Lucullus
Classical lives
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Lucullus
Classical lives
Also available in this series Julian An intellectual biography Polymnia Athanassiadi The Emperor Domitian Brian W.Jones
Lucullus
A Life
Arthur Keaveney
London and New York
First published 1992 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. © 1992 Arthur Keaveney All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Keaveney, Arthur Lucullus: a life.—(Classical lives) I. Title II. Series 355.10937 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Keaveney, Arthur Lucullus: a life/Arthur Keaveney. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Lucullus, ca. 117 B.C.–ca. 56 B.C. 2. Rome—History—Republic 265–30 B.C. 3. Generals—Rome—Biography. 4. Statesmen—Rome— Biography. I. Title. DG260. L8K43 1992 937´.05´092–dc20 [B] 91–40530 CIP ISBN 0-203-40484-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-71308-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-03219-9 (Print Edition)
For Jenny
Contents
Preface
ix
I
Lucius Licinius Lucullus and the Luculli
1
II
Master and pupil
15
III
The politic man
32
IV
The consulship
51
V
Confronting the king: the war with Mithridates 75
VI
Confronting the king: the war with Tigranes
VII
The life of a sponge?
129
VIII
‘…retired Leisure that in trim gardens takes his pleasure’
143
Lucius Licinius Lucullus and his age
166
Appendix 1: Asia 81–79 Appendix 2: When did the Third Mithridatic War begin? Notes Bibliography Index
182
IX
vii
99
188 206 261 268
Preface
Some years ago when writing a biography of Sulla I became intrigued by the figure of Lucullus, a man with whom he formed an unusual but enduring friendship. There and then I conceived the notion of writing Lucullus’ life when I had done with other tasks. I have found him to be a figure of great interest in himself, but he is also of considerable importance as one of those who carried the Sullan republican ideal into the next generation. As we study him we study, too, the last days of the Roman republic. Through his eyes and by his side we watch an ideal perish. His failure is the failure of a whole class. I was encouraged to undertake the present work by the absence of anything comparable in English. Other languages are better served. In French we have long had the work of the learned Fr. van Ooteghem, while German speakers can consult the austere but penetrating RE article by Gelzer. Even as I wrote, Antonelli gave the Italian world his entertaining but somewhat unscholarly treatment. I am aware, of course, that some, who do not themselves practise the art of ancient biography, believe that a task such as this were better left unattempted. Personally, I have never been able to understand why, when so much about the ancient world is dark, the inadequacies of the evidence in this particular department should be singled out for a special mention. Nor can I see what is wrong with being curious about the leading figures of antiquity and labouring in consequence to achieve a fuller understanding of them. Moreover, it is not perhaps altogether fanciful to suggest that if we do acquire a better understanding of a man like Lucullus then perhaps we may acquire a better understanding of his age as well. For help in the making of this book I have but one institution ix
x
Preface
to thank: my own university, Kent, which allowed me a term’s study leave in Michaelmas 1990. As regards individuals I would like to thank Mr D.R.Nightingale, Dr G.Anderson, Professor E.Badian and Dr J.Madden who answered queries while the work was in progress and Mr R.Seager who kindly read through the whole manuscript when it was completed. A version of part of Chapter VIII was read to the 1991 AGM of the Classical Association at Warwick University and benefited, I believe, by some comments then. I owe an especial debt to Dr Tracey Rihll for preparing the maps and my wife Jenny and Dr Anderson for help with the proofs. Finally, I should like to mention Rebecca Edwards and Hilary Joce of Darwin College Secretar iat who braved my handwriting to produce the typescript. For the rest, suffice to say that this book is the sole responsibility of the undersigned. Arthur Keaveney Darwin College University of Kent at Canterbury
I Lucius Licinius Lucullus and the Luculli
In every land and under every clime nobles have shown the greatest pride in their ancestry. The Romans are no exception to this rule. The Julii Caesares, for instance, unblushingly declared that they were descended from the goddess Venus herself. The Luculli, with more modesty, but no more truth, spoke of a certain Lucullus who as a king of Illyria led his people into Italy in the distant past where they eventually became the nation of the Paeligni, inhabitants of the centre of that country. So far as we are concerned, however, the first historical L.Licinius Lucullus is a man who was curule aedile in 202. Learned opinion in ancient Rome and in our own day holds that his name ‘Lucullus’ is a diminutive of ‘Lucius’. This latter signifies ‘born at dawn’. The Licinian gens to which the Luculli belonged was plebeian. Other members included the Calvi, the Murenae, the Nervae and the Crassi. The word ‘Licinius’ is believed to derive from the Etruscan lecne (‘curving’ or ‘slant’) which first came into Latin as the adjective licinius. We hear for instance of licini boves or oxen with horns which slanted upwards. During the fifth and part of the fourth century the Licinii played a fairly prominent part in Roman public life. Towards the middle of the fourth century, however, they suffered an eclipse that lasted for some hundred years. The revival of their fortunes towards the last quarter of the third century was largely due to the Crassi and the Luculli. Aside from the curule aedile we have noted, the Luculli gave the world two tribunes of the plebs, one in 196 and another in 110. An M.Lucullus was praetor peregrinus in 186, the troubled year of the Bacchic conspiracy. Scholars are undecided as to how exactly our Lucullus is to be fitted into the family tree. One school believes that his grandfather L.Licinius Lucullus (cos. 151) 1
2
Lucullus
was the son of that Lucius who was curule aedile in 202. Others take the view that the consul of 151 was the son or grandson of C.Lucullus, tribune of the plebs in 196. But, whatever problems there may be in tracing his exact line of descent, we are, nevertheless, reasonably well informed about our Lucullus’ grandfather. Since he was the first of the family to reach the consulship it was he who, in accordance with Roman custom and practice, conferred upon it the status of noble. Our Lucullus thus inherited his status and probably also his wealth from this man who, it may be said, he in some respects resembled. Both were to tangle with tribunes. The grandfather and his colleague were, during the year of their consulship, thrown into prison by the tribunes because of the way in which they conducted the levy for war in Spain. According to one version, it was their excessive severity that led the tribunes to take this action. According to another, it was the favouritism they showed in granting exemptions from serving in what was a dangerous and unpopular war. In other ways, however, the subject of our study differed radically from his ancestor. While our Lucullus gained an exemplary reputation for his provincial government his grandfather garnered exactly the opposite. Once he got to Spain he soon earned for himself a well-deserved name for cruelty, treachery and rapacity. Finding that his predecessor had made peace with the Celtiberi in Hither Spain and thus deprived him of the booty and glory he craved, he at once determined to seek them elsewhere. So he turned on the neighbouring Vaccaei who were completely inoffensive. After their principal city Cauca (Coca) had surrendered to him on terms Lucullus massacred all the male inhabitants and looted the place. His next move was against Intercatia (Villalpardo). He offered the inhabitants a treaty but they prudently refused. Eventually, with both sides suffering the rigours of a siege, an agreement was patched up. The townsfolk, however, insisted that Scipio Aemilianus who was in Lucullus’ army and had a reputation for uprightness should act as its guarantor. Lucullus’ next target was a third city Pallantia (Palencia) but operations had to be called off because of the onset of winter. In the next year Lucullus joined Ser. Sulpicius Galba, governor of Further Spain, in an attack on Lusitania. To celebrate his successes in Spain Lucullus erected in the Velabrium a temple to Felicitas. It was adorned with statues which Mummius the conqueror of Greece lent Lucullus. Some
Lucius and the Luculli
3
time later, when Mummius asked for these back he was told by Lucullus that this was impossible as they were now dedicated to the goddess.1 This man’s son, the father of our Lucullus, and himself a Lucius was born about the year 144. He married—and again we can only give an approximate date—in or around 119. His bride was a Caecilia Metella who, as her name suggests, was sprung from the Metelli, then one of the most powerful families in Rome. Of the political advantages this woman conferred on her husband we shall speak in a moment. Of the lady herself all we know is that she was said to be a bad woman, and we may anticipate our story a little by observing that she was not to be the last such to cleave to the house of the Luculli. Both this generation and the next seem to have had an infinite capacity for contracting unhappy marriages. 2 Two sons were born of the match: Lucius, our subject, whose date of birth may, in spite of that uncertainty which has plagued us in tracing the family tree, most likely be assigned to 118, although some would favour 117; and Marcus who we know for certain was born in 116.3 Lucullus père was elected to the praetorship in 104. As I hinted a little earlier, he may have owed something of his success to his wife’s family. Metella was the daughter of one consul, Metellus Calvus (142) and the sister of two others, Metellus Delmaticus (119) and Metellus Numidicus (109). With members of a family like that commending a man to the voters his path to office would surely be broadened and smoothed.4 Lucullus was either praetor urbanus or peregrinus and as such would normally be expected to carry out his duties in the city. An emergency, however, led to his being despatched to the south where a slave rebellion had broken out in what can only be described as romantic circumstances. A young eques from Capua called Vettius had fallen in love with a slave-girl. Being impoverished, he could not immediately pay the price asked for her freedom. He was, however, able to obtain her on credit and promised to pay by a certain day. When that arrived he was still unable to meet his obligations but continued to receive an extension of the period of grace. But when that too ran out Vettius’ position was no better and the only solution he could come up with was to have recourse to arms. Kitting himself out with a diadem and a purple robe and surrounding himself with lictors, he first led his slaves against his creditors and then spread the rebellion further afield.
4
Lucullus
Eventually he built a fort on a hill near Capua and by welcoming fugitive slaves he increased his force to 700. The Romans took this matter very seriously. They had not forgotten the horrors of the First Slave War in Sicily, although it had ended some thirty years before, and moreover they had witnessed recently rebellion like that of Vettius at Nuceria and Capua. So Lucullus was despatched to put things to rights. At first the strong insurgent position baffled him but then he was able to induce Vettius’ principal ally to desert and was, in consequence, able to make short work of those who remained.5 In truth this war was little more than a scuffle in a cornfield but now Lucullus received a commission that would test his talents a little more. What has since become known as the Second Sicilian Slave War had just broken out and, like the first, was on a grand scale. So Lucullus was sent out with augmented forces, in order to put it down. The rebel leader, a man called Salvius, had assumed the name ‘Tryphon’ together with the pretensions of a king. His court was established at a town called Tr iocala (Caltabellotta?) and it was for this place that Lucullus headed. Battle was joined some distance away. For a time the issue was doubtful, but at last the slave army turned and fled. The survivors took refuge in Triocala. Lucullus, at first, made an attempt to take the town but to no avail. After that he seems to have done nothing. Some claimed he was simply being indolent, while others suggested he was being his father’s son and consuming his energies in extorting money from the provincials. Whatever the truth of this last allegation, it was to return soon to haunt Lucullus. For the moment, however, he reacted with anger to the news that a certain C.Servilius was being sent out (102) to replace him. He vented his spleen by disbanding his troops and firing his camp and siege works. He hoped, it is said, that the consequent difficulties for his successor would show he had not been deliberately prolonging the war.6 The ploy did not, however, work. So far as can be made out, Servilius complained to Rome about what had happened and a cousin, known as Servilius the Augur, took up the cudgels on his behalf. Since C.Servilius had two brothers who did not bestir themselves on this occasion we may suspect that this display of familial loyalty had more than a trace of self-interest in it and was primarily designed to further the Augur’s political career. At any rate he brought a charge of res repetundae (extortion) against
Lucius and the Luculli
5
Lucullus. The latter naturally turned to his powerful in-laws for help, only to meet with a rebuff. Metellus Numidicus refused to speak on his behalf. Various theories have been put forward to account for this behaviour. Some invoke the widespread Metellan family tree with its intertwining branches. One of Metellus’ sisters might be married to Lucullus but he was not likely to forget that the Servilii brothers also had a Metella for a mother and under these circumstances he may have judged it best to steer clear of the whole affair. Others think that Lucullus’ guilt was so patent, or, at least, that his conviction was so certain, that Metellus could see no point in intervening on his behalf. While such speculation seems plausible enough at first sight, I am not sure that it is strictly necessary. One ancient text does preserve what appears to be Metellus’ own publicly declared reason for refusing aid to Lucullus. Unfortunately, ambiguity, excessive terseness and possible corruption make it enigmatic to say the least. Nevertheless, one fact does emerge with tolerable clar ity: Metellus had been offended by some kind of irregularity in Lucullus’ conduct of his praetorship (not necessarily in Sicily) and for that reason he would not have anything to do with him. And from what we know of Metellus such an obsessive preoccupation with legal niceties and such a display of high-minded probity is not at all surprising. In other words, Metellus rejected Lucullus’ request from what appeared to himself at any rate as the highest of motives; and when the matter went to court Lucullus was condemned and forced into exile.7 So far as the Luculli were concerned, this was tantamount to a declaration of war. A feud had begun between the two families.8 There is dispute, however, as to its next manifestation. When Servilius returned from Sicily he too faced a charge similar to that of Lucullus and like him he succumbed. The plausible suggestion that the friends of the Luculli engineered this has not won universal acceptance.9 What is beyond doubt though is that hostilities temporar ily ceased dur ing the exile of Metellus Numidicus which had been engineered by his great foe, Marius, and lasted from 100 to 98. Then the Luculli seem to have had no difficulty in co-operating with the Servilii and others in working for his return.10 It may very well be that they bore Metellus no ill-will or perhaps they at least considered it politic to dissemble. The recall of Metellus was certainly popular with the nobility as a whole.
6
Lucullus
By this time they had tamed Marius and the return of his enemy would set the crown on their triumph. As we shall see, the policies the Luculli were to pursue would render them anyway sympathetic to the outlook of Metellus, however much they might feel resentment against him personally. 11 The feud itself was resumed with a celebrated court case. When his father went into exile Lucullus would have barely reached man’s estate which was signified in Rome at the age of 16 by the donning of the toga virilis. But when he and Marcus attained their majority, although they did not neglect their obligatory military service,12 they devoted most of their energies to a training in forensic oratory. The two often worked together, and Cicero praises Lucullus’ oratory as ‘sharp’, implying that his ultimate decision to seek glory in battle rather than in court was a definite loss to the bar. He says indeed that Lucullus was a man of natural ability and singles out his memory as a gift with which he was particularly endowed. We may also add that Lucullus’ tall and handsome appearance may have added something to the effect he produced. And, even if we concede that there may be some exaggeration in these antique laudations, it must, nevertheless, be admitted that Lucullus’ oratory would seem to have been sufficiently developed to allow him to hold his own in the forum and the senate.13 When they were satisfied that they had had sufficient training and had honed their talents fine enough the Luculli decided the time had come to apply their learning and so they turned on Servilius the Augur. The date is hotly disputed but I am inclined to put it fairly early in Lucullus’ career and would favour sometime in the early 90s when it may even mark the brothers’ debut in court. 14 What seems to have happened is that they picked the year when Servilius was quaestor and levelled at him a charge of using public funds for illegal purposes. In Roman law this was held to be perduellio or treason.15 Great excitement was aroused by the proceedings and eventually things got completely out of hand. Both sides had brought their supporters to the court and these set upon each other, with the result that several deaths and injuries resulted from the affray. The forensic performance of the Luculli was much admired but, nevertheless, Servilius was acquitted.16 A consideration of the differing reactions that this episode awoke throws a considerable light on the Roman character. To
Lucius and the Luculli
7
begin with we may look at the high-minded. They said it was the duty of the public-spirited to take action when they saw evildoing in public life. The absence of a public prosecution service in Rome was more than made up for by the presence of a large number of lofty-minded prigs.17 However, it was well known that this sort of thing might wear another aspect and one that would seem to us to be less commendable. It was a plain fact of Roman public life that quarrels between members of the nobility were often carried out through the medium of the courts. A charge was devised or utilized to bring embarrassment or ruin on an opponent. So it followed that a man must needs know how to attack or defend himself. As Plutarch tried to explain to his Greek readers, an early start was desirable in order to gain valuable experience and the whole business could be likened to a young hunting dog fastening himself on a wild beast.18 With a cluck of disapproval the Anglo-Saxon would no doubt apply the good Italian term of vendetta to the behaviour of the brothers Luculli. The Romans took a rather different view of the matter. They regarded an act of revenge of this type as perfectly acceptable, nay honourable.19 Some even went so far as to regard it as a sacred duty passed from father to son and an obligation not to be shirked. We actually have tales of fathers on their death-beds enjoining their offspring to prosecute in turn those who had prosecuted them. 20 By the standards of the day the Luculli were exceptional in but one respect. While it was perfectly legal to prosecute a quaestor while in office it was not a thing usually done. We have here in this last detail, then, a measure of the intensity of the quarrel between the Luculli and the Servilii, and probing further we learn that, though of short duration, it was held to be one of the most bitter in Roman history. Lucullus, in fact, seems to have had a second encounter with Servilius the Augur but under rather different circumstances. The Augur has been identified with that Servilius who, as praetor, attempted to bar Sulla’s way in 88 as he marched on Rome. It is notorious that Lucullus was present in Sulla’s army, being the only officer who did not desert him. One should beware, however, lest one reads too much into this. Some have seen in Servilius a supporter of Marius and of his friends, but this is not necessarily so. With equal plausibility it could be claimed that he subscribed to that substantial body of opinion which, while holding no brief for
8
Lucullus
Mar ius and Sulpicius, was nevertheless outraged at Sulla’s behaviour. Of course, the presence of an old enemy in Sulla’s ranks may have helped to steel his resolve, but we should remember that P.Servilius Vatia Isauricus who also took the family quarrel seriously saw no difficulty in joining Sulla even though Lucullus was still one of his followers. Private quarrels had to be submerged in public. Indeed, it may very well be that it was this latter circumstance that brought about reconciliation. Romans would not easily tolerate private feuds when they threatened the state as a whole, and according to Cicero it was precisely the national interest that led Servilius Vatia and the Luculli to put an end to their differences. At a time when they were both aiding Sulla in his championship of the legitimate power in the state against those held to be usurpers there could be no place for personal quarrels. So, by 83 at the latest, the feud was at an end.21 The financial position of Lucullus and his brother does not seem to have been affected by their f ather’s exile. The foundations of the family fortune had been securely laid by their once-poverty-stricken grandfather and there is no reason to suppose that his equally unscrupulous son did not build upon them so that in turn his sons were left comfortably off upon his departure. We certainly hear of no difficulties when they entered public life.22 However, to keep matters in perspective we should remember at all times that there is no record of lavish expenditure on Lucullus’ part until he became involved in the east. 23 Plainly he was wealthy but not outstandingly so. His brother Marcus was adopted by an otherwise unknown M.Terentius Varro. He thus became M. Terentius Varro Lucullus. Informally, however, he continued in his own time and afterwards to be known as M.Lucullus and we shall continue so to style him. The act certainly offers no clue as to the material condition of the family. Roman fathers did allow their sons to be adopted if they were unable to supply the money to finance their public careers, but this was not the only possible motive. Sometimes a man might be moved to act so in order to prevent a childless friend’s family line from dying out.24 The psychological effects of the father’s departure can only be guessed at. As we shall see, the brothers remained close throughout their lives and it is, therefore, not straining credulity to suggest that this was in part, at least, the result of their being thrown back on their own resources in their mid-teens.25 They
Lucius and the Luculli
9
did not, of course, want for friends and we shall be introducing them at the appropriate points in the narrative. Since most of Lucullus’ life was given to public service they will naturally mostly appear in a political context. Mention may be made here, therefore, of one friend who, throughout his long life, shunned public affairs. I speak of T.Pomponius Atticus who is best known as the friend of Cicero but was also the friend of Lucullus who was for a time the heir presumptive of his uncle Caecilius. 26 Outside Rome the Luculli seem to have enjoyed a measure of influence in the south and in Sicily which may have been a legacy of their father’s activities in those areas. Their influence was certainly able to win the poet Archias the citizenship of Heraclea (Policoro). In Sicily a leading man of Calacte (Caronia Marina) Eupolemus was a client of the Luculli and, as a token of respect, followed his friend in the Third Mithridatic War. We also hear of Lucullus paying a courtesy call to Panormus (Palermo) at one time, which might just be taken as evidence of some kind of Lucullan influence there too.27 There is a certain temptation to suggest that once the elder Lucullus disappeared from the scene the so-called wanton Metella took charge of the household and, turning herself into something along the lines of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, carefully oversaw the education of her sons. The temptation must be resisted. We already know that Lucullus himself was almost of age when his father was exiled and so he, and not his mother, would be head of the household. Moreover, at this stage the education of the two sons would be well advanced, and it must be remarked it was a good education. Lucullus, it was said, was equally at home in Latin and Greek literature. Sulla himself paid tribute to his Latin style when he asked Lucullus to revise his Memoirs. We shall see that the request was not seriously intended but the fact that Sulla took this way of paying a compliment is obviously not without significance.28 Knowledge of Greek was, of course, widely diffused in Rome at this time and among the upper classes a competence in the language was felt to be desirable.29 In the case of Lucullus, however, we are speaking of more than mere competence. There is told a stor y of a conversation between Lucullus and two of his friends, the orator Hortensius and the historian Sisenna. The trio agreed that, according as lot should prescribe, Lucullus should write a poem or history on the subject of the Social War in either Greek or
10
Lucullus
Latin. In the event the draw dictated he should write a history in Greek. Such, however, was his command of the language that he deliberately introduced some solecisms and barbarisms into his text so that his readers would realize that the work was written by a Roman.30 Later in life Lucullus built a library in his villa at Tusculum (Frascati). It was stocked with volumes from various sources and in particular, according to one account, with some acquired during the Mithridatic War. The building was open to all and scholars thronged the porticoes and reading-rooms where they were often joined by Lucullus himself.31 This, of course, was much later. Now in 102 there arrived in Rome a man whom we have met briefly before: the poet Archias. Lucullus, by this time head of the house, welcomed him.32 Archias was born in Antioch in Syria and was at this time about 16 years of age. He was a kind of touring teenage prodigy who had won considerable fame for himself with recitals at festivals in the Greek world and in the process been awarded the citizenship of Tarentum (Taranto), Rhegium (Reggio Calabria) and Naples. Some poems in the Greek Anthology have been doubtfully attributed to him but his major works have all perished. The loss to literature is not, perhaps, all that great. His speciality seems to have been poems celebrating his patrons and their deeds. He was also renowned for his facility in producing extempore verses on a given theme and then producing alternative versions on the same subject.33 This kind of thing was much in demand in Rome and Archias had no shortage of customers. He remained faithful, however, to his first patrons, the Luculli, even unto old age and when he became a Roman citizen he took the name ‘Licinius’.34 And he accompanied both brothers on their travels. When, at some stage in the 90s, M.Lucullus served on the staff of the governor of Sicily, Archias went with him and it was on their return journey that the pair made the visit to Heraclea that resulted in Archias’ acquiring the citizenship of the place. It was on the basis of this particular citizenship that Archias was able in turn to claim Roman citizenship in 89 under the provisions of the Lex Plautia Papiria.35 Although he passed most of the Social War in Rome, Archias joined Lucullus in the east when he went to serve as Sulla’s quaestor in the First Mithridatic War. He accompanied him again in the Third Mithridatic War. The result of this trip was a poem in honour of Lucullus’ exploits and a reward from the treasury for the bard at the commander’s request.36
Lucius and the Luculli
11
Another Greek intellectual who lived on intimate terms with Lucullus was the philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon.37 After leaving his native place in Palestine this man spent a number of years in Athens and, either during the siege of Athens by Sulla or shortly before, he made the acquaintance of Lucullus whom he accompanied for the rest of the campaign. Evidently he had formed a high opinion of his protector for when Lucullus set out for the Third Mithridatic War Antiochus joined him once more and perished while the hostilities were still in progress.38 Without doubt it was this close association between the two that led Cicero to make Lucullus one of the interlocutors in his dialogue Academica. In Book 2 he is given a speech in which he recounts an attack on Scepticism which he once heard Antiochus make at Alexandria, and it is not an unimpressive performance. Although he is expounding the doctrines of another, Lucullus is, nevertheless, shown to be completely at ease in handling rather difficult material and dealing with what are—to speak frankly— rather abstruse concepts.39 Unfortunately, Cicero had no sooner finished the work than he began to have qualms. He felt that the three interlocutors he had chosen, namely Lucullus, Hortensius and the consular Catulus, were not suitable men to represent and expound these abstract doctrines. In fact they could hardly be called philosophers at all. So he produced a second edition. Instead of two books it was now divided into four and was dedicated to the savant Varro who becomes one of the speakers along with Cicero himself and his friend Atticus. The work as we have it today consists of Book 1 from the second edition and Book 2 from the first.40 On the basis of this piece of editor ializing the most extravagant charges have been levelled at Lucullus. Not only are his philosophical pretensions attacked but doubts are cast upon his intellectual capacities, his sensibilities are held to be blunted and it is denied he has any claim at all to be considered a man of broad general culture. In sum, the picture of the man we are given in Academica 2.1, a picture that clearly influenced Plutarch, is held to be not just exaggerated but patently false.41 Maturer consideration of the whole matter may, perhaps, lead to some slight modification of these views. To begin with, it has to be recognized that Cicero expressed his doubts about Lucullus in private letters and it must be said that in this correspondence he does not always tell the truth. For
12
Lucullus
instance, out of vanity and self-importance he consistently plays down the part that Lucullus played in public affairs during the last years of his life so that his own role may appear the greater.42 And if he is capable of vilipending Lucullus’ role in politics it is not straining credulity to suggest that he would do the same to his reputation as a philosopher. It has, however, to be admitted that Cicero may have had more justification for acting as he did in the latter department than he did in the former. Quite simply, he was better versed in philosophy than Lucullus and his friends and as he looked down on them from his lofty height they may have appeared to him to be smaller than they really were. 43 But what role did philosophy play in the lives of Lucullus and his friends? Probably that it played in the lives of most men of their time and class. In the Rome of their day there was still a certain suspicion of philosophy, and interest was largely centred on its non-technical aspects.44 It was undoubtedly felt too that a Roman should taste of, but not delve too deeply into, such matters. 45 As gentlemen—and Cicero never forgot they were gentlemen46—Lucullus and his friends had certain obligations to meet and being thus men of affairs would most likely have little leisure to spare for literature or philosophy. It is hardly surprising then that in such free moments as they had they sought not arcane dogma but the spiritual nourishment and comfort that some believe philosophy may bring.47 The nature of Lucullus’ relationship with Antiochus now becomes clearer. The Greek did not accompany the commander in order to read him lectures on Scepticism but to act as his spiritual adviser.48 Over a century later the younger Pliny vividly described a similar figure.49 The philosopher Euphrates from Syria with his long hair and beard was undoubtedly a guru but a sanitized guru who was made welcome in the Roman drawingroom. Ethics was a speciality of his. Pliny, for his part, whenever he felt depressed sought him out in order to receive reassurance. A man who holds public office is putting philosophy into practice and indeed has the best part of philosophy, he was told. It is not straining credulity to suggest that Antiochus now and again gave Lucullus similar comfort.50 Now that we have removed one of the grosser fictions from our picture of Lucullus, it remains for us to ask what part, if any, his upbringing and education played in forming or modifying his character. Quite simply, we have to ask the same questions as the
Lucius and the Luculli
13
ancients would have. Philosophy, some believed, could actually improve a man.51 Was this true of Lucullus? Again, the ancients, and after them the humanists, wondered if polite letters would add polish to a man or simply contribute to the enervation of a warlike spirit.52 There is an easy answer to this last: Lucullus’ military career. As regards the degenerate practices of his later years (and they may not be as degenerate as some have thought), they were hardly a delayed reaction to book-learning in youth but rather took their rise from disappointed hopes or, more likely I believe, a sense of realism combined with a strong aesthetic impulse.53 We are told that Aulus Albinus, who was consul with Lucullus’ grandfather in 151, produced a history in Greek and in the preface apologized for his imperfect command of the language. For this he was rebuked by Cato the elder who called him a trifler and asked who had compelled him to write the thing in the first place.54 The contrast with Lucullus and his History need not be laboured. Like many men of his day he had a more perfect command of Greek than previous generations and correspondingly a greater insight into Greek culture.55 Peoples’ reaction to this experience naturally differed but in Lucullus’ case as a result of his reading and personal contact with Greeks a profound philhellenism seems to have been born. When even other Greek lovers such as Cicero could complain occasionally of the Greeks Lucullus never seems to have wavered in his golden opinion of them and often he treated them far better than perhaps they deserved. His sensitive and kindly handling of provincial Greeks must owe something to a nature which was basically decent,56 but it cannot owe all. As we shall see, Lucullus made no effort to understand any other foreign nation and thus his behaviour becomes correspondingly harsher when he comes to deal with them. So we may say that Lucullus’ contact with Greek culture had the effect of refining the manners and outlook of one who was basically of a kindly disposition. It should be observed that this refining of sensibilities went hand in hand with more sophisticated tastes in other areas as well. We may illustrate this point by having recourse once more to an anecdote. We are told that when Lucullus’ father gave a banquet Greek wine was only served once. By the time his son gave a party for the people at his triumph he was able to serve 100,000 jars. What had once been a scarce commodity had become virtually commonplace.57 If
14
Lucullus
Lucullus had more developed sensibilities than his ancestors he could also be said to have sought out and enjoyed to a greater degree than they the amenities and adornments of a civilized life. Yet for all of that he was to prove himself not a whit less able than they and, it may be said, to have sur passed their achievements. In sum, the polished manners and refined tastes that he shared with other men of his age did not make Lucullus any the less ready or able for the transaction of those duties that his station in life imposed on him. He was a sophisticated man who lived in a sophisticated age.
