Logical Investigations

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International Library of Philosophy Edited by Jose Bermudez, Tim Crane and Peter Sullivan

Logical Investigations

Advisory Board: Jonathan Barnes, Fred Dretske, Frances Kamm, Brian Leiter, Huw Price and Sydney Shoemaker

Recent titles in the ILP:

Edmund Husser!

The Facts of Causation O,H.M~

Translated by J. N. Findlay from the Second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen

The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics R. lucas

Edited by Dermot Moran

Stream of Consciousness Bany Oointon

Volume II

Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science Jady Auouni

(Investigation III, Volume II of the German editions)

J.

Reason without Freedom David Owens The Price of Doubt N. M. L Nathan Matters of Mind Scott Sturgeon Logic, Form and Grammar Peter Long The Metaphysicians of Meaning Gideon Makin Logical Investigations, Vols I & II Edmund Husserl

On the theory of wholes and parts The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings (Investigation IV, Volume II of the German editions)

On intentional experience and their lcontents' (Investigation V, Volume II of the German editions)

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge (Investigation VI, Volume II, Part 2 of the German editions)

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Contents

Fif1t published in Gel1ll
VOLUME II, PART I OF THE GERMAN EDITIONS (CONTINUED) INVESTIGATION III ON THE THEORY OF WHOLES AND PARTS Introduction

3

"Rou
CHAmR ONE

Roudedge is on imprint o(rhe Taylor & Fronds Group

The difference between independent ond nOrHndependent objects

4

§l Complex and simple, articulated and unarticulated objects §2 Introduction of the distinction between independent and non-independent objects (contents) i3 The ;n,epamb;li'y of non·;ndependen' con ten" §4 Analyses of examples following Stumpf §5 The objective determination of the concept of inseparability §6 Continuation. Tie-up with a criticism of a much-favoured notional determination i7 Furth« po;nting up of om notional detennina';on by introducing the concepts of pure law and pure genus §7a Independent and non-independent Ideas §8 Demarcation of the distinction of independent and non-independent contents and the distinction between intuitively emphatic and intuitively blended contents i9 Continuat;on" Refeeen" to 'he w;dee ,pheee of the phenomena of fusion ilO The muliiplic;ty of law, govocning the ""ou' ,ort, of non-independent contents ill The dBT«ence between there "matee;a]' law, and "foemal' De 'analytic' laws il2 B.,ic detenn;na';on';n cegacd to analyt;c and ,ynthet;c propositions §13 Relative independence and non-independence

4

Translation C 1970 J. N. Findlay Editorial matter C 200 I Dermot Moran Typeset in Times by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong Printed and bound in Great 8I"itain by St Edmundsbury Press, Bury St Edmunds. Suffolk All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any elec;uonic. mechanical, or other means. now known or hereafter invented. including phototopying and recording. or in any infonnation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishef1.

British LJbrory Cato/oglling in Publication Data A catalogue re
01111122

5 6

7 9 10 II 13

13 15

17 19

20 22

vi

Contents

Contents

CHAPTEJI. TWO

Thoughts towards a theory af the pure forms af wholes and ports

25

§14 The concept of foundation and some relevant theorems §15 Transition to the treatment of the more important part·relations §16 Reciprocal and one·sided, mediate and immediate foundation §17 Exact determination of the concepts of piece (portion). moment, physical part, abstractum. concretum §18 The difference between the mediate and immediate parts of a whole §19 A novel sense of this distinction: nearer and more remote parts of the whole §20 Nearer and remoter parts relatively to one another §21 Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions of whole and part, and of their essential species, by means of the notion of foundation §22 Forms of sensuous unity and wholes §23 Forms of categorial unity and wholes §24 The pure formal types of wholes and parts. The postulate of an a prior; theory §25 Additions regarding the 'piecing' (fragmentation) of wholes through the 'piecing' of their 'moments'

25 27 27

28 30 30 32

§8 Difficulties of this conception. (a) Whether the non-independence of the meaning does not really only lie in the non-independence of the object meant §9 (b) The understanding of isolated syncategorematica §IO A priori laws governing combinations of meanings §Il Objections. Modifications of meaning which are rooted in the essence of expressions or meanings §12 Nonsense and absurdity §13 The laws of the compounding of meanings and the pure logico-grammatical theory of forms §14 Laws which discourage nonsense and laws whicb discourage absurdity. The Idea of a purely logical grammar Notes

59 60 61 64

67 68 71 75

38

INVESTIGATION V ON INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THEIR 'CONTENTS'

77

39

Introduction

79

34 35

41

CHAYrn\ ON'

ConscioutMSS 0$ the phenomenolop:aI subsistence of the ego ond ConscioosMSS 0$ inner perception

INVESTIGATION IV THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND NON.INDEPENDENT MEANINGS AND THE IDEA OF PURE GRAMMAR

47

Introduction

49

§I Simple and complex meanings §2 Whether complexity of meanings merely reflects complexity of objccts §3 Complexity of meanings and complexity of the concrete act of meaning. Implied meanings §4 The question of the meaningfulness of 'syncategorematic' components of complex expressions §5 lodepeodeot aod non·;ndepeodeot mean;ngs. The nooindependence of the sensory and expressive parts of words §6 Oth" opposed d;st;nct;ons. Unclosed. abno.mally abb",;ated and defcctive expressions §7 The conception of non-independent meanings as founded contents

vii

50 50

51 53

55 56

58

§I Varied ambiguity of the term 'consciousness' §2 First sense: Consciousness as the real phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences. The concept of an experience §3 The phenomenological and the popular concept of experience §4 The relation between experiencing consciousness and experienced content is no phenomenologically peculiar type of relation §5 Second sense. ;Inner' consciousness as inner perception §6 Origin of the first concept of consciousness out of the second §7 Reciprocal demarcation of psychology and natural science (First edition) §8 The pure ego and awareness (' Bell'lIsstheir') Additional Note to the Second Edition

81 81

82 84

85 86 87

89 91 93

CHAPTER TWO

Consdousness os intentional experience §9 The meaning of Brentano's demarcation of 'psychic phenomena'

94 94

viii

Contents

Contents

§IO Descriptive characterization of acts as 'intentional' experiences §Il Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings. (a) The 'mental' or 'immanent' object §12 (b) The act and the relation of consciousness or the ego to the object §13 The fixing of our terminology §14 Difficulties which surround the assumption of acts as a descriptively founded class of experiences §15 Whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological kind (of the genus feeling in particular) can consist partly of acts and partly of non-acts (a) Are there any intentional feelings? (b) Are there non-intentional feelings? Distinction between feeling-sensations and feeling-acts §16 Distinction between descriptive and intentional content §17 The intentional content in the sense of the intentional object §18 Simple and complex, founding and founded acts §19 The function of attention in complex acts. Instance of the phenomenological relation of verbal sound to sense §20 The difference between the quality and the matter of an act §21 The intentional and the semantic essence Appendix to §ll and §20. Critique of the 'image-theory' and of the doctrine of the 'immanent' objects of acts

95 97 100

101 102

106 107

109

112 113 115

§22 The question of the relation between the matter and quality of an act §23 The view of 'matter' as a founding act of 'mere presentation' §24 Difficulties. The problem of the differentiation of qualitative kinds §25 Closer analysis of our two possible solutions §26 Consideration and rejection of the proposed conception §27 The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual presentation and perception §28 Special investigation of the matter in the case of judgement §29 Continuation: 'acceptance' or 'assent' given to the mere presentation of the state of affairs Additional note

143 144

CHAPTER FOUR

Study of founding presentations with special regard to the dJeory of judgement §32 An ambiguity in the word 'presentation', and the supposed self-evidence of the principle that every act is founded on an act of presentation §33 Re·establishment of our proposition by means of a new notion of presentation. Naming and asserting §34 Difficulties. The concept of the name. Positing and non-positing names §35 Nominal positing and judgement. Where judgements as such can be parts of nominal acts §36 Continuation. Whether assertions can function as complete

names

1-46

146 147

149 152 155

116 CHAPTER FIVE

119 122 125

CHAPTER THREE

The matter af the act and its underlying presentation

*30 The conception of the identical understanding of a word or a sentence as a case of 'mere presentation' §31 A last objection to our view. Mere presentations and isolated 'matters'

ix

128

128 129 131 IJ2

134 135 139 140

143

Further contributions to the theory of judgement 'Presentation' as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositiofWl acts §37 The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an objectifying act §38 Qualitative and material differentiation of objectifying acts §39 Presentation in the sense of an objectifying act, and its qualitative modification §40 Continuation. Qualitative and imaginative modification §41 New interpretation of the principle that makes presentations the basis of all acts. The objectifying act as the primary bearer of 'maller' §41 Further developments. Basic principles of complex acts §43 Backward glance to our previous interpretation of the principle under discussion

158 158 159 162 165 167 168 169

CHAPTER SIX

Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms 'presentotion' ond 'content'

171

§44 "P"sentat;on" §45 The 'presentational content' Note

171 175 175

x Contents

VOLUME II, PART 2 OF THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION Foreword to the second edition

Contents

177

*12 Total and partial identification and distinction as the common phenomenological foundations of predicative and determining forms of expression

xi

213

177 CHAPTER TWO

Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions ond their essentiol vorieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment

INVESTIGATION VI ELEMENTS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ELUCIDATION OF KNOWLEDGE

181

Introduction

183

First section Objectifying intentions and their- fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations

189

CHAmA ON'

Meoning-inrention and meoninr{utfilment §I Whether every type of mental act, or only certain types. can function as carriers of meaning §2 That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue. There are two senses to talk about expressing an act §3 A third sense of talk about the 'expression' of acts. Formulation of our theme §4 The expression of a percept ('judgement of perception"). Its meaning cannot lie in perception, but must lie in peculiar expressive acts §5 Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it Addendum §6 The static unity of expressive thought and expressed intuition. Recognition (das Erkellflen) §7 Recognition as a character of acts, and the 'generality of words' §8 The dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity Addendum

§9 The diITering character of an intention inside and outside the unity of fulfilment §IO The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment §II Frustration and conflict. The synthesis of distinction

191 191 192 193

195 196 199 201

202 206 208

209 210 211

§IJ The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the characteristic form of fulfilment for objectifying acts. Subsumption of acts of meaning under the class of objectifying acts §14 Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of fulfilment. (a) Sign, image and self·presentation (b) The perceptual and imaginative 'adumbration' of the object §15 Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the meaning-function CHAmA ' " ' "

216

216

218 220

222

The phenomenology of the levels of knowfedfC

226

§16 Simple identification and fulfilment §17 The question of the relation between fulfilment and intuitive illustration §18 The gradations of mediate fulfilments. Mediate presentations §19 Distinction between mediate presentations and presentations of presentations §20 Genuine intuitive illustration in every fulfilment. Authentic and inauthentic intuitive illustration §21 The 'fulness' of a presentation §22 Fulness and 'inluilive subs,"n," (G,lmlt) §2J Relations of weight between the intuitive and signitive 'substance' (Gelwlt) of one and the same act. Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual and imaginal content. pure perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fulness §24 Graded series of fulfilments §25 Fulness and intentionallllatter §26 Continuation. Represcnlation or interpretation (AuffasSlIng). Maller as the interpretative sensc. the interpretative fonn and the interpreted content. DiITerentiating characterization of intuitive and signitive interpretation §27 Representations as the necess
226 228 229 230 231 233 234

235

238 240

242 244

xii

Contenu

Contenu

§28 Intentional essence and fulfilling sense. Epistemic essence. Intuitions in specie §29 Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and objectively complete intuitive illustrations. Essentiu (Essen=)

245 246

CHAmll fOUR

250

Consistency and inconsistency

§30 The ideal distinction of meanings into the possible or real (rea/e) and the impossible or imaginary §3l Compatibility or consistency as an ideal relationship in the widest sphere of contents in general. Compatibility of 'concepts' as meanings §32 Incompatibility (conflict) of contents in general §33 How conflict can also be a foundation for unity. Relativity of the talk of compatibility and conflict §34 Some axioms §35 Incompatibility of concepts as meanings CHAmll "'"

The ideal of adequation.

Sel(~vidence

and troth

§36 Introduction §37 The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal of ultimate fulfilment §38 Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense §39 Self~vidence and truth

Second section Sense and understanding

250 252 253 254 256 257 259 259 259 262 263

269

CHAmll SO<

Sensuous and cmegonal intuitions

271

§40 The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms.

with a thought leading towards its solution §4l Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples §42 The distinction between sensuous stufT and categorial form throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts §43 The objective correlates of categorial forms are not 'real' (reu/en) moments §44 The origin of the concept of Being and of the remaining categories does not lie in the realm of inner-perception

271

274 275 277 278

§45 Widening of the concept of intuition. and in particular of the concepts perception and imagination. Sensible and categorial intuition §46 Phenomenological analysis of the distinction between sensuous and categorial perception §47 Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as 'straightforward' perception "'8 Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts "'9 Added note on nominal formations §50 Sensuous forms categorially grasped but not functioning nominally §5l Collectiva and disjunctiva §52 Universal objects constituting themselves in universal intuitions

, ,

xiii

280 281 283 286

289 290 291 292

A study in cotegoriol representation

CHAmll ""'"

295

§53 Backward reference to the researches of our first sectioo §54 The question of the representing contents of categorial forms §55 Arguments for the assumption of peculiar categorial representing contents §56 Continuation. The mental linkage of combined acts and the categorial unity of corresponding objects The representing contents of the founding intuitions are §57 not immediately connected by the representing content of the synthetic form §58 The relation of our two distinctions: outer and inner sense. also sense for categories

295 2% 298 299 300 302

CHAmll E>GHT

The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking §59 The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory of the forms of possible intuitions S60 The relative or functional difference between mailer and form. Pure acts of understanding and those mixed with sense. Sensuous concepts and categories §6l Categorial forming involves no real reshaping of the object S62 Our freedom in the categorial forming of given material and its limits. I'urely categorial laws (laws of 'authentic' thinking) 163 The new laws of the validity of signitive and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thinking) §64 The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any understanding whatever, and not merely for any human

305 305 306 307 308 311

xiv

Investigation III

Contenu

understanding, Their psychological meaning and normative function in relation to inadequate thought §65 The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical §66 Distinction between the most important differences mixed up in the current opposition of 'intuiting' and 'thinking' Additional note to the second edition

Thin:l section Clarification of our introductory problem

)14 )16 )1)

)19

321

CHAPTEA NINE

Non-objectif;ing octs os apparent futfilmenrs of meaning

323

§67 That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing §68 The controversy regarding the interpretation of the peculiar grammatical forms which express non-objectifying acts §69 Arguments for and against the Aristotelian conception §70 Decision

323 325 327 332

AmNOO<

External ond internal

perc~tion:

physkol ond psychical phenomena

335

§l The popular and the traditional philosophical concepts of external and internal perception 335 §§2 and 3 Epistemological and psychological motives for deepening the traditional division: Orentano's conception 336, 339 §4 Criticism, External and internal perception are, on a normal interpretation of the concepts, of the same epistemological character: Perception and apperception 340 §5 The equivocations of the term 'appearance' 341 §5a Excised passage from the First Edition 344 §6 There is for this reason confusion between the epistemologically meaningless opposition of inner and outer perception. and the epistemologically fundamental opposition of adequate and inadequate perception 344 §7 That the dispute is not verbal 346 §8 Confusion of two fundamentally different divisions of 'phenomena', ThaI 'physical' contents do not exist 'in merely phenomenal fashion', but exist 'actually' 347 NOles Index

349 359

On the theory of wholes and parts

Introduction I

The difference between 'abstract' and 'concrete' contents, which is plainly the same as Stumpf's distinction between dependent (non-independent) and independent contents. is most important for all phenomenological investigations: we must. it seems. therefore, first of all submit it to a thorough analysis. As said in my previous Investigation, this distinction. which first showed up in the field of the descriptive psychology of sense-data, could be looked on as a special case of a universal distinction. It extends beyond the sphere of conscious contents and plays an extremely important role in the field of objects as sllch. The systematic place for its discussion should therefore be In the pllre (0 priOri) theory of objects as such, in which we deal with ideas pertinent to the category of object. ideas such as Whole and Part, Subject and Quality. Individual and Species. Genus and Species. Relation and Collection. Unity. Number, Series, Ordinal Number, Magnitude etc., as well as the a priori truths which relate to these. Here again we cannot allow our analytic investigation to wait on the systematic development of our subjectmatter. Difficult notions employed by us in our clarificatory study of knOWledge. and made to work rather in the manner of a lever, cannot be left unexamined. till they spontaneously emerge in the systematic fabric of the logical realm. For we are not here engaged on a systematic exposition of logic. but on an epistemological clarification, as well as on the prolegomena to any future exposition of logic. To plumb the dilTerence between dependent and non-independent contents. therefore. points so directly to the fundamental questions of the Pure Theory of Wholes and Parts (which is a part of formal ontology) that we cannot avoid going into these questions in some detail.

Chapter I

The difference between independent and non-independent objects

The difference between independent

~nd

non.independent objecu

S

in their case talk of members or of articulated structure alone comes n:lIuml. The parts are here not merely disjoined from each other. but relatively independent. they have the character of mutually-put-together pieces. Even at the start of our discussion, we see that the relations of parts faJl under characteristically different forms: these fonns, we suspect, depend on the cardinal difference between independent and non-independent objects. which is our theme in the present section.

piN'l'S:

§2 Introduction of the distinction between independent and non~independent objects (contents)

§ I Complex and simple, articulated and unarticulated objects Since the Investigation which follows mainly concerns relations of Parts. we start off with a wholly general discussion of such relations. Objects can be related to one another as Wholes to Parts, they can also be related to one another as coordinated parts of a whole. These sorts of relations have an a priori foundation in the Idea of an object. Every object is either actually or possibly a part. i.e. there are actual or possible wholes that include it. Not every object. on the other hand. need perhaps have pans, and we have therefore the ideal division of objects into the simple and the complex. The terms 'complex' and 'simple' are therefore defined by the qualifica· tion of having parts or not having parts. They may, however, be understood in a second. possibly more natural sense. in which complexity, as the word's etymology suggests, points to a plurality of disjoined parts in the whole, so that we have to call simple whatever cannot be 'cut up' into a plurality of parts, i.e. that in which not even two disjoined parts can be distinguished. In the unity of a sensory phenomenon we can perhaps discover a wholly detenninate 'moment' of redness as well as the generic 'momena' of colour. Colour and determinate redness are not. however, disjoined 'moments'. Redness on the other hand, and the extension that it covers. are such disjoined moments, since they have no community of content. They have. we may say, a mutual association in the widest sense of the word: we have here a general relation of parts which is that of disjoined parts in a whole, an association of such parts. It now seems appropriate to call the associated parts members of the association: but to give so wide a sense to talk about members of a whole, means to count colour and shape as the associated parts of a coloured expanse. That goes against linguistic usage. For in such wholes the parts have relative dependence as regards one another: we find Ihem so closely united as 10 be called 'interpenetrating'. It is quite different in the case of wholes which are broken up, or could be broken up. into

We interpret the word 'part' in the wil/est sense: we may call anything a 'part' thai can be distinguished 'in' an object, or, objectively phrased, that is 'present' in it. Everything is a part that is an object's real possession, not only in the sense of being a real thing. but also in the sense of being something really in something. that truly helps to make it up:! an object in itself, considered in abstraction from all contexts to which it is tied. is likewise a part. Every non-relative 'real' (rea/e) predicate therefore points to a part of the object which is the predicate's subject: 'red' and 'round', e.g.. do so, but not 'existent" or 'something'. Every 'real' (rea/~) mode of association, e.g. the moment of spatial configumtion, likewise counts as a proper part of the whole. The tenn 'part' is not used so widely in ordinary discourse. If we now try to pin down the limitations which mark ofT this ordinary, from our notion of part. we come up against the fundamental distinction called by us that of independent and non·independent parts. Where one talks of 'parts' without qualification, one generally has the independent parts (those referred to as 'pieces') in mind. Since each part can be made the specific object (or. as we also have frequcntly said, 'content') of a presentation directed upon it. and can therefore be called an object or 'content'. the distinction of parts just mcntioned points (0 a distinction in objects (or contents) as such. The term 'object' is in this context always taken in its widest sense. In ordinary talk of objects or of parts, one of course involuntarily thinks of independent objects. The tenn 'content' is less restricted in this respect since 'abstract contents' are also commonly talked of. But talk of'contents' tends to move in a purely psychological sphere, a limitation with which we may start invcstigating our distinction. but which must be dropped as we proceed. 2 . As a mailer of history the distinction between independent and non· llldepcndem contents arose in the psychological realm, more specifically in the field of the phenomenology of inner experience. In a polemic against LOCke. Berkeley said:) We have the ability to recall individual things previously seen, or to put them together or break them down in imagination. We can imagine a man with two heads, the trunk of a man tied to the body of a horse, or isolated pieces such as a separated head. nose, ear etc. As

6

On the theory of wholes and parts

opposed to this, it is impossible to form 'abstract ideas', to separate the idea, e.g.. of a movement from that of a moving body. We can only abstract, in the Lockean separative sense. such parts of a presented whole as are in fact unified with other parts, but as could also exist without them. Since esse for Berkeley here always means the same as percipi, this inability to exist means no more than an inability to be perceived. We must note. further, that for Berkeley ideas are the things perceived, i.e. contents of consciousness in the sense of things we really (reell) live through. We may now make a statement that brings out the essential point of Berkeley's distinctions. makjng use of a readily understandable verbal change.· Seen in their mutual interrelations, contents presented together on any occasion fall into two main classes: independent and non-independent contents.) We have independent contents wherever the elements of a presentational complex (complex of contents) by their very nature permit their separated presentation: we have dependent contents wherever this is not the case.

§3 The inseparability of non·independent contents To be more precise in regard to this ability or inability-to-be-separatelypresented. we make use of some of StumpPs observations - quite insufficiently noticed - and assert the following:' It is self-evident. in regard to certain contents. that the modification or elimination of at least one of the contents given with them (but not contained in them). must modify or eliminate those contents themselves. In the case of other contents. this is not at all self-evident it is not absurd to suppose them remaining unaffected despite the modification or elimination of all coexistent contents. Contents of the former sort can only be conceived as parts of more comprehensive wholes. whereas the laller appear possible, even if nothing whatever exists beside them, nothing therefore bound up with them to form a whole. In the sense just laid down every phenomenal thing and piece of a thing is separably presentable, The head of a horse can be presented 'on its own' or 'cut off', i.e. we can hold it in our fancy, while we allow the other parts of the horse, and its whole intuited setting, to alter and vanish at will. Strictly speaking, the phenomcnal thing or its piece, i.e. the sensuous phenomenon as such, the spatial shape filled with sensuous qualities. never stays just the same in descriptive content: but the content of such a 'phenomenon' docs not at least involve anything entailing a self-evident. necessary. functional dependence of its changes on those of coexistent phenomena. This holds, we may say, of phenomenal objects as such. as well as of the 'appearances'. in the sense of the experiellce.~. in which these things appear, as also in respect of the sensational complexes which are given an objective 'interpretation' in such experiences. Good examples in this field are the phenomena of tones

The difference between independent and non-independent objects

7

and chords. of smells and other experiences, that we can readily think of :lpart from all relation to existent thinghood.

§4 Analyses of examples following Stumpf Let us now consider some instances of insepardble contents. e.g. the relation of I'islfal quality to extension, or the relation of both to thefigllre which bounds them. It is doubtless true in a certain sense that these moments can be indt'pendently varied. Extension can stay the same while colour varies indefinitely. colour stay the same while extent and figure vary indefinitely. But. strictly speaking. such independent variability affects only the kinds of the -moments' in their various genera. While the moment of colour remains constant in respect of its specific shade. extension and shape may vary indefinitely in their sub-species. and vice:: versa. Specifically the same quality, and nuance of quality, may be stretched or spread out over every extension. and. conversely. the same extension may be covered by every quality. Scope, however. remains for relations of functional dependence:: among the changes of such moments. which, be it noted, are not exhausted by the ideal content of their Species. The moment of colour. as immediate part-content of the intuited concrete thing, is not the same in the two concrete intuitions, even when the quality, the lowest differentiation of the genus colour, remains the same. Stumpf has made the powerful observation: Quality shares after a fashion in changes of extension. We express this verbally when we say that colour diminishes. becomes smaller, even to the vanishing point. Increase and diminution are names for quantitative changes. Quality is indeed affected in sympathy with changes in extent, although its own peculiar manner of change is independent of extent. It does not thereby become less gret:n or less red: it has itself no degrees, only kinds. and can in itself neither increase nor diminish, only alter. But none the less. when we leave quality quite unchanged as regards its peculiar manner of change. e.g. let it stay gret:n. it still is affected by quantitative change. And that this is perhaps not an improper or misleading verbal transfer, is shown by the fact that a quality can decrease 7 10 nothing, that in the end mere change ofquantity can bring it to nOllght. W.e accept Stumpf's observation, only adding that it is not really the ~UalHy that is alTected, but the immediate intuitive 'moment' falling under

H. Quality must be looked on as a second-order abstraction. just like the figure and magnitude of an extension. But just on account of the law here under discussion, the moment in question can only be named by way ~f c.oncepts determined by the genera of Quality and Extension. Quality IS dllTerentiatcd 10 the qualitative 'moment' now under consideration, by

8 On the theory of wholes and parts

something not contained in the Genus Colour, since we rightly treat the quality, e.g. the determinate shade of red. as the I"jima Species within this genus. Just so, a determinate figure is the last diITerence of the Genus Figure, though the corresponding immediate, intuitive 'moment' is further diITerentiated. But the combinations among the various last diITerences of the Genera Figure and Colour fullydetennine the 'moments' in question, detemline whatever else may be like or unlike them. The dependence of the immediate 'moments' therefore means a certain necessary relationship among them, which is determined purely by their abstracta at the level just above them. Stumpf adds the following valuable remarks: From this (i.e. the above described functional dependence of the 'moments' of Quality and Extension), it follows that both are in their mllure inseparable, that they in some manner compose a lotal contenl, of which they are merely part
The same sort of thing could be said of the relation of Intensity to Quality. The intensity of a tone is not something indifferent or so-ta-speak alien to its quality. We cannot keep the intensity just as it is, while the quality varies at will, or is allowed to vanish. Eliminate quality and you unavoidably eliminate intensity, and vice versa. Evidently this is no mere empirical fact, but an a priori necessity, grounded in pure essence. In the response to change we have a further analogy to the previously mentioned case: if intensity steadily approaches the zero-limit, we feel our qualitative impression likewise reduced, even though the quality as such remains specifically unaltered. Further examples fully illustrate the 'momems' of IInil)' in the intuitive contents, 'moments' built on the elements that we primarily distinguish, by which such elements are similarly or dissimilarly associared into sensuous illflliril'e wholes. The usc of such examples gives us our first narrower concepts of a whole. of an association etc.. and. further, our distinctive concepts of various kinds and sorts of wholes. whether present to outer or inner sense. These 'moments of unity' arc of course the same as the contents called ·form·qualities' by von Ehrenfels. 'figural' moments by myself. and 'founded contents' by Mcinong.~ But one needs here il supplementary distinction between the phmolllenological moments of unity. which give unity to the experiences or parts of experiences (the real phenomenological data). and

The difference between independent and non-independent objects

9

the obje(·tin! moments of unity, which belong 10 Ihe imemiollal objec/.}· amI of objeclS. wllit'h ill gel/eral transcend the experiential sphere. The expression 'moment of unity', incidentlllly recommended to me by Riehl. has such obvious advantages in virtue of its immediate intelligibility, that it might well be universally adopted.

p{/rl.~

§S The objective determination of the concept of inseparability Stumpf uses considerations of this sort to pro\'/! the mutual inseparability of Extension and Quality, and hence their non-independence: we shall rather make use of them to define inseparability or non-independence. or contrariwise separability or independence. Stumpf himself gives us the means to do this at the end of the last quOted passage. IO What does it mean to say we can form an idea of a content 'by itself' or 'in isolation'? Does this mean, as regards the actually experiellced contents of the phenomenological sphere, that such a content can be freed from all blending with coexistent contents, can therefore ultimately be tom out of the unity of consciousness? Obvi· ousl)' not. In this sense no contents are isolable. and the same holds of the phenomenal/hing-contents in their relation to the total unity of the phenomenon as such. If we form an independent idea of the content head ofa horse, we inescapably present it in a context. the content stands relieved from an objective background that appears with it. it is inescapably given with many other contents, and is also in a way united to them. How then can this content be isolable in idea? The only answer we can give is the following: lsolability means only that we can keep some content constant in idea despite boundless variation - variation that is free, though not excluded by a law rooted in the content's essence - of the contents associated with it. and. in general, given with it. This means that it is unaffected by the elimination of any given arrangement of compresent contents whatsoever. This self-evidently entails: that the existence of this content, to the extent that this depends on itself and its essence. is not at all conditioned by the existence of other contents. that it could exist as it is, through an (I priori necessity of essence. even if nothing were there outside of it. even if all around were altered at will, i.e. without principle. . Or what plainly amounts to the s:.me: II/ Ille 'nature' of rhe conle1!f itself If! irs ideal essence. no dl'pel/llel/ee 01/ OIlier COflU!1!fS is rooled; the essence that makes it what it is, also leaves it unconcerned with all other contents. II may a.I' a maHer off(l('/ be that. with the existence of this content. other Contents are given. and in :.ccordance with empirical rules. In its ideally graspable essence, however. the content is independent: this essence by itself. i.e. considered in a priori fashion. requires no other essence to be interwoven With it.

lOOn the theory of wholes and parts

The sense of non-independence (Unselbstiindigkeit) lies likewise in the positive thought of dependence (Abhiingigkeit). The content is by its nature bound to other contents, it cannot be, if other contents are not there together with it. We need not emphasize the fact that they form a unity with it, for can there be essential coexistence without connection or 'blending', however loose'! Contents which lack self-sufficiency can accordingly only exist as partial cOlllents. We need only say 'object' and 'partial object', instead of -content' and 'partial content' - the term 'content' we regard as the narrower term, the one restricted to the sphere of phenomenology - to achieve an objectil'e distinction freed from all relation to interpretative acts and to any phenomenological content that might be interpreted. No reference back to consciolLl'ness is therefore needed, no reference to differences in the 'mode of presentation', to determine the difference between 'abstract' and 'concrete' which is here in question. All determinations which make use of such a relation, either represent an incorrect, misguided confusion with other notions of 'abstract'. or are merely subjectively slanted eltpressions of a purely objective, ideal state of affairs, a son of slanting that we also feel natural and useful in other cases.

§6 Continuation, Tie·up with a criticism of a much-favoured notional determination Occasionally one hears the difference between independent and nonindependent contents expressed in the attractive formula: Independent contents (part-contents) could be presented by themselves. non-independent contents only noticed by themselves, not presented by themselves. To this formula one may object that 'by themselves' functions vary differently in the two expressions to be distinguished: 'presented by themselves' and 'noticed by themselves'. A thing is 'noticed by itself' if it is an object of an act of notice specially directed upon it (a direct act of attending), a thing is 'presented by itself' if it is an object of a specially directed presentation - this at least if 'by itself' functions analogously in the two cases. On such a basis, however, we cannot sustain the opposition between what can only be noticed and what can only be presented by itself. Could emphatic notice perhaps conflict with presentation in a class of cases, and exclude it? But non-independent moments such as attributes and terms of relations are as much the objects of presentations (as stated above) as are independent contents like window. head etc, Otherwise we should not be able to talk of them. To attend to something by itself, and to represent it by itself (in the sense just presupposed) are so little mutually exclusive. that we find them together. In perceptual 'interpretation' the Ihing we attend to by itself is al the same time eo ipso presented; and the complete content presented by itsclf. e.g. heall. is also attended to by itself.

The difference between independent and non-Independent objects

II

---------'---------'-------'----'By itself' in fact means something quite different in the case of a presentation from what we thought it did. The equivalent expression 'present in isolation' points plainly to this fact. What it plainly means is that it is possible 10 present the object as something existing by itself. as independently (here in the face of all other objects. A thing or piece of a thing can be presented by itself - this means it would be what it is even if everything outside it were annihilated. If we form a presentation of it, we are not necessarily referred to something else, included in which, or attached to which. or associated ....<jth which. it has being. or on whose merc), it depends, as it were. for its existence. We can imagine it as existing by itself alone. and beyond it nothing else. If it is intuitively presented, a context, a whole including it, may nonetheless be presented with it, must inevitably be so presented. The visual content head cannot be presented without a visual background from which it stands relieved. This impossibility is, however. quite different from the impossibility used to define non-independent contents. If we let the visual content head count as independent, we think that, despite its inescapable. accompanying background, it could be presented as existing by itself. and could therefore be intuitively envisaged in isolation. We, ho.....ever, cannot effect this. whether because of powerful original or acquired associations. or other purely factual connections. The 'logical' possibility remains unshaken. our visual field. e.g.. 'could' shrink down to this single content etc. What we here express by the word 'present', could be better expressed by the word ·think'. An attribute, a fonn of association and the like. cannot be thought of as self-existent, as isolated from all else, as being all that exists: this only can happen with 'thinglike' contents. Wherever the word 'think' occurs in this peculiar sense, we detect one of those subjective slantings of an objective, nay of an a priori state of affairs, which we referred to above. Differences such as this. that one object - we again choose the wider term. which includes the contents of intuitive experience - can be 'in and for itselr. while another can only have being in, or attached to some other object - are no mere contingencies of our subjective thinking. They are real differences. grounded in the pure essence of things. which. since they obtain. and since we know of them, prompt us to say that a thought which oversteps them is impossible. i.e. a judgement deviating from them is wrong. What cannot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be, cannot be thought - this equivalence fixes the differences belween the pregnant notion of thinking and the ordinary subjective sense of presentation and thought.

§7 Further pointing up of our notional determination by introdUcing the concepts of pure law and pUre genus Wherever therefore the word 'can' occurs in conjunction with the pregnant usc of ·think·. there is a reference. not 10 a subjective necessity, i.e. to the

12 On the theory of wholes lond puu

The difference between independent and non-Independent objecu

I)

---------'--------'--------subjective incapacity-to-represent-things-otherwise. but to the objectively. ideal necessity of an inability-to-be-otherwise. 1I This is by its essence such as to be given in our consciousness of apodictic self-eI'idenCt!. If we remain within the expressions of this consciousness. we must assert it to be of the essence of such an objective necessity that it is correlated with a definite pure law in each case. It is in the first place obvious in general that objective necessity is as such tantamount to a being film rests on an objectil'e law. An individual matter of fact. considered as such. is contingent in its being: that it is necessary means that it stands in a context of law. What prevents its being otherwise is the law which says that it is not merely so here and now, but universally so. and with a lawful universality. Here we must note that, just as the 'necessity' relevant to our discussion of non-independent 'moments' stands for an ideal or a priori necessity rooted in the essences of things, so, correspondingly. our 'lawfulness' stands for a lawfulness of essence, a non-empirical, universal and unconditionally valid lawfulness. No relation to empirical existence may restrict the extension of our legal concepts, no empirical assertion of existence be inwoven into our consciousness of law. as occurs in the case of empirically general rules and laws. 'Natural laws', laws in the sense of the empirical sciences, are not laws of essence (ideal or a priori laws): empirical necessity is no necessity of essence. The inability-to-exist-by-itself of a non-independent part points therefore to a law of essence, according 10 which the existence of a content belonging to the part's pure Species (e.g. the Species of Colour. Form etc.) presupposeJ the existence of contents of certain pertinent pure Species, i.e. contents to which - if such an addition is still needed - the content in question can pertain as a part or an adjunct. an associate. Put more simply we can say: Nonindepende1lt objeclJ' are objects belonging 10 sllch pure Species as are gOl'erned by a law ofessence to the effeci riwi they only exist (if m all) (IS parts ofmore inc/lIsi\'/! wholes of (I certain appropriate Species. This is what we mean by the terser expression that they are parts which only exist as parts, that cannot be thought of as existing by themselves. The colour of this paper is a non-independent 'moment' of the paper. It is not merely an actual part, but its essence, its pure Species, predestines it to partial being: a colour in general and purely aJ such C'dn exist only as a 'moment' in a coloured thing. In the case of independent objects such a law is lacking: they may, but need not, enter into more comprehensive wholes. In clarifying what must be meant by the phrase 'presented by itself' in the formulation just criticized, we have therefore brought the essence of the dilTerence to be pinned down into the sh:lrpest focus. It has shown itself to be an objective dilTerence. one rooted in the pure essence of the objects (or the partial contents) in question. We may now ask how it stands with the rest of the fonnula: how far does the statement that non-independent objects or 'moments' could 'only' be noticed by themselves. or singled out from their associates for exclusive attention. not presented by themselves. help us

to pin down such objects? We can only answer: Not at all. For if the word 'only' is tied exclusively to the phrase 'presented by itself', such an exclusive opposition achieves everything for it that can be achieved. Strictly speaking our approach is positive in the case of what is non-independent, negative in the case of what is independent: when we say that the former cannot be presented by itself, we merely return in double negation to our real startingpoint. However this may be, we need not fall back on the high-lighting role of attention, and it is not clear how it can help us. A head can certainly be presented apart from the person that has it. A colour. form etc.. is not presentable in this fashion, it needs a substrate, in which it can be exclusively noticed. but from which it cannot be taken out. But the head also, considered. e.g. visually, can only be noticed. by itself, since it is unavoidably given as an element in a total visual field. If we do not treat it as such an element, if we abstract from the background as something really foreign and indilTerent, this does not depend on the peculiarity of our content, but on the circumstances of our thing-directed thought.

§70 Independent and non-independent Ideas Our distinctions have first of all related to the being of particular individuals thought of in 'ideal universality', Le. of such individuals treated purely as instances of Ideas. But they obviously carry over to Ideas themselves, which can. in a corresponding. if somewhat modified sense, be spoken of as 'independent' and 'non-independent'. A lowest difference of some highest pure Genus may be called relatively independent in relation to the hierarchy of pure Species which lead up to the highest Genus, just as every lower Species counts as relatively independent as against higher Species. Genera, the exist· eoee of whose corresponding individualizations represents an a priori im· possibility, unless they simultaneously belong to the individuaJ, but purely conceived extensions of other Genera. are non-independent in regard to these latter, and so mutatis mutandis in the case of other fields of instances.

§8 Demarcation of the distinction of independent and non-independent contents and the distinction between intUitively emphatic and intuitively blended contents We must be prepared for a further objection. Some may perhaps point to the manner in which an independent content puts itself forward as a unity valid in its own right, and cut off from all around, while a non-independent ~Ontent is contrariwise characterized as something only grounded on nther, Independent contents, and insist that we here have a phenomenological contrast that our discussion has not taken full account of. We might deal, in the first place, with the following descriptive situation. The non-independent moments of ao intuition. are not mere parts, but in a

1<1

On the theory of wholes and parts

certain (notionally immediate) manner they must also be regarded as parts: they cannot be separately noticed unless all the concrete contents, in which they are contained, have been stressed as wholes: this does not mean that they become objects in the pregnant sense of the word. A figure or colour cannot be separately noticed unless the whole object, which has the figure or the colour, stands out in relief. A 'striking' colour or form may seem at times to impress us in isolation, but if we bring such an event back to mind we see that the whole object is here phenomenally emphatic, though it is so in respect of the pe<:uliarity thai strikes us, and which alone is objective in the strict sense of the word. The same relation obtains between an emphasized sensuous 'moment' of unity - the 'moment', e.g., of spatial configuration, which, together witb other 'moments' of unity, underlies the internal closure of a sensory manifold, which makes it impressively one - and the apprehension of the sensuously-unified whole itself. 12 In this manner tbe setting in relief of one content is at times the basis for noticing another that intimately belongs to it. U If we explore the deeper grounds of the matter, we note that a SC(,;ond distinction is mixed up with and crosses the previously discussed difference of independent and non-independent contents in tbe phenomenological field (or the field of intuitive data as such). This is the distinction between intuitil'ely 'separated' contents, contents relieved/rom or cut apart/rom associated contents, on the one hand, and contents whicb blend with their associates, or which flow undivided!y Olrer into them, on the other. Our terms are of course ambiguous, but to put them together makes plain that we really do have a new distinction before us. A content, accordingly, is intuitively separated in relation to other con· tents if it does not flow over into them without a point of difference: it can thus make itself count on its own, and stand forth independently. The intuitively unseparated content forms a whole with other coexistent contents, but is not cut off in this manner within the whole; it is not merely bound up with its associates, but blends with them. Independent contents in our previous sense, which are what tbey are no matter what goes on around them, need not have the quite ditTerent independence of separateness, The parts of an intuitive surface of a uniform or continuously shaded white are independent, but not separated. If we ask what is involved in intuitive separation, the image of a mutual overflow points to cases where contents are continuously graded. This holds mainly in the case of sensuous concreta (Le. of independent contents in the sphere of outer sense). Here separation often rests on discontinuity, One may affirm that: Two contemporaneous senSllOl1S concreta necessarily/orm an 'undif/erentiated whole' if all the immediately constitlltilre 'momellts' 0/ the one pass 1mbrokenly orer illto corre,~p(Jndillg eOflstitutil'e 'momellts' of the orher. The case of exact likeness of auy .I·ueh corresponding moments shall here count as a legitimate limiting case of cominuity. i.e. as a colltinuous 'passing m'er into self'.

The difference between independent and non-independent objects

IS

--------'------------'------'-We can apply this in readily understandable fashion to a multiplicity of concreta. Here each single concretum lacks separation, if the aggregated (Qilcreta fonn a series, at each step of which the items are continuously conjoined. i.e. if what we have described holds of each neighbouring pair of items. An individual item already lacks separation/rom all other items if rhere is a single item from which it does not stand forth in relief

§9 Continuation. Reference to the wider sphere of the phenomena of fusion These propositions are in a certain sense idealized expressions of facts. Continuity and discontinuity must of course not be taken in a mathematically exact sense. Points of discontinuity are not matbematical limits, and distances must not be 'too small'. One might draw a somewhat finer distinction between sharper and more confused separation or limitation, in the empirically vague sense in which, in ordinary life, one speaks of sbarp points and corners as opposed to blunt or even rounded ones, Plainly the essential fonns of all intuitive data are not in principle to be brought under 'exact' or 'ideal' notions, such as we have in mathematics, The spatial shape of the perceived tree as such, taken precisely as a 'moment" found in the relevant percept's intentional object, is no geometric shape, no ideal or exact shape in the sense of exact geometry. Just so a seen colour as such is no ideal colour, whose Spe<:ies occupies an ideal point in the colour-pyramid. The essences wbich direct ideation elicits from intuitive data are 'inexact essences', they may not be confused with tbe 'exact' essences which are Ideas in the Kantian sense, and which (like an 'ideal point', an ideal surface or solid, or ideal Spe<:ies of colour in the ideal colour-pyramid) arise through a peculiar 'idealization'. The descriptive concepts of all pure description, i,e. of description adapted to intuition immediately and with truth and so of all phenomenological description, differ in principle from those which dominate objective science. To clear up these matters is a phenomenological task never yet seriously undertaken and not carried out in relation to our present distinction. It is also clear that this separation through discontinuity (or this fusion through continuity) only covers a very restricted field. I recall Stumpf's instructive investigations into tbe remarkable facts of fusion,l' in whose sphere we are here plainly moving. The cases stressed by u.s Would playa peculiar role in the field of the phenomena of fusion. Con~Idering these cases more closely, we are led back from the cODcreta, the Independent lotal sensa, to their immediate, non-independent 'moments', or to the Species under which these immediately fall. Discontinuity relates as SUch to the lowest spe<:ific differences within one and the same immediately Superordinate pure Genus: to qualities or colour, e.g., as compared with qualities or colour. But we do not define discontinuity as the mere distance

16

On the theory of wholes and paru

of coexistent contents in respect of such lowest differences. Simultaneous tones have distance, but they lack discontinuity in the pregnant sense of the word. This only relates to specifically differing moments in so far as they are 'spread out' with common boundaries over a continuously varying spatial or temporal 'moment'. It is 'at' a spatial or temporal boundary that one visual quality, e.g., leaps over into another. In our continuous progress from spatial part to part there is at the same time no continuous progress in the covering quality: in one place at least the neighbouring qualities are finitely (and not too minutely) distant. The same holds of a discontinuity in phenom. enal order. Here not merely qualities, e.g., colours, achieve separation, but whole concreta set bounds to one another, the visual field is split up into parts. The colour..<Jistance in such a context of 'covering' - without which there can be no talk of discontinuity - also wins separation for the 'moments' bound up with it, the covered spatial parts of our example. These could otherwise not be free from the fusion. Spatiality necessarily varies continuously. A piece of such variation can only become separately noticeable and primarily emphatic in consciousness," when a discontinuity is provided by the covering 'moment', and the whole concretum which corresponds to it has thus been separated. The first meaning we give to 'spatiality', is here the sensational 'moment' which. when objectively referred, first yields phenomenal spatiality properly so called. But we can also mean by it the spatiality which a given intuitiOD helps us to apprehend in the phenomenal thing as such. spatiality therefore as the intentional moment in which the objective, and objectively measur. able. spatial shape of the physical 'thing itself is intuitively revealed to us, and is differently revealed in different intuitions. The concrete thing of sensuous intuition therefore owes its isolation to the qualitative gap between neighbouring 'moments'. but the relief achieved by the whole concretum has priority over the relief of the mutually separated moments of its content. This depends on the peculiarly intimate fusion of the different 'moments' of the concretum, their mutual 'penetration', which reveals itself in a mutual dependence as regard change and destruction. This fusion is not a fading into one another in the manner of the continuous, nor does it remove all separateness, but it is nonetheless a sort of peculiarly intimate mutual interconnection which must at a stroke set the whole complex of interpenetrating moments in relief, if only once a single discontinuous moment has provided the right conditions. A profounder and more penetrating analysis could here lay bare a wealth of interesting descriptive differences; for our purposes these fairly rough treatments are enough. We have gone far enough to see that, in thus distinguishing stressed from unstressed contents, as was done above, or to employ a few readily suggested expressions, in distinguishing between contents that can, and contents that cannot be presented 'by themselves', or that are independent and non-independent respectively. we are dealing with differences

The difference between independent ilnd non· independent objecu

17

----------'-------'-------'---f ·subjective'. intuitive materials. which have their own remarkable peculi-

~rilies of essence. but which will not help us to grasp the universal. ontological difference between abstract and concrete contents, or. as we deliberately called them above, independent and non-independent contents. Our former distinction between contents separately singled out and confused background contents. pivots on the facts of analysis and fusion; the contents thus separated off, might as well be independent as no~-independent. The two distinctions should not therefore be confused. as IS done. e.g.. when the non_independence of the separate parts of a uniformly coloured surface is put on it level with the descriptively quite different non-independence of an abstract ·moment·. It is also done when attempts are made to base the essence of the ontological difference between concrete and abstract on phenomenologicaJ facts which concern the sphere of acts. the fact, e.g., that the act which presents a concrete object is immediate, and is independent in not needing to be based on other presentations. whereas tbe act which apprehends an abstract content is mediate and non-independent, in that it must be based on the presentation of a suitable concretum. Our analyses show. however. that anything that holds water in this descriptive situation is mixed up with other quite alien matters, and is in any case unfitted to illuminate our ontological distinction.

§IO The multiplicity of laws governing the various sorts of non·independent contents Our discussions SO far have shown that there is always an a priori law governing what is non-independent, having its conceptual roots in what is universal in the whole and part in question. But this law can be interpreted and expressed with more or less definiteness. To pin down the concept of non-independence. it is enough to say that a non-independent object can only be what it is (i.e. what it is in virtue of its essential properties) in a more comprehensive whole. At times. however. a non-independent object can vary in Species: this entails varying the kind of supplementation it requires for existence. If we say. for example. that the 'moment' of sensory quality. e.g. of sensory colour. is non-independent. and requires a whole in which it may be embodied. we have only laid down olle side of our governing law, the side of a part which belongs to the Genus Sensory Quality. We have not. however. laid down the chamcter of the whole. the manner in which such a :quality' is its part. nor the sort of supplemcnt it needs to achieve existence. It IS different when we say that a scnsory quality can only exist in a sense-field, an.d a sensory colour in a visual scnse-field. or thai it can only exist as quali. fYlng an extension. Here the law lays down the other sides as well; the notion of a visual sense-field is given: and it mellllS a particular. definite sort of whole among various possible sorts ofwholc. Just so, the notion of'qualifying an extension' points to quite specific possibilities of law-governed inherence

18

On the theory of wholes and parts

that a non-independent 'moment" may have to a whole. The specific character of this inherence is fixed in general fashion both by the essence of Sensory Quality and the essence of Extension, but each is contained in its own maoner in the essentjal unity of visual sensation. or of the visual field in whicb. all such unities find their place. This manner cannot be further described. If we ask what differentiates the generic feature of being a sensory 'moment. so as to yield the specific feature of being a sensory qllaliry, we can gi.... no answer that helps us: we can point to no additional feature in which tbo concept of quality is not included. Just so. if we are asked what must be added to Colour to produce its Species Redness we can only aOS\\"er 'Redness'. The notion of what is non-independent. with its indirectly. generally char_ acterized definitory lawfulness. points to many factually determined, variable laws of essence. It is not a peculiarity of certain sorts of parts that the, should only be parts in general. while it remains quite indifferent what theJ' are conglomerated with. and into what sorts of connection they are fitted. There are fixed. necessary connections, pure laws definite in content, w . vary with the pure Species of non-independent contents. and accordingly; prescribe one sort of completion to one of them. another sort of complcti to another. The Species associated in these laws. which mark off the sphe of contingent individuality presupposed by these laws - arc occasionaU, but not always. lowest specific differences. A law, for instance, may p scribe to contents of the Species Colour a conncction with contents of Species Extension. but it does not prescribe a definite extension to a defini colour. or vice versa. The values of the lowest differences are accordingly functionally interrelated. The law only refers to lowest Species, i.e. S having the multiplicity of ultimate specific differences inunediarely ben them. On the other hand. if we consider the dependence of qualitative rem ness on the qualities on which it rests, we find it unambiguously determi by the lowest specific differences of these qualities. and so again dete . as a lowest difference. The concept of non-independence accordingly amounts to that of idcll lawfulness in unified combinations. If a part stands in an ideally law-bouod and not merely factual combination. it must lack independence: since such. law-bound combination merely means that a part whose pure essence if of one sort. can exist lawfully only in association with certain other parts of these or those suitable sorts. And even where a law tells us of the impossibility. rather than the necessity of lin associarion. where it says. e.g.. that the existence of a part A excludes the existence of a part B as incompatible with A. our case still reduces to one of non-independence. For an A can only exclude a B. if both exclusively require Ihe same thing. A colour excludes anolher colour. but only if both aim to cover an identical piece of surface, and both cannot do so completely. To each essential. law-bound exclusion of a determinate characteri7..ation. there corresponds a positive law-bound requirement of a corresponding characleri7..ation and vice versa.

The difference between independent and non· Independent objecu

~------------'---------'-----'------

19

§ II The difference between these 'material' laws and 'forma" or 'analytic' laws The necessities or laws which serve to define given types of non-independent ontenlS rest, as we often have emphasized. on the specific essence of the ~ontents. on their peculiar nature. More precisely, they rest on the pure Gener'd. Species. differentiae under which, as contingent singulars. nonindependent contents as well as their supplementing contents, fall. If we conceive of the totality of such ideal objccts. we have with them the totality of pure essences. the essences of all ideally possible individual objects (existences). To these essences correspond the concepts or propositions which have content. which we sharply distinguish from purely formal concepts and propositions. which lack all 'maUer' or ;content'. To the latter belong the categories of formal logic and the formal ontological categories mentioned in the last chapter of the Prolegomena, which are essentially related to these, as well as to all syntactical formations they engender. Concepts like Something, One, Object, Quality, Relation, Association, Plurality, Number, Order, Ordinal Number, Whole, Part, Magnitude etc., have a basically different character from concepts like House, Tree, Colour, Tone, Space, Sensation, Feeling etc., which for their part express genuine content. Whereas the former group themselves round the empty notion of Something or Object as such, and are associated with this through formal ontological axioms, the latter are disposed about various highest material Genera or Categories, in which material ontologies have their root. This cardinal division between the 'formal' and the 'material' spheres of Essence gives us the true distinction between the analyrically a priori and the synrhetically a priori disciplines (or laws and necessities). The next section will make systematic pronouncements on these matters. . It is now immediately plain. that all the laws or necessities governing dIfferent sorts of lion-independent items fall into the spheres of the synrheric a priori: one grasps completely what divides them from merely formal, Contentless items. Laws of the type of the law of causation, which lay down the non-independence of changes in what is thinglike and real, or the laws generally imperfectly formulated - which assert the non-independence of mere qualities. intensities. extensions, boundaries. relational forms etc. _ Would not be put on a level with a purely 'analytic' generalization such as'A Whole cannot exist without parts' or with analytic necessities such as 'There ~~no~ be.3 ~ing (muster, father~ without subjects .(servanls, children) etc.'. IlMy s.ly In general: correlatIves mutually entail one another they cannmbe thought of. or cannot be. without each other. If we set beside ' these a~y definile propositions of the opposite SOrl. e.g.. 'A colour cannot exist ~lIh~ut something coloured' or 'A colour cannot exist without some space at It covers' etc. _ the difference leaps into view. 'Colour' is not a relative expression. whose meaning includes the idea of a relation to something else.

20 On the theory of wholes and paru

Though colour is 'unthinkable' without something coloured. the existence of the latter, and more definitely that of a space, is not 'analytically' founded on the notion of colour. The following discussion clears up the essence of the difference. A part as such cannot exist at all without a whole whose part it is. On the other hand we say, with an eye to independent parts: A part often can exist without a whole whose part it is. Obviously this involves no contradictioll. What we mean is that. if the part is treated in respect of its imernal conteNt. its own essence. then a thing having this same content can exist without. whole in which it exists: it can exist by itself, not associated with anythiq, else, and will not then be a part. Change in. or complete elimination associations, does not here affect the part's own. peculiarly qualified CODo tent. and does not eliminate its existence: only its relations fall away, fact that it is a part. The contrary holds of other sorts of parts: without association. as non-parts. they are unthinkable, in virtue of their "ery t~m. These impossibilities or possibilities are rooted in the essential spco""fici,, of the contents. The case is quite different in regard to the analytic trivi that a part as such cannot exist without a whole whose part it is. It would a 'contradiction'. i.e. a 'fonnal', 'analytical' absurdity. to call X a part w there was no whole belonging to X. Here the inner content of the part • irrelevant. the underlying 'formal' lawfulness of our case has nothing in mon with the material lawfulness of our above cases. and can acx:ordin not disturb them. That correlatives as such mutually condition one another certainly po' to certain mutually requiring 'moments', it points to the mutually 'bel ing' relationships and relative properties which we find in the case of relation. But it does so only with fonnal indefiniteness. The legality w here obtains is one and the same for all relations as such: it is in fact merely fonnallegality. rooted in mere analytic essences. here in fact in till essence of relation as a fonnal category. It takes over none of the materill specificity of relations and of their members, and discourses merely of'~ tain' relations and members. It will perhaps say in the simple case of dyadic relations: If a certain A stands in a certain relation to a certain B. this same B stands in a certain corresponding (converse) relation to that A; A and B are here quile freely I'ariable.

§ 12 Basic determinations in regard to analytic and synthetic propositions We may give the following general definitions: Analytic Laws are unconditionally universal propositions. which are accordingly free from all explicit or implicit assertions of individual exist· ence: they include none but fonnal concepts. and if we go back to such as are primitive. they comain only formal categories. Analytic Laws stand

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sed

The difference between independent and non.independent objects 10

21

their specifications. which arise when we introduce concepts

o~fcol1tent. and thoughts perhaps positing individual existence, e.g. this. 1

the

er The specification of laws always yields necessary connections: speci~:~:iO~s of analytic la~s therefo.~ yie,ld an.alytically necess~ry connections. What are called 'analytlc propoSitions are In general analytIcally necessary nnections. When they imply existential assertions (e.g. If this house is red, en redness pertains to lhis hOllse) such analytic necessity relates to that t ontent of the proposition in virtue of which it empirically specifies the :nalytiC law. not to its empirical assertion of existence. We may define analytically necessary propositions as propositions whose truth is completely independent of the peculiar content of their objects (whether thought of with definite or indefinite universality) and of any possible existential assertions. They are propositions which permit of a complete 'formali=ation' and can be regarded as special cases or empirical applications of the formal. analytic laws whose validity appears in such formalization. In an analytic proposition it must be possible. without altering the proposition's logical form, to replace all material which has content, with an empty formal Something, and to eliminate every assertion of existence by giving aU one's judgements the fonn of universal. unconditional laws. It is, e.g., an analytic proposition that the existence of this house includes that of its roof. its walis and its other parts. For the analytic formula holds that the existence of a whole W (A. B. C ... ) generally includes that of its parts A. B. C ... This law contains no meaning which gives expression to a material Genus or Species. The assertion of individual existence, implied by the this of our illustration, is seen to fall away by our passage into the pure law. This is an analytic law: it is built up exclusively out of formal-logical categories and categorial forms. Having formed the concept of an analytic law and of an analytic neces· sily, we also have eo ipso fonned the concept of a synthetic a priori law. and of a synthetic a priori necessity. Each pure law, which includes material concepts, so as not to permit of a formalization of these concepts sab'a I'erilate - each such law. i.e.• that is not analytically necessary - is a synthetic Q priori law. Specifications of such laws are synthetic necessities: empirical specifications of course are so also. e.g. This red is different from this green. . What we have said should be enough to make plain the essential distinc· tlOn between laws grounded in the spedfic nature of the contents to which ~on-independent factors belong. and analytic and formal laws, which, being tunded purely on formal 'categories', are unaffected by all 'material of nowlcdge· . . Note I The poims here made may be compared with those of Kant. which In ~ur view do not deserve to be called ·c1assical'. It seems to us that these ~lnts satisfactorily dispose of one of the most important problems in the ~ory of knOWledge, and make a first. decisive step in the division of a Prior; Ontologies. Future publications will carry the enquiry further. II;t.

c:

22

On the theory of wholes and parts

Note 2 It is readily seen that the main concepts dealt with by us in section: Whole and Part. Independence and Non·imJependence. Necessity Lilli', are essentially changed in sense when they are not understood in sense of purely conceptl/al matters of essence, but are given an empiri interpretation. For the purpose of the investigations which follow, it is n however, necessary fully to discuss these empirical concepts and their tion to the pure ones.

§ 13 Relative independence and non-independence Independence we have so far conceived absolutely, as a lack of depend on all associated contents: non-independence was its contradictory op ite, a corresponding dependence on at least one such content. It is, how important to treat both concepts relatively also, in such a way, that is, the absolute distinction then becomes a limiting case of the relative. In sphere of mere sense-data (not that of the things represented or apparent such sense-data) the 'moment' of visual extent,16 with all its parts, counts non-independent, but within this extent concehwJ in abstracto each of· pieces counts as reIOli\'ely independent while each of its 'moments', e.g. 'moment' of'fonn' as opposed to that of position and magnitude, counts relatirely non·independent. Here we therefore have a relative sort of'i pendence', which taken absolutely, or in some other relation, could been a case of non-independence, it is an independence, relatively to a wb whose total range of parts, together with the whole itself, constitutes sphere within which the distinctions previously drawn unrestrictedly n must moveY We can therefore define as follows: Non-independence in and relative to the whole Wor to the total of contents determined by W, characterizes each of W's partial con which can only exist as parts. and as parts of a sort of whole represented this range. Every partial content regarding which this is not true, is independent in. and relathe to. the whole W. We also speak briefly of independenT or dependent parts of the Whole, and in a corresponding of non-independent and independent parts of parr.~ (i.e. of parHl'JlOles) of whole. Our determinations can plainly be further generalized. One can interp our definition so that it does not merely relate a partial content to a m comprehensive whole, but, quite generally. a contell1 to another content, e if both are separated off. We define accordingly: . A co/ltent A is relatil'ely non-independent in regard to a coment B (o~ regard to the total range of contents determined by B and all its parts), If pure law. rooted in the peculiar character of the kinds of content in quo tion. ensures that a content of the pure Genus A has an a priori incapaCl to exist except in. or as associated with. other contents from the total ran of the pure Genera of <;ontents detennined by B.

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The difference between independent and non-independent objects

23

If such a law is absent, we say that A is relatil'ely independent in regard to B. More simply we can say: A content A is non-independent relatively to content B. if there is a law rooted in the Generic Essences A, B. which ~ays down a pr~ori that a content of the pure Genus A can only exist in r associated with a content of the Genus B. We naturally leave open the o ssibility that the Genera A and B should be Genera of combinations, so ~1t in the elements of such combinations several corresponding Genera should be woven together. Our definition entails that an A as such, taken in unconditional universality, requires to be accompanied by, and unified with some B or other: otherwise put. the pure Genus requires, in respect of the possible existence of individuals falling under it, the Genus B, or to be joined with connected instances from B's range. Briefly we may say that the being of an A is relatively independent or non·independent in regard to the Genus B. The necessary coexistence mentioned in our definition is either a coexistence relating to any point in time, or a coexistence for a certain stretch of time. In the latter case B is a temporal whole, and temporal determinations then play their part (as temporal relations or stretches) in the range of contents determined by B. A content K, e.g., which includes the timedetermination to, may thus require the existence of another content with the time-determination t 1 = to + t::., and accordingly be non-independent. In the sphere of the phenomenological events of the 'stream of consciousness', a law of essence paradigmatically illustrates the non-independence just mentioned, the law, namely, that each actual, fulfilled now-consciousness necessarily and continuously passes over into one that has just existed, so that our present conscious state makes continuous demands on our conscious future. The law further requires that our retentive awareness of what has just been, which itself has the immanent character of being actually present, demands that the phenomenon we are aware of as having just existed should in fact just have existed. The time we are talking of in this context is of COurse the immanent temporality which belongs to the phenomenological stream of consciousness itself. In the sense of our defmition, to take somewhat differently slanted ex~mples. each bit of our visual field, each concretely filled section of it, is mdepcndent within. and relatively to, the concrete totality of a visual intuition of a moment, whereas each colour of such a portion. the colour-pattern of the ~~ole etc., is non-independent: An.d. again in,. and relativ~ly ~o, the whole of momentary sensuous totalmtUltlon. the Visual field With Its contents. the ~aclual field with its contents elc.. are independent, whereas the qualities, Orms CIC .• whether attaching to whole fields, or their individual members, are n . on-Illdependcnt. We observe at the same lime that all that counted as no.n.independent or independent in relation to the whole of our previous 'Ix~mplc will count as such in relation to our present standard of reference. t I" S In fact generally true that:

204

On the theory of wholes and parts

Whatever is independent or non-independent in relation to a B, also rna· tains this property in relation to every whole B' in relation to which B . independent or non-independent - a proposition, whose converse is of co invalid. Although therefore, relations (and with them relative conceptiOIll) vary as boundaries are differently drawn, nonetheless our law entails. certain relation for the groups of contents in the context referred to. Sucb. a relation obtains, e.g., when we compare a coexistent group belonging to each point of time with successive groups which include such coexis groups, or perhaps even with the inclusive group of unending, fully occu . phenomenological time. What counts as an independent element in the lat group is what is the more comprehensive element, and so not everyth· that counts as independent in the order of coexistence must for that re count as independent in the order of succession. The converse holds, ho An independent thing in the order of coexistence, e.g. a bounded portion the visual sense-field in its concrete fulness, is non-independent relati to the whole of occupied time, to the extent that its time-determinath)Q treated as a mere instant. Following on what we have said, an instant time is as such non-independent: it can be concretely occupied only as of the concrete occupation of a time-stretch or duration. If we replace instant by a duration. in which our concrete content is thought of as maining quite constant, tben such an enduring coexistence could count independent even in this wider sphere.

Chapter 2

---Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

§14 The concept of foundation and some relevant theorems The law stated and applied in the last paragraph of the previous section is not an empirical proposition, and yet not an immediate law of essence. Like many similar laws, it permits of a priori proof. Nothing can show up the worth of a strict statement more clearly than the possibility of giving a deductive proof of such propositions as are familiar to us in another guise. In view of the great scientific interest that the constitution of a deductiYe theoretical transformation claims in every field, we wish to linger here a liule. Definitions. If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with an M, we say that an A as such requiresjoundation by an M or also that an A as such needs 10 be supplemented by an M. If accordingly A o, M o are determinate instances of the pure kinds A or M, actualized in a single whole, and standing in the relations mentioned, we say that A o is Jounded upon Mo, and that it is exclusil·ely founded on M o, if Ao's need for supplementation is satisfied by Ala a.lone. This terminology can of course be carried over to the Species, by a qUIte hllnnless equivocation. We say further, more indefinitely, that the two ~ontents or two pure Species, stand in aJoundational relationship or in a relatIonship of necessary cOl/nection. This indeed leaves it open which of the ~~o POssible but not mutually exclusive relationships is meant. The indefmile expression: A o requires supplementation by. is Jounded upon a certain . moment ,p I· aID Iy means t he same as the expreSSion: 'A o is non·independent'.

ro~OSilion I If an ,PIUI'11Ig A b un

Ihis pro

. Ilt

I/O/

A as sllch requires to be jounded on an M. e~'ery whole an AI. as a part, requires a similar Joundation.

.. . . POSition IS aXIOmatically self-evident. If an A cannot be except when ~ornpleted by M. a whole including an A but no M cannot satisfy A's need Or supplementation and must itself share it.

26

On the theory of wholes and parts

As a corollary we can assert the following. making use of the definition our previous section. Proposition Z A whole which includes a non-independent 'moment'. wit including, as its part, the supplement which that 'moment' demands. is Jikew' non-independent, and is so relatil'ely to nery superordinate independent w in "'hieh Ihat non-independent 'momenl' is contained. Proposilion 3 If IV is an independent part of (and SOl also relatil"ely 10) Ihen el'ery independent part II' of IV also is an independent part of F.

If IV needed a supplement M relatively to F. and so had a foundation in the range of F, this foundation would necessarily be included in W. F if this were not so, IV would require supplementation in respect of AI • conformity with Prop. I, and since Mo is a part of F, it would, on Prop. be non-independent relatively to F, which contradicts the assumption'. in accordance with this assumption, II' is an independent part of IV, and also independent relatively to IV: there can therefore be nothing in the r of W which could serve as a foundation for 11'. and so also nothing in whole range of F. The proposition before us can also, with suitable changes in symbo . tion, be expressed as follows: If A is an independent part of B, and B an independent pari of C. A is an independent part of C or more briefly: An independent pan of an . pendent pan is an independent pan of a whole. Proposition 4 If C is a non-independent part of a whole IV, it is also a independent part of entry other whole of which IV is aport.

C is non-independent relatively to IV, i.e. it possesses a foundation in Ala belonging to the range of W. This Alo must naturally also appear in range of every whole superordinate to IV. i.e. every whole which includes as a part. C must therefore also be non-independent relatively to each s whole. (On the other hand, we add, C may very well be independent re.... tively to a subordinate whole: we need only so draw its boundaries tblt the required supplement M is excluded therefrom. A 'piece' of an extended phenomenon in abstracto. but taken as a ·moment'. is independent relativelY to such extension; this. however, itself lacks independence relatively to tbe concrete wholes of the occupied extension.) Our proposition permits an expression analogous to the previous one, i.e. if A is a non-independent part of B, and B a non-independent part of C. then A too is a non-independent pan of C. A non-independent part of a non-independent part is a non-independen& part of a whole.

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Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and paru

27

p oposirioll 5 A relatil'ely non-independent object also is absolulely nonin:kPl'lUkflf. whereas a relatil'ely independent objeci may be non-independent . ,n obsohlfl' sense.

m'

For a proof see the previous section. Proposilion 6 If A and B are independent porlS ofsome whole W. they are also indept'lldeni relolh'ely 10 one anolher. For if A required supplementation by 8. or all)' port of B. there would be, in the range of parts delermined by JV, ("trrain pllrts (,hose of B) in \I'hich A would be founded A would therefore not be independent relath'ely 10 ilS whole W.

§ IS Transition to the treatment of the more important part-relations We shall now deal with some of the most remarkable differences among the a priori relationships holding between Whole and Part. and among the Parts

of one and the same whole. The generality of these relationships leaves plenty of room for the most manifold differences. Not every part is included in its whole in the same fashion. and not every part is woven together with every other. in the unity of a whole, in the same way. In comparing the relations among the parts of different wholes, or even among the parts of one and the same whole. we come upon striking differences, on which our common talk of different sorts of wholes and parts is founded. A hand, e.g., forms pan of a person in quite a different way from the colour of his hand, from his body's total extent, from his mental acts. and from the internal 'moments' of such phenomena. The parts of the extension are otherwise united with each other than they each are united with their colours etc. We ~haJl see at once that all these differences belong to the sphere of our present Investigations.

~ 16 Reciprocal and one-sided, mediate and Immediate foundation

If we consider any pair of parts of a whole. the following possibilities obtain:

~. There is a relation of founded ness between both parts. •. There is no such relation. In case I the foundedness can be: (aj reciprocal (b) one-sided. according as the law in question is convertible or not. Colour and extension accordingly are mutually founded in a unified intuition. 2 since ~o Colour is thinkable without a certain extension. and no extension without ctrt.ai n colour. The character of being a judgement is. on the other hand, one-Sidedly founded on underlying presentations. since these latter need not

28

On the theory of wholes and paru

function as foundations of judgements. Brentano's distinctions of parts mut ally isolable, and parts having one·sided isolability. agrees in extensi though not in definition. with the notion before us. Brentano's additio talk of 'mutual isolability' rules out every sort of foundational relation. There is some interest in asking how matters here stand in regard to relative independence or non-independence of the parts, relatively, of courae, to the whole in which they are considered, Ir there is a reciprocal relati of foundedness among two parts. their relative lack of independence is questionable. as is the case. e.g.• in the unity of Quality and Place. The differs when the relation is one·sided: in that case the foundational (thou naturally not the founded) content can be independent. Thus in every ex sion the shape of a portion is founded on the portion in question: some . non-independent relatively to the whole extension is accordingly founded something which is independent in relation to this whole, The foundation of one part in another can further be: (o) an immediate foundation or (b) a mediate foundation, according as the two parts are immediately mediately associated. This relationship, like the previous one, is natu not bound to the individually present 'moments', but concerns the essen' being of the foundational relationship. If Ao is immediately founded on but mediately on Co (in so far as So is immediately founded on CO>, it h universally and purely in virtue of essence that an A is in general i ately founded on a B, and mediately upon a C. This results from the fI that if an A and a B are associated at all, they are so immediately, and a that, if an A and a C are associated, they are only mediately associated. order of mediacy and iltutlediacy is based by Iowan Ihe pure Genera inrol The generic 'moment' of Colour, for instance. and in quite different fasm the 'moment' of Brightness. can only be realized in and with a 'moment' lowest difference such as Red, Blue etc" and the latter again only in com . tion with a certain definite extension, These associations and foundatio which are always immediate. condition the mediate associations and foun tions between the 'moment' of Colour or Brightness and that of Determi Extension. Plainly the laws of combination which concern such media foundations. are analytic. indeed syllogistic consequences of those wbidl pertain to the immediate foundations.

§ 17 Exact determination of the concepts of piece (portion), moment, physical part, abstractum, concretum We may now also reduce a further series of familiar. fundamental concepts to the above defined concepts. and so give them an exact definition. Some of these terms may. we note in advance. be open to objection; the conceptS correlated with them in what follows are nonetheless very valuable.

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and pilll'U

......-

29

We first perform a fundamental division of the concept Part into Pieces, PartS in the narrowest sense. and into Moments or Abstract Parts of the o:'hole. Earh pllrt that is indepel1dent relaril'ely to a lI'hole W we ca// a Piece ; portion), (-lIrh part that is non-independent relatil'ely to W we call a Moment ((III abstrart part) of t~'is same whole W. It ~akes n? differen~ here wheth~r he whole itself. conSIdered absolutely, or lD relatIon to a higher whole, IS :ndependent or ".ot. Abstract parts can in their 111m accordi,,?ly hal'e pieces, "d ph-n-s ill ,Iwtr 111m abstrart parts. We speak of the portions of a dura~on, although this is something abstract. just as we speak of the portions of an extension. The forms of these portions are their immanent, abstract parts. Pieces that have no piece identically in common are called exclusive (disjoined) pieces. The division of a whole into a plurality of mutually exclusive pieces we call a piecing or fragmentation (Zerstuckung) of tbe same. Two such pieces may still have a common identical 'moment': their common boundary. e,g.. is an identical 'moment' of the adjoining pieces of a divided continuum. Pieces are said to be isolated when they are disjoined in the strict sense, when they therefore also have no idelllical 'moments'. Since an abstract pan also is abstract in relation to each more compre· hensive whole and, in general, to any range of objects embracing this whole,) what is abstract, relatively considered. is eo ipso abstract when considered absolutely. The latter can be defined as the limiting case of relative treat· ment. where the relation is determined by the total range of objects in general. We therefore needed no preliminary definition of the abstract or non-independent in the absolute sense, An abstractum simpliciter is there· fore an object. in relation to which there is some whole of which it is a non· independent pan. When a whole permits the sort of 'piecing' in which the pieces essentially belong to the slime lowest Genus as is determined by the undivided whole. we speak of it as an extended whole. and of its pieces as extel1ded parts, Here belongs, e.g.. the division of an extent into extents. in particular of a spatial stretch into spatial stretches. of a temporal stretch into temporal stretches etc. We may here funher add the following definition: An object in relation to its abstract 'moments' is called a 'relative CODCrelUOl', and in relation to its proximate ·moments·. their 'proximate concretum', (~e difference here presupposed between remoter and nearer 'moments' ~111 ~ more precisely pinned down in the following sections,) A concretum ~.lIt Itself is abstTilct in /10 direction can be called an 'absolute concretum'. IOCC the proposition holds that each absolutely independent content POS~ses abstract parts. each such content can also be looked on and spoken o ~s an absolute concrelUm, The two notions are thus of equal extent. For a Similar reason one can also speak of a piece as a concrete part, whose :ncreteness is either to be understood as absolute or relative. according as . e WhOle itself only has abstract parts. or is itself abstract. Where the word COncrelum' is used simply. an absolute concretum is usually intended.

]0

--

On the theory of wholes and parts

§ 18 The diffel"ence between the mediate and immediate parts of a whole The distinction between pieces and abstract parts is intimately connected with the distinction between medime and immediate parts, or, more clearly, the distinction between proximate and remote parts. For talk of immediacy and mediacy can be understood in tll'O ways. We shall first discuss the most natural sense of such talk. If P(W) is a part of the whole W, then a part of this part, e.g. P (P(W». is again a part of the whole, but a mediate part. P( W) may then be called .. relarb'ely immediate part of the whole. The distinction is a relative one, sinoe P( W) may itself again be a mediate part, in relation to another part of whole in which it is contained as a part. The relative distinction is tra formed into an absolute one, if we understand by absolutely medi(l(e par such parts as themselves enter into other parts in the whole, whereas ab lurely immelliale parts will be such as may enter as parts into any part of tbll same whole. Every geometrical part of an extension is in this absolute sena mediate, for there are always other geometric parts that include it. It . harder to adduce suitable examples of absolutely immediate parts. Per the following might do: if we emphasize in a visual intuition the uni combination formed by all such internal 'moments' as remain identi despite all change of place, we have a part of the whole that can have superordinate part above it. The same would hold of the totality of t mere extension in regard to the geometric bodies congruent with them in except position. If we limit our distinction to parts of one and. the same then the 'moment' of total coloration is an absolutely immed13te part, SI there is no like moment of the whole, of which such coloration could reckoned a part. As opposed to this, the coloration of a piece of the wh.oIt can be treated as mediate, in so far as it contributes to the total coloraUOIl of the whole. The same holds, in relation to the Species Extension, of the total extension of an extended thing: this is an absolutely immediate part cA that thing, whereas a portion of that extension is an absolutely mediate part of that thing.

s.o

§ 19 A novel sense of this distinction: neal"er and more I"emote pal"ts of the whole

Our talk of immediate and mediate parts acquires quite a different content if we attend to certain remarkable differences that force themselves on us 4 when we compare the relations between wholes and mediate parts. If we think of an extensive whole as 'pieced IOgether'. its pieces in their turo permit of further ·piecings'. the pieces of the pieces in their turn etc. Here the parts of the parts are parts of the whole in exactly the same sense as the · ,., original parts were. We do not merely observe t h IS I eness .m respec l of

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

]I

t of partial relation which condition talk of ' the same sort of parts' in the Sor . . flh e d to the whole - the pieces of the pIeces are .m th· elr turn pieces 0 ",g',r l _ but we also observe a likeness of such relations between the whole who ·e mediate parts. on the one han d ,and .ItS re ,atlve . ,y.Immed·la le parIs, d Its an . , d' . . . ' I other There are diverse posslb e IVISlons m wh·IC h the same par I ~tle '. . . sometimes ' earher sometimes later, so that we have no tempta. comes. "p. . l accord any privilege to one part over another as regards the way m lion 0 . . .. h h' h it is contained in the whole. The descendmg order of diVISions ere W "sponds to no fixed, factually determined gradation in the relation of ~ . an d·Immed·late tS to wholes. This does not mean that talk about mediate parts is entirely arbitrary. and without objective foundation. The physical dh.h. , par . whole genuinely has the parts first dealt With, an t ese m t elr turn no .ess inely have the parts distinguished in them, which are therefore mediate gen U . fh ., arts in relation to the whole. and the same IS true of each stage 0 t e sefla ~ivision. But in themselves the remotest of these parts are no. furt~er from the whole than the nearest. The parts in any case also owe their senal order to the serial order of our divisions, and these latter have no objective foundation. In an extended whole there is no division which is intrinsically primary, and no definitely delimited group of divisions forming the first grade in division: from a given division there is also no progress detennined by the thing's nature to a new division or grade in division. We could begin with each division without violating an intrinsic prerogative. Each mediate part ean, according to one's chosen mode of division, likewise count as an immediate part. eaeh immediate part as a mediate one. The case is quite different if we bring in other examples. An intuitively unified tone-sequence, e.g. a melody. is a whole, in which we find individual tones as parts. Each of these tones has further parts, a 'moment' of quality, of intensity etc., which as parts of parts are also parts of the melody. But it is clear in this case that the mediacy with which the qualitative 'moment' of the individual tone enters the whole. cannot be attributed to our subjective series of divisions or to any other subjective ground. It is no doubt certain that if the individual tone's moment of quality is to be singly noticed. the tone itself must be ·stressed·. To single out the mediate part presupposes the singling out of the immediate one. But this phenomenological relationship mUSt not be confused with the objective situation we are here concerned With. It is evident that the quality in itself only fonns part of the melody in so far as it forms part of the single tone: it belongs immediately to the latter. and only mediately to the total tone-pattern. This mediacy is not therefore bound up with some arbitrary. or some psychologically compulsive preference for a certain order of division which first makes us hit on the tone. and then on its 'moment" of quality: the tone in itself is a prior part in the whole ~elody. and its quality a later. mediate part. The same holds of the tone's Intensity: it would here seem even to take us a step further from the melodic Whole. being as it were no immediate 'moment' of the tone. but one more

32

00 the theory of wholes aod parts

directly of its quality, and so a secondary part in relation to this melody (no doubt a somewhat objectionable conception, which requires closer scru_ tiny). If we are right in holding that there is a part of the quality. e.g. the pitch C, of the tone in question. which represents its generic 'moment', what it has in common with all tones, then this 'moment' primarily inheres in tbe quality, secondarily in the tone, and at least tertiarily in the whole tone_ pattern etc. Just so the moment of colour or shape that inheres in an extended part of what is visually intuited as such, is primarily attached to this part, only secondarily to the intuited whole. It is even more mediately related to the whole voluminousness 6 of the pauerned extension, the mag_ nitude that it primarily possesses. (We can of course not talk of a genuine quantitative pinning down in the sphere of mere data of intuition as such.) After these discussions, the novel and important sense of the distinctioD between mediate and immediate parts should be clear. The difference is. however, not merely relative: in every whole there are parts which belo'!ll directly to the whole, and not first to one of its parts. It is definite for the single part whether it is mediate or not in our sense, and, if it is mediate. whether it is so primarily, secondarily or more remotely. To make a terminological distinction one could here speak of nearer and remoter parts, or to fix things more exactly of primary, secondary . .. parts of a whole; the terms mediate and immediate pari we retain in the more general sense applicable to any parts. Secondary parts are primary parts of primary parts, tertiary parts. primary parts of secondary parts etc. The notions comprised in this series are obviously mutually exclusive. Primary parts may be, and in general also will be, absolutely mediate. But there are also primary parts that are absolutely immediate, i.e. that are not included as parts in any pan of their whole. Each portion of an extension is primarily contained in it, although it can always be regarded as a mediate part of the same extension. Objectively there are always parts whose part il is. As against this, the form of an extension is not included as a part in any of that extension's parts.

§20 Nearer and remoter parts relatively to one another We spoke above of mediate and immediate, of nearer and remoter parts, in relation to the whole to which they belong. But even when we are dealing with parts in relation 10 one allother we usually employ these terms, though in quite a different sense: we talk of an immediate or mediate connection of the terms and, in the latter case. draw further distinctions. Some parts, we say. are closer to one another. other parts further. Here the following relations are relevant. It often happens Ihat a mode of association peculiarly unites two parts A. B into a partial unity which excludes other parts. but in which. further. B and not A is associatcd in just this manner with e. In this

-

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes aod pam

33

,'tuatiOn A is also associated with C, in virtue, that is, of a complex form of AB and Be. !he latter associlions we then call1mmedlate, while we say that the association of A and C, ~chie\'cd in the form ABC, is mediate. If there are further peculiar associ:tions CD. DE etc.. we shall say that A is associated with their final terms D. E . .. with progressively increased mediacy, D is a remoter part than C, E still more remotc than D etc. We have obviously only characterized a simple special cas:e. Each symbol A, B. C.: . could have s~mm~ up a complex partial umty. a whole group of umfied members; ItI thiS case also the concatenations tying the partial unities together into wholes, would make the members of the different groups appear in relations of nearer or remoter connection. As to whether other associations, and in particular other direct associations. subsist among the mediately associated members - and associations perhaps of the same kind as those among the immediately associated members - we have so far said nothing. We are considering the members exclusively in respect of the forms of the complex relationships determined by their elementary associations. Naturally the treatment of these forms will be of particular significance in that special class of cases, so frequently dealt with in theory and practice, whose peculiarity can readily be shown up in the relations of points in a straight line. If we select any series of points from a straight line, we observe that the immediate associations of the mediately associated members belong, with the associations of immediately neighbouring points. to one and the same lowest Genus of associations: they are further only different in respect of their lowest specific difference, whereas this difference itself is unambiguously determined by the differences of the varied mediating associations. This holds of time-sequences, of spatial configurations. in short of every case where associations can be characterized by directed stretches of one and the same Genus. In every case, to put it briefly, stretches are a(/dible. But in our quite formal treatment we can pass all such matters by. T~e essence of the matter can be conceptually laid out in the following fashion. Two associations fonn a concatenation, when they have some but not all members in common (i.e. do not coincide as when, e.g., the same mem~rs are united by several associations). Each concatenation is on this ~howltlg a complex association. Associations now divide into those which ~nclude concatenations and those which do not: associations of the former are combinations of associations of the latter sort The members of an a~sOCiation that is free from concatenations are said be immediatelyassoCI(jfe(J or p . . c ' . roxlmate. I n every concatenation. and thereforc .ltI every whole °h~t;llnlng concatenations. there must be immediately associated members, ~lllCh belong 10 associations of parts which.includc no further concatenations. other members of such a whole are said to be meclimely as.wciated with one another. The member common to a simple concatenation A Be (simple

~lnilY constitutcd ~y the ~wo ass?Ciations

;0

Jo4

On the theory of wholes and parts

because it contains no concatenation as a part) is, in the sense of our ru(.. ings, immediately associated with its neighbours, while these are mediately associated with one another etc. Talk of nearer and remoter parts a1w8)'1 relates to concatenations. The concepts next neighbour (=immediately associated member), next-neighbour of a next-neighbour etc., yield, by an easiIJ determined formal completion, the requisite gradations of 'distance', and. are then no different from ordinal numbers: first, second etc. The completioa naturally tries to make these concepts unambiguous by fixing a 'direction progress', e.g. by bringing in the asymmetry of a class of relations, in COQo. sequence of which we form conceptual structures like 'right next-neighbour of A' (first man right of A), 'right next-neighbour of right next-neighbour of A' ('second man right of A") etc. The essential purposes of the p investigaLion do not require us to go more deeply into this not intrinsi trivial point.

§21 Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions of whole and part, and of their essential species, by means of the notion of foundation Our interest in the foregoing treatments was directed to the most g relations of essence between wholes and parts, or between parts among another (i.e. of contents that combine into a whole). In our definitions descriptions on these matters the notion of Whole was presupposed. It ' however possible to dispense with this notion in a/l cases: for it can be sub-stituted the simple coexistence of the contents that were denominated pa.rtI. One could, e.g., define as follows: A cOn/em of the species A is founded upon a comen/ of Ihe species B, if. A can by its essence (i.e. legally, in virtue of its specific nature) not exile. unless a B also exists: this leaves open whether the coexistence of a C, a D etc. is needed or not. One can proceed similarly with the other definitions. If all is taken mOl generally, one could then give the following noteworthy definition of the pregnam concept of Whole by way of the notion of Foumlation: Bya Whole we understand a range of contents which arc all covered by a single foundarion without the help of further contents. The contents of such a range we call its parts. Talk of the singleness of the fowularioll implies thai el'ery coment is fOlllulatioflally conl/ecled, whelher directly or indirectly, lI'it" elwy comem. This can happen in that all these contents are immediately or mediately founded on cach other without external assistance, or in that all together serve to found a new content, again without externill assistance. In the latter case the possibility remains open that this unitary content is built up out of partial contents, which in their turn are founded on partial groups from the presupposed range of contents, just as the Whole content is founded on its total range. Intermediate cases are finally also possible. where the

-----

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and paru

35

. ,of foundlllion is so formed, e.g.. that A founds a new content together

U~I~ B B onc together with C, C one together with D etc. In such cases the

\\'11

alion of new unities is in short concatenated.

fO~ne :;ccs at once how such differences determine essential dil'isions of the

lI'hole. In the ~ases ~rst referred t~, ~he 'parts' (defined as members of the

nge in question) 'lnterpenetrated • In the other cases they were 'mutually r'\ernar. but. whether taken all together, or concatenated in pairs. they ~bodied real forms of association. Where one speaks of connections, asso'alions CIC. in the narrower sense, one means wholes of the second sort, i.e. ~holes where contents relatively independent as regards one another - where the whole falls apart into its pieces - serve to found new contents as their 'combinatory forms-. Talk of wholes and parts tends in general to be oriented exclusively to such cases. The same whole can be interpenetrative in relation to certain parts, and combinatory in relation to others: the sensuous. phenomenal thing, the intuiLi\'ely given spatial shape clothed with sensuous quality, is (just as it appears) interpenetrative in respect of reciprocally founded 'momenlS' such as colour and extension, and combinatory in respect of its -pieces'.

§22 Forms of sensuous unity and wholes Before we go further, it is well to indicate expressly that, in harmony wilh OUT definition, there need not be a peculiar form for e)'ery \I'hole, in Ihe sense of a specific 'momem' of unily II'hich binds all/he parts. If unity arises, e.g., by concatenation. so that each pair of next members founds a new content, the demands of our definition are satisfied, without the presence of a peculiar moment (i.e. one of unity) founded on all parts together. That such a moment must always be presumed can scarcely be maintained a priori. On our concept of a whole, it is not even requisite that the parts should be associated in groups or pairs by peculiar 'moments' of unity. Only if the whole is an extended whole. and in general one that can be broken down into 'pieces', are such moments obvious and indispensable a priori. It might. however. seem odd that we make do with this definition, and ~an even dare to think thatllllll"holes, with the sole exception of these which r~ak up into 'pieccs, lack binding forms of unity. It is odd to hold that the ;:I1 Y. c.g.. of e.. . tension and colour. of tone-quality and tone-intensity, or htwecn the scnsational stuff of our percept of a thing and the peculiar ~ enOlllcnological 'moments' brought to it by our perceptual consciousness, a~~ all other similar unities. rest merely on one-sided or two-sided relations ~f' ounda~ion. without the added foundation. by way of such coexistence, Ih. a pecuhar form-content or 'moment' of unity. It is nonetheless obvious mat w~er~ver associative forms can really be demonstrilled as peculiar moents pa 10 Intuition. the things ilssociated are relatively independent parts, ns Such as tones in thc unity of;1 melody. colours picked out piecemeal in

36

On the theory of wholes oand poarts

the unity of a colour-pattern. or partial shapes taken from the unity oC complete shape etc. Contrariwise. it is vain to look in the unity of the . phenomenon for special form-contents in addition to those which uniCy . pieces. form-contents which will bring together non-independent 'momeq such as colour and extension. or which will bring together colour-tone brightness in the former. and the 'moments' of form and size in the la We are of course far from wishing to tum the undiscovered into the n existent without more ado. But it is in any case most important to d' Ihe possibility of there being sensuous unities 1\';lhOIl1 abstractible sens form, and if this proves feasible, to clarify the notion. It may at first seem extraordinary in this respect that mere necessities coexistence. demands for supplementation. consisting in no more than fact that the existence of certain sorts of contents conditions the mere existence of contents of certain coordinated sorts, that requirements of kind. I say, should serve to produce unity. One at once objects: could tents in such a situation be side by side in complete isolation, dependent each other for their existence and yet entirely uncombined, without t 'foundation' amounting to a connected unity in the manner here sup Our answer is plain. Talk of separation implies a thought of the rela . independence of the separated, which is just what we have excluded. picture of side-by-side existence is revealing: it plainly presupposes relati independent contents. which. since they are such, can serve to found sensuous form of side-by-side existence. What recommends such an able picture - unsuitable since it tries to illustrate sensuous formlessness a case of sensuous form - is the mutual indifference of the contents given together in space. The thought insinuates itself: where there is even the loosest. but simply flO unifying form. contents could really not anything to do with each other: they could never therefore come together would remain eternally isolated, Is it not absurd to want to bind con together without any bond? This is no doubt quite right for the contents image presupposes. but the contents of which we speak have plenty to with each other. they are in fact 'founded' on one another. and for reason they require no chains and bonds to chain or knit them together, to bring them to one another. In their case all these expressions have in C no sense at all. Where it makes nonsense to speak of isolation, the prob of overcoming such isolation is likewise nonsensical. This conception is naturally not limited in its appliCillion to the sphere the intuitive objects (phenomenological contents in particular) which se as our illustrations, but applies to the sphere of objects in general. The 0 true unifying faclors. II'(' may roundly so)'. lire relations of 'foundation'. unity even of independent objects is in consequence brought about 'foundation'. Since they ;Ire not. as independenl objects. 'founded' on another. it remains their 101 to 'found' new conlents themselves, and 'found' them logether: it is only in virtue of this situ:uion that these lat

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes oand poaru

37

]8

On the theory of wholes and pam

contents, and on all of them together. and not on some of them simply. ( this naturally presupposes our notion of foundation.) If we keep within phenomenal sphere. this content may as readily belong to outer as to . sense, according to the nature of its foundational contents. Note. 'Moments' of unity. like all other abstract contents. fall into Genera and Species. 7 The Genus Spatial Figure differentiates itself' Triangular Figure. the latter into the lower Species of Definite Trian Figure. in the sense in which we speak of the 'same' triangle however we may shift or turn it. Such examples make clear that the Genus of' ments' of unity is detennined by the Genus of the contents which found and that the lowest difference of the former is unambiguously dete by the lowest difference of the latter. One notes, further, that 'momen unity' must be distinguished into 'moments' or fonns of the first, third ... level. according as the fonn is immediately 'founded' upon lute contents. or on fonns of the first level. or on fonns founded on fo the first level. and so on. One sees further that the fonn~ntents of level necessarily fonn a wbole with the whole descending series of fl of lower level, and in such combination always represent complex relati)'ely to the ultimatel)' foundational elements. In the sphere of sensuous shapes, particularly visual and auditory ones, this can be illustrated. wbereas the general fact can be seen a priori from conceplL

§23 Forms of categorial unity and wholes In the sense in which we are here trying to pin down the notion of a a mere aggregate or mere coexistence of any contents is not to be whole, as little as a likeness (the being of the same sort) or a differeooe being of another sort, or. in another sense, the IIot being identil'al) are 'Aggregate' is an expression for a categorial unity corresponding to the form of thought. it stands for the correlate of a certain unity of refi relating to all relevant objects. The objects themselves, being only gether in thought. do not succeed in founding a new content. whether as a group or togetber: no material form of association develops them through this unity of intuition. they are possibly 'quite discoD and intrinsically unrelated'. This is shown in the fact that the form of aggregate is quite indifferent to its matter. Le. it can persist in spi wholly arbitrary variation in its comprised contents. A 'founded' coo however. depends on the specific 'nature' of its 'founding' contents: t a pure law which renders the Genus of the 'founded' content dependent the definitely indicated Genera of the 'founding' contents. A whole in full and proper sense is. in general. a combination deteooined by the I Genenl of the parts. A law corresponds to each material unity. There different sorts of whole corresponding to these different laws. or. oth put. to the different sorts of contents that are to serve as pans. \Ve cann

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and pam

]9

..---'11 make the same content at one time part of one son of whole. at another ~'

p3rt of another sort. To be a part. and. more exactly. to be a pan of

l i em e. " lph " Ior Joglca " ! pan or whatever) deternunate son (a metaph ySlca, ySIC3 ~~ted in the pure generic nature of the contents in question. and is • "emed .~ " our sense are a priori laws or 'laws of essence'. by laws wh"IC h In

~iS is a fundamental in~ight whose meaning must

be respected in all our reatments and foooulations. And with this insight we have the founda:'on for a systematic theory of the relations of wholes and parts as regards t~eir pure fomls. the categorially definable types which abstract from the 'sensuOus' material of sucb wholes. Before we pursue these thoughts. we must remove a further difficulty. The fonn of an aggregate is a purely categorial form. in opposition to which the form of a whole, of a unity due to foundation. appeared to be a material fonn. But did we not say in the previous section that unity (and we were talking specifically of a unity based on foundation) was a categorial predicate: Here we must note that. on our doctrine. the Idea of unity or the Idea of a whole is based on the idea of 'Founding', and the latter Idea upon the Idea of a Pure Law; the Form of a Law is further as such categorial- a law is not thinglike. not therefore perceptible - and that to this extent the notion of a Founded Whole is a categorial notion. But the content of the law governing each such whole is detennined by the material specificity of the 'founding' contents and consequently of the 'founded' types of content and it is this law, definite in its content. which gives the wbole its unity. Fo; this reason we rightly call each ideally possible specification of the Idea of such unity a material or also a real (reale) unity. According to our previous assertions,' the laws constitutive of the various ~-:u of whol~ a!e syntlJetica/ly a priori, as opposed to laws which are ana)'bcally a prIOri, such as those governing pure categorial forms, e.g. the Form-Idea of a whole as such. and all merely formal specifications of this Idea. We prefer to dwell in what follows, on such formal specifications.

§24 Th e pure formal types of wholes and parts. e POstulate of an a priori theory f "/ I d " oThe! pure forms . 0 II 10 es all parts are determmed by the pure forms of law. Th

nY " I"In th " " OUr d what '. Isfiorilla //y uOlversa e 'loundatlonal relation. as expressed in

it efi.OItl o n. is then relevant, together with the a priori combinations that J>Crml!s. We r'se" " 0 f ,lilY . Cat. I • III t !Ie case type of whole. to " Its pure " form. Its 1 type h "h " f " " egon.. ques . . y ,I stractmg rom the specifiCity of the sorts of content in

quit ct1~.~ More clearly expressed. this fimllalbng abstraction is something it is a I e.rell t ~rom what is usually aimed at under the title of 'abstraction': llniv qUile dllTerent perfoooance from the one which sets in relief the ersal. R e d' . Col ness 10 a concrete Visual datum. or the generic 'moment' of OUr In th e R~" . cuness preViously abstrdcted. In formalization we replace

-40 On the theory of .....holes and paru

the names standing for the sarI of content in question by indefinite ex sions such as {/ cerrain sori of comem. a certain olher sorr of cOl/tem etc, the same time, on the semamic side, corresponding substitutions of p categorial for material thoughts take place,tO The distinctions between abstract parts and 'pieces' are purely fo being in this sense drawn in purely categorial fashion, as can be seen at from our pronouncements above. These pronouncemems had however to suitably interpreted in accordance with our present leaning towards formalization: the pure concept of the whole. in the sense of our last tion, had to be made their basis. The distinction likewise between nearer remoter parts that we merely explained, in descriptive fashion, II by m illustrations. can now be reduced to the mere form of certain founda ' relations, and so formalized. In our examples we saw above that, in the case of many intuitive w a graded series of fragmentations of such wholes always results in fra of these wholes themselves, fragments all equally close to the whole, which could with equal justice count as results of afirsl fragmentation, sequence of the 'pieeings' was in these instances not prescribed by tho senee of the wholes. What is here releV',mt is first the proposition that ofpieces ofa ...holt' are themsel,'es pieces of the 1I'llOle - a proposition that formally proved above l! (in different words). But we were there dealing 'pieces', for which the sequence of fragmemations was meaningless, ' corresponded 10 no graded series of 'folmdations'. All pieces always st the whole in the same relation of 'foundation'. There were no diffe theform of the relation to the whole, all parts were 'contained in the in the same fashion. The matter would be quite different were we to ment aesthetic unities, e.g. a star·shape built out of star·shapes, w . their turn are composed of stretches and ultimately of points. The serve to 'found' stretches, the stretches serve to 'found', as new aes unities, the individual stars, and these in their turn serve to 'found' the pattern, as the highest unity in the given case. The points, stretches, and the final star-pallern are not now coordinated as are partial stretc a stretch. There is, in their case, a fixed order of 'foundations', in what is founded at one level serves to 'found' the level next ilhove, and such a manner that at each level new forms, only reachilble at that level, involved. We may here add the universal proposition: 'Piec('.~' are es,\'emially melliale or remote parIs of a whole whose 'pi they are, if wlllhin(Jfory fomls IInile 1/1('11I with other 'pieces' into wholes "' il/ their tIIrn CO/Istilllte wholes of higher orller by way of 1I(}1'e! forms, The difference between the parts nearer or further in regard to the VI hilS accordingly its essential ground in the formally expressible diversity foundational reliltions. The case is similar in regilrd to non-independent 'moments', if we account of the essential formal distinction between such 'moments' as

----

Thoughts to.....ards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and paru

-41

• satisfy their need for supplcment,nion in the complele whole, and such onl). n satisfy this need in pieces of this whole. This makes a difference to as ea ode of belonging, to the form offOllndation: by it certain parts, e.g. the :tal extent of the intuited thing. belong exclusively to the thing as a Ih~ole, while other parts, e.g. the extent of a 'piece', belong specifically to ~s 'piece', and only more remotely to the whole, This mediacy is no longer ~ essential. as is that of second-level 'pieces' in the division of a stretch, but ~n an essenlial mediacy. to be chaf'dcterized in terms of the formal nature of ~~e relationship. Obviously similar reasons place 'pieces' of no,,·;ndependem 'moments' Il'hieh perwin directly to the whole. further from tht' lI'hole than the 'momen/s' art': this at least is the case if the rule holds that we found valid in the field of intuition, that such 'pieces' can have their immediate foundation only in a ·piece' of the whole. The wider proposition also can be formally expressed: Abstract paris are further from the ",hole, are in essence mediate parts. if the;r "eedfor sllpplemem is satisfied in the sphere ofa mere part. This part can then well either be a 'piece' of the whole, or be in need of further completion. The mediacy in the latter case consists in the fael thattbe law of supplementation in which the form of foundation resides, points. in the case of the originally mentioned abstract part. to a whole which, in virtue of a new law of supplementation is, and must be. a part of a more comprehensive whole, i.e. of the complete whole. which accordingly only includes the first part mediately. This permits us also to say that abstract parts of the M'hole that are not abstract parts of ils 'pieces', are nearer to the lI'hole than lhe abstract parts of Ihe 'pieces'. These thoughts can only be meanl, and are only meant. to count as mere indications of a future trealment of the theory of Wholes and Parts. A proper working out of the pure theory we here have in mind, would have to define all concepts with mathematical exactness and to deduce all theorems by argumeflla in forma, i.e, mathematically, Thus would arise a complete law-determined survey of the a priori possibilities of complexity in the form of wholes and parts, and an exact knowledge of the relations possible in this s~here. That this end can be achieved, has been shown by the small beginnings of purely formal treatment in our present chapter. In any case the ~~ogr~ss. from vaguely fonned, to mathematically exact. concepts and COeanes. ls , here as everywhere, the precondition for full insight into a priori nnectlons and an inescapable demand of science.

Us or

Add" "

h Itlons regarding the 'piecing' (fragmentation) IN oles through the 'piecing' of their 'moments'

We may d . .. . ;nle rest, en with illl ilddltlon:ll observation thai is perhaps not without

w~~~ ~n. a~a~ytic proposition that 'pieces' considert:d in relation 10 the whole

pIeces they are, cannot be founded on each other. either one-sidedly

42

On the theory of wholes and parts

or reciprocally, and whether as wholes or in respect of their parts. But, the other hand, we cannot at all conclude from the content of our definition that it is impossible that 'pieces' should enter into foundati relationships in regard to a more comprehensive whole in which they count as non-independent ·moments'. In fact, however. we find no example in the field of pure intuition and self-evidence that is open to and remarkable relationships among parts depend on this circumstance precisely this field. We can in fact enunciate a proposition which is . wider sense phenomenological. To each 'piece' in a relative abstraction corresponds a 'piece' in each of its relative concreta, so that the mut exclusive 'pieces' of the former serve to ground mutually exclusive piecca each of the latter. In other words: the fragmentarion of a non-indep 'momem' conditions a fragmentation of rhe concrete whole. in so far as mutually exc1ush'e 'pieces', without themsel.·es entering into a foundal relation wirh one another, attract nell' 'moments' 10 themseh'es in .'irtw which they are singly distribute(lto 'pieces' of the whole. A few examples will make this clear. The fragmentation of the q spatial extensity of a visual content, which endures unchanged, but w ' considered in abstraction from its temporality, also effects a 'piecing' of visual content itself. The same holds of spatial data of intuition in of spatial 'piecing'. The separated spatial pieces serve to 'found' mut independent complementary 'moments'. The colouring of one piece is e.g., 'founded' upon the colouring of any other. To this extent one may further, that the complementary moments are themselves fragmented by fragmentation of the spatiality which serves to 'found' them, or that divide themselves piecemeal over the spatial 'pieces'. The colourings of 'pieces' stand in the same whole-part relations (exclusion, inclusion, . section) as the 'pieces' themselves. This peculiar fact, that here the 'pi ' of a 'moment' simultaneously entails a 'piecing' of the whole, obvi rests on the fact that the 'pieces' of the 'momelll' do not sene to 'found' another e.'en within the more inc1ush'e whole. but that they need new ments' to 'found' them in each case: it also depends on the further fact these new 'moments' themselves only find their needed foundation in 'pieces', not mutually in one another. The same is the case with intuitive time-wholes. If we frugment the dura of a concrete course of events. we have fragmented this course of events i to the segments of time, segments of movement correspond ('move being understood in the widest Aristotelian sense). The same holds in the of rest: rest too has its segments that count as 'pieces' in the sense of pronouncements, since rest during one lapse of time. and rest during other lapse, do not stand in any evident foundational relation to each ot The case is quite different if, instead of limiting ourselves to the sp of essential data to be studied by way of intuition, we rather bring our sideration to bear on empirically-real natural connections.

