LINGUISTICS INSIDE OUT
AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE General Editor E.F. KONRAD K...
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LINGUISTICS INSIDE OUT
AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE General Editor E.F. KONRAD KOERNER (University of Ottawa) Series IV - CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY
Advisory Editorial Board Henning Andersen (Los Angeles); Raimo Anttila (Los Angeles) Thomas V. Gamkrelidze (Tbilisi); John E. Joseph (Edinburgh) Hans-Heinrich Lieb (Berlin); Ernst Pulgram (Ann Arbor, Mich.) E. Wyn Roberts (Vancouver, B.C.); Danny Steinberg (Tokyo)
Volume 148
George Wolf and Nigel Love (eds) Linguistics Inside Out Roy Harris and his critics
LINGUISTICS INSIDE OUT ROY HARRIS AND HIS CRITICS Edited by
GEORGE WOLF University of New Orleans
NIGEL LOVE University of Cape Town
JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences — Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Linguistics inside out : Roy Harris and his critics / edited by George Wolf, Nigel Love. p. cm. — (Amsterdam studies in the theory and history of linguistic science. Series IV, Current issues in linguistic theory, ISSN 0304-0763 ; v. 148) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Harris, Roy, 1931- . 2. Linguistics. I. Harris, Roy, 1931- . II. Wolf, George, 1950 - . III. Love, Nigel. IV. Series. P85.H34L56 1997 410-dc21 96-52209 ISBN 90 272 3652 6 (Eur.) / 1-55619-863-9 (US) (alk. paper) CIP © Copyright 1997 - John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O.Box 75577 · 1070 AN Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O.Box 27519 · Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 · USA
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Roy Harris
[He] has many of the traits of the best English pamphleteers: courage, an individual mind, vehement opinions, an instinct for stirring up trouble, the arts of appealing to that imaginary creature the sensible man and of combining original observation with sweeping generalisation, of seeing enemies everywhere and despising all of them... he writes a lucid conversational style which wakes one up suddenly like cold water dashed in the face. The sting of it is sometimes refreshing; sometimes it makes one very angry... in the name of common sense [he] is capable of exaggerating with the simplicity and innocence of a savage... - V.S. Pritchett, on George Orwell
... the fact that missionary linguists sometimes end up in tribal cooking pots is no more surprising than the fact that even well trained troops sometimes end up as casualties. - Roy Harris
Contents Preface Contributors Roy Harris: Publications 1956-1995 Prologue 1 The "Language Myth" Myth: Roy Harris's Red Herrings JOHN E. JOSEPH
ix xi xv 1 9
2 The Language Muddle: Roy Harris and Generative Grammar ROBERT D. BORSLEY and FREDERICK J. NEWMEYER
42
3 Telementation and Generative Linguistics PHILIP CARR
65
4 Phonography: Setting a Term to the Evolution of Writing JOHN SOREN PETTERSSON
84
5 A New Mentality DAVID R. OLSON
99
6 Science and Significance: Making Sense of Wittgenstein's Ways of Seeing ANTHONY HOLIDAY
106
7 Rules and Algorithms: Wittgenstein on Language ROM HARRÉ
136
8 Contextualizing "Context": From Malinowski to Machine Translation NAOMI S. BARON
151
9 Is Ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis an "Integrational" Account of Language? DAVID FLEMING
182
10 Linguistic Theory and the Multiple-Trace Model of Memory JOHN R. TAYLOR
208
11 Language, Art and Kant TREVOR PATEMAN
226
12 From an Integrational Point of View ROY HARRIS
Epilogue References Index
229
311 319 339
Preface This book started life, or gestation, as a traditional Festschrift. For a number of reasons that project was soon abandoned. In the first place, the traditional Festschrift, compiled as it apparently so often is by inviting a random selection of the schriftee's friends and colleagues to send in whatever they happen to have handy, is all too likely to consist of an assortment of pieces with no better reason to appear bound together in a single volume than their authors' wish to be associated with it. Surely something more useful, and more appropriate, could be contrived. Instead we decided on a collection of critical essays. Contributors were asked to focus on (an aspect of) Roy's work, and either develop or rebut some specific point he has made, or else endorse or reject his whole approach to a given area of linguistic inquiry; Roy himself was invited to write a composite reply. The idea was to advance the debate on the issues he has been concerned with. Books of this kind are perhaps commoner in philosophy than in linguistics, and there are plenty of precedents there for what we had in mind: collections of essays that mark a scholar's achievement by discussing the work itself, and are to that extent worthwhile irrespective of any celebratory intention, as opposed to the sort of unfocusedly encomiastic production that lionises its hero by presenting a miscellany of articles some of which may have no point of contact with what was supposed to make such a book worth publishing in the first place. A collection such as the following is appropriate because, whether he would answer to the name of philosopher or not, Roy is best known for the many controversial things he has said not so much within linguistics as about it. For reasons to do with the way it has come to be institutionalised, academic linguistics is on the whole unfriendly to controversialists as wholehearted and thoroughgoing as he has never flinched from being. Having issued our invitation to potential contributors, we were therefore confident that there would be a great deal more rejecting than endorsing in the eventual book. So confident were we of this that the working title was A Blastschrifl for Roy Harris. We sat back waiting for adverse, even hostile commentary. On one level, a Blastschrift is an antiFestschrift. But a Blastschrift is not as backhanded an honour as it might at first appear: on another level it pays its anti-honorand the compliment of taking his work seriously enough to subject it to criticism.
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LINGUISTICS INSIDE OUT
In any case, given the above considerations, Roy Harris would be a hard man to honour with a Festschrift of the traditional, more unctuous kind. Outside the ranks of what one contributor calls his "cadre of talented and devoted students", most linguists are inclined to give short shrift to his ideas. The resulting volume would have been slim. A Shortschrift, in fact. In the event not all the contributions proved to be blasts, so the working title was dropped. But all make contact in one way or another with Roy's work. And Roy in his reply has something to say about all of them. In that sense his reply comprehends them all. Whether it comprehends them all in the other sense is something we originally envisaged taking it upon ourselves to pass judgement on, in a long editorial epilogue. In the end, to avoid trying the reader's patience, not to mention usurping his rightful role, we settled for drawing attention to one or two of what strike us as the more salient points arising from the debate. The sandwich is completed by a brief scene-setting prologue.
Cape Town New Orleans
N.L. G.W.
Contributors Naomi S. Baron is Professor of Linguistics and Director of the Summer TESOL Institute at the American University in Washington D.C. Former Guggenheim Fellow and past president of the Semiotic Society of America, she has taught at Brown University, Emory University and Southwestern University. Her research focuses on language acquisition in children, language in social context, the evolution of writing, and the historical development of English. Author of five books, including Growing Up With Language: How Children Learn to Talk, Computer Languages: A Guide for the Perplexed and Speech, Writing and Sign, Professor Baron is currently writing a book on the effects of technology on spoken and written language. Bob Borsley is Senior Lecturer in the Linguistics Department of the University of Wales, Bangor, U.K. His main interest is syntactic theory, and he has written extensively on English, Welsh, Breton and Polish syntax. He is author of a syntax textbook: Syntactic Theory: A Unified Approach (Edward Arnold). He is also co-editor ofJournal of Linguistics. Philip Carr is Senior Lecturer in Linguistics in the Department of English Literary and Linguistic Studies at Newcastle University. His interests lie in the areas of phonological theory and the philosophy of linguistics. His book Linguistic Realities (Cambridge University Press, 1990) addresses issues in the philosophy of science as they relate to generative linguistics, and issues concerning the ontological status of linguistic objects. His textbook Phonology (Macmillan, 1993) is an introduction to current work in generative phonology. He is currently working on an undergraduate textbook on English phonetics and phonology (to be published by Blackwell) and is co-writing a book with N. Burton-Roberts on I-language and the ontology of phonology. David Fleming is a doctoral student in rhetoric in the English Department at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. His dissertation examines the role of discourse (narrative, argument, conversation and written text) in the practical and social activity of student designers. His background includes work in literary studies, composition and rhetorical theory.
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Rom Harré is Emeritus Fellow of Linacre College in Oxford University. He is Professor in the Department of Psychology at Georgetown University, Washington D.C., and Adjunct Professor of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Binghamton University. Roy Harris, Honorary Fellow of St Edmund Hall, Oxford, was born in 1931 and educated at Queen Elizabeth's Hospital, Bristol. After reading Modern Languages at Oxford, he pursued research in comparative Romance linguistics there, and subsequently in general linguistics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He was successively Professor of the Romance Languages (1976-7) and of General Linguistics (1978-88) at Oxford, and Professor of English Language (1988-91) at the University of Hong Kong. He has also taught in the United States and France. He is the founder-editor of the journal Language and Communication. Anthony Holiday teaches philosophy in the School of Government at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. His book Moral Powers (Routledge, 1988) attempts to derive an ethical theory from a reflection on the relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and Marxist philosophy of history. He has published papers on Wittgenstein's thought and on philosophical semantics, and has a particular interest in the implications of political theory for moral philosophy. John E. Joseph succeeded Roy Harris as Professor of English Language and General Linguistics and Head of the Department of English at the University of Hong Kong. His publications cover a range of topics in language standardisation, Romance historical syntax and the history of linguistics, and include the books Eloquence and Power (1987), Ideologies of Language (coedited with T.J. Taylor, 1990), and Linguistic Theory and Grammatical Description (co-edited with F.G. Droste, 1991). He has recently completed a new translation of Plato's Cratylus, to be published in conjunction with a book situating Plato's theory of language within the broader framework of Western linguistic thought. Nigel Love read Modern Languages at Magdalen College, Oxford, and subsequently held a junior research fellowship at Wolfson College. He has taught English in France and French in Jamaica, and is currently Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Linguistics at the University of Cape Town. Topics he has written on include Welsh phonology, the work of J.L. Austin, and
CONTRIBUTORS
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the linguistic theory implied by procedures of statutory interpretation. He is editor of the journal Language Sciences. Frederick J. Newmeyer is Professor of Linguistics at the University of Washington. He is the author of English Aspectual Verbs (Mouton, 1975), Linguistic Theory in America (Academic Press, 1980), Grammatical Theory (University of Chicago Press, 1983), The Politics of Linguistics (University of Chicago Press, 1986) and Generative Linguistics: An Historical Perspective (Routledge, 1995). He edited the four-volume Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey (Cambridge University Press, 1988). From 1989 to 1994 he was Secretary-Treasurer of the Linguistic Society of America. David R. Olson is Professor at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. He has held Fellowships at Harvard's Center for Cognitive Studies and Stanford's Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and holds an honorary doctorate from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. His latest book, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading was published by Cambridge University Press in 1994. Trevor Pateman was born in 1947, studied philosophy, politics and economics at Oxford and since 1979 has taught at the University of Sussex, where he is now Reader in Education. His essay "Communicating with Computer Programs" appeared as the first article in the first issue (1981) of Language and Communication. His defence of Chomsky an linguistics in Language in Mind and Language in Society (Oxford University Press, 1987) includes an engagement with Roy Harris's work. John Soren Pettersson was born in 1961 and holds a BA in mathematics as well as a licentiate in general linguistics from Uppsala University, his thesis for which was a critique of evolutionary accounts of writing. He has also written on the origin of writing, writing and phonetic concepts, learning to read and write, and numerical notations. John R. Taylor has taught in Germany and South Africa, and is currently in the Linguistics Section, University of Otago, New Zealand. He is author of Linguistic Categorization (Oxford University Press, 1989), and has published widely on topics in semantics and cognitive linguistics.
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George Wolf took his B.A. in French at Columbia University, and his doctorate in General Linguistics at Oxford. He is currently Associate Professor of French at the University of New Orleans. He has edited and translated a collection of essays by the French linguist Michel Bréal, on whose concept of semantics he is now writing a book, has edited New Departures in Linguistics (Garland, 1992), and is collaborating with Eisuke Komatsu on an edition and translation of student notes to the first and second of Saussure's courses on general linguistics (Pergamon, 1996, and forthcoming).
Roy Harris: Publications 1956-1995 1956 "The White Stag in Chretien's Erec et Enide ". French Studies 10/1.55-61. 1957 "Et Liconaus ot non ses prre". Medium Aevum 26/1.32-5. "A Terminus A Quo for the Roman de Thebes ". French Studies 11/3.201-13. 1958 Review of W. Ziltener, Chrétien und die Aeneis. Medium Aevum 27/3.186-9. 1960 Review of G. Tilander, Mélanges d'étymologie cynégétique. Modern Language Review 55/3.439-40. 1961 Review of F.W. Locke, The Quest for the Holy Grail Medium Aevum 30/3.186-8. Review of H. Adolf, Visio Pacis. Medium Aevum 30/3.188-9. Review of L. Thorpe (ed.), Le Roman de Laurin. French Studies 15/4.360-1. 1962 Review of C. Grassi, Correnti e contrasti di lingua e cultura nelle valli cisalpine di parlata provenzale e franco-provenzale. Modern Language Review 57/1.115-6. Review of C.W. Dunn, The Foundling and the Werewolf. Medium Aevum 31/1.70-2.
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1964 Review of R.A. Haadsma and J. Nuchelmans, Précis de latin vulgaire. Modern Language Review 59/3.473. 1965 Review of S. Heinimann, Das Abstraktum in der franzosischen Literatursprache des Mittelalters. Medium Aevum, 34/1.83. Review of K. Urwin (ed.), A Short Old French Dictionary for Students. Medium Aevum 34/1.83-4. 1966 "Criteria in Descriptive Semantics". Theoria 32/3.237-9. Review of J.A. Fodor and J.J. Katz (eds.), The Structure of Language. Mind 75/299.450-1. "Gallo-Romance Third Declension Plurals". Revue de linguistique romane 30/117-18.58-70. "Chansons de geste". Chambers's Encyclopedia, New Revised Ed., 3.270-1. Oxford. "Chrétien de Troyes". Chambers's Encyclopedia, New Revised Ed., 3.525. Oxford. "Roman courtois". Chambers's Encyclopedia, New Revised Ed., 11.757. Oxford. "François Villon". Chambers's Encyclopedia, New Revised Ed., 14.306-7. Oxford. 1967 Review of S. Cigada, La leggenda medievale del Cervo Bianco e le origini della 'matière de Bretagne '. French Studies 21/1.50-1. "The Semantics of Self-Description". Analysis 27/4.142. Review of D'A.S. Avalle, Latino 'circum romançum ' e 'rustica romana lingua'. Medium Aevum 36/1.52-4. "Piedmontese Influence on Valdôtain Syntax". Revue de linguistique romane 31/121-2.180-9. Review of G. Moignet, Le pronom personnel français. French Studies 31/2.182-3.
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Review of A.M. Colby, The Portrait in Twelfth-Century French Literature. Medium Aevum 36/2.183-5. 1968 Review of R. de Dardel, Recherches sur le genre roman des substantifs de la troisième declinaison. Modem Language Review 63/1.239-40. "La structure des paradigmes en latin vulgaire". Actas del XI Congreso Internacional de Linguistica y Filologia Romanicas, 1.391-8. Madrid. Review of L.C. Porter (éd.), JaquesPeletier du Mans, Dialogue de VOrtografe e Prononciacion Françoese. French Studies 22/2.146-7. Review of P. Porteau, Deux études de sémantique française. Modem Language Review 63/3.699-700. "Translation Propositions". Linguistica Antwerpiensia 2.217-27. Review of R. Posner, The Romance Languages. Modem Language Review 63/3.698-9. "Notes on a Problem of Franco-Provençal Morphology". Zeitschrift fur romanische Philologie 84/5-6.572-81. Review of W. Meyer-Lubke, Historische Grammatik der franzôsischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Wortbildungslehre. French Studies 22/3.266-7. "Self-Description and the Theory of Types", Analysis 28/6.207-8. 1969 "Pronominal Postposition in Valdôtain". Revue de linguistique romane 33/12930.133-43. "Type-Meanings and Token-Meanings". Journal of Linguistics 5/1.143-4. Review of H. Rheinfelder, Altfranzosische Grammatik, Zweiter Teil: Formenlehre. French Studies 23/3.273. 1970 "Semantics and Translation". Actes du Xe Congrès International des Linguistes, 2.461-7. Bucarest: Editions de l'Académie de la République Socialiste de Roumanie. "Deviance and Citation". Journal of Linguistics 6/2.253 -6. "The Strasburg Oaths: a Problem of Orthographic Interpretation". Revue de linguistique romane 34/135-6.403-6.
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1972 Review of V. Introduzione al latino volgare. Medium Aevum 41/1.81-2. "Translation into Martian". Mwrf 81/322.276. Review of K. Bal dinger (éd.), Dictionnaire étymologique de l'ancien français, Fascicule Gl. Medium Aevum 41/3.294-5. "Performative Paradigms". Transactions of the Philological Society 70.44-58. "Words and Word Criteria in French". History and Structure of French: Essays in Honour of Professor T.B.W. Reid, ed. by F J. Barnett et al., 117-33. Oxford: Blackwell. 1973 Review of W.L. Chafe, Meaning and the Structure of Language. Journal of Linguistics 9/1.115-20. Synonymy and Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell. 1974 Review of D D R . Owen (ed.), Arthurian Romance. French Studies 28/1.52-3. (with N. Love) "A Note on French Nasal Vowels". Linguistics 126.63-8. 1976 Review of G. Lavis, L 'expression de l'affectivité dans la poésie lyrique française du moyen âge. Medium Aevum 45/1.114-7. "Early Generative Semantics". Journal of Literary Semantics 5/2.78-90. 1977 "Semantics, Performatives and Truth". Journal of Literary Semantics 6/2.63-75. On the Possibility of Linguistic Change. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1978 Communication and Language. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Review of B. Comrie, Aspect. Journal of Literary Semantics 7/2.114-7. "Word Wars: On Thought and Language". Encounter 50/3.42-9.
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"The Descriptive Interpretation of Performative Utterances". Journal of Linguistics 14/2.309-10. Review of G.A. Miller and P.N. Johnson-Laird, Language and Perception. Journal of Linguistics 14/2.342-7. 1979 Review of G. Cannon, An Integrated Transformational Grammar of the English Language. Review of English Studies 30/119.324-5. Review of P. Trudgill (éd.), Sociolinguistic Patterns in British English. Review of English Studies 30/120.447-9. 1980 The Language-Makers. London: Duckworth. "The Englishness of English". Review of S. Greenbaum, G. Leech & J. Svartvik (eds.), Studies in English Linguistics for Randolph Quirk. London Review of Books, 6.11.80, 21-2. 1981 "Communication About Communication". Language & Communication 1/1.1-2. "The Need for Glottotherapy". Review of D. Bolinger, Language - The Loaded Weapon. Times Literary Supplement, 30.1.81, 117. "A Passion for Words". Review of D. Crystal (éd.), Eric Partridge: In His Own Words. Times Literary Supplement, 30.1.81, 302. "Archisemiotics". Review of G. Broadbent, R. Bunt and C. Jencks (eds.), Signs, Symbols and Architecture. Design Studies, April 1981, 122-3. "The Dialect of Fleet Street". Review of K. Waterhouse, Daily Mirror Style. Times Literary Supplement, 22.5.81, 559-60. The Language Myth. London: Duckworth. "Scoring the Language Game". Review of J. Lyons, Language and Linguistics: An Introduction. London Review of Books, 15.10.81, 13-14. "Truth-Conditional Semantics and Natural Languages". Language, Meaning and Style. Essays in Memory of Stephen Ullmann, ed. by T.E. Hope et al., 21-37. Leeds: Leeds University Press. "Performing in Words". Review of E. Goffman, Forms of Talk. Times Literary Supplement, 18.12.81, 1455-6.
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1982 "Something Every Speaker Has". Review of J.C. Wells, Accents of English. Times Educational Supplement, 14.5.82, 26. "The Exchange of Signs". Review of R.E. Innis, Karl Buhler: Semiotic Foundations of Language Theory. Times Literary Supplement, 18.6.82, 669. "From Adam to Aarsleff '. Review of H. Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure. London Review of Books, 19.8.82, 11-12. "The History Men". Review of R.W. Burchfield (éd.), A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary: Volume 3. Times Literary Supplement, 3.9.82, 935-6. 1983 "Means of Communication". Review of J.J. Gumperz, Discourse Strategies. Times Literary Supplement, 14.1.83, 37. "Semantics". Review of J. Aitchison, Language Change: Progress or Decay?', R. Chapman, The Language of English Literature ; R.K. Fenn, Liturgies and Trials', J. Lyons, Language, Meaning and Context. Times Educational Supplement, 14.1.83, 24. "Beware of Standard(s)". Times Educational Supplement, 25.2.83, 2. "Putting the Users First". Review of D. Leith, A Social History of English. Times Educational Supplement, 8.4.83, 21. "Power and the Power of Speech". Review of P. Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire. Times Literary Supplement, 20.5.83, 524. "Language and Speech". Approaches to Language, ed. by R. Harris, 1-15. Oxford: Pergamon. F. de Saussure: Course in General Linguistics. London: Duckworth. "Literary Translating: Theoretical Ideas". Times Literary Supplement, 14.10.83, 1119. "The Speech-Communication Model in 20th-century Linguistics and its Sources". Proceedings of the XIIIth International Congress of Linguists, ed. by S. Hartori and K. Inoue, 864-9. Tokyo. "All My Eye and Betty Martin". Review of L.G. Pine, A Dictionary of Mottoes', J. Green, Newspeak: a Dictionary of Jargon; E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford Miniguide to English Usage; A.P. Cowrie, R. Mackin and I.R. McCaig, The Oxford Dictionary of Current Idiomatic English, vol.II; Κ. Hudson, A Dictionary of the Teenage Revolution and its Aftermath; E. Partridge, A Dictionary of Catch-Phrases. London Review of Books, 1.12.83, 12-13.
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1984 "The Misunderstanding of Newspeak". Times Literary Supplement, 6.1.84, 17. Review of J. MacNamara, Names for Things. Language Sciences 6/1.173-7. "Speaking Silently". Review of M. Deuehar, British Sign Language. Times Literary Supplement, 20.7.84, 807. "Soft Sell and Soft Soap". Review of D. Crystal, Who Cares About English Usage? and W.F. Bolton, The Language of 1984. Times Literary Supplement, 3.8.84, 859. "The View from the Blackboard". Review of M. Meek and J. Miller (eds.), Changing English. Times Literary Supplement, 14.9.84, 2031. "The Semiology of Textualization". Language Sciences 6/2.271-86. "What Was Meant By What Was Said". Review of G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Language, Sense and Nonsense. London Review of Books, 20.9.84, 18-19. "Must Monkeys Mean?". The Meaning of Primate Signals, ed. by R. Harré and V. Reynolds, 116-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985 "Mizzled". Review οf Longman Dictionary of the English Language, L. Heller, A. Humez and M. Dror, The Private Lives of English Words; B. Bryson, The Penguin Dictionary of Troublesome Words; J. Shipley, The Origins of English Words; E. Partridge, A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English, ed. P. Beale. London Review of Books, 21.2.85, 18-19. (with I. Griffiths) "The Semiotics of Mental Representation". Semiotica 53.179-214. (with Ch.-J.N. Bailey) "On Developmentalism". Developmental Mechanisms of Language, ed. by Ch.-J.N. Bailey and R. Harris, vii-xii. Oxford: Pergamon. "Saussure and the Dynamic Paradigm". Developmental Mechanisms of Language, ed. by Ch.-J.N. Bailey and R. Harris, 167-183. Oxford: Pergamon. 1986 The Origin of Writing. London: Duckworth. "Sherlock Holmes Meets the Semioticians". Review of U. Eco and T.A. Sebeok (eds.), The Sign of Three. Language Sciences 8/2.197-201.
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"No Arguing with English". Review of The Story of English (BBC 2) and the book by R. McCrum, W. Cran and R. MacNeil. Times Literary Supplement, 26.9.86, 1062-79. Review of M. Toussaint, Contre l'arbitraire du signe. Language in Society 15/3.444-5. "Language Difficulties". Review of R. Kirk, Translation Determined. Times Literary Supplement, 28.11.86, 1338. 1987 "The Grammar In Your Head". Mindwaves, ed. by C. Blakemore and S. Greenfield, 507-16. Oxford: Blackwell. Reading Saussure. London: Duckworth. The Language Machine. London, Duckworth. "The Ephemerality of Translation". Times Literary Supplement, 28.8.87, 924/933. "Mentioning the Unmentionable". International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 2/3.175-88. "In and Out of the Language Lab". Review of L.-J. Calvet, La guerre des langues et les politiques linguistiques and F.J. Newmeyer, The Politics of Linguistics. Times Literary Supplement, 11.12.87, 1373. "Language as Social Interaction: Integrationalism versus Segregationalism". Language Sciences 9/2.131 -43. "The Ideological Implications of Onomatopoeia in the Eighteenth Century". Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 17.209-216. 1988 Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games with Words. London: Routledge. "Across the No Man's Land". Linguistic Thought in England 1914-1945, ed. by R. Harris, ix-xi. London: Duckworth. (French version in Modèles linguistiques 9/2, 1987, 7-10.) "Murray, Moore and the Myth". Linguistic Thought in England 1914-1945, ed. by R. Harris, 1-26. London: Duckworth. (French version in Modèles linguistiques 9/2, 1987, 11-38.) 'Language & Communication. The First Seven Years". Robert Maxwell and Pergamon Press, ed. by E.J.J. Maxwell, 657-9. Oxford: Pergamon. Review of E.J. Reuland and A.G.B. Ter Meulen(eds.),77TheRepresentation of (In)definiteness. History and Philosophy of Logic 9/2.250-1.
