Kierkegaard's Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Modern European Philosophy)

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KIERKEGAARD’S RELATIONS TO HEGEL RECONSIDERED Jon Stewart’s groundbreaking study is a major reevaluation of the complex relations between the philosophies of Kierkegaard and Hegel. The standard view on the subject is that Kierkegaard defined himself explicitly as the antipode of Hegel and thus that he viewed Hegel’s philosophy with utter disdain. Jon Stewart shows convincingly that Kierkegaard’s criticism was not primarily of Hegel but of a number of contemporary Danish Hegelians. Kierkegaard’s own view of Hegel was in fact much more positive than is usually thought, even to the point where he was directly influenced by some aspects of Hegel’s work. Any scholar working in the tradition of Continental philosophy will find this an insightful and provocative book with implications for the subsequent history of philosophy in the twentieth century. The book will also appeal to scholars in religious studies and the history of ideas.

Jon Stewart is Associate Research Professor of Philosophy at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at the University of Copenhagen, an institution funded by the Danish National Research Foundation.

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MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY General Editor Robert B. Pippin, University of Chicago Advisory Board Gary Gutting, University of Notre Dame Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Humboldt University, Berlin Mark Sacks, University of Essex

Some Recent Titles Daniel W. Conway: Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game John P. McCormick: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism Frederick A. Olafson: Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics Gunter ¨ Z¨oller: Fichte’s Transcendental Philosophy Warren Breckman: Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory William Blattner: Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism Charles Griswold: Adam Smith and the Virtues of the Enlightenment Gary Gutting: Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity Allen Wood: Kant’s Ethical Thought Karl Ameriks: Kant and the Fate of Autonomy Alfredo Ferrarin: Hegel and Aristotle Cristina Lafont: Heidegger, Language and World-Discourse Nicholas Wolsterstorff: Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology Daniel Dahlstrom: Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Michelle Grier: Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion Henry Allison: Kant’s Theory of Taste Allen Speight: Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency J. M. Bernstein: Adorno Will Dudley: Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy Taylor Carman: Heidegger’s Analytic Douglas Moggach: The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer

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KIERKEGAARD’S RELATIONS TO HEGEL RECONSIDERED

JON STEWART The Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at the University of Copenhagen

v

   Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge  , United Kingdom Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521828383 © Jon Stewart 2003 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2003 - isbn-13 978-0-511-07124-9 eBook (EBL) - isbn-10 0-511-07124-8 eBook (EBL) - isbn-13 978-0-521-82838-3 hardback - isbn-10 0-521-82838-4 hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Denne afhandling er af Det Teologiske Fakultet ved Københavns Universitet antaget til offentligt at forsvares for den teologiske doktorgrad. København den 10. juni, 2002. Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, dekan This treatise has been accepted by the Theological Faculty at the University of Copenhagen for public defense for the degree of doctor habil. of theology. Copenhagen, June 10, 2002. Steffen Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, Dean. This book has been published with financial support from the Danish Research Council for the Humanities.

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CONTENTS

page xiii xv

Acknowledgements Abbreviations of Primary Texts

xix

Preface Introduction I. The Standard View of Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel II. Thulstrup’s Formulation of the Standard View III. The Reception of the Issue after Thulstrup IV. Thesis and Methodological Considerations 1 Kierkegaard and Danish Hegelianism I. Right and Left Hegelianism in Prussia and the German States II. The Danish Hegelians III. The Critics of Hegel in Denmark Appendix: Historical and Biographical Overview 2 Traces of Hegel in From Papers of One Still Living and the Early Works I. Hegel’s Absence in “Another Defense of Woman’s Great Abilities” II. Hegel and Kierkegaard’s Early Theory of Stages III. Von Jumping-Jack in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars IV. Heiberg’s Perseus and From the Papers of One Still Living A. Some Background Information about Perseus B. References to the Beginning of Philosophy in Hegel’s Logic C. References to the Stages of Poetry in Hegel and Heiberg D. The Reception of From the Papers of One Still Living vii

1 3 14 27 32 45 45 50 70 83 90 92 97 105 115 115 118 123 126

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contents

3 The Ironic Thesis and Hegel’s Presence in The Concept of Irony I. The Ironic Thesis II. Kierkegaard’s Own Assessment of His Hegelianism III. The Structure of the Text IV. Hegel’s Account of the Daimon V. Hegel’s Account of Socrates vis-`a-vis the Other Greek Schools VI. Hegel’s Account of Socrates as the Founder of Morality VII. Hegel’s Account of Irony and the Ironic Subject VIII. Hegel’s Criticism of Romantic Irony

132 135 141 144 150

4 Hegel’s Aufhebung and Kierkegaard’s Either/Or I. The Title “Either/Or” and Its Origin II. The Problem of the Aufhebung of the Law of Excluded Middle III. The Work of Art and Its Dialectic IV. Two Interpretations of Antigone V. The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage: “Love’s Dialectic”

182 184

5 Kierkegaard’s Polemic with Martensen in Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est I. The Allusion to Martensen in the Title II. Kierkegaard’s Discussion of Absolute Knowing A. The Concept of Absolute Knowing in Hegel B. Johannes Climacus and Absolute Knowing III. The Individual and the Subjective Beginning of Philosophy with Doubt A. Doubt and the Justification of Science in Hegel B. Johannes Climacus’ Examination of Subjective Doubt IV. Kierkegaard’s Appropriation of Hegel on “Sense-Certainty” A. Hegel’s Analysis of “Sense-Certainty” B. Johannes Climacus, Language, and Consciousness

157 161 166 170

195 209 218 225 238 242 249 250 254 261 262 263 268 269 273

6 Kierkegaard’s Repetition and Hegel’s Dialectical Mediation I. The Contradiction of Consciousness in De Omnibus II. Repetition as an Ethical Concept III. Repetition, Mediation, and Movement in Logic IV. Repetition as a Religious Concept

282 284 288 292 297

7 Hegel’s View of Moral Conscience and Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of Abraham I. Descartes and Martensen in the Preface

305 307

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contents II. Problema I: The Murderer Sand and Kierkegaard’s Abraham A. Hegel’s View of Ethics and the Moral Conscience B. Johannes de silentio’s Criticism C. An Analogous Example III. Problema II: Absolute Duty and the Inner and the Outer IV. Problema III: The Problem of Communication and Justification 8 Martensen’s Doctrine of Immanence and Kierkegaard’s Transcendence in the Philosophical Fragments I. The Paradox and Mediation A. Climacus’ Doctrine of the Paradox B. The Role of Mediation C. The Allusions to Martensen D. The Criticism of Martensen’s Article on Mediation II. The Modal Categories III. Necessity in History IV. The Absolute Method 9 The Dispute with Adler in The Concept of Anxiety I. Actuality and the Spheres of Logic and Existence II. Immediacy and Faith III. Reconciliation and Mediation IV. Movement in Logic A. Hegel’s Conception of Dialectical Movement B. Vigilius Haufniensis’ Criticism V. Quantity, Quality, and the Leap VI. Innocence and Immediacy A. Hegel’s Account of the Original Sin B. Vigilius Haufniensis’ Criticism of Innocence as Immediacy 10 The Polemic with Heiberg in Prefaces I. Kierkegaard’s Relation to Heiberg Immediately Prior to Prefaces II. Systematic Philosophy and the Conception of Prefaces as a Work III. References to the System in Preface I IV. The Reference to the Systematic Tendency in Preface VI V. Hegel and Mediation in Preface VII VI. Hegel and Hegelians in Preface VIII

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310 310 315 321 323 329 336 339 339 341 345 347 355 359 368 378 380 385 390 396 397 399 405 411 412 414 419 421 424 427 431 437 441

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contents

11 Subjective and Objective Thinking: Hegel in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript I. The True Targets of the Postscript II. Speculative Philosophy and Eternal Happiness III. Speculative Philosophy and the Paradox of Christianity IV. Speculative Philosophy’s Conceptual Understanding of Christianity A. Hegel’s Conceptual Understanding of Christianity B. Climacus’ Criticism of Christianity as a Form of Knowing V. Speculative Philosophy and Forgetting Oneself VI. The Criticism of the Presuppositionless Beginning VII. The Criticism of the World-Historical Perspective VIII. The Criticism of the Unity of Thought and Being IX. Speculative Philosophy and the Law of Excluded Middle X. The Absence of an Ethics in the System 12 Adler’s Confusions and the Results of Hegel’s Philosophy I. Kierkegaard’s Contact with Adler II. Christianity as a Sublated Concept III. Adler’s Attempt to Explain His Revelation IV. Adler and the Absence of an Ethics in Hegel 13 Kierkegaard’s Phenomenology of Despair in The Sickness unto Death I. Speculative Thought’s Mistaken Moral Psychology II. The Misguided Attempt to Comprehend Sin III. Rational Theology or the Pastor’s Rational Justification of Faith IV. Martensen and the God-Man V. Anti-Climacus’ Dialectic and Phenomenology A. Hegel’s Dialectical Method B. Phenomenology and Dialectic in “The Forms of This Sickness” C. Phenomenology and Dialectic in “The Continuance of Sin” D. A Change in Position? 14 Kierkegaard and the Development of Nineteenth-Century Continental Philosophy: Conclusions, Reflections, and Reevaluations I. The Results of the Present Study: Attempt at an Overview

448 453 466 470 472 472 476 483 488 497 502 510 515 524 526 532 537 543 550 553 559 564 567 572 573 578 584 587

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contents A. The First Period: 1834–1843 B. The Second Period: 1843–1846 C. The Third Period: 1847–1855 D. Conclusions about the Development of Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel II. The Standard Picture of the History of NineteenthCentury Continental Philosophy III. The Consequences of the Present Study for the Standard Picture IV. Kierkegaard, Hegel, and the Nature of NineteenthCentury Continental Philosophy A. Some Examples Indicative of a Metalevel Dispute B. Kierkegaard’s Conception of Himself and of Philosophy C. The Classification of Kierkegaard in the History of Nineteenth-Century Continental Philosophy

xi 597 605 612 615 618 622 632 633 640 650

Foreign Language Summaries Bibliographies

653 659

Subject Index Index of Persons

685 689

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I express my deepest gratitude to the Danish National Research Foundation and the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at the University of Copenhagen where I have been employed in the capacity of Forskningslektor or Associate Research Professor since 1995. The excellent resources at the Centre have greatly facilitated work on this project and increased its scholarly merits immeasurably. The human resources there have also been of inestimable importance, and in this regard I would like to thank above all the Centre’s Director, Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, for his constant encouragement and unwavering belief in both this project and me. In addition, I thank Alastair Hannay, Hermann Deuser, and Arne Grøn for their support through the years. I am also indebted to Michael Theunissen for his guidance and invaluable suggestions at the initial stages of my research. Many thanks are also due to those who have helped me to proofread various parts of this work: Daniel Conway, Louie Matz, Richard Purkarthofer, and Loy Stewart; their suggestions have improved the manuscript significantly. I am deeply grateful to my friends and colleagues at the Centre for many useful discussions through the years: Noel Adams, Søren Bruun, Istv´an Czako, ´ Simonella Davini, Niels Nymann Eriksen, Dar´ıo Gonz´alez, Jan Holmgaard, Bruce Kirmmse, Zachary Price, Ettore Rocca, Wang Qi, Brian S¨oderquist, Bronislaw Swiderski, Christian Fink Tolstrup, and Arild Waaler. This project was written over a period of several years. During this time I have used parts of the manuscript for public lectures; in addition, some parts of it have appeared in earlier drafts as articles in academic journals. I gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the editors of the Jahrbuch f¨ur Hegelforschung, Kierkegaardiana, the Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, and Persona y Derecho for allowing me to reprint this previously published material here in its full context.

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acknowledgements

I am thankful to the Danish Research Agency for its generous financial support of this publication. Finally, I thank my friends, David Kangas and Andr´as Nagy, for relentlessly pushing me to see to an end this project, which I often despaired of ever completing.

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ABBREVIATIONS OF PRIMARY TEXTS

hegel’s writings Aesthetics I–II = Hegel’s Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art, vols. 1–2, translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975, 1998. Briefe I–IV = Briefe von und an Hegel, vols. 1–4, edited by Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Meiner 1961. Cited by volume and page number. EL = The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, translated by T. F. Gerats, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett 1991. Cited by paragraph number (§). ETW = Early Theological Writings, translated by T. M. Knox. Fragments translated by Richard Kroner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1975. Cited by page number. First Phil. of Spirit = First Philosophy of Spirit in G. W. F. Hegel. System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, edited and translated by H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox. Albany, New York: SUNY Press 1979. Cited by page number. Hist. of Phil. I–III = Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols. 1–3, translated by E. S. Haldane. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner ¨ 1892–96; Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press 1955. Cited by volume and page number. Jub. = S¨amtliche Werke. Jubil¨aumsausgabe in 20 B¨anden, edited by Hermann Glockner. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1928–41. Phil. of Hist. = The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree. New York: Willey Book Co. 1944. Cited by page number. Phil. of Mind = Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, translated by William Wallace and A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971. Cited by paragraph number (§). Phil. of Nature = Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1970. Cited by paragraph number (§). xv

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abbreviations of primary texts Phil. of Religion I–III = Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vols. 1– 3, translated by E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities Press 1962, 1968, 1972. Cited by volume and page number. PhS = Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977. Cited by page number. PR = Elements of the Philosophy of Right, translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Allen Wood. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1991. Cited by paragraph number (§) with the exception of the Preface which is so noted and cited by page number. SL = Hegel’s Science of Logic, translated by A. V. Miller. London: George Allen and Unwin 1989. Cited by page number. TJ = Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, edited by Herman Nohl. T¨ubingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr 1907. Cited by page number.

kierkegaard’s writings A = The Book on Adler, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1998. KW vol. 24. ASKB = Auktionsprotokol over Søren Kierkegaards Bogsamling, edited by H. P. Rohde. Copenhagen: The Royal Library 1967. B&A I–II = Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, edited by Niels Thulstrup. Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1953–54. CA = The Concept of Anxiety, translated by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980. KW vol. 8. CI = The Concept of Irony; Schelling Lecture Notes, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1989. KW vol. 2. COR = The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1982. KW vol. 13. CUP1 = Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1992, vol. 1. KW vol. 12.1. CUP2 = Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1992, vol. 2. KW vol. 12.2. EO1 = Either/Or 1, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1987. KW vol. 3. EO2 = Either/Or 2, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1987. KW vol. 4. EPW = Early Polemical Writings: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars,

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abbreviations of primary texts

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translated by Julia Watkin. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1990. KW vol. 1. EUD = Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1990. KW vol. 5. FT = Fear and Trembling; Repetition, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1983. KW vol. 6. JC = Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1985. KW vol. 7. JP = Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press 1967–78. Cited by volume number and entry number. Index and Composite Collation, vol. 7, by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press 1978. KW = Kierkegaard’s Writings, vols. 1–26, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1978–2000. LD = Kierkegaard: Letters and Documents, translated by Henrik Rosenmeier. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1978. (A translation of B&A.) KW vol. 25. M = The Moment and Late Writings, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1998. KW vol. 23. P = Prefaces, translated by Todd W. Nichol. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1998. KW vol. 9. Pap. = Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. 1–16, edited by P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1909–48; supplemented by Niels Thulstrup. Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1968–78. Cited by volume number and entry number. PC = Practice in Christianity, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1991. KW vol. 20. PF = Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1985. KW vol. 7. PV = The Point of View, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1998. KW vol. 22. R = Repetition, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1983. KW vol. 6. SKS = Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, 28 text volumes and 28 commentary volumes, edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, Jette

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abbreviations of primary texts

Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, and Alastair McKinnon. Copenhagen: Gad Publishers 1997– . SL = Stages on Life’s Way, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1988. KW vol. 11. SUD = The Sickness unto Death, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980. KW vol. 19. SV1 = Samlede Værker, first edition, vols. 1–14, edited by A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange. Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1901–06. SV2 = Samlede Værker, second edition, vols. 1–15, edited by A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1920–36. TA = Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, A Literary Review, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1978. KW vol. 14. UD = Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1993. KW vol. 15. WA = Without Authority, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1997. KW vol. 18. WL = Works of Love, translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1995. KW vol. 16.

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PREFACE

As an aid to the non-Danish reader, I have made it my practice to translate the titles of Danish books and articles in the body of my text and to give the original titles in footnotes. I have, however, allowed titles of works in the Danish secondary literature and Danish journal titles to stand in the original. German and French titles have been given in the original languages. All quotations from Hegel’s primary texts are from those works given in the list of abbreviations. When referring to Kierkegaard’s quotations of Hegel, I have usually chosen to cite from the standard translations of Hegel’s writings instead of using Hong’s translations of Kierkegaard’s quotations. Many of the Danish works used in this study, in both the primary and the secondary literature, have yet to be translated into English. Since this material is not accessible to the non-Danish reader, it would have been unreasonable simply to allude to it briefly in a footnote and leave it to the reader to do the follow-up work. Due to this I have found myself obliged to quote this material extensively. I have tried to integrate these quotations into my text as much as possible so that they do not make for onerous reading. All translations from these works are my own unless otherwise noted. When possible, I have used as my main Danish text the new critical edition of Kierkegaard’s works currently being produced by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre (i.e., Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup and Alastair McKinnon, Copenhagen: Gad Publishers 1997– ). In my work I have frequently used the philological account of the various texts and the Realkommentar, both of which are found in the volumes of commentary that accompany the text volumes of the edition. The use of this often new material has been a great benefit to this investigation, and I am indebted to my colleagues for it.

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KIERKEGAARD’S RELATIONS TO HEGEL RECONSIDERED

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INTRODUCTION

Although the research community in the English-speaking world has witnessed a new wave of interest in Kierkegaard’s work over the last several years, the secondary literature has remained somewhat uneven, often treating him as a figure isolated from the intellectual tradition and context out of which his thought was born. Few of the major commentators do much to situate his thought vis-`a-vis the tradition of German idealism which preceded him or the Danish philosophical milieu in which he was educated, and it is here that many issues and connections remain to be explored. One of the issues that has hitherto been treated most unevenly is the complex relation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy to that of Hegel. The general importance of a study of this relation should be self-evident to any student of Kierkegaard’s thought. References to Hegel occur throughout his literary corpus from his earliest works, and his contact with Hegelianism has often been seen as one of the most important dimensions of his biography and intellectual development. Many aspects of Kierkegaard’s thinking, such as his conception of stages, his dialectical methodology, and his understanding of Socrates and Antigone, seem to recall key doctrines and analyses from Hegel’s philosophy. While many scholars would agree that much of Kierkegaard’s rich and diverse thought is best understood as being in a sort of dialogue with Hegel’s philosophy, few have done much to establish the concrete points of contact in a historical fashion. Thus, for anyone even mildly familiar with Kierkegaard, the value of an investigation of his relation to Hegel and German idealism should be obvious and in no need of justification. There are any number of reasons why this issue, so central to understanding Kierkegaard, has not been treated more often or more rigorously than it has. First, in a number of his books, there are several passages in which Kierkegaard assumes a tone of animosity towards Hegelian philosophy. Some of his criticisms seem straightforwardly ad hominem in character and at times resemble those of other contemporaries who were simply trying to vilify Hegel without a serious examination of his thought. 1

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introduction

Perhaps the clearest example of this is Kierkegaard’s little-known comedy from his student days entitled, The Battle between the Old and the New SoapCellars. There he caricatures the Danish Hegelians with whom he was familiar and satirizes Hegel’s stilted philosophical jargon. This clearly belongs to Kierkegaard’s juvenilia and thus is by no means a representative text; nonetheless, some of its satirical character survives in scattered passages in the mature works. Kierkegaard’s own negative rhetoric with respect to Hegel and above all to Hegelians would seem to imply that his thought has little or nothing in common with that of Hegel and that any comparative study would simply be misguided. Whatever else it might mean, Kierkegaard’s animated tone testifies to the historical importance of Hegel’s philosophy and the need for learned persons of the day to come to terms with it. There were enthusiastic admirers and bitter critics, but there was no way of avoiding taking some position on the philosopher who dominated much of academic life in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s at first in his own person and later through the agency of his students. In any case, most commentators have simply taken Kierkegaard at what seems to have been his word and have subsequently interpreted his appraisal of Hegel as universally negative. Few scholars have been able to look past Kierkegaard’s rhetoric to see if it is in accordance with the actual content of his analyses of Hegel’s thought. Another reason why Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel has not been analyzed more critically than it has is that a number of issues between Hegel and Kierkegaard appear to be cut and dry and seem to assign the two thinkers to opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum. One example can be found in their respective views on systematic philosophy. For Hegel, systematic or speculative philosophy is the kind of thinking that conceives of all cognitive categories and notions of truth in their organic relation to one another. This conception of philosophy stands in contrast to what Hegel calls “dogmatism,”1 which abstracts categories and notions from their context and sees them in isolation. According to Hegel, concepts, propositions, and individual analyses fit together like tiles in a mosaic, each needing the others and the whole in order to be meaningful. Thus, the universal perspective of absolute knowing, which constitutes a panoptic, objective view, transcending all individual and partial perspectives, necessarily implies a speculative conception of all the various finite notions of truth. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, this objective view is simply an impossible, self-deceptive abstraction from the particular individual and is ultimately incommensurable with experience and truth as lived by the human subject. Thus, according to his view, truth is necessarily subjective and individual and cannot be demonstrated by discursive or conceptual thought. Second, Hegel’s methodology seems 1

Hegel, EL, § 32, Remark; Jub., vol. 8, p. 106.

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to imply that no individual notion of truth is absolute in itself, but rather such notions are continually mediated by others. Any given notion or concept is invariably dissolved or aufgehoben into other concepts. However, for Kierkegaard, the individual existing subject is absolute and stubbornly resists reduction or mediation of any kind. Given these radically different presuppositions concerning objective and subjective reflection, objective and subjective truth, and the reduction and mediation of concepts, it seems as though the two thinkers have nothing in common since they use diametrically opposed first premises as their respective points of departure. A careful examination of the current state of affairs in the secondary literature reveals that the need for a detailed study of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel is more acute than might otherwise have been thought. Many commentators allude to Kierkegaard’s enmity towards Hegel’s philosophy as a fact given in advance of any investigation. Due to the history of reception of the issue, the agreed upon presupposition is that Kierkegaard was one of the major critics of Hegel. Some commentators briefly note that he attended Schelling’s lectures in Berlin where he received a somewhat jaded picture of Hegel’s philosophy, but few have explored Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel in a fashion that truly takes into account the cultural context and historical setting in which Kierkegaard was writing. Most comparative studies tend to abstract both Hegel and Kierkegaard from their respective historical contexts and analyze their positions directly vis-`a-vis one another without taking into consideration other possible influences. This has led commentators to seize upon and develop what they perceive to be points of comparison and contrast, but once the historical background becomes clear, it is obvious that these points in fact have little to do with Kierkegaard’s actual intentions or his own understanding of his relation to Hegel. Thus, what is needed is a somewhat more historically oriented approach that looks at the issue afresh, unencumbered by the old misconceptions and prejudices.

i. the standard view of kierkegaard’s relation to hegel There seems to be a standard view of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, which has today become firmly ensconced as a result of any number of factors in the history of scholarly reception. The standard view regards this relation as a purely negative one. Kierkegaard is thus thought to have rejected Hegel’s philosophy wholesale and to have used aspects of it only to ridicule them, often ironically. He is thought to have been entirely original and to have taken leave of his philosophical predecessor right from the beginning. Moreover, a part of his criticism of Hegel is characterized by a strikingly personal tone. Unlike Aristotle’s criticism of Plato

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or Fichte’s criticism of Kant, there is thought to be a strong personal element in Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. He is conceived as having criticized not just Hegel’s thought on its own terms but also the way in which that thought led Hegel himself to a misguided life. Kierkegaard is thus said to have waged a rabid campaign against both Hegel’s philosophy and his person. This is, generally speaking, what I understand by “the standard view” in the understanding of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. This view has been around virtually since the beginning of the twentieth-century reception of Kierkegaard’s thought at the time when he began to become known internationally. In what follows, I wish to review very briefly some typical examples of this view. The history of the reception of this issue is quite large, and what follows is to be regarded only as a cursory overview, the goal of which is merely to highlight what I take to have been the general tendency in the interpretation of the issue by some of the leading names in the scholarship. With regard to the Danish reception, this standard view of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel plays at least a minor role in Eduard Geismar’s influential work, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed from 1927–28.2 It cannot be said that the issue of Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel is the central one in Geismar’s study as a whole, but it does come up in his discussions of The Concept of Irony3 and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.4 While Geismar is willing to admit that there is some ambiguity in Kierkegaard’s use of Hegel in the Concept of Irony, regarding the work as displaying a “partial Hegelianism,”5 he nonetheless sees in Kierkegaard’s authorship a deep criticism of Hegel that begins even prior to this text.6 By contrast, Geismar sees the Concluding Unscientific Postscript as an open struggle against Hegel himself, among other things, against Hegel’s pantheism and against Hegel’s principle of the unity of the inner and the outer, of Christianity and culture. While Geismar’s account is mercifully free of any personal anti-Hegel element, he nonetheless understands much of Kierkegaard’s polemics as being directed against Hegel himself and sees the two thinkers as occupying diametrically opposed positions.7 Despite underscoring this polemic with Hegel, Geismar was criticized for making Kierkegaard too Hegelian.8 2 3 4 5 7 8

Eduard Geismar, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1927–28. Ibid., vol. 1, første del, pp. 90–101. Ibid., vol. 1, tredie del, pp. 5–21, pp. 44–91. 6 Ibid., vol. 1, første del, pp. 97–98. Ibid., vol. 1, første del, p. 99. Ibid., vol. 1, tredie del, p. 6. See K. Olesen Larsen’s article, “Noget om Afgørelsen i Øjeblikket,” in Søren Kierkegaard læst af K. Olesen Larsen, ed. by Vibeke Olesen Larsen and Tage Wilhjelm, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad 1966, vol. 1, pp. 21–73, especially pp. 27–59. See also Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaards Verh¨altnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer 1969, pp. 90–99.

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Geismar’s analyses are almost entirely immanent to Kierkegaard’s own works, and he does very little by way of Quellenforschung; indeed, he sticks so closely to Kierkegaard’s primary texts that some of his analyses border on paraphrase. While Geismar mentions the names of the main Danish Hegelians, he does not do much to trace Kierkegaard’s criticisms of their texts but instead assumes them to be directly related to key doctrines in Hegel’s own works. Another important figure in the history of the Danish reception was the Professor of Theology, N. H. Søe, whose history of philosophy, Fra Renæssancen til vore Dage from 1945,9 was highly influential due in part to the fact that it was used for years as a textbook. In this work Søe includes sections on both Hegel and Kierkegaard. The latter is of particular importance since Kierkegaard’s work and authorship are portrayed as being determined by Hegel and specifically as being critical of him. There is a tendency in Søe to evaluate the matter in Kierkegaard’s own language and from his perspective. It is not difficult to see the author’s partisanship in passages like the following: “On the whole Kierkegaard is not only Hegel’s most important . . . theological opponent, but his thoughts have their lasting validity for all times.”10 Finally, the nature of Søe’s work, as a history of Western philosophy since the Renaissance, determines the character and agenda of his analysis of Kierkegaard, who is portrayed as one figure in the series of great thinkers from Descartes to then contemporary French existentialism. Søe writes, “The first significant theologian, who understood Hegel and then declared open war on him, was S. Kierkegaard.”11 Thus, for the sake of his historical overview, Søe has an interest in seeing Kierkegaard in relation to Hegel, one of the towering figures in the tradition. But this causes him to ignore entirely Kierkegaard’s contemporary Danish context. No attempt is made to evaluate Kierkegaard’s relation to the Danish Hegelians, who were presumably deemed unworthy of inclusion. This work has seen several reprints and has been influential for many years. Søe’s work is also illustrative of another aspect of the history of reception of the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. It is a platitude to say that research changes with the political climate of the day, and it would be naive to think that it is ever completely free of some ideological investment. The ideological commitments of a given body of research are usually more or less invisible to those immediately involved with it, and they usually only become apparent years later when the political landscape has changed enough to make a sufficient contrast with the past. Thus, the contours of previous ideologies gradually come into focus. Kierkegaard 9 10

N. H. Søe, Fra Renæssancen til vore Dage. Filosofisk tænkning med særligt henblik p˚a de moralske og religiøse problemer, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag 1945. Fourth revised edition 1964. 11 Ibid., fourth edition, p. 151fn. Ibid., fourth edition, p. 186.

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research has been no exception. Kierkegaard has often been held up as the heroic advocate of freedom, equality, the individual, and human rights against all possible forces of oppression. With regard to the issue of his relation to Hegel, this usually comes out in the form that Hegel is cast in the role of one of the foremost representatives of these oppressive forces. Writing in 1945, Søe introduces Hegel as follows: “He is thus a main presupposition both for K. Marx and for the view of life of modern Nazi Germany.”12 Here Hegel is made responsible for the abuses of both extremes of the political spectrum. It is odd to read this kind of thing today, but at the time it was precisely thinking of this sort that hindered genuine research on Hegel’s thought from gaining a foothold in either the Danish or the anglophone literature. Another exponent of the standard view was Søren Holm, the Professor of Theology at the University of Copenhagen, whose numerous publications span a period of some forty years from the 1920s to the 1960s. Holm never made any single study of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, but he did have occasion to treat this issue, albeit briefly, in his two main works on Kierkegaard (i.e., Søren Kierkegaards Historiefilosofi from 195213 and Grundtvig und Kierkegaard from 195614 ). In the latter, Holm’s comparative study, Hegel comes up frequently as an important point of orientation for understanding the positions of Kierkegaard and Grundtvig. Holm’s general view is that although Kierkegaard knew Hegel’s philosophy well and was influenced by its language and its general constellation of problems, nevertheless he was “the sharpest opponent of this philosophy.”15 Holm goes on to treat Kierkegaard’s criticism of mediation,16 the system,17 objective thinking,18 and necessity in history,19 all of which he takes to be essential parts of a Hegel critique. Holm’s work on Kierkegaard’s philosophy of history is above all a study of the Philosophical Fragments, although he includes accounts of individual discussions from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Practice in Christianity. Holm’s understanding of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel with respect to the topic under consideration is expressed as follows in the Preface: “Kierkegaard’s philosophy of history and his subsequent understanding of Christianity arose in a polemic against Hegel’s philosophy.”20 Given this, one would expect to find an extended analysis of Hegel’s philosophy of history, but Holm disappoints the reader in 12 13 14 15 17 19 20

Ibid., fourth edition, p. 137. Søren Holm, Søren Kierkegaards Historiefilosofi, Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, Arnold Busck 1952. Søren Holm, Grundtvig und Kierkegaard. Parallelen und Kontraste, tr. by Gunter ¨ Jungbluth, Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, Arnold Busck; Tubingen: ¨ Katzmann Verlag 1956. 16 Ibid., pp. 25ff. Ibid., p. 13. 18 Ibid., pp. 57ff. Ibid., pp. 35ff. Ibid., pp. 82ff. Søren Holm, Søren Kierkegaards Historiefilosofi, op. cit., p. 6.

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this expectation. With only the most cursory account of Hegel’s philosophy of history, Holm goes through Kierkegaard’s well-known discussions of, among other things, movement in logic,21 the transition from possibility to actuality,22 and the god-man,23 all of which are taken to be criticisms of key doctrines in Hegel. Holm embodies the standard view quite well since there is no real attempt to examine Hegel’s philosophy on its own terms, and the whole discussion is presented from what is taken to be Kierkegaard’s perspective. Moreover, very little is done to trace other possible sources, and when the aforementioned doctrines are discussed, there is no suspicion that Kierkegaard might be in dialogue with other authors besides Hegel. Thus, in the absence of any real research either on Hegel’s own philosophy or on the contemporary authors writing about it, Holm simply conveys what seems to be the agreed upon view of Kierkegaard’s critical relation to Hegel. Another important figure in the Danish history of the reception of the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel was the Ukrainian-born philosopher Gregor Malantschuk. While Malantschuk never dedicated any single work to exploring this relation, he does treat aspects of it in several of his books. In his general introduction to Kierkegaard entitled, Kierkegaard’s Way to the Truth, Malantschuk portrays Hegel as the representative of the modern trend of secular rationalism, which has imperiled Christianity.24 Hegel is seen as one of the leading causes of the spiritual destruction of the age, which Kierkegaard dedicates himself to combatting. Thus, Malantschuk juxtaposes Kierkegaard to Hegel, portraying the two as single-minded opponents representing two opposing principles and world-views. In his work Kierkegaard’s Thought, Malantschuk is somewhat more even-handed. He originally characterizes the relation as follows: “Generally speaking Kierkegaard took a negative position toward Hegelian ‘speculation,’ but it is interesting to note that he was able to use much of what he learned from Hegel.”25 After this Malantschuk goes on to list a series of familiar objections that Kierkegaard purportedly had to Hegel’s philosophy,26 which is followed by a few examples of Kierkegaard’s positive co-opting of specific analyses from Hegel. Finally, Malantschuk concludes that Kierkegaard is best seen as a Hegel-critic. He 21 23 24 25

26

22 Ibid., pp. 34ff. Ibid., pp. 28ff. Ibid., pp. 48ff., pp. 107ff. Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s Way to the Truth. An Introduction to the Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard, tr. by Mary Michelsen, Montreal: Inter Editions 1987, pp. 13–16. Gregor Malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag 1968, p. 60. Quoted from the English translation: Kierkegaard’s Thought, tr. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1971, p. 58. A similar series of Hegel criticisms can be found in Malantschuk’s Fra Individ til den Enkelte. Problemer omkring Friheden og det etiske hos Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Boghandel 1978, pp. 250–257.

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writes, “Hegel’s great influence upon Kierkegaard was, however, indirect. The errors Kierkegaard discovered in Hegel’s system and which had a decisive negative influence upon his understanding of central philosophical and theological themes had to be corrected, and Kierkegaard saw this as one of his tasks.”27 Thus, the struggle against Hegel is conceived as one of the main goals of Kierkegaard’s authorship as a whole. Malantschuk’s research, like that of Søe before him, gives clear expression to the ideological commitments of the day. He portrays Hegel as the forerunner of the totalitarian communist states with his purported absorption of ethics into the state and his glorification of the monarch as the highest power. Malantschuk traces the line from Strauss to Feuerbach and then claims: The next step happens with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who with their consistently executed materialistic life-view end up as declared opponents of Christianity. It was not only the dialectic in modified form but also the view of freedom, the ethical and the individual as a disappearing moment, which Marx and Engels could take over from Hegel and incorporate into their philosophy. Thus, Marx and Engels could, with the help of the central concepts in Hegel’s philosophy . . . construct a system, whose actualization ultimately would mean the death of Christianity.28

Hegel is made responsible for the anti-Christian nature of Marxism and set in the immediate context of the debate about Marxism, which was taking place in Denmark at the time. He is portrayed as a thinker hostile to Christianity both from this Marxist side and from the side of Nietzsche: “It must further be noted that Friedrich Nietzsche’s atheistic and antiChristian life view is only completely understandable against the background of the foundation of paganism which Hegel’s philosophy had prepared.”29 From very early in the history of reception, this standard view was constantly reinforced in countless reference works, anthologies, commentaries, and so on. Robert Bretall’s well-known work, A Kierkegaard Anthology,30 which originally appeared in 1938, has served as an introductory textbook for anglophone students of Kierkegaard for many years now. In both the general introduction to the work as a whole and in the introductions to the various selections, Bretall is careful to point out how the 27 28

29 30

Gregor Malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens, op. cit., p. 66. Kierkegaard’s Thought, op. cit., p. 65f. Gregor Malantschuk, Fra Individ til den Enkelte, op. cit., p. 257. See also his Den kontroversielle Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Vintens Forlag 1976, p. 66f. English translation: The Controversial Kierkegaard, tr. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1980, pp. 22–23, p. 80. Ibid., p. 257. Robert Bretall (ed.), A Kierkegaard Anthology, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1946. Previously Harper and Brothers 1938; Augsburg Publishing House 1943.

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passages selected are illustrative of Kierkegaard’s disdain for Hegelianism, which, we are told, “he hated above all else.”31 For Hegel’s principle of mediation Kierkegaard is said to have had “an unyielding hatred.”32 Characterizing the content of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Bretall writes, “Hegel and his cohorts are attacked with every weapon in S. K.’s armory.”33 One can hardly help but notice the personal tone in these descriptions of what are purportedly philosophical points of disagreement between two thinkers. Through this anthology, generations of anglophone students have had it ingrained into them that a central part of Kierkegaard’s work was a thoroughgoing anti-Hegel campaign. Similarly, any number of the entries concerning Hegel’s philosophy listed in Jens Himmelstrup’s “Terminologisk Register,” which appeared in 1936 as part of a supplement volume to the second Danish edition of Kierkegaard’s complete works,34 clearly manifest the same general tendency in interpretation. The editors of this second edition were conscious of the fact that their commentaries were woefully inadequate, and to compensate in part for this they decided to include the “Terminologisk Register,” the goal of which was to provide the reader with at least some help in sorting out the difficult concepts. But the entries did not shrink from interpretation and presented a very definite picture of Kierkegaard, a picture that reflected the view not so much of Kierkegaard but of their author. For example, under the entry “mediation,” one reads, “Kierkegaard, who thinks that there are oppositions which cannot be bridged, has, as a sharp opponent of Hegel and his mediating method, caustic statements about mediation.”35 Similarly, in the related entry on the law of excluded middle, the reader is told, that “[i]t is Kierkegaard’s impassioned claim that the Hegelian conception of the law of contradiction is incorrect.”36 Here it is emphatically confirmed that Kierkegaard was a critic of Hegel, and this point about mediation is illustration of this, even though the issue is considerably more complicated, as will be seen in the body of this study.37 Similarly, in Himmelstrup’s entry on “the leap,” the same presumed anti-Hegel polemic is in evidence. There one reads, “It is Kierkegaard’s impassioned claim that this form of transition [sc. the leap] in Hegel’s logic rests on an error; no reflection on concepts can produce any movement; mediation is a chimera, and Kierkegaard especially emphasizes 31 33 34

35 36 37

32 Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 340. Ibid., p. 191. Samlede Værker, second edition, ed. by A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange, vols. 1–15, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1920–36. Volume 15 contains a “Sagregister” by A. Ibsen and the “Terminologisk Register” by Jens Himmelstrup. “Terminologisk Register” in SV2, vol. 15, p. 633. “Terminologisk Register” in SV2, vol. 15, p. 757. Chapter 4, Sections I and II; Chapter 11, Section IX.

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that it is an error pure and simple when Hegel’s system believes that it has a so-called ‘absolute’ or presuppositionless beginning.”38 In this entry the leap is portrayed as a point of profound discontinuity between Hegel and Kierkegaard. It is one of Kierkegaard’s explicit points of criticism of Hegel; moreover, it is immediately associated with other wellknown criticisms, such as that of mediation and the absolute beginning. But no mention is made of the fact that Hegel was one of the original sources of the concept of the leap and that it was from him, among others, that Kierkegaard in fact appropriated it.39 Thus, while a more impartial treatment might see this as a positive point of influence of Hegel on Kierkegaard, Himmelstrup portrays it as an unambiguous point of critique. Under the entry, “actuality” (i.e., “Virkelighed”), one finds a similar example. The term is explained once again as a part of Kierkegaard’s general campaign against Hegel. In order to illustrate the fact that Kierkegaard’s use of this term is critical of Hegel, Himmelstrup cites the following passage from The Concept of Anxiety: “Thus when an author entitles the last section of the Logic ‘Actuality,’ he thereby gains the advantage of making it appear that in logic the highest has already been achieved, or if one prefers, the lowest.”40 The astute reader will notice that nowhere in this passage is Hegel’s name mentioned. Himmelstrup seems not to be aware of the fact that the concept of actuality in Hegel (i.e., “Wirklichkeit”) does not appear as the last section of his Science of Logic but rather in an undistinguished section midway through the second (of three) books. Himmelstrup thus makes an interpretative leap for the reader by quoting this passage as a criticism of Hegel. As will be demonstrated later, there is clear evidence that in this passage Kierkegaard in fact has in mind another target and that the criticism has nothing to do with Hegel himself.41 Finally, the entry on “the System” is extremely misleading along the same lines. The first thing that the reader is told is the following: “As a rule this expression in Kierkegaard is synonymous with Hegel’s philosophical system.”42 This, however, forgets the innumerable passages in which Kierkegaard criticizes his Danish contemporaries for writing “the system.” For example, in Prefaces, there is a criticism of various unnamed writers of the system: I assume that Mr. A. A., whose promises supposedly have not weakened him, went to work and wrote the system. . . . [T]herefore posito I assume that if Mr. A. A. did not write the system, then Mr. B. B. wrote it – then 38 39 41 42

“Terminologisk Register” in SV2, vol. 15, pp. 697–98. 40 CA, pp. 9–10; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 317–318. Treated in Chapter 9, Section V. Chapter 9, Section I. “Terminologisk Register” in SV2, vol. 15, p. 711.

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what? . . . Then one would indeed have to read it, unless Mr. C. C. would instantly be kind and philanthropic enough to promise a summary of the system and also position us in the point of view.43

As will be discussed later,44 in a draft Kierkegaard specifically identifies Mr. A. A., Mr. B. B., and Mr. C. C. with three Danish contemporaries.45 Thus, there can be no doubt that when he speaks of “the system” in this passage, he is not thinking of Hegel. In the entry in question Himmelstrup goes on at length to outline the structure of Hegel’s elaborate system. This again conveys the impression that Kierkegaard in his “criticism” was primarily concerned with Hegel himself. Moreover, the entry ends with an obligatory section entitled, “Kierkegaard’s Critique of Hegel’s System,” which further reinforces the idea that the system is intended to refer specifically to something in Hegel’s primary texts and not to some general conception of philosophy which Kierkegaard finds objectionable or, as previously, to some specific imitator of Hegel’s system. The entries in Himmelstrup’s Register suggest that Kierkegaard wishes to issue a criticism of Hegel on the various points. But that Hegel is the intended target is by no means obvious from the passages cited by way of illustration. The fact that this Register accompanied the authoritative critical edition of the collected writings gave it an air of legitimacy and authority. If one wanted to know what Kierkegaard meant by specific concepts, one needed to look no further than the Register, which provided both a brief explanation of the individual concepts and relevant passages in Kierkegaard’s texts where they were illustrated. In this way Himmelstrup’s Register served in a sense to codify the individual aspects of the anti-Hegel polemic which Kierkegaard was thought to be engaged in, and thus it played a role in the establishment of a kind of Kierkegaard orthodoxy with regard to this issue. Moreover, the way in which commentaries have traditionally been written to Kierkegaard’s works reflects the standard view that Kierkegaard was engaged in a campaign against Hegel.46 It might seem a great blessing 43

44 45 46

P, p. 39; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 500–501. See COR, p. 5; SV1, vol. 13, pp. 399–400: “It is the system toward which the age is directing its efforts. Prof. R. Nielsen already has published twenty-one logical §s that constitute the first part of a logic that in turn constitutes the first part of an all-encompassing encyclopedia.” (Cited in full in Chapter 11, Section I.) Here “the system” is associated with Rasmus Nielsen. See COR, p. 6; SV1, vol. 13, p. 400: “Who failed to notice that Dr. Beck has abolished religion in order to make room for the system?” Here the system is associated with Andreas Frederik Beck. Chapter 10, Section V. P, Supplement, p. 119; Pap. V B 96. See SKS, vol. K4, pp. 606–608. I refer here to, for example, the commentaries written by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie in the early English translations, the more extensive ones written by Howard Hong in the Princeton translation series, Kierkegaard’s Writings, the ones in the German translation of Kierkegaard’s collected works (Gesammelte Werke, tr. and ed. by Emanuel Hirsch, Hayo Gerdes, and Hans-Martin Junghans, 36 Abteilungen in 26 volumes, with Registerband. D¨usseldorf, Cologne: Eugen Diederichs Verlag 1950–69; second edition,

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that editions of Kierkegaard’s works, unlike those of other thinkers, have been accompanied by commentaries that aid the reader in the understanding of difficult passages and obscure references. But the commentaries written for Kierkegaard’s works have not been value-neutral with respect to interpretation, and a very specific picture of Kierkegaard often emerges from them. Whenever there is a passage in one of Kierkegaard’s texts that employs any kind of philosophical language, there is immediately a tendency in the commentaries to refer to Hegel, even though the language employed may be quite standard in the history of philosophy. Especially when there seems to be a critical remark, whose target is difficult to identify, there is a tendency to cite some passage in Hegel’s works as the probable source. This gives the reader the mistaken impression that Kierkegaard is constantly in dialogue with Hegel’s primary texts. But the true source is quite often some little-known contemporary Danish figure. The twenty-some volumes of Hegel’s collected works make for fertile soil for the commentator in search of a passage that fits the required context. This search is facilitated by Glockner’s Hegel-Lexikon,47 which provides commentators with a host of ready-made passages to choose from for any given key word. The result is a series of commentaries that evoke the impression that Hegel was the only philosopher whom Kierkegaard was interested in, while other contemporaries such as Immanuel Hermann, (i.e., “the younger”) Fichte or Franz von Baader, who were major figures in their day, are simply disregarded as insignificant. The same tendency can be seen in the selection under the heading, “Hegel,” in the English edition entitled, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers.48 There one finds very few actual quotations from or references to Hegel’s primary texts. These few are set together with a number of journal entries containing vague allusions, which are in serious need of interpretation before they can be associated with Hegel. In many of the passages the discussion is clearly about specific Hegelians, some of whom are mentioned by name, and this juxtaposition seems to imply that there is no significant difference between Hegel himself and any given Hegelian. Moreover, there are included under this same heading

47 48

36 Abteilungen in 30 volumes, Gutersloh: ¨ G¨utersloher Verlagshaus 1986–95), and those written by Niels Thulstrup in his editions of individual works (Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, ed. with Introduction and Commentary by Niels Thulstrup, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1962. In English as Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tr. by Robert J. Widenmann. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1984; Philosophiske Smuler, ed. with Introduction and Commentary by Niels Thulstrup, Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1955; C. A. Reitzel 1977, 1990). Hermann Glockner, Hegel-Lexikon, Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, Gunter ¨ Holzboog 1957, vols. 25–26 of Jub. Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, ed. and tr. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press 1967–78, vol. 2, pp. 207–228.

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a fair number of passages where neither Hegel’s own name nor the word “Hegelian” appears, but where there is, apparently in the opinion of the editors, a general discussion of some aspect of Hegel’s philosophy. But the interpretation involved in associating these passages with Hegel himself requires justification. Perhaps what is most unfortunate is the way in which all of these quite heterogeneous entries are categorized under the heading “Hegel.” This categorization and presentation of the material leads the reader in a specific direction and conveys the impression that the various vague references and allusions contained in the passages are to be understood uniformly as referring to Hegel himself. This has been the most complete edition of Kierkegaard’s Nachlaß or Papirer in English ever since it was published, and thus it has done much to shape the reception of this issue simply by the editorial decisions it has made and the way in which the material has been presented. While this edition has been important and indeed useful in making Kierkegaard’s journals accessible to anglophone readers and to this extent has undeniably served an important function, nevertheless, with respect to Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, it simply repeats uncritically the standard view and has helped to calcify it in the literature. These seemingly banal things, such as the categorization of journal entries under the heading, “Hegel,” or the explanation of key concepts in Kierkegaard by means of a reference to his purported polemic with Hegel, have had a profound effect on the history of Kierkegaard reception and have served to shape the picture of his relation to Hegel. It would be impossible to enumerate all the factors in the history of reception that have led to the standard view, and thus I allow these few examples to suffice. The influence of anthologies like that of Bretall and reference works like that of Himmelstrup is intangible, but they can be seen as a kind of barometer for the reception of the issue. They give a general indication of the atmosphere of the reception of Kierkegaard’s thought and set the tone for students and first time readers to understand his works. The examples mentioned here (and one could mention many others) demonstrate that the view that Kierkegaard had a campaign against Hegel existed in the literature from the very early stage of the reception at the beginning of the twentieth century. Kierkegaard was introduced to the modern reader in part by means of his purported Hegel critique. This was natural enough given that Hegel was the well-established philosophical figure of his period. Kierkegaard’s position in the history of philosophy was located and defined specifically vis-`a-vis Hegel (i.e., as a Hegel critic). It will be noted that none of the works mentioned here was specifically a study of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. They focus primarily on other themes and have quite different goals and objectives. But when they come to mention Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel,

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there is a striking degree of homogeneity in what is said. Thus, there seems to have been a general consensus on this issue among the leading scholars of the day. Because no one cared to delve into the matter further, it remained a fixed truth, a general point of orientation, which itself was never called into question. If there was disagreement or discussion, then it was about the details (i.e., whether Kierkegaard was partially influenced by Hegel on one point or another), but the presumed fact about his overall anti-Hegel campaign remained unquestioned. There is little evidence that any of these scholars knew much about Hegel’s thought in its own right, and this is perhaps one of the reasons why they spared themselves the trouble of examining the matter more closely. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the research on the issue went in the direction that it did once scholars began to write specialized monographs and longer studies on Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. The view had been in the air for a long time and was waiting for someone to come along and provide a foundation for it by means of research.

ii. thulstrup’s formulation of the standard view One of the most important figures in the history of the reception of the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel was the Professor of Theology, Niels Thulstrup. While the general tendency of regarding Kierkegaard’s position as a straightforward campaign against Hegel was around long before Thulstrup’s day, he was the one who crystalized it, giving it its clearest, most unambiguous formulation; moreover, his work aimed explicitly to ground it by means of a scholarly investigation of the issue. Thus, in a sense, he can be said if not to have established then to have grounded in scholarship the paradigm in mainstream research today for understanding Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. In addition to a number of scattered essays, Thulstrup addresses this issue directly in two major works. The first is his study, Kierkegaards Verh¨altnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte.49 This book serves the function of systematically tracing and evaluating the secondary literature on the issue up until circa 1960. In this work Thulstrup does little by way of actual research but instead merely gives his opinion about the various articles and books that he investigates. But his opinion (i.e., that Kierkegaard is engaged in a major anti-Hegel campaign) is presupposed from the start and never argued for since this is presumably the task of his second book on the issue (which is discussed later). Thulstrup’s ideological investments come out clearly in the following passage, in which he explains his reasons for not treating Hermann 49

Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaards Verh¨altnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte, op. cit.

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Schweppenh¨auser’s Kierkegaards Angriff auf die Spekulation:50 Die Lehrer des Verfassers sind Th. W. Adorno und H. Marcuse samt ihren Hausg¨ottern Feuerbach und Marx. Hinter ihnen steht ja Hegel, den der Verfasser gegen Kierkegaards Angriff verteidigt. . . . Schweppenh¨ausers ausgekl¨ugelte Abhandlung ist ein typisches Epigonenwerk, ein beklagenswertes Zeugnis dessen, wie weit man sich von echter Wissenschaftlichkeit und sauberer Philosophie entfernen kann, es zeugt von dem, was man fr¨uher den Scharfsinn der Wahnsinnigen nannte. Eine Er¨orterung der Arbeit in ihrer Gesamtheit oder in Einzelheiten ist deshalb zwecklos.51

The tone of this passage speaks for itself. Given the wholly ad hominem nature of this dismissive attack without the slightest attempt to evaluate the arguments of the author, it is difficult to know what Thulstrup understands by “echter Wissenschaftlichkeit.” This is, in any case, an instructive example of the ideological commitments that for years surrounded the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. Thulstrup’s most influential work is doubtless his doktordisputats, entitled Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, published in 1967 with German and English translations following thereafter.52 Thulstrup begins by exploring the historical sources of Hegelianism in Denmark during Kierkegaard’s time and then goes on to trace chronologically the various loci in which key words, such as “Hegel” or “Hegelianism” appear, first in the journals and papers and later in Kierkegaard’s published works. The strength of this book lies clearly in its historical setting of the stage of the issue in the first few chapters.53 Although the historical aspect of the relation is treated fairly thoroughly until 1842, the actual philosophical account of Hegel in Kierkegaard’s mature works is rather cursory; for example, the final chapter purports to analyze among other things, Either/ Or, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Thulstrup’s compressed account in that chapter in no way does justice to these difficult texts and is disproportionate when considered in relation to the amount of time he spends on Kierkegaard’s unpublished writings and lesser known early works. It appears that Thulstrup embarked on the ambitious project of working through everything Kierkegaard wrote and, due to the enormous mass of material, was unable to get past the year 1842. He thus added a perfunctory final 50 51 52

53

Hermann Schweppenh¨auser, Kierkegaards Angriff auf die Spekulation. Eine Verteidigung, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1967. Munich: Edition Text + Kritik 1993. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaards Verh¨altnis zu Hegel. Forschungsgeschichte, op. cit., p. 175. I.e., Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980. German translation: Kierkegaards Verh¨altnis zu Hegel und zum spekulativen Idealismus 1835–1846, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kolhammer 1972. Some of this historical material is repeated in Thulstrup’s Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit. See also Philosophiske Smuler, ed. with Introduction and Commentary by Niels Thulstrup, op. cit.

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chapter to give the appearance of at least having worked up to the crucial year 1846. As the title indicates, there is not even the pretension of an account of The Sickness unto Death or anything else published by Kierkegaard after 1846. Thulstrup’s main claim with regard to the question of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel can be seen in its most concise form in his Introduction where he designates the following as the central thesis of the book: “Hegel and Kierkegaard have in the main nothing in common as thinkers, neither as regards object, purpose, or method, nor as regards what each considered to be indisputable principles.”54 After completing his account of the historical material, Thulstrup proceeds to go through Kierkegaard’s corpus passage for passage, trying to demonstrate how the thought found there is fundamentally at odds with Hegel’s on each and every issue. For instance, with regard to their respective views on the philosophy of religion, Thulstrup writes, “There is an absolute opposition between the viewpoints of Hegel and Kierkegaard on the relation between philosophy and Christianity.”55 Later he claims, “the incompatibility [sc. of Kierkegaard’s thought] with speculative philosophy of religion is insurmountable.”56 On a similar note, he declares further, the “theory of stages, which is suggested in The Concept of Irony, is also in total discord with Hegel’s philosophy.”57 Thulstrup summarizes Kierkegaard’s references to Hegel in the Papirer from 1842 to 1845 as follows: “Kierkegaard immediately states on every relevant point his fundamental disagreement with Hegel.”58 Thus, Thulstrup never wavers from his main thesis or allows any counterevidence to weaken or qualify it in any way. While there was not much new in Thulstrup’s work, it did lend authority to the suspicions of previous scholars. It seemed to demonstrate via what looked like actual research the claim about the radical discontinuity between Hegel and Kierkegaard. Thulstrup’s view has cast a long shadow over the secondary literature and has been taken up uncritically by a number of scholars of nineteenth-century European philosophy. Most commentators continue to see it as a foregone conclusion that Kierkegaard rejected everything that had even the slightest look of Hegelianism about it. His view has come to form a kind of standard background knowledge for the vast majority of Kierkegaard students and scholars, even those who are not primarily interested in the issue of his relation to Hegel. 54 55 57 58

Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980, p. 12. 56 Ibid., p. 209. (My italics.) Ibid., p. 82. (My italics.) Ibid., p. 260. (My italics.) Ibid., p. 296. (My italics.) In reference to Pap. V, Thulstrup writes: “The disharmony was fundamental, and it appears at any point that Kierkegaard pounced on in Hegel.” (Ibid., p. 315. My italics.)

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It would be impossible to give an exhaustive exposition of all the material that has somehow been influenced by Thulstrup’s view. Instead, I will treat his interpretation in some detail as an example of what has clearly been the most prevalent tendency in the research on this issue. While Thulstrup did not invent this view, he does formulate and encapsulate it better than any of the others, and for this reason I take it as paradigmatic. Despite Thulstrup’s apparent success as evidenced by his influence, there are a number of reasons to believe that his view of the matter is oversimplified. When one examines Kierkegaard’s works carefully, one can see that his relation to Hegel was in fact considerably more differentiated than Thulstrup would have one believe. At every stage of Kierkegaard’s literary career, there were points of overlap between his thought and that of Hegel. (1) For example, at virtually the very beginning of his intellectual career Kierkegaard seems to have experienced a phase of infatuation with Hegel’s philosophy. In his dissertation, The Concept of Irony, one can discern a marked Hegelian influence, which Kierkegaard himself acknowledges. In that work, he repeatedly praises Hegel above all for his analyses of Socrates and Greek culture. In a remark that seems to refer to this time, Kierkegaard’s teacher, Frederik Christian Sibbern, speaks offhandedly of Kierkegaard’s “Hegelian period.”59 Moreover, in a journal entry from 1850, which refers back to this period, Kierkegaard openly speaks of his discipleship to Hegel at that time: “Influenced as I was by Hegel and whatever was modern, without the maturity really to comprehend greatness, I could not resist pointing out somewhere in my dissertation that it was a defect on the part of Socrates to disregard the whole and only consider individuals numerically. What a Hegelian fool I was!”60 Given Thulstrup’s thesis of the absolute discontinuity in the thought of the two men, he is at some pains to explain away Kierkegaard’s confession that he was “a Hegelian fool.” Thulstrup still has available the interpretive option of claiming that Kierkegaard might have been positively influenced by Hegel’s thought in his youth when The Concept of Irony was written and then in his mature years came to reject it. But even this is too much for Thulstrup to admit. “Kierkegaard’s own position,” he says, “which is not formulated directly or fully thought out in this work cannot correctly be designated as Hegelian.”61 Apparently, even Kierkegaard himself could 59

60 61

H. P. Barfod (ed.), “Indledende Notiser,” in his Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1833–1843, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1869, pp. lii–liii. See also Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 217. JP, vol. 4, 4281; Pap. X-3 A 477. Translation slightly modified. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 261. See also Thulstrup’s article “S¨oren Kierkegaard, historien de la philosophie de Hegel,” (Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 27, 1965, pp. 521–572), where he attempts to minimize Hegel’s influence in The Concept of Irony.

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not, on Thulstrup’s view, claim with justice that an aspect of his thought was Hegelian. (2) There is also evidence of a Hegelian influence in Either/Or. For example, the analysis of Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone, which appears in the chapter, “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic of Modern Drama,” seems to be profoundly influenced by Hegel’s famous interpretation. In Kierkegaard’s journals there are reading notes to the section of Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics where this work is treated.62 Moreover, some scholars have noted certain structural similarities between Either/Or and the Phenomenology of Spirit or some of Hegel’s other works.63 In Either/Or Kierkegaard applies to the concepts of the aesthetic and the ethical the Hegelian categories of immediacy and reflection. For example, in “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage,” Judge Wilhelm tries to convince the aesthete that immediate impulses towards love must be brought into the ethical relation of marriage. Just as Hegel does in the Phenomenology, Kierkegaard has his pseudonymous author begin with immediate knowledge and progress to more sophisticated notions of truth. Thus, based on this similarity, one might say that the basic structure of Either/Or is in a sense Hegelian. Finally, at least one scholar has noted the similarities (which Kierkegaard himself hints at64 ) between Hegel’s celebrated discussion of the unhappy consciousness in the “Self-Consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology and Kierkegaard’s account of the reflective aesthete or “the unhappiest man.”65 (3) The period between Either/Or and the Postscript also provides evidence that Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel was more subtle and varied than Thulstrup claims. There is compelling evidence that some of the key concepts that Kierkegaard develops during this period, such as repetition66 and the leap,67 in fact have their origin in Hegel. Moreover, in a journal entry from the year 1845, Kierkegaard clearly acknowledges his intellectual debt to Hegel and speaks of him in the most deferential of terms. He writes: I feel what for me at times is an enigmatic respect for Hegel; I have learned much from him, and I know very well that I can still learn much more from him when I return to him again. . . . in confidence that an open road for thought might be found there, I have resorted to philosophical books

62

63 64 65 66 67

JP, vol. 2, 1592; SKS, vol. 19, p. 245, Not8:51. JP, vol. 2, 1593; SKS, vol. 19, p. 246, Not8:53. JP, vol. 5, 5545; SKS, vol. 19, pp. 285–286, Not10:1. See also JP, vol. 2, 1591; SKS, vol. 19, p. 237, Not8:39.1. E.g., Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: University of California Press 1980, pp. 228–262. E.g., EO1, p. 222; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 215–216. E.g., Mark C. Taylor, op. cit., p. 240. Explored in Chapter 5, Section IV; Chapter 6, Section I. Explored in Chapter 9, Section V.

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and among them Hegel’s. But right here he leaves me in the lurch. His philosophical knowledge, his amazing learning, the insight of his genius, and everything else good that can be said of a philosopher I am willing to acknowledge as any disciple. Yet, no, not acknowledge – that is too distinguished an expression – willing to admire, learn from him. But, nevertheless, it is no less true that someone who is really tested in life, who in his need resorts to thought, will find Hegel comical despite all his greatness.68

To be sure, this passage is not an unqualified encomium to Hegel, but it does indicate a profound ambivalence in Kierkegaard’s assessment of him. By his own admission Kierkegaard feels an odd respect for Hegel, even though he calls him in a certain sense “comical.” Here one finds a tone decidedly different from the polemical passages that Thulstrup is wont to cite. In this entry Kierkegaard’s straightforward praise of Hegel’s philosophical knowledge and insight hardly sounds like the words of someone who rejected Hegel entirely. This passage is conspicuously missing from Thulstrup’s account. (4) Moreover, after the Postscript, Kierkegaard continues to employ Hegel’s methodology. His use of dialectical analysis in, for instance, his account of the levels of despair in The Sickness unto Death represents further evidence of a more positive assessment of Hegel’s philosophy than his polemical rhetoric would seem to imply. Many scholars have noted that in The Sickness unto Death Kierkegaard not only directly and unapologetically makes use of a form of the Hegelian dialectic to his own ends but also adopts much of the technical vocabulary from the idealist tradition. This last period of Kierkegaard’s authorship is intriguing since, although he puts aside the direct polemics against Hegelianism in which he had so long been engaged, in his own analyses he nonetheless uses some aspects of Hegel’s thought more overtly than ever. This gives evidence for a complicated and differentiated relation to Hegel, to which Thulstrup’s analysis can hardly do justice. Hence, one has ample reason already at the outset to call Thulstrup’s thesis into question as overly simplistic and one-sided. These suspicions are confirmed when one sees the actual execution of his thesis in the course of his book. In his treatment of Kierkegaard’s works, Thulstrup systematically analyzes Kierkegaard’s references to Hegel, doing everything possible to minimize the importance and value of the passages in question or anything that might be regarded as a Hegelian element in Kierkegaard’s thought. His account of The Concept of Irony is typical. At first the reader is told that it was natural for Hegel to be mentioned occasionally in the work “since Kierkegaard almost always reacted to every stimulus from his reading or other type of information.”69 Thus, 68 69

JP, vol. 2, 1608; Pap. VI B 54.12. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 215.

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Kierkegaard purportedly had no particular interest in Hegel per se during the composition of The Concept of Irony, but Hegel was simply one of the many authors whom he just so happened to be reading at the time. Thulstrup’s claim that Kierkegaard had no interest in Hegel on his own terms is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Hegel’s texts are often quoted or alluded to in the work. Along with the primary sources for Socrates (i.e., Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes), Hegel is the author referred to most often in the book. The frequency of these references indicates a substantial interest in and study of Hegel’s thought. Given this, it would be absurd to minimize his use of Hegel here and understand it as nothing more than just an accident with no further significance. In addition, the works of Hegel that Kierkegaard makes use of, according to Thulstrup’s view, cannot be taken seriously on their own terms. He writes: “Only a single book and a single article, which Hegel published himself, are identified and used by Kierkegaard, namely the Philosophy of Right and the long review of Solger’s writings. On the other hand, he used much more extensively Hegel’s posthumously published lectures, on the Philosophy of History, Aesthetics and the History of Philosophy.”70 Following this observation, Thulstrup calls into question the authenticity and value of Hegel’s lectures and employs this as an argument for the claim that what Kierkegaard knew of Hegel was not really Hegel at all. This appraisal of the lecture notes is not in harmony with contemporary Hegel scholarship which, although recognizing the status of the notes of Hegel’s students for what they are, nonetheless generally regards them as authoritative and as useful supplements to his published works when used with the appropriate care. Thulstrup is reluctantly obliged to acknowledge that Kierkegaard did make use of the Philosophy of Right, a bona fide text by Hegel’s own hand, published in his lifetime, but he claims nonetheless that these passages cannot carry much weight for the following reason: “Kierkegaard does not take account of the fact that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as a totality does not occupy a large place within the whole Hegelian system, and thus the uniquely Hegelian element does not receive full justice in Kierkegaard.”71 This is something of a non sequitur since even though the Philosophy of Right is indeed an elaboration of the section “Objective Spirit” from the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and thus constitutes only a small part of the overall system, this in no way diminishes its importance. Indeed, it is today as in Thulstrup’s time perhaps the most read and most frequently taught of all of Hegel’s works. The problematic nature of Thulstrup’s claim can be made clear with another example. One might say with equal justice that the celebrated analysis of lordship and bondage 70 71

Ibid., p. 216. Translation slightly modified. Ibid., p. 217.

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in the Phenomenology is unimportant since it occupies only a small place in the system, but this is clearly absurd given the significance of that short section both for Hegel’s thought as a whole and for the understanding and reception of his philosophy. Given the fact that the Philosophy of Right is the only genuine text by Hegel that is alluded to directly in The Concept of Irony, according to Thulstrup, Kierkegaard himself did not understand Hegel well enough to call himself a Hegelian with justice: It will have been noticed that in all essential respects Kierkegaard knew and utilized the historical sections within the various works of Hegel that belong to the philosophy of spirit. In The Concept of Irony we find mentioned neither the Phenomenology of Spirit nor the Science of Logic nor the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, that is, none of the major systematic works published by Hegel himself. The most natural assumption is, then, that while writing his book Kierkegaard did not have first-hand knowledge of these works, and his understanding of Hegel’s philosophy as a whole, as system, was correspondingly deficient.72

What Thulstrup calls “the most natural assumption” is rather dubious given that Kierkegaard must have had some knowledge of the Science of Logic since he refers to it expressly in his early work, From the Papers of One Still Living,73 which of course antedates The Concept of Irony. Moreover, it is obvious that the reason Kierkegaard does not mention these other works is the simple fact that they are not relevant to the theme of his dissertation (i.e., Socrates and irony). He has, however, conscientiously studied the various works where Hegel treats this theme. Further, even if Kierkegaard had not read the texts mentioned by Thulstrup at the time he was writing The Concept of Irony, he nevertheless may have adequately grasped certain features of Hegel’s philosophy which were important for him (e.g., Hegel’s methodology, his conception of history or his analysis of Socrates and the Greeks). Hence, it is hardly necessary for Kierkegaard to have had a complete command of every detail of Hegel’s system for him to find Hegel’s philosophy insightful or useful in some of its aspects. Thulstrup argues further that what Kierkegaard mentions of Hegel in The Concept of Irony is not necessarily Hegelian or what is essential to Hegel: “Kierkegaard’s reading of Hegel . . . was essentially confined to sections containing historical matters and conceptual analyses.”74 The essential aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, according to Thulstrup, are omitted by Kierkegaard, who “has nothing to say about Hegel’s principles, 72

73 74

Ibid., p. 245. Koch agrees with Thulstrup that Kierkegaard was generally not familiar with Hegel’s primary texts. Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue p˚a Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag A/S 1990, pp. 196–197. EPW, p. 61; SKS, vol. 1, p. 17. EPW, p. 62fn.; SKS, vol. 1, p. 18fn. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 255.

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nor anything about Hegel’s purpose. On Hegel’s method we find only scattered comments.”75 There is nothing contradictory in saying that Kierkegaard found aspects of Hegel’s philosophy interesting and made use of them, although he never felt the need to enter into an extended discussion of Hegel’s method and purpose. Kierkegaard need not even have been aware of such things for him to have been influenced by Hegel on specific topics. Moreover, although there may be only “scattered comments” about Hegel’s dialectical methodology, Kierkegaard nevertheless unapologetically uses it in other texts. Once again, an overt discussion of the matter is not necessary for there to be a positive influence. Finally, one begins to wonder what after all the essential aspects of Hegel’s philosophy are in Thulstrup’s view. While this has been (and indeed still is) a matter of some debate in Hegel scholarship, Thulstrup presupposes that what is essential to Hegel is obvious to all and thus should have been obvious to Kierkegaard, had he known Hegel’s thought adequately. Thulstrup’s uneasiness about Kierkegaard’s self-proclaimed Hegelianism reaches its apex when he concludes his discussion of the dissertation by saying that Kierkegaard was never a Hegelian in any sense in The Concept of Irony but rather was ironically taking up the role of one. Thulstrup claims: “On the basis of a partial knowledge of the dialectical method and of certain parts of Hegel’s works, the historical, not the systematic, Kierkegaard as an experiment wished to try his hand at the role of a Hegelian historian of philosophy.”76 Thulstrup brings this covert role playing into connection with Kierkegaard’s strategy of indirect communication: “Kierkegaard . . . was not a Hegelian, but one who as an experimenter chose the indirect method, chose to appear as a wolf in sheep’s clothing.”77 As will be seen later,78 this does not square with the historical circumstances surrounding Kierkegaard’s dissertation, which speak against this kind of ironic reading. Thulstrup thus neutralizes the portions of Kierkegaard’s writing that appear to contradict his thesis by claiming that they are to be read as ironic criticisms or parodies of Hegel rather than at face value as Kierkegaard’s actual thought. While this interpretation salvages his thesis, Thulstrup offers no textual or other evidence to support it. Moreover, by using this argument, one could conveniently eliminate any aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought that one finds objectionable, claiming that it is merely a guise or an ironic strategy that he does not mean seriously. This procedure, however, reveals that there is already a hidden interpretive agenda that has been presupposed. Specifically, it presupposes that Kierkegaard intended a serious criticism of Hegel with this irony, but no independent evidence is presented to support this claim. There is an arbitrariness in the selection of the passages claimed 75 77

Ibid., pp. 254–255. Ibid., p. 260.

76 78

Ibid., p. 261. Chapter 3, Section I.

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to be ironic, and this arbitrariness is based upon an interpretation that has already been presupposed without argumentation. Finally, Thulstrup must contradict his own numerous arguments against any trace of true Hegelianism in this work in order to claim that, in fact, Hegel is after all present as a guise that Kierkegaard uses. It is clear from all of these passages that Thulstrup is hard pressed to explain away Kierkegaard’s claim about the Hegelian nature of The Concept of Irony. This explains why he is careful to avoid mentioning other passages in which Kierkegaard gives a positive assessment of Hegel. But the lengths to which Thulstrup must go to purge Kierkegaard of all possible positive influence by Hegel are demonstration enough that such influences are indeed present. Thulstrup’s view is misguided since it leads one to overlook the many points of positive contact between the two thinkers – points which Kierkegaard himself is more willing to acknowledge than Thulstrup. Thulstrup’s own unbending and undifferentiated position ultimately undercuts the very purpose of his comparative study since it leaves him no room for real comparison or contrast. The task of the comparative historian of philosophy is usually understood to involve an examination of the relation between two thinkers by comparing and contrasting their thought on given points – methodology, perceived problems, general principles, presuppositions and specific analyses, theories, and solutions. One might understand the relation in terms of the categories of identity and difference, i.e., the two thinkers in question will hold certain things in common, and this will form the aspect of identity, so to speak, and against this background of identity, important differences between the two will stand out. A comparative study is interesting in that it works within the parameters of these two categories, for example, by bringing to light little-known points of contact against a commonly accepted background of discontinuity or difference, or by making more acute the differences by tracing more clearly the points of similarity. One can suppose as a methodological assumption that two thinkers working within the same tradition (i.e., the modern European one) and in the same century (i.e., the nineteenth) will have at least minimally a few things in common, and it would be unthinkable for there to be nothing but absolute difference or discontinuity. Indeed, the very notion of absolute discontinuity is problematic. No two thinkers can be absolutely antithetical since there would be no room for differences of opinion if there were no shared ground against which such differences might appear. There would be no debate at all since there would be no common discourse or point of contact. In short, there can be no discussion if there is no common language. Even if the two thinkers contradicted each other on every single point, which is unimaginable, then there would at least be an agreed upon agenda or set of issues upon which there is disagreement.

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Conversely, no two thinkers are entirely identical. Even within tightly knit schools of thought there are diverging views; there is always orthodoxy and heterodoxy, dogma and heresy. Hence, when speaking of two different thinkers, it is absurd to speak either of absolute identity or absolute difference. Thulstrup goes through Kierkegaard’s published works and journals trying to demonstrate that Hegel and Kierkegaard constitute the antipodes of nineteenth-century thought. Indeed, he gives the impression that they hardly belong to the same intellectual universe at all. By the all too consistent insistence on his thesis, which is formulated in such an extreme manner, Thulstrup unwittingly renders his investigation considerably less interesting than it might otherwise have been. One wonders how a study on Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel can be useful or instructive if in the final analysis there is in fact no real relation. If, indeed, Kierkegaard and Hegel share absolutely nothing in common, then no comparison is possible in the first place. In a certain sense it might be argued that Thulstrup’s claim that Kierkegaard was carrying out a grand polemic against Hegel has in fact served to overemphasize the actual role of Hegel in the authorship generally. When one takes the authorship as a whole, Hegel only appears explicitly in From the Papers of One Still Living, The Concept of Irony, and a few of the pseudonymous works. In the places where his name does appear, there are rarely extended analyses. Thus, even while Kierkegaard in other works does tend to use Hegelian language and methodology without mentioning Hegel’s name explicitly, it is by no means clear that Hegel’s thought occupies the central place in Kierkegaard’s thinking that Thulstrup inadvertently attributes to it. Perhaps the problem lies in the fact that for many years the Concluding Unscientific Postscript was Kierkegaard’s most read book (at least in the anglophone tradition); as a result, many people received a somewhat slanted view of the authorship as a whole based on that single, admittedly important, work. Since Hegel seemed to play such a significant role in that text, one inferred that he must then also play that role in the rest of the authorship. But it is clear that the Postscript is more or less unique in this sense, that Hegel does not play the same role in the other works, and finally that when the authorship is seen as a whole, the Postscript, though significant, in fact constitutes only a small fraction of the entire production. In this way Hegel or the purported Hegel critique has taken on a disproportionate degree of importance in Kierkegaard’s vast authorship. In his posthumously published The Point of View for My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard surveys his authorship as a whole and gives an account of his overall strategy of publication and the role of the individual works in it. If one presupposes him to have had a campaign against Hegel, then in this work one would have the right to expect that he would give some

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account of his intentions in this regard. But in fact one finds virtually no mention of Hegel at all. Hegel’s name only appears once in a footnote in its adjectival form, “Hegelian.” Moreover, from the context it becomes clear that Kierkegaard is in fact thinking of Johan Ludvig Heiberg, a Danish Hegelian, and not of Hegel himself.79 Thus, the absence of any account by Kierkegaard himself of an anti-Hegel campaign in his authorship seems to imply that the matter has been overstated. One of the reasons Thulstrup’s influence has been so profound and so many Kierkegaard scholars have taken up his conclusions uncritically is that most studies that examine this issue have been carried out by Kierkegaard specialists who have only a limited knowledge of Hegel. Thus, Kierkegaard commentators have not always been in a position to evaluate Thulstrup’s thesis critically. Moreover, few established Hegel scholars to date have taken up the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. These comments are not meant as a criticism of either Kierkegaard or Hegel scholarship but rather of the modern tendency towards academic specialization in general. Thulstrup tries to make a case80 for his credentials in German idealism by pointing out that he has authored a short monograph on Hegel,81 but nonetheless his lack of knowledge of Hegel’s philosophy is in evidence in many places. This is clearly seen by the fact that he continually falls into a number of what are commonly referred to as the Hegel myths and legends. These expressions have come to characterize the various popularized distortions of Hegel’s philosophy such as the claims that Hegel’s dialectical methodology consisted in a movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis;82 that Hegel believed in the end of history in his own time;83 that Hegel was a determinist, a fatalist, and an opponent of free will;84 that whatever happens in history is, for Hegel, 79

80 81 82 83 84

He writes: “I have not with the smallest fraction of the capacities granted me striven to express . . . that the world is good, loves the true, wills the good, that the demand of the times is the truth, that the human race is the true or presumably even God, and therefore the task (Goethean and Hegelian) is to satisfy the age”(PV, p. 88fn.; SV1, vol. 13, p. 572fn.). It is clear that Kierkegaard is thinking of Heiberg’s work, On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age, in which Heiberg points out Goethe and Hegel as the two great spirits of the day. (See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid, Copenhagen 1833, pp. 36ff. ASKB 568. Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 1, pp. 417ff.) In the same text Heiberg also argues that philosophy is the demand of the age. (See ibid., pp. 21ff.; Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 1, pp. 102ff.) Thus, the single reference to Hegel is in fact a reference to Heiberg’s use of him in his essay. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. xii. Niels Thulstrup, Hegel, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1967, 83pp. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 63, p. 85, pp. 172–173. Ibid., p. 173, p. 186. Ibid., p. 25, p. 291, p. 302, p. 323. See also his “Kierkegaard and Hegel, 1. The System and Method of Hegel,” in Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by Niels Thulstrup (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Boghandel 1979, pp. 57– 58.

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ipso facto justified;85 that Hegel claimed that his speculative logic eliminates the law of contradiction;86 that Hegel was the official philosopher of the Prussian state,87 or that Hegel saw in his own system “the crowning achievement of the whole history of philosophy.”88 All of these caricatures, distortions, and misconceptions, typical for the state of research in Thulstrup’s time, have long since been refuted and laid to rest by contemporary scholarship, and Thulstrup’s appeal to them does not speak well for his command of Hegel’s primary texts. Finally, many scholars with a specialization in the history of philosophy have the unfortunate tendency of raising their intellectual heroes onto pedestals and of viewing historical debates as struggles between forces of good and evil. Such scholars see it as their appointed duty to defend their champion against all challengers. A part of this involves the creation of a Feindbild to which one can return at one’s convenience in order to criticize something as the opposite of what is presumed to be the correct view, in this case that of Kierkegaard. While such animated engagement in the issues may be lauded, it in no way can be seen as serving the purpose of dispassionate historical-philosophical research. Thulstrup falls victim to a sort of uncritical hero worship, which Kierkegaard throughout his life consistently deplored. Thulstrup represents one of the most pronounced examples of a general tendency in Kierkegaard scholarship towards straightforward apologia. For example, he reviles Hegel by referring to him sarcastically throughout the work as “the Master.” Thulstrup’s general attitude is in evidence in his discussion of The Concept of Irony where he writes: “We can also, as several scholars and interpreters have done, doubt the correctness of Kierkegaard’s self-proclaimed discipleship to Hegel in this book . . . because we cannot imagine that such a shrewd genius as Kierkegaard could possibly have let himself be taken in by Hegel.”89 One can see here a clear case of question begging in the portrayal of Hegel as a seducer of youth who was unable to dupe the astute Kierkegaard. This sort of disposition puts all critical thinking into abeyance, prejudices every meaningful issue ahead of time, and can hardly be said to be in accordance with honest and serious scholarship.90 It is obvious that to approach the matter in this way prohibits one from seeing the relation as an honest dialogue between two equal interlocutors. The goal of scholarship in the history of philosophy should be to understand what is at issue philosophically in the authors under examination and not to erect 85 86 88 90

Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 224. 87 Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p. 25, p. 291, p. 302, p. 330. 89 Ibid., p. 214. Ibid., p. 32. See Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, tr. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven, Connecticut, and London: Yale University Press 1980, p. 132: “It appears to me that [Thulstrup’s] main thesis was the point of departure for [his] work . . . and not the objective result of an unbiased investigation.” See also ibid., p. 149.

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a monument for a thinker who one has already decided ahead of time was in sole possession of truth and wisdom. Thulstrup’s work, for all of its outward appearance of being a piece of history of philosophy, has thus hindered Kierkegaard research from making headway towards an understanding of his philosophical sources. The idea of Kierkegaard’s radical originality brings with it the notion that he relied on no previous thinkers. As a result, to this day the research community is still lacking an adequate extended study of Kierkegaard’s relation to, for example, Fichte, Schelling, Hamann, Feuerbach, Schleiermacher, Gunther, ¨ the younger Fichte, and Baader, to say nothing of his Danish contemporaries, Heiberg, Sibbern, and Martensen. This remains one of the most poorly understood periods in the history of philosophy in large part due to the enigmatic role of Kierkegaard in it. Thus, Thulstrup’s work on this issue has exerted a profoundly negative effect on the secondary literature. His oversimplified interpretation has firmly ensconced “the standard view” in the research community and has led to a quasi-official Kierkegaard orthodoxy, which for years has stood in the way of a more critical examination of the matter. Thulstrup’s investigation told the Kierkegaard research community at the time what it wanted to hear (i.e., that Kierkegaard was an uncompromising critic of Hegel), and since the issue was so cut and dry, this view has remained largely unchallenged until the present day. After Thulstrup’s work the matter seemed to be more or less decided, and there seemed to be no reason to look into it more closely. Fortunately, since Thulstrup’s time, there have been at least a few dissenting opinions who have wished to see the matter with nonpartisan eyes.

iii. the reception of the issue after thulstrup While the paradigm set by Thulstrup has dominated the vast part of the mainstream research until today, there have been a number of scholars since then who have called into question his one-sided view of the matter. These scholars have, by means of different methodologies and agendas, tried to indicate points of positive contact between Hegel and Kierkegaard. As a result they have made a significant start in reevaluating the long-standing prejudices surrounding the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. Perhaps the most significant of these works in the post-Thulstrup research is Mark C. Taylor’s Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, for which he received the degree of Doctor of Theology at the University of Copenhagen in 1980.91 Instead of merely taking up Kierkegaard’s side on 91

Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, op. cit. This work has recently been reissued under the same title by Fordham University Press (New York 2000) as volume number 14 in the series Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, edited by John

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each of the issues as Thulstrup does, Taylor offers a much more balanced assessment in an effort to bring the two thinkers into a genuine dialogue. He writes, “My goal, in sum, is to bring Hegel and Kierkegaard closer together so that their differences can emerge more clearly.”92 Taylor selects what he sees as an underlying theme, which he uses throughout the book as a fixed point to compare and contrast the works of Hegel and Kierkegaard. “The central thesis underlying our investigation,” he writes, “is that Hegel and Kierkegaard develop alternative phenomenologies of spirit that are designed to lead the reader from inauthentic to authentic or fully realized selfhood.”93 By this he understands above all the modern problem of creating and discovering oneself in the modern context of fragmentation, estrangement, and alienation. Appropriately, he takes the Phenomenology of Spirit as the paradigmatic text from Hegel in regard to this theme of the realization of the self. His procedure is to compare the Phenomenology with a number of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works where, he argues, the same issue is treated. Unfortunately, by analyzing everything in terms of this one theme, Taylor has considerably limited the scope and importance of his study. Moreover, this theme, even though broadly conceived and having the advantage of providing a measure of continuity to the study, nonetheless tends to force many different analyses into a scheme where they do not always fit cleanly, and thus the continuity that is provided is often only apparent. Perhaps what is most problematic is the way in which this theme hinders the author from treating specific discussions on their own terms. For example, although it might be insightful to view Hegel’s analysis of world history, of political theory or of religion as a journey to selfhood, this is clearly not the way Hegel conceived of these discussions himself. The problem of modern self-identity or of the individual’s self-conception, at least so formulated, is more important for Taylor’s philosophical agenda than for Hegel’s.94 Despite Taylor’s attempt to bring Hegel and Kierkegaard into a genuine dialogue without taking sides or viewing the matter from the perspective of the one thinker or the other, his methodology tends to undermine

92 93 94

D. Caputo. This new publication is effectively an identical reproduction of the first edition. The only difference between the two editions is a 12 page preface with the title “Returnings,” which Taylor has added to the second edition (pp. ix–xxi). See also his various articles: “Journeys to Moriah: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard,” Harvard Theological Review, 70, 1977, pp. 305–326. “Love and Forms of Spirit. Kierkegaard vs. Hegel,” Kierkegaardiana, 10, 1977, pp. 95–116; “Dialectics and Communication. Hegel and Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard and Dialectics, ed. by Jørgen K. Bukdahl, Aarhus: Institute for Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion 1979, pp. 5–52. Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 21. Ibid., p. 13. See Thulstrup’s “A Ghost-Letter Caused by Mark C. Taylor’s Journeys with Hegel and Kierkegaard,” in Liber Academiae Kierkegaardiensis, ed. by Niels Thulstrup, Tomus V, 1983, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel’s Forlag A/S 1984, p. 94, p. 97.

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this goal. In his various discussions, Taylor breaks up his analyses into two parts, one on Hegel and one on Kierkegaard.95 This sort of procedure, which seems natural enough in a comparative study, does not engender a dialogue but instead gives rise to two different accounts of a given issue. His long Chapter 6 provides a good case in point. There he first summarizes the entirety of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and then goes on to do the same for Kierkegaard’s Either/Or to the ostensible end of demonstrating the similarities between these two works. The summary of the two texts may be interesting in itself, but by breaking up these extended discussions in this way, Taylor leaves open many questions about the actual points of contact. Thus, his treatment of the commonalities and differences between the two thinkers is impeded by a procedure that produces what at times seems to be two different discussions with little more than superficial similarities. Taylor is not interested in outlining any sort of development in Kierkegaard’s relationship to Hegel since he is only tracing a single theme. This leads him to view Kierkegaard’s oeuvre as a monolithic whole and to cite in the same context various passages from different periods and texts without regard to the issues of pseudonymity, development, and the like. This is misleading since by this procedure one is able to create patchwork positions, which it is not clear that Kierkegaard ever actually held. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s thought was not born in a single instant but rather developed over a period of time. But Taylor’s procedure does not allow him to distinguish different positions or periods in Kierkegaard’s development. The relation of Kierkegaard to Hegel is more complex and differentiated than has often been thought due in part to the fact that it changed over time. Thus, to explore the question of Hegel’s influence on Kierkegaard, one must first put the specific subject-matter of the study into a determinate context by designating what period or work is at issue. Taylor’s theme-oriented procedure is thus distorting in individual analyses and fails to do justice to the intellectual-biographical development of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. Therefore, although Taylor’s work represents in many respects a considerable improvement over Thulstrup’s, it still does not treat the issue in an ultimately satisfying manner. Given his theme-oriented methodology, Taylor has written a work that explains more about his own philosophical views on the self and the modern problem of alienation than about the actual historical relation between Kierkegaard and Hegel. He ignores the tremendous amount of historical-philosophical documentation that could help him to illuminate this relation. After Taylor there 95

This practice is common in comparative studies on the Hegel–Kierkegaard connection. See Eduard von Hagen, Abstraktion und Konkretion bei Hegel und Kierkegaard, Bonn: Bouvier 1969.

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have been no monograph-length studies dedicated specifically to the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. There have, however, been a handful of works that have touched on this issue in the pursuit of different goals and agendas. One significant contribution to the issue is the disputats from 1990 of the Professor of Philosophy, Carl Henrik Koch, under the title, En Flue p˚a Hegels udødelige næse.96 As his subtitle indicates, Koch’s work seeks to investigate primarily the Hegelian theologian Adolph Peter Adler and Kierkegaard’s relation to him. He thus states quite clearly at the beginning that the work is not about Hegel or Hegelianism.97 Yet in working through Adler’s Hegelian works, Koch has occasion to touch on a number of aspects of the Danish Hegel reception, which were relevant for Kierkegaard. His approach is clearly one of Quellenforschung, and his work thus departs significantly and indeed fruitfully from Taylor’s work in point of methodology. This leads Koch to a more differentiated view of Kierkegaard’s understanding of Hegel. While Koch still sees a part of Kierkegaard’s critique as being aimed at Hegel himself, he tries to show how much of it is also directed at Adler.98 But given that Koch’s investigation is primarily concerned with Adler, the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel is only incidental. Thus, even though Koch makes important contributions to understanding this relation, given that it is not his main concern in this study, he makes no attempt to explore it systematically. Thus, a great number of issues with regard to this topic still remain unexplored by means of source-work research. With regard to the German research, Michael Theunissen has published two works that are of particular relevance for the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, namely Das Selbst auf dem Grund der Verzweiflung from 199199 and Der Begriff Verzweiflung from 1993.100 Both works concentrate primarily on The Sickness unto Death. Theunissen presents a Kierkegaard, who appropriates and modifies different aspects of Hegel’s logic for his own purposes. Specifically, he sees Kierkegaard as applying a Hegelian dialectic in his analysis of the forms of despair.101 Thus, Kierkegaard is understood to be in a productive and positive relation to Hegel with regard to this specific point. Like the work of Taylor, 96 97 99 100

101

Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue p˚a Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag A/S 1990. 98 E.g., p. 61. Ibid., p. 10. Michael Theunissen, Das Selbst auf dem Grund der Verzweiflung. Kierkegaards negativistische Methode, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Anton Hain Meisenheim Gmbh 1991. Michael Theunissen, Der Begriff Verzweiflung. Korrekturen an Kierkegaard, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1993. Also noteworthy is his earlier work, Der Begriff Ernst bei Søren Kierkegaard, Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber 1958. Michael Theunissen, Das Selbst auf dem Grund der Verzweiflung, op. cit., p. 28, pp. 32–33, pp. 53–54, p. 60. Der Begriff Verzweiflung, op. cit., p. 20f., p. 82, p. 93, pp. 140–156.

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Theunissen’s study is thematic since he is concerned with exploring the concept of despair. Thus, he does not pursue the historical or biographical aspect of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. Another recent work that has Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel as one of its secondary themes is Sophia Scopetea’s Kierkegaard og græciteten from 1995.102 Scopetea presents a refreshingly differentiated picture of this relation. She argues that Hegel exerts a profound positive influence on the Kierkegaard of The Concept of Irony.103 Kierkegaard is, she claims, receptive in particular to Hegel’s account of Socrates and Romantic irony. But yet she is careful to point out that Kierkegaard is never a Hegelian or a blind follower. Instead, he remains in a critical dialogue with Hegel throughout the work. Thus, Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel is portrayed as an ambivalent one at this early stage of the authorship. Later in works such as the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, she argues, Kierkegaard becomes more openly critical of Hegel. This investigation also represents an important contribution to the general understanding of the issue, but its significance remains limited for the question at hand since the theme of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel is only a subsidiary issue to the study in general. The recent work of the Professor of Theology, Arne Grøn has also avoided characterizing Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel as purely negative. On the contrary, in various books and articles, Grøn has indicated a number of thematic points of continuity between the two thinkers. He has, for example, suggested that in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love there is a dialectic of recognition that is similar to that sketched by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit.104 One of the central claims in his doctoral disputats, entitled, Subjektivet og negativitet from 1997, is that there is a fundamental methodological similarity between The Sickness unto Death and the Phenomenology.105 Taking up one of the main themes from Theunissen’s work, Grøn tries to demonstrate that The Sickness unto Death contains a phenomenological analysis that is very much derivative from Hegel. He also draws similarities between Kierkegaard’s conception of human beings as a synthesis in The Concept of Anxiety and the Hegelian conception of synthesis.106 Thus, Grøn attempts to sketch points of similarity between the two thinkers based on specific themes or methodologies. His approach is, like Taylor’s and Theunissen’s, thematic, and thus 102 103 104 105

106

Sophia Scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1995. E.g., p. 121, pp. 126–127, pp. 131–140, p. 147, pp. 149–150, pp. 153–154, p. 156. Arne Grøn, “Kærlighedens gerninger og anerkendelsens dialektik,” Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift, 54, 1991, pp. 260–270. Arne Grøn, Subjektivet og negativitet: Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1997, pp. 137– 142. See also his article, “Kierkegaards Ph¨anomenologie?” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1996, pp. 91–116. Arne Grøn, Subjektivet og negativitet, op. cit., p. 66.

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he is not interested in establishing the historical connections between the two thinkers by means of Quellenforschung. All of these works in the period after Thulstrup have, each in its own way, performed an invaluable service to Kierkegaard research. By dropping the needless polemic with Hegel that characterized so much of the earlier research, they have been able to see new connections and points of positive influence of Hegel on Kierkegaard. Moreover, the change in the political climate has also meant that the authors from this most recent period have not been caught up in the ideological commitments of earlier scholars in the immediate aftermath of fascism and later during the Cold War. This has opened the door for a fresh look at the issue. But while these studies make useful contributions and point in the right direction, much work still needs to be done. None of the works mentioned here, with the exception of Taylor’s, is dedicated specifically to the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, and even Taylor’s book does not attempt a systematic analysis of Kierkegaard’s texts specifically with an eye towards this issue but rather limits itself to a single theme. Thus, the revolution in the research on the issue after Thulstrup is still far from complete. There is a sense of suspicion that Thulstrup’s presentation of the matter is too one-sided, but only scattered individual points of positive contact have been established. In addition, the vast number of points on which Kierkegaard, according to Thulstrup, criticizes Hegel have gone generally unchallenged.

iv. thesis and methodological considerations Given this state of affairs in the secondary literature, it should be evident that more scholarly work needs to be done on the question of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. I have entitled this study Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered since I wish to take a fresh look at this issue and to reevaluate the views of, among others, Thulstrup and Taylor. The present investigation contains both a general thesis about the relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard and also what might be regarded as a more specific historical thesis about how this relation came about and changed throughout Kierkegaard’s career. With respect to the general thesis, I hope to establish in a concrete and detailed way the claim for the positive influence of Hegel on Kierkegaard. Thus, when compared with Thulstrup’s interpretation, my main thesis can be viewed as the claim that there are many more points of comparison and similarity between the two thinkers than are generally recognized. But this is only a part of the claim I wish to defend, since by getting clearer about the points of comparison, I hope also to bring into relief the points of contrast. Indeed, it would be absurd to write a book that is the mirror image of Thulstrup’s, with the guiding intuition being that instead of absolute

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difference there is nothing but similarity between Hegel and Kierkegaard. By contrast, my goal is to give a balanced assessment of the issues. I do not wish to prejudice my study with an approach that is either pro-Hegel or pro-Kierkegaard. Instead, I wish to analyze in a nonpartisan fashion the points of both similarity and difference. This will serve two distinct purposes: first it will make it possible in general to achieve a truer picture of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel than has been possible heretofore, and second and more specifically it will bring out more clearly what is really characteristic of the genius and originality of Kierkegaard once it is clear how much of Hegel is present in his work. It should be said at the outset that I regard it as misguided to try to determine whether or not Kierkegaard was ultimately a Hegelian. By framing the issue of the relation as one of identity and difference, one might be tempted to work through Kierkegaard’s texts in order to determine quantitatively how many passages, themes, or concepts are Hegelian in origin. This would give rise to the fruitless question of how many such Hegelian passages would be necessary before one would have a preponderance and would be able with justice to call Kierkegaard a Hegelian. This is an antimony which I have no interest in pursuing. The question is not whether Kierkegaard was a Hegelian since this way of understanding the issue makes it an all or nothing proposition: either Kierkegaard was a Hegelian or he was not. The goal of the present study is to see the matter in a more nuanced fashion and to examine precisely which of Hegel’s texts, doctrines, or ideas influenced Kierkegaard positively or negatively at any given period in his life. This procedure will, I hope, allow for a balanced and differentiated analysis of the issue. I have tried to reflect this, by using the plural “relations” in my title, by which I wish to indicate my conviction that the issue cannot be reduced to a single relation. Instead, I wish to argue that Kierkegaard had several different relations to Hegel that evolved over time. My historical or biographical thesis concerning Kierkegaard is that his intellectual development with regard to Hegel passed through three discernible stages.107 In his early works, characterized primarily by From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), The Concept of Irony (1841), and Either/Or (1843), he was strongly and positively influenced by Hegel and Hegelian philosophy. After this there was a middle period beginning with Fear and Trembling (1843). This period is characterized by what most commentators have taken to be his most overt and aggressive criticism of Hegel. I wish to show that this criticism is, however, directed primarily at other 107

A part of this thesis builds on the suggestion made by Henning Fenger (in response to Thulstrup) that Kierkegaard had an early pro-Hegelian phase which turned into a negative anti-Hegel period following Either/Or. Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, tr. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven, Connecticut, and London: Yale University Press 1980, pp. 132–149.

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sources and not at Hegel himself. This period culminated in 1846 with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript where Kierkegaard gave his most extended response to Hegel’s philosophy or, more exactly, to the discussions about it that were then taking place in Denmark. In the unpublished Book on Adler, which was written primarily during 1846, many of the same criticisms from the Postscript appear. This work marks the end of the second period. After The Book on Adler there was a final period in which Kierkegaard dropped his polemic and for one reason or another made his peace with Hegelianism. During this final period, although in both the published works and the journals there appear substantially fewer direct references to Hegel, Kierkegaard openly uses Hegelian concepts and methodologies as in The Sickness unto Death. It is this three-step development in Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel that constitutes the historical thesis of my study. My procedure has been to select the most important of Kierkegaard’s works in which Hegel or Hegelianism seems to play a significant role. These have then been used as the main subject-matter of my study. I have arranged them in chronological order and have worked through them each individually in order to determine if there were any recognizable general tendencies in the development of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. I have then evaluated these discussions in light of my understanding of Hegel’s doctrines as presented in his primary texts and lectures. Due to this procedure, the present investigation is more about Kierkegaard than about Hegel since Kierkegaard’s texts constitute the primary subject-matter. Thus, the perspective that my discussion takes is not that of Hegel looking forward to Kierkegaard or of the two being in some ahistorical dialogue (as in Taylor), but rather that of Kierkegaard looking backward to Hegel. I wish to arrive at a differentiated picture of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel that brings out changes in this relation in different texts and periods in his career. I will thus explore the various aspects of Kierkegaard’s contact with Hegel’s thought in their different contexts, examining each of these aspects on its own. By means of this procedure it will be possible to avoid couching the issue in the way Thulstrup does, in terms of a dichotomy about whether Kierkegaard was a Hegelian or not. The danger of a comparative study of this kind is that there is so much primary material to take into account that one is never able to work through it all adequately. I have been enjoined to make some painstaking decisions about which of Kierkegaard’s texts would be central to my investigation and which ones would be treated only marginally or left out altogether. A word about these decisions may be in order here. I will begin with a brief explanation of the role of Kierkegaard’s journals, notebooks, and papers in the present investigation. Since this study is conceived as a piece of history of philosophy, I am interested primarily in what has in the

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secondary literature traditionally been taken to be Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel. This critique has generally been thought to be found in his published writings and above all in his pseudonymous works. Therefore, I have for the most part used these published writings as the main objects of investigation in this study. Usually, I refer to the unpublished journals and papers only as additional sources of information about Kierkegaard’s developing views on Hegel. They are thus used primarily to elucidate or supplement the discussions of Hegel and Hegelianism in the published works. But I have neither worked through the journals and papers systematically with an eye toward Hegel nor treated them as independent texts in their own right, with the exception of (1) an early entry that is illustrative of Kierkegaard’s theory of stages108 and (2) the unpublished works, The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, and The Book on Adler, which are generally acknowledged to be more or less independent texts, although, strictly speaking, they belong to the journals. The final reason for my sparing use of the Nachlaß is that these journals and papers are currently being reedited and published in a radically new and different form in the new critical edition of Kierkegaard’s works (i.e., Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter). It thus seemed imprudent to embark on a rigorous study of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel in the journals before this work was completed or at least well underway. I have also been obliged to limit this study primarily to the main published works in which Hegel plays or has in the secondary literature been thought to play a significant role. The religious works that appeared in Kierkegaard’s own name have been omitted since they are not concerned primarily with the Hegel problematic in any obvious way. By contrast, I have chosen the texts that have the most overt and frequent discussions of Hegel’s philosophy. In this group I count the following: The Concept of Irony, Fear and Trembling, The Concept of Anxiety, Prefaces, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and The Book on Adler. Next I selected other texts, which, although containing fewer direct references to Hegel and Hegelianism, nonetheless were implicitly concerned with similar issues treated by Hegel or made use of Hegelian methodology or language. In this group I include the following: From the Papers of One Still Living, Either/Or, Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments and The Sickness Unto Death. I am aware of the fact that these decisions may well be controversial, but I believe that the results of this study have proven them to be judicious. For the purposes of my investigation a selection was useful and indeed necessary. I thus make no claim to have explored every possible trace of a Hegelian influence or criticism in Kierkegaard’s works. I have reluctantly chosen not to treat 108

JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 117–119, BB:25, treated in Chapter 2, Section II.

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Works of Love or Stages on Life’s Way in any detailed fashion, although scholars have identified Hegelian elements in them. Likewise, I have not treated the criticism of Hegel that appears in Kierkegaard’s notes to Schelling’s lectures, Philosophie der Offenbarung (1841–42). The philological and interpretive difficulties involved in a study of this text have led me to conclude that it would be best treated in the context of an investigation of Kierkegaard’s relation to Schelling. Though I have studied and used some of this material here in an ad hoc fashion, I make no claim for completeness in my treatment. Throughout his authorship Kierkegaard tends to repeat the same discussions of what seem to be different aspects of Hegel’s thought. This has enjoined me to make some editorial decisions about when to treat any given discussion. As a rule I have given the full treatment at the first occurrence of a discussion in Kierkegaard’s works and have noted subsequent treatments as they occur. In this way I have attempted to avoid in my text the repetitions that occur frequently throughout Kierkegaard’s works. When a given discussion has been supplemented with further arguments or altered by new positions, I have noted the changes and made an attempt to put them into the larger general context of Kierkegaard’s changing relation to Hegel. Due to the length of this work, I have endeavored to make the individual chapters and analyses as self-contained as possible. The result is the inevitable repetition of some material. I have tried to minimize this by means of frequent cross-references to other parts of the text where the material is also treated. What has been influential in the interpretation of the development of nineteenth-century philosophy is what has been perceived as Kierkegaard’s explicit, self-conscious criticism of Hegel. It is this explicit critique that will be the focus of this study, and for this reason I am, as has just been noted, primarily interested in ascertaining an overview of Kierkegaard’s knowledge of Hegel’s philosophy and his assessment of it. This is, of course, not to deny that one can make illuminating and interesting comparisons and contrasts that Kierkegaard himself never saw or at least never wrote about. But since the main goal of this project is to understand Kierkegaard as a part of the development of nineteenth-century European thought, the focus will not be on this abstract comparison of issues but on what has commonly been regarded as his own explicit criticisms. Thus, this investigation is not a piece of analytic history of philosophy that compares two given thinkers abstractly and places them in an ahistorical forum of ideas independently of the question of their actual explicit assessment of one another.109 Instead, it is to be conceived as a corrective 109

As an example one can take Taylor’s comparison of the accounts of Abraham offered by Hegel and Kierkegaard (in “Journeys to Moriah: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard,” Harvard

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work in the history of philosophy. There are doubtless many fruitful connections and points of dispute between Hegel and Kierkegaard that the commentator can discover, but for the purposes of this investigation I have generally limited myself to assessing Kierkegaard’s own account. The enormity of material constituted by the primary texts has made it necessary to limit the investigation in this manner; due to this limitation (and the others mentioned here), the present work can hardly be seen as exhausting the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. The fact that Kierkegaard read Hegel’s texts and had contact with his philosophy from different concrete sources seems to justify a historical approach of this kind. It would be a different matter if one wanted to compare on some thematic issue the thought, for example, of Socrates with that of Confucius, where there was no historical point of contact. In that kind of a study there would be no alternative but to make a thematic analysis in the absence of any actual historical connection. Likewise, a study that wanted to take up an anachronistic relation, such as Kant’s critique of Heidegger, would be obliged to proceed in the same fashion. This methodology is fine on its own terms and perhaps appropriate for any number of studies; however, it seems to me to be a mistake to employ it when one is concerned with philosophical figures who are contemporaries and where at least one of them is known to have had contact with the thought of the other. Given that Kierkegaard in fact knew the works and thought of Hegel, it seems absurd to abstract from this and to try to make comparisons and contrasts, which Kierkegaard himself never conceived of. It would be irresponsible to ignore the enormous body of historicalphilosophical material that could help to document Kierkegaard’s actual contact with Hegel’s primary texts and with the Hegelian movements, in favor of constructing, as it were, a priori an imagined point of contact or connection, which exists only in the mind of the commentator. This body of historical material stands at the disposal of anyone with the requisite language and research skills, and not to use it would amount to making the absurd claim that historical documentation is not relevant or necessary for the exploration of a specific historical connection. This historical material is, to be sure, in need of interpretation, but the parameters of the discussion should, it seems to me, be dictated by it and not by the fantasy of the commentator. Presumably Kierkegaard knew best his Theological Review, 70, 1977, pp. 305–326). Hegel’s account comes in an edition called the Early Theological Writings, which is a collection of manuscripts from his period as a student of theology. These manuscripts were only discovered in the twentieth century and thus were not available to Kierkegaard. Therefore, to compare this analysis with Kierkegaard’s famous account in Fear and Trembling is ahistorical since the latter cannot genuinely be seen as a response to the former. Taylor employs the same procedure in his article, “Love and Forms of Spirit. Kierkegaard vs. Hegel,” (Kierkegaardiana, 10, 1977, pp. 95–116), where he analyzes their respective accounts of love, taking once again Hegel’s Early Theological Writings as his main text for Hegel’s account.

