Jurismania: The Madness of American Law (Studies of the German Historical Institute, London)

JURISMANIA

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Jurismania

THE MADNES S O F AMERICAN LAW

Paul F. Campos

Oxford Universit y Press New York Oxford

Oxford Universit y Press Oxford Ne w Yor k Athens Aucklan d Bangko k Bogot a Bueno s Aires Calcutt a Cape Town Chenna i Da r e s Salaam Delh i Florenc e Hon g Kon g Istanbul Karach i Kual a Lumpur Madri d Melbourn e Mexic o Cit y Mumbai Nairob i Pari s Sa o Paolo Singapor e Taipe i Toky o Toronto Warsa w and associated companies in Berlin Ibada n

Copyright © 199 8 by Oxford University Press, Inc. First publishe d by Oxford University Press, Inc. , 199 8 First issued a s an Oxford University Press paperback, 1999 Oxford i s a registered trademar k of Oxford University Pres s All rights reserved. No par t o f this publication ma y be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted , i n any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical , photocopying, recording , o r otherwise, without the prior permission o f Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Campos, Paul F. Jurismania : The madnes s of American law / by Paul F. Campos p. cm . ISBN 0-19-510785-3 (cloth)/0-19-513083-9 (pbk. ) 1. Law—Unite d States—Methodology . 2 Judicia l process— United States . 3. Cultur e and law. I. Title . KF379.C36 199 8 349.73'01—dc21 97-1794 0

13 5 79 1 08 6 4 2

Printed i n the Unite d State s of America

Contents

Preface

vii

Acknowledgments x i 1. American Culture an d th e Madness of Law 3 2. The Colo r of Money 1 6 3. The Anarchi c Panopticon 2

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4. Leaving Las Vegas 5 0 5. Rationalization

d Its Discontents 8 1

6. Toward a General Theory of Unicorns 7. Addicted to La w 12 2 8. The Futur e o f an Illusion 13 8 9. The Banalit y of Goodness 15 1 10. The Wa y of Renunciation 17 5 Index 19 5

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For Kayla h and Leia

It is from m y experience that I affirm huma n ignorance, which is , i n m y opinion , th e mos t certai n fac t i n th e school of the world. MONTAIGNE

Preface "I alway s wanted yo u t o admir e m y fasting, " sai d th e hunger artist . "W e do admire it," sai d the overseer , affa bly. "Bu t you shouldn't admir e it," said th e hunger artist . "Well the n w e don't admir e it, " sai d th e overseer , "bu t why shouldn' t w e admire it?" "Becaus e I can' t hel p it, " replied the hunger artist . "I couldn't find food I liked. If I had, believ e me, I shoul d have made no fus s an d stuffe d myself like you or anyone else." FRANZ KAFKA , " A Hunger Artist"

In hi s boo k Ea t Fat Richar d Klei n point s t o " a growin g awarenes s that the whole [American ] culture o f dieting and rigid exercise is the root cause of the fat explosion." Klein believes that "th e die t syste m produces th e diseas e that th e syste m i s charged wit h curing . Fa t i s decreed t o b e poison , bu t th e antidote , die t an d exercise , make s more f a t . . . . There is reason to think that i f doctors stopped threat ening people about their weight the y would be thinner." Klein's accoun t o f why Americans are fa t taps into th e dee p psychology o f obsessiv e behavior . Hi s i s a sor t o f "anti-diet " book , based on th e insight tha t it is in the nature o f obsessions t o cause us to pursue something in such an excessive way that we not onl y fai l in our quest , bu t en d up producing th e opposit e o f whatever it was we were pursuing in the first place. This boo k is , in part , abou t ho w th e obsessiv e pursui t o f la w in contemporary America n culture tend s t o produce a kind of bureaucratized anarchy. It i s intended for the genera l reader whose experience o f American la w has mad e him o r he r wonde r i f there migh t

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not b e something fundamentall y wrong wit h a system o f social coordination an d dispute processin g that "works " i n the ways ours does . (Notice, b y the way , how apologist s fo r America n la w always claim in its defense tha t "the syste m works" withou t eve r bothering t o explain what they migh t mean by this.) Why i s America n la w s o complex , s o hypertrophied , s o obses sively perfectionist , an d (therefore ) s o terribl y expensive ? Wh y i s our lega l system s o eager to bring every variety of social interactio n within it s ever-expandin g gaze? And why do Americans of every so cial backgroun d an d politica l orientatio n persis t i n believin g tha t what they thin k o f as "the law" can succeed wher e politic s an d cul ture fail ? I believ e the answer s to these question s ar e interrelated an d have much t o d o wit h th e excessivel y rationalistic structur e o f moder n \\ie.Jurismania trie s to show how the pathological features o f American la w are themselve s symptom s o f an ofte n irrationa l worship o f rationality tha t characterize s muc h o f ou r publi c culture . Indeed , what I cal l "jurismania " is at botto m a mania for givin g reasons— a kind o f widespread cultural syndrom e tha t i s the produc t o f a neu rotic goal. Tha t goa l i s to rationall y resolve socia l dispute s tha t ar e not amenabl e to rationa l solution, bu t tha t thos e sufferin g fro m th e syndrome hav e bee n acculturate d t o believ e bot h mus t an d ca n b e resolved throug h th e us e of reason.* Although ou r lega l system i s perhaps it s favorite locale, th e gen eral syndrom e manifest s itself wherever th e form s o f cognitive dis sonance tha t mar k moder n mora l discours e ar e particularl y acute . Thus the boo k eventuall y branches out fro m th e specifi c analysi s of American law to touc h o n the broade r underlyin g crisi s in contemporary mora l and politica l life . I n on e sens e this boo k i s a diagnosi s *Throughout this boo k I wil l spea k o f "reason " withou t givin g a n accoun t a s t o what precisely thi s word i s supposed t o signify . Thi s isn't an oversight. I n a n impor tant sens e man y o f th e extrem e claim s rationalist ideolog y make s fo r wha t i t call s "reason" are enabled by the ever-shifting meanings it assigns to this rather mysteriou s term. Indeed, as we shall see , "reason" i s to the rationalis t what "God" i s to the the ologian: that entit y whic h by definition always is whatever it must b e in orde r t o d o the metaphysical work attributed t o it.

Preface i

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not merel y of a sick legal system, bu t a sick culture: a culture whos e metaphysical axioms , i f the y wer e take n seriously , woul d requir e people t o believ e tha t choosin g betwee n th e moralit y o f Socrate s and tha t o f Hitler is no differen t fro m choosin g betwee n Cok e an d Pepsi. A s i t happens , almos t al l huma n being s ar e incapabl e o f believing suc h a thing ; an d I tr y t o sho w how , a s a consequence , the politica l an d mora l rhetori c o f ou r publi c cultur e i s plague d both by severe conceptual incoherenc e an d by that dogmati c denial of an y suc h incoherenc e a rationalist cultur e alway s elicit s fro m it s defenders. Until fairl y recentl y th e centra l thesi s o f thi s book—that , i n it s more extrem e manifestations , what Americans call "the rul e of law" can come t o resemble a form o f mental illness—would have seemed an exercis e i n frivolou s or irresponsibl e hyperbole . Perhap s i t stil l does. Bu t can anyone who followed the O. J. Simpso n affai r dismis s such a n ide a out o f hand? It i s too eas y to discoun t suc h event s a s representing anomalou s departures fro m a healthy norm . Conside r the sordi d nationa l spectacl e which is the Paul a Jones-Bill Clinto n litigation. Or observ e the effect s o f a decision t o initiate yet anothe r of ou r intermitten t ceremonie s o f specia l prosecutoria l zeal . B y now we are all familiar with the routine: smal l armies of lawyers will demand documents , subpoen a witnesses, convey hearings, cite laws, interpret regulations , uneart h precedents , impane l gran d juries , bring indictments, and , in the course of their diligen t investigations, almost incidentall y destro y th e politica l effectivenes s o f ou r mos t important publi c figures. To what end, exactly ? To uphold "th e rul e of law"? Legal academics, dedicated as we almost always are to the defens e of that law, are no t incline d t o as k such questions . Still , a s America prepares t o indulge in yet another o f its periodic spasms of legalistic sanctimony, ca n we who hav e helped brin g abou t suc h spectacles of political self-immolatio n stat e with rea l confidence that th e benefits are wort h th e cost s o f what we claim , over an d ove r again , is "th e best legal system in the world"? How many times must we partake in a species of symbolic huma n sacrifice, performe d by our relentlessl y bureaucratic priesthood , befor e we begin t o questio n thi s culture' s

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obsession with the pursuit of what it calls the rule of law? And when will we begin to consider tha t it is precisely our addiction to law that produces so much of the very lawlessness our la w condemns? Jurismania isn' t a n argumen t fo r irrationalism , nihilism , anar chism, or any other -ism. It no more endorses messianic visions of a libertarian socia l orde r tha n i t doe s unlimite d regulator y zeal . (Fo r those wh o care about suc h things, it s author's politic s are essentially those expresse d b y Ernest Hemingway' s ver y short story , "Ol d Ma n at th e Bridge." ) The boo k doesn' t den y that , i n thei r prope r place , law o r reaso n o r lega l reaso n ar e goo d things ; i t doesn' t eve n deny that th e presen t excesse s of American law might b e a form o f necessary madness . But it tries to describe those excesse s for what they are, without rationalizin g them awa y or otherwis e minimizin g the socia l damage they cause , and without proposin g th e sort s of facil e "solu tions" to which the legal-minde d are so prone. This book ask s us to recognize th e vice of legal gluttony, and to learn to admire the virtue of a kind of jurisprudential fasting. That, indeed, is its solution. Paul F. Campos Boulder, Colorado July, 1997

Acknowledgments

Jose Lui s Campos , Sara h Krakoff , Rober t Nagel , Michae l Perry , Steve Smith , and Christine Tren d rea d the entire manuscrip t of this book, an d mad e many helpful suggestions . S o did Pete r Berkowit z and Richar d Posner, wh o commente d o n draft s o f individual chapters. Member s o f th e la w faculties a t th e Universit y o f Michiga n and Souther n Methodis t Universit y hear d talk s base d o n wha t became chapters o f the book ; I am grateful fo r their engage d com ments, an d hop e th e manuscrip t retain s som e evidenc e o f thos e interchanges. Th e editoria l suggestions mad e by several persons a t Oxford Universit y Pres s wer e models o f tac t an d discretion . Tavi a Fielder Colvin g provide d m e wit h valuabl e researc h assistance , as did th e scholarl y researc h fund s o f th e Universit y o f Colorad o School o f Law. All books are more o r les s collective efforts ; thi s one i s especially so. The wor k an d though t o f m y colleagues Rebecc a French , Bo b Nagel, Pierr e Schlag , and Stev e Smit h ha s played an indispensable role i n th e gestatio n o f thi s book . Jurismania is i n man y sense s a reflection o f their collectiv e influence. In particular, justice demands I than k Steve Smith fo r bailing me out o f many a jam—intellectua and otherwise—i n whic h I foun d mysel f durin g th e cours e o f th e book's composition . Finally, I thank Kaylah Campos Zeli g and Leia Campo s Zeli g for making this book possible.

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1 AMERICAN CULTURE AND THE MADNES S OF LAW As formerl y w e suffere d fro m crimes , s o no w w e suffe r from laws. TACITUS

In th e middl e of a dul l Apri l afternoo n I answe r a telephon e cal l from a reporter wit h the New York Times. The reporte r want s to talk about Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf's constitutional rights . He inform s me that Abdul-Rauf, a shooting guar d for Denver's professional basketball team , ha s jus t bee n suspende d withou t pa y b y th e Nationa l Basketball Association . Apparently, h e i s refusin g t o stan d a t re spectful attentio n durin g tha t playin g of th e nationa l anthe m tha t always takes place before the beginnin g of any significant American sporting event . I t turn s ou t ther e i s actually a league rul e tha t re quires al l players to stan d at respectfu l attentio n durin g the playing of the Star-Spangled Banner. Abdul-Rauf is claiming that he consid ers standin g for the nationa l anthe m a violatio n of his religiou s obligations and furthermor e consider s the U.S . flag and anthe m "symbols o f oppression. " O n wha t I hop e i s a slo w news day, this rather absur d little disput e has bee n seize d on b y element s o f th e national media . "Wha t abou t th e Firs t Amendment? " th e Times reporter asks. Here we go again, I think: the la w talk is starting. In contemporary America there seem s to be no issue of public lif e that can spend more than a few minutes on the national radar screen before lega l mode s o f argumen t begi n t o tak e over . Al l type s o f social disagreement s see m to b e route d almos t inexorabl y into th e tendentious jargo n an d intellectuall y impoverishe d categorie s o f 3

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legal reasoning , unti l everyon e fro m Ala n Dershowit z t o th e gu y fixing your radiato r insist s on givin g you hi s opinion abou t funda mental rights , o r presumption s o f innocence, or probabl e cause , or —God hel p us—"what the Constitution requires. " If i t shoul d s o happe n tha t yo u ar e someon e wh o i s intimatel y familiar with thes e form s of argument and, as a consequence of tha t familiarity, don' t muc h believ e in them an y more, al l this law talk is going t o get on your nerves. In the case of the Abdul-Rauf "controversy" m y irritation i s exacerbated by the fac t tha t I d o have some questions I' d lik e t o discus s with th e Times reporter , question s i n which he seems to have no interest. Fo r example, what does it tell us that th e NB A actuall y has a forma l rul e addressin g this particula r contingency? How is it that Abdul-Rauf claims to believe his Islamic faith prohibit s hi m fro m salutin g th e fla g whe n n o sec t o f Isla m enforces suc h a prohibition? And i s he eve r going t o ge t hi s game back together? But the reporter doesn' t want to hear about any of that. He wants to talk about the First Amendment . Games Without Frontiers Abdul-Rauf's refusa l t o stan d fo r th e nationa l anthe m violate d th e NBAs cod e o f conduct for it s players , whic h explicitl y require s all players t o stan d a t respectfu l attentio n durin g th e playin g o f th e Star-Spangled Banner. In the jargon of the law , this provision created a contractua l obligatio n tha t Abdul-Rauf was required t o fulfil l un less the obligatio n itsel f was superseded by some other legal rule o r norm. How, we might wonder, did the code of conduct com e to address such a seemingly arcane contingency ? Ye t the specifi c answe r to that question i s in all likelihood not a s important or interesting as the mere fact of the provisio n itself. The NBA s provision is a prime example of an ongoing process we might thin k o f a s the juridica l saturatio n o f reality. In th e moder n world, la w is everywhere. And although , a s the tacitur n epigra m a t the beginnin g o f this chapter testifies , thi s process is hardly unique

American Culture and the Madness of Law 5

to modernity, the increasingl y bureaucratic structure o f modern lif e has allowe d that proces s t o accelerat e to a truly strikin g extent . I n particular, anyone who compares the legal domains of our society to those o f th e premoder n stat e immediatel y become s awar e o f a tremendous and ever-increasing contraction of formally unregulated social space . Consider th e ol d Russia n fol k saying , "Russi a i s large and the Cza r is far away," or that quaint expression from th e Anglo American past , "goin g t o law. " These proverbia l phrase s capture d the realit y o f a stat e an d it s la w tha t wa s elsewhere : a n elsewher e both remot e fro m everyda y existence an d henc e mor e tha n a littl e exotic. No t s o long ag o the notio n o f "going to law " was for most Americans muc h lik e th e ide a o f goin g t o Romania ; while t o th e Russian peasant the Cza r was akin to the Hol y Spirit—an awesome symbolic forc e tha t nevertheles s seeme d largel y absen t fro m th e ordinary workings of day-to-day life . Today all that i s changed, changed utterly. Now la w comes to us, whether we want it to or not. Legal modes of vocabulary and behavior pervad e even th e mos t quotidia n socia l interactions ; th e work place, the school, and even the home mimic the languag e of the law, and a s a consequenc e replicat e it s conceptua l schemes . Indee d w e may b e seein g th e fulfillmen t o f Max Weber's gri m predictio n tha t in the postindustrial worl d everything will eventually be subjected to formal rules , if only because the gradua l elimination o f unregulated human conduc t is necessary to the efficien t functionin g o f both th e modern bureaucrati c stat e an d advance d consume r capitalism . I n such a juridified futur e w e will all, no doubt, be "free"—free, tha t is, to perfor m ou r exquisitel y regulated labor , i n orde r t o fulfil l thos e cultural imperative s tha t eve n no w impe l u s t o acquir e a n ever expanding list of luxurious necessities. What i s clea r i s tha t al l o f u s mov e throug h a socia l spac e tha t becomes more saturated wit h rules: regulations tha t attempt to con trol th e minutia e o f our socia l roles i n ever-mor e obsessiv e detail . Not s o long ago informal socia l pressures would have been exerte d on a basketbal l playe r t o stan d fo r th e nationa l anthem ; i f thos e failed, perhaps a n equally informal exception t o the genera l cultural norm woul d hav e accommodate d hi s peculia r beliefs . O r perhap s

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not. Toda y such examples of the power o f civic etiquette are becom ing rapidl y besid e th e point . Today , th e playe r i s tol d tha t h e ha s "consented" t o th e requiremen t tha t h e stand , whic h afte r al l has been mad e "explicit " somewhere(! ) amon g th e multifariou s clauses of his "freely negotiated contract. " The mott o of contemporary America n life migh t well be an ironic variation o n th e dru g culture' s slogan , "Legaliz e it! " W e striv e t o legalize ever y actual or potential human conflic t s o that all aspects of our existence can benefit from the advantage s of the rule of law. And really, who could objec t to that? The subtex t of the NBA' s anthemic rule i s th e unspoke n messag e o f America n lega l ideology : mak e every obligation, ever y right an d its corresponding duty , sufficientl y explicit so that non e ma y have cause to complain that the y were no t given proper notice , tha t the y were denied due process, o r that the y are bein g oblige d t o d o or no t t o d o anything othe r tha n wha t th e various lega l an d socia l contract s the y hav e chose n t o ente r int o explicitly contemplate . I t all sounds reasonabl e enough , save for one problem: take n t o th e extreme s manifeste d in the followin g modest excerpt from the National Collegiat e Athleti c Association's vas t reg ulatory code—styled , revealingly , a s it s "Constitution"—thi s ide a becomes nothin g les s than a for m o f cultura l madness . (Painfu l a s this brief selection i s to read, grappling with it is a necessary exercise for th e lay reader who needs to experience, if only for a moment, th e occupational angs t o f the ordinar y lawyer, who mus t plo w throug h muddy fields of similar documents ever y day.) Constitution. Article 1 1.3.1 Basic Purpose. The competitiv e athletic s program s o f membe r institution s ar e de signed t o b e a vital part o f the educationa l system. A basic purpose o f this Associatio n i s t o maintai n intercollegiate athletic s a s an integra l part of the educationa l progra m and the athletes as an integral part of the studen t body and , by so doing, retai n a clear lin e of demarcatio n between intercollegiat e athletics and professional sports.. . . Article 2

Principles for Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics 2.01 Genera l Principle

American Culture and the Madness of Law

Legislation enacted by the Association governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletic s shal l b e designe d t o advanc e on e o r mor e basi c principles, includin g th e following , t o whic h th e member s ar e com mitted. In som e instances, a delicate balanc e of these principle s is necessary to help achieve the objective s of the Association. 2.2 The Principl e of Student-Athlete Welfare Intercollegiate athletic s programs shal l be conducted i n a manner de signed t o protec t an d enhanc e the physica l and educationa l welfare o f student-athletes. 2.2.1 Overal l Educational Experience It i s th e responsibilit y o f eac h membe r institutio n t o establis h an d maintain a n environmen t i n whic h a student-athlete' s activitie s ar e conducted a s an integral part of the student-athlete's educationa l experience. Article 1 3 13.1 Contacts and Evaluations Recruiting contacts (pe r 13.02.3 ) and, in Divisions I and II, telephon e calls with a prospect (o r th e prospect' s relative s or lega l guardians) by institutional staf f member s and/o r representative s of th e institution' s athletics interest s ar e subjec t t o th e provision s se t fort h i n thi s bylaw.... 13.1.2.3 General Exceptions ... (f ) Unavoidable Incidenta l Contact . A n unavoidabl e incidental contact mad e wit h a prospec t b y representative s o f th e institution' s athletic interests [shal l not b e subject to this regulation], provide d th e contact is not prearrange d b y the representativ e or a n athletics department staf f member , doe s no t tak e plac e o n th e ground s o f th e prospect's educationa l institution or a t the site s of organized competition an d practic e involvin g th e prospec t o r th e prospect' s tea m (i.e., high school , preparator y school, two-yea r colleg e o r all-sta r team) , is not mad e for the purpos e of recruitment o f the prospect , an d involves only normal civility.. .. 13.4 Recruiting Material s (c) Newspaper Clippings—Divisio n I I Only . Newspape r clipping s may b e sen t t o a prospect, bu t ma y no t b e assemble d in an y form o f scrapbook.... 13.7.5 Entertainment/Tickets on Official Visit 13.7.5.1 General Restrictions. An institution ma y provide entertainment, which may not b e excessive, on th e officia l visi t onl y fo r a prospect an d th e prospect' s parent s [o r legal guardian(s) ] o r spous e an d onl y withi n a 30-mil e radiu s o f th e institution's mai n campus. . ..

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13.7.5.5 Student Host.

The institutio n may provide the following t o a student host entertaining a prospect: (a) A maximum of $20 fo r eac h da y of the visi t to cove r all actual cost of entertainin g the prospec t (and the prospect' s parents, lega l guardian, o r spouse) , excludin g the cos t of meals an d admissio n t o campu s athletic events. These fund s ma y not b e used for the purchas e of souvenirs such as T-shirts or other institutional mementos.... 13.7.5.8 Normal Retai l Cost. If a boat , snowmobile , recreationa l vehicl e o r simila r recreationa l equipment (including those provided b y an institutional staff member or a representativ e o f th e institution' s athletic interests ) i s use d t o entertain a prospect or th e prospect' s parents o r lega l guardians , th e normal retai l cos t o f th e us e o f suc h equipmen t shal l b e assesse d against th e $20-per-da y entertainmen t limit ; furthe r i f suc h norma l retail cos t exceed s th e $20-per-da y entertainmen t allowance , suc h entertainment may not b e provided.

The NCAA' s effort s t o regulat e th e conduc t o f its revenue-pro ducing sports i s a rather frightening example of both juridical saturation an d of what might b e called the Wil l to Process . Thi s latter phenomenon i s a product o f the assumptio n that substantive flaws in the natur e o f a practic e ca n b e neutralize d o r eve n eliminate d b y crushing thos e flaws under a sufficiently vas t mountain o f administrative rules and procedures. Hence th e NCAA produce s a 300-page code, with it s thousands of sections, subsections , an d subsections o f subsections, in an attempt t o anticipate and resolve everythin g fro m the mos t mundan e conflict s of interest t o th e mos t exoti c adminis trative contingencies. Yet despite—o r perhap s because of—this appearanc e of regula tory comprehensiveness , th e NCA A cod e actuall y fail s t o addres s the centra l proble m o f college athletics . Th e mos t notabl e substan tive flaw in the practic e of big-time intercollegiat e sport s i s this: th e NCAA regulator y code' s self-proclaime d basic purpose o f ensurin g that the athletes whose performances fill huge stadiums and guarantee billion-dolla r televisio n contract s ar e nevertheles s otherwis e ordinary colleg e student s i s blatantl y a t odd s wit h limitation s im posed b y wha t migh t b e calle d "reality. " I t is , afte r all , exactl y as

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realistic to expect great running backs to be adequate scholar s a s it is to expec t grea t scholar s t o b e adequat e runnin g backs . Everyon e knows that, to the extent major college football and men's basketball hold themselve s ou t a s mere extracurricula r activitie s i n th e lif e o f otherwise ordinar y college students, th e tw o sports ar e and must be fundamentally fraudulen t practices. I don' t want to soun d to o sanctimoniou s abou t this— I lov e col lege footbal l a s muc h a s anybody . Anyon e wh o gre w u p i n An n Arbor, Michigan, or Columbus , Ohio , in the 1970 s will understand when I admi t tha t th e Michigan-Ohi o Stat e game s o f m y yout h remain som e o f the mos t intens e emotiona l experience s of my life . The essentia l hypocris y o f big-tim e colleg e athletic s doesn' t ran k high o n America' s lis t o f socia l crises , no r shoul d it . Bu t tha t hy pocrisy can't b e eliminated, or eve n significantly reduced, as long as a fundamenta l contradiction remain s betwee n th e actua l an d th e professed goal s o f th e revenue-producin g colleg e sports . An d tha t fundamental contradictio n wil l stay in plac e so long a s certain col lege sport s ar e drive n t o produc e million s o f dollar s o f revenue . Such sports must be professional in all but name. The NCAA' s response to this inescapable and corrupting dilemma is straightforward: legalize it. The governin g bod y of college athlet ics i s graduall y extrudin g a regulator y tex t tha t read s lik e som e crazed amalgam of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Uniform

Commercial Code. W e migh t not e tha t thi s particula r cod e i s ad dressed t o a social context i n which, to choos e fro m a n almost endless lis t o f examples , colleg e basketbal l coache s ear n million s o f dollars pimping for athletic sho e companies by requiring their play ers to wea r thos e companies ' shoe s while at th e sam e time making pious noise s abou t th e "integrity " o f thei r spor t (translation : th e players mus t wor k fo r free) , an d i n whic h i t wa s revealed recentl y that on e ou t o f every seven footbal l player s at a prominent univer sity ha s bee n arreste d a t leas t onc e durin g hi s tenur e ther e a s a "scholar-athlete," leading the country's best-know n sport s magazine to cal l fo r th e schoo l t o eliminat e its football program. Meanwhile , as high schoo l basketbal l prodigies hold lavis h press conference s at which the y announc e i n advance o f their matriculation tha t the y will

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grace some ivie d campus for but a single year before departing to an unambiguously professional team, subsection 13.7.5. 5 of the NCA A code is trying to regulate th e purchase of T-shirts. These phenomen a ma y see m paradoxical , but i n th e contex t o f American culture they are actually part of a standard operating pro cedure. A sphere of human activity that i s understood t o b e corrup t in some essentia l way—college sports, politica l fundraising, the cig arette trade , and so on—is therefore subjected to the most exquisite regulatory schemes , a s i f saturatin g th e activit y wit h juridica l re quirements wil l someho w transfor m it s rotte n essenc e int o some thing rich and strange. Again, painfu l a s the y ar e t o read , th e NCA A regulation s ar e symptomatic an d thus worth grapplin g with. Indeed, even th e min uscule selection s I hav e quoted illustrat e several professional deformations that mark the pathologies of the American lega l mind a t its most florid. For instance , one would think the "Genera l Principles " found i n Articl e 2 coul d onl y b e take n seriousl y b y person s wh o believe that platitudes have special and perhaps even magical powers whenever the y ar e cas t into sufficiently legalisti c language. Of what possible us e can i t b e t o infor m institutions o f higher learnin g tha t "athletics programs shall be conducted i n a manner designed to pro tect an d enhanc e th e physica l and educationa l welfare o f student athletes?" And who has ever doubted that anything like a sufficientl y broad lis t of abstrac t principle s delimitin g any comple x set o f con siderations could avoi d bein g "balanced " against each other? Thes e banal utterances migh t b e understood a s part o f an incantation tha t attempts to dissolv e throug h verbal magi c th e ineliminabl e conflic t between the financia l structur e o f major colleg e sport s an d the edu cational rol e o f th e university . Woul d no t a perso n wh o trul y believed i n th e efficac y o f suc h provision s b e laborin g unde r som e sort o f delusion? Yet as we will see, lawyers are i n on e sens e profes sionally obliged to believe that legal language has such powers . Or conside r th e definitio n of an incidental contact, not subjec t to the multitud e of restrictions o n other sorts o f contacts betwee n col lege recruiters an d their quarry. This definition exempts such a con tact a s long as, among many other things, i t was "unavoidable," no t

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prearranged b y the recruiter , an d "no t mad e for the recruitmen t o f the prospect. " Fro m a pragmatic perspective th e entir e subsectio n would mor e sensibl y read "incidenta l contact s ar e exempt. " (Afte r all, truly incidenta l contacts ar e b y definition neither avoidabl e nor prearranged, an d th e restriction s o n wher e incidenta l contact s ca n take plac e merely illustrate ho w certain contacts ar e no t trul y inci dental.) Her e agai n we se e th e lawyer' s characteristic urg e t o giv e words efficaciou s power s throug h act s o f compulsiv e elaboratio n and repetition. Or we can puzzle over the almos t Kafkaesque flavor of the regulation allowin g newspaper clippings to b e sen t t o a prospect, bu t no t "in an y for m o f scrapbook. " Suc h obsessiv e attentio n t o wha t ar e surely meaningles s distinction s i s a produc t o f a hypertrophie d rationalism: of a rationalist ideology that can envision no limitations to it s power . A s a consequenc e o f thei r insisten t nee d t o exercis e control, out-of-contro l regulator y schemes en d u p producin g rule s more absurd than any that could be generated within a more modest cognitive framework . Increasingly, the lega l institutions o f our cul ture see k t o regulat e socia l interaction a t th e mos t maniacall y fine level o f detail, until the bureaucrati c schemes of law's empire begi n to have more than a passing resemblance to Kafka's nightmar e world of inexplicabl e orders hande d dow n throug h th e agenc y o f som e anonymous, unappeasable force. In this regard, conside r the interaction betwee n article s 13.7.5.1 , 13.7.5.5, an d 13.7.5.8 . Th e firs t articl e state s tha t entertainmen t "which ma y no t b e excessive " can b e provide d fo r a prospect, an d "the prospect' s parent s o r lega l guardians, or spouse. " The genera l word "excessive " i s the n rendere d superfluou s b y a $20-per-da y entertainment limit ; tha t limi t i s further elaborated o n b y a provi sion tha t specificall y addresse s th e renta l o f recreationa l vehicle s (why is thi s necessary?) ; and thi s furthe r subsectio n add s both an obviously redundan t rul e forbiddin g more tha n $20 to be spent on such things, and a potentially confusing omission that implies to th e lawyerly mind either tha t (1) this rule doesn't apply to the entertain ment o f prospects ' spouse s becaus e spouses , unlik e parent s an d guardians, ar e no t mentione d i n thi s particula r subsection , o r (2 )

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spouses ma y therefore no t rid e o n rente d snowmobile s a t all . Th e quest fo r regulator y comprehensivenes s thu s produce s a surrea l mishmash o f redundant an d contradictory rules . From a certain perspectiv e al l this appears, as I say, to b e a manifestation o f a kind o f madness . Readin g through th e NCA A code , the proverbial visito r from anothe r lan d might conclud e a lawyer is a person wh o believes that certain words have magical properties, tha t there is no suc h thing as an excessively fine analytic distinction, an d that regulatory scheme s can be both comprehensiv e and self-executing. An d th e visito r woul d be correct— to a certain extent. Yet ironically most lawyer s are bette r protecte d agains t th e madnes s o f law than th e American publi c itself, bombarde d a s that publi c is by cultural imperative s demandin g tha t i t tak e law' s own representation s of wha t la w is an d doe s wit h th e utmos t seriousness . B y contrast , what (usually) keeps the madness of law from becoming the madness of lawyers is a necessary—and indeed a therapeutic—inauthenticity . This, too, mus t be part of the properly socialized lawyer's persona. Let us return to Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf s constitutional saga . What was it tha t le d Abdul-Rauf to clai m his religiou s belief s prohibite d him fro m "conformin g hi s conduct," a s lawyers say, to the standard s enunciated i n the National Basketbal l Association's regulator y man ual? Here we must enter briefly into the technical arcan a of employ ment law . To wit : i f Abdul-Rauf was merel y undertakin g a political protest by refusing to stan d fo r the anthem , as his comments abou t "symbols o f oppression" implied , he would under curren t lega l doctrines have no groun d fo r complaint i f he were penalized fo r failin g to adhere to the terms o f the standard player contract. O n the other hand i f hi s refusa l t o stan d wa s a consequenc e o f a sincerel y hel d religious belief , the n hi s employe r coul d b e require d t o mak e "rea sonable accommodations " fo r the practic e of that belief . Given this , it is easy enough t o imagine the practical outcome o f a conversatio n between Abdul-Rau f and his agent, o r som e othe r lawyer, in whic h he was apprised o f these particular facts . Every lawye r knows with som e part o f his or her brai n that "sin cerely held belie f i s ofte n a ter m o f ar t meanin g somethin g lik e "invented o n th e spo t fo r the purpose s of litigation." An d yet ever y

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lawyer and law professor quote d i n the newspaper s the da y after th e Abdul-Rauf stor y brok e treate d th e player' s professio n o f a previ ously unknown dictu m o f Islamic law as if this professed belief were simply a peculiar aspec t o f the player' s worldview. Were thes e lawyers bein g disingenuous ? I t depend s o n ho w you defin e tha t term . The lega l academic s among the m ma y well have bee n s o naive, so disconnected fro m the actua l practice of law, that the mos t plausible account o f wh y Abdul-Rau f claime d a religiou s groun d fo r hi s actions ma y no t hav e occurre d t o the m a t all . Bu t th e practicin g lawyers mus t surely hav e know n wha t th e mos t likel y explanation was fo r Abdul-Rauf' s statements.* Yet to "know " i s a complex con cept—especially for a lawyer. Lawyers mak e claim s not becaus e the y believ e the m t o b e true , but becaus e they believ e them t o b e legally efficacious. I f they hap pen to be true, the n all the better ; but the lawye r who is concerne d primarily with th e truth value of the statement s he makes on behalf of client s i s soon goin g t o fin d himsel f unabl e to fulfil l hi s professional obligatio n t o zealousl y represent thos e clients . Anothe r way of puttin g thi s i s to sa y that inauthenticit y i s essential to authenti c legal thought . Practicin g lawyer s mus t ofte n maintai n a peculia r mental stat e i n whic h the y fail—authentically—t o recognize th e inauthenticity o f their claims . A lawyer must b e authentically inau thentic, s o muc h s o tha t h e o r sh e ca n honestly(? ) ech o Samue l Goldwyn's observatio n tha t th e most importan t qualit y in successful acting i s sincerity . "Onc e you'v e learne d t o fak e that, " Goldwy n observed, "you've got it made." It is to say the least an awkward state of mind, but i t i s the essenc e of the lega l form of thought. An d it is this for m of thought that , ironically , preserves the lawyer' s sanity in the fac e o f the madnes s of law. *In fact, one day after saying that he would rather retire than make any concession to th e NB A rule, Abdul-Rau f agree d t o stand , respectfully during th e nationa l an them, with his hands covering his face in a traditional posture of Islamic prayer. Th e one-game suspension cost him approximatel y $31,000 in lost salary, and would have cost him a n additional $31,000 for every game he would have missed while adhering to the dictates of his "sincerely held religious belief."

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A lawyer learns the ar t of indulging in the mos t extrem e forms of law talk , with al l thei r apparen t reliance o n verba l magic, with al l their obsessional and delusional qualities, while never fully internal izing man y of the belief s thi s tal k seems to require . Indeed, a goo d lawyer keep s his or he r gri p on realit y by remembering, o n appro priate occasions , tha t la w is ultimately just a way of talking . For i n the end , law can't b e treate d a s an accurat e reflection o f th e social world i t is attempting t o regulat e without doin g seriou s damag e to the intellectua l an d emotiona l capacitie s of people who trea t it a s if it were . Imagin e tryin g t o understan d colleg e sport s throug h th e lens of the NCA A regulatory code. That would be akin to studying American cultur e b y goin g t o Disne y Worl d fo r a week an d the n flying bac k t o th e Sorbonn e (no t tha t thi s metho d hasn' t bee n employed b y certain audaciou s savants), or attemptin g t o discer n a presidential candidate' s actua l beliefs by reading his party's conven tion platform. It would be like trying t o improve your socia l life b y studying the representations o f successful socia l interaction foun d i n beer commercials—an d then drinkin g lots and lots of beer. Celluloid Heroes In th e mids t o f th e 199 6 presidential campaign , Senato r Rober t Dole wa s criticized fo r condemnin g th e mora l message s conveye d by variou s Hollywoo d film s h e ha d neve r actuall y seen. Th e re sponse o f Dole' s staf f t o thi s criticis m wa s trul y remarkable . Th e staff arrange d a "media event " a t which Dole woul d view a suitably uplifting movi e (Independence Day) and the n prais e th e fil m fo r upholding value s he claime d the films he criticize d ha d slighte d o r ignored. Th e particularl y brazen aspect of this campaig n stunt was that hi s staf f ha d writte n th e speec h containin g Dole' s purporte d reaction t o Independence Da y befor e h e ha d see n th e film ! Whe n reporting on these events , the journalist Michael Lewi s pointed ou t that mos t member s o f the nationa l press have become s o inured t o this sor t o f thing they no longe r eve n notice th e multipl e level s of fraudulence it involves . Lewi s commente d tha t in his view , "Th e

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only wa y to sta y san e i s to assum e th e America n peopl e don' t pay any attention t o this kind of crap. " That, in a nutshell, i s how lawyers stay sane when they ar e forced to profes s allegiance to, an d eve n i n a peculiarly limite d sens e be lieve in, th e sort s o f things proclaime d b y texts suc h as the NCAA' s regulatory constitution. Unfortunately, i t is often par t of their job to make sure the rest o f us don't hav e that particula r option .

2 THE COLOR OF MONEY In thei r majesti c equalit y ou r law s forbi d th e ric h an d poor alik e t o slee p under bridges , to be g i n th e streets , and to steal their bread. ANATOLE FRANC E

In Gilbert and Sullivan's H.M.S. Pinafore, the Boatswain praises

Ralph the abl e Seaman with the followin g song: He i s an Englishman! For h e himself has said it , And it's greatly to his credit, That he is an Englishman! For h e might hav e been a Roosian, A French, o r Turk, or Proosian , Or perhaps Italian! But in spite of all temptations To belong to other nations, He remain s an Englishman!

This is supposed t o strik e th e audienc e as absurd: Ralph can hardly be praise d fo r resistin g th e temptatio n t o b e wha t he canno t b e in order to remain what he surely is—an Englishman. Today, when we have com e t o accep t tha t s o much o f reality is socially constructe d rather tha n bein g a reflection of some objectivel y immutable orde r of things , ther e i s n o longe r anythin g absur d abou t th e ide a o f choosing t o remain a member of one nationality rather tha n becom ing somethin g (o r someone ) else . Indeed , i t seem s tha t variou s markers of personal identity are becoming ever-mor e transitor y an d 16

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permeable; an d thu s i n contemporar y America n cultur e i t i s no w widely accepted tha t persons can alter not jus t their nationality, but their clas s status , thei r religion , thei r sexua l orientation , an d eve n their gender . Interestingly, on e socia l marker seem s relatively immun e t o thi s protean flux: race. Fo r example , in ou r publi c culture O . J. Simp son's "blackness" is understood t o b e just as much a brute fac t abou t him as the fac t tha t h e has two arms and two legs. In America at the end o f th e twentiet h centur y th e ide a tha t Simpso n ca n choos e t o remain black remains as ridiculous as the ide a Ralph could choose t o remain English seeme d to his fellow countryme n 12 0 years ago. A very different perspectiv e on the nature of racial identity comes to us from th e forme r heavyweigh t boxing champion, Larry Holmes. In respons e t o a white reporter' s question s abou t growing u p black in th e working-clas s tow n o f Easton , Pennsylvania , Holme s aske d the reporter if she had ever been black. Startled, the reporter admit ted that sh e had not. "Bein g black," Holmes said , "is hard. I used t o be black—when I was poor." This crypti c statemen t concernin g th e comple x relationship between th e concept s o f rac e an d clas s i n America n societ y migh t serve a s a n epigra m fo r th e firs t O . J . Simpso n trial . Indeed , Holmes's observatio n remind s u s o f ho w O . J . Simpso n wa s in a unique positio n t o exploi t tha t relationship . Fo r Simpso n i s cer tainly "black " i n the Holmesia n sens e tha t hi s public racial identity made possible the sort s o f arguments his defense was able to exploit so well—arguments about the racist proclivities of the likes of Mark Fuhrman. Bu t Simpson i s also "white"—again i n Holmes's sense— in tha t h e coul d actuall y affor d t o pa y fo r suc h a n elaborat e ex ploitation o f thos e arguments . B y successfull y synthesizin g thes e aspects o f Simpson' s identit y hi s defens e wa s able to produc e wha t even i n victim-obsessed Americ a remain s a true cultura l rarity : th e oppressed millionaire . But suc h observation s merel y remin d u s o f ho w al l th e hand wringing ove r rac e i n th e Simpso n affai r ha s onl y helpe d obscur e the mor e salien t questio n o f social class. Can ther e b e much doub t that i f Simpso n ha d bee n poo r o r workin g class , then , blac k o r

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white, the overwhelming circumstantia l case against him would have led hi s public defender t o convinc e hi m o f the wisdo m o f pleadin g guilty to a charge of second-degree murder ? That if, in the unlikely event there had bee n a trial, it would have taken mor e tha n perhap s two weeks? Or tha t th e outcom e o f such a trial would neve r reall y have bee n i n question ? Thes e ar e not , o f course , origina l observa tions. All throughout th e tria l we heard again and agai n from a host of lega l commentator s ho w onl y th e circumstanc e o f Simpson' s wealth mad e it possibl e fo r hi m t o tak e ful l advantag e of the man y generous feature s th e America n lega l syste m make s availabl e t o those criminal defendant s who can afford t o emplo y them. This, we were le d t o understand , wa s a shame . S o i n a sense th e clas s angle was not ignore d durin g the Simpso n trial . Yet these very same com mentators seeme d t o believ e i t wa s simpl y a regrettabl e (an d immutable) featur e of socia l lif e tha t onl y ric h defendant s have th e resources t o exploit the exceedingly complex structure o f contempo rary American crimina l jurisprudence. Now what I find most interesting about this attitude is its orienta tion toward th e very problem it identified. Imagin e if Simpson wer e to receiv e th e sor t o f defens e tha t coul d hav e bee n pu t u p b y a n earnest publi c defender. Then, afte r th e inevitabl e conviction , th e American publi c i s informed tha t unfortunatel y onl y whit e peopl e are allowe d th e sor t o f defens e tha t migh t hav e spared th e forme r football star . Needles s t o sa y such a clai m woul d b e utterl y unac ceptable. Ye t when face d wit h th e disturbin g fac t that , despit e th e egalitarian rhetoric of our lega l system, onl y ric h people ca n affor d much o f what is referred t o a s "the rul e o f law," the reactio n o f th e legal establishmen t i s aki n t o th e fatalisti c resignatio n o f a Dos toyevskian peasant confronting th e onse t o f another Russia n winter . "You shouldn' t blam e u s fo r thi s stat e o f affairs, " explai n variou s apologists fo r th e lega l status quo . "That' s just the pric e we pay for having the rul e o f law. Justice, afte r all , isn't cheap. " Thi s i s generally followe d b y Utopia n statement s t o th e effec t tha t th e govern ment "should " mak e "hig h quality " (a.k.a . expensive) legal service s available to everyone : statement s tha t t o be actualized would neces sitate the sort of wealth redistribution tha t would in turn requir e th e

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elite lega l establishmen t t o surrende r som e o f it s economi c an d social privilege, whic h of course it isn't going t o do. Am I bein g unfair ? Sure—bu t no t that unfair . Le t u s imagin e a certain figure : we'l l cal l hi m a typica l libera l lega l academic , o r ATLLA fo r short. ATLLA believe s in what h e think s o f as the rul e of law. Now w e must understan d tha t thi s thin g h e believe s in, and which h e dedicate s muc h o f hi s professiona l lif e t o defendin g and reproducing, isn' t anythin g nearl y a s capaciou s a s wha t i t sound s like. After all , in its literal sense th e phras e "th e rul e o f law" would also signify ho w they do things i n other countries—countrie s whos e legal system s ATLL A admittedl y doesn' t kno w muc h about . Fo r ATLLA, th e rul e of law is in all likelihood really the rul e of Harvard law, which i s to sa y of the lega l process jurisprudenc e handed down to a generatio n o f lega l academic s durin g thei r studen t day s i n Cambridge, Massachusetts , o r some very similar sort of place. I onc e produced a catechismic imitatio n o f the lega l process styl e that tried to captur e bot h th e ideologica l commitment s underlyin g it s meth ods and the consequence s fo r thought an d prose tha t ten d t o follo w from faithfu l attempt s t o carr y ou t th e style' s rigorou s jurispruden tial requirements. Her e is a representative sample: What judicial procedures d o these methods involve? They involve , firstly, a carefu l no t t o sa y exhaustive review o f al l th e relevant lega l material s whos e meaning , properl y interpreted , migh t throw ligh t o n th e prope r resolutio n o f the sort s o f cases and contro versies tha t court s displa y a specia l institutiona l competenc e towar d resolving; secondly , th e formulatio n o f variou s comple x interlockin g directives b y mean s o f whic h th e properl y interprete d meanin g o f those material s ma y b e mad e synonymou s wit h thos e interpretation s that flow from th e prope r deploymen t o f those interpretiv e method s which give the meanin g of those materials a public and formal character, thereb y makin g tha t meanin g accessibl e t o everyon e wh o ha s undergone a socialization process resembling that to which students at elite America n la w school s wer e subjected , circ a 1958 ; thirdly , th e acceptance o f the pragmatic yet principled dictu m tha t law is a purposive activit y whic h continuall y strive s t o solv e th e basi c problems o f social living ; fourthly , th e ful l recognitio n o f th e indispensabl e rol e played b y tha t mos t lawyerl y virtue, procedure , i n assurin g a kind of

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objectivity to what would otherwise degenerat e into a n unconstraine d act o f judicial fiat; fifthly, the establishmen t of the principl e o r publi c norm tha t decisions which are duly arrived at as a result of duly established procedure s fo r makin g decision s o f thi s kin d ough t t o b e accepted as binding on the whole society unless and until they are duly changed; an d sixthly, the soberin g realization that th e onl y alternative to regularize d an d peaceabl e methods o f decisio n is a disintegratin g resort to violence.

This is a parody, but no t a very gross one. Indeed, several phrases in th e passag e wer e lifte d whol e fro m th e locu s classicu s o f th e movement, Harvar d la w professors Henry Har t an d Alber t Sacks's eternally unfinished treatise, Th e Legal Process (tentative draft , 1958) . Legal proces s pedagogy , an d eve n mor e s o th e visio n o f la w from which th e teachin g method springs , require s a n exhaustiv e engage ment with th e material s an d procedures of the America n lega l sys tem tha t i n certai n circumstance s ca n begi n t o resembl e a typ e o f repetition compulsion . (T o b e clear : i t isn' t tha t carefu l revie w o f legal question s i s a ba d thing . Bu t the n neithe r i s washin g you r hands—unless yo u fee l compelle d t o d o i t forty-seve n time s pe r day.) The emphasi s on "gettin g i t right," an d the agonize d struggl e to defin e jus t what that might entail , produce a distinctive vision of law tha t i s totalizing, relentless , and mostl y obliviou s t o suc h crass considerations a s time, money, an d possibl e limits to th e power s of human reason. Nevertheless, a s a matter o f what can best be under stood a s a highly contingent quir k of social and intellectua l history , the forma l characteristic s o f this jurisprudence hav e combined wit h the political orientation o f the Warren an d Burger Suprem e Court s to produce wha t ATLLA no w thinks o f as not s o much a particular vision of law, but rather a s nothing less than "the " rul e of law itself. It ha s not bee n note d tha t on e o f the mos t fascinatin g aspects of the Simpso n tria l wa s how i t provide d American s wit h a n unusua l opportunity t o se e a n almos t pur e exampl e of thi s rul e o f la w i n action. After all , given th e economi c consequences o f taking what is called th e rul e o f law seriously, it isn' t surprisin g tha t full y 9 5 per cent o f all criminal convictions in this country ar e obtained withou t a trial, and that an even higher percentage o f civil litigation i s settled

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without th e benefit of a courtroom verdict . Thos e trials that do take place ar e themselve s almos t alway s muc h mor e cursor y tha n wha t rule o f la w ideolog y woul d conside r consonan t wit h a n adequat e exploration o f th e relevan t lega l materials . Bu t American s ar e b y reputation practica l people; and most of the time we find it is simply too expensiv e t o enjo y the ful l benefit s of th e rul e o f Harvard law . Indeed, i n a sense th e America n lega l syste m doesn' t collaps e onl y because of a tacit understanding that it s forma l rule s must neve r b e followed. Most legal actors perceive , if only unconsciously, tha t an y serious effor t t o actuall y instantiat e th e rul e o f law would produc e results simila r t o on e o f thos e wor k action s wher e a labo r unio n brings a factory almost to a halt by the simple expedient of requiring its members t o follo w th e wor k rule s supposedly i n force . Nothing would destro y ou r lega l syste m mor e effectivel y tha n a sincer e attempt t o enforce its laws. The Simpso n tria l wa s different. Becaus e of the politica l impor tance o f the cas e to th e Lo s Angeles District Attorney' s Office , an d because o f th e almos t unprecedente d socia l positio n o f th e defen dant (wit h th e doubtfu l exceptio n o f Aaron Burr , Simpso n wa s th e most celebrate d America n eve r t o b e charge d wit h murder) , ther e was essentially no economi c barrie r t o transformin g th e rul e of law from classroo m theor y int o courtroo m practice . Her e wa s a trul y singular occasio n wher e consideration s o f scarcity would not rei n in the enthusias m o f the participants . This circumstanc e allowe d pla toons o f lawyer s an d "experts " deploye d b y bot h th e prosecutio n and the defens e t o exploit the ful l panopl y of options mad e available to the m b y the structur e o f our crimina l justice system . Dozen s o f witnesses wer e questione d an d cross-examine d for day s at a stretch ; evidentiary rulings , interpleadings , an d motion s o f ever y conceiv able sor t took up hundred s of hours; indeed , the impanelin g of the jury an d th e intermitten t expulsio n o f nearl y hal f o f it s origina l members alon e took u p fa r more tim e tha n was spent on , fo r example, the debat e and ratification o f the origina l U.S. Constitution . None o f this, o f course, seeme d t o mak e much o f an impressio n on th e survivin g jurors , wh o dispose d o f th e issu e a t han d wit h a brisk indifference t o the evidenc e that itself suggested th e futilit y of

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the whol e absur d exercise , an d whic h indee d brough t t o min d th e relative advantage s of trial b y ordeal. In th e month s sinc e tha t sur real clima x it ha s often bee n sai d that recommendation s fo r refor m should no t b e base d o n th e Simpso n trial , give n tha t i t wa s i n s o many ways a unique event. Such statements are of course accurat e as far a s they go , but consider wha t they overlook. For again , what was most uniqu e abou t th e Simpso n tria l was precisely that i t provide d an example , in th e practice o f a n actual courtroom rather than i n th e theory o f th e la w school classroom, o f moder n America n rul e o f la w ideology i n full bloom . Here, in the scarcity-free space of Judge Ito's court, w e saw the consequence s o f actually taking the rul e o f Har vard la w seriously. Her e we saw in thei r mos t extrem e form various characteristic feature s of the America n lega l system tha t ar e usually muted b y th e constraint s o f fisca l an d psychologica l reality . These include (bu t ar e no t limite d to ) th e worshi p o f procedure ; th e attempt t o rationaliz e every aspec t o f th e decision-makin g process ; the distrus t o f spontaneou s action ; th e deman d fo r somethin g approaching perfectio n in the handlin g of the relevan t legal materials; the urge to maintain a continuous and pervasive managerial con trol ove r ever y participant ; and, above all, the dauntin g complexit y of th e rule s tha t suc h a syste m requires . I t i s of cours e hyperbole , but i s there als o no t som e trut h i n th e clai m that this , afte r all , is how th e America n lega l syste m i s supposed t o work ? Indeed , w e might wan t to thin k o f the Simpso n tria l a s a year-long demonstra tion o f th e way s i n whic h muc h o f wha t i s calle d th e rul e o f la w resembles, i n it s most flori d manifestations , a culturally sanctione d form o f obsessive-compulsive behavior . Perhaps th e questio n o n which th e professiona l defender s of th e legal statu s qu o nee d t o focu s thei r attentio n i s this : jus t whos e interests ar e served b y this socia l structure an d th e behavio r i t elic its? Wh o benefit s from the immens e an d eve n neurotic complexit y of the modern America n legal system? We alread y know the answe r to thi s question—indeed , ou r frien d ATLL A know s th e answer . That is why he "supports" increased funding for legal aid; that is , in part, why he wil l fro m time t o tim e undertak e to represen t a deat h row inmate for free. Pro bono publico, "for the publi c good." That is a

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noble-sounding phrase, but let me suggest a scheme that might ben efit th e wretched refus e o f our teemin g shore s i n a more meaningfu l way. O f cours e i t isn' t goin g t o happen ; almos t nothin g recom mended by well-intentioned academic s ever happens. Still, imagine a system o f criminal trials i n whic h juries were seated b y picking th e first twelve peopl e in the poo l who did not kno w the defendan t or the victim. Imagine a system i n which witnesses coul d say what the y had t o sa y in thei r ow n words , withou t constan t interruption s fo r evidentiary rulings by control-obsessed advocate s and decision makers. Imagin e a syste m wher e thes e advocate s playe d a relativel y minor, facilitatin g rol e i n th e proceedings . Imagin e a syste m i n which, because of such features , it was simply expected as a matter of course that a well-conducted, full y adequat e trial would take a day or two, wit h th e occasiona l proceedin g lastin g a s long a s a week. Fi nally, picture a system of criminal justice where mixed panels of legal professionals an d la y judge s woul d engag e i n a pragmatic , mostl y nontechnical dialogu e in the course of deciding the fate of the defendant. Now despit e their exoti c flavor these suggestion s ar e not mer e pipe dreams . I n fac t somethin g lik e this i s what the crimina l justice systems of many other develope d nations already resemble. What social consequences woul d flow from suc h a scheme? No that i n thi s sor t o f syste m a middle-clas s perso n woul d b e abl e t o afford a defens e t o a serious crimina l charg e tha t woul d i n mos t respects b e comparabl e t o wha t a rich perso n coul d procure . Fur thermore a syste m alon g thes e line s would giv e th e poo r crimina l defendant a realistic chanc e o f having his or he r tru e lega l expenses defrayed b y th e government , o r absorbe d b y a lawye r wh o unde r such circumstances woul d not nee d t o make a huge economi c sacri fice to adequately represent a n impoverished defendant . By contrast , i n th e America n lega l syste m elaborat e procedure s designed t o ensur e fairnes s ofte n en d u p ensurin g somethin g els e altogether. Conside r th e following example. In high-profile criminal trials—those tha t ten d t o featur e ric h defendant s or , a s i n th e Oklahoma Cit y bombin g case , defens e lawyer s wh o fo r whateve r reason ar e willin g t o exhaustivel y litigat e a tria l a t governmen t expense—the process o f interrogating prospective juror s now some-

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times take s severa l weeks. The naiv e justification for allowin g such an extensive process i s that it weeds out prejudice d persons from the jury pool. The sophisticate d justification is that the strenuous effort s of both prosecutio n an d defense to stack the jury with persons prejudiced in their respectiv e favors will cancel each other out, resulting in a jury that manifest s a rough balanc e of various prejudices . No w note ho w thi s sam e result coul d b e achieve d a t leas t a s effectivel y (and a t much less expense) by simply employing the Englis h system of selecting juror s at random . But o f course suc h a system deprives wealthy defendants of the advantages to be gotten from the hiring of high-priced jur y selection consultants , wh o tend to defea t compara tively overworke d an d understaffe d prosecutor s i n th e playin g o f this particular psychological and demographic game. Such example s remind u s of how the Wil l t o Process—th e urg e to rationalize , codify , administrate , proceduralize , an d otherwis e complicate a system of social coordination an d dispute processing — increasingly make s tha t syste m availabl e onl y t o th e socia l elite s who have the resource s t o manipulat e it. They als o remind u s tha t academic vision s o f wha t la w i s hav e politica l consequences , although rarel y i n th e wa y law professor s imagine . What matter s about what legal academics teach their student s i s not th e substance but th e form ; o r rathe r i n thi s cas e th e for m i s the substanc e o f what student s learn . Fo r instance , whil e ATLL A believe s h e i s demonstrating i n his criminal law classroom tha t th e deat h penalty is unconstitutional, wha t he i s really demonstrating i s how t o pro duce a system tha t wil l not onl y execut e a poor man , bu t wil l als o spend $2,000,00 0 tryin g to determin e whethe r that ma n was represented adequatel y b y a court-appointe d drunkar d wh o wa s pai d $500 for his services. Justice, w e are told, isn't cheap. Indeed it isn't : especially when, despit e the egalitaria n rhetoric withi n which the y are routinely cloaked , the excesse s of American legal ideology tend to transform the rul e of law into a kind of luxury good. We ma y b e sur e th e defender s of what they cal l th e rul e o f law will fin d themselve s horrifie d by any suggestio n tha t ou r lega l system should grant its subjects fewe r right s and options; that it should be les s rationalis t an d mor e ope n t o th e rol e o f chanc e i n human

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decision making ; o r tha t i t shoul d giv e u p o n an y ambition s t o achieve a celestia l degre e o f wha t w e cal l "justice." * Bu t ho w ca n such a system ensur e th e undeniabl e benefit s of what lawyer s refer to a s "procedural du e process" ? Ho w wil l it weed ou t th e effect s o f prejudicial evidenc e and prosecutorial misconduct ? How , in a word, will it be fair ? Ye t the questio n th e defender s of the statu s qu o nee d to face—tha t we nee d t o face—i s "fair " i n compariso n t o what? I n comparison t o a syste m tha t has , partiall y throug h th e effort s o f ATLLA an d his legion of academic fellow travelers, become s o elaborate, s o complicated , s o unwieldy, and therefor e s o expensive tha t as a practical matter i t exists almost exclusivel y for the benefi t o f th e upper class ? "The rich, " noted F. Scott Fitzgerald, "are differen t fro m you and me." "Yes, " replie d Ernes t Hemingway , "the y hav e money. " I n America today , wha t i s celebrate d i n lega l academi c circle s a s th e rule of law often function s as a complex cultural mechanis m fo r th e protection o f class privilege. Thi s statement isn' t merel y a rephras ing o f the bana l platitude that th e ric h wil l always be able to affor d more "justice, " so-called , tha n th e poor . Fo r wha t th e Simpso n criminal trial illustrate d with special clarity is that the answe r to th e specific questio n o f bo w much more justic e th e ric h ca n affor d i s always a function o f th e particula r characteristic s o f a specific legal system. The gran d iron y o f the American legal system i s to be found in precisely this: that it is by their very effort s t o mak e law "fair"— efforts tha t perversely mak e the benefits of law ever more dependen t on th e expertis e o f a specialize d secto r o f th e uppe r class—tha t lawyers in this same sector of the upper class have made many of the benefits o f law all but unavailabl e to anyon e othe r than member s o f the class to which those lawyers belong . Yet the blindnes s s o many contemporar y America n lega l thinker s display towar d ho w lega l ideolog y play s a n importan t rol e i n th e creation an d maintenanc e o f th e clas s structur e fro m whic h thos e same lawyer s benefi t i s hardl y a ne w o r uniqu e phenomenon . Indeed, on e migh t eve n remar k tha t i n thei r majesti c equalit y our *"I fear thos e big words that make us so unhappy." James Joyce, Ulysses.