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

------

43

· Ir·lnsition. however. demands a widening of our notions. We have T1IS ' . I all our conceptual constructIons to the pure sphere of essence, the cd rel(lt, of foundatlon . h were su b·~ect to pure I awsf 0 essence. t e parts were la"s ,illfly one in the whole. as a result of (l priori connections of the Ideas eSsen -ponding to the parts and 'moments'. But nature with all its thing-like cor~~ts certainly also has its a priori, whose systematic elaboration and ~~:elopmenl is the still unperfonned task of an ontology of nature. It is no d ubi clear from the start that natural laws in the ordinary sense do not ~Iong to this {/ priori. this pure universal 'fonn' of nature, that they have the haracter. not of truths of essence, but of truths of fact. Their universality ~s not (l 'pure' or 'unconditioned' universality, and just so the 'necessity' of all the thing-histories which fall under them is infected with ·contingency'. Nature with all its physical laws is a fact that could well have been otherwise. If we now treat natural laws, without regard to their infection with contingency. as true laws, and apply to them all the pure concepts we have formed, we arrive at modified Ideas of empirical 'foundation', of empirical wholes, empirical independence and non-independence. If, however, we conceive the Idea of a factual nature as such, of which our own nature is an individual specification, we arrive at universal Ideas, not bound down to Ol/r nature, of an empirical whole. empirical independence etc. These Ideas are plainly constitutive of the Idea of a nature in general, and must fit, together with the essential relations pertaining to them. into a universal ontology of nature. All this being presumed. we return to our specific question. While we found no example in the material sphere of essence where a fragmentation of a non-independent 'moment', e.g, of the spatial and temporal 'moment', ~id not entail a fragmentation of the concrete whole, the matter is different III the field of all empirically real connections of coexistence and succession. Th~s is clear if we consider the sense of empirical relations of necessity, whIch associate things spatially and temporally separate. If a particular causal law involves that a concrete process of change in a time-segment II-tl)' is necessarily succeeded by a certain new process in the neighbouring time~gment, 'l-'I' the fonner thereby loses independence in regard to the latter. t Us aSSume now that particular laws of this sort, whose essence it is only ~ be knowable empirically. belong ontologically, i.e. in virtue of the Idea of ceatu,r e as such. to each concrete process of change. to which they assign sr~:alll necessary. temporally contiguous consequences. and let us make the ~ stronger assumption that each such process must itself be a necessary consequence of previous antecedents. To assume all this is to hold that each rn:crcte natural process of change lacks independence in respect of the c tlle r . c.mbracing temporal whole in which it is realized. and that no fragrelalltallon of a time-stretch therefore conditions a fragmentation of the corlin tcd cUllcre//:, temporal whole. But the limitation to processes of change is necessary and. strictly speaking. not even allowable. As mechanics treats

..

On the theory of wholes and parts

of rest and movement from a single viewpoint. and includes rest as a s limiting case of motion in its laws. so one should proceed analogously concepts extended in the Aristotelian manner. Even the imaginary case fixed rest isolated from the whole world is not immune from the pro fonnulated principle of causality. If we conceive of any time-lapse, ho small, as filled with a rigidly unchanging concrete content (if indeed the I of Nature pennits such a conceptual possibility) and if we conceive of whole of reality as reduced. during this period to such a changeless then the causal principle certainly demands that such being should unchanged a parte POSI for all eternity (though. a parte ante, it may arisen out of eternal rest or law-governed change). In regard to these ca connections, from which nothing temporal is immune. we may therefore that a fragmentation of its time aspects never entails a fragmentation a concrete temporal whole. The 'moments' needed to complete its . sections are indeed separated as these sections are. but such sep effects no fragmentation in the temporal concretum: this is prevented by reciprocal causal 'foundation' of its temporally sundered contents. The case is of course similar at least in regard to the spatial fragmenta . of those wholes in which spatial and temporal extension are coincident, that each fragmentation of the one 'moment' is attended by a fragmenta ' of the other, and vice versa. The fragmentation of the spatial aspect of movement is as little able, as is the fragmentation of its temporal aspect" effect a fragmentation of the movement itself. These considerations also mean that in objective time, the time of na time-stretches that in abstracto had the character of 'pieces' in respect each duration that embraced them, lose their mutual independence, if treat them in relation to a concretely occupied temporal unity of which are non-independent 'moments'. The proposition that each objective pordl duration is a mere part of time, which cannot only be extended in directions in infinitum. bUI also has to be so, is. as one readily sees, a consequence of causality, and therefore related to the content of time. consequence makes a temporal part non-independent. not merely in rela . to its own filling. but also in relation to neighbouring parts of time and contents, This non-independence of temporal parts, and their recip 'foundation', is governed by laws which not merely associate time-stre with time-stretches, but associate concretely occupied tempordl wholes other similar temporal wholes. Since in these laws. among the varia representing 'moments' of time-occupying contents, times or time-stretC , also figure as mutually dependent variables. such time-stretches like , acquire a mediate relation of 'founded ness' in regard to a more inclUSl concrete unity. The same of course holds of bits of space in relation to III embracing spatial unities. and ultimately to the whole infinite space nature. The proposition that each bit of space requires to be extended in directions. or, as we should put it more precisely, requires the real possibi'

---

Thoughts towoards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

45

bci ne SO extended and as far as the one infinite space goes. is a consequence o~ rt;in causal laws. more precisely of certain natural laws. The fact that

o.

I'C

7ree lYextend spatial and tempontl stretches in imagination, that we can

ourselves in imagination at eaeh fancied boundary of space or time

P~\e ever new spaces and times emerge before our inward gaze - all this ;~ not prove the relative 'foundedness' of bits of space and time, and so does not prove space and time to be really infinite, nor even that they can really be so. This ean only be proved by a law of causation which presupposes. and so requires, the possibility of being extended beyond any given boundary,

Investigation IV

~ distinction between independent and nonindependent meanings and the idea of pure grammar

.-----Introduction

(n the follo",ing discussions we wish to tum our gaze to a fundamental difference in the field of meanings, a difference which lies hidden behind insignificant grammatical distinctions. such as those between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions. or between closed and unclosed expres-

sions. To clear up such distinctions will enable us to apply our general distinction between independent and non-independent objects in the special field of meanings, so that the distinction treated in our present Investigation may be called that of independent and non-independent meanings. It yields the necessary foundation for the essential categories of meaning on .....hich. as we shall brieRy show. a large number of a prior; laws of meaning rest, laws which abstract from the objective validity. from the real (rca/) or fonnal truth. or objectivity of such meanings. These laws, which govern the sphere of complex meanings, and whose role it is to divide sense from nonsense, are not yet the so
50

The distinction between independent and non-independent me;anlngs

in the usual pregnant sense. the name of 'logico-grammatical laws' justifiably given. Even more aptly we can oppose the pure theory ofse forms to the pllrt' theory of mlidity which presupposes it.

§ I Simple and complex meanings We start from the immediately obvious division of meanings into s and complex. which corresponds to the grammatical distinction simple and complex expressions or locutions. A complex expression' expression, to the extent thai it has one meaning; as a complex expr it is made up of parts which are themselves expressions. and which u have their own meanings. If we read of '3 man of iron' or '3 king who the love of his subjects' etc.. we are impressed by such part-exp . part-meanings as those of man, iron. king, /01'(' etc. If we now find further part·meanings in such part·meanings, may again come forward as parts of these. but this can obviously not in infinitum. •Continued division must ultimately lead to simple, e ary meanings. That there really are such simple meanings is shown indubitable case of something. The presentative experience we have we understand this word is undoubtedly complex, but its meaning s sign of complexity.

§2 Whether complexity complexity of objects Clear as this seems. we are still beset by varied doubts and questioDl. l We may ask first whether the complexity or simplicity of meanings reflects the complexity or simplicity of the objects which such significantly present. One might at first imagine so: the presentation the object, and is its mental picture. Very little reflection will. however, how deceptive such a picture·analogy is, both in this and in many cases. and that its presumed paf'"..lIelism holds from neither side. In the place. complex meanings may present simple objects. An example .as ~ it is decisive is the expression 'simple object" itself. It is quite md whether there is. or is not, any such object. 2 It is truc. convcrsely. that simple meanings can 'present' complex 0 can refcr to them in significant fashion. One might doubt (though I do not correctly) whether the simple names in our above examplcs ('man" ,. 'king' etc.). reillly give expression to simple meanings. but we shall ha count names like 'one' and 'something' as doing so. It is clear that they. their indefinite reference to all that is possible. will refer to every co . object. even if they refer to it quite indetemlinately. or as a mere 'some It is clear. furthcr. thilt cven where a complex mcaning refers to a cotll. object. no part of the object need correspond to each part of the me

----

The distinction between independent and non.independent meanings

5I

,lone the othcr way round. Bolzano's notcworthy example. a lantl with. let a 1IOIIIIIa;lIs. has indeed been disputed by Twardowski. but this is due out:.s identification of meaning with the direct. intuitive presentation of to Slubiect. :lI1d to his total disregard of that notion of meaning which alone the J . Th·IS. I~a d s h·1m to t~k · . cnta I·l~ Ioglc.. is fundam e cons~ltuents of the meamng (lii/hOIII m{)ll//((lllls) as aUXIliary presentations which resemble linguistic roo iS .

..

§3 Complexity of meanings and compleXity of the concrete act of meaning. Implied meanings 11Jete arc. on the other hand. wide ranges of cases where doubt arises whether a ginm meaning should cOrlm as complex or simple. If we wish. e.g., to Ireat tbe meanings of proper names as simple. we face the objection that in a certain obviously good sense. we can say that a name like ;Schultze', when used of a person known to us. helps to present a certain human being. a being possessed of all the pans and attributes that we think proper to human beings. as well as many individual peculiarities which distinguish him from others. On the other hand, we hesitate to assign partial meanings within such 'proper meaning' to the successively stressed attributes of the thing tbe name uniquely stands for. the more or less clearly presented object, or even 10 identify such a 'proper meaning' with a complex meaning of the form 'an A. which is a. b. C" •• : which we build up step by slep as we analyse the content of the idea Schultze objectively. Ooscr considcration shows thai we must here distinguish two senses of ~~licily anti complexit)': simplicity in one sense does not exclude complexIty UI another. Undoubtedly we must refuse to look on a 'proper meaning' as an articulate. and so complex structure of meanings; we must nonetheless grant that our consciousness of meaning here shows a certain complexity. that Surely stands in need of clarification. Everything Ihat later explication and COnceptualization coax out of the Sclmlt:e on whom we confer a name andace,· . r am content. no doubt represents new meamngs that were not ~~lly (Tee/l) implicit as under-emphasized parts in our original meaning. . . f S I I . .. lthoul dOubt 'h . funher . . e pro~r meamng.o c./I/ r:e was sl.mple. It IS plam. w . that the presentative contcnt With which Schullzc IS presented when r:rr.narn~ him. can change in m:my ways. while his proper name goes on 'djr~~~ng Ihe samc significant role. always naming the same Schultze Pr"'~ Y'. On the othcr hand. we ,Ire not here dealing with some chance -.;Ot,nIOll· I 'dd' . . . presen . .1 ,I 1IIon to our consciousness of memung. but with facts of thern lallon that ilrc necessary. even though variilblc in content: without really :ctU~11 ~eaning COUld. not point to the objcct. it ~leans. and so nol Presen meanmg at all. Usmg thc proper name slgmficantly. wc mllST Schult I t~ ourselves the subject namOO. in this case the definite person le. and as endowcd with some definitc contcnt or othcr. Howevcr

0:

52 The distinction between independent and non-Independent meanings

impalpably, defectively, vaguely, indefinitely we may think of him, p tionnl content cannot be wholly lacking. The indefiniteness which is to a large extent inevitable - for even the most intuitively vivid and ricb entation of a real thing (Dingrealen) must be in principle one-sided incomplete - can never be entirely void of content. Its essence plainly in possibilities of further determinntion. and these not in any direction soever. but in connection with the identical man Schultze whom we and no other. Or what is the same: our consciousness of meaning, its full concreteness, has an essence which involves possibilities of ful and coincidence with cnrain ranges of intuition and no others. This sciousness. even when wholly non-intuitive, must plainly have a intentional content, in virtue of which the individual is not given as a empty somewhat. but as somehow determinate and typically dete determinable whether as a physical thing. an animal. a human beiac - even if not meant in such capacities. The consciousness of meaning which attaches to proper names has a certain double-sidedness: there are two directions in which here talk of complexity or simplicity. One side fixes the simplicity or plexity of the meaning itself, and here we have the pure essence of as such: to it alone belongs the intentional essence of our concrete, meaning«)Osciousness which, regarded in specie, is the meaning. case of 'proper meanings' this side is simple. But it necessarily presu wider intentional background of content. for the very reason that the thing. referred to in the same sense (or univocally named by the same name) can be very differently presented. with a variable set of det marks. and that it must be presented with some such set - while the ation and complexity of this set do not touch the meaning itself. Here we have openings for expositions and for predicative inte of meaning. such as we give when we try to answer the question as lO and as what. the object called 'Schultze' is presented in a given cue. complicating developments stand in contrast with our original CO ness of meaning, and we must therefore first clarify the essence of our distinction: the distinction between concrete. meaning-oonferring ex which are complex or simple as regards their meaning conceived p . meaning. and such experiences as are complex or simple only in a respect, through the presentative content through which one is conset the object meant. Plainly. as pointed out above, the meanings which in predicative expositions of what is presented as such. are newly co . meanings. not in any way really (reell) implicit in our original meanl our intrinsically simple 'proper meanings', The proper nllme P na~ object. or its 'proper meaning' means the object. in a single 'ray' ~s It a 'ray' intrinsically uniform. and so not capable of differentiation 10 . of the same intentional object. Explicative meanings such as E which /Silo which is b. Eb which i,f (I etc.. are many-rayed meanings. or are at least

---

The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

53

her in several steps and in varying fonns. so that they can 'head for' the IOget biec t with varying content. Their plurality of levels does not disturb same ~ ' . 0mill': they are um'fie
?e

~4 The question of the meaningfUlness of syncategor'ematic' components of complex expressions The treatme f ' divi . nI a complex meanmgs leads al once to a new and fundamental arti,,,oln. Such meanings are, in general. only given to us as meanings of ' these one may. however. ask whether each u ate word . -comp Iexes, Regardmg wOrd 10 such a I h ' , all".eral b comp ex as liS own correlated meanmg ' , and whether ~,"t' ~rtJculation and fonn counts as expressing a corresponding seartlculat"lon.m . d f orm. Accordlllg ' to Bolzano. 'each word in speech StandsIC fo' lie th r Its Own presentation. while some stand for entire propositions' .• ' meamng , to every COlliu erefore . . with ou ( f urt hcr a d o. alln'b utes a peculiar ~ IICllon or ., 0 .....Ords, prepositIOn. n the olher hand. one frequently hears of ing by a~d expressions that are merely ·synsemantic·. i.e. lhat have no meant emseJ"cs. but acquire this only in conjunction with other meanings

S
The distinction between Independent and non-independent meanIngs

or expressions. One distinguishes between complete and incomp pressions of presentations, and likewise between complete and in expressions of judgements and of the phenomena of feeling and and one bases on such a distinction the notion of tbe categorematic or categorematic sign. Marty applies the expression 'categorematic si 'name') to 'all verbal means of designation, that are not merely s (as. e.g., "the father's", "around", "nonetheless" etc.) but which yet themselves completely express a judgement (an assertion), or a fi voluntary decision etc. (requests, commands. questions etc.), but express a presentation. "The founder of ethics", "a son who has' his father" are names'.' Since Marty and other write~ employ the 'syncategorematic' and 'synsemantic' in the same sense of signs 'which have complete significance together with other parts of speech, wh help to arouse concepts as mere pans of a name, or contribute t~ the sion of a judgement (i.e. to a statement) or to that of an emotIOn or will (Le. to a request or command-sentence) etc.'.' it would have bl:ca consistent to interpret the notion of categorematic expression equally This notion should have been made to cover all independently . or complete expressions of any intentional experience (any phenomenon' in Orentano's sense), and a division sho~d h~ve beeD then between the categorematic expressions ofpresentauons (I.e. n categorematic expressions of judgements (Le. statements) etc. Wh. a coordination is justified. whether names, e.g., express presentatlODI same sense that request-sentences express requests, wish-sentences wishes etc., and likewise whether the things that names and sent said to 'express' are themselves experiences of meaning, o.r how t~ to meaning-intentions and meanings - all these are questions to ~ _ shall have to devote earnest thought. However this may be, the between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions. and tbe its introduction. certainly have justification. and so we are led to syncategorematic words in a manner at variance with the abov~ doctrine of Bolzano. Since the distinction between categoremauc aDlI categorematic words is grammatical. it might seem that the situation lying it is likewise 'merely grammatical'. We often use several express a 'presentation' - this. one might think. depends on chance arities of one's language. The articulation of one's expression may relation to the articulation of meaning. The syncategorematic word~ help to build up this expression are. properly speaking. quite mea only the whole expression really has a meaning. . . The grammatical distinction, however. pennlts another mterpTC provided one decides to view the completeness or incompleteness o~ sions as reflecting a certain completeness or incompleteness ofme~o~ grammatical distinction as reflecting a certain essential semantic diS . Language has not been led by chance or caprice to express presenta

The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

SS

~'ing

many words, but by the need to express suitably a pluralparUe; m tuaUv cohering part·presentations, and dependent presentational it)' of O1~thin ~he enclosed self·sufficiency of a presentational unity.· Even a forrn.~:.xndent moment. an intentional fonn of combination through which, oop-\ . presentations unite in a third. can find semantic expression. it can e.g·, t"i~e the peculiar meaning-intention of a word or complex of words. /Jelen; we may say that if presentations. expressible thoughts of any sort r Qea ~,r are to have their faithful reflections in the sphere of meaningII/hale' . tions. then there must be a semantic form which corresponds to each . IUten ntational form. TIShIS"LD' rlact an a priOri . . trut. hAd·fh n I lever hi a pres:rces of language are to be a faithful mirror of all meanings possible resc;iOri. then language must have grammatical forms at its disposal which ~~'tdistinct expression. i.e. sensibly distinct symbolization, to all distinguishable meaning-forms.

IS Independent and non-independent meanings. The non-independence of the sensory and expressive parts of words This conception is plainly the only right one. We must not merely distinp:uisb between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions but also between categorematic and syncategorematic meanings.9 It is more significant to speak of in(lependem and non-independent meanings. It is of course possible that meaning may so shift that an unarticulated meaning replaces one that was originally articulated, so that nothing in the meaning of the total expression now corresponds to its part.-expressions. But in this case the expression has ceased to be genuinely complex. and tends. in developed speech, to be telescoped into one word. We no longer count its members as s}'ncategorematic expressions, since we do not count them as expressions at aU. We only call significant signs expressions, and we only caU expressions :mplex when they are compounded OUt of expressions. No one would call UaWord 'king' a complex expression since it consists of several sounds and ~ bles. As opposed to this. many-worded expressions are admittedly -mplex· the ,.smce 'It .IS part of the notion of a word to express something; ind meanmg of the word need not, however. be independent. Just as nonOn ependent .meanings may occur only as 'moments' of certain independent on~' SO the linguistic expression of non-independent meanings may function the; :s formal constituents in expressions of independent meanings: they Oe o~e become linguistically non-independent. i.e. 'incomplete' expressions. and Ur rSt purely external impression of the difference between categorematic txpr sY~categorematic expressions ranks the syncategorematic parts of 1trs, ::lons On a level with quite different pans of expressions. with the let· &lnct t1~nds and syllables which are in gener.1.1 meaningless. I say 'in general', re are many genuine syncategorematic expressions even among these.

56

The distinction between independent ilnd non-independent meanings

such as the prefixes and suffixes used in inflexion. But. in the vast rna' of cases. they are not parts of an expression qUlI expression. i.e. not ill nificant parts; they are only parts of the expression as a sensuous ph enon. Syncategorematic expressions are therefore understood, even when occur in isolation; they are felt to carry definite 'moments' of m content. 'moments' that look forward to a certain completion which, t it may be indeterminate materially. is formally determined together the content in question. and is circumscribed and governed by it. But a syncategorematic expression functions normally, and occurs in the text of an independently complete expression, it has always, as iIlust will testify, a determinate meaning-relation to our total thought; it has u meaning a certain non-independent part of this thought. and so definite contribution to the expression as such. That we are right clear when we consider that the same syncategorematic expressioa occur in countless compounds in which it always plays the same role. For this reason, in cases of syncategorematic ambiguity, we can ably consider, doubt and dispute whether the same conjunction, p or relational expression has the same meaning in two contexts or not. conjunction like 'but', or to a genitive like 'father's', we can signi attribute a meaning. but not to a verbal fragment like 'fu'. Both before us as needing completion. but their needs of completion differ tially: in the one case the need principally affects the thought rather mere expression, in the other case it affects the expression alone or the fragmentary expression. The hope is it may become an exp possible spur to thought. In the successive formation of a complex structure its total meaning gradually gets built Up,lO in the successive mation of a word. the word alone gets built up: only when the completed does it house the fleeting thought. In its own way, of coW'll, verbal fragment evokes thoughts: that it is. e.g.. a verbal fragment, and it may be completed; these are not, however, its meaning. And accord' we complete it in differing ways (fu-futile, fuming, fugitive, furry, etc.) the meaning alters. without thereby revealing an element com~ this multitude of meanings. that could be taken to be ,he meaning .~ common fragment. We search in vain also for a structuring of the indl word-meaning which might in part depend upon the significance of verbal fragment. It is quite meaningless.

§6 Other opposed distinctions, Unclosed, abnormallY abbreviated and defective expressions We must go on to a much-needed clarification of the difference betWeen pendent and non.independent meanings. fixing its character more P In relation to more general concepts. and connecting with it the d ani fact. thc presiding rule in the whole field of meaning. Bcfore we do

--

The distinaion between independent and non-independent meanings

57

. ver. it will be useful to separate off the grammatical distinction that ho"e our starting point from other distinctions confused with it. forlllcd ' . . sync,ltcg?rem,ItIC expreSSIOns, qua non'lndepen~ent. require some. sort f cOlllp]ellon. and we therefore also call them 'Incomplete cxpresslons'. ~alk of 'in~ompleteness' has, howe.vcr, a~oth~r sense, which is not to be fused With the need for compleuon which IS here in question. To show :i: we first observe that.a. ~ivis!on meanings into independent and nonindependent crosses the dlV1slon IOtO Simple and complex. Meanings such as.

0:

c.g.,larger "illi/a house; benellth Go
despite thClr plurality of dlscermble parts. Several non-indcpendent meanings. or meanings partly non-independent and partly independent, can be accordingly associated in relatiJ'ely closed units, which yet manifest. as wholes. a character of lion-independence. This fact of complex non-independent meanings is grammatically registered in the relatively closed unity of com. plex syncategorematic expressions. Each of these is a single expression, be. cause expressive of a single meaning. and it is a complex expression, because expressive part by part of a complex meaning. It is in relation to this mean. ing that it is a complete expression. If nonetheless we call it incomplete, this depends on the fact that its mellning, despite its unity. is in need of com. pletion. Since it can only exist in a wider semantic context. its linguistic expression likewise points to a wider linguistic context, to a completion in speech that shall be independent and closed. I.t is q.uite different in the case of an abnormally abbreviated expression, which gtves to thought. whether independent or non-independent, an incomplete. though possibly in the circumstances quite intelligible. expression. We. can here point to defect;"e expreSSions. where syntactical members are onuu~ from a COntinuous sentential context. although a certain mutual belongl~gness of the disjecta membra remains recognizable. The need for complehon of such defective utterances differs in kind from the need for the com~lction of the syncatcgorematica. Not because the pertincnt meaning is ~~~-lOdcpendent. but ~ause all unitary meaning is absent, such defective a ~ cannot sc,:"e as fimshed talk. not even as talk at all. If on deciphering '. lntgmentary. I nscnptlon tions we rea d ClIesar ... qui . .. dllabus, external indicath may pomt to a certain sentential and semantic unity· this indirect it ~ug~ll is not. however. the meaning of the fmgment before u~. As it stands. .. · . bl a WIthout .unitary mC
58

The distinction between independent ilnd non.independent meilnlngs

expressions as expressional fragments. These distinct notions cross another. An abbreviated expression can be categorematic. a syncatego expression gapless etc.. etc.

§7 The conception of non-independent meanings as founded contents We have recognized that the seemingly indifferent distinction between egorematic and syncategorematic expressions corresponds to a fund division in the realm of mcanings. We took the fonner as our starting. but the latter revealed itself as basic. as the prime foundation of the matical distinction. The concept of the expression. or of the difference between the audible, or sensuous parts of an expression and its partial expressions ill true sense of the word. or, as we may say more pointedly. its S)'II parts (roots, prefixes. suffixes. II words. conjoined complexes of words). only be fixed by recurring to a distinction among meanings. If these . into simple and complex meanings, the expressions which fit them also be simple or complex, and this complexity necessarily leads final significant parts, to syntactical parts and so once more to exp On the other hand, the analysis of expressions as mere sensuous ph also always yields mere sensuous parts. ones that no longer signify. same is true of the superimposed distinction of expressions into categ and syncategorematic. It can at least be described by holding the fo be capable of serving as complete expressions. finished locutions by selves. whereas the lauer cannot. But if one wishes to limit the vag this characterization, and to pin down the sense that is here relevant, as as the inner ground that enables some expressions, and not others, to as finished locutions. one must, as we saw. go back to the semantic and point out there the need of completion that aUaches to certain independent meanings. Having called syncategorematic meanings 'non-independent', we ba~ ready said where we think the essence of such meanings lies. In our enq into non·independent contents in general. we have given a general de tion of the concept of non-independence: it is this same non-indepen that we have to recognize in the field of meaning. Non-independent tents, we stated above (Inv. 111. §§5-7), are contents not able to exist ai, but only as parts of more comprehensive wholes. This inability has I!' priori governing ground in the specific essences of the contents in ques Each non-independence points to a law to the effect that a content of sort In question. e g. sort A. can eXist only in the context of a whole (AB . .. An. where B , .. M stand for determi/late sons of conlent, '[)ete ate'. we said. since no law merely asserts connection between the sort A, any other sorts whatever, thai an A only needs some complelion, no

The distinction berween independent and non-independent meanings

------

L:I\~

59

involves specific delerminateness of context: dependent and

~'~:~ndcnt v:lriables have spheres limited by fixed generic or specific char-

In . We have mainly employed as examples the concrete things of sensuous lJClc rs . , ',ion. We could. however. have brought in other fields. those of act· lotu l , rienCt."'S and their abstract contents. ~ '\V ' , Here we are on Iy 'Illterested'III mealllngs, e conceived these as Ideal unities. but our distinction naturally passed over from the real (real) to the 'deal realm (sec above Inv, Ill. §7a). In the concrete act of meaning some:hing. there is a momcnt whi~h corr,esponds to t.he meaning which makcs up the essential character of thiS act, I.e, necessarily belongs to each concrete act in which the smuc meaning is 'realized', In regard to the division of :lctS into simple and complex. a concrete act can involve several acts; such partial actS can live in thc whole, whether as independent or non-independent parts, An act of meaning, in particular, can as such be complex. be made up of acts of meaning, A total meaning then belongs to the whole act. and to each partial act a partial meaning (a part of the meaning that is itself a meaning), A meaning. accordingly, may be called 'independent' when it can constitute the/lIl1. entire meaning 0/a concrete act o/meani'lg, ·non-independent'. when this is nOI the case. It can then only be realized in a non·independent partact in a concrete act of meaning. it can only achieve concreteness in relation 10 certain other complementary meanings, it can only exist in a meaningful whole, The non·independence of meaning qua meaning thus defined determines, in our view. the essence of the syncategorematica.

§8 Difficulties of this conception. (0) Whether the ~on:independence of the meaning does not really only lie In the non·independence of the object meant :e must now ~onsider the difficulties of our conception. We shall first , lSCUSS the relation between independence and non-independence of mean~Dgs. and independence and non-independence of objects meant. One might ;r,the moment Ihink the former distinction reducible to the laner. lz Acts ~.lCh lend meaning refer as 'presentations'. as 'intentional' experiences, to ?presented'" ~ts, If SOme constituent of an object is non-independent, it cannot be . c . III Isolation; the corresponding meaning therefore demands a Ornpletlon . . . If ' em . It IS ltse non-Illdepcndent. The seemingly obvious principle S" crges: categorematic expressions arc directed to independent objects ~neategor."""" .' . d • S ....1 u; expressIons to non-Ill cpendent ones. 110/ U,Ch a conception is rcadily seen to be erroncous. The very expression l' ' .. C:lt Hnt/epe/l (till mOll/cm prOVides a dcclslve counter-example, It is a egO rem 'I\' . flOII_' • Ie expresSion and yet presents a non-independent object. Ercr)' ~u '~t/epc"dem uhji'cl ll"hulc\'er cun be madi' the objul 0/ WI independem ~ng, and that directly, e,g, Redllen, Figure. Likeness. Si=e. Unit)'. Being. examples show that independent meanings correspond. nOI merely 10

60

-

The distinction between independent ilnd non-independent meilninls

material moments of objects, but also to their categorial forms, me

peculiarly directed to these forms and making them their objects: the are not for that reason self-existent in the sense of being independent. possibility of independent meanings directed to non-independent 'rno is not at all remarkable. when we reflect on the fact that a meaning 'p an object. but does not therefore have the character of picturing it, its essence consists mther in a certain intention, which can be intentio 'directed' to anything and everything, to what is independent as much what is non-independent. Anything. everything can be objectified as a meant. i.e, can become an intentional object.

§9 (b) The understanding of isolated syncategorematica A serious difficulty is occasioned by our understanding of syncatego expressions tom from all context. If our notion is right, there can be no thing: for us the non-independent elements of categorematically closed (MyOS) cannot be isolated, How can we possibly treat such elementl, Aristotle treated them. apart from all connection? Under the headiup TO: OvEV OVI.J:'TTAOKil'i, TO: KaTO: 1-''l5elJiav OVlJtTAOKilv AeyOIJEYQ he CO\'CII classes of words. including the syncat-<:gorematica, This objection can first be met by pointing to the distinction 'authentic' and 'so-to-speak' presentations. or what is here the same, tbe ference between merely intending and fulfilling meanings, We may in fact . Isolated syncategorcmatica such as equals, together with. (In(I. or can no fulfilment of meaning, no intuitive understanding. eltcept in the _ of a wider meaning-whole. If we wish to 'be clear' what the word 'cc:a means. we must tum to an intuitive equation, we must actually (gen perform a comparison, and following upon this, bring to understandin. fulfilment a sentence of the form a = b, If we wish to be clear as to meaning of the word 'and', we must actually carry out an act of col and bring to fulfilment in the aggregate thus genuinely presented a m of the form a and b. And so in every case, The non-independent statUS or. fulfilling meaning. which thus necessarily forms part of a fUlfill~ng m of wider content. serves to base derived talk about the non-lOde status of the intending meaning,lJ Undoubtedly we have here a correct and valuable thought. We can express it by saying that I/O syncategoremm;c meal/illg. 110 acl of indepef/(Iel/' melllling-imemioll, CllII filne/ioll ill klloll"ll!dgl' Oli/Silll! of the COrl of (l categorematic meaning. Instead of 'meaning'. we could of cou~

l

·expression'. in the normal sense of a unity of verbal sound and m:an,';S sense. But we ha\'e to ask whether. since there is a unily-of-cOlnCl between intending and fulfilling meaning in the state of fulfilment. we look on a fulfilling meaning as non-independent. while an intending m

The distinction between independent ilnd noo-independent meanings

61

, ."dependent. Can. we. in other words..hold.that talk ofnon.ind~J':Cndence ~s I h case of illtllillrely unfulfilled meamngs IS merely loose, conditional on In t _~ndependence in possible fulfilment? This seems scarcely thinkable, and non,~ are pushed back to holding that even empty meaning-intentions - the ~"_aulhenlic', 'symbolic' presentalions which give sense to an expression no~ from any knowledge-function - reveal a difference between indepen~pace and non-independence, How can we explain the indubitable fact that , e~aled syncalegorematica, e.g. the isolated word 'and', are understood? ~ey are non-independent as regards their meaning-intention, and this surely means Ihat such intentions can exist only in categorematic contexts: the isolated 'and', the particle tom from its context, ought therefore to be a hollow noise, We can only resolve our difficulty in the following manner: A syncategorematic expression tom from context either has not got the meaning it has in categorematic contexts, or it has got it, but has also undergone a completion of meaning quite indefinite in content, so that it is an incomplete expression of this momentarily activated, completed mean· ing. We understand an isolated 'and' either because the indirect, verbally unexpressed thought of a certain familiar conjunction gives it an unusual meaning, or because vague, unverbalized presentations of things help us to fonn a thought of the type A and B, In the latter case, the word 'and' is functioning normally to the extent that it is really only an aspect in a complete, inwardly performed meaning-intention, the same aspect as in a combination of categorematic expressions standing for a collection, It is functioning abnonnally only in not being connected with other expressions, which give normal uttemnce to the complementary pans of the meaning here in question. Our difficulties are thus removed, We may assume that the difference between independent and non-independent meanings affects the realm of ~aning-intentions as it affects the realm of fulfilment. We hm'e the situation which the possibility of an adequate fit between intention and fulfilment necessarily requires.

§10 A priori laws governing combinations of meanings If we relate the distinction between independem and non-independent

~eanings 10 the more general distinction between independent and oon-

. one of the most fundamental facts .lndepcnd ent 0 b·~ects, we lire really covenng rcalm 0 f melllllng: . I . . .I I . t 1(1/ m(,lllllllg.~ are .\·ub· ljf.'Cr 10 a pnon (III'S regll /It/llg i~('" .cU,:,hil1l11ion in10 nt'lI' ",('allillg.~, To each case of non-independent meanr ~' ,a JdW of essence applies - following the principle discussed by us in i~ ~llon to all non-independent objects whatever - a law regulating the mean· a~s ~eed of complelion by further mcanings. and so pointing to the forms Co k~nds of context into which il must be fined. Since meanings cannOI be rtIbtned to foml new meanings without the aid of connective forms. which In /I the .

62

The distinction between Independent and non· independent meanings

are themselves meanings of a non-independent sort. there are obvioualy priori laws of essence governing all meaning-<:ombinations. The impo

fact here before us is not peculiar to the realm of meaning: it plays its wherever combination occurs. All combinations whatever are sub.iect pure laws: this holds particularly of all material combinations limited single sphere of fact. where the results of combination must OCCUpy same sphere as the combining members. (This case is opposed to that formal. 'analytic' combinations. e.g. collections. which are not bound with the peculiarities of a sphere of fact. nor with the factual essence of combining members.) In no sphere is it possible to combine items of any every kind by way of any and every form: the sphere of items sets a limits to the number of combinatorial forms. and prescribes the laws for filling them in. That this fact is general should not lessen obligation to point out such general laws in each given field. and to p their unfolding into special laws. As regards the field of meaning, the briefest consideration will show our unfreedom in binding meanings to meanings, so that we cannot j at will with the elements of a significantly given. connected unity. M only fit together in antecedently definite ways. composing other signi unified meanings. while other possibilities of combination are excluded laws, and yield only a heap of meanings, never a single meaning. The possibility of their combination rests on a law of essence, and is by means merely subjective. It is not our mere factual incapacity. the com of our 'mental make-up', which puts it beyond us to realize such a unity: the cases we here have in mind, the impossibility is rather objective, . rooted in the pure essence of the meaning·realm. to be grasped, th<...1lI with apodietic self-evidence. The impossibility attaches. to be more not to what is singular in the meanings to be combined. but to the kinds. the semantic categories. that they fall under. This or that meaniDI of course. itself a species. but, relative to a meaning-category. it only as an individual specification. In arithmetic. likewise. relatively to n forms and laws a numerically definite number is an individual specifica . Wherever. therefore. we see the impossibility of combining given mea . this impossibility points to an unconditionally general law to the effect meanings belonging to corresponding meaning-<:ategories. and confo • to the same pure forms. should lack a unified result. We have. in short, 1I priori impossibility. What we have just said holds of course of the possibility of signifi combinations as it holds of their impossibility. To consider an example. The expression 'This tree is green' has uni meaning. If we fonnali ....e this meaning (the independent logical propositi and proceed to the corresponding pure form of meaning, we obtain' S is P". an ideal form whose range of values consists solely of inde dent (propositional) meanings. It is now plain that what we may call

--

The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

63

'mate n'..lizatiol\· .. . of this form, its specification in definite pmposltlons . , is ible in infiOltely many ways. but that we are not completely free in such po5Sification, but work confined within definite limits. We cannot substitute s~meanings we like for the variables '5' and' r. Within the framework of • form we ~an change ou~ e~a~pIe "Th'IS tree .IS g~n ,.mto .'This gold, . :. our 'This algebraiC number, , .. This blue raven etc.• IS green: any nominal aterial - in a wide sense of 'nominal material" - can here be inserted. and : plainly can any ~djecli~al m.aterial re~lace th.e 'r, In each case we have onet more a meanmg uOlfied m sense, I,e. an mdependent proposition of the prescribed form. but if we depart from the categories of our meaning· material. the unitary sense vanishes. Where nominal material stands, any nominal material can stand, but not adjectival. nor relational. nor com· pleted propositional materiaL But where we have materials from such other categories. other material of the same kind can be put. Le. always material from the same category and not from another, This holds of all meanings whatsoever. whatever the complexity of their form. In such free exchange of materials within each category, false, foolish, ridiculous meanings - complete propositions or elements of propositions may result, but such results will necessarily be unified meanings, or gram· matical expressions whose sense can be unitarily realized. When we transgress the bounds of categories. this is no longer true, We can string together words like 'This careless is green', 'More intense is round', 'This house is just like'; we may substitute 'horse' for 'resembles' in a relational statement Oftbe form '0 resembles b'. but we achieve only a word-series. in which each word is as such significant. or points to a complete. significant context. but we do not. in principle, achieve a closed unity of sense, This is above all the ~ wh.e n .we seek arbitrarily to exchange pans which are themselves formed ~01ts Within an articulated unit of meaning. or when we replace such parts y ~thers taken at random from other meanings, as. e.g.. when we try to rep ace the antecedent in a hypothetical proposition (a mere element in the total unity that we call 'the hypothetical proposition') by a nominal element. r one of the members of a disjunction by a hypothetical consequent. 1nstead of d' rts . OlOg t h"IS m the concrete. we may also attempt it in the cor· m ~ndlOg pure forms of meaning. i.e. proposition.. 1 forms. We are at once ti: e aware. through (l priori insight into law, that such intended combina. in ~s ar~ ruled out by the very nature of the constituents of the pure patterns mea U~tlon, that such constituents can only enter into definitely constituted "lng-patterns It ' a concrete unity of mean'is plain ' fi111.1."il y, t h'at the pure elements of form 10

°

and ~~~c~a.n nev~r change plu';Cs ~ith the.clements. to which they give form, Unified al~ give our mean 109 Its relation to thlOgS. The specification of PrinCipl~C
6"!

The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

can construct verbal strings such as 'if the or is green', 'A tree is and' but such strings have no graspable single meanings. It is an analytic that the fonns in a whole cannot function as its materials, nor vice·v and this obviously carries over into the sphere of meanings. In general we recognize, as we construct and think over such exam that every concrete meaning represents a fitting together of materials forms, that each such meaning falls under an ideal pattern that can be forth in fonnal purity, and that to each such pattern an a priori law meaning corresponds. This law governs the fonnation of unitary mea ' out of syntactical materials falling under definite categories having aa. priori place in the realm of meanings, a formation according to syn forms which are likewise fixed a priori, and which can be readily SOCIl constitute a fixed system of forms. Hence arises the great task eq fundamental for logic and for grammar, of setting forth the a priori stitution of the realm of meanings, of investigating the a priori system the formal structures which leave open all material specificity of meattin& a 'theory of the fomls of meanings'.

§ II Objections. Modifications of meaning which are rooted in the essence of expressions or meanings We must now take account of possible objections. One must not be astray by the fact that meanings of any category, even syncatego forms like (11/{I, can be put into the subject-position otherwise occupied substantival meanings. If one looks closely, one sees that this happens modification ofmeafling, so that what replaces a name is itself really no . a meaning differing in syntactical type (an adjectival or merely fo meaning) has not been simply transplanted. We have such a case, e.,., statements like 'If is a conjunction', 'And is a non-independent m . The WOrtJs certainly occupy the subject-position, but their meaning is p , not the same as they have in an ordinary context. That each word expression can, by a change of meal/illg, come to occupy every place iD categorematic whole. is not remarkable. What we have in mind here is • a verbal but a semantic compounding, or a compounding of words which meanings remain constant. Logically considered. all shifts ofm . are to be adjudged abnormal. Our logical interest. oriented towards unit selfsameness of meaning, demands constancy in the meaning-function. naturally happens, however, that Cf!rrail/ mealling-trllllsformalions beJong the grammatically lIormal .flock-ill-Trade of erer)' language. Verbal con. will at least make a modified meaning readily intelligible, and, if the mo tl for modification are pervasively general. rooted, e.g.. in the general cha ter of expressions, or in the pure essence of the realm of meanings, then ~ abnormalities will recur regularly, and their logical abnormality will WID grammatical sanction,

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The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

65

e belongs the supposilio mmerialis of scholastic parlance. Every exHe.r n whether its nonnal meaning is categorematic or syncategorematic, presSI~O' function as its own name. i.e. it will name itself as a grammatical can a ",cno n If we say "'The earth is round" is a statement'. our subject. . PhellOnUltio n· is not the meamng of the statement, but a presentation of pre~t:ltelllent as such. We do not judge about the sUIre of affairs that the e th th is round. but about the indicatil'e semel/ce: this sentence itself fune· . . , t he ear . own name. If we say "A . s abnormally as Its . nd" .IS a conJunction, (lOll . ,• lInCC of meaning normally correspondmg to the word ·and IS not put ~~o the position of subject: this is occupied by an independent meaning ~irected to the \l'ord 'and', In this abnormal reading, 'and' is not really a synC:ltegorematic, but a categorematic expression: it names itself as a word. We have an exact analogue of sllppositio materialis when an expression has. ins/eluJ of it.~ I/ormal meaning. a presemation of this meaning (i.e. a meaning directed to this meaning as object). This is the case. e.g.. if we say 'And. bUI. grelller lIum are non·independent meanings'. Here we should gen· erally say that the meanings of the words 'and', 'but'. 'greater than' are nonindependent. Just so in the utterance 'Man. Ulble. house, are thing--concepts', presentations of these concepts function as subjects, and not the concepts themselves. In these. as in the previous cases, the change of meaning regularly shows itself in our written expression: quotation marks, or what may be suitably called other hetero·grammatical mode.f ofexpression, are employed. All expressions to which 'modifying' rather than 'detennining' predicates anach, function abnormally in the above described or some similar sense: the normal sense of our utterance is to be replaced by another, in a more or less complex fashion. so that, however it may otherwise be built up. its apparent subject (on a normal interpretation) is replaced by some sort of p r esentati01l of itself. an ideal presentation. perhaps, in the sense of pure logic, or an empirical-psychological one, or a purely phenomenological one. We say. e.g.. 'The centaur is a poetic fiction'. With a little circumlocution we can instead say: 'Our ideas of centaurs, i.e. subjective presentations with ~~e meaning-eotltent cenUllir. are poetic fictions'. The predicates 'is', 'is not', IS true', ·is f,lIse' modify meaning. They do not express properties of the ~pparent subject. but of the corresponding subject-meaning. 'That 2 + 2 =. 5 IS false' means that the thought is a false thought. the proposition a false proposition. Leaving aside the examples in the last paragraph. where the modifying pr7ntation is subjective in a psychological or a phenomenological sense. n :t un~erstanding our analogue of sliPPOSilio mlllerialis with its previously c ated IImit'Hions. we note that we are here dealing with alterations in the tJontent, or rather act of meal/iI/g. /hm hm'e Illeir roots in the ideal nmure of ~e ~I~ewlil/g_r('{/I/II itself. They have their roots in changes of meaning. in a t n:t •un ?ther sense of 'meaning' that abstracts from expressions. but which is unlike that of arithmetical talk of 'transforming' arithmetical patterns.

66

The distinction between independent and non-Independent meanings

In the realm of meaning there are 0 priori laws allowing meanings to transfonned into new meanings while preserving an essential kernel. belongs the tnmsfonnation that any meaning cun undergo, by un a rule, when there is a 'direct presentation' of it, i.e. an intrinsic reference its original meaning, Its verbal expression will then function, with m meaning, as a 'proper name' of its original meaning. This modifica ' having a priori univers.1.lity, conditions a large class of equivocalioaa general grammar, changes in the verbal act of meaning which go far yond the peculiarities of empirical languages. In our further Investiga , we shall have more chances of meeting similar modifications rooted in essence of meanings, the important cases. e,g.. where whole stat are 'nominalized' so as to appear in the subject-position, and so too in position that requires nominaJ members, We may point to cases where jectival predicates or attributes are 'nominalized', so as to dispel any aroused by things said in our previous section. An adjective has, as it a predicative and, in consequence, an attributive role; it functions no in its 'originar. unmodified meaning in, e.g.. our above example 'This green'. It remains intrinsically unchanged - apart from its syntactical if .....e say 'This green tree', Such a change in fonn as opposed to the 51 syntax, which occurs also when, e.g., a nominal presentation functio . subject takes on the objecHole, or a proposition functioning as aD ent takes on the role of a consequent. must first be pinned down: it • central theme in describing pervasive structures in the meaning-realm. adjectival meaning, in the sense of syntactical material not affected by ing from a predicative to an auributive role, can yet undergo a modifi when, from functioning merely as an attributive aspect of some n meaning, it is itself nominalized. i.e. made into a name, as, e,g" in ' a colour' and 'Being green (Greenness) is a differentiation of Being col (of Colour)', These t.....o modes of speech do not mean quite the same. spite shirting ambiguities, since in one case a non-independent side concrete object's content may be meant, while in the other case we a nominalization of the being which is the correlate of the predica ' attaching to the predicate member of a categorical predication and a to its positing of the subject The same word 'green' therefore changcl meaning in such nommalizatlons: its wnllen e;o.;pression {Ill Gennan] its initial capital. indicates what is common to such modifications, capital is by no means logically or grammatically pointless, The on and the nominalizcd meaning (gree/1 and Greell, i,\' gre('11 and Beillg·g plainly have an essential moment, an idcntical kernel. in common. kernel is an abstractum having several forms qua kcrnel: these fonns are be dislinguished from the syntactical forms which already presu kernels, together with their ronns qua kernels, as their syntactical mate If Ihe fonn qllQ kernel of an adjectival kernel or kernel-content yields sm. tical malerial of nominal type, then such delenninately constructed no

v: '

--

The distinction between independent

~d

non-independent meanings

67

'ngscnn perform every syntactical function which requires nominal mean·

~~n;or ils synlaclical materials in accordance with fonnal meaning·laws.

In~ ,_,'II suffice as an indication. Closer treatment belongs in a systematic fhls \ _ g rorth of our theory of fonns, setun I'

§ 12 Nonsense and absurdity

oe

of course, dislinguish the law·governed incompatibilities to study of syncategorematica has introduced us, from the other . compatibilities illustrated by the e;o.;ample of 'a round square', As said in In 14 our FirsT !I/l'(',~Ti1!(lfil)//, one must not confound the senseless (or nonsensical) with the absurd (or 'counter-sensical'), though we tend to exaggerate and call the latter 'senseless', when it is rather a sub-species of the significant. The combination 'a round square' really yields a unified meaning, having its mode of 'e;o.;istence' or being in the realm of ideal meanings, bill it is apodictically ('I'idem that no existent object can correspond to such an existent meaning. But if we say 'a round or', 'a man and is' etc., there exist no meanings which correspond to such verbal combinations as their ex· pressed sense. The coordinated words give us the indirect idea of some unitary meaning Ihey express. but it is apodiclically clear that no such mean· ing can e;o.;ist. that significant parts of these sorts, thus combined, cannot consist with each othcr in a unified meaning. This indirect notion would not itself be accepted as the meaning of such verbal complexes, When an e;o.;pression functions normally, it evokes its meaning: when understanding ~ails, its sensuous similarity to understood, meaningful speech will evoke the ~nauthentic notion of a 'certain' pertinent meaning, since the meaning itself IS what is precisely missing. The difference between the two incompatibilities is plain, In the one case Ctttain partial meanings fail to assort together in a unity of meaning as far as t~ objectivity or truth of the total meaning is concerned, An object (e,g. a thmg, .st~te of affairs) which unites all that the unified meaning conceives as PC,:amlng to it by way of its 'incompatible' meanings, neither exists nor ~n eXlSI, though the meaninl! itself e;o.;ists. Names such as 'wooden iron' and rOund square' or sentcnces ;uch as 'All squares have five angles' are names :ese~ten~es as genuinc as any. In the Oilier case the possibility of a unitary in ,alllng Itself e;o.;cludcs thc possible coexistence of certain partial meanings su~~se\;'r~~e havc ,then, only ,an indirec~ idea. directed upon the synthesis of ob'ec P tl'llmc'llllngs In a slllgie memung, and at the same time see that no S()~ t Cdn Cvcr correspond to such an idea. i.e, that a meaning of the intended .....ith call1,lOt e~ist. The judgemenl of incompatibility is in one case connected the trescnt
w~ich Ihe

68

The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

meaning-combinations. must in part be found in the grammatical governing the parts of speech. If we ask why our language allows verbal combinations and disallows others. we are to a large extent ref! to contingent linguistic habits. to matters of mere fact concerning Ian which develop in one way in one speech-community and another way another, In part. however, we encounter the essential difference of ' pendent and non-independent meanings and, closely involved ther the a priori laws of the combination and transformation of meanings, which must be more or less revealed in every developed language, both in grammar of forms and in the rdated class of grammatical incompatib' .

§ 13 The laws of the compounding of meanings and the pure logico.grammatical theory of forms The task of an accomplished science of meanings would be to inv the law-governed, essence-bound structure of meanings and the laws of bination and modification of meaning which depend upon these, reduce such laws to the least number of independent elementary laws. should obviously also need to track down the primitive meaning-pa and their inner structures, and. in connection with these. to fix the categories of meaning which circumscribe the sense and range of indeterminates - the 'variables' in a sense quite close to that of math _ that occur in such laws. Wh.lt formal laws of combination may can be made fairly plain by arithmetic. There are definite forms of syn through which. quite in general or in certain definite conditions, twO bers give rise to new numbers. The 'direct operations' a + b, ob, Q. resultant numbers unrestrictedly. the 'inverse operations, a-b. b-Ja.bloga. only in certain conditions. That this is the case must be laid by an assertion or rather a law ofexi,flellce. and perhaps proved from primitive axioms. The little we have so far been able to indicate plain that there are similar laws governing the existence or non-e of meanings in the semantic sphere. and that in these laws meanings ~re free variables. but are bound down to the range of varying categones. . arising out of the nature of the sphere in question. 1/1 Ihe pure logic of meanings, whose hi~"er aim is Ihe lall'$ of ob I'll!il!ity for meal/ings (to Ihe extenl thaI .I'uch I'(llidily lJepends purely semanlic form), the theory of the essential me(l/ling-slruclllre.~. al/tI th~, of lheir formal COIIStitllliOll, prOl'ide Ihe lIeeded fOllndarion, Tra~IU logic. with its theories of concepts and judgements. offers us a few \.so starting-points. without being clear as to the end to be aimed at. eltbel' general or in respect of the pure Idea of mcaning, Plainly the theory of c1emcnt.lry structures and the concrete patterns of 'judgement' - here stood as 'propositions' - will comprise the whole form-theory of mea each concrete meaning-pattern being either a proposition or a possible eI

has.

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The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

69

· onl'lsitions. We must note that the exclusion of the 'material of knowlpr 1'I .. b . edgl:', to which Phu~eh OglCldlS .y Its very ~n~ committed. obliges us to keep everything w IC cou give semantic [orms (types. patterns) a definite o~t tiOli to factual spheres of being. Everywhere indefinitely general pres::atiOllS of factual. materi~l. d.efinitely det:~ined only in respcl;t of semantic ategory. e.g. nonllnal. adJectIval. propoSItional etc.. must do duty for con~l1tful concepts and eve~l for the highest of such concepts. e.g. physical thing. · alial thing. mental thmg etc, ~P Our first task, therefore. in a purely logical form-theory of meanings. is to lay down the primitil'c forms of meaning with the requisite purity just described. Wt' /II/ISI fix the primifh'e forms of independent meanillgs, ofcomplete prupositioll.f with their internal arlieu/alions. and Ihe !>'Iruetures colltoined ill such arliw/miom'. We must fix, too. the primitive forms of compounding and modification permitted by the essence of different categories of possible elements. (We must note that complete propositions can become members of other propositions.) After this, we must systematically survey a boundless multitude of further fonus. all derivable by way of repeated compounding or modification. The fonus to be established are naturally ·valid·. which here means that, however specified. they will yield real meanings. meanings real as meanings, To each such primitive form there belongs. therefore. (III a priori loll' of c.\islence. to the effect that each meaning-combinalion confonuing to such a fonn genuinely yields a unified meaning. provided only that its terms the Fonn's indeterminates or variables, belong to certain semantic categdries. Th71educliol/ of deril't!d forms must also pro raJlto be a deduction of their v~hdlty. and laws of existence will, therefore, also relate to these, but they ,,:,111 be deduced from those relating to the primitive forms. Any two propositIOns Yi~ld, when combined in the form M and N. another proposi,tion, any two adjcctives another adjective (again one meaning that can stand as a complex but unitary attribute or predicate). To any two propositions, M. N, there belong l"k . . . . connectIve . forms If M then N. /1-1 or N . I eWlse. t he primitive , SO that tho 'e I' , . . , T and ..... su agalO IS a propOSition. 0 any nominal meaning S, h any adjcctival meaning p. there belongs the primitive form Sp (e.g. red OUse) the .· . no .' resu It L lJI:lOg a new mealllOg fixed by law in the category of priml.n.al meaning. We could in this manner give many other examples of mltlve COnn ". c \" . . hold here. a e~ Ive lon.ll~. ;y~ must .remember. to statl~~ all the ~aws that efttali nd III concelvlllg categonal Ideas of propO,l"ItfOlI. nomlfllll pn'sto aboll._ (/(Ije{"fiwl pres('fllatioll. which determine the variables of the laws. ·In 0; Stritet fro m th'e cI · syntactIcal . langlOg forms that such meunings have e.>Ven cases . d h h i ·III some determinate form. We SPeak f . an I at t cy lave to have as a 0 the samc n:lme. whether it occupies the subject-position or serves correht'd " lt ribur < l.: 0 b'~cct. 0 r t I\e same adjective. whether used predieatively or Coniu, 1~e1y. of the same proposition. whether used as a free unit or as a ~ Ctlve d' . . , ISjUnctlve. or hypothetical antecedent or consequent. or whether III

70

The distinction between Independent and non-independent meanings

occupying this or that place as a member in a complex propositional We thus fix plainly the much used, but never scientifically c1a.rified. about terms in traditional logic. In the formal laws which enter the of this logic, IS as in our own laws of structures_ such 'terms' fu variables: the categories circumscribing the range of their variab' . categories of terms, The scientific pinning down of these categories is one of the first tasks of our doctrine of forms. If we now make gradual substitutions in the primitive forms set fo for a simple term repeatedly substitute a combination exemplifying the forms. and if we always reapply our primitive existential law, we ever new forms. of deductively proven validity. encapsulated in one with any degree of complexity. Thus for the conjunctive combination positions one can substitute: (M and N) and P (M and N) and (P and Q) I(M and N) and P} and Q

etc.. etc.. and so for the disjunctive and hypothetical combination positions, and for other modes of combinations in any other categories. We see at once that the compoundings go on in inft"; manner permitting comprehensive oversight, that each new form tied to the same semantic category. the same field of variability as ill and that. as long as we stay in this field, all framable combi • meanings necessarily exist, i.e. must represent a unified sense. We that the relevant existential propositions are obvious deductive co of an existential proposition with the primitive form. Instead of cons applying the same mode of combination. we can plainly vary our at will. and combine different forms of combination in our cons always within legally allowed limits, and so conceive a~ infinit~ of forms legally engendered. As we formulate these facts 10 COnsCI~ gain insight into the a priori cOllSt;tIItion of the meaning-realm In r all those forms which hal't! their a priori origin in its basic forms. This insight. and the final comprehensi\'e insight into the formal. tion of the whole semantic realm. is, of course. the one aim of such In tions. It would be stupid to hope for worthwhile rules for the com of meanings (or rules for the grammatical compounding of exp from the formulation of semantic types, and the existential laws re them. There is no temptation here to depart from the line of cor hence no practical interesl in determining it scientifically. Nmuell st so immediately revealed. with each deviation from normal formS. hardly fall into such deviations in the practice of thought an~ s theoretical interest of the systematic investigation of all possible. forms and primitive structures. is all the greater. We. in fact, nSC insight that all possible meanings are subject 10 a fixed typic of ca

The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

~Uill.

71

in " priori fashion. into the general Idea of meaning, that

strU':tU~aws go\'ern the realm of meaning, whereby all possible concrete o p'w,rl _patl ems systematically depend on a small number of primitive forms. rneat\~:lawS of existence. o~t of w~ic~ they flow by p,ure constructio~, This fi.'(ed eralization. through ItS a prIOri, purely categonal character, bnngs to Ia-s t ~fin c aW'lreness a basic chapter in the constitution of'theoretical reason', nU • • scieAdditional Ik d b f . ., /lOll'. I t:l e a ove 0 ~mpoundlRg and modificatIOn. The I of modific:llion also have a place IR the sphere we must define, What ru ~ean is shown by the analogue of sllppositio materialis considered above. ~her instances ,Ire differences of con~ex~ual functi.oning,. of a priori ~yn­ taetical position. as when a name funcllonlRg as subject shifts to the obJcctp1aet:. These differences are not easy to elucidate: they are mixed up with empirical factors. and terminate in case·fonns and syntactical fonns of grammar. The diffe;ence between the .at~ributive and predicative fun~tioning of adjectival meamngs, as well as Similar matters, have here their place. (The investigations of the form-doctrine of meanings announced in our First Edition, and since expounded with many improvements in my lectures at Gottingen since 1901. will shortly. I hope, be laid before a wider public in my Jahrbuch flir Philosopme lind plliinomenologische Forsell/mg.)

'14 Laws which discourage nonsense and laws which discourage absurdity. The Idea of a purely logical ,rammar The fonnal laws of meaning just discussed, which serve merely to separate tbe realms of sense and nonsense. must in an extended sense certainly count

as laws of formal logic. They will. however, be the last things one will think o~ where 'logical laws' are in question: this tenn only suggests the quite dIfferent laws. infinitely more interesting in our cognitive practice. that are ~ncem:ct ~nly with significant (i.e. not-nonsensical) meanings. and with t r obJeCtive possibility and truth. Let us look into the relation of these WO t}'pes of law 0(The a.

priori mng.

I~ws

pertinent to the constitution of the essential forms

obk:: or not,leaveor quile open whether meanings built on such forms have whether (when they are propositional forms) they yield

poss"bl

lepa~t~ truth or nol. As said above. these laws have the mere function of -mUSt ~gusense from. n~n~nse. The, word 'nonsense' - let us stress it again Or lik, ,nderstood In Its literal. stTlct sense. A heap of words like 'King but but the and C'l• nnot be understood as a unit: each word has sense in isolation . ' or theecom av . round IS senseless. These laws of sense, or. normatively put. laws ' i l l oldance of nonsense. direct logiC' to the abstractly possible forms of t.....•. g.whoseubie ., .. I . I becomeSIlS . Ii k I . . ""IICd~b ,J ( t1erallel1ll(,~' r!tl~ !occ?ermllle. ThiS 'te Y5CltlOg up the II'holl)' clifferenr laws which dlstlOgulsh a formally nt from a formally inconsistent. i.e. absurd. sense.

72

The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings

The consistency or absurdity of meanings expresses ohjeNiI'e. i,e, a possibility (consistency. compalibility) as opposed to objective impoSSi (incompatibility): it expresses. in other words. the possibility or i bility of the bl!ing of thl! objl!cts me(ln! (compatibility or incompati " ~he ,ob~ective determinati~ns meant~ to the extent that this depends ~ mtnnslc essence of meanmgs. and IS seen from this essence with a evidence, This contrast between objectively. semantically consistent and absurdity. has been notionally opposed and set apart from the between sense and nonsense. but we must observe thar. in loose, speech. the two contrasts are confused. and every absurdity, even affront to empirical truth. is readily called 'nonsensc', We have also (0 a line between material (synthetic) absurdity andformul. analy'ic In the fonner case. concepts with content (first-order material k meaning) must be given. as is the case. e.g., in the proposition
----

The distinction between Independent and non.independent meanings

73

exn
means easy. The notion of universal grammar can of course be carried beyond the Q

priori sphere. if the somewhat vague sphere of the universally human (in

the empirical sense) is brought in. There can, and must. be a universal grammar in this widest of senses. and that this extended sphere is 'rich in important and wen-established findings' (as A. Marty observes on page 61 of his Unrersuchungen =. GrllI/dlegullg etc.. under the strange impression that he is contradicting me) is something I do not. and never did. doubt. But here. as elsewhere where philosophical interests are concerned. it is important to. se.para~e the a priori sharply from the empirical, and to recognize that, Wlthm thIS widely conceived discipline. the findings of fonnal semantics rt~n~ f~r grammarians have a peculiar character: they belong to an a PrIOri dISCipline that should be kept apart in its purity. Here as elsewhere. ~ne must subscribe to a great Kantian insight. and steep oneself in its sense: boat one.does not enrich. but rather subverts. the sciences if one blurs their , undanes. One musl realize that a universal grammar in this widest sense IS . all concrete scIences. . t a concret' e science wh·IC h . like frequently brings f· d· h . . .In ogether for expla . t ~~~ . na ory purposes 10 lIlgs W ose theoretical place lies ........ntlally different ,h . I ' . , . . ha d . eoretlca SCiences, In emplflcal sciences. on the one n,andlO '.' natural' a prum SCiences, on the other. Our age. oriented towards neglect:~ence. sees to it that generalizing, empirical investigations are not SO fa In the grammatical field, nor in nny other. What is a priori is not ag"svseOurcd: even though :Ill basic insights lead back to the {/ priori our nSe f . . IIp the or It almost threatens to wither away. I therefore fairly take philoso CUIdgcls for the old doctrine or a xrammairl' ghlha/e l't raisollnee '1 Plical gr·lmn,·,- r .. b d I . . . •, ' ': or Its 0 scure. un eve oped mtentlon aiming al ,'he 'rational"': logic' r, LO speech. 1Il the true sense of the word. and in particular at the o sn"cc/,· . , If I am '~ ~r .lIS Sem:lnllC 1I priori, ~ they sho I nght. It IS of basic importance for linguistk investigations that ud~om~ I / d'" ., l: C car as to t 1e Istlllcllons provISionally shadowed forth

74

The dininction between independent and non-independent meanings

here. They should possess themselves of the insight that the foun of speech are not only to be found in physiology, psychology and the tory of culture. but also in the a priori. The latter deals with the meaning-forms and their a priori laws of compounding or modi and no speech is conceivable that is not in part essentially determined this a priori. Every investigator of language operates with notions st from this field. whether he is clear on the matter or not. We may finally say: within pure logic one must separate off what, ered in itself, forms a first, basic sphere, the pure theory of meaning-Ii Considered from the standpoint of grammar, it must lay bare an framework which each actual language will fill up and clothe differen deference either to common human motives or to empirical motives that at random. To whatever extent the actual content and grammatical Ii historical languages are thus empirically detennined. each is bound to ideal framework: theoretical research into this framework must a be one of the foundations of the final scientific clarification of alii as such. The main point to be kept in mind is this: all semantic t forth in pure, fonnal semantics, and systematically explored in their lations and structures - the basic forms of propositions. the ca proposition with its many particular patterns and fonns of man primitive types of propositionally complex propositions. e.g. the tive. disjunctive and hypothetical propositional unities. the difTi universality and particularity, on the one hand, and of singularity, other. the syntactical fonns of plurality, negation. the modalities etc. these matters are entirely a priori, rooted in the ideal essence of as such. The same applies to the semantic formations to be conjured operational laws of compounding and modification out of these . forms. They hold prime place over against their empirical-grammatM:ll pressions, and resemble an absolutely fixed ideal framework, more or perfectly revealed in empirical disguises. One must have this in order to be able to ask significantly: How does German. Latin. ChillCll express 'the' existential proposition, 'the' categorical proposition, 'lbe' tecedent of a hypothetical, 'the' plural, 'the' modalities of possibilitY probability, 'the' negative etc? It is no matter of indifference whetbel' grammarian is content with a prescientific personal opinion on m fonns, or with notions empirically contaminated by historical. e.g. by grammar, or whether he keeps his eyes on a scientifically fixed. theore coherent system of pure meaning-forms, i.e. on our own form-theo!')' meanings. Considering the fact that in this lowest field of logic questions of t objectivity, objective possibility are not yet relevant. and considering tOO just described role of rendering intelligible the ideal essence of all s such, one might give this basic field of pure logic the name of pure 10 grammar.

The distinction between Independent and non-independent meanings

75

f'lI otes

J In the First Edition I spoke of 'pure grammar'. a name conceived Note ·dtb , · d :tpressly d eVlse 0 e ana 1ogous to K ant t s pure sctence of nature • . a? \ cannOI. however. be said that pure formal semantic theory compre· ce sm . a pr.ton "f . a bends the enure 0 genem I grammar - t h ere·IS. e.g.. a peculiar jor; go\·erning relations of mutual understanding among minded persons, ~Iations very important for grdmmar - talk of pure logical grammar is to be preferred.

/lott 2 Afler what has been said, no one will imagine that there could be a universal grammar in the sense of a universal science comprehending all particular grammars ~s continge~t specifications, just as a universal math· ematical theory contams all poSSible cases a priori in itself, and settles them aU 'in one go'. Naturally we speak of a general or purely logical grammar in a sense analogous to that in which we speak of general linguistic science. Just as the latter deals with the universal principles that can be placed before the sciences of particular languages, and mainly. therefore, with the presuppositions and foundations equally relevant to all such languages, so pure logical grammar in its narroll'er sense explores only olle of these foundations, which has pure logic for its theoretical home-territory. Its inclusion in linguistic science naturally only serves interests of application just as, in another direction. linguistic science itself satisfied similar interests in many chapters of psychology. Marty of course disagrees with me on these points, as also generally in regard to a theoretical classification into a priori and empirical researches (d.loc-. cit. §21. pp. 63ff.). In the note to page 67, he holds that the logico~atiC"dl findings I credit to pure logic ·have. theoretically, their natuml ['orne: \~ the psychology of language. Logic. and the nomothetic part of ;SU\stIC psychology, borrow from this what serves and suits their purpose'. home Many's conception is basically mistaken. On it. we should ultimately e:.~i~.c1ass ~rithmetic: as \\:ell.as ~Il.other formal disciplines i~ ~ath­ na In - ps)chology. Ifnot m lingUIstic psychology. For pure lOgIC 10 the ~~wer sense. i.~. the doc~rine of the. validity of mea?ings, and the condisci r pure theor) of meanmg-forms. IS, I hold, essentially one with these a" P/ln~s (cr. the final chapter of the Prolegomena). In the essential unity of • I· a II t hesc sCiences . quitIUlles/S . 11/1II'1!r.I"(II.\· must be treated, and certainly be kept Mat~apart.f~om all empirical sciences. whether styled 'physics' or ·psychology'. their ~~atlclans in ract do this. even if in naIvely dogmatic fashion. turning Philosoack. on specifically philosophicill problems. and not worrying about phlcal objL'Ctions - to the great profit. in my view. of their science. NOIf!

right

3 N

.

I ~thlOg has so much confused discussions of the question of the re atlo nof loglc · to grammar. as the constant confusion of two logical

76

The distinction between Independent and non-independent meanings

spheres, sharply distinguished by us as lower and upper. and char by way of their negative counterparts - the spheres of nonsense lad fonnal absurdity respectively. The logical sphere. in the sense of the sphere oriented towards fonnal truth and objectivity. is certainly i to grammar. This is not true of all logic whatever. If. however, one . discredit the lower logical sphere on account of its supposed narrow ousness and practical uselessness. one would have to say that it ill befill philosopher. the dedicated representative of purely theoretical inteTeltl. let himself be guided by considerations of practical use. He must surety know that it is precisely behind the obvious that the hardest prob hidden, that this is so much so. in fact. that philosophy may be cally, but not unprofoundly. called the science of the trivial. In the case at least what seems at first quite trivial. reveals itself, on closer ination, as the source of deep-lying, widely ramifying problems. These lems, though intrinsically prior in the sense of Aristotle, are not the make themselves felt by logicians, concerned as these are with 0 ' validity: it is not, therefore. remarkable that, till this day, no logiciaaa. even Bolzano, have even formulated these problems scientifically, fonned the idea of a purely logical theory of fonns. Logic accordingly its prime foundation: it lacks a scientifically strict, phenomenol clarified distinction of primitive meaning.elements and structures, knowledge of relevant laws of essence. We may thus explain how, in lar, the many theories of 'the concept' or 'the judgement', which in of their aspects belong in this field. have produced so few tenable This is to a large extent due to a lack of correct aims and vii.."",... confusions of radically distinct layers of problems, and to a psy operative openly or in manifold disguises. Since the eye of the I ever on form. these defects also point to difficulties inherent in these themselves.

Note 4 For related but opposed conceptions one may refer to H. S Einleilllng in die PsydlOJogie lind Sprachll"issenschaft (lntroductiOli 'Sprechen und Denken, Grammatik und Logik', pp. 44ff.). I referes to his beautifully precise statement of the notion ofW. v. Humboldt (laC. pp. 63 ff), from which it would seem that the views stated here are in points close to those of the great thinker. whom Steinthal also . Steinthal himself sides against us, and raises many objections to our but our distinctions would seem to have disposed of these all so clearly, no thoroughgoing criticism is required here.

Investigation V

O-;;intentional experiences and their 'contents'

lour Second Investigation we clarified the general sense of the ideality of ~ Species and. I~gether with it. the. sense ~r the id.e~lity of meanings with ..-bich pure logic IS concerned. As Wlth all Ideal URllle5, there are here real possibilities. and perhaps actualities. whic.h correspond to m~nings: t~ mean-

ings ill specie correspond acts of meamng, the fonner bemg not.hmg but ideally apprehended aspects of the lauer. New questions now arise regarding the kind of eAperiences in which the supreme genus Meaning has its originative source. and likewise regarding the various sorts of experiences in ....ilich essentially different sorts of meaning unfold. We wish 10 enquire into ti!e originative source of the concept of Meaning and its essential specifications, so as to achieve a deeper-going. more widely ranging answer to our question than our investigations have so far given us. In very close connec· tion with this question. certain other questions arise: meanings have to be present in meaning-intentions that can come into a certain relation to intuition. We have orten spoken of Ihefuljilment of a meaning-intention through a corresponding intuition. and have said that the highest form of such ful. fiIment was that of self-evidence. It is therefore our task to describe this rtma.r~able phenomenological relationship. and 10 lay down its role. and so :~a~fY .the notions of knowledge which presuppose it. For an analytical thr IJgalJon these ~asks are not really separable from our earlier work on tio essence of meamng (particularly as this last relates to the logical presentan and the logical judgcment). .... The present investigation will not yet embark on these tasks. since we -nnOt ent . . Phe er ~pon them wlIhout firsl pcrfornllng a much more general as ,;o~enologlcal investigation. Experiences of meaning are classifiable in th~ts. and the meaningful clement in cach such single act must be sought makes a~~:~pcr~('nc~. and .not i.n its o~jcct; it must I.ie in t~at c1em.cnt which essence f act
80

On Intentional experiences and their 'contents'

chapter...:I_---------

an

'act', ~nd doubt, i,f not quic~ rej~tion, may have been aroused by sages In our prevIous Investigations where we made use of the no . 'act' to characterize or express our conception. It is therefore im and a precondition for carrying out all our tasks, that this concept be clarified before all others. It will appear that the concept of act, sense of (III ill/emionol experience, circumscribes an important generic in the sphere of experiences (apprehended in its phenomenological and that to put meaning-experiences inlo this genus enables us to terize them in a truly worthwhile manner, It is of course part of phenomenological research into the essence as such, that we should clear up the difference betwec=n the characr.r the roment of acts, and that, as regards the lauer. we should point fundamentally different senses in which the 'content' of an act bu. talked about. The nature of acts as such cannot be satisfactorily discussed goes fairly fully into the phenomenology of 'presentations', 1be ' relevance of this topic is recalled by the well,known statement, that act is either a presentation or is founded upon presentations, We however, ask which of the very many concepts of 'presentation' is required one: to separate tbe closely confused phenomena und ambiguities of this word thus becomes an essentiaJ part of our tast. The treatment of the problems thus rougbJy outlined (to whicb others will be intimately linked) is suitably connected by us with the concepts of consciousness which are always being distinguished, always shading into one anotber in descriptive psychology, Mental often called 'activities of consciousness', 'relations of conscio conlent (object)', and 'consciousness' is, in facl, at times defined at a prehensive expression covering mental acts of all SOrlS,

;:::..-;--

_

consciousness as the henomenological subsistence of P d ' the ego an consciousness as .Inner perception

§I Varied ambiguity of the term 'consciousness' In p5}'Chology there is much talk of 'consciousness', and likewise of 'conscious contents' and 'conscious experiences': the latter are generally abbreviated to 'contents' and 'experiences', This talk is mainly connected with the division beCween psychical and physical phenomena; the fonner being those phenomena which belong 10 the sphere of psychology, the latter to the sphere of the natural sciences, Our problem, that of circumscribing the concept of 'mental act' ~. i~ ph~nomenological essence, is closely connected with this problem of dl~lon, Since the concept arose precisely in this context, as supposedly marking off the psychological sphere, On(' concept of consciousness is justifiably ~~loYed in effecting this demarcation correctly, another yields us lhe defimtlon of a mental act. We must, in either case, distinguish between ~;:l them~ticall}' cognate, an~ so readily confounded, notions. ha' s,hall, In what follows, diSCUSS three concepts of consciousness, as vlDg mterest for our purposes:

I. COnsciou · " sness as th e entire, real (reell(') phenomenological being of the eJnptncal ego's th . . f . . . trea ' .. I' mterweavlng 0 psychiC expenences m the unified

2 ~ ~ of consciousness. , nscrousness a th . " . l. Co' s e mner awareness of one s own psychiC expenences. OSCIOusness as a h ' d· . ttmio . ,compre enslve eSlgnatlon for 'mental acts', or 'innal expenences', of all sorlS.

th:\t~,

hardly, be said that we have not exhausted 011 ambiguities of

n~O-SCien~~fique~tl~n, I particularly r~all, e.g.. modes of speech current in

8Ciousnes" ~ ~arl.mce such as 'emenng consciousness', 'coming to con-

selr~nsc~' helgh,tened' or 'reduced' sclf..consciousness, the 'awakening of

frOIl} the :uslle~s (the last expression quite differently used in psychology Since allOse gIven it ill ordinary life), and so forth, ilIlJbiguou terms ll\ all relevant for terminological differentiation are thetn;lve:' an unambiguous fixing of the concepts which here distinguish Can only be done indirectly: we must put together equivalent

82

On intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego

expressions, and oppose them to expressions to be kept apart from t we must employ suitable paraphrases and explanations. We shall t have to make use of these aids.

§2 Fir-st sense: Consciousness as the r-eal phenomenological unity of the ego's exper-iences. The concept of an experience We begin with the following summary statement. The modern psyc defines (or could define) his science as the science of 'psychic indi considered as concrete conscious unities. or as the science of tbe experiences of experiencing individuals; the juxtaposition of these this context determines a certain concept of consciousness and, at the time, certain concepts of experience and content. These latter terms, • ence' and 'content', mean for the modern psychologist the real (Wundt rightly calls them 'events') which, in flux from one momeut next. and interconnected and interpenetrating in manifold ways, the real unity-of-consciousness of the individual mind. In this seDIIt cepts, imaginative and pictorial presentations. acts of conceptual surmises and doubts, joys and griefs, hopes and fears. wishes and acts etc., are, just as they flourish in our consciousness, 'experiences' or' of consciousness', And, with these experiences in their total and fulness, their component parts and abstract aspects are also ex they arc real contents of consciousness. Naturally, it is irrelevant these parts are in some manner inwardly articulated, whether they are off by special acts directed upon themselves, and whether, in particuIU are themselves objects of an 'inner' perception, which seizes them as in consciousness. and even whether they can be such objects or not. We may now point out that lhis concept of consciousness can be purely phe/lomellologicalmallner, i.e. a manner which cuts out all re empirically real exislellce (to persons or animals in nature): ex . the descriptive-psychological or empirically-phenomenological sed. becomes experience in the sense of pure phenomenology, I The illustrations that we now append may and must lead to the convicti~ the required exclusion lies always in our power, and that the d psychological treatments that we have first applied or might first a such illustrations. are to be interpreted 'purely' in the manner above, and to be understood in what follows as pure, a priori insights . Ci essence. The same, of course, holds in all par~llel.cases. The sensational moment of colour, e.g.. whIch 10 outer percepuon a real constituent of my concrete seeing (in the phenomenological visual perceiving or appearing) is as much an 'cxperienced' or 'co content, as is the character of perceiving. or as the full perceptual ap or the coloured object. As opposed to this. however. this object,

sense.

83

< : s not itself experienced nor conscious, and the same applies to percel~ou~ing perceived in it. If the object is non-existent, if the percept is tne cO 0 critil.:islll as delusive, hallucinatory, illusory etc" then the visually open '~'ed coloUr. that of the object. does not exist either. Such differences of l perce [and abnormal. of veridical and delusive perception. do not affect the ?~:al. purely descriptive (or phenomenological) character of perception. ~~ile the secn. colour, i.e. t.he colour appea~ing upon and with the ~p~a.r­ in object of visual ~rceP.t1on, and seen. as Its property: and one Wlt~ It 10 . g resent being - whIle thIS colour certamly does not eXIst as an experience, :~e~ is a real part. (reelles Besumdstii.ck) of our experienc~, of this appearing to perception, \~hlch corres~onds to It. Our colo.ur-sensatlon correspo~ds to '1 thai qualitatively determmate phenomenological colour-aspect, which re~i\'es an 'objeclifying interpretation' in perception, or in an intrinsic aspect of such perception (the 'appearance of the object's colouring'), These two, the colour-sensation and the object's objective colouring, are often confounded. In our time people have favoured a form of words according to which both are the same thing, only seen from a different standpoint, or with adilferent interest: psychologically or subjectively speaking, one has a sensation, physically or objectively speaking, one has a property of an ex.ternal thing. Here it is enough to point to the readily grasped difference between the red of this ball, objectively seen as uniform, and the indubitable. unavoidable projective differences among the subjective colour-sensations in our percept, a difference repeated in all sorts of objective properties and the sensational complcxcs which correspond to them. What we have said about single properties carries over to concrete wholes. It is phenomenologically false to say that the difference between a conscious ~ntent in perception. and the external object perceived (or perceptually tntend~) in it. is a mere difference in mode of treatment, the same appear~L'e being at one time dealt with in a subjective connection (in connection ~I,th appearances which relate to an ego), and at another time in an objec~e Connection (in connection with the things themselves). We cannot too ~arply strcss the equivocation which allows us to use the word 'appearance' th of the experience in II·hiclt Ihe ohjeds appearing consist,l' (the concrete :teeb~ual experience, in which the object itself seems present to us) and of " ·'h'Jt'Ct which uppCllrs as .fllch. The deceptive spell of this equivocation nlS es . of th ~s soon as one takes phenomenological account as to how lillie apPee object which appears is as such to be found in the experience of its ~hic~nng. Thc appearing of the thing (the experience) is not the thing io g in ~ppears. (that SCCms 10 stand before us ilt propria persona), As belong~ bela: c?n~lous connection, the appearing of things is experienced by us, ng .1I1 the phenomenal world, things appear before us. The appearll]g of h&i Ir \\, t C things does not itself appear to us, we live through it. !)hYSi~lo~rsClvcs appear. to oursel~cs as members of the phe~omena~ world.! nd mental thmgs (bodies and persons) appear 10 phySIcal and

81

On Intentional experiences and [heir 'contents'

mental relation to our phenomenal ego. This relmion of the p object (that we also like to call a 'conscious content') to /he pheno ject (myself as an empirical person. a thing) must naturally be kept the relll/ioll ofa conscious content. in the sense of tin experience. to ness in the sense of alinity of such COtlSciOlIS contents (the phenom subsistence of an empirical ego). There we were concerned with the of two appearing things, here with the relation of a single expe . complex of experiences. Just so, conversely. we must of course .• the relation of the appearing person I to the externally appeariac from the relalion of the thing's appearing ('qlla' experience) to the 1 appears. If we speak of the latter relation. we only make clear to that the experience is not itself what is intentionally present 'in' it: e.g., make plain that what is predicated of a thing's appearing ia predicated of the thing that appears in it. And yet another rela . objectifying relation ascribed by us to the sense-complex exper' when something appears to us. a relation in whieh the complex s object which appears 10 us. We concede that such a complex is ex the act of appearing, but say that it is in a certain maoner 'in 'apperceived', and hold that it is in the phenomenological character an animating interpretation of sensation that what we call the a the object consists.) Similar distinctions of essence to those needed by us in the CUI ception. when we sought to separate off what is really 'experieocc' really composes it, from what is only 'in' it in an 'improper' or . sense. will have soon to be drawn in the case of other 'acts' as well soon have to deal with such distinctions more generally. Here il it portant to guard from the start against certain misleading thoughl which might obscure the plain sense of the notions to be elucida

Consciousness as [he phenomenological subsistence of [he ego

85

- - -. - -judgll1g ' etc., WIt'h t.h' 'hie sense-material. their interpret·nl!. elr varlll ....reel VI . . h f':"\~ cont~nt. theIr assertive. c ~rac~ers elC. Experiencing in the latter sense .U . e different from expcnencmg m the former sense. To experience outer jsqUII I ' r ' meant to /lwe certam acts 0 perception, of this or that type of tS C\'tIl .Iedge. dlrecte . d upon t hem. Th'IS 'h avmg ' , at once furnishes an instance :r~ quite different 'e~periencing' in the sense. of phenomenology. This p)eICIY mea.ns that certam content~ help to .constltute a uoity of consciouspeSS. enter II1to the ~h~nom~nologJcally ul1l~ed str~am of consciousness of CII1pirical ego. ThiS Itself IS a real whole, m reality made up of manifold ~ each of which m~y be said to ~ ·experien~'. It is. in this sense that ,.. bat the ego or consciousness expenences. are Its expenence: there is no difference belween the experience or conscious content and the experience iudf. What is sensed is, e.g., no different from the sensation. lf, however, an experience 'diree:ts i~lr t~ an object dislinguishable from itself, as, e.g., otema! perceptIon directs Itself to a perceived object, a nommal presentation 10 an object named etc., such an objecl is not experienced or conscious in the sense to be established here, but perceived, named etc. The situation justifies talk of 'contents', which is here entirely proper. The lXlnlUl1 sense of the word 'content' is relative: it refers quite generaUy to a alIIIprebensive unity which has its content in the sum total of its component ~ ~tever can be regarded as a part of a whole, and as truly constitutmg It In real fashion (reell), belongs to the content of that whole. 10 our ~t desc~ptive-psychologicaltalk of contents, the tactitJy assumed relaIionaI focus, I.e. the corresponding whole is the real unity of consciousness Itscot . h ' , pluraJ 0 ent IS t e sum t~tal of present ex~riences. and 'contents' in the tu means these expenenccs themselves. I.e. all that as real parts constile any phenomenological stream of consciousness.

14 lndThe ex §3 The phenomenological and the popular cone of experience A similar aim leads us to point out that ollr concept of experiena tally with the popular notion; here the distinction just sketched, real (reel/em) and intentional content. has its part to play.

If someone says he 'experienced' the wars of 1866 and 1870, then has been said to have ;experienced' in this sense. is a complex events. and 'experiencing' consists here in perceptions,judgern.ents f acts, in which these events appear as objects. and often as objects. 0 assertions which relate them to the empirical ego. The experiencln. the phenomenologically paradigmatic sense. has naturally not got theI' in itself as things mentally lived through. as its real constituenls or in the way in which these events are in the things concerned in th it finds in ilself. what are present in it as realities. are the relevant

relat' ' . Ion b etween experienCing consciousness Pet r perlenced content is no phenomenologically u lar type of relation

1'be foregoin

.. g expoSlllon has made clear that the relation in which ex periare thought t d " , Perierl·. 0 stan to an expenencmg conSCIOusness (or to an ex. Clng phenome I ' I ')' ' 'lIlia/ion . no oglca ego pomts to no peculiar phenomenological ~

OrIe'lO . The ego m the sense of common discourse is an empirical object

PbYsica~nh~gO as much as someone else's, and each ego as much as an;

etn._ .00000000nc tlngaho • use

or a tree elc. S" clentlfic elaboralion may alter our llldividu.~Pt a.s Ill.uch as it will. but. if it avoids fiction. Ihe ego remains an U Go Other • ~hll1ghke object. which. like all such objects. has phenomenally unltv. than th'a tgiven ' 'Ith ' uOlfied , ).. ~ 'oYhich· ;"U t roug h Its phenomenal pmpenies It..... Inth' h ' , , -,., the . ~Ill as liS own lOternul make-up. If we cut out the ego-body tlIoIOgicalempJrlCal ego. and limit the purely mental ego to ils phenomCOntent. the latter reduces to a unity of consciousness. to a real

86

On intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 87

experiential complex. which we (i.e. each man for his own ego) part evidently present. and for the rest postulate o~ good ~o phenomenologically reduced ego is therefore nothl.ng pee.uhar, above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own lOt unity. In the nature of its contents. and the laws they obey, of connection are grounded. They run in diverse fashions from content. from complex of contents to complex of contents, till in unified sum total of content is constituted, which does not differ phenomenologically reduced ego itself. These ~ontents have, u, generally have, their own law-bound ways of comlOg together. ofl selves in more comprehensive unities and. in so far as they thua and are one. the phenomenological ego or unity of consciousness ill constituted, without need of an additional. peculiar ego-pri . supports all contents and unites them all once again. Here as e not clear what such a principle would effect.}

cen.u.

§5 Second sense. 'Inner' consciousness as inner perception Our sense of the tenns 'consciousness', 'experience'. 'content', bas in the treatments of the last three sections, a descriptive-psycho which. with phenomenologk:al ·purification'. becomes purely pbcn We wish to adhere to this sense in future, but only when other have been expressly indicated. . A second concept of consciousness is expressed by talk of sciousness'. This is thaI 'inner perception' thought to accompaDY in ce~tain classes ~f present experiences, whether in general, relate to them as its objects. The 'self-evldence- usually allnbuud perception. shows it to be taken to be an adequate perception, .OPI: nothing to its objects that is not intuitively present~, and g:JvaI. part (reell) of the perceptual experience. and one Whl.ch, conv ively presents and posits its objects just as they are 10. fact ex , and with their perception. Every perception is characterized by ~ • of grasping its object as present. and in prop~;a perso.na. To thiS perception corresponds with complete perf:ctlon. aC~leves object in it is it~lf actua~ly present, and 10 the stnc~est . ~nseand ropria persona. IS exhaustively apprehended as that which It IS, . P 0 0 0 r I. 0, I' IOs aceor
0:

o

----::-nce (which would be caJled an 'inner' percept in the natural ipnd e~ the word) need be adequate. In view of the just exposed ambiguity sense 0 pression 'inner perception', it would be best to have different terms oft~e e~ perception, as the perception of one's own experiences, and ad· foT r e\1dent perception. The epistemologically confused and psycho~I)' misused distinction of inner and outer perception would then vanish: been put in the place of the genuine contrast between adeqllUie and it;node has /lale perception . ° ° whOhh IC as ItS roots 10 t he pure p henomenological ~ of such experiences. IOn this point, see the Appendix on internal and external perception.1 . . Many thinkers. as, e.g.. Brentano, are led to posit a close connection between me t.....O concepts of con~ousness so far di~ussed, ~use they think that theY may regard the conSCIousness, or the bemg-expenenced, of contents, in the fint sense, as at the same time a consciousness in the second sense. The equivocation which pushes us to treat consciousness as a sort of knowing, and in fact of intuitive knowing, may here have recommended a conception fraught with 100 many grave difficulties. I recall the infinite regress which sprung from the circumstance that inner perception is itself another experimee, which requires a new percept, to which the same again applies etc" a regress which Brentano sought to avoid by distinguishing between a primary and a secondary direction of perception. Since our concern is here with purtiy phenomenological asseverations, we must leave theories of this sort ?D one side, so long, that is, as the need to assume the unbroken activity of moer perception cannot be phenomenologically demonstrated.

1lI0:

16 Origin of the first concept of consciousness out of the second

~ndeni~bIY.th~ second concept

of consciousness is the more 'primitive': it Pasla~ I~tn~slc priority'. The following considerations would enable us to Obe. If~t1fi~ order from th~s last narrower concept to our former, broader lim I e ConSIder the self-eVIdence of the Cogito. ergo SIIIII, or rather of its as one that can be sustained against all doubts, then it is plain other""ha t here passes as ego cannot be the empirical ego. But since. on the ~ nd......e cannot allow the self-evidence of the proposition ,( am' to the ego o~. the knowledge and acceptance of philosophical ideas about the jUd w Ich have always remained questionable, we can at best say: In ern g~~ent '1 am' self-evidence attaches to a certain central kernel of Plrtcal ego -notion whO It ~ no...... IC hObo IS not unded by a perfectly clear concept. ~OTt ask what could belong 10 this conceplUally undemarcated and ~ eletnunUt~erable kernel. what may constitute the self-evidently certain, JIId~ ent In the empirical ego at each momenl, it comes easy to refer to ~tl a~~s of in~er (i.e. adequate) perception. Not only is it self-evident . self-eVIdence also attaches to countless judgements of the form

llJare;::m,

°

88

On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

I perceil'f' this or Illar. where I not merely think, but am also self assured, that what) perceive is given as I think of it, that I appre thing itself, and for what it is - this pleasure, e.g" that fills me, this asm of the mind that float before me etc. All these judgements share of the judgement 'I am', they elude complete conceptualization and sion. they are evident only in their living intention, which cannot equately imparted in words. What is adequately perceived, whether thus vaguely or left unexpressed, constitutes the epistemologically absolutely certain focus yielded by the reduction, at any given m the phenomenal empirical ego to such of its content as can be the pure phenomenologist. It is also true, conversely, that in the j ') am'. it is the kernel of what is adequately perceived which, ranpd the ego. first makes possible and provides a ground for this 'I am' ence.' To this primary focus more territory is added when we red past phenomenological content all that retention, essentially a perception, reports as having been recently present, and also aU tbIl lection reports as having belonged to our earlier actual ex,oericlllllll when we then go back through reflection to what 'in' retention aDd brance is reproductively phenomenological. We proceed similarly • can be assumed on empirical grounds to coexist with what at eac:II we adequately perceive, or with what can be assumed to have . what now forms the reflective substance of retention and recol can be assumed to have cohered continuously with it in unity. 'cohered continuously with it in unity', I refer to the unity of the phenomenological whole, whose parts are either abstract aspeCtl, founded upon, and requiring each other in their coexistence, or p whose nature spring forms of coexistent unity, forms which act tribute to the content of the whole as real indwelling aspects. TheIe of coexistence' pass continuously into one another from one momeat next, composing a unity of change, of the stream of consciousness. its tum demands the continuous persistence, or no continuous c least one aspect essential for its total unity, and so inseparable f a whole. This part is played by the presentative form of lime wbicb manent in the stream of consciousness, which lauer appears as a time (not in the time of the world of things. but in the time which together with the stream of consciousness itself, and in which the flows). Each instant of this time is given in a continuous projective (so-to-speak) 'time·sensations'; in each actual phase of the strea~ sciousness the wllole time-horizon of the stream is presented, and It possesses a form overreaching all its contents. which remains the satDI continuously, though its content steadily alters. This accordingly forms the phenomenological content of the ego, empirical ego in the sense of the psychic subject. Phenomenological yields the really self-enclosed. temporally growing unity of the s

Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego

8'i

-------'f ' has WI'd cned out from what is inwardly . ce The notion 0 expe:nence e.tpe~~~. ;l1d thai is in this sense conscious. to the notion of the 'phenomemr ::;;; ego'. by which the empirical ego is intentionally constituted.

1 Reciprocal demarcation of psychology and I Ural science (first edition) nat (PaJ1.gra ph from the First Edition, excised by Husserl from the Second Edition as being unclear and irrelevant.) Ps)"Chology's tas~ - d~riptiv~ly - is. to study the ego-experiences (or con-

scious contents) 10 their essential Species and forms of combination, in order to explore - genetically - their origin and perishing, and the causal patterns

and laws of their formation and transformation. For psychology, conscious contenlS are contents of an ego, and so its task is to explore the real essence of the ego (no mystical thing-in-itself but one only to be demonstrated empirically), to explore the interweaving of psychic elements in the ego, and their subsequent de\'elopment and degeneration. To empirical egos stand opposed empirical, physical things, non-egos, unities of coexistence and succession. having a claim to exist as things. To us, wbo are egos, they are only given as intentional unities. as things reftmd to in psychical experiences, as unities presented or judged about. They are not for this reason themselves mere presentations, any more than the same is true of the egos alien to ourselves. Physical things are given to us, they stand before us, they are objects - this means that we have certain percepts and judgements fitted to them which are 'directed to these objects'. ~o the system of all such percepts and judgements corresponds its inten. cOITel.at~, t~~ physical world. As we deal with the system of such ~eOls 10 indIVIduals, or as the common judgement-system of a comrnuruty of . d' . Pl't.cise d' ~n I~duals. or in the unity of science, we should draw more em '. lstlO~tlons between the world of the individual. the world of the ncal , socl3l community, and perhaps the world of an ideal community of psyc~~wers. the world of (ideally perfected) science, the world in itself. law leal experiences and the ego likewise document their being and their 'gOverned co . I" Pl'tSen' nnectlons on y In science as a system of objectively valid latIOns and J' ud gements, an d t hey are given ' .tional' only as targets of in ten· ' .III a SOaCts In the ego. But t hey are gIVen. truly and as what they are. though haPPen m~What narrower sphere than that of their being. while this never ""hich r~n Ihe case of physical things. The doctrine of Berkeley and Hume, the fact huces phen.omenal bodies to bundles of ideas, fails to do justice to ttali~blle at. even If the elementary ideas in these bundles are psychically ' t i . the bundle itself. the intended complexes of clements, are never tlto,.erWjI~ real fashion (reell gegenll'iinig) in any human consciousness and be. No body can be inwardly perceived _ not because it is ·physicar.

':a1 i

90 On intentional experiences and [heir 'contenu' but because. e,g.. its three-dimensional spatiality cannot be adeq tuited in any consciousness. But adequate intuition is the same as ' perception. It is the fundamental defect of phenomenalistic th they draw no distinction between appearance (Erscheimmg) as in experience, and the apparent object (the subject of the objective p and therefore identify the experienced complex of sensation with the plex of objective features. In any case the objective unities of ps and those of natural science are not identical. at least not. as in the of first data, they await scientific elaboration. Whether the two their full development will still be separated, depends on whether tbey concern separate, or at least relatively self-sufficient realities in their relation. (Such self-sufficiency does not of course entail necessary of the two realities by any mystical abysses.) We can tum the mat_ and say: If there is such a separation. we can only learn of it as both develop, It is sure, at least, that their points of origin, the original facts that they anempt to elaborate, are to a large extent mutuallr pendent, and that this is true, further. as regards their advancing We can indeed not exclude the possibility which is presented by enalism as a proven theory - to me phenomenalism has nOI beyond vague, if by no means worthless lines of thought - that the bases of all talk of physical things and happenings lie merely governed correlations established among the psychical experiences ~ consciousnesses. The acceptance of such a theory would not, ho move the separation of the sciences. The distinction between lived ences, conscious contents, and the non-experiences presented ' experiences (and perceived in them or judged to exist) would before the foundation for the division of the sciences as departments son. It would therefore be the foundation for the son of division tbIt is in question at the present stage of development of the sciences. demand of a 'psychology without a soul'. i.e, a psychology that all metaphysical presumptions in regard to the soul - and does so they could only become insights when science was perfected - co the demand of a 'natural science without bodies', i.e. a natural ' begins by rejecting all theories as to the metaphysical nature of the , Such a theory which puts metaphysics in bondage from the outset, • we have in phenomenalism. But it ought not to anticipate the the question as to the division of the two sciences. The division m on purely phenomenological ground, and I think that. in this resped. discussions above were well suited to resolve the much-debated q in a satisfactory manner. They only make use of the most fun phenomenological distinctions. those between the descriptive contcal the intended object of our percepts and of our 'acts' in general. This distinction has naturally not escaped the psychologists. We in Hobbes. Descartes and Locke. One can say that all the greater thinkers h~l\'e at times touched on it or treated of it. It is only a

Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego 91 - - - : ; : do so ,II times. instead of starting with the distinction. and the~ tU~hc ~loscst account of it at every step. instead. that is. of making it '''j
o;;re

'I

The pu,.e ego and awa,.eness ('Sewusstheit')

We have not so far referred to the pure ego (the ego of 'pure apperception') whkh for many Kantians. and likewise for many empirical investigators, provides the unitary centre of relation, to which all conscious content is as such referred in a wholly peculiar fashion. To the fact of 'subjective experic.n ee' or consciousness, this pure ego is accordingly held to pertain essentIally. 'Consciousness is relation to the ego', and whatever stands in this relation is a content of consciousness. 'We call anything content if it is relat~ to an ego in consciousness: its other properties are irrelevant.' 'This relatl~n is plainly one and the same despite manifold variation of content: it ~tuutes. in fact. what is common and specifie to consciousness. We mark. It ofT', ,says atorp (whom we are continuously quoting}.l 'by the special ~~Ion "awareness" (Bell'llssihei/) to distinguish it from the total fact of --'O'lO USness.. The ego (I.f slIhjl!('ril"l' cemre of rl'llltion for all contents in my conscious-

~ess. cannot be compared to what are contrasted with it. it is not relat~ve to the~l as they are to it. it is not consciously given to its contents as

i ey are .glven {O il. It reveals itself as ~mi g('//eris in its incapacity to be nn anythlllg else's consciousness. while other things arc in its conscious~s~. It cannot itself be a contellt. and resembles nothing that could d a .content of consciousness. For Ihis reason. it can be no further CScnbcd . since all descriptive terms we might seck to employ. could be d rawn hit On Iy rrom the content of consciousness. and could nOI therefore CO ~ff the ego, or a relation 10 the ego. Otherwise put: each idea we l.J d make of the ego would turn it into an objeci. but we have ceased

92

On intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego

eao'

to think of it as an ego. if we think of it as an object. To be an to be an object. but to be something opposed to all objects. for they are objects. The same holds of their relation to the. ego. in-consciousness means being-objective for an ego: such belDg cannot in ils tum be made into an object. The faci of awareness. while it is the basic fact of psychology, acknowledged and specially emphasized. but it can neither be nor deduced from anything else.

These statements are impressive. but closer consideration fails 10 stantiate them, How can we assert such a 'basic fact of psycholoo". are unable to think it. and how can we think it. if not by making the consciousness, both subject-matters of our assertion, into 'objc:ccs1 might be done if we thought of this fact only in indirect, symbolic Natorp, however. wants it to be a 'basic fact'. which must as such given in direct intuition, He in fact tells us that it 'can be ack.no~ specially emphasized'. Surely what is a~knowledged ~r emphasized content? Surely it will be made inlo an object? Perhaps, mdeed, some concept of object is excluded, but the wider concept is here relevant. A note of a thought, a sensation, a slirring of displeasure etc., maUl experiences objects of inner perception. without making them ob~ sense of things. just so. the ego as relational centre. and an~ . lation of the ego to some content, will. if taken note of. be objCCllveIJ I must frankly confess, however, that I am quite unable to find this primitive, necessary centre of relations.' The only.'hing I. c.an of. and therefore perceive. are the empirical ego and Its empm~ to its own experiences, or to such external objects as a~ recelVlDl attention at the moment, while much remains, whether 'Without' or which has no such relation to the ego. I can only clarify this situation by subjecting ~he empiri~ ego, empirical relation to objects. to phenomenological analySIS, froat the above conception necessarily results. We excluded the body-ego. appearances resemble those of any other physical thing. and dealt mind-ego. which is empirically bound up with the former, and a belonging to it. Reduced to d~ta that are phenome.nologicaUy .::. yields us the complex of reflectively graspable expenences descn a complex which stands in the same sort of relation to the mental ego side of a perceived external thing open to perception .stand,s to the thing. The cons:cious .intentional. relation of t~e eg~ to ItS O~Jec~re tbI me simply that mtentlonal experiences whose mtent~onal ob}~ts e body. the personal ego-mind and therefore the entire empln~1 ~ or human person. are included in the total phenomenological unity of consciousness. and that such intentional experiences also an essential phenomenological kernel in the phenomenal ego.

9)

~{!S us to our third concept of consciousness, defined in terms of ~IS 'int;ntional experiences', which will be analysed in our next chapter.