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"Who Will Translate the Translators?". Encounter 72/2.68-73. "The Semiotic Basis of Applicative Grammar". Review of S. Shaumyan, A Semiotic Theory of Language. Semiotica 74/1-2.121-32. "On a Sticky Wicket". Review of R. Bartsch, Norms of Language and S. Greenbaum, Good English and the Grammarian. Times Literary Supplement, 30.9.88, 1082. 1989 "The Worst English in the World?" An Inaugural Lecture. Supplement to the Gazette, University ofHong Kong 36/Ί, 24 April, 37-46. "The Garden of Eden". Hongkong Standard (Education), 9.6.89, 5. "Theories About the Origin of Language". Hongkong Standard (Education), 16.6.89, 5. "Lessons from Evolution". Hongkong Standard (Education), 23.6.89, 5. (with T.J. Taylor) Landmarks in Linguistic Thought: the Western Tradition from Socrates to Saussure. London: Routledge. "Degree-0 Explanation". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12/2. 344-5. Review of R. Schleifer, A.J. Greimas and the Nature of Meaning: Linguistics, Semiotics and Discourse Theory. Review of English Studies 40/160. 541-2. "How Does Writing Restructure Thought?". Language & Communication 9/23.99-106. "English Fights for Survival in Hong Kong Schools". Hongkong Standard (Education), 1.11.89, 5. 1990 "Quelques réflexions sur la tyrannie de l'alphabet". L Ecriture: le cerveau, l'œil et la main, ed. by C. Sirat, J. Irigoin and E. Poulie, 195-200. Turnhout: Brepols. "The Integrationist Critique of Orthodox Linguistics". The Sixteenth LAC US Forum 1989, ed. by M.P. Jordan, 63-77. Lake Bluff: L.A.C.U.S.. u Lars Porsena Revisited". The State of the Language, ed. by C. Ricks and L. Michaels, 411-21. Berkeley: University of California Press. "The Scientist as Homo Loquens". Harré and his Critics, ed. by R. Bhaskar, 64-86. Oxford: Blackwell. "Semantics and its Critics". Hong Kong Papers in Linguistics and Language Teaching 13.35-9. "The Dialect Myth". Development and Diversity. Linguistic Variation across Time and Space. A Festschrift for Charles-James N. Bailey, ed. by J. A.
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Edmondson, C. Feagin and P. Miihlhausler, 3-19. Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics. The Foundations of Linguistic Theory. Selected Writings of Roy Harris, ed. by N. Love. London: Routledge. "On 'Folk' and 'Scientific' Linguistic Beliefs". Meanings and Prototypes. Studies in Linguistic Categorization, ed. by S.L. Tsohatzidis, 449-64. London: Routledge. "On Redefining Linguistics". Redefining Linguistics, ed. by H.G. Davis and Τ J. Taylor, 18-52. London: Routledge. "On Freedom of Speech". Ideologies of Language, ed. by J.E. Joseph and T.J. Taylor, 153-61. London: Routledge. Review of M. Johnson, Attribute-Value Logic and the Theory of Grammar. History and Philosophy of Logic 11. 252-3. 1991 (with T.J. Taylor) "A Second Decade for Language & Communication". Language & Communication 11/1-2.1. Review of J.R. de J. Jackson, Historical Criticism and the Meaning of Texts. Review of English Studies 42/166.301-2. Review of A. Rai, Orwell and the Politics of Despair. Review of English Studies 42/166.307. "Words, Which Go Together. Are Languages Really Fixed or Error-Free?". Review of Z. Harris, A Theory of Language and Information. Times Literary Supplement, 26.7.91, 24. "Hobgoblins of a Cold Warrior". Review of N. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy. The Independent, 7.9.91, 29. Review of J. DeFrancis, Visible Speech: The Diverse Oneness of Writing Systems. Journal of Language and Social Psychology 10/3.217-220. "Language". The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment, ed. by J.W. Yolton, R. Porter and B.M. Stafford, 272-4. Oxford: Blackwell. (with M. Chan) "Introduction". Asian Voices in English, ed. by M. Chan and R. Harris, 1-2. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. "English versus Islam: the Asian Voice of Salman Rushdie". Asian Voices in English, ed. by M. Chan and R. Harris, 87-100. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
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1992 "On Scientific Method in Linguistics". New Departures in Linguistics, ed. by G. Wolf, 1-26. New York: Garland. "Writing and Proto-writing: From Sign to Metasign". New Departures in Linguistics, ed. by G. Wolf, 180-192. New York: Garland. 1993 "Ecriture et Notation". Proceedings of the Workshop on Orality versus Literacy: Concepts, Methods and Data, ed. by C. Pontecorvo and C. Blanche-Benveniste, 9-42. Strasbourg: European Science Foundation. "Saussure and Linguistic Geography". Language Sciences 8/1.1-14. "Another Crystal Maze". Review of D. Crystal, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Language and Languages. Times Literary Supplement, 16.4.93, 10. "Signs and Sentences". Review of Y. Tobin, Semiotics and Linguistics. Semiotica 95/1-2.141-6. "Three Models of Signification". Structures of Signification, ed. by H.S. Gill, 3.665-77. New Delhi: Wiley. "Introduction" to Adam Smith's Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages. British Linguistics in the Eighteenth Century. London : Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to James Beattie's The Theory of Language. British Linguistics in the Eighteenth Century, v-xii. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to James Harris's Hermes. British Linguistics in the Eighteenth Century, v-xi. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to John Home Tooke's Diversions of Purley. British Linguistics in the Eighteenth Century, v-xii. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to Joseph Priestley's Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar. British Linguistics in the Eighteenth Century, v-xi. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to William Jones' Discourses Delivered at the Asiatic Society 1785-1792. British Linguistics in the Eighteenth Century, v-xi. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Linguistic Questions That Linguistics Does Not Ask". Actes du XVe Congrès International des Linguistes, 4.243-6. Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Université Laval. "Integrational Linguistics". Actes du XVe Congrès International des Linguistes, 1.321-3. Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Université Laval.
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(with E. Komatsu) F. de Saussure, Troisième Cours de Linguistique Générale (1910-1911), ed. and trans. Oxford: Pergamon. (with R. Harré) "Preface". Linguistics and Philosophy. The Controversial Interface, ed. by R. Harré and R. Harris, ix-xi. Oxford: Pergamon. "What Is Philosophy of Linguistics?". Linguistics and Philosophy. The Controversial Interface, ed. by R. Harré and R. Harris, 3-19. Oxford: Pergamon. "Saussure, Wittgenstein and la règle du jeu ". Linguistics and Philosophy. The Controversial Interface, ed. by R. Harré and R. Harris, 219-31. Oxford: Pergamon. "Graphically Speaking". Review of T. Conley, The Graphic Unconscious in Early Modern French Writing. Times Literary Supplement, 24.9.93, 11. 1994 "Criticizing Saussure". Review of D. Holdcroft, Saussure: Signs, System and Arbitrariness. Semiotica 98/1-2.181-6. La Sémiologie de l'écriture. Paris: C.N.R.S. "Introduction" to Alexander Murray's History of the European Languages. British Linguistics in the Nineteenth Century, v-xi. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to excerpts from works by Dugald Stewart, Nicholas Wiseman, Robert Chambers, Charles Darwin and Henry Sweet's History of Language. British Linguistics in the Nineteenth Century, vii-xiii. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to Max Millier's Lectures on the Science of Language. British Linguistics in the Nineteenth Century, v-x. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to Richard Chenevix Trench's On the Study of Words. British Linguistics in the Nineteenth Century, v-xi. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Introduction" to William Dwight Whitney's The Life and Growth of Language. British Linguistics in the Nineteenth Century, v-xi. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Semiotic Aspects of Writing". Schrift und Schriftlichkeit, ed. by H. Giinther and O. Ludwig, 1.41-8. Berlin: de Gruyter. 1995 "Talking Pictures (No Vision Needed)". Review of W.J.T. Mitchell, Picture Theory. Times Higher Education Supplement, 6.1.95, 22.
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"A Well-Defined Corpus". Review of J. Willinsky, Empire of Words: The Reign of the OED. Times Higher Education Supplement, 14.4.95, 29. "Opening the Door to Language". Review of RE. Asher and J.M.Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Times Literary Supplement, 21.4.95, 10-11. "Translating Mitspeak". Review of S. Pinker, The Language Instinct. How the Mind Creates Language. Essays in Criticism 45/3.21r2-9. "Introduction". The Wellesley Series. Nineteenth Century Sources in the Humanities and Social Sciences. I Language and Linguistics, l.vii-x. 4 vols. London: Routledge/Thoemmes. "Put That in Your Pipe and Smoke It". Review of F. Merrell, Semiosis in the Postmodern Age. Times Higher Education Supplement, 22.9.95, 21. "The Lesson to Learn from Ern". Review of J. Harwood, Eliot to Derrida: the Poverty of Interpretation and N. Royle, After Derrida. Times Higher Education Supplement, 13.10.95, 22. "Saussure, Generative Grammar and Integrational Linguistics". Saussure and Linguistics Today, ed. by T. De Mauro and S. Sugeta, 203-213. Roma: Bulzoni.
Prologue It is more than twenty years since Roy Harris set out on his self-imposed mission to the academic tribe concerned with inquiry into language. The intricately interwoven complex of intellectual sins that the missionary has excoriated over those years, and the redemptive gospel he has more recently begun to preach, may be briefly summarised as follows. Although linguistics tends to present itself as a culture-neutral science of language, the enterprise is based not on ab initio consideration of the phenomena under investigation, but on a projection of certain preconceptions about language derived from a particular tradition of linguistic thought. These preconceptions are so pervasive as to determine the form taken by the inquiry itself: modern linguistic science sees itself primarily as engaged in elucidating the synchronic structure of spoken languages. But the very idea, says Harris, that there are (in any relevant sense) such things as "spoken languages" with a determinable "structure" is a product of a particular culture-specific way of apprehending linguistic phenomena. The most fundamental preconception is a consequence of the word "language" itself: Unfortunately, lip-service paid to the diversity of language does not detract from the lure of looking beyond this diversity in the hope of finding an underlying unity that the single term language can plausibly be held to stand for... Scholars who openly proclaim the variety of human linguistic activities are quite capable of speaking in the same breath of the capacity of human beings for language acquisition, as if nature had provided mankind with a single piece of biological equipment from which there somehow flowed the whole range of diverse behaviour acknowledged as "linguistic". Others find no inconsistency in pointing out how various are the uses to which men put the words at their command, and then proceeding forthwith as if nothing else mattered in the analysis of language apart from constructing an account of truth telling, or an account of syntax. In these and similar ways, academically respectable forms are found to accommodate the urge to find some core of unity which justifies one comprehensive term, language. (Harris 1981a: 8-9)
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The word "language" is a Baconian "idol of the market": a name "confused, badly defined and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things" (Harris 1981a: 8, quoting Bacon). It functions as such because of the deeply-rooted conviction that words "stand for" things: if there is a word, there must be a corresponding thing for which it stands. This notion Harris dubs "surrogationalism", and he identifies it as one of three ideas as to the nature and function of language that have dominated Western thinking since classical antiquity. The others are "contractualism", which envisages language as manifesting a tacit collective understanding among members of a community as to how a certain range of social affairs shall be conducted, and "instrumentalism", according to which words are understood as instruments for accomplishing human communicative objectives. Against the background of these ideas there has developed a Western myth about languages whose entrenchment as the basis for an academic science of language was the achievement that made Saussure the progenitor of modern linguistic theory. The myth is that languages are "fixed codes" - systems of correspondences between forms and meanings whose function is to facilitate "telementation" - the transfer of thoughts from one mind to another. These two doctrines are interdependent: if communication is indeed a matter of transferring thoughts from one mind to another, there must be a device or mechanism that enables this to happen. That device is the "fixed code". Thus the fixity of the code (in the sense that the same forms are paired with the same meanings for all speakers of the language) is a requirement of the telementational model of communication. It follows, therefore, that a language must be thought of as an abstraction from the variability of actual utterances. But given this variability, how is the underlying fixed code to be identified? A viable practice of descriptive linguistics, as Bloomfield recognised (Bloomfield 1933 [1935: 144]), depends on the possibility of counting certain utterances as "the same" in respect of both form and meaning. The required "sameness" is established by appealing, in effect, to the decisions about sameness already embodied in an antecedently given practice of writing, which is taken to provide, grosso modo, a ready-made representation of speech at the level of abstraction with which descriptive linguistics is concerned. But, says Harris, there is not only no plausible sense in which writing "represents" speech, it has no intrinsic or necessary connection with spoken language at all. It is a communicational medium sui generis whose use in connection with language is merely a function of the fact that oral communication is available "as an incomparably rich source of analogies for the graphic expression of all kinds of information..." (Harris 1986: 156), and whose
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invention was profoundly significant in restructuring modes of thought including thought about language. How does the fixed code come to be available to users of a given language? The answer takes the form of (a supporting explanatory myth - the myth of the "language machine". This myth is responsible for the recently developed idea that linguistics is in the business of investigating the psychobiological realia that allow one to acquire one's native language. Acquiring one's native language is seen as a matter of deducing a "grammar" from the evidential data provided by the speech that one hears. Given that this evidence is fragmentary, variable and deficient, the question arises how children can so swiftly achieve error-free mastery of their language. The answer offered is that they do it with the aid of a built-in guidance mechanism: the language machine in the brain. So if language-learning is indeed the acquisition of unconscious knowledge of a fixed code, the child must be equipped with a function-specific mental machine to help him with the task. Thus the generativist theory of the language machine is seen to be a logical requirement imposed by the initial step of taking a language to be some fixed set of invariants underlying the vagaries of speech. Under the title "integrational linguistics", Harris has outlined the principles that would guide an attempt to work out a demythologised account of language and language use. The most radical of these principles is founded on the perception that for anyone who hankers after fulfilling Saussure's ostensible wish to develop a linguistics that looks at language "as it is" for language-users, simply treating "languages", in any sense of definition of the term, as so many "givens" for the linguist to set about analysing without further ado leads at best to an impoverished and at worst to a downright distorted view of the phenomena. Languages, according to Harris, are not the primary objects of the linguist's inquiry at all, but second-order products of communites of individuals whose actual linguistic experience is what first has to be made sense of, both for its own sake and in order to understand what languages are. In so far as the demythologising project, as envisaged by Harris, does not automatically point to a definite programme of work for an institutionalised academic discipline, he may be seen as endorsing a Wittgensteinian refusal to release the fly from the bottle only to entrap it forthwith in another. And this perhaps goes some way towards explaining both Harris's interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and the reception accorded to Harris's work by the academic tribe called "linguists". For the fact is that for every benighted recipient of this complex and iconoclastic message who has either been converted by it or, alternatively, has consigned its importunate bearer to the tribal cooking-pots, there must be ten who have reacted with silence. The silence may be a prudent mask for bewilderment
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or a polite mask for contempt. It may be based on the feeling that Harris is doing philosophy rather than linguistics, and can therefore legitimately be ignored by linguists. Or it may simply reflect the tendency towards intellectual solipsism engendered in an academic world where professional advancement depends above all on transmitting (never mind whether anyone is receiving) a message (no matter how ill-considered) of one's own, and where evaluating the messages of others is consequently so much waste of time and effort. However that may be, this collection was conceived as an attempt to encourage further discussion by engineering a confrontation between Harris and his critics. The theme of John Joseph's essay is that Harris's language myth is "conceived so broadly as to take on its own mythical dimensions" (p. 12): Harris's endeavour to root out Baconian idolafori is flawed by the very kind of intellectual error under discussion. Arguably, Joseph's conception of the language myth is itself unduly broad, in that a large part of his essay deals with surrogationalism, which is identified by Harris as one of several conceptual strands that collectively make up "the concept of a language which survived as part of the intellectual inheritance of modern linguistics" (Harris 1980: 33), but whose precise relevance to or role in the language myth stricto sensu (i.e. the combination of the telementational and fixed-code fallacies) is obscure. Joseph claims that Harris fails to draw a clear distinction between surrogationalism and nomenclaturism, and that, partly as a consequence of this confusion, the attempt "to read surrogationalism into the whole of the Western tradition" (p. 17) is unconvincing. In particular, Joseph objects to the "rhetorical cleverness" that allows Harris to interpret Bloomfield's behaviorism, "the main purpose of which was to do away with...psychocentric surrogationalism..." (ibid.), as plunging linguistics yet more deeply into the surrogationalist mire. If Bloomfield is a surrogationalist, says Joseph, then either Harris doesn't understand what surrogationalism is, or surrogationalism itself is an idol of the market. Turning to the language myth proper, Joseph raises a similar objection to Harris's claim that, since Aristotle, Western thought about language has been in thrall to a telementational theory of communication. In particular, he objects to the ascription of a telementational theory to Saussure, who, according to Joseph, had no theory of communication at all. Like surrogationalism, telementation turns out to encompass too much to be a useful notion with which to map the history of linguistic thought. Joseph's final point is that these historical oversimplifications are in any case irrelevant, in that, even if they were justified, they have no bearing on Harris's positive views about language. The next two chapters discuss Harris in relation to generativism. Borsley and Newmeyer's contribution is a comprehensive rejection of Harris's ideas, on the
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interesting basis that they "represent a regression to a form of empiricism more extreme even than that advocated by Leonard Bloomfield and his followers" (p. 62). But Borsley and Newmeyer's main focus is on the role of those ideas as a critique of generative grammar. The gravamen of their charge is that Harris's work "is remarkable for the ignorance it manifests of the actual claims and results of generativist theorizing, to the point where it attributes to Chomsky positions that he is on record as rejecting" (p. 43). According to Harris, generativism, like all other species of twentieth-century structuralism, is based on the language myth. But Borsley and Newmeyer argue that both components of the myth are irrelevant to generative grammar. As far as telementation is concerned, they claim that, far from being committed to such a view of communication, generativists not only explicitly reject it, but deny that generativism is interested in, or obliged to have truck with, any theory of communication at all: "since generative grammar does not seek to explain communication, it is under no obligation to propose an alternative to the telementational conception" (p. 47). As for fixed codes, Borsley and Newmeyer concede that in the adult speaker's "I-language" representations of phonetic form are linked with representations of logical form, and that to that extent the I-language constitutes a "code", in some sense. Moreover, the I-language is a "relatively stable... state...which then undergoes only peripheral modification" (Chomsky 1986b: 25). Does this mean, then, that generative grammar is concerned with fixed codes, in Harris's sense? No, for at least two reasons. First, because the linkages between phonetic form and logical form envisaged by Chomsky do not add up to the kind of mechanism for effecting telementation that Harris is concerned with, in that they do no more than help "to provide a basis for determining what a sentence means when it is used... Since L[ogical] F[orm] is not equivalent to the actual message conveyed, Chomsky's view of grammar is not consistent with Harris's idea of what a 'code' is". Secondly, it is crucial to Harris's conception of a fixed code that it should be the same for all its users. But an I-language is the property of an individual: a unique cognitive system that is only "partially shared by others in the various communities with which people associate themselves in their normal lives" (Chomsky 1991: 19; quoted by Borsley and Newmeyer). Philip Carr argues, contra Borsley and Newmeyer, that current generativist theory is committed to a version of the telementational thesis, that since that thesis imputes telepathic powers to human beings it cannot be sustained, and that therefore Harris's rejection of generativism is pro tanto justified. But rather than reject generativism himself, Carr suggests that the answer is to be more royalist than the king, and to elaborate a form of generativism free of the telementational taint. Not content to join with Borsley and Newmeyer in merely reiterating the
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familiar assertion that generativism is not bound to espouse any particular view of how communication works, Carr makes the starker and much more radical claim that "Chomsky has consistently denied that language serves communicative ends" and that "this denial is fundamental to the generative enterprise" (p. 82). Accordingly, what is required is that the generativist's I-language be disconnected from the outside world altogether, via a revision of "the current generative conception of linguistic expressions" whereby "they are...oriented towards behaviour, in the sense of being instructions to behave or intentions to behave" (ibid.). Two essays address Harris on writing. Pettersson pinpoints two novelties in Harris's thinking. First, the idea that it is idle to seek answers to such questions as how and when human beings first wrote on the basis of arbitrary terminological and definitional decisions as to what is to count as writing. Rather, there is a prior and more fundamental question: what conceptual advance was prerequisite for the systematically meaningful use of graphic signs? Pettersson offers no criticism of Harris's answer to this question; instead, he wonders how anyone writing the history of writing - and therefore concerned with how and when - is to apply it. The second novelty is the rejection of the idea that writing has an essential connection with speech: this, says Pettersson, has the striking implication that writing has a future - that its evolution did not come to an end with the development of the alphabet. David Olson aims to fill out, or at any rate modify, Harris's account of how the availability of writing "restructures thought". The obvious difference between a written text and a spoken utterance is that a written text is not ineluctably connected with a particular utterer. There thus opens up a conceptual gap between the (written) sentence and the (spoken) utterance: sentences, Harris says, are "authorless" and "unsponsored" (Harris 1989b). The concept of the unsponsored sentence must obviously add a dimension to the language-user's apprehension of the possibilities of language, but it is not immediately obvious how this new dimension affects the language-user's thinking. Olson's conjecture is that writing affects the mind by requiring the development of new concepts required for dealing with writing itself: "a kind of literate metalinguistics" (p. 102). Two contributions deal with Harris's discussions of Wittgenstein. Anthony Holiday is upset by what he sees as Harris's cavalier attitude to Wittgenstein's distinction between science and philosophy. This distinction, says Holiday, is crucial to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, and resides in the fact that "philosophy does not enable us to criticise or justify what we do by showing that our doings match or mismatch criteria laid down in the course of our philosophising" (p. 109).
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Rom Harré offers a variety of comments on Harris on Wittgenstein. He suggests that Harris's complaint that Wittgenstein "never tells us where grammar comes from" results from a misunderstanding of the Wittgensteinian notion of "grammar". There are two sorts of Wittgensteinian grammar: "immanent grammar", which comes, says Harré, from "training in a practice", and "transcendent grammar", which comes from "someone sitting down and working out a system of rules". He suggests that Harris's belief that "Wittgenstein did not leave room in his treatment of language for the instability of linguistic practice and the fact of language change" (p. 142) is likewise mistaken. And against Harris's scepticism about linguistic rules he says that we cannot make sense of any human practice without the distinction between correct and incorrect performance, proper and improper actions, well and ill done projects and so on. We all agree that all human practices are normative, from drinking and cooking to calligraphy and doing mathematics, and even to persecuting people. If this is so the notion of "rule" must surely have a central place somehow (p. 145). Two contributions focus on Harris's integrational linguistics. As the word "integrational" implies, at the heart of his theorising is the idea that language must be understood in the light of its imbrication with the non-linguistic. Baron seizes on the consequential emphasis on "context", and argues that the importance of context in using and understanding language is itself a context-dependent variable: to the extent that it is unimportant, the argument for an integrational linguistics is weakened. David Fleming tackles the problem of providing integrational linguistics with a method and a programme. He considers the possibility that ethnomethodological conversation analysis, a mode of linguistic inquiry that appears to have certain assumptions in common with integrationalism, may offer an appropriate and useful exemplar. However, ethnomethodologists hypostatise a "system" of trans-situational formal mechanisms governing conversational interaction "abstract structures external to the particular act drive that act in a way surprisingly compatible with the orthodox structuralism that ethnomethodologists have claimed to reject" (p. 199). Fleming proposes an "integrational rhetoric" that "would produce close, detailed, empirical analyses of situated discursive action.. .without resorting to the limitations of ethnomethodological conversation analysis" (p. 207). Two further contributions revert in different ways to the issue of linguistic rules. John Taylor points out the incompatibility of fixed codes with a "multipletrace" model of memory. According to such a model,
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knowledge of a language... would comprise nothing other than a vast set of memory traces of previous encounters with the language. There would be no place in the model for "rules", whether these be understood as procedures for the manipulation of categories of symbols, or simply as abstractions or generalisations over individual linguistic events. For in its pure form at least, the multiple-trace model makes no provision whatsoever for the mental storage of generalisations over individual events. The archetype of language knowledge is not the generalisation captured in the grammar rule, but the particularities of the corpus, (pp. 214-5) Finally, Trevor Pateman suggests that the dispute between the orthodox linguist and the position taken by Harris vis-à-vis linguistic rules can be characterised in terms of Kant's distinction between determinant and reflective judgements as applied to art. Harris's response to all this, published here as the final chapter, is intended both to advance the various debates in which he is engaged and to provide him with the opportunity to re-state and refine his message in the light of critical reactions to it.
