Locke's Abstract Ideas John Linnell Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Mar., 1956), pp. 400-405. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28195603%2916%3A3%3C400%3ALAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.
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DISCUSSION LOCKE'S ABSTRACT IDEAS * Professor Aaron in his book, John Loeke,' as well as in his recent book, Theory of universal^,^ has defended Locke's theory of abstract ideas against Berkeley's attack. He also gives an interpretation of Locke's theory which, he believes, makes this theory less absurd than does the traditional interpretation which stems from Berkeley. According to Aaron, B e r k e l e ~ as , ~ well as those who follow his lead on this point, have done Locke an injustice by taking as typical the account of the idea of triangle in Essay IV:vii:9: "For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist ;an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together." Aaron claims that criticism of Locke based on this passage is unfair since a) this is an isolated passage "which comes as an aside when Locke is discussing a matter quite different from that of general ideas," and b) the The blame for the misinterpretation is given passage is mi~interpreted.~ Berkeley since, in quoting the passage, Berkeley italicized the word 'inconsistent'. Aaron feels that "if any words of the phrase need to be stressed . . . they are the words 'some parts of.' 5" Thus, Berkeley is charged by Aaron with attacking a straw-man, and not Locke. We will return to Aaron's defense of this passage shortly. In his positive account of Locke's theory of abstract ideas, Aaron distinguishes three strands in Locke's argument. Locke's first strand, "his first crude thought," "the one he seems to have held before he devoted serious attention to the problem," is that an abstract idea is "a particular
* This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph. D. dissertation, Berkely's Criticism of Abstract Ideas, done a t the University of Minnesota (1954) under the direction of Professor Wilfrid Sellars. This paper was read at the 1954 meeting (April 29-May 1) of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association a t the University of Illinois. R. I. Aaron, John Locke (London, 1937),pp. 192-206. R. I. Aaron, Theory of Universals (London, 1952),pp. 28-36.
Philosophical Commentaries687, Theory of Vision 125, Introduction to the Principles
13, Alciphron VII:5, and Defence of Free-thinking in Methematics 46. Aaron, John Locke, pp. 192-194. Aaron, John Locke, p. 194.
idea, which 'represents' many other particulars." This first strand is said to occur in the discussion of the idea of white in Essay, II:xi:9: ". . . the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general: which is done by considering them as they are in the mind, such and the circumstances of appearances, separate from all ~ther~existences, real existence, as time, place or any other concomitant ideas .. . Thus the same color being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it thename whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined or met with, and thus universals, whether ideas or terms are made." The second strand, which Aaron finds in Locke, is that the abstract idea is framed by omission; it "is the resultant of a certain process of elimination" of all "qualities except only those which are common." 7 This strand is said to occur in the discussion of the idea of man in Essay, III:iii:7 : "And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea; wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all." Aaron's third strand is that the abstract idea is "neither a particular idea nor a part of a particular idea. I t is a meaning . . . the essence meant when the general term is used . . ." Aaron finds this third strand in the last part of chapter 3 and in chapters 4 and 5 of Book 111. " . . . the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds." (1II:iii :13). A careful reading of Locke makes it difficult to see why Aaron claims to find three strands in the Essay. Perhaps, after Vaihinger's "patchwork" interpretation of Kant's Critique, and Wild's "development" interpretation of Berkeley, Aaron thought it necessary to find several theories instead of just one in Locke's Essay. I shall argue instead that what we find is a confused position held continuously, with perhaps different emphases being made in various places, rather than a series of clear-cut distinguishable positions succeeding or replacing each other. Are there actually three different positions on abstract ideas in the Essay? Let us begin answering this question by examining Aaron's third strand. 'The abstract idea is a meaning.' Is this actually a third theory, or even a strand of a theory? Surely, in those passages where Aaron finds a third strand, Locke is merely emphasizing his conceptualism, that is, abstractions exist only for thought, or have only 'objective' reality, to use the scholastic term. Throughout the Essay Locke attacks both Platonic Aaron, John Locke, p. 195; Aaron, Theory of Universals. p. 28.
Aaron, John Locke, p. 197; Aaron, Theory of Uni~er~gals. p. 29.