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laws grant th e poo r as well as the ric h th e "right " to, amon g man y other things , th e ful l analyti c rigor o f procedural due process , th e endless elaboratio n o f evidentiary questions, th e exhaustiv e deploy ment of the appellate courts, and the most socially irresponsible representation money can buy.

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THE ANARCHI C PANOPTICO N What hav e ou r legislator s gaine d b y selecting a hundre d thousand particula r case s an d actions , an d applyin g a hundred thousan d law s to them? Thi s number stil l bear s no proportio n t o th e infinit e diversit y o f huma n actio n .. . the most desirable laws are those tha t ar e rarest, sim plest, and most general ; an d I even think it would b e bet ter t o hav e non e a t al l than t o hav e the m i n such num bers a s we have. MONTAIGNE, "Of Experience "

In th e hear t o f Boulder , Colorado , nestle d agains t th e ver y spo t where th e hig h plain s disappea r abruptly int o th e foothill s o f th e Rocky Mountains , Alfalfa' s Marke t represent s th e cultura l epicen ter o f wha t th e native s refe r to , withou t apparen t irony , a s "ou r healthy Boulde r lifestyle. " Here one can purchase dairy-fre e chees e and whea t gras s lemonade; her e the glistenin g breast s of free range chickens—birds we can onl y hop e chos e poulterer-assiste d suicid e —offer themselve s up t o thos e o f u s wh o stil l ea t animals . (Twin bumper sticker s spotte d o n a Volvo i n Alfalfa' s parkin g lot : "Pro child, Pro-choice " an d "Friend s Don' t Le t Friend s Ea t Meat. " I wonder fo r a disorienting moment i f the car' s owner sanction s th e eating of unborn herbivores.) Wander th e richl y laden aisles of Alfalfa's an d you wil l encounte r beautiful, recentl y divorced women of a certain age, their voice s ful l of money, their face s alread y beginning to suffe r fro m th e wrinkled, emaciated loo k tha t eventually marks everyone who worships at th e shrine of the ubiquitous and unappeasable god "Health." Here , too , 27

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you will find Boulder's college students , well-heeled hippies accompanied b y thei r babushka-cla d dogs , buyin g th e $3 0 pe r poun d smoked salmon they will carry back to the communa l condominium in ne w Rang e Rover s an d Saabs . Their bumpe r sticke r o f choice : "Live Simply So Others May Simply Live." Shopping a t Alfalfa' s i s an ethicall y and intellectuall y challenging task. It seems every other item advertises itself as organically grown, or pesticide free, o r gathered unde r humane conditions (human e for whom i s no t specified) . Th e heretofor e simpl e ac t o f buyin g egg s has come t o require the interpretation o f a rigorous mora l code that regulates jealousl y what befor e wer e considere d fairl y unproblem atic acts. It i s all very much lik e th e Boo k of Leviticus, excep t here the wrath of the God o f Israel has been replaced by snide looks fro m Birkenstock-clad trus t fun d babie s wh o otherwis e spen d thei r un limited leisur e tim e worryin g abou t cholestero l levels , th e Dala i Lama, and the price of IBM. Boulder, i t woul d appear , is being transforme d int o a littl e Nir vana fo r a certain discret e secto r o f the America n upper class . Th e town i s fas t becomin g a kin d o f fantas y cam p fo r agin g yuppies : stereotypical limousin e liberals with bottomless reservoir s o f empathy fo r everyon e wh o can' t affor d t o liv e within a n hour' s driv e of these blesse d environs . Ope n spac e laws both ensur e tha t th e pric e of housing stays astronomica l an d th e populatio n remain s more o r less al l white; ferociou s anti-smokin g ordinance s ar e enforce d wit h unrelenting zeal ; and the loca l constabulary makes sure the panhan dling Deadheads on the mall don't interfere with one's legal right t o buy a $1,500 Navajo blanket, or anythin g els e a person migh t nee d to climb the north face o f K2, or at least look like he might . Alfalfa's Marke t function s a s the spiritua l center o f that informa l but vigorou s hedonisti c cult , Ou r Health y Boulde r Lifestyle . It s credo i s disarmingl y simple : i f yo u ea t onl y what' s goo d fo r you , exercise with monk-lik e devotion, and avoi d unreasonable risks, you will neve r die . O n pleasan t days—whic h means almos t ever y day; that, too , i s par t o f OHBL—initiate s o f th e cul t strol l th e down town pedestria n mall , searching for the perfec t latte, "marked" wit h a hin t o f foam . Watchin g thes e idea l specimen s o f Nordi c healt h

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and goo d look s I notice everyon e seem s to be a sort of light golden color, lik e extras from a Leni Riefenstah l epic. In Boulde r th e ubermensch ha s bee n transforme d int o a sociall y conscientious shopper . It' s 3:3 0 on a Wednesday, and I'm reminde d of Michael Moore's commen t a t th e beginnin g o f his documentar y film, Roger an d Me. Th e so n o f a n autoworker , h e survey s various denizens of the Sa n Francisco caf e se t whiling awa y the languorou s hours o f anothe r weekda y afternoon an d ask s himself, Doesn 't anybody here have a job? No, actually . Emblazoned abov e th e mai n entranc e o f Alfalfa' s i s th e Alfalf a risk-free guarantee : "Your Alfalfa's shopping experience i s risk-fre e an d 100% guaranteed." W e ar e furthe r assure d tha t althoug h "man y o f our choices may be new and unfamiliar to you," we are permitted t o experiment to our hearts' content . If any element o f our experimen tation goe s wrong—if , fo r example , we fin d ourselve s revolte d b y dairy-free cheese—w e ca n retur n ou r purchas e an d receiv e a "n o hassle" refund. "S o take your shopping cart and your tast e buds on a new adventure—risk free." Here w e encounte r th e apotheosi s o f th e regulator y state , an d indeed th e whol e poin t o f striving t o achiev e tota l juridica l satura tion: the final elimination of risk itself. The goo d citizen s of Boulder may spen d al l da y danglin g fro m th e shee r roc k fac e o f a loca l canyon, or they may enliven the evening by ingesting hallucinogenic mushrooms befor e driving back up that canyon without remember ing to turn o n their headlights , but i f they should b e so unfortunate as to purchase a bruised apricot, they retain, if they made that choice at Alfalfa's , a n unimpeachabl e lega l righ t t o retur n i t fo r a ful l refund. There' s a rule, you see , that says they can . Oh, i f only al l of life coul d b e like shoppin g at Alfalfa's! Wh y isn' t lif e itsel f ris k fre e and 10 0 percent guaranteed ? And indee d i f you liv e in som e plac e as aggressivel y Utopia n as Boulder , wher e everyon e own s a turbo charged Saa b equipped with a ski rack and tw o enormous dogs , you may actually expect an answer to this question. Asserting th e inalienabl e right t o th e pursui t o f some versio n o f hedonistic immortalit y is one commo n reactio n t o th e shee r point lessness of so much of modern life . Th e urg e t o regulate—t o med-

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icalize, juridif y an d polic e ever y ac t o f labo r o r play—i s in par t a contemporary by-produc t o f the nee d t o dea l wit h th e los s o f any broadly held belie f regardin g wha t th e poin t o f huma n existenc e might entail . The ide a seems to b e that , i f we no longe r hav e any sense of why we should choos e t o liv e in thi s or tha t fashion , le t us at leas t mak e thes e meaningles s "lifestyl e choices" a s properly in formed consumers . The crypti c message of American consumer culture could thus be decoded as , "Feelin g existentia l dread ? Bu y something! " A par ticularly extrem e manifestatio n o f thi s tendenc y i s th e magazin e Consumer Reports, wit h its unconscious and apparentl y arbitrary ideological commitmen t t o puttin g th e suppose d right s o f consumer s always and everywher e before th e interest s o f producers, whomever they might be . This, we are t o assume , is the America n Way. Read Consumer Reports an d yo u wil l be tol d whic h flavo r o f chocolate ice cream tastes best, along with a helpful descriptio n of what chocolate ice crea m i s "supposed " t o tast e like . Never wil l you, th e full y in formed consumer , choos e th e extravagan t creaminess o f Haagen Dazs when—for seventeen cents less!—you could have experienced the sociall y conscious goodnes s o f Messers . Be n & Jerry, wh do good b y tasting good. In quests such as these do we squander h rs, days, and years. The ultimat e dream of our contemporary regulator s i s to harness technology so that every choice, no matter how trivial, can be imagined t o b e the choic e of the full y cognizan t and freel y choosin g lib eral individua l self . G o ahea d an d bu y tha t pin t o f Haagen-Daz s Chocolate Chocolate-Chip : on e da y soon, afte r yo u hav e struggled to ope n th e ne w safety-sealed lid, a holographic image— a veritable regulatory homunculus—wil l spring fort h t o lectur e yo u o n what , precisely, this gastronomic indulgenc e is doing to your arteries , and what you could have done with the seventee n cents Consumer Reports wants to help you save. And remember: it will all be done so that you can freely make the choice that the hedonistic puritans who regulate our live s hav e alread y determine d t o b e th e right choice , th e "healthy" choice of conscientious citizens everywhere. "Cigarettes ar e ba d fo r you, " note s Richar d Klein , "tha t i s why

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they are so good." The char m o f the sublime, life-wrecking narcoti c that is tobacco remain s wholly opaque to Boulder's local Committee for Public Safety , who have made it almost impossible to have a legal smoke anywher e within th e town. Eve n bar s have been transforme d into "atmosphericall y healthfu l environments, " whic h whe n yo u think abou t i t makes little more sens e than requirin g brothel s t o be havens o f chastity. A few months ag o a small scandal erupted whe n a loca l productio n of the pla y Grand Hotel was threatene d wit h municipal sanction s fo r allowin g a n acto r on-stag e tw o o r thre e puffs o f a cigarette , fo r th e sak e o f th e drama' s mise-en-scene. Th e theater's owne r reacte d by threatening to—wha t else?—sue the city, for violatin g the First Amendmen t no less. I myself , having been i n thi s regard emasculate d b y the voice s of my so-calle d education , fin d i t impossibl e t o smoke . I thu s prett y much limi t my attempts t o engage i n what used to be known i n the police state s o f the Easter n Blo c as "anti-social behavior " t o occa sionally concoctin g on e large , ver y col d martini—wha t in a mor e civilized er a E . B . Whit e referre d t o a s "th e elixi r o f quietude. " (Instructions: th e nigh t befor e your symposium , put shaker , glasses, and Bombay gin in the freezer . Mix four parts gi n to one part Noill y Pratt, over ic e that is cold enoug h t o giv e off wisps of smoky vapor when i t make s contac t wit h th e air . Serv e wit h a twis t o f lemon. ) This mixture is guaranteed to transport th e soul into region s of contemplative clarity , region s tha t remai n utterl y inaccessibl e t o wor shipers o f the bitc h goddes s Health . Speaking of which, I have bro ken—definitively—with m y previou s flame , Winona . An d why ? Simply because Uma, bestowe r o f blessings, smoke s thre e pack s of Marlboros per day, lending her voice a raffish, Bacallesqu e charm no straight ma n can resist. Welcome to the Working Week Reader, i f your da y is at al l like mine your alar m goes of f at some thing lik e 6:1 7 A.M . As yo u stumbl e towar d it s digita l glo w i t i s worth reflectin g o n th e fac t tha t unti l ver y recentl y ther e wa s no

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such thing as "6:17 A.M." For almos t all of human history, people go t up aroun d dawn , or towar d th e middl e of the morning , o r were late risers. The sor t o f regulatory exactitud e made possible by the con cept "6:17" is yet another o f the dubious advances that technologica l progress ha s bestowe d upo n th e contemporar y world . Becaus e of such advance s in huma n consciousnes s you kno w yo u hav e exactly forty-three minute s befor e yo u mus t depar t you r domicil e fo r th e place o f your employment . Withi n tha t tim e yo u wil l perfor m th e series o f comple x ablution s require d o f a well-socialize d individual of you r statio n i n life , an d yo u wil l do n tha t delicatel y calibrated semiotic system—you r clothes—tha t represen t t o it s othe r mem bers your precis e position withi n a n invisible but comple x hierarchy. You will then head for the freedo m of the ope n road . Driving t o work , you pas s an automati c speed monitorin g devic e that announce s yo u ar e movin g a t precisely twelv e mile s pe r hou r above th e poste d limit . As you slo w t o seve n miles abov e th e limi t (the exac t speed at which you calculate no office r wil l ever stop you) you ar e nearl y run of f th e roa d b y a truc k tha t feature s a toll-fre e number unde r the legend "Ho w A m I Driving? (W e Hire Only Saf e and Courteou s Drivers). " Yo u remembe r wit h a pan g o f mingle d guilt an d annoyanc e tha t th e deadlin e for th e car' s annua l require d emissions tes t ha s passed ; you the n circl e i n a parking lo t fo r nin e minutes becaus e the only available spaces are three o f the eigh t new ones you r employe r i s no w legall y required t o reserv e fo r handi capped individuals, but that in fac t ar e usually occupied b y the vehi cles of various able-bodied persons who have the temerit y t o declare themselves "disabled. " Once a t you r des k you fin d tha t you r superviso r expect s yo u t o spend al l da y generatin g memorand a designe d t o documen t th e many derelictions of a co-worker who , becaus e he can no longe r b e fired without wha t the lega l system will recogniz e a s "just cause" — and really , who bu t a misanthrope coul d objec t t o suc h a transpar ently fai r requirement?—cling s to hi s sinecure wit h al l the tenacit y of a python. He, lik e most othe r members o f the smal l class of per sons wh o th e fir m eve r actuall y fires, will eventuall y sue th e com pany fo r wrongfu l discharge , despit e th e hundred s o f hour s tha t

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have been spen t o n mind-numbingly bureaucrati c tasks designed t o gather evidenc e indicating why it was imperative thei r employmen t be "terminated. " This particular task is especially aggravating to you because by the end o f th e wee k yo u mus t draf t a memorandu m fo r th e firm' s lawyers, describin g i n ric h detai l all the risk s involved i n th e firm' s development of a new product. The purpos e of this memorandum is to allow the lawyer s to produce th e legall y required prospectu s tha t will announc e a ne w stoc k offerin g b y th e firm' s paren t company . The lega l system' s justificatio n fo r thi s requiremen t i s tha t th e prospectus wil l give investors th e informatio n the y nee d t o mak e a rational investmen t decision . Th e firm' s lawyers , however , hav e already told you to make the risks associated with the issuance of the stock soun d muc h mor e sever e tha n the y actuall y ar e because , as they explai n it, th e institutionalize d habi t of risk-avers e lawyer s of putting grim-soundin g warning s i n prospectu s literatur e ha s made investors almos t completel y indifferen t t o suc h warnings . Because this kind o f lawyerly boilerplate is so commonplace it no longer ha s any real informational value and is therefore ignored . An d precisely because it i s ignored, th e lawyer s explain, there i s no rea l disincen tive t o producin g undul y pessimisti c warning s tha t ca n late r b e cited, i f necessary , fo r th e propositio n tha t investor s wer e "full y informed" of the risk s involved in their investmen t decision . You the n fin d yoursel f spendin g twent y minute s o f you r lunc h hour arguin g wit h som e poo r telephoni c drone , wh o i s technicall y the representative o f the insurance company that is supposed to pro vide your family' s medica l benefits. This conversation, which will be replicated severa l thousan d time s thi s da y al l acros s America , i s a product of the following game-theoretical dilemma . Insured person s realize tha t becaus e the y pa y fo r covere d medica l car e i n advance, they hav e ever y incentiv e t o exploi t th e inevitabl e ambiguitie s an d loopholes tha t aris e i n th e extremel y comple x rul e system s o f modern insuranc e regimes, thereb y makin g sure th e insuranc e cov ers a s many medica l costs a s possible. Insuranc e companie s are , o f course, awar e of these sam e incentives; henc e the y ofte n follo w a n informal policy of simply refusing, as an initial matter, to pay for any

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medical cost s whatsoever. The tw o groups then engag e in strategic posturing via the agenc y of the telephoni c drones , eac h citing a n inexhaustible supply of rules, policies, procedures, administrativ e reg ulations, an d s o on, an d intermittentl y threatenin g eac h othe r wit h formal lega l action. By th e day' s end yo u wil l joi n million s o f similarl y situated per sons emergin g fro m tower s o f glas s that , a t precisel y 5:0 7 ever y afternoon, disgorg e river s o f thei r exquisitel y regulated occupants . You are "free," now, to hea d for your hom e an d family : venue s that are themselve s becomin g mor e an d mor e permeabl e t o variou s rapidly proliferatin g networks o f bureaucrati c imperatives . Indeed, although you r spous e aske d you t o pic k up a pint o f Haagen-Daz s on your way home, eve n now a voice from th e car' s radio is intoning that th e Cente r fo r th e Eliminatio n o f Socially Irresponsible Pleas ure ha s determine d a pint o f gourme t ic e crea m contain s more fa t than twenty-tw o strip s o f bacon , s o o n furthe r reflectio n perhap s you shoul d bu y som e 9 7 percen t fat-fre e SnackWel l Bars , 10 0 percent guarantee d to mimic the flavor of real chocolate... . This is our moder n panopticon . This is a world so saturated wit h juridical and quasi-juridical imperatives that there i s almost no social interaction no t subjec t to possible surveillance and regulation via the agencies of the state . All of us might a s well be walking around wit h toll-free number s o n ou r backs , under the legen d "Ho w A m I Liv ing? (W e Socializ e Only Docil e an d Complian t Citizens). " Despit e our culture' s continuou s celebratio n o f human freedom, and despit e the libertaria n rhetoric o f "choice" that pervade s the propagand a t o which th e citizen-consume r i s continually exposed , yo u an d I , dea r reader, posses s considerabl y les s freedo m tha n w e migh t imagine . Indeed, ther e ar e day s whe n th e juridica l saturatio n o f ou r live s ensures w e hav e fewe r rea l choice s tha n a free-rang e chicken . W e are all fast becomin g slaves , as it were, of modernity and its obiquitous rules. The origina l Panoptico n wa s th e Englis h philosophe r Jerem y Bentham's mode l penitentiary . Bentham' s ide a wa s t o construc t a prison withi n which it would be possible, by means of rendering th e prisoners' cell s transparen t t o a centra l observatio n point , fo r th e

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wardens t o observ e al l th e inmate s al l th e time . Miche l Foucaul t describes its function: "to induc e i n th e inmat e a state of consciou s and permanen t visibilit y that assure s the automati c functionin g of power. S o to arrang e things tha t the surveillance is permanent in its effects, eve n i f i t i s discontinuous i n it s action. " Suc h observation s remind u s how the moder n stat e doe s not exercis e power primarily through th e over t deploymen t o f force (the polic e officer' s gun , th e sheriff's evictio n notice , th e barbe d wire atop th e wal l of the "cor rectional facility") , but throug h the internalization of its imperatives. A key element in this process of internalization is the juridical saturation o f social space: the proces s b y which all of us are made mor e or less continuously aware that we inhabit and move through a space full o f legal and quasi-lega l commands. Indeed by comparison to Bentham's relatively modest scheme the modern panopticon' s ambition s ar e almos t unlimited : fo r althoug h the inherent limitations of law ensure it will always be a rather crude social steerin g mechanism , this ha s not stoppe d th e hypertrophie d rationalism of modern lega l thought fro m tryin g to bring more and more o f human life unde r what it imagines to be law's benign gaze. In contemporary America it often seems that everything not actu ally prohibited i s required; indeed, as a practical matter many things are simultaneousl y prohibited an d required. Thi s curiou s parado x arises, i n part , becaus e o f evidentiar y problem s an d conceptua l incommensurabilities tha t mus t plagu e any social coordination an d dispute processing system . As we will see, such intractable problems ensure tha t attempts t o creat e anythin g approachin g a comprehen sive legal regime mus t lead inevitably to such paradoxical outcomes. Consider the following scenario: suppose I am an administrator a t a state-sponsore d la w school . A mal e studen t begin s wearin g a T-shirt to class emblazoned with a vaguely political message that many other students, especiall y women, find disturbingly sexist and offen sive. Wha t ca n (must? ) I d o abou t this ? Th e lega l schola r Danie l Farber note s that such a situation will be governed initiall y by First Amendment "publi c forum " doctrine s tha t divid e publi c propert y into various different sort s of public forums, with different analytica l tests relevan t to the analysi s of each one. Now a s Farber point s out ,

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these multi-par t test s ar e s o notoriousl y vagu e an d contradictor y that i t is widely acknowledged the y ca n provide littl e rea l guidanc e to th e harrie d administrato r tryin g conscientiousl y t o follo w "th e law." But thi s i s just th e beginnin g of the administrator' s problems . For i f one cour t decides , on whatever grounds, tha t th e wearin g of the shir t i s a for m o f constitutionall y protecte d conduct , anothe r court in reviewing that judgment may well—given the vagueness of the relevan t constitutiona l la w doctrines—declar e thi s sam e con duct t o b e no t onl y unprotecte d bu t actuall y illegal, unde r equally vague civil rights la w doctrines designe d to protec t th e complainin g students fro m a "hostile educationa l environment. " Farber's poin t i s that thes e various legal "tests " are so amorphous that administrator s can' t determin e with any real confidence whether the y ar e require d t o intervene , ar e require d no t to intervene , o r might eve n conceivabl y hav e som e discretio n i n th e matter . While certainly vali d a s fa r a s i t goes , thi s criticis m doesn' t addres s tw o deeper problems. First, Farbe r seem s to assume it would be possible for th e lega l system t o regulat e this sor t o f social conflict i n a more rational wa y by simply generating mor e determinat e rules . Bu t th e vagueness of the rule s isn' t merel y a product of bureaucrati c arro gance an d incompetenc e (whic h i n an y cas e ar e themselve s in eliminable factors in any complex system of dispute processing): tha t vagueness i s als o th e unavoidabl e consequenc e o f a n essentia l tension betwee n th e clashin g valu e systems—crudel y speaking , between libertaria n an d communitaria n norms—thes e rule s ar e attempting t o mediate . Th e rule s ar e vague precisel y because the y are attemptin g t o regulat e conduc t withi n wha t I wil l throughou t this boo k refe r t o a s a n "equilibriu m zone. " Social , political , an d legal equilibriu m zone s aris e wheneve r publi c dispute s implicat e powerful competin g ideologica l visions—visions that are themselves the product s o f axiomati c politica l an d mora l beliefs . Ou r funda mental belief s abou t suc h matters ar e b y their natur e no t amenable to rationa l analysi s or disputation ; indeed , a s Richar d Posne r ha s pointed out , suc h beliefs must always "live below reason and are no t the less worthy fo r doing so. " Second, as we will see in the next chapter, th e competing ideolog -

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ical vision s tha t alway s manifest themselve s withi n socia l an d po litical equilibriu m zone s can be counted o n t o produc e both sever e evidentiary problem s an d radicall y incommensurabl e conceptua l understandings regarding th e lega l materials at issue. These in tur n result i n lega l situations wher e i t wil l literally be th e cas e that , a s a practical matter, a particular action will be both required and forbid den. Give n th e stat e o f the relevan t lega l rule s it i s possible—and perhaps eve n probable—tha t i n ou r hypothetica l cas e the administrator wil l be foun d b y a cour t t o hav e violated th e constitutiona l rights o f the studen t fo r refusin g initially to allo w him t o wea r th e shirt, an d then wil l be held responsible b y another cour t for violating the civi l rights o f the offende d student s b y allowing the shir t t o be worn. So it isn' t merely tha t th e administrato r i s functioning in a social space wher e al l freedo m o f actio n ha s bee n subverte d b y compre hensive juridica l requirements . Th e deepe r proble m i s tha t th e rationalist goa l o f constructin g comprehensiv e regulator y scheme s designed to eliminate fundamental social conflict will lead inevitably to paradoxica l overlaps and conceptua l discontinuitie s in the officia l interpretation o f thos e regulations . An d thos e interpretiv e para doxes will in turn produce absurd social situations in which it is literally n o longer possible fo r eve n th e mos t prudent , best-intentione d person to obey "the law." The rationalis t reactio n t o thi s dilemm a is straightforward: keep doing what we're doing, only more so. Technocratic planners , total izing socia l theorists , enthusiasti c architect s o f ne w an d bette r bureaucracies—all mimi c the medieva l barber whos e respons e t o a patient's deteriorating condition i s always to open another vein. Recently a well-known la w professor wrot e a review essa y com menting o n a book tha t too k a dim view of the regulator y excesse s and inefficiencies tha t characterize th e moder n administrativ e state . After admittin g th e autho r ha d made a number o f telling points, th e reviewer proceeded i n the Pavlovia n fashion of the doggedl y helpfu l legal academi c t o sugges t hi s ow n solutio n t o thi s problem : a n administrative agency that would promulgate regulation s governin g the promulgation o f regulations by all other administrativ e agencies.

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Such circumlocutions , immun e a s they ar e t o parody , ar e degen erate heirs to the gran d visions of the self-proclaimed "lega l realists " who believe d tha t la w shoul d she d wha t Feli x Cohe n calle d th e "transcendental nonsense " o f its conceptual metaphysics an d replace formalist sophistr y wit h th e pursui t o f rationa l technocrati c plan ning.* Th e realis t visio n o f la w has sinc e bee n elaborate d o n i n a more overtl y politicize d vein by the critica l legal studies movement , which fo r a brie f tim e i n th e 1980 s scandalize d America n la w schools wit h a peculia r combinatio n o f intellectua l audacit y an d new-left sloganeering , an d whic h wa s responsibl e fo r th e insight / slogan "Law is politics." An d although th e ide a critical legal studie s meant t o convey by that phras e is undoubtedly true—and is , more over, tru e fo r al l legal systems everywhere—thi s formula has inad vertently helpe d obscur e a mor e loca l an d henc e mor e relevan t insight, applicabl e especially to the presen t state of American law. Politics Is Law By the phras e "Law i s politics," th e critica l legal studies movemen t meant t o asser t tha t al l legal decisions were merel y part of a special category o f political decisions , and henc e ha d t o b e justified o n th e basis of essentially political argument, rathe r tha n via formal deduction. Th e suppose d neutralit y of la w was always a mask fo r a con tingent an d potentiall y controversia l exercis e o f stat e power ; an d therefore particula r exercise s o f tha t powe r coul d no t b e justifie d adequately o n th e self-referentia l grounds tha t th e la w required it . "The logica l conclusio n of this trai n of thought was reached by Fred Rodell, a Yale Law Schoo l professo r wh o ha s th e dua l distinctio n o f producing the mos t ap t com ment eve r mad e abou t lega l academi c writin g ("Ther e ar e tw o thing s wron g wit h almost al l legal writing . One i s its style. Th e othe r i s its content."), and o f authoring Woe Unto You, Lawyers!, described b y Richard Posne r as "the wors t book ever written by a professo r a t a majo r la w school." Rodel l wante d t o mak e th e practic e o f la w a crime, an d to replace courts entirely with commission s o f bureaucratic experts.

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As one o f the movement' s guru s (Dunca n Kennedy ) put it , "there is never a correc t lega l solutio n t o a proble m tha t i s other tha n th e correct ethical an d political solutio n t o that lega l problem." Now i n a sense this statemen t seem s self-evident. Who coul d have imagined that a n institutionalize d deploymen t o f stat e powe r (law ) could b e justified o n ground s tha t wer e no t deepl y parasiti c on som e mor e fundamental theor y o f politica l an d mora l obligation ? The answe r to thi s question , unfortunately , was " a larg e numbe r o f American legal academics. " S o in fac t th e critica l legal studies movement per formed a useful servic e by reminding legal thinkers tha t la w always and everywher e is by necessity a specialized form o f political action. Yet thi s valuabl e insight ha s i n it s ow n wa y mad e i t mor e diffi cult for legal thinkers t o appreciate that the converse need not hold. There i s no logica l o r practica l reaso n wh y politics mus t b e a spe cialized for m o f law . Th e denia l o f thi s assertion , however , ma y well be the centra l tene t of American legal ideology. The ide a that political powe r i s legitimate only t o th e exten t thi s powe r i s chan neled through lega l procedures, vocabularies, and modes of though t is such a n integra l par t o f both elit e an d popula r America n politi cal culture that thi s ide a migh t well be the ke y to what is meant b y that obscur e oracula r phrase, "the rul e of law." Indeed th e eminen t legal philosophe r Ronal d Dworki n ha s gon e s o fa r a s to den y tha t ordinary interes t grou p politic s hav e an y politica l legitimacy — unless, tha t is , the politica l compromise s suc h group s reac h can be made consonan t wit h " a single , coheren t se t o f principles, " whos e content mus t b e determine d b y non e othe r tha n federa l judges . How thes e judge s will manage to perform , in th e cours e o f sorting out th e quotidia n detail s o f civi l an d crimina l litigation , a n intel lectual fea t tha t ha s elude d al l politica l thinker s fo r severa l thou sand year s is left unexplained . Even mor e mysteriou s i s the answe r to th e questio n o f wh y anyon e woul d believ e that a grou p o f civil service bureaucrats , whos e professiona l educatio n an d experienc e has been focused on th e interpretatio n o f a necessarily parochial set of forma l rules , woul d hav e an y particula r insigh t int o suc h pro found matters .

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But Professo r Dworki n i s fa r fro m alon e i n hi s faith . Conside r how American s lov e t o clai m the y hat e politics , despis e politi cians, an d loath e lawyers . Indeed, th e mos t commo n insul t hurle d at thos e wh o addres s a questio n o f publi c controversy i s that the y are "playin g politics " wit h th e issue . O f cours e o n a superficia l level this phrase merely means to assert that suc h persons ar e interested primaril y i n th e aggrandizemen t o f thei r ow n o r thei r group's power , rathe r tha n i n th e merit s o f the issu e itself . Yet the phrase's ver y ubiquit y convey s a deepe r cultura l meaning . Accus ing someon e o f "playin g politics " ca n als o b e translate d t o mea n something lik e "everyon e know s wha t commo n sens e an d basi c fairness requir e i n thi s situation ; you , however , ar e politicizing th e issue, an d thu s contaminatin g i t wit h ideologica l considerations , rather tha n simpl y advocatin g wha t everyon e know s i s th e righ t thing to do. " Even relativel y sophisticated venue s fo r politica l argumen t ofte n convey thi s particula r subtextual message. A recent editoria l in the highbrow opinio n journa l The New Republic condemne d Bo b Dole' s proposed ta x cut o n th e ground s tha t Dole' s descriptio n o f his pro posal as comprising "a flatter, fairer tax " was "oxymoronic." Now a n oxymoron i s a statemen t tha t contain s a logica l contradiction . B y contrast, we might defin e a "moron" a s a person who believe s questions involvin g matter s o f dee p social controversy ca n b e answered syllogistically* Afte r all , thi s woul d b e tru e onl y i f "everyone " "knew" tha t th e majo r premis e o f suc h a logica l argumen t wa s in fact correct . Bu t o f course th e reaso n question s lik e these ar e matters of deep social controversy in th e first place is that the y can't b e resolved b y recourse t o eithe r logica l o r empirica l argument . Thi s inconvenient fac t i n tur n reduce s everyon e t o employin g wha t ap pear t o b e rhetoricall y camouflage d emotiv e arguments , i n th e course o f whic h "elementar y logic, " "th e facts, " "commo n sense, " "public reason, " an d tha t perennia l favorite "th e Constitution " will *That is , majo r premise : progressiv e ta x rate s ar e faire r tha n flatte r ta x rates ; minor premise : Dole's pla n calls for flatter , faire r taxes ; conclusion : Dole' s plan con tains a logical contradiction. This reasoning is impeccable—as far as it goes.

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all be enliste d i n a doomed campaig n t o convinc e one' s benighted opponents t o see the erro r o f their ways . Americans hate politics because politics happe n at just those junc tures o f social equilibriu m wher e th e invocatio n o f such normativ e terms doesn' t work . W e ca n i n a sense "prove " slaver y is wrong b y pointing t o th e socia l fac t tha t ther e i s no meaningfu l support fo r the idea that it isn't. This social fact can then b e used to construct a n apparently compellin g argumen t tha t slaver y is immoral. Th e use lessness o f suc h insight s fo r th e resolutio n o f liv e politica l con troversies shoul d b e self-evident . Ye t we remai n entrance d b y th e rationalist conceit tha t matter s o f deep political conflict are usefull y amenable to rationa l argument . Henc e we accuse those with who m we disagre e of "playing politics " wit h importan t issue s when, i n all truth, wha t els e coul d the y (o r we ) do ? American s hate lawyer s as well; in par t becaus e we pay lawyers to den y the intractabl e natur e of significan t political questions , whic h o f cours e aggravate s us n o end whe n we fin d th e lawyer s on som e sid e o f a n issu e other tha n our own. But—at leas t b y compariso n t o thei r feeling s fo r lawyer s an d politicians—Americans lov e judges . Thi s shoul d b e quit e a littl e mystery. After al l judges are in essence nothin g more tha n a n espe cially politicize d subclas s of lawyers . The socia l role w e giv e the m requires judges to dispose of the most intractable socia l and politica l disputes b y essentiall y arbitrar y act s o f fiat, while at th e sam e tim e claiming their decision s are impelled by "the law " or "ou r constitu tional traditions," or "fundamenta l rights inheren t i n the concep t of ordered liberty," or some similar magic phrase. And yet, despit e intermitten t moanin g abou t judicia l tyranny and government b y judiciary , Americans sho w a remarkabl e toleranc e for bein g sat on by this specia l class of bureaucratized politicians. T o paraphrase Stalin , ho w man y division s d o th e court s have ? Th e courts ar e lio n tamers , wit h thei r flims y chair s an d ornamenta l whips, an d th e peopl e ar e lions , wh o wit h a flic k o f a pa w coul d obliterate thei r putativ e masters . Wh y the n ar e we so docile ? I s i t the priestl y robes ? The obscurantis t jargon ? The shee r inerti a tha t always underlie s institutionalize d authority ? N o doub t al l thes e

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things pla y a par t i n maintainin g th e mas s hypnosi s tha t support s legal authorit y i n general , an d judicia l powe r i n particular , bu t w e can also surmise more profoun d cultura l tendencies are at work. "Man canno t exis t withou t bowin g befor e something, " wrot e Dostoyevsky. "Le t hi m rejec t God an d he will bow before an idol. " What Arthur Lef f referre d to as "the remarkabl y unappetizing idea" that "w e ar e al l we have " i s something tha t unconsciousl y terrifies the votaries of the rule of law. Judges ar e the oracles of that cult; and the denia l of their access to the special wisdom of the law—to whatever hidde n lod e o f knowledg e supposedl y allow s them t o resolv e profound politica l conflic t withou t resor t t o ra w socia l power — would require that we face up to the existential dread engendered by any cognizanc e of our tru e situation . This we are not goin g t o do . Hence ou r willingnes s to allo w matters o f great publi c controvers y to be jammed a s a matter of course into the intellectuall y impoverished languag e o f th e law , wit h al l it s methodologicall y useles s "three-part tests, " its rationally inexplicable feats of "interest balanc ing," an d its conclusory invocation of such god-terms a s "legal principles," "substantial justice," and "the Constitution." * Our publi c cultures featur e man y modes o f legal faith, an d many diverse sects worship a t law's shrine. Fo r example , nothing coul d be more inaccurat e tha n th e laz y assumptio n o f th e polic y elite s tha t groups such as the Freeme n an d the various militia movements rep resent anarchisti c "anti-government" tendencies . If anything, th e socalled anti-governmen t force s o f th e radica l righ t ar e amon g th e '"Many o f [our ] 'observations' ar e bu t implication s o f the particula r terminolog y in term s of which th e observation s are made . . . perhaps the simples t illustration of this point is to be got by contrasting secular and theological terminologies of motives. If you want to operate, like a theologian, with a terminology that includes 'God' as its key term, the onl y sure way to d o so is to pu t i n the term , and that's that. The Bibl e solves th e proble m by puttin g 'God' int o th e firs t sentence—an d fro m thi s initia l move, many implications 'necessarily' follow .. . I have called metaphysics 'coy theology' because the metaphysician ofte n introduce s the term 'God' no t outright, as with the Bible , but b y beginning with a term that ambiguously contain s such implications." Kenneth Burke , Language as Symbolic Action,

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most fanatical devotee s of legal authority among us. Indeed, nea r the end o f their confrontatio n wit h the FB I (in what was always referred to as the "self-proclaimed" Township of Justus, a locution tha t surel y suggests th e question , "Wha t othe r kin d i s there?") i t was reporte d that the Freemen were worshipping the Constitution like an idol. Such groups have elaborate ideological or rather theological justi fications fo r th e primac y of what they thin k o f as the commo n law , the Constitution, an d the inalienable rights o f men. It is tempting t o marginalize suc h person s a s merely quasi-religiou s extremists ; an d some new s accounts o f the Freeme n standof f tende d t o d o di d just that. Yet consider the broade r implications of the followin g description, provide d b y Dr . J. Philli p Arnold , directo r o f th e Religion Crisis Tas k Forc e i n Houston , wh o a s a specialist in extremis t an d apocalyptic religions was called on b y the FB I to hel p end th e con frontation. Arnol d describe d th e Freeme n a s an extremis t religio n for severa l reasons : they wer e willin g to di e fo r thei r beliefs ; the y were suspiciou s o f outsiders ; the y possesse d a sacre d territor y ("Justus Township"); they believed in sacred scripture, including the Bible, Magna Carta, Declaration of Independence, and United State s Constitution; the y recognized th e higher authority of both Go d and their lega l interpretations; an d they conducte d text-centere d rituals , such a s writing out writs, affidavits , an d liens . "Religion nowaday s is a mor e expansiv e term tha n i t wa s thirt y years ago, " Dr . Arnol d explained . "Ther e ar e som e peopl e wh o don't tal k abou t God , Buddha , Jesus o r th e Bible , who ar e never theless religiously committed t o an ideology." Indeed. This certainly can't b e doubte d b y anyon e wh o ha s eve r see n America n la w pro fessors pourin g ove r every jot an d tittle o f the Constitution , search ing fo r answer s their fait h tell s the m mus t li e ami d th e recondit e symbols o f tha t ever-changing , never-changin g ancien t text — answers tha t wil l reveal how , exactly , the mos t esoteri c conflict s of our ow n day should be regulated. Is not som e of the zea l of a righteous remnan t als o t o b e foun d amon g th e contemporar y talmud ists o f th e ACLU , wh o daven furiousl y befor e thei r ow n secula r decalogue and cry out that they shall have no gods before their God ,

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the Bil l of Rights? Words spoke n i n 1913 , at the annua l meeting o f the Missouri Bar , merely confirm wha t all Americans know must be true, i f th e interpretatio n o f ou r fundamenta l la w i s t o ris e abov e mere politics. Our grea t an d sacre d Constitution , seren e an d inviolable , stretche s its beneficen t power s ove r ou r lan d .. . lik e th e outstretche d ar m of God himsel f .. . th e peopl e o f th e Unite d State s .. . ordaine d an d established on e Suprem e Court—di e mos t rational , considerate , dis cerning, veracious , impersona l power—th e mos t candid , unaffected , conscientious, incorruptibl e powe r .. . O Marvelou s Constitution ! Magic Parchment ! Transformin g word ! Maker, Monitor, Guardian of Mankind!*

We believe in the transcendent, more-than-huma n authorit y of "the rule o f law," and b y extension o f its various fetish object s an d thei r official interpreters , becaus e the alternativ e woul d b e to accep t th e authority o f ourselve s ove r ourselves . An d tha t alternative , sadly , must remain so absurd as to represent a practical impossibility. The Anarchic Panopticon In C . S . Lewis' s nove l Ou t o f th e Silent Planet th e protagonis t Ransom, an English philologist, describe s the earth' s history of war, slavery, prostitution , an d othe r evil s t o sorns, inhabitant s o f Mars. These beings are , like humans, bnau—rational creatures—wh o ar e under th e rule of eldila, spirit-like entities analogous to earthly ideas of angels. The sorns are amaze d by the wholesal e moral corruptio n that marks human life, and speculate as to what might be its cause. *I ow e thi s quotatio n t o Professo r Henr y Monaghan' s fin e essay , "Ou r Perfec t Constitution," Vol. 5 6 Ne w York University Laiv Review, p . 35 3 (1981) . Thi s verbal apotheosis gain s a certain piquanc y when we consider that , i n th e eighty-od d year s since i t was uttered, th e constitutiona l interpretation s undertake n b y the rhapsode' s "singularly rationa l an d discernin g Court" hav e no t merel y altered th e meanin g o f "the" Constitution , bu t t o a great extent have actually inverted it .

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"They cannot help it," said the ol d sorn. "There must be rule, yet how can creature s rule themselves? Beast s must be ruled b y hnau and hnau by eldila an d eldila b y Maleldil . These creature s hav e n o eldila. The y are like one trying to lift himsel f by his own hair—or one trying to see over a whole country when he i s on a level with it—like a female trying to beget young on herself. " This passage is a nice descriptio n o f the classi c and perhap s insolu ble problem o f legal authority. "What is law," asks the lega l philosopher Phili p Soper , "tha t I shoul d obe y it? " Remarkably , there i s a widespread consensus that this question—surely the most importan t question i n th e entir e fiel d o f jurisprudence—ha s no satisfactor y answer. Th e barrier s t o suc h a n answe r ar e bot h conceptua l an d practical. As a conceptual matter , i t ha s proved very difficult t o giv e any coheren t descriptio n o f wha t woul d eve n coun t a s valid lega l authority. Fo r example , the classi c political theorie s o f the moder n West usuall y rely o n som e concep t o f th e consent o f the governe d when attemptin g t o explai n why lega l directives ar e politicall y an d ethically binding on those subjec t to them. But these account s fai l t o explain adequatel y why consentin g t o lega l rule s obligate s on e t o obey them . Th e theorie s eithe r simpl y assert that peopl e ar e obligated to keep their promises , o r point to the general utilitarian bene fits o f promis e keepin g (whic h the n raise s th e questio n o f wh y should on e alway s seek utilit y a t th e expens e o f othe r goods) , o r observe that , sociologicall y speaking , mos t peopl e ten d t o believ e they are obligated to keep their promises . These unsatisfactory replies do not eve n address the most obvious objection to theorie s o f consent, whic h is, of course, that as a matter of fac t almos t n o on e eve r actually consents t o bein g governe d b y a particular lega l regime. This practica l difficult y the n lead s to muc h intellectual wheel-spinnin g ove r theorie s o f "tacit" o r "implied " o r "constructive" consent . Suc h flimsy fictions only point us toward the fundamental weaknes s of the whol e concep t o f consent wheneve r i t is invoke d a s a linchpi n o f libera l politica l theory . Thin k o f i t thi s way: di d you "consent " to an y of the mos t importan t circumstance s

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of your life ? T o have these parents ; t o b e brought up in thi s family ; to b e indoctrinate d i n thi s faith ; t o liv e i n thi s neighborhood ; t o attend thes e schools; to be immersed in this culture; to be under the authority o f thi s government , an d al l its multifariou s lega l obligations? By the time we get around to "freely consenting" t o anything, we are in many ways no longe r capabl e of doing so—at least not i n that uncoerce d manne r i n which the autonomou s individual subject of classic liberal theory i s supposed to assent to restrictions o n his or her freedom. And ye t a s a n empirica l matter , i t remain s th e cas e tha t t o th e extent people believe in any account of legal obligation, they usually believe i n som e variatio n of th e ide a tha t i t mus t b e base d o n th e consent o f the governed . Thus other account s of legal obligation— those that , for example, stress the importance of social coordination, or presum e th e existenc e o f communitie s o f principl e o r rationa l actors—face not only the empirical problem that society never actually resembles their accounts, but th e furthe r theoretical an d practical difficult y that , unlik e i n th e cas e o f consent , almos t n o on e accepts these equall y problematic conceptual accounts as true. Today ou r lega l syste m face s a n additiona l problem : th e wide spread acceptanc e of utilitarian modes of reasoning, which has pro duced a corrosiv e instrumentalis m tha t ultimatel y undermines th e very concept of binding authority. The frigi d rationalism s of Jeremy Bentham an d hi s follower s have borne frui t i n th e ide a that la w is nothing bu t a matter o f prudent self-interest ; that, in th e words of Joseph d e Maistre, w e ar e al l merely members o f a limited liability company, who obe y certain communa l directives for just s o long as it remains in our mutua l interest t o d o so. If the cultura l myths and legal fictions that help maintain an essentiall y mystical belief in th e authority o f the stat e break down—if, i n our society , it comes to be generally recognized tha t there i s in fac t n o actua l "social contract " —then la w i s reduce d t o a strategic , consequentialis t practice : a complex exercis e i n gam e theor y tha t bind s n o on e an d forbid s nothing, unles s it can be shown to be "useful" t o pretend it does. Hence our presen t condition: we al l live i n th e mids t o f an anarchic panopticon. Bentham' s rationalist dream whereby cadres of tech -

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nocrats would maintai n a continual surveillance o f human behavio r is bein g fulfilled—an d no t onl y i n th e penitentiary . "Th e law " is everywhere: yet increasingly , la w is also nowhere a t all. For i f law is perceived a s nothin g bu t set s o f rule s deploye d t o pursu e conse quentialist purposes , the n peopl e will ignor e o r perver t thos e rule s precisely t o th e exten t necessary t o ge t wha t the y conside r goo d results. A t th e leve l o f cras s self-interest this mean s that when , fo r instance, th e governmen t issue s regulation s requirin g employer s t o provide famil y leav e time , employee s wil l dul y "game " th e rules , exploiting bot h ambiguitie s i n thei r interpretatio n an d unforeseen consequences flowin g fro m thei r applicatio n t o extrac t th e maxi mum persona l utilit y fro m th e regulator y scheme . Fo r thei r part , employers wil l reac t to thi s behavio r by treating th e regulation s as incentives t o corruption ; an d thus , rathe r tha n tryin g t o follo w th e rules i n goo d faith , the y wil l attemp t t o limi t th e enforcemen t of those rule s by every lawyerly stratagem a t their disposal. But th e effect s o f corrosiv e instrumentalis m ar e no t limite d t o such obviousl y self-intereste d behavior . Onc e th e concep t o f lega l authority ha s begu n t o collapse—onc e th e ide a o f doin g wha t is required ha s bee n replace d b y th e goa l o f doing somethin g else — then eve n action s bor n o f the mos t altruisti c motive s will help pro duce essentiall y anarchic results. A t present , th e dominan t generation o f legal academics—law professors wh o wer e socialize d in th e heady day s of the Warren Court—continuall y celebrat e that cour t and it s epigon i fo r sweepin g aside petty consideration s o f positiv e law i n orde r t o d o th e righ t thing . Bu t fo r lega l decisio n maker s "doing th e righ t thing " soo n become s a habit the y fin d difficul t t o break. That is, doing the right thing feel s a little too good—so goo d that i t becomes difficul t t o remember why , for example, a statute o r a constitutio n isn' t simpl y limite d t o som e delightfull y open-tex tured directiv e alon g th e line s o f "D o wha t substantia l justic e requires." (Indeed , typical examples of what is called "constitutiona l theory" indicate thei r academi c authors migh t b e surprise d t o dis cover the historical meaning of the U.S. Constitutio n is perhaps net quite identical with this particular phrase.) Such ecstasie s o f jurisprudentia l righteousnes s hel p corrod e th e

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sense tha t th e whol e point o f maintaining ou r enormou s syste m o f positive law , with it s hundreds o f millions of pages of text, entombing seemingl y endles s numbers o f state and federa l statutes, admin istrative regulations , executiv e orders , and , o f course , th e judicial opinions o f fifty-on e discret e jurisdictions, is to hav e some law ou t there that wil l at leas t decide a few things ahea d of time. The con temporary America n lega l syste m thu s ofte n present s u s wit h th e perverse spectacl e o f historically unprecedented amount s o f formal legal materia l bein g fo r th e mos t par t ignore d b y decisio n makers conditioned b y the dominan t ideology of the moder n la w school t o act th e par t o f th e traditiona l Islami c qaadi, wh o wa s supposed t o decide cases by "doing th e righ t thing." The qaadi, however, wasn't burdened wit h th e absur d tas k o f siftin g obsessivel y throug h a mountain o f practically irrelevant formal material s before rendering what was understood to be a particular and pragmatic judgment . W e on the other han d have managed to produce a legal system that both incurs al l th e cost s o f forma l law , an d allows the uncertaintie s o f open-textured, particularisti c judgment to eliminate mos t of the ad vantages of employing a formal disput e processing system. "Man doe s no t see k pleasure," wrote Nietzsche , "onl y th e Eng lishman does. " This characteristicall y elliptical aphorism point s t o the limitation s tha t plagu e utilitaria n account s o f human behavior . The structur e o f the anarchi c panopticon help s reveal these limita tions a s well. For man y purposes, law has been reduced to an instru mental, strategi c practic e i n whic h consideration s o f vali d lega l authority pla y no rea l role; hence th e inauthenti c flavor of so much of the juridical saturation tha t pervade s our lives . Much o f the time , law is simply something w e strive to exploit , avoid, or ignore . This, the modern panopticon' s anarchi c subtext, is a product o f the failur e of utilitaria n vision s o f moralit y to creat e a genuine communit y o f political an d lega l obligation. Ye t the ver y fac t o f th e panopticon' s existence is also a testament t o the enduring hunger fo r such a community; otherwise , why would such pragmatic peopl e as Americans are reputed t o b e subject themselves to the obsessiv e excesses of the modern regulator y state , a s well a s to th e pseudo-theologica l pre tensions of their judicial priestcraft ?