1 The "Language Myth" Myth: Or, Roy Harris's Red Herrings John E. Joseph
1. Introduction:
Idols of the
market
The criticism of Roy Harris most frequently voiced by other linguists is that his work destroys without rebuilding. Nowhere in his writings does he articulate the kind of practical program on which the linguistics industry could continue to survive, let alone expand. As if his relentlessly trenchant judgements on other theoreticians of language from the beginning of history to the present day didn't do damage enough, he casts them in a lucid and elegant prose style that can actually be read by people outside the field. Hence he is a threat to linguistics not only from within - where he can be safely ignored - but from without, where his scepticism over the possibility of any scientific linguistics puts the general reputation of the discipline into peril. The failure to establish a practical programme is indeed a problem that Harris should confront, for no one can reasonably expect people to embrace ideas that threaten their livelihood. It is like asking the tobacco industry to recognize a link between smoking and cancer. Linguistics, after all, really is an industry employing thousands of people and creating significant business for related industries such as abstracting, library cataloguing, publishing, printing, binding, all the way down to logging. It is not just an abstract "field" in Bourdieu's sense. Hundreds of millions of dollars per year are involved. Harris wants linguistics to give up its claim to the status of science which it won in the last century and has fought hard to keep, and upon which its economic position is founded. He seems to have forgotten the wisdom of Proverbs 11.29: "He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind". But even if we acknowledge the economic function that academic disciplines serve, they are nevertheless supposed to do more than that. They are supposed to be concerned with the validity of the ideas they pursue. The notion that Harris need not be attended to because he merely criticizes without offering anything positive in return may be fair enough from a pragmatic view, but intellectually, it
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JOHN E. JOSEPH
is empty. It implies that what matters first and foremost is to keep the economic wheels of linguistics turning - give people work to do. If cogent arguments are put forward for reconfiguring the rationale for this work, they should be heeded only if they allow an overall increase in the amount of work produced or producible, and shunned if they threaten the workflow. Surely academic linguistics should aim higher than this. There is no denying the power of the economic drive; no linguist, including Harris, whose cadre of talented and devoted former students includes the editors this book, wants to put other linguists out of work. But it is a moral duty for linguists and other academics to resist the economic tide when intellectual integrity is at stake. For sheer integrity, Roy Harris has it all over his critics. His refusal to be a cog in the economic wheel is a large part of what makes him uniquely worth reading among modern theoreticians of language. Yet he does not stand aloof from the market whose idols he tries to shatter; he wields his hammer while standing within the marketplace itself For anyone who knows Harris's work, the phrase "idols of the market" will strike a familiar note. It is the title of Chapter One of The Language Myth (1981), the second book of a trilogy that forms the core of the Harrisian canon. The myth of the title is the concept of language as used, not by lay speakers, but by linguists. It is a reification, postulating the existence of a thing where in reality there is a diversity of forms of behavior and knowledge. Harris compares this myth with the second type of Bacon's "idola fori" {Novum Organum, 1.59-60): Idols of the market, in Bacon's view, are of two kinds. The less pernicious sort arise when words function as "names of things which have no existence". These idols are relatively easy to unmask, once it can convincingly be shown that there is nothing existing to which the word could correspond. But the more pernicious idols are "intricately and deeply rooted". This class includes the cases of words which do indeed correspond to actualities and not to fictions; but they are names "confused, badly defined, and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things". They mislead because they conflate under a single designation things which are distinct in reality. The harm which may thus be caused to the understanding is clearly this: that we may be led to believe, by reason of the single designation, in an underlying unity present in what in fact is a collection of merely associated but disparate things. (Harris 1981a: 7-8) The "language myth" thus engendered is responsible for the "segregationalism" of mainstream modern linguistics, which Harris's "integrationalist" program is aimed at resolving. He characterizes segregationalism as follows:
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... segregational analysis treats language and languages as objects of study existing in their own right, independently of other varieties of communication and amenable to description in terms that are quite separate from those used in any other discipline. The alternative approach, the integrational approach, sees language as manifested in a complex of human abilities and activities that are all integrated in social interaction, often intricately so and in such a manner that it makes little sense to segregate the linguistic from the non-linguistic components... ...the segregationalist approach to language typically abstracts from the linguistic community and from the communication situation, and proceeds by setting up decontextualized systems of linguistic units and linguistic relations. The integrationalist, on the other hand, insists that language cannot be studied without distortion except in its normal functional context. (Harris 1987a [Love (ed.) 1990: 199]) Harris asserts that we must pass beyond the myth in order to arrive at a kind of linguistics that might produce real knowledge about human linguistic and communicative functioning, rather than continuing to elaborate the foundational myth itself. He describes the language myth as a "complex of interconnected errors" and as "the product of two interconnected fallacies: the telementational fallacy and the determinacy fallacy. The telementational fallacy is a thesis about the function of language, while the determinacy fallacy is a thesis about the mechanism of language" (Harris 1981a: 9). Telementation holds that "linguistic knowledge is essentially a matter of knowing which words stand for which ideas. For words, according to this view, are symbols devised by man for transferring thoughts from one mind to another" (ibid.). The determinacy fallacy, alternatively called the "fixed-code" fallacy (ibid. 10), explains how telementation works: languages are "fixed public plans", sets of "correlations between ideas and verbal symbols" shared by a community "in order to provide themselves with a viable system for exchanging thoughts (ibid.), i.e., for telementation. It soon becomes clear that the two fallacies are more than interconnected: the fixed-code fallacy is actually a corollary to the telementational one, since "the telementational model imposes what may be called an 'invariance condition' upon the language" (ibid. 88). As Harris would later write, "if speech communication is a telementational process, it demands a fixed code" (Harris 1990c: 30). The "complex of interconnected errors" that make up the language myth include the two fallacies which are the main focus of the first part of the trilogy, The Language-Makers (1980), namely surrogationalism and nomenclaturism, and two others which receive somewhat less attention in that book, instrumentalism and contractualism. The other one which he treats at length is the
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mechanistic conception of language which is the subject of The Language Machine (1987). The key fallacies he identifies as constituting the language myth, including surrogationalism, instrumentalsm, telementation, and fixed-code theory, have undeniable power. To what extent that power is logical or conceptual, and to what extent rhetorical, is an open question. Nor is it even certain that conceptual and rhetorical power can be meaningfully separated from one another in linguistics or any other realm of inquiry-cw/w-persuasion. At the very least, they are much more difficult to separate than is generally assumed. From this point of view it is not necessarily a criticism of Harris to assert that the component fallacies of the language myth, whatever their conceptual power, possess definite rhetorical power within his writing. Indeed his writing would not be so compelling otherwise. Yet the perception of a gap between rhetorical power and conceptual justifiablility is precisely what characterizes an idol of the market. Since Harris's "language myth" and its component fallacies are aimed at rooting out idola fori, it seems only fair that their own status in this regard should be examined. The present paper is therefore based upon the premise enunciated above by Harris, that certain terms can lead us "to believe, by reason of the single designation, in an underlying unity present in what in fact is a collection of merely associated but disparate things". The terms I shall investigate in the light of this premise are the following: surrogationalism, nomenclaturism, telementation, and the language myth. For if there turns out to be cause for a sympathetic reader to suspect that the "language myth" is conceived so broadly in Harris's writings as to take on its own mythical dimensions, that the desire to establish its existence prompts historically unconvincing readings, and that the whole idea of "myth" in Harris's work is finally at odds with his own linguistic, historical, and epistemological scepticism - then the opportunity for Harris to disabuse the reader of those suspicions would certainly be welcome. I should say at the outset that, unlike some of the other contributors to this volume, I really do see my disagreements with Harris as slight in comparison with how many of his central conclusions I accept. Yet neither are the divergences insignificant, for although they have mainly to do with the treatment of history, they point to quite another exit route from segregationalism than the one Harris would have linguists take.
THE "LANGUAGE MYTH" MYTH 2. Surrogationalism
and
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nomenclaturism
Two of the fallacies that Harris discusses at greatest length are never clearly defined by him, and his use of them throughout his work shows no obvious or consistent pattern. Surrogationalism, the idea that "words are essentially surrogates or substitutes for other things" (Harris 1987b: 33), is arguably the oldest of the fallacies which compose the language myth: Languages are thus surrogational systems, which provide the language-user with a set of verbal tokens which stand for, or take the place of, non-verbal items of various kinds. Accordingly, it is the relation between words and what they stand for which is central to understanding how languages work. The concept of languages as surrogational systems has as its principal component a doctrine of names which goes back to the very beginnings of the Western tradition. In the Judaeo-Christian branch of that tradition it is embodied in one of the most influential etymological myths ever told: the account given in ch. 2 of the Book of Genesis of how Adam gave the animals names. In the Graeco-Roman branch, it makes it first appearance in the extended discussion of words presented in Plato's dialogue Cratylus. (Harris 1980: 33) The passage then goes on to discuss the "nomenclaturism" of Cratylus without any remark upon the terminological transition. The reverse occurs in Harris (1988a: 10), where after a discussion of nomenclaturism from the Bible through Locke, he suddenly comments that "Locke and Leibniz, no less than Cratylus and Hermogenes, espouse an essentially surrogationalist view of language". At times Harris appears to use the terms interchangeably (see ibid. 41 and 44, which respectively cite Saussure's condemnation of nomenclaturism and Wittgenstein's of surrogationalism, apparently in reference to the very same thing; Harris 1987c: 56, which states that "Saussure's attack on nomenclaturism in the Cours has been compared, not unreasonably, to Wittgenstein's in the Philosophical Investigations"', also ibid. 213, where Locke's account of communication is called "psychocentric surrogationalism" and "basically a form of nomenclaturism"). Elsewhere he speaks of nomenclaturism as a subtype of surrogationalism ("The difficulties which Locke's theory encounters are typically surrogationalist, and specifically nomenclaturist difficulties", Harris 1980: 69; "nomenclaturism, or, in its more general form, surrogationalism", Harris and Taylor 1989: 38). The closest he comes to an explicit definition of nomenclaturism is this: "the things in question are antecedently given; that is, exist independently either of their being named at all, or of what they are named. .. .what is named is prior, and the name is secondary" (ibid. 35-6).
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It seems, then, that surrogationalism and nomenclaturism say more or less the same thing in two different ways. Surrogationalism holds that words stand for things or ideas, and therefore emphasizes the function of language. Nomenclaturism says that words come about as names for already-existing meanings, and therefore highlights the historical and ontological primacy of nonlinguistic reality. If this is indeed an accurate account of Harris's view, then it would seem possible to have surrogationalism without nomenclaturism, but not the other way around. That is, one can hold that words stand for things, yet deny that words simply name realities that already exist; but to hold that words name realities that already exist necessarily entails that words stand for things. This is consistent with the statement about Locke (ibid. 69) quoted earlier in this paragraph, and it means that there are three possible positions for a theory of language to take in this regard: (1) surrogationalist and nomenclaturist; (2) surrogationalist but not nomenclaturist; (3) neither surrogationalist nor nomenclaturist. Harris divides nomenclaturism into two types, "natural" and "non-natural" (ibid.: 36). The first holds that "each name not merely stands for but somehow reflects the identity o f what it names (ibid.: 39), while the second does not make this assumption. He likewise divides surrogationalism into two types, "reocentric", which "supposes that the things words stand for are to be located 'out there' in the world external to the individual language-user", and "psychocentric", which "supposes that what words stand for is to be located internally, that is to say in the mind of the language-user" (ibid.: 44). In Harris's view, the Biblical account of Adam naming the animals (Gen. 2.19) is surrogationalist since the words will stand for the things, and nomenclaturist since the animals and the distinctions among them exist before they are brought to Adam for naming. Of course it is enough to say that the account is nomenclaturist, since surrogationalism is entailed thereby - though actually what independent evidence of surrogationalism there might be in this particular Biblical story is hard to see. Indeed, the first Creation account (Gen. 1) is neither surrogationalist nor nomenclaturist, in that it depicts God using words to create the cosmos, which means that some words, at least, exist prior to the things they name and can have a function very different from "standing for" them. Nevertheless, Harris asserts that ... there is a measure of agreement between Genesis and Cratylus, at least in the following respects. Names are treated as vocables standing in a certain relationship to things [= surrogationalism: JEJ], and the things in question are antecedently given; that is, exist independently either of their being named at all, or of what they are named [= nomenclaturism: JEJ]. (Harris 1980: 35-6)
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At the very least, this statement must exclude Gen. 1 to be accurate. Harris goes on to say that the question of "natural" vs. "arbitrary" names does not arise in this story, since the names Adam gives to the animals are not subject to evaluation. Yet the rest of Gen. 2-4 contains numerous accounts of what might be called natural or motivated naming: Adam calls the woman made from his rib ishshah 'woman' because she was taken from ish 'man' (Gen. 2.23), and later names her Eve ('life') because she is the mother of all who live (Gen. 3.20; see notes in Sandmel et al. (eds.) 1970). Eve in turn names her third son Seth 'granted' because God granted him to her in place of the murdered Abel (Gen. 4.25). In addition there are cases of implicitly natural naming: in the second Creation account, God forms adam 'man' from adamah 'the dust of the ground' (Gen. 2.7); Abel ('herdsman') and Cain ('smith, metallurgist') are a shepherd and a tiller of the soil respectively (Gen. 4.2), and so on. Perhaps it is the case that names for animals are left to the arbitrary choice of Adam, while names for human beings must be naturally or at least rationally justified. The name of God is, of course, taboo. In any case, it is far from clear that questions of natural naming do not arise in the pre-Babel portion of Genesis; though the examples given here certainly suffice to temper the statement "Nor does Genesis explain the origin of any words other than the names of the various species of animals and birds" (Harris and Taylor 1989: 39-40). On the other hand, one can assume with assurance that all surrogationalism, including that of the Old Testament, is reocentric prior to the introduction of psychocentrism by Aristotle. In Harris's view, "The Western intellectual tradition has been mainly dominated by reocentric thinking, from Plato's theory of Forms onward" (Harris 1980: 49). That statement assumes particular definitions of "Western intellectual tradition" and "mainly" on which not everyone would agree, for arguably equal or greater domination could be ascribed to the psychocentric surrogationalism that Harris sees extending from Aristotle through the modistae in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, to Locke and Hobbes in the seventeenth, to Saussure in the twentieth, and through Saussure to contemporary segregationalist linguistics. But to go back to Plato, the question may be asked: is he a nomenclaturist as well as a surrogationalist? And if so, what kind of nomenclaturist is he? The answer to these questions depends crucially on how one interprets the dialogue Cratylus. In Harris's view, which I share, Plato is rejecting both the natural nomenclaturism of Cratylus and the non-natural nomenclaturism of Hermogenes, denying that either provides an adequate account of language, which for Plato would depend crucially on the kind of reocentric surrogationalism represented by his theory of forms. Plato "deconstructs" nomenclaturism by dividing "things" into two types: the ideal forms of things, which are eternal and unchanging and
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therefore "real", and physical things, which are merely copies of these forms and ephemeral. The ideal forms of things precede both physical things and their names. The question of the "correctness of names" hinges upon whether names are direct imitations of the ideal forms, or only of their physical "shadows", which are illusions; and the answer cannot be given a priori, since it is a historical matter having to do with the person who made the names and how well he knew his art. Taking nomenclaturism again to assume that "things... exist independently either of their being named at all, or of what they are named. .. .what is named is prior, and the name is secondary" (Harris 1980: 35-6), this is a fair assessment of Cratylus' and Hermogenes' positions, but it is precisely the kind of oversimplification that Socrates (and through him Plato) sets out to complexify. Thus, to associate Plato with nomenclaturism, and to identify him as the source of reocentric surrogationalism, is a red herring. The "reocentric" part is already a problem - of course Plato believed that the reality of things is "out there" relative to human beings, rather than internal to the mind, but not in the way that most people have always conceived "out there" to be, namely in the physical "reality" of the world of perceptions that surrounds us. But "surrogationalism" is a complete red herring as applied to Plato, who does after all problematize the whole idea that words stand for things and decides that the problem is insoluble. In calling it a red herring, I do not mean to assert that Plato cannot be made to fit the term "surrogationalist" as Harris has defined it, but only that the application of this term to him is trivial, obfuscating, and ultimately meaningless. And the same goes for the "surrogationalism" of Genesis. But not, I should think, for the surrogationalism of Augustine. The famous account of his acquisition of language in Book I of the Confessions, doubly famous as the point of departure for Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, really does assert that words stand for things, and indeed incorporates this assertion into his explanation of how the child learns to speak: ... cum ipsi [maiores homines] appellabant rem aliquam et cum secundum earn vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant: videbam et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum earn vellent ostendere... Ita verba in varus sententiis locis suis posita et crebro audita quarum rerum signa essent paulatim colligebam measque iam voluntates edomito in eis signis ore per haec enuntiabam. (Augustinus, Confessiones 1.8) When they [older people] would name something and then, following their voice, would move their body toward it, I would see this and grasp that the thing was called by the sounds they made when they wanted to point it out... Thus, by hearing words frequently used in their proper places in various sentences, I
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gradually pieced together what things they were signs of, and after my mouth was trained in these signs, I would enunciate my own wishes through them. (My trans.: JEJ) It is specifically the use of words to enunciate and satisfy wishes - a wish implying absence of the thing named - that is the proof of surrogationalism, if admittedly not its only manifestation. That is what makes the attribution of surrogationalism to Augustine so convincing. Harris, however, is determined to extend surrogationalism back in history to the founders of the basic worldview that informs Augustine's works, though the same kind of evidence for it that occurs in Augustine is not found there. Similarly with nomenclaturism: it is easy enough to demonstrate in the story of Adam naming the animals, and in the linguistic theories of Cratylus and Hermogenes; but to extend it to Genesis and to Plato, as Harris does, is a leap whose logic is not apparent. It seems to go something like this: look at the surrogationalism of Augustine - striking isn't it? but in fact it isn't really Augustinian. It is symptomatic of the whole intellectual tradition of which Augustine is a part, even if clear cases like Augustine's are rare. And it testifies to the antiquity and longevity of the "language myth". The problem is that, having said this, we are liable to read surrogationalism into the whole of the Western tradition regardless of whether there is any evidence of it or not. And likewise, we are liable to read Plato as a nomenclaturist and reocentric surrogationalist even if he is as opposed to all these notions as it is possible for anyone to be. If the terms nomenclaturist and surrogationalist are broadened to apply to all the people Harris would apply them to, they give up whatever significance they originally had when applied to the clear cases, like Cratylus and Augustine. In some instances Harris's rhetorical cleverness verges on the diabolical, as when he comes to discuss the behaviorism of Bloomfield, the main purpose of which was to do away with the psychocentric surrogationalism or "mentalism" characteristic of most turn-of-the-century continental linguistics, and which seemed hopelessly metaphysical in the modernist lights of 1920s America and Britain. Yet in Harris's view, behaviorism does not save Bloomfield from surrogationalism at all, but plunges him into it even more deeply: ... Bloomfield had recourse to one of the oldest options available in the Western tradition, and reinstated a crude reocentric surrogationalism of the kind to which Saussure had been utterly opposed. In Bloomfieldian theory, languages thus became again what Saussure had denied they were: nomenclatures. Words were merely vocal substitutes for non-vocal things and events in the external world. To the question of how words came to function as substitutes for things,
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To make his point, Harris contrasts Bloomfield precisely with Augustine, and downplays Augustine's surrogationalism in order to make that supposedly implicit in behaviorism appear all the stronger: If we compare Augustine's account of language-learning with Bloomfield's, it is clear that Wittgenstein could have picked a better example of pure surrogationalism without going outside the present century. (Harris 1980: 160) Yet by way of illustration of Bloomfield's "reocentric surrogationalism", Harris supplies quotations not from Bloomfield, but from the behaviorist John B. Watson, who said that "words are but substitutes for objects and situations" (Watson 1924: 184) and that a language provides the speaker with "a verbal substitute within himself theoretically for every object in the world" (ibid. : 187). This is indeed reocentric surrogationalism at its strongest, but it is not Bloomfield. Harris does quote Bloomfield's definition of the meaning of a linguistic form as "the situation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth in the hearer" (Bloomfield 1933: 139), then offers the following comment: By putting forward this pivotal definition, Bloomfield unhesitatingly took surrogationalism to an extreme which the Western linguistic tradition had not previously seen. That is, he proposed that as far as the linguist was concerned everything in the universe should be divided into just two categories: speech events on the one hand, and the corresponding speakers' situations and hearers' responses on the other. (Harris 1980: 162) This comment loses sight of what surrogationalism is supposed to be essentially about: words functioning as surrogates of or substitutes for things (or meanings or ideas, though with Bloomfield ideas are not in question). Although Watson appears to have thought of words in this way, Bloomfield instead sees languages as a kind of action, on a par with other sorts of behavior; he attempts to undo the traditional reification of words that is already the basis of surrogationalism. That he is not consistently successful in the attempt is apparent, but the attempt itself ought to be recognized as a significant effort in the direction Harris wishes linguistics to go. There are certainly aspects of Bloomfield's behaviorism that Harris might legitimately criticize, but the attempt to force it into the surrogationalist framework for the narrative purposes of Harris's "language
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myth" myth - in part by making Watson a "surrogate" for Bloomfield - is a red herring. The problem with surrogationalism, the reason it is so limiting to a theory of language, is that it implies that language actually covers and consists of much less than it actually does, that linguistic meanings can be inventoried in a list of all the things one might wish to replace with a surrogate. Bloomfield stresses over and over that nothing of the sort is true. Meaning is unlimited: In order to give a scientifically accurate definition of meaning for every form of a language, we should have to have a scientifically accurate knowledge of everything in the speakers' world. The actual extent of human knowledge is very small, compared to this. (Bloomfield 1933: 139) Furthermore, surrogationalism implies that a deterministic, one-to-one match-up between word and meaning is a straightforward matter. Bloomfield says that this might be true for some things, but not for most: We can define the meaning of a speech-form accurately when this meaning has to do with some matter of which we possess scientific knowledge. We can define the names of minerals, for example, in terms of chemistry and mineralogy, as when we say that the ordinary meaning of the English word salt is 'sodium chloride (NaCl)', and we can define the names of plants or animals by means of the technical terms of botany or zoology, but we have no precise way of defining words like love or hate, which concern situations that have not been accurately classified - and these latter are in the great majority, (ibid.) From this Bloomfield concludes that "The statement of meanings is therefore the weak point in language-study, and will remain so until human knowledge advances very far beyond its present state" (ibid.: 140). It will be evident by now that what Harris means by "surrogationalism" is a bit slippery, shifting here and there as his narrative purposes require. Another way to try to get hold of it is to inquire what, in Harris's view, its opposite might be. The only discussion to be found of a non-surrogationalist approach to language concerns the concept of language which informs the dictionary: The dictionary, in short, embodies a semantics which is in some respects the complete antithesis of surrogational semantics. The meanings the dictionary gives for words like chair, table and bread are neither physical objects nor ideas; but simply other words. In a civilisation with a thoroughgoing surrogationalist attitude to language, the dictionary as we know it would be inconceivable.
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JOHN E. JOSEPH Whereas the fact is that in Europe the dictionary came to be seen as the repository of verbal meanings par excellence, regarded with a veneration and respect for authority amounting in certain cases almost to superstition. Such a development would be impossible if a surrogational view of languages prevailed twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. (Harris 1980: 78)
There are at least two problems with this passage. Its reasoning goes like this: surrogationalism means that words stand for things or ideas; dictionaries define words not in terms of things or ideas but of other words; therefore, surrogationalism and dictionaries are incompatible. But the conclusion does not follow from the premises, any more than this one does: economic theory holds that paper money stands for abstract value; change machines convert paper money into coins; therefore change machines are incompatible with economic theory, and change machines could never have been invented in a society in which economic theory prevailed twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. Secondly, the only thing which is truly inconceivable in the passage is a civilisation in which "the dictionary as we know it would be inconceivable" - this is another red herring, intended to mask the fact that the "extended" surrogationalism Harris is discussing is itself mythical. Truly to escape from surrogationalism would mean giving up the notion that words stand for physical things or events, mental ideas, or Platonic ideas - in other words, for anything at all, except, perhaps, other words. It is not something that either the behaviorists or Wittgenstein managed to do, in Harris's view. Indeed there is no historical precedent for it: no record of any society that has thought about language as not exchangeable for things in the world, in the mind, or in heaven. Nor does Harris pretend to be able to conceive of what a linguistics that got beyond this conception of language would be like. His achievement lies in recognizing that unless and until a theory of language is developed that does this, we are trapped within this conceptual prison we have inherited, and it takes nothing away from this achievement that no one, including Harris, has yet seen the way forward. But this is really the point of it all: getting beyond the notion that words have meanings. There is no reason to think that this notion is a peculiarly Western product, since it is not the case that other cultural traditions offer any significantly different understanding of language in this regard. In so far as the naming of surrogationalism, nomenclaturism, and other fallacies lends power to Harris's conceptual apparatus, he might be said to exploit an aspect of nomenclaturism itself: the belief that "what is named is prior, and the name is secondary" (Harris and Taylor 1989: 36). A corollary of this is, as Bacon knew, the belief that whatever is named, exists. If Harris had described
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the phenomenon of telementation without attaching a name to it, it would not function so forcefully within his writing. There is of course nothing inherently wrong with naming new concepts, even if it exploits aspects of the very fallacies the concepts are aimed at unmasking. I suspect that many of Harris's best readers appreciate the postmodern irony of this, however much Harris himself might cringe at the postmodern part. Yet at the same time the fallacy is capable of working even on these best readers; perhaps the rhetorical effect of the name is even stronger when one's attention has been momentarily deflected by the irony. Again, there is nothing wrong with such a deployment of rhetoric; it is just that we should then ask whether the concept so persuasively named is appropriately applied in each particular case. That is, whether the power of the name is backed up by actual historical evidence for the fallacy's existence, or the power of the name functions in place of any such evidence. If the former is true, no reader should feel guilt over being swept off on the rhetorical tide. As Aristotle pointed out in his Rhetoric (in answer to the Socratics, who believed that rhetoric was inherently deceptive and evil), to have truth on one's side counts for nothing if one is unable to persuade a jury. Truth does not come automatically equipped with persuasiveness. But if the latter is true, the strong reader will resist being persuaded by the rhetorical effect. I believe that the evidence presented above suggests that surrogationalism and nomenclaturism, while based upon arguably fair descriptions of what certain people have said about language in the Western tradition, are turned into "doctrines", and simultaneously into idola fori, and red herrings. They draw attention away from, and thus needlessly weaken the logical force of, Harris's ultimate concern to challenge the almost universal assumption in contemporary linguistics that language exists in order to serve the needs of the deeper, more important realm of meaning. We should, moreover, expect those twentieth-century theoreticians of language who problematize the ultimacy of meaning to receive more sympathetic treatment (at least on this particular score) in Harris's writings than do those who assume it. Bloomfield in particular should loom high on this list. But instead, as we have seen, the opposite occurs: Bloomfield is depicted as taking surrogationalism to an unprecedented height. Harris seems initially more drawn to the Saussurean and Wittgensteinian problematizations of meaning, but finally neither of these emerges with any points for trying either. Harris instead stays consistent with his narrative framework of a monolithic language myth - it is as though no one can break free from, or even make a dent in, any part of it so long as he remains captive to other parts of it. One is either an integrationalist or a segregationalist, with no middle ground. But it may be that in time we shall look back on the parallel rise of problematizations of meaning in linguistics and philosophy (as well as
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psychology and other areas) in the first half of the twentieth century as the starting point of a movement that would lead in time to the realization of something like Harris's integrationalist project. This would then be the ultimate justification of what Saussure, Wittgenstein, and even Bloomfield were trying to do; and the fact that in their wake the traditional approach to meaning not only refused to give way but was actually shored up will appear not so much as a consequence of their inability to escape the language myth, but as the kind of rearguard reaction that almost always occurs in the long process of establishing a wholly new understanding of physical or human phenomena. If the essence of Harris's critique of linguistics is taken to be that we have no hope of moving toward a radically improved understanding of linguistic behavior unless and until we have passed beyond the basic conceptions of language and mind that have been handed down to us since Aristotle and more particularly since Descartes, then I doubt that any but the most shortsighted of linguists or philosophers would find anything in it to dispute.