II Master and pupil
Late in 91 a goodly portion of Rome’s Italian subjects rose in revolt against her. This uprising came about as a direct result of Rome’s persistent and stubborn refusal to open her citizenship to the peoples of Italy. Equality was what her allies had long sought and seeing that it was not to be had from the Romans they at last deter mined to take it for themselves by declar ing independence. So the rebels created a new federal state of their own which they called ‘Italia’. It hardly needs to be said that the Romans were not prepared to permit such a thing and the two sides were soon locked in a ruinous conflict which we call the Social War.1 It is in this bitter struggle that we first encounter Lucullus in the role of a soldier. However, it is likely that this was not his first taste of the military life since the office he held, that of military tribune, had as a pre-requisite at least five years’ service and we may suspect that, like his brother Marcus, Lucullus had not shirked his duty in the years preceding. 2 In the middle republic the tribunes were the most senior officers in the legion. The office had considerable prestige and was often held by the politically ambitious anxious to further their careers. But from about the time of the Second Punic War the tribunate diminished in importance due largely to the increasing practice of employing legates and from now it was the latter post, rather than the former, which became the prize to be sought after by those who wished to advance themselves in public life.3 Lucullus, however, was to prove to be one of the exceptions to the rule. Like so much else about the Social War details are scarce but the reader may be offered a tentative reconstruction of what happened. Each year the assembly elected tribunes for the four consular legions, 15
16
Lucullus
and it would appear that, in 89, Lucullus was one of these. As such he served under the consul Cato, but when the latter was killed in battle early in the spring his army was handed over to his legate, Sulla, who was given proconsular powers, and with it went Lucullus. This, of course, was the year in which Sulla won a brilliant reputation by his campaigns against the Hirpini and the Sammites. Sadly, all we hear of Lucullus’ part in these campaigns is that he acquitted himself well but the sequel shows this report to be true. Impressed by Lucullus’ performance, Sulla sought him out and ever after took care to have him on his staff. 4 We learn, however, that it was not just Lucullus’ soldierly abilities that drew Sulla to him. The commander divined in the officer qualities of mildness and constancy. These, in themselves, are not, of course, military virtues but it may be said that they are desirable in a subordinate and we might guess that it was a reliable subordinate that Sulla sought when he first searched Lucullus out. But such qualities are also the hallmarks of a tactful and loyal friend and that was precisely what Lucullus soon became to Sulla. At first sight it must seem a rather odd relationship. On the one hand, we have the fiery patrician then nearing the height of his powers, on the other we have a slightly phlegmatic plebeian who was about twenty years his junior. Yet, however unlikely this friendship appears, it was destined to endure until the day Sulla died. Events soon showed that the latter’s judgement was shrewd and that he had made no mistake. In all the vicissitudes of the coming years Lucullus never once wavered in his loyalty and steadfastness. Even when asked to perform tasks such as the collection of the Asian revenues in 84 which he obviously found distasteful he complied without a murmur. Moreover, given the age difference and the contrasting personalities of the two men, I do not think it far-fetched to suggest there was something of the master and the pupil about their relationship, with the older and stronger leaving his impress on the younger and weaker.5 Sulla had by now reached his political maturity and since Lucullus in his later career shows he held many of the former’s principles it is not, I think, rash to suggest that he had taken them directly from their author, even after due allowance is made for the possibility that two men of optimate outlook would naturally and independently gravitate towards the same political position. Again, in joining Sulla’s staff, Lucullus was attaching himself to the man who, along with Marius, could claim to be the greatest general of the day and
Master and pupil
17
here once more we may detect that general’s influence on Lucullus. It was, however, exercised in a more subtle fashion than in the political sphere. Lucullus, after observing Sulla in action, seems to have deliberately chosen a style of generalship diametrically opposite to that of his friend. In Sulla’s campaigns we detect a great urgency. He is ever anxious to bring the enemy to battle and when confronted with a fortified town his first instinct is not to lay siege but to attempt to storm it forthwith. In Lucullus’ greatest campaign there is but one major pitched battle and he emerges as a great master both of the war of attrition and of siege craft. Unfortunately for his young friend there was one skill which Sulla was unable to teach Lucullus: the management of men by love rather than fear.6 In the very next year Lucullus was to give a spectacular demonstration of his loyalty. This, of course, was the bustling and troubled year of 88 which some believe marks the final milestone on the road to the destruction of the Roman republic. We shall, however, but lightly sketch the course of events since not only have we treated of them elsewhere but, in a biography, our attention must be focused on our subject, Lucullus. 7 He was elected to the quaestorship which was usually the first office of state held by a man embarking on a political career. His friend Sulla meantime had been elected to the consulship and it was under him that Lucullus was to serve. Normally a quaestor was assigned his province by lot but in exceptional circumstances the senate might allow a commander to pick his own quaestor. This would appear to be one such occasion for it is difficult to believe that one of the heroes of the Social War should be refused anything.8 Certainly, Sulla would want reliable men serving under him for he had been entrusted with a great task: the war with Mithridates, King of Pontus. For nearly two decades Rome had been wrangling with this monarch and now matters had at last come to a head. The king had over-run the Roman province of Asia and even now was advancing into Greece. But before he could move Sulla had become entangled in domestic politics with the result that his enemies Marius and Sulpicius illegally deprived him of his command. Seeing no other way out of the impasse Sulla put himself at the head of his troops and marched on Rome where he made short work of his enemies. But the senators, while holding no brief for Marius and Sulpicius, were outraged by this unprecedented act and their feelings were shared by
18
Lucullus
Sulla’s senior officers who belonged to the same stratum of society. To a man they deserted Sulla. Alone among them Lucullus remained loyal and joined the march.9 No doubt this was a tribute to friendship but we might also consider that Lucullus actually accepted Sulla’s view of his enemies as ‘tyrants’. Certainly, in a few years many others came to believe (or professed to believe) that Sulla’s enemies were also the enemies of the state. At any rate, by the spring of 87 the situation in Greece had so far deteriorated that Sulla was obliged to cut loose from his domestic entanglements and go to meet the king’s armies. The advance guard was entrusted to Lucullus. Arriving in Boeotia he discovered another Roman army wintering there. This was commanded by a certain Braetius Sura, legate to the governor of Macedonia. Although his army was but a small one Sura had inflicted a number of reverses on the Pontic forces in the previous year. Coming to Chaeroneia, Lucullus found that one of Sura’s cohorts billeted in the town had provoked a serious incident. The gravity of the matter seems to have made a deep impression on the Chaeroneians who long preserved the details in their folk-memory. Years afterwards they still pointed out the descendents of the principal participant, one Damon, and also the place where he was slain which was said to be haunted by his ghost. This Damon was renowned for his good looks and the commander of the Roman cohort duly fell in love with him. When the Roman could not get what he wanted by blandishments he resolved on the use of force. Damon, foreseeing what was about to happen, gathered together a band of sixteen youths. After a night’s drinking they smeared their faces with soot and killed the Roman and his friends while they were sacrificing at daybreak in the market-place. They then fled the town. The town council, acutely aware of the danger in which they now stood, 10 immediately met and established their good faith by condemning Damon and his followers to death. Their reply was swift and clear. Slipping back into the town by night they murdered the magistrates as they were having dinner in the town hall. Then they bolted once more to live the life of outlaws. It was at this point that Lucullus arrived on the scene. Despite the pressing business on which he was engaged, he took the time to make an investigation and ruled that not only did no blame attach to the town but that it had actually suffered wrong. He then joined the cohort to his own troops and marched away.
Master and pupil
19
Meeting with Sura, soon after, he told him he must quit Greece. The command of the war against Mithridates had been given to another and it was for him alone to fight it. A few years later, however, the Chaeroneians were to approach Lucullus once more as suppliants. After his departure Damon began to ravage the countryside round about. Eventually he was lured back to the town and made gymnasiarch only to be felled by an unknown hand soon after. There matters rested until some time later the Orchomenians, traditional enemies of Chaeroneia, re-opened them. They hired a Roman to bring a prosecution against the Chaeroneians for the murder of the soldiers. The case was heard by the governor of Macedonia in whose jurisdiction it fell. The Chaeroneians’ advocate invoked the name of Lucullus and the governor duly wrote to him. Lucullus’ reply convinced him of the city’s innocence and the case was dismissed. In gratitude the Chaeroneians erected a marble statue to Lucullus in the market-place. Here then, for the first time, we have an incidence of Lucullus’ fair-minded treatment of Greek provincials even in the most adverse circumstances. It will not be the last and it may rather be said that Chaeroneia was not the only town to express its gratitude to him on this campaign. Hypata in Greece, Synnada in Phrygia, and Thyateira (Ak Hisar) in Lydia all erected statues to Lucullus with inscriptions which variously described him as benefactor, patron and saviour.11 The first objective of the Romans was to wrest Athens and the Piraeus from the control of Mithr idates’ general, Archelaus. Macedonia was still in Roman hands and a small detachment was sufficient to guard Chalcis so Sulla was able to concentrate his energies on his main target. However, the Social War had drained Rome’s coffers with the result that the money at the proconsul’s disposal was inadequate for the job on hand. So he levied contributions on the cities of Greece and borrowed their temple treasures. What was thus gathered was turned over to Lucullus who spent part of the winter of 87/6 in the Peloponnese turning it into coin.12 Sulla, however, was soon to find him something more exciting to do. Shortage of funds was not the only problem faced by the proconsul in that winter. As the Romans possessed no ships the Pontic fleet had total mastery of the seas and was thus able to br ing supplies and reinforcements with impunity into the Piraeus. In an effort to close this loophole Sulla applied to
Master and pupil
21
Rhodes which among Rome’s allies had by far the best fleet. He soon learned, though, that no help would be forthcoming from that quarter. In the previous year, it is true, the Rhodians had beaten off Mithridates’ assault on their island home but their fleet was simply not strong enough to challenge the Pontic navy on the open sea and hence they would not venture far from home. This, in effect, left Egypt as the only other place which might be both friendly to Rome and capable at the same time of giving aid. So Sulla plucked Lucullus from his financial duties, put his brother Marcus in his place and despatched him to gather a fleet. He was to proceed to Alexandria, collect vessels there and in Syria and then, having added the Rhodian fleet to his numbers, return forthwith to Greece. Although it was the winter season when fear of stor ms made ancient mar iners reluctant to stir abroad the urgency of Lucullus’ mission meant he must go at once. Yet for all its urgency—and this is a slightly sur real touch—a place was found in the expedition’s tiny squadron of six ships for Lucullus’ philosopher friend, Antiochus. Plainly Lucullus did not wish to be deprived of the comfort philosophy may bring and Antiochus was willing to supply it. Whatever view we may take of Lucullus’ philosophical attainments we can hardly deny that Antiochus’ readiness to accompany him on a hazardous mission is a tribute to the affection and loyalty he could command. More than storms was to be faced. Those who held the sea in their grip would plainly do their utmost to see that Lucullus did not loosen that grip. Hence he was obliged to make a scuttling crab-like progress across the Mediterranean, changing ships from time to time in order to throw his pursuers off the scent. 13 His first landfall was Crete, an island long notorious as a haven for the pirates who, in those days, were such a terror to the peoples of the Mediterranean basin. By Lucullus’ time, however, much of this lucrative business of pillaging had been wrested from the Cretans and was now in the hands of the Cilicians. The latter, with an eye to the main chance, had thrown in their lot with Mithridates and formed a considerable portion of his fleet. Doubtless it was this circumstance which led the islanders to give Lucullus a fairly sympathetic hearing. He was unable to extract any actual aid from them but they did promise not to take sides in the struggle between Rome and Pontus.14 With that Lucullus had to be content and so he headed for his next port of call,
22
Lucullus
Cyrene (roughly the coastal region of modern Libya between Banghazi and Darnah). In this place Lucullus found another opportunity to indulge his zeal for improving the lot of those Greeks who fell under the shadow of Rome. Ten years before the last king of the region, Ptolemy Apion, had died and in his will had bequeathed it to Rome. The senate, however, decreed that the five Greek cities there should be free and thus they were left to their own devices.15 As might be expected, the inhabitants were incapable of taking advantage of their good fortune and like many Greeks before them, fell into stasis. In addition, they were not immune from the pirate scourge which, as we have noted above, plagued the civilized world in those days. The upshot was that tyrants established themselves as a result of the strife and confusion. The Cyrenaeans were thus in a sorry plight when Lucullus arrived and they begged him to act as a lawgiver. Reminding them of what Plato had once said when they had implored him to play the same role, namely, that it was hard to be a lawgiver for the Cyrenaeans when things were going well with them, he nevertheless consented and established a new constitution for them. The absence of any information on the contents of this constitution have led modern scholars to make a number of guesses of varying quality. Some believe that Antiochus played the part of a cultural middleman between his friend and his fellow Greeks but we may counter this by suggesting that Lucullus’ deep understanding of things Greek might render this service unnecessary. Others would go further and claim Antiochus as the author or co-author of the constitution and this has a certain plausibility if we accept the view that the philosopher interested himself in matters political. An oligarchic complexion is claimed for the constitution because Lucullus quoted that arch-oligarch Plato before getting down to work. A better argument for this view might be that the political opinions that Lucullus shared with Sulla would almost inevitably lead him to devise a constitution of such a type. 16 But whatever it was Lucullus handed down for the Cyrenaeans it was not destined to last for, in 75, the Romans belatedly entered on their inheritance and annexed the place.17 All of this must have taken time and so we are entitled to ask why Lucullus chose to indulge his altruistic tendencies at a time when Sulla’s per ilous plight would seem to have made it imperative he be about his proper business. This is particularly pertinent because the Cyrenaeans do not appear to have been in
Master and pupil
23
a position to offer him any worthwhile assistance.18 The most likely explanation is that his sojourn here was an enforced one. He did not come seeking ships but a convenient bolt-hole on the road to Alexandria. Once having been safely ensconced in that hole, he discovered that the operations of the Pontic navy rendered it perilous to venture forth again and so he determined to employ his enforced leisure usefully. What happened next is in harmony with this reading of the situation. When Lucullus did eventually take to the sea once more he was attacked by the pirates and lost most of his ships, although he himself escaped safely to Egypt.19 It was probably about the beginning of summer when Lucullus came to Alexandria to be met with what was literally a royal welcome. The Egyptian fleet went forth to meet him decked in the livery normally reserved for the arrival of a king. He is unlikely, however, to have been in ignorance of what lay behind this pompous display. The position of the king Ptolemy Soter II was a very delicate one indeed. He had come to the throne for the second time in 88 after chasing out his rival, Ptolemy Alexander I. The latter had died soon after during an attempt to regain his throne but not before leaving something for his rival to worry over in the form of a will bequeathing Egypt to Rome. To complicate matters further this man’s son (the future Ptolemy Alexander II) was at this moment in the hands of Mithridates. Self-evidently both sides had a handle ready for use against the king should he make the wrong move. At the moment, it was true, the Romans did not seem to be in any state to claim their inheritance. Sulla was totally engaged in Greece, and at Rome itself a civil war had just ended which had resulted in the installation of a regime bitterly hostile to him. To give aid to Sulla then would be tantamount to an invitation to a victorious Mithridates to install the ‘rightful heir’ in Egypt. But were Sulla to win, against all the seeming odds, then there might be no safety there either, for it was not inconceivable that his enemies at Rome would crush him and all who aided him. Rome would take revenge by entering upon its inheritance. And were one to give active aid to Mithridates and should he lose, then there opened up the dreadful possibility that both Roman factions might visit their wrath upon the hapless Ptolemy. The permutations were virtually endless but for the king they spelt out one message: shun all entanglements as the very plague. So he
24
Lucullus
would avoid giving offence in so far as was possible, treat Lucullus with every courtesy and respect and give him nothing. Thus when Lucullus stepped ashore he found he was to be the first foreign commander ever lodged in the royal palace. He later discovered the allowance for his subsistence was to be four times the norm. As befitted a man on an important mission for his chief who was at that very moment fighting for his life, Lucullus did his best to avoid being smothered by this lavishness. He would only accept such expenses as were strictly necessary and refused all gifts, although 80 talents’ worth was offered. He also ostentatiously avoided the normal Roman practice of making the grand tour to Memphis and other sites, judging it to be inappropriate on the present occasion. What such a tour would have involved is shown in the record of a visit some thirty years before by a certain L.Memmius. Then there was a great flurry of activity as the royal officials busied themselves with elaborate preparations for guest houses, landing places and even the feeding of the royal crocodiles. Lucullus would have none of this and instead remained at Alexandria working on Ptolemy and, in his free moments, conversing with Antiochus and other philosophers. At length he realized that Soter would not budge and he decided to resume his travels. The king, still anxious to please as long as he did not have to commit himself, gave his guest a naval escort as far as Cyprus. In addition, he presented the Roman with an emerald set in gold. At first, Lucullus was minded to refuse this bauble as he had all other gifts. But when Ptolemy showed him that it had on it an engraved image of himself he realized a continued refusal would hurt his host’s feelings and so he accepted. He knew full well the murderous propensities of the Egyptian royal house and feared that an insult might lead to his meeting with an ‘accident’ on the coming voyage.20 Only now, with the year well advanced, did Lucullus begin to meet with success.21 As he headed for Cyprus he was able to gather ships from the towns of the Syrian coast. However, upon nearing his destination he discovered that the pirates were once more waiting for him. Across the channel lay their base, Cilicia. They had, by means of fortification, strengthened the already rugged coastline to the east and west of the Calycadnos (Göksu) river. From these vantage-points they were able to watch for and pounce upon the traffic from the Levant which must needs travel through the waters which lay between them and Cyprus.
