Landscape in Language
Culture and Language Use Studies in Anthropological Linguistics CLU-SAL publishes monographs an...
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Landscape in Language
Culture and Language Use Studies in Anthropological Linguistics CLU-SAL publishes monographs and edited collections, culturally oriented grammars and dictionaries in the cross- and interdisciplinary domain of anthropological linguistics or linguistic anthropology. The series offers a forum for anthropological research based on knowledge of the native languages of the people being studied and that linguistic research and grammatical studies must be based on a deep understanding of the function of speech forms in the speech community under study. For an overview of all books published in this series, please see http://benjamins.com/catalog/clu
Editor Gunter Senft
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen
Volume 4 Landscape in Language. Transdisciplinary perspectives Edited by David M. Mark, Andrew G. Turk, Niclas Burenhult and David Stea
Landscape in Language Transdisciplinary perspectives Edited by
David M. Mark University at Buffalo (SUNY)
Andrew G. Turk Murdoch University
Niclas Burenhult Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen and Lund University
David Stea Texas State University
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdamâ•›/â•›Philadelphia
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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Landscape in language : transdisciplinary perspectives / edited by David M. Mark ... [et al.]. p. cm. (Culture and Language Use, issn 1879-5838 ; v. 4) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Language and languages--Variation. 2. Semantics. 3. Geographical perception. 4. Language and culture. I. Mark, David M. P120.V37L25â•…â•… 2011 910’.02014--dc22 2011003203 isbn 978 90 272 0286 4 (Hb ; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8704 5 (Eb)
© 2011 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
Table of contents
Foreword
ix
Preface
xi
Landscape in language: An introduction David M. Mark, Andrew G. Turk, Niclas Burenhult and David Stea Ethnophysiography Andrew G. Turk, David M. Mark and David Stea
1
25
Exploring philosophy of place: Potential for synergy between phenomenology and ethnophysiography Andrew G. Turk
47
Embedded in place: ‘Mirror knowledge’ and ‘simultaneous landscapes’ among Māori Brian Murton
73
Philosophical issues in ethnophysiography: Landform terms, disciplinarity, and the question of method Bruce B. Janz
101
‘Land’ and life: Ethnoecology and ethnogeography as complementary approaches to the analyses of landscape perception Chris S. Duvall
121
Landscape in Western Pantar, a Papuan outlier of southern Indonesia Gary Holton
143
vi
Landscape in Language: Transdisciplinary Perspectives
Hawaiian storied place names: Re-placing cultural meaning Renee Pualani Louis
167
Between the trees and the tides: Inuit ways of discriminating space in a coastal and boreal landscape Scott A. Heyes
187
Differing conceptualizations of the same landscape: The Athabaskan and Eskimo language boundary in Alaska Gary Holton
225
A case study in Ahtna Athabascan geographic knowledge James Kari
239
Revitalizing place names through stories and songs Susan Paskvan
261
Language and landscape among the Tlingit Thomas F. Thornton
275
Language, landscape and ethnoecology, reflections from northwestern Canada Leslie Main Johnson
291
Landscape embedded in language: The Navajo of Canyon de Chelly, Arizona, and their named places Stephen C. Jett
327
Navajo landscape and its contexts Carmelita Topaha
343
Navigating regional landscapes with Jicarilla personal narrative Elizabeth M. Lynch
353
Table of contents vii
Ontology of landscape in language Werner Kuhn The role of geospatial technologies for integrating landscape in language: Geographic Information Systems and the Cree of northern Quebec Renée Sieber and Christopher Wellen
369
381
Classifying landscape character Lars Brabyn and David M. Mark
395
Perspectives on the ethical conduct of landscape in language research Andrew G. Turk and David M. Mark
411
Notes on contributors
435
Index
443
Foreword
This book substantially advances a nascent interdisciplinary field focused on the human cognition of the natural world we inhabit, as reflected especially though language, but also through other kinds of action. Here, archaeology, geography, psychology, anthropology and linguistics all intersect in mutually informing€ways. This book is not just another “Language and X” book, where X is some other random, perhaps trivial, domain. Perhaps the term ‘Landscape’ doesn’t help here: according to the OED, it came into English at the end of the sixteenth century from Middle Dutch, hitch-hiking on the small easel paintings produced for the newly formed urban bourgeois market in such things. From there, it was rapidly generalized to views and vistas, and then more slowly to the Romantic landscape-appreciation and garden making of the eighteenth century. That sentiment born of a vanishing countryside is not the subject matter here. Instead the focus of this book is on our Umwelt, the terrain and water worlds we inhabit and exploit. As yet we have no better widely-accepted term, however, that captures this interdisciplinary domain. Our relationships with our ecologies are obviously of fundamental importance, and may yet determine the fate of the species on this planet. But on the surface it is quite unclear that concepts of landscape and ecology are systematically reflected in language. Many domains important to human existence have poor lexicalization in the world’s languages, and show little or no grammatical reflex (consider e.g. the limited terms for disease or internal organs in many unwritten languages). A moment’s reflection though shows that landscape is different. For a start, there are just two great systems of proper nouns in just about all languages: namely personal names, and toponyms. Proper nouns are names, which usually have special grammatical reflexes (as in English where determiners are usually disallowed, as in the oddity of the London, the Mount Everest, etc.), even if ultimately what is a proper noun is determined pragmatically by usage. This property of nameability or properhood reveals a deep psychological reality. Persons on the one hand and places on the other are our two great mental index systems – they are the two coordinate systems we use to plot our social and ecological spaces. Naturally, the two systems intersect: we think of places in terms of persons, and persons in terms of places. Both systems are underpinned by specialized neural
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Landscape in Language: Transdisciplinary Perspectives
circuitry. Both derive their cognitive power from the fact that they name nodes in great networks – a person is joined by kinship or association links to a field of other persons, and a place is connected by pathways to a network of other places. So finding or naming a node in the network releases the computational power afforded by the network – all the inferences about connections, shortest routes, triangulations and so forth. Toponyms have been the focus of extensive study, especially by those interested in the history they reveal due to their extraordinary stability through time€– a stability of course that is derived from their cognitive centrality. Proper nouns, names, are merely a way of picking out specific persons or locations – a shorthand instruction to find a unique particular of a certain class. Normally, then, toponyms ride on a classification of the underlying landforms: Mount Everest is a unique exemplar of the class of mountains, the Thames of the class of rivers, Lake Michigan of the class of lakes, etc. Toponyms thus presuppose cognitive categories, normally expressible in common nouns (although the relation is sometimes more complex). This book focuses on that underlying cognitive classification, as reflected (perhaps imperfectly) in language. This topic – unlike the study of toponyms in the major Western languages – has been relatively very neglected, and it is only in the years immediately preceding this volume that it has come to the fore as a major focus of interdisciplinary work. This book samples this recent work right across the languages and the varied ecologies of the world, from Maori concepts of landscape in New Zealand to Inuit conceptions of the arctic world. It offers a wonderful panorama of languages, landscape types and methods of analysis, from linguistics to ethnography, geography and GIS to philosophy. It also demonstrates the special added value of interdisciplinary work: none of these studies would have the rich, descriptive ‘bite’ they have without being deeply informed by parallel work in other disciplines. One of the signal attractions of this domain is that scientific inquiry is still in the nascent stages. There are still fundamental discoveries to be made, and it will be years before we have achieved a thorough synthesis of all this new material. There are many fundamental open questions about the underlying nature of the cognitive categories involved, how universal they are or how molded by local ecologies or local linguistic structures, and how closely language, cognition, action and use interact in this domain. This book will inspire further research on these issues, while remaining a landmark (forgive the inevitable metaphor) for years to come.
Stephen C. Levinson Nijmegen, The Netherlands 18 December 2010
Preface
This book is an outcome of an international collaborative effort that began more than eight years ago, and resulted in a transdisciplinary workshop held in New Mexico and Arizona (USA) in October and November 2008. The idea for the workshop followed from the interaction of two interrelated research projects: a research program on space and landscape, coordinated by Stephen C. Levinson and Niclas Burenhult, in the Language and Cognition Group of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics (MPI) in Nijmegen, the Netherlands; and the “Ethnophysiography Project” of David Mark (University at Buffalo, USA), Andrew Turk (Murdoch University, Australia), and David Stea (Center for Global Justice, San Miguel de Allende, Mexico). A place names project at MPI was launched in 2001, and Mark visited MPI during May 2002. Then Mark worked with Turk to launch ethnophysiographic fieldwork in Northwestern Australia in October 2002. Stea joined the Ethnophysiography Project in 2003 to coinitiate a case study on the Navajo language. Turk, who had already visited the Navajo Nation, visited MPI in October 2005 to update researchers there on progress of the ethnophysiography case studies and to discuss enhanced collaboration. The researchers from MPI conducted studies in several languages, leading up to a special issue of Language Sciences (Burenhult 2008). Mark and Turk assisted with this publication and visited MPI together in June 2007, at which time the idea of having an international workshop on the topic of landscape in language was discussed and confirmed. In April 2008, the National Science Foundation awarded a grant (BCS-0753737, David Mark, PI) to support the workshop. A call for participants was published internationally, and twenty-eight people were invited to the workshop. Participants gathered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on Sunday, October 26, 2008, to launch the workshop. Monday morning started with introductory remarks by the organizers, followed by seven presentations. The next day, participants boarded a chartered bus to travel west to the Navajo Reservation. The group stopped for a while in Window Rock, capital of the Navajo Nation, where participants learned about the activities of the Navajo Nation Cultural Preservation Office and their Geographic Information Systems office. The group then traveled
xii Landscape in Language: Transdisciplinary Perspectives
north to Canyon de Chelly, near Chinle, Arizona, still on the Navajo Reservation, where the remainder of the workshop was held at historic Thunderbird Lodge. During all of Wednesday and Thursday morning, more presentations were given and the issues they raised were discussed. Thursday afternoon was spent touring the magnificent Canyon de Chelly, visiting ancient cliff dwellings situated on the red sandstone cliffs, and meeting Navajo artists. After Friday morning’s final presentations, the afternoon was occupied by three sessions of panel and audience discussions of critical topics: Ethical Issues in Indigenous Landscape Research; Methods and Theory/Methods Interaction; and Priorities for Future Research. On Saturday the group traveled back to Albuquerque, with a long stop in Newcomb, New Mexico, for a lunch and cultural celebration with members of the local Navajo community. This book presents chapters written by many of the workshop participants. All participants were invited to submit chapters and contributions to the volume were edited by members of the workshop organizing committee. The editors are pleased that the book is being published by John Benjamins as part of their new series, “Culture and Language Use: Studies in Anthropological Linguistics (CLUSAL),” edited by MPI’s Gunter Senft, who participated in the workshop. Many people and organizations contributed to the success of the workshop and the production of this book. The editors wish to thank the U.S. National Science Foundation for awarding grant BCS-0753737 to support the workshop and the preparation of this book. We are also grateful to the Max Planck Society for funding the participation of some MPI staff. Linda Doerfler and Sunita Gupta in the offices of NCGIA-Buffalo assisted with the paperwork and arrangements for the workshop, from the proposal to the final travel reimbursements. Silke Lambert copy-edited all of the chapters, bringing them into compliance with the publisher’s format guidelines and detecting a few logical or grammatical inconsistencies; her contribution to the production of the book is greatly appreciated. We especially wish to thank Ron Maldonado, of the Historic Preservation Office, Navajo Nation, who helped arrange our visit to Navajo Nation offices and participated in the workshop, and his colleagues who spoke to our group in Window Rock. We also thank Larry King, who conducted a Navajo blessing of our trip into Canyon de Chelly, and Carmelita Topaha, who organized our visit to Newcomb chapter. The workshop participants who did not contribute chapters for this book nevertheless played an important role in the discussions and presentations. In alphabetical order, these are: Shonto Begay, Clair Hill, Jay Johnson, Karen Kemp, Larry King, Asifa Majid, Ron Maldonado, Carolyn O’Meara, and Gunter Senft. Several of these people, along with many of the chapter authors, also reviewed other book
Preface xiii
chapters. We wish to thank all the workshop participants for the free and open sharing of knowledge and opinions, much of which appears in this book.
David M. Mark, Amherst, New York, USA Andrew G. Turk, Perth, Western Australia Niclas Burenhult, Lund, Sweden David Stea, San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato, México February 2011
chapter 1
Landscape in language An introduction David M. Mark, Andrew G. Turk, Niclas Burenhult and David Stea
1.
Introduction
The relationships that people have with landscape, individually and collectively, have long formed an important research theme in several disciplines, notably geography, anthropology, philosophy, and psychology. A “man-land tradition,” now often re-labeled as a “human-environment tradition,” was one of the four traditions of geography identified in Pattison’s (1964) classic article on the intellectual core of geography. This tradition and its successors have focused on land use and land-based activities. Anthropologists also examine the relations of people to their environments, mainly emphasizing cultural aspects, and an anthropology of landscape has developed (see especially Ingold 2000). The fundamental relations between culture and landscape, and attachment to landscape, have been discussed in geography (Tuan’s 1974 idea of topophilia) and in anthropology (for example, Keith Basso’s 1996 book Wisdom Sits in Places). Philosophers of place have often taken a phenomenological approach to the relationship of people to ‘lived-in’ landscape (e.g. Casey 1996; Malpas 1999, 2007). However, until recently, there has been relatively little scholarly research on how landscape is conceptualized, that is, how a continuous land surface, a landscape, becomes cognitive entities, and how those entities are classified and represented in language and in thought. Toponyms, the proper names given to geographic features, have certainly been studied, but the relation of the generic parts of such names to geographic categories has received considerably less attention (although see Zelinsky 1955). There has been even less work on cross-cultural and cross-linguistic variations and similarities in delimitation, classification, and naming of geographic features. The definition of “landscape” itself is not necessarily simple. Granö (1997) suggested that landscape consists of the more distant parts of the human environment, and used the term proximity for the part of the environment close to the
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observer. Granö claimed that landscape is perceived mainly through the visual sense. While intuitively appealing, this definition is not unproblematic. For example, senses other than vision may also be significant: Feld (1996) has drawn attention to the importance of sound in the nature of some places, and similar claims could be made for odor (e.g. the smell of vegetation types, water) and skin sensation (e.g. temperature, wind). Multi-sensory perception of landscape is discussed further in the chapter by Louis in this volume. Furthermore, the proximity/landscape dichotomy is itself difficult to operationalize, and people may have different ideas as to whether they see landscape and its features as a distant backdrop or a surrounding environment that necessarily contains them (cf. Burenhult & Levinson 2008). There is the possibility that whether a landscape feature or scene is considered to be (as distinguished from “perceived”, in the psychological sense) nearby or distant may be related to the relative intimacy of attachment to that feature or scene. As with “environment,” there is always the question of the role that is played by the human. Does the person perceive him/herself as necessarily a part of the landscape, or apart from it, as observer, listener, etc.? In other words, is the observer active or passive, and is the landscape “distant” in any relative or absolute sense? On the cognitive level, what is the relation of landscape to spaces too large or complex to be apprehended from a single vantage point? Such spaces are termed “transperceptual spaces” (Downs & Stea 1977) because, to construct the overall concept of the place, a series of direct perceptual experiences would need to be integrated over time. Despite the apparent lack of clarity in the “proximal/distal” distinction regarding landscape, this distinction has been accepted in the psychology of perception for more than a century. For instance, it is implicit in Gibson’s later work (Gibson 1979, 1987; Gibson & Bridgeman 1987; Reed & Jones 1982), in his use of “contours” and “textural gradients,” for example. However, a definition relying on common understanding of the proximal/ distal distinction may be difficult to reconcile with notions of emotional and cultural attachment to landscapes, landscape features, and places (Basso 1996; Tuan 1974). For example, Ingold’s (2000) approach to anthropology of landscape involves concepts such as dwelling and livelihood, and does not recognize a distinction between natural and human-modified landscapes. There is debate in the literature concerning the sources and meanings of the English term landscape and its historical and conceptual links to similar terms in associated languages, such as the German Landschaft (Cosgrove 2004; Ingold 2010; Olwig 2008). Ingold (2010) discusses the visual bias in most accounts of landscape and suggests that: “… we might do well to return to an earlier understanding of landscape – one that is closer to the ground, more haptic than optical” (p. 17). Cosgrove (2004) notes that: “Spatially, landscape was constructed as a
Landscape in language
bounded and measured area, an absolute space, represented through the scientific techniques of measured distance, geometrical survey, and linear perspective” (p. 62). He goes on to make the case for definitions of landscape and Landschaft which are not so bound to measurement orthodoxy but incorporate a sense of social construction: Much recent scholarship has sought to unmask and denaturalize landscape, paying as much attention to its pictorial and literary representations as to material spaces themselves. In refusing to take landscape “at face value,” such landscape study moves beyond Landschaft in its original Germanic sense, beyond the pictorial English sense of landscape as an aesthetically unified space, and beyond the traditional geographical sense of landscape as an expression of ecological relations between land and life. It draws upon and contributes to the revised ways of conceptualizing space with which I opened this discussion, regarding space as a function of natural and social processes, but also as an outcome that in turn has social agency, able to create and transform the material world. Landscape’s revival within contemporary geography derives from those aspects embedded in its conceptual history that allow it to transcend the modernist dualism (perhaps dialectic) of nature and culture. (p. 68)
This sentiment is echoed by Smith (1989:â•›109): “With a dialectical conception of geography more rooted today, and the mutual interdependence of social theory and geography increasingly evident, the time has proven ripe for a more serious and long-overdue reexamination of landscape that moves beyond narrow descriptive, aesthetic, and idealistic confines.” The Landscape in Language Workshop, and this book, open up new perspectives on this discussion of the relationship between physical attributes of land and the meanings attributed to it by those who dwell in that place. To explain all of these issues would involve a lengthy analysis of relevant aspects of cultural geography, phenomenology, semiotics, linguistics, human ecology, environmental psychology, etc., impractical to cover adequately in this chapter. However, some discussion of these issues is included below and in other chapters of this volume.
2.
The linguistics of landscape
The language sciences have no tradition of research on landscape. The only branch of linguistics with a vested interest in landscape is onomastics (the study of names), but typically the study of place names (toponymy) has been approached in a way totally divorced from the actual referential subject matter.
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In fact, landscape has several characteristics that give it potential to exert considerable influence on theorization of key problems throughout linguistics. How do languages select geographic entities as objects to be labeled (‘mountain,’ ‘river,’ ‘valley’)? Are there universal categories? What is the formal and referential relationship between common nouns (landscape terms) and proper nouns (toponyms or place names)? Are terms for landforms easily translatable across languages (mountain–montagne–Berg)? What are the ontological principles behind such terms? Do they involve structured sets of lexicon, semantic fields and relations, with possible repercussions in grammar? How much variation exists in categorial strategies across languages and speakers? What are the factors that drive such variation? Does variation in linguistic representation have resonance in cognition? Questions such as these indicate that linguistics as a discipline may have a lot to gain from in-depth exploration of the landscape domain. Language and linguistics also have great potential to be of help in studying various aspects of human-landscape relationships (Levinson 2003; Levinson & Wilkins 2006; Majid et al. 2004). Language reflects a range of cultural and cognitive preoccupations, and linguistics has tools and models for identifying, describing and explaining representations of landscape of key concern to other branches of science. Thus, landscape opens up important links between linguistics and disciplines with a longer tradition of interest in the domain that usually do not have a major focus on language, such as anthropology, archaeology, environmental psychology, philosophy, and cognitive geography (e.g. Bell et al. 1996; Bender 1993; Hirsch & O’Hanlon 1995; Tilley 1994; Mark et al. 1999; Smith & Mark 2001). Here, linguistic attention to the domain is certain to unleash a variety of new questions and perspectives of inquiry. An indication of the potential of linguistic exploration of landscape was provided by a recent pilot study at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, initiated by its director Stephen C. Levinson in 2004 and coordinated by Niclas Burenhult. The study – whose results were published as a special issue of the journal Language Sciences (Burenhult 2008a) – was a cross-cultural inquiry into linguistic categorization of the landscape domain. Case studies of language-specific systems were carried out with uniform methods by language experts across a sample of nine geographically and genealogically diverse languages. The following were the general research questions pursued by the study: 1. How is landscape divided into categories, and how are these categories named? Are there cross-linguistic differences in how landscape is divided into categories? Which are the main determinants of landscape categorization?
Landscape in language
2. How do we formally identify place names? To what places do place names refer? How are places semantically construed for this purpose? 3. What is the denotational relation between landscape terms and place names? Research topics and methods of investigating them were detailed in a questionnaire formulated by Bohnemeyer et al. (2004) and taken to the field by language experts for first-hand fieldwork. The language settings included in the study were Tzeltal (Mayan, Mesoamerica, Brown 2008), Jahai (Austroasiatic, Malay Peninsula, Burenhult 2008b), Marquesan (Austronesian, Polynesia, Cablitz 2008), Lao (Tai, Mainland Southeast Asia, Enfield 2008), Yélî Dnye (isolate, Island Melanesia, Levinson 2008), Lowland Chontal (isolate, Mesoamerica, O’Connor & Kroefges 2008), Seri (isolate, Mesoamerica, O’Meara & Bohnemeyer 2008), KiliÂ� vila (Austronesian, Island Melanesia, Senft 2008), and ≠Akhoe Hai//om (Khoisan, southwestern Africa, Widlok 2008). The introductory article of the special issue of Language Sciences mentioned above outlined the main results of the study and the theoretical relevance of landscape to the discipline of linguistics (Burenhult & Levinson 2008). A major finding was that languages are extremely diverse in how they categorize landscape features and name places, and in how the two ontological categories of landforms and place names are related. Languages were shown to vary along the following dimensions: 1. The denotation of landform terms (‘mountain,’ ‘river,’ ‘valley’): different languages carve out and classify similar landforms in different ways and indeed differ also in which features get labeled. For example, terms for which the English translation ‘mountain’ is used vary considerably in how they extend their meaning with respect to the magnitude, shape, substance, and boundedness of referents; also, equivalents of some presumably basic landform terms are not universally present, notably ‘valley.’ 2. Whether landscape can be considered a discrete semantic domain: in some languages there is structural evidence for claiming the existence of such a distinct domain, in others there is evidence against it. 3. Semantic themes: mapping and labeling of landforms draw on a variety of ontological design principles, including metaphor and analogy involving body, animacy, agency, containment, and so on.
. These results find clear parallels in the recent work by Mark, Turk and Stea on the Yindjibarndi language, discussed in Chapter 2.
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4. How proper nouns (i.e. place names) are linguistically generated: the formal tools used (e.g. form classes, syntactic units, morphological complexity) vary across languages, as do the lexical source domains from which names are drawn (landscape features, body parts, animals, plants, objects, people, proper names, activities, etc.); there is also a great deal of variation within and between languages as to the degree to which the meaning of place names can be analyzed, since they frequently have archaic characteristics. 5. Which geographical categories get named, e.g. whether names map neatly onto generic landform categories or if they represent an ontologically distinct system; both extremes were present in the language sample cited, some languages naming only features with a corresponding generic label and others systematically not doing so. The study identified a number of linguistic phenomena which apply particularly to the landscape domain, or find in landscape their main locus operandi, and which have considerable relevance in a wider linguistic, cultural and cognitive context. One such phenomenon consists of sets of semantic distinctions in a particular language that structure the lexicon across more than one word class, so that, for example, the same set of semantic oppositions recur in landscape nouns, place names, motion verbs and directional terms. The discovery of this descriptively and theoretically overlooked phenomenon, dubbed ‘semplates’ (a blend of “semantic templates”) and in fact not restricted to landscape, was possible thanks to in-depth analysis of a domain whose fundamental character is likely to be crucial for such structures to develop. The concept of semplates and its theoretical significance is elaborated in Levinson and Burenhult (2009), and a field guide for their identification and exploration is provided in Burenhult and Levinson (2009). Another ontological puzzle addressed by Burenhult and Levinson (2009) was the tendency of languages to treat landscape terms as systematically ambiguous regarding whether their referents are considered to be objects or places, a phenomenon noted by Lyons (1977) and followed up by Smith and Mark (2001) and Cablitz (2008). Size and perceptual (non)discreteness are factors that influence to which ontological category a landscape term is assigned in a given context, with considerable syntactic ramifications (see e.g. Cablitz 2008; cf. English expressions such as ‘the big forest’ vs. ‘a house in the forest’). Although fundamental, landscape and its features therefore have a dual nature, with challenging consequences for human formal representational systems. This and other facts turn landscape, surprisingly, into a center stage for the study of grammar. Yet another set of ontological problems concerns the relationship between categorization of landscape and categorization of the human body and its parts.
Landscape in language
The two can be thought of as parallel domains offering similar categorial affordances (Gibson 1979) and challenges, with diffuse natural borders, part-whole relationships, omnipresence etc. Languages frequently use the lexicon of one of these domains to map and name the other in more or less systematic and pervasive ways through analogy and metaphor (Brown 2008; Burenhult 2008b; Cablitz 2008). To summarize, even a limited exploratory study based on a handful of languages has managed to uncover not only interesting patterns of linguistic diversity and illuminating examples of classical linguistic problems, but also previously unknown linguistic phenomena of considerable theoretical interest. Thus, landscape shows all the signs of being a fascinating domain for studying the dynamics and resourcefulness of language.
3.
