Ion

ION Translation by George Burges Plato ************* Introduction In Plato's Apology, Socrates says that in order to test the Oracle of Delphi's pronouncement that he is the wisest, he has gone to the craftsmen, the poets, the politicians, and all of those with a reputation for wisdom. In each of these cases, the person with a reputation for wisdom sets himself up as an expert in some particular arena or concerning some particular concept; e.g., Euthyphro and his claim that he knows what Piety is. In the Ion, Socrates encounters a rhapsode [A person who recites poetry.]; a person who recites poetry professionally. Ion, a rhapsode, claims to have mastered not only the recitation of the epic [A style of Greek poetry in which heroic, and often mythological, events are told in grand scale.] poetry of Homer, but to have the ability to interpret Homer's work. While the issue of Ion's ability to recite Homer is of interest, what is more interesting to him is whether or not the knowledge of Homer's meanings (that is, the ability to interpret Homer) is actually a kind of knowledge. One of the central features of Socratic/Platonic epistemology is the Principle of the Priority of Definition [To make a claim to knowledge of some concept is to claim that one knows the definition of that concept.]. Simply put, when a person makes a claim to knowledge of some thing or other, he is implicitly claiming to know the definition of that concept. So, for example, when Laches asserts that he knows what "courage" is or when Euthyphro says that he knows "piety," each is making a claim to possess the definition of that concept. These claims to knowledge set up the Socratic questioning that drives the early dialogues, like the Ion which is paradigmatic of the Socratic dialogues of Plato's early career. The central feature of that Socratic questioning is a simple question, formally rendered as the "What is F?" question. In the Euthyphro, Socrates asks, "What is piety?" In the Laches, "What is courage?" In each case, the person who has set himself up as the expert by making a claim to knowledge is in fact subject to answer this question. In each case, Socrates' interlocutor [A participant in a dialogue.] offers a working definition that, through the questions and responses, is shown to terminate in contradictory beliefs. In each case, the

interlocutor offers a new definition, which is then subjected to the same sorts of questioning. This process continues until, in almost all of the early dialogues, a point of confusion takes the interlocutor (and Socrates) and the interlocutor abandons the discourse. The point of the Socratic "What is F?" question, then, is to examine whether or not the person who claims to know F can, in fact, provide a definition for F that does not itself terminate into contradictions. The Ion, as an early Socratic dialogue, is driven by this pursuit for an answer to the "What is F?" question. In the Ion, the question is somewhat more complex, although of the same sort. Here, Socrates asks Ion whether or not Ion's seeming mastery of Homer is a form of knowledge or a form of inspiration. The refined question, then, is "What is rhapsody?" Ion clearly thinks his ability is a form of knowledge; an excellence that he claims to possess. As Socrates and Ion engage in dialogue, Socrates develops a different theory of Ion's ability, and of rhapsody, in general. Whenever Socrates encounters poets who claim to be able to explain their poetry, he discovers that rather than knowledge of the meanings of their work, the poets are incapable of truly providing those interpretations. Indeed, on Socrates' view here, Homer himself had no knowledge. Instead, Homer was possessed by a divine spirit that enabled him to compose. Thus, Socrates concludes that while the poets are inspired, a state that Socrates himself values, but that they do not, in fact, have knowledge. In the Ion, Socrates seems to conclude that the rhapsode (the one who recites poetry) is like the poet. Both are inspired; neither has knowledge. Reading PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: SOCRATES AND ION. SOCRATES. HAIL to thee, Ion; from whence have you come to sojourn with us for the present? Is it from your home at Ephesus? Ion. By no means, Socrates, but from Epidaurus, from the feast of Aesculapius. Soc. Do the Epidaurians too ordain a contest of rhapsodists, in honour of the god? Ion. They do; and other kinds of the muse's art likewise. Soc. What then? Did you contend? Ion. I do not deny it. Soc. And how did you contend?