'aetS or

uliar character of intentional experiences is contested. if one refuses Irth: : what for u~ is most. certa~n, that bei~g-an-object con~ists phenom10 :IOgicallY in ccrt:lln acts m. whl~~ somethlOg ,appears..or IS th~ught of ert r object. it Will not be IOtclhglble how belOg·an-obJect can Itself be liS .outi\,c 10 us. For us the matter is quite clear: there are acts 'trained upon' ObJCChanlcter of acts in which something appears, or there arc acts tmined the ~ the empirical ego and its relation to the object. The phenomenological ~:e1 of the cm~irical ego he~ con~ists of acts which ~ring o~jects to its notice. acts in which the ego directs Itself to the appropnate object. I am unable. further, to grasp the view that the relation of the ego to conscious content is bare of all difference. For if by 'content' we mean the tX~ience which forms the real side .of the phe~omen~logical ego. surely the way in which contents enter the unity of expenence wdl depend throughout on their specific nature, which is true of all parts that enter into wholes? But, if by 'content' we mean some object upon which consciousness 'directs itselr, whether perceivingly, imaginingly, retrospectively, expectantly, conceptually or predicatively etc., then it plainly involves many differences, obvious even in running through the expressions just used. Objection may be raised to our previous assertion that the ego appears to itself, enjoys a consciousness and, in particular. a perception of itself. Selfperception of the empirical ego is, however. a daily business. which involves no difficulty for understanding. We perceive the ego. just as we perceive an txtemal thing, That the object does not offer all its parts and sides to perception is as irrelevant in this case as in that. For perception is essentially the ~~mptive apprehcnsion of some object, not its adequate intuition. PercepI~on Itself, though part of the ego's phenomenological being, naturally falls. like SO much else in consciousness that evades notice, beyond the glance of Ptt'ce~tion. much as ungrasped. yet apparent, aspects of a perceived external thlOg are not themselves perceived. Ego and thing are in either case said to be perceived. and perceived they indeed are. and in full. 'bodily' presence. It ~dditional Note 10 the Secolld Edition. I must expressly emphasize that the ~lJde here taken up to the question of the pure ego - an attitude I no longer btl rse, as remarked before - is irrell.'l'tmt to thl.' im'estigations of this I'Olume. thePonant .'IS this question may be, phenomenologically or in other respects, gcn~ ~~m'lln wide fields of phenomenological problems, relating more or less Of esr
Chapter 2

Consciousness as intentional experience

------------~::...::::..==-=:::=:.-::

9S

We must now embark upon a fuller analytic discussion of OUf third of consciousness. which ranges over the same phenomenological field concept of 'mental act". In connection with this. talk of conscious talk in particular concerniog contents of presentations. judgements etc.. a variety of me-doings. which it is aU-important to sort out and to the sharpest scrutiny.

h experiences. merely havini contents inside it such as the experiences but unable to intcrpret these objectively, or otherwise use them o '" ke objecls present to .ItseIf,quite . IIlcapable. . therefore. of referring to a 10'" h f'd ' , b'ecls in furt er acts 0 JU gement. JOy. gnef. love. hatred. desire and ~thing - such ~ ~ing would n.ot be called ',psychical' by anyone, If one doubts whether I~ IS at all poSSIble to ~oncelve of such a being, a mere complex of sens~uons, one has but to ,,?lIlt to external phenomenal things. resent 10 consciousness through sensatIonal complexes. but not appearing ~ such Ihemselves. and called by us 'bodies' or 'inanimate things', since they lack all psychical experiences in the sense of our examples. Turning aside from psychology, and entering the field of the philosophical disciplines proper. we perceive the fundamental importance of our class of experiences, since only its members are relevant in the highest ranks of the normative sciences. They alone. seized in their phenomenological purity. furnisb concrete bases for abstracting the fundamental notions that function systematically in logic, ethics and aesthetics, and tbat enter into the ideal laws of these sciences. Our mention of logic recalls the panicular interest which has inspired our whole probing into such experiences.

§9 The meaning of Brentano's demarcation of 'psychic phenomena'

110 Descriptive character'ization of acts as 'intentional' experiences

Among the demarcations of classes in descriptive psychology, there ill mOTe remarkable nor more important philosophically than t..he one by Brentano under his title of ;psychical phenomena'. and used by his well·known division of phenomena into psychical and physicaL that I can approve of the great thinker's guiding conviction, plain f very [emu that he uses. that he had achieved an exhaustive cl . of 'phenomena' through which the field of psychological research kept apan from that of natural science, and through which the vexed q of the right delimitation of the fields of these disciplines could be very solved. Possibly a good sense can be given to defining psychology science of psychical phenomena. and to the coordinated definition of science as the science of physical phenomena, but there are good for disputing the view that the concepts which occur in Orentano's ' are those found under like names in the definitions in question, It shown that not all 'psychical phenomena' in the sense of a possible tion of psychology, arc psychical phenomena (i.e. mental acts) in oren • sense. and that. on the other hand. many genuine 'psychical phenomena under Brentano's ambiguous rubric of 'physical phenomena',' The val Brentano's conception of:1 'psychical phenomenon' is, however, qu~tc pendent of the aims that inspired it. A sharply defined class of expen here brought before us. comprising all Ihat enjoys mcntal. conscio~ cnce in a certain pregnaf/l sense of these words. A real being depl1

We must now dig down to the essence of Brentano's demarcation of phenomenal classes. of his concept of consciousness in the sense of psychical act. ~~O\'td by the interest in classification just mentioned, Brentano conducts ~ enquiry i~ the form of a two-edged separation of the two main classes of phen~mena that he recognizes, the psychical and the physical. He arrives at a Sixfold differentiation in which only two heads are relevant for our purpose, since in all the others misleading ambiguities do their destructive ~'ohrk~ rendering untenable his notion of 'phenomenon' in general and of ' partlcu . Iar, as weII as bis concepts of internal and eplH )'Sical pheno menon • 111 : crnal perception.) .. . Of his two ' . I d'ff< Psych' pnnclpa I erentlUtlOl1S. one directly reveals the essence of lcat we h phenomena or acts. This strikes us unmistakably in any illustration oose irnaCg. . In perception something is perceived. in imagination. something . love something loved. in hate hatedIned " In .a St·
Consciousness as intentional experience

SUr' n~tiol1.

of all ~.l1ledlacval schoolmen called the intentional (or mental) inexistence COnten~ ~CCt.
96

On Intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

in other passages) is presentative in a presentation, judicial in a jud etc. etc. Brentano's attempted classification of mental phenomena into entations,judgements and emotions ("phenomena oflovc and hate') is based upon this 'manner of reference', of which three basically . kinds are distinguished (each admitting of many further specificatioDl Whether we think Brentano's classification of 'psychical' p successful. and whether we think it basically significant for the who. ment of psychology, as Brentano claims it is, does not matter here. 0aI, point has importance for us: that there are essential. specific diffi intentional relation or intention (the generic descriptive character of The manner in which a 'mere presentation' refers to its object, difTcn the manner of a judgement. which treats the same state of affairs as false. Quite different again is the manner of a surmise or doubt, lite of a hope or a fear. of approval or disapproval. of desire or aversion; resolution of a theoretical doubt (judgemental decision) or of a doubt (voluntary decision in the case of deliberate choice); of the tion of a theoretical opinion (fulfilment of a judgemental intention), voluntary intention (fulfilment of what we mean to do). Most, if not are complex experiences. very often involving intentions which are selves multiple. Emotional intentions are built upon presentative or . intentions etc. We cannot, however. doubt that to resolve such co always to come down on primitive intentional characters whose essence precludes reduction into other types of experience, and unity of the descriptive genus 'intention' ("act-character') displays differences, flowing from its pure essence, which take Q priori over empirical, psychological matters-of-facl. There are essentially . species and subspecies of intention. We cannot. in particular, reduce ferences in acts into differences in the presentations or judgemcDtl involve. with help only from elements not of an intentional kind. approval or disapproval, c.g., is evidently and essentially a peculiar of intentional relation as opposed to the mere presentation or t . assessment of the aesthetic objet:t. Aesthetic approval and aesthel~ cates may be asserted, and their assertion is a judgement, and as such presentations. But the aesthetic intention and its objects are then of presentations and judgements: it remains essentially distinct from theoretical acts. To evaluatc a judgement as valid. an emotional ex . as elevated etc" prcsupposes analogous. closely related. not s identical intentions. Just so in comparisons of judgementul with vol decisions etc. . . , biolt We take intentional relation. understood 10 purely descnpuve fas an inward peculiarity of certain experiences. to be the essential feat 'psychical phenomcna' or 'acts'. sceing in Brentano's definition .of I 'phenomena intentionally containing objects in thcmsclves' a ClrcU tion of essence. whose 'reality' (in the traditional sense) is of course

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---pies S DiITcrently put in terms of purc phenomenology: Ideation e:l:am . . bY . ed in excmplary cases of such experiences - and so performed as perfo~l empirical.psychological conception and existential afTtrmation of to.lea~:t of:lccount. and to deal only with the real phenomenological con· being f these experiences - yields us the pure. phenomenological generic Idea len~o n!iofW! (,-,"{'(',it'"cf' or act. and of its various pure species.' That not of I1II~riences are intentional is proved by sensations and sensational com· all e~. Any piece of a sensed visual field. full as it is of visual contents. is an p}e;ll: rieoce containing many part-contents. which are neither referred to. nor ape "'h l . ntionally obJecu\·e. III t h e woe. Itt~e discussions which follow will give precision and clarity to the funda· meotallydiITercnt uses of the word ·content'. Everywhere it will appear that ,.,.hat ODe grasped in the analysis and comparison of instances of the two sorts ofcontents. can be ideationally seen as a pure distinction of essence. The phenomenological assertions we aim at, are all meant by us (even without special pointing) as assertions of essence. A second characterization of mental phenomena by Brentano that has value for us is the formula 'that they are either presentations or founded upon presentations·. l ' othing can bejudged about. nothing can likewise be desired, nothing can be hoped or feared. if it is not presented." In this char· aeterization the term 'presentation' does not of course mean the presented content or object. but the act of presenting this. This characterization does not seem a suitable starting-point for our reo searches, since it presupposes a concept of 'presentation' that has yet to be worked oul: it is hard to draw distinctions among the word's highly ambigu· o~ uses. The discussion of the concept of 'act' will lead us naturally on to this. But Ihe characterization is an important utterance. whose content prompts further investigations: we shall have to come back to it later.

1

1)1 Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings, a The 'mental' or 'immanent' object While to Brentano's essential characterization. our departures rrom h'we adhere " IS OplOlons force us to abandon his terminology. It will be as well to d ~~r talk .of 'psychical phenomcna'. or of 'phenomena' at all. where we are jl1sti~ng wllh experiences of the class in question. 'Psychical phenomena' is a PsYchable .phrase only on 8rentano's view that it fairly circumscribes the On a tlogleal field of research: on our view ;111 experiences are in this respect ambi e~e.1. Ihe term ·phenomenon· is likewise fraught with most dangerous ProregUlIles. and insinuates a quite doubtful theoretical persuasion. expressly At 'p~sed by Brelltano. that each intentional experience is a phenomenon. ap Pca ~nome~on' in its dominant use (which is also Brentano's) means an Only ;n g object as such. this implics that each intentional experience is not IrCCted upon objects. but is itself the object of certain intentional

98

On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

experiences. One thinks here, mainly, or the cxperiences in which 'appear' in the most special sense, Lc. perccptions: 'cvery psychical p enon is an object or inner consciousness', We have already mentioned grave misgivings that keep us rrom assenting to this, Further objections surround the expressions used by Brentano as with, or roughly circumscribing, his tenn 'psychical phenomenon' which are also in gcneral use. It is always quite questionable, and rreq • misleading, to say that perceived. imagined. asserted or desired obA 'enter consciousness' (or do so in perceptual. presentative rashion to say conversely that ·consciousness·. 'the ego' enters into this or tba of relation to them. or to say that such objects 'are taken up into c ness' in this or that way. or to say. similarly. that intentional ex 'contain something as their object in themselves' etc. etc.' Such ex promote 1"'0 misunderstandings: first, that we are dealing with a real ( event or a real (reales) relationship. taking place between 'con .. or 'the ego'. on the one hand. and the thing of which there is con . on the other. secondly, that we are dealing with a relation bel.... things. both present in equally real fashion (reell) in consciousncsa, and an intentional object. or with a sort of box-within-box S;!n"'. mental contents. If talk of a relation is here inescapable. we mUll expressions which tempt us to regard such a relation as having logical reality (Realitiit). as belonging to the real (reel/en) content experience. Let us first discuss our second misunderstanding more closely. 1l ill ticularly suggested by the expression 'immanent objectivity' used to the essential peculiarity of intentional experiences. and likewise equivalent scholastic expressions 'intentional' or 'mental inexistenoc' object. Intentional experiences have the peculiarity of directing in varying fashion to presented objects. but they do so in an inlentiONli An object is 'referred to'lO or 'aimed at' in them, and in presentative or, ing or other rashion. This means no more than that certain ex are present. intentional in character and. more specifically, presenla judgingly, desiringly or otherwise intentional. There are (to ignore exceptions) not two things present in experience, we do not expe , object and beside it the intentional experience directcd upon it, there ate even two things present in the sense of a part and a whole which it: only one thing is present. the intentional experience, whose . descriptive charactcr is the intention in question. According to its pa specification. it constitutes the full and sole presenwtion. judgement etc.. of this object. Ir this experience is present. then. eo ifJ.w and thro . own essence (we must insist). the intentional 'relation' to an object is a. and an object is 'intentionally present': these two phrases mean prec~ sd1 same. And of course such an experience may be present in conSCI O together with its intention, although its object docs not exist at all,

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99

~pable of existence, The object is 'meant', i.e. to 'mean' it is an

perha'p~ (.'1: but it is then merely entertained in thought. and is nothing in

e:(pencll .

rea~trha\'e ,In idea or the god Jupiter, this god is my presented obj~t, he is ha~ 'm'7ntal inexistence' in the laller, or

.' I anently present" in my act. he

jrnlI1 'er \:;<pression we may use to diSgUIse our true meaning. I have an v...ba tC \r the god Jupiler: • . presentatIve . expen. t h·IS means t hat I have a certain jdea °the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness. ~'intentional cxperience may .be dismembered as one chooses in de'pti\'e analysis, but the god JupIter naturally will not be found in it. The :manent'. 'mental object' is not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-uP (deskrifJ/ireu reel/en &Slaut/) of the experience, it is in truth not reallY immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does ootexist at all. This does not prevent our-idea-or-the-god-Jupiter from being actual, a particular sort of experience or particular mode of mindedness (ZumUlesein), such that he who experiences it may rightly say that the mythical king of the gods is present to him, concerning whom there are such and such stories. If. however, the intended object exists, nothing becomes phenomenologically different. It makes no essential difference to an object prc5CIIted and given to consciousness whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd. I think or Jupiter as I think or Bismarck. of the lower of Babel as I think of Cologne Cathedral. of a regular thousand-sided polygon as of a regular thousand-faced solid. 1I . These so-called immanent contents are therefore merely intended or intenIlOnal, while truly immanellt contents, which belong to the real make-up (rt~ll~n &stant/e) of the intentional experiences. are not intentional: they ~nstl~ute the act. provide necessary points d'ufJfJui which render possible an mtenlJon, but are not themselves intended. not the objects presented in the act. I ~o not sec colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear toneSCnsalJons but the singer's song. etc. etc,l! thaWhat is true of presentations is true also or other intentional experiences to tare bU,ilt upon them. To represent an object. e.g. the Schloss at Berlin, ras~~eself. IS: we said. to be minded in this or that descriptively detenninate ' ..ohn. thTOjl/(lgt, about this Schloss, to delight in its architectural beauty , to cliens . teri1.ed ' e Wish thill one could do so ctc, etc.. are new experiences, characthey arel~ nov~l phel~on~en~logici~l tcrms: All have this in common, that than b odes of objectIve llltentlon, which cannot be otherwise expressed tt1ted ~ silying that the Schloss is perceived, imagincd, pictorially represWe' ~~~ged aboul. delighted in. wished for ctc. etc. 0( talk' all need more elaborate investigation to determine the justification in a ju~ng figuratively about the object presented in a presentation judged to Ob.iecgernent etc.. as well as the full sense: of talk about the relatio~ of acts be Well tts.. It i.s dear. at least. as far as we now have penetrated. that it will o aVOId all talk of immanent objectivity. It is readily dispensed with,

Conscio usness

100 On intentio nal experie nces and their 'COntenU'

since we have the expression 'intenti onal object' similar objections, As regards misleading talk of the intentional 'contai nment' of acts. it is undenia ble that the parallel. equivalent locutio ns - 'the 0 conscio us datum' , 'is in conscio usness' . 'is imman ent in consciousn suITer from a most damagi ng ambiguity; 'being conscio us' (beM. it means someth ing quite different from the possible senses given to modern All '. ousness 'consci of gs meanin ed t.....o previously discuss ogy and epistemology have been confuse d by these and similar tions. With psychological though t and termino logy as influential III now. it would be ill-advised to set up our own terms in oppositioQ of contem porary psychology. Our first concep t of consciousness, empirical-psychological slant. covers the whole stream of expe . makes up the individual mind's real unity, togethe r with all enter into the constit ution of this stream, This concep tion shoWi spreadi ng to psychology. and we therefo re decided in our last give the preference to it, though we did so in phenom enologi cal not from a properl y psychological angle. We must therefore ex necessary care in talking of consciousness as inner perception, or in of it as intentio nal relation. even if we do not altoget her avoid sudt which would scarcely be practicable.

§12 (b) The act and the relati on the ego to the objec t The situatio n is similar as regards the first misund erstand ing we

where it is imagined that consciousness, on the one hand, and the consciousness' on the other, become related to one anothe r in a red ('The ego' is here often put in the place of·cons ciousne ss'.) In nald as one lion. in facl. it is not the single act which appears . but the ego theD one If object. the is pole other the while n. the relation in questio an ego the of make to one tempts last which , an act-experience selfsame point of unity in every act. This would, however, bring us the view of the ego as a relational centre which we repudia ted befOftlO But if we simply 'Ii\'e' in the act in questio n. become absorbe d. e.... perceptual ·taking in' of some event happen ing before us, in some fancy, in reading a story. in carryin g out
~r,

;as

intentio nal experie nce

101

(~h!e(,lil'('

standpo int (and so, too, on the other, From .an landpoi nt of natural reflectIOn) It IS doubtle ss the case that in each slIbJcc s from th:: o is intentionally directed to some object. This is quite obviou porary ~ W:he ~£o is ei~hcr no mo~ than the 'conscious ~~ity·. or contem ~dle" ofexj>CrI.cnces. or,. In a. more.n atural e,mpJnc~l1y.real (realer) perof conbU. ve the I:onunuous thmg-Ilke Ulllty, constit uted m the unity " f b" I mental whose . ego the speell . ness as the persona su ~ect 0 our experiences, judgeor , percept n, tCJOUS these experiences are, that perform s the intentio . the present is nce stlll~ in question. If such and such an intentional experie meneo ipso has the corresponding intention, eg~e sentences 'The ego represents an object to itself', 'The ego refers object presentativel y to an object'. 'The ego has someth ing as an intentio nal cal enologi phenom the ofilS presentation' therefore mean the same as 'In virtue in said, nce ego, a concrete complex of experiences, a certain experie .' of its specific nature, to be a presentation of object X. is really (reell) present as same the means object' Just SO tbe sentence 'The ego judges about the In our 'sucb and such an experience of judging is present in the ego' etc. etc. nce experie the but able, Jacriplion relation to an experiencing ego is inescap n sentatio ego-pre the having x described is not itself an experiential comple n, reflectio of act ying objectif as its part. We perform the description after an nced ill which reflection on the ego is combin ed with reflection on the experie to related itself as s appear ego the act to yield a relational act. in which has change tive descrip l essentia an its act's object through its act. Plainly in it. occurred. The original aCI is no longer simply there, we no longer live il. Oil ent judgem pass but !t't!' alfend to il ami discus. We m~t therefore avoid the misund erstand ing which our present of essence the of as ego an to relation ~ hasJ.ust ruled out, that of treating itself,u nce experie nal an IntentIO

" III The f"IXlng of our termi nolog y

After

these ,. Crtllca! prolego mena, we shall now fix our own terminology, CXcIud' as we can. and in their light, all conflicting assump tions and "nf".~ng as far ....lOg a b' .. . We shall avoid the term 'psychical phenom enon' m IgUltiCS tn.li~1 " nces , wherever accurac y teo I expene "na shall talk 0 f""IIltenllo . qut-....Y, and . . . - q It, 'Ex cal sense ~ abo. penenc e must be underst ood In the phenom enologi comessence the names onal' 'intenti e ftlon to ~e. The qualifying adjl.'Ctiv of rity peculia (he ofT, mark to wish we nces inltndin t e class of experie ,III a presentative or other analo" b' ' h referrin of g, ...... g to w at IS 0 1ectlve, -.q fash' ~l ~on. As a briefer expression, in harmon y with our own and foreign ~ ge, we shall usc the tenn 'act', nding' (bol, of exprcssi?ns certain ly have their defects. We speak of'illle , or noticing y l;~ill course, In English: Trmu.) in thc sense of speciall ht' ubru)'s 'r. g to SOmcthing. AI/ il/lt'-lIIionul tlbj(,('1 IIeed 'fOr, 11011·('I'(

102 On intentional ellperiences and their 'contents'

noticed or attended to, Several acts may be present and interwoven

another, but attention is emphatically active in one of them, We ex them all together, but we 'go all out' (as it were) in this particular it is not unfitting, in view of Ihe traditional use of the term 'in object', to which Brentano has given renewed currency, to speak in relative sense of 'intention', especially when we have the term 'at do the work of 'intention' in the other sense; we shall find reaSOn 14 Ibat attention does not involve a peculiar act. Another ambigun,; ever, confronts us. The term 'intention' hits off the peculiarity of imagining them to aim at something, and so fits the numerous cases naturally and understandably ranked as cases of theoretical aiming. metaphor does not fit all acts equally, and if we study the examp'c:s ated in §IO, we cannot avoid distinguishing a narrower and a widn of intention. In our metaphor an act of hitting the mark correspondl of aiming, and jusl so certain acts correspond as 'achievements' or' to other acts as 'intentions' (whether of the judging or tbe d '. The image therefore fits these latter acts quite perfectly; fu however, themselves acts, i.e. 'intentions', though they are not in at least not in general - in that narrower sense which points to co fulfilments. This ambiguity, once recognized, becomes harmless, But where the narrower concept is wanted, this must be expressly s equivalent term 'act-character' will also help to avoid misunders In talking of 'acts', on the other hand, we must steer clear of the original meaning: all thought of aCli~'ity mllst be rigi(lIy excluded," 'act' is so firmly fixed in the usage of many psychologists, and so and loosed from its original sense that. after these express r can go on using it without concern, If we do not wish to introduce novelties, strange alike 10 our living speech-sense and to historical we can hardly avoid inconvenience of the just-mentioned sort,

§ 14 Difficulties which surround the assumption acts as a descriptively founded class of experlen In all these terminological discussions. we have gone deep into analyses of a sort required by our interests in logic and episte~ol~gy. we go deeper, however, we shall have to consider some obJec1l0Dl affect the bases of our descriptions, , There are a group of thinkers who absolutely reject any mark:~8 class of experiences which have been described by us as 'acts' or ~n ,. I ' experiences'. In this connection Brentano ,s ongma mtrodUCUOD diSlinction, and his aims in introducing il, have, with some su, . misunderstandings. produced confusion: they have kept the diS eXlraordinarily valuable descriptive content from being rightly Natorp. e,g., rejects it decisively. But when this distinguished thinker

Consciousness as intentional experience

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103

'I can deal with a tone by itself or in relation to other conbY saYI;gOl1SCiOUSllCSS, without also paying regard to its being for an ego, tentS 0 .f; not dClll with myself and my hearing by themselves, without but I. ca~f thc tone', we find nothing in this that could confusc. Hearing thillk.l~g cannot be torn OUI of the hearing of a tone, as if it were something certlllll/ OIl1 the tone it hears. But this does not mean that two things are apart ~ distinguished: the tone heard, the object of perception. and the not ~o of the tone, the perceptual act. Natorp is quite right in saying of hearing . r ' , f' If anyone can e fanner: 'Its eXlstenc.e lor m~ IS my consclOusn~ss 0 It. th h his consciousness III anythlllg else than the eXIstence of a con lent for ~tC I ant unable to follow him.' It seems to me, however, that the 'existence o~ms'omething for me', i~ a thin.g both per:rnitting a~d requiring further henomenological analySIS. ConSider, first, differences III the mode of atten~on. A content is differently present to me, according as I note it implicitly, not relieved in some whole, or see it in relief, according as I see it marginally, or have specially turned my focussing gaze upon it. More important still are differences between the existence of a content in consciousness in the sense in which a sensation so exists, without being itself made a perceptual object, and of a content which is made such an object. The choice of a tone as an instance slightly obscures the distinction without altogether remcving it. 'I hear' can mean in psychology 'I am having sensations': in ordinary speech it means 'I am perceiving'; I hear the adagio of the violin, the twittering of the birds etc. Different acts can perceive the same object and yet involve quite different sensations. The same tone is at one moment heard close at hand, at anOlher far away. The same sensational contents are ~ik~ise 'taken' now in this, and now in that manner. What is most emphas~ In the doctrine of apperception is generally the fact that consistency of ~tlmulus does not involve constancy of sensational content; what the stimu~ really provokes is overlaid by features springing from actualized disposi:~o~s len behind them by previous experiences. Such notions are, however, o~ ,equate and, above all. phenomenologically irrelevant. Whatever the lhi~kn or the experienced contents now present in consciousness, we can inl C that .the same sensational contents should be present with a differing lionsrpretatlon' f ' ,I.e. t hat t he same contents should serve to ground percepinflux 0 rdlffcrent objects, Interpretation itself can never be reduced to an 'rnind~ nc,; s:ns;lIions: it is an act·character, a mode of consciousness, of CoIlSci ness (ZlIIlIIlfeseills). We call the experiencing of sensations in this 1.... OUs lllanne lh . f h .. . ~n made .' r. c perceptIon 0 t c ob~ect 111 questIon, What has here Priale to pl,un, III a context of natural eXistence. and by methods approItlbstanC:~YChology
104

On imentioniil experiences and their 'contents'

essence among these. We then see it to be a fact of essence that the a sensational content differs from that of the perceived object p it which is not a reality in consciousness (ree/J M\I'IISSf).11 All this becomes clear if we change our field of illustration for vision. Let us lay the following considerations before a sceptic. I see e.g. this box. but I do not see my sensations. I always see one and box. however if may be turned and tilted. I have always the same' consciousness' - if I care to call the perceived object a content of ness. But each turn yields a nell' 'content of consciousness', if I ~ enced contents 'contents of consciousness', in a much more appr of words. Very different contents are therefore experienced, though object is perceived. The experienced content, generally speaking. it pe~i~~ object. We must note. funher. that the object's real beiDa bemg IS Irrelevant to the true essence of the perceptual ex~ its essence as a perceiving of an object as thus and thus appearlaa, thus and thus thought of. In the nux of experienced content, we ourselves to be in perceptual touch with one and the same object; belongs to the sphere of whal we experience. For we experieoc:e sciousness of identity'. i.e. a claim to apprehend identity. On what consciousness depend? Must we not reply that different sensational are given. but that we apperceive or 'take' them 'in the same sense', 10 take them in this sense is an experienced character through .....hidt of the object for me' is first conSlituled. Must we not say, further, consciousness of identity is framed on a basis of these two sorts enced characters. as the immediate consciousness that they meall And is this consciousness not again an act in our defined objective correlate lies in the identity it refers to? These questioDl, call for an affirmative and evident answer. I find nothing more the distinction here apparent between contents and acts, between contents in the sense of presentative sensations, and perceptual sense of interpretative intentions overlaid with various additioul ters. Such intentions. united with the sensations they interpret, full concrete act of perception. Intentional characters and com tional acts are. of course. contents of consciousness in the widest sense of experiences: all differences predicable at all. are in this seOIt differences of content. But within this widest sphere of what can be enced. we believe we have found an evidcnt difference between in experiences. in whose case objecfil'(' illtellfiolls arise through imm acters of the e~periences in question. and e~pcriences in whose case not occur. contents thai may serve as the building-stones of aeU being (leu themse"'es. Examples that will serve 10 elucidate this distinction. and also to. various chanlcters of acts. are provided by comparing pe memory. or comparing either with presentations by means ofph)~

Consciousness

ilS

intentional experience

105

< : : u e s ctc.). or of signs. Verbal expressions yield the best ex' I' t hat cenalO . ara besq ues or figures ha\'e affected of all. lei us . Imagme JlIIpId heticaJl). and that we then suddenly see that we are dealing with t \IS .cs or verbal signs. In what does this difference consist? Or let us take bOS 1I1 l of an attcnllve . man h ' S) eanng some tOlally strange word as a soundthe case d ' " leX without evcn reammg ~t IS a word. and compare this with the case same man afterwards heating the word, in the course of conversation. :~ ~ow lIcquai.nted with its meaning,. ~ut ~ot. illustrating it intuitively,? What in generalis Ihc surplus element dlstlOgulshlOg the understanding of a 1I1bOlicaJly funclioning expression from the uncomprehended verbal sound? ~t is the difference between simply looking at a concrete object A. and tre3 tin g it as representative of 'any A whatsoever'? In this and countless similar cases it is act-characlers that differ. All logical differences. and differences in categorial fonn. are constituted in logical acts in the sense of intentions. In analysing such cases the inadequacies of Ihe modem theory of apper«ption become plain: it overlooks points decisive from a logical or episleIIlological standpoint. It does not do justice to phenomenological fact; it does not even attempt to analyse or describe it. Differences of interpretation are above all deseriptil'e differences, and these alone, rather than obscure, bypothet~1 events i~ the sours unconscious depths, or in the sphere of pb)'1lok)gical happenmgs. concern the epistemologist. These alone pennit of • purdy phenomenological treatment. excluding all transcendent affinnations. suc,b ~ the critique of knowledge presupposes. Apperception is our surplus. which ~ found in experience itself, in its descriptive content as opposed to the raw ~x~tence of sense: it is the act-character which as it were ensouls sense aod"h In ~nce such as to make us perceive this or that object. see this tree: e.g., aetJ " ear thiS ring'mg. sme II t h'IS scent 0 f flowers etc. etc. Set/smiot/s, and the "h • n Interpreting' the m or appercelvlOg t em, are alike experienced bill they 0/ appear as ob' h ' sense Db' 'Jeets: t ey are not seen heard or pereeil'ed by any , ...~~ on the other hand. appear and 'are perceived but they are no~ --rr:'~nced Nat II ' The . ur:a y we exclude the case of adequate perception. (or holds m other cases: it holds. e.g.. in the case of the 'sensations' we choose t lservmg ' . art\er -'hicb ~. 0 ca i contents as bases to interpretation) Ittltrpreta,.ound m aCls of simple or representative imagining. It is an imaging L.. Ion that SCts . . cd h ~Ort us h . an lmagm rat er than a perceptual appearance '~~I . were cxpcnenc d . ....liIly prese . e sensations me d'mte the appearancc of a picthe Very Sa nte~ obJl'Ct (e.g. a cCntaur in 11 painting).19 One sees at once that p,.,p_ . ' .IS called its · .......1I(a/io me. thlllg which' . m re I"atlon 10 t h e 'mtcntlonal object. tiun .direct~ I;e. ;.he ~rc~iving. remembering. picturing. symbolizing inten~tJoIl in relato...... rds II. IS also. called an illft.'rprt'lation. conceptiun. apperI also r-.. d ~on 10 the sensations really present in this act. !bert are-~&'Ir ' regard to the examples just cited. that diflj II as rele van tI yeV!'dent. m f ' , d'~ , erent ·manne.... ." 0 conscIOusness. IIICrent mtentional relations J... inune"·

u-

com:

ho,::e

. 106

On intentiona.l experiences a.nd their 'COntents'

to objects: the character of our intention is specifically different in of perceiving, of direct 'reproductive' recall, of pictorial represen the ordinary sense of the interpretation of statues. pictures etc.), and. in the case of a presentation through signs. Each logically distinct entertaining an object in thought corresponds to a difference in in To me it seems irrefragable that we only know of such differences we envisage them in particular cases (apprehend them adequately mediately), can then compare them and range them under Con can thus make them into objects of varying acts of intuition and From such 'seeing' we can. through abstract Ideation. progress adequate grasp of the pure species they exemplify, and of the co of essence among these latter. When Natorp remarks that 'all ri multiplicity of consciousness pertains rather to contents alone. ness of a simple sensation does not differ, qua consciousness, fi sciousness of a world: the "being in consciousness" is entirely the both; their difference lies solely in their content'. he seems to me keeping apart quite distinct notions of consciousness and content, be erecting his identification into an epistemological principle. explained the sense in which we too teacb that all multiplicity of ness depends on content. Content must mean experience, a real part sciousness: consciousness itself must be the complex formed by ex The world, however, never is a thinker's experience. To refer to may be an experience. but the world itself is the object intended. It . terial, from the point of view of our distinction, what attitude one to the question of the make-up of objective being, of the true, being of the world or of any other object, or of the relation of being, as a 'unity', to our 'manifold' thought-approaches, or of the which one may metaphysically oppose immanenl to transcendent distinction in question is prior to all metaphysics. and lies at the of the theory of knowledge: it presupposes no answers to the qu this theory must be the first to provide.

§ 15 Whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological kind (of the genus feeling In particular) can consist partly of acts and partly of non-acts A new difficulty arises in regard to the generic unity of intentional. e~ It might be thought that the standpoint from which we dIVide ences into intentional and non-intentional. is a merely external one, same experiences, or experiences of the same phenomenological cl at times have an intentional relation to some object. and at times ha The examples used to attest either concept. and also. in part, the at solutions of the problem. have already been discussed in literary C

Consciousness as intentional experience

107

-------::-:ebated issue as to whether the 'intentional relation' suffices to regard t~e 'psychical phenomena' (the domain of psychology) or not. The de l11arca ntred chiefly in pbenomena from the sphere of feeling. Since the debat~ CC:llity of other feelings seemed obvious, two doubts were possible: ·J1le ntlon • . ,.Ity mig . ht not per.haps attach Ioosely to I ndered whet, ler . mtentlona one wo of feeling in question, belonging really to the presentations fused the. OC/1 . ,. . , to the class of feelhem. or whether . IOtentiona lty cou 'd be essentla ~th ~jnce one allowed it to some feelings while denying it to others. The con:;on between this commonly debated question and our present question thuS been made clear. ba~e must first see whether any sorts of feeling-experience are essentially intentional, and then whether other sorts of feeling-experience lack this property. (aJ Are there any Intentional fee/lnfs?

Many experiences commonly classed as 'feelings' have an undeniable, real relation to something objective. This is the case, e.g., when we are pleased by a melody, displeased at a shrill blast etc. etc. It seems obvious, in general, that every joy or sorrow. that is joy or sorrow aboul something we think of, is a directed act. Instead of joy we can speak of pleased delight in something, instead of sorrow we can speak of displeased or painful dislike of it, aversion from it etc. etc. Those who question the intentionality of feeling say: Feelings are mere states, not acts. intentions. Where they relate to objects, they owe their relation to a complication with presentations. No intrinsic objection is involved in this last position. Brentano who :~ds .the in.tentionality of feelings, also maintains without inconsistency . feelings. hke all acts that are not themselves presentations, have presen~tJons as their foundations. 20 We can only direi;t ourselves feelingly to obthat are presented to us by inwoven presentations. No difference emerges tha~~nt'the disp~ting p~rties until someone is really prepared to maintain not ~ mg, conSidered 10 itself. involves nothing intentional. that it does tion ~mt ~yond itself to a felt objei;t, that only its union with a presentaWay ~fv:i:t a cer~a.in relation t? a~ o.bject, a rela~io~ ~nly intentional by Pan'd' connection and not lOtrmslcally so. ThiS IS Just what the other ISputes Brentano IInderl,' t !Oks we have here two intentions built on one another: the 109 fou d' . . . IQtentio h' n mg mtentlon gives us the prt'sellted object. the founded . n t e r.,1t h· T . ~Parabl JIC 0 ~cct. he former IS separable from the latter. the latter bere, the e from the fom)er. His opponents think there is only vne intention tr p~esenting one. Co We Subject th' . to a careful phenomenological review. Brent:mo's ~Ptio e SituatIOn toSOl'heth~ seems definitely to be preferred. Whether we turn with pleasure lng, or whether its unpleasantness repels us. an objcct is presented.

:s

h'

lOS

On intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

But we do not merely have a presentation. with an added feetina atirely tacked on to it. and not intrinsically related to it, but distaste dirfCI themselves to the presented object, and could not ~ out such a direction. If two psychical experiences, e.g. two presen . associated in an objective-psychological sense. there is a pheno,,,,,,,,,,. . discernible type of associative unity among the reproduced which corresponds to the objective dispositions which govern lheI:n. side with the intentional elation which each has to its object, there it phenomenological mode of connection: one idea, e.g. that of Nap&ea. with it the idea of Vesuvius, the one is peculiarly bound up with II-. so that we say in regard to the objects presented - the mode ofthcW tation here essentially requires further description - that the one of the other. (This sentence is being used to express a pheno situation.) It is easily seen, however, that though all this in a stitutes a new intentional relationship, it does not turn each member into an object of the other's intention. The intentional remain unconfused In their association. How indeed could they object, borrowed from an associated intention, to something intentional? It is clear. further, that such a phenomenologically relation is extrinsic, not at all to be put on a level with the pleasure to the pleasant. The presentation which reproduces is quite without such a reproductive function. But pleasure without an ' ant is unthinkable, And it is unthinkable. not because we are ben with correlative expressions. as when we say, e.g., that a cause ' effect, or a father without a child, is unthinkable, but because , . essence of pleasure demands a relation 10 something pleasing. JUII feature known as conviction is unthinkable apart from somelhinl we are convinced. There is, similarly. no desire whose spc:cific c do without something desired. no agreement or approval without agreed on or approved etc. etc. These are all intentions, genuine . . sense. They all 'owe' their intentional relation to certain underlyiDI tations. But it is part of what we mean by such 'owing' that they really now hal'e what they owe to something else. It is plain. too. that the relation between founding (underlying) tion and founded act cannot be correctly described by saying that ~ produces the latter. We say that the object arouses our pleasure, JdIl say in other cases that some circumstance inspires doubt, COOl~ ment. provokes desire etc. But the result of such apparent causa pleasure. doubt or agreement provoked. is itself through and througla tional. We are not dealing with an external causal relation where till conceivably could be what it intrinsically is without the cause, or cause brings somcthing forth that could have existed independentlY, Closer consideration shows it to be absurd in principle, here or cases, to lreat an intentional as a causal relation, to give it the

Consciousness as intentional experience

109

~tantial-causal case of necessary connection, For the intentn1PiriC3 I::>t here thought of as' provocative', is only in question as an (i0081. ob;~ ~ot as an external reality. which really ~nd p~ycho-physically iIltenU~o my mental life, A battle of centaurs, seen 10 a pIcture or framed det(1llU~pro\'okes' my approval just like some beautiful, real landscape: ill f~ on the latter psycho-physically as the real cause of my mentally if I k>Oed state of pleasure, this 'causation' is altogether different from the pro\1)~ we ha\'e when we see the visible landscape - in virtue of such causauo~ a mode of appearing and such and such piclured colours and ltId ~ as the 'source', 'ground' or 'cause' of my pleasure. Pleasantness or ronr:re do oot belong as effect 10 this landscape considered as a physical ~ but ooly to it as appearing in this or Ihal manner, perhaps as thus reality, . d'109 us 0 r t h'IS or tal, h '10 Ihe conscIOus ' and thus judged of or as remm act lint in question: it is as such that the landscape 'demands', 'arouses' such rcelings. l1 (b) Are there non-Intentional (eelin,s? DistinctIon between

(••'h'I_sensations and (eel/ne-acts

We may now ask more generally whether, in addition to the intentional \"'lrieties of feeling, there are not other non-intentional species. It may seem at fint that an obvious 'Yes' is the right answer. In the wide field of socalled sensory feelings, no intentional characters can be found. The sensible pain of a burn can certainly not be classed beside a conviction, a surmise, a volition etc. etc., but beside sensory contents like rough or smooth, red or blue etc. If we recall such pains, or any sensory pleasures (the fragrance of a rose, the relish of certain foods etc. etc.), we find that our sensory feelings are blended with the sensations from the various sense-fields, just as these latter are blended with one another. . Every sensory feeling, e.g. the pain of burning oneself or of being burnt, doubt after a fashion referred to an object: it is referred, on the one ~ to ~he ~go. and its burnt bodily member, on the other hand, to the other Whlc~ mfllcts the burn. In all these respects there is conformity with the ~nsatlons: tactual sensations, e.g., are referred in just this manner to h11y member which touches, and to the external body which is touched. "'ou~ I~~gh this r~ference is realized in .intcn,tlonal. experie~ces, no one ease th ok of calling thc referred sensations mtentlOnal. It IS rather the Ptrttptat Our sensations are hcrc functioning as presentative contents in bert r~~1 acts. or (to use a possibly mislcading phrasc) that our sensations llot acts Ive an objective 'interpretation' or 'taking-up'. They themselves are tional Ch but acts are constituted through them. wherever. that is. inten~ an' aracters like a perceptual interpretation lay hold of them, and as it borill&~~ate them. In jusl this manner it seems that a burning. piercing, In, fused as it is from the stan with certain tactual sensations, must

:a: "nd

110 On intentional experiences and their 'COntents'

itself count as a sensation. It functions at least as other sensatiOOI providing a foothold for empirical, objective interpretations. All this seems unobjectionable, and the whole question dispoled seem to have shown that some feelings are to he reckoned among ill experiences. while others are non-intentional. But we are led to doubt. then. whether two such sorts of 'fee . form a single class. We spoke previously of 'feelings' of liking and approval and disapproval, of valuation and disvaluation - expel...... ously akin to theoretical acts of assent and rejection, of laking to be probable or improbable, or to deliberative acts of jud voluntary decision etc. Here we have a kind, a plain unity of ........, included nothing but acts. where such sensations of pain and no place: descriptively the latter belong, in virtue of their speci8c among tactual. gustatory. olfactory and other sensations. Being II sentative contents of objects of intention. but not themselves . they manifest descriptive differences so essential, that we cannot believe in the unity of a genuine class. In both cases of course, we 'feelings'. i.e. in the case of the above-mentioned acts of liking 81 ia of the above-mentioned sensations. This fact need not perp5ex, than our ordinary talk of 'feeling", in the sense of touching, need astray in the case of tactile sensations. Brentano has already pointed to the ambiguity here dealt with. ia ing the intentionality of feelings. He draws a distinction, in seDII words. between sensations of pain and pleasure (feeling-sensatiODl) and pleasure in the sense of feelings. The contents of the fo~ I should simply say, the former - are in this terminology 'ph . the latter are 'psychical phenomena', and they belong therefore tially different genera. This notion I regard as quite correct, but whether the meaning of the word 'feeling' does not lean p towards 'feeling-sensation', and whether the many acts we call 'fi not owe their name to the feeling-sensations with which they are interwoven. One must of course not mix up questions of suitable with questions regarding the factual correctness of Brentano's d' Our distinction should constantly be kept in mind and fruitfullY in analysing all complexes of feeling-sensations and feeling-actS. concerning some happy event, is certainly an act. But this act, w . merely an intentional character, but a concrete and therefore compJel. ence, does not merely hold in its unity an idea of the happy event act-charactcr of liking which relates to it: a sensation of pleasure at the idea, a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional exc:i the psycho-physical feeling-subject. and also as an objective pro event seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam. The event thus pleasinglr now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach, the ... the being charmed. or however one's state may be described. A

Consciousness as intentional experience

III

~t merely seen in its thinglike content and context. in the rese . I he
I . hich make It. an event: It seems c ot an coloured with sadness. ~IS We unpleasing sensations which the empirical ego refers to and locates ~;r- the pang in the hea~t - are referred in one's .emotional conception ~, h;ng itself. These relations are purely presentational: we first have an · · .In hOStl.)e repugnance. in active dislike etc. 1,th<1 tially new type 0 rmtentlon esset'tions of pleasure and pain may continue. though the act-characters : :upon them may lapse. When the facts which provoke pleasure sink . .". background. are no longer apperceived as emotionally coloured. 111(0 W'" be . . I b· and perhaps cease to l~ten~lona o. ~ects at aiL the pleasurable excitement IlI3Y linger on for a while: It may Itself ~ fel.t ~ agreeable. Instead of ~ting a ple~s~nt property of the object, It IS referred merely to the fcding-subject. or IS Itself presented and pleases. Much the same holds in the sphere of desire and volitionY If difficulty is felt in the fact that desire does not always seem to require conscious rd"ereooe to what is desired. that we arc often moved by obscure drives or pressures towards unrepresented goals. and if one points especially to the "ide sphere of natural instinct. where goal-consciousness is at least absent It the start, one may say: This is a case of mere sensations - we may speak aualogica.Uy of 'desire-sensations' - without needing to affirm the existence ~ an .essentially new class of sensations - i.e. of eIperiences really lacking lD:cnbonai reference. and so also remote in kind from the essential charac~ o~ intentional desire. Alternatively one may say: Here we are dealing llith. Intentional experiences. but with such as are characterized by indelerm.inateness of objective direction. an 'indeterminateness' which does DOt.amount to a privation. but which stands for a descriptive character of ooespresentation. The idea we have when ;something' stirs when there is arustling.· h d .. ' .. . ' nng at t e oor. etc.. an Idea had before we gIve It verbal =~:n, h~s i,ndetennina.te?ess of di~tion. and this indeterminateness is 'U-_L' tentlon s essence, It IS determmed as presenting an indeterminate ........,uung'. ~

~ ODe concept of desire

might fit many cases. and our other concept

bet\V~a~d we. might have to allow. not a relation of generic community

eql1iv...... ~ l~tentlOnal and non-intenlional urges or desires. but one of mere .......tlon . Wern

cornple USt observe. 'llso. that our classification is oriented to the concretely . .. may at one time . .- dtpex, and th·u .., • the tot·a I c h'Mclcter 0 r suc h umtles seem l.rlOther nd on s.cnsational features (e.g. pleasure on urge-sensations) at h· I ' w IC 1 rest on these. The formation and use of ~. esslonswill·t· -, h r · -Intenr .1 tImeS t ere ore POlDt to sensory contents. at limes to Jtddili lon,s. so giving rise to the equivoc'ltions in question. bri... lIQ ary Of/a No/£' r' . ' Th e 0 b· VIOUS tendency of our conception is to attribute COacrtt~ :enu me dilTerences in intensity to underlying sensations. and to Cts only in a secondary manner. in so rar as their concrete total

olit expr' On act-Inte n t·Ions

112 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

<:haracter involves differem.:es of intensity in their sensational intentions, the inseparable aspects whi<:h give acts their essential peculiarities. or which characterize them severally as judgementa,. etc.• must be without intrinsic intensity. Deeper analyses are, h quired here.

§ 16 Distinction between desc,.iptive and intentional content We have bUllressed our notion of the essence of acts against ob' given them a generic unity of essence in their character as intentiolll, sdousnesses in the unique descriptive sense. We now introduce au . phenomenological distin<:tion, obvious arter our previous discussioal. the real (reellenf' and the intentional content of an act. By the real phenomenological content of an act we mean the its concrete or abstract pans, in other words, the sum total of experiences that really constitute it. To point out and describe is the task of pure descriptive psychological analysis operatiDa empirical, natural-scientific point of view. Such analysis is in aD cerned to dismember what we inwardly experience as it in itself is. is really (reell) given in experience, without regard either to nections, or to extrinsic meaning and valid application. Purely psychological analysis of an articulated sound-pattern finds and abstract parts or unifying forms of sounds, it finds no soundor organs of hearing etc.; it also never finds anything that resemblel sense that makes the sound-pattern to be a name, nor the persoa the name may apply. Our example suffices to make our intention real (reell) contents of acts are of course only known throup tive analyses of this kind. That obscurities of intuition or i...leq~ descriptive conception - faults, in short. of method - may Iead 'manufa<:ture' of sensations (to use Volkelt"s phrase) cannot be This, however, only concerns the legitimacy of particular cases of analysis. It is clear, if anything is clear. that intentional experiCOClll distinguishable parts and aspects, and this alone is of importance Let us now shirt from our natural-sdentific. psy<:hological sl an ideal-scientific. phenomenological one. We must exclude ~ . interpretations and existential affirmations. we must take what IS experienced or otherwise inwardly intuited (e.g. in pure fanc~) experiences. as our exemplary basis for acts of Ideation. We mu~tl versal essences and essential connections in such experiences - Ideal of experiencing of differing levels of generality, and ideally valid essence which apply a priori. and with unlimited generality, to periences of these spt:des. We thus achieve insights in a pure phen. which is here orienled to real (reel/en) constituents. whose descn

Consciousness as Intentional experience

113

~ear

and free from 'experience', i.e. from presupposition of e''e~nCi' When we speak simply of the real (reel/en). and in general res' alS~f'no~enological analysis and description of experiences. the tie-up ri lhe ~'~ussions to psychological material is (we must keep on stressing) rJO!Jf ~silional. since none of its empirically real (reel/en) conceptions ~)' Ir1ions of existence (e.g. of experiences as states of animal beings aOd. ~perienees in a real (realen). space-time world) are at all operative. ba'1ng e phenomenological validity of essence is aimed at and c1aimed. 25 tbJ~~:nt in the real (reel/en) sense is the mere application of the most °1 notion of content. valid in all fields to intentional experiences. If generaw oppose illfellf;Of/a/ Yl to real (reel/) content, the word shows that the ",-eno . I expenences . (or acts ) IS . now In . question. . Here. pteUliarity of intcntlOna bOlIo-e,"er. there are several concepts, all grounded in the specific nature of IClS. which may be equally covered by the rubric 'intentional coment', and lit oHm so covered. We shall first have to distinguish three concepts of the iDlentionaJ content: the intentional object of the act, its itlletllional material (as opposed to its inti'tlrional quality) and. lastly its intentional essence. These distiDctions will become familiar in the course of the following very general ualyses, which are also essential to the more restricted aim of clarifying the esstIICt of knowledge. jJl,

117 The intentional content in the sense of the Intentional object Our first concept of intentional content needs no elaborate preliminaries. It COllCtms the intentional object, e.g. a house when a house is presented. That the intentional object does not generally fall within the real (reel/en) con~t of an act. but rather differs completely from this, has been already ~. is not only true of acts pointing intentionally to 'outer' things; "1Ie:na1so true In part of acts that point to our own present experiences, as ~ I S~k of. ~.g:. my ac.tllally present. but 'background' conscious experito ~Ial COinCidence IS only found where an intuition actually points IdeqlOmeth mg 'lived through' in the intentional act itself. as. e.g.• in acts of Wuate perception. or~ IlIUSt distinguish. in relation to the intentional content taken as object is intrn~t. between 'he object as it is im/!/Idt'd. and the object (period) which II1anllcr Cd. In each act an object is presented as detennined in this or that ~tio~a~nd a~ such.it may be the target of varying intentions. judgemental, b.lernal t' deslderatlve etc. Known connections. actual or possible. entirely IIl1it)' as 0 the reality of the act. may be so cemented with it in intentional ~ P:O be ~eld to.attribule objective properties to the same presented ~ta/pertles not 10 Ihe scope of the intention in question. Many new 1tQ1t, to I~S may a~ise. all claiming. in virtue of an objective unity of knowPrCSCntlOg the same object. In all of them the object which we

This.

11"1

On intentlon..1 experlence5 ;and their 'contenu'

intend is the same. but in each our intention differs, each mearu in a different way. The idea. e.g., of the German Emperor, object as an Emperor. and as the Emperor of Germany. The tnaD the son of the Emperor Frederick lll. the grandson of Queen V' has many other properties neither named nor presented. One can quite consistently speak of the intentional and extra·intentional the object of some presentation, and one can use many other sui technical expressions, e.g. what we intend in the object, that wouJd to misunderstandings. Another. yet more important. distinction goes with the d' . drawn. that between the objectil'e reference of the act. taken in ;,. and the objects to II'hich its 1'Or;ous partial. constituent aclS refn. has its own appropriate. intentional. objective reference: this is complex as of simple acts. Wha/ever the composition of an act ow acts lI'ay be. if it ;s an act at all. i, must IJa~'e a single objective which we say it is 'directed'. in the full, primary sense of the partial acts (if they really are acts entering the complex act as mere parts of this act) likewise point to objects. which will, in the same as the object of the whole act. though they may . same. In a secont/ary sense. no doubt. the whole aet may be said these objects also. but its intention only terminates on them in constituent acts primarily intend them. Or, seen from the other are only the act's objects in so far as they help to make up its true the manner in which this is intended. They function as terms of which the primary object is seen as the correlated term. The act, ponding to the name 'the knife on the table' is plainly complex: till the whole aet is a knife. of one of its part·acts. a table. But, U nominal act refers to the knife as on the table. presents it in dIiI position to the latter, one can say that the table is in a second.a'r intentional object of the whole act. Again, to illustrate another class of cases. the knife is the object ahow which we judge OI! statement. when we say that the knife is on the table; the however. the primary or full object of the judgement. but only ~ its subject. The full and entire object corresponding to the wbo~ . is the state of affairs judged: the same state of affairs is presented. presentation. wished in a wish. asked after in a ques~ion. d~U?ted-:" etc. The wish that the knife were on the table. which comcld~ ~ with the judgement. is concerned with the knife. but we. don't m :. knife. but that the knife should be on the table. that thiS shou~d state of affairs must obviously not be confused with the judglOg r with the presentation of this judgement: I plainly do not wish .fo ment. nor for a~y presentatio~. ~ust so there is. a correspondln~ regarding the kDlfe. but the kDlfe IS not (nonsensically) what we . regarding the knife's position on the table. whether this actually IS

Consciousness


intention.. 1 experience

115

----;::e first sense in which we speak of intentional contents. Since SO (111/G~ .0so highly ambiguous. we shall do well never to speak of an inten· sud' "ll:n ent where an intentional object is meant. but to call the latter the clollal.co I object of the act in question. jnttllllOna

I:

I'

Simple and complex, founding and founded acts

§, b \"C so far only leamt to attach one meaning to the term 'intentional \\e aIS'. further meanings will develop in our ensuing investigations. where COO:1l attempt to seize on certain important peculiarities of the phenomena,.~. I ~nce of acts. and to throw light on the ideal unities rooted in these. ~ start with the difference. previously noted. between simple and comund acts. Not every unitary experience compounded out of acts is for : t reason a compollmJ act. just as every concatenation of machines is not a compound machine. Our comparison illuminates our further requirements. A compound machine is a machine compounded out of machines. but so COOIpounded. that it has a total performance into which the performances cI the partial machines flow. and the like is the case in regard to com· pounded acts. Each partial act has its particular intentional reference, each its unitary object. and its way of referring to it. These manifold part-acts art, however, summed up in one total act. whose total achievement lies in the wtity of its intenlional reference. To this the individual acts contribute their individual perfonnanccs: the unity of what is objectively presented. and the whole manner of the intentional reference to it. are not set up -,~ of the partial acts. but in them. in the way in which they are c:om~ned. a way which realizes a unity of act. and not merely a unity of ~. The object of this total act could not appear as it does. unless tioo~l1lal acts presented their objects in their fashion: their general func· reIa ~ to present parts. or to present externally related tenns. or to present ~nal fonos of the object etc. The same is true of the non-presentative the ~f the act that make out of the unified qualities in the partial acts 1tI 'N:~ty of w~ole acts. and so determine the specifically different ways tnr.....: _ the objects concerned in either sort of act are ·taken up into

--"'ness· W .

lioa,e~take as an example the unity of categorical or hypothetical predica.

Ill~. the tOtal acts are plainly put together out of partial acts. The • 'Ilb~rnernber o.r a cillegorical assertion is an underlying ac!. a positing of ~ juan which the positing of a predicate. its attribution or denial. 'cJearl~ d st so the antecedent of a hypothetical assertion is constituent in "':he total :~ar~ated ~a~t-act. upon which the conditional assertion is built. 1iIzt&le, total Penen(.-c: IS In each case plainly one act, one judgement. whose ~ lloll&sidObJttt IS a single state of affairs. As the judgement does not ~ i ~ of. Or between. the subject-positing and the predicating acts. f) t em as their dominant unity. so. on the correlative side. the

116

Consciousness as intentional experience

On intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

objective unity is the state of affairs judged. an appearance emer subject and predicate. or out of antecedent and consequent. The situation may be yet more complex. On such a structured members may themselves be further structured) a new act may be a joy may be built on the assertion of a state of affairs. a joy in tbIt affairs. The joy is not a concrete act in its own right, and the j act set up beside it: the judgement rather underlies the joy, fixes ill realizes its abstract possibility for. without some such foun could be no joy at allY Judgements may similarly serve as fo surmises. doubts. questions. wishes. acts of will etc.. and lbe lanw like",ise serve to found other acts in their tum. There are lberefON ways in which acts may be combined into total acts. The briefest tion makes plain that there are deep dilTerenees in the ways in . concretely woven into other acts, or based upon underlying acta. possible by such concretion: the systematic investigation of such in descriptive. psychological fashion. is as yet hardly in its .

~t"s

unity. lending it evidence. or illustrating it. or otherwise iII10 ~ il:S in it. nbsorb our domina~t interest in varying degree. They may f~· ent. as in Ihe perceptual Judgement. or the analogously consti· ~""n h " h IS " to express the perception or be t"-. ture-judgemenl. were our one WlS ~ted':ion in which we live, and likewise in the completely ~vident ju.dge. iJnI~ of necessary I:IW. They may and ~ome to .seem quite SUbSidiary, ~ ses of imperfect or wholly unsuitable Illustration of some dominant as ~;. They may then be a vanishing phantasm, to which practically no ~ t auaches. (In extreme cases one may even doubt whether accompany· ~t~ure.ideas really enter. the unity o~ t~e ex~ressive act ,at all, whether ::,. an: nOI me,re aceomp~mments; coexlsttng WIth the acts 10 question but IOl fonning a smgle act WIth them.) For us it is especially important to get as much clarity as we can on this sifllation of expressions: we shall therefore dwell on some points in more

reced:


Expression and sense are Iwo objective unities. laid before us by certain An expression itself. e.g. a written word. is, as our Firs! Im'estigarion sbowed,19 as much a physical object as any penscratch or ink-blot on paper. 11 is 'given' to us in the same sense as a physical object, i.e. it appears, and that it appears merely means, as it means elsewhere, that a certain act is aperieooed, in which certain sensory experiences are 'apperceived' in a cer· lIin manner. The acts in question are naturally perceptual or imaginative praentations: in these the expression (as physically meant) is constituted. Wh.I:t make the expression an expression are, we know, the acts attachIII !O.u. These are not outside of it or beside it, or merely simultaneous in ~lIsness: they are one with it, and so one, that we can scarce avoid ::m~ them all as making up a unirary total act. (By the word 'ex. wbieho n we m.ean. with natural and convenient looseness. the act-unity • strietrrese~ts 11.) A statement. an assertion. e.g" we should al once say. is IlOI: firkl- IImtary experience. which belongs to the genus Judgement. We do • ">'"lyln ourselves a mere sum of acts. but a single act in which. as it were uua and '. . . ~ Splfltual SIde are distinct. Just so an expressed wish is no mere ~~f exp~sion an~ wish - wilh perhaps an additional. debatable CII. -;sh. ~rdlDg ,the Wish - ~ut a whole. an act. which we unhesitatingly '0% un', e p~Y~lcal expression. the verbal sound. may seem unessential Ir..... IY,andlts '1"masmuch as any other verbal sound might "'YC I'tplaced . I unessentm ~ With II ;~n~ ~one duty for il: it could even have been wholly dis"'tit ,the a~0~Ul.1f I,~ IS there.. and ~erves as :I ve~bal sound. it will be fused ~ln sense p,.IIl}.lIlg al;ts III a smgle act. Illamly the conncction is in a ....... . extnnSlc " as sue h . I.e. " the mamfest " ~ Or .....rj : . s"'n ce th e expressIOn verbal tten ...~ Itt, no sign etc.. is nOI secn as part of lhe object meant in Ihe Itat~ COntrjrbeV~n as really determining it. nor as having really 10 do with -~l., ditreUtl~n. made .b~ the acts consliluli~g l~e verbal sound of a rs Characlenstlcally from the contnbutlon of the underlying 1CtS,

§ 19 The function of attention in complex acts. Instance of the phenomenological relation of sound to sense How far differences go in this direction will be plain from previously considered: the whole which is formed by expressioa This will be quite as interesting as the examples just analysed. siderations will also illustrate the obvious to anyone. the fact thII great dilTerenees in the energy, so to speak, with Which. acts • selves in an act-complex. Generally the greatest energy w1l1 be the act-character which comprehends and subsumes all partial unity _ whether it be a particular act-intention like joy, or a r. that pervades all parts of the whole act. In this act, we Ii~ principally: In the subordinate acts only in proportion to the their achievements for the whole act and its intention. But of such differences of importance. is just to use other words to 'preferential living' in question. which some acts enjoy and otbcd Let us now consider our example. It concerns a un~on of ~e ted. an expression, treated as a sensuous verbal sound. IS co~sutu . quite different act constitutive of its meaning. ~n essentlally .d nection. we may note. 10 that of the last·mentloned acts Wit b whicb they have an immediale or a more remote intuitive fu only is the mode of union here essentially different. but also the which certain acts are performed. The expression is indeed our interest does not live in this perception: we allend. when n~ to Ihe signified ralher than the signs. Dominant energy resides til giving acts. The inluitive acts which perhaps accompany. and ...

117

118

On intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

Consciousness as intemional ellpe:rience

acts illustrated and discussed above, or of the partial acts whic:ll to the predicative members of complete predications. We must ever, despite all this, question the presence of a certain intenti between word and thing, Inasmuch, e.g., as the word names the once more appears as in some sense one with it, as belonging to • not as materially part of it, or onc of its material properties. Ita unrelatedness does not exclude a certain intentional unity, co the interconnection of the corresponding acts to fonn a singh: confinned if we recall the deep-set tendency to exaggerate lIle word and thing. to invest it with objectivity. perhaps even to i . thing of mystic unity into it. [ef. Inv. VI. §6ffl In the compound act which includes both appearing-expressioo giving acts. it is plainly the latter. or the act-unity which do . which essentially fixes the character of the whole act. It is for thiI we call experiences. whether expressed or unexpressed, by the i.e.. ;judgement'. ·wish'. etc, Certain acts in the compound are peculiarly prominent. a fact incidentally noted when we said tbII;.. nonnally express something, we do not, qua expressing it, live • constituting the expression as a physical object - we are not in object - but we live in the acts which give it sen~: we are ex~, • to the object that appears in such acts, we aim at It, we mean It lD pregnant sense. We pointed out. also, that, while a special orien physical expression is possible, it essentially changes the c experience: this no longer is 'expressive' in the ordinary sense of Plainly we are here concerned with a case of the general fad 01 to which long effort has not yet brought sufficient cleamess..)D so hindered right views in this field as the by-passing of the fld I;on is an emphmic fllnclion II'hich belongs among aclS in the sense of iment;onal experiences, and which is not descriptively long as 'being experienced'. in the sense of the mere existence ora consciousness, is confused with intentional. objectivit~. Acts before we can lire in them or be absorbed 10 pcrfomuog thes:rt' . are so absorbed (in various manners requiring further ~escn~ the objects of these acts. we are primarily or secondanly o~ . them. perhaps thematically concerned with them. A.bsotpUOO 1D minding objects are the same thing expressed from different a As opposed to this. men speak of attention as if it were a na~ of special relief imparted to experienced contents. At the same still talk of these contents (the contemporary experiences th,e they were the things to which we ordinarily say we are a.ttendlng. of course dispute the possibilily of atlending to expenenced . f· "",I . when this happens. such contents become objects ~ mle such perception is not the mere being of the content In a co~ but an acl in which the content is rendered objectil·e. Intenl

mo:..

~tcntional

119

objects. are the things to which we are at any time

,ctS- ~nd 0 nd 10 which we can be so attentive. This accords with ordinary

.ttellll~h:se true sense should. be plain on the b~efest n~flection. To ordin\lSlIgt,

the objectS of allentlon are always objects of Inward or outward

arr usa~e obiects of nlemory, of expectation, perhaps states of affairs in a .-cepuon , C· I J

I":'..fjc discussion. etc,

ertaln y we can only speak of attention where
110 The difference between the quality and the "'IUer of an act : ::

tu~ from

the distinction be.ween the acts in which we ;!ive' and 'on the side', to another extremely important. ~ plain dlstmctlon lying in a quite different direction. This is the Pl'etenta~ bc:tween the gener,d act-character. which stamps an act as merely "an:IPs it e. JUdgcmc.ntal. emotional. desiderative etc.. and its "content" which '2)( 2 _ 4' as presentmg r"i,~, as judging (11m etc. etc. The two assertions ~ both and 'Ibsen is the principal founder of modern dramatic realism', tbeir ~ qUa assertions, of one kind: each is qualified as an assertion. and 0tIe mOn featu re .IS th· . I r.... COlltent elr Jutgeme1lf-qllality. The one, however. judges ~~other a~d the Other another content. To distinguish such 'contents' ~b~~~ns~f 'conten~' ~'e sha.11 ~pea.k here of the moUer (material) of tilo.... f shall draw Similar distinctions bet.....een qllalit)' and mauer o all acts.

ltitlningl Whl~h p.r~

120 On Intentional experiences and their 'contents' Under the rubric of 'matter' we shall not divide. and then unity. constituents of an act such as the subject-act. the pred' this would make the unified total content the act itself, What we in mind is something totally different. Content in the sense of' component of the concrete act-experience. which it may share quite different quality. It comes out most clearly if we set up I identical utterances. where the act-qualities change. while the mains identical. All this is not hard to provide. We recall familiar effect that the same content may now be the content of a mere now of a judgement. now of a question. now of a doubt, a wisb man who frames the presentation 'There are intelligent beinp frames the same presentation as the man who asserts 'There are beings on Mars'. and the same as the man who asks 'Are tbcre beings on Mars?". or the man who wishes 'If only there are in on Mars!' etc. etc. We have deliberately written out the clOidy dent expressions in full. To be alike in ·content'. while difTeriDI ia has its visible grammatical expression; the harmony of gram..... points the way to our analysis. What do we mean by the 'same content"? Plainly the in tivity of the various acts is the same. One and the same state presented in the presentation. put as valid in the judgement. the wish, asked about in the question. This observation de:. ever. go far enough, as we shall now show. In real (reell) p,beI",!,~ treatment. objectivity counts as nothing: in general, it traosccacll makes no difJerence II'hat sort of being lI'e gil'e our object, or d or justification we do so, ",hether this being ;s real (real) or . possible or impossible. the act remains 'directed upon' its obj«t. asks how something non-existent or transcendent can be the object in an act in which it has no being, one can only give !be gave above. which is also a wholly sufficient one. The object iI tional object: this means there is an act having a determinate and determinate in a way which makes it an intention towards This 'reference to an object' belongs peculiarly and intrinsically. experience, and the experiences manifesting it are by definition experiences or acts. ll All differences in mode %bjectil'l! re/erena til'e differences i1l intentional experiences. We must note, however, that this peculiarity revealed in the. logical essence of acts. of directing themselves to a cerftli~ ob,;ect ,mother. will not exhaust the phenomenological essence In q spoke of differences in mode of objective reference. but this IU~pI totally distincl. independently variable differences, Some are ~ act-qualily, as when we speak of such different wllyS of bei~g ~n being presented. being judged, being asked etc, Such vana 1l0D with the Olher. wholly independent variation in objective refe

Consciousness as intentional experience

~s.

121

another 10 that object. regardless as to whether the acts dilTcrent in quality. Elwy quality can he combined with erer)' "h " are tt!lk. eor''i'reIlCt'. ThiS. secon d vanatlon I. ereJore pomts 10 a second side in ..J,;,dll't rt)' . / ., d"" IF/"(lIologlca colltent oJ acts, !JJermg flrom t /' lelr qlla /,It),. t1It phtn: se of this latter variation. which concerns the changing direction In ,~s one docs not speak of different 'manners of objective reference', 10 obr~~ differentia of this direction lies in Ihe act itself. tbOugbking more closely. we see another possibility of variation independent ~itY which certainly prompts talk o~ d~ffer:nt w~y~ of .referring to ".q We see. too. that the twofold vanatlon Just dlstmgUlshed is not ~ a position to effect a neat separation of what must be defined as qUJtt~er' from quality. Our distinction posited two sides in every act: its ~ty, which stamped it as. e.g.. presentation or judgement. and its malter. ~t lent it direction to an object, which made a presentation. e.g.• present dIis object and no other. This is quite right, and yet is to some extent lDis5eading. For one is at first tempted to interpret the situation simply: IIIItter is that part of an act which gives it direction to this object and no otMr. Acts are therefore unambiguously determined by their quality. on the one hand, and by the object they will intend, on the other. This seeming obviousness is. however. delusive. One can readily see. in fact. that el'en if fIIIl/ity and objectj)'e direction are both fixed at the same time, certain ,'aria- rzmain possible. Two identically qualified acts. e.g. two presentations, IDly appear directed. and evidently directed, to the same object. without hili agretment in intentional essence. The ideas equilateral triangle and equi~ triangle differ in content. though both are directed, and evidently ~. to t~e ~me object: they present the same object. although ;in a .Cftnt fashIOn. The same is true of such presentations as a length ofa + b a length ofb +0 IInits: it is also true of statements, in other respects llOoymous. which differ only in 'equivalent' concepts. The same holds if "'t n"~~,.:: ~ther ty~ of ~uivalent as~rtjons. e.~. We shall,hal'e rain and ""',/ • IS becommg ramy. If we conSIder a senes of acts hke the judgeI 1lJI!l rain t d h . It rain ada 0 oJ'. t e SUTnllSe Ir may well rain today. the question Will exemPli~ed~? an.d the wish Oft that il W01l1d rain toclel)'!, we see that it ... "" Identity not only as regards objective reference in general. but 0... • \' if b' , ., ,,,,,,litt> org(Jrd~ h (J nell' ,elise 0 () './eC//I'e rl'Jerence, a sense not tixed by the ~ t eact , lity only d" , I~Jon is . . elermlnes whether what IS already present(,.'
rf/I'I ~mt

:;vuand

122

On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

Consciousness as intentional experience

that it itself allributes to it. It is the act's matter that makes its as this object and no other. it is the objectil'e. the interpretative der gegenstiilldlichen Altffassung. Auffassungssblll) which serves II the act's quality (while indifferent to such qualitative difference.). mailers can never yield distinct objective references. as tbe prove. Differences of equivalent, but not tautologically equi sions. certainly affect matter. Such differences must not be th respond to any fragmentation of matter: there is not one piece corresponding to an identical object. another to the differing senting it. Reference to objects is possible a priori only as bcUaa manner of reference: it arises only if the mailer is fully det . To this we may add an observation: act-quality is undou stract aspect of aClS, unthinkable apart from all matter. Coukt experience possible which was a judging without definite This would take from the judgement its character as intentiooal which is evidently part of its essence. The same holds of matter. A matter that was not matter for nor for judgement, nor for ... etc. etc., would be held to be Talk about the manner of objective reference is ambiguo_ points to differences of quality. at times to differences of henceforth counteract such ambiguity by suitable locutions . teons 'quality' and 'malter'. That such talk has yet other' ings will appear in due course. lee. the enumeration in lnv. VI.

aoo...

§21 The intentional and the semantic essence We shall postpone investigation of the difficult problems here • treat of a new distinction. in which a new concept of mten . arises. which has to be separated off from the full descriptiWl the act. In each act's descriptive content we have distinguished qualitY as two mutually dependent aspects. If both are taken together. first seem. the act in question will merely have been reconstituted. more closely. however, another conception distinguishes itself point of view the tll'O aspects. brought 10 unity. do not make up . complele aer. Two acts may in fact agree in respect of their qualitY matter. and yet differ descriptively. In so far as quality and count for us (as will be shown later) as the wholly essential, and be dispensed with constituents of an act. it would be suitable union of both, fo;ming one part of the complete act, the act'l e.fsence. To pin down this teon. and the conception of thc with. we simultaneously introduce a second term. To the extent with acts. functioning in expressions in sense-giving fashion, ?r so runctioning - whether all acts are so capable must be con

123

~nore

spt-"'Cifically of the ,femlmtic essence of the act. The ,,-e shall spebstr;lction of this essence yields a 'meaning' in our ideal sense. :r.nlll a . . I I· jd(3t~ tifica tion of our conceptua ru mg, we may pomt to the followmg III J~ of identifications. We may say generally. and with good sense, ¢Ii ~: ma)'. at different times. and that several men may, at the same or tIll t a (mes, have the same presentation, memory, expectation, percepdiJfcfd1t Ithe same assertion or wish, cherish the same hope etc. cte. n tiofI. utter . h ve the same presentation means. but does not mean as much as, r~ a presentation of the same object. The presentation I have of GreenbI\1~~ wastes certainly differs fro~ the p~esentati~n Nansen has of it, )aPdthe object is the same. Just so t~e Idea~ obJ.ects, slr~lgll1/~ne and shortest :. are identical. but the presentallons - straight bemg SUItably defined ~ diff;:::'bout the same presentation, judgement etc. points to no individual ruoeness of acts, as if my consciousness were in some way conjoined with Jl)lDeOOC else's. It also means no relation of perfect likeness, of indiscemibility • regards inner constituents, as if the one act merely duplicated the other. 'i'e ha\'t the same presentation of a thing, when we have presentations in wbidt the thing is not merely presented. but presented as exactly the same: l'oIIotling our previous treatment we may add 'presented with the same iDtcrprttative sense' or 'based on the same maUer'. In our ;essence' we really 1lI~ the same presentation despite other phenomenological differences. Such CIRfltial identity comes out most clearly when we reflect how presentations Ilmction in forming higher acts. For essential identity can be equivalently ddined if we say: Two presentations are in essence the same, if exactly the AIDe statements, and no others. can be made on the basis of either regard~the Presented thing .(either presentation being taken alone, i.e. analyti). ~ same holds 10 regard to other species of acts. Two judgements ~~tlaIlY the same j.udgement when (in virtue of their content alone) WQuJd ng that the one judgement tells us of the state of affairs judged, TI._, also be told us by the other. and nothing more is told us by either. 'QQI" truth-value ·'s·d . 1 an d t h·IS IS . CIear to us when 'the' judgement . U1t'. I entlca. intentIonal . ". .. ' dat same. essence umtlOg Judgement-quality and judgement-mauer, is

let US now be

.

phe qUlle clear that tlte ;lI1emiol/a/ essence doe.f 1Iot exhaust the lito.' "ome"a/agh' /I, A .. . . -....C1hativ. a ,I. n 'lmaglllatlve presentation. qualified (l.r merely lit,

Ol'the sen e, IS unessentially altered in munner, if the ruilless and vividness

~ivelSUous Contents helping to build it up is increased or decreased or

y put 'r h ' . ' , ..... no..... bee . I I e object now llppcars With greater clearness and definite-

~~t one homes lost in a mist. now becomes paler in colour etc. Whether Its a b . ere assumes intensive dilTerences whether one concedes or

IL.

"'e SIo... aSlC like be . ..... -~'l3ittio., ness tween the sensory phantasms here present and ~t na clem' . . .. Ute quo r . ellis III perception. all thIS makes little dllTerence to the . . allIes• rorm'" :s C c. 0 r t he act, .III so rar as t he act ,s.Intention. ItS

12<4

On intentional experiences and their 'contentS'

meat/ing. stays unchanged, identically dctennined (identity of me. auributc these changes, not to the object. bUI to its 'appearance'; '" the object as constant and persistent, and we 'mean' this in merely fashion (identity of quality). As opposed to this, the m"tter of a sentation changes if its object is given as changing (despite any 0 form of unity to which the intentional object's identity-in-variety co The same is true when new features enrich our conception of which is constantly before consciousness, features not previously object's intentional content, of the object of our presentation as The case of perception is similar. If many persons share the' cept, or repeat a previous one, we have merely an identity of intentional essence. which does not at all exclude change in the content of the experience. The same holds of the variable pan pia can be played. by imagination in perception. in the putting of. object before us. Whether or not images of the back of the . float in front of me, with this or that degree of fulness, st vividness, is quite irrelevant to the essential content. the inte of my percept to that side of it, in shon which. suitably u plains and justifies talk of the 'same percept' in opposition to • of phenomenologically distinct perceplUal acts, In each of sucb object is presupposed as identical, is seen clothed with the ~ properties: it is 'meant' or 'apprehended' and posited in pe A percept may. further. have the same matter as a flight of latter may present an object or state of affairs in imagination u. the same' as it is perceptually apprehended in the percept. No objectively ascribed in the one case which is not likewise other. Since the quality of the presentation may be identical (e.g. of memory), we see that the specific differences of intuitive depend on their intentional essence. Much the same may be said of any sort of act. Many persons same wish. when their optative intention is the same, This wish person be fully expressed, in another unexp~essed. in o~e bring to full intuitive clarity its basic presentative content, 10 ano be more or less 'notional' etc. In each case the identity of essence , in the two aspects distinguished above, in an identity of act-qu . matter. The same may be claimed for expressive acts, for the ~~ts "!' lar which /el/d meaning to expressions: as said above by an~tclpa sell/til/ric enel/ce. i.e. the really present (reell) p Ilenomeno Ioglcal their meaning, coincides with their intentional essence. We may confirm our notion of semantic essence (the lIct of y cOl/creto) by recalling the series of identities used above in .In ad (§12) in order to draw a distinction between a uni.ty of me~l1Ing~ of object. and the numerous examples of expressive experience . illustrated our general notion of intentional essence. The idenUI1

Consciousness as Intentional experience

125

-----:Of ·the· statement consists in an identity of meaning repeated nt jlJligerne 0 in lhe many individual .Icls, and represented in them by their (IS the ~nJ~ ~11~'e. This leaves room for important descriptive difference in semantic esSl:'hcr constituents of these acts. as we have pointed out in detail.J.I

,rgard 10 0

.Appe n

dix to § I I and §20

the
are tWO fundamental, well-nigh inemdicable errors that have to be in t~e phenomenological interpretation of the relationship betVottn act and subject: ... . . I. The erroneous image-theory. whIch thinks It has suffiCIently explamed the fact of presentation - fully present in each act - by saying that: 'Outside the thing itself is there (or is at times there); in consciousness there is an image which does duty for it.' To this notion we must object that it entirely ignores a most weighty point: that in a representalion by images the represented object (the original) is IftW1Il, and meant by way of its image as an apparent object. This repramtative character is. however. no 'real predicate'. no intrinsic character of the: object which functions as image: an object is not representative as, e.g., it is red and spherical. What therefore enables us to go beyond the image 1l1tich alone is present in consciousness. and to refer to the latter as an image to a certain extmconscious object? To point to the resemblance betlI-een image and thing will not help. It is doubtless present. as an objective ~Utt-Qf-fact. when the thing actually exists. But for consciousness. which tS~umed only to possess the image.)' this fact means nothing: it can throw ~ ~ght on the essence of the representative relation to the object. to the Oflgtnal, which is external to itself. Resemblance between two objects, howt\'tt . J sen' Prectse. does not make the one be an image of Ihe other. Only a pre_ ~n~ ego'~ ~wcr to use .. simil..r as an image-representative of a similar ~a: rs~ sImilar had intuitively. while the second similar is nonetheless tht lin .IIS place - makes the image be an image. This can only mean that co~nStltution of the image us image takes place in a peculiar intentional aPpe~us~ess. Whose il/ner character. whose .\pCdfically peculiar mode of IUch bUt Phon, not only constitutes wh.lI we call image-representation as Iftlai.e.r also. through its particular inner determinateness, constitutes the ~il~prese~tation of this or that "('.fi"i/(' objcct. The reflective. relational I;Pparen~nb~f Im~lgc to original does not. however. point to two genuinely ~Il.SUJnrn~ .1ects 10 thc imaginative act itsclf, but rather to possible cognitive Ilttentio n atlons. ~hich new acts must realize, both fulfilling the imaginal I ~nd achIeving a synthesis between the imagc and the thing it repnaccurate oppositions of inner likenesses to outcr objl.'Cts cannot

~ against

.

'ta.

Consciousness as Intentional experience

126 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

be allowed i,n ~ descrip~ive ~sychology, a?d much less in a pure p ology, A painting only IS a likeness for a hkeness-eonstituting co w~ose imaginative apperception, basing itself on a percept, first Ii pnmary, perceptually apparent object the stalus and meaning of III ~ince ,the inte~retation of.anything as an image presupposes ... intentionally gIven to conSCiousness, we should plainly have a infinitum were we again to let this latter object be itself constituted an image. or to speak seriously of a 'perceptual image' immanent lal percept. by way of which it refers to the 'thing itselr. We must COllIe moreover, the general need for a constitution of presented objecta..r.r con~iousness, in consciousness's own circle of essential being. realize that a transcendent object is not present to conscioUSbe8 because a content rather similar to it simply somehow is in co a supposition which, fully thought out, reduces to utter nonsetlJe_ all relation to an object is part and parcel of the phenomenolop:.l of consciousness, and can in principle be found in nothing else, such a relation points to some 'transcendent' matter. This pointiDa in the case of a straightforward presentation: it is mediate in the 'founded' presentation, e.g. one by way of images. One should not talk and think as if an image stood in the same consciousness as a statue does to a room in which it is set up, or least light could be shed on the matter by inventing a hotch· objects, One must rise to the fundamental insight that one can the understanding one wants through a phenomenological Ihe essences of the acts concerned, which are acts of the 'imagina . wide, traditional sense of Kant and Hume. The essential and a liarity of such acts consists in the fact that in them 'an object sometimes straightforwardly and directly, and sometimes as 'co 'representation by images' of an object that resembles it, Here we forget that the representative image, like any apparent object, is ' stituted in an act in which the prime source of its representative to be sought. Our exposition extends, mU((ltis 1111/1(lIId;s, to the theory of rep in the wider sense of a theory ofsigns. To be a sign, likewise, is no predicate; it requires a founded conscious act. a reference to certaia characters of acts, which are all that is phenomenologically relevant consequence of Ihis last predicate, all that is really (reell) phenom 2, It is a serious error 10 draw a real (reell) distinction betWeen immanent' or 'intentional' objects, on the one hand, and 'tran 'actual' objects, which may correspond 10 them on the other. It is" whether one makes the distinction one between a sign or image reaU1 present in consciousness and the thing it stands for or images, or one substitutes for the 'immanent object' some other real (reelles) consciousness, a conten!. e.g.. as a sense-giving factor, Such e

thin~

127

--:;:::-Ough the centuries -:- one has ?nly to of Anselm's ontodl1lgg ument - they have theIr source In factual difficulties, but their lOgical a~~s in equivocal talk concerning 'immanence' and the like. It need support said 10 be acknowledged thai ,he illlt'miollalobject of a presentalioll only ~"'t. as iH actlial object. alld Oil occasio" as its external object, am/tllat ~~1te bsurd 10 distinguish betweell tllt'm. The tnmscendent object would not object of ,IIis prese~tation, if, i~ was not i'~ intentional object. This ~ ainly a merely analytIc proposll,lon, The object of the presentation, ~~ 'intention', i.r and means what IS presented. the intentional object. If I represent God to myself. or an angel. or an intelligible thing-in-itself. • physical thing or a round square etc" I mean the transcendent object ~ in each case,. in ~ther ~ords ,m,y int.entional object: it makes no difference whether thIs object eXists or IS Imaginary or absurd. 'The object is memY intentional' does not. of course, mean that it exists, but only in an intention, of which it is a real (rulles) part. or that some shadow of it exists, It means rather that the intention, the reference:l' to an object so qualified. aists. but not that the object does, If the intentional object exists. the intention, the reference, does not exist alone. but the thing referred to exists also. But enough of these truisms, which so many philosophers still manage to obfuscate so completely, What we have said above does not. of course, stop us from distinguishing, as 1II't said previously, between the object tout court which is intended on a liven occasion, and the object as it is then intended - what interpretative slant is put upon it and with what possible fulness of intuition - and in the latter case peculiar analyses and descriptions will be appropriate.

illS;

Chapter 3

The muter of the act and its underlying presentation

129

~ as de:lr as one can in regard to the nature of such reference is

The matter of the act and its underlying presentation

~. ntal interest for epistemology. since all thinking takes place in acts.

of r..,daO'" 1'h III

,,,,e re

§22 The question of the relation between the and quality of an act We wind up our general probe into the phenomenological SI tentional experience with a discussion which throws important li main problems in our special field of meaning. It deals with the qllality to matter, and so with the sense in which each act both also includes in itself a presentation which serves as its basis. W. once come up against fundamental difficulties, scarce noticed certainly not put ioto words. The gap in our phenomenological is all the more grievous since. while it remains unfilled. we can hi insight into the essential make·up of intentional experiences, and fore into meanings. Quality and matter were distinguished by us as two 'moments', constituents of all acts. We did so quite properly. If, e.g., we ID encc one of 'judgement' > there must be some inner determination, mere outwardly attached mark, that distinguishes it as a jud wishes. hopes and other sorts of acts. This detennination it all judgements: what distinguishes it from all other judgements (~ ments other in essence) is above all its mailer (disregarding certaa 'moments' to be investigated later). This matter also is an inner the act. This is not so much directly apparent - quality and matlel' readily prise
can

vieW of 'matter' as a founding act of peresentation'

answer \0 our question is furnished by the well·known proposition . ..-first " " b e h"IS 'psyc h"Ica I phenomena." II'" ong olhcrs by Brcnlano to Clrcumscn used a~h such phenomenon - in our tenninology and definition each inten~t ~.l'prrienC(' _ is ('irh~'r a presentation or ba~~d l'pon Wlderlyi~g presentat~ More precisely. thiS remarkable propoSition means that In each act ~~tentional object is prese~ted in an (~~l of presenlation, and that. wb~nwe have no case of 'mere presentation. we have a case of presentation t\~iarlY and intimately inwoven with one or more further acts or rather :-charactCrs. that the presented objects become the object judged about. ~ished for. hoped for etc. Such plurality of intentional reference is not achieved in a linked concomitance or sequence of acts, in each of which the object has a novel. i.e. a recurrent, intentional presence, but in a single strictly unitary act, in which a single object is only once apparent. but is in this single appearance the target of a complex intention. We can. in other _-ords. interpret our proposition as saying that an intentional experience only pins objective reference by incorporating an experienced act of preseatation in itself. through which the object is presented 10 it. The object would be nothing to consciousness if consciousness did not set it before ~If as an object. and if it did not further pennit the object to become an object of feeling. of desire etc. These added intentionlll characters are plainly not to be regarded as tomp~ete and independell1 (lct.~: they cannot be conceived apart from the act ~tifYing presentation. on which they are accordingly based. That an 'th or state of affairs should be desired. without being presented in and ~ such desire. is not merely not the case in fact. but is entirely inconceivrorc:' an.d the same holds in every similar case. The maHer before us there"",,()~s to be a.pri~rf' and the pro~sition asserting it. is a self-evi~ent • OOt ~~e. !~e addition of. e.g., dcslre to some underlymg presentation. ~ e ad~lIlon of something that exists independently. with its own 'oQ.ind ent direction to some object: we must see it as the addition of a 0b;ect ,CJlendem factor. intentional no doubt as having real reference to an SUch r~;nd umhinkable a prio/'i without it. but only .. ble to develop or gain Joa... erenl.:e thro ugII "" ., . -•....,.-p Ilia intimate /.wl.wm with a presentation. But lhis lasr is QUne ca '~~ II/C'rt,. {j(·t-ql/(flity: unlike the quality of desire based upon it. it is III.tt ~~ of l~dcpcndent existem.:e as a concrete intentional experience. We rou mere presentation. lit ntilld i n~ ofT these explanations with an observation which must be kept n Uturc discussions: that among cases of 'mere presentation' we

oi:

1)0 On

intention~1

experiences

~nd

their 'comenu'

must include. following Orentano. all cases of mere imagination apparent object has neither being nor non-being asserted of it. and. further acts concern it as well as all cases where an expression, e.g.. ment. is well understood without prompting us either to belief or . It is mainly by contrast with such a 'belief-character', whose addi ' feets judgement. that the notion of mere presentation can be elu ' well-known how important a part this contrast plays in the madera of judgement. Returning to our proposition, we are tempted (as said at the to apply the principle there expressed and here set forth. to explaia tion between matter and quality. Identity of mailer accompanym, of quality rests, we may say, on the 'essential' identity of the presentation, Or otherwise put: acts having the same 'content', and only in intentional essence. inasmuch as one judges. one wishes, 011I etc., this same content. have 'in essence' the same presentation as If this presentation underlies a judgement. it yields (in its pfelCld 'matter') the content of a judgement. If it underlies a desire, it content of a desire etc. etc. We spoke of 'essentially the same presentation'. We are not to as saying that mailer and underlying presentation are actually OBI same. since 'maller' is merely an abstract 'moment' in an act. In 'essentially the same presentation' we rather meant. following p cussion, presentations with one and the same matter, which may, be phenomenologically differentiated by further 'moments' which ing to do with matter. Since quality is also the same. aU these have the same 'intentional essence'. The following is the outcome: that. while every other intentiooal is a complex of quality and matter. the intentional essence of a is pure matter - or is pure quality, however one may choose to Otherwise put. it is only oc'Cause all other acts have a complex' essence, and necessarily include a presentative factor among their constituents, that talk of the difference between quality and matt« The word 'matter' refers to the necessary, basic presentative con . the case of simple acts, which are also eo ipso presentative, the tinction necessarily falls away. One should then say: the difference quality and matter represents no basic difference among the kinda stract moments found in acts, MU//('r,f, treated in and for themselves. differ from qllalitil'.~: they are qlltlliti('.\' of presl'lI/atiol/, What. w~ intentional essence of an act is its total qualilative being: thiS IS essential to it. as opposed to what varies accidentally. The matter could also be put in the following manner: . If an act is simple. i.e. is a pure presentation. its quality COl what we have called its intentional essence. If it is complex - aod that are not mere presentations. as well as all complex presentatiodSo

The mUter of the

~ct

and iu underlying preSentation

I) 1

~e:l: intentional essence is merely a complex of qualities brought CO

tJdC_ ltS . unit)'. from which a unitary total quality emerges, in such a way.

together IOhat each primitive or complex quality in the pattern. which is not bO",'Cvtr~ntativequality, rests upon such a presentative quality, which in itsC lfa P ,.on yields. or is called, the corresponding matter, or the total . func I L1uS 'relation to the complex total act. J1)Suer 10

.. Difficulties, The problem of the differentiation

II, ualitative kinds o q Evllkn t as this whole interpretation seems, and based on an irrefragable port it is yet not such as to exclude other possibilities. Brentano's prin5~~e is ~ndoubtedly self·evident, but things have perhaps been read into it :~ich are not truly part of it. We note at least the peculiar stress laid on presentations: as the one class of intentional experiences whose intentional essence (or, what now is the same. whose intentional quality) could be truly simple. In connection with this a problem arises as to the interpretation of the last sp«ific differences of the I'arious types of intentional essence (or briefly of iruentions'). When we judge. e.g., is our full judgement-intention. the aspect in the act of assertion which corresponds to our asserted sentence's mean· illg a complex whole made up, on the one hand, of a presentative intention, ,,'hich merely gives 'presence' to some state of affairs. and a corresponding, Rnctly judgemental intention. which sees it in the further aspect of what really is? What is the position, we may ask. in regard to last specific differ· ~ of such added intentions'! The SUIt/mum genus of Intention specifies iUdf. mediately or immediately. in the species of Judgement-intention (the latter o~ COurse conceived 'for itselr, and in abstraction from its supposedly ~IY'lllg presentative intention). Is this species. we may ask. an ultimate ~fic difference?

~reserve ~la~ity

tbt

let us compare our case with a plain case where

~nce IS differentiated. The genus Quality is essentially specified in

",,~es ~Iour, an~ this in its tum has the species Red ranged under it, r~ as thl~ ~etemllnate shade of Red. This last is a last specific dif·

limits

::ernultmg of no differentiation which remains within its generic II that is still possible are alliances with detenninations which das. ~ to other genera, which are themselves last differences in their own 'Peakin:~.allianc~s add definiteness to content, but they do not. properly olt;,,,, W' ,ffercntlate. J The same Red, e,g.. can be extended in this or that . t mod'f ~ &enu ElY, the moment of Red, notl/I/a quality. but in respect of the ~ 0; ll.tenslon. a moment essentially belonging to it, since it is of the JtetUtn' COlour that il cannot be without extension. ~I~g. 10 ~ur present case, how shall we hold that the superadded Is: It quite ~~U~gJng .stand~ to its presenlati~nal basis i~ a concrete ju~geme.nt? same III all Judgements. and IS the SpecIes Judgemenl-mtenuon

beton'

132 On intention;al experiences and their 'contents'

(understood in ideal isolation. uncomplicated by presentations) tralr est specific difference?" We should not hesitate to say so. But ifwcclo and if we then try to argue similarly in the case of all kinds 01 in encounter serious difficulties in the case of presentations. For, if Do differentiation of the species Presentation is possible. the difference this or that presentation in specie. e.g. the difference between the tion Emperor and the presentation Pope. will not affect the intention as such. What then \\rill differentiate these presentationa. or these intentional essences or presentational mt!(millgs'! They must complexes of the character or quality Presentation together with generically different character and, since all difference of objecti-..e is absent from the former. this second character must introduce ence into the complete meaning. In other words. the intentional the presentation (its meaning. in our example) cannot be the lui difference in the presentative intention: a wholly new determinatioa other sort must be added to the fully differentiated intention. 1be of each presentation will then consist of PresenUllil'e Intention with COllfent. two generically different ideal unities woven togetb« Returning to our old terms we must say: If we hold it obvious, above. that intentions of all sorts must be differentiated in like must again opt for an essential distinction between act..qua1ity maner. We cannot maintain the view that what we called 'matter' ill with the intentional essence of an underlying presentation, and its tum is identical with a mere quality of presentation.

§25 Closer analysis of our two possible solutio... Many will here ask in amazement why we are so prolix in difficulties that we ourselves have put in our path. The whole malW simple. Each act of presentation has of course the general act of the Species Presentation, which permits no further genuine . tion. What differentiates presentation from presentation? Tbrir course. The presentation Pope presents the Pope. the presentatiOll the Emperor. Such 'obviousnesses' will satisfy nobody who has grasped the p logical distinctions of kind which obtain here. and which derive f unities. and especially the fundamental cleft between 'content' as . 'content' as matter (interpretative sense or meaning), It will only sa who, at this point where it is so all,important. fail to feci the fofCll truth that the objcct is. properly speaking, nothing at all 'in' a P Our prolixity was therefore quite necessary. Objects, I!Ult ore a pre.w.'lITwiml are a/so wUlh!e 10 crewe dif/ereIlCt'.f amollg presenUJ

especially not the differences so familiar to us from the proper. each presentation in respect of what it presents. If .....e think of tbJS

The matter of the act ;and itS underlying presentation

~istinct

133

from the intended object and immanent in the pres'COnt~t .. is nol clear what we could mean by it. Only t.....o possibilities seem etltlluon. It which .....ere indicated above and .....hich we now wish to set forth to us. . ~ Iy as poSSible. . .. . . IS sharP ,aSSume. as one POSSibility. that It IS the quality of the presental11a) • h· h ' h· h· h . . Wedifferentiated 10 t IS. or: at las .Ion, w .IC .constltules the variable tiCJlL • nal essence. and wllh It the vanable objective reference. in the real ~: content of the presentation. The presenlations Pope and Emperor ( Pope and Emperor themselves) differ from one another in the very (DOt way that the colour Red differs from the colour Blue (both thought of ~bollY definite ·shades'). O~r uni\'ersal is Presenlation, our particular is ~tation in the full determmateness and complele differentiation that its J(ItIan tic essence permils. I~ the compar:oo case the universal is Colour. the particular this or that defiOlle colour. thiS shade of Red, thai shade of Blue. That a presentation refers to a cerlain object in a certain manner, is not due 10 its acting on some e;.;lerna!. independeOl object. 'directing' itself to it in some literal sense, or doing somelhing to it or wilh it. as a hand writes with I pen. It is due to nothing that stays outside of the presentation. but to its OIPt1I inner peculiarity alone, This last holds on any view but. on the present \iew. a given presentation presents this object ill lhi!l' ma/lller in view of its pmJilJr/y differentiated presemaliolla/ quality. Or we may hold. as the Jecond possibility open to us. that the full intentiooa.l essence (in our cases the full semantic essence) that achieves Abstract !deatioo in talk of 'The (ideally-single) Presentation Pope' or of 'The MeanIIlJ of the word ··Pope···. is essentially complex. and divides into two abJlract mo~ents: Presentational Quality. on the one hand. the Act-Quality of IlrtSental.lon conceived in universal selfsameness and purity. and 'Content' ~ue,:, on the ~lher ha.nd: which does not pertain to the inner essence of 11 totaltal.lon:u a dlfferentlatmg feature, but accedes to it and perfects it into I"ort n; meanmg. The relation of Presenlational Quality to Maller is there~: thai of Dele~inate Shade of Colour to Extension. in our parallel lkeY,isc '. Each colour IS Ihe colour of a cenain extension: each presentation ~ IS t~e presenlation of a certain content. In neither case is the conCOntmgent. but has a priori necessity. Ou rCOmpa' . bon, and h nson shows how we Wish to conceive this kind of combinafonra or ow. we must conceive it from our present point of view. It is a killdl"ed ~ho,mbllllliion that still lacks a suitable name. Brentano and certain r~ IIlkcrs .c'lll " b·· f 'Q'S (0 SPe k ' . 1 : 1 .com mallon 0 'metaphysical parts': Stumpf pretbell.l)ityO~ of attnbutlve parts'. The connections of inner properties in the Idea of ~~ternal phcnomcll:Il things yield the typical examples on which 'ott that t~ IS form of combination must be conceivt:d. We mus!. however. ~ Chara Ccompleting ch'lracter which adds determining content to the CoQteql)", Cter of Preseut.ltive Quality (only abslractly separable from such -~-., . regarded ...."n as truly belonging to a lIell' gemu. Ir .....e agam

IH

On Intentional experiences and their 'contents'

it as a qualitative character, the difficulties we are now seekina to would surge up once more, and only names would have been at If we therefore decide to exclude 'Content" or 'Matter' frOUl Act-Quality. we shall have to say: The qualitative character as to make a presentation a presentation. and the qualitative consequently, which are such as to make judgements judg desires etc.. have in their inner essence no relation to an 0 . ideally necessary relation is grounded in this essence: this character without complementary 'matter'. through which the relation to first enters the complete intentional essence and the concrete . experience itself. This carries over eo ipso to the semantic pressive experiences, what makes us speak, e.g.. of the 'same . asserted by different persons. This semantic essence, this ideal sense. is. in the concrete judgement-experience, the Act Judgemental Position (the abstract Judgement-quality), attri up with tbe 'content' (the Mauer of Judgement) tbrough which to the 'object'. i.e. tbe state of affairs. is consummated. This Assertion may be seen a priori to be unthinkable without a colour is unthinkable without extension.

§26 Consideration and rejection conception How shall we decide among these opposed possibilities, both with equal care? If we accept the first possibility Presentation stands as an exception in a series of intentional ex.periences. Within the Intentional Quality, which includes as coordinated species tbe. Presentation, Judgement. Wish. Will etc.. the s~ies Pre~ola eotiated into all the varieties classed as presentations of thiS or (or matter). while qualities of Judgement. Wishing, Willi?8 dilTerences: differences of content are in their case mere dtfti . presentational qualities which are combined with. or underltc. quality. The matter can be seen in another wa~. One ~anoot formity by treating the distinguishing contents of dlfTerentJudg willings etc., as differences o~ the qualitative species JUdgemen~. etc .. since different pure species cannot share the mille lowest this anomaly not ex.changed for another if we accept different s same level. of which some have lowest diITerences under rhelll, IN themselves (Ire such lowest differences? But if we adopt the :"econd possibility it seems to force u~ to to conception yet further. Have we good groUl~d left for ad~enng ciple that every intentional ex.perience is either a. '~ere p implies presentations as its necessary basis? Such pnoruy for p

The muter of the act and in underlying presentation

1]5

~Ch complication

in all acts not themselves presentations, as actS - anost gratuitous assumption. On the view now set up as correct. ;tC'I111il aIm. arc thought of as ex.periences sui generis. only entering into Ibt' '~ilteilt~ unity with the act-character of Presentation. (This combina(Olilblil~tOr)a)' be very intimate and may connect intrinsic. positive properwrY Lll1lt~;;uch :t manner of combination can here produce what we call an tieS-) ~utl.gi\'en-content. why should the case be different for other types a ,ct.•,th- t least why mllst it be dilTerent? The combinatory form here in oI'~00or aakes out of Presentative Quality and 'Content' a whole entitled que511 :00 with a given Content'. Why should not the same combinatory .~: the same for other .acts. and in the case. e.g., of. the Judgement, :eout of Judgement-Quality and Content. the whole entitled 'Judgement .-rth. given Content'? The peeu1iar character of many sorts of acts may of necessity require mediation: many act-qualities may only make their appearance in combinatlOlI "ith other act-qualities. e.g. that of presentation. which underlie them • tbe total act, and which relate to the same matter. so that they are mediatdv linked with this matter. But that this must always be so. and that the Act~ of Mere Presentation plays this all-important role, so that every aa DOt itself a mere presentation gets its matter only through a mediating ro--tsauation: all this appears neither obvious nor initially likely.

