Making Global Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries
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Making Global Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries
The Global Economic Governance Programme was established at University College in 2003 to foster research and debate into how global markets and institutions can better serve the needs of people in developing countries. The three core objectives of the programme are:
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to conduct and foster research into international organizations and markets as well as new public–private governance regimes; to create and maintain a network of scholars and policymakers working on these issues; and to influence debate and policy in both the public and the private sector in developed and developing countries.
The Programme is directly linked to Oxford University’s Department of Politics and International Relations and Centre for International Studies. It serves as an interdisciplinary umbrella within Oxford drawing together members of the Departments of Economics, Law, and Development Studies working on these issues and linking them to an international research network. The Programme has been made possible through the generous support of Old Members of University College. Its research projects are principally funded by the MacArthur Foundation (Chicago) and the International Development Research Centre (Ottawa).
Making Global Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries Edited by
Dana L. Brown and Ngaire Woods
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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © The several contributors 2007 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–923463–9 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Contents
List of Figures List of Tables List of Contributors
Introduction Dana L. Brown and Ngaire Woods 1. Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries David Graham and Ngaire Woods
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2. Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments? The Experience of International Financial Standards in East Asia Andrew Walter
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3. Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Corporations? The Experience of the Chemicals Industry Michael Lenox
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4. Making Disclosure Work Better: The Experience of Investor-Driven Environmental Disclosure Robert Repetto
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5. Bringing in Social Actors: Accountability and Regulation in the Global Textiles and Apparel Industry Dara O’Rourke 6. Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies John Braithwaite 7. Using International Institutions to Enhance Self-Regulation: The Case of Labor Rights in Cambodia Sandra Polaski
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Contents
8. Local Politics and the Regulation of Global Water Suppliers in South Africa Bronwen Morgan
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9. Self-Regulation in a World of States Dana L. Brown
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Index
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List of Figures
2.1. Private sector compliance costs and third-party monitoring costs
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4.1. Oil and gas company exposures
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4.2. Three-pollutant cap-and-trade, permits grandfathered
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4.3. Four-pollutant cap-and-trade, announced carbon, permits grandfathered
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4.4. Four-pollutant cap-and-trade, carbon later, permits grandfathered
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6.1. Toward an integration of restorative, deterrent, and incapacitative justice
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6.2. A responsive regulatory pyramid for a developing economy to escalate the networking of regulatory governance
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6.3. Regulatory pyramid for a developing country human rights NGO seeking to escalate networked regulation for human rights
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6.4. A network of governance in which just two nodal actors have a capacity to escalate networked regulation
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7.1. Reinspected factories: response to ILO suggestions
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7.2. Incidence and remediation of wage problems
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8.1. Private sector participation in water: South Africa
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List of Tables
2.1. Key international standards and codes
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2.2. Summary of BCBS core principles for effective banking supervision (September 1997)
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2.3. Compliance with SDDS and adoption of IAS/US GAAP, end 2003
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2.4. SDDS subscription, posting and compliance dates, selected countries and groups
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2.5. Basle CARs in selected Asian countries and the USA, 2003
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3.1. Typology of stakeholder responses to environmental externalities
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3.2. Typology of self-regulatory strategies
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4.1. Probability of a reduction in company shareholder value by more than 10% or 5%
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List of Contributors
John Braithwaite is Professor at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University and Founder of RegNet (the Regulatory Institutions Network) at the Australian National University. He works on business regulation and criminal justice, and particularly on restorative justice. He is the author of Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue, published by Federation Press. Dana L. Brown is University Lecturer in International Business at the Said Business School, University of Oxford. Her research interests focus on the way that national employment and social policies affect business strategies, particularly in developing and former communist countries. David Graham is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at University College, University of Oxford. He is researching the social and environmental regulation of multinational corporations, focusing on the role of the World Bank as a standard-setter. He has published an article in World Development, coauthored with Ngaire Woods. Michael Lenox is Associate Professor of Strategy at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He holds a secondary appointment as Associate Professor of Environmental Policy at the Nicholas School of Environment, Duke University. He has published numerous articles on corporate selfregulation. Bronwen Morgan is Professor of Socio-Legal Studies in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law at the University of Bristol, UK. Her research focuses on the political economy of regulatory reform, the intersection between regulation and social and economic human rights, and global governance, especially issues such as citizenship that link social theory and political economy. Sandra Polaski is Senior Associate and Director, Trade, Equity and Development Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Until
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List of Contributors
April 2002, she served as the US Secretary of State’s special representative for international labor affairs, the senior State Department official dealing with such matters. She recently published Winners and Losers: Impact of the Doha Round on Developing Countries (Carnegie Endowment Report). Dara O’Rourke is Associate Professor of Environmental and Labor Policy at the University of California at Berkeley. He researches the environmental, social, and equity impacts of global production systems. He is the author of Community-Driven Regulation: Balancing Development and the Environment in Vietnam, published by MIT Press. Robert Repetto is Professor in the Practice of Economics and Sustainable Development at Yale University. He has served on EPA’s Science Advisory Board and National Advisory Council on Environmental Policy and Technology, on the National Research Council’s Board on Sustainable Development and on many NRC committees. As vice president and senior economist at the World Resources Institute in Washington, DC he published numerous books and monographs on environmental policy. Andrew Walter is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Academic Director of the TRIUM Global EMBA at the London School of Economics. His research interests include the political economy of international money and finance and financial regulation. His forthcoming book is Mock Compliance: The Politics of the International Standards Project in East Asia. Ngaire Woods is Director of the Global Economic Governance Programme and University Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. Her most recent book The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers was published by Cornell University Press (2006).
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Introduction Dana L. Brown and Ngaire Woods
As companies ‘go global’, they are increasingly using factories and facilities spread across the world. But who regulates their activities in farflung corners of the world economy? In many sectors such as textiles and apparel, chemicals, and forestry, the answer is that companies regulate their own behavior through codes and standards which they agree among themselves. These codes have attracted a lot of attention by scholars who have carefully described and attested to the growth of self-regulation, detailing the number and content of codes of self-regulation and standards which have been promulgated in various sectors. Missing is an analysis of the effectiveness and impact of codes and self-regulation and how it compares to other forms of global regulation. Does corporate self-regulation work and if so under what political and economic conditions is it most likely to be effective? This question is particularly important for developing countries which tend not to be involved in the formulation of sectoral self-regulatory standards and who suffer asymmetrically from their failure—mainly because they lack the domestic regulatory structures which industrialized countries can use to make up for failures in self-regulation. Given that developing countries often have few capacities to regulate global corporations operating within their borders, this book considers some minimal forms of government action that can make global corporate self-regulation more effective. In Chapter 1 of this book, David Graham and Ngaire Woods examine whether voluntary codes of corporate conduct are a promising alternative to regulation in countries where governments have limited capacity to regulate. They review the state of the literature about selfregulation, focusing in particular on market-based pressures which alter
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the incentives on corporations to take greater account of their social and environmental impact. The analysis highlights the critical role information plays in catalyzing such pressures. For this reason, Graham and Woods closely examine voluntary disclosure regimes, highlighting the collective action problem faced by companies in respect of disclosure. The result is a strong argument for mandatory disclosure accompanied by robust enforcement. For developing countries with little capacity to regulate in the first place, this suggests that the prospects for effective self-regulation in developing countries are dim. However, drawing on another approach to understanding voluntary codes enables the authors to propose an alternative way to make corporate self-regulation more effective by leveraging local and global political and legal forums. In Chapter 2 of this book, Andrew Walter highlights the gap between sign-up to and compliance with voluntary codes. It is easy for firms or governments to sign up to voluntary codes or standards, and it is equally easy to track how many of them have done so. But this does not tell us that self-regulation is effective. Crucial is the difference between subscription and compliance. In East Asia, governments have voluntarily agreed to conform to financial codes and standards set by international organizations. However, few have actually complied with the codes and standards. This is partly because the standards were imposed by international organizations and have created unexpected high compliance costs for many domestic actors. This has produced a strong incentive for ‘mock’ compliance. Walter argues that compliance would be improved if there was more involvement of domestic actors in the initial setting of standards. Moreover, he finds that accurately to assess compliance would require engaging actors with local and specific knowledge. The overall lessons about compliance are further explored by Michael Lenox. In Chapter 3, Michael Lenox examines a different form of selfregulation promoted by the international chemicals industry. The Responsible Care Code has often been touted as a success because of its formal standards and the number of participants in the scheme. Contrary to this, Lenox finds that participants in the scheme have improved their standards more slowly than nonparticipants. Like the previous chapters, Lenox’s findings point to the vital input needed from states and local actors. Compliance difficulties in the case of Responsible Care are partly related to the problems of adequate disclosure since the lack of information makes it difficult for activists, industry members, or investors to identify real environmental laggards and hold them to account. The solution, Lenox suggests, is for states to step in to improve industry self-regulation 2
Introduction
by changing the incentives for firms to coordinate, improve disclosure, and deploy punishments and rewards. Disclosure is further examined by Robert Repetto in Chapter 4 who begins by noting the importance of disclosure for achieving compliance with environmental codes and standards. In North America, changes in the financial marketplace have brought about a revolution in disclosure requirements. On the face of it, new regulation has created strong investor-driven incentives to disclose environmental risk. However, Repetto finds that these incentives are not as strong as they seem by examining practices in three sectors. In the pulp and paper industry, there is clear evidence that environmental exposure poses financial risks to companies but that companies have failed to report financially material environmental exposure and risks. Similarly, in the oil and gas producing industry as well as in the electricity-generating industry in spite of high financial risks from environmental exposure, there is under-reporting. The key to ensuring disclosure affects compliance, argues Repetto, is strong enforcement. Companies will only disclose in an adequate and timely way if they know their disclosure requirements will be enforced. To this end, Repetto argues, state agencies need to coordinate among themselves better and to share information with investors and investment analysts. This will enhance their capacity to enforce disclosure requirements which will in turn strengthen the incentive of companies to lower their environmental exposure. In Chapter 5, Dara O’Rourke examines the conditions under which regulatory or private sector self-regulatory schemes are effective in developing countries. He draws on a comprehensive study of efforts to regulate labor conditions in the textile and apparel industry. Joint efforts between multinational firms and wide ranging multistakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have been partly effective in improving conditions in this industry. However, significant weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement exist. Thirdparty monitoring of compliance in far-flung production networks is difficult. However, O’Rourke argues that these efforts could be considerably enhanced by enlisting state and local regulatory authorities as partners, ensuring maximal local involvement in rule-setting and implementation and vastly improving the degree of information about producing factories that is gathered and disclosed. His findings strongly support the idea that coordination across a range of global, national, and local actors is essential for making current regulatory regimes more effective. In Chapter 6, the broader themes raised by O’Rourke are elaborated by John Braithwaite who applies his analytical framework of 3
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‘responsive regulation’ to the global economy and to the issue of corporate self-regulation in developing countries. For Braithwaite, responsive regulation is a realistic solution for developing countries because it requires only minimum state capacity and resources. At the core of ‘responsive regulation’ is progressively escalating regulation, with firms self-regulating as an ideal, and states stepping in with sanctions for noncompliance only in the most egregious cases. In the middle, regulation is accomplished through networks of nonstate actors. Braithwaite’s model accords a critical role to the state as the ultimate enforcement agent, but it crucially relies on other actors as well. Local actors must play a role if regulation is to be responsive and comprehensively implemented. But, the power of local actors can be greatly enhanced through networks with transnational and global actors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations tasked with upholding human rights. In his chapter here, Braithwaite provides perhaps the most pointed case for focusing on coordinated forms of regulation to overcome challenges arising from global expansion in the developing world. In Chapter 7, Sandra Polaski presents a case study of Cambodia where the involvement of governments and an international organization created a strong framework of social regulation. In Cambodia, bilateral trade relations with the USA put labor rights squarely on the government’s agenda. In that context, local workers were able to negotiate with the government to produce labor codes, with reporting requirements involving the International Labor Organization (ILO). By using its authority to grant export licenses, the Cambodian state considerably bolstered local producers’ participation in the ILO scheme at a minimal cost of resources and expertise. In brief, a particular combination of international agreements, the involvement of multilateral agencies, alongside local and national workers and government agencies made a self-regulatory regime effective. But this is not always the case. In South Africa, global water utilities companies have attempted to forge dialogue with local groups in order to improve their reputation and effectiveness. In Chapter 8, Bronwen Morgan examines this case, asking why global water companies are doing this and what particular incentives they face as they seek to invest in utilities in developing countries. Three of the factors already highlighted in the previous chapters come clearly to the fore. Changes in global rules and opportunities, actions and pressures have reconfigured corporate incentives to behave in particular ways. But equally importantly, national regulation and the emergence of new norms within South African politics have played a key role in shaping the 4
Introduction
environment to which global companies feel they must adapt. Finally, the case study gives a fascinating analysis of local politics, its divisions and dynamics, and the way a range of protest, reactions, and participation by local NGOs, some of whom are supported by transnational movements, can affect corporate behavior. There is generally agreement among the authors in this book that in order for developing countries to realize the benefits of corporate selfregulation, efforts and involvement of the state, local and international actors are required. Only then problems inherent to self-regulation such as compliance and representativeness can be overcome. But how far can self-regulation really go to resolve the complex social, environmental, and developmental problems that developing countries face? In the conclusion to this book, Dana Brown considers the extent to which selfregulatory efforts can supplement for a state role in regulating the global economy. Brown uses historical and recent evidence to argue that even in the globalized economy, states have a vital role to play in fostering economic development and growth; a role that goes beyond that which self-regulatory schemes even intend to accomplish, let alone what they can accomplish. The implication is that ‘weak’ states in the developing world need to become stronger, a fact that cannot be overlooked by international organizations and NGOs whose attention and energy are focused increasingly on bolstering self-regulatory schemes. The increasing attention to corporate self-regulation by global actors makes the contributions in this book timely. For many, self-regulation promises a solution to the key challenges of globalization. By getting corporations to check their own actions, self-regulation can contribute to more equitable growth especially in developing countries where states are often weak. At the same time, for corporations, self-regulation is a more flexible way than the imposition of state rules to address the social, environmental, and ethical issues that have become globally important. The authors of this volume do not necessarily disagree that global selfregulation holds such promise, but they provide important reminders that self-regulation is not a panacea. It is at most just a partial solution, and that only if accompanied by robust disclosure and enforcement backed by social actors and governments. In sum, global self-regulation can be made more effective only if inherent limitations are recognized and if states, local actors, and international organizations work together to overcome these limitations.
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1 Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries David Graham and Ngaire Woods
1.1. Introduction Corporate self-regulation has become dizzyingly popular. Most global companies today are signing up to codes of conduct in respect of their social and environmental impact. Many such codes are issued by individual corporations or industry associations, some involving other groups of stakeholders, committing participants to minimum standards of environmental and social conduct (Haufler 2001; Florini 2003). An inventory prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) analyzes the contents of 246 such codes across most major industry sectors and finds that environmental and labor standards were most prominent among the goals addressed, which also included commitments to protect human rights and refrain from bribery (OECD 2001). The new trend has been encouraged by several international organizations. For example, the United Nations Global Compact and the OECD through its ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ invite corporations to uphold principles of human rights, labor rights, and environmental conduct across the whole extent of their global operations (OECD 2000, United Nations Global Compact). For people in developing countries, the rise of self-regulation in global corporations offers a possible way for improving lives and livelihoods. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are playing an ever-larger role in many developing countries. At the same time, governments in these countries often have very weak capacity to regulate or uphold labor or
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Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries
environmental standards. Those same governments even when they have capacity are shy of regulating MNCs for fear of losing their investments to other countries. For this reason, the idea that multinationals will themselves accept responsibilities for uptake of corporate social responsibility seems full of promise. The most optimistic view of corporate self-regulation emerges among those who see it as a product of a new global politics which is accompanying economic globalization. On this view, self-regulation reflects a global shift in what is considered appropriate behavior for MNCs in relation to human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection. The new standard has become part of societies’ normative structure, culture, and institutions. The MNCs embedded in these societies cannot escape the new norms which define what is perceived as ‘legitimate’ and appropriate (cf. the argument applied more broadly to international law: Franck 1990). At the core of this view are NGOs and corporations playing ‘increasingly important roles in generating, deepening and implementing transnational norms in such areas as human rights, the environment and anti-corruption’ (Ruggie 2003). Nongovernmental organizations are key to the optimistic view of self-regulation. They act as norm entrepreneurs, enhancing the standing of particular causes and values and persuading others to prioritize them (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). For example, an activist NGO such as Global Witness is seen to adjust the values of business and society, ‘challenging established thinking on seemingly intractable global issues’ and establishing a central place for the promotion of peaceful and sustainable development in the business of resource extraction (http://www.globalwitness.org/vision.php). When a sufficient number of corporate leaders have been persuaded to adopt a set of emerging norms, they will reach a ‘threshold’ or ‘tipping point’ at which they come to be seen as legitimate and to specify appropriate behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Policies and procedures will then be developed to internalize these in corporations’ operational structures. A contrasting approach to explaining the rise of corporate selfregulation is rooted in theories of public choice. This view is skeptical about corporations changing their behavior because of a change in the perceived legitimacy of certain standards. Indeed, one author suggests that managers with altruistic concerns for legitimacy may be removed or else their firms will not last long in a competitive market (Lenox 2003). More fundamentally, public professions of corporate codes of
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conduct will not necessarily result in changes in actual behavior. Beyond the sign-up and content of the code, one needs to seek out evidence that corporate behavior changes with the adoption of commitments or responsibilities. Empirical studies show that in practice voluntary codes are often not implemented and that many apparent instances of self-regulation are ineffective (Lenox 2003; Lenox, Walter, and O’Rourke, in this book). These studies do not negate the possibility that self-regulation could work. But they push us to identify why and when self-regulation is effective. The answer lies in the incentives which shape the behavior of companies. To quote an Australian government task force on self-regulation: ‘For industry self-regulation to be effective, there need to be some vested interests or incentives to make it so’ (Commonwealth of Australia Department of the Treasury 2000: 48). Our question then is whether there is any change in incentives underpinning the sign-up by corporations to voluntary codes of conduct. This chapter reviews the changing incentives that give rise to the possibility of effective self-regulation in industrialized countries. To foreshadow the argument, some of these incentives are market-based, these include pressure from consumers and activists, pressures to retain and attract employees, and pressure from investors. Crucial to all of these influences is access to accurate information. However, here voluntary regimes wobble. The evidence suggests that voluntary disclosure regimes do not provide the necessary information to unleash market-based pressures on firms to improve their behavior. One step toward remedying this is to improve auditing or assurance of standards in respect of information. However, we argue (along with other authors in this book) that companies face a serious collective action problem in respect of disclosure. If any one company discloses information about its social and environmental impacts without others doing the same, it risks attracting the adverse attention it seeks to avoid. For this reason, even under the best conditions, mandatory disclosure is required to give rise to a shift in market-based incentives. Mandatory disclosure implies a necessary minimum role for governments if self-regulation is to be effective. Governments need to set standards and also to enforce them. This raises serious problems for developing countries. Many developing countries do not have bureaucratic and judicial capacity to mandate and enforce disclosure of foreign companies. Furthermore, such regulation is perceived as risky since it might discourage investors who will relocate to other countries with 8
Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries
less regulation. 1 Recall that these are the same reasons that direct social and environmental regulation is difficult for these countries. Does this mean that there is little promise of effective self-regulation in developing countries? Prospects are dim for effective self-regulation in developing countries if changes in incentives require enforced mandatory disclosure rules. But as we work through the analysis of market-incentives, there is another strand to the argument. In the final section of this chapter, we examine an alternative way to conceive of making corporate self-regulation effective in developing countries, using local and global political and legal forums.
1.2. Market-Based Incentives to Adopt Self-Regulatory Codes The markets in which MNCs operate may supply incentives to selfregulate. Demand for a company’s products, and its supply of labor and capital may all be adversely affected by poor behavior and the adverse publicity it attracts. The behavior of consumers, employees, and investors can prompt companies to undertake self-regulatory activity (Gordon 2000).
1.2.1. Pressure from Consumers and Activists Multinational corporations may be prompted to self-regulate as a direct response to consumer pressure, intensified and assisted by NGO campaigns to encourage boycotts of firms with poor social and environmental standards. Nongovernmental organizations can identify problems associated with corporate behavior and then ‘work strategically to frame these problems in a way that supports consumer understanding and action and that places responsibility on specific corporations’ (O’Rourke, ‘Market Movements’). When activists highlight an issue and encourage consumer action, the resulting damage to corporate reputation can encourage MNCs to undertake effective self-regulation of their operations in developing countries. Even the threat of consumer boycotts can be sufficient to influence corporate conduct (O’Rourke, ‘Market Movements’). 1 The evidence suggests there is less risk than imagined. While regulatory standards for some industries are driven down, in others standards converge upward or remain heterogeneous across countries (Murphy 2004). On issues such as labor standards, national approaches may remain diverse while gradually coming to recognize some minimal norms and rules (Gitterman 2004).
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The latent power of consumers, brought into action by NGO and media publicity, was important in prompting the development of voluntary regulatory standards for footwear and apparel manufacturers in Asia. A combination of activist and consumer pressure against Nike following a 1996 CBS news report revealing sweatshop conditions at a Vietnamese supplier contributed to decreases in the company’s market share and profits (Haufler 2001: 59). The impact of consumer boycotts and activism led the company to attend to the effective implementation of the code of conduct for suppliers’ labor and environmental practices which it had adopted four years earlier. It developed new internal and external monitoring tools and improved management practices and training. Nike’s principal competitors within the sports footwear industry, Reebok and Adidas, then sought to avoid the reputational damage suffered by Nike by establishing effective self-regulatory programs of their own (O’Rourke 2003).
1.2.2. Pressure to Retain and Attract Employees Within large global companies, an oft-cited influence on self-regulation is the desire to recruit and retain the most able employees. Firms with reputations tarnished by poor social and environmental behavior are likely to find it more difficult to recruit and retain employees in their home countries’ labor markets. Corporations which fail to control risks to their reputation will effectively face higher labor costs than those which are perceived as socially and environmentally responsible (Lenox 2003). A 2003 study of employees for Business In The Community found that almost half regarded it as very important that their employer take social and environmental issues seriously (Social Investment Forum 2003: 21). Shell, for instance, argues that its ‘commitment to sustainable development is an important factor in people’s decision to join and stay’ and that ‘alignment between personal values and values of staff and corporate values is a powerful motivator’ (Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies 2002: 7). Since the best graduates are particularly averse to working for corporations with poor reputations (World Economic Forum 2003: 17), a further cost may be incurred in the long run if key executive positions are filled with less able candidates.
