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中
I N T E R PR E T I NG
HINA’S
DEVEL
PMENT
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中
I N T E R PR E T I NG
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HINA’S
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Editors
Wa n g G u n g w u Jo h n Wo n g East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
World Scientific NEW JERSEY
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LONDON
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SINGAPORE
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BEIJING
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SHANGHAI
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HONG KONG
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TA I P E I
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CHENNAI
Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
INTERPRETING CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT Copyright © 2007 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.
For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.
ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10
978-981-270-802-1 981-270-802-2 978-981-270-806-9 (pbk) 981-270-806-5 (pbk)
Printed in Singapore.
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Introduction
xiii
Part I. The Challenges of Governance Survey Chapter Responding to Challenges and Problems of Governance WANG Zhengxu & LYE Liang Fook
3
China’s leadership is grappling with mounting socio-economic problems and rising expectations. Besides various policy measures to cope with these challenges, the Party and government have attempted to re-invent themselves ideologically and organisationally.
Topical Chapters The Dynamics of Elite Politics in China BO Zhiyue
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Elite politics is increasingly being institutionalised. The dynamic interactions between political institutionalisation and factional politics have continued to influence leadership line-ups.
How Did the Hu-Wen Leadership Consolidate Its Power? LAI Hongyi
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Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have surprised many with their rapid consolidation of power. Their success results from the ongoing institutionalisation of leadership succession, as well as Hu’s effective political skills in building a political coalition to establish his authority.
The Chinese Communist Party in Rapid Transformation ZHENG Yongnian & TOK Sow Keat
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The CCP has introduced organisational and ideological reforms, allowed limited elections at grass-roots levels and more space for selected social groups to maintain its dominant hold on politics.
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
The Party and the Media: Control versus Change LYE Liang Fook
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The Department of Propaganda of the Party has to balance control with the changing demands of society. It is under increasing pressure to adjust the old way of managing and controlling information based on fiat and fear.
Political Reforms First, Democracy Later? WANG Zhengxu
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Political democratisation in China is driven by the people’s higher expectations and greater awareness of their rights and the Party’s desire to deliver good governance. As opposed to a big-bang approach, China’s democratisation is likely to be a gradual and fitful process.
The Struggle against Corruption YANG Dali
38
To contain corruption, China has introduced institutional reforms, including completing market transitions, public sector management reforms, greater political accountability and stricter institutional restraints. The reforms have led to a modest reduction in corruption cases.
Managing China’s Civil Servants Kjeld Erik BRØDSGAARD
44
Contrary to popular belief, the number of civil servants in China is actually quite small. Improving the quality of personnel and governing capacity are important to preserve one-Party rule.
Can Beijing Still Dictate Local Politics? TAN Qingshan
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Beijing is facing a big challenge in reining in local governments without jeopardising economic growth. Tthe key issue is whether they can deliver the outcome that Beijing wants.
Towards the Rule of Law ZOU Keyuan
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The Party appears determined to promote rule of law to meet the demands of a marketoriented economy, the obligations of being a WTO member and the need to improve the administration and management of a more complex Chinese society.
The Party and the Gun: Civil-Military Relations LI Nan
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The relationship between the civilian leadership and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone a fundamental change over the years. The political leadership has focussed more on governance issues while the PLA has concentrated on military-technical tasks.
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The PLA in Transformation YOU Ji
vii 62
China’s national defence strategy seeks a transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through mechanisation and informatisation. The real issue is whether the PLA can achieve a balanced transformation between these two objectives.
Hong Kong and Macau under One Country, Two Systems CHOU Kwok Ping
67
A decade of “One Country Two Systems” has produced different outcomes in terms of Hong Kong’s and Macau’s respective political relations with Beijing. These can be attributed to the different legacies of colonial rule and influences of democratic forces in these two localities.
Chen Shui-bian: Taiwan’s Lame Duck President John F. COPPER
72
The corruption and embezzlement charges involving Chen Shui-bian’s close aides, son-in-law and wife have dented his image and credibility. However, Chen has cleverly exploited the local identity movement to bolster public support for his party.
What to Expect from the 17th Party Congress WANG Zhengxu
77
The 17th Party Congress will most likely witness adjustments to the central leadership and comprehensive endorsement of the “scientific development” concept and creation of a “harmonious society”. While references may also be made to the need for political reforms, they are likely to stop short of concrete plans.
Part II. Growth and Structural Changes Survey Chapter China’s Major Economic Challenge: Sustaining High Growth Whilst Fixing Its Growth Problems John WONG
83
The Chinese economy has become a significant force in the global economy. It has been argued that the current global economic boom is basically the combined effects of US consumption and Chinese production.
Topical Chapters China’s Twin Surpluses YU Yongding
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China is the only country in history which has run the twin surpluses for 15 years since 1990. The underdevelopment of China’s financial market is one of the most important contributing factors to China’s persistent twin surpluses.
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
Explaining High Productivity Growth WU Yanrui
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Whether productivity growth has played a role in China’s recent growth can be investigated by examining the source of growth. Economists conventionally attribute the rate of GDP growth to the combined growth in labour and capital inputs.
The 11th Five-Year Programme Sarah Y. TONG
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The 11th Five-Year Programme outlines Hu and Wen’s vision for the country’s economic development and tackles growing economic and social problems following China’s recent rapid economic expansion.
China’s Drive to Become a Technological Power QUAN Xiaohong
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When China embarked on market-oriented economic reforms, its science and technology system was subjected to far-reaching challenges for its lack of efficiency, R&D weaknesses, poor technical skills and outdated focus on defence and other heavy technologies.
Banking Reforms to Meet WTO Obligations Sarah Y. TONG & ZHENG Yi
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China’s banking reform has lessened the vulnerability of China’s banks to external shocks. However, this does not mean that most of China’s banks are now sufficiently robust to stand up to major international challenges.
Reforming State-Owned Enterprises Sarah Y. TONG
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China's reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been quite successful in reorienting firms to be more responsive to market competition.
Rise of China’s Auto Industry YANG Mu & TENG Siow Song
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Many new auto players, including foreign companies have entered the Chinese market after China’s WTO accession. By 2005, China was the world’s second largest auto market (equalling Japan), with auto sales of over five million units.
The Political Economy of Urban and Regional Development CHIEN Shiuh-shen
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China’s economic transition over the past three decades was characterised by dramatic but imbalanced urbanisation, serious territorial competition and uneven regional development.
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Shanghai’s Mega Port in Yangshan YANG Mu & Lionel HO
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Shanghai, the centre of the Yangtze River Delta manufacturing hub, has been earmarked by the Chinese government to regain its previous global shipping hub status.
China’s Energy Outlook Elspeth THOMSON
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Over the next ten years, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation and the dominance of the manufacturing sector in China together clearly presage China’s continual requirement for large quantities of energy.
Part III. Coping with Rising Social Problems Survey Chapters Social Dilemmas of High Economic Growth ZHAO Litao
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Three decades of sustained economic growth have not only failed to boost social confidence, but also given rise to persistent social problems such as social injustice, corruption, income inequality and environment degradation.
What is China’s San-Nong (Rural) Problem? John WONG
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The rural problem, often dubbed “san-nong wenti”, is one of the burning issues the Chinese government must come to grip with. The rural problem, if remain unresolved, could become a potential time-bomb for the Chinese leadership.
Topical Chapters Growth and Widening Inequalities LAI Hongyi & TENG Siow Song
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As China’s economy continues to grow, income inequalities have also increased, generating social discontent. The Hu-Wen leadership has acted to address rural-urban and interregional divides. Their efforts, however, have only moderated but not reversed the growing trend of inequalities.
Reforming Hukou to Protect Migrant Labour ZHAO Litao
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The introduction of the temporary hukou and resident permit, and the relaxation of the quota system governing conversion of agricultural hukou holders to nonagricultural hukou status have been highly successful in managing migrant labour, but problems of the “new poor” still need to be addressed.
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
Building a New Social Safety Net GU Xin
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China has established social insurance and public assistance systems to replace the workplace-based social security system to reduce the vulnerabilities of the “new poor”. However, compliance still remains a problem and current systems provide merely a low level of social protection.
China Facing an Environmental Crisis CHIEN Shiuh-shen & YANG Mu
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China’s rapid economic growth has left a trail of environmental problems in its wake. It has to act fast to reverse the situation before some of its wonderful natural resources are permanently lost.
China’s Cultural Development ZHAO Litao & TAN Soon Heng
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After the issuance of a national programme on cultural development in the 11th Five-Year period (2006-2010), the perception of culture – previously subverted as a convenient tool under communist propaganda – has been dramatically changed.
China’s Booming Higher Education QUAN Xiaohong & ZHAO Litao
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The Chinese government’s decision to achieve “mass higher education” saw a substantial boom in the higher education sector. However, unemployment quickly becomes prevalent when the job market fails to expand as quickly.
China’s Emerging Middle-Class YAN Hao
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Though China’s middle class is unlikely to challenge the autocratic power of the Party and the government, its rise will certainly bring about profound implications for China’s future economic and social development.
Haigui in China's Modernisation YANG Mu & TAN Soon Heng
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Overseas returnees or Haigui have already become China’s “movers and shakers” in the political, economic and social domains. Especially prominent is the Haigui-pai’s leading role in a new “technopreneurship wave” that is rapidly changing China’s modern economic sectors.
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Part IV. China’s Relations with Major Powers and its Neighbours Survey Chapter Featuring “Harmonious World” for “Peaceful Rise” LAI Hongyi & LYE Liang Fook
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To secure a peaceful external environment for its domestic development, China has pledged to be a responsible power and follow a course of peaceful rise. It also advocates a “harmonious world” of diversity. So far China’s actions have generally been in line with its words.
Topical Chapters China and US: A Pivotal but Uncertain Relationship WANG Fei-ling
218
Despite sharing many economic interests, China and the United States are often at odds on numerous issues ranging from ideology differences to the Taiwan problem. However, both sides are determined to accommodate to each other as much as possible and for as long as possible.
Managing Difficult Relations with Japan ZHENG Yongnian & TOK Sow Keat
223
Managing China-Japan relations is a challenging task especially when it involves numerous issues ranging from geo-strategic to historical factors. As the reconciliation process between China and Japan remains slow, their relations are becoming increasingly complicated.
Facing a More Assertive and Nationalistic Japan LAM Peng Er
227
Shinzo Abe’s aspiration for Japan is that of a “beautiful country” in which the Japanese people can rightly take pride in its tradition, achievements and autonomy. This could be a potential problem for Japan’s diplomatic relations with the region.
China and South Korea in Their Dealings with North Korea CHOO Jaewoo
233
China’s balancing act in the Korean peninsula is a delicate task. Under the notion of a “good-neighbour policy”, Beijing is involved in achieving a balance between an unpredictable Pyongyang and a democratic Seoul.
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
Seeking Closer Cooperation with Post-Suharto Indonesia LIM Tin Seng
237
China’s relations with post-Suharto Indonesia is improving rapidly. Although there are still many challenges, cooperation between Beijing and Jakarta will become even closer and deeper in the future especially when this renewed relation is mutually beneficial.
Malaysia’s Relations with China: From Mahathir to Badawi LAM Peng Er & LIM Tin Seng
241
Malaysia has recalibrated its foreign policy orientation from Japan to China following China’s phenomenal economic rise and the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy. However, Kuala Lumpur is careful not to play a zero-sum game but to pursue a “win-win” strategy to maintain close cooperation and exchanges with the region.
China’s Special Relationship with Singapore John WONG & TENG Siow Song
245
Over the years, relations between Singapore and China have deepened and matured into a multi-faceted one with extensive interactions between the two governments, business communities and peoples.
EU and China: Heading towards Bumpy Relations Jean-Pierre CABESTAN
251
Burgeoning relations between the European Union (EU) and China have often been perceived as a new “strategic partnership”. However, maintaining this partnership will not be a smooth and easy one as the EU and China have considerable differences over arms embargo, Taiwan, human rights and trade issues.
China’s Growing Influence in Africa WANG Zhengxu & LIM Tin Seng
256
China’s influence in Africa is growing rapidly but it has also invited severe criticism from the West. However, Beijing is unlikely to reverse its African policy especially when it complements its economic interests in the continent and has won strong approval from African leaders.
Index
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I
ntroduction
I The East Asian Institute (EAI), set up in April 1997 as a full-time autonomous research organisation under a statute of the National University of Singapore, is celebrating its 10th anniversary this year. EAI is the successor of the former Institute of East Asian Political Economy (IEAPE), whose main mission was to conduct policy-oriented research related to China’s economic reform and open-door policy. EAI has continued with this major research focus, but it has over the years also broadened its research scope to include the global and regional impact of the rise of China, particularly China’s fast-changing relations with its neigbhouring economies/countries in East Asia. In a way, EAI is virtually the only academic organisation in the whole of Southeast Asia that has its research heavily focussed on the study of contemporary China, i.e. “watching” developments of “Communist China” or the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The challenges for starting contemporary Chinese studies in places like Singapore were quite real. Because of Cold War legacies, non-socialist Southeast Asia basically had neither strong academic foundation nor strong public interests in studying developments of “Communist China”. Information on China used to rely heavily on Western media and research done by Western scholars. Our first major task initially was to build up a good data base comprising primary source materials emanating from China. But the greater challenge for our scholars in their study of contemporary China here was to try to consciously follow an academic approach that is as far as possible “non-Western” and “non-PRC”. We believe that by analysing and interpreting events in China without going through certain ideological prisms would better meet the needs and interests of our policy makers and our community.
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
Thanks to its success in economic reform and its opening up to the world, China in recent years has rapidly transformed its economy and its polity. This, coupled with the sharp growth in the two-way commercial contacts and travels, has rendered it much easier for people in Southeast Asia to know and comprehend what is going on in China. To many Singaporeans, China today appears much like another “normal” country, fairly open, as they can visit China anytime without a visa. Thanks also to the IT revolution, events in China often appear almost instantaneously on local media. Such a fast access to China’s information together with its greater transparency has certainly contributed to a greater understanding of contemporary China. Viewed from a different angle, however, analysing and interpreting events and developments in China have always been and will remain a formidable challenge, not just for non-specialists, but even for China experts. China is a huge and diverse continental-size economy, which is rapidly growing (at the breakneck rate of 9.6 percent for the past 27 years) and radically reforming itself, all at the same time. Size combined with speed creates its own dynamics. With its vast base, any growth in any industry or sector will inevitably push up China’s aggregate statistics to jumbo numbers. Today, China is the world’s top producer of a wide range of goods and commodities (for 2006, 2.4 billion tons of coal, 420 million tons of steel, 7.3 million automobiles, 85 million TV and so on). In percapita terms, however, China’s levels of production and consumption are invariably very low. Thus, China’s total GNP in 2006 ranked the world’s fourth largest after the US, Japan and Germany, but its per-capita GNP at around US$1,900 was near the bottom of the hundredth! It would be quite easy for someone from a smaller country to lose perspective on those numbers. China’s diversity (a product of its enormous size) is another important feature. In winter, the subzero temperature of Harbin up north contrasts sharply with the subtropical Hainan Island, some five or six flying hours down towards the south from Harbin. In summer, serious floods in the Yangtze can occur simultaneously with serious droughts in the Yellow River basin. Because of its size, China is administratively divided into 34 provinces or regions, 333 regional cities and 2,863 counties. Many
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INTRODUCTION
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of China’s provinces are bigger than Germany or France. Numerous regional cities in China are bigger than Singapore. To rule such a vast country effectively, China’s governance has to function at five or six levels: zhongyang, sheng, qu, xian, xiang, and cun. Economic and technological dualism is quite common in many developing countries. However, China’s dualism is often exacerbated by its vast size and great diversity. While China has mastered sophisticated space technology in one sector, it still uses simple and traditional tools in others. Anyone with a preconceived idea or a certain theory on China is able to pick up real events from some part of China to support his story, be it the good, the bad or the ugly! One can go on with a long litany of examples about the “inscrutability” of China and the many enormous problems of studying and understanding it. But this is the land which is now engaged in an unprecedented undertaking of modernisation. Human history has never before witnessed such an intense level of industrialisation taking place on such a massive scale. It is not just the static complexity, but the dynamic changes and rapid transformations that make the task of analysing and interpreting developments in China a real challenge. As scholars, we believe that sound scholarship with painstaking search for information and evidence, and patient analysis will help us come up with a more balanced picture and better understanding of developments in China. Good modern social science skills can also help us better grasp the significance of the fast-changing scenes in China. As always, studying China is a fascinating and rewarding feat for serious scholars.