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At thi s poin t i n m y argumen t I realiz e I a m expecte d t o follo w certain convention s o f lega l academi c writing. Thes e requir e that , having given suc h an account o f our situation , I rail at the intolera ble dissonanc e an d irrationalit y tha t plagu e ou r lega l system , an d demand we face ou r true circumstances without the comforting illusions that sustai n th e system' s perceive d legitimacy. Suc h a t least is the rationalist conceit under which the modern academic labors. But what i f i t i s th e cas e tha t th e practic e o f law , the practic e o f la w teaching, and—especially—th e practice o f judging the la w all to a significant degre e requir e tha t we not perceive our actua l situation? Is tru e knowledg e reall y the goal— should i t b e th e goal—o f every discourse that claims to seek it? Perhaps the value intellectuals place on talking about th e searc h fo r truth i s more tha n a little analogou s to th e valu e footbal l player s pu t o n th e abilit y to benc h pres s 50 0 pounds. The maintenanc e o f certain illusion s may, after all , be more im portant tha n an y Promethea n insigh t th e deliberativ e pursui t o f truth might bring. As the old joke has it, a man goes to a psychiatris t and tell s hi m tha t th e man' s brother think s h e i s a chicken. When the psychiatris t ask s th e ma n wh y he doesn' t brin g hi s brothe r t o him s o tha t h e ca n b e cure d o f thi s disturbin g delusion , th e ma n replies, "I would, but I need the eggs." Let us at least hope ou r eggs will b e lai d by free-range chickens , gathere d unde r human e condi tions, and come to us both ris k free an d 10 0 percent guaranteed .

4 LEAVING LA S VEGAS I have known what the Greeks did not: uncertainty. JORGE LUI S BORGES , Th e Lottery i n Babylon

A crow d o f 15 0 me n i s gathere d aroun d a hug e televisio n screen , shouting a t th e to p o f it s collectiv e lungs . Th e scen e i s the sport s book at a gigantic La s Vegas casino, the eponymou s Mirage, an d th e occasion i s th e fina l minut e o f a colleg e footbal l game . Comin g upon thi s displa y o f unbridle d passio n a naiv e visito r assume s th e contest mus t truly be hanging in the proverbial balance. He i s in fac t correct, but not in the sense he imagines. The Universit y o f Nebraska i s about to conclude anothe r eviscer ation o f a haples s opponent , an d it s coach , Dr . To m Osborn e (th e Dr. Kevorkia n o f many a lesser colleague' s career) , ha s emptie d hi s bench. Th e fourth-strin g quarterback , a walk-on fro m som e wind swept hamle t o f th e grea t plains , i s lurchin g towar d th e goa l lin e in wha t appear s t o b e slo w motion . I f h e shoul d reac h hi s goal , Nebraska's winning margin will swell to 49 points, sending precisely half th e crow d int o temporar y ecstasy , an d th e othe r hal f int o a slough o f despond. This seemingly strange ritua l is a product o f one of the mos t inge nious invention s o f th e America n entrepreneuria l mind : th e gam bling poin t spread . The poin t sprea d allows wagers on footbal l and basketball game s t o b e mad e a t eve n odds , n o matte r ho w mis matched th e respectiv e team s migh t be . I t work s i n th e followin g way. Suppos e tha t o n a Septembe r weeken d som e colleg e footbal l powerhouse i s scheduled to annihilat e a sacrificial victim , which will for it s troubl e receiv e a nice paycheck . Gambling emporium s the n

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duly establish a "line," a number that they estimat e will produce a n equal numbe r o f bet s o n eac h team . Le t u s sa y th e numbe r i s Nebraska minu s 43 . Thi s mean s tha t fo r th e gamble r wit h hi s money on Nebraska t o collect o n his bet, the vaunted Cornhusker s must win the gam e by more tha n 43 points. Conversely, if he places his mone y on th e underdog , th e sacrificia l victi m mus t no t los e by more tha n 43 points. I t i s an even money bet, with the hous e keeping a percentage of the winning wagers—usually around 1 0 percen —that covers its costs, generates profit, and ensures mathematicall that i n the long run the gamblers lose and the casino wins. The beautie s of this scheme ar e several . First, th e lin e makes for much mor e livel y bettin g tha n a variabl e odds system , especiall y when, a s i s ofte n th e cas e i n colleg e sports , th e contes t i s a mismatch. A 43-poin t sprea d correlate s wit h somethin g lik e a 250-1 chance fo r th e underdo g t o wi n outright . That i s a fundamentally uninteresting be t t o th e seriou s sport s gambler : at thos e odds , h e might as well buy a lottery ticket. O n th e other hand an even money proposition alway s generate s the greates t gamblin g interest amon g the cognoscenti , a s i t b y definitio n reflect s a perfec t balanc e o f informed opinio n concerning th e question at hand. Second, th e lin e will more ofte n than not resul t in a contest tha t remains, i n th e relevan t sense , i n som e doub t unti l it s fina l mo ments. This featur e explains those otherwis e puzzlin g spectacles of passionate intensit y produce d b y th e continuin g presenc e o f th e wagering interest, when all other interes t in the game has long since departed. It ha s been note d tha t despite—o r perhaps because of— eons o f effort s b y stern moralists , people will be t o n quit e literally anything i f give n hal f the chance . Indee d ther e i s n o activit y that can't b e made utterly fascinatin g b y the simpl e expedient of wagering o n it s outcome . Combin e thi s wit h th e natura l interes t mos t men i n thi s cultur e fee l regardin g the outcom e o f sporting events , and th e pretension s the y (all right, we) harbor regardin g our exper tise in such matters, and the shee r genius of the line becomes all the more apparent. Third, an d mos t german e to th e topi c o f this book , th e lin e is a marvelously elegant demonstration o f the power and the limitation s

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of bot h individua l an d collectiv e rationality . Fo r th e lin e i s no t stable: i t shift s i n reactio n t o th e ongoin g wager s mad e aroun d it . Suppose tha t Nebrask a "opens " a s a 17-poin t favorit e agains t Kansas. This again is an estimate on the part of the house as to what number wil l spli t th e bettin g evenly . The bettin g publi c the n dis plays a small but significan t preference for Kansas; the lin e moves t o 16, and then t o 15 1/2. Finally i t stabilizes , as the actio n come s i n a t equal proportions for both teams . Much o f the time the house' s ini tial estimat e o f the matte r i s so accurate that th e lin e move s no t a t all. I n eithe r case , thi s collectiv e judgmen t ofte n predict s wit h a seemingly diabolica l accuracy the actual outcome o f the contest; an d always, fo r an y statisticall y significan t numbe r o f games , th e fav orites an d the underdogs will each "cover th e spread" almost exactly half the time . The foregoin g accoun t will come a s no surprise to anyone wh o is familiar wit h th e behavio r o f financial markets. Such market s ar e in effect sport s book s o n a n exalted economic an d social scale, and th e classic account o f their behavior , the so-calle d "efficient marke t the ory," predicts precisel y the outcomes I describe above. The efficien t market theor y come s i n severa l versions, makin g claims o f varying strength. I will therefor e first describe the theor y a t a general level, before notin g specifi c disagreement s regardin g wha t version mostl y closely correlates wit h the structur e o f American financial markets. More tha n fort y year s ago , th e statisticia n Mauric e Kendal l noticed tha t fluctuation s i n stoc k price s appeare d t o follo w what i s called a "rando m walk. " A rando m wal k i s a statistica l patter n i n which previous iterations of a phenomenon have no predictive value regarding it s futur e course . I n othe r word s stoc k pric e fluctuation s seemed t o follow no predictable pattern. With some unimportant — i.e., non-exploitable—exceptions , Kendall' s observations hav e prov en correct . Indeed , Richar d Breale y an d Stewar t Myer s not e tha t "with remarkabl e unanimit y researcher s hav e conclude d tha t ther e is n o usefu l informatio n i n th e sequenc e o f pas t change s i n stoc k price. A s a result , man y o f th e researcher s hav e becom e famous . None has become rich. " At first , th e random-wal k patter n o f stoc k price s wa s me t wit h

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surprise. Ye t it soo n becam e apparen t tha t thi s empirica l outcom e should hav e been anticipate d theoretically ; an d i n fac t i t was anticipated, a t the tur n o f the century , i n an obscure doctora l thesi s b y a French writer , Loui s Bachelier . Armed with thes e initiall y puzzling facts, economist s determine d tha t a random walk is exactly what one should expec t i n th e price s o f a n efficientl y functioning financia l market. They reasoned tha t i n a competitive marke t tha t processe s information efficiently , investment s wil l achiev e a n equilibriu m price. An equilibrium price is a price that incorporates an d therefore reflects al l th e relevan t informatio n availabl e to investors . Brealey and Myers su m up why price changes in an efficient marke t must be random: If prices alway s reflect al l relevant information , the n the y will chang e only when ne w informatio n arrives . Bu t ne w informatio n b y definition cannot b e predicte d ahea d o f tim e (otherwis e i t woul d no t b e ne w information). Therefor e stoc k price s canno t b e predicte d ahea d o f time. To put it anothe r way , if stoc k price s reflec t all tha t is pre dictable, then stock price change s mus t reflec t only the unpredictable .

Analysts disagree as to just how efficient variou s financial markets actually are . I n it s weak form, the efficien t pric e theor y hold s tha t stock price s reflec t al l information contained i n th e recor d o f past prices. Almost all researchers agree that American financial markets are efficient in this sense . A stronger version o f the theor y declare s that curren t price s als o reflect all "published" o r "public " information (e.g. , earning s and dividen d announcements, forecast s of futur e earnings, prediction s o f mergers , etc.) . Althoug h on e woul d gues s that significan t problem s exis t a t th e margi n whe n attemptin g t o determine wha t information i s truly public, Brealey and Myers nev ertheless not e tha t "th e pric e reactio n t o [such ] news appears to be almost immediate, " an d tha t "mos t o f thi s informatio n [is ] rapidly and accuratel y impounde d i n th e pric e o f th e stock, " makin g th e potential gai n from th e informatio n less than the transactio n cos t of acting on it. It appear s the majorit y of analysts believe—subject to various caveats—tha t America n financia l market s ar e efficien t i n this stronger sense . Finally, the strongest versio n of the theory holds

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that stoc k price s reflec t al l th e relevan t informatio n a n investo r could hop e t o acquire abou t a stock. This version woul d seem to be contradicted empiricall y by the successfu l practic e o f "insider" trad ing, an d refute d theoreticall y by th e undeniabl e presence o f infor mation an d tradin g costs (th e strongest for m o f the theor y require s these cost s t o b e zero) . Henc e ther e i s almos t n o suppor t fo r th e strong versio n o f th e theory , althoug h Breale y and Myer s not e i t should giv e us pause that studie s of professionally managed portfo lios have concluded that, after factorin g in risk, "no grou p o f institutions have been abl e to outperform the marke t consistently an d that even th e difference s betwee n th e performanc e o f individua l fund s are no greater tha n you would expect from chance. " Let u s return t o th e Mirag e sport s book s o as to concretiz e thes e observations in a more glamorou s setting. Ho w efficien t ar e bettin g markets? T o answer thi s question, w e need onl y revie w th e proces s that creates the bettin g line. Recall that the setting o f a line is a twostep process: first, the sports boo k sets an initial number, which then fluctuates in response t o th e bet s tha t are made. We migh t as k as an initial matter how it is that bookmakers are able to predict with suc h accuracy th e bettin g public' s reactio n t o a particula r line , an d wh y that reaction itsel f so closely correlates with th e outcome o f any sig nificant se t o f games. The answer s to thes e question s brin g u s fac e to fac e wit h both th e powe r and the limitation s of rational inquiry . In th e seaso n o f mist s an d mello w fruitfulnes s I wil l sometime s annoy my wife into participating in a childish game called "guess th e line." Sh e consult s th e bettin g lin e printe d i n th e loca l newspape r (along with a spurious disclaimer, "for entertainment purposes only " —law i s everywhere) an d ha s m e estimat e th e lin e o n variou s pr o and colleg e footbal l games . Although I giv e eac h questio n perhap s five seconds consideration , around two-third s o f the tim e I am able to com e withi n a point o r tw o o f the actua l spread an d I a m rarely off by more than three . This trivial accomplishment is the combine d product o f a no doub t unhealthy level of interest i n footbal l an d th e somewhat—but no t completely—predictabl e natur e o f th e gam e itself. Now I don't doub t that rny modest abilities in this regard pal e before th e expertis e an d perspicacit y of a professiona l bookmaker ;

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nevertheless the y ma y giv e u s som e glimps e int o ho w thos e mor e accomplished person s g o about their task. Suppose I a m trying t o determin e wha t the sprea d will be on th e upcoming Colorado-Michiga n colleg e footbal l game . Colorad o i s ranked fift h i n th e nation , Michiga n tenth . I sense , wit h tha t in choate bu t generall y accurate sense of these things serious fan s pos sess, that a s a consequence o f their nationa l reputations bot h team s are a little overrate d b y casual observers (i.e. , sportswriters), Michi gan perhap s a bi t mor e so . O n a neutra l field , I woul d mak e Colorado abou t a six point favorite, but sinc e the gam e is in Boulder I woul d bum p tha t t o nine , mayb e ten points . When I loo k i n th e paper next week, I will be very surprised i f a few hundred thousan d serious bettor s haven' t analyze d the gam e i n muc h th e sam e way. After all , with almos t n o importan t exception s w e hav e th e sam e information t o wor k with, an d roughl y th e sam e set of experiences in regar d t o th e significanc e of simila r informatio n in th e past . I t therefore isn' t surprisin g that w e come t o ver y similar conclusions; what would be surprising would be if we didn't. Such is the nature of the competitiv e rationa l analysis of potentially valuable public information: among serious competitors, disagreemen t will only begin t o take place in that zon e of analytic equilibrium where the absenc e of information an d the presence of randomizing effects ar e much mor e important factor s tha n whateve r margina l difference s exis t i n th e interpretive abilitie s of the competitors. This is not t o sa y that seriou s bettor s hav e all the relevan t information. Of course the y don't: they probably won't know that Michi gan's quarterback is breaking up with his girlfriend, o r perhaps eve n that Colorado' s bes t playe r twiste d hi s kne e i n practice . Bu t not e that t o th e exten t thi s informatio n become s publi c the y wil l al l assimilate it—tacitly , perhap s eve n unconsciously , bu t quit e effi ciently al l the same. And given the tremendous incentive s t o acquire relevant information , i t i s probabl e tha t th e mor e importan t th e piece o f information, th e mor e likel y it wil l becom e know n t o th e betting public. The bettin g lin e thu s function s a s a highly accurat e equilibriu m price tha t establishes successfully the collectiv e investmen t valu e of

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all individua l bets: zer o minu s th e transactio n cos t o f the wager . A simple example: if I bet $50 on Nebraska givin g l 5 l / 2 points , ther e will b e i n a n efficientl y functionin g bettin g pool a .5 probability of Nebraska winning by more than 1 5 points, in which case I will be up $50 minus the bookmaker' s fee, and a .5 probability of their winning by les s tha n 1 6 points o r losin g outright , i n whic h cas e I wil l b e down $50. And on the basis of both theoretical modelin g and exper imental evidence, there i s every reason t o believe that public betting lines price their products just as efficiently a s financial markets price theirs. Thu s in th e lon g ru n th e booki e mus t wi n and the gamble r must lose. Nevertheless, compulsiv e gambler s ofte n indulg e i n th e illusio n that i f the y coul d onl y ge t thei r hand s o n th e "insid e story, " the y could bea t the bettin g lin e an d make the killin g that wil l ge t the m even. Bu t the insid e stor y rarel y exists, or , more precisely , the rea l inside story isn't something even the best informed gamblers can get at. O f cours e occasionall y peopl e d o acquir e reall y valuable inside information: just ask Ivan Boesky or, if you can get through t o baseball hell , Joe Jackson.* Bu t what makes both bettin g an d investin g interesting i s that eve n wit h the bes t possibl e information a perso n could reasonably hope to acquire, a large amount of what affects th e fortunes o f companies and footbal l team s can't b e learned ahea d of time an d i s therefor e practicall y inaccessibl e t o th e investor , o r indeed i s truly random , an d henc e isn' t predictabl e eve n i n theory . Rational analysis , especiall y when a communal structure o f inquiry negates idiosyncratic predilections , goe s a long way toward produc ing true knowledge . But it can't g o all the way , because some o f th e necessary information i s either a s a practical matte r unknowabl e i n advance or—an d her e w e touch o n th e mysteriou s elemen t i n th e concept o f the random—isn' t knowable at all. The powe r o f reason i s evident i n the fac t tha t I ca n in five sec*Although eve n i n th e cas e o f th e Blac k So x scandal o f 1919 , whic h remain s th e only authenticate d instanc e o f a majo r America n professiona l tea m spor t contes t being "fixed," the knowledg e o f the impending fix became s o common so quickly that even some of the fixers were unable to profit from it .

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onds mak e a roughly accurat e prediction o f the outcom e o f a foot ball gam e an d a n extremel y accurat e predictio n o f othe r people' s predictions o f the same thing. The limitation s of rational inquiry are manifested b y th e fac t that , leavin g asid e th e possibilit y o f ne w information becomin g available , I coul d stud y th e sam e question s for a wee k an d hav e littl e o r n o chanc e o f answerin g the m mor e accurately. Appreciatin g th e significanc e of suc h fact s lead s to th e counterintuitive insigh t that, in an efficient proces s o f collective rea soning, th e employmen t o f reaso n work s t o mak e it s furthe r employment unreasonable. In othe r words , the investmen t o f intellectual capital and labo r is just as subject to problem s o f diminishing marginal utilit y a s i s th e investmen t o f thei r bette r understoo d material cousins . Thi s i s precisely why people bu y shares in cheap, market-indexed mutua l funds , rathe r tha n payin g someon e t o tr y and bea t th e market , o r attemptin g t o d o s o themselves . Ye t th e notion that , i n th e lon g run , i t i s possible fo r gifte d individual s to analyze the informatio n relevant to a system of competitive rationa l analysis i n suc h a way as to achiev e significantly better result s tha n those achieve d by the collectiv e reaso n o f the proces s itsel f remains one o f the mos t tenacious illusions of rationalism.* So tenaciou s i s thi s illusio n tha t whol e industrie s o f rationalis t divination—investment counselin g guides , gamblin g ti p sheets , appellate court decisions—sustai n themselve s within the ambit of its hypnotic glow . I now turn to the latter of these phenomena . *What about George Soros , Warren Buffett , th e ladies' guild that beat the market by 20%, and s o on? I f 10,00 0 people eac h flip a coin te n times , an d five of them ge t "heads" on al l ten attempts , thi s isn't evidenc e of a special ability. If fifty were t o d o so, that would b e another matter. In both financial and wagering market s extraordi nary return s o n investmen t ar e achieve d b y individual s a t level s consisten t wit h expected pattern s o f rando m statistica l deviatio n fro m th e mean . Thu s eve n i f we were to assume certain individuals have the ability to "beat the market," the statistical fact thi s does no t happe n an y more ofte n tha n would occur b y simple chance mean s that, for the purpose s o f institutional decision making, such extraordinary abilities—if indeed the y exist—hav e no practica l significance. When takin g par t i n a process of collective reasoning i t i s better t o b e lucky than good; o r rather , i n a n efficien t mar ket, those concepts wil l amount to the same thing.

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The Efficien t Proces s Theory I liv e i n a typica l America n smal l tow n o f abou t 15,00 0 people . Every day , literally million s of event s tak e plac e here tha t coul d i n theory b e th e subjec t o f forma l lega l action . Ever y tim e someon e buys a loa f o f bread , write s a check , borrow s a car , turns u p th e stereo, water s th e lawn , get s int o a n argument , o r take s care o f a neighbor's pet , those actions ar e subject to th e possibilit y o f forma l legal intervention; indeed , the list could fill this entire boo k an d yet be fa r fro m complete . O f cours e i n onl y a minuscule percentage of these case s will it ever occur t o anyone, however fleetingly, that suc h action coul d or should take place; and it will in turn b e in only a tiny proportion o f those instance s wher e som e suc h actio n eve r come s about. This in itsel f shoul d no t b e surprising . W e don' t normall y thin k about th e lega l ramification s of ou r action s fo r th e sam e reaso n a man neve r thinks abou t his liver until i t begins to bothe r him : laws, like livers, are invisible when they ar e working as they should. Almost ever y featur e o f th e educationa l an d cultura l indoctrina tion law students undergo conspire s to make them forget this simple point. In th e American law school, th e focu s o f pedagogical inquiry, and indeed the very site of "the law" itself, is almost invariably the

appellate court opinion. And what are these opinions? Consider ho w for ever y dispute that ripens into even th e possibility o f a lawsuit o r an arrest, million s o f frictionless legal transactions tak e place, most of them blissfull y fre e o f any conscious knowledge on the part of the participants tha t they are in any sense partaking in legal interaction . For ever y disput e involvin g som e sor t o f formal lega l action, ther e are dozen s o f conflicts wher e suc h actio n wa s considered bu t wer e resolved withou t recours e t o it . For ever y civil lawsuit resulting i n a formal courtroo m disposition , ther e ar e betwee n thirt y an d fift y suits tha t ar e settle d prio r t o thi s point . An d for ever y lower cour t disposition o f a case that results in an appellate court opinion , ther e are many more tha t do not. Imagine a volcani c islan d whos e bas e i s thirt y mile s wide , an d rises out o f waters 35,000 feet deep . The portio n o f the island above

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water i s onl y 20 0 fee t i n diameter , an d th e highes t patc h o f thi s ground i s but 2 0 feet abov e sea level (this is roughly wha t the island of Hawai i woul d loo k lik e if the Pacifi c wer e 13,00 0 fee t deepe r a t the spo t wher e i t emerge s fro m th e sea) . On thi s patc h o f groun d lies a single stone, abou t the siz e of a baseball. The submerge d por tion o f this island represents th e invisibl e workings o f the la w when it functions as a successful mediu m of social coordination. Th e por tion abov e th e wate r represent s th e visibl e worl d o f forma l lega l action. Th e ston e represent s th e univers e o f appellat e cour t cases . Lawyers, law students, an d especially legal academics routinely mistake that stone fo r an entire island, and then nam e it "law." Why i s almos t th e entir e islan d o f la w submerge d fro m view ? Formal lega l actio n take s plac e fo r man y reasons : becaus e o f dis agreements abou t the fact s o f a social interaction; becaus e of a fundamental conflic t o f mora l views ; becaus e th e relevan t rule s ar e ambiguous, contradictory, anachronistic, or otherwise controversial; because peopl e are willing to spen d money to sublimat e their emo tions int o publi c modes o f expression ; an d man y othe r reason s as well. Give n ho w w e al l ten d t o notic e th e presenc e o f somethin g more readil y than its absence, w e rarely appreciate that o n th e vast majority o f occasions, non e o f these variou s preconditions fo r over t legal actio n i s present. An d even when one o r mor e o f these factor s is present, it is much mor e likel y than not tha t th e absenc e of other factors will keep the disput e fro m going into a formal legal orbit. Suppose I as k you o n a Monday i f I ca n borrow you r ca r for th e next week. You say "sure," when what you mean , naturally enough , is "unless I need it back for some really pressing reason." On Frida y you lear n you hav e an opportunity t o us e a friend's seasid e summer house fo r th e comin g weekend . You need you r ca r t o ge t there , so you walk over t o m y place. Onc e there , you find the ca r parked on the street an d that I'm not home , so you leave a note explaining why you're takin g the car before driving off with it. Now I may get quite angry at you. I may believe we had a "deal." I may even think of you as a morally defectiv e person fo r actin g i n thi s way . But i f I shoul d be so rash as to consul t a lawyer, I will be told tha t I don't have any grounds fo r lega l complain t because , a s a matte r o f fact , I don't .

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This i s the portio n o f the islan d o f law near th e island' s shoreline : that become s visible, as it were, when the tida l pull of social coordination i s low . Most o f th e time , o f course , suc h interaction s don' t lead t o ope n conflic t o f an y sort , an d suc h conflict s tha t d o tak e place never reach a lawyer's office. Th e islan d remains almost completely underwater. The ke y to understandin g wha t I wil l cal l "th e efficien t proces s theory" i s this : la w become s presen t t o u s throug h it s absence . Conversely, law' s very presenc e tend s t o negat e ou r perceptio n o f that presence . Thi s i s a fanc y Hegelia n phrasin g o f th e sam e idea behind th e basebal l truism tha t say s you neve r notic e th e umpire s when they're doing their job right. (A s Yogi Berra is reputed t o have observed, "Al l I ever really needed t o know about phenomenology I learned fro m sports." ) The efficien t proces s theor y consist s o f th e followin g proposi tions. 1) In a legal system, efficiently processed disputes will be settled to the extent that the available information predicts a likely outcome.

This follows from the obvious point that , subject to exceptions for disputes bein g processe d for reasons othe r tha n to advanc e directly the interest s o f the litigants , rationa l litigant s wil l pursue o r defend against an action unti l the y have achieved a sufficient leve l of confi dence concerning wha t the probabilities for the final outcome o f the dispute see m t o be . Onc e thi s poin t i s reached, processing th e dis pute furthe r merel y increase s th e transactio n cost s incurre d i n th e course o f resolving it. A dispute is thus "efficiently processed " whe n it remains in the dispute processing syste m only until enoug h infor mation become s availabl e to mak e a sufficientl y accurat e estimat e concerning its eventual outcome . Consider tw o relatively pur e examples. The first cas e is our hypo thetical ca r loa n betwee n friends . Th e lega l syste m processe s thi s dispute so efficiently that a lawyer can immediately inform me of the value of undertaking legal action: zer o minus transaction costs . And

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since even if I'm no t a lawyer I'm likel y to hav e a tacit appreciatio n of tha t fact , thi s disput e i s likely to remai n completel y "belo w th e surface," par t o f the vas t invisible island o f law. By contrast, assum e the lawyer s processing a dispute become certain, give n their analysis of th e forma l rules , th e evidence , th e judge , the jury , thei r overal l situation sense , and whatever else they believe relevant, that the jury will return a verdict of $100,000 fo r the plaintiff . Th e presen t value of th e disput e t o th e plaintif f i s the n $100,00 0 minu s whateve r transaction cost s th e plaintif f ha s alread y incurred , whil e t o th e defendant th e disput e ha s a valu e o f minu s $100,000 , plu s sun k transaction costs . Assumin g bot h partie s ar e i n a positio n t o incu r equivalent future cost s by continuing the dispute, and assuming that (not coincidentally ) i t i s bot h th e lawyers ' professiona l obligation and i n their long-term economi c interests to maximize their clients ' welfare, th e case will then settle for $100,000. Of cours e wheneve r the y dea l wit h th e visibl e rathe r tha n th e invisible law, lawyers will never be certain of anything to this extent . But the point of the idea l case is to illustrate that to the extent the dispute proces s move s th e disputant s towar d certainty , th e proces s moves towar d resolution . Thi s analysi s is undoubtedly far too nea t and formalistic , and we should not tak e it too literally. But the theo retical point is surely valid: in general, to the exten t people can predict lega l outcome s the y wil l avoi d engagin g i n forma l lega l dis putes, eithe r b y avoidin g the m altogethe r o r terminatin g the m a s soon a s th e disput e proces s reveal s a sufficientl y predictabl e set o f likely results. In other words, the more clearly the information made available b y th e disput e proces s predict s a particular outcome, th e sooner th e disput e wil l b e terminated , whil e conversely , t o th e extent th e proces s fail s t o produc e a reliable prediction, th e further the disput e wil l ten d t o trave l through th e disput e processin g sys tem. This brings us to the theory's secon d proposition . 2) The farther an efficiently processed dispute travels through a dispute processing system, the more firmly that dispute is lodged in a legal equilibrium zone.

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A lega l equilibriu m zon e i s a sor t o f negativ e analogu e t o a n "equilibrium price, " tha t is , t o whateve r stoc k pric e incorporate s and reflect s al l th e relevan t informatio n availabl e t o investors , thereby allowin g the stock to be valued accurately. Whatever factor s the dispute processing system considers relevant to the resolution o f the dispute—formal rules, inchoate cultural norms, loca l knowledg e of th e system , th e wealt h o r statu s o f th e disputants—i s b y def inition relevan t information . Therefor e whateve r th e syste m con siders, formall y o r informally , i n th e processin g o f the disput e (an d whether w e call this mass of material "law," or "principle, " o r "politics," or "socia l power, " o r somethin g els e altogether make s no difference to the analysis ) is in equilibriu m to the exten t tha t the state o f this materia l makes it difficul t o r impossibl e t o predic t ho w the disput e will be resolved. A dispute is thus in an equilibrium zon e when it s travel s throug h th e disput e processin g syste m hav e no t yet provided th e disputant s with enoug h informatio n to allo w them to mak e a sufficientl y accurat e estimat e o f th e dispute' s eventua l outcome. Naturally, th e dispute s tha t wil l prov e hardes t t o mov e ou t o f legal equilibriu m zone s wil l be thos e i n which whateve r considera tions th e broade r cultur e consider s mos t importan t remai n i n th e greatest tension : i n other words , those lega l disputes takin g place in what in the previous chapter I described as social and political equilib rium zones . These will b e dispute s i n which, fo r example , powerful moral claim s of an axiomatic and even mystical nature—i n ou r cul ture claims regarding concepts such as "equality," "liberty, " "person hood," "fairness, " an d s o forth—seem to b e irreconcilabl y a t odds . Conflicts tha t featur e a clash between wha t appear s t o b e justice i n the individual case and the consistent enforcemen t o f general norm s or conflict s in whic h i t i s claimed tha t importan t interest s o f som e members o f the communit y mus t b e sacrifice d fo r wha t seem s lik e the goo d o f the many will also fit this model . One resul t o f these variou s interpretiv e tension s i s that th e out come of many legal disputes will turn o n conceptually incommensu rable definition s o f wha t "th e law " is . Indeed , th e America n lega l

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system's taci t toleratio n o f suc h interpretiv e incommensurabilit y helps ensur e th e "same " piec e o f la w will b e capabl e of accommo dating contradictory answer s t o especiall y difficul t lega l questions . Consider a simple , ver y commo n exampl e o f thi s phenomenon . Suppose tha t whil e th e so-calle d "plain " (literal , apparent , at-first glance) meanin g o f a statute' s languag e appear s to produc e a clear rule fo r dealin g with a certai n dispute , a mor e full y contextualize d interpretation o f tha t languag e reveal s the enactin g legislatur e in tended a different rule , on e perhaps better suited t o what the inter preter considers justice in a particular case. Now, i s the meanin g of a statute determine d b y what th e legislatur e tha t passe d i t thought i t meant, o r by what the statute's languag e would be taken to mean, at first o r secon d glance , b y some hypothetical ordinar y observer ? (As the reade r ca n anticipate , th e answe r our lega l syste m give s to thi s interpretive questio n i s "yes.") Here w e shoul d not e a n importan t differenc e between , o n th e one hand , disput e processin g systems , an d o n th e other , financia l and wagerin g markets . I n th e latte r cases , ther e i s little ambiguit y about wha t kin d o f evidenc e i s relevant t o a rationa l predictio n o f what th e system s i n questio n wil l do, because there i s little controversy about what the point o f the respective activities is—predicting which tea m wil l win b y how much , an d whic h corporation s wil l be more o r les s profitable . B y contrast, mos t difficul t lega l problem s involve not onl y complicated empirica l questions, bu t also problematic judgments concernin g question s o f moral value, and (ofte n a s a direct consequenc e o f thes e othe r difficulties ) variou s conceptuall y incommensurable definition s of what sorts of facts are said to consti tute lega l meaning. Thes e latter types of disputes will tend not t o be amenable to resolutio n throug h th e procuremen t o f more evidenc e via th e working s o f th e disput e processin g system , eithe r becaus e they involv e conceptua l disagreement s abou t wha t shoul d eve n count a s evidence , o r becaus e the y can' t usefull y b e though t o f as involving evidentiar y question s at all . But eve n mor e prosai c lega l questions ma y prove intractabl e i f the evidenc e the syste m need s t o process th e disput e towar d a predictable outcome i s too difficul t o r

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expensive to procure. Thus a corollary of the theory's second proposition is that i n a system tha t processes disputes efficiently, dispute s will trave l throug h th e syste m unti l the y emerg e fro m a n equilib rium zone , o r unti l th e cost s o f attemptin g t o mak e the m d o s o become to o high . A second corollar y i s tha t whe n eithe r poin t i s reached, th e proces s terminates . Thi s bring s u s t o ou r theoretica l conclusion: 3) In an efficient dispute processing system the terminal decision making structures of the system will resolve disputes arationally.

This conclusio n i s profoundly inimical to rationalis t ideolog y i n general, an d t o America n lega l though t i n particular . Indeed , i t would be fai r t o sa y the conventiona l vie w of how la w works is precisely th e opposit e o f the conclusio n reache d here . The celebrate d political philosophe r Joh n Rawl s is i n hi s ow n grandiloquen t wa y speaking no t onl y fo r himself , but fo r whol e academi c disciplines, political ideologies, an d pervasive social institutions whe n he asserts that "in a constitutional regim e with judicial review, public reason is the reason o f its supreme court." (For Rawls , "public reason" i s that exercise o f rationa l decisio n makin g tha t make s politica l decision s legitimate.) O n a similar note, Mar y An n Glendo n o f the Harvar d Law Schoo l ha s recentl y describe d th e prope r exercis e o f lega l thought toward th e solutio n o f difficul t lega l questions a s a kind of "singing reason, " and Dean Anthony Kronman has characterized his Yale La w School , whic h wit h Harvar d supplie s th e lion' s shar e o f elite American lawyers to th e bar , the bench , an d th e academy , as a "community unite d b y fait h i n th e powe r o f reason. " I t woul d b e putting it mildl y to sa y a conclusion tha t the rol e o f reason i n legal argument i s to rende r itsel f superfluous wil l not prov e congenia l t o our legal elites. If, a s Richar d Posne r ha s asserted , a pragmati c a s oppose d t o a formalist conceptio n o f la w is damaging to th e amour propre o f th e legal profession , wha t reactio n ca n we expec t t o a n explicitl y antirationalist approach ? Bu t m y argumen t i s no t attempting , i n th e neurotic styl e o f s o muc h academi c discourse , t o convince peopl e

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whose professional identities ar e invested in the conceptua l schem e the argument attacks . I merely aim to convert them.* Disturbing a s the argumen t migh t be , it s conclusio n i s logically entailed by what has gone before. Indeed, once on e has given up on the dogm a tha t ther e mus t b e rationall y determinabl e answer s t o difficult lega l issues, the questio n become s ho w peopl e ca n believ e disputes tha t hav e reached th e termina l decision-makin g poin t i n a legal syste m ar e generally amenabl e t o ye t mor e extensiv e rationa l analysis. If the relevant materials allow the disputants to predict with confidence th e outcom e o f a rational analysi s of a dispute, wh y d o they continue t o incur processin g costs ? Of course people occasion ally value engaging i n th e proces s fo r reason s other tha n pursuin g the forma l dispositio n o f their disput e per se , as when, fo r instance, what they seek is to have their view heard in a formal public setting, or when they derive satisfaction from the conflic t itself. But relative indifference t o the practical outcome o f litigation o n the part of the litigant is as rare as indifference to th e outcom e o f a bet o n the par t of th e bettor , o r t o th e fluctuatio n o f a stoc k o n th e par t o f th e investor. I n al l thes e case s the practica l outcom e o f th e proces s i s almost always the paramount consideration . Thus if lawyers persist in processing dispute s whose outcomes ar e usefully amenabl e t o rationa l analysis—i.e. , dispute s whos e out comes wil l b e sufficientl y predictabl e t o allo w the m t o b e valued *One o f the unwarrante d conceits o f rationalism is that i t i s possible t o convinc e people through th e sheer persuasive force o f reasoned argument to discard their most basic worldviews: May someone have telling grounds for believing the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth?—Suppose he had always been told that,— would h e hav e an y goo d reaso n t o doub t it ? Me n hav e believe d the y coul d make rain ; why should no t a king b e brought u p i n th e belie f that th e world began with him ? And if [G. E.] Moore an d this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore reall y prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moor e could not conver t the king to his view, but it would be a conversion o f a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. Ludwig Wittgenstein, O n Certainty, paragrap h 92.

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accurately for the purpose s o f rational resolution—one o f two con clusions must follow . 1. Lawyers pursu e such dispute s because increasing the transactio n costs of processing disputes is ultimately in their interest. This claim is belied b y the observatio n that a lawyer's interests ar e i n th e lon g run dependen t o n th e pursui t o f th e interest s o f hi s or he r clients . Lawyers wh o incu r unnecessar y cost s fo r thei r client s ar e puttin g themselves a t a systemati c competitiv e disadvantag e with lawyer s who do not. Indeed , disput e processing systems that incur too many avoidable costs will put themselve s at a disadvantage with alternative systems that avoid doing so. It i s therefore in the long-ter m interes t of bot h individua l lawyers an d th e syste m a s a whol e t o resolv e clients' dispute s a s soon a s there i s enough informatio n available to allow them t o d o so with confidence. This theoretica l observatio n i s buttresse d b y th e empirica l fac t that fo r ever y appellate court decision , there ar e thousand s of cases that neve r ge t tha t fa r in th e forma l lega l system. Indeed , fo r ever y formally filed case, there are several disputes that lawyers help settl e without takin g forma l lega l actio n o f an y kind . O f cours e som e number o f corrupt, desperate , o r ideologicall y driven ("th e caus e is more important tha n m y client") lawyers will convinc e thei r client s to continu e th e pursui t o f cases whose outcome s hav e become emi nently predictable. But if this sort of thing is in fact commonplace, i t is n o refutatio n o f th e efficien t proces s theory . O n th e contrary , i t merely confirm s that th e syste m i n questio n i s not a n efficien t dis pute processin g system . Thi s the n leave s u s wit h a n alternativ e explanation: 2. The lawyer s who pursue suc h disputes do so because they , unlike the lawyer s wh o decid e th e disputes , lac k th e requisit e cognitiv e skills to subject the dispute s in question t o successful rationa l analysis. This claim comes down t o saying that judges, and especially legal academics (who, as Pierre Schla g has pointed out , hav e traditionall y imagined themselves to be the judges of the judges), are just smarter than lawyer s in general . Actually the clai m is much mor e audaciou s

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than that . Th e clai m mus t b e tha t judge s an d la w professors are so much smarte r tha n othe r lawyer s tha t thei r exceptiona l abilit y t o analyze otherwis e intractabl e disputes enables them t o succee d as a matter o f professional routine a t th e tas k o f movin g suc h dispute s squarely out o f interpretive equilibriu m zones and into the real m of the sufficientl y predictabl e outcome. The philosophe r John Searl e has noted, i n the cours e o f describing various incredible claims about the natur e o f human conscious ness, tha t "peopl e wh o are about to say something tha t sounds silly very seldom come right ou t an d sa y it. Usually a set of rhetorical o r stylistic devices is employed to avoid having to say it in words of one syllable." S o it i s in law . Indeed suc h device s are th e lawyer' s bread and butter . Thus you ar e unlikely to com e acros s judges or judge wanna-bes who sa y things suc h a s "the peopl e wh o ar e arguin g s o passionately abou t thi s apparentl y intractabl e legal , moral , an d political issu e ar e jus t to o dum b t o se e th e answer. " Instead , the y tend to say things like this: [Issues suc h a s abortion] , involvin g th e mos t intimat e an d persona l choices a perso n ma y mak e i n a lifetime, choices centra l t o persona l dignity an d autonomy , ar e centra l t o th e libert y protecte d b y th e Fourteenth Amendment. At the hear t o f liberty i s the righ t t o defin e one's ow n concep t o f existence , o f meaning , o f th e universe , an d o f die mystery of human life. Belief s about these matters coul d not defin e the attribute s o f personhood wer e they forme d unde r compulsio n o f the state. [Planned Parenthood v. Casey ]

This is supposed t o address the questio n o f whether o r not state s are legally entitled t o regulate abortion. (B y the way, the answe r this judicial opinio n eventuall y gives , afte r mor e tha n 10 0 page s o f equally helpful analysis , is "sort of.") The rhetorica l trick s involved —begging the question i n extremely abstract, oracular language and then proceedin g t o asser t a no n sequitur—ar e no t ver y edifying , although familia r enoug h t o an y lawyer. What is remarkable is how this kin d o f thing ca n send otherwis e discernin g person s int o ana lytic ecstasy:

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The Joint Opinion see[s ] in the citize n a capacity for responsible ten sion an d growth , [an d sees ] i n th e proces s o f law — especiall y in th e work of the [Supreme ] Court—a sourc e of education for itself and th e polity.... The conversatio n to which the Joint Opinio n i s committed is th e direct descenden t o f tha t t o whic h Socrate s wa s committed , which he would rather die than damage, the conversation that assumes that Athens, or America , is a moral actor with a moral career, capable of justice or injustice.

If on e ca n someho w kee p a gri p o n wha t Planned Parenthood v . Casey actuall y is—th e bureaucrati c wor k produc t o f twentysome thing judicia l clerks , whos e relevan t lif e experienc e consist s fo r the mos t par t i n gettin g goo d grade s an d otherwis e ingratiatin g themselves wit h variou s authorit y figures—on e i s tempted t o con clude tha t th e eminen t professo r wh o penne d thi s encomiu m ha d lost his mind. Ho w wholesome, b y contrast, seem s Olive r Wendell Holmes' philosophicall y modest observatio n tha t h e considere d a law constitutional unles s it made him want to "puke. " Granted , th e puke tes t lack s analyti c content , bu t wh o othe r tha n a fe w self deluded ideologue s think s tha t issue s such a s the moralit y o f abor tion ca n b e resolve d throug h th e successfu l employmen t o f wha t they call "reason?*" The efficien t proces s theory holds that what is true fo r abortion i s true generall y for dispute s that g o to th e termina l point s o f an effi ciently functionin g lega l system . I f thi s theor y i s correct, the n th e appellate judge who thinks "the law" gives him the answer to an effi ciently processe d lega l question i s in th e gri p of a rationalist delu sion. Lega l equilibriu m zone s ar e produce d b y profoun d tension s and uncertaintie s i n th e interpretiv e material s with whic h lawyer s

"'The ide a tha t eve n th e mos t passionat e politica l and ideological disagreement s rest o n mer e analyti c error s i s th e fait h o f a certai n kin d o f analyti c philosophe r ... non e o f th e weapon s i n th e armor y o f th e analyti c philosopher o r exper t lega l reasoner wil l or shoul d deflec t a person wh o believe s that th e fetu s i s a human bein g and th e abortionis t a murderer . Thos e beliefs , lik e othe r fundamenta l beliefs, liv e below reaso n an d ar e not th e les s worthy fo r doin g so." Richar d Posner, Overcoming Law, p. 188 .

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and judge s mus t work : tension s an d uncertaintie s tha t mirro r in tractable conflicts between the various explicit and tacit social norms these material s reflect . Thu s th e so-calle d "realist " vie w hel d b y many modern lega l scholars—that when what they think of as "law" fails t o provid e a n answer t o a difficul t lega l question a recourse t o "policy" o r "politics " wil l help—ca n be sustaine d onl y i f ther e i s some reaso n t o thin k th e rationa l analysi s of difficul t politica l and moral questions wil l be more successfu l tha n the analysi s of difficul t "legal" questions . Bu t onc e w e appreciat e tha t difficul t lega l ques tions are difficult becaus e they implicate, directly or indirectly, rationally undecidable political and mora l disputes, we will be less prone to make this same mistake. We ca n no w bette r appreciat e wh y la w become s presen t t o u s through it s absence . Fo r i t i s in jus t those situation s wher e la w is going to fai l t o giv e us answers that we will be most insistent tha t it do so . The intensit y o f ou r concern s abou t wha t th e la w requires will therefore ten d t o correlat e inversel y with th e presenc e o f clear legal requirements; an d our plea s to judge s to exercis e "good judg ment" wil l tak e plac e i n jus t thos e circumstance s wher e goo d judgment isn't going to help either the m or us. Indeed th e efficien t proces s theor y suggest s th e followin g inversion o f conventional lega l thought: what lawyer s refer to a s "frivolous" cases will often b e those dispute s that w e recognize as having been inefficientl y processe d precisely became w e recogniz e that , although thes e case s ar e usefully amenabl e to rationa l evaluation , they have nevertheless approache d the termina l point in the formal dispute processing system . Thus the frivolous cas e isn't the case that isn't worth thinkin g about , but rather th e opposite. Paradoxically , it is the seriou s disput e i n which th e extensiv e employment o f reason ends up being an exercise in rationalist frivolity. Leaving Las Vegas Is American law an efficien t disput e processing system ? This deceptively simple questio n require s a somewhat comple x answer . Con -

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sider tw o institution s o f th e America n lega l process : th e votin g booth an d th e jury . Voting , whethe r i n a legislativ e o r a directl y democratic setting , i s an explicitly arational mechanism fo r decidin g controversial issues . Hardl y anyon e think s tha t th e appropriat e way to determin e whethe r a meteorit e i n Antarctic a hold s evidenc e o f life o n Mar s i s to as k fo r a general sho w o f hands . Bu t i t i s just as ridiculous t o imagine that on e ca n determine successfull y whethe r a fetus ha s a right t o lif e b y consulting supposed experts o n that ques tion, whethe r thes e b e scientists , mora l philosophers , platoni c guardians, o r th e politicize d lawyer s called judges . I n thi s sor t o f legal, moral , an d politica l equilibriu m zon e th e putativ e reason s given for deciding to do this rather than that are ultimately post-ho c rationalizations, designe d t o justif y axiom s an d intuition s tha t ar e not wort h arguin g about. Lik e al l such beliefs , th e axiom s and intu itions that mak e up th e basi s o f one's ow n moral reasonin g are no t and indeed cannot b e open t o eithe r real examination or self-reflec tive critique . The y ar e wha t Holmes , tha t grea t skepti c amon g American judges, called his "can't helps. " When decidin g wha t t o d o abou t suc h question s i t i s eminentl y ational t o refuse t o engag e in rational analysis. Voting is thus a senible wa y t o resolv e conflict s of valu e precisel y becaus e i t doesn' t require an y justification o f particular results beyond reference to th e formal definitio n of the activit y itself. ("Why di d we adopt this rule? Because more people voted fo r it.") At botto m man y judge s and mos t lega l theorist s dislik e democ racy because i t i s an implici t acknowledgmen t o f the sever e limita tions o f their expertise . Among lega l academics , the formalis t wants the immanent rationality of the law to decide deep conflicts of value, while the realis t wants to put a commission o f technocrats i n charge of suc h questions , an d th e critica l schola r strive s t o politiciz e th e masses so as to ri d the m o f the fals e consciousnes s h e think s causes the conflict s in th e firs t place . The mora l an d intellectua l preten sions o f judge s ar e mor e troubling , i f onl y becaus e the y hav e dis cernible consequences. S o it i s that i n America today it ha s becom e possible to produce a document such as the joint plurality opinion i n Planned Parenthood v . Casey, whic h permit s person s o f th e modes t

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jurisprudential gift s grante d Justices Souter , Kennedy, and O'Connor to sign their name s to a text exhorting th e American people t o prove they posses s a virtuous nationa l character—apparentl y throug h th e act of allowing their valu e judgments to be overridden b y a panel of solemn bureaucrat s mouthing th e words of judicial clerks (an operation calle d "submitting t o the rule of law.") Nevertheless lawyer s as a class are hardly insensible t o th e advan tages o f arational decisio n making , even within th e forma l confines of the courtroom itself. Observers o f our litigation syste m ar e some times bemuse d b y th e sigh t o f a judge a t a trial' s end readin g tw o hours o f extraordinarily technical and complex instructions t o a jury. These direction s ar e often barel y comprehensible t o th e lawyer s in the courtroom, and there i s no reason to imagine that th e jury takes away mor e tha n th e mos t rudimentar y understandin g o f ho w i t i s being tol d t o g o about decidin g th e issue s a t hand. This particula r ritual i s often cite d b y critic s o f American la w as proof o f ou r will ingness t o tolerat e irrational , atavisti c features at th e hear t o f ou r dispute processin g system . Ye t the readin g o f a n incomprehensibl e charge t o th e jur y ca n b e reinterprete d no t a s a n exampl e of irra tionalism, bu t rathe r a s the secre t cunning o f reason a t work. Condemnations o f the jury system would hold more sting if there were goo d reason s to believ e jurie s ofte n decid e question s that are usefully amenabl e to rationa l analysis. But, for reasons predicted b y the efficien t proces s theory , suc h question s rarel y get befor e juries. The enormousl y hig h settlemen t rat e for both crimina l and civil litigation indicate s not jus t an understandable desire to avoi d transac tion costs , bu t a n acknowledgment tha t a conflict that i s sufficientl y controversial t o g o before a jury will as a practical matter have to b e decided mor e o r les s arationally . Questions tha t involv e significan t problems o f knowledge (wha t do we mean b y "beyond a reasonable doubt"?) o r tha t implicat e deepl y conflicting value systems (should individuals o r societ y a s a whole absor b the direc t cos t o f unfortunate accidents? ) can be analyzed usefully onl y up t o a point—a dis tressingly modes t point. Then a decision must be made. Under suc h conditions, th e observatio n tha t askin g lay juries to resolv e difficul t legal question s i s like deciding issue s by nipping coins i s not nearl y

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so devastating a criticism as the gli b technocrats an d secular theologians in our midst imagine it to be. Needless t o say , the America n legal system doesn' t alway s exhibit such a wholesom e tendenc y t o ignor e th e sire n cal l o f rationalist excess. Indeed, those text s that the lega l system in general, and legal education i n particular , fixate on a s the ver y embodiment s o f "th e law"—the mas s of appellate court opinions—ofte n resemble nothing so much as monuments t o the ways in which an excessive faith in reason can come to resemble a form o f mental illness. Legal scholar s as ideologically diverse as Robert Nagel, Danie l Farber, and Morton Horowitz hav e pointe d ou t variou s way s i n whic h contemporar y legal writin g ha s come t o manifes t the wors t form s o f bureaucratic obsessionalism. Her e i s Horowitz' s evaluatio n o f a year's worth o f recent Suprem e Cour t opinions : With three o r fou r "prong" tests everywhere and for everything; with an almost medieval earnestness about classification an d categorization; with a theologica l attachmen t t o th e determinat e powe r o f variou s "levels of scrutiny"; wit h amazingly fine distinctions tha t produce multiple opinions, designated in Parts, sub-parts, and sub-sub-parts, this is a Court whose Justices appear caught in the throe s of various method ological obsessions.