Master and pupil
25
But this time they met their match. Lucullus, divining what was afoot, immediately beached his ships and sent letters to the cities of the island asking them to make winter quarters and provisions available to him. They were willing to do this and somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, in view of this fact that the island formed part of Ptolemy’s dominions, they also gave him ships. But the preparations for wintering were simply a ploy to fool the enemy. When he obtained a favourable wind Lucullus put to sea once more and sailed safely to Rhodes. There, as his fleet was now large enough, he was able to break the Pontic blockade of the island. By this time too he will have learned of the great change in the affairs of Greece. Not only had Athens fallen, but Sulla had utterly destroyed Mithridates’ forces in two great battles. There was now no need for desperate haste. A second winter’s storms need not be braved and so Lucullus took up his winter quarters here.22 With a Rhodian squadron added to his numbers, Lucullus judged, in the spring of 85, that his fleet was now sufficiently large to allow him to rejoin Sulla. But he also determined that on the way he would do Mithridates a damage. His first landfall was at Cnidus (Tekir) in Caria and there he induced the inhabitants to abandon the king and join him. Continuing on his journey northwards he next put into Cos. This place had willingly gone over to Mithridates when he first invaded Asia but had saved its Roman residents from the massacre that followed. Now it gladly imitated the example of Cnidus. With these new allies Lucullus next made an assault on Samos, only to meet with a reverse. Although the island had, before the war, enjoyed the status of a friend and ally of Rome the inhabitants at this point seem to have chosen to support the royal garrison and Lucullus was beaten off. After this the Cnidians and the Coans went home but Sulla characteristically remembered the services of the latter at least when he gave them their freedom the following year.23 Despite this diminishing of his forces Lucullus pressed on to achieve further successes. When, in the previous year, it became plain that the war in Greece was turning against Mithridates a number of Asiatic cities had revolted from him. Colophon (Degirmendere) was one of these and for its pains had a tyrant called Epigonus set over it. Lucullus now arrived and put this man under ar rest—no doubt with a view to having him
26
Lucullus
eventually displayed at Sulla’s triumph.24 The island of Chios was his next target. In the original invasion of Mithridates it had taken the king’s side but there seems always to have been a strong pro-Roman party there and as a result when the unrest we have just mentioned manifested itself the place fell under suspicion. Mithr idates vented his spleen to the full by transplanting part of the population to the Euxine and placing a garrison to watch the rest. This garrison was expelled by Lucullus and, in the following year, Chios had its freedom restored.25 Up until this point Lucullus’ achievements, though solid enough in themselves, could hardly be described as spectacular or dazzling. Certainly he had done nothing to rival the great victories by which his friend Sulla had gained mastery in Greece. In truth his main contribution to the war effort had been to add to the already considerable discomfort Mithr idates was experiencing at the hands of a rival Roman army. When Sulla’s enemies installed themselves in power they lost no time in sending out a force of their own to attack the king in Asia. Led by a blood-thirsty but able commander, Fimbria, this army had inflicted a series of reverses on the king. There is a certain irony then in the fact that it was this very army that presented Lucullus with the opportunity to cover himself in glory for the first time in his career. Fimbria had penned up Mithridates in Pitane (Çandarli) but was unable to draw the noose fully about his victim as he possessed no ships. He therefore applied to Lucullus, intimating that he should forget about Sulla and join his own operations. If the king were to fall into their hands then the great battles of Chaeroneia and Orchomenus in which Sulla had smashed the monarch’s power in Greece would appear as nothing beside such an exploit. Lucullus, however, would not yield to temptation and flatly refused to have anything to do with Fimbr ia. As a result Mithridates was able to get away to Mytilene in Lesbos. Lucullus has sometimes been castigated for this since it would seem that had he joined Fimbria there was a good chance that between them the pair might have brought the career of one of Rome’s most redoubtable foes to an abrupt end.26 However, in at least one respect, Lucullus’ decision, it seems to me, does him great personal credit. He had justified Sulla’s faith in his steadfastness and loyalty. He was simply not prepared to upstage someone who was both his commander and his friend by making common
Master and pupil
27
cause with a deadly enemy. Indeed, this conspicuous loyalty must have led him to regard Fimbr ia with, at the ver y least, considerable distaste since the latter had reached his present position by murdering his own commander. But, over and above such personal considerations, there is a wider issue in question here. Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 had divided the Roman world. Some agreed with the consul that he had acted perfectly correctly in putting down tyrants; others held that he had acted unlawfully and should be tried for what he did. And when Sulla’s opponents, with Cinna at their head, came to power they soon showed what they thought by declaring him a public enemy. Sulla, for his part, ignored the decree and continued to act as a proconsul. Because of the Mithridatic War the issue lay in abeyance but now, with the king on the verge of defeat, both sides began to think about renewing the contest. Was it Sulla or was it the Cinnans who represented legitimate authority in the state? Was the hostis decree to be rescinded or not? When no satisfactory answer to this question could be found by peaceful means both sides ultimately went to war over the issue. In Lucullus’ refusal to aid Fimbria we can see the battlelines already being drawn and we have here a foreshadowing of the struggle to come. If we accept, as indeed we must, that Lucullus was one of those convinced of the legitimacy of Sulla’s position then his actions are, in themselves, perfectly logical. He would quite simply regard Fimbria as a servant of an unlawful regime who had no proper authorization for what he did. Such a person must be shunned since he was little better than an outlaw or a renegade.27 For the rest of the journey Lucullus’ appetite for attacking the king showed no sign of diminishing. He met with and defeated part of Mithridates’ fleet off the promontory of Lectum (Baba) in the Troad. Proceeding on his way, he discovered that a still larger royal fleet under the command of Neoptolemus was lying in wait for him off Tenedos (Bozcaada). Immediately Lucullus sailed ahead of the rest of his ships in a galley commanded by an experienced Rhodian admiral called Damagoras who had given a good account of himself during Mithridates’ siege of his native island. Neoptolemus dashed out to ram his reckless opponent in a ship which was heavily plated with bronze ar mour. Damagoras, realizing that a head-on encounter would be fatal, instantly turned around and backed water with the result that Neoptolemus struck
28
Lucullus
him only a harmless blow astern. At this point the rest of Lucullus’ fleet caught up with their chief and he, turning his ship about once more, led it against the enemy. The upshot was that the Mithridatic forces were routed and Neoptolemus fled with Lucullus in hot pursuit.28 About eighteen months had elapsed since Sulla sent Lucullus on his mission and he had begun to show every sign of despairing of seeing his subordinate again. In the previous year he had even started to build a fleet of his own at Chalcis. But now, at last, Lucullus rejoined his commander and found him in the Chersonesus (Gallipoli) preparing to cross over to Asia. As we know, the course of events had long since rendered obsolete the original objective of Lucullus’ mission. And by this time they had moved even further. Mithridates had yielded and agreed to terms which were to be ratified at a personal meeting between himself and Sulla at Dardanus (Mal Tepe, Sehitlik Batarya) in the Troad. So all that was left for Lucullus to do, after his long and perilous adventure, was to secure Abydos (Nara), Sulla’s entry-point into Asia, and ferry his troops across the Dardanelles.29 He was, however, to play an important role in Sulla’s settlement of Asia. Once the proconsul had had his interview with Mithridates he made short work of Fimbria and then set about the congenial task of rewarding Asian friends, punishing Asian enemies and generally making provision for the better ordering of the province. Those who went scatheless need not concern us here. Our attention must be focused on those who paid the price for siding with Mithridates. In essence Sulla divided the guilty into two groups. Those who had massacred their Roman inhabitants were deprived of their freedom, some of them lost part of their territory and all were made liable for five years’ back taxes. Lesser offenders, who had not actually committed murder but whose support for their Roman allies was judged to have been, at best, lukewarm were forced to contribute to a war indemnity which was also levied on the greater culprits. As Sulla was desperately short of funds and already facing the possibility of a war with the Cinnan regime he proceeded with utter ruthlessness and, in a single winter, collected all the back taxes. 30 But ruthlessness has its limits and, by the spring of 84, when Sulla was ready to return to Greece the indemnity had not yet been paid. He realized then he would have to leave behind in the
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province someone to attend to this. That someone would need to combine absolute loyalty to himself with honesty and financial acumen. Lucullus was the obvious choice, having given signal proof of his fitness in all spheres. So it was decided that Lucullus should join the staff of Licinius Murena as pro-quaestor; Murena, who was already governor of Cilicia, was now made governor of Asia as well. His pro-quaestor, L.Manlius Torquatus, then took Lucullus’ place on Sulla’s staff.31 Murena’s activities as governor assured Lucullus of a free hand and left him in virtual control of the province. In 84 Murena was busy in Cilicia making war on the pirates. The problem they posed was a long-standing one but there was now a punitive intent on the part of the Romans. They would naturally wish to settle scores with people who had made up a large part of Mithridates’ fleet in the late war. However, Murena soon allowed himself to be lured away from this task by fairer prospects. Hungry after military glory and a cheap triumph, he picked a fresh quarrel with Mithridates and for the next two and a half years (83–81) was embroiled in warfare with the king.32 In truth the task that faced Lucullus seemed to be thankless. Yet he emerged not only with his reputation intact but actually enhanced. The financial burdens Sulla laid on the Asiatic cities, coming hard upon the depredations of Mithridates, reduced many of them to beggary. In order to meet his exactions they had had to borrow money at exorbitant rates of interest. Theatres, gymnasia, harbours, in short every available piece of public property, had to be mortgaged to raise the necessary cash. We may be sure this situation caused Lucullus considerable distress. His views on how provincials should be treated are by now well known to us, and some ten years later when he returned to the province as governor and found the problem persisting he took effective measures to bring it to an end. But plainly there was nothing very substantial he could effect now and loyalty to Sulla must be paramount. Yet Lucullus did what he could and we are told he won golden opinions for the fairness and mildness with which he carried out his distasteful task. This, of course, could mean any number of things. For one, it appears to refer to his willingness to receive deputations to see what might be done to alleviate their plight. For another it could mean that he always treated the provincials with courtesy and good manners. And, I would suspect, it meant too that Lucullus extracted no more than was strictly owed. Not for him the extortion of the provincials
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practised by so many Roman officials. And if he himself did not steal we may be sure he saw to it that his assistants did not either. Those statues erected in Thyateira and Synnada would seem to be the expression of genuine gratitude.33 Another Greek city was to have less pleasant memories of Lucullus, largely through its own fault. Of all the towns which had taken Mithridates’ part, Mytilene alone held out when Sulla retook Asia. Having surrendered the Roman legate M’. Aquillius to the enemy they knew they could expect no mercy from the vengeful Sulla.34 It was probably not until the spring of 82 that Lucullus finished collecting his monies and Mytilene was still in rebellion. Being of a less choleric disposition than his friend, Lucullus seems to have tried to reason with the Mytileneans and offered them, so we learn, relatively easy terms. What exactly these were we are not told but it is difficult to believe Mytilene could escape the financial penalties, the trials of ringleaders or the loss of freedom which other like culprits had suffered. On the other hand, since they were sur render ing on ter ms, the Mytileneans might have avoided the plundering, the demolition of city walls, the loss of territory and the selling into slavery which so many other places had undergone. But whatever it was that was on offer, it failed to impress the townsfolk and Lucullus was obliged to proceed against them with his forces. They, in a show of defiance, met him in open battle and were duly worsted. The Romans then put the town under siege. However, when his enemies showed no sign whatsoever of yielding Lucullus decided to employ a r use. In broad daylight he sailed to Elaea (Kazikbaglari) which lies on a gulf off the mainland a little to the south of Mytilene. From here he slipped back again and waited in ambush near the city. One would have imagined that, as Asiatic Greeks, the Mytileneans would have bethought themselves of what had previously happened in the neighbourhood on a famous occasion when a besieging army appeared to withdraw leaving a gift in its wake. But apparently not, for they took the bait that was offered them. Baying for the loot which the abandoned Roman camp seemed to offer they sallied forth in a disorderly mob, only to have Lucullus fall upon them. He captured a great number and killed five hundred who had sufficiently collected their wits to make a resistance.35 There can be little doubt that this was a heavy blow to Mytilene but the city was still not disposed to give in and soon
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afterwards events elsewhere ensured it would have a respite. Murena’s campaign against Mithridates had not, to say the least of it, gone well and before he could repair the damage an envoy arrived from Sulla, about the middle of 81, bidding him desist from attacking one who was about to become an ally of Rome. Murena had no option but to comply. Early in the next year Murena’s successor, C.Claudius Nero, arrived in the province and so he was forced to withdraw. With him went Lucullus. Not only had he completed the most important task he had been set but he had also served for longer than a quaestor usually did. But, although he had captured 6,000 slaves and a great deal of other booty from Mytilene the town remained unsubdued in his wake. Nero did nothing worth while and it was not until 79 that his replacement M.Minucius Ther mus captured the place in a storming in which the young Julius Caesar distinguished himself.36 But by then Lucullus had taken his place in Sulla’s Rome.
III The politic man
Lucullus’ return to Rome in 80 can be said to mark his real entry into political life. Strictly speaking, of course, his public career had begun with his quaestorship, the first office held by a man intent on pursuing the cursus honorum, but it is fair to say that in this position he was given little chance to display whatever political talents he might possess. When not about the business of soldiering or administering, his role was simply that of a loyal supporter of Sulla’s policies. So, it is only now, with his aedileship (79), that we can begin to speak of him as a political figure. But when we do speak of the political career of Lucullus or indeed of any Roman noble there are three considerations which we should always bear in mind. To begin with, we must remember the ideals people such as he had before them. It was generally accepted that a noble like Lucullus should devote himself to the service of the state. Since he was of independent means he did not have to labour and it was expected that he should employ the freedom he thus enjoyed in public business. If he acquitted himself well in office self-evidently he would have served the state well but it would also be acknowledged that he had brought honour and distinction to himself. And not just to himself but to his family. Ever before his eyes the noble would have the achievements of his ancestors and his goal would be to have men say he had equalled or surpassed them.1 Idealism was not enough however. The noble recognized full well that public life had its less exalted side.2 Achieving office involved struggle and competition with one’s peers who sought the same goal. Rome was a fiercely competitive society and any man who wished to make his way in public life there had, in 32
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essence, to do two things. He had, first of all, to make himself pleasing to the sovereign people, for they were the ones who would elect him to office and pass any laws he cared to bring forward. Second, a man had to cultivate his fellow nobles. Political friendships would have to be formed with those who possessed power and influence and were prepared to use them on his behalf. In other words, the Roman noble soon discovered that everyday politics had its own mechanical processes and, if he wished to succeed, he had better learn how to apply those processes. Like any politician anywhere, he recognized where the sources of power lay and shaped his behaviour on that recognition. 3 Finally, we have to remember that a Roman politician could be confronted with issues on which opinion divided. Then the noble would, no doubt, be swayed by diverse considerations: the urging of his political friends, the possible consequences of his decision for his own career and, we may say, the intrinsic merits of the question being debated. The validity of this thesis has sometimes been questioned but it will readily admit of proof. For instance, when, in 91, the younger Drusus announced his legislative programme a clear majority of the senate supported it because they believed it would be beneficial to the house. But support was not unanimous, for there were those who opposed the tribune from the start. In some cases this opposition was based on the belief that the proposed laws held real political dangers; in others it sprang from personal enmity. Eventually, in an atmosphere of increasing rancour and bitterness, these men were able to persuade a majority of the senate to their way of thinking and Drusus’ laws were abrogated. It could, of course, be argued that this instance was exceptional but, in fact, we do have abundant evidence of cases where less dangerous issues such as the allocation of provinces or the granting of triumphs gave rise to sharp differences of opinion.4 These, then, are the considerations we should bear in mind when we come to examine Lucullus’ political career. I shall not be referring explicitly to them again for I would hope that the narrative itself would make it tolerably clear how they manifested themselves in his particular case. In antiquity it was claimed Lucullus was a very lucky man since he was away in Asia while Sulla was carrying out his proscriptions. He was, therefore, spared the agony of choosing
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between his own instincts which would be on the side of clemency and obeying the commands of Sulla whom he revered. Thus, not being called upon to join in the man-hunts, he avoided besmirching his reputation.5 However, the advantage thus gained added more to his posthumous fame than to his contemporary standing. If modern historians have not levelled the charge of savagery at him, it has at the same time to be said that a name for bloodthirstiness would have done him no harm at all in the Rome of his own day. Crassus, for instance, won evil repute and even fell under Sulla’s displeasure because of his activities at this time, yet went on to become one of the leading figures of the next couple of decades, and who will forget that Pompey who was branded as an adulescentulus camifex (youthful butcher) because of his zeal in hounding Sulla’s enemies was also hailed as ‘Magnus’? To be labelled a Sullan, whether zealous or not, was no disadvantage in the Rome the dictator had created.6 In truth, we may suspect that Sulla’s friendship will have proved extremely valuable to Lucullus. His candidature for the aedileship of 79 was, in fact, made in absentia. He was either still in Asia or on his way home with Murena when the elections of the year 80 took place. Under these circumstances he must have relied not only upon his brother Marcus who was also seeking the same office but also upon friends to canvass for him. I think it not unlikely that Sulla was among those friends and that his presence will not have gone unnoticed by the voters. Admittedly this much is hypothesis, but one other circumstance which aided Lucullus is well documented. On age grounds alone, Lucullus could have been an aedile possibly in 81 and certainly in 80. Moreover, there were no real problems about his leaving Asia even as early as 82. His main work there was done and he could reasonably claim he had been a pro-quaestor for far longer than was usual. But instead of making an early bid he elected to postpone his candidature until his brother came of age so that they might both hold office together. This gesture, we are told, was pleasing to the people and both brothers were elected aediles for 79.7 The minor magistracy of the aedileship had charge of the maintenance and improvement of roads, br idges and public buildings. Aediles were also required to regulate the markets and superintend both houses and taverns. They had a tribunal of their own to deal with those who transgressed their ordinances. No
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doubt it would be noted in the appropriate quarters how well or badly a man carried out these tasks. But it was not really their essential but unexciting duties that drew attention to these magistrates. Rather, it was a further obligation they had to fulfil: that of giving games. In April there were seven days of these in honour of Cybele, known as the Ludi Megalenses. September saw games in honour of Jupiter which lasted for fifteen days. These consisted of three elements: chariot races (circenses), animal hunts (venationes) and theatrical performances (scaenici). The proper mounting of these games was of considerable importance for it was by means of them that an aspiring young politician showed his respect for the Roman populace. The people expected that any man who was contemplating suing for higher office should provide them with a suitably splendid entertainment. If he wished to be taken seriously later on then he had better take them seriously now. Stinginess at this stage would be remembered. It is true that some who did reach high office could boast that they had made only a modest outlay during their aedileship or had not bothered to seek that office at all. But these were dangerous precedents to adopt as a pattern and men like Mamercus Livianus served as an awful warning of what might happen if one did follow them. He refused to stand for the aedileship although he was known to be a rich man and he paid for his contumely when he forfeited the consulship. Thus, the received wisdom was: court the people during one’s aedileship. Public monies were provided to stage the games but, when empire brought wealth to Rome, many men supplemented these from their own resources. They were thus enabled to mount lavish shows which, they hoped, would give them an advantage over others who would be seeking the same higher office. This practice plainly carried danger with it. As is well known, Caesar had to borrow extensively in order to make a display and so fell into debt. But, dangerous or not, aediles strove to eclipse contemporary rivals by surpassing the achievements of those who previously held their office. The ancients have preserved for us lists of men who were long remembered for the lavishness of their spectacles or the novelties they introduced to stimulate the jaded palates of their audience.8 The Luculli brothers were certainly not the ones to go contrary to the spirit of the age or to take any chances when dealing with the people. Although it cannot be proved, it is like
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enough that the already-large family coffers were swollen by a share of the booty from the war with Mithridates. At any rate they spared no expense in seeing to it that the people of Rome had something memorable set before them. Twenty years before, elephants had made their first appearance in the Roman arena, and now a new refinement was introduced when they were pitted in combat against bulls. The stage, too, witnessed innovation. A machine was provided that was capable of making the scenery revolve. These novelties were sufficient to ensure the pair a place in that roll-call of individuals whose aedileships had been particularly memorable. 9 More immediately the people showed their goodwill by electing Lucullus praetor for the very next year. This was a signal mark of affection and respect because under the Lex Cornelia annalis of Sulla a biennium (period of two years) was required to elapse between the holding of curule offices.10 In fact we are told that a special law had been passed, the effect of which was to allow Lucullus to proceed in this fashion. But what law was this? Some think that Sulla was the author of a measure designed to benefit his officers. As their careers had been seriously retarded because of their years of service to him in the late wars it would be but natural justice that when they resumed them they should be allowed to make up for the time they had lost as a result of their loyalty. So they would, under the terms of the postulated law, be allowed to disregard the biennium which should exist between offices. To this it has been objected that of the Sullani Lucullus is the only man who seems to have been able to act in this fashion. So some believe there was no general law at all but one that benefited him and him alone.11 There is, however, yet another possibility which need not necessarily invoke the hand of Sulla. We saw earlier that the people were very taken with the fact that Lucullus had deliberately delayed his own career in order that he might be an aedile along with his brother. We may further postulate that the games the brothers had given would have put them in a mellow and accommodating mood. In this frame of mind they might very well then be amenable to a suggestion (coming we know not from whom) that this splendid aedile should not have to suffer for an act of generosity on which they themselves had set the seal of approval. So they were induced to pass a law which would allow him to become praetor in the very year he would have
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expected to have done had he held the aedileship at the date he was first entitled to do so.12 Early in the year of his praetorship (78) Lucullus lost his friend and patron when Sulla died in his villa at Puteoli (Pozzuoli). After his will was opened it was found to contain a last expression of his friendship for Lucullus. The latter was named as the guardian of his young children, Faustus and Fausta. At the time of his death Sulla had been working on his Memoirs and these he dedicated to Lucullus with the remark that his young friend would be better able than himself to give them an aesthetically satisfying form. Yoked to this pleasing compliment was a typically Sullan piece of advice: above all else put your faith in the messages the gods send in dreams. At the appropriate point in our narrative we shall see what Lucullus made of this counsel. As regards the editorial injunction he seems to have interpreted it in the way he was most probably meant to: not as a sacred duty laid on him by a dying man but simply as an elegant salute to himself. Sulla, in making his request, was likely to have been no more sincere than Caesar was later when he said his Commentaries were not history but the raw material for history and Lucullus was no doubt perfectly aware of this. Thus we learn that the last book of the Memoirs left unfinished at Sulla’s death was completed by his freedman Epicadus but we hear nothing about Lucullus meddling with what Sulla himself had written. However, if Sulla’s will is of considerable interest for what it contains it is of equal interest for what it does not contain: the name of Pompey. The Romans expected a man to make honourable mention by name of all those whom he regarded as his friends in his last testament. Consequently, those who had thought themselves to be numbered among a man’s friends and now, at this late date, found they had been mistaken were not just hurt but regarded the omission as an insult. Given Sulla’s character there can be no doubt that the intention was to wound since, significantly, every other prominent Sullan received his due mention. On two occasions in the years 81–79 Pompey had caused Sulla some considerable political embarrassment and he did not forget it. It may also be that this was a final attempt from beyond the grave to tame the monster he himself had helped to create.13 In thus passing over Pompey and conferring great honour on Lucullus, Sulla—consciously or otherwise, we cannot say—along