II This particular commemorative volume is made up of papers and commentaries on various aspects of China’s development, written by present and past scholars at EAI, specifically for non-specialists. We have asked them to make their writing succinct and informal as well as readable in the hope that readers can easily get a good glimpse of what is happening in China, politically, economically and socially today.
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
Many staff members at EAI have contributed to this volume. Dr Lai Hongyi, in particular, has done an excellent job in organising this project and arranging for its publication and Ms Jessica Loon, in the copyediting.
Wang Gungwu John Wong May 2007
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P ART I THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE
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esponding to Challenges and
Problems of Governance WANG Zhengxu LYE Liang Fook
The past decade in China’s politics was marked by mounting social and political challenges amidst China’s surging economy. Despite loud cries of “the coming collapse of China” and “China’s governance crises”, by around 2001–2002, the Party seemed to have survived all major tests in managing the world’s most populous society and fourth largest economy (second largest if using purchasing power parity calculation) by around 2006. Today the Party maintains tight control over political power while striving to re-invent the government. By doing so, the Party wants to continue to deliver economic growth and public goods, and to remain the legitimate ruling force for China. The challenges faced by the Chinese government in the last decade had all been daunting. The 1990s witnessed largely failing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as opposed to the fast growing private sector. In the late 1990s, the reform of the SOEs resulted in millions of laid-off workers in Chinese cities, many of whom took to the streets. Meanwhile, social problems such as the rise of the Falun Gong Cult put the Party’s ability to maintain social control to serious tests. Problems caused by China’s unbalanced development abound, such as environment degradation, aggravating income disparity, government corruption and public protests. In fact, as often noted by the Western media, the number of public protests in China skyrocketed from about 10,000 in 1993 to 74,000 in 2004 and 87,000 in 2005. Against this background of challenges and problems, this chapter offers an overview of the major efforts the Party took in the last decade
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
to stay relevant and renew its ability to deliver economic growth and governance. It has been a relatively remarkable record, but as the Party opens its 17th Party Congress, new challenges continue to cry out for urgent attention. In the coming decade, then, the Party will need to take up tasks that are even more trying.
China Under Jiang and Zhu With Deng Xiaoping’s demise in early 1997, the 15th Party Congress in the later part of the same year marked the first Party congress presided by Jiang after his consolidation of power. As China entered a period of Jiang Zemin and (Premier) Zhu Rongji’s governance, the foremost political developments were the leadership’s effort to redefine the Party and reorganise the government to stay relevant and competent. The Jiang-Zhu Administration had to manage China’s deeper reforms towards market economy, especially the large-scale SOE reform. Serious challenges continued to emerge; in 1997, China’s economy suffered a slowdown as the global economy was hit by the Asian financial crisis. In 1998, China was hit by a flood of scale unseen in more than a hundred years. Then in 1999 Gong’s practitioners besieged Zhongnanhai earlier in the year, followed by NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and Taiwan’s Lee Tenghui’s proclaimation that Taiwan and Mainland relations should be defined as “special state-to-state relations”, openly asserting Taiwan’s independence tendency. Amidst these internal and external crises and challenges, the Party started the Sanjiang Campaign (三讲 literally “three stresses”, i.e. stress politics, stress virtues and stress studying) to beef up Party morale and unity, which had gradually eroded as China’s economy marketised and the old Marxist-Leninist ideology lost its appeals. By emphasising the “Three Stresses”, the leadership hoped to renew the Party’s strength and avoid or at least delay its degeneration. A more fundamental effort at ideological rejuvenisation is Jiang Zemin’s Sange Daibiao (三个代表 Three Represents) doctrine, meaning that the Chinese Communist Party represents the most advanced mode of production, represents the most advanced culture and represents the interests of the majority of the population. Jiang first put forth this doctrine in February
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2000 during a studying tour to South China’s Guangdong Province where Deng Xiaoping revived China’s reform in his Southern Tour of 1992. Jiang then elaborated on it in July 2001 in a speech made to the Central Party School in which he also called on the Party to admit private entrepreneurs and other professionals into its ranks. The “Three Represents” doctrine marked a major shift in the traditional role of the Party, which was prescribed as the vanguard of the working class (the workers and the peasants, basically). Now the Party will represent all social groups, including private entrepreneurs and business owners, who, in orthodox Party ideology, were erstwhile treated as exploiters and enemies of the Party. The Three Represents doctrine is without doubt the Party’s affirmation of the non-state sector in the economy, and shows the Party’s pragmatism in re-orientating its ideology. The Three Represents was eventually incorporated into the Party constitution at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, alongside Marxism1 Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. In the governmental arena, Premier Zhu Rongji pushed through a major reengineering of the State Council and its sub-national bureaucracies. It started at the State Council level at the 9th National Party Congress (NPC) in 1998, and in three years was expanded to all the provincial and sub-provincial governments. The goal was not only a slimmer and more efficient government, but also tied to the marketisation of the economy: the reforming of the SOEs towards market forces meant many government agencies were now obsolete. In the end, the original 40 ministries within 2 the State Council were reorganised into 29 ministries. Jiang and Zhu also oversaw China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. This came after years of arduous negotiations with its trading partners, especially the US, and it was Jiang-Zhu’s political commitment to economic reform and opening that eventually made
1
See chapter by Zheng Yongnian and Tok Sow Keat in Part I of this volume for a focussed discussion of the Party’s transformation.
2
Notably, all the major line ministries managing state-owned industries, such as the Ministry of Coal and Ministry Textile Industry, were all removed from the cabinet and reorganised into State Council-affiliated industrial associations or bureaus.
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it possible. In fact, when it finally came, most Chinese were uncertain whether it would be a boon or a bane. There was much fear that with the opening up of China’s domestic markets, some of China’s economic sectors would be overwhelmed by foreign competitors. But the Chinese leadership seemed to have displayed competence and gumption in managing this full-scale integration into the world economy. By the end of 2006, five years after China’s accession, China’s economy had surged ahead, greatly boosting the Party’s confidence in leading China’s economy in a globalised world.
Hu Jintao: Searching for a New Development Model When Hu Jintao assumed the Party’s leadership in 2002, there were doubts about his ability to assert his position and assume firm control of power. The Western media had cynically asked “Who is Hu?” and speculated that Jiang Zemin would continue to wield power from behind the scene. However, Hu proved his critics wrong when he quickly consolidated his power. By 2004, Jiang Zemin had to leave his last post, and during these years Hu had also established his leadership style and governing principles. In tackling the problems and issues that confront China, such as income disparity, regional development gaps, social discontent, deteriorating work safety, official incompetence, corruption and environmental degradation, Hu tried to shift China’s development towards a more humane and more balanced model on the one hand, and tried to enhance state authority and political control on the other. Hu came into power with a populist, pro-people image. His first public appearance in December 2002 after assuming the top leadership position was to visit an old revolutionary base in a rural area in Hebei Province where he articulated what was later called the New “Three People’s Principles” (新三民主义): power to be used by the people, concern to be showered on the people and benefits to be enjoyed by the people (权为民所用, 情为民所系, 利为民所谋). At the height of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003, Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao displayed their caring and down-to-earth side with tours to hospitals, offering encouragement and words of comfort to frontline nurses and doctors handling SARS cases. Hu proclaimed that China should
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pursue “people-centred” development (以人为本), and put forward the concept of “scientific development” (科学发展观). Essentially, it was a call to shift from the single-minded pursuit of economic growth towards a more balanced and more sustainable model of development. “Scientific development” is intended to comprehensively address problems China faces following decades of fast growth, such as income disparity, inadequate healthcare and social security systems, and pollution. Eventually, these people-oriented ideas came to be manifested in the concept of “harmonious society” (和谐社会). This is both a grand vision Hu offered to the nation and an overarching idea that would guide the Party’s policies in the years to come. Hu Jintao apparently has come to believe that the Party should not only deliver economic growth, but also other public goods such as equity and good government. Hence, a “harmonious society” would contain elements of fairness and uprightness, rule of law, order, democracy and balance between the needs of man and nature. The “harmonious society” concept was developed into concrete initiatives in the 11th Five-Year Programme (2006–2010) endorsed by the 10th NPC in March 2006 that was aimed at spreading wealth more evenly and protecting the environment. More importantly, the 6th plenum of the Central Committee in October 2006 formally adopted building a “harmonious society” as its supreme goal in governance.
Building the Party: Educative Campaign and Fighting Corruption Hu Jintao also saw problems in the weakening of the Party’s unity and moral strength. From January 2005 to June 2006, the Party carried out a three-staged nationwide campaign, each lasting six months, to “maintain the advanced nature” of the Party (保持党的先进性). The purpose of this campaign was to improve the quality of the then 69 million Party members and eradicate malpractices that had tarnished the Party’s image and reputation. Party members had to attend educational and discussion sessions to improve the standard and quality of their work. Such educational campaigns, however, may fall short of being effective in improving the Party’s quality. A more effective way is to build institutions that are conducive to clean, transparent and competent
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government. As a move in this direction, the Party has taken measures to enhance its anti-corruption arms and stepped up efforts to fight corruption. According to official figures, in the 19 months up to February 2007, 6,660 government officials were investigated for corruption charges. Even senior officials such as a Vice Mayor in Beijing and the Chief Procurator in Tianjin were not spared. The most high-profile case was the ouster of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu in September 2006 for the misuse of Shanghai’s pension fund and the abuse of power to seek improper benefits for his family members. Other officials of ministerial ranks, including Chief of the National Statistical Bureau Qiu Xiaohua and Head of the State Food and Drug Administration Zheng Xiaoyu were sacked. The results of such anti-corruption campaigns may be short-lived: once the centre’s effort recedes, corruption will resurge. Because of this, the Party is implementing institutional changes to curb corruption. For example, the Party’s Discipline Inspection Committee at various levels is given more power to check officials, and in the first half of 2007, a National Anti-Graft Bureau was launched. By introducing more transparency and openness in government, by giving local people’s congresses more authority to check the government and by introducing more rule of law in the government, the Party hopes to significantly reduce corruption in 3 the years to come.
Coping with Social Discontent Amidst rising grievances and social discontent, in recent years, the Party has placed a premium on maintaining nationwide stability to ensure China’s development course will continue undisrupted. There are many sources of instability arising from public discontent such as local government’s illegal seizure of land, as well as soaring estate prices, medical expenses and educational expenses. For example, while land disputes continue to cause rural unrests, in recent years, the sharp rise in housing prices in the cities has become a source for urban discontent when many ordinary wage earners could not 3
See Yang Dali’s chapter in Part I of this volume for more detailed discussion of this topic.
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find affordable housing. A more worrying trend is the promotion of estate and development projects by local officials to generate local revenue. In doing so, they disregard laws and proper procedures in seizing land and driving many peasants from their land and urban dwellers out of their housing. This often results in protests by the residents and peasants. In many extreme cases, thousands of protestors besieged government buildings, demanding government concessions. In response, the Party leadership has tightened supervision of local officials, limited land use rights, as well as strengthened regulations on development projects. On the other hand, the Party and government also tried to allow more channels for citizens to voice their concerns. It made an effort to improve the “letters and visits” system (信访), through which citizens can bring their grievances to the attention of higher authorities for a resolution. To add a more personal touch, some local leaders made themselves directly available to the citizens by receiving a few petitioners every month to help solve their problems. In some provinces, aggrieved individuals can also request for an official hearing (听证会) if they are not satisfied with the initial handling of their petitions by the relevant government departments. Such measures seem to have generated some results. In 2006 the number of collective protests fell “markedly” by about 20 percent after going on an upward trend from 1993 to 2005. While displaying a caring front, the Party has also shown its readiness to act firmly against elements that could pose a threat to the stability of the country. These may include intellectuals, dissidents and representatives of non-governmental organisations. In particular, the leadership is averse to “colour revolutions” that have led to the downfall of regimes in several Central Asian countries. Luo Gan, a Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of law and order matters, said in February 2007 that the Party must “defend against infiltration and sabotage activities that threaten state security”. The Party can be expected to be even more vigilant as it gears up for the 17th Party Congress due in the second half of 2007.
Looking to the Future The intermittent reports of rising social unrest and environmental disasters by the Western media may have given the mistaken impression that the
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Chinese leadership is in danger of losing control. Yet these incidents still do not constitute a real threat to the regime. For one, China’s successful economic reform and development, whilst creating a lot of problems, has produced many winners, particularly the rising middle class in the urban areas. On the whole, the majority of the population is satisfied with and is still supportive of the Party and government. Public opinion surveys continue to confirm this. Nevertheless, in the years to come, China will have to deal with some urgent problems arising from its rapid but unbalanced development. The government needs to deliver public goods in the areas such as affordable housing, education, healthcare and social security to everyone, including the very poor in the rural and urban areas. It also needs to reform government institutions to be more transparent, more lawbiding and more service-oriented. Government institutions need to be able to better protect citizens’ rights and respond to citizens’ demands. The Party also needs to allow civil society to grow more freely. There is increasing pressure for political liberalisation from an expanding urban, well-educated and well-informed middle class. To sum up, while shifting towards a “scientific development” model may help to solve some of the developmental problems such as environmental degradation and energy over-consumption, the Party needs to introduce real measures in government and political reform, and gradually put China onto the track leading to a pluralist democracy. In this regard, the “harmonious society” banner can fly high. What it carries — democracy, rule of law, justice and equality, among others — is indeed what China needs. But understanding what it needs to deliver does not mean the Party can deliver. While the Party has been relatively successful in managing China’s economic reform and economic development, the current challenges of reforming and building government institutions are likely to be much more overwhelming. It remains to be seen, then, whether the Party can fulfil its promise to the people, that is, a democratic and prosperous China.
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T
he Dynamics of Elite Politics in China BO Zhiyue
China’s elite politics in the past decade has evolved along two seemingly contradictory trajectories. On the one hand, it has become increasingly institutionalised. Authority is closely linked to positions and those who do not occupy any official positions no longer have substantial powers. On the other hand, factional groups do exist and have been used as political resources for power contestation.
Political Institutionalisation In contrast to Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) who exerted extraordinary personal influences with or without any particular offices, the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the past decade exercised influence on the basis of their powerful positions. Jiang Zemin (1926–) was the core of the third generation leadership because he was General Secretary of the CCP, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. When he relinquished his offices between November 2002 and September 2004, Jiang quickly faded into history. Although he is still alive and remains interested in the limelight, Jiang is no longer a key player in elite politics. In the same vein, Hu Jintao (1942–) emerged from obscurity into political prominence when he was elected General Secretary of the CCP at the 16th National Congress of the CCP in November 2002. He succeeded Jiang as President of the PRC at the First Session of the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2003 and replaced Jiang as Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CCP at the Fourth Plenum of
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the 16th Central Committee in September 2004. Hu’s prominence within the Party leadership was largely due to his assuming these powerful positions.