Yet this sor t o f critique, accurat e a s it is , can hardly be limited t o judicial texts . N o bette r demonstratio n o f the mor e genera l poin t can be found than in that exemplar of the American legal mind gon e off th e rails , th e bod y o f material s calle d "constitutiona l theory. " Examine any litigated issu e in this area and you will find essentially the sam e situation. Amon g legal academics, everyone from th e mos t self-consciously critica l thinker s t o th e mos t traditionall y minde d doctrinalists produce s contribution s t o th e literatur e tha t trac k th e same basic interpretive structure : 1. The extan t law of (th e establishment clause, the fre e exercise clause, freedo m o f speech , takings , crimina l procedure , th e deat h penalty, equa l protection, etc. , etc., ) is an incoherent mess , made up of conclusory an d muddled doctrines embodied in methodologicall y

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useless multifacto r test s tha t decid e nothing an d tha t n o on e eve n pretends t o take seriously. 2. Al l previous attempt s t o deriv e a coherent an d workabl e theor y from this material have failed miserably . Therefore , 3. Here's mine. Constitutional la w theor y thu s mimic s th e implici t rhetorica l structure o f the standar d constitutional la w opinion, i.e., "Where all others befor e m e hav e faile d t o brin g fort h ligh t fro m darkness , I (the judge , th e scholar ) wil l exer t m y singula r cognitiv e abilitie s and/or exemplar y moral character to part the mists of ignorance and confusion tha t envelo p thi s issu e an d thereb y revea l Wha t th e Constitution Requires. " I t say s somethin g abou t th e hol d rational ism exert s ove r America' s lega l an d cultura l imaginatio n tha t th e absurdity of such claims is not mor e self-evident. In fac t th e efficien t proces s theor y predict s that , give n th e struc ture o f ou r lega l system , an y are a o f socia l conflic t tha t i s cate gorized unde r th e rubri c "constitutiona l law " will b e a theoretica l disaster area . I n th e America n lega l system , t o cal l somethin g a question o f constitutional la w is not s o much a n ac t of formal cate gorization a s it i s a shorthand wa y of signalin g that i t involve s th e most intractabl e mora l an d politica l issue s ou r societ y faces . Constitutional law is the categorical dumpin g groun d for everythin g the norma l politica l proces s can' t digest : rac e and religion , se x and death. All the thing s on e shoul d neve r bring u p in polit e conversa tion. O f course i t i s incoherent : yo u wer e thinkin g tha t perhap s we lawyers were going to solve some of these problems? Indeed, nothin g i n th e ric h an d variegate d histor y o f Anglo American law is more ridiculou s than when a court take s it on itself to announc e it s solutio n t o thi s o r tha t tragi c conflic t o f politics , culture, o r life . Th e mos t extrem e exampl e in thi s genre , settin g a standard that will be difficul t t o surpass, is that moment i n the Casey opinion wher e thre e Suprem e Cour t justices cast their gaz e on th e enormous politica l an d moral controvers y surroundin g th e legalit y of abortion— a controvers y inflamed , i f no t actuall y created , b y

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previous judicia l pronouncement s o n th e sam e subject—an d pro ceed t o "cal l [on ] the contendin g side s of a national controvers y t o end thei r nationa l divisio n by accepting a common mandat e roote d in the Constitution. " Why , w e might wonder , don't the y just issue a writ o f mandamu s agains t unwante d pregnancie s or , bette r still , grant a preliminar y injunctio n agains t ba d consequence s o f an y kind? Her e w e se e ho w i n it s decadenc e hypertrophie d rationalit y mutates int o somethin g tha t become s difficul t t o distinguis h fro m frank irrationalism. The efficien t proces s theor y predict s tha t random , unpredictabl e decisions ar e exactl y what we should expec t to fin d a s we approac h the termina l poin t i n a n efficien t disput e processin g system . Th e American legal process fulfill s thi s prediction i n a healthy way when it adopts, explicitl y or implicitly , arational mechanisms for decidin g rationally undecidable disputes . I t illustrate s the theor y in a pathological fashio n whe n i t expend s enormou s amount s o f tim e an d money producin g texts—appellat e cour t opinions—tha t i n fac t follow, a s an y experience d attorne y wil l admit , random , arationa l patterns o f outcome , an d ye t clai m t o answe r th e lega l question s presented b y such dispute s i n rationall y dispositive and henc e pre dictable ways. Note that if the theor y i s correct, a dispute processing syste m tha t engages routinel y i n a n elaborat e rationa l analysi s of dispute s tha t have approached the system's terminal point must contain significant elements o f dysfunctiona l reasoning. Fo r eithe r th e disputant s ar e failing t o perceiv e or choosing t o ignor e wha t tha t analysi s requires (in which cas e the syste m i s inefficient), o r th e decisio n makers ar e deceiving themselve s whe n the y assum e suc h a n analysi s is i n fac t possible (i n whic h cas e arationa l decision s ar e bein g reache d through a n irrationa l proces s o f elaborat e rationalization) . I hav e suggested that , o n th e whole , th e America n legal system i s an effi cient disput e processin g mechanism , an d tha t th e hypertrophie d reasoning foun d i n appellate court opinion s i s evidence of the ratio nalist delusion s o f judge s an d thei r academi c imitators , rathe r than o f widespread craziness or stupidit y on the par t of litigants an d

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their lawyers . But thi s i s only a suggestion: reader s ca n decid e fo r themselves. A Necessary Madness ? To this point , m y account has ignored wha t seems a pragmatic con tradiction: i f most actua l o r potentia l lega l dispute s i n ou r societ y are processe d employin g roughl y appropriat e level s o f rationa l analysis, wh y the n ar e thos e dispute s tha t lawyer s and, especially, legal academics think of as "the law " subjected to such dysfunctional and indee d frankl y irrationa l level s o f rationalis t inquiry ? Why d o certain disputes that could have been resolved in weeks instead drag on fo r years? And why do courts writ e 200-page opinions analyzing matters tha t ar e i n fac t no t amenabl e to furthe r analysis? I believ e answering thes e question s require s we examine what i n th e Amer ican lega l syste m ar e thre e majo r impediment s to rationa l disput e processing: overgeneralizatio n regardin g th e power s o f rationa l analysis, professional vanity, and fear . One o f the peculiaritie s of th e moder n worl d i s a certain axiom atic assumptio n made—ofte n unconsciously—b y man y avowedl y secular intellectuals . The assumptio n is that huma n reaso n i s suffi cient unt o whateve r task s i t shoul d se t fo r itself . What i s peculiar about this is that without some kind o f teleological account, whic h by definitio n remains unavailabl e to th e secula r intellectual , a s t o why huma n reaso n shoul d hav e such powers , th e assumptio n itsel f seems quite irrational. After all , as John Searl e points out , i t i s simply impossible that a dog will ever understand quantum mechanics. Why ar e we not eac h of us that do g for the purpose s o f other form s —perhaps mos t forms—o f knowledge? It ma y be tha t w e need t o adopt a heuristic fiction that assume s we can discover what we want to know; but, often enough, it will be a fiction. Consider th e us e of reason b y investors an d gamblers. Is reason a powerful too l i n these contexts? I t i s an immensely powerfu l tool— up to a point. Yet it is this very power that tends to lead us toward an unwarranted generalizatio n tha t reaso n "works, " whe n i n fac t th e

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proper wor k o f reason i n suc h a context i s to rapidl y make further reasoning unreasonable . When bettin g o n th e 199 7 Supe r Bowl , i t would hav e bee n demonstrabl y unreasonabl e t o wage r o n Ne w England i f the Patriots were only a 7-point underdog. I t would have been equall y unreasonable to be t o n Gree n Ba y if the Packer s ha d been favore d b y 21 points. Reason certainly "works" i n these (hypo thetical) contexts . Bu t whe n th e questio n almos t immediatel y be came whethe r Gree n Ba y shoul d b e mad e a 13'/ 2 o r a 14-poin t favorite, rationa l inquir y ha d nothin g useful lef t t o say . Similarly, if the stoc k marke t wer e t o offe r investor s a choic e o f buyin g eithe r ten share s o f Microsoft o r Chrysle r fo r a total pric e o f $100 , the y would kno w immediatel y whic h stoc k t o choose . Bu t o f course n o financial market is going to offe r investor s such a choice. The mistake n generalizatio n t o which we are all prone i s to thin k that becaus e employin g sophisticate d reasonin g scheme s make s sense withi n a particula r social context , i t wil l continu e t o mak e sense t o emplo y thos e scheme s a s tha t ver y proces s o f reasonin g causes th e analyti c contex t t o shift . I n almos t al l socia l contexts , attempting t o determine throug h th e exercise of reason what the law requires make s goo d sense . Understandably , w e want t o believ e i t makes sense "all th e way up" through th e forma l disput e processin g system. W e will especiall y want to believ e this give n that , generally , the furthe r a disput e travel s throug h th e system , th e mor e con tentious an d painfu l th e socia l conflict it involves will be. But this is a rationalist myth, bor n o f our tendency t o overgeneralize about th e powers of reason. On th e da y the y ar e published , lawyer s stud y appellat e cour t opinions i n much th e sam e way investors por e ove r the stoc k table s or gamblers watch the game highlights. If the lawyers have won they will congratulate themselve s o n their power s o f insight; i f they have lost the y ma y rai l a t wha t the y se e a s ba d luc k o r th e stupidit y o r even corruptio n o f th e decisio n makers . Yet in mos t instance s th e losing lawyer s will eventuall y come t o blam e themselves fo r failin g to se e before the fac t wha t seem s so obvious now . After all , no on e wants t o believ e h e i s wastin g hi s tim e attemptin g t o predic t th e unpredictable: bette r t o se e yourself a s failin g a t your tas k tha n t o

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onfront the possi le absurdity of your situation. And besides, after

the fact ther e i s new information to analyze : information tha t i s usefully amenabl e t o th e applicatio n o f sophisticate d reasonin g tech niques. The outcom e o f the game, or the news of the merger, or the opinion i n th e cas e al l hav e plent y o f relevanc e t o futur e analysis . This information will help determine th e conten t o f the nex t price, or the next line, or the next advice to the client . In the actual practice of law new appellate court opinions redefine equilibrium zones , makin g som e claim s no w "obviously " righ t o r wrong, an d creatin g fres h area s o f ambiguit y i n th e process . (Whether an y particula r opinio n decreases , expands , o r merel y shirts th e boundarie s o f a lega l equilibriu m zon e wil l alway s be a complex and highly contextual question. ) I t i s easy enough t o over generalize, an d henc e t o confus e th e usefu l an d indee d essentia l process o f incorporating ne w information into futur e analyse s with the possibilit y of undertaking a rational analysi s of what the la w will supposedly require in the contex t o f the next appellate dispute. To sa y tha t la w work s beautifull y a s lon g a s peopl e don' t as k too muc h o f it sound s suspiciousl y akin t o claimin g that medicin e does wonder s fo r thos e patient s wh o ar e o n th e whol e healthy . (Which, o f course , i s true. ) Suc h a clai m injure s th e professiona l vanity of lawyers who, naturally, want to believ e the y ar e in posses sion o f uniqu e skill s an d esoteri c source s o f knowledg e tha t allo w them to go beyond the relatively modest tasks of specialized bureaucrats who help maintain a smoothly runnin g system of social coordination an d disput e processing . N o one , afte r all , work s u p muc h ideological fervo r defending "the rul e of accounting," o r goes abou t claiming that generally accepted accounting standard s are crucial to protecting democrati c value s and th e America n way of life . Atticu s Finch wa s not a CPA. The ideology o f American law thus encourage s lawyer s to imag ine themselve s a s masterfu l technocrat s o r freelanc e philosophers , purveying "rationa l polic y solutions " o r "practica l wisdom " t o th e culture a s a whole. Th e immensel y useful wor k lawyer s perform i n maintaining the submerge d portio n of the islan d of law fails t o flat ter thes e more exalte d visions of the professiona l self. These visions

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are furthe r fuele d b y th e legitimatio n need s o f la w schools , wh o must justif y thei r plac e i n th e America n universit y system , an d therefore mus t clai m to b e producing an d elaboratin g o n a distinc t body of valuable knowledge. I know an academic, technically a professor o f law, whose friends , all realize can be driven to amusing fits of exasperation by the simpl e tactic o f asking him a question concernin g th e substantiv e conten t of law. "Look it up in the phone book!" h e exclaims, waving his arms about, if you should ever inquire into his views on how any legal dispute, rea l o r hypothetical , wil l o r ough t t o b e resolved . B y th e "phone book" he means the conventiona l material s of legal analysis. And i n fac t mos t lega l question s ca n b e answere d tha t way . As th e saying goes, i t isn't exactly rocket science. (A side point: my brother , who actuall y is a rocket scientist , assure s me that wha t he doe s isn't, either). Anyway, legal academics fixate on those disputes whose solution can' t b e looke d u p i n th e phon e book , i n par t becaus e an y enterprise tha t coul d actuall y provide suc h solution s woul d hav e t o be i n possessio n o f th e sor t o f powerfu l theorie s an d effectiv e methodologies w e associat e with legitimat e intellectua l disciplines . This in turn leads to that peculiar ritual of American legal pedagogy —the case method—in which students study various operations tha t managed t o kil l th e patien t s o a s to bette r describ e ho w eac h was really a success. In th e end , overgeneralization s concernin g th e powe r o f reaso n and intellectua l pretension s bor n o f professiona l vanit y ar e eac h symptoms o f fear . I t i s difficul t fo r bot h lawyer s an d ordinar y citi zens t o accep t tha t al l w e ca n reall y sa y whe n face d wit h som e intractable legal , moral, and politica l controversy i s that it' s a tough issue. Academics in particula r fin d thi s unacceptable . Fo r member s of th e professiona l intelligentsi a thi s i s th e equivalen t o f bein g a mechanic who, afte r peerin g under a dank and odiferou s hood, ca n only tur n t o th e strande d drive r and announce tha t th e car' s engin e isn't working. Henc e the compulsiv e solution-mongering o f American academics , especially legal academics , who rarel y fee l the y ar e doing thei r job at all unless they are purporting t o solv e some basic conflict o f social life .

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America ha s never bee n a fatalistic culture , excep t t o th e exten t we have always believed it our manifes t destiny to be "progressing " toward somethin g o r the other . Face d with th e prospec t o f existen tial dread at our helplessness before the mysteries of life, we look for someone o r somethin g tha t ca n dispe l tha t uncann y sensation . Hence, despit e our vaunte d pragmatism , we are pron e t o a certain child-like fait h tha t som e perso n o r institutio n wil l wit h a singl e heroic gestur e fre e u s fro m th e intolerabl e web s of uncertainty sur rounding our most difficult choices . In the American law school, th e most strikin g evidenc e o f thi s fait h i s th e wa y i n whic h a n entir e generation o f legal academics almost literally worships the Warre n Court. Th e continuin g fascinatio n tha t long-departe d institutio n holds fo r la w professors of a certain ag e resemble s i n som e ways a collective cas e o f arreste d emotiona l development . Th e kindl y image of Earl Warren himself , with his grandfatherly shock of white hair, an d hi s fame d willingnes s t o brus h asid e lega l technicalitie s with the question "Bu t is it right, is it fair? " helps satisfy the longin g for som e paterna l figure in comfortin g ceremonia l garb— a sort of juridical Sant a Claus—who goes abou t dispensin g justic e i n muc h the sam e wa y reforme d miser s i n Dicken s showe r pound s an d guineas on everyone the y meet. It ma y be that an explanation as to why, in the cours e of deciding certain elaborat e lega l conflicts, an otherwis e fairl y rationa l syste m of socia l coordinatio n an d disput e processin g indulge s i n suc h excesses of hypertrophied reasonin g ca n be found by distinguishin g between what we ask of the visibl e and the invisibl e portions o f the legal system. Someone once remarked that a serious gambler doesn't gamble to win money—he wins money in order t o gamble. Perhaps we look to the visible law not s o much for answers to the unanswer able, but t o submit ourselves to the will of those who assure us they have suc h answers . Joseph d e Maistre, the grea t enem y of rational ist, socia l contractarian visions o f law understood this . Isaia h Berlin sums up Maistre's view of the matter : Men—moral beings—mus t submit freel y t o authority : bu t they mus t submit.... No man , and no society , can govern itself ; such an expres-

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sion i s meaningless : al l governmen t come s fro m som e unquestione d coercive authority . Lawlessnes s ca n onl y b e stoppe d b y somethin g from whic h ther e i s no appeal . I t ma y be custom , o r conscience , o r a papal tiara , o r a dagger, bu t i t is always a something.

The invisibl e law—tha t submerge d islan d tha t help s determin e the shap e and textur e o f our ordinar y social lives—has no nee d for such obscur e justifications . Here, th e modest wor k o f day-to-da y cooperation ca n take place without recourse t o tha t mystical some thing fro m whic h there i s no appeal . But fo r th e deepes t question s and conflicts , the modesty of a law made present to us throug h its absence won't do. For Maistre, nothin g wa s more absur d than th e naiv e enlighten ment fait h tha t society coul d b e held togethe r b y factors as humble as reciproca l self-interes t an d neighborl y forbearance : "Wha t thi s religion [o f the stat e and its laws] demands is not conditiona l obedi ence—the commercia l contract o f Locke .. . bu t the dissolutio n of the individua l in the state.... Society is not a bank, a limited liability company formed by individuals who look on each other wit h suspicious eyes. " The visibl e law, which must choose—and, if the effi cient proces s theor y i s correct , choos e arbitrarily —betwee n th e deepest commitments, th e dearest values those who are subject to its will struggle to cherish and defend, mus t be made of sterner stuff . The hypertrophie d rationalis m of American appellate law in gen eral, an d o f constitutiona l la w i n particular , ca n the n perhap s b e understood and—wh o knows?—even justified, a s a species of necessary madness : as our own versio n of whateve r atavisti c faith mus t ultimately undergir d th e violence of the state . It i s the tru e sover eignty of law as unreasoning and unquestionable fiat, masquerading, as i t mus t i n ou r hyperrationa l world , a s th e ver y embodimen t o f reason itself.

5

RATIONALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS He who possesses strength divest s himself of mind. NIETZSCHE

Six thousand years ago, the people s of the Nil e valley began to bur y their dea d in way s that indicated the y believe d th e departe d woul d go on to an afterlife. A t first, such rituals were limited to including a few househol d implement s insid e th e modes t buria l site s withi n which the corpses wer e placed. Then followed th e practice of mummification t o preserve the body itself, and the gradual elaboration of the plac e o f burial . Eventuall y thes e practice s culminate d i n th e building of enormous tomb s fo r persons o f high socia l rank, a practice that itsel f reached its apogee with th e constructio n o f the grea t Pyramids at Giza i n th e twenty-sixt h centur y B.C . The onl y surviv ing wonders o f the ancient world, they still rise out of the boundles s sands of the Sahar a as durable monuments t o th e theological obses sions of the Pharaohs , obsession s that eventuall y caused a huge por tion o f the wealth of a great civilization to be poured int o th e building of tombs. "Hypertrophy" is the nam e given to th e anthropologica l concep t that attempts to describe and explain such extreme processes of ritualistic elaboration . Today , th e America n lega l syste m i s rif e wit h examples o f thi s phenomenon : th e three-da y deposition , th e six month trial , the decade-long appeal, and the various textual progeny of these rituals: the 100-pag e appellat e court opinion , th e 200-page, 500-footnote la w review article, the 1,000-pag e statute , th e 16,000 page se t o f administrativ e regulations . Suc h ritual s an d text s ar e 81

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examples of that hypertroph y o f rationalism I have called "juridical saturation," whic h itself is a consequence o f the belie f that the bes t way t o attac k a proble m i s t o inflic t a comprehensiv e regulatory scheme o n th e socia l contex t i n whic h th e proble m occurs . Thi s belief in turn produces those vast texts the sigh t of which cause even the mos t stout-hearte d attorne y t o quai l i n fear : th e Interna l Revenue Code , th e Congressional Record, th e administrativ e regulations of any government agency. What I will explore here ar e some implicit ideological messages, inculcated throug h th e proces s o f lega l education , tha t hel p con tribute to hypertrophied rationalis m in legal thought . Finding the Law In Augus t of 194 0 Dunca n Hannah , a lance-corporal of the Britis h Royal Artillery , foun d a brooc h covere d wit h cobweb s an d dirt , which someon e ha d lodge d int o on e o f th e windo w frame s a t Gwernhaylod House , a country mano r that ha d bee n requisitioned by the Britis h Army. Two months late r he informe d his commanding officer o f his find, who suggested h e turn it over to the police. A little more than tw o years later the police turned the brooch ove r to Major Hugh Edward Ethelston Peel , who had bought Gwernhaylo d House in December 1938 , but who had never lived in it prior to its requisitioning te n month s later . Soon after , Pee l go t a lette r fro m Hannah's lawyer s demandin g Pee l giv e th e brooc h t o Hannah , whereupon Peel immediately sol d th e brooc h to a jeweler. Hannah then sue d Peel for the value of the brooch . Hannah v . Peel has becom e a classic case in th e stud y of modern Anglo-American propert y law . Law student s wh o ar e require d t o grapple wit h i t ar e confronte d wit h a maz e o f conflictin g forma l rules, instrumental concerns, an d ethical norms. The opinio n in the case is the work of a certain Judge Birkett , who a t first glance comes across fro m th e tex t o f hi s opinio n a s a well-meaning sort, totall y out o f his depth whe n trying t o negotiate hi s way through thi s particular jurisprudentia l labyrinth . Indeed , Birkett' s opinion ha s be -

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come somethin g o f a pedagogical byword fo r ho w no t t o g o abou t the analysi s o f lega l issues . (I n fac t Judg e Birket t wa s a ver y dis tinguished attorney : amon g hi s man y accomplishment s h e wa s by general consensu s th e bes t Englis h crimina l defens e lawye r of hi s time; an d h e wa s chosen t o b e on e o f hi s country' s judge s at th e Nuremberg trials. ) Bu t o f cours e whethe r o r no t Judg e Birkett' s opinion i s actually a deficient example of legal reasoning depends on whether o r no t th e cas e coul d b e analyze d in som e mor e effectiv e manner. Judge Birkett attempts, at least in theory, to decide the case by the common la w metho d o f deducin g a rul e o f decisio n fro m simila r past cases . This specie s o f lega l conceptualis m ha s bee n famously criticized fo r bein g a n elaborat e for m o f question-begging , an d I wil l no t belabo r thos e criticism s here . I n brief , many critics have noted tha t th e form s o f analogica l reasonin g lawyer s an d judge s typically emplo y ar e alway s fraugh t with ambiguitie s an d dangers , the mos t noteworth y bein g th e inescapabl e problems inheren t i n the tas k of determinin g whic h similaritie s an d difference s betwee n cases ar e significan t and whic h are trivial . Thus when decidin g the case i n thi s way , Judge Birket t mus t attemp t t o fi t Hannah v. Peel into a conceptual framewor k tha t wil l require h e giv e an inevitably controversial interpretatio n o f th e lega l "meaning " o f severa l dis parate disputes. For example , i n th e cas e o f Bridges v . Hawkesworth, a salesma n found a bundle of pound notes on the floo r o f a shop. He gav e them to th e shop' s owner , who held the note s i n the hop e tha t thei r tru e owner would appear and claim them. After thre e years, the salesman asked for the notes, but th e shop's owner refused t o tur n the m over. At the conclusio n of the subsequen t lawsui t the appellat e cour t awarded them t o the salesman on the grounds that , first, he was the finder of a lost item, and, second, the sho p owner had never been in possession o f the notes before the salesman found them . By contrast, i n South Staffordshire Water Co . v. Sharman, a case in which the defendant found two rings at the bottom of a pool on land owned b y the plaintiff , th e appellat e court awarde d the ring s to th e plaintiff, assertin g that "the possessio n of land carries with it posses-

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sion of everything which may be on or in that land." The cour t distinguished th e Bridges cas e on th e basi s that i n those circumstances the bank notes were found i n the public part of the shop, and therefore(?) were never in the possession of the shop' s owner. After describin g on e othe r case , in whic h a prehistoric boat was awarded t o the owne r of the land in which it was buried rather than to the boat' s finder, again on the ground s that the owne r of the land had "possession " o f the los t item , Judge Birket t notes " a review of these judgment s shows that th e authoritie s are i n a n unsatisfactory state." H e conclude s i t i s fairl y clea r tha t " a ma n possesse s everything that i s attached t o o r unde r hi s land," but tha t "h e doe s no t necessarily possess a thing which is lying unattached on th e surfac e of his land even though th e thing is not possesse d by someone else. " He als o notes, correctly, tha t the rules governing what lost items the owner o f land possesses by the mer e fac t tha t h e own s th e lan d on which the y ar e foun d hav e "never bee n ver y clearly formulated in our law. " Before turnin g to ho w Judge Birket t eventually untangled this conceptual knot, let us review the situation and consider how he might go about doing so. In th e Anglo-America n legal worl d ownershi p o f los t propert y tends to be governed by two general propositions, both of which are reflected i n th e dispute s Judge Birket t discusses. First, i t i s said th e finder o f a los t ite m ha s a bette r clai m t o i t tha n anyon e sav e th e item's "true" owner. Yet it is also commonly asserted that the possessor of land is entitled t o al l lost items foun d o n tha t land. The sec ond propositio n isn' t a forma l exceptio n t o th e first ; rather , a s Bridges v . Hawkesworth illustrates , th e tw o rule s ofte n contradic t each other. If we consider the explici t and tacit social norms these legal rules reflect, it shouldn't surprise us that the norms produce contradictor y rules. As the editor s of the leadin g property casebook for American law student s suggest , amon g thos e norm s migh t b e counte d th e desire t o ge t los t item s bac k to thei r origina l owners, t o carr y ou t the respectiv e expectation s o f finder s an d owner s of land on which lost items are found, t o rewar d both honest y and luck, and to d o all these thing s a s cheaply as possible. Not e tha t becaus e attempts t o

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pursue an y one of these norms will often conflict with the pursui t of some o r al l of the others , we can expect the lega l rules tha t gover n these situation s wil l als o ten d t o conflic t wit h eac h other . Judg e Birkett attempt s t o skir t an y inquir y int o th e variou s conflictin g instrumental purpose s o f finder s la w by framin g th e questio n con ceptually: as between Corpora l Hannah an d Major Peel, whic h litigant had "prior possession" o f the brooch ? Bu t the lega l concept of possession i s of cours e a n artifac t o f lega l reasoning itself , whic h is to sa y it i s a socially constructe d concep t rathe r tha n a plain fact o f nature; thus if this concept is constructed i n a sufficiently ambiguous manner t o allo w eithe r part y t o b e "in " possession , th e forma l invocation o f the concep t wil l only beg the question . And, in a legal culture whos e norm s properl y mirro r th e norm s o f th e broade r culture fro m which law springs, w e can predict th e concep t will be sufficiently ambiguou s t o accommodat e th e essentia l tension s between th e variou s socia l value s th e lega l concep t reflects . Le t u s consider som e of those tensions . The followin g instrumental parado x will beset an y social coordi nation mechanis m tryin g t o produc e a genera l rul e tha t aim s a t returning los t item s to thei r owners : if finders have a legal right t o keep what they find, then th e item s the y find will soon b e untrace able b y thei r origina l owner s (becaus e finder s wil l themselve s become subsequently hard to find). Yet if finders are not given rights over thei r finds , the n w e ca n suppos e the y wil l tend no t t o com e forward a t all . If, b y contrast , w e coul d b e reasonabl y certain tha t awarding lost item s t o th e owner s o f property o n whic h th e item s were found would not serv e as a disincentive to honest y o n the par t of finders , the n w e could bes t serv e the goa l o f returning item s t o their origina l owner s b y awardin g th e item s t o th e owner s o f th e sites where those item s were los t (becaus e the loser s of items could then successfull y retrace thei r step s t o th e sit e o f th e loss) . Thu s even if decision makers could be certain the y were operating withi n the confine s of a broad social consensus tha t returning los t items t o their owner s was the paramoun t goal of finders' law, their pursui t of that coheren t goa l would still involv e a delicate practical judgment regarding wha t the likel y effect o f any particular incentive structur e

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might be . It should be unnecessary to add that court s have no realistic way of gathering th e sor t o f empirical data tha t would allow this judgment to b e something mor e tha n a very roug h guess , made up of equa l part s amateu r sociological speculation, basi c fol k psychol ogy, and seat-of-the-pants intuition . But a s a matter of fact th e socia l consensus tha t would allo w legal decision maker s t o achiev e even thi s leve l o f coherent helplessnes s doesn't exist . Th e socia l judgment tha t th e organizin g principl e o f finders law is to return los t items to their original owners flies in the face o f th e universa l dictum , "finder s keepers , loser s weepers. " A t some very crude leve l of cultural generalizatio n i t is simply the cas e that thos e wh o fin d los t item s expec t t o b e allowe d t o kee p them . This expectatio n i s recognize d b y th e genera l rul e tha t a finder' s right t o los t propert y i s superior t o tha t o f everyone othe r tha n th e property's tru e owner . Yet th e actua l socia l contex t i s more complicate d still . Corpora l Hannah ha d th e goo d luc k t o pu t hi s han d blindl y o n a valuable piece o f lost jewelry , an d naturall y enough h e feel s hi s claim to th e item i s a valid one. Bu t then o f course Majo r Peel ha d th e goo d luc k to bu y a hous e wit h a valuabl e ol d brooc h hidde n i n a windo w frame. Just a s naturally, he believes the brooch shoul d be deemed his —not becaus e that decisio n will facilitate gettin g it back to its original owner , bu t becaus e the brooc h wa s found i n his house, whic h is to say within the confine s of a place that is to some degre e an exten sion of its owner's sens e of self. As for rewardin g honesty, Corpora l Hanna h cam e forward i n th e first place, yet his honesty in these circumstance s wa s perhaps not as exemplary as we might wish: it did, after all , take him two months t o confess th e existenc e o f the brooc h t o hi s commanding officer . A t a still mor e genera l leve l o f ethical judgment w e might wel l want t o reward a soldier serving his country i n time of war. Yet Major Peel is a soldier too; an d whether o r not h e is on activ e duty , he has had t o sacrifice hi s hous e t o th e quarterin g o f othe r soldiers . Bu t the n again, Major Pee l ha s never actuall y lived i n th e house , s o to wha t extent are his expectations of ownership bound u p with this partial-

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lar place ? O n th e othe r han d hasn' t h e faile d t o liv e i n i t onl y because it was requisitioned .. . ? and so on and so on. All this is to say that the ethical consideration s in the case seem to require jus t a s delicate a judgment a s does the instrumenta l tas k of assessing wha t sor t o f relativel y cross-contextua l lega l rul e wil l return lost items t o their origina l owners. And we have already seen that i f we tr y t o decid e th e outcom e o f th e cas e conceptually—by attempting t o determine which party had prior lega l "possession" o f the brooch—th e predictabl y ambiguou s characte r o f th e forma l legal materials will force u s to be g the questio n o f just what are the circumstances o f which legal possession consists . Today, law students ar e often taught t o see the circularit y of such conceptual arguments ; thus th e leadin g property cas e book ask s stu dents i f the losin g party i n Hannah v. Peel lost "becaus e h e di d no t have prio r possession , o r di d h e no t hav e prior possessio n becaus e he lost? " I n th e moder n America n la w school, futur e lawyer s are told—sometimes explicitly , more ofte n implicitly—t o analyze such "hard" case s i n th e ligh t o f somethin g calle d "policy, " tha t is , t o make the analysis turn primaril y on the pursuit of instrumental goals rather tha n o n a n attemp t t o follo w pre-existin g lega l rules. In any dispute wher e th e forma l lega l materials are ambiguou s (i.e. , i n all serious appellat e cases) students ar e usually told that lega l reasonin g requires the y determin e wha t sort s o f lega l rule s wil l both address the variou s ethical concerns th e cas e presents, an d at the sam e time achieve whatever instrumental goa l or goal s the disput e processin g system wishe s t o pursue . Furthermore , la w professor s wh o recal l that tim e an d mone y ar e scarc e commoditie s wil l remind student s that an y attempt t o answe r thes e question s shoul d b e pursued a t a reasonable cost. It i s part of the rationalis t dogm a underlyin g America n legal ideology tha t undertakin g suc h a n analysi s always makes sense; henc e the criticis m heape d o n Judg e Birket t fo r failin g t o d o s o i n th e course o f decidin g Hannah v. Peel. But th e tas k o f making difficul t legal question s usefull y amenabl e t o rationa l analysi s face s man y obstacles.

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Consider a s a n initia l matte r th e questio n o f whethe r conflict s between finder s an d propert y owner s shoul d b e resolve d b y refer ence t o so-calle d "brigh t line " rule s o r t o mor e amorphou s lega l standards. In on e sens e almost all jurisprudential arguments ca n be reduced t o som e variatio n o f this classic , irresolvabl e debate . Th e debate i s irresolvabl e becaus e th e strength s o f eac h approac h wil l always magnify the weaknesses of its alternative. Clear, easil y applicable rule s hav e th e advantage s associate d wit h certaint y an d pre dictability an d th e disadvantage s as well: th e genera l efficienc y o f such rules always comes a t the cos t of injustice in the od d particula r case. All rules by their natur e as rules must be both over-an d under inclusive in regard t o the behavio r the y are intended t o regulate : as Aristotle note d a t tha t historica l momen t halfwa y betwee n th e building of the pyramid s an d ou r ow n time , t o decid e b y reference to rul e i s to foreg o th e relativ e accurac y of case-by-case judgment . By contrast, fuzz y lega l standard s allow for particularistic , context sensitive judgment s tha t ar e b y their nature pron e t o al l th e hig h processing cost s an d subjectiv e arbitrarines s suc h judgment s in evitably produce . Thus a case such as Hannah v. Peel might b e decided by reference to a hard-edged rul e ("lost objects go to those who find them"; "los t items foun d in or o n privat e property g o to the owne r o f the prop erty") o r a fuzz y lega l standar d ("los t object s g o t o whateve r part y has the most reasonable expectation s of ownership"). The respectiv e rules ar e fairl y eas y to apply , yet tha t very ease of application guar antees tha t fro m tim e t o tim e th e result s o f thei r applicatio n wil l seem blatantl y unfair. The proffere d standar d sound s good , bu t i t has th e disadvantag e of not allowin g parties t o predic t ver y readily how their dispute will be resolved; and it als o gives decision makers no rea l guidance, beyon d tellin g the m t o d o what seems best i n the course o f sorting out the endlessly protean circumstance s of particu lar legal disputes. In an y decisiona l contex t wher e variou s importan t socia l norm s are i n tension , th e disput e processin g syste m wil l ten d t o produc e either seemingl y clea r rule s tha t t o som e exten t contradic t eac h other, an d therefore don' t reall y resolve difficul t intermediat e cases ,

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or fuzz y standard s tha t hardl y eve n preten d t o d o so . Ofte n a synthetic approac h develop s i n whic h apparentl y rigi d rule s ar e modified b y vague, standard-like exceptions . Historicall y thi s latte r pattern wa s formalized i n the commo n la w system by the divisio n of courts int o thos e o f "law" and "equity," with th e forme r aspiring t o the domain of the certain, and the latter to the honorific of the just. Indeed i t i s likel y that , give n th e respectiv e strength s an d weak nesses o f rule s an d standards , al l developed lega l culture s wil l t o a certain degre e oscilat e betwee n them . Som e dialectica l pattern , whereby a seemingly certai n rul e is eroded by the gradua l accretio n of standard-lik e exception s t o it s application , unti l th e increasin g amorphousness o f th e exception s produce s a rule-lik e counter reaction, i s probably a n inevitabl e featur e o f an y elaborat e disput e processing system . What Judge Birket t think s of as "the law " that governs Hannah v. Peel seems t o b e a law of rules: los t propert y belong s t o th e finder , and los t item s i n o r o n privat e propert y g o t o th e owne r o f tha t property. Yet if either o f these apparently clear rules is enforced with any consistenc y acros s variou s unforseeabl e socia l contexts , wha t will b e fel t t o b e obviousl y inequitabl e result s ar e sur e t o follow . Instead o f simpl y toleratin g th e cost s o f suc h result s th e disput e processing syste m interpret s th e tw o rule s s o tha t the y contradic t rather tha n complemen t eac h other; thus , i n case s such a s this one , the invocation o f the rule s can by itself decide nothing. All o f thi s is , a s I say , exceedingly well known . Wha t isn' t suffi ciently appreciate d ar e the ultimat e implications o f such insights fo r the practice o f legal reasoning . Hannah v . Peel is yet another example of a dispute that take s place in a socia l an d lega l equilibriu m zone . Again , a socia l equilibriu m zone i s a n are a o f mora l an d politica l judgmen t i n whic h variou s powerful, widel y held , an d rationall y irrefutabl e beliefs—belief s not amenabl e t o eithe r rationa l confirmatio n o r rebuttal—ca n b e adduced fo r holding contradictor y position s regarding controversia l issues. A legal equilibrium zon e develop s whenever th e material s o f legal interpretation faithfull y reflec t this underlying cultural tension , by failing to resolve through forma l rules social conflicts that are not

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otherwise usefull y amenabl e t o rationa l analysis . When face d wit h such conflict s legal thinker s hav e three options : the y ca n den y th e failure o f formal legal reasoning; the y ca n admit this failur e an d ye t deny the failur e of reaso n mor e broadl y conceived ; or the y can acknowledge thei r tru e situation. In the America n law school mem bers of the first group ar e called "formalists," while those o f the sec ond ar e usuall y identifie d a s "realists " or , i n thei r mor e overtl y politicized modes , "critica l legal thinkers." A s for the thir d grou p i t either never existe d at all or has been hunted t o th e verge o f extinction. (We will have to abandon the trim turf of the academi c suburbs for th e wild s of actua l legal practic e t o fin d representative s o f thi s latter species. ) The eternall y recurrin g conflic t betwee n rule s an d standard s is just on e exampl e o f th e rationa l wheel-spinnin g tha t take s place whenever decision makers attempt to analyze conflicts within a legal equilibrium zone . Ye t many other problem s bese t th e mor e explic itly instrumental form s of analysis recommended by up-to-date legal thinkers, wh o believ e the y hol d formalis m i n contemp t an d henc e insist tha t "we are all realists now." Let u s consider three . First, an d mos t obvious , ho w wil l w e choos e wha t instrumenta l goal t o pursue ? I t i s al l very well t o scof f a t formalis m i n favo r o f result-oriented lega l reasoning , bu t jus t ho w i s thi s "reasoning " going t o tak e place ? A s Richard Posne r point s ou t i n th e cours e of discussing Alasdai r Maclntyre's book-lengt h demonstratio n o f th e same point , "Ther e i s n o rationa l wa y o f resolvin g [controversia l moral issues ] i n a societ y a s morall y divers e a s ours. " (Posne r i s speaking specificall y of abortion, bu t Maclntyre' s argumen t applies to al l significant moral controversies. ) Th e standar d reply tha t w e can stil l reaso n abou t suc h matter s i s quit e besid e th e point . After all, w e can , an d ofte n do , undertak e impossibl e interpretiv e activi ties; yet ou r willingnes s t o d o s o doesn' t mak e th e interpretation s that resul t fro m those activitie s an y more compellin g t o thos e wh o disagree with our conclusions—nor indee d should it. Note this recognition of the problem of moral indeterminacy isn't a produc t o f a pragmaticall y trivial skepticis m tha t assert s w e ca n never actuall y be "certain " o f anything . Th e rea l problem i s much

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deeper. I t isn' t merel y tha t w e can' t b e certain ou r belief s abou t deeply controversial mora l issues are in fact true; rather, th e real difficulty is tha t unde r curren t cultura l condition s w e canno t giv e any recognizably vali d reason s wh y thos e wh o disagre e wit h u s abou t such issues should chang e thei r minds. Within such a culture impassione d moral and political debat e will tend t o devolve into th e bald assertion of intuitive belief masquerading a s rationally compelling argument . Fo r example , let us suppos e Dick thinks tha t affirmativ e actio n i s a moral imperative, while Jane considers i t a n ethica l abomination . I f they ar e professor s o f moral philosophy, we can b e fairl y certai n the y wil l procee d t o insis t tha t their respectiv e politica l commitment s ar e impelle d b y somethin g they cal l "reason. " I f the y ar e elit e lawyers—an d especially if the y are judge s o r lega l academics—w e may surmis e the y wil l identif y those commitment s wit h "wha t th e Constitutio n require s (o r for bids)." God know s they wouldn't d o this i f they wer e arguing abou t the relativ e merits of Haagen-Dazs an d Ben & Jerry's. My poin t her e isn' t tha t mora l belief s ar e merel y subjectiv e an d therefore nothin g mor e tha n manifestations of arational preference, but rathe r that , i n a society tha t doesn' t featur e enoug h widel y held axiomatic moral agreemen t o n fundamenta l ethical questions , ther e simply isn' t an y way of distinguishin g betwee n subjectiv e o r inter subjective pref ence and objective moral truth. (The suppose d post modern "insight " tha t thes e things are actually identical attempts t o eliminate this interpretive crisi s by enshrining it.) Second, a s I noted earlier , even if they should happe n to agre e on what instrumenta l goal s th e la w ough t t o pursue , lega l decisio n makers generally lack acces s to both th e initia l information an d th e sorts o f informational feedback structure s tha t woul d allo w them t o predic with confidenc e wha t th e effect s o f a particula r decisiona l outco ar e likely to be. This is not, o f course, a problem uniqu e t o law, althoug h i t i s on e t o which—perhap s b y necessity—th e lega l form o f though t remain s particularl y oblivious . B y contrast , con temporary natura l an d socia l scienc e ha s show n i n ric h detai l ho w almost an y systemi c actio n wil l caus e a myria d o f unforeseen , an d indeed unforseeable, reactions. Thus biologists hav e traced ho w the

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disappearance of an obscure parasit e can bring about th e collaps e of an entir e ecosystem , whil e sociologist s hav e demonstrate d ho w even the mos t careful, empiricall y informed attempts t o affec t socia l structures ofte n hav e more powerful unintende d than intended con sequences, with th e effect s o f th e forme r perversel y overwhelming any benefits gained from th e latter. The recen t history o f American law is full o f such examples . We have see n ho w th e libera l legal scholar' s insistenc e o n continuall y elaborating th e du e proces s right s o f the accuse d has ende d i n th e functional eliminatio n of the constitutiona l righ t to a trial for all but a tiny percentage of criminal defendants: our lega l system has found it simply impossible, as a practical matter, to actually carry out thos e generous procedures. * Ironically i t ha s bee n throug h th e exploita tion o f publi c ange r an d resentment , generate d b y th e suppose d effects o f thes e well-publicize d ye t mostl y illusor y "rights, " tha t conservative politicians have managed to brin g about a fourfold pe r capita increas e in the U.S . priso n populatio n ove r th e pas t twenty five years. These radical, symbiotic shift s i n socia l policy hav e hap pened withou t th e ai d o f any systematic institutiona l o r budgetar y planning, an d (a s we wil l se e i n th e particula r contex t o f th e so called "wa r o n drugs" ) the y hav e togethe r combine d t o produc e extremely dubious social effects . Along simila r lines , conside r ho w mor e tha n a generatio n afte r the Suprem e Cour t declare d schoo l segregatio n unconstitutional , America's urban school systems are now more segregate d than the y were th e da y that brave , hubristi c declaratio n wa s uttered: a n out come tha t i n som e respect s wa s a produc t o f unanticipate d socia l consequences resultin g fro m th e declaration itself. Indeed, the polit ical scientist Geral d Rosenberg' s recen t boo k Th e Hollow Hope illus trates i n powerfu l detai l ho w th e progressiv e politic s o f judicial review hav e ofte n backfire d i n jus t thi s fashion . Fo r instance , th e practice o f liberal judicia l review has played an unforeseen ye t cru *In Colorado i n 1995 , 96 percent o f all criminal convictions were obtained without th e benefi t o f a trial.

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cial rol e i n producin g tha t unifie d an d politicall y influentia l social and politica l movemen t ofte n calle d "th e religiou s right"— a politi cal movement tha t depends for its strength on various intense public controversies, tha t i n tur n ow e muc h o f their intensity , an d eve n their ver y existence , t o controversia l judicia l decision s o n matter s such a s abortion , busing , th e right s o f crimina l defendants , an d school prayer. If we descend t o the leve l of farce, we have the recent example of the Suprem e Cour t o f Ne w Jersey' s attemp t t o protec t lawyer s from a n upsurg e i n lega l malpractic e suits . That cour t interprete d a statut e o f limitation s i n a highl y restrictiv e manner , thereb y ef fectively barrin g a larg e subclas s o f suc h suit s unles s thos e suit s were file d ver y soo n afte r litigant s wh o switche d lawyer s i n th e course o f ongoin g case s obtaine d ne w representation . Wha t wa s supposed t o b e a prophylacti c interpretation , designe d t o forestal l malpractice suits , instead cause d a sevenfol d increase i n lega l malpractice actions—becaus e newl y hire d lawyer s wer e afrai d they would b e liabl e fo r malpractic e i f the y faile d t o infor m thei r ne w clients that they had to sue their forme r lawyers immediately or forever hold their peace. A particularly compelling series of narratives, illustrating the per verse instrumental effect s lega l rules often have , is found in Thomas Geoghegan's wonderfull y funn y an d sa d indictmen t o f America n labor law, Which Side Are Yo u On? Rules intended originall y to pro tect th e right s o f workers t o organiz e and join unions hav e become so bureaucratized, so complex, and s o contradictory tha t they ofte n make it feasible fo r those wit h the requisit e resources (i.e., management) t o manipulat e the lega l interpretatio n o f these rule s s o as to make effectiv e unionizatio n al l bu t impossible . Here i s par t o f hi s account o f an attemp t t o organiz e a small grou p o f nurse s i n rura l Illinois, under wha t should hav e been idea l conditions for unioniza tion ( a shortage o f qualifie d workers , ba d employmen t conditions , etc.). Capturin g th e thickl y descriptiv e qualit y o f Geoghegan' s almost anthropologica l pictur e o f th e madnes s o f America n labo r law requires an extended quotation:

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But organizin g [th e nurses] is a nightmare. I know of [National Labo r Relations] Boar d case s pendin g fo r seven years . Thin k o f it : Seve n years ago, a union asked a group o f nurses t o sign cards, risk their jobs, and sai d a t the time , perhaps , "Look, this'l l g o fast." Now, seve n year s later, the Board and the court ar e still trying t o decide whether on e little clutch of nurses should b e in a union together—whether they are , in a legal sense, "an appropriat e bargaining unit." What , yo u say , is an "appropriate bargainin g unit?" .. . Ther e ar e hundreds, mayb e thou sands [o f possible employe e permutations ] an d a goo d managemen t lawyer wil l rais e eac h one . No t jus t rais e it , bu t brie f it , pu t o n wit nesses, as k for a ruling, an d the n d o i t al l again fo r anothe r permuta tion. An d I , th e Unio n lawyer , have to argu e it , brie f it, a s if we were talking about something serious... . Meanwhile, the hospita l is firing all the nurses it can. And meanwhile, the Board is changing the rules for deciding what is "an appropriate bargaining unit." Sinc e the cases drag on for years, the rules ca n chang e tw o o r thre e time s i n th e cours e o f one case . A few years ago, the Boar d tried to codify th e rules in a decision known as St. Francis Hospital, o r St . Francis I. Then it came up with new rules in St . Francis II. Sinc e a federal judg e has jus t throw n ou t St . Francis II, w e are al l no w waitin g for St . Francis III. An d afte r St . Francis III, ther e will be a puff o f white smoke, and we will have St. Francis IV, an d the n St. Francis V,in dynasti c succession, like a long line of popes. On e day , when I am old, and young lawyers are at my knee and asking me abou t St Francis XXIII, mayb e I will shoc k them b y saying, "I remembe r St . Francis I." Meanwhile, th e nurse s wai t an d wait , thei r hai r turn s white . I f a nurse is fired, I say to her, "You'r e going to file a charge, I hope." "Where?" sh e says. "The NLRB. " "THERE? That place?" "Well, wher e did you think?" "How lon g is this going t o take?" "Three years." She looks at me as if I'm nuts . I don't even tel l her th e truth, which is that fo r thre e year s she'l l se e her nam e dragge d throug h th e mud , with doctors, administrators , eve n parkin g lot attendants comin g i n to say: "She didn' t chang e the patient's bedpan. " "I saw her yelling at a patient. " "I saw her flirtin g wit h a patient. " "I saw her havin g sex with a patient."

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And finally: "She's o n drags." And th e hospita l can swin g away, sinc e in a hearing it ha s absolute protection from libel. Sure she should file a charge. Kafka woul d file a charge.

This is the hypertrophy o f the urge to regulate. This is what happens whe n a legal syste m forgets tha t the mor e it elaborate s itself , the more manipulable the system will become, and the more unpre dictable the socia l effects o f such manipulation will be. In the fac e of thousands o f suc h soberin g example s th e moder n instrumenta l vision o f law as "policy science " remain s little more tha n a series of hopeful guesses , a pseudo-science conducted wit h much bravado but little real data and no valid method o f experimentation; and, despite the shallo w technocratic optimis m o f its rhetoric i t remains hard t o see how, as a practical matter, i t could ever be anything more. Third, instrumental vision s of law are al l more o r les s dependen t on th e assumptio n tha t peopl e "know " wha t th e la w is. But, espe cially at the level of technical specificity a t which people would have to kno w th e la w fo r muc h instrumenta l lega l reasonin g t o mak e sense, this assumption is almost always a blatant fiction . George Fletche r ha s mad e the amusin g observatio n tha t on e o f the fe w technical rule s of criminal law the la y public actually knows is that ignorance o f it is no excuse. Consider i n this light th e classic instrumental analysi s o f finder s problems . Thi s analysi s turn s o n how to mediate tensions in the incentiv e structure s supposedl y cre ated b y rules that eithe r rewar d or penaliz e finders for coming forward wit h los t property . No w o f cours e th e salienc y o f suc h a n analysis mus t hing e o n finder s knowin g wha t thos e rule s are . Bu t finders almos t literall y never know the rules , which in an y case ar e often s o ambiguous an d contradictor y tha t "knowing " the m would be o f littl e practica l use . Wit h th e exceptio n o f thos e fe w people who engag e routinel y i n searche s fo r los t o r abandone d propert y (salvage operations, etc. ) almost all lost property is found b y persons who ar e perfectl y ignoran t o f the governin g rules , an d wh o there fore remai n immun e t o any instrumental incentive s th e rule s migh t be thought to promote .

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Every yea r I teac h Hannah v. Peel t o m y Propert y clas s of first year la w students . I alway s conclud e a complicate d instrumenta l analysis o f finder s la w by asking students ho w man y o f them kne w the mos t genera l rules of that law (i.e., los t property generall y goe s to the finder, but locus owners have strong claims ) before they stud ied thi s case . The answer , invariably, is "none." This fac t i s all th e more soberin g i f we conside r these student s ar e al l part o f a highly educated subgrou p o f th e populac e tha t ha s an unusua l interest i n legal questions. My informal surveys only reflect what more sophis ticated studie s have demonstrated: th e genera l publi c almost neve r knows the conten t o f the la w at a level of specificity that would allow even th e crud e instrumenta l calculation s o f judges—le t alone th e subtler analyse s of academics—to affect socia l behavior in an y very predictable way. Expecting to Fly The successfu l rationa l analysis of legal questions mus t be based on interpretive agreemen t concernin g eithe r th e forma l concept s i n question, o r th e instrumenta l goal s those concept s ar e supposed t o advance. In th e latte r case , further requirement s o f rational succes s are tha t th e analysi s have a sufficient empirica l basis in the dat a and methodologies availabl e to decisio n makers , and tha t ther e i s a reasonable probabilit y a decisio n wil l affec t i n som e sufficientl y pre dictable manne r th e subsequen t calculation s of thos e subjec t to it . We have seen how in a dispute such as that underlyin g th e decisio n in Hannah v. Peel, none o f the condition s enablin g successfu l ratio nal analysi s is present. B y definition, this will always be the cas e fo r disputes tha t tak e plac e inside lega l equilibrium zones. As I argue d in the previous chapter, almost all nonfrivolous appellate court cases are litigated within wha t are both broadl y social and narrowly legal equilibrium zones ; hence suc h cases are fraught with al l the analyti c ambiguity those zones produce. I now consider within the context of this particular case the general consequence s fo r legal reasoning tha t follow fro m the pervasiv e presence of such decisional ambiguities .

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As we saw, after describin g the fact s and the la w of several previous cases Judge Birkett concludes (correctly) that "a review of these judgments show s tha t th e authoritie s ar e i n a n unsatisfactor y state. " Hannah v . Peel occupie s a lega l equilibrium zone betwee n a forma l rule that would certainly grant th e brooch t o Corporal Hanna h i f he had foun d i t lying on public sidewalk, and another that would almost as surely award it to Major Peel if it had been dug up out o f the gar den o f Gwernhaylo d House . (Not e ho w thi s disput e take s plac e within a legal equilibrium zone eve n though i t is, in terms of formal legal action, a remarkably straightforward case, featuring none of the significant factua l o r procedura l uncertaint y decisio n makers almost always confront when dealing with the typica l litigated conflict.) Faced wit h thi s conceptua l equilibrium , Judge Birket t disdains launching o n a vai n searc h fo r a n instrumentall y desirabl e result , and instea d merel y notes tha t Hannah' s conduc t i n coming forward was commendable and meritorious , an d tha t Pee l wa s never physi cally in possessio n o f the premises . For a moment th e judg e seems poised to decide the matter o n the specious conceptual groun d tha t "the brooc h wa s never [Peel's] , i n th e ordinar y acceptatio n o f th e term, in that he had the prior possession." What the ordinary meaning o f the clai m a property owne r "possesses " a n object lost o n hi s land might be, and whether o r not tha t meaning, once determined, should b e a requirement fo r overcomin g th e finder' s claim s are, of course, jus t th e question s a t issue ; bu t i n th e en d Judg e Birket t refuses t o rely on such circular reasoning. A discussion of the merit s does not see m to help, but it is clear on th e facts tha t the brooc h was "lost" in the ordinary meaning of that word, that i t wa s "found" b y th e plaintif f i n th e ordinar y meaning o f tha t word, that its true owner has never been found, that die defendant was the owne r of the premise s and had his notice draw n to thi s matter by the plaintiff , wh o found th e brooch . I n thos e circumstance s I propose to follo w th e decisio n i n Bridge s v. Hawkesworth, an d t o giv e judgment in this case for the plaintif f fo r £66.