1.2.3. Pressure from Investors Corporations can face pressure from investors to regulate the social and environmental outcomes of their business activities. For some investors, this pressure is motivated by their own ethical concerns. Others are 10
Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries
driven by the fear of potential damage to shareholder value if risks to reputation are not effectively managed. Although it remains a point of contention whether responsible conduct does in fact yield benefits for firms’ share prices (Vogel 2005: 16; Dowell et al. 2000), many institutional investors urge careful management of potential risks to corporate reputation. The Association of British Insurers, for instance, whose members account for 20 percent of investments in the London Stock Exchange (http://www.abi.org.uk) has drawn attention to the financial implications of the ‘social and environmental risks and opportunities for companies . . . in every sector’ (Cowe 2004: 4). Screened funds can be used by normatively committed investors to invest only in companies that meet their ethical standards. There is evidence that this form of investor pressure is being increasingly applied. Investments in professionally managed funds employing major socially responsible investment strategies grew substantially during the 1990s and remained at a high level through the market downturn at the start of this decade. In 2003, the total value of these investments was estimated at $2.16 trillion (Social Investment Forum 2003: 2). In the United Kingdom (UK), such funds account for an increasing proportion of overall funds under management (Davis 2004: 2). Shareholder advocacy—the use of shareholders’ voting rights to improve corporate regulatory policies—is an alternative route through which investors can exert pressure for self-regulation. It can be employed by both normatively committed investors and those who seek to maximize their returns by urging corporate attention to risks that might potentially undermine value. Some 87 percent of UK pension funds responding to a 2002 poll claimed to exercise their voting rights on grounds of social, ethical, and environmental risk (SEE) (Cowe 2004: 16). In the USA, $448 billion of professionally managed funds was used to support shareholder advocacy campaigns. Environmental advocacy has been especially prominent. In the first eight months of 2003, 28 shareholder resolutions were moved in US corporations on issues relating to climate change, 7 of which received support from over 20 percent of shareholders. Shareholder campaigns have been effective in bringing about corporate self-regulation. For instance, pressure organized by union pension funds pushed the California-based energy corporation Unocal to adopt the commitments of the ILO’s ‘Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’, including the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Market pressures are, however, limited in their scope and effectiveness. In particular, they do not always address the issues of most relevance 11
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to MNCs’ operations in developing countries and are less effective in changing the behavior of firms without prominent brands. Much ‘ethical’ consumer activity is not targeted at improving conditions in developing countries. Organic produce and free-range eggs are among the most prominent ‘ethical’ purchases (Co-operative Bank 2001: 18). Products, such as energy-efficient appliances, unleaded petrol and renewable electricity which reflect a concern with the global environment, may show little concern about local environmental impacts of companies’ operations in developing countries. Fairly traded coffee, tea and fruit, and sustainable timber can have positive social and environmental conditions in developing countries. But high profile boycotts and campaigns such as those against Shell for human rights abuses in Nigeria and against Nike for poor labor conditions in Asia may be an exception rather than the rule. Similarly, ethically screened funds can incorporate a very wide range of normative concerns, many of which may not be relevant to controlling the potentially damaging effects of corporate activity in developing countries. Labor standards and the environment are among the most significant screens deployed by US mutual funds, being the third and fourth most prevalent respectively. But screens against investment in tobacco and alcohol each account for more than three times as much investment capital as either the labor rights or environmental screens, and human rights concerns are still less prevalent among screened funds (Social Investment Forum 2003: 9–10). Pressure from consumers is likely to be felt strongly only by firms which directly face the mass market and are highly visible, selling products with which they are strongly identified by branding (Haufler 2001: 70). The campaign against Nike relied on the ease with which the brand could be targeted as well as the significance of the brand’s reputation to the company’s value (O’Rourke 2003). Nestlé’s mass-market foodstuff sales could be targeted with relative ease following concerns over the company’s aggressive marketing of breast-milk substitutes in the developing world (Sikkink 1986). In the visibly branded and mass market-facing oil industry, Shell and its principal European rival BP each developed their own self-regulatory systems. In industries which do not face the mass market, however, it may be more difficult for consumers and ethical investors to become accurately aware of a firm’s poor conduct. Even if accurately informed, they may lack information about which brands and products they should boycott in order to sanction the company. Thus, the responsiveness of a small number of corporations with prominent, reputation-sensitive brands ‘may not tell us much about the potential to 12
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influence production and consumption that falls outside this top tier of consumption’ (O’Rourke, ‘Market Movements’). Market-based incentives will not, therefore, apply to all MNCs nor to all issues relevant to their conduct in developing countries. Pressures from consumers, investors, and the labor market can all play a role in mitigating damage to the risks to the environment, human rights, and labor rights of some MNC activity in the developing world. But there will not always be a business case for self-regulation (Vogel 2005: 73). The question then—for firms, NGOs, governments, and international organizations—is how to respond to the limitations of market-driven self-regulation.
1.3. Improving Information to Catalyze Market-Based Incentives One set of responses to the problems of market-driven self-regulation attempts to enhance self-regulation by making market-based incentives work better. In particular, firms and governments have sought to address the need for market actors to be extensively informed about corporate activities in order to bring effective pressure for self-regulation to bear. An adequate supply of accurate information about corporate behavior is essential if market-based incentives to self-regulate are to work properly. Without it, the informed decision-making by potential and actual investors, consumers, and employees on which market-based incentives rely is not possible. When information is sporadic and unreliable they cannot assess a company’s performance, comparing it with its own claims and aspirations and with the performance of its competitors. The effect of market-based incentives on MNCs’ conduct in developing countries will therefore depend on securing reliable and comprehensive disclosure of relevant corporate information. This presents a challenge. Legally, companies enjoy an assumption that information they hold is confidential except where its disclosure is specifically mandated. The trend in many developed states toward openness with regard to government information has not extended to corporate information. In the UK, for instance, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 introduced a general right of access to information held by public authorities, limited by various exemptions. No such right exists in relation to information held by companies. Despite the blurring of boundaries between private and public, as the delivery of public services is reformed, corporate information continues to enjoy a privileged 13
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status of confidentiality, on the grounds of commercial sensitivity. Even information about companies held by public authorities is liable to be exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act if it would prejudice commercial interests (FOI Act 2000). This situation may be particularly anomalous with regard to MNCs’ activities in developing countries, where attempts at socially responsible conduct frequently involve private companies undertaking functions—such as the provision of transport, education, and health infrastructure—traditionally associated with governments. Nevertheless, information about these activities enjoys a presumption of confidentiality. If market actors are to be properly informed, information must either be disclosed voluntarily or else specific legal requirements for disclosure must be introduced.
1.3.1. Voluntary Disclosure Pressure from stakeholders for responsible conduct may itself induce companies to release information to demonstrate their good performance (Blacconiere and Patten 1994). For instance, in the late 1990s, Shell responded to the pressure of NGO campaigns and consumer boycotts over its human rights and environmental records by introducing an annual report on its social and environmental performance. The earliest examples of these reports were constructed around an argued defense of the company’s record in implementing its Business Principles. Data supplied in the report was selected to support the case being argued (Royal Dutch/ Shell Group of Companies 1998). The reporting of data that is entirely self-selected and unverified does little to prevent unscrupulous firms creating a misleading impression. Combined with voluntary codes loudly proclaiming lofty aspirations, voluntary reporting can help firms control their reputation without actually changing their behavior. Companies can buy reputational benefits cheaply by adopting voluntary standards or codes but avoiding the costly steps required to implement them. However, they risk a backlash if their duplicity is exposed. As has been noted, many institutional investors have encouraged firms to manage carefully potential risks to their reputation. These investors recognize that the reporting of good news alone does not enable them to form a reliable view of the risks faced by a company. They have exhorted companies to disclose information enabling investors to identify material risks and assess companies’ steps to address them. Disclosure Guidelines issued in October 2001 by the Association of British Insurers recommend that annual reports should ‘include information 14
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on SEE related risks and opportunities that may significantly affect the company’s short and long-term value’ (Association of British Insurers 2001). Some firms have responded by moving beyond the reporting of good news stories to publication of data which measures performance through specific indicators. Shell, for instance, worked to develop ‘increasingly verifiable measures of the performance of Shell companies against the [Shell Business] Principles’. Over several years more such measures were introduced to its annual social and environmental reports. While these continued to stress Shell’s aspirations and positive performance, the increasing quantitative content provided readers with data from which to draw their own conclusions, note shortcomings, and monitor changes in performance from year to year.
1.3.2. Improving the Comparability of Voluntary Disclosure Reporting of company performance through specific indicators is an important development in corporate disclosure. Market-based incentives to self-regulate will be most effective when these indicators are standardized across firms. Investors, customers, and employees do not merely judge a company’s performance in isolation. Each set of stakeholders faces choices in their respective markets: consumers a choice of products to buy, a choice of where to invest capital, and a choice of where to supply labor. The reporting of financial data to investors mandated by governments requires each company to provide standard information not only because it is deemed important in judging the merits of a company’s individual performance but because it enables comparison between companies. Similarly, social and environmental performance is best communicated in an easily comparable form, with firms reporting their performance through standard indicators. Standard indicators also help overcome a disincentive to full disclosure of relevant performance information. Any one firm attempting balanced disclosure of information that reveals weaknesses as well as strengths faces the risk that their bad news will be seized upon while more secretive competitors are let off the hook. If standard indicators are available and widely accepted, it becomes more obvious if a firm seeks to hide poor performance by failing to report certain performance indicators. The importance of accurate comparison of disclosures between firms has led to recent attempts to develop standardized voluntary reporting indicators which permit investors to form reliable comparative judgments of different firms’ exposure to risks. Governments and international organizations have supported these efforts. The Global Reporting 15
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Initiative (GRI) is a particularly important development in voluntary standardized reporting by companies. Initiated in 1997, it responded to the profusion of inconsistent approaches to social and environmental reporting (GRI 2002: 4). It aims to improve the ‘comparability, consistency, and utility’ of reporting through the development of standard indicators, detailed in its Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI 2002: 9). The indicators specify information to be provided in six categories: direct economic impacts, environmental impacts, labor practices and decent work, human rights, society, and product responsibility (GRI 2002: 36). Environmental reporting includes information on biodiversity and on the levels of emissions, effluent, and waste. Although the labor practices indicators focus on industrial relations between labor and management, they also include health and safety reporting. More fundamental aspects of labor rights, including the use of child labor and forced labor, are covered by the human rights indicators which also include indicators for impacts on indigenous rights. The society indicators include information relating to bribery and corruption and political contributions (GRI 2002: 50–5). The indicators are underpinned by principles of identifying information relevant to sustainability concerns and reporting it fully, accurately, and clearly. Firms are required to report ‘all information that is material to users for assessing the reporting organisation’s economic, environmental, and social performance’ and can then refer to their reporting as being ‘in accordance’ with GRI guidelines (GRI 2002: 26). There is some evidence that the ‘incremental approach’ envisioned in the GRI approach—whereby companies are encouraged to apply at least some of the guidelines and to work incrementally toward fuller compliance—is effective. In its 2002 ‘Environment and Social Report’, BP recognized the value of the GRI indicators but gave reasons for not following the guidelines to structure BP’s reporting. By 2003, the BP ‘Sustainability Report’ provided extensive reporting of the GRI indicators and indexed all the core indicators, pointing to the forms in which each was reported and declaring when an indicator was not reported or covered only in part (BP 2004: 46–7). The GRI indicators, incorporated in reports respecting the GRI principles, offer a strong prospect of escaping the problems of anecdote and incomparability that have dogged reporting of environmental and social impacts. Though much relevant information remains qualitative and cannot easily be expressed quantitatively (as the GRI indicators recognize), standardized reporting facilitates systematic interfirm and intertemporal comparisons. 16
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1.3.3. Enhancing the Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure Voluntary disclosure, to be effective, must be credible. Corporate financial reporting is subject to detailed legal requirements for audit and verification, designed to assist stakeholders in judging its accuracy and reliability. But in spite of incentives to provide convincingly audited disclosures to stakeholders to show that risk has been adequately managed, the adoption of independent monitoring of environmental, human rights, and labor rights information remains limited. In 2002, just 36 of the FTSE 250 companies had their environmental and social reports independently audited (Maitland 2002). Environmental and social auditing, when it does take place, faces particular difficulties. When companies report on their finances, their accounts are audited in a highly formalized process aimed at ascertaining whether the reporting conforms ‘in all material aspects’ to ‘an identified reporting framework’ (OECD 2001: 11). Statutory controls and formal standards remove discretion from the auditor and require professional standards of expertise and independence of judgment (OECD 2001: 11). In respect of nonfinancial reporting, there have been few such statutory controls, presenting the risk that nonfinancial auditors or monitors face unbalanced incentives to err toward favorable treatment of their clients. Independence and appropriate expertise are vital qualities of auditing bodies but have been especially difficult to achieve for social and environmental monitoring. Even when monitoring is carried out by bodies external to the reporting corporation, its independence can be undermined if the monitors are paid by the corporation being audited. An examination of labor standards monitoring in China and Korea by Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) found ‘significant and seemingly systematic biases’ in the auditors’ methodologies which ‘call into question the company’s very ability to conduct monitoring that is truly independent’ (O’Rourke 2000). The problems encountered by PwC are likely also to be symptomatic of the difficulties faced by monitors with experience of financial audits adapting to the necessarily very different methods and objectives of environmental and social auditing. Unguided by auditing standards, monitoring will struggle to achieve the credibility that it seeks to provide to the reporting of corporations’ environmental, human rights, and labor rights performance. An OECD report on making corporate codes of conduct work effectively identifies the need for formal auditing standards for social and environmental monitoring which echo the processes used in financial
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auditing. Formal standards remove discretion from the auditor and ‘reinforce its claim to be acting independently of the firm being audited’. Further, auditing standards make it easier for all stakeholders ‘to determine whether the audit has been done competently’ (OECD 2001: 11). A notable attempt to develop such standards has been made by the Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility, a membership association of a range of stakeholders including corporations, NGO advocacy groups, business service firms, and researchers. Established in 1996, by March 2004 it comprised over 300 members in 20 countries (see http://www.accountability.org.uk). Noting that the credibility achieved by ‘robust external Assurance’ is ‘a prerequisite for more effective sustainability Reporting’, in March 2003 it introduced the AccountAbility AA1000 Assurance Standard as a ‘non-proprietary, open-source assurance standard’ for nonfinancial audits (Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility 2003: 3–4). The AA1000 Assurance Standard is designed to address auditors’ ‘need for a single approach that effectively deals with the qualitative as well as quantitative data that makes up sustainability performance plus the systems that underpin the data and performance’ (see http://www.accountability.org.uk). Three assurance principles form the core of the assurance standard. Reporting should be assessed against requirements of materiality, completeness, and responsiveness. The assurance provider must state whether the reporting firm has included in its report all material information ‘required by its Stakeholders for them to be able to make informed judgements, decisions and actions’. It must assess the degree of completeness to which the reporting company can identify and understand what are the material aspects of its environmental and social performance. Finally, the auditor must ascertain whether the reporting firm has ‘responded to Stakeholder concerns, policies and relevant standards, and adequately communicated these responses’ (Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility 2003: 15–18). The principle of materiality points to a particularly helpful advance in the standards of nonfinancial auditing. It notes that firms’ reporting should be assessed for the extent to which it includes information about performance against statutory requirements as well as policies promulgated by the firm or industry association. Attention should also be given, the principle states, to conceptions of materiality held by a firm’s peers as well as to the expressed views and perceptions of stakeholders (Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility 2003: 16–17). Attention to supplying material information can serve to sway social and environmental 18
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reporting away from ‘good news’ stories and force audited reports to address frankly the risks to which companies remain exposed. Ernst and Young’s assurance report on BP’s sustainability reporting for 2003 was carried out in accordance with the AA1000 Assurance Standard. In its assessment of materiality, the auditor drew attention to the omission of information about legal liabilities faced by the company in connection with its participation in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline project. The audit also emphasized the importance of further reporting of BP’s attempts to manage its own reputational risk by encouraging its suppliers to behave consistently with its policies (BP 2004: 42). The AA1000 standard is a potentially significant development in enhancing the quality of nonfinancial auditing corporate reporting on activities in the developing world. Where reporting of MNCs’ environmental, human rights, and labor rights behavior is carried out in accordance with standardized guidelines, and independently audited according to standardized monitoring guidelines, consumers and investors are more likely to have access to sufficient information about companies’ performance to make reliable judgments of their conduct.
1.3.4. The Limits of Voluntary Disclosure The development of the GRI and the AA1000 standard both indicate the role of a diverse group of stakeholders, including activist NGOs, in developing standardized reporting to ensure transparency of information about corporate conduct. But although more large corporations are undertaking reporting of environmental and social performance, many remain resistant. Some 750 organizations worldwide used the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines in 2005. This number includes a significant number of large MNCs, including BP and Shell, Ford and General Motors, alongside smaller domestic businesses (see http://www.globalreporting.org/guidelines/companies.asp). But, despite pressure from institutional investors to report in accordance with the guidelines (GRI Activities Report 2004), this remains a tiny fraction of the total number of MNCs. Of the firms whose social and environmental reporting is audited in accordance with the AA1000 standard, most are based in the UK. Some, such as BP, British American Tobacco and United Utilities, are large MNCs with extensive operations in developing countries (British American Tobacco 2003; United Utilities 2003); others, though, are primarily domestic companies. In general, the ‘business case’ for voluntary reporting has not yet proved strong enough to persuade 19
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many large MNCs to take part. Research in the UK in 2002 showed that although 50 of the FTSE 250 index of the country’s largest companies had reported for the first time in 2001–2, still only 103 companies produced substantial environmental or social reports. Eighty-seven firms supplied short notes in their annual reports while the remainder provided very limited data without detail (Maitland 2002). As a result, many NGOs have focused not on developing voluntary standards but on advocating mandatory disclosure requirements imposed by states.
1.3.5. Mandatory Disclosure A clear prerequisite for corporate self-regulatory codes to be effective is disclosure. But as mentioned above, companies are unlikely to disclose in any meaningful way unless their reporting is mandated by government. There is a collective action problem. If one company were to publish extensive information on their compliance (or inability to comply) but rival companies did not, then the most transparent company would likely suffer as rivals, regulators, and NGOs used the disclosures to their own advantage. Mandatory disclosure requirements set by government regulatory authorities in MNCs’ home countries can oblige firms to disclose standardized information on environmental, labor rights, and human rights performance in a similar way to the requirements for disclosure of financial information in annual reports. This opens up the possibility of legal redress for misstatements—a more robust incentive that exists in self-regulatory reporting (see http://www.foe.org/corporatesunshine/faq. html). Indeed, for this reason recent campaigns by NGOs have sought to expand the scope of mandatory disclosure requirements in both the UK and the USA. In the UK, the ‘CORE’ coalition of forty NGOs, including Amnesty UK, Christian Aid, Friends of the Earth, trade unions and church groups, has pressed for more demanding disclosure requirements (see www.foe.co.uk/ campaigns/corporates/core/news/index.html). CORE worked with sympathetic MPs to develop the ‘Performance of Companies and Government Departments (Reporting) Bill’, which would require the directors of a company to include information in their annual reports on the impact of the company’s operations, policies, products, and procurement practices in relation to employment, the environment, and social and community issues when they consider such information to be material to providing 20
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a fair review of the company’s financial performance (Performance of Companies and Government Departments (Reporting) Bill). Although more than 300 MPs signed an Early Day Motion supporting the Bill’s aims, the government blocked further consideration of the Bill on January 30, 2004 (see www.foe.co.uk/campaigns/corporates/core/index.html). Requirements to disclose social and environmental performance were also discussed under the rubric of the Department of Trade and Industry’s 2002 White Paper ‘Modernizing Company Law’ which set out the government’s intention to expand the scope of mandatory disclosure requirements by necessitating preparation of an Operating and Financial Review (OFR) in the Annual Reports of listed companies. In 2004, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry described this as a measure to ensure that ‘our largest businesses report fairly and transparently on the factors which affect them, including their impact on the environment and society’ (FT March 14, 2004). In the end, however, the reporting is voluntary. Company directors were, from 2006, to have been obliged to consider including information affecting the company’s reputation and details of corporate policies and performance on the environment, employment, and social issues. However, the proposed regulations would have restricted directors’ obligations to considering inclusion, and only when they judged these issues to be material to a company’s financial performance (Cowe 2004: 15). In the USA, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires reporting of certain known risks and nonfinancial trends that might affect future financial results. It mandates disclosure ‘where a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently known to management and reasonably likely to have material effects on the registrant’s financial condition or results of operations’ (SEC regulations quoted in Repetto 2003). At present risks and trends for which disclosure is mandated are restricted to environmental liabilities, labor relations, and legal proceedings and exclude entirely human rights and workers’ health and safety (see www.foe.org/corporatesunshine/faq.html). Pressure for further change in the USA is being brought to bear by a coalition of NGOs called the ‘Corporate Sunshine Working Group’ (CSWG) which aims to address the perceived inadequacy of information about corporate risks available to institutional investors. The coalition includes Friends of the Earth and the World Resources Institute, institutional investors, and trade unions. They support the voluntary GRI standards but argue that without statutory regulation investors will not receive adequate information. Hence, their proposal for an expansion of 21
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the SEC’s mandatory disclosure requirements for social and environmental information focusing on items of particular material significance to financial value (Corporate Sunshine Working Group 2001). Mandatory disclosure requirements are just half the picture. The other half is enforcement. Companies have to know that they will be punished for failing to disclose—and that their competitors will be similarly punished for noncompliance. Yet robust enforcement is difficult even in industrialized governments. This was highlighted by a US government audit of that country’s implementation of a Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Points strategy applied to seafood. The government audit found that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) simply could not keep up with the necessary level of reviews and monitoring (General Accounting Office 2001). Similar results have been found in other industries (Coglianese and Lazer 2003). Another study shows that in the period 1975–2000 the SEC brought only three administrative proceedings and one civil action for inadequate environmental risk disclosures (Repetto 2003). A study by the US Environmental Protection Agency showed that 74 percent of companies do not meet SEC rules in their disclosure of environmental information (see www.foe.org/corporatesunshine/index.html). In many other countries, the record of disclosure against statutory requirements was even worse (Repetto 2003). A history of low levels of compliance with statutory obligations and of limited efforts by statutory bodies to enforce their requirements argues for caution in identifying the potential achievements of mandatory disclosure in regulating social and environmental outcomes in the global economy. In developing countries the enforcement of mandatory disclosure requirements is likely to be yet more difficult. For a start, many MNCs are registered on stock markets in their home countries. This means that disclosure requirements of securities regulators in developing states will have little effect on them (although they may be able to address the behavior of joint ventures and subsidiary companies). Equally, investors ‘back home’ are unlikely to access or respond to reporting about the operations of individual plants, although clear and standardized reporting will permit investors, consumers, and the like to bring pressure to bear toward compliance. This means that even where there is mandatory disclosure, it will not necessarily provide an incentive for MNCs to comply with self-regulatory codes in their operations in developing countries. For this reason, we need to examine other possible government actions which shift incentives. 22
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1.4. Reinforcing Self-Regulation by Nonmarket Means Outside of market-based pressures, there are other ways to create incentives for compliance with self-regulation or with mandatory disclosure requirements. In countries without capacity to regulate, social forces can buttress the role of governments in enforcing disclosure and promoting compliance with voluntary codes. For example, statutory disclosure programs have been effective in reducing environmental damage by companies in developing countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America (World Bank 2000). Notably, such programs have been highly dependent on wellorganized community groups in the immediate vicinity of polluting (or otherwise noncompliant) plants which encourage enforcement of disclosure requirements and use the resulting information to exert pressure on companies for improved performance (World Bank 2000: 59). Put simply, local activists can complement the actions of government as part of making self-regulation work.
1.4.1. Need NGOs—Expectations, Aspirations, and Culture Under what conditions are we most likely to find social action or social enforcement of standards by nonstate groups? Social organizations and NGOs sometimes face barriers created by firms, governments, and resources such as when their organizations or activities are banned, systematically disrupted, or otherwise strongly discouraged. A first condition for NGOs to be effective is for national laws which ensure the freedom to organize and mobilize by upholding rights to associate as workers or consumers and the right to freedom of speech and the capacity to publish (in independent media) criticisms of the actions of companies. More broadly, activism by civil society requires expectations on the part of citizens for better lives or treatment, which can themselves be generated by government policy. Finally, government agencies can provide a crucial focal point and important target for those wishing to uphold standards expressed in government or corporate policy.