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own intellectual commitments and knew best what he found agreeable or objectionable in Hegel’s philosophy and can do without the help of the modern commentator prompting him on that score. Thus, I wish to make Kierkegaard’s own assessment of Hegel the main object of investigation and not some imagined theme (such as that proposed by Taylor), which never occurred to Kierkegaard himself. Many studies of the major figures of the history of philosophy make little attempt to understand these figures as historical (i.e., as located in a specific cultural and historical context). By contrast, more often than not, they are used as pawns in the current debates that frame our own modern academic world. The result is that these thinkers must be transformed into something new in order to play the requisite role in the context of today, and they thus end up lobbying for causes that they never heard of. Much of the reception of the issue of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel has also been a victim of this. The debate has been conceived along ideological lines in order to support a specific picture of the development of nineteenth-century European philosophy. But in this way Kierkegaard in his own intellectual context has largely been lost sight of. In this investigation I wish to concentrate primarily on the philosophical issues at stake in Kierkegaard’s reaction to Hegel, and for this reason mine is not a historical study in the narrow sense. Thus, I forego giving a detailed account of Kierkegaard’s biography or of the history of Hegelianism in Denmark (although these matters are broached somewhat schematically in my first chapter). This said, in the course of this investigation I have found myself obliged to treat some historical and biographical aspects in an ad hoc fashion because they are relevant for the proper explication of specific passages. But Kierkegaard’s primary texts always dictate the occasions for and the extent of the use of this historical or biographical material. My main interpretative principle has been to try to understand Kierkegaard as he understood himself and was in fact understood or presumably would have been understood by his contemporaries to the degree to which this is possible on the basis of the historical source material relevant for his own writings and for the reception of them. I have thus tried to reconstruct his position in its relation to contemporary discussions with which he is known to have been familiar. This is an important point for the present study since it is impossible to evaluate Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel without also taking into account his relation to the Danish Hegelians. As I will argue at some length below, the bulk of his criticism is aimed at his Danish contemporaries and not at Hegel himself. Thus, in order to identify the targets of Kierkegaard’s criticisms effectively, it is necessary to obtain a clear picture of whom he was arguing against, and this can only be done with a historically oriented interpretative approach. Indeed, many of the most egregious misconceptions of

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Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel stem from an ignorance of the cultural and intellectual milieu in which Kierkegaard lived and wrote. This said, I of course do not want to reduce Kierkegaard to some idiosyncrasy of his local context or deny the universal appeal and importance of his thought and writing. The sentiment of wanting to make Kierkegaard speak to our modern world is doubtless an admirable one. To be sure, far too much research in the history of philosophy treats historical figures or issues as ends in themselves. As a result research tends to lose touch with the question about why such research is interesting, valuable, or relevant in the first place. This should certainly not be the approach when one treats a philosopher from a different age. On the contrary, we should continually pose our modern questions to thinkers of the past and continually ask ourselves about the relevance of our research projects on them. But by the same token, one should avoid being overeager to make the figures of the tradition relevant to the modern world and to our modern ideological agenda, for when we go back to the tradition in order to call up a thinker from the past for insight on a modern problem, we will often find that in the process of bringing that thinker into the modern age we in effect lose important aspects of his or her own thought. When we apply these thinkers from the past to our current problems, we often lose the very essence of those thinkers by abstracting them out of their historical context, and if there was ever a thinker rooted in a specific historical context, it was surely Kierkegaard. There might be some ideas in Kierkegaard that we can extrapolate and build up into a theory that answers to our contemporary world, but when we do this, we must be aware of the fact that, instead of looking back to Kierkegaard for insight, we are rather quite often looking at ourselves in a mirror. It can hardly be anything other than this, given that the problems of our present day world are ours and not his, as is the motivation for constructing an interpretation that makes him palatable to our contemporary views. Moreover, we do Kierkegaard no service by trying to see him as a thinker of our present day. By transferring his views into a context for which they were never intended, we often simply render them ridiculous. Finally, I would like to note that in the present study little attention has been paid to marking out the different positions specifically with respect to the various pseudonyms. I am, of course, aware that this procedure runs counter to much of current Kierkegaard research. Many scholars influenced by the post-modernist trend in contemporary literary theory claim that the key to understanding Kierkegaard’s works is to keep separate the individual pseudonyms and to distinguish as carefully as possible among them. The guiding idea behind this view is that Kierkegaard meticulously conceived of the individual pseudonyms in advance and, as he wrote, invested each of them with its own idiosyncratic voice, language, and philosophical position, which were all different from one another

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and at variance with the views that he argues for in the signed works. This conception is in my opinion mistaken, and I have rejected it for the purposes of the present work for four main reasons. (1) With respect to the subject of this investigation, it became apparent very early on that Kierkegaard’s discussions of Hegel and Hegelianism did not vary among the pseudonyms. On the contrary, the same handful of issues, criticisms, and formulations are repeated again and again with little variation throughout the authorship and thus throughout the different pseudonyms. For example, the charges that Hegel’s system lacks an ethics or that it, despite all its pretensions, remains unfinished can be found in numerous works with various pseudonyms. The consistency and continuity displayed in these discussions and similar ones seems to imply that this handful of issues was in fact what interested Kierkegaard himself and was not something he artificially invented in order to ascribe to a pseudonymous author. Moreover, this seems to be confirmed by the fact that precisely the same criticisms and formulations appear again and again in the unpublished journals and papers as well. Thus, with all theoretical issues aside, it would have little meaning, with respect to this particular study, to insist rigorously on the distinctions that are purportedly implied by the pseudonyms. (2) Recent philological research on the genesis of Kierkegaard’s writings has called into question the weight that one should attribute to the different pseudonyms generally.110 From this research it is clear that Kierkegaard originally planned for certain works to appear under his own name and only at the last minute removed his name and added a pseudonym. This is precisely the way in which Vigilius Haufniensis came to be the author of The Concept of Anxiety, which was planned and written entirely under the presupposition that it would appear under Kierkegaard’s own name. In earlier drafts Kierkegaard’s name appears as the author on the title page, but on the clean copy of the manuscript, which Kierkegaard submitted to the printer, the lower part of the page has been cut off precisely below the word “by,” and Kierkegaard has then at the last minute added at the bottom right-hand side of the page the name of the pseudonymous author, “Vigilius Haufniensis.” In addition, he scratched out his own initials after the motto of the book, which follows the title page, and has once again added the name, “Vigilius Haufniensis.” However, while he made these quick changes, Kierkegaard forgot that other parts of the text could only refer to himself and not to his pseudonym. For example, in a footnote Kierkegaard refers to his 110

Søren Bruun, “Tekstredegørelse” to Begrebet Angest in SKS, vol. K4, pp. 307–339. See also Søren Bruun, “The Genesis of The Concept of Anxiety,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2001, pp. 1–14.

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stay in Berlin in 1841–42, where he attended Schelling’s lectures.111 This only makes sense as an allusion to Kierkegaard’s own biography and not to that of the pseudonymous author. This example is far from being anomalous in Kierkegaard’s works. Philosophical Fragments was also intended to be a signed text, and even in the clean copy Kierkegaard’s own name appears as the author; only at the last minute did Kierkegaard replace it by “Johannes Climacus” and thus relegate himself to the role of editor.112 Here there can be no talk of Kierkegaard consciously constructing a characteristic voice or position for the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis or Johannes Climacus since he only decided at the last minute to have the works appear pseudonymously. Indeed, everything points to the fact that both of these pseudonyms are completely ad hoc inventions. (3) The philological research gives evidence of an indiscriminate use of material between the pseudonymous and the signed works. Kierkegaard’s polemical text Prefaces provides an example of this.113 Although ultimately the work appeared under the pseudonym Nicolaus Notabene, the individual parts of the text were originally written for different purposes before the idea of publishing them together under a single title with this pseudonym occurred to Kierkegaard. For example, Preface II was originally intended as a book-review of Christian Winther’s Four Novels.114 At the time when Kierkegaard wrote this text, it was conceived to be a signed work just like his other book-reviews (i.e., From the Papers of One Still Living and later the review of Two Ages). Only when he hit upon the idea for the work Prefaces was this text assigned the pseudonym Nicolaus Notabene. Similarly, Preface VII was originally written as the Preface to The Concept of Anxiety, but Kierkegaard decided to remove it from that context because it was too polemical. Thus, it represents a text that he originally conceived to be written in his own name, and then presumably changed to the pseudonym of The Concept of Anxiety (i.e., Vigilius Haufniensis), and finally changed again to the pseudonym Nicolaus Notabene for inclusion in Prefaces. Thus, with regard to this text, it is difficult to claim that one should ascribe great significance to the fact that it is ultimately attributed to Nicolaus Notabene, qua pseudonym, since Kierkegaard seems to have used the material indiscriminately between the two texts and among the three authors (i.e., his own name and then the two pseudonyms). 111 112 113 114

CA, p. 59fn.; SKS, vol. 4, p. 364fn. See also CA, p. 21fn.; SKS, vol. 4, p. 328fn. Jette Knudsen and Johnny Kondrup, “Tekstredegørelse” to Philosophiske Smuler in SKS, vol. K4, pp. 171–196, especially pp. 192–193. See Johnny Kondrup and Kim Ravn, “Tekstredegørelse” to Forord, in SKS, vol. K4, Section 3, “Tilblivelseshistorie,” pp. 542–564. I.e., Christian Winther, Fire Noveller, Copenhagen 1843. See Pap. V B 81.

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(4) Finally, when discussing this issue, one must constantly bear in mind that the use of pseudonyms and anonyms was commonplace in Copenhagen in the first half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, virtually every major writer used a pseudonym at one time or another, including thinkers as antithetical to Kierkegaard as Bishop Mynster. The reason for this was the small size of the intellectual community in Denmark where the leading figures were all personally acquainted. Copenhagen was considered a market-town and not a cosmopolitan European capital on a par with Paris or Berlin.115 The aforementioned Johan Ludvig Heiberg, one of Denmark’s leading men of letters at the time, complains of the provincial nature of Copenhagen in an article from 1828.116 Heiberg says explicitly that Copenhagen is a place where everyone knows everyone. As a result, the use of a pseudonym was simply a common precaution used to avoid embarrassment or unnecessary offense. When the matter is seen from this perspective, it is clear that it would be a mistake to read much more into Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms than this simple function. For all of these reasons, I have not placed much weight on the issue of the different pseudonyms for the purposes of the present study, although I of course recognize that this runs somewhat contrary to Kierkegaard’s own emphasis on them. It should be noted that this is only a negative statement about my own methodology (i.e., one that explains why the methodology I have employed here is not in line with one of the main interpretive trends in contemporary Kierkegaard research). It is thus not to be construed as a positive statement about the theoretical role of the pseudonyms in Kierkegaard generally. This is, of course, a large issue that cannot be adequately treated in this context. Although I have paid little attention to the use of the different pseudonyms in Kierkegaard’s works, I have, by contrast, made a great deal of his frequent use of hidden references to his contemporaries, references that, I would like to argue, can be conceived as a kind of code. When he wanted to criticize one of his contemporaries, he often did so indirectly; instead of using the names of his opponents, he made use of anonyms, such as Dr. Hjortespring117 (which he used to refer to Heiberg), or, as in the passage quoted earlier in Section I, Mr. A. A., Mr. B. B and 115 116

117

See George Pattison, ‘Poor Paris!’ Kierkegaard’s Critique of the Spectacular City (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 2), Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 1999. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Om den i det offentlige Liv herskende Tone,” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, 1828, no. 86, article II. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 8, p. 452.) “It is well-known that in a good many respects our good Copenhagen answers poorly to the concept of a large and populous capital city. Daily we are made the subject of laughter among foreigners, who look with amazement at how we here are all birds of the same feather, where everyone knows everyone else, to the extent that it is even fashionable to call strangers, persons quite unknown to one, gentlemen and ladies alike, by their first names.” CUP1, p. 184; SKS, vol. 7, p. 169f.

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Mr. C. C. Just as Kierkegaard used pseudonyms in an attempt to remain anonymous as an author, so also he used anonyms for his intellectual enemies in order to give them at least a semblance of anonymity. He also availed himself of a handful of key phrases or terms which he clearly associated with particular individuals. This was perhaps a part of the strategy of indirect communication. The key terms and anonyms functioned as a kind of code for Kierkegaard’s contemporary readers, who were doubtless able to identify the real targets of the criticism by means of them. In connection with the Corsair affair, Kierkegaard, in line with Heiberg’s aforementioned comment, laments the fact that the small size of Copenhagen, in contrast to Paris or Berlin, obliges one as an author to make certain concessions when criticizing others; he says that one must “use precautionary procedures,”118 which would not be necessary in a larger literary scene: in a smaller setting “other rules of procedure must be adopted. In a limited setting, it is never wise to want to live in the delusion that one is living in a large setting; it is better to know the circumstances and then to act according to them.”119 He uses the metaphor of sediment to describe bad literary works and complains that one must use indirect methods in criticizing them in a small literary scene: “In a limited literary setting, it is, regrettably, impossible to express in an ordinary way that sediment is sediment, because we live so close to one another.”120 This explains at least in part why Kierkegaard availed himself of pseudonyms, anonyms and code words. For Kierkegaard’s contemporaries, seeing through the code was presumably a relatively simple matter, but unfortunately the passage of time has rendered it more cryptic. The modern reader can nonetheless reconstruct at least a part of it by going back and examining the works of some of his contemporary opponents. Once one decodes the references and learns who his real targets are, one gains a picture of the various texts and of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, which is entirely different from the mistaken one that has enjoyed such wide currency heretofore. The historical aspect of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, which is emphasized in the present investigation, remains very much unexplored in Kierkegaard studies in general and above all in the anglophone literature. Although there is no shortage of studies on the Hegel-Kierkegaard connection, there has been very little work done in any language that puts this connection into any historical-philosophical perspective or attempts to ground it with historical documentation. The hope is that this book will go some distance toward filling this gap in the literature. 118 119 120

COR, Supplement, p. 204; Pap. VII-1 B 72, p. 260. COR, Supplement, p. 206; Pap. VII-1 B 72, p. 261. COR, Supplement, p. 205; Pap. VII-1 B 72, p. 260.

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introduction

The goal of my investigation is to locate Kierkegaard in his proper historical-philosophical context so that it is possible to obtain a truer picture of his relation to Hegel than the reigning view has provided. In this way I hope to uncover the true targets of his criticisms. By tracing Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel through the three stages outlined earlier, I will demonstrate the main negative thesis of the present study, namely, that Kierkegaard never had the anti-Hegel campaign that he is so often thought to have had. By examining Kierkegaard’s works individually, I hope to establish my positive thesis that there are a number of heretofore neglected points of positive influence of Hegel on Kierkegaard. The goal of the present study is ultimately to call into question a number of preconceived beliefs about Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel and, as a result, about the development of Continental philosophy. This will, I hope, occasion a fundamental reevaluation of the standard interpretation of Kierkegaard’s role in this philosophical tradition.

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1 KIERKEGAARD AND DANISH HEGELIANISM

Before I turn to an examination of Kierkegaard’s texts, it will be useful to say something about the intellectual scene in Denmark during the first half of the nineteenth century and Hegel’s influence on it. As was indicated in the Introduction, due to the enormous mass of material it is impossible in the context of this investigation to give a detailed account of the history of Hegelianism in Denmark. Nonetheless, it will be useful here at the outset to discuss briefly some of the most important figures involved in the discussion about Hegelianism during Kierkegaard’s lifetime and to examine his contact with them and thus with Hegel’s philosophy at one degree removed. Pursuant of this goal, I have dedicated the second and third sections of the present chapter to a brief review of the principal adherents and critics of Hegelianism in Denmark during the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s. It should be noted that my account can be nothing more than a cursory overview, appropriate only for the limited purposes of the present study. In addition to orienting the reader in Kierkegaard’s historical context, my goal is to introduce the various personalities and their main works so that they will not be completely unfamiliar when I come, in the body of this study, to discuss them in an ad hoc fashion in connection with my analyses of Kierkegaard’s texts.

i. right and left hegelianism in prussia and the german states A natural presupposition for the Hegelian movement in Denmark is, of course, the development of the Hegelian schools in Prussia and Germany, which I will endeavor to sketch here in a most cursory fashion. This account must, however, be prefaced by a brief caveat about the word “Hegelian.” Works on the history of philosophy often tend to paint in broad strokes. Tidy, yet distorting categories are used to characterize long periods in the history of ideas. One such category that is frequently applied to much of nineteenth-century European philosophy is 45

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“Hegelianism.” There is a tendency to regard the so-called Hegelians as second-rate minds, the idea being that these thinkers simply popularized and promulgated Hegel’s thought without adding anything new or original of their own. This, however, misunderstands the nature of the Hegelian schools, which were constantly developing on the basis of new interpretations of Hegel’s thought as well as changing social and political circumstances. Thus, the Hegelian schools cannot be seen as simply a banal repetition of Hegel’s own ideas. Instead, the Hegelians in both Germany and Denmark were highly original thinkers in their own right, who responded to the most important intellectual and socio-political challenges of their day. Moreover, they applied the basic principles of Hegel’s philosophy to new problems, issues, and fields, often in quite original ways with novel results. The academic scene in Prussia and the German states in the 1820s and 1830s had Berlin as its focal point. Since its founding in 1810, the University of Berlin had attracted the most prestigious scholars in the German-speaking world and in a short time had eclipsed Jena as the leading university in Germany. During the 1820s the faculty in Berlin boasted names such as Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), Johann August Wilhelm Neander (1789–1850), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788– 1860), and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834). In 1818 Hegel, then in Heidelberg, accepted the offer of a professorship in the Prussian capital where he was to stay until his death in 1831. Hegel’s Berlin period represents the zenith of his philosophical career. It was there that in 1821 he published his last major work, the Philosophy of Right. But it was perhaps less through his written work than through his popular lectures that he was able to exert a powerful influence on his contemporaries and to dominate German academic life as no one since Kant had been able to do. His lectures during this period attracted the most able students of an entire generation, among whom figured the likes of Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), Bruno Bauer (1809–82), David Friedrich Strauss (1808– 74), and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72). It was primarily in Berlin that Hegel delivered his celebrated lectures on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy. After his death Hegel’s students collected, collated, and edited their notes from these lectures and published them as a part of the first collected edition of Hegel’s works.1 Today these lecture notes constitute an important source, which supplements the writings by Hegel’s own hand. In addition to his lectures, Hegel’s popularity also grew through his work as editor 1

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich F¨orster, Eduard Gans, Karl Hegel, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Marheineke, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Karl Rosenkranz, and Johannes Schulze, Berlin 1832–45.

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of the journal, Jahrb¨ucher f¨ur wissenschaftliche Kritik, which appeared for the first time in 1826. This was referred to simply as “the Hegel journal” and became an important organ for the dissemination of his philosophy already during his lifetime and long after his death. Given Hegel’s enormous popularity and the intrinsic obscurity of his writings, it is hardly surprising that after his death in 1831 there was a scramble among his students for the rights to his philosophical heritage. The rise of the factions known as the “right” and “left Hegelians” has been well explored by intellectual historians,2 and it will suffice for the purposes of the present study to outline the basic contours of the debate without entering into its details. The best-known battlefield of the Hegelian factions was in the political sphere, but it was in the fields of philosophy of religion and theology where the distinctive schools of Hegelianism were originally formed. (In particular, the latter was important for the discussion about Hegel’s thought in Denmark and thus for Kierkegaard.) The difficulty of Hegel’s varied pronouncements on religion made for fertile ground for this debate. The school known as right Hegelianism argued that Hegel held conventional religious views and that his philosophy was ultimately compatible with traditional Christianity. Among the most prominent members of this faction were Karl Friedrich G¨oschel (1784–1861), Karl Daub (1765–1836), Philipp Marheineke (1780–1846), and Karl Ludwig Michelet (1801–93). They argued that Hegel’s philosophy provided the key for a true understanding of Christianity by showing it to be built on a system of metaphors or representations [Vorstellungen] which can be unveiled and grasped by thought. Once understood correctly, these representations take on their true and eternal meaning. For these theologians, Hegel’s thought did not present a threat to orthodoxy, but, on the contrary, would strengthen and invigorate it. They claimed that the notion of a personal God could still be maintained according to Hegel’s premises. Moreover, they argued that Hegel’s philosophy was fully consistent with the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Left Hegelianism was represented by figures such as David Friedrich Strauss and Ludwig Feuerbach. They drew radically different conclusions from the same basic premises of Hegel’s philosophy of religion. Strauss’ influential Das Leben Jesu3 interprets in a negative way Hegel’s claim about 2

3

E.g., William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press 1970. Jacques D’Hondt, Hegel et h´eg´elianisme, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1982. George Lasson, Was heißt Hegelianismus? Berlin: Reuther & Reichard 1916. Robert MacKintosh, Hegel and Hegelianism, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1903. Willy Moog, Hegel und die Hegelsche Schule, Munich: Verlag Ernst Reinhardt 1930. Ren´e Serreau, Hegel et h´eg´elianisme, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1963. John Edward Toews, Hegelianism: the Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805–1841, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980. David Friedrich Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, vols. 1–2, Tubingen ¨ 1835–36.

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the representational form of religious thinking, arguing that the stories featured in the history of Judaism and Christianity are nothing but insubstantial myths or mere representations with no genuine basis in reality. Moreover, the notion of the incarnation of Christ is merely a metaphorical way of saying that the divine exists in all human beings. Similarly, Feuerbach argued in his Das Wesen des Christentums 4 that since Hegel’s philosophy demonstrated that all reality is necessarily constructed with categories of human thought, God is nothing more than a projection of the human mind according to these categories. As a mere projection of human thought, Christianity can make no claim to possess ultimate ontological truth but rather is merely one of many transitory forms of human consciousness. Feuerbach also set off a debate about Hegel’s views on the immortality of the soul when he anonymously published his Gedanken u¨ ber Tod und Unsterblichkeit.5 In this work he argues from Hegelian premises against any doctrine of personal immortality. Thus, left Hegelianism denied the ontological basis of Christianity along with some of its most important doctrines such as the notion of a personal God and the immortality of the soul. According to the left Hegelians, Hegel’s God was, if anything, pantheistic and impersonal. In time the left Hegelians began to shift the terrain of the debate from the religious to the political sphere, where the terms “right” and “left” are usually employed. The right Hegelians such as Hegel’s biographer Karl Rosenkranz (1805–79) and Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–92) emphasized the immanent reason in the existing order as resulting from the development of spirit through the ages. They defended a form of whiggism, welcoming new historical developments such as the rise of modern technology and the advancement of the natural sciences as unambiguous signs of the progress of world spirit and the realization of human freedom. They differed from the left Hegelians in that they regarded as misguided and impertinent the desire to overthrow the contemporary social and political order, which world spirit had taken so long to construct. It should be noted that the right Hegelians were by no means hopeless reactionaries but were usually advocates of a constitutional monarchy. Only a few extreme cases ever argued that existing institutions were the product of the rational divine will or that Hegel’s famous statement that the rational is the actual and the actual the rational6 is to be interpreted to mean that actual existing conditions and institutions,

4 5

6

Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig 1841. Kierkegaard owned the second edition from 1843 (ASKB 488), which contained significant changes. Ludwig Feuerbach, Gedanken u¨ ber Tod und Unsterblichkeit aus den Papieren eines Denkers, nebst einem Anhang theologisch-satyrischer Xenien, herausgegeben von einem seiner Freunde, Nuremburg ¨ 1830. PR, Preface, p. 20; Jub., vol. 7, p. 33. EL, § 6; Jub., vol. 8, p. 48.

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whatever they might be, are rational and ipso facto philosophically justified.7 It should be noted that during this period the kinds of intellectual tendencies that paraded under the name of “Hegelianism” were quite heterogeneous. As one intellectual historian writes, “Like all the parties at the time, the Young Hegelians never formed a rigid phalanx of thought. Unity never meant unanimity; the party never transcended the individuals who composed it.”8 The same can be said of the right Hegelians. As is common with any intellectual trend, what originated in a set of primary texts and teachings from a single author was quickly appropriated for use in very different contexts in ways that its originator could never have foreseen and would hardly have condoned. Indeed, the disputes which formed the basis of the divisions within the Hegelian schools is demonstration enough that the people designated as “Hegelians” in fact had radically different opinions on any number of themes, not the least of which were religion and politics. The attempt of Arnold Ruge (1802– 80) to create a kind of literary Hegelian party through his journalistic efforts failed due not merely to the Prussian censors but also to the bitter internal disputes among the various editors and contributors. Moreover, Hegel’s philosophy came to be applied to any number of different fields such as theology, law, history, and the arts. Thus, “Hegelianism” came to be concerned not just with philosophy in Hegel’s sense but with countless other fields and issues that went far beyond his philosophical system. Thus, one should be careful to distinguish between Hegel, strictly speaking, and Hegelianism as a historical phenomena, which often only had a loose connection with his thought. The discussions, criticisms and reevaluations of Hegel’s thought that were taking place in Prussia and the German states were profoundly influential for the intellectual scene elsewhere. As the left Hegelians were sent into exile, they brought with them these discussions and debates about Hegel’s philosophy, which they published in German and other languages in their political and philosophical journals. Just as there was a movement from Prussia and Germany outward as scholars departed from their homeland, so also there was a movement inward as foreign scholars made their pilgrimage to Berlin and learned of Hegel’s philosophy and the debates surrounding it, which they then took back with them 7

8

See Emil L. Fackenheim, “On the Actuality of the Rational and the Rationality of the Actual,” Review of Metaphysics, 89, 1969, pp. 690–698. M. W. Jackson, “Hegel, the Real and the Rational,” International Studies in Philosophy, 19, 1987, pp. 11–19. Yirmiahu Yovel, “Hegel’s Dictum that the Rational Is Actual and the Actual Is Rational,” in Konzepte der Dialektik, ed. by Werner Becker and Wilhelm K. Essler, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1981, pp. 111–127. Adriaan Peperzak, Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1987, pp. 92–103. William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians, op. cit., p. 12.

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when they returned to their native countries. In this way Hegel reached Denmark through the work of Danish scholars who studied or taught in Prussia or the German states. When they returned to Denmark, they brought different aspects of Hegel’s thought to bear on various discussions in contemporary Danish intellectual life.

ii. the danish hegelians Hegel’s philosophy reached Denmark in the mid-1820s and found there a full spectrum of commentators from zealous advocates to bitter critics. The goal of this section is to sketch briefly (1) the main personalities involved in the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark and (2) their biographical relation to Kierkegaard. Although the thinkers to be examined here can be designated as “Danish Hegelians,” one must avoid regarding them as a homogeneous group. The term, “Danish Hegelians” is a rough and ready category by means of which a handful of thinkers with a certain family resemblance can be classified. However, one must bear in mind that each of them interpreted and reacted to Hegel in his own way based on his own education, intellectual interests, and goals. Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that the figures that made up the movement of Danish Hegelianism all thought alike or that they made up a sort of political party or social club with some measure of solidarity. On the contrary, there was a great deal of internal strife among the Danish Hegelians about the proper interpretation and use of Hegel. Like their German counterparts, the Danish Hegelians can best be characterized not by their unanimous agreement on some specific issue but by the internal disagreement about various aspects of Hegel’s thought. When discussing these thinkers, one must thus resist the urge to regard them as uncritical parrots of Hegel (despite the fact that they are often portrayed as such). Probably the leading exponent of Hegelianism in Denmark was the philosopher, poet, literary critic, and dramatist Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791–1860).9 Heiberg was a many-sided genius who played an extremely important role in Danish intellectual history during the so-called Golden Age of Denmark. He came from a family of intellectuals and from an early age knew personalities, such as the poet Adam Oehlenschl¨ager (1779–1850) and the physicist Hans Christian Ørsted (1777–1851). He 9

For more detailed accounts of Heiberg’s life and work see the following: Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, tr. by Frederick J. Marker, New York: Twayne Publishers Inc. 1971. Harald Høffding, “Heiberg og Martensen,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, pp. 129–137. Johanne Luise Heiberg, Et liv genoplevet i erindringen, vols. 1–4, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1973, fifth revised edition. Morten Borup, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1947–49. Paul V. Rubow, Heiberg og hans skole i kritiken, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1953.

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graduated from the University of Copenhagen in 1817 with a dissertation on Spanish literature.10 From 1819–22 he lived in Paris, studying French drama. Later he went to Schleswig-Holstein, then a dukedom belonging to the Danish crown, where he taught at the University of Kiel from 1822 to 1824. There for the first time he came into contact with Hegel’s thought through the Professor of Philosophy, Johan Erik von Berger (1772–1833).11 After having read some of Hegel’s works himself, Heiberg became so taken by them that he made a journey to Berlin in 1824 in order to meet the philosopher personally. There he attended Hegel’s lectures and met with some of the leading intellectual figures in Berlin. Inspired by Hegel, Heiberg wrote in his native Danish a treatise entitled, On Human Freedom, which he published in the same year.12 This treatise, which Heiberg claimed to be the first work in Danish on Hegel’s philosophy,13 attempted to employ a Hegelian methodology in order to treat the free will controversy, then reigning in Copenhagen, surrounding the claims of the Professor of Medicine, Frantz Howitz (1789–1826).14 Heiberg, by quoting and referring frequently to Hegel’s main works, effectively introduced him into Danish philosophy. This initial work was followed quickly by another short monograph, this time written in German, entitled, Der Zufall, aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Logik betrachtet.15 This work treated concepts such as necessity, probability, and contingency from a Hegelian perspective. It was taken as another declaration of Heiberg’s affiliation with Hegel’s philosophy.16 During this same period, from 1824 to 1825, Heiberg worked on a ¨ book in German entitled Grundlinien zum System der Asthetik als spekula17 tiver Wissenschaft, where he purportedly attempts to work out a theory 10

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, De po¨eseos dramaticæ genere hispanico, et præsertim de Petro Calderone de la Barca, principe dramaticorum, Copenhagen 1817. ASKB 1928. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 11, pp. 1–172.) See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Autobiographiske Fragmenter,” in Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 11, pp. 498ff. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Om den menneskelige Frihed. I Anledning af de nyeste Stridigheder over denne Gjenstand, Kiel 1824. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 1–110.) Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Fortale,” to Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen 1841–43, vol. 1, p. xiv. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 10, p. 590.) See Oluf Thomsen, F. G. Howitz og hans Strid om Villiens Frihed, Copenhagen: Levin og Munksgaard 1924. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Der Zufall, aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Logik betrachtet. Als Einleitung zu einer Theorie des Zufalls, Copenhagen 1825. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 11, pp. 325–359.) Anonymous [Frederik Christian Sibbern], “Der Zufall, aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Logik betrachtet. Als Einleitung zu einer Theorie des Zufalls. Von Dr. I. L. Heiberg. Kopenhagen. Verlag von C. A. Reitzel. Druck von H. F. Popp. 1825. 30 Sider med Titelblad og alt,” Dansk Litteratur-Tidende for 1825, no. 44, p. 691. See “Heiberg an Hegel,” February 20, 1825. Hegel, Briefe III 487; Letter 124 in Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Johan Ludvig Heiberg, vols. 1–5, ed. by Morten Borup, Copenhagen:

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of aesthetics based on Hegel’s speculative system. Regrettably, he never published this work since he was unable to bring it to a satisfactory completion. It is interesting to note that the composition of this study antedated the publication of Hegel’s posthumous Lectures on Aesthetics, which appeared from 1835 to 1838.18 In preparing his manuscript, Heiberg used lecture notes taken by friends who were present at one of Hegel’s courses.19 By writing in German Heiberg hoped (in vain, as it turned out) to obtain an academic position at a German or Prussian university. He returned to Copenhagen in 1825, where he authored a series of theatrical works for the Royal Theater, where he obtained a permanent post in December of 1828. This allowed him the luxury of returning to philosophy and to Hegel. In 1830 Heiberg was appointed as Lecturer in Logic, Aesthetics, and Danish Literature at the newly founded Royal Military Academy,20 the closest he ever came to a university position in philosophy. In 1832 he published as a textbook for his students his Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic.21 This work is largely a paraphrase of Hegel’s Science of Logic. It employs Hegel’s dialectical methodology and in large part follows the structure of Hegel’s text. It was the first major work on Hegel’s logic in the Danish language and was the forerunner of a whole series of books by Danish scholars on the same subject that would appear over the next several years. Heiberg’s most important attempt to introduce Hegelianism in Denmark appeared in 1833 in the form of a short treatise under the title, On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age.22 This work appeared as a pamphlet and was an invitation to a series of philosophical lectures, which were to be based on Hegel’s philosophy. The work caused such controversy, above all for its statements about religion, that the lectures

18

19 20

21

22

Gyldendal 1947–50, vol. 1, pp. 162–163. See Morten Borup, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1947–49, vol. 1, p. 139. The three volumes of Hegel’s aesthetics appeared for the first time as a part of the first edition of Hegel’s collected writings, which was published between 1832 and 1845 by Hegel’s friends and students. Vorlesungen u¨ ber Aesthetik, I–III, ed. by Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Berlin 1835–38, vols. 10-1, 10-2, 10-3 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1– 18, Berlin 1832–45. See “Heiberg an Hegel,” February 20, 1825: Hegel, Briefe III 487; Letter 124 in Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Johan Ludvig Heiberg, ed. by Morten Borup, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 162–163. See Flemming Conrad, Smagen og det nationale. Studier i dansk litteraturhistorieskrivning 1800–1861, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag 1996, pp. 150–179. Morten Borup, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 14–17. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik. Som Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen 1832. (Reprinted as Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger over Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik ved den kongelige militaire Høiskole in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 111– 380.) Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid, Copenhagen 1833. ASKB 568. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 381–460.)

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were never given.23 In it Heiberg analyzes what he perceives as the crisis of his age. He claims that religion and art have lost their once central importance in contemporary life and have been replaced by relativism and nihilism. He thus sees his age as being in a period of crisis, which is in the process of forming itself towards a new world-view. For Heiberg, Hegel’s philosophy alone can provide the framework with which the contemporary chaos of thought can be overcome. Only it offers a viable and stable truth in the face of the waves of relativism, alienation, and nihilism. Only it can unite the various spheres of human life and activity and bring them into a unitary whole by seeing what is necessary in all of them. Like Hegel, Heiberg relegates religion to a secondary role behind philosophy, claiming that while religion grasps the truth of the world only in terms of concrete particulars, thus mistakenly taking the particular for the universal, philosophy grasps the universal or the essential as it is in itself. No doubt due to its controversial nature, this work had a popular appeal and introduced Hegel to a general public beyond trained academics.24 In 1835 Heiberg published his Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military College,25 which was more ambitious than his previous work on logic, although it is considerably shorter. Here Heiberg makes a general case for the truth of idealism, claiming that universal categories of thought underlie all transitory experience. He tries to demonstrate that all human experience ultimately must refer back to thought. Given that thought is the basis of all experience, logic, as the discipline that examines the forms of thought, must be foremost among the sciences. In this work Heiberg picks up on some of the main motifs from On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age. He claims that only the abstract categorial structure of thought can provide the stability lacking in the chaotic present age. In 1837 Heiberg published the first number of a journal under his direction called Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. This review, to which Kierkegaard had a subscription, was conceived by Heiberg as a forum for Hegelian philosophy in Denmark. There is evidence that Kierkegaard originally planned to publish in this journal his book-review of the novel by Hans Christian Andersen (1805–75), Only a Fiddler ; the review was eventually published as an independent monograph under the title From the Papers of One Still Living.26 Although Heiberg’s journal saw only two numbers, it was profoundly influential and occasioned much controversy. In the second number of Perseus, which appeared in August of 1838, 23 24 25

26

See Chapter 2, Section I. Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, op. cit., pp. 132–134. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen 1835. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 461–516.) See Chapter 2, Section IV.

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Heiberg published an article entitled, “The System of Logic.”27 This text contains the first twenty-three paragraphs of a Hegelian system of logic and thus overlaps with the first part of his aforementioned Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic. This article was a response to criticisms of the pretensions of Hegel’s logic to begin without presuppositions with the category of pure being. In 1839 Heiberg was involved in a debate concerning another aspect of Hegel’s logic. Bishop Mynster had written an article entitled, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism,” in which he criticized Hegel’s principle of mediation and his critique of the law of excluded middle.28 Heiberg responded to this with an article entitled, “A Remark on Logic in Reference to the Right Reverend Bishop Mynster’s Treatise on Rationalism and Supernaturalism,” which defends the Hegelian principle of mediation against Mynster’s criticisms.29 This debate attracted much attention, and many of Copenhagen’s leading intellectual figures were involved in it. Heiberg’s Hegelianism focused primarily on two themes which for him were closely bound together: logic and aesthetics. His interest in applying Hegelian philosophy to aesthetics clearly comes from his longstanding interest in poetry and drama. He found in Hegel’s system a way to understand these art forms as representing a higher philosophical truth. He wrote and lectured on logic several times, and all of his works on logic freely use examples from the arts. He indicates that his Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic and his “The System of Logic” are intended to provide the background for his theory of aesthetics.30 He clearly gives aesthetics a more central role in his philosophical thinking than Hegel does. Moreover, he had no qualms about making emendations to Hegel’s system to suit his own purposes. In his works on logic, he makes slight 27

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Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Det logiske System,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 2, 1838, pp. 1–45. ASKB 569. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 113– 166.) Jakob Peter Mynster, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 249–268. (Reprinted in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen 1852–57, vol. 2, pp. 95–115.) Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “En logisk Bemærkning i Anledning af H. H. Hr. Biskop Dr. Mynsters Afhandling om Rationalisme og Supranaturalisme i forrige Hefte af dette Tidsskrift,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 441–456. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 167–190.) See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Det logiske System,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 2, 1838, p. 3. ASKB 569. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 115– 116.): “The author allows himself to present herewith the first contribution to the working out of a long nourished plan, namely to expound the system of logic. . . . Furthermore, he has the goal with the present exposition and its continuation to clear the way for an aesthetics, which he for a long time has wished to write, but which he cannot send out into the world without ahead of time having given it the support in logic upon which it can rest.”

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changes, for example, altering the initial triad – being, nothing and becoming – from Hegel’s original scheme, grouping together being and nothing as the first category, with becoming as the second, and adding determinate being [Tilværen] as the third.31 Thus, while Heiberg generally follows Hegel’s sequence, he weights the individual categories somewhat differently. Likewise, in his response to Oehlenschl¨ager,32 he, apparently unknowingly, diverges from Hegel’s ordering of the poetic arts (presumably since he did not have Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics at his disposal): while Hegel placed epic first, as the immediate form of poetry, and lyric second as mediated, Heiberg treats lyric as immediate and epic as one of three forms of Romantic poetry, which are all mediated.33 Heiberg was able to exercise a considerable influence on the Danishspeaking public since he was one of the leading public figures in diverse aspects of Copenhagen’s intellectual and cultural life throughout the 1820s and 1830s. It would be a distortion to think of him merely as one of the Danish Hegelians since his intellectual activity went far beyond merely promulgating Hegel’s philosophy. He was an elegant spokesman for Hegel’s philosophy due precisely to the fact that he was able to put it in a comprehensible and attractive form. In a letter dated from 1843, Nikolai Fogtmann (1788–1851), Bishop of Aalborg, writes the following to Mynster: “The most important support for Hegelianism among us [in Denmark] is without doubt Prof. Heiberg because he is clever and knows how to give everything that he treats a smooth and shiny appearance.”34 It is difficult to evaluate the degree to which Heiberg can properly be considered a Hegelian or even the degree to which he considered himself one. On the one hand, in his earliest Hegelian period immediately after meeting Hegel in Berlin, he seems to reject the notion that he is a follower of Hegel. He writes the following in a letter a` propos of his recently published work On Human Freedom: I have indeed in this treatise drawn attention to Hegel, without whom a controversy of this kind does not seem to me to be able to take place, but it has not been my intention to declare myself a Hegelian. (I have, moreover, quite a lot against all -ians, regardless of what first name they put before 31

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This deviation from Hegel was criticized by Adler in his review of the work. Adolph Peter Adler, “J. L. Heiberg, Det logiske System, a) Væren og Intet, b) Vorden, c) Tilværen, i Perseus Nr. 2, Kjøbenhavn 1838,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 3, 1840, pp. 474–482. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Svar paa Hr. Oehlenschl¨agers Skrift: ‘Om Kritiken i Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, over Væringerne i Miklagard,’ ” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, 1828, (I, no. 7; II, no. 8; III, no. 10; IV, no. 11; V, no. 12; VI, no. 13; VII, no. 14; VIII, no. 15; IX, no. 16). (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 194–284.) See Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, op. cit., p. 136. See Chapter 2, Section IV. “Letter from Bishop Fogtmann to Mynster, Aalborg, 1843,” in Af efterladte Breve til J.P. Mynster, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, Copenhagen 1862, p. 227.

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kierkegaard and danish hegelianism this, their family name, which an etymologist perhaps might think to derive from “asinus.”) My presentation is, as far as I know, quite my own and even different from Hegel’s, at least in the method, although indeed in the main point it is in agreement with the Hegelian thought.35

From this it is clear that Heiberg does not want to claim the title “Hegelian” and indeed is critical of those who do. Moreover, the many deviations from Hegel’s works that Heiberg allows himself suggest that he regards himself as an independent thinker inspired by, but not a slave to, Hegel. On the other hand, in his “Autobiographical Fragments” written in 1839, Heiberg describes his encounter with Hegel’s philosophy in almost evangelical terms. He recalls how, upon his return trip from Berlin after meeting Hegel, he suddenly grasped the essence of the Hegelian system in a kind of revelation: While resting on the way home in Hamburg, where I stayed six weeks before returning to Kiel, and during that time was constantly pondering what was still obscure to me, it happened one day that, sitting in my room in the K¨onig von England with Hegel on my table and in my thoughts, and listening at the same time to the beautiful psalms which sounded almost unceasingly from the chimes of St. Peter’s Church, suddenly, in a way which I have experienced neither before nor since, I was gripped by a momentary inner vision, as if a flash of lightning had illuminated the whole region for me and awakened in me the theretofore hidden central thought. From this moment the system in its broad outline was clear to me, and I was completely convinced that I had grasped it in its innermost core, regardless of however much there might be in the details which I still had not made my own and perhaps will never come to make my own.36

Moreover, the fact that Heiberg felt obliged to defend Hegel against the criticisms leveled by Mynster and others seems to speak for his Hegelianism as being a part of his self-understanding. Finally, in Copenhagen at the time it seems to have been generally known that Heiberg was a Hegelian. Given these ambiguities in his relation to Hegel, the label “Hegelian” cannot be applied to Heiberg without some qualifications. 35

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Letter 126, “J.L. Heiberg til H.C. Ørsted,” March 25, 1825, from Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Johan Ludvig Heiberg, ed. by Morten Borup, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 164–165. In the same letter Heiberg expresses reservations about his own aptitude and disposition for presenting Hegel’s philosophy to others: “But with what concerns me, I dare not give myself credit for a sufficient knowledge of this system to discharge such a difficult task, and I likewise do not know how far I would be successful in an undertaking of this kind since I feel a greater inclination to present my own ideas than to set myself into a foreign train of thought so completely, which would be necessary for this.” Ibid., p. 167. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Autobiographiske Fragmenter,” in Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 500. (Excerpts from and paraphrases of this text were originally published in Christian Molbech, Dansk poetisk Anthologie, vols. 1–4, Copenhagen 1830–40, vol. 4, pp. 243–300, p. 275.)

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Kierkegaard’s relation to Heiberg was by no means transparent. Despite his later criticisms, Kierkegaard seems in fact to have been something of a follower of Heiberg for a period.37 As a student, he read Heiberg and seems to have been anxious to win his approbation and to be accepted into the Heiberg circle of aesthetics and criticism.38 In his student days Kierkegaard published articles in Heiberg’s influential journal Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post39 and is said to have attended soir´ees at Heiberg’s home.40 Their relationship seems nonetheless to have been a rather formal one. Since Kierkegaard did not cultivate a deeper friendship with Heiberg, he was not obliged later to temper or qualify his criticism. What seems particularly to have turned Kierkegaard against Heiberg was a short book-review of Either/Or that Heiberg wrote in his journal Intelligensblade,41 in which he criticized the work in a rather dismissive manner. From this point on Kierkegaard had nothing but scorn for Heiberg. Under the name of the pseudonymous editor of the work, Victor Eremita, he first published a polemical response to this review with the title, “A Word of Thanks to Professor Heiberg.”42 In another article in his journal Urania,43 Heiberg discussed briefly Kierkegaard’s Repetition and once again evoked his anger. After writing drafts of different responses,44 Kierkegaard settled on the idea for his work Prefaces, which was his most extended polemic with Heiberg. The affectation and zeal of Heiberg’s Hegelian revelation evoked Kierkegaard’s satire. In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus satirizes the account, quoted previously, which he describes as Heiberg’s miraculous conversion to Hegelianism, referring to him as “Dr. Hjortespring”: “But I have no miracle to appeal to; ah, that was Dr. Hjortespring’s happy fate! According to his own very well 37

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See Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, tr. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven, Connecticut, and London: Yale University Press 1980, pp. 135–149. Sejer Kuhle, ¨ “Søren Kierkegaard og den heibergske Kreds,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 68, series 12, vol. 2, 1947, pp. 1–13. See H. P. Holst’s Letter to H. P. Barfod, September 13, 1869, in Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 13. For an account of the significance of this journal, see Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, op. cit., pp. 118–141. Recounted in Henrik Hertz’s diaries, in Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., p. 218. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Litterær Vintersæd,” Intelligensblade, vol. 2, no. 24, March 1, 1843, pp. 285–292. ASKB U 56. In COR, pp. 17–21; SV1, vol. 13, pp. 411–415. Fædrelandet, no. 1168, March 5,1843. See Chapter 10, Section I. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Det astronomiske Aar,” Urania, 1844, pp. 77–160. ASKB U 57. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 9, pp. 51–130.) Namely, “Open Letter to Professor Heiberg, Knight of Dannebrog from Constantin Constantius,” R, Supplement, pp. 283–298; Pap. IV B 110–111, pp. 258–274. “A Little Contribution by Constantin Constantius, Author of Repetition,” R, Supplement, pp. 299–319; Pap. IV B 112–117, pp. 275–300.

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written report, he became an adherent of Hegelian philosophy through a miracle at Streit Hotel in Hamburg on Easter morning . . . an adherent of the philosophy that assumes that there are no miracles. Marvelous sign of the times!”45 Kierkegaard had no patience for Heiberg’s unqualified enthusiasm for Hegel and constantly made it the object of satire. After the dispute had calmed down somewhat, Heiberg and his family remained important for Kierkegaard. In 1846 Kierkegaard published a lengthy book-review of a novel entitled Two Ages, which was published by Heiberg and authored anonymously by Heiberg’s mother, the gifted Thomasine Christine Gyllembourg-Ehrensv¨ard (1773–1856), who was one of Denmark’s leading novelists of the day. In 1847 Kierkegaard published a series of articles under the title, The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, which was about Heiberg’s wife, Johanne Luise Heiberg (1812– 90), who was a celebrated actress in Copenhagen’s theater scene.46 Thus, even though the polemic with Heiberg faded in time, Kierkegaard continued to be interested in the Heiberg circle throughout his life. The second important spokesman for Hegelianism in Denmark was the theologian Hans Lassen Martensen (1808–84). Although his zeal was clearly more moderate than Heiberg’s, Martensen must be counted as one of the most important sources regarding Hegel’s philosophy for his fellow countrymen. One must be particularly careful not to regard Martensen as an uncritical Hegelian, although this is the picture that Kierkegaard paints of him. It must be stated that Martensen did not regard himself as a Hegelian per se and in fact offered many criticisms of Hegel throughout his career. In any case, there can be no doubt about the fact that he was extremely important for the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark. Martensen was born in Flensborg, the son of a German mother and a Danish father, and thus learned the German language and culture from his earliest childhood.47 He lived in Copenhagen from 1817 to 1834 45

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CUP1, p. 184; SKS, vol. 7, p. 169. See also “Hired waiters presumably are not needed. – Yet all is not thereby past – Heiberg himself is a diplomat, before that miracle in Hamburg, where through a miracle he gained an understanding of and became an adherent of a philosophy that (remarkably enough) does not accept miracles”(FT, Supplement, p. 324; Pap. IV B 124, in Pap. XIII, p. 364). Also in his journals he writes: “Who has forgotten the beautiful Easter morning when Prof. Heiberg arose to understand Hegelian philosophy, as he himself has so edifyingly explained it – was this not a leap? Or did someone dream it?”( JP, vol. 3, 2347; Pap. V C 3). In the Concept of Anxiety he writes: “The system is supposed to have such marvelous transparency and inner vision that in the manner of the omphalopsychoi [navel souls] it would gaze immovably at the central nothing until at last everything would explain itself and its whole content would come into being by itself. Such introverted openness to the public was to characterize the system”(CA, p. 81; SKS, vol. 4, p. 384). See Johanne Luise Heiberg, Et liv genoplevet i erindringen, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 172–176. Of singular importance for the details about Martensen’s life is his autobiography: Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1882–83. See also the following: Skat Arildsen, Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og

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and received his degree in theology from the university there in 1832. Kierkegaard knew Martensen from his early student days. In Summer Semester 1834 Martensen was his teacher at the University of Copenhagen for private tutorials on Schleiermacher’s Der christliche Glaube.48 That same year Martensen traveled to Germany in order to learn more about Hegel and German philosophy. Naturally enough, he first journeyed to Berlin where Hegelianism was still thriving.49 There he made the acquaintance of Marheineke, who was the dominant figure on the scene. In a letter from Berlin dated December 20, 1834, Martensen describes as follows the current state of Hegelianism: “Hegel’s philosophy still attracts the greatest interest in philosophy circles in Germany despite its many bad disciples and the many attacks which have been made on it. I do not think that it has been surpassed yet; one must fight against it until one either overcomes it or is oneself overcome by it.”50 From Berlin he continued on to Heidelberg where he met with the aforementioned Hegelian theologian, Karl Daub, who tried to employ Hegel’s dialectical methodology to further the ends of Protestantism. Martensen went on to Tubingen ¨ and met Strauss, whose Das Leben Jesu had just appeared and was causing much controversy. The next stop on his tour was Munich where he attended Schelling’s lectures and made the acquaintance of the speculative theologian Franz von Baader (1765–1841). Martensen continued to Vienna and eventually to Paris where he met Heiberg, in whom he found a friend and ally in philosophical matters.51 After these extensive travels, Martensen returned to Copenhagen in 1836 to formulate his own views on Hegelianism and speculative philosophy. He was appointed Lecturer of Systematic Theology at the University

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Arbejde, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1932. See also Harald Høffding, “Heiberg og Martensen,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, pp. 137–146. Josepha Martensen, H. L. Martensen i sit Hjem og blandt sine Venner, Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag 1918. C. I. Scharling (ed.), H. L. Martensen. Hans Tanker og Livssyn, Copenhagen: P. Haase & Søns Forlag 1928. Jens Holger Schjørring, “H. L. Martensen,” in his Teologi og filosofi. Nogle analyser og dokumenter vedrørende Hegelianismen i dansk teologi, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1974, pp. 27–35. For an account in English see Jens Holger Schjørring, “Martensen,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulov´a Thulstrup (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10), Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1982, pp. 177–207. See also the Introduction by Curtis L. Thompson in Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion, tr. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, Atlanta: Scholars Press 1997, pp. 1–71. See JP, vol. 4, 3843–3844; Pap. I C 20, in Pap. XII, pp. 126–131. See also Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 78. See Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 85ff. See also Martensen’s letter to H. C. Ørsted from December 20, 1834 in Breve fra og til Hans Christian Ørsted, ed. by Mathilde Ørsted, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen 1870, vol. 2, pp. 134–140. “Letter to H.C. Ørsted” from December 20, 1834 in Breve fra og til Hans Christian Ørsted, ed. by Mathilde Ørsted, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 135. See Johanne Luise Heiberg, Et liv genoplevet i erindringen, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 281–282. See also Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 218–227, vol. 2, pp. 24–39.

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of Copenhagen, later becoming a full professor in 1840. During this period, Martensen seems to have been quite enthusiastic about Hegel’s philosophy of religion, praising Hegel for recognizing the conceptual necessity of religious thought. In 1836 in the journal, Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Martensen reviewed Heiberg’s aforementioned Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military College.52 There he gave a generally positive assessment of Hegelian philosophy, claiming that it is the greatest philosophical achievement of the modern age. He nonetheless criticizes certain aspects of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, criticisms to which Kierkegaard was attentive.53 In 1837 Martensen completed his dissertation, written in Latin, which was entitled, On the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness.54 There he criticized the notion of autonomy which he saw as characteristic of modern thought such as Hegel’s. At the University of Copenhagen in Winter Semester 1837–38 Martensen gave a course entitled “Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics,” which Kierkegaard attended.55 The lectures continued through Summer Semester 1838 and Winter Semester 1838–39.56 In these lectures he developed a philosophy of religion with some affinities to Hegel. In Winter Semester 1838–39 Martensen gave a survey of German philosophy under the title, “Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy from Kant to Hegel.” Among Kierkegaard’s journals and papers there are notes to this course written in someone else’s hand.57 These lectures were popular and evoked much academic discussion and even controversy. It was the success of Martensen’s lectures that occasioned Heiberg to declare that Hegel’s philosophy had finally become a causa victrix in Danish intellectual life.58 At this time Martensen also betrayed his allegiance to Hegelianism with his lectures on moral philosophy, which he later published. In 1839 he, like Heiberg, defended 52

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Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole. Af J. L. Heiberg, Lærer i Logik og Æsthetik ved den kgl. militaire Høiskole,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, 16, 1836, pp. 515–528. See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980, p. 93. Hans Lassen Martensen, De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta, Copenhagen 1837. ASKB 648. Danish translation: Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie, tr. by L. V. Petersen, Copenhagen 1841. ASKB 651. English translation: The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology, in Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion, tr. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, op. cit., pp. 73–147. SKS, vol. 19, pp. 125–143, Not4:3–12. A complete list of Martensen’s lectures can be found in Skat Arildsen, Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde, op. cit., pp. 156–158. SKS, vol. 18, pp. 374–386, KK:11. See also Pap. II C 27–28, in Pap. XIII, pp. 3–116. Pap. II C 25, in Pap. XII, pp. 316–331. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Fortale,” to Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen 1841–43, vol. 1, p. xv. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 10, p. 591.)

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Hegel’s critique of the law of excluded middle against Bishop Mynster’s criticism.59 He argued that the principle of mediation was the principle of Christianity since the doctrine of the incarnation could not be understood without it. Martensen was a charismatic figure who attracted many students. In the journals from 1849, Kierkegaard, looking back on his student days, describes Martensen as creating “quite a sensation”60 at the University of Copenhagen. Martensen’s popularity among the students earned him not merely Kierkegaard’s animosity but also attracted much attention in the Danish intellectual community generally. Martensen’s lectures brought him into the public eye and functioned as a sort of forum for the general debate about the legitimacy of the introduction of Hegelian philosophy into theological questions.61 As a result of his promulgation of Hegel’s doctrines among the students, he quickly became the object of public criticism by an anonymous critic in Kjøbenhavnsposten.62 Critics harped on the fundamental differences between Hegel’s speculative philosophy and Protestantism, which they claimed were ultimately incompatible. For a time Martensen made an attempt to defend himself against these criticisms and tried to maintain a Hegelian position. As late as 1841 he published a work entitled, Outline of the System of Moral Philosophy,63 which bears a decidedly Hegelian stamp.64 But in 1842, however, Martensen experienced a crisis as a result of new publications by some of the left Hegelians who were unapologetically critical of religion and Christianity in particular. Ludwig Feuerbach’s Wesen 59

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Hans Lassen Martensen, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii i Anledning af H. H. Biskop Mynsters Afhandling herom i dette Tidsskrifts forrige Hefte,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 456–473. PF, Supplement, pp. 226–227; Pap. X-2 A 155, p. 117. Translation slightly modified. See Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, op. cit., pp. 139–140. Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue p˚a Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag A/S 1990, pp. 27ff. See the anonymous criticism: “Nogle Træk til en Charakteristik af den philosophiske Aand, som for Tiden findes hos de Studerende ved Kjøbenhavns Universitet,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 14, no. 25, January 26, 1840, pp. 97–99. Martensen’s response: “Philosophisk Beskedenhed i Kjøbenhavnsposten,” Fædrelandet, vol. 1, no. 50, January 29, 1840, pp. 259–261. The anonymous rejoinder: “Philosophiske Suffisance i Fædrelandet,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 14, no. 31, February 1, 1840, pp. 121–124. Martensen’s response “Erklæring,” Fædrelandet, vol. 1, no. 56, February 4, 1840, pp. 315–316. The final article, “Sidste Indlæg: Sagen contra Lector Martensen som Mandatarius for Hegel & Comp,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 14, no. 41, February 11, 1840, pp. 161–163. Hans Lassen Martensen, Grundrids til Moralphilosophiens System, Copenhagen 1841. ASKB 650. English translation: Outline to a System of Moral Philosophy, in Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion, tr. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, op. cit., pp. 245–313. See the review: Peter Michael Stilling, “Grundrids til Moralphilosophiens System, udgivet til Brug ved academiske Forelæsninger af Dr. H. Martensen. Reitzels Forlag. 109 S. 80- . Kjøbenhavn 1841. (Priis 1 Rbd.),” Theologisk Tidsskrift, Ny Række, 7, 1843, pp. 88–115. See the discussion in Bruce H. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1990, pp. 172–175.

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des Christentums65 and Strauss’ Die christliche Glaubenslehre66 claimed to be furthering Hegel’s philosophy, yet the Danish theologian could recognize in their positions nothing of his own notion of Christianity. When this anti-Christian tendency began to emerge in certain forms in Denmark,67 Martensen felt obliged to modify his position, lest he be associated with the radicals. In 1842 he openly criticized Strauss and took a stand on the side of orthodoxy in “The Present Religious Crisis.”68 Moreover, at the end of 1842 he refused an invitation from the German philosopher and theologian Eduard Zeller (1814–1908) to submit an article for the newly founded journal, the Theologische Jahrb¨ucher, in which Strauss was also involved. At the beginning of 1843 he refused a similar invitation from Marheineke to join a philosophical society dedicated to Hegel’s thought.69 Martensen’s Hegelian period did not impede his professional advancement. Even during the controversy regarding Hegel’s principle of mediation, he remained on the best of terms with Hegel’s critic, Bishop Mynster. In a letter dated June 18, 1839, Mynster writes: “Moreover, yesterday I had a long philosophical discussion with Martensen; naturally, regardless of this dispute, we are the best of friends.”70 In 1845 Martensen became a royal chaplain despite relatively scant experience in preaching. In 1849 he published his best-known work on theology, Christian Dogmatics,71 which cannot be considered straightforwardly “Hegelian,” although it is clearly a piece of systematic theology with some Hegelian strands. By this time Martensen’s initial burst of enthusiasm for Hegelianism had clearly waned, and he had backed off considerably from its most provocative aspects.72 65 66

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Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig 1841. See ASKB 488. David Friedrich Strauss, Die christliche Glaubenslehre, vols. 1–2, Tubingen ¨ 1840–41. Danish translation: Fremstilling af den christelige Troeslære i dens historiske Udvikling og i dens Kamp med den moderne Videnskab, tr. by Hans Brøchner, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen 1842–43. ASKB 803–804. See Jens Holger Schiørring’s mention of “the examination scandal” and “Frederik Andreas Beck” in his article “Martensen,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulov´a Thulstrup, op. cit., p. 192. See Leif Grane, “Det Teologiske Fakultet 1830–1925,” in Københavns Universitet 1479–1979, ed. by Leif Grane, vol. 5, Det Teologiske Fakultet, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1980, pp. 366–367. S. V. Rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1966, pp. 16–26. See also Harald Høffding, “Hans Brøchner,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, pp. 196–206. This is discussed in Chapter 3, Section I. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Nutidens religiøse Crisis,” Intelligensblade, vol. 1, no. 3, 1842, pp. 53–73. For an account of both of these episodes, see Jens Holger Schjørring, Teologi og filosofi. Nogle analyser og dokumenter vedrørende Hegelianismen i dansk teologi, op. cit., pp. 27–35. “Mynster to his eldest son Joachim,” June 18, 1839, in Nogle Blade af J.P. Mynster’s Liv og Tid, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, Copenhagen 1875, p. 404. See also p. 69. Hans Lassen Martensen, Den christelige Dogmatik, Copenhagen 1849. ASKB 653. See Helweg’s assessment: Hans Friedrich Helweg, “Hegelianismen i Danmark,” Dansk Kirketidende, vol. 10, no. 51, December 16, 1855, pp. 827–828.

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Martensen was never a full-fledged devotee of Hegelianism,73 and the issue of how Hegelian he was after the entire course of his intellectual development remains open. In his autobiography Martensen denies that he was ever a Hegelian at all. He explains his goal as a teacher of Hegel’s philosophy as follows: I had to, if possible, get [the students] enthused about Hegel, and yet I had to oppose him and bring them to oppose him. Whether I always succeeded in this to the same degree I must leave undecided. But I can assert with certainty that all the way through I have maintained my theonomic standpoint in contrast to Hegel’s autonomic, that the intuitive view of faith and revelation was for me the principal thing in contrast to the autonomic in Hegel. I could not agree with a thinking which wanted to produce its own content. I sought only a second-order reflection on that which is given in revelation. When it is often said that during this my initial period at the University I was a representative of Hegelianism, then this is a most uncritical assertion which totally ignores my explicit and justified declarations in my dissertation, and which has been refuted by each of my literary works.74

One should, of course, be wary of taking autobiographical statements made years after the fact at face value, but nonetheless there is some support for Martensen’s claim. In a letter from as early as 1836, Martensen indicates that he is no longer satisfied with the “autonomic principle” of Hegel’s philosophy, which is precisely the criticism he recalls in his autobiography almost a half a century later.75 In a part of his review of Perseus, Sibbern portrays Martensen not as a Hegelian but rather as one of the great critics of Hegel.76 In a letter from 1839 Mynster notes that Martensen was “not nearly such a strict Hegelian as Heiberg.”77 Even during the period when Martensen had the most success among the students, it is not clear that he was universally regarded as a Hegelian. In a letter from 1841, Fogtmann writes to Mynster in a way that implies that he distances Martensen from the real Hegelians: “I have recently 73

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One author tells us that “Martensen, apart from a brief period around 1833–34 was not actually a Hegelian, but rather he wanted to use Hegel’s method to create a speculative theology.” Leif Grane, “Det Teologiske Fakultet 1830–1925,” op. cit., p. 363. See Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 4–5. Quoted from Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion, tr. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, op. cit., p. 8. See also vol. 2, pp. 5–7. See vol. 1, pp. 146–147 where Martensen says that he broke with Hegel. “Letter from Martensen to Sibbern,” March 19, 1836, in Breve fra og til F.C. Sibbern, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel 1866, vol. 1, pp. 181– 183. See Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1, Juni 1837. Kjøbenhavn. Reitzels Forlag. XIV og 264 S. 8. Priis 1 Rbd. 84 Skill. – (Med stadigt Hensyn til Dr. Rothes: Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Et speculativt Forsøg i Anledning af Reformationsfesten.),” in Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 20, 1838, Article VIII pp. 405–449. See especially p. 406. “Mynster to his eldest son Joachim,” June 18, 1839, in Nogle Blade af J. P. Mynster’s Liv og Tid, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, Copenhagen 1875, p. 404.

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read much in Prof. Martensen’s theological writings and have found a great interest in them. He is certainly, as Your Holiness once remarked, a true Christian theologian, who is not bound by Hegelian formulations.”78 This seems to indicate that Martensen was not generally regarded as the most convinced or dogmatic Hegelian at the time. Moreover, Martensen did indeed offer criticisms of Hegel in each of his works which have been designated as “Hegelian.” Martensen was also critical of the subordination of religion to philosophy in Hegel’s thought and was more interested than Hegel in the concept of a personal God.79 He also criticizes Hegel’s philosophy for dismissing as unscientific anything that cannot be reduced to its categories. At the end of his “Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” he offers a number of criticisms of Hegel’s philosophy and notes some of the leading contemporary critics. He enumerates three points that, to his mind, remained unanswered in Hegel: the notion of (1) a personal God, (2) a personal Christ, and (3) the immortality of the individual.80 With these points of divergence, one can see that Mynster’s assessment seems to be correct: Martensen’s Hegelianism was more qualified and less zealous than Heiberg’s. Despite this, it does seem that Martensen was at least perceived to be a Hegelian by some people. Otherwise it would not make sense for the aforementioned Eduard Zeller to solicit his work in the service of a Hegelian journal or for Marheineke to invite him to become a member of a Hegelian society.81 Moreover, his response to the anonymous critic in Kjøbenhavnsposten has the look of a Hegelian. Although Martensen is, of course, at pains there to defend himself against the charge that he has corrupted the students at the University of Copenhagen, he is also quite anxious to defend Hegel’s philosophy against both misunderstanding and criticism. Kierkegaard’s criticism of Martensen is more aggressive than his criticism of Heiberg due perhaps to the fact that Martensen was only a few years older than Kierkegaard and thus was regarded as more of a threat by him.82 While Heiberg was perceived as a mentor, Martensen was perceived as a rival. In many journal entries Kierkegaard compares himself and his work with that of Martensen. As was noted previously, Kierkegaard in his student days attended Martensen’s tutorials and apparently was at 78 79 80 81 82

“Letter from Bishop Fogtmann to Mynster, Aalborg, 1841” in Af efterladte Breve til J.P. Mynster, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, Copenhagen 1862, p. 221. See Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 103ff. Pap. II C 25, in Pap. XII, p. 328. See also p. 331. Jens Holger Schjørring, Teologi og filosofi. Nogle analyser og dokumenter vedrørende Hegelianismen i dansk teologi, op. cit., p. 27. For Kierkegaard’s relation to Martensen see M. Neiiendam, “Martensen, Mynster og Kierkegaard,” in C. I. Scharling, H.L. Martensen. Hans Tanker og Livssyn, op. cit., pp. 94–127.

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that time favorably impressed by the command of German philosophy and theology that Martensen displayed. However, Kierkegaard seems to have lost much of his respect for him when Martensen returned from Germany in 1836 and began to advocate Hegelianism and proclaim that he had gone beyond it. In his journals Kierkegaard writes: Some teach that eternity is comic, or more correctly, that in eternity a person will perceive a comic consciousness about the temporal. This wisdom we owe especially to the last three or four paragraphs of Hegel’s Aesthetics. Here [in Denmark] it has been presented in one of the journals by Professor Martensen. Although the professor, after his return [from Germany], and since his first appearance in the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, has invariably assured us that he has gone beyond Hegel, he certainly did not go farther in this case.83

This claim of “going beyond Hegel” is one that Kierkegaard returns to again and again throughout his career. Expressions like this seem to have been common during this period.84 In his autobiography, Martensen recalls, “I had to lead my listener through Hegel; we could not stop with him, but rather, as was said, we had to go beyond him.”85 This expression seems to refer to the then recent sequence of famous German philosophers, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, who displaced one another in succession. Each new philosopher started from the premises of his predecessor and reworked them in a new, original manner, thus incorporating and surpassing the previous system. In this way each of these philosophers was said to “have gone beyond” his predecessor. After Hegel’s death the question that resounded during the 1830s was who would pick up the torch and go beyond Hegel.86 In his memoirs one of Martensen’s students, the later priest and author Johannes Fibiger (1821–97), describes the way in which one regarded the intellectual task of the age: “One had to imitate [Hegel’s philosophy] and bring it even further; one was supposed to build one’s own system and go beyond Hegel and become the great 83

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CA, Supplement, p. 207; Pap. V B 60, p. 137. Translation slightly modified. See also CA, Supplement, p. 213; Pap. V B 72.33: “The whole wisdom of the superiority of the comic we owe to the three or four last paragraphs in Hegel’s Aesthetics, although it has also been presented with bravura by one who long since has gone beyond Hegel; and while he astonished women and children with his discourse, he would not as much as intimate that it was Hegel’s.” See also JP, vol. 6, 6947; Pap. XI-3 B 57, p. 107: “Professor Martensen ‘goes further’ – that is to be expected of Prof. M.” See commentary to “at gaae videre” in SKS, vol. K4, pp. 259–260. See Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 4. See Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1, Juni 1837. Kjøbenhavn. Reitzels Forlag. XIV og 264 S. 8. Priis 1 Rbd. 84 Skill. – (Med stadigt Hensyn til Dr. Rothes: Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Et speculativt Forsøg i Anledning af Reformationsfesten.),” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article I, p. 313: “Few seem to be aware that to correctly make use of the great content discussed here [sc. of Hegel’s philosophy] . . . one must go beyond it.”

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man of the scholarly world.”87 Kierkegaard was critical of Martensen and others for their pretensions to have unseated Hegel and to have assumed the role of his successor in this distinguished series of thinkers. As has been noted, Kierkegaard became increasingly incensed by what he perceived as Martensen’s base attempt to profit from Hegel’s genius. Kierkegaard speaks positively of Hegel in this regard and negatively of his parrots and emulators. He writes, for example: “Those who have gone beyond Hegel are like country people who must always give their addresses as via a larger city; thus the addresses in this case read – John Doe via Hegel.”88 Many years later he writes in his journals, naming Martensen explicitly, “Professor Martensen . . . is only an insignificant thinker and essentially only a reporter and correspondent for German thinkers and professors.”89 Another reason for Kierkegaard’s animosity was a straightforward jealousy. In 1837 Martensen published an article on a new version of Faust by Nicolaus Lenau,90 a pseudonym for the Austro-Hungarian poet Niembsch von Strehlenau (1802–50). The article appeared in Heiberg’s review, Perseus, and in a sense served to make Martensen the prot´eg´e of Heiberg and to give notice to the academic community that he was the up and coming young scholar in Danish intellectual life. Kierkegaard himself had tried to get into the good graces of Heiberg and his circle, but he was quickly displaced by the new academic star, Martensen. What was worse, the theme of Faust was one that fascinated Kierkegaard in particular at that time. In his early journals one finds many long discussions of it, and it seems clear that he was planning a manuscript of some kind on it.91 He was thus startled and upset when Martensen’s article appeared since it undercut his own plans for a study of the subject. He became bitter and

87 88

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Johannes Fibiger, Mit Liv og Levned som jeg selv har forstaaet det, ed. by Karl Gjellerup, Copenhagen 1898, p. 73. JP, vol. 2, 1572; SKS, vol. 18, p. 109, FF:176. In an apparent reference to Martensen from 1836, Kierkegaard writes: “The Hegelian cud-chewing involving three stomachs – first, immediacy – then it is regurgitated – then down once more; perhaps a successor master-mind could continue this with four stomachs etc., down again and then up again. I do not know whether the master-mind understands what I mean.” JP, vol. 2, 1566; Pap. I A 229. Pap. X-6 B 103. See also JP, vol. 3, 3034; Pap. X-2 A 117. CUP1, p. 195f.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 180f. JP, vol. 2, 1570; SKS, vol. 17, p. 50, AA:40. JP, vol. 2, 1573; SKS, vol. 17, p. 262, DD:141. JP, vol. 2, 1576; SKS, vol. 18, p. 14, EE:26. JP, vol. 2, 1738; SKS, vol. 19, p. 375, Not12:7. JP, vol. 6, 6460; Pap. X-1 A 588. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Betragtninger over Id´een af Faust med Hensyn paa Lenaus Faust,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 1, 1837, pp. 91–164. ASKB 569. JP, vol. 5, 5100; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 18–30, AA:12. JP, vol. 2, 1177; Pap. I A 88. JP, vol. 2, 1178; Pap. I A 104. JP, vol. 4, 4387; Pap. I A 122. JP, vol. 1, 795; Pap. I A 150. JP, vol. 2, 1671; Pap. I A 154. Pap. I A 274. SKS, vol. 18, p. 78, FF:19. SKS, vol. 17, pp. 205–207, CC:14–18. JP, vol. 5, 5077; Pap. I C 46. JP, vol. 2, 1179; SKS, vol. 19, p. 94, Not2:7. JP, vol. 5, 5110; Pap. I C 61. JP, vol. 5, 5111; SKS, vol. 19, p. 94f., Not2:10. JP, vol. 5, 5160; Pap. I C 102. JP, vol. 3, 2703; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 104–106, BB:14. Pap. I C 114.

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envious of Martensen’s success,92 and this initiated a lifelong enmity on Kierkegaard’s part, an enmity that, it should be noted, was reciprocated by Martensen. Kierkegaard’s criticism became all the more bitter when he saw Martensen’s lectures become popular. During his most productive period of work between 1843 and 1846, Kierkegaard often caustically criticizes Martensen’s positions without mentioning his name as, for example, in the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.93 From journal entries it is clear that Kierkegaard felt slighted by some of Martensen’s remarks in the Introduction to his Christian Dogmatics.94 In his autobiography, Martensen describes Kierkegaard’s animosity thus: In the beginning his [Kierkegaard’s] relation to me had been friendly, but it assumed an increasingly hostile character. He was moved to this in part by the differences in our views and in part by the recognition I enjoyed from the students and the public, a recognition which he clearly viewed – nor did he attempt to conceal it – as an unjustified overestimation . . . I was now chosen to be the object of his attack, and he sought to disparage me, my abilities, and my work in many ways. He sought to annihilate and extinguish every bit of activity that emanated from me.95

Kierkegaard remained a critic of Martensen until the end of his life. His journals from the years 1849–50 are full of criticisms of Martensen’s Dogmatics.96 In Kierkegaard’s attack on the Danish Church in the last year of his life, Martensen, then having been elected Bishop of Zealand, was the target of much of his critique. Indeed, it was Martensen’s eulogy to his predecessor Mynster, in which he said that the deceased bishop had been a witness to the truth, that set off Kierkegaard’s campaign of criticism in the first place.97 Kierkegaard’s animosity towards Martensen stayed with him his whole life and lies behind much of his anti-Hegelian polemics. Another important advocate of Hegelianism in Denmark was the priest, Adolph Peter Adler (1812–69).98 Adler was almost the same age as 92 93 94 95

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See JP, vol. 5, 5225; Pap. II A 597. See also JP, vol. 2, 1183; SKS, vol. 17, p. 49, AA:38. JP, vol. 5, 5226; SKS, vol. 18, p. 83, FF:38. See Arild Christensen, “Efterskriftens Opgør med Martensen,” Kierkegaardiana, 4, 1962, pp. 45–62. Pap. X-6 B 113, p. 143. JP, vol. 6, 6636; Pap. X-6 B 137. Martensen mentions this in his autobiography: Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 146. Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 140. Cited from Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., pp. 196–197. Translation slightly modified. Pap. X-6 B 103–193, pp. 129–193. See “Was Bishop Mynster a ‘Truth-Witness?” and the other articles in The Moment: “Var Biskop Mynster et ‘Sandhedsvidne,’ et af ‘de rette Sandhedsvidner’ – er dette Sandhed ?” in Fædrelandet, no. 295, 18 December 1854; M, pp. 3–8; SV1, vol. 14, pp. 5–10. For Kierkegaard’s relation to Adler see: Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue p˚a Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag A/S 1990. Leif Bork Hansen, Søren Kierkegaards Hemmelighed og Eksistensdialektik, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1994.

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Kierkegaard, and his father, like Kierkegaard’s, belonged to the nouveau riche in Copenhagen’s high society. Adler began his studies in theology at the University of Copenhagen in 1832. In 1837 he traveled abroad to Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and France. In Germany he was able to familiarize himself with Hegel’s thought. He returned to Denmark in 1839, and on the basis of his studies abroad he wrote his dissertation, The Isolated Subjectivity in Its Most Important Forms,99 which he completed in 1840, a year before Kierkegaard’s dissertation. His official opponents at the oral defense were Sibbern and Martensen. Directly thereafter in Winter Semester 1840–41, he gave lectures on Hegel’s philosophy, which became the basis for his book, Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic.100 This work was an important source for Kierkegaard’s understanding of Hegel’s logic and the object of criticism in The Concept of Anxiety. In addition, Adler wrote reviews of the works on speculative logic by Heiberg and Rasmus Nielsen.101 After his dissertation, Adler was appointed priest on the Danish island of Bornholm in 1841. Up until this point he had been a full-fledged Hegelian. While many Danish intellectuals in the 1830s and 1840s experienced a Hegelian period and then later came to reject Hegel due to one reason or another, this rejection was nowhere so dramatic as in the case of Adler. After his appointment as priest, Adler claimed to have experienced a revelation, and this event marked his turn away from Hegelianism. He purported to have been visited by Christ personally in December of 1842. According to the account that Adler gives in the Preface to his collection, Some Sermons,102 Christ came to him one evening while he was writing and dictated sacred verses to him. Moreover, he was commanded by Christ to destroy his writings on Hegel’s philosophy. Needless to say, these claims, once made public, were a great embarrassment to the Danish Church, which after some inquiries suspended and ultimately fired the priest. Adler continued to write on a number of other topics, but his days as a Hegelian and as a controversial public figure were over after this episode. Kierkegaard knew Adler personally: they attended the same school at the same time, and both studied theology at the University of Copenhagen, Kierkegaard starting in 1830 and Adler a year later. Kierkegaard followed closely the controversy surrounding Adler’s suspension and dismissal by the Church. In Hans Brøchner’s recollections of Kierkegaard, 99 100 101

102

Adolph Peter Adler, Den isolerede Subjectivitet i dens vigtigste Skikkelser, Copenhagen 1840. Adolph Peter Adler, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen 1842. ASKB 383. Adolph Peter Adler, “J. L. Heiberg, Det logiske System, a) Væren og Intet, b) Vorden, c) Tilværen, i Perseus Nr. 2, Kjøbenhavn 1838,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 3, 1840, pp. 474–482. Adolph Peter Adler, En Anmældelse, egentlig bestemt for Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, Copenhagen 1842. Adolph Peter Adler, Nogle Prædikener, Copenhagen 1843, pp. 3–4. ASKB U 9. See A, Supplement, pp. 339–340.

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he recounts how after the revelation Adler came to visit Kierkegaard some time in the latter half of 1843.103 Kierkegaard was so taken by Adler that he planned a book on him, which he began work on in the summer of 1846. This so-called Book on Adler was never published, perhaps out of respect or personal feeling for Adler, and was found among Kierkegaard’s papers and eventually published posthumously. What fascinated Kierkegaard was what he perceived as the obvious contradiction between Adler’s Hegelianism and his revelation, and this constitutes the centerpiece of Kierkegaard’s analysis. I have mentioned here the most important advocates of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark, but it would be misleading to give the impression that Danish Hegelianism consisted only of these few personalities. Indeed, there were a host of other thinkers in Denmark in the 1830s and 1840s whose names were associated with Hegelianism at one time or another, names such as Rasmus Nielsen (1809–84), Carl Weis (1809–72), Hans Brøchner (1820–75), Peter Michael Stilling (1812–69), Andreas Frederik Beck (1816–61), Carl Emil Scharling (1803–77), Christian Fenger Christens (1819–55), Rudolf Varberg (1828–69), Ditlev Gothard Monrad (1811–87), and the brothers Frederik Christian Bornemann (1810–61) and Johan Alfred Bornemann (1813–90). In the course of this study I will have occasion to discuss some of these figures. There is a tendency in Kierkegaard scholarship to convey the idea that Hegelian philosophy represented the scholarly status quo at the time and that the Danish academy was dominated by Hegelians. This is indeed sometimes the impression that one receives when reading Kierkegaard himself. But from the very presence of the critics, which constitute the subject of the next section, it is clear that Hegelianism never enjoyed a position of undisputed hegemony in Danish intellectual life. Moreover, apart from Heiberg, one cannot really speak of full-fledged Hegelians, let alone an intellectual community dominated by them. Indeed, while Heiberg exercised a great influence for a time in literary and dramatic criticism, he never held a university position in philosophy. As one intellectual historian concludes, “In spite of Heiberg’s efforts, Hegel did not catch on in Denmark.”104 A number of Danish intellectuals passed through a brief Hegelian phase, but these phases were usually fairly shortlived, and the individuals involved never formed an organized or coherent school. Thus, one can hardly speak of Hegelianism as being a dominant school in Denmark during this or any other period. This said, I pass now from the advocates of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark to the critics. 103

104

Hans Brøchner, “Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard,” Det Nittende Aarhundrede, Maanedsskrift for Literatur og Kritik, vol. 5, March 1877, § 20. English translation cited from Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., pp. 234– 235. Leif Grane, “Det Teologiske Fakultet 1830–1925,” op. cit., p. 363. See also Skat Arildsen, Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde, op. cit., p. 163.

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iii. the critics of hegel in denmark After Heiberg, Martensen, and others had introduced Hegel into academic life in Denmark, a handful of anti-Hegelians rose up in opposition to the new trend. Just as those thinkers usually assigned to the category “Hegelians” are not to be conceived as uncritical, unoriginal parrots of Hegel, so also those assigned to the category of “anti-Hegelians” cannot be said to have rejected Hegel’s thought entirely. On the contrary, many of the so-called Hegel critics themselves experienced a Hegelian period. Moreover, many co-opted specific aspects of Hegel’s thought in their mature views, even while criticizing other aspects. Thus, one must be cautious about the use of these general categories. Among those usually classified as anti-Hegelian was Frederik Christian Sibbern (1785–1872), a jurist and philosopher at the University of Copenhagen.105 Sibbern was an interestingly ambivalent figure. He was profoundly influenced by German thought and from the earliest days had a number of essentially Hegelian proclivities, such as the desire to overcome traditional dualisms (e.g., freedom and necessity, individual and state). But despite these seemingly Hegelian views, Sibbern is usually numbered among the Hegel critics in Denmark. He is particularly important because of both his personal relation to Kierkegaard and his role as the towering figure on the Danish philosophical scene of the day. After completing his doctoral dissertation in Copenhagen in 1811, Sibbern made an extended trip to Germany where he came into contact with the leading minds of the age including Fichte, Schleiermacher, Goethe, and Schelling. At this time Hegel had yet to achieve any great reputation, and Fichte and Schelling were regarded as the major figures in the German philosophical milieu. Sibbern returned to the University of Copenhagen in 1813 to assume a professorship. This was the beginning of a long and distinguished university career that would last until 1870. During his career he published major treatises on every area of philosophical inquiry. Despite the fact that Sibbern has been consistently categorized as a Hegel critic, there are many signs, particularly in his early works, that indicate that he had a rather favorable opinion of Hegel’s philosophy. For example, as early as 1822 (i.e., two years before Heiberg’s On Human Freedom purportedly introduced Hegel into Denmark), Sibbern in his On 105

See Harald Høffding, “Frederik Christian Sibbern,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, pp. 97–117. Jens Himmelstrup, Sibbern, Copenhagen: J. H. Schultz Forlag 1934. Poul Kallmoes, Frederik Christian Sibbern. Træk af en Dansk Filosofs Liv og Tænkning, Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaards Forlag 1946. Poul Lubcke, ¨ “F. C. Sibbern: Epistemology as Ontology,” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 13, 1976, pp. 167–178.

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Knowledge and Enquiry refers to Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences by way of illustration.106 Moreover, he alludes to the Science of Logic, calling it “both profound and penetrating.”107 In 1825 Sibbern anonymously reviewed Heiberg’s treatise on contingency.108 At the time Sibbern was already an established professor of philosophy, whereas Heiberg was just beginning to write philosophical works. This review, like On Knowledge and Enquiry, does not give the impression that its author is an anti-Hegelian. Sibbern briefly alludes to Heiberg’s earlier treatise, On Human Freedom, in order to indicate its continuity with the work under review. The point of continuity is that both works are written from a Hegelian perspective: The author shows himself in the present work, just as in the previous one, to be a resolute follower of Hegel’s philosophy. He is not intimidated but perhaps rather attracted by its difficulty and has read his way well into it. We also believe him to be in a position to be able to give some excellent contributions to elucidate these speculations, which certainly deserve to be studied and pursued, and to make them more attractive than they are in Hegel’s own difficult, rough, and rather unhappily expressed language.109

The tone here is indicative of the measured criticism of the review. Sibbern alludes to Hegel’s difficult style but unhesitatingly agrees that his philosophy is worthy of careful consideration. Moreover, it is clear that Sibbern welcomes Heiberg’s attempts to explain Hegel’s philosophy and to make it better known. In the body of the review Sibbern explicitly lauds Heiberg for his use of Hegel’s speculative methodology. This short review, which shows a very positive disposition towards both Heiberg and Hegel himself, stands in sharp contrast to Sibbern’s later criticism. In the series of articles published in 1829–30 under the title Philosophical Review and Collection, Sibbern quotes and refers to Hegel on a couple of occasions.110 In one passage he defends Hegel against unjust criticisms. It would be a mistake, he says, to condemn Hegel on account of his dry, indeed graceless language and his difficult presentation without respecting the truly great value which lies in it and which in truth has naturally enough been very attractive to the speculative minds of the day, both the older and the younger ones, 106 107 108

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Frederik Christian Sibbern, Om Erkjendelse og Granskning. Til Indledning i det academiske Studium, Copenhagen 1822, p. 21. Ibid., p. 82. [Anonymous] Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Der Zufall, aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Logik betrachtet. Als Einleitung zu einer Theorie des Zufalls. Von Dr. J. L. Heiberg. Kopenhagen. Verlag von C. A. Reitzel. Druck von H. F. Popp. 1825. 30 Sider med Titelblad og alt,” Dansk Litteratur-Tidende for 1825, no. 44, pp. 689–702. Ibid., p. 691. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Philosophiskt Archiv og Repertorium, vols. 1–4, Copenhagen 1829–30, vol. 1, p. 5, pp. 25–26fn.

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kierkegaard and danish hegelianism especially the latter, who in the richest period of the inner development of the Idea are entirely correct to find something as stimulating, as refreshing and delightful in the most abstract movements in the speculative train of thought as in poetry’s soul-elevating, -expanding, and -liberating effects.111

Here as in the review of Heiberg’s treatise on contingency, Sibbern refers to Hegel’s difficult style, but, while criticizing this style, he clearly is positively disposed towards the actual content of Hegel’s thought. Needless to say, this encomium does not square with Sibbern being a tireless critic of Hegel. In 1838 in the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, Sibbern published a long review of the first number of Heiberg’s aforementioned Hegelian journal, Perseus.112 This work represents one of the major documents in the history of the Danish Hegel reception. In a letter Sibbern indicates that the long review was intended not just as a criticism of Heiberg’s journal but as a general assessment of Hegel’s philosophy.113 Sibbern’s reputation as anti-Hegelian comes primarily from this work. This review, which was longer than Heiberg’s journal, was later in part republished as a monograph under the title, Remarks and Investigations Primarily Concerning Hegel’s Philosophy.114 In it Sibbern takes issue with any number of things in Hegel’s philosophy (i.e., his logic, his philosophy of religion, and his general philosophical methodology). Sibbern is particularly critical of Heiberg’s criticism of what the latter believed to be the sad state of philosophy in Denmark and of the concomitant belief that Hegel’s philosophy was urgently required to improve the situation. As was mentioned, for all his anti-Hegelianism, Sibbern remained a somewhat ambivalent figure. For example, he had a notion of the harmony of the universe or the idea of God which corresponds rather straightforwardly to what Hegel called “absolute knowing” or “the absolute Idea.” Moreover, he shared with Hegel an organic conception of the world and the notion of a developmental progression of concepts. Given Sibbern’s many positive statements about Hegel and their profound agreement on many issues, one is led to the conclusion that what 111 112

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Ibid., vol. 2, p. 116. Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1, Juni 1837. Kjøbenhavn. Reitzels Forlag. XIV og 264 S. 8. Priis 1 Rbd. 84 Skill. – (Med stadigt Hensyn til Dr. Rothes: Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Et speculativt Forsøg i Anledning af Reformationsfesten.),” in Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, 19, 1838, Article I, pp. 283–360; Article II, pp. 424–460; Article III, pp. 546–582; 20, 1838, Article IV, pp. 20–60; Article V, pp. 103–136; Article VI, pp. 193–244; Article VII, pp. 293–308; Article VIII pp. 405–449. “Letter from Sibbern to Zeuthen,” September 12, 1837, in Breve fra og til F.C. Sibbern, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 192–193. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen 1838. ASKB 778.

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has been taken as his criticism of Hegel is in fact in large part a criticism of Heiberg. As was noted, Sibbern’s only real anti-Hegelian treatise, indeed the one work from which he received the reputation for being anti-Hegelian, is his review of Heiberg’s Perseus. But this work is primarily a criticism of Heiberg. While, to be sure, Sibbern indicates his disagreement with Hegel on individual points, he is careful to point out to the reader that Heiberg’s presentation of Hegel is often incorrect and that Hegel’s own position is much more reasonable than that presented by Heiberg. Sibbern calls Heiberg a dilettante in philosophy115 and writes in the very first article of the review, “Indeed, I would hope that no one will make Professor Heiberg’s Hegelian statements the foundation for his judgment of Hegel’s philosophy. That would be to run the risk of doing a great injustice to Hegel.”116 The tone of this clearly indicates a respect for Hegel, despite whatever philosophical differences Sibbern might have had with him. Given Sibbern’s early positive statements about Hegel and his later negative ones about both Hegel and Heiberg, one can perhaps infer that Sibbern, like Kierkegaard, was particularly incensed at Heiberg’s evangelizing for Hegelianism. That this comes to expression in a critical review of Heiberg’s journal is no accident since the journal was intended as an organ for the promulgation of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark. Kierkegaard knew Sibbern personally and, as a young man, seems to have been on good terms with the popular teacher. Indeed, for a time Kierkegaard was a regular guest at the Sibberns’ home. Sibbern seems also to have played the role of a sort of chaperon, at times accompanying Kierkegaard on his visits to Regine Olsen.117 With respect to intellectual matters, Sibbern acted as mentor to him during the years of Kierkegaard’s studies. Kierkegaard attended many courses that Sibbern offered on various subjects.118 Sibbern was the first reader on Kierkegaard’s dissertation committee and in this capacity advised the young candidate on the work. During his stay in Berlin, Kierkegaard wrote a letter to Sibbern which evinces both familiarity and warmth.119 Although in time Kierkegaard became estranged from Sibbern,120 he seems to have shared his mentor’s 115

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Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1,” in Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article I, p. 290. Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 8. Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1,” op. cit., p. 335. Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 53. See Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit. 1996, p. 37. Valdemar Ammundsen, Søren Kierkegaards Ungdom. Hans Slægt og hans Udvikling, Copenhagen: Universitetstrykkeriet 1912, pp. 77–107. LD, 55; B&A I, p. 83. Cf. also LD, 49; B&A, pp. 71–73. LD, 51; B&A I, pp. 75–77. See also Hans Brøchner, “Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard,” op. cit., § 35. English translation: Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., p. 241. See JP, vol. 6, 6196; Pap. IX A 493. Pap. VI B 201. Pap. X-1 A 446.

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criticisms of Hegel. Indeed, many of Sibbern’s criticisms of Hegel in the review of Perseus prefigure Kierkegaard’s own. Nonetheless there were differences; for example, Kierkegaard clearly came to reject Sibbern’s speculative approach to philosophy and did not share with Sibbern the search for a unity or harmony in the universe. Also classified among the Hegel critics was Poul Martin Møller (1794– 1838),121 a poet and professor of philosophy at the University of Christiania (today Oslo) and later, from 1830, in Copenhagen. Like Sibbern, Møller cannot properly be classified as a Hegel critic without qualification, for he was, even more so than Sibbern, ambivalent towards Hegel.122 Like many intellectuals in Denmark, Møller experienced a period in which he was infatuated by Hegel. He made a study of Hegel during his time in Christiania, and it was when he returned to Copenhagen in 1830 that his pro-Hegel period can be said to have begun. During this time he and Heiberg seem to have been generally regarded as Denmark’s foremost representatives of Hegelianism.123 Indeed, one commentator from the period suggests that Møller was the first Hegelian in Denmark.124 Møller’s course from 1834 to 1835, published posthumously under the title Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, is written in a Hegelian tone. For example, in his Introduction he calls the history of philosophy, “the history of human consciousness.”125 There he lauds Hegel as follows: “With extraordinary genius and unusual learning, Hegel strove to grasp reason’s eternal history in the actual development of philosophy and has executed this plan . . . with a strength with which no other has executed it.”126 Predictably these lectures owe much to the first volume of 121

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See F. C. Olsen, “Poul Martin Møllers Levnet,” in Møller’s Efterladte Skrifter, vols. 1– 3, Copenhagen 1839–43, vol. 3, pp. 1–115. ASKB 1574–1576. Vilhelm Andersen, Poul Møller, hans Liv og Skrifter, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1894, third edition 1944. Ludvig Daae, “Fra Poul Møllers Liv som Professor i Christiania,” Historiske Samlinger, ed. by Den Norske Historiske Kildeskriftkommission, vol. 3, no. 1, 1908, pp. 1–20. Johannes Brøndum-Nielsen, Poul Møller Studier, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1940. For Møller’s relation to Hegel, see Arne L¨ochen, “Poul M¨oller og Hegels Filosofi,” ˚ Nyt Tidsskrift, Ny Række, 3. Argang, 1894–95, pp. 447–456. Uffe Andreasen, Poul Møller og Romanticismen, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1973, pp. 17–43. Vilhelm Andersen, Poul Møller, hans Liv og Skrifter, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1894, third edition 1944, pp. 302– 316, pp. 359–372. See also Harald Høffding, “Poul Møller,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, pp. 119–121. See Frederik Ludvig Bang Zeuthen, Et Par Aar af mit Liv, Copenhagen 1869, p. 44. Hans Friedrich Helweg, “Hegelianismen i Danmark,” Dansk Kirketidende, vol. 10, no. 51, December 16, 1855, pp. 825–837, and December 23, 1855, pp. 841–852. See pp. 826– 827. Poul Martin Møller, “Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” in Møller’s Efterladte Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 284. ASKB 1574–1576. Poul Martin Møller, ibid., p. 285.

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Hegel’s posthumous Lectures on the History of Philosophy, which appeared in 1833.127 But later Møller came to reject Hegel. Critical elements are already present as early as 1835 in Møller’s review128 of Sibbern’s On Poetry and Art. The break was complete with his long article in 1837, “Thoughts on the Possibility of Proofs of Human Immortality.”129 This work was a response to the discussions, alluded to above, among the German Hegelians regarding the question of whether or not Hegel had a doctrine of personal immortality. Friedrich Richter (1807–56), in Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen,130 argued that Hegel denied the immortality of the soul as a mistaken belief, whereas the aforementioned right Hegelian Karl Friedrich G¨oschel argued that in fact proofs for the existence of God could be derived from Hegel’s philosophy.131 Other leading figures such as Immanuel Hermann, the younger Fichte (1797–1879), and Feuerbach were also involved in the debate. As was noted previously, it was around this issue that the schools of right and left Hegelianism separated and took form. In the article Møller claims that nowhere in Hegel’s philosophy can one find a doctrine of the personal immortality of the soul which is in harmony with that taught by Christianity. He thus argues, contrary to the right Hegelians, that Hegel’s philosophy is not consistent with Christianity. Further, he argues, in a way that anticipates Kierkegaard, that speculative philosophy remains incomplete since it consists only of abstract concepts that cannot take account of individual experiences, which remain outside the system. Møller’s rejection of Hegel in this article was regarded by Heiberg, his comrade-in-arms, as an act of treason against Hegel’s philosophy. In an 127

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The three volumes of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy appeared for the first time as a part of the first edition of Hegel’s collected writings, which was published between 1832 and 1845 by Hegel’s friends and students. Vorlesungen u¨ ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, I–III, ed. by Karl Ludwig Michelet, Berlin 1833–36, vols. 13–15 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45. Poul Martin Møller, “Om Poesie og Konst i Almindelighed, med Hensyn til alle Arter deraf, dog især Digte-, Maler-, Billedhugger- og Skuespillerkonst; eller: Foredrag over almindelig Æsthetik og Poetik. Af Dr. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Professor i Philosophien. Første Deel. Kiøbenhavn. Paa Forfatterens Forlag, trykt hos Fabritius de Tengnagel. 1834,” Dansk Literatur-Tidende for 1835, no. 12, pp. 181–194; no. 13, pp. 205–209. (Reprinted in Møller’s Efterladte Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 105–126. ASKB 1574–1576.) Poul Martin Møller, “Tanker over Muligheden af Beviser for Menneskets Udødelighed,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 17, Copenhagen 1837, pp. 1–72, pp. 422–53. (Reprinted in Møller’s Efterladte Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 158–272.) Friedrich Richter, Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen, vol. 1, Eine wissenschaftliche Kritik aus dem Standpunct der Religion unternommen, Breslau 1833; vol. 2, Die Lehre von j¨ungsten Tage. Dogma und Kritik, Berlin 1844. Karl Friedrich G¨oschel, Von den Beweisen f¨ur die Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele im Lichte der spekulativen Philosophie, Berlin 1835.

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article in the first number of Perseus, Heiberg refers to Møller anonymously as a deserter.132 In response to Heiberg’s comment, Sibbern in his review of Perseus, claims that it was impossible for such an active and original thinker as Møller to remain a Hegelian for long.133 In a footnote in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard himself describes Møller’s relation to Hegelianism: “Poul Møller, when everything here at home was Hegelian, judged quite differently . . . for some time he first spoke of Hegel almost with indignation, until his wholesome, humorous nature made him smile, especially at Hegelianism.”134 Kierkegaard attended Møller’s lectures and was by all accounts fond of him. He was attracted by Møller’s poetical side and by his love for the Greek and Roman classics. Møller’s interest in irony apparently in part inspired Kierkegaard to write on the same theme for his dissertation.135 Møller’s premature death in 1838 robbed Denmark of one of its potentially greatest minds and Kierkegaard of an important mentor and ally. In 1844 Kierkegaard dedicated The Concept of Anxiety to his memory.136 According to some biographers,137 Møller’s criticism of Kierkegaard’s 132

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Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Recension over Hr. Dr. Rothes Treenigheds- og Forsoningslære,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 1, 1837, p. 33. ASKB 569. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 41–42.) “I might add I know well that this utterly simple solution to the task will not satisfy everyone, in particular those who are interested in the most recent fermentation in philosophy. But it has still not been shown whether the striving, which is in itself laudable, among these most recent men of this movement, that is, their striving after progress beyond the present circle of philosophy, is not unwittingly a regress; whether the system, which they just left, does not contain what they now are looking for outside it, in which case they would have gone over the stream after water. Yet it does not seem that these deserters would ever come to make up their own corps; for their goal is too indeterminate, for if they also could name something or another for which they are searching, for example, a future worldview, then they cannot say anything about the way which leads there, but it is just that which is at issue in philosophy, which cannot be served by having its property on the moon.” Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1,” op. cit., Article I, p. 336. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 54. ASKB 778. CUP1, p. 34fn.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 41fn. Among Møller’s posthumous works there is a fragment entitled, “On the Concept of Irony,” which was written in 1835 and published in the second edition of his posthumous writings. Poul Martin Møller, “Om Begrebet Ironie,” in Efterladte Skrifter, ed. by Christian Winther, F. C. Olsen, Christen Thaarup, and L. V. Petersen, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen 1848– 50, vol. 3, 1848, pp. 152–158. Socratic irony is also treated in his “Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” in Efterladte Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen 1839–43, vol. 3, pp. 363ff. ASKB 1574–1576. See SKS, vol. 17, pp. 225–226, DD:18. See detailed account in H. P. Rohde, “Poul Møller,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulov´a Thulstrup (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10), Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1982, pp. 91–108. See also Frithiof Brandt, Den unge Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaards Forlag 1929, pp. 336–446. Frithiof Brandt, Den unge Søren Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 432. Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, London: Oxford University Press 1938, pp. 143–149.

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general polemical attitude helped the young Kierkegaard out of what has been regarded as his period of perdition between 1836 and 1838. In a draft of the dedication to The Concept of Anxiety, Møller is referred to as “the mighty trumpet of my awakening.”138 Scholars have noted that Møller’s influence on many aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought has been profound,139 and it seems almost inconceivable that Møller’s assessment of Hegel was not important for Kierkegaard’s developing views. One of the most important and the most consistent of the Hegel critics in Denmark was the theologian and later Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster (1775–1854).140 Hegel’s philosophy never occupied a central place in his thought, but Mynster did play an important role as a critic of some of Hegel’s Danish followers. Mynster was awarded his degree in theology at the extraordinarily young age of nineteen. He then worked for some years as a private tutor, during which time he read the German philosophers – Kant, Schelling, and Jacobi. In 1802 he became a pastor and received his first parish in a rural town in southern Zealand. In 1811 he was awarded a prestigious position as curate in Copenhagen’s Cathedral Church of Our Lady. Thus, by the time the issue of Hegelianism reached Denmark, Mynster was already an established priest and theologian.141 Unlike the other Danish scholars mentioned here, Mynster was of the same generation as Hegel himself and thus experienced first-hand the rise of Hegelian philosophy. He seems to have been suspicious of the new intellectual trend from the very beginning, even if he only spoke out on the subject later. In his autobiography he describes the new movement and his reaction to it as follows: Philosophy had been dormant in Germany for many years; now with Hegel it was again brought to life, but in a form in which it did not attract me at all, regardless of the extraordinary talents the originator had. Since Hegel’s 138 139 140

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CA, Supplement, p. 178; Pap. V B 46. E.g., Poul L¨ubcke, “Det ontologiske program hos Poul Møller og Søren Kierkegaard,” Filosofiske Studier, vol. 6, 1983, pp. 127–147. For Mynster’s biography and thought see the following: Jakob Peter Mynster, Meddelelser om mit Levnet, ed. by F. J. Mynster, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1854, 1884; O. Waage, J. P. Mynster og de philosophiske Bevægelser paa hans Tid i Danmark, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 1867. C. L. N. Mynster (ed.), Nogle Blade af J.P. Mynster’s Liv og Tid, Copenhagen 1875; C. L. N. Mynster (ed.), Nogle Erindringer og Bemærkninger om J.P. Mynster, Copenhagen 1877; Niels Munk Plum, Jakob Peter Mynster som Kristen og Teolog, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad 1938. Jens Rasmussen, J. P. Mynster. Sjællands Biskop 1834–1854, Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag 2000. Bruce Kirmmse, “Piety and Good Taste: J. P. Mynster’s Religion and Politics,” in his Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1990, pp. 169–197. For an account of Mynster’s view of Hegelianism see O. Waage, “Hegelianismens Fremkomst i Danmark og Mynsters Forhold til denne Retning,” in his J.P. Mynster og de philosophiske Bevægelser paa hans Tid i Danmark, op. cit., pp. 104–117.