Factional Dynamics Political factions based strictly on clientelistic ties do not exist in Chinese politics. Yet four factional groups based on corporate ties can be identified. A typical factional group is the Qinghua Clique, graduates of Qinghua University. There are 20 Qinghua graduates in the 16th Central Committee: 16 full members and four alternate members. Noticeably, four of the nine standing members of the 16th Politburo were Qinghua graduates, including Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju and Wu Guangzheng. Another Politburo member, Zeng Peiyan, is also a Qinghua graduate. Other Qinghua graduates in the 16th Central Committee include 10 central leaders, three provincial leaders and one academic leader. These Qinghua graduates do not necessarily form a political faction, but their school ties may be used as resources in politics. The Shanghai Gang is a factional group whose members have worked or are currently working in Shanghai. This factional group is closest to the definition of a political faction because the relationship between Jiang Zemin, former party boss of Shanghai, and at least some other members of the group is to a large extent clientelistic in nature. There are 17 Shanghai Gang members in the 16th Central Committee of the CCP: 13 full members and four alternate members. Three Shanghai Gang members, Wu Bangguo (1941–), Zeng Qinghong (1939–) and Huang Ju (1938–), are with the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Chen Liangyu (1946–), former party secretary of Shanghai, used to be a member of the Politburo. Zeng Peiyan (1938–), another Politburo member, also had some work experience under Jiang Zemin in Shanghai. The Shanghai Gang reached its peak of influence at the First Session of the 10th NPC in March 2003 when many of its members took up important government positions in addition to their party positions. Wu Bangguo was elected Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC; Zeng Qinghong was made Vice President of the PRC; Huang Ju and
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Zeng Peiyan were both appointed as Vice Premiers, and Chen Zhili and Hua Jianmin were both promoted as State Councilors. However, the Shanghai Gang began its downward slide a month later. Due to his mishandling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in China, Health Minister Zhang Wenkang (1940–), a Shanghai Gang member, was fired in April 2003. In the meantime, the Shanghai Gang in general and Jiang Zemin in particular suffered reputation damage because they fled to Shanghai. The arrest of Zhou Zhengyi, the richest man in Shanghai, further tarnished the image of the Shanghai Gang. Following Jiang Zemin’s complete retirement, his son, Jiang Mianheng (1951–), was transferred from Beijing back to Shanghai in August 2005. Zhao Qizheng, another Shanghai Gang member and Director of the Information Office of the State Council, was also retired in the same month. Huang Ju, Jiang Zemin’s confidant, was terminally ill in January 2006 and has been mostly inactive politically. Most importantly, Chen Liangyu was removed from office in September 2006 as a Politburo member, a central committee member and Party Secretary of Shanghai due to his involvement in a corruption case in Shanghai. The third important factional group is the Communist Youth League Group (CCYL), former or current cadres of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League. In the 16th Central Committee of the CCP, there are 57 CCYL cadres: 24 full members and 33 alternate members. General Secretary Hu Jintao is a former CCYL cadre. There are three other Politburo members who also worked in the apparatus of the CCYL earlier: Wang Zhaoguo (1941–), Liu Yunshan (1947–) and Wang Lequan (1944–). Since the 16th Party Congress, the CCYL Group has rapidly become an important political force, especially in provinces. In February 2007, nine out of 31 provincial party secretaries were former CCYL cadres. Among them, one may find potential central leaders such as Li Keqiang (1955–), Li Yuanchao (1950–) and Wang Yang (1955–). At the same time, 12 out of 31 provincial governors were of CCYL origins. Many former CCYL cadres have also joined the provincial leadership as deputy party secretaries, standing members, vice governors, chairmen of the provincial
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people’s congresses, or chairmen of the provincial people’s consultative conferences. During the same period, former CCYL cadres also became prominent in the central party and government apparatuses. Shen Yueyue (1957–) was transferred to the Central Organisation Department in November 2002; Wu Aiying (1951–) became Minister of Justice in July 2005; Liu Peng (1951–) became head of the State Sports General Administration, and Cai Wu (1949–) became Director of the Information Office of the State Council in August 2005. Finally, princelings, children of former high-ranking officials of the CCP, constitute another factional group. There are 20 princelings in the 16th Central Committee: 15 full members and five alternate members. Among the Politburo members, one may find Zeng Qinghong and Yu Zhengsheng. Six princelings are current (or former) provincial leaders: Hong Hu (former governor of Jilin), Wang Qishan (mayor of Beijing), Bai Keming (party secretary of Hebei), Xi Jinping (party secretary of Zhejiang), Li Yuanchao (party secretary of Jiangsu) and Yu Zhengsheng (party secretary of Hubei). Seven princelings are working (or worked) in the central party and government organisations: Zeng Qinghong (vice president of the PRC), Liu Yandong (vice chairman of the 10th National People’s Political Consultative Conference), Dai Bingguo (vice minister of Foreign Affairs), Li Tielin (former vice director of the Central Organisation Department), Liao Hui (director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office), Bo Xilai (Minister of Commerce), Zhou Xiaochuan (governor of the People’s Bank of China, the central bank) and Liu Jing (vice minister of Public Security). Most noticeably, a group of princeling generals has emerged in recent years. In addition to three princeling generals in the 16th Central Committee (Ding Yiping, Xu Qiliang, and Ma Xiaotian), other princelings have also assumed important positions in the military. In the past, princeling generals faced two career barriers. Many of them retired in deputy positions and few of them could get into the central committee of the CCP. Now many of the new cohort of princeling generals have already overcome the barrier of the “deputy position phenomenon” to become key officers in various organs of the military. Lieutenant General Xu Qiliang (1950–) is a deputy chief of the General Staff; Vice Admiral
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Wu Shengli (1945–) is commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy; Lieutenant General Liu Yuan (1951–) is political commissar of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences; Lieutenant General Zhang Haiyang (1949–) is political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region, and General Peng Xiaofeng (1945–) is political commissar of the Second Artillery Corps and a member of the Central Military Commission. It is very likely that some of these princeling generals will cross the “central committee hurdle” and enter the 17th Central Committee in the Fall of 2007.
Institutionalisation and Factional Dynamics Political institutionalisation has been the main feature of elite politics in the past decade. Authority is primarily determined by position. Those who lose their positions lose their authority and those who obtain positions obtain power. This is why Jiang Zemin was reluctant to let go of his offices because without these offices he would have no authority. This is also why Hu Jintao is able to emerge from obscurity to become the most powerful man in China. There are four identifiable factional groups in Chinese politics: Qinghua Clique, Shanghai Gang, CCYL Group and the Princelings. With different membership and varying degrees of group cohesion, these factional groups have played a role in China’s elite politics. Though seemingly contradictory, factional politics can also go hand in hand with institutionalised politics. Political leaders can augment their formal authority by placing former associates and personal friends into important positions and fighting for formal authority through factional activities reinforces the importance of formal positions. It will be very interesting to see how these two factors — political institutionalisation and factional dynamics — operate to bring about a new leadership at the coming 17th National Congress of the CCP.
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H
ow Did the Hu-Wen Leadership Consolidate Its Power? LAI Hongyi
Only in their fourth year of office and China President Hu Jintao, along with his political partner Premier Wen Jiabao, has already left a distinctive political trademark in China’s politics. Right in their first year, Hu and Wen impressed with the dismissal of incompetent senior officials for their mishandling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, and their projection of a people-loving image at home and an unyielding leadership image abroad. To cap it all, Hu-Wen’s new policy initiatives have even earned a positive term, the Hu-Wen New Deal (胡温新政). What Hu has achieved politically has come as a big surprise to many overseas observers. Many of them had expected Hu to have a feeble tenure, or Hu to be reduced to Jiang’s puppet at best, if not replaced. Hence the familiar headlines of “Who’s Hu?”, “Who/Hu’s in charge?” and “Is Hu 1 going to be lame-duck leader?” These predictions have turned out to be incorrect. Even when Jiang was still the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Hu was able to introduce his pro-people agenda and handle the SARS epidemic decisively during the April–June 2003 period. Contrary to gloomy predictions, Jiang handed the CMC chairmanship over to Hu in September 2004. This marked the first real smooth power transfer in the People’s Republic of China. Succession prior to Hu has been fraught with purges and near purges.
1
See Reuters, 15 November 2002; Times (Asia), 25 November 2002; International Herald Tribune, 21 November 2002; The Sunday Times (Singapore), 17 November 2002.
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Hu’s surprising rapid power consolidation can be explained by first, the ongoing institutionalisation of China’s leadership succession and second, Hu’s effective political skills. Hu has subtly but skilfully brought his own followers to top political elites and built a coalition. He has also treaded carefully to ensure a smooth leadership transfer, turned calamities into political opportunities and unveiled a series of political initiatives to establish his authority. Institutionalisation of China’s leadership succession started in Deng’s later years. New selective criteria were set for young leaders. They must be highly educated, young in age, professionally trained and politically reliable. Deng also favoured young leaders who embrace his principle of market liberalism, have coastal working experience and served in both 2 local and national positions. The institutionalisation of succession was accelerated under Jiang. The age and two-term limits were also rigidly imposed on top posts including State President, Premier and General Party Secretary (GPS) in the late 1990s. In 1997, Qiao Shi, the No. 2 man of the CCP, retired when he reached 70. In 2002, Jiang retired from State Presidency and GPS after he had served two terms. Another crucial component in the institutionalisation of leadership succession is the designation and two-step installation of the core leader. Deng helped institute this arrangement after June 1989. Deng suggested that each generation of leadership should have a core leader, and the core leader should hold three posts and is the first among the equal. He also suggested that the new core leader assume Chairmanship of the CMC sometime after he took over the State Presidency and the GPS. Deng himself handed over this post to Jiang in November 1989, several months after 3 Jiang became the GPS. Obviously, Jiang followed Deng’s arrangement of phased succession. He handed over to Hu the posts of State Presidency 2
For a study on Deng’s promotion of young leaders, refer to Lai Hongyi. 2006. Reform and the Non-State Economy in China: The Political Economy of Liberalization Strategies, Chapter 5; Lee Hong Yung. 1991. From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 3
For a detailed discussion on institutionalisation of leadership succession, refer to Lai Hongyi. 2005. Hu-Wen Quan Toushi (Hu-Wen under full scrutiny). Hong Kong: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, pp. 16–41, 64–66, 319–364.
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and the GPS first at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002. Less than two years thereafter, he passed the CMC Chairmanship to Hu. Hu also owes his political success to his political skill in managing top leadership politics and in introducing his own policies. First, Hu has been able to build his own following, form a critical political coalition and counter the influence of his predecessor’s faction among top leadership. While he was in charge of Party building in much of the 1990s, Hu quietly groomed officials who share his institutional background of serving in the Communist Youth League. Coined tuanpai (or the League Faction), these officials share many of his pro-people ideals and owe their careers to Hu, regardless of whether they have any direct working relationship with him. By the 16th Party Congress, the tuanpai had emerged as one of the few primary factions/groupings within the national and provincial leadership. Among members of the 16th Central Committee of the Party, the following groups of factions could be identified — the Shanghai Gang (formerly Jiang’s associates from Shanghai), tuanpai (associates of Hu’s Communist Youth League), economic technocrats groomed by Zhu Rongji 4 and further developed by Wen Jiabao and Wu Yi, and the princelings. What emerged was a balance of power among leaders of the state, the National Party Congress (NPC), the State Council, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the military between the Shanghai Gang (or the elitist faction) on the one hand and the tuanpai and economic technocrats on the other. Hu then moved to form a coalition with economic technocrats led by Premier Wen Jiabao. This coalition dominated the Party (under Hu) and the administration (under Wen’s control) as the two most powerful and resourceful institutions of the state. Under this arrangement, Jiang’s associates can thus influence but not dictate major policies, giving Hu and Wen considerable room in introducing their own policies. Hu also displayed great dexterity in political manoeuvring. He skilfully managed his relations with Jiang and earned Jiang’s cooperation in leadership succession. Besides Premier Wen, Hu adroitly finds alliance at the Standing Committee of the Politburo. During the anti-corruption campaign Hu worked closely with Wu Guangzheng, his acquaintance at Qinghua University. When Jiang stepped down, Hu also found an ally in 4
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There are some overlaps among these factions.
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Zeng Qinghong. Hu also has a smooth working relationship with low-key Wu Bangguo, the head of the NPC. Hu was also able to seize opportunities amidst calamities, launch his own set of policies and move to assert his authority. Hu’s decisively open and intense fight against SARS from mid April to June 2003 saw his popularity soar. Equally important, Hu also converted the downsides of 5 his predecessors’ policies into a main venue for claiming political credits. Former President Jiang Zemin left behind a fast-growing and prosperous economy along with a slowly transforming Communist Party, one that is ideologically flexible enough to embrace capitalists. Yet Jiang was seen negatively as associating the Party too closely with the new rich at the expense of the working classes. To shrug off this negativity, Hu played up his concepts of “people first” and “harmonious society” and went on to address elements of potential risks and causes of popular grievances and protests, such as rising urban-rural and inter-strata income inequality, regional economic disparity, urban unemployment and economic plights of commoners. To ease the economic agonies of the lower classes, the Hu-Wen leadership has introduced a pro-people policy platform and renewed reforms to social welfare, healthcare and demographic policies, and introduced rural and land policy reforms. These policies, as documented in other chapters of this volume, address stagnant income, discontentment with illegal resettlement, lack of social security, and rising public services cost for peasants, migrant workers and the low-income groups in the 6 cities. In their four years in power, Hu and Wen are a breath of fresh air in China’s politics and governance. Nevertheless, their pro-people promise and programme have yet to be put into practice by local officials. To do so, reforming the highly authoritarian bureaucracy and Party is necessary to make officials more responsive to the concerns and voices of the commoners than to the bidding of their superiors. 5
For a detailed analysis of how Hu and Wen established their authority through SARS management and introducing new policies, refer to Lai, Hu Wen Quan Toushi. 6
For an overview and assessment of the Hu-Wen new deal, refer to John Wong and Lai Hongyi, eds. 2006. China into the Hu-Wen Era. Singapore: World Scientific.
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T
he Chinese Communist Party in Rapid Transformation ZHENG Yongnian TOK Sow Keat
The Chinese Communist Part (CCP) is a party in transformation. China’s “open door” policy and rapid globalisation process in the post-Cold War era have generated increasingly high pressure for changes on the CCP leadership. Once deemed the vanguard of the Chinese State, the CCP’s failing ideological appeal, its equally unattractive and clumsy structure, and disillusioned party cadres are increasingly making the Party’s sustainability problematic. The CCP now needs to review its continued relevance to the ongoing and fast-changing economic, social and political climates in China. Party reforms appear to be the most logical and urgent choice. In the past years, the most apparent reforms to the party are ideological and organisational. Today, the CCP remains the world’s single largest political party with membership of over 70.8 million in the year 2005. The CCP has drastically transformed from a peasantry- and workers-based party to a “catch-all” party. During Mao’s era, the CCP was a revolutionary party that was dominated by workers and peasants. In 1956, the two groups made up 83 percent of the party membership. When Deng came to power, he initiated changes to this membership proportion, replacing workers and peasants with technocrats. Since then, the representation of workers and peasants has dwindled from 64 percent in 1981 to 48 percent in 1994 and to 29 percent in 2005 (see Figure 1). After private entrepreneurs were officially admitted as members into the party in July 2001, the number of the once-shadowy group of CCP cadres swelled. Its actual numbers are not officially available, but based on
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Figure 1. Professions of CCP Members, 2005 Self-employed Self-employed (entrepreneurs), free-lance (entrepreneurs), free-lance w orkers, 1.4% workers, 1.4% Government officials, 8.1% 8.1% Government officials,
Military/Militiamen, 8.8% Military/Militiamen, 8.8%
Students, 29.7% Students, 29.7%
Workers, 9.1% Workers, 9.1%
Managers of enterprises, Managers of enterprises, non-profit organizations and non-profit organisations professionals, 23.0% and professionals, 23.0%
Peasants, Peasants,19.9% 19.9%
Source: Xinhua News Agency.