What ar e w e to mak e o f what th e editor s o f my students' case book characterize as "the judge' s rather remarkabl e statement" tha t

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"a discussion o f the merit s doe s not see m t o help"? Certainl y Judg e Birkett avoid s any such discussion ; hence the almos t universa l academic criticism o f his opinion a s analytically deficient. Bu t as a matter of fac t a discussio n o f th e merit s doe s no t see m t o help . W e hav e already seen tha t th e cas e is conceptually indeterminate; that stron g ethical claim s can b e mad e fo r eac h party ; an d tha t th e questio n o f what a soun d instrumenta l approac h t o th e issu e woul d entai l i s both practicall y and theoreticall y intractable. Again , w e can alway s discuss th e merits , jus t a s w e ca n alway s "reason " abou t essentiall y contested mora l an d politica l issues. Go righ t ahead , if it makes you feel an y better. It remains on e of the abidin g vices of rationalism, especially in its various academic incarnations, that i t assumes reasoning about diffi cult question s i s alway s reasonable . Bu t o n thos e occasion s whe n further reasonin g doesn' t see m to help, and yet we nevertheless con tinue t o indulge in it anyway, what is called "reason " soo n turn s into something tha t ca n b e positivel y unhelpful : a n elaborat e for m o f rationalization. Indeed , t o cal l thi s activit y "reasoning " bring s t o mind a strange youn g ma n I kne w in college , wh o kep t insistin g h e could fly. When challenge d t o prov e i t h e woul d sprin t dow n th e hall of the dormitory , flappin g hi s arms with mani c glee, an d shout ing, "Fly ! Fly ! Fly! " H e woul d the n lea p approximatel y te n fee t through th e ai r before crashin g into the cinde r block s at the en d of the hall . The broo d o f mockers i n ou r midst—thos e skeptic s who , always and everywhere, endeavor t o rui n th e sacre d truths to whic h the faithfu l cling—refuse d to accep t thi s evidenc e as definitive. Yet soon enoug h hi s versio n o f fligh t becam e a stapl e o f sophomori c drunkenness a t the en d o f dorm parties , a s well as a part of the ritu alistic celebration o f the school' s athleti c triumphs . At the heigh t o f the Dionysia n frenz y tha t marke d th e en d o f semeste r final s (b y which time , alas , our her o had bee n expelle d fo r failin g to atten d a single class) even some o f the skeptic s were attempting t o fly. Judge Birket t refuse s t o tak e flight . B y havin g th e strengt h o f mind no t to give reasons h e remind s us o f how, when th e weapon s o f reason fail , a n arational , gnosti c utteranc e ca n b e th e ver y mar k of reason itself . The apparen t aporia i n which his argument leave s us is,

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perhaps, bu t a for m o f Socrati c motley , whos e obscurin g mantl e hides from u s the deepe r wisdom of the self-knowin g fool . Naturally, th e insigh t tha t " a discussio n o f th e merit s doe s no t seem t o help " will be a s disturbing t o th e intelligentsi a a s the real ization tha t ther e ar e situation s i n whic h physica l courage i s of n o use wil l be t o th e initiate s o f a warrior caste . Eve n a s heterodox a legal thinke r a s Richar d Posne r ca n embrac e thi s possibilit y onl y with considerable ambivalence. Consider a n opinion written earl y in his judicial career, 0 'Shea v. Riverway Towing, in which Judge Posne r grappled with the issu e of whether a trial judge's award of damages for los t futur e earning s wa s unreasonabl y high . I n th e cours e o f doing s o h e admonishe d th e tria l judg e tha t "[u]nlik e man y othe r damage item s in a personal injury case , notably pain an d suffering , the calculatio n o f damage s for los t earning s ca n an d shoul d b e a n analytical rather than an intuitive undertaking." Note this is said in a decisional contex t tha t feature s suc h a profoun d leve l o f analyti c uncertainty (regardin g ho w t o determine , amon g othe r things , future wag e rates, the probabl e pre-accident lengt h o f the plaintiff's career, th e likel y effect s o f inflatio n o n bot h wage s an d financia l instruments, an d the bes t methodology , give n thes e an d other vari ables, fo r discountin g t o presen t valu e a hypothesize d strea m o f future earnings—al l controversia l question s amon g professiona l economists) tha t th e plaintiff' s exper t economis t coul d onl y giv e a range o f estimate s betwee n $50,00 0 an d $114,00 0 regardin g th e question o f what his client's lost earnings were likely to have been. Judge Posner , o f course, i s well aware of the enormou s empirica l and theoretica l difficultie s an y suc h calculatio n mus t face , eve n going s o far as to not e tha t "th e exactnes s which economic analysis rigorously pursue d appear s to offe r is , at least in th e litigatio n set ting, somewha t delusive. " Afte r a n extremel y learne d an d abstrus e discussion o f the differen t route s on e migh t follo w i n makin g suc h calculations, h e uphold s a s reasonable th e distric t judge' s awar d of damages, whic h i s near th e midpoin t o f th e expert' s serie s o f esti mates. Yet at th e conclusio n o f hi s opinion Judg e Posne r take s th e somewhat unusual ste p o f chiding the lowe r court judge for failing to "se t ou t th e step s by which he arrived at his award for lost futur e

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earnings, i n orde r t o assis t th e appellat e cour t i n reviewin g th e award," and he ask s that i n th e futur e th e distric t judge s of the cir cuit not neglect to do so. Two thing s see m curiou s abou t thi s request . First , i n th e grea t majority o f simila r case s th e awar d of los t futur e earning s wil l b e made by a jury, who o f course wil l provid e the appellat e court with no assistanc e regardin g th e questio n o f ho w the y cam e t o mak e a particular determination. Why , w e might ask , should th e occasiona l bench tria l be treated differently ? Second , what practical differenc e does it make whether a lower court judge explains or fail s t o explain the purporte d basi s for his or her decision , as long as that decisio n is somewhere withi n th e rang e o f what the reviewin g court consider s reasonable conclusions? I believe the answers to these question s are closely linked. We can surmise tha t Judg e Posne r accept s th e pragmati c trut h tha t jurie s will mak e arationa l decision s regardin g thos e question s h e admit s must be answered intuitively, or that can be analyzed in only weakly rational ways. Indeed, as we have seen, the jury can be understood a s an implicitl y arationa l mechanis m fo r decidin g question s tha t ar e not amenabl e t o sophisticate d rationa l analysis . Th e decision s o f judges, o n th e othe r hand , are supposed to embod y reasoned judgment rathe r tha n mer e wil l o r chance . Bu t a s Judge Posner' s ow n analysis o f th e question demonstrates , i n th e cas e at han d th e dis counted presen t valu e of the plaintiff' s hypothetica l futur e earning s can onl y b e determined—eve n give n a n optimisti c belie f i n th e powers o f rationa l economi c analysis—t o fal l somewher e withi n a wide zone of possible outcomes. Within this sort of analytic equilibrium zone it becomes quit e arbitrary to declare some results reason able and others unreasonable, o r eve n to claim that some outcome s are mor e reasonabl e tha n others . Unde r suc h interpretiv e condi tions, th e deman d fo r mor e reason s fro m decisio n maker s amount s to a n invitatio n fo r the m t o indulg e i n analyticall y pointless—ye t ideologically potent—forms of juridical rationalization. In O'Shea v . Riverway Towing th e distric t judg e ha d t o mak e a choice fro m amon g wha t th e mos t sophisticate d rationa l analysi s

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available indicated wa s a series o f rationally indistinguishable alternatives. A s in Hannah v. Peel, a discussio n o f th e merit s ha d pro duced a decisiona l situatio n i n whic h a furthe r discussio n o f th e merits did not seem to help. It is precisely at this juncture in any dispute processing syste m that the hypertrophy o f reason can begin: at that moment when the deployment of reason has worked to make its further deploymen t superfluous, and indeed unreasonable. But i t i s in jus t such situations tha t various influential ideologies of American legal and politica l thought wil l demand we attempt t o resolve the most difficult socia l conflicts through yet more elaborate exertions o f rationalis t inquiry . Face d wit h a n impossibl e task , th e system reacts to the cognitive dissonanc e these demands generate by producing thos e artifact s o f rationalis t exces s tha t simultaneousl y deny and illustrate the limitations of reason: the decade-long appeal, the 100-pag e appellate cour t opinion, the 200-pag e la w review article, the 1,00 0 page statute, an d s o on. These sort s o f legal artifacts are th e frui t o f futile, hypertrophie d exercise s in form s o f argumen t that cal l themselves "reason, " bu t tha t i n fac t mus t conclud e with the assertio n o f axiomati c or circula r propositions . An d th e exces sive, jurismaniacal character of such monuments to rationalist vanity can itself be understood a s the produc t o f what is in essenc e a kind of obsessive-compulsive reaction to the neurotic structur e o f American legal thought . The ideologica l functio n o f such hypertrophie d text s i s to grin d both thei r writer s an d reader s int o submission : t o convinc e u s by sheer verba l hyperbol e tha t la w can provid e answer s t o question s that defeat the resources of politics and culture. For the uninitiated lay public, the massive bulk of the endeavor combines with the technical obscurit y o f it s languag e t o provid e a vagu e assuranc e that , surely, these peopl e mus t kno w what they ar e talkin g about. A s for lawyers, we in on e sens e remain mor e awar e than tha t la y public of how isn't th e case ; after all , we know from experienc e that much of the time in our roles as advocates and decision maker s we are, to pu t it bluntly, fakin g it. This, ironically, is why Judge Birkett' s acknowledgment tha t a discussion o f the merit s does not see m to hel p is so

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rare a s to shoc k th e sensibilitie s o f th e lega l mind : thi s admissio n shocks precisely because, with som e par t o f that mind , ever y lawyer recognizes its truth. It ma y b e th e cas e tha t th e practic e o f la w and , especially , th e practice of judging the law—whether in the courtroom or the class room—requires tha t thi s kin d o f self-knowledg e remai n fo r th e most par t systematicall y repressed. All the technocrati c obfuscatio n and oracula r resonanc e withi n whic h w e drap e ou r mos t dubiou s arguments may be both the law and the lawyer' s way of avoiding this disturbing insight. Perhap s th e lega l form of life simpl y demands we deny th e fac t that , whe n i t come s t o society' s mos t difficul t issues , the maker s an d manipulator s of la w ar e n o differen t fro m anyon e else: i n th e end , w e can' t explai n wh y w e believ e th e thing s w e believe or—mor e t o th e point—wh y thos e wh o disagre e wit h u s should be forced to act as if they believed thos e things as well. The Unacknowledged Legislators Six thousan d year s fro m now , long afte r th e grea t southwester n desert ha s reclaime d th e glitterin g valle y th e Spanis h name d Lo s Angeles, centuries afte r th e toples s tower s o f Manhattan hav e bee n buried unde r tons o f geologi c strata , th e fecun d silenc e o f virgi n forests wil l hav e onc e agai n returne d t o shrou d th e vanit y an d grandeur o f a vanishe d world . What , w e migh t wonder , wil l th e archeology o f th e futur e mak e o f th e plac e it s creator s calle d "America"? I f th e presen t momen t i s any guide , ou r inconceivabl e descendants will pick through the remnant s of a lost civilization and come t o suspec t tha t thi s wa s a peopl e obsesse d wit h somethin g called "th e rul e o f law. " They wil l fin d wha t i s lef t o f vast temple s dedicated to th e cul t of this god, a s well as many bits of circumstan tial evidenc e indicatin g tha t a grea t par t o f everyda y life wa s give n over t o th e scrupulou s observanc e o f it s demandin g rituals . The y will conclude, perhaps, that the people of this nation came to believe their go d coul d tak e dominion ove r ever y aspect of their lives , until an overweening pride in their deity's powers came to be inscribed on

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the very monuments the y erecte d t o it s worship. Will ther e stil l be poets, somewher e i n tha t undiscovere d country , wh o wil l loo k o n the ruin s o f what we are today ? If so, may they revivif y i n verse th e peculiar passions of a long-departed world . I met a traveller from an antique land Who said : Two vast and trunkless leg s of stone Stand in the desert. Nea r the m o n the sand Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frow n And wrinkled li p and sneer o f cold comman d Tell that its sculptor wel l those passions read Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things , The han d that mocked them an d the heart that fed; And on the pedestal thes e words appear : "My name is Ozymandis, king of kings; Look o n my works, ye Mighty, an d despair! " Nothing beside remains. Round th e decay Of that colossa l wreck, boundless and bare, The lon e and level sands stretch far away.

6 TOWARD A GENERA L THEORY OF UNICORN S The greates t of sorcerers would be he who could cast a spell on himsel f t o th e degre e o f taking his own phantasmagoria for autonomou s apparitions. Might that not b e our case ? NOVALIS, Philological Fragments

Once upo n a tim e peopl e believe d tha t unicorns , lik e owls , doves , and salamanders , live d dee p i n th e verna l gloo m o f th e forest . Because unicorns wer e reputed t o b e especially clever and shy creatures, the y wer e ver y difficul t t o find ; indee d the y were rarel y ever spotted excep t i n poor light , flittin g betwee n th e shadow s of moss y trees, or disappearing behind the sudde n bend of a glittering stream . Despite thes e impediment s t o thei r systemati c study , elaborat e accounts nevertheles s develope d concernin g thei r habits , appear ance, an d likel y whereabouts . Th e biolog y an d psycholog y o f th e unicorn wer e subjects of immense learning; comprehensive treatise s were composed; competing theorie s jostle d for attention; an d schol ars argued in heated conventicles, disputin g the value of each other's evidence, interpretations, an d methods . Then on e da y (o r s o i t seemed , s o sudde n wa s th e change , s o irrevocable th e los s of faith) n o on e believe d in unicorns any more . The unicor n becam e a poten t ye t imaginar y symbol ; a subjec t o f fables and legends; an image woven into the golde n thread s of tapestries; a n emblemati c heral d prancin g acros s th e landscape s o f Flemish painters . N o on e argued abou t whether o r not th e unicorn was reall y blac k o r whit e o r green , o r whethe r it s hor n i f los t i n combat actuall y regenerate d itself . N o on e argue d an y longer tha t 104

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the unicorn wa s "really" anythin g a t all. Unicorns had, in one sense, ceased to exist. But onl y in a sense. Are unicorns real ? O f cours e the y are : as th e philosopher Ma x Blac k noted , th e onl y appropriat e answe r t o th e question o f whether o r no t somethin g i s real is "yes." The relevan t question then becomes, "real" in what way? The stor y of the unicor n is the tal e of a concept's migration , in the mind s of men an d women, from th e brigh t sunligh t o f a n actua l fores t glad e int o th e murk y realm o f th e fantastic . Onc e thi s journe y wa s complet e i t wa s n o longer possibl e t o hop e t o fin d a unicorn i n th e forest : one ha d t o limit tha t searc h t o th e precinct s o f poems , paintings , an d dreams. Unicorns remained "real," bu t onl y in limited ways, for certain pur poses. A writer could still place a unicorn ami d the gilt-edge d pages of a novel, but eve n an empero r ha d t o dispens e with th e notio n o f actually capturin g a fabulou s beas t tha t woul d i n th e coo l o f th e evening wander the labyrinthine paths of the imperial gardens, to the wonderment of ambassadors, concubines, an d saffron-robed priests . California I s a State of Mind Some thing s exis t apar t fro m us ; other s continu e t o subsis t onl y because we think they do. The scuffe d cowhid e of a baseball is there whether people thin k it is or not, bu t the infiel d fly rule only comes into being when we invoke it, submit to it, exploit it, or argue about it. The stat e of California is at bottom a state of mind, because without suc h huma n mental state s ther e woul d b e n o California . Th e cliffs o f Yosemite , the bristlecon e pine s o f th e deser t interior , an d the mackerel-crowde d sea s o f th e souther n coast s woul d all , o f course, still be "there"; yet the state of California is not merely these things, bu t thes e thing s understoo d withi n th e confine s of a social and politica l concep t tha t simpl y doe s no t exis t outsid e th e belie f systems created an d maintained by various human minds.* If every*Whether thos e features o f "California" that are not dependen t on human cognition ar e themselve s completel y independen t o f an y min d i s a muc h mor e difficul t

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one everywher e simultaneousl y ingeste d a dru g tha t eliminate d all memory o f the concept , Californi a woul d at that moment b e fulmi nated out o f existence as if by some lightless fire. California is ther e only because, quite literally, we think it is there. One o f the mos t curiou s aspect s of socially constructed entitie s i s that man y o f the m ar e th e sort s o f artifact s tha t ca n perfor m th e social work they are supposed to accomplish only if we ignore or forget their artificia l nature . A classic example of this is the socially necessary assumptio n tha t valu e inheres i n wha t we cal l "money. " A s a matter o f practica l psycholog y mone y ca n functio n a s a medium o f exchange only to the exten t tha t w e manage to treat i t as valuable in itself. We don' t "believe" money is valuable: we know it is. Yet what is that knowledg e othe r tha n ou r unconsciou s confidenc e that, i n thi s case, knowledg e an d belie f are no t merel y compatible , bu t actuall y identical? W e believ e we kno w money i s valuable because we kno w we believ e it is . In suc h cases , the psycholog y o f appropriat e socia l belief requires that w e maintain an involuted stat e of mind in which we bot h kno w an d don' t kno w tha t variou s artifact s i n whos e existence we believe exist precisely because we believe they do. Or conside r in this regard th e mimeti c aspects of watching a film. If we keep saying to ourselves, "That's not reall y James Bond, thos e aren't rea l bullets," an d so on, we will no t maintai n the appropriat e mental state o f belief required of the audienc e in the creatio n o f the film a s aestheti c experience . Ye t our belie f i n th e realit y o f wha t appears to b e taking plac e must als o be limited b y our unconsciou s knowledge that thi s belief is false. We must "believe " i n James Bond —but no t t o the exten t of ducking every time he brandishes a piece of Q's devastating gadgetry . Now films , an d t o a lesse r exten t currencies , ar e example s o f where ou r knowledg e of the fictional, context-specific nature of our belief remain s fairl y clos e t o th e surfac e o f conscious thought . Bu t many othe r psychologica l artifact s o f contemporar y lif e ar e muc h more cognitivel y complicated . T o what exten t d o we, or shoul d we , recognize that a concept lik e "the government " o r "the court" is also question tha n th e dogmati c materialis m o f ou r cultur e i s a t presen t willin g t o acknowledge. Thi s point wil l be touched o n i n Chapter 8 .

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a pragmati c an d mimeti c fiction ? On e thin g i s certain : give n th e socially constructe d natur e o f so much o f our dail y experience, th e structure o f modern lif e ensures that a great deal of what we think of as "reality " wil l b e a produc t o f a kin d o f mas s hypnosis , whic h requires tha t w e maintain ourselve s i n delicatel y balanced, psycho logically comple x states o f knowin g ignoranc e an d skeptica l cred ulity. (T o paraphras e Thoma s Szasz : if yo u believ e i n th e Unite d States o f Americ a that' s calle d "patriotism" ; i f yo u believ e i n th e Republic of Texas that's called "schizophrenia." ) Which bring s u s t o wha t i s called "th e law. " In wha t sense doe s law exist ? As a historical matter, i t is fairly clea r that a t one tim e th e lawyers and judges of the Englis h common la w thought o f their law as rather more like a horse tha n a unicorn; that is , to the exten t the y considered th e questio n a t all, they believed "the law " was an objective, metaphysically robust entity . They also appeared to believe the law ha d existe d fro m tim e immemoria l an d tha t therefor e i t cer tainly wa s no t a produc t of , o r dependen t on , huma n belief s an d desires. This particula r metaphysical vision—what Oliver Wendel l Holmes famousl y called "the broodin g omnipresenc e o f the law" — cannot b e maintaine d a s a matter o f self-conscious belie f in a thoroughly secular , aggressivel y materialis t publi c cultur e suc h a s ou r own. I n ou r lega l culture , on e ca n n o longe r asser t openl y th e proposition tha t law is not a n artifact of human will without runnin g the ris k o f bein g tol d tha t anyon e wh o coul d believ e suc h a thing must be deeply confused, if not actuall y deluded. Nevertheless contrar y t o th e explici t claims of rationalizers, technocrats, an d utilitarians of every stripe th e implici t belief in law as a brooding omnipresenc e i s fa r fro m dead . Indeed , give n wha t w e require o f law, it may be that som e degree o f belief that i t is "really" there—that the unicorn stil l inhabits some hidden hollow of the forest—remains a necessary component o f the legal form of thought. How To Do Things with Laws In November 1968 , Masako Sawada and Helen Sawada were injured when struc k b y a car drive n b y Kokichi Endo . The y sue d him an d

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won judgment s totalin g slightl y mor e tha n $25,000 . Durin g th e nineteen-month perio d betwee n the filing of the suit s and the jury's verdicts Kokich i Endo and his wife, Um e Endo , transferre d owner ship of their hous e to their sons. The Endo s continued t o live in the house afte r th e transfer , althoug h Um e End o die d onl y te n day s after th e verdicts were returned agains t her husband. The Sawada s were subsequently unable to collec t their judicially decreed deb t fro m th e remainin g asset s o f Kokich i Endo . The y brought anothe r suit , asking the court t o declare the transfer of the Endo home a fraudulent conveyance , undertaken for the purpose of defrauding th e propert y owner' s creditors , an d t o therefor e se t the conveyance aside. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Hawaii was asked to answer the question o f whether or not the manner in which the Endos had held their propert y precluded a finding that the transfer to their sons was fraudulent a s a matter o f law, no matte r ho w "fraudulent, " in ordi nary la y terms, th e transferors ' inten t ma y have been . The Endo s had owne d thei r hous e i n a "tenanc y b y th e entireties. " I n th e English commo n law , property hel d i n a tenancy b y th e entiretie s had the followin g relevant characteristics: it had to be owned jointly by a married couple; it could be conveyed or mortgaged b y the husband, but no t b y the wif e (a t common law, a married woman was for most property-ownin g purpose s no t a juridicall y recognized per son); it was subject to th e husband' s general debts ; and at the deat h of one spouse , it was treated a s if it simpl y remained the sol e prop erty of the survivin g spouse. Thus if the husban d sold or mortgage d the propert y an d then die d before his wife, th e husband' s interest i n the estat e was treated a s if it had never existed, and hence the prop erty woul d belon g solel y t o hi s widow , unencumbered b y her lat e husband's conveyances and debts. With th e passag e o f the Marrie d Women' s Property Acts i n th e nineteenth century , American jurisdictions removed most of the for mal commo n la w disabilitie s that preclude d marrie d wome n fro m controlling marita l property . Thes e statutes , however , faile d t o address the question o f what effect the y should be construed t o have on th e tenanc y b y the entireties . Variou s state court s subsequentl y

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answered thi s questio n i n fou r differen t ways . A few states treate d the tenanc y as unchanged; the husban d retained sol e power to con vey the estate, and it remained liable to his debts, subject only to the wife's righ t o f survivorship . Othe r state s place d th e wif e i n wha t under the common law had been the husband's shoes, by making the estate liable to he r separat e debts as well a s to his , and b y allowing either spouse to sell the property . A third grou p placed the husband in th e wife' s forme r position , barrin g th e separat e debt s o f eithe r party fro m affectin g th e estate , an d no t allowin g either spous e t o convey th e estat e withou t th e consen t o f th e other . Finally , two states allowed either spous e to subjec t hi s or her survivorship interest to creditors , but barre d an y separate debts fro m bein g attached to the property itself while both spouses still owned it. By th e 1970s , Hawai i remaine d th e onl y stat e no t t o hav e addressed thi s particular question; an d the inabilit y o f the Sawada s to collect o n their deb t gave the state' s supreme court the opportu nity to d o so. For i f Hawaii chose to retain the commo n la w estate, or if it put th e wif e i n the forme r position o f the husband , then th e Endos' transfe r of their propert y to thei r son s would b e treate d a s fraudulent a s a matter o f law, given tha t Mr . Endo' s interes t i n th e estate would still be liable to his general debts. On th e other han d if Mr. Endo was placed in what under the commo n la w was the wife' s position, neithe r hi s nor hi s wife' s separat e debts could the n affec t the solvency of the estate , and hence as a technical matte r the trans fer would not b e considered fraudulent. The moder n tenanc y b y th e entiretie s produce s som e difficul t conceptual puzzles . Its commo n la w predecessor wa s a produc t o f what t o u s seems the metaphysicall y mysterious idea , derived fro m various element s o f Christia n doctrine , tha t a husban d an d wif e were a single legal person. Thi s idea led to littl e practical difficult y as long as only one of the subject s in this consubstantial union was a juridically recognize d entity . Bu t wit h th e lega l emancipatio n o f women, Simon e de Beauvoir's observation that for the equatio n 1 + 1 = 1 to wor k on e o f th e integer s ha d to , functionall y speaking, become a zer o coul d n o longe r adequatel y explain the conceptua l structure of the tenanc y by the entireties . As the opinio n i n Sawada

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v. Endo notes , "Th e tenanc y wa s an d stil l i s predicate d upo n th e legal unity of the husban d and wife, bu t th e Act s converted it into a unity of equals and not o f unequals as at common law." The concep tual difficult y thu s arise s becaus e unde r the moder n vie w eac h spouse owns , in bot h theor y an d practice, th e entir e estate : each is deemed i n th e reifyin g jargo n of property la w to b e "seize d o f th e entirety" rathe r tha n "takin g b y respective moietie s [parts]. " Bu t if each spouse owns all the estate , then stric t logic would seem to dictate th e parado x that whil e the property' s owne r canno t conve y o r indebt the land without the consent of the property's owner, neither can th e property' s owne r sto p th e property' s owne r fro m sellin g o r indebting that which, after all , belongs to the property's owner . In decidin g Sawada v . Endo, th e cour t attempt s t o navigat e thi s conceptual muddle through th e straightforwar d use of circular reasoning. It first quotes anothe r court to the effec t tha t "each spous e owns th e whol e [estate ] while both live " and tha t "a t th e deat h o f either th e othe r continue s t o ow n the whole , an d does not acquir e any new interest fro m th e other. " From it s witnessing o f this meta physical marve l th e cour t "deduce s th e indivisibilit y and unsever ability of the estat e int o tw o interests, and hence tha t th e creditor s of eithe r spous e canno t durin g thei r join t lives reach b y execution any interest which the debtor had in land so held." Impressed by the force o f its own deductive powers, the cour t the n muse s that while "one ma y hav e doubt s a s t o whethe r th e holdin g o f lan d b y entireties is advisable or in harmony with the spirit of the legislation in favor o f married women," these doubt s must give way before th e insight that "when such an estate is created due effect mus t be given to its peculiar characteristics." Here w e se e th e mor e o r les s hypnotic powe r tha t formal—or , more precisely , pseudo-formal—mode s of reasonin g continu e t o cast over the workings of the legal mind. (The reasonin g in this case can't be formal in any useful sens e because of that conceptual pluralism, acknowledge d by the cour t i n it s review of the law s of various states, tha t result s in conflictin g conceptualizations of th e moder n tenancy b y the entireties. ) Ye t the Suprem e Cour t o f Hawaii give s no indicatio n whatsoeve r tha t i t ha s th e faintes t suspicio n ther e

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might b e anythin g fishy about thi s particula r use of deductive rea soning. Indeed , th e ide a that the y ar e simply begging th e questio n seems quit e beyon d th e judges ' collectiv e ken. I t i s a s if a painter , asked wh y h e alway s mad e hi s unicorn s whit e whe n othe r artist s chose to represent thos e imaginary beasts as black or green, were to reply that he had always found whiteness to be a "peculiar characteristic" of the unicorn's actual coloration. When th e cour t turn s fro m discussin g legal concept s t o instru mental consideration s o f policy , w e receiv e even cleare r confirmation that we are in the presence of a level of cognitive confusion akin to tha t accompanyin g some sor t o f menta l illness . Th e argumen t that it is unfair t o creditors to exempt the tenancy from th e debt s of either spous e i s dismisse d wit h th e observatio n tha t "I f th e deb t arose prior to the creation of the estate, the property was not a basis of credit, and if the debt arose subsequently the creditor presumably had notic e o f the characteristic s of the estate which limited his right to reach the property." The cour t the n criticize s by implication th e choices supposedl y mad e b y th e plaintiff s i n th e cas e befor e it , pointing ou t that "there i s obviously nothing t o prevent the creditor from insistin g upon th e subjectio n of property hel d in a tenancy by the entiret y as a condition precedent to the extension of credit." These kind s of statements shoul d give teachers of law pause. Do we hav e the misfortun e to b e burdened with the tas k of subjecting some numbe r of mentally impaired persons to th e benefit s o f legal education, o r i s it perhaps the cas e that thos e "benefits " are in fac t doing serious damage to the cognitive capacities of persons of otherwise norma l intelligence? * Ho w i s i t possibl e fo r thes e judge s t o entirely overloo k problem s o f fairnes s create d b y th e existenc e of involuntary creditors, when the plaintiffs i n the case before them are representatives of that very class? An d ho w i s it possibl e for thi s cour to assume that even voluntary creditors "presumably had notice" of the

*Note that the state supreme court judges who decided Sawada v. Endo were quite far advance d in th e America n legal hierarchy. I t i s therefore difficul t t o dismis s th e opinion a s a product of mere incompetence o n the part of marginal legal actors.

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relevant characteristics o f the tenancy by the entireties i n this particular lega l contex t when , afte r all , the cour t is creating thos e sam e characteristics b y means of this very decision? After som e furthe r discussio n o f variou s publi c polic y justifica tions for rulin g as it has, the specious character of the court's reason ing achieve s a sor t o f Platoni c perfectio n whe n i t conclude s it s analysis with the following remarkable announcement : If we were to selec t betwee n a public policy favorin g the creditor s o f one of the spouses and one favoring the interests of the famil y unit, we would not hesitat e to choos e th e latter . Bu t we need not make this choice for, a s we pointed ou t earlier , by the very nature of the tenanc y by the entirety a s we view it, " a .. . broa d immunit y from claim s of separate creditors remains among its vital interests." [emphasis added]

The opinio n i n Sawada v . Endo ca n be reduced t o th e followin g propositions. 1. Legal concep t X is conceptualized in a number o f differen t ways in the contex t o f situation Y, thus producing result A in Jurisdiction One, resul t B in Jurisdiction Two , resul t C i n Jurisdiction Three , and result D in Jurisdiction Four . 2. Lega l concep t X has never bee n conceptualized i n the contex t o f situation Y in Jurisdiction Five . 3. I n Jurisdiction Five , lega l concep t X mus t b e conceptualize d i n the context of situation Y to produce result C . 4. Thi s conceptualizatio n i s impelle d o n th e decisio n make r no t because th e resul t i t produce s i s in som e wa y desirable, but rathe r because thi s resul t i s inheren t i n th e prope r conceptualizatio n o f legal concep t X i n th e contex t o f situation Y in Jurisdiction Five . Q.E.D. This is the kind of thing that drove the classic legal realists—antiformalist lega l scholars o f the 1920 s and 1930s—int o paroxysms of rage an d disgust . Sixt y years later , despit e routin e lega l academi c claims tha t "we " ar e al l realist s now , anyon e wh o practice s la w is well aware that suc h blatantly circular forms o f pseudo-formal rea-

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soning ar e stil l a n integra l par t o f actua l lega l decisio n making . Sawada v . Endo is a far from uncommo n demonstratio n o f what happens whe n a particularl y clums y magician struggles i n ful l vie w of his audienc e t o stuf f a recalcitrant rabbi t int o a too-small hat , an d then—having a t las t succeeded—proceed s wit h a n ai r o f absurdl y triumphant prid e t o lif t th e enrage d bunn y hig h aloft , s o tha t al l may look on his handiwork with amazement and awe. At thi s point , th e sophisticate d contemporar y la w professo r i s supposed t o declar e such transparen t sophistr y anathem a an d pro ceed t o do—what ? The moder n instrumenta l orthodoxy taugh t i n American la w schools proclaim s tha t dispute s that ar e conceptuall y indeterminate shoul d b e decide d o n th e basi s o f socia l polic y or , more ostentatiously , "principle. " ( I shoul d emphasiz e tha t thi s instrumental orthodox y i s less universal than some of my arguments would seem to imply. Many American legal academics still deny—as both th e implici t beliefs o f conventionally minded doctrinalists, an d the explici t assertion s o f jurisprudential luminaries suc h a s Ronald Dworkin illustrate—tha t lega l disputes ar e ever conceptuall y inde terminate.) Bu t again, such disputes are formally indeterminate pre cisely because th e relevan t legal concepts reflec t powerfully conflict ing social policies and principles. Beneath its tendentious conceptua l veneer Sawada v . Endo i s abou t th e clas h betwee n th e libertaria n championing o f the value of freedom o f contract an d the communi tarian impulse to protect th e famil y from th e recklessness of a single member; betwee n th e desir e t o kee p credi t chea p an d thu s widel y available, an d t o maintai n thos e economi c privilege s grante d t o those wh o undertake marriag e an d child-rearing; betwee n th e urg e to compensat e th e victim s o f unfortunat e accident s an d t o avoi d magnifying th e socia l damage such accidents cause. Our fea r o f th e ineliminable practica l an d theoretica l difficultie s pose d b y th e attempt t o mediate these essentia l tensions allow s us to delud e our selves int o believin g w e ca n someho w d o so—if , tha t is , th e bes t minds o f ou r generatio n wil l firs t thin k very , very carefull y abou t such problems , an d the n procee d t o exercis e "goo d judgment, " "practical reason, " or , i n Ronal d Dworkin' s formulation , "th e bes t available political theory. "

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Let u s conside r briefl y ho w wel l Dworkin—th e mos t masterfu l illusionist i n the field—actuall y succeed s in the performanc e of this phantasmagoric task. Smaller Rabbits, Bigger Hats Despite hi s reputatio n a s a n esoteri c lega l philosopher , Ronal d Dworkin i s i n al l trut h a lawyer' s lawyer : a supremel y skillfu l rhetorician whos e silk y arguments subtl y flatter th e politica l preju dices o f bien pensant reader s o f th e Ne w York Review, eve n a s h e drapes thos e argument s i n th e academi c robe s o f th e Empir e o f Reason an d th e Constitution o f Principle . Thu s i n hi s boo k Life's Dominion, Dworki n plausibl y reduce s th e vexe d mora l questio n o f abortion right s t o a clas h o f essentiall y religiou s worldview s con cerning th e "sacred " statu s o f life , an d the n argue s tha t significan t government regulatio n o f abortion woul d violate th e establishmen t clause o f the Firs t Amendment . No w a s an initial matter thi s argu ment i s plausible only becaus e the seductive eloquence of Dworkin's prose hide s fro m th e grea t bul k of his readers various inconvenien t details, such as the fac t tha t Dworkin's definitio n of what counts a s a "religious belie f i s much broade r tha n tha t recognize d b y modern judicial decision s interpretin g th e establishmen t clause . A n eve n more intellectuall y problemati c difficult y i s avoided when Dworki n conceals fro m hi s readership an y hint tha t acceptin g thes e moder n establishment claus e doctrines a s correct als o requires—a s all candid supporter s o f th e doctrine s admit—tha t th e interprete r als o accept a radically ahistorical understanding of the clause' s meaning.* *It is no longer in serious question that the historica l purpose of the establishmen t clause wa s to leav e th e governmenta l suppor t o f religion—u p t o an d includin g th e establishment of officia l stat e religions—t o th e state s themselves , rathe r tha n t o th e federal government . Se e Steve n D . Smith' s Foreordained Failure fo r a ful l account . Dworkin's failure t o acknowledge this difficulty shoul d be all the mor e startling if we consider tha t his theory o f constitutional interpretation claims , a t least i n part, to be concerned explicitl y wit h th e demand s o f historica l understanding . Se e Ronal d Dworkin, Law's Empire, a t 230 , 338 , 380 .

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Dworkin's argumen t thu s simpl y ignore s th e entir e proble m o f conceptual incommensurabilit y in constitutiona l interpretation : th e interpretive an d intellectua l crise s cause d b y th e circumstanc e tha t the America n legal system give s conceptually incommensurable, yet still supposedly authoritative answer s to the questio n o f whether th e meaning of the Constitutio n i s determined b y its text, or b y certai n interpretations o f tha t text . Indee d th e Constitutio n a s a whole (as opposed to judicial decisions that refer t o the Constitution) appear s to have nothing whatever to say about a right to abortion, or to privacy, or individua l autonomy, o r sacredness , o r an y o f th e othe r highl y abstract concepts that make up the heart of Dworkin's argument. Furthermore, Dworkin's argument only succeeds if we accept it as axiomatic that prior t o viability a fetus i s not a constitutionally pro tected perso n (Dworki n admit s tha t state s ca n prohibi t abortio n once th e fetu s i s viable). We mus t trea t thi s assertio n a s an axio m because Dworkin's boo k provides no explanatio n as to why a fetus is not i n fac t suc h a person. And, if we conside r th e essentiall y metaphysical and indeed rather mystical character of the concept of "personhood," w e wil l realiz e there i s no reaso n t o imagin e th e boo k could provid e suc h a n explanation . Thus Dworki n i s reduce d t o asserting tha t th e centra l holdin g o f th e ke y abortion cases , Roe v. Wade, an d Planned Parenthood v . Casey —that a purported constitu tional righ t t o procreativ e autonom y forbid s state s from regulatin g almost al l abortions—"follow s fro m an y competent interpretation o f the du e process claus e and of the Suprem e Court's [other ] decision s applying it" [emphasi s added]. As any competent interprete r o f American constitutional la w will recognize—at least any whose cognitive faculties haven't been hopelessly impaired by the ideological distortion surroundin g thi s issue— Dworkin's central interpretive clai m is so absurd that it doesn't warrant the dignit y of a serious reply. Richard Posner's aci d dismissal of the linchpi n o f Dworkin' s argumen t mor e tha n suffices : "Thi s amounts t o sayin g tha t th e thousand s o f lawyers , man y o f the m highly exper t an d distinguishe d an d severa l of the m Justices o f th e U.S. Suprem e Court, who believe that the abortion case s do not follow from a competent interpretatio n of the du e process clause and of

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due process jurisprudence are—incompetent, maybe even deluded."* That Dworkin' s disingenuou s use of strongly conclusor y reason ing fool s a s many people as it does is a tribute t o hi s rhetorical gifts: which is to say to his skill in obscuring the vigorous leap s of unjustified fait h require d b y hi s argument . Bu t th e effectivenes s o f thos e gifts i s in tur n enable d by a powerful nee d o n th e par t o f his audience: the need to believe that the most difficul t moral , political, and legal questions can be resolved through th e use of reason, especially what i s calle d "legal reason. " Still , even i f a magicia n i s s o skillfu l that no one in the audienc e can explain how the rabbi t got into th e hat, onl y th e childre n presen t trul y believ e tha t i t wa s don e b y magic. Fo r al l lega l rhetoric' s grandiloquen t tal k o f "reason " an d "principle," w e know that our law is always a contingent produc t of fallible human choices—choices that within interpretive equilibrium zones mus t remai n essentiall y contestable . It i s thus inevitable tha t whenever the y ar e deploye d i n suc h situations, th e mos t sophisti cated political and philosophical arguments will in the en d be every bit a s axiom-ridde n and tautologica l a s was Sawad a v . Endo's crud e resort to a more obviously circular, pseudo-formal line of reasoning. Toward a General Theory of Unicorns The nee d t o believe in the powe r o f reason in general, an d of legal reason i n particular , play s a n importan t rol e i n producin g tha t extremely complex and interestin g psychologica l phenomenon, th e modern legal mind. Of course it may be more than a little ridiculous to speak of "the" moder n lega l mind; but nevertheles s a t the ris k of serious overgeneralizatio n I will try to trace out some of its characteristic features. Two attitudes toward the ontological statu s of unicorns see m rela*Of course i n a sense I g o Dworkin on e bette r b y claiming tha t both sides in thi s particular lega l argumen t ar e deluded . Bu t I locat e th e delusio n i n th e searc h fo r "the" lega l answe r t o suc h questions , rathe r tha n i n th e givin g o f som e particula r answer.

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tively unproblematic. On e could , for example, believe that unicorn s are actual biological phenomena—tha t unicorns ar e real in the same way horses are real. Or one could believe that unicorns ar e creations of th e huma n mind , imaginar y creature s whos e characteristic s ar e therefore wholl y a produc t o f ou r assumption s abou t thos e sam e characteristics. No w imagin e a social practic e tha t requires person s to act as if they sincerely believe there actually are independent fact s of th e matte r regardin g unicorns—fact s not dependen t o n huma n beliefs—and indee d routinel y require s thes e peopl e t o asser t th e existence of such facts. Yet suppose this practice also requires that on certain occasions those who engage in the practice claim no such independent facts concerning th e status of unicorns exist because, after all, "everyon e knows " unicorns ar e merel y product s o f th e huma n mind. We could anticipate that many of the participants in this practice will develop a sort of double consciousness about unicorns, on e in which they will both affir m an d deny—and in which they will in a sense both believe and not believe—that unicorns are actual or imaginary creatures, depending on the contex t in which such affirmatio n or denial, and belief or absence of belief, is deemed appropriate. The participant s i n this practice would as a matter of psychological necessity have to engage in a kind of Orwellian doublethink . O n certain occasions , the y would argu e passionately about what color s unicorns reall y were, or about their actua l population, whereabouts, and habits . On other occasions the y would trea t with derisio n any one wh o coul d b e foolis h enough t o tak e th e naiv e view that uni corns were the sort of creatures that existed outside the minds of the men and women who imagined them into being. On yet other occa sions the y woul d see m t o asser t bot h view s at once , claimin g tha t while of course unicorns didn' t really exist outside our imaginations, nevertheless by treating them as ifthey were actual living animals we could eliminat e an y practical distinction betwee n th e characteristic s of real and imaginary creatures. Such i s th e ordinar y menta l conditio n o f th e moder n America n lawyer. Th e moder n lawyer , and especiall y th e moder n judg e and law professor , mus t continuall y practic e a sor t o f "a s i f juris prudence, withi n th e contex t o f which th e lawye r both know s and

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doesn't kno w tha t mos t importan t lega l fact s ar e fact s onl y t o th e extent w e believ e them t o b e legal facts . Variou s strategies ar e the n employed t o dea l with the intense cognitiv e dissonanc e tha t charac terizes this condition. A common on e among practicing lawyers is to simply ignore th e dissonance—to treat it as someone else's problem . That someon e els e is , o f course , whateve r decisio n make r i s pre cluded fro m employin g the sam e cognitive strateg y b y virtue o f th e decision maker' s decisional responsibilities. Among judges the strat egy exemplifie d b y th e opinio n i n Sawada v . Endo —that o f failin g altogether t o gras p th e interpretiv e complexitie s o f the situation — remains a perennial favorite. As I often hav e occasion to explain to my students, if a judge undertakes a sufficiently rigorou s mortificatio n of the intellec t every decision can eventually become "an easy case." Although thi s latte r gambi t i s far from unknow n amon g la w pro fessors, th e mor e sophisticate d lega l academi c prefer s t o affec t a jaded, world-wear y cynicism . Yo u see, "we " kno w al l thi s already ; there's nothing ne w here; Wittgenstein o r Holmes o r Lord Cok e o r William o f Occam sai d exactly the sam e thing; indeed this very same heresy is in many respects identical to that denial of consubstantiality first proclaime d b y Ariu s an d dul y extirpate d a t th e Counci l o f Nicaea, etc. , etc . N o doubt . Bu t note well : let som e rar e issu e tha t still engages the ebbing passions o f our cynic arise , le t the Suprem e Court touch on the scholar's ideological bete noire, or the local zoning board threaten t o put a McDonald's across the street fro m hi s house, and al l that postmoder n ennu i in the fac e o f the circulatio n o f social power, all that intellectua l indifference t o what in another moo d ar e treated a s nothin g bu t endlessl y recursive, essentiall y meaningles s language games goes right out the window. Suddenly notions o f "th e rule o f law, " of "fundamenta l concepts o f justice an d fairness, " and even of "the correc t decision i n this case" spring, vampire-like , back to a kind of morbid life . Professor X , who on most days sounds like a cross between a Chicago alderma n and Michel Foucault, i s transmo grified int o a hybri d o f Perr y Maso n an d Christophe r Columbu s Langdell, an d dul y unleashes a torren t o f sanctimonious formalis m in the service of his rediscovered ethical zeal. Still, I mus t admi t ther e i s somethin g unreal , an d eve n unfair ,

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about thes e criticisms . Fundamenta l concept s o f fairnes s requir e that I consider th e possibility that if I had to kill, cage, and impover ish people on a regular basis—if, that is, I had to actuall y "do" law , as oppose d t o merel y talking about doin g law—the n I , too , migh t succeed i n dumbin g mysel f down t o th e leve l of the Sawad a court. * If it were m y job to parce l out, o n the basi s of circular justifications and instrumental guesses , a daily portion o f the violence of the state , I, too , migh t becom e extremel y adep t a t maintainin g th e intens e levels of sophisticated doublethin k that get the normatively commit ted la w professor through th e day . Perhaps th e prope r functio n of a legal educatio n reall y i s t o produc e person s wh o "thin k lik e lawyers": individuals, that is , who are trained t o hold various unambivalent yet rationall y unjustified beliefs , necessar y for th e vigorou s deployment o f socia l power , tha t nevertheles s remai n highl y rol e specific, an d ar e therefor e subjec t t o chang e a t a moment's—o r a client's—notice. Suc h belief s hel p mol d otherwis e ordinar y peopl e into th e sort s o f state actor s wh o wil l not hesitat e to kill , cage, and impoverish thei r fello w citizen s on wha t ar e deeme d institutionall y appropriate occasions , in much the same way that successful militar y training render s otherwis e pacifi c young me n capable of committin g acts of politically sanctioned homicide . The Ministr y of Law In Orwell' s Nineteen Eighty-Four ther e is a particularly chilling scene in which , afte r th e directo r o f th e Ministr y o f Lov e ha s subjected Winston Smith to intense physica l tortures, h e employs yet anothe r strategy i n the proces s o f Smith's gradual re-education. "This time it will not hurt, " [O'Brien ] said . "Keep you r eye s fixed on mine." *"The very construction o f judges—that which enables them to be judges at all— will lea d them i n importan t sense s not t o see , not t o understand , and not t o pursu e certain line s o f inquiry. " Pierre Schlag , "Clerk s i n th e Maze " i n Pau l F . Campos, Pierre Schlag , and Steven D. Smith , Against the Law.

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At this momen t ther e wa s a devastating explosion, o r what seemed like a n explosion... . A terrific , painless blo w ha d flattene d [Smith ] out. Als o something ha d happened inside his head ... somewher e o r other there was a large patch of emptiness, as though a piece had bee n taken out o f his brain. "It will not last," said O'Brien. "Look at me in the eyes.... Just now I held up the fingers of my hand to you. You saw five fingers. Do you remember that?" "Yes." O'Brien hel d up th e finger s o f hi s lef t hand , with th e thum b con cealed. "There are five fingers there. D o you see five fingers?" "Yes." And h e di d se e them , fo r a fleetin g instan t .. . ther e ha d bee n a moment—he di d no t kno w ho w long , thirt y seconds , perhaps—o f luminous certainty, when each ne w suggestion o f O'Brien's ha d filled up a patch of emptiness and become absolute truth, and when two and two coul d hav e bee n thre e a s easil y a s five , i f tha t wer e wha t wa s needed .. . "You see now," said O'Brien, "tha t it is at any rate possible. "

Compare thi s passage to Karl Llewellyn's famou s description o f the student's first year of law school: "Th e hardes t job of the first year is to lo p off your commonsense , t o knoc k your ethic s int o temporar y anesthesia. You r vie w o f socia l policy , you r sens e o f justice—t o knock these ou t o f you along with woozy thinking, along with ideas all fuzzed alon g their edges. " But of course whe n we undertake th e resolutio n o f hard issues it will always be the case that the relevan t legal concepts, th e demands of socia l policy , and th e idea l of justice wil l b y necessity appea r t o sensitive interpreter s t o b e "fuzze d alon g thei r edges. " That ver y same formal, empirical, and ethical fuzziness is , after all , what makes hard issue s hard. A successful lega l education therefor e bot h sharp ens and desensitize s th e adept' s sens e o f analytic complexity, sharp ening i t s o tha t th e advocat e ca n identif y variou s plausibl e argu ments, an d the n deadenin g i t fo r th e purpos e o f makin g an d (especially) decidin g betwee n suc h arguments . Thi s characteristi c doubleness of the lega l mind produce s th e doublenes s of the litera l sophomore—of th e brillian t simpleton wh o understands and exploit s

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and a t appropriat e time s forgets—th e evidentiar y problems , con ceptual incommensurabilities , an d ethica l dilemma s tha t alway s characterize difficult lega l issues. To be trained to think like a lawyer is t o b e taugh t ho w t o evok e al l the chaoti c complexit y o f law, and then ho w t o repres s th e intolerabl e doubt tha t sam e evocatio n ca n produce b y going on to achieve the "luminous certainty" required of the advocat e or judge. Within a n eve n vaguel y democrati c culture , law s mus t b e com promises between widel y held yet conflictin g social norms, whic h is to say that they will be, at best, the honest hunche s of all-too-huma n people attemptin g t o dea l with profoun d ethica l disagreement , an d to resolv e th e inevitabl e socia l conflict s thi s disagreemen t engen ders. Indeed, the modern metaphysica l crisis of belief that Nietzsche so clearly identified has combined with the ever-mor e eviden t limits of rationa l inquir y t o leav e us in a situation wher e i t ofte n appear s that, i f God i s not dead , then a t the leas t he has left humanit y blind. For eve n i f we assum e tha t Go d (o r whateve r god-term fulfill s th e deity's indispensable role withi n wha t Kenneth Burk e has called th e "coy theology " o f secular metaphysics) reall y does provid e answer s to ou r ultimat e questions , thi s informatio n mus t evidentl y remai n unavailable to the moral man. In our culture la w does its work by being the peculiar kind of psychological artifac t tha t i s treate d simultaneousl y a s i f i t bot h doe s and does not hav e some sort of formal existence independen t o f our desires and beliefs. Indeed, thi s psychologically comple x "as if qual ity of legal reasoning remain s so deeply tangled within th e rational ization structures o f the legal mind that our cultural ideal of law may simply b e inseparabl e fro m som e semiconsciou s illusio n o f lega l objectivity. Th e la w remains fo r moder n American s a n essentiall y mythical beast : whic h i s to sa y it i s the kin d o f half-acknowledged cultural fictio n tha t retain s a much greate r powe r tha n man y a self evident truth . Fo r eve n w e who ar e disenchanted—wh o hav e see n the magician' s incantation s fai l a few too man y times—canno t hea r the hoofbeat s of his unicor n withou t falling , i f only fo r a moment, beneath thei r potent spell.