Issues in ethnophysiography
Mark and Turk (2003a, b, 2004) coined the term ‘ethnophysiography’ to cover their research on the topic of cultural and linguistic aspects of landscape concepts, in the context of their ongoing case study of the Australian indigenous language Yindjibarndi. To some extent this research was a natural extension of earlier work on geographical ontology, and especially on geographic categories, in some European languages (Smith & Mark 2001). The core of ethnophysiography is the investigation (for any particular language) of categories of landscape features, especially those denoted by common words (usually nouns or noun phrases). Those terms and their definitions form a research topic of considerable importance in its own right. But an understanding of the landscape vocabulary also provides foundations for understanding other important dimensions of ethnophysiography, including the study of knowledge systems, beliefs, and customs of a people concerning landforms and landscapes. Thus, ethnophysiography is related to the study of ‘place,’ ‘sense of place,’ and ‘place attachment.’ Ethnophysiography examines how these significances are tied into traditional beliefs, such as those embedded in creation stories, which help to make sense of the world, of its physiographic entities, and of the relationship of such entities to everyday activities, including traditional cultural practices (ceremonies, music, art, etc.). An initial set of broad research questions includes: – Do all people, from different cultural/linguistic groups, think about landscape in more or less the same way, or are there significant cross-cultural and crosslinguistic differences in the ways human beings conceptualize their environments at landscape scales?
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– How important is the nature of the particular landscape that provides the environment for a speech community, and especially the range of forms in that landscape, in the development of the particular landscape category system and terms used by a speech community? – How influential are the culture and lifestyle of the people on their conceptions of landscape; i.e., what is the impact of human interaction with the landscape? – In what ways does the nature of the language itself (its grammar etc.) contribute to the way terms for landscape are structured? – Can alternative worldviews, as expressed in representations of landforms, be utilized to produce appropriate, culturally specific geographic information systems (GIS)? The use of proper names (toponyms) for individual landscape features, such as “Golden Hill,” as against generic terms for classes of features (and instances of this class – e.g. any hill), is also an important aspect of ethnophysiography. Why do some landscape features acquire proper names while others do not? Are proper names more frequent for some classes of landscape features and less common for other classes? Are there cultures that rely predominantly on proper names, rather than a more extensive set of generic terms, and vice versa? Turk et al. (Chapter 2, this volume) have suggested that a way of making some of these research questions more tractable is to construct a descriptive model of factors relevant to ethnophysiography. There are various ways (dimensions) in which the attributes of places and peoples differ. Also, there are numerous common ways for languages to vary in their ways of referring to landscape. Researchers in ethnophysiography are seeking to understand these factors through examination of case studies. Mark, Turk and Stea are involved in work with the Yindjibarndi people in northwestern Australia and Navajos in southwestern USA (Mark et al. 2003; Mark & Turk 2003b, 2004; Mark et al. 2007, 2010; Turk et al. Chapter 2, this volume). A detailed description of the methodologies used in these ethnophysiography case studies is provided in Turk et al. (in press). As discussed above, researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics have recently concluded a set of case studies of landscape terms and place names in nine languages in a wide variety of geographic locations (Burenhult 2008a). This work has extended very significantly the range of ethnophysiography-related case studies and strengthened its linguistic basis. In the introduction to that collection of studies, Burenhult and Levinson (2008:â•›1) discuss the theoretical basis of the work and its relationship to ethnophysiography. They review the results of the case studies and state that “The data point to considerable variation within and across languages in how systems of landscape terms and place names
Landscape in language
are ontologised. This has important implications for practical applications from international law to modern navigation systems.” The case studies to date provide strong support for the basic ethnophysiography hypothesis – i.e. that people from different language groups/cultures have different ways of conceptualizing landscape, as evidenced by different terminology and ways of talking about and naming landscape features. However, much more collaborative research on this topic is required. Effective research in this field requires an integrated approach by researchers from many disciplines. Research approaches of increasing levels of integration may be termed: disciplinary; multidisciplinary; interdisciplinary; transdisciplinary; and postdisciplinary (Booth et al. 2000; see also Schunn et al. 2006). The last of these is difficult to achieve other than in individual or small group projects; hence the objective is to develop a transdisciplinary approach to ethnophysiography research. This goal was significantly advanced by the workshop conducted in 2008 that led to this book, and the results of this cross-disciplinary debate permeate the chapters in this volume.
4.
Landscape terms and categories Of all the countless possible ways of dividing entities of the world into categories, why do members of a culture use some groupings and not use others? What is it about the nature of the human mind and the way that it interacts with the nature of the world that gives rise to the categories that are used? (Malt 1995:â•›85)
Barbara Malt went on from those questions to present an excellent review of research issues regarding categories. The issues raised by Malt frame the terminological aspects of ethnophysiography. For geographic entities and categories, the problem of defining the sets of instances is even more complicated than for domains commonly studied, since to some extent instances of landforms and many other geographic features are themselves contingent on the definitions of the available types. Thus, while a bird might be a robin, but otherwise is still a bird, an elevated area of land might be a “hill” in one speech community but not a coherent entity at all under different landform definitions. Even within a single language, different words may be used to refer to particular landscape features, depending upon frames/scales of reference: e.g. a landform in an area of moderate topographic variation might be spoken of as a “mountain” by locals, but be . The word “ontologised” was intended to refer to the way any particular language uses generic landscape terms as a way of breaking the landscape systematically into parts (forming an ontology of landscape features) and the impact of this on place naming practices. (Note: This footnote was added by the present authors, and was not in Burenhult & Levinson 2008.)
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referred to as a “hill” by people from areas of more extreme topography. Some have claimed that the existence and classification of landforms and other landscape elements are not facts of a mind-independent reality, either as objects or as categories (Smith & Mark 1998, 2001, 2003). Thus landscape constitutes an excellent domain for the investigation of whether categorization of natural entities is universal, or whether categorizations differ significantly across languages and cultures. Landscapes vary considerably, making this universally relevant domain particularly problematic and fascinating for research. An understanding of landscape calls for universal attention and maximal representational plasticity at the same time. Related research has been carried out regarding the potential impact of categorization on the design of GIS (Kuhn 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007; Mark 1993; Mark & Smith 2004). There are many contributions in the published literature that are implicitly ‘ethnophysiography,’ although the works either predate the creation of this term, or their authors were not aware of its having been coined, or chose not to use the term. Terms and categories for landscape features have been addressed in general works on linguistics and in ethnoecology. In their classic work on the problem of lexical choice in the Hopi language, Voegelin and Voegelin (1957) introduced the idea of eliciting vocabulary by systematically going through semantic domains. The domain of topography was the very first domain that they discussed in the monograph; other landscape terms were included in the water and vegetation domains. Several books and papers on ethnoecology (Hunn with Selam and family 1990; Taller de Tradición Oral del CEPEC & Beaucage 1996; Beaucage & Taller de Tradición Oral del CEPEC 1997; Johnson 1999, 2000, 2002; Johnson & Hargus 2006) have included brief systematic discussions of ecological features and assemblages at landscape scales. Likewise, some studies in other aspects of cultural anthropology have included accounts of important landscape terms and their referents, including Pinxten et al.’s (1983) exploration of Navajo natural philosophy and landscape in the USA, Myers’ (1986) work on the Pintupi country and culture in Australia, and Kofod’s (2003) report on language, identity, and land in the East Kimberley region of Australia.
5.
Place names
Place names (toponyms) have long fascinated geographers, cartographers, and others, and there are many books about the origins of place names that have been written for a general audience. In many languages, including English, most proper names for geographic features contain a generic part that designates the feature type of the named entity: Mount Washington, Niagara River, and Gulf of
Landscape in language
Mexico, for example. However, this is not the practice in all languages, and the generic parts of place names do not always indicate what kind of thing current residents believe the feature to be. Both the generic and specific parts of place names, if present, may contain clues about the cultural or linguistic history of a place, and may be a source of prototypes for learning the meaning of generic landscape terms. Zelinsky’s (1955) paper on the distribution of generic terms in the place names of the northeastern United States is a classic example of a study connecting place names to cultural history. Zelinsky mapped the generic parts of names for features such as watercourses, and showed that the distributions of terms for smaller watercourses, such as ‘creek,’ ‘brook,’ ‘kill,’ and ‘branch,’ were often localized and reflected the naming practices of different cultural groups. Other authors have followed up this theme, including investigations of Navajo place naming practices (Jett 1997, 2001, 2006; Jett this volume).
6.
Cultural and spiritual significance of places Time will tell what other cultural constructions await the ethnographer bent on an interest in place. But that such constructions are everywhere to be found – in deserts and savannas, mountains and rain forests, cities and towns – is altogether certain. We should begin to explore them with all deliberate speed, and not, I would emphasize, solely for the purpose of enlarging our knowledge of particular social groups. For as surely as place is an elemental existential fact, sense of place is a universal genre of experience, and therefore, as more and more work gets done, it may be found to exhibit transcultural qualities. (Keith Basso, 1996, Wisdom Sits in Places, pp. 147–148)
The preceding sections of this chapter concentrated implicitly on realist aspects of topography and of cognitive responses. However, for many peoples conceptualization of landscape elements also incorporates what could be termed beliefs, cultural considerations, or spirituality; aspects of what makes a “space” into a “place.” A review of some literature on how lived experience (engagement with social and physical worlds) influences conceptions of place and topophilia (Tuan 1974) is provided in Mark et al. (2010). In their COSIT03 paper, Mark and Turk (2003a) noted that for “Indigenous Australians, including the Yindjibarndi people, spirituality and topography are inseparable (e.g. all yinda have warlu)” (p. 45) – for Yindjibarndi people, each permanent water hole (yinda) has a spirit (warlu) which determines how one should act at that place. Yu (2002) has described similar beliefs and associated practices among the Karajarri people, an indigenous group living several hundred
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kilometers northeast of the Yindjibarndi. Malpas (1999:â•›95) emphasizes the critical importance of considering the observer (agent) in the process: Understanding an agent, understanding oneself, as engaged in some activity is a matter both of understanding the agent as standing in certain causal and spatial relations to objects and of grasping the agent as having certain attitudes – notably certain relevant beliefs and desires – about the objects concerned.
Mark and Turk (2003a) discussed the difficulty of integrating such aspects of indigenous worldviews with Western Philosophy (in the ‘realist’ tradition) and indicated that further attempts would be made to undertake this task. Andrew Turk has commenced a major study (Turk 2007) of the relationship between these aspects of ethnophysiography and phenomenology (Malpas 2007; Mohanty 1997; Patocka 1996; Schutz 1977; Smith 2007). Chapters in this volume by Turk and Janz explore these issues.
7.
Cultural differences and Geographic Information Systems
The questions raised above are fundamental to many academic disciplines. But now, in the information age, they also have important new practical implications. Are the spatial data infrastructures being compiled by various countries and international agencies around the world biased toward the conceptualizations of the dominant cultures in those countries and agencies? Do the functionalities of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have similar biases? And if they exist, do such biases broaden the “digital divide” and further marginalize some groups and cultures within the global society? Can GIS facilitate retrieval of information by people from one culture that was collected and stored by another culture? Can culturally sensitive information be preserved in information systems without exposing it to outsiders? What changes in GIS, computer mapping systems, and so on are needed to allow indigenous groups to take full advantages of such technologies without having to step outside or abandon their traditional cultures? Since land is especially important to indigenous peoples and cultures, there has been considerable interest in making GIS technology available for use by indigenous communities and tribal governments. Rundstrom (1995) discussed a number of potential issues regarding the use of conventional GIS for the (mis)representation of traditional geographic knowledge. In the United States, the Bureau of Indian Affairs provided conventional GIS to the tribes in a topdown manner, which may have reinforced the colonial history of “Indian country” by depriving the tribes of control of their own GIS in the early period of GIS adoption (Palmer 2006). This topic has also been of interest to Australian
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researchers, especially in the context of native title land claims (Turk 1996, 2006; Turk & Mackaness 1995). Turk and Trees (1999) reviewed Rundstrom’s concerns in the context of ethical aspects of GIS projects with indigenous Australians. One response to the call for more culturally appropriate systems for information about the landscape was the International Forum on Indigenous Mapping held in Vancouver, British Columbia (Indigenous Mapping, 2004). This forum brought together about 200 people to discuss outcomes from indigenous mapping projects conducted in the United States and Canada and to make plans for future efforts. The technology needed to support such efforts is unclear, and the relative roles of commercial GIS software, mapping systems such as Google Maps and Google Earth, ontology software, or other solutions remain to be seen. The research on ethnophysiography is seen as potentially allowing indigenous concepts to form the basis of GIS data structures (Mark & Turk 2003b, 2004). In a project to implement more culturally appropriate GIS, Renée Sieber and Christopher Wellen of McGill University in Québec, Canada, have been working with a Cree community in northern Québec, to develop an environmental information system for community use that is based on an ontology rather than on commercial GIS software (Sieber 2004, 2006, 2007, in press; Sieber & Wellen 2006, 2007; also Sieber & Wellen this volume). These issues were discussed at the 2008 workshop, described below.
8.
Overview of the remaining chapters
In the second chapter of this book, entitled Ethnophysiography, Andrew Turk, David Mark and David Stea present this new branch of ethnoscience, first introduced by Mark and Turk (2003a). They describe case studies of two language communities, Yindjibarndi and Navajo, providing a cultural, linguistic and environmental background for each group and explaining the methods and results of the studies. The authors go on to sketch an initial ethnophysiographic descriptive model aimed at representing factors of landscape conceptualization as elucidated in these and other case studies. Such a model, it is argued, is a necessary precursor for any causal or predictive model in this undertheorized field. In a chapter entitled Exploring philosophy of place: Potential for synergy between phenomenology and ethnophysiography, Andrew Turk makes the case that an intrinsically transdisciplinary inquiry like ethnophysiography requires an overarching and unifying paradigm. He suggests that this paradigm is best represented by philosophy and, specifically, phenomenology. The chapter describes the relevance of phenomenology to landscape studies and, conversely, explains how landscape can contribute to an enhanced understanding of phenomenology.
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Furthermore, the author underlines that such a synergy should involve a meaningful dialogue between European philosophy and indigenous cultural concepts of place. In his chapter, Embedded in place: ‘Mirror knowledge’ and ‘simultaneous landscapes’ among Māori, Brian Murton explores the understanding that Māori, the indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand, have of landscape. Landscape is experienced by Māori as the ‘face of place,’ incorporating deep cultural and spiritual associations. The author contends that the approach to landscape in European thought which most closely approximates Māori understanding of the concept is through the use of phenomenology; a ‘dwelling approach’ resonates with Māori metaphysics. He emphasizes the role of traditional beliefs and narratives, linked to genealogies, as the basis for Māori place names, using detailed discussion of particular examples from the region where he himself has close cultural ties. The chapter by Bruce B. Janz, Philosophical issues in ethnophysiography: Landform terms, disciplinarity, and the question of method, discusses the goals of ethnophysiography (as a nascent discipline), its methods, data types and how its approaches to analysis relate to other ways of exploring the nature of ‘place.’ Such investigations must take account of cultural and spiritual aspects of peoples’ relationships with landscape, including: meaningful actions; social structures; and individual interests and desires. The chapter analyzes the potential for phenomenology to combine synergistically with empiricist/positivist approaches within ethnophysiography and the role of formal ontologies in applying the results of ‘place language’ research. In his ‘Land’ and life: Ethnoecology and ethnogeography as complementary approaches to the analyses of landscape perception, Chris Duvall explores the relationship between landscape categories and local knowledge and use of the biophysical environment among the Maninka, subsistence farmers in southwestern Mali, who speak a Niger-Congo language. In particular, he looks at the significance of land-cover categories in local classification of site arability, arguing that studies of local knowledge systems related to subsistence benefit from careful analysis of physiographic concepts. The account includes a detailed description of the elaborate Maninka taxonomy of landforms. Gary Holton’s chapter Landscape in Western Pantar, a Papuan outlier of southern Indonesia provides an in-depth account of the relationship between language and landscape in a little-known language spoken in an extraordinary environment. Western Pantar presents eye-opening examples of what a given community prefers to encode semantically in its landscape categories, notably an unusual strategy of categorizing hydrological features according to their chemistry rather than their size, shape or permanence. The language also raises
Landscape in language
some fundamental questions about the relationship between generic landscape categories and place names. Renee Louis speaks from an indigenous Hawaiian perspective in her chapter Hawaiian storied place names: Re-placing cultural meaning. She discusses sensuous and cultural aspects of traditional Hawaiian place names and their role in narratives and ceremony, using detailed examples. Place names and their cultural meanings are the result of constant interactions of people and their environment and provide a ‘placescape.’ This traditional cartographic perspective is contrasted with the practices of European colonists in terms of a ‘culture clash,’ which led, in part, to indigenous people adopting some Western surveying and mapping techniques. The author discusses recent attempts to develop a ‘third space’ integration of indigenous traditions and Western GIS approaches. In the chapter Between the trees and the tides: Inuit ways of discriminating space in a coastal and boreal landscape, Scott Heyes provides an account of how the Inuit of Kangiqsualujjuaq, a coastal community in Nunavik, Northern Quebec, conceptualize their world of land, sea, and ice, forest and tundra. Extreme tides and high latitude produce strong cyclic variations on daily and annual scales. The people have developed a system of terms and names that allows them to communicate this ‘landscape of variability.’ Narratives of hunters’ journeys reveal aspects of their conceptualization of the coast. Heyes also reports on the past and present roles of spiritual, mythological, and cosmological dimensions in these conceptualizations. In a chapter entitled Differing conceptualizations of the same landscape: The Athabaskan and Eskimo language boundary in Alaska, Gary Holton introduces a comparative language setting with potential to address some of the key questions in ethnophysiography. The same landscape – the Yukon Intermontane Plateau€– is shared by two communities representing unrelated language families and distinct environmental and subsistence histories. Are these differences reflected in how the two communities categorize their common landscape? Or has the nature of the landscape itself caused differing categorial systems to converge? Holton addresses these issues with a focus on terms referring to elevations and water features. James Kari’s chapter Ahtna geographic names: A case study in Athabascan geographic knowledge encapsulates the author’s long-term dedication to understanding and describing the principles of labeling, naming and navigating . Note: The term “Athabaskan” is spelled in various outlets with either a ‘b’ or a ‘p’, and also with either a ‘k’ or a ‘c’. The editors have decided to use “Athabaskan” in the sections that they write, but to respect the spelling choice of the chapter authors, since sometimes the choice of spelling has political implications.
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landscape among the Northern Athabaskan-speaking communities of Alaska. Arguably one of the most thoroughly researched landscape systems to date, Ahtna geographic classification makes up a well-defined, purposeful and highly economic semantic engine, centered on the flow of water. The chapter explains how this system structures landscape terms, place names, directionals, and geographical narratives, providing a holistic showcase example of how language and landscape can interrelate. In Revitalizing place names through stories and songs, Susan Paskvan draws on her own experience with Koyukon Athabaskan place names. As with other Athabaskan languages, including Navajo as discussed by Jett in this book, Koyukon Athabaskan place names normally are descriptive. Paskvan tells an interesting and useful story of the roles of places and stories in the preservation of language and culture and the transmission of traditional environmental knowledge. She reports on how innovative teaching techniques and technologies can contribute to intergenerational transmission of this knowledge. Thomas Thornton’s chapter, Landscape and language among the Tlingit, tells how the Tlingit people of southeastern Alaska conceptualize their marine and coastal environment. Most of their traditional and modern activities take place in a narrow band along the shore, between the tides, offshore and inland. The land/sea dichotomy provides fundamental structure to their understanding of directions, animals, and spirits. Geographical names cluster along the land/sea interface, indicating the cultural significance of this zone. Thornton discusses the Tlingit conceptualization of landscape and environment in terms of J. J. Gibson’s idea of affordances – day-to-day activities expose affordances and structure their experiences. Leslie Main Johnson’s chapter, Language, landscape and ethnoecology, reflections from northwestern Canada, provides a fascinating description of landscape terms and their meanings in three different languages in adjacent or nearby areas of northern British Columbia. The Gitksan and Witsuwit’en people share similar landscapes but their languages are from different language families. The Witsuwit’en and Kaska people are members of the same language group (Athabaskan), but live in different environments. Comparisons among landscape terms and concepts across these languages provides a basis for untangling the factors that influence which kinds of landscape features have lexicalized terms, and which do not. Language, culture, ways of life, and the nature of the landscape itself all shape a group’s conceptualization of landscape and its components. Stephen C. Jett’s chapter continues his exploration of Landscape Embedded in Language: The Navajo of Canyon de Chelly, Arizona, and their Named Places. The chapter takes on special significance because the majority of the 2008 workshop upon which this book is based was conducted at the mouth of Canyon de Chelly,
Landscape in language
and Jett’s presentation of this material at the workshop set the stage for a field trip into the canyon. Jett places his Canyon de Chelly study in the context of Athabaskan toponyms in general, and points out a number of distinctive aspects, such as the predominance of descriptive names, and rarity of places named after people or holy beings. Currently, place names fill traditional origin narratives, grounding the stories in tangible reality and providing a mutual memory reinforcement between stories and places that served, and continue to serve, a key role in a society that until recently had no written language. In her essay Navajo landscape and its contexts, Carmelita Topaha discusses cultural aspects of landscape from a Navajo perspective. She relates this to her own experience as a young woman visiting significant places with family members and more recent experiences as an archaeologist working on the Navajo Reservation and in nearby areas. She also discusses her involvement in the Ethnophysiography research project with David Mark, David Stea and Andrew Turk, commenting on her role as a facilitator of collaborations with other Navajo participants. Elizabeth Lynch’s chapter, Navigating regional landscapes with Jicarilla personal narrative, investigates how Jicarilla hunter-gatherers may have navigated the landscape, based on analysis of historical narratives. The Jicarilla (an Athabaskan language group) have lived in the southwest of the USA since at least the 15th century. Jicarilla traditional stories were recorded in the early 20th century and the author uses selected stories to construct abstract maps of hunting journeys between named locations, some of which align with current place names. The author suggests that such narrative analysis can complement archaeological data to provide a richer understanding of how these people interacted with the€landscape. Ontology, especially formal ontology, has become popular in information science as a framework that enhances semantic interoperability. In his chapter Ontology of Landscape in Language, Werner Kuhn outlines an ontology-based approach to knowledge representation for research on landscape and language. Ontologies specify vocabularies and associated concepts. Kuhn describes a foundational ontology called DOLCE, which may be especially appropriate for landscape in language because it is has been designed to formalize concepts found in language. Kuhn gives examples of how a formal ontology can accommodate both realist views of physical reality and spiritual dimensions of landscape. Renée Sieber and Chris Wellen write about The role of geospatial technologies for integrating landscape in language, drawing examples from their work with a Cree community in northern Quebec. Rather than employing commercial GIS, Sieber and Wellen used ethnographic methods to elicit the ontology of Cree landscape terms and concepts and represented these concepts in ontology software. The digital ontology provided the backbone of an information system
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for community management of their land and environment. They found that the Cree ontology of hydrologic features was based primarily on functional relationships between water flow and human travel potential by water. The Cree ontology was more “shallow” topologically than official government ontologies of the same hydrologic systems, that is, do not have as many superordinate categories. Ontology-based environmental information systems may provide a more appropriate basis for indigenous environmental management than other software currently in use. The chapter by Lars Brabyn and David M. Mark, Classifying landscape character, discusses approaches to classification of ‘landscape character’ and how GIS can be used to assist. The complexities of classifying landscape are discussed, since landscape has a number of meanings and can be conceptualized at a range of scales. The authors contend that language plays an important role, especially if the opinions of members of the public are utilized as well as the views of scientists. This leads to discussion of the important role that landscape classification plays in communication and in determining how geographic space itself is conceptualized. The chapter discusses a collaborative approach to improving the New Zealand Landscape Classification system. The book concludes with an edited transcript of a panel discussion held at the workshop, entitled Ethical issues in indigenous landscape in language research: A panel discussion. Statements by workshop participants provide multiple perspectives on the diversity and subtlety of issues involved in landscape and language research, especially in the case of indigenous languages and societies.
Acknowledgments Funding for the workshop was provided by the U.S. National Science Foundation under grant BCS-0753737; their support is greatly appreciated, as is support from the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and the hospitality of the Navajo Nation.