1.4.2. Rights/Focal Points of Those Crucial in bolstering the capacity of governments and leveraging transparency is civil society or organized groups which bring together concerned or affected citizens. Such groups have typically played a central 23
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role in pressing for information, monitoring the information, and publicizing noncompliance. Yet these groups do not organize or act in a vacuum. Their activities are greatly affected by government policy and institutions. Two examples highlight this. In Vietnam, laws and institutions for environmental protection created a framework within which communities organized and channeled complaints to regulatory agencies. The result has been labeled ‘community-driven regulation’ and highlights the importance of government-created institutional frameworks for mobilizing and channeling social pressures (O’Rourke 2004). A rather different example is afforded by the experience of water privatization in South Africa where government policy created expectations that citizens would have particular kinds of rights to water. That policy combined with local institutions to set up a framework within which local communities have held private companies taking over water systems strongly to account (Morgan 2004). Thus far we have highlighted important ways governments might shift incentives faced by MNCs; in this final section, we examine whether international institutions, actors, and standards might bolster or support such actions. Typically, international law has played a rather weak role. Human rights, environmental standards, and such like are covered by international treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO’s Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development, all of which commit governments to respect standards to which they have jointly agreed. None apply directly to corporations and firms. None are directly enforced by legal actions or sanctions. The proposed adoption by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights of ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (United Nations, Economic and Social Council 2003) has highlighted firms’ fear of an expansion of the coercive regulatory burden (Eaglesham 2004). Though the exact legal status of the document is disputed, business associations have argued that it may impose specific, enforceable legal obligations on MNCs. In their campaign against adoption of the document, the United States Council for International Business has drawn attention to the development of many voluntary codes for the good conduct of business toward human rights (United States Council For International Business 2003b). The UNCIB aims to use evidence of ongoing voluntary regulation to alleviate political pressure for coercive standards and convince governments on the UN Commission on Human Rights not 24
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to adopt the ‘Norms’ document (United States Council For International Business 2003a). Though attempts to impose statutory regulation through agreement in the UN remain some way from fruition, they indicate a possible strengthening of international incentives for MNCs to continue and strengthen self-regulatory undertakings. The weaknesses in international law in upholding public goods and social standards look particularly striking when we compare them with the specific and enforceable sets of rights enjoyed by investors against the rights of government to regulate economic activity within their borders. The legitimate regulatory aspirations of governments have long been pitted against the desire of investors to enjoy some guarantee against illegitimate interference or expropriation. This issue was hotly debated in the UN in 1974 when developing countries passed a resolution in the General Assembly entitled a Charter of Rights and Duties of States which strongly reinforced the rights of governments to regulate within their borders. Since that time companies and industries have lobbied successfully for their rights to be protected in an enforceable way. The protection of investors is entrenched in bilateral investment treaties (or Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements), through the 1965 Washington Convention which created the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the specific agreements on TRIPS, TRIMS. In these instruments, we find that states have bound themselves to treat investments fairly and equitably, to give them full security and protection, and to guarantee against unlawful expropriation. Investors have increasingly sought to use these provisions not just against government policies which aim to expropriate them, but equally against any government policies which affect their profitability. As one eminent international lawyer concludes, the ‘fair and equitable’ standard of treatment has taken on a life of its own with ‘an exceptionally wide interpretation . . . greatly favouring investors’ (Lowe 2002: 455). He argues that there must be a category of government actions which are so far removed from deliberate interference with investments that, even though committed by the government and even though they entail losses to investors, they should be beyond the reach of investment-protection treaties. The very fact of this argument highlights the extent to which international law has shifted to endorse investors’ rights. Alongside these muscular and enforceable protections of the rights of companies, the existing multilateral regime of constraints remains weak. 25
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Those who have tried to balance investors’ rights with those of local communities have found several difficulties. An illuminating case is proffered by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1992 which requires pharmaceutical companies to share some benefit with local communities from whom they seek ‘traditional knowledge’ and remedies as a shortcut toward the research and development of new products (Hayden 2003a; see also Hayden 2003b). A further degree of protection of local know-how has also been attempted in WIPO initiatives on the protection of traditional knowledge. The CBD creates responsibilities on investors (in this case pharmaceutical companies) to direct some benefits to the local communities whose labors and knowledge they are exploiting. On the other side of the coin, the CBD treaty enshrines rights for investors to work without unreasonable restriction. Yet the Convention has had problems on both sides. The USA has steadfastly opposed it on the grounds that it contravenes rights acquired by commercial actors in the WTO and in TRIPS. From the local communities’ side, the treaty regime has provoked problems and tensions at the local level which have made it difficult constructively to channel its benefits (United States Council For International Business 2003a). Softer international conventions and commitments do not create robustly enforceable rights, yet as we noted at the outset of this chapter, there is a strong argument that they have other effects which contribute to the effectiveness of self-regulatory systems. International standards assist in mobilizing civil society within and across countries by creating standards and expectations that such standards might be upheld (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This is captured in the UN Global Compact which seeks to encourage learning and best practice among participating companies who have all committed to existing international standards on human rights, environmental protection, and suchlike. Finally, international cooperation and institutions are being turned to by both governments and international firms who face increasing pressures to provide public goods. As discussed earlier, individual developing country governments fear competition by other countries competitively devaluing their corporate governance requirements so as to attract investment. Here interstate agreements and cooperation can assist in leveling the playing field. Meanwhile international companies—most obviously in oil and gas exploration—are increasingly finding that in many countries and regions they are being required to take on public goods responsibilities. The provision of security, health, education, and other elements crucial for a community to function is falling to multinationals who need 26
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to create an environment within which they can work but have little expertise or capacity to take on these public goods functions. For this reason, international firms need effective cooperation between governments, development agencies, international aid arrangements, and other investors. That cooperation can in turn be fine-tuned better to enhance the effectiveness of appropriate government regulation and corporate selfregulation.
1.5. Conclusion This chapter set out to examine the conditions under which corporate self-regulation might be effective in developing countries. Our analysis of market pressures highlights the importance of information, transparency, and disclosure——prerequisites for holding corporations to account for their pledges of self-restraint or voluntary compliance. Yet corporate commitments of transparency and disclosure are not sufficient. Market pressures create too many alternative incentives and collective action problems within industry. Companies may simply find it rational to continue life as before with a little more investment in public relations. If disclosure is to alter the incentives faced by firms, governments need to mandate and enforce it. Furthermore, because of the unevenness of market responses to disclosure, transparency will not always shift incentives better to meet the social goals and public goods to which governments aspire. This is particularly true where firms are operating in developing countries—far from the eyes of their headquarters, regulators, and investors. That being the case, we have nevertheless explored measures which might strengthen the incentives faced by corporations to comply with their own codes of self-regulation. Although developing country governments are weak, there are three factors which together might enhance the effectiveness of self-regulatory codes in developing countries. The first is disclosure—a prerequisite for the market and other social pressures outlined in this chapter. Governments need to mandate standards of disclosure and to work with partner governments in investor home countries to enforce such standards. We have not detailed what forms international or cross-border enforcement of disclosure standards might take. However, we see this as an important question of law and governance at the global level. A second important force toward compliance with self-regulatory codes is social pressure. Local mobilization can draw attention to noncompliance and bolster the 27
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position of regulators vis-à-vis investors. This does not mean governments have little role to play. Far from it, social mobilization is likely to be most effective where governments uphold freedoms of association and speech, and create institutions which can respond to social pressures. Finally, international institutions and instruments are important in creating conditions for effective self-regulation. At present, trade and investment treaties create an unbalanced system which robustly protects the rights of foreign investors (who in turn have strong commercial incentives to enforce those rights). The correlate responsibilities of investors toward workers, consumers, and communities are much weaker. That legislation and the interpretation of investor rights need careful re-examination. In the interim, we have noted that even the unenforceable soft law standards play a role in helping to mobilize social pressures within and across states. That pressure, however, depends heavily on governments providing the necessary framework for disclosure and social mobilization.
References Association of British Insurers (2001). ‘Disclosure Guidelines on Socially Responsible Investment’, http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/framegu.html Blacconiere, W. G. and Patten, D. M. (1994). ‘Environmental Disclosures, Regulatory Costs, and Changes in Firm Value’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(3): 357–77. BP (2004). Defining Our Path: Sustainability Report 2003. British American Tobacco (2003). ‘Social Report 2002/3’. Coglianese, C. and Lazer, D. (2003). ‘Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals’, Law and Society Review, 37(4): 691– 730. Commonwealth of Australia Department of the Treasury (2000). ‘Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation Draft Report’. Co-operative Bank (2001). ‘Who Are the Ethical Consumers?’, http://www.cooperativebank.co.uk/downloads/ethics/ethics_whoconsumers1.pdf Corporate Sunshine Working Group (2001). ‘Proposed Expanded SEC Disclosure Schedule—Draft’, http://www.foe.org/corporatesunshine/proposedisclosure.pdf Cowe, R. (2004). ‘Risk Returns and Responsibility’, Association of British Insurers, February. http://www.abi.org.uk Davis, P. (2004). ‘Marketplace: Ethical Funds Hit High’, Financial Times, March 1. Dowell, G., Hart, S., and Yeung, B. (2000). ‘Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy Market Value?’, Management Science, 46: 1059–74. Eaglesham, J. (2004). ‘Business Calls for Action on Human Rights Liability Plan’, Financial Times, March 8.
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Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in Developing Countries Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 30(4). Florini, A. (2003). ‘Business and Global Governance: The Growing Role of Corporate Codes of Conduct’, Brookings Review, Spring (6). Franck, T. M. (1990). The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. New York: Oxford University Press. Freedom of Information Act (2000). http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2000/ 20000036.htm General Accounting Office (2001). ‘Federal Oversight of Seafood Does Not Sufficiently Protect Consumers’, Report to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, US Senate, GAO-01-204. Gitterman, D. P. (2004). ‘A Race to the Bottom, A Race to the Top, or the March to a Minimum Floor? Economic Integration and Labor Standards in a Comparative Perspective’, in D. Vogel and R. Kagan (eds), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National Regulatory Policies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), ‘Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/ (2002). ‘Sustainability Reporting Guidelines’, http://www.globalreporting. org/guidelines/2002/GRI_guidelines_print.pdf (2004). ‘Activities Report 2004’, http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonl yres/3D7598C9-2136-4486-BF6A-425712A54353/0/ActivitiesReport2004.pdf Gordon, K. (2000). ‘Rules for the Global Economy: Synergies Between Voluntary and Binding Approaches’, Working Papers on International Investment 1999/3. Paris: OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs. Haufler, V. (2001). A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Hayden, C. (2003a). ‘Benefit-Sharing: Experiments in Governance’, Prepared for the SSRC Workshop Intellectual Property, Markets, and Cultural Flows, New York, NY, October 24–5. (2003b). ‘From Market to Market: Bioprospecting’s Idioms of Inclusion’, American Ethnologist, 30(3): 359–71. Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility (2003). ‘AA 1000 Assurance Standard’, http://www.accountability.org.uk Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lenox, M. J. (2003). ‘The Prospects for Industry Self-Regulation of Environmental Externalities’, Working Paper, October. Lowe, V. (2002). ‘Regulation or Expropriation’, Current Legal Problems, 55: 447– 66. Maitland, A. (2002). ‘Rise in Environmental Reporting’, Financial Times, July 29. Morgan, B. (2004). ‘Global Business, Local Constraints: The Case of Water in South Africa’, Manuscript.
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David Graham and Ngaire Woods Murphy, D. D. (2004). ‘The Business Dynamics of Global Regulatory Competition’, in D. Vogel and R. Kagan (eds), Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects Nationonal Regulatory Policies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. OECD, Working Party on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2000). ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Review 2000’, DAFFE/IME/WPG, (9), September 11. OECD, Working Party of the Trade Committee (2001). ‘Codes of Corporate Conduct—An Expanded Review of Their Contents’, TD/TC/WP(99)56/FINAL, June 7. O’Rourke, D. (2000). ‘Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) Labor Monitoring’, Unpublished manuscript.http://web.mit. edu/dorourke/www/PDF/pwc.pdf (2003). ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring’, Policy Studies Journal, 31(1): 1–29. (2004). ‘Motivating a Conflicted Environmental State: Community-driven regulation in Vietnam’, Manuscript. Performance of Companies and Government Departments (Reporting) Bill. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmbills/027/2004027.pdf Repetto, R. (2003). ‘Protecting Investors and the Environment through Financial Disclosure’, Paper Presented at the Environment Canada Policy Research Seminar Series, November 17. Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies (1998). ‘Profits and Principles—Does There Have to be a Choice?: The Shell Report 1998’. (2002). ‘People, Planet and Profits: The Shell Report 2001’, http://www. shell.com/static/royal-en/downloads/shell_report_2001.pdf Ruggie, J. G. (2003). ‘Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection’, in D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. Sikkink, K. (1986). ‘Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code’, International Organization, 40(4): 815–40. Social Investment Forum (2003). ‘2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States’, December. http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/ research/trends/sri_trends_report_2003.pdf United Nations, Economic and Social Council (2003). ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, August 26. United States Council for International Business (2003a). ‘Corporate Responsibility Committee: Status Report on the draft Human Rights Code of Conduct’, http://209.238.219.111/USCIB-text-Status-Report.htm (2003b). ‘Talking Points on the Draft: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’, http://209.238.219.111/USCIB-text-Talking-Points-htm United Utilities (2003). ‘Corporate Responsibility Report 2003’.
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2 Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments? The Experience of International Financial Standards in East Asia Andrew Walter
Can there be a worldwide ‘race to the top’ in financial regulatory practices? The G7 countries and the international financial institutions (IFIs) would seem to assume so. In recent years, they have actively promoted the adoption of a set of voluntary international standards and codes on the grounds that worldwide convergence on ‘best practice’ in macroeconomic policy and regulation is both possible and desirable. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), established in the wake of the emerging market crises of the late 1990s, refers to the twelve ‘key standards’ listed on its website as ‘the various economic and financial standards that are internationally accepted as important for sound, stable and well functioning financial systems’. 1 The FSF, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, has been tasked by the G7 countries with the active promotion of international standards and codes so as to encourage better self-regulation in the major emerging market countries. I term this effort the ‘international standards project’. 2 The origin of the international standards project can be found in the major emerging market financial crises of the mid- to late 1990s. 1 Financial Stability Forum, ‘About the Compendium of Standards’, http://www.fsforum. org/compendium/about.html, accessed 15 June 2006. 2 In this chapter I am concerned only with international policy standards, not technical product standards. On the latter, see Mattli and Büthe (2003).
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Self-regulatory failures in Mexico and especially in East Asia in the 1990s were interpreted by the major developed countries and the IFIs as the prime cause of these crises. Accordingly, since the establishment of a global financial regulatory agency would be unacceptable to the major developed countries, the focus has been on improving selfregulation in those countries where the perceived regulatory weaknesses are both significant and of the greatest consequence for global financial stability. The question that arises is whether this approach to improving selfregulation in the major emerging market countries is likely to succeed. In this chapter, I argue that the East Asian experience since 1997 suggests that the international standards project suffers from some major shortcomings. First, the project makes optimistic assumptions about the strength of the two main international mechanisms promoting compliance: the IFIs and the private financial markets. The weakness of these mechanisms means that compliance remains largely a matter of domestic politics. Second, domestic politics in a number of developing countries often favor what I term ‘mock compliance’ strategies, where governments adopt international standards formally but in ways that limit their impact on the private sector. Third, compliance failures have varying effects on financial stability. Poor compliance can be associated with bad regulatory outcomes, but sometimes noncompliance is the best option. I focus on East Asia for three main reasons. First, East Asian countries were a particular focus of the international standards project because of the dominant view that inadequate financial regulation and supervision was the main cause of the deep crisis in Japan and subsequently in other East Asian economies. Second, after the 1997–8 crisis, most Asian governments pledged to improve self-regulation by adopting international standards. Third, as I argue later, there are considerable differences within East Asia relating to the degree of compliance with international standards. Exploring these differences can help illuminate the causes of failure and success in compliance in general. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the origins and nature of the international standards project. Section 2.2 presents a theory of compliance, focusing on the determinants of compliance and compliance failure. Section 2.3 considers compliance with a few key international standards in a few East Asian countries since 1997. Section 2.4 discusses the implications of the argument for financial regulatory reform.
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2.1. International Financial Standards and Codes and the Asian Crisis This section briefly outlines the emergence of international standards in the pre-1997 period before going on to explain the catalytic role of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8 in the international standards project. Finally, I discuss the presumed roles of the IFIs and private financial markets as international compliance mechanisms.
2.1.1. Origins of the Standards and Codes Exercise The initial steps toward an international regime for financial regulation began in 1974, with the creation of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) by the G10 central bank governors under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In response to the globalization of banking, the BCBS subsequently agreed the Basle Concordat on the sharing of supervisory responsibilities in 1983 and the Basle Capital Adequacy Accord of 1988 (Kapstein 1994; Oatley and Nabors 1998). The key objective was to agree some minimum standards of banking sector supervision and to encourage their adoption in the major developed countries. Adoption proceeded via the voluntary agreement of bank regulators in the G10 countries, though in practice most developing countries also adopted the Basle Capital Adequacy Accord in the 1990s (Ho 2002). Even though the Accord was a highly flawed product of political compromise among the major countries, its worldwide adoption entrenched the position of the BCBS at the heart of global financial regulatory standardsetting. It also suggested that there were strong incentives for nonsignatory governments to converge voluntarily on standards set by developed country regulators. Less noticed by commentators and academics was that superficial compliance with the Accord was usually not difficult because it was full of loopholes. 3 The emergence of the ‘Washington Consensus’ on economic policy in the early 1990s also signaled a growing confidence in the appropriateness of Western economic policy models for developing countries. In late 1994 and early 1995, this confidence was reflected in the Western response to the Mexican peso crisis. Although the crisis of this star 3 As I explain in Section 2.3, Oatley and Nabors (1998) and Ho (2002) are among those who overlook the various loopholes that limited the practical impact of the Accord’s adoption in both developed and developing countries.
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pupil of Latin American economic reform prompted a heated debate about the virtues of capital account liberalization, the G7 governments emphasized the failure of the Mexican government to provide timely and reliable macroeconomic data to the markets in the lead-up to the crisis. ‘Transparency’ became the new mantra. 4 If countries like Mexico wished to participate in international financial markets, it was concluded, they needed to adopt Western standards of policy and data transparency. The G7 assigned the IMF to take the lead in establishing benchmarks for the public provision of timely and reliable data. This led to the creation and promulgation of the Specific Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and the General Data Dissemination Standard (GDDS) in March 1996 and December 1997, respectively. The SDDS was specifically designed ‘to guide countries seeking access to international capital markets in the dissemination of economic and financial data to the public’. Within little more than two years, however, it became clear that transparency by itself would not solve the problem.
2.1.2. The Impact of the Asian Crisis When much of East Asia succumbed to financial crisis only a few years after Mexico, the international financial reform debate was reignited and ranged more broadly than at any time since the Bretton Woods conference of 1944. Although there were different interpretations of the Asian crisis, the one that most appealed in IFI and G7 circles blamed poor domestic regulation in Asia, exacerbated by cronyism and corruption, for creating moral hazard in the financial and corporate sectors (Corsetti et al. 1998; Krugman 1998). 5 The American, British, and German governments in particular favored this interpretation of the crisis, while Japan, dealing with an intensifying domestic financial crisis at home, was in no position to oppose it. The view that the Asian crisis was primarily due to domestic regulatory failures played an important role in the design of the structural reforms contained in the IMF-led rescue packages (Blustein 2001; IEO 2003). It also 4 See the background paper issued before the Halifax G7 summit of June 1995, which included a section on ‘promoting financial stability in a globalized economy’, available at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1995halifax/financial/5.html, accessed 4 February 2004. 5 An alternative view gave more weight to poorly regulated and volatile international capital flows (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Wade and Veneroso 1998).
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prompted a renewed effort by the G7 and the IFIs to set and promulgate new international standards and codes that could serve as benchmarks for regulatory upgrading in developing countries. Michel Camdessus, then IMF Managing Director, mapped out the path in a speech in March 1998: ‘[T]here is broad consensus on what needs to be done to strengthen financial systems—improve supervision and prudential standards, ensure that banks meet capital requirements, provide for bad loans, limit connected lending, publish informative financial information, and ensure that insolvent institutions are dealt with promptly.’ 6 With the Basle Accord and SDDS as precedents, the G7 finance ministers argued that the promotion of global financial stability required both sound macroeconomic and sustainable exchange rate policies and ‘the adoption and implementation of internationally-agreed standards and rules in these and other areas’ (G7 Finance Ministers 1999). The twelve ‘key standards for sound financial systems’ are summarized in Table 2.1. They include financial regulatory standards (e.g. banking, securities, and insurance regulation), ‘market infrastructure’ standards (e.g. accounting and corporate governance), and policy and data transparency standards (e.g. fiscal policy, monetary policy, and data transparency). Note that these international standards have no legally binding status and have no formal international compliance mechanism attached to them (Jordan and Majnone 2002: 15). Generally, according to the FSF, standards ‘set out what are widely accepted as good principles, practices, or guidelines in a given [policy] area’. 7 There are a number of things to note about this list. First, it reflects how core aspects of domestic economic regulation and governance have become matters of international concern and negotiation. Second, all of the standards are of relatively recent origin, many postdate the onset of the Asian crisis in July 1997, and upgrading is a continuous process. Third, a wide range of international institutions is responsible for standardsetting, including the major IFIs and other more specialized standardsetting bodies (some of which are private-sector organizations). Fourth, each of the twelve key standards contains further codes and principles, though these often take a fairly general form. By January 2001, in effect, the standards compendium maintained by the FSF comprised 6 Michel Camdessus, remarks at the IMF Seminar on Capital Account Liberalization, Washington, DC, March 9, 1998, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/ 030998.htm, accessed August 14, 2003. 7 FSF, ‘What are Standards?’, http://www.fsforum.org/compendium/what_are_standards. html, accessed April 22, 2003.
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Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments? Table 2.1. Key international standards and codes Year of adoption or revision
Standard-setter
Standard or code and official objective
Macroeconomic policy and data transparency standards 1996–7 IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), General Data Dissemination Standard (GDDS): The SDDS serves to guide countries that have, or that might seek, access to international capital markets in the dissemination of comprehensive, timely, accessible and reliable economic, financial and socio-demographic data to the public. The GDDS serves to guide any member countries in the provision to the public of such data. 1998 IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency: contains transparency requirements to provide assurances to the public and to capital markets that a sufficiently complete picture of the structure and finances of government is available so as to allow the soundness of fiscal policy to be reliably assessed. 1999 IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: identifies desirable transparency practices for central banks in their conduct of monetary policy and for central banks and other financial agencies in their conduct of financial policies. Institutional and market infrastructure standards 1990/2002 FATF The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: set out the basic framework for effective anti-money laundering policies. Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing: set out the basic framework to detect, prevent, and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts. 1999/2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: aimed at improving the legal, institutional, and regulatory framework for corporate governance in OECD and non-OECD countries. 2001 CPSS/IOSCO Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (CPSIPS), Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (RSSS): CPSIPS sets out core principles for the design and operation of systemically important payment systems. RSSS identifies minimum requirements that securities settlement systems should meet and the best practices that systems should strive for. 2002 IASB International Accounting Standards: set out principles to be observed in the preparation of financial statements. A total of 41 standards have been issued as of July 2003; updating is ongoing. 2002 IFAC International Standards on Auditing: ISAs contain basic principles of auditing and essential procedures together with related guidance in the form of explanatory and other material. 2001 draft, World Bank Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and not yet Creditor Rights: intended to help countries develop agreed effective insolvency and creditor rights systems. (cont.)
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Andrew Walter Table 2.1. (Continued) Year of adoption or revision
Standard-setter
Financial regulation and supervision 1997/2003 IAIS
1998
IOSCO
1997/2006
BCBS
Standard or code and official objective
Insurance Core Principles: comprise essential principles designed to contribute to effective insurance supervision that promotes financial stability. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation: designed to help governments to establish effective systems to regulate securities markets and to promote investor confidence. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision: intended to serve as a basic reference for bank supervisory and other public authorities in all countries and internationally. The 25 basic principles are considered essential for any bank supervisory system to be effective.
Sources: IMF and FSF websites.
in total seventy-one specific standards. Finally, many of the standards are interdependent (e.g. accounting, auditing, and corporate governance standards). The Basle Committee’s 25 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (hereafter ‘Core Principles’), issued in September 1997, is one of the most important key standards (Table 2.2). Along with the Corporate Governance Principles (CGP) and International Accounting Standards (IAS), 8 these constitute a central pillar of financial sector regulation and prudential supervision. The first Basle Core Principle, the ‘precondition’ for effective supervision, advocates what is by now G10 conventional wisdom: political independence for financial regulators, a clear set of responsibilities and objectives, the power to enforce compliance, legal protection for supervisors, sufficient financial resources, and so on. The discussion on principles 2 and 3 suggests that ‘clear and objective criteria . . . reduce the potential for political interference in the [bank] licensing approach’ (BCBS 1997: 15–16). Generally, ‘[t]he Principles are minimum requirements . . . intended to serve as a basic reference for supervisory authorities in all countries and internationally’ (BCBS 1997: 2).
8 Strictly speaking, since 2001 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issues International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), but existing IAS remain valid until replaced or withdrawn. In what follows, I refer simply to ‘IAS’.
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Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments? Table 2.2. Summary of BCBS core principles for effective banking supervision (September 1997) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
Supervisory framework Permissible activities of banks Bank licensing criteria Ownership review powers Investment review powers Minimum capital requirements for banks Bank credit policies Loan evaluation, provisions Large exposure rules Connected lending rules Country risk rules Market risk rules Other material risk rules Internal control systems Preventing fraud Onsite/offsite supervision Contact with management Offsite supervision rules Mechanisms for independent validation of information Consolidated supervision Accounting/disclosure Remedial measures/exit Global consolidation Host country supervision Supervising foreign banks
Sources: BCBS, www.bis.org
Behind this general prescription lay a new ideal type of what may be called ‘regulatory neoliberalism’: the idea that independent regulatory agencies should apply stringent rules in a nondiscretionary fashion in a deregulated financial marketplace. The subtext is fairly clear: excessive state intervention of a discretionary kind, as in many East Asian countries prior to the crisis, creates problems of moral hazard and chronic regulatory failure. Hence, the adoption of Western-style standards would help to eradicate such self-regulatory failures and promote both domestic and international financial stability (Mishkin 2001).