3. Telementation This brings us to the cardinal fallacy for the language myth as Harris describes it. As noted toward the beginning of this paper, Harris (1981a: 9) has identified telementation as one of two interconnected fallacies of which the language myth is the product; the other, the deterministic fallacy or fixed-code theory, he comes to see as little more than a corollary of telementation (see Harris 1990c: 29-30). The classic description of telementation occurs in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689): To make Words serviceable to the end of Communication, it is necessary, (as has been said) that they excite, in the Hearer, exactly the same Idea, they stand for in the Mind of the Speaker. (Locke, Essay, III.9.6) Locke intends this not as a description of communication, but as a goal to strive toward, and from which actual communication, alas, falls short. In a later passage he writes: ...the ends of Language in our Discourse with others, being chiefly these three: First, To make known one Man's Thoughts or Ideas to another. Secondly, To do it with as much ease and quickness, as is possible; and, Thirdly, Thereby to convey the Knowledge of Things. Language is either abused, or deficient, when it fails of any of these Three. (Locke, Essay, III. 10.23)
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But just as he has read surrogationalism and nomenclaturism into texts where they are not clearly to be found, Harris does the same with telementation. Indeed he takes it as far back as Aristotle: Speech is a form of telementation. This theory can be traced back through the medieval modistic grammarians to Aristotle. Words, says Aristotle at the beginning of De Interpretatione, are "symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul". "As writing," he continues, "so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections are representations or likeness, images, copies". (Harris 1981a: 9, translation of Aristotle by H.P. Cook, On Interpretation, Loeb Classical Library ed., London, 1938, I) ... although agreeing with Plato that the mind stores "likenesses" of the things we perceive, [Aristotle] does not agree that there is any mimetic relation between these likenesses and the words which stand for them. The latter relationship is purely conventional. Thus he maintains (i) that the world is the same for all its inhabitants, (ii) that the "mental representation" of the world is the same for all its inhabitants, but (iii) that language is not the same for all because it is conventional, and different communities have different conventions. This entails that people will understand one another's speech if, and only if, they base their speech on the same conventions... It is clear that Aristotle presupposes that communication is telementational; in short, that words "transfer" thoughts from one person's mind to another person's mind because - and in so far as - the words are associated with the same thoughts in both minds. And that, precisely, is the role of convention; to establish in a person's mind the connections between words and thoughts. (Harris and Taylor 1989: 33) But if we look to the actual texts of Aristotle, we can only conclude that Harris has interpolated the tele- into the telementationalism supposedly found there. Aristotle never says anything about the transference of ideas from one person's mind to another's. Rather, Harris says it is implied by Aristotle's statements that words are "symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul" - that is, the mind - and that they signify by agreement, i.e. convention. But it is an unjustified and pointless logical leap to say that because Aristotle believed that the mind was the locus of meaning, and that meaning was conventional, he therefore believed that communication actually functioned in the way that Locke described
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as the ideal of how it should function, as the transfer of ideas from one speaker's head to another. He is again committing the same error of anachronism of which he accuses anyone who reads a Hermogenetic non-natural nomenclaturism back on to Adam's naming of the animals. Indeed, since his "telementalization" of Aristotle would proceed equally unfettered if Aristotle held to a naturalist rather than a conventionalist view of names, Harris is simply equating all "mentation" with telementation. What he is really criticizing, in other words, is not the idea of thought transfer, but the whole idea of mind. Here again Harris's problematization of the notion of mind in linguistic theory is of central importance - but all the rest, all the supposed "telementation", is so many red herrings. Where telementation really comes to the fore is in the case of a post-Lockean figure, Saussure. In some of his more recent writings Harris has stressed Saussure's responsibility for embedding the language myth within twentiethcentury linguistics, particularly through his adoption of the telementational model. Why did the adoption of the principles of arbitrariness and linearity produce a segregationalist linguistics? Was that inevitable? No, it was not inevitable; but it became inevitable once the principle of arbitrariness and the principle of linearity were conjointly wedded to one particular theory of human communication. The theory in question is telementation; that is to say, the theory which explains communication as the transference of thoughts from one person's mind to another person's mind. Saussure adopted telementation as his theory of communication, although he does not designate it by that term. Nevertheless, the adoption is explicitly spelled out in Saussure's account what he calls the "speech circuit". (Harris 1990c: 26) Harris locates Saussure's adoption of the telementational model in his description of the speech circuit, and identifies it as the decisive element in the fallacious grounding of linguistic theory from Saussure onward. Harris's treatment of this theme is powerful and memorable, perhaps in part because Saussure's speech circuit diagram is itself so visually striking, and one measure of its impact is its persistence in work by his former students, for whom Saussure's telementationalism is a given (see Love 1990a: 53; Taylor 1990: 124-5). The previous passage continues as follows: Saussure's speech circuit envisages the archetypal speech act, reduced to its bare essentials, stripped of all possible ramifications. There are just two participants, A and B, who in turn take on the roles of speaker and hearer. A says something to B, and Β in return says something to A. That constitutes one completed lap of
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the speech circuit. This simple scenario assumes that A and Β are speaking the same language. If the only language known by A were Catalan and the only language known by Β were Cantonese, this exchange would not constitute a speech circuit in Saussure's sense, regardless of how A and Β eked out their oral utterances and their mutual tolerance with gestures, facial expressions and other varieties of non-verbal communication. Let us suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that A and Β are both speaking Kalaba. What happens in the speech circuit, according to Saussure, is that certain ideas occur to A. A wishes to transmit these ideas to B. Because A is a speaker of Kalaba, these ideas trigger in A's mind the phonetic image of certain Kalaba words, which A then proceeds to utter. Β hears A's utterance and, being also a speaker of Kalaba, is able to interpret the Kalaba sounds heard as having precisely the meanings which correspond to the original ideas in A's mind, which A intended to transmit to B. Speech communication, on this view, is essentially a process of telementation, or thought-transference. (Harris 1990c: 26-7) This appears to be such a straightforward presentation of Saussure's speech circuit that it is surprising to realize how much of it consists not of citations or paraphrases of anything Saussure said or wrote, but of Harris reading between the lines. What the Cours de linguistique générale (henceforth CLG) actually says is this: Le point de départ du circuit est dans le cerveau de l'une, par exemple A, où les faits de conscience, que nous appellerons concepts, se trouvent associés aux représentations des signes linguistiques ou images acoustiques servant à leur expression. Supposons qu'un concept donné déclenche dans le cerveau une image acoustique correspondante: c'est un phénomène entièrement psychique, suivi à son tour d'un procès physiologique: le cerveau transmet aux organes de la phonation une impulsion corrélative à l'image; puis les ondes sonores se propagent de la bouche de A à l'oreille de B: procès purement physique. Ensuite, le circuit se prolonge en B dans un ordre inverse: de l'oreille au cerveau, transmission physiologique de l'image acoustique; dans le cerveau, association psychique de cette image avec le concept correspondant (CLG 28) The starting point of the circuit is in the brain of one individual, for instance A, where facts of consciousness which we shall call concepts are associated with representations of linguistic signs or sound patterns by means of which they may be expressed. Let us suppose that a given concept triggers in the brain a corresponding sound pattern. This is an entirely psychological phenomenon,
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JOHN E. JOSEPH followed in turn by a physiological process: the brain transmits to the organs of phonation an impulse corresponding to the pattern. Then sound waves are sent from A's mouth to B's ear: a purely physical process. Next, the circuit continues in Β in the opposite order: from ear to brain, the physiological transmission of the sound pattern; in the brain, the psychological association of this pattern with the corresponding concept. (Harris trans.)
Saussure never says explicitly that A and Β must be speaking the same language, that A wishes or intends to transmit ideas to B, that Β is able to interpret A's utterance as having precisely the meanings which correspond to the original ideas in A's mind, or that any of this is being offered as a model of "communication". The characterization of the circuit as "the archetypal speech act, reduced to its bare essentials, stripped of all possible ramifications" is Harris speaking, not Saussure. Saussure never restricts the circuit to just two participants, but says that this is the minimum number required. And when he says that Β associates the sound pattern he hears with le concept correspondant "the corresponding concept", he means the concept corresponding to the sound pattern, not to "the original ideas in A's mind", which is not necessarily the same thing. Of course the mere fact that something does not appear in the CLG or its source materials does not rule it out as a Saussurean idea. We can legitimately reconstruct things Saussure left unsaid based upon the records of what he did say - records which are themselves subject to reconstructive interpretation from the multiplicity of sources. We can with equal legitimacy eliminate other reconstructions as unlikely or impossible within Saussure's overall linguistic worldview. My purpose is actually not to contest Harris's interpretation of Saussure as a telementationalist - the available evidence allows a convincing case to be made either for or against this interpretation, though not for any definitive judgment - but rather the use Harris makes of this interpretation, turning telementation into Saussure's "theory of communication" and giving it a central place in his idea system, indeed suggesting in the citation above that it is the crucial element in the development of segregationalist linguistics in the twentieth century. First, I should explain in what sense the evidence for Saussure 5 s telementationalism is ambiguous. If he had actually said the words Harris put into his mouth, that Β "is able to interpret" the sounds of A's utterance "as having precisely the meanings which correspond to the original ideas in A's mind, which A intended to transmit to B", he would be as clear-cut a telementationalist as they come. In fact Saussure makes hedging statements that suggest a recognition on his part that such an interpretation can never be "precise":
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Entre tous les individus ainsi reliés par le langage, il s'établira une sorte de moyenne: tous reproduiront, - non exactement sans doute, mais approximativement - les mêmes signes unis aux mêmes concepts... C'est par le fonctionnement des facultés réceptive et coordinative que se forment chez les sujets parlants des empreintes qui arrivent à être sensiblement les mêmes chez tous. (CLG 30; italics added: JEJ) All the individuals linguistically linked in this manner will establish among themselves a kind of mean; all of them will reproduce - doubtless not exactly, but approximately - the same signs linked to the same concepts... The individual's receptive and co-ordinating faculties build up a stock of imprints which turn out to be for all practical purposes the same as the next person's. (Italics added: JEJ) But perhaps that is close enough. Even Locke, after all, recognized that the communication of ideas is not as perfect as he would have liked it to be. Similarly with the question of A's "intention" of transmitting ideas to B: this is not asserted in the presentation of the speech circuit in the CLG, which says instead that a concept "triggers" a corresponding sound pattern, implying that this is an automatic process. This seems to contradict the statement on the following page that the "executive side" of the circuit, the conversion of concept into sound pattern, ".. .is always individual, and the individual is always master of it. This is what we shall designate by the term speech" (30) - that is, parole rather than langue. Part of the problem here is that Saussure did not actually use the word déclenche "trigger' in his lecture on the speech circuit; it was supplied by the editors of the CLG. On the other hand, they did not make it up out of the blue: for CLG 99, reproducing one of Saussure's lectures faithfully, says of the signifier and signified that "The two elements are intimately linked and each triggers the other". A full reading of the CLG and its source materials suggests that Saussure ultimately believed that both views were true, each applying in its particular domain. That is, the "executive" production of speech is first something which an individual speaker must choose to do at all. He then chooses the thoughts he wishes to express, and the language in which he will express them. Only after choosing the language can he organize his thoughts into linguistic concepts and their basic linear sequence, which are part of the language, though still subject to the speaker's will up to the point, apparently somewhere within syntax, where the choosing stops and the triggering begins. Saussure is never clear on this. Nor does he ever specify anything about the process by which the individual's thoughts are organized into linguistic concepts, i.e. signifieds, or about what
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happens in the hearer's mind following the association of concepts with the sound patterns heard. Are these concepts then delinearized into post-linguistic thought, and is this a matter of individual parole, or somehow dictated by the structure of langue? Neither the word idée 'idea' or pensée 'thought' occurs in the discussion of the speech circuit, which makes Harris's account of it (especially the reference to "thought-transference") slightly misleading. All Saussure speaks of are les faits de conscience, que nous appellerons concepts 'facts of consciousness which we shall call concepts' (CLG 28), and these 'concepts' will later be identified as signifiés 'signifieds'. Although Saussure elsewhere sometimes conflates "idea" with "concept" and "signified", the imposition of the word "idea" on this discussion forces it into a Lockean mold. Again, I am not denying that Saussure imagined the speaker to intend to transfer thoughts or ideas to the mind of the hearer and to carry off that transference more or less successfully; I am saying that the evidence is too scanty and ambiguous either to support or deny such an interpretation definitively. But the more important point is that it simply does not matter. Saussure did not address all the questions outlined above (and many more that could be outlined) because he did not have a "theory of communication" at all. A fact which Harris never points out is that the word communication never occurs in the CLG or Constantin's notebooks for the third course. The plural, communications, and the verb communiquer occur once each, in the same sentence, but nowhere near the discussion of the speech circuit. Instead they arise in the context of language change, in the discussion of "intercourse" (CLG 281 ff.) as the explanation of why languages are essentially cohesive and yet susceptible to change. Although this discussion occurs long after that of the speech circuit in the published CLG, it actually came five months earlier in Saussure's final course of lectures (intercourse on 29 November 1910, the speech circuit on 25 April 1911). Here we find no mention whatever of mind or brain: "la force d'«intercourse»" is simply ...[ce] qui crée les communications entre les hommes. ...l'intercourse les oblige à communiquer entre eux. C'est lui qui amène dans un village les passants d'autres localités, qui déplace une partie de la population à l'occasion d'une fête ou d'une foire, qui réunit sous les drapeaux les hommes de provinces diverses, etc... C'est à l'intercourse qu'est due l'extension et la cohésion d'une langue. Il agit de deux manières: tantôt négativement: il prévient le morcellement dialectal en étouffant une innovation au moment où elle surgit sur un point; tantôt positivement: il favorise l'unité en acceptant et propageant cette innovation. (CLG 281-2)
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...[that] which establishes communication between men. ...intercourse forces them to communicate with others. Intercourse brings to a village visitors from elsewhere, brings together people from all around on the occasion of a celebration or a fair, unites men from different provinces under the same flag. It is intercourse which is responsible for the extension and cohesion of a language. It acts in two ways. Negatively, it prevents dialectal fragmentation by suppressing innovations as they emerge at one point or another. Positively, it favours unity by accepting and propagating innovations. Here, as virtually everywhere in the Cours, the focus is on langue. Saussure is simply not interested in communication, except for its ramifications on langue, which pertain strictly at the level of diachronic inquiry. For synchronic inquiry, communication is nothing more than a backdrop. This is where I believe Harris commits a serious distortion of Saussure, centered upon the "talking heads" drawing of CLG 27. From Constantin's notebook we can see that Bally and Sechehaye are partly to blame for this: Saussure's own drawing showed two unconnected lines, one extending from A's mouth to B's ear, the other from B's mouth to A's ear, with no lines involving their brains or minds. The figures are not even labeled A and B. Directly to the right of this is the "real" drawing, similar to the one on CLG 28, which does not show speakers at all, but rather signs divided into verbal concept and verbal image, and connected by way of phonation and audition. For Saussure, clearly, this was the one that mattered; and I believe that the same is true for the vast majority of readers of the Cours, except those who under Harris's influence have come to see the initial background drawing as instead the core of it all, the proof of Saussure's telementationalism and the source of segregationalism in twentieth-century structuralist linguistics. I have accused Harris of distorting Saussure, a charge serious enough to require attribution of a motive. What might have induced him to promote Saussure's telementationalism (real or imaginary) to a status of a cardinal explanandum in the development of modern linguistics? The answer lies in the power it confers on the "language myth" archemyth. I noted earlier that Harris's use of the word "ideas" in his account of Saussure's speech circuit channels the reader toward a Lockean, hence a telementationalist, reading. By making the speech circuit look as Lockean as possible, a tradition of telementationalism extending from Locke to Saussure and onward through the twentieth century is established as a linchpin of the language myth. Yet when Harris comes to discuss the relationship between Locke's and Saussure's "theories of communication" directly (Harris 1987c: 204-218), interestingly enough it is the basic discrepancies between them that emerge as most salient. The most severe of these discrepancies has to do with what
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Parkinson (1977) calls Locke's "translation theory" of understanding, a part of which, but only a part, does Harris believe Saussure shares: The term "translation theory" refers to the fact that, according to the theory in question, when language is the vehicle of communication understanding requires a double process of "translation": a speaker's thoughts are first translated into sounds, and then the sounds uttered are translated back again into thoughts by the hearer. This is clearly the basic idea behind Saussure's account of what happens when A and Β engage in discourse. (Harris 1987c: 205) However, Locke and Saussure do not conceive of "thoughts" in the same way. Locke believes in simple and complex "ideas" that exist as it were independently of both words and speakers, whereas the equivalent for Saussure, concepts, are themselves part of linguistic signs, hence not independent of words. Thus, There are differences between Locke's version of the translation theory of oral communication and Saussure's. Locke evidently supposed that there could be thought without language, and that the mind could engage in it without the aid of any linguistic instrument... Saussure emerges as a sceptic on this score. He does not explicitly discuss the question of whether or to what extent human beings could think without language, but he describes prelinguistic thought as amorphous. "Psychologically, setting aside its expression in words, our thought is simply a vague, shapeless mass" ([155]). More specifically still, "...were it not for signs, we should be incapable of differentiating any two ideas in a clear and consistent way... No ideas are established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of la langue " ([155]). This marks a significant shift of emphasis away from Locke... (ibid.: 209) Indeed, comparing Locke's and Saussure's views on the existence of thought without language is an even more difficult undertaking than Harris suggests here, because these views cannot be disentangled from the way other people used thought and pensée in the late seventeenth and early twentieth centuries. In Locke's time, thought was used by philosophers to denote the entire range of mental processes, starting from simple perceptions (e.g. sights, smells, feelings). In the course of the eighteenth century it gradually shifted focus and became more specialized, so that the "archetypal" thought was conscious and linearly organized, and simple perceptions were usually excluded. Thus when Max Muller took as his slogan in the 1860s "No language without thought, no thought without language", he did not mean to include vision, pain, etc., within "thought". Indeed from our perspective it is not clear how much his slogan
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constituted a theory of language and thought, and how much a normative assertion of the new definition of "thought" as restricted to that mental activity which is linguistic in nature. Nevertheless, Harris is certainly right that there are differences between the Lockean and Saussurean conceptions of thought and language, from which he concludes: To this extent it could perhaps be argued that it is unfair to saddle Saussure with a crude, old-fashioned Lockean theory of communication. For Saussure would certainly have denied that the systems of concepts on which communication depends are given independently of the system of vocal signals. In Saussure's theory, therefore, there is strictly no question of "translation" between two systems: on the contrary, both are constitutive of one and the same langue. (ibid.: 210) Yet Harris does not draw the conclusion he himself suggests, that in fact it is pointless to characterize Saussure as a telementationalist. Another discrepancy which Harris notes is that Locke's theory of communication is designed, first, as part of a more general theory of mind, and second, to account for linguistic behavior which Saussure would classify as parole. Saussure however adapts it to become the basis for his theory of langue'. ...Saussure leaves himself room to dissent from Locke's claim that men talk "only that they may be understood; which is then only done when, by use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech excites in another man's mind who hears it the idea I apply to it in mine when I speak it" (Locke 1706: III.3.3). For Saussure is apparently concerned only with giving an account of communication in so far as it is mediated by la langue: he has nothing to say about the more general problem of understanding between individuals, (ibid.: 211) Harris expresses puzzlement therefore that Saussure should'have adopted Locke's telementational model: Why did Sàtisstire apparently try to adapt to his own ends a theory of communication Which ostensibly served a quite contrary purpose? To put the point more shârply, why did Saussure take over a (Lockean) theory of communication concerned obviously (in Saussurean terms) with la parole, and apply it instead to la langue? (ibid.: 212)
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The answer, Harris says, lies in Saussure's structuralism. Whereas "preSaussurean linguistics treated language as being reducible, in the final analysis, to a constitutive totality of individual linguistic acts" (ibid.: 212, taking a cue from Hjelmslev 1942: 30), "[s]uch a view is completely antithetical to any form of structuralism, and Saussure could not accept it". To be more precise, the "constitutive totality of individual linguistic acts" is precisely what Saussure called parole, distinguishing it from langue, the virtual system that makes such acts possible; and Harris is asserting in effect that any structuralism had to be based on langue, the socially-shared system, and not parole, the totality of individual acts. In rejecting a theory of communication that took language to be the latter, Saussure ... inherited the obligation to offer at least a minimal account of the individual linguistic act, in order to avoid the charge that his theory was an abstraction which simply failed to come to terms with the realities of everyday speech. Looking at the problem from this angle, one can see why Saussure would have found a modified Lockean model of communication attractive. In effect, it offered two welcome guarantees. In the first place, it established the role of linguistics in the human sciences. By interposing la langue between the individual speaker and la parole within a Lockean framework, Saussure ensures that the study of language cannot be reduced either to the psychology of individual speech acts, or to social analyses of the communication events which such acts constitute. For the individual acts depend on the existence of a linguistic system, of which neither the psychology nor the sociology of the nineteenth century offered any detailed description. In the second place, reducing la parole to the individual implementation of resources provided by la langue ensured that within linguistics the study of the latter take priority over the former and be independent of it. Thus built into the speech-circuit model there is what amounts to a double guarantee of autonomy: (i) autonomy of linguistics among the disciplines dealing with human speech behaviour, and (ii) autonomy of the study of la langue within linguistics. (ibid.: 212-213) I agree completely with the idea that Saussure was motivated by a desire to establish linguistics independently of psychology and sociology (a point I elaborate on in Joseph 1994). What I do not see, however, is what difference the "modified Lockean model of communication" makes in this regard. The "double guarantee of autonomy" to which Harris refers falls out precisely from the privileging of langue as the "real" reality of language, the sole one amenable to scientific inquiry. To imply that this privileging falls out from the theory of communication, rather than the other way around, would be to put the cart before
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the horse - except that there is no cart. As I have stated above, the speech-circuit diagram is not offered as a "theory" of communication, any more than the drawing of a tree on CLG 97 is offered as a "theory" of tree. Instead, to take Harris's own words out of context, "Saussure's speech circuit is essentially a schematic summary" (Harris 1987c: 205), but not of what Harris takes it to be a summary of. It is, in effect, a schematic summary of the general sense of the word communication, applicable to whatever "theory" of communication one may hold - including one which states that no "real" communication ever occurs when people speak, only the illusion of communication - and committed to none. The speech circuit is based on no more elaborate assumptions than that "people communicate" and "words have meanings". If these things are so, then whenever someone tells someone else something (which is the commonsense interpretation of a speech event, though clearly not a complete one, as Saussure points out), then the actual utterance (as phonation) is sandwiched between meaning as speaker's intention and meaning as hearer's interpretation. If this is telementation, then anyone who believes that words have meanings, or that communication can occur, is a telementationalist. That seems ultimately to become Harris's position, and it threatens to turn the whole concept of telementation into a red herring. When Saussure says that the individual act of speech "requires at least two individuals", it is not to assert any controversial corollary within a theory of communication, but simply to say that speech exists for the purpose of communication. That is a theory not of communication, but of speech, parole, which is precisely what Saussure claimed his circuit drawing to represent. Presumably a "Lockean" model of communication is one which asserts telementation of ideas that exist separate from language, while a "modified Lockean" model asserts telementation of concepts that are already part of language. Hence the "essence" of a Lockean model is telementation: a model which does not assert telementation would be non-Lockean, regardless of whether it traffics in ideas separate from language, in which case we might consider it Platonic, or in concepts that are already part of language, in which case I could think of nothing more appropriate to call it than Saussurean. For it is only by a distortion of Saussure that one can assert him to have a "theory of communication" that takes precedence over the distinction between langue and parole. The fact that variants of the word communication appear in only one sentence in the published CLG and Constantin's notebooks at first seems almost unbelievable in a text that insists so strongly on the social nature of langue. But it is a fact nonetheless, one that no amount of Harrisian commentary can obliterate. The explanation for it is that Saussure's lectures focused on the linguistics of langue, but communication is always a matter of parole. Hence
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Harris's question, "why did Saussure take over a (Lockean) theory of communication concerned obviously (in Saussurean terms) with la parole, and apply it instead to la langue!" (Harris 1987c: 212), contains two false premises. If he had taken over a theory of communication, he would clearly have restricted it to parole. It does not take an intimate familiarity with the Cours or its source materials to realize that langue is a pivotal concept around which much else revolves and from which much else falls out, while the speech-circuit diagram is tossed in, as Harris rightly asserts, as part of a campaign to position langue strategically between psychology and sociology. But whereas investigation of langue consitutes nearly the entire rest of the Cours and the lectures they were based on, the "model of communication" is never revisited. When Harris invokes Saussure's "structuralism" to answer the question re cited in the last paragraph, it is tantamount to admitting that Saussure's conception of language does not in fact fall out from his "telementational theory of communication". His structuralism, under which Harris (correctly) subsumes his view on the nature οf langue and its status as the principal or sole object of linguistic inquiry, must stand independently of and prior to the "telementation" which it is supposed to explain. But this is not what Harris had been claiming up to this point, or what he would claim more strongly than ever in his 1990 article: namely, that Saussure's adoption of the telementational theory of communication, wedded with the principles of arbitrariness and linearity, are the primal causes from which langue and the rest of linguistic structuralism fall out. The fact is that if we need to have structuralism independently to understand Saussure, then telementation does not "buy" us anything. We no longer need it as the foundation stone of anything else, and that is good, in view of what a poorly set foundation it is in the first place. Moreover, if we ask: would a different (i.e. non-telementational) theory of communication have forced Saussure to change his conception of langue in any essential way? - the answer is no. Suppose for a moment that Saussure had been a communicational sceptic, believing that communication never actually occurs, though we sometimes have the illusion that it does. Could this only be explained by asserting that langue is not a social fact, or that signifiers and signifieds are not intimately bound to one another? Not at all. As hinted at above, Saussure could have continued to assert this structuralist conception of langue, while simply extending parole to the "receptive" as well as the "executive" end, and holding that the understanding of language, as well as its production, involves individual, willful construction. Within such a theory, the socially-shared langue would serve to explain how it is that the illusion of communication occurs, which may ultimately be the most difficult thing to explain of all. Consider too that Bloomfield (1927), whose antimentalism would seem to immunize him from any
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charge of telementationalism, found no difficulty in reconciling Saussure's system with his own behaviorist views (see Joseph 1990: 58-63), which might not have been the case were telementationalism really so central to Saussure as Harris suggests. That the reverse is equally true - telementationalism is not compatible solely with a structuralist conception of language, but with others as well - has already been argued by Harris in the case of Locke. But, finally, is even Locke a telementationalist in the sense that Harris makes Saussure out to be? As noted at the start of this section, Locke describes telementation as the ideal of communication, and explicitly denies that it is the reality. This is the essence of what Taylor terms "Locke's puzzle". I imagine many, perhaps most, people in Locke's time as well as our own would agree that the ideal or goal of communication is the transference of ideas, and that this goal is rarely if ever met. It is not clear from Harris's work that he would classify them as telementationalists, if they believe that perfect transference of ideas is not the reality of communication. I imagine there have always also been more hardcore telementationalists, who really do believe such communication is always taking place. Of course, having no direct access to other people's thoughts, we cannot prove them right or wrong; all we can do is to deny that the mind as such exists at all. In other words, "telementation" does not even count as a fallacy, since a fallacy is by definition a failure of logic, and there is no basis for counting telementation as a failure of logic unless it is based on a "mentation" that is itself nonexistent. And again, as before, this makes both telementation as such, and the "telementational fallacy", a pair of red herrings. In the case of Saussure, what they deflect attention from is the fact that his conception of langue independently accounts for the various subfallacies Harris wants to attribute to him - a fact which does not lend the kind of support to the idea of a "language myth" that a continuity of telementationalism from Aristotle to Locke to Saussure does. Harris (1987c: 206-7) gives examples of linguists from the 1960s onward who express overtly the kind of telementational stance that Harris reads into Saussure, noting that "The family resemblance is unmistakable" (ibid.: 205). This might be taken as showing that, regardless of whether a reading such as mine absolves Saussure of literal telementationalism, that is nevertheless how he was read, and that is part of his legacy to twentieth-century structuralist linguistics. But surely this would be absurd. It is in fact Harris's original contribution to have read the speech-circuit diagram as a telementationalist theory of communication, or indeed as anything at all. A look at any treatment of Saussure not written by Harris or one of his students will show that the diagram has never been accorded any significance, theoretical or otherwise, in the transmission of Saussure's leading ideas: namely, the dichotomies of langue and parole, synchrony and diachrony, signifier and signified, and other tenets of
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structuralist linguistics. The simple fact is that, as stated in the previous paragraphs, some people subscribe to a telementationalist view of communication and others do not; there has never been any unitary "myth" on this score, any more than on the related question of whether the "real" meaning of texts is that intended by their author, that inferred by their readers, or that which somehow inheres within the text itself. All three views - all three "myths", if you like have always coexisted, even if at various times and in various quarters a particular one has been temporarily dominant. If we were to attribute to Saussure, even indirectly, views that formed within the context of Saussurean structuralism, we would have to include the doctrine of structuralist literary criticism that the real meaning of a text inheres neither within the intention of the author, nor within the minds of readers, but within the text itself. This view fails a crucial test for being telementational: it stresses that texts (a concept which does not in principle exclude any type of utterance) are fundamentally different from the intentions of their authors, but always contain both less and much more than was in their authors' minds. The goal of reading is not telementation between reader and author, but as rich a construction as possible of the meaning that is latent within the text. And individual minds and individual readings are always made secondary to the ultimate reality of the text itself. This position is in fact quite in line with Saussure's view of linguistic meaning. He locates meaning within the sign. Individual speakers, speech acts, and minds are all subordinated to the sign itself. He is not really concerned with thought before it comes into language, or after it goes out of language, because it is amorphous. Only in so far as it is in language is thought of any concern to the linguist; divorced from sound, which is to say from its existence as one half of the linguistic sign, it belongs to "pure psychology" {CLG 157). I am not asserting that Saussure held the structuralist view of textual meaning, but only countering the use of later developments within structuralism as evidence for the telementational heritage of the CLG. Like most intellectual movements, structuralism was far less homogeneous than we are sometimes tempted to make it appear in hindsight. The problem with an approach like Harris's which tends to focus on individual thinkers and not give much consideration to their contemporaries is that it, for want of a better word, mythifies those thinkers into both more and less original creators than they may actually be, mythifies their times into periods when everybody thought alike, and mythifies the most famous thinkers of various periods into having been in a kind of dialogue with one another that has no basis in reality. Harris's discussion of Locke and Saussure, for example, is absurd in the absence of any substantial placing of either in the context of his time or any serious consideration of all the developments which took place between
THE "LANGUAGE MYTH" MYTH
37
them. Harris actually acknowledges much earlier in the book that "Scholars doubt whether Saussure had ever studied Locke at first hand (de Mauro 1972: 381 n. 11), Aarsleff 1982: 27)", but, he declares without explanation, "the question is irrelevant to a reading of the Cours" (Harris 1987c: 28). Well, so it is if in fact both are simply manifestations of a unitary "language myth" that runs through Western thought from antiquity through the present; but not if that is precisely one of the questions to which one is seeking an answer. In addition, Harris's discussion of the contrast between Locke's and Saussure's notions of thought and language would be clarified tremendously by the inclusion of information on what thought meant to people in the late seventeenth century (when it often included perceptual data) and pensée to people in the early twentieth. And consideration of the intervening history might save him from creating the false impression that the development of early structuralist ideas beginning in the late nineteenth century is the source of Saussure's views on how thought is amorphous until it is analyzed and linearized by the introduction of language (ibid.: 209-210), views which in fact are already articulated in Condillac's Grammaire in the eighteenth century. The chapter on Locke and Saussure in Harris (1987c) closes with a brilliant conceit that the lines connecting the "talking heads" in the speech-circuit diagram resemble telephone wires, and that the power of this analogy helps account for the force with which Saussure's telementationalism was taken up in twentiethcentury structuralism. It would be a marvelous explanans, if only its explanandum were true. There is no evidence that such cases of telementationalism as can be detected in modern linguistics (Harris does not identify more than a handful) have any link to Saussure. What then does the characterization of Saussure as a telementationalist "buy" Harris? A lot, actually. First of all, in deploying a term like "telementation" Harris simultaneously fashions a concrete and simple concept and joins it with a visually suggestive name that moreover carries overtones of magician's trickery as well as of- not just the telephone wires that were seen as a marvelous contrivance in Saussure's day, but the electronic communications media that have come to occupy a much more central role in our lives today. What is more, the reader of Harris does not even need to read the CLG, but only to open to page 27, to see in one split second the apparent visual proof that the language myth not only existed but informed the very Bible of modern linguistics.