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Bell, Paul, Greene, Thomas, Fisher, Jeffrey & Baum, Andrew. 1996. Environmental Psychology. Fort Worth TX: Harcourt Brace. Bender, Barbara (ed.). 1993. Landscape: Politics and Perspectives. Providence RI: Berg. Bohnemeyer, Jürgen, Burenhult, Niclas, Enfield, Nick J. & Levinson, Stephen C. 2004. Landscape terms and place names elicitation guide. In Field Manual Volume 9, Asifa Majid (ed.), 75–79. Nijmegen: Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. Booth, Michael, Rodgers, Stephen & AgInsight. 2000. Interdisciplinary Research Methodologies in Natural Resource Management [Report to LWRRDS Social and Institutional Research Program]. Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy, Murdoch University, Western Australia . Brown, Penelope. 2008. Up, down, and across the land: Landscape terms, place names, and spatial language in Tzeltal. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 151–181. Burenhult, Niclas (ed.). 2008a. Language and Landscape: Geographical Ontology in Cross-linguistic Perspective [Language Sciences 30(2/3)]. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Burenhult, Niclas. 2008b. Streams of words: Hydrological lexicon in Jahai. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 182–199. Burenhult, Niclas & Levinson, Stephen C. 2008. Language and landscape: a cross-linguistic perspective. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 135–150. Burenhult, Niclas & Levinson, Stephen C. 2009. Semplates: A guide to identification and elicitation. In Field Manual Volume 12, Asifa Majid (ed.), 44–50. Nijmegen: Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. Cablitz, Gabriele H. 2008. When “what” is “where”: A linguistic analysis of landscape terms, place names and body part terms in Marquesan (Oceanic, French Polynesia). Language Sciences 30(2/3): 200–226. Casey, Edward S. 1996. How to get from space to place in a fairly short stretch of time: Phenomenological prolegomena. In Senses of Place, Steven Feld & Keith H. Basso (eds), 13–52. Santa Fe NM: School of American Research Press. Cosgrove, Denis. 2004. Landscape and Landschaft. “Spatial Turn in History” Symposium, German Historical Institute, lecture delivered February 19, 2004. GHI Bulletin No. 35 (Fall 2004) 57–71. Downs, Roger M. & Stea, David. 1977. Maps in Minds: Reflections on Cognitive Mapping. New York NY: Harper and Row. Enfield, Nick J. 2008. Linguistic categories and their utilities: The case of Lao landscape terms. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 227–255. Feld, Steven. 1996. Waterfalls of song: an acoustemology of place resounding in Bosavi, Papua New Guinea. In Senses of Place, Steven Feld & Keith H. Basso (eds), 91–135. Santa Fe NM: School of American Research Press. Gibson, James J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin. Gibson, James J. 1987. The perception of visual surfaces. American Journal of Psychology 100(3/4): 646–664. Gibson, James J. & Bridgeman, Bruce. 1987. The visual perception of surface texture in photographs. Psychological Research 49(1): 1–5. Granö, Johannes Gabriel. 1997. Pure Geography. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hirsch, Eric & O’Hanlon, Michael (eds). 1995. The Anthropology of Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Hunn, Eugene S., with Selam, James, and family. 1990. Neh’I-Wana “The Big River.” Mid-Columbia Indians and Their Land. Seattle WA: University of Washington Press. Indigenous Mapping. 2004. The International Forum on Indigenous Mapping: Mapping for Indigenous Advocacy and Empowerment, held in Vancouver, BC, Canada, March 11–14, 2004. Ingold, Tim. 2000. The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. London: Routledge. Ingold, Tim. 2010. The shape of the land. Epilogue in Landscapes Beyond Land: Routes, Aesthetics, Narratives [European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) Series], J. Vergunst, A. Árnason, N. Ellison & A. Whitehouse (eds). Oxford: Berghahn. Jett, Stephen C. 1997. Place-naming, environment, and perception among the Canyon de Chelly Navajo of Arizona. Professional Geographer 49(4): 481–493. Jett, Stephen C. 2001. Navajo Placenames and Trails of the Canyon de Chelly System, Arizona. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Jett, Stephen C. 2006. Reconstructing the itineraries of Navajo chantway stories: A trial at Canyon de Chelly, Arizona. In Southwestern Interludes: Papers in Honor of Charlotte J. and Theodore R. Frisbie, Regge N. Wiseman, Thomas C. O’Laughlin & Cordelia T. Snow (eds), 75–86. Albuquerque NM: The Archaeological Society of New Mexico. Johnson, Leslie M. 1999. Aboriginal burning for vegetation management in northwest British Columbia. In Indians, Fire and the Land in the Pacific Northwest, Robert Boyd (ed.), 238–254. Corvallis OR: Oregon State University Press. Johnson, Leslie M. 2000. “A place that’s good,” Gitksan landscape perception and ethnoecology. Human Ecology 28(2): 301–325. Johnson, Leslie M. 2002. Chapter 2: Indigenous knowledge as a basis for living in local environments. In Ethnographic Essays in Cultural Anthropology: A Problem Based Approach, R.€Bruce Morrison & C. Roderick Wilson (eds), 28–49. Itasca IL: F.E. Peacock. Johnson, Leslie M. & Hargus, Sharon. 2006. Witsuwit’en words for the land – a preliminary examination of Witsuwit’en ethnogeography. In ANLC Working Papers in Athabaskan Linguistics, Vol. 6, Siri Tuttle, Leslie Saxon, Suzanne Gessner & Andrea Berez (eds). Fairbanks AK: Alaska Native Language Center. Kofod, Frances. 2003. My relations, my country: language, identity and land in the East Kimberley of Western Australia. In Maintaining the Links: Language, Identity, and the Land [Proceedings of the Seventh Conference of the Foundation for Endangered Languages, Broome, Western Australia, 22–24 September 2004], Joe Blythe & R. McKenna Brown (eds), 41–47. Bath: Foundation for Endangered Languages. Kuhn, Werner. 2002. Modeling the semantics of geographic categories through conceptual integration. In Geographic Information Science – Second International Conference (GIScience 2002) [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2478], Max J. Egenhofer & David M. Mark (eds), 108–118. Berlin: Springer. Kuhn, Werner. 2003. Semantic reference systems. International Journal of Geographical Information Science 17(5): 405–409. Kuhn, Werner. 2005. Geospatial semantics: Why, of what, and how? In Journal on Data Semantics III [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3534], Stefano Spaccapietra & Esteban Zimányi (eds), 1–24. Berlin: Springer. Kuhn, Werner. 2007. An image-schematic account of spatial categories. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Spatial Information Theory [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4736], Stephan Winter, Matt Duckham, Lars Kulik & Benjamin Kuipers (eds), 152–168. Berlin: Springer.
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Levinson, Stephen C. 2003. Space in Language and Cognition: Explorations in Cognitive Diversity. Cambridge: CUP. Levinson, Stephen C. 2008. Landscape, seascape and the ontology of places on Rossel Island, Papua New Guinea. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 256–290. Levinson, Stephen C. & Burenhult, Niclas. 2009. Semplates: A new concept in lexical semantics? Language 85(1): 153–174. Levinson, Stephen & Wilkins, David (eds). 2006. Grammars of Space. Cambridge: CUP. Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics. Vols. I & II. Cambridge: CUP. Majid, Asifa, Bowerman, Melissa, Kita, Sotaro, Haun, Daniel & Levinson, Stephen. 2004. Can language restructure cognition? The case for space. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8(3): 108– 114. Malpas, Jeff E. 1999. Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography. Cambridge: CUP. Malpas, Jeff E. 2007. Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Malt, Barbara C. 1995. Category coherence in cross-cultural perspective. Cognitive Psychology 29(2): 85–148. Mark, David M. 1993. Toward a theoretical framework for geographic entity types. In Spatial Information Theory: A Theoretical Basis for GIS [Lecture Notes in Computer Sciences No. 716], Andrew U. Frank & Irene Campari (eds), 270–283. Berlin: Springer. Mark, David M., Kuhn, Werner, Smith, Barry & Turk, Andrew G. 2003. Ontology, natural language, and information systems: implications of cross-linguistic studies of geographic terms. In AGILE 2003 – 6th AGILE Conference on Geographic Information Science, Michael Gould, Robert Laurini & Stéphane Coulondre (eds), 45–50. Lyon: Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes. Mark, David M. & Smith, Barry. 2004. A science of topography: From qualitative ontology to digital representations. In Geographic Information Science and Mountain Geomorphology, Michael P. Bishop & John F. Shroder (eds), 75–100. Berlin: Springer-Praxis. Mark, David M., Smith, Barry & Tversky, Barbara. 1999. Ontology and geographic objects: An empirical study of cognitive categorization. In Spatial Information Theory: A Theoretical Basis for GIS [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1661], Christian Freksa & David M. Mark (eds), 283–298. Berlin: Springer. Mark, David M. & Turk, Andrew G. 2003a. Ethnophysiography. Paper presented at the Workshop on Spatial and Geographic Ontologies, 23 September, 2003 (prior to COSIT03), in Ittingen, Switzerland. Mark, David M. & Turk, Andrew G. 2003b. Landscape categories in Yindjibarndi: ontology, environment, and language. In Spatial Information Theory: Foundations of Geographic Information Science [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2825], Werner Kuhn, Michael Worboys & Sabine Timpf (eds), 28–45. Berlin: Springer. Mark, David M. & Turk, Andrew G. 2004. Ethnophysiography and the ontology of the landscape. In GIScience 2004 Extended Abstracts and Poster Summaries, Max Egenhofer, Christian Freksa & Harvey Miller (eds), 152–155. Santa Barbara CA: Regents of the University of California. Mark, David M., Turk, Andrew G. & Stea, David. 2007. Progress on Yindjibarndi Ethnophysiography. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Spatial Information Theory [Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 4736], Stephan Winter, Matt Duckham, Lars Kulik & Benjamin Kuipers (eds), 1–19. Berlin: Springer.
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Mark, David M., Turk, Andrew G. & Stea, David. 2010. Ethnophysiography of arid lands: Categories for landscape features. In Landscape Ethnoecology, Concepts of Biotic Physical and Space, Leslie M. Johnson & Eugene S. Hunn (eds), 27–45. New York NY: Berghahn Books. Mohanty, Jitendranath N. 1997. Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press. Myers, Fred R. 1986. Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and Politics among Western Desert Aborigines. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. O’Connor, Loretta & Kroefges, Peter K. 2008. The land remembers: Landscape terms and place names in Lowland Chontal of Oaxaca, Mexico. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 291–315. Olwig, Kenneth. 2008. Performing on landscape versus doing landscape: perambulatory practice, sight and the sense of belonging. In Ways of walking: Ethnography and practice on foot, Tim Ingold & J. Lee Vergunst (eds), 81–91. Aldershot: Ashgate. O’Meara, Carolyn & Bohnemeyer, Jürgen. 2008. Complex landscape terms in Seri. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 316–339. Palmer, Mark H. 2006. Creating Indigital Peripheries: The Bureau of Indian Affairs, Geographic Information Systems, and the Digitization of Indian Country. PhD dissertation, University of Oklahoma. Patocka, Jan. 1996. An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology. Peru IL: Open Court Publishing. Pattison, William D. 1964. The four traditions of geography. Journal of Geography 63(5): 211–216. Pinxten, Rik, Van Dooren, Ingrid & Harvey, Frank. 1983. Anthropology of Space: Explorations into the Natural Philosophy and Semantics of the Navajo. Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Reed, Edward & Jones, Rebecca. 1982. Reasons for Realism: Selected Essays of James J. Gibson. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Rundstrom, Robert A. 1995. GIS, indigenous peoples, and epistemological diversity. Cartography and Geographic Information Systems 22(1): 45–57. Schunn, Christian D., Paulus, Paul B., Cagan, Jonathan & Wood, Kristin. 2006. Final Report from the NSF Innovation and Discovery Workshop: The Scientific Basis of Individual and Team Innovation and Discovery. August 2006. (23 August 2007). Schutz, Alfred. 1977. Husserl and his influence on me. In Interdisciplinary Phenomenology, Don Ihde & Richard M. Zaner (eds), 124–129. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Senft, Gunter. 2008. Landscape terms and place names in the Trobriand Islands – the Kaile’una subset. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 340–361. Sieber, Renée E. 2004. Rewiring for a GIS/2. Cartographica 39(1): 25–39. Sieber, Renée E. 2006. Public participation Geographic Information Systems: A literature review and framework. Annals of the American Association of Geographers 96(3): 491–507. Sieber, Renée E. 2007. Spatial data access by the grassroots. Cartography and Geographic Information Science 34(1): 47–62. Sieber, Renée E. In press. The nature of GIS: The social implications of using GIS for the environment. In Geographic Information Systems and Society Handbook, Timothy Nyerges, Helen Couclelis & Robert McMaster (eds). London: Sage.
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Sieber, Renée E. & Wellen, Christopher C. 2006. Participatory indigenous spatial ontology. Paper presented at the 4th GIScience Biennial Conference, September 22, 2006, Munster, Germany. Sieber, Renée E. & Wellen, Christoper C. 2007. Blending participatory GIS and geo-spatial ontologies for indigenous knowledge preservation. Keynote speech at SAGEO/CQFDGéo: The International French Geomatics Conference, June 20, 2007, Clermont-Ferrand, France. Smith, Barry & Mark, David M. 1998. Ontology and geographic kinds. In Proceedings of 8th International Symposium on Spatial Data Handling [SDH ‘98], K. Tom Poiker & Nicholas Chrisman (eds), 308–320. Vancouver BC: International Geographical Union. Smith, Barry & Mark, David M. 2001. Geographic categories: An ontological investigation. International Journal of Geographical Information Science 15(7): 591–612. Smith, Barry & Mark, David M. 2003. Do mountains exist? Towards an ontology of landforms. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 30(3): 411–427. Smith, David W. 2007. Phenomenology. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (20 April 2007). Smith, Neil. 1989. Geography as museum: Private history and conservative idealism in The Nature of Geography. In Reflections on Richard Hartshorne’s The Nature of Geography, J.€Nicholas Entrikin & Stanley D. Brunn (eds), 91–120. Washington DC: Occasional Publication of the Association of American Geographers. Taller de Tradición Oral del CEPEC & Beaucage, Pierre. 1996. La bonne montagne et l’eau malfaisante: Toponymie et practiques environmentales chez les Nahuas de basse montagne (Sierra Norte de Puebla, Mexique). Anthropologie et Sociétés 20(3): 33–54. Tilley, Christopher. 1994. A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments. Oxford: Berg. Tuan, Yi-Fu. 1974. Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall. Turk, Andrew G. 1996. Presenting aboriginal knowledge: Using technology to progress native title claims. Alternative Law Journal 21(1): 6–9. Turk, Andrew G. 2006. Representations of tribal boundaries of Australian Indigenous peoples and the implications for Geographic Information Systems. In Information Technology and Indigenous People, Laurel E. Dyson, Max Hendricks & Stephen Grant (eds), 232–244. Hershey PA: Information Science Publishing. Turk, Andrew G. 2007. A phenomenology basis for trans-disciplinary research in ethnophysiography. Proceedings of the 26th International Human Science Research Conference, Rovereto, Italy. CD-ROM. Turk, Andrew G. & Mackaness, William A. 1995. Design considerations for spatial information systems and maps to support native title negotiation and arbitration. Cartography 24(2): 17–28. Turk, Andrew, Mark, David, O’Meara, Carolyn & Stea, David. In press. Geography – documenting terms for landscape features. In Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Fieldwork, Nicholas Thieberger (ed.). Oxford: OUP. Turk, Andrew G. & Trees, Kathryn A. 1999. Ethical issues concerning the use of Geographic Information Systems technology with indigenous communities. Proceedings of the Australian Institute of Computer Ethics Conference (AICEC99), Melbourne, Australia, 385–398.
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chapter 2
Ethnophysiography Andrew G. Turk, David M. Mark and David Stea
This chapter provides an overview of recent progress in the research field of ethnophysiography. It provides a summary of two case studies, one with the Yindjibarndi people from northwestern Australia, and the other with the Diné from southwestern United States of America. The main findings to date from these studies are that most basic terms for landscape features in each of these languages do not have a one-to-one equivalence with any landscape term in English. The findings point to key research issues in the way in which landscape is referred to in different languages. To facilitate this transdisciplinary research, an initial descriptive model is presented, which includes key observed differences in the way languages treat landscape and also a set of factors which might be considered as possible reasons for such differences.
1.
Introduction
This chapter briefly describes developments in ethnophysiography, defined as the study of different human conceptualizations of landscape, especially as indicated by differences in the way languages use generic terms and proper names (toponyms) for landscape features. The field of ethnophysiography was initiated in 2002 by David Mark and Andrew Turk (Mark & Turk 2003a); David Stea joined the research group two years later. More complete descriptions of the motivations, methodology and findings of this research project are provided in: Mark and Turk (2003a, b); Mark, Turk and Stea (2007, 2010); Turk, Mark, O’Meara and Stea (in press); and in Chapters 1 and 3 of this book. The first ethnophysiography case study, with the Yindjibarndi people from northwestern Australia, has been underway since 2002. Land is absolutely central to Yindjibarndi culture. Hence, terms for parts of landscape play an important role in their language. Terms for landscape features relate to practical activities of Yindjibarndi life and also to deep cultural/spiritual associations with ngurra
26 Andrew G. Turk, David M. Mark and David Stea
(country) from the earliest time, Ngurra Nyujunggamu ‘when the world was soft’ (Ieramugadu Group Inc. 1995). The second ethnophysiography case study conducted by the authors involves the Diné. The majority of the Diné, known as Navajo from the time of Spanish settlement, currently live on a reservation half the size of England, situated in the southwestern United States of America. The main reason for choosing the Navajo language for the second case study of the Ethnophysiography Project was the superficial resemblance of Navajo country, semi-arid with many exposed rock formations, to Yindjibarndi landscapes. This holds promise for comparing sets of terms for similar landscape features between languages of vastly different origins. In addition to the ethnophysiography case studies described in this chapter, the authors have also reviewed a number of similar studies, especially those carried out by the Language and Cognition Group at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen (Burenhult 2008a). This work, which is currently seen as fitting predominately within the disciplines of linguistics and geography, could also fall under such other rubrics as philosophical or environmental anthropology. A way to improve understanding of such diverse contributions is to construct a descriptive model of factors relevant to ethnophysiography. Attributes of places and peoples differ in various ways. The case studies reviewed indicate a number of common ways that languages also seem to vary in how they refer to landscape. The former factors could be possible reasons for the latter linguistic effects, although they are unlikely to be related via a deterministic causal model. Indeed, the reasons any specific language has particular concepts and terms may be lost in the mists of time. An initial version of the Ethnophysiography Descriptive Model is developed in the fourth section of this chapter, which was presented by Turk as a paper at the Landscape in Language Workshop.
2.
Yindjibarndi case study
2.1
Description of language community
Language and location Yindjibarndi belongs to the Coastal Ngayarda language group, within the southwest group of the Pama-Nyungan languages (SIL 2000). According to Thieberger (1996), about 1,000 Yindjibarndi speakers remain, of whom about 500 live in and near Roebourne in the Pilbara region of northwestern Australia. The population of the Roebourne community is mostly indigenous and people use both
Ethnophysiography
their own languages and English to differing degrees, depending on the context, sometimes mixing words from different languages in a single utterance. Several linguists have studied the Yindjibarndi language and partial dictionaries have been produced: Wordick (1982); Anderson (1986); and a digital version by Anderson and Thieberger (n.d.). The Yindjibarndi language, like other Pilbara languages, relies mainly on nouns and verbs (Wordick 1982). Almost 70 percent of the words listed in the aforementioned dictionaries are nouns and 20 percent verbs. Yindjibarndi has no word class equivalent to adjectives per se. However, nouns are used to modify other nouns in ways somewhat equivalent to adjectives in English. Word order is relatively flexible, and the roles of words in utterances often are indicated by an elaborate set of suffixes, including two indicating location (-ngga, â•‚la) and another indicating a particular instance of a generic term or name (-na). Yindjibarndi does not make any formal distinction between mass and count nouns.
Brief description of landscape and ecology Traditional Yindjibarndi country starts at an escarpment about 50 km from the sea and extends on tablelands for about 200 km to the east, through the broad valley of what is called the Fortescue River in English, and for 50 km south up to the Hamersley Ranges. The relief (elevation differences) is mostly relatively low, with rolling hills, extensive flats, and some cliffs and rock outcrops. The climate of this region is quite hot, sometimes reaching over 50°C (122°F) in summer, and relatively dry, with average annual rainfall of about 300 mm (12 inches). There are no permanent or even seasonal rivers or creeks in Yindjibarndi country. Larger watercourses have running water only after major rainfall events, usually associated with cyclones (hurricanes). Permanent pools occur where the lie of the land and the geology cause the water table to break the surface of the ground, e.g. along the channels of the Fortescue River. There are also some small permanent springs and soaks (where water can be obtained by digging) but no significant intermittent or seasonal lakes in Yindjibarndi country. The vegetation is mostly sparse grass or spinifex (Triodia), low scrub and scattered eucalypt trees, except in the floodplain of the Fortescue River, where vegetation is more dense. Brief description of lifestyle and history of language community Until the 1860s the Yindjibarndi people lived mostly along the middle part of the valley of what Europeans named the Fortescue River and on adjacent uplands, pursuing a semi-nomadic hunter/gatherer lifestyle, living in small groups (Tindale 1974). However, they have been progressively displaced from their ‘country’ over the last 150 years as part of the colonizing process, having been obliged
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to make way for, initially, pastoral activities and, in more recent times, the mining industry (Ieramugadu Group Inc. 1995; Rijavec, Harrison & Soloman 1995). Almost all Yindjibarndi people now live outside their traditional territory, with about half living in the nearby small town of Roebourne (Ireamugadu), near the coast, together with Ngaluma and Banjima peoples. Many Yindjibarndi retain strong cultural links to the land, visiting their traditional country for hunting, gathering and ceremonies.
2.2
Case study description
Participants This language group was chosen for study partly because of a long history of research and community development projects undertaken in Roebourne by Turk and his partner Kathryn Trees (e.g. Trees & Turk 1998; Turk & Trees 2000). The language participants (listed in the acknowledgments section) are all members of the Roebourne community. Some of these people have, sadly, passed away but the researchers have been requested to continue to list their contributions, despite a tradition of not using the names of deceased persons. The Yindjibarndi cultural organization Juluwarlu and the Pilbara Aboriginal Language Centre (Wangka Maya) also provided invaluable assistance. Brief description of case study methodology The methodology used in this case study consisted of the following five major stages: 1. Dictionary work and photo collection; scoping the domain and preparing fieldwork materials; 2. Photo interpretation sessions with language consultants; transcription; clarifying landscape terms identified from dictionaries and collecting new terms; 3. Field interviews; travelling through Yindjibarndi-related country and identifying the set of landscape terms and distinctions among them, cultural associations and usage; 4. Semi-structured follow-up sessions with selected photos; clarifying confusions, probing for extra meanings and evaluating the quality of interpretations; 5. Reporting back; presentation of the initial results to community members (as a draft pictorial landscape dictionary) and obtaining feedback.
2.3
Ethnophysiography
Main findings
Summary of main landscape terms A draft photo-illustrated dictionary including about 100 Yindjibarndi landscape terms has been compiled (Turk & Mark 2008). This version was discussed with participants in 2009 and has been revised, in collaboration with Juluwarlu. Table€1 presents the meanings of the most interesting and important of the terms collected. Table 1.╇ Selected Yindjibarndi landscape terms and explanations Yindjibarndi term
English words with similar meaning
bargarra birlin
Convexities / eminences mound, heap, pile small rough hill or steep, rocky hillside small, low, smoothly-rounded hill summit, peak (of hill/mountain) bottom (foot) (of hill/mountain) flat-topped (e.g. hill) hill, mountain, ridge, range, rock, stone Horizontal areas (plains) flat (area) or plain flat rock outcrop
ganyjiya yirra
Edges edge of hilltop; edge of water body exact edge of hilltop or water body
barlu burnda garga wundu yalimbirr yarndirr
Longitudinal depressions bank (of river, creek or pool) depression, ditch, hollow gully riverbed steep, high riverbank gorge
bawa jinbi mankurdu thanardi thardarr thurla yijirdi yinda yurrama
Water and water features water spring strong flow, flood (of water) sea, ocean waterfall place small, temporary pool (of water) slow, shallow flow (of water) permanent pool (of water) soak
bantha bargu burbaa gankarni jinangga marlirri marnda
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Table 1.╇ (continued) Yindjibarndi term
English words with similar meaning
jardungu muji ngathiny wirga
Openings and gaps rock-hole cave, hole space or gap between rocks gap (in ridge line or between hills)
biyiila bura ngurra thalu thunggawaya wana wankurri wardiwardi
Areas and locations in the open “out bush” (i.e., far away from settlements) earth, ground, place, camp, land, country sacred site sandy area ground in the middle distance corner (in cliff) slope
barurru garrarnmarra
Land cover (vegetation) spinifex, area of thick vegetation, area of
mardiya (resp.) yirdiya
Tracks road, track, trail (respect language) road, track, trail
Key aspects of interest The way that Yindjibarndi terms subdivide and represent landscape features differs considerably from terms used in the English language. Key aspects of these differences are: – There are no terms for types of landscape features not found in traditional Yindjibarndi country, except for thanardi (ocean, sea). – One term marnda covers a wide range of features of different sizes: things that would be called ‘hill,’ ‘mountain,’ ‘ridge,’ ‘range,’ ‘rock,’ ‘stone,’ etc. in English. – Terms for convex landscape features do not match those in English: marnda, bargu, burbaa do not equate to mountain, hill, rise; the last two are smaller but mainly differentiated by shape. – Yindjibarndi uses some compound phrases for landscape features denoted by single words in English; e.g. marnda marlirri (flat-topped hill, mesa). – Yindjibarndi hydrology terms separate the water and the magnitude of its flow (bawa, mankurdu, yijirdi) from longitudinal depressions (garga, wundu)
–
–
– –
Ethnophysiography
along which the water sometimes flows, whereas English incorporates both the water and the channel in the terms ‘river’ and ‘creek,’ with the water and the bed probably being considered to be parts of one entity. Similarly, thardarr is the term for the place where water sometimes falls down a cliff; if the falling water is present it is referred to by the flow magnitude words above. Some Yindjibarndi terms effectively refer to shape rather than topographic objects; e.g. burbaa, which can refer to a small marnda that is low, smooth and rounded, or to a rise in a yirdiya (road), or to low rounded areas of higher ground, for instance between garga (gullies). There are alternative words for some landscape features in a special ‘respect’ language (used in major ceremonies involving visitors from other tribes); e.g. mardiya (track, trail). Spiritual aspects of features are part of the meaning of terms; e.g. yinda (permanent pool with warlu spirit). Place names tend not to include generic terms, are unanalyzable, rather than descriptive, and are sometimes grouped, especially when they are related by ‘the dreaming’ (creation beliefs in the form of narratives); e.g. Jindawurru.
3.
Navajo case study
3.1
Description of language community
The Diné (Navajo) people In their own language, the people refer to themselves as Diné, but they normally use the term Navajo in English-language contexts. In the 2000 U.S. census, 298,197 people reported that they were of Navajo ancestry. With about 240,000 officially registered members, Navajos are second in numbers only to the Cherokees among U.S. Indian groups. The 2000 U.S. census also reported a total of 178,014 people living in Navajo-speaking households. The Navajo language is the most frequently spoken indigenous language in the United States; 47 percent of those who speak an Indian language at home in the United States speak Navajo. The Navajo Reservation consists of 67,339 square kilometers and is located in northeastern Arizona, northwestern New Mexico, and southeastern Utah. The 2000 U.S. census reported that 58% of Navajos (173,987 people) lived on the reservation. Other Navajos live in such cities as Phoenix, Arizona, and Los Angeles, California, and the U.S. census reported Navajo speakers living in 47 of the 50 U.S. states.
