cover
next page >
Cover
title: author: publisher: isbn10 | asin: print isbn13: ebook isbn13: language: subject
publ...
119 downloads
751 Views
2MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
cover
next page >
Cover
title: author: publisher: isbn10 | asin: print isbn13: ebook isbn13: language: subject
publication date: lcc: ddc: subject:
Japan and Asia Pacific Integration : Pacific Romances 1968-1996 Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series Korhonen, Pekka. Taylor & Francis Routledge 0415180015 9780415180016 9780203021859 English gtt--Economische integratie, Asia-Economic integration, Pacific Area-Economic integration, Japan--Foreign economic relations. 1998 HC412.K65 1998eb 337.1/9 gtt--Economische integratie, Asia-Economic integration, Pacific Area-Economic integration, Japan--Foreign economic relations.
cover
next page >
< previous page
page_i
next page >
Page i Japan and Asia Pacific Integration The long-cherished Pacific age is nearly upon us. The emergence of the Pacific as an economic competitor to the West had taken place alongside a process of integration based on trade and investment, and has been accompanied by political discourse celebrating the region’s strength. Japan and Asia Pacific Integration is a study of regional integration in the greater Pacific area between 1968 and 1996. It examines the political rationale of such international organizations as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). There is a focus on Japanese conceptions of regionalism and integration, but the attitudes of other countries such as the United States, Malaysia and China are also explored. Pekka Korhonen shows how the stories and narratives of success have generated a rationale for the continuing economic and political integration of the Asia pacific. His clear and accessible approach will be welcomed by all those wishing to understand a crucial process in a rapidly changing region of such obvious importance. Pekka Korhonen is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. His previous work includes Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area, also published by Routledge.
< previous page
page_i
next page >
cover
next page >
Cover
title: author: publisher: isbn10 | asin: print isbn13: ebook isbn13: language: subject
publication date: lcc: ddc: subject:
Japan and Asia Pacific Integration : Pacific Romances 1968-1996 Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series Korhonen, Pekka. Taylor & Francis Routledge 0415180015 9780415180016 9780203021859 English gtt--Economische integratie, Asia-Economic integration, Pacific Area-Economic integration, Japan--Foreign economic relations. 1998 HC412.K65 1998eb 337.1/9 gtt--Economische integratie, Asia-Economic integration, Pacific Area-Economic integration, Japan--Foreign economic relations.
cover
next page >
< previous page
page_ii
next page >
Page ii Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series Series Editor: Glenn D.Hook Professor of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield This series, published by Routledge in association with the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheffield, will make available both original research on a wide range of subjects dealing with Japan and will provide introductory overviews of key topics in Japanese studies. The Internationalization of Japan Edited by Glenn D.Hook and Michael Weiner Race and Migration in Imperial Japan Michael Weiner Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area Pekka Korhonen Greater China and Japan Prospects for an economic partnership? Robert Taylor The Steel Industry in Japan A comparison with the UK Hasegawa Harukiyo Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan Richard Siddle Japan’s Minorities The illusion of homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner Japanese Business Management Restructuring for low growth and globalization Edited by Hasegawa Harukiyo and Glenn D.Hook Japan and Asia Pacific Integration Pacific romances 1968–1996 Pekka Korhonen
< previous page
page_ii
next page >
< previous page
page_iii
next page >
Page iii Japan and Asia Pacific Integration Pacific romances 1968–1996 Pekka Korhonen
London and New York
< previous page
page_iii
next page >
< previous page
page_iv
next page >
Page iv First published 1998 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1998 Pekka Korhonen All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, noivw known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Korhonen, Pekka. Japan and Asia Pacific Integration: Pacific romances 1968–1996/Pekka Korhonen. p. cm.—(Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Asia—Economic integration. 2. Pacific Area—Economic integration. 3. Japan—Foreign economic relations. I. Title. II. Series. HC412.K65 1998 337.1’9–dc21 97–27165 CIP ISBN 0-203-02185-1 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-26585-8 (OEB Format) ISBN 0-415-18001-5 (Print Edition)
< previous page
page_iv
next page >
< previous page
page_v
Page v Contents Acknowledgements List of acronyms 1 Introduction
next page >
vi vii
1
Part I Economism
11
2 The etymology of economism 3 On being great 4 Investing in development 5 Remodelling the Western Pacific
Part II The Pacific age
87
6 The etymology of the Pacific age 7 The blueprint 8 The institution 9 Japan’s decade 10 The politicization of economics 11 Continentalism 12 Conclusion Bibliography Index
< previous page
15 29 48 67
page_v
89 106 122 135 156 176 196
203 235
next page >
< previous page
page_vi
next page >
Page vi Acknowledgements I thank the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, the Finnish Academy, and the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Ǻbo Akademi University for financial, institutional and intellectual support throughout the research and writing of this study. I also thank the Peace Research Centre at the International Christian University and the Institute of Social Sciences at Waseda University in Tokyo, Australia-Japan Research Centre at the Australian National University, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, and the Asia Pacific Research Centre at Lingnan College in Hong Kong for allowing me to use their libraries and other facilities during research trips in spring 1994 and spring 1996, as well as for important intellectual stimulation afterwards. Numerous individuals have helped along the process, and I cannot single all of them out. Especially I thank the students who have attended my lectures; and Kari Palonen, Ari Turunen, Annamari Antikainen-Kokko, Nils H.Winter, Glenn D.Hook, Akami Tomoko, Diana Wong, Yamaoka Michio, Kuroda Toshirō, Mutsuko, and Oona for helping along the way in many forms. Also, I thank Alice Moore for checking the English text. Part of the etymological origins of the romance of economism at the beginning of Chapter 2 has been previously published in the Philippine Political Science Journal (1993–94) 37:1–28; parts of the romance of the Pacific age at the beginning of Chapter 3 have been published in the Journal of World History (1996) 7:41–70, and in chapter form in Sarah Metzger-Court and Werner Pascha (eds) (1996) Japan’s SocioEconomic Evolution: Continuity and Change, Folkestone: Japan Library. I am obliged to the editors for permission to use the material here. Spring 1997, on the shore of Miekkaves Pekka Korhonen
< previous page
page_vi
next page >
< previous page
page_vii
next page >
Page vii List of acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area AIC Advanced Industrial Country ANIC Asian Newly Industrialized Country ANIE Asian Newly Industrialized Economy APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (informally AsiaPacific Economic Community) ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEANAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations ASEM Asian Europe Meeting ASPACAsian and Pacific Council CCP Chinese Communist Party CPPS Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur; Permanent Commission of the South Pacific CSCA Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia CSCAPCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe EAC East Asia Community EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus EAEG East Asian Economic Group EC European Community ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association EPG Eminent Persons Group EU European Union ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (formerly ECAFE) FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas GAIT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GNP Gross National Product HPAE High-Performing Asian Economy IMF International Monetary Fund
< previous page
page_vii
next page >
< previous page
page_viii
next page >
Page viii IPR Institute of Pacific Relations ISIS Institute of Strategic and International Studies JCER Japan Center for Economic Research (formerly JERC) JERC Japan Economic Research Center LDC Less Developed Country MAPA Manila Action Plan for APEC MCEDSEAMinisterial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia MER Market Exchange Rate MITI (Japanese) Ministry of International Trade and Industry MOFA (Japanese) Ministry of Foreign Affairs NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NIC Newly Industrializing Country NIEO New International Economic Order OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (formerly OEEC) OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPTAD Organization for Pacific Trade and Development PAFTA Pacific Free Trade Area PAFTAD Pacific Trade and Development PBEC Pacific Basin Economic Council PBF Pacific Business Forum PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (formerly Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference) PMC Post-Ministerial Conference PPP Purchasing Power Parity SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SCPC Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SEZ Special Economic Zone TAFTA Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development WESPEC Western Pacific Economic Cooperation WTO World Trade Organization (formerly GATT) YMCA Young Men’s Christian Association ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
< previous page
page_viii
next page >
< previous page
page_1
next page >
Page 1 1 Introduction Japan and Asia Pacific Integration is a study of the process of regional integration in the greater Pacific area between 1968 and 1996. It examines the political rationale of the ideas behind such international organizations as the Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conferences, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). Focus is on Japanese conceptions of regionalism, because by and large it has been Japanese ideas that set the process going in the first place, but also American, Australian, Malaysian and other contributions are perused. If one searches through recent books with titles like International Economic Integration, or something similar, one tends to find either no mention (Jovanović 1992), or only a brief mention, of any kind of Asia Pacific integration (El-Agraa 1988; Melo and Panagariya 1993; Axline 1994; Kahler 1995). Integration literature is overwhelmingly dominated by discussions of European integration, and a European perspective in general. Europeans are inclined to view integration in terms of a codified structure (Kraus 1990), i.e., keeping the European organizations as the norm. The higher the degree of institutionalization, the more successful integration it represents, and the more reason to study it. This may or may not be a relevant criterion. Anyhow, it is not relevant in the Asia Pacific area, where integration has proceeded with a very different conceptual scheme. Rapid economic development of the participants, increase in regional trade, and successful creation of international organizations fashioned as friendly discussion clubs facilitating economic activity, constitute the criteria for evaluating Asia Pacific integration in its own terms. To a strong degree this is also a study of Japan’s foreign policy and the evolving structure of international relations in the Pacific region. Various forms of regionalism have been presented there during the past thirty years, named Pacific, Western Pacific, Asia-Pacific, or East Asian integration. All of these geographic metaphors represent different ways of combining together a number of countries of the region, the common denominators being that Japan has been depicted as the essential core
< previous page
page_1
next page >
< previous page
page_2
next page >
Page 2 country in all of them, and that at least some Japanese politicians have been actively promoting them. However, this analysis will not be carried out with the tools for ordinary studies of international politics. The present book forms the final part of a larger study that I started in 1986 as a visiting research student in the University of Tokyo’s Faculty of Law. I wanted to embark on a comprehensive study of the history regarding Japan’s various attempts at regional integration in the wide Pacific region since the middle of the nineteenth century (Korhonen 1990). The main interest has been in the postwar period, and an analysis of the years 1945–68 has been published earlier by Routledge as Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area (Korhonen 1994a). However, the present study has been written as an independent work, and can be read without knowledge of the earlier publications. Methodologically the project has formed a whole, with the study of the linguistic forms of representing reality constituting the main approach to Pacific integration. The basic methodological tool has been rhetorical analysis of texts (Korhonen 1992:19–32). However, the methodology has evolved along with the proceeding study. Reinhart Koselleck’s style of analysing German conceptual history in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe project (1985) has been an important inspiration for the structuring of the present work. For this reason much that the reader might expect to find as central in this study, such as security aspects, diplomatic transactions, or political decision-making, are reduced to a minor role. The reader interested in these aspects is advised to refer to works such as Inoguchi Takashi’s Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change (1993), Wolf Mendl’s Japan’s Asia Policy (1995), Funabashi Yōichi’s Asia Pacific Fusion (1995b), or Michael Yahuda’s The International Politics of the Asia Pacific 1945–1995 (1996). The formation of the language of Asia Pacific integration has been primarily the work of intellectuals, and consequently analysis has here been limited to a small but representative group of academics, called PAFTAD economists. The Pacific Trade and Development conferences were started in 1968 to discuss prospects for Pacific economic integration, and to 1996, after twenty-eight years, altogether twenty-three conferences have been held. The participants have been top-ranked economists and other social scientists from Asian, Oceanian, North American, and Latin American countries, with Europeans appearing once in awhile. PAFTAD has been from the start a policy-oriented institution. Its members have often had important roles as advisers to, or even as members of, their national governments. PAFTAD conferences thus never were ordinary academic gatherings. Discussions were freely academic, and yet the conferences always had a vague aura of diplomatic meetings, because they might influence national policies. Participants tended to argue as representatives of their countries. They have also tended to be intellectual leaders in their respective academic fields. The published proceedings of the conferences
< previous page
page_2
next page >
< previous page
page_3
next page >
Page 3 form a distinct body of texts, which displays well the intellectual currents in the Pacific area. Around this core then has been collected a looser group of texts, consisting of other writings of the same PAFTAD members, other important scholarly works, published speeches of politicians, noteworthy articles from popular magazines, and other similar material deemed essential in constructing the history of the discussion. As focus is especially on Japan and its place within the process of Pacific integration, two Japanese economists have been singled out for closer study. They are Kojima Kiyoshi (1920–) whose main contributions were made as professor of international economics at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, and Ōkita Saburō (1914–1993) whose career spanned a multitude of posts in the Japanese bureaucracy, policy research institutes, governmental advisory committees, and as foreign minister in 1979–80. The relationship between these two men has been crucial to the development of the Pacific narratives. Kojima has been essentially the constructor of ideas par excellence, who was well versed in economic theory and economic history, and who came up with original theory and policy-oriented reinterpretations of Japan’s changing relations with the rest of the world. He was a creative theoretician, and the original founder of PAFTAD (Patrick 1996). Ōkita embodied political imagination. He skilfully shaped Kojima’s ideas into forms that were applicable politically, and enjoyed the necessary connections to take these ideas to Japan’s top political leadership for consideration when the situation seemed appropriate. When interviewed in Tokyo in autumn 1991, both men gave an essentially similar account of their relationship (Kojima 1991: interview; Ōkita 1991: interview). George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), as well as Hayden White (1973, 1978).Z have insisted on acknowledging the extent to which metaphors and other linguistic tropes influence our way of structuring reality. In a study of regional integration, geographic metaphors are crucial, because they define so clearly which country belongs to a certain group and which country does not. The basic geographic concept in this study is the ‘Pacific’. It encompasses all relevant countries appearing in discussion, both the ‘Pacific Rim’ and the ‘Pacific Basin’, from North, Central, and South America through Oceania (Pacific island states, New Zealand, and Australia) to Southeast and Northeast Asia, up to Siberia. This is a relatively simple definition. Asian countries bordering on the Pacific have presented a far more complex conundrum. During the postwar period various metaphors with shifting meanings, such as Far East, Extreme Orient, Western Pacific, Western Pacific Rim, Asian Pacific, Asia-Pacific, or East Asia, have been used in grouping these countries. This multitude of metaphors reflects the rapidity of changing viewpoints in regard to them, and the subsequent groupings, dispersions, exclusions, and regroupings among them. Following Shibusawa et al . (1992:vii), and Drakakis-Smith (1992:1–2),
< previous page
page_3
next page >
< previous page
page_4
next page >
Page 4 I shall use ‘Pacific Asia’ as a general term for them. Pacific Asia denotes the gradual orientation of these Asian countries towards the Pacific, and that they nowadays derive a measure of group identity from this orientation. A specific list of countries cannot be given, because it is more a functional than a spatial concept. Some countries oriented themselves early and strongly to the Pacific, like Japan; some did it later, like China, and it is doubtful whether a country like North Korea can even nowadays be said to belong to Pacific Asia. It is clearly a concept of the 1990s, and restructures history from the present point of view. At the same time it has a slight ‘outsider’ flavour. It has been used more frequently by outside observers than by discussants in the region themselves. In this sense, and only in this sense, it has the advantage of relative neutrality. It can easily be used throughout the period under study, while all of the other metaphors tend to reflect a certain phase of discussion. The Pacific would thus be composed of the three subregions of Pacific Asia, the Americas, and Oceania, with the Soviet Union/Russian Federation geographically present, but otherwise on the periphery. A metaphor is a fairly straightforward trope of discussion. With it various phenomena are characterized as similar or different from other phenomena. For instance, when India and Malaysia were called Southeast Asian countries during the 1950s, before the Pacific had become a conceptually organized focus, they were depicted as being similar to each other, and different from Japan. Nowadays, when Malaysia and Japan are called East Asian countries, they are placed in the same group, but India is excluded. Socialistic vs. capitalistic countries, imperialistic vs. exploited countries, dynamic vs. stagnant countries are other relevant metaphors according to which various groupings have been made, displaying various ideological and theoretical ways of conceptualizing the world. The study begins with the year 1968, because it marked the beginning of the depiction of Japan using the metaphor of a great power, differing from the small countries of the region, and differing also from Japan itself before the reinterpretation. During the preceding period Japan had been depicted as a small country (Korhonen 1994a:16–28). One of the roles of a great power is to influence weaker states. In Japan’s case the conceptual reinterpretation of its international position meant that as a new self-proclaimed leader it had to start to look for suitable followers among whom to spread the Japanese understanding of the world. The natural followers were found among Pacific Asian developing countries. Because of the legacies of the Pacific war, both the domestic and international situations had to be argued in strictly economic terms. A metonymy is a reductionist trope. In it a part of a phenomenon is substituted for the whole. Japan was never defined as an actual great power, with corresponding global military and political clout, but metonymically as an economic great power. The whole focus on the economy in the Japanese definition of themselves, and the exclusion of the military and
< previous page
page_4
next page >
< previous page
page_5
next page >
Page 5 political dimensions, was strongly reductionist. It was exposed as such through radical criticism of Japan’s apparent imperialistic designs during the early 1970s, but as the decade proceeded, the metonymical definition became gradually accepted. The reason was that an economistic world view started to spread in Pacific Asian countries, while simultaneously the reductionism of economistic rhetoric disappeared from view. During the 1980s it became normal, and even normative, that a country should concentrate on economic development. At the same time the metonymical economistic expressions shifted to forms of synecdoche. Theoretically synecdoche is usually considered as a subspecies of metonymy, a trope that symbolizes some specific quality. This turned the reductionism into an intrinsic relationship of qualitative similarity among Pacific Asian countries. When Japan was depicted as a rapidly developing economy-oriented country, it became qualitatively similar to other rapidly developing economy-oriented countries like Singapore and Malaysia. This synecdochic similarity then enabled the depiction of other inherent similarities between the countries during the 1990s, such as common Asian cultural heritage, or common Asian ethnicity. These tropes enabled Japan to make a conceptual, still continuing transition from the separate group of advanced industrialized countries to the group of Pacific Asian countries within a couple of decades. Corresponding changes in the geographic metaphors, and in the discussion on regional integration also occurred. These groupings, dispersions, and regroupings based on linguistic tropes are one of the basic objects of this analysis. I have also been greatly inspired by Hayden White’s emphasis on the importance of narratives in historical writing (1987,1996). White positions himself as a metahistorian, analysing other historians as individual narrators, and concentrating on texts that clearly display the narrative form. But these are expendable limitations. The narrative aspects of a phenomenon like regional integration are most fruitfully analysed under the concept of grand stories. The study of grand stories has not been in fashion in the recent past. Works like Jean-François Lyotard’s La condition postmoderne (1979), and subsequent post-modernist literature, have claimed that grand stories are dying, as people cease to believe in their ability to shape our epistemic world. This literature reflects a certain aspect of North Atlantic existence during the 1980s and 1990s, when the postwar goals of building peaceful, democratic, and rich societies had been achieved in the industrialized societies of Western Europe and North America. What remained seemed to be just a continuation of the same—which is boring, as any listener to a bad storyteller knows—while socialism had ceased to be a progressive narrative in Eastern Europe. All stories have an end. Sooner or later they cease to function properly as social mystifiers. They are placed on bookshelves, becoming the objects of historical research, but that does not mean that storytelling itself ends. All stories also have a beginning.
< previous page
page_5
next page >
< previous page
page_6
next page >
Page 6 In fact, the world abounds in grand stories. The human world cannot do without them. Social units are held together by complex structures of authority, economic interest, coercion, the feeling of belonging together, etc., and the purpose of social stories is to form the conceptual basis of these structures. Stories form the mystical substance that links people together in a meaningful, purposeful way. Such stories offer the basic conceptual space within which societies define themselves, discuss their quintessence within the changing patterns of the world, and formulate common goals for their future endeavours. A contemporary phenomenon is the shift of telling stories based on ideas of political philosophy, to stories built on ethnic, cultural, religious, and geographic metaphors, such as the European project of deeper integration, or unity of the West built in contrast to ‘human rights abuses and child labour’ in much of the rest of the world. The fact that grand stories always face political opposition, a part of the population is indifferent to them, and a part of the intelligentsia finds them ridiculous, is no argument against their existence and power. Legitimating myths always face such opposition. Grand stories are simply a part of human social existence, and definitely worth studying. Besides a study of regional integration, this book is also a study of two Pacific grand stories, Economism and the Pacific age. They are here called the Pacific romances, because grand stories essentially have to be romances to be politically effective. In his monumental study of nineteenth-century European intellectual history Hayden White used emplotment, i.e., providing the meaning of a story by identifying what kind of story was being told, as one of his tools of analysis. He identified four archetypal forms of emplotment: Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire (1973:8–11). The Romance is an optimistic and heroic drama of the triumph of virtue over vice, or of light over darkness. It is the story of the victory of human effort over the prevailing forces of crushing material reality, and transcendence to a better plane of existence. The legend of the search for the Holy Grail is a beautiful Romance. Socially legitimizing stories are also typically cast in the Romantic mode. Periods of reconstruction after a great war give natural rise to Romances of a dark past, industrious present, and optimistic future. The postwar Pacific stories of economic development, the rise of countries from poverty to riches, the creation of peaceful societies and stable regional systems, and the transference of the world’s economic and political centre to the Pacific are all essentially Romances. Their narrators had lived through the dark years of World War II, and strived to construct a better world. The best literary form for presenting a Romance is to write another Romance, but it seldom makes for a good analysis. Analysis needs a different angle, and other forms of emplotment provide them. Whereas the Romance depicts an absolute human triumph over the dark forces of the world, the Comedy promises only a series of temporary
< previous page
page_6
next page >
< previous page
page_7
next page >
Page 7 triumphs. Still, it is an optimistic mode, and holds out the hope that the series will not be broken. The Comedy plays with dramatic accounts of change and transformation, and how humans are taken unawares by the unpredictable forces of the world, but these difficulties are invariably resolved in the festive moments when rescuers arrive and solutions are found. Even though humans cannot transcend their world, they can well survive in it as long as they work together. While the Romance in its idealism is a serious mode, the Comedy is playful. Laughter and merriment make people like each other, reconciling their relations, so that they can cooperate in keeping each other afloat in the currents of the world. The Comedy is a suitable mode of scientific analysis, because it takes nothing for granted, but is inherently creative in its easy selfreliance. A lot of good social scientific work has been cast in the Comedic mode, even though the generally serious tone of academic rhetoric often hides the fact, making studies appear as if they contained only description and analysis. The Comedy is basically agreeable to the dreams of the Romance, even though it sometimes treats them roughly. My earlier writings on the history of the rhetoric of Pacific integration have been essentially Comedies, and also most of the present book has been written in that form. However, where the Comedy would end the story in joyful success, the Tragedy takes the narrative further to a fall. A Tragedy may contain festive occasions, but in the end they are proven illusory. The forces of the world are shown to be stronger than even the combined strength of humans. The Tragedy tilts the balance towards pessimism, but is not altogether black. It is written for the education of the survivors. The fall of the hero and the trembling of the world teach those who remain on the scene that life is still possible, but they have to resign themselves to the seemingly unalterable conditions of the world. The Tragedy aims at increasing the consciousness of the survivors that the world has eternal, immutable laws, which set limits to our aspirations. The hero may slay the dragon, but not win out over his own internal weaknesses. Although the Tragedy shatters the dreams of the Romance, and gives a blow to the self-reliance of the Comedy, it is still a hopeful mode, as it aims to increase sober consciousness of what is possible. In this sense the Tragedy is also a useful plot for analysis, and often employed in scientific studies. This study, although containing Comedic scenes, finally turns to the Tragic mode, with Japan’s fall in the 1990s from the position of the Asian developmental hero. Perhaps this also reflects the spread of gloom in the whole industrialized world, the foreboding of great structural changes in domestic and international systems, and fear of the end of the world as we know it. I cannot be immune to this atmosphere. This book is a product of the 1990s, when although nothing drastic has happened, the world has been uneasy and restless. The fourth mode of emplotment is Satire. It is the direct opposite of Romance. It is a drama of the folly of human endeavour, of apprehension that humans are captives in the world. They cannot escape death,
< previous page
page_7
next page >
< previous page
page_8
next page >
Page 8 which arrives for all and finishes everything humans have tried to build. The Satire makes a mockery of the hopes of the Romance, scorns the joyous selfreliance of the Comedy, and ridicules even the wisdom of the Tragedy. It is the mode of demolition. The Satire has the appearance of wisdom, as consistent use of cool irony gives that impression to most listeners at first, but because it destroys everything, it sooner or later also displays its own inadequacy of depicting reality. The Satire is the rock bottom, the literary equivalent of war. It is something that one passes through, and if one emerges spiritually alive at the other end, the only way forward is upward, to the reconstructive mood of the Romance. Romance would then appear incomparably wiser than the Satire, because at least it boldly attempts to do something beautiful. The Satire is also sometimes used in social scientific literature. There exists even a norm that critical political analyses should be written with the Satirical mode, exposing the machinations of power politicians. Nevertheless, the political decision-making level appears only in a minor role in this study. The main purpose is to understand, rather than criticize, the political dynamics of Pacific integration in light of the Pacific romances. I have thus avoided the Satirical mode of emplotment. The focus chosen may make the study appear one-sided, but again I advise the reader to scrutinize also the more traditional studies that have been written on the subject. Arif Dirlik’s work is also worth inspecting (1992, 1993). But I also trust that my method of analysis brings out thus far poorly researched but essential aspects of Pacific integration. This book has been divided into two parts, Economism and The Pacific Age. Both parts are introduced by detailed etymological constructions of the historical origins of the narratives involved. The etymological approach enables us to see how these stories have a life of their own, and how our contemporary actions are in a sense just creative reiterations of old plays in new situations. Economism dates back to the sixteenth century, to the European search for stability and peace after religious wars had devastated the continent. Its special Japanese variant has been the flying geese theory of development, with its many interpretations. Chapter 3 focuses on the implications of the new Japanese self-image of the late 1960s as an economic great power, with the economy still growing at over 10 percent a year, opening magnificent vistas of future greatness. Chapter 4 analyses the interpretations made by Japanese economists of the situation during the early 1970s, forming in their discussions a consensus that Japan had to become a major investor in the Pacific region, aiding in this way both its own economic advancement, and the development of Asian developing countries. Chapter 5 deals with the foreign political initiatives by Japanese prime ministers directed towards the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during 1974–7, culminating in the successful proclamation of the Fukuda doctrine.
< previous page
page_8
next page >
< previous page
page_9
next page >
Page 9 Part II starts with an analysis of the concept of the Pacific age, which was created by the Japanese political economist Inagaki Manjirō at the end of the nineteenth century. It is a story of competition with the old centre of the world, Europe. The chapter deals also with the shift of the Japanese foreign political horizon from Southeast Asia to the Pacific in the late 1970s, together with the emergence of the Pacific integration process. Chapter 7 analyses the formulation of an integration initiative by PAFTAD economists during the late 1970s. Chapter 8 examines the political drive to establish what is nowadays known as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) at the turn of the decade. Chapter 9 deals with Japan’s rise as a global model of economic performance during the 1980s, and the consequent easy spread of its ideological influence, especially among Pacific Asian countries. The two final chapters deal with the politicization during the 1990s of the original economistic narrative after the ending of the Cold War. The subject matter of Chapter 10 is the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which attempts to integrate the whole Pacific region into a huge free trade area by the early twenty-first century—at the beginning of the Pacific age. Chapter 11 analyses the rise of a competing form of regional integration, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), concerning only East Asia, and the accompanying rise of continentalist rhetoric, which may eventually break the depicted Pacific unity.
< previous page
page_9
next page >
< previous page
page_10
next page >
page_10
next page >
Page 10 This page intentionally left blank.
< previous page
< previous page
page_11
next page >
Page 11 Part I Economism The first Pacific story to be analysed here is that of economism. Economism, in the context of nations, simply means that economic values are placed above other national values. Economic values provide the ideational horizon toward which national goals and projects are directed. A country may also orient itself toward other values, such as political, military, or religious ones. Each chosen orientation produces a different kind of country, which acts differently within the international system. Economistic countries concentrate, for various reasons, on development, growth, and self-enrichment. Economism is an ideal type in the Weberian sense, and seldom appears pure in the real world. Combinations with other values are more usual. The concepts of both liberalism and communism refer to a combination of economic and political values. Liberalism refers to open societies, to free enterprise in the economic sector, and democracy in the political sector. The concept of communism brings with it the idea of freedom from exploitation, and strives from this angle toward political equality and economic well-being. No essential difference exists in the Utopian goals of liberalism and communism, although their practical manifestations in the material world have been quite different. Religious values can be combined with economic ones, producing countries imbued with a deep religious spirit, but still intent on economic advancement. Protestant countries, studied by Max Weber, provide an historical example. During the late twentieth century Islam seems to have become a similar economistic religion in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, while suitable reinterpretations of Buddhism have been made in, for example, Thailand (Jackson 1989). Also, military values combine with economic ones, producing countries intent on economic as well as military expansion. The Japanese prewar fukoku kyōhei (rich country, strong army) orientation was a typical example, while postwar Japan has exemplified an economistic country in a relatively pure form. Because Japan was one of the losers in World War II, concentration on the economy was forced onto it. Japan’s position was comparable to that of certain European countries which had also lost the war but
< previous page
page_11
next page >
< previous page
page_12
next page >
Page 12 remained in the capitalist camp. These abandoned the field of high politics to the winners in order to concentrate on the low politics of economic development. The early postwar decades presented sparkling economistic fairytales of poverty-stricken countries rising rapidly to riches, such as the German Wirtschaftswunder, Italian il miracolo, Finnish talousihme, and the Japanese selchō jidai . To become rich was not the only goal. Economism as an ideology, below its surface, contains political goals, namely the creation of stable societies and peacefully integrated regional systems. European rhetoric has addressed these political goals quite openly, while Pacific rhetoric has tended to concentrate on more purely economic argumentation. Concentration on the economy was more intense in Japan, actual growth rates were higher there than in Europe, and much more was made from the situation in terms of self-identity. The international implications were also greater, because Japan was situated among poor countries. Japan gradually became a model, in the sense of being a source of envy and inspiration, and during the postwar decades several other Asian countries started to follow the Japanese economistic example. In Chapter 2 we shall first examine the etymology of economism, tracing its origin back to European post-medieval discussion regarding economic activity as a way of cleansing societies of their violent habits. However, the word economism itself is of more recent origin, taken from Japanese discussion in the mid-1960s, when they were trying to conceptualize the de facto way in which they were conducting their national and foreign policies (see e.g. Ōkita 1965). At that time Japan was still understood as a small country, but its image began to change during the late 1960s, when Japan became reinterpreted as an economic great power. In Chapter 3 we shall analyse this process of reinterpretation. Japan appeared as a rising star in the Pacific, while European and American countries seemed to be withdrawing from the region, leaving space for Japan’s rising economic and ideological influence to spread throughout Pacific Asia. We shall then proceed to analyse the debate on development economics conducted among Pacific economists. Japanese-style economism was not a fashionable topic at the turn of the decade from the 1960s to the 1970s. The general radicalization of global discussion at that time was reflected in the rise of the dependencia theory, which depicted the world as being in a state of confrontation between imperialistic industrialized countries and exploited developing countries. Japanese economists tried to resolve the conflict by developing a non-imperialistic investment theory which would conceptually allow for Japan’s economic expansion, while at the same time benefiting, rather than harming, Asian developing countries. In Chapter 5 we shall move to the foreign political arena, and investigate how politicians tried to incorporate this project into Japan’s foreign policy, concentrating their efforts on the Association of Southeast Asian
< previous page
page_12
next page >
< previous page
page_13
next page >
Page 13 Nations (ASEAN). A breakthrough was achieved in 1977 with the Fukuda Doctrine. It became an official symbol for the fact that Japan was allowed finally to speak of itself as a great power within the Southeast Asian setting.
< previous page
page_13
next page >
< previous page
page_14
next page >
page_14
next page >
Page 14 This page intentionally left blank.
< previous page
< previous page
page_15
next page >
Page 15 2 The etymology of economism Economism as a political project emerged in the discussions of classical political economists, who were writing in Europe during and after the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Albert O. Hirschman shows (1981), the period represented a change in the ideals of European culture. Throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance the aristocratic ideals of passionately striving for honour, glory, power, and the display of knightly valour had been the dominant social values guiding human conduct. In political theory, Machiavelli’s Il Principe, written in 1517, was a sort of culmination of this ideal. Here, faith was placed in the personal characteristics of an energetic individual, who could manipulate the passions of his subordinates and enemies, and through his personal skill create an island of peace in the turmoil of the world. However, in his search for stability rather than glory, Machiavelli was already pointing towards the emerging new paradigm. By the beginning of the seventeenth century these medieval ideals had begun to be openly ridiculed by, for example, Cervantes with his figure of the heroic knight Don Quixote de la Mancha. True to his knightly calling, Don Quixote embarked on a voyage of adventures, but after an unsuccessful journey he was finally carried home in a cage, beaten, while his down-to-earth companion, Sancho Panza, the representative of the new world, returned to his good wife on his own feet with a basketful of coins. This literary tradition continued, with one of the most delicious examples being Jonathan Swift’s account in 1726 of the adventures of Mr Lemuel Gulliver—a merchant marine surgeon—among the princes and nobles of the kingdoms of Lilliput and Blefuscu. Similarly, social theorists began to look for ways to tame human passions, so that an orderly society could be created. Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan introduced in 1651 the concept of a covenant, and with it the idea of an impersonal political structure, capable of guaranteeing protection and order. Hobbes also reinterpreted the concept of passion. His thinking was mostly within traditional categories, so that his conceptual world was inherently violent, but he talked also of other kinds of passions which incline men towards peace, namely Feare of Death; Desire of such
< previous page
page_15
next page >
< previous page
page_16
next page >
Page 16 things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them’ (Hobbes 1980:188). Economic activity here begins to dawn as a road to peace, but for Hobbes this was still only a sliver of a thought. During the eighteenth century, in pace with the accelerating economic development in Europe, thinking began to centre on the idea of peaceful passions. Money-making appeared as a calm passion in contrast to the violent aristocratic ones. As social values became more bourgeois, the concept of passion was gradually replaced by the concept of self-interest. Concentration on pursuing private economic interests began to appear as a means of weaning societies away from violent habits. As Montesquieu put it in his contemporary bestseller, Esprit des Lois, published in 1748: Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities. (Montesquieu 1962:316) Montesquieu formulated the idea that is nowadays called interdependence, and has become the conceptual cornerstone in modern functional and neofunctional analysis of international economic and political relations. During his time economism had already begun to emerge as triumphant. Economic activity appeared as a way of polishing the manners of nations to eliminate barbarism, and Montesquieu could advise his European readers ‘not to be astonished, then, if our manners are now less savage than formerly’ (1962:316). The polishing of people’s manners appeared as a byproduct of individuals acting as their economic interests dictated. They entered, nationally and internationally, into strong webs of interdependent relationships, which were being continuously strengthened by the expansion of trade. The entrance of the idea of interdependence based on economic activity brought about a paradigmatic shift in the way relations within and between human societies were seen to be organized. The new paradigm gradually displaced the aristocratic model based on strong leadership and a balance of power system, colouring it with the pejorative connotations of savagery and barbarism (Hirschman 1981:51–2). Economism in the European intellectual history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thus can be seen as a political project for achieving peace in both national and international relations. The idea took the strongest hold in the economically rapidly developing England. Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776], advocating the idea of free competition, and David Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and Taxation [1817], introducing the idea of comparative advantage, provided the theoretical basis for the British
< previous page
page_16
next page >
< previous page
page_17
next page >
Page 17 ideology of capitalism and international free trade. The idea then spread around the globe through British commerce, and the prestige of the British Empire became attached to it. The possibility for rapid economic development made other European countries receptive to the idea. It was also natural to emulate a successful example. After the Napoleonic Wars the Smithian style of free trade economism became the dominant ideology in Europe, partly because European countries longed for peace and stability after all the bloodshed, and partly because England as the overwhelmingly dominant economic, political and military power strongly advocated it. Smithian economism remained the dominant ideology of the nineteenth century, and during that century Europe was more peaceful than it had ever been before during its whole history. Of course, that peace and development was achieved at the expense of most of the rest of the world, which was subjected to imperial domination, but at least Europe itself was peaceful, as the ideology promised. Nevertheless, economism came under attack during the same period. The uprooting and impoverishment of millions of people through global economic activity, the miseries caused by cyclical depressions, and the creation of alienated mass societies brought that project into disrepute in the eyes of many. Karl Marx’s trenchant critique of capitalism in Das Kapital is the example par excellence of such criticism. Seen from another angle, where the political project of economism has temporarily succeeded, life appears ‘empty, petty, and boring’ (Hirschman 1981:132). Heroism, adventure, and the magical world of incalculable passions have disappeared, giving place to a regulated and pacified society, setting the stage for the Romantic critique of the Bourgeois order, such as Søren Kierkegaard’s Begrebet Angest [1844], or Friedrich Nietzsche’s Also sprach Zarathustra [1884]. Most relevant here, however, is an economic theory which in general accepted the British style of economism, but began opposition to free trade as a universalist principle, applicable in all situations. Long-term national economic development came to be seen as an even more important goal than the immediate gains in economic efficiency for the global system as a whole, as promised by free trade. The founder of this competing school of development economics was Friedrich List, a scholar and bureaucrat, who had works published and held governmental positions in Germany and in the United States. He could thus observe closely the strategies that developing countries adopted while trying to cope with British industrial supremacy. His main work, Das Nationale System der politischen Oekonomle, was published in 1841. He attacked strongly the dominant contemporary school, which drew inspiration from Adam Smith, calling it ‘cosmopolitical economy’, as it saw only productive individuals, and benefiting humankind in general, but nothing in between. For List, the nation stood between individuals and humankind, and a developing nation needed what he called political economy.
< previous page
page_17
next page >
< previous page
page_18
next page >
Page 18 Nations were clearly on differing levels of development. These differences enabled advanced countries to dominate the less advanced, and inhibit their development. England possessed the globally dominant power of production, and the British practice of dumping onto international markets, during economic downturns, huge quantities of goods priced below production costs acted like a lash striking down weaker local industries. The United States and continental European countries simply were not able to compete under conditions of free trade. Germany was depicted as in danger of being limited to the export of ‘children’s toys, wooden clocks, and philological writings’ (List 1916:106). Less advanced countries had to treat development as a serious national political project. They were to forego the immediate welfare gains that cheap British imports gave to domestic consumers, and aim at establishing strong industries, which promised far greater returns in the future in terms of national power, in addition to the individual citizen’s well-being. Protection against the dominant power was indispensable. The amount of protection needed depended on the stage of development. In barbarian, pastoral, and agricultural stages free trade was the optimal condition, because it opened the door to cultural advancements, and brought the nation to a civilized level. After reaching that stage the promotion of industrialization could begin. The state had to use tariffs to ensure that the new industries could grow; always, however, allowing a degree of foreign imports, because of their educational and competitive value. After national industries grew sufficiently strong, the country should turn back to free trade; otherwise its industries would decline due to laziness. For an advanced country only free trade facilitated further development (List 1916:141–56). From that stage on List is again in complete agreement with Smith. The main point of his theory is that development comes in stages, and, in a world of already existing dominant producers, less advanced countries must take special measures in moving from the agricultural to the industrial stage. When all countries capable of doing this have entered the advanced stage, humankind can become the economistic cosmopolitical society, where perpetual peace might just possibly reign. List’s ideas were opposed strongly by the English school, but they spread rapidly in the less advanced countries in continental Europe and North America. List became the intellectual father of the Zollverein, the first instance of successful European economic integration. It united the German states behind a common tariff barrier, achieved what List had predicted in terms of German industrialization, and later also led to the political integration of Germany into a single state. During the late nineteenth century List’s variety of developmental economism was at least as influential as Smith’s type of economism, especially in the less advanced but ambitious countries, such as Germany, France, and the United States. List’s relative lack of fame nowadays stems at least in part from the events
< previous page
page_18
next page >
< previous page
page_19
next page >
Page 19 of the 1930s, when German Nazis discredited his name, like that of many other German thinkers, by honouring him as a national hero. But the general idea, widely accepted nowadays, that developing countries are entitled to higher levels of protection than advanced ones, stems largely from his writings. As any ideology, economism cannot last forever in any particular place. It cannot sustainably, over decades, deliver all that it promises. It also tends to forget the displaced, and it bores the romantic, which begins to take effect as generations pass. Things can go well for a long time, as long as societies move firmly towards greater abundance, but cracks in the ideological framework begin to appear when the particular type of economic expansion reaches its limits. Any ideology organizing human relationships tends to ossify over time into a hard structure, which more dynamic forces then tear asunder, at which time other values, such as the old aristocratic-military ones, tend to take over. In Germany—which finally broke the European peace in 1914—List’s economistic image of industrious German producers of goods and culture changed increasingly to incorporate the image of heroes (Helden), in opposition to British traders (Händler), who were depicted as being at a lower moral level of greed and pettiness (Sombart 1915). Edward Hallett Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1966) is the classic analysis of the end of the first phase of European economism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when rapid economic growth on the subcontinent waned, Europe moved from peace and relative abundance to the Great War, and then to a period of relative poverty, with high international debt and inflation. The Great Depression of 1928 ended the reborn economistic optimism of the reconstruction period, and during the 1930s highly authoritarian political structures grew up in many countries in continental Europe, as well as in Japan, and economic activity was again subsumed under military values. The Pacific War and the second European Great War were the culminations of this development. In the post-World War II situation economism was given a forceful rejuvenation by the United States. At the end of the nineteenth century, when Europe had fallen into economic stagnation, the United States continued its rapid economic development, and economism was given a new lease of life there as a progressive ideology. During the 1930s, instead of becoming authoritarian as most other major countries of the time, the United States was able to combat the effects of the Great Depression with determined federal policies, whipping up economic growth, thus pacifying the society. Because this economistic policy had succeeded so well on the national political level, it was natural for American policy-makers to apply it also at the international level, starting from the latter stages of the war, beginning at Bretton Woods in 1944. The United States had by this time become the dominant global economic power, and it was at this moment that it moved from a Listian to a Smithian style of
< previous page
page_19
next page >
< previous page
page_20
next page >
Page 20 economism, beginning to advocate global free trade. The early postwar reconstruction period was characterized by massive outflows of American capital to Western Europe and certain Asian countries, such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. It was accompanied by an equally strong ideological push to spread the ideals of economism (Ellwood 1990). The United States singlehandedly rejuvenated economism as a global ideology. The curious paradox was that it took the strongest hold among the losers of the war, while the United States, by assuming the global hegemonic position, lost simultaneously the relative economistic purity that its previous isolationistic policies had given, becoming a politicomilitary leader in the context of the Cold War. In war-weary Western Europe David Mitrany’s A Working Peace System (1943) can be seen as a prime example of economistic ideology. Although it was written by a European political scientist, the book drew its inspiration from the American New Deal policies of the 1930s. Mitrany advocated starting the process of peace through working together in reconstruction. Such economic cooperation would lead towards integration, and eventually a pacified international system. Mitrany was influential in starting the school of functionalism, which became one of the chief intellectual bases for global and —as neofunctionalism—regional integration. In continental Europe, before and during World War II, international integration had been discussed mainly in relation to a legalistic framework, and future Europe was usually depicted as a political federation (Smith and Stirk 1990). However, what really moved the process of integration forward was the Schuman Plan of 1950. Aided by the American ideological push, it changed the direction of rhetoric regarding European integration to an economistic one, related to coal and steel. It seems that major post-conflict situations, where the potential for rapid economic growth presents itself, are those where economism has the greatest persuasive power, and the most obvious legitimacy. Before World War II Japan had been regarded as a great power. Nothing remained of this glory after the war, except a relatively advanced economy, and certain lessons, the basic one of which was that war technology had advanced to a stage where the strategic advantage of being an island country had been eroded. The seas surrounding Japan had previously provided a natural defence against attackers, but the ability of US submarines to cut Japanese supply lines, and aerial bombardment of most urban centres, demonstrated the impossibility of keeping the economy functioning during an extended war. Any amount of samurai fighting spirit could not offset that disadvantage. The conclusion, drawn by a few in the latter stages of the war, and spread among many afterwards, was that in the modern world Japan was no longer able to wage a major war (Korhonen 1994a:29–31). The Occupation period (1945–52), with its reforms, strengthened the transformation in thinking. Japan was demilitarized, and Article 9, which
< previous page
page_20
next page >
< previous page
page_21
next page >
Page 21 prohibited the maintenance and use of military power, was inserted into the new 1946 constitution. Although this article has been circumvented since 1950, and land, air and sea forces have been reestablished, Japan has consistently followed a low military profile (Hummel 1991). Another important change was that the old aristocratic and military elites were removed from their leading cultural and political positions. Although the purges were reversed during the latter phases of the Occupation, these elites were never able to return to their former positions of influence. Their place as the creators of the basic ideology of the nation was taken by economists, and in general by people who were thinking within economic categories (Zahl 1973). Yoshida Shigeru, as prime minister during the periods 1946–47 and 1948–54, implemented the economistic orientation of Japan’s foreign policy. Yoshida’s policies meant concentration on economic reconstruction, development, and trade (Shiraishi 1989), while in foreign policy it was considered sufficient to support the United States, in exchange for American military protection of Japan. During the 1970s political scientists codified this foreign political approach in the term ‘Yoshida doctrine’. Ikeda Hayato, a protegé of Yoshida, during his premiership from 1960–64 implemented the project at Japan’s national political level with the famous Income Doubling Plan (Keizai Shingikai 1960). The plan simply promised to double Japanese national income in ten years. The publication of the plan was accompanied by the vigorous use of optimistic economistic rhetoric by Ikeda and his intellectual supporters, and a national economistic consensus was garnered in support of it. Both that consensus, and the Yoshida doctrine, have evolved as a result of changing national and international circumstances, but economism still constitutes the basic outlook of Japan as a political actor. This meant the re-emergence of the concepts of classical political economy into a prominent place in national discussion. Japanese international economists, such as Kojima Kiyoshi and Ōkita Saburō, have expounded the virtues of economism, which leads to economic development, growth, and prosperity. This should not, however, be seen only as an economic project intended simply to enrich Japan alone. Under the phenotype of modern economic rhetoric, which draws a line at political arguments, the genotype of the old political project of economism is very much alive. The goal of the modern Japanese economic project has been to create a peaceful international environment around Japan, guaranteeing its security better than any military means. This goal can be quite easily gleaned from Ōkita Saburō’s texts, because he never was a pure economist, writing usually with political goals in mind. Throughout the postwar period the constant repetition of the basic idea is evident in his texts: contributing to the economic development of Asia through war reparations, official development assistance, and private investment (Ōkita 1947; Arisawa et al . 1951; Ōkita 1956, 1960, 1965). The
< previous page
page_21
next page >
< previous page
page_22
next page >
Page 22 goal has to be understood against the background of World War II, the global Cold War, and the equally tragic local wars in Japan’s vicinity that followed in succession after 1945 in China, Korea, Indochina, and Southeast Asia. The wish of Japanese international economists, among whom Ōkita was just one, was simply to eradicate conflict from the Asian regional system. The idea relied on the use of economic development to escape from the constraints of scarcity, into a world of constantly increasing abundance, where the allocation of material and spiritual rewards would be easy in national and international settings alike. After the beneficial effects of economic activity would have made life more affluent in the region, the countries would recognize how beneficial it was to cooperate peacefully with each other. They would quietly forget their previous conflicts, as if an invisible hand had wiped the slate clean from the grime of political and military tensions. Economic theory in Japan had for historical reasons been excessively development oriented. Japan had been the only Asian country that had become industrialized before the war, and the achievement had been accomplished hurriedly to catch up with the Western countries. List, among other classical economists, was quite well known there, as the Japanese studied how the United States, Germany, France, and other countries had succeeded in industrializing themselves in the face of British industrial supremacy. During the 1930s interest in List deepened, much for the same reasons as in Germany at the time. A Japanese translation of his major work was published (List 1938), and a number of studies were written (Kobayashi 1943, 1948; Ōkawachi 1943). Interest also continued during the postwar period (Sumitani 1969). A Japanese theoretician, appearing a century after List with corresponding ideas and influence, was Akamatsu Kaname, who developed his theory of the flying geese pattern of development (gankō keitai hattenron) during the 1930s and 1940s. Among Japanese economists, Akamatsu has been considered their first world-class theoretician, and his theory was correspondingly influential in Japan, although Japanese intercollegiate politics have dictated Akamatsu’s influence to be strongest in his own alma mater, the modern Hitotsubashi University (Korhonen 1994b). In the postwar situation the theory was important as a prism through which the international ideological onslaught of American-style economism was broken down into Japanese terms. Just like List’s theory, the flying geese theory draws clear distinctions between different categories of countries competing on different levels of development. Its basic conceptual distinction is between leading countries (senshmkoku) and following countries (kōshinkoku) . At the time when the theory was created, the senshinkoku meant the industrialized Euro-American countries, while Asian countries appeared in the position of kōshinkoku (Akamatsu 1932, 1945; Korhonen 1994a:50–63). During the postwar period an additional category, middle level countries
< previous page
page_22
next page >
< previous page
page_23
next page >
Page 23 (chūshinkoku), was created to accommodate those countries that developed more dynamically than other followers. During the 1950s Japan was considered as a middle level country, and when during the 1960s it moved to the status of an advanced country, the position of chūshinkoku was filled by the rapid Asian developers, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. Akamatsu’s theory is a general theory of development, which describes how an undeveloped country can rapidly become a developed country. The primus motor of development is international trade. When an undeveloped country is exposed to the economic power of an advanced industrialized country, its old economic system is swept away, it runs into debt and unemployment, and much misery ensues. However, a new kind of economic culture is also introduced into the country. Within years, decades, or centuries, depending on the strength of the old cultural institutions, it turns from an undeveloped country into a follower, and begins to pursue the advanced countries on the road of development. Classical British economists, who were discussing the characteristics of an already strong economy securely protected by the military capabilities of the mightiest contemporary maritime power, could ignore the importance of the state. A thinker in a peripheral undeveloped country exposed to that power, whether in Germany during the 1830s, or in Japan during the 1930s, could not. The state is important also in Akamatsu’s theory, having the responsibility to nurture local industries with tariff policies and other support, until they are strong enough to dominate the home market. At that stage Akamatsu, just like List, advocates moving to free trade. The idea is not state-led development, but only state-supported development; the main role in the establishment of new industries is given for the skill and cunning of individual, but highly nationalistic, entrepreneurs. Development is a serious national undertaking. After an industry has become strong in the home market, exports follow. Typically, they are cheap consumer goods of low quality. Because of differing levels of development, intensified by the period of misery after the collision of cultures, wage levels and other production costs tend to be lower in the follower country. That is where the comparative advantage on exports is based, and eventually the cheap exports can find a market somewhere. They bring in foreign currency, which enables the import of more foreign products: consumer goods, capital goods, and culture in general. The imports enable the raising of quality and expansion of production, while new industries are also introduced into the country. The basic recipe for development is this: import and learn; produce for the home market and grow strong; export and become internationally competitive. With state protection, entrepreneurs in the follower country adopt suitable industries from the more developed countries, produce at home at low cost, and finally start exporting. The industries adopted are chosen carefully to suit the relative advantage of the country. The process
< previous page
page_23
next page >
< previous page
page_24
next page >
Page 24 is repeated over and over with different products. A strong industrial base is eventually built. The theory maintains that a suitable combination of economic nationalism, international free trade, and a national will to develop guarantees success with a fairly high degree of certainty. Local production does not diminish international trade. Rather, an expansion of trade follows. The follower has to import as much as its balance of payments allows if it is to continue its development, thus providing an expanding market for the advanced countries. Increased trade also draws new countries into the system from the lower end, so that there ensues a long procession of countries at differing levels of development. All of them try to climb toward higher stages. The whole group is flying towards a common goal: the increasing sophistication of industries. The theory presupposes fairly close communication between countries, so that a wide stream of culture can flow from the leaders to the followers. It is far easier to adopt an existing culture than to devise something new, and consequently a successful follower can approach rapidly the level of the leaders. If the momentum holds, the follower can even pass them and become a new leader, as the United States was able to leave the Western European countries behind during the twentieth century. The follower thus has a definite national goal before it. It has to catch up and, if possible, pass the contemporary leading countries. A modern concept of political science gives a useful angle from which to interpret the theory. We can say that the flying geese theory argues for the establishment of what is nowadays called a developmental state. Manuel Castells has the following definition of the concept: A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy. (Castells 1992:56) Structural change in the international economy is the same as the abovementioned catching up, raising the status of the country with respect to other countries. It is based on structural change in the domestic economy, which increases the economic and other capabilities of the country. A high growth rate as a goal is important because it speeds up the process, making the changes visible within a lifetime, and because it leads to rapidly increasing abundance among the populace, allowing the state to claim legitimacy on that score. A crucial part of the definition is the concept of legitimacy. The concept, as usually understood in liberal political theory, is related to the democratic state. A state is considered legitimate when it can establish consensus vis-à-vis civil society. The idea presupposes that the state itself follows the principle of representing society. But also other constructs exist. Besides
< previous page
page_24
next page >
< previous page
page_25
next page >
Page 25 the principle of legitimacy being exercised on behalf of the society, it also can be exercised on behalf of a societal or historical project. The Weberian concept of charismatic leadership comes in a certain sense close to this; as such, a leader usually embodies in his or her person some kind of national mission or project [Weber 1921]. The leader can unite the nation under this project, and derive his/her legitimacy directly from it. The question as to how undemocratic, repressive, unjust, or violent such a state is in practice is largely irrelevant in this connection. The temporal horizon of such a state is not the present, but the future. The future legitimizes the present. A revolutionary state typically uses such a principle of legitimacy. Lenin’s State and Revolution [1918], giving the state the responsibility of first leading the revolution, and then educating the proletariat to communism—before withering away—is a classic example. A revolution involves a fundamental change of the societal order, and in that kind of situation the state substitutes itself for society in the definition of societal goals. The national and international transformation attempted is so vast that its execution cannot be left in the hands of the generally less visionary masses. The state, with its concentration of capabilities, and with its ability for creating visions, has to assume the greatest responsibility. For the vision building only a small number of people is needed. They may be the political leaders of the state, part of the bureaucracy, academics, business leaders, or journalists, but typically they work alongside the state, not against it, and use it as a channel for their influence. A developing state, such as Japan, or the mainly right-wing authoritarian regimes that emerged later in Pacific Asia espousing similar grand projects for economic development, follow a related kind of legitimacy principle. In such a case the societal project respects the social order, although not necessarily a specific social structure. To a certain extent it has to break down the constraints of the old rigidified system to be able to effect change. However, the real revolution at which a capitalistic developmental state aims is a fundamental transformation of the economic order, in both the national and the international system (comp. Castells 1992:57). Economic development is not only a goal in itself, but a means for achieving various political objectives of the developmental state. For the Pacific Asian countries it was a means of survival, as societies, and as states. Economic development was seen as a way of providing a livelihood for the people, creating national cohesion, breaking away from dependency, and acquiring means of national defence. For instance, as Koo and Kim interpret it, in South Korea after the military coup of 1961, General Park Chung Hee began to build up Korea as a nation of wealth and power. This was not only his political slogan, but also his personal dream, and as soon as he had gained power he began to push forward plans for economic development (Koo and Kim 1992:124). Park had received a Japanese education, and had served as an officer in the
< previous page
page_25
next page >
< previous page
page_26
next page >
Page 26 Japanese army during wartime. It is quite plausible that the Japanese spirit of modernization and expansion had been instilled into him at that time, and without doubt he also knew the flying geese theory, as used in Japanese war propaganda. Among the Koreans also can be found a strong desire to correct the national disgrace that Japanese colonization had brought upon them, making them keen to challenge Japan at least economically. However, an equally important ideological source was the American economic advisers, as well as American economic aid, and the opening of the American market to Korean exports. This made exportled economic development a practical possibility. Similar comments can be made in the case of Taiwan. Another crucial aspect was that through belief in their historical mission the leading elite was able to create self-legitimacy in the initial stages. It was needed. The Kuomintang executed between 10,000 and 20,000 people in establishing its hold on Taiwan during 1947–50. Singapore’s socialist People’s Action Party (PAP) liquidated all serious opposition during 1961–5. Hong Kong used British troops to quell riots in 1956, 1966, and 1967, maintained an efficient police force of over 20,000, and deported to China all dissidents perceived as dangerous to the public order. South Korea built up one of the most effective repressive apparatuses in the world, the Korean CIA, and killed, imprisoned, and arrested dissidents, occasionally by the thousands. What is more, an important element was that not only were the working classes repressed and their wages kept below the rise of productivity, but also the previously dominant classes were either destroyed or made subordinate to the state through land reforms, government regulations, and the education of the bureaucratic corps (Castells 1992:64–5). The state made itself supreme over all segments of the society, just like the Meiji state had made itself supreme in Japan during the nineteenth century. In later stages, when the effects of the development projects have begun to appear, governments can seek legitimacy on that basis. For instance, in South Korea President Park in 1973 promised to deliver a ‘$10 billion export, $1000 GNP per capita, and my-car age’ by the end of the decade (Koo and Kim 1992:133). The promise brings to mind the one made by Prime Minister Ikeda in Japan in 1960, of doubling the national income in a decade. That kind of promise could well be made after economic development was set in motion. At the same time the authoritarian character of the state could start to move in a softer and more democratic direction, because direct repression was of less necessity for maintaining the momentum of development. These are some of the political implications of the type of thinking inherent in the flying geese theory. In regard to peace, Akamatsu remained ambivalent. The theory depicts a world of constant change, which is ferociously competitive and highly unstable. An ideal world would be an economic one where struggles would take place through nonmilitary
< previous page
page_26
next page >
< previous page
page_27
next page >
Page 27 means, but in the real world economic struggles tend to be accompanied by political and military confrontations, too. This can be seen when we examine individual nations over short periods, such as decades. Akamatsu saw Hegel as his philosophical inspiration (Akamatsu 1927), and he displayed a sense of optimism similar to Hegel’s in his philosophy of history. When we look over centuries and at the whole of humankind, the furious competition at the level of individual countries produces a vast movement of progress. In Akamatsu’s version of Hegelianism ‘the Spirit of Industrialism’ will lift the whole of humankind from poverty to prosperity within a few short centuries. This Hegelian concept of the ‘cunning of reason’, just as Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, is a form of the political project of economism, according to which the relentless pursuit of individual interest eventually creates a civil order where people can live peacefully and prosperously (Hirschman 1981:17). Akamatsu’s pupils, working in the post-World War II and Cold War environments, were using a different temporal framework. Stability and peace had to be attained as soon as possible. They could not wait for centuries (Kojima 1961:25). Ōkita Saburō’s idea had been to make contributions to Asian development, and in this way create goodwill towards Japan. Kojima Kiyoshi added to this the idea of international economic integration. Kojima’s proposal in 1965 to create a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) (Kojima and Kurimoto 1965; Kojima 1971) corresponded with the Schuman Plan in Europe in the sense that nowadays it is considered to be the intellectual spring from which the subsequent regional integration processes began to flow. The nucleus of the organization was to be composed of the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, while Asian and Latin American developing countries would gather around this nucleus, just like many African countries associated themselves with the contemporary European Economic Community (EEC). However, because of the historical shallowness of regional consciousness in the Pacific, nothing seemingly important resulted from the proposal at the time. The origin and implications of the proposal have been extensively studied elsewhere (Korhonen 1994a). The Japanese administration of Satō Eisaku, especially his Foreign Minister Miki Takeo, expressed interest in the proposal in 1967–8, but as other countries showed little enthusiasm, government level interest disappeared. During most of the 1970s the idea of Pacific integration lived on mainly through two private international organizations. The more important of them—in terms of theoretical discussion and concept building—was the series of Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conferences, started in Tokyo in 1968. These were gatherings of Pacific economists. The other was the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), a group of Pacific business executives, which held its first general meeting in 1968 in Sydney. The development of organizations relevant to Pacific integration has been well analysed by Woods (1993). These two
< previous page
page_27
next page >
< previous page
page_28
next page >
Page 28 organizations continued to discuss and lobby for Pacific economic integration, until the idea again surfaced at the foreign political level at the end of the 1970s. As we have seen, economism in its modern Pacific Asian form has several aspects, some of which are in conflict with each other. Basically economism is a political ideology, which relies exclusively on the pursuance of economic interests for the realization of its two goals. An increase in material wealth is one of these, but an equally important one is the emergence of a viable system of peace. Both of these goals aim for stability. They are typical goals that societies adopt after periods of conflict and misery, when a means to achieve stability and affluence presents itself. However, when economism becomes embodied in the form of a national will for development in a follower country, intent and capable of catching up with its economic model, an immanently dynamic, unstable factor becomes incorporated into the ideology. It aims at the same time for both stability and fundamental change, and these two goals cannot but cause friction with each other. Change and stability can coexist, as they did in nineteenth-century Europe with the economic competition between Britain and Germany, but not without strain.
< previous page
page_28
next page >
< previous page
page_29
next page >
Page 29 3 On being great All time is not equal. In human constructions of the temporal world, some points in time are more important than others. The time measured by the clock is linear in a mechanistic way, and very different from human time. Human time is composed of a procession of stages (Korhonen 1989). The moments at which one stage is ending and another one beginning are perceived to be more important than the periods in between. A ‘moment’ can be longer or shorter, lasting a minute or a few years, depending on the context; its length in terms of mechanical time is not relevant. All that is relevant is the heightened consciousness of living at a time of transition. In the national consciousness such recurring transitional points correspond to changes of government, or the beginning of a new year. At such moments people reflect on what has been accomplished in the past, and make wishes, visions, plans, and decisions for the future. At the turn of decades, and even more at the turn of centuries or millennia, a sense of the significance of the moment tends to be even sharper. It can be noticed that fundamental changes in the world’s political and economic systems tend to happen within a couple of years before or after the change of a decade, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that latent processes become apparent at such moments. At the end of the 1940s a worldwide economic slowdown took place, plunging the pound sterling into a devaluation in 1949, signalling the beginning of the end of Britain’s image as a great power. A new recession hit at the end of the 1950s, but it was mitigated by the emergence of Western European integration, which restored Europe to an influential position in the world (Kojima 1973b:1). The end of the 1960s brought to light the weakening of American hegemony, the leftist radicalization of Western intellectuals, and the early 1970s witnessed the replacement of the Cold War with détente, as well as the emergence of the oil-producing countries as an economic and political force in the world. A decade later the second oil crisis further weakened the Euro-American countries, the Iranian revolution made militant Islam a new force in the world, the debt crisis plunged most of the Third World into misery, détente was replaced in turn by the ‘Second’ Cold War, while Japan and the Asian newly industrialized
< previous page
page_29
next page >
< previous page
page_30
next page >
Page 30 economies emerged as global economic models. The end of the 1980s brought with it the collapse of socialism, a complete ending of the Soviet-American confrontation, a severe new economic downturn affecting mostly the developed countries, and the spread of free trade ideology among most of the developing countries. The beginning of a new period focuses the human mind on placing new interpretations on already existing tendencies, and facilitates the more or less intentional mental construction of a new paradigm. Skilful politicians and other vision builders can often grasp such moments. If they succeed in verbalizing well their visions, a sense of historical change can easily spread throughout the society, and new political forces can be set into motion. Likewise the global economic system, in the form of nervous market forces, is greatly affected by subtle psychological changes, reinforcing, and being reinforced by, similar changes in the global political climate. The idea of measuring time in terms of distinct eras may be even more prevalent in Japan than in Euro-American cultures, because of the way social time has traditionally been measured in the Atlantic societies. Since the introduction of Arabic numerals into Europe, time has officially been measured linearly, with the postulated year of the birth of Christ serving as the point of fixing the scale. The missing year 0 from the scale does not hamper time extending in an uninterrupted procession forwards and backwards. Hayden White has given a beautiful account of the medieval religious sense of time, which was based on this (1987:1–25). Astronomers are still searching for a definite starting point, a positive zero, but in its pure form the European sense of tune means living at a randomly defined point in the magnificent emptiness of infinity. This feeling is also part of the modern Japanese culture, as time there has already been measured in the Western way (seiki) since 1873, when the Gregorian calendar was adopted. However, the birth of Christ was not used as the base line in the official calendar, but rather the calculated year of the legendary installation of the first emperor, Jimmu, in 660 BC. This created a system of imperial linear time (kōki), used alongside the Western one (Crump 1992:108–11). Thus the year 1998 can also be presented as 2658. The intensity with which either of the systems was used in written texts depended on the international political situation, kōki becoming the only accepted one during World War II, and seiki becoming prevalent after the war. Nevertheless, neither of these linear systems was able to replace the much older cyclical system of counting time, nengō, adopted from China in 645. This was based on eras, decreed and given a name by the imperial court, with the beginning of a new era always serving as a new basis for counting the years from one. During most of Japan’s recorded history the duration of an average era lasted hardly more than five years. In 1868 with the Meiji Restoration these eras became linked with the reigns of emperors, so that the crowning of a new emperor also became the
< previous page
page_30
next page >
< previous page
page_31
next page >
Page 31 occasion for naming a new era, but the name was not altered during the reign. This was accepted official practice until 1979, when the Diet passed legislation making the nengō mandatory for official use (Crump 1992:110). Thus the era of Emperor Shōwa (1925–89) lasted until the year 64, when it was replaced with the era of Emperor Heisei. Seiki 1998 is consequently Heisei 10. Also other kinds of periods have been structured into eras or ages (jidai) according to various criteria, such as the location of the capital (Nara jidai or the Nara period), type of government (bakufu jidai or the Shogunate period), the prevalence of war (sengoku jidai or the period of warring states), or the prevalence of economic activity (seichō jidai or the period of rapid growth during the 1960s). The whole post-1945 period has also been presented as a qualitatively distinct period of economism. The postwar period represented a wholly new phase in Japan’s history, in which the laws of prewar history did not apply anymore. The idea that Japan was a qualitatively new economistic being which had shed militarism forever was proposed with epithets like reborn Japanese, and reborn Japan (umare kawatta Nihonjin, shinsei Nihon) (Etō 1967:113, 120). Both seiki and nengō are used in modern Japan. It should be emphasized that the European and Japanese cultures use both ways of counting time, and can perfectly well understand each other; the Japanese lean just a bit more towards seeing time as specific periods, each one of them having a special name, and being qualitatively different from the preceeding and succeeding eras. The late 1960s presented new beginnings in Japan according to both methods of counting. The year 1968 marked the beginning of a new century. A hundred years had passed since the ascension of Emperor Meiji to the throne. The Meiji period (Meiji jidai) (1867–1912) was psychologically important for the Japanese of the 1960s, because that was the period with which they most deeply identified themselves. The Taishō period (1912–25) was viewed mostly as stagnant and conservative; the so-called Taishō democracy was only an elite phenomenon, and did not leave a deep imprint in Japanese minds. Early Shōwa (1925–45) was seen as an even darker period, as it combined the economic hardships of the 1930s with the Pacific War. In contrast to these, in the 1960s the Meiji period was remembered as a time of active modernization of all aspects of Japanese life, a time when things grew rapidly better, and Japan succeeded in almost all of its economic and military undertakings. The Meiji period had witnessed a rapid rise in Japan’s international esteem, up to the rank of a great power. The Japanese of the 1960s saw themselves living in a positive period similar to that of Meiji, having achieved a brilliant recovery after the war, and continuing to modernize themselves rapidly. They identified with the golden age of their past, anticipated an equally good future, and also had a fundamentally positive attitude towards the present (Watanabe 1977:108–9).