117 The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual presentation and perception We close our argument with the ;testimony of inner perception'. which in exploring controversial questions of description, though fit ~ reason to prefer speaking of immediate intuitive analysis of the ~ of int~ntional ex.periences. Such a reversal of expository order is to tted and III certain circumstances necessary. We wish in epistemology ~.er all due honour to the evidence of a rightly understood. immanent dais tesl~n of essence which is falsely credited to 'internal perception'. But ~~lInony. .when appealed to. must be conceptually apprehended and doublS ,~.nd Will thereby lose much authority and permit of well-founded IoqUit~ Irrer~1It people all appeal to such 'illternal perception'. and come "true i oprSHC results: they read different things into il or out of it. This ~ ra~ t e Case before us. The analyses just done enable us to recognize Irlttl'Jn-Ct ~nd to distinguish and appraise various illusions which arise in ~ hO~IO~S of the data of phenomenological inspections of essence. The !IIIler intu':' In regard to the evidence of general principles based on our ~reta:·IO~ of individual cases. based on this evidence, i.e.. and not on "'e la: IVe lIHerpolations. t(.. Id abo e h ~an .v t at it wus wrong to talk of 'internal perception' instead enl InSpection of essences' in making the usual appeals to the

Jbou&d COme first

136 On Intentional experiences and their 'comenu'

'evidence of internal perception', For, if one examines lIle maUer appeals either serve to establish facts of essence belonging to • phenomenological sphere. or mere transfers of such facts to the psychological reality. Assertions of phenomenological fact CiIII epistemologically grounded in psychological experif!rlce (Erfi. illtemal perception in the ordinary sense of the word, but only in phenomenological inspt'ction of essence. The latter has its ill in inner intuition, but such inner intuition need not be actual' ceptian or other inner experience (Erfilhrung). e,g, recollection: ita are as well or even better served by any free fictions of inner . provided they have enough intuitive clarity, Phenomenological however, as often stressed. fundamentally excludes all psychological tion and real (rt'ale) assertion of existence, all positings of nature with its actual things, bodies and persons. including one', icaJ ego, as well as all that transcends pure consciousness. ThiI achieved eo ipso. since the phenomenological inspection of turning of immanent ideation upon our inner intuitions, only ing gaze on what is proper to the real (reel/en) or intentional experiences inspected. and only brings to an adequate focua modes of experience which such individual experiences ex u priori ideal laws which relate to them. It is of the yeatesl . be quite clear on this matter. Men are misled by a mere iIIusioa think, in conducting epistemological discussions, or in psychol sions which base general principles of conscious data on apod' that the source of such evidence lies in inner experience (Erfi. particular in internal perception. i.e. in acts which assert e cardinal error infects Ihat style of psychologism which thinks il the ~uirements of pure logic, ethics and epistemology and thai .• beyond extreme empiricism, merely because it speaks of 'a and even of 'u priori insights'. without ever leaving the ground experience (ErfahTlmg) and psychology, It is in principle im beyond Hume in this manner. since he too acknowledges ltw the form of 'relations of ideas'. and yet is so far from disting' . ciple between inner experience (ErfuhTlmg) and Ideation, that III the latter nominalistically as a set of contingent facts. [Second menI. Trans.) Going into more detail. it is, of course. evident that each experience has its basis in II presentation. It is evident that we if the state of affairs :Ibout which we judge is not present to our the same is true of enquiring. doubting. surmising, desiring etc. 'presentation' here mean what it means in other contexts'! May thralls to ,10 equivo<::ttion when we expand this evidence into lhe 'Each act-experience is either a mere presentation. or has its sentations·. We are put on our guard by the fact that, if we

The matter of the act and Its underlying presentation

~ernlY

137

descriptive fashion. we do not by any means always the acts which are not 'mere presentations' into ~ It P? I actS \\'hich supposedly make them up. Let us contrast a case ....rl1a . I' I ~ r:-. tentional reference IS p am y compound. and in relation to the same .'bd" ,n 'th one or other of our dubious cases, I cannot rejoice in anything lIJItl er. ~~at I rejoiL'e in stands before me in the hues of existence. in the ~ \\al. the reminiscent. possibly also the judgemental and assertive ptrtCPtU Here the compounding is indubitable, If. e.g., I see and rejoice. the IIl3n~er~cter of my joy has its basis in a percept with its own act-character. ~~hal11akes its matter into mailer for my joy. The character of my joy may ,hi< . led. fait away while my percept remalllS una ter . Without doubt. therefore, it f()l1llS part of the concretely complete expe~ience of joy. . PtrctPtion offers an example of the dubiOUS compoundlllg of acts, Here IS in all acts we distinguish between quality and mailer. Comparison with a corresPOnding mere presentation, one, e.g.. of mere imagination, shows how tilt same object can be present as the same (with the same 'interpretative 1fIl$e'), and yet present in an entirely different 'manner. In perception the object seemed to achieve full-bodied presence, to be there in propria fWrsona. fa !be imaginative presentation it merely 'floats before us', it is 'represented' without achieving full-bodied presence. This is not. however. the difference dult concerns us: ours is a difference of mere ·moments'. involving neither IlItter nor quality. just like. e.g.. the difference between perceiving and rcoollecting one selfsame object which is present to mind with the same ullnpret~tive sense etc. Let us therefore compare a percept with a mere p!'e$Cntallon that corresponds to it. while abstracting from all such differ~..On Our conception. II 'malter' is abstractly common 10 both cases. In tach case in different fashion. and with a differing act-quality. On ~r ~n~ption which we were questioning. the matter which underlies Pl'tIeD 1l0~ IS Itself a second act-quality. that of an underlying act of mere I'ttttpttatlon. Does analysis reveal anything of the sort'! Can we look on a bon as a compound act in which an independent act of mere presenta~ be really iSOlated'! Poadent~1 SO,meone wil! here point to the possibility of an exactly corres· -the isol uSlon. and will hold that. once exposed as illusion. it can be seen tQd prOvi~~ed ~ere. pr~scntation. inwrought without change into our percept 1rlasirnpl Ing 1t W.lIh ItS matter. Illusion, while not recogni7.ed as illusion. beuer felt perceptIon. But. later. its perceptu:II character. the act-quality of ~. 'Pollndiawav.' and th-c mere perceptual presentation rem,lined, The same IIrldtrI Ying ng mUst be assumed to obtain in :111 percepls: everywhere the ~ion PCr~eptuat presentation - whose quality fomlS the mailer of 1_-" -Wl!lbc 'Ii 'oCt 1II di completed by a belief-character. dr.~ng th~ matter more closely in the light of a concrete example. ~ing la; UI 10 the IJanopticum Waxworks we meet on the stairs a YWhom we do not know and who seems to know us. and who

~nc:ibte to an:llysc

:;en

sc:

1]8

On intentional experienc.es and their 'c.ontents'

is in fact the well-known joke of the place: we have for a m tricked by a waxwork figure, As long as we are tricked, we ex perfectly good percept: we see a lady and not a waxwork figure, illusion vanishes. we see exactly the opposite, a waxwork figure represents a lady. Such talk of 'representing' does not of course the waxwork figure is modelled on a lady as in the same waxworq figure-models of Napoleon, of Bismarck etc, The percept of the as a thing does not therefore underlie our awareness of the SlIIII representing the lady. The lady, rather, makes her appearance the wax-figure and in union with it. Two perceptual interpreta . appearances of a thing, interpenetrate, coinciding as it were in perceptual content. And they interpenetrate in conflicting f our observation wanders from one to another of the apparent barring the other from e:t.istence. It can now be argued that while the original perceptual p,~:;::: not achieve an entirely detached existence, but appears in Cl the new percept of the wax-figure, it does not serve to foa percept: only the wax-figure is perceived, it alone is believed to there. The isolation is achieved after a fashion. which suffices for purpose:. But it would only really suffice if we could truly speak. in this case, if we could, in other words, assume the presentatiOil in the second case to be really contained in the original percept vl lady. But, when the fraud is exposed, presentation amounts to consciousness resolved in conflict. But a consciousness q • fashion is naturally not part of the original percept. CertaiDly something in common: they are as like one another in our which cannot in this respect be improved upon. as percept and ing presentation can possibly be. Certainly both share the same which such far-reaching likeness is by no means needed. It is the who appears on both occasions, and who appears endowed widl set of phenomenal properties. But in the one case she stands real, in the other case as a fictjon, with a full-bodied appearaDOO amounts to nothing. The difference lies in the qualities of our almost exactly as if she herself were present. a genuine, actual unusual likeness in matter and other non-qualitative constilUenli fl certainly inclines us to slip from a representational into a pe of consciousness. It is only the contradiction which this tendencY believing perception encounters, as it directs itself upon the beck tbI that prevents us from rcally yi~lding to it: a.contr~diction due t~nd of the mere wax-doll. which In part COinCides With our I?dy ~icb respects rules her out. and due especially to the note of belief w this laller percept. The difference is. however. plainly of a sort tblt the thought that the presentation should be contained in the same matter is at one time matter for a percept. and al another

The matter of the act and Its underlying presentation

~Ptual fiction.

1]9

but both can evidently not be combined. A

rOf a mere 110t also fictitiously construct what it perceives. and a fiction ~t ~J1 pen.:eive what it constructs, caf\llOI ~ ~ve analysis does nol. therefore, favour Ihe view. so obvious to

~~t each percept is a c~m~u~d. in which a moment of belief, the

pnY,

'stic quality of perception, IS Imposed on a complelf! act of percependowed with its own independent quality. tual prese

cbJ!8"'1.er1ntatio n.

11 special investigation of the matte" in the 0/ J'udgement

I • ca'

1'be situation is similar in the case of judgements. a class of acts of particular iDtere51 to the logician. We here employ this K'ord in its principal sense. IfIDc/r connects it Ii'ith lUsertions (predications), and so excludes percepts.

rcmembt'aJlCCS and similar acts (despite their not unessential descriptive affinity). In the judgement a state of affairs 'appears' before us, or, put IIIOR plainly, becomes intentionally objective 10 us, A state of affairs, even ooe concerning what is sensibly perceived, is not, however, an object that rouId be sensibly perceived and apparent (whether to our 'outward' or to our 'inward' sensibility), In perception an object is given to us as having fd.bodied existence. We call it something which now is. in so far as our pcn::q.t serves as our basis for judging that it is. In thisjudgemem, which can eootiDue essentially unaltered even when the percept falls away. what appears or intentionally is 'in consciousness'. is not the existent sensible object. ~ the fact lhal this is. In the judgement it further seems to us that somethina has such and such properties. and this 'seeming', which we must not of ~ ':Onceive as a case of doubtful surmise. but as one of firm opinion. ~?ty, of conviclion as in the ordinary sense of ·judgement'. may be ~ 10 many forms which vary in conient. It may be an opinion that S ~ not, that S is p or is not p, that either S is p or Q is r etc. e{ affQi~:I~yS th~ part ,of.obj~t to ~u~gement and opinion we call the stale iladt: he jUd~ed. we distingUish thiS 10 reflex knowledge from the judging ~. act 10 which Ihis or that appears thus or thus, just as in the case of F~1o ~on we distinguish the perceived object from the perception as act Irt'ing this ' I . . Iftalttr of ~na ogy. we must ask ourselves whether what constitutes the tflQirs I' o~r Judgement. what makes il the jut/gemelli of a gil'en state of be 6tl~ les IfJ an underlying aCI ofpre,5ellfarion. The stale of affairs will then ~ th~r~nted through this presentation. :lnd. thus presented. will be"hich is bta.r,gel or a new act. or rather act-quality. of judgemental positing I., UI I upo ntis h· presentatIon. . "00 ~tia~eg Would question that. for every judgement, conceived (l priori in lAId . endowed wllh . the same matter. - thereCcnerallll' . t h ere·IS a presentation AtI&trn~nt~re presenting the same thing in exactly the same manner. as the JUdges about it. To the judgement. e.g.. The earllt's mass iJ' abollt

140 On intention;al experiences ;and their 'contenu'

IIJ25,OOO of the SIIII'S mass. corresponds. as 'mere' presentation, performed by someone who hears and understands this statement., no reason to pronounce any judgement upon it, We now ask 0 this very act of mere presentation a constituent of the judgement., the latter merely differ in respect of a superadded, deciding note ment which superl't!lll!s upon the mere presentation? I for my I may, can find no confirmation of this view in descriptive a find no trace of the required duplicity in act-quality. One cannot base a pretended analysis on the fact that one talks of ;mere p The word 'mere' points to a deficiency, as it does everywhere, but deficiency is remedied by an addition. We oppose, e,g., 'mere' i to perception, thereby according a preference to the former, wi ing it with a plus. Just so, in the verbal opposition of mere p judgement, a preference for the former corresponds to a defic:iel"l laner. the preferential status of having come to a decision, a j regard to what formerly was a merely presented state of affain.

§29 Continuation: 'acceptance' or 'assent' .Iv•• to the mere presentation of the state of affaln Others may think that the complications that escape our notic:c tain cases extremely clear. For they recall the familiar expe~ mere idea first floats before our mind, without leading to an ' decision in judgement, and to which an obviously novel act of acceptance (or denial or rejection) only afterwards accrues. We shall not, of course, dispute these plain facts, but we sec them, and the whole matter before us, in a somewhat diftj Undoubtedly a new act terminates our 'mere presentation', followS latter and maintains itself in consciousness. What is questionable. is that the tlew act really contains the old act whole and entir~ itt that, to be more precise, it simply grows out of the old one association of the note of belief. the specific quality of judgemeat. mere presentation, thereby completing the concrete experience 01 - much as the act-quality of joy associates itself with a perceptso completes the concrete act of rejoicing. Undoubtedly when tilt thus emerges from the old, an identical element persists which incl we called their 'maller', This identical clement need not. ho complete :ICt of presentation. the only change being the emergence quality based upon it. We can also interprct what happens as in sllpersl'Ssioll of the specific note of presentation in the original , sentative act by the note of judgement. while the 'identical elemcot an abstraci 'moment' not amounting to a full act. . We must, however, be more precise. Only part of the situation If degree described by the above line of thought: what justifies talk tA

The matter of the act and iu underlying presenntion

141

< b s e n t . We shall base a more careful description on a case where ISprec~ \ssent' is specially apposite: we assent to a judgement that an· til' ..,.-or ounces. His words do not then immediately arouse a concordant (J.tJf:f pro~ in us: to judge concordantly, simply to accept a communication. jlldgdOen ~~"nt to it. Assent rather involves an original understanding of a . ' sal'd'IS 'mereIy IS (lOt loa.,.,.. t which we do not ourselves Judge true: what IS stl~n ed' in consciousness, is pot/derecl and considered, Plainly all these cPtertaln'nvolved in the mere presentation, to which assent is added. We .....cart I ., r ' ed ..... I nderingly on the speaker, s opmlOn. lor wh at 'IS mere Iy enterlam d'oI'Cl POt remain thus merely entertained, We face the issue, we mean to llIUS,tllO',Then the deciSion, .. ' ad option ' the a m IrmatlvC supervenes: we ourdecide I ' . 'CS pass judgement and eoncord~ntly with t~e other pe~n. The prev~ous Jth: resentation', the mental tram of broodmg suspenSion and questlon:mrre~ certainly not contained in this judgement. Assent is rather achieved a judgement is pronounced that accords with the speaker's judgement and with the pondered question, which has the same 'matter'. ~ assent to a jUdgemenl means that I judge likewise, my judgement ba~ llself on the samt matter. I answer 'yes' to the question means that I precisely hold what tbequestion questions: my act again has an identical matter. Rtgarded more narrowly, however, this analysis still betrays incompleteorss: what is specific to assent is really omitted. The sequence of question and concordant judgement, or of judgement and concordant judgement, does not complete the whole, i.e. that of a judgement which assents to a question or a judgement. Plainly a certain transitional experience mediates or rather connects the two distinct members. The pondering and question 'intention' is fulfilled in the assenting decision, and in this fulfilling unit of ~ (which has the phenomenological char
:u

P!a;'

'Ilo~I~ SUch talk of an assenting judgcment - assenting in relation to or rul.fi.l Judgement ullered by a speaker - has its source in this experience

~ent. t~e resolution of a kind of tension. which is related 10 iI question. The speaker conceives of his auditor, whose concordant

1-42 On intentional experiences and their 'contentS'

judgement he cannot simply count upon. as pondering the mailer quests .his agreement: .even when a like ju~geme?t has OCCut'l1ld pondering, agreement IS felt as assent. especially Since prior enhance iu worth. The auditor in his turn is pleased to pose to loculOr as pondering and assenting. even when he has had DO to ponder: he hopes to give his interlocutor the joy of assent Straightforward agreement often is thought of as assent, while consists in the comple~ experience where a perceived or p ment leads to a phase of questioning, which in its tum finds f corresponding actual judgement (or. in the contrary case, in ill or rejection). These considerations lead us to look on assent as the .fanw silionul experience as the fulfilment of a surmise, an expectQtioft, • similar 'directed' intentions. We have, e.g.. in the fulfilmenl 01 mere sequence of wishful intention and wished-for cons........ characteristically unitary consciousness of fulfilment. Here too ment in 'material'. but such agreement alone is insufficient: two acts with the same material would yield a 'fulfilment'. It iI. sciousness of fulfilment which first coordinates the wish that S with the judgemental experience that S is P. giving to the laner character of the fulfilling act. and to the wish the character 01. intending, directed act. Our analysis shows plainly - as we observe for later Inv,,:::: any 'theory of judgement'. or, more properly. any purely p~ characterization of the judgement. which identifies its peculiar an assent or acceptance. or a denial or rejection, of some p,......~ alTairs (or of some presented object in general), is not on me Superl'enient assent is nOI an act-quality supen'ening upon a pritw presentation: what analysis really discovers is first mere presen here includes the interrelated acts of mere entertainment, puttiq tion and consideration) passing over by way of fulfilment into I ' of like material. The judgement is not intrinsically the acceptlDOl viously given mere presentation: it is accepting, assertive only ill of fulfilment. Only in this context has it this relational character. it alone the 'presentation' (or pondering) has the relational ch intention directing itself to such assent. The analogy with otbet fulfilment, e.g. of wish-fulfilment. is here most illuminating. The: of the wished-for consummation. or rather our belief in its turninl are concerned not with an objective turning up but with our kn conviction about it - has in itself no character of wish_fulfilment. would here wish to describe the experience of fulfilment as the mere of a new act-quality to the original wish. or would dream of . fulfilling conviction. the goal of the process, as a compound wtUcb the wish as an underlying partial act.

The matter of the act and in underlying presentation

1-43

~ve

can no longer ar.gue from an experiem:,:e of assent suba mere presentation. to that constitution of intentional ,eQuc ntlya th'lt we have found so dubious. at least not in the field of the ",fter added

(0

"",","G<' '

;nd"",enl.

I Note

~dditiona

not of course overlooked the fact that there is generally a wish-

We ~l'e WOl'en into the pondering which precedes assent. an intention

~(d1,:ntO a judgemental decision. But we should think it quite wrong to ~y the fulfilment involved in the (so to say) theoretical question (in

~ the appearance of ~uestio.nablenessis cons~ituted) with the fulfilment rJ the wish or wish-questIOn whIch rests upon thiS. It would seem that the ."rd 'question' has twO senses. In one sense it slands for a definite wish. in JDl)Ibrr for a peculiar act presupposed by each such wish. Our wish aims at jalIFD1C'DtaJ decision'. i.e.. it aims at a judgement which will decide a ques,.., or which in the case of a two-sided disjunction, will resolve a dOllbl. Tbt ..ish, in brief. strives for an unsl\'cring of Ihe question: this last is not dlertfore itself the "Irish. Tbedouhl just mentioned is. likewise. no emotional act. It is not in fact an aetdistinet from a theoretical question nor on occasion woven into it, but is IimJ::Iy the special case of a disjunctive question, in our present theoretical

-.

IJO The conception of the identical understanding of • word or a sentence as a case of 'mere presentation'

~Uowin~ general argument may suggest itself as against our doubt.

~ same ~ords and l'erbul patterns presene ,heir identical sense in the most

and are partial expressions for quite different acts. There to ~ fo.re be some IIlliform experience which ill all cases corresponds them all. WhIch can only be regarded as an (lC! of presenlllfioll underlying

IllllSt ;:;:exrs

One Dlan Iloderst nd

say .S'

.

. S IS P to express a judgement. another man hears and lhe sarn: s hIS words withollt himself judging. The same words function in differ-en ~nse: ~hey are used and grasped with a similar understanding. The ., 'IS only an understandlOg . of the . Ords, in ISh plam". III lh e second case. there 1Q,1._ t e first I . "It two SOmct ling more as well. Our understanding is the same or OUr sam~ses. ?ut judgemellt is something additional. Widening the range "P, alJ :rf~' d.llTercnt pers?lls may wish. hope, surmise. doubt etc.. that S ~n set r~lOg appropnate acts of expression. They all understand a ~ the rna 01 Words: all share with the man who judgcs whal he shares in the n ~ho merely understands. This last man experiences ill iso/lIlion Ot er man appears coloured with conviction. desire. hope etc.

'I

1+4 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

The matter of the act and its underlying presentation

Mere wulerslmulillg is here mere prese1lllltion which furnishes basis for a series of acts having the same 'matter'. The same 00 ~ course be transferred from verbally expressed acts to acts expressIOn. This is certainly a specious argument. Talk of a sameness of sameness of understanding of words and sentences, certainly thing which does not vary in the varied acts thus brought to This something is not merely what leads us to attribute a 'stance' • response of conviction. desire, hope, etc., to ourselves, but we think also consists purely in an activity, an active achievetneDl standing. Much of this may point back to peculiarities of c genuine phenomenological interest. but we must remind OW1o:j,... concept of act was not defined by us in terms of activity, but that to use the word merely to abbreviate the locution 'intentional By this last we understood any concrete experience that 'refen' ' to an object, in one of the familiar modes of consciousness that cidated only by examples. Such sameness of understanding two possibilities of interpretation. Either we are dealing with element which is not a complete act, but is something in an act it definiteness of objective direction. This common element wiD differing act-qualities, through which the total intentional act is completed. Or our common element consists in a complete essence, and there is a peculiar act of understanding underlying of a close-knit group, serving as a basis for this or that sort of act-quality. In this way, e.g., a judgement arises when mere p enriched by the quality of judging, a wish when it is enriched by of wishing etc. etc. We cannot, however, be sure that the proposed isolation of of the mere understanding of a statement represents a true iso sense that is here relevant. Closer consideration rather proWl wulers/(mdillg stands to lIClllal jlldgemem milch as a mere idea of sf(lllds to a predfely similar memory. There are different model lional reference to one and the same object of which we are in .. sense 'conscious', and this means that we have two acts similar ill differing in qualily. One of them is not. as a real part. enclosed in Ihe sense merely that. in the latter, a new qualification has been

pam..

§31 A last objection to our view, Mere pres en and isolated 'matters' If one immerses oneself without bia~ in descriptive relations, oneself from delusive prejudices and equivocations, one will be. conviction that 'presentations', conceived as 'mere presentations' III from and in opposition to judgements as a peculiar species of aett.

.

t

145

role in knowledge as has been supposed, What is ascribed to

~ dorrun~naking present' in each act of its intentional object - is in fact

tbt'I' - the bl11 floll_illde'pendent experiences.

II'hich are necessarily found in (III abstract (lspects of their imemionlll essence, gltJ. since t '~~nts of this view remain silently beguiled by the following flie OP.~f an intentional character is to have reference to something at1!~ent. his last must be 'present" to us. How can I believe, wish, doubt ob,P:'ll ve, ~e of aITllirs, if it is not at all present to me? But what gives sta . ] y an un d · . etc.. a , to objects is precise erlymg presentation. 'pCt:St0ce, nothing factually wrong in all this. What is here said is quite true, ~re:ISno objection to our view. Every intentional experience certainly onlY It ~ component. a side, that looks after the presentation of a thing. hO~hiS component is a complete act is, however, just what is in question. : \ t is in question above all in the case of the judgement and its immanent axnponent, the presentation of the state of affairs judged, which are our special concern. W~ felt forced to the co~c1usion that t~is component, in respect of the essential feature through which the 'presentmg' of the state of affairs was managed, must differ essentially in kind from the characters dltwbere called 'act-qualities', the familiar characters in virtue of which the prc5Cnted thing is judged, wished etc. Among these characters we count abo that of 'mere presentation' mentioned above, but not the abiding, selfideaticai moment of 'content' or 'matter', however much the latter, or the wboIe underlying act--eomponent, may likewise be called a presentation or a pramting. The following route of evasion still seems open. Having admitted that 'contents' are not act-qualities, one might still think it possible that the very ~ cO~lents which at one time make their appearance in acts, i.e. in :;aJunctlon wit.h ~mplementary act-qualities, may at other times also appear Ille tbernselves, I.e. m concrete experiences quite free from act-qualities, Genu~ of mere presentation would arise in the latter manner, as concrete itt invo~c:es which are yet not 'acts', if we hold, that is, to the notion of acts Ca ,Yln.g, among other things, the presence of an act-quality. re ul IOspecfIon 0 r t he essences of the expenences . r.o..'t'\'c concerned forces us, r, to treat m· . . . .. . 'Il'()J co . "re presentatlon as a genume act. Exemp1ary mtultlOn llIvolv~Vince us that the involvement of maners with act-qualities is an lh...... ent1 of abstr"'" . Iatmn: . -'can . ' " . moments.. But matters cannot occur .m ISO r.h On yachlc '. "lI Under th ve Concretion If supplemented by certain moments which ~tr!: linde e ~up~cme genus 'act-quality· and are subject to its limiting laws, frOrb the' rstan.dll1g. mere entertainment as such. certainly differs totally aSSCrtlon' r "'I· r rrom our other ailltudes . . Wish . tt: l" V\: Ie . or of surmise, Ocn. Us~.ActmUSt ac. cord·amgly acknowledge differences in the comprehensive -quality ,an . d pm . t hese d own phenomenologically. . ,

pert'0rtfled /1'

(If('

Chapter 4

Study of founding presentation with special regard to the the of judgement

§32 An ambiguity in the word 'presentatlon', supposed self·evidence of the principle that is founded on an act of presentation If we may lake the results of OUf last chapter as assured, we m.tim concepts of Presentation. Presentation in Sense One is • peculiar act-quality) on a level with Judgement Wish, • have examples of this concept in all cases where isolated complete sentences not functioning normally. are merely understand indicative. interrogative and optative sentences wiI·lho.. judging, asking or wishing. The same applies to any unex floating thoughts where no 'attitude' is taken up. or any tions etc. In Sense Two. -Presentation' is no act. but the matter for aD. tuting one side of the intentional essence of each complete . . concretely. this matter united with the remaining moments concreteness - what we shall later call 'representation', This underlies every act. and so also underlies the act of presentaUoe One), If this happens. the matter which can function as self·' of dilTerent sorts, is given with the peculiar act-Quality of·p........ peculiar 'mode of consciousness'. If we model the meaning of talk about acts of mere presco above examples, we can in the case of such acts undoubtedly phenomenological analysis in terms of quality and matt~r j,u~,~ in the case of other acts. In the case of judgement we dlSUng,",:",," the spedfic character of conviction, and the contents of the con we distinguish between the peculiar mental state of mere u pure entertainment. and the determination which lays down wbal stand. The same plainly holds whatever set of examples onc seledl date Mere Presentation or to bring out its notion, It must alwaY', mind that our present analysis attempts no resolution of actS only a distinction of abstract moments or 'sides' in them. These

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

li7

~. Ihey arc moments contained in the essence of the acts ,ciS arc

~ntheV condition the possibility of arranging acts serially according

~I~' ...,; 'Ind difference, The likeness and difference intuitively shown .....r !lken..".., , h "d , . . . IOlU"~ ries plainly are t e Sl es m question, e.g. quality and matter, In

ill such a se y no one can break up a motion into direction, acceleration etc.: ssmewa 'h . . . tilt only distin~Ulsh t esc .pro~rtl~s m ~t. .. /Ie can ch intenflOlw1e):fH!"ence IS either Itself a (mere) presematlOn, or IS 11tat ~JlIch a prt'sellwtiOll, is a proposition that our previous investigations ~:wn to have a merely prl'tended self-el'idence. The mistake rested on P\~ t discussed ambiguity of 'presentation', In its first half, the proposi· dle~rrectlY interpreted. speaks of 'presentation' in the sense of a certain tJOlI. if iNt, in its second half in the sense of the mere matter of acts (com· ;::; in the manner indicated above). This second half by itself, i.e. e.'ery ~tioN1l experience is based on a presentation, has genuine self.-evidence, if ~tation' is interpre.ted, ~s compl~ted matter. The false proposition we reject arises if 'presentatlon IS here gIVen the sense of an act as well, AD objection here warns us to take care. Is there only one way in which 'JRICIltation' can be interpreted as an act? The questionable proposition perhaps admits of other interpretations which are not open to our objection. 11 that case our treatment would be right as regards the concept of presenIItioD taken over from ordinary explanations of the word, but not right in rtprd to other concepts of presentation, nor to the consequently arising ... iaterpretations of our proposition, with its ever shifting senses.

IU Reoestablishment of our proposition by means of • new notion of presentation. Naming and asserting

:t~US1 ~ow ask

whether our proposition cannot be completely sustained

Tbt ~s of another notion of presentation,

IlZlity ~nlty of .an act corresponds in each case to the correlated objective

'lIlltn:onally' the 'object' (understood in the widest sense) to which it refers We had d h d' h .. d . .

III SO fa " ou ts regar mg t e propoSition un er diSCUSSion r as It meant h . .,. . Illd direc ' . Y presentation a cerlam (lcf underlymg another act. tlng Of atrairs ,n5elf. upon the total objective unity of the latter act. The state ~ et opI,ned In the judgement. wished in the wish, surmised in the Prtstntati~" ,IS necessarily 'presented'. and presented in a peculiar act of liori, a kindn . B~ th: term 'presentation' we understood 'mere' presenta. ~Itd ".,,-ordsof ,lct Illustrated by the case of the mere understanding of "ttl f 1tlde is d' or 0 statements heard. but to which a 'wholly neutral' . a Opted But . . . I.. onahl ., our proposlllOn at on(..'C achieves a new and un..I;...., esensc If a . d . /ft,'"VII, one . new concept IS rna e to underlie the term 'presen'~IUtions ~:~ strange. and remot':, since talk of names as expressillg "-ntation' h s up to It. We must Illdeed then cease to demand thai our s auld intentionally cover the whole objective unity of the act

"""ti

1<48

On intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

in question. But we can employ the term to co,'er acts in whid, becomes objecti"e to us in a certain narrO"'er sense of the word, oat from the manner in which percepts and similar intuitions grasp in a single 'snatch', or in a single ;ray of meaning" or borrowe.a, from the one·term subject-acts in categorical statements, or straightforward hypothesis. serving as antecedents in acts of assertion etc, We here have in view the following most important descriptive When we make a judgement. an act of complete predication, seems to us either to be or not to be, e.g. that S is P. But the which thus becomes 'present' to us, can plainly become p different fashion when we speak of 'the P·ness of 5', The stale is P likewise comes before consciousness in quite differeDt f: we simply judge and assert'S is P'. and when it occurs in the of another judgement, as when we say 'the fact that S is P', or S is P - has as a consequence ... is delightful. is doubtful" etc. true when we say. in the antecedent of some hypothetical or tion. 'IJ(Since) S is P'. or. in the second or later member of. 'or S is P', In all these cases the state of affairs - not thej'~l""" object in a different sense, and is seen in the light of differ.from what it is for the judgement whose full objective correaa. the state of affairs is 'objective' in much the same sense as a single 'mental ray' of perception or imagination or represen . a state of affairs is of course no thing, and cannot be perceived. represented in the stricter, narrower sense of these words. I said above in passing that propositions functioning as presentations ofjlldgements, but of the correspondin~ Slates 0/ point must be noted. Judgements as concrete eltpenences CIDo be objects of possible perception. imagination and perhaps ~ physical representation. They can then function as subject-o ments, as happens when we judge about judgements. When sudt judgements are eltpressed. and not merely indirectly referred to judgement', ;your judgement' etc.) a sentence will occupy 1M But where a sentence occupies this position, it will not always a judgement. Judging ablml judgements differs from judK.inK, affairs: having a presentation of or naming a judgement IS 11k. from halting (l presentation of. ~r f1a1~ling ~ome s~ale of affa~~ subject. If I say. e.g.. 'That S IS P IS delightful· I ~o not . judgement is delightful. It makes no difference in thiS c~~n we mean by ·judgem.cnt' t.he indiv~dual act, or the proPOsltlO~iI qua Species. What IS dehghtful. IS rather that such and su . the objective state of affairs. the fact. Thi.s is sh.own by ~be o~ valcnt transformation (which however differs 10 meaning). S (the victory of the righteous cause) is delightful'.

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

1<49

'Id- upon Ihis changed notion of presentation. and also lets drop.

. t hat t he presentation . und ' an act must Ifont bUI~ ed b<wc. the claim erlymg

It ~t /the matter of the act that it underlies, it would seem that our

~CO\'d a 'nciple _ that each act not itself a presentation must be founded ~ pntations - acquires a valuable content. for which self-evidence IIfIOCI ~II be claimed. We shall have to give it more precision in the -.1 \~ each act is either itself a presentation. or is founded on one ~g resentations. Eltamples illustrating the first part of this sentence r1".ore t~rmed (one-rayed) acts of perception, memory. anticipation. im~ ~n etc.: these are now our 'mere' presentations. Eltamples illustrating JIilIIllOnd half arc prcdicalive judgements, and mere presentations in the Jtf ~ust stated as their corrcspondent images. A judgement is based on at ::~ presentation. just as each cltpressed statement contains at least one __ 00 the prevailing view which cites S is P as the normal form of .-ptjodgements. we should have to accept a basis of at least two presen__ (or twO names). There is. however, no max.imal upper limit to such IftdtatiODS. Indefinitely many presentations can nest in a single judge- . It makes no difference if one here brings in compound judgements, .:ceadl compound judgement undoubtedly also is a judgement. 11Ie same seems to hold for all other acts. to the extent that they are full -'complete. The wish 'May S be P', ;May truth triumph' etc., has as its prac:D1auons ;S' and 'P'; 'truth' is straightforwardly posited as subject. and IlIl'wisb arises out of its prcdicatively presented triumph. The same holds of 11 ~rly constituted acts, and of the simpler acts immediately based on -.woos, e.g. my rejoicing in something perceived. ~c may finally add the proposition that the ultimately underlying acts in lCt-eomplelt are necessarily presentations.

;nn:

P4 ' _ Diffl cu Ities. The concept of the name. Positing non·positing names

0.. ....

.. ~~Pt of presentation is by no means free from difficulties. That "-at' .I.e, underlying acts genuinely have it in common to make objects ......._-'Inapecl' .....tatio ,. u. Iar. pregnant sense. cannot be doubted. But whether In t~IS sense stand for an essential genus of intentional eltperiIqa C1cIUded ~enenc u~ity is purely determined by act-quality. so that the ~: allth' r.om their sphere necessarily belong to qualilll/i\'el)' different 'unilY cIS I~ not cstablished. It is nOI al all easy to decide in what the ht lhis onsJsts. 'It "':.• CQnncclio h f -......--.1, as the n t e ollowing elaborations are necessary. Where /lames ~ or p~ Usually are. to be expres.~ions of presentations, our present ctnainly ;tatlo n really is in question. All presentations eltpressed by ·'CIIl:h One . orm a unity. which must now be examined. Different senses can speak of 'cltpression' involve that by 'presenlations' one

''tIbO::

'k:

ISO

On Intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

can mean both nominal meaning-intenlions and also the fulfilments of meaning. Both non-intuitive and intuitive acts alike the notion here demarcated. By 'names' we should not Un nouns, which by themselves do not express complete acts, If lYe clearly what names are and mean we should look at contextl, statements. in which names function in their nonnal meaning. that words and word-groupings that are to count as names complete acts when they either stand for some complete simpk statement (thereby expressing a complete subject-act), or at Ieut fonn such a simple subject-function in a statement without intentional essence. I (Syntactical fonnations are here dis,~IlU'cIe': therefore a mere nOlin, perhaps even coupled with an attributnw clause, that makes a full name: we must also add the definite article, which has a most important semantic function. 'The of flowers', 'a house built of sandstone', 'the opening of tbe expressions like 'that the Reichstag has been opened', are We now note a remarkable difference. In many, but plaiDly names and nominal presentations are such as to intend and aClllaffy existent, without thereby being more than mere ~ other words counting as full assertions. This last is excluded br assertions can never take the subject-position without a cbaDII Judgements may function as subjects of judgements in the judged about, but never. without a certain change of meam.. acts of other judgements, as 'presentations'. This importaDI must not, however. be conceded without further argument, provide in what follows. Let us for the time being ignore ~ statements apparently serve as subjects, and deal with names Henry', 'the statue of Roland in the market-place', 'the po...~ by' etc. Someone who uses these names in their normal ~ discourse 'knows' that Prince Henry is a real, and not a mythic. a statue of Roland does stand in the market-place, that the hurrying by etc. The objects named certainly confront him .. imaginary objects: not only do they appear to him .as. ex expression also treats them as such. Nothing of all this IS, h the act of naming: exceptionally existence may be expressed a some such fonn as 'the really existent S·. as. in the oppo~. say 'the supposed 5', 'the imaginary S' etc. But existential posltinS even in the case of such a grammatically enriched name ~fII enquire whether its sense has been essentially ~nodifi.ed or meork in that aspect of the act expressed by the defimte :lrtlcle, and S is altered. Even now we have not said Ihal S exiSIS. o~ly. th~~ • an altered sense. is presented as really existent. that It I~ a . therefore ealk'd 'the really existent S'. and even here nammg from saying.

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

151

~cdCd.

we have two different sorts of names and nominal If thiS ISthfl l gire II'hflt Ihey name Ihe status of an existem, and those that ,cts. '~: this. An e;(an~ple o~ the latt~r. if any is. needed, is yielded by the dO ttl! al material of a d~scusslon of eXistence. whteh genuinely starts withpaaun 'stential commitment. 0111 ~ ~\here are sim!lar ~iffere~ces in oth.er underlyin.g acts, as a com~ of an if·protasls with a smce-protaslS shows: thiS was only to be pansor'ed. since these acts have an essential affinity with nominal ones. The ~ betw~n positing and non-positing acts ranges over t~e K'holef!eld ~tot;on m our pre~nt ~nse. and far .beyond .Ihat of stnctly nommal " tauon. Among the mtuUlve presentations which belong here, which, preseo memseh'CS nominal. have the logical vocation of fulfilling nominal acts aot . .. rJ meaning, there a~e certam poslt.lng ~cts,. sen~-perception, recollection aJdlllticipatioD. which all catch their object m a single ray of positing refer(IICt. Thecorresponding abnormal perceptions lack existential commitment, e... iUusions freed from attitudes towards the reality of the apparent, and all QICS of mere fancy. To each positing act there corresponds a possible non,.ui!tg ael hal,ing rhe same marrer, and I'/'ce '·ersa. This characteristic difference is plainly a difference in aet-quaIiIY, which IIJlOtU a certain duality into the notion of presentation. Can we still speak ci I P"'Lf of presentations in the strict sense, and dare we think that posit-a az.d non-positing presentations are species or differentiations of this

lliwygmw?

Ow- difficulty would be at once removed, could we treat positing acts as kU round~ on other acts. not as mere presentations, but as acts founded 01 PltSenlatlons, a new positing character being then presumably added on :.~mere presentation. ~One would then have to consider whether this The raCIer was not obViously of the same kind as judgement-quality.) .\s tittleanaly5eS performed above make such a notion most questionable. or lQ as one can separate ofT an act of mere presentation from a percept ·glng d · · from an actual assertion so' IittIt aClofmere. unJu understandmg ...'rOll! canone f f ··· . '. a .. ' eg '" separate 0 a non-poSiting act of nommal meanmg llrOposi~JllDg one. A perfect analogy must obtain between nominal and IOnal acts s· .. I . .......1 . Ince It IS Ccar a prIori that to e:leh complete positing act a PO' 'bl . ' IIott-PQsitin ~Sl e complete assertion corresponds, and that to each ~tand·g nommal act a correl
~

152 On intention,,1 experiences and their 'contenu'

§lS Nominal positing and judgement. Where judgements as such can be parts of nominal acta Let us now go back to the question raised above as to the affinity relationship belll'een positing presentations and predicatil'e jJJd: might try to look on the difference of the two sorts of act as un...... to say: a positing may be no assertion, i.e. no independent p expression of self·sufficient judgement. But it still yields a jud however, that will serve as a presupposition or basis of another let be built upon it. This role, though making flO difference to the imenriona/ coment, makes a difference to the judgement's verbal someone says 'the postman hurrying by , , .' he implies the jud postman is hurrying by', The nominal form merely indicates the function, which points towards the predicative positing whicb Ii We can scarcely approve such a total extemalization of !be under discussion - as if new acts simply attached themselves to identical judgement. and the grammatical name-form merely direct indication of this sort of attachment. Most logicians, amoDI profound Balzano, saw the distinction between names and ' of essence, and a maturer science will support them. Sometbiaa well be common to both cases, but views of the difference as must be disputed. One must, more precisely, be clear that nomiDII complete judgements never can have the same intentional esseDCl, every switch from one function to the other, though p munities, necessarily works changes in this essence. What most leads us astray at this point is the circumstaDCI predications, comp/eu! assertions, can in a certain sense really logical subjects. Though not themselves subject-acts, they are buill last in a certain fashion as judgements determining subjecU already given in them, e.g. 'the Minister - he is now driving upthe decision'. We can replace our parenthetic assertion without sense by speaking of 'the Minister who is now driving up' or 'the driving up'. It can be seen. however, that such a conception is DGI suitable, Attribution often represents a detennining predication, bit. it invariably did so. which it certainly does nol. it would only of the subject-name. After the removal of such deten:nin~ng uId complete name would be left over. corresponding to whIch It WO to look for some judgement functioning as logical sUbj~~, 10,0: the determining predication attaches to the name 'the Mmlster, ..... no second predication can be separated. What could the underl,....,. ment be in this case. and how would we fonnulate it independ~ Minister' equivalent to 'he - he is a Minister'? In that case 'he ~ complete name and would require its own judgement. But boW uttered? Is it perhaps the judgement which. expressed indepen

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

IS3

-----::::: Here again we encounter the same subject 'he', and so are 'tit e:tl . . fIIJI 'n an infinite regress. iII\1)I\-cd ~tedlY many names. including all attributive names. have 'arisen' Vpdou r indirectly out of judgements. and accordingly 'refer back' to ~y ai' But such talk of'arising' and 'referring back' implies that names ~~~ents are different. The difference is so sharp. that it should Iod ~ played down for the sake of .theoreti~1 prejudice or ~o~-for ~ p1ifications in the theory ,of present~tlon and Judgement. T.he prlor Judge· $iJII is no l as yet the nommal meamng that grows out of It. What in the lPC'lt remains as lJ deposit ofjudgement is nOI a judgemenl but a modificlltion ;::Iy differing from it. The carrying out of the modified act does not ;~e the unmodified one. If we have found out or seen that the town ~aIk is on the Saale, or that TI is a tr.mSCtndent number. we may go on to talk of Halle--on-the·Saale or of the transcendent number TI, but we shall aot be judging any longer, or at least we need not be doing so, and such a ;.Jtmttnl, should it arise on the side. makes no contribution 10 our act of I/1IIIi1ttJ1 r~ference. And so in every case. We said above that judgements could function in determining fashion, but this is not strictly or properly so. Better regarded, their function consists IOIdy in setting before our eyes an attribution which enriches the name. ltJrilfg itself is nolan attributil'e function, and cannol take o\'er such a functUI: it will only provide the soil out of which an attributive meaning will phenomenologically grow. This function once performed, the judgement can fall away, and the attribute with its significant content remain over, Our exceptional cases are therefore cases of compounding: the attributil'e /wrct~n is combined wilh Ihe predjcmive. The latter gives rise to the former, but stili wants to count independently and 'on the side' - hence the nonnal Pltenthetic expression, Ordinary cases of attribution are free from such "'pl' . ICabon. A man who speaks of 'the German Emperor' or 'the trans· ~u~ber ~', d~ .not mean to say 'the Emperor - he is the Emperor Wha oy nor TI - It IS a transcendent number'. 1be t has been said is only fully intelligible with an imponant addition. 0Qe; ':!0:mance of the modified act, we said. no longer contains the 'original' dora IS IS at best present as an unnecessary, subsidiary complication. This ally :\~e.m~\'e Ihe fact. thai the 'original' judgement is in some sense logiclnd 'rn~~lt In Ihe modified act. We must here stress that talk of 'origin' ~ica/lfication' are nOI to be understood in an empiriCll/-ps)'ch%gica/. IiIe Phe senSe, bUI (IS expre,fSing a peculillr relation of essence growu/el/ in hOlllenol . I ~tial 0glcC/ cOn/em of the experiences, It is part and parcel of the I'tfers ba~~~tent of the nomi~al.. attributive presenta.ti~n t,hat its intention Itletr l$ a' 10 .the correspondlOgjudgemcnt. and that 11 lOtnnsically presents 'tar mO
,

15-4

On intentionilll experiences iIInd their 'contents'

of demonstrative fulfilment of wbat the expression ·means'. We must it were to the corresponding predicative judgement. we must carry and take our nominal presentations from it as from a source, let them from it. derive them from it. The same plainly holds. mutatis non-positing attributive presentations, their 'proper' carrying out. phenomenologically predicative acts of qualitatively modified counterparts of the actual judgements) out of which they may then' A certain mediacy therefore enters phenomenologically into the the attributive presentation. which our talk of origination, den also of 'referring back' expresses, It is therefore true a priori that the validation of each nominal attribution leads back to that of the ing judgement, Correlatively. we may likewise say that the nomiul whatever its categorial interpretation, derives from the co>m:spoa., of affairs, which has an intrinsic priority as regards authenticity. After saying all this, we may maintain generally that there an belwel.'n names and assertions which affect their 'semantic esst1ta'. rest on the essential difference of presentations and judgements, II II same, in lem/s of intentioll(ll essence, whelher one perceil'es QlI ju(lges Ihat il exists, so it is not Ihe same if one names an exislmt til or says or predicates of it thai il exists. We may now note that to el'ery positing name a possiblej'w.l. . . evidently corresponds, or that to e)'ery attribution a possible pr responds alJd I'ice )'erso. After we have: rejected the essential these acts, we: can assume: only that we have here a case of la connection, and of connection governed by ideal law. Ideal COOD~ not point to the causal genesis or the empirical concomitance of they coordinate, but to a certain ideally governed, operative of the ideatively graspable act-essences1 in question, which have and law-governed ontological order, in the realm of phen,__,--_, ideaJity, just as pure numbers and pure specifications of geometric have theirs respectively in the realms of arithmetical and geornet:ril:al If we enter the a priori reaches of pure Ideas. we can likewise say (in pure. i,e, unconditional universality) could not pe~onn I.btt: : acts without being able to perform those coordinated \\'lth them. account of the specific semantic essence of the acts concerned.. We further. that there are coordinations, interesting from the pol?t cI logical validity, law-governed equivalences. rendering it imposslbleotl irrational to start with the words 'this S' without 'potentially' that there are 5's, In other words, that propositions containinJ names should be true. and that. the existential j~d~~ments, which 'fbiI to such names should be false. IDvolves an a PTlOTlIDCOnslstenC)'. • of the ideal. analytic truths which are rooted in the 'mere fofdl thought. or in the calegories or specific Ideas which belong to tilt: forms of thinking proper.

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

ISS

~nuation. 116

,s co""

Whether assertions can function plete names

. yel anolher important class of instances to consider and shall use We ha\econfirm our notion of the relation of nominal acts and judgements. thefll to concerned with cases where declarative sentences are not merely Weare . , 'mtent, an d so seem. as actua l ' used with dcterlTlllllDg assertIons, to be parts mes but where they seem to function as full and complete names. e,g. ~:t rai~ has se~ in at last will d~light the fan,ners·. It seems impossibl~ to id the admiSSion that the subject-sentence IS here a complete assertion. ~\'O it means that rain has really set in. The modified expression of the ;gemenls by way of a subordinate clause-fonn here only serves to show thai our assertion is functioning as a subject. that it provides the basic act on wbich a predicative assertion may be imposed. All this sounds very nice. If the disputed conception had real support in our class of instances, and were really allowable there, a doubt would arise Yo'hether, despite :Ill previous objections, it might not apply even over a Ilider field. Let us consider our example more closely. If asked what the fanners are glad about. one replies with a 'that so-and-so' or 'about the fact that rain has at length fallen'. The fact. therefore. the state of affairs posited as existmt, is tbe object of the gladness. is the subject about which we are making aD assertion. This fact can be variously named. We can simply say 'this', as illthecase of all other objects. we COdn also say 'this fact', or. more definitely. 1he fact of the set-in min. of the setting in of the rain' etc. We can also say. ~ above. 'that the rain has set in', Our coordination shows that this clause ts a ~arne in exactly the same sense as all other nominal expressions of acts, that It does nOI differ essentially in sense-giving backing from other acts. It e~actly as they do, and in naming presenls; as other names name in t~lngs. properties etc.. so it names or presents a slate of affairs. which paniCular IS an empirical fact. If~t is the difference between such naming and the independent assertion Ie/i ,?,rtote of affairs. when. e.g.. we make the assertion: 'Rain has at last

:;:,r

n, h SOrnet ' PrOCeed Irnes happens that we first assert something absolutely. and then the: fa to ?ame the state of arT:lirs: 'Rain has at last set in. That will delight ia in ;;:;~r: .. ,Here ,we c:ln slu~y .:In unde~iabl.e con.trust. !he state of affairs UIeSl ' ases the same. but It IS our obJcct m qUIte a dlffcrent manner. In ra let in: ~htfom:ard assertion we judge about Ihe rain. and about its having ~ a th are In a pregnant sense objective to us. presemelJ, But we do not lTlere sequence of presenlations. bUI ajudgemem. a peculiar 'unity of ess ·. thai binds these togethcr. this binding logether the con" ~.s of Ihe Sltllt' 01 affairs is constituted: to execute jlldgl'lllem. and to IQIls of II SI(I((' of affairs, it! lhis symht·t;r positing 01 something as

'0 ,,.:n

In

156

On intentional experiences and their 'contentS'

referre(J to something, are one a1/(J the same. A thesis is enacted, and second dependent thesis is based, so that, in this basing of thesis Oq the synthetic unity of the state of affairs is intentionally constituted. a synthetic consciousness is plainly quite differenl from setting before aile in (l single-myelJ Ihesis. in a possible, direct sllbject-act, in Q lion, One may compare the ways in which Ihe rain 'comes to conscio

the assertedness of the slate of affairs. and the presentational, na~ which in our example succeeds it, and which applies to Ihe same affairs: 'Thai will delight the farmers'. 'That', as it were, points a the state of affairs: it therefore means this same state of affairs. reference is not the judgement itself, which has preceded it as a thus qualified mental happening now passed away: it is a new act of kind, which in pointing to the stale of affairs previously constituted thetic, many-rayed fashion, now simply confronts this state of atTain single-rayed thesis, and so makes it an object in a sense quite difJi the way the judgement does so, The state of affairs comes more' . to consciousness in the judgement: the single-rayed intention t state of affairs presupposes the many-rayed judgemental intentioD. reference to the lauer is part of its intrinsic sense. But in each conscious approach there is rooted, in a priori fashion, an essentilll possibility of transformation into the single-rayed approach, in state of affairs will be pregnantly 'objective' or 'presented'. (Just. an a priori possibility, resting on the ideal essence of geometrical fi 'one' can turn them about in space, distort them into certain atbel' etc.) It is now at all events quite clear that the manner in whicb conscious of something, or in which it is our intentional object, is in each case. Otherwise put. we are dealing with 'essentially' difli or with acts differing in intentional essence. If we ignore pointing proper, what is essential in the 'That' of 0lIl' ous example is also present in the thought of the mere sentence a slIbject-position (and any other position in a contex.t whicb presentation). and is necessarily absent from the thought of a and independent assertion. A.f soon as the semantic moment whiC~ the definite article comes (l/iW!, a presentation ill ollr present sense u Whether a language or dialect actually employs the article or nol, one speaks of der Mensch or homo, of Karl or der Karl is irrelevant.. moment of meaning attaches to the sentence 'That Sis func.o subject, is easily seen. For 'Thai Sis P' means what we mean by Tbilt S Sis p', or. a little more elaborately. The fact. the circumstance thai The situation is not of a kind. after all this. to encourage us to judgements, actual predications, that could be logical sllbjeclS or acls. We rather see that there is a difference of intentional essence sentences serving to name states of affairs. and the corresponding ser of states of affairs, a gulf bridged by ideal relations of law. An as

r.

---fi

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

/lc/ion as

(I

/lame, 1I0r

ll nel'f!r ',III/(/Ilfre. . I.e..'Its SSfllll

(I

n(lme

(IS

157

all assertion. withollt challging its

. essence, an dh 'h'Its very meanmg. , semantic t erewlt . t rh' s does not of course mean that the correspondmg acts are descnp_ I Ialien. The matter of the assertion is in part the same as that of the Il~~rnalact, in both the same state of affairs is intended in the same terms. , gh in a different form. The great affinity of expressive form is no matter thOUchance, but h. as semantlc. ' roots. If .occaslO.na ' I I y the ex.pres.slon ' of stays hanged. despite a change In semantic funcllon, we are dealing with a "norticular casc 0 feqUIvocatIOn, " wh'ICh bel ongs to the broad class of cases :ere expressions have anomalous meanings. These anomalies, arising from the pure essence of the semantic field, resemble the anomalies of pllre gramnror.) Our conception accordingly admits of a consistent working-out: we differentiate in all cases between presentations and judgements and, among presentations, between such as are positing and existentially committed, and such as are nol. We shall accordingly not hesitate to deny judgement-status to antecedents of the form 'Because S is which state causes: we shan put t/rem in the S(lme reJtltion 10 hypothetical antecedents that we have recognized Qj obtaining between positing and non-positing names. The 'because' may point back to a judgement that asserted S to be P, but this judgement is not again enacted with the causal sentence itself. We no longer assert that Sis P, but we impose on a purely presentative substructure, that of an antecedent characterized in its very sense as a modified judging synthesis. a second consequential thesis which is grounded upon, and which 'looks to', the ~ormer. The whole is a new form of judgemental synthesis, whose sense, a hule elaborated, can be said to be: the conditioning of the being of one state of affairs by that of another which grounds it. Only as so combined, morea~tecedent and consequent function as a judgement, as when we assert SIS P-, and because this is so, 'Q is R'. Here it is not enough to establish :~a~ a,se~ue~ce s~nt~eti~a.lIy, but to have and to. hold Ihe ~wo states of c ~ SIS P and Q IS R Judgementally together, In our relating. synthetic onSCIOusness itself. " ' I presentations " StnNQ/e. The ....x(enslons Just rna de s how t hat nomina m the or ~t., narrow sense merely represent a wider, but still limited class of ,thetic' " . acts. Th'IS m~st be re.member~ In , what follows, evenSlOgle.r·lyed Wile' posltmg The ( n we connect our treatments wnh genumely nommal presentations. errn • . I ' ingl y be .nomma presentation', understood as a class-term, must accordo given a much widened sense. ,. Ur Stand- d f ' , JUdge . ar S 0 termmology must also be noted, accordlllg to which a canno~e~t Eneans a complete. independent assertion. That such a meaning caUsal wllhout intrinsic change become the meaning of a hypothetical or ~bove. antecedent or indeed any nominal meaning, is the thesis established

r

?v:r,

Chapter 5

Further contributions to the theory of judgement. 'Presentation' as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositional acts

§J7 The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an objectifying act The investigations just completed have not done with the questioa at the beginning of §34. Our result was that presentations and j are essentially different acts. Since the ambiguity of words again help of standard-selling concepts. we mean by 'presentations' ",,1IIiI_ and by 'judgements' assertions that are nonnally performed and Naming and asserting do not merely differ grammatically, but 'in which means that the acts which confer or fulfil meaning for each. intentional essence, and therefore in (let-species. Have we thereby prescntation and judgement. the acts which lend meaning and fulfilment to naming and assertion. belong to different basic cJ(UM301 tional experience'? Obviously our answer must be negative: nothing points to sucb. We must recall that intentional essence is made up of the twO matter and qllOlity, and that a distinction of 'basic class' obvioudJ only to act·qualities. We must further recall that our exposition doCI all entail that nominal and propositional acts differ in quality, mucb . • they differ generically as regards quality. This latter point should not arouse objection. The matter of a~. sense no alien, external attachment. but an internal moment, an I be-' side of the act·intention. of the intentional essence itself. Talk atbe differing 'ways of consciousness', in which. we can ~ ~wa:e off ..... state of affain;. should not mislead us. It points to a distinction 0 not one of act-qualities. Quality may remain id~ntical - so muc~~as us since we fonned the Idea of matter - whIle the same obJ ...-aJcIII differently present to consciousness. One may think. e.g., of eqUl tbC iting presentations. which point by way of differing mallets to object. The essential change of meaning which an assertion under~ it passes over into the nominal (or other parallel) function, a polO proof we found so important above. may involve no more than a c

----

Further c:ontribution5 to the theory of judgement

159

. ql/a!itl· or (It least qllalitati!'e genus (according to the kind of nominal r. · .onrtr . lll/C h(lnget.I ,.... 'ficationl /IIay remain 111~~ \ this describes the actual situation ococomes plain if we carefully at· d tlo the mallcrs themselves. Completion by nominally significant articles t~~e ':he eircumswnce that'. 'the fact that', where a propositional meaning is JU: de to fuoction as subject. has been shown by the above examples to be ~ry. The examples introduce us to contexts where transfonned sense with a transfer of unchanged. essential. material content. and where, ~fore. interpretative functions are present which the original assertion I d:s. or for which it has substitutes. The essential moments which agree in ~e twO caseS. also undergo, as we can see in each case, a different 'categorial trUCluring·. One may compare. e.g.. the fonn 'S is P' with its nominal ~ificatiOn 'S which is The following treatments will show. on the other hand, that there is a quaJitariJ'e community between nominal and propositional acts; we shall therefore end by demarcating yet another nell' concept of presenllllion, wider andmore sigllijictlll/ Ihan the farmer. which will give us a new, most important interpretation of the principle that each act has its basis in presentations. To keep our present two concepts of 'presentation' apart. we shall ..ithout making final recommendations as to terminology - speak of 'nomina.I aets' in the case of the narrower concept. and of 'objectifying acts' in the case of the wider. We need hardly stress. after our whole introduction of the concept of "nominal presentation' in the last chapter. tbat the expression does not merely cover acts attached to nominal expressions, and conferring or fUlfilling their meaning, but also all acts that function analogously, even if Dot performing the same grammatical role.

r.

III

Qualitative and material differentiation of Objectifying acts

:mong nominal lIcts we distinguish positing from non-positing acts. The onner were after a fashion existence·meanings: they were either sensuous ~pts. or percepts in the wider sense of pretended apprehensions of what ..;r ~ther acts which. without claiming to seize an object ·itself. in 'full~ l~ or intuitive fashion. yet refer to it as existent. I The other acts leave ert<1eXls~ence of their object unseuled: the object may, objectively consid· actu' ~lUSt. but it is not referred to as existent in them, it does not COlint as then a, bUI ralher as 'merely presentcd·. In all this therc is alaw to the effect to of'lik each positing nominal act a non·positing act. a 'mere presentation' ~e.matter. corresponds. and vice versa. this correspondence being under1\. In l~e sense of the ideally possible. Posit: rtaln ~'odifi("Ulion, as we may also express the mauer, makes each \\Ie fi ~ nOmmal act pass over into a mere presentation with like matter. n exactly the same modification in the case or judgemcnts. Each

160

On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

~udgement has its modified fon:n, an act which merely presents what Judgement takes to be true. which has an objoci without a decis' 'h' trut h a.n d 'I~l · sHy.' I enomenologlcally regarded. this modification Ion of' .. ments IS quite of the same sort as that of positing nominal acts. JUd as po.siting propositional acts have therefore their merely presentati ~ . 1ates III non-pm;iting propositional acts. The corresponding acts have' cases the same matter and a differing quality. But just as we COUnt La and no.n~positing ~ominal acts .as one genus of quality, we do the same propositIOnal acts 10 regard to Judgements and their modified coun The qualitali~e diff~re?ces are in ~oth cases the same, and not to regarded as differentiatIOns of any higher genera of quality. To P8SI the positing to ~he modified act is. not to pass to a heterogeneous elsa. the case of passing f,r~m any ~omlnal act to a desire or act of wiU. But ia passage from a positing nO~In~1 act. 10 an act of affirmative assert:ioa. are nOI tempted to see a qualitative difference; the same holds if we the corresponding 'mere presentations'. Matter alone, in the sense the present investigation. constitutes both differences: it alone det'"'.... unity of the nominal, and the unity of the propositional acts, This suffices to mark off a comprehensil'e class of intentional e which includes all the acts hitherto dealt with in their quaUtatil'e es~ determines the widest concept that the term 'presentation' can standfor the towl class of intentional experiences. We ourselves would like to qualitatively unitary class, taken in its natural width, the class of Db acts. It yields (to put the matter clearly in front of us): I. through qualitative differentiation, the division into positing aetIof belief or judgement in the sense of Mill and Brentano respectivelynon-positing acts. acts 'modified' as regards positing, the coom..,OIIlI 'mere presentations'. How far the concept of positing belief extendl, how it is specified. remains undetermined: 2. through differentiation of malter. it yields the difference of n and propositional acts, though we still must consider whether this di is not merely one of many equally valid material differences. A glance over the analyses of the last chapter.) makes us aware oftbe pervasive opposition between synthetic, Ilwny-rayed act-unifies and rayed acts, acts which posit or en/erwin something ill a single thesis. We note, however. Ihat predicative synthesis is only an especially favoured fl (or complete system of forms) of synthesis, to which other frequently in forms stand opposed, e.g. the fonn of conjunctive or disjunctive syn ,. We have, for example. in the plural predication 'A and Band Care unitary predication terminating in three predicative layers on the same cate P. 'Upon' the basic positing of A. the socondary positing of B. and. tertiary positing of C. the predicate P, kept identical throughout, is. in a single. three-layered act. Our act of judgement is as it were arU by a 'caesura' into a subject- and a predicate-positing. but so that the

Further contributions to the theory of judgement

16 t

~1ber is in its turn a unitary conjunction of three nominal memS\.lbJec~hese are united in the conjunction. but they do not come together

nominal presentation, But it is true of the 'conjunctive' (or better t.hat it pennits CO minalizllllon. to which case the collocllve obJoct constituted by the of n:esis . becomes the simply presented objoct of a new 'single-rayed' act, Sy~t so is made 'objective' in the pregnant sense of the word. The nominal a~lltatiOn of the colloction now again refers back in its own sense (in Ph matter from the original act that it takes over and modifies) to the t etler (or the consciousness) which originally constituted it. Closer exam~:tion reveals in all synthesis what we noted in the case of the predicative ~ynthesis - w~en we kept. moreover, to the basic predicative fonn of ~ateg­ oneal syntheSIS ~ that we can always perfonn the fimdllmemal operatlOII of Jlominali=(ltiofl. ,he tramformotioll of many-rayed symhesis imo single-rayed JI(lIIling lI'i/h all appropriate backward reference in our material, Our general treatment of ideally possible objoctifying acts therefore brings us back to the basic distinction of 'thetic' and 'synthetic' acts, of 'single-rayed' and 'many-rayed' acts. The single-rayed acts are not articulate, the many-rayed acts are articulate. Each member has its objoctifying quality (its peculiar stance towards being. or the corresponding qualitative modification of this stance) and its matter. The whole synthesis as a single objoctifying act has likewise a quality and a matter, the latter articulate. To analyse such a whole is. on the one hand. to come upon members and, on the other, upon syntactical fonns of synthesis. The members in their turn may be simple or complete. They may themselves be articulate and synthetically unified, as in ?ur above example of the conjunctive subjects of plural predications, or as In the case of conjoined antecedents in hypothetical predications, or as in the corresponding disjunctions in either case etc, ~e. at length come down to simple members. single-rayed in lheir rX:Jecrijicatioll, but 1I0t necessarily primitil'e ill some ultimate sense. For such ~~g1e-raYed members may still be nominalized syntheses, nominal presentaa ~s of states of affairs or collectil'lI or disjUllctiwl, whose members may be states of affairs etc, Our matter will ther~fore contain backward ..,crences of . 1 . . moeffi . .'1 more or ess complex sort, and therefore. In a peculiarly mernl~d, indIrect sense. impUcil articulations and synthetic forms. If the e.g. I ~ no longer refer back, they are also simple in this respect. This is, Pe~ aln.ly true of all proper name-presentations, and of single-membered SUCh Pt~. Imaginations. etc.. which are not split up by explanatory syntheses, ronns~h?ll.y straightforward objectifications are free from all 'categorial O1>;"":fi I I,unly Ihe analysis of each act that is not straightforward in its . I ICatlon' . In its . s, lIlust pursue the senes of backward references contained nOlnlllaliz ( ' 1 . d own upon such :uraixlltforWlIrd octlJIern.b . . < 1 Ions. unll It comes &tner:;-~' .\'Imp/I' hOlh ill form lIlid ill lIIauer. We may finally note that the treatment of possible articulations and synthetic formations leads to bets·

~n ~:tive') syn.lhesi~. as it. is true of the predic.ative s~nthesis.

,::1 11

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On Intentional experienc.es and their 'c.ontents'

Further contributions to the theory of judgement

the pure logico-grammMicallaws discussed in our Fourth lnvestiga , this respect only mal1ers (objectifying act-senses) arc relevant, and in all forms of structured objectifying synthesis express themselves. Here principle obtains that our self-contained objectifying matter (and any possible non-dependent meaning) can function as a member in synthesis of every possible fonn. This entails the particular principle each such matter is either a complete propositional (predicative) a possible member of such a matter. If we now bring in qualities, WI affirm the principle that, ideally regarded. any objectifying matler CIa combined with any quality. Jfwe now look at the special difference between nominal and pro acts, which is of such particular interest in our present Investigatioa, just-mentioned possibility of combining any quality with any ma... be readily confinned. In the analyses of previous sections, it bas 1lOl made universally plain, since we confined ourselves to modifications judgement, i,e. a positing propositional act, into a nominal act. U however, each judgement modified into a 'mere' presentation can be fonned into a corresponding nominal act. Thus '2 x 2 = 5', u express understanding and not to take up an assertive stance, can be into the name 'that 2 x 2 = 5'. Since 'modifications' are spoken of case of such transfonnations of propositions into names as leave q unaffected, i.e. in the case of mere transformations of proposi , other synthetic mol1ers, it will be well to reserve the name 'qualitatiw ification' for the quite different type of modification which affects (transfonning of positing names and statements into non-positinl Where the matter, which alone gives fonn or underlies formal d' . either remains. or is meant to remain constant. where a name stays a a proposition a proposition. in all their internal articulations and ~ shall also have to speak of cOllformatil"e II/odifications of positing actl, the notion of con formative modification is widened, by a natural ex. so as to cover nery modificMiol1 /101 affecling acl-material, then (as we presently see) it will be a wilier notion than our present concept of tive modification.

. If' §39 p,.esentation in the sense of an obJect ym I and its qualitative modification

act.

When we grouped objectifying acts into a single class, we were d moved by the fact that this whole class is characterized by one q b c opposition: just as there is a 'merely presentative' counterpart to ea, r .. I hebe, inal belief, so there is one in the case of each proposltlona. uali complete judgement. We may now doubt, however. whether thiS q modification really chafilcterizes a clan, whether it does not rat.h:: r the whole sphere or such experiences. and provide a basis for divldlnJ

- -obviouS - - -lIrgumen.t rav~urs

163

. a ~ere presentation . th·IS Ia~t: t here IS cor· d'ng to every intentional experience, to a Wish the mere idea of a respoll I" h.,tC the mere idea of a hate, to a volition the mere idea of willing . h to" ' \\1S . 'u- 1 as there ,Ire mere presentations corresponding to actual cases of elc.-. Jg ~.tnd .' -, . .lsst:rlJon. lJ8-D11O ' . . dW One should n~t. howev~r, mix up qUIte Ii.,erent ~ h·lO~s, To each possible 10 each possible experience, to each possible object 10 general, there is a 1 ac , nlation which relates to it, and which can as readily be qualified as P~ing as non-positing (as 'mere' presentation). Fundamentally, however, po have nol here one. but a whole multitude of presentations of different ..rts: Ihis is lrue even · rrestrict · ourse Ives (as we would seem tacitly to I we :vedone) to presentations of nominal type. Such a presentation can present its object intuitively or notionally, directly or by way of attributes, and can do so very dilTerently. But it suffices for our purposes to speak of one presentation, or to high-light anyone variety of presentation, e.g. the imaginative, since all varieties of presentation are in each case and in the same ll'3y possible. To each object. therefore, corresponds the presentation of that object, to a house the presentation of a house, to a presentation the presentation of lhe presentation. to a judgement the presentation of a judgement etc. Here we must note. however, as indicated above, that the presentation of the judgement is not the presentation of the state of affairs judged. Just so, more generally. the presentation of a positing is not the presentation of the positingly presented object. Different objects are presented in each case. !he will, e.g., to realize a state of affairs, differs from the will to realize a Jl1dg~~nt or the nominal positing of this state of affairs. A positing act's qual,ltatlve counterpart corresponds to it in quite different fashion from the ~Shlon in which its presentation. or any act's presentation, corresponds to at act. Modifying an act qualilalil'ely is quite a different 'operation', as it lI. ::;'/ro/ll ,,-rollucing a preselllatioll '0J' this act. The true difference between fi ,OperatIons comes out in the fact that the operation o!presenlatil'e objectiisCQt/on, ~hown symbolically in the sequence 0, P(O), P(P(O)) ... where 0 ~~ObJ~t and P(O) its presentation, admits of iteration, whereas qualilatil'e app/' Cll/1011 does lIot. and in the further fact that preselltatil'e objectification Ieru;e~ 10 all objecl... lr!wlel'er, whereas qUlIliratire modification only makes of me:;;· Ihe ~'m'(' of lieu. It also comes out in the fact that, in the one order orde .Ific,nlons. 'presentations' are exclusively nominal, whereas the other rlSnolso restncte . d . an d·111 t he further fact thaI, in the first order, 1/IIa/i,. II'S r('lIla' . l d·· ~ Oth //I Irfe (01'(1IIt. an modification only affects matters, whereas. in let or beer .order of modification. it is precisely quality that is modifled, Each 'I . . , . . • "'" b'llcf h'IS .'" mere presentatIon as Its counlerpart. which presents the O~cctJn . I h !Ilatter . prCClse y t e same manner, i.e. on the ground of the same llb.iect ,.and only differs from the former act in that it leaves the presented In S/f,I"!Je/lse. and does not refer to it positingly as existent. Such a i\I1

16'4

On intentional experientes and their 'c.ontents'

Further contributions to the theory of judgement

sen.e

modification can of course not be repeated, as little as it makes case of acts not ranged under the notion. ofbeli.ef. It there~ore Createa, peculiar connection between acts of thIs quality and their eoun positing percept or recollection, e.g., has its counterpar.t in a co act of 'mere' imagination having the same matter. as 10, e.g., the' percept of an image, the consideration of a painting that we allow to ence us purely artistically, without in any way responding to the . non-existence of what is represented. or the intuition of some mental where we drop all stances towards existence and lose ourselves 'Mere' presentation has here no funher counterpan: it is unintellill such a presentation could mean or achieve. If belief has been into mere presentation. we can at best return to belief: There is DO tion that can be repeated in the same sense. and carried on further. The case is different if we pass from tbe operation of qualitative tion to that of nominalizing. presentative objectification. Here evident possibility of iteration. This is most simply shown in tile of acts to the ego. and their division among different persons ad of time. At one time I perceive something. at another I preseal to mati am perceiving it. at yet another I present to myselftbat I ~ to myself that I am perceiving it etc.~ Or another example: A IS second painting represents the first painting, a third the secoDd differences are obvious in these cases, and they are of coune DOt differences in sense
m

tn._..

.

165

~

all)' poSiting act. e.g. 11 percept. directed upon this wish. This • ,,'ISh, bu pI and mere presentation of a wish. arc of one kind. whereas the ptir. ped~IS .....rcept or imagination or any other presentation which relates ish all I ,,-. ", differ in killd. to It,

continuation. Qualitative and imaginative

40 . 1modification

is readily led to call positing acts affirmalil'e (fiirlmhrhalrende). their terpans imaginalil·€'. Both expressions have at first blush their objec::. which especially impede the terminological fixation of the latter. The ~on of these objections will prompt us to make certain not unimponant additions. Tbc whole tradition of logic only speaks of affirmation in the case of judgements. i.e. the meanings of statements. but now we wish to call all percepts, recollections. anticipations. and all acts of normally expressed positing, 'affirmations'. The word 'imagination', likewise. normally means a DOO-positing act. but we should have to extend its original meaning beyond the sphere of .sensuous imagination. SO as to cover all possible counterpans d affirmations. Its meaning will also require restriction. since we must ad~'
166

On Intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

The phenomenal cOnlent of a painting, with its painted figures etc e.g., the same, whether we regard these as representing real objeeU, ot them to influence us aesthetically without positing anything. It is rnOlt ful whether anything similar occurs in its purity in nonnal perception: perception can preserve the rest of its phenomenological featUre&, qualitatively modified, so as to lose its normal positing cbaracter. It doubted. whether t~e char.acteristic perceptual view of the object • present In full-bodied reahty, would not at once pass over into a view, where the object, much as in the case of nonnal perceptual consciousness (paintings and the like) appears portrayed rather itself given. Yet one might here point to many sensible ap'''''....... stereoscopic phenomena. which one can treat, like aesthetic 'mere phenomena', without adopting an existential stance, and)tl 'themselves', and not as portraits of something else. It suffices that tion can pass over into a corresponding picturing (an act with like differently interpreted) yet without change in its positing character. We see that two conformative modifications may bere be . . one qllaJitati\'c and one imaginatil·c. In botb the 'matter' remains But with maner unchanged, more than quality can alter in an Kt. and mailer we took to be absolutely essential to acts, since inSClpalUi them. and relevant to their meaning, but we originally pointed out aspects could be distinguished in them. Our next investigation wiD precisely the relevance of these last two distinctions between objectification and intuition. and between perception and ima,p·lIIIlII When the descriptive relations are clarified, it is plainly a purely logical issue whether one limits the word 'judgement', in the seDIO tion. to the unmodified meaning of statements, or applies it t.!u'...... sphere of acts of belief. In the former case no 'ground-class' of even a lowest qualitative difference. is completely co\'ered, since tbt - which for us covers the 'is not' as well as the 'is' - assists in the tion. All this is. however. irrelevant. Since 'judgement' is a logical for logical interests and logical tradition alone to decide what be its meaning. It has to be said. in this connection, that a notio~ 10 mental as that of an (ideal) propositional meaning, being the uI of unity to which all things logical must relate. must retain its traditional expression. The term 'act of judging' must therefo,: be to corresponding types of act. to the significant intentions behmd statements. and to the fulfllments which fil in with these and semantic essence. To call all positing acts 'judgements' tends to 0 essential distinction. despite all qualitative community, betWeen and propositional acts. and so to confuse an array of important ships. The case of the term 'presentation' resembles that of the teflll.jL ment'. Logical requirements must decide what logic is to mean by • must be paid 10 the (mutually) exclusive separation of prese nta

Further contributions to the theory of judgement

167

~and to the fact tbat a 'presentation' claims to be something from

j~.ge;;('col1lpkteju~gement

may possi~ly be built up. Shall one then accept the ll'~ of presentallon. as comprehcndlOg all possible part-ll1('(ming!>' oflogical ~uonliml. which Bol7.ano made basic for his treatment of lVissenscllllftslehre? ~all one limit one's noti.on to wh~t are, phenomenologically speaking, or "ely independent meanmgs of thiS Iype, complete members of judgerda~ and. in particular. nominal acu? Or shall one not follow another ::;e of division, and treat as pre~ntations the me~ represem~tions. i.e. the tal content of all acts that survives the abstraction of quailty. and only ~'es the 'matter' out of Iheir intentional essence? These are difficult questions which can certainly not be decided here.

,41 New interpretation of the principle that makes presentations the bases of all acts, The objectifying .et as the primary bearer of 'matter' 5e'o-eral thinkers in olden and more modem times have interpreted the term 'preSCOtstion' so widely as 10 include 'affirmative' acts, particularly judgements, as well as 'merely presentative' acts, in its purview, and so to include in this Ihe whole sphere of objectifying acts. If we now base ourselves on this important concept which sums up a closed class of quality, our proposi~ legarding basic presentations gains a highly significant, novel sense - as pomted out above - of which the former sense based on the nominal con~ o.f presentation. is merely a secondary offshoot. For we may say: Each /IItOl~um~1 experience is eilher

(III

objectifying act or has its basis in SIIch an

must. in the latter case, contain an objectifying act among its ::~I~ents, ~hose tot.al ,n~aller is ind.ividually the same as ils total matter. .c: preViously said, III expoundmg the sense of this as yet unclarified :;OSItJO,n. ~n. n~w be practically used word for word in justification of nat term ObJCC~lfymg act'. If no act, or act.quality, not objectifying by "lh~' ~n a~Ulrc 'matter' except through an objectifying act that is inwoven ;ng Ith In URlt y. 0 b·~ectl·f· ylng acts have the unique function of first provido! er aCIS w'th . they may then refer in their ~I I presented 0 b·~ccts. to which let's' ways. 'The reference to an object is. in general terms. constituted in an obkrt~~ter . But all maller. according to our principle. is 'he mailer of an Iet-qu I' g aCI. ilnd only through the latter can it become matter for a new ~:tY.found~ upon this. We must after a fashion distinguish between their ro: ,:n~ prlllwry ifl/('IIfiollS, the laller owing their intentionality to Positing ~dffiatlO~ on the ronner. Whether primary objectifying acts are of a Ittltin.. ,a nm ng. be,·· levlng character. or of a non-positing merely prea..._ • neutral ch araeter. d oes not affect thIS . . Many ' secondary ~"va . functIOn. Ih...., nably . ffi· . :--uaificat r~Ulre a Irmatlons. as. e.g. JOY and sorrow: for others mere IS a COrn lions SUnlce. e.g. for wishes or aesthetic feelings. Quite often there P ex underlying objectifying act. including acts of both sorts. /1('1, 1:('. H

168 On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

§42 Further developments. Basic principles of complex acts To cast more light on this remarkable situation, we add the following . Each complex a~t is. eo ips~ qua~itatively com.plex: it ~~ as rnaoy ties. whether of dlffenng or Identical sort. as It has dlSlmguisbable vidual acts in ilSClf. Each complex act is further a founded act: ita quality is n~ mere sum of the ~ual~ties of ~rt-a~ts. but a sing~~ quatitJ'. a unity restmg on those constitutive qualities, Just as the unity of till 'matter' is no mere sum of the matters of the part-acts, but is ~ the extent that this 'matter' is really divided among tbese part-eaa. • partial ·matters'. Tbe manner. however. in which an act can be q complex and founded upon other acts, differs profoundly, and this u the varied ways in which differing qualities stand to one another, aad to the unitary total matter and to possible part-matters, ways in achieve unity through varied sorts of elementary foundedness. An act can be complex in such fashion that its complex total quality into selwal qualilies, each having indil,itfually the same common in joy over some fact. the specific quality of the joy is compounded of the affirmation in which the fact bet:omes 'present' to us. This one to think that each of these qualities, bar one chosen at raJIdcD. fall away, while a concrete complete act was left standing. One . think that qualities of any kind could be bound up with a single the manner in question. Our law asserts that all this is not possible, each act there must necessarily be an act-quality of the objcc:tifyilllsince there can be no matter that is not the matter of an objcctifyi:al Qualities of other kinds are accordingly always founded on . qualities: they can never be immediately associated with matter in . right. Where the former are present. the total act must be q multiform. i.e. must involve qualities differing in kind, in such a '?' complete objectifying act can be (one-sidedly) separated from .... having the whole matter of the total act as its total matter. Acts . a corresponding sense need not be simple. All uniform acts arc o. acts and, conversely, all objectifying acts may be held to be unifi objectifying acts may nonetheless be complex. The. mat~ers of the ~ are then mere parts of the matter of the total ac!: lD thIS total act ..... matter is constituted inasmuch as its parts belong to the part-acts, ' e lemCO' unifying element of the totul matter belongs to the Ulll'fymg . lotal quality. Th~ di~isiOl.l into part~ can. furth~r. be an :xplicit a~~so but muuers nommahzed m the preVIOusly deSCribed fushlon, may as implicit articulations all the forms otherwise possible in free To their members correspond underlying part-acts with their part while founded aCl-charactcrs (and together with them founded m tbO the tOlal mailer) correspond to the connective fomlS. to tbe is or

Further contributions

to

the theory of judgement

169

~e 111('1/. Ihe (lilli, the or etc. In all this compounding the act remains

lbe.if~: 111l'rt' nmlw 110 morl' thalia single objectifying qmllily rdared 10 a uJ\lfo . alter' cO/l.fi(lered as a II"hoil'. lf si'l m such uniformity multiformity arises if the objectifying total act from associated with new kinds of quality referred to its total matter. ~h qualities merely ac.,''Company single part-acls. as when. on the basis or :: unified. articulate intuition. liking becomes directed to one member of~ dislike to another. It is plain. conversely, that in each complex act ~ wH1'ing I/oll-objectifJing acl..qllalities. which rest either on the total matter =r its parts. the.se .Iauer a~t-qualities can all. ~s it were be eliminated. A complete objecufymg act IS then left. contalDlDg the total matter of the original act. A further consequence of the law which prevails here is that the ullimate wtdtdring (lcts in every complex act (or the ultimately implied acts in its nominal members) must be objectifying acts, These must all be nominal Q(ts. and the ultimate implied acts are in every respect simple nominal acts, straightrorward combinations of a simple quality with a simple matter. We may also assert the proposition that all simple acts are nominal, The converse, of course, does not hold: not all nominal acts are simple, When articulate material is present in an objectifying act, a categorial foml must also be present in it. and it is of the essence of all categorial fonns to be constituted in founded acts. as we shall discuss more fully later on. Nott. In this treatment and the immediately following, 'matter' need not be taken to mean the mere abstract moment of intentional essence: we could replace this by the whole act. in abstraction from its quality. Le, by something we shall call 'representation' in our next investigation. Everything essential will then be unaffected. 14l Backward glance to our previous interpretation or the principle under discussion hcannoWbe un derst ood why we smd . aboveI thai Brentt/llo. .. it! s prmclple arttrprtltnl in terms of tIll' nomillal concept ofpresentalion is merely a second~ con.sequenCl' of Ihe same proposition ill our nell' illterpreUlIioll, If every act! ~b~ectir~ing. or nOl purely objectifying act. is founded on objectifying ' Iy a Iso be c d ' every, It IS. phlO '. .Ih a t It' must uI tlmate loun cd on nominal acts. For tom IObJcctlfYlOg act is. as we said. either simple. and so eo ipso nominal. or inte! ex., <1.nd s.o fOllnded upon simple. i.e. again on nominal acts. The new " f ilcant. slllce ,, ' I ' lelati·"retdtlon IS pi",111l Iy muc h more slgm In It ;l one essenttal Ons' of gr oun d · pure expreSSIOn, . Iito lfgh Ing ' receive On fhe olher imerpreUlfion, cOtiflUe~ Slmt·s 1100hill1: !il/S(', fll'O IIff('r/y difji.·n·nl //JOd('.f offOlllld(llioll are (If

I lh cr()~.~·pllrp(H'('s: Ob~ire.foundingof non-objectifying acts such as joys. wishes. volitions on

Ylng acts (presentations. affirmations): here one act-quality has its

Ch3pter.::6:.-

170 On intentional experiences ;and their 'contents'

primary foundation in another act-quality. and is only mediately fi

on 'matter'. 2. The founding of objectifying acts on other objectifying llCtI. an ac~.material is ~ri~arily founded on other act·materials. e.... _ matenal of a predlcatlve statement on those of the underlyina acts. For we can see the matter in this way also. The fact that no • possible without objectifying quality, has as an automatic conseq_ _ where onc matter is founded on others, an objectifying act having the matter is founded on just such acts as have the latter 'matters', therefore. ,IIal each act is a/ways fOllnded on /lomin,,1 acls, has a sources. The original source is always that each simple 'matter', iny further material foundations, is nominal. and that therefore each u1 ' underlying objectifying act is nominal. But since all other act-q founded on objectifying acts, this last foundation upon nominal ae.u over from objectifying acts to all acts whatever.

::::-:--

_

SlIrTlrTling-up of the most 'rT1portant ambiguities in the ~errTlS 'presentation' and 'content'

n.

--------------..... 'Presentation' In the last chapter we have encountered a fourfold or fivefold ambiguity lttaching to the word ·presentation'. I. Presentation as ael-materia! or matter. which can be readily completed into: Presentation as the reprejentation underlying the act. i.e. the full contmt of the act exclusive of quality. This concept also played a pan in our treatment, though our special interest in the relation between quality and matter made it important for us to lay special stress on the latter. The mattertells us, as it were, what object is meant in the act, and in what sense it is there meant. 'Representation' brings in the additional moments lying Outside of the intentional essence which determine whether the object is ~erred to in. e.g., a perceptually intuitive or imaginatively intuitive fashlo.n, or in a merely non-intuitive mode of reference. Comprehensive analyses 'WIll be devoted to all this in the first section of the next Investigation. 2. Presentation as 'mere presentation'. as qualitative modification of any ~ of belie~, e.g. as mere understanding of propositions. without an inner on leadmg to assent or dissent. surmise or doubt etc. 1 ~ntation as "omina! act. e.g. as the subject-presentation of an act of ISSt'nlon,

Vy4. Presentation as objectifying act. Le. in the sense of an act-class necessar-

tiel represented in every complete act since every 'matter' (or 'representa-

tx:

&fo:1~ust given primarily as the matter of such an act. This qualitative "'ell n -(;Ia~s mcludes acts of belief. whether nominal or propositional. as of 0 as their counterparts. so that all presentations in the second and third T~r above senses are included here. ep ' · ·YSls I ·0f h · . ~e thm o r ecl~e ana t ese concepts 0f presentatIon or the expefl'ill ~ ey compnsc. and the final determination of their mutUill relations, Only t a task for further phenomenological investigations. Here we shall ~u:: to ~dd some further equivocations to those affecting the term under OUrlo~on. ro keep them sharply apart is of fundament.al importance in Cal and epistemological endeavours. The phenomenological analyses

172 On intention",1 experiences ",nd their 'contenu'

indispensably needed to resolve these equivocations. have only been ally encoumered in our previous expositions. What is missing has often been touched upon, and indicated to an extem that makes ~ of headings possible. We therefore continue our enumeration as fi 5. Presentation is often opposed to mere thinking. The same diffi then operative that we also call the difference between inluition and Of an ellipsoid I have a presentation. though not of a surface of K through suitable drawings, models or theoretically guided flights of I can also achieve a presentation of the latter. A round square, a icosahedron I and similar Q priori impossibilia are in this sense 'un"". ._ The same holds of a completely demarcated piece of a Euclidean of more than three dimensions. of the number Tf. and of other quite free from contradiction, In all these cases of non-presentabililJ concepts' are given to us: more precisely. we have nominal inspired by significant intemions in which the objects of our ref< 'thought' more or less indefmitely, and particularly in the indefinite tive form of all A as the mere bearer of definitely named attributes. To thinking 'presentation' is opposed: plainly this means the intuitioa gives fulfilment. and adequate fulfilment. to the mere meaning' The new class of cases is favoured because in it 'corresponding ia are added member by member and from all sides to thOUght-~::; - whether these are purely symbolic meaning-imentions or fr and inadequately mixed with intuitions - presentations which leave . . est cognitive cravings unsatisfied, What we intuit stands Mfore (}fIT perception or imagination just as we intended it in our thought. To something to oneself mealls lherefore to achiel'e a corresponding . what one merely thoughl of or It'lWI one meanl but only at best . . , equately inti/ired. 6. A very common concept of presentation concerns the oppooi~ imagination to perception. This notion of presentation dominateS discourse. If I see 5t Peter's Church, I do not have an 'idea', a """".of it. But I do have the latter. when I picture it in my memory. or stands before me in a painting or drawing etc. . 7. A presentation has just been identified with the concrete act of tion, But, looked at more narrowly, a physical thing-image is also presentation or representation of what it depicts. as. e,g" in the ~~ photograph represents 5t Peter's Church'. The word 'presen~atloD • applied to the apparent image-object. in distinction from the Ima or thing represented. This is here the thing uppearing i~ pho t colours. not the photographed church (image-subject), and It o?IY tf< (represents) the latter. These ambiguities carry over into the stratgb rJ pictured presence of memory or mere imagination. The appearau:.. fancied object as such in experience is naively interpreted as the tainment of an image in consciousness. What appears. in its

-----

Summing.up of the mon important ambiguities

173

aring. counts as an i~~er. picture, I~ke a painted picture presenting the

~pPC'ned object. In all this It IS not realized that the inner 'picture' is inten-

U:OII~/Y constituted. and that so is the way in which it and other possible t~res present one. and .the ~me thi~g. and that it cannot be counted as a ~ oment in the Imagmatlve expenence.:

~. 7n all cases of this ambigu,ous talk of presentation, where a picturing relation is supposed. the :ollo~mg thought also se.e~s act.ive. A ,very ina~. equate picture 'rcprc~n~s a thlOg ~nd also recal,ls It. IS a sign of ll, and thiS laSt in the sense that It IS able to IOtroduce a d~~t presentatio? ?f it that , richer in content. A photograph recalls an onglnal, and also IS liS repre:nt8tive. in a manner its surrogate. Its pictorial presentation makes many judgements possible, tha~ would otherwise need a basis in a percept of the original. A sign remote m content from a thing often fulfils similar functions. e.g. an algebraic symbol. It arouses tbe presentation of what it stands for, even if this is something non·intuitive. an integral etc.; it turns our thought towards this. as when we represent to ourselves the complete definitory sense of the integral, At the same time, the sign functions 'representatively', surrogatively, in a context of mathematical operations: one operates with it in additions. multiplications etc.. as if the symbolized were directly given in it. Previous discussions have shown this mode of expression to be rather crude,! but it expresses the governing notion in our use of 'presentation'. which here means representation in the double sense of profOking presenta(iolls and doing duty for ,hem. Thus the mathematician drawing on the blackboard says: 'Let OX represent (present) the asymptote of the hyperbola'. or. calculating. 'Let x represent (present) the root of ~ equation Ax) "" 0'. A sign, whether it depicts or names, is called the representation' ('presentation') of what it stands for, fixOUf pres.e nt talk of representation (which we do not wish to erect into a ed .ternunology) relates to objecls. These 'representative objects' are oonslituted . . d' , 06' . 10 certam acts, an acquire a representative character for new A!}eCU m certain new acts of transcendent (hin(llIsdeutenden) presentation. (I~~~r. more primitive sense of 'representation' was mentioned under ;"1' t IS m~de :representatives' experienced contents receiving an objectifying erprelatlOn In s uch r~prese~tat~on. 'd , to present ~. an 'm t h'IS manner helpmg Th' . wuhout beeommg objective themselves. 9 IS lea~s ~o a new ambiguity. sbo~~e dIstinction between perc('ption and imagi1lOlion (which lauer itself tinct·s Important descriptive dilTerences) is always confused with the disthe t" between sl'lI.mtiom; and images. The former is a distinction of acts, or imat~r .o~ non-acts, which receive interpretation in acts of perception 'ttpr_!nat.lo~, (If one wishes to call all contents which are in this sense .> ....... lI tatl\'e· .. Jnlpr~h' . ' sensations. we shall have to have the distinct terms 1... - '~Io"al and' ' ..) If there are essential ' descrip... ~ din; reprad' ucttve sensatIons ~rences be. ween sensations 'd ' 'f h an Images. I t e usually mentioned

II:

IH

On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

differences of liveliness. constancy, elusiveness etc.. are sufficient, or varying mode of consciousness must be brought in, cannot be . here. Anyhow we are sure that possible distinctions of content do not up the difference between perception and imagination. which analysis with indubitable clarity, to be a difference of acts qua acts. We regard what is descriptively given in perception or imagination as a complex of experienced sensations or images. The all too comlDOIl fusion between them is, however, grounded in the fact that at ODe ' 'presentation' is understood as an imaginative idea (in the sense 01"(6) (7)), at another time as a corresponding image (the complex of tative contents or imagery), so that a new ambiguity arises. 10. The confusion between an appearance (e.g., a concrete experience or a 'mental picture'). and what appears in it, leads us to presented object a presentation (idea). This applies to perceptions, ad erally to presentations in the sense of mere intuitions or logically iD intuitions. e.g. 'The world is my idea'. II. The notion that all conscious experiences (contents in IbI (reelJent phenomenological sense) are 'in consciousness', in the SCDIe 01 perception or some other inner orientation (consciousness, oriJiDal ception), and that with this orientation a presentation is eo ipso sciousness or the ego represents the content to itself), led to all consciousness being called ·presentations·. These are the 'ideas' of tile empiricist philosophy since Locke. (Hume calls them 'perceptions'.) Jlt an experience and to experience a content: these expressions are orteD equivalent. In logic it is very important to separate the specifically logical of presentation (idea) from other con(,:epts of it. That there are such concepts has already been indie-dted in passing. We may again one not included in our list so far, Bolzano's notion of the 'preteD itself'. which we interpreted as equal to every independent or part-meaning within a complete assertion. In connection with all purely logical concepts of presentation, we on the onc hand, distinguish the ideal presentation from the real ( one. e.g. the nominal presentation in the purely logical sense and tbe which it is realized. And. on the other hand. we must distinguish the mere meallillg-inrl'miofls
ir"Ilal".

an-

---§4 S

Summing-up of the most important ambiguities

175

'fhe 'presentational content'

ressions c~rr~lative. to ·presentation'. naturally have a correspondent III regard to talk about 'what is at11 nted in a presentation. I.e. about the 'content' of a presentation. That presere distinction between content and object of presentations. like the one • Pl~\.01ended by Twardowski following Zimmerman. will not remotely ~ce - howev~r merito~ous it may have been to dig down to any formdifferences in thiS fiel~ - IS clear from ~u~ analyses up t~ this point. In the 1ogic31 sp~e~e -.to which th:se authors h~lt the~selveswUho.ut.bei~gaware of their hmltatlon - there IS not one thlllg which can be dlstmgUlshed as ;cootent" from the objecl named; there are several things which can and must be so distinguished. Above all, we can mean by 'contenl'. in the case. e.g.. of a nominal presentation. ils meaning as an ideal unity: the presentation in the sense of pure logic. To Ihis corresponds. as a real (ree/les) moment in the r~1 (reel/en) comenl of the presentative act. the intemional essence with iu presentative quality and matter. We can further distinguish. in this real (mllen) content. thc separable contenLS nol belonging to the intentional cssence:: the 'contents' which receive their interpretation in the aet-consciousness (in the intentional essence). Le. the sensations and images. To these arc again added. in the case of many presentations. variously meant differences of fqnn and contem: particularly important is here the difference of matter (m a tOlally new sense) and categoriaJ form. witb which we shall have to cooc:ern ourselves a great deal. With this is connected the by no means univocal talk concerning tbe coment of concepts: content = sum total of 'properties, in distinction from their mode of combination How dubious 'blanket' talk about 'content' can be, when we merely op~se act, content and object. is shown by the difficulties and confusions into which Twardowski feU, ~nd which have in part been exposed abovc. We may point particularly ~o bi~ talk of 'presentative activity moving in two directions'. his complete I~?nn¥ of meaning in the ideal sense, his psychologistic elimination of III dl~erences of meaning by recourse to etymological distinctions and. tri Uy, hIS treatment of the doctrine of 'intentional inexistence' and the docne of universal objects.

EJ:~iguit)'. ThiS IS part~cu~a~ly the case

ks

Note. In r' '. . . . diRi ceent tIme:; a view has often been expressed which dentes the "d " "ItS Ph erence bet ween presentatIon an presented contcnt. or at least dellles de;:omel1ological ostensibility. Onc's attitude to this rejection natumlly theseTldS o.n one's interpret:lIion orthe words 'presentation' and 'content'. If Phen are mterpreted as the mere having of sensations and images. and the tight omenological moment of interpretation is ignored or discounted. it is " " " and presented are Otte a tod deny",I d"Istmct act 0 f presentatIon: presentatIon or an nth: Same. The mere having of the content. as a mere experiencing expenence. is no intentional experience. dir(,,'Cting itself upon an object

176

On Intentional experiences and their 'contenu'

by way of an interpretative sense: it is, in particular. not an mlr percept. For this reason we identified a sensation witb a sensational But can ~nyone doubt. once he h~ ~isti~g~ished ~he various coOtqlea presentation. that a concept so dehmltoo IS Impossible to sustain, IJ:Id arisen merely tbrough a misinterpretation of original. intentional n . presentation'! However the notion of presentation is defined, it is un...... seen as a pivotal concept. not only for psychology. but also for ology and logic. and particularly for pure logic. A man who adrnita and yet bases himself on the above rejection. has eo ipso involVed . confusion. For this concept has no part to play in epistemology 8Dd logic. Only through this confusion can I explain how a thinker as pen v. Ehrenfels. on occasion maintained (ZeitsclJr. f PsyclJologie u. Pit der Sinnesorgane, XVI, 1898) that we cannot dispense with a ctiI"...cl between act and content of presentation since without it wt: should be able to state tbe psychological difference between tbe presentatioa If object A. and the presentation of a presentation of this objoct. For_ he informs us, he has no direct assurance of the existence of such a enon. I myself should say that an act of presentation is as such . intuited. precisely where this distinction between a presentation and. entation of this presentation is phenomenologically drawn. Were such cases, no earthly argument could possibly provide an indirect fication of the distinction in question. Just so. I believe, we have established the existence of an act of presentation in becoming clear the difference between a mere sound-pattern and the same pattern as a name etc.

valurne II. Part 2 of the Second German

Edition

:::---

Foreword to the second edition

--------------The present new edition of the final part of my wgicallm'estigotions does not correspond. unfortunately, with the notice in the Preface added in 1913 to the first volume of the Second Edition. I was forced to a decision to publish the old text. only essentiaUy improved in a few sections, instead of the radical revision of which a considerable portion was already in print at the time. Once again the old proverb came true: that books have their dc:stioies. The exhaustion naturaUy consequent on a period of overwork first forced me to interrupt the printing. Theoretical difficulties that had made themselves felt as the printing progressed, called for revolutionary transformations of the newly planned text. for which fresher mental powers were necessary. In the war years which followed. I was unable to muster, on be~alf of the phenomenology of logic. that passionate engagement without which fruitful work is impossible for me. I could only bear the war and the ensuing 'pe~ce' b~ absorption in the most general philosophical reflections, ~ by agam taking up my works devoted to the methodological and ma~Iaboration ?f the Idea .of a phenomenological philosophy. to the systIC sketch of ItS foundations, to the arrangement of its work-problems llId.the continuation of such concrete investigations as were in these conindispensable. My new teaching activity at Freiburg favoured a l'ClClen on of my interest to dominant genenllities and to system. Only very Illy ~ have these.systematic studies led me back into the territories wbere old P nomenologlcal researches originated. and have recalled me to my ..........Work on the foundations of pure logic which has so long awaited comI"':lIOn and p bl" " D"" Itsea h . . u Icatlon. IVlded as I am between intensive teaching and to thrc .' It IS uncertain when I shall be in iI position to adapt myoid writings Iltlce e ~dV;lllces since made. and to recast their literary form It is also flaID wheth er I s.. h" II use the text of the Sixth . Investigation ... Purpo for. thiS It);t t~' or Shall give my plans. whose content already goes far beyond the ~ ~. form of an entirely new book. IDgs stand. I have yielded 10 the pressures of the friends of the at ~t ~'o.rk. and have decided 10 make its last part once more accessible. In liS old form.

= =::ns

Prtsen:

178

Foreword to the second edition

The First Section, that I could nOI revise in detail without e the style of the whole, I have allowed to be reprinted practically But in the Second Section on Sensibility and Und~w(lndj~g by \Vbicb particular store, I have, on the other hand, contlOually Intervened to prove the form of the text. I remain of the opinion that the c 'Sensuous and Categorial Intuition', together with the preparatory ments of the preceding chapters, has opened the way for a pheno>meool.. clarification of logical self-evidence (and eo ipso of its parallels ill axiological and practical sphere). Many misunderstandings of my wards a Pure Phenomenology would not have been possible had the8e been attended to. Quite obviously, the immediacy of the vision of essences spoken of in the !detlS, implies, like the immediacy of lUI)' categorial intuition, an opposition to the mediacy of a non-intuim.e. emptily symbolic thought. But people have substituted for lhis . the immediacy of intuition in the ordinary sense of the word, just they were unacquainted with the distinction, fundamental to any reason. of sensible and categorial intuition. I think it shows somethial the contemporary state of philosophical science that straightforward ments of such incisive meaning, presented in a work that for decades has been much attacked, but also much used, should have without noticeable literary effect. The position is similar in the case of the textually improved 'The A Priori Laws of Authentic and Inauthentic Thinking'. It at leal a blueprint for the first radical worsting of psychologism in the Reason. This blueprint makes its 'breakthrough' within the f of an Investigation exclusively concerned with fonnallogic, and is restricted to the Reason of formal logic. With how little deep at chapter is read. is shown by the often heard, but to my mind reproach. that I may have rejected psychologism sharply in the first of my work. but that I fell back into psychologism in the second. It affect what I have said to add that. after twenty years of furthcl' should not write at many points as I then wrote. and that I do n~o.l. .... of much that I then wrote. e.g. the doctrine of categorial re~r_.:..w Nonetheless. I think I can say that even .the immature a?d mlsl~ ments in my work deserve a close pondenng. For everythlOg and there said. derives from a research which actually reaches uP.to the themselves. which orients itself towards their intuitive self.gJve~ which also has that eidetic-phenomenological attitude to pure c~n through which alone a fruitful theory of reason becomes poSSible. who here, as also in the Ideas, wishes to grasp the sense of my ar, must not be afraid of considerable efforts, including the efforts ~~y ing' his own notions and convictions upon the same. or the ~utat:h themes. These efforts are demanded by the nature of the thillS!

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Foreword to the second edition

179

ho is not afraid, will find sufficient opportunity for improving on

one WsitiOl1S and, if he cares to. for censuring their imperfections, Only if

mY POtrenches himself in a superficial reading drawn from an extra-

h~e~~ll1enoIOgical sphere of thought, will he refuse to attempt this. if he is

P to be disavowed by all who truly understand the mailer. How readily not y authors employ critical rejections, with what conscientiousness they ma~ my writings, what nonsense they have the audacity to attribute to rea and to phcnomcnology, are shown in the Allgemeine Erkenllfllislehre of ~:ritZ Schlick. On pa~e ~21 ?~ this wo~k it is said that my ltIeas 'asserts the existence of a peculiar lOtUitlOn. that IS flO! a real psychical act, and that "[someone fails 10 find ,\'/I('h ll/l "experience", which does 1I0t fallll'i/hill the ~JIlai/1 ojpsycllOlogy. this indicates that he has not understood the doctrine, that he has not yet penetrated to the correct attitude of experience and thought, for this requires "peculiar. strenuous studies"'. The total impossibility that I should have been able to utter so insane an assertion as that attributed to me by Schlick in the above italicized sentences. and the falsity of the rest of his exposition of the meaning of phenomenology. must be plain to anyone familiar with this meaning. Of course I have always repeated my demand for 'strenuous studies', But not otherwise than, e.g., the mathematician demands them of anyone who wishes to share ill talk of mathematical matters, or who even presumes to criticize the value of mathematical science, In any case. to devote less study to a doctrine than is necessary to master its meaning, and yet to criticize it, surely violates the el~mal laws of the literary conscience. No amount of learning in natural SCIence or psychology or historical philosophies. will make it unnecessary to ~ke these efforts in penetrating into phenomenology. or can do more than I,&bten them. Everyone. however, who has made these efforts. and who has n :: ~ ~'ery seldon~ exercise~ lack of prejudic~, h~IS achieved an indubit. h rtamty regardlOg the given ness of Its sClenufic foundmion and the ;n erentjustification of the me/hod demanded by it. a method which here, as : O~her SCiences. renders possible a common set of conceptually definite ",or ·problems. as well as definite decisions as to truth or falsehood. I must irr~~sSly o~scrve that. in the case of M. Schlick, one is not dealing with cistne~ant ~hps, but with sense-distorting substitutions on which all his critiIS bUilt Up After these w·· ' f-' that I 'h ' orus 0 udence, I must also observe, in regard to Section III c an"~d ' . on the problem of the phenomenological inter-' pret~l' .,<.: my positIon . , . "IOn of ill !ion of h I crrogatlve and optatIve selllences shortly after the first edi"'"ere al: c work, and th,lt there would be no place for small revisions. which onalter ~hat could be undertaken at the time, The text therefore remained on 'Ex~ ..' <.:ould be less conservative :IS regards the much used Appl'lldix basbee~rn;l_~,and Jn~crnal Perceptio.n'. Though the text's essential content P <.:servcd. It now appears 10 a considerably improved form.