2.1.3. External Compliance Mechanisms All of the international institutions involved in the international standards project recognize that promulgation is one thing and compliance is another. There is an explicit emphasis in the official literature on two interdependent, external compliance mechanisms: market and official incentives. Market incentives would be promoted by educating market 39
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actors about the various international standards and encouraging them to take them into account in assessing international portfolio risk (FSF 2000: 4). Essentially, markets would encourage compliance by raising the cost of finance for sovereign or private sector borrowers in noncompliant countries. The operation of market pressure was also seen as dependent on the provision of credible and timely information about the level of country observance of various standards. Here, the IFIs were to play a key role by assessing compliance in an objective manner and making this information available to market actors. The assessment of country compliance with standards and codes has been part of the IMF’s Article IV policy surveillance role since May 1999. The IMF executive board also included observance of standards among factors taken into consideration in committing financing to a country under the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) facility. 9 As noted earlier, the upgrading of financial regulatory, accounting, and corporate governance standards were also prominent aspects of the IFIs’ conditionality packages in Asia and elsewhere in the late 1990s. Most importantly, the joint IMF– World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) is designed to assess country compliance with international standards, though on a voluntary basis. 10 Reports on standards observance are prepared for the executive boards of the IFIs and may be published in the form of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Despite their voluntary nature, as of the end of April 2005, 592 initial assessments of standards observance and 131 updates had been completed in 122 countries, constituting two-thirds of the IMF membership (IMF and World Bank 2005: 14). The rate of ROSC publication is about 75 percent to date. Official incentives for standards compliance would work through two main mechanisms. The first was by promoting a dialogue between the IFIs, their executive boards, and member countries. There have been considerable efforts by the IFIs to raise awareness of the importance of better self-regulation in member states, and the IMF in particular has invested significant new resources in this area. Second, by encouraging the publication of ROSC modules, IFI assessments could be expected to bolster market pressure on governments to comply by raising the financial costs of nonobservance.
9 Particularly SDDS, the Codes on Fiscal Transparency, on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies and the Basle Core Principles (Clark 2000: 168, fn. 20). 10 The US Treasury has argued for mandatory participation (US GAO 2003: 65), though the USA itself has published only one ROSC, on fiscal transparency.
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2.2. Compliance in Theory Should we expect the market and official compliance mechanisms outlined above to operate effectively? In Section 2.2.1, I outline how we should understand compliance, the effect of compliance costs and ease of third-party monitoring on compliance outcomes.
2.2.1. What Is Compliance? Some authors assume that once international standards are promulgated, the external market and official pressures for compliance outlined above will be sufficiently powerful to ensure compliance (e.g. Soederberg 2003). I argue below that this view is mistaken and that a significant gap between ‘implementation’ and ‘compliance’ is likely to arise in particular cases. Compliance is a more comprehensive concept than ‘implementation’. Implementation occurs when state legislatures and agencies take the necessary steps to ensure that official policies and regulations are consistent with international standards. Compliance occurs when countries’ actual behavior conforms to the prescriptions of a specific rule or standard. 11 Thus, a gap may arise between implementation and compliance if individual actors in the public and/or private sector behave in ways inconsistent with implemented regulations and if domestic enforcement is weak. Compliance could also conceivably occur in the absence of formal implementation, though often a failure by a government to adopt or implement international standards in the first place will derive from domestic resistance to compliance. Note in this regard that although the burden of implementation falls primarily on the state and its agencies, the burden of compliance often falls on both the public and the private sector. Although some international standards only constrain aspects of public sector behavior (e.g. SDDS), other international standards can imply considerable costs for private sector actors. This applies to most standards relevant to financial regulation, including IAS, corporate governance, and banking supervision standards. Thus, for example, if a country adopts IAS for domestic financial reporting by listed companies, the level of country compliance is likely to be affected by the expected costs incurred 11 Compliance is a ‘state of conformity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule’ (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 539). This definition owes much to Young (1979: 3). See also Shelton (2003: 5).
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by companies who must change their methods and degree of financial disclosure and the costs they can expect to incur in the event of noncompliance. There is no reason to believe that compliance failures will only occur when private sector actors fail to conform to (implemented) international standards. ‘Regulatory forbearance’ also occurs when the government or its agencies intentionally refrain from strictly enforcing adopted regulations, systematically or on an ad hoc basis. As in the classic ‘timeinconsistency’ problem in monetary policy, it may be optimal for the government to commit itself to the adoption of international standards and subsequently to engage in regulatory forbearance (e.g. because the strict application of new prudential rules could lead to a contraction of private sector credit). Regulatory forbearance includes allowing technically insolvent banks to continue operating, temporary relaxations or nonapplication of rules relating to bad loan accounting or provisioning, turning a blind eye to violations of exposure rules, rapid deregulation of new lines of business to allow banks to build profits, and so on (Honohan and Klingebiel 2000: 7). In addition, compliance failure may occur because of low bureaucratic capacity or corruption, both of which limit the effectiveness of oversight and enforcement. Highly independent and powerful agencies may also obstruct compliance. By strictly applying regulations that force bank failures, for example, regulators may leave themselves open to accusations of past negligence or incompetence. 12
2.2.2. Compliance Costs and Benefits Although the benefits of observance of international standards are often made to sound self-evident, they can raise fundamental economic and political issues for developing countries in particular. In the first place, there is little doubt that representatives from the major Western economies have dominated the standard-setting process in most cases. The perception that they are not just Western but Anglo-Saxon in origin is strong in developing countries, potentially creating what the IMF likes 12 Such considerations may have played a part in the 1980s decision of the US regulator of savings and loan (S&L) institutions, the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation (FLSIC), to engage in regulatory forbearance (Jackson and Lodge 2000: 109).
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to refer to as ‘ownership problems’. 13 This perception of limited legitimacy and the consequent politicization of international standard-setting significantly lessen the likelihood of ‘norm-driven’ compliance, as does the often substantial gap between international and existing domestic standards. 14 Rather than focus on this legitimacy question here, I consider compliance from a simple cost–benefit perspective. Considering compliance costs first, there are potentially significant distributional asymmetries at both the international and domestic levels. In the case where international standards are more stringent than existing domestic standards, this implies potentially significant compliance costs for public and private sector actors. Compliance costs are therefore generally higher for developing countries than for the developed countries who dominate international standard-setting. As for domestic compliance costs, these tend to be concentrated on particular sectors or societal groups (e.g. banking regulatory standards raise costs for the banking sector, IAS raise costs for the business sector generally, etc.). They also tend to be higher in the short run: the one-off costs of adjusting to higher standards tend to be greater than the ongoing costs of compliance. 15 Compliance benefits may be potentially high for countries whose domestic standards are lax compared to international standards (the key benefit, presumably, is greater financial stability). However, compared to compliance costs, benefits of these kinds tend to be both uncertain and long term in nature. Moreover, while compliance costs tend to be concentrated on businesses or particular business sectors, compliance benefits tend to be much more widely spread across society. Indeed, the main supposed benefit of adopting international standards, greater financial and economic stability, has public good characteristics. The nature of compliance costs and benefits and their distribution makes standards compliance rather like trade liberalization, and quite different from technical standards. Technical standards often exhibit strong market incentives for compliance because of high network externalities 13 Arguments of this kind were made by Asian representatives at the first Asia-Pacific meeting of the FSF in October 2001 (FSF Press Release, ‘First Asia-Pacific Regional Meeting of the FSF’, Ref. No. 32/2001E, October 19, 2001). 14 For a discussion of these and other factors that hinder norm-driven compliance, see Checkel (2001) and Underdal (1999). 15 Think, for example, of the initial costs incurred by European firms in adjusting to the recent adoption of IAS in Europe, or to the new listing and corporate governance requirements in the USA.
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(i.e. the benefits of compliance increase as more actors adhere to the standard). By contrast, those sectors that bear most of the immediate costs of compliance with policy standards are likely to oppose compliance, whereas the potential beneficiaries will have comparatively little incentive to lobby strongly for their adoption. As a result, when existing domestic standards are inferior to international standards and compliance costs for the private sector are substantial, governments are not likely to favor compliance. As an empirical matter, private sector compliance costs in East Asia varied substantially across international standards. They were especially high for IAS, corporate governance standards and financial sector regulation standards, since existing domestic standards in these areas were poor in most Asian countries in 1997. Adopting international standards in these areas was especially costly for the family- and state-owned banks and companies which predominate in Asia (Claessens et al. 1999; Capulong et al. 2000: vol. 1, 23–8). Low levels of bank capitalization, poor corporate profitability, and the predominance of relationship lending meant that higher prudential and disclosure standards would be especially costly for banks and for their customers. This was especially true after the crisis, when the private sector in the crisis-hit Asian countries was in a highly distressed situation. By contrast, private sector compliance costs were low for other standards such as SDDS and the other macroeconomic transparency standards, though adherence to these international standards could potentially reduce both public and private borrowing costs. 16 We would therefore expect levels of Asian compliance to be greater for these standards than for prudential, corporate governance, and financial disclosure standards.
2.2.3. Monitoring, International Pressure, and Compliance This conclusion might be questioned for the following reason. Even if the private sector is largely opposed to compliance with certain international standards, international actors may still place considerable pressure on both governments and the private sector to comply. As we have seen, the international standards project has explicitly cited both the IFIs and international financial markets as important external compliance mechanisms. However, I wish to argue that these two mechanisms are likely 16 For example, if SDDS adherence reduces the sovereign borrowing rate, this could reduce the average private sector borrowing rate, since the former is usually a floor for the latter.
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to be weak in precisely those areas where the domestic-level compliance incentives discussed above are also weak. Let us assume that the external pressure on countries to adopt international standards is indeed strong, but that governments and the domestic private sector believe that it will be difficult for third parties to monitor the true level of compliance and/or to punish noncompliance. In this situation, the government may decide that its best option is to adopt international standards but to engage in ‘mock compliance’, or formal adoption or implementation without substantive compliance. The government may believe that by doing so it will obtain at least some of the benefits of compliance (or at a minimum, avoid the costs of explicit noncompliance), 17 while the domestic private sector may be reassured that they will not bear large real compliance costs in practice. Although well-capitalized and strongly managed banks and companies may prefer the gap between formal and substantive compliance to be relatively small, weak banks and firms threatened with their very survival have stronger incentives to lobby for mock compliance. The government also has stronger short-term incentives to be concerned about business failures. The difficulty of third-party monitoring of compliance, and hence the applicability of this argument, will vary by international standard. In the case of the SDDS, for example, monitoring is relatively straightforward. Whether countries meet the SDDS requirements is publicly disclosed in a simple yes–no manner on the IMF’s Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB). Although the IMF does not monitor in depth the quality of the data placed by the country authorities on the DSBB, cross-checks embedded in the format and considerations of reputation both pose constraints on fraudulent postings. By comparison, monitoring the quality of compliance with the Basle Core Principles, CGP, or IAS is very difficult and costly for third parties, requiring considerable research and qualitative judgment. To take one obvious but typical example, a government may say that its domestic accounting standards ‘approximate’ IAS. Estimating the importance of any divergences between domestic and international standards in such cases is difficult enough. Even when governments claim that all listed companies must report using IAS (which is the case today 17 The costs of explicit noncompliance by one country are likely to increase if most of its peers adopt international standards. Of course, if third parties have imperfect information concerning governments’ true compliance intentions, the credibility of any government’s commitment to compliance will be low (Rodrik 1989: 757). As a result, some potential benefits such as lower borrowing costs may not be forthcoming. However, governments with weak compliance intentions may calculate that they have little to lose from formal compliance and the potential to achieve other benefits, such as cooperation with the IMF.
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for about half of all countries), 18 assessment of the quality of compliance requires in-depth analysis of auditing processes, stock market organization, and the strength of legal enforcement among other things. Some might argue that the IFIs themselves perform this task through the FSAP process. However, this process has major shortcomings from the point of view of market participants. As noted earlier, country participation in the FSAP is voluntary, as is publication of ROSCs. Even when published, sensitive information is removed, usually including any quantitative assessments that might be more easily digested by market actors. Furthermore, given the resource-intensive nature of the FSAP process, updates are infrequent. Unsurprisingly, private sector analysts routinely respond that ROSCs are ‘untimely, outdated, and too dense to be useful’ (US GAO 2003: 22). The considerable difficulties encountered in assessing compliance are one reason why the IFIs and market actors tend to be weak at enforcing compliance, but there are other reasons. Even if the IFIs have explicit knowledge of poor quality compliance in a particular case, they may be reluctant to make this known so as to avoid precipitating a market reaction or to maintain a good working relationship with the government. In practice, market participants have little faith in the willingness of the IFIs to ‘blow the whistle’ on countries that fail to observe core standards (FSF 2000: 20–31). There are also reasons to believe that markets will not consistently punish poor compliers. If we assume investors will be concerned primarily with financial returns, a particular company’s compliance with international standards will only be relevant to the investment decision if such compliance affects risk-adjusted profitability. Although better financial disclosure and higher corporate governance standards might sometimes be important to investors, strong market positions, and political connections might be more important in emerging markets. 19 In practice, such ‘pull’ factors that apply to particular companies and markets tend to be swamped by aggregate ‘push’ factors like the level of liquidity in developed country financial markets. Push factors are the dominant determinants of equity inflows into emerging market countries (Maxfield 1998; IMF 2001: 40–1). Indeed, emerging market countries and firms with 18 Deloitte provides information on national accounting requirements for 143 countries, of which 72 required IAS reporting for all listed companies as of March 26, 2006 (http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm, accessed June 19, 2006). 19 One bank respondent to an FSF survey said that if it were to require strict observance of IAS in its business in developing countries, up to 25 percent of this business would be lost (FSF 2000: 23–4).
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better quality corporate governance have tended to under-perform those with poorer quality corporate governance when international liquidity is flowing into these countries, as in recent years (CLSA Emerging Markets 2005: 4). Unsurprisingly, few companies have felt a need to undertake independent and transparent assessments of the quality of their corporate governance. 20 It may be said that banks, which are especially dependent on reputation for their viability, should be subject to considerable market compliance pressure. Again, however, formal compliance with international standards such as the Basle capital adequacy minima may be all that is necessary. Although sophisticated creditors understand that banks’ capital adequacy ratios (CARs) are easily manipulated and are a poor measure of true financial strength, formal compliance by banks seems to be all that is necessary. This is because such creditors take into account that national authorities usually effectively guarantee the liabilities of formally compliant banks (Moody’s Investor Services 1999; Fitch Ratings 2003a). In other words, too-big-to-fail assumptions can short-circuit market pressure for substantive compliance with international standards. To summarize, the argument suggests that compliance strategies are driven by domestic political factors instead of by external compliance pressures, which we suggest will often be weak. In particular, we expect that mock compliance strategies will be more likely when private sector compliance costs and third-party compliance monitoring costs are both relatively high. This is illustrated by quadrant 4 in Figure 2.1. The following section considers whether this prediction is consistent with the evidence.
2.3. Compliance in Practice In what follows I briefly assess the prediction of Section 2.2 in two ways. First, I compare compliance with SDDS (where private sector compliance costs and monitoring costs are low) and IAS (where both costs are high) globally and in East Asia. Second, I assess compliance across East Asian countries in one key standard of the Basle Core Principles for which 20 Standard & Poor’s, the credit ratings agency, announced in 2002 that it would offer corporate governance ratings based on the OECD Principles for companies to complement their credit ratings (Standard & Poor’s 2002). However, as of February 6, 2005, only twentyfive companies had been rated, fourteen of which were from Russia.
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Andrew Walter Compliance costs Low 1
Monitoring costs
Low
2
SDDS, GDDS
3
High
High
Macroeconomic transparency standards
4 Prudential regulation, corporate governance standards, IAS, money laundering standards
Figure 2.1. Private sector compliance costs and third-party monitoring costs
private (and public) sector compliance costs and third-party monitoring costs are relatively high: the Basle capital adequacy regime.
2.3.1. SDDS vs. IAS Table 2.3 compares rates of compliance with SDDS to rates of adoption of IAS or US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) across different country categories. 21 It shows that on average, at the end of 2003 SDDS compliance among IMF members was 29 percent. This was similar to the percentage of countries that had adopted IAS or US GAAP in full, though lower than the 59 percent of countries that at that time required or allowed at least some firms to report using these international standards. Compliance with SDDS, as one would expect, is much higher for the major emerging market countries on JP Morgan’s EMBIG database, but the adoption of IAS is much lower for this group (58% vs. 29%). It is even higher for those countries hit by systemic banking crises in recent years. Of eighteen major banking crisis countries over 21 For sources and definitions, see Table 2.3. The IAS/US GAAP calculations are made using data for those countries for which information is available, which probably biases the estimates upward. I use US GAAP and IAS as joint benchmarks for international accounting standards because of the unresolved competition between them for international standards status.
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Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments? Table 2.3. Compliance with SDDS and adoption of IAS/US GAAP, end 2003
% of IMF members/known countries: IFRS % of emerging market countries (EMBIG) % of countries with banking crises within past 5 yrs % of 58 crisis-hit countries (past 10 yrs) % of 18 major crisis-hit countries (past 10 yrs) % of 10 major East Asian economies
SDDS
IFRS/US GAAP (full adoption)
IFRS/US GAAP (including partial definition)
29 58 47 50 78 80
30 29 22 29 6 0
59 50 47 53 22 20
Notes: SDDS compliance is measured by whether a country is deemed by the IMF to have met SDDS specifications. Banking crises are defined as ‘systemic’ (Caprio and Klingebiel 2003). The 18 major banking crisis countries are Argentina, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. Emerging market countries are those on the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG). The 10 major East Asian economies are China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Sources: Street (2002); IAS Plus website (http://www.iasplus.com/country/country.htm), SDDS website (http:// dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/sddshome), and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).
the past decade, 78 percent are SDDS subscribers. Levels of SDDS compliance by major East Asian countries are higher: eight of the possible nine are subscribers (Taiwan is not an IMF member; China was the only nonsubscriber). Table 2.4 shows that the major crisis-hit East Asian countries were relatively early subscribers to SDDS, only slightly behind the G7 average, though they took longer than most countries to meet in full the various SDDS specifications. Note, however, that Korea complied with SDDS much more quickly than the G7 average and that the average time to compliance for all countries is low because since 2001, new SDDS subscribers have tended to collapse all three stages of SDDS compliance into one. By contrast, few major crisis-hit countries adopted IAS/US GAAP (only one of eighteen did so in full); none of the major East Asian economies did so. Table 2.3 gives a misleading picture of the extent of compliance with IAS in two ways. First, it ignores the fact that most countries in East Asia have revised domestic accounting standards in recent years and brought them closer to international standards. Second, it only shows formal adoption rates, not true compliance. Estimating the latter is very difficult. It was clear in 2002–3 that important areas of divergence between national and IAS remained in most cases in East Asia, though this is difficult even for experts to assess. 22 Moreover, few believe the quality of financial reporting 22
For example: see the country assessments in Nobes (2001).
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Table 2.4. SDDS subscription, posting and compliance dates, selected countries, and groups
Average all countries G7 average Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Date of subscription (1)
Date metadata were posted on the DSBB (2)
Date when subscriber met SDDS specifications (3)
3−1 (days)
3−2 (days)
April 20, 1998 July 5, 1996 September 24, 1996 September 20, 1996 August 21, 1996 August 1, 1996 August 9, 1996
October 2, 1998 November 19, 1996 May 21, 1997 March 30, 1998 September 19, 1996 September 19, 1996 September 19, 1996
March 30, 2001 January 3, 2000 June 2, 2000 November 1, 1999 September 1, 2000 January 30, 2001 May 16, 2000
1,060 1,258 1,328 1,121 1,450 1,619 1,357
897 1,124 1,091 571 1,422 1,571 1,317
Note: The average figure is for all 61 SDDS subscribers as of June 22, 2005. Sources: IMF, DSBB: http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/sddssubscriptiondates/, accessed June 22, 2005.
Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments?
in most of East Asia to be on a par with that, say, in the USA and UK. Comparable measures of the quality of accounting and auditing are hard to find, but survey measures of the quality of national accounting regimes generally show that East Asian countries except Singapore and Hong Kong substantially lag the G7 average. 23 Most Asian countries adopted a strategy of moving only toward allowing IAS reporting for some companies (usually those that are foreign-listed and for whom compliance costs are low), while more incrementally modifying national accounting standards for the rest. On balance, then, it is reasonable to conclude that the quality of compliance with SDDS is probably considerably greater in East Asia than is compliance with IAS. This is consistent with the prediction made in Section 2.2.
2.3.2. Basle CARs By comparison with SDDS and even IAS, assessing the degree of country compliance with the Basle Core Principles is very difficult. Published FSSAs and ROSCs, as already noted, are in very short supply: only Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, and Singapore have undertaken FSAPs and published banking ROSCs, despite considerable international pressure on the others to do so (US GAO 2003: 19). These reports are also qualitative, difficult to compare across countries, and often pull punches, though the Japanese assessment is, unusually, sharply critical in places. For this reason and because of space considerations, I simplify the task in this section by considering only East Asian convergence on the Basle capital adequacy provisions. Is there evidence that the quality of compliance is poor in this area, as predicted above? In terms of formal adoption, fully 90 percent of all countries surveyed by the World Bank have signaled that they had adopted the Basle capital adequacy regime by 2001, which requires internationally active banks to have a minimum 8 percent risk weighted capital ratio (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2002). This is a much higher formal adoption figure than for any other international standard discussed here. Furthermore, as Table 2.5 shows, official Basle CARs in the major Asian crisis-hit developing countries were considerably in excess of the 8 percent Basle minimum. In many cases, average Asian bank CARs were above those in the USA by early 2003. 23
See, for example, the World Economic Forum survey (2003: 610).
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Andrew Walter Table 2.5. Basle CARs in selected Asian countries and the USA, 2003 Country
Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand USA
Official average capital adequacy ratios, mid-2003 (%)
Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings, March 2003
15.6 21.4 10.8 10.4 13.4 17.8 13.6 12.7
C+ E D− D− D+ B D− B
Notes: CARs are unweighted averages, whereas Moody’s BSRF ratings are weighted averages. Moody’s BFSR ratings explicitly do not take into account the probability of public sector assistance in the event of potential default. Ratings are from A (the strongest) to E (the weakest). Sources: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2004; Moody’s, Bank Risk Monitor, March 2003.
To conclude that this reveals over- rather than under-compliance would be wrong, however. There is little doubt that most Asian banks in 2003 had real capitalization levels that were much lower than those of US banks, contrary to the official CARs. The final column of Table 2.5 shows Moody’s bank credit risk department’s average Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR). Moody’s BFSRs, in contrast to their standard deposit ratings, are intended as an indication of the ‘stand-alone’ financial strength of banks. As such, BFSRs explicitly do not take into account the probability that the government would rescue a financially distressed bank. It is clear that there is, if anything, an inverse relationship between official CARs and Moody’s estimates of the true financial strength of banks. 24 Only Singapore’s banks have comparable financial strength ratings to the USA, but most of the banks elsewhere in Asia were rated in the two lowest categories of E or D−. There are many reasons why official CARs are not comparable across countries and why they can be wholly misleading as indicators of bank financial strength. The 1988 Basle regime is notoriously weak as regards to rules on loan loss provisions and the components of bank capital, with the result that official ratios often hide a multitude of sins. 25 Below, I provide some illustrations of the often poor quality of compliance with 24 Fitch Ratings (2003b) finds this inverse relationship holds generally using its own estimates of banks’ stand-alone financial strength. 25 For the calculation of Basle CARs, see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04.htm, accessed April 11, 2004.
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these standards in postcrisis Asia in three main areas, though these do not exhaust the problems with official CARs. First, loan accounting standards and practices remained opaque in postcrisis Asia, particularly for ‘restructured’ nonperforming loans (NPLs), which made up large proportions of bank assets in countries like Indonesia and Thailand. Lax loan accounting has the result of reducing required loan loss provisions, increasing reported profits and inflating official capital. After the crisis, with the encouragement of the IFIs, most countries in the region converged on the standard three-month past due rule for calculating NPLs. 26 In Thailand after the crisis, debt classified as ‘doubtful’ or ‘loss’ could be reclassified as ‘substandard’ when a debt restructuring agreement was signed. Substandard or ‘special mention’ debt would remain within those categories until three months of repayments (or three installments) were fulfilled, after which they could be upgraded to the pass (i.e. accrual) category. This less conservative standard (compared to the USA, which requires six months of repayments) was further relaxed on April 10, 2000, allowing the immediate reclassification of restructured loans to accrual status that satisfied certain criteria. Nor were Thai banks required to report the total amount of such restructured debt in accrual status, though the high levels of ‘re-entry NPLs’ reported by the Bank of Thailand (BOT) suggested that many restructured loans had turned bad again. Direct evidence of lax loan accounting in Thailand is given by DBS (Singapore) Group’s consolidated accounts for 2001 and 2002. This group has a Thai subsidiary, DBS-Thai Danu Bank (TDB). DBS Group is required by Singapore’s conservative Monetary Authority to note in these accounts that Thailand’s loan classification standards are much laxer than Singapore’s, and that if the latter’s classification standards were used instead, TDB’s NPLs would be about five times higher. Indeed, DBS explicitly noted that according to Thai GAAP, TDB had positive net assets, but that according to Singapore accounting standards it was technically insolvent. 27 If this difference is representative of Thai classification standards, 26 The exceptions are Korea, which from 1999 partially instituted a US-style ‘forwardlooking criteria’ (FLC) approach to NPL estimation, and Malaysia, which retains a dual three and six-month standard. 27 DBS Group, Annual Report (2001), p. 126 and Annual Report (2002), p. 80 (Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements). According to Singapore standards, TDB’s NPLs at the end of 2001 were 27.7 percent of total loans, whereas by Thai standards they were merely 5.8 percent (the figures for 2002 were 25.4% and 5.1%, with substandard loans increasing slightly from 2001–2). Furthermore, TDB’s level of NPLs increased to 28.8 percent of total loans in December 2003 (available at: http://www.dbs.com/investor/2003/ fy/PerfSummaryFY2003.pdf, accessed February 25, 2004).