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kierkegaard and danish hegelianism appointment in Berlin, his philosophy had become regarded as the end all, and the arrogance of his followers knew no limits. I was indeed convinced that it would not last long, but I was disappointed in the expectation that it would all be over with Hegel’s death, for on the contrary it only really began to be dominant then.142

Here Mynster indicates his irritation with Hegel’s followers, while admitting his admiration for Hegel himself. But generally he seems to regard his own role as something of a spectator to the whole matter. Mynster’s anti-Hegelian polemics began with an article from 1833 entitled “On Religious Conviction,”143 in which he took issue with Heiberg’s On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age. Mynster concentrated his critique on Heiberg’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, criticizing Heiberg for reading Hegel as a secular thinker. Thus, the criticism is ultimately of Heiberg’s interpretation of Hegel and not of Hegel himself. Mynster quotes Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion in order to show that to Hegel’s mind Christianity is still true and influential, contrary to Heiberg’s claims. (This provides an instructive example for the difficulty of assigning the various thinkers to the one or the other side of the Hegel debate. Here the purportedly anti-Hegelian Mynster defends Hegel’s philosophy of religion against the claims made by the purportedly pro-Hegelian Heiberg.) Shortly after this debate, in 1834 Mynster was appointed bishop and spent the rest of his life in this service. Mynster, who was of course personally acquainted with both Heiberg and Martensen, was the instigator of the aforementioned debate about Hegel’s criticism of the law of excluded middle. The debate began in 1839 with the publication of his article, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism,”144 in which he responds to the claim of the Hegelian, Johan Alfred Bornemann, that rationalism and supernaturalism are antiquated standpoints.145 In his initial response Mynster concentrates on demonstrating that the positions of rationalism and supernaturalism are in fact still relevant in contemporary theology. At the end of his article he notes that the two views, being opposites, cannot both be antiquated at the same time since if the one were antiquated then the other would then be prevailing. Thus, unless the law of excluded middle is no longer valid, 142 143

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Jakob Peter Mynster, Meddelelser om mit Levnet, op. cit., (1884), p. 239. Jakob Peter Mynster, “Om den religiøse Overbevisning,” Dansk Ugeskrift, vol. 3, no. 76– 77, 1833, pp. 241–258. (Reprinted in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen 1852–57, vol. 2, pp. 73–94.) Jakob Peter Mynster, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 249–268. (Reprinted in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 95– 115.) Johan Alfred Bornemann, “Af Martensen: de autonomia conscientiae. Sui humanae,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 1–40. See p. 3.

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then at least one of these views must still be alive and well. In this context Mynster refers to Hegel’s criticism of the law of excluded middle and his claim that opposites can be mediated. Mynster does little more than sketch Hegel’s position and note his disagreement with it, and with this the article ends. This article evoked the responses, previously mentioned, from Heiberg and Martensen, who felt called upon to come to Hegel’s defense. In 1842 Mynster took up the issue again in what purported to be a review article of two related works about the issue by Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841)146 and the younger Fichte.147 Mynster’s article, later for the sake of simplicity given the title, “On the Laws of Logic,”148 examines in detail the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle in order to evaluate Hegel’s criticisms. Mynster criticizes the Hegelian principles of mediation and Aufhebung, which eliminate strict distinctions, such as that between rationalism and supernaturalism in theology. He makes a defense of the Aristotelian law of excluded middle against Hegel’s criticism. Despite what seems to be a fundamental disagreement with Hegelianism, Mynster never dedicated a large portion of his energy to combatting it.149 Indeed, it is probably an overstatement to claim that Mynster was a major critic of Hegel in the Danish context; this is in any case not the way he viewed himself. In his autobiography he describes his overall relation to Hegelian philosophy as follows: [Hegelianism] was the one aspect of the age which left me cold and showed me how little I, as long as this trend lasted, could expect to find an entry with my scholarly efforts, which in no way would fit with the prevailing tone. I felt neither the inclination nor the ability to step forth to battle against the Hegelian philosophy. I only engaged in a few skirmishes, which, however, were perhaps not wholly without effect. Thus, in 1833 on occasion of a remark by Heiberg, I wrote an article, “On Religious Conviction” (Dansk Ugeskrift III, 241); but it did not evoke any further treatises. Only several years later in 1839 when, on occasion of a remark by another author, I wrote “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” (Tidsskrivt for Literatur og Kritik I, 249) did 146 147 148

149

Johann Friedrich Herbart, De principio logico exclusi medii inter contradictoria non negligendo commentatio, qua ad audiendam orationem . . . invitat, G¨ottingen 1833. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio, Bonn 1840. ASKB 507. Jakob Peter Mynster, “De principio logico exclusi medii inter contradictoria non negligendo commentatio, qua ad audiendam orationem. . . . invitat. Jo. Fr. Herbart. Gottingae 1833. 29 S. 80- , De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio. Scripsit I. H. Fichte. Bonnae 1840. 31 S. 80- ,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, vol. 7, 1842, pp. 325–352. (Reprinted as “Om de logiske Principer,” in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 116–144.) For Mynster’s view on Hegelianism see Leif Grane, “Det Teologiske Fakultet 1830–1925,” op. cit., p. 360.

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kierkegaard and danish hegelianism Heiberg and Martensen come forth as opponents, which again occasioned me, albeit after a few years, to write a book-review, “On the Laws of Logic” (ibid. VII, 325).150

It is perhaps something of an overstatement to cast Mynster in the role of an outspoken Hegel critic, especially given the fact that his anti-Hegelian corpus amounts to only three essays, and by far the better part of these is directed against Heiberg and Bornemann. What is, however, characteristic of Mynster’s position vis-`a-vis Hegel is his consistency. Unlike most of the other thinkers mentioned here, Mynster never had a Hegelian period but rather seems to have rejected Hegel’s philosophy from the beginning and never to have modified his opinion substantially. Kierkegaard knew Mynster from his earliest childhood and was confirmed by him in 1828.151 His father was moved by Mynster’s sermons, which he attended regularly. Kierkegaard himself also went to hear Mynster and seems to have maintained a favorable opinion of him until 1838 when his father died. He writes in his journals that he was sent to tell Mynster of the death of his father and was irritated when Mynster seemed to have difficulty remembering who the dead man was.152 Nonetheless there is evidence that individual analyses in Either/Or, Philosophical Fragments, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript are intended to support Mynster’s position in the debate about the principle of mediation.153 Throughout the years Kierkegaard became more and more estranged from Mynster, who embodied for him the prototypical representative of the official Church of Denmark, which in his view departed greatly from the Christianity of the New Testament. Despite this estrangement, Kierkegaard remained on more or less cordial terms with Mynster throughout his life, often paying him visits and sending him his newly published works. Kierkegaard’s criticism was tacit during Mynster’s lifetime, but when Mynster died in 1854, neither politeness nor discretion remained to temper it any longer. In the article entitled, “Was Bishop Mynster a Witness to the Truth,”154 Kierkegaard begins his public criticism of Mynster which became increasingly bitter in a series of essays. The gallery of personalities and events mentioned here is important for an understanding of Kierkegaard’s picture of Hegel since he followed the debates in Denmark surrounding Hegelianism in conjunction with

150 151 153 154

Jakob Peter Mynster, Meddelelser om mit Levnet, op. cit. (1884), pp. 240–241. 152 Pap. XI-2 A 419. LD, p. 4, IV; B & A I, p. 4. Explored later in, respectively, Chapter 4, Sections I–II; Chapter 8, Section I; Chapter 11, Section IX. “Var Biskop Mynster et ‘Sandhedsvidne,’ et af ‘de rette Sandhedsvidner’ – er dette Sandhed ?” in Fædrelandet, no. 295, 18 December 1854; M, pp. 3–8; SV1, vol. 14, pp. 5–10.

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or in lieu of reading the primary texts. Thus, the picture that he received was largely shaped by these discussions, which were in the public eye at the time. Figures such as Martensen and Heiberg are thus of crucial importance for Kierkegaard’s understanding of Hegel since it was their interpretation of Hegel and their discussion of the consequences of Hegel’s philosophy that Kierkegaard became familiar with. As I wish to show, often what Kierkegaard criticizes as “Hegelian” is in fact a specific appropriation or misappropriation of Hegel by people like them. Likewise, the criticisms put forth by Sibbern, Møller, and Mynster, by pointing to controversial issues in different aspects of Hegel’s thought, offered a model of critique for the young Kierkegaard. Thus, an appreciation of the context of the debate about Hegelianism in Denmark that reigned in Kierkegaard’s time is imperative if one wishes to understand correctly Kierkegaard’s view of Hegel and if one is not to assume uncritically that what he says about Hegelian philosophy, as he knew it, is the same as what is to be found in the writings of Hegel himself. In his article, “Hegelianism in Denmark” from shortly after Kierkegaard’s death, Hans Friedrich Helweg (1816–1901) lists the common set of names associated with Danish Hegelianism. Somewhat surprisingly, Kierkegaard plays a central role in his account. Helweg notes the ambiguity of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel as follows: “I have heretofore not mentioned S. Kierkegaard in this overview of Hegelianism in Denmark, and yet he stands in the most intimate relation to it, although one can indeed be in doubt about whether one should say that he belonged to it or rather that he rejected it, and to what extent the end of his life was in accordance with the beginning of his career.”155 Here Helweg correctly notes that Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel and Hegelianism is not an easy matter to form a final judgment about. It is ambiguous, contradictory, and deeply differentiated. Moreover, Helweg implies that Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel changed over the course of his life. This is in accordance with the thesis of Helweg’s article, namely, “Hegelianism came to an end in Kierkegaard, and yet he never completely rejected Hegel.”156 At first Helweg’s comments might strike one as unexpected since one is accustomed to thinking of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel as being one that is wholly unambiguous (i.e., as being wholly negative). But after this brief account of the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark, one can see that this history of reception is itself full of ambiguity. On the one hand, it is almost impossible to assert without qualification that 155 156

Hans Friedrich Helweg, “Hegelianismen i Danmark,” Dansk Kirketidende, vol. 10, no. 51, December 16, 1855, p. 829. Ibid., p. 829.

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anyone, even Heiberg, Hegel’s most enthusiastic follower, was straightforwardly a Hegelian. So-called Hegelians, such as Martensen, rejected the label with some justice. For virtually all of the so-called Hegelians, the period of their pro-Hegel affiliation was short-lived, and, as they matured intellectually, they came to reject Hegel’s philosophy. On the other hand, the purported critics of Hegel, such as Sibbern, were profoundly influenced by certain aspects of Hegel’s thought. Many of the critics, such as Møller, themselves had a Hegelian period. Even the most consistent anti-Hegelian, Mynster, admits that he has great respect for Hegel himself although he disdains the excesses of some of Hegel’s followers. Given all this, it is highly misleading to speak of Hegel advocates and Hegel critics as if these were two straightforward and unambiguous categories. Instead it is better to speak of the general discussion of the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark and to resist the urge to place the individual figures into neat categories, which are invariably misleading. The ambiguity in the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark can be used as a clue for understanding Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. Given that most of the leading names in Danish intellectual life of the period were all quite taken with Hegel’s philosophy for a period and then came to reject it as their thought developed further, it seems quite plausible that Kierkegaard as well could conceivably have experienced the same development. His own teachers and mentors – Heiberg, Møller, and Sibbern – were all highly influenced by Hegel; it seems almost inconceivable that this positive influence would not also have been formative for Kierkegaard. Later when some of these thinkers came to reject Hegel, their criticisms were carefully studied by the young Kierkegaard, who then reformulated them in accordance with his own intellectual agenda. It is thus conceivable that Kierkegaard too came to reject the Hegelian trend in the same manner as the others. All of this points to a development in his thought and not to a single static relation to Hegel. In the course of this investigation, I would like to follow Helweg’s intuition. I wish to try to make the picture of this relation more differentiated by finding out more precisely how well Kierkegaard knew Hegel’s texts at the different stages of his career. Moreover, I would like to try to piece together the picture of Hegel that Kierkegaard received in order to understand the nature of his assessment more precisely. Once this picture is clear, then one can begin to evaluate the true character of what has for so long been understood as his one-sided criticism of Hegel. With these preliminaries out of the way, I now turn to an analysis of Kierkegaard’s own texts in order to begin the actual construction of this picture.

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appendix: historical and biographical overview Contemporary Events 1811 1812 1813

1816 1817

1818 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826

1827

1828 1830

Kierkegaard’s Life

Sibbern travels to Germany Hegel: Science of Logic, Book I: The Doctrine of Being Sibbern named professor in Copenhagen Hegel: Science of Logic, Book II: The Doctrine of Essence Hegel: Science of Logic, Book III: The Doctrine of the Concept Hegel: The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences Heiberg: Christmas Fun and New Year’s Jesting Hegel appointed professor in Berlin Hegel: Philosophy of Right

1813

Born in Copenhagen, May 5

1821

Pupil at Borgerdydskole in Copenhagen

Sibbern: On Knowledge and Enquiry P. M. Møller: The Adventures of a Danish Student Heiberg travels to Berlin Heiberg: On Human Freedom Heiberg: Der Zufall, aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Logik betrachtet Sibbern: The Posthumous Letters of Gabrielis Heiberg: “On Vaudeville as a Dramatic Art” Marheineke: Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft First number of Heiberg’s Flyvende Post Grundtvig: Christian Sermons Hegel: The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (2nd expanded edition) Heiberg: Elves Hill

1828

Confirmation by J. P. Mynster Student at the University of Copenhagen

P. M. Møller named professor in Copenhagen Sibbern’s lectures on psychology begin

1830

(continued)

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appendix: (continued) Contemporary Events

1831

1832

1833

1834

1835

1836

Hegel: The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (3rd expanded edition) Hegel†

Heiberg: Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Grundtvig: Scandinavian Mythology Heiberg: On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age Mynster: “On Religious Conviction” Tryde: “Review of On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age” Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols. 1–2 Martensen embarks on his trip to Germany

Hegel: Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 1 Heiberg: Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military College Sibbern: Logic as Doctrine of Thought F. Schlegel: Lucinde Strauss: Das Leben Jesu, vol.1 Martensen returns from his trip to Germany Martensen’s review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3 Strauss: Das Leben Jesu, vol. 2

Kierkegaard’s Life

1831

Finishes exams in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, history, mathematics, philosophy, and physics

1834

“Another Defense of Woman’s Great Abilities” appears in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post

1836

“The Morning Observations in Kjøbenhavnsposten No. 43” “On the Polemic of Fædrelandet ” “To Mr. Orla Lehmann” all in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post

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appendix: (continued) Contemporary Events 1837

1838

1839

P. M. Møller: “Thoughts on the Possibility of Proofs of Human Immortality” First number of Heiberg’s Perseus Martensen’s article on Lenau’s Faust Erdmann: Vorlesungen u¨ ber Glauben und Wissen als Einleitung in die Dogmatik und Religionsphilosophie Martensen: On the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness I. H. Fichte: “Spekulation und Offenbarung” Martensen’s lectures begin: Speculative Dogmatics Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of History Hegel: Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 2 Sibbern: Remarks and Investigations Primarily Concerning Hegel’s Philosophy Second number of Heiberg’s Perseus P. M. Møller† Schaller: Der historische Christus und die Philosophie Hegel: Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 3 ¨ Philosophie und Feuerbach: Uber Christentum Mynster: “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” Heiberg: “A Remark on Logic in Reference to the Right Reverend Bishop Mynster’s Treatise on Rationalism and Supernaturalism” Martensen: “Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the principium exclusi medii”

Kierkegaard’s Life 1837

Teaches Latin at Borgerdydskole in Copenhagen The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars∗

1838

Death of father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard From the Papers of One Still Living

(continued)

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appendix: (continued) Contemporary Events 1840

1841

1842

Trendelenburg: Logische Untersuchungen Adler: The Isolated Subjectivity in Its Most Important Forms The Corsair begins publication Strauss: Die christliche Glaubenslehre, vol. 1 Nielsen: The Use of the Speculative Method in Sacred History Martensen: Meister Eckart Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (2nd edition) Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of History (2nd edition) Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1 (2nd edition) Feuerbach: Das Wesen des Christentums Martensen: Outline for a System of Moral Philosophy Rasmus Nielsen: Paul’s Letter to the Romans Rasmus Nielsen: Speculative Logic in Its Essentials, 1st number Heiberg: New Poems Werder: Logik. Als Commentar und Erg¨anzung zu Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik Strauss: Die christliche Glaubenslehre, vol. 2 Martensen: “The Present Religious Crisis” Marheineke: Einleitung in die o¨ffentlichen Vorlesungen u¨ ber die Bedeutung der Hegelschen Philosophie in der christlichen Theologie Feuerbach: Grunds¨atze der Philosophie der Zukunft Trendelenburg: Erl¨auterungen zu den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik

Kierkegaard’s Life 1840

Completes Examination at Faculty of Theology Engagement to Regine Olsen

1841

Master’s Thesis: The Concept of Irony Dissolution of engagement to Regine Olsen Trip to Berlin; attends Schelling’s lectures

1842

Return to Copenhagen Begins work on Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est ∗

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appendix: (continued) Contemporary Events

1843

1844

1845

Beck: The Concept of Myth or the Form of the Religious Spirit Rasmus Nielsen: The Use of the Speculative Method for the Sacred History Rasmus Nielsen: Speculative Logic in its Essentials, 2nd number P. M. Stilling: Philosophical Observations on the Meaning of Speculative Logic for Science Adler: Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic Mynster: “On the Laws of Logic” Hegel: Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 1 (2nd edition) Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 2 (2nd edition) Trendelenburg: Die logische Frage in Hegels System Martensen: The Christian Baptism Adler: Some Sermons Adler: Studies Rasmus Nielsen: Speculative Logic in its Essentials, 3rd number Hegel: Lectures on Aesthetics, vols. 2–3 (2nd edition) P.M. Stilling: The Modern Atheism or the Consequences of the So-Called Neohegelianism Rasmus Nielsen: Speculative Logic in its Essentials, 4th number Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3 (2nd edition) Rasmus Nielsen: Propaedeutic Logic Adler: Documents Concerning My Suspension and Dismissal

Kierkegaard’s Life

1843

Short Trip to Berlin Either/Or Two Edifying Discourses Repetition Fear and Trembling Three Edifying Discourses Four Edifying Discourses

1844

Two Edifying Discourses Three Edifying Discourses Philosophical Fragments The Concept of Anxiety Prefaces Four Edifying Discourses

1845

Short Trip to Berlin Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions Stages on Life’s Way Eighteen Edifying Discourses (from 1843 to 1844) (continued)

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appendix: (continued) Contemporary Events 1846

1847

1849

Feuerbach: Das Wesen der Religion Adler: Some Poems Adler: Studies and Examples Adler: Theological Studies Adler: Attempt at a Brief Systematic Exposition of Christianity in its Logic Marheineke: System der christlichen Dogmatik Adler: Observations Built on the Basis of My Attempt at a Brief Systematic Exposition of Christianity in its Logic Adler: Theological Studies, II

Martensen: Christian Dogmatics

Kierkegaard’s Life 1846

Satirized in The Corsair Trip to Berlin Concluding Unscientific Postscript A Literary Review of Two Ages The Book on Adler∗

1847

Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits Works of Love

1848

Christian Discourses The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress The Point of View for My Work as an Author∗ The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air Two Ethical-Religious Essays The Sickness unto Death Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays Practice in Christianity An Edifying Discourse On My Work as an Author Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays For Self-Examination Begins work on Judge for Yourselves∗

1849

1850 1851

Feuerbach: Vorlesungen u¨ ber das Wesen der Religion

1852

Adler: Christian Treatises

1853

Adler: Moments with Respect to the Work of Reconciliation in Jesus Logically Exposited Bishop Mynster† Martensen named Bishop

1854

1851

1854

Polemical articles I–II in Fædrelandet

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appendix: (continued) Contemporary Events

Kierkegaard’s Life 1855

1860 1869 1872 1884

Heiberg† Adler† Sibbern† Martensen†

†

= death

∗

= posthumously published.

Polemical articles III–XXI in Fædrelandet This Must Be Said, So Let It Be Said The Moment, I–IX, X∗ Christ’s Judgment on Official Christianity The Unchangeableness of God Dies in Frederik’s Hospital, November 11

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2 TRACES OF HEGEL IN FROM THE PAPERS OF ONE STILL LIVING AND THE EARLY WORKS

In the present chapter I wish to embark on the examination of Kierkegaard’s texts by analyzing the references to Hegel’s philosophy in the published works and unpublished journals during the period immediately preceding his dissertation, The Concept of Irony (1841) – the period from late 1834, when the first article appeared, until the fall of 1838 when From the Papers of One Still Living was published. This will help to give some idea of Kierkegaard’s basic disposition toward Hegel as he set about writing his dissertation and embarked on a literary career. Thus, in this chapter Kierkegaard’s juvenilia will be explored for clues about his relation to Hegel. In this context there are four different texts to be considered. The first text comes from the scattered articles that Kierkegaard, as a young student, wrote for Heiberg’s journal Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post.1 These articles are concerned primarily with local social and political issues of the day. Generally speaking, they contain no sign of a discussion of Hegel or Hegelianism and thus are not in any obvious way of any particular significance for the present study. However, the first article, “Another Defense of Woman’s Great Abilities,” is relevant indirectly since, although it is not concerned with any particular aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, it is a response to some of Heiberg’s remarks in his deeply Hegelian work, On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age. The first section of the present chapter will therefore be dedicated to this short article. 1

These articles are “Another Defense of Woman’s Great Abilities”; “Ogsaa et Forsvar for Qvindens høie Anlæg,” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, no. 34, December 17, 1834. “The Morning Observations in Kjøbenhavnsposten No. 43”; “Kjøbenhavnspostens Morgenbetragtninger i Nr. 43,” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, no. 60, February 18, 1836. “On the Polemic of Fædrelandet”; “Om Fædrelandets Polemik, 1–2,” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, no. 82–83, March 12–15, 1836. ASKB U 55. “To Mr. Orla Lehmann”; “Til Hr. Orla Lehmann,” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, no. 87, April 10, 1836. ASKB U 55. These articles are available in English as “Articles from Student Days,” in EPW, pp. 1–102.

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The second text to be discussed is an entry from Kierkegaard’s early journals.2 In the entry he develops a theory of stages and compares it directly to Hegel’s dialectical movement from immediacy to mediation and finally to mediated immediacy. The entry is important due to the centrality of Kierkegaard’s later, more detailed theory of stages. It shows him to be in a serious dialogue with Hegel’s philosophy and specifically with Hegel’s dialectical methodology. Although he ultimately distinguishes between his own four-step movement and Hegel’s triadic one, he is far from rejecting Hegel’s dialectical methodology out of hand. On the contrary, his theory has the look more of a modification of Hegel’s than of a criticism of it. The third text that will be explored in this chapter is The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars from Kierkegaard’s journals and papers.3 This is a fragment of a comedy apparently intended for the amusement of fellow-students at the student union of the University of Copenhagen. The comedy is relevant since it is primarily a satire on academic life and specific Hegelians from the Danish intellectual scene at the time. For some commentators, this work is the strongest evidence of the young Kierkegaard’s rejection of Hegel’s thought. In the third section I will examine this work and will argue that it satirizes one specific individual in the Danish Hegelian movement in a way that has nothing in particular to do with Hegel’s own philosophy. The fourth work to be treated is clearly the most important one from this period – Kierkegaard’s From the Papers of One Still Living. This short text, which appeared on September 7, 1838, is Kierkegaard’s first book. It is a review of Hans Christian Andersen’s novel Only a Fiddler (1837)4 and contains some general considerations on contemporary Danish literature and the art of writing. Of significance is the fact that this work was originally written for Heiberg’s Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, which was the express organ of Danish Hegelianism. Presumably due to this fact, Kierkegaard’s book-review contains a number of direct references to Hegel’s philosophy and in addition often employs Hegelian terminology. Section IV is dedicated to exploring this work. In this chapter I would like to argue that, despite the apparent polemic with Hegel in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, there are a number of clear Hegelian characteristics in the thought of Kierkegaard during this period. The positive Hegelian influence, I wish to claim, comes primarily from Kierkegaard’s association with Heiberg, who played an important and positive role for him during his years as a student. While Kierkegaard is never uncritical in his stance toward Hegel, he has 2 3 4

JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 117–119, BB:25. EPW, pp. 103–124; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 280–297, DD:208. Hans Christian Andersen, Kun en Spillemand, Copenhagen 1837.

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no ideological objections to making use of Hegel’s language or certain aspects of his thought. He is rather in a dialogue with him: he takes inspiration from certain aspects of Hegel’s thought and then develops or modifies them in his own manner. Thus, there is no anti-Hegel polemic or campaign at this stage in his career. On the contrary, Kierkegaard, like many of his contemporaries, was provoked and inspired by Hegel’s thought during this period.

i. hegel’s absence in “another defense of woman’s great abilities” Among Kierkegaard’s early articles one is of some interest even though it contains only the vaguest of references to Hegel’s philosophy. The brief article, “Another Defense of Woman’s Great Abilities,”5 was published under the pseudonym “A” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad on December 17, 1834. In this text, which was Kierkegaard’s first publication, the author satirically treats the issue of the emancipation of women and the prospect of their participation in scholarly activities. Kierkegaard’s article was preceded by another one entitled, “In Defense of Woman’s Higher Origin,” which was authored by the student of theology, Peter Engel Lind (1814–1903),6 one of Kierkegaard’s classmates at the Borgerdydskole.7 Kierkegaard’s article in and of itself is not of great significance for understanding his later thought and certainly does not show his most progressive or sympathetic side with respect to the issue of the emancipation of women. It is nonetheless important for an understanding of his relation to Heiberg and thus indirectly to Hegel. Kierkegaard’s article can be seen as a polemical or satirical response to statements that Heiberg made in his treatise, On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age, from 1833. As was mentioned,8 in this work Heiberg tries to evaluate in terms of Hegel’s thought what he believes to be the crisis of the present age in art, religion and philosophy. He argues that Hegel’s philosophy will be able to save the present age from its destructive tendencies and thus restore a sense of truth and meaning. This work constitutes one of the most important documents in the development of Hegelianism in Denmark. At the time Heiberg’s piece 5

6 7

8

“Ogsaa et Forsvar for Qvindens høie Anlæg,” op. cit. [pp. 142–143]; EPW, pp. 3–5; SV1, vol. 13, pp. 5–8. All bracketed page numbers to Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post refer to the photomechanical reproduction, edited by Uffe Andreasen, vols. 1–4, Copenhagen: Det Danske Sprog- og Litteraturselskab 1980–84. P. E. [Peter Engel Lind], “Qvindens høiere Oprindelse forsvaret,” Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, no. 33, December 4, 1834, [pp. 139–140]; EPW, Supplement, pp. 131–133. See Sejer Kuhle, ¨ “Søren Kierkegaard og den heibergske Kreds,” Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift, 68, series 12, vol. 2, 1947, p. 2. Apparently Lind founded a debating club of which the young Kierkegaard was a member. Chapter 1, Section II.

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provoked a controversy in the literary world. It was criticized in print by the student of theology Frederik Ludvig Bang Zeuthen (1805–74),9 the then priest and later bishop Jakob Peter Mynster,10 the priest Eggert Christopher Tryde (1781–1860),11 and by an unidentified anonymous reviewer.12 Heiberg is taken to task above all for his seemingly dismissive remarks about Christianity and for his claim that philosophy occupies a position higher than religion. It is interesting to see how the young Kierkegaard responds to this work in the context of this debate. Heiberg’s treatise was offered as an invitation to a series of lectures in the Hegelian spirit. At the end of the work the author states his goal of presenting Hegel’s philosophy in a way that is accessible by showing how the abstract Concept in fact rests on common representations and experiences. These common representations, he believes, can be used as a didactical aid by means of which people without philosophical education can gain a foothold in Hegel’s philosophical idealism. Heiberg then invites interested readers to sign up for these lectures, and further, quite uncharacteristically for the time, he extends the invitation to “cultured ladies”: The author of the present work nourishes at least the hope that he has now come so far that . . . in a series of lectures he will be able to present an “Introduction to Philosophy” accessible to all cultured people. Indeed, this hope is so alive in him that he does not even assume that he needs to limit himself to a lecture for gentlemen but dares to believe that also cultured ladies will, in that they make the group more beautiful by their presence, be able to participate in the lecture’s serious investigations; for if men usually have a sharper and more consistent understanding and a greater dialectical proclivity, then, on the other hand, the feminine sex is 9

10

11

12

Frederik Ludvig Bang Zeuthen, “Oplysninger til Prof. J.L. Heibergs Skrift: Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nærværende Tid,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 7, no. 76, April 18, 1833, pp. 301–302; no. 77, April 19, 1833, pp. 305–306. See Heiberg’s response, “I Anledning af Hr. Magister Zeuthens saakaldte Oplysninger,” Dagen, no. 100, April 26, 1833. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 1, Tillæg II, pp. 453– 460.) Kts. [ Jakob Peter Mynster], “Om den religiøse Overbeviisning,” Dansk Ugeskrift, vol. 3, no. 76 og 77, 1833, pp. 241–258. (Reprinted in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen 1852–57, vol. 2, pp. 73–94.) Anonymous [Eggert Christopher Tryde], “Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid. Et Indbydelses-Skrift til en Række af philosophiske Forelæsninger. Af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Kbhavn. 54 S. 80- ,” Dansk Litteratur-Tidende for 1833, no. 41, pp. 649–660; no. 42, pp. 681– 692; no. 43, pp. 697–704. See also Heiberg’s response: “I Anledning af Recensionen over mit Skrift: Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid. (Dansk Litt. Tid. No. 41– 43),” Dansk Litteratur-Tidende for 1833, no. 46, pp. 765–780. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, Tillæg I, pp. 437–452.) See also Tryde’s rejoinder: “Svar fra Anmelderen af Professor Heibergs Skrivt, ‘Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid,’ paa Forfatterens Erklæring i Litteraturtidenden No. 46,” Dansk LitteraturTidende for 1833, no. 49, pp. 820–828. [Anonymous], “Et alvorligt Ord over Professor Heibergs Skrift om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 7, no. 155, August 9, 1833, pp. 617–618.

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traces of hegel in the early works accustomed to having a more certain, infallible disposition for immediately comprehending the truth and, undisturbed by all finite determinations, for looking into the infinite in which they rest, the unity, in which they consist; and the author sees the one ability as just as effective for knowledge as the other.13

Here Heiberg makes at least a limited case for the ability of women to participate in philosophical activity, although, not surprisingly, it by no means strikes one by today’s standards as being particularly progressive especially when one considers the argument that “they will make the group more beautiful by their presence.” Heiberg was perhaps motivated to try to include women in philosophical activity by the two talented women in his own life, namely, his mother, Thomasine Christine Gyllembourg-Ehrensv¨ard, known as Fru Gyllembourg, and his wife, Johanne Luise Heiberg. Fru Gyllembourg was the anonymous author of a number of popular novels, and Heiberg himself saw to the publication of these works. Heiberg’s wife was a woman of great intellect and beauty, whose skill as an actress was admired by the elite of the Golden Age. Their home (to which Fru Gyllembourg belonged after the death of her second husband, the Swedish nobleman, Carl Frederik Gyllembourg-Ehrensv¨ard, [1767–1815]) became an important literary salon in Copenhagen’s intellectual life. It was there that Thomasine Gyllembourg and Johanne Luise Heiberg actively participated in discussions about art and literature. (Moreover, years later Heiberg, at the request of the young Mathilde Fibiger [1830–72], helped her to publish her controversial book, Twelve Letters from Clara Raphael,14 which was a pioneering work in the Danish language for the cause of women’s emancipation. Heiberg wrote a preface and appeared as editor of the work, while the author remained hidden behind the pseudonym of Clara Raphael.15 ) It was thus natural for Heiberg to extend an invitation to all cultured ladies to attend his lectures on philosophy since he had already experienced women participating fruitfully and capably in such discussions and had readily recognized their intellectual abilities. The idea of inviting women to philosophical lectures was made the object of satire in the articles by Lind and the young Kierkegaard, which appeared in Heiberg’s own journal, Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post. The ironic claim of Lind’s article, “In Defense of Woman’s Higher Origin,” is that women have a higher origin than men. Needless to say, this thesis is 13

14 15

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid, Copenhagen 1833, p. 53. ASKB 568. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 435– 436.) [Mathilde Fibiger], Tolv Breve fra Clara Raphael, published by Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Copenhagen 1850. See Morten Borup, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1947–49, vol. 3, pp. 147–151.

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satirical. Lind states: “We thus confidently put forward the principle that woman is a superterrestrial being, as such only an object for veneration, and that she ought to act only to display herself in her glory.”16 In other words, woman is to be admired for her beauty and not for any particular ability or personal achievement. Given this premise, Lind finds it objectionable that Heiberg extends to women an invitation to a series of lectures on Hegel’s philosophy. Referring to Heiberg’s invitation, Lind writes: “Some men in particular . . . do not seem to appreciate this truth, notably those who, by encouraging woman to participate in scholarly tasks, seem to want to set themselves above her. We shall not enlarge upon this further but, to their honor, believe that women themselves regard this enterprise as wrong.”17 The claim seems to be that by inviting women to scholarly lectures, Heiberg fails to respect them for their natural character, which is to be venerated. Instead, such an invitation lowers them to the tasks of scholarship, which is the domain of men. It puts them in an inferior position where they must learn from men and thus slights their true, elevated status. Lind claims that women are to be the objects of veneration but are in no way to be conceived as being equal or worthy of equal education, which would afford them the opportunity of achieving something through their own abilities. Kierkegaard’s article has much the same character and tone. He begins by referring to Heiberg’s lectures and Lind’s article: “So much has been said against the ladies’ seeking to educate themselves in a theoretical as well as in a practical direction. Indeed, even in no. 33 of this journal an irony over this is presented to the public, chiefly regarding the academic education offered them at the present time through lectures.”18 These “lectures” were, of course, those that Heiberg intended to give and to which On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age was the introduction and invitation. Here Kierkegaard, like Lind, satirizes Heiberg for his belief that women could profit from lectures of this kind: “Hardly was man created before we find Eve already as audience at the snake’s philosophical lectures, and we see that she mastered them with such ease that at once she could utilize the results of the same in her domestic practice. In the countries of the East, they tried to satisfy this talent for speculation and the allied craving for deeper knowledge already manifest here; for this reason women were confined in seraglios.”19 Here Kierkegaard, with his reference to the biblical story, implies that disaster is the result of women learning new things and this was the cause of the Fall of all 16 17 18 19

EPW, Supplement, p. 132; Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, no. 33, December 4, 1834 [p. 139]. EPW, Supplement, p. 132; Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, no. 33, December 4, 1834 [p. 139]. EPW, p. 3; SV1, vol. 13, p. 5. Translation slightly modified. EPW, p. 3; SV1, vol. 13, p. 5. Translation slightly modified.

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humanity. This can be interpreted straightforwardly as a traditional form of sexism or as merely a flippant polemic in bad taste, but this is not what is of particular interest for the present study. In any case, the allusions to “philosophical lectures” and to “speculation” make the reference to Heiberg quite clear. There are other allusions as well. In his treatise Heiberg employs Hegelian language when speaking about the present age, often referring to epochs of world spirit. Kierkegaard refers here to the ability of women to understand the spirit of the age: “Regarding history, they keep abreast of events, and many a paper, many a journal that man considers insignificant does not escape their keen eye – in fashion magazines they study the spirit of the age.”20 Then in a direct reference to Heiberg’s invitation to cultured ladies, he continues: “Thanks, therefore, to you, great men, who help them up to the peaks of knowledge but nevertheless do not forget the other sex. Therefore it is so lovely to see that the man who especially wishes to have an effect upon the ladies does not, however, forget the men and finally extends his philanthropic enthusiasm to all.”21 These references can leave little doubt about the target of the satire here. What is interesting for the purposes of this investigation is not so much what this article evidences about Kierkegaard’s sexism or his views on women but rather what it fails to say. As was mentioned, Heiberg’s On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age was the source of considerable controversy immediately after its appearance. It was above all criticized by theologians. What is odd here is that Kierkegaard does not feel the need to enter into the debate and that he is provoked neither by Heiberg’s Hegelianism nor by the seemingly dismissive statements about religion and Christianity, statements that produced a general outcry among contemporary priests and theologians. Moreover, one of Heiberg’s sharpest critics was Mynster, whom Kierkegaard highly esteemed during this period. Thus, while there was an anti-Hegelian movement aligned against Heiberg and an anti-Hegelian campaign afoot, Kierkegaard at this time felt no need to join it, even though the topics discussed in Heiberg’s treatise would later be among the most important for him. Even his respect for Mynster does not draw him into the debate. This is significant since it shows that during this period, Kierkegaard had no polemic against Hegel or against Heiberg’s Hegelianism. He stayed out of a controversy that he well could have entered if he had felt the need to object to Heiberg’s introduction of Hegel into the debate about the contemporary status of art and religion. On the contrary, the only thing that he finds objectionable about these lectures is Heiberg’s extension of an invitation to cultured ladies. Moreover, the flippant tone of Kierkegaard’s essay suggests that he does not take the substantive issues of the piece seriously. 20

EPW, p. 4; SV1, vol. 13, p. 7.

21

EPW, p. 4; SV1, vol. 13, p. 7.

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This is of significance because in Prefaces from 1843, Kierkegaard comes back to discuss Heiberg’s treatise again, and there the discussion is quite different. Although it, like the article here, is polemical and satirical and thus not particularly substantive in nature, it nonetheless ostensibly takes aim at Heiberg’s Hegelianism, whereas the article here ignores it almost completely. This clearly indicates a change in Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, which is reflected in the change in his relation to Heiberg.

ii. hegel and kierkegaard’s early theory of stages Although I will make no attempt to give a systematic account of Kierkegaard’s journals with an eye toward references to Hegel, there is one entry in particular that requires special attention for its use of Hegel’s dialectical scheme. It is an entry dated January 27, 1837, in which Kierkegaard sketches a theory of stages and explicitly refers to Hegel by way of contrast.22 Thulstrup argues that this passage, in which Kierkegaard distinguishes his scheme, which contains four stages, from Hegel’s, which contains three, indicates Kierkegaard’s fundamental rejection of Hegel’s thought.23 Malantschuk also reads it as a part of an anti-Hegel polemic.24 I wish to argue, on the contrary, that his use of this scheme shows that, far from rejecting Hegel’s philosophy out of hand, the young Kierkegaard was in fact inspired by and in a dialogue with it. It is clear that Kierkegaard at this time was interested in the triadic structure of Hegel’s dialectical method. Hegel’s dialectical triad is characterized by a movement that involves first, immediacy, second, mediation, and third, the unity of the two in a “mediated immediacy.” In various discussions of the dialectic, Hegel characterizes the first stage as “the immediate.” This can mean a number of different things depending on the context of the discussion. At the ontological level, pure being is immediate since it is the most basic (and the most indeterminate) possible category. It is considered on its own with no relation to anything else. But for a thing to be what it is at all, it must be conditioned or mediated by other things that determine it. Thus, the category of being is mediated by its opposite, the category, nothing. Finally, the categories of being and nothing are conceived in their dialectical unity as a single, unitary category – becoming. 22 23 24

JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 117–119, BB:25. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980, pp. 96–104. Gregor Malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag 1968, pp. 143–146. English translation: Kierkegaard’s Thought, tr. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1971, pp. 147–150.

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Although ontology is the most fundamental level, perhaps the easiest way to understand Hegel’s conception of mediation and immediacy is with the example of his philosophy of history. In the “Spirit” chapter of the Phenomenology, history passes through three stages. The first stage, called “the true spirit,” is represented by the Greek polis. What is characteristic about this stage in history is that the Greeks as a people have an immediate, unreflective relationship to their culture and social life. Hegel illustrates this with the example of the characters of Antigone and Creon in Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone. For them, the beliefs, laws, and values of their culture are immediately true without question. One is one’s culture, and there is no distance or separation between the two. At the second stage, represented by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the collective individual called “spirit” awakens to the manifold contradictions and hypocrisies of its culture and becomes estranged from it. This is the age of “self-alienated spirit” at which a people has a mediated relationship to its culture (i.e., its relation is mediated by reflection, skepticism, critical thinking, etc.). At the final stage, spirit returns to itself in a new unity. Here the individuals in their collectivity arrive at a new relation to their culture, which Hegel calls a “mediated immediacy.” By this he means that one still has the immediate spontaneous feeling for one’s culture, but it is no longer naive or uncritical as at the first stage. Likewise, it is no longer wholly destructive and negative as at the second stage. At the final stage of history, spirit returns to itself. This can also be seen as the goal of Hegel’s political philosophy, which aims to overcome the alienation of the modern age by resurrecting the spontaneous feeling of identification of the individual with his or her culture, which was characteristic of the Greek polis, and reintroducing it at a higher conceptual level. The movement from immediacy to mediation to mediated immediacy is one of the hallmarks of Hegel’s dialectical method. It is this Hegelian scheme that Kierkegaard refers to in the journal entry in question. Kierkegaard’s immediate source of information about Hegel’s dialectic is almost certainly Heiberg. In a series of articles in response to Oehlenschl¨ager,25 Heiberg sketches the different forms of poetry in terms of the Hegelian structure, assigning lyric to the stage of immediacy, epic to that of mediation, and drama to the final stage which unifies the preceding ones. In his journals from this period, Kierkegaard returns again and again to this scheme.26 In an entry from January 16, 1837, he even

25

26

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Svar paa Hr. Oehlenschl¨agers Skrift: ‘Om Kritiken i Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, over Væringerne i Miklagard,’ ” in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, 1828 (I, no. 7; II, no. 8; III, no. 10; IV, no. 11; V, no. 12; VI, no. 13; VII, no. 14; VIII, no. 15; IX, no. 16). (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 194–284.) JP, vol. 2, 1565; Pap. I A 225.

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sketches Heiberg’s taxonomy of forms in detail.27 There one finds the following schema:

Here the different genres of drama are divided into three stages, which are intended to correspond to the Hegelian triad of immediacy, mediation, and mediated immediacy. This is clear from the headings “immediate,” “reflective,” and “unity.” Kierkegaard’s interest in this scheme shows an interest not merely in Hegel’s or Heiberg’s aesthetics but also in Hegel’s overall methodology and the structure of his system. Kierkegaard was inspired by this structure and, after having worked with it, decided that it was in need of modification. In the key entry, he writes: “The system has only three stages: immediacy, reflection and unity; but life has four.”28 Kierkegaard here indicates a desire to modify Hegel’s scheme with the addition of a fourth stage. He distinguishes between the system and life, as he will come to do many times later.29 In other passages he refers to “life’s dialectic,” and this is apparently what he attempts to sketch.30 The identification here of “the system” with Hegel’s system is unmistakable given the three stages that he lists and has read about in Heiberg’s account of the different forms of poetry. Moreover, Hegel himself is mentioned explicitly in the passage. It should be noted that Kierkegaard was not original in his desire to modify Hegel’s dialectical scheme by adding a fourth stage. In his 27 28 29

30

JP, vol. 5, 5192; SKS, vol. 17, p. 113, BB:23. JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, p. 119, BB:25. Translation slightly modified. E.g., P, p. 49; SKS, vol. 4, p. 510: “This doubt is overcome not in the system, but in life.” CUP1, p. 109; SKS, vol. 7, p. 105: “(a) a logical system can be given; (b) but a system of existence cannot be given.” JP, vol. 1, 751; Pap. I A 113. JP, vol. 5, 5118; Pap. I A 120.

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Fermenta Cognitionis,31 the theologian Franz von Baader also criticizes Hegel for the triadic nature of the dialectical movement and instead suggests a fourfold scheme. Kierkegaard was familiar with this work as is evinced by his reading notes from precisely this period.32 In Sibbern’s review of Perseus, which appeared in 1838, one year after the journal entry in question, he refers to Baader and offers his own examples of “the manifold quadrads of life.”33 Here he specifically contrasts Hegel’s triadic structure with a fourfold or quadratic one; moreover, Sibbern associates the quadratic structure with “life” in contrast to abstract thinking, just as Kierkegaard does. Finally, in a satirical speech from a comedy written by students and performed at the student association Academicum from this period, the fictional character Peer Mikkelsen also contrasts the triads of Hegel’s system with the fourfold nature of life.34 This suggests that this particular modification of Hegel’s dialectical scheme was much discussed at the time and thus was presumably something Kierkegaard picked up on from the discussion going on around him rather than something that he invented himself. This said, it should be noted that the way in which he seems to want to develop and employ this structure could well be original. Kierkegaard goes on to distinguish between the three stages in Hegel and the stages that he himself wants to describe. Thus, it is clear that Kierkegaard himself had already begun to develop his theory of stages at this early point in his career. It is not clear to what purpose he intends to put these stages: it may be that he was merely sketching them in order to clarify them for his own purposes, or it may be that he intended to write something fictional that followed this scheme. It is conceivable that he intended to write a novel of some sort in which he traces these different stages in the life of a particular individual. But for whatever his ultimate purpose might have been, in his early journals he collected a great deal of material to help illustrate the four distinct stages that he believes best characterize life. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to examine carefully the stages that he traces in this crucial entry and compare them with Hegel’s account of the dialectical movement from immediacy to mediation to mediated immediacy. The four stages that Kierkegaard sketches are intended to characterize the four ages of a human being: childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age. At the same time they are intended to correspond to the stages in 31 32 33

34

Franz Baader, Fermenta Cognitionis, no. 1–5, Berlin 1822–24. ASKB 394. SKS, vol. 17, p. 106, BB:15. See also Pap. X–2 A 222. Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article III, p. 562. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen 1838, p. 132. ASKB 778. See H. C. A. Lund, Studenterforeningens Historie 1820–70, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen 1896–98, vol. 1, pp. 451–452.

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the development of human history generally.35 The first corresponds to childhood and is characterized as follows: The first is the stage in which the child has not separated himself from his surroundings (“me”). The I is not given but there is the possibility of it, and to that extent it is a conflict. It is formed in vague and fleeting outlines, just like the sea-maidens which the waves produce only to form new ones again (see an engraving). I would like to think that all of these profuse and fleeting forms will be formed into a unity by a stroke of magic, these multitudinous elements standing alongside each other in childhood, crowding each other out in order to enter into the eternal present of the I; in childhood there is an atomistic multiplicity, in the I there is the one in the many.36

The main characteristic of this first stage is that the individual has not become self-conscious and thus is not aware of the difference between himself and his environment. Kierkegaard underscores this aspect in a slightly earlier entry from January 7, 1837.37 In both passages he refers to an engraving of the “sea-maidens” from a dictionary of mythology.38 The picture shows the waves of the ocean which, when breaking, form the shapes of heads of women. They are ultimately still indistinct from the ocean since they disappear into the water again only an instant after being formed. Kierkegaard continues with his description of this first stage: As far as I know mythology, this stage corresponds to the oriental mythologies. It is the divine fullness which streams down like the golden rain on Dana¨e’s lap; to use an expression from dogmatics, it is the original righteousness which, as the Catholic dogmaticians believe, was given to man – in superabundance, if I may say so. But as life by means of an endless approximation comes closer to self-consciousness, the more apparent the conflict becomes. And thus in addition I get the multiplicity which has been regarded as adequate justification for calling these mythologies Romantic, yet only somewhat analogous to what I call “Romanticism,” since the genuinely Romantic stage is the reproduced first stage. But at this point life still has not gained self-consciousness, still has not gained a center of gravity within itself, and thus the multiplicity exerts a pressure. Just as in a room with a low ceiling (it is relatively the same, however high or low it is) an extremely complicated and overcrowded painting on the ceiling seems to press down and gives one the feeling that it is sinking down, just so is the heaven of the Orientals, whereas the Greeks’ light drawings and beautiful forms produce harmony and serenity.39 35 36 37 38 39

JP, vol. 2, 1966; SKS, vol. 18, p. 75, FF:2. JP, vol. 4, 4068; SKS, vol. 18, p. 77, FF:16. JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, p. 117, BB:25. Translation slightly modified. JP, vol. 4, 4394; Pap. I A 319. See also JP, vol. 5, 5100; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 18–30, AA:12. See SKS, vol. K2–3, p. 127, 97.5; see illustration on p. 129. JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, p. 117f., BB:25. Translation slightly modified.

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In the second part of the passage Kierkegaard associates this initial stage with oriental mythology and contrasts it to that of the Greeks. In this point he follows Hegel who puts the oriental world at the first stage in the development of history in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History.40 In fact Hegel characterizes the oriental world as prehistory in the sense that it has not yet reached consciousness of itself and of the idea of freedom. Thus, for Hegel actual history begins with the Greeks. On this point Kierkegaard seems to be in agreement with him. It should also be noted that Kierkegaard says that his third stage, which he characterizes as Romanticism, “is the reproduced first stage.” Thus, like Hegel’s stages, Kierkegaard’s will repeat themselves at higher levels with richer content. Kierkegaard now moves on to the second stage, which corresponds to youth. While the first stage was associated with the orientals, the second is associated with the Greeks. Kierkegaard describes this stage as follows: But after this turmoil comes a peace, an idyllic well-being. It is the youth’s satisfaction in family and school (church and state); this is the second stage: the Greek mythology. Here is genuine balance, here the divine is merged in the world . . . in such a way as it never has merged or ever will, either before or after in the world’s development, although this is indeed the case in the single individual’s development, for in what I specifically call the “Romantic” a question arises about a satisfaction lying beyond the world and which therefore cannot be found in the world, and even in the fourth stage it is to be found only in the form that there is still so much given in the world which is adequate if one is modest and unassuming (resignation), yet there is little to hope for; at least this is the way Christianity, which certainly has the greatest historical significance regarding the solution of this issue, has answered it. Yes, fundamentally Christianity has everything to hope for, so the expression “little” really refers to the philosopher’s struggle.41

In this passage Kierkegaard explicitly draws the comparison between “the world’s development” and “the single individual’s development,” both of which are intended to run through the stages parallel with one another. Kierkegaard characterizes this second stage as one of peace and harmony; in a similar fashion, according to Hegel’s romanticized view of the Greek world, there is a harmony and balance that reigns until the institutions of the Greek polis come into conflict with each other. It is at this stage that the idea of freedom becomes conscious in a people for the first time and the individual becomes self-conscious. Here Kierkegaard and Hegel seem once again to be in agreement since Hegel also sees the Greek world as existing in the harmony of immediacy. 40 41

Hegel, Phil. of Hist., pp. 111–222; Jub., vol. 11, pp. 158–294. JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, p. 118, BB:25. Translation slightly modified.

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After describing these first two stages, Kierkegaard writes, “Observations on the last two stages are to be found among my papers.”42 The reader is thus obliged to reconstruct stages three and four based on information he has provided here in this passage and elsewhere in the early papers. Given that the first stage corresponded to childhood and the second stage to youth, it would seem to follow that the third stage will correspond to adulthood. In his description of the first stage, Kierkegaard has already characterized the third stage as “Romanticism” and indicated that it will correspond to the first stage in some way. Throughout his early journals Kierkegaard contrasts the ancient world with the Romantic (i.e., the second stage with the third).43 In these journals there are many character sketches, which are intended to represent the third stage. In one entry he associates Faust, Don Juan, and the Wandering Jew with the third stage.44 There is evidence that Kierkegaard has done considerable research on each of these figures at this early period in order to employ them in some large project that uses this four-step scheme.45 This stage would correspond to what Hegel calls “self-alienated spirit,” which he characterizes with an analysis of the protagonist of Diderot’s The Nephew of Rameau.46 All of these characters are symbols of disharmony – they are all alienated from traditional belief and custom and thus are not at home in the world. In one passage Kierkegaard says that this stage is characterized by the two halves of the idea being held apart by something foreign.47 Elsewhere it is called an “unsatiated desire.”48 Kierkegaard’s account of the characters mentioned here bears a striking resemblance to Hegel’s analysis of self-alienated spirit. The alienation of the Romantic leads to a reconciliation49 and to the fourth stage, which is, for Kierkegaard, old age. In the description of the second stage, he alludes to the fourth stage, which he characterizes as one of “resignation” and with which he associates Christianity. In one entry he contrasts the age of Romanticism with “our period of understanding,”50 implying that the latter is the fourth stage. There he characterizes Romanticism as dwelling in the realm of representation of the great sublime in the individual, whereas “our age” is concerned with the masses, nations, and peoples. This final stage, however, remains the least developed.

42 43

44 45 46 47 49

JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, p. 118, BB:25. E.g., Pap. I C 135. JP, vol. 1, 16; Pap. I A 135. JP, vol. 2, 1563; Pap. I A 170. JP, vol. 3, 3804; Pap. I A 171. JP, vol. 3, 3809; Pap. I A 217. JP, vol. 3, 3811; Pap. I A 219. JP, vol. 1, 852; Pap. I A 221. JP, vol. 2, 1179; SKS, vol. 19, p. 94, Not2:7. See JP, vol. 1, 795; Pap. I A 150. See section Pap. I C. Hegel, PhS, pp. 296–321; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 376–405. 48 JP, vol. 3, 3803; Pap. I A 155. JP, vol. 3, 3801; Pap. I A 140. 50 E.g., JP, vol. 4, 4063; Pap. I A 139. JP, vol. 3, 3805; Pap. I A 200.

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There can be no doubt that Kierkegaard’s account of these stages is modelled on Hegel’s since after describing these first two stages, he then goes on to compare his scheme explicitly with that of Hegel. He asks: To what extent does Hegel include my first two stages, since his first stage (the immediate) as pure abstraction is actually nothing, and all philosophy before its retrogressive systematic movement must begin with the conflict; in his system he perhaps has the conflict between the I and the world as the first stage but not the corresponding first analogous stage, and his peace is not Grecian, which can correspond only to a prior stage, which is my first one but Hegel’s last.51

Here Kierkegaard indicates two points at which his scheme differs from that of Hegel: (1) while his first stage is the same as Hegel’s since both are characterized by the “I” stepping out from the world, he stresses that this conflict between the “I” and the world takes place again in his “corresponding first analogous state” (i.e., the third stage, Romanticism). This conflict, he seems to claim, is absent in Hegel’s third stage, presumably because this is the stage of unification and harmony in Hegel. (2) While, for Kierkegaard, the second stage is characterized by peace and harmony, which he associated with the Greeks, by contrast, Hegel’s “peace is not Grecian.” For Hegel, ultimate harmony is only achieved at the end of the dialectical movement (i.e., at the third stage), and thus it comes about after the Greek world has been aufgehoben. In Kierkegaard’s scheme, the peace and harmony are to be found at the second stage, which, as has been seen, is characterized by Greek mythology. It should be noted that the differences between the two schemes are perhaps overstated when one considers Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History. These appeared in print for the first time in 1837 in the edition of Eduard Gans (1798–1839),52 and thus it would have been impossible for Kierkegaard to have had access to them at the time of the journal entry. (Gans’ Foreword is dated June 8, 1837.) The material there is divided into not three but four stages. As was mentioned previously, the first two, “The Oriental World” and “The Greek World,” correspond perfectly to Kierkegaard’s. It is rather in regard to the last two that there are significant differences. For Hegel, the third stage is “The Roman World” and the fourth, “The Germanic World.” Kierkegaard’s third stage, Romanticism, would seem to fit better with Hegel’s fourth stage. The details here are less important than the general point that Kierkegaard uses Hegel’s scheme and self-consciously sees himself as modifying it. If this is correct, then it shows a surprising Hegelian influence on the young Kierkegaard. It confirms that Kierkegaard’s theory of 51 52

JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, p. 119, BB:25. Hegel, Vorlesungen u¨ ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. by Eduard Gans, Berlin 1837, vol. 9 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45.

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stages ultimately stems from or finds its original inspiration in Hegel. Kierkegaard’s modification of Hegel’s theory of stages demonstrates a critical approach even at this very early stage of his intellectual development. However, although he, to be sure, wants to revise Hegel’s threestep movement, this is by no means a polemic against or outright rejection of Hegel. On the contrary, Kierkegaard seems to be working within the Hegelian paradigm. He assumes a Hegelian conception of development through discernible stages that displace one another. The first three stages – immediacy, mediation, and mediated immediacy – follow the Hegelian structure perfectly. Thus, in this journal entry Kierkegaard demonstrates a surprising familiarity with Hegel’s dialectical method, which he in large measure accepts.

iii. von jumping-jack in the battle between the old and the new soap-cellars Also from the early period of Kierkegaard’s career dates the unpublished comedy, The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, in which he satirizes Hegelian philosophy. In this work while the Phenomenology of Spirit is named, there are no direct quotations of any primary texts by Hegel. Act II of the comedy is of particular importance: it takes place at “the Prytaneum,” a place where meetings and philosophical discussions are held. In the discussions there one finds references to a number of Hegelian ideas, such as the “bad infinity”53 and the dialectical opposition of concepts.54 It might appear that the work is intended as a satire on Hegel. Yet its actual target proves to be specific Danish Hegelians, and its focus is on their personalities rather than the Hegelian ideas they espouse. In this section I will concentrate on analyzing one of the characters from the work who is of particular importance for his Hegelian statements, namely, von Jumping-Jack [Hr. von Springgaasen]. I will argue that this character is intended as a caricature of Martensen.55 I will further claim that while it is clear that Kierkegaard wants to satirize the Hegelian, Martensen, there is no criticism of anything particularly Hegelian about him. From the allusions in the work to Hegel’s philosophy, Thulstrup deduces that the comedy is a straightforward satire on Hegel, and this seems 53 54 55

EPW, p. 122; SKS, vol. 17, p. 295, DD:208. (Translated in EPW as the “spurious infinity.”) EPW, p. 124; SKS, vol. 17, p. 297, DD:208. Usually the character of Mr. Phrase is taken to be a caricature of Martensen. See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 188. Jens Holger Schjørring, “Martensen,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulov´a Thulstrup (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10), Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1982, p. 200. I follow Fenger in claiming that Mr. von Jumping-Jack is Martensen: Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, tr. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven, Connecticut, and London: Yale University Press 1980, pp. 141–142.

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to be the general view. Thulstrup rather hastily concludes: “The decisive proof of the correctness of this interpretation, that Kierkegaard did not become a Hegelian, is simply the existence of the play itself. A convinced Hegelian could never have written a play such as Kierkegaard’s since the system prohibited a position that Kierkegaard consciously embraced.”56 It is difficult to know ultimately what to make of this little-known, unfinished comedy or how much stock to put in it; nevertheless it seems prudent to urge caution before drawing conclusions of this kind about Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel based on it. Thulstrup again poses the question wrongly by couching the issue in terms of whether Kierkegaard was a Hegelian or not, thus making the matter an undifferentiated dichotomy. The issue is not whether Kierkegaard was a Hegelian (i.e., whether Kierkegaard agreed with Hegel on all points or whether he saw himself as falling into line with one or the other of the Hegelian schools) but rather what particulars they have in common and where they part company. Nonetheless Thulstrup’s claim that this work is fundamentally anti-Hegelian does, at least at first glance, seem to be supported by the use of many of Hegel’s key terms and the stilted Hegelian rhetoric that appears in the mouths of some of the characters. But to say that something is anti-Hegelian does not necessarily mean that it is anti-Hegel. In other words, Kierkegaard wishes to satirize specific Hegelians or a specific context of discussion of Hegelian philosophy, but this satire has nothing intrinsically to do with anything in Hegel’s thought itself. To understand The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, one must have some familiarity with the context in which it was written. In the fall of 1836 Martensen returned from his long study-trip abroad.57 He had been in virtually all of the major university towns in Germany and had met most of the leading philosophers and theologians of the day. One of his final stops was Paris, where in summer of 1836 he met Heiberg and his wife for the first time.58 On that occasion Heiberg, who had been trying to make an inroad for Hegel in Denmark for more than a decade, spoke about his efforts with Martensen who, fresh from his trip from Germany, was excited to join the cause and to promote Hegel’s philosophy. In his autobiography Martensen recalls that they spoke for a long time about various aspects of Hegel’s philosophy and its reception.59 It seems quite probable that on that occasion Heiberg suggested that Martensen write a review of his Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military 56 57 58

59

See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 192. See Chapter 1, Section II. See Johanne Luise Heiberg, Et liv genoplevet i erindringen, vols. 1–4, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1973, fifth revised edition, vol. 1, pp. 281–282. See also Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1882–83, vol. 1, pp. 218–227, vol. 2, pp. 24–39. Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 218–222.

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College, which was given in November 1834 when Martensen had already left for Germany, and which was subsequently published in 1835.60 In any case, making Heiberg’s acquaintance must certainly have been one of the inspirations for Martensen’s review. Martensen then returned to Copenhagen in the fall of 1836. His return home after almost two years abroad was the cause of some excitement among the local students and scholars interested to hear the latest about the academic world of Germany and Prussia. One of the first things that Martensen did upon his return was to write the review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course. It was published in the December number of the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, which seems to have appeared in January 1837.61 At first glance this short review of a short lecture seems to be fairly insignificant, but if one sees it in its proper historical context, then one quickly realizes that its importance can hardly be overestimated. This was the first work that Martensen published in Denmark after his return.62 It was in a sense the first statement of his philosophical perspective after his trip, and it was doubtless anxiously awaited by many readers. This marked the beginning of a tremendously successful period for Martensen. He defended his dissertation, On the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness, on July 12th, 1837, and one month later he was appointed lecturer at the Faculty of Theology. His lectures in the fall of 1837 were among the most popular in the entire history of the University of Copenhagen. Martensen’s influence immediately after his return is attested to by Kierkegaard himself. Even years later he still recalls the event: “It is now roughly ten years since Prof. Martensen returned home from foreign travels, bringing with him the newest German philosophy and creating quite a sensation with this novelty.”63 In another late journal entry, Kierkegaard recalls, “Home from abroad at the opportune moment with Hegel’s philosophy, he [Martensen] made a big sensation, had extraordinary success, won over the whole student generation to ‘the system.’”64 Students and scholars in Denmark were starved for information about the philosophical ferment in Germany following Hegel’s death in 1831. Martensen was 60

61

62

63 64

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen 1835. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 461–516.) Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole. Af J. L. Heiberg, Lærer i Logik og Æsthetik ved den kgl. militaire Høiskole,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, 16, 1836, pp. 515–528. The only other thing that Martensen published at this time was his German work on Lenau’s Faust, which he had already written in the spring of 1836 and which was published in Germany in December of that year: Ueber Lenau’s Faust, by Johannes M. . . . . . . n. Stuttgart 1836. See Mindre Skrifter og Taler af Biskop Martensen, ed. by Julius Martensen, Copenhagen 1885, pp. 1–2. PF, Supplement, pp. 226–227; Pap. X-2 A 155, p. 117. Translation slightly modified. JP, vol. 6, 6748, p. 395; Pap. X-6 B 171, p. 262.

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able to provide this information and apparently present it in a way that was more exciting and attractive to students than Heiberg had been able to do. Thus, he was able to create something of a sensation in the local intellectual scene. It was Martensen’s ability to charm the students that particularly irritated Kierkegaard. Moreover, also in a journal entry from much later Kierkegaard attests specifically to the importance of Martensen’s article: Martensen, “after his return, and since his first appearance in the Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, has invariably assured us that he has gone beyond Hegel.”65 It might seem odd that so many years later Kierkegaard would still refer to a short review article. But this indicates that Martensen’s article was far more important than a simple review. Moreover, the fact that Kierkegaard recalls the article as immediately following Martensen’s return from Germany indicates the importance of the timing and context of the work. Immediately after his return from abroad Martensen was able to exercise a significant influence over the students. He brought with him the latest news about the development of the Hegelian schools in Germany. He was able to convey to the students his own sense of excitement and enthusiasm for the recent discussions surrounding Hegel’s philosophy. Most significant for the present purposes was the fact that he also brought with him the difficult technical terminology from Hegelian philosophy. This seems to have caught fire among the students who were perhaps all too anxious to appropriate it. Many contemporary reports attest to the fact that this was one of the most striking and indeed irritating things about the student scene surrounding Martensen. Two years later in 1839 a new student organization was founded in opposition to the more conservative student union. The new organization was called the Academic Reading Association Academicum, and Kierkegaard’s elder brother, Peter Christian Kierkegaard, was among the founding members.66 The Academicum, which was right around the corner from the lecture hall, was the place where Martensen’s lectures on Hegel’s philosophy were discussed by enthusiastic students. When one reads about the discussions that took place at the Academicum, one cannot help but be reminded of Kierkegaard’s satirical comedy. The lively atmosphere is attested to by various reports. For example, Carl Ploug (1813–94), the founding president of the association, describes the ambiance created by Martensen thus: Both Martensen’s lectures – which were also attended by quite a few nontheology students who thereafter crowded into the adjacent Academicum – and the philosophical studies cultivated for awhile by the older and younger 65 66

CA, Supplement, p. 207; Pap. V B 60, p. 137. Translation slightly modified. Quoted in full on p. 65 above. H. C. A. Lund, Studenterforeningens Historie 1820–70, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 447.

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people influenced by him furnished rich material for conversation during the first nine months that the Academicum existed, and the reading rooms were disproportionately well supplied with the same fare. . . . The result of this was that nearly all conversations were conducted in Hegelian terminology; these discussions used a jargon of unnecessary foreign words, which posited or negated, manifested or mediated everything possible, and soon elicited a satire, which surely contributed a great deal to their being abolished.67

A similar account comes from another former student, the later priest Frederik Nielsen (1818–89), who describes the discussions at the Academicum thus: “It was a philosophical glossolalia, which often was on the verge of going over the line and degenerating into a hodgepodge of philosophical neologisms! . . . There were discussions about triads, categories, negations, mediations, immanence and transcendence, etc., and this debate was no less animated than that described by Holberg in his Peder Paars.”68 At the beginning of 1840, an anonymous critic attacked Martensen in the journal Fædrelandet for instilling the theology students at the University of Copenhagen with an arrogant and corrupt spirit and for leading them away from Christianity. Although the critic does not mention the Academicum explicitly, his description of the philosophical debates among Martensen’s students is in perfect harmony with the accounts just quoted: “The discussion must always be standardized with one Hegelian phrase or another . . . Hegelian terminology and Hegelian clich´es must always be brought in. Mediations, incarnations, negations, negations of negations, immanences, etc., belong to the order of the day.”69 The theologian and politician Henrik Nikolai Clausen (1793– 1877), who at the time was Martensen’s colleague on the Faculty of Theology, also complains in his autobiography of the affected Hegelian jargon that was employed among Martensen’s students during this period.70 These accounts all allude to the stilted philosophical language used by the students and Martensen, their misguided teacher. These descriptions capture the tone of Kierkegaard’s comedy perfectly. When one recalls Kierkegaard’s disdain for Martensen and his rivalry with him, it is easy to imagine that the satire in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars is intended as a criticism of him and the students surrounding him. 67 68 69

70

Carl Ploug, “Akademicum, en Episode af Studenterlivet for 40 Aar siden,” Illustreret Tidende, 24, no. 1224, March 11, 1883, p. 295. Frederik Nielsen, Minder. Oplevelser og Iagttagelser, Aalborg 1881, pp. 35–36. [Anonymous], “Nogle Træk til en Charakteristik af den philosophiske Aand, som for Tiden findes hos de Studerende ved Kjøbenhavns Universitet,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, 14, no. 25, January 26, 1840, p. 98. Henrik Nikolai Clausen, Optegnelser om Mit Levneds og min Tids Historie, Copenhagen 1877, p. 213.

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Kierkegaard seems to have written The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars between January 27 and May 29, 1837, that is, immediately after Martensen’s review article appeared.71 (Thus, the long-standing view in the secondary literature is anachronistic, namely, that Act II of The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars is intended as a satirical account of the discussions at the Academicum.72 ) The importance of Martensen’s article for Kierkegaard’s comedy is evidenced by the fact that it is quoted, paraphrased, and alluded to several times. This supports the thesis that von Jumping-Jack, the main “Hegelian” figure in the piece, is intended to be a satire of Martensen. For example, von Jumping-Jack says, “Yes, that’s all very fine with the popular, but my doubt is by no means popular; it is not a doubt about this, that, or the other, about this thing or that thing; no it is an infinite doubt.”73 This is a paraphrase of Martensen’s review, where he writes, The demand, “de omnibus dubitandum est,” is easier said than done, for what is required is not finite doubt, not the popular doubt about this or that particular thing, with which one always reserves something for oneself which cannot be called into doubt. It is not sufficient to mention the unconditioned thought as truth, but the truly unconditioned thought must be expressed determinately, and, note well, it must be expressed as unconditioned. Science thus demands absolute, infinite doubt.74

As will be explored in more detail later,75 Kierkegaard clearly associated the slogan “de omnibus dubitandum est,” or “one must doubt everything,” with Martensen, who repeated it not only in his lectures but also in his written works. This was a part of Martensen’s stock portrayal of the skeptical method, which he attributed to Hegel’s philosophy. Moreover, Kierkegaard puts into the mouth of von Jumping-Jack two slogans from Descartes, “cogito ergo sum” and, as in the previous passage, “de omnibus dubitandum est.” He has him say, “I repeat, gentlemen, I have gone beyond Hegel. It was, namely, modern philosophy, which began with Descartes, who said: cogito ergo sum and de omnibus dubitandum est.”76 These were slogans that Martensen frequently employed after his return. Indeed even prior to his return in a letter from Vienna to Sibbern dated March 19, 71 72

73 74 75 76

Leon Jaurnow and Kim Ravn, “Tekstredegørelse” to Journalen DD in SKS, vol. K17, pp. 361–364. See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., pp. 192ff. Carl Henrik Koch, En Flue p˚a Hegels udødelige næse eller om Adolph Peter Adler og om Søren Kierkegaards forhold til ham, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag A/S 1990, pp. 27–28, p. 33. Frithiof Brandt, Den unge Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaards Forlag 1929, pp. 420ff. EPW, p. 114; SKS, vol. 17, p. 288, DD:208. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., p. 519. Chapter 5, Section I. EPW, p. 119; SKS, vol. 17, p. 292, DD:208. Translation slightly modified.

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1836, Martensen indicates his dissatisfaction with Hegel’s philosophy and in so doing repeats the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum” several times as a slogan. He writes: The foundation of the Hegelian philosophy is indeed already given in Descartes, who with his “Cogito ergo sum,” which he posited as the only certain thing, tore himself free from the “credo ut intelligam” of scholastic philosophy. One demands now a philosophy without authority and presuppositionless, which is absolutely grounded in itself and allows nothing to be valid except what the necessity of pure thought brings with it, be it now that it is determined as causa sui or as critical autonomous reason or as pure I or finally as absolute Concept, where the presuppositionlessness at the point of departure from pure being has attained its highest peak. This abstraction from all authority and presupposition seems to me to have reality only if there is no actual presupposition and authority for the human being, i.e. if the human being has no auctor. If, by contrast, there is a creator, and if the religious relation is the human being’s basic relation, then it seems to me that every abstraction from it is irreligious when it is serious and not merely a problematic discussion intra fidem. For when I posit “cogito ergo sum” as the only certain thing, then it is at bottom the creation which posits itself as what is certain, instead of knowing itself together with the creator in conscience.77

From this passage, in which Martensen outlines the basic contours of both his review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture and his dissertation, it is clear that he associates the slogan, “cogito ergo sum,” with Hegel even though it is never used in this way in Hegel’s own texts. The two slogans, “cogito ergo sum” and “de omnibus dubitandum est,” appear in a number of Martensen’s lectures during this period. They can be found in his treatment of Descartes in his course, “Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics,” in 1837–38.78 They come up again in his “Lectures on the History of Philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” which were the object of discussion in the Academicum in 1839.79 They also appear in Martensen’s dissertation, On the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness.80 77 78 79 80

“Letter from Martensen to Sibbern,” Vienna, March 19, 1836 in Breve fra og til F.C. Sibbern, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen 1866, vol. 1, pp. 181–182. SKS, vol. 19, p. 131, Not4:7. SKS, vol. 19, p. 137, Not4:10. Pap. II C 25, in Pap. XII, p. 282. Hans Lassen Martensen, De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta, Copenhagen 1837, § 5, § 12, § 24. ASKB 648. Danish translation: Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie, tr. by L.V. Petersen, Copenhagen 1841, § 5, § 12, § 24. ASKB 651. English translation: The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology, in Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion, tr. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, Atlanta: Scholars Press 1997, p. 85, p. 100, p. 125. Kierkegaard recalls Martensen’s use of the slogan “cogito ergo sum” much later in the authorship: CUP1, p. 317; SKS, vol. 7, p. 288. CUP1, p. 318; SKS, vol. 7, p. 290.

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Kierkegaard has von Jumping-Jack use the two slogans from Descartes several times, occasionally with slight variations.81 The issue of the character of Faust, which is brought up by von Jumping-Jack, also points clearly to Martensen. Kierkegaard has the character say the following: “My dear fellow! I fully perceive what ails you. It is the Faustian problem; it is what modern philosophy, which, said in parenthesi, began with Descartes, has suffered from to a great extent. . . . since I am just in the process of giving a short account of modern philosophy since Descartes, I can perhaps oblige the rest of those present by speaking about it publicly so all can hear.”82 There are two things to note in this passage. First, there is a clear allusion to Martensen’s review. There he gives a thumbnail sketch of the history of philosophy, in which he assigns a central place to Descartes. The second thing to note is the reference to Faust. Towards the end of his review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture, Martensen closes his brief summary of the history of modern philosophy with an allusion to Faust: Here I merely take the liberty of calling to mind Goethe’s Faust. He too gave up faith for doubt. He too speculates about logos but can in no way accept that it should mean “the Word.” He reformulates it again and again – here is a true picture of modern speculation in its relation to revelation. The poet has been guided by good sense, for the issue depends on the various interpretations of logos.83

The point is that by understanding the revelation as a necessary development of the Concept, speculative philosophy gives it a purely secular meaning. Faust’s struggle to translate the Greek word, “λoγ ´ oς ” from the opening lines of the Gospel of John can be seen as an analogy for this issue in speculative philosophy. The Greek term, usually rendered as “the Word,” could mean something wholly secular such as “the thought” or “the force,” translations which would, like speculative philosophy, deprive Christianity of its metaphysical significance and reduce key doctrines to

81

82 83

EPW, p. 118; SKS, vol. 17, p. 291, DD:208: “It was Descartes who said cogito ergo sum and de omnibus dubitandum.” EPW, p. 117; SKS, vol. 17, p. 290, DD:208: “It was Descartes, then, who uttered the remarkable, eternally unforgettable words cogito ergo sum and de omnibus disputandum est – words that in every well-ordered speculative state really ought to be learned in confirmation instruction, words of which no theological graduate, at least ought to be ignorant, since no speculative spiritual advisor can hope to carry out his difficult call successfully without them. Yes, what a great thought – someday it will go so far that one will regard these words, I repeat them, cogito ergo sum and de omnibus disputandum est, as the state’s scholarly order of the day.” EPW, p. 114; SKS, vol. 17, p. 288, DD:208: “Yes, sometimes I have been troubled by a truly scholarly doubt as to whether I have indeed doubted enough, for doubt is the specific character of modern philosophy, which, said in parenthesi, began with Descartes, who said de omnibus disputandum est.” EPW, p. 116; SKS, vol. 17, p. 289, DD:208. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., p. 527.

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simple forms of human thought or natural forces. This seems to be the target of Kierkegaard’s satire in the previously quoted passage from the comedy where he characterizes the problem of modern philosophy as “the Faustian problem.” As has been mentioned earlier, in 1837 Martensen published an article in Heiberg’s Perseus on a version of the Faust legend by Nicolaus Lenau.84 Already in 1836 his German work on the subject had appeared.85 At the time Kierkegaard himself had considered writing something on Faust and was deeply vexed when Martensen’s article appeared.86 This represents a significant episode in Kierkegaard’s early rivalry with Martensen, which was to last his entire life. Kierkegaard has von Jumping-Jack continue with his account of the history of modern philosophy in a way that closely follows that of Martensen in his review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture. The point of Martensen’s overview is to show that all previous philosophical systems employed doubt only partially and thus inadequately; only Hegel’s system employs it completely and is thus without presuppositions. For this reason Hegel’s system was in his view the highest achievement in philosophy theretofore: the Hegelian system “has an infinite meaning for our times since it contains the most complete and comprehensive development of rational knowledge. With this it thinks that an entire era in the history of philosophy, which sought to solve the riddle of existence independent of all tradition and any given positivity, comes to a close.”87 Thus, Martensen interprets the history of philosophy with a teleology that leads up to Hegel. He says the following of Spinoza: “Spinoza gave up on the ‘I.’ He doubted the reality of the subject, but the objective, the substance, the causa sui, he accepted without further investigation as the firm, indubitable point from which he developed his entire system.”88 Kierkegaard refers to this passage when he has von Jumping-Jack say, “Spinoza now carried through this standpoint purely objectively, so that all existence became undulations of the absolute.”89 In both passages the point is that Spinoza concentrated on the object sphere but forgot to examine the subject with skeptical doubt. Kierkegaard has von Jumping-Jack go on to mention Kant and Fichte, just as Martensen does in his account.90 84 85 86

87 89 90

Hans Lassen Martensen, “Betragtninger over Id´een af Faust med Hensyn paa Lenaus Faust,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 1, 1837, pp. 91–164. ASKB 569. Ueber Lenau’s Faust, by Johannes M. . . . . . . n. Stuttgart 1836. JP, vol. 5, 5225; Pap. II A 597: “Oh, how unhappy I am – Martensen has written a treatment of Lenau’s Faust!” See also JP, vol. 2, 1183; SKS, vol. 17, p. 49, AA:38. JP, vol. 5, 5226; SKS, vol. 18, p. 83, FF:38. 88 Ibid., p. 520. Ibid., p. 515. EPW, p. 118; SKS, vol. 17, p. 291, DD:208. EPW, p. 118; SKS, vol. 17, p. 291f., DD:208: “This objectivity, however, was entirely distilled out in the critical development, and whereas Kant carried through this skepticism only to a certain extent, it was reserved for Fichte to look this Medusa in the face in the night of criticism and abstraction.”

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Finally, Martensen evaluates Hegel’s philosophy as the culmination of the history of philosophy and thus as philosophy’s highest achievement theretofore. At the end of his overview Martensen writes: “All subordinate systems which have the rationalistic principle in themselves without having carried it out are this system’s certain booty and must let themselves be taken up as moments in it.”91 Kierkegaard mocks this enthusiastic assessment of Hegel by having von Jumping-Jack say: “but it was Hegel who speculatively drew together the previous systems, and therefore with him knowledge has reached its proper dogmatic peak.”92 Similarly he writes: “In other words, philosophy is the evening of life, and with Hegel, who speculatively drew together the previous rational systems, this evening has world-historically begun.”93 Here there is an implicit distinction between Hegel and the Hegelian who praises him. The criticism is not of any particular doctrine or theory in Hegel’s own philosophy but rather of the enthusiastic claims made on its behalf by Hegel’s followers. From these references, it is clear that Kierkegaard criticizes Martensen, but there is no substantial doctrine from Hegel’s philosophy at issue here. Martensen is criticized for his superficial account of the history of philosophy and the role of skeptical doubt in it. Thus, while Kierkegaard criticizes a Hegelian, his criticisms have nothing intrinsically to do with Hegel’s actual philosophy. From the fact that Kierkegaard satirizes a number of Danish Hegelians and uses some of their best known catch-phrases, it does not follow that he satirizes Hegel’s thought, let alone that he sees nothing whatsoever of value in it. This is the non sequitur that Thulstrup and other commentators have fallen victim to when they immediately identify any given Hegelian with Hegel himself and take a criticism of the former to be the same as a criticism of the latter. Kierkegaard’s satire is aimed at the arrogance and affectation of zealots who are anxious to jump on board as soon as a new philosophical fad comes along. Martensen and his students could just as easily have been enthusiastic followers of any other trend. It is the clique of followers and adherents that he wants to criticize and not Hegel’s own thought, which is never really discussed. It is, of course, possible that there was something philosophically deeper behind the criticism, but this cannot be determined on the basis of this text alone. What this text does indicate is that Kierkegaard was passionately interested in the discussion about Hegelianism in Denmark and was familiar with the circles in which this discussion was taking place. 91 92 93

Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., p. 524. EPW, p. 119; SKS, vol. 17, p. 292, DD:208. EPW, p. 122; SKS, vol. 17, p. 295, DD:208.

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iv. heiberg’s perseus and from the papers of one still living As was mentioned in the introductory remarks to this chapter, From the Papers of One Still Living is a book-review of Hans Christian Andersen’s novel Only a Fiddler. Kierkegaard intended to publish the review in the second number of Heiberg’s journal Perseus.94 In this section, I would like to argue that the original plan to publish the piece in Perseus determines its entire character.95 The work seems to be intended to endear Kierkegaard to Heiberg. Kierkegaard knew full well that Heiberg was estranged from Andersen at the time, and thus it is no coincidence that his review is critical of Andersen’s novel.96 Moreover, Kierkegaard refers frequently to the anonymous works of Fru Gyllembourg, which were published by Heiberg.97 For the purposes of this investigation, these factors are less important than the aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that appear in the text. The work contains a number of Hegelian aspects precisely because it was intended for publication in a Hegelian journal. I will begin by giving a bit of background information regarding the nature and conception of the journal. Then I will examine a number of passages from Kierkegaard’s text itself that provide internal evidence for a Hegelian influence. Finally, I will explore scattered bits of evidence concerning the contemporary reception of the work, which also point in the direction of it being influenced by Hegel. A. Some Background Information about Perseus. The first number of Perseus had appeared in June of 1837 and thus was already in print when Kierkegaard began work on From the Papers of One Still Living; the second number, for which Kierkegaard’s review was intended, eventually appeared in August of 1838. Kierkegaard’s friend, Emil Boesen (1812–79), writes to his cousin Martin Hammerich (1811–81) in a letter dated July 20, 1838: “Søren Kierkegaard . . . has recently written a piece on Andersen which will go into Heiberg’s Perseus; it is written in a rather heavy style, but otherwise it is quite good.”98 It is not known for certain why the piece 94

95

96 97 98

See Johnny Kondrup, “Tekstredegørelse” to Af en endnu levendes Papirer, in SKS, vol. K1, pp. 68–72. See also Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, op. cit., pp. 138–141. In the “Historical Introduction” to her translation of From the Papers of One Still Living, Julia Watkin argues to the contrary: “That Kierkegaard should be regarded as here espousing Hegelianism in any form is thus a misunderstanding of his aim and intention. Granted, he intended his review for Heiberg’s Perseus, but this in itself is no proof of Hegelianism.” EPW, p. xxxi. See Chapter 10, “Berømmelsens Kalosker,” in Niels Birger Wamberg, H. C. Andersen og ˚ ˚ Heiberg. Andsfrænder og Andsfjender, Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag 1971, pp. 93–121. EPW, p. 64; SKS, vol. 1, p. 20. EPW, p. 67fn.; SKS, vol. 1, p. 23fn. EPW, p. 69; SKS, vol. 1, p. 25. Carl Weltzer, “Stemninger og Tilstande i Emil Boesens Ungdomsaar,” in Kirkehistoriske Samlinger, seventh series, vol. 1, Copenhagen 1951–53, pp. 408–414.

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was never published in Perseus as intended, but it is quite possible that Heiberg was dissatisfied with the style. This is evidenced by a letter that Kierkegaard writes to him on July 28, 1838. It seems that Heiberg had read the manuscript and requested that Kierkegaard make some stylistic modifications. In the letter Kierkegaard responds: Honored Professor, I received your letter last night. Only one point in it troubles me somewhat. I am afraid that it may seem in some way as if I almost tried to get around that warning contained in your first letter by employing those same ordinary and imprecise phrases in which you orally stated your stylistic requirements. On this occasion, I cannot refrain from asking you, sir, to remember, as far as you are able to do so, those remarks I then made, which I think contained an Amen that was modified in several ways. – Unless, that is, I have been so unfortunate as to have expressed myself incomprehensibly, just as I see from your letter that I must have misunderstood you. As for my essay and its fate, I will, sir, take the liberty of visiting you in this connection very soon.99

Apparently Kierkegaard did make some revisions with the help of his former classmate Hans Peter Holst (1811–93).100 It is unclear exactly what happened after this, but one can surmise that Heiberg simply stuck with his original assessment and rejected the article on the basis of its unwieldy style. Ultimately, Kierkegaard published the review as a monograph on his own. The key to understanding the role of Hegel in this work is to bear in mind the context for which it was written. Despite its ultimate fate, the work was originally intended as a review article in Perseus. In order to understand why this fact is important, it will be necessary to look briefly at the nature and conception of the journal. Heiberg regarded Perseus as the official organ for Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark.101 It was to be the Danish equivalent of the Jahrb¨ucher f¨ur wissenschaftliche Kritik, which were still being published in Berlin by Hegel’s students. The journal was to play a central role in Heiberg’s plans to educate his fellow Danes in Hegel’s thought. The agenda of the journal is stated clearly in the editor’s prefatory remarks “To the Readers” in the first number of Perseus from 1837. There Heiberg declares the goal of the journal as follows: we are lacking a journal which is exclusively devoted to the undertakings of the Idea, and this not merely in a single direction of these undertakings but in their entire scope; for the more the rising culture splits up and 99 100

101

LD, 9; B & A I, p. 43. “Letter H. P. Holst to H. P. Barfod,” September 11, 1869, in Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 12. See Johnny Kondrup, “Tekstredegørelse” to Af en endnu levendes Papirer, in SKS, vol. K1, pp. 71–72. See Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, op. cit., pp. 138–141.

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particularizes the various interests of spirit, the more important it becomes to collect them anew in the highest unity, in which they all, after having traversed their empirical differences, could meet in the service of the Idea, could stand alongside the others, and thereby win their common unification. To meet the need of this kind of asylum for the undertakings of the Idea, which is ever more perceptible in our literature, the undersigned dares to make a beginning in that he herewith inaugurates a Journal for the Speculative Idea.102

With the words, “the Idea” and “spirit,” Heiberg, of course, employs key terms from Hegel’s philosophical vocabulary. He refers indirectly to the final triad of Hegel’s system (i.e., the triad of absolute spirit), which consists of art, religion and philosophy.103 The goal is thus to present specific aspects of these different spheres “in the highest unity.” Heiberg goes on to explain more precisely the nature of the contributions that he expects. They should specifically be articles in different fields that aim to make clear the speculative Idea, which underlies all representations: This more exact determination of the Idea as “speculative” states the plan of the present journal. Indeed, the Idea is immediately present in everything essential: in nature, in the world of the soul, in politics; and no true undertaking, regardless of what object it has, regardless of into what empirical details it branches off, is abandoned by its Idea. But it is not enough that the Idea is present; it also wants to be recognized as such. Only then is it speculative, only then is it the self-conscious Idea; and it is precisely this consciousness of the Idea, this sympathy and daily interaction with it, which this journal wishes to promote. No academic field is excluded here; they can all be included provided only that they are successful in developing their Ideas with the consciousness of speculation. To this extent it is the form which is essential here; the objects do not matter; it is only a matter of speculation having put its stamp on them. Any scholarly content can be raised to this form and is then, not by virtue of the content but by virtue of the form, worthy of being taken up in the circle of the undertakings of idealism.104

The stated goal of the journal is, in short, to explicate the speculative Idea in the different spheres of knowing. Thus, Heiberg invites contributions that employ Hegel’s speculative method in the various academic disciplines. Kierkegaard doubtless had in mind Heiberg’s words outlining the goal of Perseus when he was writing his review. In the letter quoted 102 103

104

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Til Læserne,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 1, 1837, pp. v–vi. ASKB 569. Ibid., pp. vii: “But, regarded from the other side, the speculative Idea also has a characteristic content, which right from birth bears the mark of the speculative form without needing to win it for itself. This content is art, religion and philosophy.” Ibid., pp. vi–vii.

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here, the tone of the young Kierkegaard is of someone willing to comply with Heiberg’s guidelines in order to have the opportunity to publish in Perseus. Thus, it seems certain that Kierkegaard must have been attentive to Heiberg’s description of the kind of articles the journal was to feature. Given this, it is hardly surprising that one can find Hegelian elements in the work. Moreover, the fact that Kierkegaard wrote for the Hegelian journal at all indicates that he had no ideological objections to Heiberg’s Hegelianism at this time. In addition to these prefatory words about the objective of the journal, Heiberg himself provides an example in the same first number of the kind of speculative work that he envisions for Perseus. There he published a long review105 of a book entitled, Doctrine of the Trinity and Reconciliation: A Speculative Investigation on Occasion of the Reformation Celebration, written by the priest Valdemar Henrik Rothe (1777–1857).106 This review article uses the book under discussion as an occasion to make a case for Hegel’s philosophy. A number of tangential discussions take up various issues surrounding the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Denmark and have nothing intrinsically to do with Rothe’s book. As the lead article in the first number, the review served as a sort of guideline for the kind of articles that Perseus was intended to feature. This was the model of a book-review that Kierkegaard had at his disposal when writing From the Papers of One Still Living. As in Heiberg’s review of Rothe’s work, so also in Kierkegaard’s text there are references to Hegel’s philosophy that are not, strictly speaking, relevant to the book he is reviewing. Likewise, a number of key terms from Hegel’s technical philosophical vocabulary appear. Thus, there is every reason to think that Kierkegaard in some respects modelled his review of Andersen on Heiberg’s review of Rothe. B. References to the Beginning of Philosophy in Hegel’s Logic. At the beginning of the work Kierkegaard makes a gesture to Heiberg by alluding to Hegel in a positive manner. In the opening pages, he discusses the modern notion of progress, which seems to congratulate itself for having reached a point in history that is far superior to the past. Each new age conceives of itself as a radical new beginning, thus forgetting its debt to previous ages. In this context Kierkegaard discusses Hegel’s attempt to begin philosophy without presuppositions. In a strikingly deferential passage, he writes: If we meet this phenomenon in its most respectable form, as it appears in Hegel’s great attempt to begin with nothing, it must both impress and 105

106

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Recension over Hr. Dr. Rothes Treenigheds- og Forsoningslære,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 1, 1837, pp. 1–89. ASKB 569. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 1–112.) Valdemar Henrik Rothe, Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Et speculativt Forsøg i Anledning af Reformationsfesten, Copenhagen 1836. ASKB 746.

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please us: impress us, in view of the moral strength with which the idea is conceived, the intellectual energy and virtuosity with which it is carried out; please us, because the whole negation is still only a movement inside the system’s own limits, undertaken precisely in the interest of retrieving the pure abundance of existence.107

Here Kierkegaard refers to the ongoing debate at the time about the beginning of philosophy in Hegel. To say that Hegel’s philosophy begins with nothing refers to his attempt to find a starting point for philosophy that is not question-begging in the sense that it already presupposes the objects of science. In both the Science of Logic and the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel makes this beginning with the concept of pure being. Thus, when Hegel says that he wants to begin with nothing, he does not mean the ontological category of nothingness but rather a starting point that does not presuppose something about science.108 In the passage just quoted Kierkegaard indirectly pays his respects to Heiberg, who made a case for Hegel on this score in the aforementioned review of Rothe’s Doctrine of the Trinity and Reconciliation in the first number of Perseus. In connection with a long tangential discussion of the issue, Heiberg argues that Hegel’s philosophy makes good on the claim to begin without presuppositions: As is known, the Hegelian system moves through nothing but triads. In every one, the first moment is immediate . . . the second is the mediation or development of the first, and finally the third is the new and synthetic unity, which is no longer immediate, but rather produced by mediation. But every first or immediate moment is given, namely, by the last previous triad, whose result or not immediate unity it was. If in this way we now go further and further back, then we come to the very first moment, to the no longer relative immediacy but rather the absolute one, which is itself the system’s absolute beginning. Should we now say of this first unit, being = nothing, that it is given or not given, that it is a presupposition or not? Admittedly, it is not given in the same manner as all of those following the first moment in every triad, for these have come from a previous cycle, but prior to the first cycle there is no previous one, and therefore there is nothing that can be surpassed. The most obvious answer is that the absolute first moment is not given. One must necessarily admit this; one must recognize that the system really delivers what it promises: a presuppositionless beginning.109 107 108

109

EPW, p. 61; SKS, vol. 1, p. 17. Thulstrup takes Kierkegaard to be making a ludicrous mistake: “Had Kierkegaard only read Hegel’s prefaces to the first and second editions of that work [sc. the Science of Logic] and the introductory section ‘With What Must the Science Begin?’ he would hardly have written what he did here. For Hegel, logic begins chiefly with ‘being’ [and not nothing]. . . . What Kierkegaard has written is simply incorrect.” (Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 168.) Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Recension over Hr. Dr. Rothes Treenigheds- og Forsoningslære,” op. cit., pp. 35–36. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 45–46.)

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Unlike the other categories or moments in the system, which are produced in the dialectical movement on the basis of their predecessors, the first moment is primary and does not refer to anything previous. There is thus a natural beginning of philosophy, which is to be found in the only nonderivative concept – pure being. Heiberg continues by addressing an apparent contradiction in this view: But this basic contradiction . . . lies necessarily in the demand made on the beginning of philosophy . . . philosophy should namely (1) begin without presuppositions; but everything has presuppositions; only nothing is without presupposition; philosophy must thus begin with nothing; but as is known nothing comes from nothing . . . but thus from this beginning, philosophy does not come to any development or does not come into existence. From this it follows inevitably that it (2) must begin with a presupposition or something given. Thus, a demand is made on philosophy, that what is original, with which it begins, shall be both given and not given. This demand is fulfilled with being = nothing. On the basis of the identity of being and nothing both are the same original thing; but as being it is given, as nothing it is not given.110

To meet the contradictory demand that philosophy begin both with something given and with something not given, Heiberg slightly modifies Hegel’s scheme. Instead of beginning as Hegel does with pure being, which passes over into the second category, nothing, Heiberg claims that philosophy begins with the aggregate category of being = nothing.111 In any case, Heiberg makes the claim that Hegel’s beginning is, at least with a slight modification, the true beginning of philosophy. This aspect of Hegel’s philosophy was taken up by Sibbern in the first article of his aforementioned review of Heiberg’s Perseus. In this part of his review, which appeared in April of 1838, Sibbern addresses Hegel’s position itself, noting the ambiguities in the two different beginnings set forth in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. But Sibbern is also interested in responding to Heiberg’s claims. He is suspicious of Heiberg’s modification and defense of Hegel’s position on the beginning of philosophy and invites him to work it out in more detail: “it would interest me to see Professor Heiberg make a start from this beginning so that the thought is firmly maintained that what is original is supposed to be both given and not given. It would also interest me to see him proceed from his nothing = being as from what is original, which is by contrast what Hegel does.”112 Realizing the deviation from Hegel’s view, Sibbern asks 110 111

112

Ibid., pp. 36–37. (Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 2, pp. 46–47.) This modification later comes to be criticized by Adler. Adolph Peter Adler, “J. L. Heiberg, Det logiske System, a) Væren og Intet, b) Vorden, c) Tilværen. I Perseus Nr. 2. Kjøbenhavn 1838,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 3, 1840, pp. 474–482. Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article I, p. 335. Frederik

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Heiberg for an explanation of the double category of being and nothing and of how a beginning can be made with it. This constitutes the background to the passage quoted earlier where Kierkegaard lauds “Hegel’s great attempt to begin from nothing.” It is striking that he simply affirms Heiberg’s defense of Hegel, even though this had been criticized by Sibbern. Kierkegaard continues in the same deferential tone, “the entire recent literature . . . has forgotten that the beginning with nothing of which Hegel speaks was mastered by himself in the system and was by no means a failure to appreciate the great richness actuality has.”113 Here Kierkegaard even refers to the system in a positive manner. What is particularly interesting is that he says that the system does not overlook the “great richness actuality has,” which is precisely a point that he later will come to criticize (namely, that the system is purely abstract and cannot capture the actuality of the existence of the individual). It is difficult to see in these statements anything other than a deferential gesture to Heiberg. They have nothing to do with the matter at hand in the text, and at the beginning of the work Kierkegaard goes out of his way twice to tip his hat to Hegel. This is evidence of the fact that he was aware of the guidelines for the articles intended for publication in Perseus and was anxious to follow them carefully. Both of the passages cited here114 refer to Hegel’s Science of Logic, which Kierkegaard in fact mentions in a footnote. He is again strikingly deferential, referring to Hegel’s Logic as an “immortal work”: The Hegelians, however, must not be taken altogether literally when they mention their relation to actuality, for when in this respect they refer to their master’s immortal work (his Logic), it seems to me to be like the rules governing rank and precedence, in which, beginning with secretaries (Seyn, pure being), one then through “other secretaries” (das Andre, das Besondre, Nichts – therefore it is also said that other secretaries sind so viel wie Nichts) – lets the category “actual secretaries etc.” appear, without therefore being entitled to conclude that there is in actuality a single “actual secretary.”115

This passage uses a reference to the system of offices in the official hierarchy to make a point about Hegel’s logic. According to the new Danish system of 1808, the lowest rank was designated “other secretaries,” above which was placed, for example, “secretary of war.” It was common to attach the word “actual” to certain ranks in order to indicate that the office in question was in fact an active one and not merely a pro forma title. The “actual” offices were then ranked one class higher than the merely

113 114 115

Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen 1838, p. 53. ASKB 778. EPW, p. 62; SKS, vol. 1, p. 18. I.e., EPW, p. 61; SKS, vol. 1, p. 17 and EPW, p. 62; SKS, vol. 1, p. 18. EPW, p. 62fn.; SKS, vol. 1, p. 18fn.

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titular ones.116 The analogy seems to imply that the attempt to derive the category of actuality from the other categories (i.e. being, nothing, etc.) is problematic since it arrives at the abstract category of actuality without ever discussing anything actual. This seems to prefigure a later criticism of the notion of actuality in German idealism which appears for the first time in Either/Or,117 but at the same time it is in tension with the claim to which it is a footnote, namely, that the beginning of the system “was by no means a failure to appreciate the great richness actually has.”118 Kierkegaard also alludes to Hegel’s notion of the immanent negation of the Concept that propels the dialectic forward. The context is again Kierkegaard’s criticism of the modern arrogance that regards contemporary governments and institutions as enlightened and superior to those of the past. He compares this tendency with Hegel’s notion of immanent negation: “Like Hegel, it [the tendency] begins, not the system but existence, with nothing, and the negative element, through which and by virtue of which all the movements occur (Hegel’s immanent negativity of the Concept), is distrust, which undeniably has such a negative force that it . . . must end by killing itself.”119 The modern view tends to see previous systems as self-destructing due to their inner contradictions. The seed of their destruction lies within themselves as a hidden contradiction and thus comes from within and not from without. In a passage cited earlier, Kierkegaard refers to the same doctrine in a positive manner in his praise of Hegel: “the whole negation is still only a movement inside the system’s own limits.”120 According to Hegel, philosophy should constitute an immanent system of thought. This is the point of his objection to Kant’s notion of a thingin-itself which is by definition transcendent and beyond the possibility of human experience and knowledge. Hegel argues against all forms of transcendence, which he takes to be conceptually incoherent. The point of a phenomenology as a philosophical method is to indicate that even things such as unseen forces, the thing-in-itself, and God, are objects for consciousness. The doctrine of immanent or internal negation is the idea that specific notions or concepts find their contradiction not in some external transcendent other that enters the scene adventitiously but rather in an other or negation that each notion posits from within itself, in the sense that, for example, being posits nothing. Thus, one does not need to appeal to anything external to account for the movements of the Concept or world spirit. 116 117 119 120

See the commentary to this passage in SKS, vol. K1, p. 83, “Rangforordning.” 118 EPW, p. 62; SKS, vol. 1, p. 18. EO1, p. 32; SKS, vol. 2, p. 41. EPW, p. 64; SKS, vol. 1, p. 20. Translation slightly modified. EPW, p. 61; SKS, vol. 1, p. 17.

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This point is of particular interest since it will come to be one of great ambiguity in Kierkegaard. Here he goes out of his way to single out this Hegelian doctrine for praise. Moreover, in works such as Either/Or and The Sickness unto Death, he takes up a kind of phenomenological method that uses this mechanism of internal negation and that presupposes a system of immanence. However, by contrast, in works such as Philosophical Fragments he criticizes the Hegelian notion of immanence and makes a plea for an absolutely transcendent other (i.e., God). I will have occasion to trace Kierkegaard’s development of this point in what follows. From these scattered references alone it is difficult to draw conclusions about the extent of Kierkegaard’s knowledge of the Science of Logic. One cannot necessarily infer with Thulstrup121 that Kierkegaard’s knowledge of Hegel at this point was wholly derivative from Heiberg since there is no evidence that it is Heiberg’s account of the beginning of philosophy or immanent negation that Kierkegaard is thinking of. Moreover, it would hardly have cost the young Kierkegaard much to look through the opening pages of the Science of Logic. It should be noted that he owned a copy of the Science of Logic, which was published in 1833 in the collected works edition,122 and thus he could certainly have availed himself of it when writing these pages. The fact that he does not say more about that text here cannot be taken as evidence that he was not familiar with it since From the Papers of One Still Living has as its object of investigation Andersen’s skill as a novelist and not Hegel’s Logic. On the contrary, the fact that such an apparently wholly irrelevant theme such as Hegel’s Logic finds its way into this work at all suggests that Kierkegaard at least knew enough about it to be provoked by it. Ultimately, the question of how well Kierkegaard knew Hegel’s primary texts is in a sense beside the point since it is clear in any case that he knew about this issue in Hegel from one source or another and was interested in it. Regardless of whether or not Kierkegaard had made a study of Hegel’s Logic, it seems obvious that these direct allusions to Hegel at the beginning of the piece should be read as gestures to comply with Heiberg’s conception of Perseus as a journal for speculative philosophy. To write for this journal, Kierkegaard needed in passing to demonstrate a familiarity with Hegel’s philosophy and with the current discussions about it in Denmark. C. References to the Stages of Poetry in Hegel and Heiberg. In From the Papers of One Still Living there is also a vague allusion to Hegel’s theory of the developmental stages of poetry, which are presented in the 121 122

Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., pp. 166–175, especially p. 170. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, I–III, ed. by Leopold von Henning, Berlin 1833, vols. 3–5 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45. ASKB 552–554.

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posthumously published Lectures on Aesthetics. Kierkegaard notes that Andersen’s development as a poet did not follow the sequence outlined by Hegel. This refers to yet another one of Heiberg’s previous discussions. As was noted previously, in a series of articles from 1828 published in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Heiberg gives a response to his main rival in the field of aesthetics, the advocate of Romanticism, Adam Oehlenschl¨ager.123 There he organizes the genres of poetry in ascending order. According to this scheme, lyric constitutes the first stage; epic poetry, the second; and drama, the third. Drama is itself subdivided into further categories. These forms constitute a hierarchy, and the last form of drama represents the highest perfection of poetry. When developing this scheme, Heiberg did not have at his disposal the published version of Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics, although he seems to have had some lecture notes to work with.124 What is significant here is that this scheme deviates from Hegel’s ordering of the genres of poetry. Heiberg ascribes to lyric the first or immediate stage, whereas Hegel puts epic in this place and attributes to lyric the second stage, or the stage of mediation.125 Despite this deviation it seems that Kierkegaard took Heiberg’s scheme to be synonymous with Hegel’s view.126 He even indicates himself that it would make more sense for poetry to begin with epic,127 but he seems to be unaware that this is precisely the way in which Hegel describes it in his aesthetics. Kierkegaard refers to Andersen’s development as a poet and writes: “we find as good as no intimation whatever of the stage he must normally run through after the lyric – the epic.”128 Similarly, Kierkegaard observes in passing that Andersen “skipped over his epic [stage]”129 and moved on to drama. Here Kierkegaard, following Heiberg’s scheme, places lyric first and epic second. As has been noted, the volumes of Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics were published for the first time from 1835 to 1838. (Direct quotations and references to this work 123 124

125 126 127 128 129

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Svar paa Hr. Oehlenschl¨agers Skrift: ‘Om Kritiken i Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, over Væringerne i Miklagard,’” op. cit. See Heiberg’s letter to Hegel: “Soon I hope to be able to do more toward the same end, when my work (written in German) appears – Grundlinien zum System der Aesthetik als spekulativer Wissenschaft, which is being printed in Schleswig – a work about which my lone regret is that I am only familiar with your interesting and deeply penetrating lectures on this subject from incomplete notes which were imparted to me in Berlin.” “Heiberg an Hegel,” February 20, 1825. Hegel, Briefe III 487; Letter 124 in Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Johan Ludvig Heiberg, vols. 1–5, ed. by Morten Borup, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1947–50, vol. 1, pp. 162–163. Hegel, Aesthetics II, pp. 1037–1039; Jub., vol. 14, pp. 322–325. See JP, vol. 2, 1565; Pap. I A 225. See JP, vol. 2, 1565; Pap. I A 225. See also SKS, vol. 17, p. 113, BB:23. JP, vol. 2, 1565; Pap. I A 225. See also JP, vol. 1, 126; Pap. I A 212. EPW, p. 70; SKS, vol. 1, p. 26. EPW, p. 70; SKS, vol. 1, p. 26. See also SKS, vol. 19, p. 94, Not2:7 where Kierkegaard also follows Heiberg’s scheme: “We should not forget that Don Juan has to be grasped lyrically (therefore with music); the Wandering Jew epically, and Faust dramatically.”