7 ADDICTED T O LAW In th e cours e o f the lif e struggle , effort s an d result s ar e found no t t o b e i n stric t relation , thoug h th e corres pondence i s regula r enoug h s o tha t peopl e depen d o n it.... Man' s reactio n t o thi s elemen t o f chanc e ha s taken tw o forms. He ha s tried t o dominat e it, thu s giving ris e t o th e phenomen a o f science an d th e develop ment o f skill. Or h e has accepted it as hopelessly beyond control an d courte d it , thu s givin g rise to th e phenom ena of magic... . DAVID D . ALLEN , Th e Nature of Gambling

The Presiden t o f the Unite d State s is about to step ont o the tarma c of Denver' s brand-ne w airport , wher e h e wil l delive r a campaig n speech, frame d artfull y fo r the camera s against a backdrop of purple mountain majesty . Afte r crossin g citie s an d plains , desert s an d mighty rivers , he has descended out of the cloud s to bring us a message o f hope, an d t o sho w us ho w t o buil d a bridge tha t will reach the ever-recedin g future . No w h e emerges fro m hi s ceremonial air ship, t o b e greete d b y kowtowin g dignitaries , hig h schoo l cheer leaders, crowd s o f th e curiou s an d th e committed , an d o f cours e that swar m o f equipment-lade n journalist s foreve r trailin g i n hi s charismatic wake. He speak s the word s he ha s come al l this way to deliver, words designe d t o b e th e firs t soun d bit e o n thi s evening' s national news : "Toda y I hav e signe d legislatio n t o crac k dow n o n illegal drugs." A wave o f cheers engulfs th e podium, above which—barely visible behind a medusa-lik e amalgamatio n o f microphones—w e ge t a 122

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glimpse o f perfectl y coife d hair , an d o f a n eminentl y presidentia l expression, stern yet empathic, noble yet sincere . This exercis e represent s wha t i n contemporar y Americ a get s called "politics." Still, despite ou r jaded ennui—despite all the seem ingly bottomles s reservoir s o f cynicis m s o characteristi c o f thes e times—no on e appears to notice th e most remarkabl e feature of the President's statement . Reporter s wil l duly note he is signing this legislation in response t o his opponent's claim s that h e is soft o n drugs . Law an d orde r type s wil l dismis s th e actio n a s "playin g politics, " refusing t o believ e tha t thi s President , redolen t a s h e i s o f eas y virtue, ca n really b e serious abou t doin g wha t i t take s to figh t th e war o n drugs . B y contras t thos e o f a libertaria n inclinatio n wil l deplore ye t anothe r incursio n o n ou r constitutionally-guarantee d freedoms, an d se e i n th e President' s remark s anothe r exampl e o f that braze n opportunis m fo r whic h h e i s famed . Still , th e mos t salient featur e o f th e President' s carefull y scripte d utteranc e goe s unremarked—its sheer absurdity. Nearly tw o decade s ago th e federa l governmen t bega n t o pas s a torrent o f anti-dru g legislation , featurin g stiffe r penalties , manda tory sentences , th e eliminatio n o f parole, an d othe r draconia n ele ments intende d t o comba t a perceive d socia l crisi s brough t o n b y the use of illega l mind-alterin g substances . Indeed , severa l of the new laws Congress enacte d declare d that th e goa l of these statutue s was no less than to make America "a drug-free nation" b y the end of the 1990s . (I f we dismis s such statement s a s mere rhetoric , w e ar e ignoring tha t such rhetoric has real consequences). Today, primarily as a result of these laws , the priso n populatio n of the Unite d State s has more tha n double d since the mid-1980s , an d nearly quadrupled since 1975 . More tha n half of all federal prisoner s no w incarcerated are servin g drug-relate d sentences ; th e averag e length o f these sen tences i s by far the longes t i n th e develope d world. Meanwhile, th e wholesale pric e o f cocain e an d heroi n i s actually lower tha n i t was fifteen year s ago ; dru g us e amon g teenager s ha s skyrocketed ; an d drugs ar e a s widel y available as ever . Fo r example , i n California , despite mor e tha n a billio n dollar s spen t o n attempt s t o eradicat e the farming of marijuana plants, marijuana growers continue t o har -

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vest thei r crop s wit h impunity , an d la w enforcemen t official s no w admit openly there is not muc h they can do about it. Faced with thes e sorts of facts, disintereste d observers of the situ ation admi t th e so-calle d "wa r o n drugs " ha s been a n almost com plete failure . Indeed , give n th e characteristic s o f th e enemy , i t i s fairly remarkabl e anyon e eve r believe d i t coul d b e won . Amon g those characteristic s are : th e employmen t o f mind-alterin g sub stances in all known human cultures; the hug e profit s alway s gener ated b y underground economie s i n highly desirable contraband, and the enormou s incentive s t o participatio n i n thos e economie s suc h profits produce; the total impossibility of stopping o r even impeding significantly th e importatio n o f banne d substance s int o a countr y with thousand s of miles of unguarde d borders ; and , not least , tha t cautionary tal e o f spectacula r failure , th e federa l government' s attempt t o ba n th e sal e o f alcoho l durin g wha t i n retrospec t ar e remembered a s "the roarin g Twenties. " Given al l this, i t woul d i n trut h mak e more sens e fo r th e Pres ident to announc e h e has undertaken to perfor m a ritualistic dance, designed t o driv e away the evi l drug spirits, tha n fo r him t o infor m us that he ha s yet agai n "signed legislatio n to crac k down o n illega l drugs." Afte r al l i t i s jus t conceivable , empiricall y speaking , tha t the Evi l Dru g Spiri t Danc e migh t work ; an d a t th e ver y leas t i t would represen t a low-cos t experimen t i n socia l policy . W e know the legislatio n isn' t goin g to work ; and we also kno w it will merely continue t o ad d t o th e expens e of a set o f destructive polic y initiatives that ar e not onl y utter failures , bu t ar e costing u s a fortune t o implement. None o f thes e point s ar e eve n particularl y controversial . Wh y then i s th e President' s proposa l no t me t wit h hoot s o f derisiv e laughter, o r perhaps with a grave suggestion tha t he be examined, so as t o determin e th e caus e o f thi s delusiona l patter n o f thought ? Why i s the reaction o f his opponent instea d to claim the legislatio n doesn't g o fa r enough , an d t o promis e tha t he , i f elected , wil l d o even more along these same lines? Why, in short, is the answer to an important socia l proble m almos t alway s more law, eve n o r rathe r

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especially in thos e socia l contexts where th e evidenc e mor e o r les s shouts a t us that mor e la w isn't goin g t o work ? Doing a rain dance in the tropics : this I can understand. Bu t in the desert? Why d o we trust so blindly in the weak magic of law? You Need Therapy Americans lik e t o thin k tha t problem s hav e solutions , an d henc e they tend t o regar d culturall y sanctioned expertis e with somethin g approaching superstitious awe . Few better examples of this tendency can b e foun d tha n tha t peculia r ico n o f ou r popula r culture , th e advice column . M y persona l favorit e i n th e genr e i s America' s as well: tha t venerabl e dispense r o f th e timeles s platitude , An n Landers. Every morning , afte r readin g th e bo x scores and the bet ting line, I join millions o f my fellow citizen s by turning t o her col umn, where she reigns like some sort of cultural concierge ove r th e world of the American bourgeoisie. Here we will find personal tales of woe ranging from th e trivial to the tragic , fro m th e neighborl y conflic t engendere d b y a barkin g dog t o th e psychologica l devastatio n wrough t b y lust , violence , betrayal, an d cruelty . Tw o theme s consistentl y dominat e Ann' s responses: he r respec t fo r th e variou s experts she consults, an d he r unlimited fait h i n the efficac y o f "counseling." T o read Ann Landers regularly is to becom e awar e that sh e considers n o possibl e dimen sion o f human tragedy, no conflic t lade n with unspeakable burdens of grie f an d suffering , t o b e i n principl e immun e fro m th e profes sional blandishment s of the therapist . Here ar e just a few examples from a recent three-month period . A little girl is raped by her fathe r and ye t i s still require d b y the la w to visi t him twic e a week: "Ge t Sherry into counseling at once. ..." Anothe r woman is haunted by a childhood ful l o f violence and abuse : "I hope you ar e getting coun seling t o hel p dea l wit h you r nightmaris h past. " A Texa s reade r writes a lette r expressin g he r shoc k an d horro r a t a group o f loca l children, age s eight t o fourteen , who bea t a horse t o deat h for th e

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sheer fu n of it. Ann's response? "Th e parent s o r guardian s of these children shoul d b e made , b y law , to attendin g severa l counselin g sessions. These childre n nee d specia l attention fro m menta l healt h professionals a s well." A woman discovers tha t he r husban d i s having a n affai r wit h he r ow n sister : " I strongl y recommen d tha t yo u and your husband get joint counseling. " Of cours e Ann' s advic e merel y reflect s contemporar y mores . I n America today , a s supposedl y scientifi c mode s o f discours e replac e religion i n th e cultura l business o f purveying metaphysica l answers to life's most difficul t questions , th e therapist has gradually displaced the clergyma n a s th e dispense r o f all-purpos e practica l wisdom . Indeed i t ha s now becom e routin e t o send , alon g wit h searc h an d rescue team s an d medica l supplies , platoon s o f self-proclaime d "grief counselors " to the sites of great public disasters. (For m y part, I've neve r bee n abl e t o imagin e wha t kin d o f "counseling " coul d possibly help a mother wh o ha s just realize d that th e chil d sh e will never se e agai n ha s die d a horribl e an d apparentl y meaningles s death. Others, it seems, have better imaginations than mine.) Ann's worshi p o f therapist s an d thei r counselin g skill s als o goe s hand i n han d wit h her—an d th e culture's—generalize d fetis h fo r medicine me n o f al l varieties. With th e deca y of belief i n persona l immortality comes th e sacralization of these moder n shamans of the tribe who , god-like, see m to hold in their hand s the key s to lif e and death themselves. As part of the professionalizatio n of this sector of the secula r priesthood, a Cartesian division of labor has taken place: one in which th e therapis t ha s become th e docto r o f the soul , who through th e magi c o f scienc e cure s thos e spiritua l ill s tha t befor e were though t to b e the provinc e o f the ceremonie s an d sacrament s of the Church . I n thei r playin g of this role , therapists fulfil l part of the broade r culture' s deman d for som e sor t o f expert clas s that will provide answers to otherwise unanswerabl e existential questions . Sometimes, whe n I contemplat e tha t ther e ar e stil l American s alive today whose parent s wer e slaves, I try to imagine which of our own cultural practice s wil l engender equivalen t shudder s o f horror and disgus t in our descendants . Along these lines, we might want to

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reconsider th e practice of unveiling the most intimat e secrets of our lives t o tota l strangers , s o that the y ma y then analyz e our deepes t motives an d mos t profoun d fears , an d thu s hel p u s t o alte r th e essence o f our personalitie s i n ways thought sociall y desirable. It is just possible that, when see n fro m a historical distance, such proce dures wil l no t b e surrounde d b y quit e th e sam e benig n glo w tha t tends to envelop them today . For instance, I have a neighbor—let us call him Humbert—whos e domestic arrangement s hav e been s o spectacularly irregular that — even in these supremely tolerant times, even in our ideally atomized subdivision o f anonymous houses—he ha s become a figure of com munal gossi p an d speculation . Humber t move d int o th e hous e h e now occupie s eightee n month s ago , i n th e mids t o f divorcin g hi s second wife , upo n whos e bod y h e ha d sire d a boy, now thre e years old. He brough t wit h him a very young woman, pregnant with what was assume d t o b e hi s secon d child . Withi n thre e month s o f th e birth o f a bab y gir l th e newborn' s mothe r had , i t wa s said , bee n forced t o depar t the Humber t residenc e with th e ne w baby in tow. Almost immediately upon thei r departur e Humber t bega n cohabiting with a yet younge r girleen , a sylph-like creatur e who m a t pre sent he appears to be keeping in some state of obscure concubinage . As fo r Humbert' s mean s o f support , h e i s durin g workin g hour s transformed into—guess , reader , guess!— a full y certified , state approved, "licensed persona l counselor." Fortunately, despit e th e growin g dominanc e o f th e cultur e o f therapeutic, powerfu l critique s of modern therapeutic ideology have been pu t fort h i n recen t year s b y writers a s diverse as Philip Rieff , Thomas Szasz , an d Alasdair MacIntyre. Thes e critics poin t to how those wh o undertak e bureaucraticall y directe d manageria l role s must obliterat e th e distinctio n betwee n manipulativ e and nonma nipulative socia l relations , a s well a s t o ho w therapist s accomplis h the same sort of obliteration i n the sphere of personal life. In each of these cases the searc h fo r trut h i s replaced with th e ques t fo r tech nique; and disputes about proper end s are subsumed into argument s about th e effectiv e pursui t o f thos e ends . Withi n suc h a world ,

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moral argumen t appear s t o giv e wa y t o value-neutra l "expertise " precisely becaus e the significan t mora l question s hav e already been begged b y th e rational-bureaucrati c structur e o f th e decisio n process itself. But what if as a matter of fact thes e form s o f rational bureaucratic expertise have no value for th e purpos e o f determining how we should dea l with th e mos t profound questions an d conflict s that troubl e our moral lives? The basi c professional role dilemma s of the therapis t an d o f the modern lawye r ar e thu s ver y similar . Each operate s within a social discourse i n which h e o r sh e is expected—at least tacitly and ofte n explicitly—to b e able to answe r the mos t difficul t question s o f per sonal and politica l obligation. But of course the professiona l expertise each actually possesses, useful thoug h i t may be for more limited purposes, turn s ou t t o hav e no relevanc e whatsoever to th e resolu tion o f suc h profoundl y existentia l questions . Yet precisely becaus e they ar e place d i n th e absur d positio n o f bein g expecte d t o "d o something" about problem s tha t defea t th e power s o f their profes sional knowledge, people who pla y the socia l roles required of such experts develop the habi t of identifying the claim they ar e undertak ing efficacious actio n with the fact o f such action taking place. So it is that th e variou s "talkin g cures " tha t mak e u p psychotherap y con tinue t o represen t themselve s as supposedly therapeutic socia l practices, despite slender evidence that they are in fact consistentl y therapeutic, eve n withi n th e narro w rang e o f result s thos e practice s define a s representing therapeuti c effectiveness . Similarly, lega l actor s com e t o identif y "doin g something " abou t social problem s wit h th e undertakin g o f variou s type s o f lega l action. Eventuall y th e ga p between th e representation s o f the prac tice regardin g wha t th e practic e i s accomplishin g an d th e actua l accomplishments o f th e practic e ca n becom e s o star k tha t man y legal utterance s ca n onl y b e understoo d a s taking plac e within th e context o f som e elaborat e for m o f magica l thinking . Conside r i n this ligh t th e President' s statemen t tha t h e ha d "cracke d down " o n illegal dru g us e b y the ac t o f signin g ye t anothe r piec e o f prohib itive legislation. The routin e qualit y of this sort o f statement inure s

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us t o th e elementar y insigh t tha t ther e i s a t bes t onl y a ver y weak relationshi p betwee n th e act s o f signin g crimina l legislatio n aimed a t th e dru g trade , an d o f doing somethin g efficaciou s abou t illegal drug use.* Yet as we will see, law is not th e onl y area of modern lif e where the distinction s between , on the one hand, a belief in science an d rationality, and o n th e other , a faith i n what is thought of as religion or magic are a good dea l less clear than we are usually led to believe. Law, Science, and Magic I liv e i n th e cit y o f Louisville , Colorado . Onc e a mild y notoriou s mining town , hom e t o mos t o f th e bar s an d al l th e brothel s o f Boulder County , i t ha s sinc e bee n transforme d int o a typical bed room communit y o f suburba n commuters . Becaus e man y o f it s more civic-minde d resident s ar e professional-clas s refugee s fro m more o r les s Hobbesia n urba n environments , th e cit y governmen t these resident s control will often produce regulator y proclamation s that giv e evidenc e o f th e sort s o f anxietie s t o whic h peopl e wit h these type s of backgrounds ar e prone. Eve n a s humble a text as the Louisville Public Library Code o f Conduct is an impressively comprehensive document, th e interpretatio n o f which provides us with an indirec t glimps e o f variou s urba n pathologie s tha t continu e t o fester in late twentieth-century America. After a verbose preamble , which amon g othe r thing s inform s us helpfully tha t "behavio r become s unacceptable when it infringes on the rights of others," the code provides thirty-one example s of unacceptable conduct . Thes e example s can b e sorte d int o fiv e genera l categories: *Or consider the argumen t for a balanced budget amendment, which boils down to the belie f tha t the bes t way to ensur e legislators pass legislation that balance s the federal budge t is to pas s legislation requiring legislators to pas s legislation that balances the federa l budget.

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1. Highl y site-specifi c regulation s ( i.e. , "Eatin g o r Drinking, " "Overcrowding a t Stud y Table s o r Carrel s (limi t o f 4 pe r stud y table"). 2. Behavio r associate d wit h stree t peopl e ("Bathing/Washin g Clothes," "Lac k o f Shoes o r Shirt, " "Loitering including refusa l t o leave at closing") . 3. Behavio r evincin g failure s o f basi c acculturatio n mechanism s ("Obscene Language, " "Bod y Odor/Perfume/Cologn e (Excessive ) which Elicit s Genera l Complain t o r Cause s Discomfor t t o Othe r Library Users," "Excessive Public Displays of Affection") . 4. General crimina l behavior ("Theft, " "Gambling " "Physical , Sex ual o r Verbal Abuse or Harassment o f Library Users o r Staff) . 5. Criminalized behavio r associated with mental illness or substanc e abuse ("Exhibitionism/Flashing, " "Visibl e Dru g o r Alcoho l Intoxi cation," "Voyeurism/Peeping") . After th e lis t of specific example s the Cod e o f Conduct conclude s with th e American lawyer's equivalent of the ol d anti-Soviet slander provision i n the USSR' s crimina l code: "An y unlawful behavio r an d any other behavio r that unreasonably interferes with the saf e o r reasonable use of the library by other persons. " This code, posted as it is in prominent places all around the build ing, i s o f cours e a ver y ordinar y documen t o f th e kin d foun d throughout th e publi c spaces o f contemporary America . Normally , neither yo u no r I would giv e it mor e tha n a glance; and w e almost surely wouldn't spar e it a second thought. Ye t it is in its own quotid ian wa y a remarkable text. Le t u s attempt t o comprehen d bot h th e specific ideologica l commitment s an d th e genera l worldvie w t o which it tacitly testifies . Orthodox America n rul e o f la w ideolog y demand s tha t thos e actions the stat e has prohibited b e made public so that person s ma y have a n opportunit y t o infor m themselve s a s to wha t i s and i s no t allowed. Once thi s condition ha s been me t people ma y then b e held to "kno w th e law"—ignoranc e o f it being , famously , n o excuse . I t

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follows from this that when persons fai l t o conform their conduct t o the la w it can be assumed they ar e "choosing" to violate its publicly announced requirements . Th e ke y elements i n this particula r ideo logical justification o f the exercis e of state powe r ar e thus publicity, knowledge, and volition. Such a t leas t i s the theory . Ho w wel l does thi s theor y appl y to a typical piec e o f moder n bureaucrati c regulation ? O f th e type s o f behavior th e Louisvill e librar y cod e prohibits , w e might not e tha t only those liste d i n the first category ca n be thought to convey use ful informatio n to any minimally socialized member o f the commu nity. I admi t ther e coul d b e a rea l questio n a s t o whethe r I' m allowed t o brin g a ba g o f pretzels int o th e library , bu t d o I reall y require "notice " that I can't snatch purses , expose myself to patrons , do my laundry in the bathroom, o r play high-stakes poke r i n the reference area ? Suppos e I hadn' t bee n give n notic e o f an y o f thes e things; does it follow I'm fre e t o clai m as a defense insufficien t pub licity o n th e par t o f th e state ? Must , tha t is , th e authoritie s firs t inform m e o f th e specifi c rule s the y inten d t o enforc e befor e the y interfere wit h wha t i n a world withou t publi c lega l notice s t o tha t effect wil l b e considere d m y presumptiv e righ t t o physically , ver bally, and sexually abuse library patrons an d workers? Can ther e b e an y nonpsychoti c perso n o f minimall y functiona l intelligence wh o woul d suppos e tha t an y of the thing s o n thi s list , other tha n thos e deal t wit h i n th e mos t site-specific regulations , were no t prohibited ? O f cours e al l socia l rule s includ e area s o f vagueness (whic h publi c display s of affectio n ar e "excessive?") , bu t these borderlin e problem s ca n hardl y b e cure d b y postin g genera l proscriptions o f the typ e foun d i n publi c legal notices. S o here we seem to be faced wit h a wholly superfluous invocation o f legal rules: rules tha t merel y reflect tacit socia l understandings tha t themselve s have n o apparen t nee d t o b e cas t int o a publi c lega l text . Bu t th e actual interpretive situation i s still more peculia r than this . Note that ultimately th e suppose d purpos e o f the librar y cod e is to giv e person s th e knowledg e the y nee d t o exercis e a freely willed choice t o follo w th e law . That is, the ide a must b e that peopl e wh o would otherwise engag e in acts of voyeurism, o r who would stumbl e

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into th e Louisvill e Publi c Librar y unde r th e influenc e o f crac k cocaine, wil l duly note the y ar e prohibite d fro m doin g so , an d will therefore choos e t o refrai n fro m indulgin g i n suc h legall y pro scribed behavior . Thes e assumption s are , t o pu t i t a s charitably as possible, unwarranted . There is no evidence whatsoever tha t peopl e in the gri p of sexual compulsions o r substanc e addictions need t o be informed thei r behavio r i s unacceptable ; indeed , i n th e cas e o f voyeurism an d exhibitionism, the very unacceptability of the behav ior i s what sexualizes and thu s enable s it. And ther e i s also n o rea l evidence tha t legall y prohibitin g suc h behavio r ha s a significan t effect o n th e "choice"—i f i t ca n eve n b e though t o f usefull y a s a choice—to engag e in or avoid the prohibited conduct . Here , in the social subtex t o f the mos t ordinar y lega l rules, we ge t a glimpse of the ideology of the autonomous libera l self gone haywire. The library' s cod e o f conduc t als o illustrate s th e characteristi c hypertrophy of modern lega l reasoning. I t i s not tha t lega l concepts such a s "notice" and "choice" never make sense; in fact, mos t o f th e time they do . It is rather tha t we tend t o emplo y these sorts of con cepts s o promiscuousl y tha t w e los e sigh t o f th e relativ e lac k o f salience the y hav e t o man y social situations. W e hav e seen how , in the contex t o f anti-drug legislation , the common-sens e insigh t tha t attaching ba d consequence s t o certai n action s ofte n deter s person s from undertakin g thos e action s is exaggerated ou t o f all reasonable proportion. I n a simila r vein , th e modest ide a tha t talkin g abou t their problem s sometime s make s people fee l bette r get s blow n u p into th e gran d scientifi c an d cultura l pretension s o f psychothera peutic ideology . Much lik e these forme r examples , the librar y code illustrates som e o f th e way s i n whic h otherwis e usefu l mode s o f analysis can be pushed to a point where the hypertrophied characte r of what is called "reason" become s indistinguishable fro m a form of magical thinking. Posting a public notice o f the unacceptabilit y of theft, o r o f exhibitionism, o r o f physical and sexua l abuse, is very much like passing yet another la w providing stil l more penaltie s for the sal e of already illegal drugs. Suc h actions represent our legal culture's equivalent t o the practic e o f nailin g garlic ove r doorway s t o repe l vampires . I n

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each case a psychological imperativ e born o f a sense of lack of con trol, an d of the fea r an d anxiety this sensation produces, demands of us that we "do something. " Those sam e factors then lea d u s to d o things tha t appea r in the col d ligh t of rational analysis to be almost wholly irrational. Now admittedl y the psychological placebo effect the y may induce in some observers might serve as a potential justificatio n for under taking such apparently pointless rituals . Other explanation s remain available a s well: the suppose d "notice " function of the regulation s can b e explaine d as an attemp t t o protec t agains t potential liability from thieves , and so on. Yet note how such explanations are still parasitic o n th e ide a tha t thi s "notice " functio n ha s a practica l effect : otherwise wh y would it work as a psychological placebo or protec t against liability? Or th e regulation s migh t b e interpreted a s a com munity statemen t o f mora l belief , with n o particula r instrumenta l function. Bu t before we embrace some sort of optimistic Durkheim ian account , celebratin g th e functionall y necessary rol e ou r ofte n irrational fait h i n th e powe r o f reason play s in th e maintenanc e of important cultura l practices, let us first examine that fait h i n a more troubling interpretive context . Recently, a n extrem e cas e o f obsessiv e behavio r wa s processe d through the cour t system of a large America n city . Tom Davi s me t Linda Jones* at their mutual workplace in a neighboring state. For a time they socialized at work together—eating lunc h an d so forth— until Jones , wh o wa s involve d i n a romanti c relationshi p wit h another man , trie d t o discontinu e an y association wit h Davis , who had begu n t o displa y signs o f becomin g obsesse d wit h her . Jone s then move d out o f the state , and enrolle d in a graduate program i n the city where her case would eventually be processed. She soon dis covered tha t Davis had followed her, and had in fact moved into the same apartment complex . At this poin t Davi s began to engag e i n a classic patter n o f relentless stalkin g behavior : h e lef t book s o n he r

*I have change d the name s o f th e peopl e involved; all other assertion s are taken from cour t records.

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doorstep, followe d he r t o school , bicycle d an d drov e pas t place s where sh e worked , an d trie d t o ren t apartment s nea r he r work places. Jones went to court and obtained a restraining orde r agains t Davis, whic h h e ignored . Finally , Davi s tunnele d hi s wa y underneath th e apartmen t comple x and drilled a hole i n Jones' bathroo m floor. When sh e discovered the hol e sh e fled the apartmen t i n ter ror; a n apartmen t comple x employe e the n discovere d th e tunnel , with Davi s in it. Davis wa s convicte d o f tw o count s o f harassment , si x counts o f restraining orde r violations, and one count each of criminal trespass and attempted third-degre e sexua l assault. Amazingly, Davis was not charged unde r th e state' s stalkin g statute. This statute require s tha t the stalkin g behavior pose "a credible risk" to the victim; apparentl y the prosecutor' s offic e believe d the fac t Davi s had neve r mad e what the offic e considere d a "verba l threat " t o Jone s preclude d Davi s from bein g charge d wit h stalking . The judg e gave Davi s th e maxi mum possibl e sentenc e fo r th e relativel y mino r se t o f offense s o f which he was convicted: nearly six years in jail. Sixteen month s later , Davi s sought a sentence reduction . A t th e hearing, Davis' s lawye r tol d th e sam e judg e wh o originall y sen tenced hi s clien t tha t Davi s wa s "worth takin g a chanc e on . Giv e him th e benefi t o f the doub t .. . thi s obsessiv e behavior happene d only onc e i n 3 7 years." A psychologist the n testifie d tha t h e didn' t believe Davi s presente d a dange r t o Jone s o r anyon e else . "He' s already understood th e impac t of his behavior an d won't repea t hi s behavior," the psychologis t testified . "H e doesn' t wan t contact wit h the victim. " Anothe r psychologis t testifie d tha t Davi s wasn't saf e i n the count y jail . Becaus e of the natur e o f his crim e Davi s had take n "a lo t o f abuse " there . Afte r considerin g thi s testimony , th e judg e decided to place Davis on probation, o n the conditio n tha t h e leave the state , receiv e counseling , and liv e for a tim e unde r a n officiall y monitored regimen . Let us consider some of the feature s of our legal system illustrated by thi s case . First , w e migh t not e th e absurdit y o f th e clai m tha t Davis's behavior never posed a "credible risk " to Jones. Here we see certain atavistic features o f legal reasoning at work, with this reason -

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ing takin g place in a context o f remarkably primitive psychological interpretation (i.e. , i f a stalke r doesn' t actuall y strike o r explicitl y threaten hi s victim , th e stalke r isn' t posin g a ris k t o th e victim) . Second, notice ho w our contemporary culture's belief in the value of therapeutic interventio n devalue s th e cor e ethica l idea l tha t a wrongdoer shoul d suffe r no t merel y for hi s ow n good , o r fo r th e protection o f others, bu t becaus e he deserve s to suffe r (i.e. , modern therapeutic ideology tells us that once a wrongdoer i s "cured" ther e can be no valid reaso n fo r punishing him) . Third, note th e lawyer' s highly dubiou s assertion tha t thi s behavio r happened "onl y onc e i n 37 years" (fo r obvious reasons , stalking is one o f the mos t underre ported o f crimes ; indee d unti l quit e recentl y i t wasn' t eve n recog nized as a crime, leading one t o wonder how it would be possible to determine thi s behavior had not happened before.) Fourth, an d o f mos t relevanc e to th e theme s o f thi s book, con sider what in the contex t o f this case the lega l system treat s a s constituting "expert knowledge." The first psychologist's statemen t that Davis no longe r pose s a threat t o th e victi m o r anyon e els e can be nothing mor e tha n a shee r guess . Thi s conclusio n can' t b e mor e than a guess becaus e numerous studie s o f the questio n hav e foun d there i s simply no reliabl e method fo r predicting futur e dangerous ness, other than t o note that those person s who have exhibited dangerous tendencie s in the pas t are more likel y to be dangerous tha n those who have not. The psychologist' s claim s that Davis has understood the impact of his behavior and therefore (?) won't repea t it, and that Davis doesn' t want an y contact wit h th e victi m are , if anything, eve n more ques tionable. How doe s the therapis t know these things? Because Davis told hi m so? Persons in the gri p of obsessive manias are notoriousl y good liar s and routinely defea t th e mos t elaborate attempts t o mea sure their veracity.* Furthermore, th e long-ter m prognosi s fo r such persons i s extremel y poor: i n time , the y almos t invariabl y relapse into som e typ e o f obsessiona l behavior . Add t o thi s th e fac t tha t

*A circumstance tha t has served man y litigators an d law professors well.

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Davis seem s t o hav e suffere d considerabl e indignitie s whil e im prisoned—indignities that have likely produced dee p feelings of victimization an d fantasie s o f eventua l revenge—and i t become s ver y difficult t o giv e any credence at al l to thi s "expert" testimony . Nev ertheless the la w in al l its solemn idiocy must rely on something; and thus, o n th e basi s o f suc h therapeuti c entrail-reading , i t let s th e wrongdoer g o free . Again, this sort of case illustrates how in contemporary public life legal and therapeutic modes of decision makin g can come t o resem ble frankly superstitious practices , whose invocation gives us a spurious sense of control ove r what remain insoluble mysteries of human behavior. Because in th e contex t o f a relentlessly rationalist cultur e the prospect of confronting the actual extent of our ignorance o f the world terrifie s us , we simply assume the ritual s we perform t o fore stall that confrontation actuall y work . Within th e lega l culture , th e assume d efficac y o f socia l practice s such a s crimina l la w an d psychologica l counselin g reflect s thi s broader cultura l faith i n what is thought o f as science. Indeed , a s we have seen , th e breakdow n o f the formalis t conceptio n o f la w as an autonomous disciplin e ha s give n birt h t o th e ide a that , a t leas t i n "hard" cases , legal thinkers mus t exten d the jurisdictio n o f law into the real m o f what i s thought o f a s "policy." Thu s th e moder n la w student i s taught , eithe r directl y o r b y implication, tha t whe n th e formal material s ar e indeterminat e th e outcom e o f a lega l matte r should b e determine d b y th e bes t policy ; ye t th e studen t i s als o trained t o believ e that th e conten t o f this polic y ca n and shoul d b e determined throug h th e prope r us e of legal reasoning . Ideally , thi s instrumental use of reason i s supposed t o achieve a level of scientific rigor; hence the contemporar y conceptio n o f law as a kind of "scien tific policy making. " This gradua l transformation o f legal thought fro m a formal to a self-consciously instrumenta l practic e ha s itself been enable d by the circumstance that , i n th e contemporar y world , scienc e ha s becom e the opiu m o f th e intellectuals . Th e reconceptualizatio n o f la w as policy scienc e i s jus t on e exampl e o f a mor e genera l trend . I t i s merely a prominent instanc e of how th e cultura l prestige o f what is

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called th e "scientific"—tha t is , th e materialist—worldvie w ha s come t o pla y a crucial role i n producin g a kind of rationalist addic tion: a n addiction t o a n intellectual narcoti c tha t soothe s th e meta physical anxieties of many a modern thinker . The wea k magic of law draws what strength it has from th e effect s o f a much stronger ideo logical intoxicant . And , i f we ar e t o full y understan d ou r culture' s abiding fait h i n it s lega l elixirs , we must tur n ou r attentio n t o thi s more powerful drug .

8 THE FUTURE O F AN ILLUSIO N The materialis t traditio n i s massive , complex , ubiqui tous, an d ye t elusive . Its variou s elements—it s attitud e toward consciousness , it s conceptio n o f scientifi c veri fication, it s metaphysic s an d theor y o f knowledge — are al l mutuall y supporting , s o tha t whe n on e par t i s challenged, th e defender s can easily fall bac k on anothe r part whos e certaint y is taken fo r granted . .. [hence ] th e defenders d o no t fee l i t necessar y t o mee t you r actua l arguments, becaus e the y kno w i n advanc e you mus t b e wrong. They know that the materialist tradition—which they ofte n mistakenly call "science"—is o n thei r side. JOHN SEARLE , Th e Rediscovery o f the Mind I have great hope s that we shall learn i n due time ho w to emotionalize an d mythologis e thei r scienc e t o suc h a n extent tha t wha t is , i n effect , a belie f in u s (thoug h no t under tha t name ) wil l cree p i n whil e th e huma n min d remains closed t o belief in the Enemy... . If once w e can produce ou r perfec t work—th e Materialis t Magician , the ma n no t using , bu t veritabl y worshiping , wha t h e vaguely call s "Forces " whil e denyin g th e existenc e o f "Spirits"—then th e en d of the wa r will be in sight . C. S . LEWIS , Th e Screwtape Letters

Here ar e tw o things you an d I , i f we are properly socialized members o f ou r contemporar y intellectual culture , ar e mor e o r les s required to believe. 138

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1. Th e universe consists entirely o f particles infields offorce . There ar e n o such things as spirit or soul or karma or God, except to the extent those entities are projections of the human mind. The human mind itself is either: (a) an independent emergent property of otherwise mindless biological processes, or (b) can be reduced entirely to a nonmental account of those same processes. * 2. All matter is a product of mechanistic material processes, and all life is a product of mindless evolutionary processes. Therefore all teleological (mindful, design-based) accounts concerning the ultimate nature of the world are false.

These propositions ar e central to the creed of that modern variety of secular materialist rationalism that ha s become the unofficia l reli gion o f th e America n cultura l an d politica l elite s (whic h i s not t o deny, of course, that ther e ar e dissenters fro m thi s view within thos e social classes . But th e poin t i s that suc h persons ar e very much dis senters from th e orthodox position) . As John Searle has put it, "This world view is not a n option. I t i s not simpl y up fo r grabs along with a lot of competing world views." Searle claims that the problem isn' t a failur e t o com e u p wit h a proo f fo r th e existenc e o f Go d o r a n afterlife, bu t rathe r "tha t i n ou r deepes t reflection s we cannot tak e such opinion s seriously. " He recall s giving a lecture i n Indi a where members of the audienc e assured him they themselves had existed in earlier lives, and comments, "Give n wha t I know about the way the world works, I could not regar d their views as serious candidates for truth." Now wha t is most interestin g abou t thi s assertion is the clai m to know th e wa y the worl d works . Searle' s clai m tha t "th e univers e consists entirel y of extremely small physical phenomena tha t we .. . call particles " require s tha t h e kno w th e univers e doe s not , fo r example, consis t o f a serie s o f discret e menta l event s tha t i n som e necessary sense provide at least part and perhaps all of the ontological essence of what we call "physical" phenomena. But how could he know suc h a thing ? A s David Hum e remarked , Bisho p Berkeley' s arguments tha t "t o b e i s t o b e perceived " wer e thoroughl y unan *These competin g view s are wel l represente d by , respectively, John Searle' s The Rediscovery o f the Mind, an d Danie l Dennett's Consciousness Explained.

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swerable—although Hum e als o noted the y remained, within his (and our) culture, thoroughly unconvincing . Bu t wh y are suc h argument s unconvincing? Certainl y no t becaus e "th e facts " tell u s otherwise . For th e fact s ar e always facts onl y within som e metaphysical frame work that itself is not amenabl e to further evidence (this is the poin t of Nietzsche's famous aphorism tha t there ar e no "facts," only inter pretations). Withi n congenitally idealist cultures th e notion tha t th e perceived universe could somehow subsist autonomously from som e mind's perception o f it is just as patently absurd as the denia l of this claim i s t o us . Thu s despit e hi s ow n perceptiv e criticism s o f dog matic materialism, Searl e in th e en d simpl y assumes as a matter o f deep cultural fait h th e trut h of a fundamentally materialist interpretive framework; an d indeed i t is only fro m withi n tha t particular se t of postulates tha t he can claim to know what he says he knows.* In a simila r vein , Danie l Dennet t declare s i n hi s boo k Darwin's Dangerous Idea tha t "anyon e who doubt s tha t the variet y of lif e on this planet was produced by a process of evolution i s simply ignoran t —inexcusably ignorant, " an d goe s o n t o sugges t th e evidenc e fo r this process bein g random and mindless is so overwhelming that it is simply impossible, rationally speaking, to treat the deepes t beliefs of almost all human beings in every other tim e an d place with anythin g other than his own mixture of intellectual condescension, ethnocen tric contempt , an d a certain hygieni c loathing . ("W e jus t can't hav e forced femal e circumcision, and the second-clas s status of women in Roman Catholicis m an d Mormonism, t o say nothing o f their statu s in Islam.") Dennett's writin g i n severa l way s typifie s th e sor t o f thinkin g found dee p insid e intellectuall y complacen t orthodoxies . First , like many zealou s advocate s of a culture's mos t embedde d conventions , his thought seems to inhabi t a n irony-free zone . Thus in the mids t of anathematizin g al l other belie f systems a s irrational melange s o f often dangerou s nonsens e h e inform s us he "think[s ] tha t there [is ] *"The metho d o f postulatin g what we want has many advantages. They ar e th e same a s th e advantage s of thef t ove r hones t toil. " Bertran d Russell , Introduction t o Mathematical Philosophy,

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no forc e o n thi s plane t mor e dangerou s t o u s al l than .. . fanati cism," an d the n proceed s t o elaborat e o n thi s poin t b y issuin g a condemnation o f al l the world' s major religions , "a s well as count less smalle r infections. " "I s there " h e ask s th e reader , " a conflic t between scienc e an d religio n here ? Ther e mostl y certainly is. " O f course ther e i s als o a strikin g similarit y between so-calle d "scien tific" an d "religious " mode s o f though t here , althoug h it' s fairl y obvious w e shouldn' t hol d ou r collectiv e breat h waitin g fo r th e author to notice it. Second, the las t sixty pages of Dennett's boo k provid e a wonderfully clea r exampl e of th e intens e cognitiv e dissonanc e that marks the orthodo x contemporar y view . Fo r anothe r ke y featur e o f tha t view i s wha t migh t b e calle d "meaning-lade n nihilism." This i s a sort of "Nietzsche lite, " adopted by modern intellectuals who accept Nietzsche's mos t importan t clai m ("Go d i s dead") , bu t wh o ar e unable to accep t the ethical consequences of that claim. The result ing cognitive dissonance allows Dennett to make statements suc h as "perhaps talk of rights is nonsense upon stilts, but good nonsense." I t is "good onl y because it is on stilts, only because it happens to have the 'political ' powe r t o kee p risin g abov e [ou r questions]—no t indefinitely, bu t usuall y 'high enough'—t o reasser t itself as a com pelling—that is, conversation-stopping—'first principle.' " Nietzsche—that mos t ruthlessl y self-critica l of thinkers—would have been sickene d b y this kind of thing. Th e idea , you see , is that even thoug h w e no w believ e unicorns ar e solel y creature s o f ou r imaginations, we are stil l habituated to a cultural practice in which we tal k abou t unicorn s a s i f the y existe d autonomousl y fro m ou r beliefs abou t them. This habit, however , is a "good" thing, becaus e it produce s "good " consequences. (Note how, given the underlyin g anti-teleological assumption s o f the author' s evolutionar y materialism, th e meanin g o f the ter m "good " must remai n deepl y mysteri ous.)* Along simila r lines , Dennet t admit s that althoug h acceptin g *In other words: to the extent a theory of evolution is treated as an account of certain biological processes, that theory remains more or less amenable to scientific verification. When , however , i t i s treate d a s th e ke y t o som e anti-teleological metaphysic,

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the metaphysical primacy of a mindless process of evolution mor e o r less eliminate s th e possibilit y o f discovering an y objectiv e basis fo r ideas o f right an d wrong , thi s nevertheles s "i s not a n occasio n fo r despair; w e hav e th e mind-tool s w e nee d t o desig n an d redesig n ourselves, ever searching for better [? ] solutions to th e problem s we create for ourselves an d others." Dennett's boo k illustrate s som e o f th e deepl y dissonan t belief s intellectuals wh o cleav e t o th e contemporar y orthodox y mus t accept. O n th e on e han d th e worl d i s assumed t o b e a product o f mindless processe s tha t car e nothin g fo r huma n concerns , o r fo r that matte r anythin g else. Yet our vocabularies and indeed ou r ver y beings see m saturate d b y ways of talking that, give n thi s axiomatic assumption, n o longe r mak e an y sense. Th e dissonan t intellectua l then deal s wit h thi s contradictio n in muc h the sam e way a judge deals wit h th e conclusor y natur e o f a lega l assertion : b y failin g t o notice it. Here, for example, is the well-known cosmologist Car l Sagan , on what he takes to be humanity's place in the universe: The Apoll o picture s o f th e whol e eart h conveye d t o th e multitude s something well known to astronomers: O n th e scal e of worlds—to say nothing o f stars and galaxies—humans are inconsequential, a thin film of life on an obscure an d solitary lump of rock and metal.... Ou r pos turings, ou r imagined self-importance, the delusion that we have some privileged positio n i n th e Universe , ar e challenge d b y thi s poin t of pale light.

So inured ar e we to this wa y of talking that i t is easy for us to over look the flagrant incoherence o f the interpretive metaphysic s underlying this particular passage . It is of course tru e tha t if human being s are inconsequential—i f i t i s indee d th e cas e tha t th e worl d i s a n obscure an d solitar y lum p o f rock—the n w e woul d i n fac t b e deluded t o thin k w e hav e som e privilege d positio n i n wha t Car l "believing" i n the doctrin e of evolution become s exactl y as much a matter o f faith a s believing i n the doctrin e o f the Virgin Birth—wit h which , b y the way, it shares som e interesting typological parallels .

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Sagan call s "the Universe. " Bu t what th e presen t confuse d stat e of our intellectual cultur e cause s us to forget is just this: when they re fer t o humanity' s actua l metaphysical condition , comparativ e term s such a s "inconsequential," "obscure, " "solitary," an d "privilege " ca n be understoo d a s meaningful onl y by reference t o some transcendent — -which is t o sa y more than merely human—standard o f evaluation. I n other words, if human beings ar e truly inconsequential , the n some thing o r someon e mus t b e consequential . I f we are obscure , the n some othe r entit y i s not . I f w e ar e solitary , the n w e ar e alon e b y comparison t o thos e wh o hav e escape d cosmi c isolation . An d s o forth. From a strictly materialist perspective, it is every bit as absurd to describ e human beings a s inconsequential a s it is to declare them the cente r o f the universe . Suc h a n interpretive framewor k renders all comparative metaphysical judgments equally meaningless. Daniel Dennett an d Carl Saga n both continu e t o employ a thoroughly teleologica l vocabulary, an d wit h i t man y o f th e implici t interpretive assumption s tha t mus t accompan y th e us e o f suc h a rhetoric. Ye t both writer s mak e arguments tha t clai m to be ground ed i n thos e basi c anti-teleologica l assumptions—materialis t uni verse, mindles s evolution—Joh n Searl e tell s u s we have no optio n but t o accept , whil e seemingl y remainin g obliviou s t o th e sever e pragmatic contradiction s create d b y the simultaneou s employmen t of these two rationally irreconcilable ways of talking. Now I a m goin g t o pos e a highl y inconvenien t question . Wha t evidence is there tha t this anti-teleological interpretatio n o f the world is true? What evidence , that is , makes this view more plausibl e than every single one o f the myriadteleologica l account s o f the nature of things tha t hav e flourishe d i n ever y huma n culture ? Her e i s th e answer: there i s none. John Searle, Daniel Dennett , Carl Sagan , and their countles s epigon i tha t populate ou r littl e corne r o f this worl d quite simply have faith i n their fundamental view of things.* *A technical aside : Searle has made a number of amusing criticism s o f the frankl y bizarre views held b y Dennett and many other contemporar y philosopher s o f mind, whose attitud e towar d thei r subjec t i s essentially tha t i t doesn't exis t (se e the discus sion o f eliminativ e materialism , stron g artificia l intelligence , etc. , i n Searle' s Th e

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Surely this i s an absurd statement . Surel y scienc e has proven .. . now what ha s science "proven, " exactly ? What , we might ask , have we learned abou t th e ultimat e questions—question s suc h a s why is there somethin g rathe r tha n nothing ; ha s there alway s bee n some thing, o r did something come of nothing an d if so, how; is the world one thing o r many, or doe s this questio n mea n anything ; do human beings hav e a special role in the world, and what might i t be; what is the relation betwee n the perceiver an d the perceived; is mind part of matter o r matter par t of mind; what are "mind" an d "matter"; wha t does it mean to say an action i s right o r wrong, an d how do we tell the difference—what , again, have we learned abou t th e answer s t o such questions tha t wasn't known by our ancestors? In a word: nothing. For al l the technologica l achievement s of science, and for all the predictive powe r it has given us over certain element s o f our world, the scientific method—lik e ever y other method o f inquiry and manner o f thought—remain s almos t totall y helples s whe n confronte d with metaphysica l question s th e answer s to which we assume on faith when we find ourselves committed t o our fundamenta l worldviews . What, after all , do we actually know? As Wittgenstein put s it, "If you d o kno w that 'here is one band,' we'll gran t you al l the rest. " But Wittgenstein's poin t is that you don't "know" even this, if by "know" is meant something mor e than "th e psychologica l experienc e o f certainty that i s a product o f the interpreter' s unconsciou s relianc e on the trut h o f various nonverifiable interpretive axioms. " And eve n if we ignor e th e difficult y tha t al l ou r suppose d knowledg e mus t b e Rediscovery o f the Mind a t pp. 5-26) . I t ma y be worth notin g i n this context that if we accept Searle' s powerfu l argument s tha t consciousnes s i s i n som e nontrivia l sens e ontologically distinc t fro m nonconsciou s form s o f matter , the n Searle' s assumption that mind is an emergent propert y o f matter is surely no more plausible—and indeed possibly less so—than th e assumptio n tha t matter i s an emergent property o f mind. (To put i t in philosophical jargon: if you are a monist, favorin g materialism over ide alism can be at best an arbitrary choice.) The potentiall y devastating effect thi s latter point has for the materialis t metaphysics to which both Searl e and hi s philosophical opponents clin g may well hav e some explanatory significance regardin g how and why those opponent s ar e capabl e o f believin g the otherwis e incredible thing s abou t th e nature of the human mind Searle so effectively criticize s them fo r believing.

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grounded in unprovable assumptions, we must still confront the vertiginous truth that, as Jorge Luis Borges puts it, "There is no classification o f th e univers e tha t i s not arbitrar y an d conjectural . Th e reason," Borge s remind s us , "i s very simple : w e do no t kno w what the univers e is. " Th e rationalis t etho s o f ou r tim e dismisse s suc h points a s metaphysical quibbling , an d proceed s o n th e assumptio n that we do know what the universe is; indeed its priests are even now assuring us that , sav e for a few details (which the lait y is to under stand ar e schedule d t o b e cleare d up an y da y now), we ar e o n th e verge o f achievin g a Fina l Theor y o f Everything : a kin d o f Re statement o f the Real . But is such an ethos trul y scientific? Near the en d of his life, Isaa c Newton wrote this about th e serie s of revolutionary discoverie s he had made: I do not kno w how I may appear to the world; bu t to myself I seem t o have bee n onl y lik e a boy , playin g o n th e seashore , an d divertin g myself, i n now and the n findin g anothe r pebbl e o r prettie r shel l tha n ordinary, while the grea t ocean of truth lay all undiscovered befor e me.

This i s th e modesty o f acknowledge d genius , bu t n o les s valid fo r that. Wha t Newto n understoo d wa s how, give n th e limitation s o f space an d time , an d give n th e inevitabl y distorting effect s ou r lim ited powers o f perception an d the particularity of our historical per spectives alway s generate , huma n knowledg e ca n neve r b e mor e than a fe w grains o f san d on tha t vas t beac h o f al l thos e thing s we know w e d o not know. Beyon d thi s lie s th e ocea n o f th e invisibl e unknown: of those things o f which our ignorance is so complete tha t we remain unaware of even the mer e fact o f that ignorance . Yet conside r ho w without exceptio n th e conventiona l wisdo m o f every rationalis t ag e ha s alway s bee n a s follows : "Afte r countles s centuries o f ignoranc e an d prejudice , of purblin d superstitio n an d irrational reverenc e fo r the follie s o f the past , men hav e at long last donned th e mantle of reason an d looked abou t them wit h eyes wide open." And on doing so what have they discovered? Why, the y have found tha t within the span of one or two generations (theirs ) almost all th e mos t profoun d question s tha t befuddle d thei r ancestor s

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either hav e bee n o r ar e abou t t o b e answered . Perhap s th e mos t remarkable aspec t of the eternall y recurring belie f that we are at the very brink of the final answer, and are thus approachin g the apothe osis o f reaso n itself , i s tha t a ke y piec e o f evidenc e invariabl y adduced t o illustrat e th e lamentabl e ignorance an d foll y unde r which our ancestors labore d is that they believed precisely the sam e thing ! But the hubri s that characterize s contemporary rationalist dogma is even more striking . Eve r since the so-called Enlightenment, mod ern intellectuals have moved gradually from arguin g for to acceptin g as self-eviden t wha t shoul d b e a n extraordinaril y counterintuitiv e claim. Th e clai m i s tha t i n al l previou s culture s me n an d wome n have no t onl y bee n wrong abou t th e precis e natur e o f th e cosmi c telos, but hav e been utterly delude d in believin g there eve n was such a thing . I n othe r words human being s ar e such weak-minded , fallible creatures that throughout recorded history their most profoun d beliefs abou t the natur e of the world were not merel y mistaken, but represented withou t exceptio n variou s farragoe s o f contemptible , superstitious nonsense , havin g no relationshi p whatsoever t o wha t we now know to b e the case . What is most extraordinar y about thi s claim is how it never includes any attempt to accoun t fo r the unique —indeed, one migh t eve n cal l i t providential—set of historical cir cumstances tha t ha s miraculousl y exempte d ou r particula r cultur e from th e effect s o f what are otherwise apparentl y universal cognitiv e limitations. We are , it would seem, a chosen people . Someone onc e remarke d t o T . S . Elio t tha t th e differenc e between moder n artist s an d th e ol d master s was that "w e kno w s o much more than they did." "Yes, " replied Eliot, "an d the y are what we know." And again, what do we know? Consider wha t we call "history." What would a true histor y of nothing bu t the brie f moment it has taken me to write this sentence include ? To even begin t o imag ine th e richnes s o f the billion s of lives around us is to gras p how in some fractio n o f thos e live s a countles s numbe r o f momentou s events sprung into being in the course of that moment an d then dis appeared, without leavin g u s th e slightes t chanc e o f undertakin g a systematic o r collectiv e recover y o f thei r essence . Ho w man y des -

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tinies wer e altered, how many long-nurtured dream s achieved thei r mark, or were broken beyond hope of redemption? In tha t momen t w e can imagine a glass was crushed under a passionate foo t i n a Gree k mountai n village ; a Russia n civi l servan t threw away his career in an instant of brave protest; a novice entered for th e firs t tim e th e coo l silenc e o f a Ze n monastery' s garden ; a poor India n fisherma n sa w a glint of gold along the langui d banks of an Amazonian tributary; a woman's tear glinted i n th e las t rays of a tropical sun ; anothe r shovelfu l of dir t was tossed on a freshl y dug grave; an d fro m th e tremblin g branc h o f elm , o n whic h th e las t seven leave s of summe r stil l clung , tw o crow s cas t themselves int o somber an d heavy-winge d flight , somewher e i n Nebraska . An d o f course al l thes e thing s woul d themselve s constitut e nothin g mor e than drop s o f water i n tha t Heracletia n rive r o f potentiall y significant, historically irrecoverable human events. We ar e tol d t o lear n fro m science . Le t u s d o so . What ar e th e teachings o f suc h impeccabl e discipline s a s quantu m physic s an d chaos theory ? I f we tak e wha t the mos t rigorou s moder n learnin g proposes t o heart , we will have to admi t that an y of these countless events, lik e th e famou s butterfl y in Brazil , th e flutterin g of whose wings unleashe s a hurrican e tw o month s late r i n Ne w England , might constitut e the ke y to understanding the subsequen t workings of huma n history . Ye t simply because they disappeare d so quickly from ou r collective recollection, leavin g behind little or no recover able evidenc e of their presenc e in th e world , we tell ourselve s the y were no t "relevant " t o a rationa l understandin g o f ou r destinies . Indeed, give n th e radica l epistemological limitation s unde r whic h we always labor, the cred o of every rationalist age must be, "we have faith tha t wha t w e d o no t kno w wil l no t mak e shambles of al l ou r supposed knowledge. " What we call "history" ca n be nothing but ou r weak conceptualization o f a fe w mostly rando m fragment s we hav e plucked ou t o f the tinies t slive r of the past . We us e such concept s t o orde r th e in tolerable complexity of things into an apparent pattern, telling our selves, absurdl y enough , tha t somethin g calle d "the Middl e Ages "

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was succeeded by "the Renaissance. " What an infinite array of pre cious, irretrievable knowledge is buried beneath thos e flimsy formulations. An d ho w wel l th e Talmu d put s i t whe n i t say s tha t wit h every man's death, a whole universe passes away. Reader, in the tim e it ha s taken you r eye s t o pas s over thi s word y an d useles s polemi c thousands o f individual worlds, with all their passion s and their con quests, wit h thei r friendships , their ambitions , thei r tragedies , an d their secre t dreads , were annihilated without a trace, an d passe d far beyond th e reac h of our meage r verbal formula e an d impoverishe d categories of analysis. And al l this, o f course, is but th e mos t infinitesimal fraction of the true history of those events that even now are happening al l around us. The priest s o f reaso n loo k fo r universa l truth, fo r tha t whic h as they pu t it , "i s tru e i n al l possible universes, " althoug h the y hav e seen onl y one. Ye t what, we might ask , do the y kno w o f the thou sands o f rituals , o f cultures , o f languages , of way s of bein g i n th e world, that have been utterly lost to what is called history? Of everything about th e worl d eve r know n b y human being s on wha t Car l Sagan considered an insignificant planet not one part in a billion billions i s retained b y the collectiv e memor y o f men an d women , le t alone by any single human mind, however powerful it s skills of reasoning might be . For al l we know, some divinity perceives that infi nitely reticulated we b of what to u s remains wholly obscure knowl edge wit h th e sam e intuitive clarity wit h whic h w e grasp th e shap e of a triangle. What then would we make of what our secula r priests call "reason" ? Were the y ther e whe n Callimachus , wh o w e ar e tol d handle d marble a s i f i t wer e bronze , fashione d a sculptur e o f translucen t stone s o delicat e i t stoo d bu t a singl e day ? An d wher e wer e the y when th e inconceivabl e min d o f Michelangel o sa w i n a sla b o f Florentine marbl e the fac e o f Moses burnin g lik e a living flame, as he brough t dow n fro m th e sacre d mountai n th e word s o f the Law, held alof t i n th e hand s of the outlaw ? Can ou r secula r priest s eve n begin t o gras p th e sublimit y o f thos e Pascalia n spaces , o f thos e immense vistas of space and time by comparison t o which our entir e solar system is nothing mor e than a stone well, hidden in a corner of

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a field , beneat h a ridg e o f hill s tha t li e a t th e foo t o f a mountai n range, whose mos t distan t and inaccessible peaks divide the rushin g waters o f a vast continent? I t ma y be tha t th e entir e histor y o f th e human race—o f which, I repeat , we know almos t nothing—is bu t an eyeblin k o f a galacti c history o f which w e remai n utterl y igno rant. Saga n himself often speculate d that ther e coul d well exist millions o f inhabite d world s i n ou r galax y alone, complet e wit h thei r unimaginable languages , their mythologies , thei r gods , thei r cere monies, thei r system s of classification, an d their way s of knowledge. Perhaps world s hidde n fro m u s b y th e grea t stella r cloud s o f th e Milky Way harbor crystallin e forms o f life tha t spen d eons formin g a singl e thought ; or perhap s withi n suc h world s entire civilizations subsist i n the intermitten t eddie s of violent electromagneti c storms . Humanity wil l never know any of this. And yet eve n this incompre hensibly greate r histor y migh t itself see m of little account, if it could somehow b e compared to al l that whic h in truth i s past, or passing, or to come . Frogs at the Bottom of the Wel l William Butle r Yeats' s grea t poe m "A t Algeciras— a Meditatio n upon Death, " end s with the following lines: Greater glor y in the sun, An evening chill upon th e air, Bid imagination run Much on the Great Questioner ; What He ca n question, what if questioned I Can wit h a fitting confidence reply.