< previous page
page_31
next page >
< previous page
page_32
next page >
Page 32 Japanese politicians rode on a tide of optimism, and consciously reinforced these feelings. For instance, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in his policy speech of January 1968, outlining the tasks for the new year, used the concept 100 years of Meiji (Meiji hyakunen), playing down the Taishō and early Shōwa periods, and connecting the present directly with the glorious past (Satō 1968). The present period was glorious because Japan had advanced to join the ranks of leading industrialized countries and had continued to grow faster than any of them. During the same year Satō also started to refer to Japan as an economic great power (keizai taikoku) (Bungei Shunjū 1972:120). During the 1960s Japan passed all the European countries in the size of its GNP, and finally in 1967 it surpassed even West Germany. It had surfaced to a new level, where in economic terms only the Soviet Union and the United States were ahead of Japan. Satō’s expression for this fact was ‘number three in the world’ (sekai daisani) (Satō 1969). In an economistic sense, the size of the GNP was sufficient as a criterion for being a great power. Satō himself did not play very much with the rather nebulous concept, but it spread in the mass media, and became a fashionable attribute used in describing Japan during 1968 (Nakamura 1987:209). It is not enough when one claims oneself to be great; others, preferably one’s peers, must also affirm it. The governments of other advanced countries did not immediately catch on to the Japanese reinterpretation of their nation’s international rank, so the role was performed by renowned Western scholars. European commentators had praised Japan (Correspondents to The Economist 1963; Galtung 1968; Guillain 1969), but the praise was sweetest when it came from an American mouth. Herman Kahn received the greatest attention both in Japan and worldwide (Nagai 1972). From the early 1960s he had been assuring the Japanese that they would have a bright future if their growth rates continued high, and in 1968 he was invited to the Kyoto Sangyō University to give a lecture on the occasion of the Meiji Centennial. Out of that lecture sprang the book The Emerging Japanese Superstate, first published in 1970. Kahn’s predictions were to a large extent based on the writings of the Japanese themselves, and thus the book presented a particular case where Japanese euphoria was echoed back to them from a foreign mouth, being amplified in the process. Kahn’s ideas were repeated over and over in the mass media, meetings, and conferences. A Japanese translation was rushed to bookshops during the same year, and Kahn himself was invited back to Japan to appear on the pages of Chūō Kōron in a discussion with Ōkita Saburō and Mushakōji Kinhide, a renowned political scientist (Kahn et al . 1970). Kahn’s predictions were straightforward. He used the term superstate rather than superpower to delineate Japan’s economistic orientation. Japan did not compete militarily with the two real superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, although the possibility remained
< previous page
page_32
next page >
< previous page
page_33
next page >
Page 33 of militarizing itself, trying to turn into a real superpower. That was a possibility, but not a necessity. If Japan continued to concentrate its energies on economic growth, Kahn predicted that it would pass the Soviet Union around 1975 in the size of its GNP. In 1990 Japan would pass the United States in per capita income, and in 2000 rise to at least the same level as the United States in GNP size (Kahn 1971:4, 130). According to this vision, the twenty-first century would become Japan’s century. Kahn had obviously made predictions to this effect already in his 1968 speech, as references imply (Shiba et al . 1969; Ōkita 1970:63). Besides the slogan of the twenty-first century as ‘Japan’s age’ (Nippon jidai), other similar expressions were circulated in the Japanese media, such as ‘economic strong power Japan’ (keizai kyōkoku Nippon) and ‘giant industrial country Japan’ (kyodai kōgyōkoku Nippon) (Bungei Shunjū 1970:118–9). In a material sense Japan’s new image as an economic great power was based principally on its growth rate. As much of what was said in the public national jubilee was just an endless repetition of the same arguments, we shall take a closer look only at what Ōkita Saburō said of the matter in his articles and speeches at the turn of the decade. Ōkita was at the time a leading member of the Government Steering Committee for producing plans and visions for Japan’s future economic development, and he was also visible publicly, writing and lecturing both in Japan and abroad. Ōkita talked about a virtuous circle of accelerated growth. He presented the following figures for Japanese growth: 8.6 percent for 1952–5; 9.1 percent for 1956–60; 9.7 percent for 1961–5; 12.9 percent for 1966–70 (Ōkita 1970:21). Japan’s growth had not only been high throughout the period, but had also been accelerating continuously. The figures implied, for example, that Japan’s GNP had doubled during the previous four years. If an economy of Japan’s size goes on doubling its GNP within a few years for any considerable length of time, obviously the sky is the only limit for visions built on that basis. It is difficult not to underestimate the impact of this trend on the national mental horizon. Of course, at the time when this shift in the national psychological horizon was taking place, not all Japanese were involved. Ōkita talks about the GNP mentality gap of many Japanese, who still regarded their country as a small and poor one, because the change in GNP had been too rapid for them to comprehend (Ōkita 1972:15). But Ōkita as a trained economist could easily understand the implications of the statistics. During the previous decades he had taken an active part in planning Japan’s growth, and it would have been difficult for him to be too modest at this moment of triumph. As he said at the beginning of 1970: ‘Looking back I feel somewhat embarrassed that our predictions, or prime targets, were too conservative compared with actual progress attained’ (1971:109). If Japanese predictions had in the past been too modest, then it might be a good idea to relax, and make bolder predictions from then on:
< previous page
page_33
next page >
< previous page
page_34
next page >
Page 34 For example if you assume a rate of expansion doubling GNP in every four years, then what will come about after forty years? This means ten power to two and the figure is about 1,024 times the present in forty years. This is just a meaningless figure. (Ōkita 1971:99) It might indeed have been meaningless to claim that Japan, which at that time was already larger economically than West Germany, or the rest of Asia, would be over one thousand times larger in 2010. But the thought experiment itself was far from meaningless. The fact that it could be carried out and presented publicly was highly meaningful. What if the speed of expansion slowed, and Japan were only 500 times larger in 2010? What if Japan were only 100 times larger in 2010? The expansion would still be so enormous that the figures would appear meaningless. The actual meaning of the thought experiment, besides displaying simple satisfaction, was to assure everyone that there was absolutely no stopping Japan from becoming unbelievably rich and powerful within less than a lifetime. This kind of thought experiment was the stuff from which economic great power consciousness was built. A more modest rate of growth, say, only 10 percent a year, would produce less spectacular results. This figure implied that Japan’s GNP would double every seven or eight years, quadruple in fifteen years, and increase tenfold in a quarter century (Ōkita 1971:2), meaning a tenfold increase by 1995. This figure would imply a hundredfold increase by 2020. A still more modest assumption made by Ōkita was that the average growth rate of the GNP for 1970–90 would perhaps slow down to 8 percent (1970:64), but it was not expected to fall much below this, at least during the next decade or two. Whatever the numbers, the vision said in effect that within the foreseeable future Japan’s GNP would expand to at least the size of the combined EEC (1970:31), or that in 2000 Japan would be richer in per capita GNP than the United States. By that date Japan’s national economy might or might not have surpassed the United States, but at least it could not be far behind (1971:3). Great is the power of economism. It can raise countries from devastation and poverty to riches and fame within a few decades. The idea of Japan surpassing the United States in GNP size was uncomfortable, however, because of its political and psychological implications. This idea was hardly touched upon publicly. Arguments always tended to end at Japan attaining economic parity. Japan’s economic life, in the form of the Yoshida doctrine, was based on a junior partnership with the United States, the latter country taking care of political and military responsibilities in the international system. If Japan really surpassed the United States, all this might change, and the easy economistic visions would become meaningless. The US GNP was an absolute mental ceiling which was not willingly raised. Not to break through that ceiling was the
< previous page
page_34
next page >
< previous page
page_35
next page >
Page 35 real criterion on which the statistical prognoses for Japan’s future growth rate were based, rather than basing calculations on the performance of the national economies of major countries. The rhetoric displayed an ambitious wish to climb as far up as possible, but a wish to remain at the same time securely within the simple economistic world. This mental ceiling did not, however, concern Europe. By 1945 it had already fallen from the position of the political and military centre of the world, consequently losing much of the psychological power that it had previously commanded around the world. After 1968 the Japanese could say bluntly that Europe was definitely no longer more advanced than Japan (ima ya Yōroppa wa, kesshite Nihon no senshinkoku de wa nai) (Kuwabara 1968:246). Another way of saying the same thing was that the age when the West has to learn from the East (Seiyō ga Tōyō ni manobu jidal) has begun (Umehara and Shiba 1970). The expressions implied that there was no longer anything special to learn from Europe, or to admire there, or to keep as a model. Europe represented one level of international prestige, and Japan had now passed beyond it. Only the two superpowers remained above Japan. The idea implied also that Japan’s competitive energies should from then on be directed toward catching up to the level of the superpowers. They became the proper peer group for Japan. When contemplating these figures we have to keep in mind that the calculations did not take into account the possibility of currency movements. Japan’s exchange rate had been pegged at 360 yen to the dollar in 1949, and had remained there ever since. The yen had gradually become grossly undervalued, but because it helped exports and GNP growth, the Japanese monetary authorities were unwilling to consider a revaluation. The idea was an absolute taboo, and it could not even be publicly discussed in Japan until August 1971, when President Nixon announced his New Economic Policy (Nakamura 1987:217–8). Thus the visions presented at the turning point of the decade were really far more nebulous than they might appear nowadays. The heights which the Japanese consciousness had reached in seeing themselves as a great and important nation are reflected in a seemingly small but symbolically important event. During the postwar period the United States had become accustomed to enjoying a healthy surplus in its bilateral trade with Japan, but around the middle of the 1960s this relationship inverted, and Japan’s surpluses started to grow. Discussion emerged of a Japanese economic invasion of the United States, and in 1969 the United States opened negotiations on Japanese voluntary restrictions of textile exports. The Japanese entered the negotiations feeling superior because of their economic strength, not as meek junior partners. As the government was also planning further measures to liberalize Japan’s trade, ministers entered the negotiations from a position of moral right. The Japanese seemed to have turned into champions of free trade,
< previous page
page_35
next page >
< previous page
page_36
next page >
Page 36 while the Americans seemed to have become protectionists. Negotiations dragged on with great difficulty, neither side giving in. In June 1970 Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi, and Minister of International Trade and Industry Miyazawa Kiichi, flew to Washington to break the deadlock. They did not succeed, and negotiations broke down with anger on both sides. This was the first time since the war that the Japanese and Americans had disagreed publicly over an important issue, and the first time that the Japanese had decisively said no to the United States. The returning ministers met with applause in Tokyo for taking this proud independent stance, appropriate for an economic great power (Destler et al . 1979). Still, it was not a simple matter to enter the world stage as a great power, not even for a country arguing its status exclusively based on economic criteria. The situation led the way to a complex pattern of differing perceptions. The Japanese claims for being an economic superpower were not always taken seriously either in Japan or abroad, as a great part of the claim referred to the future, and not to the present. Thus, in Japan there was no great hurry to start acting like a superpower. This relationship tended to prevail especially between Japan and the Euro-American countries. Japan did not really try to challenge them in any way. The idea was to catch up and perhaps surpass them in national abundance, but not to evoke conflict. On the other hand, in certain situations the Japanese visions were taken at face value. However, they were not interpreted within the Japanese economistic framework, but rather according to politico-military concepts, resulting in threatening images of an expansionist Japan setting out for an economic and possibly military conquest of neighbouring Asian countries. In global esteem Japan was far from being a great power commensurate with the United States and the Soviet Union, and whatever was claimed occasionally in self-satisfied Japanese public discussion, serious foreign policy-makers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carefully avoided placing Japan on the same level with either of the actual great powers. During the Cold War the most important criterion for determining international status was military capability, not the performance of the economy. The United States and Soviet Union were called superpowers (chōtaikoku), without qualification. Before World War II they would have been called great powers, but their exceptional capability for destruction earned them the qualification of superpower. The term implied basically that the holder of the power commanded military means to annihilate human life from the earth with its nuclear weapons. In addition to nuclear weapons, a superpower possessed a great amount of conventional military capability, political ability to create global alliances, cultural strength to spread its values throughout the globe, and sufficient economic capacity to back up its other characteristics. A superpower was superior in everything, or at least in everything that counted. The economy was not unimportant, but it did not come up first in the list of relevant
< previous page
page_36
next page >
< previous page
page_37
next page >
Page 37 superpower qualifications. Compared with a superpower, an economic great power, or even a GNP superpower as another expression went, was a far smaller entity. Yet the situation was unstable. This instability did not concern only Japan. Also Western Europe, especially the EEC, was in a similar position. Although less spectacular in comparison with Japan, nevertheless in historical terms Europe as a whole had also attained miraculously large growth rates, and Europeans had gained a high level of material affluence. Economistic values were similarly high there, making the military confrontation of the two superpowers over their heads seem senseless. At the same time, however, increased economic capability also brought back the possibility of Europe becoming again a military and political might in the world. Japan and Western Europe were essentially in a similar position, and if Kahn’s book was a fitting symbol of Japan’s new status, a corresponding work in the case of Europe was Johan Galtung’s The European Community, A Superpower in the Making (1972). It may be no coincidence that the titles of the books were so similar; both dealt with the probable consequences of the rapidly acquired new economic capability. Japan’s rise to the rank of an economic superpower similarly opened a great debate on emerging Japanese militarism and imperialism. This situation occurred also because Japan’s rise happened simultaneously with other great changes in the international relations of the Pacific. In 1968 the British government announced that Britain would pull out its troops east of the Suez Canal, and the retreat would be completed by the end of 1971. In a military sense the British retreat may not have been such a big event, except in Singapore and Malaysia, but its symbolical value was remarkable. Britain had been the last remaining Western European military presence in the Pacific region of any real weight, and now that period had ended. In 1969 another similar pull-out was announced, and it had much more effect throughout the region. That event was the announcement of the Guam Doctrine by President Richard Nixon on 25 July, when he presented an outline of the new US Asian policy. Nixon promised that the United States would maintain a close relationship with Asia into the future, but the guaranteeing of Asian security would be shifted directly to Asian shoulders, while the United States would retreat to a supporting role. Unless Asian allies were attacked with nuclear weapons, the United States would not take part in a military conflict in Asia with its own troops (Gaimushō 1970:23–4). First the British decided to leave, and now the Americans had followed suit. The world appeared to be changing on a grand scale at the turn of the decade. Nixon and Satō met on 21 November 1969, and it was then that Nixon promised the return of Okinawa to Japan, and full Japanese sovereignty to be established there in 1972. In his speech to the Diet on 1 December 1970 Satō conveyed the content of their meeting, concentrating mainly on
< previous page
page_37
next page >
< previous page
page_38
next page >
Page 38 the return of Okinawa. It had been his main foreign policy goal, and he had now fulfilled one of his major pledges. Japanese areas lost in World War II were being returned peacefully to Japan thanks to its successful economic performance. Only the Northern Territories occupied by the Soviet Union remained for future prime ministers to take care of. In the spirit of the Guam Doctrine Satō also referred to two other places, South Korea and Taiwan, that would from then on form an area of special importance to Japan’s security (Satō 1970a:347–8). He did not specify the idea, but the prevalent image created was that Japan considered adopting a military role with respect to these two countries. The international reaction, especially in China, was violent. During subsequent months a steady stream of accusations poured from China about the revival of Japanese militarism, deepening of US-led imperialism, and an attempt to recreate the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere. It seems plausible that genuine fears were behind these accusations, and it is also possible that Japan might have tried to raise its military posture if it had not been so directly opposed. China was in a difficult position at the time. After the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, China had distanced itself from the international scene. All of its ambassadors, except the one accredited to Egypt, were recalled for reeducation. This situation lasted for more than two years until April 1969 (Issues & Studies 1969:105). Its ability to act on the international scene thus was seriously limited. The Cultural Revolution also had caused serious disruptions in the economy and, in spite of the country’s large population, China had fallen far behind Japan in economic size. China’s GNP at the time was estimated to be only two-fifths of Japan’s, while Japan’s technological level was far above that of the Chinese (Emmerson 1976:207). The Chinese also felt that they were in mortal danger from the Soviet Union. There had been tension between the two countries throughout the 1960s, intensifying after the start of the Cultural Revolution (Xinhuashe 1968). In March 1969 military clashes broke out along the Ussuri River, spreading westwards as far as the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border. Between March and August numerous skirmishes took place, at least one of them a major battle with thousands of soldiers participating, and in the autumn of 1969 the Soviets openly threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear installations (Adelman and Shih 1993:210–20). The United States was continuing the war in Vietnam, and had stationed nuclear weapons in Okinawa and South Korea. The Chinese were living in a nightmare of nuclear encirclement by the Soviet Union in the north and the United States in the south, relations with India were very bad in the west, and now Japan seemed to be assuming a great power status in the east. Japan had a developed nuclear energy generating capacity; technologically it would have been able to build a small quantity of plutonium bombs, and Prime Minister Satō was openly trying to lure the Japanese population out of its ‘nuclear allergy’ (Hook 1996:146–57). The
< previous page
page_38
next page >
< previous page
page_39
next page >
Page 39 Chinese position really seemed mortally dangerous at the time, and this explains the stream of accusations regarding American capitalist imperialism, Soviet socialist imperialism, and the revival of Japanese militarism. None of Japan’s neighbours was really happy about the new developments. Throughout the region Japan was regarded with suspicion, and nobody welcomed the possibility of it becoming a military power. The event of a Japanese destroyer squadron visiting Southeast Asian ports during autumn 1969, although it went without incident, did nothing to allay their fears. As it came after the announcements of the British pullout and the Guam Doctrine, it looked as if Japan was advancing militarily into Southeast Asia to fill the vacuum. The fact that Japan’s maritime military capability was not adequate for such a task had less value; the event itself as a symbol of a new trend seemed more important. An economic superpower could build warships rapidly if there was a will to do so (Emmerson 1976:302–7). A new regional horizon had been opened with Japan’s new international rank, and it necessitated a rethinking of Japan’s foreign political orientation. Japanese national discussion started to polarize during the late 1960s, and both the extreme right and the extreme left became vocal on the matter. On the left a radical student movement was awakened, criticizing the economistic growth policies of the government, and the friendly pro-American stance. On the right such a famous figure as Mishima Yukio, who ran a small private army, tried in 1970 to encourage the Japanese Self-Defence Force into rebellion, wanting a national return to prewar values of military virtue, the attempt ending in his ritual suicide. A similar debate can be seen in the pages of general interest magazines. In the rightist Bungei Shunjū the new possibilities as a great power were contemplated. A staff writer summarized the discussion in the following way: For Japan to turn from an economic great power to a real great power, it would have to win the trust of comrades in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and become chosen as their leader, but it would have to adopt a new character of a leader for that. (Bungei Shunjū 1970:130) According to this analysis, it might be possible for Japan to create an alliance system from among the poorer developing countries, but not from the advanced Euro-American countries. In this sense Japan was seen as a direct competitor to China and the Soviet Union for influence in the Third World. Those countries, and not the advanced ones, were seen as Japan’s ‘comrades’. Japan as a great power would necessarily have to create a group of its own outside of the Euro-American system; not necessarily antagonistic to it, but clearly separate. That would mean a rebirth of a certain aspect of the Meiji period, when large navies and the possession of colonies were the marks of a great power; in the post-World War
< previous page
page_39
next page >
< previous page
page_40
next page >
Page 40 II situation the possession of nuclear weapons and a multi-layered alliance system came to serve a similar purpose. Bungei Shunjū did not directly advocate powerful Japanese armaments, but Japan would have to shed its exclusively economistic orientation, and assume a high posture at least in the political sector. This can be taken as a typical view of the Japanese right. There were few people who really advocated a strong military build-up, but there was a far larger segment that wanted Japan to arm itself powerfully enough to get rid of military dependence on the United States at least in terms of conventional weaponry, and to rise at least politically to a situation on a par with the United States, where Japan would be a leader of its own group, and nobody’s follower. The goal is the traditional romantic one: that the Japanese would be regarded as citizens of a proud great power, not as economic animals, as Pakistan’s Prime Minister Ali Bhutto had described the Japanese during the early 1960s (Kataoka 1980:20). Left-wing intellectuals were at loggerheads with this vision. They mostly congregated around the journal Sekai, whose writers tended to use the rhetoric of political science, but similar articles could also be found in the more centrist Child Kōron, which tended to favour economic rhetoric. These people interpreted Japan’s new status with serious misgivings. Japan was usually graded correctly as a middle level power, with few exclamations regarding any kind of great power status, but the idea that Japan had become an extremely capable actor still permeated all discussion. The discussion not only marked a division between the Japanese left and right, but the oppositional type of rhetoric also reflected the emergence of the dependencia school of international relations. Worldwide young or simply radical social scientists started to deal with concepts such as metropole and satellite (Frank 1967), imperialism, neocolonialism, dependence (Galtung 1971), and the creeping militarization of previously peaceful societies. Many early proponents of the theory had something to do with Latin America. Its origins were in the Latin American criticism of their stick-carrying North American neighbour, and its original empirical content was built on an analysis of inter-American international relations. It is perhaps most appropriate here to use the Spanish term, dependencia, for the theory, since although most of its internationally famous proponents were North Americans or Western Europeans, it really represented an instance of Latin American global ideological influence. The idea of Japanese imperialism in Asia (Ajia ni okeru Nihon no teikoku shugi) became the favourite point of view from which to analyse Japan’s relations with other Asian countries. The dependencia theory argued that a peripheral, economically weaker country necessarily would be harmed, exploited, impoverished, and its development would be hampered if it fell under the sphere of influence of a developed economic power. Military coercion would sooner or later be needed to keep the peripheral country in its place. This meant that the expansion of Japan’s
< previous page
page_40
next page >
< previous page
page_41
next page >
Page 41 economic relations with the other Asian countries could not be viewed with anything but alarm. A typical way of structuring the argument can be taken from Seki Hiroharu, a political scientist at Tokyo University at the time: Before the war, during the 1930s, the pattern of Japan’s advancement from Manchuria to China was that economic advancement was connected with military considerations, which then rapidly led to a wish to defend militarily the expansion of Japan’s economic sphere of power. (Seki et al . 1970:89) If the government and the political right tended to compare the present, i.e. 1970s, with the Meiji period, the political left used the 1930s for the same purpose. They also tended to avoid the traditional Japanese way of perceiving time as distinct periods, using the Western linear style instead, and consequently did not accept the view that any fundamental difference between prewar and postwar Japan could be found. The same militaristic forces were at work during both decades, and Japan was an essentially similar entity. That is why analysis of the past, and especially of the 1930s, was so important. What happened then was going to happen again, if the tendency was not exposed to strong light and opposed. Japan’s postwar economic advancement, whipped on by the leading elite, consisting of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, bureaucrats, and large companies, could be seen as part of a national strategy of expansion, preparing the ground for considerations of military security, leading later to the necessity of military advancement into Asia. The emerging Southeast Asian criticism of Japanese business practices, transferred to Japanese discussion with concepts like the Ugly Japanese (minikui Nihonjin), Yellow Americans (kiiroi Amerikajin), and Second America (daini no Amerika), which were direct applications of the criticism of American imperialism to the Japanese case, were understood as evidence that the necessity for Japan to subdue Southeast Asian criticism was rapidly arriving. Japan’s ‘big power disease’ (taikoku shugi byō) (Yamamoto Susumu 1971) was viewed with alarm as likely again to engulf the whole of Asia in warfare, bloodshed, misery, starvation, and stagnation. The turn of the decade was a special period, when Japan and its relation to the rest of the world had to be interpreted anew, and it was natural that rightist and leftist interpretations differed widely. The Japanese government was rather embarrassed about the reaction from Japan’s own intellectuals and from neighbouring Asian countries (Gaimushō 1971:3), and various government officials issued assurances that there was no attempt being made to revive militarism in Japan, and that Japan had no intention of building a nuclear weapons capability. Yet behind the scenes heated debate broke out over Japanese armaments. Already in 1966 discussion had emerged regarding autonomous defence, which also appeared in official statements. At the same time official references to
< previous page
page_41
next page >
< previous page
page_42
next page >
Page 42 American forces assisting Japan in a land war virtually disappeared, and also references to American help in air and sea defence were played down. Especially after Nixon’s Guam Doctrine the tendency toward a conceptual deAmericanization of Japan’s defence grew stronger, but in practice not very much was changed in its defence orientation (Momoi 1977). The situation remained open, however. For instance in 1970 Japan signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but then refused to ratify it (Axelbank 1977:11). The possibility of some day becoming a military great power was thus left open. Still, the decision was left for the future. The legitimacy of LDP governments since Ikeda’s time had been based on national economic performance, and as everything was going smoothly in that sector, there was no reason to rock the boat by trying to change orientation. Satō’s government attempted to solve the situation by reverting ever more strongly to an economistic stance, while at the same time trying to enjoy the elation of the economic great power status. In a speech in early 1970, referring to the beginning of a new decade, Satō talked about a new age (shinjidai). Satō’s tone in the speech was jubilant, and not only because his policy goals of the return of Okinawa, and the continuation of Japan’s high growth were secured. In elections in December 1969 for the House of Representatives he had also received the blessing of the electorate for his policies, as the Liberal Democrats won an overwhelming victory, gaining 300 seats out of 486, the greatest number any party had thus far won since 1932 (Ishikawa 1987:78–9). Satō promised that after ten years Japan would be three times stronger economically than in 1970 (1970b:350). Ikeda had started this type of argument, promising a doubling of the national income within a decade, and Satō simply tried to make a more magnificent claim by promising a tripling within a similar period. From then on the age of imitation and followership (mohō, tsuizui no jidai) would be over, and the age of setting its own goals had dawned for Japan. During the 1970s Japan would build a new society, roads and bridges, create a fine communication system from one end of the archipelago to the other, and bring the whole nation into balanced development. Poverty would be abolished, and education increased, bringing enlightenment to people throughout the land. The 1970s would be a grand decade of development (idaina hatten no jūnen), and Japan would become a prosperous country without comparison anywhere in the world. Satō also gave strong assurances that Japan would not fulfil its coming great international role by military means. Ōkita Saburō summarized most eloquently the general policy line adopted by the Japanese government, resonant of the constitution: Japan would not seek to solve international disputes by use of force. This basic posture is supported by the majority of the people at present. It is believed that this posture will remain basically unchanged in the
< previous page
page_42
next page >
< previous page
page_43
next page >
Page 43 year 2000. Japan’s contribution toward international peace, therefore, should be made not through playing a policeman’s role, but rather through efforts to constantly mitigate international tension in order to prevent conflicts from erupting. From this viewpoint, more positive economic and technical aid to assist the development of other Asian countries will be the basic posture of Japan’s policy toward Asia. (Ōkita 1970:72) The expansion of the military sector, advocated by the rightists and feared by the leftists, was definitely rejected, but Japan would try to assume the characteristics of a leader in the economic sector, and through that medium try to influence regional politics as well. Japan’s ‘comrades’, from among whom the leadership position would be sought, were in Asia; the rest of the Third World was left aside. There was really nothing new in this; the Asian developing countries had been an area of special interest to Japan from the mid-1950s onwards, but the economic means for implementing policies were now vastly greater. Japan would not try to be a policeman, but rather an economistic peacemaker. It would buy its way through disputes, rather than fight through them as it had done during the prewar period. The goal of a peaceful economistic Asia, where no military conflicts needed to arise, was also inherent in this view. Economic cooperation on a grand scale was becoming the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy formulation. Ōkita himself was not only involved in general economic planning, but he was at the time also chairman of the Council on Foreign Aid Policy (Ōkita 1971:63). He said that 1969 presented the opening of a new stage in Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia, characterized by plans for a massive expansion of technical and economic aid flows from Japan. Both Foreign Minister Aichi and Finance Minister Fukuda Takeo had spoken about doubling Japan’s aid to Southeast Asia during the coming five years. Ōkita also reported other similar speeches, and related how in 1969 Satō’s government had incorporated Aichi’s and Fukuda’s ideas into government policy towards Southeast Asia (Ōkita 1970:4–5). It is important to clarify here what Southeast Asia meant in the Japanese rhetoric of the time. The concept itself was a French invention from the early nineteenth century (Brocheux 1994; Brunei 1995), but its use became prevalent during World War II (Emmerson 1984). For the purpose of coordinating a defence against the advancing Japanese army the British established in Ceylon their military headquarters, called South-East Asia Command, under Lord Louis F.A.Mountbatten. After Indochina and Malaya fell under the Japanese, the defence of Southeast Asia basically meant the defence of India. The name remained after the war, and became associated with the Colombo Plan from its instigation in 1950. This was a loose organization coordinating economic assistance for the area, and as it was mainly inspired by the British, India continued
< previous page
page_43
next page >
< previous page
page_44
next page >
Page 44 to hold the central place in the concept of Southeast Asia. The Japanese had occasionally used the name Nantō Ajia before the war, although the more usual expression had been Nan’yō (South Seas). During the war it was changed to Tōnan Ajia (Eastsouth Asia), but its use became prevalent only after 1954, when the Japanese became involved with the Colombo Plan. Also they were interested mostly in India, because it was widely seen to have the best prospects for future development, and the Japanese naturally wanted to be part of the success. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967, but although it tried to monopolize the name of the geographical region for itself, it was not taken seriously by the Japanese government at the time. It was not believed to be a viable organization, and indeed seemed to have arrived at the point of crumbling soon after its instigation, as Malaysia and the Philippines entered into a serious dispute about the status of Sabah (Watanabe A. 1992:78–95). Officially the concept thus meant the non-socialist countries reaching from Pakistan in the West via Indochina to Indonesia, India being the central country. Indians clearly regarded themselves as the leaders of Southeast Asia also during the 1960s (Singh 1966). In the much looser general discussion the concept included Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Even Okinawa was included in certain instances (Ōkita 1970:3, 18; Imakawa 1970; Maiya 1970; Nakagawa 1971; Yamamoto 1971; Noguchi 1972; Maruyama 1973). Southeast Asia thus meant the non-Middle East, non-socialist, and non-Japanese part of Asia. In this broad sense there was really not much difference between the concepts of Asia and Southeast Asia; the latter was simply the relevant part of the former, and thus in practice more or less the same thing. The Middle Eastern countries were culturally and geographically too far away to exist much on the Japanese mental horizon. The socialist countries were excluded because there was little hope for cooperation with them within the context of the Cold War. South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were included because they were poor developing countries, and even Okinawa was comparatively undeveloped, and not part of Japan proper until 1972. The Japanese concept of Southeast Asia thus implied a combination of poverty, access in terms of economic relations, and a certain psychological closeness compared to other parts of the world. The concept also implied the possibility of development. During the 1950s India had been expected to develop rapidly, and although it did not fulfil these expectations, at least South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong entered the path of accelerated growth during the 1960s, and there were high expectations that other countries might follow suit (Ōkita 1971:18–30). This large, diffuse and poor, but promising area was the special region chosen as the focus for Japan’s economic foreign policy. Japan would study there how to be an economic great power in an international context.
< previous page
page_44
next page >
< previous page
page_45
next page >
Page 45 Satō in his policy speech for the decade promised that Japan would concentrate its economic strength on helping Asian countries. The 1970s would be turned into the decade for Asian development (Ajia kaihatsu no jūnendai) (Satō 1970b). Although he did not promise any doubling or tripling of Asian incomes within the decade, the basic idea was that the same pattern of development and growth that had taken place within the Japanese economy could be repeated in the larger Southeast Asian context. Foreign Minister Aichi made similar promises. The development of Southeast Asian countries would be supported with expanded Japanese aid, by offering a market for their exports and encouraging Japanese private investment. The goal of these measures would be the spreading of peace, and the creation of a deepening feeling of solidarity between Japan and Southeast Asian countries (Aichi 1970). All existing fora for regional cooperation were to be utilized for this end, namely the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA), and the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). Both organizations had been instigated in 1966, the former through Japanese and the latter through South Korean initiatives, but neither of them was able to generate much regional cooperation, and both became defunct after South Vietnam ceased to exist in 1975. Other usable forums were the two United Nations organizations, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which was also a product of Japan’s 1966 interest in Southeast Asia (Yasutomo 1983). These were the officially recognized fora. They were not much, and none of them functioned too well, but they were all that existed at the time. It should be noted that the Japanese government wanted to use multilateral channels, where it would not appear especially dominant, and unnecessarily arouse Southeast Asian antagonism (Yasutomo 1995). The Japanese leading elite was enthusiastic about Japan’s nascent greatness, foreign scholars like Herman Kahn were echoing these views, and many domestic and foreign observers feared a possible Japanese attempt to become a regional military power. Much furore seemed to be created by Japan’s rising international rank. Yet, many instances remained where the new interpretation had not broken through, and where the Japanese were not taken seriously at all. A typical event happened in October 1970, when Prime Minister Satō gave a speech in the UN General Assembly. Right before him Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyiko had given a speech to a fully packed room, which responded with thundering applause. When Satō’s turn came, most delegations and members of the audience left, and he had to talk to an almost empty hall (Emmerson 1976:396). The world at large was still measuring power mainly in political and military terms, and a country claiming great power status merely on the basis of its economic achievements tended to be ignored.
< previous page
page_45
next page >
< previous page
page_46
next page >
Page 46 The Soviet Union never took Japan seriously. It tried to attract Japanese money for Siberian development, but the government was willing to take it only on Soviet terms. In diplomatic exchanges the Japanese had to suffer slights to their status. For instance in 1972, when Foreign Minister Ōkita Masayoshi visited Moscow, he tried in vain to meet Leonid Brezhnev, who refused to see him (Curtis 1977). The rank of a foreign minister from an obscure middle ranking country beyond Siberia was too low to necessitate a meeting with the head of a superpower. The United States, Japan’s only ally, was not much more considerate, as was seen in the handling of American-Chinese détente in 1971. In Japan a widely published joke had already been circling, according to which former Ambassador Asakai, while stationed in Washington, had suffered from a recurring nightmare about receiving a telephone call at two o’clock in the morning, with Secretary of State Dean Rusk telling him: ‘Oh, by the way, we have just recognized Communist China.’ In reality things went quite far in that direction. On 15 July 1971 Secretary of State William P. Rogers telephoned Ambassador Ushiba Nobuhiko to tell him that within thirty minutes President Nixon would announce publicly his decision to visit Peking (Emmerson 1976:223). Japan had been bypassed completely in the course of the secret negotiations. The American handling of the matter made the Japanese political leadership, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), look like fools. It also effectively showed the Japanese the limits of being an economic power within the context of a politico-military world. Both Japan and China could, according to different criteria, be considered regional great powers, and the United States could have chosen either of them as a major player for the new scheme of organizing the international system as a game of balance among great powers. China fitted the requirements for this game much better than Japan. Although it was poor, and not an especially high economic performer, at least it was progressing along its own path of development. China possessed a large army, had acquired missile capacity, and had detonated a nuclear device, making it one of the chosen few of the nuclear club. China also had a following among some Third World countries. It was not large, Albania and North Korea being the principal ones at the time, but at least China possessed a multi-continental alliance system, as a great power should. Last but not least, adopting China as part of the American alliance system, thus furthering the division among the socialist countries, made a lot of strategic sense. With the Kissinger-Nixon balance of power politics, China was raised to the status of a great power in global esteem, nearly to the same level as the Soviet Union and the United States, while both Japan and the Western European countries remained as middle level economistic countries within the world system. This meant that not very much had changed, after all. Both domestic and foreign pressures were keeping Japan in its economistic role. Japanese
< previous page
page_46
next page >
< previous page
page_47
next page >
Page 47 self-confidence had risen greatly, enabling its leaders to engage in grand vision building, but even they were limited to the economic sector, and geographically to the Southeast Asian region. The recent diplomatic humiliations were also driving home the message that Japan was not fit to play any major role in the global politico-military world. Economism within the Southeast Asian setting was the only real place where some kind of big power role could be attempted.
< previous page
page_47
next page >
< previous page
page_48
next page >
Page 48 4 Investing in development Becoming an economic great power did not generate political problems alone, but also economic ones. Slogans like ‘resources small power’ (shigen shōkoku) started to circulate in discussion at the same time as the big power images (Edström 1988:79–80). For instance Amaya Naohiro, who had just become the chief theoretician to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (Johnson 1986:287–8), pointed out that if Japan’s economy went on growing at the rate expected, the sheer scale of import and export trade in raw materials and finished goods, transport within Japan, and related matters would create problems of staggering proportions. Almost all oil came from the Middle East, and such concentration made Japan vulnerable. A steady rise in the price of oil could also be expected. Part of the problem could be circumvented by diversifying sources and using new raw materials, such as natural gas, but there was no escaping the conclusion that Japan’s future did not lie in the expansion of heavy industry (Amaya 1969). Another serious problem was pollution. The Japanese word for pollution, kōgai, literally ‘public harm’, had come into use at the beginning of the 1960s, accompanied by revelations of such extreme cases of industrial pollution as the Minamata disease caused by mercury poisoning, itai-itai disease caused by cadmium leaked into rice fields, which resulted in painful splintering of bones, and Yokkaichi asthma caused by air pollution around Japan’s largest petrochemical complex near Nagoya. In 1964 the first successful campaign by local residents against plans to build an industrial complex was launched, and around the same time legal measures against pollution began to be implemented. In 1967 the Basic Environmental Pollution Prevention Law went into effect, but it still contained a clause to the effect that the prevention of pollution should be carried out in harmony with economic development. In the 1970 revision and strengthening of the law the clause was finally abolished (Nakamura 1987:100–2). Pollution had become a serious problem in itself, and its prevention rapidly became a much more important value in public discussion than economic growth. Pollution was depicted as a threat to the whole future of the Japanese people, causing them to drown in their
< previous page
page_48
next page >
< previous page
page_49
next page >
Page 49 own filth (Ui 1971). MITI took the question of pollution very seriously. It threatened Mill’s whole existence as one of Japan’s most important ministries, and put into question the entire success of its postwar industrial policy. At least one incident of suicide of a high MITI official was connected to a specific pollution issue, and the period from 1968 to the early 1970s was the most difficult time for the ministry during the postwar period (Johnson 1986:275– 83). Blame for the dark side of Japan’s economic success was being piled on MITI’s shoulders. A demand for a restructuring of Japan’s industries was thus felt to be extremely pressing. The new idea was to become a post-industrial state. It became a fashionable slogan during the Ōsaka Exposition in 1970, where futuristic technology bordering on science fiction was demonstrated for both Japanese and foreign visitors (Reischauer and Craig 1978:301). The post-industrial society, or third civilization concept, borrowed from the American futurologist Daniel Bell (1966, 1974), pointed to a future when Japan would do away with low-paid and polluting industries, and enter a stage when its national income would be accumulated by clean knowledge-intensive industries, high technology, and services (Ōkita 1970). A national committee, composed of representatives of the business world, bureaucrats and academicians, among them Ōkita and Kojima Kiyoshi, was organized to formulate the outlines of the industrial policy of the 1970s, and its recommendations were similar (Sangyō kōzō shingikai 1971). A lively discussion of necessary changes was also going on concerning Japan’s foreign economic relations. Ōkita had already put the idea of how to deal with Japan’s pollution problem very well in 1970 in a speech before an Australian audience: Some of us start wondering why we should produce so much steel—polluting our water and air—and export steel to the United States. It may not be very wise for us and also for our petrochemical industries and others to follow this line. ‘Why should we not export our pollution to other countries?’, we sometimes joke among ourselves. (Ōkita 1971:104) The idea may sound crude when put in these terms, but nevertheless it was a rational solution. An important research project for studying Japan’s new international economic relations was inaugurated by the Japan Economic Research Center in 1972. It was directed by Kojima Kiyoshi. In English the project was called Economic Cooperation in the Western Pacific, while its Japanese name was Nishi-Taiheiyō keizaiken no kenkyū (study of the Western Pacific economic area). The geographic metaphor used here was the Pacific rather than Asia. This partly reflected the fact that most researchers connected with the project were PAFTAD economists, whose focus was the whole Pacific area, and partly the fact that at that time Australia featured largely in Japanese plans for dealing with raw material, energy, and pollution problems. Oceania was not part
< previous page
page_49
next page >
< previous page
page_50
next page >
Page 50 of Southeast Asia, but the wider term Western Pacific enabled discussing both regions as one unit. The difference in the names of the project is also interesting, because the English name implied only cooperation, but the Japanese name implied an integrated area, where Japan would necessarily have been the leading member. The geographical boundaries of the project, like those of most Japanese discussion at the time, represented a separate economic region in the Western Pacific. Within the project, Amaya Naohiro advocated the following model for Japan: It is essential for Japan to endeavour a gradual switchover from being a production centre of the world to being a centre of the planning and selling system of the world. In this way will Japan achieve higher ‘knowledge intensification’ of industries and become the large scale Switzerland of the East. (Amaya 1973:49) The reference to Switzerland does not here symbolize a small country. The purpose was to become a large-scale Switzerland—a peacefully rich, democratic, steadfastly independent, but politically a low profile country, which was already far advanced as a global centre of services. In this sense Switzerland was perfectly suitable for Japan as a model. Japan could strain to achieve a similar position in the Western Pacific, becoming the brains of the region, and making itself clean and beautiful during the process. The ecological threat to Japan’s existence was thus turned into a profitable business opportunity. MITI’s thinking on Japan’s external economic relations has been described as simply an extension of domestic economic policy. Earlier that had meant a simple promotion of exports, the world outside Japan being seen mainly as a market, but now that MITI was trying to reorient itself to the necessary structural changes within Japan, the new policy goal became the export of certain types of industries away from Japan, and the opening of Japan’s market to begin importing the goods of these industries. Of course MITI was not a monolith, and there was serious infighting concerning the new orientation. Amaya’s ideas should be understood as those of an intellectual leader of the new internationalizers, but they were gradually gaining ground within the ministry. This point is relevant, because when MITI turned in this direction it could more easily cooperate with the MOFA, which wanted similar policies as symbols of Japan’s new independent non-American policies. An independent foreign policy was important for the MOFA after the political Nixon shock in 1971, which had humiliated the ministry (Sudō 1992:137–44). Where would the heavy and chemical industries, which were foremost in Amaya’s mind, be placed? As he put it, they were heavily environment consuming industries. They consumed resources, land, water, social capital, and produced pollution. From the larger ecological perspective, they no longer appeared as industries generating national wealth, but
< previous page
page_50
next page >
< previous page
page_51
next page >
Page 51 rather diminishing it. Australia in its turn had a huge land mass, abundant resources of industrial raw materials like iron ore, bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, and salt, as well as raw materials suitable for generating energy, such as coal, oil, natural gas, and uranium. Australia was also populated sparsely, so few people would suffer from pollution, and the country was in urgent need of further industrialization. Compared with Japan, Amaya called Australian manufacturing a Lilliputian system. The Japanese market was essential for the well-being of Australia, because Britain was to enter the EEC in 1973. The situation was perfect for a romance of Japanese-Australian relations. Japan had the capital, technology, management skills, and marketing ability, while Australia had the materials, space, and energy. It was a potentially perfect love story between the two countries (Amaya 1973:41–8). Kojima was more interested in the labour-intensive manufacturing industries, such as textiles, which had been the special case on which the flying geese theory had been built. Pollution was not a serious problem in their case, but rising wage levels, and a currency that finally started to appreciate in 1971, caused worry. In August President Nixon announced his New Economic Program. The dollar’s convertibility to gold ended, and Western European countries shifted to a floating exchange rate system. Japan belatedly did the same, after massive dollar sales in anticipation of revaluation of the yen finally forced Japanese monetary authorities to face the inevitable. The yen appreciated from 360 to 308 yen to the dollar (Nakamura 1987:219). Japanese workers were also pricing themselves out of the traditional labour-intensive industries by seeking opportunities for better paid jobs: It can be confidently expected that by 1980 the Japanese worker will enjoy a 35 hour, five-day working week and that wages will be about four times their present level. (Kojima 1973b:6) If work hours were shortened that much, and wage levels quadrupled, all Japanese traditional labour-intensive industries would lose their competing power by the end of the decade. Japan would be shedding much of its industrial capacity during the 1970s, the same industries that Akamatsu had watched grow. The same phenomenon would probably also affect such newer industries as the assembly of radios, television sets, taperecorders, cameras, or hulls of ships, which used lots of labour. Just as in the case of the heavy and chemical industries analysed by Amaya, only large-scale foreign investment seemed to be a viable solution for Japan. However, investment was a politically difficult issue at the turn of the decade. Kojima wrote mostly with Pacific integration in mind, and his thinking was heavily influenced by the debates that were taking place, for example, in the PAFTAD conferences. The conferences formed a microcosm of the intellectual currents of the whole Pacific area. They gathered
< previous page
page_51
next page >
< previous page
page_52
next page >
Page 52 together top-ranking scholars, who also were influential in their respective countries as teachers, intellectual leaders, consultants, and advisers to governments. Participants came from Japan and other Asian countries, North and South America, Oceania, the Soviet Union, and even guests from Western Europe appeared occasionally. The economic development, political orientation, history, and future prospects of these countries and regions were discussed under various theoretical frameworks. The conference series presented fertile ground for both the development and dissemination of ideas. The new intellectual currents were taken home easily from the conferences to be mulled over and then spread among others. The conference series had started originally in 1968 to study Kojima’s proposal about forming a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) among the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, which were at that time the only industrialized countries in the area (Kojima 1968b), and only economists from these countries participated. However, already in 1969 economists from Asian countries were invited to PAFTAD. The enlargement coincided with the fact that the idea of a free trade area was found unviable at the time, and it dropped below the foreign political horizon in the proposed countries. PAFTAD needed to turn from the study of integration to the study of development and related questions in the Pacific region (Kojima 1969). The shift of topic was completed at the third conference in 1970 in Sydney. The Australians chose ‘Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific’ as the general theme of the conference. It was a narrow, clear-cut economic theme fitting PAFTAD’s new self-image, but at the same time it succeeded in touching a nerve representing the radicalization of global intellectual trends among economists. The most spectacular presentation of the new radical economic analysis was given by Stephen Hymer, who had become an authority on the behaviour of large American oligopolistic companies in Latin American countries. He pointed out the political clout that these powerful companies enjoyed in the weak developing countries, and on this ground formulated the following vision of the future world: This new international division of labour implies a continued dependence on the part of the underdeveloped countries as they specialize in the later stages of the product cycle. Direct investment thus has a dual aspect: it brings capital, technology and managerial skill, but it centralizes the means for producing capital, technology and organizing ability. The relationship between the developed and the underdeveloped countries may become like the relationship between major and minor cities, the one continuously innovating and dispersing activity to surrounding areas, the other having continuously to adjust to changes in the centre. The gap could then remain permanent as the relationship between leader and lagger is reproduced through the vehicle of corporate control. (Hymer 1972a:44)
< previous page
page_52
next page >
< previous page
page_53
next page >
Page 53 Hymer introduced into PAFTAD views of the new radical leftist analysis of international relations that was gathering momentum during the late 1960s in the Americas and Western Europe. Hymer then combined this current of thought with American economic theories, especially with Raymond Vernon’s analysis of the product cycle (Vernon 1966), mentioned in the quote. This is highly interesting, because the Japanese were at the same time presenting the theory of the flying geese pattern of development as a form of the product cycle theory. Both theories viewed international economics as a flow of the various types of economic activity from advanced to less advanced countries; Vernon tended to focus only on companies and their short cycles of specific products, while Akamatsu’s interest as a development economist had been on the longer cycles of whole countries and industries. In their cultural modesty the Japanese seldom used the name flying geese theory in international fora, partly because it was connected with the war, and partly because American neoclassical vocabulary dominated the discussion. The flying geese theory was thus hidden in English texts under euphemisms like ‘dynamic international division of labour in the process of industrialization’ (Ōkita 1971:34). Of course Hymer did not take issue with the flying geese theory, as it was still internationally unknown at the time. Hymer’s target was a more worthy one: the assumptions of the dominant neoclassical theory itself. For instance, in the quote he snipes directly at such leading American economists as Harry G.Johnson, who in his writings had expounded continuously the view that ‘the essence of direct foreign investment is the transmission to the “host” country a “package” of capital, managerial skill, and technical knowledge’ (Johnson 1972a:2). According to this view, important assets were being transferred to the developing countries, and consequently development was taking place there. It could be measured by statistical analysis that countries were undeniably growing, both the investing and host countries were benefiting, and things were as they should be. Hymer’s point of attack was that according to ordinary statistics there was development in developing countries, but it was uneven. Within the host countries, the activities of multinational companies tended to benefit only a small elite, while the majority of people remained in poverty. The investing practices of big oligopolistic companies from the United States and Western Europe, with Japanese companies starting to join them, tended to create a freeze in the international division of labour. The earlier stages of the product cycle—research, planning, organizing, financing, production of the newest models, marketing, and innovation in general—where large profits and wellpaid jobs were to be found would be concentrated in the rich countries. The poor host countries would specialize in the lower end of the product cycle, where standardized goods were produced with low skills at low wages. This would not offer too many job
< previous page
page_53
next page >
< previous page
page_54
next page >
Page 54 opportunities. The whole group of countries would indeed develop, but that would not change the structural relationship between the rich and poor countries, nor would it much alleviate poverty in the latter. The structure appeared frozen, and might be expected to remain so for eternity. It is interesting to note how small nuances in the vocabulary of different schools of thought differed in the placing of countries at different levels of development. They can be presented in a simple scheme: developed—developing (neoclassical concepts) developed—underdeveloped (dependencia concepts) advanced—developing (Japanese concepts) senshinkoku—hatten tojōkoku The neoclassical pair of concepts presents a world where the rich countries have already ‘developed’, but curiously the term as a grammatical form does not necessarily point to further development. It is in the past tense, and represents a stable state. Being developed portrays the basic norm where all less developed countries should orient themselves. The term ‘developing’ is active. The neoclassical theory basically assumes that once development has been set into motion in poor countries, with the help of free investment and free trade, they will eventually catch up with the rich ones. The result will be a peaceful and democratic world, with all countries at the same developmental level. Free economic activity, as the invisible hand, will in the long run benefit everyone in a maximal way, and lead to an acceptable level of affluence throughout the world. In contrast to this, the radical theory presents two stationary forms, ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’. The situation is seen as frozen. The ‘leaders’ and the ‘laggards’ always remain the same, if the laws of economics are allowed to reign. There are political ways to break the structure, such as kicking out the overbearing and exploitative multinationals, equalizing the deeply stratified social structures, and starting afresh on a better road to development. But unless this is done, the situation will remain frozen. This was principally what the socialist revolution was all about. The generally anticommunist but populist Latin American countries attempted to achieve this process by nationalization and high tariff protection against the economic imperialists. The vocabulary that the Japanese used in their English texts differed from the original Japanese, and the English terms should be treated as imperfect translations. The term ‘advanced’ is a translation of senshinkoku, which means ‘countries that advance in front’, while ‘developing’ is a translation of hatten tojōkoku, meaning ‘countries on the road of development’. Both of them are active concepts, and suggest constant movement. The Japanese terms did not imply a steady state at all. If the radical critics talked about leaders and laggards, the Japanese were
< previous page
page_54
next page >
< previous page
page_55
next page >
Page 55 thinking in terms of leaders and followers. There was common ground between them, as both were of the opinion that development in any existing international system also requires political measures. It is a serious business, which cannot be left solely to market forces, as neoclassical theory would dictate. It involves the participation of the whole nation, with the state playing an active role. The crucial difference between them was that while the dependencia theory advocated direct economic and political opposition of the developed countries, the flying geese model recommended a close follower role, so that a maximum amount of knowledge could be imported from them. In many senses the debate in Sydney in 1970 was something that Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Friedrich List might have found amusing, had they been listening. At the conference a clear confrontation emerged between these three views. Debate focused on the question of whether or not foreign direct investment is beneficial to host countries. Some neoclassical economists from the United States, such as Harry Johnson (1972b) and Donald T. Brash were generally of the opinion, despite acknowledging that some points in the critique might be valid, that foreign direct investment is favourable to host countries. They could easily point to successful examples of American investment. Postwar Western Europe was one such example, and in the Pacific region, especially in the case of Canada and Australia, there could be ‘little doubt that United States investment has been of enormous net benefit’ (Brash 1972:130). In addition to Hymer, some other economists from the United States, such as A.E.Safarian (1972) and Charles P.Kindleberger (1972), and Miguel Wionczek (1972) from Mexico, argued to various degrees the possible harmful effects of investment. Wionczek in his paper on postwar Mexican development described a typical Latin American developmental strategy, based on the highly nationalistic and anti-American policy of import substitution combined with high tariff protection and ‘Mexicanization’ of existing foreign-owned industries. Although Wionczek himself did not evaluate Mexico’s prospects for the future too highly, pointing out problems such as the inefficiency of the industries, and a worsening balance of payments situation, Hymer interpreted his paper from the point of view that ‘Mexico now stands, among the developing world, as one of the largest industrial countries’, calling Mexico ‘a major success’ (Hymer 1972b:287). Japan was another country mentioned favourably by Hymer. Japanese development history could be used as a perfect example for both the dependencia and flying geese theories, depending on the interpretation. This also shows how much the two schools had in common. Komiya Ryūtarō’s paper (1972) outlined how foreign investment had been welcomed as a way of introducing new technology and new industries into Japan, but it had been placed under consistent government control. Because of a high savings rate Japan did not actually need foreign
< previous page
page_55
next page >
< previous page
page_56
next page >
Page 56 capital; only the importation of skills was necessary. Consequently, the main system of importing technology was through licensing, and the total level of foreign direct investment remained very low. In cases where a foreign company did not want to enter into a licensing agreement, it was allowed to invest, but rarely large amounts of capital, and rarely with a large percentage of ownership in the subsidiary. Generally, only joint ventures with Japanese companies were allowed, in that way maximizing the spread of manufacturing skills to Japan. The Japanese case thus was diametrically opposed to the Latin American one: foreign investment in Japan was regarded favourably, but it was placed under tight control, and the overall amount remained so small that it did not in any way present a political problem. Latin Americans tended to be antagonistic towards foreign investment, but in practice allowed it to enter their countries in large amounts, and, despite official policies on localization, foreign companies were in practice quite inefficiently controlled. As Hamada Kōichi (1972) pointed out, the Japanese government had been restrictive also in terms of outflows of investment. Investment had not really been an important part of Japan’s relations with the rest of the world. In the past Japan had tended to relate outside mainly through the medium of trade. However, at the turn of the decade Japan was on the brink of emerging as a major international investor, due to a favourable accumulation of capital, and because a need had arisen to do something with industries that were no longer competitive in Japan. The Japanese government began relaxing regulations on the outward flow of capital, and companies began to show interest in the prospects of producing abroad. Most of Japanese investment tended to flow towards Asian developing countries. From the point of view of Asian economists this was a good thing. While a leftist critique of foreign multinationals was gathering strength in the Eastern Pacific, a flow in the opposite direction had begun in the Western Pacific. Foreign investment was evaluated either positively, or extremely positively; the attitude seemed to grow warmer according to the country’s degree of industrialization. Thus, the South Korean economist Yang Yoonsae could state: I have no reservations in stating that private equity invested in the form of either joint ventures or enterprises owned solely by the foreign investor is the best form of economic cooperation. It is based on the principles of free economy and the pursuit of profit. It is the fairest and most honourable way of mobilizing needed capital and know-how as well as creating jobs for the developing countries. (Yang 1972:250) South Korea after the war entered a period of strict nationalization of formerly Japanese-owned industries, and the policy of restricting foreign investment lasted until the mid-1960s. After that, investments were actively
< previous page
page_56
next page >
< previous page
page_57
next page >
Page 57 sought. Still, incoming investments were carefully controlled, just as they had been in Japan, and a diversity of home countries was encouraged. As a matter of fact, the third largest group of investors after Americans and Japanese were overseas Koreans. Yang did not display any special fear of foreign political domination of South Korea. The Americans were allies in the difficult political situation on the Korean peninsula; their presence was balanced by the Japanese, and overseas Koreans invested almost as much as the Japanese. Also Western European companies were coming to South Korea as investors. As a consequence South Korean exports were expanding, the economy was growing rapidly, people were becoming more affluent, and the South Korean level of technological sophistication was being pushed ahead. Thus the South Korean attitude was extremely favourable, which is attested to by the noneconomic attributes like ‘fair’ and ‘honourable’ that Yang gives to investment. What is more, other economists from Asian countries, like Mohammad Sadli (1972) from Indonesia, Amnuay Viravan (1972) from Thailand, and Cesar Virata (1972) from the Philippines were quite favourable towards foreign investment. During the 1950s and 1960s all these countries had used up the economic advantage that import substitution policies had offered. Also the example of the successful export-oriented countries, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, had prompted a discussion among Southeast Asian economists about favouring more open economies and export orientation during the latter half of the 1960s. Viravan posed a simple question to pinpoint the change in attitudes, saying ‘why is Thailand not more outward looking like some of her neighbours, namely, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan?’ (1972:231). Southeast Asian economists considered the development prospects of their countries reasonably high, viewed the future with optimism, and considered -foreign direct investment as one of the best ways to create strong export industries. There was little worry about the possible political problems of investment so typical of the situation in the Americas. Sadli could state confidently: Indonesia relies for defence of her national interest vis-à-vis the large foreign corporation on competition between the foreign companies, between major companies and independents, and between companies of different countries. (Sadli 1972:224) This echoed Thai policy. The government tried to attract investment from as many countries as possible, and took care that any particular industry did not fall under the complete control of a single foreign nation (Viravan 1972:236). In the Western Pacific it looked as if foreign direct investment could be tamed easily so that it would not become a political problem, and in terms of the economic development of the countries it was evaluated positively.
< previous page
page_57
next page >
< previous page
page_58
next page >
Page 58 Helen Hughes has analysed brilliantly the difference in attitudes between the Eastern and Western sides of the Pacific at the time. The Latin American countries typically faced one dominant investor, the United States, and it was largely this situation that created the political problems. The Western Pacific countries had a much more favourable history of foreign investment. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries investment had poured into the area from various European countries. In each colony the colonizer was the principal investor, but also non-colonial European countries invested in the region, and British investment spread everywhere. During and after World War II there was a break, but European investment returned after the struggles for independence were over. The United States, however, became the biggest investor in the area at that time. Japanese investment was resented during the 1940s and 1950s, but during the 1960s it became accepted. A fourth distinct group of investors was the overseas Chinese with their extensive networks over the whole region. During the 1950s most of their investment went to Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, but during the 1960s they became important investors in the whole area. By the end of the decade a fifth pattern of investment emerged, as local non-Chinese companies from the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia, and further afield from Australia, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan began to invest in the region. As a result of all this, Southeast Asian countries at the end of the 1960s had the most complex pattern of foreign direct investment outside Western Europe (Hughes 1972:314–17). The diversity of sources meant that a reasonably strong government could control the situation, and especially after development started to accelerate, as had begun in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the situation became even more acceptable from the host country’s point of view. This debate formed the intellectual background for Kojima’s own theory of foreign investment. Also, he participated in a conference in Chile in 1970, witnessing the bitter Latin American criticism of American imperialism. He visited El Teniente, a large copper mine. It was ruled by American capital, and organized as an enclave which had little to do with the Chilean economy. There were hardly any spill-over effects, and its contribution to the development of the Chilean economy appeared negligible. The bitterness shown towards the United States contrasted with the enthusiasm that Chileans showed in creating closer economic links with Japan, to balance their dependence on the United States. Kojima expressed sympathy for their point of view, and in his report of the conference used the concepts of centre and periphery as fluently as any dependencia theorist (Kojima 1980a:467–8). It had been only a couple of decades since the Japanese had been afraid of their country becoming a colony of the United States, and until recently had still been considering their country as a peripheral one. The Japanese could understand the Latin American viewpoint perfectly.
< previous page
page_58
next page >
< previous page
page_59
next page >
Page 59 This presented, however, a difficult dilemma for them. Japan had developed without much foreign investment, but it was now in need of becoming a largescale investor if it wanted to continue on its path of development. And it was to be done without awakening similar resentment as was American investment, and without evoking memories of Japan’s colonial history. Chinese and other Asian suspicions of Japanese remilitarization were already high enough, but as the opinions of Southeast Asian economists during the PAFTAD conference had shown, and what Kojima’s experience in Chile had confirmed, were that Japanese investment was in many cases welcomed. Interestingly, Kojima’s solution was not simply to create a theory to point out how foreign investment should be made in order to be beneficial for all concerned; he set out at the same time on the open political path of showing how Japanese investment was good, even though American investment was bad. His theory regarding Japanese-style (Nihon gata) and American-style (Amerika gata) foreign investment took form (Kojima 1974a). Also the concepts of trade oriented and non-trade oriented foreign investment were used (Kojima 1974b, 1996:94– 114). Kojima subsequently developed his argument in numerous works (see especially Kojima 1979; Kojima and Ozawa 1984; Kojima 1990, 1996:132–63), but analysis here will be concentrated on the first versions written during the early 1970s. Kojima’s presentation of American-style, or non-trade oriented, foreign investment was a skilful application of the dependencia theory. The American economy, as a continental economy covering a large territory, embodied a dual structure. A large part of the economy was based on agriculture and the extraction of natural resources, while the United States also possessed the most innovative and advanced industrial companies in the world. The main market of this vanguard of the American economy was in the home country, even though a fair number of goods was also exported. Wage levels were high, making the market both huge and diverse, capable of absorbing large quantities of all kinds of goods. High innovation costs meant that the most advanced companies tended to have an oligopolistic position; a small number of big companies shared the domestic market among themselves. These huge companies were also the typical companies to invest abroad. Because the domestic market was so good—the best market in the world—smaller companies were not used to thinking in terms of foreign markets. Exporting would have meant competing in worse markets with indigenous producers. Only the large advanced conglomerates had the experience, skills, and the perspective to venture abroad. Because they were world leaders in their respective fields of specialization, their goods were the most advanced in the world. As Raymond Vernon’s product cycle theory showed, a new product was normally sold at first solely in the American market, and exports to world markets followed later. At this point it was often wisest economically to shift
< previous page
page_59
next page >
< previous page
page_60
next page >
Page 60 production to countries with a fairly advanced level of development, but with lower unit costs, such as Western Europe or Japan. This was done by direct investment, or by selling licences. If this was not done, indigenous companies in those countries would find out how a product was put together, and start making it themselves. At home in the United States the company was already bringing a new product to the market. The margin of leadership to other countries was quite narrow, often only a couple of years (Vernon 1966). Not much harm was done if investments flowed to other developed countries, but this type of investment pattern to developing countries tended to pose economic, social, and political problems for all parties concerned. Because the large multinationals were in an oligopolistic situation at home, they sought similar conditions abroad. Excellent conditions in this regard prevailed in countries with high protective barriers against imports, and with ambitious governmental policies of reaching rapidly to prestigious levels of development. Also in these countries the companies tried to produce for the domestic market, and keep it captive as long as possible. There was some trade, normally in components from the mother company to the subsidiary, but little exporting of finished products. In general, this form of investment had diminishing effects on trade. It thrived in an atmosphere of protection from international capital transactions and trade, enabling a large company having good connections to the political leadership of the country to keep competitors out of the market. The skill levels in a developing country tended to be inadequate for such production. The answer was to combine cheap labour with advanced machinery, developed at home to deal with the high wage level. This did not create much employment. The building of the necessary infrastructure, and the import of necessary machinery and components, combined with high levels of corruption, easily drove the developing country into debt, while little export income was generated to pay for all this. The large multinational companies, perhaps with the support of the home country itself, often had considerable political influence in the affairs of the small developing country. A vestige of high level development was brought to the receiving country, and the power of indigenous elites was enhanced, but the country itself could end up being impoverished and enfeebled in the process. This was the situation where accusations against the ugly Americans began. On the other hand, if trade was created with this kind of investment, it tended to have undesirable effects as well. It would naturally be directed towards the best market in the world, and thus compete directly with companies in the United States. Cheap labour costs would be a formidable weapon in this competition. The most advanced companies would be able to withstand the competition, but middle and low level companies would be squeezed into a tight position, and before long, out of the market. Because they did not have a tradition of venturing abroad, they
< previous page
page_60
next page >
< previous page
page_61
next page >
Page 61 could easily go bankrupt. A predictable solution would be to clamour for protection against unfair foreign competition. It would provide for a respite in the short run, but in the long run it would erode the competitiveness of these sectors even more. Before long the weakness in the lower and middle sectors would also start to influence the innovative capacities of the most advanced sector: In contrast to Japan, it seems to me that the United States has transferred abroad those industries which ranked in the top of her comparative advantage and has thus brought about balance of payments difficulties, unemployment and then need for protection in her remaining industries. (Kojima 1974b:24) This situation seemed to present an impossible situation in the long run, both for the health of the American economy itself, and for the openness of the international trading regime. Kojima calls the situation ‘American loserism’ (Amerika no haiboku shugi), because the country seemed to be phasing itself out of its advanced position (1974a:151). The basic problem with American companies was that they were conscious only of immediate company-wide economic interests, but not of national economic interests (1996:100). Kojima analyses the situation forthrightly in Listian and Akamatsuan terms of national economy. What Kojima called Japanese-style foreign investment was trade oriented. At the turn of the decade, when Japan’s advantage in labour-intensive industries was disappearing, these industries were starting a wave of investment in search of lower labour costs. Japan, in elevating its level of development, was transporting a whole group of old industries to Southeast Asia. It was good for Japan to get rid of these low-paid and low-skill jobs, because it would raise its level of development a stage upwards with one stroke, make it a better market, and release its resources for further advancement. The idea of dumping old-fashioned industries on poor countries may look bad at first glance, and be exactly what Hymer had criticized. With a second glance the picture begins to change. The whole pattern of investment followed faithfully the principle of comparative advantage. It guaranteed that the pattern of investment was beneficial to all countries concerned. Industries requiring low skills were the most perfect ones for the developing countries. Such industries could be set up quickly with comparatively little cost, and did not need very developed infrastructure. Workers could easily be trained for the tasks required. Labour-intensive industries created employment for large numbers of poor people, which meant that income levels also started to rise at the lower levels of society, which was beneficial to the social structure of the country. It sucked in exactly the type of people who would otherwise be idle, or burdening the economy of the countryside. Establishment of such industries had a
< previous page
page_61
next page >
< previous page
page_62
next page >
Page 62 considerable amount of economic spill-over effect. They raised the skill levels of the population, and could help to kick the whole country into a rapid development process. Traditional Japanese industries, such as textile mills, were typically of small and medium size, and just such companies were being squeezed out at that time. The owners were used to working with their employees, and except for the language barrier, the cultural difference between low-paid Japanese workers and low-paid workers in developing countries was not insurmountable. They would delve deeply into the society, implanting their skills, rather than remain as high technology enclaves outside of the societies. Also, such small companies would pose no political threat to the developing countries. These kinds of industries benefited the international balance of payments of developing countries. They were easy to set up, and started quickly to bring in income. They developed in Japan as export industries, so that after moving to a developing country they would already have established markets at their disposal. The transfer of successful export industries would benefit the receiving country visibly, and the process would start to wean the country away from protectionism, towards a more open economy. The trade generating effect of Japanese-style investment thus would spread the principle of trade expansion around the region. A general opening of countries and rapid development would ensue. Japan, which was by definition moving toward a new stage of development, would also benefit greatly, as low priced imports would enhance its well-being, and the increased buying power in the developing countries would increase their power to buy Japanese goods of a more advanced variety. Japanese-style investment thus would be beneficial to all parties, and would guarantee that the open international trading system would stay open. This was Kojima’s theory in answer to the political dilemma of Japan becoming a large-scale investor. As it was an innovative application of Akamatsu’s ideas in a new intellectual and practical situation, it can well be called a second generation interpretation of the flying geese theory. Akamatsu, like List, had concentrated on the question of how a developing country is able to industrialize itself successfully. This had now been achieved by Japan. It was time to move a step towards a more Smithian type of cosmopolitical economism, opening Japan’s market to free trade, and passing Japan’s industrialization experience on to Asian developing countries, keeping, however, Japan’s national economic interests always in sight. This does not mean that Kojima’s investment theory should be taken as a description of empirical reality. Things were never as simple as Kojima described. Japan did not open its markets as expected, Japanese companies were quite as eager to exploit oligopolistic situations as any others, and American companies could act in a much more beneficial way in terms of development than their Japanese counterparts. Instead, Kojima’s
< previous page
page_62
next page >
< previous page
page_63
next page >
Page 63 investment theory should be taken as a symbol of the highly nationalistic, selfconfident, and optimistic Japanese intellectual climate at the beginning of the 1970s. At that time Japan was suddenly being vehemently condemned by the United States, Western Europe, and Southeast Asian countries because of its trading success, and its psychological consequences. Kojima eyed this criticism closely: In the last two years, 1971 and 1972, Japan experienced an extraordinarily favourable balance of payments with a phenomenal growth of exports and huge accumulation of foreign reserves. This aroused, first, fierce condemnation from the USA for her balance of payment difficulties with the USA saying that in 1971 Japan’s bilateral trade surplus ($3.2 billion) was much larger than the US worldwide trade deficit ($2.8 billion) although this was the first time in a hundred years that Japan attained a long desired bilateral trade surplus. Then the fear of a Japanese export explosion moved to Europe. (Kojima 1974b:1) Western Europeans were not yet complaining much about the trade imbalance, but they were feeling Japanese competition keenly both in global and European markets, and the trend of Japan continuously increasing its market share, displacing Europe, was unmistakable. There had been, during the 1930s, furious condemnation of the flooding of European markets by Japanese textiles and other cheap consumer products. As Japan had once again dawned on Europe’s horizon as a formidable competitor, after being largely absent from the scene for three decades, the first wave of criticism tended to draw directly on the old hysterical anti-Japanese rhetoric. Europeans had an additional sensitive point: their culture. The newly rich Japanese had started to import such cultural items as works of art and quality wines, entering as competitors in these markets as well. This led to very typical European schizophrenic complaints of market penetration on the one hand, and laments over very highly value-added goods being exported to Japan (Kojima 1974b:58). Europeans would have liked to be left in peace and tranquillity. They would have liked to return to the nineteenth-century world, where the United States was their only formidable outside competitor, and the rest of the world a market. They did not need any new competitor entering the scene. Heavy criticism against Japanese market penetration was also voiced in Southeast Asian countries, and it was there that the grounds for complaints were the most solid (Kojima 1974b:59). Japan had conquered a large share of the Southeast Asian markets for several categories of industrial products, such as steel, cars, motorcycles, radios, and other consumer goods. In addition, spurred on by the high yen, Japanese tourists had started to pour into the region. Even though the numbers were small compared with today, at the beginning of the 1970s it was a sudden
< previous page
page_63
next page >
< previous page
page_64
next page >
Page 64 onslaught, and was felt accordingly. Besides simple trading relations, the psychological reaction to this was an equally grave problem. While Americans were angered by the loss of international prestige due to the trade imbalance, and Europeans due to the removal of European cultural artifacts, Southeast Asians were upset by Japanese behaviour. Japanese tourists and businessmen tended to move in bunches, use only Japan Air Lines, stay in Japanese hotels, move in guided tours with Japanese guides, frequent Japanese bars, restaurants, and night clubs which grew up to serve the Japanese market, and even eat Japanese food flown in direct from Tokyo. The most hurtful thing was, however, the open and large-scale sex business that grew up to serve the mostly male tourists, giving rise to the expression of ‘sperm exports’ (seishi no yushutsu) (Yamamoto Sachiko 1977). These criticisms met with alarm from Japanese economists, and particularly a movement to boycott Japanese goods, organized by students in Thailand in 1972, was viewed with grave concern (Kanamori 1973:61–2). Kojima’s answer was to maintain that Japan’s show of wealth was only an isolated phenomenon: To answer this condemnation and fear, it should be made clear that Japan’s export explosion and huge export surplus in recent years will certainly not continue forever but will be short-lived extraordinary phenomena brought out partly by the unhealthy performance of the American economy and partly by the delayed accommodation of Japanese policies. (Kojima 1974b:1) Japan was called an ‘infant giant’ who had grown big, but had not been able to adjust psychologically to its sudden greatness. This was the reason why the revaluation of the yen had been delayed, together with Japan’s opening of imports and investment. However, the situation seemed to be changing rapidly. During the early 1970s Japan started to eliminate its barriers. It became one of the most important foreign policy goals of Satō’s government, the prime minister himself criticizing Japanese egoism and extolling the virtues of free trade (Satō 1972). His foreign minister, Fukuda Takeo, attacked what he called Japanese ‘my homeism’ (maihōmu shugi), arguing for the internationalization of Japan’s economy (Fukuda 1972). The Japanese government also acted positively in dismantling Japan’s trade and investment barriers, so that Kojima could claim that nearly all legal barriers had been eliminated by 1972 (Kojima 1974b:2). It seemed that import liberalization and the yen revaluation had worked well, because in 1973 Japan’s balance of payments had already moved into a deficit, which was expected to continue widening during the following years. In that sense, in 1973 it did not look as though Japan would be posing any kind of threat to the world economy. Normal trade balancing mechanisms seemed to be taking care of Japan’s overall surpluses.