38 4. Conclusion:
JOHN E. JOSEPH The "Key to All
Mythologies"
By this point you may be wondering why I should have stated in the introduction that my disagreements with Harris were slight, then gone on to write about them at such length. In fact most of the points I have tried to make in the preceding sections are themselves red herrings, since the real point is whether or not the historical exposition is essential to Harris's theory of language. If, as I believe, it is not, then not only is Harris's historical exposition filled with red herrings - it is itself the biggest, reddest herring of all, deflecting attention from his original thinking on language and communication and his program for redefining linguistics. Herring number two is the "language myth", that archemyth encompassing all of Western civilization and its offshoots. Harris's attempts at bringing it to light are reminiscent of some grand theosophical quest, or of The Key to All Mythologies; the tragically unfinishable life's work of Edward Casaubon, the dried-up old scholar who marries the heroine of George Eliot's Middlemarch. To be sure, "dried-up" is the last description anyone would apply to Harris. But the desire to reduce all the conceptions of language in the history of linguistics to a set of "keys", with the language myth as master key, is in the same universalist spirit. This is a crucial aspect of the rhetorical power of Harris's writing. Harris locates errors that are conceptually concrete, discrete, and simple, within texts that are themselves remarkable for their abstractness and complexity. Few of his readers, including his students, are so well-read as he, and for the others their first introduction to many classic texts is through Harris's treatment of them. His account of the elemental fallacies really do function for such readers as a set of keys, offering a clear and unified reading of sprawling and opaque texts that resist global comprehension even after a lifetime of study. From Harris one learns how to go into a text in the history of linguistics and, using the key fallacies, come out with a reading that is not only coherent but that readily assigns the author a place within a historical chain of thinkers whose work has been analyzed using the same set of keys. From a pedagogical and heuristic point of view, this is a real contribution, and earns Harris a place within a great tradition of teaching and textual analysis. If the method poses the danger that students may interpret their key-derived reading as the real and full meaning of the text rather than as one interesting but partial reading, useful for certain purposes but with no pretensions to being globally right - one might point out that the same danger exists in all teaching and writing, and grows proportionally with the power of the method. Or one might say that these keys "mislead because they conflate under a single designation things which are distinct in reality. The harm which may thus be caused to the
THE "LANGUAGE MYTH" MYTH
39
understanding is clearly this: that we may be led to believe, by reason of the single designation, in an underlying unity present in what in fact is a collection of merely associated but disparate things" (Harris 1981a: 7-8). From this (Harrisian) perspective, Harris contributes to the process of linguistic myth-making which he claims to undo. He is driven to this by an archemyth of his own designing, namely the idea that one single language myth, with all its various components, has characterized the whole of Western linguistic thinking. The title of The Language Myth, the second installment of Harris's "language" trilogy, confirms this idea. While serving as a powerful expository and rhetorical device, this myth of a myth has proven to be too powerful a heuristic device in Harris's hands, leading him to discover fallacies in key linguistics texts that in fact can only be read into those texts via arguments from silence, inferences from side comments, or by throwing the texts to the winds and referring instead to what their authors should have said if they were to be consistent with themselves. If such a unitary tradition existed, it would be a simple enough matter to explain, given the status of the Bible, Plato, Aristotle, and other surrogationalist etc. texts in Western culture, together with the role played by Latin and the way it was taught in Europe from the days of the Western Roman Empire through the eighteenth and in some cases the mid-twentieth century. Yet when has there ever been any universal consensus on the meaning of the Bible, or Plato, or Aristotle, on the role of language and rhetoric in society, or on a theory of how language operates? It is true that a myth of such unity is commonplace, for example that everyone in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was committed to the basic principles of modistic grammar. But one does not have to dig very deeply into the surviving documents of any period to appreciate the splintering of views extant under even the most oppressive majority; the religious schisms within the Christian church are merely the best known examples. This is not to deny the existence of traditions of linguistic thought of the kind Harris is describing. It is rather to affirm them, while at the same time stressing that traditions (plural) and not myth (singular) is historically the operative concept. Whichever term we use, it is important to insist that such traditions are historical products, in the sense that the ideas they contain can be connected to particular developments in the histories of peoples and languages that could conceivably have gone otherwise. If I prefer to refer to "traditions", it is because "myth" is such a loaded term, implying that a particular tradition runs contrary to logic or some other objectively determinable standard of truth. In my own (post-Harrisian, or perhaps pre-post-Harrisian) perspective, it is not so clear that the language myth and its component fallacies, even if they are the red herrings I claim them to be, are to be dismissed as idola fori. When the
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JOHN E. JOSEPH
gods have died, and taken absolute criteria for truth with them, perhaps idola fori are all that are left to us. This sort of "rhetorical constructionist" view, which has become quite prevalent in both humanistic and scientific disciplines over the last two decades, does not assume a clearcut distinction between myth and reality and a special knowledge of which concepts fall into which category. It throws into question the commonsense conception of what academic work and scientific knowledge are about, the kind of conception that informs Harris's writing. Yet rather than dismissing work based on such a conception, it retains it as one particularly privileged "myth" among a variety of others. For example, the rhetorical constructionist would recognize that Harris's frequent insistence on the impossibility of any "science" of language is actually based upon a particular "myth" of what a science must be and do - in fact a view of science which epistemologists of the "hard sciences" have largely discarded. Harris gives absolute credence to this myth when he insists that language is not fit to be one of its objects. Yet the rhetorical constructionist will prefer to examine why Harris chooses to argue in the way that he does, rather than to dismiss his argument as discordant with the spirit of his own project for "demythifying" linguistics. The strength of the integrationalist program lies in its commitment to a diversity of perspectives and sources of insight into language and communication. That commitment would be strengthened by the recognition that a diversity of perspectives has always characterized linguistic thought in the West as elsewhere, and not by attempting to fit it all into the Procrustean bed of a single "language myth". In other words, the "'language myth' myth" produces a history of linguistics that is as segregationalist - if not more so - than the linguistics it is purporting to describe. Demythifying the myth allows us to integrationalize that history. De-emphasizing the discourse of myth and fallacy altogether may help us see our way clear to what I believe may ultimately prove the most promising route out of segregationalism: the realization that the "science" of language actually consists of the rhetorical construction of a variety of accounts (myths, if you prefer) of linguistic behavior - not all equally valid, but subject to evaluation against criteria that are neither independent nor universal, but are themselves part of the same language game within which the construction of theories is taking place. Harris's belief in the impossibility of any scientific linguistics is in fact based not in scepticism, but in the lack of it - in a too great credulity about the possibility of "science" as a body of absolute knowledge. If we are to believe our colleagues in virtually every other area of inquiry that has ever laid claim to such a possibility, the epistemological problems that beset the study of language are not so unique to it as Harris's views on linguistics would lead us to believe. To drop the denial that it can be a science would also be a move coherent with the general spirit of integrationalism; for it is
THE "LANGUAGE MYTH" MYTH
41
supposed to be segregationalist to suggest that language is "amenable to description in terms that are quite separate from those used in any other discipline", and integrationalist to assume that "it makes little sense to segregate the linguistic from the non-linguistic components..." (Harris 1987a [Love (ed.) 1990: 199]).
2 The Language Muddle: Roy Harris and Generative Grammar Robert D. Borsley Frederick J. Newmeyer
1. The "language myth" If our sweep of the bibliographical surveys of the field is accurate, a major theme in modern linguistics is that Chomsky has got it all wrong. Functionalists, discourse analysts, structuralists, cognitive grammarians, connectionists, stylistic analysts, and even a sizeable percentage of those committed to formal linguistic analysis take as their point of departure the fundamental inadequacy of Chomsky's approach to language. Typically, such work interweaves its critical remarks with concrete proposals for alternative conceptions of the form that an adequate theory of language should take. In one sense, Roy Harris's scholarly output of the past two decades is very much in the above tradition; we doubt that any other author has devoted as much space to attacking (what are taken to be) the historical and theoretical foundations of generative grammar. 1 But Harris's work is unique in several striking respects. * We would like to thank John Joseph and Keith Percival for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 1 Our critique is based upon a close reading of the following publications by Harris, which we take to be representative of his ideas: Harris (1970; 1972; 1973a; 1973b; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1981a; 1981b; 1983a; 1983b; 1983c; 1984a; 1984b; 1985; 1986; 1987a; 1987b; 1987c; 1988a; 1988b; 1988c; 1989a; 1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1993a; 1993b); Harris and Taylor (1989). Throughout this paper, the term "generative grammar" will be used to refer to the constellation of approaches whose intellectual roots lie in Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (1957) and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). That is, the term will be applied to those models that attempt to characterize the human linguistic capability in terms of grammars whose essential properties are universal and which consist of a set of formal, discrete, and interacting rules and
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First, it stresses that it is not just Chomsky who is to blame for the mess that the field is in; rather, most twentieth-century linguists from Saussure onward have labored under the most profound misconceptions. Second, it is remarkable for the ignorance it manifests of the actual claims and results of generativist theorizing, to the point where it attributes to Chomsky positions that he is on record as rejecting. And third, even for a genre in which demolition characteristically outpaces construction, it is noteworthy for its failure to erect even the bare foundations of an alternative approach. After presenting in somewhat schematic form the outline of Harris's critique, we address some specific issues that we feel merit attention in virtue of their importance to the foundations of linguistic theory. According to Harris (see especially 1980; 1981a; 1987b; 1990c), modern linguistics is infected by the "language myth", which is composed of two interconnected elements. One is "telementation", the theory that communication is the mechanical transference of ideas from one person's mind to another "in accordance with a prearranged plan determined by [the grammatical] rules" (1981a: 11). The other is the "fixed code" theory of language, the theory of the "prearranged plan" itself This theory posits that pairings of sounds and meanings "remain invariant from speaker to speaker and from occasion to occasion..." (1990c: 29). The dubious achievement of generative grammar is its extreme mechanistic development of these ideas, extending them to encompass syntax (Chomsky 1957) and soon thereafter meaning itself (Katz and Fodor 1963). Harris does devote some space to substantive empirical criticism of the components of the language myth (to which we will return), though he is clearly far more comfortable casting aspersions on its disreputable origins. While it can be found in rudimentary form in Aristotle and Locke, "in its modern form [the myth] is a cultural product of post-Renaissance Europe. It reflects the political psychology of nationalism, and an educational system devoted to standardizing the linguistic behavior of pupils" (Harris 1981a: 9). Rising nation-states naturally saw the advantage of stable national languages. Hence the birth of the monolingual dictionary to "fix" sound-meaning pairings and normative grammars to ensure that only the speech of the privileged be sanctioned as correct. Linguists readily accommodated to such nationalist fervor by sanctioning a fixed-code view of language, which takes the dictionary as a model, and by enshrining grammars as sets of rules, thereby giving "scientific" cover to what amounted to an endorsement of the prescriptivist enterprise. principles. Any linguist committed to this program will be regarded as a "generative linguist", whether his or her research is devoted to grammar per se, or to some other area, such as psycholinguistics, pragmatics, sociolinguistics, or whatever.
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But immediately a problem of chronology arises: nation-states were in the making from the Middle Ages onwards. Why did it take until the early twentieth century with Saussure,2 then, for the language myth to assume the status of scientific dogma? Harris explains: Not until a time when the European nation-state was itself in crisis as a viable social and political entity did European linguistics at last embrace a theory of languages which explicitly mirrored the ideally integrated, stable community which the nation-state would have liked to be (Harris 1980: 157). ...What had started out as a patriotic aspiration was eventually given the solemn blessing of modern science. (167) Harris could not be more explicit in linking structural approaches in linguistics to our century's more extreme attempts to save the capitalist nation-state in decline. To wit: The "ideal" speech community [which] is "totally homogeneous" [is] a fascist concept of languages if ever there was one (1983c: 119). Conveniently for those in power, then, the degree of abstraction inherent in the machine model "effectively precludes any possibility of raising issues concerning freedom of speech" (1990b: 153). Generative grammar has enjoyed an extra fillip to help propel it to prominence: it was able to latch on to the postwar infatuation with computers and high technology: Postwar over-optimism about building machines that could handle language made mathematical modelling of linguistic structure a very fashionable area of research. That was the context in which generative grammar was born (Gardner 1985). Suddenly, in the mid 1950s, linguistics seemed to have acquired a new engine which would propel it forward into the computer age; and, as a result, the model sold very well in the universities of the world for a quarter of a century. (Harris 1993b: 15) 2 While the present paper will focus on the extent to which the "language myth" is applicable to generative grammar, one might question whether Saussure held it in anything like the strong form in which it is attributed to him by Harris. True, a strong interpretation can be read into the Cours. But that book was a posthumous compilation from his undergraduates' lecture notes. We would hate to have our ideas judged from our undergraduate students' hastily scribbled interpretations of the already oversimplified material in our lectures to them! For more remarks along these lines, see Percival (1984).
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A recurrent theme in Harris's writings is that the basic analytical units of modern linguistics owe their existence and characteristics to the fact that their originators used alphabetic writing. Despite linguists' protestations to the contrary, their work reflects an extreme alphabetic bias (see especially Harris 1980; 1986). The ability to segment speech into phones (or phonemes), the idea of the sentence as a linguistic unit (and therefore the possibility of sentential ambiguity), syntactic categories, and even the notion of the "word" reflect the effects of scriptism. Thus, the linguist's attributing "psychological reality" to these constructs is nothing but a vain attempt to accord scientific status to what are no more than cultural artifacts. Harris proposes to replace the linguistics of the self-contained system with an "integrational linguistics", which redefines linguistics as a mode of inquiry into the construction and articulation of our linguistic experience. It inquires not into the hypothetical structure of abstract linguistic systems, nor into their even more hypothetical representations in the human brain, but into the everyday integrational mechanisms by means of which the reality of the linguistic sign as a fact of life is established. For this purpose, in contrast to all previous linguistic programmes, it rejects any a priori attempt to circumscribe the phenomena of language or to draw a distinction between language and non-language which will be valid in each and every case. (1990c: 50; emphasis added) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 deal with the two central aspects of the "language myth", telementation and fixed codes, respectively. Section 4 questions his account of the historical origins of current linguistic concepts and § 5 debunks the idea that they are linked intrinsically to alphabetic literacy. In § 6, we challenge Harris's contention that generative linguists are covert prescriptivists. In § 7, we suggest that an essentially empiricist world-view underlies much of Harris's critique of modern linguistics. Section 8 takes a brief critical look at "integrational linguistics", followed by concluding remarks in § 9.
2.
Telementation
Let us turn to the first component of the "language myth", the telementational conception of communication, the idea that communication is the mechanical transference of ideas from one mind to another, a mere process of encoding and decoding. In criticising this conception of communication, Harris is not alone.
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The inadequacies of what they call the "code model of communication" is one of the starting points for the "relevance theory" of Sperber and Wilson (1986). We agree with them, in fact, that it is an untenable conception of linguistic communication. The question, then, is whether generative grammar is committed to such a conception. Harris's only support for the idea that it is comes from one decades-old passage from Katz (1966) that he cites over and over again. 3 This hardly constitutes an impressive body of evidence. We have found no more recent example of a generative linguist endorsing telementation. Chomsky, for example, has explicitly rejected the idea that communication involves a mechanical implementation of our mental grammars. As he has noted in a recent paper: ...in real world communication, virtually any information and strategy can be used to try to determine what some person is saying in a given situation. Furthermore, little knowledge need be shared by the speaker and the interpreter. (Chomsky 1991a: 18) One could not ask for a more explicit rejection of the telementational conception of communication. There is, in fact, one proposition about communication that is a central assumption of generative grammar. This is that key aspects of language are not reducible to facts about communication. The "autonomy thesis", as this proposition is known, distinguishes generative grammar from most so-called "functional" approaches to linguistics, where the communication-based grounding of grammatical phenomena is taken for granted.4 Chomsky has missed few opportunities to stress that language is only incidentally an instrument of communication; its "design features" do not manifest any signs of communicative ends (see, for example, Chomsky 1975b: 69; 1980: 230; 1991b: 51). The following passage, from Chomsky (1979), is typical: There is no reason to believe - to repeat myself once again - that language "essentially" serves communicative ends, or that the "essential purpose" of language is "communication", as is often said, at least if we mean by 3
Katz's position, here as elsewhere in his writings, is sui generis. As Harris notes, the theory is also expounded in Cairns and Cairns (1976), a popular introduction to psycholinguistics that takes a generative slant on some issues (but which cites no generativist work to support a telementational view). 4 For the idea that the needs of communication are the central force shaping grammatical structure, see Givon (1979; 1984; 1990). For defence of the contrary autonomist view, see Newmeyer (1983).
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"communication" something like transmitting information or inducing belief. (P. 87) Lately, Chomsky has taken to claiming that the organization of grammar makes it ill-designed fox communication and that only a series of "computational tricks" allow it to be used to these ends at all (see for example, Chomsky 1991b: 49). The goal of generative grammar is not now and never has been to explain linguistic communication. For generative linguists, the central question is not How do speakers use language to communicate?, but rather How do speakers come to have the grammatical knowledge that they do? Generative grammar is concerned, for example, with the fact that an English-speaker knows that Which men does she expect to like each other? is acceptable, although Does she expect to like each other? is not; or the fact a speaker knows that John and him cannot refer to the same person in Did John expect to see him?, whereas they can in Who did John expect to see him? It argues that this knowledge is a manifestation of our "I-language", that is, our internalized linguistic knowledge, and that Ilanguage is in turn a manifestation of the principles and parameters that constitute universal grammar. One might or might not accept this explanation, but it is clear that it is not an attempt to explain linguistic communication. Since generative grammar does not seek to explain linguistic communication, it is under no obligation to propose an alternative to the telementational conception. However, it is interesting to note that Sperber and Wilson stress that their alternative inferential account of communication accepts the basic generativist assumptions (see Sperber and Wilson 1986: 94). It seems, then, that generative grammar is quite compatible with the most clearly articulated alternative to telementation. We must conclude, therefore, that the first of Harris's main criticisms is quite misconceived.
3. Fixed
codes
We now consider the second of the main criticisms that Harris advances against generative grammar: that it is committed to the mistaken view that languages are "fixed codes", defined as "some fixed set of correlations between ideas and verbal symbols" (Harris 1981a: 10), which remains invariant from speaker to speaker and from occasion to occasion within the sphere in which it operates. It is fixed in the sense in which the institutionalized rules of a game such as chess are fixed. (Harris 1990c: 29)
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As noted in the previous section, no generative linguist since the 1960s has advocated the telementational theory of communication. So even if Harris is right that telementation entails a fixed-code view of language, generative linguists are not required to adopt such a view. Do they adopt one anyway? One might suppose that Harris is on firmer ground here. Chomsky sees an adult speaker's Ilanguage as constituting a "relatively stable steady state.. .which then undergoes only peripheral modification" (Chomsky 1986b: 25). In other words, he sees it as something (relatively) fixed.5 But is I-language a "code"? For Harris, a code is invariant from speaker to speaker. But generative linguists have never made such an assumption. Chomsky, for example, has repeatedly stressed that an I-language is an individual cognitive system that is only "partially shared by others in the various communities with which people associate themselves in their normal lives" (Chomsky 1991a: 19; emphasis added). In this sense, then, I-language does not meet Harris's criteria for being a fixed code. A code for Harris links "ideas and verbal symbols", i.e. meaning and form. Since under the mainstream approach to generative grammar, the principles-andparameters theory of Chomsky (1981; 1986b), representations of phonetic form (PF representations) are linked with representations of logical form (LF representations), there is a sense in which I-language is in fact a (relatively) fixed code. However, as we will argue below, it is not one in Harris's sense of the term, and hence the objections that he advances against the idea that languages are fixed codes are irrelevant to generative grammar. Chomsky's position is that at LF, certain aspects of meaning, notably anaphoric relations and quantifier scope, are made explicit. LF is a level that "interfaces...with conceptual-intentional systems" (Chomsky 1993a: 2), and thus 5
The assumption that one's I-language remains invariant from occasion to occasion throughout one's life has never been regarded as a particularly important one. On this topic, Chomsky has remarked: Suppose contrary to apparent fact, that the system never hit a steady state but kept growing (like a carp) until termination of life. I don't see that anything much would change, (cited in Patemanl987: 91, fn.16) In remarks germane to this issue, Emonds (1985: 238; 1986) and Pateman (1987: ch. 4) argue that many prescriptively-mandated prestige constructions acquired via schooling or parental correction do not represent changes to one's I-language at all, but rather only a tenuous overlay on it. One might also call attention to the debate in the field of second-language acquisition research over whether an adult-acquired second language, however fluent, is an I-language. For answers to the affirmative, see Epstein, Flynn and Martohardjono (1994); White (1985); the negative, see Bley-Vroman (1989); Clahsen (1988); Clahsen and Muysken (1986).