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it implies substantial regulatory forbearance by the BOT and continuing severe weakness in the banking sector. 28 A second illustration of poor quality compliance can be found in the regulatory treatment of collateral. Asian banks usually require collateral when lending, particularly property collateral. A large percentage of the value of the collateral attached to NPLs can usually be offset against required provisions. As a result, lax collateral valuation practices can also inflate official CARs. For example, in Thailand, the BOT defined the market value of collateral as ‘the probable price on the date of the collateral asset valuation or appraisal under normal market conditions with no transaction costs (nor taxes)’. 29 According to many analysts, the ‘normal market conditions’ clause, and the poor quality of valuation firms in Thailand, meant that collateral was often overvalued. Furthermore, in countries like Thailand and Indonesia, where most collateral is in the form of illiquid real estate and where the legal foreclosure regimes were dysfunctional, a best practice (conservative) approach would not allow such netting practices regarding required provisions (Song 2002: 21). A third area of weakness can be found in the definitions of the allowable components of capital, which vary considerably by country. In Thailand, regulators allowed banks to issue expensive hybrid debt instruments (socalled CAPs and SLIPS) and to include these in Tier I capital, contrary to practice in the USA and elsewhere. 30 In Japan, meanwhile, by early 2003 more than half the Tier 1 capital of major banks consisted of deferred tax assets (DTAs), most of which are past tax losses carried forward. 31 For two of the top seven banks, DTAs made up all of Tier 1 capital (Fitch Ratings 2003c: 17). The Japanese rules on DTAs were lax by almost any standard. In Japan, DTAs could be carried forward for up to five years, as opposed to only one year (or a maximum of 10% of Tier 1 capital) in the USA, the only other major country in which DTAs are important. Since the value of DTAs was often in doubt due to very poor bank profitability, and since 28 Further evidence from another Singapore-owned Thai bank, UOB-Radhanasin Bank, gives a very similar picture to the TDB case (UOB Group, Annual Report (2001), and UOBRadhanasin Bank monthly reports to BOT, available at: http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/ databank/financial_institutions/npl_fi/254412/ecb.htm). 29 BOT, ‘Regulations for Collateral Valuation and Appraisal’, http://www.bot.or.th/ bothomepage/notification/fsupv/2541/thtm/RCVA.DOC, accessed April 1, 2002. Italics added. 30 Confidential author interviews, regulatory officials, Hong Kong, April 2002, and Thailand, March 2002. In the USA, approved subordinated debt instruments are only allowable as Tier II capital: Comptroller of the Currency (2001: 40). 31 DTAs arise due to differences between financial reporting for accounting disclosure and for tax purposes.
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in particular they are not generally available to cushion large losses, there is a strong case for their use as core capital to be sharply constrained (IMF 2003: 8, 18). Their heavy use by Japanese banks cast considerable doubt on the quality of their compliance with the Basle regime. The weakness of internal and external auditors is another factor that allows banks and regulators to collude in regulatory forbearance. 32 Evidence of strong postcrisis pressure on crisis-hit Asian countries to adopt a mock compliance strategy regarding bank capitalization standards is consistent with the theory offered in Section 2.2. The higher quality of compliance witnessed in Hong Kong and Singapore is also supportive. This is not because these countries are rich (cf. Japan) or because they have independent regulatory authorities (neither Singapore nor Hong Kong has). Rather, higher compliance with Basle has been possible for Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s banks because their economies were much less affected by the crisis, so that the private sector costs of compliance were much lower than in their crisis-hit neighbors. Their banks and other companies are also relatively internationalized and the authorities in both have seen overcompliance as a means of distinguishing themselves from their less compliant neighbors. In general, then, we can conclude that where the private sector costs of compliance with international standards and third-party monitoring costs are both relatively low, as is the case for SDDS, levels of compliance in East Asia are high. However, where private sector compliance costs and monitoring costs are both high, as is the case with IAS and Basle capitalization standards, the quality of compliance is relatively poor. That the Asian countries wished to signal their intentions to converge on international standards of this kind despite the difficulty of achieving compliance after 1997 suggests that they were under considerable pressure to do so. The crises that hit Asia demolished the credibility of their previous regulatory frameworks, to the extent they existed, and entrenched the idea that the only viable path to reform was to adopt Western-style financial regulatory standards. At the same time, the economic distress the crises produced made it more difficult to comply in practice with the international standards that received most attention by the IFIs (financial supervision standards, corporate governance standards, and accounting 32 However, the external auditors of Resona, a major Japanese bank, refused in March 2003 to accept the bank’s stated value of DTAs, resulting in an overnight collapse of the bank’s CAR and a further costly government bailout. Two other major banks also wrote down DTAs in FY2003, though bank analysts believed others should have done the same (Fitch Ratings 2003c: 3).
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standards). The evident reluctance of a number of important East Asian countries (notably China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) to submit to the FSAP review process is another indication of this dilemma.
2.4. Implications for Self-Regulatory Reform What are the implications of the preceding analysis for the reform of self-regulation? We have seen that external compliance mechanisms (IFIs and markets) can promote the reform of domestic regulation after crises. However, governments in crisis-hit countries are also usually subject to stronger domestic pressures to resist substantive compliance with international regulatory standards, leading them to square this circle via mock compliance strategies. The question this raises is whether this outcome is suboptimal and, if so, what should be done about it. The answer, I suggest, is a mixed one. That there is often considerable domestic flexibility in adopting and adapting international standards is not, on the face of it, a bad thing for two reasons. First, given the legitimacy problems of international standards, retaining some flexibility might be politically important. Second, contrary to the prescriptions of the new ideal type of regulatory neoliberalism, there are occasions on which governments should engage in discretionary regulatory forbearance. Though Asian regulators strenuously denied that they were engaged in forbearance in the postcrisis years, there is little doubt that many were. Thailand’s relatively lax loan accounting and Tier I capital definitions, Japan’s lax loan accounting and regulatory treatment of DTAs, Malaysia’s relaxation of bad loan definitions, Indonesia’s extraordinarily expensive purchase of bad private sector assets, Korea’s encouragement of state-owned banks to lend to a few large firms—all are examples of discretionary interventions aimed at giving breathing space to a highly distressed private sector. 33 Although many Western critics tended to see this as evidence of continuing collusive, ‘cronyistic’ relationships between East Asian states and their private sectors, such examples might also be seen as pragmatism. This was a pragmatism that, in the new intellectual climate of regulatory neoliberalism, did not dare speak its name. 34 33
For further details, see Walter (forthcoming 2007). The exception is Malaysia, where Prime Minister Mahathir was openly critical of the assumption that it made sense to import more stringent Western financial regulations in the midst of the crisis. 34
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No doubt in some cases the Western critics of discretionary interventionism in Asian financial regulation are right. However, we should not overlook that the major Western countries, the IFIs and international banks saw the crisis as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to fundamentally remodel the relationship between state and market in East Asia. The international standards project was at least as much a deployment of power as the bringing of regulatory ‘best practice’ to an important part of the developing world. Is it obvious that Japan should have strictly enforced US-style rules in 2002–3, thereby forcing its government to recapitalize, nationalize, or close most of its big banks? (cf. Fitch Ratings 2003c: 2). Western critics of Japan’s approach worked themselves up into a frenzy of indignation, but it may be doubted that forbearance is as great a sin as they claimed. Since early 2003, the Japanese banking system has greatly reduced its NPL problem and profits have recovered rapidly, thanks in part to the extraordinary use of DTAs and other time-buying measures. In retrospect, it might have been simpler and more straightforward for the Asian governments simply to argue that Western standards were inappropriate to the circumstances of the postcrisis period. That they felt unable to do so underlines the effect of the crisis on self-confidence in the region. However, denial of the obvious drained the credibility of governments and regulatory agencies, with serious negative consequences (most notably, perhaps, in Japan). If the strict application of international standards did not always make sense in the immediate postcrisis period, the question remains whether such standards are appropriate benchmarks for long-term regulatory convergence in Asia and elsewhere. Clearly, the pre-1998 financial regulatory regimes in Indonesia, Korea, Japan, and Thailand all had major failings that contributed to the depth of the crisis these countries suffered in the late 1990s. However, it would be wrong to see international standards as a panacea in all areas. Not only is the international standard-setting process dominated by the major Western countries, but they are the products of domestic politics within these countries. No doubt American bank regulatory, corporate governance, and accounting standards are generally more stringent than those in most developing countries, but as recent scandals have amply demonstrated, US rules are sometimes far from ‘best practice’. Nor is it clear that one size should fit all. In the case of corporate governance standards, the importation of Western rules on board independence has failed to place significant constraints on family ownermanagers (Nam and Nam 2004). There is also a difficulty in asking countries to accept a rules-based model of financial regulation and 57
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supervision when (as in Asia) personal relationships continue to predominate. Institutionally, personal relationships compensated successfully in the past for weaknesses in the institutions that are necessary for arm’slength finance: secure property rights, third-party legal enforcement of contracts, etc. (Yoshitomi et al. 2003: 78). The interdependence of the reforms required by the various standards and codes arguably poses an enormously difficult, complex, and costly transition task for many developing countries. Even in the case of IAS, where the case for a single set of international standards is strong, we need to ask whether the costs of compliance exceed the potential benefit. The sophisticated treatment of financial instruments required by IAS 39, for example, is much less relevant to most firms in developing countries. In general, the appropriate sequencing of institutional reforms remains an open question. Moreover, as we have seen, regulatory outcomes remain dominated by domestic, economic, and political factors. Setting the standards bar at a fairly high level for developing countries may be the best way of encouraging serious long-term reform, but in the meantime, this approach more or less condemns most countries to a degree of failure. It may also promote a confrontational approach to regulation and supervision that alienates the private sector rather than encouraging them to see better regulation as in their interest.
References BCBS (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision) (September, 1997). Core Principles for Banking Supervision. Basle: BCBS. Barth, James R., Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine (2002). ‘Bank Regulation and Supervision Database’, World Bank. Available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ view.php?type=18&id=12171 Blustein, Paul (2001). The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF. New York: Public Affairs. Caprio, Gerard and Daniela Klingebiel (2003). ‘Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises’, World Bank, January. Available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ view.php?type=18&id=23456 Capulong, Ma. Virginita, David Edwards, David Webb, and Juzhong Zhuang (eds) (2000). Corporate Governance and Finance in East Asia: A Study of Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, 2 vols. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
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Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments? Checkel, Jeffrey (Summer 2001). ‘Why Comply?’, International Organization, 55(3): 553–88. Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry Lang (1999). ‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations’, World Bank Working Paper, November. Clark, Alastair (2000). ‘International Standards and Codes’, Financial Stability Review, December: 162–8. CLSA Emerging Markets (April 2005). CG Watch 2005: Corporate Governance in Asia. CLSA Emerging Markets and Asian Corporate Governance Association. Comptroller of the Currency (US), Administrator of National Banks (January 2001). An Examiner’s Guide to Problem Bank Identification, Rehabilitation, and Resolution. Washington, DC: OCC. Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini (1998). ‘Paper Tigers? A Model of the Asian Crisis’, Working Paper, December. Fitch Ratings (2003a). ‘Bank Rating Methodology’, March 20. (2003b). ‘Are Credit Ratings Correlated with Regulatory Capital?’, November 26. (2003c). ‘Japanese Banks: Results for 2002/2003—Where’s the Way Out?’, Special Report Japan, June 25. FSF (Financial Stability Forum) (2000). ‘Report of the Follow-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of Standards’, Basle, August 31. G7 Finance Ministers (1999). ‘Strengthening the International Financial Architecture’, Report of G7 Finance Ministers to the Cologne Economic Summit, June. Ho, Daniel E. (2002). ‘Compliance and International Soft Law: Why do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?’, Journal of International Economic Law, 5(3): 647– 88. Honohan, Patrick and Daniela Klingebiel (2000). ‘Controlling Fiscal Costs of Banking Crises’, World Bank. IEO (Independent Evaluation Office, IMF) (July 2003). The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil. Washington, DC: IMF. IMF (2001). Emerging Market Financing. Washington, DC: IMF. (September 2003). Japan: Financial System Stability Assessment and Supplementary Information. Washington, DC: IMF Country Report No. 03/287. and World Bank (July 2005). The Standards and Codes Initiative—Is it Effective? and How Can it be Improved? Washington, DC: IMF and World Bank. Jackson, Patricia and David Lodge (June 2000). ‘Fair Value Accounting, Capital Standards, Expected Loss Provisioning, and Financial Stability’, Financial Stability Review. Jordan, Cally and Giovanni Majnone (2002). ‘Financial Regulatory Harmonization and the Globalization of Finance’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2919, October.
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Andrew Walter Kapstein, Ethan B. (1994). Governing the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Krugman, Paul (January 1998). ‘What Happened to Asia?’, Unpublished Paper, MIT. Mattli, Walter and Tim Büthe (2003). ‘Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?’, World Politics, 56(1): 1–42. Maxfield, Sylvia (1998). ‘Understanding the Political Implications of Financial Internationalization in Emerging Market Countries’, World Development, 26(7): 1201–19. Mishkin, Frederic S. (January 2001). ‘Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerging Market Countries’, NBER Working Paper, No. 8087. Moody’s Investor Services (1999). ‘Rating Methodology: Bank Credit Risk—An Analytical Framework for Banks in Developed Markets’, April. Nam, Sang-Woo and Il Chong Nam (October 2004). Corporate Governance in Asia: Recent Evidence from Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Nobes, Christopher (ed.) (2001). GAAP 2001: A Survey of National Accounting Standards Benchmarked Against International Accounting Standards (Anderson, BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers). Oatley, Thomas and R. Nabors (1998). ‘Redistributive Cooperation, Market Failure, Wealth Transfers and the Basle Accord’, International Organization, 52(1): 35–54. Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs (1998). ‘The Onset of the East Asian Currency Crisis’, NBER Working Paper No. 6680 (April). Raustiala, Kal and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2002). ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds), The Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 538–58. Rodrik, Dani (1989). ‘Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling’, Economic Journal, 99(September): 756–72. Shelton, Dinah (ed.) (2003). Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System. New York: Oxford University Press. Soederberg, Susanne (2003). ‘The Promotion of “Anglo-American” Corporate Governance in the South: Who Benefits from the New International Standard?’, Third World Quarterly, 24(1): 7–27. Song, Inwon (2002). ‘Collateral in Loan Classification and Provisioning’, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/122, July. Standard and Poor’s (2002). ‘Corporate Governance Scores: Criteria, Methodology and Definitions’. Available at http://www.standardandpoors.com Street, Donna L. (2002). GAAP Convergence 2002: A Survey of National Methods to Promote and Achieve Convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers).
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Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Governments? Underdal, Arild (1998). ‘Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models’, European Journal of International Relations, 4(1): 5–30. US GAO [General Accounting Office] (2003). ‘International Financial Crises: Challenges Remain in IMF’s Ability to Anticipate, Prevent, and Resolve Financial Crises’, report to the Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, and to the Vice Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, DC, GAO-03-734, June 16. Wade, Robert and Frank Veneroso (1998). ‘The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus the Wall Street—Treasury—IMF Complex’, New Left Review, No. 288, March/April, 3–23. Walter, Andrew (forthcoming 2007). Toward Compliance: The Political Economy of International Standards in East Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. World Economic Forum (2003). The Global Competitiveness Report 2002–2003. New York: Oxford University Press. Yoshitomi, Masuru et al. (2003). Post-Crisis Development Paradigms in Asia. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Young, Oran R. (1979). Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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3 Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Corporations? The Experience of the Chemicals Industry Michael Lenox
In an attempt to avoid costly government regulation and other liabilities as a result of environmental externalities, a growing number of firms have promoted industry self-regulation—the association of firms to voluntarily control their collective behavior. In the past twenty years, environmental self-regulatory programs have proliferated in both the USA and abroad (Nash and Ehrenfeld 1996). Growing environmental regulations in industrialized nations and increasing environmental activism of consumers and the public in general have driven many industries to look for alternative strategies to deal with stakeholders. Industries have attempted to avoid costly government regulation and to placate concerned stakeholders by promising to voluntarily reduce their environmental impacts. In this chapter, we explore the conditions under which effective industry self-regulation is likely to emerge. Formally, we define ‘self-regulation’ as the provision of public goods beyond that required by law. As opposed to unilateral self-regulation by a single firm, industry self-regulation entails collective action by member firms to improve the reputation of the industry as a whole. To facilitate collective investment, many industries have relied on trade associations to initiate and coordinate programs. These programs typically entail the adoption of codes of environmental management practice by member firms. Codes of environmental management practice stipulate environmental goals for firms beyond those that are codified into government regulation. They include guidance as to how participating firms are to meet these goals. Trade associations utilize
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a mix of mechanisms, including trade association oversight, external verification, and peer pressure, to ensure compliance with program goals. In the sections to follow, we discuss the incentives for firms to selfregulate and how the costs of failure to self-regulate are often borne by the collective, for example the industry, rather than narrowly by individual firms. Given this collective nature, we discuss a number of challenges to industry self-regulation, in particular, adverse selection, moral hazard, and freeriding. In the latter half of this chapter, we discuss the various strategies firms adopt with regards to self-regulatory efforts and identify potential public policies that may help facilitate industry self-regulation. Throughout this chapter, we reference previous empirical work conducted by the authors. In particular, we pull from a series of studies examining the American Chemistry Council’s (ACC) 1 Responsible Care™ program (King and Lenox 2000; Lenox and Nash 2003; Lenox 2006). The ACC is the primary trade association of the US chemical industry and consists of many of the largest US chemical producers. Responsible Care was initiated by the ACC in 1989 in response to negative public perception surrounding the chemical industry in the USA. Participation was required as a condition of membership in the ACC. Members pledged to uphold a set of ten principles and to adopt six codes of management practice. The codes required that firms adopt certain practices, dedicate staff to specific activities, and employ particular techniques. They did not, however, set specific environmental performance criteria. Initially, compliance to program requirements was self-reported by member firms. Failure to comply with program requirements could result in expulsion from the ACC, though in the first few years of the program no firms were expelled. The hope of the chemical firms who made up the ACC was that by voluntarily reducing the harmful environmental impacts of chemical manufacturing operations they could improve the chemical industry’s reputation and subsequently forestall further government regulation and ease community relations and the citing of new manufacturing facilities.
3.1. Incentives for Industry Self-Regulation Traditionally, the environmental impact of industrial processes has been assumed to be a pure externality. In other words, in the absence of 1 Prior to 2000, The American Chemistry Council was known as the Chemical Manufacturers Association.
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government regulation, the harm caused by environmental degradation as a result of economic activity is borne by others than those who generate the environmental impacts. For example, a factory polluting a river does not bear the cost of the damages to fisheries downstream. Since there is not a market for water pollution, damaged parties have no recourse against the factory. While the factory may utilize more of a resource (in this case clean water) than is socially optimal, the factory has no incentive to reduce its environmental impact. In such a world, profit-seeking firms are unlikely to self-regulate. Industry self-regulation may be viewed as corporate philanthropy at best and foolhardy and welfare decreasing at worst (see Friedman 1970). While purely altruistic-driven self-regulation may be possible, we suspect that it will be rare, idiosyncratic, and ultimately limited due to the disciplinary forces of capital markets. 2 Altruistic managers are likely either to be removed by shareholders or to lead their enterprises to competitive failure and exit. 3 While managers may have some discretion to be altruistic in the presence of weak corporate governance, recent history has shown that managers rarely act on behalf of the public but rather in their own narrow self-interest when discretion is available. More likely, industry self-regulation arises as a result of some financial benefit that it provides to firms. In the absence of market imperfections, firms that self-regulate will incur costs with no offsetting financial benefit (Reinhardt 1999). Such firms will eventually be driven out of the market, as lower cost rivals are able to drive market prices to the self-regulating firm’s average unit cost. However, there often exist external pressures that, when brought to bear, ‘internalize’ externalities. Costs may be imposed on polluting firms such that they have an incentive to reduce their environmental impacts even in the absence of government regulation. The most obvious pressure is the threat of future government regulation. Industry self-regulation may be a potent strategy by industries to forestall government regulation. By demonstrating to legislators that they can police their own, industries may be able to avoid costly government intervention. This is one of the reasons given by the ACC for the creation of the Responsible Care program. According to the trade association, pollution reductions may be achieved at lower cost (both to firms and 2 We define altruistic behavior as strategic choices that benefit external stakeholders such as the general public at the expense of the firm’s profit objective. 3 It is possible that under some circumstances that altruistic-driven self-regulation may be sustainable. In particular, tightly held private firms may have owners who are willing to sacrifice returns for the greater welfare.
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to society) through industry self-regulation than by governmental regulation (Chemical Manufacturers Association 1991). The implicit assumption being that industry members have better information than regulators about technological opportunities and the efficiency of various solutions. Especially derided by the for-profit sector are command and control regulations that specify specific technological solutions that may not be efficient for every producer in the industry. In addition, self-regulation potentially could reduce the political costs of crafting legislation and regulatory rules and the regulatory cost of monitoring and enforcing rules. Beyond pressure from the state, nongovernmental stakeholders such as consumers, community advocacy groups, and environmental organizations may place substantial pressure to self-regulate directly on firms. Boycotts, lawsuits, and protests by activist stakeholders may be extremely costly to firms. Effective boycotts can have a significant impact on firm revenues. Successful lawsuits can cost firms millions of dollars. Protests may raise operational expenses by making it difficult to get permits or to site new facilities. Each of these stakeholder actions may embolden public sentiment and lead to future government regulation, depress consumer demand, and raise labor costs by making it more difficult to hire and retain quality employees. Furthermore, protests, boycotts, and lawsuits may siphon scarce managerial attention away from other pressing firm endeavors. The Responsible Care program was started in large part to deal with negative public perceptions of the chemical industry that manifested themselves in the actions of activist stakeholders. However, if stakeholders have good information about the environmental performance of firms, pressure to self-regulate by activists should inspire firms to unilaterally reduce their environmental footprint (see Table 3.1). In other words, firms would not need to coordinate their pollution reduction efforts as in the Responsible Care case. Activists could target polluting firms while ignoring or even rewarding higher quality (i.e. less polluting) firms. In essence, a market for environment-friendly products and practices would Table 3.1. Typology of stakeholder responses to environmental externalities High
Low
Stakeholder ability to differentiate competitors
Simplistic but targeted Informed & precise
Arbitrary & capricious Ambivalent (or worse)
Stakeholder ability to assess firm’s performance
Ambivalent (or worse) Informed & precise
Arbitrary & capricious Simplistic but targeted
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be created. These markets could be further enhanced by general consumer demand for environment-friendly goods. 4 If such a market exists, selfregulating firms would be able to differentiate their products and services from competitors and command price premiums. However, the assessment of firm environmental performance by stakeholders is rife with information asymmetries. The environmental behavior and performance of firms are often unobservable. Reliable metrics are few and the ones that do exist are often ambiguous and noncommensurate with other metrics. As a result, firms find themselves in a world where stakeholders have little information on the environmental performance of themselves and their competitors. In such a world, stakeholder actions tend to be arbitrary and capricious. Activists may lash out at a firm, not because it is a relatively poor performer within its industry, but because it is large and visible. The whole industry may be held responsible for the actions of a handful of laggards. In the absence of credible information, even environmental leaders may find themselves under scrutiny. In such a situation, leading firms may try to reduce information asymmetries by providing detailed information on their own performance. However, it is exceedingly difficult for high-quality firms to make credible claims about their environmental performance (and thus appease environment-friendly consumers and avoid the ire of activist stakeholders). Absent additional information from competitors, stakeholders will have difficulty making use of detailed performance data released by high-quality firms. At best, activist stakeholders may be ambivalent to corporate-provided information. At worst, activists may target firms who release information given their ability to scrutinize their performance. As a result, efforts to unilaterally self-regulate are often insufficient. Ultimately, individual environmental reputations are tied with other firms within the industry. Fatal accidents, damaging spills, and the emission of toxic pollutants have consequences not only for the offending firm but for all firms within an industry. Environmental leaders may find themselves facing the same regulations, activist pressures, and consumer demands as environmental laggards. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was the case in the US chemical industry. The ACC lamented that chemical firms were often all ‘tarred by the same brush’. An accident at one chemical plant had repercussions not only for the owner but for all firms within the industry. A prime 4 Surveys of US consumers suggest that demand is relatively elastic with regards to environmental impacts. Nonetheless environment impacts have been found to be important purchase criteria in at least some segments of the US economy.