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The Navajo language The Navajo language, which the people call Diné Bizaad, is a member of the Athabaskan language family (Young & Morgan 1992). Most of the Athabaskan languages are spoken today in Alaska and northwestern Canada, but those spoken in the western United States include Navajo, various Apachean languages, and several others along the Pacific Coast. Like other Athabaskan languages, Navajo has an elaborate prefixing system with words formed by fitting elements into templates, with many words combining several components (Kari 1989). The Navajo language has a large number of verbs, relatively few nouns, and no word class that corresponds to adjectives in English. Language community history and lifeways, past and present The Navajo origin stories place their beginnings in the area where they now live, bounded by their four Sacred Mountains. Research in non-Navajo archaeology and anthropology, however, suggests that people with a material culture associated with Athabaskan arrived relatively recently in the American Southwest. While sources vary regarding the estimated time of arrival of these peoples in New Mexico, they almost certainly moved into the area between 1100 and 1400€A.D. (see Iverson with Roessel 2002:â•›16). When they arrived in northern New Mexico, the people now known as Navajos apparently led a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, perhaps complemented by raiding. However, they soon adopted corngrowing from the Puebloan peoples living in the area, and began cultivating fruit trees. When Spaniards introduced horses and sheep, various tribes adopted them. Both horses and sheep became central to Navajo culture and were incorporated into origin stories. The majority of the Navajo people were forcibly removed from their land by the United States government in 1864, but after four and a half years of exile on the plains of northeastern New Mexico, they were allowed to return to their traditional lands, some of which were designated as a reservation straddling what is now the Arizona-New Mexico border. They promptly expanded into neighboring lands and have continued to gain considerable land up to the present. Navajos are traditionally matrilineal and matrilocal, i.e., people’s primary clan affiliation is with their mother’s clan, and daughters traditionally settle near their mothers’ homes. Today, many Navajos live on the reservation in dispersed settlements, and some herd sheep, while many others, wage-earners living in towns on and off the reservation, return home on weekends. For a more detailed history of the Navajo people, see Iverson with Roessel (2002).
Ethnophysiography
The physical landscape and ecology Navajo land, ranging from semi-arid to arid, is forested at high elevations. The physiography is basin-and-range, and much of the Navajo Reservation is on the Colorado plateau. In many areas, flat-lying rocks and volcanic necks form features that in English would be called buttes, mesas, and plateaus. While vegetation in lower areas consists of sagebrush (Artemisia tridentata) and other shrubs and grasses, there are junipers (Juniperus monosperma and J. osteosperma), piñon pines (Pinus edulis and P. monophylla) and ponderosa pines (Pinus ponderosa) at intermediate elevations. A few permanent rivers and streams cross through or bound Navajo country after originating outside the area, but most watercourses are dry for most of the year. 3.2
Case study description
Brief methodological description Following preliminary examination of published dictionaries and other literature, the first exploration of Navajo landscape terminology involved having Navajo speakers sort landscape photographs into groups; participants were then asked to describe why they grouped the photos as they did. Groupings differed widely from speaker to speaker and were difficult to interpret. However, the results of the grouping task did help the researchers in their selection of images for the photograph response protocol (see below). This exploratory phase was followed by a second phase using two main research protocols. During field interviews, individual participants or small groups rode in vehicles with the researchers along routes chosen by the participants in areas familiar to them, and talked about what they saw in the landscape. Some participants spoke mainly English to the researchers and simply included Navajo landscape terms. Other participants talked about the landscape in complete Navajo sentences. The conversations were recorded on digital audio media; numerous photographs were taken and GPS coordinates were collected along most of these routes. Field interviews were conducted at sites distributed across the Navajo Reservation. A third protocol involved showing landscape photographs to small groups of participants (with a mean of about 3 people), recruited by local Navajo consultant Carmelita Topaha. Participants talked about what they saw in the photographs, and the sessions were again recorded on digital audio media. For some sessions, photographs were projected using a digital projector; elsewhere, page-sized color prints of the same photographs were passed around among the participants as
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they sat at a table. The photographs were selected by the researchers to represent various “types of landforms” (etic categories) and different regions of the reservation and were always shown in the same order. The set of photographs was adjusted in later fieldwork to better elicit terms about which the researchers were less certain. Fieldwork was conducted between July 2003 and April 2009, and, as of early 2010, is in the analysis stage. Participants were paid for their participation in accord with locally appropriate practice and the research ethics approvals, including a research permit issued by the Navajo Nation.
3.3
Main findings
As of early 2010, analysis of data had begun but only preliminary results had been obtained. Thus, presentation of lists of landscape terms and definitions here would be premature. There are, however, some more general findings.
Key aspects of landscape terms The Navajo language has a large number of terms that refer to features or parts of the landscape. A draft list of terms for an illustrated landscape dictionary for community use, prepared in 2009, includes about 175 terms, which can be placed under 47 main entries. In contrast, the draft illustrated landscape dictionary for Yindjibarndi (Turk & Mark 2008) has about 100 terms under 50 main entries. With a similar number of “main entries” (somewhat abstracted terms), the greater number of low-level or compound terms in Navajo may relate to the synthetic nature of the Navajo language. Another interesting aspect of Navajo landscape terminology is that many terms are compounds that explicitly indicate the materials of which the feature consists. Thus, there are many terms beginning with tsé (rock) and to (water), as well as lesser numbers beginning with words for other earth materials such as sand and clay. The stem verb of a term often indicates what the material is “doing” or how it is arranged. This superficially resembles the structure of complex landscape terms in the Seri language of Sonora, Mexico (O’Meara & Bohnemeyer 2008), a language isolate unrelated to the Athabaskan languages. The Navajo language also has a number of simple landscape terms with obscure etymologies. An example of the relative importance of materials is provided by terms for longitudinal depressions in the landscape. English and many European languages have two or more terms for longitudinal depressions, depending on the size of the feature. English-language terms such as ‘valley,’ ‘canyon,’ ‘gorge,’ ‘gully,’ ‘ravine,’ and ‘rill’ are distinguished from each other mainly by size. If material is relevant, the material is included as an adjective (e.g., “rock canyon”). For Navajo, there are
Ethnophysiography
different terms depending on the material into which the feature cuts: bikooh for a large canyon or small gully with sides of dirt or soil, and tsékooh for small or large longitudinal depressions cut into rock. If the size of a feature must be communicated in Navajo, a general-purpose size term is added.
Names, terms, and descriptions (links to toponymy) An interesting characteristic of landscape reference in the Navajo language is that the differences among toponyms (place names), landscape descriptions, and landscape terms are subtle. This differentiates Navajo from both Yindjibarndi and English, but also complicates analysis and interpretation. As noted by Jett (1997, 2001), almost all Navajo toponyms are translatable into English, and the majority translate into descriptive English phrases. The Navajo language has a term, hoolyé, translated as “a-place-called…” (Kelley & Francis 1994:â•›85; Kelley, personal communication, 2006). However, hoolyé is often omitted, so while its presence removes ambiguity and clearly indicates a toponym, a word not followed by hoolyé might still be a toponym. The Navajo language also has a particularizing enclitic, -í, which is similar in function to the English definite article the in that it denotes a particular instance, e.g. “the rock” or “that rock”. The presence of -í transforms a generic term or description into a reference to a single instance, but once again, this enclitic is sometimes omitted. Generic landscape terms, such as “hill,” commonly occur as elements of toponyms in many languages, indicating the category to which the feature belongs. Jett (2001, this volume) has coined the term ‘semi-generic’ to refer to descriptive feature names in Navajo that occur frequently within a region, yet are richer and more complex than ordinary generics. An example is tsé ’íí’áhí, literally ‘the rock that is standing’. Is tsé ’íí’áhí a type of landscape feature to be included in a Navajo landscape dictionary, or a feature name that occurs frequently, or a description? Perhaps it is all three. Relationship of landscape terms to culture and spirituality As described in published and internet sources, traditional Navajo beliefs do not make a distinction between animate and inanimate objects. Also, every kind of thing and, sometimes, individual landscape features (such as specific mountains and rivers) are considered to be male or female. Mountains, rock formations, and rivers have “inner forms”. Sometimes the land on one side of a certain river is male and on the other side it is female. In Navajo “most plants have at least three names, the ‘real’ name, the way-in-which-it-is-used name, and a descriptive name” (Vestal 1952:â•›57). Similarly, many landscape features have two or more names: a name used for secular contexts such as hunting or wayfinding, and another name in the context of sacred stories (Williams & Blackhorse 2006).
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Also, within traditional beliefs, many angular rock formations are considered to be the turned-to-stone bodies of monsters killed by the Hero Twins, as described in origin stories. The origin stories often contain lists of places visited by Holy Beings, enhancing both memory for the events in the stories and knowledge of the geography of Navajo country.
4.
Ethnophysiography Descriptive Model
4.1
Beyond descriptive ethnography
This section discusses the formation of an initial descriptive model explaining the ethnophysiographic factors emerging from analyzing existing case studies. Of course, as factors are likely to be interdependent, separating them is only for the purpose of trying to understand and explain the differences found between the ways in which various languages refer to landscape. It is hoped that this initial version of the model will stimulate discussion and lead to more effective analysis of generic issues underlying the results of the individual case studies. The basic ethnophysiography hypothesis is: people from different language groups/cultures have different ways of conceptualizing landscape, as evidenced by different terminology and ways of talking about, and naming, landscape features. To investigate this proposition it is hence necessary to have some way of developing constructs for its key elements: ‘different language groups/cultures’; ‘different ways of conceptualizing landscape features’; ‘different terminology and ways of talking about landscape features’; ‘different ways of naming landscape features’. Development of each of these formal constructs is only beginning. Some of the issues relevant to each are as follows: Different language groups/cultures: – Grouping in terms of languages vs. dialects; – Use of geographically and/or historically coherent groups; – Interaction between ‘language’ and other constructs of culture, such as ‘religion’ and ‘ethnicity.’ Different ways of conceptualizing landscape features: – Ways of cutting up landscape into features; – Conceptualization of features as object vs. field; – Spiritual significance of features.
Ethnophysiography
Different terminology and ways of talking about landscape features: – Use of generic landscape terms; – Grammatical issues: e.g. use of single words vs. phrases for features; – Talking about landscape differently in different contexts of discourse. Different ways of naming landscape features: – What types of features are given proper names; – Relationship of proper names to landscape terms; – Cultural significance of naming practices. Development of such constructs is being advanced by the case studies reported in this and other chapters of this book. If ethnophysiography is to be merely ethnographically descriptive it may be sufficient to refine these formal constructs in such a way as to enable them to adequately express all data obtained in cases studies. However, there is a deeper analytical objective in most, if not all, studies of the representation of landscape in language: the desire to understand which language feature terms are universal and which are culturally determined (and therefore different); and the causal apparatus involved in observed cultural differences. It is, however, important to recognize that some people who contribute data to this general field of investigation are primarily motivated by the desire for language documentation and preservation. However, even in these cases, the linguists have an underlying interest in at least some types of inter-language comparisons, such as differences between or among grammatical systems.
4.2
Towards a descriptive model of ethnophysiographic factors
As a field of theoretical development ethnophysiography must ‘walk before it runs.’ Theory (“grounded theory”) should be developed in a logical manner from the ground up. It is extremely easy to start developing causal theories that apply only to part of the domain, ignoring yet undiscovered confounding variables. Hence, it is important to start with a sequence of ever more complete and coherent descriptive models before attempting a causal or predictive model. Theory describes what is observed and then predicts what might be observed under specified conditions: the latter involves relations and even, in many cases, causation. By explicitly laying out the details of a descriptive model (together with examples of each element drawn from published case studies) it is possible to uncover weaknesses in the current taxonomy of factors and to test whether any new data fits the existing descriptive model or requires its revision.
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Each iteration of a descriptive model can also assist researchers to seek out new case study data which might conflict with the existing model and perhaps reveal new factors. For instance, European scientists may well have felt justified in making the leap from correlation (“all swans so far observed are white”) to causation (“all swans are necessarily white”) prior to the discovery of black swans in Australia. Indeed, part of the drive for exploration of parts of the world poorly known to Europeans in the ‘enlightenment project’ was seeking out examples of flora and fauna new to the West, and documenting the environmental conditions of their location. The activities of naturalist Charles Darwin during the voyage of HMS Beagle (from 27 December 1831 to 2 October 1836) is a classic example of this (Darwin 1845, as cited in Quammen 2008). Darwin’s deep consideration of the variations he discovered and the mechanisms of differentiation he hypothesized resulted in perhaps the most celebrated scientific theory of modern times: the theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection.
4.3
Preliminary version of Ethnophysiography Descriptive Model
Understanding of the differences in the way landscape is treated in language is still emerging. However, based on the ethnophysiography studies to date and informed by treatment of these issues by MPI researchers (Burenhult & Levinson 2008), those differences currently identified may be assembled into groups. These include the following (with examples drawn from the Yindjibarndi case study of the Ethnophysiography Research Group and some studies included in Burenhult 2008a): 1. Completeness of the set of landscape terms used in any particular language, within the range of all possible landscape types [e.g. in Yindjibarndi (NW Australia), there are no terms for a cinder cone or a coral reef]; 2. Granularity of classification of landscape types used in sets of terms [e.g. Yindjibarndi uses the same term marnda for entities termed mountains, ranges, ridges, and (some) hills in English. Similarly, in the Lowland Chontal language (in Oaxaca, Pacific coast of Mexico) ijwala labels any elevated entity, whether mountain, hill, or highlands, in general; a single word, ane’, refers to any path, from a dirt track to a paved highway (O’Connor & Kroefges 2008)]; 3. Use of compound words and phrases, instead of simple generic landscape terms [e.g. in Yindjibarndi, a “mesa” is called a marnda marlirri (flat-topped hill); in Seri (Mexico) most landscape terms are complex and based on four substances plus posture semantics (O’Meara & Bohnemeyer 2008)];
Ethnophysiography
4. Role of nouns vs. verbs vs. prepositions in landscape terms [e.g. in Kilivila (Kaile’una Island, PNG) landscape terms are mostly (common) nouns, but some are prepositional phrases (locatives and directionals) (Senft 2008)]; 5. Role of metaphors and/or frames for structuring landscape terms (referred to as ‘semplates’ in Burenhult & Levinson 2010) [e.g. in Jahai (Malay Peninsula) terms for hydrological features, there is a strong use of metaphor (from animate domains, mainly human) of two sorts: body parts (creating partonomy) and kinship terms (creating size taxonomy) (Burenhult 2008b)]; 6. Distinctions between referring to parts of landscape as objects or places [e.g. in Marquesan (spoken on steep rocky volcanic islands in the Pacific Ocean) there are two different prepositions for “at,” one for ‘at a (landscape) object’ and the other for ‘at a place’ – “Both islands and islets and small lava rocks sticking out of the sea are all motu, but small ones take the object-marking preposition ‘io and large islands the place preposition ‘i” (Cablitz 2008)]; 7. Role of place names (toponyms) vs. generic landscape terms: e.g., where each mountain is given a proper name, it may not be necessary to have a generic term for ‘mountain.’ Alternatively, types of landscape features may have both generic terms and toponyms [e.g. in Yélî Dnye (Rossel Island, PNG) toponymy seems to follow (almost exactly) terms for landscape features (rather than working as a complementary system) (Levinson 2008)]; 8. Structure of place names: whether they are descriptive; if they include generic landscape terms; and how they arise and are constructed [e.g. in Marquesan most place names are semantically transparent and have been derived from definite descriptions (Cablitz 2008); in Kilivila toponyms are almost all in the form of simple nouns (although their meaning may be complex) and are very culturally specific (Senft 2008)]; 9. Role of religious beliefs relating to landscape, implicitly embedded in landscape terms [e.g. in Yindjibarndi, each yinda (permanent pool) has a warlu (spirit); in Jahai waterfalls and rocky outcrops are linked to mythology (Burenhult 2008b)]. The factors which might cause a language to refer to landscape in a particular way include the following (again with examples drawn from the Yindjibarndi case study of the Ethnophysiography Research Group and some studies included in Burenhult 2008a): A. Physical environment factors: A1. Topography of the region occupied by the language group: whether mountainous, hilly or flat; the presence or absence of particular landscape features, such as volcanic cinder cones, sand dunes, coral reefs, etc. [for
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example, since there are no cinder cones in Yindjibarndi country or nearby, the language would not be expected to include terms for them. Yindjibarndi does have a term for ocean/sea (thanardi), which occurs in the territory of the adjacent language group but not in Yindjibarndi ‘country.’ However, Yindjibarndi does not appear to have a term for sand ridges, which occur a similar distance inland. Perhaps there was more traditional trade with the coastal people, who are also considered less fierce than the Yindjibarndi’s inland neighbors. Of course the sea is a much more important feature than sand ridges near Yindjibarndi country. However, sand ridges are very significant features for the Ngaanyatjarra people (from country 1,200 km inland from Yindjibarndi country), who have a similar multi-meaning mountain/hill/rock term like Yindjibarndi marnda (i.e. purli) but also a separate term for ‘sand ridge’ (tali) (Glass & Hackett 2003)]; A2. Climate of the region: the “strength” of seasons (e.g. does it snow in winter?); seasonal variability (e.g. does rainfall come only from seasonal cyclones/hurricanes?); etc. [e.g. there are no permanent rivers or creeks in Yindjibarndi country and larger watercourses have running water only after major precipitation events, usually associated with cyclones (hurricanes). Hence it is not unreasonable for the term wundu (river) to refer only to the longitudinal depression through which water passes, and to use other terms for different sorts of water flow: yijirdi (shallow and slow) and mankurdu (deep and fast)]; A3. Vegetation of the region: its variability in space and time; its density; its uses (e.g. for shelter, food and medicine); its affordances regarding travel, blocking long views, etc. [e.g. in ≠Akhoe Hai//om (a Khoisan language from the Oshikoto region of Northern Namibia, in SW Africa) people use cardinal direction terms to describe walking tracks, perhaps because “in the central part the thick bush and woodland covers permanent dunes which are generally too low (and bush too high) to allow wide vistas” (Widlok 2008)]; B. Social environment factors: B1. Lifestyle and traditional economy of the people: whether they are hunter/ gatherers, cultivators, etc. [e.g. in Kilivila, where people cultivate food gardens, there are numerous words for different soil types (Senft 2008)]; B2. Settlement patterns: whether settlements are permanent or nomadic camps; and the way in which buildings and/or gardens/fields interact with the natural landscape to produce settled places [e.g. the ≠Akhoe Hai//om language generally uses female word endings for roundish objects and male word endings for long and tall things, distinguishing between areas
Ethnophysiography
of land that are round (e.g. a settlement) and those which are long (e.g. a riverine region) (Widlok 2008)]; B3. Religious beliefs or spiritual concerns linked to landscape, such as creation beliefs, presence of spirits in landscape features, and cultural practices (e.g. ceremonies, taboos) which accompany such beliefs [e.g. among Lowland Chontal speakers, springs are commonly venerated as sacred places and the locations of supernatural forces; there are sacred hills and sacred rivers, dwelling places of either dwarf-like creatures or the Devil (these places receive a plural prefix in their toponyms to mark them grammatically) (O’Connor & Kroefges 2008)]; B4. Historical factors, such as: movement of the people into their current region; colonization of the people and their land by outsiders with a significantly different culture/language; major changes in lifestyle and economy; etc. [e.g. as Lowland Chontal uses a Spanish loan word for a territorial boundary, perhaps boundaries were not considered at all (or thought of differently) prior to colonization (O’Connor & Kroefges 2008). There has been a similar effect observed among the Kelabit people of central Borneo (Bala 1999)]; C. Linguistic factors: C1. Structure/grammar of the language, such as the roles played by nouns, verbs, adjectives, compound words, noun phrases, etc. [e.g. in Jahai a small number of general landscape terms are of simplex form (e.g. hGp = ‘forest’) but most terms are complex, always consisting of a simplex term combined with a metaphorical noun (e.g. kuy tfm = ‘water-head’, for English ‘headwaters’) (Burenhult 2008b)]; C2. Influence of other languages, through cross-fertilization by neighboring languages, impact of colonial language(s), etc. [e.g. in Jahai, “loanwords” from Malay (about 20% of landscape terms collected) often do not have indigenous synonyms (Burenhult 2008b); in Lowland Chontal some binomial toponyms mix a Lowland Chontal and a Spanish word, in either order (O’Connor & Kroefges 2008)]; C3. Use of a non-traditional language for a particular purpose. One example would be a ‘pidgin’ or ‘lingua franca,’ especially for dealings with colonizers or visitors. Another would be the special version of a traditional language used for ceremonies [e.g. in Yindjibarndi the term for a road/ trail/track is yirdiya; however, mardiya is used in the ‘respect language’ (used in major ceremonies involving visitors from other tribes) and is sometimes used to refer to a track followed through country, assisted by landmarks].
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5.
Conclusions
This chapter has provided some details of two ethnophysiography case studies. The fieldwork for the Yindjibarndi case study has been completed and all that remains is finalization of the Illustrated Dictionary of Yindjibarndi Landscape Terms and preparation of final summary articles. This first case study assisted the researchers greatly in developing an understanding of ethnophysiographic methodology and theory. It established prima facie support for the basic ethnophysiography hypothesis. The Navajo case study will complement the one undertaken with Yindjibarndi speakers. Once all Navajo study field recordings have been transcribed, detailed analysis of landscape terms and toponyms can be undertaken. This will allow more detailed comparison with the findings of the Yindjibarndi case study and the results of other ethnophysiography-related research. The main findings to date from these case studies were discussed in the context of how they point to key research issues regarding the way in which landscape is referred to in different languages. These results, together with those from similar studies undertaken by the Language and Cognition Group at the Max Planck Institute of Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, formed the basis for developing the transdisciplinary “Landscape in Language Workshop” and, thus, this book. An initial descriptive model of ethnophysiographic factors is presented here, including key observed differences in the way languages treat landscape and also a set of factors which might be considered as possibly explaining such differences. Much more work is required to render the Ethnophysiography Descriptive Model more complete and effective. However, the model indicates some of the key issues involved in ethnophysiography. It can also be useful to compare the results of particular case studies and to assist researchers to decide which future studies may best fill in gaps in existing knowledge, and can help to explain the significance of particular factors in the model.
Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge the assistance of the Yindjibarndi consultants, including: Trevor Soloman, Allery Sandy, Dora Soloman, Nita Fishook, Nelly Wally, Pansy Manda, Aileen Sandy, Marleen Harold, Patricia Pat, Donna Willis, Wendy Darby, Marion Cheedy, Jane Cheedy, Cherry Cheedy, Ned Cheedy, Rosie Cheedy, Sylvia Allen, Pansy Sambo, Lorraine Coppin and Michael Woodley. The cultural organization Juluwarlu and the Pilbara Aboriginal Language Centre (Wangka Maya) provided invaluable assistance regarding the Yindjibarndi language. Thanks also
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to the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies for providing material from the Aboriginal Studies Electronic Data Archive (ASEDA). For assistance with the Navajo case study, the authors thank Carmelita Topaha, Larry King, Jay Williams, and all the Navajo consultants, too numerous to list here. The Navajo portion of the project has been conducted under permit C0513-E from the Historic Preservation Office of the Navajo Nation. Researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics have also been very helpful. Funding by the US National Science Foundation (grants BCS-0423075 and BCS-0423023) and from Murdoch University, supporting the ethnophysiography projects, is gratefully acknowledged.
References Anderson, Bruce. 1986. Yindjibarndi dictionary. Photocopy. Anderson, Bruce & Thieberger, Nicholas. n.d. Yindjibarndi Dictionary [Document 0297 of the Aboriginal Studies Electronic Data Archive (ASEDA)]. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. Bala, Poline. 1999. Permanent Boundary Lines in the Kelabit Highlands of Central Borneo: A Colonial Legacy. MA thesis, Cornell University. Burenhult, Niclas (ed.). 2008a. Language and Landscape: Geographical Ontology in Cross-linguistic Perspective [Language Sciences 30(2/3)]. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Burenhult, Niclas. 2008b. Streams of words: Hydrological lexicon in Jahai. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 182–199. Burenhult, Niclas & Levinson, Stephen C. 2008. Language and landscape: A cross-linguistic perspective. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 135–150. Burenhult, Niclas & Levinson, Stephen C. 2010. Semplates: A guide to identification and elicitation. In Field Manual Volume 13, E. Norcliffe & N. J. Enfield (eds), 17–23. Nijmegen: Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. Cablitz, Gabriele H. 2008. When ‘what’ is ‘where’: A linguistic analysis of landscape terms, place names and body part terms in Marquesan (Oceanic, French Polynesia). Language Sciences 30(2/3): 200–226. Darwin, Charles. 1845. Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries Visited during the Voyage of H. M. S. Beagle round the World, under the Command of Capt. Fitz Roy, R. N., 2nd edn. London: John Murray. Glass, Amee & Hackett, Dorothy. 2003. Ngaanyatjarra and Ngaatjatjarra to English Dictionary. Alice Springs: IAD Press. Ieramugadu Group Inc. 1995. Know the Song, Know the Country: The Ngarda-Ngali Story of Culture and History in the Roebourne District. Roebourne, Western Australia: Ieramugadu Group. Iverson, Peter, with Roessel, Monty. 2002. Diné: A History of the Navajos. Albuquerque NM: University of New Mexico Press. Jett, Stephen C. 1997. Place-naming, environment, and perception among the Canyon de Chelly Navajo of Arizona. Professional Geographer 49(4): 481–493.