Ion. We carried off, Socrates, the first of the prizes. Soc. You say well, come then, in order that we two may win at the Panathenaea. Ion. And this will be if a god is willing. Soc. Often have I indeed, Ion, been envious of the art of you rhapsodists. For that both your body is decorated (so as) to be always becoming to your art, and to appear the most beautiful, and at the same time that it is necessary for you to be conversant with many other excellent poets, and especially Homer, the best and most divine of all, and to learn thoroughly his meaning, not his words merely, is indeed a thing to be envied. For a man would never be a (good) rhapsodist, unless he understood what was said by the poet; for a rhapsodist ought to be an interpreter to the audience of the meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to do well, without knowing what the poet means. Now worthy is all this to be envied. Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true. At least this very portion of my art has given me the greatest trouble. I fancy however I can speak most beautifully about Homer, so that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasus, nor Glauco, nor any one else of those who have ever existed, had it in their power to express so many and such beautiful sentiments as I can do, relating to Homer. Soc. You speak beautifully, Ion. For it is evident that you will not grudge me an exhibition (of your talent). Ion. Indeed, Socrates, it is well worth your hearing how well I have set off Homer; so that, I conceive, I am worthy to be crowned by the Homeridae with a golden crown. Soc. I will make for myself still a leisure time to hear you. But for the present, answer me thus much. Are you skilled on the subject of Homer alone, or of Hesiod and Archilochus likewise? Ion. By no means; on the subject of Homer alone. This seems to be enough for me. Soc. But there is that, about which Homer and Hesiod say the same things. Ion. There are, I think, many such. Soc. Respecting these, can you better explain what Homer says than what Hesiod does?

Ion. Equally, Socrates, respecting those, where they say the same. Soc. But how, where they do not say the same? For instance, Homer and Hesiod say something about the prophetic art. Ion. Certainly. Soc. Well then, whatever those two poets say about the prophetic art, either agreeing or disagreeing, could you explain better, or one of the clever prophets? Ion. One of the prophets. Soc. But if you were a prophet, would you not know, if you were able to give an explanation where they agree, to explain likewise where they disagree? Ion. It is evident I should. Soc. How then are you skilled as regards Homer, but not as regards Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Does Homer speak of other things than what other poets have, taken all together? Has he not gone through the greater part of subjects relating to war, and to the intercourse with each other of men, good and bad, and unskillful and practiced in arts, and relating to the gods, as having an intercourse, such as they have, with one another and with human beings; and to such as relate to celestial events and those in Hades, and the birth of gods and heroes. Are not these the subjects, relating to which Homer has composed his poetry? Ion. You say, Socrates, what is true. Soc. Well then, and do not the rest of the poets (write) about these very things? Ion. They do, Socrates; but they have not composed their poetry as Homer has his. Soc. What then, in a worse way? Ion. Very much so. Soc. But Homer in a better? Ion. Better indeed, by Zeus. Soc. Now, thou dear head, Ion, when many persons are speaking about numbers, and one of them speaks the best, assuredly some person will know

who speaks correctly. Ion. I admit it. Soc. Will it be the same as he, who (knows) likewise those speaking incorrectly, or some one else? Ion. The same person, certainly. Soc. And is it not he, who knows the science of arithmetic? Ion. Yes. Soc. What then, when many persons are speaking about wholesome food, of what kinds they are, and one speaks the best, will one person know that he, who speaks the best, does speak the best, and another (know) that he, (who speaks) worse, (does speak) worse, or will the same person (know both)? Ion. The same person, clearly. Soc. Who is he? What is his name? Ion. Physician. Soc. Let us say then universally, that, when many are speaking upon the same subject, the same person will always know who speaks correctly and who incorrectly. For if a person shall not know the party speaking incorrectly, it is evident that he will not (know) the party speaking correctly, at least upon the same subject. Ion. Just so. Soc. The same person then will be skilled respecting both. Ion. Yes. Soc. Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets, amongst whom there are both Hesiod and Archilochus, write about the same things, though not in the same manner? but that the one does so well, the others worse? Ion. And I said what is true. Soc. If then you know the party who speaks well, you will know those likewise, who speak worse, that they do speak worse? Ion. It is probable.