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with his tangible bequests had left a legacy to Rome itself: enmity between the two men. From the very moment their careers began to coincide there must have existed a spirit of rivalry between Pompey and Lucullus even though one was active in Italy and Africa while the other was engaged in Asia. Both were young, able and ambitious and seeking the favour of the man to whom they had attached themselves. To Sulla they looked for important commissions and help in advancing their careers. They were vying with each other in the race for advancement. However, from this point onward we are speaking of something more than mere competitiveness. Given the heterogeneous nature of the coalition which Sulla led to power it is hardly surprising to discover that there was a corresponding diversity of opinion among those who now made up the ruling oligarchy of Rome. Leaving aside those disaffected or about to be disaffected, we find, at one extreme, men like Lucullus who were passionate partisans of the dictator, at the other, the likes of Pompey, who, despite quarrelling with Sulla, were prepared to work his system for his own advantage. Yet, whatever shades of opinion we may detect now or later, we may, with confidence, style the republic ‘Sullan’ and the men who ruled it ‘Sullani’ for two simple reasons. Those now in charge were where they were because Sulla had put them there in the first place, and recognizing this they were, for a time at least, content to live by the laws he had given them. It therefore follows that when Sulla made his final statement to the world, to receive an honourable mention in it could not but be of advantage to anybody who, for whatever reason, styled himself Sullan in Sullan Rome. In this instance, Sulla’s irrevocable pronouncement was clear and unequivocal. By loading Lucullus with signal marks of honour he declared him to be the first among his friends while, at the same time, dismissing Pompey entirely from their number. Thus we need not wonder that the latter from this time on saw Lucullus as more than a competitor for honour and began to harbour feelings of jealousy and dislike for the rival who had thus surpassed him even though, on this occasion, he was able to redeem the situation.14 The opportunity to repair the damage done presented itself immediately and Pompey was astute enough to seize it. One of the consuls for the year was a certain M.Aemilius Lepidus, a renegade Marian who had made his peace with Sulla. He, in fact,
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owed his elevation, in a large measure, to the support of Pompey in one of the politically embarrassing acts that had so infuriated Sulla. By this time (early 78) he seems to have already laid plans to overthrow the Sullan constitution. As a kind of prelude to the great work, he set his face against granting the dictator a public funeral. Pompey, for his part, seeing the drift of his policies, appears to have concluded there was nothing to be gained from further support of Lepidus and that an instant sundering had much to commend it. So, blithely ignoring Sulla’s insult, he boldly stepped forward to play the part of the good Sullan and declared his support for the other consul Catulus who, as an ardent Sullan, was determined his old chief should be buried with full honours. Together the two of them smothered Lepidus’ call and ensured that the funeral was carried out in due and proper form. We may suspect that as he watched the funeral pyre burn Pompey permitted himself a self-congratulatory smirk. The alleged pariah had shown himself to be one of Sulla’s greatest friends. It has been suggested that one of the reasons Pompey had supported Lepidus in the first place was the expectation he would eventually do something outrageous from which Pompey himself might at some stage reap some benefit. Whether or not this cynical calculation was made this was actually how things fell out. Despite several attempts to placate him, Lepidus eventually broke out into open rebellion and early in 77 the senatus consultum ultimum was passed against him. As Catulus, by now proconsul, was no soldier Pompey was appointed to assist him. Between the two of them they put down the revolt. And almost at once another and greater prize fell into Pompey’s hands: command in a sphere where it would be possible to win great renown by defeating an opponent of note. Refusing to disband his army, Pompey awaited the results of the senate’s deliberations about Spain. There war was being waged against Sertorius, one of the last and ablest of the Cinnans, and it was a war which was going none too well. Indeed, the government’s general there, Metellus Pius, had urgently asked for help. In the event neither the consuls nor anybody else could be found to go and so Pompey was picked and had conferred on him the title pro consule.15 Pompey therefore was one of the leading young men—the leading young man, rather—of the early 70s. Living up to the promise he had shown under Sulla he had, without ever holding office, won for himself a position of considerable influence and
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one from which he could gain yet more. In short, he was a figure of prominence and as such had totally outstripped Lucullus in the race for honour and renown. While the pages of the history books are filled with the exploits of Pompey first at home then in Spain, Lucullus’ career, despite the early benediction of Sulla, can, in comparison, seem commonplace. Nowhere is this better brought out than in the bustling year of 78 when all we hear of Lucullus is his involvement in an arresting but minor incident which illustrates not only his reverence for the law but also highlights again that quality of mildness which Sulla found in him. One day as Lucullus and his fellow praetors were giving judgement M’. Acilius Glabrio, who is believed to have been tribune at the time, passed by. When Lucullus failed to rise from his seat as a mark of respect to the other’s standing, Glabrio had his chair broken in pieces. Evidently believing himself to be in the wrong, Lucullus meekly accepted this reprimand and he, together with his colleagues, continued with his business standing.16 Demonstrations of this sort, with or without the smashing of chairs, are not rare in Roman history. Several instances are well attested where a magistrate (not always a tribune), believing that the dignity of his office has not been accorded the respect that is its due, has forcefully brought home to the offender the necessity for a change of attitude. There may, in Glabrio’s case, have been an element of personal animus. He certainly had little reason to love Sulla, who had forced him to divorce his wife so that she might marry Pompey, and the hatred thus engendered is like enough to have been extended to embrace one of Sulla’s leading henchmen. It may also be that Lepidus’ contemporary call to restore to the tribunate the powers Sulla had taken from it had emboldened someone who is habitually described as sluggish to bestir himself for once and insist upon the dignity of his emasculated office. But whatever motives impelled Glabrio to act as he did the matter definitely ended there and had no further repercussions. Later, indeed, Lucullus was to have other unpleasant dealings with Glabrio but, on this occasion, with the reprimand administered and accepted, there was no more to be said or done. The incident stands in stark isolation and has no connection with the other issues of the day.17 With the year of his praetorship over, Lucullus became governor of the province of Africa. All that we know of his
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activities there comes from a bald statement, in a late source which is as renowned for its brevity as it is for its unreliability, to the effect that he governed it justly. This calls for but two comments. To begin with, whatever qualms we may sometimes feel about the source, we can believe it here. What little it has to say is perfectly in harmony with what we know of Lucullus’ behaviour in other provinces. Likewise, the paucity of information means something else: Lucullus was in a peaceful province where there was no opportunity for military exploits. He was thus denied the chance to bring glory to the state and shed lustre on himself. While Pompey was warring against a worthy opponent in Spain Lucullus was performing routine administrative duties in Africa. 18 Looking at all of this there is an obvious temptation to level the charge of political incompetence at Lucullus for having allowed himself to be thus outstripped by his rival and, in one respect at any rate, the accusation may be justified. If it fell to anyone to voice his support for Catulus when Lepidus began to make difficulties over Sulla’s funeral then it surely fell to Lucullus. He, after all, had been most honoured in the dictator’s will. Instead, he seems to have done nothing and thus allowed Pompey to seize the opportunity that had been proffered. Proceeding from this, we might go on to level a further charge at Lucullus. He was a military man yet he did not join Catulus in crushing Lepidus and he did not seek the command against Sertorius. Once more it was Pompey who fulfilled these roles. There is a simple answer to these latter charges: Lucullus was absent from Rome when these matters came to be considered. By the time a decision was taken to do something about Lepidus it was already 77. Lucullus would have left for his province by then and so would hardly be reckoned among the men the senate might call upon for aid. However, when we probe the issue further we discover that the simple answer is not the whole answer. There is some reason to believe that Lucullus had not gone abroad willingly and that he had had hopes of playing a prominent part in the events that were about to unfold. Long before the actual decision was taken to destroy him, Lepidus had clearly become a menace. It did not require much wit then to predict that events would fall out as they eventually did. Lucullus seems to have divined matters correctly and tried to take advantage of the situation. It was not, in fact, Africa that was
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the province assigned him at first but Sardinia. He, however, refused to accept this because, as he said, of the large number of Romans whose activities in the provinces were by no means wholesome. The targets of the barb are obvious: provincial governors, their staff and the publicani. Such a statement is wholly typical of the man whose own pro-quaestorship in Asia had been distinguished by its gentle handling of the provincials. But highminded declarations of this sort, carrying, as they do, the implication that the speaker is morally superior to others, are rarely popular and least of all among those who suspect that they personally are being numbered among the delinquents. Eventually Lucullus’ attempts to realize his ideals with regard to provincial government were to bring him to grief, but even now his assertion can have won him few friends.19 But, aside from this one publicly proclaimed, Lucullus, as I hinted above, may have had another reason for this sloughing off his province. If he were free of other commitments then he might have some hopes of being called upon to aid in the quelling of Lepidus. If that really was his expectation then it would appear he was very soon disabused of it. His acceptance of Africa in place of Sardinia shows clearly his realization that he would not be given something more substantial closer to home. As he departed for his province he no doubt consoled himself with the thought that he could provide there an object lesson in provincial administration for those he had lately castigated. Ironically, had he clove to his original province he would have encountered Lepidus, for it was to that island the rebellious proconsul retreated when he was defeated in Italy.20 If we accept the hypothesis just expounded then we should be in a position to appreciate fully the difficulties Lucullus would have faced in pursuing his ambitions not only in 78 but also in 77, had he chosen to linger in Rome. If a bright young man were to be sought for military tasks for which his elders were unfitted then Pompey—despite the qualms of some, which were to be proved justified—was a more natural and obvious choice than Lucullus.21 In the elder statesman L.Marcius Philippus he had a powerful friend whose influence won for him the command against Sertorius and who also may have had a hand in seeing to it that he was sent against Lepidus. 22 Lucullus, indeed, had powerful friends of whom we shall speak but they do not appear to have been strong enough to overcome Philippus. They would
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hardly have been helped by a comparison between the military records of Pompey and Lucullus. Both had served Sulla well but the achievements of Pompey had been the more dazzling and his repute as a soldier stood high. On the other hand, many seem to have believed that Lucullus had no claim whatever on the title of ‘soldier’. We who can survey his whole career may find this a little strange but it was not an unreasonable opinion to hold at the time. While Pompey was one of the mighty warriors of the late civil war Lucullus was merely the man who brought ships tardily to Sulla, collected monies in Asia and had failed to capture Mytilene. The difficulties he had faced must have been as well known to the Romans as they are to us but the malicious, we may be sure, simply ignored them and talked only of the failures. A few years later when Lucullus sought the Mithridatic command we shall discover a substantial body of opinion in the senate that does not believe him equal to the task. Then, when he did actually receive the appointment, some said he made ready for the coming campaigns by interrogating experienced soldiers and reading histories.23 Thus, Lucullus cannot be totally blamed for his failure to achieve greater prominence at this time, despite the help of Sulla’s will. He had to contend with Pompey’s powerful friends, the latter’s great reputation and his own relatively minor achievements to date. We have spent some considerable time on this comparison of Pompey and Lucullus but we need make no apology for doing so. Since both men can be said to have helped shape the destiny of the Roman republic a comparison is undoubtedly important. It becomes vital when we reflect how as rivals—nay enemies—their careers intertwined. Nevertheless, in carrying out this exercise we must beware lest we acquire a distorted view of Lucullus’ career up to this point. Judged by any standards Pompey’s career had been extraordinary and remarkable. Brilliant campaigns, fought in his twenties, under Sulla had resulted in a triumph for a man who had held no office, however lowly. And still without holding office he obtained command against Lepidus and Sertorius. 24 Small wonder that beside him Lucullus should appear very ordinary indeed. But, if we shift our perspective and measure Lucullus’ career not against that of this extraordinary man but against what was the norm and against that of the mass of his contemporaries then we shall see that it was creditable and more
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than creditable.25 Although his career had been delayed by war, Lucullus still felt confident enough to postpone it still further in order to hold the aedileship with his brother. Then, such was his influence, he was able to have a law passed enabling him to be elected immediately afterwards to the praetorship. This was followed by an excellent provincial government and, upon his return, he was elected consul within one year of being suo anno. In sum, Lucullus’ advance to the highest office had been one of almost unbroken, and at times privileged, progress. But before we talk of the consulship there is one other matter that must engage our attention. It is appropriate that we say something here about certain aspects of the political situation at Rome in the 70s for not only did the rivals Pompey and Lucullus advance their careers against its backdrop but it was then, I believe, that the fate of the Roman republic was sealed.26 On one thing the Sullan oligarchy were virtually unanimous. Surviving proscribed men like Sertorius would, for obvious reasons, receive no quarter. The sons of those others whom Sulla had proscribed were not to enjoy their full civil rights either. Should such men hold office then they would inevitably attempt to recover their lost properties. Sulla had done his work well in this department. By distributing his enemies’ estates to his followers he bound them to himself and ensured they would not admit unwholesome elements back into public life.27 Yet, for all of that, the Sullan oligarchy seems to have gone in fear of what might emerge from among its own numbers. Everpresent before them was the possibility that someone judged sound and respectable and admitted to public life by Sulla might imitate the general’s example and mount a coup d’état. The heterogenity of the Sullani carried dangers with it. Ex-Marians were particularly feared as being mere time-servers of doubtful loyalty, and such fears were wholly justified in the case of Lepidus. Before he was destroyed he had unveiled most ambitious designs: restoration of the powers of the tribunate, re-introduction of corn doles and restoration of confiscated land to its previous owners. In short, he aimed at the total abolition of the Sullan system.28 And the uneasiness did not go away after that. Caesar, who owed his life and his career to an act of grace on the dictator’s part, had never made any secret of his enmity to the Sullan system. So when, in 65, as aedile he began gathering
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gladiators ostensibly for a show, the senate took fright and set a limit on their numbers.29 Most famous of all the assaults on the Sullan system was, of course, the conspiracy of Catiline in 63. Press of necessity had turned the one-time Sullan hitman into a champion of the poor and an advocate of the abolition of debt.30 The senate’s initial hesitancy in dealing with Lepidus and Catiline can in part be attributed to the fact that such a corporate body is naturally slow to act. But even more there lies behind such sluggishness a desire not to provoke trouble unnecessarily. Having had one taste of civil war, the fathers were not anxious to have another.31 At first sight it might appear that the lack of a standing military force or police could have hindered the Sullan republic in its attempts to defend itself. By way of an answer we need only appeal to its record. When troops were needed to meet external threat from an armed force they were found and they duly did what was expected of them. In point of fact the consequences that flowed from the rise of Pompey, one of its greatest defenders, proved in the end to be far more dangerous, nay fatal, to the republic than any assault from without. Nobody nowadays, I think, believes that Pompey aimed at anything more than to be the first man in the republic. With dignitas greater than anyone else’s he would be deferred to and have the rules bent in his favour.32 Yet there were times in the 70s when it must have seemed to some, at least, that he actually sought domination. Along with his military talents Pompey had inherited from his father, no mean practitioner of the art, a talent for brinkmanship which he exercised to the full.33 When Lepidus was crushed his refusal to disband his forces was in contradiction of an order from Catulus to do so and soon after he received the command against Sertorius in Spain. On his return from there he kept his army intact until the last day of 71 before entering on his consulship the very next morning. On neither occasion was there any violence, no treason was spoken and no overt move to seize power was made, but men must have looked uneasily over their shoulders and bethought themselves of Pompey’s former master, Sulla. They certainly did so in 62, for upon Pompey’s return from the east many thought mistakenly that he would imitate the old dictator. All in all, as we survey these incidents it is not impossible to believe that Pompey’s subtle pressure played some part in getting him what he wanted.34
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Undoubtedly Sulla was responsible for giving Pompey’s career its initial impetus and was also to blame for turning his head by hailing him as ‘imperator’ and ‘Magnus’ and permitting him to triumph. But the dictator also seems to have realized that he had created something that ran clean contrary to his own ideal of a state where no man might have excessive power and that something would have to be done to smother it. It is certainly not without significance that, after his triumph in 81, Pompey never received any further public employment so long as Sulla lived.35 We are probably on safe ground if we say that no matter what conditions were like in the 70s a man of Pompey’s ambitions and abilities would have sooner or later emerged into public life once more. As it happened, it was chance, and chance alone, that facilitated Pompey’s career and determined the shape it would take. We may say it was this chance too which played a large part in the destruction of the Roman republic. It is very easy to understand why the consuls of 77 should decline the dangerous honour of the Spanish command. The Romans had a strong traditional memory of the horrors of the Spanish wars of the previous century and anybody might hesitate to pit himself against the inhospitable terrain and an enemy like Sertorius.36 But, nevertheless, their refusal and the refusal of anybody else to go revealed a situation of which the Romans themselves were acutely aware: by chance it had happened that there was at this time a lack of military talent in the state. A situation had arisen which a man might foresee but not legislate against and there was but one remedy.37 Pompey might be potentially troublesome but Sertorius was definitely dangerous. There was really no option but to confer a special command on the young man. In taking this decision only the dimmest can have been unaware of what it implied. Pompey might rid them of Sertorius but there would be a price to pay. He would be helped further on that road which lead to the pre-eminence he craved. But neither now nor later were the senators prepared to let him have that position.38 The senate was ever ready to use his talents but not to reward them. Now it is very easy for a historian, armed with the deadly weapon of hindsight, to lecture the dead on what they ought or ought not to have done in a given situation but we may, perhaps, be permitted one observation. In hardening their hearts against Pompey the oligarchy had erred greatly.39 Their attitude eventually
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drove him into the arms of Crassus and Caesar to form the First Triumvirate, and few will deny that out of that there came directly civil war.40 We may now return to our narrative of Lucullus’ career and one of the things we shall be considering is the part he played in defending Sulla’s constitution, which, as we have just seen, was in some danger. We do not know how long Lucullus spent in Africa. We are thus either at liberty to assume that he returned to Rome in 76 and remained quiescent for a year before embarking on an electoral campaign for the consulship or instead we may choose to believe that he was not free of provincial duties until 75 and that he began his canvass immediately on his return. One circumstance might favour the second alternative. If Lucullus were in Rome it is unlikely that either his ambitions or the political situation would have allowed him to be quiet for a whole year. But if the date of Lucullus’ return to Rome is disputed the date of his consulship is secure. In 75 he was elected to the consulship of 74.41 We described how Lucullus wooed the people when he sought the aedileship and although we are told nothing about his canvass on this occasion, we may be sure that he did not neglect to do so now either. Here we shall spend a little time considering another aspect of Lucullus’ campaign, namely the support he enjoyed from the political friends he had made in his years in public life. All men at Rome could call themselves ‘Sullan’ but some could, and did, lay greater claim to that title than others. Lucullus naturally was one but he was not alone in considering himself an inheritor of Sulla’s mantle. One of the features of these years was the existence, within the ruling oligarchy, of an informal group of nobles who made the defence of Sulla’s constitution the chief aim of their political life. Where others were hostile, lukewarm or merely indifferent, they were ardent. It was they, for instance, who were to be in the forefront of the opposition to the Gabinian law that conferred such wide powers on Pompey. 42 But now, with cer tain alar ming developments in the matter of the tribunate,43 a sense of urgency was lent to their support for their friend Lucullus. A sound man was needed in a position of authority to deal with the problems of the day. So we can with reasonable certainty state that a formidable array of consulars, Q.Lutatius Catulus, Mam. Lepidus, C.Scribonius Curio, Cn. Octavius and Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, came to canvass on Lucullus’ behalf. It is very like too that he
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called upon men like Q.Hortensius, the leading orator of the day, and L. Cornelius Sisenna whose partiality for Sulla could be seen in the histories he wrote. Probably these men will also have aided Lucullus’ colleague, M.Aurelius Cotta, since it is almost certain that he too shared their political views.44 But more than a shared political stance linked Lucullus to some of these men. In the case of Catulus, Hortensius and Sisenna, Lucullus enjoyed a warm personal relationship. All four had a common interest in literary and philosophical matters. So far as Catulus and Lepidus were concerned there was something more. Both shared Lucullus’ dislike of Pompey. Catulus is unlikely to have forgotten how the young butcher flouted his order to disband his army and Lepidus had good cause to remember Pompey’s intervention in the elections of 79 as that had cost him the consulship then.45 We may fittingly close our chapter on the politic man with Lucullus’ marriage, for such an event in the circles in which he moved usually wore a political as well as a domestic aspect. His bride was a girl called Clodia from the family of the Claudii Pulchri. As so often with Lucullus, the date is not known exactly but two circumstances allow us to fix it approximately. The girl’s father, Appius Claudius Pulcher, died about the middle of 76 and it was Clodia’s brother, also called Appius Claudius Pulcher who, acting as her guardian in accordance with Roman custom, gave his consent to the match. Then again, Lucullus, in the course of his consulship, is described as a married man. Thus the weddingday must have fallen somewhere after the middle of 76 and before the middle of 74 when he departed for the east.46 The Claudii were patricians with a reputation for hauteur and waywardness. Two of the present generation, Tertia and her brother C.Claudius Pulcher, were by no means negligible figures in the society and politics of the time but few will quarrel with the judgement that they have been eclipsed by Clodia herself and the other members of the family who fully lived up to the traditions of their ancestors. Of Clodia’s own activities we will speak in another place. A third sister, also called Clodia and like all the girls of the family accounted a great beauty, was famed in her day for her love affairs and she has achieved a kind of immortality through being identified, rightly or wrongly, with that Lesbia to whom Catullus wrote so many of his poems. The brother Appius, of whom we have just spoken, was well known
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for his stubborn self-regard and his jealous fostering of the dignity of his clan. In politics he was perceived as being a man of fickle loyalties whose primary allegiance was to himself. But, without doubt, the most colourful of the lot was P.Clodius. He early showed signs of instability and his reputation was to be besmirched with the imputation of incest. By deliberate and avowed choice he chose the way of the demagogue, a choice that eventually led to his death in a brawl on the Via Appia.47 Such was the family into which Lucullus married. As I hinted, almost invariably matters of this sort among the Roman nobility were arranged with a view to the political advantages which would ensue. The bond thus forged would, it was hoped, result in the members of the two houses working together in public life. Nor is it difficult to detect such a consideration at work here. The stature of Lucullus, a plebeian noble, would have a number of cubits added to it as a result of an alliance with an ancient patrician family, even if some of its members were eccentrics. But, if we look at the matter dispassionately, we must conclude that the Claudii stood to reap greater benefit from the alliance than Lucullus did. 48 Upon his death the elder Appius had left his large family in straitened circumstances and so when Lucullus came to seek Clodia’s hand he magnanimously forbore from looking for the customary dowry. Indeed, the younger Appius in after-times would jokingly remark that until Lucullus resigned Clodia’s portion to him he could not afford to serve mulsum (honeyed wine) at home but could taste of it only when he scrounged it in other people’s houses. In modern times he would doubtless have said he never drank cognac unless somebody else was paying for it. 49 However, for a man in Appius’ position shortage of funds meant more than a simple shortage of delicacies. A fair amount of money was required to finance a political career and, in its absence, Appius and his two ambitious brothers might, for all their distinguished ancestors, find some difficulty in procur ing advancement.50 Hence there was a certain urgency about finding good husbands for the girls,51 and so the acceptance of Lucullus’ overtures, especially as he was prepared to be generous when it came to financial arrangements. He was rich and he had already made some mark in the world. Plainly he could do something for the Claudii and they did not hesitate to take advantage of the connection in order to further their own careers.
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A dynastic union then. However, since it defies reason to argue that no Roman couple ever felt any attraction for each other, we are at liberty to ask if Lucullus viewed Clodia with an eye to anything other than the events of the senate house or the forum. We have seen that she was renowned for her good looks and since other men found her attractive we could suppose that Lucullus did too. To waive a dowry might indeed betoken anxiety to gain a political advantage but equally well it is amenable to the interpretation that it reveals a smitten suitor’s ardour. The question of the existence of warmer feelings than simple cold calculation in Lucullus’ marriage is therefore an open one and I believe it is best left so.52 But whatever motive (or mixture of motives) impelled Lucullus to marry Clodia, the marriage itself was not to be a happy one and his connection with this dangerous and volatile family brought him small profit.