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Jett, Stephen C. 2001. Navajo Placenames and Trails of the Canyon de Chelly System, Arizona. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Kari, James. 1989. Affix positions and zones in the Athapaskan verb complex: Ahtna and Navajo. International Journal of American Linguistics 55(4): 424–454. Kelley, Klara B. & Francis, Harris. 1994. Navajo Sacred Places. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. Levinson, Stephen C. 2008. Landscape, seascape and the ontology of places on Rossel Island, Papua New Guinea. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 256–290. Mark, David M. & Turk, Andrew G. 2003a. Ethnophysiography. Paper presented at the Workshop on Spatial and Geographic Ontologies, 23 September, 2003 (prior to COSIT03), in Ittingen, Switzerland. Mark, David M. & Turk, Andrew G. 2003b. Landscape categories in Yindjibarndi: Ontology, environment, and language. In Spatial Information Theory: Foundations of Geographic Information Science [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2825], Werner Kuhn, Michael F. Worboys & Sabine Timpf (eds), 28–45. Berlin: Springer. Mark, David M., Turk, Andrew G. & Stea, David. 2007. Progress on Yindjibarndi ethnophysiography. In Spatial Information Theory [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4736], Stephan Winter, Matt Duckham, Lars Kulik & Ben Kuipers (eds), 1–19. Berlin: Springer. Mark, David M., Turk, Andrew G. & Stea, David. 2010. Ethnophysiography of arid lands: categories for landscape features. In Landscape Ethnoecology, Concepts of Biotic Physical and Space, Leslie M. Johnson & Eugene S. Hunn (eds), 27–45. New York NY: Berghahn Books. O’Connor, Loretta & Kroefges, Peter K. 2008. The land remembers: landscape terms and place names in Lowland Chontal of Oaxaca, Mexico. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 291–315. O’Meara, Carolyn & Bohnemeyer, Jürgen. 2008. Complex landscape terms in Seri. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 316–339. Quammen, David (ed.). 2008. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species: The Illustrated Edition. New York NY: Sterling. Rijavec, Frank, Harrison, Noelene & Soloman, Roger. 1995. Exile and the Kingdom [documentary film]. Roebourne, Western Australia: Ieramugadu Group & Film Australia. Senft, Gunter. 2008. Landscape terms and place names in the Trobriand Islands – the Kaile’una subset. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 340–361. SIL. 2000. Yindjibarndi: a language of Australia. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 14th ed., (December 2001). Thieberger, Nicholas (compiler). 1996. Handbook of Western Australian languages south of the Kimberley region. (August 2003). Tindale, Norman B. 1974. Aboriginal Tribes of Australia. Their Terrain, Environmental Controls, Distribution, Limits, and Proper Names. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Trees, Kathryn A. & Turk, Andrew G. 1998. Culture, collaboration and communication: Participative development of the Ieramugadu Cultural Heritage Information System (ICIS). Critical Arts 12(1–2): 78–91. Turk, Andrew G. & Mark, David M. 2008. Illustrated Dictionary of Yindjibarndi Landscape Terms. Informal publication, Murdoch University (Australia). Turk, Andrew, Mark, David, O’Meara, Carolyn & Stea, David. In press. Geography – documenting terms for landscape features. In Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Fieldwork, Nicholas Thieberger (ed.). Oxford: OUP.
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Turk, Andrew G. & Trees, Kathryn A. 2000. Facilitating community processes through culturally appropriate informatics: An Australian Indigenous Community Information System case study. In Community Informatics: Enabling Communities with Information and Communication Technologies, Michael Gurstein (ed.), 339–358. Hershey PA: Idea Group. Vestal, Paul A. 1952. Ethnobotany of the Ramah Navaho [Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology 40(4)]. Boston MA: Harvard University. Widlok, Thomas. 2008. Landscape unbounded: Space, place, and orientation in ≠Akhoe Hai//om and beyond. Language Sciences 30(2/3): 362–380. Williams, Jay S. & Blackhorse, Taft. 2006. Haash holyé? “What’s this place called?”: Metaphor, metonymy, and iconicity in Navajo. Ms, Albuquerque NM. Wordick, Frank J. F. 1982. The Yindjibarndi Language [Pacific Linguistics C-71]. Canberra: Australian University. Young, Robert W. & Morgan, William. 1992. Analytical Lexicon of Navajo. Albuquerque NM: University of New Mexico Press.
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chapter 3
Exploring philosophy of place Potential for synergy between phenomenology and ethnophysiography Andrew G. Turk
This chapter discusses aspects of place from the perspective of phenomenology. It draws upon the author’s collaborative research on ethnophysiography discussed in earlier chapters of this volume. Ethnophysiography research requires an integrated approach by researchers from many disciplines; i.e. it should be transdisciplinary and utilize an overarching paradigm. Phenomenology is a candidate to provide this overarching paradigm. This paper discusses this issue and also the potential for research in ethnophysiography to contribute to an enhanced understanding of phenomenology. These twin objectives must be carried out in a manner which respects Indigenous knowledges. Hence, the chapter also discusses Indigenous Australian concepts of ‘The Dreaming’ and ‘Tjukurrpa’ and their role as organizing structures for concepts of place.
1.
Introduction
As discussed in earlier chapters (Turk et al. this volume), ethnophysiography is a recently defined field of study that seeks to understand cultural differences in conceptualizations of landscape, via comparisons between the meanings of terms that people from different cultures use to refer to the landscape and its components (Mark & Turk 2003a). Landscape is an interesting topic of study because relationships with land are central to many cultures and landscape features pose problems for classification. Ethnophysiography also includes study of the nature of place names (toponyms) and their relationship to generic landscape terms. In addition, a central concern for ethnophysiography is the study of the knowledge systems, beliefs and customs of peoples concerning landforms and landscapes. Thus, ethnophysiography involves the study of ‘place’ and ‘place attachment’ and examines how these are related to traditional beliefs and people’s
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everyday activities, including cultural practices. The goal is to describe the meanings of landscape held by particular cultural/linguistic groups. Hence, there is a considerable overlap with topics of primary interest to phenomenology, and initial research by the author supports the potential for a synergistic relationship between ethnophysiography and the theoretical and methodological framework provided by phenomenology. A prima facie case for use of phenomenology as an overarching paradigm for transdisciplinary research in ethnophysiography was established in Turk (2007). This investigation also provided an initial examination of the research trajectories of the two fields and a brief introduction to how the concept of ‘essences’ might be usefully applied within ethnophysiography research. This chapter also seeks to demonstrate the potential for the reverse relationship, i.e. the proposition that ethnophysiography research might assist in explicating aspects of place in phenomenology. In his chapter in Feld and Basso’s collection “Senses of Place” (1996), Casey suggests a revitalized phenomenological examination of place: To reinstate place in the wake of its demise in modern Western thought – where space and time have held such triumphant and exclusive sway – one can equally well go to the premodern moments described in ethnographic accounts of traditional societies or to the postmodern moment of the increasingly non-traditional present, where place has been returning as a reinvigorated revenant in the writings of ecologists and landscape theorists, geographers and historians, sociologists and political thinkers – and now, in this volume, anthropologists. (p. 20)
In the present chapter, the author suggests a possible way to integrate these two related, but different, approaches (premodern and postmodern) via ethnophysiography.
2.
Complexities of ethnophysiography
A summary of the ethnophysiography case studies with Yindjibarndi and Navajo peoples is provided by Turk et al. (this volume). The work to date indicates that terms for landscape features from different languages differ significantly. The following list of types of landscape terms (using examples from Yindjibarndi unless otherwise stated) indicates that such differences become increasingly complex as understandings of languages in the cultural context are developed: a. Terms for fairly equivalent concepts between languages – e.g. muji ‘cave’: Muji is the word for a deep hole in marnda (a rock face), with an overhanging roof (a cave), large enough for a person or animal to shelter in.
Exploring philosophy of place
b. Terms for sets of landscape features that do not match up – e.g. marnda, bargu, burbaa ‘mountain, hill’: Marnda refers to an area of ngurra (ground) that stands higher than the country around it – a hill, mountain, ridge or range. A bargu is a gubija (small) marnda made of rock or sand. Burbaa can refer to a gubija (small) marnda that is low, smooth and rounded – not as steep as a bargu. c. Different whole-part concepts – e.g. wundu, mankurdu, yijirdi ‘river’: A wundu is a relatively broad, level channel where water flows or lies after heavy rain. In Yindjibarndi country, there are no wundu that flow with water all the time. But the wundu is always there, and water may flow in the wundu after rainstorms. If there is water in a wundu, it is referred to as mankurdu if flowing deep and fast, yijirdi if flowing gently, and bawa if it is just lying there temporarily. d. Terms effectively referring to shape rather than topographic objects – e.g. burbaa: Burbaa can refer to a gubija (small) marnda that is low, smooth and rounded€– not as steep as a bargu. Burbaa also refers to a rise in a yirdiya (road, track or trail), especially at the crest. Burbaa can also be used to refer to low rounded areas of higher ground, for instance between garga (gullies). e. Physical point of view – e.g. (in Navajo) initial results suggest that tséyi’ could be used for a rock canyon seen from the canyon floor, whereas tsékooh could be used when the same feature is seen from the rim above. f. Spatial locations rather than landscape features – e.g. wana, wanangga: Wana refers to a hillside (or perhaps a flat area) in the middle distance; where you can still see something (like a kangaroo) but it is much too far away to throw a stone at it (or shoot the kangaroo). Wanangga could refer to the location of something in the middle distance. g. Spiritual aspects of place – e.g. yinda: Every yinda (permanent pool) has a warlu (spirit) that formed and protects the yinda. h. Sets of places related by ‘The Dreaming’ – e.g. Jindawurru: During an audio recording session at Juluwarlu (the Yindjibarndi culture maintenance group) where photos of landscape features were examined, with the researchers (AT and DM) asking for landscape terms, the informants (CC, ED and FV) spontaneously referred to spiritual aspects of the features. The following (edited) example from the transcripts illustrates this: Photo 31 (very large pool at Millstream) CC: This is a yinda. This is Deep Reach. ……
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CC: I think we will have bin explained to you what this is (referring to previous discussions with AT) ED: It means a lot to us. AT: Yes CC: That’s where the two men been taken, you know? ED: And buried – very frightening for us to go and stop there, you know … CC: You see the hole on top of the bank in Millstream (addressing DM)? DM: I have not seen it. ED: You ought to see it. Maybe more bigger than this (showing size with her hands). Snake got up, got the two men, and come back – this wasn’t like this, it was a dry riverbed – ‘til that. Camping ground for the old people as well, long ago. CC: In the wundu, yes. ED: In the Dreamtime, yes. ……. CC: They bin crying, crying, and that warlu got wild, sent the big flood come down. FV: Made them permanent pools.
Here the informants were talking about how the warlu (mythic snake) had come up out of the ocean near the location of the town of Onslow and traveled up the route of what is now called the Fortescue River, chasing two boys who broke the law, until he got to Jindawurru (Millstream) (Ieramugadu Group 1995). This is part of an explanation of what Yindjibarndi call the ‘learning times’ or ‘when the world was soft.’ This is also known as ‘The Dreaming,’ a translation of Indigenous explanations of the formation of the world into its current landscape and ongoing spiritual aspects of place.
The sequence above indicates some of the complexities of the role of landscape in language. The preliminary Ethnophysiography Descriptive Model (presented Turk et al. this volume) seeks to explicate the range of factors involved in the different ways that languages treat landscape and the possible range of reasons for this. Thus it can be seen that the development of theories for ethnophysiography is a very complex undertaking, requiring contributions from many disciplines.
3.
Collaborative research
There are many complex questions associated with the study of the role of landscape in language. This requires input from a range of disciplines, including: linguistics,
Exploring philosophy of place
geography, cognitive and experimental psychology, information systems, anthropology, philosophy and cultural studies. Hence, ethnophysiography research needs to be carried out in a way that integrates theory and analysis in an effective manner. However, Gallagher (2008:â•›18), in discussing how cognition is embedded in context, analyzes how language operates within scientific disciplines and suggests that this “brings us to the possibility that theories of situated cognition are themselves differently situated, within different disciplines or discourses, shaped by specific debates and specialized vocabularies.” Thus it is necessary to contextualize and explain our use of terms within disciplines and to try to express concepts in ways that build bridges between disciplines, rather than walls to hide behind. Increased levels of integration of fields of knowledge and research paradigms are necessary in order to address complex “messy” research problems. Alternative approaches, at increasing levels of research integration, are summarized in Table 1. The last of the levels of research integration listed in Table 1 (postdisciplinary) is difficult to achieve other than in individual or small group projects. Hence the highest level of integration practically possible for ethnophysiography is a transdisciplinary approach. This requires an overarching paradigm (spanning the various disciplines involved) that is operationalized by researchers in a manner which permits theoretic discussions from within the individual disciplines to be integrated in a coherent way. It must also provide a mechanism for the integrated analysis of empirical data from case studies. The next section introduces phenomenology, a potential approach to such integration. Bruce Janz (this volume) suggests that ethnophysiography can be considered as a nascent discipline (although the researchers have never claimed this). He contends that the strength of the discipline approach is the synergistic integration of a variety of methodological approaches that it potentially affords, although some disciplines display deep and acrimonious fissures along philosophical and methodological fault lines. He goes on to suggest that a transdisciplinary paradigm might stifle methodological plurality. Although this is possible, it is not necessary if the overarching paradigm is suitable and appropriately applied. A great strength of the ethnophysiography research project to date has been the synergistic integration of phenomenological and positivist methodologies and interpretative approaches. In addition, there has been an iterative approach to shifts from emic to etic and back to emic representations (Janz this volume). Emic data was collected, clarified and analyzed, leading to initial ontological (etic) interpretations. These were then re-evaluated by further emic data gathering and, as the project progressed, (etic) draft pictorial landscape dictionaries were reviewed by local participants (Turk, Mark, O’Meara & Stea in press).
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Table 1.╇ Differing levels of research integration (after Booth et al. 2000) Level of integration
Characteristics of this type of research approach
Disciplinary
• Research using only particular bodies of knowledge, paradigms, theories, methods; • Disciplines are a relatively recent phenomenon (perhaps only 200 years old); • Some are very recent; e.g. Information Science. • Researchers from more than one discipline working on a research project; • Each discipline uses its own paradigm and methods to do part of the research; • Results from different parts of the research are combined. • Researchers from more than one discipline working on a research project; • The disciplines try to integrate aspects of the research by using multiple paradigms and methods; • Results from different paradigms and methods of research are combined. • Researchers from more than one discipline working on a research project; • The disciplines integrate their research paradigms and methods via some overarching paradigm and meta-methodology; • Integration of methods and results is more effective than other approaches, provided one discipline is not privileged over the others. • A holistic approach is used, which seeks to avoid disciplinary divides; • Highly reflective practice.
Multidisciplinary
Interdisciplinary
Transdisciplinary1
Postdisciplinary
4.
Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a branch of European philosophy started in the early 20th century by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), although the term is now used more broadly in many disciplines, such as: psychology; ecology; architecture and archaeology (Fuchs 1976; Heidegger 1962; Ihde & Zaner 1975; Moran & Embree 2004; Patocka 1996). It seeks to understand how a person’s consciousness interacts with things around them, including landscape, as part of their mode of ‘being in the world.’ It provides an alternative approach to objectivism and positivism.
. Although this is the dominant meaning of “transdisciplinary,” some authors adopt other meanings (Nicolescu 2008; Nowotny 2003; Schunn et al. 2006).
Exploring philosophy of place
Mohanty (1997) provides an analysis of the field of phenomenology in terms of a trajectory of concerns, including the following: a. As an ontological endeavour, phenomenology describes the nature of the core phenomena of domains of human experience: “Phenomenology started with the program of describing essences and essential structures of various regions of phenomena” (p. 1). b. This search for ‘essences’ and ‘structures,’ within particular domains, led phenomenology to be concerned with meanings: “Whereas the concept of essence was an ontological concept, an essence being an entity of a certain sort, an ideal entity to be sure, nevertheless an entity belonging to the world, the concept of meaning is a semantic concept to begin with but then, in the extended sense given to it by phenomenology, becomes ambiguously poised in between the mind and the world, being the way the world is presented to experience” (p. 2). c. Thus, consciousness is a central concern of phenomenology: “… consciousness constitutes the world, confers sense on all things, not only provides access to the world, but is the very presenting of the world, making it evident, the source of its being and vitality” (p. 2). d. Phenomenology considers consciousness in the context of people’s activities in the world: “… the world as lived by us in our everyday life, the world of perception and interest, valuations and actions” (p. 2). e. Phenomenology contends that people experience and represent their world in an integrated manner: “Husserlian phenomenology starts with an insistence upon the integral unity of language, thought, and experience” (p. xi). f. It is not enough for phenomenology to merely bring to the surface and illuminate particular aspects of ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt); rather the project is more analytical, seeking explanation of relationships between ontologies, consciousness, meaning and human activities: “… if a science of the lifeworld is not to be empirical ethnology, if it is still to be philosophy, it has to uncover the essential structure of lifeworld, and not merely its contingent, variable features, features which vary from community to community” (pp. 2, 3). g. Concern with experiences and activities in the world was further advanced in the version of phenomenology developed by Heidegger (e.g. Being and Time, 1962): “For Heidegger, we and our activities are always ‘in the world,’ our being is being-in-the-world, so we do not study our activities by bracketing the world, rather we interpret our activities and the meanings things have for us by looking to our contextual relations to things in the world” (D. Smith 2007:â•›7).
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As phenomenology has developed, it has more adequately addressed the meaning of the world for groups, not just individuals. Kockelmans (1994:â•›25) asserts that “I experience the world as being not my own private world but an intersubjective world in which others exist both as others as well as for others,” hence a community “is constituted in the sphere of my ownness, which in its communalized intentionality constitutes the one identical world for everybody.” He goes on to explain the process of moving from individual to group concepts: “my transcendental subjectivity is gradually expanded into a transcendental intersubjectivity or community, which in turn is the transcendental ground for the intersubjective value of nature and the world in general” (25/26). For instance, the common conceptualizations of a speech community extend beyond the merely physical aspects of topographic features to encompass also their cultural and spiritual dimensions: Whether we happen to act alone or, cooperating with others, engage in common pursuits, things and objects with which we are confronted, our own plans and designs, finally the world as a whole appears to us in the light of beliefs, opinions, conceptions, certainties, etc., that prevail in the community to which we belong. … Besides being objects in the Lebenswelt, we are at the same time subjects with respect to the Lebenswelt, insofar as it derives its meaning and the sense of its existence from our collective mental life, from our acts (concatenated and interlocked with those of our fellow men) of perceiving, experiencing, reasoning, purposefully acting, etc. (Gurwitsch 1957:â•›372)
Thus, phenomenology has the potential to assist in understanding the way that landscape terms may incorporate cultural and spiritual aspects of the worldview of the speech community.
5.
Phenomenology as overarching paradigm for ethnophysiography
Because of the nature of the field of ethnophysiography, phenomenology is seen as a candidate to provide an overarching paradigm for the transdisciplinary study of ethnophysiography. However, there have been many versions of phenomenology, some of which will be more effective than others in the context of ethnophysiography. For instance, Husserl’s universalism could perhaps be seen as contradictory to the fundamental premise of ethnophysiography. There is a long history of using phenomenology in the social sciences, e.g.: the work of Alfred Schütz, starting from the late 1920s (Schütz 1977; Schütz & Luckmann 1973); ethnomethodology developed by Harold Garfinkel in the 1960s (Psathas 1977); and Max Scheler’s theory of knowledge: “In his works he
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has also shown, in an exemplary manner, how phenomenology and sciences (in his case, biology, anthropology, and sociology) can be blended in one’s thinking” (Mohanty 1997:â•›23). Ihde (1986:â•›26) contends that “in its essence, phenomenology is neither obscure nor esoteric and that it holds important implications for a whole range of disciplines.” Malpas (2006) makes a strong case that an understanding of the relationship of individuals and communities to the places where they dwell is central to phenomenology. Basso (1996:â•›54) suggests that “As formulated by Martin Heidegger … the concept of dwelling assigns importance to the forms of consciousness with which individuals perceive and apprehend geographical space.” In the Introduction to their edited collection of essays on place and environment, Seamon and Mugerauer (1985) discuss the emerging engagement with phenomenology by scholars of various disciplines interested in ‘place’ – the relationship between persons and their environment. This includes consideration of themes such as: “environmental ethics, sacred space, environmental behaviour, sense of place, and a phenomenology of architectural design” (p. 2). They emphasize the significance of the work of Martin Heidegger in providing a theoretical basis for phenomenological approaches, including recent research in geography. D.€Smith (2007:â•›2) asserts that the study of consciousness via phenomenology can explain how it is directed towards things in the world: Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl called ‘intentionality,’ that is, the directedness of experience towards things in the world, the property of consciousness that is a consciousness of or about something.
An initial comparison of key aspects of ethnophysiography and phenomenology has indicated that examination of their interaction is useful and feasible (Turk 2007). Hence, phenomenology may well be able to provide an overarching paradigm for transdisciplinary research in ethnophysiography; or, inverting the spatial metaphor, phenomenology can “stand under” (Fuchs 1976:â•›27) the disciplines involved in ethnophysiography, providing a firm foundation and scaffolding to support their activities. Some possible methods for using phenomenology in ethnophysiography are discussed in Section 10 below. The author also contends that research in ethnophysiography can perhaps be useful within phenomenology, by providing interesting examples of cultural differences in understanding the nature of place. Some possible contributions that ethnophysiography may make to phenomenology are discussed in Section€11
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below. However, before pursuing the topics in Sections 10 and 11, it is necessary to ask whether adopting any Western philosophical position is appropriate, given that ethnophysiography examines the worldview of Indigenous, as well as non-indigenous, peoples.
6.
Indigenous knowledges
If ethnophysiography is to genuinely seek to understand the way that landscape is treated in languages across the world it must do so from a perspective that is not biased towards Western (European) concepts of knowledge. In particular, if key case studies of differences between languages are carried out with Indigenous peoples, then their worldviews must be reflected in theories that result. Such an approach is justified on a scientific and an ethical basis, but is also pragmatically necessary to ensure collaboration by Indigenous people in ethnophysiography research. Whiteley (1998) discusses what he sees as a crisis in ethnography as it has been practiced with Hopi people and explains why tribal officials have adopted severe restrictions on research activities. These have applied to the ethnophysiography researchers who have so far failed to convince tribal officials to approve a study with the Hopi. Whiteley (1998) suggests that The reasons for indigenous resistance to cultural commodification by academic ethnography are several … but at base they are the result of the social and political estrangement of anthropology as a research-university discipline from the perspectives and situated interests of its subjects. (p. 6)
Researchers must not only respect Indigenous knowledges but also carry out their research using ethical methods (Turk et al. in press; Turk & Mark this volume). These concerns regarding research with colonized Indigenous peoples are also highlighted by L. Smith (1999) – “The globalization of knowledge and Western culture constantly reaffirms the West’s view of itself as the centre of legitimate knowledge, the arbiter of what counts as knowledge and the source of ‘civilized’ knowledge” (p. 63) and “Most of the ‘traditional’ disciplines are grounded in cultural world views which are either antagonistic to other belief systems or have no methodology for dealing with other knowledge systems” (p. 65). Of course individual researchers working in particular contexts are not necessarily guilty of such ethnocentrism. Watson-Verran and Turnbull (1995) suggest that cross-cultural comparisons of knowledge systems are receiving renewed interest from researchers in the field of science and technology studies, “… as fresh insights are gained from the intersections of the social study of science with anthropology, postmodernism,
Exploring philosophy of place
feminism, postcolonialism, literary theory, geography, and environmentalism” (p.€115). Unfortunately, Indigenous knowledges have often previously been thought to be merely of interest within a particular anthropological context. However, such a restricted view is giving way to one which encourages a respectful examination of local knowledges within the global context. Studying representations is the key way that outsiders have access to understanding of Indigenous knowledges. Jovchelovitch (2007:â•›2) suggests that representation “is at the basis of all knowledge systems and understanding its genesis, development and realisation in social life provides the key to understanding the relationship that ties knowledge to persons, communities and lifeworlds.” Hence, language (as well as pictorial representations) provides the basis for understanding alternative worldviews, including cultural aspects of place. Indigenous worldviews are determined by physical and social environments and the day-to-day activities of members of a speech community. Gallagher (2008) discusses Wittgenstein’s notions of language, for instance: “Language is grounded on acting in particular contexts, and in the immediate reactions we have to others. The meanings of words are not the products of the linguistic system nor derived from a one-to-one correspondence to items in the world; rather they are generated in the activities in which they are used” (p. 15). Further: “The meaning of a concept is not fixed or universal, as it is dependent on its use in specific contexts, which are subject to temporal and historical change” (p. 16). Thus the Yindjibarndi word marnda can quite conveniently mean both ‘a mountain range’ and ‘a small stone’ (and indeed in colonial times ‘a coin’), with the particular meaning made clear to the listener via the context of utterance. The Yindjibarndi term bargarra refers to a large flat area, prototypically an extensive plain, usually grassy, although it can be stony or sandy, and could even have bushes. On the other hand, biyiila is a term meaning ‘in the open’ or ‘outdoors’ or ‘outside the dwelling’ or ‘a clearing in a forest’. Older speakers pointed out to the researchers (Mark & Turk 2003b) that, in the speech of younger people, bargarra is gradually replacing biyiila as a term for smaller open spaces. They said that young people felt less need to differentiate between the two terms, as they now live in town. Languages are living and mutable. It is important that Indigenous languages be studied in terms of their cultural/spiritual content as well as in the context of everyday social and practical activities. In discussing a chapter by Layton in their book, James et al. (1997:â•›7) mention that he … bids us address the distinction between representations that carry a direct reference to an external, locally situated material reality – a hole in a rock, a track, a river valley – and representations that are self-referential, which carry
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meaning only to the extent that they make sense within the framework of a culturally specific knowledge-base. This might be a sacred site which marks the passage of a totemic creature.