Soc. In saying then, thou best of men, that Ion is clever on the subject of Homer and all the other poets, we shall not err; since he acknowledges himself that the same person is a competent judge of all such as speak upon the same subjects, and that nearly all poets take the same subjects for their poetry. Ion. What can be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever any one is discoursing upon any other poet, I pay no attention, and am unable to contribute any thing whatever (to the discussion) worth mentioning, and really begin to nod; but when any one brings Homer to my recollection, I am immediately awake, and give my mind to the subject, and am at no loss what to say. Soc. It is not difficult, my friend, to guess the reason of this. For it is clear to every one that you are unable to speak about Homer by art or science. For if you were able by art, you would be able to speak about all the other poets; for the whole is surely poetry. Or is it not? Ion. It is. Soc. When a man shall have laid hold of any other art whatever as a whole, is there not the same method of viewing it (as) all the arts? Why I say this, do you, Ion, request to hear from me? Ion. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, I do; for I delight to hear you wise men. Soc. I would wish, Ion, that you were saying what is true; but you surely are the wise men, you the rhapsodists and performers, and those whose poems you recite; whereas I speak nothing but the simple truth, as becomes a mere unskilled person. Since the question, which I just now asked you, see how trifling it is, and suited to an unskilled person, and for every man to know, namely, that, which I spoke of as presenting the same view, when a person lays hold of the whole of any art. Let us then lay hold in our discourse of painting; for it is an art (whole in itself), is it not? Ion. Yes. Soc. Are there not, and have been, many painters good and bad? Ion. Very many. Soc. Now then, did you ever see any person who, as regards Polygnotus, the son of Aglaophon, is skilled in showing what he paints well and what ill, but is unable to do so as regards other painters? and whenever any exhibits the works of those other painters, grows drowsy, and is at a loss, and has not what to contribute to (the conversation); but when it is necessary to

declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other painter you please, immediately wakes up and gives all attention, and is at no loss what to say? Ion. Not at all, by Zeus. Soc. Well then, in the statuary's art, did you ever see any one who, as regards Daedalus, the son of Metion, or Epeius, the son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other single statuary, was skilled in explaining what each had executed well, but as regards the other statuaries, was at a loss, grew drowsy, as having nothing to say? Ion. No, by Zeus, I never knew such a person as this. Soc. Nor, as I think, in the case of playing on the hautboy or harp, and in singing to the harp, and in the recitations of the rhapsodists, you never saw a man who, as regards Olympus, or Thamyris, or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsodist of Ithaca, is a skillful interpreter, but as regards Ion the Ephesian, is at a loss and unable to give an opinion whether Ion does well or not as a rhapsodist. Ion. I have nothing to say against you upon that point, Socrates, but of this I am conscious to myself, that as regards Homer I speak the best of all men, and am least at a loss, and everybody else says that I do speak well, but not, as regards the rest. Consider then why is this. Soc. I do consider, Ion, and I commence showing you how this seems to me. This faculty of speaking well about Homer is not an art, as I said just now, but a divine power, which moves you, like that in the stone, which Euripides calls the Magnesian, but the common people Heraclean. For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but imparts a power to the rings, so that they are able to do the very same things as the stone does, and to attract other rings, and sometimes a very long series of iron rings, hung (as in a chain), one from another; but from that stone depends the power in all of them. Thus too does the Muse herself move men divinely inspired, and through them thus inspired, a chain hangs together of others inspired divinely likewise. For all the good epic poets compose all their beautiful poems, not by art, but by being divinely inspired and possessed (by the Muse); and so too the good lyric poets, just as the Corybantes dance, not being in their sound senses, compose their beautiful lyrical poems, when they are not in their sound senses; but when they go on according to the harmony and rhythm, they become mad, possessed (by a god), as are the priestesses of Bacchus, (who,) possessed by a god, draw from rivers honey and milk; but are unable to do so, when in their senses; and the soul of the lyric poets does that, which they say they do. For assuredly they say to us, that (drawing) from fountains flowing with honey, and gathering (flowers) from the gardens and glades of the Muses, they bring us their songs, as bees do