< previous page
page_64
next page >
< previous page
page_65
next page >
Page 65 The world economy had slowed down at the end of the 1960s, as exemplified by the economic problems of the United States, but seemed to be picking up again as the 1970s started to roll by. Kojima saw a simple cyclical phenomenon underlying the postwar world economy. It seemed that around the end of each decade the postwar world economy had experienced setbacks, but on each occasion a new stimulus had appeared, and put economic expansion back into motion. The economic crisis at the end of the 1940s was overcome by massive American aid to Europe and Japan, and by the Korean War, both of which helped to achieve a new expansion. The global recession at the end of the 1950s was turned into an expansion by the success of Western European integration, especially the formation of the EEC, which provided a suitably strong stimulus, the expansion lasting throughout the 1960s. Now a new recession had hit the world, but Japan had become an economic giant. It was Japan’s turn to follow the example of the United States and the EEC, and to stimulate a new world economic expansion for the 1970s (Kojima 1973b:1). We have to remember that Japan’s high rate of growth was still continuing. The accelerating growth pattern of the late 1960s seemed to have ended with the revaluation of the yen, but the government could still confidently predict that Japan’s economy would grow by 9.4 per cent annually between 1973–7. The figure was still high enough. The combination of sharp currency appreciation with continuing high growth meant that when Japan’s GNP had been roughly US$200 billion in 1970, in 1973 it was already expected to amount to US$400 billion. This meant that Japan was probably already surpassing the Soviet Union, and would catch up to the level of the United States during the early 1980s (Kanamori 1973:57–8). Japan’s economic great power status continued to strengthen, and its rightful place seemed to be among the superpowers, not with the smaller fry. Japan could not only afford, but was even responsible for becoming the new leading force in the world economy. The visible opening of Japan’s market seemed to be doing exactly that, and the crowning initiative was the restarted GATT negotiations for trade liberalization, which were named the Tokyo Round, in 1973. The previous one had been called the Kennedy Round, and it was symbolic of both Japan’s economic greatness and its global responsibility that the new round should be named after the Japanese capital. The idea that Japan had become the new champion of free trade, replacing the United States, was also clearly expressed by Ōkita: Today, the positions of the United States and Japan have been somewhat reversed. The United States, which had long advocated the principle of free trade, is gradually moving toward protectionism. And Japan, which had striven to protect its industries, has become a strong advocate of free trade. (Ōkita 1972:12)
< previous page
page_65
next page >
< previous page
page_66
next page >
Page 66 Because Japan seemed to have taken the place of the United States as the champion of free trade, another American policy initiative could be revitalized by Japan, namely, the Marshall Plan. The whole discussion of the need for massive foreign investment, such as Ōkita’s visions of the post-industrial age, Amaya’s plans for exporting polluting heavy and chemical industries to Australia, and Kojima’s theory of transferring Japan’s labour-intensive industries to Asian developing countries formed the theoretical justification for such an initiative. Ōkita Saburō had the political connections to bring the idea before the government. At that time he was a member of the advisory council on remodelling the Japanese archipelago, set up by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in 1972 to assist him in devising practical policies on how to carry through his grand visions for Japan’s domestic and international transformation. In the council Ōkita suggested directly to Tanaka a plan to allocate US$20 billion to Southeast Asian countries over the next ten years, half as Official Development Assistance (ODA), and the other half as private investment (Ōkita 1972:9). Through Ōkita and other similar channels Tanaka’s basically national plans for remodelling Japan became transformed into a grand international initiative for ‘remodelling the Western Pacific’. That was not the actual name used; it became known as ‘Asian Reconstruction Programme’ and ‘Japan’s Marshall Plan for Asia’, but the remodelling analogy is quite suitable, as it was essentially a complement to Tanaka’s domestic policies. At the same time it also was a way to implement Japan’s new economic great power status in the international setting, in an economistic way. By Kojima it was seen as an initiative that would turn his innovative investment theory into practical policy for the benefit of Japan and the world at large, and he naturally welcomed the turn of events (1973b:20–1).
< previous page
page_66
next page >
< previous page
page_67
next page >
Page 67 5 Remodelling the Western Pacific Satō had come to power in 1964 promising more high growth and the return of Okinawa, and he had fulfilled both of his promises by the time he left office in July 1972. He had also reinterpreted Japan’s rank as an economic great power. Yet, his government was never able to deal well with the political implications of the new rank. Relations with China were frozen, and his handling of the textile issue had caused a serious conflict with the United States in the summer of 1971. Relations between the countries were further strained by the shocking announcement of Nixon’s new China policy in July, and by the announcement of the New Economic Program in August, called in Japan the second Nixon shock. Satō held on to power until the return of Okinawa was completed, and then stepped down. Satō’s hand-picked successor for the premiership had been Fukuda Takeo, who unfortunately had been nominated foreign minister only a couple of weeks before the first Nixon shock, but had to carry the political blame for Japan’s own passive China policy. The Chinese government was also continuing its campaign against the revival of Japanese militarism, concentrating its attacks on Satō personally, and refusing to deal with Satō or anyone closely connected with him. Tanaka Kakuei was able to capitalize handsomely on the situation, and could start his premiership in July 1972 from a strong position both nationally and internationally. He rose to the position with the domestic platform of ‘remodelling the Japanese archipelago’ (Nihon rettō kaizō), which is the name of a bestselling book that he had published in June, right before assuming premiership. The book had actually been ghost written by MITI, while Tanaka served there as minister between July 1971 and July 1972. It was in reality a popularized version of MITI’s restructuring plans. Tanaka thus became prime minister with a clear plan prepared by Japan’s most powerful ministry (Johnson 1986:293). Also, Tanaka had practical experience of how to deal with the new domestic and international situation. He had succeeded in solving the textile wrangle with the United States. The previous MITI ministers, Ōhira Masayoshi and Miyazawa Kiichi, had taken a proud and principled line in the negotiations, which then came to a standstill in the summer of 1971.
< previous page
page_67
next page >
< previous page
page_68
next page >
Page 68 After taking the post Tanaka adopted a different stand. In September he gave the United States what it wanted, a promise to curb Japan’s textile exports. He had negotiated with the textile industry a large relief package, which included government purchases of useless machines and compensation for export losses, as well as long-term loans for production adjustment and occupational change (Johnson 1986:293). Skilful use of financial resources in the right places with the right timing was the proper economistic way of getting Japan through international conflicts. Tanaka’s new policy was based on a complete overhaul of Japan’s productive and urban structure. Japan’s population and industry had been concentrated on the Pacific coast, mainly on the stretch reaching from the Tokyo area through Nagoya to Osaka, causing congestion, traffic jams, difficult living conditions despite increased material affluence, and high levels of pollution. The countryside, especially the Japan Sea coast, was suffering from depopulation, unemployment, and general stagnation. Tanaka planned to reverse the trend of urban concentration, relocating industries throughout the country, building trunk roads, super-express railways, and nationwide information networks. Dirty old industries would be scaled down, and new knowledge-intensive ones would be erected in their places. With this, the stream of people would be turned away from the big cities, affluence would be spread evenly all over the country, and people would return to living beautiful lives in harmony with nature, devoting their increased leisure time to culture. A new Japan would be born, a Japan that would have taken itself to the vanguard of human civilization, as befitting an economic great power (Tanaka Kakuei 1973). Tanaka’s plans for remodelling were accompanied by a rapid increase in government spending. The 1973 budget was 30 percent larger than the 1972 budget made by Satō’s government. Part of this went into preparations for the remodelling, and part into increasing Japanese social welfare (Inoguchi 1993a:23). Tanaka was riding on the themes of economic great power, affluent Japan, and technologically progressive Japan. He was spending government money in grand style. His energetic figure seemed to be the perfect embodiment of the new Japanese national self-confidence, and during the early part of his administration he was able to pull together a broad national consensus supporting his policies. His plan can be rightfully compared with Ikeda’s National Income Doubling Plan of 1960, the main difference being that Ikeda’s plan succeeded, and still evokes a nostalgic afterglow in Japan, whereas Tanaka’s plan became ridiculed and cursed after 1974, when the long Japanese spell of easy economic growth came to an end. But the early part of Tanaka’s government in 1972–3 was easy and optimistic. An economic superpower needed an independent global policy, and Tanaka was ready to give it to Japan. He moved fast. Already in August he met President Nixon in Honolulu, and coordinated with him Japan’s
< previous page
page_68
next page >
< previous page
page_69
next page >
Page 69 new China policy. There was, however, an important difference from the previous situation between the countries. At that time the United States was still committed to maintaining official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but Tanaka did not consider them important. China was the more important country of the two, and trade with Taiwan could be handled without official relations. Trade with China had been conducted successfully in that way for decades under the policy of seikei bunri, or separation of politics from economics. During the late 1960s it had started to expand rapidly so that by 1970 Japan had already become China’s largest trading partner, in spite of the political attacks against Satō (Ogata 1977:178). Like the Japanese, the Chinese were also beginning to separate economic and political matters. In 1972 Tanaka felt strong enough to maintain an independent line with the United States, and conveyed to US officials the message that Japan had decided to sever its ties with Taiwan and establish official diplomatic relations with China. The United States accepted the position (Shibusawa 1984:67). This was the second time after the disruption of the textile negotiations in July 1971 when Japan and the United States parted ways on a major foreign policy issue. This was a larger issue than the textile dispute, but less noticeable, because the matter was dealt with using much more skill. It never became an open quarrel. Within a month Tanaka was in Beijing, where official relations were established. Tanaka also declared that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China, as required by the Chinese. As Amaya had already recommended in 1969, Japanese business and political leaders during the early 1970s started planning to diversify the sources of oil and other raw materials. Tanaka continued these policies even more strongly, and his opening of China can be seen as part of this strategy. Other directions were Europe and Siberia. In September and October 1973 Tanaka made a trip to France, Britain, and West Germany, where he sought cooperation on energy policy. With the French he discussed nuclear energy, and with the British possible Japanese participation in North Sea oil development. He then continued to Moscow, there discussing possibilities for large-scale Japanese investment in Siberia for the exploitation of Siberian oil and timber. A peace treaty was also on Tanaka’s agenda, but resources were seen as the more pressing matter. Japan’s initiative relating to the Soviets was not, however, too independent. They were reluctant to deal with the real superpower on their own, and wanted American companies to cooperate with their Japanese counterparts in the exploitation of Siberian resources. In that way the Japanese would retain the backing of the other superpower in case of disputes. There was a clear difference in this respect in the way the Soviet Union and China were treated; for the latter a careful tuning of company level cooperation with Americans was not considered necessary (Curtis 1977).
< previous page
page_69
next page >
< previous page
page_70
next page >
Page 70 Just when things seemed to be going so well, and Tanaka was flying in grand style around the world, placing together the pieces of a global independent economic strategy for Japan, the rug was pulled out from under his initiatives, and his plans started to crumble. The easy, expansionary, and visionary Tanaka period had lasted only a little over a year. We can merely speculate what the consequences would have been if Tanaka had been able to stay in power as long as Satō, because in spite of his shady money dealings he really was a political innovator. His political demise began during a visit to Germany on 6 October, when the Arab-Israeli war broke out. At first Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, and during the following week Iraq, Sudan, Jordan and Saudi-Arabia joined the war. Then on 17 October the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to use oil as a weapon to influence the global balance of power in their favour. They divided countries into three classes. The United States and the Netherlands were their enemies, and a total embargo was imposed on them. Countries which either did not have diplomatic relations with Israel, or were willing to break them, or which at least provided the Arabs with weapons, such as Britain, France, Austria, and many African countries, were labelled friends, and they suffered no restrictions in their oil supplies. The third category was composed of countries between these two extremes. They would receive oil, but its amount would be reduced. Japan found that even though it was the biggest customer of Middle Eastern oil, and had duly paid its bills, it was placed among the ‘unfriendly’ countries. Once again no negotiations were held, nor were any warnings given beforehand; Japan was simply given the cold shoulder as an insignificant actor without any importance as a political partner. In November OPEC decided, in order to win their political favour, to guarantee previous levels of supply for all EEC countries except the Netherlands, but again Japan was not considered. In warfare and high politics no need arose to consider Japan, which had been only an indirect customer, that had bought most of its oil through US-controlled multinational oil companies. There had been very little direct contact between Japan and the Arab countries (Shibusawa 1984:78–81). Little was known about Japan there, and the Japanese did not even consider the Middle East as part of Asia proper. The place had been beyond the Japanese horizon, until it now forced itself suddenly onto Japanese consciousness. Even though Japan’s confinement of itself to the economic sphere had placed it in this trouble, it was through economistic means that a solution was eventually found, so that in that sense the Oil Crisis did not change Japan’s ideological orientation. In December the Japanese government dispatched deputy prime minister Miki Takeo to the Middle East, where he promised great amounts of development aid and investment to help to industrialize the oilproducing countries, and with these measures was able to secure for Japan the status of a friendly country. A global foreign
< previous page
page_70
next page >
< previous page
page_71
next page >
Page 71 policy based on aid and investment was ready to be used in all conflicts, and again it proved effective. Notwithstanding, the remedy was only partial, because oil prices rose fivefold during the autumn and winter, causing severe inflation, a deep economic recession which ended Japan’s high growth, an unemployment problem which hit women especially hard, and serious balance of payments difficulties. A deep feeling of crisis pervaded Japanese society, wild rumours spread of coming shortages, and people hoarded goods like kitchen detergent and toilet paper. Fights between housewives even broke out in shops, with some injuries (Nakamura 1987:227). The lucky ones succeeded in buying enough toilet paper to fill a room. The Japanese archipelago rebuilding programme was shelved, as well as grandiose talk of Japan becoming the new world leader of free trade. But Tanaka’s programme of remodelling the Western Pacific was not shelved. It became more important than ever. A trip to the five ASEAN countries had been scheduled for January 1974, and there was no reason for postponing it. We should note that the concept of Southeast Asia had changed within these few years. By 1973 ASEAN had already been in existence for six years. It had been able to solve its internal conflicts, and started to assume for itself the meaning of the concept of Southeast Asia. Part of the reason was that it had a suitable name, effecting the conceptual shift. ASEAN governments were also receptive to foreign investment, and Japanese trade with them was firmly established. Their economies showed encouraging signs of growth. On the other hand, India had moved towards a more Soviet type of economic system, restricting both trade and investment, and growing more slowly. The Indian subcontinent lowered on the Japanese economic horizon, while the ASEAN countries rose. The conceptual division between South and Southeast Asia was finalized in 1985 with the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Aggarwal and Pandey 1994). The two superpowers, and even China which was a nuclear and military power, had to be treated with respect, but towards the Southeast Asian countries the Japanese could feel a mixture of superiority and benevolence. The Southeast Asian countries would be the natural followers of Japan; perfect disciples who could be helped, guided, and educated along the road of economic development, where the Japanese felt themselves to be unsurpassable masters. Sudō Sueo pointed out that Japan needed Southeast Asia to provide itself with the position of a regional leader, which was necessary for a global leadership position (Sudō 1992:161). As Japan seemed to be emerging from the position of junior partner of the United States, it needed a group of countries to display as its own in global fora. However, the traditional term of international relations analysis, ‘ally’, would not be appropriate here, because it evokes a
< previous page
page_71
next page >
< previous page
page_72
next page >
Page 72 military connotation. The term ‘disciple’ is better. It conveys perfectly the image of followers of a leader, inherent in Japanese thinking regarding development policy. Moreover, in terms of world politics, the Southeast Asian countries were in a situation similar to Japan’s. Due to the withdrawal of British military forces, the Guam Doctrine, and the expected ending of the Vietnam War, big power presence in the region was diminishing, even though both China and the Soviet Union made attempts to advance into the region. This situation pulled the ASEAN countries together, and enabled them to pursue more neutralistic policies. The member countries wanted to neutralize ASEAN as a region, so that it would not be divided into spheres of influence by the great powers any more. In the Fifth Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1971 the ASEAN countries jointly proclaimed Southeast Asia ‘a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality’, which came to be called the ZOPFAN or Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Too much should not be read into the declaration, especially when the Vietnam War was still going on, Thailand being involved in it, and the Philippines having US military bases on its soil. But the declaration cannot be wholly dismissed. It was an attempt to gain freedom of movement, and also a declaration of intent, a goal for the future. Japan could be a suitable partner, if cooperation was restricted to the economic sphere, and this suited perfectly well Tanaka’s Japan, which did not want a recurrence of the deadlock caused by Satō’s great power politics. The situation created a common interest between Japan and ASEAN. Advance preparations for Tanaka’s trip were handled in the normal way. For instance, in October 1973 Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, in his speech to the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia, reviewed Japan’s promises of increasing its total aid to developing countries to 0.7 percent, or even 1 percent of its GNP, and could point out the fact that Japan’s actual aid was rising so rapidly that these promises could well be fulfilled very soon, as both governmental aid and private investment. The Tokyo round of GATT had just been started in September, and Ōhira promised to open the Japanese market to the products of Southeast Asian countries, painting a picture of rapid increase in Southeast Asian exports to Japan (Ōhira 1974). Tanaka went to the region in January 1974 bearing the slogan ‘good neighbours sharing peace and prosperity’ (heiwa to hanei wo wakachiau yoki rinjin). He supported ASEAN’s striving for peace, freedom, and neutrality, promised to increase official aid and encourage private investment in the region to help development. He praised the Southeast Asian countries for dismantling barriers to investment. He promised to help correct the trade imbalance between Japan and the region. He wanted to create a ‘heart-toheart relationship’ (kokoro to kokoro no fureai) between the Japanese and the people of ASEAN, encouraging exchanges between people on all levels. One initiative was a ‘youth ship’ (seinen no
< previous page
page_72
next page >
< previous page
page_73
next page >
Page 73 June), where young people from Japan and the ASEAN countries would sail from country to country, and get to know each other by living together. Tanaka also used wordy language in talking about the importance of Asian or Asian Pacific regional cooperation (chi-iki kyōryoku), regional partnership (pātonāshippu), and regional solidarity (rentai) (Gaimushō 1974:48–66). Regional cooperation, the heart-to-heart relationship, extensive exchanges between people and cultures, and deepening economic relations formed a package that would tie Japan and Southeast Asia even more closely together. No institutional organization was proposed, and no special name was given to the Japanese—ASEAN solidarity concept, which indicates that no advanced plans had been made. All in all Tanaka’s promises were so roundabout that probably no extensive blueprint had been prepared. Still, Tanaka’s policy towards Southeast Asia could be called an attempt towards forming an international alliance in the economic sphere, understood as a teacher-disciple system, commensurate with the rank of an economic superpower. For all that, Tanaka’s initiative led to nothing at the time. His trip started in Manila on 7 January, and in the Philippines things went smoothly. But in Bangkok on 9 January Tanaka was met at the airport by students carrying placards with ‘imperialist monster Tanaka’ and other similar slogans written on them. Of the ASEAN countries, Thailand had been most deeply penetrated by Japanese exports, and its students most radicalized by the dependencia theory, which was spreading around the globe at the time. Japanese economic penetration looked dangerous. It is reported that the Thai students joked that even their anti-Japanese posters were printed on Japanese paper, using Japanese printing machines, with Japanese ink (Shibusawa 1984:74–7). The activity of the Thai students was nothing new, however, as it had been going on since 1972, and Tanaka arrived armed with a proposal to establish a joint committee to study measures for correcting the trade imbalance. Obviously his proposal was not very impressive from the point of view of the students. From Bangkok he proceeded to Singapore, which he could praise as a garden city, and then to Kuala Lumpur. There were no special problems in either city. On 14 January in Jakarta, however, a real calamity struck. The whole city was full of student demonstrators and rioters who had been encouraged by the success of their Thai colleagues, and Indonesian troops had to force a way open for the motorcade carrying Tanaka from the airport to the city. The next day was even worse, and began to look like a full-scale revolution; Japanese cars were set ablaze, shop windows were broken, and Japanese flags were torn down from government buildings. Soldiers fired over the heads of the rioters. The riot was later named Malari, from Malaputaka Januari, or January Misfortune (Shibusawa 1984:76). This furore of anti-Japanese sentiment was quite short-lived, and violence against Japanese property soon died down. ASEAN governments actively clamped down on the students. Anti-Japanese feelings were
< previous page
page_73
next page >
< previous page
page_74
next page >
Page 74 prevalent among radical students and part of the intelligentsia, but the governments tended to favour increased cooperation with Japan. The effect on Tanaka, however, was devastating. The oil shock had killed his national programme of remodelling Japan, and this ASEAN shock ended his international programme for remodelling the Western Pacific. It meant the end of Tanaka’s time. He was probably no more corrupt than other ordinary Japanese prime ministers of the time, although his ability for collecting money might have been exceptional. Anyway, after information on his shady deals was leaked to the press, he was forced to step down in December 1974. Tanaka is still seen as a hero by Japanese nationalists, and unverified suspicions are still being circulated that Tanaka’s reputation was intentionally taVnished in the Lockheed scandal by the Americans, who did not like his independent foreign policies (Mahathir and Ishihara 1994:83–6). Miki Takeo, who had dealt well with the Arabs in oil negotiations, and who had had no charges of corruption levelled at him, succeeded Tanaka as prime minister, even though his factional basis within the LDP was narrow. His premiership had been planned to be only transitory, although in practice it lasted for two years. He was not, however, able to achieve very much within the period. With the end of rapid growth—and the previously unthinkable phenomenon of negative growth of −0.2 percent in 1974—Japan’s optimistic visions, and ability for generating international initiatives, collapsed. Miki’s government had its hands full trying to cope with the severe economic recession. In addition to the recession at home, and his narrow factional basis within the LDP, Miki’s foreign policy also suffered from his bad relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reason was largely that Miki was overconfident of his abilities in formulating foreign policy, which meant a tendency to bypass the ministry in decision-making, and that, in turn, caused resentment among officials. It led to poor groundwork for policy initiatives, which then led to poor execution. For instance, during his term as foreign minister in 1968 Miki had supported enthusiastically Kojima’s idea of the Pacific Free Trade Area, and Pacific integration in general. It is reported that he attempted to revive the idea for his meeting with President Gerald Ford in August 1975, but the idea did not actually reach the agenda, because the MOFA was strongly opposed (Sudō 1992:119). It may also be that from the perspective of MOFA the time was not propitious for such an initiative; in 1975 the United States was made to suffer serious humiliation, as the Vietnam War ended in an all-out victory for North Vietnam. It was such a devastating blow to the national psyche of Americans that probably there would not have been the political will or energy for any major Pacific initiative at that time. An alternative to the Pacific policy was the ASEAN direction started by Tanaka, and Miki tried to follow suit. The ASEAN countries were planning to hold their first summit meeting in Bali in February 1976, and
< previous page
page_74
next page >
< previous page
page_75
next page >
Page 75 both Miki and Foreign Minister Miyazawa were planning seriously to attend the meeting, making their intentions public in Japan. The ASEAN countries, however, refused to let either of them attend (Sudō 1992:120–1). The reasons that led to this refusal are still unclear. One explanation offered has been that ASEAN at that time was fearful of the Vietnamese reaction to such a visit. The future course of the Indochinese states with respect to ASEAN was unclear, and perhaps the ASEAN states did not want to give the impression that they were building an antagonistic block against Vietnam. Another explanation might be that the poor relations between Miki and MOFA had indicated poor preliminary sounding out and negotiations between Japan and the ASEAN countries. It is possible that the spectacular failure of Tanaka’s visit was still too fresh, so that especially Indonesia did not want to risk anything similar happening again. The summit was important for ASEAN, as it tried to consolidate itself further, and potentially troublesome outsiders were not needed to spoil the delicate process. Be that as it may, in the middle of his two domestic difficulties Miki tried to push through two older initiatives, failing with both of them. Miki was, however, able to score at least a partial victory. As the international status of ASEAN and its seeming viability as a functioning organization appeared to be growing, the United States began to take a greater interest in the organization. The State Department contemplated sending a congratulatory message to Bali for the summit, but the MOFA persuaded it from doing this. Instead, both Miki and Miyazawa sent separate messages to Bali, congratulating ASEAN on its development, and offering Japanese assistance to the organization (Miki 1976; Miyazawa 1976). This political manoeuvre may seem quite insignificant, but at least it gave the impression that the region belonged exclusively to Japan’s sphere of influence, and they consequently had the exclusive right to congratulate the first ASEAN summit meeting (Sudō 1992:83). The Tanaka riots in Bangkok and Jakarta had created a strong impression of Southeast Asian countries rejecting Japanese attempts to approach them, and that there was deep resentment against Japanese economic imperialism. Both impressions were certainly true. However, the picture that emerged in the PAFTAD conferences, where the region’s influential economic policy advisers gathered, represented a far more soothing situation for the Japanese. There was indeed a strong confrontation going on within PAFTAD, but it was a debate between North and South Americans, not between the Japanese and other Asians. In the early 1970s the successful models of economic development were not all situated in Asia. Some Latin American countries, especially Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, were considered even better successes. Among the developing countries they were situated at the upper middle income level, and thus were relatively well-off. Latin Americans could look at Asians from a position of superiority:
< previous page
page_75
next page >
< previous page
page_76
next page >
Page 76 Seen from the other side of the Pacific, Latin America may look… considerably more developed than either Africa or the eastern and southeastern rim of Asia extending from Korea to Pakistan. (Wionczek 1973:191). Although Wionczek talked about the view as seen from the other side of the Pacific, this was really a Mexican view. Wionczek grouped Africa and Asia together as undeveloped and poor countries, excluding only the oilrich Middle Eastern countries from the bunch. He did not make any distinction between, say, Korea and Liberia. He envisioned the region geographically as an unstructured mass. Wionczek pointed out that economic growth was higher in some Asian countries than in Latin America, but the speed of growth was not that important. Latin American countries were growing too, if less spectacularly, and were already at a comparatively high level of development. They were the elite of the developing world. Only the developed countries in North America and Western Europe were ahead of them, and it was natural to want to catch up with them as quickly as possible. It was partly this sense of a high Latin American status that made for conflict with the developed countries, which were seen as standing in the way of further Latin American development. Mexico’s strength as a model of industrialization was reflected in the fact that Mexico was the first developing country in which a PAFTAD conference was held, in July 1974. The mid-1970s represented the highest peak in the global influence of the dependencia theory. The clear military defeat of the United States by the Vietnamese had shown how weak the military superpower was against determined Third World fighters. Its economy had likewise become weaker, exemplified by its balance of payments problems. The weakening of the United States had also forced it into détente, and at the same time increased the international prestige of the Soviet Union. The oil shock had shown how vulnerable were the Western industrialized countries, in general. Determined countries possessing sensitive raw materials were able to dictate their terms to the West. The global exploitative economic structure was seen to be crumbling, and this was therefore the time to push for further international progress. It was in this spirit that many Latin American participants used highly confrontational rhetoric at the conferences (Cuadra 1975; Legorreta 1975; Ziribn 1975; Salgado 1976), and even more clearly than is reflected in the published papers, this situation seems to have prevailed in discussions. An Australian participant described them in the following way: Ideological differences…coloured much of the debate and…it would not be unfair to say, tended with some exceptions to range the Latin American and Soviet participants on one side and the other foreign—North American, Asian and Australasian—participants on the other. Sometimes it sounded like oldfashioned ‘socialism vs. capitalism’. More often it was expressed in terms of a conflict between a ‘market oriented’
< previous page
page_76
next page >
< previous page
page_77
next page >
Page 77 and a ‘state-control’ approach…. I confess I was distressed and surprised, as a visitor to Latin America, to encounter so much bitterness, almost desperation, among our Latin American colleagues. One does not often hear eminent, sober academics use the language of international confrontation, about their countries ‘running out of patience’, condemning ‘mere tinkering with the rules of the game’, rejoicing that the enemy has been found ‘much more vulnerable because of dependence on supply of raw materials’ and warnings that ‘the beginning of a transfer of economic power from developed to certain less developed countries’ is at hand. There is so much more poverty in Asia than in Latin America… there is so much evidence of achievement in economic development in Mexico, as in Brazil; Mexico seems to have so much more of the natural resources, material and human capital for further development than many Asian countries, that the visitor finds it hard to account for the prevailing sense of failure and impotence. When one reads of all the intolerable burdens which, according to our Latin American friends, weigh down the latecomers in industrial development, and of the insuperable obstacles in their way, one would not believe that Japan, Sweden or Australia could ever have made it. (Arndt 1975:231–2) An example of Latin American rhetoric was given, for example, by Jose Pinera from Chile: Whatever power Southern nations may harness in the short run from their control of natural resources should be employed as a weapon to negotiate a new liberal and equitable international economic order. (Pinera 1978:489) The policy goal of the ‘South’ was to confront the ‘North’ with the means it had, basically the possession of raw materials. Military means were not advocated, but economic and political means were seen to be effective as weapons. Pinera’s argument was influenced by the 1976 UNCTAD conference, which had adopted the New International Economic Order (NIEO) as a global policy goal. It had been campaigned for mainly by raw material producers among the developing countries, and its basic goal was to get a fair price for their exports. OPEC’s successful raising of oil prices had been the model for NIEO. As Kojima noted with regret, during the 1970s many of the developing countries shifted from the economic goal of development to the political goal of equity (Kojima 1977b:437). The military world of the 1960s had, with détente, receded, and was replaced with a world where political values were placed above others in global discussion. Latin Americans received support from Soviet economists, who had begun to participate in PAFTAD at this time. Capitalism was in dire straits,
< previous page
page_77
next page >
< previous page
page_78
next page >
Page 78 weakening visibly, but socialism was doing well. It seemed to be triumphing globally. Soviet participants presented papers displaying unwavering confidence in their own system. The Soviet economy, which ‘knows no depressions or crises’ (Yakubovsky 1975:28), could easily be depicted as superior to the capitalist economies, which were experiencing the deepest suffering from the oil crisis (Lebedev 1975). Unemployment became a perennial problem in Western Europe and North America during the 1970s, but ‘the Soviet Union got rid of unemployment once and forever as far back as the late 1920s’ (Volkov 1977:74). Socialism and cooperation with the USSR were presented as the solution for exploited countries in their fight for independence (Chekhutov 1976; Yakubovsky 1976). The Soviet participants were confident in the superiority of their own economic system, and, in the generally leftist intellectual climate of the time, the Soviet Union was easily seen as the rising global power in contrast to the stagnant and retreating United States. The ideological impact of the Soviets on PAFTAD was not really that great, and their arguments were not necessarily taken at face value, but presenting an alternative and successful economic system to the capitalist one was a constant source of dispute. The Latin Americans were answered by participants from the United States. Strong attacks were launched by American economists trying to silence these vocal critics, who did not even use proper economic tools of analysis, but instead mixed political science and sociology into their arguments. For instance, Harry G.Johnson called his critics ‘the self-styled radical elite’ and ‘the educated leisure class of students and intellectuals’ (Johnson 1976:308). Another good example comes from Helen Hughes: If I may caricature the ‘Latin American Viewpoint’ a little, I am reminded of a situation in which a young lady or gentleman accepts an invitation from a person of the opposite sex to visit their apartment late at night, and, two brandies later, cries ‘rape! rape!’ (Hughes 1975:16) However, the open conflict lay almost solely between North and South Americans. Asians tended to participate little in this quarrelling. The Japanese were quite sensitive to the dependencia theory, in the sense that such structures should be carefully avoided in international economic intercommunication (Murakami 1976; Naya and Akrasanee 1976). Kojima occasionally might take part in the theory debate, as he perceived the NIEO type of tactics as a dead end. The future of the developing countries did not depend on natural resources. Commenting on Thailand’s development, Kojima pointed out that the development of textile industries as export industries was hampered by the fact that the profitable exports of tin and agricultural commodities allowed the maintenance of a high exchange rate, which made the export of industrial goods difficult or unprofitable (1977a). In the long term, real development lay only in
< previous page
page_78
next page >
< previous page
page_79
next page >
Page 79 establishing a diverse industrial base. An abundance of raw materials, and especially getting good prices for them, could actually be harmful for development (1996:75–93). But most of the time the Japanese tended to stay away from the debate. The same can also be said of other Asian participants. The PAFTAD conferences of the 1970s really presented an instance of two quite separate discussion processes, which only sporadically touched each other. For Asians, their region did not present an unstructured mass of poor countries, as it might have seemed from Latin America. They also were ambitious to move up, but instead of evaluating the international system using political concepts, such as equality, they used economic ones. With these concepts, the region became clearly layered, with Japan at the top, and other countries arranged neatly below it. Read as narratives, the Asian papers were rather pure examples of romantic heroic legends. However, the stories did not display valiance in a fight against imperialist exploiters, but skilful use of national development policies to produce economic advancement. In these Asian economistic narratives, Japanese economists adopted the role of teachers, who were supremely confident of what they were saying. They were teaching Japanese economic history. This attitude dated back to before the PAFTAD conferences, as the Japan Economic Research Center (JERC; now Japan Center for Economic Research, JCER) had been organizing educational conferences for Asian economists since the middle of the 1960s (1966, 1968). Japanese economic history was spread out as an example of successful development, and it was explained carefully how countries proceeded upwards in distinct stages (e.g. Komiya 1972; Namiki 1973; Ōkita and Tamura 1975; Murota 1978). The Japanese here were arguing clearly within the theoretical framework of the flying geese theory, although they carefully avoided using the name. There was a group of countries, whose representatives told stories depicting present success. The proud tone of being from a country climbing upward on the ladder of economic development can be seen, for example, in the following quote from Liang Kuo-shu’s paper on the development of the Taiwanese and South Korean economies: Taiwan’s small scale but successful technical assistance program in developing countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been not only a means of passing on Taiwan’s own experiences, but also a promising way to widen its trade connections with less developed countries. (Liang 1969:346) Taiwan had graduated from the level of needing development assistance, and had simultaneously turned into a teacher of less developed countries. From the Taiwanese point of view, Latin America was being included in the same context with Africa and Southeast Asia: i.e. less developed
< previous page
page_79
next page >
< previous page
page_80
next page >
Page 80 countries in need of education from a successful developer. Liang’s national pride was based on Taiwan’s rapid growth, expansion of exports, and upgrading the level of technological sophistication. South Korea’s Kim NakKwan could similarly argue that in 1962 his nation had been one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita GNP of $102, but by 1972, with an average annual rate of growth of 10.1 percent, that figure had nearly tripled to $298, and most of that growth had been achieved with the help of rapid export-led industrialization (Kim 1975:199; see also Yang 1972). Hong Kong and Singapore were also discussed using similar economistically heroic narratives, and the idea of developmental stages, which makes it easy to place a country at a certain position on the ladder and plan ahead for the next steps, was equally applicable to them all. This clear conceptual basis for predicting what to expect on the basis of a successful recent past also meant that the rhetoric of members of these countries was distinctly confident and optimistic in expressions regarding the future (Hsia 1971; Lim 1971; Chough 1973). There was a clear alignment of rhetoric with that of the Japanese in the criteria upon which one’s claim for respect could be based. The main criterion was an exceptionally high rate of growth, while the level from which it started was not important. After the oil crisis Japanese claims tended to refer to history, while the four rapidly growing countries were still talking of the present. For instance, when Yamazawa Ippei—a pupil of Kojima at Hitotsubashi University—started his presentation by saying ‘Japan’s phenomenal economic growth from the late 1950s until 1973’ (1977:84), Hong Wontack started with ‘Korea achieved one of the highest growth rates in the world during the 1962– 75 period’ (1977:170). The rest of the argument followed in a logical vein from these opening lines. The third distinct layer of Asian countries was formed by the four large ASEAN states. These were, generally speaking, in the role of spectators, gazing intensely on what was happening to these economic performers. The group’s economic success became a perennial source of wonder to the conference. Amado Castro from the Philippines expressed the feeling beautifully: We are privileged to be witnesses to contemporary cases of economic development. For me as a student of economic history, I am gratified that the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century are also taking place in the twentieth century in our part of the world…. It is heartening to witness success in economic development and to see how human beings can overcome obstacles. Even if there are mistakes, even if the process of development is not perfect, the hits are more than the misses…. it can already be perceived that these East Asian countries will be going along the same path of development as Japan and so they should find much to learn from Japan’s experience. (Castro 1973:146, 148)
< previous page
page_80
next page >
< previous page
page_81
next page >
Page 81 Japan was not able to serve as a direct model for the ASEAN developing countries, because it was perceived to be in a different class: that of developed countries. Japan could serve as an historical model, but its history also taught the lessons of the benefits of colonialism and military subjection of other countries on one’s own development. Even though Japanese economists were arguing carefully, using only economistic rhetoric, Japan’s history could never present an unambiguous message. Japan did not really ignite that much wonderment. It had done the same thing as Europe and North America, starting a century before, and Japan’s prosperity was an established fact. The success of these four new countries was far more potent. Because they had been so poor until very recent times, and had shared the experience of being colonized, their success was all the more ‘heartening’ and gratifying. It brought about a feeling of a great historical change taking place in the midst of the region, before the eyes of the observers, which can be clearly seen in Castro’s emotionally loaded words. As shown by ASEAN interest in acquiring foreign investment, analysed earlier, and the gradual shifting of trade policies from import substitution to export promotion (Naya and Kerdpibule 1973), there was considerable interest in entering a similar development path to that which Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan before them, had travelled. The 1970s presented a multitude of competing models of development: Japanese and Latin American state supported, Soviet and Chinese socialist, and Euro-American capitalist models were all hailed in international discussions as successes. An East Asian model of development had not yet been clearly formulated, but something of the sort was starting to emerge from the discussion process, as the rhetoric of Asian economists began to converge. The four rapidly growing countries were geographically and culturally close, and it was their type of economic strategy that was the easiest to adopt for ASEAN, rather than other competing models. They acted as a pulling force, while what happened in Vietnam represented an equally strong push. The authoritarian ASEAN governments were not impressed by the socialist models, and a widely shared belief emerged that the best defence against possible communist subversion was strong economic progress (Sudō 1992:100–6). The Latin American type of import substitution had already been tried for a considerable length of time, and its limits had become visible, illuminated by the bright light of the four achievers. The weakness of the Western European and North American economies had been exposed by the oil crisis, and by the middle of the 1970s it had already become visible that Japan was adjusting to the situation more successfully than any of them. Fears from the late 1960s of Japan attempting again to become a military force in the region had not materialized. During his premiership Miki Takeo had even imposed a ceiling on Japan’s military spending; it should not increase above 1 percent
< previous page
page_81
next page >
< previous page
page_82
next page >
Page 82 of GNP. It began to look as if Japan would not pose a military threat. Japan also had proved itself quite easy to control politically. Rioting students had sent Tanaka home in a panic, and the diplomatic humiliations of Miki and Miyazawa were not answered with anger, but by sending humble congratulations and promises of economic support. Fears of Japan began to disperse. Japan could also be viewed as an asset, representing a huge market for the export of ASEAN raw materials and agricultural products; the Japanese were promising large-scale industrial investments, and hopes also sprang up that Japan’s market would open to ASEAN industrial exports. During Miki’s premiership Japan had also started to participate in the summit meetings of the advanced countries, later named the G5 meetings, and as Japan seemed to be committed seriously to ASEAN, it began to seem useful to have a political ally with such connections. The United States, on the other hand, was becoming a sort of burden. In 1977 Jimmy Carter became president with a moralistic human rights agenda, which embarrassed many Asian governments. In the psychological aftermath of the lost Vietnam war Carter also planned to withdraw all American troops from Korea. Additionally, a rumour had spread that Carter planned to pull out of the Philippines, and that the United States no longer considered Southeast Asia as vital to its interests. In Congress serious talk unfolded of cutting security assistance to Thailand and Indonesia, as well. This looked like the next step along the road started by Nixon’s Guam Doctrine in 1969. The convergence of interests between Japan and ASEAN was increasing during the latter half of the 1970s. The Japanese needed a group of countries to display as their own in international fora, and the ASEAN countries could use a rich ally (Sudō 1992:77–109). Economic cooperation was the only possible field in which closer relations could be built, but at least in that field the ASEAN countries had by 1977 become ready to enter into a tentative discipleship with Japan. Fukuda Takeo became Japan’s next prime minister in December of 1976. His foreign political platform was based, from the beginning, on an ASEAN initiative. In his foreign policy speech in January 1977 he said that Southeast Asia’s peace and prosperity were Japan’s greatest concern (mottomo ōkii kanshinji). He praised ASEAN’s development, and promised Japan’s active help (Fukuda 1977a). His trip to Southeast Asia was planned carefully, so that no misfortune such as Tanaka and Miki had experienced would recur. Additionally, President Carter’s blessing was secured. The trip was geared to achieve maximum political effect. The contents of his initiative were leaked to the press well ahead of the trip, and were calculated to be pleasing to both Japanese and Southeast Asian audiences. The international implications were also well calculated. When Fukuda, along with Chief Cabinet Secretary Sonoda Sunao, Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanaka Tatsuo, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hatoyama Ichirō, met with ASEAN heads of state in Kuala
< previous page
page_82
next page >
< previous page
page_83
next page >
Page 83 Lumpur on 7 August 1977, the event was another step in healing wartime wounds. This was the second time that Japanese high leadership had met with Southeast Asian leaders in a major international conference; the previous meeting had been the Greater East Asian Conference held in Tokyo in 1943 (Sudō 1992:176–7). This time the participants were on a more equal level, symbolized by the location of the conference, and by the fact that it was not convened with a call from Tokyo, The Japanese were, rather, allowed to attend after begging for the privilege for three years. In addition, Japan was not the only guest. Australia and New Zealand also attended, mitigating the symbolic meaning of the conference. They kept the geographical frame around the Western Pacific, so that the geographical image of the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere did not spring to mind. The so-called Fukuda Doctrine was not, however, announced at Kuala Lumpur. The handling of the doctrine issue was a masterpiece of international image making, planned by Fukuda’s aides and the MOFA. This was the first time since the war that Japan publicly proclaimed a ‘doctrine’; the so-called Yoshida Doctrine was an ex post facto invention. The custom of American presidents was to make major political statements during official visits to important places, and Fukuda’s speech was modelled consciously after this pattern. It was given in Manila, on the last stop of his ASEAN tour. The Philippines had been the most important symbol of American presence in Asia since the late nineteenth century. When Fukuda’s doctrine was presented there in 1977, it symbolized effectively that Japan had arrived in the region to replace the United States, at least as an economic group leader (Sudō 1992:155). Fukuda’s speech has been analysed mainly as a declaration for practical measures in the practical world, and in that light not very much has been found in it. He promised US$1 billion aid for ASEAN, and spoke obscurely about ‘heart-to-heart’ understanding between Japan and ASEAN. Read in that way, the document indeed does not yield much, and at its core is left only the $1 billion. But there is much beyond. The Fukuda doctrine should rather be analysed as a carefully prepared text, which summarizes the horizon of Japan’s Southeast Asian policy in operation throughout the 1970s. Read from this angle, the Manila speech is a rich document. Fukuda argued simultaneously at three levels, one of them defensive, and the other two constructive (Fukuda 1977b). He pointed out that Japan had the economic and technological capability to build nuclear weapons, and could easily become a military great power if it wanted, but promised that this path would not be taken. Even though all other great economic powers had become military powers, Japan would be an historical exception, and seek to maintain its security through international cooperation. This experiment would be ‘unprecedented in history’ and ‘without parallel in history’. Fukuda thus faced squarely the worries about a militaristic Japan, and argued forcibly for the case of an historical exception. He was
< previous page
page_83
next page >
< previous page
page_84
next page >
Page 84 attacking directly the conceptual world of the dependencia theory and accusations of emerging Japanese militaristic imperialism, making them appear mistaken and outmoded in Japan’s economistic case. Similar references against that description of the world stated that Japan would not be a threat to its neighbours ‘either in a military way or in any other way whatsoever’, and that cultural cooperation between Japan and ASEAN would not be a ‘one-way street serving only to introduce Japan’s culture to our neighbours’. Japan would also be an ‘equal partner’ of ASEAN, which can be interpreted to mean that even though Japan was a big power it would not attempt to control the Southeast Asian countries. Imperialism and neocolonialism are things that exist in the world, but in Japan’s exceptional case that kind of thinking was wrong-headed. Fukuda used much more space in describing thinking that was ‘right’. This was divided into two parts. One of them was ‘heart-to-heart understanding’ between the Japanese and Southeast Asians, the same thing that Tanaka had tried to bring about. This expression has caused some embarrasment among commentators, but its analysis is really quite simple. Fukuda himself explains how the Southeast Asians should understand it: You, fellow Asians, will understand what I mean. For it is in our Asian tradition, and it is in our Asian hearts, always to seek beyond mere physical satisfaction for the richness of spiritual fulfilment. (Fukuda 1977b:53) In the world political context of a retreating United States, Fukuda approached ASEAN on an old pan-Asianist basis. This is old prewar rhetoric. The seeking of mere physical satisfaction was a characterization of rich colonial EuroAmericans, while the poor Asians were presented as superior on a spiritual level. As Fukuda’s attendance at the Kuala Lumpur summit carried subtle undertones of the corresponding conference in 1943, his Manila speech was also reminiscent of wartime rhetoric. The common Asian racial background was chosen as the principal link between Japan and ASEAN, while the white EuroAmericans were closed out of this common bond. The mystical unity through a common race, which allows the members to understand each other immediately, does away with all conflicts of interest (Dale 1995). This level of rhetoric tries to go deeper than the previous one, which moved on the level of current intellectual discussion. On an intellectual level Japan could be called an equal partner, and formally, within the conceptual space of liberalism, Japan would be one. However, Asian culture—at least as it was understood in Japan —was a culture constructed on hierarchical relations, where leaders were supposed to be benevolent and caring, and followers devoted and loyal. This is the social structure of harmony, and within this conceptual space Japan appeared in the position of the benevolent leader. Other expressions denoting a harmonious relationship called Japan ‘a true
< previous page
page_84
next page >
< previous page
page_85
next page >
Page 85 friend’, and ‘an especially close friend’, ‘walking hand in hand’ with ASEAN, like an older brother guiding his younger brother. Also a wide array of more intellectual level expressions, such as ‘solidarity’, ‘cooperation’, ‘interdependence’, ‘assisting’, ‘complementing’, ‘enduring peace and stability’ and, ‘peace and prosperity’, were spread abundantly in the text. They helped to mitigate the otherwise too openly pan-Asianistic rhetoric, and helped it to blend harmoniously with the other parts of the speech. Discipleship implies teaching and learning, and the implications of this comprised Fukuda’s third level of argumentation. He defined Japan as a’world economic power’ and ‘great economic power’, which has the will and capacity to deal constructively in the world. Japan was denned as being big, and by implication the ASEAN countries were defined as small. This was the basic situation between the countries, on which was to be woven a programme of common action. The programme was purely economistic. Fukuda went directly to the heart of the matter when he, as leader of a ‘half a trillion dollar’ economy, promised ‘$1 billion for ASEAN industrial projects’. He also promised cooperation with ASEAN in agriculture, health, education, and culture; but industrial projects, infrastructure improvement, and facilitating the industrialization of Southeast Asia were at the centre of this level of rhetoric. This was what the ASEAN countries wanted, and Fukuda was careful to present the offer as a response to a ‘heart-to-heart understanding’ of ASEAN wishes. Fukuda added that he planned to double the level of Japan’s development assistance, and that a practice already existed of directing half of Japan’s official development aid towards Southeast Asia, thus indicating that there indeed existed a special relationship between Japan and the area. If the ASEAN countries would become Japan’s disciples, Japan would lead them—by the hand and with generous financial help—towards becoming industrialized and rich countries. In Japan Fukuda’s Southeast Asian initiative was a monumental success. It touched the basic chords of the Japanese view of themselves in relation to Southeast Asia. The press hailed the new diplomatic success, and the bureaucrats set out to implement the initiative. In this sense Fukuda can be said to have instilled into his speech the prevalent Japanese foreign political mood of the policy-making circles, important parts of the bureaucracy, the economic community, and the public at large. The Southeast Asian reaction was much more subdued. Financial and technical assistance was welcomed, but the idea of Japan’s enduring peaceful state, and entering a disciple relationship with Japan were viewed with more caution. Even so, these parts of Fukuda’s speech were not denounced (Sudō 1992:179). It did not mean an acceptance of all that Fukuda had said, but at least from then on Japan was allowed to speak in this fashion. It can be called tentative acceptance, the exact degree being left to later determination, after examination of the results of cooperation. A kind of special
< previous page
page_85
next page >
< previous page
page_86
next page >
Page 86 relationship was finally formed officially between Japan and ASEAN, not only on the de facto level of trade and investment, but also on the equally important rhetorical level.
< previous page
page_86
next page >
< previous page
page_87
next page >
Page 87 Part II The Pacific age An old tale exists about the future grandeur of the Pacific region, circulated among the local intellectual elites. Although not as old as the story of economism, it nevertheless has a history that spans more than a century. While the story of Pacific economism was continuing to unfold, the story of the approaching Pacific age reappeared at the end of the 1960s, and the two became intertwined by the end of the 1970s. For most of its history the vision of the Pacific age has been a subchapter of the larger story of economism, but it is not a tale of peaceful global cooperation, but of challenge and competition, and as such fits well with the developmental state type of economism. It places the Pacific region into direct economic competition with the old-established centre of the world, Europe, and, as any narrative dividing the world into friends and foes, it also attempts to create a measure of unity among Pacific countries. Throughout its history the story has been told in connection with Pacific cooperation, and the emergence of international discussion on Pacific integration was the reason for its reappearance during the late 1960s. However, precisely because its goal is the creation of unity, it also has a tendency to create conflictual subgroups even among the Pacific countries themselves, because in historical situations the achievement of unity sometimes appears easier among smaller groups of countries than the whole Pacific region. We shall first examine the etymology of the Pacific age concept. It emerged for the first time during the late nineteenth century, and ended with World War I. Its second cycle was fairly short, lasting only a few years during the 1920s, ending with the Great Depression. Its third cycle has been long, starting sporadically in Japan during the late 1960s, spreading slowly to international discussion during the 1970s, and exploding into full bloom internationally during the 1980s. PAFTAD economists started to discuss a new Pacific integration initiative after the middle of the 1970s. The main features of their blueprint are analysed in Chapter 7, while the creation of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) on the foreign political level forms the subject matter of Chapter 8. Chapter 9 is devoted to Japan’s triumphant emergence as a global model of economism during the 1980s, the effect being strongest
< previous page
page_87
next page >
< previous page
page_88
next page >
Page 88 on Pacific Asian countries. In Chapter 10 we shall analyse how the international triumph of economism led to its politicization during the 1990s, and how in the old economistic narrative this politicization was to be controlled in the form of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Finally in Chapter 11 we shall attempt to characterize the emerging discussion of East Asian continentalism, especially the proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), where the tendency towards politicization has been less controlled, and which may signify the transformation of the current cycle of the Pacific age narrative into a conflictual phase.
< previous page
page_88
next page >
< previous page
page_89
next page >
Page 89 6 The etymology of the Pacific age The first person to use the term ‘Pacific age’ was the Japanese political economist Inagaki Manjirō (1861–1908) (Watanabe 1992:98–102). Inagaki studied during the late 1880s at Cambridge University, under the guidance of the British historian John Robert Seeley, the history of Great Britain’s expansion. Seeley, in turn, was inspired by the German geographer Carl Ritter. Through Inagaki a certain style of European nineteenth century visionary rhetoric was introduced into discussions about the future Pacific. This is an interesting point in itself, but even more interesting are the shifts in perspective resulting from this transference of concepts into a different context. Seeley’s rhetorical style was based on the use of a few grandiose concepts. The first of these was ‘ocean’. Seeley had adopted from Ritter a certain way of looking at the history of Europe. Ritter linked the idea of water as a medium of communication to the idea of progress, developing a theory of three stages of civilization (Ritter 1820). The first stage in the development of humankind was potamic, which clung to rivers. The second stage was thalassic, which grew up around inland seas, such as the Mediterranean and the Baltic. The third, and highest stage of civilization, was oceanic. Potamic and thalassic civilizations have blossomed all around the globe, but only Europe moved humankind to the stage of an oceanic civilization, where commerce and culture spread over all the oceans of the world (Seeley 1883:87–90). The second concept was progress. It was a romantic word, and clearly displays the fact that we are here dealing with a heroic narrative, where insignificant countries rise, relying on their own skill, to grandeur. The structure of the argument was the same as in fairy tales where a poor boy marries a princess, thereby acquiring a kingdom. In Ritter’s example Europe itself was the poor boy, the system of waterways represented the princess, and the whole world represented the kingdom. As Ritter emphasized, Europe is the smallest of all continents (Ritter 1863:1), and the civilizations of China, India, Persia, and Arabia previously had been more progressive than Europe’s. However, when humankind had reached the nineteenth century things had changed:
< previous page
page_89
next page >
< previous page
page_90
next page >
Page 90 Europe is the centre of the civilized and cultivated world…it is the spiritual metropole, the burning point of the planet, the focus, where all beams of light gather and from where they are reflected back anew. (Ritter 1863:7, 23) By the middle of the nineteenth century Europe had become the most progressive place in the world, the centre of commerce and politics, and the absolute leader of world culture. The world had never had such a centre before. That is why in Europe a need never arose for a concept like ‘the Atlantic age’. It would have been too narrow. European grandiose thinking during the nineteenth century was not limited to the area of one single ocean, but embraced the whole world. Ritter used terms like ‘planetaric’, ‘telluric’, and ‘oceanic’ to describe the new age. In Seeley’s case the poor boy was Britain: a barren island with a small population. The world’s oceans were the princess, and the British Empire the kingdom. The English were a progressive people. The whole non-European world appeared stagnant, and even in Europe previously progressive countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Holland, Sweden, Germany and France, appeared stagnant in comparison with the advance of the British Empire. At the beginning of the 1880s only three progressive nations were left in the world, namely the British, the Americans, and the Russians. These were the nations that carried forward world history. The third concept was economics. The association between tales of global centres and tales of economism is deep rooted. Seeley was not interested in warfare and military heroism. For him progress and economic expansion were linked together. The oceanic age meant that the exploitation of worldwide trading links facilitated the growth of commerce and industry. He treated with contempt the continental states, which wasted their resources on petty intrigues. This was why they were stagnating. Only England had been wise enough to remain aloof from wars on the continent over the centuries. Seeley formulated the results of the British strategy in the following well-known way: ‘we seem…to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind’ (1883:8). Future was the fourth concept. Time is measured in terms of centuries here. Progress, on the scale of civilizations, cannot be discerned using shorter time periods. Seeley was an exceptional historian in the sense that he did not value historical knowledge as important in itself, but only as a basis of planning for the future. He was, so to speak, a policy-oriented social scientist, and the future prosperity of Great Britain was his greatest interest. At that time the imperial possessions all across the world had a British population of over 10 million people, and increasing rapidly, as they were exploiting abundant resources. On this basis Seeley expected that the number of Englishmen would be over a hundred million after 50 years (i.e. 1930). If only political stability were taken care of, so that the colonial possessions would not fall away from the control of the mother
< previous page
page_90
next page >
< previous page
page_91
next page >
Page 91 country—as the United States had done—and resources were not wasted in military adventures, the leading position of England would be guaranteed into the distant future (1883:10–16). Seeley’s historical narrative can perhaps be summed up by saying that in his world a few dynamic, economistic great nations headed towards a glorious future, where everything was measured in grandiose oceanic terms. Seeley’s pupil Inagaki Manjirō adopted the basic concepts, but used them in a different context. Inagaki’s Japan was also a poor boy: a few small, barren islands far away from glittering Europe. However, he identified his country with Great Britain, which had started from similar beginnings. If the British had been able to make it to riches, the Japanese certainly could. The recipe for success taught by Seeley—commercial and industrial expansion, and refraining from wasteful military adventures—could be applied to Japan’s case. Inagaki was optimistic, wholly confident that his country, which at that time exported coal, raw silk, tea, and rice, would be able to rise to the top rank of manufacturing nations (1890:54–6). Inagaki’s optimism resulted from the fact that he was looking at the world mainly from an economic point of view. The economic thought categories tend to direct thinking towards positive-sum game situations, where everybody can win at the same time, while military/territorial conceptions force discussants towards a zero-sum game type of argumentation, where every actor is evaluated as a winner or a loser. In other words, as we have seen earlier, economistic rhetoric depicts a world of increasing abundance, while militaristic rhetoric tends to move in a world of scarcity. At that time only one region of the world remained where large-scale expansion was still possible, namely the Pacific. The three progressive nations identified by Seeley would therefore enter the Pacific with force. Great Britain would sail over the oceans, approaching the Pacific from the South. Russia would advance from the north using the Siberian railway, which was under construction at the time. The construction of a railway network covering China was also under discussion. Canada had completed the Canadian Pacific Railway across the continent in 1887. Inagaki believed that humankind had entered a new stage of civilization, namely the ‘railway-oceanic’ stage, which had opened inland areas to large-scale commerce (1890:40). The United States had started to plan a canal through Nicaragua in 1889, and the French had been at work in Panama since 1879. Germany had started to expand to the Pacific commercially and colonially, beginning with the annexation of New Guinea in 1884. From all directions Europe was rushing to the Pacific. Inagaki did not see it as a threat, being confident that Japan would be able to defend itself in an alliance with Great Britain. Rather he saw it as a great opportunity. The same routes that took European goods to the Pacific, would also carry Japanese goods to Europe. European expansion was opening
< previous page
page_91
next page >
< previous page
page_92
next page >
Page 92 the huge world market to Japanese exporters. Japan would be situated in the centre of all main trade routes, and its commercial greatness would be ensured (1890:47). Places like Vladivostok, Vancouver, Nicaragua, and New South Wales would probably also develop into commercial centres, and these local centres would benefit from mutual cooperation to shield themselves against European machinations. The Anglophile Inagaki was especially interested in cooperation with Australia (1890:57). This may be one of the first proposals for pan-Pacific cooperation. Based on this vision of European expansion and local response to it, Inagaki could have said that at last the Pacific was also entering the telluric age. But he did not say so. One of his greatest contributions to Pacific yarn-spinning was that he abandoned this European vocabulary, and devised a new one. He said that the twentieth century would be the Pacific age (Taiheiyō jidai) (Inagaki 1892:1). The centre of the world in terms of dynamics would shift from Europe to the Pacific. Europe was a stable, built-up place where no great changes could be expected. The ‘railway-oceanic’ stage of civilization, the diffusion of European capital and trading experience, and the abundant resources in the Pacific meant that the centre stage of history would move there. Correspondingly, Inagaki named the nineteenth century the Atlantic Age (Taiseiyō jidai). European grandeur was thus restricted conceptually to a single ocean and a single century. Inagaki’s vocabulary implied that just at the moment when Europe seemed to be at its greatest, it was being left behind. Inagaki was the one who named the new age, and he was probably also its first determined campaigner. He personally mailed copies of his English book to dignitaries around the world. However, he cannot be regarded as the absolute originator of the vision. Some roots could probably be found in European seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Utopian writing regarding China and Japan (Steenstrup 1979). According to Australian lore about the origins of the idea, Henry Copeland, who painted visionary images of the Pacific in 1882, has been mentioned (Fletcher 1917:39). In American discussion Senator William H.Seward, who later became President Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of state, has been credited with having uttered the following prophecy during the California gold rush sometime in the 1850s: European thought, European commerce, and European enterprise, although actually gaining in force, and European connections, although becoming more and more intimate, will nevertheless relatively sink in importance in the future, while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and adjacent territories will become the chief theatre of human events and activities in the world’s great hereafter. (see Lea 1909:168; Roosevelt 1928:3) Seward represented, together with such a figure as Admiral Matthew Perry, those Americans favouring an expansionist policy. The opening of
< previous page
page_92
next page >
< previous page
page_93
next page >
Page 93 Japan in 1854 was one of the results of their efforts. However, the exploitation of the remaining wilderness areas in the United States, and the Civil War took up so much national energy that an expansionist policy did not receive substantial governmental support until the end of the nineteenth century. The foreign policy of the United States was, in the middle of the century, centred primarily on trade, and American traders could rely on British naval hegemony to keep the sea lanes open. Seward was forgotten, until his words were dug up in the early part of this century to give historical weight to the arguments of contemporary espousers of the idea. The concept of the Pacific age was brought into American politics by means of the cooperation between two men, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and President Theodore Roosevelt. Mahan’s magnum opus, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), provided the intellectual basis for the modernization and expansion of the US fleet at the turn of the century, and Mahan became an outstanding authority on national maritime strategy. A rising politician, Theodore Roosevelt, liked his ideas. The two became personal friends, working together as a team comprising an intellectual and a politician, shaping great visions for the American nation. Roosevelt became vice president in 1900, and then suddenly president in 1901 after the assassination of the reelected McKinley. McKinley’s foreign political views had been vacillating between expansionism and isolationism, but Roosevelt had a clear vision of making the United States an acknowledged world power. He took active interest in the canal issue being planned across the Central American isthmus. He abandoned Nicaragua, where the work had not proceeded well, plotted the secession of Panama from Colombia in 1903, took over the French company operating there, and ordered a speedy continuation of the digging. The American Navy expanded rapidly under Roosevelt, and by 1907, when he sent the Great White Fleet on its round-theworld cruise from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the United States became recognized as a major naval power. With Roosevelt’s activities, American interests in the Pacific ceased to be predominantly economistic, and a clear military dimension was added (Mowry 1958). The published writings of Mahan and Roosevelt at the end of the nineteenth century were dramatic because of their temporal horizon. There was a typical fin de siècle aura in them: the ending of a glorious era of ‘immense increase of prosperity, of physical and mental luxury’. A new century, and a new age, was beginning. It was going to bring even more luxury to those who could win the competition. Competition there was, and not everyone could be a winner. Like many contemporary writers, Mahan and Roosevelt understood international competition in terms of race and civilization, rather than economics, and the military background of both men also pointed more to a world view of conflict rather than harmony. There was no doubt that winners in the competition to exploit
< previous page
page_93
next page >
< previous page
page_94
next page >
Page 94 the Pacific would be the European peoples, who, like the ‘lemmings of Scandinavia’, are driven by a ‘blind outward impulse’ to conquer the world, bringing the blessings of Christian civilization to the backward races (Mahan 1897:251–64). Roosevelt expressed the same sentiment in a speech in 1899, where he exhorted his countrymen to live ‘the life of strenuous endeavour’, as the ‘twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations’, and then would be decided which nations were bold and strong enough to ‘win for themselves the domination of the world’ (Roosevelt 1906a). In an essay published in the same year, Roosevelt continued the theme: Every expansion of civilization makes for peace. In other words, every expansion of a great civilized power means a victory for law, order, and righteousness…the barbarians recede or are conquered, with the attendant fact that peace follows their retrogression or conquest…the mighty civilized races… by their expansion are gradually bringing peace into the red wastes where the barbarian peoples of the world hold sway. (Roosevelt 1906b) The simple self-righteous thinking of the period can be illuminated by contrasting it to the views of Theodore Roosevelt Junior, the president’s son and Governor General of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, who from retirement gave the following comment on the American visions of his father’s generation: It was considered as axiomatic that no white nation could find a worthy opponent except in another white nation. Warring against the colored nations was more dangerous and more exciting than big-game shooting but still more or less in the same category. Destiny seemed to point to an entire world ruled by white people. (Roosevelt 1937:66). Race was a common concept used in the analysis of world politics at the turn of the century. As Mahan visualized things in 1900, the three dynamic Teutonic states, namely Germany, Great Britain and the United States, would carry on their shoulders the major burden of advancing Christian civilization during the century that had just begun. The main confrontation seemed to be with the Asian race, which also represented an old civilization, but frozen and stagnant, with only one exception, namely Japan. It was a maritime power, and had an interest similar to the Teutonic powers in keeping trade flowing over the wide oceans. Japan had so rapidly acquired an industrial civilization that Mahan was able to consider it as an adoptively European power, and part of the European commonwealth just like the United States. The historical parallel of Japan learning the Teutonic civilization with the Teutonic tribes adopting Roman civilization a millennium ago seemed appropriate (Mahan 1900:147–50).