2005 figures (see Figure 1), this group is deemed to come from various job categories from managers and professionals (23 percent), self-employed and free-lance workers (1.4 percent), to unknown numbers of peasantsturned-private entrepreneurs who remained categorised under their previous profession (19.9 percent). Given that the contributions of private enterprises to the Chinese economy were not officially recognised by the State Constitution until 1999, this change of faith to allow their owners into the party represents a quantum leap in the CCP’s transformation. Other than private entrepreneurs, CCP cadres who were current students experienced a big jump in their numbers as well. The 2005 number stood at 29.7 percent, almost one-third of CCP’s total membership. This figure reflects the demographical changes to educational proficiency in China as well as the CCP’s general move towards building a younger and more educated core of cadres — 23 percent, or 16.3 million, of current membership was under the age of 35, and almost 30 percent of the total has at least attained a college degree. The CCP’s nomenklatura mechanisms have also undergone profound changes. Although the party has retained its Leninist structure, intra-
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party democracy (dangnei minzhu) is slowly transforming the way the CCP works. Experimentations on democratic reforms are carried out in tandem with the ongoing local leadership reshufflings. More democratic and transparent nomination and selection systems are encouraged at the local levels. It is now common to see more candidates running for Party committee member at the local levels than the seats that need to be filled. At times, these candidates were first screened by party cadres and local legislators — as was the case with Jiangsu province — before public feedback was sought. The party’s rank and file is slowly feeling the heat from the State’s adoption of the “rule of law”. “Rule of law” places the party structure alongside that of the State’s, and not “outside” or above the State as before. Unlike the CCP’s Leninist structure which makes its membership highly susceptible to rent-seeking activities, the “rule of law” fills in for the lack of institutionalised societal supervision. Indictments for breaches of the law became pretexts for party disciplinary actions, more commonly “double restrictions” (shuanggui) or “double expulsion” (shuankai). In the year 2006, some 97,260 CCP members were disciplined by the party on corruption charges alone. This included high-profile cases like that of Qiu Xiaohua, China’s former top statistician, and Liu Zhihua, Beijing’s former vice-mayor. But arguably, none catches more public attention than the sacking of Chen Liangyu, former Political Bureau member and Party Secretary of Shanghai. Chen is the highest-ranking CCP member to be disciplined in a decade. More recently, the Party is planning to set up a special body for corruption prevention at the central level under the direct control of the central leadership and independently from local governments. Corresponding changes were also made to the ideological dimension. CCP’s dogmatic stance with its Marxist roots took an abrupt turn in 1978 when then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping embarked on his “open door” and “four modernisations” policies. The ideology that was applied as means for class struggle during the Mao era was transformed by Deng to one of development. Jiang Zemin, who succeeded Deng, took China further down Deng’s road of economic revivalism. With the passing of Jiang’s legacy, ideology now plays a different role. China’s current batch of top leaders, headed by Hu, plays the ideological card to justify policies
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towards building social justice. Ideologically, the CCP is progressively moving from its puritan Maoist roots to one that marries socialism with free market principles. Changes in organisation and ideology have led to greater space for political engagement by different social groups. The CCP has an aversion to bottom-up initiatives; it is more comfortable with the topdown approach through which it is able to keep developments in check. In recent years, the party has continued to tighten political control, and crackdown on budding social movements. Yet there are also moves taken by the CCP to broaden its social base by pro-actively engaging different social groups, particularly new social forces that have emerged in China’s changing socio-economic environment. Effective governance requires the CCP to solicit political support from these groups. Some democratic features were introduced (again on experimental basis) to local township and village elections. Various election systems were experimented; some adopted a two-vote system (where voters were allowed to vote for both members of their village/township committee as well as the village/township party secretary), while others practised simpler voting systems. The expansion of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and their functions are important measures to gauge social engagement by the CCP. The number of NGOs in China has increased steadily over the years. Prior to 1978, there were only about 100 national social organisations in China. However, statistics released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which is in charge of NGO registration, show that by the end of 2003, their number had reached 1,736. Meanwhile, the number of local-level social organisations grew from 6,000 to 142,121. The number of private nonenterprise units, which did not exist before the reforms, hit 124,491. The state is today actively creating and sponsoring NGOs to take over hitherto state functions. In the economic sphere, the government has established intermediary organisations such as trade associations and chambers of commerce to perform sectoral coordination and regulation functions, which in the process reduced the government’s direct management role. In the social welfare sphere, the government is looking at fostering NGOs to take over part of the burden of service provision. In the social development sphere, the government makes use of NGOs to
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mobilise societal resources to supplement its own spending. However, unlike their counterparts in Europe and the US, these NGOs are far from autonomous. They will have to tow the line of the Chinese government in order to remain relevant and effective. Due to this lack of autonomy, the political influence of China’s NGOs tends to vary, depending on their agenda. In some areas such as poverty reduction, charity and environmental issues, NGOs are encouraged to play greater roles. But in other areas such as religions issues, ethnicity and human rights, the influence of NGOs is virtually absent. Some NGOs are more powerful than the others. At one end of the spectrum, commercial organisations are generally influential and powerful; it is not difficult to find business people in the People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at different levels of government. At the other end, workers and farmers are not allowed to organise themselves, and thus do not have any effective mechanism to articulate and aggregate their interests. All these transformations are however mere baby steps along the CCP’s long reformist route. As China refocuses its attention on sustaining economic development, the CCP has to reassess the sustainability of its party rule. The mission is clear: to stay viable, it has to boost its governing capacity (jiaqiang zhizheng nengli). Governing capacity, in turn, depends heavily on the CCP’s ability to renew itself through the party’s mechanisms, to legitimise its predominance in political affairs through connecting with the common people, and to reconnect its ideological frontage with ongoing social and economic changes. These are daunting tasks, but the party appears to be going on the right track, for now.
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T
he Party and the Media: Control versus Change LYE Liang Fook
When foreign media watchdogs examine the degree of press freedom in China, they invariably focus on the apparent ubiquitous control that the Chinese Communist Party wields over the media. According to the Worldwide Press Freedom Index compiled in 2006 by Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF), a non-profit organisation dedicated to press freedom worldwide, China is ranked dismally at 163 out of a total of 168 countries. RSF considers China among the “worst predators of press freedom” where journalists continue to risk imprisonment or their lives for keeping others informed. Yet, such an assessment underestimates the complex and dynamic changes that had occurred on China’s media scene in the past decade from 1997 to 2007. While the Party’s control over the media remains strong, it increasingly has to contend with a proliferation of various media channels driven by market forces and the population’s insatiable demand for alternative sources of information. Consequently, the Party has to tread a fine balance between maintaining control and an increasing demand by the general public for timely and accurate information, both of which have implications for China’s long-term stability. Although the Party still has the upper hand, it would have difficulty persisting with its usual way of control based on fait and fear.
China’s Propaganda Machinery The institutional system that governs China’s mass media as a whole has remained largely unchanged. It can be divided into state and party
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institutions. At the governmental level, the two key organisations under the State Council involved in overseeing information flow and control are the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP). Both have provincial or lower level bodies. In theory, all media players come under the purview of the relevant government bodies at the national or local levels. On the Party side, the foremost organisation for media control is the Department of Propaganda (DOP). The roles of the DOP include screening books and articles on the Party or nation’s leaders, significant political issues, policies relating to foreign diplomacy, religion or other issues that may be regarded as sensitive, and issuing notices informing publishers and editors of the stories that can or cannot be covered, and the ideological standpoint that should be used when discussing certain issues. Between the Party and state institutions, it is the DOP that wields real control over the media under the rule known as the Party principle, by which the media must adhere ideologically to the Party line, propagate its message and obey its policies and directives. Hence, the DOP ranks above the SARFT and GAPP. In Chinese administrative parlance, these government bodies fall within the xitong (network) of the propaganda machinery of the Party. They often carry out directives set by the DOP.
Media Channels: Diversity and Proliferation The task of the DOP in media supervision and control is getting more challenging with the variety and growth of media channels. Since the reform and open door policy, and especially after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992 that reaffirmed China’s market-oriented reforms, China’s media system has undergone dramatic changes. Among the most important are the trends towards decentralisation and commercialisation. Due to decentralisation, more newspapers, periodicals, television, broadcasting stations and books were established at the municipal/prefectural and county levels. Also, many newspapers and magazines specialising in particular subjects such as property, tourism, entertainment, fashion and employment have flourished.
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The second significant trend in the media scene is commercialisation where the media, especially Party owned and affiliated ones, had to explore alternative sources of funding as they could no longer rely on government subsidies. An immediate outcome of media commercialisation is the growth of the advertising industry. According to official figures, the total advertising revenue in 2004 was RMB126 billion as opposed to RMB20 billion in 1994, representing an annual increase of 20 percent in over a decade. Of this amount, the bulk of the advertising revenue came from the property, pharmaceutical, food, cosmetics, home appliances and automobile sectors. Apart from traditional media channels, an equally important development is the growth of non-traditional media channels such as the short messaging systems and the Internet. According to a survey by China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC), the number of Internet users in China reached 137 million in 2006, up 23.4 percent from 2005. Another interesting development is the rise of Internet bloggers in China, estimated at 20 million in November 2006, representing a more than 20 percent increase over the same period in 2005. There is a limit to how much influence the Party and government can exert over these high-tech communication platforms.
Vocalness Versus Control In recent years, there are more reported instances of individuals speaking up against the excesses of the DOP and relevant state media organisations responsible for supervising and controlling the media. This is due to them being more well-informed and to their greater awareness of their rights as citizens. In April 2004, Jiao Guobiao, a professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at Beijing University, posted an article on the Internet attacking the excesses of the DOP including its blatant abuse of power and its endemic corruption. He even suggested that the DOP be scrapped. Jiao was subsequently pressured to resign in March 2005. Other established media organisations and individuals have also questioned the DOP’s high-handedness in dealing with publications that presumably flout reporting parameters. In January 2006, Bingdian (冰 点), a weekly publication of the highly-regarded China Youth Daily under
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the Chinese Communist Youth League, carried a controversial article on history textbooks in China. The author, Yuan Weishi, a retired college professor of philosophy from Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou, had offered his interpretation of how past historical events such as the razing of the Summer Palace by the Anglo-French forces and the Second Opium War could have been avoided. The thrust of Yuan’s article was that instead of putting the blame entirely on the foreign invaders, the Chinese side ought to bear some responsibility for these events. The DOP’s response was to suspend the publication and remove Li Datong and Lu Yuegang, the publication’s respective Editor-in-Chief and Deputy Editor-in-Chief. Instead of relenting, Li Datong and Lu Yuegang lashed out at propaganda officials and championed free speech in a letter posted on the Internet. A group of prominent scholars and lawyers publicly denounced the crackdown on Bingdian as a violation of China’s Constitution and reminded China’s top leaders of their promise for a consistent rule of law. Bingdian was eventually allowed to resume publication on 1 March 2006, but without its two top editors. Most recently, in January 2007, Zhang Yihe, a renowned writer in the mainland, publicly challenged the GAPP with her demand for an explanation why her book was banned. Zhang’s book is about the suffering endured by seven Peking opera actors, who were friends of her family, during the Cultural Revolution, a sensitive period in China’s history. However, the apparent reason for the book ban was not because of its contents but because of who the author is. Zhang Yihe is the daughter of former transport minister Zhang Bojun, the key target of Mao Zedong’s anti-rightist campaign in 1957. As a result, Zhang has vowed to defend her constitutional right to free speech and publication. Other writers and intellectuals both locally and abroad have expressed support for her. This is yet another example of individuals appealing to the constitution and other legal means to safeguard their rights.
Reform or Obsolescence The DOP will increasingly find itself having to justify its actions to the public especially actions taken to ostensibly punish those who flout reporting parameters. It used to be the case that once a course of action
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had been decided by the DOP, it is accepted and considered case closed. But times have changed. The reform and open door policy have brought about a more vocal and mature Chinese society which the DOP has to grapple with to stay relevant. The much touted harmonious society would require adhering to the rule of law, displaying fairness and respecting differing views. The DOP will need to meet this challenge or face the risk of obsolescence. It is not necessarily at the losing end as it remains an influential and pervasive organisation, which can tap on these advantages to reform itself. The predominant view of the DOP is that it is a tool of the Party to achieve certain desired ends. The ultimate challenge for the DOP is to transform itself into an organisation that not only serves the Party but also takes on board the interests of the people as well.
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2nd Reading
P
olitical Reforms First,
Democracy Later? WANG Zhengxu
Today’s public opinion surveys consistently find the majority of the Chinese population supporting democracy as a form of government. Even among Chinese government officials, the ganbu (cadres), the proportion of those supporting democracy and political reform is high and increasing. But some scholars also argue that the Chinese political system has acquired some sort of resilience, and democratic changes will be hard to come by. It is also possible that the Chinese state is turning into a predatory state, voraciously grabbing wealth of the society for the benefit of the corrupt officialdom. If such is the case, then political decay (probably in the LatinAmerican style), instead of democracy, will be the future of the Chinese regime. So will China become a democracy? In fact, the rising public demand for democracy and the Party’s desire to renew its governing capacity may combine to drive the state towards democratisation, although this will take place in a gradualist and trial-and-go way. State building and political reform under one-party rule might be the most likely path for China’s continuous democratic changes in the foreseeable future.
One-Party “Democracy” The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always emphasised political reform to build “socialist democracy”. To the CCP, China is already a democracy (as clearly stated in China’s Constitution), hence there is no need for China to “become” a democracy. Furthermore, CCP claims that building a socialist democracy is always a continuous, ever-deepening
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process. As a result, a big-bang approach to democratisation is out of the question. Deng Xiaoping in 1980 was the first to advocate political reform. To him, political reform was about separating the Party from the direct management of enterprises (zhengqi fengkai), setting age-limit for the retirement of leaders, decentralising power and promoting grassroots democracy (mainly giving labour unions the power of checking factory management). This kind of thinking has continued till today. For the Party, political reform has always been reforming the government institutions, largely in response to the changing tasks of managing the society and the economy. From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, the Party categorically rejected any idea of multiparty democracy or the weakening of the CCP rule. Following the 14th Party Congress of 1992, China formally launched the drive to transfer the economy to a completely free market economy. In less than ten years, China’s economic system has changed beyond recognition. No democratic changes that were even remotely close, however, took place in the political arena. Jiang Zemin’s era (1989–2002) was marked by tight political control and blind pursuit of economic growth. During this process, the CCP allowed capitalists to enter its rank, and advanced the theory of “Three Represents”, amounting to a minor ideological reconfiguration. Meanwhile, the Party introduced elections at the village level, and allowed direct elections of the deputies to local people’s congresses. But in terms of political democratisation towards free media, free election of government leaders and legalisation of opposition parties, no visible progress has been made in the official thinking. In the work reports of the 14th (1992), 15th (1997), and 16th (2002) CCP National Congress, mere lip service was paid to the term “political reform”. Why are genuine democratic reforms ruled out by the Party? Lack of vision is probably the most important reason. The CCP leadership has a profound distrust of Western style democracy. The view that multi-party competition equals disorder and inefficiency is held by almost all CCP leaders, from Deng Xiaoping down to today’s Hu Jintao. Meanwhile, although the CCP always hails a populist mandate, the Party leadership appears ambivalent about the ability of the people to make right judgments
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in democratic politics. Wen Jiabo, the current amicable Premier, once commented that the low level of education of Chinese peasants is a major barrier to democracy. Lastly, CCP leaders all share the fear that the opening up of politics will lead to chaos, or luan. Hence, although they realise the need to allow more space for people to participate in politics, they maintain that such a process must be controllable and controlled by the Party.