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in Kierkegaard only begin to appear in 1841.130 ) These references to the stages of poetry must also be taken as a gesture to Heiberg and as an attempt to make explicit the speculative Idea in the work under examination, in accordance with the stated goal of Perseus. Kierkegaard also uses Hegel’s categories of immediacy and reflection in his analysis of Andersen’s work. The different stages of art and poetry in both Hegel and Heiberg are characterized by these categories. As was alluded to previously, the first stage is the immediate, the second is reflection, and the third unites the two into what Hegel calls “mediated immediacy.” Here Kierkegaard uses these same categories to discuss Andersen’s work. He writes: “As far as [Andersen’s] relation to A Story of Everyday Life is concerned, we certainly may justly reckon him among the misunderstanding readers mentioned earlier, who, also through these short novels among other things, are brought to a certain degree of reflection, which, however, is in no way carried through to any significant degree.”131 Kierkegaard goes on to characterize the work of Steen Steensen Blicher (1782–1848) as “unreflective folk poetry.”132 Thus, while Andersen has reached the stage of reflection, Blicher remains at the level of immediacy. These characterizations of the work of Andersen and Blicher in terms of Hegelian categories can be seen as yet another attempt to make the book-review appropriate for Heiberg’s Hegelian journal. Thulstrup infers from all this that Kierkegaard’s analysis here is derived from Heiberg,133 a claim that seems undeniable. However, he goes on to argue that, given that Kierkegaard did not know Hegel’s text, his analysis on this point cannot with justice be called “Hegelian.” This overestimates the importance of a familiarity with the primary texts. In a sense if it were merely a matter of the label, one could conceivably become a convinced Hegelian without ever reading a single text by Hegel. A mastery of the primary texts of an author is thus not essential either for an influence or for a personal affiliation. Thulstrup fails to entertain the possibility that Kierkegaard might unknowingly have adopted certain concepts from Hegel that were being generally discussed at the time and thus might be in some measure Hegelian without having direct knowledge of Hegel’s texts.134 This is not an unlikely possibility given how much of Hegel’s philosophy was in fact in the air when Kierkegaard was studying. Moreover, what is specifically Hegelian here is not so much the sequence of genres of 130 131 132 133

134

JP, vol. 2, 1592; SKS, vol. 19, p. 245, Not8:51. JP, vol. 5, 1593; SKS, vol. 19, p. 246, Not8:53. JP, vol. 5, 5545; SKS, vol. 19, pp. 285–286, Not10:1. EPW, p. 74; SKS, vol. 1, p. 29. See also EPW, p. 79; SKS, vol. 1, p. 34. EPW, p. 74; SKS, vol. 1, p. 29. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 175. Paul V. Rubow, Heiberg og hans skole i kritiken, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1953, pp. 47–59. See also Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, tr. by Frederick J. Marker, New York: Twayne Publishers 1971, pp. 136–138. See Henning Fenger, “Hegel, Kierkegaard and Niels Thulstrup,” in his Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, op. cit., pp. 136–137.

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poetry, which could be a matter of debate among different Hegelians, but rather the attempt to create such a sequence based on a systematic principle in accordance with the sequence: immediacy, reflection, and their unity in mediated immediacy. This is something that Hegel, Heiberg, and Kierkegaard all have in common despite their disagreement about the details. It should be noted that Brandt and Hirsch represent dissenting voices in this debate about the degree of Hegel’s influence in From the Papers of One Still Living. Hirsch sees a strong relation between Hegel and Kierkegaard in this work. In particular he points out an affinity between Hegel’s concept of lyric and that of Kierkegaard.135 Likewise, Brandt sees here a Hegelian-Heibergian theory of aesthetics.136 In Kierkegaard’s text, there is only an allusion, but this allusion does indicate a general interest in and familiarity with Hegel’s aesthetics at the most rudimentary level, if not a rigorous study of the subject. Although Kierkegaard does not sustain this discussion, he does return to it or something like it in Either/Or. There he follows a couple of different dialectical sequences along Hegelian lines that characterize specific works of art into stages.137 D. The Reception of From the Papers of One Still Living. In addition to all of this evidence internal to the text, there are a number of reasons external to it to regard this work as containing Hegelian elements. The first of these is a remark in Andersen’s autobiography, where he recalls Kierkegaard’s review of his work. Andersen writes that From the Papers of One Still Living was “somewhat difficult to read because of the Hegelian heaviness of expression.”138 He adds that due to this “one also said in jest that only Kierkegaard and Andersen had read the book to the end.”139 From this it is clear for Andersen and his contemporaries that the style and language of the work bears the stamp of Hegel’s philosophy. A follower of Heiberg, the poet and playwright Henrik Hertz (1797–1870), refers to this as well in his diary. In one entry he mentions taking a walk with Kierkegaard and discussing the book. In another he writes: “Those who have picked up on the German philosophy are completely incapable of practicing it in Danish. Their text teems with words of which no Dane knows the meaning. [Kierkegaard’s] work on Andersen shows what language we can 135 136 137 138

139

Emanuel Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–2, Gutersloh: ¨ C. Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 1, pp. 13–24. Frithiof Brandt, Den unge Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaards Forlag 1929, pp. 136ff. See, for example, Chapter 4, Section III. Hans Christian Andersen, Mit Livs Eventyr, Copenhagen 1855, p. 198. (Reprinted in Andersen’s Samlede Skrifter, vols. 1–15, Copenhagen 1876–80, vol. 1, p. 188.) See Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., p. 28. Hans Christian Andersen, ibid., p. 198. (Samlede Skrifter, vol. 1, p. 188.)

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expect from this philosophy.”140 It is clear in this context that “the German philosophy” is a reference to that of Hegel. Thus, Hertz as well took the book to be written in a distinct Hegelian language, to which he, apparently like others, objects. Second, given that Kierkegaard’s manner of expression was regarded as being Hegelian, the conclusion was drawn that he must belong to the Hegelian school. In his vaudeville, A Comedy in the Open Air,141 which was performed at the Royal Theater in 1840, Andersen parodies Kierkegaard as a Hegelian in order to take revenge for the negative review. In the comedy, the character of Dalby represents Kierkegaard. In many of Dalby’s statements one can find quotations and paraphrases of From the Papers of One Still Living. Dalby speaks in a highly affected manner; his long, incoherent, jargon-laden sentences are clearly intended to satirize Kierkegaard’s serpentine style in the review. There can be no doubt that Andersen intends to parody Kierkegaard as a Hegelian with the character of Dalby; indeed, even Kierkegaard himself recognizes it. In the journals and papers there is a draft of a response to Andersen’s satire, which was never published. There Kierkegaard writes: “In this comedy, theater manager Dalby appears in several roles, among others also as a hairdresser. I deal only with this performance. This character is meant to be a prating Hegelian.”142 Kierkegaard is concerned only with this character since it is the one that is intended to be a satire on him. Thus, for whatever one makes of From the Papers of One Still Living today, it was understood in its time as a statement of Hegelian aesthetics and as having been written in a Hegelian spirit. In his planned response to Andersen, Kierkegaard goes on to say why it would be futile for him to attempt to explain that he in fact is not a Hegelian. Rather than make a straightforward denial of being influenced by Hegel, he casts his defense in terms of a dichotomy: either he has made a careful study of Hegel’s philosophy and accepted it, or he has not. If the former is the case, writes Kierkegaard, “it would be crazy . . . to say it in a conversation with Andersen because he probably would not be able to attach a sensible thought to it.”143 If Kierkegaard were really a Hegelian, then there would be no sense in affirming or denying it to Andersen who has no understanding of philosophy and thus would not know what it meant to be a Hegelian in the first place. Clearly, this is not a denial of an affiliation with Hegel but rather a criticism of Andersen. “I would,” Kierkegaard continues, “at least hesitate to use such a significant predicate about myself, even if I were conscious that I had tried 140 141 142 143

Cited from Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., p. 218. Hans Christian Andersen, En Comedie i det Grønne, Copenhagen 1840. EPW, Supplement, p. 220; Pap. III B 1, p. 108. Translation slightly modified. EPW, Supplement, p. 220; Pap. III B 1, p. 108.

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to make myself familiar with Hegel’s philosophy.”144 Here once again there is no denial that Kierkegaard ever studied Hegel’s primary texts but merely that he would not be so immodest as to claim publicly that he is a Hegelian. He now moves to the second half of the dichotomy: “Or by ‘a Hegelian’ I would understand a person who, superficially influenced by this thought, now deceived himself with a result he did not possess.”145 In this case, Kierkegaard imagines people who claim to be Hegelians without really knowing Hegel’s thought very well. If he falls into this category, Kierkegaard says, then it would not make sense to explain it to Andersen, who is not in a position to distinguish a genuine Hegelian (i.e., one who knows Hegel’s thought and texts well and agrees with them) from a false one (i.e., one who only superficially knows them and yet still boasts of being a Hegelian). It will be noted here that both sides of the dichotomy amount to a criticism of Andersen’s lack of knowledge about Hegel’s philosophy. This is the reason why Kierkegaard does not want to bother to explain to him his position vis-`a-vis Hegel, regardless of what that position might be. But it should be noted that in either case Kierkegaard values Hegel’s philosophy sufficiently to criticize Andersen for his ignorance of it. On the whole, Hegel’s appearance in From the Papers of One Still Living is unobtrusive, yet he is present in many ways. He neither dictates nor dominates the discussion. Although there are here no direct quotations of any of Hegel’s works, he is alluded to occasionally as one might allude to secondary literature or a dominant intellectual movement that one can presuppose most readers to be at least in part familiar with. But, clear Hegelian elements are operative here. Even though it is difficult to claim that Kierkegaard gives a thoroughly Hegelian analysis or interpretation of Andersen’s novel, he nonetheless uses Hegelian categories and terminology in his discussions. Moreover, Hegel is not perceived as an enemy to be attacked. For example, Kierkegaard uses uncharacteristically positive tones when he mentions systematic philosophy, immanent negation, and the attempt to begin philosophy with the category of being. Here Hegel is simply an important intellectual trend that must be acknowledged and can be used when profitable. The references to Hegel’s philosophy that one finds here are by no means in harmony with the later negative picture of Hegel that is presented, for example, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The issue of the beginning of philosophy and the degree to which the system can capture actuality appear later in a much more negative light.146 This is a clear indication that the character of Kierkegaard’s statements about Hegel changed over the course 144 145 146

EPW, Supplement, p. 220; Pap. III B 1, p. 108. EPW, Supplement, p. 220; Pap. III B 1, p. 108. Translation slightly modified. Treated in Chapter 11, Section VI.

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of time. Finally, the gratuitous nature of many of the Hegel references seems to indicate that they are aimed to satisfy Heiberg’s Hegelianism and to bring the work into accordance with the stated goal of Perseus. This also explains Kierkegaard’s “Hegelian style,” for which he was reproached by Andersen and Hertz. In the final analysis, there can be no doubt that this work is profoundly influenced by Hegel, regardless of whether Kierkegaard’s knowledge of him was derived from a study of his primary texts or from the secondhand accounts of Heiberg or others. In the years immediately after Hegel’s death in 1831, his philosophy became such a ubiquitous force in learned circles in both Germany and Denmark that every educated person was obliged to take some sort of position on it. This ubiquity created what might be called a “second Hegel” in the form of a picture presented by commentators, translators, adherents, and critics. It was a picture that in many cases went far beyond anything that could be said to find a reasonable sanction in the primary texts. Naturally enough, the number of learned persons exceeded the number of Hegel scholars, and the result was that many educated people in Denmark came to learn about Hegel and were obliged to take a stand on him in accordance with the picture they had gained not from a careful study of the primary texts but rather from more accessible commentators like Heiberg and Martensen. The absence of direct quotations from or readings notes to Hegel’s texts in Kierkegaard’s works and unpublished papers during this period indicates that this is largely his picture of Hegel at this point. Just as today educated people are compelled to take some sort of stand on, for example, deconstructionist theory due to its predominance in literary criticism and other fields, even though few of them have ever actually read the texts in which it is grounded theoretically, so also Kierkegaard was compelled to take a stand on Hegel without in every case a thorough familiarity with the primary texts. This is particularly obvious in the references to Hegel’s philosophy that appear in Kierkegaard’s works prior to The Concept of Irony since, although he does not seem to have made a careful study of the primary texts, he nevertheless clearly had formed some ideas about Hegel and does not hesitate to allude to him and discuss some of his better known concepts. This said, despite his apparent lack of familiarity with Hegel’s primary texts, Kierkegaard’s early works and journal entries demonstrate a number of Hegelian elements, a fact that seems primarily to be due to Heiberg’s influence. The analysis of From the Papers of One Still Living reveals that Kierkegaard’s view of Hegel’s aesthetics is derived largely from Heiberg’s hierarchy of poetic genres. Likewise, his view of Hegel’s logic found therein is perhaps also derived from Heiberg’s discussion of the beginning of philosophy in Hegel. From the analysis of the theory of stages from the papers, it is clear that Kierkegaard is using Heiberg’s

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exposition of the taxonomy of forms of poetry, characterized by the stages of immediacy, reflection, and unity, and seems unaware that there is a scheme in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History, which also contains four stages. The fact that Kierkegaard’s initial information about Hegel comes from Heiberg is significant for a number of reasons. First, his information was in part inaccurate, as has been seen, for example, with the account of the hierarchy of poetic genres. Other contemporary writers complained of Heiberg’s distortions of Hegel’s thought on other issues. For example, in response to some of Heiberg’s claims about Hegel’s philosophy of religion in On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age, Mynster responds: “But however suspicious it seems to be for the system and even for many propositions which Hegel . . . has allowed himself to write, we cannot convince ourselves to attribute to him these crass conceptions.”147 Likewise, as has been seen previously, in response to Heiberg’s comments about the beginning of logic with the category of being in the review of Rothe’s Doctrine of the Trinity and Reconciliation, Sibbern warns the reader against accepting uncritically Heiberg’s account of Hegel’s position.148 So also Adler protests against Heiberg’s conflating the categories of being and nothing in Hegel.149 Thus, insofar as Kierkegaard depended on Heiberg for his information about Hegel, the picture that he received was at times somewhat distorted. But what importance one should attribute to these distortions is open to debate. As I have tried to argue, Thulstrup makes too much of the ways in which the secondhand accounts diverge from Hegel himself since he ultimately wants to argue that Kierkegaard was only familiar with the distorted secondhand versions and thus could not possibly have been influenced by Hegel himself. While this might be the sense in which a purist would take it, this forgets that there are numerous thinkers in the nineteenth century who are designated as “Hegelians” in the history of philosophy, even though their thought deviates from Hegel significantly, indeed deviates from it much more than the examples from Heiberg outlined here. Thus, it would be absurd to insist on an exact knowledge of Hegel when speaking of the question of positive influence. The result of such an insistence would be a purist position that is so strict that it 147

148

149

Kts. [ Jakob Peter Mynster], “Om den religiøse Overbeviisning,” Dansk Ugeskrift, vol. 3, no. 76 and 77, 1833, pp. 257–258. (Reprinted in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 93.) Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1,” in Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article I, p. 335. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen 1838, p. 53. ASKB 778. Quoted above on p. 73. Adolph Peter Adler, “J. L. Heiberg, Det logiske System, a) Væren og Intet, b) Vorden, c) Tilværen. I,” op. cit., pp. 474–482.

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would be impossible for there ever to be any actual cases of it. On this definition there would be no Hegelians at all, and Heiberg himself, given his deviations from Hegel’s primary texts, could not be designated as such. Moreover, the exact nature of Kierkegaard’s knowledge of Hegel is in a certain sense not so important given the character of the influence. The young Kierkegaard uses certain concepts and analyses from Hegel’s philosophy for his own purposes. Given that his goal is to apply these concepts and analyses in his own context and in accordance with his own agenda, he is distorting them (at least with regard to their original context) in any case. Thus, it does not matter so much if the original concept comes directly from Hegel himself or in the form of a slight variant through the filter of Heiberg or others. What is important is that there is a general thought or concept that can be traced back to Hegel. In this sense one can see a clear influence of Hegel on Kierkegaard in specific cases, and one need not stubbornly insist on proof of Kierkegaard’s familiarity with specific passages in Hegel’s primary texts as Thulstrup does. At this early period, Kierkegaard perceives no contradiction in, on the one hand, using aspects of Hegel’s thought in From the Papers of One Still Living and, on the other hand, satirizing specific Hegelians in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars. This significant point is one that many commentators have failed to notice. For Thulstrup, for example, a criticism of any one of the Hegelians for anything at all is ipso facto a criticism of Hegel himself. Instead, one must examine the nature of the criticism and see if it is actually some aspect of Hegel’s thought that is being criticized or merely a specific person. Kierkegaard himself distinguished between Hegel, to whom he was generally deferential during this early period, and specific Hegelians. In From the Papers of One Still Living, he is quite positive with respect to Hegel’s actual ideas and philosophy; by contrast, in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, he is quite critical of Martensen who bears the brunt of his satire. This distinction is important since later Kierkegaard comes into open dispute with Martensen and others and comes to criticize them under the name of Hegel; however, all the evidence speaks for the view that he is in fact positively disposed towards Hegel’s philosophy itself during this early period.

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3 THE IRONIC THESIS AND HEGEL’S PRESENCE IN THE CONCEPT OF IRONY

Kierkegaard’s dissertation, The Concept of Irony, with Constant Reference to Socrates (1841), is the first work in which there are clear signs of a careful study of Hegel’s primary texts. Up until this point in Kierkegaard’s incipient literary career, the references to Hegel are vague, and there are no extended textual analyses of his works. By contrast, The Concept of Irony contains several quotations from a number of Hegel’s writings and lectures as well as detailed discussions of a number of his most famous analyses. The absence of such quotations and analyses in the works prior to this makes it difficult to evaluate with any certainty what Kierkegaard actually knew of Hegel, but here for the first time there is a wealth of material that can be evaluated. In this work Kierkegaard cites extensively Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History,1 History of Philosophy,2 and Aesthetics3 as well as the Philosophy of Right4 and Hegel’s review of Solger’s posthumous writings.5 1 2

3

4

5

Vorlesungen u¨ ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. by Eduard Gans, Berlin 1837, vol. 9 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45. Vorlesungen u¨ ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, I–III, ed. by Karl Ludwig Michelet, Berlin 1833–36, vols. 13–15 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45. ASKB 557–559. Vorlesungen u¨ ber Aesthetik, I–III, ed. by Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Berlin 1835–38, vols. 10-1, 10-2, 10-3 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45. ASKB 1384– 1386. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, Berlin 1821. Reprinted in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45, vol. 8, ed. by Eduard Gans, Berlin 1833. Zweite Auflage 1840. ASKB 551. ¨ “Uber Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel. Herausgegeben von Ludwig Tieck und Friedrich von Raumer. Erster Band 780 S. mit Vorr. XVI S. Zweiter Band 784 S. Leipzig, 1826,” Jahrb¨ucher f¨ur wissenschaftliche Kritik, Erster Artikel (March 1828), no. 51–52, pp. 403–416, no. 53–54, pp. 417–428; Zweiter Artikel (June 1828), no. 105–106, pp. 838–848, no. 107–108, pp. 849–864, no. 109–110, pp. 865–870. Reprinted in Vermischte Schriften, I–II, ed. by Friedrich F¨orster and Ludwig Boumann, Berlin 1834–35, vols. 16–17 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45, vol. 16 (1834), pp. 436–506. ASKB 555–556. In Jub. vol. 20, pp. 132–202. English translation: “Solger’s Posthumous Writings and Correspondence,” tr. by Diana Behler, in Hegel, Encyclopaedia of

132

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In The Concept of Irony Kierkegaard’s main object of study is irony as employed by Socrates. This analysis occupies all of Part One and some of Part Two of the work. But the text goes beyond a study of the figure of Socrates himself. Kierkegaard also examines the views on irony of a number of German writers, such as Friedrich von Schlegel (1772– 1829), Johann Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853), Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (1780–1819), Johann Paul Friedrich Richter, the author behind the pseudonym Jean Paul (1763–1825), and Hegel himself. Part One of the work consists of three chapters. In the lengthy first chapter, “The View Made Possible,” Kierkegaard analyzes the person of Socrates based on the various pictures of him presented by the primary sources – Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes – and attempts to bring to the fore hints of Socratic irony found there. He consistently interprets Socratic irony as something essentially negative in character, which refutes and destroys arguments, customs, traditions, and so forth, without having any positive content with which to replace them. There are only occasional references to Hegel in this chapter.6 In Chapter 2, “The Actualization of the View,” Kierkegaard analyzes the daimon as well as Socrates’ trial and condemnation and attempts to extend his interpretation of Socratic irony to these subjects. Hegel plays a particularly important role in this discussion and indeed can be said to dominate it. In Chapter 3, “The View Made Necessary,” Kierkegaard discusses the Greek Sophistic movement and the schools of Greek thought influenced by Socrates. In this context he interprets Socrates as a world-historical individual in the transformation of Greek culture. There he argues in Hegelian fashion that Socrates’ irony is necessary in the movement of world history. Here as well Hegel is cited frequently and is an important figure in the discussion. Part One is followed by an appendix entitled, “Hegel’s View of Socrates,” which treats Hegel’s account explicitly and which will also be examined in some detail later. While the first part of the dissertation treats the figure of Socrates historically and takes up the issue of his relation to irony, the second discusses the concept of irony on its own terms. In this context Kierkegaard examines the notion of irony of the German Romantics, which he contrasts to Hegel’s view of Socratic irony. Kierkegaard follows Hegel here and interprets Socratic irony as being world-historically necessary and thus justified in contrast to the irony of the Romantics, which is merely flippant. For Kierkegaard, the irony of Tieck and Schlegel is merely indiscriminate, nihilistic criticism in contrast to that of Socrates, which,

6

the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and Critical Writings, ed. by Ernst Behler, New York: Continuum 1990, pp. 265–319. E.g., CI, p. 35; SKS, vol. 1, p. 96. CI, p. 46; SKS, vol. 1, p. 107. CI, p. 101; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 154–155. CI, p. 132; SKS, vol. 1, p. 183. CI, p. 135fn.; SKS, vol. 1, p. 186fn. CI, p. 152fn.; SKS, vol. 1, p. 202fn.

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although negative, is guided by a profound moral vision. Socrates thus remains serious in his irony, whereas the Romantics use it only as an instrument for play. Kierkegaard’s discussion of both the figure of Socrates and irony in the German Romantics is largely shaped by Hegel to whom he constantly refers throughout this part of the text. Although there have been a number of disputes about the role and status of Hegel in this work, there is overwhelming evidence that The Concept of Irony is a deeply Hegelian text. Indeed, Høffding argues that The Concept of Irony is of little value since Kierkegaard at the time was so much under Hegel’s sway.7 According to his view, this Hegelian orientation caused Kierkegaard to misinterpret the figure of Socrates. Following Høffding, Himmelstrup argues that Kierkegaard was essentially Hegelian when he wrote this text, and therefore that his understanding of Socrates was largely shaped by Hegel.8 Likewise, Hirsch9 and Fenger10 also argue for a strong Hegelian influence in this work. In the present chapter, I would like to support the view of these commentators: I wish to argue that, whatever Kierkegaard’s later relation to Hegel might have been, here in his student years he was clearly infatuated by aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, which he unapologetically adopted and employed. Evidence for this thesis can be found in both the content of the work itself and in Kierkegaard’s later comments on it. In Section I of the present chapter I will address the well-known claim that Kierkegaard’s apparently positive use of Hegel in The Concept of Irony is itself merely ironic and thus is to be understood as an attempt to criticize Hegel indirectly and to fool the Hegelian faculty members on Kierkegaard’s dissertation committee. I will argue that this view is not plausible since it is not in harmony with the historical circumstances surrounding the dissertation. In the second section I will evaluate some of Kierkegaard’s own statements about his intellectual development, which indicate that he himself regarded his dissertation as being profoundly influenced by Hegel. In Section III, I will address the claim that the sequence of the three chapters of Part One of the book follows a Hegelian pattern due to the references to the modal categories of possibility, 7

8 9 10

Harald Høffding, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, p. 151. He too argues that Kierkegaard had a Hegelian phase early in his career. Jens Himmelstrup, Søren Kierkegaards Opfattelse af Sokrates, Copenhagen: Arnold Busck 1924, pp. 42–84. Emanuel Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–2, Gutersloh: ¨ C. Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 2, pp. 572–602. Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, tr. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven, Connecticut, and London: Yale University Press 1980, p. 147: “As a historian, one can also read Kierkegaard’s dissertation as a piece of Hegelian writing which – without following Hegel in all its details – must be regarded all the same as a respectable piece of work in the spirit of the Hegelian school.”

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actuality, and necessity, which are found in the titles of these chapters. I will argue that there is nothing particularly Hegelian about this pattern, which resembles more closely Kant’s account of the modal categories than Hegel’s. Sections IV–VIII will constitute the actual textual analysis in the present chapter. With the help of this exegesis, I wish to argue that Kierkegaard follows almost to the letter Hegel’s treatment of Socrates in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s account of Romantic irony comes virtually verbatim from Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics. By means of these similarities, I hope to establish that The Concept of Irony is a profoundly Hegelian work with respect to its content.

i. the ironic thesis At first glance, the issue of Hegel in The Concept of Irony seems straightforward and unproblematic. Given the number of quotations and allusions to him in the text, it would seem that Hegel’s influence is so obvious that it is hardly in need of demonstration. Moreover, given that this is not a pseudonymous work, the interpreter can seemingly attribute the Hegelian views expressed here to Kierkegaard in a more or less straightforward manner. Unfortunately, this seemingly obvious point has been rendered complicated by what has come to be known as “the ironic interpretation” of the work. As has been noted,11 The Concept of Irony is one of the most difficult texts for Thulstrup to make sense of due to the fact that it seems to rely so heavily on Hegel. Thulstrup is at pains to minimize the importance of Hegel, whose influence during this period Kierkegaard himself acknowledges. Thulstrup tries to avoid this problem by arguing that The Concept of Irony is itself an ironic work and that Kierkegaard was cunningly assuming the role of a Hegelian in order to criticize Hegel indirectly or ironically. This thesis draws on a tradition of Kierkegaard interpretation that goes back at least as far as Pierre Mesnard’s Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard (1948).12 Since Mesnard’s work, it has been taken up and championed by a host of others, and today it has become so prevalent that it seems to be the standard view of the matter.13 11 12

13

Introduction, Section II. Pierre Mesnard, Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard, Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils 1948. N.b. Helweg hints at this view as early as 1855: Hans Friedrich Helweg, “Hegelianismen i Danmark,” Dansk Kirketidende, vol. 10, no. 51, December 16, 1855, p. 830. For example, Wilhelm Anz, “Die religi¨ose Unterscheidung,” in Symposiom Kierkegaardianum, ed. by Wilhelm Anz, et al. (Orbis Litterarum, Tome 10, Fasc. 1-2), Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1955, pp. 5–17. J. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1957, p. 11. Lee M. Capel, “Historical Introduction,” in his translation of The Concept of Irony, London: Collins 1966, e.g., p. 8. Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia 1993, pp. 44–46. Louis Mackey, Points of View. Readings of Kierkegaard. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1986, pp. 1–22. For a dissenting view, see Sophia Scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1995, pp. 101–106.

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At the end of the chapter which he dedicates to The Concept of Irony, Mesnard merely suggests his ironic interpretation without any real argument or evidence. There he refers to an early German translator, Wilhelm K¨utemeyer, who also hinted at this view.14 Mesnard claims: Kierkegaard’s attitude in this whole affair is in fact manifestly ironic, one could even add, ironic in the second degree. The first consisted of “presenting under the stamp of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen his most secret ideas, hidden behind the guise of a historic study.”15 The second aimed at nothing less than solemnly registering his declared purpose to destroy the system and to vex the established order and nevertheless to receive all the yes-votes from the representatives of Hegelian philosophy and bourgeois society.16

According to Mesnard, Kierkegaard used irony at two different levels. First, it was the subject of his dissertation; this use is straightforward and unproblematic. Second, and more interestingly, the dissertation itself was ironic at a metalevel in the sense that Kierkegaard himself was ironically playing the role of a Hegelian to criticize precisely that position. This was then presumably a part of Kierkegaard’s strategy of indirect communication, which forbade him from criticizing Hegel directly. According to Mesnard, Kierkegaard pretended here ironically to be a Hegelian for two reasons: (1) in order to fool the Hegelian faculty members into accepting his dissertation, which was in fact, unbeknownst to them, critical of Hegel, and (2) in order to dupe bourgeois society, which was dominated by Hegelianism, and deceive it into giving its approbation as well. Both of these purported motives prove ill-founded when one examines the actual historical circumstances surrounding the work. The first motivation Mesnard attributes to Kierkegaard is the desire to fool the Hegelian faculty members by pretending to be a Hegelian. This argument proves implausible when one considers the composition of Kierkegaard’s dissertation committee and of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen at the time.17 As was noted previously,18 there was never really any unified Hegelian school per se in Denmark, and the claim that the faculty at the University of Copenhagen was dominated by Hegelians is simply not true. Kierkegaard’s dissertation advisor and first 14 15 16 17

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Wilhelm Kutemeyer, ¨ Der Begriff der Ironie mit st¨andiger R¨ucksicht auf Sokrates von S.A. Kierkegaard, Munich: Kaiser Verlag 1929. Ibid., p. 343. Pierre Mesnard, Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard, op. cit., pp. 178–179. For a complete account of the circumstances of Kierkegaard’s dissertation see Carl Weltzer’s “Omkring Søren Kierkegaards Disputats,” in Kirkehistoriske Samlinger, sixth series, ed. by J. Oskar Andersen and Bjørn Kornerup, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1948–50, pp. 284–311. See Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1996, pp. 29–32. Chapter 1, Section III.

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reader was Sibbern, who was not a Hegelian but, on the contrary, one of the most outspoken critics of Hegelianism in Denmark. In 1838, three years before Kierkegaard’s dissertation, Sibbern published his review of Heiberg’s Perseus in which he was critical of both Hegel and Heiberg’s Hegelianism.19 Thus, he could certainly not have been the one whom the dissertation was intended to fool. Before the oral defense, the work had to be approved by six professors on the faculty. Three professors of classical philology also served as official readers of Kierkegaard’s dissertation: Johan Nikolai Madvig (1804–86), Peter Oluf Brøndsted (1780–1842), and Frederik Christian Petersen (1786–1859). None of these men had any stake whatsoever in Hegelianism, and they could likewise not have been among the Hegelians whom Kierkegaard intended to dupe.20 In addition, the famous physicist, then rector of the university, Hans Christian Ørsted (1777–1851), read and approved the dissertation. Ørsted was well read in philosophy and highly influenced by Kant. He can by no means be seen as an advocate of Hegelianism.21 In fact, in a letter to Heiberg, he reports that his progress in philosophy stopped with Hegel whom he found dry and impossible to read.22 Moreover, his questions to Heiberg show that he was quite suspicious of the new trend. Thus, none of these men, all senior scholars on the committee, can be rightly considered a Hegelian.23 The final reader, Martensen, was a known Hegelian, but he only became a member of the dissertation committee by chance and at the last 19

20

21 22

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Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1, Juni 1837. Kjøbenhavn. Reitzels Forlag. XIV og 264 S. 8. Priis 1 Rbd. 84 Skill. – (Med stadigt Hensyn til Dr. Rothes: Læren om Treenighed og Forsoning. Et speculativt Forsøg i Anledning af Reformationsfesten.),” in Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, 19, 1838, Article I, pp. 283–360; Article II, pp. 424–460; Article III, pp. 546–582; 20, 1838, Article IV, pp. 20–60; Article V, pp. 103–136; Article VI, pp. 193–244; Article VII, pp. 293– 308; Article VIII, pp. 405–449. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen 1838. ASKB 778. In Madvig’s autobiography, Livserindringer (Copenhagen 1887), he describes the academic aspiration that haunted him during the early 1830s. He recalls: “It was entirely contrary to my nature to attempt a superficial satisfaction of this aspiration through the appropriation of the formulas of the philosophical system which was dominant for a time – the Hegelian system – and only later did I find the time and occasion for a more continuous study of the philosophical systems from Spinoza and then from Kant onward.” See Harald Høffding, “Hans Christian Ørsted,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, pp. 49–56. Ørsted’s letter to Heiberg, April 1, 1825, Letter 127 in Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Johan Ludvig Heiberg, vols. 1–5, ed. by Morten Borup, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1947–50, vol. 1, p. 171. It must be noted that Madvig, Petersen, and Ørsted worked together with Heiberg on his journals, but one cannot properly speak of them as belonging to his school or as Hegelians since all of these journals, with the exception of Perseus, were general literary journals with no particular Hegelian affiliation. See Paul V. Rubow, Heiberg og hans skole i kritiken, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1953, p. 134.

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minute, and Kierkegaard had no way of knowing ahead of time that he would be one of the readers. Sibbern, as Kierkegaard’s advisor, was responsible for getting together the six signatures required for the acceptance of the work by the faculty. After he had the first five together from the aforementioned colleagues, he had to cast around for a final reader. The logical choice would have been the new professor of philosophy, Rasmus Nielsen, who had replaced Poul Martin Møller. Nielsen had been an enthusiast of Hegel’s philosophy at this time but had only just received the professorship (professor extraordinarius) at the University of Copenhagen on April 22, 1841. Kierkegaard submitted his dissertation only a short time later on June 3 of the same year. Thus, he could not have known ahead of time of the possibility of this Hegelian being a reader on his dissertation committee. It would therefore be historically mistaken to think that Kierkegaard formulated a strategy of an ironic dissertation in order to fool Nielsen. Sibbern approached Nielsen about the dissertation, but the latter declined to have anything to do with it since he had already been thoroughly alienated by Kierkegaard’s unprovoked attack on his competence.24 Thus, by default Martensen became the sixth reader.25 Moreover, although he had been a lecturer from 1838, Martensen only became professor in January 1841, and thus could not have been perceived by Kierkegaard as a potential reader before that time.26 But the dissertation is thought to have been completed between January 10 and June 3, 1841.27 Given that Kierkegaard had no way of foreseeing the course of events involved in Martensen’s appointment, it is impossible that he could have formulated his purported ironic strategy during the years previous 24

25 26

27

When Sibbern encouraged Kierkegaard to apply for an academic position at the University of Copenhagen, Kierkegaard expressed reservations, stating that he did not feel adequately prepared. Hans Brøchner recounts the exchange in his recollections: “Once he [Kierkegaard] told me that Sibbern had suggested he apply for a position as a lecturer in philosophy. Kierkegaard had replied that in that case he would have to insist on a couple of years in which to prepare himself. ‘Oh! How can you imagine that they would hire you under such conditions?’ asked Sibbern. ‘Yes, of course, I could do like Rasmus Nielsen and let them hire me unprepared.’ Sibbern became cross and said: ‘You always have to pick on Nielsen!’” When Nielsen got wind of this, he refused to be a reader on Kierkegaard’s dissertation committee, even though Sibbern asked him personally and even though he would have been the logical choice. Hans Brøchner, “Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard,” Det Nittende Aarhundrede, Maanedsskrift for Literatur og Kritik, vol. 5, March 1877, § 21. In English in Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., p. 235. See also Carl Weltzer, “Omkring Søren Kierkegaards Disputats,” op. cit., p. 286. Søren Bruun and Johnny Kondrup, “Tekstredegørelse” to Om Begrebet Ironi in SKS, vol. K1, p. 139. See Skat Arildsen, “Universitetsansættelse og Avancement,” in his Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1932, pp. 151–155. The King of Denmark approved the appointment in December 1840. Søren Bruun and Johnny Kondrup, “Tekstredegørelse” to Om Begrebet Ironi in SKS, vol. K1, p. 128.

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when he conceived of the project and began working on it. It must be recalled that there is evidence that Kierkegaard conceived of The Concept of Irony and began work on it as early as 1837.28 Moreover, the bulk of the work seems to have been written between summer 1838 and summer 1839.29 Thus, the motivation that Mesnard cites of wanting to dupe the Hegelians on the faculty is based on historical inaccuracies. Aside from Martensen, there were no Hegelians to dupe, and with respect to him, since he was appointed professor so late, it is impossible that Kierkegaard could have known that he was going to be a reader at all. Mesnard cites as the second motivation the desire to dupe the status quo and “bourgeois society.” This too evinces a misunderstanding of the political and intellectual climate in which Kierkegaard’s dissertation was written. During the years after Hegel’s death in 1831 his philosophy was regarded, contrary to Mesnard’s claim, as a grave danger to the bourgeois social order. Hegel’s students, Feuerbach and Strauss, had shocked the theological world with their works. When it became known that Feuerbach was the author of Gedanken u¨ ber Tod und Unsterblichkeit,30 he was fired from his teaching post and barred from university life forever thereafter. Some five years later Strauss lost his position at the University of T¨ubingen after the publication of his Das Leben Jesu.31 Hegel’s philosophy was perceived as such a threat to established religion, politics, and morals that the King of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, in 1840 saw himself obliged to appoint Schelling to a professorship at the University of Berlin for the express purpose of destroying the dangerous Hegelian tendencies toward pantheism among the students.32 In 1841 a ban was put on all left Hegelians, which prohibited them from teaching at a Prussian university.33 The journal, the Hallische Jahrb¨ucher, which had been one of the most important forums for the dissemination of Hegelian philosophy, was outlawed in 1841 by the Prussian government.34 In 1843 its successor, the Deutsche Jahrb¨ucher was banned, and its editor Ruge along with other Hegelians fled into exile. 28

29 30

31 32

33 34

See JP, vol. 5, 5262; SKS, vol. 17, p. 240, DD:58. JP, vol. 2, 1708; SKS, vol. 17, p. 248, DD:83. JP, vol. 2, 1714; SKS, vol. 18, p. 93, FF:90. JP, vol. 2, 1703; SKS, vol. 17, p. 235, DD:38. JP, vol. 4, 4243; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 245–246, DD:75. Søren Bruun and Johnny Kondrup, “Tekstredegørelse” to Om Begrebet Ironi in SKS, vol. K1, p. 128. Ludwig Feuerbach, Gedanken u¨ ber Tod und Unsterblichkeit aus den Papieren eines Denkers, nebst einem Anhang theologisch-satyrischer Xenien, herausgegeben von einem seiner Freunde, Nuremburg ¨ 1830. David Friedrich Strauss, Das Leben Jesu, vols. 1–2, Tubingen ¨ 1835–36. See F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841–42, ed. by Manfred Frank, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1977; third revised edition, 1993. Anhang II: “Historische Hintergrunde ¨ der Berufung Schellings; Schellings Auftreten in Berlin 1841,” p. 486. William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press 1970, p. 87. Ibid., pp. 74–82, pp. 87–88.

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The situation was little different in Denmark. As was noted previously, Martensen’s lectures at the University of Copenhagen in 1838 on Hegel and speculative philosophy were strikingly popular among the students, but he was attacked publicly for corrupting the morals of the youth by introducing Hegel’s philosophy into theological questions.35 Moreover, the publication of Feuerbach’s Wesen des Christentums36 and Strauss’ Christliche Glaubenslehre37 caused great alarm among the Danish intellectual community at this time. In 1842, only a year after Kierkegaard’s dissertation, Hans Brøchner, a student of theology who had translated some of Strauss’ works, was refused the opportunity to take his examination by the Theological Faculty at the University of Copenhagen when it became known that he shared some of Strauss’ views.38 This was not an isolated incident. As one intellectual historian records: “The storm caused by Brøchner’s application can be understood as the clearest illustration of a more general tendency.”39 Another Danish theologian, Andreas Frederik Beck, was made the target of criticism in 1842 for his The Concept of Myth or the Form of the Religious Spirit40 in which he espoused the views of Bruno Bauer.41 For his views, he was barred from obtaining a position in the service of the Danish Church. It was these events that compelled Martensen to modify his position publicly in order to distance himself from Hegelianism, which he did in his article “The Present

35

36 37 38

39

40 41

See the anonymous criticism: “Nogle Træk til en Charakteristik af den philosophiske Aand, som for Tiden findes hos de Studerende ved Kjøbenhavns Universitet,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 14, no. 25, January 26, 1840, pp. 97–99. Martensen’s response: “Philosophisk Beskedenhed i Kjøbenhavnsposten,” Fædrelandet, vol. 1, no. 50, January 29,1840, pp. 259–261. The anonymous rejoinder: “Philosophiske Suffisance i Fædrelandet,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 14, no. 31, February 1, 1840, pp. 121–124. Martensen’s response: “Erklæring,” Fædrelandet, vol. 1, no. 56, February 4, 1840, pp. 315–316. The final article, “Sidste Indlæg: Sagen contra Lector Martensen som Mandatarius for Hegel & Comp,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 14, no. 41, February 11, 1840, pp. 161–163. Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig 1841. See ASKB 488. David Friedrich Strauss, Christliche Glaubenslehre, vols. 1–2, Tubingen ¨ 1840–41. See ASKB 803–804. See S.V. Rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1966, pp. 16–31. See also Harald Høffding, “Hans Brøchner,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, pp. 196–206. Frederik Nielsen, Minder, Oplevelser og Iagttagelser, Aalborg 1881, p. 43f. F. L. Liebenberg, Nogle Optegnelser om mit Levnet, Copenhagen 1894, p. 26f. Jens Holger Schjørring, Teologi og filosofi. Nogle analyser og dokumenter vedrørende Hegelianismen i dansk teologi, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1974, pp. 33, 36ff. Jens Holger Schjørring, “Martensen,” in Kierkegaard’s Teachers, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulov´a Thulstrup (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10), Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1982, p. 192. See also Leif Grane, “Det Teologiske Fakultet 1830–1925,” in Københavns Universitet 1479–1979, ed. by Leif Grane, vol. 5, Det Teologiske Fakultet, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1980, p. 366. Andreas Frederik Beck, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen 1842. ASKB 424. Jens Holger Schjørring, Teologi og filosofi, op. cit., 1974, pp. 36–49.

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Religious Crisis.”42 Admittedly, some of these events took place a year after Kierkegaard’s dissertation and in an atmosphere where things changed quickly. Nonetheless they do give evidence for the fact that different aspects of Hegel’s philosophy were highly controversial and that some of his followers were regarded as dangerous. Given this great stir surrounding Hegelianism at the time, it would be an absurd historical error to think that Kierkegaard, by portraying himself as a Hegelian, would thus have ingratiated himself to bourgeois society. Apart from these problems of the historical context, there are also some deep theoretical problems with the ironic reading: namely, it covertly presupposes an anti-Hegelian stance based presumably on other, later texts (e.g., the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). But one could with equal justice make the opposite presupposition and claim that Kierkegaard’s “anti-Hegelian” statements in the later texts are ironic and that he was thus covertly pro-Hegelian based on a reading of this text. The ironic thesis thus plays a double game with a secret agenda: it wishes to dismiss certain readings as ironic, but in order to do so it must tacitly favor other readings that in fact are not ironic but rather transparent, but it provides no criteria for distinguishing between these and no evidence for the reading it covertly favors. In this way the ironic reading presupposes a position for which it is not prepared to argue. In the final analysis, there is no evidence that Kierkegaard wanted to be ironic in his dissertation in the way indicated by Mesnard. The ironic reading is anachronistic since it transposes Kierkegaard’s later polemical rhetoric toward Hegel onto this early period. Kierkegaard was during his time as a student rather ambivalent to Hegel, and in the works and journal entries prior to The Concept of Irony there is no evidence of the later polemic. In addition to this historical information, a number of other arguments based on evidence both internal and external to the text refute the ironic reading. First, I will examine the external evidence, which includes Kierkegaard’s own assessment of the work, and after this I will turn to an examination of the text itself.

ii. kierkegaard’s own assessment of his hegelianism Apart from the actual content of the work, which will be examined later, there are many reasons external to the text itself to believe that Kierkegaard was strongly under Hegel’s influence at the time of the composition of The Concept of Irony. Above all, his own later assessments of the work consistently describe it as Hegelian in character. In the journals and papers from the year 1850, almost ten years after the dissertation, there is 42

Hans Lassen Martensen, “Nutidens religiøse Crisis,” Intelligensblade, vol. 1, no. 3, 1842, pp. 53–73.

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a revealing passage which Himmelstrup uses as his point of departure.43 There Kierkegaard writes: Influenced as I was by Hegel and whatever was modern, without the maturity really to comprehend greatness, I could not resist pointing out somewhere in my dissertation44 that it was a defect on the part of Socrates to disregard the whole and only consider individuals numerically. What a Hegelian fool I was! It is precisely this that powerfully demonstrates what a great ethicist Socrates was.45

Although it is evident that Kierkegaard was critical of Hegel when writing this entry in 1850, nonetheless he says rather clearly that at the time of his dissertation he was under Hegel’s sway, indeed, so much so that he mistakenly criticized Socrates along Hegelian lines. The self-critical expression, “a Hegelian fool,” leaves little ambiguity in this regard. Thulstrup cites this passage with some embarrassment in a footnote and tries unconvincingly to make sense of it by arguing that it too is ironic.46 But this journal entry in no way supports an ironic interpretation. Kierkegaard says here with regret that he was “a Hegelian fool” and not that he was pretending to be one for the sake of issuing a criticism. On the contrary, he says in this passage that he regrets giving a Hegelian critique of Socrates. If he were merely playing the role of a Hegelian ironically, then he would presumably have no reason for regret. This passage is not anomalous. In a similar one from 1854, Kierkegaard expresses regret at having promulgated in his dissertation an aspect of Hegel’s doctrine of the state. He writes: “That the state in a Christian sense is supposed to be what Hegel taught – namely that it has moral significance, that true virtue can appear only in the state (something I also childishly babbled after him in my dissertation47 ), that the goal of the state is to improve men – is obviously nonsense.”48 Here Kierkegaard 43 44

45 46 47

48

Jens Himmelstrup, Søren Kierkegaards Opfattelse af Sokrates, op. cit., p. 12. Presumably CI, p. 234; SKS, vol. 1, p. 275: “Here the subject shows itself to be the deciding factor, as that which arbitrarily determines itself within itself. But the limiting of the universal that takes place thereby is one that the subject himself arbitrarily posits at every moment. It is possible for this curtailment of the universal to remain fast and not be occasional, for the universal to be acknowledged in its determinateness, only in a total system of actuality. But this Socrates lacks. He negated the state, but he did not come back again to the state in a higher form in which the infinite he negatively required is affirmed.” JP, vol. 4, 4281; Pap. X-3 A 477. Translation slightly modified. (Cited previously on p. 17.) Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980, p. 215fn. Presumably CI, pp. 228–235; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 271–276. For example, CI, pp. 229; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 271–272: “But Socrates destroyed the immediate, substantial political consciousness and did not arrive at the idea of the state, and as a result virtue can be defined only in this abstract way and has its reality neither in the state nor in the full personality yielded only by the state.” JP, vol. 4, 4238; Pap. XI-2 A 108, p. 114.

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admits once again by way of self-criticism to having parroted one of Hegel’s claims. As in the preceding passage, it is clear that Kierkegaard no longer believes this to be true and regrets having claimed it previously, but this entry leaves no room for doubt that, at least according to his own interpretation of his intellectual development, he uncritically accepted some aspects of Hegel’s philosophy at the time of his dissertation and was not merely ironically pretending to do so. Finally, there is in the journals from 1845 a relevant entry, which was originally a part of a draft of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. There Kierkegaard under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus criticizes himself as being under the sway of Hegel in The Concept of Irony: “In his dissertation, Magister Kierkegaard was alert enough to discern the Socratic but is considered not to have understood it, probably because, with the help of Hegelian philosophy, he has become super-clever and objective and positive, or has not had the courage to acknowledge the negation.”49 By saying that he used “the help of Hegelian philosophy” and by designating himself as “objective” and “positive” – terms that he consistently associates with Hegel – Kierkegaard at this later date seems again to think that his interpretation of Socrates in the dissertation was too Hegelian in character. As in the other journal entries, he again indicates that this allegiance to Hegel at that time led him to misunderstand important aspects of the figure of Socrates. All of these passages demonstrate that Kierkegaard at a later date judged himself to have been strongly influenced by Hegel while he was a student writing The Concept of Irony and that he later repudiated these aspects of Hegelianism. They make it clear that he sees the Hegelian influence as only a passing phase that he later rejected. The tone of selfcriticism and regret provides clear evidence that Kierkegaard was truly influenced by Hegel and was not merely pretending to be a Hegelian. If he had intentionally wanted to parody Hegelian philosophy by playing the role of a Hegelian, then there would be no need for regret or self-critique at a later period. Kierkegaard’s assessment of himself as a Hegelian at this time squares with the accounts given about him by some of his contemporaries. For example, Sibbern recalls as follows a chance encounter with Kierkegaard on the street during roughly this time: I do remember, however, that once, during his Hegelian period, he met me at Gammeltorv and asked me what relationship obtained between philosophy and actuality, which astonished me, because the gist of the whole of my philosophy was the study of life and actuality. But subsequently I of 49

JP, vol. 5, 5796; Pap. VI B 35.24. See CUP1, p. 503; SKS, vol. 7, p. 456: “What, then, is irony, if one wants to call Socrates an ironist and does not, like Magister Kierkegaard, consciously or unconsciously want to bring out only the one side?”

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course realized that the question was a natural one for a Hegelianized thinker.50

What is important here is not so much the question posed but rather Sibbern’s allusion to Kierkegaard’s Hegelian period and his description of him as a “Hegelianized thinker.” Sibbern speaks of this Hegelian period in a manner that suggests that it was generally recognized and in no need of explanation or defense. The fact that Sibbern designates it as a “period” implies that it was something transitory, which Kierkegaard later came to reject. Sibbern’s remarks are consistent with what Brøchner says of Kierkegaard, when he writes: “For a long time he was much occupied with Hegelian philosophy, which indeed seems to have overwhelmed him until an ethical respect for the conditions of existence taught him to see the errors in that philosophy.”51 Brøchner here also implies that Kierkegaard had a Hegelian period that he later moved beyond. This remark comes in the context of a discussion about the main influences on Kierkegaard during his studies at the University of Copenhagen, which would seem to imply that his Hegelian period took place during this time. Given this evidence, one can infer that Sibbern and Brøchner refer to this period when Kierkegaard was still a student. Both Kierkegaard’s own accounts of his intellectual development and the accounts of his contemporaries attest to the fact that he had a Hegelian period early in his career. The results from Chapter 2 clearly support this conclusion since, as was seen, there was ample evidence of a positive Hegelian influence in From the Papers of One Still Living and scattered journal entries from the period. Given this, there is every reason to suspect that there might be some Hegelian elements in Kierkegaard’s other works from this period, the most important of which is The Concept of Irony. The nature of these elements now remains to be explored.

iii. the structure of the text In addition to this external evidence provided primarily by the journals and papers and secondhand reports, it has been claimed that the very 50

51

H. P. Barfod (ed.), “Indledende Notiser,” in his Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1833–1843, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1869, pp. lii–liii. Cited from Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., “Letter F. C. Sibbern to H. P. Barfod,” September 19, 1869, p. 217. Translation slightly modified. The similarity between this remark and a journal entry from this period suggests this dating. JP, vol. 2, 1592; SKS, vol. 19, p. 245, Not8:51. “Letter H. Brøchner to C. K. F. Molbech,” February 17, 1856. Cited from Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., p. 251.

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structure of The Concept of Irony itself is Hegelian in nature.52 Specifically, it is argued that there is a Hegelian triad of categories in the movement of the three chapters that constitute Part One. According to this view, in the titles of these chapters – “The View Made Possible,” “The Actualization of the View,” and “The View Made Necessary” – Kierkegaard uses the purportedly Hegelian categories – possibility, actuality, and necessity – to structure his work. Thus, it is claimed, he seems to want to convey the idea that there is a Hegelian methodology operative in the work. The issue is, however, a complicated one since these categories are, of course, not original in Hegel but rather go back to Aristotle.53 Kant’s understanding of the categories is most important for the issue at hand. In his table of categories in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lays out twelve categories in four different groups. He assigns under the categories of modality the following pairs: possibility/impossibility, existence/nonexistence, and necessity/contingency. With the exception of the second category, existence (“Dasein” instead of “Wirklichkeit”), these categories fit Kierkegaard’s scheme. This variant is, however, insignificant since the two terms were taken synonymously as is seen by the fact that in Hegel’s lectures one finds them used interchangeably.54 Moreover, in Martensen’s account of Kant’s categories in his “Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy from Kant to Hegel” (given in Winter Semester 1838–39) he uses “Virkelighed” and not “Tilværelse,”55 the Danish equivalent of “Dasein.” This might be an indication that Kierkegaard’s source for these categories was Martensen’s lectures and not Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In any case, the variant is of no significance, and the structure of the three chapters in Part One of The Concept of Irony can be seen to correspond to these Kantian categories. 52

53

54

55

This apparently goes back to Eduard Geismar’s work, Søren Kierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1926–27, vol. 1, første del, pp. 95–103. Geismar merely suggests this correlation without fleshing it out in any detail. Gregor Malantschuk, Dialektik og Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag 1968, p. 66. English translation: Kierkegaard’s Thought, tr. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1971, p. 65. See also Hong’s “Historical Introduction,” in his translation of CI, p. xvi: “In Part One of Irony, the Hegelian pattern is followed: possibility, actuality and necessity.” One will recall that it was Trendelenburg’s treatment of precisely these modal categories which interested Kierkegaard so avidly after his return from Berlin in 1842. See Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin 1840, vol. 2, pp. 97– 138. ASKB 843. See Arnold B. Come, Trendelenburg’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Modal Categories, Montreal: Inter Editions 1991. Jacques Message, “Kierkegaard, Trendelenburg: La logique et les cat´egories modales,” Kairos, 10, 1997, pp. 49–61. During that same period, Kierkegaard also made a study of Aristotle’s works on logic with an eye towards this issue. Hegel refers to the modal categories mentioned as follows, “possibility, existence (actuality) and necessity.” (Hegel, Hist. of Phil. III, p. 439; Jub., vol. 19, p. 567. The full passage is cited later.) Hegel makes precise the category of “existence” [Dasein] by naming the category “actuality” [Wirklichkeit] immediately after it, thus avoiding all ambiguity. Pap. II C 25, in Pap. XII, p. 286.

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By organizing the categories in the way he does, Kant indicates that there is an organic relation between the categories in each of the four sets. Specifically, he claims that the third category in each group is always a combination of the first and the second. With respect to the modal categories, Kant claims, necessity is “the existence which is given through possibility itself.”56 By this he seems to mean that of the large set of things that are possible, there is a subset of things that are necessary, and these in fact do exist. Thus, necessity is possibility realized in the realm of existence. (Later in the “Interlude” to the Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus will come to criticize this position (i.e., that necessity is the combination of existence and possibility), which has been mistakenly attributed to Hegel.57 The same position is criticized in The Sickness unto Death.58 ) Hegel takes the insight about the logical interrelation of the categories and develops it in his own idiosyncratic fashion in the Science of Logic. In the section entitled, “Actuality” (which constitutes the third part of the Wesenslogik or “The Doctrine of Essence”), he treats these categories and attempts to demonstrate their organic relations to one another. In the second chapter of that section he works through an elaborate analysis of the different aspects of the modal categories. There he tries to demonstrate that these categories mutually imply and thus reciprocally condition one another in contrast to the unilateral Kantian conception according to which the third in the group is the combination of the first and the second. Moreover, Hegel’s account is much more differentiated than a straightforward analysis of the sequence of categories – possibility, actuality, necessity; by contrast, Hegel distinguishes a number of variants of the three categories, such as “formal actuality,” “relative necessity,” “real possibility” and “absolute necessity,” and supplements the three original modal categories with others. Thus, the matter in Hegel is much more complicated than either Kant’s table of categories or Kierkegaard’s scheme. It will be noted that Kierkegaard’s sequence – possibility, actuality, necessity – differs from Hegel’s since in the latter actuality precedes possibility; indeed, Hegel criticizes Kant for placing possibility first. In the account 56 57

58

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., New York: St. Martin’s Press 1963, B 111, p. 116. (My italics.) See Hong’s note 12, p. 299 to PF, also note 35, p. 175 to SD. Hong attributes this to Hegel on the basis of the following passage in the Encyclopaedia Logic: “It is true that necessity has been rightly defined as the unity of possibility and actuality.” But Hong fails to quote what Hegel says immediately after this: “But when it is expressed only in this way, this determination is superficial, and therefore unintelligible”(EL, § 147; Enz I, pp. 330–331). Hegel draws on this view but departs from it in significant ways. SUD, p. 36; SV1, vol. 11, p. 149: “The philosophers are mistaken when they explain necessity as a unity of possibility and actuality – no, actuality is the unity of possibility and necessity.”

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of Kant’s view of the modal categories, which Hegel gives in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, one reads, “The categories of modality . . . come forth, viz. possibility, existence (actuality) and necessity. Possibility should come second; in abstract thought, however, the empty conception comes first.”59 Here Hegel criticizes Kant’s ordering of the categories as a typical error caused by abstraction. Moreover, there is in Hegel’s own account very little that resembles the simple sequence of possibility, actuality, and necessity. It is not necessary to examine Hegel’s intricate analysis in detail since Kierkegaard is not, strictly speaking, interested in an account of these categories for their own sake and does not draw on this aspect of Hegel’s philosophy at all in his dissertation. The use of these categories in the chapter titles of Part One of The Concept of Irony seems to imply that the phenomenon of Socratic irony, which Kierkegaard designates as “the view,” will be analyzed in terms of each of these three categories. Yet, at first glance, it is not obvious how Kierkegaard’s chapters reflect a dialectical movement in terms of these categories. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the titles reflect the actual content of the individual chapters at all. Fortunately, Kierkegaard provides a few scattered explanatory remarks on this question. At the end of Chapter 1, which deals with possibility, he says by way of clarification: I have allowed the whole development to reach a point of final confrontation. I have thereby procured a possibility of being able to explain the discrepancy among these three views [sc. Xenophon, Plato and Aristophanes] by a view of Socrates corresponding to it. But with all this I still have come no further than the possibility, for even though the explanation propounded is able to reconcile the opposing powers, it by no means follows that this explanation is therefore entirely correct. If, however, it could not reconcile them, then it could not possibly be correct. Now, however, it is possible.60

Here the use of the category of possibility concerns the possibility of explaining the discrepancies in the account of Socrates given by the three major primary sources. Kierkegaard tries to do this by means of an interpretation of Socrates as ironic. The idea seems to be that he has merely suggested this interpretation without proof and that at this point in the text it is merely one interpretive possibility among others. Chapter 2 then purportedly interprets the irony of Socrates under the aspect of a new category, namely, actuality. Kierkegaard explains the shift in the analysis and his employment of this category as follows: “From this point on, the investigation will take another form. I shall deal with some phenomena that as historical facts do not need to be provided through a mistaken view but merely need to be kept in their inviolate innocence and thereupon explained. . . . This section could be called ‘The 59 60

Hegel, Hist. of Phil. III, p. 439; Jub., vol. 19, p. 567. See SL, p. 327; Jub., vol. 4, p. 404. CI, p. 155; SKS, vol. 1, p. 205.

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Actualization of the View,’ because it actualizes itself through all these historical data.”61 Kierkegaard reminds the reader again and again in this section that he is no longer concerned with personal interpretations of the authors Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes, but rather with actual historical facts, such as Socrates’ daimon and his condemnation by his fellow Athenians.62 The historical information is then interpreted as indicative of Socratic irony, presumably in order to support the claim about the mere possibility of that irony, which was established in the first chapter. Thus, the agreed upon historical facts of Socrates’ existence transform the thesis from one of mere possibility to concrete actuality. In the final chapter of Part One, Socrates’ use of irony is considered as necessary (i.e., from the world-historical point of view). The older order of Greek life was no longer viable, and Socrates’ use of irony as a negative tool set loose the historical forces that ultimately destroyed it. His role in the historical movement is seen in hindsight as necessary for the dissolution of classical Greek culture: “Early Greek culture had outlived itself, a new principle had to emerge, but before it could appear in its truth, all the prolific weeds of misunderstanding’s pernicious anticipations had to be plowed under, destroyed down to the deepest roots. The new principle must contend; world history needs an accoucheur. Socrates fills this place.”63 Seen in this fashion, the irony of Socrates is not merely a historical fact among others but rather a necessity of world history. In the chapter, “The World-Historical Validity of Irony,” from Part Two of the work, Kierkegaard again takes up the notion of historical necessity in strongly Hegelian terms: Even though world spirit in any process is continually in itself, this is not the case with the generation at a certain time and with given individuals at a certain time in the same generation. For them, a given actuality does not present itself as something that they are able to reject, because the world process leads the person who is willing to go along and sweeps the unwilling one along with it. But insofar as the idea is concrete in itself, it is necessary for it to become continually what it is – that is, become concrete.64

Here he understands there is to be a historical necessity in the destruction of the actuality of any given historical period. There is a necessity not in every historical detail but only in those changes of history that conform to the Idea. Given that Socratic reflection and skepticism corresponded to the changes in the Idea of world spirit at the time, they were historically necessary. Thus, necessity replaces actuality as the relevant category in the analysis. 61 62 63 64

CI, p. 156; SKS, vol. 1, p. 206. See also CI, pp. 259–264; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 297–302. CI, p. 157; SKS, vol. 1, p. 207. CI, p. 167; SKS, vol. 1, p. 215. CI, p. 211; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 255–256. CI, p. 259; SKS, vol. 1, p. 297. Translation slightly modified. (My italics.)

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It is difficult to know exactly what to make of the claim that the organizational structure of Part One is Hegelian in character. Kierkegaard’s scheme only vaguely follows the pattern of Hegel’s analysis of these categories in the Science of Logic. Given that Hegel’s discussion of the modal categories does not follow the sequence – possibility, actuality, necessity – it cannot be said that this sequence is Hegelian or that Kierkegaard’s use of it is indicative of a Hegelian view.65 Given this, it is unclear why any contemporary would have thought that this aspect of the dissertation was typically Hegelian, especially given that many other philosophers from Aristotle onward treat these categories as well. Moreover, aside from the few explanatory comments Kierkegaard provides here, the actual content of his chapters seems only loosely related to these categories anyway. In what follows I would like to argue that there are many discussions and analyses in The Concept of Irony that are derived from Hegel, and that it is not so much the work’s structure as its content that bears the stamp of Hegel’s thought. On the basis of the discussion in Section II in this chapter, it is clear that there is good reason to suspect that Kierkegaard’s dissertation might be influenced by aspects of Hegel’s philosophy; I now turn to a treatment of the content of the text itself in order to determine if it bears out this hypothesis. Kierkegaard mentions Hegel several times throughout The Concept of Irony, often merely referring briefly to some aspect of his thought, and for this reason it would be impractical to go through every single reference serially. Therefore, it will be useful to pick out some passages as representative of his use of Hegel in the text generally. In addition to various scattered references and allusions, there are a handful of extended discussions in which Kierkegaard analyzes in detail some aspect of Hegel’s thought, and it is these which will be particularly productive to examine. With an analysis of these passages, it will be possible to gain a sense for how well Kierkegaard knew Hegel’s works in addition to what use he makes of him and which aspects of his philosophy he seems sympathetic to and which ones he rejects. In what follows I propose to analyze the following passages: (1) Kierkegaard’s discussion of Hegel’s interpretation of the daimon at the beginning of Chapter 2, “The Actualization of the View,”66 (2) Chapter 3, “The View Made Necessary,”67 (3) the 65

66 67

The categories discussed here will become important themes in Kierkegaard’s later works, particularly after he becomes familiar with Trendelenburg’s logic. See PF, pp. 74–78; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 274–277. SUD, p. 36; SV1, vol. 11, p. 149. CUP1, pp. 314ff.; SKS, vol. 7, pp. 286ff. CA, p. 49; SKS, vol. 4, p. 354. But here in The Concept of Irony, he is not yet concerned per se with the general question of the conceptual or logical relations among them, although he had considered the question of the modal categories somewhat during this period. See JP, vol. 2, 1592; SKS, vol. 19, p. 245, Not8:51. JP, vol. 2, 1593; SKS, vol. 19, p. 246, Not8:53. CI, pp. 157–167; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 207–215. CI, pp. 198–218; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 244–262.

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appendix to Part One entitled, “Hegel’s View of Socrates,”68 (4) the chapter from Part Two entitled, “The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the Irony of Socrates,”69 and (5) Kierkegaard’s criticism of Romantic irony in the chapter “Irony after Fichte.”70

iv. hegel’s account of the daimon The first analysis to be treated is the account of Hegel’s interpretation of the daimon71 which comes at the beginning of the second chapter, “The Actualization of the View.” This is the point in the discussion when Kierkegaard moves to his treatment of the life and person of Socrates. The discussion begins with a treatment of the references to the daimon in the texts of Xenophon and Plato and then moves on to the modern interpretations of it. There can be no doubt that Kierkegaard draws heavily on Hegel here, and in fact his discussion follows exactly Hegel’s own treatment in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.72 In addition, Kierkegaard also quotes from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History73 and from the Philosophy of Right.74 Kierkegaard begins by claiming that previous writers have not been able to understand the daimon correctly due to the fact that it has always been interpreted as something external or accidental to Socrates’ character. By contrast, Hegel has attained clarity on this issue by understanding the phenomenon of the daimon as representative of Socrates’ fundamental moral disposition. In the following passage, Kierkegaard approvingly cites Hegel as an authority on the issue: “One of Hegel’s statements expresses in a general sense and yet very pregnantly how to understand the daimon: ‘Socrates, in assigning to insight, to conviction, the determination of men’s actions, posited the individual as capable of a final moral decision, in contraposition to country and customary morality, and thus made himself an oracle in the Greek sense.’”75 Kierkegaard cites a similar passage from the Philosophy of Right,76 apparently to make the same point, while noting that Hegel’s most extended discussion of the issue comes in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Thus, at the beginning of his discussion, Kierkegaard makes it clear that Hegel’s account of the issue is important for him. 68 70 72 73 74 75

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CI, pp. 219–237; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 263–278. 69 CI, pp. 259–271; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 297–308. CI, pp. 272–323; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 308–352. 71 CI, pp. 157–167; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 207–215. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 421–425; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 89–100. CI, p. 161; SKS, vol. 1, p. 211. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 269–270; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 350–351. CI, p. 162; SKS, vol. 1, p. 211. Hegel, PR, § 279, Remark; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 385–386. CI, p. 161; SKS, vol. 1, p. 211. Hegel, Phil. of Hist., pp. 269–270; Jub., vol. 11, p. 350. Translation slightly modified. N.b. In quoting Kierkegaard’s quotations of Hegel, I use the standard English translations of Hegel and not Hong’s translations of Kierkegaard’s quotations. CI, p. 162; SKS, vol. 1, p. 211.

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Hegel’s analysis of the Greek world is now the object of his attention. Classical Greek culture was governed by traditional morality or what Hegel calls “Sittlichkeit” (usually translated as “ethical life”). This was reflected in the religion, the customs and the laws of the state, all of which were believed to have their sanction in the gods. Such customs and laws represented an absolute moral command which the individual, being immediately immersed in them, never thought to question. By incessantly calling into doubt established religion and morality and demanding that they justify themselves rationally, Socrates represented the destructive force of individuality and subjective freedom. “Socrates’ position,” Kierkegaard writes, “is that of subjectivity, of inwardness, which reflects upon itself and in its relation to itself detaches and volatilizes what is established in the flood of thought that surges over it and carries it away while it itself recedes again into thought.”77 With Socrates the individual was for the first time invested with the burden of moral reflection and judgment, and this new principle of individuality comes into conflict with traditional morality. Hegel portrays the conflict by juxtaposing the Delphic oracle, one of the main organs of traditional morality, with Socrates’ daimon, which is conceived as a kind of inner, subjective oracle, representing the principle of individuality. Since the oracle was essentially a medium for the propagation of traditional morality, its utterances were perceived as having absolute validity. By appealing to the oracle, the people effectively denied themselves the freedom of decision and action, for they allowed the oracle to choose and to determine their course of action for them. Kierkegaard cites Hegel once again: “This element, the fact that the people had not the power of decision, but were determined from without, was a real factor in Greek consciousness; and oracles were everywhere essential where man did not yet know himself inwardly as being sufficiently free and independent to take upon himself to decide as we do. This subjective freedom . . . was not yet present with the Greeks.”78 The unreflective citizen thus had no subjective freedom or autonomy since life was lived in accordance with established patterns and customs, which were thought to have their legitimation in their antiquity or in the gods. The oracle, understood as the mouthpiece for traditional morality and universality, is then contrasted with the daimon of Socrates, which is individual. The daimon is not something external or adventitious like the oracle; moreover, it is not accessible to the public sphere but rather dwells within the person of Socrates himself and is thus subjective. It represents the principle of subjective freedom that stands in contradiction to 77 78

CI, p. 163; SKS, vol. 1, p. 212. Translation slightly modified. CI, p. 163; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 212–213. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 423; Jub., vol. 18, p. 97. See PhS, pp. 340–432; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 542–544.

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traditional morality and indeed poses a threat to it. But the daimon does not represent the extreme limit of individuality but only a sort of halfway house between it and the universality of traditional morality. Kierkegaard quotes Hegel once again: “the daimon of Socrates stands midway between the externality of the oracle and the pure inwardness of the mind.”79 The daimon is not synonymous with Socrates’ own private will; indeed, it often warns him against doing things that his private will would otherwise like to do. Thus, although it is in Socrates, qua individual, the daimon is not wholly subjective; rather, it has an objective validity since it transcends Socrates’ individual will, but yet it still stands in contrast to the universal public morality of the oracle. Kierkegaard indicates that his account of Hegel’s interpretation of the daimon is here at an end and that he will now use it as a point of departure or foundation upon which he intends to build.80 His addition to Hegel’s account involves merely the observation that the phenomenon of the daimon is consistent with his own interpretation of the irony of Socrates. With its negative commands and warnings, the daimon provided Socrates with a truth that was for him valid and objective. Thus, the daimon furnished Socrates with a stable truth (albeit a purely negative one) that remained sacrosanct even with respect to his own skeptical questioning, and in this one finds, according to Kierkegaard, its ironic element: “If we now add to this the polemical consciousness into which Socrates absorbed his whole relation to his contemporaries . . . the security provided for him by the daimon against being perplexed by all the happenings in life, then Socrates’ position once again manifests itself as irony.”81 The essential point here is that the daimon’s commands had no positive content but rather were always negative in character; the daimon warned Socrates and told him what not to do, but it never gave him positive suggestions for action. Thus, this interpretation of the daimon is consistent with Kierkegaard’s claim that Socrates had no positive doctrine and remained in a position of pure ironic negativity with respect to traditional morality. Kierkegaard finishes his discussion by contrasting his general methodology with that of Hegel and by offering a criticism of him on this point. Clearly referring to Hegel, he writes: “As a rule, irony is understood ideally, is assigned its place as a vanishing element in the system, and is 79 80

81

CI, p. 164; SKS, vol. 1, p. 213. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 425; Jub., vol. 18, p. 99. Translation slightly modified. CI, p. 165; SKS, vol. 1, p. 214: “This concludes my exposition of Hegel’s presentation, and, here as always when one has Hegel along . . . I have thereby acquired a footing from which I can safely start out on my own excursion to see whether there might be some particular worthy of note to which I can safely return whether or not I have found anything.” CI, p. 166; SKS, vol. 1, p. 214. Translation slightly modified.

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therefore treated very briefly.”82 Kierkegaard is critical of Hegel’s speculative method of abstracting irony out of its actual concrete context and analyzing it as an abstract concept in relation to a general system of concepts. For Kierkegaard, by contrast, irony is not just an abstract concept but rather a concrete utterance or action in a specific situation: This is the purely personal life with which science and scholarship admittedly are not involved. . . . Whatever the case may be, grant that science and scholarship are right in ignoring such things; nevertheless, one who wants to understand the individual life cannot do so. And since Hegel himself says somewhere that with Socrates it is not so much a matter of speculation as of individual life, I dare to take this as sanction for my procedural method in my whole venture, however imperfect it may turn out because of my own deficiencies.83

Kierkegaard’s method, in contrast to Hegel’s, will be to analyze irony in its concrete context in the life of a specific individual. According to Kierkegaard, Hegel has with his method overlooked important aspects of irony, for in order to understand the irony of Socrates one must examine his use of it within the context of his life and cultural setting. Hegel allegedly fails to see this since he is purportedly only interested either in the historical concept [Begriff ]that is represented by the Greek world or in irony as a concept in a general theory of aesthetics. The details of history are, it is claimed, of no interest to him. What is interesting to note here is that Kierkegaard grants the legitimacy of “science and scholarship” and recognizes that this is the domain where Hegel’s analyses are operative. He is further willing to recognize that Hegel makes no claim about the life of the individual, which is not the subject-matter of a scientific analysis. His objection seems to be that the life of Socrates cannot be fully grasped by means of a purely scholarly method. But there is no criticism of the method on its own terms or of Hegel for his employment of it. Kierkegaard develops this point further at the beginning of the appendix, “Hegel’s View of Socrates.” The relation between the original discussion and its development here is clear since he refers to his previous discussion in a footnote.84 Here Kierkegaard criticizes Hegel for overlooking important aspects of the figure of Socrates, arguing that Hegel is not concerned with the various empirical particulars in his analysis of history: The difficulty implicit in the establishment of certainty about the phenomenal aspect of Socrates’ life does not bother Hegel. He generally does not acknowledge such trivial concerns. . . . Although he himself observes that 82 84

83 CI, pp. 166–167; SKS, vol. 1, p. 215. CI, p. 166; SKS, vol. 1, p. 214. CI, p. 219fn.; SKS, vol. 1, p. 263fn.: “With Socrates (to bring up again a previously quoted remark by Hegel, which strangely enough is by Hegel) it is a question not so much of philosophy as of individual life.”

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with respect to Socrates it is a matter not so much of philosophy as of individual life, there is nothing at all in his presentation of Socrates in Geschichte der Philosophie to illuminate the relations of the three different contemporary views of Socrates.85

Kierkegaard goes so far as to criticize Hegel for not being historically exacting.86 He attributes Hegel’s lack of interest in matters of philology or textual criticism to his insistence upon taking in a wider historical perspective: “Anything like this is effort wasted on Hegel, and when the phenomena are paraded, he is in too much of a hurry and is too aware of the great importance of his role as commander-in-chief of world history to take time for more than the royal glimpse he allows to glide over them.”87 According to Kierkegaard, by viewing history only from the macrolevel, Hegel has not been able to grasp fully the nature of Socrates and his use of irony. This claim seems to prefigure Kierkegaard’s later criticism, which charges philosophy and the system with being idealized and abstracted from actuality. Strangely enough, in his Introduction, Kierkegaard says just the opposite of this and indeed praises Hegel’s methodology on precisely this point. There he discusses the difference between an empirical account of history and a philosophical one. His discussion is derived wholly from Hegel. He begins by claiming with Hegel that philosophy necessarily involves a historical element, given that concepts, which are the objects of philosophy, are historically contingent entities: “Concepts, just like individuals, have their history and are no more able than they to resist the dominion of time, but in and through it all they nevertheless harbor a kind of homesickness for the place of their birth. Indeed, philosophy can now on one side no more disregard the recent history of this concept than it can stop with its earliest history.”88 Kierkegaard is quick to point out that, although concepts have their histories, there is a difference between a purely historical account, which merely recounts various actions, and a philosophical-historical account, which interprets the general historical pattern or idea behind the manifold phenomena: “Just as the individual making a confession is certainly able not only to reel off the incidents of his life chronologically but also to relate them entertainingly but still does not comprehend them himself, so history certainly is also able to declare the eventful life of the human race with pathos in a loud voice 85 86

87 88

CI, p. 221; SKS, vol. 1, p. 265. CI, pp. 221–222; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 265–266: “He uses one single dialogue from Plato as an example of the Socratic method without explaining why he chose this particular one. He uses Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Apology, and also Plato’s Apology, quite uncritically.” CI, p. 222; SKS, vol. 1, p. 266. CI, p. 9; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 71–72. See Hegel, PR, Preface, p. 21; Jub., vol. 7, p. 35: “As far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a child of his time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts.”

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but must leave it to the senior (philosophy) to explain it.”89 This is, of course, an essentially Hegelian view and corresponds generally to the distinction, outlined in the Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, between “original history,” which is concerned with facts and empirical data, and “philosophical history,” which is concerned with an interpretation of history in terms of abstract thought. Kierkegaard surprisingly goes on to insist on this Hegelian distinction, claiming that philosophy should concentrate on the universal, while history concentrates on the particulars. Each has its own domain, and they should avoid merging into one another. Both philosophy and history “ought to have their rights so that, on the one hand, the phenomenon has its rights and is not to be intimidated and discouraged by philosophy’s superiority, and philosophy, on the other hand, is not to let itself be infatuated by the charms of the particular, is not to be distracted by the superabundance of the particular.”90 Here he says directly that philosophy should avoid slipping into the realm of pure particularity for which it is unsuited. The surprising thing about this passage is that it contradicts precisely what Kierkegaard argues for in the passage just discussed. As has been noted, there he seems to criticize Hegel for concentrating on the universal and ignoring the particular, claiming that by so doing Hegel has missed the point of the notion of irony. But here in the Introduction, he says: “The same holds for the concept of irony: philosophy is not to look too long at one particular side of its phenomenological existence and above all at its appearance but is to see the truth of the concept in and with the phenomenological.”91 Here he insists that the goal of philosophy is to examine irony abstractly as a concept and not to be concerned primarily or exclusively with a specific use made of it by specific individuals. Moreover, Kierkegaard states, empirical or original history fails to see the true importance of the figure of Socrates. In his Introduction, Kierkegaard announces that in this work he intends to examine the philosophical concept of irony, but in order to do so he must first come to terms with the history of the concept. He claims that the concept of irony was introduced into the world by Socrates, and for this reason he must first give a philosophical-historical account of Socrates in order to understand

89 91

90 CI, pp. 10–11; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 72–73. CI, p. 10; SKS, vol. 1, p. 72. CI, p. 11; SKS, vol. 1, p. 73. Kierkegaard goes so far as to make a plea for a systematic understanding of history: “Just as it has been correctly pointed out that nature is unable to adhere to the concept . . . so also something similar can legitimately be said about history, inasmuch as every single fact does indeed evolve, but only as an element, and the whole sum of historical existence is still not the completely adequate medium of the idea, since it is the idea’s temporality and fragmentariness . . . that long for the backward-looking repulse emanating, face against face, from consciousness.” Ibid.

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the concept.92 But to give a purely empirical account of the particulars would not be sufficient. “Moreover,” he writes, “if through an intimate familiarity with Socrates’ life and way of living someone gained a notion of his singularity, he would still not therefore have a total concept of what irony is.”93 But it is precisely the understanding of Socrates as an individual that Kierkegaard aims at in the body of the text. Later Hegel is cited as one who sees Socrates in his historical context. At first Kierkegaard writes: “The point of this, of course, is not to tear Socrates out of his historical context – on the contrary, it is to see him properly in that context.”94 He then goes on to quote Hegel to the same effect: “But Socrates did not grow like a mushroom out of the earth, for he stands in continuity with his time.”95 On the one hand, Kierkegaard insists on understanding the person of Socrates and Socratic irony as individual phenomena in the sphere of empirical actuality; on the other hand, he insists that they must be understood in a scholarly fashion in terms of the Concept. It is difficult to know what to make of Kierkegaard’s inconsistency here. It suggests that he was developing his ideas as he was writing and can be seen as indicative of an uncertain or ambivalent relation to Hegel generally. In any case, it cannot be reconciled with the ironic interpretation. If Kierkegaard were ironically playing the role of a Hegelian, it would not make sense for him to criticize Hegel on this point and thus fall into a contradiction with his own methodological considerations. Such an obvious contradiction would merely call attention to the anti-Hegelian aspect of the text, which would undermine Kierkegaard’s purportedly ironic intent. These criticisms would merely serve the purpose of provoking the ire of the purported Hegelians on the faculty. They would also contradict his strategy of indirect communication, which would forbid him from giving such a direct criticism. It is fair to say that in “The Daimon of Socrates,” Hegel dominates the discussion. It is his interpretation of the daimon that Kierkegaard discusses at length and largely adopts. He does not expand Hegel’s analysis in any detail and is in no way critical of it as a point of departure; indeed, he cites Hegel at length without much analysis at all. At the end of his discussion, Kierkegaard points out that his interpretation of Socratic irony is wholly consistent with Hegel’s account of the daimon. It thus seems indisputable that Hegel is crucial for shaping Kierkegaard’s views on this matter. The daimon represents, for Hegel and Kierkegaard, 92

93 94 95

CI, p. 9; SKS, vol. 1, p. 71: “Before I proceed to an exposition of the concept of irony, it is necessary to make sure that I have a reliable and authentic view of Socrates’ historicalactual, phenomenological existence.” CI, p. 11; SKS, vol. 1, p. 73. Translation slightly modified. CI, p. 199; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 244–245. CI, p. 199; SKS, vol. 1, p. 245. Hegel Hist. of Phil. I, p. 384; Jub., vol. 18, p. 42.

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Socrates’ general negative relation to the established order. This is the key for Hegel’s understanding of Socrates as a world-historical figure and for Kierkegaard’s understanding of the concept of irony as essentially negative. Moreover, Hegel is an important interlocutor for Kierkegaard, which can be seen above all in the criticism that Kierkegaard offers. There he carves out his own position and methodology in contrast to Hegel.

v. hegel’s account of socrates vis- a` -vis the other greek schools In the third and final chapter of Part One, “The View Made Necessary,”96 Kierkegaard turns to an analysis of the figure of Socrates as a worldhistorical individual in the Hegelian sense (i.e., as someone who set off profound changes in the development of history by helping to bring about the destruction of historical concepts that are no longer viable). Socrates is analyzed as “a turning point”97 in history since he was in part responsible for the destruction of the Greek polis as a form of life. Kierkegaard’s language and methodology in this discussion are, as before, profoundly Hegelian.98 Once again following exactly Hegel’s analysis in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy,99 he divides his own account here into two parts: first he examines Socrates in relation to what came before (i.e., the Sophistic movement in Greek thought) and then in relation to what came after (i.e., the post-Socratic schools). In a typically Hegelian passage, Kierkegaard emphasizes Socrates’ importance in the development of world spirit and says that the goal is “to become conscious of the idea that is the meaning of his existence in the world, of the phase in the development of world spirit that is symbolically indicated by the singularity of his existence in history.”100 Kierkegaard reminds the reader that the task now is not to view Socrates in his concrete historical context as before but rather to grasp his meaning for world history in thought or, as Hegel would say, according to the Concept: “He [sc. Socrates] is not, because he is not the object of immediate apprehension. . . . He is, because of thought he is, which corresponds to the emergence of the Idea in the world of mind – but, please note, the Idea in its abstract form, its infinite negativity. Thus, the form of his 96 98

99 100

CI, pp.198–218; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 244–262. 97 CI, p. 200; SKS, vol. 1, p. 245. E.g., CI, p. 200; SKS, vol. 1, p. 246: “Precisely because it is a turning point in history, Hegel talks about it again and again; sometimes his task is to describe it, and sometimes he uses it as an example. Therefore, everyone who has read anything at all of Hegel must be familiar with his views on this, and I shall not vex people by repeating what no one can say so well as Hegel himself.” Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, “The Sophists,” pp. 352–384; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 5–42. “The Philosophy of the Socratics,” pp. 448–487; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 122–169. CI, pp. 198; SKS, vol. 1, p. 244.

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existence in history is not a perfectly adequate pictorial indication of his significance for spirit.”101 As seen previously, Kierkegaard seems to have an ambiguous position on this point, making a plea for an understanding sometimes in terms of the Concept and sometimes in terms of the particular empirical phenomenon itself. Here he clearly comes down on the side of Hegel, claiming that the various empirical facts about Socrates’ life are not sufficient for a philosophical-historical analysis of his importance; instead, one must investigate his conceptual meaning for history. Kierkegaard begins by trying to understand Socrates in relation to the Sophists. Again Hegel is referred to at the start as the authority on the issue.102 The Sophists are characterized as wanting to teach to the young a “universal culture”103 that would prepare them to participate fully in civic life. They introduced a kind of reflection that called tradition and law into doubt only to return again and put them back into place: “In its first form, this education shakes the foundations of everything, but in its second form it enables every pupil of integrity to make everything firm and fast again. . . . In Sophistry, reflection is awakened; it shakes the foundations of everything, and it is then that Sophistry lulls it to sleep again with reasons.”104 The Sophist gives arguments and reasons for every cause, and thus a stability is reestablished in the face of the original skepticism. Thus, something positive replaces the original negation. Kierkegaard is critical of Hegel’s understanding of the Sophists as wholly negative. He quotes at length the beginning of the account of the Sophists in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy in order to analyze and criticize it.105 Kierkegaard’s point seems to be that the Sophistic movement is portrayed by Hegel as something wholly negative (i.e., wholly skeptical), without any positive aspect. Kierkegaard writes by way of commentary: It seems, however, that Hegel makes the Sophistic movement too grandiose, and therefore the distrust one may have about the correctness of his view is strengthened even more by the presence, in his subsequent discussion of Sophistry, of various points that cannot be harmonized with it; likewise, if this were the correct interpretation of Sophistry, there is much in his conception of Socrates that would make it necessary to identify Socrates with them.106 101 102 103 105

106

CI, p. 198; SKS, vol. 1, p. 244. Translation slightly modified. CI, p. 201fn.; SKS, vol. 1, p. 247fn.: “Here again Hegel has provided excellent expositions.” 104 CI, p. 205; SKS, vol. 1, p. 250. CI, p. 203; SKS, vol. 1, p. 248. CI, pp. 206–207; SKS, vol. 1, p. 251. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 352; Jub., vol. 18, p. 5: “This firm ground – whether it be a security of natural being or the security of definite conceptions, principles, customs and laws – becomes vacillation and loses its stability. . . . We see this movement arising in the so-called Sophists.” CI, p. 207; SKS, vol. 1, p. 251.

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Kierkegaard, using Hegelian language, has already claimed that Socrates introduced into the world the principle of “finite subjectivity.”107 Given that Socrates is characterized as subjectivity, it is important for Kierkegaard to contrast him to the Sophists who also are often represented as champions of subjectivism. According to Kierkegaard, the Sophists and Socrates cannot be distinguished in Hegel’s account.108 Contrary to Hegel, Kierkegaard argues that the Sophists were not wholly negative. Rather, they tried to offer solutions to the skepticism they had initiated: “the Sophists’ pompous, confident parading, their matchless self-sufficiency . . . is proof enough that they thought themselves able to satisfy the demands of the times, not by shaking the foundations of everything but, after having shaken the foundations, by making it all secure again.”109 The Sophists tried to find a remedy to the disease of critical thinking, which had afflicted Greek culture, and thus they “considered themselves to be physicians to the age.”110 For Kierkegaard, evidence for the positive aspect of the Sophists is also provided by the very nature of their rhetorical abilities. In public speaking, the orator always makes a particular case (i.e., something in particular is always argued for, and this is ipso facto something positive). Thus, for Kierkegaard the Sophists were in the final analysis always positive. Given this interpretation of the Sophists, Kierkegaard is able to distinguish them from Socrates whom he sees as wholly negative. He contrasts the view of Socrates with that of Protagoras as portrayed in Plato’s dialogue of the same name: “Protagoras’ thesis that virtue can be taught is certainly positive; it contains a high degree of confidence in existence and in the Sophistic art. On the other hand, the Socratic thesis that virtue cannot be taught is negative.”111 Contrary to the Sophists, Socrates’ role in world history is purely negative, and his goal is to overcome this principle of positivity: “But irony is the very incitement of subjectivity, and in Socrates irony is truly a world-historical passion. In Socrates, one process ends and with him a new one begins.”112 Thus, Socrates’ use of irony plays an important role in the development of Greek history. It is in this sense “that irony has a world-historical validity.”113 This irony initiated the transformation of the Greek world and shook it out of its traditional way of life forever. This use of irony was, according to Kierkegaard, wholly absent among the Sophists. Now that he has analyzed the figure of Socrates in relation to what preceded him (i.e., the Sophists), Kierkegaard begins the second part 107 108 109 111 113

CI, p. 201; SKS, vol. 1, p. 246. See Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 385–387; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 43–45, where Hegel does in fact distinguish them. 110 CI, p. 208; SKS, vol. 1, p. 252. CI, p. 207; SKS, vol. 1, p. 251. 112 CI, p. 211; SKS, vol. 1, p. 256. CI, p. 208; SKS, vol. 1, p. 253. CI, p. 211; SKS, vol. 1, p. 255.

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of the analysis and turns to an account of what came after him, namely, the Megaric, Cyrenaic, and Cynic schools inspired by him.114 This once again follows exactly Hegel’s account of the subject-matter in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. As before, Kierkegaard here begins his analysis by addressing Hegel’s view of the issue: “Hegel . . . notes that Socrates had been reproached for the derivation of so many diverse philosophies from his teaching; he replies that this was on account of the indefiniteness and abstraction of his principle.”115 However, for Kierkegaard, the fact that so many later philosophies trace their origins back to Socrates is not a result of the abstractness of his philosophy and thus a ground for criticism but rather evidence that Socrates’ position was purely negative: if the Socratic position had included the limitation that every intermediate positivity must necessarily have, then it most certainly to all eternity would have been impossible that so many descendents could try to claim their right of primogeniture. If, however, his position was infinite negativity, then it is easily explained, since this contains within itself the possibility of everything, the possibility of the whole infinity of subjectivity.116

According to Kierkegaard, it would make sense that Socrates’ philosophy was interpreted in so many different ways if it were, as he claims, without positive content since then later schools could read whatever they wanted into his position and claim him as their heir. This would presumably not have been possible, had Socrates espoused a clear, fixed positive position that would, by virtue of its positivity, have stood in contradiction to other positive views and thus have made it impossible for those views to claim it as a forerunner. Kierkegaard acknowledges that for Hegel as well the diversity of the Socratic schools is the result of the essential negativity of Socrates’ teaching: “In discussing the three Socratic schools (Megaric, Cyrenaic, and Cynic), Hegel notes that all three schools are very different from one another and adds that this alone clearly shows that Socrates had no positive system.”117 Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel on this point but insists that his comments here must be supplemented: “Not only did he have no positive system, but he was devoid of positivity. . . . It does not suffice to say that from the heterogeneity of the Socratic schools the conclusion may be drawn that Socrates had no positive system; but it must be added that by its pressure the infinite negativity made all positivity possible, 114

115

116

CI, p. 214; SKS, vol. 1, p. 259: “We now proceed to show in Socrates the other side of the bifrontic character implicit in every historical beginning: we must look at his relation to the development that traces its beginning back to him.” CI, p. 215; SKS, vol. 1, p. 260. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 449; Jub., vol. 18, p. 125: “The most varied schools and principles proceeded from this doctrine of Socrates, and this was made a reproach against him, but it was really due to the indefiniteness and abstraction of his principle.” 117 CI, p. 216; SKS, vol. 1, p. 260. CI, p. 215; SKS, vol. 1, p.260.

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has been an infinite incitement and stimulation for positivity.”118 For Kierkegaard, Socrates had no positive element at all. Socrates’ negativity was important for stimulating subsequent schools to move into a position of positivity, and thus his position contained “within itself a multiplicity of beginnings.”119 This then concludes Kierkegaard’s account. Hegel is omnipresent in this chapter. Kierkegaard cites him at length and closely follows his analyses from the Lectures on the History of Philosophy; the accounts Hegel gives of the Sophistic movement, of Socrates and of the later Socratic schools are repeated and generally approved of. Hegel’s account of world history and of Socrates as a world-historical figure are also adopted. Only with respect to the questions of the positivity of the Sophists and the infinite negativity of Socrates does Kierkegaard venture what he perceives as slight modifications of Hegel’s position, arguing that there is no positive aspect in Socrates at all. In any case, Hegel’s influence here in this section seems to be unquestionable.

vi. hegel’s account of socrates as the founder of morality The next section to be explored is “Hegel’s View of Socrates,”120 an appendix at the end of Part One in which Kierkegaard once again discusses Hegel explicitly.121 At this point he has completed his account of Socrates, and now his goal is to situate his understanding of Socrates in the context of other interpretations. This appendix thus represents, so to speak, Kierkegaard’s treatment of the literature on the topic of his thesis. But he tells his readers at the start that he has no intention of giving a survey of the various historical interpretations of Socrates. For him, there is only one theory worthy of mention, namely, Hegel’s: “Hegel clearly provides a turning point in the view of Socrates. Therefore, I shall begin with Hegel and end with Hegel, without giving attention to his predecessors, since they, insofar as they have any significance, have been corroborated by his view, or to his successors, since they have only relative value in comparison with Hegel.”122 Kierkegaard is so taken by Hegel’s analysis that he does not bother to examine other interpretations. He praises Hegel overtly, in particular lauding his grasp of history.123 In this appendix, Kierkegaard approvingly cites long passages from Hegel’s analysis of Socrates in the 118 120 121 122 123

119 CI, p. 217; SKS, vol. 1, p. 261. CI, p. 216; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 260–261. CI, pp. 219–237; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 263–278. See Sophia Scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten, op. cit., pp. 131–134. CI, pp. 220–221; SKS, vol. 1, p. 264. CI, p. 221; SKS, vol. 1, p. 264: “Just as his presentation of the historical usually cannot be charged with wasting time on wrangling about minutiae, so it focuses with prodigious intellectual intensity upon specific, crucial, central battles. Hegel apprehends and comprehends history in its large formations.”

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Lectures on the History of Philosophy and speaks of Hegel in a generally deferential tone. At the beginning he takes up his criticism of Hegel’s methodology where he left off in the discussion examined previously;124 since I have treated this issue previously,125 I will not repeat it again here. After levelling this criticism, Kierkegaard goes on to analyze Hegel’s account of Socrates in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, and this forms the main subject-matter of the appendix. Here Kierkegaard announces that he will concentrate his energies on a single aspect of Hegel’s interpretation of Socrates, which, to his way of thinking, captures the very heart of Hegel’s position. This is the question that Kierkegaard uses as the title of a subsection here, namely, “In What Sense Is Socrates the Founder of Morality?”126 According to Hegel, the revolution in thought effected by Socrates is that the universal good is something that must be recognized by the individual.127 With this revolution the terms of morality are shifted from the outer sphere to the inner. Formerly, moral laws had been considered to be a part of the fabric of the universe independent of the views of any specific individuals. As Antigone says of the laws of the gods, “They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting,/Though where they came from, none of us can tell.”128 Contrary to this conception of natural law, Socrates claims the conscience of the individual has jurisdiction in moral matters. In this sense Socrates is the founder of a new conception of morality that is still alive today. Kierkegaard underscores Hegel’s claim that Socrates’ teaching had no positive content but instead was essentially negative. The Socratic dialectic or λεγχoς finds the contradictions in any given argument but is not able to construct an edifice itself, and for this reason many Platonic dialogues end in πoρα. This negative aspect essentially frees one from the commands of traditional morality and leaves it to the individual to decide what is right.129 “In the old Greek culture,” Kierkegaard explains, “the individual was by no means free in this sense but was confined in the 124 126 127

128 129

125 In Section IV in this chapter. CI, pp. 166–167; SKS, vol. 1, p. 215. CI, p. 225; SKS, vol. 1, p. 269. CI, p. 226; SKS, vol. 1, p. 269. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 386; Jub., vol. 18, p. 44: “Socrates’ principle is that man has to find from himself both the end of his actions and the end of the world, and must attain to truth through himself.” Hegel, PhS, p. 261; Jub., vol. 2, p. 333. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 386; Jub., vol. 18, p. 45. In this context, Kierkegaard appropriately alludes to the “Morality” section of the Philosophy of Right. CI, pp. 227–228; SKS, vol. 1, p. 270: “In his Philosophie des Rechts he [sc. Hegel] discusses morality before proceeding to ethics. And under morality he discusses in the section ‘Good and Conscience’ the moral forms of evil, hypocrisy, probabilism, Jesuitism, the appeal to conscience, irony. Here the moral individual is the negatively free individual. He is free because he is not bound by another, but he is negatively free precisely because he is not limited in another. When the individual by being in his other is in his own, then for the first time he is in truth (i.e. positively) free, affirmatively free. Therefore, moral freedom is arbitrariness; it is the possibility of good and evil.” See Hegel, PR, §§ 129–140, esp. § 140, Remark; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 204–223.

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substantial ethic; he had not as yet taken himself out of, separated himself from, this immediate relationship, still did not know himself. Socrates brought this about . . . he brought the individual to this by universalizing subjectivity, and to that extent he is the founder of morality.”130 The conscience was universalized and then came to take the place of the universal, natural law or traditional morality. With Socrates the individual became for the first time the vessel in which moral judgment occurred. The abstracting of conscience to moral judgments ultimately ignores the actual empirical individual who is filled with inclinations and irrational impulses. For this charge, Kierkegaard cites Hegel’s approving reference to Aristotle’s famous criticism: Socrates “places all the virtues in judgment (cognition). Hence it comes to pass that he does away with the irrational-feeling part of the soul, that is, inclination and habit.”131 Virtue and morality according to Socrates’ conception thus become so abstract as to depart from the sphere of actuality. For moral action to take place at all, there must be not merely an abstract moral law but also a determinate empirical moral agent to act on it. There must be two aspects of morality: “the universal and the actualizing individuality, the real spirit.”132 Socrates has in a sense destroyed morality by insisting on the former at the expense of the latter. This view forgets that in order for a moral action to take place, it must be performed by an agent in the sensible world with passions and irrational inclinations. According to Hegel’s criticism, Socrates’ position, by its insistence on the purity of abstract moral judgment, effectively eliminates the possibility of actual moral acts in the empirical world. From this analysis, says Kierkegaard, one can see that there was for Hegel a positive content, albeit an abstract one, in Socrates’ teaching. The individual conscience must provide a positive content from within itself. It must manifest the universal moral law. As has just been seen, this is, according to Hegel, precisely the defect in Socrates’ moral view. Since by nature the universal moral law is abstract, it cannot be determined concretely in the realm of action. Kierkegaard quotes Hegel again: “but the main point with Socrates is his knowledge for the first time reached this abstraction. The good is . . . the universal. . . . It is a principle, concrete within itself, which, however, is not yet manifested in its concrete development, and in this abstract attitude we find what is wanting in the Socratic standpoint, from which nothing that is affirmative can, beyond this, be adduced.”133 Ultimately, the universal good that Socrates preaches is indeterminate since it remains in the abstract realm of thought and is 130 131 132 133

CI, p. 228; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 270–271. CI, p. 229; SKS, vol. 1, p. 271. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 412; Jub., vol. 18, p. 77. CI, p. 230; SKS, vol. 1, p. 272. CI, p. 232; SKS, vol. 1, p. 274. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 406–407; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 70–71. Translation slightly modified.

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foreign to the sphere of actuality, the empirical realm of determinate content.134 It appears that the universal has no positive content, and thus “Socrates had advanced the universal only as the negative.”135 Since the universal has no fixed content, the action of the moral individual reduces to arbitrariness. The individual is left to act according to whim: “Here the subject shows itself to be the deciding factor, as that which arbitrarily determines itself within itself. But the limiting of the universal that takes place thereby is one that the subject himself arbitrarily posits at every moment.”136 In the absence of any determinate principle upon which to act, the moral agent has recourse only to his own arbitrary will. Kierkegaard, by way of conclusion, returns to the theme of irony in order to make clear that the results of Hegel’s discussion are in harmony with his thesis about irony. He claims that from Hegel’s analysis of Socrates as the founder of morality, one can rightly attribute to Socrates irony in moral matters. “If we wish,” Kierkegaard writes, “to include the qualification of irony, which Hegel so frequently stresses, that for irony nothing is a matter of earnestness, then this can also be claimed for the negatively free subject, because even the virtues he practices are not done with earnestness.”137 Since the moral individual has only an abstract moral law as his principle, a law that is indeterminate in the realm of actuality, he cannot be serious about his actual actions being moral. This leads to what Hegel calls “dissemblance” and “duplicity.”138 In other words, the individual cannot really be serious about acting in accordance with a moral law since, according to this view, his actions, while purporting to be noble and virtuous, are always necessarily tainted by irrational desires. Thus, the individual in principle cannot act morally in the mundane sphere where he is forever a slave to irrational passions in the absence of any genuine moral content. This analysis is consistent with Kierkegaard’s thesis about irony since the ironic individual is likewise not serious about his or her actions. Kierkegaard is thus happy to find in Hegel an authority that supports his view. At the end of his analysis, Kierkegaard criticizes the static or finished view of Socrates as presented by Hegel’s speculative philosophy. For Kierkegaard, one must essentially understand Socrates and his life not as a static entity but as a process. “The real difficulty with Hegel’s view of Socrates,” he claims, “is centered in the continual attempt to show how Socrates interpreted the good, and what is even more wrong in the 134

135 137 138

CI, p. 234; SKS, vol. 1, p. 275. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 417–418; Jub., vol. 18, p. 83: “The positive, which Socrates sets in the place of what was fixed and has now become vacillating, in order to give a context to the universal, is . . . obedience to law. . . . it remains in its content undetermined.” 136 CI, p. 234; SKS, vol. 1, p. 275. CI, p. 233; SKS, vol. 1, p. 275. CI, p. 235; SKS, vol. 1, p. 276. See Hegel, PhS, pp. 374–383; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 471–484.

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view, as I see it, is that it does not accurately adhere to the direction of the trend in Socrates’ life. The movement in Socrates is toward arriving at the good. His significance in the world development is to arrive there (not to have arrived there at some time).”139 Socrates plays the role in the worldhistorical process as the founder of morality, as someone who reached a new conception of the good, and this is the picture of him that the system presents. But this is distorting since Socrates in his own life was always in the process of moving toward the good with each new discussion and new interlocutor. “Now,” Kierkegaard writes, “this does not mean that he arrived there almost toward the end of his life, but that his life was a continual arriving at the good and having others arrive at it.”140 Kierkegaard emphasizes Socrates’ role as a teacher who helped individuals move from the realm of actuality to that of abstract morality. He thus did not stop once he reached abstract morality himself; instead, he returned again and again to help others to reach it. “But in order to be able to hold him fast at this point, in order never to forget that the content of his life was to make this movement at every moment,” Kierkegaard claims, “we must recollect his significance as a divine missionary. Although Socrates himself places much weight on his divine mission, Hegel has ignored this.”141 This completes Kierkegaard’s account of Hegel’s interpretation. The missionary aspect of Socrates’ work is indicative of the fact that it was begun anew with each new discussion. The criticism seems to be that Hegel ignores this by seeing the life of Socrates, as it were, backwards from a world-historical perspective, which tends to reify both the person of Socrates and his activity. Aside from the final point of criticism, Kierkegaard’s view of Hegel in this section is quite positive. Indeed, at the beginning of his discussion he indicates that his view amounts to a mere modification of Hegel’s.142 In his criticism, Kierkegaard notes the one aspect of Hegel’s analysis that he does not agree with, but up until that point they have traversed a lot of ground together. Moreover, Kierkegaard seems to acknowledge that these attempts to distance his view from Hegel’s position are ultimately unsuccessful since they are in many ways question-begging: he indicates that his procedure is different from Hegel’s but that Hegel’s might well

139 140 141

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CI, p. 235; SKS, vol. 1, p. 276. CI, p. 235; SKS, vol. 1, p. 276. Translation slightly modified. CI, p. 236; SKS, vol. 1, p. 277. A variant of this criticism appears later in the Postscript, where Socrates is used as the exemplar of the subjective thinker who is always in the process of becoming in contrast to the speculative philosopher who is pure being. See CUP1, p. 92f.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 91f. CI, p. 225; SKS, vol. 1, p. 268: “However, when I consider the Hegelian account in its totality and consider it in relation to the modification I have advanced, I believe that it all can best be dealt with under one rubric: In what sense is Socrates the founder of morality?” (My italics.)