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example was the accident at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India in 1984 in which thousands died. Analysts observed that not only did Union Carbide suffer financially from the accident, but that other chemical firms also saw their stock devalued in the wake of the accident. Investments by some firms to reduce accidents were insufficient to avoid the negative repercussions of others’ actions.
3.2. Challenges to Industry Self-Regulation The collective nature of government regulation, activist pressure, and consumer demand forces firms to band together if they wish to minimize the threat posed by these various stakeholders. Hence, for self-regulation to be beneficial, investments are needed by self-interested firms in the collective reputation of the industry. This creates a ‘reputation commons’ problem (King, Lenox, and Barnett 2001). Like all commons problems, the nonexcludability of contributions to industry reputation creates a collective good. When a collective good is provided, all members of the relevant group benefit regardless of whether they contribute to providing the good or not. Consequently, such goods are subject to freeriding, that is, firms will do nothing while benefiting from the efforts of others. Common examples of collective goods include maintaining public fisheries, rangelands, and aquifers and the provision of basic scientific research and education. In all these cases, the possibility of freeriding often leads to under investment in the collective good. Traditionally, scholars have proposed that the collective good problem can only be solved by an independent governing body (e.g. the state). A sovereign authority is needed to either directly provide the collective good (Pigou 1912) or to privatize the good so that each user bears the full costs and benefits of his actions and thus will not tend to overuse the resource (Coase 1960). According to the traditional view, without such a ‘leviathan’, collective goods fall victim to the ‘remorseless workings of things’ (Hobbes 1960; Hardin 1968). In contrast, recent research suggests that firms may, under certain circumstances, collectively self-regulate their behavior. Examples of successful self-regulation are numerous and diverse. For centuries, certain communities have successfully managed common resources such as water, fish, and land (King 1995). Examples of successful self-regulation within business include the management of a commodity futures exchange (Abolafia 1985), safety regulation in the nuclear power industry 67
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(Rees 1997), and shipping rules in the international maritime industry (Furgur 1997). Economists have focused on a number of factors that may facilitate self-regulation. Game theoretic treatments propose that credible threats of punishment for noncompliance are necessary for collective self-regulation (Radner 1981; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Axelrod 1986). Central for such outcomes is the notion of reciprocity acting as a mutual deterrent to deviant behavior. When one firm violates agreed-upon rules, mechanisms must be put in place to sanction that firm. In essence, firms must agree to punish one another if one of them deviates. Scholars have provided a number of specific examples in which reciprocal actions enforced self-regulation. In some New England lobstering communities, lobstermen who overfish have the buoys on their traps cut (Ostrom 1990). In the Champagne fairs of medieval England, traders who reneged on agreed-upon exchanges were forcibly removed from the fair grounds by a collectively appointed judiciary (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990). The Maghribi traders from the eleventh-century Mediterranean enforced a commercial code by ostracizing and retaliating against members found in violation (Greif 1993). In the case of modern industry self-regulation, the potential punishments are limited. Civil law prohibits any number of draconian retaliatory responses (such as destroying property). Antitrust law does not allow firms to collectively boycott or to raise prices for competitors. Subsequently, any punishments administered for failure to comply with a self-regulatory program must be accepted by firms who participate voluntarily. Since firms may not force industry members to join into such programs, a firm may avoid punishment by simply exiting the program. Given that participation in industry self-regulation is voluntary, we would expect such initiatives to be subject to free riding. Unable to force industry members to participate, firms would elect not to participate, enjoying the fruits of the labor of self-regulatory participants while avoiding the costs. For moderate size industries and absent heterogeneity among firms, we might expect that self-regulatory programs would fall apart (Olson 1965). Segerson and Dawson (2001) demonstrate, however, that fear of such failure might cause some firms to participate so long as the cost of membership is less than the cost of government regulation or stakeholder sanctions in the absence of industry self-regulation. Presumably these firms disproportionately bear the cost of failure and thus are willing to provide for the collective good. In our studies of Responsible Care, we provide empirical evidence that a critical number of firms may 68
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band together to continue the collective effort even though each firm would benefit from freeriding off the program (Lenox 2006). Hence, we may observe two sets of firms within an industry—those who self-regulate and those who freeride. Interestingly, whether a firm self-regulates or freerides may provide valuable information to stakeholders. Participation in self-regulatory programs may provide a signal to stakeholders about a firm’s quality. Stakeholders may subsequently reward firms for participation. For example, adherence to a standard set of practices may provide evidence of due diligence in legal battles. Even if a firm’s environmental performance is below the norm, its adherence to management practices adopted by other firms may demonstrate that it has not been willfully negligent (King and Baerwald 1998). To the extent participation in a self-regulatory program provides insurance, some firms who might otherwise not participate will have incentives to participate despite the costs. Troubling, though, is that if there is no mechanism for screening members, these programs may be subject to adverse selection—bad firms will join to receive the insurance and signaling benefits. While some firms will join to improve the collective reputation others may join to mask their poor performance. This is exactly our finding with respect to Responsible Care (King and Lenox 2000). In a study of over 3,500 US chemical facilities over the period 1987–96, we present evidence that a few larger, less polluting firms join Responsible Care but that, in general, dirtier firms tended to join Responsible Care. This is perhaps not surprising given that over the first decade of its existence, the Responsible Care program allowed self-monitoring by firms and had no history of expelling noncompliant members. Even if all members join with the intention to improve the industry’s reputation, the absence of mechanisms to monitor and sanction firms who fail to comply with program objectives may lead to moral hazard. In other words, once in receipt of the insurance benefits conferred to program participants, members have an incentive to be more risk seeking and consequently underinvest in environmental improvements. The duediligence benefits discussed above may lead to a race to the bottom as ‘best practice’ degrades as firms reduce investments. Our research on Responsible Care provides collaborating evidence (King and Lenox 2000). We found no evidence that Responsible Care firms reduced their toxic emissions any faster than nonparticipants and, in fact, found weak evidence that they reduced emissions less quickly than comparable nonparticipants. 69
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On the basis of our findings, we argue that absent explicit mechanisms for penalizing malfeasance, self-regulatory programs are likely subject to adverse selection and moral hazard. As pointed out earlier, however, selfregulatory programs are limited in the punishments they may administer. Monetary penalties such as fines are likely to raise antitrust concerns among government regulators. Neoinstitutional theorists have claimed that compliance may be achieved through informal mechanisms such as shaming and public exposure (Braithwaite 1989) and the emergence of new norms and values that change members’ preferences for collectively valued actions (Gunningham 1995; Furger 1997; Hoffman 1997; Rees 1997). According to this perspective increases in interpersonal communication can serve as a ‘basic ingredient of sustained individual accountability’ (Furger 1997: 449). While sociologists have argued that subtler coercive, normative, and mimetic means may be evoked, our previous empirical research casts doubt on the power of informal sanctions to prevent adverse selection into industry self-regulatory programs at least in the case of the US chemical industry during the early 1990s (King and Lenox 2000). Trade associations are nonprofit organizations that rely on the support of voluntary members in order to remain viable. For many trade associations, lobbying government on behalf of members’ interest to minimize the costs of regulatory compliance is their major activity. Facilitating industry self-regulatory programs, however, is substantively different from these activities. It is perhaps not surprising that trade association-managed selfregulatory programs are only as effective as the explicit sanctions brought to bear to ensure compliance.
3.3. Strategic Implications An interesting picture begins to emerge when we consider the challenges to industry self-regulation. We identify four generic strategic positions that firms may take with respect to self-regulatory efforts within their industries (see Table 3.2). We suspect that in many cases some firms will freeride off the efforts of others (Table 3.2: lower-left quadrant). These firms choose not to participate in industry-led efforts and do not selfregulate unilaterally. They gain the benefits of industry self-regulation without incurring the costs of participating and self-regulating themselves. In the case of Responsible Care, over 70 percent of US chemical firms choose not to participate (Lenox 2006). These firms tended to be 70
Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Corporations? Table 3.2. Typology of self-regulatory strategies
Self-regulate
Do not self-regulate
Do not participate Participate in program
smaller firms or firms with little production in the chemical industry. We may speculate that their absence from a self-regulatory program would likely not be of major concern to external stakeholders and thus not lead to the collapse of the self-regulatory effort. We propose that a second group of firms (Table 3.2: lower-right quadrant) may join self-regulatory efforts to gain the legitimacy and learning benefits of membership without putting forth the effort to meet the standards specified in the program. In other words, these firms fail to truly self-regulate. (We refer to them as laggards for lack of a better term.) In the case of Responsible Care, these firms tended to be dirtier firms from dirtier industry segments. Conservatively, roughly 10 percent of ACC members fell into this category. One inference is that companies with high risk for future liability (those in the most polluting sectors) joined for the liability protection that membership provided. These firms were able to avoid meeting the standards because Responsible Care lacked explicit monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. Absent these mechanisms, firms could join the self-regulatory program without putting forth any real effort, for example, making changes to their production and management processes. We may surmise that the liability benefits that laggard firms seek is available despite their lack of effort due to the actions of a set of leading firms (Table 3.2: upper-right quadrant). In the case of Responsible Care, these leading firms tended to be larger firms, heavily focused in the chemical industry (e.g. Dow and Dupont). Their exit would likely lead to the collapse of the Responsible Care program. Furthermore, their active participation was necessary to placate concerned stakeholders. These firms likely continued to participate despite the various forms of freeriding 71
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taking place because they internalize the benefits from industry selfregulation more than others. Finally, there may exist a small set of loner firms (Table 3.2: upperleft quadrant) who choose not to participate in industry self-regulatory efforts but that unilaterally self-regulate nonetheless. These firms have private incentives to improve environmental performance regardless of the actions of others. These may be highly visible firms or foreign firms who find themselves under greater stakeholder pressures (King and Shaver 2001). These firms may elect not to participate in industry self-regulatory efforts because these nonmembers use alternative management programs that would be disrupted by participation. For some firms, participation may even damage their reputation. Due to adverse selection, Responsible Care members tended to be more polluting and more slowly improving than nonmembers on average (King and Lenox 2000). Responsible Care members also have a reputation for overly conservative management among some Wall Street analysts (Anonymous 1999). Thus small, clean, and aggressive firms may have harmed their reputation if they chose to participate in Responsible Care. The presence of loners suggests that the value created by the selfregulatory efforts of leading firms is degraded by the presence of laggards and, to a lesser extent, freeriders. The marginal improvement in industry reputation due to self-regulation by leading firms is less, given laggards and freeriders. In addition, the ability of leading firms to differentiate themselves from others in the industry is undermined by the presence of laggards. From the leading firms’ perspective, the existence of laggards and freeriders may be tolerated but is obviously not desirable. Thus, leading firms may pursue a number of actions to narrow the scope of these two groups. We will consider each in turn. We propose that the most viable way to eliminate laggards is to simply expel noncompliant firms from the program. This means that self-regulatory organizations must (a) establish structures to monitor individual firm compliance with program objectives and (b) establish procedures for removal of firms from the program. Otherwise, industry self-regulatory programs will attract poor performers who may benefit from participation without putting forth any real effort. Only when rigid monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are in place, may poor performers be dissuaded from joining the self-regulatory program in the first place. Empirical work of ours comparing across four trade association sponsored programs in different industries provides evidence consistent with 72
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this proposition (Lenox and Nash 2003). Using a sample of over 4,000 US firms in the chemical, textile, and pulp and paper industries, we find evidence that, in at least one program, more polluting firms tended to join, while in another, cleaner firms were more likely to join. We speculate that differences in the structure of the programs drive these findings. In particular, the self-regulatory programs that were able to avoid adverse selection had a history of expelling noncompliant members while the less successful programs had not. The elimination of freeriders is more difficult. As mentioned earlier, antitrust law prohibits firms from forcing compliance with standards on nonparticipant firms through various retaliatory measures. Since firms can only voluntarily participate in industry self-regulatory efforts, their only recourse to leading firms is to expel noncompliant members. One potential solution for leading firms is to lobby government to impose the standard on the industry. Of course, this ceases to be ‘self’ regulation and simply reflects lobbying by firms to impose government regulations that create favorable barriers to entry in the industry. In fact, some antitrust experts have expressed concern that industry self-regulation is really an attempt by leading firms to force out lower cost rivals. Another potential solution to the freerider problem is for leading firms to differentiate program participants from nonparticipants in such a way that the value created by the self-regulatory effort is appropriated solely by participants. To the extent that participation in self-regulation may serve as a signal of superior environmental performance, external stakeholders may differentiate between firms and direct their environmental externality ‘internalization’ efforts to poor performers. Referring back to Table 3.1, participation in industry self-regulatory efforts may be a way to move from the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ world due to rampant information asymmetries to the ‘informed and precise’ world where environmental laggards are punished and environmental leaders are rewarded. In other words, leading firms may be able to privatize the reputation commons.
3.4. Policy Implications To the extent that industry self-regulation is socially desirable, the state may wish to aid industry efforts to self-regulate. There are a number of actions that the state may feasibly take to help promote industry selfregulation and mitigate some of the challenges to self-regulation. For one, the state could use the threat of future regulation to coerce industry 73
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self-regulation. Yet, as discussed above, the mere presence of collective incentives may not be sufficient to establish industry self-regulation given the organizational challenges to success. An alternative approach is for the state to require firms to abide by industry standards using the government regulatory apparatus. While this would solve the freerider problem, such compliance requirements resemble traditional government regulation and likely provide few of the efficiency benefits of ‘self’-regulation. A third possibility is for the state to allow various forms of collusion that otherwise may be prevented by antitrust law. For example, leading firms may be given permission to punish those firms who fail to comply with industry self-regulatory efforts. In the chemical industry, it has been suggested that self-regulating firms could raise the factor prices of nonparticipating firms because of the dense vertical exchanges that occur within the industry. This is a potentially powerful way to address the freerider problem. However, the state would need to balance the welfare gains from reducing environmental externalities with the threats of potential price collusion and exercise of market power to limit entry as a result of allowing such coordination. Another possibility is for the state to reward firms who participate in industry self-regulatory efforts. This would help address the freerider problem by providing incentives directly to those who self-regulate. Potential rewards include favorable treatment in permit and review processes, preference in government procurement contracts, and reduced fines in light of regulatory violations. Of course, from the state’s perspective, any attempt to reward self-regulation participants is contingent that they are able to achieve their self-regulatory goals, that is that they have adopted structures which avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Finally, the state may take actions to help solve the information asymmetry problem between stakeholders and firms. In other words, the state could help eliminate the reputation commons problem. In doing so, stakeholders could directly punish polluting firms and provide incentives for unilateral self-regulation—thus avoiding the freeriding, adverse selection, and moral hazard problems associated with industry self-regulation. Potential actions by the state include various forms of standard setting and reporting requirements. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)—a database of annual toxic emissions of US manufacturing facilities—is one such attempt to provide accurate, unbiased environmental performance data for use by nongovernmental stakeholders. 74
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3.5. Conclusions Industry self-regulation has the potential to offer an efficient and effective complement to traditional government regulation. Industry-led efforts to self-regulate may reduce the costs of achieving environmental impact reductions and avoid the political and regulatory costs associated with regulation by the state. Increasingly, society is dealing with environmental issues on a global scale—atmospheric warming, the creation of the ozone hole, the loss of biodiversity. As the scale of these problems has increased, so has the scale of the necessary political coordination needed to address these concerns. Given the absence of a single state to enforce regulation in the global context, we suspect that industry selfregulation will become increasingly important in efforts to address global environmental impacts. Given industry self-regulation’s growing importance, it is critical to consider the incentives motivating firms to self-regulate and the challenges to collective action that industry self-regulatory efforts face. We propose that industry self-regulation arises in response to threats of future government regulation and to pressure from external stakeholders such as consumers and activists. Response to such pressures often requires collective action on the part of industry members since information asymmetries prevent the accurate assignment of individual firm performance. In other words, industry reputation is a collective good in which the poor behavior of some firms has negative repercussions for all within the industry. As a result of the collective nature of industry self-regulation, industry efforts are subject to freeriding, that is some firms will fail to selfregulate while gaining benefits from those who do. When participants in self-regulatory efforts fail to install viable monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, industry self-regulatory programs will be subject to adverse selection and moral hazard in addition. Polluting firms will join to receive the insurance benefits of membership while failing to put forth the effort required. There are a number of strategies that may help mitigate these problems. Adverse selection and moral hazard may be avoided by installing explicit procedures for reviewing firm compliance with program goals and for removing those firms who fail to comply thus ensuring that participants in self-regulatory initiatives truly self-regulate. While freeriders are difficult to eliminate completely, leading firms may reduce the benefits to freeriding by attempting to differentiate themselves through 75
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their participation in the self-regulatory program. The state may play an active role by helping to reduce information asymmetries between firms and their stakeholders and by rewarding self-regulating firms. In the end, while our research suggests that industry self-regulation faces a number of important challenges, our conclusion is that when structured properly industry self-regulation holds promise as a valuable approach to address global environmental concerns.
References Abolafia, M. Y. (1985). ‘Self-regulation as Market Maintenance: An Organizational Perspective’, in R. G. Noll (ed.), Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences. Berkeley, CA: University of Califonia Press, pp. 312–43. Anonymous (1999). Personal conversation with a manager of a large screened mutual fund. (Name withheld at respondent’s request.) Axelrod, R. (1986). ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’, American Political Science Review, 80(4): 1095–111. Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, Shame, and Reintegration. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chemical Manufacturers Association (1991). Responsible Care: A Public Commitment. Washington, DC. Coase, R. H. (1960). ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, The Journal of Law & Economics, 3: 1–44. Friedman, M. (1970). ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, New York Times Magazine, September 13: 32+. Furger, F. (1997). ‘Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Maritime Industry’, Law & Policy, 19(4): 445. Greif, A. (1993). ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’, The American Economic Review, 83(3): 525– 48. Gunningham, N. (1995). ‘Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care’, Law & Policy, 17(1): 57–108. Hardin, G. (1968). ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162: 1243–8. Hobbes, T. (1960). Leviathan. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Hoffman, A. (1997). From Heresy to Dogma: An Institutional History of Corporate Environmentalism. San Francisco, CA: New Lexington Press. King, A. (1995). ‘Avoiding Ecological Surprise: Lessons from Long-Standing Communities’, Academy of Management Review, 20(4). and Baerwald, S. (1998). ‘Greening Arguments: Opportunities for the Strategic Management of Public Opinion’, in K. Sexton et al. (eds), Better Environmental Decisions: Strategies for Governments, Businesses and Communities. Washington, DC: Island Press.
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Do Voluntary Standards Work Among Corporations? and Lenox, M. (2000). ‘Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program’, Academy of Management Journal, 43(4): 698–716. and Shaver, J. M. (2001). ‘Are Aliens Green? Assessing Foreign Establishments’ Environmental Conduct in the United States’, Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1069–85. Lenox, M., and Barnett, M. (2001). ‘Strategic Responses to the Reputation Commons Problem’, in Hoffman and Ventresca (eds), Organizations, Policy and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R. (1982). ‘Sequential Equilibria’, Econometrica, 50(4): 863–94. Lenox, M. (2006). ‘The Role of Private Decentralized Institutions in Sustaining Industry Self-Regulation’, Working Paper. and Nash, J. (2003). ‘Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection: A Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs’, Business Strategy and Environment, 12(6): 343–56. Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., and Weingast, B. R. (1990). ‘The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’, Economics and Politics, 2: 1–23. Nash, J. and Ehrenfeld, J. (1996). ‘Code Green’, Environment, 38(1): 16. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pigou, A. C. (1912). Wealth and Welfare. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Radner, R. (1981). ‘Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal– Agent Relationship’, Econometrica, 49(5): 1127–48. Rees, J. (1997). ‘The Development of Communitarian Regulation in the Chemical Industry’, Law and Policy, 19(4): 477. Reinhardt, F. (1999). ‘Market Failure and the Environmental Policies of Firms’, Journal of Industrial Ecology, 3(1). Segerson, K. and Dawson, N. L. (2001). ‘Environmental Voluntary Agreements: Participation and Free Riding’, in K. Deketelaere and E. Orts (eds), Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe. Philadelphia, PA: Kluwer, pp. 369–88.
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4 Making Disclosure Work Better: The Experience of Investor-Driven Environmental Disclosure Robert Repetto 1
4.1. Introduction Experience in the world’s financial markets during the past decade underscores the importance of transparency and disclosure for the protection of investors and the efficient functioning of capital markets. Disclosure of financially material environmental information serves not only these ends but also that of environmental protection. It allows investors and insurers to judge more accurately the environmental risks being incurred by companies and industries, which might affect their financial results and conditions, and to price those risks more accurately. Pricing environmental risks accurately reduces principal–agent problems between management and outside investors that tempts the former to pursue environmentally risky strategies in pursuit of increased short-term profitability. Environmental disclosure is a particular case, with the same underlying rationale, of the principle underlying most securities regulation that all material information should be promptly disclosed. Environmental and sustainability reporting has increased substantially over recent decades, but most of it is divorced from company’s financial statements and does not serve the interests of investors adequately. Such reporting serves companies’ interest in informing and mollifying environmentally concerned stakeholders and may also reflect stronger 1 Robert Repetto is Professor in the Practice of Economics and Sustainable Development, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
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internal management information systems but rarely enlightens investors on the financial implications of companies’ environmental exposures. Some companies—those with exposures significantly more favorable than their competitors’—would seem to have an interest in informing investors of their superior position and in raising disclosure standards, but in reality there is little systematic differentiation among companies in environmental transparency, even with respect to compliance with existing legal disclosure requirements. Stronger enforcement of these existing disclosure requirements is needed to induce more widespread compliance. Stronger enforcement is needed, but new regulation generally is not needed. The Sarbanes–Oxley Law in the USA and a variety of other recent regulatory enhancements in other financial centers have already elaborated on the underlying principle that all material environmental information must be disclosed. In the world of corporate counsels and boardrooms, news of a few well-publicized enforcement cases brings about widespread self-examination and self-correction to avoid similar difficulties. Thus, without much additional regulation or bureaucracy, the power of financial markets can be brought to bear to reduce environmental risks, while simultaneously making capital markets more efficient. This could be quite useful in middle-income countries with growing domestic capital markets and significant environmental problems, but with environmental regulatory systems that are still being developed. Financial markets evidently will reward companies with better disclosure policies and practices. In the USA, companies that reported no significant weaknesses for the years 2004 and 2005 in their internal systems to capture and disclose material information substantially outperformed the overall stock market. Those companies that reported such weaknesses in 2004 but not in 2005 also outperformed the market, but to a lesser degree. By contrast, companies that reported weaknesses in their internal controls in both 2004 and 2005 markedly underperformed the market (Reilly 2006).
4.2. Increasing Capital Market Attention to Environmental Issues In virtually all segments of the financial marketplace, the attention to environmental issues has increased rapidly over the past two decades (Labatt and White 2002). To some observers, this trend merely reflects underlying fundamentals. Expanding economic output and population 79
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have put more stress on environmental quality while rising incomes have strengthened public demands for environmental amenities (Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins 1999). As an inevitable result of this conflict, environmental issues have gained prominence in the business world and will continue to do so. Leaders in many industries already cite them as important management concerns (Schmidheiny and Zorraquin 1996).
4.2.1. Asset Managers Among institutional asset managers, these trends are reflected in the rapid growth of environmentally screened or ‘socially responsible’ mutual funds and other portfolios. Such portfolios now hold at least $2 trillion in assets (Social Investment Forum 2001). Their growth has been stimulated by two factors, in addition to the growing investor interest in ‘ethical’ investing. First, the replacement of defined-benefit pension plans by definedcontribution plans in which beneficiaries have greater control over asset allocation has led money management firms to create and offer screened funds as an investment choice. For this reason, among others, almost all major investment houses now have staff responsible for environmental evaluation and research. Second, the demonstration in recent years that screened portfolios often provide risk-adjusted returns superior or equal to unscreened benchmarks has encouraged investors to allocate at least a portion of their assets to the environmentally screened portfolios (Labatt and White 2002: 151–4). Many managers of pension funds and other endowments, which together command trillions of dollars in assets, have evolved a heightened interest in the long-term sustainability of entire communities and economies because of their long-term obligations to beneficiaries and the size and breadth of their asset holdings. They have become universal investors, internalizing the externality costs generated by individual firms within their portfolios. Broader concerns about sustainability have led managers of large US pension funds, such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF, to take an active interest in corporate governance, including environmental governance. The Investor Network on Climate Risk, including institutional investors with more than a trillion dollars in assets, have submitted many shareholders’ resolutions calling on companies to reveal and address the financial risks arising from their greenhouse gas emissions. In the UK, pension funds have been called on to disclose the way they address social and environmental issues in their portfolio decisions. 80
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Environmental and social considerations have been incorporated into investment decisions by large pension funds in other countries as well.