The Increasingly Assertive Society Based on the above, the Party will thus attempt to prolong its one-party rule. Nevertheless, in today’s China two major impetuses are driving democratic changes in the Chinese political system. The first is rising citizen awareness and the demand for rights, and the other is, ironically, the Party’s desire to maintain its legitimacy through deliverance of good governance. The first is pressing the government to introduce more and more reforms that will legalise citizens’ rights against the state, thus further limiting the power of the state while the second is propelling the Party to adopt political reforms and build institutions that will bring about a more law-based, accountable, transparent and responsive government. In recent years, rising awareness of citizen rights has brought forth changes leading to constitutionalism and rule of law. In a notable case in 2003 (the Sun Zigang case), a college graduate was accidentally killed due to bad government policies at the local level. Citizens, journalists, public intellectuals and legal scholars rebuked the government for its unreasonable policy and inability to correct misdeeds. It eventually led to the public questioning of the constitutionality of certain government regulations, forcing the government to take corrective actions. A second notable case is the anti-discrimination case in 2003 involving a hepatitis B virus (HBV) carrier. Pertaining to this issue, more than a thousand people petitioned the National People’s Congress (NPC) for a constitutional review of the government’s recruitment policies across the country. As a result, at the end of 2003, the national government ordered the abolition of this and other similar discriminatory policies across all the 30 plus provinces. Several similar cases between 2002 and 2006 also demonstrated Chinese citizens’ increasing willingness (and the ability to mobilise themselves)
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33
1
to challenge government policies. Many citizens are also more ready to protest against abusive government officials. In a well-known case in 2005, a protest escalated into an open conflict between the villagers and the police in Taishi Village, Guangdong. Of course, in all these cases the success of limiting government power or appealing for redress was partial. Nevertheless, in all of them the government was seriously challenged and curbed by the citizens. It appears, hence, that citizens, especially those educated and versed in legal languages, are able to fight for rights and justice in the face of government power. Increasingly too, they are capable of organising themselves on a large scale. What is also important is the emergence of attorneys and social activists who advocate for the wronged and for those without the knowledge or skill to defend themselves in court. These developments do show that the Chinese polity is making small steps towards constitutionalism, limited government, rule of law and political openings in general.
In Search of Good Governance Another driving force to democratic changes is, ironically, the Party’s search for good governance. At least at the top leadership level, the Party seems seriously committed to building a competent and good government. Such commitments, beliefs and visions may stem from the Confucian tradition of government responsibility, the long-term influence of Party’s discourse and education, or the recently acquired understanding of modern governments in countries such as the US and Europe in the West, and countries such as Singapore in Asia. A second and probably more important cause to this urgent sense of government building is the crisis of governance.
1
Such as the BMW Case in Heilongjiang Province in which a BMW hit a peasant woman, the Nujiang River case in which citizens mobilised to stop a dam project, and the high-speed rail case in which citizens demanded that the government change course in contracting out a mega rail project linking Beijing and Shanghai.
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In recent years, China has experienced frequent social, economic, industrial, environmental and public health crises. In dealing with these increasingly explosive crises, the Chinese leaders realise that openness, transparency and a system of accountability are indispensable. The SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic in early 2003 was a costly lesson on the importance of transparency. In the single year of 2002, industrial accidents (coal mine collapses and factory explosions, for example) resulted in 14,924 deaths. In 2005 alone, there were 69 coalmine accidents, resulting in a total death toll of 2,671. In 2003, there were 379 cases of food poisoning, involving 12,876, with 323 deaths. Through such painful lessons, many caused or exacerbated by government failures, the top leadership realised that government processes needed to be made more open and transparent if crises were to be prevented or managed well. Since 2004, the Central government has promulgated several regulations to increase transparency and accountability of lower level governments. Another example is the Party’s war against corruption. The Party now understands that transparency is the key to ensuring a clean government. It has decided to build a system of financial disclosure of officials. At the NPC of 2005, it was made explicit that the Civil Service Law will soon be revised to include such requirements. The national auditing agency is also empowered to check (and release) financial records of government agencies. In 2004 alone, the National Auditing Authority revealed illegal financial practices of 38 Central Government agencies, involving a total amount of RMB9 billion (US$1.1 billion). Officials are now subject to public scrutiny and inputs are invited from citizens. For example, major government appointments are announced for public scrutiny and public hearing sessions are held for some major policy decisions. To institutionalise transparency, accountability and openness, the Party has announced that China should build a law-based government (法治政府, fazhizhengfu). The impersonal, generalist rule of law should replace the case-by-case handling of corruption or ideological campaign, two methods that the Party heavily relied on up till now. In early 2004, the government issued a blueprint for building a “government based on rule of law”. It emphasises “using legal means in the administration of state affairs, economic, cultural, and social affairs”. Most notably, it puts forward concepts such as constitutionality, due process, openness, public’s
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right to government information, public’s right to participate in policy decisions and citizen’s right to legal redress. Legal redress has occurred in a well-publicised case in 2005: She Xianglin, a peasant wrongly convicted of murder and imprisoned for many years, received 900,000 yuan (about US$111,000) in state compensation. Other concrete actions have been taken to achieve governmental goals in accordance to law. A Law on Legislation (2005) was adopted for a “legislative check” on lawmaking. In addition to asserting constitutionality on any governmental laws and rules, any law or regulation curbing civil liberty can only be made by the NPC. Government Force Law (2005), Government Permission Law (2003) and Government Punishment Law (1996) form a relatively comprehensive legal framework to limit 2 government power.
Towards Rule of Law Besides building good government, rule of law is also officially endorsed by the CCP. “Rule of law” is now included in China’s Constitution and the Party’s Constitution. In fact, in the wake of the Cultural Revolution (late 1970s), China had no legal system to speak of. From 1978 to 2003, China’s national lawmaking body (the NPC) passed 307 laws, giving China a fairly elaborate body of civil, criminal, administrative and procedural laws. In terms of the judiciary system, the People’s Court also started from scratch in the 1980s. By around 2000, courts at various levels had assumed an indispensable role in civil conflict resolution. In 2003 alone, courts across China issued verdicts to more than eight million legal cases (about five million of them are first trial cases). Around 1978, the legal profession was nonexistent; by 2000, the number of lawyers in China had exceeded 100,000. Legal aid is also emerging, with lawyers, law students and social activists providing free legal support to those who cannot afford legal services. Law is playing a more and more critical role in China’s society indeed. Nevertheless, China’s judicial system was set up as a tool for the state to rule the society. Officially, the legal arm of the Chinese government 2
See the chapter by Zou Keyuan in Part I of this volume on building a law-based government in China.
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includes the police (公 gong), the procuracy (检 jian) and the People’s Court (法 fa). By design, all these three bodies are to work together to prevent any challenges to state order and Party rule. Party control of the legal system results in institutional structures of non-independence and fragmentation of legal authorities. At the highest level, the court system is subjected to the control of both the CCP and the government. Within the court system, lower level courts are subjected to instructions and intervention from the upper level courts. Within a trial court, judges do not have the independent authority to make rulings. At the current stage, it is not possible to pursue “total” judicial independence, as the CCP still controls the legal arms of the state. But as long as the major function of the court system is to provide fairness and rule of law instead of prosecution, many meaningful reforms towards better judicial independence and integrity are possible. In fact, the legal reform has been identified as a major area of government reform. The Supreme People’s Court is spearheading a judiciary reform project that started from 1999. From 2004 through 2008, it is carrying out its second Five-Year Judiciary Reform Plan. Most of the reforms outlined in this five-year plan are still piecemeal changes, but big-scale structural reforms have also been identified as areas of reform, such as the reform of the jurisdiction system to prevent local influences in civil cases and reforming the Trial and Ruling Committee within the court, changing it into a smaller but more professional body that only serves an advisory function. Judges making independent ruling is to be the norm. In the longer run, more fundamental changes are likely to take place, such as giving courts fiscal independence from the same level government. There are also discussions on revamping the currently unitary court system into a sort of federalist system in which there is a national court and a local court. To better promote constitutionalism, there is also a discussion of establishing a constitutional court, much like what some other developing countries have done. Some of these reforms might be quite large in scale, and will be difficult to implement within a short time. But the good news is, they make sense to the CCP leadership, which is ostensibly interested in more judicial professionalism and quality. Developments in the next five years or so will be good indicators of what to come.
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Growing Democracy under a One-Party Regime? Assuming the ruling CCP will stay in power for some time to come, how will democracy come about within such a strong one-party framework? For a long time to come, political changes in China will still come in a gradualist way, without fundamentally challenging the Party’s power. But nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no hope for democracy. On the one hand, the Chinese society is far more dynamic today compared to 20 or even 10 years ago, and will continue to become more dynamic. A dynamic society demands an open political system. Citizens are becoming more active, articulate, assertive and better organised than before. They are the real force that will drive the one-party regime to adapt. On the other hand, the Party is also consciously reforming the state apparatus to meet the demand of governance. This effort includes reforming the obsolete party-state institutions, but more importantly it includes building new institutions, such as transparency, accountability, representation and rule of law. Hence, China’s democratisation is not a transition into democracy per se, but should be more accurately characterised as building a democracy from within. In the decade to come, it will be a one-party regime that is acquiring more and more democratic elements, a form of “democratic growth” indeed. Such a democratic growth period will last long enough, until the one-party framework itself gradually becomes obsolete. By then a transition into a multi-party competitive democracy is possible.
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T
he Struggle against Corruption YANG Dali
Corruption is a serious socio-political issue in China. Popular discontentment with corruption, then referred to as official profiteering (官倒), was an important element behind the massive student demonstrations in 1989. Since the Tiananmen crisis, the scale of corruption in China is generally believed to have worsened. The Chinese media report on new corruption cases almost daily. The annual Auditor General report has unveiled many cases of irregularities, illegalities, and outright fraud and embezzlement in government budget management and operations of major state enterprises. Many corruption cases have also been uncovered in construction, banking, stock IPOs (initial public offerings), regulation of coal mining and pharmaceuticals, as well as customs administration, government procurement, land allocation, municipally-based social security fund management and personnel appointments. Many scholars suggest that endemic corruption is inherent to the system of Communist Party rule and thus continues to fester in the absence of political regime change. It can be argued, however, the introduction of numerous institutional reforms that bear on corruption prevention, together with greater efforts to crack down on corruption, has allowed the Chinese leadership to make some initial progress in containing the spread of corruption. It is likely that further progress will be made to curb corruption and improve governance.
Institutional Reforms for Anti-Corruption Until the 1990s China’s leaders tended to rely on anti-corruption campaigns. Since then they have combined the anti-corruption drive — China leads
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the rest of the world in the number of officials jailed for corruption each year — with comprehensive initiatives to alter the institutional incentives for officials. Some of these initiatives are as follows.
Completing Market Transitions 1. Much of the 1980s type of official profiteering, made possible by the existence of multiple — plan, extra-plan, market — prices for the same products, had largely withered away by the mid-1990s as a result of the advent of buyer’s markets for most products. The spread of market incentives has generally reduced the need to go through gatekeepers to obtain goods and services. 2. In the 1990s, the involvement of the armed forces and government organs in business operations severely aggravated the smuggling crisis for the Chinese economy in 1998/99. Between 1998 and 2001, the Chinese leadership successfully divested the commercial businesses and operations owned by or affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army, the Armed Police, judicial organs, as well as Party and government agencies. Little noted in the West, the divestiture greatly helped to level the playing field for businesses of all types, and reduced the possibilities of corruption. 3. The greater presence of multinational corporations, especially western companies which are subject to stricter regulations on corrupt practices, has helped dampen corruption in China. Companies such as Lucent have dismissed their top China representatives for questionable practices.
Public Sector Management Reforms 4. Since 1998, Chinese government reforms have eliminated most government ministries in charge of industrial sectors and downsized the staff strength of central and provincial government by as much as 50 percent. In the meantime, a systematic drive towards government transparency, service and a reduction of government red tape started in 2001. At different levels of government, the list of government approval items has been reduced substantially. These initiatives
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culminated in the enactment and implementation (in 2004) of the Administrative Licensing Law. 5. Learning from the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore, a growing number of cities in China have established one-stop administrative service centres. Such government service centres not only improve government efficiency but also boost transparency and curb rent-seeking by bureaucrats. 6. Measures of transparency, particularly competitive bidding, tendering and auctions, have been introduced into areas widely known to be afflicted by serious corruption, including government procurement, government-funded construction projects and allocation of commercial land use rights. The use of quotas for stock IPOs was scrapped in favour of a more transparent registration process. Major projects, including the Three Gorges Dam and the Beijing 2008 Olympics, now come under the careful scrutiny of central government auditors. 7. In connection with the struggles against smuggling and financial fraud in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there have been major investigations of the Customs Administration and state-owned commercial banks. The chiefs of more than a dozen customs offices nationwide are behind bars and hundreds of officials in various cities were punished severely for colluding with smugglers, corruption and dereliction of duty. In the banking sector, Wang Xuebing, the former president of the Bank of China, and numerous lesser banking officers, are spending time in jail. In both the Customs Administration and the banking sector, internal controls have been improved since the crackdowns.
Greater Political Accountability 8. The anti-corruption establishment, notably the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC)/Ministry of Supervision, has been empowered and augmented, particularly since 2004. While CDIC/ Supervision officials seconded to other government ministries and agencies were largely part of the host ministries or agencies in the past, they are now required to report to the CDIC/Ministry of
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Supervision only. Meanwhile, the CDIC/Ministry of Supervision has institutionalised the use of roving inspection teams to monitor provincial leaders and uncovered a host of high-profile corruption cases in the provinces. 9. The institutional framework for the punishment of corrupt behavior has been recalibrated. For example, changes in the Criminal Law now require corrupt officials to prove that their assets are legally acquired. Those who cannot offer proof can be charged for possessing illegitimate income and sentenced to jail. On the other side of the equation, bribers have also received more attention from prosecutors in recent years. Corruption fighters began to seriously crack down on commercial bribery in 2006. 10. Rules on official accountability and conflict-of-interest have been introduced, though enforcement has been relatively weak. All officials are also subject to end-of-term audits whenever they are promoted, transferred, or retired. These audits have become an important measure for uncovering financial irregularities and corrupt behavior.
Stricter Institutional Restraints 11. A very simple but important change for combating corruption has been the introduction of real name accounts in financial services. Until recently anyone could open a bank account with a false name, making it easy for corruption and money laundering. Today real names and proof of identity need to be presented for opening accounts with banks, brokerages and for purchasing government bonds. 12. Government budgeting and management practices are being systematically reformed to reduce individual discretion and enhance monitoring. Take, for example, the collection of fines by police. The past practice was for the police officer or his department to collect the fine directly and spend the collected money (if the police officer had not pocketed it himself). Today the police officer would have to issue a ticket or payment form for the offender to pay through a monitored bank account. In general, such reforms — and there are
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many others — have strengthened financial monitoring, ferreted out numerous ghost payrolls in the localities and regularised financial management. 13. The National Audit Office (NAO), with the support of the Premier’s office and the National People’s Congress, has also gained clout. The public release of NAO’s audit reports has helped spur further reforms in government financial management.
International Norms and Obligations 14. As its international presence has grown, China also has to live up to more international norms and obligations that bear on governance and anti-corruption. WTO membership, for example, imposes requirements on government transparency, especially in economic governance. As a corollary of its entry into the WTO, China is obligated to further promote government procurement reforms. As a signatory to the recently-approved UN Convention Against Corruption, China has announced that it will set up an Agency for Corruption Prevention even as it hopes the Convention will help it extradite corrupt officials back to China.
Reforms and Results Various surveys from both within China and abroad have pointed to modest improvement in China’s corruption. In a tracking poll of urban residents, “Clean government/anti-corruption” rose to number two in 1998 and number one in 1999 among the three most important issues the residents were concerned with. As the Chinese leadership intensified the crackdown on corruption and introduced various institutional reforms, the ranking of “clean government/anticorruption” has moved down steadily and no longer ranks within the top seven. Meanwhile, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for China had recovered from the low achieved in 1995 to the 3.3 level in 2006. Though still quite low, China’s CPI score ranked it 70 among the 163 countries or economies in the survey and is actually substantially better than what its nominal per capita GDP would predict.