< previous page
page_94
next page >
< previous page
page_95
next page >
Page 95 As no large-scale war was expected to take place among the Teutonic countries and Japan, and the rest of the world was depicted as stagnant, and if we moreover clean away the effects of a military background from the rhetoric of Mahan and Roosevelt, the Pacific narrative still appears quite peaceful and economistic. Expansion into the territory of barbarians was not counted as real conflict, and their economic goals were focused steadily on the abundance of the global open trading system. They certainly wanted to make the United States a global power, but there seemed to be ample space in the world for its expansion. President Roosevelt is sometimes credited with being the first person to use the term Pacific age, or some of its equivalents. The thick and painstakingly compiled Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia (Hart and Ferleger 1989) completely ignores the expression, but it is reported that he used it at least in 1898 in connection with the annexation of the Philippines, and at the end of the RussoJapanese war. Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, John Hay, is likewise cited as having used the term (Soesastro 1989:65–6). Mahan certainly talked about the Pacific replacing the Atlantic as the centre of future world struggle (1900:131, 192). It seems to have belonged to the normal political vocabulary at the turn of the century, at least in Roosevelt’s circle. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5 changed with one stroke the strategic landscape of the Pacific, and the atmosphere of discussion. Before the war, the strong naval powers in the Pacific had been Great Britain, Russia, and Japan. The United States had only started to expand its navy at the time. After the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 Great Britain had gradually reduced its presence in the Pacific, concentrating its ships in Atlantic waters in response to the heavy German naval build-up. When Japan annihilated the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets, it suddenly became the strongest naval power in the Pacific. This swift turn of events was combined with the psychological shock of an Asian nation winning a stunning victory in war with a European great power. In reality the Japanese had not been the first to defeat a European nation. The Philippine independence army had decisively beaten Spanish troops in 1898. However, the problem of interpreting this case lies in the fact that the Spaniards did not capitulate to the Filipinos, as would have been considered humiliating in the nineteenth-century world, but rather to the Americans, who were white (Rivera 1994: interview). This victory was consequently forgotten, and the Japanese took the global credit of being the first Asians to beat the whites. This fact led to a realignment of the potential main players in the expected struggle for Pacific supremacy. Images of Pacific abundance receded, while scarcity—experienced as a lack of natural resources, lack of food, lack of living space, tightening market competition, and increasing unemployment—came into discussion. The forthcoming struggle was depicted in military terms, and races as basic units were emphasized ever
< previous page
page_95
next page >
< previous page
page_96
next page >
Page 96 more strongly. Emperor Wilhelm II’s term die Gelbe Gefahr spread rapidly among the white nations of the region, and ‘the Yellow Peril’ became a favourite term for anti-Asian writers. One of the first influential authors to use the term in the United States was Jack London, who on one hand espoused socialist and democratic ideals in his writings, while on the other combined them with racist ideas, without any seeming contradiction (Shibusawa 1970:231–4). As early as 1904 he visited Manchuria to witness the victorious Japanese army. In an essay at the time he told his readers about the fanatic Japanese dreaming Napoleonic dreams, and of the four hundred million industrious Chinese, who would constitute a Yellow Peril for the Western world if the fanatic Japanese undertook their management. A new ‘great race adventure’ for the Western world seemed to be developing from that combination during the twentieth century (London 1910). In 1909 the first book was published depicting a war between Japan and the United States, written by Homer Lea and entitled Valor of Ignorance. It became an immediate bestseller in the United States, and the Japanese translation also sold 40,000 copies. Lea was not actually anti-Asian; he liked and admired the new post-revolutionary China, studied the Chinese language, and worked there for a time as a military adviser (Shibusawa 1970:236–46). That experience made him antagonistic to Japan and its territorial ambitions in continental Asia. Generally Lea could be called anti-foreign. He argued against foreign immigration to the United States on the grounds that it diluted AngloSaxon purity, increased crime, and created a strategic weakness in time of war with a strong country that had sent a lot of immigrants. Germany and Japan especially were dangerous countries, as both were increasing their military and economic power so rapidly that they were beginning to appear menacing. Accordingly, Lea mentioned that of all immigrants ‘the Germans exceed all other foreigners in criminality’ (1909:131). The painting of such degrading racist pictures is a normal part of building enemy images, and it is necessary to note here that those images were not constructed against Asians alone, but against anyone who appeared dangerous. With the rising image of a German menace the term ‘Teutonic’ ceased to be applicable to ‘Anglo-Saxons’; it lost the positive value that had earlier been attached to it, and became a negative characterization restricted to Germans. Lea also seriously contemplated the possibility of a German attack on the United States, but the Atlantic was no longer an interesting ocean to him. He was clearly part of the Pacific age discussion process, as it was the Pacific that he considered to be the most important part of the future world: ‘Whether the world in the future is to be dominated, politically, militarily, or industrially by any one nation, or a coalition of them, in the dominion of the Pacific shall it be determined’ (1909:189). Thus, the main struggle for the domination of the world would be fought between Japan and the United States. The main story of the book is an imaginative tale
< previous page
page_96
next page >
< previous page
page_97
next page >
Page 97 of how Japan lands an attacking force on the American Pacific slope and conquers it, being easily able to defend it against badly organized and poorly equipped American troops trying to launch a counter-attack over the dry prairieland. That would leave the riches of the Pacific, the American west coast, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines in Japanese possession, and give it a free hand with all of the lesser powers in the region. The main point of Lea’s book was an attack on the ‘commercialism’ of American public opinion, which relied on the ‘fanciful and erroneous conception of economic interdependence’ to maintain peace between the two nations (1909:163). Similar ideas were also expressed in Japan at the time, and Lea attacked these, for example, an article by Baron Kaneko Kentarō, Privy-Councillor to the Emperor, who had written that No lady in the United States can get a silk dress if we stop the export of silk to that country, and that the average American citizen cannot drink tea if our tea is excluded from America. So much for the dependence of the American people on Japanese products. (Kaneko 1907) Kaneko’s argument was a typical economist’s answer to the emerging discussion of a possible military confrontation between the two countries. He continued with a list of items showing how dependent the Japanese were on America, concluding that the people would never allow their statesmen to drag their countries into a nonprofitable war with each other. Lea easily refuted this kind of simplistic idea (1909:164; see also Shibusawa 1970:250–1). With his book Lea wanted substantially to increase funding in American naval and military armaments. Instead of Japan, it should be the United States that should control the Pacific, and with the Pacific the world. The Pacific promised riches, but they could be won only through military struggle. That was his message, which sold well both in the United States and Japan. It needs only to be added that both countries started extensive naval construction programmes, which led to an arms race, and the prospect of a naval war between Japan and the United States became a continuing topic of discussion during subsequent decades (Bywater 1970). Frank Fox, an Australian journalist, analysed the political, economic and military situation in the Pacific, stating his standpoint clearly: The Pacific is the ocean of the future…. On the bosom of the Pacific will be decided, in peace or in war, the next great struggle of civilization, which will give as its prize the supremacy of the world. Shall it go to the White Race or the Yellow Race? (Fox 1912:1–2) Fox considered the possibility of a peaceful struggle, which would be conducted through industrial and commercial means. The rapid economic
< previous page
page_97
next page >
< previous page
page_98
next page >
Page 98 development of Japan, and the beginning economic development of countries like China and India, had opened the horizon of the Asian nations to conquer the markets of Western countries through penetration by low-cost manufactures, eroding their industrial base. If free trade conditions had prevailed in the Pacific, these countries would have enjoyed a chance of success, but Fox could say with relief that there were ‘no Free Trade ideas in the Pacific; the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, all alike protect their home markets against any destructive Asiatic competition’ (1912:235–6). In home markets the problem could easily be solved by hostile tariffs, which any ‘White Nation’ was free to impose at will. That left the neutral markets. There were a number of these, China representing the greatest one in the Pacific. Thus far major nations had continued their efforts to make open-door agreements, guaranteeing access. The Open Door policy in regard to China had been devised by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899, during the McKinley administration. It was invented as a way to prevent the European powers from slicing up China to their exclusive spheres of influence, and to enable American traders free access to the whole Chinese market. Economically the United States was at that time able to compete with anyone, but militarily it was weaker. Its Pacific navy was still small, and in terms of national politics a major military expedition to China would have been difficult, because the United States was already involved in large-scale warfare in the Philippines against the forces of Emilio Aguinaldo, fighting for independence (Schulzinger 1990:21–4). The European powers reluctantly agreed to Hay’s initiative, and Open Door became a general term referring to free economic competition in neutral markets. The problem during the 1910s was that as the economic struggle went on, neutral markets were being absorbed gradually into the sphere of influence of one or another dominant power, thus dwindling their numbers. The trend clearly pointed to a situation where all major industrial nations would be forced to rely on exports to dominions directly under their control. If that happened all commerce would depend on military and naval control, and attempts to expand markets would lead to military conflict. Another point worrying Fox was the rapid increase in world population. Populations began to press against their boundaries in relation to food production. Fox expected that empty places like Australia would almost certainly be attacked by some hungry Asian race. Thus, according to this analysis, competition in the Pacific might continue peacefully for a time, but sooner or later a military struggle would break out. Because of the poverty of Japan in terms of natural resources and arable land, combined with pride based on its military and industrial achievements, Fox expected that even though its chances of winning the conflict were not good, it would inevitably be forced to enter the struggle, claiming that ‘she has gone too far on the path to greatness to be able to retire safely
< previous page
page_98
next page >
< previous page
page_99
next page >
Page 99 into obscurity. She must “see it through”’ (Fox 1912:46). The Japanese on their side had naturally been very proud of their military and economic achievements, and had not tried to hide it (see, for example, Suyematsu 1905). The five million Australians were in an awkward position on their rich continent. With its resources they could envision a great future for themselves in the Pacific, but their small population made them feel insecure, like a weak man sitting on a chest of gold, listening to creeping sounds from the dark garden. The same mixture of great hopes and insecurity can also be seen in other contemporary Australian analyses (Fletcher 1917, 1919). In 1914 a war broke out in the Pacific, but not involving the Japanese. This one was fought against the Germans, who were driven off the ocean. It was only a small skirmish of the Great War, which was to engulf the European world in bloodshed. During the war, in Japan, Field-Marshal Yamagata thought with foreboding about its end, when the European powers would renew their never-ending expansion to the Pacific: When the present great conflict in Europe is over and when the political and economic order are restored, the various countries will again focus their attention on the Far East and on the benefits and rights they might derive from this region. When that day comes, the rivalry between the white and the non-white races will become violent, and who can say that the white races will not unite with one another to oppose the colored peoples? (Yamagata 1958a:207) In short, we must attempt the solution of our myriad problems on the premise of ‘Asia for the Asians’. (Yamagata 1958b:210) Very similar racist enemy images were being conjured up in all the countries dreaming of a glorious destiny in the Pacific and in the world. Discussion on the Pacific age had begun in an optimistic atmosphere, with regard to the economic development possibilities of the whole region. The possibility of military struggle was only a small cloud on Inagaki’s horizon, and even on Mahan and Roosevelt’s horizon the possibility was small. After the RussoJapanese war the strategic landscape changed at a stroke. Europe received a setback when Russia’s advance stopped, while the principal local actors, Japan and the United States, were both emerging strongly onto the Pacific scene. The world economic situation was tightening due to the new competition. The remaining available resources to be exploited began to look far smaller than before, and scarcity replaced abundance as the underlying theme. The situation led to heightened tension in racial and military argumentation, and economic rhetoric receded into the background of discussion. The optimistic economistic image of an industrious twentieth century withered away, and the
< previous page
page_99
next page >
< previous page
page_100
next page >
Page 100 probability of a military struggle for the wealth of the region began to loom large on the horizon. The first cycle in the life of the Pacific age narrative ends here, but a second one was soon to begin. The Great War destroyed much of the previous world order. The centre of the world, Europe, was also the main centre of devastation. The German and Austrian empires disappeared, Russia was engulfed in civil war, and both Great Britain and France were severely weakened. The Great War ended European global expansion. Europe, especially Great Britain, remained in the Pacific as a presence, but only as a ‘conservator’, trying merely to maintain the status quo (Roosevelt 1928:6). The Pacific sank low on the European list of priorities, and Europe sank low on Pacific horizons of the future. The number of powers seen as trying to fight for Pacific supremacy diminished greatly. A symbolical European work of the period was Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes, completed during the war (Spengler 1918). Although it was thick, in two volumes, and rather hard to follow in places, it sold well, especially as a philosophical treatise; by 1926, when the first English edition appeared, 90,000 German copies had been sold. Perhaps even more important than the work itself was its name. In the Pacific area Decline of the West began to symbolize disillusionment with the old European powers. They had started the miserable war, and brought about their own downfall (Stein 1936). Not everyone forgot the Pacific region in Europe, and not everything was pessimistic there. Reconstruction started, and a few observers even remembered the prewar dreams of the Pacific age (Haushofer 1924; Etherton and Tiltman 1928), but they were few in number, and they tended to use the prewar, race-based concepts (Fox 1928). In the Pacific countries during the 1920s a new type of discussion emerged regarding the Pacific age. As the Great War had been such a wretched affair, worldwide attempts arose to prevent such a war ever occurring again. The League of Nations, centred in Europe, was the most spectacular of these efforts. A new method of conducting international politics, the international conference with accompanying wide publicity, began to replace the old secret channels of professional diplomats. In terms of government level conferences, this method, too, was concentrated in Europe; the Pacific countries employed it far less. Another type of conference system, namely the private level international conference, with lower levels of politically charged publicity, seemed to be more suitable to the Pacific situation, where countries had shorter traditions of formal relations with each other than in Europe. The most important conference series was called the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), which during its existence over the years between 1925 and 1948 brought together hundreds of academics and political leaders from the Pacific and Europe, and had on some occasions power to influence the decisions of various governments (Hooper 1980:65–136, 1992; Akami 1994). The IPR placed
< previous page
page_100
next page >
< previous page
page_101
next page >
Page 101 academics in an important role in Pacific politics. They provided a relatively neutral channel where national interests could be expressed and discussed in light of new scientific research, and in a friendly spirit, while the academic nature of argumentation did not force governments into any commitments. The IPR was thus in a similar role to that of private postwar organizations, such as PAFTAD, and has been studied as their forerunner (Yamaoka 1991; Woods 1993). It had an ambitious programme of using scientific research to solve the various problems that potentially threatened peace in the Pacific. The IPR was a major undertaking among contemporary liberal intellectuals to build a peaceful society of nations in the Pacific. The generally economistic views of the Institute can perhaps be summarized with the following quotation from a member from Hong Kong: It is very possible that the new nations will show the same short-sighted jealousy on the shores of the Pacific as the older models have shown in the Mediterranean and Atlantic basins. In its eagerness to secure all the possible gain for itself, each nation may forget that the gross increase in wealth depends more on half-conscious co-operation than on overconscious rivalry. It may confound the economic interpreters of history by yielding to a strange longing to go to war with its best customers. Let us make it clear through our proper channels of influence that the industrial and commercial development of the Orient does not involve any necessary loss for any nation, in Europe or elsewhere. (Hinton 1928:391) The European nations with their Great War had disgraced themselves, and even in the Pacific the potential for a new great military conflict was continuously in the air, but the Pacific area also held the promise of wiser international politics. It was plain to see especially for the ‘economic interpreters of history’. It was easy to argue in this way at the time. During the late 1920s the size of the world economy was barely at the level that it had been in 1913, but matters were heading in a better direction. Some Pacific economies were booming, especially that of the United States. The Great Kantō Earthquake had hit Japan in 1923, but reconstruction was rapid, and its economy continued to expand. Also, international politics were moving smoothly. The Washington naval conference had, in 1922, limited the size of the navies of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, easing the naval race in the region. The IPR undertook to encourage similar developments. A member, James T.Shotwell, Professor of History at Columbia University, drew up with J.P.Chamberlain a draft for a treaty to banish war totally from the world. The draft was discussed extensively in a conference of the IPR in 1927 (Institute of Pacific Relations 1928). In June 1928 a revised version was adopted by the international community as the Briand-Kellogg Pact,
< previous page
page_101
next page >
< previous page
page_102
next page >
Page 102 which about fifty governments signed, and which formally outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. The world clearly seemed to be heading towards permanent peace. Members of the IPR were duly happy about the fact, and about their own part in it (Eggleston 1930; Hailsham 1930; Rowell 1930). Discussion about the Pacific age flared up during 1927–8 among the members and other people associated with the IPR. A recurring theme in their texts was that history had flowed from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and was now flowing to the Pacific. In the second conference in 1927 in Honolulu, Sawayanagi Masatarō, President of the Imperial Educational Association of Japan, said in his opening statement that ‘the Pacific Ocean is gradually becoming the centre of the world’ (1928:30–3), and a British representative, Sir Frederick Whyte, said that ‘it has become a commonplace in recent times to say that the future of peace and war lies in the Pacific’, adding that ‘the Eastern Hemisphere has emerged to challenge the predominance of the West’ (1928:23, 29). The most vocal promoters of the idea at the time were probably Americans, like Herbert Croly, editor of the New Republic, who saw in the IPR an embryo of a future official level Pacific society of nations for the deliberation and solution of the political problems of the region. He even envisioned the creation of a Pacific Community, as distinct from the European-based League of Nations (1928:577–90). Another American author, Nicholas Roosevelt, son of the president’s cousin (Roosevelt 1967), continued a Mahan/Roosevelt-type of argumentation about the necessity and inevitability of American expansion in the Pacific, also using the concept of the Pacific age (1926:283). For instance, he said that ‘the outstanding fact of the twentieth century is that the theatre of world-events has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific’ (1928: vii). Nicholas Roosevelt was probably the first one to shift to the past tense. Thus far all discussion had been oriented towards the future, which is more logical with this kind of visionary idea, but Nicholas Roosevelt was confident that the shift had already taken place. Nevertheless, most discussants continued to use the future tense. Besides the Americans, many Japanese at the time were also quite vocal about the idea. Saitō Sōichi, secretary of the Japanese YMCA, and a member of the Japanese Council of the IPR, told his listeners at the Japanese Industrial Club that a Pacific age was approaching, bringing peace and prosperity with it. He published the speech later with the title Taiheiyō jidai kuru (the Pacific age will come) (1928). Moriya Hideo in the same year published a book with the same title (1928). Actually only the Japanese used the term ‘Pacific age’, which they probably got from Inagaki’s works, but the general idea was the same all over the region. The concept may have had somewhat different roots in different Pacific countries, but they were intermixed during the 1920s in the IPR conferences.
< previous page
page_102
next page >
< previous page
page_103
next page >
Page 103 The third conference was held in Kyoto in 1929, and there a proliferation of Pacific age rhetoric was especially noticeable. Nitobe Inazo, the well-known Japanese scholar and diplomat, used the expression in his opening address (Nitobe 1929). Also, on 28 October two other speakers referred to the Pacific age. One of them was the American J.Merle Davis, General Secretary of the IPR (Davis 1929), and the other, Governor Sagami of Kyoto prefecture (Sagami 1929). The timing was crucial, because on the same day the international stock exchange on Wall Street crashed. The international situation took a new turn. The economic boom ended, and turned into the Great Depression. In the pages of Pacific Affairs, the journal of the IPR, stories began to appear of rebellion in China, rising protectionism in the United States, falling commodity prices in Australia, restrictions against Korean immigration to Japan, and unemployment everywhere. The IPR was no more than a group of intellectuals with economistic inclinations, and their influence evaporated after the economic and psychological basis for liberal international politics had disappeared. The Briand-Kellogg pact was forgotten, after it had worked for less than half a year influencing world moral opinion. The 1930s became a decade of gradually escalating conflict between Japan and China, and gradually increasing tension between Japan and the United States. Increasingly it became expected that Japan would have to start a war with some white nation, whether with the United States (Pickens 1934; Toynbee 1934; Peffer 1935; Bywater 1991), with Great Britain (Ishimaru 1936), or with the Soviet Union (Tanin and Yohan 1936). As military topics became central in Pacific discussions, the optimistic Pacific age rhetoric was once again pushed into oblivion. Optimism and enthusiasm easily appear naive during pessimistic periods, although there is nothing inherently naive in them. Only the psychological mood of international society had changed. Many economists were still arguing against rising tariff barriers and for the benefits of free trade, and even in 1931 the optimists could still think that: It is probable, indeed, that historians of the future will record in this period a fairly definite movement which might almost be described as a turning inward of all the countries which border the Pacific. (Pacific Affairs 1931:520–1) The choice of words of the anonymous writers of this background paper for the IPR meeting in 1931 was unfortunate. By ‘turning inward’ they meant the post-Great War trend of a relative decrease in Pacific trade with Europe, and a rapid increase in intra-Pacific trade, so that during the 1920s the Pacific region had begun to resemble an economic unit in itself. The historians of the future have recorded, however, the exact opposite. In economic terms the Great Depression meant a drastic reduction of intra-Pacific trade, while the economically more developed Europe was
< previous page
page_103
next page >
< previous page
page_104
next page >
Page 104 able to increase its relative share of world trade (Brandt 1940). In political terms the year 1931 witnessed the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the beginning disintegration of the League of Nations system, and increasing autarkic tendencies all over the world. Countries indeed began to ‘turn inward’, raising barriers against imports. The result was a movement towards national autarkies, far stronger even than during the 1910s. Legitimation for regional empires, able to control markets for each industrial country, became a new topic in global, as well as in Japanese, discussions (Takaki 1932). After 1931, hardly a trace of Pacific age ideas can be found in the pages of the publications of the Institute, although the IPR itself remained a vigorous organization, and even increased its importance during the war, providing expertise and knowledge for the formulation of American Asian policies. It is possible that some discussion continued in places like Hawaii, which would be quite appropriate in view of the intellectual traditions of the islands (Hooper 1980). At least after the war the term ‘Pacific era’ was used there in speeches, but the usage is somehow empty, without concreteness (Davenport 1948). We can say, in general, that the idea of the twentieth century as the Pacific age died in 1929. In 1941 a grand new vision emerged in its place, when the publisher of Life magazine, and an active IPR participant, Henry R.Luce, proclaimed the twentieth century to be the American Century (White 1992). This ended the second and quite short cycle in the life of the concept. The main references to it can be found only from the short span of 1926–9. Once again it had started in an optimistic period when the world seemed to be heading towards peace and abundance, but the winds of the military world had swept it away as soon as scarcity stepped in. It went to hibernate in the pages of books on library shelves, which turned from new to old while their readers were fighting each other, waiting for someone to come and wipe the dust off the covers. The idea of the Pacific age was revived again in 1967 in connection with the emerging discussion regarding Pacific economic integration in the form of Kojima Kiyoshi’s Pacific Free Trade Area proposal. Foreign Minister Miki Takeo took up the idea as his main foreign political platform, and it was in selling the idea to Japanese and international audiences that Miki began to use the old Pacific age concept. However, he now placed it in the twenty-first century (nijū isseikf) . The twentieth century was already so far advanced that there would have been little point in placing it in the present one. In view of the development potentialities of Asia, Miki preferred the expression ‘Asia Pacific age’ (Ajia Taiheiyō jidai) (Miki 1984; see also Korhonen 1994a:145–53). In the first PAFTAD conference in 1968 Japanese participants tended to present optimistic views based on the vision of a Pacific age in the twenty-first century, but participants from the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were completely ignorant of the term (Kojima 1968b).
< previous page
page_104
next page >
< previous page
page_105
next page >
Page 105 It seems to have disappeared almost into oblivion during the four decades that had passed since 1929. Even now it did not really get wind under its wings. It had been connected with Miki’s initiative, but as Pacific integration did not gather political momentum, references to the concept were few during the early 1970s. Prime Minister Satō Eisaku used the concept in the form ‘new Pacific age’ (Talhelyō shlnjidai) in his 1970s policy speech (Satō 1970b), which shows that this concept remained in the basket of beautiful slogans that Japanese politicians could pick from in times of need. In addition, Herman Kahn’s expression of the twenty-first century as Japan’s century was still alive in Japanese discussion. Norman Macrae, the deputy editor of the British Economist, belonged to the global circle of high-flying economic commentators, whose members, like Ōkita Saburō and Herman Kahn, called each other old friends and borrowed freely from each other’s ideas (Macrae 1980). He was invited in 1974 to a colloquium in Tokyo to hear the Japanese talk of the postindustrial age. He returned to London convinced that the Pacific century was about to begin already in 1975. He wrote his conviction into a special survey on Japan, and from the prestigious pages of The Economist it then spread to the world (Macrae 1975). Macrae played in this instance a similar role to that of Herman Kahn in promoting the idea of Japan as an economic great power a few years earlier. It was probably this article that gave the legend new momentum, whose effect was naturally strongest in Japan. When Tokuyama Jirō, managing director of the Nomura Research Institute, wrote an article for Newsweek, another journal with global circulation, entitling it ‘The Pacific Century’, he referred to Macrae (Tokuyama 1977, 1978). The time was appropriate in many senses. Japan had already adjusted well to the oil shock, while the USA was starting to recover from the post-Vietnam War trauma, and the Western states in particular were pressing for deeper relations with Asian countries. Indochina was emerging from militancy to reconstruction, Southeast Asian countries from import substitution to exports, and Northeast Asia was filling up with rapidly developing countries. China was emerging from the cultural revolution to international cooperation. The détente period was still continuing, and sharp ideological confrontations seemed to be disappearing. Fukuda’s plans for his ASEAN initiative were going smoothly as Tokuyama was writing. Economistic values were gaining in global importance, while the world was again heading towards abundance after the hiccup of the oil crisis. It was an ideal time for Pacific age rhetoric to start spreading again.
< previous page
page_105
next page >
< previous page
page_106
next page >
Page 106 7 The blueprint The idea for a new Pacific integration initiative was first discussed in 1976 at the meeting of PAFTAD’s International Steering Committee (Kojima 1976). This time the goal was not to build a free trade area, but a looser organization for government level consultations on trade and development questions, patterned after the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The idea dates back to the 1968 discussions between Kojima and Peter Drysdale, and had also been examined in the early PAFTAD conferences (Kojima 1968a:177). The organization was at first called Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development (OPTAD), in accordance with Drysdale’s suggestion (1968:208). Its Japanese translation was Taiheiyōbōeki enjo kaihatsu kikō . The name rhymes well in English, but not in Japanese. Kojima dropped the word ‘aid’ from the name, but to keep its pronunciation easy drew the ‘a’ from the word ‘and’. OPTAD thus became the abbreviation for the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development, its Japanese equivalent being Taiheiyō bōeki kaihatsu kikō (Kojima 1980a:528–9). During the early 1970s the idea had lain dormant, but now the situation was once again seen to be ripe for a new attempt. The confrontation between the dependencia theory and neoclassical theory had begun to wane, and the general consensus in PAFTAD began to favour the Asian type of development strategy over the Latin American one. The development policy issue between import substitution and export-led industrialization being thus solved, PAFTAD was seriously lacking direction. The eighth PAFTAD in Pattaya, Thailand, in July 1976 represented, in terms of policy-making, a low point in its history. Progress was made in the sense that the conference was held for the first time in an Asian developing country, but otherwise it was remarkably dry. The conference had probably adopted a conscious policy of toning down political quarrels, but the method was not altogether successful. It was achieved by raising the formal methodological level of the papers, with the result that most of them were based on complex econometric models, lengthy statistical tables, and sophisticated methodological discussions. There was noticeably little discussion of policy, and that went against PAFTAD’s basic principle of being a forum for discussion about concrete
< previous page
page_106
next page >
< previous page
page_107
next page >
Page 107 policy issues. Purely academic meetings were not enough to satisfy PAFTAD’s ambitions. Separate from PAFTAD, but largely involving the same key persons from among Australian and Japanese economists, was a special ongoing AustraliaJapan economic relations project. It provided a suitable inner circle for planning a new Pacific integration initiative. After becoming convinced in the July 1976 PAFTAD meeting that widespread support existed for such an initiative among Pacific economists from various countries, Kojima wrote a policy paper, which he presented in Canberra in September 1976, laying out the justification for a new integration initiative. The paper later formed the backbone of his 1980 recommendations for MOFA, when the initiative had reached the stage of practical foreign policy formation (Kojima 1996:188–228). During the early 1970s, together with his theory of foreign investment, Kojima had tried to develop the concept of agreed specialization. An unsolved problem within the flying geese theory was how to deal with the economic relations among advanced countries, whose number would swell rapidly when more and more developing countries succeeded in their industrialization. As long as the developmental stages differed sufficiently, the responsibility of the advanced countries was simply to push forward in their development, climb towards higher stages, leaving space for the followers to fill up. Japan would not have needed to worry about trade disputes with the United States if the latter had been able to advance as fast as Japan was trying to catch up with it. But it would not have been sustainable for very long. A follower tends to advance faster than a leader, because the application of existing skills is easier than the development of new ones. Agreed specialization simply means that countries and companies agree not to concentrate their efforts on exactly the same types of products, and so leave space for the others to develop. This clearly goes against the principle of free competition, but it does not imply planned command economies either. It is simply an extension of the principle of national economy to a larger group of ‘like-minded nations’, namely regional integration. Integration means increased contact and communication, knowledge of the other members, and a feeling of community. If there is a will to develop the regional community as a whole, and maintain a conscious awareness of the interests of the community, agreed specialization can happen as a natural process. The model for this idea was naturally the EEC and the multinational industrial rationalization process taking place there against outside, mainly American and Japanese competition (Kojima 1996:67–70, 112). A policy of regional integration involving the contemporary Pacific advanced countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, would thus have been advantageous for Japan in order to solve the immediate trading disputes, and it would have been beneficial also for the Pacific Asian countries, so that a feeling of community would develop at the same pace as they caught up with Japan and the other advanced countries.
< previous page
page_107
next page >
< previous page
page_108
next page >
Page 108 In 1976 Kojima’s main worry was the growing might of Europe: ‘If there were no European Community, we would have no need to consider Pacific integration either’ (1976:9). This may have been too one-sided a view, because Pacific integration as an idea had already long immanent traditions in the region, but Europe provided a suitable focus for concentrated action. Europe was indeed a real problem for two reasons: it tended to focus global attention on the Atlantic-centred world, and it was making inroads back into the Pacific. There were three global fora for discussing development policy, but none of them took care of the interests of Pacific countries. One was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the Tokyo round of negotiations was going on, but proceedings were not promising and Kojima’s expectations were limited. As usual, the round had degenerated into bickering between the United States and EEC. Another forum was the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but this had become a forum for political confrontation. Latin American and African interests were prevalent there, and it produced only the NIEO-type of development strategies. UNCTAD was not of much use to the Pacific developing countries, which were moving towards export-led industrialization. The third forum was the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where the advanced countries met, but this was dominated by Europe. Historically, the OECD started as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and was only later enlarged and renamed to include advanced countries from other regions. In 1976 the OECD consisted of 24 member countries. From the EEC there were Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland; from other parts of Europe: Greece, Iceland, Spain, and Turkey. Only Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand represented non-European countries. Only the last three were non-Atlantic countries, so the ratio between Atlantic and non-Atlantic countries was 21:3. The meetings were usually held in a European country, the agendas for discussion were European or Atlantic centred, and to the extent that the problems of developing countries were discussed, areas near Europe received the main attention. The Cold War was generally handled with the Atlantic strategy in view. This meant that Pacific trade expansion to include socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam, and with Eastern European countries as well, had been hindered or subjected to wide and sudden fluctuations, depending on changes in the political and military situation in Europe. Problems created by the oil crisis were dealt with as European problems. Investment was flowing into Europe, creating a huge Euro-dollar market, and consequently not enough capital was being funnelled to the Pacific region. The OECD sanctioned the American policy of voluntary export restraint
< previous page
page_108
next page >
< previous page
page_109
next page >
Page 109 agreements on products such as chemicals and synthetic textiles, hurting mainly Pacific countries like Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; European countries could then use the American example as an excuse to impose similar restraints. The European Common Agricultural Policy was hurting traditional Pacific exporters of agricultural commodities including Australia, New Zealand, and many developing countries in Asia and Latin America. The list could be continued, but this is enough to show that even though Europe was not a superpower in the sense that the United States and the Soviet Union were, it was nevertheless able to attract world attention, and formulate policy-making agendas favourable to European states in economic, political, and military discussions. The interests and problems of the Pacific region were neglected or sacrificed within the OECD (Kojima 1976:9–12). Europe was also re-entering the Pacific, and seemed to be drawing Pacific developing countries into its orbit. The enlargement of the EEC itself was going on, with the probable participation of the remaining Western European countries being debated. Mediterranean countries had long been directing themselves economically towards the EEC, and in 1975 the Lomé Convention was concluded, through which the EEC provided for preferential trade with several African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. There were altogether 46 signatories from the developing world, but only three of them, Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa, were from the Pacific (Lister 1988:61). Kojima did not talk about the Pacific age, but his argumentation was structured in such a way that it was clear that the idea was in his mind. The European attempt to reestablish itself as the centre of the world worried him. It was high time to jettison this old global structure (Kojima 1976:7–8). Kojima’s purpose was not to walk out of the OECD, nor to confront the expansion of the EEC directly. Political confrontation does not pay. It is wasted investment. Instead, he wanted to form another institutionalized focus toward which the Pacific countries could orient themselves. He sought to establish a distinct group of countries, which would stand on an equal footing with the EEC in the international community, but pursue Pacific rather than Atlantic interests: Like the OECD, the main characteristic of OPTAD is that it functions primarily as a forum for key policy officials of member governments in the Pacific, Asian and Latin American region, as a generator of knowledge about regional problems and as a workshop for building that knowledge into co-ordinated policies through a permanent exchange of views. The idea was to have OPTAD as an independent Pacific organization, but if there are too many obstacles it could be a suborganization of the OECD in the Pacific. It should not be an organization of the United Nations family. (Kojima 1976:15)
< previous page
page_109
next page >
< previous page
page_110
next page >
Page 110 OPTAD would thus be modelled mainly after the OECD. Kojima would have liked to establish the group as an alternative to the OECD, but the established global status of that body made him agree even to a subordinate status. The creation of an OPTAD was more urgent than a high profile political confrontation. OPTAD was to include discussions of trade at a central location, and in that sense it would also become a ‘mini-GATF. It is interesting to note that Kojima explicitly opposed OPTAD gaining UN status. The reason was that because nearly everything the UN did was heavily politicized it could not provide an effective organizational framework for an economistic initiative. OPTAD would include both advanced and developing countries, thus resembling a regional UNCTAD, but hopefully more efficient. There was an important difference with the OECD model. Kojima also stated that ‘military security in the region and defence co-operation should be discussed in some forum’ (1976:16). He had misgivings about OPTAD being the right forum, but something like it was certainly needed. In Europe the final communiqué of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), initiated in 1969 by Finland, was signed in 1975 in Helsinki, and seen as a promising way of furthering the European peace process. Everything good, except for simple rapid economic growth, seemed to be concentrating once again in Europe. Kojima strove for similar developments also in the Pacific. The efficiency of the organization would depend on its membership and institutional procedures. Here Kojima was explicit. The key members would be the five advanced Pacific countries: the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. They would have to make a joint declaration to establish OPTAD, or, if that proved too difficult, Japan and Australia should take the primary initiative. The economic relationship between Japan and Australia was harmonious enough for them to work easily together, and both were middle level powers whose initiative would be strong enough to encourage a following. Kojima was confident that although the United States might decline to take the initiative, due to its post-Vietnam syndrome, it would be willing to join an organization where the groundwork was already laid, and eventually assume the leadership role expected of it. This core of five countries should then invite all market-oriented developing countries from East and Southeast Asia into the organization. They would not be the initiators, nor the rule makers; they would join an established organization. Kojima wanted to ensure that OPTAD would not become an UNCTAD-style forum for confrontation, and he could point out that ‘the Asian group is not as radical as the African group, and is seeking a realist and modest policy for economic development’ (Kojima 1976:17). The increasingly economistically oriented Pacific Asian countries would form the outer core group of OPTAD. Their inclusion was really more important than it would appear: ‘ultimately, developing countries may
< previous page
page_110
next page >
< previous page
page_111
next page >
Page 111 grow to an industrialized stage equal with the present advanced Pacific countries and have close relations of interdependence with them on an equal footing as has emerged in the European Community’ (Kojima 1976:17–18). The vision of a new industrialized region, institutionally on a par with Europe, as developed as Europe, and as stable as Europe, was thus continuously in Kojima’s mind. In his later recommendation to the MOFA he put it even stronger: ‘The ultimate objective of the OPTAD is to raise East and Southeast Asian economies to a level equal to advanced Pacific countries and to build the Western Pacific economic region into something resembling the European Community’ (Kojima 1996:217). Because Japan needed to be surrounded by a stable international system for its own safety and well-being, it was essential that Pacific Asian developing countries should develop rapidly to a stage where Western European postwar-style regional stability and prosperity could be achieved. Of Latin American countries Kojima wrote: ‘OPTAD may prefer to have membership open only to those Latin American countries which are inclined to join’ (Kojima 1976:18). This was an unbalanced way of building a preferred kind of international organization. The advanced countries would be the mothers and fathers who take the initiative, inviting all Pacific Asian developing countries into the organization. These would be welcomed as a group, with open arms. Latin American countries should take the initiative themselves and join as individual countries. Their entrance would be essentially negotiable. Kojima had nothing against Latin American countries as such, but he wanted to deal only with countries that were prepared to follow the kind of development policies he favoured. The last possible members in OPTAD were China and the USSR. The Soviet Union was becoming interested in the Pacific region and in Siberian development, while China was ending its seclusion and entering the Pacific as a trader. Because they were big countries, both holding vast economic potential, OPTAD could not ignore them. If some sort of security process was to be started in the Pacific, their membership in the organization would be necessary. However, their ongoing political confrontation presented a problem. For this reason Kojima proposed that they should not be accepted separately, thus possibly alienating the one left outside. Both should join at the same time, and if that was impossible, ‘we had better wait until they join simultaneously’ (1976:18). Kojima regarded himself as the chief architect of the organization, as the use of the pronoun ‘we’ implies. He was determined to keep political confrontation out, and retain only the developmental consensus. In his paper, presented in the cordial atmosphere of a small seminar, Kojima laid out clearly the aims, characteristics, and priorities of his proposed organization. It was suitable as a background paper for generating ideas, but in its bluntness unsuitable for political initiatives. Kojima’s version of OPTAD as a combined Pacific OECD, GATT, UNCTAD, and
< previous page
page_111
next page >
< previous page
page_112
next page >
Page 112 CSCE was once again too ambitious. He was essentially a vision builder, who made blueprints for the structures that were needed, while others developed his ideas until they became politically feasible in the circumstances of the time. In subsequent discussion the initiative was toned down until it became sufficiently uncontroversial. Peter Drysdale took the main responsibility of initiating discussion on OPTAD at the ninth PAFTAD in 1977 in San Francisco, although Kojima also talked about the concept there (Kojima 1978). Drysdale dropped the security aspects, but retained the functions of a regional OECD, GATT, and UNCTAD. His main idea also was to build an organization that could provide a ‘focus, a point of reference for thinking in Pacific terms and for building a practice of co-ordination and co-operation in the Pacific’ (1978:622). He viewed critically the expansion of the influence of the EEC, and, pointing to the enormous developmental potentialities in the Pacific, wanted to build an organization on ‘the strength and vigour of the Pacific, not as an appendage of the Atlantic Community’ (1978:639). Drysdale definitely rejected the model of the extensive bureaucracy of the OECD, and argued for building only a very loose organization. It would have a council, composed of heads of state or senior bureaucrats, who would meet occasionally to initiate policies. It would be aided by a skeleton secretariat that would take care of organizing, and service the ad hoc task forces which would cover research, and be set up if need arose. This kind of OPTAD would not actually lead the region, but serve only as a low-key forum for consultation and confidence building. Drysdale’s proposal was received favourably by the conference, which had already begun to focus on the Pacific. In the first conference in 1968 serious doubts had been expressed as to the viability of conceptualizing the Pacific as a region, and particularly the American participants had tended to view the region as unimportant compared with the Atlantic. Now, after nine years of meetings, terms like the ‘Pacific region’, ‘Pacific basin’, and ‘Pacific community’ were being used extensively throughout the conference. Conceptually, within PAFTAD, the region had already become depicted as a unit. Unfortunately this view did not yet prevail outside the conference. Ōkita Saburō mentioned that he had personally asked a delegate from Fiji during the seventh PAFTAD in Auckland why the country had joined the Lomé Convention, and received the answer: simply because no such arrangement existed in the Pacific (Ōkita 1978:649). In organizational terms, only a Europe-centred world existed, while the Pacific still appeared as a vacuum. Ōkita also wanted to tone down the leadership qualifications for OPTAD. The conference took place in August only a week after Fukuda’s ASEAN trip had ended in spectacular success. The idea of placing ASEAN in a central position in OPTAD seemed best for advancing the new organization. While Kojima had thought that middle level powers
< previous page
page_112
next page >
< previous page
page_113
next page >
Page 113 like Japan and Australia might be the best to initiate the organization, Ōkita believed that it might be even better if the developing countries initiated the process. A low posture approach might be the most viable politically (Ōkita 1978:649). Another Japanese participant, Naya Seiji, was of the same opinion (Naya 1978). Likewise, American economists had become interested in OPTAD. They pointed out that the Pacific was the place with the highest growth rate in the world (Krause 1978), and saw a need to make the United States understand that future major issues in the Pacific would no longer derive from political and military considerations, but from economic issues (Patrick 1978). They needed OPTAD not only for the education of developing countries, as Kojima had thought, but also for the education of the United States. As an anonymous discussant put it, ‘OPTAD seemed a good means to begin conversion of a US geopolitical-military perspective to an economic perspective’ (Krause and Patrick 1978:660). Discussion of OPTAD in PAFTAD was linked closely to other topics, such as the passing of the Oil Crisis. The San Francisco conference also discussed mineral resources, since they were such a hot global topic at the time. It determined quite conclusively that ‘the world does not face a shortage of raw materials’ (Krause 1978:25). The supply of raw materials was covered by market laws, just like other commodities. The scarcity of a commodity drove up its price, which then led to increased production, searching for new sources, finding new alternatives, and economizing. Within a few years the situation would become stabilized. Even conditions of oversupply, which would drive prices down, could occur; NIEO tactics would have no long lasting effect. Oil might be a special case, as it was needed for so many purposes, but even such a resource could not escape market laws for long (Gorham 1978; Kojima 1978; Magee and Robins 1978). The world did not need to fear scarcity, at least in terms of raw materials. Another recurrent and increasingly important topic was development theory. The Southeast Asian countries in particular started to become the focus of interest of the economic experts. Because OPTAD was biased towards Asian developing countries, and among them only Southeast Asia as a subregion presented relative political stability, the general theme of the conference was ASEAN. If the concept was to be formulated as a political initiative, the state of discussion among ASEAN countries would have to be assessed. Fukuda’s successful ASEAN initiative was another reason for focusing on ASEAN in March 1979 at the tenth PAFTAD in Canberra. In the previous decade two different success stories had emerged, one Asian and the other Latin American. Chilean professor Ricardo Ffrench-Davis pointed out that during the 1970s remarkable growth had been achieved in Latin American industries, especially in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and that the share of manufactured goods in their exports had increased steadily (FfrenchDavis 1980). However, as can be seen in
< previous page
page_113
next page >
< previous page
page_114
next page >
Page 114 comments on Ffrench-Davis’ paper, there had ceased to be much support at PAFTAD regarding the success of Latin American-type development policies. There were clear indications that stagnation was taking place in Latin America. The balance of payments situation was worsening, protection was high, the established industries were not particularly competitive internationally, and the Latin American share of world trade was falling steadily. Latin America was marginalizing itself from the world, and, especially in comparison with the Southeast Asian countries, Latin American achievements paled. It could already then be stated that the time of the dependencia theory was over (Sekiguchi and Krause 1980). On the other hand, economists from the ASEAN countries were in a jubilant mood, similar to that which the Japanese had enjoyed since the late 1950s, and the South Koreans, Taiwanese, Singaporeans, and Hongkongers since the late 1960s. Their rhetorical style as a group was clearly changing, and a regional approach regarding their economies, patterned after their forerunners, was spreading rapidly among them. For instance, the following characterization was made of ASEAN in an international context: ASEAN in 1976 was a market of 236.5 million people, with total GNP of $83.7 billion dollars and per capita GNP of about $354. The market is roughly the combined size of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, with 23 million people, or Australia and New Zealand with 16 million. Clearly ASEAN belongs with the Group of 77. But within the Group of 77 it is a leader, taking into account per capita GNP and more important, growth, which has been at 6–9 per cent in real terms per year over the last decade. The five countries of ASEAN have a larger total GNP and foreign trade than the 42 African countries with which the European Economic Community has preferential relations under the Lomé Convention. (Castro 1980:60–1). By the late 1970s ASEAN members were able to begin arguing from a position of strength and success, based on their economic achievements. ASEAN had even become comparatively rich. Growth was mentioned as the most important characteristic; as the doubling of the size of an economy within a decade requires an annual growth rate of 7.2 percent, and ASEAN was achieving 6–9 percent, it had entered the sweet stage of doubling in size every ten years. In its conceptual simplicity the situation was satisfying, and enormous selfconfidence could be derived from it. When one has reached this stage of economic achievement, it becomes possible to visualize real and profound changes in the international economic balance of power within one’s lifetime. Of course, ASEAN was still composed of poor developing countries, and the total market was only the size of three small European countries, or that of the two rich southern Pacific neighbours. However, more important
< previous page
page_114
next page >
< previous page
page_115
next page >
Page 115 than the dismal result of this comparison is the fact that it was made. Rich countries could now be used as a natural reference point. The conceptual wall dividing countries between rich and poor, centre and periphery, north and south, which says that the two groups are qualitatively different and will remain so, was disintegrating. Their gaze was now raised to the level of the rich countries, and all that was really needed was to continue high speed development for a few decades to reach their level. They could be caught up with. One of the ASEAN countries had already almost completed this feat: Singapore is the youngest and smallest member of the ASEAN nation states. It also has the fastest rate of economic growth and the most advanced level of economic development in the region…. With a per capita GNP of $2,782 in 1977, Singapore clearly belongs to the top income group of developing countries; in fact, it was recently almost reclassifled by the IMF as a developed country. (Chia 1980:241) Because these narratives are of the romantic variety, it is effective artistically to begin from a difficult or low position. Singapore was indeed the smallest and youngest member of ASEAN, but it was also the most successful. The fast rate of growth is duly pointed out as follows: during the boom years 1966–73 it had averaged 12.9 percent annually, and had been number one among nonoil producing countries in the world, easily outperforming even Japan, which was number four, behind South Korea (Krause 1981:131). For the total postindependence period Singapore’s growth had averaged 8.9 percent annually. This rate had thus been continuously above that required to double the size of the economy within a decade, and the advanced country level was nearly achieved. Nevertheless, the empire struck back and changed the rules of the game. A new category was added to the global economic scale rating of countries, namely the newly industrializing countries (NICs), situated above the less developed countries (LDCs), but below the advanced industrial countries (AICs). The definition was made in a study by the OECD secretariat (Secretary General 1979). As a well-known developmental economist Kojima was used by the OECD secretariat as the only Asian consultant for the report. He did not participate in the conceptual work, but it was his contribution that led to the inclusion of so many Asian countries under the NIC concept (Kojima 1996: interview). The concept of NIC was arbitrary, which the authors themselves conceded fully. It referred to a heterogeneous new group of countries that had attained rapid expansion in their exports of manufactured products during the 1970s, causing ‘disquiet’ in the AICs, who were trying to cope simultaneously with the oil crisis, transition to slow growth, high unemployment, and effects of trade with the NICs. The secretariat had singled out ten countries for its study: four in Southern Europe (Greece,
< previous page
page_115
next page >
< previous page
page_116
next page >
Page 116 Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia), two in Latin America (Brazil and Mexico), and four in ‘Southeast Asia’ (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan). Ireland was left out because it was not a Southern European country. Oil producing countries, which were directing part of their huge capital inflows to heavy and chemical industrialization, also were left out, because they did not yet do much exporting. For the same reason several Latin American and Asian countries were also placed below the line. Socialist countries, except for Yugoslavia, which was closest to the West, were all left out. Of the group of countries that were singled out as ‘prospective NICs’, one was in the Mediterranean (Egypt), three in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Colombia), two in South Asia (India, Pakistan), and three in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand). The arbitrariness of the definition can be explained by the fact that the purpose of the authors was simply to make a study of an economic phenomenon, not to create a special ranking. They regarded sudden bursts of industrialization and trade expansion as a normal phenomenon. Germany and the Nordic countries had enjoyed such an expansion during the 1950s, while Finland, the latest to develop, was still during the 1970s showing typical NIC patterns, for example, in its employment structure, where the share of industrial workers was still increasing, while the other countries were already shifting to services. Italy and Japan had followed them during the 1960s, and the above-mentioned NICs during the 1970s. The authors expected that at least some of the current NICs would soon reach the level of advanced countries. This definition was never meant to stick to any of these ten countries, but it did to some of them. Because the analytical concept became used as a ranking definition in international discussion, and the Spaniards, for example, saw no reason why they should be placed in a lower category than the Irish, the term was never used much in Europe. The whole of Latin America soon became engulfed in the debt crisis of the 1980s, giving less reason to single out two countries for a special category. But Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea became stuck with the categorization. The term itself has changed somewhat. It was never clear why these countries should be called ‘newly industrializing’, because they were already quite far advanced. During the 1980s they were usually called newly industrialized countries, which described them better. To differentiate them from the other NICs, the term ‘Asian’ was usually added, and the abbreviation thus was ANICs. However, because the legal status of the Republic of China was unclear, and the People’s Republic of China objected to calling it and Hong Kong countries, the last word was changed to ‘economies’ during the middle of the 1980s. At that time China started to accept simultaneous Chinese and Taiwanese participation in international events, such as the Olympics, or Pacific integration
< previous page
page_116
next page >
< previous page
page_117
next page >
Page 117 meetings, but this required a thorough rectification of names. Taiwan could not be referred to with a name connoting a political entity, but defining it as an ‘economy’ was acceptable. The Taiwanese, naturally, continued using the ANIC concept, but international usage gradually shifted to ANIEs. For purposes of consistency, we shall throughout the following use this last concept when referring to these four countries, even though the Asian NIC concept would be historically more correct during the first half of the 1980s. The ANIE remained a closed category until the middle of the 1990s. The rest of the ASEAN countries would without doubt have been classified as ANIEs long before, if the contemporary holders of the rank were not occupying it, and somehow they were not able to leave it. Even nowadays Japan is still the only ‘real’ advanced country in Asia. It is difficult to say how much this matters. The Pacific integration process during the 1980s might have been different if there had been five Asian countries classified as advanced, instead of only one—or perhaps it would not have mattered. The Japanese would have seen no reason to change the categorizations. Besides supporting their national ego, it also fits their way of ranking countries as leaders and followers at differing stages of development. The ANIE concept fits perfectly the conceptual world of the flying geese theory, and perhaps reasons for its longevity have to be attributed to the gradual rise of the theory itself to the position of the dominant way of conceptualizing the Pacific Asian international structure. The tenth PAFTAD not only refuted the dependencia theory, but construction of a new theory of development was also started. Neoclassical concepts were usually used as the starting point, but there was a strong tendency to try to find some new concept with which to analyse the new evidence of development on a regional scale. Export orientation and open economies became standard expressions. For instance, comparing ASEAN with other regional groups, such as the East African Common Market and the Central American Common Market, an American economist pointed out that ASEAN was the only regional arrangement that was not based ‘upon the false hope’ of the import substitution strategy, and that success in development seemed, in the long run, to lie only with those countries with relatively open economies and export orientation towards the world as a whole (Krueger 1980:38–9). For the first time the flying geese theory was mentioned in PAFTAD by Australian economists: A dynamic view of production and trade specialization has been taught in international economic courses at Hitotsubashi University for many decades as the doctrine of the ‘flying wild geese pattern’. (Garnaut and Anderson 1980:398) They did not grant it the status of an economic theory, but called it only a ‘doctrine’, which in the parlance of academics is a lower grade characterization. The naming of Akamatsu’s theory also went by without
< previous page
page_117
next page >
< previous page
page_118
next page >
Page 118 generating much notice at the tune, but at least it was introduced publicly to Pacific economists. It may also have been a good thing that the introduction was done by Australians. They were in a sense neutral, because they were not Japanese nationals, and Australia was not a big economic power. Japanese presentations were based clearly on this framework (Ikema 1980; Yasuba 1980), but in their cultural modesty in the face of the dominant neoclassical theory it was never uttered. The propagation of the flying geese theory did not happen at that time by raising it high in the air and claiming that here is the solution to the mystery of development. It happened more simply in the way that Japanese economists steadfastly argued in conference after conference about government guidance, stages of development, upgrading of the national level of technological sophistication in a painstaking step-by-step fashion, gluing it all together with the romantic rhetoric of rapid growth. Other Pacific Asian economists started little by little to use similar concepts, roughly at the same pace as their countries entered the path of accelerating development. ANIE rhetoric, in general, had already during the 1970s aligned itself pretty well with the Japanese version, and Chia’s description of Singapore’s economy in 1979, excluding the different size, location, and starting point of the country, showed little difference from Japanese rhetoric. By 1970—about the same time as Japan—Singapore had reached the end of the low-wage, labourintensive industrialization stage, because of severe labour shortages and rising wage levels. During the 1970s these industries were being relocated to other ASEAN countries with foreign investment, while Singapore built up capital and technology intensive industries, such as metal engineering and machinery, aerospace engineering, shipbuilding, optical instruments, scientific and medical equipment, electrical and electronic products, petrochemicals, plastic materials, fashion clothing, foods and confectionery. It could also be seen that Singapore was, because of lack of space, exhausting the possibilities for industry-led development, and would before long have to make a transition to the stage of high value-added services, such as recreational, educational, professional and software services, which its rising level of education made possible (Chia 1980). The manner of using concrete examples is indicative of the concreteness of thinking, and Chia’s argumentation shows perfectly how Singapore’s planners knew exactly what they were doing. Singapore was moving up fast. The other ASEAN countries can be neatly placed on a scale along the same dimension. Malaysia had the highest per capita GNP in ASEAN after Singapore, $860, doubly higher than that of Thailand or the Philippines. Mineral resources and agricultural products still formed the main part of Malaysia’s economy at the end of the 1970s, but manufacturing industries were developing rapidly. Textiles, apparel, rubber and wood products, industrial and electrical machinery, and recently also
< previous page
page_118
next page >
< previous page
page_119
next page >
Page 119 transport equipment, were increasing their share in Malaysia’s GNP and exports. This was the direction in which the government had guided the economy since the late 1960s, and their share of the GNP had risen from 11.2 percent in 1968 to 15.1 percent in 1976. Export processing zones, directed towards foreign markets, had been established, and foreign investment was arriving. Mohamed Ariff could claim that the Malaysian economy was in an enviable position compared with most other developing countries, and obviously he felt that Malaysia was securely on the road of upward development (1980). Thailand had shifted towards export promotion in 1972, and appeared to possess surprisingly competitive labour-intensive industries. An export boom followed in 1973, and the government actually had to impose a ban on the export of some goods, notably animal feed, thread, and yarn, to provide these goods for the domestic economy. Despite similar curbs, exports continued to expand, doubling in 1975, and by that time, in addition to various food items, textiles, and clothing, Thai exports also included electrical components, pharmaceuticals, iron and steel products, and chemical materials. By 1976 the share of manufactured exports was already 37 percent of the total, and their growth was continuing impressively. Thailand had made a fairly easy transition toward export orientation with a diversified range of products, and the country was definitely following the two other ASEAN performers (Akrasanee 1980a, b). Even though the Philippines was the worst performer among the ASEAN countries in terms of growth, it definitely belonged to the top one-third of the world ‘growth league’ (Krause 1981:131), attesting to the exceptionality of the region as a whole. The Philippines had in 1949 adopted a severe import substitution policy, which had enabled rapid industrialization during the 1950s, but much of this was actually assembling and packaging of consumer goods. There was comparatively little making of producer goods and intermediate products tradeable in international markets. Since the early 1960s difficulties in the balance of payments, servicing the foreign debt, and large-scale unemployment had emerged. Philippine real wage levels had started to show a steady downward trend; not only in manufacturing, agriculture, and services, but even in skilled white-collar occupations. A need for policy change was perceived, and in 1973 the government began to encourage exports, with a complicated scheme of tax reductions. The policy was thus heavily subsidized by the state, and not particularly successful, but at least it seemed to be a step in the right direction (Bautista 1980). The Philippine experience closely resembled that of the Latin American countries. The lack of concrete examples in Bautista’s presentation regarding specific products or industries that should be developed indicated how Philippine thinking was not yet well oriented towards the new doctrine. They saw that their three ASEAN partners were succeeding, but had not themselves thus far experienced any comparable export success, and did not exactly know how to proceed.
< previous page
page_119
next page >
< previous page
page_120
next page >
Page 120 Indonesia was a poor country, and nearly half of its vast population still lived at or below subsistence level. Its postwar history had been tumultuous, and its economy had been in relative stagnation until 1968. At that time it had started to grow, after the Suharto government allowed large inflows of foreign investment. Oil and timber were the main growth and export sectors. Its industrialization had started from a low level, and was proceeding under an import substitution policy. Manufactured goods were almost non-existent among Indonesia’s exports. The favourable balance of payments situation, and the still unexhausted possibilities on the large domestic market, had not necessitated any special export promotion measures. However, there was no reason to wait for the kinds of difficulties that had been faced by the Philippines and Latin American countries. Consequently, the Indonesian government had started to plan manufacturing as an export sector (Anwar 1980). Results would lie in the future, but at least in terms of orientation Indonesia was planning to move in the direction of the Western Pacific manufacturing exporters. A profound change in the ASEAN economic horizon had thus taken place during the 1970s, and the process was continuing. ASEAN was, with the ANIEs, singling itself out as an especially successful group in the developing world, and in the most advanced ASEAN countries horizons were already raised to the level of catching up with the advanced countries in the relatively near future. The countries were also being placed on a neat scale measuring the dimension of development, with Japan at the top, the four ANIES in second place, and Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia following. There was a tendency on the part of economists from the Asian follower countries to align their argumentation with that of Japanese economists, and the nearness of their rhetoric to that of the Japanese could be read almost directly from the same scale. This combination of material progress and rhetorical realignment was of considerable importance in view of the newly emerged discussion of a Pacific integration initiative. The main theme of the tenth conference did not specially deal with integration. The main purpose was to present ASEAN to the audience of Pacific economists. But Kojima used the opportunity to spread his OPTAD idea, as it fit perfectly the new economic orientation of the ASEAN countries. OPTAD would be the institutional instrument with which to introduce his theory of foreign investment smoothly into institutional practice. Ikema Makoto, one of Kojima’s former students at Hitotsubashi University, made a presentation on Japanese aid and investment patterns to ASEAN (Ikema 1980), and Kojima himself followed with a detailed account of how the transfer of old industries from advanced countries to developing ones would be accompanied by a structural transformation, creating export markets for the developing countries. The whole process would be regulated by OPTAD, thus untying it from bilateral relations, where the monster of economic imperialism would always loom (Kojima 1980b).
< previous page
page_120
next page >
< previous page
page_121
next page >
Page 121 ASEAN countries had thus far tended to look for cooperation only within their own group, with concepts like an ASEAN Free Trade Area being discussed. Institutional cooperation with the advanced countries had been a strange idea. However, it seems that the OPTAD concept was discussed privately outside the formal proceedings, as well as in other similar fora. Kojima was able to report that at least Thanat Khoman, a former Thai foreign minister, and Soedjatmoko, a former Indonesian ambassador to the United States, and later the director of the United Nations University, had expressed support for OPTAD (Kojima 1980b: 474). Also Chia in his paper talked about a need for organizing relations between ASEAN and selected OECD countries (1980:261–72). Kojima was campaigning hard. Although support for OPTAD was not yet widespread, at least the idea had become known to leading Asian economists, and also some politicians were expressing positive interest.
< previous page
page_121
next page >
< previous page
page_122
next page >
Page 122 8 The institution For about a year circa 1978 it seemed as though Fukuda’s initiative was successful on the international scene, and that Japan had been able to secure for itself an important place as a peacemaker in the politics of the Western Pacific. There was a lot of diplomatic traffic between Japan and ASEAN following Fukuda’s Manila speech, and Japan’s Foreign Ministry started to devise plans on how to implement the doctrine, attempting simultaneously to take a leading role over other ministries in decisions regarding Japan’s economic foreign aid. The year 1978 was called ‘ASEAN year’, because ASEAN became the focus of international diplomatic activity, with various leaders visiting the region, among them Vice President Walter Mondale and the new Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Japan’s political initiative in taking ASEAN seriously was clearly being emulated by other big countries. Yet, all of this activity did not result from an increase of economistic thinking in the region. Much of it rather signified that the international period of détente was coming to an end. Vietnam and Cambodia took an increasingly antagonistic stance toward one another, and Vietnam’s relations with China also deteriorated. The lingering Sino-Soviet tension began to escalate, and in May 1978 the Chinese claimed that Soviet troops had crossed the Ussuri river, penetrating four kilometres into Chinese territory. The Chinese began to build a new anti-Soviet coalition, approaching the United States, and accusing it of appeasement in the face of the Soviet threat. In April a civilian Boeing 707 of Korean Airlines returning from Paris through Anchorage had been forced to land on a Siberian lake by Soviet military planes, resulting in the death of one Korean and one Japanese passenger, and serious injuries to many. Immediately after the incident President Carter postponed the withdrawal of American troops from Korean bases. The Carter administration had been suffering from accusations of political weakness, and during May 1978 Carter changed his policies. No retreat from Asia was to take place. He dispatched National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski to Beijing to convey to the Chinese the message that the United States was determined to check Soviet military expansionism.
< previous page
page_122
next page >
< previous page
page_123
next page >
Page 123 Prime Minister Fukuda visited Washington the same month, and was given a similar message. Fukuda was also asked to assist the United States. A change in the horizon of long-term economic trends took place at the same time. The economy of the United States was recovering, while the economy of the Soviet Union, which had been given a push from the higher oil prices after 1973, started to show signs of serious economic stagnation. The Soviet Union had been depicted thus far as the rising power, and the United States as in decline, but in 1978 it began to look as if the roles were being reversed (Sudō 1992:192). With considerable swiftness a new realignment of alliances occurred in the region. Japan concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in August. The move had been planned during the détente era, and had been meant to set Sino-Japanese relations on a solid economistic basis after the successful ASEAN initiative, but in this new situation it acquired the meaning of an anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnam alliance, composed of China, the United States, Japan, and ASEAN. In September the United States halted negotiations for normalizing relations with Vietnam, and in October Vietnam concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. In December the United States and China announced that normal diplomatic relations would be established between them, and the formal exchange of ambassadors would be conducted on New Year’s Day in 1979. On 25 December Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and in February 1979 China attacked Vietnam. By December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, détente had been a thing of the past for over a year already. The international environment in which Japan had conducted its policies of the 1970s oriented towards Asia had changed. The power vacuum created by the impression of a retreating United States disappeared along with the international psychology of détente . Also, the Japanese prime minister changed. Fukuda had formed a secret alliance with Ōhira Masayoshi in 1976. The deal was that Fukuda would hold the office only for two years, and then hand it over to Ōhira. As Fukuda had for the most part been successful in his policies, he was reluctant to step down in the autumn of 1978, and the two contenders had to challenge each other in a serious campaign. Ōhira emerged as the victor on 7 December. The fact that there had to be a major public contest may have been important in some respects. Because Fukuda was identified with the Asian orientation, Ōhira had to attack him from a different platform. Ōhira fought Fukuda with a package of grandiose visions. In 1978 it had been 110 years since the Meiji restoration, the end of a decade was once again approaching, and the twenty-first century had drawn a decade closer. The traditional rhetoric of identification with the Meiji period was combined with a new wave of euphoria over Japan’s economic success. It was no longer based on the
< previous page
page_123
next page >
< previous page
page_124
next page >
Page 124 absolute levels of economic growth, as they had slipped far below those of the ANIEs, but on relatively high growth rates compared with other large advanced countries. Moreover, it was no longer simple growth and development that were hailed, but the national skill of adapting rapidly to changing international conditions. Japan’s economic advancement during the 1960s had benefited from the low yen, low wages, and cheap raw materials plentifully available from international markets. All this had changed during the 1970s, and still Japan continued to outperform the Euro-American countries. Like the phoenix, it had risen up from the ashes of the oil shock, stronger than ever. Ōhira seems to have been fond of the term ‘age’, which he used in many combinations. Various kinds of ages became the trade mark of ‘Ōhira’s age’. One expression favoured by him was the post-modern age (kindai wo koeru jidai), which referred to the idea of Japan building a new kind of post-industrial civilization. Related to it were expressions like the age of culture (bunka no jidai), the new age (shinjidai), or the age of regions (chihō no jidai), which meant much the same as Tanaka’s idea of remodelling the Japanese archipelago. Japan was once again thought to be strong enough to start rebuilding itself anew. These domestic ages were balanced with the age of global society (chikyū shakai no jidai), and the Pacific age (Taiheiyō jidai), a slogan which was gathering strength in Japanese rhetoric. Elections are not necessarily won with slogans, and factional juggling within the LDP was what determined the outcome of the fight with Fukuda, but after his victory Ōhira had to try to find substance for his election speeches. Ōhira was a good organizer, skilful in using a wide array of emotionally arousing slogans, and riding on the mood of the time. He was a mover of emotions, but he does not seem to have been particularly gifted in conceptualizing concrete political goals. To aid him in formulating his national and foreign policies he set up a number of study groups, among them a group for Pacific integration, which later surpassed the others in its importance. In the beginning it was headed by Ōkita Saburō, until he became Ōhira’s foreign minister in November 1979. By that time Ōhira had his mind set on a grand Pacific initiative, which would beat Fukuda’s achievement with ASEAN, and at the same time help Japan to extricate itself from the tight international situation in which the return of the Cold War had placed it. There has been speculation as to why Ōhira became interested in Pacific integration in the first place, because the original decision seems to have been made by him, personally, during the campaign in autumn of 1978. Pacific economists were certainly discussing the OPTAD concept, but how much did the musings of academics matter? Kojima Kiyoshi himself was quite surprised at the rapid turn of events (Kojima 1980a:547–8). As nobody can interview Ōhira anymore we must speculate, because the matter has acquired historical importance over the years.