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still be the true and correct one for scholarship and science.143 In the previous discussions Hegel played a positive role, and Kierkegaard drew from his analyses frequently in his own account of Socrates. Here Hegel’s own analysis is made the subject-matter of discussion in its own right, and Kierkegaard’s view is on the whole no less positive.

vii. hegel’s account of irony and the ironic subject Kierkegaard announces at the beginning of Part Two that he will take leave of his historical account of Socrates and embark upon an analysis of the concept of irony itself.144 Of particular interest here is the chapter, “The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the Irony of Socrates,” in which he again draws heavily on Hegel.145 Here Socratic irony is contrasted with the irony employed by the Romantics. In his Introduction to Part Two, after briefly touching on the contributions to the understanding of the concept made by Friedrich von Schlegel, Tieck, Solger, and Jean Paul, he declares that it is Hegel’s work on the issue which he finds the most impressive,146 saying, “Finally, here irony also met its master in Hegel.”147 Kierkegaard’s overall assessment seems to be that Hegel’s understanding of the concept of irony is insightful, if somewhat incomplete.148 He explains: At the point in all his systems where we could expect to find a development of irony, we find it referred to. Although, if it all were copied, we would have to concede that what is said about irony is in one sense not so inconsiderable, in another sense it is not much, since he says just about the same thing on every point. . . . Yet I am far from being able to lament justifiably over Hegel as Hegel laments over his predecessors. There are excellent 143 144

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CI, pp. 166–167; SKS, vol. 1, p. 215. (Cited in footnote 83.) For an excellent treatment of this section see Ernst Behler, “Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Romanticism,” in Kierkegaard Revisited, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Jon Stewart (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 1), Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 1997, pp. 13–33. CI, pp. 259–271; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 297–308. In this section Kierkegaard refers primarily to Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 397–406; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 58–70. See CI, p. 244; SKS, vol. 1, p. 284. Kierkegaard here indicates the nature of Hegel’s importance on this issue with relation to his predecessors: “While the Schlegels and Tieck had their major importance in the polemic with which they destroyed a previous development, and while precisely for this reason their position became somewhat scattered, because it was not a principal battle they won but a multitude of skirmishes, Hegel, on the other hand, has absolute importance by defeating with his positive total view the polemic prudery.” CI, p. 242; SKS, vol. 1, p. 282. In this context he alludes to the treatment of irony in Hegel’s review of Solger and in the Lectures on Aesthetics (CI, p. 244; SKS, vol. 1, p. 284). See also CI, pp. 261–262; SKS, vol. 1, p. 299: “In my opinion, the significance of this formation has not received sufficient attention hitherto – all the more strange, since Hegel has treated the negative with such decided partiality. But the negative in the system corresponds to irony in the historical actuality. In the historical actuality the negative exists, which is never the case in the system.”

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observations especially in his review of Solger’s posthumous writings . . . even if the presentation and characterization of negative positions . . . are not always as exhaustive, as rich in content, as we could wish.149

While Kierkegaard applauds Hegel’s criticism of the Schlegels, he claims that it nonetheless led him to a one-sided reading.150 Kierkegaard claims that Hegel’s polemic against the Schlegels, the German champions of irony, clouded his view of the concept. Kierkegaard begins his analysis here with an account of the historical process in Hegelian terms.151 According to this view, history moves by virtue of contradictory concepts in the world-views of historical peoples at any given time: “a contradiction appears, by means of which the world process takes place. The given actuality at a certain time is the actuality valid for the generation and the individuals in that generation, and yet, if there is a reluctance to say that the process is over, this actuality must be displaced by another actuality.”152 When a concept [Begriff ] is no longer viable and its contradictions become apparent, it must be replaced by another. In this way history passes through different forms during the course of time. But the past, however contradictory it may be, is never wholly discarded: “Here we see how intrinsically consistent the world process is, for as the more true actuality presses onward, it nevertheless itself esteems the past; it is not a revolution but an evolution.”153 The historical process is not one of pure negation or of a replacement change of one period with another; rather, it is an Aufhebung that preserves each historical period whose time has expired and raises it up into a new form. Kierkegaard goes on to interpret the world-historical individual, a concept borrowed from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History, as the ironic subject. According to Kierkegaard, the ironic subject is one who stands in a negative relation to the entire actuality of his time and plays a role in the march of world history: Inasmuch as the new [sc. age] must forge ahead, here we meet the prophetic individual who spies the new in the distance, in dim and undefined contours. The prophetic individual does not possess the future – he has only a presentiment of it. . . . He battles for the new and strives to 149 150

151 153

CI, p. 244; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 283–284. See CI, p. 265; SKS, vol. 1, p. 303: “But the fact that Hegel became irritated with the form of irony closest to him naturally impaired his interpretation of the concept. . . . In no way does this mean that Hegel was not right about the Schlegels and that the Schlegelian irony was not on a very dubious wrong road. All that it says is that Hegel has surely conferred a great benefit through the earnestness with which he takes a stand against any isolation, an earnestness that makes it possible to read much that he has written with much invigoration and considerable edification. But on the other hand, it must be said that by his one-sided attack on the post-Fichtean irony he has overlooked the truth of irony, and by his identifying all irony with this, he has done irony an injustice.” 152 CI, p. 260; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 297–298. CI, p. 259; SKS, vol. 1, p. 297. CI, p. 260; SKS, vol. 1, p. 298.

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destroy what for him is a vanishing actuality, but his task is still not so much to destroy as to advance the new and thereby destroy the past indirectly. But the old must be superseded; the old must be perceived in all its imperfection. Here we meet the ironic subject. For the ironic subject, the given actuality has lost its validity entirely.154

The ironic subject is thus one who helps instigate changes in history by bringing to the fore the contradictions present in the world-view of his age. This is how Kierkegaard understands the figure of Socrates. He summarizes his previous account of Socratic irony by saying: “the whole of existence has become alien to the ironic subject and the ironic subject in turn alien to existence, [and] as actuality has lost its validity for the ironic subject, he himself has to a certain degree become unactual.”155 The ironic individual is out of sync with his world-historical period. The ironic stance is an expression of this, for it represents a general negation of everything in a given age. This is the meaning of Kierkegaard’s characterization of irony “as the infinite absolute negativity.”156 Given this stance, the ironic subject in a sense stands aloof and does not interfere, allowing the internal contradiction within the world-view to work itself out. Like Hegel, Kierkegaard emphasizes the internal negation of the concept that irony effects. He cites Hegel to support his claim that the ironic subject can destroy the principle of the world-historical period in which he lives by finding its contradiction and allowing it to dissolve itself immanently instead of importing a criticism from outside.157 Kierkegaard once again refers to Socrates and places his irony in the historical context: For him, the whole given actuality had entirely lost its validity; he had become alien to the actuality of the whole substantial world. This is one side of irony, but on the other hand he used irony as he destroyed Greek culture. His conduct toward it was at all times ironic; he was ignorant and knew nothing but was continually seeking information from others; yet as he let the existing go on existing, it foundered.158

This is, for Hegel, “the universal irony of the world.”159 Socrates’ ironic stance allowed the contradictions in traditional Greek morality to become 154 156

157

158 159

155 CI, p. 259; SKS, vol. 1, p. 297. CI, pp. 260–261; SKS, vol. 1, p. 298. CI, p. 261; SKS, vol. 1, p. 299. See CI, p. 261; SKS, vol. 1, p. 299: “It is negativity because it only negates; it is infinite, because it does not negate this or that phenomenon; it is absolute, because that by virtue of which it negates is a higher something that still is not.” The ironic subject is infinite since he negates everything and not just some particular thing. See Lee M. Capel, “Historical Introduction,” in his translation of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony, London: Collins 1966, p. 32. CI, pp. 262–263; SKS, vol. 1, p. 300: “Precisely because every particular historical actuality is continually but an element in the actualization of the Idea, it carries within itself the seeds of its own downfall.” After citing Hegel, Kierkegaard writes: “and in this the world of irony is very accurately interpreted”(CI, p. 262; SKS, vol. 1, p. 300). CI, p. 264; SKS, vol. 1, p. 302. CI, p. 262; SKS, vol. 1, p. 300. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 400; Jub., vol. 18, p. 62.

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apparent without actively evoking them. Socrates merely asked questions and then observed how the proponents of traditional morality fell into confusion and contradiction in their attempts to answer them. Thus, the seed for the destruction of Greek ethical life was planted and, once planted, required no further cultivation on the part of Socrates.160 Kierkegaard then associates irony with subjectivity. The worldhistorical individual must be self-consciously aware of his negative assessment of the actual and his own negative stance toward it: “But if irony is a qualification of subjectivity, then it must manifest itself the first time subjectivity makes its appearance in world history. Irony is, namely, the first and most abstract qualification of subjectivity. This points to the historical turning point where subjectivity made its appearance for the first time, and with this we have come to Socrates.”161 This is, of course, precisely Hegel’s claim (i.e., that Socrates represents the principle of subjectivity or subjective freedom in contrast to traditional morality). Thus concludes Kierkegaard’s own, highly Hegelian view of the historical Socrates, which he now, somewhat paradoxically, contrasts with that of Hegel.162 He cites Hegel who claims that Socratic irony consisted in making the abstract concrete. This, of course, refers to the Socratic method of crossexamination, which seeks individual examples that are meant to illustrate some general point. Hegel says, If I say I know what reason is, what belief is, these are only but quite abstract ideas; it is necessary, in order to become concrete, that they should be explained, and that it should be understood that what they really are, is unknown. The irony of Socrates has this great quality of showing how to make abstract ideas concrete and effect their development, for on that alone depends the bringing of the Concept into consciousness.163

Hegel, as a critic of static, abstract ideas, lauds Socrates for his attempt to make them concrete and develop them in a dialectical fashion. By claiming not to know or to understand anything, Socrates obliged his interlocutors to try to explain their views more precisely. This invariably involved trying to illustrate general rules or definitions, which the interlocutors thought were clear, with concrete examples. Socrates then went to work showing the contradictions involved in the individual examples given and how they did not fit the general definition. Kierkegaard’s criticism

160

161 162

163

It will be recalled (Chapter 2, Section IV, B) that Hegel’s doctrine of the immanent or internal negation of the Concept was singled out for praise in From the Papers of One Still Living. CI, p. 264; SKS, vol. 1, p. 302. CI, pp. 264–265; SKS, vol. 1, p. 302: “Since Hegel declares himself against viewing Socrates’ position as irony, it becomes necessary to look at the objections found here and there in his books.” CI, p. 267; SKS, vol. 1, p. 304. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, p. 400; Jub., vol. 18, p. 62. Translation slightly modified.

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is aimed at this point in Hegel’s interpretation. “But this confuses everything,” Kierkegaard complains, “the description of Socratic irony completely loses its historical weight. . . . Socrates’ understanding was by no means one of making the abstract concrete, and the examples cited are certainly very poorly chosen.”164 Kierkegaard objects since this would seem to attribute to Socrates some positivity, namely, the concrete.165 It would seem to imply that Socrates already knows ahead of time some idea made concrete, which is the goal of his discussion. Here as before the purported criticism seems to be best characterized as a modification based on a larger context of shared views and not as a complete or utter rejection of Hegel’s analysis, given how much of Hegel’s analysis he has used and incorporated into his discussion. Kierkegaard finally comes to answer the question raised by this chapter. He claims that Socrates (unlike the Romantics) is “world-historically justified”166 in his use of irony insofar as he, qua world-historical individual, brought traditional Greek morality to an end and thus caused history to move beyond this stage of immediacy. Here Kierkegaard does not add anything new to what he has already discussed regarding the general role of Socrates as a world-historical individual in the development of Greek culture. Like the other discussions, this one follows Hegel’s analysis very closely. For all of his criticisms of Hegel here, Kierkegaard seems to admit that in the final analysis there is not much disagreement. He is careful to point out once again that his conclusions are consistent with Hegel’s.167

viii. hegel’s criticism of romantic irony While the chapters from The Concept of Irony analyzed up until now have proven to be largely modelled on Hegel’s account of Socrates in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the long chapter from Part Two, entitled “Irony after Fichte,”168 is, I wish to argue, modelled on Hegel’s brief account of irony in his Lectures on Aesthetics.169 Kierkegaard continues his discussion of the previous chapter, now examining different instantiations of Romantic irony, treating specifically the leading authors of the German Romantic movement: Friedrich von Schlegel, Ludwig Tieck, and 164 165

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CI, p. 267; SKS, vol. 1, p. 304. CI, p. 267; SKS, vol. 1, p. 304. He claims that (1) this positivity may be a fair characterization of Plato but not Socrates and (2) Socrates’ whole life was a movement in the opposite direction, namely, from the concrete to the abstract. CI, p. 271; SKS, vol. 1, p. 308. CI, p. 270; SKS, vol. 1, p. 307: “I believe, therefore, that everyone will agree with me that there is nothing in these Hegelian observations to preclude the assumption that Socrates’ position was irony.” CI, pp. 272–323; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 308–352. Hegel, Aesthetics I, pp. 64–69; Jub., vol. 12, pp. 100–106.

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Solger. I wish to argue in this section that Kierkegaard’s criticism of these Romantics is largely borrowed from Hegel170 and that his account of their respective positions can be seen as an expansion on that presented by Hegel. The first obvious point of overlap concerns Hegel’s analysis of the origin of modern irony in the philosophy of Fichte. It was, Hegel argues, Fichte’s philosophy of the subjective ego which provided the theoretical framework for Friedrich von Schlegel’s theory of irony. Hegel writes: Fichte sets up the ego as the absolute principle of all knowing, reason, and cognition, and . . . the ego . . . remains throughout abstract and formal. Secondly, this ego is therefore in itself just simple, and, on the one hand, every particularity, every characteristic, every content is negated in it, since everything is submerged in this abstract freedom and unity, while, on the other hand, every content which is to have value for the ego is only posited and recognized by the ego itself.171

Fichte’s theory of the self-positing “I” or ego transfers to the individual subject the criteria for truth and validity. These criteria are no longer conceived as being given by the external world but instead as being posited by the subject. But this transcendental ego is purely formal (i.e., devoid of any determinate content), and for this reason the individual ego is free to supply whatever content it wishes. It is in this that Hegel sees the problem. The self-positing “I” denies the truth and validity of everything in the external world and sets itself up as the ultimate judge and arbiter of truth, but this truth has no content in itself, and a given thing is true by virtue not of anything intrinsic to the matter itself but only of the fact that it is posited by the subject. The individual subject realizes this formal structure of truth and knows that its own determinations of truth are at bottom arbitrary. It thus comes to take up an ironic attitude toward even its own judgments and creations. It knows that it can negate all customs, beliefs, ideas, and the like, at a whim, and it therefore takes none of them seriously. This subject holds beliefs only ironically and shows its superiority to others in its ability to drop them at a moment’s notice and take up others, which are equally arbitrary. This is the aspect of Fichte’s philosophy that, according to Hegel, Friedrich von Schlegel developed in his account of Romantic irony. In his chapter “Irony after Fichte,” Kierkegaard begins his account in exactly the same way, tracing Romantic irony back to Fichte. He gives a brief account of the problem of the thing-in-itself in Kant’s philosophy and Fichte’s attempt to resolve it with the theory of the self-positing 170 171

For Hegel’s criticism of the Romantics, see Otto P¨oggeler, Hegels Kritik der Romantik, Bonn: Rheinische Wilhelms-Universit¨at 1956. Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 64; Jub., vol. 12, p. 100. Translation slightly modified.

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subject. He writes: The producing “I” is the same as the produced “I.” “I = I” is the abstract identity. By so doing [Fichte] infinitely liberated thought. But this infinity of thought in Fichte is, like all Fichte’s infinity (his ethical infinity is ceaseless striving for the sake of this striving itself; his esthetic infinity is ceaseless producing for the sake of this producing itself; God’s infinity is ceaseless development for the sake of the development itself), negative infinity, an infinity in which there is no finitude, an infinity without any content.172

By eliminating the external other (i.e., the thing-in-itself), Fichte unites subject and object. Since the world is merely something posited by the subject, it has no independent existence and is thus continuous with the subject itself. In the second half of the passage quoted, Kierkegaard emphasizes the same critical point as Hegel: the lack of content in Fichte’s subject. Kierkegaard follows Hegel’s account by connecting this principle in Fichte with Romantic irony. Specifically, Schlegel and Tieck reinterpreted Fichte’s theory of the subject for their own purposes: “This Fichtean principle that subjectivity, the ‘I,’ has constitutive validity, is the sole omnipotence, was grasped by Schlegel and Tieck, and on that basis they operated in the world.”173 Schlegel and Tieck take the self-positing subject of Fichte, which was originally conceived as an atemporal epistemological presupposition (i.e., a condition for all knowing), and turn it into an actual temporal, empirical subject. Thus, in an odd twist, an epistemological principle becomes a model for actual life. The second point of overlap between the accounts of Hegel and Kierkegaard concerns the conception of the artistic life promulgated by the Romantics. In his discussion Hegel shows how this general concept of the self-creating subjective ego in Fichte is reformulated and turned into a model for life by Schlegel. This constitutes the link from the epistemological point about the self-positing “I” to aesthetics. The subject’s creation of the content of actuality is conceived as a specific kind of life, which is higher and grander than that of the common person, namely, “living artistically.” Hegel describes this as follows: the ego is a living, active individual, and its life consists in making its individuality real in its own eyes and in those of others, in expressing itself, and bringing itself into appearance. For every man, by living, tries to realize himself and does realize himself. Now in relation to beauty and art, this acquires the meaning of living as an artist and forming one’s life artistically. But on this principle, I live as an artist when all my action and my expression in general, in connection with any content whatever, remains for me a mere show and assumes a shape which is wholly in my power.174 172 174

173 CI, p. 275; SKS, vol. 1, p. 311. CI, p. 273; SKS, vol. 1, p. 309. Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 65; Jub., vol. 12, p. 101.

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Hegel criticizes this Romantic view of the artistic life, which, as it were, creates reality from itself, giving the world truth, meaning, and beauty at will and then at the next moment negating it again. This constitutes a part of the ironist’s self-conception. The self-ironic artist arrogantly regards himself as the truly enlightened one since he has seen through the hollowness of traditional customs and values: “he who has reached this standpoint of divine genius looks down from his high rank on all other men, for they are pronounced dull and limited, inasmuch as laws, morals, etc., still count for them as fixed, essential, and obligatory.”175 Kierkegaard once again follows Hegel’s analysis, discussing in detail the notion of “living poetically.”176 He describes this notion of the ironist’s artistic self-creation in much the same way as Hegel. The ironist can create himself ex nihilo by choosing to be and do anything at all; the ironist does not feel bound by traditional laws, customs, or conceptions of what is good or right or wrong. He is free to exercise “infinite poetic freedom.”177 This is demonstrated by the fact that he plays a series of radically different roles, shifting from the one to the other at will. Like Hegel, Kierkegaard notes the arrogance of the ironist, who regards with contempt others who accept customs or habits handed down to them by their culture or tradition.178 The third point of overlap concerns what Hegel in his analysis points out as the absence of character in the Romantic ironist. A result of the view of the artistic life is, for Hegel, that the ironist has no enduring identity. Since he changes his actions, views and life every day, the ironist becomes, as it were, schizophrenic. Everything is reduced to the fleeting passion of the moment. Hegel contrasts the mutable character of the Romantic ironist with the steadfast character of Cato the Younger: Irony loves this irony of loss of character, for true character implies, on the one hand, essentially worthy aims, and, on the other hand, a firm grip of such aims, so that the whole being of its individuality would be lost if the aims had to be given up and abandoned. This fixity and substantiality constitutes the keynote of character. Cato can live only as a Roman and a republican.179

While the Romantics reproach their reading public for being too shallow or ignorant to appreciate the profundity of the characters they produce, Hegel attributes the general lack of success among the Romantics to precisely the fact that the characters they portray stand for nothing and lack any clear character trait. This is the true reason, Hegel claims, that 175 176 178 179

Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 66; Jub., vol. 12, p. 102. 177 CI, p. 281; SKS, vol. 1, p. 317. CI, p. 280; SKS, vol. 1, p. 316. CI, pp. 280–281; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 316–317. Hegel, Aesthetics I, pp. 67–68; Jub., vol. 12, pp. 104–105.

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Romantic art fails to hold the attention of the public. Its characters are transitory and ultimately uninteresting. Once again Kierkegaard follows Hegel’s analysis, treating the characterless individual that the ironist becomes. He discusses character in Kantian terms as the “an sich,” contrasting the unreflective individual with the ironist. He writes: “But just as commonplace people do not have any an sich but can become anything, so also the ironist has none.”180 The contrast here is between unreflective people, who live in the immediacy of the customs and values of their culture, and the Romantic ironist. The latter have no character of their own since the character they have comes to them from without. By contrast, the Romantic has no intrinsic character but for a different reason. The Romantic ironist has no enduring identity beyond his momentary mood: “As the ironist poetically composes himself and his environment with the greatest possible poetic license, as he lives in this totally hypothetical and subjunctive way his life loses all continuity. He succumbs completely to mood. His life is nothing but moods.”181 Here Kierkegaard also refers to Hegel explicitly in approval of his criticism of Tieck on this issue.182 In his analysis of the individual thinkers – Schlegel, Tieck, and Solger – Kierkegaard also draws heavily on Hegel, even though Hegel does not go into any detailed analysis of these thinkers in the section on irony from the Lectures on Aesthetics. Of particular interest is Kierkegaard’s account of Solger. He mentions explicitly Hegel’s brief account of Solger’s irony in the section under examination,183 but, more importantly, he draws heavily on Hegel’s aforementioned book-review of the then recently published edition of Solger’s posthumous writing, edited by Ludwig Tieck and the historian, Frederik von Raumer (1781–1873).184 A specific point of overlap in this regard concerns Hegel’s criticism of Solger for not recognizing the positive aspect of the dialectical method. In the Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel criticizes Solger as a purely negative thinker who did not realize the positive aspect of the dialectic. According to Hegel, the dialectic of course passes through three distinct stages: a position is (1) posited, then (2) negated, and finally, once the conceptual unity between the position and its negation has been recognized, (3) the negation is negated in a positive moment. Hegel’s reproach of Solger is that he has only recognized the negative element but not the higher 180 182

183 184

181 CI, p. 284; SKS, vol. 1, p. 319. CI, p. 281; SKS, vol. 1, p. 317. CI, p. 285; SKS, vol. 1, p. 320: “It is especially for this that Hegel criticizes Tieck, and it is also present in his correspondence with Solger. At times he has a clear grasp of everything, at times he is seeking; at times he is a dogmatician, at times a doubter, at times Jacob B¨ohme, at times the Greeks, etc. – nothing but moods.” CI, p. 308; SKS, vol. 1, p. 340. ¨ Hegel, “Uber Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel. Herausgegeben von Ludwig Tieck und Friedrich von Raumer. Erster Band 780 S. mit Vorr. XVI S. Zweiter Band 784 S. Leipzig, 1826,” Jahrb¨ucher f¨ur wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1828, op. cit.

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positive moment. “To this negativity Solger firmly clung,” Hegel writes, “and of course it is one element in the speculative Idea, yet interpreted as this purely dialectical unrest and dissolution of both infinite and finite, only one element, and not, as Solger will have it, the whole Idea.”185 Even though the second stage (i.e., the negative stage) is an important and essential part of the dialectical movement, what makes it truly speculative is the third positive stage, which unites the previous moments and keeps them from falling apart from each other as independent entities. In this critique of Solger, Kierkegaard follows Hegel exactly. He too reproaches Solger for not recognizing the true nature of the speculative dialectic. He writes: “Throughout this whole investigation, Solger seems to have a dim notion of the negation of the negation, which in itself contains the true affirmation. But since the whole train of thought is not developed, the one negation erroneously slips into the other, and the true affirmation does not result.”186 Indeed, Kierkegaard even mentions Hegel explicitly, indicating that he is the original source of this criticism.187 Given this, there can be no doubt that this aspect of Kierkegaard’s analysis is derived straightforwardly from Hegel. Another point of overlap can be found in Hegel’s employment of the phrase “infinite absolute negativity” in his description of Romantic irony; this definition proves to be profoundly important for Kierkegaard. In his brief account of Solger’s position in the section on irony from the Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel employs this phrase to describe Solger’s irony. He writes: “In this process [Solger] came to the dialectical moment of the Idea, to the point which I call ‘infinite absolute negativity.’”188 By this Hegel means that Solger negated the philosophical Idea. He reduced the universal of the Idea to a whim of the individual, only to reconstruct it once again and then negate it yet again. In other words, Solger denied the concept of truth and beauty in general and regarded it to something subjective. The position of Solger is absolute negativity because it fails to include the third stage at which a positive moment replaces the negative one. The negative thus remains absolute as the final moment. The formulation, “infinite absolute negativity,” appears many times throughout The Concept of Irony, above all in Part Two,189 and is important for the development of Kierkegaard’s view of irony. In his account in 185 186

187 188 189

Hegel, Aesthetics I, pp. 68–69; Jub., vol. 12, p. 106. CI, p. 317; SKS, vol. 1, p. 348. See CI, p. 323; SKS, vol. 1, p. 352: “[Solger] does have the negation of the negation, but still there is a veil in front of his eyes so that he does not see the affirmation.” CI, p. 317; SKS, vol. 1, p. 348: “Hegel perceived this very clearly and therefore articulates it explicitly on page 470.” Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 68; Jub., vol. 12, p. 105. CI, p. 26; SKS, vol. 1, p. 87. CI, p. 254; SKS, vol. 1, p. 292. CI, p. 259; SKS, vol. 1, p. 297. CI, p. 261; SKS, vol. 1, p. 299. CI, p. 271; SKS, vol. 1, p. 307. CI, p. 273; SKS, vol. 1, p. 309. CI, p. 312; SKS, vol. 1, p. 343. CI, p. 323; SKS, vol. 1, p. 352.

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the chapter, “Irony after Fichte,” he borrows Hegel’s phrase to describe Romantic irony. There it comes up many times, for example, in his description of the origin of Romantic irony in Fichte: “In Fichte, thought was infinitized, subjectivity became the infinite, absolute negativity, the infinite tension and urge.”190 He employs this same expression in his analysis of Solger. In the chapter “The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the Irony of Socrates,” Kierkegaard explains this expression as follows: “Here, then, we have irony as the infinite absolute negativity. It is negativity, because it only negates; it is infinite, because it does not negate this or that phenomenon; it is absolute, because that by virtue of which it negates is a higher something that still is not.”191 The main point seems to be that Romantic irony is infinite in the sense that it indiscriminately negates everything, whereas Socratic irony or controlled irony is finite, being directed only at specific finite things. Finally, Kierkegaard makes no attempt to hide his debt to Hegel in this chapter. He refers to him directly on several occasions to indicate that he is freely using Hegel’s analysis or that he is in agreement with Hegel’s results. For example, he recalls the discussion from the chapter “The World-Historical Validity of Irony, the Irony of Socrates,” indicating his agreement with Hegel’s criticism of Romantic irony in contrast with Socratic irony. Unlike Socratic irony, which was directed at specific beliefs or institutions that Socrates found to be internally contradictory, Romantic irony is all-encompassing. It negates not select things for a specific reason but rather everything generally. Thus, it serves no higher purpose than to glorify the subject employing it. For this reason Kierkegaard views Socrates’ use of irony as justified, when seen historically, since it was aimed at a specific goal. By contrast, the Romantics’ use of irony has no goal other than the self-indulgent pleasure of the ironist himself. Kierkegaard writes: “Now, there certainly may have been much in actuality that needed criticism. . . . there may well have been much in existence that had to be cut away precisely because it was not actuality, but it was utterly indefensible for irony to aim its criticism at all actuality for that reason.”192 On this point Kierkegaard entirely shares Hegel’s criticism of Romantic irony: “We also perceive here that this irony was totally unjustified and that Hegel’s hostile behavior toward it is entirely in order.”193 190 192 193

191 CI, p. 261; SKS, vol. 1, p. 299. CI, p. 273; SKS, vol. 1, p. 309. CI, p. 276; SKS, vol. 1, pp. 312–313. CI, p. 275; SKS, vol. 1, p. 311. The oddity should be noted that in much of contemporary research Kierkegaard is taken, primarily by interpreters influenced by a post-modernist approach, to hold precisely this view of all-negating irony, which he associates with Romantic irony and which clearly resembles the use of irony in post-modernism. But it is clear that this is the position that Kierkegaard, following Hegel, wishes to criticize and not the one he wishes to defend.

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Although there are more parallels and points of overlap that could be explored, I take these to be sufficient to establish the thesis that the chapter “Irony after Fichte” is modelled on Hegel’s discussion of irony in the Lectures on Aesthetics. The main features of Hegel’s brief account of Romantic irony are all mentioned by Kierkegaard here. Kierkegaard follows closely Hegel’s account of the origin of irony in Fichte, of living artistically in irony, and of the absence of an enduring character in the ironist, in a number of passages lauding Hegel explicitly. Although Hegel does not analyze the irony of Schlegel, Tieck, or Solger in any detail in this brief account of irony, he does in any case allude to all three, and more detailed discussions of each of them come elsewhere in these lectures and in other texts. Kierkegaard expands upon Hegel’s brief allusions to Schlegel, Tieck, and Solger to illustrate his account of Romantic irony and to contrast it with Socratic irony. One can still debate the degree to which Kierkegaard was influenced by Hegel’s criticism of the Romantics in this chapter, but the fact that he was influenced by him is beyond question. In Section III of the present chapter I explored the argument that the structure of Part One of the The Concept of Irony might have been intended to have a Hegelian look about it in that it follows the categories of possibility, actuality, and necessity. Now it is clear that the content of the work is more Hegelian than this structure. One can see The Concept of Irony as a sort of commentary on a part of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. When one looks at Hegel’s table of contents for the relevant section, one can map Kierkegaard’s analyses here in the dissertation onto it in a fairly straightforward manner. This can be represented as follows: Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy

Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony

A. The Sophists (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 352–384/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 5–42)

Part One: The View Made Necessary (CI, pp. 198–214/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 243–259)

B. Socrates (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 384–448/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 42–122) 1. The Socratic Method (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 397–406/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 58–70)

Part Two: The World-Historical Validity of Socrates (CI, pp. 258–271/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 297–308)

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Part Two: The World-Historical Validity of Socrates (CI, pp. 258–271/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 297–308)

b. Midwifery (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 402– 404/Jub., vol. 18, pp. 64–67)

Part Two: The World-Historical Validity of Socrates (CI, pp. 258–271/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 297–308)

c. Aporeia (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 404–406/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 67–70) 2. The Principle of the Good (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 406–425/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 70–100)

Appendix: Hegel’s View of Socrates (CI, pp. 219–237/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 263–278)

a. The Principle of Subjective Freedom (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 407–414/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 71–79)

Appendix: Hegel’s View of Socrates (CI, pp. 219–237/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 263–278)

b. The Aspects of the Universal (Hist.of Phil. I, pp. 414–421/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 79–89)

Appendix: Hegel’s View of Socrates (CI, pp. 219–237/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 263–278)

c. The Daimon (Hist.of Phil. I, pp. 421–425/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 89–100)

The Daimon of Socrates (CI, pp. 157–167/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 207–215)

3. The Fate of Socrates (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 425–448/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 100–122)

The Condemnation of Socrates (CI, pp. 167–197/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 215–245)

a. The Charges (Hist.of Phil. I, pp. 431– 440/Jub., vol. 18, pp. 103–113) α. Socrates Introduced New Gods (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 432– 435/Jub., vol. 18, pp. 103–107)

1. Socrates Does Not Accept the Gods Accepted by the State, and He Introduces New Deities (CI, pp. 168–183/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 216–230)

β. Socrates Led the Youth Astray (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 435–440/Jub., vol. 18, pp. 107–113)

2. Socrates Seduces the Youth (CI, pp. 183–197/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 231–243)

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b. The Proposal of an Alternative Penalty (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 440–445/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 113–118) c. The Aftermath (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 445– 448/Jub., vol. 18, pp. 118–122) C. The Philosophy of the Socratics (Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 448–487/ Jub., vol. 18, pp. 122–169)

Part One: The View Made Necessary (CI, pp. 214–218/ SKS, vol. 1, pp. 259–262)

1. The Megarics 2. The Cyrenaic School 3. The Cynic School

It should be noted that there are some differences in the nature of the correspondences; for example, Kierkegaard’s sections “The Daimon of Socrates” and “The Condemnation of Socrates” follow Hegel’s analyses very closely, whereas in “The World-Historical Validity of Socrates” he refers to aspects of the corresponding analysis in Hegel (e.g., Hegel’s treatment of irony and midwifery), without following Hegel’s discussion in any detail. Nonetheless, this scheme can be used as a basic guide to the importance of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy for The Concept of Irony. Given the similarities between the two texts, it seems that Kierkegaard largely structured The Concept of Irony in accordance with this part of Hegel’s lectures. In addition, as has been argued in Section VIII, Kierkegaard’s criticism of Romantic irony in the chapter “Irony after Fichte” was modelled on Hegel’s account of irony in the Lectures on Aesthetics. Thus, Kierkegaard shows his substantial debt to these two Hegelian texts. The long quotations of Hegel’s texts here also suggest that Kierkegaard is not yet wholly the master of the subject-matter. At times lengthy passages are cited with little or no explanation or discussion, and often Kierkegaard allows the quotations from Hegel’s texts to carry the analysis for him. In virtually every discussion after the first chapter, Kierkegaard draws heavily on the content of Hegel’s individual analyses and largely accepts Hegel’s views on the key issues. Indeed, Kierkegaard makes it a point at the end of each section to say that his view is consistent with Hegel’s. He accepts, for example, Hegel’s account of Socrates as a world-historical figure and as a destructive force in Greek ethical life, Hegel’s characterization of Socrates’ irony as infinitely negative and his criticism of the German Romantics. He also has a rather Hegelian conception of the movement

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and development of history. Finally, the very thesis of the work that irony is a negative concept is essentially a Hegelian notion that Kierkegaard appeals to many times for support. Not only does Kierkegaard draw heavily on the content of Hegel’s thought in The Concept of Irony, but he also in many passages makes use of clearly Hegelian language. He speaks, for example, of “world history,” of “the unfolding of the Idea,” of the “phenomenological,” of “being-inand-for-itself,” “the world historical,” and “world spirit.” Thus, as both this work and From the Papers of One Still Living attest, Hegel’s philosophical language seems to have been perceived by Kierkegaard as a legitimate tool for the expression of his ideas. This is of particular interest since, even during this early period, he is critical of philosophical jargon as is evinced by The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars. In The Concept of Irony, Hegel is used sometimes as a tool, sometimes as a commentator, and sometimes as a participant in a discussion. Hegel’s role here is much greater than in From the Papers of One Still Living, where aspects of his philosophy were alluded to briefly without any accompanying discussion. By contrast, in The Concept of Irony there is no longer any doubt that Kierkegaard has read and studied carefully many of Hegel’s primary texts. They are quoted and analyzed in detail in a fashion that is unique in Kierkegaard’s authorship. Neither before nor after this work are Hegel’s primary texts made the object of Kierkegaard’s study to anything approaching the extent seen here. Although Hegel’s thought does not set the agenda for the study as a whole, he is clearly the most important interlocutor who at times comes to dominate the discussion. Sometimes Kierkegaard cites him, seeking support for some view in his authority, or makes use of his analyses as a focal point for some discussion. By virtue of the vast number of references to Hegel that run throughout The Concept of Irony, there can be no doubt that Hegel plays an important role in this text. Even the ironic thesis implicitly admits this since, by arguing that Kierkegaard is playing the role of a Hegelian in this work, authors like Thulstrup acknowledge that there are indeed Hegelian elements present. Thus, the question becomes one of the nature of that role. As has been seen, one interpretation of Hegel’s large role in The Concept of Irony is the thesis that the use of Hegel here is ironic. But, as I have tried to demonstrate, this reading is implausible for a number of reasons. (1) It was not consonant with Kierkegaard’s own self-understanding of The Concept of Irony as is testified by the references to it in his journals. (2) It does not square with the tone of the text itself where one at times finds criticisms of Hegel. The tone is not that of a naive devotee of Hegel, which one would expect in a parody or satire. (3) The ironic reading does not make sense on its own terms since the faculty at the University of Copenhagen was at the time of Kierkegaard’s dissertation no more

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dominated by Hegelians than the bourgeois social order was, and thus there was no one for Kierkegaard to dupe by pretending to be a Hegelian. The ironic reading of The Concept of Irony makes the mistake of transferring Kierkegaard’s later polemical stance onto this early text, thus confusing different periods of his intellectual development. To put the matter differently, the Hegel of The Concept of Irony is not the same as the Hegel of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In the former, Hegel is hardly portrayed as an enemy. These distinctions are lost on interpreters who tend to take the criticism of the Postscript to be the paradigm for Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. Like Thulstrup, they thus believe that Kierkegaard and Hegel have nothing in common based on what they think they know of the later works. Then when they go back and see the numerous references to Hegel in The Concept of Irony, they are obliged to make a decision. One can, as I have, simply say that Kierkegaard changed his views about Hegel as his own thought developed. Or one might insist, as the ironic thesis does, that there is only one static Kierkegaard with a single position and viewpoint with respect to Hegel. If one chooses to follow this course, one is compelled to invent some sort of ad hoc story about The Concept of Irony to minimize the importance of the undeniable Hegelian elements found there. But, as has been argued, the story that the ironic reading tells is wholly arbitrary and lacking any historical basis. Thus, it seems much more plausible simply to admit that Kierkegaard was captivated by certain aspects of Hegel’s thought during his student years as the statements by Sibbern and Brøchner attest.194 This is conceivable given the fact that Hegel’s philosophy was very much in the air at the time and that a number of Copenhagen’s leading intellectuals, many of whom were Kierkegaard’s friends and associates, also had a period of infatuation with Hegelianism before they came to reject it. Thus, there is nothing strange or extraordinary about thinking that Kierkegaard too had a period of this kind, during which he was interested in and indeed found convincing some aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, and The Concept of Irony itself provides ample testimony that this is precisely what happened. 194

Treated in Section II in this chapter.

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4 HEGEL’S AUFHEBUNG AND KIERKEGAARD’S EITHER/OR

After his dissertation, the next work that Kierkegaard wrote was Either/Or, which appeared in two volumes under the name of the pseudonymous editor Victor Eremita in 1843 (i.e., two years after The Concept of Irony). It is the work that in Kierkegaard’s own mind marks the beginning of his actual authorship.1 Either/Or was apparently begun during his stay in Berlin (from late October 1841 to early March 1842) and then completed during the months immediately following his return to Denmark.2 Kierkegaard ultimately finished the book in November of 1842,3 and it was published in February of the following year. The subject-matter of the work overlaps in some respects with that of The Concept of Irony, but the way in which it is treated differs radically. Perhaps the most obvious points of contact can be found in the chapter on tragedy. Likewise, “The Seducer’s Diary” has been thought to represent the ironic stance of Romantic individualism, as embodied by Friedrich von Schlegel’s Lucinde, which is of course discussed in some detail in The Concept of Irony.4 Some see the entire account of the esthete in Part One as corresponding to the irony of the Romantics. Likewise the section entitled, “Rotation of Crops,” seems to be a portrayal of Romantic nihilism, which is criticized in The Concept of Irony. Aside from these points, much of the content of Either/Or departs from that of the dissertation. 1 2

3 4

PV, p. 10; SV1, vol. 13, p. 521. In a letter from Berlin he cites the desire to complete the work as one of his reasons for wanting to return to Copenhagen: “It is absolutely imperative that I return to Copenhagen this spring. For either I shall finish Either/Or by spring, or I shall never finish it”(LD, 68; B&A I, p. 107). In a later letter he writes in the same vein, “I am coming to Copenhagen to complete Either/Or. It is my favorite idea, and in it I exist. . . . As soon as I have finished Either/Or, I shall fly away again like a happy bird. . . . but first I must finish Either/Or and that I can only do in Copenhagen” (LD, 69; B&A I, p. 108). See Jette Knudsen and Johnny Kondrup, “Tekstredegørelse” to Enten-Eller in SKS, vol. K2–3, especially pp. 38–58. See JP, vol. 5, 5568; Pap. III B 189. See George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Crisis of Faith, Melksham, Wiltshire: The Cromwell Press 1997, pp. 38–39, p. 76.

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Moreover, the tone of the two works is quite different. While the latter clearly has the look of an academic treatise, the former is much more literary. In contrast to Either/Or, the dissertation contains numerous quotations from the ancient Greek authors and contemporary commentators. While Kierkegaard is careful to give evidence and weigh arguments in The Concept of Irony, there are few scholarly trappings of this kind in Either/Or. Not surprisingly, Hegel’s role in Either/Or is also different from that in The Concept of Irony. There are few direct references to Hegel, and one does not find the lengthy quotations or textual analyses that were present in the dissertation. However, one point of continuity between the two texts is a complete absence of anti-Hegel polemics which is so prevalent in later works. Given that there are few references to Hegel and no polemics against him, the casual reader might be led to the conclusion that Hegel is entirely absent from Either/Or. But Hegel does play an important role in this text despite the relatively small number of direct references. In this chapter, I would like to argue first that Either/Or was conceived primarily as a response to a debate, which was taking place in Denmark at the time, about Hegel’s doctrine of mediation or, more specifically, his criticism of the law of excluded middle. Second I will try to demonstrate that this text employs a kind of Hegelian dialectical development in some of its analyses. Thus, I will claim that, like The Concept of Irony, this work is profoundly influenced by Hegel. Some of the Hegelian elements in Either/Or, particularly in Part Two, have been noted by the secondary literature. For example, Høffding has noted the similarities between Judge Wilhelm’s interpretation of love and marriage in the first chapter, “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage,” and Hegel’s account of immediacy and mediation.5 Likewise, it has been noted that the long chapter, “The Balance Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical,” contains dialectical movements akin to Hegel’s thought as well as the deeply Hegelian discussion of universality and particularity.6 In addition, Taylor has sketched a loose comparison of Either/Or and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.7 Despite this preponderance of literature that argues for a positive Hegelian influence in Either/Or, Thulstrup’s dissenting voice has carried the most weight. True to his thesis, Thulstrup argues that this text has nothing in common with Hegel and that when Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors here discuss some aspect of Hegel’s 5

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Harald Høffding, Søren Kierkegaard som Filosof, Copenhagen and Kristiania: Gydendalske Boghandel 1892, pp. 92ff. See also his “Søren Kierkegaard,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, p. 158. Knud Hansen, Søren Kierkegaard. Ideens Digter, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1954, pp. 82ff. Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: University of California Press 1980, pp. 228–262.

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philosophy, then it is only in order to criticize it.8 I wish to argue that once again this view is erroneous and, as has been indicated, that there are a number of profoundly Hegelian aspects in the work. I would like to examine in some detail a handful of passages in which there seems to be a clear Hegelian influence. First, I would like to explore the origin of the expression “either/or” in the contemporary debates about Hegel’s logic. In Section II, I will then analyze a key discussion in the second chapter of Part Two in which Judge Wilhelm treats the issue of mediation specifically and distinguishes the sphere of freedom from that of abstract thought and Hegel’s speculative philosophy.9 In the third section I would like to explore a discussion in the “Insignificant Introduction” from the second chapter of Part One,10 where the esthete discusses the criteria for judging a great work of art. His criticism of onesided, nonspeculative criteria recalls Hegel’s discussion in the Lectures on Aesthetics. Next I will compare the interpretations of Sophocles’ Antigone that are given by Hegel and Kierkegaard and that constitute a part of the subject-matter of the chapter “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic of Modern Drama” in volume 1 of Either/Or.11 Finally, in Section V, I will return to Part Two in order to explore the discussion in the first chapter in which Judge Wilhelm portrays marriage as the ethical Aufhebung of immediate, Romantic love.12 I wish to demonstrate that a Hegelian three-step dialectical movement is present here as well. My main thesis in this chapter is that Either/Or is of a piece with the works that preceded it insofar as it too is positively influenced by Hegel. As in those other works, while this influence is by no means naive or wholly uncritical, Kierkegaard has no qualms with availing himself of various aspects of Hegel’s thought.

i. the title “either/or” and its origin An understanding of the meaning and origin of the title of the work itself is crucial for an appreciation of Hegel’s role in it. Kierkegaard tells us that the title “Either/Or” [Enten-Eller] is intended to call to mind speculative philosophy. In a letter from Berlin he writes: “‘Either/Or’ is indeed an excellent title. It is piquant and at the same time also has a speculative 8

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Thulstrup summarizes his view with respect to Part Two of the work by saying, “on every point that was important to him, Judge Wilhelm has directly criticized, not just corrected Hegel. It becomes abundantly clear that as thinkers they are totally divergent in points of departure, methods and conclusions.” Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980. p. 333. EO2, pp. 170–176; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 166–172. EO1, pp. 47–59; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 55–66. Specifically, EO2, pp. 153–164; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 152–162. EO2, pp. 17–32 and ff.; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 26–38 and ff.

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meaning.”13 Under the pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, he says the same thing in his review of Either/Or in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript: “Either/Or, the title of which is in itself indicative, has the existencerelation between the aesthetic and the ethical materialize into existence in the existing individuality. This to me is the book’s indirect polemic against speculative thought which is indifferent to existence.”14 What precisely does Kierkegaard mean by this? In this initial section I wish to address this question by tracing the title “Either/Or” to the ongoing debate about Hegel’s logic in Denmark. This is the key, I wish to argue, for understanding what is referred to as “the book’s indirect polemic against speculative thought.” In the work, two positions, which represent fundamentally opposing views, are presented. They seem to resist all mediation and require of the reader an absolute choice. The expression, “either/or,” is intended to indicate that the one view or the other must be adopted but not both. The title thus reflects the dichotomy presented by the two parts of the work. Victor Eremita confirms this in the preface: “A’s papers contain a multiplicity of approaches to an aesthetic view of life. . . . B’s papers contain an ethical view of life. As I allowed my soul to be influenced by this thought, it became clear to me that I could let it guide me in determining the title. The title I have chosen expresses precisely this.”15 Moreover, the two views stand in a static opposition, and the dichotomy is never resolved: “these papers come to no conclusion.”16 Thus, it is clear that the expression “either/or” is intended to represent the opposition of the views of the esthete and Judge Wilhelm. This conception of the work as a juxtaposition of two contradictory positions seems to be inspired at least in part by Hegel’s criticism of the law of excluded middle and of traditional Aristotelian logic generally since in that criticism Hegel uses the formulation “either/or” frequently as an abbreviated form of the law of excluded middle. This influence becomes clear when one examines how this expression was used at the time in the Danish discussions about Hegel’s logic. By tracing the formulation “either/or” back to Hegel, I do not mean to suggest that he is the only possible source but rather that he was one of the most important ones for Kierkegaard and the contemporary works he was reacting to. Hegel uses the expression “either/or” several times to denote the kind of one-sided thinking that fails to grasp the dialectical interconnection of 13 14 16

JP, vol. 5, 5551; LD, 68; B&A I, p. 107. 15 EO1, p. 13; SKS, vol. 2, p. 21. CUP1, p. 252; SKS, vol. 7, p. 229. EO1, p. 14; SKS, vol. 2, p. 21. See EO1, p. 14; SKS, vol. 2, p. 21: “When the book is read, A and B are forgotten; only the points of view confront each other and expect no final decision in the particular personalities.” See CUP1, p. 252; SKS, vol. 7, p. 229: “That there is no conclusion and no final decision is an indirect expression for truth as inwardness and in this way perhaps a polemic against truth as knowledge.”

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things and instead insists on viewing issues as simple dichotomies such as freedom and necessity, finitude and infinity, individual and state, human and divine, and so on.17 For Hegel, speculative philosophy presupposes that knowing involves a network of interrelated beliefs. Thus, it must examine not just individual ideas but rather the totality of beliefs and concepts that constitute a belief system. Speculative philosophy treats the whole and examines individual beliefs in their relation to that whole. In the following passage from the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel uses the expression “either/or” to refer to what he calls “dogmatism,” which, in contrast to speculative philosophy, isolates concepts and abstracts them from their organic unity: But in the narrower sense dogmatism consists in adhering to one-sided determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their opposites. This is just the strict “either-or,” according to which (for instance) the world is either finite or infinite, but not both. On the contrary, what is genuine and speculative is precisely what does not have any such one-sided determination in it and is therefore not exhausted by it; on the contrary, being a totality, it contains the determinations that dogmatism holds to be fixed and true in a state of separation from one another united within itself.18

Dogmatism sees truth on the one side or the other of individual disjunctive pairs, whereas speculative philosophy overcomes these immediate contradictions and sees them as compatible by viewing such pairs from a different, more abstract perspective.19

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Hegel was certainly not the first to use this expression. Indeed, it has traditionally been a common way of referring to disjunctions in classical logic. For example, Kant writes: “In logic the ‘either-or’ always denotes a disjunctive judgment; for if one member is true, the other must be false. For instance, a body is either moved or not moved, i.e., at rest; for one speaks there simply of the relation of the cognition to the object.” Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, tr. by James W. Ellington, in Philosophy of Material Nature, Indianapolis: Hackett 1985, p. 126fn. Hegel, EL, § 32, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 106. See also EL, p. 8fn.; Jub., vol. 8, p. 13: “One would always do better not to talk about philosophy at all as long as, in spite of one’s depth of feeling, one is still so deeply entangled in the one-sidedness of the understanding that one knows nothing better than the either-or.” EL, § 80, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 189: “But again it is usually said also that the understanding must not go too far. This contains the valid point that the understanding cannot have the last word. On the contrary it is finite, and, more precisely, it is such that when it is pushed to an extreme it overturns into its opposite. It is the way of youth to toss about in abstractions, whereas the man of experience does not get caught up in the abstract either-or, but holds onto the concrete.” EL, § 65; Jub., vol. 8, p. 171: “This standpoint is not content when it has shown that mediate knowing, taken in isolation, is inadequate for the [cognition of ] truth; its particularity is that immediate knowing can only have the truth as its content when it is taken in isolation, to the exclusion of mediation. – Exclusions of this kind betray that this standpoint is a relapse into the metaphysical understanding, with its either-or.” See also Jub., vol. 1, p. 410. See Hegel, EL, § 82; Jub., vol. 8, p. 195: “The speculative or positively rational apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their

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Hegel refers once again to the “either/or” in his discussion of the law of excluded middle, one of the three fundamental laws of traditional logic. The first is the law of contradiction, according to which nothing can be both P and not-P (i.e., contradictory predicates cannot be attributed to the same thing at the same time). The second, which can be seen as the inverse of the first, is the law of the excluded middle term, which states that everything must be either P or not-P.20 According to this law, between contradictory judgments there can be no third, intermediate “middle” term: a thing is either P or not-P, but it must be one of the two. In his discussion of the law of excluded middle in the Encyclopaedia, Hegel refers once again to the “either/or”: Instead of speaking in accordance with the law of excluded middle (which is a law of the abstract understanding), it would be better to say, “Everything stands in opposition.” There is in fact nothing, either in heaven or on earth, either in the spiritual or the natural world, that exhibits the abstract “either-or” as it is maintained by the understanding. Everything that exists at all is concrete and hence is inwardly distinguished and selfopposed.21

According to common sense there is an either/or, but when philosophical reflection enters the scene it demonstrates that there are no such absolute opposites. A thing is an opposite only in relation to its other, to which it is an opposite. For Hegel, the contradiction between P and not-P is incoherent since not-P is indeterminate; it is merely the abstract negation of the first term. By contrast, he tries to redefine contradiction in terms of opposites or contraries such as north and south. Such opposing pairs do not have an independent existence but are, he claims, identical at the conceptual level. The point here for the moment is simply to note that the formulation “either/or” appears in Hegel in the context of the discussion of the law of excluded middle. In a final passage, Hegel employs the expression “either/or” in connection with a discussion of one of his best known philosophical terms, “Aufhebung,” or in its verbal form, “aufheben.”22 The German verb, “aufheben,” has two or three contradictory meanings and cannot be rendered adequately in English. Common translations are the rather stilted terms “to sublate” or “to supersede.” In the following passage, Hegel

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dissolution and in their transition.” See also Hegel, SL, p. 56; Jub., vol. 4, p. 54: “It is in this dialectic as it is here understood, that is, in the grasping of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative, that speculative thought consists.” The final law of thought is of course the law of identity, according to which if anything is P, then it is P, or, put differently, everything is identical to itself. Hegel, EL, § 119, Addition 2; Jub., vol. 8, p. 280. Translation slightly modified. (My italics.) See B. C. Birchall, “Hegel’s Notion of Aufheben,” Inquiry, 24, 1981, pp. 75–103.

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explains that the overcoming of opposites in speculative philosophy is implied in the variety of meanings of this German word: we should remember the double meaning of the German expression “aufheben.” On the one hand, we understand it to mean “clear away” or “cancel” and in that sense we say that a law or regulation is cancelled [aufgehoben]. But the word also means “to preserve,” and we say in this sense that something is well taken care of [wohl aufgehoben]. This ambiguity in linguistic usage, through which the same word has a negative and a positive meaning, cannot be regarded as an accident nor yet as a reason to reproach language as if it were a source of confusion. We ought rather to recognize here the speculative spirit of our language, which transcends the “either-or” of mere understanding.23

According to nonspeculative thinking, when one is presented with a dichotomy, one must choose one side and negate or cancel the other. This is the thinking designated by the formulation, “either/or.” But for speculative philosophy, such contradictions are not merely negated but also preserved as they become reformulated at a higher level. Thus, more sophisticated concepts contain within themselves seemingly contradictory elements that have been mediated or rendered consistent. Given this account, Hegel’s term of art, “Aufhebung,” can be regarded as the opposite of what might be called Kierkegaard’s principle of the “either/or.” This aspect of Hegel’s doctrine of contradiction was taken up in the discussion of Hegelianism in Denmark during Kierkegaard’s time.24 In 1838 Sibbern treated extensively Hegel’s doctrine of contradiction in a section of his long review of Heiberg’s Perseus.25 In this article, he makes a case for classical logic against Hegel’s speculative logic. In his discussion

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Hegel, EL, § 96, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 229. (My italics.) See CUP1, p. 222f.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 202f. For the whole discussion, see V. Kuhr, Modsigelsens Grundsætning, Copenhagen and Kristiania: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1915. Anton Hugli, ¨ “The Principle of Contradiction,” in Concepts and Alternatives in Kierkegaard, ed. by Marie Mikulov´a Thulstrup (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 3), Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Boghandel 1980, pp. 272–280. Skat Arildsen, “Striden om de logiske Principer og om Rationalismens og Supranaturalismens Begreb,” Chapter 8 in his Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag 1932, pp. 142–150. O. Waage, “Strid om de logiske Principer og om Rationalismens of Supranaturalismens Begreb,” in his J. P. Mynster og de philosophiske Bevægelser paa hans Tid i Danmark, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 1867, pp. 123–152. Henning Høirup, Grundtvigs Syn paa Tro og Erkendelse. Modsigelsens Grundsætning som Teologisk Aksiom hos Grundtvig, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1949, pp. 73–75, pp. 85–89. Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Om den Maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske Skole, med mere, som henhører til de logiske Grundbetragtninger,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article II, pp. 424–460, especially pp. 424– 433. Frederik Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid, Copenhagen 1838, pp. 79–115, especially pp. 79–88. ASKB 778.

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of the law of excluded middle, Sibbern employs several times the Latin formulation of the “either/or,” “aut/aut”:26 Like the law of contradiction, it [sc. principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria] stands against flux since it basically aims at explaining that everything is determinable, that everything must be something definitely determinate and that therefore an aut/aut is generally valid. Certainly one might frequently observe, that a middle link can force its way in between the aut/aut, which seems to posit only two contradictoria, that is two things, of which the one is thought to be necessarily opposed to the other. . . . I call the proposition “the law of determination,” and it states that every question ultimately reduces to a yes or a no or to something decided.27

This passage makes clear the contrast between the Hegelian view and the view expressed by the “aut/aut.” For Hegel, a third term can always be introduced between contradictory pairs, whereas according to the “aut/aut” and the law of excluded middle, every determinate thing stands in a dichotomy which cannot be mediated. In 1839 following Sibbern’s article, there was an extended debate about this point in Hegel’s speculative logic in the journal, Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik. In that year Mynster published his article, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism,” in which he discussed, among other things, the law of excluded middle in Hegel’s philosophy. The immediate occasion for Mynster’s piece was a review of Martensen’s dissertation. The author of the review, Johan Alfred Bornemann, a Hegelian student of theology and law, claimed that the opposition between rationalism and supernaturalism had been rendered obsolete by Hegel’s speculative logic, which mediates or sublates such contradictory pairs.28 In his article Mynster responded, arguing that the laws of classical logic were still true and that between rationalism and supernaturalism no mediation was possible. He too uses the formulation “aut/aut” in his discussion:29 We also find this law [sc. principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria] treated with apparent disapproval in Hegel’s Logic. . . . We note simply that when he explains the law in the sense in which it is usually understood . . . he uses examples which make it clear that, for him, the law itself is 26

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Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Om den Maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske Skole,” op. cit., p. 432; Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 87. See also Sibbern’s “Hegel i Forhold til vor Tid,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article I, p. 313; Sibbern Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 31. Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Om den Maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske Skole,” op. cit., pp. 431–432; Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., pp. 86–87. Johan Alfred Bornemann, “Af Martensen: de autonomia conscientiae. Sui humanae,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 3ff. Jakob Peter Mynster, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, p. 267. (Reprinted in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen 1852–57, vol. 2, p. 114.)

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laughable.30 . . . When we here say the following: “the revelation which Christianity rests on is either supernatural or is not supernatural,” then it is presumably clear straightaway that all mediation is impossible here and that all such attempts can only lead to a partial grounding, a teetering and an oscillating back and forth between rationalistic supernaturalism and supernatural rationalism, as one has seen so often. . . . Aut, aut; one can mediate between opposites but not between contradictions. Every basic scientific theory must decide for the one or the other of the mutually contradictory opposing views.31

Mynster thus joins forces with Sibbern in condemning speculative logic. He insists on the aut/aut between rationalism and supernaturalism, which allows of no mediation by some middle term. It was with this article that the debate proper can be said to have begun. Mynster’s article was perceived as a provocation against Hegelian philosophy. In the next number of the journal, the Hegelians – Heiberg and Martensen – responded to the attack with a defense of Hegel. In both articles, the law of excluded middle is the central object of investigation, and the formulation “either/or” is frequently employed. In his article Heiberg writes: One can claim there that between right and left, front and back, up and down, north and south, there is no medium (namely, no intermediate direction), just as little as between hot and cold or the opposites in electricity and magnetism; furthermore, that one must either be at home or be out, that one must either be silent or speak, and in general, that one must either be inside or outside of a certain limit in everything. The more trivial the examples one chooses, the less the criticism against their aut/aut can do.32

Here Heiberg clearly associates the expression, “aut/aut,” with the view of absolute opposites, which allow no mediation; indeed, he seems to take it as a synonym for the law of excluded middle. By employing the personal pronoun “their,” he associates this view with the Hegel critics, Sibbern and Mynster. In his response to Mynster, Martensen likewise uses the expression “aut/aut,” and its Danish equivalent “enten-eller” several times. He characterizes Mynster’s position as an either/or (i.e., an absolute choice

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Mynster cites Hegel here: “When the determinations sweet, green, square are taken – and all predicates are meant to be taken – and then it is said that spirit is either sweet or not sweet, green or not green, and so on, this is a triviality leading nowhere.” (Hegel, SL, p. 438; Jub., vol. 4, p. 544.) Jakob Peter Mynster, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme,” op. cit., pp. 265–267; Blandede Skrivter, vol. 2, pp. 113–114. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “En logisk Bemærkning i Anledning af H. H. Hr. Biskop Dr. Mynsters Afhandling om Rationalisme og Supranaturalisme i forrige Hefte af dette Tidsskrift,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, p. 444. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 2, p. 173.)

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between rationalism and supernaturalism).33 He writes: “But can one stop with the opposition between pantheism and theism, with the aut/aut? Is it not precisely the task of our time to sublate this unhappy aut/aut, in which Jacobi’s noble, truth-loving soul was ensnared and from which he thought that there was no deliverance.”34 Martensen, arguing in line with Hegel’s philosophy of religion, tries to demonstrate that the very nature of Christianity implies a speculative way of thinking that stands in contrast to an absolute either/or: “The central point of Christianity – the doctrine of the incarnation, the doctrine of the God-man – shows precisely that Christian metaphysics cannot remain in an either/or [Enten Eller], but that it must find the truth in a third which that law [sc. the law of excluded middle] rules out.”35 Moreover, Martensen tries to demonstrate the Aufhebung of rationalism and supernaturalism directly. In a final dramatic passage, he translates the expression, “aut/aut,” once again into the vernacular and uses the Danish formulation, “enten-eller,” that one recognizes from Kierkegaard’s title: If theology does not want to be without result, it likewise may not be presuppositionless, just as little ab exteriori as ab interiori, and especially not concerning the historical revelation when the opposition between rationalism and supernaturalism now comes forth as the opposition between idea and fact; it can then be designated “either” idea “or” fact, but also here thought will mediate or will not find rest until it discovers the invisible copula which connects the fact with the idea.36

Here Martensen brings the point to a head with this turn of phrase to which Kierkegaard was attentive. One can imagine that it was this article in particular that provoked Kierkegaard given his animosity for Martensen. This was not the end of the debate. In 1842, Mynster issued a rejoinder to Heiberg and Martensen.37 In this second article Mynster again employs the Latin form of the expression a couple of times. In one passage he writes: “However much my honored opponents and I agree with respect to much which is important and essential, a difference is still present with respect to which the principium exclusi medii asserts itself. We could

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Hans Lassen Martensen, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii i Anledning af H. H. Biskop Mynsters Afhandling herom i dette Tidsskrifts forrige Hefte,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 456–457. 35 Ibid., p. 458. Ibid., p. 467. Ibid., p. 473. Jakob Peter Mynster, “De principio logico exclusi medii inter contradictoria non negligendo commentatio, qua ad audiendam orationem . . . invitat. Jo. Fr. Herbart. Gottingae 1833. 29 S. 80- , De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio. Scripsit I. H. Fichte. Bonnae 1840. 31 S. 80- ,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, vol. 7, 1842, pp. 325–352.(Reprinted as “Om de logiske Principer,” in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 116–144.)

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not on both sides be right: aut/aut.”38 In another passage, after offering a criticism of Martensen’s dissertation, he writes in the same vein: “Aut/aut; there is no third.”39 As can be seen from both of these passages, Mynster tends to use this formulation as a slogan for his thesis that the law of excluded middle is still valid. What is important in all this is the fact that the expression “either/or” was not something that Kierkegaard himself invented but rather a slogan or catchword in the discussion about the law of excluded middle in Hegel’s philosophy that was taking place in Denmark. It is clear that Kierkegaard followed this discussion and that he applauded Sibbern’s and Mynster’s efforts.40 Thus, his employment of this expression in the title of his work was full of significance both for himself and for the contemporary reader. The first appearance of the formulation “either/or” in Kierkegaard’s writings comes in The Concept of Irony where it appears twice in its Latin form, “aut/aut.”41 The Latin formulation also shows up several times years later in the Postscript.42 There Kierkegaard contrasts the principle of the either/or directly with Hegel’s speculative logic: “As is well known, Hegelian philosophy has cancelled the law of contradiction, and Hegel himself has more than once emphatically held judgment day on the kind of thinkers who remained in the sphere of understanding and reflection and who have therefore insisted that there is an either/or.”43 There is evidence in the text of Either/Or itself that Kierkegaard intends this formulation to refer to the contemporary discussion with the Danish Hegelians about contradiction and the law of excluded middle.44 38 39 40

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Ibid., p. 343; Blandede Skrivter, vol. 2, p. 135. Ibid., p. 346; Blandede Skrivter, vol. 2, p. 138. In summer 1839 in his journals, he uses virtually the same formulation as Mynster: “All relative contrasts can be mediated; we do not really need Hegel for this, inasmuch as the ancients point out that they can be distinguished. Personality will for all eternity protest against the idea that absolute contrasts can be mediated (and this protest is incommensurable with the assertion of mediation); for all eternity it will repeat its immortal dilemma: to be or not to be – that is the question (Hamlet).” JP, vol. 2, 1578; SKS, vol. 18, p. 34f., EE:93. CI, p. 81; SKS, vol. 1, p. 139: “On the front of the stage, then is Socrates – not as someone who rashly brushes away the thought of death and clings anxiously to life, not as someone who eagerly goes toward death and magnanimously sacrifices his life; not as someone who takes delight in the alteration of light and shadow found in the syllogistic aut/aut when it almost simultaneously manifests broad daylight and pitch darkness, manifests the infinitely real and the infinitely nothing.” CI, pp. 82–83; SKS, vol. 1, p. 140: “At the end of the Apology, however, an attempt is made to show that to die is a good. But this observation is once again an aut/aut, and since the view that death is nothing whatever emerges in conjunction with the one aut, the extent to which one can share the joy that encircles both these continents like the ocean becomes somewhat doubtful.” CUP1, pp. 304–307; SKS, vol. 7, pp. 277–279. See also TA, pp. 66–67; SV1, vol. 8, p. 63. CUP1, p. 304f.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 277. Translation slightly modified. See V. Kuhr, Modsigelsens Grundsætning, op. cit., p. 9: “it is in actuality also this formulation of an either/or . . . which Kierkegaard is thinking of with the law of contradiction. . . .

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In the “Diapsalmata,” the esthete reflects on the meaning of the expression “either/or.” He begins by listing a number of disjunctive possibilities, “Marry, and you will regret it. Do not marry, and you will also regret it. Marry or do not marry, you will regret it either way.”45 He then makes the bold claim that in all these disjuncts we find “the quintessence of all the wisdom of life.”46 The esthete continues, “It is not merely in isolated moments that I, as Spinoza says, view everything aeterno modo, but I am continually aeterno modo. Many believe they, too, are this when after doing one thing or another they unite or mediate these opposites. But this is a misunderstanding, for the true eternity does not lie behind either/or but before it.”47 The esthete claims that there is no eternity in going beyond the contradiction to something higher as Hegel tries to do, but rather the true eternity is found in the need to choose between the static opposition. It is clear from this discussion that the formulation, “either/or,” is intended to represent a position in explicit contrast to Hegel’s speculative philosophy. This formulation is also discussed in the same context by Judge Wilhelm in Part Two.48 The esthete distinguishes himself from Hegelian philosophy by his indifference to the dichotomy presented by life. It does not matter if he does one thing or the other. There is a point of commonality since both the esthete and the Hegelian reject the either/or, but they do so for different reasons. On the one hand, the esthete rejects it with his nihilism – he is simply indifferent to all choices; on the other hand, the Hegelian eliminates choices by mediation. Thus, the esthete rejects the either/or ahead of time by his general disposition, whereas the Hegelian rejects it after the fact by mediating the dichotomy. Although it may seem that the “either/or” is for Kierkegaard only a moral concept,49 in drafts from the work that survive in his journals, he explicitly associates the expression with logic and the law of contradiction: What matters most to me about the whole of Either/Or is that it become really evident that the metaphysical meaning that underlies it all leads everything everywhere to the dilemma. The same also underlies the little philosophical essay: tautology as the highest law of thought, namely, if the

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And in Either/Or Kierkegaard in his book has set up and conceives actually only two (contradictory) possibilities, the stage of the esthete and that of the ethicist, between which one must make a choice.” EO1, p. 38; SKS, vol. 2, p. 47. See also EO2, pp. 158–159; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 156–157. There can be little doubt here that Kierkegaard’s biography plays a large role both in this example and in the content of Either/Or as a whole. This work was written immediately after his dissolution of the engagement with Regine Olsen, which was certainly a part of what caused him to go to Germany. 47 EO1, p. 39; SKS, vol. 2, p. 48. EO1, p. 39; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 47–48. See EO2, pp. 157–178, esp. p. 170; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 155–174, esp. p. 166. For the relation between the logical and the ethical implications of this concept, see, V. Kuhr, Modsigelsens Grundsætning, op. cit., p. 11.

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law of contradiction is true (and it is expressed by either/or), it is . . . the scientific expression for it, and it is the only unity into which it can be taken up and by which the system becomes possible.50

Here Kierkegaard underscores the logical principle of contradiction in a way continuous with the previous discussion of the issue by Sibbern and Mynster. In a draft from the esthete’s papers, the Hegelians’ view of contradiction is again rejected: “Therefore, I have not like some philosophers cancelled the law of contradiction by going beyond.”51 Anyone who had been following the discussion at the time would doubtless have understood Kierkegaard’s title in connection with it. The title would have been perceived as a clear declaration of allegiance to the critics of Hegel’s doctrine of mediation. This is confirmed by Kierkegaard’s own assessment. In the passage cited earlier from the Postscript, his pseudonymous author, in reference to the title of Either/Or, alludes to “the book’s indirect polemic against speculative thought.”52 This polemic is also evidenced by Heiberg’s reference to it in his review of Either/Or where he writes: “But what does the title of the book mean? The second volume is absolute, here there can be no question of an either/ or, and the book, far from refuting the proposition that the law of contradiction is sublated (p. 176), is on the contrary a proof more for its correctness.”53 Since, as modern commentators have also noticed, Kierkegaard seems clearly to weight the argument in favor of Judge Wilhelm’s position and not that of the esthete, the text loses its ostensibly dialectical balance. The two positions are by no means recommended to the reader on an equal footing. Thus, Heiberg sees the book as a failed attempt to refute the Hegelian Aufhebung of the law of contradiction and excluded middle since ultimately the esthete’s position is sublated by that of the judge. Kierkegaard, like Sibbern and Mynster before him, in effect rehabilitates the either/or, which Hegel had claimed was the trademark of dogmatism. By using this title, Kierkegaard is ironically playing on a known Hegelian hobbyhorse. It is ultimately unimportant whether or not Kierkegaard was familiar with the passages from, for example, Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic, in which the formulation “either/or” was employed. Whatever his knowledge of Hegel’s primary texts might have been, there can be no doubt but that he knew this expression in the context of the discussion surrounding the law of excluded middle that was taking place between the Danish Hegelians and their critics. With the work Either/Or, 50 51 52 53

EO1, Supplement, p. 526; Pap. III B 177, pp. 189–190. Translation slightly modified. EO1, Supplement, p. 528; Pap. III B 179.63, p. 209. Translation slightly modified. CUP1, p. 252; SKS, vol. 7, p. 229. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Litterær Vintersæd,” Intelligensblade, vol. 2, no. 24, March 1, 1843, p. 292. ASKB U 56.

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Kierkegaard, like Sibbern and Mynster, argues that there are contradictory views that allow no mediation and no middle term; the antimony of the aesthetic and the ethical is his grand example. These constitute, for him, an absolutely contradictory pair, an unresolvable dichotomy, which enjoins an existential decision and which defies the dialectical Aufhebung. With the formulation “either/or” in the title, Kierkegaard invokes the Danish discussion about the law of excluded middle. There is thus nothing new or original in Kierkegaard’s title, rather it can be seen as an example of his appropriation of material at hand for his own purposes, in this case for the purpose of a title.

ii. the problem of the aufhebung of the law of excluded middle In the chapter “The Balance Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical” from Part Two there is an important discussion for understanding Kierkegaard’s overall relation to Hegel in Either/Or on the issue of mediation.54 There Judge Wilhelm treats the issue of contradiction, which is crucial for Hegel’s dialectical methodology. As has just been seen in the discussion of the expression “either/or,” this appears to be a crucial point of departure from Hegel’s thought insofar as the entire book seems to be based on the idea of an absolute contradiction that is intended as an explicit contrast to Hegel’s doctrine of the Aufhebung of the law of excluded middle. The passage to be explored here can be seen as the theoretical background or justification for this general view of contradiction, which is in evidence in the very structure of the work. Although there are no direct quotations, one can judge from the content of the discussion that Kierkegaard has in mind here not so much Hegel’s primary texts as the contemporary Danish debate about the issue of the law of excluded middle. I wish to argue in this section that despite what at first seems to be a polemical stance against Hegel’s principle of mediation, Judge Wilhelm ultimately sketches a position that is in harmony with Hegel. I will further claim that the criticism has little to do with logic but is rather ethical in character and that its targets are specific Danish students of Hegel’s philosophy. Before I examine the passage in question, it will be useful to say a few words about Hegel’s disputed doctrine of contradiction. Hegel’s account of the law of excluded middle draws on a longstanding discussion in the history of philosophy. Aristotle argued for the metaphysical truth of this principle, claiming that it was the most 54

EO2, pp. 170–176; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 166–172. See CUP1, pp. 189–198; SKS, vol. 7, pp. 173–181.

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important principle of being.55 According to this law, a given predicate or its negation must be attributed to a given subject, but not both (i.e., there is no third mediating term between the two). A given rose is either red or not red, but it cannot be both at the same time. Since Aristotle this has traditionally been counted as one of the fundamental laws of logic. In both the Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel discusses the law of excluded middle and argues that, upon closer examination, it collapses into an identity.56 Hegel’s argument is that contradictory pairs in fact represent a unity at the ontological level. This unity is already present in the very notion of an opposite. He uses different colors as an example: “In the doctrine of contradictory concepts, one concept is, for instance, called blue . . . the other not-blue, so that this other would not be an affirmative (like, for instance, yellow), but is just the abstractly negative that has to be held fast. – That the negative is also positive within itself is . . . already implied in the determination that that which is opposed to an other is its other.”57 Hegel’s point here is that a concept cannot be an opposite unless it is the opposite of some other determinate concept. The first concept is determined by the second insofar as it is conceived as an opposite. Thus, concepts are complementary, and any given concept, insofar as it is an opposite, stands in a necessary relation to another concept. This necessary relation between concepts can be seen as a higher identity which goes beyond the individual member terms. When seen from the abstract level, there is thus a kind of arbitrariness at work in calling one concept “positive” and the other “negative,” one concept “the one” and its opposite “the other.” Each is what it is only in its relation to the other. Hegel illustrates this with a number of examples: In the positive and the negative we think we have an absolute distinction. Both terms, however, are implicitly the same, and therefore we could call the positive “the negative” if we liked, and conversely we could call the negative “the positive” as well. Consequently, assets and debts are not two particular, independently subsisting species of assets. What is negative for the debtor is something positive for the creditor. The same applies to a road to the east: it is equally a road to the west. Thus, what is positive and what is negative are essentially conditioned by one another, and are what

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Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, Chapters 3, 4, 7. He introduces the law of excluded middle as follows: “Distinction in itself gives us the principle: ‘Everything is something essentially distinct’ – or (as it has also been expressed): ‘Of two opposed predicates, only one belongs to something,’ and ‘There is no third. . . . The principle of the excluded third is the principle of the determinate understanding which tries to avoid the contradiction and by doing so commits it.” Hegel, EL, § 119; Jub., vol. 8, p. 276. Hegel, EL, § 119; Jub., vol. 8, p. 277.

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they are only in their relation to one another. There cannot be the north pole of a magnet without the south pole nor the south pole without the north pole.58

For any two things to be opposites, they must have something in common as a criterion or basis for comparison; otherwise, they would not be opposites in the first place since, in the absence of such a criterion, it would be like comparing apples with oranges. They must be opposites with respect to some particular quality or aspect. The criterion that serves as the basis for comparison simultaneously constitutes the basis for their ontological unity. Insofar as north and south are latitudinal directions, they are ontologically identical. Opposites thus constitute an identity at the conceptual level (i.e., at the level of the Concept). Thus, Hegel’s criticism of the law of excluded middle is to say that a concept is determined both by what it is and by what it is not. For example, north is what it is (i.e., it has self-identity), but it is also determined by what it is not, namely, as the opposite of south. Thus, north is both north and not north at the same time. As indicated in the previous section, this Hegelian doctrine was a topic of discussion in Denmark when it came under attack by Sibbern and Mynster. It will be useful to examine the nature of the responses of Hegelians Heiberg and Martensen to see what strategy they employed in order to make a case for Hegel’s speculative logic. Heiberg claims that the problem at the heart of the debate lies in a misunderstanding of the scope of the law of excluded middle. He argues that the law is used correctly when applied to objects in the empirical sphere. A relation of absolute, unmediated opposites “can only take place in the finite or empirical [sc. realm]. . . . If one therefore wants to have examples for which the principium exclusi medii is employed, then one takes them from this sphere [sc. the empirical sphere].”59 According to Heiberg, the law of excluded middle applies to the empirical sphere but is not relevant in the sphere of abstract thought. When one is concerned with speculative philosophy and the Concept, then opposites are mediated or aufgehoben. Heiberg continues: “In the same fashion the principium exclusi medii is sublated everywhere, where one takes up the standpoint of the Concept and the Idea, for this standpoint’s entire activity aims at mediating opposites.”60 Heiberg gives a number of examples of issues that are best understood from the standpoint of Hegel’s speculative

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Hegel, EL, § 119, Addition 1; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 278–279. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “En logisk Bemærkning i Anledning af H. H. Hr. Biskop Dr. Mynsters Afhandling om Rationalisme og Supranaturalisme i forrige Hefte af dette Tidsskrift,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, p. 444. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 172–173.) Ibid., p. 445; Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 175.

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philosophy and where the law of excluded middle is best seen as aufgehoben: But if the principium exclusi medii were itself not excluded from the Idea, then man, as a unity of soul and body, would be impossible; the state could not be a unity of opposing forces; Christ would be exclusus as medium between God and man; no religion, art, poetry, philosophy could exist, for everywhere it would be manifest that the principium exclusi medii was the principium exclusi Dei.61

Hegel’s philosophy operates at the abstract, theoretical level of these disciplines (e.g., theology, art, and politics), and the scope of the law of excluded middle must be understood as limited to this level. Heiberg argues that Mynster, by denying Hegel’s speculative logic, simultaneously denies the possibility of the aforementioned doctrines (e.g., that Christ is a mediating agent between God and human beings). Thus, Heiberg’s strategy for resolving the conflict lies in separating two spheres – the empirical and the speculative – and limiting the scope of the validity of the law of excluded middle to the former. Although he does not bother to go into much detail to outline the two spheres, Martensen in his response to Mynster’s article essentially supports Heiberg’s solution to the problem. He discusses the role of Hegel’s Phenomenology as the road to true science. He explains that there can be oppositions at any given point along that road, but not at the level of science itself, which is reached at the end of the journey: With this way of observing the matter one will constantly note that a contradiction can already be mediated, although, among the manifold of individuals of the age, it has maintained its contradictory character. In this sense, the aut/aut can freely maintain its validity to all eternity; but this meaning is not what is at issue when science is observed in and for itself.62

Martensen, following Heiberg, thus distinguishes between two spheres, arguing that the law of excluded middle applies to the nonspeculative sphere prior to science but has no validity at the level of science proper, which is, of course, the level of Hegel’s philosophy. When one examines Judge Wilhelm’s solution to the problem of mediation in Either/Or, one finds that it strongly resembles that given by the Danish Hegelians Heiberg and Martensen. Judge Wilhelm discusses this doctrine of contradiction in Hegel and tries to indicate that his own views are in a certain sense consistent with it. He distinguishes between two spheres: on the one hand, “the sphere 61 62

Ibid., pp. 445–446; Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 175. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii i Anledning af H. H. Biskop Mynsters Afhandling herom i dette Tidsskrifts forrige Hefte,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 470–471.

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of thought,” which he clearly associates with Hegel and speculative philosophy, and on the other hand, “the sphere of freedom.”63 The sphere of freedom is “situated in the area of action, philosophy in the area of contemplation.”64 Thought is the realm of mediation, freedom, that of absolute dichotomy. Thought is the realm of necessity, freedom, that of autonomous action. Thought examines the external deed, freedom, the internal. The realm of freedom is thus designated by the expression “either/or.”65 It is immediately apparent from these characterizations that the two spheres correspond to Heiberg’s distinction between the empirical realm and the standpoint of the Concept. Judge Wilhelm argues that the sphere of thought is the sphere of mediation in which all contradictions are aufgehoben or come together in a higher unity, whereas by contrast the sphere of freedom admits no mediation, and genuine contradiction is present. For Judge Wilhelm, the sphere of freedom is oriented toward the future, whereas that of thought is oriented toward the past: “You turn toward the future, for action is essentially future tense; you say I can either do this or do that. . . . Philosophy turns toward the past, toward the totality of experienced world history; it shows how the discursive elements come together in a higher unity; it mediates and mediates.”66 On this point, Judge Wilhelm’s characterization of Hegel’s philosophy is wholly accurate. Hegel makes clear that his philosophy cannot see into the future and has no predictive power. On the contrary, philosophy must have a determinate subject-matter before it can begin to go to work. It can only analyze the events of history after they have already happened, as Hegel says in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right with his famous allusion to the Owl of Minerva.67 The dialectical

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EO2, p. 173; SKS, vol. 3, p. 169. See JC, p. 154; Pap. IV B 1, p. 136: “Would it not be an illusion to give negativity the appearance of having continuity? In the sphere of thought, is not the negative what evil is in the sphere of freedom and thus, like evil, without continuity?” See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Der Zufall, aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Logik betrachtet. Als Einleitung zu einer Theorie des Zufalls, Copenhagen 1825, p. 23. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 350.) Heiberg distinguishes between “the abstract sphere of the mathematical sciences” and “the sphere of freedom.” EO2, p. 170; SKS, vol. 3, p. 166. See EO2, p. 171; SKS, vol. 3, p. 167: “But if the contradiction is present, then it is an Either/Or.” EO2, p. 170; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 166–167. See also EO2, pp. 170–171; SKS, vol. 3, p. 167: “Now, I assume that philosophy is right, that the principle of contradiction is actually cancelled or that philosophers at every moment elevate it into the higher unity that is for thought. Yet this cannot, after all, apply to the future, for the contradictions certainly must be present before I can mediate them.” Hegel, PR, Preface, p. 23; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 36–37: “As the thought of the world, it [sc. philosophy] appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative process and attained its completed state. This lesson of the concept is necessarily also apparent from history, namely that it is only when actuality has reached maturity that the ideal appears opposite the real and reconstructs this real world, which it has grasped in its substance, in the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey

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mediation and sublation of views and positions that characterizes speculative philosophy thus applies only to the past. Given that philosophy cannot mediate opposing terms that as yet do not exist, it can offer no normative guidance regarding future action. The realm of morality thus falls within the domain of the sphere of freedom. In one’s capacity as a free individual and not as a speculative philosopher, the ethical issue about how one should comport oneself in the future is nevertheless important: The philosopher declares: “This is the way it was up until now.” I ask: “What am I supposed to do if I do not want to be a philosopher,” for if I want to be a philosopher, I am well aware that I, like other philosophers, will have to mediate the past. For one thing, this is no answer to my question “What am I supposed to do?” for even if I had the most brilliant philosophic mind there ever was, there must be something more I have to do besides sitting and contemplating the past.68

Philosophy occupies a sphere distinct from that of freedom and ethical action. If one is too absorbed in philosophy and thus in the realm of necessity, then one can neglect ethics in one’s own life, which falls within the realm of freedom.69 In the first of the Two Edifying Discourses published parallel to Either/Or on May 16, 1843, Kierkegaard discusses the proper relation to the past, the present and the future. The discourse is entitled “The Expectancy of Faith” and takes as its point of departure Paul’s Letter to the Galatians. Here Kierkegaard outlines in some detail how the believer is oriented towards the future in what he calls “the expectancy of faith.” He writes: “The ability to be occupied with the future is, then, a sign of the nobility of human beings.”70 The believer is oriented to the future with the concept of faith. One need not explicate this further to recognize in it the positive contrasting view to which the negative criticism in Either/Or corresponds. The sphere of freedom is the sphere of the religious believer, conscious of the challenge of faith. The philosopher is criticized for viewing the past and thereby not being oriented towards the future in the expectancy of faith. Thus, the idea seems to be that Hegelian philosophy with its focus on history leads away from the proper religious disposition toward the

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in grey, a shape of life has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy; the Owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of dusk.” Quoted by Heiberg in Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid, Copenhagen 1833, p. 7. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 387–388.) EO2, p. 171; SKS, vol. 3, p. 167. Translation slightly modified. It must be recalled that Kierkegaard later repeatedly criticizes Hegel for not having an ethics, by which he seems to understand something specifically prescriptive, which enjoins concrete action. See Chapter 11, Section X; Chapter 12, Section IV. See EUD, p. 17; SKS, vol. 5, p. 27.

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future. In this way it seems clear that this edifying discourse is intended as a complement to the criticism offered in Either/Or. To return to Judge Wilhelm’s analysis, in contrast to the realm of freedom, the realm of philosophy and thought is portrayed as the realm of necessity. This is also an accurate understanding of Hegel, who constantly underlines the necessity of philosophic thought, albeit necessity understood in his own idiosyncratic fashion. In the following passage, Kierkegaard indirectly refers to Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which is composed of the three philosophical disciplines: logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit: “The spheres with which philosophy properly has to deal, the spheres proper to thought, are logic, nature, and history. Here necessity rules, and therefore mediation has its validity.”71 That logic and nature operate with necessary laws is unproblematic, but the claim that there is a necessity in history is more troublesome. Kierkegaard correctly interprets Hegel’s theory as a form of compatibilism: History . . . is more than a product of the free actions of free individuals. The individual acts, but this action enters into the order of things that maintains the whole of existence. What is going to come of his action, the one who acts does not really know. But this higher order of things that digests, so to speak, the free actions and works them together in its eternal laws is necessity, and this necessity is the movement in world history.72

The individual acts freely, but the aggregate actions of countless individuals at the macrolevel produce world-historical events that display a necessity and a rationality that the human mind can grasp and analyze philosophically. Thus, insofar as philosophy considers history at this level, it operates with necessity and uses the concept of mediation appropriately. Hegel’s view of history is thus compatibilist and not deterministic as Thulstrup would have it.73 But philosophy is silent about the autonomous action of the individual taken on its own, for this belongs to the realm of freedom. Judge Wilhelm continues: “Philosophy has nothing at all to do with what could be called the inner deed, but the inner deed is the true life of freedom. Philosophy considers the external deed, yet in turn it does not see this as isolated but sees it as assimilated into the world-historical process.”74 The philosophical study of history is not concerned with the freedom of individuals per se. “For the historical process,” he writes, “there is no question of an either/or, but nevertheless no philosopher can think of denying that for the acting individual there is such a question.”75 There is thus a

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72 EO2, p. 174; SKS, vol. 3, p. 170. EO2, p. 174; SKS, vol. 3, p. 170. See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 25, p. 291, p. 302, p. 323. 75 EO2, p. 175; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 170–171. EO2, p. 174; SKS, vol. 3, p. 170.

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dialectic of action according to which an individual is in part shaped by his world-historical situation and in part free to determine his individual action: “So even the lowliest of individuals has a double existence. He, too, has a history, and this is not simply a product of his own free acts. The interior deed, on the other hand, belongs to him and will belong to him forever; history or world history cannot take it from him.”76 Regardless of the results of a rigorous philosophy of history, which demonstrates the necessity in world-historical movements, the freedom of the individual will always remain. For Judge Wilhelm, the solution to the problem lies in keeping the two spheres separate in order to avoid confusion about the tension between mediation and absolute choice. Thought is the realm of mediation, and freedom, that of contradiction: “For thought, the contradiction does not exist; it passes over into the other and thereupon together with the other into a higher unity. For freedom, the contradiction does exist, because it excludes it.”77 There can be no mediation in the realm of freedom since the very nature of freedom is to choose between alternatives. So long as one keeps in mind the distinction between these two spheres, the problem of the Aufhebung of the law of excluded middle disappears. This analysis demonstrates the compatibility of Judge Wilhelm’s doctrine of the absolute either/or with Hegel’s doctrine of mediation and noncontradiction. With the distinction between the sphere of thought and the sphere of freedom, both doctrines get their due without contradicting each other. Thus, there is no incompatibility between the doctrine that Judge Wilhelm expounds and Hegel’s philosophy on this point. The Judge’s remarks here are in some ways reminiscent of Kierkegaard’s concluding comments at the end of the individual chapters and sections in The Concept of Irony, where he is careful to underline the fact that his analyses and interpretations are compatible with Hegel’s. Finally, this solution is precisely the one proposed by Heiberg and Martensen, from whom one can infer it was derived. This conclusion is also consistent with what is said later in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author, Johannes Climacus, is careful to point out that his emphasis on the existential realm of freedom is compatible with Hegel’s philosophy and his speculative doctrine of contradiction.78 Just like Judge Wilhelm, Johannes Climacus insists that the two spheres be kept separate. So long as they are not confused, there is no problem. Both pseudonymous authors are willing to recognize the legitimacy of the philosophical sphere of mediation on its own terms. Moreover, the emphasis here on keeping

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77 EO2, p. 173; SKS, vol. 3, p. 169. EO2, p. 175; SKS, vol. 3, p. 171. CUP1, p. 305; SKS, vol. 7, p. 277f. Examined in Chapter 11, Section IX.

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the two spheres apart is reminiscent of a passage (discussed earlier79 ) in The Concept of Irony in which Kierkegaard distinguishes his approach from Hegel’s. While granting that Hegel’s view is appropriate for scholarship and academics, Kierkegaard nevertheless argues that it neglects the personal or biographical aspect that he wants to underscore.80 Also in Either/Or, despite the agreement on the point in logic, a hint of a criticism still remains to be explored. The critical aspect in Judge Wilhelm’s analysis foreshadows an argument that will be examined in more detail in the Postscript.81 He points out that speculative philosophy tends to lose itself in contemplation of the past, and it thus forgets the relevant ethical questions of the present: “For the philosopher, world history is ended, and he mediates. This accounts for the repugnant spectacle that belongs to the order of the day in our age – to see young people who are able to play games with the titanic forces of history, and who are unable to tell a simple human being what he has to do here in life, nor do they know what they themselves have to do.”82 An account of world history can by no means be seen as a substitute for an ethics, not an ethical theory, but a specific conception of how to live. The Judge writes, “If the philosopher is only a philosopher, absorbed in philosophy and without knowing the blessed life of freedom, then he misses a very important point, he wins the whole world and he loses himself – this can never happen to the person who lives for freedom, even though he lost ever so much.”83 The point seems to be that the philosopher, burying himself in speculative analyses, neglects his ethical obligations by neglecting the realm of freedom altogether. Questions of ethics, which should be pressing, never arise for him. Judge Wilhelm asserts that since the philosopher is absorbed in the realm of thought, he tends to be abstracted from the realm of action. It is as if he were a spectator waiting for the events to run their course so that he could subject them to dialectical analysis. Judge Wilhelm criticizes the 79 80

81 83

Chapter 3, Section IV, p. 153. There Kierkegaard claimed that Hegel’s analysis of Socrates missed the point since it viewed the life of Socrates as something complete. There he writes in reference to Socrates and Hegel’s analysis: “This is the purely personal life with which science and scholarship admittedly are not involved. . . . Whatever the case may be, grant that science and scholarship are right in ignoring such things; nevertheless, one who wants to understand the individual life cannot do so. And since Hegel himself says somewhere that with Socrates it is not so much a matter of speculation as of individual life, I dare to take this as sanction for my procedural method in my whole venture, however imperfect it may turn out because of my own deficiencies”(CI, pp. 166–167; SKS, vol. 1, p. 215. Cited in Chapter 3, footnote 83). Socrates is thus analyzed from the realm of thought. But this overlooks the existential aspects of Socrates’ life and action as an individual in the realm of freedom. 82 EO2, p. 171; SKS, vol. 3, p. 167. See Chapter 11, Section V. EO2, p. 176; SKS, vol. 3, p. 171.

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esthete for the same tendency and compares him with the speculative philosopher in this regard: If someone asks you whether you will sign a petition to the king, or whether you desire a constitution or the right to impose taxes, or whether you want to join this or that charitable cause, you answer, “My esteemed contemporaries, you misunderstand me. I am not a participant at all; I am outside. . . . ” So it is also with the philosopher. He is outside; he is not a participant. He sits and grows old listening to the songs of the past; he has an ear for the harmonies of mediation.84

The argument seems to be that being absorbed in the realm of necessity tends to blind one to the ethical choices of the moment, thus rendering one an absent-minded spectator. The argument has the flavor of an ad hominem since it does not make any claim against the truth or validity of Hegel’s speculative thought or principle of mediation but rather against a certain disposition toward it. One could presumably be a Hegelian and still be authentic if one recognized the limitations of philosophy and consigned it to its appropriate sphere, while at the same time recognizing one’s freedom as an individual in the existential sphere. Indeed, the judge does not ask for any more than this. Insofar as one abstracts from action and tries to view the world from the panoptic, atemporal perspective of absolute knowing, the philosopher “makes himself into the absolute.”85 The philosopher forgets his time is but one contingent historical moment that will pass and tries to make that moment an absolute. But the truth of the matter is that “the system is in a continual process of becoming.”86 In the course of time the past comes to be reinterpreted again and again as new ages become chapters in the annals of world history. The philosopher tends to reify his own position in history since it is always from his perspective that the analyses are given. This, of course, overlooks the transitory nature of any given period and historical perspective. Thus, the philosopher’s perspective is clearly limited. The plea seems once again to be for an awareness of the developing course of life, seen not only backwards from a third person perspective, but also forwards, as the individual in the first person lives and experiences it. This analysis of the issue of mediation is somewhat different from the previous ones in the Danish discussion in the sense that Judge Wilhelm wants to use it to draw ethical conclusions from the original logical principle. For Hegel, the issue of the law of excluded middle is primarily a question of logic, which has repercussions for his dialectical methodology and thus for any number of other philosophical subdisciplines. The 84 85

EO2, pp. 171–172; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 167–168. 86 EO2, p. 173; SKS, vol. 3, p. 169. EO2, p. 172; SKS, vol. 3, p. 168.

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discussion of this issue in Denmark during Kierkegaard’s time also focused on the issue in logic and its consequences above all in theology. By contrast, Judge Wilhelm’s concern is with the ethical consequences of the Aufhebung of the law of excluded middle since mediation would seem to eliminate autonomous choice between genuine, mutually exclusive alternatives, which is crucial for ethics.87 In this sense he changes considerably the focus and the terms of the discussion that preceded him. Judge Wilhelm’s focus on ethics points away from Hegel’s original discussion and toward a specifically Danish context of Hegel reception. Indeed, despite the numerous passages that are concerned with this issue in the work, nowhere is there a reference to either the Science of Logic or the Encyclopaedia Logic, although there are indirect allusions to the Danish debate.88 In the passages analyzed here the brunt of the criticism is aimed at the contemporary Hegelians rather than at Hegel’s philosophy itself. This is clear from the fact that Judge Wilhelm speaks not of Hegel but of the “young people” playing games with world history. This is further clear when he distinguishes the true devotees of scholarship from the young people of the day: I respect scholarship, and I honor its devotees, but life, too, has its demands. And even though I, if I saw one single extraordinarily endowed intellect one-sidedly lose himself in the past, would be perplexed about how I should form a judgment, about what opinion I should have alongside the respect I would hold for his intellectual competence – I am not perplexed today when I see a host of young people, not all of whom could possibly be philosophic minds, lost in today’s favorite philosophy, or what I am somewhat tempted to call the adolescent philosophy of our day.89

There is a pun in the word for “favorite philosophy” [Yndlings-Philosophi] and the “adolescent philosophy” [Ynglings-Philosophi]. With this pun Judge Wilhelm associates Hegel’s philosophy with the irresponsible youths or adolescents who are the object of his criticism. If one wishes to insist on seeing this as a criticism of Hegel, at best one could claim that it is a natural consequence of Hegel’s philosophy that it leads “young people” who study it to abstract from their concrete ethical situation

87

This interpretation of the issue is consistent with, for example, Kierkegaard’s understanding of the category of actuality not as an abstract logical category but as something concerned with one’s own life and existence (i.e., as something relevant for ethics and not logic). See JP, vol. 5, 5535; SKS, vol. 19, p. 235, Not8:33. See also EO1, p. 32; SKS, vol. 2, p. 41. 88 E.g., EO2, p. 170; SKS, vol. 3, p. 166. EO1, Supplement, p. 528; Pap. III B 179.63, p. 209. 89 See EO2, p. 172; SKS, vol. 3, p. 168.

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and thus make them ethically irresponsible. But, generally speaking, the Judge seems less interested in the original point in Hegel’s logic than in the behavior of his followers. One can gain a better appreciation of the nature of the criticism once one identifies the “young people” who are taken to task. Some insight is provided by a letter from Sibbern to his former student, the priest Frederik Ludvig Bang Zeuthen (1805–74). The letter, dated July 4, 1839, speaks of the debate set off by Mynster’s article: Are you able to get hold of a copy of Petersen’s Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik in your district? Recently, namely in the number for April, there was an article in it from Mynster under the title, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism.” He tries to make good on the claim that the distinction between these two is in no way “antiquated,” as was claimed in another article in the journal, and he thinks that here there is an aut/aut, between which everyone must decide. This article has caused some agitation among the young speculative theologians here, who have been rather dissatisfied with it. A few responses will come in the next number, one from Prof. Heiberg and another from Lecturer Martensen, who in particular must have seen the article as a challenge to themselves.90

Here Sibbern portrays the stir that Mynster’s article gave rise to among the students of theology at the time. There can be little doubt that Judge Wilhelm’s criticism is aimed at these students and the arrogance with which they defended the Hegelian principle of mediation. That Kierkegaard intends the judge’s remarks here as a criticism of contemporary students of theology seems to be confirmed by a comment in the memoirs of Henrik Nikolai Clausen. In his description of the Hegelian movement in Denmark, Clausen recalls specifically the impact of Martensen’s lectures, “Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics,” from Fall Semester of 1837, at which Kierkegaard was present.91 Clausen describes with disdain the immaturity and affectation of the young students of theology who were quick to use stilted Hegelian language in their discussions. In this context Clausen refers explicitly to the passage from Either/Or cited earlier. He writes: “Soon the favorite philosophy [YndlingsPhilosophi] of the day – to use an expression from Søren Kierkegaard – became the adolescent philosophy [Ynglings-Philosophi] of the day.”92 The 90

91 92

“Letter from Sibbern to Zeuthen,” July 4, 1839, in Breve fra og til F.C. Sibbern, ed. by C. L. N. Mynster, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen 1866, vol. 2, pp. 194–195. See also Frederik Christian Sibbern, “Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, Article I, p. 307; Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, op. cit., p. 25. Here Sibbern refers to these students as the “younger theologians.” SKS, vol. 19, pp. 125–143, Not4:3–12. Henrik Nikolai Clausen, Optegnelser om Mit Levneds og min Tids Historie, Copenhagen 1877, p. 213.

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fact that Clausen uses Kierkegaard’s turn of phrase to refer to these discussions among Martensen’s students indicates that for him there was no ambiguity about the fact that they were the target of Kierkegaard’s criticism in Either/Or. For Clausen and Kierkegaard’s other contemporaries the allusion was obvious. That Kierkegaard was irritated by Martensen’s success in the classroom and his popularity among the students is testified by a journal entry from ten years after the fact (i.e., from 1849). Kierkegaard begins by recalling how Martensen returned from Germany and presented Hegel’s philosophy to the students. He continues: “It was the philosophy of points of view – the demoralizing aspect of that kind of survey – that fascinated young people and opened the prospect of swallowing up everything in half a year.”93 Later in the same entry Kierkegaard refers once again to the “demoralizing aspect in allowing young people to do this.”94 It is clear that he takes Martensen to have exercised a corrupting influence on the students of the day. The references to the “young people” again echo the words of Judge Wilhelm and seem to fix the object of his discussion. Thus, the target seems to be the same as that in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, where Hegelian discussions with affected jargon were satirized. Kierkegaard thus again criticizes a specific context of Hegel reception among the students of theology of the day, but this polemic has nothing to do with the original point about Hegel’s criticism of the basic laws of Aristotelian logic. Indeed, in a journal entry from much later Kierkegaard indicates that his criticism is not of mediation on its own terms: “Yet, again I do not want to dispute the fact that there is mediation, but rather the shamelessness of wanting to make it something superior.”95 This makes clear that Kierkegaard’s criticism is of those who attribute to mediation more than it is due and not of the principle itself. Thus, the criticism is of something quite different than is usually thought and much closer to home. In the final analysis Judge Wilhelm’s position with respect to Hegel is ambivalent. On the one hand, he demonstrates a certain deference toward Hegel himself, while, on the other hand, he reproaches Hegel’s followers for their lack of self-reflectivity. This ambivalence comes out clearly in another passage in which he discusses speculative philosophy’s approach to history: “It seems, to me at least, that there is much foolish and incompetent talk mixed up in this point of view. I do not deny that the young necromancers who want to conjure up the spirits of history are especially ludicrous to me, but I also genuflect deeply to the 93 94 95

PF, Supplement, p. 226; Pap. X-2 A 155, p. 117. PF, Supplement, p. 227; Pap. X-2 A 155, p. 117. JP, vol. 2, 1617; Pap. X-4 A 385. Translation slightly modified.

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magnificent accomplishments our age has to exhibit.”96 This ambivalent disposition can be explained when understood in its historical context. It has been noted that Kierkegaard, on the one hand, was deeply impressed with many aspects of Hegel’s philosophy in The Concept of Irony. On the other hand, due to largely personal reasons, he at this time held in disdain a number of Danish Hegelians such as Martensen, Rasmus Nielsen, and their students. This personal enmity explains some of the ad hominem character of his criticisms of the Hegelians (e.g., the claims that they are unreflective, self-deceived, etc.). If one bears in mind the extremely polemical climate of Danish intellectual life of the day – a climate that tended to polarize issues often along personal lines – then one can begin to assess properly Kierkegaard’s negative view of the Danish Hegelians. However, it is important not to allow these personal animosities and grudges to be taken for genuine philosophical issues in their own right. Thus, it is necessary in this context to distinguish his view of Hegel from his view of the Danish Hegelians. It has become virtually a clich´e in the secondary literature that the question of mediation constitutes a major point of contrast between Hegel and Kierkegaard. While Hegel is conceived as the philosopher of mediation, Kierkegaard is thought to be the philosopher of the either/or. The two are thus thought to be at opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum with regard to this issue. But what is interesting to note is that with respect to the original point in Hegel’s logic, Judge Wilhelm is in perfect agreement with Hegel. At the level of the understanding there exists an either/or, and the laws of Aristotelian logic are valid. By contrast, at the level of the Concept, there is no either/or, and mediation and necessity are valid. Although Judge Wilhelm uses different language, designating that distinction as that between the realm of freedom and that of necessity, the point is the same. Both Hegel and the Judge offer a compromise solution. There is an either/or at one level and mediation at another. Thus, contrary to the standard view, the Judge does not have any quarrel with respect to the point in logic. Oddly enough, the polemic is not aimed at the point in logic at all, but rather it is directed against the young people who become absorbed in the contemplation of the past or who confuse the two spheres to the point where they neglect their ethical obligations. The mistake in the secondary literature is that the ethical aspect of Judge Wilhelm’s criticism has been entirely overlooked as have the numerous references to the “young people” or the “young necromancers.” Thus, the criticism has generally been understood as directed against Hegel himself. But as is clear from this analysis, on the point of logic, Judge Wilhelm is at pains

96

EO2, pp. 174–175; SKS, vol. 3, p. 170.