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THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST
CORRUPTION
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Overall, the top leadership, the media, and the public are in favour of more sunshine measures and in such an atmosphere, it is virtually impossible for any politician to reverse basic reforms, such as auctions for land earmarked for commercial use. In conclusion, while the Chinese corruption situation remains serious, a more effective institutional framework for corruption fighting has gradually come into being in China. Much remains to be done, of course. The Chinese leadership will be wise to continue to prioritise anti-corruption and promote institutional reforms that improve governance and reduce corruption.
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M
anaging China’s Civil Servants Kjeld Erik BRØDSGAARD
After a 12-year trial of regulations on civil servants, on 27 April 2005, the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China adopted The Civil Servant Law which took effect on 1 January 2006. Who are the civil servants in China and how many are there? According to the new law the term civil servant refers to a person who performs public duties in accordance with the law, is part of the state administrative staffing (bianzhi) and enjoys salary and benefits from the state finance. There are about 64 million people in China on the public payroll, but only 6.37 million of these can be categorised as civil servants. They work in state organs (jiguan) and are the real bureaucratic backbone of the system. A civil servant should satisfy the following: a Chinese citizen, at least 18 years of age, uphold the Chinese constitution, have good moral conduct, good health and an educational level and a working capacity as required for the position. The new law also stipulates that all public servants should be recruited through just, open and fair examinations. Officials should take the blame and quit their posts if their mistakes or negligence cause major losses or serious social repercussions. Civil servants are also required to stay out of cases involving their relatives. Civil servants are normally regarded as cadres, but not all cadres are civil servants. In fact there are 42 million cadres in China, and only those working in administrative state organs are civil servants. This means that public employees working in shiye danwei such as schools, hospitals, cultural institutions, social service, etc cannot be regarded as civil servants.
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Civil servants are not necessarily party members. However, it is difficult to go any further than the level of division head (chuzhang) without a party membership. It is almost impossible to be appointed to the “real leadership position” (zheng zhi) without being a party member, although there are an increasing number of non-party members in vice positions. Civil servants are classified according to the nature of work, level of responsibility and qualification, ability and political integrity, working experience and the degree of complexity/difficulty involved in the position. Based on such classifications the civil service is divided into 15 grades. Corresponding to this hierarchy is a four-component wage system: position salary, grade salary, basic salary and seniority salary. According to this system, in 2003 the president of the PRC earned a salary of 3,186 yuan per month. This sum composed of position salary (1,750 yuan), grade salary (1,166 yuan), basic salary (230 yuan) and seniority salary (40 yuan). Basic salary and seniority salary is the same for everyone in the civil service; only position salary and grade salary vary. There have been some adjustment to the salaries of civil servants recently, but the basic system remains unchanged. In recent years, to strengthen the state’s governing capacity a number of regulations for the selection and appointment of cadres that serve as civil servants have been introduced. Thus there are now clear criteria concerning age, gender and national minority distribution. A civil servant without higher education will not be able to go beyond division level or become a top leader without having reached the division (chu) level before the age of 40 and the department (ju) level before the age of 45. This has resulted in a much better educated and younger bureaucracy than during Mao’s and Deng’s times. It is often argued that there are too many public officials in China. This is an impression conveyed in speeches by government officials as well as in scholarly publications. However, the reality is that China in an international comparison has comparatively few public employees. There are 64.38 million people on the state payroll in China. Of these, 28.41 million work in productive enterprises such as manufacturing and construction while 25.34 million work in health, education, culture, social
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service and other shiye danwei. There are 10.63 million public employees in government and party agencies, 6.37 million of whom belong to the category of civil servants. In addition there are more than three million in the military and in the People’s Armed Police (PAP). These people are encompassed by the bianzhi system and are said to “eat imperial grain” (chi huangliang). The Chinese often claim that the number of people “eating imperial grain” has increased dramatically and that the country has become highly bureaucratised. The reality provides another picture. State-salaried people in China constitute 5.1 percent of total population and 8.6 of total employment. In comparison the percentage in Denmark is 14.9 percent and 29.9 percent respectively. If the employees in productive enterprises are taken out the remaining 35.96 million employees in shiye danwei and in state and party administrative organs only account for 2.9 percent of the population or 4.8 percent of the total number of employed people. In comparison the Nordic countries employ between one quarter and one third of workforce in the public sector with Finland at the lower end, Sweden and Norway at the higher and Denmark in the middle. Among the developed countries Korea has one of the lowest percentages of public sector employment as a percentage of total employment (11.2 percent in 2004). The comparatively small size of the Chinese government is also reflected in the fact that government revenue in China only accounted for 19.3 percent of GDP in 2004. In the Nordic countries government revenue accounted for more than 50 percent of GDP in the same year. In Japan the percentage is 31.6 percent and even in the United States, government revenue amounted to 29.6 percent of GDP. During the 1990s the ratio of state revenues in China fell to about 10 percent, generating doubts about the Chinese state’s extractive capacity. Not only is the Chinese bureaucracy small, it is also plagued by a lack of qualified personnel. To be true in recent years the educational and professional quality of government personnel has risen considerably, but there are still many problems such as the widespread misuse of academic degrees and titles. The most common way of faking titles and degrees is changing technical school and post-secondary school diplomas into college degrees or even doctoral degrees. Another method is to change titles from,
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for instance, technician to chief engineer or economic administrator to chief economic administrator. A third widespread method is to equate courses taken at Party Schools to professional diplomas or university degrees. There is no doubt that the authorities are well aware of the many problems faced. There are discussions in the media and in internal government and party publications stressing the need to build a contingent of qualified personnel and of improving the state and the party’s governing capacity. The Chinese leadership has learned its lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union and they know that improving the quality of public officials and strengthening the capacity of governing institutions is a sine qua non for continued party rule. They also know that further reform in this area is a crucial part of ongoing attempts to further regularise and institutionalise Chinese politics.
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C
an Beijing Still Dictate Local Politics? TAN Qingshan
Beijing’s relations with provinces have never been so dynamic, fluid and interdependent as in the past ten years. In central-local relations, local governments were often out of sync with central themes. The biggest challenge for the central government is to rein in local governments without jeopardising economic growth. Rapid economic development and financial restructuring have given local governments the power to pursue their own developmental strategy which is often at odds with central priorities. A single-minded pursuit of rapid economic growth by local authorities has resulted in local regulatory negligence, corruption, occupational accidents, environment deterioration, and food and drug safety problems. To restrain wayward local governments, the central government has launched several noticeable counter measures including tightening personnel grip, reasserting party control at various levels, improving Party supervision, expanding state regulatory authority over local economies and centralising state regulatory institutions. The recentralisation is hardly a zero-sum game, but a way to ensure local compliance with central priorities. However, achieving such central objectives is increasingly dependent on local cooperation and implementation. The central leadership has tightened Party control over provincial governments. This is to address the conflict between top provincial leaders and among provincial political institutions over whether politics or economics should be given local priority. While provincial Party secretaries are more concerned with overall political and social stability,
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CAN BEIJING STILL DICTATE LOCAL POLITICS?
49
governors, administrative officials and local legislators are more interested in economic development. To tighten Party control over provincial governments, the central leadership has placed provincial Party secretaries in top provincial people’s congress (PPC) posts and allowed most of the provincial Party secretaries to take over the presidency of PPC Standing Committees. That puts local Party leaders in control of local legislatures. To oversee the performance of provincial Party secretaries (PPS) and constrain possible PPS abuse of power, the supervising power of the Provincial Party Commission of Discipline Inspection (PCDI), a Party watchdog against corrupted and undisciplined provincial Party and government officials is enhanced. In the past, PCDI personnel matters were controlled by locally appointed provincial Party secretaries, thus limiting its ability to discipline its provincial boss. With the direct appointment of provincial Party disciplinary committees heads by Beijing, this takes away the PPS personnel power over PCDIs. At the same time, centrallyappointed PCDI czars are also members of the provincial Party standing committees, the key provincial decision making body. This measure will make PCDIs answerable to Beijing rather than to provincial Party 1 secretaries and hold top provincial officials more accountable. Boosting financial power is a key part of the state’s strategy to rein in local governments. The central government has stepped up fiscal control over local governments by introducing a tax-sharing scheme in 1994 that aimed to streamline complicated fiscal measures and ending incessant bargaining between the central and local governments. The new fiscal system has generally improved state extractive capacity resulting in the steady increase in government revenue as a percentage of GDP from 10.8 percent in 1994 to 17.3 percent in 2005. The centre’s share of state revenues grew from 6 percent of GDP in 1994 to 9 percent in 2005. The centre has also reversed a declining trend in its share of revenue with local governments. Since 1999, the centre’s proportional share of government revenue has gone up to more than 53 percent on an annual average. The success in part
1
Tan Qingshan. 2004. “China’s Provincial Party Secretaries (II): Powers and Constraints.” EAI Background Brief, No. 196, East Asian Institute.
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was attributed to the establishment of the State Tax Administration with provincial agencies responsible for collecting various central taxes from the local governments. The Beijing leadership has also centralised and empowered other state institutions to exercise macro and regulatory control over local development. Newly empowered state agencies, such as the State General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the State Environmental Protection Administration, the China Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, the China Securities Supervision Commission, and the State Food and Drug Administration, represent state determination to curtail local protectionism and establish central standardisation in policy implementation, market regulation and law enforcement. This “soft” centralisation may have transferred power from local governments to the centralised bureaucracies and to an extent, curbed localism, but it has also strengthened provincial governments, as they continue to control the 2 institutional mechanisms of personnel and budgetary resource allocations. The success of this regulatory centralisation will hence heavily depend on provincial cooperation. Given the state efforts, the centre still faces daunting challenge in lining up local governments to achieve state objectives, such as a “scientific concept of development” and a “harmonious society”. For years, unabated land development and investment has threatened the centre’s effort in achieving an economic soft landing, and yet, local governments continue to circumvent or ignore the centre’s directives by giving out bank loans and approving illegal land deals. The latest survey shows that illegal land use accounted for 60 percent of the total approved land use in 2005 and the situation is worsening. The central government has failed to curb housing investment and land development because the stake or incentive is too high for local officials to forgo. These local officials count on land development as their “political record” for career promotion as well as for boosting local revenues.
2
Andrew C. Mertha. 2005. “China’s ‘Soft’ Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations.” The China Quarterly (184): 791–810.
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CAN BEIJING STILL DICTATE LOCAL POLITICS?
51
Even if the tax reform of 1994 has contributed to an increase in central revenues, local governments continue to enjoy non-tax revenues derived from “fees” imposed on the public. A report from the Ministry of Finance estimated total local non-tax revenues at more than one trillion yuan in 2005, which did not include revenue from land sale. Non-tax revenues constitute major income for governments in poorer regions. In some western areas, non-tax revenues are even higher than the total fiscal revenue for local governments. Most non-tax revenues were various administrative fees and fines imposed on the public, and were used for lavish “business consumption” (gongkuan xiaofei) and for year end bonuses for government or institutional employees. These incomes disproportionably benefit government employees at the expense of the public. The lack of local cooperation and compliance with the centre often runs counter to the centre’s populist policy intent as local governments are often viewed by the public as predators. Despite the central objective of pursuing a “scientific concept of development” and building a harmonious society, corruption, miscalculation and mismanagement of local governments continue to generate mass protests and collective resistance. State statistics showed that in July 2005 alone, there were about 80,000 cases of social unrest, which was more than the 56,000 cases in 2004. Ironically, the high-handed behaviour of local officials was, in many cases, responsible for the rise in social tension, and yet, these were the officials entrusted with the task of crisis management. Proper handling of such social tensions not only calls for wisdom and tolerance, but pro-people attitudes of local government officials. An iron-fist approach to crack down on mass protects is short-sighted and often counter-productive. The recent decision to train over 56,000 county officials on the issue of building a new socialist countryside represents the centre’s desire to reach out to local officials directly. However, the effect of this new experiment on creating central orientation in local officials very much hinges on the further tightening of Party control over local governments. The downfall of former Shanghai mayor Chen Liangyu could be politically motivated, but at the same time, it also demonstrated the centre’s resolve to punish
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those who deviate from the centre’s orders. The deterring effect of such a high profile move by Beijing on local governments remains to be seen. The rectification of current central-local relationship is the key to the realisation of the centre’s objectives of scientific development and harmonious society. Notwithstanding measures to ensure control of local officials, better Party supervision, downward reach of state institutions and local administrative reform, the central government still finds it difficult to contain local abuse of power, impose macro control and reduce social tensions. In the present central-local relationship, the central reach is long, but grip is just weak.
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T
owards the Rule of Law ZOU Keyuan
For the first time in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the concept of the rule of law was incorporated into the Constitution, in 1999. Following that, progress towards building a government based on rule of law was gradually made. In April 2004, the policy on “Implementing Administration in Accordance with Law” officially ushered in a new era of law-based government in China. The Party’s determination to promote rule of law is first due to the fundamental changes China has seen since the late 1970s. The shift from the old planned economy to a new market-oriented economy has brought prosperity and the rule of law concept on which it is based. China has officially pledged to establish a comprehensive legal system by 2010 to facilitate the development of the economy. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) obligations constitute another main factor for the change in China’s legal environment and law enforcement mentality and methods. As a WTO member, China has to bring its relevant laws and regulations in line with those of the WTO, including transparency and accountability. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003 and many later incidents were other push factors. The poor administration and management in the early period of the SARS outbreak was a partial cause for the thousands of SARS victims within and outside China. The Chinese government finally realised the importance of law when it applied the 1989 Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases to the SARS case.
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Implementing Law-Based Administration In the “Implementing Programme of Comprehensively Pushing Forward Administration in Accordance with Law” of 2004, the Chinese government pledged to realise a rule-of-law government by around 2014 or 2015. The document laid out six basic requirements for law-based administration, including lawful administration, reasonable administration, due process or judicial fairness in proceedings, efficiency and readiness to serve the people, honest and clean administration, and power with responsibility. In the last decade, several laws were enacted to build a law-based government. The most important of which is the Law on Administrative Licensing, passed in August 2003 and enforced on 1 July 2004. Administrative licensing as defined by this Law is the examining and approving of a specified activity by an administrative organ. Administrative licensing is necessary for public health, macro economic adjustment and control, ecological environmental protection, and development and utilisation of limited natural resources. Administrative licensing documents must be publicised before an administrative license could be granted. A citizen, legal person or an organisation has the right to apply for administrative review or launch an administrative litigation. The new law explicitly forbids government agencies from granting permits or collecting fees not required by the law. Another important law is the 1996 Law on Administrative Punishment. It governs administrative activities and imposes punishment on violators. It works on several principles: (1) no punishment shall be imposed when there is no express stipulation for such a punishment; (2) the power to prescribe punishment for personal rights or property rights belongs to the central legislature, and (3) the procedure for administrative punishment is for the first time detailed in the law, particularly the hearing system which is quite new in China. This is one of the important milestones for rule of law in China. Following this law, other major laws were also enacted, such as the Law on Administrative Review Procedure (1999) and the Law on Civil Servants (2005). The latest development in administrative law is linked to WTO requirements. Governments at all levels should administer in accordance to the law and follow the transparency principle set forth by the WTO.
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TO W A R D S
THE
RULE
OF
LAW
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After China’s accession to the WTO, it can no longer govern the country by using large amount of normative internal documents. These government documents should be reflected in the form of laws and regulations when needed and in line with WTO regulations.