IV The consulship
Right at the very beginning of his consulship, Lucullus was obliged to deal with a crisis that had arisen in Spain. There the forces of the gover nment were exper iencing considerable difficulties because of the failure of Rome to send them supplies and reinforcements.1 Pompey had despatched a stream of missives asking for help but to no avail.2 At last he wrote in exasperation to say that if the present situation continued he would be forced to bring his army back to Italy with the possibility that Sertorius would then soon be hot on his heels.3 This letter was read to the senate at the start of 74. Immediately, Lucullus and the other consul, Cotta, neither of whom had any desire to see Pompey’s return, proposed he be given what he asked for. Their influence prevailed and the necessaries were duly voted. On the surface, this appears to be a straightforward transaction. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the consuls coerce a sluggish senate into doing its duty. A closer look, however, reveals that it is not, perhaps, all that simple. To start with, we might ask why Lucullus should have exerted himself in this fashion to rescue an enemy from embarrassment. Then again, we might legitimately enquire why Pompey had been allowed to get into such a mess in the first instance. To answer this second question first: Rome was, at this time, faced with a financial crisis and a famine brought about by her foreign wars and the activities of the pirates in the Mediterranean.4 In short, there was very little money to spare for Pompey. That, however, is only half an answer. If it were possible now to scrape together what was needful, why was the scraping not done earlier, especially since Pompey’s plight was well known for some time? We can, I think, detect the malign influence of Pompey’s enemies at work here. To suggest 51
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that they deliberately withheld supplies in order to bring about his destruction is a palpable absurdity. He was one of the commanders duly appointed by the senate to prosecute the war and his enemies, no less than he, fervently wished to see the campaign brought to a successful conclusion with an end made of Sertorius. At the same time, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where they would view with equanimity Pompey’s failure to distinguish himself and that they might work towards the objective of the chastisement of youthful arrogance. Metellus Pius, the other general in Spain, was sounder politically and it would be all to the good if he were to gain the major part of the credit for winning this war.5 Unfortunately, things had been allowed to go too far. There can be little doubt that what Pompey said about his position and about what would flow from it was perfectly true. Already a seasoned general, he would surely know when a position had become untenable and when retreat was necessary.6 At the same time we may suspect there was an element of bluff in what he said. Quite simply, Pompey was exercising, once more, his talent for brinkmanship. A military situation was being exploited for the benefit it might give.7 In the present instance he dangled before his audience nothing less than the complete collapse of the Spanish war-effort. This, as we have noted, was a real enough possibility but it looks as if Pompey deliberately made things look worse than they really were by claiming that Sertorius would then go over to the offensive. In fact, it is very doubtful if the latter were strong enough to launch a serious assault on Italy.8 But there were many at Rome who would not have known that and many more who would tremble at even the very mention of such a thing. Pompey knew his men and he made it his business to thoroughly frighten them. So, we may say that Pompey had a very good case to begin with and that he improved its appearance by skilful presentation. Furthermore, from the very outset, he must have had a good idea that the ploy would work for the simple reason that there were people at Rome who had their own reasons for keeping him where he was. One of these was Lucullus and this brings us to the answer to our first question: why did he aid Pompey?9 It is sometimes claimed that Lucullus’ motive was fear, fear that if Pompey returned then the Mithridatic command would be given to him. Relations between the king and Rome had now reached
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the point where another war yet again appeared virtually inevitable. Nobody had yet been chosen to command Rome’s army since hostilities had not actually commenced but Lucullus was determined that when they did he himself should lead it. However, a moment’s consideration will show that whoever Lucullus had to fear as a rival it could not be Pompey. Someone who has botched one major operation is not usually entrusted immediately with another. Rather, Lucullus was anxious about something else. At the present moment he held as his province Cisalpine Gaul and his hope and expectation would be that he might slough it off in favour of Asia. But should Pompey be beaten out of Spain all hope of such a swap would instantly be at an end. With Sertorius seemingly about to descend on Italy the senate would surely oblige Lucullus to go to the province he had been assigned and there mount guard. Police-work would take the place of the glamour and glitter of an Asian command. In sum, Lucullus saw looming before himself a governorship like that he had had in Africa.11 But this was not likely to be the only consideration that weighed with Lucullus. He will have bethought himself of what Pompey was likely to do should he actually turn up in Italy. In the light of his career to date nobody can have seriously believed for even a moment that this thrusting young man would quietly disband his army and go home.12 As we know, there were those at Rome who mistakenly believed Pompey was capable of mounting a coup. But even those who did not share this extreme, pessimistic view could draw little comfort from Pompey’s previous ambiguous behaviour. More manipulation could be expected. Should Pompey return at the head of an army then, given his record in such matters, he could almost certainly be expected to try and exploit his position at its head in order to gain something for himself. And, as he was a man with both friends and enemies, one could look forward to tension and quarrels.13 Since Rome was now already facing serious difficulties at home and abroad this kind of situation were plainly best avoided.14 Pompey should be given what he asked for. Clearly there was something statesmanlike in such an outlook and Lucullus at this time was not motivated solely by worries over his own career. We are explicitly told that he acted for the good of the state.15 Apart from the disruption that might ensue from Pompey’s return he obviously regarded it as unacceptable that the
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forces of the legitimate government should be driven from Spain. To be worsted by a bandit and a renegade would constitute an intolerable affront to the majesty of Rome. Hence, Lucullus laid aside his enmity for Pompey. And when he put his proposals to the house he found a majority of a like mind. Those who out of indolence or malignancy had been unwilling to send Pompey supplies now showed the greatest enthusiasm for doing so.16 One other excursion that Lucullus may have made into the domain of imperial policy may be mentioned here. Some believe that the problems of Cyrene had become ineradicable and intractable and that Lucullus’ new constitution had failed to bring any relief. Thus, so the argument runs, he now (74) urged the senate to take up the legacy of some twenty years before and annex the place, since that would be in its best interests. The senate was willing to listen. We have just seen that Rome’s financial position was shaky and this, in turn, had led to a food crisis, which we shall, in due course, illustrate by reference to a famous and dramatic incident. Plainly, there was need of new areas to exploit in order to bring some amelioration in the situation and so the senate went ahead and erected Cyrene into a province. Neat and tidy this reconstruction of events may appear but the reader should bear in mind two words of warning. Though plausible, Lucullus’ intervention is purely hypothetical. It is the kind of behaviour we expect of the man but it is nowhere mentioned in the sources. Further, the annexation may not have taken place at all in 74 for there is good reason for assigning it to 75.17 What is not in doubt is that Lucullus had other matters besides running the empire to preoccupy him. He was also called upon now to defend Sulla’s laws from attack. We have already seen one weakness in Sulla’s schemes in the matter of military commands and have observed that the author of the constitution was not wholly to blame for them since they were, in part at least, not of a sort to be legislated against. Now we encounter another, which manifested itself about the same time and for which most of the blame must attach itself to Sulla. I speak of the arrangements he had made for the tribunate. This was one of the areas towards which the dictator’s reforming zeal had been particularly directed, for it was from here, since the time of the Gracchi onward, that one of the greatest challenges to stable government as he conceived it had come. So Sulla emasculated it. Tribunes were deprived both of
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their power to bring legislation before the people and of their right to summon the senate. Their veto or intercessito could now be employed only to protect the rights of an individual and might not be deployed against a law. Finally, anybody who held the tribunate would automatically become ineligible for any other office. Sulla’s intentions can hardly be in doubt. With the prospect of advancement removed, only the mediocre would seek to become tribunes. And if, during their year of office, they were minded to exercise their second-rate talents then the drastically reduced powers at their disposal would ensure that their capacity for mischief-making would be limited.18 It may very well be—we cannot say for certain—that Sulla thought he had done his work well here. Unfortunately, a dispassionate examination reveals serious flaws in his arrangements. To begin with, he had left virtually untouched the natural power base or constituency of the tribune: the plebs. He did nothing to reduce their numbers, even though one presumes he might have found places for some of them in his colonies. After all, traditionally such foundations had been used to siphon off excessive and potentially dangerous numbers. Indeed, so far from reducing the number of the plebs Sulla actually increased it. A body of 10,000 slaves of the proscribed was manumitted and, given the name of Cornelii, distributed among the tribes. The idea seems to have been that, mindful of their origin, these men would have a wholesome and restraining influence on those whom they were set among. But the Cornelii proved to be a grave disappointment. They vanish almost as soon as they appear and play no discernible role in the politics of the 70s. The supposition must be that when it came to confrontation they opted to identify with the class to which they now belonged rather than sally forth as loyal clients of those who had made of them freedmen.19 Now, it can be claimed that, however badly it worked out in practice, the creation of the Cornelii was, in its basic theory at any rate, a reasonable scheme, but the same can hardly be said of Sulla’s abolition of the system whereby a ration of corn was sold cheaply to the people. Even his loyal followers recognized this and the events of the years immediately after Sulla’s death brought out clearly the wisdom of having such a system and paid tribute, it may be said, to the foresight of Caius Gracchus, who first devised it. With the state guaranteeing storage and regular
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distribution the vagaries in supply, so common in the ancient world, had less of an impact. People ate regularly and when people eat regularly they are less likely to give ear to agitators. Sulla’s measure, on the other hand, simply ensured that when hunger came the plebs would rebel against his system.20 In sum, Sulla left the plebs virtually untouched. They remained what they had always been: a large and volatile body who, if conditions were right, could be stirred to action by a skilled hand. The dictator had hammered the tribunate but the people’s reverence for the office had not diminished one whit. The tribune was their officer and, at the right moment, they could be relied upon to respond to a call to restore to him his full powers.21 Conventionally, the bar on advancement from the tribunate to further office is seen as one of the most effective clauses in Sulla’s tr ibunician law. 22 The able and ambitious would shun this magistracy, leaving it to become the preserve of the sluggish and the mediocre. Yet the history of the tribunate after Sulla reveals a paradoxical situation: so far from ensuring tranquillity this ordinance merely emboldened certain people to seek confrontation. To put it simply: a man facing political extinction at the year’s end was not likely to worry over-much about his actions or their consequences. He would see no reason for ingratiating himself with the great since their power and influence would not be deployed to secure his advancement. Indeed, the only hope of such advancement lay in having the restraints placed on tribunes removed and so it was entirely natural he should want to work towards that end. If he were successful then obviously he had much to gain and, if he were not, he had little to lose. Sulla, in fact, was scarcely dead when the call for repeal was heard. The tribunes of that year (78) divined that Lepidus would be their man. At first he refused their request to have full tribunician powers restored but then as his own position became more extreme, he relented and included this item in his programme. His eventual squashing may have disappointed, but it did not deter.23 Two years later the tribune L.Sicinius demanded that extribunes be allowed to stand for higher office and directed tirades at the consuls, Cn. Octavius and C.Scribonius Curio, who were numbered among Sulla’s staunchest supporters and formed part of that circle of Sullani to which Lucullus belonged. True to his reputation as a noted wit, Sicinius likened Curio to one Busbaleius, a famous actor of the day who was popularly supposed
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to be crazed. Cur io does not appear to have found this particularly funny and he was certainly not amused by Sicinius’ proposals. He therefore proceeded ruthlessly against the tribune.24 Any self-congratulations the inner circle of Sullans might have indulged in were destined to be short-lived, for the very next year starkly revealed the dangers attendant upon Sulla’s inadequate provisions for keeping the plebs in their place. In 76 the suppression of Sicinius had merely awoken mutterings but now the temper of the populace had radically altered. The economic crisis, to which we have referred, had now reached the point where the shortage of grain had become very serious indeed, and a hungry and enraged people soon let its feelings be known. One day as the consuls C.Aurelius Cotta and L.Octavius, accompanied by a praetorian candidate Metellus Creticus, were making a stately progress along the Via Sacra they were set upon by an infuriated mob. Dignity had to be forgotten as the trio dashed for the safety of the nearby house of Octavius. But, as so often happens—the phenomenon is familiar to students of the French revolution—the elemental cry for necessar ies can often become a call for political change. Capitalizing on this re-awoken aggressiveness of the people, another tribune, Q. Opimius, repeated the demand of the previous year: let extribunes be allowed to sue for higher offices. The Sullans, for their part, fully recognized the dangers inherent in this changed situation. One of them, Hortensius, was aedile in this year and, in an effort to assuage popular fury, he arranged for a grain distribution to be made. But it was too late. By now yet another flaw in Sulla’s arrangements had revealed itself. He seems to have overestimated the Roman nobility’s capacity for facing down the mob. When a man such as Lepidus stood outside the law and had recourse to arms there was, in one sense, no problem. The senate might dither and hesitate, at first, but having time at their disposal the fathers eventually steadied their collective nerve and took the steps necessary to deal with the threat. But with a mob on the streets of Rome time was not given for reflection and in consequence hesitancy and fear were not always overcome. Despite his own experiences in 88 when Marius and Sulpicius intimidated the senate, Sulla does not seem to have taken this factor into consideration. At best, he seems to have hoped that his senate would model itself after, say, those who had crushed the Gracchi.
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If that was what he thought, then the present instance showed his calculations to be awry. The consul Cotta cracked. His late experiences on the Via Sacra had thoroughly unnerved him and he resolved to placate the mob. With the enthusiastic backing of Opimius and the support of the people he passed a law removing the ban on tribunes standing for other offices. Under any circumstances the Sullans would have been enraged by such a bill but in the present instance they were incensed beyond measure. Up until now they had no reason to suppose that Cotta was anything but one of themselves. Exiled by the Varian commission, he had been brought back to Rome by Sulla. Owing his political life to the dictator, he had been at one with those who sought to defend his ordinances until the day he resolved to put the advantage of the moment before what they conceived to be the greater and more lasting good.25 The discomfiture of the Sullans was crowned and completed in the following year when all the other laws Cotta had passed during his consulship were abrogated but that concerning the tribunate was suffered to remain on the statute book. So, not only had the Sullani been unable to stop Cotta in the first place; they were now equally unable to undo the damage he had done. Even the joy of personal revenge was denied them and they had to be content with venting their spleen on the lesser culprit, Opimius, deriving what satisfaction they could from engineering against him a court case that resulted in his financial ruin.26 So, after this reverse, we can appreciate why Lucullus’ friends and allies would expect much from him. With Cotta’s capitulation further trouble could be expected and a strong man would be required to deal with it. The enemy must not be allowed to advance further. They were not to be disappointed. Another tribune, L.Quinctius, now popped up to press for further tribunician reform. He yoked this with an assault on the jury system, which Sulla had left in the hands of the senators. Corruption was alleged as the reason for reform here. This was supposed to have taken place during a celebrated case of the day—the lurid details are preserved in Cicero’s Pro Cluentio—that of Oppianicus of Larinun who was standing trial for poisoning. At first Lucullus tried to avoid direct confrontation and spoke privately to Quinctius in an effort to dissuade him from making trouble. Without a doubt such a course came naturally to someone of Lucullus’ placid nature. But
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he may also have wished to avoid further public strife. Such feuding could not but be dangerous in view of the doubtful international situation. The war in Spain was, we know, not going well and yet further campaigns both against the pirates whose marauding had in part caused the recent food shortages and also against Mithridates had become imperative. Wars on this scale are best fought when there is concord at home. That is to say, we can detect here the same statesmanlike outlook that informed Lucullus’ dealings with Pompey. Quinctius was not to be dissuaded, however. But he then discovered that, as sometimes happens, the mildmannered can, when provoked, prove to be most formidable opponents. In the present instance Lucullus deployed his oratorical powers to the full and showed himself to be more than a match for his adversary. Clad—to the delight of connoisseurs of the Awful—in a long purple gown reaching to his ankles, the flashy tribune called from the rostrum for magisterial reform only to have Lucullus answer with equal vehemence as he refused to yield anything. In the judicial sphere Quinctius fared no better. He managed to extract from the senate a senatus consultum directing Lucullus to investigate his allegations of bribery. The latter, however, simply refused to execute the warrant and there the matter lay. For this year, at least, there would be no further changes in the constitution. Modern historians, however, tend to emphasize that Cotta’s law of the previous year had, in fact, made it inevitable that Sulla’s other ordinances would eventually be repealed. The question of inevitability might, ultimately, be left to the theologian but the historian will, at least, want to know how Lucullus and his friends viewed the situation. Unfortunately, our sources do not say and thus all we can do is propound two differing hypotheses, each of which could be possible. It may very well be that the Sullani saw Lucullus’ successful defence of the established order as a kind of turning-point in their fortunes. Thanks to the pusillanimity of Cotta something had been yielded but no more would be given away. The Sullani had shown they were strong enough to resist any further assault. In some quarters a less sanguine view could have been prevalent. The failure to repeal Cotta’s measure showed clearly how weak the friends of Sulla really were. Sooner or later there would come an attack that would prove fatal. Lucullus’ success did no more than offer a respite. But, despite their acknowledging the truth of this observation, all the instincts of
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these men would forbid them to follow Cotta and his example into simple craven surrender. They would never make a public declaration of their weakness. Though recognizing their cause to be doomed, they would preserve face by defending it to the last. As I have said, we have no means of telling which, if any, of these views prevailed in Sullan circles. All that can be said is that, if the second was held, then time showed it to be the correct one. In 70 Pompey’s influence was far greater than that of the Sullani and when he backed tribunician reform the result was the abolition of the remainder of the Sullan measures. 27 The failure of their peers to support the Sullani can only be understood when we have formed a just appreciation of the danger the tribunate posed. In the case of people like Sertorius the issue was simple: either you destroyed him or he destroyed you. Nobody could be in any doubt that if the renegade ever returned victorious to Rome then the ruling oligarchy could expect to forfeit power, positions, wealth and (in many cases) life itself. Hence there could be no compromise here. All other differences were laid to one side and the oligarchy, as one man, proceeded against the common foe. In contradistinction to the dangers posed by the rebel in arms, the threat from the tribunate was neither immediate, constant or necessarily fatal. The tribune did not only menace the senate. With full powers he might interfere in all departments of life but riot and revolution rarely followed his interventions. And instances where a tribune actually menaced the position of the oligarchy had been rare in the past.28 In the light of these remarks it is possible, I believe, to envisage that on the tribunician question there was room for a divergence of opinion that would not have been found when the topic of Sertorius was mentioned in polite Roman society. It seems to me that in the Rome of the 70s everybody would have agreed on one basic proposition: a tribunate restored to full powers had the potential to create trouble. Dissent would then occur as people pondered the extent of that potential and the response which it required. Undoubtedly, Lucullus and his fr iends were the most pessimistic in outlook and consequently most violent in reaction. It would be a palpable absurdity to suggest that they foresaw what was to happen when the restoration actually took place. Indeed, it is doubtful if they looked to the future at all. Their
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gaze was fixed on a past where the likes of P.Sulpicius had almost destroyed their late chief and they could see no way of controlling such mavericks save by muzzling the tribunate as a whole. Others who looked back over the same years might, with some justification, have reached a slightly different conclusion. The damage done by the tribunate had not, perhaps, been as great as the good. Was it right then that an ancient and revered office of state should be truncated as it was now? Again, those who looked into a future where the tribune had full powers may have consoled themselves with the thought that whoever now filled the office would proceed with caution having, like themselves, learned the lessons of the recent civil war. If the charge of naïvety be levelled at such a viewpoint I can only plead that people do think in this way. The 1930s form a splendid example of the consequences (far more extreme than anything experienced in ancient Rome) of basing policy on such a calculation. But the Romans were, anyway, a practical people and others looking to the same future reached a more brutal but equally comforting conclusion: a man who aspired to be a Gracchus was a rarity but the senate now, as in the past, was perfectly able to oblige him and see that he met the same fate as his hero. Aside from these attempts to learn the lessons of the past or divine the course of the future, there was also the desire to enjoy the present. Once people realized that the restoration of tribunician power did not mean their destruction then they will have perceived an immediate advantage in reform. The constant agitation over this matter would be brought to an end. True restoration of powers might lead to even more disturbances but who could say for certain? In any case, doubtful future trouble must have seemed like a cheap price to pay for certain present ease. We can now see how Lucullus and his friends ultimately failed to save Sulla’s laws on the tribunate. Their stance was only one of a number in the Rome of the day and they failed to command in the senate the unity they required on the issue. No doubt Lucullus was troubled by the weakness of his position but he had another preoccupation to divert him from melancholy reflection: the Mithridatic command. We have already seen that this was an element the consul had taken into account when dealing with Pompey’s request for reinforcements and the ag itation of Quinctius. The time has now come for us to see exactly why. With the peace of Dardanus the First Mithridatic War had come
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to an end. Ratification of the treaty did not immediately follow, however, and the king, who had never been very keen on its terms, began to try and evade them. Among other things, the assault Murena made on him, sometimes dignified with the title of the Second Mithridatic War,29 brought it home to him that it were best to regularize his position vis-à-vis Rome and become an amicus sociusque (friend and ally). So one day in 78 his ambassadors turned up at the senate to ask that the treaty be formally accepted but there they received a nasty surprise indeed. The senate would not admit them. Neither party to this transaction could be in the slightest doubt as to what it signified: without a formal treaty Mithridates was, in Roman eyes, no amicus but a hostis. He was an enemy to be attacked and destroyed.30 The senate claimed that it was too busy to receive the ambassadors but nobody believed them then and nobody seems to believe them now. Preoccupation with Lepidus could hardly have reached the point where important emissaries were simply shooed away.31 What was most likely the real reason for this behaviour was the general unpopularity of the peace. Even Sulla’s men had made known their displeasure32 and the senators no doubt shared the view of the commons that its terms were altogether too lenient for the man who, in 88, had perpetrated those massacres that, in view of their scale, we now call the Asiatic Vespers. Nor did Mithridates himself do anything to help his case. His recent attempts to evade his obligations under the treaty were nothing more than the latest in a series of cheap frauds and transparent devices that he, over the years, had attempted to foist on Rome. Nobody likes to be thought a fool, and a Roman senator, with his ingrained sense of his own worth, was likely to be hurt more than most if he believed somebody so regarded him. Hence the fathers seem to have reasoned that there was little point in concluding a treaty, of whose provisions they did not approve anyway, with a man whose attitudes had not changed and who would, in consequence, be expected to break it at the first opportune moment. Although, by this refusal, the senate had not just annoyed Mithridates but seriously provoked him, it did not set out to war on him. The king himself tells us why33 and although he can hardly be called a totally unbiased witness what he says sounds perfectly reasonable. Some years later he told the king of Parthia that only their problems elsewhere prevented the Romans from attacking him. Readers of this chapter so far will not quarrel
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with that analysis. The unfolding of events reveals for us what Roman policy was. Because of their preoccupations in other places, they were content simply to watch Mithridates and do nothing so long as he made no overt threat. But the moment he showed signs of becoming aggressive then, no matter what engagements there were elsewhere and no matter what the cost, he would be met with firmness. For his part, the king of Pontus reacted with fury to the news of the rebuff his ambassadors had suffered. For him, this was an act of treachery made even worse by the hollow excuse which cloaked it. Like many crooked people, Mithridates lacked a sense of irony and so he indulged in feelings of moral outrage and indignation when he discovered that others could employ against him the kind of cheap diplomatic trick he himself had used in the past. But thinking oneself to be in the right has never been a guarantee of security and Mithridates was acutely aware of the peril in which he stood. 34 Sooner or later there would be war with Rome and he had best be ready for it. To this end, therefore, he completely overhauled his army. Profiting by his bitter experiences in Greece he now formed a force on the Roman model. Gone was the gilding and the glitter, gone too was the raucous multilingual indiscipline of yesteryear which had fared so ill at the hands of Sulla. In their place there came sober, well-drilled units. A search for new allies led to marriage-alliances with Cyprus and Egypt. These, in the event, proved to be of little practical worth but alliances with tribes such as the Scythians and Taurians of Asia and the Sarmatians and Thracians of Europe brought useful recruits to the ranks. Nor did the king neglect old friends. Once more he approached the pirates and added these, who had been so useful in the past, to the numbers of his host. But the most striking of all Mithridates’ alliances was forged in 75. In that year he despatched two Roman renegades, L. Magius and L.Fannius, to Spain. These had served in Fimbria’s army35 but, upon their commander’s death, had thrown in their lot with Mithridates. Now through their agency a pact was made between the Pontic king and Sertorius. Mithridates was to send a fleet and money to Spain. In return, Sertorius despatched to him one of his officers, M.Marius, to aid in training the new model army. He also acknowledged that Mithridates might have a free hand to do as he would with Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia and Galatia.