(their honey), and are ever too on the wing. And they tell us too what is true. For a poet is a thing light, and with wings, and sacred, and unable to compose poetry until he becomes inspired, and is out of his sober senses, and his imagination is no longer under his control. For so long as a person is in complete possession of it, he is unable to compose verses or to speak oracularly. Hence as they compose not by art, they say many beautiful things relating to their subjects, as you do about Homer; but each is able to compose that alone through a divine allotment, to which the Muse has impelled them, one to dithyrambics, another to panegyrics, another to hyporchemata, another to epic verse, and another to iambic; but in the other kinds each makes no figure; for they do not compose by art, but through a divine power; since if they knew how to speak by art upon one subject correctly, they would (be able to do so) upon all others. And on this account a deity has deprived them of their senses, and employs them as his ministers, and oracle-singers, and divine prophets, in order that when we hear them, we may know it is not they to whom sense is not present, who speak what is valuable, but the god himself who speaks, and through them addresses us. And of this assertion Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords the greatest proof; who never composed any other poem, which any one would think worth remembering, but the Paean, which everybody sings, of almost all hymns the most excellent, and as he himself states, "An invention of artless Muses." For in him most especially does the god seem to me to point out to us, that we are not to doubt about those beautiful poems being not human but divine, and the work not of men but of gods; and that poets are nothing else but interpreters of the gods, possessed by whatever deity they may happen to be. And in pointing out this, the deity has through a poet the most indifferent sung a melody the most beautiful. Or do I not seem to you, Ion, to say what is true? Ion. To me at least you do. For you somehow, Socrates, touch my very soul by your arguments; and the good poets seem to me, by a divine allotment, to be in this way to us the interpreters of the gods. Soc. Now do not you rhapsodists interpret, on the other hand, the writings of the poets? Ion. And this too you truly assert. Soc. Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters? Ion. By all means. Soc. Mind now, Ion, and tell me this; and do not conceal whatever I shall ask about. Whenever you are spouting well any verses, and astonishing your audience the most, or when you are reciting how Ulysses, leaping on the threshold (of his house), appeared manifest to the suitors, and poured out

his arrows before their feet; or how Achilles rushed against Hector; or tell any of the tales of pity relating to Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at such times are you quite in your senses, or beside yourself? And does not your soul fancy itself carried away in a state of ecstasy by the deeds you are telling, whether they occur at Ithaca or Troy, or however else the verses may be. Ion. How clear a proof have you, Socrates, produced! For so I will say, concealing nothing. For when I am reciting any tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears; but when any thing of horror, my hairs stand erect through fear, and my heart leaps. Soc. What shall we say then, Ion? that the man is in his sound senses, when, decked in a many-tissued garb, and with a crown of gold, he bursts into tears at festivals and feasts, without having lost any of those (ornaments)? or feels a fear when he is standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all friendly to him, and no one is stripping him or doing him an injury? Ion. He is not, by Zeus, to confess the truth, Socrates. Soc. Know you that you (rhapsodists) produce this very same effect upon the majority of your spectators. Ion. I know it very well. For I am constantly looking down from my standing-place above upon those, who are weeping, or looking fiercely, or astonished, in unison with what is narrated. For indeed I must pay a great attention to them, in order that, if I set them weeping, I may laugh on receiving their money; but if laughing, that I may weep myself on losing their cash. Soc. Know you not, then, that this spectator (of yours) is the last of the rings, which, I said, receive their power from one another by means of the Heraclean stone? The middle rings are you the rhapsodist and the actor; but the first ring is the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw, wherever it pleases him, the souls of men, having suspended from each other the power. And, as if from that stone, there is suspended a very numerous series of chorus-singers and dancers, and under-masters, hang the rings depending from the Muse, hanging sideways. But from one Muse one of the poets hangs; another from another. And this we call by the expression " he is possessed;" for the (meaning) is very similar; since he is held fast. From these first rings some of the poets hang, some from one, and others from others, and become inspired by them; some, for instance, Orpheus, others by Musaeus; but the majority are inspired by Homer, and held fast by him. Of this number, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer. Hence when any one sings the verses of any other poet, you fall asleep, and are at a loss what to say: but when any one recites a strain of