Aaron, John Locke, p. 199; Aaron, Theory of Universals. p. 32.
realism (universals ante rem) and Aristotelian realism (universals in re). When Locke says that "every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence," (Essay, III:iii:14) he is not putting forth a new or different theory. He always holds to this. The abstract idea of man is the meaning of the general term 'man'; the abstract idea of white is the meaning of the general term 'white'; the abstract idea of triangle is the meaning of the general term 'triangle'. Aaron to the contrary, there is no third strand; Locke is merely saying what he has always said: all that 'exists' is particular; abstracta, are creatures of our understanding, i.e., meanings. What about Aaron's first two strands? The basis for Aaron's distinction between the second strand (the discussion of the idea of man) and the first strand (the idea of white) is that the second strand involves omission, that it makes the abstract idea the "resultant of a certain process of elimination." However, omission and elimination are also involved in Locke's account of the formation of the idea of white (strand 1).For Locke the idea of white is an element in our idea of chalk, of snow, and of milk, and may be abstracted from any of these by separation - by omission of context. Both the abstract idea of white and the abstract idea of man are framed by separation or omission. In both cases Locke believes that the abstract idea is related to the idea of the particular as part to whole; in both cases the abstract idea is framed by separating it from all other ideas which accompany it on a given occasion and determine a particular existence. By way of introducing a more detailed discussion of the above points, let us return to Aaron's defense of the passage on the idea of triangle. Is this an isolated passage, a slip in an aside, not typical of Locke's considered position? On the contrary, Locke's treatment of the idea of triangle is similar to his treatment of other abstractions. l1 The idea of white is said by Locke to be part of the idea of chalk, of snow, and of milk; the idea of man is said to be part of the idea of Peter, of James, and of Mary. In his earlier examples, as well as here, Locke speaks of the general idea as if it Aaron, John Locke, p. 197. Aaron, John Locke, p. 192. l1 Professor Luce, in his reply to an earlier version of Aaron's argument (Aaron, "Locke's Theory of Universals," Arist. Soc., 1933), dces not think Aaron has successfully defended Locke. "I doubt if Dr. Aaron's two arguments are on all fours. For he wants to defend Locke's statement, a t the same time pleading that it is not typical of Locke's teaching . . . I do not think that Dr. Aaron's case, though ably pleaded, is made out. Locke seems to have meant by the words what Berkeley said he meant. For if the abstract triangle were made up of judiciously selected consistent parts, what is the point of the passage? Locke's whole point here is that the abstract idea is a mass of inconsistencies, and is therefore difficult to frame, imperfect and non-existent. If in saying so, he gives his case away, it is Berkeley's right and duty to point it out." A. A. Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche (London, 1934), p. 130, note. lo
were a common part of various more inclusive sets of ideas. Locke holds the absurd position that the general idea of triangle is framed by omitting and retaining parts of ideas of determinate triangles, the general idea of man by omitting and retaining parts of ideas of individual men. Berkeley saw that Locke's position was the same throughout, a,nd never tired of pointing out the absurdity both of the general idea of triangle which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrurcal, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once." la and of the general idea of man which is neither white nor black nor red nor yellow, but all and none of these at once.13 Thus, instead of there being three distinct strands in Locke's account of abstract ideas, we see there is just one, very confused, account. Part of the difficulty in understanding Locke, as well as a partial explanation of some of his confusions, lies in the fact that he uses the same term, 'ideas,' for thoughts of particulars, thoughts of qualities, relations, abstractions, sensations, images, and feelings. The fact that the same term is used for both sensations and for thoughts of particulars might be responsible for the fact that Locke does not always clearly distinguish sensations from thoughts of particulars. Furthermore, Locke tends to think of the sensation of a specific shade of red, for example, as differing from the thought of color only by being most determinate. To put it crudely, Locke tends to think of perceptions as being most determinate conceptions. Locke frequently uses the term 'perception' and the term 'thinking' in such a broad sense that they are synonymous. Thus, when Locke speaks of an idea of a white object, it is not clear on his terminology whether he is referring to having a sensation of white or to thinking about a white object. The use of 'idea' for both conceivings and perceivings was deliberate on Locke's part, but it was dangerous. The danger lay in the temptation it gave to think of the perceiving of crimson, for example, as differing from the conceiving of red only in having a more determinate or specific content. Even though this use of 'idea' was deliberate, it was unfortunate and had serious repercussions for Locke's doctrine of abstract ideas. Thus, when Locke discusses abstract ideas he implies that the thought of white is the sensation (or image) of white separated from all contexts of other sensations (or images). In the famous comparison of the mind to an empty cabinet we can see the lack of clarity resulting from Locke's broad use of 'idea.' "The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names." (Essay, l2 la
Introduction to the Principles 13.