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An agreement of this sort needs little gloss. By aiding Sertorius after this wise, Mithr idates intended to exacerbate Roman troubles in another part of the world. And he would only have done this if he intended to exercise shortly the rights Sertorius confer red on him in his own area. What it was impelled Mithridates into this alliance and, it has to be said, eventually war was no secret either in 75. For some time it had been common knowledge that the childless Nicomedes IV of Bithynia, ignoring the claims of a pretender, was going to leave his kingdom to Rome. As Mithridates had twice in the past chased this same Nicomedes out of the place it is, I think, legitimate to infer that he believed he had as much, if not more, right to it than the Romans. Such then was the position of Bithynia. Both great antagonists laid claim to it and whoever yielded to the other on the issue was not only conceding him territory but was doing so at the expense of his own loss of face.36 So we can now see precisely why from the start of 74 Lucullus was preoccupied with the question of the Mithridatic command. Like everybody else in Rome he knew that the events of 75 could have but one outcome—war—and he determined to lead it. Hence the problems posed by Pompey and Quinctius had to be solved in a fashion that would leave him free to bid for the command when it was put on offer. Thereafter events moved with great rapidity. Mithridates had not the slightest intention of backing off from confrontation. From the summer of 75 right through the winter of 75/74 preparations for war went ahead apace. The barbarian allies in Asia and Europe now received requests to join their master. In Pontus itself munitions were manufactured and down came forests to build a fleet. Along the route this invasion was to take supply depots were set up. Yet, for once, the Romans were way ahead of Mithridates and moved before his preparations were complete. Early in 74 Nicomedes died. Even though it was yet winter the governor of Asia M. Junius Juncus was ordered to occupy the kingdom. He duly marched into Bithynia and began turning it into a Roman province. Thus when spring and the campaigning season arrived Mithridates found the enemy in occupation. But even then he was not completely ready to engage them. First of all, he had to give his new fleet a sea-trial. Then, before he could feel strong enough to take on the foe, Mithridates wished to have by his side his European allies. The most natural place for them to join him
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was in Paphlagonia and Mithridates headed for there first of all. So, as he waited for the various contingents to come in, even more time was lost.37 The moment Bithynia was annexed the despatch of reinforcements became imperative. Nobody, save the most dimwitted, could have failed to realize that Mithridates was going to do exactly what I have just described him as doing. Juncus seems to have had only a small force and it would require considerable stiffening if he were going to resist the kind of assault Mithridates was about to launch. The long-awaited Mithridatic command had become a reality and it was time for Lucullus to make his bid for it. In making that bid Lucullus enjoyed the full support of his consular colleague, M.Aurelius Cotta.38 We have said little of this man so far and mention has been but casual. Quite simply, this is in keeping with his position vis-à-vis Lucullus. He was one of three Cottae brothers then active in politics, all of whom began their careers as good Sullans. In this man’s case he seems to have belonged to that middle group in the senate which sought to conciliate Sulla with his enemies and, when this proved impossible, threw in their lot with him. The elder brother we have already met. He it was who, in the previous year, had opened the first breach in Sulla’s constitution. The younger, Lucius, completed the work with a bill in 70 restoring the full powers to the tribunate. Unlike this pair, however, the middle brother never wavered in his devotion to the Sullan ideal and was content to play the role of loyal helpmate to Lucullus.39 He certainly cherished ambitions of a command in the east but any possibility that this would bring him into conflict with Lucullus was removed when it became known that the senate intended to send two commanders to deal with Mithridates. The lesser of the two would go to Bithynia with a fleet. There he would replace Juncus and defend the new province against Mithridates’ attack. That task would be considerably lightened by a further senatorial decision, namely, to wage an offensive war on the Pontic king. L.Octavius, the governor of Cilicia, had just died, so whoever succeeded him would be given also the province of Asia and the command of the war. In essence what Lucullus and Cotta had to do now was quite straightforward. Under the Lex Sempronia of Caius Gracchus their provinces had been designated before their election in the previous year. This, of course, was before it was realized there would be war with Mithridates. So,
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Lucullus, as we know, had received Cisalpine Gaul. What Cotta held we cannot say but obviously it was not an eastern province. Therefore, the two would have to approach the senate, be relieved of their current provincial commands and receive charge of Cilicia and Bithynia.40 The execution of this design did not prove to be easy, however. Many men, we are told, sought the Mithr idatic command. 41 As we have no names this might seem to cast a doubt over the accuracy of this statement. But hesitancy is needless. The lengths to which Lucullus had to go to beat it off is proof enough that the challenge was real indeed.42 Anonymity, in fact, probably means simply that those who contested with Lucullus were of small talent.43 The situation now was rather different from what it had been a couple of years before when nobody could be found to go to Spain. Then the men of small merit reasoned that whatever might be gained there in the way of booty would be little recompense for the rough treatment Sertorius would hand out. Now, although nobody will have thought of Mithridates as an easy opponent, the wealth of Asia must have seemed to some enough to make it worthwhile taking him on, and since there is no direct correlation between ability and political influence it is perfectly possible that men of this type could (and did) command sufficient of a following to mount a serious challenge to Lucullus. In fact, Lucullus’ colleague Cotta, with his own easter n ambitions, is a perfect concrete example of the kind of secondrater who now longed to fight Mithridates. Although totally loyal to Lucullus, he possessed political influence of his own which he was not afraid to use44 and which in another’s hands could easily have been turned against his fellow consul. When he did get to the east Cotta soon showed he was not up to the tasks with which he had been entrusted. On the one occasion when he acted on his own initiative he precipitated a great disaster from which he had to be rescued by Lucullus. After that, Cotta was content to let his colleague conduct the main fight while he conducted a side-campaign. This, it is fair to say, was characterized by incompetence, cruelty, treachery and an unslakable thirst for loot. A fitting climax was reached on his return to Rome when Cotta had to face a charge of repetundae and expulsion from the senate in consequence.45 The upshot of all this was that when Lucullus made informal
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soundings he discovered he would not have a majority in the house when he asked to be conferred with the Mithridatic command. His abilities would not outweigh the malign influence of his rivals. There was nothing else for it. He would have to approach Cethegus. But who was Cethegus and what could he do for Lucullus? P.Cornelius Cethegus had been a senator since at least 88 and possibly earlier. It therefore follows that by then he must have held some office or other. But how far he had actually advanced in the world we cannot say for definite. A praetorship in the Cinnan period has also been conjectured but definite proof is lacking. Beyond dispute, however, is the fact that he made a very bad mistake in 88 when he elected to become one of Sulla’s enemies. He found himself declared an outlaw and forced to flee for his life. Returning to Rome in Cinna’s wake, he promptly deserted to Sulla when the latter landed in Italy. Divining who was going to win the war Cethegus came and made his peace with his old foe. He soon redeemed his promise to be of service to Sulla when he induced part of the garrison of Praeneste (Palestrina) to surrender with a pledge of safe conduct, which proved to be worthless.46 Thus restored to public life, Cethegus very rapidly became one of the leading figures in the post-Sullan senate. There can be no better illustration of or more elegant a tribute to his power than the fact that, when in 77 the senate was debating what to do about Lepidus, Philippus, in a speech urging strong measures, singled out Cethegus as a most dangerous opponent. Cethegus is, in fact, the only senator thus named and Philippus directly accuses him of being eager to renew civil strife so as to profit thereby. Taking their cue from this, some scholars go further and implicate Cethegus in Sertorius’ revolt. We know that the rebel had a treasonous correspondence with people in Rome but no names have been preserved. But, in the light of Philippus’ accusations, it has been suggested Cethegus was among them. Yet one wonders. Philippus’ scurrilous attack may not so much constitute a plain statement of fact as an unwitting acknowledgement both of the difficulties Cethegus had encountered in reaching his present position and his success in overcoming them. In general, it can be said that men like him, who had but lately turned, were not popular with Sullans of long standing, and the behaviour of people like Lepidus shows why. Therefore, it was but natural (if
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unfair) that in moments of crisis it would be assumed that Cethegus and those like him were up to no good. In the absence of any firmer evidence we may at least wonder if the astute Cethegus really was going to risk his position a second time. Certainly, one should not too readily believe an accusation made by Philippus who was, in his way, as slippery as his enemy. His past too was besmirched by his dealings with Cinna and in consequence it may very well be that he also was an object of suspicion. And what better way to deflect that than by turning peoples’ attention to others?47 The nature of Cethegus’ power is not in doubt. He controlled a bloc of senatorial votes whose number was such as to make it of decisive weight when voting in the house was close. As a consequence Cethegus was a much-courted man. The mighty of Rome waited upon him bearing gifts and begged to be admitted to the sunshine of his favour.48 What is puzzling, though, is how Cethegus established and maintained his control over these creatures of his. Cer tain theor ies can be excluded from consideration without hesitation. Patronage in court is one such since we are specifically told Cethegus’ influence lay elsewhere and that, in truth, he was a very poor speaker. The speeches he made in the senate were merely adequate for the business in hand and no more. By the same token we may safely rule out any extensive patronage exercised over Italian communities and individuals. When Cethegus was called upon to woo the men of Praeneste it was surely because he was a well-known Cinnan face and not because he was a powerful local baron. The possibility that our faction-leader lent money to people in order to help with election expenses or to meet other less reputable debts is obviously attractive. We must, however, remember that we have no evidence as to what resources he commanded and can only wonder how far, if at all, he profited by the proscriptions. 49 The real key to understanding the influence Cethegus wielded lies in a statement of Cicero’s to the effect that he was a man who knew the workings of the state thoroughly and as a result was able to exert a power equal to that of a consular in the senate. We may be sure that this power did not extend over those in the upper regions of the house. Those who had held high office were not likely to become the errand-boys of a man like Cethegus.50 So the influence must have worked further down. In fact, we can pinpoint where and show how Cethegus would find his command of
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statecraft especially useful there. In brief, what happened is that Cethegus was able to exploit one particular feature of the Sullan reforms. At any given time there was in the senate a large body of rank-and-file members who are sometimes called pedarii. Normally they took no part in debate but contented themselves with registering their vote. They thus ranked lowest in the scheme of things and many of them were destined to rise no higher, lacking both ambition and ability. Sulla’s augmentation of the senate naturally increased their numbers and thus, at one moment, a large body of such men entered the senate. All of them were looking for guidance as to the procedures of the house and how they might best use their votes. I would suggest that it was Cethegus with his inimitable knowledge of the workings of the state who came forward to give that guidance and advice. He it was who showed them what they must do and how they might advance their interests. In consequence he won much favour (gratia) and soon had large numbers at his command.51 In the story of Aelius Staienus we may observe, after a fashion, Cethegus fulfilling his paternalistic role. Staienus was a notoriously corrupt senator who had, during the trial of Oppianicus, accepted money from the defendant in order to bribe the jury. When it looked as if details of the transaction were about to come out Staienus is said to have approached Cethegus for advice. The latter, so the story goes, is supposed to have told him he should claim he accepted the money to effect a reconciliation between Oppianicus and his accuser. Some believed this to be insincere advice. Cethegus was widely held not only to hate Staienus but to be, in principle, opposed to conduct such as his in public life. Now, seeing that he was unlikely to escape, he gave him this worthless counsel. Others took a more benign view and declared it to be the best possible advice that could be given under the circumstances and the one that would put the most wholesome construction on Staienus’ action. Wherever the truth may lie, one thing is beyond dispute: we catch here a glimpse of Cethegus wielding his influence over one of the lowly. 52 To find an occasion on which Cethegus deployed his foot soldiers to decisive effect we do not have to look far. In this very year (74) M.Antonius was given a special command against the pirates. However, he only obtained this because the consul Cotta and Cethegus joined forces and used their combined influence to obtain it for him.53 The lesson was obviously not lost on Lucullus
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and, as we saw above, he deter mined to make an ally of Cethegus. But here a further twist enters our narrative. The pair were open enemies. We may be sure Lucullus, like the good Sullan that he was, shared to the full that general hatred and mistrust felt for late converts to the cause, like Cethegus. Our ancient authority also supplies us with a second and more personal reason for dislike. Lucullus thought Cethegus to be a fairly disgusting sort of person because of his sexual habits.54 Ironically, it was precisely those habits that enabled him to win Cethegus’ support. At this time there was in Rome a woman called Praecia.55 She was renowned for her beauty and intelligence, although her detractors said she was nothing more than a hooker. 56 Whether this accolade originated with a disappointed male suitor or a jealous female rival I cannot say, but it fits ill with our admittedly scanty knowledge of the lady.57 Praecia seems, in reality, to have been somewhat selective in bestowing her favours, specializing in the rich and powerful. She presided over a kind of salon to which her numerous upper-class admirers flocked. 58 However, Praecia was not just content with being admired but used her influence among the powerful to advance the careers of those she favoured. Cethegus was numbered among her entourage and was said to be so totally besotted with her that he would do nothing save at her behest. As we know, Lucullus was aware of the situation and, swallowing his scruples, he set out to exploit it. He made himself pleasing to Praecia with gifts and flattery and won her over to his side.59 Cethegus then received his instructions and he obeyed. A triple alliance was formed between Lucullus, Cotta and Cethegus and when it came to the assignment of provinces the trio achieved their objectives. To Cotta was given Bithynia, while Lucullus received Cilicia and the Mithridatic command.60 This whole transaction has attracted a good deal of comment in modern times and, it must be said, not all of it has been favourable.61 Judgements such as ‘a sordid intrigue’ and ‘not a pleasant episode’ have been passed. Yet it is difficult to fault any of the principals for acting as they did. In the case of Cethegus one cannot, to begin with, withhold one’s admiration for him when one considers the skill with which he rebuilt his shattered career. From being an outlaw with a price on his head he went on, in the face of considerable hostility, to become one of the
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most powerful figures of the day. Then, when he had shown himself to be a master of political management we can hardly expect him to do otherwise than use the power thus gained to influence events. Perhaps the time has come for us to acknowledge Cethegus for what he was—a great parliamentarian. So far as Lucullus is concerned, on a dispassionate view all that he can be accused of is possessing a sense of realism. If he were to get the Mithridatic command he would require the votes Cethegus controlled. And, in approaching Cethegus, he had to use the services of an intermediary. So he used the most influential. Had he won Cethegus by means of a mutual male friend one wonders if there would have been any fuss at all. As for Praecia this much may be said: it should occasion no surprise that a spirited and intelligent woman such as this should want to break the constraints Roman society placed on her. Instead of just talking about politics in her salon she wanted to play a part in actually shaping them. Women, of course, were not permitted to hold office in Rome but we do know that, in a number of ways, they sometimes played an indirect role in the shaping of events and they could hope to have some influence over what their menfolk did.62 In one sense, then, there was nothing untoward in Praecia giving advice and Cethegus taking it; in another, there is every reason why it should cause the greatest possible offence. If advice was to come from a woman it was expected she would be a chaste wife, mother, sister or daughter and not someone who was popularly rumoured to be a prostitute. Such advice too should be tendered in a discreet manner and not paraded in the brazenly open fashion in which it had been given on this occasion. But, if Praecia really had the intelligence with which she is credited— and her championship of Lucullus would seem to indicate she had—then, whatever the Romans might think, the question of how she earned her living is simply irrelevant to any judgement we might wish to form. What we are talking about here is not sexual morality but wit and political acumen. Acknowledging that Lucullus benefited by the advice of an alleged whore, we should be equally ready to admit that many a man has come to grief because of the advice of a good woman. To see in this episode evidence of some sort of canker or distemper in Roman political life is, I hold, absurd. So far from being proof of rot and ruin, the whole affair is simply yet another example of indirect female
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influence on Roman politics. Such interventions were, as we saw, not uncommon and, we may add, one to be found in all societies. Even our own is not immune, or so some profess to believe.63 With the immeasurable benefit of hindsight we can say that the Roman republic was about to enter its death-throes. That same hindsight should allow us to see that one woman’s meddling with matters political was in no way responsible for the onset of those convulsions. Immediately he had received his commission, Cotta set off for Bithynia. No doubt the desire for loot and glory had him in its grasp but in fairness it should be said that the sooner he arrived there with his reinforcements the better. Mithridates’ army was growing by the day in Paphlagonia. Lucullus, however, remained for a time in Italy. Waiting for him in Asia there were legions but he wished to augment these forces by raising a further legion at home. 64 While about this task he was also putting his staff together. A commander on campaign usually had the services of one or more legates whom he, in effect, picked himself. Legati were expected to serve indefinitely but might quit with the general’s permission. 65 This campaign was to be a long one and the irregular appearances that certain figures make would suggest that Lucullus allowed the war-weary to be replaced from time to time by fresh recruits. Political connections could secure a man a place on a general’s staff but the prudent commander usually chose with an eye to ability rather than birth.66 Lucullus’ political appointees were few and their presence on his staff is readily explicable. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, who was to prove useful on a diplomatic mission for Lucullus, plainly owed his position to being the general’s brother-in-law.67 His brother P.Clodius turned up in 73. He enjoyed no official title but was simply a comes or companion. He had good reason for wanting to be out of Rome that year. Some of the Vestals had been charged with incest and Clodius had distinguished himself (if that is the right word) by the savagery of his verbal assault on one of the accused, Fabia. For his pains he received such a severe mauling from the younger Cato that he decided the rigours of the camp were preferable to the feel of that tongue.68 Under Sulla, Lucullus had served alongside L.Licinius Murena, son of the instigator of the Second Mithridatic War. The two seem to have got on well together but friendship alone did not win Murena his place now.
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He was a good soldier and having fought Mithridates both under his father and Sulla he could provide useful experience for his new commander.69 Save for the fact that he was active very early in the campaign nothing seems to be known of an officer called Mamercus. There has been a suggestion, however, that he could be a son of Mam. Lepidus (cos. 77). As the latter was a political ally of Lucullus, Mamercus could perhaps owe his position to this connection.70 A connection of a sort also previously existed between Lucullus and his legate C.Valerius Triarius, a man who served him well throughout the whole campaign until he went down to defeat right at its very end. After Lucullus refused the governorship of Sardinia the next governor we hear of is this Triarius and it was he who made an end of Lepidus.71 In contrast with Triarius are four other officers about whose background we know little or nothing: Sextilius, whom we shall encounter at the Parthian court; 72 C.Salluvius Naso, who operated in Mysia and Phrygia in 74;73 M.Fabius Hadrianus, who first makes his appearance in 72;74 and a Censorinius who commanded the fleet in 70.75 But if these are names they are at least names. We now enter the realms of confusion. Similar ity of name means that a Pompeius and a Pomponius get mixed up. The former chased Mithridates to the Armenian border. In contrast, the latter was captured by Mithridates when he was a prefect of cavalry but the king, admiring his gallantry, treated him well.76 But this is as nothing to the problem posed by Barba, Voconius and Sornatius. The first two we hear of only in 73 but Sornatius is attested as being with Lucullus throughout the whole campaign. According to taste and the scholar one reads, there are various possibilities offered by the evidence. The Voconii had their origins in Aricia (Ariccia) and our Voconius has been identified with a certain C.Voconius whose name is known from a dedicatory inscription of the first century BC. This equation would seem preferable to the view that Voconius and Barba are one. What we have here is a record of an addition to the temple of Diana at Nemi, an act we might expect from one who was to put religious duties before military obligations. Yet another blend is favoured by some who would make Sor natius and Barba a single person called C.Sornatius Barba, although others would keep them separate and give us a man called Cassius Barba.77 Depressing as this confusion must seem at first sight, when
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taken together with the obscurity of so many of the other names it tells us something important about Lucullus’ army. The staff largely consisted of men who may be described as belonging to the professional officer class. Scholars have detected a growth, ever since the reforms of Marius, in the number of men who do not follow the time-honoured practice of making the army the starting-point for their eventual political career but rather choose to make soldiering itself their life. The men who officer Lucullus’ army and who are scarcely heard of again outside of the camp illustrate perfectly this trend in Roman life.78 By about the middle of August 74 all was ready and Lucullus sailed away to confront Mithridates.