The dogmati c rationalist , th e philosophe r wh o can write sentence s such a s "I hav e learned tha t arguments , n o matte r ho w watertight , often fal l o n dea f ears, " an d " I a m mysel f the autho r o f argument s that I consider rigorous an d unanswerable " (Darwin's Dangerous Idea, p . 12 ) has b y contrast a n almost unlimited fait h i n th e power s of human ratiocination. The ide a that human beings have the ability

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to make "watertight" an d "unanswerable" claims about the nature of the worl d (a s oppose d t o claim s abou t th e empt y symbol s the y manipulate when they emplo y various types o f tautological reason ing)* is a symptom o f ho w th e contemporar y worship o f analytical and supposedl y scientific modes of thought ca n shade off into a type of dogmatic pseudo-religious belief , and eventually into the realm of a sort of intellectualized irrationalism. The anthropologis t Si r James Frazer ende d hi s famous study The Golden Bough by comparing human thought t o a fabric made of three threads: a blac k one representin g magic , a re d stran d standin g fo r religion, an d a whit e threa d symbolizin g science . Writin g a t th e dawn o f the twentiet h centur y Frazer share d his culture's dee p fait h in th e powe r o f reason , an d i n wha t wa s assume d t o b e th e ineluctably linear progress o f human thought. I t is thus understand able Frazer believed it was historically destined that black should give way t o red , an d tha t th e whit e threa d woul d soo n overwhel m bot h the others. We, who at the end of that century sit upon the unprece dented pil e of corpses this same faith ha s helped wrought, hav e less excuse fo r cleavin g so blindl y to tha t particula r illusion . For , a s we should have learned by now, the color s of Frazer's fabric must always be blende d mor e inextricabl y amid th e labyrinthin e path s o f th e human mind than a naive faith i n the power of reason would allow. "Frogs at the botto m o f the well, " goes th e Chines e proverb , "see only part o f the sky. " We ca n be confiden t tha t i n th e languag e o f such frog s th e word s fo r "well " an d fo r "universe " ar e exac t syn onyms. An d it also seems likely that, a t the botto m o f any particular well, frog s wh o questio n th e classi c definitio n o f th e univers e (" a ubiquitous stone shaft" ) wil l be assured they ar e "simply ignorant — inexcusably ignorant " o f thi s self-eviden t trut h concernin g th e world's ultimate nature: a truth th e powe r o f amphibious reason has demonstrated conclusivel y every rational frog is required t o acknowl edge and accept. *"So far as the law s of mathematics refer t o reality, they are not certain . And so far as the y ar e certain , the y d o no t refe r t o reality. " Alber t Einstein , Geometry an d Experience.

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THE BANALIT Y OF GOODNES S Science, thank s t o it s link s wit h observation , retain s some tid e t o a correspondenc e theor y o f truth . Bu t a coherence theor y is evidently the lo t of ethics. WILLARD VO N ORMA N QUINE, Theories and Things

The bes t lack all conviction, while the wors t Are full o f passionate intensity. YEATS, "Th e Secon d Coming "

"Napalming babies," observed Arthur Leff , "i s bad." This I am willing to grant; although a s Richard Posner point s out in his inimitably relentless fashion , eve n tha t sor t o f mora l statemen t need s t o b e qualified b y it s particula r contex t (jus t o r unjus t war; unavoidable consequence o f battl e o r negligen t inflictio n o f civilia n casualties, etc.). The essa y in which Leff mad e this observation , "Unspeakabl e Ethics, Unnatura l Law, " make s a star k cas e fo r th e dept h o f th e crisis modernit y face s i n regar d t o th e evaluatio n o f ethica l an d moral questions . Nietzsch e sum s up tha t crisi s in a single sentence : "Now suppos e tha t belie f in Go d ha s vanished: th e questio n pre sents itsel f anew : 'wh o speaks?' " Let u s pursu e th e answe r t o thi s question i n th e particula r contex t o f lega l argumen t an d judicial decision making. Compare th e statements " I believe the Earth revolves around th e Sun" an d " I believ e Haagen-Daz s ic e cream taste s bette r tha n Ben & Jerry's." In our culture th e first statement will be generally under stood a s a claim about th e objectiv e nature o f the world , while th e 151

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second wil l b e interprete d a s a statemen t abou t subjectiv e prefer ence. I n othe r words , th e belie f i n a heliocentri c sola r syste m i s understood t o b e a belief abou t th e wa y things are , independent o f any human belief or desire . By contrast, th e clai m about the superi ority o f Haagen-Daz s ic e crea m i s taken to b e nothing other than a claim abou t th e conten t o f certain huma n desires an d beliefs . Thus the statemen t "fo r m e th e Eart h goe s aroun d th e Sun , bu t fo r you the Su n ma y wel l revolv e aroun d th e Earth " woul d b e treate d a s being jus t as absurd a s the clai m tha t th e tast e o f Haagen-Daz s i s objectively superio r t o that o f Ben & Jerry's, independen t o f whatever opinions peopl e might hold regarding th e latter question . In th e 1930 s the logica l positivist movemen t i n philosoph y cam e up with som e usefu l term s fo r sorting thes e differen t type s o f truth claims out fro m eac h other . The logica l positivist s claime d tha t "true" statement s wer e eithe r tru e b y definitio n (e.g. , logica l an d mathematical statements) , o r wer e empiricall y verifiabl e claim s about the objective facts of some matter ("th e Eart h revolve s around the Sun") . O n th e othe r hand , statement s abou t persona l prefer ences ("Haagen-Dazs taste s better tha n Ben & Jerry's") wer e catego rized a s "emotive." Suc h statements were either treate d a s examples of a kind of degraded "subjectiv e truth," o r indee d in the mor e rig orous version s o f the logica l positivis t cree d wer e considere d t o be , strictly speaking, meaningless. Now consider th e statement "Abortio n i s murder." Obviousl y thi s claim can, like any other, b e interpreted a s a logical proposition; bu t just as obviously nothing o f ethical importance turn s o n suc h a trivial interpretation of its meaning. Can it be understood as an empirical claim ? Th e logica l positivist s though t tha t i t couldn't . Bein g believers in good standin g in the churc h of anti-teleological materi alism (the universe is made up of nothing bu t particles; life is a product of mindless evolutionary processes , etc. ) the y could not imagin e whatfact of the matter would make such a statement empiricall y true. Hence they dismissed all ethical claims as emotive statements , illus trating th e subjectiv e belief s an d preference s o f thos e wh o mad e them, but nothing more .

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It soon becam e clear that, despite its formal elegance , logical pos itivism wa s at th e leas t a very inadequat e model fo r understandin g the psycholog y o f human belief . Fo r nothin g i s more obviou s tha n that whe n peopl e mak e statement s suc h a s "Abortio n i s murder " they d o not believ e they ar e merely signaling their persona l prefer ences. Hardl y anyone , that is , believes the claim "Napalming babies is bad" is equivalent to sayin g "Coke tastes bette r tha n Pepsi. " Still, the logica l positivist s mad e a disturbin g point : i f ethica l assertion s cannot t o b e reduce d t o eithe r trivia l definitional claims , o r exam ples of wholly subjective human beliefs, what sorts of claims do such assertions involve? Or , as Nietzsche pu t it, "Who speaks? " Nietzsche's formulatio n of the issu e remind s u s that , withi n th e context o f a teleological worldview , this questio n ha s a n answer . If the worl d i s so constituted tha t there reall y is such a thing a s objective huma n virtue—"objective " precisel y becaus e tha t virtu e doe s not merel y reflect human beliefs , bu t actuall y corresponds wit h th e demands of some metaphysical telos, or ultimate desig n an d purpos e of the world—the n i t i s by reference t o th e natur e an d conten t of this desig n tha t w e ca n mak e tru e ethica l claims . Teleologica l accounts of what constitute s th e goo d presen t thei r ow n problems , of course (wha t is the nature an d content of the world's design ; ho w can we discover it, etc.) ; but a t least they a s a logical matter succee d in separatin g ou t mora l claim s fro m mer e assertion s o f subjectiv e belief and preference. Thu s when Nietzsche speaks of belief i n God vanishing, h e isn' t merel y speakin g o f belie f i n th e persona l Christian God , o r indee d o f belief in an y deit y in particular . H e i s speaking o f th e ethical consequence s tha t flo w fro m th e muc h broader phenomeno n o f the triump h o f the materialist , anti-teleo logical faith . Within that set of assumptions about the natur e o f the world (and, as I argued in the previous chapter, they must be assumptions—having fait h i n no t havin g fait h bein g just as much a specie s of ungrounded metaphysica l belief as any other) i t becomes difficul t to see why the harshest judgments of the logical positivists wer e no t correct. For i f you den y any transcendent metaphysica l significance to your ethica l statements, an d yet a t th e sam e time insis t the y ar e

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not merel y culturall y sanctione d subjectiv e beliefs, * the n wha t exactly is th e meaning of suc h statements ? Just what sor t o f fac t i s being asserted here? The characteristi c crisi s o f ethica l interpretatio n amon g mod ern intellectual s i s thu s a produc t o f th e combinatio n o f a n anti teleological worldvie w wit h vocabularie s an d modes o f though t that, give n thi s view, no longer make any sense. Again, what we see so often i n contemporary ethica l debate is analogous to th e contin uation o f passionate argument s concernin g th e biolog y o f the uni corn whe n all belief in the unicorn a s an actual biological entity ha s vanished. Variou s strategie s ar e the n employe d t o dea l wit h thi s incoherent interpretiv e situation . A s we have seen, on e o f the mos t common i s to fai l t o gras p th e contradictor y natur e o f the claims . Thus Daniel Dennett i s committed t o a worldview in which the different level s o f politica l participatio n grante d wome n i n variou s human culture s hav e exactl y the sam e metaphysica l significanc e as the differen t level s of status granted t o female s i n the hierarchie s of any other specie s (i.e., these difference s mus t b e understood a t bot tom a s more o r les s "successful " evolutionary adaptation s to loca l conditions o n th e par t o f the specie s i n question) , an d ye t h e stil l feels himsel f impelle d t o proclai m tha t "w e just can' t hav e .. . th e second-class statu s o f women i n Roma n Catholicis m ... " etc. , etc . Given th e nihilisti c metaphysic s that underli e wha t h e call s "Dar win's dangerou s idea, " on e migh t wan t t o as k jus t wh o i s thi s "we," as well as why it is that "we " can't have this. Because the prac *Despite th e claim s o f cultural relativist s to th e contrary , th e fac t tha t everyon e might agre e with an ethical assertion ca n make no differenc e t o its metaphysical status as truth. In other words, to assert "Everyone think s chocolate tastes good" isn't t o assert the sam e sort of claim about huma n belief's relatio n to the actua l nature of the world as to assert "Everyone think s incest is wrong," even if, as a matter o f social fac t within a particular culture , bot h claim s happen t o b e true. In th e first case, the cul tural relativist' s perspectiv e i s perfectl y adequate : th e belie f i n th e goo d tast e o f chocolate is simply identical with that which is asserted t o be the case. Yet it is difficul t to imagine what moral claims would even mean if in their cas e human belief and eth ical trut h wer e understoo d t o b e identica l i n thi s sam e radicall y subjectivized , observer-relative way.

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tices o f certai n culture s offen d th e mora l sensibilitie s o f Danie l Dennett? The y obviousl y don' t offen d th e mora l sensibilitie s o f others; and after all there simply can be no scientific basis for objecting to thos e practices . Wha t we call "science" is limited t o th e business o f providin g accurat e physica l descriptions , rathe r tha n normative metaphysica l objections . That , too , i s par t o f Darwin' s dangerous idea. Another strategy , muc h favore d b y analytica l philosophers , i s what might be called the "magic word" gambit. The ide a here is that when on e i s confronted wit h a n inexplicable phenomenon, on e ca n give th e impressio n o f knowledge by inventing a word tha t appear s to redescrib e usefull y thi s otherwis e inexplicabl e stat e o f affairs . Hence whe n mora l philosopher s o f a certain strip e ar e confronte d with th e fac t that , i n th e contemporar y world , statement s o f value seem no t t o involv e empirica l claims , bu t nevertheles s stil l see m irreducible t o mer e tautologie s o r statement s o f preference , the y will begi n t o burbl e enthusiasticall y about ethica l "supervenience, " or abou t mora l "modalities " o f argument . O n close r examinatio n these term s wil l b e foun d t o pla y th e sam e rol e i n contemporar y moral argument that the invocation of the "taboo" plays among cer tain preindustria l peoples . Ethnographer s hav e discovere d tha t among such peoples th e statu s of the tabo o often can't b e explained by reference to any consequences said to follow from its breach (i.e., sickness, ba d luck), or b y any more overtly teleologica l explanatio n as t o wh y th e tabo o i s forbidden (such as the god s prohibitin g it) . The activit y is simply deemed "taboo." In such societies the belief in the forbidde n nature of the tabo o thus appear s to b e an example of frank irrationalism. Yet the assumption that the deployment o f theoretical terminolog y equal s th e possessio n o f practica l knowledg e remains so deeply embedded in the huma n min d that it is perfectly possible fo r bot h comple x cultura l practice s an d erudit e scholarl y literatures t o b e erecte d aroun d th e invocatio n o f suc h apparentl y empty signifiers. Still another approac h is illustrated in the followin g passage from an essa y by the well-know n professor of classics and (recently ) law, Martha Nussbaum .

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As Nietzsch e showed , i t i s onl y t o someon e whos e fait h i n hi s ow n human capacitie s ha s been erode d by the teaching s o f an otherworldl y faith tha t the news of the deat h o f God bring s nihilism an d the aban donment of evaluation and selection . The failur e of thes e thinker s to commit themselve s t o sortin g ou t ou r huma n an d historica l practice s of choice an d selection, the insistenc e tha t we could have good normative argument s onl y i f the y cam e fro m heaven—al l thi s betray s a shame befor e th e human. O n th e othe r hand, if we really think o f the hope of a transcendent groun d fo r value as uninteresting o r irrelevan t to huma n ethics , a s we should , the n th e new s o f its collaps e wil l no t change th e way we think an d act. It will just let us get on with th e business of reasoning in which we are alread y engaged, [emphasi s added]

One o f the mor e intrepi d thing s a n academic reader of philosophy can d o i s t o cit e Nietzsch e i n suppor t o f a normativ e propositio n regarding the role o f reason in the maintenance of moral discourse . Indeed, i t is somewhat startling t o juxtapose Professor Nussbaum' s observations with a few of Nietzsche's own words: When one finds it necessary t o turn reason into a tyrant, a s Socrates did , the dange r canno t b e sligh t tha t somethin g els e wil l pla y th e tyrant . Rationality wa s then hi t upo n a s the savior ; neithe r Socrate s no r hi s "patients" had an y choice abou t bein g rational : i t was de rigueur, it was their last resort. The fanaticis m with whic h al l Greek reflection throw s itself upo n rationalit y betray s a desperate situation ; ther e wa s danger , there was but one choice: eithe r to perish or—t o b e absurdly rational.

To quote th e autho r of Th e Antichrist and Twilight o f the Idols fo r th e proposition tha t accepting the deat h of God doe s not i n fac t herald the arriva l of nihilism i n Western thought; and, even more remark ably, t o imagin e tha t what Nietzsche calle d "the revaluatio n of all values" entails nothing mor e tha n "get[ting] o n with the business of reasoning in which we are already engaged"—what are these claims but evidenc e o f tha t ver y decadence o f reason o f whic h Nietzsch e warned? It is no exaggeration to say these assertions invoke nothing less tha n th e precis e negatio n o f Nietzsche' s mos t distinctiv e an d characteristic ideas. Such talk betrays, to echo the Nietzschean into nations of Professor Nussbaum, a shame before th e inhuman: before the metaphysica l void tha t Nietzsche , a t least , ha d th e courag e t o

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acknowledge made nonsense o f the mora l chimera s at the cente r o f all thos e "huma n an d historica l practice s o f [ethical ] choic e an d selection" Professo r Nussbau m urge s us to continue pursuin g mor e or less exactly as before. For what , in th e end , is this "busines s of reasoning" suppose d t o be reasoning about? Abou t wha t yo u o r I , o r fo r tha t matte r Professor Nussbaum , believ e ar e trul y ethica l choices ? Such belief s cannot be interpreted a s the product s o f a rational process aime d at determining wha t i s actually good , unles s our argument s abou t th e good refe r t o somethin g othe r than our respective belief s abou t th e good. What then ar e we to mak e of the fac t s o many contemporar y academics den y that th e tota l subjectivization o f ethical argument — the reductio n o f the goo d t o beliefs abou t th e good , whethe r thes e beliefs b e thos e o f individuals , communities, o r entir e cultures — must o f necessity rob the practice of ethical argument of most of its meaning and purpose ? Is this fac t merel y anothe r sig n o f the solip sistic decadenc e tha t mark s muc h o f ou r mora l an d politica l dis course? O r i s it, perhaps , an illustration of what can only be under stood a s a collective los s of cultural and intellectual nerve? This isn't the plac e for a disquisition regardin g the deadl y effects of academi c pedantr y o n th e interpretatio n o f s o muc h o f wha t were, befor e th e academi c disciplinarians got thei r hand s on them , original an d arrestin g ideas . Ye t still—if I migh t b e permitte d a prayer to whatever form o f transcendence has been granted us, even if it should turn out to be nothing mor e than the superannuated and deficient divinit y of a degraded Gnostic universe—oh Divin e Presence, i f you should eve r turn you r eterna l gaz e in our miserabl e direction, please spare u s from the "Nietzsche" o f the professors! Nietzsche , who abov e al l els e was th e fathe r o f radicall y heterodox an d trul y dangerous countercultural ideas , has been domesticate d int o a darling o f the soporifi c university seminar : into a purveyor o f pruden tial Aristotelian virtue , o f liberal democratic "values " and— mirabile dictu—of th e ideall y neat, acontextuall y "objective," an d intellectu ally arid conceptual categories o f Anglo-American analytical philosophy. N o for m o f incomprehensio n i s wors e tha n tha t o f th e learned.

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Abortion and the Politics of Reason Moral debat e i n ou r publi c culture i s at present i n a state o f almost total confusion . With th e collaps e of any generally accepte d teleo logical account o f what is entailed i n the prais e or condemnatio n of morally significan t huma n choices , w e n o longe r hav e a widel y shared sens e o f what i t eve n mean s to cal l such choice s "right " o r "wrong." Needless t o say, this stat e of affairs pose s significant problems for law. Law requires bringing the violence o f the state t o bea r on thos e wh o mak e certai n mora l choices , an d usin g tha t sam e power t o protect th e freedom of others t o choose differently . A thin formalist or positivist conceptio n o f law thus requires us to admit we are deployin g stat e powe r withou t an y justification beyon d tha t o f pointing out a particular deployment i s required by the extan t legal rules. (Example: We imprisoned Jones fo r five years because the leg islature determine d tha t thos e wh o sel l te n pound s o f marijuan a should be imprisoned fo r five years.) This situation make s legal actors unhappy . For while advocates or judges may sometimes be able to rationalize their rol e in the respec tive punishment an d legitimation of various moral choices by telling themselves the y are onl y followin g the rules , all but the mos t sim pleminded realiz e both tha t th e rule s justify nothin g i n themselves , and tha t i n an y case many significant legal decisions are not i n an y meaningful sens e impelled b y those rules . Give n thei r professiona l obligations, lega l academic s are eve n mor e acutel y awar e o f thes e uncomfortable facts . Th e mora l an d psychologica l inadequac y o f formalist justificatio n thus give s ris e t o th e rationalis t urge : t o th e desire t o find compelling reason s for adopting thi s rul e rathe r tha n that one . Le t u s trac e ou t som e o f th e consequence s o f indulgin g that urge in a characteristically difficult socia l and legal context . Arguments abou t th e moralit y o f abortio n ar e o f cours e classi c illustrations o f conflict s between deepl y held, fundamentall y irreconcilable views. These conflict s are structured aroun d wha t i n ou r culture ar e tw o point s o f almos t unanimou s agreement : th e belie f that infanticide is murder, and that the choice to have or not t o have children shoul d remai n unregulated by the state . Th e mora l statu s

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of th e fetu s betwee n conceptio n an d birt h the n become s a crucial question fo r th e ethica l an d political analysi s of the issue . It shoul d be unnecessary to ad d that this i s the sor t of question tha t can' t be answered empirically , a s belief s concernin g wha t constitute s "per sonhood" are at bottom metaphysical acts of faith, and hence remai n unamenable to empirical proof or refutation. This question ca n be phrased in bivalent (i.e., when does the fetu s become a person?) or multivalen t terms (i.e. , at what stage s of de velopment doe s th e fetu s hav e which attribute s o f personhood?). A separate se t o f question s revolv e aroun d wha t mora l limit s an d obligations ar e impose d o n other s b y th e varietie s o f personhoo d attributed t o th e fetus . Yet another grou p o f questions involve what legal rule s shoul d gover n ou r mora l conclusions , whateve r thos e may be. Within these sets of considerations, an enormous number of con clusions can be drawn that are neither susceptibl e to proof, nor sub ject to refutation. Besides the most obvious positions—the fetu s is or is not a person a t point X and henc e abortio n i s or i s not immoral , and shoul d o r shoul d no t b e illega l at tha t sam e point—there ar e almost limitles s possibl e variations : the fetu s i s a person, an d abor tion is immoral, but it should not b e prohibited because such prohi bitions are unenforceable and do more har m than good ; th e fetu s is in some ways like a person, but not enoug h fo r considerations of the morality of abortion to overcome th e importance of individual moral choice; th e fetu s i s only a little lik e a person, bu t abortio n i s therefore deeply wrong and should be outlawed, if only to symboliz e ou r respect for all human life; the fetus is somewhat of a person, and thus has certai n lega l rights, but abortio n i n cases of rape and incest is a type of justifiable homicide—and so on and so on.* *Note ho w ideologicall y driven arguments for a particula r moral o r lega l vie w must deny the potential complexity of other views, if those who make such arguments are t o clai m person s wh o disagre e with th e proffere d vie w ar e makin g rationall y inconsistent claims . Fo r a ful l critiqu e o f thi s rhetorica l strateg y in th e contex t of arguments about abortion and reason , see Steven D. Smith , The Constitution an d the Pride of Reason.

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Arguments abou t abortion thu s take place within a moral, social, and lega l equilibriu m zone . Again , withi n suc h a zon e powerfu l competing consideration s ca n b e adduce d fo r holdin g a variet y o f views. Furthermor e suc h consideration s can' t b e refute d withou t recourse t o som e axiomati c ground o f argument that other s do no t accept an d that , precisel y because it i s axiomatic, cannot b e argue d for rationally . Suc h dispute s must end , i f at all , in som e ac t o f arational assertion, and will have to be resolved accordingly. The rationalis t urg e to den y this i s part o f rationalism's denial of what the philosophe r Migue l d e Unamuno calle d "the tragi c sens e of life. " Th e ide a tha t importan t value s ma y b e irreconcilabl y a t odds with eac h other, an d that th e choic e betwee n the m canno t b e adjudicated b y reason , i s no t dependen t o n acceptin g mora l rela tivism; it merely requires we acknowledge that, as Isaiah Berlin puts it, "The [legitimate ] value s of one culture may be incompatible with those o f another, " an d tha t w e ma y fin d th e sam e incompatibilit y within "one cultur e or group or in a single human being at differen t times." Berli n points ou t tha t suc h a "notion of a plurality of values not structure d hierarchically " does not entai l relativism, but i t does entail "th e permanen t possibilit y o f inescapabl e conflic t betwee n values." The acceptanc e o f intractable ethica l pluralis m and its potentiall y tragic implication s mus t alway s b e i n grea t practica l tensio n wit h what Rober t Cove r calle d th e "jurispathic " characte r o f legal deci sion making : face d wit h "th e luxurian t growt h o f a hundre d lega l traditions, [judges ] assert tha t this on e is la w an d destro y o r tr y t o destroy al l the rest." The weapo n of choice in such jurispathic operations is often calle d "th e law, " or "th e Constitution, " or eve n "rea son" itself . For example , in th e cours e o f an acknowledgment , rar e within th e lega l academic literature, of the limit s of reason i n moral and lega l decisio n makin g Professo r Robi n Wes t point s ou t tha t "reason wil l no t accoun t for , or i n th e en d meaningfull y challenge, our rock-botto m moral beliefs, an d [Cass ] Sunstein i s simply wron g to thin k otherwise. " Wes t thu s conclude s correctl y tha t o n issue s such as abortion "reaso n alon e is not goin g to compel agreement. " At thi s poin t on e migh t expec t Professo r Wes t to , figurativel y

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speaking, shru g he r shoulder s an d mov e on . Bu t tha t woul d leav e the lega l academi c with nothin g usefu l t o contribute t o th e resolu tion o f this particular legal debate; hence ex hypothesi, there must stil l be more to say. West thus goes on to argue that to function well our reason mus t be supplemente d wit h a n emotional, experientia l com ponent o f knowledge. "I f we are reall y aimin g for genuin e consen sus," she says, "then the experientia l gaps [in our variou s lives] must be bridged. " She then give s the followin g example. Many years ago, sh e saw a picture tha t ha s haunte d he r eve r since . I t wa s o f a nake d youn g woman who appeare d to b e sleeping peacefully, bu t who in fac t ha d died afte r undergoin g a n illega l abortion . Whe n sh e firs t sa w this picture sh e was "filled wit h sadnes s and then with a n overpowerin g feeling o f identity. " Sh e relate s tha t ever y yea r "a t leas t on e [law ] student, usuall y a man, tell s me that [thi s o r some simila r represen tation] change d hi s min d o n abortion. " Th e poin t i s "tha t mora l convictions ar e changed experientiall y or empathically , not throug h argument." Wes t emphasize s sh e is "not advocatin g illogi c or irra tionality. What I a m seekin g t o highligh t i s that injustic e mus t b e shown, not asserted... . Reaso n alone simply will not mov e us—bu t experience, empathy , and reflection might. " There is much to admire in this argument. A s a description o f the psychology of fundamental mora l belief it is both mor e accurat e and infinitely mor e attractive than th e intellectua l hubri s o f arguments that clai m to demonstrat e tha t reaso n eithe r impel s one t o accep t a particular mora l view or, as in th e cas e of the omniscien t Professo r Dworkin, require s th e acolyt e t o accep t tha t h e already believe s in the particula r mora l cod e th e evangelis t o f reaso n bring s unt o th e nations.* Still , wha t i s missing her e i s an y acknowledgmen t o f th e other sid e of the question. This omission seems all the more surprising whe n on e consider s tha t a crucial elemen t o f pro-lif e activis m has been to undertake precisel y the sorts of emotive an d experientia l *See, for example, Dworkin's book Life's Dominion, which argues that opponents o f abortion woul d not b e against the practic e if they truly understood thei r own moral beliefs.

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consciousness-raising task s that West advocates. Opponents of legalized abortio n tr y t o buil d tha t elusiv e "genuine consensus " o n th e issue b y confrontin g th e ambivalen t with, fo r example , pictures of aborted fetuse s tha t have been hacked to pieces in a procedure diffi cult t o distinguis h visuall y fro m simpl e infanticide . The y als o employ the narratives of self-proclaimed victims of abortion, wome n who relate how they carr y burdens of almost intolerable guil t fro m having "kille d thei r babies " as a consequenc e o f th e availabilit y o f legal abortion . Ar e thes e picture s an d thes e storie s someho w les s legitimate, les s compelling, tha n th e picture s an d storie s employe d by pro-choice advocates ? Do the y fai l i n the tas k of illustrating how "injustice must be shown"? Obviously West believes they do. But this belief is no more defensible or, more to the point, transmissibl e to those who disagree with it than are the rationalist arguments she rightly chides Cass Sunstein for treatin g as more dispositiv e tha n they are . The experientia l and emotive side of the abortio n questio n is just as ineluctably tangled as its rationalist an d axiomati c cousin. Indee d i f it wer e not, the n th e reasons give n fo r supportin g a particular positio n o n th e questio n would convinc e practicall y everyone , eve n thoug h thos e reason s themselves coul d no t a s a rationa l matte r resolv e th e issue ; o r b y contrast suc h reason s would convince n o on e at all , no matte r ho w logically impeccabl e an d rationall y consistent the y migh t be . Afte r all, it is possible t o make a perfectly coherent an d rational argument for infanticide; and indeed many cultures have never considered tha t practice t o b e morall y problematic . Th e irrelevanc e o f this logica l and historica l fac t t o th e America n debat e abou t abortio n tell s u s much abou t the limit s of reason; bu t i t als o indicates that th e sam e practical limitation s exten d t o thos e emotiv e factor s that , a s West points out, alway s undergird ou r most profoun d moral and political beliefs. Legal Reasoning as Mental Illness As I write thes e words, the Suprem e Cour t has just announced tha t it will review two federal cour t decision s that foun d a constitutiona l

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right t o physician-assisted suicide, and hence invalidated state legislation forbiddin g tha t practice . Onc e mor e th e votarie s o f what i s called constitutiona l la w are thrusting themselve s int o th e mids t of an excruciatingl y difficul t publi c ethical debate, i n orde r tha t the y may tell us yet again what "the Constitution " requires Americans to believe concernin g a matter o f fundamenta l mora l controversy . O f particular interes t i n thi s regar d i s the decisio n i n Quill v . Vacco, i n which a federal appeals court foun d tha t a New Yor k state law penalizing assisted suicide was not "rationall y related to a legitimate state interest." Physician-assisted suicid e is yet anothe r issu e that lie s squarely in the middle of a moral, social, and legal equilibrium zone. That zone was as a formal matte r bounde d b y on th e on e sid e the lega l right , now recognized i n ever y American jurisdiction, of mentally competent adult s to refus e medica l treatment an d on th e other , wha t was the almos t equall y universal prohibitio n forbiddin g persons fro m assisting another's suicid e attempt. Obviously the righ t t o refuse medica l treatment an d the prohibi tion o n assiste d suicide represent attempt s t o accommodat e power fully conflictin g ethica l an d practica l concerns . A stron g cultura l commitment t o individua l autonomy support s th e vie w tha t seri ously ill people should b e allowe d to en d thei r live s as they se e fit, without bein g subjecte d t o unwante d an d perhap s futil e medica l treatment. Indee d i t ha s bee n estimate d tha t 7 0 percen t o f th e deaths tha t tak e place i n hospital s an d nursin g home s ar e a direc t product o f the cessatio n o f medical intervention. Wit h nearl y two thirds o f this society's vast medical care costs alread y being incurred within th e last six months of people's lives, a requirement that heroi c measures always be undertaken without regar d t o th e wishe s of the patient would quickly bankrupt the health care system. Thus in this instance th e cultura l commitmen t t o individua l choic e dovetail s nicely with frankly pragmati c fiscal concerns. But thi s ver y coalescenc e o f ideologica l commitmen t an d eco nomic interest i s also, of course, a major reason why there ar e pow erful argument s i n favo r of limiting our lega l righ t t o "choose " t o kill ourselves . Afte r al l i n a societ y i n whic h suicid e is a culturall y and legall y sanctioned choice , it will soon becom e obvious that it is

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very muc h i n th e interest s o f various partie s t o ensur e tha t certai n classes o f person s understan d ho w importan t i t i s the y mak e tha t particular choice . Already , a s the philosophe r an d bioethicis t John Arras point s out , physician s fai l routinel y t o "diagnos e an d trea t reversible clinica l depression, especiall y in th e elderl y population." Arras furthe r note s tha t nearl y 4 0 millio n American s lac k decen t primary medical care; that most physicians suffer fro m "a n appalling lack o f trainin g i n palliativ e care"; an d tha t significan t discrimina tion i n th e deliver y o f pai n contro l an d othe r medica l treatmen t takes plac e on th e basi s of race an d economi c status . Furthermore , the sanguin e assumptio n tha t abuse s o f a syste m o f physician assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia can be regulated out o f existence i s not supporte d b y comparative inquiry . The Dutc h experi ence wit h legalize d euthanasi a suggest s tha t i n th e Netherlands , despite copiou s regulation s designe d t o avoi d suc h things , severa l hundred patient s ar e euthanize d ever y yea r wh o di d no t actuall y consent t o being killed. Laws agains t physician-assiste d suicid e ar e i n par t attempt s t o protect society's mos t vulnerabl e members fro m thos e wh o wish t o relieve societ y o f the burde n o f that membership. A s Professor Yale Kamisar put s it , th e lin e draw n b y th e America n lega l syste m "between 'lettin g die' an d actively intervening t o bring abou t death represents a cultural an d pragmatic compromis e betwee n th e desir e to le t seriously il l people carry out thei r wishe s to en d it all and th e felt need t o protect th e weak and vulnerable." Faced wit h thi s welte r o f delicat e considerations , th e appeal s court in Quill v. Vacco could, for reasons having to do with the pecu liar institutio n o f judge-create d constitutiona l la w doctrine , over turn th e balanc e struck betwee n the m b y the Ne w Yor k legislature only i f i t foun d eithe r a "fundamenta l constitutiona l right " t o assisted suicide , o r i f it determine d tha t thi s la w was not "rationall y related t o a legitimate stat e interest." After acknowledgin g a right t o physician-assisted suicid e "find s n o cognizabl e basis in th e Consti tution's languag e o r design " ( a circumstance, b y the way, that didn' t keep th e judge s i n th e othe r cas e currentl y befor e th e Suprem e Court from finding such a right), the court noted that the New York

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law "doe s no t trea t equall y al l competent person s wh o ar e i n th e final stages of fatal illnes s and wish to hasten thei r deaths, " and that in it s view "the distinction s mad e b y New Yor k law with regar d t o such person s d o no t furthe r an y legitimat e stat e purpose. " I t summed up its argument i n the following passage: What busines s i s it o f the stat e t o requir e th e continuatio n o f agon y when th e resul t i s imminen t an d inevitable ? What concer n prompt s the stat e t o interfer e wit h a mentall y competen t patient' s [quotin g Planned Parenthood v . Casey ] 'righ t to defin e [his ] own concep t o f existence, o f meaning, of the universe , an d o f the myster y of human life,' when the patien t seeks to have drugs prescribe d to end lif e durin g the final stages o f a termina l illness ? The greatl y reduced interes t o f th e state in preserving life compels the answer to these questions: 'None.'"

Let u s hope i t is necessary to first be transformed into wha t Joseph Stalin referre d to i n anothe r contex t a s "a specia l breed o f person" before on e become s capabl e of uttering suc h thing s i n th e nam e of what "the Constitutio n requires." Le t us hope, tha t is, that this passage i s a product o f a lifetim e o f indulgin g i n lega l reasoning, an d not a representative o f it s author' s unindoctrinate d cognitiv e abili ties. For her e ar e just a few of the consideration s th e autho r o f this encomium t o bureaucratized death overlooks o r ignores . First, the claim that no rational distinction can be drawn between the righ t t o refus e medica l treatmen t an d th e righ t t o physician assisted suicid e i s true onl y in a rationally trivial sense . It i s true i n the sens e tha t n o compelling distinctio n ca n b e draw n betwee n th e two rights ; bu t o f course , whe n rationa l analysi s i s takin g plac e within a n equilibriu m zone , n o compellin g distinctio n ca n ever b e drawn between differen t positions . In claimin g that n o suc h rationa l distinctio n ca n b e drawn , th e Quill cour t too k advantag e of a n unavoidabl e logical an d practica l difficulty tha t beset s an y exercis e in analyti c line-drawing. Al l such line-drawing i s vulnerabl e t o a logica l parado x tha t th e ancien t Greeks name d a "sorites problem. " A sorites proble m arise s in an y logical context o f the for m "If A, then B ; if B, then C ; if C, . .. i f Y, then Z " s o tha t th e firs t ter m implie s th e last : i f A, the n Z . Th e

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philosopher Zen o formulate d i t thus : Suppos e a hea p o f san d i s comprised o f n grains . Remov e a grain . I s i t stil l a heap ? Yes . Remove anothe r grain . I s it still a heap? .. . an d so on. The poin t of the proble m i s that w e can't describ e accurately the transitio n fro m heap to not-heap becaus e the analytic boundary between thes e con cepts i s fuzzy, rathe r tha n sharpl y defined. Within moral , social , an d henc e lega l equilibriu m zone s thi s problem is , as both a logical an d practica l matter , endemic . Almos t everyone i n this culture believe s competent adult s should b e able to refuse medica l treatment. Almos t n o on e believe s that involuntar y euthanasia i s morall y acceptable . Betwee n thos e relativel y shar p lines com e a whole serie s o f fuzz y distinctions . Shoul d competen t adults b e abl e t o refus e foo d an d water ? Shoul d terminall y il l patients b e abl e t o obtai n fata l dose s o f self-administere d drugs ? Should physician s b e abl e t o administe r suc h drug s t o willin g pa tients? Should such measures be made available to those who are not terminally ill ? Ho w fa r shoul d w e g o i n "implying " th e desire s w e believe incompeten t patient s woul d hav e i f they wer e stil l compe tent? And so on. Note that according t o Quill v. Vacco a physician in New Yor k who hands a terminally ill patient a fatal dos e o f morphine i s vindicating the patient' s constitutional rights ; but i f the physician inject s a physically incapacitate d patien t wit h a fata l dos e o f th e sam e dru g i n response t o th e patient's desperat e plea s tha t h e want s t o die , th e physician has committed a serious felony . How "rational " is that distinction? Indee d i f w e wer e t o tak e th e court' s definitio n o f wha t rational distinction s entai l seriously , penalizin g a drive r fo r goin g sixty-six mile s pe r hou r o n th e interstat e woul d hav e t o b e consid ered unconstitutional , a s it i s obviousl y impossibl e t o demonstrat e that i t i s "rationall y relate d t o a legitimat e stat e interest " fo r th e state t o enforc e a speed limi t of sixty-five rather tha n sixty-si x miles per hour—if, that is , we ignore th e eminentl y rationa l need t o draw some kind o f line in the first place. Within a lega l equilibriu m zon e ther e wil l neve r b e compellin g reasons for drawing the analytic line at point / rather tha n at point m or point n ; but o f course there wil l also never be compelling reason s

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for drawin g i t a t poin t n rathe r tha n poin t m or l. Thu s nothing i s easier—or mor e analyticall y trivial—than fo r a cour t t o poin t ou t that ther e i s no rationall y compellin g reaso n fo r distinguishin g be tween tw o positions withi n suc h a n equilibrium zone. And yet ther e will alway s b e plent y o f rationally defensible reasons—thoug h no t rationally compelling ones—fo r distinguishing between an y of these various positions . In th e cas e of laws prohibiting physician-assiste d suicid e it is easy to poin t to all sorts of reasons why we might dra w a line prohibitin g physicians fro m helpin g thei r patient s t o kil l themselves . Here ar e just a few : because terminall y ill patient s ar e ofte n i n situation s o f great pai n an d chronic depression , wher e th e concep t o f informed consent become s highl y problematic; because determining what the phrase "termina l illness " doe s or shoul d encompas s is a much mor e difficult tas k than th e nea t conceptua l categorie s employe d i n legal argument woul d hav e us believe ; becaus e onc e w e sanctio n physi cian-assisted suicid e it wil l becom e difficul t o r impossibl e t o pro hibit activ e euthanasia ; because suc h "rights " wil l b e use d t o pres sure th e elderly , poor people , ethni c minorities , th e handicapped , and other marginalize d persons t o kill themselves; and because with the loosenin g o f formal restriction s som e doctors wil l be more likely to, a s in th e Netherlands , practic e informa l nonvoluntar y euthana sia. (Thes e reason s d o no t eve n touc h o n wha t ma y b e th e mos t powerful argumen t agains t th e practice , whic h i s tha t mos t o f th e major Wester n religiou s an d philosophica l tradition s hav e consid ered suicid e to be deeply wrong. O f cours e i t merely begs th e ques tion t o clai m tha t makin g suc h mora l judgment s i s non e o f th e state's business. ) The Quill court respond s t o som e o f these concern s i n a manner that once again illustrates th e disablin g effect th e nee d t o engag e in the rationalizatio n o f lega l decision s ca n hav e o n th e abilit y t o undertake usefull y rationa l analyse s o f difficul t issues . Thu s th e court assert s "the stat e o f New Yor k may establish rules an d proce dures t o assur e that al l choices ar e fre e o f [coercive ] pressures, " an d that "wit h respec t t o th e protectio n o f minorities, th e poo r an d th e non-mentally handicapped , it suffice s [! ] to sa y that thes e classe s of

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persons ar e entitled t o treatmen t equa l to tha t afforde d t o al l those who no w ma y haste n deat h b y mean s of life-suppor t withdrawal." Of cours e th e firs t poin t simpl y ignores th e fac t tha t th e stat e o f New Yor k ha s already establishe d wha t i t see s a s a n appropriat e regime o f rule s an d procedure s t o assur e that seriousl y ill person s are not coerce d into suicide, in the for m of the very laws the court is invalidating. An d wha t ca n possibl y b e th e poin t o f assertin g tha t marginalized persons "are entitled to equal treatment?" After all , the special concer n abou t th e possibl e coercio n o f members o f other wise vulnerable groups obviousl y has nothing t o d o with th e formal legal rights those group s already enjoy. The almos t surrea l irrelevanc e of thes e response s ca n b e inter preted as a product of what are at bottom various delusional patterns of thought concernin g both th e efficac y an d the justificatory forc e of legal regulations. We migh t conclud e tha t lega l actor s who actually believe the sort s o f claims made by the cour t i n the Quill case are in the gri p of a professional deformation that ha s many of the qualities of a mental illness. Yet the presenc e of this cognitive patholog y isn't in itsel f evidenc e tha t ther e i s something "wrong " wit h suc h lega l thinkers. Indeed, as I have argued, properly socialized lawyers are in a sens e required t o inhabi t a cognitiv e univers e tha t feature s pro foundly untenable assumptions concerning the relationship between legal imperatives and the social reality these imperatives are attempt ing to regulate. Suc h legal actors are thus to some extent impelle d t o adopt irrationa l belief s regardin g legal reason's power t o determin e rationally what those imperative s should be. Cases such as this also illustrate the specia l role th e U.S . Consti tution play s in the maintenanc e of a species of mystifying obscurantism at the bas e of American law. (I should emphasiz e that this isn't necessarily a criticism. I t i s only fro m a rationalist perspectiv e tha t mystification an d obscurantism are necessarily ba d things.) When th e Supreme Cour t rule s o n th e question o f assiste d suicide , fe w lay observers wil l eve r b e awar e tha t th e la w supposedl y compellin g whatever result it reaches will be one or another clause of a sentence reading "no r shal l an y Stat e depriv e any perso n o f life , liberty , o r property, without due process of law; nor den y to any person within

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its jurisdiction th e equal protection of the laws."* This sentence, lik e so many other clause s of the Constitution , i s read today a s if it were some gran d evocatio n o f highly abstrac t mora l an d politica l princi ples, whe n i n fac t a s a matter o f history suc h clause s were withou t exception relativel y modes t response s t o wha t a t th e tim e wer e understood t o be quite local an d particularized disputes . But histor y i s o f littl e relevanc e t o th e interpretatio n o f a fet ishized cultura l artifact . Th e Constitutio n ha s becom e t o man y members o f a certain America n socia l clas s what th e prophecie s o f Nostradamus represen t t o thos e o f another: a n ideall y vague se t of oracular-sounding propositions , whos e ver y vagueness comfor t th e devotee wit h a sense tha t th e correc t interpretatio n o f an essentially magical text will provide insight int o mysteries tha t would otherwis e remain unknowable an d obscure . The Banalit y of Goodness Why i s napalmin g babie s "bad? " Give n th e curren t stat e o f ou r intellectual culture , w e ca n n o longe r b e sur e wha t thi s questio n even means, let alone how to answer it. Thus if we turn t o courts for answers t o question s o f th e mos t profoun d mora l resonance , per haps we do so in part becaus e we no longe r kno w how to talk abou t such thing s withou t resortin g t o th e analyti c circularitie s an d rhetorical sophistrie s o f lega l reasoning . Ye t anyone wh o believe s that thinkin g ver y carefull y abou t matter s o f dee p mora l disagree *Despite various pleas that this was too important an issue to be decided democratically (see, e.g., the self-style d "Philosopher's Brie f filed by Ronald Dworkin, et al.) the Suprem e Cour t foun d n o constitutiona l righ t t o physician-assiste d suicide . Commentators generall y praised the Court fo r not imposing its views on the democ ratic process . Tw o day s earlier , many of th e sam e commentator s ha d bee n equall y effusive i n thei r praise when the Cour t struck dow n a federal statut e (the Religious Freedom Restoratio n Act) that had passe d both House s o f Congress wit h a total of three dissentin g votes . I t i s indee d unfortunat e that , o n thi s latte r occasion , ou r elected representatives proved almost unanimously incapable of understanding "what the Constitution requires. "

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ment wil l mak e thos e matter s usefull y amenabl e t o th e power s o f human reason need s to think about that belief some more . But this conclusion leave s us faced wit h a considerable mystery. I t remains a n articl e o f fait h i n bot h lega l an d academi c circles tha t indulging i n extensiv e reasonin g abou t suc h matter s make s sense : indeed th e mor e extensive , th e better . A particularl y interestin g illustration o f this belief is provided by Judge Guid o Calabresi' s con currence i n the Quill decision. Judge Calabres i i s i n hi s ow n righ t a n unusuall y distinguishe d legal scholar, so it comes as no surprise that his concurrence is , as an intellectual matter, vastly more impressive than the majority's almost comically wea k opinion. Judge Calabresi concur s with th e majority' s conclusion that , o n th e recor d befor e th e court , th e Ne w Yor k statutes prohibitin g physician-assiste d suicid e are unconstitutional . But h e admit s tha t th e underlyin g ethica l an d socia l issue s ar e "o f extreme difficulty" (his emphasis). He alludes to Margaret Mead's troubling observation tha t w e should bewar e giving those wh o have the power to hea l the righ t to kill , since as an anthropological mat ter this distinction i s a relatively recent one; and he ponders whethe r this an d simila r insights migh t "hel p u s distinguis h betwee n givin g doctors the right to remove lif e suppor t system s and the righ t o f the terminally il l to deman d letha l drugs fro m th e sam e doctor. " Judg e Calabresi wonders whether person s wh o are prohibited fro m acquir ing letha l drugs will kil l themselve s i n mor e horrifi c way s that wil l be ultimatel y "mor e dangerou s t o societ y an d devastatin g t o sur vivors. But is it really the cas e that terminall y ill patients would take such measures? And which way would i t cut, i f they di d not? Thes e questions," h e adds, "hardly begin t o approach the human tragedies , and th e deepl y held beliefs , that th e issue s we would hav e to decid e would requir e u s to explore. " Judge Calabres i therefor e conclude s th e cour t shoul d no t a t thi s time addres s the ultimate merits of the case, and should thu s leave it open t o the stat e of New Yor k to enact new laws prohibiting assiste d suicide. Fo r i f th e Ne w Yor k legislatur e doe s s o i n a wa y tha t explains th e legislature' s reasons fo r reenactin g suc h prohibitions ,

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then perhap s thos e reason s wil l surviv e th e court' s constitutiona l scrutiny: I [wil l fo r now ] tak e n o positio n o n whethe r suc h prohibitions , o r other more finely drawn ones, might be valid under either or both [the due proces s o r equa l protectio n clauses] , were Ne w Yor k to reenac t them w hile articulating th e reasons fo r th e distinction s i t make s i n it s laws, an d expressing th e grounds fo r th e prohibition s themselves, [em phasis added]

Note th e remarkabl e cognitiv e dissonanc e implici t i n thi s conclu sion. Judge Calabres i is far too intelligent no t t o appreciate what he calls th e "extrem e complexity " o f th e mora l conundrum s a t th e heart o f suc h a n excruciatin g politica l an d ethica l issu e a s tha t o f assisted suicide . And yet s o deep is the cultura l fait h i n both reaso n in general, and in what the American legal system treats as the extra ordinary rationa l power s o f judges, that Judge Calabres i stil l finds himself impelle d t o asser t that th e la w both require s an d (w e must suppose) enables he and his judicial brethren t o evaluate and resolv e the various moral questions posed by these matters in some rational, and indee d rationally superior way. Perhaps th e busines s o f judging the la w simply doesn' t allo w for the cultivatio n o f tha t qualit y o f sympatheti c imaginatio n Keat s called "negativ e capability"—"tha t is when man i s capable of being in uncertainties , Mysteries , doubts , withou t an y irritabl e reachin g after fac t & reason." Indeed, we can suppose tha t as a practical matter th e psychologica l pressures o f judging require th e elimination of real ambivalence . But t o lac k suc h ambivalenc e abou t th e prope r resolution o f a dee p cultura l conflic t mus t itsel f requir e a kin d o f blindness: an intellectual blindness that makes one incapable of perceiving, o r a t leas t takin g seriously , thos e sam e uncertainties, mys teries, and doubts of which Keats wrote. One o f the continua l puzzle s of political, legal , and academi c life is how a highly intelligent person , full y capabl e of appreciating th e tremendously comple x an d indee d fundamentall y inexplicable ele ments involve d i n undertakin g essentiall y contestable ethica l judg -

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ments, i s somehow transforme d into th e sor t of happy idiot who is certain—beyond a reasonable doubt, as it were—of "the sanctit y of unborn life, " o r o f a woman' s "constitutiona l righ t t o choose. " Reader, do such persons posses s some enzyme that you and I lack? Is some chemica l release d in thei r brain s tha t allow s them t o believe they have "reasoned" to thes e conclusions ? I t i s a deep an d abidin g mystery. Many a tim e I hav e sa t amon g superbl y educated , intellectuall y gifted lega l academics , listenin g t o a subtl e discussio n o f som e deeply controversial issue , waiting for that inevitabl e moment whe n the miracl e o f ethica l judgmen t wil l b e performed . Fo r a t tha t moment thi s grou p o f talente d lega l scholar s wil l metamorphos e (with th e possibl e exception o f this or tha t pervers e nonconformist ) into a veritable warren o f rationalist rabbits , their head s bobbing i n a blissfu l communit y o f agreement , a s th e questio n i s begge d an d the magi c word s uttered : "justice, " "fairness, " "principle, " an d o f course, "reason. " Now i f this sor t of group i s sufficiently homogenous , it s members may neve r eve n notic e tha t thei r agreemen t i s a produc t o f tha t homogeneity rathe r tha n o f any inherent abilit y to reaso n t o valid ethical conclusions. Richard Posner ha s described how, when he was a studen t there , th e facult y o f the Harvar d La w School wa s almost exclusively whit e an d male , an d ra n th e ideologica l gamu t o f American politic s fro m mildl y libera l t o mildl y conservative . Nat urally this particular grou p foun d tha t o n most issues of public con troversy mos t o f its member s prove d t o b e reasonabl e men . Toda y law facultie s display considerably greater gende r an d ethni c diver sity, and even some real ideological divisions . Nevertheless, th e vast majority o f la w professor s ar e liberal-lef t Democrat s wh o ca n b e counted o n t o vote , howeve r grudgingly , fo r Bil l Clinton . I t seem s almost a s if th e institution s tha t emplo y thes e person s manag e t o perceive, howeve r dimly , tha t i f thi s kin d o f relativ e ideologica l blandness isn' t maintained , th e comfortin g facad e o f th e power s o f legal reason can't b e maintained, either . Consider i n thi s ligh t a revie w writte n b y th e neo-conservativ e scholar Thoma s Sowel l critiquing tw o recen t book s o n affirmativ e

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action, on e strongl y supporting an d the othe r jus t a s strongly con demning th e practice . Th e revie w i s entitle d "Affirmativ e Action : Logic vs. Sentiment"; and , whether o r not Professo r Sowel l is actually responsibl e fo r tha t title , i t capture s th e essenc e o f hi s review. Here again we find the rationalist illusion rightly criticized by Robin West: th e fallac y tha t thi s sor t o f issu e i s amenabl e t o resolutio n through th e employmen t o f logica l argumen t an d th e citatio n o f empirical data, rather than through appeals ' to our sentimental faculties and axiomatic moral beliefs. Th e revie w ends with these words : "Still, ther e i s much t o b e sai d for readin g both books—i f only t o discover .. . tha t ther e ar e issues on which goo d argument s canno t be found o n both sides . Affirmative actio n is one of those issues." Of course th e iron y here is that Sowell' s equally dogmatic liberalleft opponent s would be in complete agreemen t with his theoretica l observation—although needles s t o sa y they woul d dra w precisel y the opposite practical conclusion. What sor t o f "reasone d discourse " ca n w e suppos e i s goin g t o take plac e between people wh o thin k this way ? Isn' t i t obvious tha t in order t o maintain the rationalist illusion that this type of issue can be resolve d throug h th e employmen t o f reason th e representative s of on e o r anothe r o f these camp s must b e ignored , silenced , ostracized, eliminated, or otherwise precluded from participatin g in what Professor Nussbau m call s wit h a certai n benig n complacenc y "ou r human and historical practices of choice and selection?" For i n th e en d d o we—indeed , can we—mak e such choice s b y virtue of what reason demands? It appear s that thos e who are prone to think of deep social conflict a s a sort of ongoing graduate seminar in moral philosophy believe we can. Yet when th e powe r of the stat e is employed for the purpose of resolving such conflicts we do not cal l that force "reason, " but rather "law, " "politics," o r "war," depending on th e implici t levels of ideological obfuscation and explici t levels of state violence to which the sovereign power must resort. Consider on e o f th e mos t spectacula r examples o f thi s process , drawn fro m th e centra l event of American history. Th e debat e over slavery wa s no t resolved , despit e numerou s attempt s t o d o so , through eithe r publi c debate, judicial decision , or legislativ e enact-

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ment. Severa l millio n American s fough t an d kille d thei r fello w countrymen wit h ferociou s and unrelenting zea l t o resolv e a n issu e before which , lik e al l fundamenta l issue s o f ethica l an d politica l judgment, the powe r of reason lay impotent . Today nothin g i s more "self-evident " tha n th e evi l of slavery. In our lazy , ahistorica l fashio n w e mor e o r les s assum e w e hav e bee n granted som e sor t o f moral perspicacity regarding thi s practice tha t was unavailable to th e mos t o f th e world' s civilizations, and indee d to our ow n great-grandparents. Ye t if we lack the negativ e capability to suspend ou r relentlessl y judgmental natures—if we cannot exer cise the sympathetic power s to place ourselves in the historica l con text of other, ver y different time s an d places—then thi s truly repre sents a failur e o f th e capacit y fo r rationa l judgment . I f yo u an d I , that is, cannot imagine ourselves as zealous and wholehearted apolo gists for the peculia r institution o f the America n South—if we can not imagin e insisting , wit h Professo r Nussbaum' s favorit e philoso pher, tha t th e prope r us e o f reason demonstrate s beyon d cavi l tha t some me n ar e bor n slaves—the n w e hav e bee n burdene d (o r blessed) not wit h th e gift s o f reason, bu t rathe r wit h all-too-huma n limits on our powers of moral imagination an d historical sympathy.