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to make his view consistent with that of Hegel and aims his criticism at a wholly different target.

iii. the work of art and its dialectic In the “Insignificant Introduction” to the second chapter of Part One, “The Immediate Erotic Stages,” the esthete discusses different criteria for judging the truly great work of art.97 The discussion shows clear signs of Hegelian influence. This is confirmed at least superficially by Kierkegaard’s notes on his reading of Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics found in his journals from 1841 to 1842.98 Moreover, Hegel is referred to directly in this passage in Either/Or itself.99 Here the esthete examines in order three possible criteria for determining the great work of art; the first places the emphasis on the subject-matter, which is regarded as the essential element. At the second stage a case is made for the formative activity of the individual artist as the essential thing. Finally, what is called “the idea” of the work of art is introduced as the third criterion. Here the measuring rod is the degree of abstraction of the idea of the work of art, with representation of the most abstract idea being the greatest work. The criteria are examined and rejected as being one-sided until an adequate view is reached, just as in the Phenomenology individual concepts are examined and rejected as partial or incomplete before absolute knowing is reached. In this section I wish to analyze this aspect of Hegelian influence. Before I turn to the “Insignificant Introduction,” I will briefly say a few words first about Hegel’s methodology and second about a discussion in Heiberg that was influential for Kierkegaard’s account. Hegel is known for his dialectical methodology, which examines individual concepts for internal consistency. The word “concept” [Begriff ] is Hegel’s term for any kind of belief system or conceptual scheme. It involves a certain criterion for truth and the set of beliefs that issue from it. Hegel’s dialectical procedure first involves discovering the contradiction inherent in any given concept. Once the contradiction is brought to the fore, the concept must be abandoned and a new one posited. The next concept is not a wholly new beginning but contains elements of the old concept. As the dialectical movement progresses, concepts thus become more and more complex in the sense that they contain more and more of the content of previous concepts. Hegel’s dialectical movement operates with three stages or moments. Sometimes he refers to these stages as the in-itself, for-itself, and in-and-for-itself aspects of the concept or 97 98

99

EO1, pp. 47–59; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 55–66. JP, vol. 2, 1592; SKS, vol. 19, p. 245, Not8:51. JP, vol. 2, 1593; SKS, vol. 19, p. 246, Not8:53. JP, vol. 5, 5545; SKS, vol. 19, pp. 285–286, Not10:1. See also JP, vol. 2, 1591; SKS, vol. 19, p. 237, Not8:39.1. EO1, p. 50; SKS, vol. 2, p. 58. EO1, p. 53; SKS, vol. 2, p. 61.

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sometimes as the object, the subject, and the dialectical interrelation of the two. The third member of the movement is thought to bring together the first and the second, which in their isolation were one-sided and incomplete. In his Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel employs this methodology in his discussion of the idea of beauty. The triadic movement that he describes there strongly resembles the movement of the esthete’s stages here. Hegel refers to the first stage not as subject-matter but as “real independent objectivity.”100 This is the aspect of the work of art as a concrete, real, existing object (i.e., the material of which it is made). But there are many objects such as trees and rocks that are real and substantive but yet are not works of art. Thus, in the work of art there must also be a subjective side or, as Hegel says, a “concept” in the mind of an artist: “But, since it is only the Concept which has to give itself existence and reality in objectivity, objectivity will have to bring the Concept to actuality in objectivity itself.”101 Both the objective, empirical side, which the esthete calls the subject-matter, and the subjective side of the artistic conception must be present. For Hegel, the unity of these two sides is what he calls the “idea of the beautiful.”102 This is the same term the esthete uses to describe his third stage. Heiberg was attentive to Hegel’s dialectical methodology which he made use of in his analysis of art. During the 1830s, Heiberg published a number of works on aesthetics in his journal Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post. For Heiberg, the distinction between content [Stof ] and form [Form] was crucial.103 In his Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military College, Heiberg turns to aesthetics to illustrate the logical relation between content and form. There he runs through a Hegelian series of stages starting with the subject-matter and moving to the technical organization or form before culminating in the unity of both or, as one commentator puts it, in “the rebirth of the poetic idea in the outward form of the work.”104 His discussion bears a remarkable resemblance to that of the esthete. Heiberg begins with the understanding of the work of art based on matter [Materie] or content [Stof ] alone: “The fine arts, just like the sciences, stand on the standpoint of finitude insofar as the objects upon which they carry out their activity have an independent existence apart from that activity or are a content. Marble, colors, tones exist independently 100 101 102 103

104

Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 110; Jub., vol. 12, p. 158. Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 110; Jub., vol. 12, pp. 158–159. Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 110; Jub., vol. 12, p. 159: “The totality is the Idea.” See Paul V. Rubow, Heiberg og hans skole i kritiken, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1953, pp. 60– 62. See also Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, tr. by Frederick J. Marker, New York: Twayne Publishers. 1971, p. 126, p. 136. Henning Fenger, The Heibergs, op. cit., p. 135.

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of the form which sculpture, painting, music give them.”105 Just as in Hegel’s dialectic, the work of art must be made of some material stuff and must have an outward existence in the world. But this material content is not enough to constitute a work of art since that material can exist alone as a simple object of nature. Therefore, Heiberg hastens to add that this is only one side of the work of art: “But in this whole consideration we have only observed the arts from their one, admittedly necessary and indispensable, but nevertheless merely subordinate side, from the side which one is wont to call the real in contrast to the ideal.”106 The second aspect of the work of art is the idea of the artist. The raw material is shaped and formed in accordance with an abstract idea in the mind of the artist: “Since now thought or feelings can also exist independently of the work of art . . . they are the material for art but an ideal material whose nature is the opposite of the real material which we examined first.”107 Despite Heiberg’s misleading use of the expression “ideal material,” it is clear that he means the plan or idea in the mind of the artist as opposed to the material of which the work of art is composed. The third view is the combination of the ideal “material” and the real material in the true work of art: “Here we thus see one sole form, namely, the art form, the opposition of two materials, such that it gives priority to the one but is itself subordinated to the other.”108 Heiberg’s point here is that the ideal is higher than the material, and their unity falls between these two poles: “The statue or the painting is of a higher unity than stones or colors, but they are of a lower nature than the ideas which are expressed in them.”109 Thus, the dualism of content and form is aufgehoben in the work of art itself. For Heiberg, poetry represents the genre of art that sublates the dichotomy of content and form on the basis of the fact that poetry’s material is language that is an expression of thought. Thus, concludes Heiberg, “art’s ideal is realized in poetry.”110 The ideal is the absolute unity of content and form. Heiberg’s account here prefigures that of the esthete in many ways. It moves through a series of stages based on the dialectic of content and form. It aims to determine the great work of art or the great artist. For Heiberg the supreme artist is Goethe, whereas for the esthete Mozart 105

106 107 108 109

110

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole,” Copenhagen 1835, p. 14. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 478.) Ibid., p. 15; Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 1, pp. 479. Ibid., p. 16; Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 1, p. 480. Ibid., p. 16; Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 1, p. 480. Ibid., p. 16; Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 1, p. 480. See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid, Copenhagen 1833, p. 33. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 414.) Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Indlednings-Foredrag,” op. cit. p. 17; Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 1, p. 481.

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occupies this place of honor. Kierkegaard was familiar with Heiberg’s writings on aesthetics and indeed, as will be seen later, even has the esthete refer to Heiberg in this discussion. It thus seems fairly safe to conclude that it is from Hegel via Heiberg that Kierkegaard derived his dialectical movement of aesthetic stages.111 The first view examined by the esthete is that the subject-matter itself ultimately determines the greatness of a work of art. According to this view, a particularly propitious subject-matter lends itself to artistic representation. Thus, there is a certain degree of chance involved when an artist hits upon a subject appropriate for artistic creation. Perhaps the artist will find a favorable subject-matter by means of which to manifest his artistic idea, but perhaps he will not. This view accordingly takes credit away from the artist. The great artist would never have become great if the particular subject-matter upon which he worked had not presented itself. This view “considers that many a poet has lived who would have been just as immortal as Homer if that glorious subject-matter had not been taken over by him, many a composer who would have been just as immortal as Mozart if the opportunity had offered itself.”112 Thus, the subject-matter enjoys a privileged status here, and the identity and skill of the artist is secondary. As in Hegel’s dialectic, the movement begins by positing truth on the side of the object. Now comes the Aufhebung of this concept. For the esthete, this view is mistaken in its one-sidedness. Here he exhibits the key intuition behind speculative thinking in his desire to hold the two elements together in a single concept and not allow them to be taken up individually or in abstraction from one another: “The subject-matter is an essential element, inasmuch as it is one factor, but it is not the absolute, since it is only one element.”113 By emphasizing the subject-matter at the expense of the artist, this view overlooks how the artist transforms the raw material. Although one may be able to speak of good fortune with regard to an artist hitting upon an appropriate subject-matter, a great work of art is not purely accidental since the genius of the artist and the subject-matter are bound together: “Here the emphasis is just as much on Homer as on the subject-matter. Here is the deep harmony that pervades every production we call classic.”114 The esthete’s Hegelian proclivities are clearly in evidence when he emphasizes the necessary marriage between the artist and the subject-matter: In a classic work, good fortune – that which makes it classic and immortal – is the absolute correlation of the two forces. . . . For example, 111 112 114

See George Pattison, “Søren Kierkegaard: A Theatre Critic of the Heiberg School,” The British Journal of Aesthetics, 23, 1983, pp. 25–33. 113 EO1, p. 51; SKS, vol. 2, p. 59. EO1, p. 47; SKS, vol. 2, p. 55. EO1, p. 48; SKS, vol. 2, p. 56.

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if it is said that it was Homer’s good fortune that he acquired that most exceptional epic subject-matter, this can lead one to forget that we always have this epic subject-matter through Homer’s conception, and the fact that it appears to be the most perfect epic subject-matter is clear to us only in and through the transubstantiation due to Homer. If, however, Homer’s poetic work in permeating the subject-matter is emphasized, then one runs the risk of forgetting that the poem would never have become what it is if the idea with which Homer permeated it was not its own idea, if the form was not the subject-matter’s own form.115

The subject-matter in a sense cannot exist apart from the artist who transforms it. Without the intervention of the artist, there is no subject-matter but only raw material such as a slab of marble. This thesis is strikingly similar to what Hegel says to illustrate the relation between content and form in the Encyclopaedia Logic. In fact, Hegel uses the same example: “The only genuine works of art are precisely the ones whose content and form show themselves to be completely identical. We can say of the Iliad that its content is the Trojan War or, more precisely, the wrath of Achilles; and in saying this we have said everything, but also very little, for what makes the Iliad into the Iliad is the poetic form into which that content is moulded.”116 Thus, the esthete’s thesis is the same as Hegel’s, namely, subject-matter alone cannot determine the great work of art. The use of the same example of Homer’s works leads one to suspect that Kierkegaard might have been familiar with this passage. The next concept examined is the claim that the activity of the artist is the essential factor in the greatness of the work of art. The weight now shifts from the external object (i.e., the subject-matter) to the subject (i.e., the artist). This movement from object to subject or from in-itself to for-itself is, of course, one of the hallmarks of the Hegelian dialectic. According to this second view, the genius of the artist can take any given subject-matter and transform it into a great work of art. Homer is the great poet because of his inherent genius and not because of any particular subject-matter. One can recognize the hand of the genius in the most trivial works. Here the subject-matter is arbitrary or inessential since the great artist can always turn it into something great. Thus, the roles are now reversed, and the artist enjoys the privileged status, while the subjectmatter plays a secondary role. Now one turns once again to the Aufhebung of the concept. The emphasis on the formative activity of the subject also fails in its one-sidedness. Not every work of a great artist is ipso facto a great work; thus, even though a recognized genius puts his hand to something, the material is not a matter of indifference to the result. Like Hegel, the esthete uses 115 116

EO1, pp. 49–50; SKS, vol. 2, p. 57. Hegel, EL, § 133, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 303.

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a reductio ad absurdum argument to show the internal contradiction of this position: “The same individuality may have produced many different things, but they are not to be compared with it. For example, Homer also wrote a Batrachomyomachia117 but did not become a classic writer or immortal through it.”118 Thus, the subject-matter is relevant since “if whatever makes a classic work classic lies simply and solely in the producing individual, then everything he produced would inevitably be classic.”119 Here the esthete reduces this thesis to absurdity, using the obvious argument that not everything produced by a great artist is great. With this claim, the esthete emphasizes again the necessary interconnection of the two elements. He not only employs Hegel’s speculative methodology but expressly underscores it: “Consequently, a single aspect cannot be used as the basis for an order of rank, because it is still too essential to be sufficiently accidental, too accidental to be a basis for an essential ranking. But this thoroughgoing mutual permeation . . . justifies saying . . . that the subject-matter permeates the form and also that the form permeates the subject-matter.”120 Thus, for the esthete, the truth and greatness of the work of art lies in understanding its speculative concept (i.e., the necessary interconnection of content and form). Moreover, a view that emphasizes only one side and ignores the other is false: “This unity, this mutual intimacy in each other, every classic work has, and thus it is readily perceived that every attempt at a classification of the various classic works that has as its point of departure a separation of subject-matter and form or of idea and form is eo ipso a failure.”121 Thus, for the esthete as for Hegel, form and content are united in a great work of art.122 A third criterion for the classification of a great work of art is now proposed. This dialectic, like Hegel’s, has a teleology since the esthete hopes to demonstrate that this third concept is the correct one: “I believe, however, that the following observations will open the prospect for a division that will have validity.”123 According to this new view, “the idea” of artistic experience is the necessary and essential aspect. What is at issue here is the level of abstraction of the idea.124 The esthete argues: “The most abstract ideal conceivable is the sensuous in its elemental originality. 117 118 120 122

123 124

The apocryphal Homeric work, The Battle of the Frogs and the Mice. 119 EO1, p. 50; SKS, vol. 2, p. 58. EO1, p. 50; SKS, vol. 2, p. 58. 121 EO1, p. 54; SKS, vol. 2, p. 61. EO1, pp. 52–53; SKS, vol. 2, p. 60. See Hegel, EL, § 133, Addition; Jub., vol. 8, p. 302: “Form and content are a pair of determinations that are frequently employed by the reflective understanding, and, moreover, mainly in such a way that the content is considered as what is essential and independent, while the form, on the contrary, is unessential and dependent. Against this, however, it must be remarked that in fact both of them are equally essential, and that . . . there is no more a formless content than a formless stuff.” EO1, p. 54; SKS, vol. 2, p. 62. EO1, p. 56; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 63–64: “I can choose either the works with the most abstract medium or those with the most abstract idea. In that respect, I prefer the idea, not the medium.”

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But through which medium can it be presented? Only through music.”125 For reasons the esthete does not discuss, other forms of art cannot capture sensuous originality as music can. The conclusion the esthete wants to draw is that Mozart’s Don Giovanni is “the perfect unity of this idea and its corresponding form.”126 It has an abstract idea at its heart and is expressed in music, an abstract form. For this reason, there can, for the esthete, be no second Don Giovanni. By contrast, other classics such as the poems of Homer or Goethe’s Faust can be imitated ad infinitum: Homer found a perfect epic subject-matter, but because history offers more epic subject matter, many more epic poems are conceivable. . . . Goethe’s Faust is really a classic work, but it is a historical idea, and therefore every extraordinary time in history will have its Faust. Faust has language as its medium, and since this is a much more concrete medium, for that reason, too, many works of the same kind are conceivable.127

In contrast to Homer’s epics and Goethe’s Faust, which have a concrete element, Don Giovanni stands alone as truly great by virtue of the abstract nature of its artistic idea. The esthete does not flesh out this third concept in much detail since he uses this criterion not to classify art works generally but rather to justify in an ad hoc fashion his claim that Don Giovanni is the greatest of all works of art. He is more interested in Don Giovanni than in the idea of the work of art per se. At the end of his account here, the esthete looks back on this “movement of thought”128 and describes it in a way reminiscent of Hegel’s description of the movement of the dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit. At first a concept is presented, and only when the so-called natural consciousness (i.e., Hegel’s idealized, phenomenological actor) examines it and discovers its inconsistency, is it compelled into motion. The esthete writes: “Thought was calm, rested happy in its knowledge; then I went to it and begged it to bestir itself once more, to venture the ultimate. . . . It labored in vain; egged on by me, it was continually going beyond itself and continually collapsing back into itself. It was continually looking for a foothold and finding none, continually trying to find bottom, but could neither swim nor wade.”129 The movement of thought here is like that of Hegel’s natural consciousness, which in vain continually shifts the variables in its conceptual scheme in order to come up with a consistent concept. Individual criteria for truth are continually mediated and transformed into more complete concepts. What is puzzling in this discussion is that Hegel is mentioned twice, and both times the one-sided view in favor of the subject-matter is ascribed to him. Thus, despite the esthete’s overt use of Hegelian methodology, 125 127 129

EO1, p. 56; SKS, vol. 2, p. 64. EO1, p. 57; SKS, vol. 2, p. 64. EO1, p. 58; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 65–66.

126 128

EO1, p. 57; SKS, vol. 2, p. 64. EO1, p. 58; SKS, vol. 2, p. 65.

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when he mentions Hegel in this context, it is not to praise his speculative approach to art but to criticize him for insisting on the importance of the subject-matter: There was a school of estheticians who, because of a one-sided emphasis on the significance of form, were not without guilt in occasioning the diametrically opposite misunderstanding. It has often struck me that these estheticians were as a matter of course attached to Hegelian philosophy, inasmuch as both a general knowledge of Hegel and a special knowledge of his aesthetics give assurance that he strongly emphasizes, especially with regard to the aesthetic, the importance of the subject-matter.130

A little later, Hegel is mentioned a second time by name and once again associated with the proponents of the first view, which gives priority to the subject-matter: “Hegel reinstated the subject-matter, the idea, in its rights and thereby ousted those transient classic works, those superficialities.”131 At first glance this seems to be a puzzling misreading of Hegel especially given that the esthete makes use of precisely Hegel’s speculative methodology by seeing the two different elements of the work of art in their necessary connection. Some light is shed on the issue when we identify the unnamed school of estheticians in the first passage cited as Heiberg and his circle.132 There was long debate in Danish literature, originally between the poet Jens Baggesen (1764–1826) and his rival Adam Oehlenschl¨ager (1799– 1850), concerning the relative significance of form and content in art. While Oehlenschl¨ager emphasized content as the main element in poetry, Baggesen argued that form and technical expertise were the most important. Heiberg took up Baggesen’s case against Oehlenschl¨ager on several occasions. In the passage above the esthete notes the contradiction between Heiberg’s emphasis on form and his open advocation of Hegel’s philosophy, which, according to the esthete, emphasizes just the opposite (i.e., subject-matter).133 According to Heiberg, the spectators can immediately enjoy a work of art, but the critic must be concerned only with the work’s form or with the technical mastery it displays. Thus, 130 132

133

131 EO1, p. 53; SKS, vol. 2, p. 61. EO1, p. 50; SKS, vol. 2, p. 58. Commentators also refer to Christian H. Weisse, System der Aesthetik von der Idee der Sch¨onheit, vols. 1–2, Leipzig 1830 (ASKB 1379–1380), where there is indeed an extended discussion of content and form. See vol. 1, pp. 110ff. It must be noted that the esthete is at least careful to distinguish Hegel from his followers. EO1, p. 53; SKS, vol. 2, p. 61: “Like so many others, however, this effort found its subduer in Hegel. It is a sad truth about Hegelian philosophy that on the whole it has by no means achieved the importance, neither for the past nor for the present age, that it would have achieved if the past age had not been so busy scaring people into it but rather possessed a little more calm presence of mind in appropriating it to itself, and if the present age had not been so indefatigably active in driving people beyond it.” Here one will recall Kierkegaard’s repeated criticism of Martensen for his claim to have gone beyond Hegel.

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“form is the sole object of criticism.”134 Elsewhere, Heiberg writes: “Here in Denmark it has recently been hotly disputed what should be seen as the main thing, content [Materien] or form. To this one can answer in short that in poetry and in all of the fine arts this opposition does not entirely exist such that one cannot even say that form is the main thing, but rather one must say that it is the one and only thing.”135 Heiberg’s argument here is not easy to understand given what he says about the unity of content and form in poetry representing the highest form of art and given that Hegel’s speculative philosophy insists on the unity of both content and form.136 According to Hegel’s dialectic, there can be no form without content and no content without form, and the “idea” of the work of art is the organic unity of these two elements.137 This seems also to be the upshot of the esthete’s dialectic here in this analysis. Heiberg is aware of this, and he compares the relation of content and form in the work of art with that of the body and the soul.138 For Heiberg, even though there is no work of art without a given content, just as one can never observe a soul outside the body, nevertheless the work’s artistic basis lies in its form, just as the essence of a human being lies in the soul and not the body. Whatever the case may be here regarding Kierkegaard’s, Heiberg’s or the esthete’s understanding of Hegel’s view on the subject-matter of art, there can be no doubt, given the similarities to Hegel’s philosophy in the analysis presented by the esthete, that Hegelian methodology is employed here. Whether there is a direct Hegelian influence here or an indirect one via Heiberg’s dialectic is ultimately unimportant. First, there is clearly a Hegelian movement through the three stages. Moreover, just as in Hegel’s dialectic, so also here the criterion for the truth of the concept is first on the side of the object and then on the side of the subject and then in the unity of both. Finally, the esthete’s insistence on an integrative

134

135

136 137

138

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Svar paa Hr. Oehlenschl¨agers Skrift: ‘Om Kritiken i Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, over Væringerne i Miklagard,’” I no. 7, in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, 1828, (I, no. 7; II, no. 8; III, no. 10; IV, no. 11; V, no. 12; VI, no. 13; VII, no. 14; VIII, no. 15; IX, no. 16). (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 203.) See also Heiberg’s letter to H. C. Ørsted, January 5, 1831, Letter 236 in Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Johan Ludvig Heiberg, vols. 1–5, ed. by Morten Borup, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1947–50, vol. 2, pp. 96–98. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik. Som Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen 1832, § 98, Remark 3, p. 52. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 216.) See Paul V. Rubow, Heiberg og hans skole i kritiken, op. cit., p. 62. For example, Hegel, Aesthetics I, p. 70; Jub., vol. 12, p. 107: “It has already been said that the content of art is the Idea, while its form is the configuration of sensuous material. Now art has to harmonize these two sides and bring them into a free reconciled totality.” Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Svar paa Hr. Oehlenschl¨agers Skrift: ‘Om Kritiken i Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, over Væringerne i Miklagard,’” op. cit., I, no. 7; Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 3, p. 202.

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approach that takes into account seemingly opposing elements is clearly reminiscent of Hegel’s speculative philosophy.

iv. two interpretations of antigone In the chapter “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic of Modern Drama,” from Part One of Either/Or, Kierkegaard’s esthete analyzes among other things, Sophocles’ famous tragedy, Antigone. This constitutes a natural point of comparison with Hegel, whose treatment of this work is well known. In his discussion the esthete cites from Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics.139 There is thus good evidence that Kierkegaard was familiar with Hegel’s accounts of the famous drama. Some commentators have already argued that the esthete’s interpretation of Antigone is Hegelian. For example, George Steiner writes, “It is the Hegelian Antigone which lies behind the tormented silhouette in Either/Or. . . . Contrasting, in certain respects antithetical, as they are, the Antigone readings and transformations proposed by Hegel and by Kierkegaard remain inseparable.”140 I would like to support Steiner’s general thesis that much of Kierkegaard’s Antigone interpretation is derived from Hegel’s. I would, however, like to develop Steiner’s claim somewhat and argue that Kierkegaard took to heart Hegel’s analysis of the distinction between ancient and modern tragedy and applied Hegel’s characterization of the modern notion of tragedy to the story of Antigone. In this way he modifies the story by Sophocles in order to make it into a modern tragedy. His entire analysis, although original in its development, is thus informed and motivated by Hegel’s characterization of the nature of modern tragedy. Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone is clearly Hegel’s favorite drama; indeed, he says directly, “Of all the masterpieces of the classical and the modern world . . . the Antigone seems to me to be the most magnificent and satisfying work of art of this kind.”141 He discusses the drama in the initial sections of the “Spirit” chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit and again in the Lectures on Aesthetics.142 In the Phenomenology the analysis is intended 139 140

141 142

EO1, p. 147; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 146–147. George Steiner, Antigones, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984, pp. 65–66. See also Walter Rehm, “Kierkegaards Antigone” in his Begegnungen und Probleme, Bern: A. Franke AG 1957, pp. 274–316, especially pp. 284–285. Karsten Friis Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘The Tragic,’” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 13, 1976, pp. 105–146, especially pp. 122– 124. Dar´ıo Gonz´alez, “El ‘reflejo’ de lo tr´agico. Nota sobre la Ant´ıgona de Kierkegaard,” Persona y Derecho, 39, 1998, pp. 107–135. Isak Winkel Holm, “Reflection’s Correlative Fate: Figures of Dependence in Søren Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1999, pp. 149–163. Hegel, Aesthetics II, p. 1218; Jub., vol. 14, p. 556. It is also alluded to in the Philosophy of Right. PR, § 166; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 246–247. PR, § 144, Remark; Jub., vol. 7, p. 227.

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to illustrate the fundamental tension at the heart of the Greek world that led to its downfall. In this context Hegel does not therefore analyze the drama Antigone as a piece of literature or art per se; rather, this discussion of the Antigone is a part of a larger historical analysis of the Greeks as a world-historical people. By contrast, in his Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel discusses the tragedy specifically as a work of art. Although he examines the piece in these two quite different contexts, the general points he makes are much the same. The esthete’s Antigone interpretation, which is located at the end of a longer analysis of the nature of ancient and modern drama, contains many Hegelian aspects.143 The claim of the esthete is that what characterizes modern drama is a sense of individuality that is lacking in ancient drama. His discussion is not so much an interpretation of the ancient tragedy as a retelling of it with significant changes in order to illustrate specific aspects of modern and ancient tragedy. Thus, the esthete’s use of the Antigone is, in a sense, quite different from Hegel’s. I will try to show that the modifications to the play that the esthete effects are intended to turn the ancient Greek tragedy into a modern tragedy. The esthete does this by using Hegel’s definition of modern tragedy from the Lectures on Aesthetics and by modifying key aspects of the Antigone in order to bring it into accordance with this definition. He thus presents the reader with his own modern version of the story along the lines sketched by Hegel. According to the esthete’s version, the conflict of the drama is not between the family and the state (i.e., between Antigone and Creon) but rather between two conflicting forces within Antigone herself. The esthete, following Hegel’s definition, has devised a way to make the conflict an inward one. I begin by looking at Hegel’s account of the difference between ancient and modern tragedy as he presents it in the Lectures on Aesthetics. According to Hegel, the tragic heroes in ancient drama are motivated by the substantial nature of their characters and their ethical relations. By contrast, in modern tragedy, these things no longer carry any weight, and the motivation becomes more arbitrary. He writes: “But in modern tragedy it is generally the case that individuals do not act for the sake of the substantial nature of their end, nor is it that nature which proves to be their motive in their passion; on the contrary, what presses for satisfaction is the subjectivity of their heart and mind and the privacy of their own character.”144 This understanding of the motivation of action also changes the nature of the tragic conflict in modern drama. According to Hegel, while the tragic conflict in ancient drama was between external things such as the family and the state, the tragic conflict in modern 143 144

EO1, pp. 153–164; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 152–162. Hegel, Aesthetics II, p. 1225; Jub., vol. 14, p. 565.

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drama takes place within the individual. He writes: The heroes of Greek classical tragedy are confronted by circumstances in which, after firmly identifying themselves with the one ethical “pathos” which alone corresponds to their own already established nature, they necessarily come into conflict with the opposite but equally justified ethical power. The Romantic dramatic personae, on the other hand, are from the beginning in the midst of a wide field of more or less accidental circumstances and conditions within which it is possible to act either in this way or in that. Consequently the conflict, for which the external circumstances do of course provide the occasion, lies essentially in the character to which the individuals adhere in their passion.145

The move from ancient to modern tragedy can be characterized as a move from outer to inner. Modern tragedy is then more psychological in the sense that its focus is the soul of the individual and not the external circumstances. Hegel’s example is the character of Hamlet: “Therefore the collision [in Hamlet] turns strictly here not on a son’s pursuing an ethically justified revenge and being forced in the process to violate the ethical order, but on Hamlet’s personal character.”146 The focus is on Hamlet’s wavering back and forth, his uncertainty and procrastination, in short on the inner psychological forces battling for hegemony over his character. It is this Hegelian account that Kierkegaard uses in the reworking of the story of Antigone that the esthete presents. The claim for a Hegelian influence here is strengthened by the fact that Kierkegaard was clearly familiar with Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics. As has been seen, he had already used these lectures in The Concept of Irony, where he quotes from them directly. Indeed, as was noted, he also quotes from them in this section of Either/Or.147 Even more important are his reading notes to the third volume of these lectures. These notes, which are quite detailed, come from the years 1841–42 (i.e., just prior to Either/Or).148 Here it is clear that Kierkegaard has read carefully Section III, “The Several Generic Types of Poetry.” Under this heading come “A) Epic Poetry, B) Lyric Poetry and C) Dramatic Poetry.” Therefore, there can be no doubt that Kierkegaard was familiar with Hegel’s analysis. It is in his final section on dramatic poetry that Hegel discusses the differences between ancient and modern drama analyzed in the previous paragraph; indeed, Hegel’s section is entitled, “The Difference Between Ancient and Modern Drama.” This is strikingly 145 146 147 148

Hegel, Aesthetics II, p. 1226; Jub., vol. 14, p. 567. Hegel, Aesthetics II, pp. 1225–1226; Jub., vol. 14, p. 566. EO1, p. 147; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 146–147. JP, vol. 2, 1592; SKS, vol. 19, p. 245, Not8:51. JP, vol. 2, 1593; SKS, vol. 19, p. 246, Not8:53. JP, vol. 5, 5545; SKS, vol. 19, pp. 285–286, Not10:1. See also JP, vol. 2, 1591; SKS, vol. 19, p. 237, Not8:39.1.

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similar to Kierkegaard’s title “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic of Modern Drama.” At the beginning of his treatment the esthete indicates that he intends to change the story of Antigone to suit his own purposes. He briefly explains the main events of the narrative and then hints that he wishes to make some modifications: “So, then, the family of Labdakos is the object of the indignation of the gods: Oedipus has killed the sphinx, liberated Thebes; Oedipus has murdered his father, married his mother; and Antigone is the fruit of this marriage. So it goes in the Greek tragedy. Here I deviate. With me, everything is the same, and yet everything is different.”149 The esthete thus uses some of the fundamental aspects of the plot as his point of departure and then goes on to indicate which changes in the story he wishes to make. He proposes the following: “Everyone knows that he [Oedipus] has killed the sphinx and freed Thebes, and Oedipus is hailed and admired and is happy in his marriage with Jocasta. The rest is hidden from the people’s eyes, and no suspicion has ever brought this horrible dream into the world of actuality. Only Antigone knows it.”150 The difference that the esthete wishes to introduce is that no one besides Antigone knows that Oedipus has killed his father and married his mother. All of the rest of Thebes regard the marriage as a legitimate and happy one. The esthete then analyzes Antigone’s situation in terms of the concept of anxiety. Due to its inward nature, anxiety is a modern emotion. Like Hegel, Kierkegaard’s esthete uses Hamlet as an example of a modern tragic figure characterized specifically by this emotion: “Anxiety, therefore, belongs essentially to the tragic. Hamlet is such a tragic figure because he suspects his mother’s crime.”151 The esthete’s claim is that sorrow is what characterizes ancient Greek tragedy, whereas anxiety is what characterizes modern tragedy. Then it becomes clear why he wishes to make the modification he does in the story of Antigone in the original of Sophocles, Antigone suffers sorrow but not anxiety, while in the esthete’s modern version she suffers from anxiety due to the secret that she knows about Oedipus. The esthete uses Hegel’s analysis in his characterization of the ancient world as lacking in subjective reflection, which is the sign of modern thought. The esthete writes, using very Hegelian language: “the ancient world did not have subjectivity reflected in itself. Even if the individual moved freely, he nevertheless rested in substantial determinants, in the state, the family, in fate. This substantial determinant is the essential fateful factor in Greek tragedy and is its essential characteristic.”152 This 149 151 152

150 EO1, p. 154; SKS, vol. 2, p. 153. EO1, p. 154; SKS, vol. 2, p. 153. EO1, p. 155; SKS, vol. 2, p. 154. EO1, p. 143; SKS, vol. 2, p. 143. See also EO1, p. 149; SKS, vol. 2, p. 148. EO1, p. 154; SKS, vol. 2, p. 152. EO1, pp. 155–156; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 154–155.

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characterization is drawn directly from Hegel’s analysis which sees the substance of the Greek ethical life as resting in the institutions of the family and the state. The esthete’s characterization of modern tragedy also has a profoundly Hegelian ring to it: “in the modern period situation and character are in fact predominant. The tragic hero is subjectively reflected in himself, and this reflection has not only reflected him out of every immediate relation to state, kindred, and fate but often has even reflected him out of his own past life.”153 This follows very closely Hegel’s account of modern tragedy which sees the element of reflection as being first introduced by modern tragedy. Hamlet, the modern tragic figure par excellence, is characterized by reflection. Kierkegaard’s esthete now compares the two versions in order to illustrate the difference between the ancient and the modern accounts. He first takes the original story by Sophocles: “In Greek tragedy, Antigone is not occupied at all with her father’s unfortunate fate. This rests like an impregnable sorrow on the whole family.”154 There is thus a general sense of sorrow surrounding the history of the family but no anxiety. The esthete then goes on to analyze the modern story of Antigone that he proposes (i.e., Antigone alone knows of Oedipus’ incestuous marriage). He contrasts the Antigone of Sophocles with his own version: “Whereas the Greek Antigone goes on living so free from care that, if this new fact had not come up, one could imagine her life as even happy in its gradual unfolding, our Antigone’s life, on the other hand, is essentially at an end.”155 In contrast to the ancient Antigone, the esthete’s Antigone is consumed inwardly by the secret that is hers alone. Hence, she cannot live happily or be carefree like the Greek Antigone. Kierkegaard’s esthete distinguishes between two tragic collisions in his version of the story. The first is the conflict between protecting the good name of Oedipus and Antigone’s own happiness prior to the entr´ee of Haemon. With respect to her familial duties, he writes: “She is proud of her secret, proud that she had been selected in a singular way to save the honor and glory of the lineage of Oedipus. When the grateful nation acclaims Oedipus with praise and thanksgiving, she feels her own significance, and her secret sinks deeper and deeper into her soul, ever more inaccessible to any living being.”156 Thus, Antigone feels honored to carry the secret alone, and by so doing she is responsible for Oedipus’ success and is linked with his fate. This secret separates her from everyone else. Her duty is to extol and maintain the memory of Oedipus. Antigone gladly sacrifices her own personal happiness and lives in suffering with her secret in order to preserve the good name of Oedipus: “She dedicates her life to sorrowing over her father’s fate, over her own.”157 153 155 157

EO1, p. 143; SKS, vol. 2, p. 143. EO1, p. 156; SKS, vol. 2, p. 155. EO1, p. 158; SKS, vol. 2, p. 156.

154 156

EO1, p. 155; SKS, vol. 2, p. 154. EO1, p. 157; SKS, vol. 2, p. 156.

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The second collision is when Haemon enters the scene, and Antigone must sacrifice her love for him in order to keep the secret.158 Antigone’s most sacred duty toward Oedipus comes into conflict when she falls in love with Haemon. She is bound morally to keep the secret and thus to honor her father: “To confide in any other living being now would be to dishonor her father; her life acquires meaning for her in its devotion to showing him the last honors daily, almost hourly, by her unbroken silence.”159 But to keep a secret from one she loves (i.e., Haemon) would be a betrayal of that love. Kierkegaard’s esthete describes this as follows: “Now my Antigone is no ordinary girl, and her dowry likewise is not ordinary – her pain. Without this dowry, she cannot belong to any man – that, she feels, would be taking too great a risk. To conceal it from such an observant person would be impossible; to wish to have it concealed would be a breach of her love – but with it can she belong to him?”160 If Antigone keeps the secret to herself, then she is pious to her father Oedipus but untrue to her lover Haemon. If, by contrast, she reveals her family secret to Haemon, then while she is true to him, she sullies the reputation of her father. Kierkegaard’s esthete imagines the situation of this second collision and the tragic end of this modern Antigone. Haemon knows that Antigone is keeping some sort of a secret from him and does everything he can to extract it from her. He knows clearly of her deep piety and veneration for her father and pleads with her in his name to reveal the secret. This only makes Antigone suffer more since it is precisely for the sake of her father that she keeps the secret. As long as she lives, Antigone must endure the torment of keeping the secret in the face of Haemon’s entreaties. According to the esthete, when she yields and betrays the secret of Oedipus to him, she must die: “Only in the moment of her death can she confess the fervency of her love; only in the moment she does not belong to him can she confess that she belongs to him.”161 Antigone cannot continue to live with the thought that she has betrayed the memory of her father, and thus she must die. But up until that point, her life is nothing but suffering due to her harboring the secret. This is for Kierkegaard’s esthete a truly tragic situation in the modern sense. Aside from the esthete’s use of Hegel’s definition of modern tragedy to recast the Antigone, he takes over a number of other aspects of Hegel’s analysis. One point of similarity is the esthete’s understanding of history and the role of the individual, which is decidedly influenced by Hegel. In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes: “As far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a child of his time.”162 The

158 160 162

159 EO1, p. 161; SKS, vol. 2, p. 159. EO1, p. 163; SKS, vol. 2, p. 161. 161 EO1, p. 164; SKS, vol. 2, p. 162. EO1, pp. 162–163; SKS, vol. 2, p. 161. Hegel, PR, Preface, p. 21; Jub., vol. 7, p. 35. Quoted in Chapter 3, footnote 88.

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esthete seems to paraphrase this when he says: “Every individual, however original he is, is still a child of God, of his age, of his nation, of his family, of his friends, and only in them does he have his truth.”163 There seems to be a tension between this statement and Kierkegaard’s repeated statements about the absolute, irreducible nature of the individual. In a similar vein, the esthete writes at the very beginning of the chapter: “If someone were to say: ‘The tragic, after all, is always the tragic,’ I would not have very much to urge to the contrary, inasmuch as every historical development always lies within the sphere of the concept.”164 This also seems to follow Hegel’s conception of history in terms of a general concept of the historical period. In the first case, it is the individual who is equated with the whole, and in the second, it is the individual historical phenomena. In both cases the emphasis is placed upon the wider perspective beyond the individual. These passages square with at least the one strand of The Concept of Irony where Kierkegaard also employs a Hegelian understanding of history in terms of the development of the abstract Concept. Perhaps the most obvious point of contact in this section is when the esthete alludes to Hegel directly and quotes from the Lectures on Aesthetics. Here the esthete comments upon Hegel’s understanding of compassion or pity: It is well known that Aristotle maintains that tragedy should arouse fear and compassion in the spectator. I recall that Hegel in his Aesthetics picks up this comment and on each of these points makes a double observation, which, however, is not very exhaustive. . . . Hegel notes that there are two kinds of compassion, the usual kind that turns its attention to the finite side of suffering, and the truly tragic compassion. This observation is altogether correct but to me of less importance, since that universal emotion is a misunderstanding that can befall modern tragedy just as much as ancient tragedy. But what he adds with regard to true compassion is true and powerful: “das wahrhafte Mitleiden ist im Gegentheil die Sympathie mit der zugleich sittlichen Berechtigung des Leidenden.”165

Clearly, the esthete’s assessment of Hegel’s conception of compassion is in fact quite positive. He wishes merely to supplement it or to point out a different aspect, but there is no trace of criticism here; on the contrary, Hegel’s assessment is lauded as “true and powerful.” The esthete then goes on to indicate the difference between his view and that of Hegel: “Whereas Hegel considers compassion more in general and its differentiation in the difference of individualities, I prefer to stress the difference in compassion in relation to the difference in tragic guilt.”166

163 165

EO1, p. 145; SKS, vol. 2, p. 142. EO1, p. 147; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 146–147.

164 166

EO1, p. 139; SKS, vol. 2, p. 139. EO1, p. 147; SKS, vol. 2, p. 147.

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Finally, the esthete, like Hegel, uses the concept of dialectic. This is of particular interest since Kierkegaard hails himself as a dialectical thinker and uses a dialectical methodology in any number of other works. In connection with the issue of tragic guilt the esthete writes, “Here I am face to face again with the curious dialectic that places the family’s iniquities in relation to the individual. This is what is inherited. Ordinarily, dialectic is thought to be rather abstract – one thinks almost solely of logical operations. But life will quickly teach a person that there are many kinds of dialectic, that almost every passion has its own.”167 Here it is clear that Kierkegaard’s esthete is speaking of Hegel’s dialectic since the passage concerns the relation of the universal, in this case, the family, to the particular (i.e., the family member).168 In any case, the issue of dialectic is one that Hegel and Kierkegaard share, even though Kierkegaard has a conception of dialectic that removes it from purely logical analysis and puts it in the sphere of actuality and life. From this analysis it seems clear that Kierkegaard’s use of Antigone is very much inspired by Hegel’s accounts of this work. Even though what Kierkegaard does with it is original, it is clear that he takes his point of departure in Hegel’s distinction between ancient and modern tragedy. It is conceivable, indeed probable, that Hegel’s section, “The Difference Between Ancient and Modern Drama,” from the Lectures on Aesthetics was a source of inspiration or even a model for his chapter “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic of Modern Drama.” In addition, the esthete seems to use Hegel’s Antigone interpretation from the Phenomenology, as is evidenced by his talk of ethical substance and reflectivity. Thus, even though the esthete changes the story and thus analyzes a different version of it than Hegel, the changes he makes are based on Hegel’s definition of modern tragedy, and thus the esthete’s account is still full of Hegelian elements.

v. the aesthetic validity of marriage: “love’s dialectic” As some commentators have noted, Judge Wilhelm seems to employ Hegelian methodology in his discussion of love and marriage in the first chapter of Part Two, “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage.”169 It has been claimed that Hegel’s doctrine of mediation can be seen in Judge Wilhelm’s argument that the immediate impulse of love must be 167 168

169

EO1, p. 159; SKS, vol. 2, p. 158. See also EO1, p. 151; SKS, vol. 2, p. 150. It is this relation of universal to particular that Kierkegaard later develops with the concept of repetition, which is explored in Chapter 6, Section I. In addition, the issue of hereditary sin and the relation of the individual to the human race in general is explored in The Concept of Anxiety. EO2, pp. 17–32 and ff.; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 26–38 and ff.

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mediated and transformed into the institution and ethical union of marriage.170 In this chapter, another three-step dialectical movement is discernible. Judge Wilhelm refers to this as “love’s dialectic.”171 This movement illustrates yet another well-known aspect of Hegel’s dialectical methodology, namely, that of immediacy and mediation. Although he ignores Part One entirely, Thulstrup addresses the apparently Hegelian elements in each chapter of Part Two. With regard to “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage,” he cannot help but admit that there are a number of parallels between Judge Wilhelm’s analysis and Hegel,172 although he attempts to minimize these in a number of different ways. Instead of simply admitting the existence of the Hegelian elements and then claiming that they are ironic as he did in his interpretation of The Concept of Irony, Thulstrup here tries to find a reason to reject the individual elements on an ad hoc basis. He acknowledges that Judge Wilhelm’s account of the movement from immediate romantic love to love in the sphere of reflection in the institution of marriage is essentially Hegelian,173 but he nevertheless insists that there are decisive differences. He claims Judge Wilhelm cannot be a Hegelian since he is a clear proponent of free will, whereas Hegel was a determinist. Thulstrup writes: “Judge Wilhelm is just not a spokesman for this notion. His whole reasoning process proceeds in the sphere of freedom, not in that of necessity, where the possibilities of choice are genuine and not illusory as in Hegel.”174 As an argument, this of course has nothing to do with the analysis of love and marriage which is at issue. Moreover, this evinces a profound (yet regrettably widespread) misunderstanding of Hegel’s notion of necessity. Hegel was a compatibilist and not a determinist, which, as will be seen later, is something Kierkegaard understood better than Thulstrup. It will be recalled from Chapter 2, Section II, that Kierkegaard was inspired by Hegel’s dialectical movement from immediacy, to mediation, to mediated immediacy, which he presumably knew from Heiberg’s discussions of it in his works on aesthetics. In the early journal entry examined there, Kierkegaard attempts to sketch a revised version of this scheme, which adds a fourth stage. From the discussion in Either/Or, it is clear 170

171 172 173 174

See Harald Høffding, Søren Kierkegaard som Filosof, Copenhagen and Kristiania: Gydendalske Boghandel 1892, pp. 92ff. See also his “Søren Kierkegaard,” in his Danske Filosofer, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag 1909, p. 158. EO2, p. 18; SKS, vol. 3, p. 27. See Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., p. 324. See ibid., p. 326. See ibid., p. 327. See p. 323: “By means of this poetic work to confront the reader with an alternative between the esthetic and the ethical attitude toward life, there is a clear indication of the rejection of the speculative mode of development in which individual choice is illusory because the process originates and continues with necessity, not freedom, for the individual as well as for world history.”

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that Kierkegaard is still fascinated by the basic Hegelian structure. Judge Wilhelm’s discussion follows the Hegelian triad perfectly.175 The first stage Judge Wilhelm portrays is that of romantic love, the concept of love advocated by the young esthete. The essential characteristics of this concept of love are immediacy and sensuality. Judge Wilhelm describes this stage as follows: “First I shall indicate the characteristics of romantic love. One could say in a single word: it is immediate. To see her and to love her would be one and the same.”176 The language here of “immediacy” is obviously Hegelian. In romantic love there is no calculating or rational consideration of feelings but rather an immediate, spontaneous impulse. Romantic love is a simple reaction to the object of desire, and precisely in this simplicity one finds its charm. Judge Wilhelm continues his characterization of this concept: “Romantic love manifests itself as immediate by exclusively resting in natural necessity. It is based on beauty.”177 This kind of love has its beginning in a natural sensuous reaction evoked by the beloved. The esthete extols this feeling. The romantic advocates giving it free rein and criticizes everything that hinders it as repressive and evil. This concept is now examined dialectically as the Judge goes in search of its internal contradiction, which will lead to its Aufhebung. Not surprisingly, the natural element of romantic love constitutes the contradiction in the concept. Since it is based on the sensuous, it is not stable. Romantic love is impulsive and can only exist in the spontaneous moments of sensuous desire, beyond which it has no enduring features. Thus, romantic love collapses into individual moments. Judge Wilhelm explains the contradiction as follows: Although this love is based essentially on the sensuous, it nevertheless is noble by virtue of the consciousness of the eternal that it assimilates, for it is this that distinguishes all love from lust: that it bears a stamp of eternity. The lovers are deeply convinced that in itself their relationship is a complete whole that will never be changed. But since this conviction is substantiated only by a natural determinant, the eternal is based on the temporal and thereby cancels itself.178

Romantic love takes itself to be eternal but has no such principle within itself; on the contrary, it is grounded in transitory desire. It knows only momentary satisfaction and has no glimpse of the eternal. Thus, it proves contradictory and is aufgehoben in the sense of negated, yet an aspect of it will be preserved and resurrected at the third stage. 175

176 178

It will be noted that when Kierkegaard comes to treat the issue of love and marriage again in Stages on Life’s Way, he avails himself of the same structural movement. SL, pp. 156–175; SKS, vol. 6, pp. 146–163. 177 EO2, p. 21; SKS, vol. 3, p. 29. EO2, pp. 19–20; SKS, vol. 3, p. 28. EO2, p. 21; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 29–30.

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The view that is posited next as the claim opposed to romantic love is the marriage of convenience or the love of reflection. Just as immediacy is the sphere of romantic love, so also reflection and rational calculation represent the sphere of the marriage of convenience. Judge Wilhelm introduces this concept as follows: “The second way out, the respectable way, was the marriage of convenience. One immediately hears in the designation that the sphere of reflection has been entered.”179 For Judge Wilhelm, the marriage of reflection is a typical outgrowth of the age of reflection, which subjects everything to rational consideration. The marriage of reflection is based on a sense of resignation or cynicism about the possibility of true love. It satisfies itself with the ceremony and outward trappings of marriage and does not expect more. This view scoffs at the romantic and regards all talk of love as sentimental nonsense. This clearly corresponds to the sphere of mediation for Hegel, which was described previously with the example of self-alienated spirit.180 Here there is no longer any immediate or spontaneous feeling since the marriage of convenience is governed wholly by calculated pragmatic concerns. This conception also falls victim to self-contradiction when examined closely. It sets its object beyond the prospective spouse in some pragmatic consideration such as money or status: “It is a motive foreign to the marriage itself that becomes the decisive factor – for example, out of love of her family a young girl marries a man who is able to rescue it.”181 But these contingent external considerations are, like spontaneous desire, transitory and cannot provide a stable basis for the eternal. As Judge Wilhelm puts it: “Consequently, the eternal, which as already indicated above, belongs to every marriage, is not really present here, for a commonsensical calculation is always temporal.”182 Thus, the marriage of convenience is also based on the contingent and collapses under the weight of its own internal contradiction (i.e., its pretence to be eternal rather than grounded in finite, calculated self-interest). Judge Wilhelm now indicates that his task is to unite these two attempts into a third view that, on the one hand, preserves their positive features while, on the other, avoiding their contradictions. The beauty of immediacy and spontaneity that characterize romantic love must be preserved without the transitoriness and mutability of passion and desire. Likewise, the caution and prudence of the marriage of convenience must be preserved, but its cynical lovelessness must be overcome. Judge Wilhelm puts forth the challenge of this third view, the view of love within marriage, as follows: “The question remains whether the immediate, the

179 181

EO2, pp. 26–27; SKS, vol. 3, p. 35. EO2, pp. 27–28; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 35–36.

180 182

Chapter 2, Section II. EO2, p. 27; SKS, vol. 3, p. 35.

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first love, by being caught up into a higher, concentric immediacy, would not be secure against this skepticism so that the married love would not need to plough under the first love’s beautiful hopes, but the marital love would itself be the first love with the addition of qualifications that would not detract from it but would ennoble it.”183 Again drawing on Hegelian language, Judge Wilhelm indicates that the task is to characterize marriage as a “higher concentric unity” that unites and sublates the two previous stages. For Judge Wilhelm, love within the institution of marriage represents the satisfactory concept in the dialectic of love. In it the two previous views are aufgehoben to form an internally consistent third view: “Therefore, inasmuch as in the foregoing I have indicated romantic love and reflective love as confrontational positions, it will be clearly apparent here to what extent the higher unity is a return to the immediate, to what extent this contains, in addition to the something more that it contains, that which was implicit in the first.”184 This final stage is what Hegel calls “the mediated immediacy.”185 The immediate feeling of spontaneous love is preserved, but it is contained within the mediated relationship of marriage. It should be noted here that Judge Wilhelm’s doctrine of marriage is essentially Hegelian with respect to its content. In the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopaedia, Hegel treats the concept of marriage.186 In both places he argues that in marriage the immediate feelings of love that come from nature are aufgehoben and brought into an ethical [sittliche] relation by spirit. From this discussion it is clear that Judge Wilhelm is as much a Hegelian as the esthete at least with respect to methodology. Even though the content of their discussions and arguments is different, they employ essentially the same methodology. Once again a dialectical movement through three distinct stages is discernible, and once again Hegel’s doctrine of the dialectical movement from immediacy to mediation to mediated immediacy is clearly illustrated here. In this chapter I have confined myself to an analysis of a handful of passages and by so doing have neglected a number of other discussions that also display distinct Hegelian elements. For example, I have not examined the esthete’s account of “the unhappiest one,” which in the text itself is explicitly compared with Hegel’s celebrated discussion of the unhappy consciousness in the “Self-Consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology 183 185

186

184 EO2, p. 30; SKS, vol. 3, p. 38. EO2, pp. 29–30; SKS, vol. 3, p. 37. In his sketch of this in Stages on Life’s Way, this stage is referred to in profoundly Hegelian terms as a “new immediacy.” SL, pp. 162; SKS, vol. 6, pp. 151–152. SL, pp. 163; SKS, vol. 6, p. 152. Hegel, PR, §§ 161–169; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 239–249. Phil. of Mind, §§ 519–522; Jub., vol. 10, pp. 399–400. See Robert Lee Perkins, “The Family: Hegel and Kierkegaard’s Judge Wilhelm,” Hegel-Jahrbuch, 1967, pp. 89–100.

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of Spirit.187 In addition, in his Preface Victor Eremita uses the terms “the inner” and “the outer,” which have been taken to be Hegelian.188 I likewise pass over this issue here since it will be treated in some detail later.189 These passages have been left aside since they are not particularly relevant to the themes that I have selected as the main ones for the present chapter. The nature of the use of Hegel in Either/Or is different from that of The Concept of Irony. In the former there are no extended analyses of his primary texts, and Hegel does not dominate the discussion as he did in parts of the dissertation. As a result, one has the sense that in Either/Or Kierkegaard has more thoroughly developed his own literary voice (albeit through pseudonyms). While Kierkegaard’s use of Hegel in The Concept of Irony was generally a straightforward appropriation of specific analyses, here it is much more varied. The present chapter has demonstrated that Hegel’s presence in Either/Or takes many forms. (1) The analysis of Antigone and of the notion of modern tragedy (Section IV) provides an example of the fact that, as in The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard uses specific discussions in Hegel as sources of inspiration. He takes certain ideas and analyses from Hegel as starting points and then develops them in his own way. However, his use of Hegel here is considerably more free than it was in The Concept of Irony. In the dissertation he follows very closely Hegel’s analyses of, for example, Socrates and Romantic irony. In Either/Or, by contrast, he uses Hegel’s account of Antigone, but his own reconstruction and reinterpretation of the story is the focal point. (2) In addition, the two authors, A and B, use Hegel’s dialectical methodology in their respective analyses. Examples of this have been seen with the esthete’s dialectic of the work of art (Section III) as well as Judge Wilhelm’s dialectic of love (Section V). These discussions display some of the best-known features of Hegel’s method. In a Hegelian fashion, the former analysis places the criterion for the great work of art first on the side of the object in the form of the raw material of the work of art (in-itself ), then on the side of the subject in the form of the talent and ability of the artist independent of the given material (for-itself ), and finally in the unity of the two in the idea of the work of art (in-and-for-itself ). In Judge Wilhelm’s analysis, the concept of love is traced in its movement through the Hegelian stages of immediacy (romantic love), mediation (marriage of convenience), to mediated immediacy (love in marriage). (3) Not only do both pseudonymous authors individually use the dialectical methodology in their respective analyses of sundry topics, but the 187 188

EO1, p. 222; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 215–216. See Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: University of California Press 1980, p. 240. 189 See Chapter 7, Section III. EO1, pp. 4–5; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 12–13.

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positions they represent themselves also stand in some kind of a dialectical relation to one another. At first glance, it seems as if the two points of view are supposed to be in a straightforward nondialectical opposition, constituting an absolute either/or with no possibility of mediation or compromise. Yet, there is nevertheless a kind of dialectic at work in the two views portrayed in the two volumes of the work. The aesthetic is first presented as a possible view, and then the ethical is opposed to it. But the two opposing views do not remain in a static opposition but rather enter into a dialogue with each other. The ethical is not a simple opposition, rather it contains the aesthetic within itself and thus represents the dialectical Aufhebung of the aesthetic. The esthete is a nondialectical thinker who sees two unmoving opposites: “He still persists in thinking that the ethical lies outside the aesthetic, and this even though he himself must admit that life gains beauty through the ethical view.”190 But Judge Wilhelm, the ethical individual, is dialectical; he sees the ethical as a higher form that encompasses the aesthetic. Judge Wilhelm devotes much of his argument to showing how the ethical interprets the aesthetic categories at a higher level. For example, marriage is the sublation, not the simple negation, of immediate desire. Thus, the two possibilities that are presented are not really on an equal footing since it seems clear that Kierkegaard cannot help but prefer the ethical to the aesthetic. In some of Kierkegaard’s other works, there is a sense in which a third category, “the religious,” comes to complement the first two. The question is whether or not this is a genuine third category or whether it should be understood as an aspect of the ethical. Here in Either/Or, Kierkegaard has still not thoroughly developed this third category, and at this point the ethical and the religious are still mixed together. Yet the later addition of this third category to the initial dichotomy seems to imply that the two original opposing terms are not the final word, but rather that there is in fact a triadic structure akin to Hegel’s. It seems to imply that the two views presented in Either/Or cannot remain in a static opposition but must enter into a dialectical movement that results in a third term or a higher unity.191 Of course, it should be noted that the movement from aesthetic to ethical to religious is not, strictly speaking, dialectical in Hegel’s sense due to the fact that the aesthetic and the ethical do not represent conceptual opposites in the way that, for example, being and nothing do. But given the analyses in the present chapter as well as preceding chapters,192 there can be no doubt about the fact that Hegel was one of Kierkegaard’s most important sources of inspiration for the development of the theory 190 191

192

EO2, p. 299; SKS, vol. 3, p. 283. See the discussion in CUP1, p. 294; SKS, vol. 7, pp. 268f. Here Kierkegaard associates the stages, the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious with immediacy, mediation, and mediated immediacy. Chapter 2, Section II.

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of stages. Perhaps one can find in this one of the most interesting aspects of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel in Either/Or. Even though Kierkegaard seems to indicate his rejection of Hegelian mediation with the title of the work and its insistence on an absolute dichotomy along with the emphasis on the sphere of freedom, a closer look reveals that in fact the views presented in the body of the text are still profoundly stamped with Hegel’s speculative thought. It may seem as if Hegel plays a relatively minor role here in Either/Or given the fact that in two large tomes only a few passages bear a marked similarity to his methodology or actual doctrines or analyses. But this misses the point since, as has been noted, it is the very conception of the work as a dichotomous either/or that is at some level a reaction to Hegel’s notion of mediation and Aufhebung. In this sense, Hegel is the motivation of the entire work or at least its structure and general conception (Sections I and II). Either/Or represents Kierkegaard’s first published response to the contemporary debate about this aspect of Hegel’s logic, but the issue will continue to exercise him for the next several years. Seen in the context of Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel as a whole, Either/Or can be regarded in some ways as the crowning point of his initial period of development. All of the main texts from this first period – From the Papers of One Still Living, The Concept of Irony, and Either/Or – show clear signs of a profound Hegelian influence. Kierkegaard has no objections to using specific analyses from Hegel and co-opting his dialectical methodology. Moreover, although he raises an occasional critical point or modifies one or another of Hegel’s views, there is rarely a polemical tone vis-`a-vis Hegel himself. If by some strange historical accident only these three works survived from Kierkegaard’s entire corpus, then one would probably conclude that the author was a Hegelian at least to some degree. It was after this period that his relation to Hegel became more complicated. It is worth examining in detail the reasons for the change. On March 1, 1843, Heiberg published a brief and dismissive bookreview of Either/Or in his journal Intelligensblade.193 The significance of this snub can only be appreciated once one understands the nature of Kierkegaard’s relation to Heiberg up until that point. As has been noted previously, Kierkegaard had done his best to make a place for himself in the Heiberg circle. He attempted to publish From the Papers of One Still Living in Heiberg’s journal Perseus. Knowing that Heiberg was an enthusiast of Hegel, Kierkegaard demonstrated a familiarity with Hegel’s thought, which he overtly employed in The Concept of Irony and Either/Or. In both texts Heiberg and his works are frequently referred to in a very

193

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Litterær Vintersæd,” Intelligensblade, vol. 2, no. 24, March 1, 1843, pp. 285–292. ASKB U 56.

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complimentary fashion.194 In Either/Or there is a long analysis of The First Love,195 a comedy by another of Heiberg’s favorites, the French playwright Augustin Eug`ene Scribe (1791–1891), which Heiberg had translated into Danish and which was a success at Copenhagen’s Royal Theater. In June 1842 Kierkegaard published an article, entitled “Public Confession,” in which he criticizes the Hegelians, Rasmus Nielsen, Peter Michael Stilling, Andreas Frederik Beck as well as the founder of Tivoli, Georg Johan Bernhard Carstensen (1812–57), but yet Heiberg is mentioned positively.196 In a later journal entry he writes of this article, “As early as the article ‘Public Confession’ there was a signal shot . . . suggesting that Professor Heiberg was the literary figure I wanted to protect; he and Mynster both were mentioned there and as unmistakably as possible.”197 At this same time there was a dispute between Heiberg and Carstensen that was occasioned by an article by Heiberg in the Intelligensblade.198 Concerning this Kierkegaard writes in his later journals, “I was once offered 100 rd. per ark by Carstensen, at the time he had Figaro or Portefeuillon, for an article against Heiberg.”199 Despite this lucrative offer, Kierkegaard declined to criticize Heiberg publicly at this time. All of this evidence indicates that the young Kierkegaard held Heiberg in great esteem and was anxious to win his praise. This explains his consternation with Heiberg’s public condemnation of Either/Or. Heiberg’s negative review, entitled “Literary Winter Crops,” was an incontrovertible rebuff. In the review Heiberg takes up a discussion of the books that were published in winter, including Either/Or, which he treats metaphorically as a kind of winter crop. He introduces the book thus: Further, in recent days, like a lightning bolt from a clear sky, a monster of a book has fallen suddenly down into our reading public; I mean the work consisting of two large and thick volumes or of fifty-four large sheets with small print, Either/Or by Victor Eremita. It is therefore almost with respect to its volume that the book must be called a monster, for it is already impressive in its size before one yet knows what spirit lives in it, and I do not doubt that if the author wanted to let it be exhibited for money, he would take in just as much as by letting it be read for money.200

194

195 196 197 198 199 200

CI, p. 26; SKS, vol. 1, p. 88. CI, p. 329; SKS, vol. 1, p. 357. EO1, p. 105; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 108–109. EO1, p. 109; SKS, vol. 2, p. 112. EO1, p. 110; SKS, vol. 2, p. 113. EO1, p. 130; SKS, vol. 2, p. 132. EO2, p. 63; SKS, vol. 3, p. 69. EO1, pp. 231–279; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 225–270. In COR, pp. 3–12; SV1, vol. 13, pp. 397–406; Fædrelandet, no. 904, June 12, 1842. JP, vol. 5, 6201; Pap. IX A 166. See also JP, vol. 6, 6748, p. 395; Pap. X-6 B 171, p. 261. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Smaa Skjermydsler,” Intelligensblade, vol. 1, no. 9, July 15, 1842, pp. 224–228. JP, vol. 6, 6624; Pap. X-3 A 99. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Litterær Vintersæd,” op. cit., p. 288.

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Heiberg’s tone is flippant, suggesting that he does not take the work seriously. He makes fun of the book for its inordinate length before saying a word about its content; he shows an utter lack of deference towards the author and the work under examination. In the critical part of the review, Heiberg imagines a fictional reader and his problems in grappling with the cumbersome text. He describes this reader with the impersonal pronoun “one,” something which Kierkegaard constantly harps on in his response. Heiberg criticizes the work in the first line for being badly organized and difficult to follow. He writes: One finds oneself thus for the first in Either, and here one does not find oneself very well, for one notices that one has not nearly as much time as the author. It is an unpleasant, awkward walk when one constantly has the feeling of wanting to be ahead of the person who is holding one under the arm. One comes across many piquant reflections; some of them are perhaps even profound; one does not know for certain, for when one believes one has seen a point . . . one once again becomes disoriented. One becomes impatient about the fact that the author’s uncommon brilliance, learning and stylistic ability are not united with an ability for organization which could let the ideas spring forth plastically.201

The assessment here seems to be mixed; while the work is praised for its display of learning and command of style, it is criticized for being disorganized and a bit boring. These few positive words seem hardly to have been enough for Kierkegaard. Heiberg goes on to discuss the “Diary of the Seducer,” which he criticizes as being shocking to morality. He writes: One now hastens to the “Diary of the Seducer,” for already the title implies that this production must be more creative than critical. And in a way one is not disappointed in this expectation, but one is disgusted, one is nauseated, one is revolted, and one asks oneself not whether it is possible for a person to be like this seducer but whether it is possible that an author can be so constituted that he finds pleasure in setting himself into a character of this kind and in working out this character in his quiet thoughts.202

It should be noted that Heiberg is not a simple bourgeois prude in this regard since he goes on to relish the thought of how this chapter will offend the moralists. Nonetheless he does not seem to find much of redeeming value in this part of Either/Or. After having finished Part One, Heiberg’s imagined reader “closes the book and says, ‘Enough! I have enough of Either, and I’ll not have any Or.’”203 Heiberg does, however, give a very cursory assessment of Part Two, which is generally positive. 201 203

Ibid., pp. 289f. Ibid., p. 290.

202

Ibid., pp. 290f.

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Even though Kierkegaard’s work appeared pseudonymously, it seems the academic world was too small to conceal the identity of its author. Although Heiberg does not mention him by name, the tone of his review seems to indicate that he knows exactly whom he is criticizing, for the tone is clearly that of an older, established professor condescending to criticize the work of a young writer. From this point on Kierkegaard’s relation to Heiberg seems to have been wholly negative. Now for the first time he enters into polemics with the man who for a time he courted as a potential mentor. Either/Or was Kierkegaard’s first major independent work after his dissertation, the book with which he hoped to make a name for himself in the Danish literary world. Given how seriously he took his literary works and the high hopes that he doubtless had for this one, it does not take much effort to imagine his indignation with Heiberg. Kierkegaard replied to this review, again under the pseudonym of Victor Eremita, in a rather bitter and sarcastic article published in Fædrelandet on March 5, 1843, with the title, “A Word of Thanks to Professor Heiberg.”204 Here it is clear from the article that Kierkegaard thinks that Heiberg passed judgment on the work too hastily after only a cursory reading of it. Thus, he not surprisingly failed to grasp the upshot of its structure and the main points of its content. In his response Kierkegaard constantly talks about “one,” referring to Heiberg’s imaginary reader. In much the same tone Kierkegaard refers to Heiberg’s review in Prefaces.205 From the moment Heiberg’s review appeared Kierkegaard had nothing but disdain for him. Polemical comments directed against him are frequent throughout the works that Kierkegaard published after Either/Or. In a letter Hans Peter Holst (1811–93), his friend of youth, tells of Kierkegaard’s disappointment: Kierkegaard “was quite depressed by the fact that Heiberg would never really involve himself with his [Kierkegaard’s] writings or recognize him as a philosopher.”206 In his recollections of Kierkegaard, Hans Brøchner portrays the change in Kierkegaard’s relation to Heiberg, which he traces to the event of the review. He recounts how Heiberg was once being ridiculed by a pseudonymous pamphlet, which was a parody of his poem A Soul After Death (1841). He recalls, Kierkegaard “did not like Heiberg being made the object of such jest. He spoke with warmth of his [Heiberg’s] importance as an aesthetician and as the aesthetic educator of his generation in our country. K[ierkegaard] ranked H[eiberg] above all the contemporary 204 205 206

In COR, pp. 17–21; SV1, vol. 13, pp. 411–415; Fædrelandet, no. 1168, March 5, 1843. Translation slightly modified. P, p. 24; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 486–487. “H. P. Holst to H. P. Barfod,” September 13, 1869. Quoted from Encounters with Kierkegaard. A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 13.

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aestheticians in Germany.”207 But Kierkegaard’s positive assessment of Heiberg changed forever after the review. Brøchner continues: “Later, after Either/Or had appeared and Heiberg had written his well-known review of it, S.K. once spoke to me about him and made no secret of his displeasure at H[eiberg]’s behavior. He recognized Heiberg’s importance as an aesthetician, but now also emphatically emphasized his limitations. ‘I could name a whole series of aesthetic problems about which H[eiberg] hasn’t a clue.’”208 Here Brøchner portrays in no uncertain terms the review of Either/Or as the turning point in the relation. In a single moment Heiberg goes in Kierkegaard’s eyes from being the leading theorist of aesthetics of the age to being someone who has no idea about any number of problem constellations in the field. Given all this, there can be no doubt that Kierkegaard’s disposition toward Heiberg changed radically at this time. Reflecting on his intellectual development years later, Kierkegaard himself points to the change in his relation to Heiberg. There he states unambiguously that the review of Either/Or was the decisive factor: Then in the spring of 1843 came Either/Or. I had steadfastly expressed nothing but respectful devotion to Prof. Heiberg, had also received proofs of his favor; there is surely not one single syllable in the whole book Either/Or which can affront him, but there certainly are good words expressed for him, and yet Prof. H. could not resist a compulsion to make himself (falsely) important (in the Intelligentsblade), trying to make it ridiculous, saying it was such a big book, etc.; the whole thing was only a tap, but one for which he perhaps has paid and will continue to pay dearly.209

Kierkegaard explicitly portrays the review as the turning point with regard to his relation to Heiberg. He even intimates that he attempted to avenge this offense, presumably by means of his literary works, such as Prefaces. A part of his criticism of Heiberg was also a polemical stance against Heiberg’s intellectual hero, Hegel. Thus, it is only after this review that Kierkegaard begins his polemical rhetoric against Hegel. But although he overtly takes this stand against Hegel, his polemic, as should be clear from its motivation, is in fact with Heiberg (and the other Danish Hegelians). After Either/Or one finds nothing either in the journals or in the published works to indicate a renewed study of or interest in Hegel’s primary texts.210 If Kierkegaard’s later polemic was directed at Hegel per 207

208 209 210

Hans Brøchner, “Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard,” Det Nittende Aarhundrede, Maanedsskrift for Literatur og Kritik, vol. 5, March 1877, § 11. English translation cited from Encounters with Kierkegaard, tr. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., p. 231. Hans Brøchner, “Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard,” ibid., § 11. Encounters with Kierkegaard, ibid., p. 231. JP, vol. 6, 6748, p. 395; Pap. X-6 B 171, p. 261. Translation slightly modified. The sole exception to this is the unpublished manuscript, Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est, which was written in part concurrently with Either/Or.

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se, one would expect some evidence that Hegel’s works received at least enough further attention to cause Kierkegaard to reconsider his previous favorable evaluation of them. The absence of such evidence suggests Kierkegaard’s subsequent criticisms of Hegel were really directed at Heiberg. Thus, Kierkegaard first had a period, in which he was positively and openly influenced by Hegel. Then he entered into a period of polemics against above all Heiberg and as a result put on the appearance of pursuing a polemic against Hegel. Kierkegaard’s pro-Hegelian period clearly includes the texts treated so far in this investigation – From the Papers of One Still Living, The Concept of Irony and Either/Or. I will argue in the next chapter that Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est also displays a positive influence from one of Hegel’s primary texts and thus falls into this first period. In Chapter 6 Kierkegaard’s book Repetition will be explored. This work, I wish to argue, represents a transitional text since one finds in it at least a hint of a polemical criticism against Hegel himself. The second period, characterized by this criticism can be said to begin with Fear and Trembling, which contains several critical references to Hegel’s philosophy. Here Kierkegaard develops an important part of his strategy of revenge against Heiberg, namely the anti-Hegel polemic.

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5 KIERKEGAARD’S POLEMIC WITH MARTENSEN IN JOHANNES CLIMACUS, OR DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM EST

The name “Johannes Climacus” is well known as the pseudonymous author of the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. What is less well known is that Kierkegaard planned a work entitled, Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, in which he intended to treat a number of philosophical themes in a literary fashion. About fifty pages of the manuscript were written apparently between the last few months of 1842 and the first few of 18431 and were first published in Barfod’s edition of Kierkegaard’s journals.2 In this text Kierkegaard takes up a number of issues surrounding Hegel’s philosophy that were being discussed in Denmark at the time (e.g., the problem of the beginning of philosophy and the problem of systematic doubt). In tone and content, much of the work is satirical of Hegelianism in a way reminiscent of The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars. The work takes the form of an intellectual biography of a naive young student named Johannes Climacus. It recounts how he became fascinated by the most recent philosophical movements and above all by the claim that modern philosophy begins with doubt. The Introduction tells, among other things, of Climacus’ childhood and how his relation to his dialectical father prepared the way for his future philosophical contemplation. Part One relates how he begins his studies and comes into contact with discussions about “the recent philosophers.”3 He is captivated by the Latin phrase used in those discussions, “de omnibus dubitandum est,” or “everything must be doubted,” and vows to examine its implications at all costs. The body of Part One is filled with Climacus’ deliberations about three theses: “(1) Philosophy begins with doubt; (2) in order to philosophize,

1 2 3

The key for the dating of this manuscript is the journal entry, JP, vol. 3, 3300; SKS, vol. 18, p. 231, JJ:288. H. P. Barfod (ed.), Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1844–46, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag 1872, pp. 78–132. JC, p. 130; Pap. IV B 1, p. 113.

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one must have doubted; (3) modern philosophy begins with doubt.”4 In the first three chapters, Climacus takes each of these claims in turn and reduces them to contradictions and absurdities. After having exposed the confusions of the unnamed recent thinkers regarding these theses, Climacus vows at the beginning of Part Two to part company with the philosophers and no longer to pay any attention to them. Unfortunately, Part Two is only a few pages long and in much rougher form than the preceding text. In these few passages, however, the nature of consciousness and language is examined in a surprisingly Hegelian fashion. In a journal entry Kierkegaard recounts his plan for the work and how he intends for it to develop and end: Johannes does what we are told to do – he actually doubts everything – he suffers through all the pain of doing that, becomes cunning, almost acquires a bad conscience. When he has gone as far in that direction as he can go and wants to come back, he cannot do so. He perceives that in order to hold on to this extreme position of doubting everything, he has engaged all his mental and spiritual powers. If he abandons this extreme position, he may very well arrive at something, but in doing that he would have also abandoned his doubt about everything. Now he despairs, his life is wasted, his youth is spent in these deliberations. Life has not acquired any meaning for him, and all this is the fault of philosophy.5

Kierkegaard thus uses Johannes Climacus as a literary refutation of universal skeptical doubt. The professor of philosophy who preaches “de omnibus dubitandum est” promptly forgets it after coming down from the lectern. It is impossible for him to incorporate this universal skepticism into his daily life since one would simply not be able to function if absolutely everything were called into doubt at every instant. Kierkegaard creates in the character of Johannes Climacus someone who takes the maxim literally and really tries to think it through and to act consistently with it. The idea of the work seems then to be to show the impossibility and absurdity of this. In this way, the work can be seen as a literary refutation in the form of a reductio ad absurdum of the position of universal doubt. From this outline it appears to be primarily the disappointment and despair of Climacus that are still missing from the narrative. From this account of the plot alone it is far from clear what the main issue of this text has to do with Hegel. There are passages both in the body of the work and in various drafts that can be (and have been) read as a criticism of Hegel. For example, in the brief prefatory note to the text, there is a reference to “the system,”6 which has been associated 4 5 6

JC, p. 132; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 115–116. JC, Supplement, pp. 234–235; Pap. IV B 16. JC, p. 117; Pap. IV B 1, p. 103.

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with Hegel’s system.7 In the same note, the author characterizes his goal in the work as follows: “I . . . seek to counteract the detestable untruth that characterizes recent philosophy.”8 Predictably, this seems to some readers to be an unambiguous reference to Hegel’s philosophy. In the same journal entry cited previously, Kierkegaard makes it clear that the goal of De Omnibus is to criticize contemporary philosophy with the help of this intellectual biography: By means of the melancholy irony, which did not consist in any single utterance on the part of Johannes Climacus but in his whole life, by means of the profound earnestness involved in a young man’s being sufficiently honest and earnest enough to do quietly and unostentatiously what the philosophers say (and he thereby becomes unhappy) – I would strike a blow at philosophy.9

As previously, this reference to “philosophy” can be interpreted as a straightforward reference to Hegel’s philosophy in particular. Moreover, Hegel’s name appears several times in different drafts of De Omnibus.10 Finally, Hegel is associated with the fictional person of Johannes Climacus in a journal entry from January 20, 1839 (i.e., long before Kierkegaard began work on De Omnibus itself).11 All of this has been interpreted to mean that the text is to be viewed as an attempt at a kind of literary refutation of Hegel. De Omnibus can be regarded as Kierkegaard’s Candide. Just as Voltaire uses the character of a naive young man to refute Leibniz’s theory that ours is the best of all possible worlds, so also Kierkegaard uses Johannes Climacus, the naive young student, to refute the claims about skeptical doubt made by the Danish Hegelians. Voltaire seems to reduce Leibniz’s theory to absurdity by ironically portraying Candide’s stubborn adherence to it despite the terrible events taking place around him, which seem so obviously to refute it. Similarly, Johannes Climacus is firmly convinced that there must be something to the claims about the beginning of philosophy with doubt, and thus he analyzes these claims from several different directions in order to try to make sense of them. The challenge is to try to determine if there is a substantive philosophical criticism in De Omnibus or if it is merely a flippant satire.

7 8 10

11

See Hong’s first note to De Omnibus in his translation, JC, p. 321. 9 JC, Supplement, p. 234; Pap. IV B 16. JC, p. 117; Pap. IV B 1, p. 104. JC, Supplement, p. 246; Pap. IV B 2.4. JC, Supplement, p. 243; Pap. IV B 2.6. JC, Supplement, p. 246; Pap. IV B 2.16. JC, Supplement, p. 258; Pap. IV B 10.12. JC, Supplement, p. 262; Pap. IV B 13.9. JC, Supplement, pp. 264–265; Pap. IV B 13.17. JC, Supplement, p. 266; Pap. IV B 2.14. JC, Supplement, p. 231; SKS, vol. 17, p. 277, DD:203; JP, vol. 2, 1575: “Hegel is a Johannes Climacus who does not storm the heavens as do the giants – by setting mountain upon mountain – but climbs up to them by means of his syllogisms.”

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In the present chapter I will argue that in fact there is in the work no real pretense of a criticism of Hegel. On one hand, I will try to support this thesis negatively, first with regard to Part One of the text, by arguing that no substantial aspects of Hegel’s thought are present there. Although it might seem at first glance that some of the doctrines being examined by Johannes Climacus in Part One look something like those of Hegel, in fact none of them can be said to be found in Hegel’s works themselves. Part Two, however, contains an analysis of the chapter “Sense-Certainty” from the Phenomenology of Spirit. But while Hegel’s thought is indeed present in this part of the work, there is no criticism of it; on the contrary, it is used in a positive way. On the other hand, I will argue positively in support of the aforementioned thesis that the work’s true target of criticism is not Hegel but Kierkegaard’s old rival Martensen. While Martensen’s name does not appear in the text, the work is full of hidden allusions to him. Despite this, there is a tendency nevertheless to want to find in these allusions some aspect of Hegel’s thought. While, to his credit, Thulstrup is careful to identify the quotations from Martensen’s texts that appear in the work, he mistakenly assumes that Martensen is simply an uncritical mouthpiece for Hegel, and he thus sees Hegel himself as the ultimate target of the work.12 I wish to show that, while Thulstrup is correct in pointing out Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Martensen here, the positions that are criticized are Martensen’s alone and have nothing to do with Hegel. Due to the short length of this fragmentary work, I will be able to treat it more or less systematically. In the first section I will try to demonstrate the most obvious connections to the main historical target of the work, Martensen. In the second section, I will turn to Chapter 1, “Modern Philosophy Begins with Doubt,”13 in which the problem of the beginning of philosophy is discussed. What is most important in this chapter is the criticism of the concept of absolute knowing. Then I will continue with Chapter 2, “Philosophy Begins with Doubt,”14 which explores the question of the relation of the individual to the problem of doubt. Finally, I will turn to Part Two15 where Kierkegaard examines in some detail Hegel’s chapter “Sense-Certainty” from the Phenomenology of Spirit. I want to argue that, while Kierkegaard is critical of the Hegelian Martensen in Part One, when he turns to Hegel’s primary text in Part Two he is remarkably receptive and deferential toward Hegel himself. 12

13 14 15

After listing the three theses about philosophical doubt that are featured in the work, Thulstrup writes: “In this context it is particularly important to clarify how Kierkegaard’s posing of problems and solutions relates to Hegel’s (and thus also to Martensen’s and thus far anonymous Danish Hegelians’).” Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980, p. 301. JC, pp. 133–143; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 116–126. JC, pp. 144–156; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 126–139. JC, pp. 161–172; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 141–150.

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i. the allusion to martensen in the title The claim that De Omnibus is directed against Martensen is supported most obviously by the very title of the work itself. As was noted previously,16 the expression used in the title, “de omnibus dubitandum est,” was employed many times by Martensen in a slogan-like fashion. In reaction, Kierkegaard employed the expression (in this Latin formulation and in Danish equivalents) satirically in a number of works throughout his literary career.17 In this way he was able to criticize Martensen indirectly since he could rely on the fact that the contemporary Danish reading public would associate this expression with the person of Martensen and thus see the satire in the allusion. This phrase thus served in Kierkegaard’s works as a kind of code word for Martensen. In this section I will briefly trace the history of this expression and examine the context in which Martensen employs it. My thesis is that although the expression ultimately has another source and is in fact used by Hegel himself, it is Martensen’s employment of it that Kierkegaard wishes to satirize in De Omnibus. The phrase, “de omnibus dubitandum est,” originally goes back to Descartes. It appears in the opening lines of his Principia philosophiae (1644) in his discussion of the method of universal doubt.18 Descartes observes that all human beings in the course of their upbringing come to accept as true a number of beliefs based on empirical experience. Many of these beliefs turn out to have no solid grounding and amount to no more than prejudices. In order to systematically reexamine one’s belief system, Descartes proposes his famous method of doubt by means of which one exposes one’s beliefs to an all-encompassing skepticism. In his first paragraph Descartes writes: “It seems that the only way of freeing ourselves from these opinions [sc. prejudices] is to make the effort, once in the course of our life, to doubt everything [de iis omnibus studeamus dubitare] which we find to contain even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty.”19 16 17

18 19

Chapter 2, Section III, p. 110. E.g., EPW, p. 114; SKS, vol. 17, p. 288, DD:208. EPW, p. 118; SKS, vol. 17, p. 291, DD:208. EPW, p. 119; SKS, vol. 17, p. 292, DD:208. EO2, p. 95; SKS, vol. 3, p. 97. FT, pp. 5–6; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 101–102. PF, p. 82; SKS, vol. 4, p. 281. P, p. 49; SKS, vol. 4, p. 510. P, p. 18; SKS, vol. 4, p. 482: “As I opened the book I read these words: ‘One must doubt everything.’ For that reason I sent the book straight back, for this phrase is offensive to me and like an obscenity which one should only insinuate.” SL, p. 34; SKS, vol. 6, p. 38: “This cannot seem strange to anyone, inasmuch as everyone, after all, has doubted everything.” SL, p. 120; SKS, vol. 6, p. 114. SL, Supplement, p. 540; Pap. V B 175.4. CUP1, p. 195; SKS, vol. 7, p. 179. CUP1, p. 200; SKS, vol. 7, p. 184. CUP1, p. 255; SKS, vol. 7, p. 231. CUP1, p. 264f.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 240. CUP1, p. 405; SKS, vol. 7, p. 369: “One writes on paper, ‘Doubt everything’ – then one has doubted everything.” LD, 213; B&A I, p. 235. LD, 215; B&A I, p. 239. See SKS, vol. K4, pp. 583–584. Quoted from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vols. 1–2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985, vol. 1, p. 193.

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The subtitle to this opening paragraph reads: “The seeker after truth must, once in the course of his life, doubt everything [de omnibus . . . esse dubitandum], as far as is possible.”20 The goal of this method is to purge the mind of prejudices in order to begin anew from the ground up and to justify one’s beliefs by means of reason alone.21 This method of doubt is treated by Hegel in his account of Descartes in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. (It will be noted that the published version of these lectures is of course based on student notes that were edited by Karl Ludwig Michelet [1801–93] and were first published in three volumes from 1833 to 1836.22 ) There one finds the passage from Descartes, just quoted, paraphrased with the precise formulation that is found in the title of Kierkegaard’s work: “Descartes expresses the fact that we must begin from thought as such alone, by saying that we must doubt everything (De omnibus dubitandum est); and that is an absolute beginning.”23 Hegel notes in his analysis that the point of Descartes’ skepticism was not simply to dwell in it as the ancient skeptics did but rather to use it to arrive at truth.24 In a draft of De Omnibus Kierkegaard refers to this aspect of Hegel’s analysis, which indicates his familiarity with it.25 (There can be no doubt that Kierkegaard knew this part of Hegel’s lectures since in another draft he cites them directly.26 ) Since Hegel 20 21 22 23 24

25

26

Ibid., p. 193. N.b. Kierkegaard refers to this point in Descartes in Fear and Trembling: FT, pp. 5–6; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 101–102. Descartes, Opera Philosophica, Amsterdam 1678. ASKB 473. Vorlesungen u¨ ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, I–III, ed. by Karl Ludwig Michelet, Berlin 1833–36, vols. 13–15 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollst¨andige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, Berlin 1832–45. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. III, p. 224; Jub., vol. 19, p. 335. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. III, pp. 224–225; Jub., vol. 19, p. 335: “This first proposition [that everything must be doubted] has not, however, the same signification as skepticism, which sets before it no other aim than doubt itself, and requires that we should remain in this indecision of mind, an indecision wherein mind finds its freedom. It rather signifies that we should renounce all presuppositions – that is, all hypotheses which are accepted as true in their immediacy – and commence from thought, so that from it we should in the first place attain to some fixed and settled basis, and make a true beginning. In skepticism this is not the case, for with the skeptics doubt is the end at which they rest.” Translation slightly modified. JC, Supplement, p. 246; Pap. IV B 2.16: “He [Johannes Climacus] had already been struck by Hegel’s and Spinoza’s saying that Descartes did not doubt as a skeptic for the sake of doubting, but for the sake of finding truth.” JC, Supplement, pp. 264–265; Pap. IV B 13.17: “He [Johannes Climacus] regrets that he did not begin immediately with Descartes, all the more so because he recalls that Hegel praises Descartes for his ‘childlike and simple exposition’ – but that was precisely why he did not begin, because it sounded like sarcasm by Hegel, who certainly was a long way from praising the childlike and the simple and who in other passages says of Descartes: ‘mit ihm ist weiter nichts anzufangen.’” With regard to Descartes’ “childlike and simple exposition,” Kierkegaard quotes here from Jub., vol. 19, p. 334: Descartes “geht ganz einfach und kindlich dabei zu Werke.” (N.b. this passage is omitted from the English translation, Jub., vol. 19, where it should appear on p. 224.) With regard to the passage, “mit ihm ist weiter nichts anzufangen,” Kierkegaard seems to have in mind Hist. of Phil. III, p. 224; Jub., vol. 19, p. 335: “Was nun die Methode anbetrifft, wie er die Gedanken gestellt,

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employs this statement in his exposition and since it is clear that Kierkegaard knew this analysis, it might seem to some readers that Kierkegaard’s allusion to it in the title is an obvious satirical criticism of him. But a closer examination of the matter reveals that it is not so much Hegel’s use of this expression in his lectures as Martensen’s appropriation of it that is most important for understanding Kierkegaard’s work and the criticism found there. Martensen employed the phrase “de omnibus dubitandum est” many times and indeed turned it into a slogan. For example, in 1836 it appeared in his review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military College.27 In part following Hegel’s account in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Martensen characterizes modern philosophy as beginning with Descartes’ radical break from scholastic thinking. While the philosophy of the Middle Ages was based on faith, the philosophy introduced by Descartes tried to establish its foundation on reason alone. Martensen writes: doubt is the beginning of wisdom. . . . Descartes had indeed expressed this thought and advanced the demand for a presuppositionless philosophy, but a long time was needed before the thought could be developed into a concept and before the expressed demand for a presuppositionless philosophy could actually be realized. The demand “de omnibus dubitandum est” is easier said than done, for what is required is not finite doubt, not the popular doubt about this or that particular thing, with which one reserves something for oneself which cannot be called into doubt.28

Martensen claims that Descartes began the history of modern philosophy with this principle of doubt, but it was not applied rigorously or completely until Hegel. Only he, according to Martensen, managed to eliminate finally all prejudices of thought and to begin without presuppositions. In De Omnibus there is a direct reference to this passage from Martensen that Kierkegaard cites in Part Two of the work: “Another time [ Johannes Climacus] heard one of the philosophizers, one whose utterances people especially trusted, express himself this way: ‘To doubt everything is no easy matter; it is namely, not doubt about one thing and another, about this or that, about something and something else, but is a speculative doubt about everything, which is by no means an easy

27

28

wie sie abgeleitet hat, so hat dieß kein besonderes Interesse f¨ur uns. – Es ist im Ganzen wenig von seiner Philosophie zu sagen.” See CUP1, p. 334fn.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 205fn.: “Hegel, however, does not speak this way; by means of the identity of thinking and being he is elevated above a more childlike manner of philosophizing, something he himself points out, for example, in relation to Descartes.” Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole. Af J. L. Heiberg, Lærer i Logik og Æsthetik ved den kgl. militaire Høiskole,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, 16, 1836, pp. 515–528. Ibid., pp. 518–519.

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matter.’”29 (As has been seen previously,30 the second part of this passage was also paraphrased in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars.) If there is any uncertainty left, Martensen’s name figures in a draft of the text in reference to this passage: “Professor Martensen made an exception. He explains that it is no easy matter, that one can understand, if it would only be of some help.”31 The Latin phrase featured in the title appears again in 1837 in Martensen’s doctoral dissertation, On the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness, where he rehearses much the same material about the history of philosophy. There he writes: “Descartes, who may be seen as the founder of modern philosophy, since he wanted to construct science from the ground up, arrived at the proposition, de omnibus dubitandum est.”32 In this account Descartes is portrayed as taking the first step towards a modern conception of autonomy, which is the object of the dissertation. In the same paragraph Martensen employs the other well-known Latin slogans, “cogito ergo sum” and “sub specie aeternitatis,” which Kierkegaard also satirizes in various texts.33 The slogan “de omnibus dubitandum est” is quoted by Bornemann in his review of Martensen’s dissertation: “The beginning of all wisdom is to subject one’s purported knowledge to a critique (de omnibus dubitandum).”34 This seems to indicate that this slogan was generally associated with Martensen. Moreover, as has been noted previously,35 in 1837–38 as a young student, Kierkegaard attended Martensen’s lecture course, “Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics.” In his lecture notes from November 29, 1837, one reads the following: “Descartes (d. 1650) said: cogito ergo sum and de omnibus dubitandum est. He thereby produced the principle for modern Protestant subjectivity. By means of the latter proposition – de omnibus dubitandum est – he gave his essential watchword, for he thereby denoted

29

30 31 32

33 34 35

JC, pp. 164–165; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 143–144. See CI, p. 247; SKS, vol. 1, p. 286: “there is a qualitative difference between speculative doubt and common doubt about this or about that.” See also CI, p. 254; SKS, vol. 1, p. 292. CI, p. 259; SKS, vol. 1, p. 297. Chapter 2, Section III, p. 110. JC, Supplement, p. 249; Pap. IV B 2.7. Hans Lassen Martensen, De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta, Copenhagen 1837, § 5, p. 19. ASKB 648. Danish translation: Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie, Copenhagen 1841, § 5, p. 16. ASKB 651. The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology, in Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen’s Philosophy of Religion, tr. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, Atlanta: Scholars Press 1997, § 5, p. 85. Translation slightly modified. For “cogito ergo sum,” see Chapter 2, Section III, pp. 110ff. For “sub specie aeternitatis,” see Chapter 11, Section I, p. 460f. Johan Alfred Bornemann, “Af Martensen: de autonomia conscientiae. Sui humanae,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, p. 27. Chapter 1, Section II.

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a doubt not about this or that but about everything.”36 Kierkegaard’s description of Johannes Climacus attending a lecture on philosophy by one of the modern philosophers37 could easily be taken as autobiographical and as alluding to his own attendance at Martensen’s lectures.38 The suggestion that the work is autobiographical was indeed made by Barfod in his brief introductory remarks to De Omnibus in his edition of Kierkegaard’s journals.39 Martensen repeats the same phrase in his “Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” in 1838–39. Descartes is once again contrasted with the scholastics in a way that is quite similar to the previous course: Only Descartes expressed the great proposition that man must begin from the very beginning and investigate everything from the foundation. His principles were thus: 1) De omnibus dubitandum est, and 2) Cogito ergo sum. . . . In order not to remain in this doubt, Descartes wanted that one doubt everything, for only thereby can a point be found which it is impossible to doubt, and this point is: cogito ergo sum.40

From the similarity in formulations, it is clear that Martensen is recycling his lectures. It will be recalled that the two Latin slogans mentioned here were also attributed to the character von Jumping-Jack and satirized in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars. Finally, without appealing to the Latin formulation, Martensen discusses this principle of doubt many years later in his autobiography. Recalling his trip to Germany, he explains the principle specifically in his account of the thought of the theologian Karl Daub (1765–1836), whom he met in Heidelberg. There he writes, ostensibly characterizing Daub’s views: “Philosophy should lead us to a dialectical skepticism, to doubt, not about this or that particular thing, but to absolute doubt. This absolute doubt should lead us to Hegel’s presuppositionless thinking.”41 While the Latin catchword is missing here, the principle is the same. It is interesting to compare this passage with one from Fear and Trembling, which appeared on October 16, 1843 (i.e., only months after De Omnibus was apparently written). There Kierkegaard, under the pseudonym of Johannes 36 37 38

39 40 41

SKS, vol. 19, p. 131, Not4:7. JC, pp. 164–166; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 143–144. Thulstrup, among others, has explored the autobiographical aspect of the text. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, op. cit., pp. 296–310. For a critical assessment of this tendency, see Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins, tr. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1980, pp. 145– 147. H. P. Barfod (ed.), Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1844–46, op. cit., p. 78. Pap. II C 25, in Pap. XII, p. 282. Hans Lassen Martensen, Af mit Levnet, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1882–83, vol. 1, p. 117.

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de silentio, writes: “Here . . . is the dormant comic element in the plot, that is, bringing Faust into an ironic relation to those slapstick fools who chase after doubt in our own day, present external arguments to prove that they actually have doubted – for example, a doctoral diploma – or swear that they have doubted everything, or prove it by once having met a doubter in their travels.”42 Here Kierkegaard alludes to the fact that Martensen was known to have taken an extended study tour of the German states during which he met many of the leading scholars of the age. In the passage cited previously from Martensen’s autobiography, it is Karl Daub whom he met on his travels who was the representative of the principle of skeptical doubt. Although Martensen published his autobiography years after Kierkegaard’s death, and it would obviously be anachronistic to think that Kierkegaard is referring to just this passage, nevertheless it is extremely likely that Martensen in his lectures recounted much the same thing about skeptical doubt with allusion to Daub. The passage from Fear and Trembling also refers to “a doctoral diploma,” which is a hidden allusion to the honorary degree of Doctor of Theology, which Martensen was awarded in 1840 by the Faculty of Theology at the University of Kiel. In the passage quoted from Fear and Trembling, Johannes de silentio discusses the doubt of Faust, a figure who had long interested Kierkegaard. It will be recalled that Martensen published an article on Lenau’s Faust in 1837.43 While the formulation “de omnibus dubitandum est” does not appear there, the theme of Faust as a doubter is central to Martensen’s article.44 Due to this work, Martensen was associated with the figure of Faust in the mind of both Kierkegaard (who was irritated by the article) and the contemporary reading public. In the description of Faust in the passage in question, the attentive reader can hear a criticism of the doubt that Martensen had made into a kind of slogan among the students at the time: “But he [Faust] is a doubter; his doubt has destroyed actuality for him, for my Faust is so ideal that he is not one of those scientific doubters who doubt one hour every semester on the podium but otherwise are able to do everything else.”45 The allusion to the teacher advocating doubt from the podium seems clearly to be a hidden reference to Martensen. Kierkegaard’s description of Faust as one who has taken doubt so seriously that it has destroyed actuality for him recalls the plot of the manuscript De Omnibus, where Johannes Climacus is also destroyed by taking doubt 42 43

44 45

FT, p. 110; SKS, vol. 4, p. 198. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Betragtninger over Id´een af Faust med Hensyn paa Lenaus Faust,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 1, 1837, pp. 91–164. ASKB 569. See also Ueber Lenau’s Faust, by Johannes M.......n. Stuttgart 1836. Ibid., pp. 108ff. See also Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., p. 527. FT, p. 110; SKS, vol. 4, p. 198. See also EO1, p. 207–210; SKS, vol. 2, pp. 202–205. EO1, Supplement, p. 454; SKS, vol. 17, p. 19, AA:12.

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too seriously. It will be noted that both the phrase “de omnibus dubitandum est” and the notion of Faust as a doubter were objects of satire in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars.46 Thus, once again these two texts seem to have the common goal of satirizing Martensen. In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript one finds further evidence in a passage that apparently associates the phrase “de omnibus dubitandum est” with Martensen and his students. One reads: Thus, for example, if speculative thought, instead of didactically discoursing on de omnibus dubitandum and acquiring a chorus of followers who swear to swear by de omnibus dubitandum, had instead made an attempt to have such a doubter come into existence in existence-inwardness so that one could see down to the slightest detail how he goes about doing it – well, if it had done this, that is, if it had started to do this, then in turn it would have abandoned it and understood with shame that the grand slogan every parroter swears he has carried out is not only an infinitely difficult task but an impossibility for an existing person.47

Here one finds a statement of the upshot of De Omnibus (i.e., someone who, internalizing the slogan, “de omnibus dubitandum est,” attempts the impossible by trying to doubt everything in actual life). Martensen is ridiculed in his lectures for “didactically discoursing” and for using the slogan. His students are ridiculed as “a chorus of followers” and parrots. In the later journals there is an entry in which Kierkegaard directly associates Martensen with the phrase. There one reads: “Martensen was just as dogmatically rigid when he lectured on de omnibus dubitandum as when he lectured on a dogma.”48 Here Kierkegaard years later recalls the phrase specifically in the context of Martensen’s popular lectures. One could hardly hope for a clearer statement of the source of this slogan than this entry. It also shows that the slogan continued to be an issue for him even more than a full decade after Martensen’s lectures. Given all this, there can be little doubt that the phrase “de omnibus dubitandum est” was in Kierkegaard’s mind associated with Martensen. The work seems to be conceived with him specifically in mind and, as has been suggested, could well have had its beginning and main inspiration in his lecture hall. Kierkegaard was clearly disconcerted by Martensen’s popularity among the students and by his authority in matters of philosophy and theology. In the passage cited previously, it is presumably Martensen who is described as “one of the philosophizers . . . whose utterances people especially trusted.”49 Kierkegaard saw Martensen as a corrupting influence on his naive fellow students. With Johannes Climacus he creates in the form of a literary character just such a naive student 46 47 49

EPW, p. 116; SKS, vol. 17, p. 289, DD:208. CUP1, p. 255; SKS, vol. 7, p. 231. JC, pp. 164–165; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 143–144.

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JP, vol. 3, 3107; Pap, X-3 A 544.

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who is misled by a teacher such as Martensen and by the discussions surrounding Hegelianism. A general problem in the secondary literature on Kierkegaard has been an inability to distinguish Hegel’s actual position from that of specific Hegelians. As has been noted previously,50 the tendency in the history of ideas to designate a specific thinker as “Hegelian” or a group of thinkers as “Hegelians” is a matter of convenience that is useful for characterizing certain very general intellectual trends; however, among the so-called Hegelians, both German and Danish, there were radical differences and divergences – both among themselves and vis-`a-vis Hegel. The idea of a homogeneous school or movement is simply a mistake, and thus it is dangerous to assume that the view of any given Hegelian on any given issue is the same as that of Hegel himself (or as that of any other given Hegelian for that matter). This unfortunate tendency is found in much of the secondary literature, with perhaps the most influential example being Thulstrup, who in his account of De Omnibus associates Martensen immediately with Hegel. But, as is seen from this brief analysis, while the expression “de omnibus dubitandum est” appears in Hegel, it was Martensen’s frequent employment of it that was clearly the most important for Kierkegaard. As has already been seen,51 Kierkegaard seized upon the expression “either/or” for the title of his famous book. While, to be sure, this expression was employed by Hegel in his criticism of Aristotle’s law of excluded middle, it was clearly the Danish debate about this criticism that served to turn this expression into a readily recognizable slogan. By means of it, one could refer indirectly to those thinkers (primarily Sibbern and Mynster) who opposed Hegel’s principle of mediation and insisted on the either/or dichotomy. So also here in De Omnibus, Kierkegaard seizes on a phrase that, like the expression “either/or,” had a long history and was also employed by Hegel, but it was clearly Martensen’s employment of it that is significant. It is only with Martensen that the expression comes to take on its slogan-like character. Moreover, it is Martensen’s use of it that Kierkegaard’s contemporary Danish reader would have been familiar with. Thus, before even beginning with the actual analysis of the text, one has every reason to suspect that Martensen will play a major role as one of Kierkegaard’s targets.

ii. kierkegaard’s discussion of absolute knowing Kierkegaard begins with an account of Johannes Climacus exploring the thesis “Modern philosophy begins with doubt.”52 The central question 50 51 52

Chapter 1, Section I, p. 45f. and Section II, p. 50. Chapter 4, Section I. JC, pp. 133–143; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 116–126.

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that is explored in the first part of this chapter is what is meant by the word “modern.” It seems to indicate that modern philosophy, unlike ancient or medieval, begins with doubt. So understood, the thesis is a historical one that concerns different kinds of philosophy. But there is an ambiguity in that the idea seems to be that true philosophy begins with doubt and that only a pseudo-philosophy would begin with presuppositions that have not been subjected to critical consideration. In this sense this third thesis (i.e., that modern philosophy begins with doubt) is not a historical one but rather concerns philosophy in general and thus becomes synonymous with the first thesis that philosophy begins with doubt. Therefore, there is a deception at work here in that the two theses pretend to be two different claims, although they say the same thing. This is the conclusion that Johannes Climacus arrives at.53 The analysis of this question takes up the first few pages of the first chapter.54 It is difficult to find in this discussion any issue inherent in Hegel’s philosophy. It seems rather to be a criticism of Martensen and the inexact formulation of his thesis.55 But since there is in any case no temptation to interpret this analysis as something stemming from Hegel, there is no reason to pursue it further here. However, the last few pages of the chapter, which fall under the heading, “A Presentiment,”56 seem to take up an issue that is a genuine one in Hegel’s thought, namely, that of absolute knowing. Although Hegel’s name is never mentioned here, and there is no overt criticism of his view, this passage might be construed as a critique of this controversial doctrine. I wish to demonstrate that the position criticized is not one that can be properly attributed to Hegel and is best understood in the context of Martensen’s lectures. In order to evaluate Kierkegaard’s criticism correctly, it will first be necessary to examine briefly the concept of absolute knowing in Hegel’s philosophy. This account will serve as a basis for comparison with the view criticized in De Omnibus. A. The Concept of Absolute Knowing in Hegel. The final chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, entitled “Absolute Knowing,” has caused a great deal of debate in Hegel interpretation and has been the source of some of 53 54 55

56

JC, pp. 138–139; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 121–123. JC, pp. 133–138; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 116–121. In his review of Heiberg’s lecture, Martensen is guilty precisely of confusing claims about the history of philosophy with claims about philosophy in general. Specifically, he briefly sketches the characteristic elements of the leading philosophical movements from the Middle Ages to Hegel; however, when he discusses Descartes and the method of doubt, he makes claims about philosophy in general: “The absolute autonomy of thought is the principle of philosophy. . . . Science thus demands absolute, infinite doubt.” Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., p. 519. JC, pp. 138–143; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 121–126.

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the best-known misconceptions about his philosophy. About half of this chapter consists of a review of the previous forms of knowing that the work has run through. Hegel’s point with this review is to indicate that absolute knowing is the general concept that contains within itself all the previous ones. Thus, absolute knowing is the grasping of all of the previous concepts and modes of knowing together as a complete system of thought. It is thus that he defines the Absolute Concept: “The realm of spirits which is formed in this way in the outer world constitutes a succession in time in which one spirit relieved another of its charge and each took over the empire of the world from its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of the depth of spirit, and this is the Absolute Concept.”57 The Absolute Concept is therefore the most abstract concept, which encompasses all others. By grasping the Concept, the observer ipso facto sees the previous ones in their systematic interconnection since they are all related in it. Since it contains all of the previous forms of knowing, the Absolute Concept is complete or exhaustive. The concept of absolute knowing thus has nothing to do with gaining knowledge of some particular secret or ultimate wisdom. Instead, it is merely the comprehension of the various forms of thought in their systematic unity. The idea behind the dialectical movement of the Phenomenology of Spirit is that each finite or limited concept already contains within itself the seeds of a more complete one. This is the reason why the content of the Phenomenology becomes richer and richer as the work progresses. Finally, the organic totality of all the concepts is what Hegel describes as absolute knowing. He writes: “This last shape of spirit – the spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the self and thereby realizes its concept as remaining in its concept in this realization – this is absolute knowing.”58 Here Hegel says explicitly that absolute knowing is the complete concept or the Concept that is exhaustive in its content. All of the previous concepts in the dialectical process of the Phenomenology of Spirit were one-sided or incomplete, and for that reason they were dialectically aufgehoben. Yet, in their Aufhebung these views pointed towards other conditions for knowing, which they themselves were lacking. The teleology of the dialectic is supplied by the fact that in the course of the process there must be a point at which all of the transcendental conditions for knowing are laid bare. When the dialectic reaches this point, it stops, for it can go no further; this then is absolute knowing. History, art, and religion all grasp a form of knowing, but they nonetheless maintain an empirical element. Given this empirical aspect, the truth 57 58

Hegel, PhS, p. 492; Jub., vol. 2, p. 619. Hegel, PhS, p. 485; Jub., vol. 2, p. 610. Translation slightly modified. See PhS, p. 485; Jub., vol. 2, p. 610: “Our own act here has been simply to gather together the separate moments, each of which in principle exhibits the life of spirit in its entirety, and also to stick to the notion in the form of the notion.”