Thus it is important to discuss landscape terms in the context of Indigenous peoples’ attachment to place.
7.
Indigenous attachment to ‘country’
Explorations of ‘sense of place’ span many disciplines and traditions. Tuan (1974) discussed environmental perception, attitudes and values about place and coined the term ‘Topophilia’ – “the affective bond between people and place or setting” (p.€4). He explains that “Natural environment and worldview are closely related: world view, unless it is derived from an alien culture, is necessarily constructed out of the salient elements of a people’s social and physical setting” (p. 79). The affective bond is strong if it is one’s own place. A phenomenological perspective of a dwelling place is explored by Casey (1996): There is no knowing or sensing a place except by being in that place, and to be in a place is to be in a position to perceive it. Knowledge of place is not, then, subsequent to perception – as Kant dogmatically assumed – but is ingredient in perception itself. … Local knowledge is at one with lived experience if it is indeed true that this knowledge is of the localities in which the knowing subject lives. (p. 18)
To love a place is to know it deeply, through dwelling in that landscape. The author and his wife have owned for the last seven years about 25 ha (60 acres) of land at Porongurup, near the southwest tip of the Australian continent, and they have spent most of the last four years living there. The land is mostly covered by native forest and the author is gradually revegetating the remaining cleared areas. Even after this short association, he knows intimately all parts of the property, having walked it many times chipping weeds, planting seedlings or just enjoying the flora and fauna. He knows the variations in soil, where water runs after rain and which birds feed from which species of trees in which seasons. He is developing topophilia for this place. Of course this cannot be compared with the strength of sentiment felt by some non-indigenous Australian property owners whose family have farmed a piece of land for perhaps six generations. Some such people refuse to leave their land even after repeated droughts and financial ruin. Consider, then, Indigenous Australians, some of whom have occupied the same territories for more than 50,000 years; in excess
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of 2,000 generations. Their culture is imbued with associations from this immemorial past and their knowledge of, and attachment to, their own place is of an immeasurably greater magnitude. For Indigenous Australians, the term ‘country’ has a localized meaning; i.e. the area of land traditionally occupied by a particular tribe or language group (Benterrak et al. 1984; Sutton 1995). Thus ‘country’ comes with a complex set of shared rights and obligations, arising from that group’s unique attachment to that place. Davis and Prescott (1992:â•›132) summarize this connection as follows: Aboriginal people generally believe that each sociopolitical group variously described in the literature as a clan or tribe was made corporate by its birth from ancestral beings upon an area which became identifiable as a territory at the moment of birth of the group with whom the territory is identified. The acts of ancestral beings in conferring territories and giving birth to each group established for all time the identity of those groups and the boundaries of the territories with which they are identified.
Further, the specific associations with ‘country’ are unique for each individual. Within a tribe individuals will have different sorts of rights and responsibilities for different places (within the general tribal area) because of factors such as: the special country of their father and that of their mother; the place where they were born; and places where they have spent large periods of their life (Sutton 1995). Tuan (1974:â•›99–100) discusses the depth of Indigenous peoples’ association with their ‘country,’ citing Strehlow (1947:â•›30–31): Strehlow, an ethnologist who knows the Australian aborigines intimately, says of the Aranda that he “clings to his native soil with every fibre of his being …” Mountains and creeks and springs and water holes are to the Aranda not merely interesting or beautiful scenic features; they are the handiwork of ancestors from whom he himself has descended.
The people’s relationship with their country is at such a fundamental level that it constitutes the religious and philosophical basis of their being. Such a ‘situated’ view of conceptions of landscape is also fundamental to phenomenology. Heidegger (1962:â•›100) asserts this phenomenological view of nature in terms of an engaged (‘ready-to-hand’) relationship to place, in which deep meanings of landscape arise from the activities that people undertake, the uses they make of their place: The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock, the river is waterpower, the wind is wind ‘in the sails.’ As the ‘environment’ is discovered, the ‘Nature’ thus discovered is encountered too. If this kind of Being as ready-tohand is disregarded, this ‘Nature’ itself can be discovered and defined simply in
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its pure presence-at-hand. But when this happens, the Nature which ‘stirs and strives,’ which assails us and enthrals us as landscape, remains hidden.
Casey (1996:â•›28) suggests that interaction with place determines how it is designated in the local language: We designate particular places by the place terms of the culture to which we as place designators and place dwellers belong, but the places we designate are not bare sub-strates to which these terms are attached as if to an unadorned bedrock. They are named or nameable parts of the landscape of a region, its condensed and lived physiognomy.
This is akin to the basic thesis of ethnophysiography. Mohanty (1997:â•›60; emphasis in the original) contends that connection to country is not just about practical aspects of living: The lifeworld is a world of practice (of action, making and doing) and praxis (of social action, of production of goods, and distribution of goods). It would, however, be mistaken to say that these modes of acting exhaust the lifeworld in all its dimensions. For example, there are religious, aesthetic, and cultural dimensions. By virtue of these, the world as well as things in the world are presented to subjects inhabiting that world with different sorts of values – as useful, as sacred, as beautiful – all of which can be brought under the general heading “cultural.”
Malpas (1999:â•›187) explains how a person’s worldview and social environment influences their concepts of landscape: “Embedded in the physical landscape is a landscape of personal and cultural history, of social ordering and symbolism … the narratives of the land as enculturated and humanised cannot be prised away from its physical structure.” Thus it is not just practical activities which turn space into place, but also its social, cultural and religious significance. The Proposition is a feature film set in the Australian outback in the late nineteenth century. In one scene the English colonial police captain is interrogating a group of captured tribal Aboriginal men. He requests his Aboriginal police tracker to ask the men (in their language) “how long they have been hiding up in the ranges,” where a band of white outlaws is believed to be camped. The tracker translates an elder’s reply: “Captain sir, he said they don’t hide in the ranges, they live in the ranges.” The captain then requests the tracker to ask them “how long they have lived in the ranges.” The tracker says, “Them always been living in the ranges, captain sir” (Cave 2005). To the colonial policeman this landscape is a hiding place for outlaws; to the tribal Aboriginals it is their home, since time immemorial.
8.
Exploring philosophy of place
The dreaming, Tjukurrpa and gathered places
For Yindjibarndi people, their law is not just an age-old myth (from ‘when the world was soft’), but a vital part of their current existence: Biidarra Law is an infinitely rich, veiled, subtly mutable, mercurial, carnival, intimate skein of elements and influences that derive from, and speak of, the Yindjibarndi conception of creation, their country and the life within it, including living landforms and water, and which embodies and gives carriage to the relationships between the people, creatures, spirits and things that share (Rijavec 2008 – emphasis in the original) existence in the creation.
This version of ‘The Dreaming’ is the philosophy of life for Yindjibarndi, incorporating detailed instructions for maintaining a cohesive society. For instance, it stipulates Galtharra relationships, including which of four ‘skin’ (subsection) groups should marry which other ‘skin’ group and the complex set of rights and responsibilities that each person has to specific members of their extended family. In addition, it provides the basis for interpretation of landscape as part of the law and culture (Ieramugadu Group 1995; Rijavec, Harrison & Soloman 1995). Myers (1986:â•›47, 48) discusses the meaning of ‘The Dreaming’ for a Western Desert Aboriginal group: “the constitution of the World by The Dreaming must be treated phenomenologically as a given condition of ‘what there is,’ an endowment of being and potential that defines for Pintupi the framework of human action.” He explores these issues from the phenomenological perspective of the ‘lifeworld’ of the Pintupi. He explains how the term ngurra (camp; country; place)€– designating “socialized space,” “the place where one belongs” (p. 55) – integrates land and culture with concepts of time, via The Dreaming. The relationship between the terms ‘The Dreaming’ and Tjukurrpa is complex; however, in this context, it is perhaps sufficient to think of the latter as primarily referring here to the stories/songs/dances associated with ‘dreaming tracks’ crossing the landscape, linking cultural sites. Academic understanding of these matters is (necessarily) limited: It is important to note that the core of Aboriginal philosophy and religious practice is subject to secrecy and knowledge on a “need-to-know” basis. Within Aboriginal society people are chosen as the eventual repositories of such knowledge, often over many years of proving their worth. There is much that is not known to the broader Australian society and non-Indigenous researchers such as those whose published work appears on this site, often have incomplete and sometimes puzzling information. (Grieves 2007)
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Myers (1986:â•›12) explains how his examination of the meaning of ‘The Dreaming’ and ngurra (country), with the assistance of Pintupi informants, enabled him to “understand that the organization of people in space is itself a manifestation of what is called by some a ‘deep structure’ or an ‘inner logic’ and by others a ‘total system.’” Thus, it is impossible to adequately interpret ethnophysiography data without striving to comprehend (to the extent that an outsider ever can) the cultural structure which provides the logic of these peoples’ ‘lifeworld’ and the way that landscape is place; “As the invisible framework of this world, The Dreaming is its cosmic prototype” (p. 51). The Dreaming is for all time: It represents all that exists as deriving from a single, unchanging, timeless source. … Indeed, not only do the Dreaming narratives tell how the world came to be, but the raw material of the stories, the symbols themselves in the form of the landscape, signify the same concern on another level. Human life and being, they imply, are as permanent, enduring, and unchanging as the land itself. (pp. 52, 53)
Casey (1996:â•›24, 25 – emphasis in the original) discusses how place gathers together physical and abstract aspects: Places gather: this I take to be a second essential trait (i.e., beyond the role of the lived body) revealed by phenomenological topoanalysis. Minimally, places gather things in their midst – where “things” connote various animate and inanimate entities. Places also gather experiences and histories, even languages and thoughts. … Third, the holding at issue in the gathering of a place reflects the layout of the local landscape, its continuous contour, even as the outlines and inlines of the things held in that place are respected. The result is not confusion of container with contained but a literal configuration in which the form of the place – for example, “mountain,” “mesa,” “gulley” – joins up with the shape of the things in it. Being in a place is being in a configurative complex of things.
Malpas (2006:â•›127 – emphasis in the original) links this ‘gathering’ to Heidegger’s notion of the relationships between places and activities: “the way in which our activity, and our orientation to things and places within that activity, is not merely determined by the end to which we are directed, but also by the structure of the spatiality in which that activity is situated.” This applies to the interconnectedness of cultural associations with topography expressed by Tjukurrpa: “the Ancestors do not move from one place to another but rather they link sites by common intentionality of place” (Swain 1993:â•›33 – emphasis in the original). Hence, each Tjukurrpa is a ‘gathering’ of particular locations into an extended place, via its narrative.
Exploring philosophy of place
The Spinifex People, from desert country several hundred kilometers south of the Pintupi, have a similar conception of The Dreaming (Cane 2002). An exploration of this can assist an understanding of the role of Tjukurrpa: “The combination of the social, political, environmental and spiritual dimensions of Tjukurrpa provides the Spinifex People with the philosophical and religious basis for understanding and defining their place within their country and the place of their country within the larger Western Desert socio-cultural bloc” (p. 85). Thus the Tjukurrpa of a particular group provides the basis for their mode of being in their particular place. However, much work is necessary to reach an understanding of how this meshes with phenomenology, as expressed within European philosophy. As Cane (2002:â•›86) points out: “No non-Aboriginal person has done enough systematic field work with the Spinifex People to understand the geographic intricacy, sanctity and philosophical depth of Spinifex Tjukurrpa other than to appreciate that there is a lot of it, that is extremely well known by them and that it is of the utmost importance to them.” Hence, ethnophysiography studies of assemblages of landscape elements can contribute to our understanding of social and linguistic aspects of place. This relates to generic landscape terms and also place names, which sometimes refer to groups of features (Hercus, Hodges & Simpson 2002; Sutton 1995). The Indigenous senses of place discussed in this chapter are impressive, deriving in some cases from tens of thousands of years occupation of the same territory and sometimes not much diluted by other cultural influences. However, it is important to note that places are of great significance to people of all cultures and these strong cases should serve to enliven our search for understanding of the phenomenon in general. Basso (1996:â•›87) asserts the urgency of ethnographic studies of cultural constructions of sense of place: We should begin to explore them with all deliberate speed, and not, I would emphasize, solely for the purpose of enlarging our knowledge of particular social groups. For as surely as place is an elemental existential fact, sense of place is a universal experiential genre, and therefore, as more and more work gets done, it may be found to exhibit transcultural qualities.
Ethnophysiography research serves this purpose.
9.
Towards philosophical reconciliation
In Australia there is a possibility for a reconciliation between versions of philosophy – Indigenous and European – as part of a broader movement of respectful cohabitation of the continent by original inhabitants, descendents of colonizers
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and recent immigrants. This could provide an intellectual framework for a more informed dialogue about how to address the many problems inherent in practical aspects of current Indigenous Australian life. Muecke (2004) explores what the term ‘Aboriginal Philosophy’ might mean, especially its relationship to ‘Aboriginal Religion,’ and whether such terms have real meaning within aboriginal culture itself. He refutes Stanner’s (1965) claim that because there is no tradition of intellectual detachment there can be no ‘Aboriginal Philosophy’: “Stanner’s argument about why there is an Aboriginal religion, but not a philosophy, is based on the need for stated ‘axioms’ to be non-ritual and non-mythic, that is, to be ‘scientific.’ … The problem is how to recognise the ‘potencies’ Aboriginal people understand, since Western categories flip between the theistic and the scientific” (p. 115). An Aboriginal philosophy will of necessity take a different form from Western philosophy: “Dreaming stories, ritual acts and experiences are the forms of expression of indigenous Australian philosophies. By ‘expression’ I do not mean the representation or construction of some pregiven content or essence, I mean the expressions are the dreaming” (p. 21). An Aboriginal philosophy will also be based on the physical landscape, experienced as a dwelling place. Brian Murton (this volume) discusses how Maori narratives link specific people to specific places. In discussing an example narrative he explains: The first line identifies a feature, a mountain or hill, the second line a river, and this unvarying form emphasizes the significance of these features. The third and fourth lines identify the people. More can be added to such sayings, such as a canoe, an ancestor, a marae (a complex of buildings, including a meeting house, belonging to a related group of people). They are identity axioms linking land and people into a whole in such a way as to make them inseparable.
Thus, in a sense, the Indigenous philosophy does have axioms, but they are about associations between people and place, the core of their world view. An Aboriginal philosophy is ‘in place’ and based on imperatives of the particular physical landscape in which it was formed and has its meaning. It is this author’s intention to develop a set of ideas (a framework perhaps) based on phenomenology which will permit effective discussion of ethnophysiography in the context of Indigenous worldviews. This is not to say that this line of reasoning can in any sense completely contain or subsume, imitate or appropriate those worldviews. Rather the desire is that it might be sufficiently commensurate to enable discussion of Indigenous concepts of landscape (within the Western philosophical framework) without doing serious injustice to those worldviews. This involves engagement with Indigenous communities in a manner based on mutual respect and a desire to work together to reach common outcomes, which
Exploring philosophy of place
have been discussed and agreed to be important and valuable for both the academic and local communities. An effective approach to philosophical reconciliation can only be accomplished in terms of landscape as place. Clearly there is much work needed to develop an effective approach to this daunting enterprise; however, since topography is primary, ethnophysiography is likely to be of assistance.
10.
Methods for using phenomenology in ethnophysiography
The discussion above, and in Turk (2007), has established that there is a strong overlap between the concerns of phenomenology and ethnophysiography in the context of understanding the concept of place. Aspects of place have been explored indicating how philosophers, geographers, anthropologists, and writers from other disciplines have linked them to phenomenology. However, the author needs to carry out much more detailed research on the fundamentals of phenomenology before he can determine exactly how it can operate as an overarching transdisciplinary paradigm for ethnophysiography. This is being undertaken via examination of the writings of key philosophers who have contributed to phenomenology, including: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Lévinas, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Jan Patocka. This includes study of both primary texts by these philosophers and also secondary texts interpreting their work in the context of place (e.g. by Edward Casey and Jeff Malpas). Additionally, works by writers from other disciplines utilizing phenomenology are being examined (e.g. texts by Alfred Schütz). Investigation of the potential role of phenomenology in ethnophysiography is, however, unlikely to be advanced without engaging directly with the methods of inquiry utilized in phenomenology: Without doing phenomenology, it may be practically impossible to understand phenomenology … Phenomenology, in the first instance, is like an investigative science, an essential component of which is experiment. Phenomenology is experimental and its experiments are conducted according to a carefully worked out set of controls and methods. (Ihde 1986:â•›14 – emphasis in the original)
The set of classical phenomenological methods suggested by D. Smith (2007) seems directly applicable to research in ethnophysiography:
. See also Maso (2001).
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(1) We describe a type of experience just as we find it in our own (past) experience. Thus, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty spoke of pure description of lived experience. (2) We interpret a type of experience by relating it to relevant features of context. In this vein, Heidegger and his followers spoke of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation in context, especially social and linguistic context. (3) We analyze the form of a type of experience. In the end, all the classical phenomenologists practiced analysis of experience, factoring out notable features for further elaboration.
Analyzing ethnophysiography case studies in this manner could be considered a Grounded Theory Methodology approach (Charmaz 2006; Charmaz & Mitchell 2001; Glaser 1994; Glaser & Strauss 1967), seeking to develop ethnophysiography theory from carefully analyzed data. The initial work on the Ethnophysiography Descriptive Model (discussed in Turk et al. this volume) represents an initial informal application of this approach. Orleans (2008) discusses the role of phenomenology in investigations of the relationship between individual consciousness and social life: The central task in social phenomenology is to demonstrate the reciprocal interactions among the processes of human action, situational structuring, and reality construction. Rather than contending that any aspect is a causal factor, phenomenology views all dimensions as constitutive of all others. Phenomenologists use the term reflexivity to characterize the way in which constituent dimensions serve as both foundation and consequence of all human projects. The task of phenomenology, then, is to make manifest the incessant tangle or reflexivity of action, situation, and reality in the various modes of being in the world.
Considerably more research is needed to verify the suggested approaches and to achieve an appropriate synergistic interplay between phenomenological and empiricist approaches to ethnophysiography theory and practice.
11.
Potential for ethnophysiography research to inform phenomenology
The project discussed in this chapter sits squarely within the tradition of philosophical concepts informing research in other disciplines. The author is also investigating the possibility that ethnophysiography research may enhance phenomenology. As it is early days in this endeavour, the following examples of how this may occur are merely exploratory.
Exploring philosophy of place
From the author’s own experience of many interdisciplinary projects, and from review of relevant literature, it is clear that transdisciplinarity is very difficult to achieve. If this research project can demonstrate that phenomenology can operate effectively as a transdisciplinary paradigm for ethnophysiography, this will be evidence of the power and utility of this philosophy. It would also be coherent with one of Husserl’s original objectives: to establish phenomenology as the integrative basis for all science. Kockelmans (1994) notes that phenomenology seeks to provide the “absolute” foundation for other sciences and “pertain to every science and every form of knowledge” (p. 11) by attempting “to stay away from all free-floating constructions, accidental findings, unexamined preconceptions, and arbitrary prejudices” (p. 12). Patocka (1996:â•›1) suggests that, through phenomenology, the rigor of science does not need to be divorced from spiritual and cultural aspects of being: What makes Husserl’s approach distinctive is that (1) it seeks to be a rigorous science and (2) it singles out such rigor not only as one instance but as the central, most important, and profound access to meaning; as such science can claim a fundamental, crucial significance for human existence. Science ought to and can provide human lives with a “spiritual meaning,” the content and aim of life we need in order to be truly at home, at one with ourselves, with our life, and with our world.
Heidegger (1962:â•›76) suggests engagement with Indigenous lifeworlds, although from what seems a rather Eurocentric perspective: To orient the analysis of Dasein towards the ‘life of primitive peoples’ can have positive significance [Bedeutung] as a method because ‘primitive phenomena’ are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation on the part of the Dasein in question. Primitive Dasein often speaks to us more directly in terms of a primoidal absorption in ‘phenomena’ (taken in a pre-phenomenological sense). A way of conceiving things which seems, perhaps, rather clumsy and crude from our standpoint, can be positively helpful in bringing out the ontological structures of phenomena in a genuine way.
He goes on to caution that ethnology “operates with definite preliminary conceptions and interpretations of human Dasein in general, even in first ‘receiving’ its material, and in sifting it and working it up” (Heidegger 1962:â•›76). Hence, ethnographers should base their studies on phenomenology “recapitulating what has already been ontically discovered, and by purifying it in a way which is ontologically more transparent.” Apparently Husserl (and presumably, through him, Heidegger) was influenced to adopt an inappropriate view of non-European ‘primitive’ societies by
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the second-hand anthropology of French philosopher Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1857– 1939). Levy-Bruhl did not himself collect ethnographic data, but collated it for the purpose of developing his thesis that archaic thought is prelogical and fundamentally different from modern thought. It could be contended that these foundation views of phenomenology can be more adequately critiqued via ethnophysiography explicating Indigenous peoples’ relationships to places and the meanings of the terminology that they employ for aspects of landscape. As discussed above, dwelling place is a central theme of Indigenous philosophy. Exploring key aspects of that philosophy, via ethnophysiography, could lead to a deeper understanding of ‘intentionality,’ one of the main tenets of phenomenology. In phenomenology ‘intentionality’ is used in a specific sense to indicate that which our consciousness is directed at; a physical or mental object, which may not necessarily exist (e.g. fear of a ‘bogey-man’) (Mathews 2006). Intentionality is not capable of being explained by a series of psychological facts, since the totality of its content, structure and variables cannot be effectively made explicit. However, by examining the way landscape is treated in language for a wide variety of cultures, the range of examples of intentionality can be extended, especially regarding spiritual aspects of Indigenous sense of place. Ethnophysiography research can also help explicate issues of universalism central to debates within phenomenology. The purpose of the Ethnophysiography Descriptive Model (discussed by Turk et al. this volume) is to investigate the possibility that there are universal factors behind the individual cultural differences observed in the ways landscape is represented in language, although it is not suggested that deterministic causation is at play. Van Manen (1990:â•›10) suggests: The essence of a phenomenon is a universal which can be described through a study of the structure that governs the instances of particular manifestations of the essence of that phenomenon. In other words, phenomenology is the systematic attempt to uncover and describe the structures, the internal meaning structures, of lived experience. A universal or essence may only be intuited or grasped through a study of the particular or instances as they are encountered in lived experience.
Whether these particular objectives can be achieved only time will tell. Further research may also reveal other potential benefits (and problems) of utilizing phenomenology with ethnophysiography.
. See, for instance: http://www.bookrags.com/biography/lucien-levy-bruhl/.
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Exploring philosophy of place
Conclusions
In this chapter it has only been possible to scratch the surface of the potential interactions between phenomenology and ethnophysiography. It has, however, provided an initial indication that a fruitful relationship between the two is possible. For Indigenous Australians, such as the Yindjibarndi, Aranda, Pintupi and Spinifex People, land and culture are integrated with concepts of time via The Dreaming, the ever present flux of ideas connecting people with their own place and informing both practical and cultural aspects of their ‘lifeworld.’ Examination of Indigenous concepts of place in Australia – and elsewhere – can provide a rich vein of phenomenological understanding. Since such concepts are intricately tied with landscape, the methods of ethnophysiography can assist in unravelling these ideas. However, to accomplish this synergy, in the context of Australian Indigenous cultures, it is necessary to both understand and respect concepts such as The Dreaming and Tjukurrpa. Hence, development of a synergistic relationship between phenomenology and ethnophysiography entails a meaningful dialogue between European philosophy and Indigenous cultural concepts of place.
Acknowledgments The author acknowledges the contribution of his collaborators David Mark, David Stea and Carmelita Topaha in the ethnophysiography research projects, as well as assistance from philosopher Bruce Janz and linguist Niclas Burenhult in the preparation of this chapter. The role of Yindjibarndi and Navajo informants is also acknowledged. Many members of the Roebourne community, the cultural organization Juluwarlu and the Pilbara Aboriginal Language Centre (Wangka Maya) provided invaluable assistance regarding the Yindjibarndi language. Funding support by the US National Science Foundation (grants BCS-0423075 and BCS-0423023) and from Murdoch University for the ethnophysiography projects is gratefully acknowledged.
References Basso, Keith H. 1996. Wisdom sits in places: Notes on a Western Apache landscape. In Senses of Place, Steven Feld & Keith H. Basso (eds), 53–90. Santa Fe NM: School of American Research Press.