:e

180

Foreword to the second edition

The desideratum of an Index for the whole work could unfOrtuna be realized, since my promising pupil, Dr Rudolf Clemens, who bad taken to prepare it. had died for his country.

Freiburg-im-Breisgau, OclOber 1920

l/est..icgca.=..ti_o_n_V_I I~

elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

-

_

---

.

Intr odu ctio n

------------our last

Investigation may have seemed at first to lose itself in remote ueslions of descriptive psychology: it has, however, been of conside rable ~IP in our auempt ed elucidation of knowl~ge. AI.! thought, and in partic~. lar all theorelical thought and knowledge, IS earned on by way of certam 'letS', which occur in a context of expressive dis«;:ouf'Se. In lhese acts lies the lOurce of all those unities-of-validity which confron t the thinker as objects of thought and knowledge, or as the explanatory grounds and principles, the theories or sciences of the latter. In these acts, therefo re, lies the source, also, of the pure. universal Ideas connected with such objects. whose ideally JO\'tt'Ded combinations pure logic auemp ts to set forth, and whose elucida · lion is the supreme aim of epistemological criticism. Plainly we shall have gone far in our elucidation of knowledge, once we have established the phenomenological peculiarities of acts as such, that much debated, little understood class of experiences, By putting our logical experiences into this dus. we shall have taken an important step towards the demarcation of III analysis which will 'make sense' of the logical sphere and of the funda~tal concepts which concern knowledge. In the course of our Investig a: : were led to distinguish various concepts of content which tend to to con.fusedly mixed up whenever acts. and the ideal unities pertaining I ~ are In question. Differences which had already struck us in our First ~~lgation. in the narrower context or meanings and or acts conferring r~lng, appeare~ once more in a wid~r context and in the m~st ge?eral ~,Even. the highly noteworthy nouon of content, that or'mte ntlona l Got .' whIch emerged as a novel gain from our last Investig was tities.. . . tho~t this relation to the logical sphere: for the same seriesation, of idenI\litabivrevlousl~ employed t~ i~lustr~lte the unit~ of m.eaning. now yield~, ~ied generalized. a certalO Identity. that of 'mtentlOnal essence '. which ideaJ ~~ all acts whatsoever. By thus linking up. or subordinating. the Clttilt Unities and phenomenological characters or the logical realm. to the , general characters and unities of the sphere of acts, we importantly ned Our phenomenological and critical understanding of the former.

Is..

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Introduction

185

--------------=-==~

The investigations carried out in the last chapter, basing t""",,_ the distinction of act-quality and act-material within the unity of in essence, again led us far into the zone of logical interest. We Were Ii enquire into the relation of such intentional material to the pr·... foundation essential to every act. and were compelled to hold apan important, constantly confounded concepts of presentation, and SO to out a fundamental parl of the 'theory of judgement'. Here as e........ vast amount remains to be done: we have barely made a beginning. We have not yet even been successful in our more immediate task. laying bare the source of the Idea of Meaning. Undeniably and im the meaning of expressions must lie in the intentional essence of the acts. but we have not at all considered the sorts of acts that can tm. tion in meaning, and whether all types of acts may not be in this on a level. But when we seek to tackle this question, we at ooce ...""'. as the next paragraphs will demonstrate - tile relation bem'ffJ'l intention and meaning-fuJjilmem, or to speak traditionally, aDd ambiguously, the relation between 'concept' or 'thought' on the OBI understood as mere meaning without intuitive fulfilment, and 'co ing intuition', on the other. It is most important that this distinction, touched on even in Investigation, should be most minutely explored. In carrying out die priate analyses and, in the first instance, auaching them to the naming-intentions. we at once perceive that our whole treatment natural extension and general circumscription. The widest class 01 which we meet with distinctions between intention and intenti... (or intention-frustration), extends far beyond the logical sphere. itself demarcated by a peculiarity in the relation of fulfilment. A cIaa _ those known as 'objectifying' - are in fact marked off from alt that the fulfilment-syntheses appropriate to their sphere have tbe of knowings, of identifications. of a 'putting-together' of things while their syntheses of frustration. similarly, have the correlative of a setting apart of things conflicting. Within this widest objectifying acts. we shall have to study all the relations rele)'ant 10"" of knowledge. We shall not have to limit ourselves to the Ii . such peculiar meaning-intentions as attach to our verbal exp~ similar intentions also tum up without grammatical support.. our tions, further, themselves mostly have the character of intenUOPlt both require, and very often sustain ~ further fUlfil.me~t. uite We shall provide a phenomenological charactenzallon of the q eral notions of signification and intuition in relation to the phen . fulfilment. and we shall pursue the analysis of l'arious sorU 01. starting with sensuous intuition. an enquiry basic to the ell""ida~ knowledge. We shall then embark upon the phenomenology of theted degrees of knowledge. giving dearness and definite fonn to a rcla

""'011

.fII.

~ danlcntal epistemological concepts. Here certain novel notions of con-

of uflb3rel )' glanced at in our previous analyses. will take the centre of the

tent. the concept of intaitire content and the concept of representing (interslJIg<'d)' content. We shall range the notion of epistemic essence alongside of

~:tprevioU.S n~tion of inten.tiona~ essence, ~nd wit~in

the fonner we shall draW a distiR~tl.on ~twee.n Intentlo?al quality and Intentional matter, the latter being dlv~ded Into mterpret.atll'e sense, imerpretatil'e form and inter· re led (apperceived. or representing) content. We shaJi thereby pin down ft.e concept of 'nterpre.tation (Auffassung) or Represemation, as the unity of IIl8tcnal and representing content by way of interpretative form. In connection with the graded transition from intention to fulfilment, \\1: shall recognize distinctions of greater or less mediacy in an intemion iut/f, which exclude straightforward fulfilment, and which require rather a graded sequence of fulfilments: this will lead to an understanding of the a11important. hitherto unclarified sense of talk about 'indirect presentations'. We then follow up the differences of greater or lesser adequacy of intention 10 the intuitive experiences which fuse with it, and which fulfil it in knowl. edge, and point to the case of an objeclil'ely complete adeqU(Jcy of the one to the others. In this connection we strive towards an ultimate phenomenok>gical clarification of the concepts of Possibility and Impossibility (harmony, compatibility - conflict, incompatibility), and of the ideal axioms relating to ~. Bringing back into consideration the act-qualities tbat we have for a ."bile neglected, we then deal with the distinction. applicable to thetic acts, of a pro~~ional and afinalfuJjilment. This final fulfilment represents an ideal of perfectIon. It always consists in a corresponding percept (we of course take for granted a necessary widening of the notion of perception beyond the ~unds of sense). The synthesis of fulfilment achjeved in this limiting case IS se/fe~k/ence or knowledge in tile pregnant sense of lhe word. Here we have!>t· . J ada "~g "'. tie. sellse of truth, 'correspondence' rightly understood, the . equatto N!I ac mteJJectllS: here this adaequatio is itself given, to be directly ~ and gazed upon. The I'llrying notions of truth. which all must be built ~ one single, selfsame phenomenological situation. here reach complete f~ The same holds of the correlative ideal of imperfection and thereex~ the ease of absurdity. and as regards the 'conflict' and the non-being 1'h eneed therewith. of falsehood. • • e natural cou fl·· . tiith S h' rse 0 our nvesttgatlon. whIch at firsl only concerns itself lie Intent" . Itlents all be j lo.ns as ar~ meamngs. h.as as a c~nsequence that our treal10""al difjrr. g n with the SImplest meanlOgs. and tn so doing abstract from Ij('rences among suc h meamngs. . Th e complementary Investigations or Sec 'Ond Sec' ·11 llld. will tlon WI then make these differences their main theme ""-Iconcept .r . -vqtraSt atbeOnce lead 10 a 1010I y new OJ mauer or material. to a basic Obieetive r. tWeen sensuous stuff and caregorial form or - abandoning an itnd CQte a phenomenological stance - to a contrast between sensuous 'B(mal acts. In close connection with this last. we have the important

;SS.

0"

0:

186

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

distinction between sensuous (real) and categooal objects, dete'.......... combinations etc.. regarding which last it becomes clear that tbey CIa be 'perceptually' given in acts which urefounded upon other acts, and' last resort, on acts of sensibility. In general we may say that tbe' and accordingly likewise the imaginative. fulfilment of categorial founded on acts of sense. Mere sense. however. never fulfils categorial or intentions which include categorial forms: fulfilment lies rather, ia. case. in a sensibility structured by categorial acts. With this goes an able extension of the originally sense-turned concepts of intuitiOll 01ItI tion, which permits us to speak of cmegorial and. in particular, of intuition. The distinction between sensuous and pI/rely categorial ah""... then leads to a distinction between sensl/ous concepts and categoria. old epistemological contrast between sensibility and lInderstandinr a much-needed clarity through a distinction between straigbtf; sensuous. and founded or categooal intuition. The same is true ofdll trast between t!linking and seeillg (intuiting). which confuses pM" parlance by confounding the relations of signification to fulfilling' on the one hand, with the relations of sensuous and categorial the other. All talk of logical form concerns what is purely categorial meanings and meaning-fulfilments in question. But the 'matter' of 'intention' of terms, itself admits. through a graded superim • categorial intentions. of distinctions of matter and form, so that tbe antithesis of matter and form points the way to a readily u 'relativization' of our absolute distinction. We shall end the main body of this Investigation by discussing the which limit freedom in the actual categorial shaping of given shall become aware of the analytic mles ofauthentic thinking whteb,. in pure categories. do not depend on the specificity of their materillL. lar factors limit thought in the inauthentic sense. i.e. pure acts of the extent that they might lend themselves to authentic cases of resting on a priori principles and not dependent on subject·mattell expressed. From this demand springs the function of.the laws of. thinking to provide norms for our acts of mere meamng. We raised a question at the beginning of this Investigation as .. natural circumscription of sense-giving and sense-fulfilling ac~ answered by ranging such acts under objectifying acts. and .bY su the latter into acts of signification and acts of intuition. !-Iavmg s,",""" clarified the phenomcnologicul relations which concern fulfilment, we last in a position to cvuluate the arguments for. and the arg~ments rI Aristotle's view of optative and imperative sentences as special cases dication. The last section of the present Investigation is devoted to up this controversial issue. The aims just sketched are not the final. highest aims of a pheno. .. elucidation of knowledge in general. Our analyses. comprehenSive

OIl"

----

Introduction

187

leave untilled the extremely fruitful field of ",('€liar/.' thought and are· ,ledge: Ihe nature of ",edillle evidence, and of its correlated ideolia. retll~:S illsuffi<.:ienlly illuminated. We consider. however. that our aims have not tf13.1 100 Ifi\ ial. and we hope that we may have dug down to the genuinely ""',11 underlying foundations of a critique of knowledge. Even such a cri6~" " of the modesty essential 10 all slrict. scien. ue demands 0 f us an exerCIse ~ research. If Ihis last aims at a real. full completion of the tasks at hand. (it has gi\:e~ .up the ~~eam of ~Iving Ihe greal problems of knowledge by merel)' critiCIZing Iradllional phllosophemes or by probable argumemation. if it has at last seen that matters can be advanced and transformed only by gelling to close grips with them. i.t mus~ Ih~n also reconcile itself to tackling the problems of knowledge. not 10 their hIgher or their highest. and there· fore their most interesting developments. but in their comparatively simplest forms. in the lowest grades of development accessible to us. That even such a modest epistemological enquiry has vastly many difficulties to surmount, that it has in fact still got all its achievements ahead of it. will become clear in the course of the ensuing analyses.

First Section

~ctifying intentions and their fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations

Chapteo:..r...:I_---------------

~

...eaning-intention and ll1 ean ing-fu lfil ment

II Whether every type of mental act. or only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning We shall now go on with the question raised in our Introduction: whether meaning-something is exclusively the prerogative of certain restricted sorts of mental acts. It might seem at first plain that no such restrictions can exist. and tbat any and every act might operate in sense-giving fashion. For it seems plain that we can verbally express acts of every kind - whether presentations. judgements. sunnises, questions. wishes etc. - and that, when we do this. they yield us the meanings of the ronns of speech in question, the meanings of names. of statements, of interrogative or optative sentences etc. The opposite view can. however, lay claim 10 the same obviousness. particularly in a form that restricts meanings to a single, narrow class of acts. All acts are certainly expressible. if language is sufficiently rich. each has its ~Wn appropriate speech-form: sentence-forms. e.g., differentiate themselves mto indicative. interrogative. imperative etc.. and among the first of these we have categorical. hypothetical. disjunctive and other sentence-fonns. In each case the act. in so far as it achieves ~xpreS5;on in this or that speechfo.nn. must be known for the sort of act it is. the question as a question. the ;:h as .a wish. the judgement as a judgement etc. This will apply also to A partial act.s constitutive of such acts. in so far as these too are expressed. r. ClS cannot, 1l seems. find their own appropriate expressive forms till their io rm and content have been apperceived and known. The expressive role ::.eSr>eech lies. accordingly. not in mere words. but in expressi\"f! acts: these III ale. fo~ the correlated acts to be expressed by them a new expressive ot~~,~1 In \Vh~ch they can be given filiI/king l'xprf!s.~ion. the general essence A IC~ ~ons!ltutes the meaning of the speech-form in question. Pu tt nkln g l.:onfirmation of this view seems to lie in the possibility of a 'io~ y hsYm~lie functioning of expressions. The mental (geistigl') ex prest Vtrbal e thln~iog counterpart of the act to be expressed. attaches to the itself' expresSion. and can be brought to life by the latter even when the act IS oot performed by the person who understands the expression. We

192

ElementS of a phenomenologiCilI eluciduion of knowledge

understand the expression of an act of perception without OUrsel\lel ceiving anything, of a question without ourselves asking anything etc. experience more than the mere words. we enjoy the thought-forms expressions. In the opposed case. where the intended acts are ~ actually present. the expression comes to coincidence with what it hal express, the meaning which clings to the words fits itself into what it .. its thought-intention finds in the latter its fulfilling intuition. -... It is plainly in close connection with these opposed viewpoints that have the old dispute as to whether or not the peculiar fonns of gative, optative, imperative and similar sentences are to count as sta~ and their meanings asjudgements. Aristotle's doctrine places the tneaDiDael all complete sentences in the varied array of psychic experiences, ofjudging, wishing, commanding and so forth. As against this, another modem and increasingly influential doctrine locates meaning exclusMir our judgements (or in their purely presentative modifications). AD • rogative sentence in a sense expresses a question, but only in SO far. question is realized to be a question, in so far as it is referred in tho a speaker, and so judged to be his experience. And so similarly in cases. Each meaning is, on this view, either a name-meaning or a """"_~ meaning, i.e. either the meaning of a complete indicative sentence or a part of such a meaning. Indicative sentences are here to be unden
in':

ex."".'....

§2 That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue, There are two senses to talk about expressing an act All acts it has been agreed are e:.:pressible. This cannot. of co~ questioned. but it does not therefore follow, as might be sum:pu suggested. that all acts for that reason also function as carriers of . Talk of 'expressing' is, as we argued carlier. ' ambiguous. and it rematPI even when we connect it with the (leU to be expressed. What are ex . may be, on tbe one hand. said to be the sense-gil·jng acts. to which, III narrower sense, 'voice' is given. But there are other acts which can abO said to be expressed, though this is the case. naturally. in a different refer here to the very frequent cases in which we name acts wt' art' periencing, and through such naming manage 10 s"y thai we art' t'xper

nt;"

--

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

19]

In this sense I 'express' a wish through the words 'I wish that .. .', a t:';io n through the words '1 am asking whether .. :, a judgement through q 'oros '1 judge that .. .', and so on. Naturally ....'C can pass judgement on (be ~ ",'J1 inner experiences just as we can pass judgement on outward things ourd 0 when we do t he 'lormer, t he meanlOgs . 0 f the relevant sentences will "·d·e in our judgements upon such experiences, and not in the experiences -h rnselves. our WIS · es, h · . of statements questions etc. Just so, the meanlOgs ~~ut external things do ~ot reside in these things (the horses, houses etc.), but in the judge.ments we lO~ardly pass upon them (or in the presentations thai help to bUild up such Judgements). That the objects judged about in OOC case transcend consciousness (or purpon to do so), in another case are taken to be immanent in consciousness. makes no real difference. Naturally ,,'ben 1express the wish that now fills me, it is concretely one with my act of judgement. but it does not really contribute to the latter. The wish is apprehended in an act of reflex perception, subsumed under the concept of wishing, and named by way of this concept and of the further determining presentation of the wish-eontent. Thus the conceptual presentation makes the same sort of direct contribution to the judgement about the wish (and the corresponding wish-name to the wish-statement), that the presentation of Man makes to a judgement about Man (or the name 'Man' to a statement about Man). Substitute for the subject word T in the sentence 'I wish that ...' the relevant proper name, and the sense of the sentence remains unaffected in its remaining pans. It is. however, undeniable that the wishstatement can now be understood without change of sense by someone who hears it, and can be imitatively re-judged by him, even though he dOf!s not share the wish at all. We see, therefore, that, even when a wish chances to ronn a unity with an act of judgement directed upon it, it does not really fann pan of the meaning of the latter. A truly sense-giving experience can never be absent if the living sense of the expression is to survive change. ~becomes clear, therefore, that the expressibility of all acts is without f: nee to the question whether all acts can function in sense-giving fashion ~r, that is: as such 'expressibility' means no more than the possibility or .iust og cenaln statements about such acts. For in this connection acts are DOt functioning as carriers of meaning at all.

IJ A thO d aCts F Ir sense of talk about the 'expression' of ,

orrnulation of our theme

We have ju d" . elptessed' Sl. Istlngulshed two ~nses .in which there can be talk about 'acts ~ant . EI.ther they are acts 10 which the sense. the meaning of the rel10 hirncxPIresSl.on is constituted. or they are acts that the speaker attributes . h'IS recent expenence. . . IPPrOpsefaslte . ms In ThIS latter conception may be atel y in any n . widened. Plainly the situation that it covers would not differ CSSenhal respect. were an expressed act not to be attributed to the

19'"

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

experiencing ego, but to other objects. and it would not differ for ceivable fonn of expression that really (ree/f) named this act as .., experienced, even if it did not do it so as to mark the act off as the or object-member of a predication. The main point is that tbe act. directly named or otherwise 'ex~~', shoul.d.appea~ ~ the actually object ofdisCQursf' (or of the obJectlfymg, posltmg activity behind . whereas this is 1I0t the case in regard to our sense-giving acts. There is a thinl sense of the same talk of 'expression' in which ... in our second sense, with a judgement or other objectification rc:1IteIl acts in question, but not with a judgement about the latter - DOt, with an objectification of these acts by way of presentations aDd acts which refer to them: we have rather a judgement grounded acts, which does not demand their objectification. That I express IIlJ' of something may, e.g.. mean that I auribute this or that COnteal may also mean that I derive my judgement from my percept, that 1 merely assert but also perceive the matter of fact in question, assert it as I perceive it. My judgement is not here concerned perceiving but with the thing perceived. By 'judgements of pe1""'1pdl court we generally mean judgements belonging to this last class. In a similar manner we can give expression to other intuitive actio imaginings, remembering or expectations. In the case of utterdnces grounded on imagination we may' whether a genuine judgement is present: it is in fact plain tbat lbiI iI present. We are here thinking of cases where we allow our . to 'run away' with us, and where we employ ordinary statemeots, ate to things perceived, in giving a name to what then appears lO the narrative fonn in which story-tellers. novelists etc., 'express'. circumstances, but the creations of their anistic fancy. As we saw ill Investigation, we are here dealing with conformably modified serve as cOllnterparts which correspond to tbe actual judgements be expressed in the same words, just as intuitive imaginations co perceptions. and perhaps also to rememberings and expectations. leave aside all such distinctions for the present. In connection with the above class of cases, and in connection thereby defined new sense of 'expressed act'. we wish to make clear till relation between meaning and expressed intuition. We wish to whether such an intuition may not itself be the act constitutive of or if this is not the case, how the relation between them may be beSt stood and systematically classified. We are now heading towards • general question: Do the acts which gil'e expression in general, and which in general are capable of receil'ing ~xp.ression, bel~ng to d different spheres. and thereby to fimliy delim.lled llC~-S~les? Anof nonetheless take their tone from an overarchmg. umfymg genus which all acts capable offimctiollillg ·meallillgfi,Jly'. ill rhe widest

Meaning-intention and meanIng-fulfilment

195

--. . _ whether asmeanmgs proper, or as ·fu 1"1 11 ments . 0 f meamngs - can be ~gbt together a.nd set apan, so that all other ge~erd of a~ts can eo ipso, in bf:O 'erne
4 The expression of a percept Cjudgement of

f erceptio n '), Its meaning cannot lie in perception, :ut must lie in peculiar expressive acts Let us consider an example. I have just looked out into the garden and now Ih-ecxpression to my percept in the words: 'There nies a blackbird!' What is Itde lhe act ill which my meaning resides? I think we may say, in harmony Iliith points established in our First Investigation, that it does not reside in perception, at least not in perception alone. It seems plain that we cannot describe the situation before us as if there were nothing else in it - apart from the sound of the words - which decides the meaningfulness of the apression, but the percept to which it attaches. For we could base different statements on the same percept. and thereby unfold quite different senses. I could, e.g., have remarked: 'That is black!', 'That is a black bird!', 'There lies that black bird!', There it soarsr, and so forth. And conversely, the IOUDd of my words and their sense might have remained the same, though my ~t varied in a number of ways. Every chance alteration of the ~\'er's relative position alters his percept, and different persons, who pen:ejyt lIle same object simultaneously, never have exactly the same per· cepts. No such differences are relevant to the meaning of a perceptual state:t~e may at times pay special attention to them, but one's statement ~ .be correspondingly different. to be aught, however, maintain that this objection only showed meaning L " tunan:ected by such differences in indil'idllal percepts: it might still be ""lQ 0 res d . ICtJ who I e In something comlllO" to the whole multitude of perceptual 1 I~h centre in a single object. o this we 1 h lItogeth . rep y, t at percepts may not only vary. but may also vanish cr . ., U d , Without causing an expression to lose all its meaning. A listener . the. n erstand my wor ds, and my sentence as a whole. without looking iltto llidgeltl gar~cn: confident ill my veracity, he may bring forth the same ~"ttIac~~t Without the percept. Possibly he is helped by an imaginative ........u. ent. but perhaps this too is absent. or occurs in so mutilated so .~ tea~ , tt least n . orm. as to be no fit counterpan of what appears perceptually, But ift~~ III respect of the features :expres~' i.n m.y statement. lithe IaJn sense of a statement survives the elimmatlon of perception, and e sense as before, we cannot suppose that perception is the act in

1'il6

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

which the sense ofa perceptual statement its expressive intention, is The acts which are united with the sound of our words are ph logically quite different according as these wor~s have a purely or an intuitively fulfilled significance. or accordmg as they have a fancied or a perceptually realizing basis: we cannot believe that si . is now achieved in this sort of act. and now in that. We shall ralher conceive that the function of meaning pertains in all cases to one same sort of act. a type of act free from the limitations of the pe""lIIi. the imagination which so often fail us. and which. in a1.1 cases where pression authentically 'expresses'. merely becomes one Wlth the act It remains, of course. incontestable that, in 'judgements of 1"..... perception is internally related to our statements' sense. We have good to say: the statement ~xpresses the percept. i,e, brings out what is 1"..... 'gil·en'. The same percept may serve as a foundation for several but, however the sense of such statements may vary, it addresses itlei' phenomenal content of perception, It is n~w one, n~w another, .-rt unified, total percept - a part. no doubt. m a non·mdependent, sense - which gives our judgement its specific basis. without thereby ing the true carrier of its meaning, as the possibility of eliminatiq has just shown us. We must accordingly say: This 'expression' ofa percept - more phrased, of a perceived thing as such - is no affair of the sound of of certain expressi\'e acts, ;Expression' in this contex.t means ~ sion informed with its full sense. which is here put In a ce~ perception, through which relation the lalter is in its tum said to pressed'. This means, at the same time. that between percep~ aDd words another act (or pattern of acts) is intercalated. I call It an -.: the expressive experience, whether or not accompanied, by a ~~ has an intentional direction to something objective. This medlaliDl be the true giver of meaning, must pertain to the signi.fica~t1y f expression as its essential constitue?t: and m,ust det~rmme Its po...... an identical sense. whether or not thiS IS associated With a confirmiDI The rest of our investigation will show ever more clearly that our tion is workable,

§5 Continuation. Perception as an act. which determines meaning. without embodYing It We can go no further without discussing a doubt which cro.ps up point. Our treutment seems to demand a definite narro":'lOg appears to cover mor~ than cun be fully juslified, If pcrcePtl~~: it stitutes the full mealllng of a statement grounded on pcTCCP .' . . to t h·IS meamn~, . nonetheless to make a conlnbutlon an d to, do so In the sort just dealt with, This will become clearer If we slightly m

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

197

----------=---_--:...-~=~

Ie and instead of speaking quite indefinitely of a blackbird, proceed e.tJIIlP k'o f rhis blackbird, This' is an essentially occasional expression which IOspeabeComes fully significant when we have regard to the circumstances on.l~tterance, in I.his c~se to an ~clu~lIy perfornloo percept. The perceived ~ject. as it i~ given m perc~ptlon. IS what th~ w~rd 'this' signifies. The I Icnse m the grammatic form of a verb IIkeWlse expresses a relation ~al is actually present, and so again to perception, Plainly the same ~ of our orig!nal. example: ~o sa,y 'There flies a blackbird' is not to say that some blackbird 10 general IS f1ymg by, but that a blackbird is flying by het't aod now. It is clear. of course. that the meaning in question is not attached to the ,..ord·sound of 'this': it does not belong among the meanings firmly and ~Iy bound up wi~h this word. ".'e must, howe\'er. allow that the sense of_ unified statement IS 10 be found 10 the total act of meaning which in a Ji''eO case underlies it - whether or not this may be completely expressed through the universal meanings of its words. It seems. therefore. that we must allow that perception contributes to Ihe significant content of a judgemmL in all cases where such perceplion gives intuitive presence to the fact 10 Vo'hich our statement gives judgemental expression. It is of course a contribution that can perhaps also be made by other acts. in an essentially similar manner, The listener does not perceive the garden. but he is perhaps acquainted with it. has an intuitive idea of it. places the imagined blackbird and, reponed event in it. and so, through the mere picture-work of fantasy. acbie'.~ an understanding which follows the inlention and which agrees in sense with the speaker·s.

be~ situation pennits. however. of another reading. Intuition may indeed in ~O~-ed to conlribute t? the meaning of a perceptual stalement. but only ob..iect ~nse that th.e meanmg co.uld ~?t ac~uire a determinate relation to the the· I~ .means without some mtultlve ald. But this does not imply that

ha,,.mtultlVe ~ct is itself a carrier of meaning, or that it really makes conrriIOns to thIS mea . ·' of'th nmg. contn' b utlons {tiscol'era h'Ie among the constituents I ':Omple~ed meaning, Genuinely occasional expressions have no doubt eietne nJ~g WhIch varies from case to "Ise, but in ull such changes a common nt IS left Over. wh·IC h d·· .h · am b·· equiv· Istmguls es,iIe" tgulty from Ihal of a casual Cleatlon 1 Th dd·· r· .. eItrnentofme
me:

i;' ,

t

198

HeOining-intention Oind meOining-fulfilment

Elements of Oi phenom enolOli ul elucidu ion of knowle dle

reference. ami in il alone. our meaning resides. Withou t a percept _ correspondingly functioning act - the pointing would be empty or. definite differentiation. impossible in the concrete. For of coune t~· minate thought of the speaker as pointing 10 something - which the may entertain before he knows I\·/lat object we wish to indicate by oar - is not the thought we enact in the actual pointing. with which the minate thought of the thing pointed to has been merely associated. ' should not confuse the general charact er of actual pointing as such g. pointin indefinite presentation of 'a certain ' act of ng ormy .Percept~on a~co~dingly r~ali:es t.he possibi lity.of an unfoldi paper this to e.g. object, thls-meamng With Its defimte relation to the . me.... this ute constit my eyes. But it does nol. on our view, itself even part of it. In so far as the act-character of a pointing act is oriented to in achieves a definiteness of intention which fulfils itself in intuition, in ance with a general feature of acts which may be called their essenu . For a pointing reference remains the same, whichever multitude of mutually belonging percepts may underlie it, in aD 01 the same, and recogni:ably the same. object appears. The meanina is again the same when, instead of a percept. some act from our imaginative presentation is substituted for it. an act presentiDJ object through a picture in a recognizably identical manner. II however. when intuitions from other perceptual or imaginative substituted. We are once more referring to a this, but the general of the reference which obtains here. that of direct, attributively aiming at an object. is otherwise differentiated: the intention to object attaches to it. just as physical pointing becomes spatially with each change in sp'llial direction. We hold. therefore, that perception is 0/1 act which determiM$, by the fact that IIO! embody meaning. This view is confirmed and understood used be occasional expressions like 'this' can often n to an intentio the an approp riate intuitive foundation. Once and revived be can it been formed on a suitable intuitive basis, , i".__or ion percept of act suitable a of reproduced withollt the help proper like much ngly accordi are Genuinely occasional expressions in so far as the latter function with their authentic meaning. For a name also names an object 'directly'. It refers to it. not attributively, bearer of these or those properties. but without such 'conceptual' as what it itself is. just as perception might set it before our meaning of a proper name lies accordingly in a direct refere object. a reference that perception only fulfils, as imagination d~ sionally and illustratively, but which is not identical with these intul .. the wa It is just in this manne r that perception gives an object to C:" refereOC our ion): percept e possibl of objects to directed is (where it

199

. ut·IS not perception itself, And naturally the ion,b -ed-in percept· Uifill , ~aming expressions has an intuitive origin. dlr~tly o.f IS ~ ing of both .types ns first orient themselves towards an mtentlo nammg IJ)CllII which their :fvidual object. In oth~r ~es~t.s they are different, As 'this' is infected and . h the thought of a POinting, It Imports (as we showed) a medialion · 'Joml a bs ent from the proper name. The proper "" mplicatiol1. .I.e. a pecuIlar also belongs as a fix~ a~pellation to its object: to this constant pertinobject. ence correspon~s somethmg m the ma~ner of its relation to thatname, as by thing or person a g knowm our of fact the III 1his is shown We something called so-and-so: I k~ow Hans as Hans, Berlin as Berlin. names ba\'C, in our treatment, no doubt Ignored the case of all those proper once have .,..bich are significam in deril'Dtil'e fashion. When proper names gil'e which ns been formed in direct application (and so on a basis of intuitio itself called', things to us). we, can, by employing the concept of 'being names to formed by reflection on the use of proper names, give proper objects such objects. or take cognizance of their proper names, even though tly as indirec are not directly given or known to us, but are only described has (i.e. the bearers of certain properties, The capital of Spain, e.g.. is called Madrid town the the proper name) ·Madri d'. A person unacquainted with name !tself, thereby achieves both knowledge of its name and the power to d'. 'Madri word the g of II correctly, and yet not thereby the individual meanin could city the of IMead of the direct reference. which only an actual seeing operat~use, he must make do with an indirect pointing to this reference. 'being of tion mg thrOUgh characteristic ideas of properties and the concep called' such and such. . If we may trust our arguments, we must not only draw a general djstincin the statement of bon be~ween the perceptual and the significant element itself. ~:n : w~ ~ust also locate "~ port of the meaning in the percept of the way by which. iw4 pc pI. II/l1eh presefllS the object. and the stalemellt ent) judgem the of I~lent (or by the thought-act inwoven into the unity , in the case of the and expre.r.r.es it. mllst be rigorollsly kept apart, even though other in each to ~ ~tual Judgement fnow being considered. they stand . 0 mutual eoit/cit/elfee. or in the unity offulfilmenL mOSt lOtimat ere]atlon We itltUitive O~d not dwell on the fact that a like result applies also to other nts which. in a sense analO&ous t JUdgem~nts. and thus also to stateme . .. e . d gements. 'express ' the mtUltlv app]·les I0 perceptua ] JU whIch o that ~tent f ' o an lmaginalion, a remembering, an expectation etc.

::e

. . .. Addendum. In h t e expositIOn of §26 of Investigation I we began with the ~ta d' ing' (0I:eige ~ Ing of the hearer, and drew a distinction between the 'indicat occally essentia an of g meanin igte) t') and the 'indicat ed' (ange:e tional

t;

in .... h~ rnPresslon and, in particular, of the word 'this', For the hearer, is out point to wish we that thing the Ptrhaps Otnenlary field of vision : aroused first at is t though general tely indefini this OOt present. only

200

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

~n~e~hing is bein.g ~intcd o,ut. Only ~hen a presentat~on

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

is

adcIett

mtUltlVe presentation If the thmg dealt With demands an mtuitive ' out). is a definite reference constituted for him. and so a fUll, • meaning for the demonstr.uive ~ronou.n. For the spea.ker there is .. sequence: he has no need of the mdefimtely referential Idea whicb Ii as 'index' for the hearer. ot the idea of an indication, but an . itself. is given in his case, and it is eQ ipso detemlinately directed from the first the speaker enjoys the 'indicated' meaning, and en~' presentative intention immediately oriented towards intuition. If the meant cannot be intuitively picked out, as in a reference to a th mathematical proof, the conceptual thought in question plays the an intuition: the indicative intuition could derive fulfilment from IQ re-Iiving of this past thought. In each case we observe a duplidly indicative intention: the character of the indication seems in the espouse the directly objective intention, as a result of which we have. tion directed upon a definite object that we are intuiting here and other case does not differ. If the previous conceptual thought is being performed, an intention which corresponds to it survives ill this attaches itself to the act-character of the indication, thereby definiteness of direction. What we have just said about indicating and indicated meanbr6 111'0 meanings. It can mean (I) the two mutually resolving tbo. . . . characterize the hearer's successive understanding: first tbe iind"'~ idea of something or other referred to by 'this', then the act of directed indication into which a completing presentation transfo the latter act we have the indicated, in the former the indicatin. (2) If we confine ourselves to the complete, definitely directed . which the speaker has from the beginning, we can again see double about it: tbe gener,tl character of indication as such, and till which determines tbis, which narrows it down to an indication of there', The former can again be called an indicating meaning, or indicating element in the indissoluble unity of meaning, in so far what the hearer can immediately grasp by virtue of its expressive and can use to indicate what is referred to. If I say 'thi~', the hearer01 knows that something is being pointed at. (Just so 10 the case. essentially occasional expressions. If I say 'here', I have to do Willa thing in my nearer or further spatial environment, etc.) On the,otblr the true aim of my talk lies not in this general element, but 10 !be intending of the object in question. :~wards .it and its f~lness of rdI am direcled. and these empty generalities do hllie or nothlOg towa , mining the latter. In Ihis sense a direct intention is the primary. meaning. ,. This second diSlinclion is Ihe one laid down by our defiD1tl~ previous exposilion. (1m'. I. §26). The dislinclions achieved in tluJ

m.

201

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r much clearer treatment. will probably have helped towards a furof this difficult mailer.

:=. ~~rifi('-dlion

6 The static unity of exp,.essive thought and § ressed intuition. Recognition (dos Erkennen)

.xP

Vie shall n~w a?~orb ourselves in a closer investigation.ofthe relations holding among 101Ultive acts, on the one hand. and expresSive acts, on the other. Wc shall confine ourselves, in the present section entirely, to the range of the siiTlplest possible cases, and so naturally to expressions and significant intentions which belong to the sphere of naming, We shall make, for the rest, no claim to treal this field exhaustively, We are concerned with nominal expressions, which refer themselves in the most perspicuous of possible fashions to 'corresponding' percepts and other forms of intuition, Let us first glance in this field at a relalionship of static union, where a ~gMng lhought has based ilself on inwition, and is lhereby relalt'd to ils

obj«t, I speak. e.g.. of my inkpol, and my inkpot also stands before me: I

see it. The name names the object of my percept, and is enabled to name it by the significant act which expresses its character and its form in the form oftbe name. The relation between name and thing named, has, in this state of union, a certain (/escriplil'e characler_ that we previously noticed: the IWnC 'my inkpoC seems to ol'erlay the perceived object, to belong sensibly 10 .it. '!'his belonging is of a peculiar kind. The words do not belong to the objeCtive context of physical thinghood that they express: in this context they h.ave no place. they are not referred to as something in or attaching to the thmgs that they name, If we lurn to the experiences involved. we have. on the one hand. as said before,J the acts in which the words appear on the Other lb Simi - -) ar acts " , the hand , e m which the thmgs appear. As 'regards ~lter. ~he inkpot confronts us in perception. Following our repeated ~ nstratlon of the descriptive essence of perception, this means no more oru:menologically then that we undergo a certain sequence of experiences info class of sensat!ons, sensuously unified in a peculiar serial pattern, and ~ by. a certam act-character of 'interpretation' (Auffassung), which fact thatl~:lth.~n ~bject!v~ sense. !his act-chamcter is responsible for the ObJUl, I.e, thiS mkpot. IS perceptually apparent to us. In similar 'tshio itnagi n. ~he appearing word is constituted for us in an act of perception or native presentation, Not Word I· . "bich th '~'1( Lnk~ol. therefore. but the act-experiences just described, in 'NOrd a ~y. make their appearance, are here brought into relation: in these ques:tio~ ~nkpot appear, while yet being nothing whatever ill the acts in ~r' ut how does this happen? What brings these acts inlo unity? The by acts se;ms c1~ar. The relation. as one of naming. is mediated. not merely IJso aets° o;:eaOl~g. b.ut by acts of ~ogni~ion ,(Erkel/lien), which are here lussificutlOlI, The perceIved ob)C'C1 IS recoglli=ed for an ink pot.

I

202

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Meaning.intentlon and meanlng,fulfilment

203

----------"---=:.::.::.:.::::..=====--.::::

known as one, and in so far as. the act of meanin~ ~s most intimately 0Iat an act of classification, and thIs latter, as recogmtlon of the perceiVCd is again intimately one with the act of perception. the expression 5eeIba applied to the thing and to clothe it like a gannent, Ordinarily we speak of recognizing and classifying the object of tion. as if our act busied itself with this object. But we have seen tbIt is no object in the experience, only a perception, a thus and lb. minate mindedness (Zumlltesein): the recognitil't' act in the ex~ accordingly base iuelf on the act of perception. One must not of misunderstand the matter. and raise the objection that we are • matter as if perception was classified rather than its object. We doing this at all, Such a performance would involve acts of a quite . much more complex constitution, expressible through expressioal responding complexity. e.g. 'the perception of the inkpot'. It follows recognitive experience of this thing as 'my inkpot'. is nothing but. tion which. in a definite and direct fashion. fuses an expressive on the one hand. with the relevant percept. on the other, The same holds of cases in which picture-presentations serve ill. percepts. The imaginatively apparent object. e.~, the i~entical ' memory or in fancy. is felt to bear the expressIOn which Ramel means. phenomenologically speaking. that a recognitive act in an expressive experience is so related to a~ ~maginativ~ act,,:. objective parlance, spoken of as the recogmtlon of an '~~h sented object as. e,g., our inkpol. The imagined object, too, .IS a ing in our presentation of it. our experience is rather a certato blend 01 fancied sensations informed by a certain interpretative act< live through this a~t. and to have an imaginative presentation of" are one and the same, If we therefore express the situation in ~ have before me an image, the image of an inkpot', we have plainlY nell' acts with our expressions and. in particular, a recogniti)-e ac:t intimately one with our act of imagining.

U:.:,"=

§7 Recognition as a character of acts. and the 'generality of words' The following more exact argument would seem to show con~lusi in all cases where a name is applied to a thing intuitiv~IY. gIVen. presume the presence of a recognitive act-character mediating lett appearance of the word-sounds. on the o~e hand (or the comp _ informed word), lind the intuition of the thmg on the othe~, o?e ~ of the generality of words. and usually understands by th~S. high Y ous phrase that a word is not bound to an individual intUItion, but rather to an endless array of possible intuitions. In what. however, does this belonging consist?

uS deal with an extremely simple example, that of the name 'red'. In it names an appearing object ~s r~, it ,belongs to this object in 5?\1rt Ue of the moment of red that appears m thiS object. And each obiect that . . Ir· . , beats a moment 0 r I·k I e sort In Itse •Justifies the same appellation: the same roe belongs !O each, and does so by way of an identical sense. piBut in what does this appellation by way of an identical sense consist? We observe first thai the wo~d does not attach externally, and merely thftlugh hidd:n n:'~ntal m~hamsms, to the individual. specifically similar (tllits of our mtUltlons, It IS not enough. manifestly. to acknowledge the batt fact thaL wherever such and such an individual trait appears in our intuition. Ihe word also accompanies it as a mere pattern of sound. A mere COOCOrnitance. a mere external going with or following on one another would DOt forge any internal bond among them. and certainly not an intentional hood, Yet plainly we have here such an intentional bond, and one of quite peculiar phenomenological eharucter. The word calls the red thing red. The red appearing before us is what is referred to by the name. and is referred to IS 'mJ', In this mode of naming reference. the name appears as belonging 10 the oamed and as one with it. On the other hand. however, the word has its sense quite apart from an ~1~nt.1O Ihis, intuitio,n, and without attachment to any 'corresponding' IIltwUOn. Smce this sense IS everywhere the same, it is plain that it is not the ~ phoneme, ralher the true, complete word. endowed on all occasions .llb. the conslant character of its sense, that must be held to underlie the ~g relalion. Even then it will not be enough to describe Ihe union of tneaningful word and corresponding intuilion in terms of mere concomitance. T~e the word, present in consciousness and understood as a mere =~ ~tho.u,t being. act.ually used 10 name anything. and set the corresteaJo g intUition besIde II: Ihese two phenomena may at once, for genetic Theirns, be brought together in the phenomenological unity of naming. &fit ~~re t~getherness is. however. not as yet Ihis unity, which groll's out trntr'Wit plam novelty. It is conceivable. a priori. that no such unity should ge, that the c ' h disjoined ~xlstent p enomena should be phenomenologically by lh e ,th?t the object before us should not be the Ihing meant or named . , nmeaningful wo rd ,an d t h·.It t he wor d should not belong 10 the object "Its Phe arne. and so name it. , nomenologic'a II y we filo d be'lore us no mere aggregate. but an intimate IJl fact int. II en tIona] 't . h ' ,P the Co ] . Ull] y: we can fig tly say that the two aCIS, the one seHing mp 1 ete word, and the other the thing. are intentionally combined 111 Single "'th equ I III/It)' or I Wh at here I·les before us can be naturally described, 'J ac , I~. a Correctness .. h· h .. "lill the rib' ,b y S.IYlOg I at t e name r('(/ ml/s 'he abjeci red or /.1., C( Q 'jei" is . . 1('. . '''Il rteog . , re(ugm=e( ,mown) liS reli. (/1/(1 cal/e(1 'red' liS (/ reslIl, or '!t'"h nll/ol/ To 'c'll h· ed·· ..... pres . a somet 109 r - m the fully actual sense of'calling', 'iZe uPPOSC~ an underlying intuition of Ihe thing so called _ and to somCthlOg as re d· . are .m rea I·Ity s}'Iumylllous expressions: they

~~ as

2()4

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

only differ in so far as the latter brings out more clearly that we ba_ no mere duality. but a unity engineered by a single act-eharaeter. intimacy of this fusion. we must nonetheless admit. the variOQl implicit in our unity - the physical word-phenomenon with its meaning. the aspect of recognition and the intuiting of what one ......... not separate themselves off clearly. but our discussion compels US Ie sume them all to be there. We shall have more to say on this point It is plain that the recognitive character of certain acts, which Biwa their significant relation to objccts of intuition. does not pertain to noises. but to words in their meaningful, their ,f{'II11lfUic (bedeutun,go"'lIIi essence. Very different verbal sounds. e.g. the 'same' word in difli guages. may involve an identical recognitive relation: tbe object i, known for the same, though with the aid of quite different noises. the complete recognition of something red. being equivalent to the used name. must include the noise 'red' as a part. The memben of speech-communities feel different verbal sounds to be fitting. aad . these in the unity of 'knowing something'. But the meaning attachiaa words, and the recognitive act actually attaching this meaning to its remains everywhere the same. so that these verbal differences are regarded as irrelevant. The 'generality of the word' means, therefore, that the uni6cd one and the same word covers (or, in the case of a nonsense-word., to cover) an ideally delimited manifold of possible intuitions, each 01 could serve as the basis for an act of recognitive naming endowed same sense. To the word 'red', e.g.. corresponds the possibilitY knowing as. and calling 'red', all red objects that might be given in intuitions. This possibility leads on. with an 1I priori guarantee. to ther possibility of becoming aware, through an identifying s)"IdtnII such naming recognitions, of a sameness of meaning of one with ~ this A is red. and that A is the same. i.e. also red: the two intuited belong under the same ·concept'. A dubious point emerges here. We said above that a word could be stood even if not actually used to name anything. Must we not, ho~ that a word must at least have the possibility of functioning as the aaUIl of something and so of achieving an actual recognitive relat.io,n, to. ponding intuition? Must we not say that without such a ~~~blhty d not be a word at all? The answer, of course. is that this POSSIbIlity d . the possibility of the recognitions, the 'knowillgs', in question . Not ~I knowing is possible, not illl nominal meilning can be re(lll=ed. I , names milY be names. but they can~ot at'/lI(ll/y be ~sed to name ~n . , have. properly speaking. no e.x.~enslon. t~ey. are wuhout gen~ra/lty~bCJ'lf oflhl' possible ond lhe lrue. TheIr generality IS emply pretensIOn. Bu last fonns of speech arc themselves to be made clear. what pheno facts lie behind them. will be a matter for further investigation.

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

a~pli~

205

~uch

- ; : : : have said to a/J expressions, and not merely to as enerdlity of meamng In the manner of a cJass-concepl. It applies also b,I\'t gress ions having indil'idllal reference. such as proper names. The fact to ~Pn of as the 'generality of verbal meaning' does not point to the genSPOit~ accorded 10 g~neric:, a~ opposed to individu~I,concepts, but..on. the traI ra r),. embraces eIther mdlfferently. The ·recognltlOn·. the 'knowmg. of ~~h we spe~k. ~~en a significantly functioning e.xpression encounters corresponding mtu.ltlon, mus.t no.t,. therefore, ~ ~ncelved as an actual ~/as­ ijico tion . the rangmg of an intUitIvely or cogltatlvely presented objcct 10 a s/(lS$, a ranging nl."Cessarily based on general concepts ilnd verbally mediated ~y general names. Proper names. too, have their generality, though, when actually used to name anything. they can eo ipso not be said to classify it. Proper names. like other names. cannot name anything. without thereby a\sO 'knowing' it. That their relation to corresponding intuition is, in fact. as indirect as that of any other expression. can be shown by a treatment exactly analogous to the one conducted above. Each and every name obviously belongs to no definite percept. nor to a definite imagination nor to any other pictorial illustration, The same person can make his appearance in countless possible intuitions, and all these appearances have no merely intuitive but also a recognitive unity. Each appearance from such an intuitive manifold will justify a precisely synonymous use of the proper name. Whichevtr appearance is given. the man using the name means one and the same person or thing, And he means this not merely in being intuitively oriented to it, as when he deals with an object personally strange to him; he knows it as this definite person or thing. He knows Hans as HailS, Berlin as Berlin. ~o recognize a person as this person. or a city as this city. is again an act not ~ t~ the particular sensuous content of this or that word·appeamnce. It is ~tlCally the same act in the case of a variety (in possibility of an infinite Yanety) of verbal noises. as. e.g.. when several different proper names apply to ~ same thing. This generality of the proper name. and of the peculiar meaning which ~nds to it. is plainly quite different in kind from that of the general

to The: fO~er consists in the fact that a synthesis of possible intuitions belongs

~sl1fgle Individuill object. intuitions made one by the common intentional

tna~~:~e~Olpar.ted by eve.ry ~e~iltion ~o t~e. same object: des~ite all ph,enomcnces ;lInong mdlvldual mtullions. On thiS Unified baSIS, the "" k nowmg " reposes. which belongs to the 'gentralitleu ar unit Y 0 r recognitIve Ilan" I

'Nay I~ of Ver?al meaning'. to its range of ideillly possible reaIi7.ations. In Ihis lnt1J.i!i e naOlmg word has a recognitive relation to a boundless multitude of Ons Who se "d " I 0 b"~ect It " both knows and thereby names. 1'b~' I enllca Of 0/)' Case of the cJas,NUWU! is quite different. Its generality covers a range ~~:ts, I~ each of which. collsidered lI/Hm. a possible synthesis of per, POSSible individual meaning and proper name belongs. The general

1

206

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

name 'covers' this range through being able to name each item in the range in general fashion. i.e. not by individually recognizing it in the of the proper name, but by classifying it. in the manner of the cotnrnoD The thing that is either directly given. or known in its authentic self. (Eigenheit). or known through its properties. is now known as an A named accordingly.

§8 The dynamic unity of expression and expresse" intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity

eIi"

From the tranquil. as it were SUI/ic coincidence of meaning and iot .. now turn to that dynamic coincidence where an expression first f".. merely symbolic fashion. and then is accompanied by a 'more or lea' ponding intuition. Where this happens. we experience a descriptively consciOllsness of fll/fitmenr: 4 the act of pure meaning, like a g intention. finds its fulfilment in the act which renders the matter . In this transitional experience. the m"wat betongingness of tbe cwo act of meaning, on the one hand. and the intuition which more or responds to it. on the other. reveals its phenomenological roots. We ence how the ,mme objective item which was 'merely thought of' in is now presented in intuition. and that it is intuited as being p . detenninate so-and-so that it was at first merely thought or meant to are merely expressing the same fact if we say that the intentioNJI the act of intllition gets more or less perf«t1y fitted into tM semmtnc of the oct of expression.

.

In the previously considered static relation among acts of intuition. we spoke of a recognition. a knowing. This represents the informed relation of the name to the intuitive datum that it namct. elcment of meaning is nOI here itself the act of recognition. In tbe symbolic understanding of a word. an act of mcaning is performed word means something to us) but nothing is thereby known, The difference lies. as the foregoing paragraphs have established, DOC mere accompanying presence of the intuition of the thing n~ the phenomenologically peculiar fonn of unity. What is characteriJUC this unity of knowing, of r«ognition. is now shown up by .the d . relationship before liS. In it therc is at first the mcaning·intentlo n, q its own: thcn the corresponding intuition comes to join il. At the same we have the phenomenological unity which is now stamped as a co ness of fulfilment. Talk about recogniz.ing objects. and talk about (i meaning-intention. therefore express the same fact. merely from l. standpoints. The fonner adopts the standpoint of the object .meantil' the laller has the two acts as its foci of in teres I. Phenomenolo~icaIlY,. are always present. while the obje<:ts are sometimes non-elUstent.

--

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

207

Iment therefore cha~cteriz.~ the p.henom.en~~ogical essence of t~e reeog·

f~, relation more sausfactonly. It IS a pnmltl\'e phenomenologIcal fact.

IIl U\e ctS of signification) and acts of intuition can enter into this peculiar t tba '~n Where they do so. where some act of meaning-intention fulfils itself . ,. IS' k nown through its ·reJ!lU intuition. we a Iso say:' The 0 b"~ect 0 r .intuItion ::~p( ~r 'The correct name has been applied to the object appearing

before us . . .. . . We can readily do Justice to the obVIOUS phenomenological difference betv,cc n the static and the dynamic fulfilment or recognition. In the dynamic relationship the members of the relation. and the act of recognition which relates them. are disjoined in timc: they unfold themselves in a temporal pauem, In the stalic ~elationship. whi,ch represents the lasti~g outcome of this temporal transactIon, they occur In temporal and materml (sm:hlicher) coincidence. There we have a first stage of mcre thought (of pure conception or mere signification). a meaning-intention wholly unsatisfied. to which a second stage of more or less adequate fulfilment is added. where thoughts repose as if satisfied in the sight of their obje<:t. which presents itself. in firM a/this conseiousness of unity, as what is thought of in this thought. what it refers to. as the more or less perf«t1y attained goal of thinking. In the static relationship, on the other hand. we have this consciousness or unity alone. perhaps with no noticeably marked-off. precedent stage of unfulfilled intcntion, The fulfilment of the intention is not here an event of self-fulfilment. but a trunquil state of being-fulfilled. not a coming into coincidence. but a being coincident. · Fr?m an objective point of view we may here also speak of a unily of idmmy. If we compare both components of a unity of fulfilment - whether Irtating them in dynamic transition into one another. or holding thcm ~part analytically in their static unity, only to see them at once nowing back m.to one another _ we assert their objec/il'e idemiry. For we said. and said ~th self-evidence, that the object of intuition is the SlI/fle as the object of · e thought which fulfils itself in it and. where the fit is exact. that thc obj«t ~seen as. being exactly the same as it is thought of or (what always says thr: same In this context) meant. Identity. it is plain. is not first dragged in ~lIgh compar"oJtive. cogitatively mediated ren«tion: it is there from the "'ord as experience. as unexpressed. unconceptualized experience. In other enol s'. the thing which. from the point of view of our acts is phenomt...o :t~~I}' ~escribed .as ,fulfilnu:nt. .will als? from the point of view of the though~ ts Involved In It. the intUited object. on the one hand. and the 'cotlSci t obJcct. on the other. be expressively styled 'cxperience of identity'. N.... OUsness or"d "" or 'act 0 r"d"fi" ......le 'tk I cntily. I enll lcallon ", A morc or 1ess com~, I w y is the objUtil't' {t"rllm II'hich corrl'spOlu/s /0 Ihe {ICI offilljitirlt\lj;io Ich 'appears in it'. This means thai. not only signification and ~Ied n. bUI also their mutual adequation. their union of fulfilmenl. can be an act. since it has its own peculiar inlentional correlate. an objective

;.tit

208

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Meaning-Intention and meaning-fulfilment

something to which it is ·directed·. Another side of the same Ii again, we saw above. expressed in talk about recogni=ing or fact that our meaning-intention is united with intuition in a f~ nero gives to the object which appears in such intuition. when it . concerns us. the character of a thing known. If we try to say more 'as what' we recognize something. our objective reflection POints. our act of meaning (Bedel/tens). but to the meaning (Bedeutung), identical 'concept' itself: talk of recognition therefore expresses our the same unified state from the standpoint of the object of intuitioa the fulfilling act). in its relations to the meaning-eoncept of the si Conversely we say. though perhaps in more special contexts, that our 'grasps' (begreife) the malter. that it is the latter's concept ( 'grasp'. After our exposition it is obvious that recognition,like Ii the former is in fact only another name for the latter - can be caDell of identification.

k".".....

Addendum. I cannot here suppress a difficulty connected with the

illuminating notion of the unity of identity or recognition, U • identification or recognition, This is particularly the case, since cuhy will reveal itself as a serious one as our clarifications progress, and will inspire fruitful discussions. Closer analysis mabI that. in the cases detailed above. where a name is actually a . object of intuition, we refer to the intuited and named object, but illelltily of this object. as something at once intuited and named. say that an emphasis of attention decides the matter? Or oulJbt rather to grant that there is not here a fully constituted act of id . the nucleus of this act. the connective union of significant in corresponding intuition is really present but it 'represents' no interpretation (Auffassl/ng). On the experienced unity of c:oo~·:::; act of relational identification is founded. no intentional con . identity. in which identity. as a unity referred to. first gains objectiW In our reflection on the unity of fulfilment. in analysing and mutually connected acts. we naturally. and indeed necessarily, ~ that relational interpretation which the form of its union, Wl~. necessity. permits. Our second section will deal with this questiOll widest form which concerns the categorial characters of acts (see §48. and the whole of Chapter VII). Meanwhile we shall continue to sort of unity in question as a full act. or we shall at least not ditto expressly from a full act. This will not affect the essential ~tD~ treatment. in so far as the passage from a consciousness of uOlty t tional identification always remains open. has a possibility gu priori. so that we are entitled to say that an identifying coincide.nee . f!xperimced. even if there is no consciollS intention directed to Ideo no relmiOll{l1 identification.

209

~fering

character of an intention inside and .' 11d~ the unity of fulfilment o"U: . roduction of dynamic fulfilment. or of fulfilment strung out in an ~ In: ted process. to help interpret the static act of recognition. removes a ~ Iy which threatens to blur our clear grasp of the relation between ~nt intention and the full act of recognition. Can we really say that Slgn..._ factors can be distinguished in the unity of recognition. the verbal · andlOtUltlon · · . an d ..fi nally. the overarching aall turession.lhe aCls.~r mea?lOg racter of recog llltlVe ul1lty or fulfilment? One might hold that analysis c ~y lays bare lwhal expressiom,", particularly names, on the one hand, and ?~uition. on the other. both unified through the character of recognitive One might reject the idea of an act of meaning bound up with the \'tl'ba1 expression. an element distinct from recognitive character and fulfilling intuition. and identifiable with the 'understanding' as opposed to the 'knoWing' character of the expression: this would seem. at least. to be an QIIlYttssary assumption. This doubt affects. therefore. the central conception which in §4 we took to be most intelligible. before we embarked on our analysis of the unity of recognition. We must accordingly re-emphasize the following points in our ditcussion: I. If we compare expressions used in recognizing objects with those used outside of such recognition. it is plain that both have the very same ~ning. Whether I understand the word 'tree' as a mere symbol, or use it III connection with my intuition of a tree. it is plain that I mean something by the word. and mean the same thing on both occasions. 'fi 1 I~ ~ plai.n that it is the significant intention of the expression that ~fils I~self In the process of fulfilment. and so achieves 'coincidence' 0( ~n .lOtuitio.n.. and that the recognition which stems from this process 0( ~dence IS I~self !his unity of coincidence. The notion of this unity \idedC'.Ol.Dcid~ce plainly Involves that we are not here concerned with a di· ~ __ dd uaht y but with a seamless unity. which only acquires aniculation ~UQ1 ra.....n '. tlleani . O~t In time. We must. therefore. maintain that the same act of Part ng-Intentlon which occurs in an empty symbolic presentation is also "u ,~f t?e. complex act of recognition. but that a meaning-intention that is I() ; : ••IS now 'bound' and 'neutralized' in the stage of coincidence. It tetnao!" uharly inwrought and infused in this combination that. while its Ie essence .. . h I or~aracter rcm:lIllS IOtact. It nonet cess undergoes a certain change

t

:UUng.

same h ld III tl.·'. cOnn· 0 s wherever contents ;Irc first studied apart. and then seen . ectlOn with ?ther contents. a~ parts knit into wholes. Connceould ~ih h not conncct If they made no difference to what they connected. ~~ anges necessarily occur. and these are naturdlly such specific nesses as constitute the phenomenological correlatives of what • 'lit

lin....Iq. ":""lI .....

210

Elements of a phenomenological eluc.idation of knowledge

are objectively rela/iollal properties. Consider, for example, a line let perhaps on a bare white background, and the same line as pan or a In the latter case. it impi~gl's,On other Iin~.. js lOu~"e~, cut by"we tum from mathematical Ideals to emplncally mtUlted linear these are phenomenological characters that help determine the of linearity. The same stretch - 'same' in internal content - app.... different according as it enters into this or that phenomenal conte:u. incorporated in a line or surface qualitatively identical with it. IDdII tinguishably into this background, losing its phenomenal !lei""...... independence.

§ I 0 The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment We may now further characterize the consciousness of fulfilment br in it an experiential form which plays a part in many otber fiekb at life. We have only 10 think of the opposition between wishful • and wish~fulfilment. between voluntary intention and execution, 01 filment of hopes and fears. the resolution of doubts, the co surmises etc.. to be clear that essentially the same opposition is to in very different classes of intentional experiences: the oppositiOD significant intention and fulfilment of meaning is merely a special We have dealt with this point previously,' and delimited a class of' experience under the more pregnant name of 'intentions': their lies in being able to provide the basis for relations of fulfilment. In are ranged all the acts which are in a narrower or wider seue including the intuiti)'e. whose role it is to fulfil other intuitions in When. e.g.. a familiar melody begins, it stirs up definite iDtea~ find their fulfilment in the melody's gradual unfolding. The same· even when the melody is unfamiliar. The regularities goveminl as such. determine intentions. which may be lacking in compkte defmiteness. but which nonetheless find or can find their f • concrete experiences. these intentions are of course fully definite: the . iteness' of what they intend i~ plainly ~ descriptive peculiarity . did their character. We may say. m fact. with correct paradox (as \\e in a similar case) that 'indefiniteness' (i.e. the peculiarity of d~ incompletely determined completion. which lies in a 'sphere' CI~ by a law) is a definite feature of such an intention. Such an intenUoO merely a range of possible fulfilment. but imports a common f character into each actual fulfilment from this rangc. The fulfilmeo~ which have definite or indefinite intentions is phenomenologicallY and the same holds of fulfilments of intentions whose indefinitepCSt ill this or that direction of possible fulfilmenl.

Meanlng.intention and meaning-fulfilment

211

----::-evious example there is also a relation between expectation l'fioljilll1/'"1 of expectation. It would. however, be quite wrong to think. and , ~l\'. that every relation of an intention to its fulfilment was a rela~iP invoh'ing expectation. In/ention is not expectancy. it is not of its to be directed to future appearances. If I see an incomplete pattern. ~!.his carpet panially covered over by furniture, the piece I see seems e.g. ~ with intentions pointing to further completions - we feel as if the : and coloured shapes g~ on 'in the sense' of what we see - but we expect pOlhing, It would be: poSSIble for. us to expec.t something, if movement mised us further views. But poSSible expectations. or occasions for poss: ; expectations. are not themselves expectations. I The external perceptions of the senses offer us an indefinite number of rdevant examples. The features which enter into perception always point to completing features, which themselves might appear in other possible peretpts, and that definitely or more or less indefinitely, according to the degree of our 'empirical acquaintance' with the object. Every percept, and every perceptual context, reveals itself. on closer analysis, as made up of components which are to be understood as ranged under two standpoints of intention and (actual or possible) fulfilment. The same applies to the parallel acts of imagining and picture-thought in general. In the normal case intentions lack the character of expectancy, they lack it in all cases of tranquil perceiving or picturing, and they acquire it only when perception is in flux. when it is spread out into a continuous series of percepts, all belonging to the perceptual manifold of one and the same object. Objectively put: the object theD ~1i itself from a variety of sides. What was pictorially suggested from one Iide, becomes confirmed in full perception from another; what was merely ~umbrated or given indirectly and subsidiarily as background, from one ~. at least receives a ~rtrait-sketch from another, it appears perspectivally ~rt~n.ed and ~roJ~t~. o~ly to appea.r 'just as it is' from. an?ther side. rllSCd~vlllg ~nd Ima8,'nmg IS. ?n our V1e~. a ~'eb of partial IOtentions, last. og~the~ m the unuy of a slllgle total mtentlon. The correlate of tbis (~~?tentlon IS the thing. while the correlate of its partial intentions are the Itio s parts mill moments. Only in this way can we understand how conIllta~~ess rea:hes out beyond what it actually experiences. It can so to say Yond Itself. and its meaning can be fulfilled,

Iii F or eli r~stration

and conflict. The synthesis stlnction In the wi ~t a ~er s~here of the acts to which distinctions of intention and fulfiltonlra;P y. jrllsrrm;on may be set beside fulfilment. as its incompatible tveo th~' The negative expression thai we normally use in this case. e.g. term ·non-fulfilment'. has no merely privative mcaning: it points to

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iI

phenomenologicill elucidiltlon of knowledge

Meaning-intention and mCiining-fulfilment

a new descriptive fact, a form of synthesis as peculiar as fulfilmenl so even in the narrower case of significant intentions as they stand to . intentions. The synthesis of recognition, of 'knowing', is the co,,,,,....,, of a certain agreement. The possibility correlated with agrtelnent it. ever, 'disagreement' or 'conftict': intuition may not accord with a' • intention, but may 'quarrel' with it. ConRict 'separates', but the of conRict puts things into relation and unity: it is a form of .r}'nt~ previously studied synthesis was one of identification, this new 'Y11l10111 one of distinction (unfortunately we possess no other positive ~). 'distinction' must not be confused with the other 'distinction' whicll opposed to a positive likening. The oppositions between 'identificetiaa distinction' and between 'likening and distinction' are not the same. it is clear thai a close phenomenological affinity explains our use of. . word. In the 'distinction' which is here in question, the object of trating act appears not the same as, 'distincl from the object of the . act. These distinctions poinl to wider classes of cases than we have preferred to deal with. Not only significative. but even intuitive ' are fulfilled in identifications and frustrated in confiicts. We shaD explore the whole question of the nalUral circumscription of tbe which the terms 'same' and 'other' (we can as well say 'is' and 'iJ application. The two syntheses are not, however, completely parallel. Eadl presupposes something which directs its intention to the object of flicting act: only a synthesis of fulfilment can give it this di~ we may say, presupposes a certain basis of agreement. If I think .4. when it shows itself to be 'in fact" green, an intention to red quarM intention to green in this showing forth. i.e. in this application to • Undeniably, however. this can only be the case because A fied in the two acts of signification and intuition. Were this ~ intention would not relate to the intuition. The total intention A which is red, and intuition reveals an A which is green..It is ~ cidence of meaning and intuition in their direction to an Iden.ticaI the moments intended in union with A in the two cases, come IOto The presumed red (i.e. red of A). fai.ls to agree with the intuit~ . . . through identity thai such non-comcldent aspects correspolldWl~ instead of being 'combined' by fulfilment. they are .. su~~ered by An intention is referred to an appropriate aspect in mtuluon froID is also turned away. ., . n What we have here said with s~ial regard 10 slgnlficant .:~y the frustrations they encounter. apphes also to our whole pre Vi • class of objectifying intentions. We may generally say: An i"t~ntlon. .. be frustrate(J in conflicl in so far as it forms parI of a wider '''.te".' completing porI is fit/filled. We can therefore not talk of conflict US of simple, i.e. isolated. acts.

ha:'--

213

~I

and partial Identification and distinction tl%th e common pheno"'!e?ological foundation~ of ,- d'cative and determining forms of expression p,e I rtlation belween intention (~n particular. meaning-intention) and ful1b' t that we ha\'e so far conSidered_ was that of total agreement. This : : : Wnitation due to our aim of maximum simplicity: to achieve this, bslt3.C1ed from all form. even from the fonn that announces itself in the .'e' - I th ' . to ~xtemal or internal intuititUe word ·is,.n e reiauon 0 r an expression tioO. we conSidered only t~o~ p~rts oft~e expressIOn that fit what we inluit lite a garment. But by bnngln~ m conDict as the possibility opposed to the case of total agreement - conRlct that could therefore. somewhat misleadingly, be called 'tolal conRict' - we are made aware of certain new possibilities. the important cases of partial agreement and disagreement between lUI intention and the act which fulfils or frustrates it. We shall, from the start. keep the closer treatment of these possibilities 50 general, that the validity of all essential results will be clear for intentions of the above indicated wider class, and not merely, therefore, for meaning-inten tions, . All conflict pointed to the fact that the frustrated intention in ques~ ~ ~rt of a more comprehensive intention. which partially fulfilled its."If(l.e.1O the supplementary parts) while the original part was estranged. Iu every conflict there is. accordingly. in a certain fashion, both partial IlRanent and partial conflict. Our auention to objective relations should 1lI\'e revealed these possibilities, since wherever we can talk of coincidence :~~k about the correlated possibilities of exclusion, inclusion -'-'lIon.

and

I~~~ kttp to the case of conRict, the following additional points suggest -lUXIVes:

e-'10 th . at 8'IS associated

. other . . With mtentlons FJ. "hole h are fulfilled. these latter need not be so united with 8, that the ,~ •••6h(9; '1; I . . . ) deserves to be called an act constituted on its own one ~-I" , o(tonsei .Ive. ~nd to whose unified object we 'pay heed'. In the texture ltIection ou:. IOtentlonal experience. there are many possibilities of pointing lIzlreaJiztd0 acts and aCI-complexes. which remain for the most part a(individ' And only such poinled unities are relevant when we are speaking ,.IOfl the......Ual acts and
e.

e.

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green'. (Of course this sentence does not have the same m~ sentence 'The verbal intention "green" is frustrated by the intuitioD, For the new expression renders objectil'e the relation of acts whicb us, and turns new meaning-intentions upon the latter in total Ii It can also be the case that a a (8: 11; I . . . ) enters syntbesis .. and is herewith either associated witb a corr:.sponding whole e (I; or specially associated with its isolated part 8. In the former caae part coincidence among the combined elements. i.e. among 1), I,. part total conflict. (8, 8). The whole synthesis has the character conflict. but of conflict not pure, but mixed. In the other case 8 out as the corresponding act, for the reason, perhaps, that in IIliut the unity ofa (8: ,.,:, ... ) is resolved. The special synthesis of e (9: ,.,: , ... ) and (8), which is appropriately expressed by obje<::t, the red-tiled roof) is not green'. This important relatiaa called one of exclusion (Ausscheidung). Its central character iI affected, when 8 and 8 are themselves complex. so that we can between pure and mixed exclusion. Roughly speaking, the illustrated by the example 'This (red-tiled roof) is no green-tiled Let us now consider the case of inclusion. An intention caD in an act which contains more tban its fulfilment needs, in • latter presents an object which contains the intention's object, common-or-garden part, or as a 'moment' explicitly or implicitly as belonging to it. We are of course ignoring the acts in comprehensive objective field is set up as an obje<::tive backgr0a4 delimited as unities nor as preferential carriers of attention: should be brought back to the synthesis of total coincidence. Let that a red-tiled roof is presented to us, and that the . behind the word 'red' is fulfilled in it. The verbal meaning is .... with complete coincidence in the intuited red, but the IOlal in red-tiled roof. relieved sharply as a single item from the backgro~ the work of attention, still enters into a peculiar sort of synthetIC the meaning-intention Red: '(This) is red'. We speak here of ~ 'subsumption' (Einordmmg), the opposite of the exclusion menU Subsumption can obviously only be pure. The act of subsumptive synthesis. as the act which puts intending and fulfilling acts in its total unity. ha.s its ~bjecti~ in the relation of partial identity of the corresponding objects. T sumption points in this direction: it pictures our grasp of the. an activity which subsumes the part in the whole. The same ob tionship is, with a change of conceptual standpoint - pointing to phenomenological dilTerences casually revealed in our fonn o~ eJ expressed in the words: ·S. has 8_' or 'e_ pertains to e_'. Th~ IndeS us aware that it is the intentional objects of the acts in question into these rdations: we stress the inrentiOlwl objects, the objectS"

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

~n

215

these acts. The application of these remarks to the case of rtfe 'on. and to the expressions 'has not' or 'does not pertain', is obvious. aclus;he mere 'is' objective identity belongs in all cases, to the 'is not' non. r~ty(conl1ict). '!Oat we are specially dealing ~ith a relation of subsumption jdeO elusion reqUires other means of expresSion, e.g. the adjectiJ'al form, or .e.~ c marks off I\'JIOI is had or what pertains as such, just as the substantil'al ,..tll eXpresses its correlative, the thing which has as such, i.e. in its function ~bjeet" of an identifi.cation. In the attributive, or more generally deter~ng fonn ~f ex?resslon (ev~n ~omplete identity determines), being is bidden in the LOtlexlon of the adJective, to the extent that it is not explicitly and separately expressed in a relative clause, or. per contra, not wholly suppressed ('this. phil~sopher Soc:ates'). Whether the always mediate expression of.non-Identity, wheth,er LO.~ o~ predication or attribution, or in substantival forms such as non-Identity, 'non-agreement', expresses a oecessarY relation of actual 'negation' to an affirmation Which, if not actual, is at least present in modified form, would lead to discussions into which ,,-oe do not now care to enter. All normal statements are accordingly statements of identity or nonidcIltity, and expressions of the same wherever there is a relation to 'corres~g int~ition'. i.e. where the intention towards identity or non-identity fulfils Itself In a completely achieved identification or distinction. 'The tiled roof', i!S we would say in our previous case provided a mere intention went before, 'is r~all>: red'. The predicate-intention fits the subject which is pre~ted and mtUlted as, e.g., 'this tiled roof'. In the opposite case we say: 'It II DOl ~tully red'; the predicate does not pertain to the subject. . But If ~e meaning of 'is' finds a fulfilment based on an actual identifica::: (wh~h often has the character of a fulfilment), it is clear that we are eye ~lng beyond the sphere on which we had hitherto always kept our rio:U~thout being quite clear as to its limits, the sphere namely of expreswt at can really be fulfilled through corresponding intuition. Or rather are made awa th . .. . IliI 0 . re at IOtultlon, 10 the common-or-garden sense of exterl1ltnt r .Internal'sc nSI'b'I' I Ity,, W h'IC h we took as an obvious basis in our treatnot be ~s d the only function that can rightly be styled 'intuitive', and can doset r cd as .capable of carrying out the work of fulfilment. We leave the flttsen~~Plora~lOn. of this emerging difference to the Second Section of the We nVesllgatlOn. mUSt stress . I' .. • COlllpl,. ..lD cone USlon, that the above expositIon has not provided ~~ e e an'lly, r h ' d q\e ign 'IS 0 t e JU gement. but a mere fragment of the same. We btl·tion and Ored the qu'a I't f h h' , I y 0 t c synt etlc act. the differences between attripredication etc.

Chapter 2

Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and their essential varieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment

§ 13 The synthesis of knowing (recognition) .s the characteristic form of fulfilment for objectlfylnJ Subsumption of acts of meaning under the cI ••• objectifying acts We have, in the above treatment, classed meaning-intentions in class of 'intentions' in the pregnant sense of the word. All inter/; corresponding possibilities of fulfilment (or of opposed frustra . themselves are peculiar transitional experiences, characterizable as permit each act to 'reach its goal' in an act specially correlated with latter acts, inasmuch as they fulfil intentions, may be called 'fi • but they are called so only on account of the synthetic act of Ii rather of self-fulfilment. Such transitional experience;s nOI a/wayJ. character. In the case of meaning-intentions, and not less clearly ia of intuitive intentions, such experiences are unities of knowing, or identification in respect of their objects. This need not be so in class of intentions in generaL Everywhere we may speak of coin' everywhere we shall meet with identifications. But the latter often an inwrought act of a sort which permits of a unity of identi also serves as the foundation of one in the contexts in question. An example will clarify the matter. The self-fulfilment of a wish is in an act which includes an identification, and includes it as a component. For there is a law which ties the quality of wishi?8 to" lying presentation, i.e. to an objectifying act, and more preclse:ly to presentation', and this leads to a complementary law tying ~ ~Isb~ to an underlying act. which incorporates this presentation m. Its .. grasp. A wishful intention can only find its fulfilling satisfaction lP the underlying mere presentation of the thing wished for beC~ formed into the corresponding percept. What we have, howe~er, IJ mere transformation, the mere fact of imagination dissolved I~ . both enler in unity into the character of an act of identifying COlD this synthetic character, we have it constituted that a Ihing is really

. ct characterization of objectifying intentions and essential varieties

Illdl re

217

~ had previously merely pictured and wished): this of course does so (I.l!:· lude the possibility that such 'really being so' is merely putative, and exC

ot iallY. in 1I10~t. cases, t h at " , d l~ IS lOa . e~uate.ly pr~sented. If a wish is based presentation. thIS Identification can of course involve on a ore special coincidence described above, in which meaning is fulfilled the ~ intuition that fits it. The same could plainly be said of all intentions by ~ as objectifying acts. are based on presentations, and what applies to t h acarnes , . o~er, mutatl~ . mutand'IS, to t he case 0 ffrustratlon. ' fulfilment 11 is clear accordmgly, to stick to our example, that even if the fulfilment fa wish is founded on an identification, and perhaps on an act of intuitive ~gnitiOn, this latter act never exhausts the fulfilment of the wish, but merely provides its basis. The self-satisfaction of the specific wish-quality is a peculiar, act-character, different in kind. It is by a mere analogy that we extend talk of satisfaction, and even of fulfilment, beyond the sphere of emotional intentionality. The peculiar character of an intention accordingly goes with the peculiar character of its fulfilling coincidence. Not only does every nuance of an inltnlion correspond 10 some nuance oflhe correlatedfulfilment, and likewise of the self-fulfilling activity in the sense of a synthetic act, but to the essentially different classes of intention there also correspond perl'asil'e class-differences iIf fulfilment (in the twofold sense mentioned above). And obviously the Mtmbers which belong 10 these parallel series belong also to a single class of acts. The syntheses of fulfilment in the case of wish- and will-intentions ~inly show close affinities, and differ deeply from those occurring, e.g., m the case of meaning-intentions. On the other hand the fulfilments of meaning-intentions and of intuitive acts are definitely of'the same character : : so in the case of all acts that we classed as ·objectifying'. We may say of class of acts which alone concerns us here, that in them unity offulfiltntnl has the ~haracter of IInily of identification, possibly the narrower charr of a Unity of knowing, i.e. of an act to which objective identity is the rresponding correlate. r"'l~eIDUst here emphasize the following point: As pointed out above, every "'UIIIDent of a •. .. 'h ' .. Ofiden'fi . Slgmhve y an mtultlve act has the character of a synthesis 3 identifitll: t1on. But it is not the case, conversely, that, in each synthesis of .lIlg int cation . .IS f u Ifill ed, and fulfilled by a correspond. . ' 3 me'" amng-mtentlOn Ultlon In th 'd ' , aqual'd : . e WI est sense, certainly, we do ordinarily speak of every r ...... I entJficatlon . . B ' --ny' I as a recogmtlOn. ut, 10 a narrower sense, what is , "'row.lettobc',' a Issue IS an approach to a goal of knowledge and, in the II.:St sense f .. "qs Iller C . 0 a critique of knowledge, the arrival at that goal. To turn approac~ eelln~ into clear insight. and to define the precise sense of this the Iln i,y Q~ .arnv.al. will yet be our task. Meanwhile we shall maintain that lIJd the /(lenlijica/ioll, and thereby all unit)' of knowing in the narrower fYiltg aCISnarrowest sense. has ilS plact' of origin in the sphere of objecli11

espee purelY sigOlt1ve

:e

218

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge I"d

Their peculiar manner of fulfilment will therefore suffice to c the unified class of acts to which it essentially belongs. We can define objectifying acts as those whose syntheses of fulfilment have a ter of identification. while their synthesis of frustr.ttion has a c distinction. We Clln also define them as acts which can function p logically as members of possible syntheses of identification and d' Lastly. presuming a law as yet unformulated. we can define lhcal intending. fulfilling or frustrating acts which have a possible function. To this class belong also the synthetic aclS of idemi distinction Ihemseb-es: they are themselves either a merely pUlali,. identity or non·identity, or a corresponding real gmsp of the ODI other. This putative grasp can be either 'confirmed' or 'refuted' in knowing (in the pregnant sense of the word): identity is really 'adequately perceived', in the former case. as non·identity in the Our analyses have been lightly sketched rather than thoroughly but they lead to the result that both meaning·inlentions and acls of fulfilment. acts of 'thought' and acts of intuition. belong 10 a siltlfr objectifying acts. We establish thereby that acts of anolher sorl exercise any sense-gfloingfuflction. and that they can be 'expressed' far as the meaning-intentions which attach to words are fulfilled ill or imaginations which have as objects the acts requiring exp . therefore. where acts function meaningfully, and achieve exp sense. a 'signitive' or intuitive relation to objects is constituted in the other cases the acts are mere objects. and objects. of course. acts which here function as the authentic carriers of meaning. Before we discuss this matter more closely. and seek to refute ible counter·arguments - see the final Section of this Investi must explore the remarkable facts of fulfilment somewhat more and in the sphere of objectifying acts.

§ 14 Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between signitive and intuitive inten through peculiarities of fulfilment (0) SI,n. Imo'l! and se/f-pTl!SP:ntotion

In the course of the last discussion we have ~n led to .note how ~ol character of an intention closely coheres With that of liS synthCSI ment. so that the whole class of objectifying acts can be defined the identification generically characteristic of their syntheses of r wbose nature we take to be familiar. This thought leads us 00 whether the specific differences lI'ithin this class of objectifications. likewise rest upon corresponding differences in the mode of Ii Objectifying intentions are basically divided into sigl/ificatil'e and

. t characterization of objectifying intentions and essential varieties lrec

219

~et us try to give an account of the difference between these types jrItet1 t1on :.. cJ a.ct. the starting point of our treatment lay in expressed acts. we took Sl~~ ill(el1tio/ls to be the significations. the meanings of expressions. If

. . sense to exvc .. side the question whet her t he same acts wh·ICh give we 1~1 ns can also function outside of the sphere of meaning, these signitive ~~?ons always have intuitive support in the sensuous side of the expres· IlItt1l1 . .. . but not on that account intuitive col/tem. Th ough·In a manner one ~~. intuitive acts. they yet differ from them in kind. "'We can readily gr.tsp the distinction between expressed and purely intuit· . intentions if we contrast signs with likenesses or images. n'tThe sign has in general no community of content with the thing it signincs' it can stand as readily for what is heterogeneous. as for what is hom· ~neous with itself. The !ikene~s ~n ~he other hand is related to t~e thing by similarity where there IS no slmllanty. there can be no talk of a likeness. an image. The sign as object is constituted for us in an act of appearing. This act is not significant: it needs. as we held in former analyses, to be tied up with a new intention. a new way of taking things, through which a novel. signified object takes the place of the old. intuitively apparent one. The tikeness similarly. e.g. the marble bust, is as much a thing as anything else: the new way of regarding it first makes it a likeness. Not merely a thing of marble appears before us, but we have. based on this appearance. a reference to a person through a likeness. The intentions attaching to the phenomenal content are, in either case, DOt extemally tied up with it. but essentially based upon it. and il) sucb • 1'o"y that the character of the intention is detennined thereby. It would be a ~?tively wrong notion of the matter. to think of the whole difference as lying III the fact that the same intention which. in the one case is tied to the ~pPearance of an object like the object referred to. is in the other case lied to . e ~ppcarance of an object ,mlike it. For the sign. too. can be like what it SlgJl.Ifies. even entirely like it: the sign-presentation is not thereby made into ltd Olatlon by way of a likeness. A photograph of the sign A is immedia(~la.ken to be a picture of the sign. But when we use the sign A as a sign Irtat SIgn A: as. when we write'A is a letter of the Latin written alphabet'. we d:SPI.te ItS representational similarity. as a sign. and not as a likeness. is JI......._ Ob~ectl\'e fact of similarity between what appears and what is meant. --.urdmgly ,. rrc Ievant: It. .IS not. h ·Irrelevant where somethmg . .IS Prtse owever. II1ent~~ed by W:ly of a likeness. This shows itself in the possibility of fulfil· bring' i~t .:~s o.nl~ t.he. r~oll.ecti~n of this possibility which allowed us to has the bJ~tlY~ slmllanty In thiS context. The Iikeness·presentation plainly ~ berul.lUrHY that. when it achieves fulfilment. the object which ap~ i ~re It as likeness gets identified through similarity with the object tQb.tio: t ~ fUlfillin~ act. Having held thi.s to be the peculiarity ~f a presbYway of likeness. we have admitted thatfulfilmem of hke by like jmll/ll('

Sb"

'

...... n:.

220

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

internally fixes the character of a synthesis offulfilment as imagillQli~ when, on the other hand, casual likeness between sign and tbing .' leads to a knowledge of their mutual resemblance, this knowledge is all a case of the peculiar consciousness of identity, when similar is refi similar and made to coincide with it in the manner of likeness and thing. It is rather of the very essence of a significmjl'e intention, that the apparent objects of intending and fulfilling acts (e.g. name aod named in their fully achieved unity) 'have nothing to do with one It is clear, therefore, that descriptively distinct modes of fulfilmeat. rooted in the descriptively distinct character of our intention, can help detect these laller differences, and to find definitions for them. We have so far only considered the difference between signitive aginative intentions. If we ignore less weighty distinctions within the sphere of imaginative acts - we have preferred to consider represen way of physical images, instead of stressing those of fantasy - we consider the case of percepts. As opposed to imagination, perception is characterized by the fact it, as we are wont to express the matter, the object 'itself' appears, not merely appear 'in a likeness'. In this we at once recognize cba...~ differences in syntheses offulfilment. Imagination fulfils itself peculiar synthesis of image-resemblance, perception through the $ identical thinghood (sachlichen Jdentitiit). The thing establishes itself its very self, in so far as it shows itself from varying sides while one and the same. (b) The perceptuol ond Imor'not've odumbrotlon of the object We must, however, pay heed to the following distinction. Perceptioo, as it claims to give us the object 'itself', really claims thereby to be:. intention, but an act, which may indeed be capable of offering f other acts, but which itself requires no further fulfilment. But ge . in all cases of 'external' perception, this remains a mere pretensi080 object is not actually given, it is not given wholly and e~tirelY as that it itself is. It is only given 'from the. front', on!y 'pers.pectlvall y ~o he and projected' etc. While many of Its properties are Illustrated In ~ content of the percept, at least in the (perspectival) manner whlcb ill expressions indicate. many others are nOl present in the pe~pt illustrated fonn: the elements of the invisible rear side, the intenO r no doubt subsidiarily intended in more or less definite fashion, syPl suggested by what is primarily apparent, but are not themselves · · con{ the intuitive, i.e. of the perceptuaI or · ImaglOatlve ent•oftheme On this hinges the possibility of indefinitely many perceptS of object. all differing in content. If percepts were always the actual,

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Indirect characterization of obiectifying intention5 and essential varieties

221

f- reSCllwtions of objects that they pretend to be, there could be only a "liP nl'rcept for each object, since its peculiar essence would be exhausted SillS e ,,. . eh self-presentatIon. III ~:e must. however, note that the object, as it is in itself-in the only sense "nt and understandable in our context, the sense which the fulfilment I ~~ .. Id . of the perceptual Intentlo.n wou car~y out - IS not II'ho.//y different from the bject realized. however Imperfectly, In the percept. It IS part so-to-say of a o rctpt'S inherent sense to be the self-appearance of the object. Even if, for ~enOJl\enoIOgical purposes, ordinary perception is composed of countless fntClitiOns. some purely perceptual, some merely imaginative, and some even signitive. it yet. as a total act, grasps the object itself, even if only by way of an adumbration. If we may conceive of a percept put into a relation of fulfilment 10 the adequate percept that would offer us the object itself, in the ideally strict and most authentic sense, then we may say that a percept so intends its object that this ideal synthesis would have the character of a portial coincidence of the purely perceptual contents of intending and fulfilling acts, and also the character of a complete coincidence of both complete perceptual intentions. The 'purely perceptual' content in 'external' perception is whal remains over when we abstract from all purely imaginative and symbolic components: it is the 'sensed' content to which its own, immediate, purely perceptual interpretation is given, which evaluates all its pans and moments as self-projections of corresponding parts and moments of the perceptual object, and so imparts to its total content the character of a 'per~tual picture', a perceptual adumbration of the object. In the ideal, limitIn.gease of adequate perception, this self-presenting sensed content coincides With t~e perceived object. This common relation to the object 'in itself', i.e. to t~e Ideal of adequation, enters into the sense of all perception, and is also mamfest in the phenomenological mutual belongingness of the manifold rrorcepts. pe.rtai~ing to a single object. In one percept the object appears d' m thIS SIde, In another from that side; now it appears close, now at a o~.tan'7 ;tc, In each percept, despite these differences, one and the same t IS, there', in each it is intended in the complete range of its familiar en I o~ liS perceptually present properties. To this corresponds phenom~.~c~IlY a continuous flux of fulfilment or identification, in the steady Pc a 17.il~IOIl of the percepts 'pertaining to the same object'. Each individual Pt IS a mixture of fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions. To the fonner prOj~~nd.s that part of the object which is given in more or less perfect is no tlon In this individual percept, to the laller that part of the object that . 10 actual, fulfilhng . presence. A.1I Sut~t~~nth' ...t new percepts would bnng ch ident"fi S~ntheses of fulfilment are marked by a common character: they are '". . to self-mamfestations . of tit IICatlons b·Ind·109 se Ir-mamlestahons of an object It .c same Object. ~ns at .once clear that similar distinctions apply in the case of imaginative tatton . H ere too Ihe same 0 b ·IS· picture · d ~ect . now r rom · thiS and now

an::c

se:;

co:

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from that side. Corresponding to the synthesis of manifold where the same object always presents itself. we have the Parallel of manifold imaginations. in which the same object appears in a "I~·:::: the changing perceptual adumbrations of the object there are COrl imaginative adumbrations. and in the ideal of rt:rfect.co~yingthe would coincide with the complete likeness. If Imagmatlve acts are • time fulfilled in imaginative contexts. and at another time through ponding percepts. the difference lies plainly i.n the character.of their of fulfilment: the passage from likeness to hkeness has a different from the passage from likeness to original thing. The above analysis will be of use for the further investigations to be on in the next chapter; they also show the mutual affinity of """",Po; imaginations, and their common oppositi~n to 'signiti,ve' intcntioaa. cases we distinguish between an actually given. appeanng content, not what we mean. and an object which is what we mean - whether we represent or perceive it - or between a sign-content on the one haod" imaginative or perceptual projection of the object on the other. But and thing signified 'have nothing to do with one another''. ~ me affinities between a thing's imaginative and perceptual projeC1lOlll thing itself, affinities which are part of the very sense of our ~ o~ suciI These relationships are phenomenologically documented 10 difli their constitutive intentions. and not less in their syntheses of f This account does not. of course, affect our interpretation of ment as being an identification. In all cases an inte~tion ~m~ iato dence with the act which offers it fulness. i.e. the objeCt which 1$ is the same as the object meant in the fulfilling act. We were not. comparing these objects of meaning-reference, but signs and ad in their relations to such objects, or to what corresponds pheno",."",lalI to these relationships. , ' . cd 10 Our interest in the preceding paragraphs was pflmafll~ dIrect: . arities in syntheses of fulfilment: these enable us to dIfferentiate and signitive acts in a merely indirect manner. Only in the further our investigation - in §26 _ shall we be able to give a direct chara . based on an analysis of the intentions, and without regard to thcd' fulfilments,

§ 15 Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the meaning-function . In our last discussion we have pinned down certain co~pon~nts.~ ive acts as signitive intentions, But in the whole of our lOvestl~~ this point. signitive acts were for us acts of meanin~. . ·fication . . an d· Slgnltl"e mten..attached to expressions. The terms 'Slgnl for us synonymous. It is now time to ask ourselves whether the same:

s:e?se:pVtDL·

--

. e ct characterization of objectifyin& intentions and essential varieties 22] l,.dlr : : . : : . . . . - - - - - - - ' - - - - - ' - - - ' ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

essentially similar to th.ose fo~nd to function in mea~ing, may not uite divorced from thiS functIon and from all expressions. ~ this question must be answered affirmatively. is shown by certain "of wordless recognition. which exhibit the precise character of verbal cases nit ion. although words. in their sensuous-signitive content. are not "",glIY e.g. as an ancient Roman a present at all. We recognize an object. acw . . ·leStOne. its scratc b·lOgs as weat ber-wom . IOscnptlons. although no wor dS [III aroused at once. or indeed at all. We recognize a tool as a drill. but ~name will not come back 10 us etc. Genetically expressed. present intuiI~ ns stir up an associative disposition directed to the significant expression. : t the meaningr our recognition can of course not apply itself to what is given in per~on. at best it permits possible application to intuitive sequences. which Seq nOt themselves be actualized at all. In this manner recognitions. and nces of recognitions. are possible on a basis of partial intuitions. PIete "'oUl~ on a priori grounds. not at all be possible on a basis of comtrt aqual Intuitions. since Ihey combine incompatibles in themselves. There • and are only 100 many. false and el'en absurd recognitiOlIS. But 'really' ,et5

occ;

lier:

"'b:

22'4

Bements of a phenomenological elucidulon of knowledge

they are nOI recognitions, Le. not logically worthwhile. complete 'kn not recognitions in the strong sense. To say this is to anticipate later sions. For we have not yet clarified the ordering of the levels of Itn (a matter here touched upon). nor the ideals which limit these. So far we had to do with signitive intentions. which exist identically just as they are. both within and without the function of meanma.' countless signitive intentions lack either a fixed or a passing tie with sions, though their essential character puts them in a class with intentions. I here recur to the perceptual or imaginative course of a or of some other familiar type of event, and to the definite or i intentions and fulfilments which arise in such a course. I refer tikewile the empirical arrangement and connection of things in their pbel. . . . coexistence, in regard to whatever gives the things appearing in tbiI and especially the parts in each unified individual thing, the cba...... a unity im'olving preci.re/y this order and ,hi.rform. Representation 8Dd nition through analogy may unite likeness and original (analop analogizatum), and may make them seem to belong together, but they not unite what is not merely contiguously given together, but what as belonging together. And even if, in the realization of rep:~::~ through contiguity, images anticipating what is signitively reple::taltlt confirmed by their fulfilling originals. the unity among such representatives and what is represented through them can be gival relation of picturing (since such a relation is not operative among only through the entirely peculiar relation of signitive representation of contiguity. We may therefore rightly see, in inadequate percepts and im.~~':: interwoven masses of primitive intentions. among which, in a .• perceptual and imaginative elements. there are also intentions of. . kind. We may therefore maintain. in general. that all pheno differences in objectifying acts reduce to their constituent elemeotuJ tentions and fulfilments, the former bound to the latter through of fulfilment. On the side of intentions. the only last differences are between signitive intentions. as intentions by way of contiguity, and' ative intentions. as intentions by way of analogy. each plain and . their own kind. On the side of fulfilment. intentions of either_ ~_\ function as components. but on occasion (as in the case of pe~ have components which cannot be called intentions. since they only but require no fulfilment. .fe(f·presentations of the object meant by tblll the strictest sense of the word. The character of the elementary a~ determines the characters of the syntheses of fulfilment. which in l~ determine the homogeneous unity of the complex act. The emphaUC of attention helps to transfer the character of this or that ~lem~n~ to the unity of the act as a whole: this whole act becomes Imag:Jna signification or pure perception. And where two such unified acts enter

--d'

III Ir.".,~'~h:.~,,~,~,,~,_;n_';~O"---.:O_f~O~b~i,~w:'fy~I"~,~;:",=,:"":'o:":.:~=d~.:.:,,:":,,:,.~1:,,:,:;.:,,~.:.~lli~

, • relationships of agreement and conBict arise whose characler is ' . '

rel aUo .

,

~terrnined by the total acts underlymg such relatIons. and ultimately by

heir elements. .. . t In the next ch;~pter these relatlonshlps Will be f~rther tracked down. within limits in which they can be phenomenologIcally ascenained and epis. :olOgkallY evahluated. "!ehshall ~eep strictly to phenomenologically given unities. and to t ~ sense In ere~t m these and declared in their fulfilment. We shall thus aVOId the ~emP.latlon to embark on hypothelical construction. with whose doubts a c1anficatlon of knowledge should in no way be burdened.

Chapter 3

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

§ 16 Simple identification and fulfilment In describing the relation of significant intention to fulfilling int began with the verbal expression of a percept, and said that the in essence of the intuitive act fitted in with. or be/ongelJ to, the semantic of the significative
of the character of each act which comes up for synthesis, that is for identification (and naturally also for distinction). In the case of identification. the 'matters' are the special carriers synthesis. without themselves being identified. For talk of ideo' in virtue of its sense, concerned with the objl!ClS presented by such On the other hand in the act of identification, the matters themsel\'CI coincidence. Eve~ example shows. however. that even where q ,. alike. the acts need not become quite alike: this is due to the faet.tbIl is not exhausted by its intentional essence. What remains over will importance in a careful phenomenological investigation of ~ knowledge. which will be our task. It is clear from the start that, if admits of degrees of perfection. even when matter is constant, mattel' be responsible for such differences of perfection: and can,not t~eref: mine the peculiar essence of knowledge as agamst any IdenuficaU , ever, We shall tie our further investigation to a discussion of the p studied difference of mc're idenrijic;atiol/ (l/l(lfulfilme11l, We equated l fulfilment with knowledge (in the narrower sense of.the tlOP " of certalO " forms ,0 r"d indicating thai we were only talk 109 I en t"fica II be brought us nearer to the gOlll of knOll'/edgl'. What tillS means may . dated by saying: In each fulfilment there is more or less complete illllStration (1I('rtlllSclIllUJicllllllg). What the intention means. but prescot' in more or less inauthentic and inadequate manner, the fulfilmen t -

----

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

227

'nli! 11Sl:lf to an intention. and offering it 'fulness' in the synthesis of Ch _ I •. ' " . • ttafilmIent Sl'tS ("n'ci y (Jf:.Jore us. or at least more directly than the intenf~ n dOCS. In fulfilment our experience is represented by the words: 'This is UO bing iudI'. This 'itself' must not be understood too strictly. as if there tbe ~ be some percept bringing the object itself to actual phenomenal presPlus It is possible that. in the progress of knowledge. in the gradual ascent : : aclS of poorer. to a~ts of ever rich~r epistemic fulness. we must at IctIgth alwayS r~ach .fulfil.hng percepts: thIS does not mean that each step. each indi\;dualldentlficatlon that we call a fulfilment, need contain a percept as its fulfilling act. The relative manner in which we speak of 'more or less direct' and of ·seIr'. indicates the main point: that the synthesis of fulfilment inroh'cs an ineql/ality in ll'Orth among its related members. The fulfilling act bas a superiorit)' which the mere intention lacks: it imparts to the synthesis tM IlIlness of 'selF· at least leads it more directly to Ihe thing itself, The relativity of this ·directness'. this 'seIr'. points further to the fact that the relation of fulfilment is of a sort that admits of degrees. A concatenation of such relations seems accordingly possible where the epistemic superiority ste'ddily increases. Each such ascending series points, however, to an ideal limil, or includes it as a final member, a limit setting an unsurpassable goal to all advances: the goal of absolute knowledge, of the adequate selfprtsenlation of tile object of kllOlI'ledge. We have thereby achieved, at least in preliminary fashion,~ the character~tic dif!l!remiatinK mark of!IIJjilmeniS within the wider class of identificaUOns. For not every identification represents such an approach to a goal of ~iedge: there can well be a purposeless infinity of ever further identificaUOns. There. are, e.g.. indefinitely many arithmetical expressions having the ~ n~1 value 2. which pennit us to add identification to identification ~~"ItWII. J~~ so lhe~ may be i~fi!1!tely many images. of on~ and ,the same detenmnlDg agalD the POSSibility of endless chams of Identifications ~g to no goal of knowledge. The same holds for the endlessly many of one and the same thing. QarnVt~ pay heed to the constitutive elementary intentions in these intuitive the: t:Ia~: we s~all of course find moments of true fulfilment entering into side b .act of Identification. This happens when we set image-presentations fItw iY Side w~ich arc not of completely equal intuitive content, so that the rnage bnngs out many t h"lOgs much more clearly, and perhaps sets IOrneth' Ing bero . "IS. wh"1I e a Clonner Image " Or den ' rC' uS .'Just as It merely 'projects' it ates It symb I" II Ir ' . . , Itself to 0 le;1 y, we Ilnagmatlvely envisage an object turning " constantly linked by syntheses Of fUlfil eVery ' .side . our sequence 0 r "Images IS ~nta~cnt III respect of its partial intentions. but each new imageltries pr~on d~s not. as a whole. fulfil its predecessor. nor does the whole ~ts ~essl\:eIY approach any goal. Just so in the case of the manifold 1.1. every Stc o.n~mg to the sam~ external thi~g. Gain and loss are balanced p. a new act has richer fulness In regard to certain properties,

ten;

'--;"15

228

Elements of

il

phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

for whose sake it has lost fulness in regard to others. But against may hold that the whole synthesis of the series of imaginations or represents an increase in fulness in comparison with an act singled ott the series: the imperfection of the one-sided representation is, speaking. overcome in the all-sided one. We say 'relatively speakiDa' the all-sided representation is not achieved in such a synthetic I in the single 8ash which the ideal of adequation requires, as a presentation without added analogizing or symbolization: it is piecemeal and always blurred by such additions. Another example intuitive fulfilment-series is the transition from a rough drawing to I exact pencil-sketch. then from the latter to the completed picture, this to the living finish of the painting. all of which present the same, the same. object. Such examples from the sphere of mere imagination show that acter of fulfilment does not require that assertive quality in me . and fulfilling acts which is part of the logical concept of leno prefer to speak of 'knowledge' where an opinion. in the normal belief. has been confinned or attested.

§ 17 The question of the relation and intuitive illustration We must now enquire into the part played in knowledge by the kinds of objectifying acts - signitive and intuitive acts - and, under. rubric, acts of perception and imagination. Here intuitive acts p to be preferred. so much so. in fact. as to incline one to call aU intuitil'e illustration (Vercmsdltllllidllmg) - as we did above in ~ describe the work of fulfilment. wherever one deals with intuitive as a mere increase in intuitive fulness. The relation between in fulfilment plainly underlies the fonnation of the conceptual ~u~ (more narrowly, c01lcept). on the one hand. and com.'spo?dJn~.'" the other. But we must not forget that a notion of 1DtUltl~ towards this relation does not at aU coincide with t~at ~: an IIIbidI although. through the inherent tendency towards IOtUltlon wd into the sense of all fulfilment. it closely depends on the laU~r a n ' supposes it. To make a thought clear to oneself mean~. pomanly, epistcmic fulness to thc content of onc's thought. This can, ho . ' even by a slg01uve . .. pres.en .'a tion " Of achieved. ;11 tl cerllllllfasi//{I/l, h wit we ask for a clearness which will make matters self-eVIdent, whlC Ie. 'the lhing itself' clear. render its possibility and its truth k~ow~b referred to intuition in the sense of our intuitive acts, For thiS rea!lOd 'c1carness' in epistemological contexts plainly has this narrower • indicates recourse to fulfilling intuition. to the 'originative source cepts and propositions in their subject-mailers themselves.