Administrative Transparency The need for transparency in governance was made urgent by the SARS epidemic in 2003. The new Regulations on Public Health Emergencies were enacted in May 2003, granting individuals or organisations with the right to report emergencies and maladministration. For the first time, an information publicising system at governmental level was established. This complemented the 2004 “Administration in Accordance with Law” which requires the “openness” of government information. The public has the right to consult publicised information under conditions stipulated by the government. In a recent Shanghai case, Dong Ming, a 70-year-old woman sued the Xuhui District Government for denying her right of access to archives of the garden villa she used to live in. According to Dong, her father bought the villa in 1947, but her family was expelled from it in 1968. Since it was the first case after the Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality on the Openness of Government Information came into force on 1 May 2004, it drew wide attention within China, in particular from the legal circle. Transparency is also an internet-induced response. In the past, the government was able to monopolise and control information and its flow. However, with the development of the internet, the public information platform has become very big. As a result, the government is no longer able to monopolise and control information, thus making transparency an inevitable choice. With the growth of the internet and with the number of internet users in China standing at 94 million as of 2004, the internet therefore poses a new challenge to Chinese governance.
Judicial Remedies A milestone in limiting governmental power is the promulgation of the Law on Administrative Litigation in 1989 which defines legal as well as illegal administrative activities. Since the implementation of this Law, and
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as of April 2004, courts throughout the country has accepted and handled more than 910,000 “min gao guan” (government officials sued by ordinary citizens) cases covering more than 50 kinds of administrative areas. So far, 30 percent of plaintiffs won their case. The 1994 State Compensation Law is a big supplement to the Law on Administrative Litigation. Victims suffering damages caused by State organs or their personnel have the right to claim compensation from the State. In one of the notable cases, 25 repatriated people were burnt to death in a mini-bus travelling from Haifen to Guangzhou in Guangdong Province in April 2001. Families of victims were not satisfied with the post-death treatment and decided to sue the Shanwei local government. The court ruled in favour of the families of the victims. The Intermediate Court upheld the ruling in the appeal case. Between 1995 and November 2004 procuratorates at all levels throughout the country registered and handled 7,823 compensation cases and made decisions on 3,167 of such cases involving compensation of more than RMB58 million.
An Unfinished Task China is in a transitional period in which “rule of man” and “rule of law”, and “rule by law” and “rule of law” coexist. The current legal reform in China can be characterised as “rule of the Party by law”. It is not appropriate to use the standards of a matured legalised society to measure China’s legal developments. Although the CCP has imposed significant constraints over the development of the Chinese legal system, admittedly the achievements in China’s legal reform up to today should be attributed to the efforts made by the Party. In the past, such as Mao’s era, the CCP had rejected outright the rule of law. The trend is now likely to change. For one, Chinese leaders trained in law have increased in number. Between the last two CCP Central Committees, the number of full members with law degrees rose from three (2 percent) to eight (4 percent). The course towards rule of law is thus irreversible.
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T
he Party And The Gun: Civil-military Relations LI Nan
Party-army relations in China under Mao Zedong were highly symbiotic for lack of clear institutional boundaries. This is due to Mao’s emphasis on “politics taking command” and “human factors”, but not divisionof-labour-based technical expertise. As a result, political alliances and conflicts were largely defined by personalised factions that cut across party-army boundaries. Under Deng Xiaoping, however, clearer party-army boundaries emerged because Deng had allowed for more institutional autonomy, so that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could stay away from politics and pursue technical upgrading. The only caveat is that at the top leadership level such as the Central Military Commission (CMC), Deng relied on his personal influence and his pre-1949 Second Field Army comrades to control the army. These enabled him to employ the military against political opponents in the party and from society at critical moments such as the popular rebellion in 1989. By similar logic, many observers assumed that after he became the CMC chair in 1989, Jiang Zemin consolidated his power in the military through personnel appointments and budget increases, so that he was able to employ the military against his political opponents in the party and from society. During the 15 years of Jiang’s command of the gun, however, little evidence existed to show that Jiang had mobilised the military against political opponents in the party and from the society. Lacking Deng’s credentials and unsure of his ability to control a politically mobilised army, Jiang apparently adopted a different policy. That is, to enhance civilian governance, or the party’s legitimacy to rule by promoting
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economic growth and political stability, and to adopt programmes that confine the military to narrow functional-technical tasks. These policies had helped to maintain party-army institutional boundaries and the internal cohesion of the military, because it denied the military of an opportunity to intervene in politics. On the civilian side, for instance, Jiang had replaced the post-1989 policy of military control and ideological indoctrination with a focussed pursuit of economic growth at the 14th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress of 1992. This was intended to enhance the CCP’s legitimacy to rule by increasing the citizens’ income and improving living standards, and providing employment opportunities for millions of people who join the labour force every year. It also helped to generate revenue for preventing and preempting crises. Moreover, the attention was placed on managing social protests stemming from the downsides of rapid economic growth, such as massive urban unemployment due to the reform of state-owned enterprises, over-taxation of the peasants, rampant corruption, wealth polarisation and environmental degradation. The People’s Armed Police, which is primarily responsible for maintaining domestic social stability, was strengthened, and riot control units with non-lethal means such as tear gas and rubber bullets were deployed. All these had reduced the need to mobilise the PLA for domestic functions. On the military side, Jiang aimed to confine the PLA to narrow military-technical tasks. For instance, he endorsed the new PLA strategic principle of preparing for local war under high-tech conditions in 1993, and in 1995 adopted a policy to transform the PLA from a manpowerintensive force to a technology-based one. He introduced the concept of “leapfrogging” development in 1997 by shifting the emphasis of military modernisation from mechanisation (adding new hardware platforms) to informationisation (developing information technologies (IT)-based network and software) to narrow the technological gap. This led to the CMC’s full endorsement of the policy of dual-transformation (mechanisation and informationisation) of the PLA in late 2002. These technology-centric policies led to decisions to downsize the PLA by 500,000 positions in 1997 and 200,000 in 2002. Promoting revolution in military affairs (RMA)-based transformation also benefits civilian control because disparate military units would be integrated closer by
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THE PARTY
AND
THE GUN: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
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the IT network, which reduces the “asymmetry of information” and thus enhances the effectiveness of central control. Finally, Jiang endorsed the policy to divest the PLA from business activities in 1998. This significantly reduced the domestic role of the PLA. It also helped to reduce bickering over distribution of funding and corruption cases among officers and the ranks, thus enhancing the internal cohesion of the PLA. Moreover, it was a good political strategy to control the PLA through the control of the purse by cutting off its sources of extra-budgetary income. Similar to Jiang, Hu took over the position of the CCP general secretary in 2002 with weak credentials, having no service experience and few close connections in the PLA. Hu’s strategies in dealing with the PLA are also similar to Jiang’s. Basically, he has focussed on enhancing civilian governance by promoting social justice and sustainable economic growth, and adopted programmes to confine the military to narrow functionaltechnical and external tasks. On the civilian side, for instance, Hu has attempted to reverse the excesses of single-minded economic growth such as the widening of income gap that has led to serious social tension, the lack of social security for marginalised groups in society, graft of officials and environmental damage. Hu believes that these issues cannot be resolved by more economic growth and riot control techniques alone, but rather by dedicated social policies. Hu has worked closely with Wen Jiabao to divert investment from the rich coastal regions to the less developed heartland and the west, reduce tax burdens of the farmers, remove restrictive regulations on migrant workers, develop basic social and medical safety valves for the poor and the unemployed, fight corruption on a more substantial scale and require green gross-domestic-product growth as criterion for local officials to have career advancement. These policies proved to be immensely popular, and contributed to the image that the CCP leadership can also have a heart and a human touch. The image of Hu’s fair and competent governance clearly enhanced the CCP’s legitimacy to rule. This helped to consolidate Hu’s control over the PLA as well because Hu also became popular among PLA officers and ranks. The image of competent civilian governance also reduced the necessity for PLA’s intervention in politics.
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On the military side, Hu has endorsed programmes that confine the PLA to its military-technical and external tasks. At a CMC expanded conference in late 2004, Hu introduced a new military policy that includes the four new missions of the PLA: 1) serve as a source of strength for consolidating the CCP’s governing party position; 2) provide security guarantee for the window of strategic opportunity for national development; 3) provide strategic prop for the expansion of China’s national interests, and 4) play an important role in safeguarding world peace and common development. The first mission may contradict somewhat the institutional autonomy of the PLA, but it is the politically correct thing to say for any new CCP leader, and it really refers to the CCP’s “absolute leadership” of the PLA. The best way for the PLA to help consolidate the CCP’s governing position, however, is not to intervene in this governance, but to concentrate on developing its functional and technical expertise. The other three missions are generally in line with narrow militarytechnical tasks. The second mission, for instance, refers to continued military modernisation to enhance the credibility of deterrence against threats on the margins of China such as Taiwan independence and so forth. The strategic stability as a result ensures a peaceful external environment for economic development at a time when China benefitted from the diversion of the US attention to countering terrorism, globalisation and integration of China into the global economy. The third mission refers to securing China’s newly emerging interests associated with the maritime space, electromagnetic space, outer space and other areas in addition to China’s traditional security interests such as its sovereign territories, airspace and waters. The final mission refers to PLA’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. What is remarkable about these new missions is that they are all external. This is a good political strategy to control the PLA because civil-military relations usually are easier to manage when the military is externalised. At the operational level, Hu has continued Jiang’s programme of RMA-based transformation of the PLA. In May 2003, Hu presided over a Politburo study session in which researchers from the Academy of Military Science lectured members on world trends in RMA and priorities
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of China’s military modernisation. Hu has initiated a campaign to study RMA-related subjects in the PLA. He has also supported PLA personnel reform to appoint those who understand RMA to higher ranks and key positions and recruit IT specialists from civilian universities. Finally, Hu has stressed regular military training and exercises, rules and regulations and effective management as major ways to regulate behaviour. All these clearly aim to confine the PLA to its functional and technical expertise, a good political strategy to enhance the “objectiveness” or institutional control of the PLA.
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T
he PLA in Transformation YOU Ji
In 2002 China substantially revised its 1993 national defence strategy officially declared as “winning a regional limited war under high-tech conditions”. The new strategy has reset the direction of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation: from seeking superiority through mechanisation (enhancing high-tech hardware) to realising dual transformation through mechanisation and informatisation (IT integration). This will exert profound impact on the PLA’s long term evolution.
The PLA’s New Path to Modernisation The PLA’s 1993 strategy was a response to the altered form of warfare, as shown by the first Gulf War, and as a result of embracing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The strategy emphasised joint operations based on advanced conventional platforms. Weapons of Information Warfare (IW) were regarded as supportive. In the new century the PLA’s application of the RMA has entered a new stage: it has placed systems integration above developing individual high-tech hardware. Informatisation is thus singled out as the driving force behind PLA’s transformation by the Central Military Commission in 2002. This revised strategy reflects the PLA’s new understanding of the type of war facing the PLA in the future — if the combat is between conventional platforms, the key to victory is the IT systems integrating the hardware. Thinking in simplistic terms of adding hardware platforms to improve military capabilities is obsolete. Therefore, IW is no longer seen as a combat method but a dominant form and core of all other types of military engagement. Nor is IT upgrading a matter of technical significance. It is the lifeline of the PLA in the next war.
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To the PLA, systems integration represents a short cut to raising combat effectiveness as compared to adding expensive hardware. Informatisation provides the means for intelligence to be quickly shared, decision process accelerated and orders implemented smoothly. Real time grasp of battle-field situation is crucial for any war action in the IT era. 4 This sets the direction of PLA modernisation with C ISR (which stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) interconnectivity as the top priority. Therefore, informatisation has made the RMA-driven transformation of the PLA more comprehensive and systematic than before. The 2002 strategy indicated a change in focus from platform-centric to networkcentric. This represents significant progress in China’s catch-up campaign. Now the effort to enhance IW systems parallels that of creating a new class and new generation hardware. 4 Beyond the central levels, the PLA has no unified C ISR systems, leading to poor cooperation and coordination between different Services in combat operations. The PLA is designing an overarching program of informatisation to address this problem. IW systems will be standardised and regularised among and between all Services. This will help realise unobstructed and digitalised transfer of information between all systems at the strategic, campaign and tactic levels, among Services and between platforms.
The Generation Leap Strategy The idea of generation leap is the core of the new defence strategy. It means that the PLA pushes mechanisation and informatisation simultaneously. In the West mechanisation precedes informatisation, as the latter can only be built upon sophisticated hardware platforms. China’s mechanisation is far from complete but informatisation cannot be delayed any further because the prospects of fighting a war dominated by IW are very real indeed. This propels the PLA to innovate on informatisation as a matter of urgency. Although the two transformations are pursued simultaneously, the emphasis is on informatisation. This will be reflected by the funding allocations. Specifically, the army units will not acquire large numbers
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of new tanks, an indicator of mechanisation, but will seek networking facilities to be IW capable as soon as possible. The PLA will first upgrade its existing conventional weapons of industrial age by plugging IT assets into them individually to increase their interconnectivity and as force multipliers. Then all platforms will be integrated through systems integration. Ultimately, the PLA will possess the crucial features of 4 informatisation: an C ISR architecture that delivers real time command both vertically and horizontally; the five-dimensional intelligence systems (in the air, space, cyber-space, on the ground and at sea) that give the PLA good battlefield transparency, and a lean and diversified force structure that is suitable for PLA units in all kinds of combat operations. This means further streamlining of its personnel and a new priority in weapons Research & Development. The idea of generation leap is also applicable to the process of informatisation itself. To the PLA, informatisation is through three stages: digitalisation, systems integration and intelligentisation (zhinenghua). The PLA has not fully entered the stage of digitalisation. Even though its formation and training of an experimental digital brigade has just begun, the PLA is already building comprehensive networking facilities throughout the army. The automated war zone command is being constructed based on this principle: it will skip some evolutionary stages. Such a leap strategy is risky, however. Many factors may hinder its realisation. First, China’s developing economy has clear limits in sustaining the double transformation as it dictates a huge increase in military spending. Fund available for upgrading mechanisation may dry out and that for upgrading IT assets may be wasted when systems integration is employed in obsolete platforms. Second, China’s IT industries are not yet able to provide key technologies required for informatisation. Finally, with low education level the soldiers have great difficulty mastering IT facilities.
Informatisation and War Preparation The 1993 high-tech strategy did not specify the object of war and the mode of warfare for the PLA. The revised strategy filled this vacuum. It guides each Service to explore the exact type of war it is going to fight and offers a
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practical roadmap for PLA’s war preparation. Now that the Taiwan crisis with possible US involvement is identified, non-engagement warfare is logically set as the most likely form of combat, at least for the initial stage of war. A Taiwan war is a war of politics, not one of mass destruction. Too many Taiwanese casualties will dash any hope of reunification. From this rationalisation, IW is the most suitable warfare that can help achieve the political objective. More concretely, when on the offensive, non-engagement warfare makes precision and beyond-vision strikes the primary choice, as this prevents large scale direct personnel engagement. In defence, the PLA’s belief is that in a worst case scenario (with US involvement) China’s future war will be fought against lightning air and missile surgical strikes, or sustained air, missile and electronic bombardment. The PLA envisages that its future action will be information-dominated and in the maritime areas. Non-personnel engagement will be a new but prominent feature of combat, although an exchange of fire within short distance cannot be totally excluded. The idea of a pre-emptive IW strike is now central to the PLA’s design of operations: cripple the enemy’s major military assets rather than its urban centres. This has broadened its vision of waging an anti-RMA war against a superior opponent. Having to rely on inferior weapons to fight the US, the PLA has seriously studied how to conduct a one-sided war. To PLA strategists, informatisation of the US military has not only generated strength, but also exposed its weaknesses. The 9/11 tragedy reflects the vulnerability of a mighty nation to new kinds of threat. The PLA is contemplating various types of asymmetrical warfare for selfprotection. 4 For instance, cyber attack on the enemy’s C ISR will be an integral part of future warfare. It is cheaper than attacks on carrier battle groups. The more a military depends on IT, the more it is exposed to attacks on its information hubs. One PLA researcher points out that about 80 percent of US military communications facilities rely on civilian networks, creating a window of opportunity for cyber strike. The PLA’s satellite killing exercise on 11 January 2007 indicated a prototype of this kind of warfare. As the PLA’s potential opponent is heavily dependent on its military satellites, knocking down a few essential ones may paralyse its satellite system,
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especially its National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense. And this type of asymmetrical warfare is highly cost-effective: to construct an advanced space combat system is extremely expensive and a few missiles cost close to nothing in comparison. The much talked-about missile strike in early 2007 is another form of non-engagement warfare the PLA is planning as an asymmetric measure against a powerful enemy.