< previous page
page_124
next page >
< previous page
page_125
next page >
Page 125 One small but possibly relevant item may be that if you write the Japanese names for Ōhira and Pacific (Taiheiyō) with Chinese characters, they resemble each other visually. The Pacific might have resembled something close to the personal identity of Ōhira. The decision to choose Ōkita, a bureaucrat and scholar who had stayed outside of the LDP machinery, as head of the study group and then as foreign minister, may be related to the fact that Ōhira had known Ōkita since 1939, when both of them had been young officials working together in the Japanese administration of China, and Ōkita had long been associated with the idea of Pacific integration. If Ōhira wanted to make a Pacific initiative, Ōkita was a particularly suitable personal choice to help him. Ōhira had graduated from the Economics Department of Hitotsubashi University. He had a strong personal attachment to his alma mater, and moreover, he has thus far been the only Japanese prime minister with a Hitotsubashi background. Hitotsubashi was the bastion of Akamatsu’s pupils, where the flying geese theory was taught as the pride of the university, and where Kojima Kiyoshi continued to develop his Pacific integration concepts. It is wholly conceivable that Ōhira decided to bring Hitotsubashi ideas into Japan’s foreign policy now that he had the power to do so. However, any Hitotsubashi influence on policy formulation was not direct, but flowed through diffuse channels. Ōhira had little contact with current Hitotsubashi economists, and there was no personal relationship between him and Kojima. Ōhira relied more on his former aides at the Ministry of Finance, and his Pacific integration study group was mainly composed of Tokyo University economists (Kojima 1996: interview). Kojima in his turn worked rather with the MOFA, writing a special report of analysis and recommendations for it (Kojima 1996:188–228). On the other hand, seen from an international context, it can be said that a Pacific initiative matched the time better than an Asian initiative would have done. Because the Cold War was returning, Japan was forced to abandon the small world of special identification with the Southeast Asian countries, and define itself instead in terms of the global superpower confrontation. This forced Japan to turn from being a member of Asia (Ajia no ichi in) to a member of the West (nishigawa no ichi in) . In other words, Japan had to return to defining itself principally as an ally of the United States. Japanese foreign policy henceforth had to proceed from this position, and not from one of relative independence. As Fukuda’s error in timing for the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in August 1978 had demonstrated, this position carried the danger of being drawn into the reborn Cold War as a military actor. This would not have been desirable for Japan, even from Fukuda’s moderately hawkish viewpoint. Ōhira had started his professional career as an economist in the Ministry of Finance. He entered politics as a protegé of Ikeda Hayato in the early postwar period. Later
< previous page
page_125
next page >
< previous page
page_126
next page >
Page 126 he inherited Ikeda’s faction in the LDP. Ōhira thus had an intra-factional historical tradition derived from Ikeda and Yoshida under which to formulate his policies, and just as Yoshida had skilfully prevented Japan from becoming a front line country in the Cold War in the early post-war period, Ōhira had to try to do the same. He had to find a way to identify Japan clearly with the United States, but using such language that Japan’s economistic orientation could continue. This is where a Pacific economic cooperation initiative fitted in perfectly. At the same time there also was a campaign in the United States conducted by local PAFTAD economists and other influential persons connected with Pacific matters. Some members of Congress became interested in the idea in 1978. The Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs contracted Hugh Patrick and Peter Drysdale to write a detailed report about the OPTAD idea, where they summarized discussions from PAFTAD and elsewhere (Congressional Research Service 1979). Special hearings of experts were held in July and October 1979. Much was made of the fact that during the 1970s American trade with Pacific countries had surpassed its trade with Western Europe. It had quadrupled between 1970 and 1978, and continued to grow rapidly, while trade with Europe was moving forward only slowly. Differing dates were given for the occurrence, but it was one of the major arguments used in trying to ignite a new American interest in Pacific affairs (Krause 1979:16; Patrick 1979:57; Wolff 1979a:1, 1979b:89). It was a simple and effective way of demonstrating that the world economic balance was changing. As Europe was defined as a stagnant and conservative place, the United States faced the danger of contracting this European ‘disease’ if it continued to lean toward the Atlantic world. The road to ensuring future American greatness lay in orienting itself toward the dynamic Pacific countries, competing, trading, and growing alongside them. The 1970s had already shown that the United States had been able to adjust to the Oil Crisis better than Western Europe on average, so, clearly, it still had some of its stamina left (Krause 1979:16). The Pacific countries were the wave of the future, and the United States would do well to be on the side of the winners. The American campaigners also presented the situation in a way which gave an impression of widespread interest in the idea in the Western Pacific. Referring to the Japanese Pacific Basin Study Group and similar studies that had been initiated in Australia by Prime Minister Malcolm Frazer, Hugh Patrick said: ‘If we sit back as the reluctant suitor waiting for somebody to call us for a date on Saturday night we might find they call Japan instead’ (1979:59). First in Japan, then in Australia, and now in the United States, interest in some form of Pacific integration was being generated in official circles, and the campaigners succeeded in creating a self-reinforcing process, where interest in one country could be legitimized by interest appearing in another. Just as Patrick used Japanese and Australian expressions of interest in turning American minds towards the
< previous page
page_126
next page >
< previous page
page_127
next page >
Page 127 idea, proponents in other countries could now use the American proceeds in influencing their audiences. For instance, after the publication of the DrysdalePatrick report, Kojima stopped referring to OPTAD as his and Drysdale’s own idea, and began to use the expression ‘the United States Senate’s OPTAD proposal’ (Kojima 1981:121–2). The reference to the Senate, rather than to obscure academicians, added significant persuasive weight to the proposal. An American professor of international relations, Charles E.Morrison, made the following observation of the cumulative effects of the campaign: When one reads the Far Eastern Economic Review or Asiaweek or newspapers in the region which carry stories on Congressional hearings or the isolated speeches on the subject, one can get the distorted impression that American interest is not only very keen, but enjoys wide currency in the government, Congress, and business and academic communities. When one is sitting in a Congressional committee hearing on the subject, one has quite a different perspective. There are likely to be only one or two Senators or Congressmen; and the audience is relatively thin. Committee staff had some difficulty in finding witnesses (the same individuals from both the private sector and government tend to be used again and again). The hearings are not covered by major American newspapers, certainly not by television. And wire service stories carried in the Asahi Evening News or the Straits Times are not seen on the pages of the Washington Post or the New York Times . A story may appear in Asiaweek, but not in the American edition of Time or Newsweek . (Morrison 1980:32) There were only a few individuals canvassing actively in the United States for Pacific integration, and all of them had in some way been involved already with Asian affairs, and had an institutional or personal interest in promoting it. In Congress there were the chairmen and staffs of the Asian and Pacific subcommittees, Senator John Glenn for the Senate and Lester Wolff for the House of Representatives, and in addition, Senator William Roth was active. They spread the message internationally, as well (Wolff 1981), and at least Roth also used the slogan the ‘Pacific Century’ in his speeches (Roth 1981). In the State Department interest was confined to a few individuals working on economic issues in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, while those involved in the political aspects of US foreign policy tended to be sceptical. These two groups within government circles were then aided by economic experts, most of whom were PAFTAD economists or businessmen connected with the PBEC (Morrison 1980:36–40). Thus there was keen interest within the United States, but it was confined to so few individuals that it would be quite possible to name most of them. They themselves would not have been able to affect United States foreign policy in any direction. Their
< previous page
page_127
next page >
< previous page
page_128
next page >
Page 128 numbers were, however, of no consequence. Even though their voice might have been only a whisper in the United States, in the Western Pacific it was amplified by the interest of local mass media, coming as if from a loudspeaker. It was heard. With surprising swiftness hectic activity began during the winter of 1979–80 in the form of national study groups and international conferences—and in all countries concerned there were PAFTAD economists or PBEC businessmen, who could be used as experts in explaining the good features of economic Pacific integration. They were the only ones available who had the expertise to do so. It is amazing how influential a small group of intellectuals can be in international politics when the situation permits. The Canadians responded easily, endorsing the idea. H.Edward English, who had been in PAFTAD since the beginning, was especially strongly in favour of the idea (1981), and Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan began to talk enthusiastically about ‘this exciting phenomenon of a new Pacific age’ (1981). Also Ōhira (1981) and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Frazer (1981) were encouraged by the American response. Response from New Zealanders was less enthusiastic, but they were not against the idea (Thompson 1981). Han Sung-Joo describes lucidly how this process of trans-Pacific amplification worked in South Korea. The OPTAD idea had been known only to a handful of international economists there, and even they had tended to be cool towards the idea, as the Korean economy had performed so well without any formal international structures. But the loudspeaker effect of the US Congressional hearings as reported in Western Pacific media changed the situation with one stroke. Already in September 1979 President Park Chung Hee initiated several Korean research projects to study the implications of the idea. The fact that Korea’s participation in any kind of multilateral regional arrangement was minimal—after the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) had become defunct during the 1970s—was quickly noticed, and consequently interest in the Pacific Community idea grew rapidly (Han 1980; 1981). Among the ASEAN countries, Singaporeans were clearly interested in the ideas of the ‘US congressional report’ (Pang 1980), and Minister of Trade and Industry Goh Chok Tong, who was later to become Singapore’s prime minister, in January 1980 was very favourable to the idea (Goh 1981). It might have served well the interests of Singapore (Lim 1981), but Singaporeans did not want to push the matter, because they thought other ASEAN countries might be more sceptical. Some of them were not. Especially in Malaysia the Pacific age rhetoric caught fire. An economist, Lee Poh Ping, reported the consensus reached by a Malaysian study group that clearly ‘the global economic center of gravity will be shifting, if it has not done so already, to the Pacific region by the end of this century or
< previous page
page_128
next page >
< previous page
page_129
next page >
Page 129 the beginning of the next’ (1980:67). Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad talked of how increased economic cooperation would help economic achievement in the region to be massive, and how ‘the Pacific region would attain the stature that was once the pride of the North Atlantic countries’ (Mahathir 1981:45). In the Philippines, the Minister of Economic Planning, Gerardo P.Sicat, had also begun using the idea of the Pacific age in his speeches (1981), and there was clear interest in some form of Pacific cooperation, although perhaps not necessarily the OPTAD concept (Estanislao 1980). Narongchai Akrasanee gave an interesting account of how the PAFTAD rhetoric on integration clashed in Thailand with that of the uninitiated (Akrasanee 1980b), but he could also attest to tentative Thai support (Akrasanee 1980a, 1981). The former foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, who had already accepted the idea in 1978, was wholehearted in his support (Khoman 1981). An Indonesian professor of economics in an international conference in January 1980 in Japan talked about significant changes in the global geopolitical and economic situation as a result of Pacific region dynamism, and, with this, joined the Pacific age bandwagon (Widjaja 1980). In another international conference in Bali a representative of the Indonesian Department of Mines and Energy gave careful support to increased Pacific cooperation, but the matter was not very pressing from his point of view, because Indonesian raw materials would be needed whether there was some sort of formal integration or not (Wijarso 1981). The least interest was shown in the small Pacific island states (Nawalowalo 1981). In Latin America at least Chilean academics had been quick to note what was happening (Vicuña and Duco 1979). These are only haphazard glimpses at the newly emerging discussion process, but at least they point to the fact that the more developed a country was, the more urgent the need to participate in the process of Pacific integration was seen to be. Discussants from advanced Pacific countries and ANIEs were largely ready to endorse the OPTAD proposal, but members of less developed countries expressed little support. They wanted a low profile beginning, just discussions and consultations, to see what were the implications of the American, Japanese, and Australian ideas regarding a formal Pacific organization. The general impression was that the concept might hold great potential, and the slogan of the Pacific age began to pop up more frequently in the speeches of politicians in 1980, but nobody wanted to take the initiative. Kernial Sandhu, director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, even suggested sarcastically that the formal initiative should be made by a small Pacific state such as Fiji, Samoa, or Tonga, because nobody needed to fear domination by them (Sandhu 1981). A sort of summing up of the prevailing mood can be seen in the final report of the Japanese Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, which was published in August (Kan Taiheiyō rental kenkyū grūpu 1980). It could
< previous page
page_129
next page >
< previous page
page_130
next page >
Page 130 not, however, report to Ōhira Masayoshi any longer, because he had died of a heart attack while campaigning to continue his prime ministership. Ōhira had launched the study group on the course of establishing the Pacific century, and thus the prescribed goals of the contemplated integration proposal did not lie in the developments of the 1980s, but twenty years into the future. The document has been accused of being devoid of actual content, as it did not take up questions of possible organizational forms, nor questions of membership. But content never was one of its main goals. Creating a specific mood in preparation for integration was the principal goal. This mood was created and maintained by frequent references to the vitality (katsuryoku) and dynamism (dainamizumu) of the region, the levels of which, both in the case of the advanced and the developing countries, were seen to be higher than in other parts of the world. The Pacific was a place of potential (kanōsei) and diversity (tayōsei) . What was needed was a policy that would take diversity under gentle control, so that the potential could be unleashed. The formula for integration would be a regional combination of advanced and developing countries, with the common goal of development acting as the glue. A great number of politically stable and rapidly growing countries already existed, with whom North-South discussions had become easy, as seen in Fukuda’s success, and in the gradual realignment of developmental rhetorics, mentioned earlier in the context of PAFTAD. The chances for using the region as a model case of development were lauded. The contemplated Pacific initiative in 1980 was thus seen as merely the first step (dai ippo) of a longer journey towards the peaceful and prosperous Pacific age. Consequently, no need emerged to propose far-reaching measures. Even economic questions were not treated as immediate concerns. Mutual understanding and the creation of a positive, common feeling were seen as comprising the first step. The initiation of common research projects, increasing the exchange of students, promotion of tourism, cultural exchanges, development of communications, cooperation among the mass media in disseminating information and international symposiums were regarded as the immediate tasks. It was considered that there should also be an international conference to discuss the idea and to plan more concrete steps. Such a conference had already actually been scheduled to take place in September in Canberra. The groundwork had been laid by Ōkita Saburō and Sir John Crawford, and prime ministers Ōhira and Frazer had endorsed the idea during their meeting in January 1980. The Canberra seminar is remembered nowadays as the meeting that started everything, but we should keep in mind that for a whole year beginning in autumn 1979 there was constant conferencing in various countries throughout the region. The Canberra seminar was only one among many, although it was prepared with the definite purpose of moving things forward. It was low key, being held in a purely academic setting at the
< previous page
page_130
next page >
< previous page
page_131
next page >
Page 131 Australian National University. Few statements were made, and most of the seminar was spent in studying written copies of discussions conducted in the region throughout the year, analysed above. Participants came from Australia, Japan, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, ASEAN countries, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. Delegations were composed of economists, businessmen, and government officials in their private capacity, and not as official representatives of their countries. The seminar resembled in a sense an enlarged PAFTAD meeting. The seminar arrived at the consensus that a sort of informal Pacific Community already existed in the region, as a feeling of a common destiny was developing. Further seminars should be held, but the creation of a formal institutional structure was shifted to the future, the seminar considering it wisest to proceed slowly, so that the delicate mood would not be broken. Economic and cultural issues were agreed to take up the whole agenda; political and military issues would definitely be left untouched. Membership would be open, so that Latin American countries and Pacific socialist countries might be able to participate in the future. It was also decided that membership should be kept on a formally equal footing, so that no degrading ‘EEC-style’ associated memberships would be offered to anyone (Pacific Community Seminar 1981). The seminar thus ended on a low key. All that remained after the meeting was an idea, and a group of individuals committed to making it a reality. In Japan, after the Ōhira government had fallen, Ōkita Saburō had no special governmental duties left. His considerable expertise was needed, and he was simply made an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). He thus was relatively free to concentrate on pushing forward the idea of Pacific integration. A national liaison committee was established in December 1980 under his chairmanship, and named the Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation (SCPC). The Committee started to publish a Pacific Cooperation Newsletter in English in 1982. As a former foreign minister Ōkita provided a direct and authoritative link with the MOFA. Most of the other members of the SCPC came from the academic and corporate worlds, with Kojima as a natural choice for one of the members. Similar tripartite committees with low profiles but government blessing were also established in South Korea and Thailand (Woods 1993:94). The reason why the Pacific cooperation movement appeared to have slowed down was that a government-level digestion period was needed in so many countries, and this took time. It was not necessary that they should have adopted formal stances in regard to the idea; all that was needed was their tentative blessing, so that officials would be allowed to participate, although presumably only in their private capacities. Among the ASEAN countries Malaysia had in 1980 shown fairly strong interest in the concept, and Mahathir himself had meanwhile become the prime minister. It was therefore at first thought that a new conference could be
< previous page
page_131
next page >
< previous page
page_132
next page >
Page 132 held there in 1982. Plans were at an advanced stage when Malaysian leaders decided to retreat from the idea (Woods 1993:94–5). The Thais then came to the rescue. Thanat Khoman was acting as deputy prime minister at the time, and his authority was sufficient to make decisions regarding the organization of a conference. It was held in Bangkok in June 1982. The Bangkok Conference—as it was called at the time—provided the stage for two achievements. The most important of them was the simple fact that the conference was held in an ASEAN country (Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation 1982). This was an important break-through in changing official ASEAN minds with respect to the cooperation process. The other important achievement was that an international standing committee was finally established, which included the right kind of people. Its eight members consisted of: Thanat Khoman; General Ali Moertopo, the Minister of Information of Indonesia and a personal adviser to President Suharto; Nam Dok U, a former prime and finance minister of South Korea; Ōkita Saburō from Japan; Sir John Crawford from Australia; Ambassador Richard L.Snyder from the United States; and two businessmen, David Sycip and Eric Trigg, representing the Philippines and Canada. Government level interest had clearly been aroused, especially in the Asian countries. A third conference was planned to be held in an ASEAN country, in Indonesia in November 1983. It was chaired by General Moertopo. This conference decided to call itself the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), and wrote itself a history, which meant that the Canberra Conference became thereafter referred to as PECC I, and the Bangkok Conference as PECC II, Bali being PECC III (PECC 1983:5–8). Naming the conferences in this way gave the haphazard and low-key process a degree of continuity and historical depth. The naming also symbolized the fact that the conferences had ceased to be simply meetings of like-minded people, becoming instead an established conference series, and thus a specific international actor. From now on PECC’s road towards greater visibility and importance was fairly smooth, with PECC IV held in Seoul in 1985, PECC V in Vancouver in 1986, PECC VI in Ōsaka in 1988, PECC VII in Auckland in 1989, PECC VIII in Singapore in 1991, PECC IX in San Francisco in 1992, and PECC X in Kuala Lumpur in 1994. This institutional advancement was aided by an ideological offensive, where Pacific age rhetoric played a central role, tied with the idea of an emerging Pacific Community. Kojima himself called for such a campaign, and published a history of the Pacific integration process, mainly a compilation of his own writings since the early 1960s (Kojima 1980a). Ōhira’s successor, Suzuki Zenkō, was responsive. In 1981 he made a tour of ASEAN countries, painting the horizon bright (Gaimushō Ajiakyoku 1981). A suitable English quotation displaying his style can be taken from his speech in Honolulu in 1982:
< previous page
page_132
next page >
< previous page
page_133
next page >
Page 133 Now is the time for us to embark into the Pacific Age on a course set for the 21st century. Our sails billow in the wind, a full tide is running. Steering toward a grand future, and riding the same ship, we are full of courageous spirit. Shall we not join in this great endeavor of the century? Let us build a record of accomplishment for our nations and the Pacific region that will live in the annals of world history. (Suzuki 1982) In their travels around the region people like Ōkita also made similar speeches (Ōkita 1983), and a steady stream of Japanese studies related to the idea was published (Saitō Shizuo 1983; Keizai kigakuchō sōgō keikaku kyoku 1985). A specific journal, Asia Pacific Community, was published in English in Tokyo during the period 1978–86. An Australian former prime minister, E.Gough Whitlam, campaigned for the idea (Whitlam 1981). European studies also were made (Institut du Pacifique 1983; Oborne and Fourt 1983; Linder 1986; Kovalenko 1988). Pacific cooperation, illuminated by the bright light of the coming Pacific age, became an established theme in global discussion. An ASEAN comment on the matter was that ‘the ASEAN countries have been overimpressed by the glowing prospects painted in front of them’ (Wahid 1983:3). But already in 1984 the idea of Pacific economic cooperation had been for the first time discussed officially in Jakarta at a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers with their counterparts from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States, and after that the ASEAN official stand towards participation in PECC became positive (Leviste 1985). Even though practical economic considerations were no doubt the main reason for increased interest in cooperation, Pacific age rhetoric formed an additional psychological sweetener for the process. The first half of the 1980s was actually a rather depressed period economically. Adjustment to the second oil shock of 1979–80 was still going on. The advanced countries were struggling again with stagnation and unemployment, most Third World countries with the exploded debt crisis, and even the ANIEs with tightening export markets. The general global mood was gloomy, and this could also be seen in PECC discussions, where the short-term prospects of the Pacific economies were not regarded as favourable (Nam 1986), and even comparisons with the Great Depression of the 1930s were circulated (Sopiee 1986). However, nobody really seemed to doubt the long-term prospects of the region, and probably that can at least be partially attributed to the Pacific age narrative which had become rooted in the minds of local intellectuals and political leaders. Of course such a slogan has a tendency to wear thin, and most people would not have been able to use it continuously. References to the Pacific age, and corresponding expressions, were normally something that new entrants to the club had to utter. They served as a sort of password. When China started to make overtures about joining
< previous page
page_133
next page >
< previous page
page_134
next page >
Page 134 PECC in 1985, first a Chinese scholar published an article in the Pacific Cooperation Newsletter about the ‘rising of the Asian-Pacific region’ (Guo 1985), and when China then participated in PECC V in Vancouver in 1986, the leader of the Chinese delegation spoke the same magic words in his opening address (Huan 1986). At the same time he also warmly welcomed the participation of a delegation from Taiwan, going by the name of Chinese Taipei. This meeting represented the first instance when China and Taiwan were able to participate together in an international organization, and, without doubt, both the ‘officially unofficial’ atmosphere of the conference, and the long-term horizon of future prosperity, played a helping role in bringing this about. Similarly, when Latin American countries began to enter PECC, they too included in their statements what had to be said. The representative of the Comisi6n Permanente del Pacífico Sur (CPPS; Permanent Commission of the South Pacific), comprising the governments of Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru said that the CPPS wanted to join ‘because it is fully aware that the next will be called the Century of the Pacific’ (Zambrano 1985). Also the Chilean and Peruvian representatives assured their listeners that ‘we firmly believe that the future of the world lies in the Pacific’ (Ovalle 1985; see also Allan 1986; Maurtua 1986). The utterance of such words was an initiation rite, and once they had been earnestly spoken, a place of membership was granted in the exquisite ‘Pacific Club’ of the future leaders of humankind. Once you had become a member, you could then use or not use the expressions as you pleased, but it was no longer an implicit requirement. Probably much of this behaviour was not even conscious, because this is the usual way in which human groups are formed on a linguistic level. Language has to be aligned to a sufficient degree, and the necessary colour has to be displayed every now and then in a ritual representing a mutual assurance of belonging together.
< previous page
page_134
next page >
< previous page
page_135
next page >
Page 135 9 Japan’s decade The 1970s witnessed Japan’s emergence in Pacific Asia as a model of economic development, and a loose rhetorical community began to form in the Western Pacific around this common denominator. During the 1980s Japan was beginning to be discussed as a model in the advanced industrialized countries. Both in North America and Western Europe confidence in their own style of economic advancement was badly shaken by the two oil crises. First Japan, and later the whole Western Pacific region, emerged into visibility around the world as a special place, able to survive economic crises without wounds, always bouncing back after each crisis, seemingly more dynamic than ever. In the more emphalopsychotic Europe this phenomenon was less pronounced, but Americans, who had more contact across the Pacific, and who had the most to lose in terms of national well-being and international prestige, responded more quickly. Ezra F.Vogel’s Japan as Number One, subtitled Lessons for America, first published in 1979, and selling well throughout the 1980s, opened the discussion. In his foreword Vogel described the changed American mood, telling how he had never doubted American superiority in almost any social or technical field while he first visited Japan in 1960. By 1975 he and his Japanese friends had began wondering what was happening to the United States, with rising unemployment, urban disorganization, and declining confidence in government. Meanwhile Japan seemed to have handled the problems of a postindustrial society better than any other advanced country, and it was in this sense that Vogel named Japan number one. His worries were heightened, because he was one of the observers who had become used to the Japanese twenty-first century rhetoric (Vogel 1985:3). Working among the self-confident Japanese, he simply amplified contemporary economic trends in Japanese style, and arrived at conclusions disturbing for an American. Japan was not number one in riches or political influence at the end of the 1970s, but it was depicted as superior in adaptability, planning, vision and organizational innovation, which meant that if things continued the way they had for three decades, Japan would eventually pass the United States, whose decline would be deepened.
< previous page
page_135
next page >
< previous page
page_136
next page >
Page 136 There had of course been a considerable amount of literature examining Japan’s success during the 1970s, but Vogel changed the perspective from praising an amusing latecomer to a learning experience, presenting Japan as a model for the United States. Besides sociological topics like family, schooling and social organization interest among foreign researchers tended to concentrate on company management, and industrial policy. The latter discussion is of particular importance from the point of view of this study. Already Vogel had pointed out the importance of Japan’s industrial and trade policy, but the ground-breaking work in this area was Chalmers Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle, first published in 1982. Like Vogel, Johnson also wrote his book as lessons for America. His point was what he called the capitalist developmental state, characterized by goal-oriented strategic thinking, and a nationwide integrated economic strategy, which ensures that a country will be able to develop efficiently (Johnson 1986:304–24). Johnson might have turned as well to the nineteenth-century economic history of the United States, and analysed how it had developed its industries under the British hegemony à la Friedrich List, but that was in the past. Japan was the present and probably future success story, and there were lessons to be learned. Vogel’s and Johnson’s serious studies were of course accompanied by more popularized books depicting secret Japanese and Asian plots to dominate industry worldwide (Hofheinz and Calder 1982; Wolf 1985) The economic strategy advocated in these works was not a neoclassical one. During the early 1980s under the first part of the Reagan administration such views were still left on the sidelines of American discussion. Reagan began his presidency with the agenda of reinvigorating America, and making it once again the locomotive of the world. He brought with him monetarist economic policies, which relied on neoclassical economic principles. Tax cuts were supposed to release the consuming power of ordinary people, and leave more capital for rich people and companies to invest. These measures were expected to take America back to the indisputable industrial leadership position it had enjoyed up until the late 1960s. A return to the Cold War had already started during the late Carter administration, and Reagan strengthened this tendency. Cutting federal revenue with his tax policy, he simultaneously increased spending on armaments, challenging the Soviet Union to enter an armaments race, promising to break the Soviet economic backbone with this policy. The difference was financed by large-scale foreign borrowing, which drove up first American and then global interest rates, as well as the value of the dollar. Reagan’s administration did not at first mind the strengthening of the dollar, because a strong country should have a strong currency. Reagan’s Cold War strategy with respect to the Soviet Union is now seen as a spectacular success, but his success in economics was short-lived.
< previous page
page_136
next page >
< previous page
page_137
next page >
Page 137 The high value of the dollar made American exports difficult, and imports easy, which nullified his economic programme. The shift in the flow of international loose capital from financing Third World loans in the 1970s to financing American military spending in the 1980s also exploded into the Third World debt crisis, sending large parts of it, especially Latin American and African countries, into difficulties for the rest of the decade. Efficient Western Pacific exporters were able to deal successfully with the debt crisis by exporting to the United States, enabling the economic miracle to continue, and making them stand out ever more clearly from the rest of the developing countries. By the middle of the decade the United States had emerged as the world’s major debtor country, and its economic growth had slackened. There was strong downward pressure on the dollar. In September 1985 the G5 countries met at New York’s Plaza Hotel, and the agreement that subsequently became known as the Plaza Accord greatly lowered the value of the dollar against the yen and European currencies. With ex post facto wisdom Reagan’s methods of reinvigorating America might seem foolish, but in a sense they were understandable. The national psyche demanded that America stand up and fight against the slow downward slide, and a real attempt made to get out of the situation with true American methods. The essentially defensive economic policies adopted by Nixon, and continued by Ford and Carter, had not been able to reverse the previous trend. An active policy had to be attempted sooner or later, and Reagan was the president to try it. It did not help much, but at least it proved a lesson worth learning. Reagan’s experiment showed that there was no way of returning to the international position held by the United States during the 1950s. This brought industrial policy to the agenda of international discussion, and numerous reprints were made of books like Vogel’s and Johnson’s. The change of topics was clearly discernible also in PAFTAD. During the early 1980s PAFTAD had adopted a side role in policy discussions, and left the centre stage for PECC. There was also a change of participants. Although numerous longstanding members continued to participate in PAFTAD, they wrote fewer papers, and many of them, typically persons like Ōkita Saburō, concentrated their main energy on PECC activities. Younger economists who replaced them, often coming directly from the academic world, tended to write mathematically sophisticated, but from the point of view of policy rather uninteresting papers (see English and Scott 1982; Bautista and Naya 1984; Tan and Kapur 1986). The fourth PECC in April 1985 in Seoul was a kind of ideological threshold, in the sense that Ōkita Saburō brought the flying geese theory out from behind the relatively closed door of Japanese discussion, and presented it in English in front of a major international audience. Ōkita no longer appeared in PECC as an ordinary economist, but as a former foreign minister and a current ‘unofficial’ representative of the Japanese
< previous page
page_137
next page >
< previous page
page_138
next page >
Page 138 government. Also Woods tells in his analysis of the event, that Ōkita had reported the flying geese theory as corresponding with the position of Japan’s government (Woods 1993:200). Ōkita’s position, and the forum at which his speech was presented, meant that the theory was no longer purely academic, but an expression of Japanese foreign political ideology with respect to the Pacific region. However, even from then on it tended to remain on the threshold between the academic and political worlds, as Japanese political leaders holding governmental positions have refrained from arguing with its terms; its main proponents have been academics, or retired officials like Ōkita. He did not present anything new in theoretical terms; the whole point was that he mentioned openly the names of the theory and Akamatsu Kaname, and that the theory dated from the 1930s. He also set it against the contemporary Pacific political and economic context, defining three basic forms of international division of labour: the vertical structure, as exists between a suzerain and a colony; the horizontal structure, as exists between advanced industrialized countries, typified by the EEC; and the flying geese structure. The vertical structure was considered bad, because it inhibited development, as suggested by the dependencia theory. The horizontal structure was a good goal, but not yet attainable in the Pacific. The flying geese structure, vertical in form, but in practice a superb means for development, was the way for Asian developing countries to attain rapid industrial development, which would result in prosperity for the Pacific region as a whole (Ōkita 1985, 1987). Ōkita’s presentation evoked considerable debate, just as anything relating to Japan’s wartime history, but some of the discussion was positive, as the model allowed the great Pacific diversity of cultures and levels of development to be seen as a strength, rather than a weakness (Woods 1993:101). However, Ōkita’s main contribution was that he brought real names into open discussion. They could then start to spread around in the media and through other channels, although it took some time for the process to get going (Yamazawa 1990:xii). The PECC conference was followed by the fifteenth PAFTAD, entitled ‘Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth’, held in August 1985 in Tokyo. Something similar occurred there, in the form of a new theoretical debate which developed between the neoclassical theory, and a general Pacific Asian variety of development theory. It should not actually be called the flying geese theory, as the name had not yet achieved a wide circulation. It might be most appropriate to call it a theory of developmental stages, as the idea of a rational and planned climb toward higher stages differentiated it most distinctly from the neoclassical theory. Nobody seemed to take special note of it at the time, but the generally friendly debate tended to divide participants along ethnic lines, Asians and Anglo-Saxons looking at each other over an imaginary borderline.
< previous page
page_138
next page >
< previous page
page_139
next page >
Page 139 A distinct feature of the debate was that by the middle of the 1980s Asians had become supremely confident, while Anglo-Saxons tended to be puzzled and on the defensive. We shall take two quotes to describe the situation, the first from an Australian economist: There is no doubt that industrial policy generates considerable interest. Hardly a month goes by without the announcement of a new conference or the publication of a new paper on the topic. There is also no doubt that most economists feel uncomfortable with the concept of an industrial policy. There seem to be no natural or agreed boundaries to what should be encompassed within the area; nor is it even clear that there should be a body of theory that is especially tailored for industrial policy problems…. It was fairly obvious that many participants did not like the idea of economists spending too much time exploring these terrains, commenting that they belonged in the realm of the political scientist. (Gregory 1986:1, 6) An American economist described the situation in even stronger terms: Industrial policy has emerged as a category of economic policy only in recent years…industrial policy clearly is not a contrivance of academic thinkers. It is a category of policy measures searching for an analytical framework or, less kindly, a political slogan in search of respectability. Economists of traditional persuasion have greeted it with little enthusiasm. (Caves 1986:42) Gregory’s and Caves’ puzzlement and frustration stem from a situation where members of an established body of ideas are exposed to a new way of thinking, and do not like the shock to the system. Gregory’s reference to ‘most economists’ was mistaken. He really referred only to the group of like-minded neoclassical Anglo-Saxon economists at the conference. Participants from Pacific Asian countries presented a very different picture. The quotations attest also to the fact that at least among the new participants in PAFTAD knowledge of Japanese theoretical economic discussion was limited. Reference to political scientists and political slogans—both connotatively bad words—describes the alienness of the idea; an economist should be crunching numbers and statistics, but dealing with political matters as little as possible. The difference between generations of economists was clear. The PAFTAD veterans had played so much with Pacific politics since the late 1960s that they tended to view the borderline between economics and politics in a relaxed manner, and did not even feel themselves particularly uncomfortable with the idea of industrial policy (English and McFetridge 1986), but the new participants tended to be more doctrinaire. They were well aware of the problems of slow economic growth and loss of competing margins in the advanced
< previous page
page_139
next page >
< previous page
page_140
next page >
Page 140 countries, but instead of industrial policies they wanted to use more deregulation and give more free play to market forces. No special industrial policy was deemed necessary. Gregory pointed out that one of the crucial dividing lines at the conference was in determining whether there were specific and clearly delineated stages, or whether such a concept was unnecessary. As he described it, ‘the conference never quite came to grips with this idea, which seemed to have very little support from the participants from developed countries’ (Gregory 1986:6). Again he was referring only to the Anglo-Saxon countries; by this time there was no longer any special difference between Japanese, ANIE, and ASEAN rhetoric. Asian papers were built around precisely the concept of stages of development. Because of the tendency to use neoclassical vocabulary as the means of argumentation, this fact was often disguised. The principal Japanese paper came from Okuno Masahiro and Suzumura Kotarō (1986), who gave a general description of Japanese industrial policy, but unless you knew what you were looking for, it would have been difficult to find a trace of the flying geese theory in their presentation. Part of the reason was probably that their paper was based on a research project with heavy Tokyo University influence, and even though Suzumura was from Hitotsubashi University, he came from mathematics, and no Kojima vocabulary was used. In spite of this, their whole paper was based on the idea of stages of economic development. Everything else, including industrial policy, followed from this prescribed and set order of things. During the economy’s infancy a strong industry nurturing policy is called for. At maturity there is, in principle, less need for such a policy; basically what is needed then is general regulation of economic activity. During decline more active policies are again called for. The state cannot just leave the declining industries to struggle and go bust by themselves, as the neoclassical theory would recommend; rather the state should assist in restructuring and relocating, with various kinds of compensation for the industries in decline. The concept of stages implies a search for a world which is set and orderly. This world is not static; the whole idea of development is dynamic, implying constant change, but still a stage theory depicts a world where the future course of things can be known within fairly well delineated limits. This enables an analyst to see and plan fairly far into the future, which brings us back to the importance of the future time horizon in modern Japanese rhetoric. Uekusa Masu and Ide Hideki (1986) pointed out this phenomenon when they constructed the Japanese industrial policy around the concept of successive ‘visions’, formulated by a consensus developed through discussions among representatives of industry, labour, intellectuals, mass media, bureaucrats and politicians. Life is lived in the face of the future. Even the quite distant future, decades and centuries ahead, is constantly being mapped out. The future is also always tied to
< previous page
page_140
next page >
< previous page
page_141
next page >
Page 141 the concept of the nation. Specific industries and their development are just sub-chapters in the great story of the development of the nation. A stark contrast can be identified with neoclassical economic thinking, which basically does not need to know the future. Development is left to the free interplay of market forces, and individual entrepreneurs and companies can decide their own actions, but no need exists to plan the general direction beforehand. There is reliance on individual skill rather than collective foreknowledge. The future is an adventure, and those who are strong, able, or just lucky will be able to survive. The future cannot really be known; it will unfold itself by the actions of individual and collective entrepreneurs. The principal temporal horizon of neoclassical thinking is thus the present, and, in terms of investment plans, the immediate future. The nation, like the state, is never strongly present in neoclassical rhetoric, although it is not completely absent either. Representatives of an established Asian performer like Taiwan had no concerns regarding the need or importance of an industrial policy. For Liang Kuo-shu and Liang Ching-ing Hou (1986) it was clear that their country should strive to get away from low-skilled, labour-intensive manufacturing, and move towards skill-intensive and high technology based industries. The stages of industrial development should be rapidly upgraded, Taiwan should travel the same road as Japan, and the government should take a guiding role in this, while leaving ample opportunity for the markets to direct them in the desired direction. They were arguing within a rigid world of dynamic development, containing prescribed steps to be followed. They did display some anxiety regarding the future, as the big outer world could have a harmful influence on a small economy like Taiwan, but otherwise they knew perfectly well where they stood, and where they would go from there. A similar comment also applies to an analysis of the Korean steel industry, with even more direct references to Japan’s example (Nam 1986), or the Singaporean petrochemical industry, which was set up in large part with Japanese help as a consequence of shifting comparative advantage (Koh 1986). Similarly, ASEAN economists knew that their economies were at the stage that the ANIEs had been during the 1960s and 1970s, and that they could expect a major movement of labour-intensive industries from those countries to themselves. Knowledge of the Japanese flying geese theory was spreading among them, called, for example, the theory of dynamic comparative advantage, but even by then there was no direct reference to the Japanese source. The issue was potentially a politically charged one. As references were given works like ‘Garnaut and Anderson 1980’ (Ariff and Hill 1986:84), where the ‘flying geese doctrine taught in Hitotsubashi University’ had been mentioned a few years earlier. It was probably easier to refer to Anglo-Saxon authors, and especially to Australians, because they represented a mixture of neoclassical theoretical hegemony and middle power neutrality. Such references did not imply
< previous page
page_141
next page >
< previous page
page_142
next page >
Page 142 anything political, but the direct adoption of Japanese inspiration relating to theory might vaguely have corresponded with taking a political stand, even though no such clear international issue had been formulated. After the middle of the decade the global economic system moved towards one of the longest economic booms of the postwar period, and future prospects among both advanced and developing Pacific countries became brighter. The change was clearly discernible by the sixteenth PAFTAD in Wellington in 1987, engendered by the September 1986 resolution of GATT member countries in Punta del Este to set in motion a new GATT round of trade liberalization, called the Uruguay round (Castle and Findlay 1988). By the seventeenth PAFTAD in Bali in 1988 the economic boom was well under way, and especially in Pacific Asia the mood had become euphoric. The Indonesian editors of the proceedings summarized the mood by saying ‘now more than ever, rapid technological change is affecting comparative advantage among countries’ (Soesastro and Pangestu 1990:xiii). The world was visibly changing. All Pacific countries were growing, and development was proceeding fast in Pacific Asian countries, with massive flows of foreign direct investment entering, especially from Japan, whose companies had started a wave of global investment. Most of it actually went to the United States to facilitate exports, finance the US budget deficit, and property speculation, but a fair share of it flowed to Asian countries in the form of investment in industrial production. By this time a specific Pacific model of development had been accepted by most economists, whatever their background, and it was eagerly embraced. Relief can be discerned in the words of economists interested in the field of development studies as they observed the Pacific region: We now know that development is possible; the nations of Europe and North America did not, it turns out, take up all of the good seats before other countries had a chance to go to the box office. (Krugman 1990:35) We now know…that economic growth—even sustained, rapid economic growth in the style of postwar Japan—is not a ‘miracle’. It does not depend on narrow and specific cultural and economic conditions. We now know that the necessary conditions for modern economic growth can be met in many countries, and that the conditions for sustained, rapid growth are present in many parts of East Asia. Today, modern economic growth is a normal condition, and in East Asia proceeds rapidly unless specific conditions— especially those related to the positive and negative roles of government— block its path. (Garnaut 1992:7) This change in attitude also meant that the concept of stages of development had been accepted. Development began to be described in terms
< previous page
page_142
next page >
< previous page
page_143
next page >
Page 143 of leaders and followers, vertical flows of technology, contagion effects, sophisticated interventionism by the state, shifting patterns of comparative advantage, catching up, and the like. Raymond Vernon’s model of the product cycle was again wiped free of dust, and used especially by Anglo-Saxon economists (Flamm 1990: Krugman 1990; Nelson 1990; Smith and Jordan 1990). During the 1970s, with the rule of the dependencia theory, the general political goal of developing countries had been that of equality and a horizontal international structure. Verticality had been seen as bad. Now, during the 1980s, with the rise of the new form of development economics, verticality came to be seen as a good thing in the same way that Ōkita had formulated in 1985. It was exactly the phenomenon of verticality, and its skilful manipulation, which produced development. Japanese participants were naturally quick to embrace the new rhetoric, painting grand visions of Japan’s rapid advancement towards ever greater technological heights, making way for the Asian follower countries to fill the gaps left vacant by Japan (Imai 1990; Tamura and Urata 1990). The argument now sold well in other Pacific Asian countries, without dissenting voices. The argumentative structure where Japan was accepted as the regional technological leader followed by the four ANIEs, followed in turn by the ASEAN countries, with China placed below them, had been adopted almost unanimously by the Asian participants. Edward K.Y.Chen from Hong Kong summarized this attitude well by stating: ‘This sub-regional division of labour demonstrates a “flying geese” pattern of economic development which promises continuous economic prosperity in the region’ (1990:73). This is the first time that the term was used openly in a PAFTAD publication without any pejorative connotations, and by an Asian participant. By this time Japan was accepted by Asian economists as a benefactor and leader of the Asian countries, although only in the economic, or, even more narrowly, in the technological sector (see also Chew 1990; Ding 1990; Fong 1990; Shirk 1990; Soesastro et al . 1990). However, because the transfer of technology to Asian developing countries became the absolute central topic of economic discussion during the late 1980s, and economic discussion itself rose in global prominence as military rhetoric receded with the thaw in Soviet-American relations, the consequent impression of Japan’s leadership of Asian countries was strong. The impression clearly became far stronger than the actual discussion of investment and development would otherwise have warranted. From this time on references to the theory became more frequent. By the early 1990s the flying geese theory had become a fairly standard term for referring to the ‘East Asian model of development’, as it was also called (Grant et al . 1993; Young 1993). Other expressions were used, such as ‘high flyers’ instead of flying geese (Ariff 1991; Krueger 1991), but the images evoked were quite similar. By the middle of the 1990s the flying geese theory had become quite well known internationally (Soesastro
< previous page
page_143
next page >
< previous page
page_144
next page >
Page 144 et al . 1995:3). Latin American economists, who had been absent from PAFTAD since the early 1980s, returned arguing eloquently about the flying geese theory and export-oriented maquiladora industries (Palacios 1995:182). A related phenomenon was that Kojima’s investment theory from 1973 had become quite relevant to the ANIEs (Chen T. et al . 1995). The dependencia theory had become an anachronism, and confrontational rhetoric had been replaced by economic development rhetoric, spiced by references to the Pacific age. Perhaps the most beautiful account of the paradigmatic change from a personal perpective has been given, outside of the PAFTAD context, by Epeli Hau’ofa from the University of the South Pacific in Fiji. Even though he ridiculed the ‘deadly serious discourses’ of the Pacific century, he could not help being influenced by them (Hau’ofa 1993). In the late 1980s the ANIEs were already perceived to be quite near the level of advanced countries in certain industrial sectors, notably electronics. The ASEAN countries were following close behind. During the 1980s Malaysia had become the world’s leading exporter of semiconductors (Imai 1990:85), and a major exporter of integrated circuits and air conditioners (Fong 1990:242). Much of this was based on simple assembly operations but, thanks largely to foreign investment, Malaysia was rapidly upgrading its educational and technological levels, and diversifying its industries in many directions. The Malaysian vision was to achieve within the 1990s an advanced export-oriented manufacturing structure, similar to that of the contemporary ANIEs (Fong 1990:233). With such aims it is easy to understand why the flying geese theory proved so acceptable. Very important also was the fact that China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, adopted this economistic vision. The size of the Chinese economy had remained essentially the same since 1957, when the truly Utopian political and economic experiments under Mao Zedong’s leadership began. These were crowned by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution after 1966, and the result was that at the beginning of the 1970s China was still poor and stagnant, while rapid economic development was taking place in neighbouring Asian countries. The irony of the situation was that exactly at this time China was elevated to the rank of a great power by Nixon and Kissinger’s global balance of power politics. The Chinese leadership recognized that they had to try to rectify the economic situation, which lead to the political rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping in 1973. By 1975 he already wielded the highest power in the country after Mao, and his economic planners drew up a plan for a new leap towards strong economic growth. However, their mindset was still that of the 1950s. The plan was based on the Stalinist model of concentrating all efforts on developing heavy state industries, such as steel, petroleum and military support industries. In the chaotic state of the Chinese economy they were not able to reconcile the supply and demand for key commodities, and consequently the project was once again a failure.
< previous page
page_144
next page >
< previous page
page_145
next page >
Page 145 The following years were spent on power struggles among the elite for a successor to Mao, and when Deng finally emerged victorious in 1978 he was willing to try something new. He wanted to learn from the undeniably successful capitalistic countries, and to see them with his own eyes. Deng toured ASEAN, Japan and the United States. It is reported that the Nissan factory he visited in Japan made an especially strong impression on him, and he is quoted as saying: ‘learn from the great, diligent, valiant and intelligent Japanese people’ (Naughton 1995:101). It was not important that Deng himself was not an economist, and apparently did not understand much about economic theories. All that was needed was that the paramount leader legitimized the new horizon. His advisers, planners, and economic intellectuals in general could then work out the particulars. Japan was used as an outstanding model, although not the only one, during subsequent years (Whiting 1989:80–92; Jackson 1996). Already in December 1978 the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party endorsed the new direction of economic reforms, opening the economy, and increasing various types of contacts with the capitalistic world. Hong Kong watchers in Guangdong province were the quickest to move, taking the first steps to establish a special economic zone (SEZ) in Shenzen early in 1979 (Naughton 1995:101). During the 1980s Chinese developmental thinking was fundamentally transformed. The excessive egalitarian thinking of Mao’s China had followed a balanced regional development strategy, according to which all parts of China should develop with the same speed. No region should be favoured above others. This began to change under the influence of the new developmental horizon, and became official policy in 1988, when Deng’s protegé Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, proposed a ‘coastal region development strategy’. Chinese economists had during the 1980s begun to discuss a ‘ladderstep doctrine’. China was so big in terms of population, cultural diversity and geographic area that it was an ethnic region comparable to Europe, Latin America or the Muslim world. It had to be divided into more manageable pieces, resulting in the designation of three economic regions: coastal, central, and western. The coastal region was already more developed in terms of infrastructure, capital, technical skills and management skills, so main development efforts should be concentrated in this region. The goal was no longer the expansion of heavy industries, as it had been under Soviet influence, but labour-intensive, export-oriented manufactures. The coastal region was well positioned to benefit from investment by companies of neighbouring economies like Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, trying to gain from the comparative advantages that China had to offer, such as cheap labour (Jun and Simon 1992; Sung 1992). After development was set in motion there, it would spread to the central region, and finally to the western region. This plan was rather similar to
< previous page
page_145
next page >
< previous page
page_146
next page >
Page 146 the flying geese theory. The ‘ladder-step doctrine’ and the flying geese theory can be seen as essentially the same thing, even though there was no reference by the Chinese to any Japanese theoretical influence. As China was the historical ‘mother’ of East Asian civilization, even in modern times there is a tendency in Chinese rhetoric to play down foreign influences, and every good idea has to be presented as emanating from Chinese sources. Ostensibly, China seemed willing to enter the Pacific Asian formation from the bottom, as a humble economistic disciple. Combined with other changes, this meant an interesting alteration in its international status. Beginning in 1978, Deng discontinued Mao’s confrontational rhetoric. Modernization of the economy was given priority above modernization of the military, leading to drastic reductions in the size of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Deng also ended most of China’s support for foreign revolutionary movements, and significantly reduced economic aid to Third World countries. China changed from being a net aid giver to a net receiver. With this, China in practice ended its pretensions for a global leadership role in competition with the United States and the Soviet Union, and returned to a regional Asian role instead. At the same time in the United States the Reagan administration moved first to a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, and then to a peace process during the latter half of the 1980s, so there was not much foreign political need for China anymore (Yahuda 1995:147–55). China was quietly marginalized in global political and military affairs, while economic language increasingly became used in connection with it. In economic terms China was only a poor developing country. Of course it continued to have a strong military force, nuclear weapons, and a space programme, but these aspects received less attention. Within the conceptual world of economic development China was logically placed below ASEAN, and in this context it lost the rank of a great power. Correspondingly, Japan’s rank rose. China’s low rank made the impression of Japan’s leading position in Asia very strong in the late 1980s, and that impression was further amplified by the spread of the flying geese model. With China’s arrival at the bottom, ASEAN countries moved a step upwards, and ASEAN economists were able to start lecturing to China, telling the new novice what to do and what to avoid along the winding road of development (Shea and Yen 1992; Sjahrir and Pangestu 1992). Besides material benefits, there was also a lot of psychological pleasure that could be derived from the flying geese pattern, whatever the stage of development. As the Chinese real output had been expanding by about 8 percent per annum since 1978, China’s economy had consequently grown with an average rate that would double its size within the decade. The future was thus easy to read both by foreigners and the Chinese alike at the end of the 1980s, and it went like this:
< previous page
page_146
next page >
< previous page
page_147
next page >
Page 147 China made great advances in economic reform and development in the 1980s and will continue in the 1990s to further its opening to the outside world, striving towards modernization and a quadrupling of 1980 output by the year 2000. (Lu 1992:48) The idea of quadrupling the 1980 output by the year 2000 had actually been set already in 1982 at the Twelfth Congress of the CCP (Naughton 1995:97–8). At that time it could still have been mistaken for one of the endless unrealistic production targets that the Chinese leadership had announced during the previous decades, but by the end of the 1980s the goal had become to seem easily attainable. China had finally started to travel along the ‘right’ road, and its achievements could now be triumphantly presented to audiences of international economists. All that was needed was to continue the policies of economic reform and opening. The economy was anticipated to continue doubling again during the 1990s, and China was expected to arrive at the opening of the twenty-first century in a greatly strengthened condition. When China with its huge population and land mass joined Japan, the ANIEs, and the ASEAN countries in the confident developmental rhetoric, another conceptual shift in took place. The Pacific Asian countries increasingly began to see themselves as a distinct group, and there appeared an accompanying tendency to limit the geographical horizon of discussion to themselves, leaving out the Anglo-Saxon countries. One indication is the new meaning given to the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ by some Pacific Asian writers. Earlier it had been used interchangeably with the term Pacific, and that usage continued, but at the end of the 1980s also the following kind of definition appeared: By the Asia-Pacific region is meant, by and large, the Asia-10; namely, the NIE-4, the original ASEAN ‘Other Four’ (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand), Japan and China. (Chen E. 1990:51) The Americas and Oceania are here dropped out of the picture. This enhances the beauty of the flying geese theory structure, when everything perceived to be stagnant, or just simply less dynamic, is cleared out. The general picture during the 1960s and 1970s with Japan as one of the advanced Pacific countries, in a class different from the Asian developing countries, had lost much of its relevance. Rapid economic development, and the accompanying images of overall growth, technological advancement, catching up, rising to prosperity and forming a new global centre, were so sweet that a new group identity for Pacific Asian countries was based on this common denominator. The fact that Japan had become one of the richest countries in the world in terms of per capita income, or that Indonesia and China still remained among the poorest countries, did not count at all within this purely economistic developmental rhetoric.
< previous page
page_147
next page >
< previous page
page_148
next page >
Page 148 Correspondingly, the Pacific age narrative took some new turns, beginning around the middle of the decade. While most discussants espousing the vision had come from the traditional Pacific powers, Japan, the United States, and Australia, the 1980s saw a spread of the Pacific age rhetoric to smaller countries, such as the Philippines (Leviste 1986), Malaysia (Bey 1987), Singapore (Lau and Suryadinata 1988). As members of a larger community the smaller countries could also reach the same degree of elation as the bigger powers from this kind of rhetoric. The Japanese and Americans parted ways in terms of vocabulary, while Oceanians remained somewhere in the middle. Americans continued to use their set expression ‘Pacific Century’ (Borthwick 1992; Gibney 1992; McCord 1993), but the Japanese started to speak about an ‘Asia Pacific age’ (Ajia Taiheiyō jidai) (Seki 1987; Yamaoka 1991; Watanabe 1992; Koike 1993). Foreign Minister Miki had applied it in 1967–8, after which it had disappeared from use, but now it had returned again. Most Japanese, and also much of international discussion, shifted towards it. Another new term was the ‘Western Pacific age’ (Nishi-Taiheiyō no jidai), which the Japanese economist Watanabe Toshio launched in 1989 (Watanabe 1989). The western side of the Pacific was conceptually parting ways with the eastern side. Japan was the global star: so much international praise was heaped upon it at the time. The miraculous Japanese economic performance seemed to be able to weather all obstacles thrown in its way. It had emerged from the economic downturn at the end of the 1970s in far better shape than other advanced economies, and it had recently also been able to absorb the effects of the risen yen in 1985, recording in 1987 a growth rate of 4 percent, and in 1988 of 6 percent. Japanese trade surpluses with most of the rest of the world persisted, and nothing seemed to be able to stop it. Japan had emerged as the world’s leading investor, Tokyo had become one of the leading financial centres of the world, and large amounts of money were concentrated in the country. Land prices were unbelievably high, most of all in Tokyo and other urban centres. This was the time when hypothetical calculations were made to the effect that if you sold Tokyo, with the money you could buy the United States, and if you sold only the compound of the Emperor’s castle in the middle of Tokyo, you could buy the whole of Canada (Wood 1990). And asset prices were still going up in 1989. The economy was growing, domestic and international investments were expanding, consumers were consuming, and everything economic looked rosy. Even the Cold War had ended with the collapse of the socialist governments in Eastern Europe in 1989, and with the Soviet Union and the United States entering into negotiations about a drastic reduction of armaments. The world seemed to be shedding the useless military and political confrontation, and moving towards an economistic level of existence, where Japan was the supreme and unbeatable champion. Enough of the
< previous page
page_148
next page >
< previous page
page_149
next page >
Page 149 remnants of the politico-military world were still in place for the United States to remain as the world’s leader. Japan did not aspire to challenge that position, but within the narrower economistic world Japan was really an ideological leader, the ultimate example of a country that did everything right. This did not only apply to economic matters; the Japanese also enjoyed one of the highest standards of education, the highest average life expectancy, the lowest infant mortality, a low crime rate, safe and clean cities, superb public transportation systems in metropolitan regions, etc. Only superlatives were appropriate in describing the country, both from without and within Japan. Japanese self-confidence rose accordingly. The whole country seemed to ‘glitter with gold’, as Marco Polo had mistakenly described it during the thirteenth century. At that time Japan turned out to possess only modest amounts of silver, and few other valuables (Takahashi 1991), but during the 1980s everything economic that the Japanese touched seemed to turn to gold. Japan could be compared to King Midas—except that Japan was more successful than the European king, who starved to death. Japan was able to feed itself with the most beautifully served, delicious, and healthiest food in the world. The future seemed equally bright, and much of Japanese discussion resembled that of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Nakasone government in 1985 appointed a committee to study Japan’s economic place in the world, headed by Maekawa Harumi—with Ōkita Saburō as one of the members—and the socalled first Maekawa report was published in 1986. This was supposed to become the vision that would guide the government in devising Japan’s economic foreign policy. Japan was to be made an ‘internationalized country’ (kokusai kokka Nihon) . A new economic expansion was envisaged in the report, but this time based on domestic expansion, and not on exports. Japan’s markets should be opened to imports, and its industries to international competition. This, together with the higher yen, should correct Japan’s trade imbalance, and restore peace in its economic relations with the United States, and the rest of the world (Kokusai kyōchō no tame no keizai kōzō chōsei kenkyūkai 1986, 1987). It was once again a typical Japanese economistic blueprint for international abundance, based on expectations of the invincibility of the Japanese economy. Although it was not an official policy document and its recommendations were never applied diligently, the report nevertheless became a symbol of Japanese intentions, if not practice, of the late 1980s. Especially during the last, most euphoric year of the decade, it seemed as though Japan had crossed the export growth threshold needed to keep the economy growing. Japan’s trade surpluses were so high, and within a few years a substantial inflow of income from the investments made during the 1980s was expected to boost its balances even further, that imports and national construction became the means by which to expand the economy further. Japan seemed to have been able to overcome the economic cycle, and was preparing to move without interruption
< previous page
page_149
next page >
< previous page
page_150
next page >
Page 150 from the export-led economic expansion of the 1980s to a new domestic-led one during the 1990s. Correspondingly, the idea of Japan replacing the United States during the early twenty-first century as world leader was invigorated. The theory of hegemonic change (Gilpin 1981) was currently in fashion among political scientists, and it provided the conceptual framework for the decline of the pax Americana and the emergence of pax Japonica and pax Nipponica, and other similar concepts. They are reminiscent of the late 1960s idea of Japan’s Century. Most of the discussion culminated at the turn of the decade, when Japan emerged as the world’s largest creditor nation and the United States as its largest debtor, and when trade disputes with the United States had attained a new degree of intensity (Inoguchi and Okimoto 1988; Gilpin 1989; Gourevitch 1989; Schlossstein 1989; Yoon 1990; Inoguchi 1991). Few observers, however, were really and sincerely of the opinion that Japan would replace the United States as the world’s hegemon. The situation seemed to point in that direction, but somehow, whether the reason was Japan’s difficulty in defending itself or its slow decision-making structure, it did not really appear to be a suitable candidate for global hegemony. However, the fact that such a serious and extended debate was held in these terms attests to the height that Japan had reached in international esteem. It also attests to the degree that the economic way of looking at the world spilled over to other fields. The eighteenth PAFTAD conference was held in December 1989 in Kuala Lumpur. The timing was perfect for viewing the past decade, and contemplating the coming one. This was also the appropriate time for a third generation interpretation of the flying geese theory. It was made by Yamazawa Ippei. Yamazawa had taken on Kojima’s mantle by becoming a professor of international economics at Hitotsubashi University, making his own interpretation of the theory, and becoming Japan’s main representative to PAFTAD and the larger Pacific integration process. The original reinterpretation had already been published in 1984. Following the tradition set by Friedrich List, the flying geese theory has always been a nationalistic theory, and Yamazawa continued the tradition. He did not present it as a general theory of development, but as a specific Japanese model (Nihon modern), suitable for emulation by other Asian countries (Yamazawa 1984). During the late 1980s he rewrote the book in English (Yamazawa 1990), and incorporated the main arguments into a paper that he presented, together with Hirata Akira and Yokota Kazuhiko, at the eighteenth PAFTAD in 1989. The following analysis will concentrate on this paper. We might approach Yamazawa’s interpretation from the point of view of literary style. Individual differences no doubt play a large role in such a personal phenomenon as style, but it can be argued that differing circumstances may have shown themselves in the way the flying geese narrative was written. Akamatsu Kaname, the founder of the theory, lived
< previous page
page_150
next page >
< previous page
page_151
next page >
Page 151 in a poor country which was passionately striving towards development, and philosophically his thinking was based on a Hegelian struggle. It was in a sense a romantic, entrepreneurial world, and Akamatsu’s texts display a combination of theory innovation and literary skill. The name of the theory itself, at the same time beautiful and accurate as a description, is a perfect example of his style, with which he made a name for himself in Japan. Kojima Kiyoshi, the chief representative of the second generation, wrote the texts of a professional economist, which also represented good literary skills. He could move skilfully between mathematical and literary forms of argumentation, and presented considerable imaginative capacity. His arguments were well thought out, straightforward, and easy to comprehend after some reflection. They were intellectually persuasive, although hardly effective in political debate. They were suitable for conveying ideas to others, who could then act upon them. Kojima essentially exported the theory to international markets with his investment theory, Pacific integration initiatives, and other writings. Yamazawa of the third generation of Hitotsubashi economists did not really need to convince anyone any more. The flying geese theory had already been accepted in foreign countries, especially among Pacific Asian economists. Yamazawa was in a position where he had only to serve a captive market with a new model of an existing product. He also had the additional weight of an established tradition and two renowned theoreticians on his shoulders, which, combined with Japan’s undeniable global success, meant that despite his intelligence the situation did not leave him much leeway for drastic innovation. He was not really arguing a theory any more; he was arguing a truth. Yamazawa’s literary style was strikingly statistical. About half of the pages were filled with statistical tables, and the text in between was mostly loaded with such heavy statistical jargon that it is difficult to read. Form and content have a necessary relation. An excessive use of statistics implies a closed and prescribed way of observing the world. The world may not actually be static as such, as statistics usually describe trends and patterns of change, and can in this sense be dynamic. But at the same time this mode of argument presents a prescribed world, in the sense that the patterns of change are set. Turning to the content of Yamazawa’s argument, we shall take a quotation, which portrays the essence of the third generation interpretation: We posit that these changes in trade flows were caused by changes in comparative advantage of individual Pacific economies and by rapid economic growth, both of which resulted from the spread of industrialization in the developing countries of the region. The comparative advantage of a country is determined principally by factor endowment (availability of cheap inputs) and the stage of industrialization (level
< previous page
page_151
next page >
< previous page
page_152
next page >
Page 152 of technology) it has reached. In the process of industrialization, the structure of a country’s comparative advantage shifts from simple labour-intensive products to sophisticated capital and technology-intensive ones, as was observed in the case of Japan and the Asian NIEs. The ASEAN-4 countries and China will be no exception to this if they promote industrialization. (Yamazawa et al . 1991:218–9) The principal feature of Yamazawa’s interpretation of the flying geese theory is that development is a simple process. The factors affecting it are determined, each country follows the prescribed set of stages, and unless foolish things are done, all latecomers will be ‘no exception’ to the rule. Akamatsu wrote about struggling entrepreneurs, individuals who poured their ‘heart’s blood’ into copying foreign products and upgrading them to be able to survive in fierce international competition, without any assurance of success. Kojima took the organizational level a step further, and wrote about struggling companies that had to invest in foreign countries and adjust themselves to foreign environments in order to survive in international competition. The expectation of success was, however, already quite high. Yamazawa writes about whole countries, and there is not much competition left in his rhetoric. Countries fall into their prescribed places, and the whole process of development is fairly simple and easy, and success is almost assured. Another important ingredient in Yamazawa’s interpretation was the role of Japan: Japan’s FDI has been active since 1986 and has shifted from the Asian NIEs to ASEAN. It will take some time for its impact on trade and production to be statistically visible, but there is no doubt it will promote further changes in patterns of comparative advantage among the Pacific economies. (Yamazawa et al . 1991:226) It would be unfair to say that Yamazawa had dropped Europe and the United States completely out of the picture, but they appeared in a less important place. During Akamatsu’s time Japan had been a developing country, a follower of Euro-American countries. In Kojima’s time Japan had been catching up rapidly, and was just reaching the Euro-American level of technological sophistication, and his theory described the stage when Japan was starting to shed the outcome of the industrial stage that Akamatsu’s entrepreneurs had helped to build. During Yamazawa’s time Japan had already become a global technological leader with a completely developed industrial structure. Especially in the Asian setting Japan reigned supreme. With this background Yamazawa could extend the King Midas situation of Japanese national rhetoric to the Asian setting, presenting another prescribed phenomenon of Asian
< previous page
page_152
next page >
< previous page
page_153
next page >
Page 153 development: there is ‘no doubt’ that Japanese investment will also bring the ASEAN countries up to the stage of developed countries, just like their previous investment had done for the ANIEs. This is an easy and set pattern, which follows naturally, like rain falling from the clouds, saturating the ground below, and bringing a lush growth of vegetation. Japanese money appeared to fall on the follower countries like golden rain, turning them into glittering gardens. Yamazawa’s ‘golden rain theory’ is a fairly accurate description of the Japanese psychological mood of the late 1980s. A final ingredient of Yamazawa’s interpretation can be discerned from the following quote: The ‘flying geese’ model provides a guiding rule for the coordination of industrial adjustment in this region. Catch-up industrialization suggests a rational and orderly pattern of industrial development in individual countries, which coexist symbiotically within the framework of the model. (Yamazawa et al . 1991:232) With this Yamazawa turns his interpretation of the flying geese theory into a peace theory; an aspect that had always been a part of it. The main difference with the previous versions is again the simplicity with which things can be done. This is a ‘rational and orderly pattern’. All that governments had to do was to define their place in the process, take a look at what stage their industries were currently at, and plan to take them a step further. The golden rain falling from Japan—and from the ANIEs as well—would take care of the rest. This is a ‘symbiotic’ model, where every country benefits the others; the best possible world for the Asian developing countries to be in. It is an international structure, where politics are not needed any more, except perhaps as industrial policies, and where Japan appears as the leader, the great benefactor, and the benevolent helper. A similar point of view, based on a similar easy interpretation of the flying geese theory, was also presented outside of the PAFTAD context by other Japanese commentators (Awanohara 1989; Inoguchi 1989). The rhetoric of Japanese ministers travelling in Southeast Asia displayed similar characteristics. When Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō visited the region in 1986, he could congratulate ASEAN for its eye-opening economic development, which had become a model of industrialization for the rest of the developing countries. He also stopped calling the region ‘Southeast Asia’, using instead ‘East Asia’. And, as the latter term connotes a higher rank, being associated with old high cultures and developed economies, Abe in a sense elevated ASEAN to a higher rank, and brought it into the same group with Japan. The enlargement of the geographic metaphor placed them both in the same group. Abe also emphasized that as an Asian (Ajiajin no hltori) he was full of pride in ASEAN’s achievements (1987:317).
< previous page
page_153
next page >
< previous page
page_154
next page >
Page 154 Abe’s rhetoric was similar to that which Fukuda had used during his trip in 1977. More was to follow in 1987 when the newly elected prime minister Takeshita Noboru toured ASEAN. The trip was purposefully patterned after Fukuda’s. This was Takeshita’s first trip abroad as premier, and the main point was that he did not go to the United States, as a representative of a client state, but as a friendly benefactor to his followers. The main speech was again given at Manila, the most pro-American capital of ASEAN. Like Abe, Takeshita emphasized that he was an Asian, and proud of the fact. Like Fukuda, he made promises: Japan would not become a military power and would take special care of ASEAN. An ASEAN—Japan development fund of US$20 billion would be set up for mutual regional cooperation, Indo-Chinese political problems would be taken care of through cooperation under Japanese leadership, private investment would continue to flow from Japan, Japanese markets would be opened to ASEAN industrial products, ASEAN culture would be introduced to the Japanese with state help, and new foreign students were invited to learn from Japan. A new Japanese—ASEAN partnership, beneficial for both partners now but especially directed towards the twenty-first century, would follow from these policies (Takeshita 1988). A final touch came two years later in 1989, when Takeshita again toured ASEAN. Tanaka and Fukuda had used the expression ‘heart-to-heart relationship’. Takeshita’s equivalent was: ‘thinking alike, walking together, eternal partners’ (tomo ni kangae, tomo ni ayumu, eien no pātonā) (1989:317). Everything he said resembled Fukuda’s rhetoric, but Takeshita could now argue from the point of view of the absolute success of the Japan— ASEAN relationship. ASEAN had transformed itself after the Japanese economic model, foreign policies were being aligned; money, goods and culture kept on flowing in increasing amounts both ways. By the end of the 1980s ASEAN had become a special group of Japan’s followers—at least in the sense that a Japanese prime minister could claim so publicly. If this book had been written at the turn of the decade, we might have ended the story here. We could have concluded that the Japanese had finally arrived in the position they had envisaged at the end of the 1960s. Economism as an ideology was spreading like wild fire in Pacific Asia, and development was proceeding so rapidly that it seemed that the region would soon start to resemble Western Europe in terms of development level and stability. A stable and prosperous system did seem to be evolving, and Japan was placed in the position of leader. The international system as a whole—outside of the Japanese—American trade conflict—seemed to be moving in a perfect direction. The Cold War had ended, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a serious peace process, and by late 1989 socialist governments in Eastern Europe crumbled one after the other, signifying definitely that the military confrontation between the socialist and capitalist camps was over. A new
< previous page
page_154
next page >
< previous page
page_155
next page >
Page 155 age of peace and economism seemed to be dawning, and Japan appeared to be in a perfect position in the new world, both an economic and an ideological leader. A new emperor was crowned in 1989, with Japan officially starting to count years once again from number one. A new Heisei era of peace, stability, and prosperity seemed to be dawning. Japan had indeed become an economic great power, and the 1980s were truly Japan’s decade.
< previous page
page_155
next page >
< previous page
page_156
next page >
Page 156 10 The politicization of economics When we raise our gaze from the triumphant Japanese economistic rhetoric of the end of the 1980s, we can see that the world appeared as a far more complex place than it had depicted. It was changing so fast that already in 1989 there was something anachronistic in Yamazawa’s arguments. In the December 1989 PAFTAD meeting these new global developments were already lying heavily in the air. While Yamazawa and his associates concentrated on a new interpretation of the flying geese theory, most other participants were moving towards a new topic: changes in the global political structure. This difference in focus symbolizes how tightly the Japanese were encapsulated within their own success of the 1980s. Their success then faded to be replaced by the long economic stagnation of the 1990s. Japan had reached the EuroAmerican level also in that sense. Japan’s domestic political system had fallen into turmoil during the late 1980s. Some features of the 1960s and 1970s were repeated in the new situation. Nakasone Yasuhiro’s long term in the post of prime minister (1982–7) corresponded to Satō Eisaku’s time in office (1964–72). Just as Tanaka’s fall had begun with revelations of a bribery scandal, Takeshita Noboru (1987–9) fell for the same reason. The power base of the LDP started to erode rapidly after this, while revelations of various shady dealings became a perennial feature of Japanese politics. Takeshita’s follower, Uno Sōsuke, lasted only 68 days in the post during the summer of 1989, resigning after the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House. Kaifu Toshiki, a relatively ‘clean’ LDP politician, was elected prime minister on the same platform as Miki Takeo of doing away with corruption; he was popular during 1989–92, but was from a small faction. Miyazawa Kiichi held the post during 1992–3, but his inability to deal with the economic crisis and instigate electoral reform led to the sudden and surprising breakup of the LDP (Inoguchi 1993b, c). During 1993–4 Hosokawa Morihiro led a government composed of LDP break-away groups and previous opposition parties. Hata Tsutomu led a minority government for only two months from April 1994, to be replaced in June 1994 by the social democrat Murayama Tomiichi. His government was a coalition composed of
< previous page
page_156
next page >
< previous page
page_157
next page >
Page 157 the remnants of the LDP, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, and the small New Party Sakigake group (Inoguchi 1994). Murayama lasted for a year and a half in the post, being replaced in January 1996 by Hashimoto Ryūtarō, a relatively young LDP politician. Each prime minister has been politically weak, heading a fragile cabinet, and preoccupied with the domestic issues of economic and political stagnation. Due to these difficulties in the political leadership, in the middle of its economic success Japan became curiously incapable of innovative action in the international arena. Japanese society seems to have had no clear sense where it was heading (Hook and Weiner 1992). This did not necessarily show up in special areas, such as Japan’s ODA policy, which the MOFA orchestrated with skill and experience (Yasutomo 1995), but responding to new challenges at the decision-making level became difficult. This also meant that the magnificent image of Japan’s creativity, flexibility, and invincibility began to crumble, although the fact that this change in image has proceeded quite slowly attests to its strength. If friendly admiration of Japan had been the typical attitude of foreign researchers during the 1960s and 1970s, and the wish to use Japan as a model during the 1980s, the attitude of the 1990s has been characterized by ridicule, where European authors, reared in the discursive strategies of subtle irony, have tended to shine. The literature has also contained badly disguised relief that Euro-Americans no longer need to feel ashamed when faced with Japan’s success. Jon Woronoff s long crusade against Japanese image builders and their Japanologist supporters has been a front runner (Woronoff 1979, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1992), while Karel van Wolferen’s The Enigma of Japanese Power (1989) is perhaps the masterpiece of this type of literature. The sad state of Japan’s economy and polity has provided ample material for the continuation of this literary tradition during the 1990s (Reading 1993; Wood 1993). While the economic boom has continued in the rest of Pacific Asia, Japan has been ‘an odd man out’, as characterized by the Far Eastern Economic Review in the New Year issue of 1994. At the turn of the decade the unprecedented long economic boom was still continuing all over the capitalist world. The collapse of socialism as one of the leading global ideologies ensured market economists that they were right, and the end of the Cold War promised the beginning of a new peaceful economistic era for the whole world. In spite of all this, a pervasive feeling of insecurity, and foreboding of future conflicts, spread around the world. They were strong even in the winning country of the Cold War, the United States, which seemed to be awakening into a new world (Bosworth 1991). The relative downslide of its international economic position had been continuing throughout the decade, with mounting government debts and external trade deficits. The de facto victory over the Soviet Union did not taste as sweet as had been expected: ‘The United States won the Cold War…but it is losing the economic competition
< previous page
page_157
next page >
< previous page
page_158
next page >
Page 158 with Japan’ (Krause and Sundberg 1991:240). The quotation comes from the text of two economists, but it was really a set phrase for describing the situation, used by various discussants at the time, both inside and outside the United States. It combined neatly the change of rhetorical worlds into a clear expression. The goals of the military competition with the Soviet Union had been set within the politico-military world, but with the end of the Cold War that horizon suddenly receded, and the importance of the victory became evaluated in terms of a new politico-economic world. The victory was not without its merits, but after the actual event it really did not matter as much as had been expected. Political attention was directed to the newly perceived front. Japan was the focus of attention around the turn of the decade, but later while the new image spread of a stagnant Japan, Pacific Asia in general, and China in particular, became the new focus of global attention. In this way the economistic world became politicized at the same moment as it emerged triumphant. Of course this is only a matter of degree; economic disputes had become a perennial feature of the international landscape since the late 1960s, while the Gulf War in 1991, and other regional conflicts, kept the politicomilitary world in existence. Nevertheless, there was a clear change in global rhetoric at the turn of the decade, and economic affairs were definitely elevated to the level of high politics. The Cold War had neatly denned friends, foes, and those in between, but after it ended the world entered a period of flux, searching for new structural patterns. An expression of this was that regional integration became a global fashion. Once again the initial moves had been made in Western Europe. In 1985, prompted in part by all the loose talk of ‘Eurosclerosis’ and the Pacific age, the EC had started a process of revitalization, setting out to achieve a single market without internal borders by 1 January 1993. This kicked off another process, that of neighbouring countries trying to join the EC, beginning when Turkey applied for membership in 1987. The countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), namely Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, also started to debate joining, and in July 1989 Austria submitted its application for membership, followed by most of the others later during the 1990s. The turn of the decade to the 1990s presented a whole new situation, when the East European socialist governments collapsed one after another, and the German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany. Also, the other East European countries voiced their wish to join the EC, and a similar wish was strong among several Mediterranean countries. A symbol of the time was perhaps Lignes d’Horizon, a book written by the first president of the European Bank for Development and Reconstruction, Jacques Attali. Attali divided the emerging world of the ‘third millennium’ according to economic competition between two new world centres: Europe and the Pacific. Both of the world’s contemporary
< previous page
page_158
next page >
< previous page
page_159
next page >
Page 159 military powers were seen to be crumbling, with the Soviet Union being drawn into Western Europe’s orbit, while the United States would be reduced to the military arm of Japan’s Pacific supremacy (Attali 1990; see also 1997). However, the Americans were also in motion. Canada and the United States signed a free trade agreement in 1988, accompanied by the idea of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, which finally was realized in 1994 after a long campaign. A general American continental free trade arrangement including other Latin American countries was also discussed (Bouzas and Lustig 1992; Bouzas and Ros 1994). Both the European and American cases were based on a new concept of regional integration. During the 1950s and 1960s integration theory proceeded from the assumption that the best kind of economic integration was between countries on a roughly similar level of economic development, and Kojima’s original PAFTA initiative followed this logic. By the 1990s the concept had changed, and the economic combination of countries with differing levels of development had begun to look like a viable solution. This could not have been possible during the reign of the dependencia theory. At least part of this ideological change can be attributed to the Pacific Asian example of market integration, and the breakthrough of the new development theory, which dictated that wise developing countries do best in a liberal economic relationship with advanced countries (English and Smith 1993:163). This ideological triumph did not, however, benefit in any way the Pacific Asian countries, but rather placed them in a difficult position. It was feared that the expansion of regional integration in Europe and the Americas was leading to the formation of exclusive trading blocs, as had happened during the 1930s, and that the Pacific Asian countries would be the main losers. In principle, because Japan’s ideological position in Pacific Asia seemed to be evolving strongly, the possibility of Japan creating a corresponding group there might have been a possibility. It had become a gestalt, a shape of things, but Japan was unable to do anything about the matter. By 1989 it was already deep in political crisis, while the death of the old emperor and the coronation of the new one diverted a surprising amount of Japanese attention away from international issues. Besides the end of the Cold War, there also was another contingency. A ministerial level meeting for the mid-term review of the Uruguay round of GATT had been scheduled to take place in Brussels in November 1988, but instead of giving the expected boost to negotiations, the conference ended up in serious disagreement, and the whole Uruguay round seemed threatened. This formed the immediate political circumstance surrounding the presentation of the so-called ‘Hawke initiative’ by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in January 1989 in a speech to the Korean Business Association. It was a suitable non-governmental, economic forum, but
< previous page
page_159
next page >
< previous page
page_160
next page >
Page 160 through the PBEC and PECC processes it was closely linked with the existing institutional basis of Pacific integration. The Japanese had concerted their previous Pacific integration initiatives with the Australians, and were now doing it again. The main difference was that academicians were largely excluded, and the new initiative was constructed by bureaucrats. Japan’s MITI had since the middle of the 1980s become increasingly involved in an advisory role in directing the export-led industrialization of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. This pitted the Japanese and American varieties of capitalism against each other in practical policy-making, and in MITI circles there was an increasing desire to be allowed to deal with Asian economic problems in an Asian manner, without American meddling. For this reason the ministry began to draw up plans for some sort of Western Pacific economic cooperation, and to discuss these with Australian officials. Such an initiative by Japan alone probably might have misfired, while the increasingly Western Pacific-oriented Australia provided a more neutral-looking initiator (Funabashi 1995a:87–94; Higgott 1995:81–3). On the other hand, in certain PECC circles there was a desire to proceed towards more official regional cooperation from that contemporary stage where academicians, business people and bureaucrats still met in their unofficial capacity. PECC had already established itself as an international forum, and the need for proceeding cautiously had lessened. During the PECC VI conference in May 1988 in Ōsaka, Ōkita Saburō suggested that a summit meeting of PECC leaders should be convened sometime in the near future in view of the new economic problems facing the world. Also the Australian delegation strongly proposed that PECC should be developed towards a governmental level organization, and make governments openly committed to Pacific cooperation (Kikuchi 1995:183–4). As a result of these two somewhat discrepant Japanese-Australian currents Hawke suggested that in view of the difficulties of GATT, and the emerging possibility of the world being divided into three economic regions centring on Europe, the American continent, and the Western Pacific, a meeting of foreign and economic ministers of Western Pacific countries should be convened in the near future (Kikuchi 1995:179). Although this initiative was based on previous Japanese and Australian discussions, it clearly lacked the kind of careful orchestration that had preceded the establishment of PECC a decade before. At the time it was suspected that the speech had been hastily made up during the flight to Seoul (Higgott et al . 1991:17). From today’s perspective it seems that Hawke took ideas that were still under preparation, and presented them publicly without forewarning either his own foreign ministry or MITI (Funabashi 1995a:83). The initiative presented several conceptual problems. The most immediate was that the geographic horizon of Hawke’s speech had included only the Western Pacific countries, excluding thus, by implication at least,
< previous page
page_160
next page >
< previous page
page_161
next page >
Page 161 the United States. The impression was strong that an attempt had been made to exclude the United States from something important (Krause and Sundberg 1991:242). This meant that the proposition initially met with heavy opposition. Japan’s Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru was at the time so deeply involved with the Recruit Scandal that he did not have time to deal with the initiative, and the formulation of the Japanese response fell to the ministries. MOFA was initially opposed. The exclusive Western Pacific framework was a foreign political problem. In addition, MOFA suspected that Hawke’s initiative was actually MITI’s idea, which should then be opposed as a matter of ministerial principle. Swift diplomatic response followed from Australia. After Australian assurances that the idea was a brand new Australian made product, and that foreign ministries would be involved as much as economic ministries, MOFA finally concurred, provided that both the United States and Canada would be included (Funabashi 1995a:86–7). South Korea did not like the exclusive Western Pacific framework either. Hawke visited the United States, with assurances that together with Canada it was also welcome at the conference. Neither of the North American countries were really enthusiastic, but at least they did not want to be left out, and were in that sense willing to participate. The ASEAN countries, as usual, were suspicious of an initiative in which the rich advanced Pacific countries showed interest (Watanabe 1992:150). Only Singapore welcomed the initiative. Thailand and Malaysia were, however, desirous of creating a Western Pacific negotiating group without superpower presence (Kikuchi 1995:188–96). After Australian and Japanese persuasion they did, however, all agree to participate. Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita visited ASEAN countries in May, and strongly argued in favour of increased cooperation among Asia Pacific countries to support the global liberal trading system (Takeshita 1989:316). The EC was at first strongly opposed to the Hawke initiative, perceiving the emergence of a negotiating lobby on which it would have no influence, but after the idea gathered momentum, changed its mind and staked a claim to representation at the conference (Higgott et al . 1991:32). The EC was, however, refused entry. China, Taiwan and Hong Kong were willing to participate according to the same formula by which they participated in PECC, but China’s participation was cancelled after the Tiananmen Square incidents in the autumn of 1989, and thus the participation of Taiwan and Hong Kong was also prevented. Consequently, foreign and economic ministers from twelve countries assembled in Canberra in November 1989. Two countries represented North America (Canada and the United States), two Northeast Asia (South Korea and Japan), two Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), and ASEAN now had six members, with Brunei added in 1986. The original initiative directed only at the Western Pacific was thus turned into a
< previous page
page_161
next page >
< previous page
page_162
next page >
Page 162 pan-Pacific initiative, and it settled on the path created by PAFTAD, PBEC, and PECC, becoming a new forum for the discussion processes that had taken place within those institutions. The other conceptual problem with the Hawke initiative was that he called for the participation of both foreign and economic ministers. Previous Pacific regional institutions relating to integration had been kept within the economic sector, but this time there was a possibility that a political organization might be created. This dilemma formed part of the opposition of the ASEAN countries, and heightened the problem of the participation of the United States. In dispersing these worries both Australia and Japan promised that ASEAN would be given a central place in the conference and its agenda formation. It is difficult to interpret the meaning of such a promise, but it later took the form that every second meeting was to take place in an ASEAN country. After the number of participants began to grow, this tended to heighten ASEAN’s importance (Funabashi 1995a:98–9). The situation was, however, very difficult to handle even inside Japan. The question of the primacy of politics or economics incited a constant feud within the bureaucracy, especially between MOFA and MITI. Yamagami Susumu, who during 1990–3 acted as coordinator between the different Japanese ministries in regard to their Pacific policies, makes constant references to this feuding in his account of events. As he described it, in addition to the problem of the three Chinas, there was the constant problem of ‘two Japans’ within the Canberra and subsequent conferences. Different ministries presented at various times quite differing policy lines. Japan could demand double representation in committees, and Japan might even need two separate chairs at dinner tables (Yamagami 1994:122; Funabashi 1995a:317–8). The situation is quite illuminating regarding Japan’s weakness in foreign policy-making during the first half of the 1990s. The third conceptual difficulty was how to place the conference into the existing institutional framework in the Pacific. As a ministerial level conference, excluding both academicians and business people, it clearly went outside the PECC framework. The speed of events had been rapid, and there was a need to slow down for institution building. The cautious and economistic style for advancing Pacific integration, established through the activity of PECC, provided a model for the Canberra conference. Judging from the joint communiqué, the agenda of the meeting centred on economic issues, and the difficult political sector was excluded. The horizon of the meeting was not even centred on Pacific affairs, but on the Uruguay round, and ways of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion by December 1990, which had been set as the deadline. The conference decided to meet again at least twice before that date (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1995a). The purpose of continued cooperation established the meeting as an international organization, and this fact was sealed by giving it a name.