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

~n:llYsed

229

n~ed

examples are now if we are to confinn and 'h:i1 has just been suggested. These Will help us to dear up the relation dC''tiOP"fulfilnlent and intuitive illustration. and to render quite precise the ~'«n yed by intuitio~ in f'l'ery fulfilment: Di.lT~ren~ between authentic part, plauthen1ic illustrdtlon (or fulfilment) will dlstmgUlsh themselves clearly. aod I:e difference between mere identification and fulfilment will also aod -ith reach final clarity. The work of intuition will be shown to be that ~Iributing to the intended act. when authentically fulfilled, a genuinely ofCOI"e1emen,. to which thc name 'fulness' may be given. We are thereby llO~e aware of a hitherto unstressed sidc of the phenomenological content ~ cts, which is fundamcntal for knowledgc. 'Fulness' must take its place as 'moment' in an intuitive act alongside of its quality and its matter. a ~t specially belonging to the matter which it in some manner completes.

cart

:ew

til

The gradation~ of mediate fulfilments. Mediate presentatIons

The formation of every mathematical concept which unfolds itself in a chain of definitions reveals the possibility of fulfilment-chains built member upon IIItmbtr our of signitil'e intentions. We clarify the concept (S't by having ItCOUrsc to the definitory presentation: Number which arises when one fonns the product 5' . 5' , 5) . 5', If we wish to clarify this latter concept. we must aoback to the sense of 5'. i.e. to the fonnation 5·5· 5. Going back further. "'t should have to clarify 5 through the definitory chain 5 4 + I. 4 3 + I. ~ '" 2 + I. 2 = 1 + I. After each step we should have to make a substitution ~ the preceding comple:( expression or thought and. werc this proceeding y repeatable - it is certainly so in itself. just as it is certainly not so ttbit;1a- we should at last come to the completely explicated sum of ones of h we should say: 'This is the number (S'l"itself"'. It is plain that an ~ fulfilment n~t only corresponded to this final result. but to each Iioa ual. step leadlOg from one expression of this number. to the exprestacb Dtlt.1n order. which clarified it and enriched its content. In this manner 1l'llose~lnary decimal number points to a possible chain of fulfilments. lIrtits. Inks are one less in number than the number of their component We SO that chains of indefinitely many numbers are possible a priori. IQeanin~~~ly talk as if. i~ the. sphe~e of mathematics., the straightforward tJ;Pres.si a Word were Identical with the content of ItS complex defining btltiOvion. In this case there could be no t,llk of fulfilment-chains: we should tonside~gt~~ong pure.identities wholly tautologi~al in ch~racte~. But if one 'tuti complexity of the thought-formations whIch afise through 'bstitUlion, and compares them. in those very simple cases where such 0Qe at fi~n can be fully carried out. with the signific.uive intentions that t txperienced, one can hardly seriously think that in these last a I this complication was presem from lhe start. It is plain that

=

.;:mrutel

'lions

=

230

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

there are real differences in intention which. whatever their mort description, are knit together through relationships of fulfiltne.u: identify them as wholes. A remarkable property of the cases just discussed, and of the significative presentations which they iIIustrdte, lies in the fact that the content of the presentations - or. more clearly their 'matter' _ a de~erminate order offillfilment.a prio~. The fUlfilmen~ which-. me
§ 19 Distinction between mediate presentation. presentations of presentations From these mediate presentations we must, however. distinguish of presentations. i.e. presentations simply directed upon other p as their objects. Although such presented presentations are, gen ing. themselves intentions. and so capable of fulfilment. the nand presenting presentations which are in question requires no mediate through fulfilment of the presented presentation. The intention of PI presentation of a presentation. is directed to P2: it is fulfilled. pletely fulfilled. when Pl 'itself' is present. It is not enriched when tion of Pl is fulfilled in its turn. when its object appears in an iIOJlD richer image, or even in a percept. For PI refers, not to this objectto its presentation P2. Nothing obviously alters if the emboirem ent ) more complcx. e.g. in the case expressed by the symbol PI(Pl(f3)

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

231

---:::hl 'signitive presentation'. for instance. is fulfilled in the intui, 1ht:f a signitive presentation. e,g. of the presentation 'integral', or of the uo~ 0 tlltio n 'signitive presentation' itself. These examples must not be mis~~tood as meanin~ that the signitive presentation 'integral' itself claimed ~ tuitive statuS. as If the concepts of intuition and sig1lilil"e (lct (meaning~ II1tion ) were here confounded. It is not the signitive presentation 'inte. _. fh·· . graI' but the "",('r p('rce!,~ o. ,t IS present~tlon that serves as the fulfilling , uition (0 the thought slgmtlve presentation'. This presentation is not the ~~Iling intuition. bUI the ~bjeci of the fulfilling intuition. As the thought of colour has its fulfilment III the act of intuiting this colour. so the thought ~a thought has its .fulfilment in an act of intuiting this thought. and its final intuitive fulfilment 10 an adequate percept of the same. Here as elsewhere. the mere being of an experience involves neither its intuition, nor, more particularly. its perception. It must be noted that, in our general opposition between thought or intention. and fulfilling intuition, intuition is not to be understood as mere outward intuition, the perceiving or imagining of exteroal physical objects. As our just discussed example sbows, and as the nature of'presentation makes obvious, 'inner' perception or 'inner' imagination can function as a fulfilling intuition,

120 Genuine intuitive illustration in eve,.y fulfilment. Authentic and inauthentic intuitive illustration

N~ that we have sufficiently stressed and clarified the distinction between medlale presentations and presentations of presentations. it will be proper to tum 10 what they have in common. Each mediate presentation includes on .the a?ove analysis. presentations of presentations. inasmuch as it refer~ ';;'Its ,ObJCCt as the object of certain presentations, which it itself presents. as :::elf",:e think of 1000 as IOJ • we' think of it as the number characterized 0: ob~c~ of the presentation which would arise were we to carry out the IlOnentlatlon in q ue).,.Ion. F rom t h··· I frat" IS It IS Cear that genui1lely intuitil'(' iIIus. p~ay Ihe essem;al part ill all fu/jilmem of mediate imentiOlIS. and at ~/? /11 sllcll fU!(ilmell/. The characterization of an object as object of a "-<_ .)ed presentatIon (or as one related in a certain manner to obiects so -~ presup . . f fi ' Presenta . poses m liS ullment the fulfilment of these presentations of 'L. liOns and these " . . , . f lfi . . Inwoven IIIlmtn't! u dments are the first to give ,_ ~hol e 'Ident fi . . flilnCSS' ,I IC,Illon lis character of a fulfilment. Its gradual increase in . h r ?,"tsenl
toe::"'"'

I'"

232

Elements of

il

phenomenological eluciduion of knowledge

as a whole the dlllracf('r of a fulfilmelll. This kind of fulfilment is a case of inauthentic intuitive illustration. since we are only entiUeei dicate llllthelltic illlllitil'e illustration if fulness is not added all only imparts an increase to the object presented by the presenra . whole. which accordingly becomes more fully presented. This more. ultimately. than thaI a purely signitive presentation is wi fulness, and that all fulness mther resides in the actual 'makina (Vergegenll'iirtigung) of properties that pertain to the object itself, We shall presently pursue this last thought. Here We shall add difference we called one of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic intuitive' could also be called one of authentic ami inauthell1ic fulfilmellt, .... tention aims at its object. is as it were desirous of it, and since the pregna1lt sense of the word only registers the fact that some _ fulness of the object is imparted to the intention. We must, hold that inauthentic and authentic fulfilments are alike marked_ syntheses of identification by a common phenomenological c of fulfilment in the wider sense). and that there is a peculiar p' , effect that all inauthe1ltiC" fulfilment implies authtmtic fulfilmellu, . . . borrows its character of fulfilment from these authentic cases. To demarcate the difference between authentic and inauthentic illustrations somewhat more precisely, and at the same time deal of cases where inauthentic intuitive illustrations have every a authenticity. we add the following remarks: It is not always the case that. when the fulfilment of a signiti...e· is consummated on an intuitive basis. the 'matters' of the acts presupposed above. are in a relationship of coincidence, so that which appears intuitively also comes before us as itself meant ia of meaning. Only when this happens. however, may one talJc 0/ illustration ill the /rll(! sellS(': only then is a thought realized pe illustrated imaginatively. The case is different when the fulfilliq' presents an imlirectly represented object. as when the use of a name calls up the imaginative presentation of a map, which blendl. meaning-intention of this name. or as when a statement about certJIt connections. courses of rivers. features of mountains, is confirmed stands inscribed on a map before us. Here intuition should no~ be fulfil in the true sense of the word: its own matter does not enter IOto The real basis of fulfilment docs not lie in it at all. but in a plainly intention intertwined with it. That the apparent object here fu ;lulireCfly repr~sellting ~he obj~t ~ea?t a.n.d n~ln\ed. means. P ofa logically spcuk1Og. that Its constllutlve 1OtUltJon IS now the bearer intcntion. an intention pointing beyond the apparent object, an~ churactcrizing it as a sign. The analogy of what appears and what II which may be present here. docs not lead to a straightforward P by way of an image. but to a sign-presentation resting upon the Ia

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

2]]

~l!Jand as drawn in the map. may indeed represent the fonn of ine

oiltl

: itself. but the pictorial image of the map which comes up when

lbe ::~d is mentioned. does not meall England itself in pictorial fashion, not

EP$ ediately. as the country pictured on the map. It means England after e'-en;nn er of a mere sign, through e:\ternal relations of association, which ~e tied all our k~ow.ledge.of I~nd and people to th~ map-picture. When. ~ore. our ~aml~g IIlt~ntlon IS fulfilled through t~IS mental picture. it is the object Imagmed m the latter (the map). which counts as the very meant by the name. but the original object which the name represents.

:g

t 11 The 'fulness' of a presentation It v.ill. ho"'ever. now be necessary to view the achievement of intuiLive iotdlLions more closely. Since the fulfilment of mediate intentions refers bad: 10 the fulfilment. the intuitive fulfilment of immediate intentions, and siDce it has transpired that the final outcome of the whole mediate process is an immediate intention, we now concern ourselves with the question of the: intuitive fulfilment of immediate intentions and of the relationships and laws governing their sphere. This question we therefore attack. But we may observe from the start that. in the following investigations, only the 'matter'·side of an act's intentional essence will have relevance for the relation:ili.ips to be established. The qualities of our intention (whether assertive or merely presentative) can be varied indifferently. We kgin with the following proposition: ,!o every intuitive intention there pertains, in the sense of an ideal possi~ty, a signitive intention precisely accommodated to its material. This ~n1lY ~f identification necessarily has the character of a unity of fulfilment, lD which the intuitive. not the signitive member, has the character of being the fulfiller. and so also. in the most authentic sense. the gil'er of fulness. tlJaWe.on.l~ express the sense of this last statement in a different way if we say Of~ 5lgnl~lve intentions are in themselves 'cmpty', and that they 'are in need int ~I~ess. In the tn.nsition from a signitive intention to the corresponding . . or IIitlon a ' Wee' xpenence no mere 1Ocrease. as m the change from a pale image lacki rne.re sketch to a fully alive painting. The signitive intention is rather to it ng In every son of fulncss: the intuitive presentation first brings fulness to i~ :~~~hr.ou~h i~e.nti~catiOl.l, int~ it. '!'- signitive !n~ention merely points of'he WOrd ~ t. .an. IntUitive Il1tentlon gives It ·presence. 10 the p"gnant sense . 'itr an . '. It lDlports something of the fulncss of the object itself. However tllres i~lIlaglnative presentation may lag behind its object. it has many fealllakes . common with it. more than that. it is like this object, depicts it, Dr-_ II really P' . .. presentutton. . ':-:Ot.. . CSCnt to us. A slgnlllve however. does not ob.iect c analogically. it is 'in reality' no ·presentation'. in it nothing of the Of'the o~~es ,to life. The ideal of complete fulness is. accordingly. the fulness 1CCt llsel£. as the sum total of its constitutive properties. The )illness

234

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

of the presentation is, however, the sum total of properties pertainina presentation itselr. through which it analogically gives presence to ita or apprebends it as itself given. Fulness is. accordingly. a charact"'ment of presenfations alongside of quality WId matter, a positive ~_;.: only in the case of intuitive presentations. a privation of tbe case or . The 'clearer' a presentation is. the higher its piclOriallet'el, the ricberit fulness. The ideal offulness would, accordingly. be reached in a".::: which would embrace its object. entire and whole. in its pbenor content. If we include individualizing features in the fulness of the such features can be embraced by no imagination. only by a perccpt. we ignore these features. a definite ideal exists for imagination as ..... We must accordingly return to the features of the presented ' more of these features ellter into the analogical representation and, U each separate feature. the greater the similarity with which the "'. . . . represents it in its content. the greater is the fulness of the p Somehow, no doubt, el'ery feature of an object is included in the of every presentation, and so in that of the pictorial presentation. every property is analogically represented. the phenomenological the presentation does IIot contaill a peculiar. SO-IO-j'(I)' allalogdng or mOlllellt for each The SUIIl total of the illtillUltely fllsed moment.! thought to underlie purely intuitive (in tbis case imaginative) ways 01 ing things. which first gives them the character of being rep'....,,~ corresponding objective moments, constitutes theflllnes.! of the' presentation. Hence in addition to imaginative representations. there perceptual ones, graspings of the thing itself, self-exhibitions of moments. If we assemble the sum total of the imaginatively or functioning moments of the perceptual presentation. we bave the fulness of the latter.

§ll Fulness and 'intuitive substance' (Geholt) Closely regarded, the concept of fulness is still fraught with an The above mentioned moments can be looked at in respect of existential content, without regard to the functions of pure ima~ perception. which first confer on them the value of being a pI perspectivally slanted self-revelation, and so a value for the fu fulfilment. On the other hand. one can consider these moments III interpretation. i.e. not these moments alone. but the full p'i~tures or self-revelations in question. Ignoring only intentional qualities, one. with purely intuitive acts as wholes. which include these moments .111 selves. since they give them an objective significance. These 'pur~IY:' acts we conceive as mere constituents of the intuitions just menu on . the element in Ihem which gives to the momenls previously me o relation to corresponding objective properties which are represented

---

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

2]5

We ig.nore therewith (in addition to the qualities) the yet further

t!Je111 hed sigllitil"t' relations to further pans or sides of the object which are lac .t OfX'd,!' speaking (intll~til'e~y.J. repres~nted. . .

.",. ~ plainly these purely mtUltlve constituents whIch Impart to total acts IIlhanlCter of percepts or imaginings. i.e. their intuitive character. and ::h function in the ~ystem ~f seria~ly order~ fulfilments as the element .'bicb confers 'fulncss • ~r wh~ch en,:ch~ ~r mcreases the same when aldy present. To deal With thIS ambiguity 1O our talk of 'fulness' we shall ~uod uce the following distinguishing tenns: ItI By intuitirel)' presentati,'e or intuitirely representaNt'1! contents (Inhulten) 'e understand those contents of intuitive acts which, owing 10 the purely :naginative or perceptual interpretations that they sustain. point unambiguously to definitely corresponding contents in the object. represent these in imagined or perceived perspectival slantings. The act-aspects which characterize them in this manner, we ignore. Since the character of imagination lies in analogical picturing. in 'representation' in a narrower sense. while the character of perception can be called strictly presentative, the following distinctive names suggest themselves: For the intuitively presentative conlents in either case - ul/alogi:ing or pictllring contents. on the one hand. and stric/ly presell1Util'e or se/f-present01il'e contents, on the oilier, The expressions 'imaginatively slanted contents' and 'perceptively slanted cOnlents' m also very apt. The intuitively presentative contents of outer perception ddine the concept of senslltion in the ordinary. narrow sense. The intuitively present~tive contents of external fantasy arc sensory phantasms or images. ,The IOtuitively presentative or intuitively representative contents in and .lth the interpretation put upon them, we call the inlllitil'e mbSlUnce (Gehult) of 1M act: in this we still ignore the quality of the act (whether assertive or n:o'~ ~s being indifferent to the distinctions in question. On the above, all S1gJutn-c components of an act are excluded from its intuitive 'substance',J

~I~l ,R.elationships of weight between the intuitive and Pl.l nlt~ve 'substance' (Geholt) of one and the same act. Irn~e ,IntUition and pUl""e signification. Pel""ceptual and Irna g:~al .content, pure pel""ception and pUl""e g atlon, Gl""adations of fulness T-

o Increase h rnarkin t e clearness of the concepts just marked ofT. and to aid in the the rOIl~ o!f of a new set of concepts. rooted in the same soil, we embark on ,Wing discussion: I nanlnt '. . or PerceptiUlllve p.resen.t:ltl?n (l~orst~/hillg) :lll o~j~t is meant in the manner Illade a On or ImaglOatlOn: 10 thIS manner II IS morc or less perfectly ftferen~parenl. To each part and each property of the object. including its Pan Or to a h('r(' and a 11011', there must necessarily be a corresponding lllomeOl of the conscious act. What we do not mean. is simply nOI

236

EJemenu of a phenomenological elucidiltion of knowledge

there for our presentation ~Vorstellung), We ?OW ~n~ in, general tbIt possible to draw the follOWing phenomenologIcal dIstinction betweea (I) n,~ purely intuitil'e 'sllbSl(l11C(>' (Gehall) of the act, i.e, aU that ""'__.. in the act to the sum total of the object's properties that 'become (2) Tile signi/il'(' 'substance' of the act, which corresponds to the __ of the remaining, subsidiarily given propenies of the object, wlticb. themselves become apparent. We all draw such a distinction, in purely phenomenological Ii the intuition involved in the percept or image of a thing, between in the object is truly made apparent, the mere ;side' from whicb the is shown to us, and whatever lacks intuitive presentation (DaTI hidden by other phenomenal objects etc, Such talk plainly iJJlPIiII. phenomenological analysis within certain limits definitely proves, what is not presented (Nicht-Dargestelltes) in an intuitive (Vorstelhmg) is subsidiarily meant, and that an array of signitive must accordingly be ascribed to the latter, from which we bave to if we wish to keep our inllliril'e content pure, This last gives the ' presenting «(Iarstellemle) content its direct relation to correspondiaa tive moments: other novel and, to that extent, mediate, signitive ' are attached to these by contiguity. If we now define the weight of the intuitive (or signitive) sum total of the intuitively (or signitively) presented (,'orgesteJlle) of the object. both ;weights' in each presentation (Vorstellung) wiI to a single total weight, i.e, the sum total of the object's propertieL therefore the symbolic equation holds: i + s I. The weights ; plainly vary in many regards: the same, intentionally same, objeet intuitively given with more or less numerous, ever varying pro, signitive content also alters correspondingly. it is increased or d Ideally we now have the possibility of two limiting cases:

con"

=

--:;:sed

The phenomenology of [he level5 of knowledge

with innocuous ambiguity. at times to cover complete acts.

t~ ~ such acts in abstraction from their quality, We may speak distin-

II 'U~ngly of qualified and unqllalifi~d pure intuitions. fllsh ch presentalion (Vorsudl"ng) we can therefore surely abstract from In, eaitive components. an d I>Imlt> ourseI ves to what > > IS rea IIy represented lR n , B d > , / ..uSlg d > > , s rtpresentatlve,content, Y so, Ol~~ we lorm, a r~l."Ce presentation, ,Wllh II redUced object ,ll~ regard to whIch It IS purely lRlUltlV~, We can ~ccordlOgly • Iha t the inlUlf/I'£' substance (Gelwlt) of a presentation compflses aI/that ~y UTe inllli/ioll;1I it, just as we may also speak of the object's purely intuit· ~: content. of all that is rendered intuitive in this presentation, The like ~ppl)es to the signit,ive s~bs~an,ce of the presentation: this can be said to be aU that is pllre significatIOn lR It, Each total act of intuition has either the character of a percept or an ilIlagination: its intuitive substance is then either perceplllal or imaginatil'l! substance or content. This must not be confused with the perceptually or ilIlaginatively presenting content in the sense defined in §22, Perceptual content comprises (though not in general exclusively) strictly presentative contents: imaginative contents comprise only analogizing contents, It is not to the point that these latter contents permit of another iDlerpretation (as in the case of physical images). in which they function strictly presentatively. On account of the mixture of perceptual and imaginative components which the intuitive substance of a percept permits and usually exhibits, we can again consider adopting a division of perceptual content into pllre perceplllal OOI1tmt, on the one hand. and sllpplememary image-conrem, on the other. If then, in each pure intuition we take P, and I, to be the weights of its purely perceptual and purely imaginative components. we can write down lhe symbolic equation P,

i=O i=1

s=1 s=O,

237

:~

+ I, = 1

I symbolizes the weight of the total intuitive content of the pure

iat~t~on. ,and thus the total content of its object. If I = 0, i.e, if the pure

In the former. the presentation (Vorstdhmg) would have ,onlY content: no propeny of its intentional object would remam ovd was brought to intuitive presentation (Dllrsrellllllg) in its content. The case of purely signitive presentations. well-known to ~s a~ ~ure intentions. therefore appears here as a limiting case of IOtUlUO~" In the second case the presentation (Vors/el!lmg) has flO sigmll,ve whatever. In it all is fulness: no part. no side. no property of its objc:d. be intuitively presented (dargeste/ft). none is merely indirectly and su meant. Not only is everything that is intuitively presented also, . much is analytically true - but whatever is meant is also intuill.. sented. This new class of presentations may be defined as pure 111 >

"'.

IS f ree rrom a,11 . , ' called a pure perImagmal cont,ent: .It should .be tIl:lbra' ~ shall here Ignore the qualitatively asserllve character usually tailed ~ 1n,Ihe sense of the term 'perception', But if PI' = 0, the intuition is Oot pure IlI/og;l/(l/ioll, The 'purity' of pure perception relates, therefore. merely 10' ., h Of an' slgmtlve. ut also to imaginative supplements, The narrowing intllitilmpure percept which throws out symbolic components yields the pure tvtr'yt~~ W~ich is immanent in it: a further reductive step then throws out , Can :~: :ma~i,ned, and yields the substance of pure perception. ~tified w~tultl\'ely ~rese~tative content in the case of pure perception be Itrict $tn nh the ob~t It~lf? ,The essence of pure pr~ntation (in the lie) Surely consists m bemg a pure self-presentation of the object, "'iliCn

trpriofl' w

2]8

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

one which means the intuitively presentative content (Jirectly (in tbe of 'seW) as its object. This would. however. be a paralogism, The as presentation in the strict sense. so interprets the intuitively p......... content. that the object appears as itself given with and in this conte:Qt. entation (in the strict sense) is pllre. when each part of the object is and intuitively presented in the content. and none is merely i...'Ii..~ symbolized. As there is nothing in the object not strictly presented. 10 is nothing in the content not strictly presentative. Despite such euct pondence. self-presentation may still have the character of the all-sided perspectivity (of a completed perceptual picture): it Deed DOt the ideal of adequation, where the intuitively presenting content is intuitively presented content. The pure picture-presentation, wbidI. pletely depicts its object through its freedom from all signitive holds in its intuitively presentative content a complete likeness oftbe This likeness can approach the object more or less closely, to a complete resemblance. The same may be true in the case of pure with the sole difference. that imagination treats the content as a image. whereas perception looks on it as a self-revelation of the object. perception no less than pure imagination admits. accordingly, of • degrees of fulness. without thereby altering its intentional object. the degrees offilllf/!sS of ;n1l1itil'e con/en!. to which degrees of fu10ell resentative content run eo ipso parallel, we may distinguish: I. The exten! or richness of the fulness, according as the con1eDl object achieves intuitive presentation with greater or less co~ . 2. The Jil'e!iness of this fulness. i,e. the degree of apprOlUIDabOR primitive resemblances of the intuitive presentation to the co moments of content in the object. 3. The reality-level (Realitiitsgehalt) of the fulness. the greater number of its strictly presentative contents. .' In all these regards. adequate perception represents an Ideal: it maximum of extent. liveliness and reality: it is the self-apprehenst<Jll whole. full object.

mere.

§24 Graded series of fulfilments We framed our talk of 'fulness' with an eye 10 relationships of 'f that peculiar form of the synthesis of idenlification. But in o~r l~ we not only threw light on the concept of fulness. bUI also on Its dl of greater or lesser completeness. liveliness and reality. as well as gradalions in pictorialization and perspectival projection. and all by relationships among the inner 'moments' of our presentations, or.. .. . dB" I in that ~t II IS P a Jed these and the obJectlvc tnomenls th~t they lO~en, relalionships there correspond pOSSIble grUlJl('lIts of mcrease. folU1 theses offll/filmell/.

------

239

IfilOlcnt arises out of the first application of fulness as such. in the · ~~ifying accommodati~n ~f 'corres~ndi?~' intuiti~n t~ ~ signitive in ten~ In the contcxt of cOlllcldence the llltUl1lve act 'glves Its fulness to the ~\i\'e act. The consciousness of increase is here founded on the partial Sl~~dence of the fulness with correlatjve parts of the signitive intention. ~~e (0 the .co~po.nding empty parts o~ both inte?tions. which alike ~nter thiS identifYlOg ~olllciden.ce. no part ~fthls sense o~ lIlcre~se can be ~sc~bed. A (OI/r;nllolls Increase In fulfilment IS further achieved 10 the contlllUlty of · tuith'e actS or serial fulfilments which present the object with ever more It! tended and intense illustrativeness. That B2 is a 'more perfect' image than ~ means Ihat fulfilment obtains in the synthetic context of the pictorial p~tatiOn in question. and increased fulfilment in the direction of B~. Here as dsewhere distances pertain to increases, and transitivity to concatenated relationships. If B~ is at once> B I • and B) > B2, then B) > B I and this last distance exceeds those which mediate it. This is so at least if we take separate account of the three moments of fulness. i,e, extent. liveliness and reality. which were distinguished above. These increases and gradients of increase correspond. as analysis shows, to resemblances and gradients of resemblance among the imuiril'(:/Y prestntatil'e contents of the fulnesses. Likeness of presentative contents, or concatenations of such likenesses, are not, however. to be taken to be the same lIS simple or concatenated increases: they are not so when these 'ruloesses' are considered in their own being as contents. in abstraction from their representative function in the relevant acts. Only through this latter function. i.e. through the fact that. in the order of graded fulfilments, and of ~ increases obtaining among its acts. each later act of fulness appears neller. do the representative contents of the acts achieve their ascending ~. They appear one after the other as not only themselves furnishing 'fulness. but as furnishing it ever more abundantly. To call such components is to talk relatively and functionally: it is to exp~ a character"'" . to the contents through the acts. and through the part played by aCCTlung ,1._ these acts in possible syntheses of fulfilment. Our term here resembles ~tenn' b' . IJlCcies o:}eet. T? be an object represents no positive mark. no possible fllilh of conte~t: It refers to the content only as intentionally correlated plaint ~~:enta~lon. For ~he ~st. relationships of .fulfilment and increase or Y a\e their foulJdatlon 1Il the phenomenological 'substance' (Gelmlt) OU~~~lacts: C~/lsiclerl'd 1~lIrdy/" their J'Pl'cijicily, We are concerned through• In th~ :lth Id~al rel.atlo.. \~hlps dctcnnined by the ideal Species in question. 11\ rUI Ylllhesis or IntUlllVC acts there is. however. not always an increase \t,'t m~es~: partial fulfilment can go h:lI1d in hand wilh partial emptying. as {" , L. ., 1ft . Iltloned <'Ibo ve. T7 ~l Po· I,'l' (ISlmCllOlI m!lll'el'n IIwre /( enlllCaf/on (II/(I fil/fil'nay be I~ts back \0 the rac!. we may say. Ihat in Ihe case of the former there identir either no genuine fulfilment. since we have to do only with assened Its among acts alike lacking in fulness. or because the fulfilmenl or

·U!oesses'

240

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

enriched fulfilment which obtains goes together with a simultaneoua ing or surrender of previous fulness, so that no emphatic UJuniIed sciousness of increase arises. In any case the primitive relations ~ elementary intentions are either fulfilments of empty (i.e. purely . intentions. or supplementary fulfilment of intentions already to SOIDc filled. i.e. increase and realization of an imaginative intention.

§25 Fulness and intentional matter We now wish to discuss the relation between the new coDCept 01 sentational content covered by the name 'fulness', with content in till of 'matter'. which last has played such a large part in our in.v;:~= to this point. 'Matter' was classed as that moment in an ob' which makes the act present just this object in just this manner, i.e. . these articulations and fonns. and with special relation to just thee ties or relationships. Presentations which agree in their matter do DOl present the same object in some general fashion: they mean it ill • complete fashion as the same. as having exactly the same pro one presentation confers nothing on the object in its intention other presentation does not likewise confer. To each objectifyiq tion and form on one side there is a corresponding articulation aod the other, in such a manner that the agreeing elements of the po.... have an identical objective reference. In this sense we said in ~ Investigation. in elucidating the concepts of 'maUer' and 'semantic 'Two judgements are in essence the same judgement (i.e. judll"..... the same ·maller'). if everything that would hold of the stale tIl judged according to one. would likewise hold of it according 10 the and nothing different would hold of it in either case. The truth-value judgements is the same'. They mean the same in regard to the object. they are otherwise quite different. if the one, e.g., is achieved . • while the other is more or less illustrated by intuition. I was led to form this notion through a consideration of what is . in the assertive and understanding use of the same expression, . may 'believe' the content of some statement. while another leaves it cided. without disturbing this content's identity. in which case it abO no difference whether expression occurs in connection with co intuition, and whether it can so occur or nol. One might therefore be . I myself hesitated long on this point - to define meaning as tbit ·maller·. which would, however. have the inconvenience that the m tls,vertion in. e.g.. a predicative statement. would fall outside of ~balil menl's meaning, (One could no doubt limit the concept of mearuDJ fashion. and then distinguish between qualified and unqualified .' Our comparison of meaning-intentions with their correlative jnfUl the static and dynamic unity of identifying coincidence. showed us.

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

HI

------:::- thing that we marked off as the 'matter' of meaning. reaptll't t~ ce more in the corresponding intuition. and fumished the means ~ '~;otification. Our freedom, therefore. to add to or take away intuitfor an I eotS. and even all correspondent intuitions, wherever we limited our ~1: elef1l to the abiding meaningfulness of a given expression. was based on ~ that the whole act attaching to the sound of our words had the same the acrs' on the intuitive as on the meaning side, in respect. that is. of such e 'lIJlltt ts of meaning as receive intuitive illustration at all. ~: clear. therefore. that the concept of 'matter' must be defined by way oC~ unity of total, identification as t?e element in our acts U'/~ich serves as 1I 1Jqsisjor identijicatlOII. and that all differences of fulness which go beyond mere identification. and which variously detennine peculiarities of fulfilment and jncreaSC of fulfilment. have no relevance in the formation of this conception. However the fulness of a presentation may vary within its possible gJ1dients of fulfilment. its intentional object, intended as it is intended. remains the same: its ·matter'. in other words. stays the same. Matter and fulness are, ho\\-ever, by no means unrelated and, when we range an intuitive act alongside a signitive act to which it brings fulness, the former act does not differ from the latter merely by the joining on of a third distinct moment of fulness 10 the quality and matter common to the two acts. This at least is not the cue where we mean by 'fulness' the intuitive content of intuition. For intuitive content itself already includes a complete 'matter', the maner of an act tttktdto a pure intuition. If the intuitive act in question was already purely iatuitive. its matter also would be a constituent of its intuitive content. The relations which obtain here will be best set forth by establishing the following parallelism between signitive and intuitive acts. . A purely signiti\'c act would be a mere complex of quality and mauer. if ~Ddeed it could exist by itself at all. i.e. be a concrete experiential unity 'on ~~" !.his it cannot be: we always find it clinging to some intuitive basis. . . Intu~tlOn of a sign may have 'nothing at all to do' with the object of the :1Ifica:tl~~ act, it may stand to it in no relation of fulfilment, but it realizes ill J)Ossl bl1ny in COllcreto of being an altogether unfulfilled act. The follow~~OPDsition therefore seems to hold: An act of signification is only poss~so ,far ,as a~. intuition becomes endued with a new intentional essence. ("'~ Its IDtUItI\'e object points beyond itself in the manner of a sign prOpos' ~ as a sign regularly or fleetingly used). More closely considered. this "'hich ItbIO~ does not. however, seem to express the necessities of connection . clearness. and perhaps says more than isOtalnhe . , re wit'J1 t he needed analytiC ~ Q Iv~~~:lfied. For w~ can. it seems: say that it is not ?lIr founding i~l/lIjtiQn q<i'"'h . but utlly ItS repre:;efltllllOllal come",. which really assists the .~ aCt F II t1atural '. or what goes beyond this content. what pins down the sign as ~Oh ~Ject. cm/ be l'uried at will withoul disturbing the sign's signitive lit( tte' hether the letters of a verbal sign are of wood. iron or printer's " Or seem to be such objeclively, makes no difference. Only their

242

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

repeatedly recognizable shape is relevant, not as the ~bjective shape thing of wood etc., but as the shape actually present In the intUi . sentative sensuous content of intuition. If there is only a connection the signitive act and the intuitively presentative content of our int ' . if the quality and matter of this intuition mean nothing to this function, then we ought not to say that each signitive act requires a intuition. but only that it requires a founding content. It woWel any content can function in this fashion, just as any content can the intuitively presentative content of an intuition. If we now turn our regard to the parallel case of the purely in its quality and matter (its intentional essence) are not capable of existence on their own: here too a supplement is required. This is by the representative content. i,e. the content - sensuous in tbc sensuous intuition - which in its present fusion with an intentioaal has acquired the character of being an intuitive representative. If ... mind the fact that the same (e.g. sensuous) content can at one tiD meaning, and at another time an intuition - denoting in one case IIIll ing in the other - we are led to widen the notion of a representabW and to distinguish between contents which represent signiti\'ely (. , Tesentatives) and contents which represent intuitilY!ly (intuitive Our division is. however, incomplete. We have so far considered purely intuitive or purely signitive acts, If we bring in the mixH those we ordinarily class as intuitive. we find them peculiar in tbe their representative content is pictorial or self-presentative in . part of what it objectively presents, while being merely denolaU":' remaining part. We must accordingly range mixed representati* purely signitive and purely intuitive representatives: these r~pre~ and inlllitil'ely at the same time, and in regard to the same mtentio#tlll We may now say: Each cOl/crelely complele objectifying act has three components: IU Us mailer alld its represellllllil'e coment. To the extent that rldl fimclions as a purely signj/il'e or purely imlli!il'e representati,,'e, or together, the act is a purely signitiJ'e. a pI/rely ;ntu;lil'e or a nuxed-

'"1""._

--:::-henomenOIOgicallY discoverable content to our distinction. This ~ g1\ peeiallY unites the mailer to the representative content, since the fOffl'l sn!ati ve function is unaffected by change in the quality. Whether, e,g.. rtP;:gin
§26 Continuation, Representation or interpret. (Auffassung), Matter as the interpretative sen'.' interpretative form and the interprete~ conte~t. Differentiating characterization of intUitive an signitive interpretation We may now a~k. ,~'h(lt t!lis 'jImclionjng' really stamls for: sine::an a priori posslb,llIy that the same content. bound up wlt.h tb. lbIl and matter. should function in this threefold manner. It IS plaID only be III(' phel/oll/enological peculiarity of tht, relel'Ullt form 0/

2043

....e C'oJI,'

~.

•

gin "'"lIh the observation that signit;\'e representation institutes a l1Igenr nr I I' be tween matter and representative content ".~ .' . ('m" re atlon .... s Intuiti\'c 'C ... h . . ""'ntingenc " 'presentatlol~ lllS~"utes one t at IS e~s(,n1~al. in.ter~llIl. The ~ be tho} of the former consists III the fact that an Identical SIgnification ... Iou, u ught of as aHachi,.'
20M

Elements of ~ phenomenological e'ucld~tion of knowledge

The case of purely intuiti)'e representation is quite different. " an internal. necessary connection betll'een matter and repUS{'tubtr fixed by the specific stuff of both. Only those contents can be . representative of an object that resemble it or are like it. Phen ally put: we are not wholly free to interpret a content as this or ell in this or that interpretative sense) and this has more than an foundation ~ el'ery interpretation including a significative one is necessary - since the content to be interpreted sets limits to us cenain sphere of similarity and exact likeness. i.e. through its stance. The internality of the relation does not merely forge a liat the imerpretatil'e matter as a 1I'II0ie and the whole content: it I.inb on each side piece by piece, This occurs in the presupposed CUI intuition, In the case of impure inluition the specific union is PO>li~ of the matter - the matter of the reduced. and therefore, of intuition - provides the intuitive sense in which the content is ' while the remainder of the matter undergoes no represenlaaa. similarity or e;tact likeness. but merely through contiguity, i.e. intuition the representative content functions as intuitive ' : : : : one part of the matter, but as signitive representative for the If one finally asks how one and the same content (in the senlC of ter') can at times be 'taken up' in the manner of an intuitive,lIIIl in the manner of a signitive representative, in what the differiq these interpretative forms consists. I can give them no further are facing a difference that cannot be phenomenologically redUCIIA. In these discussions we have treated representation in union of matter and representative content. If we go back ..... complete acts, these reveal themselves as combinations of act either intuitive or signitive representation, The whole acts are caIIIll ive or signitive. a difference determined by these inwrought • The study of relations of fulfilment led us above to the concept. of substance or fulness. If we compare that case of concept-formatiOD present one, it sets bounds to the purely intuitive representa,tiOD intuition) that belongs to an act of impure intuition. 'Fu1n~ ~. specially framed for the comparative treatment of acts m ~ function. The limiting case opposed to pure intuition, pure Sl of course the same as purely signitive representation,

§27 Representations as the necessary bases of III: presentation in all acts. Final clarification of ta about the different modes of the relation of consciousness to its object Each objectifying act includes a representation in itself. Every a':' following the conclusions of the Fifth Investigation (see pa

The phenomenology of [he levels of knowledge

~aPter.

2-4S

§:II) is either itself an objectifying act. or has such an

F'u1~ basis. The ultimate bases of all acts arc therefore 'presentations' in

as ItS of representatIons. . tbC ~r Illl' diffi'rin,K mode ofrelll/ion of(ltl (J~f to ils ob!ecIs ha~ bt;e~ shown.

,cl:

f

bo vc diSCUSSions. to cover the followlOg essential ambigUIties: of ;lcts, the modes of believing. entertaining, wishing. doubt.

jp :aqualil)'

I. jp,g etc.

,

']'be underlying represenlatlOn, an

d

!. M 1M inlerpr~t~/til'e form: i.e, wh~ther the object is presented in purely . 'th1:, or intUItive. or mixed fashIOn. Here also belong the differences a perceptu~1 and an imaginative p~nt~tion etc.; . . (b) the interprl'f(lf/l'e mailer: whether the object IS presented 10 thIS or that '5ttlSC'. e.g. significatively through differing meanings, presenting the same object but qualifying it differently: (t) Ih~ interpreted contents: whether the object is presented by way of this or that sign. or by way of this or that representative content. In the latter cue. if Vo'C consider the matter more closely, the laws connecting intuitive representatives with matter and form, entail that we are also concerned with differences that affect form even where matter remains constant.

:-een

111 Intentional essence and fulfilling sense. Eplstemlc essence. Intuitions In specie In our ~irst Investigation (§14) we opposed 'fulfilling sense' to meaning lor fulfillmg meaning to intending meaning) by pointing to the fact that. in ~t.the object is 'given' intuitively in the same way in which the mere ~ng means it. We then took the ideally conceived element which thus ~.es ~ith the meaning. to be thefll/fi//ing sense. and said that. through fda ~IOCldence. the merely significant intention (or expression) achieved ~?n to I.he intuitive object (expressed Ihis and just this object). r""'l~S entails, to employ conceptual formations later introduced, that the ....u IIlg sen ' . ldequa I se IS IDterpreted as the intentional essence of the completely and 1ltis te)' fUlfilling acl. Pose of ~n~ptual formation is entirely correct and suffices for the pur· tiotith.tlOnln~ down the entirely general aspects of the situation where a e:.:Prtsses 1~le~llon achieves relation to its intuitively presented object: it tlPtessive~ :clm~Tla~t in~ighl. that I.he semantic e~sen~ o.f .the signitive (or ~nornenOlo1.~~aPJJ:C'lrs ulenl/(·ally. III cor.respondmg IIltultlve acts. despite ldtntificar g.tc.. ~ differences on either Side. and that the living unity of tilt ~Pt~~n reahzes this coincidence itself. and so realizes the relation of ~Iy 0;°°.10. \\Ihn.t it expresses, On the other hand it is clear. in virtue ~, th t~IS Idcntll)'. that the 'fulfilling sense' carries no implication of err, to tile al 11 dOl'S flOl accordingly it/cllIde the total ron/ent o/the intllitil'j' e:nem rlull this is rele\'llnt/or tht· Iheory 0/ bWlI'ledge. It might be

246

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

thought objectionable that we have conceived the intentional narrowly as to exclude such an important constituent of the act; so decisive for knowledge, We were guided by the thought that the of an objectifying int~ntion must be something ,wh~ch. no intentiOQ sort could lack. or which could not be freely vaned 10 It, without ideally necessary effect on its relation to its object, Purely signitive however, 'empty' acts. acts lacking in the moment of fUlness, llDd the unity of quality and matter can count as the essence of an act. It might now be objected that signitive intentions without suppon are impossible, that they also have intuitive fulness in their BUL in the sense of our treatment of signitive representation, and treatments of authentic and inauthentic illustration, this is reaUy DOt Or rather it is fulness. but not fulness of the signitive act, but ohM which it is founded. the act in which the sign is set up as an intuiti1e This fulness may, we saw, vary without limit, without affecting tile intention, and what concerns irs object. Taking into account tbiI stance, as well as the fact that, even in intuitive acts, fulness may within bounds, while the same object is constantly meant, with properties and with the same act-quality, we plainly need a term to the mere unity of quality with matter, But it is now also useful, on the other hand, to frame a more concept. We accordingly define as the episremic essence ofan 00' (in opposition to its merely semalllic essence) all rhe content w~ e\'(lnce for ils knowlellge-function. The three components of qualitJ, and fulness (or intuitive content) all belong to it. If we wish to overlap of the last two components, and have wholly exclusive we may make it consist of quality, matter and ill111ilil'ely represenltIIIN the last of which falls away in empty intentions, together with All objectifying acts having the same epistemic essence are the' for the ideal purposes of the theory of knowledge, When. we objectifying acts in specie. we have a corresponding idea in mmd. holds of (deliberately) restrictive talk of intuitions in specie etc.

an

§29 Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate objectively complete intuitive iIIustl"ations, Esse (fssenz) In an intuitive presentation a I"arying amounl of illtllitil'e Jlllne~s is . talk of a varymg ' . 'CdIOPO~~ ThiS amount pomts. as we argu , ~ of fulfilment: proceeding along these. we come to know the ob . ver and better, by way of a presentative content that resembles It e more closely, lmd grasps it more and more vividly and fully. ~e that intuition can occur where whole sides and parts of the object . .' conteol not apparent at all. i.e. the presentation has an IIltUltlve

~i11

247

representatives of these sides and pans. so that they are lllinl(Jg Psen 1ed 'inauthentically', through inwrought signitive intentions. (lillY pr~tiOn with these differences, which result in very different modes of In conn tiol1 for one llnd the same object, with meaning governed by the presentaatter. we spoke above of differences in the exlelll of fulness. Here ¢lI~ rnportant possibilities must be distinguished. 1\1'0 '~he intuitive presentation presents its object adequately, i.e. with an . I.. lve substance (Gehalt) of such fulness, that to each constituent of the UlIUlt. . h" " objeCt, as it is meant m t IS Pdresentatlon, a representative constltucnt of ibC intuitive content correspon s, , . 2. Or this is /lot the case. The presentation contall1s no more than an inCOmplete project~on of the object: it pr~sents it inadequately. . Here we are lalkmg of the adequacy or ll1adequacy of a presentation to its objtCt. Since. however, we speak more widely of adequacy in contexts of fulfilment, we introduce yet another set of terms. We shall speak of complete and deJeelil'e i1lluitions (more particularly of complete and mutilated percepts orirnaginations). All pure intuitions are complete. The following considerations will at once show that the converse does not hold, and that our proposed division does not simply coincide with that of pure and impure intuitions. Whether presentations are simple or complcx is a matter regarding which oothing is presupposed in the distinction just drawn. Intuitive presentations may, however, be complex in two ways: (a) The relation to the object may be simple in so far as the act (more ~fically. its matter) has no constituent acts (or no separate matters) that ~pendenllypresent the same total objea, This does not preclude the possibility that an act should be made up of partial intentions homogeneously fused, which relate to the individual parts or sides of its object. One can 1Ca~ly avoid assuming such complexity in the case of 'external' percepts :;maginations. and we have proceeded on this assumption, But. on the hand we have l~) the kind of complexity in which the total act is built out of constiI~ t acts, each of which iI/dependently is a full illfllilil"e presentation of . those extremely remarkable cOllfillUOllS 'FPrthsame objec . I. Th·IS we have In same ~~~ wh~ch bind together a multitude of percepts which pertain to the ~ ob' 1CCt. Into a single 'many-sided' or 'all-sided' percept. which deals with t I}'nthe: ~~n.til~u~usl~ in 'varying posi.tiOl.1S·, There are the corre~pon.ding I:lrneness lnlagmatlon. In the contlnulty of a prolonged fuslon-ll1tosingly nOt broken up into isol
2048

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

The phenomenology of the levels of kno.....ledge

possible in synthetic fonn in respect of its all-sided surfacc'"'COntOUra; form of an objcx:tively simple presentation. it is impossible. Of complete intuit.ion~ it is plain that objcx:tively ~imple one., no means always obJcx:tlvely complex ones. are pure mtuitions. intuition which corresponds to an empirical thing is denied to .... hidden after a fashion in the complete synthetic intuition itself were dispersedly. with a perpetual admixture of signitive rep.....•.... we reduce this synthetic intuition to its pure form. we do not ha_ intuition possible in an objcx:tively simple presentation, but a COD. • intuitive contents. in which each aspect of the object quite of\ea intuitive representation. achieves ever varied perspectival pro~ which only the continuous fusion of identity constitutes the pbalOll,. objective unity. When an intuitive fact serves to give fulness in connection with. intention, perhaps in connection with a meaning-intention exvre-dia: similar possibilities arise. The object as it is meant can receive an or an inadequate intuitive illustration. The former possibiliry separable possibilities in the case of complex meanings: First. that to all parts (members. moments. forms) of the me. . . . themselves have a meaning
sr-

~nother

2-49

intuition which cannot be united to the intuition of

nJtU(1lJ~' It is not then merely the signitive green-intcntion. but the same t.bC reo n in its objcctively complete fulfilment. which is at odds with the iOte~UO 'tion: thcse two intuitive moments are in total 'rivalry'. while the cor-

rtd·l~;;:ntuitive wholes are in

partial rivalry. This rivalry especially touches.

rela U\ might say. the intuitil'e or intuitil'ely presentutire contents of these as ooe fulfilling acts. . I· , ced h 11· f k f' .. . If othing specla IS prela we s a III uture spea 0 'mtultlve Itlustraonly in the case of fulfilments (not fruSlf'"dtions). ~tioctiOns of fulness in cases where quality and mailer are identical. prompt us to frame one f~rth:r. important concept: We shall say that two mtultlve acts have the same essentia (Essen=), if tltDr pure intuitions hal'e the same matter. A percept, and the whole possibly existent infinity of imaginative presentations. which all present the same object with the same breadth of fulness. have one and the same essentia. All objccti\'e1y complete intuitions with one and the same matter have the same mmtio. A signitive presentation has no essentia in its own right. But a certain mmtio may. in an inauthentic sense, be ascribed to it, if it permits of complete fulfilment through one of the possible manifold of intuitions pertaining to this es.sentiu. or. what is the same. if it has a 'fulfilling sense'. This probably clarifies the true meaning of the scholastic term essentia, which crnainly hinges on the possibility of a 'concept'.

. ?

Chapter 4

Consistency and inconSistency

251

-------;¥cn

Consistency and inconsistency

§lO The ideal distinction of meanings into the possible or real (reale) and the impossible or imaginary It is 1/ot possible (0 fit intuitive acts to every signitive intentiOD manner of an 'objectively complete intuitive illustration'. I Meaning' may accordingly be divided into the possible (internally co . the impossible (internally inconsistent, imaginary). This division, law underlying it. does not concern acts ill isolation - this applies other propositions propounded here - but their epislemic essence" and therein their 'matters' taken generally. For it is not signitive intention with matter AI should find a possibility of in some intuition, while another signitive intention with the same M, should lack Ihis possibility. These possibilities and impossi not refer to intuitions actually found in certain empirical in of consciousness: they are not real (reale), but ideal possibilities, sole ground in specific character. In the sphere of the verbally ex which we may without essential loss limit ourselves, the axiom ruDI= ings (i,e, concepts ami propositions in specie) dil'ille into the possibW impossible (the real alld the imaginary), Drawing on our just made notional constructions. we may define till bility (reality) of a meaning by saying thai rhere is an adequate essnrtM correspomls ro ir in specie ill rhl' sphere of objectifying acts, an essen'''' mailer is idemicalwilh its 011'11, or what is the same. that it has a " sense, or that there exists ill specie a complere illtuirioll whose matler tical wirh its own, This 'exists' has here the same ideal sense as in rna to reduce it to the possibility of corresponding particulars is not to to the possibility of anything different. but merely to employ an c,q turn of phrase. (This is true. at least. when 'possibility' is given and therefore non-empirical. scnse, and is 'rear only in this 'pureoak The idea of the possibility of a meaning really expresses, to I, matter morc exactly. a gCllerali:mion of the rela/ion off/llfilment III

po_*'

,I:

b' (Iil'e~r aJlJ/plett' im/liril'e illusrra/ioll. and the above definitions are to of/) ~t'arded, not as classifications of words, but as the itJeal, necessary and be t criferia of possibility, They really state the specific law that where C sl! h : relationship obtains between the matter of a meaning and the matter S~Can eSSl'1I1ia. possibility ~Iso o.brains. ,and conversely also that in every case ~f possibility such a rela,tlonshlp o.btalll~.. . Further: thaI such an Ideal relationship obtalllS at all, l.e. that this generalization holds objectively,. and is there~ore in its own t~rn 'possible' - this . self amounts 10 a law whIch may be SImply expressed 10 the words: There :rt possible ~1/('(lIIillgS (it must ~ ~oted lha.t 'me~ning' d.oes not stand for the act of mea 11m g). Not every emplflcal relationship permIts such a generalization. If we find Ihis intuited paper rough, we cannot pronounce generally 'Paper is rough', as we can pronounce generally, on the basis of a certain actual act of meaning: This meaning is possible (real)'. Just for this reason the proposition 'Every meaning is either possible or impossible', is no mere case of the law of excluded middle, in the familiar sense which excludes contradictory predicates from indil'id/lal subjects, and can only pronounce such an exclusion for such subjects. The exclusion of contradictory predicates in an ideal sphere (e.g. the sphere of numbers, of meanings etc.) is by no means obvious, but must be demonstrated afresh in each such sp~ere, or set up as an axiom. We may recall that we cannot, for instance, say that every kind of paper is either rough or not rough, for this would entail ,tha,t ~very individual paper of a particular sort was rough. or that e,very Illdlvldual paper of that particular sort was not rough: such assertIOns a~ obviously not valid for every possible species. There accordingly really. lies, behind the division of meanillg,f into possible and impossible, a pecuhar general law rich in content. a law that governs phenomenological mome~t~ in ideal fashion by binding their species in the manner of general prOPOSItIons.

~:~bIC .to utle: such an a.xiom. ~ne must ~'e~ its truth, and that we the ~-evldence III our case IS certam. If we realize. e.g.• the meaning of ofthexpresslOn ·white surface' on an intuitive basis. we experience the reality '. appearance really presents somethmg , whIte . and a SUrfe conccpt-. Ih' e mtultlve iotuiti~ce, and precisely as a white surface. This implies that the fulfilling iVe D'i" n does not mcrely present a white surface, but brings it to intuit....enness tl h demands 1Ioug Its Contenl as completely as its meaning-intention I·,po:.lSI-b-Ifill" is ,L . ,. as an Idea of equal tIlle. . "'QuId n . r
252

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

§31 Compatibility or consistency as an ideal relationship in the widest sphere of contents In general. Compatibility of 'concepts' as meanlnll We start with the concept of consistency or compatibility, wbich I widest sphere of contents in general (objects in the widest sense oftbe Two conlf;nts. which are parts of any whole. are united in it, .... accordingly compatible. consistent within the unity of the whole. Tbia emptily obvious. but the same contents will still be compatible . . . chance not to come together. There is good sense in speaking of a bility of contents. whose actual union always has been, and alwa)'l excluded. But if two contents are unified. their union proves not oaIJ own compatibility. but that of an ideal infinity of other cases, nameIJ pairs of contents exactly like them and belonging to similar kinds. II iI what this points to. and that the foIlO\~..ing axiom is by no means .. assertion: Compalibility does not pertain to dispersed individual but 10 the Species ofconlents. If. e.g.• the moments of redness and have once been found unified, a complex Species is at once ideal;"f! abstraction. and can forthwilh be gil'en, which embrac:cl Species of redness and roundness in its specifically gras~ f?rm. ~ bination. It is the ideal 'existence' of this complex Spectes lD compatibility of redness and roundness. in each thinkable i~stanee, a priori foundation, a compatibility which is an ideally valKi whether empirical union occurs anywhere in the world o~ not. If._ able sense of talk of compatibility is pinned down as the Ideal bciIII corresponding complex Species, a yet weightier point m~t ~ talk ofcomparibilily al"'a}'s relates to some sort ofwhole, which LS tbc point for our logical interest. Such talk is applied when we are whether or not certain given contents can be fitted together on a by certain fonns. a question decided in the affinnative if.w:e. can whole of the sort in question. The correlate of this compatlbdlty of is the 'possibility' of the complex meallillgs: this follows fro.m ~~ criteria of possibility, The appropriate essentia. the complete IOtUl~ tration of the corresponding complex conten!. proves the co m,p8U its parts. and conversely furnishes an esselltill and a correspondlO~ to such incompatibility, The reality of a meaning is theref~re ~UI Ve the meaning is an objectil'ely complete 'expreniol/' of an IOtUlll ibility of content. In the limiting case of a simple content one can. . h ' If' ObVIO validity of the simple species as a 'compaU·b·\· I llY, WIt se . combination of expression, an~ ~xpr~~(,.'
Consistency and inconsistency

253

~ty

in the sense of our Fourth Investigation - but are rather cornp~ed with a compatibility of meanings in a 'possible' meaning. Le, a cooce'oe. compillible with corresponding intuition in the unity of objectively l1leaOla~e knowledge. We have here accordingly a deril'ed. secondary fonn ade'lu h. The same is true of the tenn ·possibility'. The original possibility ofS~tV) is the validity. the ideal existence of a Species: it is at least fully (or ~nt~ by this, Next the intuition of an individual case which corrcsguaods to this possibility. and the intuitable individual itself. are possible. ally the meaning realized with objective completeness in such an intui:nn is said to be possible. The difference between talk about compatibility ~ talk about possi~il~ty consists ~Iely in the fact .that. while ,the ,latter defl0tes the simple vahdlty of a Species. the former (pnor to the Wldenmg of the notion to cover the limiting case) connotes the relationship oflhe compontfll Species in a Species which counts as one, and in connection therewith also the relationship of the panial intuitions in a total intuition. of the partial cootenlS to be intuited within a total content to be intuited as one. of partial meanings to be fulfilled within a total meaning to be fulfilled as one. Finally we remark that the concept of essentia, like tbe concepts of possi· bilityand compatibility. imparts its original sense derivatively to the realm ofmeaning. The original collcept ofessentia is expressed in the proposition:

f

£""J' l'a/id species is an esselltia,

fJ2

Incompatibility (conOict) of contents in general

Contents are incompatible. to pursue the opposed case down to its general uounds. if they cannot suffer each other in the unity of a whole. Put pbenomenologic-dlly: no unified intuition must be possible which presents SUCh. ~ whole with complete adequacy. But how shall we know this? In tnIPlr~cal instances we allempt to unite contents. sometimes successfully, ;rnetl mes without success - we experience an absolute resistance. But the Oe/lUll failure docs not establish a necessary fai/llre. Possibly greater power :Uld ultimately overcome the resistance. Nonetheless, in our empirical 'ri ~~ with the contents in question. and our attempted removal of their in ~ ~ . we experience a peculiar relationship of the contents. again grounded efl'o ~Ir specific being. lllld with an ideality quite independent of the empirical Of cf1:a~nd all the other features of the individual cuse, It is /he relationship °'!J,ICI

~~~~er~l~ltion,Shi~

con~ent ~nto

p.uts quite definite ,Wm.f of relation. within In "e if, 11I/(,' ll'\sOC",flOl1,\' oj COIltC'll1,f, Colours conflict wllh one another not • to neral b t ·fi ' 1111 sPec' ' ~ on \y.10 SIX"C11C contexts: several moments of colour. of varylbe sa lfic dltlerence. are incompatible as simultaneous overlays of one and "ithin~e ~ily extension. while they are quite compatible if set side by side II is n a Single extension. This is universally the case, A content of the sort eVer simply illcompmible with a content of the sort p: talk of their

254

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Consistency and inconsistency

incompatibility always relates to a definite sort of combination of W(a. b ... p) which includes p. and should now include q as well. The 'should' ce~tainl~ indica~es an .intention. a pre~nta~ive and generan voluntary Illtentlon. which thmks of Ihe q. given III any intuitioQ Y brought into the present intuition of W. which presents q signitivel This intention we shall. however, ignore, just as. in the case of COm r we ignored the intention towards unification. as well as the procesa ference and union. We only maintain the presence of a descriptiVely relationship between q - the remainder of A is variable at will aad no further part - and p. within the whole of contents W, and that thiI is independent of the individual element in the case. In other wOl'dl. grounded purely in the Species W. p and q. What is specific in the sciousness of conflict pertains to these Species, i.e. the gene'nilizlLlio the situation is actual. is realizable in an intuitively unified consci universality, it yields a unified, valid ('possible') Species which lI1IiIa Q, through cOIifiicl, on the basis of W

or

§33 How conflict can also be a foundation for unl Relativity of the talk of compatibility and conflict To this last expression and sentence there attach a series of . doubts and questions. Does conflict unify? Is the unity of conflict a possibility? Unity in general certainly underlies possibility, but does latter absolutely exclude conflict. inconsistency? These difficulties are resolved when we remember that not only incompatibility. but also talk of a compatibility, necessarily rela certain whole IV which. subjectively speaking, govems our intention. ing out from the specific make-up of this whole. we call its parts We should call the same contents p. q . .. (which here function II incompatible, if in our symbolic intention towards their unity within whole, we experienced intuitive conflict instead of intuitive unity. Tbe lation of the two possible cases in relation to the two definite sorts of • or combinations of compatible or incompatible contents, is clear. ~ tion also detennines the sense of these terms. We do not call p, q . .. compatible, merely considering thm they are unified and not at all ht1tI are so. but in the light of their ul/ion affer the mal/ller of IV, and.mat union of p. q ... excludes the conflict of the same p. q ... ill relatl(JII same IV. Contents p. if . .. are similarly not said to be simply illCO . but in the light of the fact that they will not 'sufTer' one anothe~ ~ framework of a unity of the sort W which just happens to 111 The intention to such a unity brings out a conflict il/steml of such. a the exclusion. of unity by corre~ated co~l1icl ?nc~ n~ore. also.plays::aThe consciousness of conflict entails ·dlSUOlty. smce It excl IV-type unity which is in question here. With this direction of interest,

255

- - itself - count liS umty. . b ut as separatlon. . . b ut not as a com b·matlon does ~ot inl!. But if we change the relations. an incompatibility can also a su~ er;l; a unity. e.g. between the character 'contHct' and the contents fUJlCIlO~ by it. This character is compatible with these contents. and perhaps ~paral atible with others. If our dominant intention is upon the whole1I1COI1l~bv..cont1ict which is the whole for the parts just mentioned. then. shapedwc' find such a whole. when conflict accordingly obtains. there is en ".h . tibility among these parts. p. q ... in this context. and in the cOllflict co=~ separates them. Thi.~ conflict is not a contHct among the members w t~e intended conflict. whose absence it in fact indicates. but a conflict f o taching 10 the contents p. q . .. united without conflict in one intuition, a~d the moment of conflict which is made intuitive in af/other intuition. a The paradox of talking of a unification-through-contlict is cleared up by noting the relativity of these concepts. One can no longer object: 'Conflict absolutely excludes unity. In the manner of conflict anything and everything could ultimately be unified. Where unity fails, there contlict obtains, and to allow this conflict once more to count as a unity. is to obliterate the absolute, stark distinction between unity and conflict. and corrupt its true sense'. No, we may now presume to reply, conflict and unity do not 'absolutely' exclude one another. but only in a variously detennined correlation which changes from case to case. In this correlation. they exclude each other as stark opposites. and only if we limit our 'absolutely' to some such tacitly presupposed correlation can we be satisfied with our polemical assertion. Not everything. moreover. can be unified in the form of a conflict. but only such things as serve to base a conflict, and none of the things that are or could be unified. For in the meaning of this talk of union·in·the-form-of· confl!ct it is implied that the fonn of conflict of a p. q ... thought of as in a cer:tam combination Woo shall count as a IInity, which as a unity re-cstablishes ~nlo~ an~ compatibility. and so corresponds to the W we mentioned above. !hUt If unlly obtains among p. q . .. in respect of the combination Woo then coes;.p,? ... will not pemlit themselves to be brought into a relationship of ~ Ict In respect of Ihi.f combination. since combination as such means Ity.

un

fO~h~ot ~verything can reall.y be unit~ in the foml of co.nflict: at least not whi h Stdted reason that fatlure of umty would be mamfest III a conflict. con~ .would therefore restore unity through conllict. We understand the faJluUston here fallen into. the confounding of underlying relations. The reOrth' P, q ..e Ul1Ity Wo. fixes the character of the conflict attaching to ItOt 'h" wllhln the conte.'.;t determined by the notion Woo This conflict does . ld . has,oweve th r. Yle the unity W o, bUI lIl/other unity. As regards the former it binati e ch,lr,lcter of a separation. as regards the new unity that of a comPeculi~ll. All this is in order. as an example will make clear. In relation to a t014fld
256

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

the first case. it produces separation between uxl and green. Despq. in regard to another kind of combination. it helps to establish a unit.. in regard to the type of combination conflict among Ihe sensuous --n a phenomenal object. Conflict is now a unity between red and greere, in respet:t of the elements conflict. red, greef/. As opposed to tbU" of red and rOlilld' is now disunity in respect of these elements cOlljfict rowlll. •

Consistency and Inconsistency

~bilities four pas terms:

257

must here be distinguished. expressed in the following

Unity} Conflict

f obtains 1does not obtain.

n_unity is. however.. another na~e for confli~t. and non·conflict (accord. "8 final elucidation of these aXIOIllS. and their relation to purely logical The I . r I· . Wh at we 0 the present nvestlgatton. . goes beyond the boundaries ~IOIl1S, " dd . h· I I · . here adduced tS only mten e to pomt to t e mterna re atlOns t hat ha~ed sire to track down later: they make us aware, very VtVI "dI y, t hat we :~ h:re already working to lay down the phenomenological foundations of

~o to the previous aXIOm) an eqUl~alent of u m t t .

§34 Some axioms After this elucidation, very important for our basic analysis, of the of relations of compatibility, we can lay down primitive axioms aod plete their phenomenological clarification. The first would be the the convertibility of relalions of compatibility (or incompatibility), analysis of the underlying phenomenological relationships makes . ately clear. The next axiom to be set up requires more consideration: that cOf/flicl (or compatibility and incompatibility) - each pair related to" basis of correlarion - exclude each olher reciprocally (or are . with one another), We need no longer emphasize that incompatibilit}' . the mere privation of compatibility, not the mere fact that a does not obje<:tively obtain, Union and conflict are notions with • phenomenological foundations. and we are therefore really utteriDJ. ment with content if we say that if a p conflicts with a q as form of unity W(p. q, .. ) - such conflict is a phenomenologically character - the union of a p with a q in the sense of the same W' possible'. The phenomenological ground of this fact has been laid bale previous discussion: when we try to unite actual conflict between p, q ••• the correspollding U1IiIY of p. q ... - actually to impose the fonn of • which has been somewhere really intuited in the case of items m, n .•• pertinent case of conflict 011 the same items p. q . , ,- a nell' conflict which has its roots in the first conflict and the elsewhere intuited f1 unity. Analogous things are plain ill the converse case. which may f1 rest be regarded as an application of the first axiom. The propositions that there is a l'Onjlict. and the proposition that I/O unity among any given p, q . , , (the same in both cases), say exacd1 same thing. £I'ery '1/01' expresses a cOlljlicl. , When a conflict attaches to the circumstance that p. q shall be in conftido p. q ... shall be one in the form of conflict. p. q ... are one, In other. If p. q are 1101 in cOf/flicl. are nat 1101 unified, they are unified (axl double negation) which entails that: Either IInity or conjficl obtaill.\· - one or OIlier i.\' the ('{Ise _ Ihere is ItO possibility.

pure logic.

13S Incompatibility of concepts as meanings Incompatibility. like compatibility, appears in thought in conne<:tion with signitive intentions directed to certain combinations_ in conne<:tion, accordingly, with signitive and intuitive identifications. The concept or incompatibility docs not relate to intentions. but the identically styled concept which relates to intentions is deriwuil'e. is a special case of the original notion, very definite in scope. and with limited openings for relations of frustration. Here we have an analogue of the matters set forth above (§31) in regard to compatibility or consistency. Talk or incompatibility in regard to meanings ('concepts') may again be said to express. not any and every ideal incompatibility or the same. not, e.g.. a purely grammatical incompatibility. It has to do only with the relationship or the partial meanings within a complex meaning. which does not fulfil itself in an objectively complete illustration, but is, or may be rrustrated. Plainly conflict of the intuitively illustrated ~ntents underlies such rrustration. although (be it noted) this conDiet is not :~lr,~eant and expressed. Otherwise conflict would pertain to the fulfilling ,lOtuI.tlOn·. and the expression would express adequately. and in an entirely ~lble' manner. an objective impossibility. who e connection between the meaning and each or the unified intuitions co l~~ cancel each other in the process of intuitive conflict, is likewise one or ~~t. (o.r COurse with partial coincidencc~, . . . the .l?cal laws to be set up ror the poSSibility or meamngs are based on cq,~ngm
258

EJemenu of " phenomenologiul elucidnion of knowledge

Of a pair of contradictory meanings - of meanings such that Wbal means as incompatible the other means as compatible - one is PoIOill!O; the other impossible. The negative of a negative - i.e. a meaning which presents . bility in a given matter M as itself involving incompatibility - is equj the corresponding positive meaning. This positive meaning is defined meaning which presents the inner consistcncy of the same M t"".... same presentative matter (the matter left over after the negations baWl cancelled). Quite obviously a real theory of meanings according to their loaicII tions would demand that all such propositions should be enuncitlltl proved in a systematically ordered fashion. We break: off our fragmentary discussions. leaving their oo"'lllool. later investigations. We need, in the interests of logic, a much DtORI sive, completely executed phenomenology and theory of identifica . differentiations. particularly of such as are partial. as well as of their close relations to the doctrine of unity and conflict.

5 Ch3 pte r .:._ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~ . file ideal 0 f a d equation. self-evidence and truth

--------------fl' Introduction In our discussions up to this point we have said nothing of the qllalities of acts, nor presumed anything in regard to them. Possibility and impossibility have indeed no special relation to these qualities. It makes no difference. e.g.. to the possibility of a proposition, whether we realize the propositional mailer as matter for an act of assertion (not of an act that assents to somelhing in the accepting or recognizing manner of approval. but in the manner of I simple act of belief or taking for true). or whether we use it. in qualitati\'dy modified fashion. as the matter of a pure presentation. A proposition is always 'possible'. when the concrete act of propositional meaning permits ofa fulfilling identification with an objectively complete intuition of matching material. It is likewise irrelevant if this fulfilling intuition is a percept. or ,.pUrt construction of fantasy. etc. Since the summoning up of imaginative ptCtUrts is more subject, in varying degrees. to our will. than that of percepts ~nd asscrtions. we inclinc to relate possibility specially to the picture-life of anlas)'. A thing counts as possible, if it allows itself. objectively speaking. to be rtalized in the fonn of an adequate imaginative picture. whether we Ol.1r1tIves. as panicular empirieal individuals. succeed in thus realizing it or ~But through the ideal linkage between perception and imagination. tbU: assu~~ us u priori that to each percept a possible image corresponds. to ir::;oposl.tlo n is equivalent 10 our own. and the limitation of the concept Wha~n~tlOn ,not CS5elllial.. . . . . indica . . e. ha\ e now to do. qUltc bnefly. IS to diSCUSS the effect of these Just ltIaya:~~adlrr~.r~nces up~n. relationships of fulfilm~nt, so that our treatments St fI:,ICh a provislolllil tcnn. as well as a vIew over further rcsearches.

117 Th .. or "It. e fUlfilling function of perception. The ideal \I; lrtlate fulfilment e have " , ~Pona seen that differences In the completeness of 'fulness have an nt bearing on the manner in which objects are made present in

260

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

presentations. Signitive acts constitute the lowest step: they POSSess Qo whatever. Intuitive acts have fulness. in graded differences of rnore and this is already the case within the sphere of imagination. The of an imagination. however great, still leaves it different from a it does not present the object itself, not even in part. it offers only ita' which. as long as it is an image at all. never is the thing itself. 1be owe to perception. Even this. however. 'gives' us the object in varied tions of perfection. in differing degrees of ·projection·. The intentioall acter of perception. as opposed to the mere representation of' . is that of direct presentation. This is, as we know, an internal . acts, more precisely of their interpretative form. But 'direct' does not in general amount to a true being-present, but only to III ance of presence. in which objective presence, and with it the perfo~ veridicity (lVahr-IIelllmmg. perception) exhibits degrees. This is glance at the corresponding scale of fulfilment. to which all exempll~ of perfection in presentation is here. as elsewhere, referred. We become clear that a difference extends over the fulness of perceptiOll sought to cover by our talk of perceptual projection, a difference not concern fulness in respect of its sensuous stuff, its internal ch..... means a graded extension of its character as fulness. i.e. of the in character of the act. From this point of view many elements off for us - quite apart from anything genetic. for we know full weD dill like all similar differences. have an associative origin - asjiNJ/ of the corresponding objective elements. They offer themselves u . with these last, not as their mere representatives: they are the t.... an absolute sense. Other cases again count as mere adumbrations m perspectival foreshortenings etc.. in which case it is clear that to such something corresponds in the phenomenological content of the IICl all reflection. We have already dealt with these 'projective' dilli found them. pictorially transferred. in the case of imagination. E. jection is representative in chamcter. and represents by way of . but the manner of this representation by similarity differs accordiDI representation takes the projected content as picture or self(self-projection) of the object. I The ideallimil. which an increase;:-" of projection permits, is. in the case of perception. the absolute thing (as in imagination it is its absolutcly resembling image), and every side and for every presented element of the object. The discussion of possible relationships of fulfilmcnt therefore a goal ill which increase ofjllljilmem 1t>rlllimllt'S, in ll'hich rhe c~ elltirt, ill/f!lItiun ~j(lS rt'oched its juljilml'll~. ,"~~ that not intenn~l~ partially. but ultimately and finally. The Intulllve substance of thiS ment is the absolute sum of possible fulness; thc intuitive represeJ1 the object itsclr. as it is in itselr. Wherc a presentative intention bas its last fulfilment. the genuine udaeqllatio rt!i t!t imellectlls has beeP

The ideal of adequation. Self·evidence and truth

261

~jt'(1

iJ octllllily 'presellf' or ·gil·en·. ami prt'S('1If as jllst what .bO~~~.t' illft,"ded it; no partial intention remains implicit and still lacking .,~

,.,.:;lntCn t . ~. SO

.

also, ('0 ipso, the Ideal of every fulfilment. and therefore of a .~rotirt' fulfilment. ,is sk~tched for u~: the intellt!('fllS is in thi~ case. the ~~t.intention. the intention of meamng, And the adueqllatio IS realized tbOu the object meant is in the strict sense girt'n in our intuition. and given ,,~ t what we think and call it. No thought-intention could fail of its ~ent. of its last fUlfil~ent,. in !"act. in so f~r as t~e ful~lJing medium of . 'lion has itself lost all Implication of unsatisfied intentions, 1lI~ sees that the perfection of the adequation of thought to thing is ~fold: on the one hand there is a perfect adaptation to intuition. since the ::OUght means nothing that the fulfilling intuition does not completely present IS belonging to the thought. In this the two previously (§29) distinguished 'petfections' are plainly comprehended: they yield what we called the 'objective completeness' of the fulfilment. On the other hand the complete intuition itself involvcs a perfection. The intuition fulfils the intention ."hich terminates in it as not itself again being an intcntion which has need orrurther fulfilment. but as offering us the lasl fulfilment of our intention. We must therefore draw a distinction between the perfection of the adaptation f:I inruitiOtl. which is 'adequation' in the natural. wider sense. and the perfection of final fulfilment which presupposes this fulfilment. and which is an adequation with the 'thing itself'. Each faithful. unalloyed description of an iatuitive object or event provides an example of the former perfection, If the ot;::ct is something in interior experience, and is grasped as it is in reflex ~tion, then the second perfection may be added. as when. for instance. kloling back on a categorical judgement just made, we speak of the subject::ntation in this jUdge~lent. The first perf~tion. is, ~owever, lacking. \\-e call the tree standmg before us a 'cultlvated vanety of apple-tree. : ~ we speak of the 'vibratory frequency' of the note just dying away. .,;,..In gtneral. when we speak of such properties of perceptual objects as. 1It'tVtt much they may be marginally meant in our perceiving intention. t even more or less projectively present in what actually appears. ilia)' fOll?wing observation is also in place. Since ,10 ultimate fulfilment ~ntalO absolutcly no unfulfilled intentions. it must issue out of a pllrt! otq I~' :n, obje~tivcly complete percept. but one achicved by the continu1\..... t eSIS of Illlpurc percepts. will not fill the bill. I f ' . _lOst OUr Ilttenti .' 1Il0C e 0 treatmcnt. whIch places the final fulfilment of all r-, Ons In ....'r " be 0 b'~ectcd that the re,lhzed , '_ of h ~J~ ceptlon. It lIlay consciousIrneral t e ~Olvcr.sal. the consciQusness which gives fulness to conceptually OUr eyespresentations. and which sets the 'universal object itself' before !.be difJi . rests On a ground of mere imagination. or is :11 least indifferent to I... erencebct, 'd , ~"t, "ecn perceptIOn an "ImaglOatlOn. The same 'IS obViously a consequence of what has just been said. of all self-evident gener-dl

n:

262

Elemenu of il phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

assertions. which make themselves plain to us. in axiomatic fastUo.a. our very notions alone'. This objection points to a gap in our investigation that has a] touched on from time to time. We first took perception, with' obviousness. as being the same as sense-perception, intuition as same as sensuous intuition, Tacitly. without any clear canscio have frequently gone beyond the bounds of these notions, e.g, in with our discussions of compatibility, We regularly did this, wbea, spoke of intuiting a conflict or a union, or some other synthesis u our next chapter. which deals generally with categorial forms we the need to widen the concepts of perception and other sorts 0( . To remove our objection. we shall now only say that the imagina,.., serves as basis for generalizing abstraction. does not therefore actual. authentic function of fulfilment, and so does not play the 'corresponding' intuition. What is individually singular in phen",..... itself. as we have several times stressed. the universal, nor does it universal as a real (reell) 'piece' of itself.

§18 Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense Under the rubric of 'intentions', positing and non-positing acts been indiscriminately ranged. Nonetheless. thougb the general fulfilment essentially depends on the 'matter' of acts, which alone iI to an array of most important relationships. the quality of acts the determination of others. and to such a degree that talk of in dim:ted aiming. really only seems to suit assertive acts, Our though! ( aims at a thing, and it hits its mark, or does not hit it. according 81 or does not agree in a certain way with perception (which is here" ive act). Positing then agrees with positing: the intending and ,Ii . are alike in this quality. Mere presentation. however, is paSSIve: iI matters 'in suspense', Where by chance an adequate percept a mere presentation. a fulfilling coincidence certainly issues from till ally fitting 'matters' of the acts: in the transition. however, the p acquires an assertive note. and the unity of coincidence itself, this note quite homogeneously. E(ICh llCIl/O/ idemificlltion or diffi is all 1I.uertil'e aCI. whether itself founded on assertions or not: briefly-worded proposition adds an all-important characterizaUo~ results of our last chapter. a characterization determining a.1I ~ela of compatibility: the theory of identifications and differen~lallODJ reveals itself. with more clearness than before. as a chapter ID the. judgement, For according as positing or non-positing acts fuo cU08 imentions or their fulfilments. they illuminale distinctions like ~t illustration. perhaps exemp/ificalion. on the one hand. and l'd'

The ideal of ildequuion. Self-evidence and truth

263

~and its opposite reflltation, on the other. The concept of verifica-

#~Ies exclusively to positing acts in re/alion 10 their posilingflllfi/ment. poca rt ~ ateh' 10 their fulfi/ment Ihrough percepts.

and u1~~ lasl-prc-cminent case we now give closer consideration. It is a case

r~~ ~ Ihe ideal of adequation yields us self-el'idellce (Eviden=). We speak in 'If IChat loosely of self-evidence wherever a positing intention (a statement ~ro~~icular) find~ verification in a correspolld~ng, fully 3.ccommodated III papt, even if thiS be no more than a well-fitllng syntheSIS of coherent ~ percepts. To speak of degrees and /el'e1s of self-evidence then has a ~ sense. Here are relevant an approximations of percepts to the objective pkteness of Iheir presentation of their object. all further steps towards final ideal of perfection, the ideal of adequate perception, of the complete sdf_manifestation of the object. however it was referred to in the intention 10 be fulfilled. BUI the epistemologically pregMnt sense of self-evidence is exdusi\'e1y concerned with this last unsurpassable goal, the act of this most ,elect synthesis offulfi/mem. which gives to an imemion, e.g. the intention ofjudgement. the absolute fulness of content, the fulness of the object itself. The object is not merely meant. but in the strictest sense ghen, and given as it ill meant, and made one with our meaning-reference. It does not matter. for the rest. whether one is dealing witb an individual or a universal object. _il; an object in the narrower sense or with a state of affairs. the correlate 0( an identifying or distinguishing synthesis. Self-evidence itself. we said. is the act of this most perfect synthesis of coiocidence. Like every identification. it is an objectifying act, its objective correlate being called being in the sense of truth, or simply trWh - if one does DOl prefer to award this term to another concept of the many that are TOOt«! in the said phenomenological situation. Here. however. a closer disClasion is needed.

:n

13' Self-eVidence and truth I.lf\lo~atfi

COrrelate rs! kee? ~o the ~otion of truth just suggested. truth as the I't\ate: of an Identlfymg act IS a stale of affairs (Sachrerll(l/r). as the cor• Oleaof a .coincident identity it is an it/enlity: Ille filII agreement of what what is gil'ell as sllch. This agreement we experience in self-

tviden nt ~1th

~u ct, ~n so far as self-evidence means the actual carrying OUI of an

encc' ~~e

Identification. The proposition that self-evidence is the 'experi-

lttr-evid:~~th. cannot. how.ever,. be simpl~ interp~eted as telling us that the

lbe tase f e loS the perceptIOn

(10 a sufficlenlly Wide sense) of truth and, in

~. pr o. Slnet self-evidence. the lldel/lIl11t! perception oflruth. For. to recur IIIlist all~vlousl,,' -". d ou b t (see Ihe addendum to §8 and chapter 7). we \Olu;u

"" 'ct11a~w Ihat I~e carrying oul of an identifying coincidence is nOI as yet Ita ~ perception of objective agreement. but becomes so only Ihrough

aCt of objectifying interpretation. ils own looking lowards present

261

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

truth, Truth is indeed ·present'. Here we have always the a prior' of looking towards Ihis agreement, and of laying il before ou/. consciousness in an adequate percept, . 2, A ~ond con~ep~ of Iruth ~oncerns the itll'al relationship wtaq In the unity of cOincIdence which we defined as self~vidence epislemir ('SSl'm:es of Ihe coil/ciding aCIS, While truth in sen~ I objl'clII'l' ite~ corresponding to the act of self-evidence, truth in drbl the Idea whIch belongs to the act-fonn: Ihe epistemic essence in, the itlealessence of Ihe empirical(v cOn/illgem act of self~vidence, "" absolllff! adeql/Mioll as such, 3. We also experience in self-evidence, from the side of the . . furnishes 'fulness'. Ihe objeci girell ill Ihe mallller of Ihe object given, the object is fulness itself. This object can also be called the 'truth' in so far as it is here not experienced as in the rnerdy percept. but as the ideal fulness for an intention, as that whicb intention true (or as the ideal fulness for the intention's spedjic essence). 4. Lastly, considered from the standpoint of the intention. the the relationship of self-evidence yields us truth as the rlghlnen of lioll (and especially that of our judgement), its adequacy to ill or Ihe righilless of the ill1ell1ion's epiSlemic essen« in specie, We laller regard, the rightness, e.g., of the judgement in the logical the proposition: the proposition 'directs' itself to the thing itself, it it is so. and it really is so. In this we have the expression of the· therefore general. possibility that a proposition of such and suc:b. admits of fulfilment in the sense of the most rigorous adequatioa. We must further particularly note thaI the 'being' here in q • first objective sense of truth. is not to be confused with the 'beins' the mpula in the affinnative categorical judgement. Self-evidence ill of Iollli /'Oilleidellce. whereas the 'being' of the copula corresponds if not invariably to partial identifications {i.e. judgements of q • Ilut even where total identification is predicated, the two 'bein..' coincide, For we must observe that in the case of a self-evident j i.e. of a self-evident predicative asserlion, heil/K ill the sellse ofIrUl1i " el/ced bUl /lor t'Xp"'.l"Sed, and so never coincides with the being expericnced in the 'is' of the assertion. This second 'being' is the moment in what i!>' in the sense of i.~ trul' - how could it express lhe the latter is truc '? There arc in fact sel'er(ll agrl'l'lIIl'n1,~ which are here to synthesis: (llIe of these. the partial. predicative one. is meant and perceived adequately. and so self-presented. (What this become clearer in the next chapter by way of the more general d categorial objl.."Ctific;l\ion,) This is thc agreelllellt ()f.~lIbjf!t't with p' suiting of predicate to subject. We have. in the second place, the which COI/Srilllit's rhe !>Tfllhl'lie form of rhe (jel ofse!f-t'I'il!eIlU, and

The Ideal of adequation. Self·evidence and truth

265

----:;:oincidence of the meaning.intention of our assertion with the of the :oof the state of affairs itself. a coincidence nalurally achieved in ~p 'hich do 110t here concern us further. Thi,~ agreement is plainly not stSges~v. it is not objective like the first agreement. which belongs to the assert f~fTairs judged. No doubt il emf always be asserted and asserted with stale: o'dence. It then becomes the verifying state of affairs for a new self~. of ~'hich Ihe I~k~ is true. and so.on, At each step. howe~er. one I distingUish the venfymg stale of affaIrs from the state of affairs con· ~."'u\.e of the self-evidence itself, we must distinguish the objectified from ",," ~. the: not-ob~ecli,fied ~tale 0 f allalrs. . ,. The distlDctlons Just dmwn lead 10 the foJlowmg general dISCUSSIOn. In our exposition of the relationships of the concepts of self-evidence and trUth. we ha\'e nOi drawn a distinction which touches the ohjeclh'e side of 1M acts which. whether functioning as intentions or fulfilments. find their absolute: adequation in self-evidence: we have not. that is. distinguished bd:",-een states of affairs. on the one hand, and other objects. on the other. We have paid no heed. correspondingly, to the phenomenological difference beuottn acts which relate. on the one hand - acts of agreement and disapmnent. predicative acts - and acts which do not relate. on the other. We bn~ paid no need. therefore. to the difference between relational and non. ~tional meanings, or to the relational·non-relational distinction among ~y apprehended essences in genenll, Strict adequation can bring nonrdaung as much as relating intentions into union with their complete fu.l6lments. If we now particularly consider the field of expressions. we need DOl cono=m ourselves with judgements as assertive intentions or assertive fuifUments: acts of naming can also achieve their adequation. The concepts 0{ truth 'gh ,n tness, the true. are genemlly interpreted more narrowly than _"t have done' Ih . h JU . d gemenlS and propoSitiOns, .. .h . ey are connect ed wll or the ~tates of affairs which are their objective correlates. 'Being' is meantbou;allll y sP<:'ke~ of in relation to absolute objects (not states of affairs). latio no definnc hnes are drawn, Our right to our more general interprethat ~hOfthese concepts is unassailable. The very nature of the case demands least ~ Concepts of truth and f;.lsehood. should, in the first instance at _', h fixed so widely as to span the whole sphere of objectifying acts. It •......lS t crefor . 10 dislin ' e most Suitable thut the concepts of truth ;1I1d being should be Cition gUI~h7d, that our concepts of truth - a certain range of equivoC1arifie:~ITl:llnIng i~cvitable but hardly dangerous once our concepts are iraspabtc MC apphcd from Ihe !>'it/t' of fhe acls ,hl'lIIse/l'I'.\' and their ideally applied, momenls. whereas the concepts of bei/lK (genuine being) arc be, defined' 0 the eorr-' I I:spon d'Illg (I b·· ~t'l"lIre ('urre art's. Truth would then have to f't&htness In th.e manner of (2) and (4) as the Idea of adcqu:ltion. or as the be Pinned~ Objectifying assertion and meaning, Ileing would then have 10 ~nt and o.w n a.ccording to (I) and (3) as the identity of the object 'II once given In adequation. or (in conformity wilh the natural sense of

::ile

266

The ide;lll of ;IIdequuion. Self·evidence and truth

Elements 0' ;II phenomenologinl elucidnion of knowledge

words) as the adequately perceivable thing as such, in an indefinite to an intention that it is to make true or fulfil adequately, After our concepts have been thus widely fixed and aSSured enologically, we may pass on, having regard to the distinction relational and non-relational acts (predications versus absolute to define narrower concepts of trulh (llill being. The narrower truth would be limited to the ideal adequation of a relatiotud ICt corresponding adequate percept of a state of affairs: just SO the concept of being would concern the being of absolute objects. .... separate this off from the 'subsistence' of the state of affairs. The following is accordingly clear: if one defines a judgement _ sertive act in general, then the sphere of judgement, subjectively coincides with the joint spheres of the concepts trlle andfa/se in the sense of these words. But if one defines it by way of the statemcat possible fulfilment, and ranges under judgements only the sphere tional assertions, then the same coincidence obtains again, provided naffower concepts of truth and falsehood are again used as a baiL In one-sided fashion we have hitherto favoured the case or JeIf. the aet described as one of total coincidence. But, turning to the case of connict. we encounter absurdity, the experience of the totII: between intention and quasi-fulfilment. To the concepts of trum the correlated concepts of falsehood and non-being then corte.... phenomenological clarification of these concepts can be carried oat particular difficulty, once all foundations have been prepared, 1bI ideal of an ultimate frustration would first have to be exactly cU·. . . . When self-evidence is conceived strictly, in the manner here, it is plain that such doubts as have rrom time to time bceD in modem times are absurd. doubts as to whether the expericDce evidence might not be associated with the matter A for one rna-, absurdity is associated with it for another. Such doubts are only long as self-evidence and absurdity are interpreted as peculiar . negative) feelings which. contingently attaching to the act ?f impart to the latter the specific features which we assess 10gJeaU>: • and falsehood, If someone experiences the self-evidence or A., it el'l'dent that no second person can experience the absurdity or thiS for. that A is self-evident. means that A is nOI merely meant, bUI inely given, and given as precisely whal it is thought to be, In the s it is ilself prescnt. But how could a S\.."'C~n~ pcr~on ref~r in thO~~ same thing A. while the th~ug~t. that ,It IS A, IS ge.numel y exc or genuinely given non-A? One IS. It IS plam, dealing With a matter • the same maUer, in fact. Ihat the law of contntdiction (iDto whose the correlations discussed in §39. p. 264 naturally enler) successfully It is reliably clear. as a result of our analyses. thai being and are not conceplS which in their origin express opposilion among the

=

~enl~;'

267

Following our interpretation of the phenomenological

cJ o~r J~hiPS involved, every judgement is assertive: this assertion does not

reJ:!uon~ 'ze the 'is· of which the 'is not' is the qllulitalil'e contrary. The cha~et~~e contrary of a judgemenl is II mere presentation having the same atL ' " , I qll ahl 'Differences between 'IS an d··IS nOI . are d'rt". 11lerellCCS "til mtentlOna er lIlau ' , Just as an "IS . , expresses pr00·lcatlve . agreement a f ter Ihe manner 0 f _ftUcr. ," 00·· n· :¢ning.intcntion, so an IS not expresses a pr Icauve con ICt.

and Section ~

sense and understanding

----------------

Ch3Pter 6 _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~I1SUOUs and se

categorial intuitions

~-----------

f40

The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms, with a thought leading towards lu solution 1lI. our discussions up to this point we have repeatedly and strongly felt a IarF gap. It had to do with the categorial objective forms. or with the s,'Utbetic functions in the sphere of objectifying acts through which these objective fonns come to be constituted. through which they may come to "iDtuition' and thereby also to 'knowledge', We shall now attempt to some atcJ.t to fill in this gap. taking our point of departure from the investigation of our fint chapter: Ihis was concerned with one limited aim of epistemoIoP::a1 clarification: the relation of a meaning-intention as the thing to be CIpressed, with an expressed sensuous intuition. We shall for the time being tpin build on the simplest cases of perceptual and other intuitive state~lS, and shall use them to shed light on the theme of our next treatments, III the following manner: In tbe ,case of a perceptual statement. not only the inwrought nominal ~latlons are fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement finds fulfilment Ji\ 6Ugb Our underlying percept. We say likewise that the whole statement ink~utterance 10 our percept: we do not merely say 'I see this paper, an "'rit~ several books', and so on, but also 'I see that Ihe paper has been art Iyj on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books iQ&tc~ open', and so on, If a man thinks the fulfilment of nominal meanor tOtal r enough, we shall ask him how we are to understand the fulfilment beyond ~Ia,!ements. especially as regards that side of them that stretches ~1Jd cant r :mattcr', in this case beyond their nominal terms, What may PrOPosir urntsh fulfilmenl for those aspects of meaning which make up lbt cop Ull~nal form as such. the aspects of 'ClIfegor;a! form' to which, e,g., , loOk: a belongs? Il:ll() fa~ al mOrc narrowly, Ihis qucstion also applies to nominal meanings, lbe!lam aSrthese arc not totally formless like the meanings for individuals, e, Ike the Statement. even in its grammatical appearance, possesses

t

272

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledae

both 'maUer' and 'fonn'. If it comprises words, the form lies way these words are strung together, partly in its own form.wo:::u' the mode of construction of the individual words, which allows US to distinction between its moments of 'matter' and its moments of 'rona' grammatical distinction~ refer us bac.k to ~istinctions of meani0l- ' at least a rough expression of the artl~ulatl~ns and forms which are in our meaning's essence and the articulations and forms of P1.... our meanings, therefore, parts of very different kinds are to be fi among these we may here pay special attention to those expressed bJ words such as 'the', 'a', 'some', 'many', 'few', 'two', 'is', 'not', 'wbicb0 'or' etc" and further expressed by the substantival and adjectival. ° and plural innection of our words etc. How does all this stand as regards fulfilment? Can the ideal of adequate fulfilment fonnulated by us in our third chapter still III tained? Are there parts and forms ofperception corresponding 10 alI forms ofmeaning? In that case we should have the parallelism bel";" ingful reference and fulfilling intuition that talk of 'expressioo' The expression would be an image-like counterpart of the perocpt its parts and fonns to be expressed) but reconstituted in a DeW ex-pression in the stuff of meaning, The prototype for interpreting the relation between meania& ing would then be the relation of the 'proper' individual lDC&IIiII responding percepts. The man who knows Cologne itself, aad possesses the genuine 'proper meaning' of the word 'Cologne'" contemporary actual experience something exactly correspoodilll future confinning percept. It is not, properly speaking, a the percept, as, e.g., the corresponding imagination would be, BIll the city is thought to be itself present to us in the percept, 10 . . name 'Cologne', in its 'proper meaning', refers, as previously ~.::~ same city 'directly': it means that city itself. and as it is, The str: percept here renders the object apparent without the help or f~ ordinate acts, the object II'hich the meaning-intention means, and laller means it. The meaning-intention therefore finds in the mere the act which fulfils it with complete adequacy. If instead of considering directly naming, unstructured exp rather consider structured, articulated expressions, the matter the same. I .we white paper and say 'white paper', thereby exp . precise adequacy, only what I see. The samc holds of co~plet: J . I see that this paper is white, and express just this by saYll1g: Tb" whitc'. . We
Sensuous and cuegorial intuitions

~he

273

white paper itself; this 'meaning' therefore coincides, in lOg .IUlcb of fulfilment. with the partial percept which relates to the 'white· lbC st~l~f the object. But Ihe assumption of a mere coincidence with this ~ rcept is nol enough: we are wont to say here that the white thus part.pe t is known (IS white and is called so, In our normal talk of 'knowltppa;':>t are, however, more inclined to call the object which is our (logical) td~ the Ihing -known'. In slIch knowledge another act plainly is present. ~ perhaps includes the former one. but is nonetheless different from it: poper is known as whit~, o~ r'dther a,s a whi.te thi~g, whenever we expr~ :. percept in th~ ~rords .whlte paper. The mtentlon of the word 'white' ooiY partially COInCides .wlth the colour-aspect of the apparent object; a surPlus of meaning remams over, a form which finds nothing in the appearpee itself 10 confinn it. White paper is paper which is white. Is this form DOl also repeated, even if it remains hidden, in the case of the noun 'paper'? Qaly the quality-meanings contained in its 'concept' terminate in perception. Here also the whole object is known as paper, and here also a supple-.wy form is known which includes being, though not as its sole form, in ibdf. The fulfilment effected by a straight percept obviously does not extend 10 such forms. We bave but to ask, further, what corresponds in perception to the difTereDl.'t between the two expressions 'this white paper' and 'this paper is white', w'cicb an: both realized on the same perceptual basis, we have but to ask what side of perception is really brought out by this difference - the differCIICe, that is, of the attributive and the predicative mode of statement _ and .1,. in the case of adequate adaptation, this difference brings out with PftUliarexactness, and we experience the same difficulty. Brieny we see that ~,~ of structured meanings is not so simple as the case of a 'proper' 1ldivid~1 meaning. with its straightforward relation of coincidence with ~on .. Certainly o~e can tel! one',s auditors, intelligibly and unambiguthat I see that thiS paper IS white'. but the thought behind such talk let;" not be that the meaning of this spoken sentence expresses a mere act of ~'~t may also be _lhe case that the epistemic essence of our seeing, in tahi CO e a~parent object announces itself as self-given, serves to base cerIIre&t thDnectlve or relational or otherwise formative acts. and that il is to IIlcb ac~t our expression in its changing forms is adjusted, and that it is in ~ perfonned on a basis of actual perception, thai our expression in rotlnded° Such changing forms. finds fulfilment. If we now combine th~se lion, andact~ or rather act-forms with the acts which serve as their foundal:OnlPle:o; gIve the comprehensive name 'founded act' to the whole actPossibili~S t.hat result from such formal 'founding', we may say: Granted the tlo longe; ;US,I ~ket~hed, our parallelism .ma~ be ~e-eslablished, but it is tbt I1ltre parallehsm between the meanll1g-lI1tentlons of expressions and ....;ng .percepts which correspond to Ihem: it is a parallelism between -Inte . Ililons and Ihe above mentioned p(~rceptu(l/ly founded acts.

-1

r

2H

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

27S

~our judgem.ent would cease to know anything. It means. in all

§41 Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples

.iIQlI~ col!italive style. Just what could be known by the aid of intuition. if

lf we suppose our range of examples widened so as to cover the of predicative thinking. we shall encounter similar difficulties ... possibilities of resolving them. Judgements in particular will C01Do have no dcfmite relation to anything individual which ought to through any intuition: they will give gelleral expression to rela_ ideal unities. The general meanings embodied in such jud&emeall be realized on a basis of corresponding intuition. since they origin. mediately or immediately. in intuition. The intuited indi . however. what we mean here; it serves at best only as an '"odi..10 an example. or only as the rough analogue of an example, for the which alone interests us. So. for instance. when we speak 'colour' or specifically of 'red'. the appearance of a single nlCl furnish us with a documenting intuition. It also at times happens. that one calls such a general 518 pression of intuition. We say. e.g., that an arithmetical axiom ex we find in intuition. or we raise objection to a geometrician tbIt expresses what he sees in his figure without deducing it fo borrows from his drawing and omits steps in his proof. Such talk sense (as when the objection scores no mean hit against the f, of Euclidean geometry) but 'expression' here means something . the previous cases. Even in their case expression was nnt a mere of intuition: this is even less the case here. where our thought'•• not aimed at intuitively given phenomena nor at their intuitive relationships. and call in our case not be aimed at them. For ~ stood geometrically is known to be an ideal limit incapable m intuitive exhibition in the concrete. Even in our case. nonetheles&, generic field as such. intuition has an essential relation to ex • its meaning: these. therefore. constitute an experience of general related to intuition. no mere togetherness of them aU, but a belongingness among them. Even in our case. concept and ~:= oriented towards intuition. through which alone. after COI'1 justment. self-evidence. the crown of knowledge. emerges. It reflection. on the other hand. to see that the meaning of the ex question is not found in intuition at all. that such intuiti?n onlY'fi, a filling of clarity ,md in the favourable case of self-eVidence. know only too well that the overwhelming majority of general and in particular those of science. behave meaningfully without anY tion from intuition. and that only a vanishing section. even ~f the proven. are and remain open to complete intuitive iIIununa Even in the general realm. as in the realm of individuals, our. has a relation to intuitively founded acts of thought. Should Ul

tJ:-

e:tP: ~I!e~ent

is indeed true at all. Knowledge always has the character of

~~rt1~nt and
• f~nfinn a general judgement through subsequent intuition. as in every case of knowledge. ~r difficult~.then is ~ow id~ntifica.tion can arise. where. the fonn of the I'll propoSlllon. and III particular Its form of ulliversahty. would vainly :::syJllpathetic clements in individual intuition. To remove this difficulty. If io tbe previous case. the possibility of 'founded acts' suggests itself. This ·bilit)'. carried out more fully. would run more or less as follows: ~ general thoughts find fulfilment in intuition. certain new acts are bUih on our percepts and other appearances of like order. acts related quite diffcrtfltly to our appearing object from the intuitions which constitute it. ibis difference in mode of relation is expressed by the perspicuous tum of pItrUe employed above: that the intuited object is not here itself tbe thing meant. but serves only as an elucidatory example of our true general mean· iDa- But if exprej'sil'e acts conform to these differences. their significative lIImtion will not move towards what is to be intuitively presented, bu't IlIWIrds what is universal. what is merely documented in intuition. Where this - intention is adequately fulfilled by an underlying intuition. it reveals its objective possibility (or the possibility or 'reality' of the universal). tiC

0-,

142 The

distinction between sensuous stuff and catelorial form throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts After. these provISional .. treatments have shown us our difficulty. and have :aVid~ US with a thought leading to its possible removal. we shall embark W OUr actual discussion. by assumlllg "h "lilt he case of structured expressions. the notIoo. estaned or t at, .~bimore or less. mirro~-Iik.e m~e of expression was quite unavailing CII the ng the relation which obtalllS between meanings to be expressed. COtrtct o~ hand. and expressed intuitions. on the other. This is doubtless ~ :~atn~ now only be ~ade more precise. We need only earnestly thlllgs can be poSSible matter for perception. and what things PoIaible w.. matter for me,lIllllg. .' " ,lie mere form of a ~t""t.''', to become aware that, III 0\01\' tome~, ~lIly ('('.rraill wllt'cedemly .fpeci!i(/ble fJ(/rij' of our .flllremelll ClJII IIrrt SIQlt'" UII); lr/llell corresfJOI/(b' to ,IIem ill illlllirioll. while /0 o,IIer parts of

ltt US lem ~10lhillg iflluitire possibly call mrrespontl.

p.-.:- ConSIder this situation a lillie more closely . ..... ~u I

...,..._ a st
~ as '-1 ~r v~rying pattern. We have no difficulty in distinguishing such IS

P (where 'A' serves as index for a proper name). 'An Sis P'.

276

Elemenu of il pnenomenologicill elucidation of knowledge

'This S is P. 'All S are P' etc. Many comp\,jcations arise through the ing influence of negation. through the introduction of distinetiooa absolute and relative predicates (attributes). through conjunctive. tive and determinative connectives etc. In the diversity of these t)'pea sharp distinctions of meaning make themselves clear. To the YaJ'oc"~ (variables) and words in ~hese types c~rrespond sometimes ~ times connecth'e forms. In the meamngs of the actual sta~ belong to these types. Now it is easy to see that only at the placa by letters (l'Qriables) in such 'fonns of judgement'. can meaniaaa that are themselves fulfilled in perception, whereas it is hope'ess. misguided. to look directly in perception for what could give our supplementary fonnal meanings. The letters (variables) on their merely functional meaning. can doubtless take complex their values: statements of high complexity can be seen from the of very simple judgement-types. The same difference between 'form' therefore repeats itself in what is looked upon, in unified a 'tenn'. But eventually, in the case of each perceptual statemcot. wise. of course, in the case of every other statement that in a certaia sense, gives expression to intuition, we shall come down to elements of our terms - we may call them elements of stuff direct fulfilment in intuition (perception, imagination etc.), wbiII plementary forms, which as forms of meaning likewise crave can find nothing that ever could fit them in perception or acu of This fundamental difference we call, in a natural extension of its over the whole sphere of objectifying presentation, the categorial Illte distinction between the form and matter of presentation, and at time separate it off from the relath'e or functional difference wbidt bound up with it. and which has just been subsidiarily t~uc:~ ~ We have just spoken of a natural extension of our dlSu~ whole sphere of objectifying presentation. We take the . thefitlfilment which correspond to the material or fon:nal consU meaning-intentions as being material or fonnal constltuenU making clear what is to count as 'material' or 'formal' in the of objectifying acts. Of matter (stuff) and foml we often talk in many other sen~ e,pressly point out that our present talk of 'matter', which has IU a " "hh'm in categorial form, has nothlllg whatever to d 0 Wit, .t e . h tbe contrasts with the quality of acts, as when, e.g., we dlStlllg~IS in our meanings from their assertive or merely presentatlve ~ , d ndID 'matter' being what tells liS as II"hat. or as 11011' determine a, an object is meant in our meanings. To make the distincUo,n shall not speak of 'matter' in our categorial contrast. but of s wherever 'matter' is meant in our previous sense, we shall talk of 'intentional matter' or of 'interpretative sense'.

Sensuous and Ciltegorlal intuitions

277

-" t'Ive correI ' I f orms are The-obJec ates 0f categorla

t 4J

• eal' (realen) moments

lI"t r

• OW lime to illuminate the distinction to which we have just gi\'en a It is nWe shall link on. for this purpose. to our previous examples. fonn-gh'ing flexion Being, ~he~her in its auributive or predicative fpDCtion, is not fU.lfill~, as we said: many, pe~pl. We here re~ember t's dictum: Being IS no real predicate, This dictum refers to bemg qua or to what Herbart called the being of 'absolute position', but it csn be taken to ~ no less applicable to predicative and attributive being. ID illY case it precisely ~fers 10 what we are here trying to make clear. I can _ colour. but not bemg-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being,gDOOth. ) can hear a sound. but not that something is sounding. Being is aothing in the object, no part of it. no moment tenanting it. no quality or iDtenSity of it, no figure of it or no internal form whatsoever, no constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing attaching to an object: as it is no real (reales) internal feature, so also it is no real external feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a 'feature' at all. For it has lIOthing to do with thc real forms of unity which bind objects into more com. prtbensive objects, tones into hannonies, things into more comprehensive things or arrangements of things (gardens, streets, the phenomenal external worid), On these real forms of unity the external fC"dtures of objects. the right lid the left, the high and the low. the loud and the soft etc.. are founded, AIDoug lhese anything like an 'is' is naturally not to be found. ~have jus~ been. speaking o~ objects. their co.nstituti\·e features, their . connection With other objects. through which more comprehensive ~ are created, and also, at the same time, otema) features in the objects. We said that something corresponding to being was nOI to ught among them. For all these are perceptible. and they exhaust the liat ~~f ~ible percepts. so thai we are at once saying and maintaining H tng IS absolutely IiI/perceptible. " necessary. Perception and object art ere, however a cI··f" an ymg supp Iemenl IS IC:IIst~ts that cohere most intimately together. which mutually assign 8tlt w 0 one another, and which widen or narrow this sense conJ'ointly" Cmust h' dtUcnittd emp aSlzc that we have here made use of a certain naturally !t i$ well~tatural. but also I"ery narrow concept ofperception (or of object). telejng> . nOWn lhat onc also speaks of 'perceiving', and in particular of 'tales I~ a, grcatly widcned sense, which covers the grasping of whole CIae or..a .alrs. ilnd even ultimlltcly the tI priori self-evidence of IllWS (in the ~Iatll~sl~ht'). In. the IIarrower sense of perception (to talk roughly and ~ Ollt~ .... c perceIve everything objective that we see with our eyes, hear ~b, noa~ or can grasp with any 'outer' or even 'inner sense', In ordinary ~ \\'jtb oU.bt: only extemal things and connective fonns of things (10their Immediate qualities) can count as 'perceived by the senses',

oa:

:=eoce.

:nw raa:

or

278

Elements of ~ phenomenologjc~1 elucidation of knowledge

Sensuous and cuegorial intuitions

But once talk of an 'inner sense' had been introduced, one sboWd ill ency have widened the notion of sense-perception suitably, so as to 'inner perception'. and so as to include under the name 'sen••• _.·correlated sphere of 'inner objects', the ego and its internal ex In the sphere of sense-perception thus understood, and in the likewise, of sensuous intuition in general - we adhere to our much talk of the 'sensuous' - a meaning like that of the word 'being' caa. possible objectil'e correlate. and so no possible fulfilment in the aetI perception, What holds of 'being' is plainly true of the remainiq forms in our statements, whether these bind the constituents of gether, or bind terms themselves together in the unity of the The 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'if' and the 'tbca'. and the 'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of the determinations of number etc, - all these are meaningful elements, but we should look in vain for their objective may be ascribed to them at all) in the sphere of real objects, wbicIl no other than the sphere of objects of possible sense-perception,

correau.

§44 The origin of the concept of Being and of remaining categories does not lie in the realm inner perception This holds - we stress it expressly - both of the sphere of outer that of 'inner sense'. It is a natural but quite misguided doctrine. put about since the time of Locke, that the meanings in q , corresponding substantivally hypostatized meanings) - tbe logicItI. ies such as being and non-being. unity, plurality, totality, number. consequence etc, - arise through reflecrion UpOIl certain memol fall ill the sphere of'inller sense', of'inner perception'. In this ~ concepts like Perception, Judgement. Affirmation, Denial, Co ing. Presupposing and Inferring arise, which are all, therefore. concepts, belonging, that is. to the sphere of 'inner sense', 1b8 series of concepts do not arise in this manner, since they canool regarded as concepts of mental acts. or of their real constituents, of a Judgement fulfils itself in the inner intuition of an actual , but the thought of an 'is' does not fulfil itself in this manner. a judgement nor a constilUent of a judgement. Being is as little a stituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, an~ 50 judgement. In a judgement, a predicative statement. 'is' funcUO ns of our meaning, just as perhaps, although otherwise placed a.nd Ii 'gold' and, 'yellow' do. The is itself does not enter into the Jud , merely meant. signitively referred to, by the little word :is'. It ~ sef!-gil'en. or at least putatively given, in the/ll/jilmenr which at ~ the judgement. the becominK all'are of the state of affairs supposed-

":b'

~nt

279

in the partial meaning gold. nor only what is meant in the itself ~ppears befo~ u~" but also gold·lJeing·yelloll' PJ'~appears. ju~gement and judgemen~al IDtUltlO~ are t~erefore at ,one in t1tllS lf~vident Judgement. and pre-emlDently so If the judgement IS self~~t in the ide,llly limiting sense, e" /~one nOW understands by 'judging', not merely meaning-intentions conted with actual assertions, but the fulfilments that in the end fit them pte pletely. it is indeed correct that being can only be apprehended rhrough ;Zing. but this does no~ aI. all mean. t~at the concept of t>:eing must be arri\"eCi at 'through reOectlon- on certalO judgements, or that It can ever be arri'"eCi at in this fashion, 'ReOection' is in other respects a fairly vague .-ord. In epistemology it has at least the relatively fixed sense that Locke p\'( it. that of int~rnal ~~ptio~: w~ can only adhe~. to this sense in inltrprtting a doctnne whIch ImaglDes It can find the ongm of the concept of /king through reflecting on judgements. The relational being expressed in predication, e.g, through 'is', 'are' etc., lacks independence: if we round it out to something fully concrete, we get the stale of affairs in question, tile objective correlate of the complete judgement. We can then say: As Ihe lOUible object slll/ltlf to sense-perception so the state of affairs stands to the 'hmJming Ulmre' in which it is (more or less adequately) gil'en - we should like to say simply: so the state of affairs stands to the perception of it. As the c:onoept Sensuous Objeci (Real Objec/) cannot arise through reflection upon pat:eption, since this could only yield us the concept Perception (or a concept .of oertain real constituents of I)erception), so the concept of State of ~lIrs cannot arise out of reAection on judgements, since this could only yidd us concepts of judgements or of real constituents of judgements. That percepts in the one case, and judgements (judgemental intuitions, Iletttpts of states of affairs) in the other, must be experienced. in order that ;:~~~Ch ~ct of ~bstraction should g.et ~tart~, goe~ w,ithout sayi~g. ~ut tha penenced IS not to he made objective. ReflectlOn-. however, Implies ~hat we reflect upon. the phenomenological experience, is rendered ~~e to us (is inwardly perceived by us). and that the properties to be No/ ~ are really given in this objective content. 6rq in 7n;eflenioll upon jlldgemems, nor eren llpoll fll/jilments ofjlldgements, ~e juljilmems of jlldgemems themsell'es lies the true source of the ptJ b' Stme 0if ....'!Ii'" . I" . . or".. as J"17S (lilt Bl'mg (m the copulative sense), Not In these ~ .....;. ~:ct.r, but in Ih" objects of these acts. do we have the abstractive ~PPtop '~c enables us to realize the concepts in question, And naturally the mod'fi . . It is iflate f I ICatlons of these acts yield just as good a basis, ~_:naCtob' f ' ~lic U' VIOUS rom the start that. Just as allY other concept (or Idea. It{ Which nlly) can only 'arise', Le, become seJf-gil't!I/ to us, if based on an OQ,. tyCS at least sets some individual instance of it imaginatively before ~ SO the concept of Being can arise only when some being, aClllal or y, IS Sf'1 before ollr yes. If 'being' is taken to mean predicativc being,

.~:~s meaning .n'lIoll',

280

Elements of ;a phenomenological eluciduion of knowledge

some stale of affairs must be given to us. and this by way of an gi\'es ii, an ana/oglle of common senSIlOus intllition. The like holds of all categoria/ forms (or of all categories). An e.g.. is given. and can only be given. in an actual act of assembly. that is. expressed in the conjunctive fonn of connection and the concept of Aggregate does not arise through reflection on tbiI • stead of paying heed to the act which presents an aggregate, we ba.. to pay heed to what it presents. to the aggregare it renders concreto. and then to lift the universal fonn of our aggregate to universal consciousness.

A B-de

§45 Widening of the concept of intuition, and in pa,.ticula,. of the concepts pe,.ception and imagination. Sensible and categor-ial intuition If we now ask: 'Where do the categorial fonns of our meaninp fulfilment, if not in the "perception" or "intuition which we tried ally to delimit in talking of "sensibility"'. our answer is plainly the discussions just completed, We have taken it for granted that forms, too. can be genuinely that the same applies to variously structured total meanings, aDd to the 'material' elements of such meanings, and our a;:~:::: beyond doubt by looking at each C'dse of faithful perceptual will explain also why we call the whole perceptual assertion lUI of perception and. in a derivative sense. of whatever is intuited presented in perception. But if the 'categorial forms' of the exp~ together with its material aspects, have no terminus in pc • the laller we understand merely se/lse-perception, then talk of ex percept must here rest on a different meaning: there must at act which renders identical services to the categorial elementl of that merely sensuous perception renders to the material elementl. tial homogeneity of the function of fulfilment, as of all the ideal ships necessarily bound up with it, obliges us to give tbe name' to each fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation, to each act whatever the name of an 'intuition', and to its intentional name of ·object'. If we are asked what it means to say that .ftrllCtllred memli/lgs find fulfilment. confirnl themselves in pe: can but reply: it means only that they relate to the object itself in its srrllcfllre. The object wi~h these c~tegorial forms is ~ot mereIY:e~ Illl in the case where meamngs function purely symbohcally. but It IS our very eyes in just these forms. In other words: it is not merelY of. but intuited or perceived. When we wish. accordingly, to set f< this talk of 'fulfllment" is getting at. what structured meaniogs structural elements express. what unitary or unifying factor co

Sensuous ;and Utegori;al intuitions

~vclY,

281

we unavoidably come on 'intuition' (or on 'perception'

~o:jeCt')' We cannot manage without these words, whose widened sense aJ)lI course evident. What shall we call the correlate of a non-sensuous is _presenl:ltion. one involving non-sensuous structure, if the word ~b~, is not available to us? How shall we speak of its actual givenness, ob.iC'pa rent givenness. when the word 'perception' is denied us? In comor l1Pparlance. therefore, aggregllles. imJejinite pluralities, toralities, numbers. Pl;nCliOIl S. prl'lJicllll!s (right-ness). stales of affairs. all count as 'objects', ~ Ihe acts through which they seem to be given count as 'percepts. " Plainly the connection between the wider and narrower. the supersensllous (I Co raised aOO\'e sense, or categorial) and sensuous concept of perception, is ~ extc11lal or contingent matter, but one rooted in the whole business on und. It falls within the great class of acts whose peculiarity it is that in tbctn something appears as ·actuar. as 'self-given'. Plainly this appearance ofac1uality and self-givenness (which may very well be delusive) is throughOUI characterized by its difference from essentially related acts through which alone it achieves full clarity - its difference from an imaginative 'making present', or from a merely significative 'thinking of', which both exclude ~'(so to say appearance 'in person'), though not excluding the belief ia being. As regards the latter, imaginal or symbolic representation is plmible in two manners: in an assertive manner, asserting something's being ia imaginal or symbolic fashion, and in a non-assertive manner. as 'mere' imagination or thinking without taking something to be. We need not enter ~ closely ~nto the discussion of these differences after the analyses of the JIm'lO.us section, which permit of a sufficiently general interpretation. It is dear, 10 any case. that the concept of imagination must be widened in corresJ10tIdence with the concept of perception. We could not speak of something ~per-sensuouSlY or categorially perceil'ed. if we could not imagine this thing .the same manner' (i.e. not merely sensuously). We must therefore draw a qWte general d' t' . be the '" IS mctlon tween sensuous and calegorial intuition (or show POSSibility of such a distinction). a ~~tended concept of Perception permits. further. of a narrower and ~ be 1?lerpretation. In the widest sense even universal states of affairs ICnse said to be perceived ('seen'. 'beheld with evidence) In the narrower , perception tenninates upon individual. and so upon temporal being.

o!

146 Ph bet"",

Ita

enomenological analysis of the distinction een sensuous and categorial perception

1ri.l~1Jr neXt treatm ems we sha 11 fi rst on Iy d'lSCUSS . . . "ql 0 mdlvldual percepts. then ~ d~:.t~eatment 10 take in individual intuitions of the same order.

~ S1JPe~I~~ be~w~n 'sensuous' ~nd 'supersensuous' percepts was only ~led talk clally mdlcated. and qUlle roughl~ char-dcte~zed above. Antiof external and mlemal senses, plamly stemmmg from the naive

282

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metaphysic and anthropology of daily life, may be useful in pointioa sphere to be excluded, but a true determination and circumSCriptioQ sensory sphere is not thereby reached, so depriving the concept of perception of its descriptive underpinning, To ascertain and clarify distinction is all the more important. since such fundamental . as that between categorial fonn and sensuously founded matter similar distinction between categories and all other concepts, de~ on it. Our concern is therefore to seek more profound descriptive izations, which will give us some insight into the essentially diffi stitution of sensuous and calegorial percepts (or intuitions in &<1""... For our immediate purposes it is, however, unn~essary to carry exhaustive analysis of the phenomena involved. That would be a would require extraordinarily comprehensive treatments, Here it iI to concentrate on some weightier points, which may help to mark sorts of acts in their mutual relation. It is said of every percept that it grasps its obj~t directly, or obj~t itself But this dir~t grasping has a different sense and according as we are concerned with a percept in the narrower or sense, or according as the directly grasped obj~t is sensuous or Or otherwise put, according as it is a real or an ideal object. or real obj~ts can in fact be characterized as objects of the lowat possible intl/ition, categorial or ideal obj~ts as objects of higher In the sense of the narrower, 'SellSIlOI/S' perception, an object it apprehended or is itself present, if it is set up in an act of pe1~pdi straightforward (schlichter) marmer. What this means is this: that is also an imme(Jiate/y gil'ell object in the sense that, as this object with this definite objectil'e cOlltent. it is not constituted in rela' nective. or otherwise articulated acts, llcts fowuJed 011 other acts orher objecrs to perceprion. Sensuous obj~ts are present in pc single a('r-It,>I'eI: they do not need to be conslituted in many-rayed in acts of higher level. whose obj~ts are set up for them by way obj~ts, already constituted in other acts, Each straightforward act of perception, by itself or together, acts, can serve as basic act for new acts which at times include It, merely presuppose it, acts which in their new mode of consci~ wise bring to maturity a flell' awareness of objecls which ess~lll/al1~ poses rhe oltl. When the new acts of conjunction, of disjunction, 0 • and indefinite individual apprehension (that - something), of ~en of straightforward, relati.on~1 and co.nn~tive kl,lOwledge, anse, : : then ha ve lilly sort of subJ~tlve expertenl.'es, nor Just acts connect original ones. What we have are acts which, as we said, set liP ~eW acts in which something appeal.f liS lIclllal al/(I self-gil'en, which given, and could not have been given, as what it now appears to be. foundational acts alone. On Ihe orher hlllld, the nell' objects (Ire

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

283

------------=-=:.:..::...::-=-==~.=:.::.-:=

's 1lll'I' af{' related 10 lI'fllll appeal's in rhe basic acrs. Their manner of

oJdel OI"I~l~e is' essentially detennined by this relation, We are here dealing

. b' a.ppear. 'I spht:re ot 0 ~ects,

Ilie ' II call 011 Iy sholl' rhemseil'es 'in person . in sm.-h l\'lth lIl't'\", In such founded acts we have the categorial element in intuif~ od knowledge, in them assertive thought, functioning expressively, UO~ ~ulfilmcnt; the possibility of complete accord with such acts detennines fin ~ruth, the rightness, of an assertion. So far we have of course only the sidered the sphere of perception, and only its most elementary cases, ~~ one sees at once that the distinction of straightforward and founded ~s can be extended from percepts t.o all.intuition~, We clearly envisage the possibility of complex acts whIch In mixed fashion have a part-basis in straightforward percepts and a part-basis in straightforward imaginations, and the further possibility of setting up new foundations on intuitions which thetl1selves have foundations, and so building up whole series of foundings upon foundings. We further see that signilive intentions have structures patterned on such foundings whether of lower or higher order, and that again mixtures of signitive and intuitive acts emerge out of such 'founding', founded acts, in short, that are built on acts of one or the other sort. Our first task, however, is to deal with the elementary cases and elucidate them completely.

jed

1\'

147 Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as 'straightforward' perception We shall now scrutinize the acts in which sensuous concreta and their sensu-

ous ~nstituents are presented as given; as opposed to these we shall later

Cl)ns~der the quite different acts in which concretely determinate States of AffaIrs, ~ollections and Disjunctions are given as complex thought-objects, or as objects of higher order, which inc/llde rheir foulldarional objects as real ~~.I' (ree/~) ill rhem.\'eil'e.f. We shall then deal with acts of the type of gener~~ng or Indefinitely individual apprehension. whose obj~ts certainly are of I Cr level, but which do 1101 include their foundational objects in themselves. n our ~ellse.pcrceptiol1. the 'external' thing appears 'in one blow', as soon as ""-~ a~ce falls upon it. The manner in which it makes the thing appear I . , "'''''l:nt IS str . I ., acts T /IIg If.JOfll"l/f( : It requIres no apparatus of founding or founded . . . ha~ ~ what ~omplex mental processes it may trace back its origin, and in W manner, IS of course irrelevant here, e are nOt" . , '1>, ph Ignonng the obVIOUS complexity that can be shown to exist in enomcn I . t ' Particularl ' ~ OgIC~1 co~tel1t?f the straIghtforward perceptual act, and ~1a y In Its ullltary Illtentlon, "'ith ally :onstitutive properties certainly pertain to the thing when it appears others gIven c.ontent. some of them themselves 'falling under perception', ~teQa:ere!y Intended, But we certainly do not live through all the articuts ot perception which l\'ould arise were we to attend to all the details

28'1

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

of the thing. or. more precisely. to the properties of the 'side tUflled were we to make them objects i~ the~r own ri~t. No d~~bt idea.. of supplementary p~opert~es. not .glven In percepuon. are. dispositi0llll, cited', no doubt intentions which relate to them contnbute to pO~1ilIi and determine its total character. But, just as the thing does Oot before us as the mere sum of its countless individual features, wtticb. preoccupation with detail may distinguish. and as even the latltT . . . dirempt the thing into such details~ but takes note of them only in die complete. unified thing. so the act of perception also is always a eneous unity. which gives the object 'presence' in a simple, i.rnmediatt The unity of perception does not therefore arise through our 0-..,. activity. as if only a form of synthesis. oper,tting by way of foUDde4 could give unity of objective reference to part-intentions. It . articulation and hence no actual linkage. The unity of perception being as a straightforward unity, as an immediate lusion 01 part ' lI'itholll the addition ollieII' art-intentions. We may also be unsatisfied with a single glance. we may handle ... from all sides in a continuous percepfllal series. feeling it over as it our senses. But each single percept in this series is already a ~ thing. Whether I look at this book from above or below, fre:m . outside. I always see this book. It is always one and the same thin.. not merely in some purely physical sense, but in the view of our themselves. If individual properties dominate variably at each s1Cp, itself. as a perceived unity. is not in essence set up by some ov founded upon these separate percepts. Considering things more closely, we should not present ttM: the one sensible object could be presented in a founded act (to • ously developing act of perceiving). while it merely does not .MfItI presented in such an act. Closer analysis shows that even a conUO ceptual nux involves a lusion of part-acts in one act. rother than a act 10llnded llpon SIIch port-acts, ..' To prove this we embark on the f?lIowmg dISCUS~lon. . .. The individual percepts of our senes have a contmuo~s uOl.ty..S tinuity docs not amount to the mere fact of temporal adJuncu~n. till of individual acts rather has the character of a phenomen?logJcal ... which the individual acts are fused, .In this unity. o~r maOlfold ta~ merely fused into a phenomenological whole. but mto one. t~C, I cisely. into Olll.! concept. In the continuous running on of indlvldua e.t we continuously perceive the single. selfsame object. Can we noW continuous percept since it is built out of individual percepts, a. in the seose: aD fiowuled upon them'! It is of course founded upon. them a whole is founded on its parts. not however m Ihe sen se here according to which a founded act manifests a new act-character. in the act-characters that underlie it and unthinkable apart fro lO

-----

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

285

sc before us perception is merely. as it were. elttended: it allows parts the c:I broken oIT from itself which can function as complete. independent to be pts, But the unification of these percepls into a continuous percept is percthe perfonnance of some peculiar act, through which a new consciousness not t mething objective is set up. We find. instead. that absolutely nothing of s."iS objecti\'e1y meant in the extended act. bUI that the same object is ~tinUouslY meant in it. the very object that the part-percepts. taken singly, re already mean .mg. "tOne might lay stress on this sameness. and say that our unity is plainly a ",ity 01 itkll1ijicOIioti. that the intenli~n of ~he seri~lI~ arran:&ed a.cts coincideS continuously. and that so the unity anses, This IS certamly nght. But ",ity 01 illemijiratiotl is unavoidably distinct. dlWS not so)' the same as the ", it1 0! an oet olidentification, An act meons something. an act of identification means identity. presents it. In our case ao identification is performed. but no identity is meant, The object meant in the differing acts of the continuous perceptual series is indeed always the same, and the acts are one through coincidence. but what is perceived in the series. what is rendered objective in it. is solely the sensible object. never its identity with self. Only .-hen we use the perceptual series to found a novel act. only when we articulate our individual percepts. and relate their objects to each other, does the unity of continuity holding among these individual percepts - the unity of fusion through their coinciding intentions - provide a point d'appui for a consciousness of identity, Identity itself is now made objective. the moment of coincidence linking our act-characters with onc another, serves 15 represematil'e content lor a new percepl, 10llnded upon our articulated individual percepts. This brings to intentional awartness that what we now ~ and what we saw before are one and the same. Naturally we have then lO do with a regular act of our second group. Our act of identification is in IOber fact a new awareness of objectivity. which causes a new 'object' to appear to us, an object that can only be apprehended or given in its very telfhOOd in a founded act of this sort. Before we penetrate further into our new class of acts and objects. we "rl USt . however. first round off our treatment of straightforward percepts. we may presume to have cleared up the sense of the concept of a straiglllfion.,'uTtI pc . 'Nt h rcept. or. what we lake for the same. of sense-perceptIon. then ba . ave also cleared up Ihe concept of a s('lIsible or real objl'ct (in the most lt~I.C ~nse of ·real'). We define a real object as the possible object of a lndl~ tforward percept. There is a necessary parallelism between perception Prec,1JJ1IIKiIiIl/WIi. which guarantl.'Cs that a possible im:lgination (or more ' 0 r llnagmatlOns) . .. I ' Pondlsely •'\ \vh 0 ei senes lavmg t he same essence, corres"ith s 10 each possible percept.
"'"

286

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

course involves no essential generalization of our previous defini ' parallelism just stressed makes both definitions equivalent. Through the concept of a real object. the concept of a real pan particularly. the concepts a r('(ll piece, and a real mo.ment (teaI'lt and a real form, are detenmned. Each part of a real object is a real In straightforward perception we say that the whole object is given, while each of its parts (in the widest sense of 'parts') is . given. The sum total of objects that can be explicitly or impJicilly straightforward percepts constitutes the mosl widely conceived sensible objects. Each concrete sensible object is perceptible in explicit fashion, aDd every piece of such an object. How does the matter stand in abstract moments? Their nature makes them incapable of separate their representative content, even where there is merely repreacn way of analogy, cannot be experienced alone. but only in a more hensive concrete setting. But this does not mean that tbeir intuition a founded act. It would be one. if the apprehension of an abstrace was necessarily preceded by the apprehension of the concrete whole complementary moments, such an apprehension being an act of turning towards its object. This I do not find obvious. It is clear,,,,, that the apprehension of a moment and of a part generally (lj a whole in question and, in particular. the apprehension of a sensuoat as a feature, or of a sensuous form as a form, point to acts wbidl founded: these acts are in our case of a relational kind. This meaDI sphere of 'sensibility' has been left and that of 'understanding' en shall now subject the just mentioned group of founded acts to • consideration.

0:

§48 Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts A sensible object can be apprehended by us in a variety of ways. It of all. of course, be apprehended in 'straightforward' fashio.n, It possibility, which like all the other possibilities here in ques~lon throughout interpreted as 'ideaL which characterizes the senSible a sensible object. Understood in this manner. it stands as it were before us: the parts which constitute it are indeed in it. but are not explicit objects in the straightforward act. The same object can, ho . grasped by us in explicating fashion: acts of articulation c~n pUI ill 'into relief'. relatiOllll1 acts bring the relieved parts into relation, ~ one another or to the whole. Only through such new modes of 1dof tion will the connected and related members assume the character (or of ·wholes'). The articulating acts and. taken in retrospee1twe call 'straightforward', are not merely experienced one after I

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

287

-------',il1:lIlIilie.\. ofacl are rather always present. in which. as new objecrs. >(freoc . . !II llioJlships of rlu.' paris become constItuted. tile re (l s first look at the relationsbips of parts and wholes: limiting ourLet ~o the simplest cases. let us consider the relationships A is or has a seh'CS is ill A. To point to the founded acts in which these typical states JIId ;airs become constituted as data, and to c1eilr up the just employed or II of categorical statement (to lead them back to their intuitive origin r~~:deqU'lte flllfilment~ ~re one and the same.. We are not,. ho~ever. he~e 11 nce rned with the qualities of acts. but only With the constitution of their CO rpretative forms: to that extent our analysis. if regarded as an analysis of mte . 'udgement. will be d.efectlve. , . . , j An act of perceptlon grasps II as a whole. at one blow· and III stralghtrorwa rd fashion. A second act of perception is trained upon a, the part or dependent moment. that belongs constitutively to A. These two acts are not merely perfom1ed together. or after one another, in the manner of disjoined experiences: rather are they bound together in a single act in whose synthesis A is first given as containing a in itself. Just so, a can, with a reversal of the direction of relational perception, achieve self-givenness as pertaining to A. Let us now try to penetrate a little deeper. The total intuitive reference to our object implicitly contains an intention to a. For perception purports to grasp the object itself: its 'grasping' must therefore reach to all its constituents in and with the whole object. (Naturally we are here only concerned with what constitutes the object as it appears in perception, and as what it appears in perception, and not with such constituents as may pertain to it in 'objective reality', and which only later nperience. knowledge and science will bring out.) In .the narrowing down of our total percept to one specific percept, the part-mtention to awill not be torn out of the total appearance of A, so as to break up the latter's unity, but an independem act will have a as its own Pttcep~\Ial object. At the same time one's continuously operative total per('t ~Ill coincide with this specific percept in respect of one implicit part~tentlOn. The 'content' which represents a. will be functioning as the same to~te~t in a twofold fashion and. in so far ilS it does this. it will effect a Ot~nCldence, a peculiar unity of the two representative functions: we shall. in rep:r word,S. have two coincident interpretations. both sustained by the run:entatl~e COntent in question. But this unity of these two representative iQ its IOns W~ll now itself take on a representative role. It will not itself count oU Ou own. fight as an experienced bond among acts: it will not set itself up ively r object. but will help to set up another object. It will act representat"'ith 'aa nd to sllch effect. th.1I A will now appear to contain a in itself (or. A.CCore~ersed direction. a will appear
288

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

matter of the relating act - there will be two possibilities, marked off.

priori fashion. in which the 'same relation' can achieve actual givenneaa.ID.~ these correspond two a r.riori possibiliti~ .~f.relati~n, objectively difl'~ yet ticd together by an Ideal law. posslblhtlcs w/uch can only be direet(l col/slimled in Jounded ~ClS oJ.the sorl i~, qlles~ion, .which can achieve ....

givenness to perception only III acts bUIlt up III this manner. Our exposition obviously applies to all specific fonns of the relatioa tween a wllol(' and its parIs. All such relationships. arc of categorial. .... nature. It would be a mistake to try to locate them III the straightfo, i given whole, to discover them in this whole by analysis. The part lies hidden in the whole before all division into members, and is su ' apprehended in our perceptual grasp of this whole. But this fact, tbat it lies hidden in the whole, is at first merely the ideal possibility ofbrinaiaa part. and the fact that it is a part. to perception in correspondingly lated and founded acts. The matter is plainly similar in the case of eXlemal relations, from predications such as 'A is to the right of B'. ;A is larger, brighter, than B etc,', take their rise, Wherever sensible objects - directly aDd pendently perceptible - are brought together, despite their mutual e into more or less intimate unities, into what fundamentally are more prehensive objects, then a possibility of such external relations arise&. all fall under the general type of the relation of part 10 parts within II Founded aCls are once more the media in II'hich Ihe primary appeartllfCe slates oj aJJairs in question, of such external relationships, is ac,hio"....... clear, in fact. that neither the straightforward percept of the complex nor the specific percepts pertaining to its members, are in th relational percepts which alone are possible in such a complex. Only one member is picked out as principal member, and is dwelt on other members are still kept in mind, docs a detennination of mcml",! members make its appearance, a determination which varies witb tho of unity that is present and plainly also with the particular mem~ relief. In such cases also the choice of a principal member, or of a , " d of relational apprehension. leads to phenomenologIcally dlstlllC relationship, correlatively characterized. which fonns are nO,t gco present in the unarticulated percept of the connection as a stralgh~ phenomenon, but which are in it only as ideal po,f.fibililies, the poSSJ that is, of fulfilling relevant founded acts, auld A real (reelle) location of these relations of parts in the whole w confusion of distinct things: of ,\'ello5IIOII,\' or T('al (realm) fonns of c J. tion with categorial or Meal ones, Sensible combinations are aS~~kr , . , 'f Iy imph Clu.1' real (r('alell) object. its actual moments. prescnt III It. I on 'nJl capable of bein(lifted o~t o~ it" by a'.l abstractive pc~cept., As .a~~latt forms of categonal combmatlon go with the manner In which ~ thesized: they are constitutcd as objects in the synthetic acts bUIlt U

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

289

-------------------=-----ibility. In the formation of external relations sensuous forms may serve

scn;Olll1datiOns for the categorial forms which correspond to them. as when.

~s he face of the sensuously intuited contact of the contents A and B within • In tomprehensive whole W, we. obscrve, and perhaps verbally express our II bCservation. in the synthetic fonns 'A is in contilct with B', or 'B is in o ilIad with A'. But. in constituting the latter forms. we bring new objects ~tO being, objccts belonging to the class of ;states of affairs', which includes ~one but 'objects of higher order'. In the sensible whole. the parts A and B are made onc by the sensuously combinatory fonn of contact. The abstraction of these parts and moments, the formation of intuitions of A, Band conUlCl, will not yet yield the presentation A in contaclwilh B. This demands a novel nct which. laking charge of such presentations, shapes and combines them suitably,

§49 Added note on nominal fOr'mations We shall now make an important addition to our analysis up to this point: this concerns the shaping which synthetically combined presentations, each

on Iheir own account. may undergo. We have already studied this importani point in a special class of cases: we observed, in our Fifth Investigation that an assertion can never be made, in unmodified fonn. the basis of a synthetic act built upon it. the subject- or object-member of a new assertion. An assertion. we said, must first of all take on nominal fonn, whereby its state ~f affairs becomes objective in a new. nominal fashion (lnv. v, §§35, 36). :~ t~IS fact .the intuitive distinction we have in view is brought out, a dismCtlon which docs not merely hold of the relata of the hitherto discussed synth.eses of lowest grade. immediately based on sensibility, but of all presentations presided over by 'many-rayed' syntheses of whatever kind or level. t ~e may at first then hazard the general statement; Objectifying (lcts which XUI pllrel" 'on 11' I same . 0b'lJeetl.tymg if,' . letr 011'11 ,,am/" 11(' aCls J'erl'mg to eonstitule Ihe / . .r . diffi erm,<, OJ 50m(' relal/OlI or olher. are not really the same acts: they in er .phenomenologically, alld difJer in re,..peet oj what we hlll'e called 'heir " ,fellse has changed, and hence the ten/lanai I J/{I/ter. Th"" ella elT mterprewl/l'e me n~e(/IIi('(/lIillg of their adequate expression. It is not as if something had ~~rn~n sh?ved in between unchanged presentations. a bond which or iot II t~em III merely extcrnal fashion. The working of synthetic thought. thoug~ eCllon. has done something to them. has shaped them anew. aIthat th~ being a categorilll function, it has done this in categorial fashion. so ob.iect d sensuous content of the apparent object has not been altered. The htfore uO:~ nO,t appear before us with new real (realen) properties: it stands COll1e:c.t s :ts t1~IS same object. but in a l1ell'manner, Its fitting Into its categorial 'llld in glv: s It il definite place and role in this context, Ihe role of a rdall/m. are ph partIcular of a subject- or object-member. These are differences that enornenologically evidcnt.

290

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

291

-----------_.:::=:.:.::...:::::...::==::::::~

It is no doubt easier to pay heed to changes of meaning in Our ex symbols than to modifications of our direct presentations themsel~ situation. e.g.. in the field of straightforward intuitions. when we ",_.:c such intuitions within and without some relational function. is far clear. and I have not therefore touched on it in my last Investigation. isolated sense-percepts were put on a level with nominally functi0nioa (see Inv. v, §33). Just as the object in a straightforward percept ' confronts us. so too does the state of affairs in the act which names it. so too does any categorially formed object. The gradual constitUlica the object has been completed. as a finished object it becomes a te:nD relation: it keeps. it seems. its constitutive sense quite unaltered. Oae certainly say that the phenomenological change in sense made by C'IltIJ a relational act is at first masked by the very fact that the new form . the whole previous interpretative sense in itself. to which it only im new sense of a ·role·. Perception remains perception. the object is . it was before given, 'only' it is 'put into relation'. Such shapinp our synthetic function do not alter the object ilself. we count tbca as pertaining to our subjective activity. and we therefore overlook phenomenological reflections aiming at a clarification of know should in consistency therefore say: A state of affairs also is the SUIII of affairs when it functions as logical subject (or generally when it fi nominally). and it has its ultimale constitution in the same act of intuition as when it fimctiolled in isolation. When. however, it f . relatum in an act of higher level, it is constituted with a new fonn (aad so to say. the characterizing costume of its role) of which the nomiDII is the adequate expression. Further researches will however be n a last clearing-up of the phenomenological situation just tackled.

§50 Sensuous forms categorially grasped but not functioning nominally We have so far only spoken of the re-shapings of tenns put into sucla lions as that of whole and part. External relations. however, show III sensuous forms enter inlo the unity of a relation (in its predicat~) ulldergoing nominal reification. e.g. 'A brighter than B'. 'A to th~ nghl etc. There are undeniable phenomenological differences - dlffe interpretative sense - between cases where we. so to say, pay direct at to the form of brightness. and make this our /lomillal object. as, when 'This relation of brightness (between A and B) is more readily no than that one (between AI and Nf. and the quite differenl caseS. whet' form of brightness is meant as in the above expression' A is brigbt~ B', In the latter class of cases we once more have a categorial fonn to a peculiar function in the total relational situation. Concepts s Terms of Relations. Form of Rela!ion. Subject, Object etc.. con

'!"

's ckarly expressed and certainly insufficiently clarified. plainly lead which in this and previous "phs we have become familiar.