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Benterrak, Krim, Muecke, Stephen & Roe, Paddy. 1984. Reading the Country. Fremantle, Western Australia: Fremantle Arts Centre Press. Booth, Michael, Rodgers, Stephen & AgInsight. 2000. Interdisciplinary Research Methodologies in Natural Resource Management [Report to LWRRDS Social and Institutional Research Program]. Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy, Murdoch University, Western Australia . Cane, Scott. 2002. Pila Nguru: The Spinifex People. Fremantle, Western Australia: Fremantle Arts Centre Press. Casey, Edward S. 1996. How to get from space to place in a fairly short stretch of time: phenomenological prolegomena. In Senses of Place, Steven Feld & Keith S. Basso (eds), 13–52. Santa Fe NM: School of American Research Press. Cave, Nick (screenwriter). 2005. The Proposition. Feature film, directed by John Hillcoat. UK Film Council. Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis. London: Sage. Charmaz, Kathy & Mitchell, Richard G. 2001. Grounded theory in ethnography. In Handbook of Ethnography, Paul Atkinson, Amanda Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland & Lyn Lofland (eds), 160–176. London: Sage. Davis, Stephen & Prescott, J. R. V. 1992. Aboriginal Frontiers and Boundaries in Australia. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Feld, Steven & Basso, Keith H. (eds). 1996. Senses of Place. Santa Fe NM: School of American Research Press. Fuchs, Wolfgang W. 1976. Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence: An Essay in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Gallagher, Shaun. 2008. Philosophical antecedents to situated cognition. In Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Philip Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds), 35–52. Cambridge: CUP. Glaser, Barney G. (ed.). 1994. More Grounded Theory Methodology: A Reader. Mill Valley CA: Sociology Press. Glaser, Barney G. & Strauss, Anselm L. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Hawthorne NY: Aldine de Gruyter. Grieves, Vicki. 2007. Aboriginal Philosophy. (22 November 2007). Gurwitsch, Aron. 1957. The last work of Edmund Husserl. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17(3): 370–398. Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. New York NY: Harper and Row. Hercus, Luise, Hodges, Flavia & Simpson, Jane (eds). 2002. The Land is a Map: Placenames of Indigenous Origin in Australia. Canberra: Pandanus Books. Ieramugadu Group. 1995. Know the Song, Know the Country: The Ngarda-Ngali Story of Culture and History in the Roebourne District. Roebourne, Western Australia: Ieramugadu Group. Ihde, Don. 1986. Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction. Albany NY: State University of New York Press. Ihde, Don & Zaner, Richard M. (eds). 1975. Dialogues in Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. James, Allison, Hockey, Jenny & Dawson, Andrew (eds). 1997. After Writing Culture: Epistemology and Praxis in Contemporary Anthropology [ASA Monograph 34]. London: Routledge. Jovchelovitch, Sandra. 2007. Knowledge in Context: Representations, Community and Culture. London: Routledge.
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Kockelmans, Joseph J. 1994. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology. West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press. Malpas, Jeff E. 1999. Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography. Cambridge: CUP. Malpas, Jeff E. 2006. Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Mark, David M. & Turk, Andrew G. 2003a. Ethnophysiography. Paper presented at the Workshop on Spatial and Geographic Ontologies, 23 September, 2003 (prior to COSIT03), in Ittingen, Switzerland. Mark, David M. & Turk, Andrew G. 2003b. Landscape categories in Yindjibarndi: ontology, environment, and language. In Spatial Information Theory: Foundations of Geographic Information Science [Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2825], Werner Kuhn, Michael F. Worboys & Sabine Timpf (eds), 28–45. Berlin: Springer. Maso, Ilja. 2001. Phenomenology and Ethnography. In Handbook of Ethnography, Paul Atkinson, Amanda Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland & Lyn Lofland (eds), 136–144. London: Sage. Mathews, Eric. 2006. Merleau-Ponty: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Mohanty, Jitendranath N. 1997. Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press. Moran, Dermot & Embree, Lester E. (eds). 2004. Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. London: Routledge. Muecke, Stephen. 2004. Ancient and Modern: Time, Culture and Indigenous Philosophy. Sydney: UNSW Press. Myers, Fred R. 1986. Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and Politics among Western Desert Aborigines. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. Nicolescu, Basarab. 2008. Transdisciplinarity as methodological framework for going beyond the science-religion debate. The Global Spiral, 24 May 2007, (December 2008). Nowotny, Helga. 2003. The potential of transdisciplinarity. Rethinking Interdisciplinarity, 1 May 2003 <www.interdiscplines.org/interdisciplinarity/papers/5>. Orleans, Myron. 2008. Phenomenology. (accessed June 2008). Patocka, Jan. 1996. An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology. Peru IL: Open Court Publishing. Psathas, George. 1977. Ethnomethodology as a phenomenological approach in the social sciences. In Interdisciplinary Phenomenology, Don Ihde & Richard M. Zaner (eds), 73–98. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Rijavec, Frank. 2008. Personal communication. Draft PhD dissertation, Murdoch University, Western Australia. Rijavec, Frank, Harrison, Noelene & Soloman, Roger. 1995. Exile and the Kingdom [documentary film]. Roebourne, Western Australia: Ieramugadu Group & Film Australia. Schunn, Christian D., Paulus, Paul B., Cagan, Jonathan & Wood, Kristin. 2006. Final Report from the NSF Innovation and Discovery Workshop: The Scientific Basis of Individual and Team Innovation and Discovery. August 2006. (23 August 2007). Schütz, Alfred. 1977. Husserl and his influence on me. In Interdisciplinary Phenomenology, Don Ihde & Richard M. Zaner (eds), 124–129. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
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Schütz, Alfred & Luckmann, Thomas. 1973. The Structures of the Life-World. Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press. Seamon, David & Mugerauer, Robert. 1985. Dwelling, Place and Environment: Towards a Phenomenology of Person and World. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Smith, David W. 2007. Phenomenology. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. (20 April 2007). Smith, Linda T. 1999. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. Dunedin NZ: University of Otago Press. Stanner, William E. H. 1965. Religion, Tokenism and Symbolism. Reprinted in Religion in Aboriginal Australia: An Anthology, Max Charlesworth, Howard Murphy, Diane Bell & Kenneth Maddock (eds, 1984), 137–172. Queensland: University of Queensland Press. Strehlow, Theodor G. H. 1947. Aranda Traditions. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Sutton, Peter. 1995. Country: Aboriginal Boundaries and Land Ownership in Australia [Aboriginal History Monograph 3]. Canberra: Australian National University. Swain, Tony. 1993. A Place for Strangers: Towards a history of Australian Aboriginal Being. Cambridge: CUP. Tuan, Yi-Fu. 1974. Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall. Turk, Andrew G. 2007. A phenomenology basis for trans-disciplinary research in ethnophysiography. Proceedings of the 26th International Human Science Research Conference, Rovereto, Italy. CD-ROM. Turk, Andrew, Mark, David, O’Meara, Carolyn & Stea, David. In press. Geography – documenting terms for landscape features. In Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Fieldwork, Nicholas Thieberger (ed.). Oxford: OUP. Van Manen, Max. 1990. Researching Lived Experience: Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy. London ON: Althouse Press. Watson-Verran, Helen & Turnbull, David. 1995. Science and other indigenous knowledge systems. In Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen & Trevor Pinch (eds), 115–139. London: Sage. Whiteley, Peter M. 1998. Rethinking Hopi Ethnography. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institute Press.
chapter 4
Embedded in place ‘Mirror knowledge’ and ‘simultaneous landscapes’ among Māori Brian Murton
This paper explores the understanding that Māori, the indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand, have of “landscape”. I argue that although Māori in the past did “gaze” at their surroundings, and did have visual forms of representation, the concept of “landscape” as it is commonly used in Western scholarly and popular representation is inappropriate. What replaces the profound visuality of the West for Māori is language, especially sound and speech. Māori represent the world primarily through the act of naming, in which naming places becomes an integral way of actively engaging perceptually with the animate and inanimate world. Māori “imagine” named places as “simultaneous landscapes” reflecting cosmology, ancestors, history and everyday life.
1.
Introduction
In this paper I explore the understanding that Māori, the indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand, have of “landscape”. The word “explore” is used purposely because like any other exploration it will provide a map of the territory, but different explorers will notice different aspects of a territory and will produce different maps. It will seek to demonstrate that the approach to landscape in European thought which most closely approximates Māori understanding of the landscape emerges from phenomenology. Such an approach, I suggest, makes available aspects of Māori understanding of the landscape concept that other European approaches (for example, those deriving from positivism, structuralism, and post-modernism) do not provide. The people now collectively called Māori are the indigenous Polynesian inhabitants of Aotearoa, the Māori name for the islands of New Zealand (the European name) as a whole. The word Māori means “normal,” “natural,” or “ordinary,”
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and in oral tradition the word distinguishes ordinary mortal human beings from deities and spirits. It has only been used to refer to Māori collectively since the early nineteenth century. The ancestors of the Māori came from Eastern Polynesia around 700–800 years ago, and linguistically, the various dialects of the Māori language (te reo māori or simple te reo) belong to the Tahitic subgroup (which also includes Tahitian, Tuamotuan, Rarotongan) of the Eastern Polynesian subgroup within the Eastern Oceanic branch of the Austronesian language family (Cablitz 2008:â•›204). I have italicized Māori concepts and place names, primarily to demonstrate, as did Wiri (2001), that the Māori and English languages have different epistemological foundations. I am of part Māori descent (Te Popoto and Te Honihoni of Ngā Puhi, Te Ihutai of Te Rarawa, with whānaunga (relatives, family) among Te Aitanga a Mahāki) and was involved in research during the 1990s and early 2000s to support a number of claims to the Waitangi Tribunal (the body established by legislation in 1975 to provide Māori with judicial means to address breaches by the Crown of the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840; see Ward 1999; Byrnes 2004; Belgrave et al. 2005), as well as a collaborative project dealing with landscape change in the Bay of Islands in northern New Zealand, 1769–1840. An enormous difficulty encountered in this work was the very different understandings of key concepts and how they should be represented, both among researchers, who consist of university academics of both Māori and non-Māori ancestry, and members of the tribal groups involved. This was especially the case with the term “landscape,” which, although a quintessentially European term, is widely used throughout the world today, even among peoples whose homelands have been settled by Europeans over the past several hundred years, especially where English is the dominant language. In spending many hours listening to and talking with people, especially elders, it became very apparent that they continue to have a very different understanding of what is now referred to as “landscape” from the understanding held by academic disciplines and people of European descent generally. Fundamentally, in this paper I argue that although Māori “saw,” and still “see,” things in the world (“landscape”), things became “visible” primarily through language, and that a European visual approach is subversive of non-Western modes of knowledge, its acquisition, revelation, and articulation. Section 2 of the paper is an exploration of the “landscape problematic,” including a review of the salient aspects of the landscape concept as it emerged in Europe, a discussion of whether it can be considered a universal concept, an examination of whether Māori “gazed” at their surroundings, and the presentation of an alternate phenomenological perspective on landscape. In Section 3 I present information on how Māori know the world about them. I first outline an approach which, while based in a European epistemological framework, enables
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me to weave into the Māori world. I then identify and discuss three dimensions of Māori knowledge critical to a phenomenological approach to “landscape” as the “face of place”: understandings of time, genealogy as a way of knowing things, and the importance of the creative word. In Section 4 I examine how Māori places can be constituted and how people and land are inseparable. The last major section, Section 5, focuses on named places. I briefly overview past studies of Māori place names, and then give examples of terms for “landscape” features. I then outline how Māori “imagine” named places, and finally present a limited number of selected examples from one area of Aotearoa/New Zealand to illustrate how named places are the landscape.
2.
The landscape problematic
2.1
Landscape: An ambiguous concept
Today landscape is a very loosely used term. Once used primarily in art, art history, landscape architecture, and geography, it now has resonance well beyond academia, and is part of our everyday vocabulary. The word has of late become a well-worn metaphor, and there are a confusing array of uses of the term, ranging from, for example, the “legal landscape,” the “religious landscape,” “landscape ecology,” the “leisure landscape,” the “cultural landscape,” and even the “changing landscape of bladder augmentation” (Creswell 2003:â•›269). Because “landscape” is used by so many different people for such a variety of purposes, it is invariably an ambiguous term. There are problems of translation between fields and often uncertainties of exact meaning within any one, as well as between languages, and it is not surprising that there is not a clean and clear definition that satisfies all. A number of scholars have reviewed how the term “landscape” has been used in Europe since it became a word in common usage from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, especially art historians and historians (for example, Clark 1956; Appleton 1975; Schama 1995), philosophers (Casey 2002), but also geographers, notably Cosgrove (1998) and Olwig (2002). These writers have emphasized that the idea of landscape is a cultural concept that emerged in Europe and involves a particular way of seeing; a way in which some Europeans have represented to themselves and to others the world about them and their relationships with it (Cosgrove 1998:â•›1). Most of the commentators on the landscape idea point out that only since the late nineteenth century has there been any technical or academic discussion of the meaning of landscape (Relph 1981:â•›23). Our current notions of landscape derive from a complicated array of ideas, linked to many of the key concepts of Western thought. These include what
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Martin Jay (1992:â•›178–195) calls a “resolute ocularcentrism” in which the eye is the primary way of sensing the world, the basis for the development of the methods of perspective in art, which helped define and delimit relations between observer and the world, and helped create an “optic” for framing the “objective science” emerging in the seventeenth century and the separation of humanity from nature. It also involves the subject-object and mind-body separation emerging from the philosophy of René Descartes, in which the mind contains two elements, representations of the external world and the scanning activity of what Macnaughten and Urry (1998:â•›110) call the “Inner Eye”. In this abstract and disembodied Western approach the starting point is the self-centered subject, who confronts a domain of isolable objects, entities, that a perceiver first has to make sense of, rendering them intelligible by categorizing them and assigning to them meanings or functions, before they can be made available for use (Ingold 2000:â•›168–169). What is more, Martin Heidegger (1977:â•›115–154), in his essay “The age of the world picture,” contends that the “metaphysical ground” of modern science is the idea of the world conceived and grasped as a picture. Within this modern optic, the “certainty of truth” is made to turn on the need to establish a distance between observer and observed. Only then may order be discovered and re-presented. The key binary of mind/matter (the former irreducible, impenetrable, and disembodied and the latter entirely knowable and manipulable), which underlies this perspective, is one of the many separations (other ontological binaries include nature/culture, individual/society, space/place) which are much less emphasized within Indigenous knowledge systems. Relph (1981:â•›28–29) notes that just as mind had been separated from matter, so the viewer had been separated from landscape.
2.2
Landscape: A universal concept?
A number of commentators have urged caution when using the landscape idea in relationship to non-European societies. Corner (1999:â•›5), for example, observes: … the landscape idea is neither universally shared nor manifested in the same way across cultures and time; its meaning and value, together with its physical and formal characteristics, are not fixed. To assume that every society shares an American, English, or French view of landscape, or that other societies possess any version of landscape at all, is to wrongly impose on other cultures one’s own image. Indeed, there have been societies and times wherein the notion of landscape simply did not exist.
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Corner (1999:â•›6) also states that while every society has historically been aware of an environment, most did not develop the idea of a unified scene, a visual landscape in the sense that emerged among educated Europeans. Burenhult and Levinson (2008:â•›135–150) raise the issue of whether landscape is a cross-linguistically distinct and easily identifiable semantic domain, like kinship, color, or folk biology. They note that European cultures identify a category “landscape,” but the results of collaborative work on the relationships between language and landscape carried out by the Language and Cognition Group at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics suggest that caution is required when applying it to other cultures. In this work, the term “landscape” is taken to refer to features and entities of the environment. Burenhult and Levinson (2008:â•›148) conclude that there is a great deal of plasticity in how language models the earth and in what is considered to be the essence of its features, and they warn that there are no unique beginner terms for landscape as a whole, and that notions of landscape are often intertwined with notions of settlement, migration, resources, and ethnicity (Burenhult & Levinson 2008:â•›143). The study of these issues is what Mark and Turk (2003, 2004) have labeled “ethnophysiography”.
2.3
Did Māori conceptualize “landscape”?
There is evidence that Māori did have a notion of “landscape” in a visual sense, although not as a dominant mode of representation. This emerges from interpretations of early nineteenth-century European paintings of landscape containing Māori, from observations by European travelers and early ethnographers, from other types of Māori visual material, and from language.
Interpreting landscape painting W. T. J. Mitchell (2002:â•›22–27) uses a painting (ca. 1827) by Augustus Earle, “Distant View of the Bay of Islands”, which has a carved Māori figure in the right foreground, to argue that the figure is intended to reflect the Māori experience and representation of landscape. On this basis, Mitchell argues that Māori did place importance on looking at the land, and that Earle uses the figure to represent the Māori gaze as a presence in the landscape. Mitchell (2002:â•›26) concludes that Earle’s painting suggests that Māori did look at the land: The Maori statue indicates at a minimum that they erect a statue to keep surveillance over a place. Nor is this surveillance confined only to the carved figure. The Maori bearer on the left seems to be hesitating as he walks, turning to the side to scan the tabooed territory, while raising his war club slightly to ward off a potential threat.
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Ethnographic commentary By the late nineteenth century it was well known by European commentators that Māori obtained overviews of the land from high points called taumata (“gaze on, let the eyes rest on, resting place on a hill, brow of a hill”). Elsdon Best (1942 reprinted 1977:â•›28), who began to carry out ethnographic research among Tūhoe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, described the role of taumata thusly: The old type of Māori much appreciated a commanding taumata from which a fine view of his tribal lands might be obtained, and when resting at such places I have frequently heard them crooning old songs that referred to long past occurrences at the places they looked upon.
Of significance is that narratives about people and past events were remembered when places were viewed: when a place was named, hearers thought about narratives attached to the name. Many place names, incidentally, incorporate the word taumata.
Māori visual representation Although Māori do not appear to have forms of representational painting before the nineteenth century, they did have a number of visual methods of representing the world around them. Roger Neich (1994:â•›16) notes that at the time of early European contact oral forms of representation were the most important, but visual forms, such as dance, weaving, tattoo, woodcarving and sculpture in stone and bone, were significant. There were also several types of painting, including face and body painting, the painting of carvings, the painting of canoe hulls and architectural timbers, parietal painting in caves and rock shelters, and most significantly the abstract curvilinear patterns painted on house rafters, on monuments and mausoleums, on paddles and on the underside of canoe prows, known as kōwhaiwhai (Neich 1994:â•›17). A number of these visual forms represented ancestors and genealogically related entities, and could elicit oral descriptions of places and events. Linguistic evidence The Māori language does contain several words which provide connotations of “landscape”. These include tiro or titiro, which as a verb can mean “look,” “survey,” “view,” “examine,” and in the noun form, tirohanga, a “view,” “sight” or “aspect,” all of which seem to be of some antiquity (Williams 1844 reprinted 1992:â•›424). A phrase tirohanga paruhi (panorama), on the other hand, seems to be of more recent origin. A number of phrases (for example, takoto o whenua, literally “the lie of
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the land,” or tohu o whenua, literally “marks on the land”), when used in the appropriate context, are used to refer to landmarks. There are several publications which use these phrases in their titles, notably F. L. Phillips’s (1989) Nga Tohu a Tainui, the New Zealand Historical Atlas: Ko Papatuanuku e Takoto Nei (McKinnon 1997), and Taimoana Tūroa’s Te Takoto o Te Whenua o Hauraki (2000). There is no question that Māori in the past did view their environment, gaze upon it, and they may have even had a number of terms for landscape as a whole. But the question remains how they primarily represented it. Edward Casey (2002:â•›xvi) notes that what is problematic about representation is not found in the fact that it happens, but in how it happens. He points out that representing landscape occurs in line and in paint, in gesture and in photograph, in image and in word (Casey 2002:â•›xiv), and that it is integral to the perception of landscape itself, indeed, part of its being and essential to its manifestation (Casey 2002:â•›xv).
2.4
An alternate perspective on landscape
More than a decade ago Casey (1996:â•›13–52) noted that landscape, which humans could only grace by being bodily there, could be construed as the “face of place, its expressive facies or sensuous surface”. This phenomenological expression of landscape stands in contrast with the dominantly visual notions of landscape in Western understandings, whether it be in the popular mind or in the writings of a range of scholars in different disciplines, where the “gaze” is at the center, where the landscape, however it is interpreted, is an assemblage of objects marked by their existence at a distance. It is the contention of this paper that, as Gregory Cajete (2000:â•›23, 25) notes, phenomenology parallels the approach of Indigenous understandings of the world. He argues that Indigenous knowledge is rooted in the soil of direct physical and perceptual experience of the earth. This process of intersubjectivity is based on the notion that there is a primal affinity between the human body and other bodies of the natural world. In this perspective, lived experience of this “lifeworld” is the ultimate source of human knowledge and meaning. Central to this participation with the world is the body, as the source of thinking, sensing, acting (Cajete 2000:â•›185). A number of other Native American scholars, including Vine Deloria and Daniel Wildcat (2001), Leroy Little Bear (2000:â•›77–85), and N. Scott Momaday (1974) have also identified phenomenological approaches as being aligned with Indigenous thinking. The phenomenological work carried out in Indigenous societies by non-Indigenous scholars (for example that of Myers 1986; Weiner 1991, 2001; Basso 1988, 1996a, 1996b; Thornton 2008) has drawn on the concept of dwelling as articulated by Martin Heidegger (1971:â•›141–160), a concept that assigns importance
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to the forms of consciousness with which individuals perceive and apprehend geographical space (Basso 1996a:â•›106). It also uses ideas from Maurice MerleauPonty (1962), especially that of the “body-subject.” There are several dimensions of a dwelling approach which have been identified by recent commentators, including the philosophers Edward Casey (1993, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002) and Jeff Malpas (1999, 2006), as important to understanding place. First, the human physical constitution as embodied is seen as the ultimate arbiter of human interaction with the environment (Thornton 2008:â•›24). As Edward Casey (1993:â•›48) puts it: My body continually takes me into place. It is at once an agent and vehicle, articulator and witness of being-in-place … Without … our bodies, not only would we be lost in place – acutely disoriented and confused – we would have no coherent sense of place itself. Nor could there be any such thing as lived places, i.e. places in which we live and move and have our being. Our living-moving bodies serve to structure and configurate entire scenarios of place.
Second, the question of “self ” is linked to the body in the literature on place, and closely related to the issue of identity. Such identity entails a body in place, an implaced self, a “body/self ” (Casey 2001:â•›689). Third, because it is through the body that humans make a living in an environment, the experience of doing this is central to what it means to inhabit a place, to dwell in it. Heidegger (1962:â•›100) used the term “work-world” to emphasize that place and self are intimately locked in the world of concrete work. Fourth, both Ingold (2000:â•›193) and Casey (2001:â•›689, 2002) identify the concept of landscape as a complementary term to that of body. Both concepts place an emphasis on form. Fifth, in a dwelling approach, in everyday life humans are thought of as getting along unreflectively using words, implements, clothing and other pieces of equipment, engaging in casual social encounters without consciously posing the problem of our relationship to such entities. Most familiar things around us are thus already integrated into a set of practices for “coping” or getting by, what Pierre Bourdieu (1977) called habitus. Sixth, a dwelling approach insists that humans first of all find themselves enmeshed in a world and in a set of relationships, and that it is only subsequent to this that they begin to separate out a sense of themselves and a sense of things as they are apart from them: according to Heidegger human existence cannot be construed as coming before (either temporally or ontologically) the encounter with other things or persons (Malpas 2006:â•›51–52). Seventh, what creates the world, bringing forth the earth as a collection of human places, is speech. As David White (1978:â•›25) observes:
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… names bestow what Heidegger calls a measured command over entities. The measure is the extent to which any given name is a locus wherein may be experienced relations between the being of the entity named and being as totality.
Names are considered to be part of the things (entities) labeled and language is laid out as a property of the world and not as a coding of the world, as in a Cartesian approach (Weiner 2001:â•›89–90).
3.
How Māori know places
3.1
Introduction
Most of the scholarship using the concept of landscape has been carried out in Western settings, or, if located in the non-Western world, has employed approaches reflecting the ontological and epistemological legacies of European colonialism, producing a “hall of mirrors” in which theory reflects its own views rather than engaging with alternative ontologies (Howitt & Suchet-Pearson 2003:â•›557). To begin to address this issue, this paper uses a modified form of kaupapa Māori, an approach to research which is connected to Māori philosophy, principles, language, and customs (Irwin 1994:â•›25–43; L. Smith 1999, 2000:â•›225–247; G. Smith 2000:â•›209–224; Pihama 2005:â•›191–209). According to Linda Smith (1999:â•›188) kaupapa Māori does not mean the same as Māori knowledge and epistemology, as the concept of kaupapa implies a way of framing and structuring how Māori think about those ideas and practices. Wiri (2001:â•›57–58) notes that kaupapa Māori is bicultural in that it may weave into both Māori and European worlds, and that its theoretical underpinnings may be partially interpreted within a European epistemological framework. A kaupapa Māori approach is based on Māori ways of knowing, or mātauÂ� ranga Māori, which according to Tau (1999:â•›10–24) is the epistemology of Māori, to Salmond (1985:â•›240–262) a complex and open system of knowing the world, and to Royal (1998:â•›80) it is Māori knowledge created to understand the world. It is generally agreed that Māori knowledge is divided into two domains, that of the “upper jawbone” (Te Kauwae Runga) and that of the “lower jawbone” (Te€Kauwae Raro). The former refers to matters that are associated with the origins of the universe and cosmology, the latter with the world of humans. Mason Durie (1994:â•›27) notes that these realms embrace long-standing philosophies in which all power and authority came from higher forces, gods or atua, and mana wairua or mana atua, denoted activities associated with those various deities.
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While humans might be the agents of the gods or the medium through which their power is expressed, supreme control rests not with individuals, but with deities. In contrast, mana tangata is a reflection of human expertise, assisted by the gods but essentially an acknowledgement of the skills and knowledge which allows certain people to direct day-to-day activities within their communities. Mana whenua is another form of control and authority which enables a group to claim a particular area of land. All three domains of mana are components of a holistic Māori worldview. Thus, Māori see knowledge as involving an inseparable relationship between the world of matter and the world of spirit. In Māori understandings of the world, the Cartesian dichotomy between an observing thinking self and the outside world cannot exist. There are at least three dimensions of Māori knowledge critical to a phenomenological approach to “landscape” as the “face of place”: understandings of time, of genealogy as a way of knowing things, and the importance of the creative word.