4.2.2. Insurance Markets For good reason, environmental issues became embedded earliest and most deeply in property and casualty insurance markets. As early as 1980, the passage of Superfund legislation (CERCLA) in the USA mandating the clean-up of thousands of badly contaminated industrial sites alerted insurers to the possibility that despite policies written to cover only ‘sudden and accidental’ releases, they could be financially liable for huge clean-up costs on policies that had been written decades ago when such coverage was never anticipated. Despite enormous litigation costs, insurance companies have paid out billions of dollars in such claims. Equally large claims have been upheld related to asbestos liabilities. As a result, property and casualty insurers as well as commercial banks, the other deeply involved financial institutions, have invested heavily to inform themselves about contamination risks in order to define and limit their liabilities. In response to demands from financial institutions, the EPA, the SEC, the Accounting Standards Board, and other oversight bodies have placed heavy emphasis on disclosure and proper recognition of these environmental liabilities. As a result, industrial companies have been forced into much fuller disclosure. Using newly available databases, financial institutions and their consultants now routinely evaluate sites and entire neighborhoods for potential contamination. Such evaluations now are important elements in insurance underwriting, mortgage lending, and project finance. Consequently, contamination risks are priced much more efficiently in insurance and other financial markets. New financial products have even been developed to handle such risks. For example, insurance against the discovery of contamination is again available, as is insurance against cost overruns in site remediation. Another environmental alarm for the property and casualty insurance industry was triggered when Hurricane Andrew hit the Florida coast in 1992, causing $16 billion in insured losses, a sum almost 50 percent larger than the premiums collected in Florida over the preceding twenty years. Confronted with a geometrically rising trajectory of insured and total losses from catastrophic natural disasters, the insurance and reinsurance industries came to grips with climate change. They have responded vigorously on several fronts, one of which has been an intensive effort to improve their modeling and estimation of catastrophic risks (Froot 1999). 81
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Also, insurers have aligned themselves to diversify their exposures and to spread risks more broadly throughout the insurance industry and to broader capital markets. In addition, the insurance industry, particularly European reinsurance companies such as Munich Re and Swiss Re, has taken an active role in advocating government and industrial actions to reduce the risk of natural disasters by curtailing greenhouse gas emissions.
4.2.3. New Financial Products to Manage Environmental Costs Increasing attention from financial institutions has stimulated development of innovative financial products and mechanisms with which to allocate environmental risks efficiently. To distribute catastrophic risks to capital markets with more capacity, the insurance sector has successfully marketed catastrophe bonds, which have variable returns linked to the occurrence of extreme weather events. Because of their high expected yield and low risk correlation with economic variables, these have found buyers among large portfolio managers. Sophisticated weather derivatives, such as swaps and hedges, have also come into existence. An even more revolutionary innovation has been the emergence of financial markets on which emission permits can be traded. Beginning in pilot markets in the USA in the 1980s, emission trading emerged nationwide with the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Amendments mandating trading of permits to emit sulfur oxides. The notable success of that initiative in containing costs while accelerating the schedule for reducing pollution has led to the adoption of emission trading as a policy tool in other countries and for other pollutants. Notably, it has become a crucial feature of the Kyoto Protocol on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The European Trading System, for example, has given rise to an entire industry of investors, brokers, exchanges, and market makers, which has grown up to facilitate emission trading. Emission futures, options, swaps, and other derivatives are now regularly traded on the Chicago Board of Trade and over the counter. These financial instruments allow companies to manage their environmental affairs with far greater efficiency.
4.2.4. Increased Recognition of Environmental Issues by Mainstream Investors More slowly but with increasing momentum, mainstream securities markets have begun to incorporate environmental factors into considerations of risk and return. The insight through which mainstream investors 82
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and analysts became aware that environmental factors are relevant came through experience, often painful. Investors have suffered severe and abrupt losses when environmental disasters occurred or news of such situations became public. In addition to such notorious calamities as the Exxon Valdez Alaskan oil spill or the Union Carbide toxic release in Bhopal, many other such events have caused investors pain. For example, the stock of Solutia, a company formed when Monsanto spun off its chemical division, plunged by almost 60 percent within a few weeks when an article in the Washington Post revealed that Monsanto had dumped tons of PCBs in Anniston, Alabama, and had covered up its behavior for decades. The company’s behavior was deemed ‘outrageous’ by an Alabama jury that held the company liable for negligence, suppression of truth, and nuisance, opening Solutia to further lawsuits. In another well-known case, the stock of U.S. Liquids, a Houston waste-management firm, fell 58 percent in one week when employees revealed to government authorities that the company had illegally dumped hazardous wastes and falsified records. Consequently, shareholders filed suit against the company for violation of securities law by issuing false and misleading reports and failing to disclose material information. Many studies have demonstrated that environmental events can have material financial consequences. Repeatedly, so-called ‘event studies’ have found that stock prices have been affected, often by substantial amounts, by spills and accidents, announcements of new environmental regulations, initiation or settlement of environmental litigation, and other environmental matters. Thus, for example, in the five trading days following the 1986 explosion at Union Carbide’s Bhopal, India plant, Union Carbide’s common stock price lost approximately $1 billion or 27.9 percent in value (Blacconiere and Patten 1994). After the Valdez accident, Exxon’s stock was depressed for six months (Jones et al. 1994), with a value loss ranging from $4.7 billion to $11.3 billion. When TRI data were first published in 1989, the stock value of TRI-reporting firms dropped by an average of $4.1 million (Hamilton 1995; Konar and Cohen 1997; Khanna et al. 1998). Most environmental event studies to date find a significant negative impact of pollution news on stock prices. Balancing these negative experiences, investors have found that companies with good environmental performance often outperform others in their industries (Dowell et al. 2000). Such companies may be more efficient in their use of materials and energy and more technologically advanced, leading to higher operating margins, but are also likely to have better management systems in place. Superior environmental 83
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management may signal superior overall management efficiency. In addition, companies that develop and commercialize solutions to environmental problems have found favor with investors, especially venture capitalists. For example, two highly successful companies in the rapidly growing organic foods sector have been Horizon Dairy, which supplies organic dairy products throughout the USA, in Europe, and Japan, and Whole Foods Market, which has achieved a commanding presence as an organic foods retailer. Many other ‘solution-oriented’ firms have been successfully established and brought to market in the energy sector, including firms dedicated to the commercialization of fuel cells, wind energy, and waste-to-energy converters. A rapidly increasing amount of venture capital and private equity is flowing into these sectors. Mainstream investors have come to realize that there is money to be made and money to be lost on account of environmental issues.
4.3. The Key Role of Information Disclosure 4.3.1. Mandatory Disclosure of Environmental Information These developments have underscored the key role of informational transparency in bringing financial markets to bear on industry’s environmental performance. When environmental risks could be hidden behind a veil of corporate secrecy until unfortunate occurrences revealed their extent, investors incurred significant unforeseen losses. When mandatory reporting and disclosure rules required companies to reveal to the public and to investors the extent of their environmental exposures, financial markets reacted in ways that priced those risks more efficiently and allocated them to willing, rather than unwitting, risk-bearers. Mandatory disclosure has become a widespread public policy instrument, employed to protect the public and to improve the performance of businesses and government in fields as diverse as food safety, fuel efficiency, management of toxic substances, sales of financial securities, and many others (Graham 2002). Disclosure is a policy tool that has appealed to both liberals and conservatives because it relies on informed consumer and public choice rather than direct regulation. Disclosure typically increases market efficiency by eliminating informational asymmetries between sellers and potential buyers. Such asymmetries often distort market prices and sometimes deter market transactions altogether (Akerlof 1970). Publicity provides strong incentives for business and 84
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government managers to improve performance by eliminating the possibility of shielding inferior or excessively risky products and services behind a veil of secrecy. The effectiveness of mandatory disclosure as a policy instrument has been reinforced in the past two decades by several ongoing trends. The development of the Internet and communications technology has dramatically improved the ease and speed of communication and has lowered its costs. Citizens and consumers can now diffuse information across the globe through decentralized linkages within hours or minutes. Complementing these trends in many sectors of the economy more and more of a company’s market value consists of intangible assets, including its brands and business reputation. The market value of many companies has become an increasing multiple of the book value of its tangible capital. Since strategic alliances, supplier networks, complex chains of financial relationships, and other networks have become an increasingly prominent aspect of the business world, impairment of a firm’s reputation can be a devastating loss. Reputational losses can also undermine consumers’ brand loyalty and make it more difficult for a company to recruit and retain high-quality employees. In the environmental realm, mandatory disclosure programs have been notably successful as tools to promote environmental protection. In the USA, the EPA’s TRI has not only informed the public about potential hazards in their communities, it has also provided a strong stimulus to companies generating reportable quantities of toxic substances to reduce their generation and release (Fung and O’Rourke 2000). Subsequent to the publication of TRI data and the adverse impact on public and investor opinion, prominent companies such as DuPont and Dow Chemicals, among many others, have entered into voluntary commitments to achieve major reductions, largely through pollution prevention initiatives. Explaining these commitments, CEOs of these companies have cited the need to protect their firms’ reputations. In Canada, the National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI) has had a similar success, prompting many companies to embark on accelerated pollution prevention and reduction programs, especially when also under some regulatory threat (Harrison and Antweiler 2003). Emissions reporting requirements, such as the TRI and NPRI, stimulated managers in some companies to quantify emissions on a plant and company-wide basis for the first time. On the principle that ‘You manage what you measure’, this expanded measurement by itself encouraged better environmental control. In addition, greater transparency discouraged 85
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management from pursuing unduly risky environmental policies that might save money in the short run but would expose the company and the public to excessive potential damages in the longer run. European countries have typically taken a broader view of corporate social responsibility than has the USA. Consequently, a large number and variety of corporate reporting systems are in place, most of them voluntary, by which companies make themselves accountable to stakeholders. In an effort to make such reports more comparable across companies, the GRI and others are attempting to achieve more standardized reporting frameworks. However, since these are not integrated with financial accounting and reporting systems, they have so far been of limited usefulness to investors and financial analysts. Public disclosure can be an even more advantageous policy tool in countries in which the government’s administrative capacities to operate an efficient environmental regulatory system are less fully developed. In such settings, publicity can serve as a powerful instrument with which to mobilize public opinion against those companies with lax environmental practices. A recent World Bank publication has documented the effectiveness of disclosure programs in influencing industrial polluters in countries throughout South and Southeast Asia (World Bank 2000).
4.3.2. Mandatory Disclosure in Financial Markets Disclosure of all financially material information is essential for the protection of investors against fraud, and for the efficient functioning of financial markets. When the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 enshrined disclosure as the principal means for regulating financial markets in the USA, Justice Brandeis said, ‘Sunlight is the best disinfectant.’ Disclosure is the dominant regulatory mechanism underlying the Securities Act to promote capital market efficiency, as emphasized in a recent law review article (Williams 1999). She quotes the House Report on the Securities Act 1933: The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgements of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value. (Williams 1999: 1210, n. 59)
Reinforcing this perspective, a leading scholar of securities law states, ‘At its core, the primary policy of the federal securities laws today involves 86
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the remediation of information asymmetries’ (Seligman 1995: 604). The recent revelations in the USA of accounting irregularities, executive selfdealing, and other corporate scandals dramatically revealed the risks to financial markets of informational asymmetries between insiders and outside investors. These scandals have reduced investor confidence in corporate management to a minimum and, if anything, have increased the potential damages to companies and investors when hidden information becomes public. To ensure sufficient disclosure by companies, the SEC has established a comprehensive set of guidelines and rules governing what companies should report. In addition to rigorous accounting rules for reporting financial results, the SEC holds firms to demanding standards regarding the disclosure of qualitative nonfinancial information that is needed lest current financial statements be misleading. According to Seligman, ‘The past two decades have witnessed a significant expansion of what must be disclosed by all registrants . . . in their 10K annual reports . . . This expansion can be termed the “soft information revolution” in the mandatory disclosure system’ (Seligman 1995: 610). These requirements include not only information about current conditions affecting the firm that investors would consider relevant but also any known risks and uncertainties that might have future material financial effects. In general, in addition to disclosures specifically required, registrants must disclose any material information needed to prevent statements from misleading investors (17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(b) 1998; SEC Release Nos. 33-6130, 34-16224, Sept. 27, 1979; 44FR56924–56925). The SEC and the courts have eschewed any numerical measure of materiality such as a fixed percentage of assets or earnings, instead defining it as information that a reasonable investor would be likely to consider important in the context of all the information available. Moreover, SEC guidance states that facts can be considered material if they bear on the ethics of management, its integrity, or its law compliance record, irrespective of the financial sums involved (SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99). Omitting to disclose material information is equivalent to making false or misleading statements and is subject to serious penalties. These disclosure requirements explicitly include forward-looking statements. The emphasis on transparency in financial markets is by no means restricted to the USA, of course, although disclosure requirements are more detailed in the USA than in other major financial markets. The principle that all material information should be promptly disclosed is widespread in countries with developed financial markets and, indeed, 87
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has played a significant role in their development. Experiences over the past two decades in international capital markets have also pointed out the importance of transparency. By reducing uncertainty and perceived risk, greater transparency reduces financial volatility and lowers the cost of capital. An important reason for the home-country bias that impedes international investment in particular is the disadvantageous informational asymmetry that investors perceive in venturing outside their own borders. The contagion that aggravated past international financial crises stemmed mainly from investors’ inability to differentiate between one emerging financial market and others, largely because of lack of transparency. Therefore, virtually all programs to reduce international financial market volatility and increase its efficiency have included strong recommendations for improved disclosure.
4.3.3. Disclosing Environmental Information in Financial Reporting Within this framework, the requirement that companies disclose to the investment community the material financial implications of their environmental exposures has become increasingly important. Unless financial market valuations of risk and return accurately reflect the financial risks that companies incur through their environmental management decisions, investors will be endangered and an important market incentive for prudent environmental management will be lacking. Rational investments to reduce future environmental costs, liabilities, or risks may be undervalued in the capital markets and thus discouraged. Because managers who position their companies to gain competitive advantage by virtue of their superior ability to cope with impending environmental challenges might not be rewarded by investors, such strategies might be discouraged. Asymmetric information about companies’ environmental exposures creates principal–agent problems. If external investors cannot accurately value companies’ investments in pollution control, managers may have an incentive to inflate stock prices for short-run gain by neglecting such investments (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). As managers’ compensation is more closely tied to stock market performance through stock options and performance-linked bonuses, and as financial analysts focus ever more closely on quarter-by-quarter earnings, the temptation to manage earnings through shortsighted strategies has become more powerful. Though in recent years this has been seen most obviously in accounting irregularities and financial engineering by such companies as Enron and 88
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WorldCom, the temptation to pursue shortsighted environmental practices may be no less strong. The Solutia and U.S. Liquids experiences also illustrate the dramatic damages that can be suffered by companies and investors through lack of transparency regarding environmental risks and exposures. A case has been made by corporate activists and some academics that the SEC should require disclosure of information on environmental performance and other social issues—irrespective of financial materiality— because of its mandate to promote corporate accountability (Williams 1999). The Securities and Exchange Acts were designed to influence corporate governance by increasing management accountability to other stakeholders and the general public as well as to shareholders. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act empowers the SEC to issue necessary or appropriate rules regulating proxy solicitations ‘in the public interest or for the protection of investors’ (Exchange Act §14(a), 15U.S.C. §78n (1994); emphasis added). Similar language pervades the acts. Moreover, the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) authorizes all federal agencies, including the SEC, to include environmental protection as a policy objective when not inconsistent with their primary missions. This case was first put forward in a petition to the SEC by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in the early 1970s, shortly after NEPA was enacted, proposing that listed companies should have to report on pollution, environmental practices, and the environmental impacts of their products and operations (NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693–4 (D.D.C 1974)). After lengthy hearings, appeals, and reconsiderations, the SEC decided, with judicial concurrence, that it would continue to rely on an economic criterion of materiality in judging environmental disclosure requirements. The SEC determined that, to the extent that environmental issues are economically material, they must be disclosed under existing disclosure requirements. At the time, Harvey Pitt, who later became chairman of the SEC, argued that much environmental information would be material under a strict definition and would have to be disclosed (Sonde and Pitt 1971). In those proceedings, the SEC argued that its enforcement activities would be applied to elicit disclosure of environmental information in specific cases when appropriate on materiality grounds (Williams 1999). Thus, as far back as the 1970s, the SEC has committed itself to active enforcement of its general and specific disclosure requirements concerning financially material environmental information. As the following pages will indicate, this commitment has not yet been fulfilled. Disclosure 89
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remains incomplete despite considerable evidence that the materiality of environmental information has increased substantially since the early 1970s. For example:
r
r
r
r
Companies have to spend more and more to comply with environmental regulations. Between 1972 and 1994, expenditures by business on pollution abatement and control were more than doubled in real terms (Vogan 1996). In the NRDC proceedings, the SEC demonstrated that only a trivial fraction of institutionally managed assets were in socially screened funds or portfolios. By 1999, it was estimated that more than $1.5 trillion resides in socially and environmentally screened portfolios, while the number of screened mutual funds has risen to 175, from just 55 five years earlier. By 2001, the asset base had grown to $2 trillion. Socially responsible investing can no longer be considered a negligible phenomenon. It has been demonstrated repeatedly that companies’ stock prices have been influenced by disclosure of information regarding emissions (even if legal), or failure to comply with environmental regulations, or potential liability to environmental remediation requirements. Several financial research services that sell environmental performance information to investors have emerged. Most large investment houses also employ environmental managers and undertake in-house research on environmental issues affecting companies. The fact that the generation and sale of environmental information has become an economic activity in the investment community indicates that professional investors consider such information relevant to their decisions—and thus financially material.
However, the availability of information on environmental issues has not kept pace with this growing materiality. According to the research firms that sell information to screened fund managers, environmental information is among the hardest to obtain. Many EPA and state government databases, even those theoretically in the public domain, are hard to access, often inaccurate, inconsistent, or out of date, and not formatted in useful ways for financial or company-specific analysis. Moreover, companies’ own environmental reports are typically selective, unstandardized, and unrelated to financial statements (Birchard 1996). Therefore, the information available through stand-alone environmental reports, from 90
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government agencies, or from environmental research services is not a substitute for adequate disclosure by companies of financially material environmental information.
4.3.4. Specific Requirements in the USA Disclosure of environmental exposures is governed both by the SEC’s core rules on materiality and by specific requirements regarding environmental liabilities and compliance with federal and state environmental regulations. General disclosure requirements explicitly include forward-looking statements. Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires a management discussion and analysis (MD&A) of ‘material events and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or future financial condition’ (17 C.F.R. 229.303). The firm shall disclose ‘where a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently known to management and reasonably likely to have material effects on the registrant’s financial condition or results of operations’ (SEC Release Nos. 33-6835, 34-26831, May 24, 1989; 54FR22427). Disclosure of known trends, risks, and other uncertainties affecting future business results is particularly important to investors because asset markets are themselves inherently forward-looking. The value of any financial security is derived from the stream of returns it is expected to bring and the riskiness of those returns. The SEC has strengthened these requirements by narrowing a company’s ability to avoid disclosure on grounds of uncertainty. In its release on MD&A requirements, the SEC indicated that disclosure of uncertain events is necessary unless the registrant ‘determines that a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur’ (54FR22427). In the same release, the SEC warned companies that if a registrant’s future filings reveal a material effect from an event that was a known uncertainty in a prior period, the SEC enforcement staff will ‘inquire as to circumstances existing at the time of the earlier filings to determine whether the registrant failed to disclose a known . . . uncertainty’ (54FR22427, n. 28). Moreover, forwardlooking disclosure is further encouraged by a ‘safe harbor’ rule that protects companies from applicable liability provisions of federal securities laws that might otherwise be relevant (SEC Release Nos. 33-6084, 3415944). Companies cannot be penalized for making ‘reasonably based and adequately presented’ projections that subsequently fail to materialize. 91
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Disclosure requirements of known uncertainties under Item 303 of Regulation S-K apply to environmental uncertainties. While the SEC has recognized Superfund liabilities as known uncertainties requiring disclosure, the requirements of Item 303 of Regulation S-K could reasonably apply to many other environmental uncertainties.
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Many firms own contaminated industrial sites that have not yet been identified for mandatory remediation, although contamination might well be discovered through future investigation, particularly if the site is transferred to another owner. Ownership of such contaminated sites might be considered a known uncertainty. EPA regulations are first issued in proposed forms before final promulgation. Affected industries typically submit extensive comments on proposed regulations through their industry associations or sometimes individual companies submit comments directly. Not infrequently, these submissions complain of financial impacts ranging from serious to dire. Many final regulations are challenged in court, with billions of dollars in compliance costs resting on the judicial outcome. Thus, many proposed environmental regulations are known uncertainties with potentially material financial consequences. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed by the President in November 1998 though not yet ratified by the Senate, has come into force and must be considered a known uncertainty, especially for multinational firms. Detailed economic studies commissioned by several industry associations have come to generally pessimistic conclusions about the impacts of implementing the protocol’s provisions on the US economy and affected industrial sectors. Individual companies have joined business coalitions that oppose implementation of the protocol, largely on grounds of economic cost. The possible adoption of policies to curb greenhouse gas emissions could be considered a known uncertainty with potentially material consequences for some companies.
Thus, Item 303 of Regulation S-K would seem to require a significant increase in the disclosure of forward-looking financially material environmental information that is essential to protect investors. In addition to these general requirements, SEC rules and GAAP impose specific requirements on companies for environmental disclosure. Item 101 of Regulation S-K, governing the general description of the business, states: 92
Making Disclosure Work Better Appropriate disclosure shall be made as to the material effects that compliance with Federal, State, or local provisions which have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the environment may have on the capital expenditures, earnings, and competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries. The registrant shall disclose any material capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of the current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such future periods as the registrant may deem material. (17 C.F.R. 229.101 (c) (xii))
This requirement evidently covers regulations that have been enacted but not yet adopted because of court challenge. It requires that the registrant apply existing materiality guidelines to financial impacts beyond the oneor two-year expenditure horizon. Many regulations include compliance deadlines several years in the future, such that planned capital expenditures to comply with them are initiated only after considerable time has elapsed. Item 103 of Regulation S-K, governing disclosure of legal proceedings (civil and criminal suits), requires reporting of ‘any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is subject’ (17 C.F.R. 229.103). Environmentally related proceedings must be disclosed if they are material, they involve a claim for more than 10 percent of current assets, or they involve the government and potential monetary sanctions greater than $100,000. During the 1980s, the discovery of many contaminated industrial sites requiring remediation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)—the ‘Superfund’ statute—or under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the rapid escalation of clean-up costs led to an elaboration of disclosure requirements for contingent liabilities. GAAP, as enunciated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), requires companies to accrue a contingent liability for future remediation costs if the loss is probable and reasonably estimable (SFAS 5). SEC and FASB guidance added clarification that if a loss is probable, the firm must recognize its best estimate of the loss, despite uncertainty, and cannot wait until only one estimate is likely. New information should be recognized in later disclosures (SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 92, June 1993; FASB Interpretation 14). Together, these rules impose extensive obligations on corporate management to disclose financially material environmental costs, liabilities, and future risks. 93
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Beginning in the 1980s, financial reporting of Superfund liabilities attracted the SEC’s enforcement attention, in part because of attention drawn to the issue by public interest groups and shareholders. A 1998 report revealed that Phelps Dodge had estimated clean-up costs at a contaminated site to be ten to thirty times smaller than had a federal court, and also questioned the company’s disclosure of remedial costs at thirtynine other of its sites (Lewis 1998). A coalition of public interest groups drew the SEC’s attention to the fact that Viacom had stated in a filing that it did not believe its clean-up obligations were financially material, even though it had been identified as a Potentially Responsible Party at dozens of Superfund sites, implying a total liability of more than $300 million as against a 1995 total profit of $165 million (Friends of the Earth 1997). In addition to accounting guidances and releases mentioned above and a flurry of articles by environmental lawyers, it became known that the EPA was sharing information with the SEC about companies’ potential liabilities. Consequently, a few SEC letters of inquiry were sufficient to put companies on notice that improved disclosure of site remediation liabilities was expected. By and large, US corporations have responded. Disclosure of potential Superfund liabilities is by far the most complete and detailed of all environmental information to be found in corporate financial reports. As a result, banks, insurance companies, and other financial sector actors can now evaluate such risks more accurately. This experience indicates that a modicum of enforcement attention is sufficient to produce a fairly high degree of compliance with disclosure obligations.