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it helps to provide a basis for determining what a sentence means when it is used. The mechanisms that effect this determination, however, are proper to pragmatic theory, not grammatical theory (for discussion, see Kempson 1988). That is, generative grammar distinguishes between the grammatical encoding of meaning (sentence meaning) and the actual messages that are conveyed when language is used (utterance meaning). Utterance meaning is a result of the interaction between sentence meaning and the context of the utterance.6 Since LF is not equivalent to the actual message conveyed, Chomsky's view of grammar is not consistent with Harris's idea of a what a "code" is. Harris thinks that the view that sentence meaning and utterance meaning are distinct is untenable (see especially 1987a). But the only argument that we were able to detect in support of his position is that no discovery procedure reliably separates out the two levels of meaning. This is true, but quite irrelevant in any non-empiricist approach to language (for further remarks on this point, see § 7). Harris does attempt a series of empirical arguments against fixed codes (1990c: 32f), and it is worth reviewing them. We will argue that the first four are all in reality arguments against the telementational theory of communication, which (in order to effect a mechanical exchange of ideas) demands that speaker and hearer have precisely the same code. His fifth argument is simply an unsupported objection to the study of I-language. Harris begins by arguing that a a fixed code theory... must attribute exactly the same linguistic knowledge to A and Β if communication is to be successful. On this theory, therefore, it is impossible for anyone to come to know the meaning of a word by asking another person" (ibid.: 33). But this would be true only if communication were a matter of telementation. Since telementation is clearly an untenable conception, there is no reason why communication should demand identical codes. And, indeed, it manifestly does not; communication can take place even when codes differ to some degree. Thus, if the British co-author of the present paper were to say to the American co-author " You read Synonymy and Linguistic Analysis in one sitting? You couldn 't have done! ", the latter would understand him, even though the second sentence is not admitted by his Ilanguage - the auxiliary systems of our two varieties of English differ. It is an interesting question how different codes have to be before communication is 6
All approaches to meaning within generative grammar, including truth-conditional approaches, distinguish between sentence and utterance meaning. Since Chomsky (1979: 142) "doubt[s] that one can separate semantic representation from beliefs and knowledge about the world", he rejects truth-conditional semantics. Harris, of course, rejects it as well. His major publication devoted to the deficiencies of this approach (Harris 1981b), in appealing to the problems posed by "the practical limitations of speakers' knowledge and interests" (p. 110), echoes criticisms that Chomsky (1975a; 1979) had made earlier.
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impaired; certainly, intelligibility (i.e. the successful conveyance of utterance meaning) is a function of cultural and personal factors, as well as the purely grammatical features of sentence meaning. Harris's second, third, and fourth objections are also based directly on telementation and its concomitant idea that communication between individuals requires that they have precisely the same code. He asks, for example, how the same fixed code could get established for all speakers, given their differences in linguistic experience; how innovation could ever happen, since that would lead to individuals having different codes; and how speakers and hearers could ever be sure that they were using the same code. But, again, since generative linguists reject the telementational theory of communication, these objections are without force as a critique of generative grammar. His "fifth objection is perhaps more powerful than any of these [others]" (ibid.: 35): If linguistics deals with synchronic speech-systems... and these systems are fixed codes, then they do not correspond to "languages" in the everyday sense in which English, French, and German are reckoned to be languages typically spoken by most people brought up in, say, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. These are not fixed codes, whatever else they may be, because they are manifestly not uniform... Thus it appears prima facie that linguistics cannot deal with languages like English, French, and German; or if it does it cannot be dealing with fixed codes. Quite so! As Chomsky notes, "... the commonsense notion of language has a crucial sociopolitical dimension.... That any coherent account can be given of 'language' in this sense is doubtful; surely none has been offered or even seriously attempted. Rather, all scientific approaches have simply abandoned these elements of what is called 'language' in common usage" (Chomsky 1986b: 15). Grammatical theorists do not study "languages", but rather "grammars" the internalized systems of speakers. That is, they study I-language. But since Harris arbitrarily rejects the study of I-language, his only recourse is to retreat to another attack on telementation and its requirement of identical codes: Smith's English may not be the same English on all occasions... Worse still, if synchronic systems exist only on the idiolectal level, then ex hypo the si if Smith and Brown ever manage to engage in successful communication it will be sheer good luck. The identification of synchronic systems with idiolects is theoretically self-defeating for orthodox linguistics. It is no good for Smith to have a fixed code which is shared with no one else, (ibid.: 36)
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Once again, there is no reason to believe, and every reason to doubt, that Smith's and Brown's I-language must be identical in order for them to communicate successfully.
4. The socio-historical
roots of formal
linguistics
Harris's theory makes a clear prediction about the countries in which structural linguistics (of any variety) should have flourished most and enjoyed the highest degree of "official" sanction. They are Germany and Italy. In the nineteenth century, as the patriotic movements in these lands struggled for belated nationstate status, a model incorporating the elements of the language myth would, one assumes, have served the interests that Harris feels such a model is inherently designed to serve. The intellectuals of the Weimar republic of the 1920s, a "European nation-state in crisis as a viable social and political entity", if any ever has been, should have jumped at Saussurean structuralism. And of course contemporary fascist Italy and (after 1933) Nazi Germany would have been expected to warmly embrace Saussure's "fascist" theory. Harris's predictions are completely wrong. The centers of structural linguistics in the inter-war years were all bourgeois democracies: Switzerland, France, Britain, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and the United States. Structuralism in fascist Italy and Germany was not only not hegemonic, it was officially condemned. The egalitarian underpinnings of the approach - the idea that all languages are cut from the same mold and amenable to the same analytical methods - were incompatible with the idea of a master folk, destined to rule over the weak and the inherently inferior (for more discussion, see Newmeyer 1986). Another false prediction is that generative grammar (at least in its Chomskyan variety) should be most appealing to those with mathematical, computational or engineering interests as regards language. Hardly; meetings devoted to artificial intelligence and computational linguistics are among the most anti-Chomskyan milieux. Chomsky for years has infuriated the "technolinguists" by minimizing the importance of constructing a formalized theory (see, for example, Chomsky 1990). We also question the extent to which generative grammar has "sold very well in the universities of the world". The only country that comes to mind in which it is possible that a majority of linguists are, or ever have been, generative grammarians, is the Netherlands. It is still the case in some continental European countries that a wise career move for a young linguist is to write an "incisive" critique of generative grammar. One could speculate on why parliamentary democracy and structural approaches to languages have tended to go hand-in-hand. And one could
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speculate on the reasons for the success of generative grammar in Holland and for its failure, say, in Belgium. But what point would such speculations serve? The merits (or demerits) of Saussurean structuralism, Chomskyan generativism, and, for that matter, Harrisian integrationalism should be evaluated on their own terms without regard for their real or imagined parentage. No doubt Harris's ideas, like those of the rest of us, are to whatever extent a product of their environment. They seem to be just the sort that one would expect to flourish in an institution (Oxford University) with long traditions of philological and philosophical discussion of language, but no real linguistics. Worth the reflection of a moment or two, perhaps, but quite irrelevant to whether they are right or wrong.
5. Alphabetic
literacy and linguistic
theory
That the constructs of linguistic theory owe their origins to alphabetic writing is stressed over and over again by Harris: ...the myth that spoken English includes a unit called "the sentence Mary had a little lamb " which somehow exists independently of any precisely identified sequence of English sounds. What is the basis of this myth? Simply the fact that Mary had a little lamb occurs as a unit in written English... (1980: 8). Without the transition from syllabic to alphabetic writing, the development of phonemic analysis in modern linguistics would be inconceivable (1980: 15). As is so often the case in his writing, Harris intends such remarks simultaneously to represent an analysis of the historical origins of a particular conceptual scheme and a guilt-by-antecedence negative evaluation of their adequacy.7 In the remarks that follow, we will try to separate the historical issue from the question of their theoretical motivation. In and of itself, the observation that phonemic theory arose in the cultural context of alphabetic writing is not remarkable or even interesting: so did physical theory, biological theory, and just about every other theory departmentalized in academia. Is there a causal link between the two - did the possession of 7
Another of Harris's rhetorical ploys is to impugn the motives of those with whom he disagrees: "Saussure was nothing if not an astute academic strategist. Having adroitly fended off the competing claims of experimental psychology and neurophysiology, he had no intention of surrendering language tamely to the teaching profession" (Harris 1987b: 111). The remarks in footnote 2 above seem particularly germane here.
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alphabetic script help lead modern grammarians to discover phonemes in language? That is not out of the question: it is a commonplace observation of historians of science that the process of discovery is abetted (or hindered) by the cultural milieu of the investigator. However, as an examination of the ancient Indian linguistic tradition reveals, the possession of an alphabetic script on which great cultural value is placed is not a necessary condition for the development of phonological theory. The Indian grammarians not only grasped the phonemic principle (Allen 1953: 50, 89), but produced what are uncontroversially the most sophisticated phonological analyses before the mid-twentieth century AD. And yet controversy rages over whether Pânini, the greatest of them all, was even literate! Evidence for the use of writing in India before Asoka (third century BC) is vague and inconclusive; Pânini dates at least from the 4th century, and possibly earlier. Furthermore, even if writing did exist at the time of Pânini, no cultural value was placed upon it; it seems to have been used for centuries simply to record commercial transactions, but not for important things like religion, literature and linguistics. And the Asokan scripts, Kharosthi and Brâhmï, were not even fully alphabetic; they treated each CV sequence as an orthographic unit, with obligatory vowel diacritics attached (Bright 1988). In a rare acknowledgment of the existence of the Indian grammatical tradition, Harris (1980: 119-122) recognizes that the Indian interest in phonology arose from a desire to preserve exactness of phonetic detail in the recitation of the Vedic texts. In other words, we see that the same advance in our knowledge can arise in more than one historical context and for different underlying reasons. Just as one might wonder whether phonemic analysis would have ever been developed by the Japanese or the Aztecs, it is (necessarily) an open question whether the insights of other fields would have arisen in a different historical context. For example, would the principles of modern chemistry have been developed if they had not been preceded historically by many centuries of alchemical attempts to transmutate base metals into gold? Who knows? All that matters is the degree to which such principles successfully model reality. In any event, the claim that current linguistic theory (whatever its roots may be) mimics alphabetic writing in some relevant sense strains credulity. The segment is the only phonological construct that evokes alphabetism at all. Yet it is composed of distinctive features and may be mutated by rule into other segments. Neither distinctive features nor sequential processes have any analogue in alphabetic script. Furthermore, the segment has played an increasingly diminished role in phonological theory. Constructs such as the strict-cycle condition of lexical phonology, principles of syllabification, autosegmental linking principles, and the metrical grid have no analogues in alphabetic script,
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yet form central parts of an overall approach to phonology in which the classical phoneme is, at best, epiphenomenal. In one of his less prescient passages, Harris writes: Any quite radical approach to phonology, such as was suggested by J. R. Firth, had to face an impossible uphill struggle against the solid conservatism of the alphabetic tradition. Among the ranks of phonologists who remained faithful to that tradition, the more die-hard objected to any innovation likely to disturb the reassuring parallelism between phonological analysis and alphabetic representation. (1980: 11) One might argue that this passage exaggerates contemporary resistance to Firth's "nonalphabetic" theory. After all, Zellig Harris, arguably the leading American structuralist theoretician, put forward a proposal for "simultaneous components" in phonology (Z. Harris 1944) that bore considerable resemblance to Firth's. But as far as the "impossible uphill struggle" is concerned, it should be pointed out that Harris's remarks date from several years after the appearance of Goldsmith (1976) and Liberman and Prince (1977). By 1980 these works had already changed the research agenda of theoretical phonologists in a direction that was able to directly incorporate the insights of Firthian prosodic analysis. 8 To our knowledge, none of Harris's subsequent publications acknowledge the enormous success that this change of direction has come to enjoy. 9 If there is one feature common to all levels of grammatical description in current theoretical work, it is hierarchy. If there is one feature absent from alphabetic writing systems, it is hierarchy. Syntacticians have no interest in strings of words per se, as an orthographically-influenced approach would suggest. Rather it is the hierarchical relations of grammatical elements (encoded by such structural constructs as "c-command", "dominance", and so on) which form the primitive vocabulary in which principles of phonology, morphology, and syntax are framed. This has been true to a large extent since the earliest days
8
For interesting discussion of the extent to which current auto segmental and metrical phonology are compatible with prosodie analysis, see Goldsmith (1992). 9 Of the twenty-nine publications of his that we reviewed, not a single one cites papers in generative phonology or morphology. Aside from Harris's two-column commentary on Lightfoot (1989), the only work in generative syntax published after 1970 that he cites are four papers defending fuzzy grammar. And he cites none of Chomsky's major theoretical works published after 1975 (e.g. 1980; 1981; 1986a; 1986b; 1988). Harris, obviously, is free to read and cite whom he chooses. Yet one would expect a scholar whose expressed goal is to overturn the corrupt foundations of the field to exhibit greater erudition as to what precisely those foundations are that need overturning.
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of transformational generative grammar, though, to read Harris, one would never know it. There is work that could be taken to suggest that phonemic theory has an alphabetic bias (a conclusion reached by Olson 1993), though, curiously, Harris does not cite it. Work by José Morais and his associates (Morais 1985; Morais, Bertelson, et al. 1986; Morais, Cary, et al. 1979) demonstrates that alphabetic literates are far more adept at segmentalizing words into distinct sounds than are illiterates.10 It is not clear what bearing this fact has on the question at hand. It is well known that with training, normally submerged mental constructs can be brought to the level of consciousness. Arithmetical abilities before and after one has been explicitly taught the principles of addition, multiplication, and so on provide an example. Before the teaching, they are there latently; even innumerates can perform arithmetical operations when they have to. Yet explicit teaching of the principles makes it vastly easier for them to do so. The mastery of alphabetic writing appears to provide analogous "training" in segmenting speech into its component discrete units.11 The literature is full of references to prodigious feats of grammatical analysis by those illiterate in the language under investigation. Consider, for example, Sapir's Southern Paiute consultant Tony Tillohash and his Sarcee consultant John Whitney (Sapir 1963 [1933]), who would correct his phonetic transcriptions in favor of the phonemic ones that they "heard", i.e. were represented mentally. Since neither Southern Paiute nor Sarcee were written languages, they could hardly have been influenced by orthography. Linguistic s a y often yields subtle insights into the internalized grammars of the players. Consider, for example, the following description in Conklin (1959) of a variety of language games played by the pre-literate Hanunoo of the Philippines: The first type [of game] results from the simple rearrangement of the phonemic content of polysyllabic forms so that the initial CV of the first stem syllable is transposed with the first CV of the second syllable. Prefixes, monosyllabic particles, and vowel length position remain unchanged. In trisyllabic stems, the first and last (third) CV are transposed: a form such as balaynun 'domesticated' is pronounced nulayban.
10
Along the same lines, Read et al. (1986) show that Chinese speakers who have mastered the alphabetic pinyin script are better at segmentalization tasks than those who have not. 11 Derwing and Nearey (1986); Derwing, Nearey and Dow (1986) provide experimental evidence that suggests that speakers do have the intrinsic ability to segment their speech into phonological units.
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ROBERT D. BORSLEY & FREDERICK J. NEWMEYER In the second type... there is a simple substitution of a particular consonant phoneme... for the final consonant phoneme of each polysyllabic form. The third type... involves short prefixation with partials, i.e. with only the first CVC of each word. The fourth type... involves suffixation with partials, i.e. with only the first CV of each polysyllabic form, not counting prefixes. The fifth type... involves reduplicative suffixation with partials (which consist of the initial CV of each stem-syllable of polysyllabic forms), and the addition of the segment tag sa 'goes to', or pause, between the resulting forms. (pp. 631632)
The deft abilities of the Hanunoo at this complex form of language play bear witness, in our opinion, to their having a mental phonemic representation of each word in the language, which they are able to manipulate at will. We challenge Harris to describe these five games in a vocabulary that does not make reference, explicitly or implicitly, to the constructs of grammatical theory. Psycholinguistic research, as well, bears out the grammarians' hypotheses that their constructs are not mere orthographic after-effects. To cite only two examples from a vast literature, Lahiri and Marslen-Wilson (1991) show that speech processing makes use of underlying phonological representations, not surface phonetic ones, and Levelt (1989) demonstrates that syntactic categories such as "sentence", a noun phrase", and so on are called upon by speakers in speech production. In short, we conclude that Harris is wrong to insist that the units of grammatical theory are a by-product of the conventions of orthography. To a very great extent, it is the other way around. Phonological segments, syllables, morphemes, words, sentences, and so on are represented by orthographic units in the languages of the world because they represent real aspects of our mental grammars.
6. Generative grammar as a prescriptive
enterprise
As we noted above, Harris maintains that the grammatical theorists' rules represent a covert form of prescriptivism. He claims that: The normative grammarian is no sooner evicted from paradise than his intellectual stock-in-trade is confiscated by his evictors. The very rules he was condemned for peddling turn up on the linguist's stall, sometimes - but not always - with new labels on them. (1987b: 128-129; emphasis added)
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Characteristically, Harris fails to provide any examples of these "very rules", so we can only guess what they might be. Normative grammarians have peddled rules such as: Never end a sentence with a preposition; Say It is f not it's me, Avoid double negatives; Use which as a relative marker, not that; and Do not split infinitives. Which of these have turned up in our stall? Where specifically? What are their new labels? Harris suggests that "any categorization of usage into 'grammatical' and 'ungrammatical' involves a social value judgment of some kind, and it is idle to pretend otherwise" (1987b: 143; emphasis in original). One wonders if he has ever looked at the sort of data that linguists consider. What sort of social value judgment could be involved when a linguist points out that John is believed to be mad and Mary seems to the men to like herself are grammatical, while John is believed is mad and Mary seems to the men to like each other are not? Harris does give a couple of examples of what he considers normative judgments by supposedly descriptive grammarians, though they hardly represent traditionally-peddled proscriptions of linguistic behavior. For example, he responds to the assertion in Lightfoot (1989: 324) that null-subject sentences like ho trovato il libro are commonplace in Italian, while English-speaking children fail to hear corresponding * found the book, as follows: How many non-English-speaking linguists have been taken in by this notorious example it would be difficult to estimate. The fact is that found the book (with no subject pronoun) exemplifies a combinatorial pattern frequently encountered in colloquial English (and hence, presumably, heard by English-learning children), particularly in response to questions. (Harris 1989a: 345). Harris's observation is correct as far as it goes. Some registers of English do allow subjectless finite clauses under some circumstances. Indeed, this "English diary register" has been subject to a careful study by Haegeman (1990). But Lightfoot's point was that no register of English allows subjectless finite clauses under the conditions that a language like Italian does. As Haegeman notes, the diary register does not allow null subjects in subordinate clauses or in clauses in which some constituent is preposed. Thus, the following are impossible: (1) a. * I said that is a genius. b. * When will be able to see him?
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This is quite different from Italian (and other null-subject languages), in which null subjects are possible under both these circumstances. We have examples like the following in Italian:12 (2) a. Dissi che è un genio. said-lSG that is-3SG a genius Τ said that he/she is a genius.' b. Quando lo potro vedere? when him be-able-lSG see-INF 'When will I be able to see him?' Thus, there is a major difference between English and Italian. The facts are more complex than Lightfoot's unelaborated remarks suggest; one might accuse him of oversimplification, but it is very far fetched to accuse him of covert prescriptivism. Another example that Harris cites of a prescriptive rule masquerading as a description is "the adjective agrees with its noun in gender, number, and case" (1987b: 130). Now what exactly is the problem here? If an analysis of German leads in that direction, why shouldn't we say that German has an agreement rule? Is it the word "rule" that bothers Harris? If so, we could no doubt find an alternative. Indeed, it is worth noting that in recent years, generative linguists have appealed far more to "constraints" and "conditions" than to "rules", a fact that Harris does not remark upon. In The Language Machine, Harris remarks that "True is a word we use primarily to express our agreement with someone else's assessment of the situation or, somewhat differently, to make it clear that we do not think that person is lying" (1987b: 160). One might wonder what makes such a proposition acceptable to Harris, while he will not tolerate the statement about German adjective agreement. Our guess is that the crucial point is that the former, but not the latter, is phrased in terms of what people do, i.e. it directly describes linguistic behavior. We suspect that Harris would be happy if the German adjectival agreement rule were replaced by a statement about what German speakers do. That would be more consistent with his empiricist belief, which we will document in the following section, that the only thing that is "real" is behavior itself, not the principles underlying it. Prescriptivism is, at root, an attempt to stop people from what they are doing and to get them to start doing something else. How the examples that occur in our 12
We are indebted to Ian Roberts for providing the Italian examples.
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technical writing might play even a miniscule part in that endeavor is not revealed in any of Harris's publications that we have had the opportunity to read. It would seem to follow that if generative linguists are covert prescriptivists, then they would be careful to eschew any analysis of non-standard forms and dialects.13 This is hardly the case; two of the major debates in generative syntax, for example, have concerned the conditions under which want to might be contracted to wanna in informal speech and those under which prepositions can be "stranded" at the ends of sentences (see Postal and Pullum 1986 and Kayne 1984 respectively for discussion and reviews of the literature). One recent year saw analyses of the following non-standard dialects in Linguistic Inquiry and Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, the two leading journals of generative grammar: Bavarian German (Reis and Rosengren 1992); Haitian Creole (Deprez 1992); Belfast English (Henry 1992); Northern Italian vernacular dialects (Suñer 1992); Ottawa-Hull French (Reed 1992); American Sign Language (Perlmutter 1992); and Northern Palestinian Arabic (Shlonsky 1992). And it should hardly need to be mentioned that dozens of languages were analyzed which have never been "standardized" at all. One might also wonder what sort of prescriptivism is inherent in the work of generative linguists who work on dead languages (see Dresher & Lahiri51991and Mester 1994 for recent examples) or in that of those who attempt to provide explanations of language change (e.g. Roberts 1985; Lightfoot 1991). Are we to believe that Dresher & Lahiri and Mester were "prescribing" usage for speakers of Old English and Latin respectively? And which stage of English was Lightfoot prescribing in his explanation of the rise of accusative subjects: that prior to their rise or that following it? We must therefore conclude that Harris's claim that generative grammar is prescriptive grammar in disguise is utterly without foundation.
7. Harris's
empiricism
As we have noted, Harris's principal objection to the idea of sentence meaning as something distinct from utterance meaning is the fact that no reliable set of tests or procedures allow the former to be abstracted from the latter. Now, the rejection of abstractions on the basis of the impossibility of deriving them by a I 3 To the best of our knowledge, the first publication that argues that an analytical overemphasis on standard dialects by theoretical linguists reveals a prescriptivist bias is Newmeyer (1978 [1973]). This work is not cited by Harris. However, the increased attention to nonstandard dialects in the intervening twenty-one years has rendered the bulk of the critical remaiks of that paper inapplicable.
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mechanical procedure from a series of observations is uncontroversially the hallmark of an empiricist view of reality. While Harris never explicitly embraces empiricism, he gives himself away, as observed in Percival (1984), when he argues that "modern linguistics has proved to be no science at all". Harris writes as follows: The abstract object of knowledge, "language", is at a double remove from direct observation. It is once removed in that we cannot hope to see the workings of language except insofar as they are manifested through particular languages. But it is twice removed in that particular languages as such are not directly available to observation either. All that we can directly observe (in the sense in which "direct observation" is conducted in the natural sciences generally) are specific events, utterances, inscriptions and reactions to them by members of a linguistic community. (Harris 1981a: 44) Harris appears to assume that legitimate science is limited to classifying the products of direct observation. If that were true, then physics, as Chomsky (1972: 65) noted, would be transformed into a science of meter readings. However, numerous philosophers of science have emphasized that the goal of science is to identify the mechanisms underlying observed phenomena. This is stressed particularly forcefully in the work of Roy Bhaskar, who writes that "the objects of knowledge" are "the structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena" (Bhaskar 1975: 25) and that "...science is concerned with the behaviour of things only in as much as it casts light on their reasons for acting..." (1975: 212). This is very much the view of generative grammar. 14 Harris's empiricism also reveals itself in his reaction to Chomsky's contention that linguistic competence is just one factor involved in linguistic performance. Harris calls this an "ingenious compromise" (1981a: 109), as if it were some kind of trick. But the recognition that observed phenomena typically reflect the interaction of many different mechanisms is a fundamental feature of science. As Bhaskar notes, "The world consists of mechanisms, not events. Such mechanisms combine to generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world" (1975: 47). Only an empiricist who does not believe in anything underlying observed phenomena would see something dubious here. Since Harris rejects in principle the idea that actual behavior is the product of the interaction of a variety of different underlying mechanisms, he typically interprets any proposal regarding the properties of such mechanisms as being a 14
See Pateman (1987: Ch. 1 and 2) for relevant discussion.