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that obtains in these fields is not necessary. By contrast, absolute knowing grasps philosophical truth conceptually or according to the necessary systematic development of the Concept. It sees in this story the necessary movement from universal to particular to individual. Therefore, absolute knowing is knowing according to the Concept or according to the categorial form itself, and devoid of empirical instantiation: absolute knowing “is spirit that knows itself in the shape of spirit, or a conceptual knowing.”59 To know something according to the Concept means recognizing in that sphere of phenomena the dialectical movement of the categories themselves (i.e., universality, particularity and individuality). Therefore, to know the Concept qua Concept is to recognize these categories qua categories divested of their various empirical or accidental instantiations. Since absolute knowing is the knowing of the categories and not of their empirical forms, it is atemporal in a way the latter are not. Absolute knowing grasps the necessary categorial movement hidden in history and religion, a movement that is timeless. The spirit of the Greek world or the conception of the divine in revealed religion is each essentially bound to its temporal forms and its empirical instantiation. By contrast, the Absolute Concept is the conceptual movement that underlies them all and transcends time: “Spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Concept, i.e. has not annulled time.”60 Since the Absolute Concept is, so to speak, a priori, it is not limited to any fixed temporal location; therefore, at the end of the dialectic, consciousness “sets aside its time-form.”61 By recognizing the universal categorial movement of the Concept in the various spheres, consciousness here recognizes the unity in the various forms. In the course of the dialectical movement the various concepts were grasped in an isolated fashion, and there were no connections made among them. With absolute knowing, consciousness achieves the overview of the various spheres that allows it to recognize the unified patterns of world history, of religion, and so on as having a common structure, which is a pattern of its own thought. Consciousness ceases to see each concept individually in its particular phenomenological form but instead comes to recognize the unitary nature of all of these forms since it sees that all of the concepts and forms of consciousness have in common the same categorial movement. Now the individual concepts are not seen in abstraction or taken individually but rather are taken in “their organic self-grounded movement.”62 This overview and grasping of the systematic interconnection of the concepts is the Absolute Concept. Given that philosophical knowing is this panoptic overview and that the entire process must be at an end before it can be properly grasped in its 59 60 62

Hegel, PhS, p. 485; Jub., vol. 2, p. 610. Translation slightly modified. 61 Hegel, PhS, p. 487; Jub., vol. 2, p. 612. Hegel, PhS, p. 487; Jub., vol. 2, p. 612. Hegel, PhS, p. 491; Jub., vol. 2, p. 617.

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systematic context, it follows that philosophy can take place only after the results of the other domains lie finished and open for examination. “Only when the objective presentation is complete,” Hegel writes, “is it at the same time the reflection of substance or the process in which substance becomes self. Consequently, until spirit has completed itself in itself, until it has completed itself as world spirit, it cannot reach its consummation as self-conscious spirit.”63 This squares with what Hegel says with his allusion to the Owl of Minerva in the Philosophy of Right.64 The point is that the historical movement can only be understood philosophically after it is complete. Only when that movement is at an end can one analyze it for its abstract categorial structure. Therefore, philosophy has no predictive power; instead, Hegel conceives of the Concept as a universal structure of thought, which, like Kant’s categories, is a priori or necessary. Hegel does not claim that history itself is actually at an end with absolute knowing.65 His point is that one can only understand and interpret philosophically or in terms of the categories those events that have already taken place. Given this understanding of the notion of absolute knowing, it is easier to grasp what Hegel says in the Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, where he addresses himself specifically to the kind of commonsense objection raised by Kierkegaard in De Omnibus: how can a given philosophy be, on the one hand, one among many philosophies in the historical sequence and, on the other hand, the absolute truth in its own right. Hegel claims that it is a mistake to conceive of the history of philosophy as a series of different, independent philosophies ( just as it is a mistake to conceive of the individual concepts of natural consciousness as autonomous entities). If these ways of thinking are truly philosophical, then they belong to a single developing Idea. This Idea is philosophy itself. Thus, there is ultimately only a single philosophy that is developing through time and not countless discrete ones. On the one hand, Hegel’s philosophy is one finite moment in the development of the Idea and, on the other hand, insofar as it grasps the Idea it captures some enduring truth. In the discussion from De Omnibus there is a criticism of at least some version of this. 63

64 65

Hegel, PhS, p. 488; Jub., vol. 2, p. 614. He formulates this somewhat differently as follows: “As spirit that knows what it is, it does not exist before, and nowhere at all, till after the completion of its work of compelling its imperfect ‘shape’ to procure for its consciousness the ‘shape’ of its essence, and in this way to equate its self-consciousness with its consciousness.” Hegel, PhS, p. 486; Jub., vol. 2, p. 611. Hegel, PR, Preface, p. 23; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 36–37. Quoted in Chapter 4, Section II, p. 199fn. The source of this Hegel myth is a single sentence in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History. See Phil of Hist., p. 103; Jub., vol. 11, p. 150: “The history of the world travels from east to west, for Europe is absolutely the end of history.” See Reinhart Klemens Maurer, “Teleologische Aspekte der Hegelschen Philosophie,” in his Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte, Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber 1980, pp. 173–208. Joseph L. Esposito, “Hegel, Absolute Knowledge, and the End of History,” Clio, 12, 1983, pp. 355– 365.

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B. Johannes Climacus and Absolute Knowing. I now return to Kierkegaard’s text in order to examine his treatment of the concept of absolute knowing. The problem for Johannes Climacus is to determine whether the thesis – modern philosophy begins with doubt – is an historical one about a particular philosophy or a universal one about philosophy in general. Towards the end of this chapter his considerations focus on the ambiguity of this dual nature. Once again describing the intellectual striving of Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard writes: “He then tried to combine what he had separated in thinking that the thesis must be either purely philosophical or purely historical. Presumably it is a mystery that modern philosophy is simultaneously the historical and the eternal, he thought, and what is more, it is aware of this itself. Indeed, it is a union similar to the union of the two natures in Christ.”66 Just as Christ is both divine and human, eternal and temporal, so also philosophy is at once historical and at the same time eternal. Philosophy is historical in that any given philosophy is a part of the history of philosophy. Understood in this way, it is a part of a larger ever-developing sequence. But then, on the other hand, “modern” (i.e., presumably Hegelian) philosophy seems to claim that it can reach an eternal ahistorical perspective which encompasses all finite forms of knowing: modern philosophy must become conscious of itself as an element in a prior philosophy, which in turn must become conscious of itself as an element in the historical unfolding of the eternal philosophy. Thus the philosopher’s consciousness must encompass the most dizzying contrasts: his own personality, his little amendment – the philosophy of the whole world as the unfolding of the eternal philosophy.67

One can easily recognize here Hegel’s claim that there are not several distinct philosophies that develop over time but rather a single philosophical Idea. Kierkegaard continues to allude to the eternal philosophy in the next section.68 66 67 68

JC, pp. 139–140; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 122–123. JC, p. 140; Pap. IV B 1, p. 123. JC, p. 147; Pap. IV B 1, p. 129: Kierkegaard writes: Johannes Climacus “one day heard one of the philosophers apropos of that thesis, say ‘This thesis does not belong to any particular philosopher; it is a thesis from the eternal philosophy, which anyone who wishes to give himself to philosophy must embrace.’” This claim would then seem to portray Hegel’s philosophy as the absolute philosophy. This recalls, at least vaguely, Hegel’s thesis that all philosophies are at bottom one philosophy in that they represent different forms of the notion. This is parallel to his claim that all religions are at bottom one religion. This Hegelian thesis is discussed by Heiberg in his On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age: “the different philosophical systems . . . all contain the same philosophy, only seen from different levels of culture in humanity’s development, just as the different religions all contain the same God, observed from different standpoints in the religious Idea, and just as the different works of art contain the same beauty in alternating forms, or the different forms of poetry contain the same poetry under changed conditions. All differences are grounded in unity; they are only moments in

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In working through this issue, Climacus arrives at a criticism of some version of the Hegelian view of absolute knowing, which is referred to as such without reference to Hegel himself. The heart of the objection is that it is impossible for any finite, particular individual to arrive at eternal knowing since this implies omniscience. Kierkegaard describes Climacus’ considerations thus: the individual’s knowledge was always merely knowledge about himself as a moment and about his significance as a moment. On the presupposition that this was actually possible – something he still could not really grasp, since it was not clear to him how a moment could be conscious of itself merely as a moment, inasmuch as this consciousness was an impossibility without a consciousness that was more than consciousness of oneself as a moment, because otherwise my consciousness would have to reside in another – this knowledge would then become a very relative knowledge and would by no means be an absolute knowledge. But how would it be possible for every single moment to become aware also of its eternal validity as a moment in the whole? That, after all, would require that the individual be omniscient and that the world be finished.69

Johannes Climacus notes that a particular individual or philosophy has only a partial perspective both of the world and of its place in it. Therefore, it is impossible for any particular philosophy to go beyond this limited view and to see itself in the larger totality of philosophy. The first objection seems to be that this view implies omniscience, which is clearly beyond the capacity of the finite human view. The second criticism argues that the view of absolute knowing implies a static or finished picture of the world or the whole which is surveyed. It thus denies that the world is still developing and any given theory runs the risk of being contradicted by future changes and developments. These objections need to be examined in order to determine the degree to which they can be regarded as applicable to Hegel’s doctrine itself. The first charge seems to be a straightforward appeal to common sense. Human beings are finite, and their knowing is limited and flawed. When they can be said to know something, it is only from a limited or finite perspective. Kierkegaard writes: “to become conscious of the eternal in the whole historical concretion, indeed, according to the standard that it did not involve only the past, this [Climacus] believed was reserved for the deity.”70 Thus, to claim to know something beyond the limited perspective of the individual is presumption. The key to understanding the relevance of this criticism for Hegel’s position is to keep in mind that by

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it, i.e. they are the necessary stages in the unity’s own development.” Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Om Philosophiens Betydning for den nuværende Tid, Copenhagen 1833, p. 6. ASKB 568. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 1, p. 386.) 70 JC, pp. 141–142; Pap. IV B 1, p. 124. JC, p. 141; Pap. IV B 1, p. 124.

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“absolute knowing,” Hegel does not mean omniscience, but rather seeing the vast unity of things by virtue of their common conceptual structure. It is the Concept that they all have in common and that even a finite or limited mind can grasp. Since the Concept is a priori, to use Kant’s language, one knows it will be present in all phenomena, and in this sense the claim is eternal or absolute. But this does not imply that the individual is empirically acquainted with every particular phenomenon and knows everything in this sense. In fact, Hegel calls the infinity of particular empirical phenomena “the bad infinity” and says that it, as such, is not and can never be the subject-matter of science or philosophy.71 There is thus no claim made for omniscience. The second charge claims that in order to reach this final truth, the world would have to be in a finished state where it is no longer developing. While it is, for Hegel, true that philosophy can only make a study of the past, this does not imply that the present is already completed and that one is looking at it, as it were, from the outside. Hegel is clear that history is continually in movement and does not reach a stasis. It is merely a methodological point that philosophy can only examine the past and endeavor to see it in its totality theretofore. The past is a fixed entity in that the events to be explored have already happened, but this does not imply that history no longer progresses or that new interpretations of the past do not appear. As new events or phenomena arise, they are then incorporated into the totality of systematic knowing as established theretofore. But the word “totality” or the expression “absolute knowing” does not imply that the future is already taken up and incorporated into the system before it happens. This seems to be implied in the passage quoted previously where Kierkegaard claims this absolute knowing “did not involve only the past,”72 the implication being that it should also involve the future. But then the objection arises, how then can it be absolute or total knowing if it fails to include the future? Is it not partial knowing since it is limited to the past? For Hegel, this knowledge is absolute only in the sense that regardless of what particular empirical shapes arise in the future, one knows already a priori that they will be incarnated or instantiated in the form of the Concept. Similarly, for Kant one knows today that the objects one will perceive tomorrow will be in space and time not because one knows what particular objects one will see tomorrow but because one knows the a priori forms of human perception or sensible intuition. Thus, absolute knowing is valid for the future as eternal or atemporal knowledge in this limited sense because it is a necessary or a priori truth. Hence, Kierkegaard can again be seen as offering a

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Hegel, PR, Preface, pp. 20–21; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 33–34,discussed in Chapter 8, Section IV. JC, pp. 141–142; Pap. IV B 1, p. 124.

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criticism of some version of Hegel’s doctrine and not of the original doctrine itself. There is reason to think that these criticisms were never intended to be of Hegel in the first place but rather that they were aimed at some variant of the Hegelian thesis, which was perhaps propounded by one of the Danish Hegelians. In some of Martensen’s works one can find traces of the caricatured view of Hegel’s doctrine criticized by Kierkegaard. In his review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military College, Martensen praises Hegel’s system for enveloping into itself all other systems in the history of philosophy. He writes: “Anyone who in our age has followed the thinking self-consciousness in its striving for light and clarity cannot help but admire and recognize the sublime necessity of reason and the deep consistency which runs throughout the Hegelian system. All subordinate systems which have the rationalistic principle in themselves without having carried it out are this system’s certain booty and must be absorbed as moments in it.”73 Martensen portrays the systems in the history of philosophy as being aufgehoben in that of Hegel. Although he goes on to criticize Hegel, this pretentious claim was enough to blind Kierkegaard to the finer nuances in Martensen’s position. I wish to suggest that Kierkegaard’s criticism can best be understood as a critique of the pretension of Martensen and his students for claims like this. In his dissertation, Martensen himself employs the concept of absolute knowing. He tends generally to use it to mean the knowledge of God, which he regards as the subject-matter of both theology and philosophy. At the beginning of the work he writes: “the most certain thing the human is capable of thinking cannot possibly be derived from some other thing that is more certain, but is an absolute knowledge a priori.”74 By this Martensen refers to the knowledge of God. Here he borrows the Hegelian concept of absolute knowing and presents it as his own or at least in the context of his own thought. He continues: “Knowledge of every divine mystery and its relation to the human is mediated by this most certain truth for the human; this grounds his entire approach to being and thinking, provides the standpoint for his reflection, and forms, so to speak, the culmination point from which all speculative outlooks onto the kingdom of the divine

73

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Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., p. 524. See also: “[Hegel’s philosophy] has an infinite meaning for our times since it contains the most complete and comprehensive development of rational knowledge. With this it thinks that an entire era in the history of philosophy . . . comes to a close. But the new era which we await in science cannot come about before the old one has ended. The Hegelian philosophy is in this respect an unavoidable point for anyone who has participated in modern scientific reflection.” Ibid., p. 515. Hans Lassen Martensen, De autonomia, op. cit., p. 18. Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie, op. cit., p. 15. The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness, op. cit., p. 84.

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are opened (specula – speculatio).”75 Here Martensen explains his speculative approach to dogmatics. He notes the etymological connection between the Latin words, “specula,” meaning “outlook,” and “speculatio,” which means “speculative thinking.” Thus, the goal of speculative thinking is to gain an outlook or overview of the whole and not to dwell on the individual parts. Martensen seems to imply that this speculative approach can come to an understanding of “every divine mystery.” Moreover, he claims that from this standpoint one can look out onto the divine. This would seem to fit the target which Kierkegaard aims at with his criticism, quoted previously, that knowledge of the whole is impossible for a finite human being and is “reserved for the deity.”76 Finally, at the beginning of Martensen’s course, “Speculative Dogmatics,” he explains the concept of dogma by appealing to precisely the contrast that is found in De Omnibus (i.e., that between particular historical forms and the eternal truth). There one finds in Kierkegaard’s notes the following: The historical development of this faith to the ecclesiastical dogma – both the differences, which have arisen in this development, and the oppositions in the consciousness of the universal church – are presented in the Christian history of dogma and symbolics. By contrast dogmatics itself does not stop with knowing the dogma in its relative historical forms, but strives to know it in its absolute truth. It performs this task only when it, as speculative science, knows the dogma as Idea.77

Here Martensen makes a plea for a speculative approach to dogmatics. Only with this approach, he claims, are the Church dogmas understood in their absolute truth. This truth transcends the relative truth of the individual historical stages of the development of the individual dogmas. (Needless to say, this is a clear analogue to Hegel’s understanding of the different philosophies in the history of philosophy in contrast to the Idea itself.) Kierkegaard with his criticism seems to have in mind claims like this in defense of the notion of absolute knowing. Contemporary reports uniformly testify to the arrogance of the students of theology who, encouraged by Martensen, believed that with Hegel’s philosophy they had reached some final truth. For example, Martensen’s student, the aforementioned Frederik Nielsen, characterizes as follows the way in which Hegel’s philosophy was understood among his fellow students during the late 1830s: “Hegelian philosophy was a true child of Germany, presumptuous and arrogant on all sides. 75

76

Hans Lassen Martensen, De autonomia, op. cit., p. 19. Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie, op. cit., p. 16. The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness, op. cit., p. 85. Translation slightly modified. 77 SKS, vol. 18, p. 374f., KK:11. JC, pp. 141–142; Pap. IV B 1, p. 124.

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The absolute had come; there were no secrets either in heaven or on earth.”78 Here Hegel’s philosophy is portrayed as being lauded as the final truth that dissolved all mysteries. It will be noted that this is the claim that Martensen made on its behalf in his dissertation. Another of Martensen’s students, Johannes Fibiger, describes the atmosphere of the lectures in similar terms. Fibiger recalls: One had to have lived at that time to be able to conceive of the strange being [of Hegelian philosophy], indeed, even to be able to believe in the possibility of it. Under the absolutism of German philosophy, every thinker was zealous to work on the Tower of Babel of fantasy; what we heard all around us was nothing less than that every grandiloquent speaker made it virtually his goal in life to build a tower even higher. We were told that the universe with all of its large and small secret niches had been investigated and explained in the Concept; all riddles were solved; Hegel and his host of disciples in Berlin had finished the job. . . . One had to imitate [Hegel’s philosophy] and bring it even further; one was supposed to build one’s own system and go beyond Hegel and become the great man of the scholarly world. After a short time this was the only air we inhaled; the only one we heard at the university which sounded like a voice from the future was Martensen’s brilliant speech, and there was not so little in it of airy stones for that kind of building.79

Fibiger attests to the general perception of the finality of Hegel’s philosophy, which was thought to have penetrated into every corner of the world and to have explained everything. This seems to be akin to the view of absolute knowing portrayed in De Omnibus. Moreover, Fibiger also portrays the perceived goal of scholarly inquiry at the time (i.e., to go beyond Hegel by building one’s own system). It has been seen previously80 that this expression is one that Kierkegaard associates with Martensen, and this passage from Fibiger seems to confirm it since he states this as the then current understanding of the task of philosophy and specifically associates it with Martensen’s lectures. He criticizes Martensen for his abstractions and demagoguery. This account squares with the claims of Martensen’s anonymous critic in Kjøbenhavnsposten. It will be recalled that Martensen was attacked by an unknown critic who criticized him for exerting a negative influence on the students of theology and leading them away from Christianity. In the first article, the students are reproached for their arrogance and their claims to know the truth: Hegel’s “doctrine is regarded [sc. among 78 79 80

Frederik Nielsen, Minder. Oplevelser og Iagttagelser, Aalborg 1881, pp. 35–36. Johannes Fibiger, Mit Liv og Levned som jeg selv har forstaaet det, ed. by Karl Gjellerup, Copenhagen 1898, p. 73. Chapter 1, Section II, p. 65f.

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the students] in general as being the pure, absolute, incontrovertible truth (diese Philosophie, das ist die Philosophie).”81 The critic continues, “All previous stages of philosophy point towards Hegel and achieve their completion in him, beyond which one cannot come.”82 Here one finds something very close to the claim criticized by Kierkegaard in De Omnibus. Like Kierkegaard, the anonymous critic is offended by the pretension of a secular philosophy claiming to have reached “the absolute truth.” Moreover, the critic reproaches Martensen’s students for their naive belief that they know the truth since they are familiar with Hegel: “In particular they think that they are in possession of the philosopher’s stone when they have studied Hegel’s philosophy; they believe that they are already in possession of a portion of absolute truth when they have devoted themselves to a study of Hegel for a short time.”83 This leads one to believe that the positions being criticized are not to be found in Hegel’s texts but rather in Martensen’s lecture hall. While these examples do not ultimately prove that this is the object of Kierkegaard’s criticism, they do provide clear evidence about from where Kierkegaard could have received such a view of Hegel’s concept of absolute knowing. One might wish to argue that in the final analysis it does not really matter if Kierkegaard is criticizing Martensen or Hegel since it is the doctrine of absolute knowing that he is really after in any case. But, as has been seen here, there is a great deal of diversity in the interpretation of this doctrine, and much of it goes far beyond any position found in Hegel. The fact that the positions criticized are not Hegel’s is indication enough of this diversity. With his doctrine of absolute knowing, Hegel makes no claims for omniscience or for the solution to every mystery. Thus, it hardly makes sense to attribute to him all of the claims of his overzealous followers. This is to miss the point of Kierkegaard’s criticism, which is directed against just those followers. Moreover, the nature of the criticism in De Omnibus seems to support the interpretation that Martensen is the true target. The objections that I have sketched here are based only on a single short passage. In De Omnibus there is no analysis of Hegel’s primary texts where the issue is discussed. If he had wanted to, Kierkegaard could easily have portrayed Climacus as poring through Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit or the Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy and uncovering some contradictions, which he would then go on the criticize. But he does not do this. Instead he portrays Climacus as analyzing specific views that he has heard in the lecture hall. The views criticized are much more loose than something 81

82

[Anonymous], “Nogle Træk til en Charakteristik af den philosophiske Aand, som for Tiden findes hos de Studerende ved Kjøbenhavns Universitet,” Kjøbenhavnsposten, vol. 14, no. 25, January 26, 1840, p. 97. 83 Ibid., p. 98. Ibid., p. 97.

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the subjective beginning of philosophy with doubt 261 taken from a specific textual analysis from one of Hegel’s works. Thus, while one can insist on claiming that the criticism here can still be found in Hegel at some level, this does not seem to be the point of Kierkegaard’s account of Johannes Climacus. He has something specific in mind and it is not one of Hegel’s primary texts but rather Martensen and his students, with their arrogant claims on behalf of Hegel’s philosophy. Given that this is Kierkegaard’s target, there is no reason for him to examine in detail the accounts of absolute knowing in Hegel’s texts. Although the matter is difficult to adjudicate conclusively since one can only partially reconstruct the versions of Hegel’s philosophy that were current in the discussions and lectures at the time, Martensen would be the logical candidate for criticism here since he is clearly the main target elsewhere in the work and since he put forth the interpretations of Hegel that look suspiciously like the ones Kierkegaard criticizes. Contemporary reports also testify to the pretension and arrogance of Martensen and his students in their assertions that Hegel’s philosophy is the truth pure and simple. These reports indicate indirectly that Kierkegaard was not alone in his irritation about this. In any case, the views criticized here are not Hegel’s, and, given the arguments presented here, there is no reason to think that Kierkegaard himself intends this discussion to be critical of him in the first place.

iii. the individual and the subjective beginning of philosophy with doubt The first section of the present chapter demonstrated that the phrase “de omnibus dubitandum est” was for Kierkegaard a code word for Martensen. But in a sense the question is not so much whether or not this allusion can be traced to Martensen, for even readers such as Thulstrup will admit this. The real question concerns whether or not Martensen’s use of the expression and his general treatment of philosophical doubt, for which it stands, is in harmony with some principle in Hegel’s own thought. What needs to be explored is whether this is some idiosyncrasy in Martensen or a straightforward appropriation of a specific aspect of Hegel’s dialectical method. This is the question to be addressed in the present section. One commentator sees the matter as entirely straightforward: “Martensen was a Hegelian, and Hegel endorsed Descartes’ position that philosophy begins with doubt.”84 Thus, presumably Kierkegaard’s criticism of Martensen is ipso facto valid for Hegel as well. Contrary to this view, I wish to argue (1) that Martensen’s account of doubt is at variance with that of Hegel, 84

T. H. Croxall, “Assessment Part 1: Biographical and General,” in his translation Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est and a Sermon, London: Adam and Charles Black 1958, p. 20.

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for whom skeptical doubt is not an issue, (2) that Kierkegaard’s use of it indicates that he distinguishes Martensen from Hegel on this point, and (3) that his criticism is of the former and not of the latter. I will base my contention on an analysis of the second chapter of De Omnibus.85 It will be useful to begin the analysis with a brief account of the role of doubt in Hegel’s dialectical method and in his conception of the justification of a scientific philosophy. A. Doubt and the Justification of Science in Hegel. The issue of skeptical doubt is one that Hegel, to be sure, addresses, but it cannot be seen as central to his thought or his methodology in the way it is for Descartes. In the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel distinguishes science from common sense and indicates that the relation between them implies the need for a “phenomenology.” He discusses the problem of grounding or justifying philosophy in relation to other academic disciplines. Philosophy, unlike other disciplines, cannot make presuppositions or rely on common sense;86 rather, it is obliged to begin from the ground up and to justify itself instead of relying on justification from the outside. Common sense demands an explanation before it can accept science: “Only what is completely determined is at once exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and appropriated by all. The intelligible form of science is the way open and equally accessible to everyone, and consciousness as it approaches science justly demands that it be able to attain to rational knowledge by way of the ordinary understanding.”87 Science must be able to justify itself to common sense. It seeks to raise the ordinary consciousness to philosophy. The goal of the Phenomenology is to meet this demand for an explanation or justification. The strategy of the work is to demonstrate that all accounts of the world based on common sense fail on their own terms and must be abandoned as internally contradictory. The justification of science is characterized by means of a metaphor of a ladder: “Science on its part requires that self-consciousness should have raised itself into this aether in order to be able to live – and actually to live – with science and in science. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science should at least provide him with the ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within himself.”88 The prejudices of common sense are gradually peeled off one by one as the dialectical movement 85 86

87 88

JC, pp. 144–156; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 126–139. Hegel, EL, § 1; Jub., vol. 8, p. 27: “Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted.” Hegel, PhS, pp. 7–8; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 19–20. Hegel, PhS, pp. 14–15; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 28–29.

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the subjective beginning of philosophy with doubt 263 progresses. Thus, while moving from a lower to a higher standpoint, one is gradually liberated from the erroneous assumptions of common sense. It will be noted that the justification of science takes place not directly in terms of science but indirectly as a criticism of common sense. The Phenomenology thus begins with common sense on its own terms and proceeds by exposing its inner contradictions until the dialectic, of its own momentum, is led to the level of science. It will be noted that in Hegel’s account of his dialectical methodology in the Introduction to the Phenomenology there is no talk of Descartes or of his method of skepticism. The phenomenological method that Hegel uses to justify science to common sense does not take place by any procedure of skeptical doubt. First, natural consciousness does not begin the procedure by doubting; on the contrary, it is begun when natural consciousness uncritically posits a specific common-sense conception of truth. Second, the contradiction in the different concepts is not exposed by any skeptical method on the part of natural consciousness. The contradictions arise naturally in the course of the dialectical analysis. Thus, there is no particular reason to think that any of the discussion about doubt in De Omnibus derives directly from Hegel. Skeptical or Cartesian doubt is simply not an issue for him. B. Johannes Climacus’ Examination of Subjective Doubt. In the second chapter of De Omnibus the thesis “philosophy begins with doubt” is examined. Here the discussion shifts from the objective question about the beginning of philosophy to the subjective question of the individual’s relation to that beginning. The main argument is that if philosophy begins with doubt, then this doubt cannot be handed down objectively, but rather each individual must appropriate it for himself. The original statement that one must embrace the eternal philosophy serves as the starting point for the rest of the chapter. The question that Johannes Climacus poses to himself is how he is to embrace the eternal philosophy and its beginning with doubt.89 He is strengthened in his desire to determine the individual’s relation to this beginning when he hears of the three types of philosophical starting points: (1) the absolute beginning, (2) the objective beginning, and (3) the subjective beginning. Kierkegaard describes as follows the third variant: “the subjective beginning is the work of consciousness, by which it elevates itself to thinking or to positing the abstraction.”90 Of these three beginnings, this last one is of particular interest to Johannes Climacus: “He was well aware that if any of the 89

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JC, p. 148; Pap. IV B 1, p. 131: “he wanted to investigate, how the single individual must relate to that thesis, and, consequently, how the single individual must embrace philosophy.” JC, p. 149; Pap. IV B 1, p. 131. Translation slightly modified.

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beginnings mentioned was the one in question, it had to be the third, because reflecting about philosophy’s absolute and objective beginning had to be left to those who had already become philosophers. The subjective beginning, however, was certainly the one with which the individual started from not having been a philosopher to become a philosopher.”91 (By this Kierkegaard seems to refer to Hegel’s claim to justify science to common sense and to raise ordinary consciousness to the level of philosophy.) Most important for Climacus is the fact that the subjective beginning seems to be the only one that answers the question of the individual’s relation to the thesis. Johannes Climacus tries to come to terms with the nature of the subjective beginning in order to determine what kind of relationship to philosophy it implies. He wonders, does the thesis, “philosophy begins with doubt” hold true eternally in the same way that mathematical truths do? The key argument that Climacus hits upon is that there is a fundamental difference between this claim and mathematical truths. The latter are universal and impersonal in the sense that they are true regardless of who pronounces them; by contrast, the thesis “philosophy begins with doubt” is subjective, like a religious or ethical truth, and for this reason the person who pronounces it is essential since the cognitive value of the claim will vary from person to person: “we would still require acquaintance with the personality of the speaker with respect to religious theses and also, up to a point, with respect to an ethical thesis, for anyone could state a religious or an ethical thesis, but it would not necessarily follow that in everyone’s mouth it would become a religious or an ethical thesis.”92 Further he reasons, “If a two-year-old child could be taught a mathematical thesis, it would be essentially just as true in the child’s mouth as in the mouth of Pythagoras. If we taught a two-year-old child to say these words, ‘I believe that there is a God’ or ‘Know yourself,’ then no one would reflect on those words.”93 Ethical and religious truths have a necessary inward value for the speaker and thus are not valid if uttered rote in the way that mathematical truths are. Climacus puts the claim about philosophy beginning with doubt into this category of inward truths. This classification implies that doubt cannot truly be taught or handed down from teacher to student. If this could be done, it would be uncritically accepted from an external authority and thus would no longer be doubt; rather, each individual must doubt for himself before he can begin actual philosophical cognition. The individual cannot simply accept this doubt but instead must appropriate it personally. By teaching or commanding doubt, one falsifies it since one makes the pupil accept the teacher’s doubt. Hence, doubt can only be carried out on an 91 93

JC, p. 149; Pap. IV B 1, p. 132. JC, p. 152; Pap. IV B 1, p. 135.

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JC, p. 151; Pap. IV B 1, p. 134.

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the subjective beginning of philosophy with doubt 265 individual basis, but this eliminates the teacher and any philosophical tradition. Philosophy thus begins anew each time that the process of doubt is initiated. The question to be addressed now is what all of this has to do with Hegel. Given the previous analysis of Hegel’s method, it is difficult to see how it can be construed as one of skeptical doubt akin to that of Descartes. The issue becomes clearer when one sees how Hegel’s philosophy is portrayed by Martensen. In his accounts, Martensen attributes to Hegel the method of Cartesian doubt. His reason for doing so is clearly a passage from the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel explains the phenomenological procedure of the work. There he writes: Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the Concept of knowledge, or in other words, not to be real knowledge. But since it directly takes itself to be real knowledge, this path has a negative significance for it, and what is in fact the realization of the Concept counts for it rather as the loss of its own self; for it does lose its truth on this path. The road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of doubt, or more precisely the way of despair.94

Hegel describes how natural consciousness experiences the inconsistencies and shortcomings of its concepts of truth in the course of the phenomenological examination. He plays on the etymological relation between the German words “Verzweiflung” or “despair” and “Zweifel” or “doubt.” (Both Martensen95 and Kierkegaard play on their Danish equivalents, “Fortvivlelse” and “Tvivl.”96 ) At first Hegel characterizes the series of figures of the Phenomenology as “the pathway of doubt” and then he corrects himself and renames it “the way of despair.” This is of course a description from the perspective of natural consciousness who despairs at the demise of its truth claim. Hegel then continues, using a formulation that Martensen was keen to parrot: “For what happens on it [the pathway of doubt] is not what is ordinarily understood when the word ‘doubt’ is used: shilly-shallying about this or that presumed truth, followed by a return to that truth again, after the doubt has been appropriately dispelled – so that at the end of the process the matter is taken to be what it was in the first place.”97 Martensen frequently repeats this sentence in various forms and quotes it almost verbatim in his review of Heiberg’s Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course at the Royal Military College.98 It will be noted that Martensen puts this description of Hegel’s dialectical method together with Hegel’s 94 95 96 98

Hegel, PhS, p. 49; Jub., vol. 2, p. 71. Translation slightly modified. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Betragtninger over Id´een af Faust med Hensyn paa Lenaus Faust,” op. cit., p. 105, p. 108, p. 118. 97 Hegel, PhS, p. 49; Jub.,vol. 2, p. 71. EO2 , pp. 211ff.; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 203ff. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., pp. 518–519.

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description of Descartes’ skeptical method in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. But there is nothing in Hegel to justify this association. Finally, Hegel characterizes the nature of this philosophical skepticism as “the resolve, in science, not to give oneself over to the thoughts of others, upon mere authority, but to examine everything for oneself and follow only one’s own conviction, or better still, to produce everything oneself, and accept only one’s own deed as what is true.”99 From this definition it should be clear that Hegel is not speaking of any systematic procedure of doubt as in Descartes. He is concerned with an examination of the different concepts at the different levels. The internal consistency of the concepts is what is at issue, and natural consciousness is compelled to respect the contradictions that arise in the concepts and accordingly modify or abandon them. It must thus act in accordance with the logic of the concepts and not under the influence of some external, less rational forces. Philosophical doubt is important for Descartes but not for Hegel. For the latter, the issue is the internal consistency of particular concepts, which is quite different from a method of universal doubt. Natural consciousness at the beginning of the Phenomenology does not begin as a skeptic or with a method of doubt but, all to the contrary, as the voice of naive common sense. The whole issue of philosophical doubt captured in the phrase “de omnibus dubitandum est” and in the thesis about modern philosophy beginning with doubt is a hobbyhorse of Martensen that has little to do with Hegel. First, in his review of Heiberg’s lecture, Martensen presents Hegel as a kind of German Descartes who employed the method of skeptical doubt. After stating that Hegel’s goal was to find the unconditioned thought, he continues: Finding this means nothing more or less than finding the point outside the world, which the ancient Greek sages already sought. (Da mihi punctum & caelum terramque movebo.) This point, independent of experience and consciousness, Hegel sought to find by carrying out dialectical doubt. This is thought’s infinite abstraction from all determination. One abstracts not merely from all given reality but also from the “I,” for this too is only a concrete form of thought.100

This is a distortion of Hegel’s thought since, as has been seen, he did not employ Descartes’ method of universal doubt in order to arrive at a point that could serve as the foundation for knowledge. What Martensen describes here is Descartes’ search for a solid point of certain knowledge from which to build. Rather enigmatically, Martensen conflates “infinite abstraction from all determination,” which is a formulation from Hegel, 99 100

Hegel, PhS, p. 50; Jub., vol. 2, p. 72. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus,” op. cit., p. 521.

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the subjective beginning of philosophy with doubt 267 with doubt. When Hegel talks about beginning with the category of being, which is an abstraction from all determinations, this has nothing to do with doubt and is not arrived at by means of any skeptical, Cartesian procedure. Second, in Martensen’s lectures, the “History of Modern Philosophy from Kant to Hegel,” he once again conflates the thought of Descartes with that of Hegel. He describes Hegel’s dialectical method as follows: “The method with which the process takes place is the negative. Every thought contains its own negation, its own opposite, differences. . . . The third standpoint is now that where the person again wins satisfaction after having gone through all doubt.”101 Here Martensen confuses the second stage of the Hegelian dialectic with that of doubt. The third stage is then thought to overcome this doubt and return to certainty. This is again a clear distortion of Hegel’s method since dialectical negation is clearly different from doubt. The negation in Hegel appears not by doubting the first term but by the production of its opposite, which is conceived as its negation. Moreover, this is one of the things that Kierkegaard complains about (i.e., that Martensen makes grand claims to have doubted everything), but in the end he drops this doubt and returns to any number of given positive doctrines. The problem lies in the characterization of the dialectical method as one of doubt. Thus, when Kierkegaard satirizes the procedure of skeptical doubt, it cannot with justice be construed as a reference to Hegel himself. His entire criticism targets the use of a Cartesian method of doubt to construct a subjective beginning of philosophy. But given that there is no such method in Hegel, Kierkegaard’s analysis of the subjective nature of doubt has nothing to do with Hegel’s thought. But there is again no reason to think that Kierkegaard himself ever intended it as such. It seems highly probable that the true target is Martensen who portrays the method of Hegel’s philosophy in this way. The question to be addressed now is whether there is any evidence that indicates that Kierkegaard intended this as a criticism of Martensen and not of Hegel. One bit of evidence can be found in the Preface to Fear and Trembling where Descartes is featured as the hero and the Hegelians as the villains. In connection with the issue of doubt, Johannes de silentio expressly mentions figures who peopled the university scene: Every speculative monitor who conscientiously signals the important trends in modern philosophy, every assistant professor, tutor, and student, every rural outsider and tenant incumbent in philosophy is unwilling to stop with doubting everything but goes further. . . . [I]t can probably be taken for granted that they have doubted everything, since otherwise it certainly would be odd to speak of their having gone further.102 101

Pap. II C 25, in Pap. XII, p. 321.

102

FT, p. 5; SKS, vol. 4, p. 101.

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It is no accident that he targets figures at the university since it was the assistant professor Martensen and his students who were pretentiously making claims about the need to doubt everything before beginning a study of philosophy. Moreover, one finds here the expression of “going further,” which Kierkegaard consistently associates with Martensen.103 Here Johannes de silentio points away from Descartes and towards Martensen. Given all this, it seems clear that Kierkegaard intends Martensen as the target of this criticism and not Hegel or Descartes. The issue in fact concerns Martensen’s conflation of Hegel’s thought with that of Descartes. Given that the formulation “de omnibus dubitandum est” can unambiguously be traced back to Martensen and given that the account of Hegel’s philosophy as employing a procedure of doubt stems from Martensen (and has little justification in Hegel’s thought itself), it seems safe to conclude that the criticism of this point in De Omnibus is directed against Martensen. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that Kierkegaard ever intended the account of the subjective beginning of philosophy with doubt to be a criticism of Hegel in the first place.

iv. kierkegaard’s appropriation of hegel on “sense-certainty” In many respects the few pages104 that constitute the unfinished Part Two of the manuscript of De Omnibus are for the purposes of this investigation the most interesting and the most important since they demonstrate a striking familiarity with the first part of the “Consciousness” chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, entitled “Sense-Certainty.” The only time Hegel is alluded to by name in the entire work is in a footnote in Part Two in which Kierkegaard refers to this chapter. There he writes: The terminology of modern philosophy is often confusing. For example, it speaks of sinnliches Bewußtsein, wahrnehmendes B[ewußtsein], Verstand, etc., although it would be far preferable to call it “sense perception,” “experience,” for in consciousness there is more. It would be interesting to see how Hegel would formulate the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness, from self-consciousness to reason. When the transition consists merely of a heading, it is easy enough.105

Here Kierkegaard gives the clue about the origin of the discussion in Part Two by naming the three parts of the “Consciousness” chapter (i.e., “Sense-Certainty” [“Die sinnliche Gewißheit”], “Perception” [“Die Wahrnehmung”], and “Force and the Understanding” [“Kraft und 103 104 105

See Chapter 1, Section II, p. 65f. JC, pp. 161–172; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 141–150. JC, p. 169fn.; Pap. IV B 1, p. 148fn. See JC, Supplement, p. 258; Pap. IV B 10.12.

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Verstand”]). In this section I want to argue that Kierkegaard’s account can be seen largely as a commentary on the “Sense-Certainty” section. Moreover, despite the criticism in the passage just cited (i.e., that Hegel failed to provide adequate transitions between the individual chapters of the Phenomenology), Kierkegaard’s assessment of the “Sense-Certainty” section is, I wish to argue, quite positive and his account of consciousness and language is largely derivative from it. A. Hegel’s Analysis of “Sense-Certainty.” Before I turn to Kierkegaard’s analysis, I will briefly sketch Hegel’s “Sense-Certainty” section, the first substantive analysis in the Phenomenology of Spirit and thus the beginning of the dialectical march to absolute knowing. The dialectic of “Sense-Certainty” introduces the first concept for dialectical examination. Hegel’s phenomenological actor, natural consciousness, begins with the common sense belief in a predetermined external world, which is immediately accessible to the human subject. The claim that runs throughout the “Consciousness” chapter generally is the simple view that there exist external things independent of the knowing subject. The “Consciousness” chapter posits various forms of realist metaphysics that assert the independent reality of the external world. The first of these views is that featured in “Sense-Certainty” (i.e., the minimalist assertion that there is an external something). As Kierkegaard notes, Hegel’s terminology can be misleading, for Hegel does not use the term “sense-certainty” to denote the variety of sense experience; instead, this expression is intended to designate the most undifferentiated form of existence given in sense.106 This form of consciousness is not concerned with an object that can be discerned “in virtue of a host of distinct qualities” or that contains “a rich complex of connections, or [is] related in various ways to other things.”107 Hegel puts it bluntly: “Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sensecertainty.”108 The object model of “Sense-Certainty” is instead simply that which we are immediately aware of: “The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is.”109 This model of objectivity as pure being represents the most simple and minimal criterion for objectivity, and for this reason it is the first one featured in the Phenomenology. In typical Hegelian fashion, the dialectic here moves through three distinct stages. The object model of the concept is first considered as in-itself and as belonging to the object, then 106 107 109

Hegel, PhS, p. 67; Jub., vol. 2, p. 93: “The wealth of sense-knowledge belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, for which it was only the source of instances.” 108 Hegel, PhS, p. 58; Jub., vol.2, p. 82. Hegel, PhS, p. 58; Jub., vol. 2, p. 82. Hegel, PhS, p. 58; Jub., vol. 2, p. 81.

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as for-itself and belonging to the subject, and finally as in- and for-itself where it is united in both. At the first stage one tries to see pure undifferentiated being on the side of the object. This is what is immediately given and true. Hegel writes of natural consciousness: “All that it says about what it knows is just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing.”110 Pure being is thus any autonomous and external entity that exists independent of the subject. This amorphous entity is designated by the term the “This.” Since natural consciousness has not yet reached the level of properties, the term “This” is used simply to indicate the existence of something without determining it further, for example, as a chair or a tree, which would require properties. Natural consciousness claims that there exists some particular autonomous object, which it expresses by saying, “This is.” The demonstrative character of the “This” purportedly makes it possible to pick out the individual object. Any external object ought to be able to be designated by being pointed out as a “This.” Hegel distinguishes two distinct aspects of the “This,” namely, the “Now” and the “Here.”111 The particular spatio-temporal position is what designates the particularity of any given object.112 The claim of natural consciousness is that there is a particular object, which it formulates by saying, “This is Here, Now.” The dialectical movement, however, proves internally inconsistent. Neither the “Here” nor the “Now” is able to pick out a particular object. Hegel demonstrates this with the following argument. He begins with the dialectical examination of the “Now”: To the question: “What is Now?,” let us answer, e.g. “Now is Night.” In order to test the truth of this sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything through our preserving it. If now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale.113

In natural consciousness’s attempt to assert that a particular object exists “now,” it means [meinen] that at this particular moment it exists. But the term “now” is not a particular but rather a universal term that can refer to any given point in time. Therefore, simply by saying that the object exists now, natural consciousness has still not determined any particular temporal moment. In short, natural consciousness does not say what it means since it wants to assert something particular about the object, but because it employs a universal term, the truth of the particular is not expressed and is lost in the indeterminacy of universality. 110 112 113

111 Hegel, PhS, pp. 59–60; Jub., vol. 2, p. 83. Hegel, PhS, p. 58; Jub., vol. 2, p. 81. In the corresponding section in the Encyclopaedia, Hegel refers to the “Here” and “Now” as “spatial and temporal singleness.” Hegel, Phil. of Mind, § 418; Jub., vol. 10, p. 264. Hegel, PhS, p. 60; Jub., vol. 2, p. 83.

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A parallel argument, which is applied to the spatial term, “Here,” runs as follows: “‘Here’ is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: ‘No tree is here, but a house instead.’”114 The same word “Here” is used to designate different locations, first the space where the tree is located and then that where the house is located. Thus, the “Here,” qua universal, is incapable of designating any particular place and therefore cannot isolate a particular object of sense-certainty. Just as the “Now” refers to any time, the “Here” refers to any place. Once again natural consciousness means [meinen] to refer to a particular place but cannot express it with the universal term the “Here.” As a result of the failure of the first stage, natural consciousness now tries to make revisions in its concept to resolve the contradictions. It adopts a second strategy which reverses the roles of the subject and the object. Hegel says, “When we compare the relation in which knowing and the object first came on the scene, with the relation in which they now stand in this result, we find that it is reversed. The object, which was supposed to be the essential element in sense-certainty, is now the unessential element.”115 Now instead of the object being regarded as the immediate and the true, the focus shifts to the individual subject which is now thought to be the particular, and by virtue of this particularity determines objectivity. Therefore, the truth “is in the object as my object, or in its being mine; it is, because I know it.”116 The various immediate means of knowing the objects of sense-certainty are all domiciled in a singular subject: “The force of its truth thus lies now in the ‘I,’ in the immediacy of my seeing, hearing, and so on.”117 Thus, the pure “I” or individual subject replaces the “This” or the being of the object. Now particularity dwells on the side of the subject and not the object. Hegel now analyzes the “I” with the same dialectical scrutiny that was applied to the “This.” As it turns out, the “I” runs aground on universality in precisely the same way as the “This.” The term “I” does not designate any particular subject but, like the “This” is a universal: “The ‘I’ is merely universal like ‘Now,’ ‘Here,’ or ‘This’ in general. . . .When I say ‘this Here,’ ‘this Now,’ or a ‘single item,’ I am saying all Thises, Heres, Nows, all single items. Similarly, when I say ‘I,’ this singular ‘I,’ I say in general all ‘I’s.’”118

114 115 116

117

Hegel, PhS, pp. 60–61; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 84–85. Hegel, PhS, p. 61; Jub., vol. 2, p. 85. Hegel, PhS, p. 61; Jub., vol. 2, p. 85. The German is as follows: “Ihre Wahrheit ist in dem Gegenstande als meinem Gegenstande oder im Meinen; er ist, weil Ich von ihm weiß.” In this passage, Hegel plays on the possessive pronoun “my” or “mine” [mein] and the verb “to mean” or “to intend” [meinen] which he uses in the sense of meaning or intending a particular object whose particularity is not able to be captured linguistically due to the universality of language. See also PhS, p. 71; Jub., vol. 2, p. 98. 118 Hegel, PhS, p. 62; Jub., vol. 2,p. 86. Hegel, PhS, p. 61; Jub., vol. 2, p. 85.

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Elsewhere Hegel makes the same point: “Similarly when I say ‘I,’ I mean my single self to the exclusion of all others, but what I say, viz. ‘I,’ is just every ‘I,’ which in like manner excludes all others from itself.”119 Since every subject uses “I” to refer to him- or herself, the term on its own has no referential value; it is not a particular but rather a universal.120 The third stage unifies the previous two. Now instead of trying to locate particularity unilaterally on the side of the object or the subject, natural consciousness tries to see it in the combination of the two or in their moment of contact: “Sense-certainty thus comes to know by experience that its essence is neither in the object nor in the ‘I,’ and that its immediacy is an immediacy neither of the one nor of the other. . . . Thus we reach the stage where we have to posit the whole of sense-certainty itself as its essence, and no longer only one of its moments.”121 Here the aspect of particularity is thought to lie in the point of interaction between the subject and the object. This moment of particularity is designated as the new “Here” and the new “Now.” This particular moment of contact is what is essential, and thus natural consciousness concentrates exclusively on it, trying to keep it and it alone in focus: “I, this ‘I,’ assert then the ‘Here’ as a tree, and do not turn round so that the Here would become for me not a tree.”122 Not surprisingly, this particular moment of contact is also unable to be captured linguistically with the universal terms “Here” and “Now.” The first dialectical analysis is of the temporal point of contact or the “Now.” Like its predecessor this new “Now” is always transitory and never endures beyond the moment: “The Now, as it is pointed out to us, is Now that has been, and this is its truth; it does not have the truth of being. Yet this much is true, that it has been. But what essentially has been [gewesen ist] is, in fact, not an essence that is [kein Wesen]; it is not, and it was with being that we were concerned.”123 Natural consciousness is unable to pick out the 119

120

121 122 123

Hegel, EL, § 20; Jub., vol. 8, p. 47. See EL, § 24, Remark; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 85–86: “Everyone is a whole world of representations, which are buried in the night of the ‘I.’ Thus, ‘I’ is the universal, in which abstraction is made from everything particular, but in which at the same time everything is present, though veiled.” See also PR, § 4, Addition; Jub., vol. 7, p. 51: “‘I’ is thought and likewise the universal. When I say ‘I,’ I leave out of account every particularity such as my character, temperament, knowledge, and age. ‘I’ is totally empty; it is merely a point – simple, yet active in this simplicity.” See Hegel, Phil. of Mind, § 381, Remark; Jub., vol. 10, pp. 24–25. See also EL, § 24, Remark; Jub., vol. 8, p. 85: “When I say ‘I,’ I mean myself as this singular, quite determinate person. But when I say ‘I,’ I do not in fact express anything particular about myself. Anyone else is also ‘I,’ and although in calling myself ‘I,’ I certainly mean me, this single person, what I say is still something completely universal.” Hegel, PhS, p. 62; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 86–87. Translation slightly modified. Hegel, PhS, pp. 62–63; Jub., vol. 2, p. 87. Hegel, PhS, p. 63; Jub., vol. 2, p. 88. Translation slightly modified. In this passage, Hegel is playing on words again. In German the past participle of the verb “sein,” “to be” is “gewesen,” which is etymologically related to the word “Wesen” or “essence.” Thus, something which has been or no longer is has, so to speak, no essence.

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specific moment of contact between the subject and the object with the word “Now” since the “Now” is a universal term. The same movement happens with the spatial term of the point of contact, the new “Here.” The particular space in which the interaction between subject and object occurs becomes a plurality of “Heres”: “The Here pointed out, to which I hold fast, is similarly a this Here which, in fact, is not this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left. The Above is itself similarly this manifold otherness of the above, below, etc.”124 Natural consciousness is unable to express the particular spatial point of contact with the universal term. Once again the particularity collapses into universality. The upshot of Hegel’s analysis in “Sense-Certainty” is that “pure being” cannot be used to determine a particular object since it is too general. It is simply undetermined universality. Every time natural consciousness tries to use it to determine some particular object, the object’s particularity is dissolved. The particular or determinate “This” or “I” invariably collapses into the universality of pure being. Hegel writes: “And what consciousness will learn from experience in all sense-certainty is, in truth, only what we have seen, viz. the This as a universal, the very opposite of what that assertion affirmed to be universal experience.”125 It is a matter of expressing accurately the particularity of the object. One means to refer to an individual object but is unable to pick it out or designate it in its particularity with the category of pure being. These linguistic descriptions of particularity always rely on universal terms that destroy the particular nature of the object intended. This is where the dialectic ends at the conclusion of the “Sense-Certainty” section, and it is the job of the rest of the Phenomenology to resolve the problems of universality and particularity that have their origin here. B. Johannes Climacus, Language, and Consciousness. With this background, I now return to Kierkegaard’s discussion. The similarities with Hegel begin almost straightaway with the discussion of immediacy. Kierkegaard writes, again describing the thought of Johannes Climacus: He asked what the nature of consciousness would be when it had doubt outside itself. There is consciousness in the child, but it has doubt outside itself. How then, is the child’s consciousness qualified? It is actually not qualified at all, which can also be expressed by saying that it is immediate. Immediacy is precisely indeterminateness. In immediacy there is no relation, for as soon as there is a relation immediacy is cancelled. Immediately, therefore, everything is true, but this truth is untruth the very next moment, for in immediacy everything is untrue.126 124 126

125 Hegel, PhS, p. 65; Jub., vol. 2, p. 90. Hegel, PhS, p. 64; Jub., vol. 2, p. 89. JC, p. 167; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 145–146. Translation slightly modified.

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This could well be a synopsis of Hegel’s discussion of immediacy in “SenseCertainty.” Natural consciousness believes it had an immediate relation to its object, and thus that everything is immediately true. But yet this immediacy turns out to be indeterminate since the immediate, unqualified object for consciousness – pure being – is indeterminate. Natural consciousness learns that its relation to the object is mediated. The temporal term “Now” is mediated by other temporal terms, “before,” “after,” “day,” “night,” and so on. Likewise, the spatial term “Here” is mediated by other spatial terms, “above,” “below,” “to the right,” and so on. Thus, what appeared to be immediately known in fact relies on a whole network of terms and concepts. The question of truth and doubt only arises after the stage of immediacy where there is no doubt and therefore no true or false. Kierkegaard then goes on to introduce two new terms – reality [Realitet] and ideality – which at first glance seem to have nothing to do with Hegel’s analysis. Yet when viewed in context, these terms are clearly meant to capture precisely the contradiction between universality and particularity that is portrayed in “Sense-Certainty.” Kierkegaard writes: “Immediacy is reality; language is ideality; consciousness is contradiction. The moment I make a statement about reality, contradiction is present, for what I say is ideality.”127 Kierkegaard alludes to Hegel’s analysis of the inability to specify the particular object in words or language. The “This” is indeterminate since it expresses everything and not the particular “This” or object it is intended to express. The particularity of the object is what Kierkegaard calls “reality,” while the attempt to express it in language is what he calls “ideality.” The connection to Hegel’s analysis is even more obvious when Kierkegaard writes: “In reality by itself there is no possibility of doubt; when I express it in language, contradiction is present, since I do not express it but produce something else.”128 One cannot express the particular in language, which is a system of universal terms because in the attempt to do so the particular is transformed into something universal. Kierkegaard writes: Therefore, it is language that cancels immediacy; if man could not talk he would remain in the immediate. This could be expressed, he [ Johannes Climacus] thought, by saying that the immediate is reality, language is ideality, since by speaking I produce the contradiction. When I seek to express sense perception in this way, the contradiction is present, for what I say is something different from what I want to say. I cannot express reality in language, because I use ideality to characterize it, which is a contradiction, an untruth.129

127 129

128 JC, p. 168; Pap. IV B 1, p. 146. JC, p. 168; Pap. IV B 1, p. 147. JC, Supplement, p. 255; Pap. IV B 14.6; JP, vol. 3, 2320.

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This is strikingly similar to Hegel’s formulation of the same thought. In his conclusion, Hegel uses an example of a piece of paper to explain the result of this analysis: They mean “this” bit of paper on which I am writing – or rather have written – “this”; but what they mean is not what they say. If they actually wanted to say “this” bit of paper which they mean, if they wanted to say it, then this is impossible, because the sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached by language, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal.130

The similarity in these two passages establishes another parallel between the two analyses. In both cases the issue concerns the inability to express the particular, which is intended, with the universal terms of language. Another point of contact is Kierkegaard’s characterization of consciousness as the contradiction that unites the two terms “reality” and “ideality” or, for Hegel, “particular” and “universal.” Kierkegaard writes: “The duplexity is reality and ideality; consciousness is the relation.”131 For Hegel as well, consciousness plays the key role: it is consciousness that attempts to formulate the truth claims, and it is for consciousness that the contradiction arises. This is an express part of Hegel’s phenomenological method according to which contradictions arise since both terms – the object and the concept – are united in consciousness: “For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other hand, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth. Since both are for the same consciousness, this consciousness is itself their comparison.”130 There would be no contradiction if the two conflicting terms were not both members of the same consciousness. Thus, Kierkegaard claims: “The possibility of doubt, then, lies in consciousness, whose nature is a contradiction that is produced by a duplexity and that itself produces a duplexity.”133 Kierkegaard also mentions Hegel’s doctrine of reflection in his discussion. For Hegel, reflection is the second stage of logic in which concepts are conceived as having two elements that are “reflected” into each other (e.g., substance and accident, cause and effect, essence and appearance). For Hegel these elements are dialectically related to each other and form a single concept. Kierkegaard writes: “Reflection is the possibility of the relation; consciousness is the relation, the first form of which is contradiction.”134 Kierkegaard distinguishes between reflection, which always involves two terms, and consciousness, which involves three – the subject and object and their relation. Here as well he follows Hegel’s doctrine. For Hegel, 130 132 134

Hegel, PhS, p. 66; Jub., vol. 2, p. 91. Hegel, PhS, p. 54; Jub., vol. 2, p. 77. JC, p. 169; Pap. IV B 1, p. 147.

131 133

JC, p. 168; Pap. IV B 1, p. 146. JC, p. 168; Pap. IV B 1, p. 146.

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reflection is only a finite part of his philosophical system and not the final word. Thus, Hegel also criticizes reflection as limited. Kierkegaard then notes that the threefold relation of consciousness contains within it the binary relation of the reflection. The conclusion for Kierkegaard is that the threefold relation is necessary for doubt: “If there were nothing but dichotomies, doubt would not exist, for the possibility of doubt resides precisely in the third, which places the two in relation to each other.”135 On this issue Kierkegaard follows Hegel closely. His emphasis on a threefold movement instead of a binary one bears an obvious resemblance to Hegel’s methodology. It is unfortunate that Part Two of De Omnibus is only fragmentary. Here Kierkegaard displays a careful study of at least one small part of Hegel’s philosophical corpus. Perhaps surprisingly for some, he is not critical of Hegel’s account here136 but in fact follows it so closely that his analysis at times amounts to a paraphrase. Kierkegaard introduces some of his own terminology, but the issues involved are clearly the same. While Kierkegaard frames the discussion in the context of skeptical doubt, this is not a guiding issue in Hegel. Nonetheless the similarities between the two accounts can hardly be denied. The fact that Kierkegaard offers no criticism of Hegel here in Part Two seems to confirm the results of the analysis of Part One, namely that his criticism is of Martensen and not of Hegel. Indeed, it hardly makes sense for him to criticize Hegel in Part One and then go on in Part Two to give a careful, approving analysis of a difficult part of Hegel’s epistemology. What is interesting about De Omnibus is that it illustrates the difference in Kierkegaard’s mind between Hegel and Hegelians. First, the issue of skeptical doubt is mistakenly presented by the Hegelian Martensen as an aspect of Hegel’s philosophy. This issue is made the object of satire in the work. There are at least two possible interpretations of this: either Kierkegaard, out of an ignorance of Hegel’s own philosophy, thought he was criticizing Hegel, when in fact he was criticizing Martensen’s account of him, or he intended all along to criticize Martensen and was interested only secondarily in Hegel’s own thought. The analysis given here clearly supports the latter view. If one concentrates on the text itself, one finds no indication that Kierkegaard sees himself as carrying on a polemic of any kind with Hegel. Moreover, his careful analysis of “Sense-Certainty” in Part Two is difficult to square with the view that he was ignorant of Hegel’s 135 136

JC, p. 169; Pap. IV B 1, p. 148. Kierkegaard does at the very end sketch a criticism of the attempt to answer doubt systematically. In this regard he contrasts ancient skepticism with modern skepticism. However, the criticism here seems more relevant for Descartes and the question of doubt than for Hegel’s philosophical project which, as has been seen above, is not concerned with the issue of skeptical doubt. See JC, p. 170; Pap. IV B 1, p. 149.

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dialectical methodology. This is especially difficult to imagine when one considers that Hegel’s discussion of this methodology comes in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, which immediately precedes the “Sense-Certainty” chapter, precisely the section of text that Kierkegaard analyzes so attentively. Thus, it is very improbable that he overlooked Hegel’s Introduction completely. Second, there is a perhaps conscious change between the two parts of De Omnibus where Kierkegaard shifts from an account of Martensen to an analysis of Hegel’s primary text. While he spends virtually all of the first part criticizing the Hegelian Martensen, in the second part he turns to a section of one of Hegel’s own works, and the tone changes considerably. The satirical tone from Part One disappears as do most of the narrative aspects. Instead of telling a story as he did in Part One, Kierkegaard seems in Part Two to have forgotten the narrative and to be simply doing philosophy. The analysis in Part Two is clearly of the “SenseCertainty” chapter in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This would seem to afford Kierkegaard with a golden opportunity to criticize or satirize Hegel if he wished to do so. But surprisingly, the tone in this section is neither critical nor satirical. Instead, Kierkegaard approvingly repeats in his own words the essentials of Hegel’s analysis. This is striking in a text that is otherwise so overtly directed against a known Hegelian, Martensen. Once again the conclusion can only be that Kierkegaard’s argument is not with Hegel but with Martensen. The overall goal of the text seems to be to indicate both the hypocrisy of Martensen’s claim to doubt everything and the way in which this claim misleads the students. There is an interesting passage in a draft of The Concept of Anxiety, which appeared on June 17, 1844, not long after Kierkegaard worked on De Omnibus. There Kierkegaard writes: “philosophers have never quite surrendered to the negative and thus have never earnestly done what they have said. They merely flirt with doubt.”137 Here he alludes to Martensen and his students vaguely with the word “philosophers” and indicates Martensen’s hypocrisy by saying that he has never done what he said. Martensen says that one should doubt everything and indeed claims that this is a necessary precondition for philosophy, but he himself never applies the principle. Moreover, those students who are so naive as to take Martensen’s injunction seriously and actually try to apply it, end up in utter confusion. This is the dilemma of Johannes Climacus. He has been seduced by Martensen who merely flirts with doubt. There are a number of similarities between De Omnibus and the other main unpublished text from this initial period, namely The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars. Most obviously, both of these texts take aim 137

CA, Supplement, p. 176; SKS, vol. 19, p. 211, Not7:21; JP, vol. 3, 3284. See CA, p. 146fn.; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 445–446fn.

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at Martensen and his students. (1) Thus, it is no accident that both texts have as their setting the university milieu in Copenhagen. In De Omnibus, Johannes Climacus constantly recalls things that he has heard from the recent philosophers in the lecture hall. In the Soap-Cellars the reader is taken into the “the Prytaneum” for a first-hand taste of the philosophical discussions which are carried out in Hegelian jargon. By portraying different aspects of the student scene in Copenhagen, Kierkegaard is able to criticize Martensen in his capacity as a teacher and a zealot for Hegel’s philosophy. (2) Both texts are written in a literary form and not a standard philosophical or theological one. The Soap-Cellars is a comedy, and De Omnibus is a kind of satirical novel. Kierkegaard could have attacked Martensen openly as the anonymous critic in Kjøbenhavnsposten did, but this was not his preferred style. His polemics against Martensen could be best carried out in more literary genres. Instead of attacking Martensen with a moralistic article, Kierkegaard devises the idea of a satirical novel that traces the hapless career of one of Martensen’s students. In this way he can make a study of the negative results of Martensen’s influence. Moreover, this allows him to criticize Martensen indirectly, a technique he continues to employ until the attack on the Church in the final year of his life, when he turns to a direct attack on Martensen. (3) Even though the criticism in the Soap-Cellars and De Omnibus is indirect, Kierkegaard is still careful to include in both texts unmistakable references to Martensen. Thus, in both texts he avails himself of the Cartesian slogans “cogito ergo sum” and “de omnibus dubitandum est.” As has been seen, these slogans were taken from Martensen’s published works and lectures and would presumably have been immediately recognized by his contemporaries. This use of code words is typical of Kierkegaard’s strategy of criticizing his opponents indirectly. (4) While the goal of both works is to satirize Martensen, the things for which he is satirized are slightly different. In the Soap-Cellars, the criticism seems to be more flippant. Kierkegaard seems to want to make fun of the affected Hegelian language used the discussions among Martensen’s students. He wants to satirize their naive zeal and arrogance in defending the new trend. By contrast, in De Omnibus his criticism is aimed much more specifically at Martensen’s pretension to have doubted everything. The argument seems to be that Martensen’s claim that one must doubt everything in order to philosophize ultimately has a negative effect on any student naive enough to believe it. Thus, Martensen is portrayed as someone who corrupts the minds of the young people with irresponsible slogans of this kind, which even he himself does not take seriously. The character of Johannes Climacus is supposed to demonstrate the negative effects of one who does take it seriously.

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(5) Neither the Soap-Cellars nor De Omnibus was ever completed or published. This might be an indication of the fact that they were written more for Kierkegaard’s private amusement than for wider public consumption. One can also well imagine that it would have been rather uncomfortable for him vis-`a-vis Martensen and his students if these works had appeared in print and he had become known as the author. It is perhaps no accident that Martensen’s critic in Kjøbenhavnsposten was anonymous. Given the foregoing analyses, it seems safe to conclude that De Omnibus belongs to what I have designated as the first period in Kierkegaard’s authorship. This period, which includes all of the texts examined in this investigation up until now, is characterized by Kierkegaard’s generally positive disposition towards Hegel. In all of these works (e.g., From the Papers of One Still Living, The Concept of Irony, and Either/Or), as in De Omnibus, he incorporates and positively uses some aspect of Hegel’s thought. In all of these works there is clear evidence of a study of some of Hegel’s primary texts. Moreover, there is no anti-Hegel campaign or any trace of a polemic against Hegel himself. To be sure, there are criticisms of various aspects of Hegel’s analyses here and there (e.g., in The Concept of Irony), but the tone is always that of someone in an honest dialogue with another thinker. There is give-and-take and a clear recognition of the aspects of Hegel’s thought that Kierkegaard is in agreement with. In none of these texts is there a one-sided rejection of Hegel or an unqualified Hegel critique, as Thulstrup would have it. Traditionally, the two satirical texts the Soap-Cellars and De Omnibus have been regarded as exceptions to this general pattern since they seem at first glance to contain precisely the kind of polemical rhetoric that one has taken to be a part of the anti-Hegel campaign and thus to be directed against Hegel’s philosophy. The enigmatic nature of some of the allusions has fostered this view and allowed it to continue more or less unchallenged. But the analysis of these texts has shown that in fact they were not aimed at Hegel at all but rather at Martensen. This becomes unambiguous once the obscure allusions have been traced. Moreover, the context of both works as a criticism of the student milieu surrounding Martensen’s lectures also makes clear that the actual critique that the works aim at has nothing to do with Hegel, even though some of his language or key expressions from his philosophy might be present (e.g., absolute knowing and the bad infinity). Thus, nothing in these works disqualifies them from being categorized along with the others that belong to what I am designating as the first period in Kierkegaard’s authorship. It will be noted that Kierkegaard’s relation to the different Danish Hegelians even during this early period is quite complex. Right from the beginning he is critical of Martensen as is evinced quite clearly from journal entries and from the two unpublished satirical texts, the Soap-Cellars

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and De Omnibus. In his article “Public Confession” from June 12, 1842, he is also critical of the Hegelians Rasmus Nielsen, Peter Michael Stilling, and Andreas Frederik Beck.138 But although during this early period he is critical of these Hegelians, he is quite positively disposed towards Heiberg, the most zealous Hegelian of them all. In this same article in which Kierkegaard takes the others to task, he goes out of his way to tip his hat to Heiberg, a fact that he himself mentions explicitly later.139 Heiberg also plays a positive role in From the Papers of One Still Living and Either/Or. Similarly, Kierkegaard was a close friend of Hans Brøchner (his second cousin), who was known for his translations of the Strauss works and for his defense of his right to hold the views of a free thinker.140 Brøchner’s left Hegelianism did not seem to get in the way of the friendship. Thus, Kierkegaard’s criticism of the Hegelians – Martensen, Nielsen, Stilling, and Beck – seems to be at least in part independent of their being Hegelians. For if he had an adamant objection to their Hegelianism, he would presumably also have had the same objection to the Hegelianism of Heiberg and Brøchner. Most importantly for the purposes of this study, while the SoapCellars, “Public Confession,” and De Omnibus criticize specific Hegelians, there is still no polemical tone vis-`a-vis Hegel himself. On the contrary, Kierkegaard is consistently careful to distinguish between Hegel and the true targets of his critique. For example, in “Public Confession” he criticizes Rasmus Nielsen for his imitation of Hegel’s philosophy and then writes: “We cannot go backward; Hegel’s Logic has stood the test of Prof. Nielsen’s thought.”141 It is clearly Nielsen and Nielsen alone whom he wants to criticize. Similar examples have been seen in Either/Or. Given that De Omnibus was written towards the end of 1842 and the beginning of 1843 and thus overlaps with Either/Or, which appeared on February 20, 1843, it is not surprising that their respective discussions about Hegel’s philosophy also overlap at one important point. In Judge Wilhelm’s criticism of the “young necromancers” who have forgotten the central ethical questions of their own life one can see a portrait of Martensen’s students. The discussion about the doctrine of mediation in Hegel from the second volume of Either/Or has traditionally been taken as a straightforward criticism of the point in Hegel’s logic. As has been demonstrated,142 however, it has much more to do with the contemporary Danish discussion of the issue and the student milieu in Copenhagen. This discussion from Either/Or thus clearly overlaps with De Omnibus. 138 139 140 141 142

In COR, pp. 3–12; SV1, vol. 13, pp. 397–406; Fædrelandet, no. 904, June 12, 1842. JP, vol. 5, 6201; Pap. IX A 166. See S.V. Rasmussen, Den unge Brøchner, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1966, pp. 16–31. In COR, p. 8; SV1, vol. 13, p. 402; Fædrelandet, no. 904, June 12, 1842. In Chapter 4, Section II.

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The connection between the two texts is clinched when one sees that the main themes of De Omnibus appear in Either/Or. Judge Wilhelm issues the following criticism: This, I believe, ought to be borne in mind in regard to the enthusiasm of despair with which our age hears the acquired recommended in contrast to the immediate, as if it were this it depended upon to destroy everything lock, stock, and barrel in order to build anew. It has really made me uneasy to hear the jubilation with which younger men, just like the terrorists in the French Revolution, shout: de omnibus dubitandum. Perhaps I am prejudiced. But I do believe, however, that we must distinguish between personal and scientific doubt.143

Here one finds a reference to the “younger men,” presumably Martensen’s students, who are mentioned directly in connection with the slogan “de omnibus dubitandum est.” The young people are criticized for their overenthusiasm and their self-congratulation in overthrowing what is given and starting from the ground up. In the final sentence a distinction is suggested “between personal and scientific doubt.” This distinction is what Johannes Climacus is missing in De Omnibus. He takes a claim about Cartesian scientific doubt to be one about personal doubt. In other words, the slogan “de omnibus dubitandum est” is intended to be a statement about a specific philosophical procedure or method and was never intended to be applied in some more literal sense to one’s own life. In the Preface to Fear and Trembling, Johannes de silentio is careful to point out that Descartes also made this essential distinction.144 The point in De Omnibus seems to be that Martensen has not made this distinction sufficiently clear and has thus misled his students. Given these connections it seems that Either/Or and De Omnibus can both be seen as belonging to the first period of Kierkegaard’s authorship with regard to his relation to Hegel. In both cases the target is Martensen and his students. Moreover, both texts include and incorporate positive elements from Hegel’s philosophy. While Kierkegaard can be said to be engaged in a very active campaign against Martensen at this point in his authorship, there is nothing to indicate that he was engaged in any such campaign against Hegel. Despite all of the criticisms of Martensen and the other Hegelians, Hegel himself is still regarded as a positive source of ideas and inspiration at this point. 143 144

EO2, p. 95; SKS, vol. 3, p. 97. See also EO2, pp. 211–212; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 203–204. FT, pp. 5–6; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 101–102.

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6 KIERKEGAARD’S REPETITION AND HEGEL’S DIALECTICAL MEDIATION

After Either/Or the next two pseudonymous works to appear were Fear and Trembling and Repetition, which were both published on October 16, 1843 (the same day that Three Edifying Discourses appeared in Kierkegaard’s own name). These two works introduced two new pseudonyms into the authorship: Johannes de silentio of Fear and Trembling and Constantin Constantius of Repetition. I will treat Repetition first since I wish to establish the connections between it and De Omnibus. Repetition seems to have been written in part during Kierkegaard’s short stay in Berlin in May of 1843 and in part upon his return to Copenhagen.1 The concept of repetition is a central one for Kierkegaard. Prior to the book Repetition, the concept appears in Either/Or and De Omnibus and then after it in The Concept of Anxiety. Moreover, repetition seems to be linked closely to other well-known Kierkegaardian concepts such as “the paradox” and “the moment.” Although it is a central concept, it was relatively short lived in Kierkegaard’s total authorship. It spans the period from Either/Or (February 20, 1843) to The Concept of Anxiety ( June 17, 1844), after which it virtually disappears. In this chapter I will limit myself to an analysis of the concept of repetition only as it is relevant for Kierkegaard’s understanding of and relation to Hegel. Thus, I cannot in this context treat the concept itself exhaustively and am obliged to omit an extended analysis of many of its important aspects.2 At first glance the book, Repetition, seems not to have much to do with Hegel’s thought. There is only a single direct allusion to Hegel in the entire text. Thus, there might not seem to be any particular connection between Hegel and the notion of repetition. However, there are two reasons to think that this concept is relevant for Kierkegaard’s use, 1 2

Henrik Blicher, “Tekstredegørelse” to Gjentagelsen in SKS, vol. K4, especially pp. 12–28. For an excellent and very complete study of this concept in Kierkegaard generally, see Dorothea Gl¨ockner’s Kierkegaards Begriff der Wiederholung (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 3), Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 1998.

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understanding and criticism of Hegel’s philosophy. First, the concept appears in Part Two of Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, where Kierkegaard analyzes Hegel’s account of “Sense-Certainty.” This juxtaposition can hardly be regarded as accidental. Second, in the lone direct reference to Hegel in the book, Repetition, the concept is associated with the Hegel’s concept of mediation: “repetition proper is what has mistakenly been called mediation.”3 It seems to be a point of general consensus in the secondary literature that the concept of repetition is meant as a criticism of this Hegelian concept. Thus, both Either/Or and Repetition are concerned with this well-known Hegelian principle, the former with a negative claim about the limits of the scope of mediation and the latter with a positive doctrine. Hegel’s conception of dialectic and mediation therefore seems to be central to Kierkegaard’s general interests at least during this period of the authorship. I wish to argue that, strangely enough, Kierkegaard’s original source for the concept of repetition was Hegel himself. Thus, Kierkegaard uses one aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, develops it, and then uses it to criticize another aspect of that same philosophy. This ambivalence is typical of his complicated relation to Hegel. One interesting aspect of the book, Repetition, is that it was discussed and criticized by Heiberg in an article called “The Astronomical Year,” from his journal Urania in 1844.4 The article is ostensibly concerned with the regularities and repetitions of nature, and in this context he comes to mention Kierkegaard’s book. Heiberg is, generally speaking, quite positive in his assessment of Kierkegaard’s work, yet he claims that it misunderstands the notion of repetition by applying it to the realm of spirit and not to that of nature, where it properly belongs. As with Heiberg’s review of Either/Or, Kierkegaard took this criticism of Repetition very badly. His journals are full of drafts of a response to Heiberg which he never published. These drafts are useful since Kierkegaard’s own conception is clarified in his attempt to respond to Heiberg’s criticism. In a long footnote in The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard under a different pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, discusses both the concept of repetition and the book Repetition, and responds specifically to Heiberg’s discussion.5 This polemic with Heiberg is helpful in that it forces Kierkegaard to elaborate on his notion of repetition as well as on his intentions with the book. But it should be noted that Heiberg’s critique has nothing to do with his Hegelianism per se and that Kierkegaard’s response

3 4

5

R, p. 148; SKS, vol. 4, p. 25. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Det astronomiske Aar,” Urania, 1844, pp. 77–160. ASKB U 57. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 9, pp. 51– 130.) CA, pp. 17–19fn.; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 324–327fn.

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cannot be construed as a criticism of Hegel as some commentators have thought.6 Although the book Repetition itself will constitute the focus of the present chapter, it will be necessary to examine Kierkegaard’s use of the concept of repetition in other works. Thus, I will begin by briefly examining the account of repetition that is given in the second part of De Omnibus. I will try to show that this account is indebted to Hegel’s analysis of “Sense-Certainty” in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second section I will give an account of Kierkegaard’s conception of repetition as an ethical concept that is used in contrast to recollection and hope. I will try to argue that this aspect of the concept of repetition is a continuation of the discussion in Either/Or where the criticism of Hegel’s principle of mediation was not so much metaphysical as moral. In the third section, I will explore Kierkegaard’s conception of repetition as an alternative to Hegelian mediation with regard to the metaphysical question of motion. Finally, in the fourth section I will explore the various religious aspects of the notion of repetition. Although I will concentrate primarily on Kierkegaard’s discussion in the book Repetition, I will also have recourse to his journals and papers where his response to Heiberg is to be found. I will argue that Repetition reflects Kierkegaard’s ongoing considerations about the principle of mediation in Hegel’s philosophy. While in Either/Or there was a moral criticism of the followers of Hegel’s philosophy who were blinded by this principle, in Repetition one finds a metaphysical criticism of the principle itself, specifically in the context of the problem of motion. But the odd thing about this criticism is that Kierkegaard derives the very concept of repetition from Hegel himself.

i. the contradiction of consciousness in de omnibus Kierkegaard introduces the notion of repetition in the last few pages of Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est.7 As was seen in the previous chapter, there he discusses Hegel’s account of “Sense-Certainty” from the “Consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit and goes on to posit the thesis, borrowed from Hegel, that consciousness is “a relation whose form is contradiction.”8 He associates the idea of contradiction

6

7 8

E.g., John D. Caputo, “Repetition and Kinesis: Kierkegaard on the Foundering of Metaphysics,” in his Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1987, pp. 19–20. Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980, p. 348, p. 350. JC, pp. 171–172; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 149–150. JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, p. 149.

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the contradiction of consciousness in de omnibus 285 in this context with the notion of repetition. His claim is that the contradiction is first present with the concept of repetition: “immediately there is no collision, but mediately it is present. As soon as the question of a repetition arises, the collision is present, for only a repetition of what has been before is conceivable.”9 Thus, the concept of repetition arises surprisingly in his explication of this analysis from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Before I look at the argument, it must be recalled that in that account Kierkegaard is working with the distinction between actuality (or reality) and ideality, the former being the empirical realm of existence and life, and the latter, the realm of abstract thought and concepts. This is important since these two terms determine the structure of the argument here. Kierkegaard explains the claim about repetition and the contradiction of consciousness with a three-step argument. The first step is as follows: “In reality [Realiteten] as such, there is no repetition.”10 He explains that reality only exists in a single moment and not over an extended period of time. Thus, nothing can be repeated in a single moment since repetition implies a previous moment when the thing repeated happened the first time. For there to be a repetition, there must be an original first instance: “If the world, instead of being beauty, were nothing but equally large unvariegated boulders, there would still be no repetition. Throughout all eternity, in every moment, I would see a boulder, but there would be no question as to whether it was the same one I had seen before.”11 In order to see the boulder as the same, one must step out of the single moment of existence and compare it with a previous moment. For true repetition an aspect of what Kierkegaard calls “ideality” is required; one must have the idea of a boulder in mind in order to determine whether or not a particular object is a boulder. The repetition lies in this categorization of a particular object under a universal or ideal. Without this ideal aspect, there is never any repetition since in the pure actuality of the moment there is only a plurality of individual, isolated moments with no connection to one another. Kierkegaard now moves to the second step in his argument, which is the opposite of the first, namely, “In ideality alone there is no repetition.”12 Ideality or the realm of ideas, which is the opposite of actuality, displays no repetition since it is eternal and unchanging: “the idea is and remains the same and as such it cannot be repeated.”13 For repetition to take place something must change between the first and the second moment of the repetition. There must be some aspect of difference. If there is no change, then there is only one moment and no repetition. 9 11 13

JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, p. 149. JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, p. 149. JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, p. 150.

10 12

JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, p. 149. JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, pp. 149–150.

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Thus, in the realm of abstract ideas there is no repetition since there is no change. What is required is concrete mutable objects in the realm of actuality. Now Kierkegaard comes to his conclusion which brings together the first and the second claim. Since repetition can take place neither in actuality alone nor in ideality alone, it must take place in a synthesis of both: “When ideality and reality touch each other, then repetition occurs. When, for example, I see something in the moment, ideality enters in and will explain that it is a repetition.”14 Actuality is required for one to experience a particular event at a particular moment, and ideality is required for one to associate that particular event with a previous one and thus to recognize it as an instance of repetition. Thus, both aspects are required for repetition: the particular empirical entity and the abstract ideal of which it is an instance. Kierkegaard describes this relation and the cooperative work of actuality and ideality as a contradiction; indeed, this is for him what characterizes the contradiction of consciousness: Here is the contradiction, for that which is, is also in another mode. That the external is, that I see, but in the same instant I bring it into relation with something that also is, something that is the same and that also will explain that the other is the same. Here is a redoubling; here it is a matter of repetition. Ideality and reality therefore collide – in what medium? In time? That is indeed an impossibility. In eternity? That is indeed an impossibility. In what, then? In consciousness – there is the contradiction.15

There is an individual external object that one perceives. The object or event can be understood insofar as it can be ordered or categorized under some abstract concept. Thus, it can be conceived as a repetition of something else by virtue of an abstract concept that unites the two. The philosophical problem is how this takes place and how the universal or the ideal relates to the particular. Kierkegaard’s argumentation here follows the same form as the preceding analysis. This relation of actuality and ideality cannot take place in time (i.e., in the realm of mutable particulars) since there would then be no universal term to unite them. Likewise, it cannot take place in eternity (i.e., in the timeless realm of ideas) since then there would be no particular instances to unite. Kierkegaard concludes that the two terms – “ideality” and “reality” – must come together in consciousness. Their unity in consciousness is the contradiction. This is where the repetition takes place. What is striking about this analysis is how heavily it depends on Hegel’s account of “Sense-Certainty,” which is analyzed in the pages just before the passage where repetition is introduced. As will be recalled from the 14

JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, p. 150.

15

JC, p. 171; Pap. IV B 1, p. 150.

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the contradiction of consciousness in de omnibus 287 previous chapter, Hegel explored the contradiction between universal and particular that takes place when one tries to express in language an empirically perceived particular object. What is perceived is a particular, but what is said is a universal – a tree, a house, and so on. It is the sphere of empirical particularity that Kierkegaard calls “actuality” or “reality” and the sphere of language and universality that he calls “ideality.” He writes: “Intrinsically there is already a contradiction between reality and ideality; the one provides the particular defined in time and space, the other the universal.”16 Hegel’s distinction between universal and particular is at least a part of what Kierkegaard means by ideality and reality. When Kierkegaard says that repetition is the contradiction of consciousness, he is in effect simply repeating Hegel’s thesis in the “Sense-Certainty” chapter. Hegel says that consciousness is caught in a contradiction since it cannot say what it means (i.e., it means the particular, but it says the universal). He writes: “Of course, we do not envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say.”17 Following Hegel completely, Kierkegaard says: “The moment I make a statement about reality, contradiction is present, for what I say is ideality.”18 The contradiction that Kierkegaard speaks of is clearly the same as that pointed out by Hegel – the inability of language to capture the particularity of empirical experience. Even Hegel’s way of arguing is imitated by Kierkegaard. As was seen in the previous chapter, first Hegel presumes that the truth lies in the particularity of the object (i.e., in actuality), and this proves to be mistaken. Then he presumes that it lies in the cognition of the thinking subject, but this also proves to be mistaken. Finally, the third phase arises: “SenseCertainty thus comes to know by experience that its essence is neither in the object nor in the ‘I,’ and that its immediacy is neither an immediacy of the one nor of the other.”19 The truth is posited in the unity of both terms – the object and the subject. Kierkegaard’s argument follows a similar form. First, he argues that there is no repetition in the realm of actuality on its own.20 Then he argues similarly that there is no repetition in the realm of ideality on its own.21 Finally, the claim is that repetition 16 18 20

21

17 Hegel, PhS, p. 60; Jub., vol. 2, p. 84. JC, Supplement, p. 257; Pap. IV B 10.7. 19 Hegel, PhS, p. 62; Jub., vol. 2, p. 86. JC, p. 168; Pap. IV B 1, p. 146. This first claim, that in actuality there is no repetition since each moment begins anew and there is no continuity, is also borrowed from Hegel: “The Now is pointed to, this Now. ‘Now’; it has already ceased to be in the act of pointing to it. The Now that is, is another Now than the one pointed to” (PhS, p. 63; Jub., vol. 2, p. 88). In other words, in the immediate realm of actuality nothing holds firm. As with Kierkegaard’s example of boulders, there is simply plurality and no repetition. N.b. that this second stage differs from Hegel’s in that Kierkegaard is concerned here with abstract ideas, whereas for Hegel the “I” of the second stage is thought to be a particular.

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takes place in the unity of both terms – “actuality” and “ideality” – just as for Hegel the third stage is the unity of subject and object. What Kierkegaard calls “repetition,” at least in this context, is what Hegel means by the relation of universality to particularity. The only way one can recognize a sensible particular as a repetition is by virtue of a universal concept that one already possesses. Without universals there would be no repetition since there would only be a plurality of dissimilar particulars. By the same token, without particulars there would be no repetition since there would be only eternal universals, which could never repeat. Thus, repetition can take place only in the relationship between the two. This can be regarded as the epistemological groundwork for the notion of repetition, a groundwork that Kierkegaard borrows from Hegel. This conclusion – that the notion of repetition arises from an analysis of Hegel’s discussion of consciousness – is striking since Kierkegaard seems ultimately to want to use the notion of repetition to criticize Hegel’s notion of mediation.

ii. repetition as an ethical concept The opening pages of Repetition present a preliminary reflection on the concept of repetition itself.22 Its primary aspect seems to be ethical in the broadest sense of the term. That the concept repetition is essential for ethics is confirmed later in the text when Constantin Constantius writes: “repetition is the watchword in every ethical view.”23 In this context it is contrasted to the concepts of recollection and hope; the point of this contrast seems to be that repetition is the superior concept with respect to ethics. It is hailed as the secret to life and happiness. In Either/Or Judge Wilhelm addresses the esthete with regard to this topic: “You . . . will certainly agree with me . . . that people are divided into two great classes: those who live predominantly in hope and those who live predominantly in recollection. Both indicate an improper relation to time.”24 There he mentions the term “repetition” without elaborating on it.25 The discussion here in Repetition can thus be seen as the continuation of this one initiated in Either/Or. In this section I wish to try to show that this aspect of the doctrine of repetition can be seen as an extension of Judge Wilhelm’s 22 24 25

23 R, p. 149; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 25–26. R, pp. 131–133; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 9–11. EO2, p. 142; SKS, vol. 3, p. 140. EO2, p. 141; SKS, vol. 3, p. 140: “The source of your unhappiness is that you locate the essence of love simply and solely in these visible symbols. If these are to be repeated again and again . . . then it is no wonder that you are uneasy . . . for if what gave [these symbols] validity was the condition of being the first time, then a repetition is indeed an impossibility. But true love has an utterly different value; it does its work in time and therefore will be able to review itself in these external signs and has – this is my main point – a completely different idea of time and of the meaning of repetition.”

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discussion of the notion of mediation.26 Thus, when seen as a moral concept, repetition can be conceived as an alternative to mediation. Constantin Constantius begins his discussion with a criticism of the notion of recollection. He contrasts recollection directly with the notion of repetition, which he says will replace it: “say what you will, this question will play a very important role in modern philosophy, for repetition is a crucial expression for what ‘recollection’ was to the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowing is a recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition.”27 Repetition is to be taken in connection not with abstract metaphysical issues but with life and human action: the Greeks use the notion of recollection in epistemology, whereas Constantius’ modern philosophy with its use of repetition is concerned with “life.” This is the first indication that Constantius is concerned to sketch repetition as a concept of ethics.28 He contrasts the two concepts in terms of their relation to the past and the future: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward.”29 The idea seems to be that whenever one recollects, one is focused on a specific event in the past; but when one repeats an action in a habitual fashion, one is directed toward the future instances of the repetition, even though the original precedent for it lies in the past. The repetition takes place when a contemplated action becomes real. This contemplation prior to the action implies a relation to the future. Constantin Constantius contrasts the two concepts – repetition and recollection – in terms of the criterion of happiness. Once again he indicates that this is an ethical concept since he associates it with happiness, claiming that “repetition . . . makes a person happy, whereas recollection makes him unhappy.”30 He continues this contrast using as an example the relation of love, the central theme of Judge Wilhelm’s corresponding discussion. Constantius quotes from Part One of Either/Or saying: Recollection’s love, an author has said, is the only happy love. He is perfectly right in that, of course, provided one recollects that initially it makes a person unhappy. Repetition’s love is in truth the only happy love. Like recollection’s love, it does not have the restlessness of hope, the uneasy adventurousness of discovery, but neither does it have the sadness of recollection – it has the blissful security of the moment.31

Recollection of love cannot be truly happy for two reasons. First, to recall a love in the past implies that it no longer exists. Thus, this recollection 26 28 29 31

27 R, p. 131; SKS, vol. 4, p. 9. Treated in Chapter 4, Section II. What is unusual here is the positive way in which he uses the expression “modern philosophy,” which is usually a pejorative term intended to refer to the Danish Hegelians. 30 R, p. 131; SKS, vol. 4, p. 9. R, p. 131; SKS, vol. 4, p. 9. R, pp. 131–132; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 9–10. See EO1, p. 41; SKS, vol. 2, p. 50.

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is mixed with melancholy or regret since it is of a love which is in the past and not in the present. Nostalgia or recollection of a past love is ipso facto unsatisfying since it merely underscores the fact that it no longer exists. Second, the recollection of a love prior to its consummation is a painful one since it is of a restless and uncertain state when the outcome was in doubt. By contrast, repetition is “the blissful security of the moment.” When love is taken as a state and not as a process, then it can be conceived as the habitual repetition of specific actions in daily life. It would simply mean one’s usual interaction with the lover without the Sturm und Drang of an unconsummated or lost love. The state of love is in its stability a higher happiness than either recollection or hope. Constantius now turns to his criticism of hope, which is also contrasted with the concept of repetition. The point seems to be to indicate that hope is restless and unsatisfying, whereas repetition is stable and enjoyable: “Hope is a lovely maiden who slips away between one’s fingers; recollection is a beautiful old woman with whom one is never satisfied at the moment; repetition is a beloved wife of whom one never wearies, for one becomes weary only of what is new.”32 Here one can clearly hear something of the moralistic tone of Judge Wilhelm. Hope is vain since one is only frustrated and disappointed when it does not come to fulfillment as one anticipated. Constantius seems to imply that hope in marriage is a sign that one is bored with one’s love. It implies that one requires something new and exciting in order to sustain it. By contrast, love in repetition is a stable relation that does not require novelty in each new occurrence: “One never grows weary of the old, and when one has that, one is happy. He alone is truly happy who is not deluded into thinking that the repetition should be something new, for then one grows weary of it.”33 Thus, in contrast to hope and recollection, repetition is hailed as the highest form of ethical conduct – it is the staid day-to-day relation that one has with one’s spouse. One does not have vain hopes since repetition has already been consummated; likewise, one does not have nostalgic recollection since repetition is something that still exists and continues. Repetition is exalted as the secret of life since it avoids the disappointment of vain hope and the dissatisfaction and self-indulgence of recollection: “But he who does not grasp that life is a repetition and that this is the beauty of life has pronounced his own verdict and deserves nothing better than what will happen to him anyway – he will perish.”34 Moreover, Constantius continues: “Repetition . . . is actuality and the earnestness of existence.”35 It is actuality since it does not refer to a merely possible future as with hope; likewise, it is earnestness since it is mature 32 34

R, p. 132; SKS, vol. 4, p. 10. R, p. 132; SKS, vol. 4, p. 10.

33 35

R, p. 132; SKS, vol. 4, p. 10. R, p. 133; SKS, vol. 4, p. 11.

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and does not constantly crave what is novel. This analysis has a profoundly moralistic ring to it. Constantius criticizes hope and recollection in the way that the classical moralists criticize avarice and gluttony. Moral virtue inheres in repetition, whereas hope and recollection are the road to vice. At first glance it might seem as if this discussion of the concept of repetition as an ethical notion has nothing whatsoever to do with the account of it in De Omnibus, where it was regarded as an abstract principle of epistemology. However, upon closer examination, one can see that the same principle is at work in both analyses. The upshot of the analysis in De Omnibus was that there was a unity of abstract ideality and concrete particularity. There repetition was defined as this contradiction of consciousness. In the analysis in the book Repetition, the concept repetition is contrasted to recollection and hope. The stability of repetition comes from the fact that it is the unity of an abstract principle in the realm of ideality with one’s appropriation of it in one’s daily actions. Thus, there is a universality of thought connected to a particularity of action. Only with repetition is the universal connected to the particular. One begins with a universal principle, for example, the ideal of marriage. This principle is affirmed and taken up by those individuals who make it their own in the concrete actions of their daily lives. Repetition in this sense means appropriation.36 One interprets and appropriates abstract ideals in one’s actions. Thus, one has the unity of an abstract principle in the realm of ideality and a concrete action in the realm of actuality. Kierkegaard distinguishes three kinds of repetition in his journals. The version discussed here corresponds to the first kind, which he explains as follows: “When I am going to act, my action has existed in my consciousness in conception and thought – otherwise I act thoughtlessly – that is, I do not act.”37 An action performed without reflection or not informed by an ideal cannot be said to have any moral worth. Thus, Constantius says, without the category of repetition, “all life dissolves into an empty, meaningless noise.”38 The ideal aspect of action gives it its stability and ethical value. This unity of ideality and actuality was precisely the way in which repetition was described in the analysis in De Omnibus. Thus, the two analyses are in fact consistent and indeed complement each other. The ethical aspect of repetition can be regarded as a continuation of the discussion of mediation in Either/Or. It will be recalled that Judge 36

37 38

See Heiberg’s account of the notion of appropriation. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, IndledningsForedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen 1835, pp. 6–8. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 468–470.) R, Supplement, p. 326; SKS, vol. 18, p. 191, JJ:159.; JP, vol. 3, 3793. R, p. 149; SKS, vol. 4, p. 25.

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Wilhelm reproaches the followers of Hegel’s philosophy with being obsessed with the past and thus forgetting their ethical relations in the present. This is a result of the principle of mediation that leads the unwary to focus on the past in order to find specific principles that can be mediated. This leads the “young necromancers” away from a reflective relation to the present. This is, according to Judge Wilhelm, a mistaken relation to time. The positive model set up in contrast to the Hegelian principle of mediation with its concern with the past is Judge Wilhelm’s bourgeois conception of the married life. The judge indicates that virtue is to be found in the stable existence of marriage in a way that is consonant with the recommendation, made in Repetition, of repetition in the relation of love. Moreover, the example used here in Repetition of a relation of love clearly recalls the judge’s encomium for married life. The stable life of love in marriage is a forerunner of the concept of repetition. Indeed, as has been seen, the term itself is already mentioned in Judge Wilhelm’s discussion. Thus, while the contrasting terms to repetition – recollection and hope – are not associated with Hegel’s philosophy, the main issue of the appropriate relation to time does at some level concern the issue of mediation. This explains how repetition, when seen in its moral aspect, can be regarded as an alternative to mediation.

iii. repetition, mediation, and movement in logic As was noted previously, Constantin Constantius mentions Hegel directly and compares the notion of repetition with the Hegelian notion of mediation. Constantius in short order issues a number of criticisms of this doctrine of mediation: “it is incredible how much flurry has been made in Hegelian philosophy over mediation and how much foolish talk has enjoyed honor and glory under this rubric.”39 This discussion takes up (in a more direct way than the previous one) the analysis of Hegel’s doctrine of the Aufhebung of the law of excluded middle that began in Either/Or. Since this Hegelian doctrine and the contemporary Danish discussion of it were examined previously,40 I will forego an account of this here. In this section I will argue that Constantin Constantius intends the notion of repetition to be a more philosophically satisfying response to the problem of motion than Hegelian mediation. The main difference between the two, for Constantius, lies in the fact that mediation is immanent whereas repetition is transcendent; the former, he claims, reduces to a tautology, while the latter represents true movement. I wish to argue that the key to understanding this claim about repetition can be found in the analysis from De Omnibus where repetition is interpreted as the paradoxical unity of ideality and actuality. 39

R, p. 148; SKS, vol. 4, p. 25.

40

Chapter 4, Section II.

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Constantius’ frequent contrasting of “repetition” and “mediation” poses the main interpretative problem. How does Constantius conceive of the relation between these two concepts and why does he think that repetition is a more satisfactory philosophical concept than mediation? In Part Two of Repetition, just before the series of letters, Constantius takes up this issue and underscores the relevant aspects of repetition by which it can be contrasted with that of mediation. Both concepts are intended to solve the philosophical problem of motion, but to his mind only repetition does so adequately. At first he contrasts the concept to ancient Greek philosophy and its notion of recollection, and then he turns to “modern philosophy,” which is presumably a reference to Danish Hegelianism: “Modern philosophy makes no movement; as a rule it makes only a commotion, and if it makes any movement at all, it is always within immanence, whereas repetition is and remains a transcendence.”41 The notion of movement is, of course, connected to that of mediation in Hegel’s philosophy since it is through mediation that movement takes place. Individual concepts generate their opposites, and then these pairs of categories are mediated, thus producing new concepts. Thus, being produces its opposite, nothing, and the two opposites are united in a third concept, becoming. In this way there is a movement from one concept to the next.42 In the passage quoted Constantius indicates that while this sort of mediation is immanent, his notion of repetition is transcendent. In order to understand Constantius’ use of the terms “immanence” and “transcendence” in this context, one must first look at the claim that there is no movement in logic. At the beginning of his unpublished response to Heiberg, Kierkegaard, apparently still intending to use the pseudonym Constantin Constantius, takes up the issue of movement and specifically of its application in the field of logic. He writes: In our day some have gone so far that they have even wanted to have movement in logic. There they have called repetition “mediation.” But movement is a concept that logic simply cannot support. Mediation, therefore, must be understood in relation to immanence. Thus understood, mediation may not again be used at all in the sphere of freedom, where the subsequent always emerges – by virtue not of an immanence but of a transcendence.43

In this analysis one finds again the distinction from Either/Or between the sphere of freedom and that of necessity (i.e., between the realm of existence and that of abstract thinking and logic).44 Constantius indicates a confusion in the understanding of repetition as mediation. In Hegel’s 41 42 43 44

R, p. 186; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 56–57. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 9, Section IV. R, Supplement, p. 308; Pap. IV B 117, p. 288. EO2, pp. 170–176; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 166–172.

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dialectic there is a sense of repetition in that the various concepts and categories repeat themselves at the various levels in the system. Thus, for example, the category of being in the Seinslogik corresponds to the category of essence in the Wesenslogik. The category of being is aufgehoben in essence, which means that it receives a higher and richer meaning. Constantius claims that since movement in logic is only a movement of abstract categories, which are homogeneous entities, then this movement is an immanent movement of thought itself. It has no relation to anything outside of thought. This purely immanent movement in logic is, for Constantius, simply a mistake since no real change or movement actually takes place. The movement from one abstract category to another, he argues, is not genuine movement. Constantius indicates that repetition is his suggestion for a concept analogous to mediation but in the sphere of freedom. In doing so, Constantius again indicates that mediation and repetition are intended to do similar work. He writes: Therefore, the word “mediation” has contributed to a misunderstanding in logic, because it allowed a concept of movement to be attached to it. In the sphere of freedom, the word “mediation” has again done damage, because, coming from logic, it helped to make transcendence of movement illusory. In order to prevent this error or this dubious compromise between the logical and freedom, I have thought that “repetition” could be used in the sphere of freedom.45

Repetition is thus intended to rectify the misunderstanding about movement that the concept of mediation has propagated. The claim seems to be that by conceiving of movement only as a movement of abstract categories, Hegel’s philosophy neglects the movement that exists in what Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms call “the sphere of freedom.” Repetition is the appropriate concept for the sphere of freedom since it represents a relation of transcendence. Constantius’s thesis is that transcendence is a necessary feature of any account of real movement. Thus, the key is to understand the notion of transcendence that Constantius thinks is relevant for genuine movement in the sphere of freedom. In The Concept of Anxiety, Vigilius Haufniensis explains the aspect of transcendence as follows: “The history of the individual life proceeds in a movement from state to state. Every state is posited by a leap. As sin entered into the world, so it continues to enter into the world if it is not halted. Nevertheless, every such repetition is not a simple consequence but a new leap.”46 Each new state is a new beginning. It is transcendent with respect to the previous one.47 It does not lie 45 46 47

R, Supplement, p. 308; Pap. IV B 117, pp. 288–289. CA, p. 113; SKS, vol. 4, p. 415. See John D. Caputo, “Repetition and Kinesis,” op. cit., p. 18.

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in any necessary cause and effect relation with the previous state, and for this reason it is free. With respect to ethics, the criticism is that by conceiving of movement as necessary, Hegel eliminates the voluntarist or free element. One state smoothly and necessarily leads to the next, and there is no room for free will.48 This necessary movement is so subtle as to be no movement at all at least in comparison to a radical or voluntarist leap. This would seem to indicate that Kierkegaard has a Sartrean strain in that he believes each moment to be radically different from the past and that thus the individual is ultimately free to choose himself and his actions ex nihilo at each moment without being predetermined by his past. This interpretive option is problematic since it leaves Kierkegaard with a number of problems. For example, it seems to eliminate the very conception of a personal identity over time; what is left over is a schizophrenic individual with no continuity in his biography and self-image. If one understands by a person, someone who has the ability to see himself in a coherent development over time, then the view presented here would place the very concept of a person in danger. Moreover, this interpretation makes it difficult to explain the actual relation between the two terms of the repetition. For Kierkegaard movement implies a transcendent relation between two distinct things, whereas in logic movement takes place among abstract concepts that are all immanent to thought. Here the claim is that the relation between the moments of repetition (i.e., the original instance and its repetition) is a transcendent relation. The question that arises is how the second instance can be regarded as a “repetition” of an earlier one if there is no continuity between them. If there is only discontinuity and transcendence, then there are only individual atomic events with no repetition or identity between them. The main problem in interpreting the concept of repetition is identifying the status of the two moments that constitute the repetition. If they are simply two different actions, then it is not clear how one is to understand the claim that repetition involves transcendence. This would seem to imply that the two actions are radically different or incommensurable, which would seem to destroy the very concept of repetition. The solution to the problem of interpretation on this point lies in the analysis of the notion of repetition that was given in Part Two of De Omnibus. If one recalls that analysis, then one gains a hint about the claim of transcendence here. In De Omnibus in connection with Hegel’s account of “Sense-Certainty,” Kierkegaard talks about the contradiction of consciousness that unites ideality and actuality. He argues that repetition is 48

It will be noted that Hegel’s discussion of mediation concerns only concepts and is not about the free will of individuals, which he in no way denies. Hegel talks about the necessary relation of concepts to one another, which makes mediation possible. This principle is then transferred by Kierkegaard to the sphere of freedom and action, which is clearly not compatible with Hegel’s understanding of it.