4.4. Unrealized Opportunities to Make Use of Financial Disclosure 4.4.1. Inadequate Disclosure of Known Environmental Exposures Despite this success in stimulating improved disclosure of material site clean-up costs and the constructive results in financial markets, until now there has been little effort to enforce disclosure of other financially material environmental information. In the USA, over the period 1975–2000, the SEC has initiated only three administrative proceedings and one civil action over inadequate environmental disclosures. In other countries, the enforcement record is even scantier. Enforcement has not been vigorous in past years because environmental issues were not salient among all the securities regulatory issues that the responsible agencies were faced 94
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with. Moreover, at least in the USA, those agencies have typically been understaffed and underfunded to the extent that they were able to deal with only the most urgent and egregious issues (US General Accounting Office 2002). In addition, the securities and accounting supervisory bodies have resisted attempts to enlist them in environmental causes, seeing their sole mission as the protection of investors and financial markets. In the absence of enforcement efforts, compliance with existing disclosure requirements by the private sector has been scanty. Many companies have not even complied with the letter of the law, failing to reveal environmental legal proceedings or failing to disclose an accurate estimate of their environmental obligations and liabilities. More conscientious companies have typically complied with the letter of the law but have revealed as little as possible. Very few companies have complied with the spirit of existing securities law that require disclosure of all material information and material risks known to management that would significantly affect the financial conditions or results of the enterprise (Repetto and Austin 2000). Reports typically discuss in any detail only those regulations that have already been issued in final form and have survived court challenges, while mentioning legal actions in which the reporting companies are involved. If companies mention other pending environmental regulations, legislation, litigation, or other issues at all, they usually take refuge in uncertainty, claiming inability to estimate likely or possible financial outcomes, even within a range.
EVIDENCE FROM THE US PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY Recent research has provided strong evidence that US corporations in environmentally sensitive industries have not been adequately disclosing known financially material environmental exposures and risks in their MD&A, as required by Item 303d of Regulation S-K. The first of these studies examined thirteen of the largest publicly listed companies in the US pulp and paper industry, a sector with a wide range of environmental issues, including air and water pollution, toxic releases, and land use practices. The study estimated the impacts of known, impending environmental issues on the capital expenditures and future earnings (Repetto and Austin 2002). It found that those impacts were likely to materially affect the value of stockholder equity, the firms’ competitive position within the industry and their financial risks. The study found that these exposures and financial impacts were not disclosed or adequately discussed in the firms’ 10Ks or other financial reports. The study was unique in that the 95
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companies themselves participated in identifying important impending environmental issues affecting the industry and in estimating probable outcomes of those issues. The methodology of the study involved the following steps: 1. Impending environmental issues affecting companies in the industry were identified and categorized with respect to their potential financial impacts on those companies. 2. For issues deemed to have potentially significant financial impacts, scenarios were developed regarding their evolution and outcomes. For impending regulatory issues, for example, scenarios were developed regarding final regulatory designs. 3. Through consultation with industry and environmental experts, likelihoods were estimated and assigned to each scenario. 4. Each company’s exposure to each scenario was assessed through a facility-by-facility investigation of location, product mix, installed technology, input use, emission rates, and other relevant parameters. 5. The financial impact of each scenario on each company was estimated by applying estimates of regulatory compliance costs, impacts on input prices, site remediation costs, and the ability of firms in the industry to pass along higher costs through output price increases. 6. The likelihoods previously estimated were applied to all scenarios so as to construct a probability distribution of potential financial outcomes for each firm, including the mean impact on the discounted present value of earnings over a ten-year horizon and the variance of discounted future earnings. 7. Those measures of financial impact for each company were normalized by dividing the change in the discounted present value of future earnings by the market value of stockholder equity. 8. The financial statements of companies whose material financial impacts were estimated from known, impending environmental issues were examined to see whether such impacts had been disclosed in the MD&A. This methodology is particularly revealing of the inadequacy of MD&A disclosure of known, financially material environmental information, because senior representatives of the companies participated in identifying environmental issues with potentially significant environmental 96
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impacts, through the cooperation of the American Forests and Paper Association’s Regulatory Policy Committee. Company representatives also reviewed scenarios for plausibility and provided their estimates of the probabilities that should be assigned to each scenario. The study found that companies in the industry were differentially exposed to most of the environmental issues. Differences among companies in exposure stemmed from many causes: the location of their facilities, the extent of their present and past pollution releases, the technologies installed in their mills, their energy and fiber sources, and other factors. As a result, the issues impinging on the industry are likely to create competitive advantages and disadvantages that should be discussed as known risk factors. Overall financial risks across all issues were estimated by weighting each scenario by the likelihood assigned to it by industry representatives and other experts. These probabilities were used to estimate the joint probability of a ‘worst case’ outcome, in which all the most costly scenarios for a company would come about, and the probability of a ‘best case’ outcome, in which all the least costly scenarios would come about. Other scenario combinations were used to generate the probabilities of all intermediate outcomes. In this way, probability distributions of financial outcomes were generated for all companies in the study. A summary of these findings, comparing the financial exposures of all companies in the study, shows material financial risks. The mean values indicate that at least half the companies in the group face expected financial impacts of at least 5 percent of shareholder equity and that several face expected impacts approaching or exceeding 10 percent. These magnitudes are impressive because the expected effects of environmental issues on earnings in the pulp and paper segment are being compared with the total market value of the companies, which for many firms include the value of their other business segments, including wood products and converted paper products. Even relying on the most likely outcomes, estimates show that companies’ environmental exposures involve them in significant financial risks. The estimated variances of financial outcomes tell an even stronger story. Several companies are virtually immune to environmental risk: Their earnings will be relatively unaffected, whatever the outcome of the salient impending issues. At the other extreme, other companies face significant probabilities that impending environmental issues will be resolved in ways that will reduce the value of their companies by as much as 15 or 20 percent. Table 4.1 shows the estimated probabilities 97
Robert Repetto Table 4.1. Probability of a reduction in company shareholder value by more than 10% or 5% Firm
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−10.2 −0.6 −3.4 −2.7 −6.9 −10.8 −8.4 −0.9 −6.8 −4.2 −10.8 −6.3 2.9
3.6 0.5 0.8 4.4 2.8 9.3 6.1 0.8 6.9 3.4 9.1 2.4 3.2
64 0 0 0 24 63 44 0 34 0 61 24 0
90 0 37 33 87 86 88 0 69 60 80 79 0
Source: Repetto and Austin (2002).
from the study that each company’s shareholder value will be reduced by 10 percent or more. Three companies are more likely than not to suffer a 10 percent loss. In total, 7 of the 13 companies have a greater than 20 percent chance of experiencing a loss of this magnitude. The environmental statutes and regulations analyzed in the study would be likely to have quite different financial impacts, individually and collectively, across companies in the same industry, and these differential impacts can have material consequences on firms’ competitive positions. They should have been disclosed in MD&A. However, only three of thirteen companies even mentioned in their SEC filings any of the issues that were deemed significant by their senior environmental officers. Some companies, while disclosing little information about the financial impacts of impending regulations, minimized their likely effects on their own competitive positions. For example, according to one company, ‘In the opinion of . . . management, environmental protection requirements are not likely to adversely affect the company’s competitive industry position since other domestic companies are subject to similar requirements.’ Or, according to another company, ‘[Company X] does not anticipate that compliance with environmental statutes and regulations will have a material effect on its competitive position since its competitors are subject to the same statutes and regulations to a relatively similar degree.’ A third company stated, ‘[S]ince other paper and forest product companies also 98
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are subject to environmental laws and regulations, the company does not believe that compliance with such laws and regulations will have a material adverse effect on its competitive positioning.’ In view of the differences revealed in Table 4.1, these statements are quite inaccurate and could be considered misleading. According to the results of the study, all three of these companies have above-average financial exposure to pending environmental issues and will probably suffer adverse competitive impacts.
EVIDENCE FROM THE OIL AND GAS PRODUCING INDUSTRY A second recent study used a similar methodology to examine the exposures of sixteen oil and gas producing companies to policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to potential future restrictions on access to areas holding petroleum resources (Austin 2002). Climate policy scenarios assumed either ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, alternatively with and without US participation, or nonratification of the Protocol, alternatively with and without other restrictions on the use of carbon fuels. Subscenarios explored alternative approaches to implementation, especially with regard to the disposition of ‘rents’ arising from restrictions on fossil fuel availability. The results of the analysis are strikingly similar to those found in the pulp and paper study. Companies differed widely in their financial exposures to these environmentally related risks. Exposures varied due to differences among companies in the composition and geographical location of their reserves, their reliance on earnings from exploration and production versus earnings from refining and distribution, and other factors. For the most exposed firms, the most likely financial impacts were found to be highly material. Figure 4.1 plots these impacts for all sixteen companies. The central ‘dot’ for each company represents the probability-weighted mean, or expected, financial impact across all scenarios, expressed as a percentage of shareholder’s equity in the company. The vertical lines represent the range of outcomes, from worst-case to best-case. For seven companies, expected impacts exceed 5 percent of shareholder value and for four companies, worst-case impacts approach 10 percent. As in the pulp and paper industry, few companies made any reference to these financial exposures in their SEC filings. Only two of the sixteen mentioned climate change as a known risk to future operations of financial conditions, indicating that the financial impacts could be substantial. 99
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Change in shareholder value (%)
8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 −2.00 −4.00 −6.00 −8.00 −10.00 −12.00 AHC
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Figure 4.1. Oil and gas company exposures
Three others mentioned the issue in their annual reports, but did not elaborate on any possible business implications. The other eleven made no mention of the issues. EVIDENCE FROM THE ELECTRICITY GENERATING INDUSTRY A more recent study of a third environmentally-sensitive industry, the electric power generating sector, strongly confirmed the findings of these two earlier reports (Repetto and Henderson 2003). Forty-seven of the largest investor-owned electric utility holding companies in the USA were analyzed to estimate the potential financial impacts of environmental legislation now before the US Congress. The methodology followed the same approach used in the two studies described above. It estimates the least-cost option to comply with pending air quality regulations, for each of the companies. The least-cost option is defined as the minimized, discounted present value of adopting leastcost controls on all generating units owned by each utility holding company to bring them into compliance. The compliance options include a suite of combustion controls, postcombustion pollution controls, and permit trading. Available compliance options and associated costs are tailored to the specific technological characteristics of each generating unit, and take into account pollution control equipment already installed. 100
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Least-cost combinations of emissions controls and permit trading are derived by minimizing discounted estimated capital and operating costs over a twenty-five-year horizon. This methodology is used to analyze the following scenarios:
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The financial impacts of a three-pollutant cap-and-trade bill that imposes stricter future controls on emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and mercury; A four-pollutant cap-and-trade bill that adds restrictions on future emissions of carbon dioxide to the preceding environmental requirements; and A third hybrid scenario constructed on the assumption that controls on carbon emissions would be announced belatedly, after decisions to comply with the three-pollutant caps had been finalized, with a later compliance deadline.
These policy scenarios were chosen to resemble proposed legislation submitted to the current and the previous Congresses, but do not exactly replicate these bills’ provisions. Under one set of scenarios, financial impacts were estimated under the assumption that permits would initially be grandfathered to utilities in proportion to their historical 1998 emissions, the most likely outcome. In order to facilitate comparison of environmental exposures among companies, the present value of future compliance costs in constant year 2000 prices, discounted at 8 percent per year to the year 2000, were benchmarked to each company’s revenues in the year 2000. These benchmarks indicate the financial materiality of the companies’ environmental exposures to pending environmental issues and allow their exposures to be compared. Two limitations of this analysis should be acknowledged. First, the approach does not allow for adjustments by companies in the dispatch of their various generating units in order to achieve compliance. In reality, companies may reduce the hours operated by particular units rather than installing pollution control equipment if the former is the least-cost option. Second, the calculation does not allow for the fact that companies may recover some or all of their environmental costs if market or regulatory processes pass through these cost increases to electricity product prices. However, under current securities laws financially material costs of compliance with environmental regulations, such as those estimated through this methodology, must be disclosed in financial statements without netting these costs against possible future cost recovery. 101
Robert Repetto 50 Compliance costs as % of 2000 revenues
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Figure 4.2. Three-pollutant cap-and-trade, permits grandfathered
If a three-pollutant cap-and-trade policy similar to that endorsed by the current US administration and submitted in proposed legislation is adopted, many large US electric utility holding companies will face significant financial impacts. The required cuts in emissions would ensure that utilities would be forced to install expensive internal controls and that permit prices in an allowance trading market would remain high. Figure 4.2 illustrates the finding that more than half of the forty-seven major utility holding companies included in the study would face compliance costs with a discounted present value greater than 10 percent of their total year 2000 revenues. Over a quarter would face costs in excess of 20 percent of year 2000 revenues. Total revenues include not only revenues from sales of generated electricity, but also revenues from distribution, transmission, and unrelated business activities. To put these magnitudes into perspective, operating profits among these companies average only 4 or 5 percent of operating revenues. Figure 4.2 also shows that different companies within the electric power sector are exposed in markedly differing degrees to future environmental restrictions of this kind. Differences in exposure to impending environmental restrictions stem from several factors that reflect past investment decisions: 102
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Compliance costs as % of 2000 revenues
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Figure 4.3. Four-pollutant cap-and-trade, announced carbon, permits grandfathered
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The importance of generating revenues in total revenues; The fuel mix used in generating electricity, especially the degree of reliance on coal; The effectiveness of emission controls already in place; The efficiency of the company’s generating operations in converting fuel to electricity; and The ease of retrofitting additional emission controls onto existing plants.
The analytical results representing the impacts of a four-pollutant capand-trade policy show striking differences compared with the threepollutant results. Figure 4.3 shows that if a requirement that carbon emissions be reduced 7 percent below a 1990 baseline, with a compliance deadline of 2015, and if permits were grandfathered to utilities, then under the assumptions of the scenario, compliance costs would be lower for many companies than in the three-pollutant scenarios. The explanation lies in the assumed carbon permit price. If it is as high as $32 per ton of carbon dioxide ($100 per ton of carbon), utilities that repower to natural gas would make considerable money by selling excess carbon permits, since repowering would reduce carbon emissions by far more than necessary to meet the requirement. Moreover, in reducing carbon dioxide emissions by switching plants to run on natural gas, companies 103
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Compliance costs as % of 2000 revenues
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Figure 4.4. Four-pollutant cap-and-trade, carbon later, permits grandfathered
will avoid the need to install expensive equipment to control emissions of mercury, sulfur, and (to some extent) nitrogen emissions. Since the natural sulfur or mercury content of natural gas used as power plant fuel is low, switching to natural gas not only reduces carbon emissions, it also, as a side benefit, helps meet other emission constraints. In fact, adding a carbon constraint would induce so many companies to make the fuel switch that the prices of nitrogen and sulfur permits would fall precipitously. Companies differ greatly in their exposures to a four-pollutant regime. For most companies, the prospect of a four-pollutant cap-and-trade policy that includes carbon constrains represents a material financial risk and a potential source of competitive advantage or disadvantage. One or two companies face negative compliance costs in some scenarios, because of their potential revenue gains in selling permits. More broadly, for some companies with relatively small compliance burdens, profits would likely increase as electricity prices rose in response to higher industry operating costs. Figure 4.4 shows that for most companies, the worst of all worlds would be one in which they make least-cost decisions to comply with a threepollutant cap-and-trade policy regime but are then faced, a few years later, with a new carbon reduction requirement. The ability to defer carbon control expenditures would not make up for the wasted costs of pollution 104
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control equipment for the other three pollutants and the loss of potential revenues from selling excess carbon permits. The costs of dealing with this situation would be higher for most companies than the costs of dealing with an integrated four-pollutant cap-and-trade regime. At this point few companies among the forty-seven large investorowned electricity generating companies have disclosed in their financial reports the implications of proposed three- or four-pollutant capand-trade policies, particularly in any quantitative detail. Though some companies have provided fuller disclosure than others, a perusal of SEC filings would be of little help to investors and analysts in understanding the distribution of exposures of electric utility companies to these environmental risks. In the case of a proposed government regulation, the registrant is required to make two determinations in deciding what to disclose. First, it must determine that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the regulation or provision will be enacted. If it cannot make that determination, it must disclose the impacts on the firm’s financial conditions under the assumption that the law or regulation will be adopted, unless it can make a second determination that, if enacted, the provisions will not have a material financial effect. In the case of the three- or four-pollutant policies, most firms in the electric utility sector would find it difficult to reach the latter conclusion. Nonetheless, there is currently little information in many companies’ financial reports regarding these issues. Moreover, there is little evidence that companies with the least exposures have tried to set a higher standard of transparency for the industry, though it would seem to be in their interests to do so. No systematic differences in the completeness of disclosure are evident between the reports of the least and most exposed companies. Investors get little help from financial reports in understanding the complicated financial exposures of companies in this sector to pending environmental legislation.
4.4.2. Growing Shareholder Demand for Environmental Information Financial markets are now asserting a growing demand for transparency, in part because of these experiences. According to a recent Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Study (Standard & Poor’s 2003): Public companies around the world are increasingly under pressure from the ongoing ‘corporate governance revolution’ in which large institutional investors are intensifying the pressure on management to disclose all material information.
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A corroborating study by the accounting and consulting firm Ernst & Young found, after a study of share performance in 1,000 largest global companies, that poor investor relations was the third most frequent cause of sudden and major drops in share value. Companies that are lax on disclosure are more vulnerable to share price volatility than those that provide qualitatively good information. Moreover, investors have shown that they are willing to pay a premium for companies with superior disclosure records (Investor Relations on the Net 2002). The demand for more disclosure extends to environmental information. An increasing number of shareholder resolutions are being filed asking management for disclosure of material environmental information. These resolutions are often organized by coalitions of socially responsible investors and environmental activists but are increasingly being supported by mainstream institutional investors as well. In the USA, earlier this year an investor coalition that includes the State of Connecticut’s [Retirement] Plans and Trust Fund filed resolutions with five of the largest US electric power companies requesting that they disclose to shareholders the economic risks associated with emissions of carbon dioxides and other air pollutants and the business benefits associated with reducing those emissions. In an important recent development, Institutional Shareholder Services, an organization that advises pension and mutual fund managers on how to vote their proxies, endorsed these shareholder resolutions (Ball 2003). This endorsement potentially adds institutional money managers controlling hundreds of billions of dollars in assets to those demanding more environmental transparency. Partly as a result, the resolution commanded 27 percent of the vote of American Electric Power’s shareholders, a very high percentage for resolutions not backed by management, even though AEP has one of the best disclosure records in the industry. The Carbon Disclosure Project, an even larger initiative backed by thirty-five of the world’s largest institutional investors, has been urging companies to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and the risks they pose to the companies, and the extent of their emission reduction programs. In the oil and gas sector, a similar climate resolution submitted to Exxon Mobil captured 20 percent of the vote. In Canada, shareholders of Imperial Oil recently submitted a resolution requiring the company to spell out potential financial liabilities associated with its greenhouse gas emissions and to put in place a plan to reduce those liabilities.
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4.4.3. Government Responses In the USA, in the wake of corporate scandals, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act has been adopted requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy and completeness of their financial statements, requiring more independence of corporate directors from management, requiring corporation lawyers to take action if accounting or reporting irregularities are discovered and not corrected, and requiring separation of auditing and advisory functions. This Act also requires auditors to issue an opinion on the reliability of companies’ internal controls in capturing all material information. In addition, the administration and Congress have markedly increased appropriations of funds to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the SEC, which itself has taken steps to tighten disclosure standards, particularly of off-balance sheet arrangements and contingent liabilities. Last year the US Senate requested the General Accounting Office to investigate the adequacy of environmental disclosure by corporations publicly listed on US securities markets, and of the SEC’s enforcement of its own requirements (SriMedia 2003). This request followed the release of a 1998 study by EPA that found that 74 percent of the companies subject to environmental legal proceedings that should have been disclosed under SEC rules had failed to do so. A report recently made public by the SEC on their review of financial statements filed by the Fortune 500 largest US companies stated: We found that we issued more comments on the MD&A discussions of the Fortune 500 companies than any other topic. Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires . . . [a discussion of] known material events and uncertainties that would cause reported financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future financial conditions. . . . Our comments addressed situations where companies simply recited financial statement information without analysis or presented boilerplate analysis that did not provide any insight into the companies’ past performance or business prospects as understood by management.
The SEC review of Fortune 500 company disclosures found specifically that information on environmental exposures and liabilities was frequently deficient (US Securities and Exchange Commission 2003). In Europe as well, the European Commission issued stricter nonbinding guidelines in 2001 for disclosure of environmental costs and liabilities, in response to a finding that unreliable and inadequate information about environmental performance ‘makes it difficult for investors . . . to form a clear and accurate picture of the impact of environmental factors on
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a company’s performance or to make comparisons between companies’ (Sutherland 2001). Despite these steps, further governmental action is needed. If financial markets are to evaluate financial risks arising from companies’ environmental exposures accurately and thereby to exert a useful influence on corporate management, further disclosures must be encouraged, especially of known environmental exposures and financial risks. Fortunately, relatively small actions can bring substantial results. Corporations are advised by legal counsel whose function is to protect the company from legal difficulties, prominent among which would be difficulties with securities regulators. If a government notification or an action taken against a single company signals that new emphasis is being placed on environmental disclosure, those signals reverberate powerfully through corporate boardrooms and executive suites. Therefore, a signal from the SEC that environmental disclosures will be scrutinized more carefully would have substantial effects. This might take the form of a speech by an SEC Commissioner or Enforcement Chief, a Staff Release reinforcing existing disclosure obligations, or a well-publicized enforcement action taken against one or a few companies. The increased budget for enforcement should make such an action feasible. There are also relatively simple and low-cost initiatives that environmental ministries and agencies can take. For example, in October 2001, following release of its study showing inadequate compliance, the US EPA issued an enforcement alert emphasizing the obligation of publicly listed companies to disclose environmental legal proceedings and other material environmental information (US Environmental Protection Agency 2001). In that document, the EPA revealed that it had begun notifying companies subject to certain enforcement actions of their potential duty to disclose and had established informational links to the SEC’s enforcement division. Further steps to strengthen liaison with securities regulators could be taken. Securities regulators are often handicapped by lack of information about environmental matters that are not disclosed but perhaps should be. They have scant resources with which to deal with their growing and increasingly complex responsibilities. Without assistance, they often experience difficulty in finding out what regulated companies are not disclosing. Environmental ministries and agencies can help in providing this needed information. As a start, they could establish a small liaison office to facilitate contacts with securities regulatory agencies. This liaison office can be responsible for facilitating the flow of information from the 108
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environmental agency to the securities regulator and for redirecting questions from the former to the appropriate branches of the latter. Certain kinds of information could be shared between the two agencies on an ongoing and regular basis. Such information might include: 1. Texts of proposed major new regulations, and timetables for finalization, promulgation, and compliance; 2. Accompanying regulatory impact analyses, including analyses submitted by industry groups, estimating compliance costs and economic impacts on significantly affected industries and subsectors; 3. Emissions and waste generation inventories organized by company; and 4. Nonconfidential information regarding ongoing litigation, enforcement actions, etc. Information of this kind would be helpful to securities regulators in enabling them to form judgments regarding the kinds of disclosures that should be expected from companies within an industry. In addition to interagency cooperation of this kind, environmental agencies can greatly enhance their role as an information resource to investors and investment analysts. At present, investors and analysts typically do not see the environmental agency as a potentially useful source of information, and most within these groups lack any knowledge of how information from the environmental agency might be accessed. To some extent, analysts’ perceptions regarding the paucity of useful information available from environmental agencies have been justified. Many databases maintained by these agencies, though ostensibly public, have been difficult to access and manipulate. On some, the data can be outdated or of questionable accuracy, or the data are formatted in ways that are not useful to investors or analysts. For example, emissions data should be readily aggregated by company but often cannot be. To remedy this situation, the environmental agency could review their publicly available databases and attempt to make them more accessible and more useful. This effort, of course, would be of benefit to many users, not only to the investment community. A step in this direction would be to establish within the agency an Internet website for investors and analysts containing links and directories to potentially useful information. Such information would likely include materials in the categories (1) through (4) above. Direct Internet access to relevant information would be a valuable resource for investors and 109
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analysts, who often must make decisions under time pressure. A website would be even more useful if it contained a search engine capability that enabled users to search for information by industry, company, or environmental issue. Steps such as these merely illustrate the possibilities of closer cooperation between environmental agencies and securities regulators and the investment community. The benefits would be substantial: greater protection for investors, increased efficiency in financial markets, and stronger incentives for responsible environmental management.
References Akerlof, G., ‘The Market for Lemons’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (1970), 488–500. Austin, D., ‘Changing Oil: Emerging Environmental Issues and Shareholder Value in the Oil and Gas Industry’, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC, 2002. Ball, J., ‘Global Warming Is a Threat to Health of Corporations’, Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2003. Birchard, W., ‘Make Environment Reports Relevant’, CFO Magazine, 79 (June, 1996). Blacconiere, W