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claim about behavior itself. Nowhere is this as evident as in his reaction to Chomsky's reference to the "ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly" (Chomsky 1965: 3). Harris appears to interpret this statement as being literally a claim about the observable attributes of speakers.15 Thus he has Chomsky believing ludicrous ideas such as the following (emphasis has been added in both quotes): [Speakers have] the ability to produce an infinite set of flawless sentences. (1980:18) By definition, [the ideal speaker-listener] speaks "the language" perfectly. (1981a: 33) In some passages Harris does appear to understand that Chomsky's view is that the mental grammar is just one of many factors affecting verbal behavior. But in others, amply illustrated above, his empiricism leads him to forget this view and to equate cognitive principles with the actual behavior that they underlie. As we noted in the last section, Harris's view that generativists are covert prescriptivists seems to be a manifestation of an empiricist outlook. That is, such a view appears to stem from the belief that all that is real is behavior. From this perspective, if one is not describing behavior, then one must be prescribing it. Since generativists are clearly not describing behavior, the conclusion would seem to follow that they must be prescribing it. The logic here is sound, but only an empiricist would subscribe to the crucial basic premiss. We also suggest that empiricist assumptions underlie Harris's curious belief that the generativist position is that "linguistic rules are rules which we have no option but to obey" (1987b: 136-137) and that language is "the product of mysterious inner machinery over which human beings have no control" (ibid.: 171). The real mystery is where Harris came up with such an idea. There is absolutely no suggestion in Chomsky's writings or in those of other generative linguists that we have no option but to obey linguistic rules. Chomsky (1986b: 261) in fact argues that the cognitive system involved in use of language is "cognitively penetrable" in the sense of Pylyshyn (1984) and other current work; that is, our goals, beliefs, expectations, and so forth clearly enter into our decision to use the rules in one way or another, and principles of rational inference and the like may play a role in these decisions. 15 For discussion of the idealizations embodied in the concept of the "ideal speaker-listener", see Newmeyer (1983:73-76).
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It is worth noting that this idea is not new in Chomsky's work. For example, in Chomsky (1961), he observes that striking effects can be achieved by the use of grammatically deviant sentences. Obviously, one cannot produce grammatically deviant sentences if one has no option but to obey the rules. Thus, for Chomsky, linguistic rules are just one factor involved in the use of language. It seems to us that Harris's inability to understand this is another manifestation of his empiricist outlook. There is hardly a publication of Harris's that we reviewed in which his empiricism does not come to the fore. For example, it is evident in his attempted deconstruction of the "word" (1972), the "morpheme" (1973b: Ch. 3), and the "phoneme" (1981a: 58f.), which are based explicitly on the demonstration of difficulty in providing discovery procedures that reliably identify them. But most linguists have accepted since Chomsky (1957) that it is unreasonable to expect linguistic theory (or any other theory, for that matter) to provide discovery procedures by which theoretical constructs might unfailingly be isolated. In short, Harris's critique of modern linguistic concepts represents a regression to a form of empiricism more extreme even than that advocated by Leonard Bloomfield and his followers. After all, the Bloomfieldians were willing to admit a pretheoretical distinction between vocalizations that belong to language and those that do not. Harris (1981a: 165; 1990c: 50) is not willing to do so.
8. Integrational
linguistics
Harris's notion of an integrational linguistics, in which linguistics is redefined as "a mode of inquiry into the construction and articulation of our linguistic experience", is hardly "in contrast to all previous linguistic programmes" (Harris 1990c: 50). The call for such an approach in linguistics dates at least from early 1970s work in ethnography of speaking and conversation analysis. So, for example, in 1974 Dell Hymes devoted pages to the same criticisms of "rigid dichotomies" in linguistics that Harris's writings would echo years later. Hymes outlined a program for linguistics that, among other things, called for an approach to "performance as accomplishment and responsibility, investiture and emergence" and to "languages as what their users have made of them (not just what human nature has given)" (Hymes 1974: 206). Even earlier, the papers in Gumperz and Hymes (1972) had (in the words of Duranti 1988: 222) stressed "the role of speech in creating context, the need to take the participants' perspective in the analysis of their interaction, the cooperative nature of verbal communication - the latest feature being related, but not identical, to the claim of the emergent nature of (some aspects of) the social order".
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This work has spawned an enormous literature, which is all but ignored by Harris. Likewise, we have found no citations to the "Universalpragmatik" of Habermas (1976); to A. L. Becker' work on "text-building" (e.g. Becker 1979); or to Paul Hopper's "emergent grammar" (Hopper 1987; 1988), even though these programs are, in relevant respects, identical to Harris's, and a good deal better worked out. Even in 1990, practically a decade after his first call for an integrationalist approach (1981a), all Harris could talk about was what such an approach "would" do or "will" do, not about what it has done (1990c: 45ff). By way of comparison, imagine Chomsky writing in 1966, nine years after the appearance of Syntactic Structures, about what generative grammar might be able to accomplish in the future. A bibliography published the previous year (Dingwall 1965) listed no fewer than 962 publications written within the framework of the theory or addressing its claims. We, in fact, do find aspects of Harris's program to be of interest. For example, his advocacy of an investigation of the semiology of written texts (Harris 1984b) strikes us as a reasonable one. And we have no quarrel in principle with investigating the extent to which "communication [is] a function of the individual's experience in the context of a given situation" (Harris 1990c: 50), though our interpretation of what that would involve would most likely differ from Harris's interpretation. But the point is that such undertakings do not challenge to one slight degree the fundamental principles of generative grammar. Again, strictly linguistic knowledge (I-language) is but one system of many involved in actual use of language for communicative purposes. This point can be driven home, perhaps, by an examination of Harris's contention that the underlying assumptions of modern linguistics "effectively preclude[s] any possibility of raising issues concerning freedom of speech" (1990b: 153). Now, whether Harris knows it or not (and there is no reason to think that he knows it), Chomsky has devoted dozens, if not hundreds, of pages to exposing the manipulative use of language, in particular by the leaders of the American political establishment and their apologists, and to showing that the term "freedom of speech" is often used as a protective cover by those who would wish to deny it to others. In Chomsky (1986b), for example, he exposes the use of terms like "aggression", "doves", "hawks", "peace process", and "terrorism" in American political discourse. Surely, the fact that Chomsky sees no inconsistency between such work and his grammatical theorizing (to the point where both occur within the covers of the same book) is prima facie evidence that the study of formal grammars and their properties complements, rather than challenges, the study of language in its communicative setting. It is tempting to draw a moral from the fact that after fifteen years of rhetoric, there is no field of integrational linguistics. Successful linguistic programs, just
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like successful programs for research in other disciplines, have always been prepared to draw distinctions and to concentrate on some phenomena at the expense of others. Integrational linguistics has not been willing to do so, and has as a result doomed itself to sterility.
9. Concluding
remarks
In one way, Harris's writings are more impressive than those of other critics of generative grammar. Their broad historical sweep and their breadth of reference distinguishes them from the typical critique, which tends to focus on one or two perceived theory-internal defects or inconsistencies. In another way, however, what Harris has to say is far less impressive than the run-of-the mill criticism. As we have seen, it is remarkable for its myopic focus on what he takes to be the corrupt pedigree of the theory and its concomitant refusal to attend to what generative linguists actually say. Despite the fact that Harris, unlike many critics, has a significant band of followers, there is no sign that they are developing an alternative approach to linguistics.16 "Integrational linguistics" is no more than a name for a promissory note. There is no likelihood, then, that Harris will have any impact within linguistics. This being so, many of our colleagues would no doubt ask us: Why bother to discuss his ideas at all? One answer, of course, is that doing so is an interesting intellectual exercise. But there is a more important answer. Our impression is that Harris's writings are mainly read by non-linguists with an interest in language. We think it matters how linguistics is perceived by outsiders. It would be unfortunate indeed if the picture he paints of generative grammar were to be seen as an accurate one. We hope to have demonstrated that it is a seriously distorted picture, based on false premises, profound misunderstanding, and defective reasoning.
16
Papers in Davis and Taylor (1990), in particular those by Nigel Love and Talbot J. Taylor, present a Harrisian perspective on some issues. For a critique, see Borsley (1992).
3 Telementation and Generative Linguistics Philip Carr
1. Introduction One aspect of what Roy Harris (1981a, 1987b) calls "the language myth" is the idea that communication between humans may take the form of the mechanical transference or transmission of ideas from one human being to another in accordance with a largely shared and fixed code. Harris refers to this putative process as "telementation" and denies (with considerable justification) that it exists. Harris also takes it that generative linguistics subscribes to this myth, and thus concludes that the generative enterprise is fundamentally misconceived. In this paper, I will seek to show, following Burton-Roberts (1994) and Burton-Roberts & Carr (in preparation), that the current "minimalist" conception of I-language (Chomsky 1992), under which I-language is conceived of as generating linguistic expressions (structural descriptions) ! which are instructions for performance systems, does indeed commit the generative enterprise to a version of the telementation thesis. I argue that Harris is right to deny the existence of such a phenomenon, and that a strict "internalist" conception of language, of the sort that Chomsky has all along been seeking to elaborate, conflicts with the telementational thesis which current work finds itself committed to. I will focus on the notion that linguistic expressions include the level of representation known as Phonetic Form (PF), details of which are spelled out, as Chomsky (1992: 4, footnote 3) indicates, by Bromberger & Halle (1989). I will 1
As will become clear, the term "linguistic expression" is somewhat unfortunate with respect to what follows, in that the verb "express" suggests externalisation of something internal, a telementational notion which, I will be suggesting, is inappropriate to a strictly internalist conception of language. "Structural description" is no better, since it is founded on a two-place predicate under which the S.D. is a description of something, which is also unsatisfactory, for the same reason. I prefer the term "linguistic object", but I continue to use "linguistic expression" in order to connect what is being said here with current generative literature. The reader should think of "expression" as in "mathematical expression".
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examine those details and seek to show that, in conceiving of PF either in terms of instructions to an artidilatory performance system, or as articulatory intentions, generative theory adopts a version of the telementation thesis. My general conclusion, again following Burton-Roberts (1994) and Burton-Roberts & Carr (in preparation), will be that a strict internalist conception of language, and with it the innateness hypothesis, is sustainable only if linguistic expressions are not conceived of as instructions to performance systems. In brief, generative thinking on the internalist conception of language has been less radical than it might have been, and has thus laid itself open to Harris's valid accusation that generative linguistics subscribes to the myth of telementation. However, a non-telementational generative linguistics is perfectly possible, if the minimalist programme becomes somewhat more minimalist, and if a new, non-instructional conception of linguistic expressions is adopted. The paper is set out as follows. In section 2,1 stress the fundamentally occult nature of the telementational thesis. In section 3, I introduce the current "Minimalist" model of generative grammar. I then seek to show two things. Firstly, that the current generative conception of linguistic expressions as instructions to behave or intentions to behave is inconsistent with the Chomskyan view that language is entirely internal and not designed for use. Secondly, and more specifically, that the level known as PF is inconsistent in this way, is telementational in nature, and is profoundly problematic. I end, in section 4, with some concluding remarks on the generative understanding of realism and its relation to the notion "linguistic behaviour", subscribed to by both Chomsky and Harris, suggesting that such a notion is an empiricist notion, and inconsistent with the "internalist" ("I-language") conception of language as espoused by Chomsky (1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1993b, 1995).
2. The occult nature of the telementational
thesis
I begin by assuming that human beings do not possess powers of telepathy. By "telepathy", I mean the transmission by one human being of propositional content2 to another without engaging in any observable behaviour. Let us take it
2 I appreciate that Harris and his followers almost certainly do not accept that there are such things as propositions. But one has to start somewhere. I will be assuming that human beings are capable of engaging in mental activities which can reasonably be described as "entertaining propositions". This seems uncontroversial: it is hard to see how deductive or inductive reasoning, which surely exist, can be described other than in propositional terms.
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that this assumption is well-founded.3 The "telepathy" idea is clearly an occult idea. Intriguingly, however, the idea that we may transmit propositional content by means of observable behaviour (telementation) is not generally taken to be an occult idea. And yet, on any kind of close inspection, the telementation idea is strikingly occult. If we subscribe to the telementation idea, we are committed to claiming that propositional content can somehow be "encoded" such that objects which are claimed by generativists to be entirely cognitive in nature (i.e. linguistic expressions) can be "transformed" or "transmogrified" into something externally physical and observable, in the sense of being external to the mind/brain. This idea of transmogrification is, I will seek to show, central to the notion of the "externalisation" of the internal (and indeed "internalisation" of the external). Both notions, externalisation and internalisation, are central to the current Minimalist Programme, as I will seek to show below: speakers are said, in current generative work, to have internalised an I-language. This clearly implies that the I-language was in some sense external in the first place, and yet generativists deny that language is external. The point is an important one: if "I-language" means "internalised language" (and almost all generativists, including Borsley and Newmeyer, in their contribution to this volume, say that it does) then language cannot be entirely internal. If, on the other hand, language is entirely internal, then one cannot coherently speak of it as having been internal/serf. Something has to give, and for the generativist, it ought to be the twin ideas of internalisation/externalisation. If the linguistic is entirely internal then that which is external cannot be linguistic. Thus, there can be no aspects of behaviour which are linguistic in any coherent sense: there can be no such thing as linguistic behaviour. The idea that there can be a transmogrification of cognitive objects into external, observable behaviour (externalisation), and a reverse transmogrification in the opposite direction (internalisation), is more occult than the alchemist's claim that base metals may be transmuted into gold, or the Roman Catholic notion of trans-substantiation, since base metals, gold, wine and blood are at least all physical types whose tokens are externally observable, and at least some physical transformations are known to be possible. But to posit an ontological distinction, as generative linguists do, between cognitive states and 3 Even if experiments such as those carried out at Edinburgh University under the guidance of its Professor of Parapsychology did demonstrate possession of some kind of "parapsychological" powers by some individuals (and it is a matter of some controversy whether they do), such experiments never, apparently, involve "transmission" of large sets of arbitrarily chosen propositions, such as, say "The Chancellor will consider lowering interest rates if inflation targets are met within the forthcoming twelve month period". I take it that not even parapsychologists make the claim that this is possible.
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observable behaviour, and then allow that the one can be transformed into another, is to allow that transmutation can occur across quite distinct ontological categories. It is clear that any generative linguist would wish to deny that current generative theory is committed to this occult transmogrification proposition. It is my purpose, in what follows, to show that current generative thinking is indeed committed to it, and to suggest that it need not be.
3. The Minimalist
Programme
and problems with PF
3.1 The Minimalist Programme For Chomsky (1992, 1995 and elsewhere), the central component of the language faculty is I-language (which Chomsky identifies with language), where "I" is translated variously as Internalised language or Intensional language.4 A speaker's I-language is said to generate linguistic expressions (known as structural descriptions). Each linguistic expression is a sequence of representations, one at each linguistic level, the levels provided by Universal Grammar. The I-language is said to be embedded in performance systems, which "enable its expressions to be used for articulating, interpreting, referring, reflecting and other actions" (Chomsky 1992: 2). Despite the fact that, for Chomsky, language is not "designed for use", he thinks of linguistic expressions as complexes of instructions for these performance systems (Chomsky 1992: 2, 1993b: 184, 1995: 15): he "expects to find connections between properties of the language and the manner of its use" (1992: 3). Here lies Chomsky's fatal compromise: he ought not to expect this. It is in this instructional conception of linguistic expressions that the inconsistency between the internalist conception of language and the role and nature of linguistic expressions is to be found: if linguistic expressions are said to be instructional in nature, then that is tantamount to allowing that they are indeed "designed for use". Two major sorts of performance system assumed by Chomsky concern articulation and perception on the one hand and conceptual/intentional activity on the other. Linguistic expressions are said to contain instructions for each of these. The instructions to the articulation/perception performance system are referred to as Phonetic Form (PF) and those to the conceptual/intentional system are 4
For the reasons given briefly above, which are elaborated at greater length by Burton-Roberts (1994) and Burton-Roberts and Carr (in preparation), the term "Internal language" is preferable, and the terms "Internalised language" and "Intensional language" inappropriate to and inconsistent with a strictly internalist conception of language of the sort Chomsky seeks to develop.
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generally known as Logical Form (LF). Chomsky (1992: 3; 1995: 15) also assumes that an I-language contains two components: a lexicon and a computational system, whereby the lexicon "specifies the items that enter into the computational system" (1992: 3) which uses these items to generate linguistic expressions. 5 Thus, an I-language "generates an infinite set of linguistic expressions, each a pair drawn from the interface levels (PF, LF) respectively." (1992: 6; 1995: 15). I now consider, in some detail, the nature and function of PF as currently conceived, and the problems associated with that conception. 3.2 Type, token and telementation in PF The distinction between the linguistic, characterised as cognitive in nature, and behaviour has been fundamental to generative linguistics since its inception. The Chomskyan notion of the linguistic, conceived of as "knowledge", is a static conception: to "know a language" is to be in a certain cognitive state. In the expression "to know a language", "know" is not to be interpreted as a two-place predicate: it is not that there is some language or grammar, subsisting external to the individual, which that individual gains knowledge of; rather, "know" is to be interpreted as a one-place predicate. It is therefore unfortunate that the linguistic should be referred to by Chomsky as "internalised language", since that implies the making internal of something which exists outside of the individual, and that is not what is intended by Chomsky. The expression "knowledge of language" is also rather unfortunate,6 since it implies that linguistic knowledge is knowledge of something, but that is not what Chomsky intended "know" to convey; thus the well-known Chomskyan expression "to cognise", rather than "to know". Similarly, when Chomsky speaks of linguistic representations, he does not intend this to mean representations of the linguistic: representation is not to be interpreted as a two-place predicate. Rather, linguistic representations, as conceived of by Chomsky, are part of what constitutes linguistic knowledge: a linguistic representation is something which is mentally constituted.
5
I lack the space to pursue the interesting idea that Universal Grammar allows, via "parameter setting" for very limited variation involving "PF options and lexical arbitrariness" (Chomsky 1992: 5). Note that if neither PF nor the lexicon are taken to fall within I-language, then the way is open to conceiving of UG as entirely invariant, rather than "mostly" invariant, in the way that Chomsky (1991a: 23) suggests. 6 It is thus unfortunate that the phrase constitutes the very title of a book on the subject of the linguistic conceived of as a cognitive state: Chomsky (1986). However, it is clear from the claims made in that work, and indeed all of Chomsky's work prior to that, that no "knowledge o f relation is postulated with respect to the linguistic.
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Under this view, the phonological {qua object of inquiry), since it is linguistic, is constituted as a cognitive state, and is distinct from behaviour. It must be stressed that Chomsky has often been at pains to point out that the linguistic is not orientated towards behaviour. That is, the linguistic is not constituted as either ability or intention to behave. The term "competence" was probably abandoned by Chomsky (in favour of "I-language") precisely because it lent itself to an interpretation of the linguistic in such a behaviourally-orientated way (i.e. as ability or capacity to behave). If we insist upon a conception of the linguistic which is not behaviourally orientated, we are therefore following the spirit of Chomsky's work. But the problem with the current conception of PF, as adopted by Bromberger & Halle (henceforth B&H: 1989, 1992), and subscribed to by Chomsky (1992) himself, is that it conceives of phonological expressions as mental states orientated towards behaviour and is deeply problematic. Let us see how. B&H (1989: 53) adopt the view that phonology, unlike syntax, "is primarily concerned with the connections between forms that can serve as input to our articulatory machinery". Phonology is, for them, "concerned with the relationship between representations that encode the same type of information phonetic information - but do so in ways that serve distinct functions: articulation and audition on the one hand and memory on the other" (1989: 53). Phonological features are defined by them (p. 54) as "linguistic-phonetic behaviours"(emphasis mine: PC). Speakers, they claim (p. 56), "represent words in their memory by means of a code that is directly related to ways of producing linguistic sounds". That is, phonological expressions, constituted as mental representations, are composed, not of purely abstract, purely cognitive, objects, but of objects that encode details of physical articulation: they are geared towards phonetic events. These statements clearly express the widely held view that it is in the very nature of the phonological to be dedicated to the connection between linguistic expressions and articulatory/acoustic events, that the phonetic and the phonological interpenetrate. This view of the phonological is still adopted by Chomsky himself, thus: "As for the latter [the rules of the phonological component: PC], it still seems to me that they have something like the form originally assumed in early generative phonology, now understood in the familiar broad sense" (Chomsky 1991a: 23). It is in terms of such an interpenetration that the notion "linguistic occurrence" is connected with a more general notion of physical occurrence, such that tokens of linguistic expressions are said to be capable of being articulated and heard. B&H clearly subscribe to this view: "utterances are sequences of word tokens produced one after another" (B&H 1989: 55). Thus, "tokens" of linguistic expressions ("tokens of words") may "figure in utterances" (1989: 53), where "figure" clearly means "occur".
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Similarly, surface phonetic representations are "generated (sic) only when a word figures in an actual utterance" (1989: 53). This is the "manifestation" conception (by now traditional in generative linguistics and certainly subscribed to by Chomsky himself) of the relation between, on the one hand, phonological objects qua linguistic expressions and, on the other, observable phonetic events. As Chomsky (1993b: 184) puts it, "particular signals are manifestations of linguistic expressions". That "manifestation" (or "realisation") conception is entirely telementational: it amounts to the claim that linguistic expressions are encoded in the speech signal, which is then decoded by the hearer. The hearer may thus be said to perceive, within the acoustic signal (via performance systems) its linguistic properties. Additionally, Bromberger (1992: 14) conceives of orthographic events such that they "encode" sentences: a clearly telementational conception of those events. For him, different placement of utterance accent "creates different grammatical objects". But this is to imply that utterances may be grammatical, i.e. linguistic, objects. He asks how it can be that non-spatiotemporal types may be instantiated as tokens; his view of "linguistic types" is that they are merely theoretical constructs, and he commits himself to the claim that the evidential basis in linguistics "consists mainly of tokens" (p. 15) such that tokens, but not their types, are objectively real. This conception of "linguistic tokens" is incoherent. Bromberger seeks to allow for the existence of linguistic tokens while denying that there are linguistic types. But the notion "token" has no meaning independently of the notion "type"; the two are defined in relation to one another. One cannot speak of tokens other than as tokens of types. That is what "token" means. Consequently, one must either abandon the type/token relationship in discussing linguistic expressions, or spell out a coherent conception of it as applied to such expressions. One cannot coherently abandon talk of types while retaining talk of tokens. Equally importantly, talk of manifestation, realisation or externalisation of linguistic expressions is telementational talk: if these expressions are manifested, they "become" observable, are transmogrified into, or encoded in, observable physical events. If this were not being claimed by generativists, there would be no sense in the notion, much appealed to by generativists, of "Primary Linguistic Data" (PLD): this data, crucial to the current generative conception of language "acquisition", is claimed to be simultaneously sensory and linguistic. In short, generativists currently claim that acoustic events may have linguistic properties, an idea which is positively medieval in its occult nature: in the late twentieth century, we ought to be asserting that acoustic events have only acoustic properties. Alas, the myth of telementation is alive and well and embedded in the PLD idea.
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3.3 Articulatory intentions,phonological "events"and
PFasinstructions
B&H (1992) claim that the objects of phonological theory are "neither noises, nor gymnastics, nor Platonic ideas" (the latter expression reflects Bromberger's interpretation of constructs as types), but "a class of occurrent intentions and occurrent mental states" (Bromberger 1992: 16). B&H therefore claim that the object of phonological enquiry is to be characterised in terms of intentions orientated towards behaviour. Let us consider an example which will make this clear, and then consider the problems arising from that conception of the phonological. The example concerns a particular utterance, uttered by Bromberger during a talk at Uppsala, and labelled by B&H as "event (1)". I will represent that event as in(l): (1) The merchant sold shelves.