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not possible in either of these spheres alone but only in the unity of the two in consciousness. Now this analysis can be used to interpret the claim about the notion of transcendence. If one takes repetition in its ethical aspect, then it clearly involves a concrete action in the realm of actuality. But what is being repeated? It is not a previous action but rather an ethical principle, law, or contemplated action in the realm of ideality. By appropriating an abstract principle or law and acting on it in accordance with one’s own interpretation and moral sentiment, one repeats the abstract principle from the realm of ideality with a concrete action in the realm of actuality. Kierkegaard writes: When movement is allowed in relation to repetition in the sphere of freedom, then the development becomes different from the logical development in that the transition becomes. In logic, transition is movement’s silence, whereas in the sphere of freedom it becomes. Thus, in logic, when possibility, by means of the immanence of thought, has determined itself as actuality, one only disturbs the silent self-inclosure of the logical process by talking about movement and transition. In the sphere of freedom, however, possibility remains and actuality emerges as a transcendence.49

Here Kierkegaard characterizes transcendence as something new which comes into being or becomes actual. The transition is not a purely conceptual one but rather one characterized by a movement from something merely possible to something actual. In this sense repetition is transcendent. It spans the gap between the realm of ideality and that of actuality. The realm of action is transcendent vis-`a-vis the realm of thought. However, this is not to say that there can be a direct translation of it into actuality. On the contrary, there is no easy formula, and one must interpret the ethical principle of ideality for oneself and take responsibility for that interpretation in the concrete realm of action. The relation between the two spheres remains a paradox and a contradiction. In this sense repetition has transcendence, whereas mediation does not, since mediation presumably operates wholly in the realm of ideality and has no contact per se with actuality. In order to understand the force of the argument here, one must recall Heiberg’s solution to the debate about the Aufhebung of the law of excluded middle that was examined previously.50 Heiberg indicated that the law applied in the empirical realm, where one is concerned with concrete sensible entities. Here individual objects are clearly separable and independent of one another. In this realm there are any number of examples of the true either/or. This is what Kierkegaard called “the realm of freedom.” However, Heiberg continues with the claim that the law is aufgehoben in the realm of thought, where one is concerned with 49 50

R, Supplement, pp. 309–310; Pap. IV B 117, p. 290. Chapter 4, Section II, p. 197f.

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concepts. Thus, mediation can take place among concepts, which are all in the immanent sphere of thought. This Kierkegaard dubbed “the realm of necessity.” In Either/Or Judge Wilhelm generally agreed with Heiberg’s explanation, but here Constantius uses the distinction between the two realms to ground his criticism. As has been seen, for Constantius, movement understood as the mediation of concepts is tautologous in that it takes place among homogeneous entities (i.e., concepts). There is thus no real movement. By contrast, the concept of repetition is a genuine movement in that its terms are radically heterogeneous: the one being in the abstract realm of ideality and the other in the concrete realm of actuality. Here is a purportedly more robust account of change since a mere ideal or abstract principle is appropriated and transformed into a concrete action. There is thus a genuine movement and a radical transformation from one state to another. Repetition thus bridges the gap between the realms of freedom and necessity, whereas mediation only operates in the one (i.e., in the realm of necessity). When all is said and done the relation to Hegel evinced in the account of the concept of repetition is more or less continuous with the relation to him evinced in the previous texts: Kierkegaard begins in De Omnibus by taking a specific concept or discussion in Hegel, here “Sense-Certainty,” which he analyzes, develops, and revises in his own fashion. As in those previous works, here there can be no talk of a straightforward rejection of Hegel. Instead, the relation seems to be one of a productive dialogue and of a development from one concept of repetition to another. Thus, even though the concept of repetition is intended to be an alternative to Hegel’s notion of mediation, this does not mean that Constantius utterly rejects Hegel and has only criticism and abuse for him. On the contrary, he has borrowed much from him and has traversed much ground together with him before ultimately parting company over the issue of immanence and transcendence. His “criticism” in fact turns out to be a variant of the solution to the debate about the law of excluded middle proposed by the Hegelian Heiberg.

iv. repetition as a religious concept The understanding of repetition as a religious concept introduces a new dimension, which again distinguishes it from the Hegelian notion of mediation. That repetition is a religious concept is made clear when Kierkegaard says it is the “conditio sine qua non for every issue of dogmatics.”51 Indeed, he even says directly, “Repetition is and remains 51

R, Supplement, p. 324; Pap. IV B 120, p. 309. See also: “In my interpretation, the issue of repetition is formulated in a completely different way; in its striving it points toward the religious, which in so many ways is intimated and adequately expressed.” R, Supplement, p. 313; Pap. IV B 47, p. 293.

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a religious category.”52 It seems that not merely does repetition have a religious dimension, but rather that this is its fundamental aspect. In The Concept of Anxiety, Vigilius Haufniensis underscores the religious or specifically Christian element of repetition. In a key passage he even indicates which aspects of the concept he considers to have religious significance: “Constantin mentions several times that repetition is a religious category, too transcendent for him, that it is the movement by virtue of the absurd, and on p. 142 it is further stated that eternity is the true repetition.”53 Here Vigilius Haufniensis names as religious aspects of the concept of repetition the following: (1) the transcendent nature of repetition, (2) repetition as absurdity, and (3) repetition as eternity. It will be useful to examine each of these in turn. I wish to argue that these religious aspects of the concept are also intended to stand in contrast to Hegel’s notion of mediation and that they further represent a development of the metaphysical criticism of the concept. (1) Kierkegaard indicates that due to its aspect of transcendence, the concept of repetition is fundamentally religious. Since I have already explored what Kierkegaard means when he says that repetition is transcendent, I will now examine the implications of this transcendence for the religious aspect of the concept. The notion of repetition is associated with atonement and redemption: [R]epetition progresses along this path until it signifies atonement, which is the most profound expression of repetition. Precisely because I had this in mind, I took care not to confuse mediation and repetition, because mediation is within immanence and therefore can never have before it the transcendence of a religious movement . . . to say nothing of the actuality of sin, which is not to be nullified by any mediation.54

Kierkegaard says explicitly that the notion of transcendence was one key point in which repetition is distinguished from mediation. In The Concept of Anxiety, he argues that sin enters the world by means of a qualitative leap. Originally human beings lived in the harmonious state of paradise, and then came original sin, which signified a radical break from this state. This ushers in a new state in which humans are alienated from the world and from God. This is the second form of repetition in Kierkegaard’s aforementioned list of the three forms in his journals: “Inasmuch as I am going to act, I presuppose that I am in an original integral state. Now comes the problem of sin, which is the second repetition, for now I 52 53 54

R, Supplement, p. 326; Pap. IV A 169; JP, vol. 3, 3794. CA, p. 18fn.; SKS, vol. 4, p. 327fn. Translation slightly modified. R, Supplement, p. 313; Pap. IV B 117, pp. 293–294. See also: “When repetition is defined in that way, it is: transcendent, a religious movement by virtue of the absurd – when the borderline of the wondrous is reached, eternity is the true repetition.” R, Supplement, p. 305; Pap. IV B 117, p. 285.

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must return to myself again.”55 At this stage one’s actions are merely the repetition of one’s sinfulness without the hope of redemption. With the death of Christ, this second stage is overcome and a reconciliation takes place between human beings and God. This, says Kierkegaard, is “the most profound expression of repetition.” This final stage of redemption in a sense represents a repetition of the first stage. Although humanity cannot revert to the original state of paradise, nevertheless the fact of the original sin is no longer decisive for its fate. This third stage represents, for Kierkegaard, the true repetition: “The real paradox by which I become the single individual, for if I remain in sin, understood as the universal, there is only repetition no. 2.”56 Here one has the possibility, thanks to divine grace, of overcoming one’s sinfulness. This is the Christian challenge of the third form of repetition, which is presumably the true and highest form. Each of these three stages represents for Kierkegaard a radical discontinuity. In each case the change is something transcendent that enters from the outside. Therefore, it cannot be reached or bridged by mediation. As has been seen previously, Hegel’s dialectic follows precisely this threefold movement, which passes through the stages of immediacy, mediation, and mediated immediacy. It was clear that Kierkegaard was familiar with this dialectical movement in Hegel since he worked with it in the early journal entry examined previously57 and used it in Judge Wilhelm’s description of the stages in the dialectic of love in “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage.”58 Kierkegaard’s third term or stage of the concept of repetition (i.e., the second immediacy) corresponds to Hegel’s account of mediated immediacy. Indeed, Hegel interprets this Christian movement in very much the same way as Kierkegaard. For Hegel, the death of Christ represents the Aufhebung of the old law and reestablishes the contract between humanity and God. This new relation is no longer a simple immediacy (i.e., one does not revert to the original state of paradise in the Garden of Eden), but rather it is a mediated immediacy, the promise of salvation and paradise as mediated through the person of Christ. The difference between Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s accounts of the movement from sin to paradise to redemption is that the former sees the truth of this movement in its abstract conceptual aspect. Therefore, since it is ultimately a movement of concepts, the movement is, says Kierkegaard, immanent (i.e., to thought). Kierkegaard rejects this primarily cognitive understanding of sin and redemption. This third form of repetition underscores the freedom due to transcendence that underlies human action: “Repetition not only is for 55 56 57 58

R, Supplement, p. 326; SKS, vol. 18, p. 191, JJ:159.; JP, vol. 3, 3793. R, Supplement, p. 326; SKS, vol. 18, p. 191f., JJ:159.; JP, vol. 3, 3793. JP, vol. 4, 4398; SKS, vol. 17, pp. 117–119, BB:25. Analyzed in Chapter 2, Section II. EO2, pp. 17–32 and ff.; SKS, vol. 3, pp. 26–38 and ff. Analyzed in Chapter 4, Section V.

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contemplation but . . . it is a task for freedom . . . it signifies freedom itself.”59 One has the opportunity to become what one is by repeating in one’s action one’s true nature as determined by God. By contrast, Kierkegaard sees the Hegelian notion of mediation as a denial of freedom; for this reason he calls the abstract realm of thought and conceptual analysis “the realm of necessity.” Moreover, sin cannot be eliminated by mediation or reason but only by the absolute paradox of Christ, the eternal made temporal. In addition, with respect to the concept of transcendence, there is an analogy between the notion of repetition and Kierkegaard’s conception of faith. Religious faith has as its object something transcendent, which cannot be reached by human reason. In Fear and Trembling, this is Abraham’s faith in the divine command. Thus, Abraham, Kierkegaard’s knight of faith, believes but with fear and trembling and not with the confidence of scientific truth. So also in ethics, with the appropriation and repetition of an abstract, transcendent ethical principle, one participates in moral life as an agent, but part of being a moral agent is making mistakes. Thus, when one acts by appropriating a principle or hearkening to a divine command, there are no guarantees. One must ultimately, like Abraham, remain in fear and trembling and in uncertainty regarding the correctness of one’s actions. (2) Vigilius Haufniensis also names as one of the religious aspects of repetition that “it is the movement by virtue of the absurd.”60 By “absurdity” here one can understand that which Kierkegaard called “the contradiction of consciousness” in De Omnibus, in other words, the fundamental and irreconcilable incommensurability between actuality and ideality or particularity and universality, God and man, and so on. This aspect of the concept of repetition makes it similar to that of the paradox (i.e., the idea of the eternal becoming temporal). This is the fundamental paradox that characterizes Christianity for Kierkegaard. Thus, repetition can be understood as the absolute paradox of Christianity. Here too one sees a unity of ideality and actuality, of eternity and temporality. It is a paradox that cannot be explained or mediated but rather must be accepted as a contradiction or paradox. By contrast, Hegelian philosophy tries to bridge the gap by means of mediation. (3) The third claim about the religious side of repetition is its association with eternity. As has just been seen, Kierkegaard directly links the two concepts: “eternity is the true repetition.”61 It is clear from the original analysis of repetition in De Omnibus that the concept itself consists of two parts – actuality and ideality. The latter gives repetition its stability since it is eternal. In other works, such as the Philosophical Fragments, 59 60

R, Supplement, p. 324; Pap. IV B 120, p. 308. 61 CA, p. 18fn.; SKS, vol. 4, p. 327fn. CA, p. 18fn.; SKS, vol. 4, p. 327fn.

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Kierkegaard refers to God simply as “the eternal.” Likewise, here in Repetition, in the discussion of the ordeal embodied by Job, the eternal is associated with God.62 Thus, the claim that eternity is the true repetition can be interpreted to mean that repetition is concerned with God. As has just been seen, Kierkegaard associates the concept of repetition with the paradox of Christianity (i.e., the eternal becoming temporal). This unity is, for Kierkegaard, the highest repetition. It also corresponds to the third form of repetition that Kierkegaard lists and associates with the concept of redemption. This was the point of the eternal God becoming temporal (i.e., to effect a reconciliation after the original sin). Thus, this third aspect is consistent with the first two. This religious dimension of the concept of repetition shows most clearly its relation to other well-known Kierkegaardian concepts such as the paradox, the absurd, and the moment. These terms seem eventually to have supplanted the notion of repetition in Kierkegaard’s authorship. With respect to Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, the religious aspect of repetition points in the direction of later criticisms associated with the terms listed previously. Although in Repetition itself, he only criticizes Hegel directly for his doctrine of mediation, one can see here the groundwork for a number of later discussions and criticisms. Thus, the religious dimension of the concept of repetition is not so much of direct relevance for Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel as it is important in its consequences. In Repetition there are occasionally passages that seem to hint that the notion of repetition is aimed at a target other than Hegel. For example, Constantin Constantius contrasts Job with the professor or professional thinker. Here he shows a strain of anti-intellectualism in favor of a more simplistic view: Fortunately, my friend is not looking for clarification from any worldfamous philosopher or any professor publicus ordinarius; he turns to an unprofessional thinker who once possessed the world’s glories but later withdrew from life – in other words, he falls back on Job, who does not posture on a rostrum and make reassuring gestures to vouch for the truth of his propositions but sits on the hearth and scrapes himself with a potsherd and without interrupting this activity casually drops clues and comments.63

This passage recalls the criticisms in De Omnibus and other works of Martensen whom Kierkegaard sees as engaging in pretentious posturing without any substance. Martensen likewise, for Kierkegaard, uncritically refers to Hegel, a “world-famous philosopher,” for the truth. This contrast of Job with the professor or professional thinker shows the side of 62

See R, p. 210; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 76–77.

63

R, p. 186; SKS, vol. 4, p. 57.

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Kierkegaard that rejects abstract conceptual analysis in favor of a lived philosophy. One can also hear a criticism of Martensen in the passage quoted previously, where Constantius writes, “Modern philosophy makes no movement; as a rule it makes only a commotion.”64 This also recalls the criticism of Martensen in the context of his lectures where he makes irresponsible claims in order to attract great public attention. These allusions highlight the fact that Kierkegaard is still engaged in a polemic with the contemporary Danish Hegelian scene and specifically with the view of mediation put forth by Martensen and Heiberg. Thus, his proposal of repetition as an alternative to Hegelian mediation can be seen at least in part as a response to these Danish Hegelians. Despite passages like these, the notion of repetition can still be conceived as a criticism of Hegel himself (i.e., of Hegel’s doctrine of mediation or Aufhebung). This marks a shift from what was seen in the previous chapters, which demonstrated that the bulk of the criticism was actually aimed at Kierkegaard’s Danish contemporaries and that there was never any intention of carrying on a polemic with Hegel himself in the first place. Constantius’ analysis here can be seen as a development of the position of Judge Wilhelm in Either/Or. Following Heiberg’s analysis, the Judge merely delimits the scope of the law of excluded middle and confines it to “the sphere of freedom,” that is, to actuality. He nonetheless grants that Hegel’s doctrine of mediation or of the Aufhebung of the law of excluded middle is correct when limited to “the sphere of necessity,” that is, to the abstract analysis of concepts. In Either/Or the only criticism is of the conflation of these two spheres in the attempt to apply the principle of mediation to the sphere of freedom or in arguing that an absolute either/or exists in the sphere of necessity. Moreover, Judge Wilhelm’s criticism is primarily of a moral character and is aimed not at Hegel himself but at his uncritical followers who have become lost in their contemplation of the past. In Repetition, a new dimension to this criticism is developed. The notion of repetition is one that straddles the two spheres. It is the point of contact between ideality and actuality. This notion allows Constantius to criticize the doctrine of the Aufhebung of the law of excluded middle and mediation for in fact being tautologous or empty since they operate only with abstract concepts immanent to thought. In other words, in Either/Or the criticism was limited to merely drawing the limits of the two spheres, while the legitimacy of the Hegelian principle was recognized within the one sphere (i.e., that of necessity). In Repetition, by contrast, Constantius actively criticizes the notion of mediation on its own terms, saying that it is not a true movement, that it is a tautology, and so on, since it does not bridge the two spheres. Thus, the position with respect to Hegel, as 64

R, p. 186; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 56–57.

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presented by the pseudonyms, becomes more detailed and worked out with the concept of repetition. Yet, strangely enough, repetition is a concept that Kierkegaard in De Omnibus originally borrowed from Hegel’s analysis of “Sense-Certainty.” Kierkegaard is attracted to this analysis since it ends with a contradiction inside consciousness itself, namely, that consciousness means or intends the particular in the empirical world but can only say the universal and thus cannot say what it means. This Hegelian analysis is important for Kierkegaard, who often discusses, for example, faith in the same manner. In Fear and Trembling Abraham’s faith is not something that can be verbalized or discursively justified. It is from this conception of faith that Kierkegaard generates his theory of indirect communication, which he believes is the only form of communication that can express matters of this kind. Thus, Kierkegaard is interested in Hegel’s analysis since it indicates the limits of language and discursive expression as well as the incommensurability between language and empirical phenomena. He is thus in agreement with much of what Hegel says about the relation of the universal to the particular, and it is from Hegel’s analysis that he finds inspiration for the concept of repetition. This again bears witness to Kierkegaard’s profoundly ambivalent relation to Hegel. In terms of Kierkegaard’s overall relation to Hegel, it is not easy to place Repetition in the development that has been traced so far. In the works treated up until now, there has been no real trace of an open antiHegel polemic. Can it be said that this begins here in Repetition? The only time in the entire book that Hegel is mentioned by name, there is indeed a hint of a polemical tone. There Constantius writes the following: “The Greek explanation of the theory of being and nothing, the explanation of ‘the moment,’ ‘non-being,’ etc. trumps Hegel.”65 In the previous discussions when a criticism of Martensen or some other contemporary was intended, Kierkegaard tended to write something like “a Hegelian,” or “modern philosophers.” Here, by contrast, Hegel is mentioned explicitly. The indication seems to be that it is specifically his notion of mediation itself which is at issue. But, given that this is the only mention of Hegel in the entire work, it would be an exaggeration to say that this marks the beginning of Kierkegaard’s polemical relation to him and unambiguously ushers in what I have been referring to as the second period of his authorship. One can, however, regard this as a transitional text where a hint of the later polemics can be found, although by no means to any great degree. The other thing that disqualifies Repetition from falling into the first period of Kierkegaard’s authorship is the fact that it does not immediately evince any clear positive influence from Hegel. The groundwork for the 65

R, pp. 148–149; SKS, vol. 4, p. 25.

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concept of repetition appears in De Omnibus, where it is formed along the lines of the model provided by Hegel’s analysis of “Sense-Certainty.” Then in Repetition itself, the concept is developed in a way that goes beyond the original analysis there. Thus, while the concept of repetition is clearly influenced by Hegel, this influence is one of original inspiration which occurs prior to the book Repetition. Given that there are also hidden references to Martensen in the text, it might still be that Kierkegaard in fact intends the criticism of mediation here to be a criticism solely of him and not of Hegel, but the fact that he refers to Hegel directly indicates that he has no problem with being perceived as being in a polemic with Hegel himself, whereas previously (in, for example, The Concept of Irony and Either/Or) he had no problem borrowing things from Hegel and praising him overtly. The reason for sharpening his tone vis-`a-vis Hegel might be Kierkegaard’s desire to distance himself in the eyes of his reading public from the contemporary Danish Hegelians Martensen and Heiberg. Whereas previously on the basis of The Concept of Irony and From the Papers of One Still Living he could have been mistaken as a Hegelian, now Kierkegaard wants to make absolutely certain that his works are perceived as having nothing at all in common with those of Martensen and Heiberg. One way of doing so was to criticize Hegel, the main intellectual figure whose name was associated with theirs in Denmark at the time.

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7 HEGEL’S VIEW OF MORAL CONSCIENCE AND KIERKEGAARD’S INTERPRETATION OF ABRAHAM

As has been noted previously, Fear and Trembling appeared together with Repetition and Three Edifying Discourses on October 16, 1843. It contains some of Kierkegaard’s best-known concepts, such as the knight of faith, the paradox, the leap, and the absurd. Here Kierkegaard under the pseudonym, Johannes de silentio, gives his rich analysis of the Abraham and Isaac story to illustrate these and other concepts. In a series of three “Problemata,” he discusses the conundrums raised in the story by Abraham’s reaction to the divine command to sacrifice his only son. The first “Problema” treats what is referred to as “the teleological suspension of the ethical.” Here the claim is set forth that the usual ethical duties and obligations can be “suspended” by a divine command. In the second “Problema,” Johannes de silentio argues that there is an absolute duty towards God which renders one’s other duties finite and relative. Finally, in the third “Problema,” the problem of communication is discussed; given the private nature of the divine command, it was, according to Johannes de silentio, impossible for Abraham to explain his actions to others. Hegel’s role in this text is significant. Although Kierkegaard usually has his pseudonyms employ expressions such as “a Hegelian,” or “recent philosophy,” Johannes de silentio uncharacteristically refers to Hegel directly in several passages. His anti-Hegel polemics were noted by two anonymous contemporary reviewers of Fear and Trembling. One reviewer discusses Fear and Trembling and Repetition together, noting how the author of both works defines himself in a negative relation to Hegel.1 In a similar vein, the other reviewer says Fear and Trembling “steps forth as an opposition against the view of life’s highest concerns which has been the result of more recent scholarship and has passed over from the system 1

-v, “Frygt og Bæven. Dialektisk Lyrik af Johannes de Silentio. Kjøbenhavn 1843. Gjentagelsen. Et Forsøg i den experimenterende Psychologi af Constantin Constantius. Kjøbenhavn 1843,” For Litteratur og Kritik, 2, 1844, pp. 373–391, especially p. 375.

305

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into popular culture.”2 In the Preface to the work, Johannes de silentio overtly issues a number of criticisms of the Danish Hegelians. Then in each of the three “Problemata” he sets out a position to be discussed by indicating first how the position is in accordance with Hegel’s philosophy and then how it is at variance with it. There are thus three parallel passages at the beginning of each discussion which indicate the importance of Hegel for the problem at issue. Hegel therefore seems at least superficially to be one of the book’s main interlocutors. In the present chapter I will explore Johannes de silentio’s view of Abraham and his criticism of Hegel contained in it. I omit any comparison of this account with Hegel’s treatment of Abraham in the Early Theological Writings,3 which, being published for the first time in 1907, were unknown to Kierkegaard.4 In my first section, I will interpret the criticisms in the Preface to Fear and Trembling as a continuation of those set forth against Martensen in Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est. In Section II, I will examine “Problema I,” which contains a reference to Hegel’s account of the moral conscience in the Philosophy of Right. I will discuss the relevance of this account in Hegel for the discussion of the requirement for Abraham to disregard one’s usual ethical duties and obligations. Section III will treat “Problema II” and the criticism of Hegel’s purported view of the ultimate commensurability of the inner and the outer, which conflicts with Johannes de silentio’s view that the paradox of faith is personal and inward and cannot be directly reflected outwardly. Section IV will examine briefly the third “Problema,” which concerns the problem of the commensurability of the divine command to sacrifice Isaac and the problem of justifying such an action to others. In this chapter I will argue that while the criticism of Hegel is uncharacteristically direct and thus seems to indicate a straightforward polemic, upon closer analysis, it becomes clear that the repeated references to Hegel at the beginning of each section are incommensurable with the set of issues that Johannes de silentio himself is concerned with in the work. This raises the question of why Johannes de silentio refers to Hegel at all in the text if he is not interested in analyzing or criticizing his views. I will argue that the odd use of Hegel in this work in fact has very little to do with Hegel himself but is rather a part of Kierkegaard’s continuing polemic against Martensen and the beginning of his polemic against Heiberg. 2 3

4

[J. F. Hagen], “Frygt og Bæven. Dialektisk Lyrik af Johannes de Silentio. (Kbhavn. VII og 135 S. Reitzel. Priis 1 Rbd.),” Theologisk Tidsskrift, Ny Række, 8, February 2, 1844, pp. 197–198. Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. by Herman Nohl, T¨ubingen 1907, pp. 243–260. (In English as Early Theological Writings, tr. by T. M. Knox, Fragments tr. by Richard Kroner, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1975, pp. 182–205.) See Mark C. Taylor’s “Journeys to Moriah: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard,” Harvard Theological Review, 70, 1977, pp. 305–326.

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i. descartes and martensen in the preface Johannes de silentio’s Preface to Fear and Trembling is openly polemical against the Danish Hegelians. It contains indirect references to Martensen, Heiberg, and Rasmus Nielsen. Here Johannes de silentio runs through a palette of stock criticisms that Kierkegaard uses throughout the corpus. I wish to argue that the Preface is aimed primarily at Martensen and can be seen as a part of the continuing polemic, which began in The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars and Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est. As was seen previously,5 Martensen’s use of the Cartesian slogan “de omnibus dubitandum est” was made the object of Kierkegaard’s criticism. It was also seen6 how Martensen conflated Hegel’s statements about the dialectical method with Descartes’ method of systematic doubt. These themes are taken up again in the Preface to Fear and Trembling where Descartes is held up for praise, while the brunt of the criticism falls squarely on Martensen. Johannes de silentio begins by criticizing “the speculative monitor who conscientiously signals the important trends in modern philosophy.”7 This is a clear allusion to Martensen, who became popular for his lectures, which in Kierkegaard’s eyes were little more than reports about the recent developments in German philosophy with nothing new or original. This allusion seems beyond doubt when one sees the further reference to the “assistant professor, tutor, and student,”8 which recalls Martensen and the clique of students that surrounded him. The modern philosopher “is unwilling to stop with doubting everything but goes further.”9 This recalls Martensen, who claims to have doubted everything and to have surpassed the standpoint of skepticism. As in De Omnibus, it is pointed out that, despite the obvious difficulty, no guidance is given about how one should actually apply this method of doubt in praxis: “They have all made this preliminary movement and presumably so easily that they find it unnecessary to say a word about how, for not even the person who in apprehension and concern sought a little enlightenment found any, not one suggestive hint or one little dietetic prescription with respect to how a person is to act in carrying out this enormous task.”10 As has been seen, Kierkegaard wanted to use the character of Johannes Climacus to demonstrate the absurdity and impracticality of universal skepticism: this was precisely the point of the manuscript De Omnibus. Johannes de silentio cites two passages from Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy to illustrate that Descartes himself never intended for his method 5 6 8 10

Chapter 2, Section III, p. 110f. Chapter 5, Section I. 7 FT, p. 5; SKS, vol. 4, p. 101. Chapter 5, Section III. 9 FT, p. 5; SKS, vol. 4, p. 101. FT, p. 5; SKS, vol. 4, p. 101. FT, p. 5; SKS, vol. 4, p. 101.

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to be valid for everyone or to be employed as a maxim for ethical action. Johannes de silentio says by way of commentary: “He [Descartes] did not shout ‘Fire! Fire!’ and make it obligatory for everyone to doubt, for Descartes was a quiet and solitary thinker, not a shouting street watchman; he modestly let it be known that his method had significance only for him and was partly the result of his earlier warped knowledge.”11 Descartes was true to his word and to himself. He carried out his method without trying to impose it on anyone else. The criticism here clearly seems to be of Martensen who in a sense shouted, “Fire! Fire!” in his lectures with the slogan “de omnibus dubitandum est,” which he employed as a kind of moral imperative for his students. Martensen uses this slogan not as a descriptive account of a certain method employed by a specific thinker in the history of philosophy but rather as a prescriptive maxim. Johannes de silentio thus distinguishes between Descartes’ actual method and Martensen’s distortion and misappropriation of it. Now a slight shift is made to indicate the specific content of Fear and Trembling, although the target remains the same. Johannes de silentio began by criticizing Martensen’s claim that modern philosophy has gone beyond universal doubt to establish a foundation that is wholly without presuppositions. This epistemological issue was central to De Omnibus; in Fear and Trembling by contrast the issue is faith and revelation, and so the expression “to go beyond” is transferred from the epistemological context, where it meant going beyond doubt, to the religious context, where it means going beyond faith. Johannes de silentio writes: In our age everyone is unwilling to stop with faith but goes further. It perhaps would be rash to ask where they are going, whereas it is a sign of urbanity and culture for me to assume that everyone has faith, since otherwise it certainly would be odd to speak of going further. It was different in those ancient days. Faith was then a task of a whole lifetime, because it was assumed that proficiency in believing is not acquired either in days or in weeks.12

The criticism of those who wish to go further than faith is a familiar one that Kierkegaard tends to associate with Martensen. The idea is that by applying the speculative method to dogmatics, Martensen goes beyond the immediacy of faith by understanding the key dogmas of Christianity in terms of the Concept: “Even if someone were able to transpose the whole content of faith into conceptual form, it does not follow that he has comprehended faith, comprehended how he entered into it or how it entered into him.”13 Johannes de silentio does not expand on this criticism. The basic point seems to be that a conceptual understanding 11 13

FT, p. 6; SKS, vol. 4, p. 102. FT, p. 7; SKS, vol. 4, p. 103.

12

FT, p. 7; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 102–103.

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of faith has nothing to do with the actual faith of the individual. This criticism will get its full treatment in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and for this reason I defer my discussion of it until later.14 It should, however, be noted that this charge had already been made against Hegel by Martensen himself.15 Kierkegaard uses the final paragraph of the Preface in a very demonstrative fashion to distance his pseudonymous author from the philosophers of his age. Here he foreshadows a number of criticisms that he will develop in more detail later in the corpus. Johannes de silentio writes: “The present author . . . has not understood the system, whether there is one, whether it is completed.”16 Here he issues an indirect criticism of Heiberg and Rasmus Nielsen for their unfulfilled promises to deliver a philosophical system. He continues, “The present author . . . is . . . a supplementary clerk who neither writes the system nor gives promises of the system, who neither exhausts himself on the system nor binds himself to the system.”17 This criticism appears several times in other works and will be explored in more detail later.18 Finally, Johannes de silentio implores his readers and critics not to regard his work as a system or to try to incorporate him into the system. He emphatically repeats twice that he is “by no means a philosopher,”19 presumably meaning a Hegelian. Thus, right at the start of the work, Johannes de silentio in no uncertain terms declares himself a critic of the Danish Hegelians. If any further proof is needed to demonstrate the claim that the Preface is aimed polemically against Martensen, then evidence can be found in a journal entry from 1850. The entry in question is a draft of a response to Martensen’s Dogmatic Elucidations (1850).20 In the piece Kierkegaard sketches briefly his polemic with Martensen through the pseudonymous works. In one passage he notes to himself what he needs to add to the manuscript: “Now some quotations from the Preface to Fear and Trembling, from Prefaces and from the Concluding Postscript.”21 Here Kierkegaard clearly intends to insert into his manuscript some illustrations of his polemic with Martensen. He says explicitly that he should remember to quote from, among other things, the Preface to Fear and Trembling, thus implying that this Preface was intended as a criticism of Martensen. The fact that he singles it out here (along with Prefaces and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript) seems to indicate that he 14 15

16 18 20 21

Chapter 11, Section IV. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole. Af J. L. Heiberg, Lærer i Logik og Æsthetik ved den kgl. militaire Høiskole,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, 16, 1836, pp. 525–528. 17 FT, p. 7; SKS, vol. 4, p. 103. FT, p. 7; SKS, vol. 4, p. 103. 19 FT, p. 7; SKS, vol. 4, p. 103. Chapter 9, Section I. Hans Lassen Martensen, Dogmatiske Oplysninger. Et Leilighedsskrift, Copenhagen 1850. ASKB 654. JP, vol. 6, 6636, p. 328; Pap. X-6 B 137, p. 187. Translation slightly modified.

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takes it to be a clear-cut or representative example of his polemic with Martensen. This Preface signals to the reading public immediately that the author of the work is a critic of Heiberg, Martensen, Nielsen, and the other Danish Hegelians. It seems as if Kierkegaard needs to have his pseudonym announce this to his readers overtly, even though the actual content of this work contains much more than criticism of the Hegelians. The use of Hegel here in the Preface thus seems to be a matter of self-definition or of defining a position by contrast to that of the known Hegelians.22 The Preface is interesting since it seems to suggest that these Hegelians will play a central role in the text. Moreover, the criticisms raised in this Preface can be seen as continuous with those in the unpublished De Omnibus. It is conceivable that when Kierkegaard gave up on De Omnibus, deciding that its form was inappropriate for the criticisms he wanted to raise, he found in Fear and Trembling a different avenue to explore his differences with the Hegelians. This would explain in part the shift in the Preface from the issue of doubt which was seen in De Omnibus to that of faith which is central to Fear and Trembling. One can thus see a continuity and development from the one text to the other.

ii. problema i: the murderer sand and kierkegaard’s abraham In “Problema I,” Johannes de silentio addresses the question, “Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?” He criticizes Hegel explicitly and even refers directly to a section in the Philosophy of Right as the object of his criticism. This reference will play a crucial role in understanding the differences between Johannes de silentio and Hegel. In this section, I wish to contrast Hegel’s conception of the moral conscience and Johannes de silentio’s account of the teleological suspension of the ethical. I will argue that the reference to Hegel in the context of the discussion in Fear and Trembling is odd since Hegel’s purpose in the Philosophy of Right is wholly different from that of Johannes de silentio. This suggests that Hegel’s role here is something other than just the object of criticism. A. Hegel’s View of Ethics and the Moral Conscience. Before turning to Fear and Trembling, I will say a word about Hegel’s general conception of ethics and the moral conscience and then locate his understanding of the role of the individual within it. For Hegel, the key term in this context is “Sittlichkeit,” which has been translated as “ethical life.” By this term he 22

It will be recalled that this point was made by the anonymous reviewer, -v, “Frygt og Bæven. Dialektisk Lyrik af Johannes de Silentio. Kjøbenhavn 1843. Gjentagelsen. Et Forsøg i den experimenterende Psychologi af Constantin Constantius. Kjøbenhavn 1843,” op. cit., p. 375.

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refers to the concrete realm of customs, duties, institutions, and mores that are generally accepted in any given society. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel underscores the connection between everyday customs and his conception of ethical life: “But if it is simply identical with the actuality of individuals, the ethical [das Sittliche], as their general mode of behavior, appears as custom [Sitte]; and the habit of the ethical appears as a second nature which takes the place of the original and purely natural will and is the all-pervading soul, significance, and actuality of individual existence.”23 Here one can readily see the etymological connection between Sittlichkeit and Sitte or custom. “Sittlichkeit” is characterized by immediacy; it is the sphere that precedes reflectivity, alienation, and thus criticism. By analyzing forms of ethical life in concrete historical communities, Hegel attempts to discern the rationality in this realm of established custom. This rational element is then developed as an aspect of the rational state. For Hegel, the contrasting term to “ethical life” is what he in the Philosophy of Right and elsewhere calls “morality” [Moralit¨at].24 While ethical life is immediate and intuitive, morality is abstract and mediated. Hegel tends to associate “morality” with Kant’s moral theory, which he criticizes as overly abstract and individualistic. For Hegel, the conception of ethics as Moralit¨at overlooks the realm of customary relationships in society.25 He writes: “Morality” [Moralit¨at] and “ethics” [Sittlichkeit], which are usually regarded as roughly synonymous, are taken here in essentially distinct senses. Yet even representational thought seems to distinguish them; Kantian usage prefers the expression “morality,” as indeed the practical principles of Kant’s philosophy are confined throughout to this concept, even rendering the point of view of ethics impossible and in fact expressly infringing and destroying it.26

For Hegel, ethical life is already presupposed in Kant’s ethical theory. One must first have a conception of the various relationships that constitute social life in order to abstract from it to reach an abstract moral law such as Kant’s categorical imperative. The section that Johannes de silentio refers to from the Philosophy of Right is “The Good and Conscience.” This section appears in the “Morality” chapter, and thus the figures treated there belong to the sphere of abstract thought. Kierkegaard mentions this section earlier

23 24 25 26

Hegel, PR, § 151; Jub., vol. 7, p. 233. See Alfred Elsigan, “Zum Begriff der Moralit¨at in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie,” Wiener Jahrbuch f¨ur Philosophie, 5, 1972, p. 188. Hegel, PR, § 148, Remark; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 229–230. Hegel, PR, § 33, Remark; Jub., vol. 7, p. 85. Translation slightly modified.

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in The Concept of Irony where he quotes from it seemingly with approval.27 It also comes up later in Practice in Christianity.28 In “The Good and Conscience” Hegel treats different forms of Romantic individualism. Hegel is particularly critical of kinds of Romantic individualism that posit the arbitrary will of the individual as the absolute criterion of moral judgment. He believes that this can lead to veiling the worst kinds of crime under the cloak of legitimacy. This section is of interest to Kierkegaard since it is the relation of the individual to the universal or to the universal moral law that is at issue in the teleological suspension of the ethical. In the “The Good and Conscience,” Hegel defines conscience as follows: “Subjectivity, in its universality reflected into itself, is the absolute inward certainty of itself; it is that which posits particularity, and it is the determining and decisive factor – the conscience.”29 Johannes de silentio’s interpretation of Abraham presents a number of parallelisms to Hegel’s account of the moral conscience. First, for Hegel, the forms of subjectivism tend to absolutize the moral conscience; likewise, for Johannes de silentio, the divine command issued to Abraham is absolute by virtue of its origin in a divine source. Second, for Hegel, the very nature of conscience is private in the sense that subjectivity determines itself. As Hegel says, conscience is “infinite formal certainty of itself, which for this very reason is at the same time the certainty of this subject.”30 Likewise, for Johannes de silentio, the relation between God and man is by its very nature subjective and private and thus cannot be justified or explained to others. Finally, the forms of subjectivism that Hegel analyzes posit themselves as higher than accepted custom, civil law, and the like, just as Abraham, according to Johannes de silentio’s interpretation, has an absolute calling that puts all other external moral commands and duties into abeyance. In both cases the moral conscience is placed above that of the state, generally accepted custom, familial duty, and the like. Only its demands are regarded as absolute. For Hegel, ethical action is grounded in the rational institutions, duties, mores, and so on of a people. This rational element is recognizable and explicable by philosophy and scholarship. Insofar as it is rational, it is also the universal. Therefore, moral action, while performed by individuals, is by its very nature universal in character. Hegel writes: “What constitutes right and duty, as the rationality in and for itself of the will’s determinations, is essentially neither the particular property of an individual, nor is its form that of feeling or any other individual – i.e. sensuous – kind

27

28 30

CI, pp. 227–228; SKS, vol. 1, p. 270. See Merold Westphal, “Abraham and Hegel,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. Robert L. Perkins, Alabama: University of Alabama Press 1981, p. 67. 29 Hegel, PR, §; 136; Jub., vol. 7, p. 195. PC, p. 87; SV1, vol. 12, p. 83. Hegel, PR, § 137; Jub., vol. 7, p. 196.

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of knowledge, but essentially that of universal determination of thought, i.e. the form of laws and principles.”31 The problem arises in that the moral conscience is essentially particular. As Johannes de silentio constantly points out, the divine command confronts Abraham as an individual, and it is he alone who has access to it and who is called upon to act. This particularity of the moral conscience then brings it into conflict with the universality of the ethical life of the community. Hegel interprets this conflict not as one between the individual and something external (e.g., the state, civil law, accepted custom) but as a self-contradiction within the individual himself. He writes: The conscience is therefore subject to judgment as to its truth and falsity, and its appeal solely to itself is directly opposed to what it seeks to be – that is, the rule for a rational and universal mode of action which is valid in and for itself. . . .The ambiguity associated with conscience therefore consists in the fact that conscience is assumed in advance to signify the identity of subjective knowledge and volition with the true good, and is thus declared and acknowledged to be sacrosanct, while it also claims, as the purely subjective reflection of self-consciousness into itself, the authority which belongs only to that identity itself by virtue of its rational content which is valid in and for itself.32

Hegel’s view is that the conflict of conscience with the state or civil law is only a consequence of the deeper conflict of the moral conscience with itself. At bottom, the moral conscience is irrational in its willing. Although there is a claim, implicit or explicit, for absolute validity on the part of the moral conscience, its content is nevertheless wholly subjective. Hegel understands the conflict to be immanent and characterizes it as one between universal and particular (i.e., between the good generally and the private will). There might seem to be a disanalogy between Hegel’s account of moral conscience and Johannes de silentio’s account of Abraham in that, as Johannes de silentio is careful to point out, Abraham makes no claim for the universal validity of his action. He never tries to universalize the maxim of his action or to convince others to act in the same way. Thus, he seems to recognize the subjectivity of his moral conscience. Yet even though Abraham does not try to universalize his action and does not consider it discursively justifiable, he nevertheless must think that it is in some sense absolutely correct since otherwise he presumably would not prepare to do something that he does not want to do and that is clearly at odds with traditional moral duties about which he is certain. The absolute validation of his action comes from God Himself. This is 31

Hegel, PR, §137; Jub., vol. 7, p. 197.

32

Hegel, PR, §137; Jub., vol. 7, p. 197f.

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Abraham’s warrant that his action is higher than law, custom, and so on. He does not universalize his particular action but rather the general principle of acting at all costs as divine command bids.33 Although he is unable to argue for it or prove it discursively due to the subjective nature of the relation in which God gives the command, he must feel that he is correct and that anyone who is given a divine command ought to act on it as he does. Nonetheless the internal contradiction is present. According to Hegel, this absolute claim is in conflict with the particular content of the action. For Hegel, the danger lies in the individual who via the moral or religious conscience elevates his own private will to the status of the universal and thereby runs the risk of acting immorally. It is at this point that he begins his discussion of the potential for moral evil: “Where all previously valid determinations have vanished and the will is in a state of pure inwardness, the self-consciousness is capable of making into its principle either the universal in and for itself, or the arbitrariness of its own particularity, giving the latter precedence over the universal and realizing it through its action – i.e. it is capable of being evil.”34 This is the question raised by the figure of Abraham. Is he the highest embodiment of moral action or is he simply evil? Hegel’s conclusion is twofold. First, while the state can accept the moral conscience of the individual in some forms, it cannot regard it as its principle: “[T]he state cannot recognize the conscience in its distinctive form, i.e. as subjective knowledge, any more than science can grant 33 34

The issue of one’s absolute duty toward God is the subject of “Problema II.” Hegel, PR, § 139; Jub., vol. 7, p. 200. Hegel categorizes in ascending order ever more radical forms of subjective evil (PR, § 140, Remark; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 204–223), which correspond in part to his analyses in the Phenomenology of Spirit entitled “Virtue and the Way of the World” (from the “Reason” chapter) and “Dissemblance or Duplicity” and “Conscience, the Beautiful Soul, Evil and its Forgiveness” (from “Spirit”). Commentators have identified some of Hegel’s contemporaries as the targets of his criticism. See J. Y. ´ Calvez, “L’ˆage d’or. Essai sur le destin de la ‘belle aˆ me’ chez Novalis et Hegel,” Etudes Germaniques, 9, 1954, pp. 112–127. D. O. Dahlstrom, “Die sch¨one Seele bei Schiller und Hegel,” Hegel-Jahrbuch, 1991, pp. 147–156. Moltke S. Gram, “Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel’s Critique of ‘The Moral View of the World,’” Clio, 7, 1978, pp. 375–402. Emanuel Hirsch, “Die Beisetzung der Romantiker in Hegels Ph¨anomenologie. Ein Kommentar zu dem Abschnitte uber ¨ die Moralit¨at,” Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift f¨ur Literaturwissenschaft, 2, 1924, pp. 510–532. Also in Materialien zu Hegels Ph¨anomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Hans Friedrich Fulda and Dieter Henrich, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1973, pp. 245– 275. Andr´e Kaan, “Le mal et son pardon,” in Hegel-Tage Royaumont 1964: Beitr¨age zur Deutung der Ph¨anomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 3, Bonn: Bouvier 1966, pp. 187–194. Pierre-Jean Labarri`ere, “Belle aˆ me, mal et pardon,” Concordia, 1, 1982, pp. 11–15. Benjamin C. Sax, “Active Individuality and the Language of Confession: The Figure of the Beautiful Soul in the Lehrjahre and the Phenomenology,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 21, 1983, pp. 437–466. Donald Phillip Verene, “Two Forms of Defective Selfhood: The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and the Beautiful Soul,” in his Hegel’s Recollection. A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Albany: State University of New York Press 1985, pp. 92–103. Karlheinz Well, Die sch¨one Seele und ihre sittliche Wirklichkeit, Frankfurt am Main and Bern: Peter Lang 1986.

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any validity to subjective opinion, assertion, and the appeal to a subjective opinion.”35 Therefore, and this is the second conclusion, the individual in the state has a right to moral conscience so long as the acts it compels do not conflict with the universally valid civil law. This said, Hegel also is willing to allow moral conscience a fair bit of leeway even when it in fact does conflict with the laws of the state. For example, he allows for the conscience of the individual to be absolute for the individual in instances of conscientious objectors to military service.36 But his point is that individual conscience cannot be made into a principle of universal morality or civil law without leading to chaos. Hegel also makes room for matters of religious conscience in the rational state. Here it is clear that his position is to a certain extent compatible with that of Johannes de silentio. He is able to acknowledge Abraham, like Johannes de silentio, as a knight of faith for following the demands of his moral or religious conscience, but only up to a certain point. The right of the individual moral conscience is limited to a certain sphere and stops as soon as it comes into conflict with the law (i.e., if Abraham actually attempts to sacrifice Isaac, then he must be prosecuted since the state cannot permit the universalization of the individual acts of faith and conscience that encroach on the rights of others). Although Johannes de silentio praises Abraham’s faith, there is nothing that would prevent him from accepting Hegel’s conclusion here since he is clearly interested primarily in the religious rather than the political implications of the problem. B. Johannes de silentio’s Criticism. Johannes de silentio begins the first “Problema” by outlining the view of ethics as something universal. He then uses this as a hypothetical statement as follows: “If this is the case, then Hegel is right in ‘The Good and Conscience,’ where he defines man only as a ‘moral form of evil’ (see especially The Philosophy of Right), which must be annulled [ophævet] in the teleology of the moral in such a way that the single individual who remains in that stage either sins or is immersed in spiritual trial.”37 If ethics is conceived as having the universal for its benchmark, then Hegel is correct in his negative judgment of arbitrary individualism since it is clear that such individualism contradicts the 35 36

37

Hegel, PR, § 137; Jub., vol. 7, p. 197. Hegel, PR, § 270; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 353–354: “A state which is strong because its organization is fully developed can adopt a more liberal attitude in this respect, and may completely overlook individual matters which may affect it, or even tolerate communities whose religion does not recognize even their direct duties towards the state (although this naturally depends on the numbers concerned). It is able to do this by entrusting the members of such communities to civil society and its laws, and is content if they fulfil their direct duties towards it passively, for example by commutation or substitution of an alternative service.” In a footnote to this passage Hegel mentions precisely the example of exempting citizens from military service who have moral or religious objections. FT, p. 54; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 148–149. Translation slightly modified.

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universal. Of course, in the context of The Philosophy of Right, Hegel is not interested in the possibility of this individualism being a manifestation of a “spiritual trial” as Johannes de silentio is. Hegel’s only point is the uncontroversial claim that radical individualism or the moral conscience cannot be made into the sole criterion for morality or civil law. Johannes de silentio’s criticism lies in the fact that Hegel does not leave open this possibility of a “spiritual trial” or of a teleological suspension of the ethical. He continues: “But Hegel is wrong in speaking about faith; he is wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly against Abraham’s enjoying honor and glory as a father of faith when he ought to be sent back to a lower court and shown up as a murderer.”38 Johannes de silentio criticizes Hegel’s approach for being inapplicable in the sphere of faith. An ethics defined in terms of the universal must demand that Abraham be prosecuted and condemned like any other murderer. Anything less would be inconsistent and thus wrong; however, he overlooks the fact that from a different perspective (i.e., a religious one), the same act, which from the perspective of civil law and Sittlichkeit is illegal and immoral, respectively, can also be a sign of the highest faith. Hegel is purportedly inconsistent in not following through on his view of civil law, which would seem to require him to condemn Abraham. The reference to “The Good and Conscience” is odd since Hegel’s analysis concerns neither Abraham nor faith. But this seems to be what Johannes de silentio ascribes to him. The Philosophy of Right is an analysis of civil law and not religion. Thus, the acts of the moral conscience are in this context analyzed only from the perspective of civil law; from this perspective, Abraham is a potential murderer and nothing more. Hegel does not deny that there are other possible perspectives. Indeed, Hegel’s philosophy is rightly known for the way in which it examines the same phenomenon or concept from different perspectives and at different levels. Thus, while what Johannes de silentio says of Hegel here is in itself true, this cannot be regarded as Hegel’s only or final word on the matter. His analysis of religion is far richer than these passages on the moral conscience here in the context of his political philosophy. Hegel also discusses the question of moral conscience in the Phenomenology of Spirit,39 the Encyclopaedia,40 and the Lectures on the History of Philosophy,41 but Johannes de silentio only refers to the account in the Philosophy of Right. Johannes de silentio then states the thesis of this section and indeed of the work as a whole: “faith is namely this paradox that the single individual 38 39 40 41

FT, pp. 54–55; SKS, vol. 4, p. 149. Hegel, PhS, pp. 383–409; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 484–516. Hegel, Phil. of Mind, §§ 503–512; Jub., vol. 10, pp. 391–397. Hegel, Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 420–412; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 93–95. Hist. of Phil. I, pp. 442–443; Jub., vol. 18, pp. 115–116.

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is higher than the universal – yet, please note, in such a way that the movement repeats itself, so that after having been in the universal he as the single individual isolates himself as higher than the universal.”42 This is the core of Johannes de silentio’s position to which he returns again and again. It is clear that he does not mean that arbitrary individualism is higher than the universal. This is the point of his quick caveat, which evinces a very Hegelian perspective. But Johannes de silentio’s problem is then to distinguish his legitimate, faith-based “individualism,” which is higher than the universal, from the arbitrary kind advocated by the Romantics. He tries to do this with the example of Abraham, which is, of course, interpreted as a divine command that suspends the usual rules of social ethics and morality. Johannes de silentio then continues with his criticism of Hegel by pointing out that there must be some legitimate space between the individual and social morality such that the individual can be allowed to deviate from customary social ethics without being branded evil or arbitrary. He writes: For if the ethical – that is, social morality – is the highest and if there is in a person no residual incommensurability in some way such that this incommensurability is not evil (i.e. the single individual, who is to be expressed in the universal), then no categories are needed other than what Greek philosophy had or what can be deduced from them by consistent thought. Hegel should not have concealed this, for after all, he had studied Greek philosophy.43

What Johannes de silentio understands here by “Greek philosophy” is not wholly clear. The point is perhaps that for Hegel there is no incommensurability or mystery, and thus everything can be known and openly adjudicated; thus Hegel shares with the Greeks the view of transparency and open access to the truth. Johannes de silentio tends to contrast this with his interpretation of the Christian view, which involves transcendence and incommensurability, where the truth remains hidden. The paradox of the God-man and faith is nondiscursive. Thus, Johannes de silentio’s point in the passage is that Hegel has not gone beyond the standpoint of transparency of Greek philosophy. But in spite of the numerous misinterpretations of Hegel’s social and political philosophy which see him as destroying the individual and deifying the state, his goal is in fact to preserve the sanctity of the individual and to allow room for individuality within the state. This is made clear in his criticism of the Sittlichkeit of the Greek polis, which he characterizes as an immediacy that does not allow for subjective freedom and destroys 42 43

FT, p. 55; SKS, vol. 4, p. 149. Kierkegaard also broaches the question of an exception to the universal in Repetition. R, p. 226; SKS, vol. 4, p. 92. FT, p. 55; SKS, vol. 4, p. 149.

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individuality.44 By contrast, the modern world, as shaped by the French Revolution and Romanticism, is one in which the ethical life of the community has been fragmented and individuals have become monadic units or atoms in the social sphere.45 This is the price the modern world must pay for winning its individualism from the ancient world. The goal that Hegel sets for himself in his political philosophy is to win back the universal spirit of the community that modernity has lost, while maintaining individuality in the sense of a mediated relation to social ethics. The goal is a deep and meaningful sense of social community like the Greeks, but in a mediated way that does not destroy the individual. Johannes de silentio’s interpretation of the story of Abraham and Isaac turns on the doctrine of the “teleological suspension of the ethical.”46 Abraham entered into a direct or private relation to the divine.47 This relation, since it is with God, is absolute and thus infinitely higher than any finite relation. Therefore, Abraham stands “in an absolute relation to the absolute.”48 This absolute relation to the divine is one of faith or personal revelation which by its very nature is private or subjective. It is precisely alone, qua individual, that one enters into this relation with God. From this arises the tension: since the relation is with God it is absolute and infinitely higher than even the highest universal human moral laws and ethics, yet this relation is only possible for a single individual, who is then, qua single individual, set above such universal moral laws. The question then arises how the individual who has a revelation or receives an absolute command of conscience knows that it is genuine. Johannes de silentio poses this question and alludes indirectly to Hegel’s political philosophy. He writes: “How does the single individual reassure himself that he is legitimate? It is a simple matter to level all existence to the idea of the state or the idea of society. If this is done, it is also simple to mediate, for one never comes to the paradox that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal.”49 The upshot of Johannes de silentio’s analysis is that the individual can never be completely sure of the divine revelation. Since there is no mediation, there remains a gap between God and human beings, universal and particular, a gap that reason and knowledge cannot overcome. This seems to be one of the most important conclusions of Johannes de silentio’s entire interpretation of the story. Abraham can never be wholly certain 44 45 46 47

48 49

Hegel, PhS, pp. 266–289; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 339–367. Hegel, PhS, pp. 355–363; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 449–459. FT, p. 66; SKS, vol. 4, p. 159. This is implied when Kierkegaard contrasts Abraham with the tragic hero and says, “Here the necessity of a new category for the understanding of Abraham becomes apparent. Paganism does not know such a relationship to the divine. The tragic hero does not enter into any private relationship to the divine”(FT, p. 60; SKS, vol. 4, p. 153). FT, p. 56; SKS, vol. 4, p. 150. FT, p. 62; SKS, vol. 4, p. 155. FT, p. 62; SKS, vol. 4, p. 155.

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in the sense of discursive rationality. Therefore, his belief is not one of complacent certainty but rather of anxiety and tension. He has faith but with fear and trembling. The point of the allusion to Hegel’s political philosophy seems to be that it is an easy matter to construct the rational state discursively, but to believe with deep anxiety is infinitely more difficult. In his account of the forms of subjectivism, Hegel analyzes a position that corresponds quite well to Johannes de silentio’s interpretation of Abraham. It is the penultimate form of subjectivism analyzed in the long Remark to § 140 of the Philosophy of Right. This is the view according to which personal conviction, be it of a divine command or of the goodness of one’s own will, is placed above all other considerations. Here Hegel seems to address Johannes de silentio’s position directly: But if a good heart, good intentions, and subjective conviction are said to be the factors which give actions their value, there is no longer any hypocrisy or evil at all; for a person is able to transform whatever he does into something good by reflection of good intentions and motives, and the element of his conviction renders it good. Thus, there is no longer such a thing as crime or vice in and for itself, and instead of those free and open, hardened and undiluted sinners referred to above we have a consciousness of complete justification by intention and conviction.50

If everyone who sincerely believed that he received a divine call were obliged to teleologically suspend the usual ethical duties and act as the divine voice commanded, then the result could well include a host of terrible crimes all committed in the name of God. Johannes de silentio’s argument is potentially the same as that of any given fanatical religious terrorist. In short, it justifies any action. If conviction or faith is made the sole criterion for action, then the very possibility of a wrongful action is eliminated since that conviction can have any given content whatsoever. Indeed, on this view, it is not the content that is at issue.51 For this reason Hegel believes that ethical views like truth claims must be negotiated in practice in the public forum. One cannot remain secure in the subjectivity of one’s own heart, but rather one is obliged to enter into moral life with others in which ethical views are open for critical examination.

50 51

Hegel, PR, § 140, Remark, (e); Jub., vol. 7, pp. 213–214. See Hegel, PR, § 140, Remark, (e); Jub., vol. 7, p. 214: “In so far as we speak of judging and pronouncing a verdict on an action, this principle requires that the agent should be judged only in terms of his intention and conviction, or of his faith – not in the sense in which Christ requires faith in objective truth (so that the judgment passed on a person of bad faith, i.e. on one whose conviction is bad in its content, must also be negative, in keeping with this evil content), but in the sense of loyalty to one’s conviction (in so far as a person, in his action, remains true to his conviction), i.e. in the sense of formal, subjective loyalty, which is alone in keeping with duty.” See PhS, pp. 386–387; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 487–488. Hegel’s description of this position sounds very much like Kierkegaard’s plea for passion in faith, without regard to any determinate content.

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Hegel also argues that this position is internally contradictory. If one thinks that issues can be negotiated and truth can be determined on the basis of good reasons in what Habermas calls “communicative action,” then one’s convictions based on reasons are an important and necessary part in any communicative exchange. If, on the contrary, one believes that one cannot know the truth and that reasons and arguments play no role whatsoever, then one admits at the same time that private convictions about these matters are trivial; indeed, this is the reason why the one insisting on the absolute nature of the moral conscience rejects accepted values, civil law, ethics, and the like as trivial or merely subjective. Hegel points out the contradiction as follows: For in the first instance, conviction is supposed to be the basis of ethics and of man’s supreme worth, and is thereby declared to be a supreme and sacred value; and in the second case, all that we are concerned with is error, and my conviction is insignificant and contingent, in fact a purely external circumstance which I may encounter in one way or another. And my conviction is an extremely insignificant thing if I cannot recognize the truth; for it is a matter of indifference how I think, and all that remains for me to think about is that empty good as an abstraction of the understanding.52

By claiming an epistemological agnosticism in order to dismiss or “suspend” accepted practices and values, one forfeits the right to make any positive moral claim oneself. One’s personal conviction is trivial if the matter cannot be discursively negotiated or adjudicated. Thus, Hegel censures the subjective nature of the moral conscience which Johannes de silentio extols; indeed, it is the subjective situation of Abraham that makes the story so interesting for Johannes de silentio. His relation to God and the revelation of the divine command are his and his alone. Hegel has no problem with moral or religious conscience per se. Indeed, he distinguishes between legitimate conscience as it appears in Sittlichkeit53 from subjective or formal conscience in Moralit¨at. He analyzes legitimate conscience as one that, unlike the formal conscience, has a determinate and genuinely universal content that is guaranteed by the state.54 The problem for him is the subjective nature of formal conscience which he believes cannot be given free rein in the context of civil law. If there is no conflict with civil law, then Hegel is happy to allow the moral conscience any number of excesses. But Johannes de silentio makes no attempt to ground the actions of the moral conscience in civil law or to defend it in the face of established legal institutions. Indeed, he does not seem interested in the implications of this doctrine for 52 53 54

Hegel, PR, § 140, Remark, (e); Jub., vol. 7, p. 216. Hegel, PR, § 137, Remark; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 196–198. Hegel, PR, § 270; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 348–366. See also Phil. of Mind, § 552; Jub., vol. 10, pp. 433–445. PR, § 268; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 345–346.

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political philosophy. Thus, the two appear to be at cross purposes since the contexts of their discussions are quite different. C. An Analogous Example. The motivation behind Hegel’s position can best be understood when one has some sense of the social and political milieu in which he wrote his Philosophy of Right.55 Here one finds an example that offers an interesting parallel to Johannes de silentio’s account of Abraham. Hegel came from Heidelberg to the Royal FriedrichWilhelms-Universit¨at in Berlin in 1818, holding his inaugural lecture on October 22nd. In that Winter Semester of 1818–19, he lectured on his political philosophy. At this time the student movement in the form of the Burschenschaften was taking root throughout Prussia and the German states. The liberal students, encouraged by a number of professors, among them Hegel’s lifelong rival Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843),56 lobbied for, among other things, pan-German nationalism, political equality, a constitutional monarchy, and popular sovereignty. They consolidated their movement at the Wartburg Festival of October 18, 1817. The leaders of Prussia and the German states were alarmed by this development, and in January 1819, the King of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III (1770–1840), ordered professors who encouraged the liberal students dismissed from their posts. This was the atmosphere when Hegel arrived in Berlin in the fall of 1818. The situation exploded on March 23, 1819, when a theology student by the name of Karl Ludwig Sand (1795–1820), inspired by the higher calling of German nationalism, murdered the Russian noble August von Kotzebue (1761–1819), a conservative writer critical of the student movement and German unification. This action confirmed the authorities’ worst fears of what the spirit of youth and freedom were capable of, and they reacted with severe measures, imprisoning students and dismissing professors as “demagogues.” The “Karlsbad Decrees” were issued in August of 1819 by a council of ministers of the German states and called for a disbanding of the fraternities and political associations, a new censorship and closer governmental control of university appointments. In these actions a number of professors were dismissed from their posts including Fries in Jena and the theologian Wilhelm De Wette (1780–1849), Hegel’s colleague in Berlin. Hegel’s position in this matter is somewhat difficult to characterize since he does not readily fall into the one camp or the other. On the one hand, he was a lifelong advocate of Napoleon and of constitutionalism 55

56

See Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Philosophy and Politics: A Commentary on the Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Dordrecht, and Boston, and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff 1987, pp. 15–31. Cf. Willem van Dooren, “Hegel und Fries,” Kantstudien, 61, 1970, pp. 217–226.

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and a consistent critic of the conservative forces of the Restoration. He sympathized with many of the goals of the politically active students and helped some of them in practical matters, posting bail for his imprisoned student Gustav Asverus (1798–1843) and supporting his former Heidelberg student Friedrich W. Carov´e (1789–1852) in his application for a position in Berlin.57 On the other hand, he rejected their extremism and self-righteousness. He thus criticizes Fries for encouraging the worst aspects of youthful enthusiasm at Wartburg. The Preface to the Philosophy of Right was written very much with this in mind; there Hegel openly enters into polemics against Fries and this tendency.58 Thus, Hegel was neither a Prussian apologist nor an agitator in the student movement. Hegel’s reaction and assessment of the episode of the murder of Kotzebue is illuminating for the question at hand since Sand’s action provides an analogue to Johannes de silentio’s Abraham. Sand, who was condemned and ultimately executed in May of 1820, was regarded by his supporters not as a criminal but as a “pious heart,” justified in his actions. De Wette, in a letter, which, once discovered, led to his dismissal, writes to Sand’s mother that her son’s error “is excused and to a certain extent abolished by the strength and purity of his conviction, and his passion is sanctified by the good source from which it flows. He was sure of his cause, he considered it right to do what he did, and thus he did right.”59 Like Johannes de silentio’s Abraham, Sand believed he had a higher calling that suspended both civil law and accepted custom. In the final analysis, he is thought to have done what was right by following the call of his heart or his moral conscience. Both De Wette and Schleiermacher (who sympathized with his plight) were theologians,60 and De Wette’s view was grounded in a theological subjectivity that Hegel rejected. As was mentioned, Sand himself was a student of theology. Hegel is critical of the attempt to justify heinous acts, like that of Sand, under the name of piety, religion, or divine calling. He considers this simple fanaticism and self-indulgent arrogance. While Hegel helped De Wette with financial support after his colleague’s dismissal, he had nothing but disdain for this kind of view, which raises subjectivity above law and custom. Kierkegaard wants to make room for the legitimate place of revelation. This is an issue with which he wrestles not only here but also elsewhere in the corpus.61 Hegel has no reason to deny the possibility of divine revelation in principle but argues only that, with respect to civil law, 57 58 59 60 61

See Horst Althaus, Hegel und die heroischen Jahre der Philosophie, Munich and Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag 1992, pp. 318–320. Hegel, PR, Preface, pp. 15–16; Jub., vol. 7, pp. 26–28. Quoted from Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Philosophy and Politics, op. cit., p. 20. For an account of Hegel’s relation to Schleiermacher during this period, see Horst Althaus, Hegel und die heroischen Jahre der Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 323–326. The most obvious example is The Book on Adler.

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truth must be socially negotiable and defensible in the public sphere. For Kierkegaard, matters of faith remain forever hidden and concealed in the private sphere. In any case the two thinkers are at cross purposes on this issue since the contexts of the two discussions are so different that they preclude fruitful comparison – Hegel’s account being concerned with moral and political theory and Johannes de silentio’s with revelation and faith. This leads one to wonder why Hegel is introduced into this discussion at all. One explanation might be that the reference to Hegel here and at the beginning of the two other Problemata has a symbolic significance in the sense that Kierkegaard feels obliged to criticize him in order to declare his independence from Hegel’s Danish followers. But it is not clear, at least in the case of this first “Problema,” that there is any real content behind this symbolic opposition. This is, of course, not to imply that Hegel’s political philosophy is absolutely irrelevant for the themes of Fear and Trembling. Rather the way in which Johannes de silentio takes Hegel’s discussion of “The Good and Conscience” so radically from its original political context to the religious one, which he wants to discuss, makes one suspicious about the degree to which he really wants to criticize Hegel’s own position. It seems instead that he finds in it a convenient target by means of which to set up his own view and a convenient symbol that would have a clear significance to his contemporary Danish reader.

iii. problema ii: absolute duty and the inner and the outer In “Problema II,” Johannes de silentio begins his account in a fashion parallel to the previous one. Just as in “Problema I,” Johannes de silentio’s procedure is first to say that given certain presuppositions about ethics, Hegel was right and then that, in regard specifically to the problem of Abraham and faith, he was wrong, thereby introducing a critical point. I will argue here that while there is a potential conflict in the views of the two men, Johannes de silentio’s ostensible critique of Hegel regarding the inner and the outer is rather enigmatic since he takes these terms from Hegel’s philosophy out of their original contexts and gives them a meaning in accordance with his own discussion of faith without any attempt to explore the actual issue in Hegel. I wish to argue that this can be explained by the fact that the true target of this criticism is not Hegel at all, as it purports to be, but rather Heiberg. The main argument of this section is that there is an absolute duty towards God that is higher than any finite duty. The argument can be seen as a corollary to the one in the first “Problema” about the teleological suspension of the ethical. Johannes de silentio returns to the same example to illustrate the point: “The ethical expression for [Abraham’s]

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relation to Isaac is that the father must love the son. This ethical relation is reduced to the relative in contradistinction to the absolute relation to God.”62 Abraham’s duty as a father is “suspended” by his higher duty towards God since his relation to God is higher than his relation to his own son or to any other human being. Johannes de silentio’s main argument for this principle comes from a passage in Luke that he cites: “As we all know, Luke 14.26 offers a remarkable teaching on the absolute duty to God: ‘If anyone comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple.’”63 Johannes de silentio interprets this to mean that the finite duties one has in usual ethical relations are only relative in comparison to the absolute duty one has towards God. He is critical of those who try to soften this claim by reinterpreting the passage from Luke in order to render it more palatable. As in his account of the teleological suspension of the ethical, here in his account of the absolute duty to God, Johannes de silentio employs the notion of the paradox that the individual is higher than the universal.64 In this absolute duty towards God, the individual must remain an individual and not attempt to see this duty as an expression of the universal. This is the difference for Johannes de silentio between the tragic hero, who makes a sacrifice in accordance with the universal, and the knight of faith, who makes a sacrifice in accordance with the particular (i.e., his own particular relation to God). The latter is the paradox of faith, which defies rational explanation. It is more difficult to determine the role of Hegel in this discussion than in the previous one. The main point implicitly seems to be the same as in the previous section (i.e., that by insisting on the universal in ethics, Hegel does not allow for the possibility that the individual can be higher than the universal in the case of a divine command that suspends the usual universal ethical laws). Thus, Hegel purportedly does not recognize that the absolute duty towards God outweighs finite human duties.65 Hegel is introduced at the beginning of the section, once again, in a seemingly ambivalent fashion as in the previous analysis. The formulation is again hypothetical: “if there is nothing incommensurable in a human life, and if the incommensurable that is present is there only by an accident from which nothing results insofar as existence is viewed from

62 64 65

63 FT, p. 72; SKS, vol. 4, p. 163. FT, pp. 70–71; SKS, vol. 4, p. 162. FT, p. 70; SKS, vol. 4, p. 162. As has been seen in the previous section, Hegel finds problematic any subjectively justified absolute duty since it can be filled with any given content. Since his objections to this view have been explored in the previous section, I will not repeat them here. All of this is only implicit here in “Problema II.”

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the idea, then Hegel was right.”66 Hegel’s philosophy is based on the premise of the ultimate rationality of the world. The universe displays a logos that is accessible to human beings, and what is not comprehensible or governed by reason is accidental, which is not the object of scientific investigation. Johannes de silentio brings up Hegel in this way in order to contrast the Hegelian view of the ultimate rationality and commensurability of the world with his own view of the paradox of faith, which is incomprehensible to reason. Johannes de silentio now turns to the negative assessment of the Hegelian view. He alludes to the doctrine of the inner and the outer. While this doctrine has deep roots in the history of philosophy and theology and can by no means be said to have originated in Hegel, Johannes de silentio associates it with him: But [Hegel] was not right in speaking about faith or in permitting Abraham to be regarded as its father, for in the latter case he has pronounced judg¨ ment both on Abraham and on faith. In Hegelian philosophy, das Außere (die Ent¨außerung) is higher than das Innere. . . . But faith is the paradox that interiority is higher than exteriority, or to call to mind something said earlier, the uneven number is higher than the even.67

Johannes de silentio’s main argument against the ostensibly Hegelian principle of the dialectical relation of the inner and the outer is that, with faith properly understood, the inner is in fact higher than the outer and the two terms are not commensurable. By contrast, the goal purportedly implied by the Hegelian principle seems to be that one should purge oneself of the inner and live in the expression of the outer: Thus in the ethical view of life, it is the task of the single individual to strip himself of the qualification of interiority and to express this in something external. Every time the individual shrinks from it, every time he withholds himself in or slips down again into the qualifications of feeling, mood, etc. that belong to interiority, he trespasses, he is immersed in spiritual trial. The paradox of faith is that there is an interiority that is incommensurable with exteriority, an interiority that is not identical, please note, with the first but is a new interiority.68

Johannes de silentio conceives of faith as essentially a private and inward relation of the individual to God. Therefore, any outward sign of it would be meaningless or even misleading or distorting. This is precisely what he argues in “Problema III.” Evaluating this criticism is not easy since Johannes de silentio has taken this principle so far out of its original context in Hegel’s philosophy that 66 68

FT, p. 68; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 160–161. FT, p. 69; SKS, vol. 4, p. 161.

67

FT, pp. 68–69; SKS, vol. 4, p. 161.

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it no longer has anything to do with Hegel himself. The issue of the inner and the outer is understood by Hegel primarily as epistemological and metaphysical. His primary discussion of it appears in the Science of Logic in his account of inner hidden forces and their expression in the phenomenal world.69 There Hegel tries to demonstrate the conceptual unity of two terms, force and expression, inner and outer, which are not independent but rather mutually condition one another. Hegel shows this by pointing out the circular arguments involved in justifying the two terms: one begins by explaining a given external phenomenon in terms of an unseen inner force behind it, and then when the question is raised about how one can know that this unseen force even exists, the claim is made that it must exist since the phenomenon is its expression. Thus, each term is at first taken as cause or ground and then as effect or consequent. Hegel’s point is to show that these terms refer to complex concepts that consist of two reciprocal parts. The outer is necessary for the inner and vice versa since when one of these terms is posited, the other is immediately already implied. In his discussion of the forms of explanation in natural science,70 Hegel also uses the terms “the inner” and “the outer.” One kind of biological explanation attempts to grasp the organism in terms of specific systems (i.e., the nervous system, the muscular system, and the digestive system). In accordance with the natural science of the day, Hegel understands these systems to belong to the organism’s outer morphology. This attempt at explanation is, according to Hegel, characteristic of the field of anatomy. By contrast, there is another kind of explanation that belongs to physiology. According to this kind of explanation, an organism is understood in terms of its functions: sensibility, irritability, and reproduction. These are thought to constitute the inner aspect of the organism. Hegel criticizes both kinds of explanation as one-sided since they analyze specific systems and functions in isolation and not in the context of the entire organism. Hegel attempts to demonstrate that the inner aspect of an organism cannot be understood without its outer aspect and vice versa. Thus, the inner and the outer represent reciprocal parts of the organic whole. It should be clear that Hegel’s discussion of the inner and the outer in these contexts has nothing to do with Johannes de silentio’s discussion. Hegel makes no claims about how the outer or the inner is related to faith and certainly does not discuss Abraham in this context as Johannes de silentio implies. He does not claim that the outer is higher than the inner; on the contrary, the two are dialectically related concepts, which means 69 70

Hegel, SL, pp. 518–528; Jub., vol. 4, pp. 648–661. EL, §§ 138–141; Jub., vol. 8, pp. 313–319. PhS, pp. 160–172; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 208–223. See also his criticism of physiognomy and phrenology: PhS, pp. 185–210; Jub., vol. 2, pp. 239–271.

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that they are reciprocal and thus on equal footing. Likewise, Hegel does not claim that the individual should eliminate his interiority and make it external. Johannes de silentio seems to take key terms from Hegel’s philosophy and then apply them in a context that is wholly his own. As in “Problema I,” this raises the question of why Hegel is mentioned here at all. The answer seems again to have something to do with the need to carry on an overt polemic against the Danish Hegelians. Evidence for this explanation can be found in the context of Kierkegaard’s changing relation to Heiberg. The notion of the inner and the outer was one aspect of Hegel’s philosophy that Heiberg adopted and applied to any number of academic fields that he was interested in. He refers to these categories in many very different works, including everything from drama to natural science.71 It can be said without exaggeration that these categories became one of the trademarks of his thought. In his main work on logic, Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic from 1832, Heiberg analyzes these concepts at length. There he writes: The standpoint upon which essence is determined as the inner is one of those upon which representation takes root, without wanting to retreat from it. “The inner essence” is even a quite current way of speaking. . . . But it is also valid here that the essence thus determined is phenomenon, for what is determined as the inner, is precisely in this determination determined as the outer, for each for itself is the totality; or, the inner, seen from the standpoint of the outer, is itself outer for it, and in opposition to this, the outer likewise becomes the inner in the same way as the parts are the whole and the whole the parts. . . . The difficulty, which representation has to overcome, is to unite the two points of view.72

Like Hegel, Heiberg insists that the inner and the outer must be understood in dialectical relation to each other and cannot be grasped in isolation. Heiberg goes on to develop this basic Hegelian intuition into an elaborate theory of appearances. In his drama Fata Morgana from 1838 he treats the notion of the illusions presented by appearances, and in one of the dialogues he underscores directly the dialectical relation of 71

72

E.g., Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen 1835, p. 29. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen 1861–62, vol. 1, p. 499.) “Om Principet for Historiens Begyndelse,” Intelligensblade, no. 35–36, September 1, 1843, p. 261. (Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 400.) “Det astronomiske Aar,” Urania, 1844, p. 137. ASKB U 57. (Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 9, p. 108.) “Symbolik,” Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad, II, no. 4, January 28, 1834, [pp. 23–24]. (Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 10, pp. 162–164.) See also Martensen’s review: “Nye Digte af J. L. Heiberg (1841. 80- 249 S. Reitzel.),” Fædrelandet, vol. 2, no. 398, January 10, 1841, p. 3209. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik. Som Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen 1832, § 115, Remark 2. See also §§ 112–114. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 252–253.)

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the inner and the outer.73 He develops this theory further in 1842 in this article “The Starry Heavens” from the Intelligensblade.74 Perhaps the immediate occasion for Johannes de silentio’s use of the categories of the inner and the outer was Heiberg’s article, “Contribution to a Philosophy of the Visible,” which appeared in the Intelligensblade on May 15, 1843 (i.e., only two months after Heiberg’s review of Either/Or, and in the same journal). In this article Heiberg discusses the human senses and their relation to perception generally and to the appreciation of art specifically. There he explains that for aesthetics the outer is higher than the inner: For while in the highest sphere of spirit, the picture is lower than the object, by contrast just the opposite is the case in mere empirical objectivity: here the picture is of a higher nature than the object because the picture is aesthetic, the object only realistic. The aesthetic Idea or beauty always rests on the outer surface of objects and never penetrates into their internal, realistic structure; precisely therefore this Idea is always pictorial, for the picture is the immaterial outer surface itself.75

This is a position for which Heiberg was well known in his capacity as aesthetic theorist. In the second volume of Perseus from 1838 in his article “On the Art of Painting,” he defines beauty in much the same way: “Beauty is in general only the outer surface of the existing actuality, not its inner material.”76 Heiberg’s claim that beauty is to be found in the outer appearance leads him to the position that the outer is higher than the inner in the field of aesthetics. This is the position that Johannes de silentio seems to be responding to. It becomes even more clear that Heiberg is the true source of the criticism when one compares this polemical use of the categories of the inner and the outer with the nonpolemical use of them in The Concept of Irony and Either/Or. In the former, the categories are used to explain the nature of Socrates: “he belonged to the breed of persons with whom the outer as such is not the stopping point. The outer continually pointed to something other and opposite. . . .The outer was not at all in harmony with the 73

74 75

76

Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Fata Morgana, Copenhagen 1838, pp. 49–50. ASKB. 1561. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Poetiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 1862, vol. 2, pp. 146–147.) See also Martensen’s review: “Fata Morgana, Eventyr-Comedie af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. 1838. 125S. 80- . Kjøbenhavn. Schubothes Boghandling,” Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, pp. 361–397. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Stjernehimlen,” Intelligensblade, no. 14, October 1, 1842, p. 29. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 9, p. 30.) Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Bidrag til det Synliges Philosophie,” Intelligensblade, vol. 3, no. 28, May 15, 1843, p. 89. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 367–368.) See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Om Malerkunsten i dens Forhold til de andre skjønne Kunster,” Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, no. 2, 1838, p. 127. ASKB 569. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 281.)

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inner but was rather its opposite, and only under this angle of refraction is he to be comprehended.”77 One of the most famous examples of the use of these concepts is in the Preface to Either/Or, which begins with the sentence: “It may at times have occurred to you, dear reader, to doubt somewhat the accuracy of that familiar philosophical thesis that the outer is the inner and the inner is the outer.”78 Kierkegaard again uses these categories in the second of the Two Edifying Discourses from 1843, entitled “Every Good and Every Perfect Gift Is from Above.”79 They also appear in the discourse “Strengthening in the Inner Being,” from Three Edifying Discourses from 1843.80 In these works, they are neither employed in a polemical fashion nor associated with Hegel. The polemical usage begins in Fear and Trembling (i.e., after Kierkegaard’s alienation from Heiberg due to Heiberg’s dismissive review of Either/Or). Kierkegaard continues to refer to these categories throughout the corpus but now in a polemical fashion.81 On the whole, Hegel’s role in “Problema II” is in a sense as irrelevant for the actual issue at hand as in Johannes de silentio’s first analysis. Once again Hegel is set up as an opposing view, but the position that Johannes de silentio describes has only a linguistic similarity with Hegel’s actual view. The use of Hegel in these two Problemata seems enigmatic since it is not clear why Johannes de silentio would use him to frame the issue to be discussed or set him up as an opposing position without discussing any of his actual views. This can be explained in terms of Kierkegaard’s break with Heiberg. Kierkegaard wished to mark a distance between himself and Heiberg, which he does by ostensibly opposing the view of his pseudonym to that of Hegel. But it is clear from these analyses that the views of Hegel that he mentions have little if anything to do with the actual content of the discussions in Fear and Trembling. Thus, the criticisms seem to be only for the sake of appearances and not substantial.

iv. problema iii: the problem of communication and justification The third and final “Problema” concerns the issue of Abraham’s silence. Johannes de silentio formulates it thus: “Was it ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac?”82 The issue is not just Abraham’s silence but the problem of 77 79 81

82

78 EO1, p. 3; SKS, vol. 2, p. 11. CI, p. 12; SKS, vol. 1, p. 74. 80 See EUD, p. 101; SKS, vol. 5, p. 106. See EUD, p. 48; SKS, vol. 5, p. 55. E.g., SL, p. 375; SKS, vol. 6, p. 349. SL, p. 428; SKS, vol. 6, p. 396. SL, p. 441; SKS, vol. 6, p. 408. CUP1, p. 54; SKS, vol. 7, p. 58. CUP1, p. 138; SKS, vol. 7, p. 129. CUP1, p. 296fn.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 270fn. CUP1, p. 542; SKS, vol. 7, p. 492. JP, vol. 2, 2111; SKS, vol. 18, p. 170, JJ:96. FT, p. 82; SKS, vol. 4, p. 172.

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discursive justification in general. Given the doctrines of the teleological suspension of the ethical and the absolute duty towards God, which were examined in the first two Problemata, the question now becomes whether or not one can appeal to that absolute duty or divine revelation in order to explain or justify one’s actions to others when they are in conflict with accepted ethics and civil law. What is strange is that Hegel and Johannes de silentio in a certain sense come to the same conclusion, namely, that any appeal of this kind must be regarded as illegitimate. In this section, I want to argue that, once again, Johannes de silentio’s use of Hegel cannot be made sense of as a straightforward reference to Hegel’s philosophy. As has been seen in Section II, Hegel sees grave dangers in the view that he calls “the law of the heart” (i.e., the idea that one can act according to the private convictions of one’s own heart without subjecting them to public scrutiny). For Hegel, this can lead to a mad subjectivism that rejects any form of discursive justification. He reduces this position to absurdity by indicating the contradiction involved: “It may also be remarked that, as far as the mode of action of other people in relation to my own action is concerned, it follows from this that, if their faith and conviction make them regard my actions as crimes, they are quite right to do so.”83 If personal conviction is made the only standard for law and ethics, then one is obliged to accept the personal convictions of everyone else. Thus, when one is tried, condemned, and imprisoned for a murder committed out of the conviction of moral conscience of its obedience to a higher law, then one cannot consistently reproach civil law or those responsible for its execution since this too has the status of a conviction. Even if one attempts to justify one’s actions in this way, this justification or defense is ultimately meaningless since no adjudication is possible. In the discussion in the third “Problema,” Johannes de silentio examines a number of examples of hiddenness and recognition or revealedness in the sphere of both ethics and aesthetics. He is careful to distinguish the uniqueness of Abraham’s situation from that of others. Abraham, even if he wanted to, could not explain the divine command and make others understand it. This is the reason for his anxiety and why he is ultimately so alone. If Abraham were to attempt to explain the revelation discursively, then he would be dishonest. Johannes de silentio writes: “Even though I go on talking night and day without interruption, if I cannot make myself understood when I speak, then I am not speaking. This is the case with Abraham. He can say everything, but one thing he cannot say, and if he cannot say that – that is, say it in such a way that the other understands it – then he is not speaking.”84 The problem is that the divine command, qua revelation, cannot be grasped by reason; moreover, any attempt to do 83 84

Hegel, PR, § 140, Remark (e); Jub., vol. 7, p. 216. FT, p. 113; SKS, vol. 4, p. 201.

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so will only be a distortion. Johannes de silentio writes: “Now, Abraham can describe his love for Isaac in the most beautiful words to be found in any language. But this is not what is on his mind; it is something deeper, that he is going to sacrifice him because it is an ordeal. No one can understand the latter, and thus everyone can only misunderstand the former.”85 The attempt to explain the divine command would only lead to misunderstanding since it is in itself incomprehensible. This is the reason for his repeated question throughout the book, “Abraham, who can understand him?” Ultimately, his action cannot be understood since the divine command defies reason. No outward justification of Abraham’s actions is possible. Johannes de silentio, however, suggests that inward justification to oneself is possible, and in this he perceives a distinction between his view and that of Hegel. He sets up the issue here just as in the two previous Problemata with a reference to Hegel. He writes: “The ethical as such is the universal; as the universal it is in turn the disclosed. The single individual, qualified as immediate, sensate, and psychical, is the hidden. Thus his ethical task is to work himself out of his hiddenness and to become disclosed in the universal.”86 The universal demands of ethics are available to all in the public sphere. This is the reason they are universal. Johannes de silentio’s thesis is that in the case of divine revelation, as in Abraham’s case, silence or hiddenness is appropriate given the nature of the relation. Here Johannes de silentio introduces Hegel into the discussion to indicate a position contrary to his thesis: If there is no hiddenness rooted in the fact that the single individual as the single individual is higher than the universal, then Abraham’s conduct cannot be defended, for he disregarded the intermediary ethical agents. . . . The Hegelian philosophy assumes no justified hiddenness, no justified incommensurability. It is, then, consistent for it to demand disclosure, but it is a little bemuddled when it wants to regard Abraham as the father of faith and to speak about faith.87

Johannes de silentio grants that communicability or “disclosure” is a legitimate demand in certain spheres (e.g., the aesthetic), but in the religious sphere this disclosure is inappropriate: “The first immediacy is the aesthetic, and here the Hegelian philosophy certainly may very well be right. But faith is not the aesthetic, or else faith has never existed because it has always existed.”88 Johannes de silentio and Hegel are talking about two different things. In his account of subjectivity and the moral conscience in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel never purports to talk about faith per se. In that context, he is interested in those concepts solely in their relation to morality and 85 87

FT, p. 113; SKS, vol. 4, p. 201. FT, p. 82; SKS, vol. 4, p. 172.

86 88

FT, p. 82; SKS, vol. 4, p. 172. FT, p. 82; SKS, vol. 4, p. 172.

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political philosophy. In the passage cited previously, Johannes de silentio grants that Hegel’s view has validity in a certain sphere, which is here called “the aesthetic,” but that it loses this validity when applied to faith and religion. But Hegel never purports to apply this analysis to faith and religion. Thus, it is once again enigmatic that Johannes de silentio in this context refers to Hegel, seemingly in continuation with his reference to “The Good and Conscience” from “Problema I,” in order to determine the final word on Hegel’s account of the moral conscience. He uses a strawman position as an antipode to his own in order to explicate his own view by way of contrast. Although Johannes de silentio mentions Hegel by name, the position he presents in the context of faith and religion has nothing to do with Hegel himself. According to Johannes de silentio, Abraham cannot in any way attempt to justify his action discursively to others. He is bound to accept in silence the judgment of civil law. As strange as it may seem, Hegel and Johannes de silentio are in perfect agreement that private conviction cannot be used to ground or justify anything. This is an important qualification. But this only shows more clearly the inappropriateness of Johannes de silentio’s reference to Hegel since the issue in the Philosophy of Right is one of grounding and justification in terms of rationality. Hegel’s whole point is that the private moral conscience cannot be used to justify action that is in conflict with civil law. Thus, the use of Hegel in all three Problemata is odd since Johannes de silentio does not seem to be in a dialogue with anything in Hegel’s primary texts. Some light can be shed on the use of Hegel in the third “Problema” when one recalls the claim, mentioned in the previous section, from Heiberg’s article, “Contribution to a Philosophy of the Visible.” Heiberg claims, with regard to aesthetics, that the outer is higher than the inner since it is visible and thus accessible to sense and aesthetic judgment. Johannes de silentio’s discussion of the aesthetics in this third “Problema” strikes one as oddly out of place in an analysis of religious faith and revelation. But this discussion makes more sense when one regards it as a polemic with Heiberg’s preference of the outer over the inner in the context of aesthetics. Thus, it is no accident that Heiberg’s aesthetic category, “the interesting,” is alluded to right at the beginning of the discussion.89 Johannes de silentio claims that while transparency and disclosure might be legitimate in aesthetics, they have no place in religion, which always involves an aspect of hiddenness. This helps to explain the reference 89

FT, p. 82; SKS, vol. 4, p. 173. See SKS, vol. K4, p. 141. Heiberg discusses this concept in his review of Oehlenschl¨ager’s Dina. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Dina,” Intelligensblade, vol. 2, no. 16–17, November 15, 1842, pp. 73–106, see p. 80, pp. 95ff. (Reprinted in Heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 365–394, see p. 371, pp. 384ff.)

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to Hegel in this “Problema.” What is at issue is Heiberg’s thesis about the visible and the transparent in contrast to the hidden in aesthetics. Johannes de silentio thus criticizes Heiberg’s position, but instead of doing so directly, he uses Hegel’s name so as to do so indirectly. But from the allusions and above all from the focus on aesthetics in the discussion, one can see that Heiberg is the main target here. It is clear that Kierkegaard has Johannes de silentio use Hegel for his own purposes. In each of the references to Hegel at the beginning of each of the Problemata, Johannes de silentio grants that Hegel is right in some limited manner or under certain presuppositions, and then he issues his criticism, saying that Hegel is wrong if he talks about Abraham and faith. It is here that the problem is most obvious since it is clearly Johannes de silentio and not Hegel who is interested in talking about Abraham and faith. Thus, Johannes de silentio uses “Hegel” each time to set up the issue and to represent a position contrary to his own, but when one takes the issue on Johannes de silentio’s terms (i.e., as an issue of faith and religion), then the two discussions are so different that they defy comparison since this is clearly not the context of Hegel’s original analysis. Moreover, when one understands the issue on Hegel’s terms (i.e., in the context of political philosophy), then there is in the final account no conflict between their positions since Johannes de silentio also concedes that the demands of moral conscience cannot be justified discursively or used as a defense in civil law. The odd use of Hegel in Fear and Trembling can be explained, on the one hand, by Kierkegaard’s ongoing criticism of Martensen and, on the other hand, by his then recent break with Heiberg. As has been indicated in the previous chapters, Kierkegaard’s more or less amicable relation to Heiberg came to an end with Heiberg’s negative review of Either/Or. After the review Kierkegaard sought ways to criticize Heiberg publicly. In Fear and Trembling he for the first time hits upon the idea of doing so via a polemic with Hegel. Heiberg’s stated goal was to disseminate the word of Hegel’s philosophy to his fellow Danes. This was one of the main things that Heiberg was known for as a public figure in Denmark’s intellectual scene. Under these circumstances, what could be a better way of criticizing Heiberg than to criticize Hegel? By criticizing Hegel, Kierkegaard was in effect saying that Heiberg’s entire intellectual project was misguided and his evangelizing on Hegel’s behalf was a mistake. The other main target seems to be Martensen. From the criticisms issued in Fear and Trembling one can see that Kierkegaard is still exercised by Martensen’s success and popularity. In the “Preliminary Expectoration,” Johannes de silentio portrays theology as the prostitute of philosophy, alluding to Martensen’s claim that philosophy is theology and his

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subsequent use of philosophical trends in, for example, his lectures on dogmatics: Love indeed has its priests in the poets, and occasionally we hear a voice that knows how to honor it, but not a word is heard about faith. Who speaks to the honor of this passion? Philosophy goes further. Theology sits all rouged and powdered in the window and courts its favor, offers its charms to philosophy. It is supposed to be difficult to understand Hegel, but to understand Abraham is a small matter. To go beyond Hegel is a miraculous achievement, but to go beyond Abraham is the easiest one of all.90

Reference is made to Martensen here with his claims to have gone beyond Hegel. The point of this passage seems to be that Martensen has in effect prostituted theology by making it dependent on philosophy. But Johannes de silentio wishes to point out that there are aspects of theology such as questions of faith, about which it should not submit itself to the judgment of philosophy. Moreover, in “Problema III” Martensen is alluded to (in a fashion similar to the allusions in the Preface) in connection with his claims about doubt.91 But since this allusion has already been explored,92 I forego an analysis of it here. The polemic with Heiberg and Martensen would explain the use of Hegel in Fear and Trembling. In his Preface Johannes de silentio polemicizes against the Danish Hegelians generally with indirect references to the individual personalities. Then in the body of the text he uses Hegel in a polemical way at the beginning of each of the Problemata. Thus, this text is the first published work that seems to be openly polemical against Hegel on a substantial scale. But here one runs up against the problem of the lack of fit between the views of Hegel, which are alluded to, and the actual content of the discussions purportedly intended as a criticism of those views. It becomes clear that Kierkegaard has gone out of his way to bring Hegel’s name into the discussion. The ostensible criticisms of him seem forced. There are no analyses of or quotations from any of his primary texts. At bottom Kierkegaard is not so much interested in a criticism of any of the views of Hegel mentioned in the text; indeed, those views have nothing to do with the content of Johannes de silentio’s discussions. He is, however, primarily interested in a polemic with Heiberg and Martensen, and this seems to be the main reason why Hegel’s name appears in the text at all. In an ostensible polemic with Hegel, Kierkegaard has found a weapon that he can use against Heiberg and Martensen. This explains the odd use of Hegel in this text and the profound incongruity between Hegel’s discussions of the issues and Kierkegaard’s. 90 92

FT, pp. 32–33; SKS, vol. 4, p. 128. Chapter 5, Section 1, p. 246f.

91

FT, p. 110; SKS, vol. 4, p. 198.

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Of course, nothing stands in the way of a commentator who wants to find a substantive philosophical discussion in these allusions to Hegel, and certainly there is no reason to think that Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s views on philosophy of religion or political theory are the same or are even consistent with each other. But this abstract comparison of their views does not explain what is at issue in the text. The main point of the references to Hegel here is to criticize Heiberg and Martensen and not any particular doctrine in Hegel’s philosophy. This becomes even more clear when one compares the Hegel of Fear and Trembling with the Hegel of The Concept of Irony. In both works Hegel is thought to play a substantial role. However, in The Concept of Irony Hegel’s primary texts are quoted frequently and long analyses of them are offered. The content of Kierkegaard’s discussions of Socrates’ daimon, his role vis-`a-vis the other Greek schools, his conception of morality, and his use of irony are largely the same as those found in Hegel’s discussions. By contrast, in Fear and Trembling Hegel is merely named at the beginning of each of the Problemata in a single sentence. There are no quotations from his primary texts and no analyses. The references to Hegel in the text are incommensurable with the actual content of Kierkegaard’s discussions. All of this leads to the conclusion that the use of Hegel in Fear and Trembling is only pro forma and has nothing substantially to do with Hegel’s philosophy. The polemic with Hegel is used by Kierkegaard merely as a means by which he can criticize Heiberg and Martensen and publicly disassociate himself from them.

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8 MARTENSEN’S DOCTRINE OF IMMANENCE AND KIERKEGAARD’S TRANSCENDENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS

Philosophical Fragments was published on June 13, 1844, with Johannes Climacus as author and Kierkegaard himself as editor. It is often claimed that the title of the work, Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy, is intended as an ironic criticism of systematic philosophy. In the text of the Fragments itself Hegel’s name comes up directly only three times: twice in footnotes1 and once in its adjectival form in reference to Hegelians.2 Hegel is also mentioned in preliminary drafts of the work.3 There appear, moreover, a number of philosophical terms, such as “the system,” “mediation,” and “the absolute method,” which seem to be associated with Hegel or at least with Hegelians. These references are often found among criticisms of contemporaries such as Martensen and Grundtvig. It will thus be necessary to evaluate each of these references in order to determine to what degree they can be regarded as genuine allusions to Hegel. In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the same pseudonymous author, Johannes Climacus, criticizes a review of the Fragments,4 which he believes overlooks essential aspects of the book. The review came from the pen of the Hegelian Andreas Frederik Beck (1816–61) and appeared in a German journal for theology. In the Postscript, Climacus lists a host of things that he says are at work in the Fragments: The contrast of form, the teasing resistance of the imaginary construction of the content, the inventive audacity (which even invents Christianity), the only attempt made to go further (that is, further than the so-called 1 2 3 4

PF, p. 78fn.; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 277fn.–278fn. PF, p. 86fn.; SKS, vol. 4, p. 285fn. PF, p. 82; SKS, vol. 4, p. 281. PF, Supplement, p. 190; Pap. V B 5.3. PF, Supplement, p. 200; Pap. V B 14, p. 71. PF, Supplement, p. 217; Pap. V B 9. PF, Supplement, p. 205; Pap. V B 41, p. 94. Anonymous [Andreas Frederik Beck], “Philosophische Smuler eller en Smule Philosophie (Philos. Brocken oder ein Bischen Philosophie). Af S. Kierkegaard. Ki¨obenhavn (Copenhagen), Reitzel. 1844. 80- ,” in Neues Repertorium f¨ur die theologische Literatur und kirchliche Statistik, Berlin, vol. 2, no. 1, April 30, 1845, pp. 44–48. Reprinted in Materialien zur Philosophie S¨oren Kierkegaards, ed. by Michael Theunissen and Wilfried Greve, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1979, pp. 127–131.

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speculative constructing), the indefatigable activity of irony, the parody of speculation in the entire plan, the satire in making efforts as if something ganz Außerordentliches und zwar Neues were to come of them, whereas what always emerges is old-fashioned orthodoxy in its rightful severity – of this the reader finds no hint in the report.5

The Hegelian Beck is accused of failing to pick up on “the parody of speculation in the entire plan.” This indicates clearly that not just a small part of the Philosophical Fragments but the work generally is intended as a criticism of some aspect of speculative thought. This criticism is, however, often carefully concealed, and it is little wonder that Beck fails to see it. From this it is clear that Kierkegaard sees the Fragments as a criticism of speculative thought, but it is uncertain precisely which doctrine or doctrines it is intended to criticize. This, however, is made clear in a later journal entry (presumably from 1846) in which he responds negatively to another review of the work. This review was written pseudonymously by another Hegelian, Johan Frederik Hagen (1817–59), and appeared in the Theologisk Tidsskrift in May of 1846.6 Kierkegaard criticizes the review for having missed the essential critical point about Hegelian mediation that was made in the Fragments. He caricatures the reviewer’s remarks as follows: J[ohannes] C[limacus] is certainly justified in the way in which he emphasizes the dialectical, but (yes, now comes the wisdom) on the other hand one must not forget mediation. Historically, J. C. comes after Hegelianism. J. C. without a doubt knows just as much about mediation as such a theological graduate. In order, if possible, to get out of the spell of mediation, constantly battling against it, J. C. decisively brought the problem to its logical conclusion through the vigor of a qualitative dialectic.7

Here Johannes Climacus is characterized as attempting to escape “the spell of mediation” and indeed as “constantly battling against it.” By insisting on the Hegelian principle of mediation,8 the reviewer has failed to see that the crucial point of the work was precisely a criticism of this principle. Thus, the reviewer, Kierkegaard complains, has in effect overlooked the content of the entire work. Kierkegaard continues: “An author who really understands himself is better served by not being read at all, or by having five genuine readers, than by having this confusion about mediation spread abroad only all too much with the help of a good-natured reviewer, spread with the help of his own book, 5 6

7 8

CUP1, p. 275fn.; SKS, vol. 7, p. 250fn. 80. [Johan Frederik Hagen], “Philosophiske Smuler eller en Smule Philosophi. Af Johannes Climacus. Udgivet af S. Kierkegaard. 164 S. Kbhvn. 1844. (Reitzel 80 Sk.),” Theologisk Tidsskrift, Ny Række, 10, 1846, pp. 175–182. PF, Supplement, p. 223; SKS, vol. 20, pp. 46f., NB: 47. Kierkegaard seems to have in mind p. 181 of the review.

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which was written specifically to battle against mediation.”9 By saying that the objective of the Fragments was to criticize the Hegelian principle of mediation, Kierkegaard identifies the speculative doctrine at issue. The claim that the Fragments “was written specifically to battle against mediation” will be my point of departure in this chapter. As has been seen previously,10 the notion of mediation was criticized in both Either/Or and Repetition, and in both cases the pseudonymous author took a position with respect to the contemporary Danish debate surrounding Hegel’s criticism of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. Thus, Philosophical Fragments, I wish to argue, can be seen as a continuation and development of this discussion. Specifically, the work is primarily a polemic against Martensen’s claims for the use of mediation in speculative theology. One can find the positions that Climacus criticizes in the Fragments in Martensen’s article, “Rationalism, Supernaturalism and the principium exclusi medii,”11 which was written in response to Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism.”12 Thus, while Thulstrup13 and others see in the Fragments a straightforward criticism of Hegel, I wish to argue that the matter is much more complicated and that Climacus’ true interlocutor is Martensen. In order to make good on this claim, I will in the first section examine in detail Chapter 3, entitled, “The Absolute Paradox.” I will argue that the famous account of the paradox is formulated as a response to the Hegelian doctrine of mediation as presented by Martensen in the context of theology. Next I will analyze the “Interlude” between Chapters 4 and 5 where Climacus tries to refute two purportedly Hegelian claims: first, that the concept of necessity follows from the concepts of possibility and actuality (treated in Section II), and, second, that there is necessity in history (Section III). Climacus attempts to refute these views in order to make room for his own doctrine that there was no necessity in the god’s coming into historical existence. I wish to argue that this too is a criticism of Martensen’s article, specifically of the claim that the incarnation is a conceptual necessity. In Section IV, I will treat the brief allusion to Hegel’s absolute method, which comes in a footnote in the “Interlude.”14 I will 9 10 11

12

13 14

PF, Supplement, p. 224; SKS, vol. 20, p. 47, NB: 47. See Chapter 4, Sections I–II, and Chapter 6, Section III. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii i Anledning af H. H. Biskop Mynsters Afhandling herom i dette Tidsskrifts forrige Hefte,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 456–473. Jakob Peter Mynster, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 1, 1839, pp. 249–268. (Reprinted in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, Copenhagen 1852–57, vol. 2, pp. 95–115.) Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, tr. by George L. Stengren, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980, pp. 359–365. PF, p. 78fn.; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 277fn.–278fn.

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argue that the critical comments have little to do with Hegel’s doctrine and will suggest that the tone and the nature of the criticism point to Martensen as the true target.

i. the paradox and mediation Chapter 3 of the Fragments, entitled “The Absolute Paradox,”15 offers one of the many criticisms of the tradition of rational theology in Kierkegaard’s authorship. Johannes Climacus criticizes the rationalists (among others Spinoza and Leibniz) for attempting to offer discursive proofs for the existence of God. He tries to show that all such demonstrations fall short of what they intend to prove and that in each of them there is a “leap”16 that cannot be justified deductively. The issue of the limits of human knowledge runs through the whole discussion. The wellknown account of the paradox is formulated against this background. While Hegel’s name does not appear in this chapter, his doctrines of immanence and mediation seem to inform it. I wish to argue that Climacus has in mind these doctrines specifically as they appear in Martensen’s speculative theology. A. Climacus’ Doctrine of the Paradox. Climacus begins with the epistemological question of the limit of the understanding. His claim is that the human mind runs up against certain natural limitations. He calls this “the ultimate paradox of thought,” which he defines as the desire of the understanding “to discover something that thought itself cannot think.”17 The natural limitation of thought is simply the unknown. Climacus then goes on to define the unknown provisionally as the god: “But what is this unknown against which the understanding in its paradoxical passion collides and which even disturbs man and his self-knowledge? It is the unknown. But it is not a human being, insofar as he knows man, or anything else that he knows. Therefore, let us call this unknown the god.”18 Later he defines the paradox as the tension between the divine and human aspects of the teacher.19 Here the divine simply stands for something transcendent and beyond the sphere of human knowing. This is what the human mind cannot understand but must simply believe. Climacus thus prepares the ground for his criticism of rational theology. With proofs for god’s existence, rational theology tries to know something that cannot be known. It tries to capture discursively or deductively something beyond 15 17 19

16 PF, p. 43; SKS, vol. 4, p. 248. PF, pp. 37–48; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 242–252. 18 PF, p. 39; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 244–245. PF, p. 37; SKS, vol. 4, p. 243. PF, p. 62; SKS, vol. 4, p. 264: “Faith, then, must constantly cling firmly to the teacher. But in order for the teacher to be able to give the condition, he must be the god, and in order to put the learner in possession of it, he must be man. This contradiction is in turn the object of faith and is the paradox, the moment.”

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the sphere of what is knowable. It tries to bring what is transcendent into the realm of immanence. For Climacus, these arguments must always fail since they try to span the gap between the known and the unknowable, between human beings and God. From this he ultimately wants to conclude that man’s relation to God cannot be one of knowledge alone. To capture the distinction more clearly, Climacus introduces the concept of absolute difference.20 The relation between man and God is thought to be one of absolute difference, which Cli