3.2
Understandings of time
Michael Shirres (1997:â•›119) tells us that the deepest level of Māori understanding of being and time has it that there is a “singularity” located at the core of the cosmos, where there is neither space nor time. The latter exist only at the level of the material world, following the separation of the Earth Mother from the Sky Father, where they are firmly intertwined. Even in the material world the past, present, and the future are indissolubly interconnected, and for Māori, the ancient symbol of the double spiral (koru) represents the interrelationships of the past, present, and future, of time and space, of spirit and matter (Stewart-Harawira 2005:â•›34). Each circumbulation of the spiral incorporates the past into both the present and the future and, in doing so, reconstitutes both. Although different tribal traditions assign slightly different meanings to the spiral (the energy of precreation, the potential of being, the coming into being, a progression from potential being), in all it symbolizes the integration of the world of the spirit with the worlds of potentiality and creation (Shirres 1997). In Māori semantics, physical phenomena, including people, are held to proceed from this common primal source, and all things unfold their nature in a common dynamic process (Salmond 1985:â•›246–247). This cosmic generative power, this common dynamic process in which all things unfold, already contains the form of every possible being. Consequently, all things in the phenomenal world unfold their nature (tipu), live (ora), and have form (āhua) and so come to possess a body
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(tinana), an immaterial self (wairua), an essence of divine power, a unique living force (mauri), and a characteristic vitality (hau) (Roberts & Wills 1998:â•›49). A dwelling approach to place resonates with Māori understanding of the world. Both Ingold (2000:â•›193) and Casey (2001:â•›689) identify body and “landscape” as complementary terms, each implying the other, each represented by concrete forms, in an analogic/narrative sense. For Ingold landscapes must be understood as “taskscapes” in their embodied form: a pattern of activities collapsed into an array of features. Casey notes that body and landscape are the concretization and exfoliation, respectively, of the initially indefinite dyad of self and place, which need to be fleshed out downward into the body and outward into landscape. To Māori all things have an inherent nature (tipu) and a template (ahua) and these materialize as concrete bodies (tinana) (of people, trees, animals, birds, fish, rocks, and so on). It is the human body that carries the Māori self into place as an implaced self, what Casey (2001:â•›689) calls a “body/self ”. Landscape is complementary to the body. Casey (2001:â•›689) calls it a “cusp concept”. This is why it is necessary to know which particular body from which particular family was involved in making places.
3.3
Genealogy and knowing
For Māori, “to know” something is to locate it in space and time through genealogy (whakapapa). To “know” oneself is to know one’s genealogy. To “know” about a tree, a rock, the wind, or the fish in the sea is to know their genealogy. In its literal translation whakapapa means ‘to place layers, one upon another’. In a genealogical sense, it provides a framework for an understanding of historical descent, pattern, and linkages, whereby everything, animate and inanimate, is connected together into a single family tree or “taxonomy of the universe” (Roberts 1998; Roberts & Wills 1998; Roberts et al. 2004). In some traditions genealogy begins with the primal parents, Papatūānuku (Earth Mother) and Ranginui (Sky Father). These primal parents then produced many offspring, deified as gods (atua), who in turn act as the progenitors and personification of all known phenomena, both living and non-living. Genealogy thus acts as a cognitive template, a paradigm of reality, for the ordering and understanding of the visible and invisible worlds and is the means by which Māori “know” the phenomenal world. Moreover, by transcending this world and connecting all things on earth to the gods, to the universe, and ultimately to the Creator, it provides the framework for an all-encompassing, universal knowledge system. But because of Māori non-linear conceptions of time as represented in the double spiral, and the understanding that all things exist
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simultaneously, the conception of genealogy is spatial, or perhaps holographic, rather than involving descending vertical lines (Salmond 1985:â•›247). Knowledge associated with the individuals, be they deity, demigod, human, plant, animal, or rock, provides “flesh” for the epistemological “bones” provided by genealogy. This knowledge is primarily in the form of narratives of many kinds: songs, chants, proverbs, and prophetic sayings. All of these, as in oral cultures elsewhere (see Cajete 2000:â•›27–31; Basso 1996a:â•›68–74), make extensive use of personification and metaphor (Roberts & Wills 1998:â•›53).
3.4
Thought and the spoken word
In Māori understanding, creation is viewed as a process of continuous action or coming into being, in which particular forms of sound and thought play an essential role (Salmond 1985:â•›240–263; Stewart-Harawira 2005:â•›37–38). StewartHarawira (2005:â•›38) puts it this way: The cadences of ancient songs, of ritual calls, of sacred chants, through which the world is sung into existence, the flesh is sung onto the bones, and the relationships are sung which bind all together within the cosmos … [breathe] life into the network of subtle interconnections between human beings and the entire natural world.
Thought and spoken words exist together for Māori, with sound being the original foundation for thought to be conceptualized and expressed in word. According to Salmond (1985:â•›246) the primal energy surge produces thought, memory, the mind, then desire. From desire, ancestral knowledge generates darkness and then Te Kore, the primal power of the cosmos, the void or negation, yet containing the potentiality of all things afterwards to come. From Te Kore, space emerges, and then light, land, the gods and men. One northern Māori tradition, notes the tohunga, scholar, writer, healer, Anglican minister, and philosopher, Māori Marsden (Royal 2003:â•›16–23), has it that it is through recitation by a supreme entity, Io, that all things came into being. Marsden in his recounting of the Io tradition, which is appropriate for me to follow, states that it was through the mana of the creative word that everything has come into existence, including the phenomenal world, after the children of Rangi (the Sky Father) and Papatūānuku (the Earth Mother) separate their parents. Just as with the cosmogonic and with non-human things, the spoken word connects the breath of people to the breath of the world and animates, brings life to place. Māori understandings of how things or entities come to be known accord well with a dwelling approach to place. To quote Vincent Vycinas (1969:â•›270), in his
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work interpreting Martin Heidegger, “To say something is to bring it to life”. It is speech which enables Māori to create their world as a collection of human places. But sound, as well as being the vehicle for thought and language, has deep metaphysical and creative connotations that go beyond its use as the practical instrument of ordinary communication. It is names that expose things in their being. In Māori worldview, naming places, in my understanding, belongs to the realm of humans, who descend, depending on tribal tradition, either from Tāne (who is also the progenitor of forest trees, birds, insects, rocks and stones) or Tūmatauenga (who is primarily thought of as the deity of war). But naming places must be seen as part of a broader process of naming and ordering the world. This idea is supported by linguistic evidence. According to the linguist and Māori language scholar Richard Benton (personal communication, 13 April 2007), there is no Māori term equivalent to “place name”. He notes that he has seen the phrase “ingoa wahi,” but that it is a modern artificial construction, a recently invented technical term to convey an idea that did not need to be expressed explicitly in matauranga Māori. A similar phrase “ingoa takiwā, wāhi rānei” has also recently been used to mean ‘place names’ or more specifically region and particular place names. Benton goes on to state that the term “ingoa” (“name, namesake, acquire distinction”) covers the names for people, places, and taonga (property, anything highly prized), and as identity and status are bound up in a name, a place is its name, and the name is the place. He also notes that when a name changes, a place may well become a different one in Māori conceptualization. There are also a number of words and phrases which relate to naming in order to possess, or to affect a place in some way (Benton, pers. comm., 13 April 2007). Important among these is taunaha, to bespeak or reserve a place, object, or person for some future use or purpose. This could include a chief naming a portion of land after a part of his body in order to reserve it for his use or disposition (taunaha whenua). Further, the word taunahanahatanga was frequently used to describe the naming process by ancestors, such as in “Ngā taunahanahatanga o ngā roto o te waka ō aoraki” (“Naming great lakes of the canoe of Aoraki”) (Davis et al. 1990b:â•›86–91). Today the Māori name for the New Zealand Geographic Board, the body responsible for place names in New Zealand, is Ngā Pou Taunaha o Aotearoa (Davis et al. 1990b:â•›viii). Another important phrase is tapatapa whenua, literally ‘bespoken land.’ According to Benton (pers. comm., 13 April 2007) the term tapatapa is derived from tapa “to give a name to, recite, give a command” and denotes formal recitations (for example, an incantation or karakia) and the procedure of formally bestowing someone’s name on an object, either to enhance its value, give the person concerned some claim to it, or to insult the person whose name and therefore mana is so attached. Tapatapa whenua is the application of this custom to formally claim a piece of land, usually by someone
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of note discovering or settling on it. Another word often used in the context of bestowing names to both places and people was hua (“name, call by name, think, think of, know”).
4.
Māori places
4.1
Whenua: Place
The word whenua means both “earth” and “placenta,” and as such metaphorically represents the connection of people to their origins, material, historical, and spiritual. Māori bury both the placenta and the umbilical cord (pito), whereby symbollically recognizing the connection between place and people. It is also explanatory of the encoding of philosophical and metaphysical knowledge, which, along with genealogy and the rituals of sacred encounter, is exemplified in the geographical landscape (Stewart-Harawira 2005:â•›41). As Rose Pere of Waikaremoana expresses, I whakatangatahia te whenua (The land is imbued with human characteristics) (cited in Wiri 2001:â•›34), a sentiment echoed by Indigenous and many other scholars, who acknowledge that the earth is an entity very much like a person; as such the earth can speak, and one of the ways it does this is through the human act of place naming (Fair 1997:â•›466–480). This idea is similar to the phenomenological view that the body has a relationship to the world through two dimensions, “outgoing” where the lived body participates and is active in the world, and “incoming” where places come into the body, “placializing”, through “tenacity” or the lasting impression that places make on people and “subjection,” the idea that people are subject to places, that places constitute people as subjects. It is this notion that pepeha (a type of proverb or identity axiom) conveys for Māori. Rose Pere’s phrase quoted above is a metaphorical statement, associating the word whenua with both land and the placental membrane. It emphasizes the importance of the place where the placenta is buried, and as such reflects the individual and kin group’s place in the material world. The relationship between the body and land is clearly analogic/narrative. The burial of the placenta, which is regarded as part of the mother, the child, and the earth, also inserts the individual into the landscape of origin. Whenua, then, is the critical element of being and existing in the physical world and the critical element in understanding the holistic nature of Māori consciousness. It is a mirror where the land and the people reflect each other, and are each other. It is this holistic conception of whenua that has led scholars to identify it with the Western concept of place (Roberts & Wills 1998:â•›54–55).
4.2
Embedded in place
“Mirror knowledge”
Te Maire Tau (2001:â•›111–152) calls Māori knowledge “mirror knowledge”: for Māori the world is a mirror of their lives. All things reference back through the tribe to the family and ultimately to “self ”. The circle is confirmed and expressed in the proverb that asks the question, He tangata, he tipua, he atua rānei? (Am I human, demigod, or God?). The question, of course, is rhetorical, as the answer is all three. As the philosophers Perrett (2003:â•›258–259) and Patterson (1992:â•›109– 111) note, the traditional Māori view of self is markedly non-individualistic. A person’s identity is determined predominantly by his or her inherited status and relationship to a larger social group, membership of which is genealogically determined. This idea is carried to the point where what Europeans would think of as an individual is identified with the kinship group; hence the use in Māori of the personal pronoun au (“I”) to refer to either the individual or the tribe. As Tau (2001:â•›139) aptly observes, kinship identity reaches both backwards and forwards in time, and involves not only humans but deities. What gives unity to a life in this radically different non-individualistic conception of selfhood is tribal knowledge. This provides historical and social identity, which define the context within which an individual’s whole life takes place. Tribal knowledge is primarily narrativebased, and these narratives depict humans and other beings and their places in the cosmos, both in more universal forms (as, for example, in major cosmological and discovery narratives) and in fine detail (as, for example, in genealogy, family stories, place-naming stories, and so on). Basically, the whole Māori cosmos is conceived of as a gigantic “kin”, and humans are powerfully linked thereby to both the natural and supernatural world. This projection of “self” implies that when Māori claim descent from the ancestors and gods they did so horizontally. Among Māori, as we have noted, the ancient symbol of the double spiral (koru) represents the interrelationships of the past, present, and future, as well as of time and space, and spirit and matter (Stewart-Harawira 2005:â•›34). Within Māori ontological and cosmological paradigms it is impossible to conceive of the present and future as separate and distinct from the past, and that the past is constitutive of the present and is inherently reconstituted within the future. Ritual and naming practices impress ancestors and deities into the landscape, and they are thus immediate and available. After all, Papatūānuku, the Earth Mother, lies directly in front of the people. Ancestors, in claiming territory, named land marks, rocks, trees, waterfalls, and so on, and together tribal understanding with the entities themselves so that a place and its knowledge cannot be separated. Named places not only record and express important mythological and historical aspects of tribes, but by the
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virtue of the knowledge contained in the names, they – and the places they represent – are the physical manifestation of the tribe, just as the tribe is the manifestation of the land. The past can be read because it was before people. With the understanding that actions are incorporated into the earth, and into the minds of people, for Māori the phenomenal world, the world of things and objects, was a “mirror landscape”, a reflection of themselves, a metaphoric extension of the body, just as they are a reflection of their landscape.
5.
Named places as the face of place
5.1
Introduction: The study of Māori named places
Māori place names have been the subject of considerable scrutiny in the past. Most studies in the late nineteenth and through most of the twentieth century were the work of scholars of European ancestry who focused on collecting, classifying and seeking the origins of the name, although a few do recount the narratives in which the names appear. Notable examples of this work include the studies of Andersen (1942), Adkin (1948), Beattie (1945, 1948), Insull (1952), Reed (1974), David Simmons’ (1987) editing of George Graham’s manuscript “Māori Place Names of Auckland” (1927), and Stafford (1994, 1996) on Te Arawa. A number of tribal histories compiled by Europeans also contain many place names, including those by Best (1925 reprinted 1977) on Tūhoe, J. Mitchell (1944) on Ngāti Kahungunu, L. Kelly (1949) on Tainui, and Stafford (1982) on Te Arawa. Only recently, published studies, mostly now by Māori, have begun to integrate place names more comprehensively into tribal experience; these include Halbert (1999), Jones and Biggs (1995), and Tūroa (2000). But few of these (Wiri 2001 is an exception) have attempted to specifically locate Māori place names within the Māori knowledge system: their role is taken for granted, by knowledgeable Māori at least. Perhaps the best example of a publication which integrates names, both of places and ancestors, in the context of narratives is He Kōrero Pūrākau mo Ngā Taunahanahatanga a Ngā Tūpuna. Place Names of the Ancestors. A Māori Oral History Atlas (Davis et al. 1990a). Another recent approach has investigated how names (of people and places) were used in “oral mapping” (or “performance cartography”, Woodward & Lewis 1998:â•›1–10, 537–541), the use of spoken text to describe routes, sometimes accompanied by the drawing of lines on the ground with a stick (J. Kelly 1999:â•›1–30; Barton 1998:â•›493–536).
5.2
Embedded in place
Named places: Meaning and context
It should be noted that polysemy is a characteristic feature of the Māori language, and that many place names, when broken down into their separate parts, can be “translated” in several different ways. Davis et al. (1990b:â•›16) point out that it is only with knowledge of the appropriate narratives that the meaning of the name can be established and comment that “only the unwise attempt to translate a name lacking the evidence of tradition”. Further, Māori liked to name places after an event that had occurred to a person there (ibid.:â•›22). Very often in these cases “o,” meaning “the place of …” or “the place where,” is found as a prefix in a place name to which is added either the name of the person or what they did there. Some place names were, therefore, quite long. Today many names in common use are only a small part of a longer name, especially ones commemorating events and activities of ancestors.
5.3
Terms for landscape features
A very large number of named places include generic terms for parts of the environment. Gabriele Cablitz (2006, 2008), in her work on the Marquesas, makes an important distinction between what she terms “geographical entity/landscape feature” or “landscape term”, and the term “place name”. The former refers to generic terms for parts of the environment, and the latter to the class of proper nouns naming locations, which can include generic terms in them. Māori terms for landscape features include maunga (mountain), pae maunga (mountain range), puke (hill), hiwi (ridge of a hill), papa (flat ground, or in the context of a place name, ‘a place of ’), pari (cliff, precipice, flow of the tide), kōhatu (rock), toka (rock, often in a river or the sea), riu (valley), mānia (plain), ana (cave), wai (water generally), awa (river), manga (river, stream, stretch of water, watercourse), rere (flow, often a waterfall), puna (spring of water), rae, kūrae, matarae (promontory, headland, peninsula), whanga (bight, bay, large rive mouth), ngutuawa (river mouth), motu (small island), moutere (small island), kokoru (bay), one (beach), repo (swamp), and there are more (Davis et al. 1990b:â•›28–39; Tūroa 2000). Most of the terms are simplex forms, and some derive from body parts, e.g. mata, which can mean “face” but also “headland,” as well as having several other meanings. The terms for landscape features frequently occur as parts of place names, as they do elsewhere in the Pacific (Cablitz 2006, 2008). The importance to Māori of landscape features, notably mountains and hills, as well as rivers and lakes, is demonstrated in pepeha, proverbs which take a set form, and which define the relationships between such features and the tribe of
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the area. Let me illustrate with an example drawn from the Hokiānga area (the ancestral area of my father’s people).
Ko Whakarongorua te maunga Ko Utakura te awa Ko Te Honihoni te hapu Ko Te Ngā Puhi te iwi
The mountain is Whakarongorua The river is Utakura The sub-tribe is Te Honihoni The people are Ngā Puhi
The first line identifies a feature, a mountain or hill, the second line a river, and this unvarying form emphasizes the significance of these features. The third and fourth lines identify the people. More can be added to such sayings, such as a canoe, an ancestor, a marae (a complex of buildings, including a meeting house, belonging to a related group of people). They are identity axioms linking land and people into a whole in such a way as to make them inseparable.
5.4
Imagining named places
Like many other peoples (see Weiner 2001:â•›16–30; Thornton 2008:â•›27, 70), Māori imagined sequences of place names as the “footsteps of the ancestors” (Ngā tapuwae o ngā matua tupuna), paths or trails followed for a variety of purposes. Many Māori names can only be understood through their connection to other names and other places, and whole series of names belong together in groups, commemorating journeys of exploration by an ancestor, the understanding of how the land was made by gods and demigods, or a series of relationships between events and/or people (Davis et al. 1990a:â•›xiii). Some groups of names, as well as individual names, were of such significance that when a tribe migrated elsewhere it “transplanted” its history in its new home by using names from the place of origin. Because of the role of place names as a device for recording and remembering tribal history, the historical events themselves sometimes became relocated in the new setting. It is little wonder that the biggest single group of Māori place names consists of the names brought from homelands (either in the tropical Pacific, usually referred to as Hawaiki, or elsewhere in Aotearoa). Another way of imagining the naming process is in terms of the ways in which Māori recognized how a group, such as a tribe or sub-tribe, could base claims to stretches of country in pre-European times; these ways became enshrined in the
Embedded in place
Native Land Court (now the Māori Land Court) records in the nineteenth century. The Native Land Court, which was established in 1865, used and over time modified traditional ways (take) of claiming stretches of country. Take included the right of discovery (whenua kite hou), the right to occupy based on bloodlines (take tipuna), right of conquest (take raupatu), ability to hold off invasion (ringa kā), ability to keep the home fires burning (ahi kā), and gifting (tuku whenua) (Law Commission 2001:â•›47–49, 61–66; E. T. Durie 1994:â•›61–81; Wiri 2001:â•›101– 102, 164). These rights are complementary and all involve the naming of places associated with the activities of ancestors.
5.5
The names are the places
Places bearing names were the outcomes of activities of the ancestors (He tangata, he tipua, he atua rānei). These involve several levels of generalization. All tribal groups have slightly different narratives about how the islands that comprise Aotearoa came into being, and about their discovery. But most named places are only known and understood at a local level, within the territories of tribes and sub-tribes, even if they involve “transported” names. Tribes have a sense of the boundaries of their territory (rohe), usually high points (maunga), and usually the area included within such points overlaps with the rohe of adjacent tribes. All tribal groups also have stories about the formation of striking natural features (for example, mountains, lakes, harbors) and their associated names within their territories. But the vast majority of names are those of settlement sites, both fortified (pā) and undefended (kāinga), various kinds of sacred sites (wāhi tapu), food and other resource sites of various kinds, including gardens, birding sites, fishing sites, fern grounds and collectively referred to as mahinga kai, sites associated with initial exploration by an ancestor, and places where ancestors fought off intruders. These latter named features were the outcome of immersion in place through the Māori self/body’s involvement with the environment as part of their normal business of life (Ingold 2000:â•›194–195 uses the term “taskscape” and Casey 2001:â•›689 “habitation” to describe such activity). The examples of names which follow are a mere glimpse of places that received names. Most names at the local level are not on modern maps, and many are unknown to all but a few today and in a sense no longer exist as places. Attention is restricted to the lands surrounding the Hokiānga Harbor, an area which has names associated with an early discoverer, Kupe, and with mythical creatures, taniwha, which created landforms and with which my family has long associations.
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Naming by a distant ancestor There are many variations in the traditions of Kupe and many place names drawn from the stories of his explorations and adventures (Davis et al. 1990a:â•›8–17). There may well have been several people called Kupe, but most traditions say he was the first of the early Polynesian ancestors to arrive from Hawaiki. One of the areas where a Kupe tradition is very strong is around the Hokiānga harbor on the west coast of the northern part of Te Hiku o Te Ika a Maui (the tail of the fish of Maui, the pan-Polynesian demigod). The full name for the harbor is Te Hoki Ānga a Kupe, named because this was the place from where Kupe set out on his return voyage to his homeland. There are also a number of names around the harbor ascribed to Kupe, including Kohukohu (the place where Kupe cursed those responsible for food being cold when ovens were opened), Ngā Kuri a Kupe (“the dog of Kupe”), and a number of other rocks at the harbor’s entrance. He also left one of his pet taniwha (a powerful spirit placed in guardianship over a certain area, often living in a water body), Ārai Te Uru (a name well known in other traditions as well), as a guardian on the southern side of the harbor’s entrance. The formation of the Hokiānga Harbor Throughout Aotearoa, traditions attribute landscape change and especially the creation of landforms through sudden natural events to taniwha. According to one tradition (Hokianga Harbour Wairere Boulders, n.d.) the Hokiānga Harbor was formed by the children of Ārai Te Uru, who, in searching for homes of their own, carved out the various branches and rivers entering the water body, which are named after them (Waihou, Waimā, Utakura, Wairere, Ōmanaia, Whirinaki, Ōrirā, Mangamuka, Wairupe, Motukaraka, Ōhopa, Waireira, and Motukauri). Each taniwha’s adventure has a story. I only recount two here. Waihou was the first to leave his home, burrowing inland and flooding the land, battering down a solid hill to create what is today called “The Narrows,” skirting around a high wall of mountains, and eventually waddling up a slope, where he went to sleep. The circular hole he made with his tail filled with rainwater and eventually drowned him, creating the lake known as Ōmāpere. Another of Waihou’s brothers, Utakura, almost reached his brother, creating the Utakura river valley, the outlet to Lake Ōmāpere, in the process. However, he was foiled by the high drop of the Korotangi Falls, and makes his home today in the pool below the falls. Another narrative as to the origins of Lake Ōmāpere has it that the taniwha in the lake is called Takauere (Bay of Islands Minute Book 1929:â•›6). According to this account the lake was once a swamp rich in eels. Ngātikoro and his son Tara went there to eel. It grew dark and the son, thinking his father had left, set fire to the bush, and his father was accidentally burned to death. Takauere, another son of Ngātikoro, had died before the fire, and his body was buried in the swamp on a
Embedded in place
rock called Paparoa, on which a tree grew. But later when people went looking for the body they found nothing, and because of this Takauere became clothed with the mana of a taniwha and the place became tapu, “taboo”. There are a number of other versions of the origins of Takauere but all agree that Takauere could be found at Ngāwha geothermal springs as well as at nearby Lake Ōmāpere, though some state that he is present throughout the north.
Named places at Lake Ōmāpere In 1879 the land court heard testimony to consider the ownership of the Ōmāpere block of 768 acres, through which ran the outlet streams to the lake, as well as ditches that had been dug to facilitate eel catching (Northern Minute Book 1879:â•›455–466). All the claimants were closely related, most tracing their ancestry to Tūiti and his wives, Marohāwea and Moengāroa, through various children who were involved in catching eels in the streams, and giving names to places: knowledge about the names, the people, and their activities “mirror” each other. The places named were the outcome of events happening in the mid-seventeenth century, and involve Tūiti’s children Rangahana and Korohue by Marohāwea, and Tike, the son of Ruitaia, Tūiti’s son by his second wife, Moengāroa. Other people involved claimed through Tūtahua, a daughter of Tūiti, or through ancestors who had been granted use rights. Our family are descendant through lines from both of Tūiti’s wives. In the records fifteen places are named: six eel weirs, three ditches dug to channel eels, three natural outlet streams to the lake, two burial places, and one cave or rock shelter. One claimant stated that his ancestors, Rangahana and Korohue, worked at “eel catching at Omapere” (Northern Minute Book 1879:â•›453). Rangahana and his wife resided there and Rangahana dug the ditch called Ngā Matawhero o Rangahana, because when digging the ditch his face (mata) became red (whero) from exertion. Another eel weir was named after the flax that grew there (Te Harakeke), and another, Ahipārera, was named because ducks (pārera) were cooked (literally burned) there. The weir (pā), Rāhiripāroa, was a long one (roa), and was named after Rāhiri, most probably named after the ancestor from whom all the northern tribe, Ngapuhi, trace ancestry. It was close to a place where Tike was exposed on a rock when he died, before he was interred in the burial ground Te Rere o Tike, so named because this was where Tike fell into the water. The cave initially was named Te Ana a Rākeia after a person, but was renamed Te Ana Kāuta, because it was the kitchen (kāuta) where eels were cooked. The natural stream names were Waipapa (which has many possible meanings, including a stream across a rock flat or plain, but also a place of water, or a second growth of timber), Te Kūaha (a gateway or entrance), and Waihōanga (sandstone water).
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This brief example illustrates how Māori made a living in their environment and, in doing this, dwelt in it. The places could be named by those who were there, and the act of naming places not only brought them to life, but also the ancestors who had made and named them. The Māori body/self was locked in the world of concrete work, especially through the everyday experience of obtaining food, movement and other activity. Much of this involved habitual activity, the result of socialization from a very young age in a world where the presence of others (people and