< previous page
page_162
next page >
< previous page
page_163
next page >
Page 163 The new name, used in the joint communiqué, symbolized the rhetorical situation of the late 1980s. The organization acquired the rather curious name Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). ‘Asia’ in the name reflected the vocabulary in use at the time, corresponding with terms like ‘Asia Pacific region’, and ‘Asia Pacific age’, while emphasizing ‘Asia’ also was a way of coopting ASEAN into the organization. But this was not curious. The curious point was that the name had no real ending; it stopped before defining the characteristics of the organization, whether it would have been ‘conference’, ‘council’, ‘organization’, ‘group’, or whatever. In the chairman’s summary statement the formula ‘APEC is a non-formal forum for consultation among high-level representatives of significant economies in the Asia Pacific Region’ was used (Evans 1995:42). The attribute ‘non-formal’ may seem curious in the connection of a ministerial conference, which had the considerable weight of national governments behind it, but it is indicative of the unsure mood of the conference about itself. It simply reflected an inability to decide the organizational form, and the name was left open-ended, so that later developments would fill it in, if the organization survived. The second APEC meeting in Singapore in July 1990 was fairly similar to the Canberra meeting, except that APEC started from then on to make declarations, typically concerning the Uruguay round. At this stage Kojima did not regard APEC favourably. He was no longer directly involved as a consultant in practical foreign policy making, but continued to comment on the integration process as an influential intellectual father figure. He thought that APEC’s high political aims were premature. Important developing countries such as China were absent, and its agenda tended to make APEC merely a pre-GATT bargaining forum. Concentrating on managing the mutual relations between the United States, Japan and the EC involved the danger that APEC might become a ‘structure for predatory industrialized nations to exploit the region’ (1996:230). The agenda should rather be set by ASEAN and other developing countries. They were not in need of any strong Pacific institutional framework. All they needed for the next twenty or thirty years was a liberal international trading and investment regime, and a loose forum for consultation with the advanced countries about mutual economic problems. PECC would have been sufficient for this. Formal institutional integration of a type similar to that of the EC or NAFTA was seen only as a ‘last resort to revitalize matured economies’ (1996:241). Kojima expected contemporary Pacific Asian developing countries to need revitalization around 2020, not during the 1990s. APEC began to change in the Seoul meeting in November 1991. After considerable Korean diplomatic preparation the three Chinas were finally able to enter APEC together, and APEC started at the same time to shift towards a more Pacific-oriented horizon. The Uruguay round did not end in December 1990 as had been anticipated, and continued to be an
< previous page
page_163
next page >
< previous page
page_164
next page >
Page 164 important issue on the agenda, but the conference also issued a specific Seoul APEC Declaration, setting as its goal to deepen economic cooperation in the region, irrespective of the outcome of the Uruguay round (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1995a:61–4). The conference also established a number of work groups studying such economic issues as trade, investment, energy cooperation, marine conservation, telecommunications and human resource development. APEC was now earnestly getting down to business, using the regional horizon of cooperation among the member countries as its focus. The Bangkok meeting in September 1992 agreed to set up a small standing secretariat in Singapore, consolidating with it the organization, and enabling it to function effectively between conferences. Mexico and Papua New Guinea also became members. In 1993 the process gathered further strength. The newly elected American president, Bill Clinton, needed a Pacific foreign political platform, while he also intended to distance the United States somewhat from European affairs. He decided to use APEC’s next meeting, which had been scheduled to take place in Seattle in November, for that purpose. While diplomatic feelers were put out, Clinton made a trip to Japan and South Korea. He gave a speech in Tokyo’s Waseda University, where he pointed out that already over 40 percent of American trade took place with Pacific Asia, creating millions of jobs for Americans. The combined output of APEC countries was about half of total world output, and Pacific Asia was likely to remain the world’s fastest growing region for some time at least. The United States should join this dynamism rather than see it as a threat, and help to create a new Pacific community with the Asian countries to further prosperity, development and democracy. As a practical step he proposed that an informal leaders’ conference of APEC economies would take place during the ministerial meeting at Seattle (Clinton 1993). Clinton elevated APEC to the summit level, and he did this in the economistic framework of mutual benefits for all participants. He thus provided at last high level leadership for the organization, made it respectable, and set its tone. Almost all APEC leaders responded positively to his call, with the sole exception of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir. Clinton’s call had come without much preliminary consultation, appearing thus as a unilateral one. Mahathir, who was opposed to a strong US leadership role, could use this as a pretex for declining to attend (Higgott 1995:82). Taiwan’s President Lee Teng Hui was not able to participate because of China’s opposition. In his Waseda speech Clinton had also called for joint Japanese and American leadership in the Pacific. Although Japan could not provide much leadership, at least it was a staunch supporter of the process, whether it was Australia or the United States that decided to act. APEC was placed in an increasingly important place in Japanese foreign policy making (Nakayama 1991:425; Miyazawa 1993:169; Kono 1995:183).
< previous page
page_164
next page >
< previous page
page_165
next page >
Page 165 However, Japan was forced to keep a low profile. One of the reasons, in addition to prime ministers having other preoccupations in the messy state of Japan’s economy and polity, was the strong influence that domestic interests were able to wield in foreign policy. APEC had mostly to do with trade liberalization, including agricultural trade, and no prime minister wanted to anger influential voting groups in the countryside. For domestic audiences Japanese leadership had to appear as if it was only following a general trend, but dragging its feet whenever possible (Funabashi 1995a: 323–5). Besides Clinton’s initiative, probably an equally important event was the establisment of a special Eminent Persons Group (EPG), whose membership was mainly drawn from PAFTAD veterans. It was established during the Bangkok meeting in 1992 to create a suitable vision to light the way as to where APEC should proceed. The EPG opened a venue through which the views of Kojima and other PAFTAD economists could directly start to shape the APEC process. Ōkita Saburō was chosen as the Japanese representative, but his death in February 1993, of a heart attack in the middle of a telephone conversation dealing with matters of the EPG (Bergsten 1993:x), prevented his further participation. Yamazawa Ippei, a logical choice, inherited his place. The report of the EPG was made ready for the fifth APEC meeting in November 1993 in Seattle (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1993). As such visions tend to be written by a consensual group, and attempt to form a wider political consensus within such a large region, the report did not actually create anything new or spectacular, but it distilled a certain point of view from the discussions of the previous decades. It called for the creation of an Asia-Pacific Economic Community. No acronym was presented, in order not to give the vision too much imaginary flesh, but it was pointed out that the name would permit retention of the acronym APEC. This was a subtle way of attaching the connotation of ‘community’ to the existing fledgling body of APEC. The basic principle of the community would be free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific. As later clarified, emphasis was on the word in (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1994:54–6). This goes beyond economic cooperation and an OECD-like structure. The OPTAD concept has been in the background of APEC since the beginning (English and Smith 1991:271), but PECC had increasingly taken over that role, with its research and publication programmes. In 1990 PECC renamed itself the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, and established a standing secretariat in Singapore. One of its responsibilities was to compile and edit studies of the task forces, and publish them in the form of an annual Pacific Economic Development Report . The first issue came out in 1992 (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 1992). PECC was thus assuming the role of information gatherer and disseminator, although with far smaller bureaucracy and scope than the OECD.
< previous page
page_165
next page >
< previous page
page_166
next page >
Page 166 The other integration concept had, historically speaking, been Kojima’s idea of a Pacific Free Trade Area, but the EPG did not want to go that far. It did not want to create a formal area. This is an interesting conceptual innovation. GATT rules had allowed the creation of free trade areas, and the assumption had been that if a free trade arrangement was made, it should take place between a specific group of countries, EFTA in Europe being the traditional example. Kojima’s PAFTA had to a large extent been patterned according to that. What the EPG had in mind was that specific measures would be enforced among countries forming the APEC, but as a form of example and ideational leadership, while the practical effects of that leadership would go well beyond the geographical membership limitations of APEC. This conceptual innovation was an application of the concept of open regionalism, developed in large part by Peter Drysdale (1988). It can be seen as a way of ensuring that APEC would not present the image of a trading bloc, which contained the danger of encouraging similar movements in other parts of the world. The principal goal was still to find a way of bringing the Uruguay round to a favourable conclusion, and preventing the possible degeneration of the EC and NAFTA into exclusive trading blocs. But in the background can also be seen the new momentum of the developing countries and former socialist countries in moving towards global free trade and open economies. This made the possibility of leadership by example again a viable option in free trade policy. The temporal horizon of the vision was the natural one in Pacific integration rhetoric, namely the twenty-first century. Also, other necessary ingredients of Pacific age rhetoric were mentioned, namely that the region was the most dynamic part of the world economy, and was likely to remain so over the coming decades. This enabled the presentation of the vision as a historical opportunity for APEC members. The goal of ‘APEC 2000’ would be symbolically perfect, but in the end the EPG refrains from recommending it. The international situation was still uncertain, with the Uruguay round still not having reached a conclusion, the future prospects of European integration quite undecided, and APEC itself so young. Thus the EPG recommended that only after a gestation period of three years APEC should—in 1996—set the timetable and strategy for achieving the ultimate goal of free trade within the region. The term ‘community’ could not help being connotatively connected to the European Community in a provocative way. Although the EPG explicitly stated that the goal was not to reach European-style deep integration, but form only a group of like-minded nations, the APEC vision still retained Europe as a point of reference: We do note, however, that few Europeans—and even fewer observers elsewhere—believed in the 1950s that Europe could overcome its vast cultural differences and tragic history to unite economically. Today, we
< previous page
page_166
next page >
< previous page
page_167
next page >
Page 167 take Europe’s common market and ‘EC 1992’ as established parts of the landscape. Our Eminent Persons Group believes that it is quite feasible, if difficult and ambitious, for the Asia Pacific to achieve the more modest course proposed in this Report in the decades ahead. (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1993:22) To strengthen further the image of the Pacific region, representing a new beginning comparable to that of Europe during the period of postwar reconstruction, the EPG pointed out that just as the global institutionalized reconstruction efforts following World War II were centred in Europe, it was high time after the ‘Third World War’, namely the Cold War, to focus on the Pacific region (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1993:60–1). The leaders’ summit at Seattle did not set any timetable, but otherwise it adopted the EPG vision for building an Asia-Pacific Economic Community (AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation 1995a:1–2). There had been disagreement among the participants about the wording; the term ‘community’ evoked suspicions of too closely knit cooperation in European style. Especially the Chinese did not want to go along with that, and consented only after the character for ‘family’ was substituted for ‘community’ in the Chinese text (Higgott 1995:92). In English texts a similar effect is achieved by usually avoiding writing the word ‘community’ with a capital letter, but the usage is not consistent. The EPG was asked by the meeting to prepare a new report mapping out more concrete steps towards realizing the vision. As the intellectual influence of PAFTAD economists was strong in the EPG, APEC also asked Pacific business leaders to establish a similar think tank of their own. It was called the Pacific Business Forum (PBF) (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1995a:81–9). With the Seattle summit the United States gave a clear sign of a strong commitment towards active and conciliatory Pacific cooperation, but, as a Singaporean observer put it: Some of Washington’s policies in the region do not really reflect such an emphasis. Notably, the United States is at odds with many Asia-Pacific countries over issues of trade, human rights, nuclear and military proliferation, labor standards, the protection of intellectual property rights, narcotics control, the caning of an American youth, and others. (Lee 1995:154) American foreign policy was far from consistent towards Pacific Asian countries. In part this reflected discrepant domestic interests, in part the haphazard policy-making process that comes with high media involvement in politics, and in part sheer undecidedness of how to deal with the economically rising Pacific Asia. The APEC process is a typical place for talking nicely in public, and prodding forward a consensual process, but
< previous page
page_167
next page >
< previous page
page_168
next page >
Page 168 it is nothing more than that. Behind the scenes, in preparatory meetings and work groups, there is also a lot of quarrelling in APEC, which only shows that the organization is dealing with substantial issues, but the outer face of APEC is always smiling and consensual. Within the APEC process things started to proceed smoothly after the Seattle meeting. The Uruguay round finally ended, and successfully, at the end of 1993. GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The European situation seemed to have stabilized, with integration there both deepening and widening, but no special threat to the global trading system emanating from there. The economic vision builders could thus sigh with relief, as well as congratulate the APEC process for playing a major role in bringing the Uruguay round to a conclusion. The APEC trade ministers had, in Seattle, agreed on an additional package of offers to present at the GATT table, and the obvious adoption by Pacific leaders of the EPG vision for open regionalism and increasing free trade in the area had also helped to change the mood, resolving the deadlock in GATT: The unambiguous message is that APEC can be a major force for global trade liberalization. We believe it is imperative, to promote the interests of both the APEC membership itself and the entire international system, for APEC to build on this experience and make every effort to exploit its liberalizing potential. These recent events encourage and embolden us in suggesting such a course for APEC in the future. (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1994:9) The EPG members now felt free to argue from a position of strength. The Pacific region through the avenue of APEC, and the Pacific free trade economists acting as the vision builders, had now arrived at a position where they were major players in the destiny of the world. There were also other forces, such as the newly renamed European Union (EU), and strong countries like the United States acting unilaterally, but APEC as a whole was really seen as the force carrying the liberal international system forwards. The Pacific as a region was thus no longer only a centre of global growth and production; it had by 1993 emerged as a major centre for global economic policy making. Once again an important step had been taken towards the Pacific age, and just in time, as the 1990s were already well advanced. With this step taken, and the protectionist clouds largely cleared from the global skies—as it seemed at the time—the EPG could proceed optimistically. To realize its potential as a global leader, APEC should proceed with trade liberalization. A specific timetable was established for this. Three specific dates were needed: for a political decision to move forward; for starting liberalization; when the process should be completed. In its first vision paper the EPG had set the first date to be in 1996, but in its new optimistic mood it brought the date forward in 1994 at the second APEC summit meeting scheduled to take place in Bogor, Indonesia in November.
< previous page
page_168
next page >
< previous page
page_169
next page >
Page 169 The second date, as expected, was set in the year 2000, with the following explanation: We see considerable symbolic value in launching the evolution toward free trade in the Asia Pacific on the first day of the new millennium—and of what some have predicted will be ‘the Pacific century’. (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1994:41) The whole strength of the Pacific age rhetoric was used in carrying forward the idea. Besides its symbolic value, 1 January 2000 would also give the member countries five years for preparation. These would be needed for making national plans, and for developing domestic support. Planning on the APEC level, making arrangements there, and acquiring internal ratification for them would also require a few years. After that, practical liberalization measures should begin. In view of the differing developmental levels of APEC countries three separate timetables were set. The most advanced countries should eliminate their barriers sooner, completing the process by 2010. The countries having NIE status in 1994 should have five years longer, and open their trading system by 2015. The countries having a developing country status in 1994 should achieve the same goal by 2020, so that by that date the whole APEC region, which hopefully would be larger than in 1994, should have turned into a completely open trading and investment regime. The goal of ‘APEC 2000’ (where the acronym now openly stood for the AsiaPacific Economic Community) would not only achieve a liberal trading regime within a limitless region, but also much more. The EPG plan was an economistic vision par excellence, and as such it was also supposed to eliminate threats to security endangering the international system. It was expected effectively to bridge the ‘North-South gap’ in the way that the flying geese theory directed. This would be a historic achievement. It was to bridge the differences existing between ‘competing models of market economies’, which now ranged from the almost classical free trade model of Hong Kong via systems with increasing state intervention in the United States and Japan to the socialist market economy of China. Although the EPG did not put it in these terms, a convergence towards the model of Hong Kong by all countries was what was hoped for. This would be a second historic achievement. A topic in the security discussions of the early 1990s was also the idea of a clash of civilizations (Huntington 1993), and the Pacific region would be particularly vulnerable to such a development, but a sufficiently strong process of community forming could play a major role in preventing such conflicts (AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation 1994:58–60). The tone of the Pacific Business Forum (PBF) vision was fairly similar, only they wanted to make more haste and get settled into complete free trade and investment among advanced countries by 2002, and among all APEC countries by 2010, and they wanted to begin immediately
< previous page
page_169
next page >
< previous page
page_170
next page >
Page 170 (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1995a:23–33). The declaration of the APEC leaders on 15 November 1994 once again basically adopted the vision of the EPG, and much of the wording of the declaration was taken from the report. They also adopted the general schedule set by the EPG, with the obligation for the advanced countries to liberalize themselves by 2010, and the rest of APEC by 2020. However, following the PBF recommendation they did not start the APEC 2000 project, but used the formula ‘we will start our concerted liberalization process from the very date of this statement’ (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1995a:5–8). The economistic vision of a harmonious and prosperous twenty-first century in the Pacific region was thus officially launched. It has been commented that it was quite easy for the leaders to make such bold decisions, because in practice they did not commit themselves to very much. The time frame was so long, especially since the quite near date of 1 January 2000 was skipped, and a more magnificent sounding but really far vaguer formula adopted. A cynical European comment was that by 2020 all of them would already ‘either be dead or in their dotage’ (The Economist 1994). It would be their followers, or their followers’ followers, who would have to shoulder the responsibility of doing something serious about the process. Yet, nothing much further could have been expected, and comparisons with Europe miss the mark. The Pacific integration process is so much younger that even this declaration represented a significant step. It should be seen as an expression of the rapid speed of building the imagined Pacific community, in view of the approaching Pacific century. The Bogor summit in 1994 was also an opportunity for a display of political leadership, this time by Indonesia. The meeting was hosted by President Suharto, who took active interest in getting a favourable conclusion to the summit. Several reasons have been suggested for this. It was Suharto’s opportunity to exercise global statesmanship and become equal with his predecessor Sukarno, who in 1955 had presided over the Bandung conference, and become a leader of the non-aligned movement. The second obvious reason was that Indonesia required economic liberalization. It needed to maintain itself as a favoured destination for foreign investment in competition with other low-wage countries like Vietnam or India, which had recently started similar reforms of their economic policies. Third, Indonesia needed to retain the open international trading regime to be able to export and continue its development. The APEC process was supposed to help in this. Fourth, as the vision of the flying geese theory was that a developing country can attain the’level of leading countries within a few decades, Indonesia would seriously require trade liberalization by 2020, and it was already time to take the first careful steps (Kikuchi 1995:315–7). Similar comments can be applied to the other ASEAN countries. Suharto’s active promotion of APEC also tended to make them more favourable to it. Mahathir attended the Bogor summit without complaint, because offending Suharto would have been more serious than offending Clinton.
< previous page
page_170
next page >
< previous page
page_171
next page >
Page 171 In 1994 APEC acquired a sister organization, which dealt with regional security issues. Proposals for multilateral security discussions in the Pacific area had first appeared during the latter half of the 1980s after the Cold War started to recede with Gorbachev’s new foreign policy. At that time most governments had been hostile to the idea, but more interest gradually appeared. Political scientists and security experts started to organize conferences on the subject. The phenomenal success of PAFTAD in the economic sector was one of the reasons for encouraging students of security studies in international academic networking. The ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) played a central role in this activity, but Australian and Japanese institutions were also actively involved. This activity gradually spilled over to the foreign political plane, ending the ‘allergy’ to multilateral discussion (Ball 1994:169–70; Evans 1994:125–9). Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans proposed in 1990 the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), patterned after the European CSCE. That proposal came to nothing, but it encouraged further official discussion. Unsolved issues, such as the Cambodian conflict, tension between the two Koreas, or competing claims on the Spratley and Paracel Islands, clearly demanded that they should be addressed regionally, now that they were not addressed—or dampened out—in the context of superpower rivalry. Japan actively began to promote the idea of some kind of loose forum as of 1991. Besides Japan’s security, the idea also provided a field of action for MOFA. A suitable institutional framework was provided by the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), which ASEAN held with the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the EU. In 1991 China and Russia participated as guests in a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers, and in 1992 Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea participated as observers. In January 1992 ASEAN heads of state decided to use this structure and membership and establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The first ARF was held in Bangkok in July 1994 (Kikuchi 1995:255–77). ARF corresponds to APEC. Like APEC, ARF works solely through consensus, without any kind of enforcement function, relying on preventive diplomacy and the establishment of common principles for the peaceful solution of regional conflicts. The reason separate institutions are needed for security discussion is that several countries do not want to jeopardize the APEC economic process. Some countries, such as China, also do not want to link economic and security issues, preferring totally different fora for them (Lee 1995:164–6; Martin 1995:169). Although security is important, the most vital goal in Pacific Asia is economic development, and APEC has been guarded against disruption in this manner. The ASEAN ISIS in the same year set up a related institution, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), based on its existing conferencing networks. Members of CSCAP have been mostly
< previous page
page_171
next page >
< previous page
page_172
next page >
Page 172 academicians specialized in security studies, but foreign policy and defence officials have also participated in their private capacity. In terms of membership the council has been rather loose. Notwithstanding, it has not been unpolitical. A crucial issue was the participation of China and Taiwan, which was resolved in 1996. China entered, but did not allow Taiwan’s participation. Nor has it allowed Taiwan into the ARF. This attests to the difficulty of proceeding in the political sector, compared with the economic sector. CSCAP is modelled after PECC. It makes policyoriented studies, writes memorandums, and creates ideas for ARF. As a matter of fact, several of the persons that initiated CSCAP were at the same time members of their national PECC committees (Ball 1994:170). Japan organized APEC VII, and the third APEC summit, in November 1995 in Ōsaka. Prime Minister Murayama hosted it. However, APEC was not a foreign policy priority for him, and consequently he did not present any special imaginative contribution. The year 1995 was also the 50-year anniversary of the ending of World War II, and Murayama’s main foreign polical interest was directed to issues like apologizing for the war atrocities, and making amends for past deeds. As a social democratic prime minister in an LDP-dominated coalition his political leeway was narrow, and he was not able to take much individual initiative. There is an anecdote that every time MOFA officials went to the prime minister’s office to get advice on Japan’s APEC policy, the office merely told them to make a round of the three coalition parties—LDP, Japan’s Social Democratic Party, and New Party Sakigake—try to build a consensus with them, and finally negotiate with the prime minister’s office. But if one first asked the parties themselves, they reflected only immediate domestic interests. It was impossible to proceed with liberalization in that way (Funabashi 1995a:331). As the prime minister was not able to provide much leadership, preparations for the Ōsaka conference had to be a venture led by bureaucrats. Postwar Japan has been able to produce strong prime ministers with imaginative policies, such as Yoshida or Tanaka, but in every case the United States had already painted the big global picture. The task of the prime minister was merely to adjust Japan to these situations in the optimal way. From then on things could roll along routinely in the usual bureaucratic fashion. It was President Clinton who had done the main painting with respect to APEC in 1993, and President Suharto added Pacific Asia positively to the picture in 1994. The Seattle conference had established the vision of an Asia Pacific community, and the Bogor conference had set the timetable. In 1995 Japan could really handle the situation on a bureaucratic level. Japan’s responsibility in Ōsaka was to escort the process to a practical start. It did not really matter that President Clinton was at the last moment prevented from participating because of a budget dispute with Congress. It lowered the international prestige of the meeting, but did not affect its successful outcome. In the ministerial conference
< previous page
page_172
next page >
< previous page
page_173
next page >
Page 173 ‘two chairs’ were again needed, as it was co-chaired by MITI Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and Foreign Minister Kono Yōhei. Nevertheless, as a successful completion of the conference was an issue of national pride, MITI and MOFA were able to work relatively well together. The smoothness of their cooperation probably also reflected the fact that they were the only two Japanese ministries clearly to recognize Japan’s national interests in the global liberal trade and investment regime. (Funabashi 1995a:321–30). The EPG had come up with a plan of every country presenting a package of practical liberalization measures. It was argued as a ‘down payment’ on participating in the APEC process of a journey towards the glorious Pacific future (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1995b:152). This plan was nicely carried through, with all members arriving at Ōsaka bringing lists of cutting tariff lines, deregulation, privatization and liberalization of foreign investment rules. Many items on the lists were not exactly far reaching, and much would have been done without APEC as part of the Uruguay round agreements, but there was a genuine pressure against presenting meaningless offers. The Japanese took great care in reviewing the lists before the summit, but also important was the need in member countries of saving face for their participating leaders. These lists were also the first substantial initiatives to accelerate the implementation of the Uruguay round commitments, which the leaders’ summit duly pointed out. They also adopted an Ōsaka Action Agenda, resting on the three pillars of trade and investment liberalization, trade and investment facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation. These were then divided into action programmes for specific areas, such as human resources development, industrial science and technology, energy, telecommunications and marine resources. Unlike previous relatively short statements of the vision given by the leaders, and finalized during the conferences, this bureaucratic document ran over a hundred pages, so it is doubtful that many of the heads of states would have personally cared to read through all of the document (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 1995b:1–123). The international press again criticized the results of the conference as meagre. Its enthusiastic future-oriented language was dubbed ‘Apec-ese’ (Moffett 1995), and it was castigated for doing nothing to solve the disputes of the ‘real world’, such as Japanese and American negotiations on auto exports that had once again brought them to the brink of a trade war; the rape of a 12-year old girl in Okinawa by American soldiers with repercussions on the security relationship between the countries; Japan’s anti-dumping actions against China; or China’s irritation at the rich countries because they had prevented its entry into the WTO (The Economist 1995a; Holloway 1995). These kinds of comments are true, but they always come up in connection with APEC. At least for the time being APEC, as a consensual goodwill process, cannot solve such issues. It survives only
< previous page
page_173
next page >
< previous page
page_174
next page >
Page 174 as long as it stays sufficiently aloof from them, and continues to use Apecese as its form of expression. APEC VII was also presented as a contest between American and Japanese philosophies on economic issues, which presumably Japan won. Americans were supposed to prefer high-sounding declarations and strict commitments to measurable liberalization, while the Japanese were supposed to prefer the maintenance of harmony and hazier liberalization measures (The Economist 1995b; Moffett 1995). There certainly is a basis for this drama, Japanese and American approaches to liberalization issues being different. The competition between Japanese style and American style strategies for economic development is also a continuing characteristic of the Pacific landscape. Nevertheless, the main difference between the Seattle and Ōsaka conferences was still that of a normal proceeding from the stage of visions to the stage of starting practical measures, and nothing more dramatic than that. A good indication of the change was that the EPG was disbanded. There was no more need for a special group of vision builders any more. APEC VIII in November 1996 in the Philippines, with preliminary meetings taking place in Manila and the leaders’ summit in Subic Bay, moved the process a further step towards concreteness by signing a Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA). The contents of the MAPA were measures for the facilitation of investment, harmonization of customs procedures, and an extension of the ‘down payments’ presented at Ōsaka, with countries setting dates and numerical targets for the reduction of their tariffs. Average tariff levels had been coming down since the mid-1980s even without APEC’s influence as part of the global trend towards free trade, but in 1996 they still differed widely from Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s 0.00 percent, to the US 3.40 percent, Japan’s 4.00 percent, Indonesia’s 13.40 percent, or China’s 23 percent. For instance China, which had the highest average tariff levels, promised to lower them to 15 percent by the year 2000. The Philippines, as the host country, presented the boldest plan to reduce its tariff levels from 15.6 percent to 5 percent by 2004. Indonesia did not present any clear figures, only declaring that it will continue reducing its tariffs to reach the APEC goal of open trade by 2020 (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 1996b). The promises were thus very diverse, reflecting the different starting levels, and different goals of foreign and economic policies of the countries. Nor were the promises binding, and the only sanction attached to them was APEC’s normal ‘peer pressure’. Nevertheless, the general wish even among the developing countries to continue along the process in a dignified style, conforming to APEC’s optimistic and free trading rhetoric, was unmistakable. Part of the enthusiasm can also be explained by the fact that the conference was a preparatory meeting for the first WTO summit, held in December in Singapore, and the APEC countries wanted to present themselves there as the vanguard of global trade liberalization.
< previous page
page_174
next page >
< previous page
page_175
next page >
Page 175 During 1996 APEC continued to be a huge focus of bureaucratic activity, with various preparatory meetings of lesser officials throughout the year. More than 3,000 officials also accompanied their leaders to Manila and Subic in November, followed by a similar amount of journalists. APEC meetings have thus become a major global media event, although the various meetings of individual heads of states tend to steal the show. A meeting of President Clinton with President Jiang Zemin is simply more intriguing than APEC’s proclamations. However, APEC is doing its best to make itself better known to the wider public, publishing, for instance, a special advertising supplement about itself in the Far Eastern Economic Review, with references to the Asia Pacific century (Dowker 1996), or publishing its proceedings in the Internet. Also the leaders in their declaration pointed to the fact that APEC has to be made relevant to the citizenry, hoping that ‘the APEC process will produce substantial, concrete, measurable and sustainable results which will tangibly improve the lives of all our citizens by the turn of the century’ (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 1996a). The Pacific age narrative, Apecese as the language, the annual summits providing for prestige, thousands of bureaucrats preparing documents, trading and investing companies, and continuing economic growth in the Pacific region are the ideational and material pillars on which APEC stands at the moment, also during APEC IX in 1997 in Canada. APEC is the 1990s embodiment, and thus the far highest institutional achievement of the postwar Pacific economistic vision. Although its success in the twenty-first century cannot be guaranteed, at least it seems to be vigorously alive at the moment. This would also have been an appropriate place to end this story, if the creation of APEC had been the only significant result of the political events at the turn of the decade. The IPR, PAFTAD, PBEC, PECC, and APEC have been the ‘proper’ institutions that have been treated in Pacific integration analytical literature (Woods 1993; Kikuchi 1995). However, there were also other developments. By and large they have remained within the conceptual frame of the Pacific age narrative, but they have also represented a re-emergence of the conceptual Asian frame resembling the 1970s. The main difference is that, at that time, Japan had been the active initiator of closer relations, but during the 1990s other Asian countries have taken that role.
< previous page
page_175
next page >
< previous page
page_176
next page >
Page 176 11 Continentalism The success of APEC had meant that the original Australian initiative, presented with the horizon of an emerging tripolar world of European, American and Asian blocks, was changed back to the horizon of a bipolar world. The North Atlantic and the Pacific appeared as opposing poles, consistent with the Pacific age narrative. It represents the narrative in its early virgin form, the horizon of which is the condition of abundance, and promises increasing prosperity for all participants. However, the emergence of the political turn of events was an implication of the signs of scarcity on the horizon, and with it the contemporary cycle of the Pacific age narrative started to move in a more antagonistic direction. Fear that there might not be enough prosperity to distribute generously to all led to defensive moves. The shadow of a tripolar world did not disappear with the relatively successful development of APEC, and this brought integrated continents, rather than the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, into the centre of discussion. One of the early Asian initiatives on regional integration, based on the horizon of a tripolar global economic structure, and using Japan as an industrial nucleus, was the proposal for an East Asia Community (EAC) by the Taiwanese researcher Ricky Tung in 1984. Tung wanted to create a grouping with an initial membership of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong, and later add Singapore and the other ASEAN countries. His argument was based on the cultural and racial diversity of the Pacific concept, and the relative Confucian unity of what he termed East Asia. He also wanted to create a secure place for Taiwan in the regional setting, and to exclude China. EAC would thus have been a competitor to PECC, which was just getting off the ground at the time. The participation of predominantly Sinic Singapore in ASEAN, and the resemblance of the development style of the other ASEAN countries to that of the ANIEs, were the principal reasons why he extended the geographic metaphor of East Asia to include Southeast Asia. Although Tung did not mention the flying geese theory, it provided the rationale as to why these countries would fit well together under Japanese economic leadership. He was versed in the Pacific age rhetoric of the time, but was rather of the opinion
< previous page
page_176
next page >
< previous page
page_177
next page >
Page 177 that not the Pacific but his East Asia would become the driving force of the twenty-first century. The grouping would also allow a return to traditional Asian values, and ‘bring fellow Asians together to search in Sinic culture a path that will lead them on into the future’ (Tung 1984:77). Nevertheless, Tung was not the first to propose such an idea. Kojima had toyed with the concept of a similar East Asian economic group back in the early 1960s before settling on his PAFTA initiative (1962:214). Further roots could be traced from the Japanese vision of a Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere during World War II, the Japanese colonial empire, or the twilight of pan-Asianism during the late nineteenth century (Matsumoto 1994). In any case, debate intensified during the late 1980s. Phisit Pakkasem of the National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand proposed in 1988 the establishment of a Western Pacific Economic Cooperation (WESPEC) scheme. The grouping would have been based on a’ten plus one’ formula, with the three Northeast Asian NIEs, the six ASEAN states and China composing the ‘ten’, and Japan as the technological leader being the ‘one’. The purpose of WESPEC would have been the organization of Pacific Asian collective strength for trade negotiations with the seemingly emerging blocks of America and Europe. The WESPEC scheme attracted hardly any support at the time (Soesastro 1991:12–13). The Hawke initiative in 1989 should thus be seen not as the first but one of several proposals for exclusively Western Pacific cooperation. The Ministerial Conference, which should have finalized the negotiations in Brussels, broke down in the autumn of 1990, and the main culprits were seen to be the European Community and the United States. These two advanced but stagnant, rich but protectionist actors seemed to be tearing apart the global liberal trade regime for such trivial reasons as their mutual disagreement about agricultural policies, in total disregard to the fate of the rest of the world. The arrogant and selfish behaviour of these two mighty actors aroused deep resentment in other parts of the world. In a similar situation two years earlier, when the Mid-term Review negotiations broke down, Prime Minister Hawke had hastily come up with the suggestion of Western Pacific economic cooperation. This time the psychological situation was even graver, as it had become clear that the Uruguay round could not be completed by the final date set in 1986, and the danger of never completing it was thus more serious. An immediate reaction came from China, although it received only little notice. The Chinese economist He Xin, in a published conversation with the Japanese economist Yabuki Susumu in December 1990, suggested that China, Japan, and other unspecified East Asian countries form an economic grouping of their own (He 1990). It was no more than an idea that was thrown into the middle of the conversation, and as such did not carry much weight. On the other hand, because it was allowed to appear in the Beijing Review, it could be interpreted as a small probe from
< previous page
page_177
next page >
< previous page
page_178
next page >
Page 178 Chinese official circles to see if anything would come of it. Apparently nothing did, and it was soon overshadowed by another proposal, which received wider attention. The Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who had since the early 1980s been openly pro-Japanese (Lim 1994), proposed in early 1991 that ASEAN, Japan, and other unnamed East Asian countries form an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) (Consulate General of Malaysia 1991). As Zainal Abidin Sulong, Chairman of the Malaysian ISIS, explained, GATT negotiations were not its only goal, but also Japan’s massive foreign investment, which the yen’s continual rise spurred forward, played an important part in the proposal (1991). The proposal can thus also be seen as a way to channel an ever larger share of Japanese outbound capital and technological know-how to aid ASEAN’s industrial development. This proposal was an official one, coming from the prime minister of an important country, and it had to be taken seriously. Predictably, it caused a furore. It not only excluded North America, which was understandable, given the frustrating events within GATT, but Oceania as well. It was a shower of cold water over the Australians, who increasingly were trying to orient themselves towards Western Pacific dynamism. The United States and Australia opposed the EAEG concept outright (Watanabe 1992:150; Funabashi 1995a:307). One of the problems with the proposal was that a clear blueprint was never presented. Discussion has been vague, based on not necessarily wellcoordinated speeches by Malaysian officials. The dialogue has been charged emotionally, conducted at the level of rumours, forebodings, and misgivings. The whole issue has been heavily politicized, culminating in 1993 when Mahathir refused to attend the first APEC summit meeting in Seattle, followed by a diplomatic row between Malaysia and Australia. As a consequence, during the early 1990s the situation was depicted in terms of an opposition between the APEC and EAEG concepts; only one of them could exist, at the expense of the other, and coexistence was impossible. In terms of international law there is nothing that would stand in the way of establishing the EAEG, and integrating it smoothly with the APEC process, just as NAFTA is part of APEC. There is no indication that Mahathir wanted tight antagonistic blocks, or anticipated the emotional response his proposal received, even though the EAEG proposal can be seen as a case of Asian arrogance confronting European and American arrogance. The EAEG initiative evoked powerful images of an exclusive block, and no East Asian government was willing to risk strengthening such tendencies within Europe and North America at the time. Mahathir’s proposal also contained strong emphasis that the EAEG should be consistent with GATT and APEC. It should be viewed as an attempt to put East Asia on an equal institutional status with the European Community and NAFTA. The East Asian economic dynamism
< previous page
page_178
next page >
< previous page
page_179
next page >
Page 179 warranted a high institutional status in the world system, which was placing increasing value on economic performance. The EAEG name was changed to East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1992, as suggested by the Indonesian political scientist Hadi Soesastro (1991:14), implying only a discussion group, but the basic idea of the East Asian countries forming a distinct institutional arrangement exclusively among themselves remained the same. The EAEC has not been established, even though since 1993 there has been discussion of its establishment as a caucus within APEC (Higgott 1995:93) Both American and Australian attitudes changed gradually from outright denial to cautious acceptance (Evans 1996: lecture). The new Australian Liberal-National Party coalition government elected in March 1996 completely dropped its opposition to EAEC, and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer even declared that the previous Labour government had made a diplomatic error in opposing EAEC (Furukawa 1996). Other ASEAN governments have given polite support to Mahathir’s proposal since the beginning, but in a rather non-committal manner. Both the exclusion of the United States and Australia, and the open endorsement of Japan as the leader of the group were difficult points (Soesastro 1991:7–12). Indonesia’s support of APEC has meant that ASEAN is quite divided over the issue, but there is little willingness to present Suharto and Mahathir as outright rivals within the organization. A caucus within APEC is the general ASEAN stand on the issue. South Korea has tended to be more sceptical of any schemes involving Japan’s leadership in an Asian setting (Funabashi 1995a:337). Fears of Japan’s economic and even military domination of Southeast Asia have not disappeared completely, even though they are on a far lower level than during the 1960s. World War II is still a touchy issue. It was even reopened during the 1990s with the approaching 50-year anniversary of the ending of the war. Issues like the comfort women, Japanese soldiers’ cannibalism, or the number massacred, and the grudging Japanese official apologies, or even outright denials by cabinet members that massacres happened, were continuing topics in the media. Nevertheless, Japan has been the biggest obstacle to EAEC, because it has not been able to make up its collective mind. For Japan Mahathir’s proposal was an embarrassment. It came too suddenly, and exposed serious conflicts relating to Japan’s self-identity. Japan has been unable either to clearly embrace or decline the idea (Funabashi 1995a:304–5). On one hand there is the thrilling prospect of leading an Asian group, something that Japan has striven for since the early 1970s with its ASEAN policy. On the other hand there are great misgivings about throwing in Japan’s fortunes with an Asian group, and jeopardizing the relationship with the United States. It is indicative to look at the rhetoric of the policy speeches of Japanese prime ministers during the 1990s. During the Cold War Japanese politicians were used to dividing the Pacific world into two. When they travelled
< previous page
page_179
next page >
< previous page
page_180
next page >
Page 180 to the United States, they emphasized that they were ‘members of the West’ and ‘a Pacific country’ like the United States. When they travelled to ASEAN, they used to claim that they were proudly Asians. Takeshita in 1989 was the last Japanese prime minister who could unreservedly state this. Mahathir’s proposal really can be seen as a positive reaction to the high sounding Japanese Asian rhetoric of the 1980s, but during the 1990s Japanese prime ministers have shied away from using it. When Miyazawa visited ASEAN in 1993, no mention of Japan being proudly Asian was allowed to appear in the text. Instead, he talked about the Asia Pacific region (watakushitachi no sumu Ajia-Taiheiyō chi-iki) (1993:168). When Hosokawa assumed the premiership, he presented himself as a member of the Asia Pacific region (Ajia-Taiheiyō no ichi in) (1993:159). Similarly, Hashimoto in his inaugural policy speech in January 1996 used the Asia Pacific geographic frame (Hashimoto 1996:64). The metaphor here definitely includes the United States, as references to the paramount importance of the Japan-US security relationship imply. High Japanese political leaders have also consistently supported APEC, and have been mostly silent about the East Asian alternative. Some of them, like Ozawa Ichirō, a powerful opposition leader during the middle of the 1990s, also openly spoke against it (Desmond 1995:131). In public opinion surveys the majority of Japanese see themselves somewhere between Euro-America and Asia, rather than stressing Japan’s Asianness (Funabashi 1995a:348). The Japanese self-identity thus remains somewhere ‘between the East and the West’, as it has been during most of Japan’s modern history (Ogura 1995). Yet, there are also strong forces favouring the EAEC. Mahathir has struck a chord in the heart of many Japanese intellectuals, business persons, bureaucrats and politicians. New interest in Asia can be noticed at virtually all levels and sectors of the society. An Asian boom started to emerge already during the 1980s (Murai and Kido 1988), but compared with that time the share of Asian news in the Japanese media during the 1990s has seen a manifold increase (Funabashi 1995a:334–5). The ‘golden rain’ image of the relationship between Japan and Pacific Asia has taken deep root, and the continuous quarrelling with the United States naturally distances many Japanese from the Americans, and nears them to other Asians in a similar situation. Even many leftist intellectuals, who were nearly resigned to the idea that Japan would forever be separated from other Asian countries after its wartime deeds, have taken new heart because of Mahathir’s proposal. In Japanese policy-making circles there is likewise high interest in the EAEC. ProAsian bureaucrats favouring its establishment are reportedly increasing in numbers in powerful ministries such as MOFA, MITI, and the Ministry of Finance, and over the years are getting into senior positions. These tendencies were in existence already before the creation of APEC. Business leaders in the Keidanren and Keizaidōyūkai have voiced support, and many lower level
< previous page
page_180
next page >
< previous page
page_181
next page >
Page 181 LDP politicians are positive toward the idea (Funabashi 1995a: 310–2; Higgott 1995:84–5). The highest political leadership has, however, refrained from making any significant moves, because of the many unforeseen consequences. There were important changes in the economic image of the Pacific Asian region in 1993. The international ranking dimensions of the economies were readjusted, and their economic policies reinterpreted, in a World Bank research programme, supported financially by the Japanese government. The study was called The East Asian Miracle . It adopted the same geographic metaphor that Mahathir had used in his EAEC proposal, and treated most of these countries as a special miraculous group. The older ranking system with Japan at the top, followed by the four ANIEs, and trailed by ASEAN was retained, but renamed. The four ANIEs were named ‘Four Tigers’. It is a beautiful metaphor. Its function here was that South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were graduated from the ANIE category, but they were not yet called fully industrialized countries on the same level with Japan. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were placed at the NIE level. This group of eight countries became called ‘high-performing Asian economies’ (HPAEs), with all of them thus conceptually under the same heading. Botswana in Africa had actually been the world champion in economic growth per capita during 1960–85, but the HPAEs formed a special geographic region of high growth. Equality and human welfare had also increased. Southern China displayed similar characteristics, but was outside the scope of the study. Only the Philippines remained in the category of developing countries, and Brunei as a rich oil exporting country (World Bank 1993:1–4). Second, the study attributed this high performance to fundamentally sound development policies. It acknowledged that governments had intervened systematically through multiple channels, especially in Japan and the Tigers, resulting in ‘higher and more equal growth than otherwise would have occurred’ (World Bank 1993:6). This was qualified by noting that interventions had taken place only according to sound market principles in a disciplined, selective and cost-efficient manner, combining market competition with cooperation among firms, and between them and the government. The study thus acknowledged that industrial policies had worked well in these economies, and that the neoclassical view was not the only correct one. In the competition between Japanese and American styles of development the study thus favoured the Japanese view. The image of the global importance of the Pacific Asian region was also heightened because of a significant change in the way international economic statistics were compiled. There had been increasing dissatisfaction with traditional statistics, where market exchange rates (MERs) had been used to convert individual country GDPs into US dollars (Wong 1991). The old figures told, for example, that Asia’s share of world output had fallen from 7.9 percent to 7.2 percent between 1985 and 1990, although
< previous page
page_181
next page >
< previous page
page_182
next page >
Page 182 Asia had been by far the fastest growing region. The cause of the error was that several Asian currencies had depreciated sharply against the dollar. The United Nations had coordinated an International Comparison Program since the 1970s, supported by the World Bank, the OECD, and other international bodies, trying to develop alternative, more reliable indicators based on purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates. Interest in them deepened at the turn of the decade. So many things were changing in the world, and there was a genuine need of acquiring a more accurate economic picture. For instance, the IMF started to use the PPP in its World Economic Outlook in May 1993. The results are shown in Table 11.1. The picture of the world given by these new indicators was revolutionary. As the IMF economist David T.Coe pointed out, 77 percent of the world’s population lived in the developing countries, and the old MER figures had presented a picture of tremendous inequality in the distribution of world income, and a corresponding concentration of world wealth in the industrial countries (Coe 1993). That figure fell now from three-fourths to a little over half. The position of the United States did not change much. It remained the world’s largest economy. For the EC the plunge was somewhat deeper. Particularly significant was the corresponding rise of Asia, an area covering the Asian continent and adjacent islands eastward from Iran, excluding Japan and the territory of the former Soviet Union. Asia and the EC now became roughly comparable in size. For Japan the fall was drastic. Its weight fell almost by half, reflecting the high Japanese price level. When the Japanese economy had earlier Table 11.1 Comparison of market exchange rate (MER) based and purchasing power parity (PPP) based weights, as a percentage of world GDP MER 1987–9 PPP 1990 World 100.0 100.0 Industrial countries 73.21 54.44 United States 26.07 22.47 EC 24.81 18.51 Japan 14.61 7.63 Developing countries 17.71 34.38 Africa 1.72 4.05 Asia 7.29 17.67 Middle East and Europe 4.28 4.46 Western hemisphere 4.42 8.21 Countries in transition 9.07 11.18 Former Soviet Union 7.53 8.31 Central Europe 1.53 2.85 Source: International Monetary Fund 1993
< previous page
page_182
next page >
< previous page
page_183
next page >
Page 183 been regarded as more than half as large as the United States economy, it now appeared to be only one-third in size, and in per capita figures Americans began again to look richer than the Japanese. An even bigger change was pointed out by The Economist in its comment on the implications of the figures. Chinese figures had been especially controversial earlier. MER-based figures had implied that China was one of the poorest countries in the world, and smaller than Canada in size. With the PPPbased figures, and adding 10 percent annual growth since 1990, The Economist declared that by 1993 China had already passed Japan, and become the second largest economy in the world after the United States (The Economist 1993). The journal also had misgivings that even the new PPP figures failed to reflect reality accurately enough. Poor country governments had an incentive to report GDP as low as possible to qualify for generous aid and trade treatment, and the informal sector tended to be far more difficult to measure there than in rich countries, which meant that by 1993 the share of the industrial countries of the world economy had most likely fallen already below half (The Economist 1993). In a further survey Jim Rohwer of The Economist pointed out that with per capita PPP figures Singapore and Hong Kong had nearly attained the Japanese level of affluence (US$15,880, 15,600, and 17,620, respectively), while Malaysia (6,140) had nearly reached the South Korean (6,730) level. Adding rapid growth, these figures implied that by the year 2000 there would be fully one billion Asians, including the Japanese, living in households with enough consumer spending power to buy goods like colour televisions, refrigerators, and motor bikes. Perhaps 400 million of them would have incomes at least equal to the rich world average, being able to spend their money on good housing, cars, holidays, or education for their children. This further implied immense investment in infrastructure and producing capacity, making Asia the world’s economic locomotive for the 1990s and perhaps beyond (Rohwer 1993). Similar figures were studied intensely in Asian countries, and the prospect that Pacific Asian countries alone might become equal in economic size to North America or Western Europe by 2000 was duly pointed out (Soesastro 1993:379). International statistics usually still reflected the idea of Japan as one of the mature industrialized countries, and thus in the same group with Western Europe and North America. But if Japan, which was now increasingly seen as an Asian country, was added to them, Pacific Asian quantitative economic equality with the other two advanced regions was already reached. The regions were of roughly similar size. Moreover, US trade with Pacific Asia had already exceeded that with Western Europe during the 1970s; Japan’s trade with its neighbours exceeded that with the United States during the late 1980s, and Western European trade with Pacific Asia went above that with the United States in 1994 (Nanjō 1996:8). In this sense Pacific Asia had become the world’s economic centre by the early 1990s.
< previous page
page_183
next page >
< previous page
page_184
next page >
Page 184 With these new figures in mind it is easy to see that Pacific Asia could rightfully demand respect for its achievements from the rest of the world. Being institutionally on a similar status with Western Europe and North America would just mean recognizing the existing material reality. However, these status considerations alone did not mean that an EAEC could have been set up in 1991. Institutions need a suitable political setting. It soon turned out that the situation was not altogether hopeless for global free trade, and the reason for establishing the EAEC appeared less pressing. The world was certainly heading towards a serious economic downturn, but the Uruguay Round did not disintegrate after all. Three more years, until the end of 1993, were given for GATT members to try to negotiate the deal. GATT had also possessed a bright side. The advanced countries were causing troubles within it, but a large number of developing countries in Asia and Latin America were liberalizing their economies, and wanting to become members of GATT. The former European socialist countries also wanted to join. The way of thinking about trade and development had changed enormously during the 1980s, with the developing countries having apparently become the new champions of free trade, while the advanced countries seemed to be increasingly adopting the former closed attitude of the developing countries. The actual situation in terms of existing national tariff barriers might have been different, but the direction of movement was fairly clear (Grant et al . 1993; Whalley 1993). The EAEC proposal should be viewed within this larger movement among developing countries towards free trade. There was an important discussion of the economic rationale of a distinct East Asian free trade arrangement in PAFTAD conferences during the early 1990s. Most East Asian countries, except the free trading city states of Singapore and Hong Kong, were still quite protectionist. Theoretically, liberalizing trade among them might have led to a considerable expansion of trade both among themselves and with the rest of the world. East Asian free trade might serve as a similar kind of catalyst to world trade as Western European integration during the 1960s. If East Asian countries started to trade more intensively with each other, it would ease the pressure of exports to Europe and America, while imports from outside to East Asia might actually increase. The EAEC as a free trade concept thus presented the theoretical possibility of maintaining cordial relations among the major economic centres of the world. At the same time it would guarantee an expanding export market for the East Asian countries, and provide them with a safe haven where they could continue their rapid development (Young 1993:122). Similar economic arguments could thus be used for defending the EAEC, as for the EC and NAFTA. There were, however, flaws with this scenario. One of them was that although the East Asian countries might be the wave of the future, most of them were not yet far advanced, and the structural changes demanded
< previous page
page_184
next page >
< previous page
page_185
next page >
Page 185 by a far-reaching EAEC might be unacceptable to most of them. A trading bloc might mean surrendering the specific national styles of industrial policies that East Asian governments had learned to use. The structural changes within domestic economies might topple governments, whose claim to political legitimacy lay in their ability to promote smooth national development. Another problem was that a regional group needed a leader, but no suitable one was in sight, despite Malaysian hopes. Japan was a dominant supplier of capital, technology and intermediate goods, but nothing else. If we exclude Japan’s imports of agricultural products, raw materials, and energy, in the beginning of the 1990s Japan actually imported quite little from the other Pacific Asian countries. The situation was more conspicuous the more advanced the exports of a country were. The share was larger from the ASEAN countries than from the ANIEs, and if the pattern continued, Japan’s importance as a market would actually diminish in the future as the other East Asian countries upgraded their industrial structures. In an economistic world a leader should be economically benevolent, as the United States had been throughout the post-World War II period. Japan was not. It kept its market shielded from Pacific Asian industrial products (Park 1991:112). In cases where Asian exporters were successful in beating Japanese companies, the Japanese government regularly succumbed to domestic interest groups, and blocked the entry of those goods. Such a situation had recently occurred in the case of Korean knitwear exports to Japan: Japan had promptly forced South Korea to accept voluntary export restraints (Garnaut 1991:25; Takenaka 1991:69). It seemed that until the political turmoil in Japan ended, and a government strong enough to implement the structural measures needed for making Japan a significant importer of the manufactured goods of other Asian countries, no possibility existed for Japan to become the integrating nucleus of the region, far less a leader (Park 1991:117–20). There had been loose discussion about an emerging yen bloc, but in practice only little evidence could be found for it. A production block dominated and led by Japan might exist in East Asia, directed to markets outside Japan, but nothing else (Grant et al . 1993:51–4; Young 1993:126). The simple flying geese image, picturing Japanese leadership of the region, started to become paler during the 1990s, even though the theory itself continued to become better known globally. While Japan’s economy stagnated during the 1990s, and that of the other East Asian countries continued to grow, the image of Japan’s leadership was eclipsed. It did not disappear, but became less salient. Japan’s image began to suffer from the same disease affecting Europe and America. In the economistic developmental rhetoric, which Japan itself had helped to emerge, the important criterion was the speed of growth and development, not the amount of riches a country currently possesed. ASEAN as a group, and even South Korea as a country, could now place themselves on a par with Japan in
< previous page
page_185
next page >
< previous page
page_186
next page >
Page 186 terms of regional political leadership. These two contenders were dwarfed by China, which had become the successful country in terms of the developmental evaluative criteria par excellence (Young 1993:125). East Asia as a bloc thus seriously lacked a political leader. The situation pointed more towards mutual conflict than mutual cooperation. Nor did they form a trading bloc between themselves. Trade intensities among East Asian countries were growing, but important export markets still lay outside their area. In terms of trade they were deeply integrated with other regions, especially with North America. If a confrontation developed between, say, the EAEC and NAFTA, EAEC would be the loser, while North America would be able to fill much of its needs for labour-intensive manufactures and raw materials from Latin American countries, or from within its own economy. This was the basic rationale for the existence of NAFTA. An additional aspect of the situation was that there was asymmetry between NAFTA and the proposed EAEC. NAFTA was not seriously trade diverting, because trade barriers among its members had traditionally been low. An EAEC would be considerably trade diverting, because mutual protection in East Asia had traditionally been high. At least in the short run its formation might put North American exports to the region into difficulties, which might be a sufficient reason for a political confrontation. This was the third serious argument against making an East Asian trading group a reality. As an idea, however, it was still usable. The EAEC option should be kept on the bargaining table. It could be used in influencing the trade behaviour on the other two continents, and to ‘maintain discipline in NAFTA’ (Young 1993:128). It is exactly in this sense that the Japanese have been using the EAEC in their trade negotiations with the United States. For instance MITI Minister Hashimoto warned in 1995 that Japan would have to turn to EAEC if NAFTA became a closed bloc (Funabashi 1995a:311–2). The PAFTAD consensus was that a free trading world would be the best option for everyone. If there was division, a world divided between European and Pacific-centred regions would be the second best option. The formation of an EAEC, and the world divided between three economically strong continents would be only the third best option. In any case East Asia should try to increase its own imports, and ease the adjustment burden of the older regional centres. (Drysdale and Garnaut 1993; English and Smith 1993; Soesastro 1993). The economic case for an EAEC was not seen as pressing. Especially after the Uruguay round negotiations were finally concluded at the end of 1993, the immediate worry over the world degenerating into three trading blocs receded. However, it did not go away completely, and could easily be revived during the next global economic downturn. More important than the institutional level results of the EAEC initiative have been conceptual changes. The greatest of them was that
< previous page
page_186
next page >
< previous page
page_187
next page >
Page 187 Mahathir’s initiative shattered the geographical metaphor of Western Pacific, replacing it with East Asia. The term itself was understandable. Southeast Asia, in spite of all the developmental rhetoric, still represented poverty. Only Singapore had really escaped that. Malaysian plans for the future were ambitious, and because rhetorically a Pacific Asian developmental community already existed, it was logical to adopt a geographical metaphor that would place Malaysia and the rest of ASEAN together with the more advanced Asian countries. The concept of East Asia had traditionally referred to the Sinic cultural sphere, principally to China, Korea, and Japan, but as shown previously, the term had occasionally been extended to Southeast Asia during the 1980s in complementary speeches of visiting Japanese ministers, or in Ricky Tung’s 1984 proposal for an EAC. Mahathir simply made this usage widely known. The various implications of the new metaphor are important. In a sense, it made the concept of Southeast Asia less useful. An indication of this trend may be that during the 1990s ASEAN has increasingly been written in various publications as a proper name: Asean. As all acronyms, which are meant to be pronounced, rather than spelled out, it has a tendency to become used as an ordinary name. The official acronym has not changed, but, for instance, the ASEAN Free Trade Area, agreed to in 1992, and finally launched 1 January 1994, was not shortened to ‘ASEANFTA’, but to AFTA. The AFTA has never aroused the same type of political passion as the EAEC, because the global economic repercussions are far smaller, and the absence of Japan or China has kept the political big power dimension out (Winter 1994). If ASEAN increasingly became Asean, Southeast Asia would remain in the etymology of the term, but otherwise it might slide away from usage in ASEAN’s connection. However, if the concept of Southeast Asia should ever disappear from discussion, Mahathir’s proposal would be only a step along the way. The Indian subcontinent had left it during the 1970s, becoming South Asia. Now, if ASEAN was becoming East Asia, the situation might be curious for South Asian countries, especially India. It started to restructure its closed economic system at the turn of the decade, trying to emulate the export-led success of the Pacific Asian countries, and to forge closer relations with them (Naseem and Chee 1992). It might have been easier if the 1950s metaphor of Southeast Asia with India at its centre had still existed. Of course the conceptual division does not prevent the establishment of close relations, but it can inhibit such moves. Another implication was East Asia’s relations with the rest of the Western Pacific. The new metaphor became a grave foreign political issue, felt especially keenly in Australia and New Zealand. Since the 1960s they had oriented themselves increasingly towards Pacific Asia, away from Europe, and seen themselves as part of the dynamic Western Pacific group (Byrnes 1994). The evaporation of the Western Pacific metaphor led, for example, to the argument in Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans’
< previous page
page_187
next page >
< previous page
page_188
next page >
Page 188 diplomatic campaign in 1995, with the aid of specially drawn maps, to convince ASEAN that even though Australians and New Zealanders were not ethnically Asians, both countries were integral parts of ‘the concept of East Asian hemisphere’ (Hiebert 1995). Evans argued that his metaphor is a normal geographic concept, just like the metaphor of the American hemisphere, reaching from the North Pole to the Antarctic (1996: lecture). In addition to possibly harming Australian and New Zealand economic interests, the conceptual change has larger potential consequences. The Western Pacific had been an amorphous concept, and only loose economic cooperation could be depicted with it. No racial or cultural unity could be argued with the term. When the Anglo-Saxons of Oceania were conceptually thrown out, and Japan had been taken in to East Asia, the way was opened to racial, cultural, and political interpretations of the area. The Confucian argument, explaining the economic success of Japan and the Tigers on the basis of ancient Chinese culture (e.g. Rozman 1991; Song 1994), was not usable in ASEAN’s case. It would have been difficult to present Islamic Indonesia, Buddhist Thailand, or the Christian Philippines as Confucian societies. Malaysia has significant Chinese and Indian minorities, and it is difficult to maintain harmony between them. Confucian arguments which praised the Chinese were degrading to the other ethnic groups, and thus dangerous in domestic politics. Mahathir dropped Confucianism away from the cultural argument for Pacific Asian uniqueness, and adopted the metaphor of Asia in its place. This conceptually opened the way for the emergence of the discussion of Asian values. This conceptual change happened simultaneously with the reduction of meaning of the earlier metaphors denning the international system. The political ‘East’ and ‘West’ disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Both had been multicultural and multiracial metaphors. ‘North’ and ‘South’ were also disappearing with the emergence of new development and integration theories. They too had been amorphous metaphors, with Japan strongly in the ‘North’, and Latin America with its European based culture in the ‘South’. The terms ‘first’, ‘second’, and ‘third’ world had become obsolete. The second world, which had denoted the group of socialist countries led by the Soviet Union, had disappeared by 1991. The countries became conceptualized as ‘emerging markets’, on the same level with middle-income developing countries. They did not become part of the third world, because that concept had been torn apart by the emergence of the Pacific Asian rapidly developing countries. It was in this situation of conceptual flux that the rise of continental metaphors, (East) Asia, (North) America, and (Western) Europe, took place. Anxiety about the Uruguay round was also high at the time. There was Samuel Huntington’s idea of clashing civilizations (1993), and discussion of emerging continental trading blocs in America, Asia, and Europe (Leuenberger and Weinstein 1992; Thurow 1992; Mason and Turay 1994; Hosono 1995; Kakazu 1995). The concept of the Pacific as an ocean
< previous page
page_188
next page >
< previous page
page_189
next page >
Page 189 connecting different cultures, races, and political systems could be phased out of discussion, and the standard geographical terms of reference would then become the continents of Europe, America, and Asia, with all the possibilities for verbal tension along a multitude of boundaries. This could facilitate the formation of economic, political, and military blocs on the basis of gradually hardening attitudes between—and increasing rhetoric regarding unity within— the different continents. Oceanic metaphors like ‘Pacific’ or ‘Atlantic’ do not facilitate discussion of autarky, because the image of large expanses of water brings to mind ships, aeroplanes, and long-distance communication in general. Continental metaphors imply shorter distances, and are better suited for conceptual bloc formation. Metaphors are to an extent independent of users and context, and tend to channel discussion along confined paths. The rise of continentalist metaphors definitely signifies a new type of global confrontational rhetoric, and their widespread use may further aggravate this tendency. Continentalism can be understood as an enlargened form of nationalism. The importance of the nation-state has been eroding, although it has far from disappeared. But nation-states are only one sort of imagined community (Anderson 1995). The atavistic nationalism that has often been presented in this context can easily take new forms in larger scale communities, such as economically and politically integrated, ethnically and culturally unified continents. Western Europe and North America are obviously farther along this road, while East Asia is still much more divided. A new breed of political ideology would be needed for the further development of Continentalism; economic integration would not form a sufficient mass psychological basis. These things take time, and the economistic narrative is still going fairly strong in its current cycle. Mahathir’s proposal should not be seen as the initiating event of such a process—a process that has been going on for a long time—alongside economic quarrelling between these regions. However, there has been an intensification during the 1990s. American criticism of the East Asian countries has increased (Weiss 1989; Friedman and Lebard 1991). Perhaps the most notable argument was an article by the American economist and PAFTAD participant Paul Krugman in Foreign Affairs, where he compared contemporary East Asian countries with the Warsaw Pact countries of the 1950s. They had strong authoritarian regimes, which limited individual liberties, and sacrificed short-run consumer interests for long-run industrial growth, intent on outperforming the decadent West. The socialist growth rates were impressive at that time, but they were achieved mainly by mobilizing existing resources: employment was growing, women and agricultural labourers became industrial workers, educational levels rose, and the stock of physical capital (machines, roads) increased. This was most of it, and such growth is necessarily limited; it ended in the collapse of European socialism. In contrast, Western countries grew by raising their
< previous page
page_189
next page >
< previous page
page_190
next page >
Page 190 levels of efficiency, by learning how to utilize their resources better, not simply seeking more of them. Krugman pointed out that most growth in East Asia is taking place by a similar simple increase of inputs as had happened in relation to the socialist growth, with little growth in efficiency, and predicted that its future would not be as bright as commonly believed (1994; see also Krugman 1996). This article rocked the boat of Pacific Asian enthusiasts, and after two years it was still making waves (Quibria 1996). Mahathir is perhaps the principal East Asian leader arguing in continentalist terms. He has, for example, in 1995 chastised Europeans and Americans for deliberately allowing the massacre and rape of hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims (Mahathir 1995). Besides Mahathir, Singaporean leaders have been quite vocal. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew saw in the West ‘guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public—in sum the breakdown of civil society’ (Zakaria 1994:111). Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs Kishore Mahbubani impeached the West in regard to disappearing budgetary discipline, low savings and investment rates, an eroding work ethic, pork-barrel politics, and lack of leadership (1993). Europe he saw encircled by a ‘ring of fire’ of military conflict from Russia through the Balkans to North Africa. If European stagnation continues, the ring of fire may close in on the continent (Mahbubani 1994). A Singaporean PAFTAD veteran offers similar arguments, adding the aging of Western societies, making them ‘adverse to taking risks, less innovation minded’. This has already led to the relative decline of the West, and the trend is likely to deepen during the twenty-first century (Lim 1995). An important East Asian continentalist book was co-authored by Mahathir and the Japanese LDP parliamentarian Ishihara Shintarō. It was called ‘No’ to ieru Ajia (The Asia that can say ‘no’) (1994). It was actually the fourth book in the series of ‘No’ books that Ishihara had written with various other nationalists. The first was ‘No’ to ieru Nihon (The Japan that can say ‘no’), written together with Sony Company’s Morita Akio (1989). It sold over a million copies in Japan, and ‘No’ to ieru Ajia has also become a bestseller. The line that Ishihara has taken in his books has been simply that the Japanese should become ‘adults’ (otona no Nihonjin) (Morita and Ishihara 1989:159). Relying on their possession of advanced technology and superior intelligence (sugureta chiteki nōryoku), Japan should stop meekly following the lead of the United States, and start saying ‘no’ to it. Japan should direct its technological prowess to nurturing the development of Asian countries, and ally itself with them, rather than with the United States. This would bring in the new Pacific age (shin Taiheiyō jidai) (1989:158). Ishihara was already a storyteller who introduced confrontational elements into the Pacific age narrative. ‘No’ to ieru Ajia presented East Asian continentalism in a more mature form. It still belonged within the Pacific age narrative, as implied by references to the term. However, ‘Pacific age’ was now used by both authors
< previous page
page_190
next page >
< previous page
page_191
next page >
Page 191 interchangeably with the terms ‘Asian age’ (Ajia no jidai) and ‘Asian century’ (Ajia no seiki). Mahathir’s goal was to turn Malaysia into an advanced country by 2020, and foreign investment, combined with hard-working Malaysians, was seen as the means to realize this goal. The economic downturn at the beginning of the 1990s had affected mainly the industrialized countries, while economic growth in the East Asian countries had continued almost without change. East Asian economic development appeared no longer dependent on North American and Western European markets. The region seemed to have entered a self-feeding process, where East Asian economic growth would sustain itself far into the twenty-first century. There was no stopping East Asia becoming the economic centre of the world. This economic assertiveness was combined with similar arguments relating to culture. The original Pacific age narrative had started in the nineteenth century, with Europe already established as the centre of the world, but Mahathir and Ishihara changed the time frame. They started from earlier centuries, depicting Asian culture as older than the European one, with major technological inventions, such as paper and gunpowder, originating there. Genghis Khan had subjugated a large part of Europe at one time. The envious Europeans had caught up with Asia, and after much effort had finally succeeded in giving Asia colonial status during the nineteenth century. But that was only a historical anomaly, which ended with the economic and cultural stagnation of Europe and America, exemplified by increasing crime, drugs, divorces, homosexual marriages, and whatever. The situation would be rectified during the twenty-first century, when Asia would again resume its rightful central place in the world. At the same time, traditional Asian values, based on close family and kinship ties, would replace the mistaken EuroAmerican individualistic ones (Mahathir and Ishihara 1994:94–165). When it came to the issue of Japan’s government formally apologizing in 1995 for its wartime deeds on behalf of the Asian countries, which was the central goal of Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s Asian policy, Mahathir was simply of the opinion that such an apology was not necessary. He had been born in 1925 in colonized Malaya, under British rule. During the war he had worked at a stall in the marketplace, and Japanese soldiers had always paid for what they bought. Bad things had been done during the war, but at least Japan had shown that Europeans could be beaten. If the Japanese had been able to do it, other Asians could certainly do the same. Malaysians could thus in part thank the Japanese for their independence. After the war Japan had beaten Europe and America in the economic sector, and again Asia was able to learn self-reliance from Japan’s example. Japanese investment had played a crucial role in creating Malaysia’s present prosperity. The past was past, the present good, and the future bright. There was no reason to apologize for the war any more (Mahathir and Ishihara 1994:17–21, 171–2).