V Confronting the king: the war with Mithridates
Lucullus came ashore in his province at Ephesus. Awaiting him were four legions. Two of these had served under P.Servilius Vatia Isauricus in his campaigns (78–74) in Cilicia against the pirates. Vatia was a good soldier and these men, in consequence, were well disciplined and ready for the fray. The attitude of the other two, however, gave some cause for concern. These were the Fimbrians (so-called). They, it will be remembered, had served under Sulla’s enemy Fimbria and when the proconsul departed from Asia he had left them behind since he did not wish to be stabbed in the back in the coming civil war. It is doubtful if they had seen action since the fall of Mytilene in 79 and their time since had been passed in garrison duties. As a consequence of this their sense of discipline was not all that it might have been. Moreover, now that a fresh army had arrived in Asia they were entitled to seek their discharge. Nevertheless, they reenlisted and submitted meekly enough to Lucullus’ efforts to bring them to order.1 Lucullus’ initial intention was to make a drive on Pontus but events soon rendered this plan obsolete. Leaving one of his generals, Diophantes by name, in Cappadocia to block Lucullus’ advance, Mithridates made his long-awaited descent on Bithynia. As we know, Cotta had by now established himself there but such was the fury of Mithridates’ advance that he withdrew before it and took refuge in Chalcedon (Üsküdar).2 At once the cities of Asia, still labouring under the debt-burden created by Sulla, began to show signs of unrest and to look to Mithridates as a deliverer. Lucullus soothed them and warned the publicani to moderate their behaviour. At the same time he abandoned his earlier objective and marched to the aid of Cotta. The first part of Mithridates’ 75
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strategy had been completely successful. The Romans had been diverted from Pontus. The second was now to yield a like satisfactory result. From the very start of the campaign a quick victory in the field was necessary because of the difficulty of victualling so large an army, and now, with the Roman armies divided, it was imperative that victory should be won over Cotta before Lucullus could reach him. Cotta, for his part, proved amenable. Hearing that Lucullus was on his way, he feared lest his colleague might share in the expected triumph and so he gave battle at Chalcedon, only to be crushed by land and sea and bottled up in the town. Lucullus was encamped somewhere on the Sangarius river (Sakarya) in Bithynia when news of the disaster reached him. Some of his officers and many of his men, resentful of being deprived of the easy pickings of Pontus, urged him to abandon Cotta. Let him extract himself from the mess that had been of his own making. Archelaus, who had once been Mithridates’ chief general but had been obliged to flee when he fell under the despot’s displeasure, was present to add his voice to the chorus saying that Lucullus had only to turn up in Pontus to become master there. Lucullus, however, would not be swayed. He told his Roman critics that it were better to save one Roman life than to capture all of the enemy’s territory. To Archelaus he merely said he was not the sort of hunter who dodged the wild beasts simply in order to take possession of their empty lairs.3 So Lucullus continued with his march towards Chalcedon. Even before the battle Mithridates, knowing he was coming, had despatched an ar my under the command of the Sertor ian renegade Marius to stop him. The two armies came face to face at a place called Otroea near Nicaea (Iznik). Battle lines were already drawn when, so it is said, a flame-like body fell from the sky between the two armies. Silver in colour, it resembled a jar in shape. Both sides, recognizing an evil omen, instantly withdrew. Lucullus, in point of fact, had been in any case reluctant to engage in a set battle, so, if we are prepared to believe this story,4 like any pious Roman, we should acknowledge that the gods in this way showed approval of this attitude and the concept of strategy that informed it. Lucullus had already divined how best this campaign might be won. The Pontic army was considerably larger than his own and, although Sulla had smashed up two such
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armies, Lucullus, mindful of the fate of Murena sen., thought it prudent not to engage the enemy face-to-face but simply to harass it incessantly. Without a battle the position of the Pontic force would become critical because, given its size, it would soon run short of supplies. Lucullus, therefore, closely questioned some prisoners about mess conditions and discovered that the enemy had food for only about four days. So he waited in his own wellstocked camp until Marius was forced to withdraw. The Romans followed the enemy and skirmished with his cavalry. Not all of Lucullus’ troops approved of his handling of matters and some, in their eagerness for a proper fight, were at one point on the verge of mutiny.5 But as Lucullus approached Chalcedon, Mithridates executed a bold manœuvre. Abandoning the siege, he made for the town of Cyzicus. Lucullus caught up with him while he was still on the road but the king, taking advantage of a dark and rainy night, gave him the slip and by dawn had safely reached his objective.6 Cyzicus lay on what was then the island of Arctonnesus (Bear Island) and is now the peninsula of Kapidag.7 This is situated on the western end of the sea of Marmara and, at the time of which we speak, was joined to the mainland by a single causeway. The town itself, which had two harbours, lay close to this causeway8 but a suburb had been built on a nearby hill called Arctonoros (Bear Mountain). Overhanging this peak was another called Dindymon, which was sacred to Cybele.9 The fact that Cyzicus was the first major town he encountered on his invasion of Asia and that he bore a grudge against the inhabitants for aiding the Romans at Chalcedon were only minor considerations in Mithridates’ decision to attack the place. His principal motive was to capture what he regarded as the gateway to Asia and he was encouraged to do this by the belief that it would easily fall into his hands. Once he had taken the town he would have an abundant food supply at his disposal since the inhabitants were known to be in the habit of keeping a large quantity of grain in the town and mixing it with some kind of earth to prevent spoilage. The excellent harbour facilities meant that further supplies could be brought in and that war-fleets would have a base from which to carry the fight into the Aegean. On the landward side armies could sally forth into Asia for, as in the First Mithridatic War, it was the king’s intention to grab as much territory as possible. The resolution of the inhabitants and
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the skill of Lucullus were, however, to bring these plans to nought.10 At first all went well. On his arrival the king took possession of the mountain range of Adrasteia which lay on the mainland opposite the island and of the suburb on Arctonoros. From this last point the Pontic forces were then divided into ten camps to encompass the city by land while the royal fleet mounted a blockade on the sea.11 Then Mithridates sent his generals forth to conquer Asia. One general, Eumachus, was despatched to Phrygia and from there he managed to penetrate into Pisidia and Isauria. A second, Metrophanes, was accompanied by the renegade Fannius and they carried their campaign as far as north-east Lydia. In redemption of his promise to Sertorius, Mithridates allowed Marius to assume the gover norship of the Roman province of Asia. Garbed as a Roman proconsul, he received the submission of Parium (Kemer) and Lampsacus (Lapseki).12 Shortly afterwards the Pontic king fulfilled another pledge and despatched to Sertorius the ships he had guaranteed him by their treaty of the previous year.13 While all of this was going on Lucullus arrived and took up his station at the village of Thracia which lay just east of the isthmus. When he had fortified his camp he called his troops together and told them they could have a bloodless victory. But in order to achieve this the Romans would have to seize the heights of Adrasteia so as to bottle up Mithridates and starve him out. As it happened there was but one narrow route to it, and, as we know, it was guarded by a part of the king’s army.14 Then in an evil moment Mithridates gave ear to his Roman agent L. Magius. This man said it was best to withdraw from Adrasteia. He claimed the Fimbrian legions were on the point of deserting and thus there was really no point in contesting the route since all the king desired would come to pass without toil. So Mithridates pulled his troops out and allowed Lucullus to occupy the heights without hindrance.15 One source suggests that with this worthless advice Magius was trying to ingratiate himself with Lucullus. He was worried about his future since he had heard Sertorius was dead. We have good reason to believe this latter detail was false but obviously that does not mean that Magius, anyway, was not trying to secure his own position. On the other hand, Magius could have acted in good faith. The Fimbrians did have a reputation for unruliness
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and once more, before the siege was out, they gave Mithridates reason to believe they might defect. Moreover, in following Magius’ advice, Mithridates may well have reflected that since the Roman had once been these men’s officer he might reasonably be expected to divine their mood correctly.16 Yet, even when we acknowledge these circumstances we cannot, I feel, escape the conclusion that Mithridates had made a colossal blunder. What made it a fatal blunder was his failure to remedy it even though he had time to do so. Lucullus, it was true, was now in an impregnable position but he had not built siege works or drawn his encirclement tight. Thus, with his numerically superior forces, it was possible for Mithridates to burst out and should Lucullus try and stop him it would go hard with him, something he himself had already realized. Instead, Mithridates chose to gamble. Food would now no longer be available from the mainland but supplies might yet be brought in by sea, even at the cost of diverting to transport work a fleet intended for war in the Aegean. Winter would, of course, put a stop to this too but Mithridates’ hope and expectation seems to have been that by then Cyzicus with its corn-bins would be his.17 The king therefore pressed on with the siege preparations already begun. The harbour was blockaded with a double wall and, on the land side, a trench was dug around the city. Mounds, towers and penthouses were raised. One monster tower stood 150 feet high and had yet another mounted on its top from which bolts and missiles were to be discharged. This creature had a kind of maritime cousin which rested on two quinqueremes bolted together. From it a bridge could be lowered on to the city walls.18 One can well imagine the thoughts and feelings of the Cyziceans as they watched all the fearsome panoply of Hellenistic siege-craft being deployed against them. To add to their terrors they seem, for a time, to have believed Lucullus had not yet come and that they stood alone. They could actually see his troops across the straits but thought they were par t of Mithridates’ army. When Archelaus sent a messenger they simply refused to believe him. At last, a boy who had escaped from captivity at Pontic hands was able to convince them that what they were looking at in the Thracian village really was a Roman army. According to another account, the good news was brought by a soldier of Lucullus’ who swam over to the city aided by two inflated skins.19 More Roman soldiers soon followed him. Well
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aware that the Cyziceans were famed more for commercial acumen than warlike valour Lucullus had a boat dragged overland from Lake Aphnitis,20 filled it with soldiers and despatched them to the town where they might lend their skills to the inhabitants in the ordeal that was about to begin.21 At this point, with all in readiness for an assault, Mithridates resolved to test the nerve of the defenders. He put on board ship 3,000 Cyzicean prisoners and sailed them up to the wall of the city. There they stretched out their hands and begged their fellow-citizens to pity them. However, Pisistratus, the Cyzicean general, would not yield and merely advised them to meet their fate with courage.22 Seeing that persuasion was availing nought, Mithr idates launched his assault. The quinqueremes came, dropped the bridge and four men ran across. The Cyziceans at first drew back but when the rest of Mithridates’ men were slow to follow the leaders they took courage and drove the four from the wall. They then poured pitch down on the ships and forced them to withdraw. By land there was a massed attack by the siege machines but the townsfolk broke the heads of the rams with nooses or simply deadened their impact with strategically placed bundles of wool. Fire missiles were quenched with water or had their force broken by linen cloths. However, in spite of all the efforts of the defenders, a part of the wall was weakened by fire and caved in towards evening. Fortunately for the Cyziceans, nobody dared enter the gap because of the heat and they were able to rebuild in the night. This piece of good luck was soon followed by another and greater. At dawn on the next day there suddenly arose a great wind which overthrew and utterly destroyed the larger part of Mithridates’ engines. Not unnaturally the desperate Cyziceans attr ibuted this to direct divine intervention. Persephone, patroness of Cyzicus, had, it was reported, appeared in a dream to the town-clerk to tell him she was about to set the Libyan flute-player against the Pontic trumpeter—an enigmatic statement which puzzled until it was swiftly fulfilled before the walls. It was also said Athena had appeared to a number of people in Ilium. She was in a dishevelled state and said she had just come from helping the Cyziceans.23 Soon after there came a further sign which boded no good at all for Mithridates. The festival of Persephone had come round.
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The Cyziceans were wont to honour their patroness by sacrificing a black heifer. Now they had to make do with a paste imitation since the real one was pasturing on the mainland. At the last moment, however, the black heifer left her pasture, swam the strait and obligingly presented herself at the altar.24 Seeing that the place was holy, some of Mithridates’ friends advised him to flee but he heeded them not and ascended Mount Dindymon. From here he constructed mounds extending to the city walls and on them built a set of towers. At the same time he set about collapsing the walls by means of mines. Now, however, Lucullus’ policy of masterly inactivity paid its first dividend. Winter had at this time set in and with the consequent closure of the seas the Pontic army began to feel the pinch of hunger. In an effort to be rid of useless mouths Mithridates resolved to send his cavalry away to Bithynia since they plainly had no part to play in these operations. A favourable moment occurred when Lucullus, in accordance with his policy of harassment, left his camp to besiege one of those ten encircling camps that Mithridates had established at the start of the siege. The Pontic horse set off at speed along the Lampsacus/Prusa (Bursa) road which runs roughly parallel to the shores of the sea of Marmara. Learning that the birds had flown, Lucullus returned by night to his camp. The next morning he began his pursuit. Foul weather attended his progress. Starting in a storm, he continued through bitter cold and falls of snow so severe as to cause many of his men to fall by the wayside. Lucullus, however, was never one to spare either himself or his men and so he persisted with the chase until he caught up with the fugitives at Lopadium (Uluabat), the natural crossingpoint of the Rhyndacus (Capaz) river. Falling upon them, he slew a great number and captured besides many men and baggageanimals while, it is said, the women from nearby Apollonia came forth to loot the dead. Lucullus himself then marched home, taking care to display his captives prominently as he progressed past Mithridates’ fortifications.25 But not only did the king have to witness this galling spectacle, he also had to receive the news that his expeditions to other parts of Asia Minor had failed. Metrophanes and Fannius were driven out of Mysia by the legate Mamercus and only after many adventures did they make their way back safely to their master. Contemporaneously Eumachus went down to defeat at the hands of Deiotarus, prince of the Galatians and ally of Rome. A
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little later we hear that Mar ius too had returned to base. Evidently his governorship had not been a success and one wonders how far a certain C.Salluvius Naso, another of Lucullus’ officers and known to be active in eastern Mysia and Phrygia Epictetus, had been responsible for this state of affairs.26 Now hunger became famine. Some sustained themselves by eating the bodies of the dead. Others partook of the local vegetation but unfortunately this proved to be poisonous. To the miseries of hunger there was soon added the horror of plague which broke out as a result of the huge number of unburied corpses that lay about the place. Mithr idates, nevertheless, continued to press the siege while the Cyziceans maintained their defiance by burning his machines, rallying forth to attack his weakened army and undermining his mounds. In one of these operations Mithridates nearly lost his life. A centurion from Lucullus’ ar my who was working underg round with the Cyziceans became friendly with some of the enemy who were boring from the opposite direction. He offered to betray the city but only on condition Mithridates himself should come down in person into the mine and pledge his good faith. It is a measure of the king’s desperation that he agreed to this. Cooler heads, however, surrounded the royal person and they divined what was afoot. So they constructed a doorway in the tunnel which might be quickly shut. When, therefore, the centurion and his men rushed Mithridates he was able to dive behind the door and go unscathed. A further sign, it is said, was now vouchsafed the Pontic king. From Mount Dindymon was heard a sound like that of a Bacchic rout. As on a more famous occasion some forty years later, the gods made a noisy exit as they deserted their favour ite. Mithridates at last realized there was no hope of taking Cyzicus and resolved to bolt at the first sign of spring (73).27 But although Mithridates had decided to quit Cyzicus he had by no means abandoned his original design of conquest. As a preliminary he despatched a fleet under his admiral Aristonicus to make war in the region. Before setting out, however, the admiral entered into negotiation with the Fimbrians who were in a dangerous mood after a winter spent under canvas. The outcome was yet another disaster to be added to the long list that had befallen Mithridates in this ill-starred campaign. When Aristonicus turned up with 10,000 gold coins, the supposed traitors, instead
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of embracing him warmly, seized him and carried him off to Lucullus.28 Mithridates himself made for Parium with the rest of his fleet. His embarkation had turned into a rout when many of his soldiers, fearing they would be left behind, rushed the alreadyover-crowded boats, with the result that a number of them overturned or sank. Seeing their enemy’s discomfiture, the jubilant Cyziceans poured out of their city to plunder the Pontic camps and slay the sick and wounded they found there. Mithridates’ land-forces were despatched to Lampsacus under the command of Marius and another general called Hermaeus. Twice their progress was slowed by the natural barriers based by the rivers Aesepus (Gönen) and Granicus (Biga). However, despite being attacked, and defeated at the crossing-places of Denizkent and Biga, a remnant succeeded in struggling into Lampsacus where they were put under siege by Lucullus.29 With the enemy thus cooped up Lucullus allowed himself a pause to savour his victory. Returning to Cyzicus, he entered the city in triumph and was hailed as a deliverer. The grateful citizens then initiated games in his honour which were ever afterwards known as ‘Lucullan’. The city itself was rewarded with an increase in territory and had restored to it the freedom it lost after the First Mithridatic War.30 When the party was over Lucullus headed back to the Hellespont to conduct the next phase of the campaign. In effect, there were two tasks to be performed. First of all, the Pontic garrisons had to be rooted out of a number of towns which they had managed to occupy in the days of Mithridates’ success. This work was entrusted to two legates, Triarius and Barba. The pair, first of all, reduced Prusa. Triarius then went to take Prusias (also called Cius) while Barba received the surrender of Nicaea from which the Pontic garrison had fled. Once he had done with Prusias Triarius made for Apamea, which he stormed with great slaughter.31 Lucullus’ other objective was to gather together a navy with which to break the mastery of the seas the enemy had enjoyed since they destroyed the Roman fleet at Chalcedon. The senate, deeply worried lest Mithridates might swoop on Italy, voted a sum of 3,000 talents for building a new one. Lucullus, however, refused this money. He held fir mly to the wonted Roman principle that friends and allies of Rome must come to her aid in
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an hour of need. Knowing the area intimately, he realized that all that was needful might be got from the states in the neighbourhood and so he proceeded to levy ships from them.32 In the interval, Mithridates, as might be expected, had not been idle. Pressing ahead with his plans to create havoc in the Aegean he sailed out of Parium. Coming to Lampsacus, he pulled out the bulk of his forces and with them he made a descent on Perinthus (Erikli) in Thrace. Failing to take the place he retreated to Nicomedeia (Izmit) where he established his headquarters. On the way, however, he ran into a storm which severely damaged his fleet.33 When Mithridates quitted Lampsacus he had left behind a hand-picked force of ten thousand men and fifty ships under the command of an exotically named tr io, Mar ius the Roman renegade, Alexander the Paphlagonian and Dionysius the Eunuch. As subsequent events show, the intention was that they should head eastward while their chief operated in the north. According to the story, Lucullus was camped at Ilium when one night the goddess Aphrodite in whose precinct he slept appeared to him in a dream, ‘Lion, why do you sleep’ she asked, ‘when the fawns are nigh?’ As befitted a disciple of Sulla Lucullus took this very seriously and soon learnt what the goddess meant. Thirteen ships, hurrying to join the main enemy force at Lemnos, had been spotted off the harbour of the Achaeans which was on the mainland roughly opposite the island of Tenedos. Lucullus immediately put to sea and captured this detachment. He then set off to encounter the main force only to discover his opponents had very cleverly drawn up their ships on the shore of a barren islet and he was unable to come to grips with them. Eventually, however, he landed an infantry detachment behind them. Those troops destroyed part of the enemy and forced the rest back to the sea. There they went down to defeat at the hands of Lucullus himself . Dionysius committed suicide but the other two commanders were captured. Alexander was reserved for the eventual triumph but Marius was executed on the spot since it was not held to be proper that one who had once been a Roman senator should be condemned to walk in such a procession. Lucullus then rounded off his victory by sending laurel-wreathed despatches, sign of especial rejoicing, to Rome. Relief and joy met them on their arrival. Ever since Chalcedon there had been a great fear lest a Mithridatic fleet might sail for Italy. Although
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there is no evidence to suggest this one was doing that and although its size anyway was hardly such as to make of it a serious threat, it was nevertheless proclaimed that Lucullus had saved Italy from invasion at the hands of a Sertorian renegade.34 By now, Mithridates was growing rather uneasy in Nicomedeia. He had had a first-hand account of the success of Lucullus’ legates when the fleeing garrison of Nicaea took refuge with him. The message was then considerably reinforced when Cotta, evidently judging it safe to nose abroad once more, now left Chalcedon and came to besiege him. He was joined soon after by Triarius fresh from the capture of Apamea. Fortunately for Mithridates, Triarius’ fleet was small and he was unable to block the Astacenus channel. Reinforcements were supposed to have come with another Roman legate, Voconius, but he was frittering away his time in Samothrace, having himself initiated into the mysteries there. When, however, Mithridates learnt of Lucullus’ two victories he realized the Roman commander would soon be at Nicomedeia and that it was, therefore, time to move once more. So he set out yet again, this time with the intention of attacking Rome’s ally Byzantium. But there again he was thwarted by a storm which wrecked many of his ships and scattered the rest. Thanks to friends within the town Mithridates himself found refuge in Heraclea Pontica (Eregli) a city like, Byzantium, [which] was an ally of Rome’s.35 So when Lucullus finally arrived at Nicomedeia he found that the foe had vanished. In order to decide what to do next he held a conference with his staff. A body of opinion at that meeting believed that since the king had been dr iven out of Asia hostilities should now cease. Lucullus, however, vigorously opposed this, arguing that they must needs go in pursuit of the foe. This advocacy of further action shows that Lucullus realized full well that if Mithridates were allowed to refresh himself he would simply return to the attack sooner or later. Killing or capture was the only answer to the Mithridatic question. Certainly the debate now centred on the strategic advisability of a further assault on the Pontic king and not on any doubts about the legality of such a move. By the terms of the Lex Cornelia de maiestate a governor might not campaign outside of his province without the senate’s permission. In the case of Lucullus this proviso had been waived. When the command of the war had been conferred on him it was not intended he should be
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confined to Asia but rather he was granted that freedom of movement deemed necessary to wage it successfully and bring it to an end. The Asiatic Vespers had not been forgotten. Those who would not ratify the Peace of Dardanus for Mithridates the hostis were determined, now war had broken out again, to destroy that enemy. So a division of labours was agreed upon. Lucullus himself was to invade Pontus. Cotta was given the job of subduing Heraclea, whose defection meant it could threaten the proconsul’s advance through Paphlagonia. Triarius, meantime, was despatched to the Aegean. In his hour of need Mithridates had recalled the fleet he had once sent to Sertorius and it was now known to be close to home.36 Mithridates himself was at Amisus (Samsun)—he had travelled via Sinope (Sinop)—when he learned of Lucullus’ intentions. The need for new allies was imperative so Mithr idates made application to the kings of Parthia and Armenia while at the same time an envoy called Diodes was despatched with a large sum of money to buy the support of the Scythians. The Pontic king, however, soon learned that a beaten man has few friends. Diodes took the money and ran to Lucullus while Parthia and Armenia refused to become involved. Even though Tigranes, the Armenian king, was Mithridates’ son-in-law, he, like his Parthian counterpart, saw no reason to get involved in this particular war. Only Machares, Mithridates’ son, who was king of the Cimmerian Bosporus gave any aid. So there was nothing for it but to move again and fall back on the resources of Pontus itself. The king, therefore, took up his station at Cabira where, in the course of the winter which now followed, he gathered together another army. Lucullus for his part marched south of Paphlagonia through the country of his allies, the Galatians. Victualling presented a considerable problem which was only solved by having thirty thousand Galatian porters follow the army with grain for the troops. But after dearth there came plenty. Descending the river Halys (Kizil) to a region around Amisus, the Romans found there an abundance of good things. An ox could be had for a drachma, a slave for four. Indeed, supplies were so plentiful that people simply abandoned or destroyed them.37 Lucullus himself now put Amisus under siege together with its suburb Eupatoria which derived its name from Mithridates’ surname Eupator. He also sent forward another part of his army
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to attack Themiscyra (Terme) which lay on the river Thermodon (Terme). Accounts of what happened at Amisus differ. One author says the siege went on briskly and the inhabitants, receiving supplies from Machares, even dared make sallies upon the enemy. According to another source, Lucullus pushed the siege without any great enthusiasm. About Themiscyra there is unanimity. Towers were built, mounds thrown up and tunnels dug in which both sides fought battles. A novel feature was the bears and bees that the townsfolk stuffed into these galleries in order to dislodge the Romans. The conflicting reports about what was going on at Amisus match well stories about the disagreements between the Roman commander and his men which had ar isen at this time. Apparently, when the Roman army got as far as Themiscyra they started to complain that they had had, as yet, no booty since every town had surrendered on terms38 and, as things stood, there was precious little possibility of any since it looked like they were being led to fight against the savage tribes of the Tibareni and Chaldaei who lived in a kind of waste. Amisus was the place to be where there was loot in abundance. Thus the eagerness with which the troops pushed the siege may have been matched by a certain reluctance on Lucullus’ part. They wanted booty; he wished to spare the town from sack. As it turned out, the troops eventually had their wish but not before they conceived a deep and lasting resentment at having had to go through another winter siege. A second complaint of a different order came from another quarter. Why, it was asked, were they besieging these towns in the first place when they should be pursuing Mithridates? At a contio Lucullus explained his strategy to his officers. If they attacked Mithridates in his present weakened state he would simply take fright and disappear into the hinterland of Asia where it would be difficult to lay hands on him. But, if he were given a period of recuperation, he would surely take the field again and the Romans would then be able to come to grips with him.39 With the coming of spring (72) Lucullus handed over charge of the siege of Amisus to Murena and set off to encounter Mithridates. Marching southward by way of the valleys of the Iris (Yesil) and Lycus (Kelkit) he met with the Pontic advance-guards at the town of Eupatoria (which place should not, of course, be confused with the suburb of Amisus which bore the same
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name).40 The enemy commander, Phoenix, obeyed his instructions to the letter and lit signal-beacons to warn his master of the enemy approach. Then duty done, he deserted to the Romans. Lucullus descended into the plain. About twelve miles from Cabira he found the enemy cavalry waiting for him and, in the subsequent battle, he was worsted and forced to retreat to the higher ground.41 For several days after this Mithridates brought out his forces but Lucullus was naturally reluctant to venture back into the plain. With the guidance of some locals whom he had captured he moved his army into a strong position on the heights with a stream to his front. From here he could make sallies on the enemy while at the same time he was safe from their attacks.42 For a time both sides held off from battle until, at last, one came on virtually by accident. Some of Mithridates’ men were hunting a stag when they were cut off by the Romans. Men came out from both sides to help their comrades and a skirmish developed in which the Romans were worsted. The soldiers watching from the Roman camp begged Lucullus to do something. He duly went down into the plain, confronted the foremost fugitives and persuaded them to turn back. The rest followed this example and with Lucullus at their head they drove the enemy back to their camp. The fugitives were made to pay for their behaviour, however, by suffering a public disgrace. In ungirt tunics they were forced to dig a large ditch while being watched by the rest of the army.43 Mithridates, however, did not just attempt to bring Lucullus to battle but had recourse to other methods in order to be rid of him. One of these was assassination. Our accounts of what happened differ about minor details but agree on the main outlines of the story. A certain barbarian prince pretended to desert from Mithridates and offered his services to Lucullus. Soon he so distinguished himself that Lucullus admitted him to his friendship. Then one day when the general was taking a siesta in his tent the barbarian asked to be admitted since he said he had urgent business. The attendants, however, would not let him in and angry words were exchanged. Realizing that he might not be able to give a satisfactory account of his behaviour the prince mounted his horse and rode away to Mithridates. The other weapon Mithridates attempted to deploy was one he had bor rowed from Lucullus himself—star vation. With his