~~~)tO dilTerences in such c~ltegorial forms with ""

paraS

i SI

Collectiva and disjunctiva .

We have so far ~iscusse~. as instances of categorial and synthetic objeclrrns. ani) certam very Simple forms of states of affairs. those of total and ~ial relalions of identity, and of simple external relations. We now tum our regard to two further examples. to synthetic forms. i.e. which. though DOl themselves states of affairs. nevertheless playa large part in connection .ith states of affairs: Collectiva and Disjuncliva. The acts in which these are C(lI1StilUted as data are lhose which furnish a fulfilling intuition for the lPC3Jlings of the conjunctions ;and' and 'or'. What intuitively corresponds to the words 'and' and ;or', to 'both' or ·tither·. is not anything, as we ('.tther roughly put il above. thai can be psped with one's hands. or apprehended with some sense. as it can also DOt really be represented in an image. e.g. in a painting. I can paint A and I can paint B. and I can paint them both on the same canvas: I cannot, p-ever, paint the both. nor paint the A and the B. Here we have only the ooe possibility which is always open to us: to perform a new act of conjunctioo or collection on the basis of our two single acts of intuition, and so wan the aggregate of the objects A and B. In the situation just viewed as an ple this act is constituted as an imaginalire presentation of A and B, ·"bile this aggregate is only given as 'itself', in the manner of perception, and can only be so given. in just such an act. an act merely modified in a tonfonnable manner. and which is founded on the percepts of A and B. That ......e speak of an act which unites these percepts. and not of any col1llectlon or mere coexistence of these percepts in consciousness. depends : ' the fa~t that a lIlIiwry ;1I1emiollul relation is here given. and a unitary I : Wh~ch corresponds to it: Ihis object can only be constituted in such • lnn~tlon of acts, just as a State of Affairs can only be constituted in r~ OtlO/lul "ct-. IV e at once see t h .. those . .. ..onnectlon. e essential mistake made by ISsoci e~lOent modern logicians who have tried to explain the conjunctive n-... atlon of names or statements through a mere conscious coexistence of -Ullnal or ., f0 lln . propositional acts. and have so surrendered lIIId as an objective 'IN In LoglC,1 e rnUSt 'llso guard · I strmghrJorll"ard . ~uo '/' '.. agmllst con r· llSlng tie percepts of II.lVllnil/·1 .. r . l l · . ill IIrhich·. 'J' ({ 1/1(11I'.;0 ( s. scm's, ,nl"(lrlll,~ etc.. wnh the colljllllctil'e percepts ~

aa.m

I have ,alone the consciousness of plurality is itself properly constituted. lInifyin tned to :.how in my Philosophy of Arithmetic how Ihe sensuously 'en~ Chilral;tcrs - I there callcd them 'figural' or 'quasi-qualitative' they se~ o.f sensuous intuitions - serve as signs of plurality. This means that e as sensuous points t!"applli for the signitivcly mediated cognition

292

Elements of a phenomenological eluc.idation of knowledge

of plurality as such. and of plurality of the kind in question - which tion now has no need of an articulated grasp and knowledge of incliv;jiiji items. but docs not therefore as yet possess the character of a genuine tion of the collection as SUCh,l

§52 Universal objects constituting themselves In universal intuitions The simple synthetic acts with which we have so far concerned --,.~ were so founded upon straightforward percepts that the symhetic was SlIbsit!iarily directed to the objects of Ihese fOlmding fJerapts. ' as it held them together in ideal 'contents' or brought them to a unity. This is a IIni\'ersal character of synthetic acts as such. We DOW examples from anOlher set of caregorial acts. in which the objecta founding acts do not emer into the intention of the founded one, aDd only reveal their close relation to it in relational acts. Here we haw.: of the IIniw!r511l inlllilion - an expression which no doubt will not . . to many than 'wooden iron'. Abstraction gets to work on a basis of primary intuitions, and new categorial act-character emerges. in which a new style of becomes apparent. an objectivity wbich can only become apparenlgiven as 'real' or as 'merely imagined' - in just such a founded act. I do not here mean 'abstraction' merely in the sense ofa seuin,·' some non-independent moment in a sensible object. but Ideational tion. where no such non-independent moment, but its Idea. its U . brought to consciousness. and achieves actllal gil'enness. We mUll pose such an act in order that the Very Sort. to which the manifokl moments 'of one and the same sort' stand opposed. may itself Cf.':IfDe us, and may come before us as olle and Ihe same. For we become a the identity of the universal through the repeated performance of upon a basis of seveml individual intuitions. and we plainly do 10 overreaching act of identification which brings all such single acts tion into one synthesis. Through such acts of abstraction, woven act-forms, there arise. further. acts of universal determination, a~ which determine objects K(,lIcrally as subsumed under certain spedd acts in which 1II/,~p('cif;e(1 objects of (I .w" A become present to us. In an act of abstraction. which need not necessarily involve the ~ abstract name. the universal itself is gil'/!II 10 /IS: we do not think of II in significat~ve fashio~ as when we ~ler~l~ understand gene~al nil:;:' apprehend H, bdlOld It. Talk of an /lIfll/llO/I and. m?re precisely. lion of ,h" Imilw.ml is in this case. therefore. well-JustIfied. • Difficulties arise. however, from another quarter. Talk o~ . presupposes the possibility of correspondent imagination: ~ dlsU~aIk tween them. we held. is part of the natural sense oC our ordlRary

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"lIluiliOl1·. But it is just this distinctio~ that we cann~t he~e draw. This I s 10 stem from the fact th;lt abstractive acts do not differ In consonance ~~ the character of the straightCorward intuitions which underlie them: I\1t 'are quite unaffccted by the assertive or tlon-<) · pcrceptuaI · · character. The Rt'tl. derlying actS. or b yh t elr or· mmgmatlve :: rri{JIIl!.lt.· e;(empl~fied i.n mere phantasy is specifically the same as the Red. the Trillf/g le exemplified. l~ our pc~plS.
=

fWcrcn s

we may also me;1ll it assertively. and this 'leI. like any assertive or refutcd by adequate Cuture perception, The ~t .appens wherever the universal mcaning is fulfillcd by an adequate . I.e. by a new consciousness of the universal which constitutes itself lOll.

ronne/~: may be confirmed

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on the basis of a 'true' abstraction from the corresponding individ1lll cept. The universal object is then not merely pr~~ted and posiled, itself given to us. Again we can have an analo~n.g PresentatiOil at universal. without actually positing it. We conceIVe It, but leave it • pense. The intention to the universal which her.e r~ts on an intuitive . . . makes no decision regarding 'being' or 'non,belOg : only one re~ possibility or impossibility of the universal. and of Its presentation ...... adequate abstraction.

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Back:ovard reference to the researches of our first section

The founded acts analysed by us in select examples were considered by us 10 be intuitions. and intuitions of the new types of object that they brought to light. objects which can only be given in founded acts of a son and form "tich corresponds to each of them. The explanatory value of this extended use of the concept Intuition can only lie in the fact that we are not here dealing with some inessential. merely disjunctive widening of a concept. ,,·hich permits us to extend the sphere of that concept over the spheres of Iny heterogeneous concepts whatsoever. I but with an authentic generalization, which rests on a community of essential features. We call the new acts 'intuitions' in that. with a mere surrender of a 'straightforward' relation to their object - the peculiar son of immediacy defined by us as 'straightfor· :"'lrdness' - they yet have all the essential peculiarities of intuitions: we find In their case the same essential divisions. and they show themselves capable ~ ~hieving the same fully performedluflifmems. This last mentioned C'dpa· cnYI$ panicularly imponant for our purposes. for it was with a view to such Pttformances that this whole investigation has been conducted. Knowledge ~the uni~y of fulfilment is not achieved on a mere basis of straightforward but In general. on a basis of categorial acts: when. accordingly. we ~ imllirion to though! (as meaning). we cannot mean by 'intuition' merely uOus intuition. C\ti~~ conception of categorial acts as intuitions. first brings true perspiInto the relation of thought to intuition - a relation that no previous kl\~~~e of .know~edge. I~as n~ad~ tolerably clear.: it is .the first to render Il.Ich edge Itself lntclhglble. III Its essence "nd ItS achIevement. Through Conti a cOI~CCPtual extension the theses of our first section first gain adequate Orfa~atlon. To all intuitions.. i~ .our prcscn~ widest ~nse. however near tbti r e~ tn~y stand from senslblhty. expressive meamngs correspond - as ~~Slble Ideal counterparts. The divisions dr.lwn by us within "epistemic "and the concepts fr.lmed in close connection therewith. retain their

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validity in this wider sphere. though marked off by us in relation lO. rower one. Each categorial act of intuition has therefore: l. its quality; 2. its (intentional) nl
Finally. also. the new act has represellf;lIg cOllfellfS in regard to there are serious difficulties. Must nell' representing cOllfents be rhis IIt'W material. and what can these be?

§54 The question of the representing contents of categorial forms When one begins to analyse categorial acts. one is struck by the irrefutable observation. that all differences of categorial aets reduce responding differences of the acts on which they are founded, i.e. new element imported by the categoriaJ function represents an . content that cannot be further differentiated. How else could an . presentation of a collection differ from the percept of the same than in respect of the intentional manner in which its members are As regards the form of cmm('crioll. one would say, no furtber in distinction can be drawn in the two cases. Or should one say that of a collection - whal we express by the word 'and' - is specifically according as it is perceptually or imaginatively apparent? In thai ought to think that lhe appeanmces of phantasy might be bound by the collective form of perception. while perceptual phenomena bound together by the collective form of phantasy. and each dill this is plainly unthinkable. nay. unintelligible. Nothing. it might be objected. is easier than just what has ~ Why should we nol assemble cerlain pcrceptu;11 objects in thought 1D to refer imaginatively to some other aggregate? And why should assemble imaginative phenomena in thoughl in order 10 refer only. imagin.uive aggregate. and so 10 perceive the laner? We may ce: exactly this. But the perceptual objects will then be functioning as and the act of collection will not be directly founded on percepts. bill

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. cin;l!iollS built upon them. Just so. in the olher case. we shall not be col",,'. lhe 0 b' ' b Ul those fancyin~ themselves. i.e. the kC .~ects ~ f ourfanc,ymgs. ting of colk-cllo n wII! not be directly founded on fancymgs. but upon 'inner l1~~pts' directed upon these latter. This establishes no difference between ~r collectio,ns o~ a basi~ of perceived objects. and 'imaginary' collections n a ba~is of Im;lglOed obJccts: such a difference docs not exist. except as a ~ifference in underlying acts. The same seems to hold for all other modifications that the collective consciousness can show us. The universalily or specificity. definiteness or jndc:finiteness. or whatever other categorial forms may come into play for our underlying objo:::ts. will also determine the character of our collective presentatio~. but not so t~at we shall be able to find phenomenological differences 1Il the connective character itself: it is always the same and. According as our underlying presentations differ in type. we have a collection of universal objt..'ClS before us (e.g. Species of colour. Red ami Bille and YdJow). or a collection of individual objects (Aristolle and Plato). a collection of definite objects (as in the previous example) or of indefinite ones (0 pnJOl/ anti anolher person. a colOllr and 0 lone). One cannot conceive how diff~ces in acts of collection should be possible except in respect of differences In the acts which underlie them, Th~ same also seems immediately clear in regard to relational intuitions, Relalln~ always displays an identity of form. all variation depending on the IlIIderlymg acts. In this situation can we still hope for ascertainable differences between rtpreseming colltents and illlerpreraril't' sense in respect to the newly added f a founded ,act. lhe for~" of. ~,me~tion in th~ case of synthetic acts? ca~ of stratgJllforworti mtultlons, mterpretatlve sense (material) and ntmg content were intimately united: they were mutually related an far fro . d . .b d III III ependent in their variations. Nonetheless they underwent ' !helin am shifts , a s ;Igamst one another. The representing sensum could stay f'tnta~e While the interpretative sense altered. and could vary while the latter InOO COnsta n. t A' ' . presentatIon. . in f'tSpec n tmaglllatlve e.g.• can remain identical ~ t. not only of material. but also of extent of fulness. and can noneh 'III respect 0 f " disti"",.notabl" cange Vivacity. In the sphere of sense. the ·......On between . . I d . OUt and ' . matena an representmg content can be readily pointed y tQtt'oo ' ,unht..'Sltaungl acknowledged. How is it. however. in the case of " ria aCls h 'f' , entirely ab ~ were. I we Ignore their act·foundation. variability seems ~&ards th ;,etn, Are we 10 say Ihat they lack the distinction in question as ~ond til elr form. that they have no representing contenls which extend 'ribg actse .representing coments of their underlying acts'! When these under. loci: "p are t.hemsel\'es calegorial. e.g. acts of ide.llion. these too will D... • rescntatlon . "rh'IC h WI'II be foun d on ly'In Ihelr , ullimate , -"iIIIl&ht~ foundation of orward intuitions.

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§55 Arguments for the assumption of peculiar categorial representing contents ~n

default ~f an attitu~~ to this question we must emph~tically observe ....... the prevIOus expoSitIOn. the complete absence of differentiation ~ forms. as against the multifarious changes in the total act and its tion. has perhaps been exaggerdted. even misinterpreted. For when the act is a perceptual presentation. its form, qua form of a percePt~:1::~ tion. certainly differs in character from that of an imaginative p If the form is what is really new and essential in the categorial p it must share in the import of each essential character that penetrua whole and that belongs to it as a whole. If reflection fails to show .. enees of interpretative sense in the form. or at least in the form 01 synthetic act - the matter has already been treated sufficiently as ~ abstractive act in the discussions of §52 - this can be explained by till that we involuntarily abstract from these interpretative charactell" they do not distinguish and mark ofT the moment of synthesis, bat pervade the complete. founded act equally. Instead we attend excl the common element that confronts us in, e.g.. all forms of collective But just this common element could be the representing content are looking for. As. in straightforward sense-perception, the b,oo"'lllOl unity of the perceptual sense pervades the total representation, ba . inite relations to each separate part of the representing conleDt. seeming to inner reflection to be made up of separate partial so, in the case of categorial iOluitions, the interpretative sense p total act and its representing COOlent, without being clearly divided 10 the representing contents that can be distinguished by reflection. 1bI exposition contains. if we allow the interpretation, the important tndIl in till challge of fOllnding tlcls and i1ltl!Tpreratil'e forms, there is II. representing coment for each sorl offOllllded act. The abundant m of sense·qualities. of sensible forms etc.. is at the disposal of straigbdi sensuous intuition for purposes of representation. In the sphere of intuitions or intuitions of identity etc.. we were always limited 10 the foml of ami is everywhere the same. and so is the is-form e1Cof" forms were here to be understood as analogues of the sense-kemel. is sensuous in sensuous intuition; there was to be abstraction from q and from interpretlllive sense, One might here suspect that the wish was being father to the thou .... might direct attention to a fact issuing fro,m our ~ormer treat~e;:, representing contents are by no means essential constItuents of act. Itt the peculiarity of ~11 signitive acts. that they lack representing. co-;: authentic representmg contents which themselves relate to the. mte of the object. For signitive acts. too. hll\'e their /Ion-authentic rep t: contents. which do not stand for the object meant in the act, but of In

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object. the object of an underlying act. If non-authentic representing othernts sumce. then we of course have no more difficulty. for such contents coot;resc=nt in our case. since underlying acts always provide them. The IIrebentic representing contents of these underlying acts can be seen as non· 'U\entically representative in relation to the acts founded on them. 'U~ut the comparison with merely signitive acts makes us vividly aware that ~ nded actS cannot do without authentic representation. and representa?Un as regards categorial form. We are made mindful of relations of possible ~lfilment. of the 'fulness' which intuitive acts confer on signitive ones. ~ the ascending scales formed among intuitive acts by variable fulness. final adequation as an ideal limit. Representing contents constitute the difference between 'empty' signification and 'fulr intuition: they are responsible for ·fulness·. as is shown by the fact that they determine one sense of iuIness' (see §22). Only intuitive acts render their object apparent. seeable, for the reason. namely. that a representing content is there. which the interpretative form sees as a likeness. or as the very self. of the object. This is a fact rooted in the universal essence of the relation of fulfilment. and must therefore be demonstrable in our present sphere too. In this present sphere. too, we find 'signitively' opposed to 'intuitively'; the opposition between objectifying acts which mean a categorial object signilively. and the parallel ICIS which present the same object through the same interpretative sense intuitively. whether 'in likeness' or 'in very seW. Since the intenlional maier· iaI is the same in both cases, we can again only treat the new element in our catq:orial intuition as being representative. as setting the object before us in itscontPnI. as treating experienced contents as representing an object meant. Soch representation cannot, however, be exclusively carried out in under· lying acts. for it is not solely their objects that are presented, but the whole state of affairs. the whole aggregate etc.

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156 Continuation. The mental linkage of combined acts and the categorial unity of corresponding objects

~rm!g~t for a moment suppose that.

in the case. e.g.. of.a rela.tion. only elat,! were presented. and that the new element conSisted In a mere Illental character connecting the two llppearances. A connection of acts is ~owe\"er. p'ro {(IIIIO. a co~n~tion.of objects. At be,st it can help to ~a~e It ConnectIon apparent: It IS not IIself the conm:ctlon that appears In It. relrn~ntal bond can be cstablished among acts. and Clm cause an objective trlta~~~ ~o. appear bef?re us. while thi~ relati~n ..thou~h it ull.ites tr~ly e~i.st­ rtp ~C{;IS, has no bell1g at all. If we Judge slglllficutlvely. Without mlUlllve a.rjt~sen~atio.n of the state of affairs judged - as is the case in ordinary bas metIcal JUdgemcnts - the relational unity of the act is articulated. and me.lltal form of connection entirely analogous to thai of the corres· Ing l!ltuition. But the Slate of affairs is not. in the strong sensc of the

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word. 'apparent": it is merely meant. If we contrJst with this a case orin . representation. as when we identify the colour of two perceived surfaoea,tviIite two surfaces recalled in memory. or a person represented in two ima . presentations. then identity is likewise meant. but is meant in a pe~:: manner. in a manner that gires us the object. or. i.n the case of imagin., that gives us a likeness of it. What makes such dIfferences possibLe? o.wi we to locate the whole difference in the founding acts? Against tbia WI must object that. e.g.. in the signitive identification. the identity oftbe ~ objects is not ~xpe.riential.ly lin'd t/~rollg~, b~t .is merely th~ught of~ ~ in the case of lOtUlted objects. the IdentIty IS lOdeed perceIved or 1m. . . . . but is only given and lived through where adequation is full and strict.. . . mental bond. which establishes the synthesis. is therefore a of tbn. . . . meaning (Me;mmg) 1I11d ;s as Slich more or less fulfilled. It IS merely a independent constituent of the total meaning. a significative constit. . significative meaning, and an intuitive constituent of an intuitive but at all events a constituent which itself shares the character ofthil ing, and with this its differences of fulness, We are therefore not un' in interpreting the situation as involving thllt this constituent also e repreSe1llat;l'e fllnction. As we compare different cases in tbe light 01 possibility just raised, we believe that we may reduce the mental bond enced in aewal identification, collection etc. ('actual' = authentic, . to a Im;)'ersal common feature. to be thought of separately from quaIitJ interpretative sense. and yielding in such reduction the representatiW tent that pertains specially to the moment of categorial fonn.

01'."

bo.nd

§S7 The representing contents of the foundln. intuitions are not immediately connected by the representing content of the synthetic form Certain not unimportant observations must here suggest themselves as additions, . Objectively considered. a synthesis. e.g. one of identity. of atlribu~ belongs to the founding objects: identity is. e.g.. identity of ~he pet'SO?tion the relation between the subject tree and the predicate f rul'. The connected objects appear before us by way of their rep.resentiPI tents. and it might be thought that the synthetic bond. in whIch (O'_Db1od!~ of which. perhaps in the manner of a representing conlcnt) the COli comes before us as a form. is also the simple and direct phenomena bond between the representing contents of the underlying obj~ts. As against this we affirm that the momellt ofsynthesis establishes no conllection belll"een the representing contents of the basic acts: but ~.. the phenomenological fonn of identification has its essential baStS IlntJerlying acts a5 511Ch. i.e. it has its basis in what these acts are and in addition to their representing contents.

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If the lived-through moment of identity. its mental chamcter. were an edi;lIe bond between the representing sense-eontents - we may confine j:(I1~l\'es to the simplest case where the founding acts and objects are U .D -uous _ the unity established by this moment would also be a sensuous st" ' 1 or qua 1"Itatlve patterns or oth ' 'ty like. e.g.. th e spatia er 'lonns 0 fUnlty L1~ich likewise have their foundation in the sense-eontents in question. All :ensuous (rcal) unity. as our Third Investigation has sct forth. is unity founded 'n the various kinds of sense-eontent, The concrete contents are many-sided. ~ey sustain \'arious a?stract moment~ in themselves. ~hey underlie mani:old possibilities of alteratIon and connection. We accordlOgJy refer many klOds ofconnection to this or that moment in such contents. If particular unions lit not always founded in the generic characters of complex wholes, taken in their complete specific content. they are nonetheless founded in the primitive generic characters which correspond to the moments of the whole in question. The real lack of relation between categorial act-fonns and the sense-contents of their bases, shows itself in the limitless variability of the generic characters of these contents; in other words, no genus of content lacks an (l priori possibility of functioning in the foundation of categorial acts of every sort. What is categorial is not bound up with representing sensuous contents. but only and necessarily with their objects. and yet not "ith them in their sensuous (real) content. This means that the menllli chllr«Iu in 'whirh lhe cmegorialform is const;luted is bauntillp phenomenologically ..itn the lieu in which the objects are conSlitlited. In these acts. sense-eontents are representatively present. and so certainly contribute to such acts, They do not, however. make up the characteristic essence of these acts. and they can also exist without the interpretation which first renders them represenlative: in the laller case, they are there. but nothing thereby appears. and nothing is consequently there to be connected. or to be treated as subject or Predicate etc.. in categorial fashion. The eotegor;l,1 moment of the synthetically founded act does not bind these IInessential elements of the founding ~ together. but binds what is essenti"/to them both: it connects. in all C1rtumstances. their intentionlll moteri"ls. and is in a real sense founded : : : t~ese I~st. !his is what was said above quite generally: in all categorial '"a .... e mamtamed. the material of the founded acts was founded ;n the arn,eriol5 of the founding acts. Identity. e.g.. is no immediate fonn of unity or ong sensuous contents. but is a 'unity of consciousness' based upon one jeqa";l~cr (re~aled or inwardly different) consciousness of the same ob",.~ h hIS holds lfl all cases. It is truc. no doubt. that intuitions of all sorts. Ci.~t e~ straightforward or categorial. by their D:lture submit 10 Ihe same ~onal formations. bUI Ihis only means that categorial formation rests r1tlltt~rnenologiC'"dlly on what is universal in an objectifying act. or is a Only IOn eS~ntially bound up with the generic element in objectifying acts. d.ireq~:penences of this class penni! categorial syntheses. and such synthesis }o connects their intenlional essences. .

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Particularly in the case of adequate synthetic intuitions. immediately ~ ?n indi.vidual intuitions. ~ust we gua~d against the tempting delUSioq 01 Immediate phenomenological connectIOn. present at least on this 10"Ut~ of categorial synthesis. between the representing sense-eontents of tile underlying act and those of the other. In virtue of the functional d~ of the adequation (evidence) of tbe total act on the adequation of its fCJllil, ing intuiti~ns. the situation would seem to ha~'e the followin~ pattern: . . . the foundmg acts are adequate. the representmg contents coincide WitIt . . ~bject represented. If on such a basis the i?tuition of a .rela~ion arisca. _ _ tlon. e.g.. belween part and whole. the relatIonal act 100 IS evident in chan 7 the relation itself is lruly given with the truly given contents. The meatal of relating. conceived as a relation among sensuous contents and otiIIII here binds these experienced sense-conlents as with a direct bood. Binds them with nothing. one might object. Not the sense-eonteDta. the adequate intuitions of such conlents. serve to base the unity of the relating. Here as elsewhere we must look to the objects, to the --_...= conlents at once representing and represented, in order to perfonn the relating. to relate this content as whole 10 that content as part. can only be given on a basis of gil'en objects: objects are, however, DOl in mere lived experience. in itself blind, but only and solely in petc:epta., in our case in the perception of lived through contents which DO represent something beyond themselves. All this confirms our original introduction of categorial acts as Ii acts. It is essential to these acts. in which all thai is intellectual is that they should be achieved in stages. Objectivations arise OD _ of objectivations. and constitute objects which, as objects of higher objects in a wider, intellectual sense. can only come to light io such Ii acts, This excludes from synthetic acts that immediate unity of ~::; tion which uniles all representative contents of straightforward io ., The complete synthetic intuition therefore arises (if we are right ~ above attempled interpretation which requires a most careful poo.:-;;;.... so far as the mental content which binds the underlying acts itself interpretation as the objective unity of the founded objects. as tbeir rcIIIiII of identity. of part to whole etc.

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§58 The relation of our two distinctions: outer and inner sense, also sense for categories

c::

It is now extremely important to bring to complete clearnes~ t~e between the two distinctions introduced by us a~ the very.~~nll1ngtb8 Investigation. the dislinction between outer and mner sensibility, on hand. and between str"dighlforward and categorial acts. on the other, A presentation as a menial experience. whether it be strR.ightfo founded. sensuous or categorial. belongs to the sphere of 'mner

seJII"

no contradiction in this? Is an inner percept. which reflects on an tpereand a founded act to boot. e.g. on an actual insight into the equation act· I = I + 2. not eo ipso a founded percept. and therefore a non-sensuous .2 +- "In this ;Jct of perception the founded act is given together with the acts underlie it. and is given in the strongest sense of the word. It belongs to ~ is part of the real make-up of the (inner) percept. In so far as the latter ~rects itself to the former act. it is itself related to it. and is therefore itself founded percept. • We shall here obviously have to reply: to perceive an act. or an act· tnoment. or an act-complex of any sort. is to perceive sensuously. since it is to perceive siraightjonmrtlly. This cannOI be doubted, since the relation of .n act which perceives to an act which is perceived is no relation of foundation. even if we take a founded act to be the act perceived. The foundedness of an act does oot mean that it is built on other acts in any manner whatSQe\'er. but that a founded act. by its very nature or kind. is only possible as built upon acts of the sort which underlie it. and that. as a result, the objective correlate of the founded act has a universal element of fonn which can only be intuitively displayed by an object in a founded act of this kind. The intuitive consciousness of the universal cannot. e.g.. exist without underlying individual intuition. nor an identification without underlying acts which relate to the identified objects etc. The perreplion. however. which we direct to a founded act could as readay be directed to a non·founded act and to any objects of outer sense. e.g. borses. colours etc. In each case perception consists in a straightforward looking at our object. The material of perception (its interpretative sense) stands in no necessary relation to the material of the perceived act. The "'bole phenomenological content of this act bas rather the sheer character of ~ representative content. it is objectively interpreted io accordance with the IQ.terpret3tive form of perception. as beiog this very act of perception itself. For Ihis reason also. el'ery abstraction based on inner sense. e.g. the abstraction which looks to a founded act. is a sensuous abstractioo. As ~ to this. a.n abstraction which is itself built upon alowuled act. is. to 0{ extent that thIS founded act has the character of an intuition. even that a ca.tegorial intuition. a categorial abstraction. If we look at an intuitive : ' of Identification. i.e. llll intuition of identity. and if we abstract from it 8 e ~oment of idef1lifica(iofl. we have performed a sensuous abstraction. t l~. while Ihillg through WI idelltification. we turn our regard to objectil'e ltll )': and make [his the basis of our abstraction. we have performed a !tiee&Ofl~1 abstraction (cf. the closer discussion in §60). The objective mo· of Idelll.ity is ~o act. and no form of an act: it is an objective categorial Unit· As against thiS. on the other hand. the moment of idenlification. that ~.~s the founded acts phenomenologically. is a sensuous and categorial Ito °tTn. The same difference essentially divides those concepts framed on a und of,{J' . . acts. " · d"ff rl'.I'l'ctlOlI on any . intUitIve ,romh I e quite Illerent concepts

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Ch.pte~r~8=-

E1emenu of a phenomenololical elucidation of knowledge

fmmed on the ground of these intuitive acts themselves. J perceive a boUle reflecting on my percept. frame the concept of perception. But if I look . at the house. I use my percept itself. rather than the percept of this ""..... as the founding act for an abstraction. and the concept of hoUS4! There is accordingly nothing remarkable in saying: The same rnnttaI mems II'hich are sensuously gil'en ill imler perception (and which ~ function in it as sensuous representing contents) may. in afounded act of character of a categurial perceplion or imaginmion sel up a caregoriql~ and so sustain a totally different calegorial representation. The non-independence of categorial fonns as forms. is mirroRd, ira department of inner sense in the fact that the moments in which a form can be constituted - moments 2 narrowly restricted for each fOlat that each type of fonn corresponds to a single type of moment - the.... represent non-independent mental contents. moments founded on teTS of acts. Since. however. all characters of acts have their ultimlle dation in the contents of outer sense.) we note that there is an phenomenological gulf in the fieltl of sense. We have principally to distinguish between: I. the contents of reflection. those contents which are tbemselws ters of acts or founded upon such characters: 2. the primary contents. those contents in which all contents of are either immediately or mediately founded. These latter would be the contents of 'externar sensibility, wbidl' plainly not defined in tcnns of some metaphysical distinction of and inward. but through the nature of its representing contents. • ultimately foundational. phenomenologically lived-through contcDIL primary contents form a unique highest genus, which divides into species. The manner in which the contents of reflection have their Ii tion in primary contents is the loosest conceivable: it is such that contents are never bound to a narrower class than the whole class at primary contents. Corresponding to the difference between purely sensuOUS and c3tegorial objects of intuition. there is a distinction of representing only rejfectil'e contents can serre as purely categorial representing . One might now try to pin down the concept of a category by sayial. it comprises all object in- fort/IS arising Ollt of the forms. and not otd mailers. ofconceptual illterprewlioll. The following misgiving no doubt arise. Ought we not also to attribute to sensuous intuition the chara~ categorial act. in so far as through it the fonn of objectivity is .co~ For what we perceive does not merely ('xist in perceplion. but 15 g I as an object. The concept of an object is. however. framed as the of the concept of perception. and so presupposes. nOI merely all abstraction. but also acts of relation. It therefore also qualifies as a ca concept in our present sense.

an:.e..

COl".

_

;...--fh e a priori laws of authentic and

inauthentic thinking

--------------IS9 The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory of the forms of possible intuitions The varied fonns of founded acts where. instead of straightforward. sensuously-intuitive objects. categorially fonned and synthetically connected objects are constilUled. pennit manifold complications into new forms: in consequence of renain a priori categorial laws. categorial unities may again anr;ns mUst be laid down. To the eXlent lhat adequate intuition ilself !be la .n ts a. type of intuition. the pure lheory of intuitive forms embraces all ttIevaVos which concern the fonns of adequate intuilion: lhese have a peculiar or ihtehC~ 10 the laws of the adequatefufJilmenl of significative intentions. or nttons a I rca dy ·llltUltlVC. ..

::;r

306

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

The

0

priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking

307

.___------'--------'---.:...:....:...:...==.:...:...:2..-=

§60 The relative or functional difference between matter and form. Pure acts of understanding and those mixed with sense. Sensuous concepts and categories The relatil'e, merely fill/ctiOtml difference of matter and form hangs ~ with the possibility of making categorial intuitio,ns the fou~dationa for_ categorial intuitions. ~nd the~up~m of expressl.ng .them In c o ~ expressions and meamngs. This difference was mdlCated above 10 PIIIiII (§42). In an absolute sense. a founding sensibility provides the rna... fir. all acts of categorial form which are built upon. it. In a rel.ative objects offounding acts filrnish this matter. relatively. that IS, to the .... emergent forms of the founded acts. If we relate two objects aJraMt, egorial. e.g. twO states of affairs. these states of affairs are our matter to the relation which brings them together. To this definite use or .... ttpts of matter and form the traditional distinction between the".",.. form ofstatements corresponds exactly. The terms of a statement founding acts of the whole 'relational presentation', or, what is the they are names for its founding objects, and therefore represent the which alone contributions of sense may be sought. But founding 0 . themselves be categorial in type. Plainly fulfilment is carried out ill" acts II'hich take lIS down a whole ladder of foundations'. Indirect tions here play an essential pan, whose exact investigation is an task in a clarification of the complex forms of cognitive thought. Acts of straightforward intuitions we called 'sensuous': foUDded whether leading back immediately or mediately to sense, we called • But it is wonh our while to draw a distinction. within the sphere 0uf"""".. acts. between those acts that are pllrely cotegorial, acts of 'pure . ing'. and mixetl acts ofumlerslallding that are blended with sense, It licI nature of the case that everything categorial ultimately rests UPOD intuition, that a 'categorial intuition'. an intellectual insight, a case of in the highest sense. without any foundation of sense, is a piece of The idea of a pllre in reflect, interpreted as a faculty p~re uW (= categorial action). qllire cur off from a 'faculty of senslbl.hty, co be conceived befiJre there had been an elementary analysIs of k~ in the irrefragable evidence of its being. Nonetheless. th~ distinct~ indicated. ilnd with them the concept of a purely categonal act an • likes, the further concept of a pure understanding, ull ha~e a good ri1 we ponder on the peculiarity of eidetic abSlTaction. that It nce~ss~ on individual inlUition, but does not for that reason mean what IS 10 in such intuition, if we pay heed t~ th~ fact that i.t is. r~ally.a n~Wt"'" conceiving, constitutive of generahty Instead of lIldlVlduahty

1eIIII..

C>j_.

.0:.

J.

po.ssibility oflillil't'rsal inrllitioll:f ~I~ises. illllljti~flS. II'hic~1 nor mer~~Y"~XIP imlil,jt/llt1lity, bllt also all s('ll.nblllly from their /melitlO/wl pun Ie

. rds. we distinguish between sensuOlls ab,ftraction, which yields senSUOIIS purely sensuous or mixed with categoriat forms _ and purely :~l'gori(ll(lb.~rraction. which yields purely cMegorial concepts. Colour. house, • jUdgl'lIIl,,,t. !l"lSh are purely sens~ous co?cepts: col?lIredness, I,jrtue, the axiom ojparal/ds etc.. have a C3tegonal admixture. while unity, plurality, relation, (OIIr('pt are purely c~tegorial. Where we speak absolutely of categorial conet'P ts. purely c~t~gonal ones are always ~ea~t: Sensuous ~oncepts fin~ their j]nJI1ediate baSIS In the data of sensuous mtultlon. categonal concepts In tbe (\ata of categorial intuition. purely with regard to the categoriaJ form of the whole categorially formed object. If. e.g., the intuition of a relation underlies an abstraction, the abstractive consciousness may direct itself to the relational form in specie. so that everything sensuous in what underlies the relation is discounted. So arise categories. which rubric, understood pointedly. merely covers the primitj)'e concepts in our present context. We have just identified concept and Species: this was implicit in the whole sense of our completed discussion. But, if one understands by 'concepts' lllim'sol presentations instead of universal objects, whether these be uni"ersal ifttvitions or the uni,'ersal meanings which correspond to them. our distinction carries over simply to these, It carries over similarly to presentatioDs of the form an A. having regard to the fact that the Species A may include or oclude what is sensible. Alilogieal forms and formulae such as All Sore P, No S is P etc.. are purely categorial. Here the letters'S', 'P' etc" merely point indirectly to 'ttrtain'. indefinite concepts, variable 'at will'; in the total fonnwa a complex thought. made up of purely categoriaJ elements, corres. poDds to them. Like all pure logic. SO all pure aritlulletic. the pure rheory of 1NJJIifolds, pure marhematics. in short. in the widest sense, are pure in the

~o (eprs

sense that they contain no sensuous concept in their whole theoretical fabric. 161 Categor-ial forming involves no r-eal reShaping of the object

~r ta.lk of categorial ::~' ~~ nat~r~lIy :lOd

form, as has been clear from our last set of discushannlessly ambiguous, since we have drawn a thor011 g ng dlstlllction between act and object. We mean by categorial fonn, *l.rat.h~ Onc hand, the characters offOll/lt/ed acts, which give form to acts of 1'JelNlg tforward or of already foundcd intuition, and transfoml them into ilcts preSC~t'l(ions of objects. These laller presentations, as opposed to the ity: t~n wl.ll: h they are founded, set up for us a peculiarly modified objcetivfon- e Onglllal objects arc now seen in certain interpretative and connective ·,,'s wh"h ",,)'u . It arc our c(If('gorial form.J ill the second, objectil'(' sense. The . A (linI B. wh'IC h as a um'ficd act means a c(ftegorial li1tily nctlve if . co nncetlon lh () ubjl'cts (the aggregatc of them both). will serve as an example. or'a:d~x~ression 'A and 8' illustrates, particularly in relation to the meaning . a further sense of our talk of catcgorial fonn, according to which

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--

_

sigllificatil'e forms, fo~s which find possible f~lfilm1 ent in fau.oded tYJlel at act, are called categonal forms, or, more cautious y, categonal forma it.. loose sense of the word. This being premised, we now wi~~ to bring to explicit clearness, for ... sake of its importanc~. a ~ropos~t1on that we have alr~~dy en110Ciaell and which is really obvlO~s In the. light ?f ?ur w.hol,e eXP':'sltlon..Thia ...

proposition that categonal functIOns,. In :o~11Ing sensible obJOCtl, . . . their real essence untouched. The object IS mtellectually grasped by . . intelligence. and especially by 'knowledge' (itself a categorial functiOlll). .... it is not thereby falsified. To clarify this, let us remember the dif'fenMl mentioned in passing between categoriai unities in the objective real unities such as the unity of the parts of a thing, or of trees in an a etc. The unity of the real elements in a mental experience, or the all experiences which coexist in a single individual consciousness, . count among such real unities. All such unities, treated as wholes, their parts in being objects in the straightforward, primary sense: tbIJ be intuited in possible straightforward intuitions. They are Dot categorially unified, constituted through a bein~~nsi,dered-to~. collection, disjunction, relation etc. They are mtnnslcally umfied: they a form of union, perceivable in the whole as a real property, a ~ of unity, and perceivable in the same sense in which any of therr members and their intrinsic properties are perceivable. It is quite different in the case of categorial forms. The ~ew 0 . create are not objects in the primary, original sense. Categonal ~OI"lDl glue. tie or put parts together. so that a real, sensuously perceIVable emerges. They do not form in the se~se in which the ~tter ~o~. WD the original datum of sense-.perceptlon would be modified 10 Its 0 ~ tivity: relational and connective thought and ~nowledge w~uld not be is but would be a falsifying transformation mto somethmg else. f~rms leave primary objects untouched: they can do nothing to t~em. change them in their own being, sin~e the result would othefW1SC ~ object in the primary. real se~se. EVld~ntl~ the ou~co,:"e ?f.a c:at~g e.g. one of collection or relation. consists In an obJec~lve ~Iew ( f< what is primarily intuited, a 'view' that can only be gIVen 10 such: ed act so that the thought of a straightforward percept of the foun .•:...... , . h~ d 'ntuluuor of its presentation through some other stralg !Iorwar I piece of nonsense.

sen.e. ...

, 'f II••• §62 Our freedom in the categorlal for,:"lng 0 material and its limits. Purely categorlal laws (laws of 'authentic' thinking) Real. sensuous forms of unity. whether external or internal, are ~ed; by a law governing the essential nature of the parts to be conn

----

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n"".,.

c.

_

individual ion of th~se pa.rts is taken in. its full ~xtent, they are absolutely dtlennincd .. All um~y pomts t? governmg legality, as real unity points to al govermng legality. What IS really one. must also really be made one. • ~ere we s~ak ~f our free~/om to. unite or IIot to unite, we are not speaking ofcontcnls.1n t~elr full reality. ~hlch includes their spatio-temporal propertieS- While In thIs. field ~he conSCIOusness, and especially the direct intuition, f real conlents, IS eo IpSO the consciousness of their real connections and fonns. the position is quite different in regard to categorial fonns. With real conlents none of the categorial forms which fit them is necessarily given: there is abundant freedom to connect and relate, to generalize and subsume etc. There are many arbitrary, ways to divide up a sensuously unified group inlO part-groups: we may at ~11 arrange these diversely divisible part-groups, and effect same-level connections among them, we can also build collections of the second. lhird ... order upon one another. Many possibilities of categarial shaping therefore arise on the foundation of the same sensuous stuff, Just so, we ca~ compare any item from one and the same sense-complex with any other of Its members, or distinguish it from them. We can make either of them t~e s~bjecHerm, or, by arbitrary conversion, the object-term of some relation In question. We can put these relations into relation with one anotber, connect them collectively, classify them etc. G.reat~ howe~er, as this freedom of categorial union and formation may be, It, still has us law-governed limits. The very fact that categorial forms ?,nsutute themselves in founded characters of acts, and in these alone Illvolv~ a certain necessity of connection. For how else could we speak of ~tegonal perceprion and imuition, if any conceivable matter could be put ::: any conceivable form, and the underlying straightforward intuitions ~ore pennilled themselves to be arbitrarily combined with categorial Yo't cters? Where. e.g., we carry out a whole-part relationship intuitively C tan normally lilIcban e onverI 'It, b ut not 'm suc h a manner that the part, with' Ilart I ~ d real content. can be looked on as the whole, and the whole as the or of ,t IS also not Open to us to treat this relation as one of total identity . . between any let oftotal exclus'IOn etc. We can no d oubt' thmk' any relatton thaI is e.rms. and any form whatever on the basis of any matter - think them ~ ' them. But we cannot really carry ou'' 'OUnd',Jnlhese . nse 0 f mere 1y meanmg tngs on " d ' Cllt....o,.; 1 every loun atlon: we cannot see sensuous stuff in any . ~6.,a form l'k 1 1 .' we I et a one percell'c II thus and above all not perceive ' I ..ard\'. n frami~ ~in t' I g Our Widened concept of perception. we found. eo ipso a 1...II:, char . . Th' . , -un is re II {I(·ter 1Il It. IS does not mean that the character of percepfOr lhis a Y(redl) bound up with sensuous content. This is never the case lIJi.... Would m7an t h at not h'109 eXisted . ~teeiv d unperceived. or could exist' %rnea e . CenalOly. however. nothing exisls that cannol be perceived lI... ns that th e actua l ' ~ Str . peflormance of actual acts on the ground of just. alghtfor ward'mtultlons .. . . h IS m t e ideal sense possible. And these I

•

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_

---

-possibilities, like ideal possibilities in general, are limited by law to ...

extent that certain impossibilities, ideal incompatibilities. are by la., IIiIIII alongside of them. . ... The ideal laws governing the ~nnectio~ of sU~h ~SSlblhUes and ....... bilities. belong among coregorlat forms In s~c,e. I.C. an.'0~g ~leJoIiII .. the objective sense of the wor~. They.determine "'hat \·arl~t1on.r caregorial forms there can be In relat./On to ,he same d~fimle. but Mit • chosen. malter. They circ~mscribe the ,d~ly closed manifold o~ the lealii • ments and transformatIons of categonal ~Iorms ~n th~e bas~ of CQ"4 selfsame matter. This matter is here only re evant In so ,aT as It mUM: lie intentionally identical. But. to the extent that the spc;cies ~f this;'·~:::t quite freely variable. and are only subject to the obVlo~ Ideal.c capacity to sustain the forementioned forms. the laws In question . . entirely pure and analytic character, a.nd quire independent ,ofthe,...... of their matter. Their general expr~sslOn, therefore. c~ntalns no material species, but makes exclUSive use of algebralcal symbols u of indeterminately general presentations of certain matters, va.riabe but the identity they must keep with themselves. . To gain insight into these laws, does not theref~re requlfe an ~ ing out of a categorial intuition, ~hich makes Its ~~t,ters tndy any categorial intuition suffices, which puts the posslbll~t>: of the formation in question before one's eyes. In the generalizing .a this comprehensive possibility the unitary. intuitive 'insight' mto achieved: this insight has. in the sense used in our doctrine, the an adequate general percept. The general object, w~c~ is itself is the categoriallaw. We may assert: The ideal con~I~lotU of car lion in general are. correlatil'ely regarded. the con~I~I~tU of t~~ the objects of caregorial intuition, and of the poss~blbty of car~-­ simpliciter. That an object thus and thus categonally formed as. essentially related to the fact that a categorial intuition - a mere _ can set such an object completely before one's eyes, to the .faa. words. that lhe requisite caregorial synthe~es ~nd ,o~her caregoru;:, really performed on lhe basis of the fOllndmg mlilltlOns conceme ( latter are imaginary). . rna What categorial formations are in fact permitted by gIVen cried what categorial acts can be ~eall~ ca pe
III.,...

rt'·""'' '

The a priori law5 of authentic and Inauthentic thinking

] II

-------------'-----=~::...===-.:=~::.:. [counterpart) is not limited to the kinds of content covered by IV, 11', G, reaSO as to have no bearing on contents of other kinds. Contrariwise it is ~1de111 that conlents ofall kinds c~ be formed by all calegories. For categorial f~nns are not founded on matenal contents. as we have ~lready explained bO,'e (cc. §57). These pure laws can therefore not prescnbe what forms a • '~n maller can assume. but can only tell us that, when it. and any maller ~ general. assumes a certain form. or is capable of assuming it. a definitely \ifI1ited circle of further forms remains open to the same matter. There is, i.e.. tJJl ideally closed circle of possible trans/ormation of a functioning form. ilia ~''f'r nell' forms. The ideal possibility of these new forms in relation to the: same matter, has its a priori guarantee in the before mentioned analytic laws which embody the presuppositions in question. These are the pure laws of authentic thinking, the laws. that is, of categorial illtuitions in I'irtue of their purely categorial forms. For categorial intuitions function in the thought of theory as actual or possible fulfilments (or frusU'ations) of meanings, and impart to statements (according to their mode of functioning) the logical values of truth and falsehood. On the laws here considered the normative regulation of purely signitive, or admixedly signitive. thought depends. To expound this matter more precisely, and to clear up the special sense ?nplied in talk of the laws of alllhemic thinking, we must take a closer look mto the sphere of meanings and of meaning-fulfilments.

In The new laws of the validity of signitive .n.d admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thInking) ~Ura~~uss.ions.up t~ this point we have thought of categorial acts as free

I slgmficatlve Side-structures. as carried out. but not as founding of knOwing or naming. Every unprejudiced analyst will concede that tl~~ e.g.. intuit aggregates. or many primitive states of affairs. without 0( an~ t~em nominally or propositionally. We now oppose the case ~~ sl~lfi~~tion to the case of mere intuition: we note that to all acts of leta nallOtUltlon. with their categorially formed objects. purely significative ay Itt.f: correspond. This is an obvious a priori possibility. There is no 0( mer;. relevant here. to which there is not a corresponding possible form COttel nan~. and each meaning can be thought of as carried out without a 1.... ated lDtU'( Th· . ~glla . I lon, e Ideal of a logically adequate language is that of a lu ge which . b· . -:'1\1 all . can give unam Iguous expressIOn to all possible matters ~ u PoSSible categorial forms. To its words certain significative in ten'Cotres;:::~~g~O.usly pertai~. w~ich .c~n come a~ive even in the absence of Itt to all .g • I.e, ,of fulfilhng. IOtultlon. There IS therefore. running paral~ Possl~[e pnmary and founded intuitions. a system of primary and rneamngs which could possibly express them. iIICt.I

tie

] 12

Elemenu of

iI

phenomenol08ica1 elucidiltlon of knowled8e

;,,~

The realm of meaning is, hOIl'f!IW. much wider than that of than the total realm of possible fulfilment. For, on the meaning..... l-. endless host of complex meanings arises, which lack 'reality' or 'Poaa~ They are patterns of meanings assembled together into unitary~. which, however, no possible unitary correlate offulfilment can corrr:ttvoet" For this reason t~ere. is ~o. complett! paralMism ~twt!t!n CQtt!gorIaI ..... Le. types of categonal mtultlon, and types of meaning. To each CI. . . . . type of lower or higher level a meaning-type corresponds. but to formed by free significati.ve we~din.g.to complex types, there is not a . . . . ponding type of categonal obJectIVIty. We recall types of analytic ~ diction such as 'an A which is not an A'. 'All A's are Irs and some A_ not D's' etc. Only in connection with primitive types can and ... parallelism obtain, since all primitive meanings 'originate' in the . correlated intuition, or, to put the mailer more plainly, since talk 01 patibility and incompatibility applies only in the sphere of what .. together, or is to be put together, simple meanings, as expressiOQlol is simple, can never be 'imaginary'. This applies also to every simpIt of meaning. While 'Something that is at once A and not·A' is im,pooiilili A and a B' is possible. since the and-fonn, being simple, has a 'real" If we transfer the term 'categorial' to the realm of meaning, a significative form (and a peculiar meaning-form in specie) will co each authentic categorial fonn, whether to one authentic in the sense, or to the corresponding categorial fonn of intuition (~ wbir.It is categoriaJly objective is perceplllolly or imaginati"ely constJtutcd~ form of signification we achieve significative reference to a co disjunction, an identity or a non·identity etc. Whenever one oprotation in the authentic, to presentation in an inauthentic sense, o~ has the intuitive-significative antithesis in mind (though doubt. one is thinking of the other antithesis of adequatc-inadeq present cases would accordingly be cases of collection, disjunction, tion, abstraction etc., in an ;nallthenlic sense. If one includes under the rubric of 'acts of thinking', all the cat through which judgements. as predicative significations, gain f their whole value for k.nowledge. we must distinguish between aul of thinking and inauthentic ones. The inauthentic acts of thinking the significant intentions behind statements and. by a natural ex significative acts which could possibly function as parts of s.uch hiOIIintentions: all significlltive acts Clln plainly function in thiS fas authentic acts of thinking wouJd lie in the corresponding fUl~Olenu. intuitions of states of affairs. and all intuitions which function as parts of such intuitions. All intuitions C'dn function in this manner: in particular, no categorial fonn that could not be a constituen~ ~f of a state of affairs. The gmeral doctrine of the form ofsymbo/lc . (the meanings of statements) includes that of the forms of meaning III

noery.,..

---

______T~h~·:...:·cP:m~·~n~·:'.~~::.o:(:..:,":"'::.:no:·<::..:.:n:d~;~n:'":"'::,.~n:ti~<~"'::;n~k~;n~g~J~1J

(the pure log~co-~~mmatical forms). Just so the general doctrine of the pure

forllls o( the tnWltlons ofstates of affairs (and of the pure fonns of states of tTairs) IOciudes that of the categorial forms of intuitions (and of objective

~tegorial fonns) in general.

Jf. as often happens. thinking is identified with judging. we should have distinguish between authentic and inauthentic judging. The concept of judging would then be pinned down by the element common to statementintention and st~teme?t-fultilment. Le. by the imentional essence compounded of quality and IOtentlOnal material. As acts of thinking in the widest sense. nol only acts of judging, but also all possible pan-acts in judgements. would have to count: we should be brought back to a definition equivalent to our previous definition of the concept Act of Thinking. In the sphere of inauthentic thinking, of pure signification, we are beyond all bounds of categoriallaws. Here anything and everything can be brought together in unity. We spoke of this in our Fourth Investigation: we pointed to the purely logico-grammatical laws which. as laws of complication and modification. distinguish the spheres of sense and nonsense. In inauthentic tategorial fonna~ion and transformation. we are free as long as our meanings are not nonsenSically conglomerated. But if we wish to avoid formal and real n~nsen~, the widest sphere of inauthentic thought, of the significatively ~mbma.bl~: IS very much narrowed. We are now concerned with the objec. Ute p?SSI~I!lty of ~omplex meanings. with the possibility of their application ~ an mtUlllon whIch fulfils them totally and singly. The pllre laws ofthe "alill. fly ~f meanings, of the ideal possibility of their adequate intuiti.'e iJ/ustration, obvwusly runs parallel to the pure laws governing the combination and transformation of authentic categorial forms. In the pure laws of the validity of meanings, we are again not dealing with la''''s from which the validity of any given meaning can be read off. but with ~ posSibilities, determined in purely categorial fashion, of the combinabon and I r . r . . ranSIOrmatlon 0 meanmgs. that can be undertaken salm .·eritate Uleach 'bl' '. .. . ' , 61tn poSSl e given case, I.e. Without preJudlclOg the possibility of a fuJt atat: of m~aning, to the extent that this previously existed. If. e.g., the 'WhOle ;nt '~I'. IS a pa~. of IV' is ~alid .. t~en a statement of the form . IV is a ~ ..elatl\eJy to II' IS also valid. If It IS true that there is an A which is B, SUch ItrlS al~ .true that a .certain ~ i~ B. or that not all A's are not B's etc. In iaJ III P O.POSltIOns, what IS matenal IS boundlessly variable: hence all mater. aj.... ·fieanlngs are replaced by algebraical signs of indirect and wholly unfixed ~,I cance Fo th· h Illth' . '. r IS reason suc propositions are characterized as analytic. IS Sl(uatlOn ',. .. I h ~t~ 0 . . . I . IS ~gam lrre evan.t ~h.et er t~e man.er. ~s constituted in tetli r In Imagmatlons. The posslblhtles and ImpoSSibilities concern the ~~~n up. ~f acts .giving a~equate intuitive illustration to the form of a the Pllr~ ;ha(~~er liS matenal ~u.b~tratum: we are concerned. in short. with '~eral O~(lilt~ns of. the pOSSIbIlity of completely adequate signification in , Which. In their turn, depend on the pure. conditions of the po.rsibi/ity 10

31<4

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

=--------'------=----------'------Qf categorial intuitiml in gener~/. T~ese I~ws of the val~dity of ~ are not, of course. themselves Identical with the authentiC categorial ..... but they follow the latter faithfully. in virtue of the law which~ . . connection of significant intentions with fulfilments of meaning. The whole treatment that we have just completed requires a natural, obwi. ous extension. We have simplified the matter to the ext~t of.~nfiniua_ discussion to two extremes only: we opposed completely mtwtJve, i.e. . . . ally executed categorial act·forms. on the one hand, to purely si~ i.e. not authentically executed act-forms, on the other. forms only to be .... ized in processes of possible fulfilment. The ordinary ca.ses are, ~ mixtures: thought proceed~ intuitively. in many ~tre~ches. in many. StI~ signitively, here a categonal synthesiS. a predication, a generahza... really carried out. there a merely signitive intention directed to . . . categorial synthesis attaches to the intuitively, or to the only verl:JallJ sented members. The complex acts arising in this manner have, takca whole the character of inauthentic categorial intuitions: their tala! ' correl;te is not actually. only inauthentically, presented. Its 'possibilitf. the objective possibility of its correlate. is not guaranteed. The inauthentic thinking must accordingly be made wide enough for it to these mixed act-fonns also. Everything we have said tben holds. mlltandis for such an extension. Instead of talking of the laws oftbe of mere ~eaning.s. merely symbolic judgements etc., we shall also . speak of tbe laws of the validity of signitively ~dmi~ed. p~ta judgements. Where there is talk of merely symbolic thmkmg, It IS these mixed cases that one has in mind.

§64 The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any understanding whatever, and not merely for human understanding. Their psychological meanlnl and normative function in relation to inadequate thought . f Both sorts of laws are. of course. of an ideal nature. That a piece 0 stuff can only be apprehended in certain forms. and bound together ing to certain forms. that the possible transformation of these fo subject to pure laws. in which the material element varies freely, ~ meanings to be expressed arc likewise limited to certain forms, w~ can change only in prescribed manners, if they arc .n?t to los:e t~ oxpressibility - all this docs not depend on the emplTlcal contl~g . . 0 four IDte "" the course of consciousness, nOI even on the contlngencles or common-human organization. It depends on the spec.ific nature ofl to in qllestion, on their intentional and epistemic essence: It belongs n~~ nature of just our (individual or common-human) sensibility. nor J understanding, but rather to the Ideas of Sensibility and Undersl

The

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priori law$ of authentic and inauthentic thinking 315

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nertll. An understanding governed by other than the purely logical laws ;'ould be an understand.in.&. without understanding. If we define understanding. a5 opposed .to senSibility.. as the capacity for categorial acts, also, perhaPS. as.a c~paclty for expression and meaning directed upon such acts, and lI1ade 'nght by them. then the general laws rooted in the specific nature of these actS belong to the definitory essence of understanding. Other beings 1113)' gaze upon other 'worlds', Ihey may also be endowed with 'faculties' other than OUTS. but. if they are minded creatures at all, possessing some sort ofintenti~nal.experien~. with the relevant differences between perception and imaglO 3tJOn . str31ghrforward and categorial intuition. meaning and intuition. adequate and inadequate knowledge - then such creatures have both sensibility and understanding, and are 'subject' to the pertinent laws. The laws of authentic thinking naturally, therefore, belong also 10 the DlIture of human consciousness, to our common human 'psychic organization'. But they arc not characteristic of tbis organization in respect of its peCllliar character. The laws are rooted, we said, in the purely specific character of certain aCls: thi~ means that they concern these acts not just in so far as they occur.tog~ther lO.a human organization. They pertain rather to all possible orga~~t~ons whIch can be made up of acts of this sort. The differentiating pecuhanlics of each type of mental organization, all that distinguishes, e.g., ~ hWIIOI1 consciousness as such. in the manner of a natural historical speoes, 15 no.t at all affected by such pllre laws as are the laws of thought. A relation to 'our' mental organization, or to 'consciousness in general' (understood as the aspects of consciousness common 10 men in general) does DOt define the pure and genuine, but a grossly distorted a priori. The ~otion of a COmmon mental organization, like that of a physical organization, ~IY has a merely 'empiri~dr meaning, the meanjng of a mere ;matter of . . BUI pure laws are prCClsely pure of matter of fact. they tell us not what : generally WoOl to be in this or that province of the real. but what abso. r. lely goes beyond all wont and all divisions into spheres of reality, and that or the. reason th at wh" . belongs to the essential make-up of fib at IS 10 question ~~ IS. The true logiml a p'riori. therefore concerns all that pertains to the acH ~nce of undcrstandlOg as such. to the essence of its act·species and lil\de°rrns. ~o that, accordingly. which cannot be eliminated, as long as the thus r~tandtng. and the acts definitory of it. are what they are. i.e. thus and . .. h· , 111 natured . mamtammg t elr sehsame conceptual essence. Jtan~ extcn~. accordingly, to which the logical laws and, in the first in!Ilean: the Ideal laws of authentic thinking, .. Iso claim 11 psydlOJogical hap~n~. an~ the extent to which they govern the course of actual mental bility nln.g s..IS at once clear. Each genuine 'pure' law. expressing a compatiin rd~~~~n lncomp.atibility grounded i~ the nature of a given species, will, ~ib'I' to species of mentally reala.able contents. limit the cmpirical b. i · l( p hcnomenologlcal) . 'Yh.at lltlcsof . psyc h ooglca coexistence and succession. IS seen 10 be incompatible ill specie. cannot be brought together. be

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rendered compatible, i~ empirical instan~s, In so far as the lo~cal ~ of experience is, to an Incomparably major extent, conducted tna~~ and signitively, we ,can think, believe, many t~ings which in trul~•• manner of authentic thought, the actual carrylOg out of merely m~ syntheses, cannot be brought together, at all, Ju~t for this reason the lull'S of uuthelllic thinking anti authentIc express/O,~ become norms for ~ opinion-forming. inauthentic thought and expressIOn, Put somewhat ently: on the laws of authentic thinking other laws are .founded, fo,,::i too as practical nonns, which express in a man~er suited ~o. the III signitive or admixedly signitive presentation, the I~~al condltl~ns of. ible truth (or rightness in general), the ideal conditions, that IS, of compatibility (logical, since related to possible a?equation) wit?in.thiI of admixedly signitive thinking, The laws of mauthentlc thmkmg hold psydlOlogical/y like empirical laws governing. the origin an~ such thought, but as the possibilities or impossibilitles,of adequ~tJon. Ii in their ideal purity in the variously fanned acts of mauthentlc relation to corresponding acts of authentic thinking.

i::b_

a,.,.

§65 The senseless pr'"oblem of the r'"eal meanl". of the logical We now also completely understand why the notion of a ~our~ ~ftbe violating the laws of logic - the analytic laws of authentiC thmkmg consequent norms of inauthentic thinking - or of the need or of finit grounding these laws in experience. the 'matter of fact' of fixing for them their limits of validity - is a piece of pure .no ignore the fact that even a probabilistic grounding o,n facts IS ~ , • which as such, obeys ideal principles, principles which by antlClp8 see to'rest upon 'authentic' experiences of probability, both as reprdl specific content and their status as laws. Here we must rather stress. so-to-say facticity of a fact belongs to sensibility, and that to call lD bility to help provide a basis for purely categorial laws - laws wh~ meaning excludes all sensibility and facticity, which make pure a essence about categorialforms. as forms of possible correctness and such _ represents a most obvious j.IET6:~aOlS els OAAO ytvos. laWS refer to no fact cannot be confirmed or refuted by a fact. The , earnestly and profoundly treated by great philosophers,. as to the formal meaning of the logical'. is therefore a nonsensical problcP1requires no metaphysical or other theories to explaill the (lg~eement cOllrse of n(ltl/re anti the '"a/il'e' regularities of /~U! unde~.5({lII~mg. an explanation, one necds only a p~enomenOloglcal c1~nficat~on 0 to thinking and knowing, and of the Ideas and laws which spnng f~O . The world constitutes itself as a sensuous unity: its very meamng " the unity of actual and possible straightforward percepts, Its trUe

;ns

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The 0 priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking

] 17

b \\,cvcr. precludes its being adequately given, or given without qualifica.0 n in any closed process of perception. It is for us always a quite inadU°I.I~tely meant unity for theoretical research, in part intended through '~aightforward and categorial intuition, in part through signification, The ~lIrlher our knowledge progresses, the better and more richly will the idea of (be world be detennined, the more, too, will inconsistencies be excluded fro l11 it. To doubt whether the world really is as it appears to us to be, or as it is thought of in contemporary theoretical science, and as it counts for the well_grounded belief of thc latter, has a good sense, since inductive science C'ol.O never construct an adequate world-picture, however far it may carry us. But it is also nonsensical to doubt whether the true course of the world, the true structure of the world in itself, could conflict with the fonns of thinking, For this would mean that a definite, hypothetically assumed sensibility, which would bring the world to adequate representation in an ideally complete set of unending perceptual processes, would be capable of assuming C3legorial fonns, while forcing syntheses upon them that are generically ruled out by the universal nature of such fonns. That they are thus ruled out, and that the laws of the categories hold as pure laws in abstraction from all sensuous stuff, and are accordingly unaffected by limitless variation of such stuff, this we do not merely think. but we see it to be true. It is given 10 us in fullest adequacy. This insight is of course achieved subjectively on Ihe basis of any casual empirical intuition, but it is a generic insight relating purely to fonn. The basis of abstraction contains in this case, as in others, nOlhing presupposed by the ideal possibility and validity of the Idea abstracted from it. It would further be possible to demonstrate ad ntlUseam the absurdity involved in considering the possibility of an illogical course of the world ~n signitive thought, thereby making this possibility hold, and destroying m one breath. so to say, the laws which make this or any other possibility ~ol~ at all. We could also point out that a correlation with perceivability, mt.ultability, meanability and knowability, is inseparable from the sense of bemg in general, and that the ideal laws, therefore, which pertain to these POssibililies in specie can never be set aside by the contingent content of wh . ' ~t Itself happens to be at the moment. But enough of such argumentations, w1hl Ch merely ring the changes on one and the same position, and have a read Yglvcn . us guidance in the Prolegomena.

§66 " d'" 0"IS t"metlon between the most "Impor'"tant l 'i e~e.nees mixed up in the eunent opposition of l'ltultlng' and 'thinking'

~ ~bove invesligations should have impoTlcd a satisfactory, general c1ear[", . I.nto Ihe much used. but liule clarified. rclalion between thinking and kiting. We here lisl the following oppositions, whose confusion has vexed

] 18 Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

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epistemological research so inordinately, and whose distinctness has ~ quite clear to ourselves. I. The opposition between intllition and signification. Intuition II _ ception or imagination - it is irrelevant whether categorial or ~ adequate or inadequate - is opposed to mere thinking. as merely .fign~ reference. Our parenthetically noted differences are, of course, ignored. We consider them very important. and now specially stress ~ 2. The opposition between sensUOllS and rategorial intuition. We thcn:rcw oppose senSllOUJ intuition in the ordinary, straightforward sense, to COt,.,.,., intuition, or intuition in the extended sense. The founded acts, charaeterillt of the latter, now count as the thought which 'intellectualizes' 5eIlIaaW' intuition. 3. The opposition between inadequate and adequate intuition, or, generally, between adequate and inadequate presentation (since we ate ing intuitive and significative presentation together). In an inadequate resentation we merely think that something is so (appears so), in presentation we look at the matter itself, and are for the first time acquainted with its full selfhood. 4. The opposition between individual intuition (usually conceived. what is plainly baseless narrowness, as sensuous intuition) and intuition. A new concept of intuition is fixed by means of this oppositia&. is opposed to generalization, and so, further, to the categorial acts . generalization, and also, in unclear admixture, to the significative parts of such acts. 'Intuition', we now say, merely presents the' while 'thought' points to the unil'ersal, is carried out by way of ·'co..... One generally speaks in this context of the opposition between 'intuitioll concept'. How strongly we tend to let these oppositions shade into ODe would be shown by a criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge, which out bears the impress of the failure to draw any clear distinction these oppositions. In Kant's thought categorial (logical) functions plat great role. but he fails to achieve our fundamental extension of the of perception and intuition over the categorial realm, and this becaUl!! fails to appreciate the deep difference between intuition and si . their possible separation and their usual commixture. And so he does complete his analysis of the difference between the inadequate and.a . adaptation of meaning to intuition. He therefore also fails to dlsun between concepts, as the universal meanings of words. and concepts as cies of authemic universal presentation, and between both, and con~ universal objects, as the intentional correlates of universal prcse n18 Kant drops from the outset into the channel of a metaphysical epis in that he allempts a critical 'saving' of mathematics. natural science metaphysics. before he has subjected knowledge as such, the whole of acts in which pre-logical objectivation and logical thought are perf0

8COai"

The 0 priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking

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o a clarifying critique and analysis of essence. and before he has traced

~ck the primitive logical concepts and laws to their phenomenological sources. It was ominous that Kant (to whom we nonetheless feel ourselves • quite ~lose) should have thought he ~ad done ~ustice to the domai.n ~f pure 10l!:ic lD the narrowest sense, by saymg that It fell under the pnnclple of co;tr.1dictioo. Not only did he never see how lillie the laws of logic are all analytic propositions in the sense laid down by his own definition. but he failed 10 see how little his dragging in of an evident principle for analytic propositions really helped to clear up the achievements of analytic thinking.