B&H say that many things happened when the event represented by (1) occurred. Among these are noises, bodily movements and brain and neurological events. Additionally, they claim, (1) illustrates "a phonological event' (emphasis mine: PC), which can be examined in the light of phonological theory and given a phonological analysis. They then show how a phonologist would "represent" that event, and present a representation for the initial stage in a phonological derivation, another for an intermediate stage in that derivation, and, finally, a "systematic phonetic" representation corresponding to the final stage of the derivation. Each of the three lines, they claim, stands for some fact about the "phonological event" in question. The production of event (1) was, B&H say, an action, and like other actions, it was brought about by a distinctive kind of mental state, namely an "intention". By "intention", they mean "a familiar kind of purposive mental stance" (B&H 1992: 213). In order to explicate this "purposive mental stance", they offer an analogy: Think of someone aiming a rifle at a target. That person moved and positioned limbs, head, eyes, etc. in certain ways. But more went on. After all, the movements were not made accidentally, or by way of checking whether the barrel is in line with the butt. The person was set psychologically in a distinct way, i.e. had distinct intentions. More specifically, a person who aims a rifle has certain effects in mind, plans moves in ways calculated to achieve those effects,
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and, crucially from our point of view, has the intellectual capacity to select those effects and to devise the gestures that achieve them. (B&H 1992: 213) For B&H, event (1) was like the aiming of a rifle, it required a distinctive mind set, distinctive intentions on my part, intentions that I could not have formed without certain pre-existing intellectual capacities. Of course, I had many intentions when I produced it: I intended to give you an example, I intended to be understood, I intended to produce a sentence that you have probably never heard before [emphasis mine: PC]. But only some of my intentions account for the fact that I pronounced (1) [emphasis in original: PC], that (1) was an action of pronouncing something in a language I know, in my idiolect of English. Those intentions are the kinds of facts about (1) that we take (2) [the phonological derivation offered: PC] to represent. (B&H 1989: 213) They characterise the initial level of representation in a phonological derivation, which, they claim, eventuates in that utterance, as one of a series of intentions responsible for event (1), namely, the intentions to use certain words, e.g. the noun "merchant", the verb "sell" marked for past tense, etc. in a certain order. (B&H 1992: 216) The mental state which accompanies the firing of a rifle is a behaviourally orientated state: it is constituted in terms of intentions to behave, to perform certain acts, to bring about certain spatiotemporal events. And it is in precisely these terms that B&H conceive of the phonological expressions which figure in the first stage of their derivation: as stored memories which map directly on to intentions to bring about certain spatiotemporal (for them, articulatory) events. But they also conceive of their "systematic phonetic" representation (the final stage in the derivation) as also "standing for a series of intentions that generated [emphasis mine: PC; see § 3.4] those movements" (219), i.e. the articulatory movements in question. 7 Thus, the "[m]" in their systematic phonetic 7
It is not clear that it is quiterightto speak of intentions of this sort. In the case of therifle,it seems that the person has the intention to hit the target; whether the physical movements carried out in aid of this intention are themselves intentional is a moot point, since many, perhaps all, of them may occur at the level of motor controls, and such movements are not very clearly describable in terms of intentions. Similarly, when one walks towards a given point, it is reasonable to say that one has the intention to arrive at that point, but it is not at all clear that one has the intention, in arriving at that point, to put one leg in front of the other, bring
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transcription "represents an intention". But it does not just represent an intention to lower the velum, adjust the stiffness of the vocal cords and close the lips (since one can have that intention while intending to hum a tune); rather, "the '[m]' in (2c) represents an intention to act so as to produce a specific English speech sound, a token of the phoneme /m/." (215) It is clear from these comments that the initial stage in a phonological derivation is said to represent a set of intentions, and so too does the final stage. Interestingly, they take the final stage in the derivation, their (2c), to be entirely linguistic: "It only contains linguistic information and takes into account only linguistic knowledge." (215). It is clear from this that, for B&H, the phonological is conceived of as linguistic and is simultaneously conceived of in terms of intentions to perform articulatory events. Thus, for B&H, there are such things as "phonological events", a bizarre idea if, as is claimed, an I-language is a cognitive state, if linguistic expressions are abstract objects (rather than events) generated by the I-language, if those expressions are in part phonological, and if phonetic events are distinct from I-language. This conception of the phonological is deeply problematic. Consider the conception of phonological derivation which it provides. The first stage in the derivation of the expression "sold", in their example, is characterised as { [ s " | ] , Vb...} + { Q, Past...}. B&H are committed to the claim that, at that stage in the derivation, the speaker is possessed of an intention to utter [s"l], and perhaps to "utter it in the past tense" (whatever that may mean: it is not clear exactly what precise intention B&H propose to be represented by "{Q, Past..}"). This then converts, at the intermediate stage of the derivation, into an intention to utter [sol], and perhaps also "to utter the past tense" (again, whatever that may mean). Finally, the speaker is possessed of an intention to utter [sold]. B&H conceive of these fluctuating articulatory intentions in terms of "a mental computation" over intentions (215): the final stage in the derivation is "the result of a mental computation" (215). Thus, in uttering "[sold]", the speaker must formulate a specifically articulatory intention to utter the vowel ["]; that intention must somehow transform itself into a quite distinct articulatory intention: the intention
forward the other leg, and so on. In a similar vein, I would wish to claim that the speaker intends to utter and intends his interlocutor to know what propositional content he is entertaining. It is not at all clear that there are, additionally, intentions to close the lips, slacken the vocal cords, etc, in the manner that B&H envisage. Many, perhaps all, of those articulatory movements must surely take place at the motor-control level, and are thus not very clearly accompanied by intentional mental states of the sort B&H postulate. If we conceive of acts of speech without appeal to the idea of such states, no telementational aspect enters into the picture.
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to utter the vowel [o]. But this is surely an entirely implausible account of a speaker's articulatory intentions in uttering the noises "[sold]". 8 While Chomsky (1992) says that he subscribes to B&H's account of PF, he also adopts the view (1995: 19) that PF constitutes instructions which are common to both articulation (as in B&H) and perception, a view which, as he puts it, is "not at all obvious, hence interesting if true". He points out that the elements of these symbolic objects [PF and LF: PC] can be called "phonetic" and "semantic" features, respectively, but we should bear in mind that all of this is pure syntax, completely internalist, the study of mental representations and computations, much like the inquiry into how the image of a cube rotating in space is determined from retinal stimulations, or imagined. (1995: 19) And yet, We may take the semantic features S of an expression Ε to be its meaning and the phonetic features to be its sound; Ε means S in something like the sense of the corresponding English word, and Ε sounds Ρ in a similar sense, S and Ρ providing the relevant information for the performance systems. (1995: 20; emphasis in original: PC) It is not at all clear how a PF can simultaneously be the "sound" of a linguistic expression in any coherent sense while remaining "pure syntax", or, put another way, that linguistic expressions, conceived of in a purely internalist manner, could in any sense have a sound. Nor is it clear in what coherent sense PF can be phonetic if, as Chomsky claims, the language faculty is not tied to specific sensory modalities, contrary to what was assumed not long ago. Thus, the sign language of the deaf is structurally much like spoken language... the analytic mechanisms of the language faculty seem to be triggered in much the same ways whether the input is auditory, 8
If it is reasonable to speak of "articulatory intentions" at all when describing ordinary speech (i.e. not when describing many of the actions undertaken in a phonetics class), which is doubtful. Note that conscious intentions to lower the velum etc. actually inhibit fluent articulation: in order to become fluent in a foreign language, it is crucial that one gets to the point of not formulating conscious articulatory intentions. The English-speaker who is consciously intending to utter, say a nasalised vowel of a certain sort when speaking French is, almost by definition, not fluent in French. Formulating articulatory intentions and speaking fluently appear to be incompatible activities.
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There is no indication at all in B&H (1989) that their account of phonetic features is capable of acting as instructional input to perceptual, rather than articulatory, performance systems, and even then their account of PF as input to articulation is profoundly problematic, as we have seen. It is even less clear in what sense B&H's account of PF could possibly act as input to the performance systems of the deaf, or what the "P(honetic)" in PF could possibly amount to in the I-language of a deaf person. Chomsky (1995: 20) allows that a linguistic expression is "accessed by performance systems that interpret it, on the receptive side, and articulate it typically using it for one or another speech act, on the productive side. How is that done? The articulatory-perceptual aspects have been intensively studied, but these matters are still poorly understood." There is a fundamental problem here: on the one hand, linguistic expressions, under a strictly internalist conception of language, must be "pure syntax"; on the other hand, those expressions, when construed as input to performance systems, cannot be pure syntax. The root of the problem lies in the idea that linguistic expressions act as input to performance systems, and what is required is a conception of those expressions such that they are not conceived of in this way. The linguistic endowment shared by deaf and hearing people could not possibly be modality-specific, as Chomsky points out; what neither he nor B&H point out is that it follows from this that there can be no such thing as PF within those expressions.9 3.4 Production, generation, sentence and utterance It is striking that Harris (1987) does not discuss the distinction often made in the generative literature between "generate" and "produce". Where that distinction has been made, it consists in construing the term "generate" in a special, rather technical, and entirely formal, sense: a generative grammar "generates" a set of sentences in the sense that it formally characterises a set of expressions such that one can tell, by examining the grammar, whether a given expression is or is not generated by a particular grammar. In this sense, generative grammars are said 9
It is as well to note, at this stage, that almost all of the points made here can be dismissed as "pointless terminological controversy" (Chomsky 1993b: 184). But the issues are philosophical, and in philosophy one is obliged to choose one's terms carefully and use them as consistently as possible. Linguists typically get around issues such as these by means of copious use of inverted commas. Thus, PF, while said to be phonetic, is not really phonetic at all; thus it may be referred to as "phonetic".
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not to produce anything, and certainly are not said to produce utterances. With this conception of the notion "generate", we distinguish between grammars generating (infinite sets of) sentences and speakers producing (finite sets of) utterances, where sentences are not observable events, but utterances are. The term "generate" did indeed appear to have rather literal overtones in early generative work, and continued to be used in its literal sense of "produce" in much later work. This literal sense may well have arisen partly out of a confusion between finite-state grammars and finite-state automata, and was, no doubt, not helped by the fact that the series of rewrite rules in finite-state grammars were often referred to as "productions". The term "string" helped muddy the waters further: grammars were said to generate strings, and strings were easily thought of in terms of sequences of physical objects, that is, in terms of observable events. The confusion must also have arisen partly because of the everyday meaning of the word "generate", which is often synonymous with "produce". Harris can therefore be partially forgiven for taking the word at face value (not that he would accept that the word has a face value!); but a closer reading of generative work on his part would have revealed the special, technical, use of the word. It would also have revealed much inconsistency in that literature, with "generate" and "produce", "sentence" and "utterance" frequently used interchangeably; I will give some examples shortly. There is a deep-seated problem for generative theory lurking behind the conflation of "generate" and "produce" and the conflation of "sentence" and "utterance", and that problem resides in the notion "linguistic behaviour", which both Harris and Chomsky appear to subscribe to, and which I return to briefly in section 4. Take Harris's interpretation of the notion "rule" as it has been used in the generative literature. Harris's is a behavioural interpretation: he construes grammars as production devices, by means of which human beings engage in articulatory behaviour which results in the production of acoustic events, events which have linguistic properties. On this view, the generativist's rules are rules which guide linguistic behaviour. This conception of the generative notion of linguistic rule is quite distinct from, and indeed inconsistent with, the non-literal, formal sense of "generate". Under that formal notion, the rules of a generative grammar do not produce behaviour. Borsley and Newmeyer are right to point out that the notion "rule" plays little or no role in current generative work, and that notions such as "principle", "parameter" and "constraint" have superseded rule-based work. It may be thought that this conceptual development rather undermines Harris's criticisms, and perhaps shows them to have been misconceived in the first place. But the problem of linguistic behaviour remains. B&N object that Harris takes it that the goal of the linguist is to directly describe "linguistic behaviour", but that is to
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concede that behaviour may have linguistic properties, and generative theory cannot make that concession without compromising its internalist basis. Both Harris and the generativists subscribe to the idea that observable behaviour may be linguistic. For Harris, verbal behaviour and linguistic behaviour appear to be synonymous. For him, there are such things as words, and they are externally observable in nature. He claims that communication is a matter of making sense of such verbal or linguistic behaviour, but not in the sense of decoding a signal which is an encoding of thoughts. Nonetheless, he does perhaps think that words, conceived of this way, have meaning, but only in the sense that they are imbued with meaning by the context of utterance, not in the sense that they have meaning in and of themselves. Let us assume, with Chomsky (1986b, 1991a and b, 1992, 1993b, 1995), and against Harris (1981a, 1987b), a distinction between I-language on the one hand and observable, Ε-physical behaviour on the other, where "E-physical" means physical in the sense of being external to cognitive states.10 If generative linguists wish to uphold a sentence/utterance distinction, and want to deny that speakers may "produce sentences", then they must maintain a consistent distinction between the linguistic and the Ε-physical, such that linguistic expressions (including sentences and words) are quite distinct in their ontology from utterances (which are physical events) and are not brought into being by acts of uttering: they are not "produced". Generativists seek to uphold a strict distinction between the wholly abstract, cognitive expressions generated by the grammar and utterances produced by speakers; that is, "generate" is not synonymous with "produce". The problem with the conception of PF as elaborated by Bromberger & Halle is that it is quite inconsistent with respect to these distinctions, distinctions which play a crucial role in determining one's conception of the phonetics/phonology relation. This becomes clear if we attempt to establish where B&H stand on these matters. Let us now attempt to do so. On the one hand, the generate/produce and sentence/utterance distinctions are apparently nbt upheld by B&H: they speak of "producing sentences" that one has probably never heard before, as we have seen: I intended to produce a sentence that you have probably never heard before. (213) That which is physically heard is acoustic in nature, i.e. is Ε-physical; thus, for B&H, sentences are conceived of as physical events, and can be heard; they are 10 The advantage of the term "Ε-physical" is that, conceived of this way, it allows us to distinguish between cognitive states and physical behaviour without addressing the mind/brain issue and thus the matter of the sense in which cognitive states might be physical.
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thus indistinguishable from utterances. B&H also allow, as we have seen, that articulatory movements (which are undeniably physical events) are said to be generated: they speak of a series of intentions that generated those movements (219) If sentences are said to be produced on particular occasions, they are being equated with utterances. So sentences may be said to be produced and utterances may be said to be generated. On the face of it, then, B&H are not concerned to distinguish generation from production, nor sentences from utterances. On the other hand, the final point in a phonological derivation, which constitutes the output of operation of the phonological component of the grammar, is said by them to be entirely linguistic, and is not, they urge, to be equated with actual articulatory events. That output is, they say, like a musical score, something that can be executed through motions, but need not be executed, and often is not. (B&H 1992: 215) It seems clear that B&H, in this latter statement, wish to deny that the grammar generates actual physical events. And yet that is precisely what they have said the grammar does; clearly, B&H have committed themselves to a contradiction. B&H do not offer a consistent conception of the relation between the phonological and Ε-physical, observable behaviour, or a consistent conception of the phonological. B&H are faced with two options: they could claim that, in the course of a derivation, the phonological, not conceived of in terms of intentions, is mapped on to the phonological. They would then need to map the final stage in such a derivation on to articulatory intentions. Or they can choose to incorporate articulatory intentions into the phonological, which they do, but that option results in the implausible claim that one set of articulatory intentions is transformed into a quite distinct set of articulatory intentions in the course of a derivation. Another problem with B&H's conception is that it is not clear what the status might be of computations performed over intentions; that is, it is not clear that those computations need not themselves be intentional. Finally, it is clear that B&H conceive of a phonological derivation as a series of intentional events in real time, and that too is problematic, since it entails a conception of the phonological as event-like, which is inconsistent with the claim that to "know a language" is to be in a certain cognitive state, rather than to bring about certain events. That is, to impute eventhood to linguistic expressions is to attribute properties of the Ε-physical to the cognitive.
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It is fundamental to the generative enterprise that process terminology used in discussing linguistic expressions be interpreted merely as a façon de parler". if generative grammars are to be conceived of as generating sets of expressions, then that set does not constitute a set of utterances or a set of behaviours; a generative grammar is not a theory of utterance production; it is not a theory of behaviour. It is true that there are those (e.g. Wilks 1987) who justifiably regard such process terminology as a remarkably unhelpful and misleading façon de parler. But generative grammars, even as conceived of in recent work by Chomsky, are not interpreted as accounts of on-line production, are not accounts of behaviour. The current view, interpreting features as "behaviours" or as intentions to behave (articulatory intentions), conflicts with this conception of grammars. If grammars generate linguistic expressions and those expressions have a phonology, then the phonology of an expression is fully a part of that expression. If the phonology of an expression is constituted as a kind of behaviour, or as a set of intentions to behave, then the grammar generates behaviour or intentions to behave. But this view contradicts the definition of a grammar such that grammars generate expressions but do not produce behaviour. 3.5 Phonological derivations, "externalisation"and "manifestation" It is because B&H conceive of phonological expressions as behaviourally orientated that the notion "derivation" is so central to their position: a phonological derivation represents, for them, the "making external" (the "externalising" or "manifesting") of the linguistic: in "uttering an expression", the speaker is exploiting stored representations in memory which are conceived of in terms of articulatory targets; the speaker then harnesses these and intends to utter in accordance with them. The phonological component of a generative grammar is, on this view, conceived of primarily as a connection between the starting point in a phonological derivation (the abstract underlying forms of words) and the end point of that derivation, namely phonological "surface forms", conceived of as "the input to our articulatory machinery", thus (to repeat): Phonology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the connections between surface forms that can serve as input to our articulatory machinery (and to our auditory system) and the abstract underlying forms in which words are stored in memory. (B&H 1989: 53) Since B&H do not offer a consistent position on the distinction and relation between the linguistic and the Ε-physical, it is unfortunate that they conceive of
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these surface forms simultaneously as the input to our articulatory machinery and as the result of the harnessing of that machinery, thus: ...underlying phonological representations of words are stored in speakers' permanent memory, whereas phonetic surface representations are generated only when a word figures in an actual utterance. (B&H 1989: 53) "Surface phonetic representations" (the end point of a phonological derivation) are thus, for B&H, both linguistic and non-linguistic and constitute both the input to our articulatory machinery and the result of the harnessing of that machinery. In addition to this inconsistency, and the conception of words as objects which may "figure in an actual utterance", it is worth emphasising that it is this conception of the phonological component of a grammar as a "connecting" device between the I-linguistic and the Ε-physical which lends the notion "phonological derivation" its significance for B&H: the notion "derivation" counts, for B&H, as a characterisation of the "externalisation" or "manifestation" (Chomsky 1993b: 184) of the I-linguistic. Because of the way in which the phonological component is conceived by B&H, there is a clear and theoretically significant sense in which underlying representations are prior to surface representations, a sense that justifies thinking of the surface form as "derived" from the underlying form. (B&H 1989: 53) On the view adopted by B&H, a phonological derivation is a progression from a cognitive state of affairs to an articulatory/acoustic state of affairs; as Harris & Lindsay (1993) put it, on this view, a phonological derivation moves from the cognitive to the "ever-more physical". But "physical" does not admit of degree. On B&H's view, Ε-physical events are derived, via phonological derivations, from I-linguistic states: the internal is "made external", it is "externalised" or "manifested". However, as we have seen, this claim undermines the very distinction being made between the I-linguistic and the Ε-physical: it entails sortal incorrectness, i.e. the mistaken attributing, to the Ε-physical, of linguistic properties, and the attribution, to the I-linguistic, of properties orientated towards the Ε-physical. That attribution is pervasive throughout the generative literature and entails an appeal to the idea of a continuum from the cognitive to the Ε-physical, which is incoherent.
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4. Realism and "linguistic" behaviour in generative
linguistics
The version of realism adopted by many generativists incorporates a notion of "linguistic" behaviour. Generative linguists often complain that the object of linguistic inquiry is not observable behaviour per se, but that which "underlies" behaviour (see, for example, Borsley & Newmeyer, this volume). A common analogy (owed to Chomsky himself) is often cited between physical inquiry and generative linguistics, whereby taking observable behaviour to constitute the object of inquiry is like taking meter readings to be the object of physical (specifically, say, electro-magnetic) inquiry. A parallel analogy would be to point out that patterns of iron filings on a sheet of paper covering a magnet do not constitute the object of electro-magnetic inquiry; rather, it is the "underlying", non-observable, electro-magnetic forces which are the object of inquiry, at least under a realist interpretation of physical inquiry. These analogies lead us to believe that the generativist's postulated I-language stands in a causal relation to observable behaviour: just as the electro-magnetic forces cause or induce the iron filing patterns or the meter readings, so does the I-language cause or induce observable ("linguistic") behaviour. Under a rule-based conception of generative grammar, the rules of the grammar are conceived of as underlying observable behaviour in the sense of inducing that behaviour. But that, as we have seen, is precisely the interpretation of rule (and, for that matter, "principle", "parameter" or "constraint") that the generativist must seek to avoid if a consistently internalist conception of I-language is to be sustained; it is precisely the interpretation that Harris assumes, and can be forgiven for assuming. Borsley and Newmeyer, in their contribution to this volume (Ch. 2), claim that, in attacking the telementation idea, Harris is attacking a position not adopted by generative grammarians. Their point is that Chomsky has consistently denied that language serves communicative ends. In this they are undoubtedly correct; they are also correct in observing that this denial is fundamental to the generative enterprise. What they fail to point out, and what I have sought to show, is that the current generative conception of linguistic expressions allows that they are indeed orientated towards behaviour, in the sense of being instructions to behave or intentions to behave. In particular, the postulated PF level of representation is both geared towards behaviour and conceived of in telementational terms, as an encoding of linguistic expressions, such that Ε-physical events are said to possess linguistic properties and thus that there are such things as observable events which possess linguistic properties. The notion "linguistic behaviour" is an empiricist one, and clashes with the non-empiricist basis of generative linguistics. The problems with the current generative conception of linguistic expressions are therefore at least twofold: (i) the telementational conception of PF
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is profoundly occult, and (ii) is anyway inconsistent with the strictly internalist conception of the linguistic which Chomsky has always sought to uphold. Harris is right on two counts: that telementation is a myth, and that generativists have, if inconsistently, subscribed to it. He is wrong, however, to believe that generative linguistics must be founded on this myth; it needn't be.11
11 My aim here has been negative in the sense that I have sought to show how a consistently internalist generative theory cannot proceed while conceiving of the linguistic in telementational terms, i.e. in terms of instructions to performance systems or intentions geared towards physical performance. I have not sought to show how such a consistently internalist approach can be sustained; in particular, I have given no alternative to the "instructional" view of the relation between linguistic expressions and observable behaviour. Such an alternative is given in Burton-Roberts (1994) and is developed, with respect to the phonetics/phonology relation, by Burton-Roberts & Carr (in preparation).
4 Phonography: Setting a Term to the Evolution of Writing John Sören Pettersson
How, when, what and where human beings first wrote are ultimately questions for the archaeologist and the philologist... But the origin of writing is a different question, and it does not fall either to the archaeologist or to the philologist to answer it. (Harris 1986: viii) During the present century, many people have presented the history of writing and, not least, presented general schemes for how writing evolves. But such presentations have met with much criticism, at least during the last few decades. Not that anyone questions that the different scripts of the world have had less advanced forerunners, but the history of writing has often been presented as if it has been aiming all along toward the writing systems of today. The alphabet especially has been presented as the ultimate goal for the history of writing, while Chinese script has been viewed as a form of writing which got stuck on the way. When one is dealing with the history of writing one can hardly avoid mentioning Gelb's A Study of Writing (1963), where a very strict order for the evolution of writing was presented. Moreover, in Gelb's book non-phonographic systems, that is systems of notation not indicating pronunciation, are seen as "feeble attempts" to make real writing and are consequently classified as "forerunners of writing" (ibid.: 194). Gelb's view of the alphabet as the crowning achievement of the evolution of writing has been criticized by many, indeed also by Roy Harris (1986, 1989b). Still, however, it seems as if the majority of works in linguistics reveal the same basic assumptions as Gelb (for an extensive review of the littérature, see Rohr 1994, esp. p. 67, although Röhr himself does not pursue the criticism as far as Harris). In this paper I will comment on how the history of writing has been surveyed, but I will not focus on teleology, at least not its more obvious manifestations. Instead, I will address another issue, namely the terminology used when dealing with the origin and evolution of writing. To be sure, Harris has had a few things
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to say here too, but I will start with Gelb's work to see how the philologist approaches the problem. The aim of Gelb's work "is to lay a foundation for a full science of writing" (1963: 23), and one of its means is a comprehensive "Terminology of Writing" (assembled in Ch. 11). This terminology does not include names of specific scripts like Chinese writing, but does include categorizing terms like ideography, logography, syllabic writing, consonantal writing etc., and Gelb devotes his pages to discussing the merits of each; for instance, the term ideogram has been used by some authors to designate any kind of symbol and by some to designate word-signs of phonographic systems; he therefore urges his readers to avoid that term altogether. Further, he does not believe in "consonantal writing". Scripts that only indicate consonants are in his view syllabic systems: the so-called "consonantal" signs indicate whole syllables even if they leave the vowel unspecified. Now I will make some points on the use of a comprehensive terminology. An elaborate "Terminology of Writing" is not necessarily the right way to found a (the) science of writing, as Gelb tries to do. The abundance of terms gives the student an impression of precision and exactness, but when discussing a particular matter, what counts is of course how that particular discussion is carried out. In view of this, the relevance of a general terminology of writing will be the topic of what follows. Concomitant with any terminology, or any single definition, two kinds of error may occur: the definitions are not sensible and/or the use of the defined terms is not in accordance with the definitions. Interestingly, Gelb fails in both respects even when discussing the forerunners of writing. Not that he does not take precautions, as the following passage clearly reveals when he coins the term "forerunners of writing": "The word which I should have liked to coin for Vorstufe is 'forestage', but unfortunately this term cannot be used for our purpose because it already has the meaning 'forecastle' or 'a ship with a forecastle', even though only in obsolete English" (1963: 24). But when he proceeds to subdivide the forerunners of writing, he makes the two errors mentioned above, as will be explained immediately below. Gelb, who states that only phonography should be regarded as full-grown writing, says that within the forerunners of writing it is possible to discern two kinds of techniques that have been utilized: the descriptive-representational device and the identifying-mnemonic device. When he summarizes his theories in a chapter called "Evolution of Writing" (Ch. 6: 190 ff) he says about the "forerunners of writing": "In this stage visible drawn forms - j u s t like gesture language - can express meaning directly without an intervening linguistic form" (ibid.: 191). "Forerunners of writing" are then distinguished according to the two
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ways in which one communicates: the descriptive-representational device and the identifying-mnemonic device respectively. In the first case, drawings "contain only those elements which are important for the transmission of the communication and lack the aesthetic embellishments which form an important part of an artistic picture" (ibid.: 192). In the latter case, "a symbol is used to help to record or to identify a person or an object" (ibid.). Further, Gelb writes: "The binding traditions of art, established hundreds and thousands of years before man first attempted communication by means of conventional marks, were too strong to allow for the development of the descriptive-representational device in the right direction" (ibid.). He holds that the identifying-mnemonic device, which concentrates on objects or beings instead of events, was the device which gradually succeeded in attaching words of the spoken language to its signs. Now I want to focus on "the development of the descriptive-representational device", as Gelb put it in the last quotation above. If a descriptive-representational writing gradually acquired signs for words of the language, Gelb could say that these signs were used to identify those "things" (perhaps non-concrete) which the words "stood for". That is, use was being made of the identifying-mnemonic device. And to be sure, Gelb says on the preceding page that "[a]s the two devices are frequently interlocking it is difficult to assign rigorously some primitive writings to definite categories." The point to be made here is, then, that it is meaningless to state that the descriptive-representational device could not develop in "the right direction", because according to Gelb's own classification it would not be called descriptiverepresentational but identifying-mnemonic if it started to develop in the right direction. It is actually not the device that develops in any direction - since it is fixed by Gelb's definition - but the writing (the "script"). This should be compared with what was said above about defining a term. The definition should be sensible, and the use of the defined term should be in accordance with the definition. Gelb then does not make proper use of the term "descriptiverepresentational device". Of course, one could furthermore ask whether it is a good thing to discuss forerunners of writing in terms of the descriptive-representational device and the identifying-mnemonic device. Is this dichotomy sound? This is not the same question as the one just treated above, where the aim was not to discuss any specific classifications of writings. This latter question should instead be answered in the way that Harris deals with the matter: "contrasting 'mnemonic-identificational' with 'descriptive-representational' devices seems to set up a quite artificial o