< previous page
page_191
next page >
< previous page
page_192
next page >
Page 192 East Asian regionalism was another central topic of the book. The EAEC should naturally be made into a viable organization, although it should be kept under the APEC umbrella. However, because the book appeared as part of the discussion about the 50-year anniversary of the ending of World War II, the authors took a direct stand on the war issue. They used various metaphors for depicting regional unity, the EAEC being only one of them. Mahathir talked about an East Asian economic area, with Japan as the first of its members (Nihon wo hajime to sum ware-ware Higashi Ajia keizaiken) (1994:16). Ishihara went a step further, and talked about a new economic coprosperity sphere in Asia (Ajia ni aratana keizai kyōeiken). He readily admitted that it sounded much like the wartime Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere (Dai Tōa kyōeiken), but because military power was no longer important in the new economistic world, and because Japan had become an ordinary Asian country, the re-emergence of an East Asian coprosperity sphere would mean only beneficial results for all countries concerned. It was a structure through which Japanese technology could continue flowing to the other East Asian countries. This was combined with the idea of a ‘yen sphere’ (en keizaiken) . The Asian countries would do well to abandon the rapidly weakening dollar. Only two decades earlier a dollar had cost 360 yen, at the time it cost about 100 yen, and Ishihara expected that in the not too distant future the dollar’s price would be only two yen (Ishihara 1994:207–31). Taiwanese Kyū Eikan and Japanese Watanabe Shōichi published a book called Ajia kyōenken no jidai (The age of the Asian common yen), with quite similar argumentation. They pointed out how fast the Russian rouble lost its value after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and predicted that a similar thing might happen in the case of the US dollar. A yen bloc does not yet exist in East Asia, but the authors suggest that the countries should set it up to protect themselves against their dollar holdings turning into rubbish (1994). During the spring of 1995 it seemed that these predictions were rapidly coming true, as the yen rose steeply, peaking at 78 yen to the dollar (Tanaka 1996:228). But because of the poor Japanese economic performance the rate has since fallen, first back to the rough $1/¥100 rate, and by spring 1997 to the $1/¥120 rate. This has somewhat dampened the enthusiasm of Japanese continentalists. Mahathir and Ishihara were not the first to use the expression ‘Asian century’. One of the earliest users was probably the American author Julian Weiss (1989). Nevertheless, it is among East Asian authors that the term has acquired the widest usage. The Commission for A New Asia, set up with money from the Japanese Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and drawing its membership from political veterans in East Asian countries, such as Ōkita Saburō, talked about ‘Asian renaissance’ and East Asia becoming the economic centre in the twenty-first century (Commission for A New Asia 1994). After Mahathir’s and Ishihara’s book it has not been difficult to find the expression ‘Asian age’ in Japanese publications
< previous page
page_192
next page >
< previous page
page_193
next page >
Page 193 (Kim 1995; Kokubun 1996; Tanaka 1996). The eastern side of the Pacific has been abandoned to stagnation in this rhetoric, while East Asia alone seems to be heading towards the glory of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, this rhetoric is far from being as jubilant as was the somewhat naive Pacific age rhetoric during the early 1980s. Besides the conflictual situation with America and Europe, there is also a nagging doubt about the East Asian region itself (Korhonen 1997). Asian age rhetoric is mainly conducted in the Japanese language, but the Chinese language area presents a quite different rhetorical landscape. A corresponding antagonistic discussion process against the West also is being conducted in Chinese, but argues mostly in terms of Chinese, not Asian, culture. As Kokubun Ryōsei has noted, if you ask a Chinese if he is an Asian, in many cases he becomes embarrassed (1996:3). Asia as a metaphor connoting self-identity has never sunk deep in China’s psyche. Deng Xiaoping continued, as long as he remained politically active, to promote a mixture of economism and nationalism in his speeches (Deng 1993), while Jiang Zemin’s ascendancy, especially during 1996, has meant that a strong emphasis on old Chinese culture has been added to the political rhetoric (Communist Party of China Central Committee 1996). A more typical metaphor than East Asia in the Chinese area is the concept of Greater China (Da Zhonghua). It is a cultural and economic, rather than a political concept, which in recent discussion denotes affinity and cooperation among the Chinese societies on the mainland with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries (Shambaugh 1995). A longtime student of Pacific age rhetoric can have a feeling of déjà vu, when he comes across a book in a Taipei bookshop entitled 21 Zhongguo ren shiji (The twenty-first century will be the century of the Chinese people), and whose argument is simply that the British ruled the nineteenth century, the Americans the twentieth, and soon it will be the turn of the Chinese (Shen 1996). Japan and the other Pacific Asian countries are only given a minor role in this vision. Consequently, the problem of China’s future role in global and regional politics has recently attracted much attention in Japan and elsewhere (Masuda and Hatano 1995; Yokoyama 1995; Howe 1996; Kokubun 1996; Taylor 1996). Continentalism evokes not only quarrelling but also cooperative moves. In Bangkok in March 1996 the first Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) at the summit level was organized, based on previous cooperation in multiple fora from G7 meetings to the ARF (Bridges 1996). Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong suggested the ASEM summit to the French President Frangois Mitterrand in 1995, and as one of his last foreign political actions Mitterrand started the preparations (Nanjō 1996:9). At the meeting Europe was represented by the fifteen countries of the EU, while Asia consisted of ten countries: the ASEAN seven (with Vietnam added in 1995), Japan, China and South Korea. It was thus EAEC in practice, although not in name. If the organization is to be established someday,
< previous page
page_193
next page >
< previous page
page_194
next page >
Page 194 this meeting was probably an important milestone because various preparatory meetings of officials of the ten countries preceded the summit. ASEM’s agenda was limited to discussions of mutual trade and investment. Nevertheless, no special target was set for the summit. The main purpose was the meeting itself, and its symbolic values, as had also been the case with the first Pacific integration meetings. The EU had become interested in East Asia because of its economic allure (The Economist 1996). East Asian countries were likewise interested in economic cooperation, but the symbolic aspects of the meeting were probably more important. One of them was simply the historic first meeting of Asia and Europe on an equal footing, but in an East Asian capital, with an agenda written in East Asia. Carefully edging the EAEC forward was another goal. The MOFA had adopted this kind of indirect strategy to deal with the foreign political problems of the EAEC. Another similar case was Japan’s decision to participate in June 1996 at the East Asia Ministerial Meeting on Support and Assistance to the Greater Mekong Region in Kuala Lumpur; not necessarily a big meeting, but a way of getting ministers of East Asian countries together to establish patterns of mutual cooperation while distributing development aid. Third, ASEM took place without the presence of either Americans or Australians, signifying East Asian emerging independence from American control (Furukawa 1996). Cooperation across the Eurasian landmass could also be used—by Europeans as well as Asians—as leverage in disputes with the United States. The meeting ended in publicly amicable circumstances, as was expected. The next ASEM is scheduled to take place in April 1998 in London. Nonetheless, too much should not be read into the meeting at this stage. It was only one move in the adjustment process between economic regions in the flux of the 1990s world. It is too early to start painting pictures of an ‘Eurasian age’. In 1995 the United States, Britain, and some other Western European governments also floated the idea of a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) (Funabashi 1995a:237). Nothing special has emerged thus far, but it is another move in the new complicated global search for allies, partners, and prospective enemies that helps in the construction of group identities. The East Asian subnarrative of the Pacific story is still quite young, and as it proceeds, it may develop into an independent legend, with a constructed etymology reaching deep into history. However, in its present identity it must still be seen as a late form of the current cycle of the Pacific age narrative. The story still promises great abundance for those who are strong and able, but stagnant countries are condemned to losing the competition. It no longer tells about simple peace and prosperity for all, but about prosperity for the chosen ones, and oblivion for the rest. Outright continentalist enemy images are still relatively weak. Conflictual aspects have been brought out for the economic, political, and
< previous page
page_194
next page >
< previous page
page_195
next page >
Page 195 cultural fields, but seldom for the more dangerous military one. The narrative of the Pacific age will probably continue to unfold for some time to come. In spite of conflictual aspects, the institutional structures and patterns of cooperation over the Pacific are nowadays stronger than ever before. This may be a suitable place to depart from the Pacific story, and end this book.
< previous page
page_195
next page >
< previous page
page_196
next page >
Page 196 12 Conclusion Economism is one of the great modern Romance stories. Although it is a theoretical ideal type, some countries, one of them being Japan, have presented fairly close manifestations of the concept in the material world. Economism extols the virtues of concentrating on economic activity, development of industries, and trade. Economism is supposed to enrich its practitioners, and at the same time create peaceful domestic and international societies, based on the mechanisms of deepening interdependence, and generous distribution of material rewards in a situation of continuously increasing abundance. Economistic rhetoric tends to employ the reductionist trope of metonymy, elevating economic activity to become all-encompassing, and pushing other dimensions, especially the political and military ones, to the conceptual periphery, where they do not much matter. The contemporary absolute and relative levels of material well-being that one encounters in Pacific Asia, and the continuing increases in that well-being, display forcefully the fact that even though Romances may appear naive to the intellectually sophisticated, they are very powerful in creating revolutionary changes in our world. The practical effects of economism in the Pacific area were aided by the other contemporary regional grand Romance, the Pacific age. Its effects were the most pronounced in inventing the Pacific as a focus of cooperation. Pacific tropes were also metonymical. As a neutral and beautiful geographic metaphor the Pacific depicted an ocean of communication and cooperation with a glorious future. It linked different cultures, religions, races, ethnic groups, economic and political systems. Highlighting this diversity might easily have rent asunder the imaginary region, but working together with economism the Pacific narrative partly concealed these non-geographic aspects. Peaceful Pacific as a focus then enabled the creation of a series of international organizations from the IPR to APEC, while providing an array of images and slogans with which to sell these organizations to various political audiences. This institutional structure is more robust than it seems. Because all Pacific institutions are only discussion clubs, and do not purport to be more, they do not create too high expectations in terms of efficiency of
< previous page
page_196
next page >
< previous page
page_197
next page >
Page 197 decision making, and can, at least in principle, endure setbacks without breaking. Any single organization can be abandoned without great damage. That holds true even for APEC. The only crucial thing is that the Pacific remains a conceptually organizing focus, and that attractive narratives continue to be spun about it. New organizations can always be established when the need arises. The whole process shows how important academics have been in Pacific politics. They were able to initiate the first international networks under the shield of their seeming academic purity, even though in policy-oriented conferences rhetorically they tended to posit themselves as representatives of their nations, something like diplomats. The economic sector was easier to deal with than security, as seen, for example, in the various outcomes of the China-Taiwan disputes in different situations, cooperation moving forward first in that sector. It fits nicely into the pattern that North Korean economists participated for the first time in PAFTAD 22 in Ottawa in 1995 (English and Runnalls 1997). Similarly, security experts launched their own international conferencing networks during the 1980s. Officials in their private capacity can then become involved in creating structures like PECC or CSCAP. Finally the process can move to an openly political plane with APECs and ARFs, with summit meetings set up in appropriate political circumstances. Academics are still needed throughout the activity as mappers of the conceptual terrain, sometimes in a visible role such as the EPG played in APEC. More often they act less visibly as university professors, consultants, or members of PAFTAD and ASEAN ISIS networks. Politicians are needed for making decisions, and marketing them to national and international audiences, while bureaucrats handle best the practical details of running established international processes. The structure is flexible, but also robust. If international tensions intensify to the degree that APEC or ARF can no longer function, cooperation can always fall back on PECC or CSCAP. If they too are paralysed, the academic networks can still function in most cases, as shown by the example of the IPR in the history of Pacific integration. Once again we start to approach the turn of a decade, and with it the turn of a century, and a millennium. Great hopes, political promises, and much psychological energy have been invested in this point of time. The international system is bound to be nervous as we near the new millennium. The mystical power that we humans attach to these changing numbers can easily be translated into the idea of the ending of an old world, and the beginning of a new one. This will enable the launching of quite unexpected political projects in different parts of the globe, like the Japanese-American launching of the Pacific age narrative in the apparently stable European-dominated world a century ago. The past couple of decades can actually be seen as a preparation for the change, as reflected in the intensification of the use of concepts like
< previous page
page_197
next page >
< previous page
page_198
next page >
Page 198 the Pacific age, the twenty-first century, and the third millennium. The fundamental changes in the global structure at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s should perhaps be interpreted as part of the change of the millennium. The visions were frequently put to use already at that time. The real change will not be restricted to the crossing over from 31 December 1999 to 1 January 2000, but spread out to cover several years before and after that date. The change of the millennium is already taking place. We have been living it for some time already. Yet, the psychology of transition will be more intense closer to the mystical date. It is not easy to predict what kind of projects will be launched, and by whom, although most of the ingredients are probably already among us in the media. Each decade has had different intellectual fads, by which different countries and regions have been depicted as successes and failures. No story can remain the same for long in international discussion. It must either change, or end and be forgotten. The new stories cannot be foretold; only their coming can be anticipated. But they will be invented, because social storytelling is the point of politics itself. Every single leader who is in office at 1 January 2000 knows that he or she has to seize the historical moment. We can thus devise a speculative ending for our story of Japan and Asia Pacific integration for the next three or four decades. It will not be true, but the composition of the Pacific Romances requires it. History has rules. They are not binding, but exist nonetheless. The human world is built on the power of smaller and grander stories, and stories are cyclical phenomena. They are born, they live, and they end. There exists an eternal recurrence of narrative patterns, interacting with the cycles of the material world, such as the fluctuating performance of the units of the global economic system, or the political cycles of national governments and great powers. On the other hand, the imagined communities called countries and nations, once formed, are relatively stable entities; they may change their political forms and economic systems, integrate or disintegrate, but they disappear only seldom. According to the cyclical model of this study, the final years of the twentieth century are likely to be economically prosperous, with economic development continuing briskly in Pacific Asia. Both the European and American economies are doing reasonably well, and even Japan emerges from its gloom. The global economy will thus arrive in good shape at the point of transition to the twentyfirst century. In his New Year’s address the Japanese prime minister, simultaneously with other regional leaders, can triumphantly declare that the Asia Pacific century has now begun. The end state of the Pacific age Romance has properly been reached. It would diminish the political attractiveness of the narrative, because celebrating the future is always easier than praising the present. Notwithstanding, some of the dates, such as the APEC free trade area project, reach up to 2020, creating space for the continuing use of the narrative.
< previous page
page_198
next page >
< previous page
page_199
next page >
Page 199 The beginning of the third millennium would occasion other types of agespeak. The EU, after establishing the common currency in 1999, would obviously need to bolster it with optimistic slogans, such as the European millennium. The Americans would need to promote their planned FTAA by 2005, and ‘all American century’ could be a suitable expression. Russia would be growing rapidly by the turn of the century, and fitting with its central position between the East Asian and Western European economies, the arrival of the ‘Eurasian era’ could be utilized. In 2001 a global economic recession sets in. The world suffers from a psychological hangover of the jubilees of the millennial transition, noticing that not very much has actually changed. Global trade stagnates, and unemployment rates shoot up in the rich countries in Europe, North America, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and the special economic region of Hong Kong. Perceptions of scarcity loom in the air, and the global atmosphere is filled with tension. The EU is thrown into turmoil. Some members threaten to depart, as coping with the common currency, stagnating exports, aging population, and average unemployment rates of 25 percent, are a terrible strain for state finances already heavily in debt. The United States is furious about its worsening trade balance with Pacific Asia, threatens Japan and China with retaliation, and contemplates abandoning APEC. Japan’s government cannot do much, trying to cope with a real unemployment rate of 15 percent, drastic reduction in consumer confidence, and the appearance of a new party, Nippon Ichitō (Japan Number One Party), with a platform combining Shintō mythology with communitarian ideology, challenging the position of the LDP. A series of grand international conferences of APEC, NAFTA, EU, ASEM, G7, WTO, and UN member states is convened during 2001–4. The downturn is successfully managed in them, while brisk economic growth in China, Russia, Eastern Central Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America alleviates the global effects of the downturn. By 2003 the situation is stabilized, and economic growth starts to pick up in the industrialized countries. APEC’s name is changed to the Asia Pacific Economic Community, and the project of establishing a formal free trade area is brought forward to 2010, after China and Asean acceded to US demands of accelerating market opening measures, and Japan’s government pledged to initiate a state-sponsored ‘Buy American’ (Amerika seihin wo kaimashō) campaign. The WTO accedes to the practice, as a temporary phenomenon, in the name of international peace. At the same time Japan also tries to develop its ties with its infuriated Asian neighbours, which demand and get a corresponding ‘Buy Asian’ campaign. These international moves make LDP’s position even more difficult in Japan itself. To balance growing Chinese influence, Japan lobbies the inclusion of India into East Asian cooperation. An EAEC is not established, but an Asian Economic Caucus (AEC) is created outside of APEC in 2004. There is, however, much tension within the
< previous page
page_199
next page >
< previous page
page_200
next page >
Page 200 organization, as Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, China, and India all vie for a leadership role. Publicly these differences are patched over by emphasizing Asian unity in conferences. In the same year the EU accepts Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as members. By 2005 the world situation is relatively stable again. Crisis has once again been passed with the help of patient international collaboration. The latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century is again economically prosperous, and East Asia’s share of the world economy continues to grow. Age-speak had almost disappeared during the past few years, but returns again with the reopened global horizon of abundance. In 2007 a young Kenyan foreign student in Tokyo University’s student dormitory takes a world map on her knees, and starts to think that if all these Japanese, Chinese, and Southeast Asians have been able to create economic miracles, there is in principle nothing that would prohibit her country, and all Africa, from doing the same. She herself is certainly more intelligent than any of her lazy Japanese classmates. The Pacific area will be built up and enter stagnation within a few decades, while Africa bristles with hard-working people, only waiting for large amounts of capital to release its energies. South Asia is the same, and Southeast Asia’s growth potential remains high in the future. The Indian Ocean will become the real dynamic centre of the world during the twenty-first century. But why should the ocean be called Indian Ocean? India does not own it. It should be renamed the Central Ocean, because it is in the middle of the Eastern and Western Oceans. She decides to write a book of the twentyfirst century as the age of the Central Ocean, to show all Eastern Africans the great possibility waiting for them, if they only are determined enough to make it a reality. A new economic crisis hits in 2009. This one is quite severe. Global trade plummets to the 1979 level, and average unemployment figures reach 35 percent in the EU, 30 percent in Japan, and 25 percent in the United States. The European Communist Union (ECU), a newly reinvigorated movement of communist parties with a racist platform, sweeps several EU countries in elections in 2010–12, assumes majority in the Commission and Parliament, and declares in 2013 a dictatorship of the pure European proletariat. External trade collapses, while the subcontinent is ravaged by escalating conflicts within and between rebellious member states and the new central government. Russia becomes a haven for Western European refugees. By 2015 Britain, Ireland, and the Nordic countries have left the EU, and the situation has turned into uneasy peace. The United States with a leftist Democratic government bans all immigration in 2014, departs from APEC, NATO, UN, and WTO, and transforms the FTAA to the All American Union (AAU) to foster economic and security cooperation in the American continent. Nippon Ichitō forms a majority government with the Social Democratic Party in Japan in 2013, terminates defence cooperation with the United
< previous page
page_200
next page >
< previous page
page_201
next page >
Page 201 States, and turns towards strengthening cooperation within the AEC. Japan wants to rename it the Asian Union, and establish its headquarters in Tokyo. The move is, however, frustrated by China, which unilaterally declares itself the leader of the region, and bans the use of the concept of Asia as an obsolete European metaphor. It proclaims the beginning of the Chinese era, and summons all leaders of neighbouring countries to ascend to Beijing, bearing appropriate gifts, to discuss the establishment of a Greater China Cooperation Council (GCCC). Simultaneously, in the name of international justice for the dispossessed, China demands equal rights with Russia to develop the natural resources of Siberia. No representatives arrive at Beijing, and in 2014 China forms a military alliance with the new EU central government, promising it military aid. Chinese military forces take independent actions while the CCP elders debate policy, which results in uncoordinated border clashes with India and Russia, and unsuccessful attacks on Taiwan and Vietnam. Chinese forces are repelled from the South China Sea by joint Asean navies, but they succeed in routing the Japanese navy, occupying the Diaoyu islands. The EU tries to increase its political and military influence in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, being opposed by Russia and the Islamic Alliance. The battle line runs within countries in the EU’s periphery, resulting in political repression and coups, but not large-scale warfare. The situation remains tense. The United States reverses once again its policy, giving support to opponents of the EU, and deciding to remain in the Western Pacific as a military presence. A loose defensive alliance of Ring Powers is formed with the United States, Russia, India, Japan, Asean, and Australia against the Sino-European Twin-nuclei. Fear of mutual destruction precludes the start of a nuclear war, but the world moves to war footing, starting to prepare for a major conflict. This actually creates a boom in industrial production. The greatest beneficiary is Asean. It is situated in the middle of the major trade routes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans where the rising industrialization of India and Africa is being felt, while remaining relatively neutral in the global conflict, trading also with China. It rapidly expands its economy. In contrast, the world population as a whole faces serious deprivation, as trade patterns become ruptured, and arms buildup takes precedence over civilian production. Trade dependent Japan, Korea, and Taiwan face difficulties in feeding their populations, and even the United States suffers from widespread poverty. China and the EU are, however, the most severely affected. Cold War II continues until 2021, when the ECU government collapses in Europe under its own economic mismanagement and corruption, leading to further bloodshed in Europe as former independent states re-emerge and define their boundaries throughout the rest of the decade. It triggers a revolution in China, starting in Guangdong in 2022. The poor
< previous page
page_201
next page >
< previous page
page_202
next page >
Page 202 military showing of the central government, disruption of international trade, and economic hardships activate a legitimacy crisis for the CCP, and its forces gradually lose out. By 2025 Xinjiang, Tibet, and southern China emerge as independent countries, but the CCP retains power in northern China. In 2026 rich Asean proposes the establishment of a Global Trade Authority (GTA) to take over the duties of the defunct WTO, and help to revive the world economy. Efficient military, political, and economic cooperation during the past decade has led Asean to adopt a unified command structure, with a council of ministers acting as Asean’s government. A presidency circulates among member countries, and a central bureaucracy is situated in Singapore. Asean believes steadfastly in the power of economism to make the world a better place, because its effects can be seen all over the region. India, Mexico, Kenya, and South Africa readily agree to the proposal; as do the United States and Japan after ensuring that they do not have to make substantial financial contributions. In 2027 the GTA is finally established in Bangkok, and its membership starts to expand. Economic growth picks up globally, the rates being high all over as countries reconstruct their economies, and international trade increases rapidly. European countries with their combination of low wages and a high educational level are doing quite well. Discussion of a loose type of European economic cooperation flares up again. Building on their traditional ties, the Pacific countries agree to establish a Pacific Community (PC) in 2031, with an ambitious economic and political agenda, to ensure that the miseries of the previous years will never occur again. Within a few years it becomes the hub of contemporary international organizations, with biannual summits, a permanent council of senior officials, and a large bureaucracy in Jakarta. It acquires the nickname of ‘Pacific Concert’, because it orchestrates not only the global economy, but also world politics. In 2038 in Mombasa a small group of Kenyan, Indian, Sri Lankan, Aseanian, and Australian economists gather to discuss the viability of formalizing existing trade links between the countries. The idea of a Central Ocean Free Trade Area (COFTA) is frequently brought up in the debates. Even though nothing concrete emanates from the discussions, the participants agree to meet again in Colombo in 2039.
< previous page
page_202
next page >
< previous page
page_203
next page >
Page 203 Bibliography Abe, Shintarō (1987) ‘ASEAN kakudai gaisō kaigi ni okeru Abe gaimu daijin enzetsu’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 31 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 317–21. Adelman, Jonathan R. and Shin Chih-yu (1993) Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force 1840–1980, Taipei: The Institute of International Relations. Aggarwal, Mangat Ram and Pandey, Posh Raj (1994) ‘Prospects of Trade Expansion in the SAARC region’, in Garnaut, Ross and Drysdale, Peter (eds) Asia Pacific Regionalism. Readings in International Economic Relations, Pymble: HarperEducational in association with The Australia-Japan Research Centre, The Australian National University, 400–7. Aichi, Kiichi (1970) ‘Dai 63 kai kokkai ni okeru Aichi gaimu daijin no gaikō enzetsu, Shōwa_45 nen 2 gatsu 14 ka’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 14 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 353–6. Akamatsu, Kaname (1932) ‘Waga kuni keizai batten no shuku gōben shōhō’, in Shōgyō keizai ron, dai 15 kan jōsatsu. Nagoya: publisher unknown, 179–210. ——(1945) ‘Shinkōkoku sangyō batten no gankō keitai’, in Keizai shinchitsujo no keisei genri, kōhen dai 3 sho, Tokyo: publisher unknown, 299–314. ——(1975) [1927] ‘Wie ist das vernunftige Sollen und die Wissenschaft des Sollens bei Hegel möglich? Zur Kritik der Rickert’schen Abhandlung “Über idealistische Politik als Wissenschaft”’. in Monkasei (ed.) Gakumon henro. Akamatsu Kaname sensei tsuitō ronshū, Tokyo: Sekai keizai kenkyū kyōkai, 42–62. Akami, Tomoko (1994) ‘The Rise And Fall of a “Pacific Sense”: Experiment of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925–1930’, Shibusawa kenkyū, dai 7 go, 2– 37. Akrasanee, Narongchai (1980a) ‘Economic Development of Thailand and ASEAN Economic Cooperation, with Special Reference to Commodity Problems’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 315–38. (1980b) ‘Thailand and the Pacific Community’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.) The Pacific Community Concept. Views from Eight Nations. The Proceedings of the Asian Dialogue at Oiso, Japan, January 1980, Tokyo: JCIE, 84–95. ——(1981) ‘ASEAN and Pacific Economic Co-operation: A Survey of Issues of Interdependence’, in Sir Crawford, John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 163–73. Allan, Alberto Besa (1986) ‘Statement’, in Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Report of the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Vancouver, November 16–19, 1986, Ottawa: Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 51–2. Amaya, Naohiro (1969) Sekiyū kagaku no hanashi, Tokyo: Ninon Keizai Shinbunsha. ——(1973) ‘Prospects for Japanese-Australian Economic Cooperation’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Economic Cooperation in the Western Pacific. JapaneseAustralian Project, Report No. 1, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 40– 56.
< previous page
page_203
next page >
< previous page
page_204
next page >
Page 204 Anderson, Benedict (1995) Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London and New York: Verso. Anwar, M.Arsjad (1980) ‘Trade Strategies and Industrial Development in Indonesia’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 207–31. Ariff, Mohamed (1980) ‘Malaysia’s Trade and Industrialization Strategy with Special Reference to ASEAN Industrial Cooperation’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 280–308. ——(1991) ‘Introduction’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 1–10. Ariff, Mohamed and Hill, Hal (1986) ‘Industrial Policies and Performance in ASEAN’s “Big Four’”, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 81– 103. Arisawa, Hiromi, Ōkita Saburō and Wakimura Gitarō (1951) ‘Tōnan Ajia to Nihon keizai—zadankai’, Sekai, 12, 56–9. Arndt, Heinz W. (1975) ‘The Role of Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development: A Summing-Up’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 225–32. Asia Pacific Community. A Quarterly Review (1978–86) Tokyo: The Asian Club. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (1993) A Vision for APEC. Towards an Asia Pacific Economic Community. Report of the Eminent Persons Group to APEC Ministers, Singapore: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat. ——(1994) Achieving the APEC Vision. Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific. Second Report of the Eminent Persons Group, Singapore: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat. ——(1995a) Selected APEC Documents 1989–1994, Singapore: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat. ——(1995b) Selected APEC Documents, Singapore: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat. ——(1996a) APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration. From Vision to Action, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Home Page. ——(1996b) Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Home Page. Attali, Jacques (1990) Lignes d’Horizon, Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard. ——(1997) ‘Asia’s Ahead, Europe’s Behind’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 January. Awanohara Susumu (1989) ‘Japan and East Asia: Towards a New Division of Labour’, The Pacific Review, 2, 3, 198–217. Axelbank, Albert (1977) Black Star Over Japan. Rising Forces of Militarism, Tokyo: Tuttle. Axline, W.Andrew (ed.) (1994) The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation. Comparative Case Studies, London and Madison: Pinter and Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
< previous page
page_204
next page >
< previous page
page_205
next page >
Page 205 Ball, Desmond (1994) ‘A New Era in Confidence Building. The Second-Track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region’, Security Dialogue, 25, 2, 157–76. Bautista, Romeo M. (1980) ‘Trade Strategies and Industrial Development in the Philippines: With Special Reference to Regional Trade Preferences’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 175–201. Bautista, Romeo M. and Naya Seiji (eds) (1984) Energy and Structural Change in the Asia Pacific Region. Papers and Proceedings of the Thirteenth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in Manila, Philippines, January 24–28, 1983, Manila: The Philippine Institute for Development Studies and Asian Development Bank. Bell, Daniel (1966) The Reforming of General Education. The Columbia College Experience in its National Setting, New York and London: Columbia University Press. ——(1974) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting, London: Heinemann. Bergsten, C.Fred (1993) ‘Preface’, in Bergsten, C.Fred and Noland, Marcus (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, ix-x. Bey, Arifin (1987) Ajia-Taiheiyō no jidai, Tokyo: Chuo Kōronsha. Borthwick, Mark (1992) Pacific Century. The Emergence of Modem Pacific Asia, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford and Sydney: Westview Press and Allen & Unwin. Bosworth, Barry P. (1991) ‘The United States in the World Economy’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 44–59. Bouzas, Roberto and Lustig, Nora (eds) (1992) Liberalizacion comercial e integración regional, De NAFTA a Mercosur, Buenos Aires: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Bouzas, Roberto and Ros, Jaime (eds) (1994) Economic Integration in the Western Hemisphere, Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press. Brandt, William (1940) ‘The United States, China, and the World Market’, Pacific Affairs, 13, 3, 279–319. Brash, Donald (1972) ‘United States Investment in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 95–130. Bridges, Brian (1996) ‘Western Europe and East Asia: A Political Partnership Needed?’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 5, 4, 175–86. Brocheux, Pierre (1994) ‘Ne perdons pas le Nord’, Lettre de I’afrase, 34, 2–3. Brunei, Roger (1995) Geographic Universelle. Asie du Sud-Est, Océanie, Paris: Belin/Reclus. Bungei Shunjū (1970) ‘Keizai kyōkoku Nihon wo hyōkō chōsa sum’, shinnen tokubetsu go, 118–30. ——(1972) ‘Sayōnara Satō-san’, 12, 108–22. Byrnes, Michael (1994) Australia and the Asian Game, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin. Bywater, Hector C. (1970) [1921] Sea-Power in the Pacific. A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem, New York: Arno Press and The New York Times.
< previous page
page_205
next page >
< previous page
page_206
next page >
Page 206 ——(1991) [1924] The Great Pacific War. A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931–33, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Carr, E.H. (1966) [1946] The 20 Years’ Crisis. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, London: Macmillan. Castells, Manuel (1992) ‘Four Asian Tigers With a Dragon Head. A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim’, in Appelbaum, Richard P. and Henderson, Jeffrey (eds) States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage, 33–70. Castle, Leslie V. and Findlay, Christopher (eds) (1988) Pacific Trade in Services, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University. Castro, Amado (1973) ‘Comments and Discussion of Chough’s Paper’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Structural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific Trade. Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Pacific Trade and Development Conference sponsored by The Japan Economic Research Center and The Japan Institute of International Affairs, January 1973, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 146–9. ——(1980) ‘ASEAN Economic Cooperation’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 53–66. Caves, Richard E. (1986) ‘Industrial Policy and Trade Policy: A Framework’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 42–55. Chekhutov, Andrei I. (1976) ‘USSR: Economic Co-operation with the Developing Nations of Asia and the Pacific Area’, in Castle, Leslie V. and Holmes, Sir Frank (eds) Co-operation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region—Relations Between Large and Small Countries. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, August 25–28, 1975 and sponsored by The New Zealand Association . of Economists, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 192–7. Chen, Edward K.Y. (1990) ‘The Electronics Industry’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 51–73. Chen Tain-Yu, Ku Ymg-Hua and Liu Meng-Chun (1995) ‘Direct Investment in Low-wage and High-wage Countries: The Case of Taiwan’, in Chen, Edward K.Y. and Drysdale, Peter (eds) Corporate Links and Foreign Direct Investment in Asia and the Pacific, Pymble: HarperEducational in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University and Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 262–74. Chew Soon Beng (1990) ‘Singapore: The Information Technology Sector’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the AsiaPacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 246–57. Chia Siow Yue (1980) ‘Singapore’s Trade and Development Strategy, and ASEAN Economic Cooperation, with Special Reference to the ASEAN Common Approach to Foreign Economic Relations’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 241–72.
< previous page
page_206
next page >
< previous page
page_207
next page >
Page 207 Chough Soon (1973) ‘The Growth of Exports and Economic Development in Labor Surplus Economies—With Particular Reference to Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Structural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific Trade. Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Pacific Trade and Development Conference sponsored by The Japan Economic Research Center and The Japan Institute of International Affairs, January 1973, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 121–45. Clinton, Bill (1993) Remarks by President Clinton to Students and Faculty of Waseda University, July 7, 1993, Tokyo: Waseda University. Coe, David T. (1993) ‘Revised Weights for the World Economic Outlook ’, in International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, May 1993. A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 116–19. Commission for A New Asia (1994) Towards A New Asia, Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Communist Party of China Central Committee (1996) ‘Resolutions of the CPC Central Committee Regarding Important Questions on Promoting Socialist Ethical and Cultural Progress, Adopted at the Sixth Plenum of the 14th CPC Central Committee on October 10, 1996’, Beijing Review, 4–10 November, 20– 31. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (1979) An Asian-Pacific Regional Economic Organization: An Exploratory Concept Paper Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Consulate General of Malaysia (1991) East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), mimeo. Correspondents to The Economist (1963) Consider Japan, London: Duckworth. Croly, Herbert (1928) [1927] ‘The Human Potential in Pacific Polities’, in Condliffe, J.B. (ed.) Problems of the Pacific. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 577–90. Crump, Thomas (1992) The Japanese Numbers Game. The Use and Understanding of Numbers in Modern Japan, London and New York: Routledge. Cuadra, Miguel Angel (1975) ‘The Diffusion of Agricultural Technology. The Adaptation Problems’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 145–50. Curtis, Gerald L. (1977) ‘The Tyumen Oil Development Project and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, in Scalapino, Robert A. (ed.) The Foreign Policy of Modem Japan, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 147–73. Dale, Peter N. (1995) The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, London and New York: Routledge. Davenport, William Wyatt (ed.) (1948) The Pacific Era. A Collection of Speeches and Other Discourse in Conjunction with the Fortieth Anniversary of the Founding of the University of Hawaii, Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press. Davis, J.Merle (1929) ‘Will Kyoto Find the Trail?’, Pacific Affairs, 2, 11, 685–8. Deng, Xiaoping (1993) Deng Xiaoping sixiang baoku, Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe. Desmond, Edward W. (1995) ‘Ichirō Ozawa: Reformer at Bay’, Foreign Affairs, 74, 5, 117–29. Destler, I.M., Fukui Haruhiro and Satō Hideo (1979) The Textile Wrangle. Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969–1971, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
< previous page
page_207
next page >
< previous page
page_208
next page >
Page 208 Ding, Jing Ping (1990) ‘China: Policies for Technology Import’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 177–99. Dirlik, Arif (1992) ‘The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the Invention of a Regional Structure’, Journal of World History, 3, 1, 55–79. ——(ed.) (1993) What Is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea, Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press. Dowker, Heather (1996) ‘Blueprint for the Future’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 November. Drakakis-Smith, David (1992) Pacific Asia, London and New York: Routledge. Drysdale, Peter (1968) ‘Pacific Economic Integration: An Australian View’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Pacific Trade and Development. Papers and Proceedings of a Conference Held by The Japan Economic Research Center in January 1968, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 194–223. ——(1978) ‘An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: Regional Arrangements and the Resource Trade’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California, August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 611–48, ——(1988) International Economic Pluralism. Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australian National University. Drysdale, Peter and Garnaut, Ross (1993) ‘The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of Economic Integration’, in Bergsten, C.Fred and Noland, Marcus (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 183– 223. The Economist (1993) ‘Chinese puzzles’, 15 May. ——(1994) ‘A Dream of Free Trade’, 19 November. ——(1995a) ‘Making APEC Work’, 11 November. ——(1995b) ‘Japan Conquers APEC’, 11 November. ——(1996) ‘Has Europe Failed in Asia?’, 2 March. Edström, Bert (1988) Japan’s Quest for a Role in the World. Roles Ascribed to Japan Nationally and Internationally, 1969–1982, Dissertation, Stockholm: Institute of Oriental Languages, University of Stockholm. Eggleston, F.W. (1930) [1929] ‘Australia’s View of Pacific Problems’, Pacific Affairs, 3, 1, 3–16. El-Agraa, Ali M. (1988) (ed.) International Economic Integration, Houndmills and London: Macmillan. Ellwood, David (1990) ‘The American challenge and the origins of the politics of growth’, in Smith, M.L. and Stirk, Peter M.R. (eds) Making the New Europe. European Unity and the Second World War, London and New York: Pinter, 184–99. Emmerson, John K. (1976) Arms, Yen and Power. The Japanese Dilemma, Tokyo: Tuttle. ——(1984) ‘“Southeast Asia”: What’s in a Name?’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 15, 1, 1–21. English, H.Edward (1981) ‘Economic Prospects for the Asia-Pacific Region in the 1980s’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Cooperation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 50–6.
< previous page
page_208
next page >
< previous page
page_209
next page >
Page 209 English, H.Edward and McFetridge, Donald G. (1986) ‘Industrial Policy: The Canadian Case’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 59– 80. English, H.Edward and Runnalls, David (eds) (1997) Environment and Development in the Pacific: Problems and Policy Options, Melbourne: Addison Wesley Longman in association with the Pacific Trade and Development Conference. English, H.E. and Scott, Anthony (eds) (1982) Renewable Resources in the Pacific. Proceedings of the 12th Pacific Trade and Development Conference, held in Vancouver, Canada, 7–11 September 1981, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. English, H.Edward and Smith, Murray G. (1991) ‘The Role of Multilateralism and Regionalism: A Pacific Perspective’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 253–75. ——(1993) ‘NAFTA and Pacific Partnership: Advancing Multilateralism?’, in Bergsten, C.Fred and Noland, Marcus (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 159–82. Estanislao, Jesus P. (1980) ‘The Philippines and the Pacific Community Concept’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.) The Pacific Community Concept. Views from Eight Nations. The Proceedings of the Asian Dialogue at Oiso, Japan, January 1980, Tokyo: JCIE, 72–6. Etherton, P.T. and Tiltman, H.Hessell (1928) The Pacific: A Forecast, London: Ernest Benn. Etō, Shinkichi (1967) ‘Ajia no naka no Nihonjin’, Bungei Shunjū, 8, 110–20. Evans, Gareth (1995) ‘Chairman’s Summary Statement’, in Selected APEC Documents 1989–1994, Singapore: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Secretariat, 37–43. Evans, Paul M. (1994) ‘Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), The Pacific Review, 1, 2, 125–39. Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo (1980) ‘Comparative Experience with Economic Integration in Developing Countries: Failures and Successes in Latin America’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 138–64. Flamm, Kenneth (1990) ‘Robotics Technology’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 107–24. Fletcher, C.Brunsdon (1917) The New Pacific. British Policy and German Aims, London: Macmillan. ——(1919) The Problem of the Pacific, London: William Heinemann. Fong Chan Onn (1990) ‘Malaysia: The Technological Factor’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 233–45.
< previous page
page_209
next page >
< previous page
page_210
next page >
Page 210 Fox, Frank (1912) Problems of the Pacific, London: Williams & Norgate. ——(1928) The Mastery of the Pacific or the Future of the Pacific, London: Bodley Head. Frank, Andre Gunder (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, London: Monthly Review Press. Frazer, Malcolm (1981) ‘Australia and the Pacific Community Concept’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 88–90. Friedman, George and Lebard, Meredith (1991) The Coming War with Japan, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Fukuda Takeo (1972) ‘Dai 67 kai kokkai ni okeru Fukuda gaimu daijin no gaikō enzetsu, Shōwa_46 nen 10 gatsu 19 ka’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 16 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 407–12. ——(1977a) ‘Dai 80 kai kokkai ni okeru Fukuda naikaku sōri daijin shisei hōshin enzetsu, 1977 nen 1_ gatsu 31 nichi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 21 go, kaken, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 6–13. ——(1977b) ‘Fukuda sōri daijin no Manila ni okeru supiichi’, Kokusai mondai shiryō, 9 gatsu go, 46–50. English translation: ‘Speech by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda’, Kokusai mondai shiryō, 9 gatsu go, 51–5. Funabashi Yōichi (1995a) Ajia Taiheiyō fyōjon. APEC to Nihon, Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha. English translation: (1995b) Asia Pacific Fusion. Japan’s Role in APEC, Washington: Institute for International Economics. Furukawa Eiichi (1996) ‘Curtain Finally Rises on EAEC’, The Japan Times Weekly, International Edition, 20–26 May. Gaimushō (1970) Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 14 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku. ——(1971) Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 15 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku. ——(1974) Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 18 go, kaken, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku. Gaimushō Ajiakyoku (1981) Suzuki sōri daijin no ASEAN shokoku hōmon, Tokyo: Gaimushō Ajiakyoku. Galtung, Johan (1968) Paths of Development: A Diachronic Analysis of Development in Japan, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. ——(1971) ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research, 8, 3–4, 173–206. ——(1972) The European Community. A Superpower in the Making, Oslo and London: Norwegian Universities Press and Allen and Unwin. Garnaut, Ross (1991) ‘Economic Stability and Growth in the Pacific: an Overview’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 11–26. ——(1992) ‘China’s Reforms in International Context’, in Garnaut, Ross and Liu Guoguang (eds) Economic Reform and Internationalization. China and the Pacific Region, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 6–28. Garnaut, Ross and Anderson, Kym (1980) ‘ASEAN Export Specialization and the Evolution of Comparative Advantage in the Western Pacific Region’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 374–412. Gibney, Frank (1992) The Pacific Century. America and Asia in a Changing World, New York: Macmillan.
< previous page
page_210
next page >
< previous page
page_211
next page >
Page 211 Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——(1989) ‘Where Does Japan Fit In?’, Millennium, 18, 3, 329–42. Goh Chok Tong (1981) ‘The Role of National Governments in Strengthening Economic Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 59. Gorham, Michael (1978) ‘Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin: Stimulus and Response’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California, August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 177–233. Gourevitch, Peter A. (ed.) (1989) ‘The Pacific Region: Challenges to Policy and Theory’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 505, September. Grady, Henry F. (1930) ‘Tariff and Trade. The New American Schedule in Relation to Pacific Commerce’, Pacific Affairs, 3, 8, 719–34. Grant, Richard J., Papadakis, Maria C. and Richardson, J.David (1993) ‘Global Trade Flows: Old Structures, New Issues, Empirical Evidence’, in Bergsten, C. Fred and Noland, Marcus (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 17–63. Gregory, R.G. (1986) ‘Overview’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 1–19. Guillain, Robert (1969) Japan. Troisième Grand, Paris: Seuil. Guo Zhaolie (1985) ‘The Rising of Asian-Pacific Region and Its Problems’, Pacific Cooperation Newsletter, 6, 3–7. Lord Hailsham (1930) ‘Great Britain in the Orient’, Pacific Affairs, 3, 1, 17–26. Hamada, Kōichi (1972) ‘Japanese Investment Abroad’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 172–96. Han Sung-Joo (1980) ‘Thoughts on the Pacific Community Proposal: A Korean View’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.) The Pacific Community Concept. Views from Eight Nations. The Proceedings of the Asian Dialogue at Oiso, Japan, January 1980, Tokyo: JCIE, 42–53. ——(1981) ‘The Pacific Community Proposal: An Appraisal’, in Sir Crawford, John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 101–8. Hart, Albert Bushnell and Ferleger, Herbert Ronald (eds) (1989) Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia, New York and London: Theodore Roosevelt Association and Meckler. Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996) ‘Prime Minister’s Policy Speech’, Japan Echo, 23, 1, 62–5. Hau’ofa, Epeli (1993) ‘Our Sea of Islands’, in Waddell, Eric, Naidu, Vijay and Hau’ofa, Epeli (eds) A New Oceania. Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands, Suwa: School of Social and Economic Development, The University of South Pacific in association with Beake House, 2–16.
< previous page
page_211
next page >
< previous page
page_212
next page >
Page 212 Haushofer, Karl (1924) Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans. Studien über die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Geographic and Geshchichte, Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinkel. He Xin (1990) ‘The Development of China’s Economy—Chinese Scholar He Xin’s Talk with Japanese Professor Yabuki Susumu (III), Beijing Review, 3–9 December, 7–14. Hesse, Kurt (1934) Die Schicksalstunde der alten Machte: Japan und die Welt, Hamburg: Hanseatische. Hiebert, Murray (1995) ‘Wizard of Oz. Australia’s Evans Redraws the Map of Asia’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 August, 26. Higgott, Richard (1995) ‘APEC—A Sceptical View’, in Mack, Andrew and Ravenhill, John (eds) Pacific Cooperation. Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, Boulder and Oxford: Westview, 66–97. Higgott, Richard, Cooper, Andrew and Bonnor, Jenelle (1991) CooperationBuilding in the Asia-Pacific Region: APEC and the New Institutionalism, Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, Pacific Economic Papers 199. Hinton, W.J. (1928) [1927] ‘A Statement on the Effects of the Industrial Development of the Orient on European Industries’, in Condliffe, J.B. (ed.) Problems of the Pacific. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 365–91. Hirschman, Albert O. (1981) The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hobbes, Thomas, of Malmesbury (1980) [1651] Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, Aulesbury: Pelican. Hofheinz, Roy and Calder, Kent E. (1982) The Eastasia Edge, New York: Basic Books. Holloway, Nigel (1995) ‘Missed Opportunity. U.S. and Japan Postpone Their Defence Declaration’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 November, 17. Hong Wontack (1977) ‘Trade and Employment in Korea’, in Akrasanee, Narongchai, Naya Seiji and Vichit-Vadakan, Vinyu (eds) Trade and Employment in Asia and the Pacific. The Eighth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Pattaya, Thailand, 1976, Quezon City: The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, School of Economics, 170–84. Hook, Glenn D. (1996) Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, London and New York: Routledge. Hook, Glenn D. and Weiner, Michael A. (eds) (1992) The Internationalization of Japan, London and New York: Routledge. Hooper, Paul F. (1980) Elusive Destiny. The Internationalist Movement in Modern Hawaii, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii. ——(1992) ‘A Brief History of the Institute of Pacific Relations’, Tokyo: Shibusawa kenkyū, dai 5 go, 3–32. Hosokawa Morihiro (1993) ‘Dai 127 kai kokkai ni okeru Hosokawa naikaku sōri daijin shpshin hyōmei enzetsu’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 38 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 155–61. Hosono Akio (1995) APEC to NAFTA. Gurōbarizumu to riijonarizumu no sōkoku, Tokyo: Yūhikaku. Howe, Christopher (ed.) (1996) China and Japan. History, Trends, and Prospects, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hsia, Ronald (1971) ‘Hong Kong Textile Exports. A Case Study of Voluntary Restraints’, in English, H.E. and Hay, Keith A.J. (eds) Obstacles to Trade in the Pacific Area. Proceedings of the Fourth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Ottawa: The Canadian Host Committee, 167–85.
< previous page
page_212
next page >
< previous page
page_213
next page >
Page 213 Huan Xiang (1986) ‘Statement’, in Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Report of the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Vancouver, November 16–19, 1986, Ottawa: The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 47–8. Hughes, Helen (1972) ‘Assessment of Policies Towards Direct Foreign Investment in the Asian-Pacific Area’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 313– 43. (1975) ‘Comments on Legorreta’s Paper’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 16–17. Hummel, Hartwig (1991) Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen in Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Die Bedingungen für eine nationale Friedenspolitik, Dissertation, Tübingen: Eberhard-Karls-Universitat, Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften. Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72, 3, 22–49. Hymer, Stephen (1972a) ‘United States Investment Abroad’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 19–53. ——(1972b) ‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Mexico. Comment’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 286–8. Ikema Makoto (1980) ‘Japan’s Economic Relations with ASEAN’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 453–73. Imai Ken-ichi (1990) ‘The Information Industry’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 74–89. Imakawa Eiichi (1970) ‘Nihon keizai no Ajia shinshutsu—sono suii to genjō’, Sekai, 11, 77–86. Inagaki Manjirō (1890) Japan and the Pacific. A Japanese View of the Eastern Question, London: T.Fisher Unwin. ——(1892) Tōhōsaku ketsuron sōan, Tokyo: Tetsugaku shoin. Inoguchi Takashi (1989) ‘Shaping and Sharing Pacific Dynamism’, in Gourevitch, Peter A. (ed.) The Pacific Region: Challenges to Policy and Theory, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 505, 46– 55. ——(1991) Japan’s International Relations, London: Pinter. ——(1993a) Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change, London: Pinter. ——(1993b) ‘Hyōryū suru Nihon gaikō?’, Leviathan, 13, 7–26. ——(1993c) ‘Japanese Politics in Transition: A Theoretical View’, Government and Opposition, 28, 4, 443–55. ——(1994) The Rise and Fall of “Reformist Governments”: Hosokawa and Hata, 1993–1994’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 2, 2, 73–88. Inoguchi Takashi and Okimoto, Daniel L. (eds) (1988) The Political Economy of Japan, 2 vols, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Institut du Pacifique (1983) Le Pacifique, ‘Nouveau Centre du Monde’, Paris: Berger-Levraut and Boréal Express.
< previous page
page_213
next page >
< previous page
page_214
next page >
Page 214 Institute of Pacific Relations (1928) ‘Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific’, in Condliffe, J.B. (ed.) Problems of the Pacific. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 162–81. International Monetary Fund (1993) World Economic Outlook, May 1993. A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC: IMF. Ishikawa Masumi (1987) Deeta sengo seijishi, Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho. Ishimaru Tōta (1936) Japan Must Fight Britain, New York: The Telegraph Press. Issues & Studies (1969) ‘New “Ambassadors” Assigned by Peiping Since 9th CCP National Congress’, 5, 12, 105–7. Jackson, Peter A. (1989) Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflict. The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Jackson, Steven F. (1996) ‘Lessons from a Neighbour: China’s Japan-Watching Community’, in Howe, Christopher (ed.) China and Japan. History, Trends and Prospects, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 155–78. Japan Economic Research Center (1966) Measures for Trade Expansion of Developing Countries. Report of a JERC International Conference, Tokyo: JERC. ——(1968) The Structure and Development in Asian Economies. Proceedings of a Conference held by The Japan Economic Research Center in September, 1968, Tokyo: JERC. Johnson, Chalmers (1986) [1982] MITI and the Japanese Miracle. The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Tokyo: Tuttle. Johnson, Harry G. (1972a) ‘Survey of the Issues’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1–18. ——(1972b) ‘Summary’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 344–52. ——(1976) ‘Co-operation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region— Relations Between Large and Small Countries: A Summing Up’, in Castle, Leslie V. and Holmes, Sir Frank (eds) Co-operation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region—Relations Between Large and Small Countries. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, August 25–28, 1975 and sponsored by The New Zealand Association of Economists, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 303–10. Jovanović, Miroslav N. (1992) International Economic Integration, London and New York: Routledge. Jun Yongwook and Simon, Denis Fred (1992) ‘The Pattern of Korea’s Foreign Direct Investment: Implications for the Internationalization of China’s Economy’, in Garnaut, Ross and Liu Guoguang (eds) Economic Reform and Internationalization. China and the Pacific Region, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 182–213. Kahler, Miles (1995) International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Kahn, Herman (1971) [1970] The Emerging Japanese Superstate. Challenge and Response, London: Andre Deutsch. Kahn, Herman, Ōkita Saburō and Mushakōji Kinhide (1970) ‘Nobotta taiyō doko wo terasuka—70 nendai Nihon no kokusaika wa do susumu ka’, Bessatsu Chūōkōron, 33, 170–85.
< previous page
page_214
next page >
< previous page
page_215
next page >
Page 215 Kakazu Hiroshi (1995) Ajia no sentaku, Tokyo: Simul Press. Kan Taiheiyō rentai kenkyū grūpu (1980) Kan Taiheiyō rentai no kōsō. Ōhira son no seisaku kenkyūkai hōkokusho 4, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku. Kanamori Hisao (1973) ‘The Impact of Japanese Economic and Trade Growth on Asian Trade and Trade Policies’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Economic Cooperation in the Western Pacific, Japanese-Australian Project, Report No. 1, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 57–68. Kaneko Kentarō (1907) ‘Japan and the United States—Partners’, North American Review, 184, 631–5. Kataoka Tetsuya (1980) Waiting for a ‘Pearl Harbor’. Japan Debates Defence, Stanford: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press. Keizai kigakuchō sōgō keikaku kyoku (ed.) (1985) Taiheiyō jidai no tenbō— 2000 nen ni ataru Taiheiyō chi-iki no keizai hatten to kadai, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku. Keizai shingikai (1960) Kokumin shotoku baizō keikaku, Tokyo: Keizai shingikai. Khoman, Thanat (1981) ‘The Pacific Basin Co-operation Concept’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 21–4. Kierkegaard, Søren (1980) [1844] Begrebet Angest. En simpel psykologiskpaapegende Overveielse i Reining af del dogmatiske Problem om Arvesynden af Vigilius Haufniensis, Haslev: Gyldendal. Kikuchi Tsutomu (1995) APEC: Ajia Taiheiyō shinjitsujo no mosaku, Tokyo: Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyūkai. Kim Nak Kwan (1975) ‘The Choice of Technology and the Full Utilization of Resources’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 195–211. Kim Yan Ki (ed.) (1995) Ajia kara mita Nihon, Tokyo: Kadashi shobō shinsha. Kindleberger, Charles P. (1972) ‘Direct Foreign Investment and Economic Development’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 75–89. Kobayashi Noboru (1943) Friidorihhi Risuto josetsu, Tokyo: Itō shoten. ——(1948) Friidorihhi Risuto no seisan ryoku ron, Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinposha. Koh Ai Tee (1986) ‘Industrial Policy for Petrochemicals in Selected Pacific Basin Countries’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 234– 51. Koike Hirotsugu (1993) Ajia Taiheiyō shinron. Sekai wo kaeru keizai dainamizumu, Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha. Kojima Kiyoshi (1961) Ajia dai ichi ji shōhin no kihon mondai, chōsa kenkyū hōkoku sōsho, dai 9 shū, Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyūjo. ——(1962) ‘Tōnan Ajia keizai kyōryoku no kōzu’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Tōnan Ajia keizai no shorai kōzō, Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyūjo, 187–229. ——(1968a) ‘Japan’s Interest in the Pacific Trade Expansion’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Pacific Trade and Development. Papers and Proceedings of a Conference Held by The Japan Economic Research Center in January 1968, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 153–93.
< previous page
page_215
next page >
< previous page
page_216
next page >
Page 216 ——(ed.) (1968b) Pacific Trade and Development. Papers and Proceedings of a Conference Held by The Japan Economic Research Center in January 1968, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center. ——(ed.) (1969) The Second Conference on Pacific Trade and Development, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 8–11th January 1969, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center. ——(1971) Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. ——(1973a) ‘1970 nendai no Nihon no taigai keizai seisaku. Nishi Taiheiyō bōeki no saihensei’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Nishi Taiheiyō keizaiken no kenkyū dai 1 ken. Nichi-Gō keizai kyōryoku no hōto, Tokyo: Nihon keizai kenkyū sentā, kenkyū hōkoku 30, 95–134. ——(1973b) ‘Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy in the 1970s and the Reorganization of Western Pacific Trade’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Economic Cooperation in the Western Pacific. Japanese-Australian Project, Report No. 1, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 1–39. ——(1974a) ‘Kaigai chokusetsu tōshi no Nihon-gata to Amerika-gata’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Nishi Taiheiyō keizaiken no kenkyū dai 2 ken. Shigen mondai kara mita Nichi-Gō kankei, Tokyo: Nihon keizai kenkyū sentā, kenkyū hōkoku 33, 129–53. ——(1974b) ‘A New Direction for Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Australia, Japan and the Resource Goods Trade. JapaneseAustralian Project, Report No. 2, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 1– 74. ——(1976) An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: A Proposal, Canberra: The Australian National University, Australia-Japan Economic Relations Research Project No. 40. ——(1977a) ‘Floor Discussion’, in Akrasanee, Narongchai, Naya Seiji and VichitVadakan, Vinyu (eds) Trade and Employment in Asia and the Pacific. The Eighth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Pattaya, Thailand, 1976, Quezon City: The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, School of Economics, 296. ——(1977b) ‘Floor Discussion’, in Akrasanee, Narongchai, Naya Seiji and VichitVadakan, Vinyu (eds) Trade and Employment in Asia and the Pacific. The Eighth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Pattaya, Thailand, 1976, Quezon City: The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, School of Economics, 437. ——(1978) ‘Japan’s Resource Security and Foreign Investment in the Pacific: A Case Study of Bilateral Devices between Advanced Countries’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 506–21. ——(1979) Japanese Direct Foreign Investment. A Model of Multinational Business Operations, Tokyo: Tuttle. ——(1980a) Taiheiyō keizaiken no seisei, Tokyo: Sekai keizai kenkyū kyōkai. ——(1980b) ‘Japan’s Economic Relations with ASEAN. Comment’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 473–80. ——(1981) ‘Economic Cooperation in a Pacific Community’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 121–7.
< previous page
page_216
next page >
< previous page
page_217
next page >
Page 217 ——(1990) Japanese Direct Investment Abroad, Tokyo: International Christian University, Monograph Series No. 1. ——(1996) Trade, Investment and Pacific Economic Integration. Selected Essays of Kiyoshi Kojima, Tokyo: Bunshindō. Kojima Kiyoshi and Kurimoto Hiroshi (1965) Taiheiyō kyōdō ichiba to Tōnan Ajia, Nanpoku mondai konfarensu, kenkyū hōkoku 3 (sono 3), Tokyo: Nihon keizai kenkyū sentā. Kojima Kiyoshi and Ozawa Terutomo (1984) Japan’s General Trading Companies. Merchants of Economic Development, Paris: OECD. Kokubun Ryōsei (1996) Ajia jidai no kenshō. Chugoku no shiten kara, Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha. Kokusai kyōchō no tame no keizai kōzō chōsei kenkyūkai (1986) ‘Hōkokusho. Keikōken hōkoku, Maekawa repōto’, Ekonomisuto, 27 August, 89–92. ——(1987) ‘Shin “Maekawa repōto”. Saishū hōkoku’, Kindai keizaigaku shiriizu, 22 May, 98–105. Komiya Ryūtarō (1971) ‘Japan’s Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade in Manufactured Products’, in English, H.E. and Hay, Keith A.J. (eds) Obstacles to Trade in the Pacific Area. Proceedings of the Fourth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Ottawa: The Canadian Host Committee, 221–39. ——(1972) ‘Direct Foreign Investment in Postwar Japan’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 137–68. Kono Yōhei (1995) ‘ASEAN kakudai gaisō kaigi zentai kaigi (6+7) ni okeru Kono fuku sōri ken gaimu daijin suteetomento’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 38 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 181–4. Koo Hagen and Kim Eun Mee (1992) ‘The Developmental State and Capital Accumulation in South Korea’, in Appelbaum, Richard P. and Henderson, Jeffrey (eds) States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage, 121–49. Korhonen, Pekka (1989) ‘Ahdistuksen suloisuus. Tulkinta Søren Kierkegaardin ahdistuksen käsitteestä’, Laudatur thesis, University of Jyväskylä, Department of Philosophy. ——(1990) ‘Japanin ekspansio 1854–1945 ja nationalismin leviäminen läntisen Tyynenmeren alueella’, Rauhantutkimus, 6, 3, 34–67. ——(1992) ‘The Origin of the Idea of the Pacific Free Trade Area. A Study of Japanese Rhetorical Categories and Discussion on International Integration 1945–1968’, Dissertation, Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä. ——(1993–4) ‘Economism as a Pacific Peace Project’, Philippine Political Science Journal, 37–8, 1–28. ——(1994a) Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area, L ondon and New York: Routledge. ——(1994b) ‘The Theory of the Flying Geese Pattern of Development and Its Interpretations’, Journal of Peace Research, 31, 1, 93–108. ——(1996a) ‘The Pacific Century in World History’, Journal of World History, 7, 1, 41–70. ——(1996b) ‘The Dimension of Dreams: Discussion of the Pacific Age in Japan 1890–1994’, in Metzger-Court, Sarah and Pascha, Werner (eds) Japan’s SocioEconomic Evolution: Continuity and Change, Folkestone: Japan Library, 123– 41. ——(1997) ‘Monopolizing Asia. The Politics of a Metaphor’, Pacific Review, 10, 3. Koselleck, Reinhart (1985) Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time, Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
< previous page
page_217
next page >
< previous page
page_218
next page >
Page 218 Kovalenko, I.I. (1988) Ajia-Taiheiyō kyōdōtai ran. Shisō, puran, tenbō, Tokyo: Kyōdō sangyō shuppanbu. Kraus, Willi (1990) ‘Germany and Japan in the International Economy: The Meaning of Growth and Structural Change in the Pacific Region from a German and European Point of View’, in Hax, H., Kraus, W., Masuda T. and Nakamura, T. (eds) Pacific Cooperation from the Japanese and the German Viewpoint, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1–21. Krause, Lawrence B. (1978) ‘Introduction’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 18–28. ——(1979) ‘Statement of Lawrence B.Krause’, in T he Pacific Community Idea. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 16–20. ——(1981) ‘The Pacific Economy in an Interdependent World: A New Institution for the Pacific Basin’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 128–37. Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) (1978) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Krause, Lawrence B. and Sundberg, Mark (1991) “The Pacific and the World Economy: Inter-Relations’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 233–52. Krueger, Anne O. (1980) ‘Regional and Global Approaches to Trade and Development Strategy’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 21–45. ——(1991) ‘Pacific Growth and Macroeconomic Performance: Models and Issues’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 27–43. Krugman, Paul (1990) ‘Technology and Changing Comparative Advantage in the Pacific Region’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 25– 37. ——(1994) ‘The Myth of Asia’s Miracle’, Foreign Affairs, 73, 6, 62–78. ——(1996) ‘Cycles of Conventional Wisdom on Economic Development’, International Affairs, 72, 1, 717–32. Kuwabara Takeo (1968) ‘Yōroppa to Nihon’, Sekai, 5, 238–46. Kyū Eikan and Watanabe Shōichi (1994) Ajia Kyōenken no jidai. Saraba Amerika, Tokyo and Kyoto: PHP. Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark (1980) Metaphors We Live By, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
< previous page
page_218
next page >
< previous page
page_219
next page >
Page 219 Lau Teik Soon and Suryadinata, Leo (eds) (1988) Moving into the Pacific Century, Singapore: Heinemann Asia. Lea, Homer (1909) The Valor of Ignorance, New York and London: Harper & Brothers. Lebedev, I.A. (1975) ‘Soviet Viewpoint (2) Integration Tendencies in Pacific Asia and External Economic Relations of the USSR’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 30–6. Lee Lai To (1995) ‘Asia-Pacific Security in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Lin Bihjaw (ed.) The Asia-Pacific and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era, Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 152–66. Lee Poh Ping (1980) ‘The Pacific Community: The View of the Malaysian Study Group’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.) The Pacific Community Concept. Views from Eight Nations. The Proceedings of the Asian Dialogue at Oiso, Japan, January 1980, Tokyo: JCIE, 67–71. Legorreta, Omar Martinez (1975) ‘The Geo-Political and Economic Framework of the Transference of Technology in the Pacific Basin: Latin American Viewpoint’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 3–15. Lenin, V.I. [1918] ‘Valtio ja vallankumous. Marxilaisuuden oppi valtiosta ja proletariaatin tehtävät vallankumouksessa’, in Valitut teokset neljässä osassa, osa 3, Moskova: Edistys, 139–234. Leuenberger, Theodor and Weinstein, Martin E. (eds) (1992) Europe, Japan and America in the 1990s. Cooperation and Competition, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. Leviste, Jose P. (1985) ‘Political Will and Pacific Economic Cooperation’, in Report of the Fourth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Seoul, April 29 —May 1, 1995, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 50–1. ——(1986) ‘A Pacific Summit of Developing Countries’, in Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Report of the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Vancouver, November 16–19, 1986, Ottawa: The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 52–4. Liang Kuo-shu (1969) ‘Aid, Trade and Economic Development: The Experience of Taiwan and Korea’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) The Second Conference on Pacific Trade and Development, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 8–11th January 1969, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 319–50. Liang Kuo-shu and Liang Ching-ing Hou (1986) ‘The Industrial Policy of Taiwan’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 104– 25. Lim Chong-Yah (1971) ‘Trade Restrictions and Textile Exports of Singapore—A Case Study’, in English, H.E. and Hay, Keith A.J. (eds) Obstacles to Trade in the Pacific Area. Proceedings of the Fourth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Ottawa: The Canadian Host Committee, 187–209. ——(1981) ‘Towards the Formation of a Pacific Community’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 154.
< previous page
page_219
next page >
< previous page
page_220
next page >
Page 220 ——(1995) ‘East Asia in the Pacific Century: An Uneasy Accommodation’, in Jae Ha Chung and De Piao Tang (eds) The Emergence of East Asia. Bilateral Dynamics of the Region & Multilateral Issues of APEC, Hong Kong: The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 15–34. Lim Hua Sing (1994) Japan’s Role in ASEAN. Issues and Prospects, Singapore: Times. Linder, Staffan Burenstam (1986) The Pacific Century. Economic and Political Consequences of Asian-Pacific Dynamism, Stanford: Stanford University Press. List, Friedrich (1916) [1844] The National System of Political Economy, London: Longmans, Green and Co. ——(1938) Kokumin keizaigaku taikei, Tokyo: Kaizōsha. Lister, Marjorie (1988) The European Community and the Developing World. The Role of the Lomé Convention, Aldershot: Avebury. London, Jack (1910) “The Yellow Peril’, in Revolution and Other Essays by Jack London, London and Bradford: Mills & Boon and The Reformer’s Bookshop, 220–37. Lu Zheng (1992) ‘China’s Economic Reform and Development: Historical Review and Future Prospects’, in Garnaut, Ross and Liu Guoguang (eds) Economic Reform and Internationalization. China and the Pacific Region, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 38– 48. Lyotard, Jean-François (1979) La Condition Postmoderne, Paris: Minuit. McCord, William (1989) The Dawn of the Pacific Century. Implications for Three Worlds of Development, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. MacGuigan, Mark (1981) ‘Increasing Links Across the Pacific’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 155–6. Machiavelli, Niccolò (1992) [1517] Il Principe, Milano: Rizzoli. Macrae, Norman (1975) ‘Pacific Century, 1975–2075’, The Economist, 4 January. ——(1980) ‘Must Japan Slow? A Survey’, The Economist, 23 February. Magee, Stephen P. and Robins, Norman I. (1978) ‘The Raw Material Product Cycle’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 30–55. Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890) The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660– 1783, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. ——(1897) The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. – (1900) The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Mahathir bin Mohamad (1981) ‘Tak Kemal Maka Tak Cinta’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 41–5. ——(1995) ‘Bosnia and the West’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 September. Mahathir bin Mohamad and Ishihara Shintarō (1994) “NO” to ieru Ajia. Tai ÖBei e no kādo, Tokyo: Kōbunsha. Mahbubani, Kishore (1993) ‘The Dangers of Decadence. What the Rest Can Teach the West’, Foreign Affairs, 72, 4, 10–14. ——(1994) ‘You May Not Like It, Europe, But This Asian Medicine Could Help’, International Herald Tribune, 1 October. Maiya Kenichiro (1970) ‘Tōnan Ajia—Nichi-Bei shihon gōsen wo genchi ni mini’, Bessatsu Child Kōran, 30, 377–91.
< previous page
page_220
next page >
< previous page
page_221
next page >
Page 221 Martin, Laurence (1995) ‘The Asia-Pacific and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era: Security Issues’, Lin Bih-jaw (ed.) The Asia-Pacific and Europe in the Post-Cold War Era, Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 167–76. Maruyama Shizuo (1973) ‘Tōnan Ajia no nashonarizumu to Ninon’, Sekai, 8,14–26. Mason, T.David and Turay, Abdul M. (eds) (1994) Japan, NAFTA and Europe. Trilateral Cooperation or Confrontation, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Masuda Hiroshi and Hatano Sumio (1995) (eds) Ajia no naka no Nihon to Chūgoku. Yūkō to masatsu no gendaishi, Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha. Matsumoto Ken’ichi (1994) Kindai Ajia seishinsi no kokoromi, Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha. Maurtua, Oscar (1986) ‘Statement’, in Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Report of the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Vancouver, November 16–19, 1986, Ottawa: The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 50. de Melo, Jaime and Panagariya, Arvind (eds) (1993) New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mendl, Wolf (1995) Japan’s Asia Policy. Regional Security and Global Interests, London and New York: Routledge. Miki Takeo (1976) ‘ASEAN shunō kaigi ate Miki sōri messeeji, 1976 nen 2 gatsu 23 nichi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 20 go, kaken, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 169. ——(1984) Gikai seiji to tomoni enzetsu hatsugen shū, jōken, Tokyo: Miki Takeo shuppan kinenkai. Mitrany, David (1943) A Working Peace System, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Miyazawa Kiichi (1976) ‘ASEAN shunō kaigi ni tsuite no Miyazawa gaimu daijin danwa, 1976 nen 2_gatsu 25 nichi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 20 go, kaken, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 177. ——(1993) ‘ASEAN hōmon ni okeru Miyazawa naikaku son daijin seisaku enzetsu’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 37 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 168–73. Moffett, Sebastian (1995) ‘The Devil’s in the Details’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 November. Momoi Makato (1977) ‘Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies’, in Scalapmo, Robert A. (ed.) The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 341–64. Montesquieu Baron de (1962) [1748] The Spirit of the Laws, New York: Hafner. Morita Akio and Ishihara Shintarō (1989) “NO” to ieru Nihon. Shin Nichi-Bei kankei no kādo, Tokyo: Kōbunsha. Moriya Hideo (1928) Taiheiyō jidai kuru, Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha. Morrison, Charles E. (1980) ‘American Interest in the Pacific Community Concept’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.) The Pacific Community Concept. Views from Eight Nations. The Proceedings of the Asian Dialogue at Oiso, Japan, January 1980, Tokyo: JCIE, 32–41. Mowry, George E. (1958) The Era of Theodore Roosevelt 1900–1912, New York: Harper & Brothers. Murai Yoshinori and Kido Kazuo (eds) (1988) Ajia to watashitachi, Tokyo: Sanjūichi shobō. Murakami Atsushi (1976) ‘Japanese Foreign Investment—Problems of the Large Home Country’, in Castle, Leslie V. and Holmes, Sir Frank (eds) Co-operation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region—Relations Between Large and Small Countries. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, August 25–28, 1975 and sponsored by The New Zealand Association of Economists, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 243–56.