Additional note to the second edition AU the main obscurities of the Kantian critique of reason depend ultimately on the fact that Kant never made clear to bimself the peculiar cbaracter of pure Ideation. the adequate survey of conceptual essences, and of the laws of universal validity rooted in those essences. He accordingly lacked the phenomenologically correct concept of the a priori. For this reason he could never rise to adopting the only possible aim of a strictly scientific critique of reason: the investigation of the pure, essential laws which govern acts as intentional experiences, in all their modes of sense-giving objectivation. and their fulfilling constitution of ;true being', Only a perspicuous knowledge of these laws of essence could provide us with an absolutely adequate answer to all the questions regarding our understanding, questions which can be meaningfully raised in regard to the 'possibility of knowledge'.

fhird Section

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Clarification of our introductory problem

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Chapter 9

Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning

§67 That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing Having gone far enough in our investigation of the relation between meaning and corresponding intuition in regard to much more general problems, and having thus done enough to lay bare the essence of authentic and inauthentic expression. we have reached clearness on the difficult issues which troubled us al the beginning of this Investigation, and which first prompted us to undertake it. We have. above all, rid ourselves of the temptation to conceive of the meaning-function of expressions as in some sense a case of knowing, and in fact a case of classification, a temptation which springs from a line of thought touched on above (§I). and which always crops up in important epistemological contexts. One says: An expression must surely give expression to SOme act of the speaker, but in order that this act should find its appropriate speech·form, it must be suitably apperceived and known, a presentation as a presentation. an attribution as an auribution, a negation as a negation etc. Our reply is that talk of knowledge refers to a relationship between acts of thought and fulfilling intuitions. Acts of thought are not, however, brought to expression in statements and parts of statements, e.g. names, in such a lIJanner that they in their turn are thought of and known. Otherwise these last acts would be the carriers of meaning, it would be they primarily that ~:re expressed, the.y ~ou~d accordingly .~ in .need ~f other new acts of ught. and so on In mfillllul1I. If I call thiS mtUlted object a 'watch'. I camI Pete' ' . . In namlllg It. an act of thought and knowledge. but I know the watch, ~nd nOt my knowledge. This is naturally so in the case of all acts that confer c eaning. Should I utter the word 'or' in a context of expressive speech. I arry is OUt a disjunction. but my thought (of which the disjoining is a part) SQ ~~t trained upon the disjoining but upon the (objective) disjulIcril'ufII, in kn ar as this last enters into the unitary state of affairs. This disjllllcth'um is an~w.n and objectively denominated. The word 'or' is accordingly no name, I:kewise no non-independent appellation of disjoining; it merely gives

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voice to this act. Naturally this applies also to complete judgements assert something. I think of Ihings, that things stand in this or that ~ this is what I express. and perhaps also know, But I do not think and ~ my act of judging. as if I were also making it into my object, and classifying it as a judgement and naming it through this form of expres:: But does not the grammatical adaptation of expression to exPfelled act poi,llt to an act ~f know.ing in v.:hich su~h adaptation is perfoI'lllOll? II. a certam manner or III certam cases It docs, III all those cases, that is, .... the sense of 'expression' dealt with by us at the beginning of the ~ Investigation is relevant. This is not the case where we are dealing With ClIo pression as a mere 'voice-giving', in which case all meaning-eonferringcau.aa as expressed by our words (as verbal noises). and again not where 'exPRIIi\W means the same as 'meaning', and what is expressed is one a n d 3 meaning. In the two latter senses, every statement. whether merely si . or intuitively fulfilled, expresses something: it expresses the judgement ~ conviction), or that 'judgement's content' (the selfsame propositional_ ing), But in the former sense only the intuitively fulfilled statement (or statement which is 10 be intuitively fulfilled) expresses something, in case not the verbal noise, but the already sense-enlivened locution "I.... the 'expression' of the corresponding intuition. It is the function that meaning to our words which is primarily and universally responsib'e fIX' unitary interweaving of the signitive intentions attaching to those The latter merely make up a signitive judgement, in which they IM:t fulfilling intuition: the synthesis of agreement or disagreement, wbidl total signitive intention expresses (or claims to express) is here not tically carried out, only signitively meant. But if, contrariwise, the . synthesis is authentically carried out, the authentic synthesis will with the non-authentic one (the synthesis in signification). Both are and the same intentional essence, representing one and the same the simple, selfsame judgement, whether carried out intuitively or signitively, Similar things plainly hold for cases where only some of verbalized intentions enjoy intuitive 'fulness·. The signitive acts in vo::", same meaning as the intuitive. though without the latter's fulness; they • 'express' this meaning. The suggestions of this wo~d a:~ the more filIIIIt since signitive acts likewise preserve th~ sense of ~n lIl.t~IUon aller t~ . . has disappeared, like an empty shell w~tho,u~ th: mtUltlve kernel. Th. If of coinciden.ce is. in t~e case of. the IIltUlt~v.e Judgement, a true ~~ knowledge (If not a unity of ;el.auonal cognltlo~): we know, howeve ~ in the unity of knowledge. II IS not the fulfilling act (here the au ~ synthesis of judgemenl) that we know. but t.he f~cl which i~ its o~t.ddtt correlate. In intuiting things we carry out it Judgmg syntheSIS, an /11 thus ir is or IhllS il is flot. Because our expr~ssive int~nti~)Il. with it~ ac:& ated word-sounds (the grammatical expressIon) apphes Itself to thiS. fact-envisagemellt, we achieve knowledge of the intuited fact in ques

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68 The controversy regarding the interpretation peculiar grammatical forms which express ~Or'l.objectifying acts

If the

\'Ie nOW turn to a final discussion of the seemingly trivial, but, correctly reo garded, most importa~t and difficult ~int at issue (see above. §I jf.) whether the famili~r gra~matlcal forms used III ou.r speech for wishes, questions, \'oluntary llltentlons - acts, generally speakmg, we do not class as 'objectifying' - are to be regarded as jlldgemenls concerning our acts, or whether these actS themselves. and not merely such as are 'objectifying'. can function as 'expressed'. whether in a sense-giving or sense-fulfilling fashion. We are dealing with sentences like 'Is Tl" a transcendental number?' 'May heaven belp us!' etc. The teasing chamcter of the question is shown by the fact that pre-eminent logicians since Aristotle have been unable to agree on its answer, Statements express the fact that something is. or that something is nOI, they assert, they judge about something. In their case alone can one talk of true and false. A wish or a question asserts nothing. We cannot object to one who ullers them: 'What you say is untrue'. He would not even understand our objection. Balzano thought this argument invalid. He said: 'A question like "What is t,lJe relation of the diameter of a circle to its circumference?" asserts nothing about what it enquires into. but it asserts something nonetheless: ~ur desire, in fact. to be informed concerning the object asked about. It is mdeed capable of Iruth and falsehood, and is false when our desire is mis-stated by it" (Bolzano, Wissenschajtslehre I, §22, p. 88), .We may doubt, however, whether Bolzano has not here confused two things: the adequacy or inadequacy of an expression - here a word-sound _ to Our thought. and the truth or falsehood which relates it to the content of that thought, and its adequacy to the thing, Regarding the adequacy of an expression (as word-sound) to our thought. we can speak in two senses. ~~uwhich re~ates to 1~"slIi~abil!IY ~ as when a speaker chooses to express the W' hghts whIch fill hiS mllld III words whose customary meaning conflicts ti:~ lt~e latter - and one relating to IlI1lrl1tliflllness, i.e. to deliberately decepact' Ylng speech - as when the speaker docs not wish to express the thoughts 'd b UI ot hers at vaflance .. . agioually filii .ng h'IS nun, WIth these. and merely Im!!lin: by, h,lln: he ~ishes to express these thoughts w; if they were filling his true ,A :>UlIable, slllcerely employed expression can still state both what is ' d ·lllg as 1I /rougI ·It expresses what .IS or IS IlO and what is f a Is e, accor I liS· sefl.\·(' Or f t, Or . wh·lt· ,IS t he same. accord IIlg·as·ItS sense can be adequately fulfilled . orUStrut·u ,c b y a poSSIble adequate percept. iasin"e ~lght now counter Balzano as follows. One can talk of sincerilY and I.. cerny or SUlta . b·j· . b·j· "Ut one' llty an d unsulta I Ity. .III the case of el"l'ry expression. 'Peaker ~an only t~lk of truth ,and false.hoo~ in the case of statements. A can. accordlllgly. be objected to III dIfferent ways. 'What you say is

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false': this is the/actual objection. And 'You are not speaking s~ 'You are expressing yoursel~ un.suitably': this is the objection of ~ or inadeqllacy of speech. Objections of the latter son are the only 0-. ... can be made to a q~estioner. ~e is ~rbaps pretending, o~ is using hia ...... incorrectly, and saytng somethmg different from what he Intends to IIJ' . . one can raise no factual objection to him. since he is making no ...... claim. If one treats the objection concerned with unsuitability of ~ as showing that a question expresses a judgement, one, i.e., that WOIIll.. completely expressed in the form ~I ~ asking whether ...', one would . . . consistency to treat each expression IR the same manner, and so to~ ... true sense of each statement whatever as being what we adequately . . . . in the word-form'l am asserting that .. :. But the same would have to. . of these restatements. which would accordingly land us in an infinite In all tbis it is easily seen that tbis abundance of ever new statemeall mere abundance of words. but yields new statements by no means ent to the original ones, let alone identical in meaning. Does sucb ....... consistency not compel us to acknowledge an essential differeoce one order of sentence-forms and another'! (How this difference n:dJ be interpreted is explained in our next section: cf. the final para,gn"'~ Here two positions can be taken up. Either one can say: The q sincerity affects every ullerance: a judgement accordingly penaiDlto utterance as such, a judgement relating to the experience of the which is to be intimated. A man who speaks. intimates somethiq. this the intimating judgement corresponds. But what is intimated or differs from case to case: the interrogative sentence intimates a the imperative sentence a command, the indicative sentence a j Each indicative sentence therefore implies a double judgement, a j namely. about this or that fact, and a second judgement, passed speaker as sucb, upon tbis first judgement as his own experience. This appears to be Sigwart's position. We read (Logik, I, 2nd EdL. Note): The imperative undoubtedly includes an assertion. to tbe eff~ that the speaker wills the action he is demanding, the optative wishes what he utters. This assertion is involved in the fact of A not in the content of what he utters; every statement of the fonn accordingly involves the assertion, based on the mere fact of. that the thinker thinks and believes what he says. These assert~ gardillg the subjeclil'e slate 0/ the speaker, im'ohed in the fact I spe(Iks. and valid on the assumption of his sincerity. accomP"'! speech in the same fashion, and can accordingly not serve as a differentiating our various sentence-fonDs. Another way of conceiving the mailer would be to reject the
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ilppuent fulfilments of meaning

327

of indicative sentences as a contingent complication. only exceptionally

esse nl. and first brought into the picture. moreover. by descriptive reflection.

~nsl this one might hold that. in each case of adequate, not contextually A.f.~liC31 speech what was expressed was essentially one. in the interroga~ ~ sentence a question. in the optative sentence a wish. in the indicative

tenCC a judgement. Before I had completed these Investigations. I myself this position unavoidable, hard as it was to reconcile with the t henomenological facts. I thought myself compelled by the following argu~ents. thaI I now accompany with suitable criticism. tl\

S:Ught 169

Arg~ments

for and against the Aristotelian

conception According to the doctrine which is opposed to that of Aristotle, a man "'ho, e.g.. utters a question will be communiC'dting to another his wish to be informed regarding the state of affairs in question. This communication regarding the speaker's actual experience is. it is held, a statement like any communication. In the form of the question itself there is no express saying that one is asking whether ... ; this form only marks off the question as a question. Our speech, therefore, is a case of contextual elJiplicity. The circum~tances of utterance make it obvious that it is the speaker himself who aso the question. The complete meaning of the sentence does not, accordingly lie in what its mere word-sounds suggest, but is determined by the occasion, the context. the relation to the person speaking at the moment. In favour of the Aristotelian conception, many replies could now be given. (a) The argument ought to apply equally to indicative sentences, so that 'ie have to interpret the sentence 'S is P' as a contextual ellipsis for the new npression '1 judge that S is P'. and so on in infinilum. . (6) The argument is based on the view that the expressed sense of the ~tmogative sentence differs from its real sense. For. undeniably. in the ttltmogative or wish-sentence. the relation of the wish to the wisher does :: need. to be brought out. as little as. in the case of the indicative sentence, relation of the judgement to the judging person. If this relation is not :" oflhe explicit sense of the sentence. but only of its contextually variable ca n, this Concession gives one aU that one could want. The explicit meaning Stan be altered in certain circumstances. but there will surely also be circum(a ~~ "':here it will be just what we mean. In such cases the mere question eqn 5nntlarly the mere request or command etc.) will receive wholly adUate expression. ~ More careful comparison with the indicative sentences of ordinary lent h favours the Aristotelian conception. In verbal communication such a indien~ intimates that one is judging. and it is the grammatical form of the ~callve sentence which brings out the judgement as such. On the utterof SUch grammatically framed speech, the effect forthwith allends, that

328

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Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

m::;:-.

the person addressed takes the speahr to be judging. This effcct----""" howe~er. c~nstitute t~e meaning .of t.he expression. which surely same In sohloquy as In commumcatlve speech. The meaning lies III the act of judging as the identical judgement-content. ratbIr it The same could be the case in regard to interrogative sentence.. meaning of an interrogative sentence is unchanged whether we deal . . . imernal question or an overt one. The relation of speaker to J)CrIoa • dres~d belong~ here, ~s in the case compared, to t~e merely communi! : function. And just as In that case the 'content of judgement', i.e. a ..... specific character of judgement, determined in this or that manner • gards conlent. constitut~ the me~ning of the indi.cative sentence, 10-: the content of the question constitutes the meamng of the in~1 1 sentence. In both cases the ordinary meaning can undergo . modifications. We may uUer an indicative sentence with the primary .... tion. not of communicating the relevant state of affairs, but the , . _ we have the conviction in question, and mean to put it forward. tion, bUllressed. perhaps, by non·grammatical aids (stress, gesture). understood. Here what underlies our words is a judgement relatiq . . . explicit judgement. Just so, in the case of an interrogative or wi·oh our primary intention may lie. not in our mere wish, but in the fact wish to express the wish to a hearer. Naturally this interpretau. not hold in all cases. It could not hold. e.g.. where a burning willa spontaneously from the hean. The expression then is intimately .,. the wish. it clings to it immediately and directly. Criticism. Regarded more closely. this argument only proves that a .....' relating to the communicative function cannot be pan of the SC'DJC fI sentence. The opposing argumenl is refuted: it rests on the false 8JI""~~ that all expression is communicative. and that communication is a judgement regarding the internal (imimated) experiences of the But its thesis is unrefuted. at least when suitably modified. For we exclude the possibility that the controversial wish·. request·, and co.....~ sentences etc., are still judgements about the relevant experienced wishing. asking and willing. and that it is only as being so, that theythese experiences adequate expression. If there is no place for j here in the narrower sense of predications _ Aristotle cenainly tall:. .. conception of the controversial sentences - perhaps there is place for in a wider sense of assertive objectivations in general. . I. As regards «(I) we note. further, thut the case of statements IS.""same as. e.g.. that of questions. If we transform the sentence'S is P'sentence'l judge that Sis r. or into any related seOlence. which a relation 10 Ihe judging person, however indefinitely. we obtain not altered meanings, bUI such as are not equivalenl to the original ones: straightforward senlence may be true. the subjectivized sentence f..... conversely. The situation is wholly different in the case compared·

n.

This" 1l!!

---

ao e refuses to speak of true and false in this case. one can surely always find statement that 'in essence says the same' as the original question or wish. form. e.g. 'Is S PT =- 'I should like to know .. .' or 'One would like to know ~'helher S is r etc. May such sentence·forms not imply a relation to the speake.r. even i~ o~l! indefinitely and subsidiarily? Does the preservation of 'essentlal meumng In the transformed indicative forms not point to the fact thlll the meaning.~iving .acts are at least of the same general sort as judgements? These conslderattons also deal with (b): not the mere experience of ~1shing or willing. but the inner intuition of these experiences (and the significa.tion. adapted to this intuition) will be relevanl to our meaning. This conception IS. however. affected by tbe following argument: 2. ~ere is a?other .way in which one might try to interpret the expressed forms In questIon as judgements. If we uuer a wish. even in soliloquy. we put i~, and t~e wished-for content. into words. we accordingly have a pres(1113t!on of It. and of what constitutes it. The wish is, however. not any merely presented wish, but the living wish that we have just taken note of. And it is this wish, and this wish as such, that we want to intimate. It is not. accordingly. our mere presentation. but our inner percept. i.e. really a judge. men!. that achieves expression. It is not, indeed. a judgement of the same son as our. ordinary .asse.n~ons. that predicate something of something. In the e~presslon of a Wish, 11 IS only our concern to grasp the internally noted expenence conceptually (significatively) in straightforward affirmation, and to express its simple existence. It is not our concern to make a relational ~ication about such an experience. connecting it with the experiencing It

sub)CCt.

Against this conception it may be objected that the situation is exactly the same for expressed judgemenls as for all other expressed experiences. If we stale so~ething. we judge. and our words cover not only the presentation ~:~erIYI~g our judgement, but also our judgement itself (i.e. in the form of . SSCrtlOn). We should, therefore. also conclude here that the judgement is ,lltlernalJy perceived. and thai the meaning of our statemenllies in the straightorwardly a ffilrmatlve . JU . d gement about whal we perceive. i.e. about our jUd Ita gemenl. If no one finds such a conception acceptable in the case of a ~ernent. it cannot be seriously entertained in the case of other indepen. t >h. senlences. We recall what was said in our last section. The expressions Ich ' to t he expressed expenences. . ill th fil th emseIves are not related to them are e w~y that names are. nor in any analogous manner. Our experiences tog n~t first objl'ctil'ely preseOlcd. and then brought under concepts as if er wilh each new word. a subsumption or predication had taken' place: ""hic~~n who ju~ges ~old 10 be yellow. d,oes n,o.t judge thai the presentation that h ccompames hiS use of Ihe word gold IS yellow: he does nOI judge lind I e manner of judging he carries OUI when he uuers the word 'is' falls ~~~ Ihe concep.t 'is' et.c. ~he word .'is' does not in fact symbolize judgebut Ihe bemg which IS found In a state of affairs. 'Gold'. likewise.

A.::

330

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

---e:

does not name a presentative experience: it names a metal. Exp~ name experiences only when such experiences have been made ob;eu. presentation or judgement in reflection. The same holds for all wOrds. " syncategorematic ones. in their relation to what is objective: they mean in their fashion even when they do not name it. Expressions are not therefore associated as names with the acts which. our minds at each moment, acts in which we live without jUdging abalt them reflectively: such expressions belong rather to the concrete beingot... acts themselves. To judge e~pr~ssly is to)udge, to ~ish expressly is to .... To name a judgement or WIsh IS not to Judge or WIsh, but merely to - - . A judgement named need never be judged by the man who names it. a ..... named never wished by him. And, even when this is not so, tbe bIIIiIa expresses no judgement or no wish, but a presentation related to ODe or .... other. Criticism. This objection also exposes the weakness of our at first,:::i preliminary argument. It is clear from it, as from our previous di that not every expression (qua the expression it is) presupposes aj or other act, which makes the intimated experience its object. This does not dispose of the thesis: we have not shown, just in the case sentence·fonns under discussion, that they are not judgements about tary wishing, questioning or requesting experiences, or that they do express their straightforward existence in the speaker. True, to name a is not therefore to wish, but is experiencing a wish and naming it in the breath, not also a case of wishing? So that, even if expressed wishing it sarily a wishing which involves naming and stating, the propositioa holds, that expressed wishing is wishing and not mere naming. 3. The controversial expressions have the form of sentences, and at the form of categorical sentences with subjects and predicates. F~ it follows that they can also be treated as having predication in ~ tent, and not merely as predications in relation to one, same, unme:D subject '1'. E.g. 'May God protect the Kaiser'. 'The coachman shO~ ness the horses'. A 'may' or a 'should' is uttered: the subject in ques(:ila apprehended as standing under a requisition or an obligation. One could here rejoin: Where a 'should' counts as an objective p"=di~. and is actually attributed as such. the should-sentence has not merelY force of a wish or a command, or not this alone. An objective obligatiOll be said to hold. though the man ~tating it need ~xpe.rience no act of the~ which constitutes an actual conscIousness of obligatIon. If I know that . one's will is bound by a relationship of service or by custom or mo ralit1t can judge that he should and must do something. But this ~xpressdl living wish, desire or obligation. Statements of obligation may mdeed in appropriate contexts to express acts of this sort. e.g. 'John m~t h . the horses!' But it is clear that here no mere objective obligauon II pressed. but my own will. and this not in my words. but rotther in my

or

Non-objectifying aeu as apPilrent fulfilmenu of meaning

331

.-------------'----'-------'--------=----.ad in the circumstances. In such circumstances the predicative form doubtless does duty for an imperative or optative fonn, i.e. the thought·predication . plied by the words is either not carried out at all, or is merely subsidiary. ~iS undeniable, lastly, that the predicative interpretation only is plausible in t rtain cases. and not in the case in question. B. Erdmann, who otherwise ~ans towards it. does not favour it in this case. (Sec B. Erdmann. Logic. II, 545. pr. 271 Jf) ~ Criticism. It may be questioned whether this refutation suffices. That a shou1d·predicate has an objective sense and value cannot be doubted. But that. where this is not true, nothing is predicated or at least judged. is by no means proved. One might maintain: When we issue a command to someone, e.g. a command to the coachman John to harness the horses, he counts for us as someone subordinate to our will: he is apprehended as such by us and accordingly addressed in this form of expression. We say: 'John, harness the horses!' That he is one who should harness horses is here predicated of him, naturally in the expectation of corresponding practical results. and not merely to attest that he counts as such for me. The expression of the com· mand is relative. We can think of no one commanded, without at the same time thinking, definitely or indefinitely, of someone who commands him. This being wholly obvious requires no explicit expression. Instead of the cumbrous form 'I command etc.', we employ the brief imperative, whose fonn points to a communicative relation. The speech·fonns 'should' and 'must' were not originally used by a commander in face of the commanded to express his actual voluntary intent, but only when a more objective ex· pression of his own or someone else's voluntary intent was needed, e.g. when there was a third person relaying someone else's command or when a legislating will found expression in a law. When communication between ~mmander and commanded lapses, the imperative, which fits the conscious situation of the former, loses application. This conception can be applied 8t ne rally. One can say: In the optative, what we wish is presented as wished, and Stated to be such. Just so, in a requesting fonn, what we request is PTesented as requested. in a question what we ask presented as asked etc. These acts are related in our presentation to their intentional objects. and are SO themselves made objective as reflexive predicates attaching to the tter. "ti In the communicative situation, many others of the expressions in ques· :en ~ave. like commands. the role of telling the hearer (like essentially (of aSlona] expressions) that the speaker is performing certain intimated acts h' request. congratulation, condolence etc.) with an intentional regard to ~Udi~or. To the extent that expressions of all sorts may in full conscious0lb be mformed by the wish to communicate with others. and to acquaint ~rs .....ith one's own convictions. doubts, hopes etc.. they are perhaps all fir; .mpanled by renex acts directed upon such inner experiences and. more ecisely. by acts which intuitively relate the latter to the speaker and to the

332

Elemenu of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

---

person addressed. This accordingly holds of communicative staternenta well. These acts of reflection and reference do not on ~hat account form'-: of the meaning of a statement and of all other expreSSions, but this rnay~ well be said of expressions of our controversial class, in virtue of wlticb tbar are in all cases directed to inner experiences of the speaker. In solitary mental life - i.f we dis~gard exceptiona~ cases of talkioa " oneself, asking oneself questions, desmng or commandmg oneself - reIada. to an auditor falls away, and the subjective expressions in question, .... are still applicable, express the simple being of inner experiences in .... or less definite relation to the subject. In a monologue a question is . . . of the fonn 'I ask myself whether .. .', or relation to the subject vaaiIIIII entirely: the interrogative expression becomes a mere name, or not . . . , even that. For the nonnal use of a name is in a context of Prcdic::atnl. attributive relation, of which there is here no question. Since the expo h2 becomes one with the intuited inner experience as a knowing of the .... an interweaving of factors arises having the character of a self . . . phenomenon. To the extent that. in such interweaving, we live principdrll an interrogative act, with which our expression merely fits in, and to .... it gives articulate voice, the whole interweaving is called a questioD.1CDII6 edge is not here a theoretical function - this is the case only in Pled- " 4 while here nothing is predicated. The question is known and cqw: lit without being 'subjectivized', in the sense of being made either the sut;••• the object of predicative acts. Plainly this directly expressive seDII interrogative sentence helps to constitute the predicative interrosaa--I ask myself whether etc. - or the meaning which corresponds to such ..... circumstances.

01.

§70 Decision If hy a 'judgement' one means a predicative act, then our discussiOlll . . . shown that our disputed sentences do nor imariably express jud&CI-: Even in these cases, however, an unbridgeable gulf separates us from logicians who side with Aristotle. On their view, names, statemen~, ~ sentences, i.nterro~ations, comm.ands etc., are coordinared expresss ve~ and coordmated In the followmg manner: names express preSCl1 PIlI" statements express judgements, optative sentences express wishes etc. to entations, judgements, questions etc., in ~hort, acts of all sorts, c,a~:: confer meaning in exactly the same fashion, for to 'express acts ~ same in all cases, Le. to have one's meaning in such acts. We, on the:.. "" hand, see a fundamenUlI difference between names and statements, ..... one hand, and the expressions of our controversial group, on the othel" """ acts of presentation or judging expressed by names or statemen~ confer or fulfil meaning, but are not therefore meant; they do not. objects of naming and predication, but are constiruri~'e of stich ob)eCU-

""

Non-objectifying acu as apparent fulfltmenu of meaning

333

--------:.=.:::=~==:::::..:.::===~

the other hand we find, in flat contrast, that the acts 'expressed' by our controversial expressions, though seeming to confer meanings, are made into objecrs. This may happen, as we saw, through inner intuition reflectively directed upon such acts, and generally also through relational acts based on such intuitions. It may also happen by way of certain acts of signification, perhaps only partially ut~ered, which au~ch as. co~tions to these inner intuitions and acts of relating, thereby making their objects, the acts, namely, of asking, wishing, commanding etc.. into objects named and otherwise talked of, and perhaps into components of predicated states of affairs. In these acts of objectification lie the true meanings of our controversial expressions. We are not in their case concerned with acts which confer meaning in some fundamentally new manner, but only with contingent specifications of the one, unique class of meaning-intentions. And, just so, the acts which fulfil meaning do not fall into different classes, but belong to the one, unique class of intuitions. It is not the wishes, commands etc., themsel.'es that are expressed by these grammatical patterns and their significations; it is rather the intuitions of these acts that serve as fulfilments. When we compare indicative with optative sentences, we must not coordinate judgements with wishes. but stares ofaffairs with wishes. What results accordingly is the fact that: The osrensible expressions of non-objectifying acts are really contingent specificarions of statements and orher expressions of objectifying acts which Nll'e an immense practical and communicoth'e importance. The contentious issue here dealt with is of fundamental importance, since on its solution depends, on the one hand, whether we accept a doctrine which makes all meaning, whether in intention or fulfilment, of a single kind - the genus of objectifying acts, with their fundamental division into the significative and the intuitive - or whether, on the other hand, we decide to permit acts of all sorts to confer or fulfil meaning. The issue is, of course, not less important because it is the first to call our attention to the fundamental triplicity of the ambiguity of talk about 'expressed acts', on whose analysis our present Investigation first embarked (cf. §2 above). There it was said that we may mean by 'expressed acts': . l. The significaril'e acts which give expressions meaning, and which have, 10 their significative fashion, a certain objectivity of reference. 2. The inruiril'e acrs, which frequently fulfil the significant intent of an expression, and so represent the significantly meant objects intuitively, and In a parallel intuilive 'sense'. . 3. The acts which are the objecrs of signification, and likewise of intuition, 10 all cases where an expression (in sense 2) expresses the speaker's own experiences of the moment. If these are not objectifying acts, their nature will nOt permit them to function under the rubrics I and 2. The root of all our difficulties lies in the fact that, in the direct application of eXpressions (or acts to be expressed) to intuitively grasped inner experiences,

)31

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

::::..:--==::..:.:.~=========---­

our significative acts are completely fulfilled by the inner intuition ""hicIa attaches to them. so that both are most intimately blended, while these .... intuitions. being internal, exhaust themselves in the straightforward .... entation of the acts that they mean, Finally we must observe that the dist~n~on m~de ,above as against _ between cases where only the subJeclll'e obJectJon can be raised _ ... objection to the eltpression's sincerity or adequacy - and cases where ... factual objection can be raised - the objection related to objective truth ... falsity - that this distinction has, on a closer survey, no true connectioa .... our controversial question. For it has a quite general concern with the . . ference between expressions relating to intuitively envisaged act~~ and eltperienees not so relating. In the first class there are many quite ~ troversial predications, e.g. all statements of the form 'I ask whether ...., 'I command, wish that .. .' etc. And, be it noted, there can be DO faeIIIII objections to subjective judgements thus formulated: they are true or,.., but truth here coincides with sincerity. In the case of other stattmeDts . . . . aim at what is 'objective' (i.e. not at the self-eltpressing subject ad. ... eltperienees) the factual question concerns our meaning. The queltioa fII sincerity depends on the possibility of seeming assertions, from wbida ... genuine, nonnal act of meaning is absent. Really there is no judgcmall;'" meaning of a statement is presented in the context of an intent to decIIli-.

--

Appendix

External and internal perception: physical and psychical phenomena

Botr.a.o

The concepts of external perception and perception of self, of sensuour and in/ernal perception, have for the naly(: man the following content. External puctption is the perception of external things, their qualities and relationships. their changes and interactions. Perception ofselfis tbe perception that each can have of his own ego and its properties, its states and activities. Asked who this perceived ego may be, the naive man would reply by pointing to his bodily appearance, or would recount his past and present eltperienoes. To the further question whether all this is included in his percept of self. he would naturally reply that, just as the perceived external thing bas many properties, and has had many in the course of its changes, which are not for the moment 'open to perception', so a corresponding fact holds for h~s perceived ego. In the changing acts of self-perception appear, on occasion. such and such presentations. feelings, wishes and bodily activities of Ihe ego. just as the exterior or the interior of a house or such and such sides and pans of it. enter from time to time into ourer pe~ption. Naturally, ~o.wever. the ego remains the perceived object in the one case, as the house IS In the other. For the naive man our second pair of notions, that of sensuous and interIlal perception, does not altogether coincide with the pair just discussed, that of OUtward perception and perception of self. We perceive sensuously what we perceive by the eye and the ear. by smell and taste in brief through the orgar' ., . ns 0 sense. In thIS field everyone locales, not only eltternal things. but hIS OWn bod ' , , suc h as walking, eating, seeing, hearing y an d bod'iI y aCllVltles, etc Wh'lt II ,. . , on Ihe ot.her hand. concerns mainly s . . ~. we ca mner perception, I~~h Splrltual' experiences as thinking, feeling and willing. but also everywi~ng that we locate, like Ihese, in Ihe interior of our bodies. do not connect h Our Outward organs. of I,~ philosophical diction, both pairs of tenns - we usually prefer the pair A.r Internal and external perception' - eltpress only one pair of concepts, ter Descartes had sharply separated mens and corpus, Locke, using the

336

Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge

-

a.....

terms 'sensation' and 'reflection', introduced the two corresponding of perception into modem philosophy. This division has remained in force today. External perception was regarded, following Locke, as our ~ of bodies, w~e inner ~ption ~as the .perceptio.n that our 'Sp~ts' or·..... have of their own activities (their cogltaliones In the Cartesian SCIlIe). A division ofperceptions is a~cordingly' med~a~e~ by' a di~ision amo~g the obJect, of perception, though a difference In ongm IS hkewlse set beside it. In _ case perception arises from the effects of physical things operating tbroacIa the senses on our spirits, in the other case out of a reflection on the aetivitieI carried out by the mind on the basis of 'ideas' won through sensation.

2 In quite recent times men have been much concerned to achieve an ~ overhaul and a deepening of Locke's obviously vague and rough ~ GeneraJ epistemological interests were. on the one hand, responsible for .... move. We recall the traditional estimate of the relative value for kn~ of the two forms of perception: external perception is deceptive. inMr ~ tion evident. In this evidence lies one of the basic pillars of knowledge, ..... scepticism cannot shake. Inner perception is also the only case of ~ tion where the object truly corresponds to the act of perception, is. ill ,.... immanent in it. It is also. to speak pointedly, the one type ofperoeptioa deserves the name. In the interest of perceptual theory. we mus5tt~:::=t enter more exactly into the essence of inner. as opposed to outer p Psychological interests were, on the other hand, involved. Men were ~ cemed with the much-debated fixing of the domain of empirical psycIttJIIII. and, particularly, with establishing for it its own justification as agaiDll .... natural sciences, by marking out for it a peculiar territory of phen~ Even the prime place in epistemology readily accorded to psycbololY • basic philosophical discipline, required tbat its objects be defined willa" few epistemological comntitments as possible; it should not, therefore, ~ cern itself with transcendent realities of so controversial a type as ~ul . . body as if they were obvious data. Locke's classification of percepum:a' just such a presupposition: it was therefore at once unsuited, and not ~ designed, to serve as a basis for a definition of psychology, and to do J to the interests mentioned. It is clear, further, that if a distinction o~ ceptions is set up on the basis of an anticipated distinction between beIiI and spiritual matters. then the fonner distinction cannot be used as a._ of distinction between the science of bodily and the science o~ s~ phenomena. The matter would ~ .d~fferent if one could su~ lD ~ purely descriptil'e marks for a diVISion of percepts, marks which .Ieft ... classes unaltered in extent, and which, while lacking all epistemological suppositions, would serve to demarcate the corresponding bodily pbeP from psychic phenomena.

..----------------_....:.:=:==--= AppendiX

]]7

A possible path seemed here to be opened by the Cartesian approach through doubt. with its emphasis on the epistemological position of inner perceplion. We have already touched on this above. The line of thought, 'bich develops here, runs as follows: 1\ However widely I may extend my critical doubts regarding knowledge, I cannot doubt that I exist and am doubting, or again, while I experience tpern, that I am having presentations, am judging, feeling or however else I may designate such inwardly perceived appearances: to doubt in such a case would evidently be irrational. We accordingly have absolute 'evidence' regarding the existence of the objects of inner perception, we have that clearest cognition, that unassailable certainty which distinguishes knowledge in the strictest sense. It is quite different in the of outer perception. II lacks ·evidence', and the frequent conflicts in statements relying upon it poinl. in fact, to its capacity to deceive. We have therefore no right to assume from the outset that the objects of outer perception really and truly exist as they seem to us to be. We have, in fact, many reasons to think that !hey do not really exist at all, but can at best lay claim to a phenomenal or 'intentional' ex.istence. If one makes the reality of a perceived object part of the notion of perception, then outer perception is not, in this strict sense, perception at aU. This el'ident character will in any give a descriptive mark, free from presuppositions regarding metaphysical realities, which will C'Ilable us to sort out our various classes of perceptions. It is a character given with. or absent from, the perceptual experience itself, and this alone detennines our division. If we now consider the phenomena presented by these various classes of perceptions. they unmistakably constitute essentially dislincl classes. This is ~Ot to assert that the objects in themselves, i.e. the souls and bodies, that we nghtly or wrongly range under them, differ essentially: a purely descriptive treatmem that avoids all transcendence establishes an unbridgeable gulf bet~ttn these phenomena. On the one side we have the sensory qualities, which in themselves fonn a descriptively closed class, whether there are ~ things as senses and sense-organs or not. They form a Kind in the strict ~riStotelian sense of the word. To these are added features necessarily atla~~lng. either to sense-qualities in general, or to single r.lnges of such quahtles (again strict Aristotelian species), or, conversely, features themselves ~r.ily. presupposing qualities, and only able to achieve concrete being !Il aSSOciation with them. Here well·known propositions come up for treat· tQC'n!. e.g. no intuited spatiality without quality. Many would say that the he nverse obtained also: No quality without something spatial. Others would ~ O~ly approve particular cases: No colour, no tactile quality without to ethlng spatial. Further propositions of the same class would be: No ~-quality without intensity. no timbre without tone-qualities etc. l l:llen the Other side we have phenomena such as having presentations, judge· ts. Surmises, wishes. hopes etc. We here enter, as it were, another world.

case

case

us

ll8

Elements of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge

--

These phenomena have relation to what is sensible. but are not ~ to be compared with the latter: they do not belong to one and the (genuine) kind. When we have first clearly seen the descriptive unity ot~ class through examples. one finds. with a little attention, a positi~ ~ which characterizes them all: the mark of 'intentional inexistence'. One can of course use the above descriptive distinction of inner perception to arrive at just such a distinction of the two classes of J>bmoIt becomes now a good definition to say: Psychic phenomena are the ph : ena of inner perception. physical phenomena those of outer pen:eP'ioa.l In this manner a closer tre-dtroent of the two sorts of perceptiOQl ~ not merely to a descriptive. epistemologically important charaeterizaboa., these perceptions themselves. but also to a fundamental. descriptive di¥iIiIa of phenomena into two classes, the physical and the psychical. And to have achieved. for psychological and scientific purposes, a meta~ uncommitted definition. not oriented towards supposed data in some-. scendent world. but to what is truly given phenomenally. Physical phenomena are no longer defined as the phenomena wbich'out of the operation of bodies on our minds through our sensc-ortIIItt psychic phenomena as the phenomena discovered by us in perceiviDa. activities of our minds. In both cases the descriptive character of nomena, as experienced by us, alone furnishes our criterion. Psycbolog. now be defined as the science of psychic phenomena. as natural scieaoli.., physical phenomena. These definitions require certain limitations in order to correspood to our actual sciences. limitations which point to explanatory hypotheses. whereas the phenomena, as descriptively differentiated. ...... the true starting-points of our treatments. and the objects to be eq:' • •

...----------------_-..:.::==--= Appendi:o:

concomitant mental conditions, as things taking place for an invariant sensibility. The expression 'science of physical phenomena' must be interpreted in this rather complicated way. if it is to be equated with the meaning of 'natural science'. (Brentano. Psydlologie. I. pp. 127-128)

and_

In regard to the conceptual demarcation of psychology. it might appear that the concept of the psychic phenomenon should be widened rather than narrowed. since the physical phenomena of imagination fall as entirely in its field of reference as do psychic phenomena in the previ· ously defined sense. and since even the physical phenomena appearing in sensation cannot be disregarded in the doctrine of sensation. But it is plain that such physical phenomena only enter into descriptions of the peculiarities of psychic phenomena as the content of the latter. The same holds of all psychic phenomena which exist only phenomenally. The (rue subject-matter of psychology can be regarded as consisting solely of psychic phenomena in the sense of actual states. It is exclusively in regard to the latter thai we call psychology the science of psychic phenomena. (Ib;d. pp. 129 f)

we_

the,..

The definition of natural science is particularly in need of Iimi~'" ditions, for it is not concerned with all physical phenomena, not • • phenomena of imagination. but only with those which come before ~ perception. And. even in their case. it only sets up laws to the extt:DC~ these depend on the physical stimulation of the sense-organS. express the scientific task of natural science. by saying that nat~ .,. is the science which seeks to explain the sequence of the phYSJ~ nomena ofnonnal. pure sensations - sensations uninfluenced by "",., psychical conditions and events - by assuming the action on our takiIJ organs of a world extended in three space-like dimensions, and arriJII place in one time-like dimension. Without sclliing the absolute.ch of this world. it, is satis~ed (0 attribute. to it powers ~rovocat1ve . . ." sensations and mfluencmg each other m theIr operation. ~d t~. laws of coexistence and succession for such pow~rs. In stating cI indirectly states the laws of sequence of the phYSical phenome~ sensations. laws conceived in their purity. in scientific abstraCtion

One':::

01-

ll9

I The interesting line of thought that I have just expounded represents, as my longer quotations have made plain, the standpoint of Brentano.) and ~ that of a whole succession of thinkers who are theoretically close to him. There are further respects. as is well known, in which 'inner perception' ~ys an important role in Brentano's psychology. I am here only concerned With his doctrine of inner consciousness. Every psychic phenomenon is !lOt merely a consciousness. but itself the content of a consciousness: we are COnscious of it in the narrower sense of perceiving it. The flux of inner experience is therefore also a continuous flux of inner percepts. which are ItIOSt intimately united with the psychic experiences in question. For inner Per~~tion is no second. independent act supervening upon a relevant ~YC,hlC phenomenon; the latter f'dther involves. in addition to its relation to PIPnmary object. e.g. an externally perceived content. 'itself in all its comil1;lenes~ as presented and known' (ibid. p. 182). In so far as the act directly IV ends Its primary object. it is also subsidiarily directed upon i(self. In this ay Se Olle avoids the endless complication seemingly threatened by the con. di~~u.sne~s which accompanies all psychic phenomena (since their multiple ·evil~~on. 1~1~0 t~ree '~r~~nd-c1:lsses' itself i~volv~s an inner perception). The in thi;ce. and m.fa,lhbllUY ofmner perception Will also. be rend,ered possible lila' ,manner (Ibid. II, ch. 3. pp. 182/f). Orentano IS here. m one of his In Views. i.e. in his interpretation of consciousness as a continuous stream

340

8emenu of

~

phenomenologinl eludication of knowledge

::":':'--=-=~--=-=-'------'--------=-----­ of internal perception. in harmony with the great thinkers of the pan. E,,Locke, a true student of experience. defines consciousness as the ~ of what goes on in a man's own mind.~ Orentano's theories hav~ arou~d much opp?siti?n. This ~as Dot 0111)' been directed to the doctnnes of lOner perception Just mentioned, "'hoee subtly constructed complexity still certainly requires a phenomen0loaicll foundation. but also against his distinction between perceptions and ~ ena and. in particular. against the laying down of the tasks of psycbo&oo j and natural science which is based upon this. The relevant questiODJ boe repeatedly been made the theme of serious discussion in the past cIclcIde. and it is sad that, despite its fundamental importance for psycholOlY lad epistemology. agreement has not been reached. Criticism. it would appear, has not penetrated far enough, to hit upon", decisive points, and to separate what is indubitably significant in BrentlDo". thought-motivation from what is erroneous in its elaboration. This is due .. the fact that the fundamental psychological and epistemologica.l quem.,. which cause controversy in these dimensions of enquiry, have DOt " sufficiently clarified. a natural consequence of defective phenomenokJtirwl analysis. On both sides the conception with which men operated raM' n ambiguous. on both sides there was a consequent falling into delusi\te ~ fusions. This will be clear from the following criticism of the iIInm jn. . . . views of Oreotano.

4 According to Orentano inner perception distinguishes itself from 01IIII' perception: I. by its evidence and its incorrigibility, and . 2. by essential differences in phenomena. In inner perception we ex~ exclusively psychic phenomena. in outer perception physical ~h.en~ This exact parallelism makes it possible for the first-named dlStlnetiOG • serve as a characteristic distinguishing mark of the perceivable pbell~ as~l. . _ As opposed to this. inner and outer perception seem to me, if.IM lema narurally interpreted. t~ be of ~n e.ntirel~ s~mil~r epistemolo~cal~ More explicitly: there IS a well-Justified dlstmctlOn between eVIdent : : . . . . evident. or belween infallible and fallible perception. But, if one und .. by olller perceplion (as one naturally does. and as Orentano also does~ perception of physical thin~. properties. eve~t~ ~tc.. ~nd c1a~ ~~ perceptions as inner perceptions. then such a diViSion Will. not comel "" with tht: division prt:viously given. For nol t:very percep~lon of .tbe every perception of a psychic state referred to .lhe t:go. IS certaiDlytbiDk fill. if by the 't:go' we mean what we ~II mean by It. an~ .what we all. II perceive in perceiving ourselves. I.e. our own emplncal personahty.

at.

e:'ide*

Appendix

341

----------------=::=~

d"ir. 100. that most perceptions of psychic stales cannot be evident, since 1b(S( are perceived with a bodily location. That anxiety tightens my throat. thaI pain bores into my toolh. that grief gnaws at my heart: I perceive these things as I perceive that the wind shakes the trees. or that this box is square and brown in colour. etc. Here. indeed, outer perceptions go with inner perceptions. but this does not affect the fact that lhe psychic phenomena perceived are, as they are perceil'ed, non-existent. Surely it is clear that psychiC p~enomena. also, can be perceived transcendently? Exactly regarded. all p5ych.c phenomena seen in natural or empirical-scientific attitudes are perttived transcendently. The pure presentedncss of experience presupposes a purely phenomenological attitude which will inhibit all transcendent assertions. I know whal will here be objected: that we have forgonen the difference belween perception and apperception. Inner perception means the directlyconscious living-through of mental acts, (hey are here laken as what they ou, and not as what they are apprehended or apperceil'ed as. One must, however. reOect that what is true for the case of inner perception must be t:rUe also for the case of outer perception. If the essence of perception does 001 lie in apperception, then all talk of perception in regard to external things, mountains, woods, houses etc., is misguided, and this, the normal sense of the word ;perception', surely illustrated in these cases above all others. must be abandoned. Outer perception is apperception, and the unity of the concept demands that inner perception should be so too. It is of the essence of perception that something should appear in it: apperception, lJo.....l'l·er. constitutes whal we call appearance, whether veridical or not, and ~her it remains faithfully and adequately in the frame of the immediately lIVen, or ~nticipates future perception in going beyond it. The house appears to me - In no other manner than Ihat I apperceive actually experienced sen~-contents in a certain fashion. I hear a barrel organ - the tones sensed afe In.terpreted as 'hose of a barrel organ. In the same way 1 apperceivingly ~r~l\'e my own psychic phenomena. the blessedness quivering through arne, Ihe grief in my heart etc. They are called ·appearances'. or rather Pparent contents, being contents of apperception.

5 e l'b eWit ' h ambigUIties. , , , whose extreme da lerm "IP' pearance" IS. f 0 course. b set listTl~~;s .a~e s.cen p~ecisely i~ ~his case. It will nol be useless al this point 10 ing . sc eqUivocations expliCitly: we have already touched on them in pass>

•

'~Il~ .t~e texl of Ihese Investigations. Talk of 'appeamnce' has a preferred -~ lcalion to · ' . presentauon. . hand acts 0 fmtUlllve to acts of perception. on the one irIta : and to acts of representation. on the other. e.g. acts of remembering. ~g,nlO~. or pictorially representing (in Ihe ordinary sense). on a basis ed With perception. 'Appearance' accordingly means:

HI

Elements of a phenomenological eludic.ation of knowledge

Appendix

3-43

=":':'--==~~--'-----"----------=----

.---------------------"==....:..:.:

I. The concrete i.ntuitive. experience (the intuitive prese.ntedness or rep. resentedness of a gIven object for us); the .concrete ex.~n~nce, e.g., Whea we perceive the lamp standing before us. Since the ~u~htatlVe character of the act, whether the object is regarde,d as real.or,not, I~ Irrelevant, it can aIIo be ignored entirely, and 'appearance then coinCides WIth what we defined ..

distinct moment of property, from the sensational complex actually lived through in the percept in question, whose objective apperception first constitutes the perceptual sense, and thereby the apparent thing, in intentional fashion. It may indeed be said that the original concept of appearance was the one given in our second place above: the concept of what appears, or of what could appear, of the intuitive as such. Having regard to the fact that all sorts of experiences (including the experiences of outer intuition. whose objects are therefore called oltler appearances) can be made objects of reflective, inner intuition, we call all experiences in an ego's experiential unity 'phenomena'. Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of experiences in general. inclusive of all matters, whether real (reellen) or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly the theory of the essences of 'pure phenomena', the phenomena of a 'pure consciousness' or of a 'pure ego': it does not build on the ground, given by transcendent apperception, of physical and animal, and so of psycho-physical nature, it makes no empirical assertions, it propounds no judgements which relate to objects transcending consciousness: it establishes no truths concerning natural realities, whether physical or psychic - no psychological truths, therefore, in the historical sense ~ and borrows no such truth~ as assumed premisses. It rather takes all apperceptions and judge· menial assertions which point beyond what is given in adequate, purely immanent intuition, which point beyond the pure stream of consciousness, and treats them purely as the experiences they are in themselves: it subjects them to a purely immanent, purely descriptive examination into essence. This examination of essence is also pure in a second sense, in the sense of Ideation: it is an a priori examination in the true sense. So understood, all ~he Investigations of the present work have been purely phenomenological. In so far, that is, as they did not have ontological themes, and did not, as in the Third and Sixth Investigation, seek to make a priori assertions regarding ~he o~jecis of ~ssib~e c?n~io,usness. They did not spea~ ?: psychological ~~ts and laws III an objective nature, only of pure pOSSIbilitIes and necesSities, which belong to any form of the pure 'cogito': they spoke of these as regards their real (reellen) and their intentional contents. or as regards their ~r~'ori possibilities of connection with other such patterns in an ideally sSlble conscious context. t As the tenn 'appearance' is ambiguous, so also, and consequently, is the ;rlll. 'perception', and so are all further terms used in connection with per~Ii,on. T~ese ambiguities fiJI theories of perception with confused errors. il. ; perceived' is, e.g.. what appears in perception. i.e. its object (the house) inn, further. the sense-content experienced in it. i.e. the sum of the presentil.n~ C~ntent~, which in their interconnection are 'interpreted' as the house, Singly 'Illterpreted' as its properties.

'representation' in the last Investigation (cf. VI, §26, p. 740). 2. The intuited (appearing) object. taken as it ~ppears here and now, .... this lamp as it counts for some percept we have Just performed. 3. In misleading fashion we also call the real (reellen) co~stitue~t3 of litpearances in sense I, i.e. those of the concrete acts of appeanng or mtuitiaa. 'appearances'. Such appearances are, above all, the presentative s~ the experienced moments of colour, form etc., which we fail to di~ from apparelll properties of the (coloured, formed) objects co~ to them, and apparent in the act which 'interprets' them. That it is impan. ant to distinguish between them, that it does not do to confuse a ~ sensation with an apparent bodily colouring, the sensation of form . . . bodily form etc., we have often stressed. Uncritical theories certainly ~ the distinction. But even those who would refuse to say with SChopen.... that 'the world is my idea', are accustomed to speak as if apparent . . . . were compounded out of sense-contents. One could certainly say . . apparent things as such, the mere things of sense, are composed of a . " analogous to that which as sensation is counted a content of co~ ness. This does not affect the fact that the thing's apparent pro~. not themselves sensations, but only appear as analogues of sensatlODl. Pc they are not present, as sensations are, in consciousness, but are IDIIIII represented in it. as properties which appear in it, wh.ich a~ ~ dently referred to. For this reason perceived external thangs, Likewate..not complexes of sensations: they a.re rather objects of ap~arances,.~ appearing as complexes of properties. whose types stand In a peculiar ..... logy to types found among sensations. We could put what we baWl,said somewhat differently. Under the rubric of 'sensations', we ran . . lain sorts of experiences of this or that actual kind belongi~g to a .... of consciousness. If it now happens that. in a unity of conSClousn~. . . properties of analogous kinds appear as external to, and transcendlDJ ... sensations, we may then call them after these sensational classeS, .but rtJlfIII. are no longer sensations. We emphasize the word 'external',. Wh:~: qfIIII' of course not be understood spatially. However we may decide. .. tion of the existence or nonexistence of phen~menal.ext~mal thiD~ cannot doubt that the reality of. each such perceived thl~g ca.nnot be~ stood as the reality of a perceived complex of sensations III a pc consciousness. For it is plain, and confirmabl~ by ~henoroe: ~ analysis in each instance, that the thing of perception. thiS so-call . ~ tional complex, differs in every circumstance. both as a whole and In

I'

344

Elemenu of

phenomenological eludication of knowledge

.=--=.:.===----=-------.:......_---:I

s.

?y

Excerpt from lhe First Edition which .was re~/(Ice~ the firs' two,.,... gmphs of lhe lhird note in the precedmg §5 m EdItion II. 3. If we are only c1e~r that ,:"e have t.o draw a. distinction in 0Ir

intuition between sensatlons as hved experiences, w.hic~ are accordiltaty components of the subject, and phenomenal determmal.lons, as ~ ents of the intentional object, and that both only. coincide in the ..... case of adequate intuition (which does not come mto question for ..), then we readily see that our inwoven sensations cannot themselvea ~ as appearances, whether in the sense of acts or of apparent objccu. Moe in the former, since under the rubric of sensations we sum up Cll:I1Iit non-acts, which perhaps receive an objectifying interpretation ill . . not in the lauer, since acts would have to be part of the pbeorm .. objectivity of sensations, acts which would have to direct their .... tion to them. Such acts are indeed possible, but that they arc pili fII the stock·in-trade of every percept, and this in relation to the ~. presentative sensations, cannot be shown to be necessary descriptive analysis or on genetic grounds. All this goes without ..,... for imaginative intuitions as well, in relation to their imaginatiYelJ. resentative contents. If one has once got to the point of regarding all com~" appearances in sense I as themselves appearances, then it is ...... almost unconscious step to regard everything psychic. all li..-ed ..... enees in the experiential unity of the ego, as phenomena.

ci_"

6 How misleading such ambiguities show themselves to be ~w::..: Brentano's theory, with its division into inner and outer percepl.lon ing to evidential character and separate phenomena~ class. "!"~ are ~ Outer perception is not evid;nt, a.nd is even delus:ve. This IS undo ... the case if we mean by the phySIcal phenomena what such perceives. physical things, their properties and ~h~nges etc. ~~~ ~ Orentano exchanges this authentic. and alone permIssible sense o. ... 'perceive'. for an improper sense which relates, not to external ob~ to presenting contents. contents, i.e.• present as real parts (reell ang~ca1 r/JII' in perception, and when he consequently gives the name of ·phY~~..­ nomena', not merely to outer objects. but also to these cont,ents. t ~ seem infected with the fallibility of outer perception. I beheve.th~ divisions are necessary here. If. an e"'t~rnal. object (~ house) IS e are rI# presenting sensations are experienced 10 thIS perception, but th Y _ fI' perceived. When we are deluded regarding the exist~nce of the ho are not deluded regarding the existence of our experienced sense-""'''''':

--=

pcI"';1...

Appendix Jo4S ~----------------------'-'----

since we do not pass judgement on them at all. do not perceive them in this perception. If we afterwards take note of these contents ~ our ability to do this is. within certain limits, undeniable - and if we abstract from all that we recently or usually meant by way of them. and take them simply as they are. thell we certainly perceive them. but perceive no external object through them. This new perception has plainly the same claim to inerrancy and evidence as any 'inner' perception. To doubt what is immanent (in consciousness), and is meant precisely as it is. would be quite evidently irrational. I may doubt whether an outer object exists, and so whether a percept relating to such objectS is correct, but I cannot doubt the now experienced sensuous content of my experience, whenever, that is. I reflect on the latter. and simply intuit il as being whal it is. There are. therefore. evident percepts of 'physical' contents, as well as of ·psychical'. If it .....ere now objected that sensuous contents are invariably and nec;es· sarily interpreted objectively. that they are always bearers of outer intuitions, and can only be attended to as contents of such intuitions, the point need Dot be disputed: it would make no difference to the situation. The evidence of the existence of these contents would be as indisputable as before, and ,,",auld also not be our evidence for 'psychic phenomena' in the sense of acts. The evidence for the being of the whole psychic phenomenon implies that for each of its parts, but the perception of the pan is a new perception with a new evidence, which is by no means that of the whole phenomenon. An analogous ambiguity to that which affects the notion of a physical phenomenon, will also be found, if our conception is consistent, in the case of the notion of the psychic phenomenon. This is not the case for Brentano. He understands by a psychic phenomenon only an actually present actexperience. and by an inner perception a perception which simply apprehends such an experience, just as it is there. Orentano ignores the fact that he has only done justice to one class of percepts of psychic phenomena under the name of 'inner perception', and that it is not possible to divide all percepts into the two groups of outer and inner. He also ignores the fact that the whole evidential prerogative accorded 10 his 'inner perception' hangs upon the fact that he has employed an essentially distoned concept of perteption in the case of inner perception. and that it does not depend on the Peculiarity of inwardly perceived 'phenomena'. Had he treated as genuine Percepts of physical phenomena only such objective interpretations and ap.prchensions as survey their objects adequately, he could have attributed eVidence to that perception of sense·experiences which was by him assigned to OUter perception. and he could not have said of inner perception (in his ~nse) that it is 'really the only sort of perception in the true sense of the WOrd' (ibid. p. 119). .It is absolutely clear that the conceptual pairs of inner and outer, and of ~Idem and non-evident perception. need not coincide at all. The first pair IS determined by the concepts of physical and psychical. however these may

346

Elemenu of a phenomenological eludication of knowledge

------'---------"---------==------

Appendill

347

~-----------~=--=..::.

be demarcated: the second ex.presses the epistemologically fundamentallbti. thesis s~udied i~ o~~ Six..th Investigation. the opposition between a
il1tt'ntion finds immanent fulfilment in the experient%S in question. then the scope of inner perception will of course coincide with that of adequate perce~lion. It is ~mportant. how~ver ..to note: I. fhat psychiC phenomena tn thiS sense are not the same as psychic phenomena in Brentano's sense, nor as Descartes's cogiraticmes. nor as Locke's acts or operations ofmind. since in the sphere of experiences as such all .scnSC-contents. all sensations, also belong. 2. That Ihe non-inner perceptions (the remainder class) will not then coinriJe Ifith outer /Wrceptions in the ordinary sense of the word. but with the much wider class of transcendent, inadequate perceptions. If a sense-<:ontent, or sense-complex or sequence of sense-contents is apprehended as a thing oul there. as a multitude, an articulated connection of several things, or as a change in things, an external happening etc., we have an outer percept in the ordinary sense. But a non-sensuous content can also belong to the representative stuff of a transcendent percept. particularly in association with sense-contents. Our perceived object can then as readily be an external object with perceived mental properties (this happens in differing fashion in the apprehension of one's own and other men's bodily being as 'persons') or, as in psycho-physical apperception. an inner object. a subjective experience. perceived with physical properties attaching to it. 3. When in psychology, as the objective science of animal mentality. we meun by perceptions of psychic phenomena the perceptions that a man has of his own experiences, which the perceiver apprehends as belonging to himself. this particular person. all inner perceptions are no less cases of transcendent apperception than are outer perceptions. Among these there a~ some which (with some abstraction) count as adequate. in so far as they setze the man's own (relevant) experient%S in their very selves. But in so far as even such 'adequate' inner perceptions apperceive the experiences they appreh.end as those of a percipient. psycho-physical. personal ego, and so as bi;longmg (0 the presented objective world. they are in this respect infected With an essential inadequacy. There are. further. cases of inner perception. as Iher~ 3re cases of outer perception. where the perceived object. in the sense given to it in our percept. has no existence. The distinction. fundaf1le'flrul eren for psychology. lwtll'een adequate and inudequate perception _ pS)'cho~ . I I L • . °K1Ctl u( eq/lateness U1.'mg /lfulersl()(}(las the abstruction we mentioned - Iflll'fj,. I J ,.. • L.. . I (If/( olller perception. and therefore . c srII' (lst",ctlOn uetll'f'en ",ner Pervades the sphere of the former.

7

8

DOl.

that"

a::

It might now be objected: An experience is surely the same as a

psydli'

or::-'

phenomenon. What. then. is the dispute all about? I answer: If one by 'psychic phenomena' the real (realen) constituents of our con~ ness. the experiences themselves that are there. and if one further means ;,mer percepts. or percepts of psychic phenomena, adequate percepts.

""'' ' ' I:

lh e ambo .. f ob' Igullles.O the w,:,rd 'phenomenon' allow us first

10 call apparenl ~ ~ts and Ih~lr prope.rt1e5 'ph:nomena', then to apply the term to the Pe~nentts which constitute theIr act of appearing (particularly to the exnenced contents in the sense of sensalions) and. lastly. to all experiences

~

H8 Elements of phenomenological eludication of knowledge ----'-------=-------=----

whatever. These ambiguiti~ exp~a~n. why ,:",e tend 10 ~onfuse two enentiQJly

Notes

different lypeS of psychologIcal dmSlOn of phenomena.

I. Divisions of experiences. e.g. the division of experiences into aCIs lQd non-acts. Such divisions naturally fall into the sphere of psychology, which accordingly has to deal with all experiences. which it of course appetcej_ in transcendent fashion as experiences of animal beings in nature. 2. The division of phenomenal objeclS into. e.g., such as seem to belong to the consciousness ofan ego and such as do nOI seem to do so, i.e. the divisiob into psychical and physical objects (contents. properties, relations etc.). In Brentano these two divisions are confused. He simply opposes ph,. ical to psychical phenomena, and defines them unmistakably as a divilioa of experiences into acts and non-acts. But he at once mixes up, under the rubric of physical phenomena the contents of sense,' and apparent extemal objects (or their phenomenal properties), so that Ihe division now becomeaa division of phenomenal objects into physical and psychical (in an ordinary or near·ordinary sense), in which the latter division furnishes tbe names. Closely connected with this confusion is the erroneous criterion, also UICld by Brentano, to divide the two classes of phenomena: that physical pheoomo ena only exist 'phenomenally and intentionally, while psychical ph~ also 'have an actual existence as well as an intentional one'.l If we uDderstand by 'physical phenomena' phenomenal things, it is at least sure tbaI they do not need to exist. The forms of productive fancy, most of the objec8 of artistic representation in paintings, statues, poems etc., hallucinatory aM illusory objects, exist only in a phenomenal and intentional manner, i.e. tbIJ do not exist in the aUlhentic sense at all: only the relevant acts of exist with their real (reel/en) and intentional contents. The matter is quill different in the case of physical phenomena interpreted as sensed con.... The sensed (experienced) colour.contents, shape.contents etc., wbicb.enjoy when we look at BOcklin's picture of the Elysian Fields, and wbida. informed by an imaginative act-character. are made into the conscio"of the pictured objects, are real (reel/e) constituents of this experience. ",. they do not exist in merely phenomenal, intentional fasbion (as appareae. merely intended contents) but in actuality. One must not fors.et, of ~u: that 'actual' does not here mean the same as 'external to conscIOusness, the same as 'nOI merely putative'.

Investigation III: On the theory of wholes and parts Introduction

As regards these 'fonnal objective categories' and the fonnal ontological truths of essence perlaining to them, see the statements of the last chapter of the Prolegomena. (I WJ7 f). The difference between Independent and non-Independent objects

The two Husserlian terms. "al and rull, here IX'CUr in the same sentence, the fonner connoting what is actually there in tbe space-time world. and not abstract or ideal. tbe Jailer what is actually immanent in an experience, and not merely 'meant' by it. [Translator's note) 2 In the present discussion. there is no danger of confusion between 'presented content'. i~ the sense of any presented object (in the psychological sphere: any ~)"ch~lopcal datum), and 'presented content' in the sense of'what' the presenta· tlOn SIgnifies. 3 Princip/~s. Introduction, §IO. 4 Almost exactly as fonnulated by C. Stumpf in Ober clen psycholDgischen Ursprung rkr Rou»Il"owellung (1873). p. 109. 5 Stumpf previously used the expression 'partial content', but now prefers to speak of an 'attributive moment'. 6 In the following expositions I employed my essay. 'On Abstract and Concrete Co?tents'. (Number I of the 'Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic', PlulDs. MOtiO/shefte, 1894. Vol. xxx). 7 Loc. cit. p. 112. 8 Loc. cit. p. I [3. 9 Cf. Ehrenfels. ·Ubu Gesraftquafiliiten', Vierte/jahrssdrrift /iir lI'iss. Phi/DsopM~ 118?O); my Philosophic der Arithmetik (1891). particularly the whole of ch. Xl, Memong. 'Beilriige Zur Tlrear;e der psychischen Analyse·. Zeitschrift f Psych%gie

appea"

I

u. Physiologie d Sinnesorgune. V/ (1893).

o Cf. the words italici7.ed by us. II The o~tological transformation of th.e nOlion of self-evidence into one of pure essential lawfulness - a tr,msfonnatlon which starts at this point and which decisi\·ely influences the content of the rest of the Investigation - has already

]50

Notes

Notes

--------------12 13

14

15 16 17

been clearly carried out in my 'Bericht fiber deutsche Schrirten zur LogiJe', (1894) Archil' fir Syst. Phi/os. Ill. p. 225, n. I. See my Philosoplli~ d~r Arilllm~tik (1891), ch. Xl. p. 228 (an 'avenue' oflJ'ees.. 'flock' of birds, a 'flight' of duck, etc.). From my 'Psychologische Siudien zur elementaren Logik', Phi/os. Mrmot.fi~, (1894), xxx, p. 162, Stumpf as is wdl known at first defines 'fusion' in a narrower sense. 3$ a relatioo of simultaneous sense-qualiti~s, 3$ a result of which they appear as pam or • sensational whole. He does not however fail to point to the wider concept that we here find pi\'otal. Cf, Tonps)'t:hologie, II §17, pp. 64 fl. See Innmigu/ion II, §41. where we spoke figuratively of a mere 'being em~' of dependent moments in the consciousness of ideating abstraction, against thole cases where they themselve5 are the intended, noticed objects. The moment which is presentative of the spatial Ulension of the apparent 001oured figure in space. 'Position' and 'magnitude' here naturally sland for phenomena in the sensatiooal sphere. presentati\'e moment for the intentional (apparent) position and magnitude in the straightforward sense.

1 Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

In the sense namely of the abbreviated mode of speech defmed in the last sectio8, which must everywhere be remembered here. 2 More precisely: in the unity of a visual mluilum as such. 3 From Prop. 4 in §14, above. 4 See Bolzano's, Wiss~nschufts/ehr~, I. §58, p. 251. and Twardowski, loc. cit. fl.

pp.491 5 A new expression of Prop. 3 in §14, above.

. 6 (Husserl here has 'volumncss' which 1 take to be an unsuccessful venture mID English, Trans.) 7 See my Philosophie tkr Arjthm~tiJc (1891). p. 232. 8 One must certainly distinguish the sensuous moment of fiJc~ness from liJc~ss lU. catt'gorial unity:. the fonner is related to the latter as the sensuous. ~ fJi plurality. which serve us as direct indications of multiplicity and dlvttSlly. ~ to multiplicity and diversity themseh'cs. See my Phil. der Arit~tik, p. 23!;,~ first work of mine (an elaboration of my Hubilitutionsschrift, never pu~ and only panially printed. at the University of Halle. 1887) should be ~rnpated \lith all assertions of the present work on aggregates, moments of UDlty, c0ml binations. wholes and objects of higher order. I am sorry that in manr recea treatments of the doctrine of'fonn-qualities', this work has mostly been 19nO~ though quite a lot of the thought-content of later treatme~ts by Cornel.lUS: Meinong etc.. of questions or ~nalysis. apprehensio~ of plura~lty and co~bi·1 tion, is already to be found, dIfferently expressed. In my PIli/OS. der A"t~;"1 think it would sti~l be of.use tod~y to consl;llt this. wor~ o~ the phenomenologi; and ontological Issues In questIon. especIally smce It IS the first work wh attached importance to llctS and objects of higher order and investigated theIJI thoroughly. . . 9 See §II. above. 10 See Prolegomt'na, Vol. I (~"67-72) on the role of formalization fo.r const;ttu': the idea of a pure: logic as lIIalhl'sis. un!I·l'rsnlis. We must emphasIZe agam t tbC where we speak Simply of 'abstraction. as we: have done so far, we mean

]SI

e.mphasis on a n.on-independent 'moment' of content. or the corresponding ideation under the title of 'ideating abstraction'. but not formalization. II See §19, abo\'e. 12 Prop, 3, in §19, abo\~.

Investigation IV: The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings and the idea of pure grammar Introduction I We could equally say: 'of presentations', For plainly an answer to the more s~alized question also answers Ihe more general question relaling to presenta-

tions or objectifying acts as such. 2 T.~rd~wski (op. cit. above p. 94) removes the whole basis for making such a dlsllncllon when he objects, as against Bolzano (whom we here follow) that there are no simple o~jects. Cf. Twatdowski's own question where he speaks expressly of presenlet/ objects. We are here dealing with objects of rererence as such. J Twardowski. op. cit. p. 98. 4 B. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre (Sulzbach, 1837), I, §57. 'Presentation' means for B?lzano 'presentations-in-themselvcs'. which corresponds to our concept of meamng. 5 A. .,Marty, 'Uber subjektlose satze'. Vierteljuhrschrift fur WIS. Phi/os., VllIth year, p. _93. note. 6 Marty, 'Uber das Verhaltnis von Gidmmatik und Logik', S)'mbolae Prag~nses (1893). p. 121, n. 2. 7 ~n his last-mentioned article Marty defines a calegorematic sign as one which mdependently arouses a comp/~te preSOllotion, through which an object is named. But the delin~tion of the syncategorematic sign which follows (~ abo,~) does ~Ol dearly bnng out that tbe grammatical division rests on an essential division m the field of meaning, as Many cc:nainly tbought 8 ,,-"e,word 'presentation': carefully regarded, does not here mean 'act of presentatlon . but merely wbat 1$ presenled'as such, together wilh tbe articulations and forms with which it is present in consciousness. The 'presentational form' is therefore the form of what is presented as such: we must keep tbis in mind in what follows. 9 A. Marty ~ntly wrote, in h.is 'Untersuchungen ror Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatlk und Sprdchphilosophie' (Halle, 19(8) of 'autosemanlic' and 'synsemantic' signs (pp. 205 fl.), 10 The mode of speech nC\.'d not be taken as literally as Marty has done in his Untersuch.ungen. pp. 211 I, as meaning that we build total meanings out of "bricks' of partial. meaning that could also exist separately. That this is a wrong conception ~s precisely the theme of my further argued doctrine of non-independent meanIngs..1 ~a':lnot see how the exposition above can bear such an interpretation. and that It IS 1Il any way touch<.'
352

Notes

Notes

plain in intuitive clarification and in 'bringing to insight': the intended unity is 'frustrated' in intuitive disunity. 14 §IS. 15 The genuine contribution tradilional logic makes to pure logic including the: whole logic of the syllogism, is pan of the logic of propositional meanings (or 'apophantic' logic). 16 I gladly accept A. Many's objections (which I do not think otherwise fit lhe main features of the present Invcstigation or the other Investigations of lhiI work) thal I wenl too far, in the First Edilion when I said Ihat 'off censure of the: old doctrine of gramnlaire genera/e el raisonnee only affecls the uncleanness of iu hislorical expressions and tbeir mixture of the a priori and the empirical', Nonetheless. the sharpest words of censure were directed against il for trying to make a rational. logical ekmc:nt count in speecb.

8 I have since managed to find it, i.e, ha\'e learnt nOI to be led astray from a pure grasp of the gi\"en through corrupt fonDS of ego-metaphysic cr, note to §6.

Z Consciousness as intentional experience

2

3 -I

Investigation V: On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

5

I Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence o( the ego and consciousness as Inner perception

Sec my Ideas tOK'(lrds a Pure Phenomenology, etc.. in the JaJrrbuch /iir Philos.

6 It.

phiinom. Fors~hlUlg, I (1913). Section 2. nne present paragrapb is an insertion ill tbe Second Edition.) 2 Which is only in question qllQ phenomenal, since 'o\'C exclude: all questions regarding its existence or non-existence, and tbat of the empirical ego which appears iD it, if we wish our treatments to have, not a descripti\'C-psychologicaL but a purdy phenomenological value. One should note how, up 10 this point and for lbc future, each analysis can be first conducted as mere psychology, but there realty permits of that 'purification' which gives it value as 'pure' phenomenology. [Second Edition comment.) 3 Or what we also call its 'appearance' in the sense given above, which will also be employed in future, the sense in which a (phenomenologically understood) experience is itself styled an 'appearance'. 4 In the First Edition the name 'phenomenological ego' was given to the strcaID of consciousness as such, 5 The opposition to the doctrine of a 'pure' ego, alrcady expressed in this paBW8:ph, is one that the author no longer approves of, as is plain from his Itkas CIted above (see ibid.• §S7. p. 107; §SO, p. 159). . 6 The text as here set forth is taken O\'er without essential change from the fir51 Edition. It fails to do justice to the fact that the empirical ego is as much a case of transcendence as the physical thing. If the elimination of such .transcend~_~; and the reduction to pure phenomenological data. lCllVes us With no resld~ pure ego. there can be no real (adequate) self-evidence anaching to the '1 a~.; But if there is really such an adequate self-evidence - who indeed could deny 1.t. _ how can we avoid assuming a pure ego? It is precisely the ego apprehended ~ carrying out a self-evident rogi/O, and the pure carrying out nJ epso grasps It in phenomenological purity. and necessarily grasps it as the subject of a pure , . experience of the type t:ogito. 7 a. the whole of §4 in Natorp's £inlt'itlUlg in dit' Psyt:hologit' nat:h krt';sdter Mt'tholk, pp. II f

353

7

8 9 10 11

12

13

1-1 IS

My deviations from Brentano are not on the same lines as the qualifications that he found necessary to add to the inadequate simplifications of which he was clearly conscious (See Psyt:hologie, I, pp. 127 ff). This will be plain from the discussions in App. 2 at the end of this volume. We could not say 'experiencing contents', since the concept of 'experience' bas its prime source in the field of 'psychic acts'. E\'en if Ihis concept has been widened 10 include non-acts, Ihese: for us stand connected with, ranged beside and attached to acts. in a unity of consciousness so essentialtbat. 'o\'Cre it to fall away, talk of 'experiencing' would lose its point. See further the ApfWndix referred to above. Psychologie, t, 115. We are not therefore troubled by such vexed questions as to whether all mental phenomena, e.g. the phenomena of fec:ling, have the peculiarity in question. We must ask instead whether the phenomena in question are mental phenomena. The oddness of the question springs from the unsuitability of its wording. More about this later. Within the framework of psychological apperception, the purely phenomenological concept of experience fuses with that of mental reality. or rather, ittums into the concept of the mental slate of an animal being (either in actual nature or in an Ideally possibk n3lUrt with ideally possible animals. i.e. ~ithout existential implications). Later on the pure phenomenological generic Idea intentional eXpt'rinlu transforms itself into the parallel. nearly related psychological generic concept. According as psychological apperception is kept out or kept in. the same sort of analysis has phenomenological or ps)'chological impon_ Psychologie. p, 111 (end of §3). Psych%gie. p, 104, Cf. Brcntano, Psych%gie, pp. 266-7, 295 and p(lSSim. No reference to selcctive attention or notice is included in the sense of the 'reference' invol\'ed in our 'intention', See also §13. We may here ignore the various possible assenive traits involved in the believed being of whal is presented. One should again rccallthat it is possible to lea\'C out all presupposing of natural reality, persons and other conscious animals included therein in our completed studies, so that they are understood as discussions of itka/ possibilities. One finally sees them in the light of melhodologK:aJ exclusions. which CUI out whatever is matter of transcendenl apperception and assertion. so as 10 bring OUI what is really part of an experience and of its essence. Experience has then become the pure experience of phenomenology, from which psychologiC'
354

Notes

Notes

-

appears as a doing, and its subject as a doer. because it is often or a1wan accompanied by conation'. We too reject the 'mythology of activities': we define 'acts' as intentional experiences. not as mental activities. 16 P. Natorp, EinleillUng in (lie Psychologie, 1st edn. p. 18. 17 Last three sentences added in Edition II. 18 Cf. my 'Psychological SlUdies .. :. Philos. MOllutshe/te, xxx, (1894), p, 182. 19 The much discussed dispute as to t~e relation betwee~ perceptual and irnaainative presentation can have no satIsfactory outcome In default of a property prepared phenomenological foundation and consequent clarity in concepts &Del questions. The like holds of enquiries as to the relation of simple perception to representational or sign-consciousness. II can be readily sho\\'n, I think. that kt. chal1lcters differ in such cases in pictorial representation. e.g. an essentially new mode of intention. is experienced. 20 Psychologil'. I. pp. 116/f. 21 (Parotgraph added in Edition II.) 22 Here as elsewhere 1 identify the pain-sensation with its 'content'. since I do DOl recognitt peculiar sensing aets, Natul1llly I reject Brentano's doctrine that 1ftsentati\'e aets, in the tenn of acts of feeling-sensation, underlie acts of feeliq. 23 I point here. for purposes ofcomparison. and perhaps compktion. to H. Schwan'. Ps}'Chologil'tks Willms (Leipzig. 19(0) which in §12 deals with similar que,t" 24 In the First Edition I wrote 'real or phenomenological' for ·real'. 1be word 'phenomenological' like the word 'descriptive' was used in the First Editioo oaIJ in connection with rl'al (r""I') elements of expericnct. and in the present ~ it has so far been used predominately in this sense. This corresponds to 0IIIl'. natural starting with the psychologjc:al point of view, It became plainer and ~. however, as 1 re~wed the completed Investigations and pondered on tbcir themes more deeply - particularly from this point onwards - that the descripcioa of intentional objectivity as such. as we are conscious of it in the concrete IICI-experience. represents a distinct descriptive dimension where purely iotuitiw doscription may be adequately practised, a dimension opposed to that of rea.l (rMh) act-conslituents, but which also deserves to be called 'phenomenological'. nmethodological extensions lead to important extensions of the field of ~ now opening before us and considerable improvements due to a fully co~ separ.uion of descriptive levels. my Ideen :u I'iner reinen Phdnomenolo,w, Book I, and particularly what is said of Noesis and Noema in Section tn. 25 Paragraph added in the Second Edition, 26 Real would sound much better alongside 'intenlional' but it definitely keeps the notion of thinglike transcendence which the reduction to real (reell) im-:na~ in experience is meant to exclude. It is well to maintain a conscious assooatlon of the relll with Ihe thinglike, , .' 27 We hllve here a case of 'foundation' in the strict sense of our ThIrd InvestlgallOD. We only use the term in this strict sense. 28 Im'eslig(l/ioll I. §§9, 10. 29 Cf. §IO. .,... . .. ' SeC 30 We cncountered thiS fact In cntlelzlng the prevalhng theory of abstraction, Inv, n. §22. 31 Cr. the Appendix to this chapt.er. ..,. . d tbe 32 Confusion results from um\VOIdable ambiguities In t:llk of the definite an icb indefinite, One spcllks, e.g.. of the indefiniteness of perceptual judgements. wh consists in the fact lhilt the rear sidc of a percc~ved object is s~bsidiarily mea~ but indefinitely, whereas the clearly seen front Side seems defimte. Or one s~ of the indefiniteness of 'particular' assertions. e.g. An A ;s B, Som.' A's are B s: as oppost..-d to the definiteness of the singular assertion 'This A is 8'. Such definite-

cr.

.u

.\-1 .15

36

355

nesscs and indefinitenesses differ in sense from those in the text: they belong among the particularities of possible 'matters', as will be plainer in what follows, One constantly notices that all the empirical psychological aspects of the examples fall out and become irrelevant with the ideational grasp of the phenomenological difference of essence. Cf. §§17. 30. For the moment we pennit ourselves this improper mode of expression, which in its proper interpretation assorts ill with the image-theory. Which does not mean......e must repeat, that the object is noticed. or that we are lhematically occupied with it. though such things are included in our ordinary talk about 'referring',

] The m"tter of the act and Its underlying presentation I At the time, of course. of the appearance of this work's First Edition. 1: 'Mere' presentations. we iterate. as opposed to acts of Iwlief How the sense of Brenlano's proposition stands up to changes in our concept of presentation \\i11 be thoroughly in\"CStigated in the next two chapters. J See Inv, Ill. §§4/f. -I I have here ignored the disputed sub-species of Affirmative and Negative Judgement. If anyone accepts them he can e\'erywhere substitute 'Affirmative Judgement' for 'Judgement' in the present discussion. while those who reject them. may take our words as they stand. It makes no essential difference to our argument. S Cr. my Ideas, Book I. Section 3. §109, A deeper knowledge of the peculiarity of 'qualitative modification' ('neutrality-modification') requires extensions of the doctrine of act-quality, These leave the essential content of our discussions in this chapter untouched, but involve a partial reinterpretation of their outcome,

4 StUdy of found in, presentations with special re,,,rd to the theory of judgement Conjunctive or disjunctive plur,i1ity on the subject side. as illustrated by '..4 and B are P'. 'A or Sis P' are therefore excluded. We may also say: the subject-function is as such singular, while predication is not plural in a wider sense of the word. 2 Ucre we have, in a pure logico-grammatical context. a certain sort of significant modification grounded in the pure essence of Meaning (cf. Inv. IV). 3 See Inv, tV, §II. and the additional note to §13,

5 Further contributions to the theory of jud,ement, 'Present"tion' as a qualitatively unitary ,enus of nominal "nd propositional acts I 2 3 4

Cf. the examples in §34. It musl be noted that this mode of expression is a circumlocution. 1§38, from this point onwards. is mainly a Second Edition supplemcnt.] Alllhis must of course not be understood in ,m empirical-psychological manner, We are concerned here (as e\'erywhere in lhis investigation) with u priori possihilities rooted in pure essence, which are as such gr.lsped by us with apodictic self-evidence. S Cf. however the interpretation of a 'community of kind' as a peculiar relation of 'essence and counter-essence' in my Idells, p. 233. The further pursuit of the

356

Notes

----------------results of this investigation has generally led to many essential deepenings and __ prO\·emenl5. Cr. in panicular./deas. §§109-14. 117 on the neutrality modification. 6 The same is of course true of other act-products. e.g. the aesthetic consideratioo of pictures. 7 §23. 8 §J8.

6 Summing-up of the most Important ambiguities In the t.rrn, 'presentation' and 'content' I Not a good example of the impossible. but a slip. Trans/mor. 2 See the criticism of the picture-theory in §21. Additional Note. 3 Cf. Inv. l. §20. Also Inv. II. §20. and the chapter on 'Abstraction and Representation'. 4 Reell applies to a thing's actual pans as opposed to what it merely intenda or means. Real is the being of real things in the .....orld. [franslator]

Investigation VI: Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge First section: Objectifying Intentions and their fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations I Meaning-Intention and meaning-fulfilment

I Log. /m'. I. §12. 2 See Log. /m'. I. §26. 3 Log. /m'. I. §§9. 10. 4 Cf. my Psych. Still/iI's ofdemell/or)' Logic, II, 'Concerning Intuitions aDd ~ sentations·. Phi/os. MontJIshe[re. 1894. p. 176. I have given up tbe coooepl cl intuition supported there, as the present .....ork makes plain, S I use this expression .....ithout specially introducing it as a term, since it is tbe mere translation of'meaning', I shall accordingly often speak of signifiCQti"!« signitil"t' acts. instead of acts of meaning-intention. of meaning etc. 'M~ acts' can scarcely be talked of, since expressions are used as the normal su~ of meaning. 'Signiti\'e' also ofTers us a suitable tenninological opposite 10 . . tuith'C'. A synonym for 'signiti\'e' is 'symbolic', to the e"tent that the ~ abuse ofa word 'symbol' obtains- an abuse already denounced by Kant - wbidI equates a symbol ,..lith a 'sign'. quite against its origin:ll and still indispensable sense, 6 Cf. §13 of the previous In\'Cstig:ltion. ] The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge I See above §14, 2 Cf. the deeper analyses of §24, 3 In the above pamgr,lph, the Gennan tenns 'Jarslt'If('/,', 'Donte//uflg' etc., are translated by 'intuitively present', 'intuitive presentation' etc. The tenus '5t~ present' etc, are used to translate 'priiKntieren' ele. 'Presentation' sjmplidl~r translates' VorSlellung'. [franslator)

Notes

357

--------------.4 consistency and Inconsistency

Understanding of the analylical clarifications attempted in this chapter and the nc"t, and assessment of their possible achie\'ements, depends entirel)' on kttping the strict concepts hitherto e1abomted finnly in mind. and Dot lelling the \'ague Ideas of popular speech take their platt.

S The ideal of adequation, Self-evidence and truth I Cf. §23.

Second section: Sense and understanding 6 Sensuous and categorlal Intuitions

Thus we read in Sigwart (Logic. I (ed. 2), p, 2(6): 'The verbal conjoining of sentences through ~and" , .. expresses only the subjective fact of their coexistence in one conciousness, and it thel'Cfore has no objective meaning.' Cf. also

p.278. 2 It was precisely this question: how estimates of plurality and number are possible at a gla~. and may thel'Cfore be achieved in straightforward, and oot in founded intuition, while true collection and counting presuppose articulated acts of higher order - it was this question that independently led me to take note of those intuitively unifying characters which v. Ehrenfels called 'Gestalt-qualities'. and which he dealt with in a penetrating manner in a .....ork which appeared before mine, and which was dominated by quite different points of view, ('Ober GestaltqUlllitiiten " Viertl'lj. f wiss. Plti/osophie. 1890, Cf, my Plli/osophie der Arithmelik, ch, XI.)

1 A Study In categorial representation 0" represents the constitutive features in a concept and fJ those of any other concept whatel't'r, one can always construct the fonn: Something that is either cr or fJ. This external sort of conceptual e"tension which I call 'disjunctive', can at times prove very useful. It plays, e.g., an important role in the de\'elopment of artificial mathematical techniques not sufficiently appreciated by logicians. The logic of mathematics is in fact in its infancy: few logicians have even seen that here is a field of great problems, fundamental for the understanding of mathematics and of mathematicizing natuml science, and admitting of strict solution despite all their difflCulty. 2 Sec §SS. 3 NllluraUy not in partklllar kinds of such contents but in the rowl genus of such COntents
I If

Appendix: External iIlnd internilll perception: physical and PSYchical phenomena

It IS remarkable that no one has tried to found a posith'e detennination of 'physical phenomena' on these intuiti\'e interconnections. In pointing to them. I depart from my role as a reporter. To employ them seriously, onc must. of course, have due regard to the ambiguity of talk about 'physjc-,jl phenomena'. an ambiguity ....'C shall immediately discuss.

358 Notes

-------------2 Brenlano (Ps)'chologie. I. pp. 118f) sa~ it i~ a disti.nguishing ~rk ofall PlYcbic: phenomena 'that th~y a~ only perceived In an Inn~r conSCiousness, wherea& outer perception alone is possible in the case of physical phenomena'. It . emphatically said on p. 119 that this dctennination churacterizcs psychic phenO: ~na ad~uately. 'Inner consciousness' is here merely another expression for inner perception. 3 Up to the posili\'e mark of physical phenomena given in 2 above. I hope, fUrther to have achieved accuracy in restating the main points of view which have ~ go\-eming factors in th~ doctrines of the think~rs I valu~ so highly. 4 Locke's Essa)'. II. i. 19. Locke is nOI perfectly consistenl in so far as be ex~ makes 'perception' an apprehension of ideas. and yet makes the apprehension 0( the ideas of mental activities depend on special acts of reflection, that only at times supervene on these activities. This is obviously due to the wretched dual concept 'idea' which promiscuously cov~rs the presemarions of contents that may be experienc:ed. and also the ~xperi~nc:ed contents themselves. See our lnv. D, fiG. S Criticism. as it strikes me. generaUy stops at the first provisional theses ofBreIUIIDo - psychology as a science of psychic phenomena. natural science of pb)'Sicll phenomena - without thinking of the 'tacit limitations' which Brenlano bimIer ~xpounded with characteristic clarity and acuteness. I have bten all the more happy, therefore. to recall them by the full citations given above. 6 Brentano understands by 'sensations' acts of sensing, and opposes them to aeOIelI contents. In our mode of speech. as expounded above, no such distinctioa • tains. We call 'sensations' the mere fact that a scnse-COnlenl and, further, tbIla non-act in general. is present in the experiential complex. In relation to a ~ talk of 'sensing' only serves to poinl to the appercepti\'e function of such c:c.tents (that they function as bearers of an int~rpretation. in which tbe appearaDCII in question is carried out perceptually or imaginativ~ly). 7 cr. Brenlano, loco cit. §7. p. 120. In detailed examples he says: 'Knowledp,i07, desire, exist actually. colour. tone, wannth only phenomenally and intentionally: On p. 104 he lists as examples of physical phenomena: 'A figu~. landsc~ lbaIl Sff . . . wannth. cold, smell that I sense:

Index

Q

priori 9. II. 39-41. 70-1. 122. 126.

129.1.54,172. 186,203,229.277. 288, 311. 343; analytic/synthetic laws 19.21: existence 22-3; laws 17,49, 61-4,66,69.71_4; proof 25: truth 55: whole/part relationship 27 abbreviated ~xpressions 56-8 abstl1lct 10. 17.29.40.41. 88. 137. 298 abstraction 39, 292, 306-7 absurdity 67-8. 71-4, 76, 223. 266 acceptance 140-3 act-eharacter 80, 96, 102, 103. 105. 119-22, 1.34-5. 137, 164,201.202. 284. 285 act-quality 122, 129, 144, 145, 146. 149. 151. 169-70. 184 acts 59. 80. 90. 93. 96~7. 100-12, 114 19. 137. 140, 146-9. 151. 167. 183.222-3.285-9.306.309.323, 332. 344. 348 adequate. adequation 246-9. 261. 263 6. 272. 292-3. 294. 302. 310. 313 16.318.325-7.346_7 adjectival presentation 69 aesthetic intention 96 'lffinnation 167 "!,!greg,lte 39 agreement 213, 225. 324 ambiguity 158. 171-4. 197,343.344. 345. 347-8 ;l.nalytk: laws 19-21. 72; propositions

"

aPOdictic 12.62.67, 136 apophantic logic 72

appearance 83-4• .341-3 apperception 103. 105, 243 Aristotle 76, 325, 327. 328 arithm~tk 65, 154, 307 articulated objects 5 assent 140-3 assertion 68, 139. 147-9. 155-7. 158. 160, 226. 262-3, 293. 334 association 18, 32-4 attention 103. 116-19 attribution 153.273 authentic 186.312-14.316.324; contents 298-9: illustration 231-3; presentation 60-1; thinking 308-11 being 265-6. 278-80. 294 being.in-consciousness 91-3 belief 130. 164. 166 Berkeley. G. 5-6 BOcklin, A. 348 Bolzano. B. 54. 325 boundaries 16. 45. 73 Brentano. F. 28. 54, 87. 94-8. 102. 107. 110. 129-30. 160, 169.339-40.344, 345, 348 bundle theory 101 categorematic expressions 54. 58 categoria!. acts 185-6. 286-9. 295~6. 299 300. 306; content 298~9: form 37.60. 121-2. 185.271-6.280-1. 291. 296-7. 307 8.310,311,317; ideas 69; intuition 28O~1. 310: laws 308 II: meaning 3 J 2; objective correlates 277-8; objects 304:

360

Index

Index

------------perception 281-3: predicate 37. 115-16: structures 70-1: unity 38-9 categories 19.70.278 80. 304. 306~7; fonnal-Iogical 21; semantic 62-3 causation 19.45. 108 9 c1ass-concept 205 classification 201-2. 205 coincidence 199. 208. 221. 232 col1ectiva 291-2 communication 327-32 compatibility 67-8. 252-6, 312. 315 completeness 246 9. 261 compla.ity 115-19. 130-1. 163-9.229: defined 4; of expressions 53-5; of meaning 50-5 concatenation of association 33-4 concept 69. 76.172, 173. 175. 184.279. 290-2.306-7 concrete 10. 16-17.24.83.88: acts 59. 172: complex 51-3; experience 145; temporal 43: whole 286 concretum, proximate/absolute 29 conllict 211-12. 213. 225. 25]-7 connection 296. 301 consciousness 80. 87-9. 98. 100-1. 10]-4, 105-6, 126. 129. 138. 146, 158.174,206-8.244-5. ]01. 303, 309.315.339-40.343: experience 82-4. 85-6; inner 86-7; stream of 22-3; varied ambiguity of tenn 81-2 content 5-7. 22. 80, 81. 85-6. 93. 103-4. 106. 132-3, 135. 145. 175-6. 209.235.246.297,304.311. 344-5: by itself 10-11. 16: of consciousness 119: incompatible 253-4: inseparable 6~7: intuitively emphatic/blended 13-15; nature of 9-10: plurdlity 37-8 defective expressions 56-8 Descartes. R. 90. 335, 337 description 15. 17. 112-13 detennination 10-13. 197 discontinuity 14. 15 16 disjuncti\~d 291-2. 323 ego 82-6. 88-9. 91 3.98.100 1.125. 164. 340. 343

Ehrenfels. C. von 8. 176 emotion 96 empiricism 43 epistemology 91. 136. 295 equivalence 154 essence 9. 43. 64-7. 74, 76. 96, 122-5, 129. 130-1. 154. 158. 183--4, 246, 2SO: exact/inexact 15 essemi(/ 253 ethics 136 events 82 exclusion 214 existence 21. 22-4. 36, 37. 68,113.164 expectation 211 experience 6. 52. 82-4. 93. 101-6, 136-7. 145. 147,201,279,329-30, 333, 342. 346; consciousnesslcontau relation 85-6; phenomenological/ popular concept 84--5 expression SO, 55-8. 117. 191-5,223, 272, 274, 312, 316. 323-4, 325-6, 330.333-4: acts 192-5; complex 53-5; modification of meanings 64-7; percept 195-6: unity 206-8 extension 7-8. 18.30 external: perception 95, 335-9, 340-1, 342. 345: relations 288-9, 290 facts 155. 343 falsehood 266. 329. 334 feeling 107-9: sensations/acts distinction 109--12 fonn 5. 8. 22, 36. 68-71. 272, 296-7, 305 8 fonnal laws 72 fonnality 21. 39-41. 49 foundation 34-5. 36-9.40.44; conccpl 25 7: mediatelimmediate 28: reciprocal/one-sided 27-8 founded: acts 115-16. 286-9. 295, 303; contents 58 60: object 308 fragmcntation 40. 42. 44 frustrdtion 211 12.21]_14.217.266 fulfilment 60 I. 79. 184. 195. 198, 110-1 L 215. 216 18.221.226-9. 245 6. 259 63. 271 3. 278-80. 295, 306. 312. 324: grilded 238-40: mediate 229 30: unity 209-10

fulness 233-5. 240-2. 259. 299. 324: gradations 234-8 fusion 15-17 generality of words 202-6 genus 12 grammar 49. 54-5. 64. 66. 325-7; of pure logic 71-4. 75 grounded judgement [94 hetero-grd.mmatical modes of expression 65 Hobbes. T. 90 Humboldt. W. von 76 Hume. D. 126. 174 hypothetical predication 115-16 Idea (KSeation) 15.97. 103. 106. 112. 136.154.279.317: categorial69; independent/non-independent 13: universal 43 idcal 79, 112,264 identity 104. 123.206-8.215.218, 226-8. 285, 301. 303 illusion 137-8 image 125-7,218-20 imagination 165-7. 172-4.202.220-2. 224, 234-8. 259, 280-1. 297 immanence 125-7. 164.343: chardcters 104: objectivity 98-100 immediate 28. 30. 32 impossibility 251 inclusion 214 incompatibility 67~8. 253-4. 257-8 independent: contents 13-15: ideas 13; meaning 55-7: relative 22-4 inner: experience 136; perception 86-7. 89.95.135-6.231.335-7.339_41. 345. 347; sense 278. 302-3 inseparability 6 7: examples 7-9; objcctive detennin'ltion 9-10 insight 70. 82 lmcmion 116. 122-5. 158. 167, 184. 210-11. 213-14. 224. 226. 233. 257 imentional: chardcters 104. 129: content 112-15: essence 122-5. 130 I. 158. 183-4; experience 93. 101-3, 147: feelings 107-12; inexistence 175:

361

objects 95-100. 101-2. 113-15. 118-19 intentionality 107 intcrpretation 6.52. 103. 105.201. 242-4, 272, 287. 298. 302. 343 intuition 90. 106. 116-17. 136. 172, 184-5.199-200.201-2.210-11. 218-19.226.228-9.233.234-8. 242-4.245-9.251. 261. 272. 274-5. 279. 280~1. 295. 297. 303-4, 308. 309.313.317-19.323.324.333.344: complete/mutilated 246-9: genuine 231-3; universal 292-4 intuitive separation 13-15 isolability 9: mutual 28 judgements 54. 76. 89. 96. 114. 117. 123. 125. 130. 131-2. 135, 139-40, 141-3. 146-57. 158. 160, 166-7. 192. 193, 194.256-7.267.274.278-80. 312-13,324,326-7.328-9.332-4. 345 Kant. L 21. 126.318-19 knowing 204. 205. 216-18. 323 knowled~ 216-8. 246. 273. 275. 308. 319.332 language 54-5. 64 laws 12.43.59.72, 313-16. 343: categorial308-1 I: compounding of meanings 68-71; governing combinations of meanings 61-4; material/fonnill distinction 19-20: multiplicity 17-18: nonsensel absurdity 71-4: oflhought 308-14 likeness 219-20. 222. 299 Locke, J. 90. 174.278. 335-6. 340 logic 49.75-6. 174.316-17 logico-grammatical, compatibility 252 3: forms 68-71: hlws 162. 313. 314-16 manifolds 106. 291. 307 many-rayed acts 161 material. acts 159 62: fornls 63: moments 60 mathematics 307

362

Index

matter 119-22, 12S-9, 133-4, 137-9, 140-1, 15S-9, 164, 166, 171. 175, 184,226,250,272, 276; fulnessl intentional 240-2: interpretative 242-4; isolated 144-5; as presentation 129-31 meaning-fulfilment 184, 191-2 meaning·intention 61, 79. 174, 184, 191-2.207.214,217,250,273.

276 meaning(s) 49, 132, 184, 196-201. 208. 222_5,272_3,312.313_14,315.323. 334: combinations 61-4, 67-8: complex 50-5; compounding 68-71: implied 51-3: incompatible 257-8: independent/non·independent 55-7; modifications 64-7; simple 50 mediate 2S, 30. 32. 229--31 Mcinong, A. 8 memory 104. 172 mental: acts SO, SI. 94: character 301: phenomena 95-7. 315 metaphysics 90. 106 Mill, J. S, 160 modification 71. 159-60. 162; imaginative 165-7; qualitative 162-7 moment(s) 4, 12,20.28-9,30,31-2. 55. 137. 145. 277-8. 286. 333; nonindependent 36. 40-1; piecing of wholes 41-5: qualitative 7-8: of unity 8-9. 14. 35-8: variable 7 mutilated intuitions 246-9 names 67. 147-9. 152-3. 155-7. 192. 332: positing/non.positing 149-52. 154, 162 Natorp, P. 91-2. 93. 106 natural science 89-91. 103,338 nature 42. 43 ncar 32-4 nt.'ccssity 12 nominal: acts 152-4. 159, 161. 169-70, 171: formations 289-91: meanings 66-7; presentation 69 non·acts 106-12 non.independence 36: cOnlents 13-15: experience 145: ideas 13: laws

Index governing 17-18. 19-20: meanings 55-6,57.58-60: moments 40-1, 44. 55.59; objects 12-13: relative 22-4 non-objcctifying acts 325-7. 333 nonsense 67-8. 76. 316. 326: laws

71-4 objectifying acts 158-65. 167. 169-70. 171. 216-IS. 245. 250. 275~6

objectivity 49 ob~s 125-7. 132. 201-2. 208. 277. 299-300, 332-3: complexity 50-1 ontological-analytic laws 72 part(s) 4-5. 22. 286-9. 308-9: formal 39-41: independent/non-independent distinction 5-6: nearer/remoter 32-4: pairs 27-8: pieoesJmomenu 29; primary 32: proximate/remote 30; relationship with whole 27 perception 82-3.95. 103-4. 124. 135-9. 173-4.194.195-201.220-2.224. 234-8.259-62.272. 273.275-6, 277. 280-6. 292-3. 296-7. 302. 303-4. 309.335-41.344-6 phenomena 97.337-8.347-8 phenomenalism 90 phenomenology 112-13.203.206, 343 piclUring 173.202 pieces 5. 29. 30-1. 37. 40-1: phenomenological proposition 41-5 positing. non.positing 16. 162. 167 possibility 20. 204. 250-1. 259. 294. 309-10,317.343 predication 139. 273: llcts 192: exposition 52: form 331 presentations 10. 54. 60. 69, 96. 97. 99. 104-5. 113-14. 119. 123. 129-31. 133, 134-5, 154. 158 60. 166.230. 260,330; ambiguity 146-7, 171-4; contenl 175-6: fulness 233-4: isolated matters 144-5: mediate 229-30: naming/asserting 147-9: nominal 169: objectifying 162-5: perceptual 135 9: presentations

230-1: state of affairs 140-3: word/ sentence 143-4 projection 260 proper names 52-3. 161. 198-9, 205-6 properties 83 propositions 19, 68-9. 148. 154, 160, 192.259.278; analytic/synthetic 21 proximate 30-2 ps)'chic phenomena 346-7 psychical phenomena 54. 91. 94-8. 338-9. 341. 345. 348 psychologism 76. 1M psychology 89-91. 103, 176, 3M. 347 pure logic 68-74, 307 quality 7-8. 16. 17-18, 119-22. 124. 128-9, 137. 140. 145. 149. ISS, 165-7, 168-70, 184.259.266-7. 337; of acts 159-67: differentiated 131-4 real (rull~. rea/en) 112-13, 127. 175. 250-1.277-8,286, 28S-9, 342. 344 recognition 201-6. 216-18, 223-4 reflection 279. 303. 304 relations 20, 98, 265. 290-2, 297 "fatunl 289

remote 30-4 reprcscnlation 146. 169. 171. 224. 234, 243-4.298-9. 300-2: necessity of 244-5 rest 44 Riehl. A. 9 Schlick. M. 179 Schopenhauer. A. 342 self·evidence 6. 12. 62, 79. 86. 87 8. 147,228.251. 261-7. 274. 277 self·fulfilment 79 self·perception 93 SClf'prcsentation 218 20 semantics 62-3,72.74.1225.156 ~I\s"tions 84. 90.103-4,105.109 12, 175 6, 235, 342-4 ~nsc 105. 117. 144.275 6.297.302 4, 306 7 SCnsc-eontents 344 SCr.se-material 37

363

sense-perception 262. 278-80, 281-6. 298, 335 senseless 316-17 sensible forms 280-1 sensory quality 55-6 sensuous: acts 185-6: categories 186; concepts 186; content 345; perception 2SI-6 sign 126. 218-20, 222-5. 231. 234-8. 242-4, 246. 260. 299 signification 184,308.311-14.318.324.

m Si~'art.

C. 326 simplicity 4. 115-16; of meaning 50 single-rayed acts 161 so-to-speak presentation 60 spatiality 16. 29. 33. 42, 44-5 species 12, IS. 18.96.103.112, 131-2. 134.307.315 states of affairs 148. 155-7. 263, 265. 2SO-1. 313. 329. 333 Steinlhal. H. 76 straightforward acts 283-6, 295. 302-3 Stumpf. C. 6. 7-8. 9, 15 substance 234-8 substitution 70 subsumption 214 syncategoremat)c expression 53-6. 57. 58. 59: isolated 60-1 synthesis 288-9. 300-2. 324; acls 298: propositions 19, 21 tempomlity 29. 33. 207 thinking I J. 154. 308-11. 312. 316-19 thought 11. 184.201-2.275.295. 311-14 time 42. 43-5. 88 transcendence 126-7 truth(s) 49,55,74. 149,251. 263-7, 329. 334 Twardowski, K. 37 underlying acts 115-16 understanding 314 15 uniformity 168 9 unity 8 9,53. 106, 117~18, 147, 217.2423.254 7,278.279.287.

]64

Index

299-]00. 308-9: categorial 38-9: of consciousness 301: of expression 206-8: of fulfilment 209-10: of objects 307; sensuous 35-8 universal. grammar 72-4. 75: objects 175.261.292-4 unconsciousness 293-4 validity 317: of meaning 313-14 verification 262-3. 265

whole 4. 8. 22. 34-5. 118.287-9,309' ' concrete 83. 88: formal 39-41: founded 38-9: piecing through moments 41-5: proximate/remote distinction 30-2: unity of 35-8 wish-fulfilment 216-17 wish-intention 143 wish-sentence 54. 327 wishes 193. 329--30 Wundt. W. 82