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command of the lower ground he was able to cut off the Romans from local supplies. With the possibility that the siege might drag on into the winter the situation began to look serious. So Lucullus sent his legate Sornatius into Cappadocia to fetch provisions. Mithridates sent a force to attack the train only to have Sornatius cut it to pieces. In the mean time skirmishing continued until one day the Pontic forces were put to flight. Mithridates himself emerged from the camp and rallied his men who then chased the Romans back up the hill, so terrifying them that they kept running long after the enemy had stopped pursuing them. The king decided to puff this as a great victory and sent messengers to announce it far and wide presumably in the, ultimately vain, hope that it might bring allies to his side. Soon after with the onset of winter active hostilities ceased.44 The spr ing of 71 saw Lucullus naturally desirous of replenishing his supplies. So he sent another expedition into Cappadocia under the command of M.Fabius Hadrianus and this decision finally broke the stalemate. Mithridates sent a large cavalry force to attack Hadrianus as he returned but it fared no better than its predecessor had with Sornatius and was virtually annihilated. Mithridates wished to conceal this fresh disaster from his men but Hadrianus gave him no chance as he paraded his laden wagons in derision before the Pontic camp. The king now feared that Lucullus would go over to the offensive since a great part of his cavalry had been destroyed in the debacle and so he resolved on flight. He secretly communicated his decision to his senior officers alone to avoid panic in the ranks. Unfortunately, the officers could not wait for the signal to march but began to move their personal belongings out of the camp by night. When the common soldiers saw this they assumed they were being abandoned and, filled with panic, they scattered pell-mell in every direction. When he tried to stem the tide, Mithridates himself was nearly trampled in the rush. Lucullus, seeing what was happening, reacted swiftly. The infantry were sent charging into the enemy camp and there, longstarved of loot, they laid their hands on the rich spoils of the enemy. The cavalry was sent after Mithridates himself who had taken to horse. They had almost caught up with him when by accident or design a mule laden with gold crossed their path. To the horror of the ancient moralizing historian who relates the
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incident the soldiers stopped to plunder and thus allowed their quarry to get clean away.45 That quarry then made his way to Comana where he attended to two matters of moment. First of all, he gathered about himself an escort of two thousand horses for the next stage of his journey. Then, since he recognized that Pontus was now lost, the half-Hellenized king revealed the oriental side of his character in his determination that his womenfolk should not fall into the victors’ hands. He sent eunuchs to Pharnacia (Giresun), where they were lodged with orders to kill his wives, sisters and concubines. One sister, Nyssa, was lucky. She fell into Lucullus’ hands at the capture of Cabira. The others, however, perished as the king’s commands were scrupulously obeyed. By this time, as I have just indicated, Cabira had fallen to Lucullus and it was said he found dungeons there crammed with the king’s enemies. He then despatched a force under a legate, Pompeius, to renew the pursuit of the king. Pompeius continued the chase until he came to Talaura. Here he learned that four days before Mithridates had crossed into Armenia. Since he had no brief to proceed further Pompeius returned to Lucullus. Tigranes, we know, had never shown much enthusiasm for Mithridates and his war with Rome. At this point, of course, neither the laws of hospitality nor the ties of family could be ignored but the Armenian king showed clearly what he was thinking by literally keeping Mithr idates at a distance. The fugitive was not allowed to present himself at court but was, instead, confined to a remote estate.46 Lucullus himself tur ned to the task of mopping up the remaining resistance in Pontus. With the exception of the coastal towns it proved to be an easy job. A swift campaign sufficed to reduce the Calybes (Chaldaeans) and the Tibareni. This was followed by the occupation of lower Armenia. Most of the Pontic commanders, when they learned what Mithridates had done to his own family, saw little point in continuing the struggle and so they surrendered on terms to the Romans. One general actually brought fifteen fortresses with him when he came over to Lucullus. With the fall of these and other fortresses a goodly portion of the king’s treasures came into Roman hands.47 Coming back to the coast, Lucullus found that his subordinates had not been as successful as he. Murena was still before Amisus, baffled by the skill of the Pontic commander, Callimachus. So
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Lucullus took charge and began by trying to persuade the inhabitants to give up as so many others had done. When they refused he turned the bulk of his forces against the suburb of Eupatoria. Pretending to carry on the siege in a desultory fashion,48 he lured the defenders into carelessness. Then, at an opportune moment, ladders were placed against the wall, the town was stormed and razed to the ground. Turning to the main city, Lucullus again had recourse to the surprise attack. One evening when Callimachus, as was his wont, had taken most of his troops from the wall in order that they might rest, Lucullus mounted an assault and gained possession of part of the rampart. Callimachus, realizing his opponent could not be repelled, pulled out his forces by sea and fired the city behind him to cover his retreat. Lucullus ordered his men to extinguish the flames but they paid him not the slightest heed. With what they had so long wanted at last within reach they clashed their weapons together and demanded to be allowed to exercise the customary right of sacking a city that had been taken by storm. Lucullus had no option but to yield and as the troops set about looting they added to the destruction already begun. It was now night and, as the soldiers went on their way, heedless of the fate of the conquered, the torches they carried started further fires. Only a providential rainstorm saved the town from complete destruction. Lucullus himself tried to repair the damage and restore the town by rebuilding it before he left. He added 120 stadia to its territory and recalled the citizens who had fled, adding to their number any other Greek who might wish to settle there. A group of Athenian exiles who had fled to Amisus to escape the tyranny of Aristion in the First Mithridatic War was now repatriated and each man was supplied with clothing and a stipend for the journey. When he entered the city on the morning after the capture Lucullus is said to have bewailed his fate. He would have been a Sulla who spared Athens. Instead, he had become a Mummius who destroyed Corinth.49 Why was this so? So far as I know, Lucullus never came up with an answer to this hard question, so in due course we shall try to supply our own. At this point what is of primary interest to us is his rather extraordinary behaviour on the present occasion. We are told that among the captives was a certain Tyrannio who was a grammarian. Murena asked for him as a prize and upon obtaining him ostentatiously granted him his liberty. It was
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generally held that this showed Murena to have been cut from a coarser cloth than Lucullus who believed that a learned man like Tyrannio should never have been deprived of his freedom in the first place. Once he had been deprived of his real liberty that which Murena granted him was fictitious. But, as we have just observed, Lucullus did not simply confine himself to displaying a respectful and deferential attitude towards one individual Greek, however distinguished. His benevolence embraced the whole city which he first tried to save from destruction and then to restore. We have long known Lucullus for a philhellene. We now see to what lengths his love could bring him. He lavished a species of Marshall aid on a town that had taken the enemy’s part, long defied him and rejected offers of terms. That it was their Greekness the people of Amisus had to thank for this is brought into sharp relief by the fate of its suburb Eupatoria. This was a barbarian town created by Mithridates and it bore his hated name. As we saw, when it was taken it was levelled to the ground.50 This strict differentiation between Greek and barbarian we shall encounter again. What happened at Heraclea about this time merely serves to underline how lucky the people of Amisus had been in finding the conqueror they did. Since 73 Cotta had been conducting the siege here without much success. Towards the end of that year he had been joined by the far abler Triarius who, in a battle off Tenedos, had fulfilled his charge and made short work of the Mithridatic fleet returning from Spain. However, it was not until now (71) that the town yielded on terms which were at once broken. A general massacre then followed and only the intervention of Triarius prevented a squabble over loot among the Roman forces turning into a pitched battle. 51 After this Triarius and his ships went on to reduce Tieium (Filyos) and Amastris (Amasra).52 This left only Amasia (Amasya) and Sinope in enemy hands and it was against the latter that the Roman war-effort was principally directed. Subordinates had already begun the siege when Lucullus arrived. It was not until early in 70, however, that the place yielded and it may very well be that for part of the winter Lucullus simply left the conduct of operations to those same subordinates while he attended to certain urgent business in the province of Asia, returning only in time for the final surrender.53 The physical location of the town made it seem as if it would present problems to rival those of Cyzicus. Sea attacks were
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impossible because of the steep nature of the shore on which the city rested and the narrowness of the isthmus which connected it to the mainland. Sinope, too, possessed a powerful fleet which brought in grain from the Crimea and was even strong enough to destroy a squadron of Roman ships carrying supplies for the besiegers. However, from the Roman point of view dissension within the town was a most hopeful sign. One of the commanders had entered into negotiations with Lucullus even before his arrival. When this was discovered one of his fellow officers, Cleochares, had him murdered, but so strong was the party of appeasement that he was obliged to govern with a heavy hand and the whole town seethed with discontent. At this juncture Lucullus himself arrived and soon received a welcome messenger. He came from Mithridates’ son Machares and he carried a gold crown and a request that his master be admitted to the friendship of the Romans. Lucullus acceded to the request on condition he divert to Roman use the supplies he was sending to Sinope. Machares complied.54 Inevitably this led to shortage in Sinope which led equally inevitably to hunger and so to increasing bad temper on the part of the inhabitants. Cleochares, realizing his position was becoming untenable, in the early spring of 70 imitated the example of Callimachus at Amisus. Embarking his troops aboard ship, he wrecked the rest of the Sinopean fleet and set fire to the town. Seeing the smoke, the Romans immediately attacked and penetrated the town without encountering resistance, actually slaying part of the Pontic garrison which had not escaped. Here again Lucullus played the civilized man. No general massacre took place, the fires were extinguished and the city was declared to be once more free.55 It was widely believed that Autolycus the patron hero of Sinope actually summoned Lucullus to the city. He was a companion of Hercules who had been driven ashore here, so the legend relates, and taking possession of the place he established an oracle. In a dream a figure appeared to Lucullus, urging him to go forward because Autolycus was waiting for him. The very next day the city yielded and in the hurly-burly of the capture some men were seen carrying a very large parcel. Lucullus ordered the wrappings to be removed, to discover a statue whose features were those of the figure in his dream and to learn for the first
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time that that figure had been Autolycus. And, once more, the disciple of Sulla remembered what his old chief had had to say about divine messages conveyed through this medium. The statue was the work of a famous sculptor, Sthenis, and after this experience Lucullus acquired it for himself along with another work of art, the globe of Billarus.56 With the fall of Amasia soon after Sinope, all of Pontus was now in Roman hands and, with its king a fugitive, Lucullus thus deemed the war to have finished. He returned to Ephesus and there publicly proclaimed this fact. Triumphal sacrifice was offered in thanksgiving for the victory won. Processions, festivals, gladiatorial contests and athletic events were the order of the day and in response the cities inaugurated their own festivals which they called ‘Lucullan’. 57 The seal then seemed to be set on Lucullus’ achievements with his request to Rome that, in accordance with standard practice, they should despatch commissioners to oversee the erection of Pontus into a province.58 We have now to turn from war to peace and to consider what Lucullus did in his own province of Asia at this time.59 Up until now Asia had indeed only seen Lucullus as a defender in war. Now he was to have the opportunity to practise the arts of peace. His first task seems to have been to attend to the governor’s judicial functions which, of necessity, he had had to neglect. So he went on a visitation of the circuits (conventus) into which the province was divided.60 Next, now that the war was ended, the problem of paying for it had to be addressed. The Romans, of course, held firmly to the principle that those who were friends and allies of Rome should come to her aid when called. Lucullus himself showed his own strict adherence to this viewpoint when, in 73, he rejected a donative from the senate to build a fleet and instead elected to call upon the allies to meet their obligations and supply the necessary ships. 61 However, the Romans also accepted that, in return for the revenues raised in a province, they were responsible for the maintenance of the army that defended that province and the governor who led it. Hence we have the governor’s allowance or ornatio provincial which, in theory, was supposed to meet all his expenses. In practice, of course, a long war such as that of Lucullus would strain the purse and recourse would have to be had to other methods to supplement income. Requisitioning was
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one and Lucullus did not hesitate to employ it. Hence, for instance, the long line of laden Galatians who followed him on the road to Amisus. A common practice, too, was billeting but Lucullus studiously avoided it to the great anger of his troops who, in consequence, had to spend their winters under canvas. Their commander had seen what Sulla’s men had got up to in Asia in 85 and he had no desire to visit his beloved Greeks with anything similar again. A commander, also, might draw on his booty but in the one instance we know of where Lucullus may have used this source he actually applied the monies to underwrite another’s campaign. When in 67 Pompey made war on the pirates Lucullus lent him money to finance his campaigns. By this time the always-strained relations between the two had worsened even more and we certainly could not see in Lucullus’ loan a gesture of goodwill or reconciliation since he had no option but to pay up. The terms of Pompey’s command allowed him to collect expenses from the provinces and so, when he asked, Lucullus was obliged to give.62 Some, however, believe that Lucullus strictly reserved the booty for himself, the treasury and his men. If that is so then there is but one source from which Pompey’s donative will have come, his emergency taxes. Neither the principle of an emergency tax nor the types levied by Lucullus were new and, in fact, both were already well known in the Hellenistic kingdoms. So, it was in imitation of practices found under the Seleucids and the Attalids that he imposed a tax of 25 per cent on crops, while other taxes were put on slaves and property to defray the costs of the war.63 However, it was not Lucullus’ measures to ensure that Asia paid for its own defence that earned him the gratitude of the provincials and, it should be said, the respect of historians ever since. Rather, it was what he did to rid the province of a crushing burden of debt under which it had laboured since 85. Let us very briefly recapitulate the story. Sulla had levied a large sum of money on Asia. When he left in 84 part of this had been paid and the rest was collected by Lucullus before his own departure.64 The cities of Asia were not able to meet their obligations from their own resources and so they had to borrow. With the end of the First Mithridatic War the Roman banker soon made his reappearance in the East and he was accompanied by the publicani whose main business was to collect the regular taxes but who were obviously not averse to issuing loans on the side. It was to these people that
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the provincials had to turn in order to obtain the sums they needed. They indeed got them but only at exorbitant rates of interest. Some argue that a shortage of capital and the high risk involved in a dangerous area justified these charges but others incline to the bleaker view that pure undiluted greed was at work here. But, whatever the reasons for these rates, the cities had to mortgage every piece of public property such as theatres, gymnasia and harbours in order to get their money.65 Thus while cities were able to pay to the Roman state what she demanded they did so by putting themselves in thrall to merciless private individuals.66 The high rate of compound interest meant they were unable to clear the debt. By the winter of 71 it was calculated that the amount actually borrowed had been repaid twice over, and yet the enormous sum of 120,000 talents was still outstanding. According to one account, things had come to such a pass that people were selling off votive offerings, statues and works of art to service the debt. There were reports too of acts of physical violence and of men being sold into slavery.67 Aside from the fact that this situation was a scandal in itself it carried with it grave dangers. The Asiatic Vespers showed what could happen if the provincials were pushed too far. But this new generation of entrepreneurs recked not the lessons of the recent past, despite some ominous signs. When Mithridates invaded in 74 the cities had shown signs of restlessness and of wanting to greet him as a saviour, and, about this time, when publicani arrived to exploit the newly conquered Heraclea they so maddened the townsfolk that they, in a repeat of the scenes of 88, turned on them and killed them.68 Lucullus had never made any secret of where his sympathies lay. Though he had been Sulla’s collecting agent long ago, he did what he could to mitigate the harshness of his task and, just before setting out on his own campaigns, he warned the publicani to moderate their behaviour. These, of course, were at best palliatives but when Lucullus had, as now, the necessary power and the leisure-time in which to employ it, he set about putting an end to the problem once and for all. His intent was embodied in four measures. Henceforth the monthly rate of interest was to be 1 per cent, and no more. Interest that exceeded the amount of the principal was to be written off. A creditor might take no more than one quarter of the debtor’s income in any one year. Finally, anyone caught adding interest to principal would forfeit the lot.
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The effect of these measures was swift, salutary and wholesome. Presented now with a manageable debt that they could pay the cities of Asia cleared it within less than four years and received back their property unencumbered.69 For the biographer there is little else to say. One can only join in the paean of praise with which Lucullus’ reforms have ever been greeted. If this represents one of the finest expressions of Lucullus’ philhellenism it is also a tribute to his basic decency as a person. Of course, not everybody joined in the chorus of praise. The publicani, predictably, were enraged. Some scholars believe that Lucullus was being very brave in provoking these people, especially as the reforms of 70 meant the equites once more had a place on juries and would be ready with a charge of repetundae. Personally, I doubt if he looked at the matter in this way at all. Whatever developments there might be at Rome at this time and however unpleasing they might be to a man of Lucullus’ political outlook, they would not serve to undermine his personal position as it then was. The war was over and all that remained to be done before going home was to capture Mithridates. Lucullus was optimistic about this last and in the next chapter we shall see why. Once it was accomplished, of course, he could return to Rome a victor in a g reat campaign and display Rome’s redoubtable foe in his triumph. It would be very hard then for anybody to level charges at the man who had conquered Mithridates. But even now Appius Claudius Pulcher was on the road to Ephesus bearing a message that would change everything. Mithridates could only be captured by renewing and widening the war Lucullus had just declared to be over. The vicissitudes of that war in turn were to give the equites the opportunity they now lacked. In a little while, Lucullus, who at this point seemed so secure, was to fall victim to the advantage they took of the difficulties he was soon to encounter.
VI Confronting the king: the war with Tigranes
Though immersed in the affairs of Asia, Lucullus had never for a moment lost sight of his last great objective: the capture of Mithridates. Now in 70 the return of an envoy was eagerly awaited. In the previous year, shortly before he returned to the coast to deal with Amisus, Lucullus had despatched his brother-inlaw to the Ar menian cour t to request the sur render of Mithridates.1 The situation, in point of fact, was a somewhat delicate one. In the past Tigranes, who had an unhealthy interest in the place, had committed acts against Rome’s satellite Cappadocia which could be construed as hostile. On the last occasion, in 77, he had made a swift raid on the kingdom and carted off part of the population to people his new capital, Tigranocerta. But in the present war his attitude could only be described as correct. He had given no aid whatsoever to Mithridates and had done no more for him than the bare minimum when he turned up in Armenia as a fugitive. When, as in the case of Cappadocia, he saw some advantage to himself then plainly he was quite willing to become embroiled in Mithridates’ quarrels with Rome. But otherwise he appears to have reached the conclusion that, as a matter of general policy, it were best to maintain neutrality. However, to presume from this neutrality, as Lucullus appears to have presumed, that Tigranes could, in one way or another, be induced to yield his son-in-law was to presume rather a lot. 2 In the course of the negotiations the king himself was to say that to do so would shame him before the whole world.3 Plainly the situation called for the exercise of certain qualities such as tact and finesse, for instance, but these Lucullus proved unable to supply. In his letter requesting the extradition of 99
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Mithridates, Lucullus addressed Tigranes as ‘King’. This could not but be interpreted as an insult by a man who styled himself ‘King of Kings’ and who was actually waited upon by vassal kings whom he had conquered. So it happened that when Tigranes came to make reply he repaid Lucullus with his own base coin by omitting his title of imperator.4 One excuse that might be advanced for Lucullus’ needlessly provocative behaviour might be that he was simply ignorant of whom he was dealing with. A similar argument has sometimes been used to explain Sulla’s insulting behaviour to a Parthian embassy some twenty years before. Both suggestions fall to the ground for precisely the same reason: they are based on the supposition that men of Sulla’s and Lucullus’ intelligence would not have bothered to find out about the nature of the power they were dealing with. Tigranes was certainly not a man to be treated lightly or carelessly. He had come to the throne of Armenia about 95 and almost immediately had embarked on a ser ies of conquests. Sophene on the eastern bank of the Euphrates was the first to fall to him. Then he took from the Parthians all of northern Mesopotamia from the Euphrates to the mountains on the border of Media Atropatene. Next, Syr ia and Cilicia Campestris fell to his arms and in the region of Transcaucasia the Albanians and Iberians became his vassals. Lucullus was dealing with a monarch whose dominions stretched from the Caspian to the Mediterranean and whose title ‘King of Kings’ was plainly no empty and pompous boast.5 The natural conclusion to draw from this would seem to be that Lucullus, of set purpose, was trying to start yet another war with a great power. But it would not be the right one. Lucullus had good reasons of his own for avoiding further adventures. Strictly speaking, the terms of his command would probably allow him, as we saw in our last chapter, to pursue Mithridates into Armenia but such a move might not necessarily be a wise one. Developments at home, of which the commander was well aware, meant that political and not strategic considerations would dominate any debate on his action and, suffice to say for the moment, that these developments were of a sort that might not guarantee a favourable outcome to that debate. A man who, as we argued, was unassailable as a conquering hero, might begin to look very vulnerable if he turned himself into a militar y adventurer. In any case, Lucullus himself furnished the clearest
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proofs that, so far from planning war, he was not even expecting one. His victory celebrations and his call for commissioners were surely the acts of a man for whom fighting was at an end. Quite simply, he seems to have believed there would be no problem at all where Tigranes was concerned and this is vividly illustrated by his chagrined remark when Appius eventually returned emptyhanded: he was amazed Tigranes should wait until Mithridates was crushed before joining him in war on Rome. The king had acted clean contrary to Lucullus’ expectations.6 We have now, of course, to offer some reason for Lucullus’ having so badly misjudged the situation. Why was it he did not know what it was he asked and why did he not realize it was likely to be refused? One salient feature of his career to date had been the sensitivity he showed in dealing with Greeks and, correspondingly, the harshness he visited upon non-Greeks. Tigranes, for all the superficial veneer of Hellenic culture he had acquired, was, of course, an oriental king. He was a barbarian ruler who was hated by many of his Greek subjects because of his despotic ways. So, as with any other barbarians, Lucullus found it impossible to achieve empathy with somebody like the Armenian king, or, indeed, to understand him in any way. As a direct consequence he knew of only one way of dealing with him. There would be no deference to susceptibilities that Lucullus could not comprehend in any case. Instead, he would proceed as the Romans had always proceeded with such people. The best way to achieve results from an oriental monarch was to apply the heavy hand. Oriental kings must obey the command of a Roman and that was that. This was a method which in the recent past had worked for Sulla, and Pompey was to employ it with good results not long after this; Lucullus, however, lacked their skill and finesse, and in Tigranes he found a king who would not play the part assigned him.7 Lucullus’ choice of envoy merely underscores his resolve that Tigranes should be informed of the will of Rome with which he would then automatically comply forthwith. Appius Claudius Pulcher was not the man to be overawed by a monarch, however magnificent, or to tiptoe around him with a delicate tread. His initial impressions of the king were not particularly favourable for, on his journey, he discovered that the royal guides were leading him by roundabout paths across the Armenian plateau and when he at last arrived at his destination, Antioch in Syria, he was
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informed he needs must wait as the king was away. Now, Tigranes had good reason for being absent since he was at that moment engaged in war in Phoenicia but both his action and that of his minions could have a certain construction put on them. A message was being delivered to the Romans: they were not as great in the eyes of Tigranes as they were in their own. Let their envoy not hurry, for the king would not put to one side more important concerns so that he might meet with him. I do not know if Tigranes intended his actions to be interpreted in this way but it would certainly seem that some such construction was put on them by Appius. If I am right in assuming that Lucullus was not consciously looking for war, what Pulcher did next can only be seen as an act of personal revenge for the insult to Rome’s (and his own) dignity.8 He passed his enforced leisure in meddling and tampering with the loyalty of the subject princes who were then present at court. When, at last, Tigranes returned and granted audience, Appius treated him as the Claudii did the rest of humanity: with disdain. He told Tigranes shortly that either he disgorge Mithridates or he would have on his hands a war with Rome. Tigranes, we are assured, was rocked by this bluntness. One of our sources, who has much to say about his oriental pomposity, recounts with glee that it was the first time in over a quarter of a century that anybody had spoken to him thus plainly. Nevertheless, regal composure was maintained and the king continued to smile as he had from the start of the interview. He assured Appius that he had no intention whatsoever of surrendering Mithridates and if the Romans proposed to attack then they would find he knew how to defend himself. The niceties of diplomacy were completed when Tigranes offered Appius an array of gifts. In a gesture strongly reminiscent of his brother-in-law’s at the court of Ptolemy years before Appius contented himself with accepting one bowl before heading back to tell Lucullus Tigranes was proving difficult.9 It is sometimes claimed that Lucullus next cast about for some excuse in order to justify the assault he now determined to make on Armenia. Reports in our ancient sources that Tigranes and Mithridates at this time were planning an invasion of Lycaonia and Cilicia or that Tigranes had furnished his father-in-law with a force to attack Pontus are dismissed by those who hold this theory. In their opinion these are mere inventions devised by
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Lucullus
Lucullus in order to provide that pretext which they believe he must have sought. Tigranes, they say, actually made no hostile move until he was attacked.10 Whatever surface plausibility it has, this theory must be rejected since it is definitely grounded on a misunderstanding of Lucullus’ position and, at the same time, almost certainly misjudges Tigranes’ likely reaction to Appius’ frank talk. In point of fact, Lucullus did not need to look for any excuse. From the Roman point of view he was completely justified in going over to the offensive. Tigranes was harbouring an enemy of Rome. He had been given a clear choice: surrender that enemy or face a war. The king had chosen war and so war it would be. True, Lucullus would rather not have fought and had not expected the answer he got but that consideration is irrelevant. He had left himself with absolutely no room for manœvre. If he wanted to lay hands on Mithridates and, incidentally, avoid becoming an object of derision to foreign and domestic enemies as one who made threats he could not deliver on, then there was nothing for it but to take up arms.11 So far as Tigranes was concerned, it was but logical that after the interview with Appius he should immediately summon Mithridates to court. The whole purpose of keeping him at a distance had been to avoid giving offence to the Romans and thus maintain Armenian neutrality. But as we just saw this was not enough to satisfy Lucullus. The policy was plainly a failure and so there was no point whatsoever in going on with it. The three-day interview of reconciliation between Mithridates and Tigranes which resulted in the physical destruction of those courtiers who had urged neutrality on the Armenian king was the direct consequence of Appius’ blunt threats. Since he was now held to be at war with Rome Tigranes, as a matter of course, reversed his policies and made common cause with Mithridates. And, since the Romans had made no secret of what they would do, we may credit Tigranes w