< previous page
page_221
next page >
< previous page
page_222
next page >
Page 222 Murota Yasuhiro (1978) ‘Options for a Resource-Poor Developed Country— Japan’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 316–333. Nagai Yōnosuke (1972) ‘Dōmei gaikō no kansei’, Chud Kōron, 1, 54–78. Nakagawa Nobuo (1971) ‘Nik-Kan ittaika no seiji keizai gaku’, Sekai, 5, 129– 39. Nakamura Takafusa (1987) The Postwar Japanese Economy. Its Development and Structure, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Nakayama Tarō (1991) ‘ASEAN kakudai gaisō kaigi, zentai kaigi ni okeru Nakayama gaimu daijin suteetomento’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 35 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 424–9. Nam Chong Hyun (1986) ‘Changing Comparative Advantage and Trade and Adjustment Policies in the Steel Industry’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotaroo and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 211–32. Namiki Nobuyoshi (1973) “The Japanese Economy—An Introduction to its Industrial Adjustment Problems’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Structural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific Trade. Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Pacific Trade and Development Conference sponsored by The Japan Economic Research Center and The Japan Institute of International Affairs, January 1973, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 241–81. Nanjō Shunji (1996) ‘Ajia-Ōshu kaigō (ASEM) to Ninon’, Ajia to Nihon, 3 gatsu go, 4–15. Naseem, S.M. and Chee Peng Lim (1992) ‘The Possibilities of “Catching Up” in South Asia’, in Lin Tzong-biau and Tuan Chyau (eds) The Asian NIEs: Success and Challenge, Hong Kong: Lo Fung Learned Society, 227–42. Naughton, Barry (1995) ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Economist’, in Shambaugh, David (ed.) Deng Xiaoping. Portrait of a Chinese Statesman, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 83–106. Nawalowalo, Nao (1981) ‘Pacific Basin Co-operation: A View from the Pacific Islands’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Cooperation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 181. Naya Seiji (1978) ‘An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: Regional Arrangements and the Resource Trade. A Comment’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California, August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 651–3. Naya Seiji and Kerdpibule, Udom (1973) ‘Trade Policy and Problems of Export Expansion—The Case of Southeast Asia’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Structural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific Trade. Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Pacific Trade and Development Conference sponsored by The Japan Economic Research Center and The Japan Institute of International Affairs, January 1973, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 151–86. Naya Seiji and Akrasanee, Narongchai (1976) ‘Thailand’s International Economic Relations with Japan and the U.S.: A Study of Trade and Investment Interactions’, in Castle, Leslie V. and Holmes, Sir Frank (eds) Co-operation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region—Relations Between Large and Small Countries. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, August 25–28, 1975
< previous page
page_222
next page >
< previous page
page_223
next page >
Page 223 and sponsored by The New Zealand Association of Economists, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 94–141. Nelson, Richard R. (1990) ‘Acquiring Technology’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 38–47. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1930) [1884] Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für alle und keinen, Leipzig: Alfred Kröner. Nitobe Inazo (1929) ‘Opening Address at Kyoto’, Pacific Affairs 2, 11, 685–8. Noguchi Yūichirō (1972) ‘Ajia wo meguru Nichi-Bei keizai’, Sekai, 9, 112–20. Oborne, Michael West and Fourt, Nicholas (1983) Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation, Paris: OECD. Ogata Sadako (1977) ‘The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People’s Republic of China’, in Scalapino, Robert A. (ed.) The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 175–203. Ogura Kazuo (1995) “Nishi” no Nihon, “Higashi” no Nihon. Kokusai kōshō no sutairu to Nihon no taio, Tokyo: Kenkyūsha shuppan. Ōhira Masayoshi (1974) ‘Dai 8 kai Tōnan Ajia kaihatsu kakuryōkaigi ni okeru Ōhira gaimu daijin ippan enzetsu, Shōwa 48 nen 10 gatsu 12 nichi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 18 go, kaken, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 85– 91. ——(1981) ‘A Creative Partnership for the Pacific Age’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 182. Ōkawachi Kazuo (1943) Sumisu to Risuto. Keizai rinri to keizai riron, Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha. Ōkita Saburō (1947) ‘Bōeki to gaishi e no kōsatsu. Shukushō saiseisan kokufuku no hōto’, Chud Kōran, 7, 13–18. ——(1956) Tōnan Ajia no hatten riron, gaisei kōza shiriizu, Tōnan Ajia II, Tokyo: Nihon gaisei gakkai. ——(1960) Nihon keizai no shōrai, Tokyo: Yūki shobō. ——(1965) ‘Japan and the Developing Nations’, Contemporary Japan, 28, 2, 1– 14. ——(1970) Essays in Japan and Asia, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center. ——(1971) Essays in Japan and the World Economy, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center. ——(1972) Emerging Trends in United States-Japan Economic and Political Relationships. The Arthur Salomon Lecture, New York University, 11 December. ——(1978) ‘An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: Regional Arrangements and the Resource Trade. A Comment’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California, August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 649–50. ——(1983) ‘Cooperation and Development in the Pacific Region’, Pacific Cooperation Newsletter, 3–4, 1–3. ——(1985) ‘Special Presentation: Prospect of the Pacific Economies’, in Report of the Fourth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Seoul, April 29–May 1, 1995, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 18–29. ——(1987) ‘Pacific Development and Cooperation’, in El-Agraa, Ali M. (ed.) Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development. Essays in Honour of Professor Hiroshi Kitamura, Houndmills and London: Macmillan, 114–26.
< previous page
page_223
next page >
< previous page
page_224
next page >
Page 224 Ōkita Saburō and Tamura Shūji (1975) ‘Transfer of Technology and Japanese Experience’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 64–73. Okuno Masahiro and Suzumura Kotarō (1986) ‘The Economic Analysis of Industrial Policy: A Conceptual Framework through the Japanese Experience’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 23–41. Ovalle, Jose M. (1985) ‘Statement’, in Report of the Fourth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Seoul, April 29—May 1, 1995, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 57. Pacific Affairs (1931) ‘The Development of Pacific Trade’, 4, 6, 516–22. Pacific Community Seminar (1981) ‘Summary Report of Proceedings and Main Recommendations’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 27–32. Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (1983) Issues for Pacific Economic Cooperation: A Report By The Task Forces, Jakarta: PECC 1983 Secretariat, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (1992) Pacific Economic Development Report 1992–1993, Singapore: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council Secretariat. Palacios, Juan J. (1995) ‘Multinational Corporations and Technology Transfer in Penang and Guadalajara’, in Chen, Edward K.Y. and Drysdale, Peter (eds) Corporate Links and Foreign Direct Investment in Asia and the Pacific, Pymble: HarperEducational in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University and Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 153–86. Pang Eng Fong (1980) ‘The Concept of a Pan-Pacific Community and ASEAN: A View from Singapore’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.) The Pacific Community Concept. Views from Eight Nations. The Proceedings of the Asian Dialogue at Oiso, Japan, January 1980, Tokyo: JCIE, 77–83. Park Yung Chul (1991) ‘Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in East Asia’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 93–120. Patrick, Hugh (1978) ‘An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: Regional Arrangements and the Resource Trade. A Comment’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California, August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 654–9. ——(1979) ‘Statement of Hugh Patrick and the following discussion’, in The Pacific Community Idea. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 30–62.
< previous page
page_224
next page >
< previous page
page_225
next page >
Page 225 ——(1996) ‘From PAFTAD to APEC: Homage to Professor Kiyoshi Kojima’, in Surugadai keizai ronshū henshū iinkai (ed.) Special Issue in Honour of Professor Kiyoshi Kojima, Surugadai Economic Studies, 5, 2, Saitama: Surugadai University, Faculty of Economics. Peffer, Nathaniel (1935) Must We Fight in Asia?, New York: Harper and Brothers. Pickens, Robert S. (1934) Storm Clouds Over Asia, New York: Funk & Wagnalls. Pinera, Jose (1978) ‘Commodity Trade from a North-South Perspective’, in Krause, Lawrence B. and Patrick, Hugh (eds) Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area. Papers and Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in San Francisco, California, August 22–26, 1977, San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 457–97. Quibria, M.G. (1996) ‘Productivity Will Come With Time’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 August. Reading, Brian (1993) Japan. The Coming Collapse, London: Orion. Reischauer, Edwin O. and Craig, Albert M. (1978) Japan. Tradition and Transformation, Tokyo: Tuttle. Ricardo, David (1987) [1817] ‘Principles of Political Economy and Taxation’, in Authorized faximile of the Works of David Ricardo with a notice on the life and writings of the author, John Murray, London 1888, Ann Arbor: UMI Out-of-print Books on Demand, 1–260. Ritter, Carl (1820) Die Vorhalle Europäischer Völkergeschichten vor Herodotus, um den Kaukasus und an den Gestaden des Pontus. Erne Abhandlung zur Alterthumskunde, Berlin: G.Reimer. ——(1863) Europa. Vorlesungen an der Universität zu Berlin, Berlin: Georg Reimer. Rohwer, Jim (1993) ‘A Billion Consumers. A Survey of Asia’, The Economist, 30 October. Roosevelt, Nicholas (1928) The Restless Pacific, New York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons. ——(1933) [1926] The Philippines. A Treasury and a Problem, New York: Sears. ——(1967) Theodore Roosevelt. The Man as I Knew Him, New York: Dodd and Mead. Roosevelt, Theodore (Snr) (1906a) [1899] ‘The Strenuous Life’, in The Strenuous Life. Essays and Addresses. The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Elkhorn Edition, vol. XX, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 3–22. ——(1906b) [1899] ‘Expansion and Peace’, in The Strenuous Life. Essays and Addresses. The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Elkhorn Edition, vol. XX, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 23–38. Roosevelt, Theodore (Jr) (1937) Colonial Policies of the United States, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co. Roth, William V., Jr. (1981) ‘New Perspectives on the Pacific Basin’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 46–9. Rowell, Newton W. (1930) [1929] ‘Canada Looks Westward’, Pacific Affairs, 3, 1, 27–33. Rozman, Gilbert (1991) The East Asian Region. Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sadli, Mohammad (1972) ‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Indonesia’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 201–25.
< previous page
page_225
next page >
< previous page
page_226
next page >
Page 226 Safarian, A.E. (1972) ‘Problems of Host Countries’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 59–70. Sagami (1929) ‘Governor Sagami’s Greeting’, Pacific Affairs, 2, 11, 761. Saitō Sōichi (1928) ‘Taiheiyō jidai no torai to sono shomondai’, Bōeki, 28, 7, 18–24. Saitō Shizuo (1983) (ed.) Taiheiyō jidai. Taiheiyō chi-iki tōgō no kenkyū, Tokyo: Shinyūdō. Salgado, Germanico (1976) ‘Latin America: The Problems of Dependence and Economic Integration’, in Castle, Leslie V. and Holmes, Sir Frank (eds) Cooperation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region—Relations Between Large and Small Countries. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, August 25–28, 1975 and sponsored by The New Zealand Association of Economists, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 69–91. Sandhu, Kernial (1981) ‘The Pacific Basin Concept: A View from ASEAN’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 176–80. Sangyō kōzō shingikai (ed.) (1971) 70 nendai no tsūshō sangyō seisaku. Sangyō kōzō shingikai chūkan tōshin, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku. Satō Eisaku (1968) ‘Dai 58 kai kokkai ni okeru Satō naikaku sōri daijin shisei hōshin enzetsu, Shōwa 43_nen 1 gatsu 27 nichi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 11 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 4–6. ——(1969) ‘Dai 61 kai kokkai ni okeru Satō naikaku sōri daijin shisei hōshin enzetsu, Shōwa 44 nen 1 gatsu 27 nichi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 13 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 3–6. ——(1970a) ‘Dai 62 kai kokkai ni okeru Satō naikaku sōri daijin shoshin hyōmei enzetsu, Shōwa 44_nen 12 gatsu tsuitachi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 14 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 347–8. ——(1970b) ‘Dai 63 kai kokkai ni okeru Satō naikaku sōri daijin shisei hōshin enzetsu, Shōwa_ 45 nen 2 gatsu 14 ka’, Gaimushō; Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 14 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 349–52. ——(1972) ‘Dai 66 kai kokkai ni okeru Satō naikaku sōri daijin shoshin hyōmei enzetsu, Shōwa_46 nen 7 gatsu 17 nichi’, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 16 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 401–3. Sawayanagi Masatarō (1928) [1927] ‘The General Features of Pacific Relations as Viewed by Japan’, in Condliffe, J.B. (ed.) Problems of the Pacific. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 30–3. Schlossstein, Steven (1989) The End of the American Century, New York and Chicago: Congdon and Weed. Schulzinger, Robert D. (1990) American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Secretary General (1979) The Impact of the Newly Industrializing Countries on Production and Trade in Manufactures, Paris: OECD. Seeley, J.R. (1883) The Expansion of England. Two Courses of Lectures, London: Macmillan. Seki Hiroharu (1987) The Asia-Pacific in Global Transformation. Bringing the “Nation-State Japan” Back In, Tokyo: Institute of Oriental Studies, University of Tokyo. Seki Hiroharu, Imagawa Eiichi, Kimura Tetsusaburō, Saitō Yoshihito, Nonaka Kōichi and Yamagiwa Akira (1970) ‘70 nendai no Ajia to Nihon. Tōron’, Sekai, 3, 73–89.
< previous page
page_226
next page >
< previous page
page_227
next page >
Page 227 Sekiguchi Sueo and Krause, Lawrence B. (1980) ‘Direct Foreign Investment in ASEAN by Japan and the United States’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 421–47. Shambaugh, David (ed.) (1995) Greater China: The Next Superpower?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shea Jia-Dong and Yen Tzung-Ta (1992) ‘Comparative Experience of Financial Reform in Taiwan and Korea: Implications for the Mainland of China’, in Garnaut, Ross and Liu Guoguang (eds) Economic Reform and Internationalization. China and the Pacific Region, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 214–45. Shen Long-shi (1996) 21 Zhongguo ren shiji, Taipei: Zhenguan chubanshe. Shiba Ryōtarō, Imanishi Kinji and Ibuka Masaru (1969) ‘Nippon hiyaku no kibaku ryoku’, Bungei Shunjū, shinnen tokubetsu go, 104–15. Shibusawa Masahide (1970) Taiheiyō ni kakeru hashi—Shibusawa Ei’ichi no shōgai, Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun. ——(1984) Japan and the Asian Pacific Region. Profile of Change, London and Sydney: Croom Helm and The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Shibusawa Masahide, Ahmad, Zakaria Haji, and Bridges, Brian (1992) Pacific Asia in the 1990s, London and New York: Routledge for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Shiraishi Takashi (1989) Japan’s Trade Policies 1945 to the Present Day, Worcester: Athlone Press. Shirk, Susan L. (1990) ‘China: The Bargaining Game’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 158–76. Sicat, Gerardo P. (1981) ‘ASEAN and the Pacific Region’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 216–24. Singh, Lalita Prasad (1966) The Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia. A Study of Asian International Organizations, Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Sjahrir and Pangestu, Mari (1992) ‘Adjustment Policies of Small Open Economies: the Experience of Indonesia’, in Garnaut, Ross and Liu Guoguang (eds) Economic Reform and Internationalization. China and the Pacific Region, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 246– 271. Smith, Adam (1981) [1776] An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Tallahassee: Liberty Classics. Smith, Ben and Jordan, James (1990) ‘Trade Transformation and Technology Transfer’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 3–24. Smith, M.L. and Stirk, Peter M.R. (eds) (1990) Making the New Europe. European Unity and the Second World War, London and New York: Pinter. Soesastro, Hadi (1989) ‘The Role of the Pacific Basin in the International Political Economy’, Foreign Relations Journal, 4, 2, 64–83.
< previous page
page_227
next page >
< previous page
page_228
next page >
Page 228 ——(1991) The East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) Proposal and East Asian Concepts of the Pacific Basin, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. ——(1993) ‘Implications of the Post-Cold War Politico-Security Environment on the Pacific Economy’, in Bergsten, C.Fred and Noland, Marcus (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 365–88. Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (1990) ‘Preface’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, xiii-xiv. Soesastro, Hadi, Pangestu, Mari and Mckendrick, David (1990) ‘Summary of Chapters and Conclusion’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the Asia-Pacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 299– 323. ——(1995) ‘Introduction and Overview’, in Chen, Edward K.Y. and Drysdale, Peter (eds) Corporate Links and Foreign Direct Investment in Asia and the Pacific, Pymble: HarperEducational in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University and Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 1–8. Sombart, Werner (1915) Händler und Helden. Patriotische Besinnungen, München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Song Byung-Nak (1994) The Rise of the Korean Economy, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Sopiee, Noordin (1986) ‘Statement’, in Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Report of the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Vancouver, November 16–19, 1986, Ottawa: The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 45–7. Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation (1982) ‘A Breakthrough at Bangkok Seminar’, Pacific Cooperation Newsletter, 1, 2, 4. Spengler, Oswald (1920) [1918] Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer Morphologic der Weltgeschichte, München: Oskar Beck. Steenstrup, Carl (1979) ‘A Gustavian Swede in Tanuma Okitsugu’s Japan: Marginal Notes to Carl Peter Thunberg’s Travelogue’, The Journal of Intercultural Studies, 6, 20–42. Stein, Guenther (1936) ‘Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader’, Pacific Affairs, 9, 2, 177–90. Sudō Sueo (1992) The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN. New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Sumitani Kazuhiko (1969) Risuto to Veebā. Doitsu shihon shugi bunseki no shisō taikei kenkyū, Tokyo: Miraisha. Sung Yun-Wing (1992) ‘The Economic Integration of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea with the Mainland of China’, in Garnaut, Ross and Liu Guoguang (eds) Economic Reform and Internationalization. China and the Pacific Region, St Leonards: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 149– 81. Baron Suyematsu (1905) The Risen Sun, London: Archibald Constable. Suzuki, Zenkō (1982) ‘The Coming of the Pacific Age’, Pacific Cooperation Newsletter, 2, 1–4.
< previous page
page_228
next page >
< previous page
page_229
next page >
Page 229 Takahashi Tamotsu (1991) ‘16 seiki ni okeru Iberia seiryoku no Ajia shinshutsu to Nihonzō no henyō- Ōgon no kuni Jipangu kara gin no kuni Japan e’, Bulletin of the Sohei Nakayama IUJ Asia Development Research Programme, 3, 3, 170– 202. Takaki Yasaki (1932) ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine’, Pacific Affairs, 5, 11, 941–53. Takenaka, Heizo (1991) ‘The Japanese Economy and Pacific Development’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 60–70. Takeshita Noboru (1988) ‘Nihon-ASEAN shunō kaigi ni okeru Takeshita naikaku sōri daijin bōtō hatsugen, “Nihon to ASEAN—heiwa to hanei e no nyū pātonāshippu’”, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 32 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 335–40. ——(1989) ‘Takeshita naikaku sōri daijin no ASEAN shokoku hōmon ni okeru seisaku enzetsu, “Tomo ni kangae tomo ni_ayumu Nihon to ASEAN’”, Gaimushō, Waga gaikō no kinkyō, dai 33 go, Tokyo: Ōkurashō insatsu kyoku, 308–17. Tamura Shuji and Urata Shujirō (1990) ‘Technology Policy in Japan’, in Soesastro, Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (eds) Technological Challenge in the AsiaPacific Economy, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 127–44. Tan, Augustine H.H. and Kapur, Basant (eds) (1986) Pacific Growth and Financial Interdependence, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University. Tanaka Kakuei (1973) Building a New Japan. A Plan for Remodelling the Japanese Archipelago, Tokyo: Simul Press. Tanaka Naoki (1996) Ajia no jidai. Nihon no kyoritsu wa sakerareru ka, Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinposha. Tanin, O. and Yohan, E. (1936) When Japan Goes to War, New York: The Vanguard Press. Taylor, Robert (1996) Greater China and Japan. Prospects for an Economic Partnership in East Asia, London and New York: Routledge. Thompson, Graeme (1981) ‘Pacific Economic Co-operation: A New Zealand Perspective’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Cooperation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 174–5. Thurow, Lester (1992) Head to Head. The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe and America, New York: William Morrow. Tokuyama Jirō (1977) ‘The Pacific Century’, Newsweek, 21 March. ——(1978) Taiheiyō no seiki. Nihon keizai no katsuro wo motomete, Tokyo: Daiyamondosha. Toynbee, Arnold J. (1934) ‘The Next War—Europe or Asia?’, Pacific Affairs, 7, 1, 3–13. Tung, Ricky (1984) ‘A Plea for the Establishment of an East Asia Community’, Issues and Studies, 20, 11, 70–78. Uekusa Masu and Ide Hideki (1986) ‘Industrial Policy in Japan’, in Mutoh Hiromichi, Sekiguchi Sueo, Suzumura Kotarō and Yamazawa Ippei (eds) Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth, Sydney, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 147–69.
< previous page
page_229
next page >
< previous page
page_230
next page >
Page 230 Ui Jun (1971) ‘Nihon ni mirai wa nai’, Bungei Shunjū, 6, 104–6. Umehara Takeshi and Shiba Ryūtarō (1970) ‘Seiyō ga Tōyō ni manobu jidai’, Bungei Shunjū, 3, 108–21. Vernon, Raymond (1966) ‘International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 2, 190–207. Vicuña, Francisco Orrego and Duco, Gloria Echeverria (eds) (1979) La Comunidad del Pacífico en Perspectiva, Santiago de Chile: Institute de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile. Virata, Cesar (1972) ‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: The Philippines’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 258–67. Viravan, Amnuay (1972) ‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Thailand’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 227–239. Vogel, Ezra F. (1985) [1979] Japan as Number One. Lessons for America, Tokyo: Tuttle. Volkov, May (1977) ‘Impact Exerted by Asian-Soviet on the Employment Situation in the Region’, in Akrasanee, Narongchai, Naya Seiji and VichitVadakan, Vinyu (eds) Trade and Employment in Asia and the Pacific. The Eighth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Pattaya, Thailand, 1976, Quezon City: The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, School of Economics, 73–80. Wahid, Zainal Abidin A. (1983) ‘The Pacific Community. A View from Southeast Asia’, Pacific Cooperation Newsletter, 3–4, 3–4. Watanabe Akio (1977) ‘Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs 1964– 1973’, in Scalapino, Robert A. (ed.) The Foreign Policy of Modem Japan, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 105–45. ——(1992) Ajia-Taiheiyō no kokusai kankei to Nihon, Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Watanabe Toshio (1989) Nishi-Taiheiyō no jidai. Ajia shin sangyō kokka no seiji keizai gaku, Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū Weber, Max (1980) [1921] Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriβ der verstehenden Soziologie, Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr. Weiss, Julian (1989) The Asian Century. The Economic Ascent of the Pacific Rim—and What It Means for the West, New York and Oxford: Facts on File. Whalley, John (1993) ‘The Uruguay Round and the GATT: Whither the Global System’, in Bergsten, C.Fred and Noland, Marcus (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 65–109. White, Donald W. (1992) ‘The “American Century” in World History’, Journal of World History, 3, 1, 105–27. White, Hayden (1973) Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in NineteenthCentury Europe, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ——(1978) Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ——(1987) The Content of the Form. Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ——(1996) ‘Storytelling: Historical and Ideological’, in Newman, Robert (ed.) Centuries’ Ends, Narrative Means, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 58–78. Whiting, Allen S. (1989) China Eyes Japan, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
< previous page
page_230
next page >
< previous page
page_231
next page >
Page 231 Whitlam, E.Gough (1981) A Pacific Community, Cambridge and London: The Australian Studies Endowment with the Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University. Whyte, Frederick (1928) [1927] ‘Opening Statement for the British Group’, in Condliffe, J.B. (ed.) Problems of the Pacific. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 23–9. Widjaja, Albert (1980) ‘Toward a Pacific Basin Community in the 80s: An Indonesian Perspective’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (ed.) The Pacific Community Concept. Views from Eight Nations. The Proceedings of the Asian Dialogue at Oiso, Japan, January 1980, Tokyo: JCIE, 57–66. Wijarso (1981) ‘Energy Opportunities and Challenges: Impact on the Pacific in the 1980s’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Cooperation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 57–8. Winter, Nils H. (ed.) (1994) How Free Are the Southeast Asian Markets?, Ǻbo: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Ǻbo Akademi University. Wionczek, Miguel (1972) ‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Mexico’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 269–86. ——(1973) ‘Latin American Growth and Trade Strategies in the Post-War Period’, in Kojima Kiyoshi (ed.) Structural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific Trade. Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Pacific Trade and Development Conference sponsored by The Japan Economic Research Center and The Japan Institute of International Affairs, January 1973, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 191–229. Wolf, Marvin J. (1985) The Japanese Conspiracy. The Plot to Dominate Industry Worldwide—and How to Deal with It, Sevenoaks: New English Library. van Wolferen, Karel (1989) The Enigma of Japanese Power. People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, London: Macmillan. Wolff, Lester L. (1979a) ‘Opening Words’, in The Pacific Community Idea. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1–2. ——(1979b) ‘Opening Words’, in The Pacific Community Idea. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 89–90. ——(1981) ‘Toward Co-operation and Interdependence’, in Crawford, Sir John and Seow, Greg (eds) Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action, Selangkor, Singapore and Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia for the Pacific Community Seminar, 60–2. Wong, John (1991) What is China’s Per-Capita GNP?, Singapore: National University of Singapore, The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, Background Brief No. 18. Wood, Christopher (1990) ‘Downbeat. A Survey of Japanese Finance’, The Economist, 8 December. ——(1993) The Bubble Economy. The Japanese Economic Collapse, Tokyo: Tuttle. Woods, Lawrence T. (1993) Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations, Vancouver: UBC Press. World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public Policy, New York: Oxford University Press.
< previous page
page_231
next page >
< previous page
page_232
next page >
Page 232 Woronoff, Jon (1979) Japan: The Coming Economic Crisis, Tokyo: Lotus Press. ——(1983) World Trade War, Tokyo: Lotus Press. ——(1985) The Japan Syndrome, Tokyo: Lotus Press. ——(1986) Politics. The Japanese Way, Tokyo: Lotus. ——(1990) Japan as—Anything But—Number One , Tokyo: Yohan. ——(1992) Japan: The (Coming) Economic Crisis, Tokyo: Yohan. Xinhuashe (1968) ‘Zhonggong waijiaobu fuzhao tongchi sufang dui qizheng quanhe geming qunzhong de wumie’, Guoji guanxi yanjiusuo (comp.) Feie zhengzhi yuanshi ziliao huibian, 8, Taipei: Guoji guanxi yanjiusuo, 29–31. Yahuda, Michael (1995) ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman’, in Shambaugh, David (ed.) Deng Xiaoping. Portrait of a Chinese Statesman, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 143–64. ——(1996) The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945–1995, London and New York: Routledge. Yakubovsky, V. (1975) ‘Soviet Viewpoint (1) Emergence of the Pacific Economic Complex and Some Aspects of the Economic Relations between the Soviet Union and the Pacific Countries’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 18–29. ——(1976) ‘Comments on Chekhutov’s Paper’, in Castle, Leslie V. and Holmes, Sir Frank (eds) Co-operation and Development in the Asia/Pacific Region Relations Between Large and Small Countries. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, August 25–28, 1975 and sponsored by The New Zealand Association of Economists, Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, 198–9. Yamagami Susumu (1994) Ajia Taiheiyō chi-iki no jidai. APEC setsuritsu no ikisatsu to tenbō, Tokyo: Dai ichi hōki shuppan. Yamagata Aritomo (1958a) [1914] ‘Racial Conflict and Japan’s Foreign Policy’, in Tsunoda Ryūsaku, de Bary, Wm Theodore and Keene, Donald (comp.) Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. II, New York: Columbia University Press, 206–9. ——(1958b) [1915] ‘China and the Twenty-One Demands’, in Tsunoda Ryūsaku, de Bary, Wm Theodore and Keene, Donald (comp.) Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. II, New York: Columbia University Press, 209–10. Yamamoto Sachiko (1977) ‘Tōnan Ajia e seishi wo yushutsu sum otoko tachi’, Chud Kōran, 5, 276–84. Yamamoto Susumu (1971) ‘Keizai taikoku no ronri to byōri—“sengo” no owari wa “senzen” no hajimarika’, Sekai, 8, 46–56. Yamaoka Michio (1991) Ajia Taiheiyō jidai ni mukete—sono zenshi toshite no Taiheiyō mondai chōsakai to Taiheiyō kaigi, Fumanitasu sensho 33, Tokyo: Hokuju shuppan. Yamazawa Ippei (1977) ‘Trade and the Operation of the Labor Market in Developed Countries: A Case Study of Japan’, in Akrasanee, Narongchai, Naya Seiji and Vichit-Vadakan, Vinyu (eds) Trade and Employment in Asia and the Pacific. The Eighth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Pattaya, Thailand, 1976, Quezon City: The Council for Asian Manpower Studies, School of Economics, 84–111. ——(1984) Nihon no keizai hatten to kokusai bungyō, Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinposha. ——(1990) Economic Development and International Trade. The Japanese Model, Honolulu: Resource Systems Institute, East-West Center.
< previous page
page_232
next page >
< previous page
page_233
next page >
Page 233 Yamazawa Ippei, Hirata Akira and Yokota Kazuhiko (1991) ‘Evolving Patterns of Comparative Advantage in the Pacific Economies’, in Ariff, Mohamed (ed.) The Pacific Economy. Growth and External Stability, Sydney, Wellington, London and Boston: Allen and Unwin in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia, 213–32. Yang Yoonsae (1972) ‘Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Korea’, in Drysdale, Peter (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific. The Third Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Sydney 1970, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 242–55. Yasuba Yasukichi (1980) ‘The Impact of ASEAN on the Asia-Pacific Region’, in Garnaut, Ross (ed.) ASEAN in a Changing Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, London and Miami: Australian National University Press, 73–96. Yasutomo, Dennis (1983) Japan and the Asian Development Bank, New York: Praeger. ——(1995) The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy, Houndmills and London: Macmillan. Yokoyama Hiroaki (ed.) (1995) Higashi Ajia wa hitotsu ni nareru ka. Posuto reisen to Higashi Ajia no shinryaku, Tokyo: Dōbunkan. Yoon Young-Kwan (1990) ‘The Polical Economy of Transition. Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the 1980s’, World Politics, 1–27. Young Soogil (1993) ‘Globalism and Regionalism: Complements or Competitors?’, in Bergsten, C.Fred and Noland, Marcus (eds) Pacific Dynamism and the International System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics in association with The Pacific Trade and Development Conference Secretariat, The Australian National University, 111–31. Zahl, Karl F. (1973) Die politische Elite Japans, Wiesbaden: Harassowitz. Zainal Abidin Sulong (1991) Why Japan’s Industries Should Say “Yes” to the EAEG, Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies. Zakaria, Farced (1994) ‘Culture is Destiny. A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew’, Foreign Affairs, 73:2, 109–126. Zambrano, Ramiro (1985) ‘Statement’, in Report of the Fourth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Seoul, April 29—May 1, 1995, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 56–7. Ziribn, Gerado Bueno (1975) ‘Official Technical Assistance and the Third World’, in Kojima Kiyoshi and Wionczek, Miguel S. (eds) Technology Transfer in Pacific Economic Development. Papers and Proceedings of the Sixth Pacific Trade and Development Conference held by National Science and Technology Council in Mexico City, July 1974, Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 133–41, INTERVIEWS AND LECTURES Interviews with Kojima Kiyoshi, Musashikoganei, September 1991, March 1994 and April 1996. Interview with Ōkita Saburō, Tokyo, September 1991. Interview with Temario C.Rivera, Singapore, May 1994. Lecture of Gareth Evans at the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan College, Hong Kong, June 1996.
< previous page
page_233
next page >
< previous page
page_234
next page >
Page 234 This page intentionally left blank.
< previous page
page_234
next page >
< previous page
page_235
next page >
Page 235 Index Abe Shintarō 153–4 academics, Pacific politics 197 Adelman, Jonathan R. 38 advanced industrial countries 110, 115 Africa, development stages 200 AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) 187 ages concept 31 Aggarwal, Mangat Ram 71 Aichi, Kiichi 43, 45 Akamatsu Kaname 22–3, 26–7, 53, 117–18, 138, 150–1, 152 Akami, Tomoko 100 Akrasanee, Narongchai 78, 119, 129 All American Union 200 Allan, Alberto Besa 134 Amaya Naohiro 48, 50–51, 69 American-Chinese détente 46 Anderson, Benedict 189 Anderson, Kym 117 Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902) 95 Anglo-Saxon race 96 ANICs (Asian newly industrializing countries) 116–17 ANIEs (Asian newly industrializing economies) 116–17, 118, 120, 144, 181 anti-Japanese feelings 73–4, 75 Anwar, M.Arsjad 120 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Community) 165, 167 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) 88; APEC VII 172, 174; APEC VIII 174; APEC IX 175; Bangkok meeting 164; Bogor meeting 168–9, 170; Canberra meeting 161–2; criticized 173–4; European Community as model 167–9; Indonesian summit 170; Japan 180; Kojima 163; Mahathir 164; Manila Action Plan 174; Ōsaka conference 172–3; Pacific age 169; Seattle meeting 164–5, 167; Seoul meeting 163–4; Singapore meeting 163; Taiwan 164; trade liberalization 165, 168 APEC 2000 169 Arab-Israeli war 70 ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) 171, 193 Ariff, Mohamed 119, 141, 143 Arisawa, Hiromi 21 Arndt, Heinz W. 77 Asakai, Ambassador 46 ASEAN countries (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 44; Abe Shintarō 153–4; ANIEs 120; and Australia 83; Bali summit 74–5;
development 144; East Asian Economic Group 179; economic success 80–1, 114–15; Fukuda 83–6, 112–13; and Japan 13, 71, 72–3, 75, 82–3, 83–6; Korea, South 44; Pacific cooperation 133; ranked 118–19; Taiwan 44; as term 187; Western Pacific framework 161–2; world politics 72–3 ASEAN economists 141–2 ASEAN Free Trade Area 187 ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies 171–2 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences 171 ASEAN Regional Forum 171, 193 ASEAN year (1978) 122 ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) 193–194 Asia: economism 79; world status 139, 142, 180, 181–2 Asia Pacific Community 133 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation: see APEC Asia Pacific integration 2–3, 180 Asian age rhetoric 193
< previous page
page_235
next page >
< previous page
page_236
Page 236 Asian Development Bank 45 Asian Economic Caucus 199–200 Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) 45, 128 assembly manufacture 119, 144 Atlantic age 92 Atlantic countries 176 Attali, Jacques 158–9 Australia: ASEAN conference 83; East Asian Economic Group 178, 179; flying geese theory 117; and Japan 49–50, 51, 92, 160; and Malaysia 178; Pacific integration 128; PAFTAD conferences 76–7; Western Pacific 187–8 Australia-Japan economic relations project 107 Awanohara Susumu 153 Axelbank, Albert 42 Axline, W.Andrew 1 Ball, Desmond 171, 172 Bangkok Conference 132 Basic Environmental Pollution Prevention Law 48 Bautista, Romeo M. 119, 137 Bell, Daniel 49 Bergsten, C.Fred 165 Bey, Arifin 148 Borthwick, Mark 148 Bosnia 190 Bosworth, Barry P. 157 Bouzas, Roberto 159 boycotts, Japanese goods 64 Brandt, William 104 Brash, Donald T. 55 Bretton Woods 19 Briand-Kellogg Pact 101–2, 103 Bridges, Brian 193 Britain 18, 37, 90, 95 Brocheux, Pierre 43 Brunei 181 Brunei, Roger 43 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 122 Buddhism 11, 188 Bungei Shunjū 33, 39, 40 business practices, Japanese 41 Byrnes, Michael 187 Bywater, Hector C. 97, 103 Calder, Kent E. 136 Cambodia 122–123 Canada 91, 128, 175 Canadian Pacific Railway 91 Canberra: APEC meeting 161–2; Pacific integration seminar 130–1; Western Pacific framework 161–2 capitalism 17, 76, 78 Carter, Jimmy 82, 122 Castells, Manuel 24–26
next page >
Castle, Leslie V. 142 Castro, Amado 80, 114 Caves, Richard E. 139 Central Ocean Free Trade Area 202 Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de 15 Chamberlain, J.P. 101 Chee Peng Lim 187 Chekhutov, Andrei I. 78 Chen, Edward K.Y. 143, 147 Chen Tain-Yu 144 Chew Soon Beng 143 Chia Siow Yue 115, 118, 121 Chile 58, 129, 134 China: Asian identity 193; CCP 193; Cultural Revolution 38, 144–5; East Asian economic grouping 177–8; economic reforms 144–7, 183; Greater China 193; and Japan 38, 69, 123, 125; ladder-step doctrine 145–6; as NIC 116; Nixon 67, 68–9; Open Door policy 98; as Pacific market 4, 98; PECC 133–4; and Soviet Union 38, 122; and Taiwan 116, 134, 176–7; Tiananmen Square 161; and US 46; world politics 146; WTO 173; see also Deng Xiaoping Chough Soon 80 Christianity 188 Clinton, Bill 164, 172, 175 Coe, David T. 182 Cold War 29–30, 36, 108, 125, 136; ended 148–9, 157 Colombo Plan 43 Comedy 6–7 Commission for a New Asia 192–3 Common Agricultural Policy 109 communism 11 Communist Party of China Central Committee 193 comparative advantage 16, 23, 142 competition 16, 18, 60–1 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 110, 171 Confucianism 188 Congressional Research Service 126 Consulate General of Malaysia 178 continental metaphors 188–9 continentalism 189–90, 193
< previous page
page_236
next page >
< previous page
page_237
next page >
Page 237 cooperation, economic 43, 49 Copeland, Henry 92 CPPS (Permanent Commission of the South Pacific) 134 Craig, Albert M. 49 Croly, Herbert 102 Crump, Thomas 30, 31 CSCA (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia) 171 CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific) 171–2 Cuadra, Miguel Angel 76 cultural imports 63 Curtis, Gerald L. 46, 69 cyclical model of development 29–30, 65, 198 Dale, Peter N. 84 Davenport, William Wyatt 104 Davis, J.Merle 103 democratic state, legitimacy 24–5 Deng Xiaoping 122, 144–6, 193 dependencia theory 12; as anachronism 116, 144; and development 54; horizontal structure 143; Kojima 59, 78; Latin America 40, 76, 78; political impact 55; Thailand 73, 78 Depression, Great 19, 103 Desmond, Edward W. 180 Destler, I.M. 36 developing countries: balance of payment 62; labour costs 60; protection 19; ranking 115, 118–19, 181 development 54–5; ASEAN 144; cyclic 29–30, 65, 198; economic ladder metaphor 79; flying geese theory 79; general theory 23; hypotheses for future 199–202; Indonesia 120; Korea, South 80; ladder-step doctrine 145–6; Malaysia 191; protection 23–4; Singapore 80; Taiwan 79–80; uneven 53–4 verticality 143 development models 81, 135–6, 142 development theory 113–14 developmental stages theory 18, 79–80, 89–90, 138–9, 140, 142–3 developmental state 24–5 Ding, Jing Ping 143 Dirlik, Arif 8 dollar, valuations 137 Dowker, Heather 175 Drakakis-Smith, David 3 Drysdale, Peter 106, 112, 126, 166, 186
Duco, Gloria Echeverria 129 earthquakes 101 East Asia: and China 177–8; compared with Warsaw Pact countries 189; development model 81; Japan in 4; Malaysia 4; Ōkita 192–3; regionalism 192; US 189; and Western Pacific 187–8 East Asia Community 176–7 East Asia Ministerial Meeting on Support and Assistance to the Greater Mekong Region 194 East Asian Economic Caucus 88, 179–80, 184–7, 192 East Asian Economic Group 178–9 East Asian Miracle 181 EC: see European Community economic boom, Asia 142, 180 Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 45 Economic Cooperation in the Western Pacific 49 economic development: see development economic growth: China 146–7, 183; cyclical 65; European Community 37; Japan 33–4, 64–6, 115, 124, 148–9, 183; Korea, South 115; Latin America 113–14; Ōkita 33–4; Singapore 115; see also development economic integration: see integration, economic economic ranking, international 115, 118–19, 181 economism 8, 11; Asian 79; Europe 15–16; Japanese 11–12, 42; Ōkita 21–2; and Pacific age 87; Pacific countries 28, 196; political factors 15; as Romance 196 The Economist 32, 105, 170, 173–174, 183, 194 Edström, Bert 48 EEC: see European Community EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 108, 158 Eggleston, F.W. 102 El-Agraa, Ali M. 1 Ellwood, David 20 emerging markets 188
< previous page
page_237
next page >
< previous page
page_238
Page 238 Eminent Persons Group 165–7, 170 Emmerson, John K. 38, 39, 43, 45, 46 emplotment 6 English, H.Edward 128, 137, 139, 159, 165, 186, 197 era concept 30 Estanislao, Jesus P. 129 Etherton, P.T. 100 EU: see European Community Eurasian era 199 Europe: as centre of world 90; cultural exports 63; economism 15–16; integration 18; and Japan 69; and Pacific 91–2, 94, 100, 109, 158–9; see also European Community European Communist Union 200 European Community 27; Common Agricultural Policy 109; East Asia 194; economic growth 37; Hawke initiative 161; as model 107, 166–9; and Pacific 108 Evans, Gareth 163, 171, 179, 187–8 Evans, Paul M. 171 exchange rates 35, 51, 181, 182–3 expansionism, US 92–3 export orientation 62, 81, 117, 119
Far Eastern Economic Review 157, 175 Ferleger, Herbert Ronald 95 Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo 113–14 Findlay, Christopher 142 Flamm, Kenneth 143 Fletcher, C.Brunsdon 92, 99 flying geese theory: Akamatsu 22–3, 53, 117–18, 138, 150–1; ASEAN economists 141–2; Australia 117; development stages 79; developmental state 24; dynamism 147; history 150–1; Japanese leadership 22–3, 24, 185; Kojima 62, 151, 152; Latin America 144; leaders/followers 22–3, 55; Ōkita 53, 79, 137–8; PAFTAD 117; peace theory 153; PECC IV 137–8; prevalence 143–4; and product cycle theory 53; textiles 51; Yamazawa 150–3 Fong Chan Onn 143–144 Ford, Gerald 74
next page >
Foreign Affairs 189 foreign direct investment 52–53, 55–7, 58 Fourt, Nicholas 133 Fox, Frank 97–9, 100 Frank, Andre Gunder 40 Frazer, Malcolm 128 free trade: capitalism 17; competition 18; East Asian Economic Caucus 184–6; global 20; Japan 35, 64; Ōkita 63, 66; PAFTAD 186 Friedman, George 189 Fukuda Doctrine 13, 83–4 Fukuda Takeo 82–3; ASEAN 83–6, 112–13; foreign policy 82–3; internationalization 64; Japan as aid-giver 43; Japan and China 123, 125; Manila speech 122; Southeast Asian initiative 85–6; and US 123 Funabashi Yōichi 2, 160, 162, 165, 172–173, 178–180, 181, 186, 194 Furukawa Eiichi 179, 194 future as concept 90–1, 141, 199–202 Gaimushō 37, 41, 73 Gaimushō Ajiakyoku 132 Galtung, Johan 32, 37, 40 Garnaut, Ross 117, 142, 185, 186 GATT: Tokyo Round 65, 72, 108; trade liberalization 142; Uruguay Round 142, 159, 163, 168, 177, 184 Germany 18–19, 91 Gibney, Frank 148 Gilpin, Robert 150 Global Trade Authority 202 GNP: Japan 33–4; Malaysia 118–19; Philippines 118–119; US 34–5 Goh Chok Tong 128, 193 Gorham, Michael 113 Gourevitch, Peter A. 150 Grant, Richard J. 143, 184–185 Greater China Cooperation Council 201 Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere 177 Gregory, R.G. 139–140 Gromyiko, Andrei 45 Guam Doctrine 37–8, 42, 72 Guillain, Robert 32 Guo Zhaolie 134 Hailsham, Lord 102 Hamada, Kōichi 56 Han Sung-Joo 128 Hart, Albert Bushnell 95 Hashimoto Ryūtarō 157, 180, 186
Hata Tsutomu 156 Hatano Sumio 193 Hau’ofa, Epeli 144 Haushofer, Karl 100
< previous page
page_238
next page >
< previous page
page_239
Page 239 Hawke, Bob 159–61, 162, 177 He Xin 177 Hegel, G.W.F. 26 hegemonic change theory 150 Hiebert, Murray 188 Higgott, Richard 160–161, 164, 167, 179, 181 high-performing Asian economies (HPAEs) 181 high technology industry 49, 141 Hill, Hal 141 Hinton, W.J. 101 Hirschman, Albert O. 15–17, 26 history, narratives 5 Hobbes, Thomas 15–16 Hofheinz, Roy 136 Holloway, Nigel 173 Hong Kong 26, 44, 58, 80, 116, 183 Hong Wontack 80 Hook, Glenn D. 38, 157 Hooper, Paul F. 100, 104 Hosokawa Morihiro 156, 180 Hosono Akio 188 Howe, Christopher 193 Hsia, Ronald 80 Huan Xiang 134 Hughes, Helen 58, 78 Hummel, Hartwig 21 Huntington, Samuel 169, 188 Hymer, Stephen 52–4 55 Ide Hideki 140 Ikeda Hayato 21, 26, 125–6 Ikema Makoto 118, 120 Imai Ken-ichi 143–144 Imakawa Eiichi 44 Imperial Educational Association of Japan 102 imperialism 40–1, 58 import liberalization 64 import substitution 81, 119 Inagaki Manjirō 9, 89, 91–92, 99–100 Income Doubling Plan 21, 26 India 4, 43–4 Indochina 43 Indonesia: APEC summit 170; development 120; economic liberalization 170; foreign direct investment 57; Islam 11; Pacific age rhetoric 129; Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference 132 industrial policy 137, 139, 141 industrialization 51, 152 industry, Japanese 48, 51, 61–2 innovation costs 59 Inoguchi Takashi 2, 68, 150, 153, 156–157 Institut de Pacifique 133 Institute of Pacific Relations 100–2, 103 integration, economic 1; Asia Pacific 2–3, 180; European 18;
next page >
Pacific Age 104–5, 106; regional 3–4, 12, 158–159, 176; Schuman Plan 20; see also Pacific integration interdependence 16 International Comparison Program 182 international politics: see world politics international ranking 115, 118–19, 181 investment 56–59, 152–3 investment theory 62–3, 144 Ishihara Shintarō 74, 190–2 Ishikawa Masumi 42 Ishimaru Tōla 103 ISIS (ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) 171–2 Islam 11, 29, 188 Jackson, Peter A. 11 Jackson, Steven F. 145 Jakarta riot 73, 75 Japan: aid-giving 43, 72, 85; APEC 180; and ASEAN 13, 71, 72–3, 75, 82–3, 83–6; as Asian leader 32, 143, 148, 179, 185; and Australia 49–50, 51, 92, 160; business practices 41; and China 38, 69, 123, 125; criticised 63; domestic politics 39–40, 156–7; earthquakes 101; as East Asian country 4; East Asian Economic Caucus 179; as economic development model 135–6; economic growth 33–4, 64–6, 115, 124, 148–9, 183; economism 11–12, 42; and Europe 69; exchange rate 35; flying geese theory 22–3, 24, 185; foreign direct investment 55–6; foreign policy 82–3, 179–80; free trade 35, 64; GNP 33–4; government spending 68; as great power 4, 12, 20, 32–3, 36, 46, 48; history 20–1, 31, 80; imperialism 40–1; Income Doubling Plan 21, 26; industry 48, 51, 62; international politics 21–2, 157; as investor 58–59, 61–62, 152–3; Liberal Democratic Party 41, 42, 156; Maekawa Report 149–50;
< previous page
page_239
next page >
< previous page
page_240
Page 240 market penetration 63–4; Meiji Restoration 30–1, 123–4; and Middle East 70–1; military spending 11, 38–9, 43, 81–2; MITI 48–9, 50, 160, 161, 162, 173; MOFA 46, 50, 131, 161–162, 171, 173, 194; natural resources/population 98–9; nuclear energy 38–9; Official Development Assistance 66; and Pacific Asia 1–2, 4, 180–1, 185; as peacemaker 122; pollution 48–9; post-industrialism 49–50, 124, 135; and Southeast Asia 43–4, 179; and Soviet Union 46, 69; Tanaka’s restructuring 68–9; time concept 30–1, 41; and US 46, 67–8, 71–2, 103, 150; wars 21–2, 191; yen 64, 192 Japan Economic Research Centre 79 Japanese Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group 129 Japanese tourists 63–4 Jiang Zemin 175, 193 Johnson, Chalmers 48–49, 67–68, 136 Johnson, Harry G. 53, 55, 78 Johnson, Mark 3 Jordan, James 143 Jovanović, Miroslav N. 1 Jun Yongwook 145 Kahler, Miles 1 Kahn, Herman 32–3, 37, 45, 105 Kaifu Toshiki 156 Kakazu Hiroshi 188 Kanamori Hisao 64–65 Kaneko Kentarō 97 Kapur, Basant 137 Kataoka Tetsuya 40 Keizai Shingikai 21 Kerdpibule, Udom 81 Khoman, Thanat 121, 129, 132 Kido Kazuo 180 Kierkegaard, S. 17 Kikuchi Tsutomu 160–161, 170–171, 175 Kim Eun Mee 25, 26 Kim Nak-Kwan 80 Kim Yan Ki 193 Kindleberger, Charles P. 55 Kobayashi Noboru 22 Koh Ai Tee 141 Koike Hirotsugu 148 Kojima Kiyoshi 3, 21; APEC 163; Australia-Japan economic relations project 107; dependencia 59, 78; East Asian economic group 177; Economic Cooperation in the Western Pacific 49; equity as goal 77; European Community 29, 108;
next page >
flying geese theory 62, 151–152; foreign investment theory 58, 59; history of Pacific integraton 132; investment theory 62–3, 144; Japanese growth 64–6; labour-intensive industries 51; Latin America 111; and Ōhira 124, 125; OPTAD 109–13, 120–1, 127; Pacific Free Trade Area 27, 104; PAFTAD 51–3, 106; textiles 78; US 61 Kokubun Ryōsei 193 Komiya Ryūtarō 55–6, 79 Kono Yōhei 164 Koo Hagen 25, 26 Korea, North 4 Korea, South: ASEAN 44; development 80; economic growth 115; Japanese security 38; knitwear exports 185; legitimacy of elite 26; nationalizaton 56–7; OPTAD 128; Park 25–6, 128; steel industry 141; US 122; Western Pacific framework 161 Korean Airlines, Soviet Union 122 Korean Business Association 159–60 Korhonen, Pekka 2, 4, 20, 22, 27, 29, 193 Koselleck, Reinhart 2 Kovalenko, I.I. 133 Krause, Lawrence B. 113–115, 119, 126, 158, 161 Krueger, Anne O. 117, 143 Krugman, Paul 142–143, 189–90 Kuala Lumpur Declaration 72 Kuomintang 26 Kurimoto Hiroshi 27 Kyū Eikan 192 labour costs 60 labour-intensive industries 61–2 ladder-step doctrine 145–6 Lakoff, George 3 Latin America: dependencia theory 40, 76, 78; economic growth 113–14; flying geese theory 144; import substitution 81; Kojima 111; oligopolies 52–3; Pacific age rhetoric 129; PAFTAD 75–7; PECC 134; socialist revolution 54; Soviet Union 77–8; US 78
< previous page
page_240
next page >
< previous page Page 241 Lau Teik Soon 148 LDP: see Liberal Democratic Party Lea, Homer 92, 96–7 leadership, charismatic 25 League of Nations 100 Lebard, Meredith 189 Lebedev, I.A. 78 Lee Kuan Yew 190 Lee Lai To 167, 171 Lee Poh Ping 128–9 Lee Teng Hui 164 legitimacy 24–5 Legorreta, Omar Martinez 76 less developed countries 115 Leuenberger, Theodor 188 Leviste, Jose P. 133, 148 Liang Ching-ing Hou 141 Liang Kuo-shu 79–80, 141 Liberal Democratic Party 41, 42 liberalism 11 Life magazine 104 Lim Chong-Yah 80, 128, 190 Lim Hua Sing 178 Linder, Staffan Burenstam 133 List, Friedrich 17, 18–19, 22, 150 Lister, Marjorie 109 Lomé Convention 109, 112 London, Jack 96 Lu Zheng 147 Luce, Henry R. 104 Lustig, Nora 159 Lyotard, Jean-François 5 McCord, William 148 McFetridge, Donald G. 139–40 MacGuigan, Mark 128 Machiavelli, N. 15 McKinley, William 93, 98 Macrae, Norman 105 Maekawa Report 149–50 Magee, Stephen P. 113 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 93–95, 99 Mahathir bin Mohamad: APEC 164; Confucianism 188; continentalism 189–90; EAEC 179–80, 186–7; EAEG 178; European cooperation 129; ‘No’ books 190–2; as prime minister 131–2, 178; Tanaka 74 Mahbabuni, Kishore 190 Maiya Kenichirō 44 Malari riot 73, 75 Malaya 43 Malaysia: and Australia 178; development 191;
page_241
next page >
as East Asian country 4; East Asian Economic Group 178; ethnic minorities 188; foreign direct investment 58; GNP 118–19; Islam 11; Pacific age 128–9, 148; Pacific integration 131–2; Sabah 44; semiconductors 144; Western Pacific framework 161; see also Mahathir bin Mohamad Manila Action Plan for APEC 174 market exchange rates 181, 182–3 Marshall Plan 66 Martin, Laurence 171 Maruyama Shizuo 44 Marx, Karl 17 Mason, T.David 188 Masuda Hiroshi 193 Matsumoto Ken’ichi 177 Maurtua, Oscar 134 Meiji Restoration 30–1, 123–4 de Melo, Jaime 1 Mendl, Wolf 2 metaphors 3–4, 79, 188–9 metonymy 5 Mexico 55, 76, 164 Middle East and Japan 70–1 Miki Takeo 27, 74–75, 81–2, 104, 156 militarization, Japan 11, 38–9, 43, 81–2 Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia 45 MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) 48–9, 50, 160, 161, 162, 173 Mitrany, David 20 Miyazawa Kiichi 156, 164, 180 MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 46, 50, 131, 161, 162, 171, 173, 194 Moffett, Sebastian 173–174 Momoi Makato 42 Mondale, Walter 122 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat 16 Morita Akio 190 Moriya Hideo 102 Morrison, Charles E. 127 Mowry, George E. 93 multinational corporations 60 Murai Yoshinori 180 Murakami Atsushi 78 Murayama Tomiichi 156–7, 172, 191 Murota Yasuhiro 79 NAFTA 159, 185 Nagai Yōnosuke 32
< previous page
page_241
next page >
< previous page
page_242
Page 242 Nakagawa Nobuo 44 Nakamura Takafusa 32, 35, 48–9, 51, 71 Nakasone Yasuhiro 156 Nakayama Tarō 164 Nam Chong Hyun 133, 141 Namiki Nobuyoshi 79 Nanjō Shunji 183, 193 narratives, history 5 Naseem, S.M. 187 nation-states 189 nationalism 189 Naughton, Barry 145, 147 naval power 101 Nawalowalo, Nao 129 Naya Seiji 78, 81, 113, 137 Nelson, Richard R. 143 neoclassical economics 54–55, 117, 141 New Deal policies 20 New Economic Program 35, 51, 67 New International Economic Order 77 New Republic 102 New Zealand 83, 128, 187–8 newly industrializing countries (NICs) 115–17; see also ANICs Newsweek 105 Nietzsche, Friedrich 17 Nitobe Inazo 103 Nixon, Richard 35, 37–8, 42, 51; China 67, 68–9 Noguchi Yūichirō 44 North/South dichotomy 77, 169 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 42 Oborne, Michael West 133 Oceania 4, 49–50 oceanic metaphor 188–9 oceanic stage of development 89–90 OECD 106, 108–9, 115 Official Development Assistance 66 Ogata Sadako 69 Ogura Kazuo 180 Ōhira Masayoshi 72, 123–6, 130 oil crisis 81, 113, 126, 135 oil price shock 29, 48, 71, 74, 76, 77 Ōkawachi Kazuo 22 Okimoto, Daniel L. 150 Okinawa 37–8, 44, 67 Ōkita Saburō 3, 12, 27, 105; aid to Asia 42–3; East Asia 192–3; economic growth 21–2; economism 21–2; Eminent Persons Group 165; flying geese theory 53, 79, 137–8; free trade 65, 66; high technology 49; MOFA 131; and Ōhira 125; Okinawa 44; Pacific integration 112–13, 133;
next page >
PECC 160 Okuno Masahiro 140 oligopolies 52–3, 59–60 OPEC cartel 70, 77 Open Door policy, China 98 OPTAD (Organization for Pacific Trade and Development) 106, 109–13, 120–1, 127–128, 165 Ōsaka Action Agenda 173 Ovalle, Jose M. 134 Ozawa Ichirō 180 Ozawa Terutomo 59
Pacific Affairs 103 Pacific age: APEC 169; concept 3, 9, 87, 89, 190–1; and economism 87; Inagaki 92; integration 104–5, 106; Malaysia 128–9, 148; Ōhira 124–5; status 102; US 93 Pacific age rhetoric 102–5, 128–30, 132, 148, 169 Pacific Asian countries 1–2, 4, 110–11, 147, 180–1, 183–5 Pacific Basin Economic Council 27–8 Pacific Business Forum 167, 169–70 Pacific Community ideology 132–3, 202 Pacific Community Seminar 131 Pacific cooperation 133, 160 Pacific Cooperation Newsletter 134 Pacific countries 1–2; academics 197; advanced countries 110; China as market 4, 98; development model 142; economism 28, 196; and Europe 91–2, 94, 100, 109, 158–9; institutions 196–7; markets 98; military struggles 99–100, 103–4; oceanic metaphor 188–9; supremacy 95–7; voluntary export restraint 108–9; see also Pacific Asian countries Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) 87, 132–4, 137–8, 160 Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 137, 165 Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) 27, 52, 74, 104, 166 Pacific integration: Australia 128; Canberra seminar 130–1; Malaysia 131–2; Ōhira 124; Ōkita 112–13, 133; organizations 27–8; Pacific Free Trade Area 166; US 127–8, 167–8
< previous page
page_242
next page >
< previous page
page_243
Page 243 Pacific island states 129 PAFTA: see Pacific Free Trade Area PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development) 3, 113, 117, 186 PAFTAD conferences 27–8, 51–3, 156; PAFTAD XV 138; PAFTAD XVI 142; PAFTAD XVIII 150; anti-Japanese feelings 75; Asians 79; Australia 76–7; economists 2, 3, 49, 87, 126; Hying geese theory 117; Kojima 51–3, 106; Latin America 75–7; Pacific age 104–5; Soviet Union 78; Thailand 106–7 PAFTAD International Steering Committee 106 Pakistan, and Japan 40 Pakkasem, Phisit 177 Palacios, Juan J. 144 Panagariya, Arvind 1 Panama Canal 91, 93 Pandey, Posh Raj 71 Pang Eng Fong 128 Pangestu, Mari 142, 146 Papua New Guinea 91, 164 Park Chung Hee 25–6, 128 Park Yung Chul 185 Patrick, Hugh 3, 113, 126 PECC: see Pacific Economic Cooperation Council Peffer, Nathaniel 103 Peru, Pacific integration 134 petrochemicals 141 Philippines: APEC VIII 174; economic success 80; foreign direct investment 57, 58; GNP 118–119; Pacific age rhetoric 129, 148; ranked 181; Sabah 44; Spanish troops 95; US presence 83 Pickens, Robert S. 103 Pinera, Jose 77 Plaza Accord 137 political economy 17 politics: see world politics pollution, industrial 48–9 population growth, global 98–9 post-industrialism 49–50, 124, 135 post-modern age, Japan 124 potamic stage of development 89 product cycle theory 53–4, 59–60, 143 progress of humanity 89–90 progressive nations 90
next page >
protectionism: against Asian countries 98; against Britain 18; development 23–4; foreign competition 60–1; List 18–19; US 18, 36 Protestant countries 11 purchasing power parity 182–183 Quibria, M.G. 190 race, world politics 94–5 racism 96, 99, 100 ranking, economic 115, 118–19, 181 raw materials 77, 79, 113 Reading, Brian 157 Reagan, Ronald 136–7 regional integration 3–4, 12, 158–159, 176 regionalism 1, 192 Reischauer, Edwin O. 49 religion, and economics 11 revolutionary state 25 rhetorical analysis 2 Ricardo, David 16 Ritter, Carl 89–90 Rivera, Temario C. 95 Robins, Norman I. 113 Rohwer, Jim 183 Romance 6, 89–90, 196 Roosevelt, Nicholas 102 Roosevelt, Theodore 92–95, 99, 100 Roosevelt, Theodore Jr 94 Ros, Jaime 159 Roth, William V Jr 127 Rowell, Newton W. 102 Rozman, Gilbert 188 Runnalls, David 197 Russo-Japanese war 95, 99 Sabah 44 Sadli, Mohammad 57 Safarian, A.E. 55 Sagami, Governor 103 Saitō Shizuo 133 Saitō Sōichi 102 Salgado, Germanico 76 Sandhu, Kernial 129 Satire 7–8 Satō Eisaku 156; free trade 64; Japan in Asia 32, 45; and Nixon 37–8; Pacific age 105; PAFTA 27; textiles 67 Sawayanagi Masatarō 102 Schlosstein, Steven 150 Schulzinger, Robert D. 98 Schuman Plan 20 Scott, Anthony 137
< previous page
page_243
next page >
< previous page
page_244
Page 244 security 171–2, 197 Seeley, John Robert 89, 90–1 Seki Hiroharu 41, 148 Sekiguchi Sueo 114 semiconductors 144 Seward, William H. 92–3 sex tourism 64 Shambaugh, David 193 Shea Jia-Dong 146 Shen Long-shi 193 Shiba Ryōtarō 33, 35 Shibusawa Masahide 3, 69–70, 73, 96, 97 Shih Chih-yu 38 Shiraishi Takashi 21 Shirk, Susan L. 143 Shotwell, James T. 101 Siberia 69 Sicat, Gerardo P. 129 Simon, Denis Fred 145 Singapore: affluence 183; development 80; economic growth 115; education 118; foreign direct investment 58; Pacific age rhetoric 128, 129, 148; People’s Action Party 26; petrochemicals 141; Western societal breakdown 190 Singh, Lalita Prasad 44 Sjahrir 146 Smith, Adam 16, 26 Smith, Ben 143 Smith, M.L. 20 Smith, Murray G. 159, 165, 186 social theorists 15–16 socialism 54, 76, 78, 157–8 societal breakdown 190 Soedjatmoko, Ambassador 121 Soesastro, Hadi 95, 142–143, 177, 183, 186 Sombart, Werner 19 Song Byung-Nak 188 Sopiee, Noordin 133 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 71 Southeast Asia: as concept 44; development theory 113–14; foreign direct investment 58; and Japan 43–4, 179; Japanese tourists 64; poverty 187; world politics 72 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 128 Soviet Union: and China 38, 122; and Japan 46, 69; and Latin America 77–8; Siberia 69; as superpower 36; and US 136
next page >
Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation 131–132 specialization 59–60, 107 Spengler, Oswald 100 steel industry 141 Steenstrup, Carl 92 Stein, Guenther 100 Stirk, Peter M.R. 20 stories, grand 5–6 Sudō Sueo 50, 71, 74, 75, 81–83, 85, 123 Suharto, President 170 Sulong, Zainal Abidin 178 Sumitani Kazuhiko 22 Sundberg, Mark 158, 161 Sung Yun-Wing 145 Suryadinata, Leo 148 Suyematsu, Baron 99 Suzuki, Zenkō 132 Suzumura Kotarō 140 Swift, Jonathan 15 synecdoche 5 Taiwan: APEC 164; ASEAN 44; and China 116, 134, 176–7; development 79–80; foreign direct investment 58; industrial policy 141; Japanese security 38; US aid 26 Takahashi Tamotsu 149 Takaki Yasaki 104 Takenaka Heizo 185 Takeshita Noboru 154, 156, 161, 180 Tamura Shuji 79, 143 Tan, Augustine H.H. 137 Tanaka Kakuei 66, 67–70, 72–4 Tanaka Naoki 192–193 Tanin, O. 103 tariffs 18, 174 Taylor, Robert 193 technology transfer 143 Teutonic race 94–5 textile industry 35, 51, 62, 67–8, 78 Thailand: Buddhism 11; dependencia 73, 78; foreign direct investment 57, 58; GNP 118, 119; Japanese exports 64, 73; Pacific age rhetoric 129, 132; Western Pacific Economic Cooperation scheme 177; Western Pacific framework 161 thalassic stage of development 89 Thurow, Lester 188 Tiltman, H.Hessell 100 time concepts 29–31, 41, 90–1 Tokuyama Jirō 105
< previous page
page_244
next page >
< previous page
page_245
Page 245 Tokyo Round, GATT 65, 72, 108 tourism, Japanese 63–4 Toynbee, Arnold J. 103 trade liberalization 142, 165, 168 trading blocs 188 Tragedy 7 Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area 194 Tung, Ricky 176–7 Turay, Abdul M. 188 Uekusa Masu 140 Umehara Takeshi 35 UNCTAD 77, 108 unemployment 78 United Nations: Asian Development Bank 45; Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 45; International Comparison Program 182 Uno Sōsuke 156 Urata Shujirō 143 Uruguay Round 142, 159, 163, 168, 177, 184 US: arms reductions 148–9; canal at Nicaragua/Panama 91, 93; and China 46, 67, 68–9; Cold War 157–8; dollar strength 137; East Asia 189; East Asian Economic Group 178, 179; expansionism 92–3; Fukuda 123; GNP 34–5; Guam Doctrine 37–8, 42, 72; and Japan 46, 67–8, 71–2, 103, 150; Kojima 61; Korea 122; and Latin America 78; Marshall Plan 66; military spending 136; natural resources 59; New Deal policies 20; New Economic Program 35, 51, 67; oil crisis 126; OPTAD 113; Pacific age 93; Pacific Century 148; Pacific integration 127–8, 167–8; Pacific supremacy 96–7; PAFTAD economists 126; protectionism 18, 36; and Soviet Union 136; as superpower 19–20, 36; troop withdrawal 82, 122; Wall Street crash 103 Vernon, Raymond 53, 59–60, 143 verticality 143 Vicuña, Francisco Orrega 129 Vietnam 38, 72, 74, 81, 122–123 Virata, Cesar 57
next page >
Viravan, Amnuay 57 Vogel, Ezra F. 135 Volkov, May 78 voluntary export restraints 35, 108–9, 185 Wahid, Zainal Abidin A. 133 Wall Street crash 103 Washington naval conference 101 Watanabe Akio 31, 44, 89, 161, 178 Watanabe Shōichi 192 Watanabe Toshio 148 Weber, Max 11, 25 Weiner, Michael A. 157 Weinstein, Martin E. 188 Weiss, Julian 189, 192 Western Pacific countries 49, 58, 160–2, 187–8 Western Pacific Economic Cooperation scheme 177 Whalley, John 184 White, Donald W. 104 White, Hayden 3, 5, 6, 30 Whiting, Allen S. 145 Whitlam, E.Gough 133 Whyte, Sir Frederick 102 Widjaja, Albert 129 Wijarso 129 Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany 96 Wionczek, Miguel 55, 76 Wolf, Marvin J. 136 van Wolferen, Karel 157 Wolff, Lester 126 Wong, John 181 Wood, Christopher 148, 157 Woods, Lawrence T. 27, 101, 131–132, 138, 175 World Bank 181 world output, Asia 104, 181–2 world politics 21–2, 72–3, 94–5, 100–1, 123, 146, 157 World Trade Organization 168, 173 World War I 100 World War II 11–12, 179 Woronoff, Jon 157 Xinhuashe 38 Yabuki Susumu 177–8 Yahuda, Michael 2, 146 Yakubovsky, V. 78 Yamagami Susumu 162 Yamagata, Aritomo 99 Yamamoto Sachiko 44, 64 Yamamoto Susumu 41, 44 Yamaoka Michio 101, 148
< previous page
page_245
next page >
< previous page
page_246
Page 246 Yamazawa Ippei 80, 138, 150–3, 165 Yang Yoonsae 56–7, 80 Yasuba Yasukichi 118 Yasutomo, Dennis 45, 157 ‘Yellow Peril’ term 96 Yen Tzung-Ta 146 yen, revalued 64 yen sphere 192 Yohan, E. 103 Yokoyama Hiroaki 193 Yoon Young-Kwan 150 Yoshida Doctrine 34–5 Yoshida Shigeru 21 Young Soogil 143, 184–186 youth ship 72–3 Zakaria, Farced 190 Zambrano, Ramiro 134 Zhao Ziyang 145 Ziribn, Gerado Bueno 76 Zollverein 18 ZOPFAN declaration 72
< previous page
page_246