Introduction to the Principles 9.
I:ii:15). Here we see a fundamental aspect of Locke's epistemology: The central position assigned to mind and ideas. Experience is described in terms of ideas let into the mind by the senses; memory in terms of ideas lodged in the memory; abstract ideas in terms of an operation performed by the mind on ideas. In all these cases the analysis is in terms of mind and ideas. This is possible for Locke because of his broad use of 'idea'. I t is important to emphasize the continuity of perceptions, memory images, and abstractions. There is no clear difference in kind ; no sharp distinction is drawn by Locke. The same ideas play different roles: first they are let in by the senses, then they may be lodged in the memory, or finally they may be abstracted. Abstract ideas are perceptions which have undergone an operation performed by the mind. Abstract ideas are framed by the mind from particular ideas (perceptions) by a process of omission. Locke is taking particular ideas to be ideas of qualities, that is, he holds that particular ideas become ideas of repeatables merely by being separated. Perception becomes conception through omission of context. In his discussion of the idea of white Locke seems to be saying that I can take the whiteness of this piece of chalk as the representative of the whiteness of all white objects. I t is the perception of white which is an element in the perception we have when we look at white chalk that becomes the abstract idea of white by omission of the other elements in the perception. Roughly speaking, Locke is thinking of the perception of white as becoming the abstract idea of white by being separated from the circumstance of being accompanied by a set of other perceptions on a particular occasion. Locke is thinking of the perception of white as already the consciousness of a quality. Locke does not see the difference between a white idea and an idea of white. This confusion between a 4 idea and an idea of 4, between an item which exemplifies 4 and an idea which is of or about 4, is responsible for many of Locke's troubles. In the case of the idea of white, the idea of white is a common element of the idea of chalk, of milk, or of snow. When theidea of white is abstracted or separated, from all the other ideas which make the idea of chalk, the idea of chalk and not the idea of snow or of milk, it becomes the abstract general idea of white. What Locke seems to be saying in the case of the idea of man is that my idea of John is made up of many ideas, just as my idea of chalk is made up of many ideas, similarly for my ideas of James, of Mary, etc. Now by leaving out of my idea of James, or of Peter, "that which is peculiar to each, and retain(ing) only what is common to them all" (Essay III:iii:7) I am left with the abstract general idea of man. This is a common element, according to Locke, in my ideas of Peter, of James, and, indeed, of all men, just as the idea of white is a common element in my ideas of chalk, of snow, or of milk. In the case of the idea of white Locke confused a white idea (a perceived quality) and the idea of white. He
mistakenly thought that by separation, by omission, this white becomes the idea of white. The difficulties in his account of the idea of man are just as great. When Locke says that we form our general idea of man by omitting from our particular ideas of individuals that which is peculiar to each, and retaining that which is common, it is clear that he is not distinguishing between determinables and determinates. Locke talks as though my ideas of Peter, of James, of Mary, and indeed, of any man, had in common ideas of certain determinate qualities, and that the complex of these common ideas of determinates made up the content of this abstract idea of man. But this is absurd, for it is quite possible, and, indeed, quite likely, that there are no ideas of determinate qualities common to my ideas of various men. But even if there were, this fact would not provide us with a general idea of man. Assume that the only determinate idea common to my ideas of various men is a certain color. Then, on Locke's account, my idea of this color would be my idea of man. What Locke should have seen is that the relation between the general idea of man and the idea of a particular man is not that of part to whole but rather that of determinable to determinate. However, it is clear from Locke's use of 'leave out' and 'retain' that he did not see this. There are two ways in which one abstraction may be "more specific" than another: specification (as red stands to color) or adjunction (as red square stands to red). Locke's emphasis on omission and separation indicates that he has noticed only the latter. JOHN LINNELL. STATECOLLEGE. SACRAMENTO