that poet, you wake up immediately, and your soul dances (with joy), and you are at no loss what to say; for you say, what you say, about Homer, not from art or science, but from a divine allotment, and through being possessed. (For) the Corybantes have an acute perception of such music only, as belongs to the god by whom they are possessed, and are not wanting either in gestures or words, adapted to that melody; but care not for any other music. So you, Ion, when any one makes mention of Homer, are not at a loss, but are at a loss (when mention is made) of other poets. And this is the reason of that, about which you were asking, why as regards Homer you are not at a loss, but are so as regards other poets; because you are not by art, but by a divine allotment, a skillful panegyrist of Homer. Ion. You say well, Socrates. I should, however, wonder if you can speak so well as to convince me that I panegyrize Homer through being possessed and mad. Nor, as I fancy, should I appear so to you, if you were to hear me speaking about Homer. Soc. And willing I am indeed to hear you; but not before you shall have answered me this. On which of the subjects about which Homer speaks, do you speak well? For surely it is not about all. Ion. Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing but what (I speak well about). Soc. Surely you do not (speak) about those, of which you happen to know nothing, but which Homer mentions. Ion. And what are those, which Homer mentions, but which I do not know? Soc. Does not Homer speak much and often of arts; for instance, the art of chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you. Ion. I will recite them; for I remember them. Soc. Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, when advising him to be careful respecting the turning in the chariot-race, run in honour of Patroclus. Ion. His words are these (in II. xxiii. 335-340): Thyself upon the polish d chariot bend To the left gently; but the right-hand horse With goad and voice urge on, and somewhat yield, Holding the reins; but let the left-hand steed Come near the turn-post grazing, which almost Of wheel well-made, let the nut seem to doubt If it reach not; but stone to touch avoid. Soc. It is enough. Now whether Homer does or does not, Ion, correctly express himself in these words, who would know the better, a physician or a charioteer?

Ion. A charioteer, undoubtedly. Soc. Whether because he possesses that art, or for some other reason? Ion. For no other than that (he possesses) the art. Soc. Has not to each of the arts this been granted by the deity, to be able to know a work? For what we know by the pilot's art, we shall not know by the physician's. Ion. Certainly not. Soc. Nor what (we know) by the physician's art, (shall we know) by the builder's art. Ion. Certainly not. Soc. Is it not thus then as regards all the arts, that what we know by one art, we shall not know by another? But answer me this previous to that. Do not you admit that there is one art of one kind, and another art of another kind? Ion. Yes. Soc. Do not you make use of the same proof as I do, that when there is a science, one of some things, and another of other things, I call one by one name, and the other by another; and do not you (call them) so? Ion. Yes. Soc. For surely if of the same things there were some science, why should we call one by one name, and another by another, when it would be possible to know the same things from both? As, for instance, I know that these fingers are five in number; and you know it, respecting them, the same as I do. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art of arithmetic that both you and I know the same things, or by another art, you would surely say, by the same art. Ion. Yes. Soc. The question then, which I was lately about to ask you, answer me now. Whether does it seem so to you, as regards all the arts, in this way, that it is necessary for the same art to know the things; and for a different art (to know) not the same things? but whether, if (the art) be different, it is necessary for it to know different things?