10 THE WAY OF RENUNCIATIO N The perfec t way is without difficulty , Save that it avoids picking an d choosing . Only when you stop liking and disliking Will all be clearly understood . SENG-TS'AN, Treatise o n Faith in the Mind

In th e col d calculu s of th e utilitaria n th e America n la w school i s a classic barrie r t o entry , designe d t o maintai n a professiona l cartel . From a democratic viewpoint it is a seminary for the production o f a mystifying priestcraft , whos e obscurantis t incantation s hel p legiti mate the powe r of the social and cultural elite. In academic terms it is a mostl y fraudulen t operatio n tha t teache s neithe r theor y no r practice, bu t instea d function s a s the equivalen t of a foreign servic e academy tha t woul d sho w it s charge s Goldfinger severa l hundre d times before sendin g the m fort h t o conduct trad e talks with Austria. Should i t the n perhap s b e abolishe d altogether ? Afte r all , n o other legal system i n the world require s thre e year s of postgraduate schooling befor e a person ca n undertake the mos t routin e matte r of client representatio n o r courtroo m advocacy . Indeed, som e hin t o f the laten t dissatisfactio n with thi s syste m is found i n such curiositie s as th e maveric k presidentia l candidat e Morr y Taylo r makin g a pledge t o clos e dow n America n law schools fo r ten year s one o f the major proposal s o f his quixotic campaign. It shoul d b e unnecessary to ad d that nothin g o f the kin d i s going to happen. Advocatin g th e elimination o r even the significant paring back o f th e America n la w school (makin g i t a n undergraduat e pro gram, fo r example, or a college majo r followed by some sort of post175

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graduate apprenticeship ) woul d b e a quintessentiall y rationalis t re sponse to an institution tha t survives, and even thrives, because it fills a deep cultural need for the maintenance of some atavistic set of rituals that will obscure the inescapabl y troublesome an d often tragi c re lationship between moral belief, political practice, and social power. What w e cal l "law " must , a t moment s o f grea t socia l an d mora l complexity, den y tha t complexit y an d giv e definitiv e response s i n what ar e alway s les s tha n definitiv e circumstances . Fo r th e lega l scholar thi s ca n be a hard truth . Give n th e rhetorica l requirement s of lega l argument , an d th e practica l exigencie s o f lega l decisio n making, i t isn' t a n exaggeratio n t o sa y that th e task s o f preparin g persons t o undertak e zealous legal representatio n an d rende r lega l judgment ar e t o som e exten t incompatibl e wit h maintainin g stric t standards of intellectual honesty. Suc h is the fat e o f those o f us wh o must prepar e others to wiel d socia l powe r arbitrarily , an d yet who must at the same time legitimate that use of power by claiming legal arguments an d th e decision s tha t flo w fro m the m ar e impelle d b y "the law, " or "lega l principles," o r "reason " itself . But ther e i s no reaso n wh y tha t fat e need s t o b e replicate d i n all other area s o f socia l life . Still , i n Americ a today , th e habit s o f th e legal mind and the structure o f legal argument have become so widespread tha t i t often seem s that mos t person s wh o dominat e Ameri can publi c lif e ar e lawyers, o r a t leas t talk an d ac t ver y muc h a s if they were . An d it ma y well be the cas e that th e consequences—fo r both th e broade r cultur e an d fo r th e futur e America n law—of this wholesale juridification o f American life ar e only beginning to be felt . Natural Born Lawyers Lawyers ar e ofte n impelle d b y thei r professiona l obligation s t o become somethin g aki n to emotiona l prostitutes; tha t is , to be per sons whos e publi c persona e requir e th e simulatio n o f inauthenti c affective state s a s a condition o f their compensation . I n th e contex t of ongoing litigatio n th e most commo n o f these simulated emotion s is outrage : a lawye r tryin g a cas e mus t alway s b e read y to expres s

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what seems like genuine outrage a t the drop of the proverbial hat . Perhaps becaus e so many politicians are lawyers, or perhaps sim ply because everyone ha s seen facet s o f the lawyerl y persona exhib ited i n s o man y differen t context s o f socia l conflict , variou s dra maturgical requirement s o f th e adversar y syste m ar e no w bein g assimilated gradually into all forms of public conversation. I n partic ular, th e simulatio n o f outrage ha s become a seemingly permanen t part o f th e broade r politica l culture . Nationa l televisio n program s featuring supposedl y sophisticate d politica l commentary , suc h a s "Crossfire," "Th e McLaughli n Group, " an d "Th e Capita l Gang, " provide example s of ho w lawyerl y rhetori c an d it s accompanyin g emotional simulatio n hav e becom e ke y element s i n th e dramati c logic of public political discourse. On e o f these program s eve n con cludes with each commentator choosin g a n "outrage o f the week"— which ofte n enoug h turns out t o b e some displa y o f political inau thenticity tha t merel y mirrors the melodram a of the commentator' s own stylized performance. But such displays are hardly limited to jaded sophisticates nea r the centers o f national power. Righ t her e i n placid , provincial Boulder, Colorado, ther e i s no issue too small—no dispute abou t the singin g of "Silen t Night " in th e hig h schoo l auditorium , o r th e displa y of Halloween decoration s i n th e commo n area s of a housing develop ment—that i t wil l no t b e accompanie d b y emotiona l pyrotechnic s from amateu r litigators , complet e wit h exhaustiv e citation s t o th e Boulder Cit y Charte r an d th e U.S . Constitution , i f no t t o th e Magna Cart a an d the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . Yet unlik e rea l litigators , thos e wh o mimi c the professiona l per sonae of lawyers are usually unaware that lawyer s are almost always faking it. So it is that when a Boulder citizens' grou p expresses "out rage" ove r a zonin g varianc e tha t wil l allo w a McDonald' s t o b e built, its various members really are outraged. In thi s way the grad ual juridificatio n of publi c debat e lead s to a general cheapenin g of political discourse. Suc h a generalization of courtroom language and affect t o al l matters o f public controversy cause s people t o us e th e same terms t o condemn a proposed slowin g in the rat e of growth of Medicare outlay s a s they d o t o lamen t the practic e o f genocid e i n

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Bosnia or Rwanda. Eventually the claim that one is outraged is automatically translate d int o th e subtextua l languag e o f th e law , an d hence is understood t o mean merely that the speake r disagrees with some other person's view of a matter. All this mimicr y of legal affect an d it s accompanying language is, in part, a product of the remarkabl e romanticism that surrounds the cultural ideal of law in American society. The Solomoni c judge, the passionate defens e attorney , th e stout-hearte d juror : thes e ar e th e figures tha t dominate the American idealization of law: these are th e cultural representation s of legality that hel p produce that profound fascination wit h la w s o characteristi c o f bot h elit e an d popula r American culture . Th e breathles s analysis of all things Simpso n on Geraldo Rivera' s nightl y televisio n show i s i n it s symboli c essence replicated b y th e equall y starry-eye d reportag e o f th e lates t join t plurality opinio n fro m th e Suprem e Cour t foun d ami d th e staid , solemn page s o f th e Ne w York Times. Thi s romanti c visio n o f la w overlooks or ignore s th e fac t tha t American courts ar e now gigantic bureaucracies, processin g mor e tha n 30,000,00 0 lawsuit s pe r year , with all the attendant evils that mark enormous, anonymous government instituti s more or less run b y a permanent mandarin class of faceless functionaries. Needless t o sa y this boo k ha s not bee n a n argument for anarchy. Too often , debate s abou t th e America n lega l syste m tak e plac e within a context in which doubters are assured both tha t our system is "the bes t in the world " (such assurances tend t o com e fro m high status lawyer s who kno w next to nothin g abou t an y other lega l system), an d tha t th e alternativ e t o "th e rul e o f law" is contemporar y Bosnia or Lebanon, o r some other chaotic corne r o f the globe . Th e Federal Rule s of Civil Procedur e o r a Hobbesian wa r o f al l against all: such i s the "choice " usually presented t o u s by American rule of law ideology. But of course th e rea l argument isn't abou t whether la w is a goo d or a bad thing . Wate r i s without doub t a good thing ; indeed som e significant amoun t o f th e substanc e i s a preconditio n o f lif e itself . Too much water, however, and we drown. It i s certainly true tha t in regard to la w some contemporary soci eties resembl e th e Sahara . Thi s i s no t America' s problem. Indeed ,

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much o f our societ y lies full fatho m five beneath th e chopp y sea s of the America n lega l system ; othe r part s ar e barel y keepin g thei r heads above water; while those tha t remai n safel y ensconce d o n th e ever-shrinking mainlan d eye the advancin g tide with a nervous mix ture of uncertainty an d suspicion. That suspicio n i s wel l warrante d b y th e numerou s excesse s o f American legality: by an obsessive proceduralism that often seems to amount t o a belief in process fo r it s own sake ; by the system' s con tinual productio n an d increasingl y chaoti c interpretatio n o f a n almost unlimited quantity of massive, procrustean lega l documents , monuments t o textua l hypertroph y tha t hardl y anyon e eve n pre tends ar e coherent o r consistentl y understandable; by its belief that it i s possibl e t o bot h produc e comprehensiv e regulator y regimes , and t o predic t accuratel y the effect s o f essentially ad hoc lega l decision making; by its often irrational worship of reason in general and technocratic rationalit y in particular ; an d b y it s accompanyin g an d rationally inexplicabl e faith i n th e mora l perspicacit y of tha t small group o f career bureaucrats called judges. What wil l eventuall y resul t fro m suc h excesses ? What, i f any thing, ca n be don e abou t them ? Among such speculativ e meander ings my argument concludes . The Disappearin g Railroad Blue s At th e tur n o f th e twentiet h centur y th e mos t powerfu l grou p o f corporations in America was that made up of the great railroad con cerns. Havin g at las t linke d the vas t space s of the nascen t natio n together wit h th e completio n o f th e transcontinenta l rai l line , th e railroads directl y controlle d mos t o f the interstat e trad e acros s th e entire Unite d States , an d henc e controlled , directl y an d indirectly , much o f the politica l proces s tha t touche d o n tha t trade . Th e for tunes o f suc h me n a s Cornelius Vanderbil t and Jay Goul d wer e s o large tha t the y coul d b y themselves manipulat e th e movement s o f entire financial markets; an d th e estate s th e railroa d barons buil t as tributes t o thei r socia l eminenc e an d politica l powe r rivale d any thing t o b e foun d i n th e ancien t principalitie s o f Europe , whic h

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indeed the y proceede d t o plunde r fo r th e choices t ar t tha t lov e o r money coul d extract fro m th e ol d and rotting world. So omnipotent di d these magnate s and their companie s seem that many a private fortune was passed down through trust s that required the investmen t o f their principa l in nothing bu t railroa d stocks. Fo r nothing, surely , coul d b e mor e certai n tha n th e continue d domi nance of such brilliant entrepreneurs an d their all-powerfu l firms. Yet within jus t a generatio n o r tw o al l thi s wa s i n ruins . B y th e second hal f of this centur y th e grea t America n railroads had almos t without exceptio n eithe r gon e bankrupt , bee n absorbe d b y othe r conglomerates, o r been reduce d to various conditions of financial ill health. What circumstances le d to suc h a complete fal l fro m grace ? Thirty-five year s ago , a famou s cas e study i n th e Harvard Business Review gave a compelling accoun t o f what happened. The cas e study demonstrated tha t the railroads ha d fallen victim t o a classic erro r of self-understanding, t o whic h especiall y successfu l institution s ar e prone: the y ha d forgotte n th e tru e natur e o f th e socia l need thei r particular institution wa s in the busines s of fulfilling . The railroa d corporation s ha d mad e th e understandabl e bu t i n the lon g ru n fata l mistak e of thinking the y wer e i n th e busines s of providing railroads, whe n i n fac t thei r tru e economi c an d socia l function wa s t o provid e transportation. I n othe r words , thei r ver y success blinded the railroad s to th e contingen t feature s of that suc cess in the satisfaction of the underlying social needs their enterprise depended on. The railroad s had simply defined thei r social and eco nomic nich e a t to o lo w a leve l o f abstraction . Fo r eve n a t th e moment of these firms' greatest financial, political, an d social emi nence entrepeneur s suc h a s Henry Ford , th e Wrigh t brothers , an d others lik e the m wer e bus y wit h project s tha t woul d soo n remin d everyone tha t it is always possible to find more tha n on e way to ge t from her e t o there cheapl y and quickly. What does th e fat e o f the railroad s have to d o with th e futur e o f the America n legal system? After all , in many ways "the rul e of law" is t o American s what , fo r example , caf e a u lait , bicycl e races , Voltaire, an d simila r cultural artifact s ar e to th e French : tha t thin g that make s us what we are. America, perhaps uniquely among grea t

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nations, ha s a publi c culture tha t relie s fo r muc h o f its identit y o n the particula r structur e o f the current politica l regime. Tr y to imagine the Unite d States , like most ordinar y modern nations , choosin g to formall y adop t a significantl y differen t syste m o f governmen t from wha t we hav e at present . I t i s difficul t t o do . A s parochial as our ow n peculiar concept o f the rul e of law may be, we nevertheless know o r sens e that thi s concep t i s in man y ways identica l with th e constitutive ideolog y of our public political culture. All o f whic h i s t o sa y it i s very difficul t fo r American s t o accep t that an y lega l syste m i s a t botto m merel y a comple x networ k o f politically agreed on norms of conduct. "Th e law " is a grandiloquent term fo r somethin g tha t woul d mor e accuratel y b e calle d "socia l coordination an d disput e processing: " how , a s it were , t o ge t fro m here to there o n certain parts of the socia l and cultural map. Indeed, the semantics of the word "law" provid e a good example of the ways in which th e structur e o f our languag e can influence ou r basi c per ception o f reality . Clums y a s i t is , th e phras e "socia l coordinatio n and disput e processing " isn' t fraugh t wit h th e portentou s cultura l baggage o f "law, " resonating a s that wor d doe s wit h echoe s o f ou r deepest theological, tautological , and scientific beliefs (God's law, the laws o f mathematics , th e la w of gravity , and s o forth) . Perhap s th e word la w itself play s an importan t rol e i n ou r tendenc y t o confus e the process of making up a bunch of rules to help us muddle through the conflict s and complexities of social life wit h the altogethe r mor e grandiose projects evoked by that awesom e signifier. A system of social coordination an d dispute processing i s just that: it isn' t a n adequat e secula r substitut e fo r religion , o r eve n fo r th e impure uncertaintie s o f politica l life . Ye t wit h th e contemporar y collapse amon g America n cultura l elite s o f bot h traditionall y reli gious an d overtl y politica l form s o f metaphysica l belief , ou r la w tends mor e an d more to becom e both th e patriotis m o f the deraci nated an d the de facto fait h o f the apostate. Hence the tacit ideolog y of America n civi c lif e ha s becom e burdene d wit h th e widesprea d delusion that something calle d "th e rul e o f law" can succeed wher e politics and culture fail . In Americ a toda y wha t I hav e calle d th e juridica l saturatio n o f

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reality become s mor e an d mor e o f a fac t o f dail y life . An d no t merely i n America : i n Europe , fo r example , the particula r politica l and socia l culture s o f mor e tha n a doze n nation s ar e bein g swal lowed u p b y tha t monumen t t o th e pretension s o f technocrati c rationality, th e Europea n Union . Al l over th e so-calle d develope d world, la w i s manifestin g itsel f a s a kin d o f cultura l madness , whereby hyperrational mode s o f decision making are employed i n a vain attemp t t o resolv e rationall y wha t ar e rationall y irresolvabl e moral an d political conflicts. Yet in this regard as in so many others th e United State s remains a cultural leader. For instance , to visit California—that contemporary epicenter o f everythin g th e worl d think s o f a s American—is to b e struck b y ho w thi s o f al l place s has becom e a juridically saturated space. Whereve r on e turn s i n th e publi c for a o f tha t problemati c Eden elaborat e legal texts silently blare at the citizenry , giving the m "notice" o f this , warnin g o f th e hazard s o f that : prohibitin g an d requiring, admonishin g and advising . Indeed i n th e mids t o f an idle afternoon I have found myself wondering what it must be like to be a pregnan t woma n i n th e lan d o f th e acacia , wher e i t seem s ever y public plac e feature s som e textua l reminde r o f al l th e potentiall y damaging thing s suc h wome n ar e prohibite d fro m doin g t o thos e entities the y nevertheles s retai n a constitutionally guarantee d righ t to "terminate. " For my part, it is true I once anointed my body in the voluptuous surf o f Zuma Beach , on a day when th e re d flags prohibiting swim ming ble w rigi d i n th e Sant a Ana wind. Still , I hav e been thanke d for no t smokin g b y Kenneth, a purveyor o f Chilean se a bass served with organicall y grown vegetables in a Healthmark-approved crea m sauce, infuse d wit h a hint of cilantro; I have not drive n in the com muter lan e or presumed O . J. Simpso n to be anything bu t innocent until prove n guilty ; I haven' t importe d produc e bearin g Mediterranean fruit flies, or operated a motor vehicle that failed t o meet th e most rigorous of current emissio n standards ; and I have, to th e bes t of m y knowledge , respecte d everyone' s judiciall y guarantee d right s to b e treate d equall y i n al l matter s withou t regar d t o race , color , creed, ethni c origin , age , gender , sexua l orientation , marita l o r

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domestic partnershi p arrangements , physica l o r menta l disability , Vietnam-era veterans status, political beliefs, aestheti c handicaps, or habits of personal hygiene. I have, in short, trie d har d to be good. But it i s hard t o b e good i n California. It ma y be that where th e continent run s out manifest destiny becomes especiall y manifest. Or perhaps i t i s jus t th e hypertrophie d natur e o f everythin in tha t extreme land . For whateve r reason, it is in Californi a tha t American cultural tendencies ten d t o bloom i n their mos t virulent form . Here in Californi a on e get s th e cleares t glimps e o f ho w America , th e beautiful, unique country, i s being slowly strangled by its own obsessive wil l towar d lega l perfectionism ; towar d gettin g i t "right" ; toward "solving " throug h juridica l interventio n al l moral, political, and cultural problems, no matter how insoluble those problems may actually be. The hypertrophie d rationalis m o f American la w i s a produc t o f trying to o har d t o b e good : o f failing t o accep t that la w is always a somewhat crud e an d potentiall y destructiv e socia l steering mecha nism, tha t work s bes t when i t remains a tacit presence in the socia l background. Instea d we Americans insist on subjectin g ourselves to a dictatorship o f the bureaucratic : one in which the answe r to ever y important socia l conflic t inevitably involve s mor e rule s an d proce dures, mor e right s an d obligations, mor e "reasons " an d "principle d justifications" give n i n th e cours e o f constructin g ever-mor e com plex analyti c an d rhetorica l circle s fo r choosin g t o d o thi s rathe r than that—in brief, more law. I writ e thes e sentence s o n th e firs t da y o f th e Oklahom a Cit y bombing trial: a trial that seems certain to last for several months (of course an y appellat e process arisin g out o f it i s likel y t o tak e many years.)* Is there an y good reaso n t o believ e the vast social resource s Timothy McVeigh's tria l laste d thre e months. I n al l that time , hi s lawyers man aged t o produc e essentiall y n o exculpator y evidenc e tha t migh t hav e eve n begu n t o counterbalance th e government' s overwhelmingl y redundan t demonstratio n o f thei r client's guilt ; the y did , however , bil l th e America n publi c approximatel y $10,000,00 0 for thei r services . I t say s somethin g abou t wha t w e hav e com e t o expec t o f our la w that the McVeigh trial has been haile d a s a paragon o f expeditiousness an d efficiency .

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being devoted t o this and similar juridica l inquisition s produce better (more just , mor e accurate ) results tha n woul d a well-designed se t of more modes t proceeding s eac h lasting , say , a week ? Exactl y wha t benefits are the American people supposed to be receiving when the y so graciously foo t th e ver y considerable bil l resulting fro m ou r lega l system's obsessive devotion t o what it calls "the rul e of law"? In it s pursui t o f suc h underinvestigate d question s thi s boo k ha s suggested tha t much of the baroqu e complexity of modern America n law represents wha t is at best a wasteful multiplicatio n of transactio n costs, an d at worst a symptom o f a species of institutionalized mental illness. There can be little doubt that, fo r most of our legal establish ment, thi s ide a i s almos t literall y unthinkable. Afte r all , a critiqu e cannot eve n begin t o be heard without som e minima l willingness t o consider th e possibl e truth of its claims. And, given the curren t cul tural dominanc e o f America n rul e o f la w ideology , th e ide a tha t much of the basi c structure o f American law might b e a pointless o r even pathological outgrowt h o f various rationalist delusion s i s likely to be dismissed out o f hand as nothing les s than bizarre . The sacro sanct status of law in American culture may well ensure that , fo r th e orthodox lega l mind , a sincer e engagemen t wit h an y fundamenta l criticism o f the legal system i s simply not a n option. Indeed, th e America n lega l establishmen t ofte n seem s t o trea t "going t o law " almos t a s i f thi s wer e a goo d thin g i n an d o f itself. From thi s perspective , th e extensiv e employmen t o f th e lega l process i s no t merel y necessary , bu t actuall y desirable . No w w e should not e tha t t o criticiz e th e implici t foundationa l axio m o f American legal ideology, that is, "more law = good/less la w = bad," is not t o criticiz e la w per se. No one , fo r example , is likely to tak e th e observation tha t armie s an d hospital s ar e i n a sense necessar y evil s as a criticism o f the medica l o r militar y arts. Still , imagine a cultur e in whic h doctor s though t chemotherap y wa s s o wonderfu l the y encouraged peopl e t o undergo treatmen t whethe r the y were sick or not, o r i n whic h general s routinel y san g paean s t o trenc h warfar e and saturatio n bombing . Ye t more tha n on e prominen t America n legal academic has questioned th e desirabilit y of out-of-court settle ments, o n the ground tha t suc h settlements depriv e the lega l system

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of opportunitie s t o mak e mor e law ! (Suc h suggestion s provid e ye t more evidenc e o f how th e America n lega l elit e ha s much th e sam e orientation towar d la w that McDonald's ha s toward hamburgers — and fo r many of the sam e reasons. ) Another centra l them e o f this boo k ha s been tha t th e excesse s of American rul e o f la w ideolog y ar e i n larg e par t enable d b y ou r unwillingness to accept that reason, when properly employed, works to mak e its further employmen t superfluous . Reason, that is , works ironically toward it s ow n effacement . Whe n i t work s well, it take s the reasoner t o a point i n the decisio n process where the use of reason no longe r helps . In thi s regar d la w is, as we have seen, paradig matic. Henc e "lega l reasoning " work s wel l precisel y t o th e exten t that w e ar e no t consciou s o f it s presence . Outsid e a lega l equilib rium zon e law tends t o be both a n invisible and a powerful facto r in the maintenanc e of social cohesion. By contrast within suc h a zone the inevitabl e contradictions i n th e lega l rule s suc h situation s pro duce ar e clearl y visible, and a s a consequence th e rule s themselve s are rendered relativel y useless. Faced with such legal and social con tradictions, w e cannot decid e efficiently processe d lega l disputes o n the basi s of "reason." W e merely decide. The essentia l fallacy of legal rationalism is thus to think that what works well in moderatio n wil l work eve n bette r i n larg e doses . S o deep i s thi s belie f tha t whe n th e mor e extrem e manifestation s of legal reason fai l altogethe r w e tend t o manifest a willful blindnes s to this failure , o r w e undertake wha t soo n becom e pervers e effort s t o perfect system s o f rule s that , b y th e natur e o f th e problem s the y address, can' t b e perfected. Whe n neithe r o f these strategie s wor k we do what courts ofte n d o and simply indulge in magical thinking , assuming, fo r example , that becaus e a cour t end s it s opinio n wit h the phras e "i t i s so ordered, " "it " i s both goin g t o happen , an d t o produce a series of predictable social effects . Just a s thi s boo k ha s no t bee n a n argumen t fo r an y particula r political o r socia l theory , i t ha s als o no t argue d agains t "reason, " whatever tha t word migh t b e thought t o mean . Rather , i t ha s tried to remin d reader s o f bot h th e limitation s o f al l modes o f rationa l inquiry, and of how at some point the pursui t of reasoned judgmen t

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becomes no t merely inefficient, but actually irrational . Consider one last example : we might compar e th e diminishin g marginal utility of what i s calle d "lega l reasoning " t o th e tim e an d labo r investe d i n cleaning a hous e whe n guest s ar e goin g t o visit . Suppos e tha t i n forty-five minute s th e hous e ca n b e mad e quit e presentable ; while three hour s ar e require d t o achiev e somethin g Marth a Stewar t would applaud. Now argument s about whether we should spend one or tw o o r thre e hour s cleanin g th e hous e ca n b e assimilate d to a rational choic e mode l o f huma n decisio n making ; tha t is , w e ca n argue in such a context abou t whether i t makes sense to spen d twice as much time on the projec t to get th e hous e 1 0 percent cleaner . By contrast, a decision t o spen d fort y hour s cleanin g the hous e canno t be analyze d usefully fro m within a framework that assume s rational choice. Indeed , suc h behavio r i s evidenc e o f somethin g els e alto gether: o f a wil l t o a kin d o f obsessive-compulsiv e excess , whos e excessive characte r i s not onl y inefficient , bu t wil l actuall y end u p doing damage to the object s of its attention . This book has argued that, in sufficiently comple x decisional situations, rational analysis calls for arational decision making. This fairl y elementary insigh t flies in th e fac e o f th e America n belief in cadre s of "experts, " speciall y gifte d person s wh o wil l suppl y answer s unavailable to the rest of us. We buy more book s than the rest of the world combine d tellin g us how to flatte n our stomach s an d improve our careers ; advisin g u s ho w t o mak e love , an d i n wha t way s w e should rais e ou r children ; book s whos e gli b author s assur e u s they can tell us how to dea l with our childhood tragedie s and adult addictions, an d who promis e us psychologica l self-actualization , personal happiness, and spiritual enlightenment i n seven easy steps. Naturall y we then turn t o la w as a source o f political an d mora l expertise, an d just a s naturall y becom e infuriate d wit h lawyer s when the y revea l themselves as having no more insight into such matters than anyon e else. Nevertheless muc h lik e Charlie Brown , running onc e agai n to kick the football that, every autumn, Lucy yanks away at the last pos sible moment, w e keep coming bac k for more—ignoring th e eviden t absurdity o f expectin g court s t o giv e compellin g o r eve n adequat e reasons for accepting o r rejecting this or that answer to some funda mental moral question o n which we ourselves cannot agree .

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Because o f suc h rationalis t excesse s the America n lega l syste m i s in some danger of being treated as roughly b y the comin g decades as the grea t America n railroad s wer e treate d b y th e centur y tha t ha s almost passed. American law, that is, may well find itself betrayed b y its own overweening prid e in having succeeded in its quest t o brin g so muc h o f America n lif e unde r it s sway . As a consequenc e o f th e legal system's increasing tendency to den y the tru e natur e of its cru cial bu t relativel y modest rol e a s a socia l coordinatio n an d disput e processing mechanism , our la w is becoming so elaborate, so hyper trophied, s o pointlessly complex , and hence so unnecessarily expensive that alternate modes of getting from here t o there o n the social map ar e already springing up al l around us . Accountants ar e taking over th e ta x business ; insuranc e companie s ar e eliminatin g rea l estate titl e searches ; private firms are setting u p thei r ow n modes of dispute processing; mediation and arbitration service s o f every kin d are booming . An d o f cours e variou s militan t ideologie s o f th e fa r right serv e a s disconcertin g reminder s o f ho w considerabl y mor e radical form s o f dissen t agains t wha t i s calle d th e rul e o f la w ar e already simmering. Such nascen t rebellion s agains t law' s empir e ar e thu s t o som e extent product s o f law' s ow n success . Th e curren t cultura l domi nance o f legal mode s o f thought—the belie f that politica l an d ethical decisions are legitimate only t o th e exten t the y can be crammed into th e conceptua l categorie s o f legal reasoning—helps reinforce a legal culture in which other modes of decision making are treated as degraded versions of law, rather tha n as potentially valuable alternatives to law' s imperialisti c grasp . Indeed , partiall y becaus e of the desire t o contro l th e cultura l powe r i t wields , th e categor y o f law itself ha s i n recen t decade s ofte n bee n reduce d eve n furthe r t o encompass no more tha n th e legal process ideology o f one particula r generation o f judges, lawyers, and law professors. It is as if the entir e category o f transportation cam e to mean only "automobiles, " whic h in turn wa s usually understood t o mean only Buick Skylarks. Under suc h cultura l condition s w e coul d anticipat e tha t Buic k Skylarks would get extraordinarily expensive. That, in the short run , would b e good fo r Genera l Motor s bu t ba d for America. Bu t in th e long run, th e onerous price of these particular car s would itsel f begin

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to corrod e th e ideologica l underpinning s o f the narro w conceptio n of transportation , an d consequentl y peopl e woul d star t lookin g fo r other ways to travel. The initia l reaction to this development on the part of those who had profited from th e narrow conception woul d be to claim that driving nothing bu t Buick Skylarks was integral t o ou r national concept o f transportation. I t woul d be said that the notio n of drivin g a For d o r a Chrysle r wa s contrar y t o fundamenta l American value s (a s for travelin g b y bicycle th e ver y idea would b e dismissed ou t o f hand, given that it involved a blatant contradictio n in terms). Suc h delegitimation strategies migh t work for a time , bu t eventually either the pric e of Skylarks would have to come down, or Buick would find itself teetering on the brink of extinction. Will what is now calle d the rul e of law go th e wa y of the rul e of the railroads ? Today, surrounded a s we are b y an anarchic panopti con o f rules, and moving as we do throug h a n ever-more juridically saturated social space, the very question may seem absurd. Yet when we remembe r wha t Joseph Schumpete r calle d thos e "gust s o f cre ative destruction" b y which advanced capitalism reshapes the world, and when we add to thi s the (closel y related) theme of regenerative pragmatism tha t ha s characterize d much o f America n history, w e should als o recal l tha t thi s centur y ha s alread y witnessed th e de struction of many proud and apparently immutable institutions and ideologies whos e demis e ha s lef t behin d littl e trac e o f wha t onc e seemed their unassailable social power. Great locomotive s tha t onc e annihilated th e endles s miles of wheat fields shimmering across ou r northern plains , their whistles piercing the dar k veil of humid summer night s wit h a heartrending shriek, are toda y remembered onl y by rusted-out track s hidden amid the tal l prairie grass: iron rails on a long road to nowhere. The Wa y of Renunciation What the n i s t o b e done ? Give n th e argumen t o f thi s boo k an y answer t o tha t questio n risk s fallin g unde r th e spel l o f th e sam e rationalist illusion s th e argumen t ha s described . La w i s in it s own

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way as habit-forming a s cocaine, an d thus I— a lawyer—ca n hardly claim immunit y fro m th e temptatio n t o outlin e gran d reform s and definitive solutions , t o recommen d five-par t test s an d twelve-ste p plans: "Hello my name is____ , and I'm a jurismaniac." What is the solution t o breaking our addiction t o solutions? This is ou r paradox . Perhaps we ca n fin d th e answe r b y renouncing th e search for answers. The hypertrophie d rationalis m o f America n la w is a produc t o f trying t o undertak e forma l analysi s in a lega l system withi n which any real commitment t o formalis m has broken down ; of attemptin g to reac h accurat e empirica l conclusion s withou t anythin g lik e th e necessary data; and of engaging in covert moral theorizing without a moral theory. O f course th e rationalis t response to intimations tha t any of this might b e the cas e is to tos s oil on the fire: we must con struct a bette r justificatio n fo r honorin g forma l rules ; w e mus t invent ne w methodologies fo r gatherin g th e necessar y facts ; we are morally obliged t o discove r an adequate moral theory. Might ther e be a better way? The Federa l Land Polic y an d Management Act , Pub. L . 94-579 , 90 Stat. 2743, codified a t 43 U.S.C. sections 1701-178 4 (1982), pro vided tha t holder s o f variou s minin g claim s t o federa l lan d wer e required "prio r t o Decembe r 31 " of every year to file certain documents with th e relevan t governmen t agencie s o r los e their claims . Predictably, a numbe r o f clai m holder s file d thei r claim s o n December 3 1 itself. The federa l governmen t denie d the validit y of the claims on the ground th e claim holders had missed the statutor y deadline; the claim holders then sue d the government . What wil l a rationalis t analysi s o f thi s straightforwar d conflic t entail? (An d note agai n how this case, like most o f the case s we have glanced at , is in most respects a remarkably uncomplicated legal dispute. If reason fail s t o provide convincing answers in this sort of circumstance, ho w wil l i t far e whe n face d wit h mor e comple x forma l and empirical ambiguities?) We can anticipate that a legal actor wh o wants th e governmen t t o win will try to sho w th e la w requires th e "plain meaning" o f the statutory deadlin e to be enforced. This con -

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elusion will then be supported by more or less sophisticated formal ist arguments to th e effec t tha t th e statute' s languag e simply means what i t appear s to mean , by empirical assertion s tha t thi s resul t is what th e legislatur e intended, and b y instrumental claim s that an y other outcom e woul d hav e various bad consequence s fo r th e pre dictability of legal rules, for federa l lan d managemen t policies, an d so on. A legal actor who wants the plaintiff s t o win will support tha t position b y making more o r les s sophisticated anti-formalis t arguments abou t understandin g th e statute' s meanin g i n th e prope r interpretive context , b y empirical assertions that thi s resul t i s what the legislatur e intended, and b y instrumental claim s that an y othe r outcome woul d hav e ba d consequence s fo r th e rationalit y of legal rules, fo r th e protectio n o f citizens ' fundamenta l propert y right s against government encroachment, and so forth. Notice tha t despit e th e straightforwar d natur e o f thi s dispute , these respective rationalist analyses will turn ou t t o be quite expensive. They will necessitate sifting through heaps of legislative history and labyrinth s of administrativ e regulations; an d the y wil l requir e the lawyer s and judge s involved in th e cas e t o spen d considerabl e time constructing , deploying , an d evaluatin g thos e mor e o r les s sophisticated formal , empirical , and moral arguments. To what end? Will the resolution of this dispute produce a formal rule of legal interpretation tha t will itself determine or a t least usefully predic t the outcom e o f similar interpretive disputes ? Will th e process of resolution produce convincing evidence of what some significant portio n o f the 53 5 members of the U.S . Congres s though t about this matter, thus allowing us to do the positive will of the leg islature? Wil l tha t resolutio n resul t i n bot h sufficientl y predictabl e and adequately justified instrumenta l or ethical consequences? The disput e resolutio n proces s isn' t goin g t o accomplis h an y of these things . Attempts t o limi t the interpretatio n o f legal meaning to some formal o r intentionalist construct ca n never succeed, if only because over a range of disputes there will always be compelling reasons t o follo w a variety of interpretive approaches . The searc h fo r legislative inten t itsel f wil l usuall y involve som e questio n o f suc h conceptual complexity or bureaucratic obscurity that the interprete r

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will at best be able to discover that fe w or no member s of the legis lature eve r considere d an y suc h question . Attempt s t o produc e definitive instrumenta l o r deontologica l reason s for decidin g a diffi cult case in a particular fashion ar e equally hopeless, both becaus e of the practica l impossibility of making accurate predictions abou t th e likely instrumenta l outcome s o f particula r lega l decisions , an d because of the theoretica l impossibilit y of producing, within a n eth ically pluralist culture suc h a s our own , compelling mora l justifica tions fo r politicall y controversial results. But surely, the rationalis t ideologue asserts, we must decid e legal disputes o n th e basi s o f goo d reasons . Why ? Becaus e rationalis t dogma declares such a rationally justified decisio n necessary and we, indulging in a fairly spectacular non sequitur , assume such a decision is therefor e possible ? Thi s mani a fo r giving reasons i s th e ver y essence of jurismaniacal excess, and indee d is the sourc e o f our cul ture's irrational addiction to "reason" in general. There is a wonderful sketc h by the Monty Pytho n comedy troupe called "Th e Roya l Societ y fo r Puttin g Thing s o n To p o f Othe r Things." The Roya l Societ y fo r Puttin g Thing s o n To p o f Othe r Things meet s annuall y to evaluat e the performanc e o f the group' s membership i n th e carryin g ou t o f th e Society' s missio n ove r th e course o f th e previou s year . A t th e beginnin g o f th e sketc h th e President o f the Society calls the meeting to order and notes tha t he himself, o n his way to this very meeting, noticed several thing s not on to p o f othe r things . Thi s announcemen t i s me t b y crie s o f "Shame, shame!" which the President calms by pointing ou t that "if there were not on e thin g tha t was not o n to p o f some other thing , we would be nothing bu t a meaningless group of men who gathere d together fo r no goo d purpose. " The n follo w th e reports o f several chapters ("ou r Australasia n chapter , an d variou s group s affiliate d with th e Australasia n chapter, hav e i n th e las t year place d n o les s than twenty-two thing s o n top o f other things" ) that continu e unti l the representativ e o f the Staffordshir e chapter causes a sensation by admitting tha t his group ha s failed t o place a single thin g on to p of some othe r thing . Whe n aske d b y th e Presiden t t o explai n thi s extraordinary behavior, the representativ e replie s meekly , "Well sir ,

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it's jus t tha t mos t o f th e member s i n Staffordshir e fee l th e whol e thing's a bit silly, " to which the outrage d Presiden t responds , "Silly? What do you mean, silly ? H m .. . I suppose i t is, a bit. What have we bee n doin g wastin g ou r live s with al l this nonsense? " (Genera l cries of "Hear, hear." ) "Righ t then . Meeting adjourne d forever." It should be obvious the Legal Society for Giving Rationally Com pelling Reason s isn' t goin g t o b e adjournin g any tim e soon . Th e most w e can hop e fo r i s that som e wa y might b e foun d to mak e its meetings a little shorter, an d th e caterin g bil l a little less . Here the n is my own tentative contribution towar d tha t more modes t goal . Law is suffering. Suffering arises from the desire to get it right. Rid yourself of that desire and rid yourself of suffering. To eliminate the desire meditate on these other truths. We migh t cal l this "th e wa y of renunciation." Fo r i n law, the desir e to find the right answe r is always inflamed precisel y by our failur e t o do an y such thing . When th e holder s o f mining claim s o n federa l lands file their claim s fo r 199 6 o n Septembe r 21 , 1996 , o r January 18, 1997, we feel no desire to find the right legal answer to the ques tion of whether thei r claim s are valid because that answe r is already clear. I t i s whe n th e la w cannot giv e u s a n answe r tha t w e wil l demand i t d o so . The attemp t t o gratif y thi s desir e produce s bot h the excesse s of modern regulator y scheme s an d th e neuroti c struc ture o f appellat e cour t decisio n making . Lik e th e fable d donke y imagined b y the medieva l scholastics, wh o starve s to deat h because he i s exactly equidistant fro m tw o stack s o f hay and therefor e can' t decide rationall y t o whic h stac k he shoul d go , we demand disposi tive reasons for choosing wher e there ar e none. Les s principled tha n Buridan's ass, we then "discover"—a t grea t fiscal and psychologica l expense—some answer that must be arrived at more or less arbitrarily, while still insisting that thi s particular outcome wa s impelled by the law , or legal principles, or reason itself. How then would this way of renunciation deal with the conflic t of

The Wa y o f Renunciation 19

3

the minin g claims ? Shoul d th e apparen t plain meaning of the statu tory deadline be enforced? Answerin g this question rationall y would require comparing th e virtue of enforcing formal certainty (bu t only formal certainty, as we can predict that a deadline that excludes only

the las t da y o f th e yea r wil l b e misrea d t o includ e it ) agains t th e desirability o f enforcin g th e deadlin e th e legislatur e woul d hav e chosen i f its members had in fact considered thi s precise question . I t would als o require considerin g whethe r th e expectatio n interes t o f claim holders wa s a more compellin g ethica l consideration tha n th e potential negativ e effects o n federal land s that might arise from con tinuing t o honor thos e expectations , as well as evaluating what those effects wer e likel y t o be . A trul y comprehensiv e rationa l analysi s would als o attemp t t o tak e int o consideratio n th e possibl e conse quences fo r futur e decisio n making of either appearin g to follow , o r revising throug h "interpretation, " apparentl y clea r bu t rationall y inexplicable legal rules. On th e othe r han d b y recognizin g th e rationa l intractabilit y o f such question s a lega l decisio n make r woul d acknowledg e th e dis pute's presenc e i n a n analyti c equilibrium zone , an d woul d realiz e that th e questio n o f the dispute' s prope r resolutio n wa s not usefull y amenable to more extensiv e rational analysis. The court' s analysi s of the fact s an d it s subsequen t holdin g i n th e cas e migh t the n rea d something lik e this: "Judgment fo r the plaintiff. " Or i f it is simply a cultural imperativ e fo r lega l decisio n maker s t o giv e reason s fo r their decision s th e opinio n migh t read , "Because of the plai n meaning o f the statute' s text , th e claim s fail. " Or , i f you prefer , "Because the legislatur e di d no t inten d t o ba r claim s filed on th e las t da y of the year , th e claim s ar e valid. " I t i s just possibl e that , i f appellat e opinions looke d eve n a little mor e lik e this , lawyer s would b e les s prone to waste socia l resources researching and writing eighty-page briefs tha t attempt t o addres s ever y possible permutation o f a legal argument, o r siftin g throug h th e textua l arcan a of legislatures an d agencies—much o f which i s itself a reaction t o th e excesse s of legal reasoning—in a vai n searc h fo r whateve r scra p o f evidenc e the y hope wil l tip what they imagine to be the exquisitely b nced scale s of juridical judgment.

194 J U R I S M A N I

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As difficult a s it i s for mos t contemporar y lega l thinkers t o imag ine a dispute abou t minin g claim s being disposed o f in thi s fashion , it is quite impossible fo r them t o conceiv e of issues such as abortio n or euthanasi a bein g deal t with alon g similar lines. What legitimacy would courts hav e if they decided such excruciatingly difficult mora l and politica l question s throug h undisguise d act s o f fiat ? Ye t thi s objection overlook s tw o points. First , a s a practical matter, i t is possible that i n the lon g run poorl y disguise d acts of fiat are even mor e corrosive o f perceive d judicia l legitimac y (the y ar e certainl y mor e expensive). More fundamentally, if such momentous question s mus t in the en d b e answered by arational fiat, it is to sa y the leas t unclear why we would wan t courts t o monopoliz e th e busines s o f supplying those answers . O f cours e th e rationalis t demand s not fiat , bu t rea son. Fine— I deman d nonfattenin g ho t fudge , th e lov e o f Um a Thurman, an d th e startin g second-bas e jo b fo r the Detroi t Tigers. We'll se e who waits longer. To paraphras e Samue l Johnson, a man become s a judge to forge t the pai n o f being a man. W e each o f us want t o believ e tha t the act of passin g judgment—of declarin g we "know " affirmativ e actio n i s wrong o r that abortio n i s a constitutional right—someho w removes us from behin d thos e veils of ignorance philosopher s an d kings have struggled s o impotently t o rend . An d yet t o believ e the rationalis t illusions undergirdin g thi s particula r belie f ca n b e swep t asid e through th e persuasiv e forc e o f reasone d argumen t i s itsel f bu t another rationalis t illusion. Still, la w and lega l reason ar e als o th e simulacr a of rea l commu nity. Th e wa y of renunciation i s just on e exampl e of how, here an d there, i t remain s possibl e t o acknowledg e bot h th e strength s an d limitations o f th e la w an d it s reasons . Fo r al l th e hubri s o f law' s empire—for al l th e vanit y o f it s claim s t o kno w wha t canno t b e known of the qualit y of mercy, of justice and injustice, good an d evi l —the invisible law of our ordinar y lives still plays a modest bu t cru cial rol e i n th e maintenanc e o f both ou r politica l communitie s an d our socia l selves. To renounce th e imperia l claims of legal reason we need merel y remembe r wha t s o muc h o f ou r cultur e conspire s t o make u s forget : tha t i n al l trut h w e hav e neithe r see n th e tre e o f knowledge, nor yet tasted of its strange and bitter fruit .

Index

Abdul-Rauf, Mahmoud, 3-4, 12-1 3 Abortion, 67-68 , 73-74, 114-16 , 152-53, 158-62, 194 ACLU, 43-44 Affirmative action , 91, 172-73 , 19 4 Against the Law, 119 Alfalfa's Market, 27-2 9 Allen, David D., 122 Anarchic Panopticon, 46-49 , 188 Anarchy, ix, xii, 47-48, 178 Antichrist, The, 156 Arius, 11 8 Arnold,J. Phillip , 43 Arras, John, 164 Bachelier, Louis, 53 Balanced budge t amendment, 12 9 Beauvior, Simone de, 10 9 Ben & Jerry's, 30,91 , 151-5 2 Bentham, Jeremy, 34-35, 46 Berkeley, Bishop, 139 Berlin, Isaiah, 79-80, 160 Berra, Yogi, 60 Bible, 43-44 Birkett,J., 82-89, 96-99 Black, Max, 105 Boesky, Ivan, 5 6 Bond, James, 10 6

Borges, Jorge Luis, 50 , 145 Brealey, Richard, 52-54 Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 83-84 Brown, Charlie, 18 7 Buddha, The, 4 3 Buffett, Warren , 5 7 Buick Skylarks, 188 Bureaucracy, 5-8, 11 , 36-37, 68, 72, 178, 18 3

Burke, Kenneth, 42 , 121 Burr, Aaron, 21 Calabresi, Guido, 170-71 California, 105-6 , 182-8 3 Callimachus, 148 Case method, 7 8 Chrysler, 18 8 Cigarettes, v , 30-3 1 Clinton, Bill, 122-24 , 17 2 Cohen, Felix, 38 Coke, Lord, 118 College Sports , 5-12 , 50-5 6 Consciousness Explained, 13 9 Constitution and the Pride of Reason, The, 159 Constitution, U.S., 21 , 40-44, 47, 160 , 163-69,72-74,91, 114-1 6 Consumer Reports, 3 0 195

196

Index

Cover, Robert , 16 0 Critical legal studies, 38-39 Dalai Lama, 28 Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 140 , 14 9 Declaration of Independence, 43 Dennett, Daniel, 140-43 , 154-5 5 Dershowitz, Alan , 4 Dole, Robert, 14 , 40 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor , 42 Dworkin, Ronald, 39-40, 113-16 , 161 , 169 Efficient proces s theory, 60-69, 73-7 4 Efficient marke t theory, 52-5 7 Einstein, Albert , 150 Eliot, T. S., 146 Enlightenment, 14 6 Equilibrium zone, 36-37, 62-64, 68-69, 89-90, 96-97, 116 , 160, 163-66, 193 European Union, 182 Evolution, 138-42 , 152-5 4 Farber, Daniel, 35-36, 72 Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 189-9 2 First Amendment , 3-4, 31 , 114-16 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 2 5 Fletcher, George, 9 5 Ford, Henry , 18 0 Ford, 18 8 Foreordained Failure, 11 4 Foucault, Michel , 35 , 118 France, Anatole, 16 Frazer, Si r James, 15 0 Freemen, The, 42-4 4 Fuhrman, Mark , 17 Gambling, 50-57 , 75-76, 79, 122 General Motors, 188 Geoghegan, Thomas , 9 3 Geometry an d Experience, 15 0

Glendon, Mary Ann, 64 Golden Bough, The, 150 Goldfinger, 175 Goldwyn, Samuel, 13 Gould, Jay, 179 Grand Hotel, 3 1 Haagen-Dazs, 30 , 34, 91, 151-5 2 Hannah v. Peel, 82-89, 96-99 Hart, Henry , 20 Harvard Business Review, 180 Harvard La w School , 19 , 64, 172 Hemingway, Ernest, xii, 25 Hollow Hope, The, 92 Holmes, Larry , 17 Holmes, Olive r Wendell, 68, 70, 107, 118 Horowitz, Morton, 72 Hume, David , 139 Hypertrophy, x , 74, 79-80, 81-82, 95, 101, 132 , 179, 183, 187 , 18 9 Independence Day, 14 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 140 Ito, Lance , 22 Jackson, Joe, 56 Jesus, 43 Johnson, Samuel , 194 Joyce, James, 25 Juridical saturation, 3-6, 10 , 29, 31-38 , 177-78, 182-83 , 18 8 Kafka, Franz , ix , 11 Kamisar, Yale, 16 4 Keats, John, 171 Kendall, Maurice, 52 Kennedy, Duncan, 39 Kennedy, Anthony, 71 Kevorkian, Jack, 50 Klein, Richard, ix, 30

Index Kronman, Anthony , 64 Landers, Ann, 125-2 6 Langdell, Christopher Columbus , 11 8 Leff, Arthur , 42, 15 1 Legal reasoning as mental illness, 12-15, 107 , 111 , 167-68, 184 , 192-9 3 Legal process, 19-26 , 187-8 8 Legal authority, 43-46 Legal Realism, 38, 112-13 Legal Process, The, 20 Leviticus, 28 Lewis, C. S., 44 Lewis, Michael, 1 4 Library Code o f Conduct, 129-3 3 Life's Dominion, 114 Llewelyn, Karl, 120 Logical Positivism, 152 Magical thinking, 112-13 , 116 , 124-25 , 129, 132 , 150, 185 Magna Carta, 43 Maistre, Joseph de, 46, 79-80 Mason, Perry, 11 8 MacIntyre, Alasdair , 90, 127 McDonald's, 118 , 177, 185 McVeigh, Timothy, 183-8 4 McVeigh trial , 183-84 Mead, Margaret, 170 Michelangelo, 14 8 Monaghan, Henry , 4 4 Montaigne, 27 Moore, Michael , 29 Moses, 14 8 Myers, Stewart , 52-54 Nagel, Robert , 72 NCAA Constitution , 6-1 2 Negative capability , 171, 174 New Republic, The, 40 New York Times, 3-4, 17 8 New York Review, 114

197

Newton, Isaac , 145 Nicaea, Council of, 118 Nietzche, Friedrich, 48, 81 , 121, 140-41, 151 , 153 156-5 7 Nihilism, xii, 141, 156 Nineteen Eighty-Four, 11 9 Nostradamus, 169 Novalis, 104 Nussbaum, Martha, 155-57, 173-7 4 Obsessions, ix, 10-12, 14 , 20, 133-36 , 179, 183 , 18 6 Orwell, George, 11 9 Osborne, Tom , 50 Our Healthy Boulder Lifestyle, 28-3 1 Out o f the Silent Planet, 44, 13 8 Ozymandis, 103 O'Connor, Sandra Day, 71 O'Shea v. Riverway Towing, 99-101 Panopticon, 34-3 5 Physician-assisted suicide, 162-71 , 19 4 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 67-68, 73-74, 115 , 165 Political fundraising, 10 Posner, Richard , 36, 38, 64, 68, 90, 99-101, 115-16 , 17 2 Qaadi, 48 Quill v. Vacco, 163-6 8 Quine, W.V.O. , 15 1 Railroads, 179-81 , 187 Rationalism, 37, 41, 57, 64-65, 72-73, 87,98-99, 136-37 , 138-50 , 158-62 , 168, 173 , 183-85, 189-92 , 194 Rawls, John, 6 4 Reason, x, 36, 51-57, 64 , 68-72, 75-76 , 79, 90-91, 99-101, 116 , 148 , 150 , 156-57, 160-61 , 166 , 170-73 , 185-86, 191 , 193 Rediscovery o f the Mind, The, 139, 143-44

198

Index

Riefenstahl, Leni, 29 Rieff, Philip , 127 Rivera, Geraldo, 17 8 Rodell, Fred, 38 Roev. Wade, 11 5 Roger and Me, 29 Rosenberg, Gerald , 92 Royal Society for Putting Things on Top of Other Things, The, 191-9 2 Rule of law, 18-26 , 39 , 44, 118 , 129-32, 178, 180-81 , 184 , 187 Rules and standards, 88-90 Russell, Bertrand, 140 Ryder, Winona, 3 1 Sacks, Albert, 20 Sagan, Carl, 142-43 , 148-4 9 Sawada v . Endo, 107-13 , 117-1 8 Schlag, Pierre, 66, 119 Schumpeter, Joseph, 188 Searle,John, 67, 75, 138-4 3 Seng-Ts'an, 17 5 Simpson, O. J., si, 17-18 , 22, 178, 182 Slavery, 41, 173-7 4 Smith, Steven D., 114 , 154 Socrates, xi Soper, Philip, 45 Sorites problem, 165-6 6 Soros, George , 57 Souter, David, 71 South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 83 Sowell, Thomas, 172-7 3 Stalin, Joseph, 41, 165 Stewart, Martha, 186

Sunstein, Cass , 160, 162 Supervenience, 155 Szasz, Thomas, 107 , 127 Taboo, 15 5 Tacitus, 3 Talmud, 14 8 Taylor, Morry, 175 Tenancy by the entireties, 107-1 3 Therapy, 125-2 9 Thurman, Uma , 31, 194 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 9 Twilight o f the Idols, 15 6 Typical liberal legal academic, A (ATLLA), 20-25 Ulysses, 2 5 Unamuno, Miguel de, 160 Uniform Commercial Code, 9 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 179 Voltaire, 18 1 War o n drugs, 92, 122-2 5 Warren, Earl, 79 Warren Court, 20 , 47 Weber, Max, 5 West, Robin, 160-62 Which Side Are Yo u On?, 93-94 White, E . B., 31 Will to Process, 8-9 , 2 4 William of Occam, 118 Wittgenstein, Ludwig , 65, 118 , 144 Wright Brothers, 18 0 Yeats, W. B. , 149 , 151