Ion. It seems to me, Socrates, in this way. Soc. He therefore, who has not any art, will not be able to know what is said or done well, relating to that art. Ion. You speak the truth. Soc. As regards the verses, then, which you repeated, will you, or a charioteer, better know whether Homer says well or not? Ion. A charioteer. Soc. For you are a rhapsodist, but not a charioteer. Ion. Yes. Soc. Now the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer. Ion. Yes. Soc. If the science be different, it is conversant likewise about different things. Ion. Yes. Soc. Well then, when Homer relates how Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, gave to Machaon, when he was wounded, a potion to drink, he says, composed: Of Pramnian wine; and into it she grates, With brazen grater, cheese from goat's milk made, And for the potion onion as a relish; to know thoroughly and well whether Homer says this correctly or not, does it belong to the physician's, or the rhapsodist's art? Ion. To the physician's. Soc. Well then, where Homer (in II. xxiv. 80) says, She to the bottom went, just like the lead, Which near the horn of bull, in meadows living, (Is placed upon the line,) and rushes eager, To fish, on raw flesh feeding, bringing fateshall we say that it belongs to the fisher's rather than to the rhapsodist's art, to decide on what he says, and whether correctly or not?

Ion. It is evident, Socrates, to the fisher's art. Soc. Consider now, you asking, if you asked me, Since then, Socrates, you discover what it is fitting for each of these arts to decide upon in Homer, come, find me out, what as relating to the business of a prophet and the prophet's art, are the things which it is fitting for him to be able to know thoroughly, whether the poet has done well or ill-consider how easily and truly I could reply. For Homer, in the Odyssey, speaks frequently on the subject. For instance, where Theoclymenus the prophet, one of the race of Melampus, says to the suitorsWhy by doom fated suffer ye this ill? Involved in the gloom of night are faces, heads, And nether limbs; and "burns the loud lament Fiercely, and cheeks with many tears are wet. Of ghosts the porch is full, and full the hall, To Erebus in darkness rushing; and the sun From heaven is lost, and luckless mists come on. And often too in the Iliad, for example in the fight near the mound-wall (of the Greeks). For there too he says (II. xii. 200-207): To them, while eager to pass on, an eagle, High-flying bird, appear d upon the left, And the army check'd. For in its claws it bore A snake, of size enormous, with blood stain'd, Alive, and gasping, but of fight not yet Regardless. For on twisting round, it bit The breast of the bird, that held it, near the neck; Who, smarting with the pain, let go its hold, And sent it to the ground; and midst the throng It fell; and the bird with the wind screaming flew. These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the prophet to consider, and to judge of? Ion. Yes, if you say what is true, Socrates. Soc. And you too, Ion, speak the truth, in this. Come then, and, as I have selected for you from the Odyssey, and the Iliad, such passages as belong to the prophet, and the physician, and the fisherman, so do you select for me, since you are better versed in Homer than I am, such passages, Ion, as belong to the rhapsodist, and to the rhapsodist's art; which it is fitting for the rhapsodist to consider and judge of, (better than) other men. Ion. I say, Socrates, all things. Soc. You did not, Ion, say all. Or are you so forgetful? And yet it ill becomes a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful. Ion. Of what then am I forgetful?

Soc. Do you not remember, you said that the rhapsodist's art is different from that of the charioteer? Ion. I do remember it. Soc. And did not you confess too, that, being different, it would know things different? Ion. Yes, I did. Soc. According to your own account then, the rhapsodist's art will not know all things, nor even the rhapsodist himself. Ion. Except, perhaps, Socrates, things of such a kind. Soc. By things of such a kind you mean such as belong nearly to all the other arts. Now what will (the rhapsodist) know, if (he knows) not all things. Ion. He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; and what for a slave, and what for a freeman; and what for him, who is commanded, and for him, who commands. Soc. Do you mean that the rhapsodist will know better than the steersman, what it is proper for the commander of a ship, tossed in a storm at sea, to say? Ion. No. This at least the steersman (will know) better. Soc. But what it is proper for a person governing a sick person to say, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician? Ion. Not in this case. Soc. But what is it proper for a slave, you say. Ion. Yes. Soc. For example, do you assert that, what it is fitting for a slave, who tends cattle, to say, when pacifying cows that are in a savage state, the rhapsodist will know, but not the herdsman? Ion. Not I indeed. Soc. But what it is proper for a woman engaged in wool work to say about working in wool?

Ion. No. Soc. But he will know what it is proper for an army leader to say, when exhorting the soldiers? Ion. Yes. For such things the rhapsodist will know. Soc. What then, is the rhapsodist's art that of an army leader? Ion. I should know what it is fitting for an army leader to say. Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of a general, Ion. For if you happened to be skilled in horsemanship and in harp-playing at the same time, you would have known those, who manage horses well and ill. Now if I had asked you By which of those arts, Ion, do you know those who manage horses well? Is it by that through which you are a horseman, or by that through which you are a harpist? What answer would you make me? Ion. I should (answer), By that through which I am a horseman. Soc. If then you knew thoroughly those who play well the harp, would you not confess that you knew them by that art, through which you are a harpist, but not through that, by which you are a horseman? Ion. Yes. Soc. Since then you know the things relating to armies, do you know them by the art, through which you are a general, or by that, through which you are an excellent rhapsodist? Ion. There seems to me no difference. Soc. How say you that there is no difference? Say you that the art of the rhapsodist and of the general is one? Or are they two? Ion. They seem to me at least to be one. Soc. Whoever then is a good rhapsodist, he happens to be likewise a good general. Ion. By all means, Socrates. Soc. And whoever happens to be a good general, is a good rhapsodist too. Ion. This, I think, on the other hand does not seem to be true.

Soc. But the other does seem so, [that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.] Ion. Certainly. Soc. Now are not you a rhapsodist, the best of the Greeks? Jon. Very much, Socrates. Soc. And are you also, Ion, a general, the best of all Greeks? Ion. Be well assured, Socrates (of this); for I have learnt that too from Homer. Soc. Why then by the gods, Ion, do you, since you are amongst the Greeks the best, both as a general and a rhapsodist, go about acting the part of a rhapsodist before the Greeks, and not of a general. Does there seem to you a great need of a rhapsodist, crowned with a golden crown, but none of a general? Ion. Yes. For our city, Socrates, is governed, and our forces commanded by your people, and there is no need of a general. But your city, or that of the Lacedaemonians, would not choose me for a general; for ye (both) conceive yourselves to be competent for that. Soc. Know you not, Ion, O best of men, Apollodorus of Cyzicum? Ion. Who is he? Soc. He whom the Athenians have often selected as their general, although a foreigner, and Phanosthenes too of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom this state, although they are foreigners, appoints to the command of armies and other offices in the government, through their having shown themselves men worthy of notice. And will she not choose Ion of Ephesus as her general, honour him should he seem worthy of notice? What, are not you Ephesians Athenians of old? And is not Ephesus a city inferior to none? But as to yourself, Ion, if indeed you say truly, that you are able by art and science to praise Homer, you are doing wrong in that, after professing that you know many fine things, relating to Homer, and saying that you would make a display, you are cheating me, and want much from making it; so that, although I have been for a long time earnestly making the request, you are unwilling to mention those things, in which you are so skilled; but you really become, like Proteus, of many forms turning yourself topsy turvy, until at last you escape me, and start up a general, in order that you may not show how great you are in the wisdom relating to Homer, you really are an artist, such as I just now spoke of, and after promising to make a display

relating to Homer, you deceive me you are an unjust man; but if you are not an artist, but are by a divine allotment, inspired by Homer, and although you know nothing, are saying many fine things about the poet, as I have stated respecting you, you are doing no wrong. Choose then, whether you wish to be deemed by us a man unjust, or divine. Ion. Great is the difference, Socrates; for it is much better to be deemed divine. Soc. Now this better thing, Ion, is in your power (to obtain) at our hands, to be divine, and a praiser of Homer, but not from art.