A Crucial Decade For the PLA, moving in the right direction is more important than having available hardware. Its new strategy addresses a major problem in the 1993 strategy: lack of an overarching linkage between the abstract strategy and the PLA’s individual modernisation plans. This is one of the reasons why the pace of PLA transformation is relatively slow. The Chinese military has apparently found this linkage and may have entered a faster track of development. Certainly, as mentioned earlier, the most pressing challenge is whether it can achieve a balanced transformation between mechanisation and informatisation. The next decade will be crucial for the PLA.
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H
ong Kong and Macau under One Country, Two Systems CHOU Kwok Ping
The economic and political developments in Hong Kong and Macau after the handover of sovereignty (Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999) follow different trajectories. Before the handover, Hong Kong’s economy was shining. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the SARS outbreak in 2003 pushed up unemployment rate and welfare expenditure while a fall in tax and land sale revenue undermined the government budget (from a surplus of HK$77 billion in 1997–98 to a deficit of over HK$60 1 billion in 2002–03). Deflation badly hit property market, a powerhouse of Hong Kong economy. Real GDP growth rate dropped from 5.1 percent in 1997 to minus 5.5 percent in 1998, 0.6 percent in 2001 and 1.8 percent in 2002. The economy was unable to rebound until the Chinese government relaxed its control on outbound tourism to its two SARs in mid 2003, fuelling the tourism industry. Macau was eclipsed by Hong Kong after it became a British colony in 1841. Before the handover its economy was hit by the Chinese government’s macro-economic control in 1993, Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the gangster warfare shortly before the handover in 1999. The economy regained momentum after the gangster warfare was settled. The liberalisation of gambling further pushed up its real GDP growth rate by 14.2 percent in 2003, 28.4 percent in 2004, 6.7 percent in 2005, and 15.4 percent in 2006 (from first to third quarter) respectively. The strong growth propelled Macau’s GDP per capita (HK$221,311 in 2006), ahead of Hong Kong’s HK$214,710. 1
In April 2007, S$1 = HK$5.15.
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The two SARs also differed in their first leaders’ popularity. Tung Chee-hwa, the first Hong Kong Chief Executive, was always compared unfavourably with his Macau counterpart Edmund Ho. Tung’s record high approval rate was 67.7 percent in September 1997, a couple of months after the handover. His approval rate plunged to a historical low of 36.2 percent in July 2003 owing to public discontentment with economic setback and government’s mishandling of controversial issues (for example, short piling of public housing, Cyber Port project, penny stock saga, Financial Secretary’s “car-gate”, SARS outbreak and National Security Bill). In contrast, Edmund Ho has inherited his father Ho Yin’s political capital as the chief representative of the Chinese community; he served in the Legislative Assembly for over ten years before the handover. Thanks to the public trust on him and economic prosperity in post-handover era, Edmund Ho’s approval rate is always above 70 percent. Beijing-Hong Kong relations in post-handover era are more strained than Beijing-Macau relations. In the right of abode controversy in 1999, the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress (SCNPC) interpreted Hong Kong’s mini-constitution Basic Law. It overturned the decision of Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal to grant the right of abode in Hong Kong to children of parents who also had the right of abode. The interpretation was construed to have undermined Hong Kong’s judicial independence. In 2002, Tung Chee-hwa proposed National Security Bill, a bill which was viewed as undermining human rights, and Beijing was believed to have masterminded it. This bill triggered over half a million citizens to take to the streets and protest against the Bill on 1 July 2003, and finally led to the downfall of Tung and three of his ministers. In 2004, SCNPC interpreted Basic Law again to rule out universal suffrage of Chief Executive and Legislative Council in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The realisation of universal suffrage supported by most Hong Kong citizens and explicitly stated in Basic Law as the ultimate end of Hong Kong’s democratisation became elusive. Hong Kong citizens do not welcome Beijing government’s intervention in Hong Kong’s democratisation. An opinion poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in November 2006 revealed that only 20 percent of the respondents were satisfied with Beijing’s performance over Hong Kong’s democratisation. Another opinion poll
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by the same university in December 2006 found that almost 90 percent of the respondents hoped that the 2007 Chief Executive election would be a contested one. With the support of public opinion, most of the candidates from the pan-democracy camp were returned to the Election Committee of Chief Executive. As a result, democrat Alan Leong was able to receive enough nominations to contest with incumbent Donald Tsang, then Acting Chief Executive, who had Beijing’s support. Though the Election Committee members were under heavy influence of Beijing and were not representative of the Hong Kong people, the wide margin of Donald Tsang’s popularity rate of over 60 percent over Alan Leong’s 20 percent showed that the candidate handpicked by Beijing would have won a real election anyway. Beijing-Macau relations are more harmonious. The right of abode in Macau is more clearly defined. SCNPC has never interpreted Macau Basic Law, and therefore Macau’s judicial independence has never been questioned. Witnessing the bad example of Hong Kong, the Macau government held back on its own version of National Security Bill as required by Basic Law. Democratisation in Macau is not a contentious issue. Unlike Hong Kong Basic Law, Macau Basic Law does not state that universal suffrage must be introduced in the end. The Macau people are dissatisfied with the SAR’s political development, but their discontentment has not been translated into territory-wide demand for universal suffrage of the Chief Executive and Legislative Assembly. Beijing has also interfered with the election of Macau’s Chief Executive and Legislative Assembly; the interference has not led to a backlash, however. Macau has its own problems. The public administration is notorious for inefficiency and widespread patronage. Many inexperienced local officials were promoted to senior positions to replace their non-Chinese counterparts after the handover. The wastage and overspending of municipal councils and the 2005 East Asian Games provoked public outcry. The discontentment with the increasing social disparity in the wake of gambling liberalisation in 2002 and the collusion between government and business over labour import and land sale culminated in the 2006 Labour Day demonstration involving over 3,000 participants, the largest protest since 1989 June Fourth Incident. These issues, however, neither undermined people’s trust in the handover of sovereignty and in the
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Chinese government nor adversely affected Beijing-Macau relations. Local people tend to blame domestic factors rather than the Beijing government for the problems. The difference between Hong Kong and Macau in the degree of internal conflicts and their relations with Beijing may explain the strength of pro-Beijing elements (major pro-government forces in the two SARs) and democrats (major opposition parties in the two SARs). Pro-Beijing elements in Hong Kong were marginalised from the political landscape and their influence in the community was limited until the last days of colonial rule. The 1967 riot — an overspill of the Cultural Revolution — engineered by pro-Beijing forces killed dozens of people, caused huge economic loss and tainted the image of pro-Beijing forces. The graduates of pro-Beijing Chinese schools were few in number and had far fewer career opportunities than their counterparts in English schools. Their lack of proficiency in English hindered their progress in almost all professions and sectors of business. In contrast, pro-Beijing forces in Macau are much entrenched. Portuguese colonial rulers lost the will and muscle to govern the colony effectively in the 1966 riot, again an overspill of the Cultural Revolution. Without strong colonial rule, pro-Beijing forces have successfully penetrated all walks of life. Many younger people study in pro-Beijing Chinese schools and receive tertiary education in China (or in Macau through distance learning programmes conducted by China’s universities). Most of other social services are either funded or delivered by pro-Beijing forces with government subsidies. Because of the extensive influence of pro-Beijing forces, the outlook of the population has been shaped to be more pro-Beijing than their Hong Kong counterparts. The variation in the strengths of the democrats in the two SARs plays a part as well. The start of democratisation in the late 1970s (in Macau) and early 1980s (in Hong Kong) were windows for the rise of democrats in domestic politics. Since they support 1989 China’s student movement and are the staunchest critics of the two SAR governments, Beijing never trusts them. Democrats in Hong Kong have capitalised on the weakness of proBeijing forces and seized over 60 percent of the votes in the post-handover Legislative Council elections (geographical constituencies) as well as over one third of the seats in the Council. They called for universal suffrage of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council that are deemed by Beijing
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as a conspiracy to weaken its political control over Hong Kong. In Macau, the democrats only won some 20 percent of the vote in post-handover legislative assembly election (geographical constituencies) and less than 10 percent of the seats of the legislature. None of their motions proposed in legislative assembly has been passed. Their ability to mobilise social movement is weak. The limited success of Macau democrats to amass public support is due to the deep penetration of pro-government interest groups in the civil society. Without strong opposition camp, both the Beijing and Macau governments find it easier to contain disputes affecting Beijing-Macau relations. In coming days, the Beijing-Hong Kong dispute will centre on political reform. To pacify discontent and win support for delaying the pace of democratisation, the Beijing government will continue its preferential economic policies, such as further relaxing outbound tourism and outflow of capital to Hong Kong. For Macau, Beijing will be more concerned with Macau’s underground banks and casinos, significant sources of China’s corruption problems and transit points of criminals’ capital. The Macau government will also feel pressured to align its legislation with international practices of combating casino-related crimes such as money laundering and illegal gambling credit because the advent of American and Australian capital in the gambling industry has raised the SARs’ international visibility.
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C
hen Shui-bian: Taiwan’s Lame Duck President John F. COPPER
On 1 June 2006, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian made a startling public announcement: he declared he was surrending authority over domestic affairs to his premier, Su Tseng-chang, effective immediately. Why the sudden move to shed part of his job? Simple. President Chen’s poll numbers were fluctuating in the 20 percent range, down from more than 70 percent in 2000. The opposition parties, the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP), were preparing to recall him or cast a no-confidence vote in his premier. The president has been a liability to his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), for some time. Many said the DPP lost the last two elections because of Chen. In December 2006, citizens would vote to choose the mayors of Taiwan’s two metropolitan cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, and the city councils of both cities. The prospects were not good for DPP candidates and Chen was to blame. These elections, moreover, were said to be a bellwether for what would happen in a legislative election at the end of 2007 and a presidential election in 2008. The DPP’s future, owing to Chen, thus appeared dim. Why had Chen Shui-bian become so unpopular? From early in his presidency he was perceived as having wrecked the economy, undermined cross-strait ties and bungled relations with the United States. Six months after Chen became president, Taiwan experienced a bad recession. The gross national product contracted and unemployment reached levels few had ever heard of or thought possible. Growth
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was restored, but not the kind Taiwan had seen in the past or people expected. There was serious tension with China, mainly the result of Chen promoting Taiwan’s legal independence in order to promote local nationalism and stoke ethnic conflict to his political advantage. Relations with the United States, which were very good in early 2001, subsequently declined rapidly. Washington objected strenuously to Chen provoking China while America was trying to deal with terrorism and a myriad of other problems and needed Beijing’s help. Bush administration officials criticised Chen harshly, even broaching the subject of whether the US should defend Taiwan. But when he ceded power to his premier, corruption was the immediate cause of Chen’s woes. Chen, his close aides and his family, including the First Lady, were seen as crooked and venal. This tainted the party and the government. Some said the DPP and Chen were bad from the start. Most DPP officials came from positions in local politics, where corruption is worse than in national politics. Chen had gotten campaign donations from known gangs when he ran for mayor of Taipei in 1994. He and his party had inherited Lee Teng-hui’s “money politics” legacy. Before the end of his first term, according to opinion polls, the public perceived Chen and his party as more corrupt than the KMT. During the 2004 presidential election campaign, the press reported that Chen and his people expected to lose the election so they thought they had to cash in fast, and they did. Chen and his party were then given a respite. The president and vice president were shot and a sympathy vote got them reelected. But the corruption persisted and even got worse. Chen’s appointees taking bribes and absconding with public funds hurt the DPP at the polls in a legislative election in December 2004 and local elections in 2005. The corruption problem was unusually corrosive for the ruling DPP for two reasons: One, the party had long portrayed the KMT as dirty and the DPP as poor and clean. Many people believed this. It was a good campaign issue in 2000 and 2001. But no more. Two, President Chen, a superb campaigner, was no longer an asset to the party in election campaigns since most voters believed Chen facilitated official corruption. Now he handicapped DPP candidates.
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Many top DPP leaders wanted Chen to resign rather than face hostile voters at the polls in December 2006 with him still in office. But there was a serious downside: if Chen left office, Vice President Annette Lu would assume presidency. Top DPP leaders did not want that. They reckoned that as the sitting president Lu could not be denied the party’s nomination for the 2008 presidential election. Premier Su, former premier Frank Hsieh, and party chairman Yu Shyi-kun all hoped for the party’s nod. Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT’s chairman and its likely nominee for the presidential contest, preferred not to face an incumbent. So he too was not sanguine about Chen resigning or being recalled. Meanwhile, the US Department of State came to view Chen’s predicament as a positive sign. It made him more pliable. And, Lu, State thought, might be a bigger troublemaker. She was certainly a stronger advocate of Taiwan’s independence than Chen. China saw it this way too. Beijing thus muted its criticism of Chen. This explains why a recall effort against Chen failed. Still, the DPP had to worry about Chen dragging down its candidates in the coming election. Then former DPP chairman, Shih Ming-teh, known as “Taiwan’s Nelson Mandela” because of his years of imprisonment for opposing the KMT, launched a mass movement to compel Chen to quit. Shih called for a million people to contribute and they did. His movement attracted huge turnouts in Taipei and other cities. On 10 October 2006, Taiwan’s National Day, Shih planned a demonstration finale. President Chen did not appear in public for some time. There were reports that some of Shih’s activists would storm the presidential palace and guards would shoot them and this would incite a revolution. Chen would then flee the country. Chen survived this, but a month before the city elections, three of Chen’s close aides and his wife, the First Lady, were indicted for fraud, embezzlement and perjury. His son-in-law was already under detention. The prosecutor, who had been a Chen supporter, said Chen would be indicted too except that as president he could not be charged with crimes other than treason.
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Nobel prize winner Lee Yuan-tseh, who had helped Chen get elected in 2000, wrote a public letter saying the president should resign. Former president Lee Teng-hui spoke likewise. Opinion surveys showed most citizens, by a good margin, thought Chen was unfit for office and should quit. Only 5 percent of civic groups supported him. Leading up to voting day, it appeared the corruption issue would catapult the KMT to victory in both city elections. However, just before the voting the DPP closed ranks and President Chen skilfully played the “ethnic card”. This helped the DPP’s candidate, Chen Chu (no relation to Chen Shui-bian), to win the Kaohsiung mayorship by a thread. Afterwards pundits said Chen had survived. Some even said that the KMT had lost the election in spite of winning the Taipei mayorship and making big gains in both city councils races. KMT Chairman Ma Yingjeou was seen as having failed to help the KMT candidate in Kaohsiung. Yet, according to post-election polls, Ma remained the favourite to win the presidency in 2008. Premier Su was a distant second in the polls. Frank Hsieh, who lost the Taipei mayorship race but made a good showing, led among DPP members. Most observers concluded Annette Lu was the reason for Chen surviving and the public continued to view President Chen, his family, and his administration as woefully corrupt. Chen, the media said, was “saved by Lu”. Then, in February 2007, prosecutors indicted Ma Ying-jeou for misusing Taipei city funds when he was mayor. Ma immediately resigned as KMT head and the party seemed to be in disarray. But Ma forthwith announced his candidacy for the presidency and his poll numbers rose. Almost two-thirds of survey respondents reported they felt he was honest and the indictment was wrong. Still the event helped President Chen. After all they were accused of the same crime, though the magnitude of it in Chen’s case was much larger and what his friends and relatives had done showed culpability of a different sort. The bitter competition for the DPP’s presidential nomination also helped Chen. He stepped in to set the rules in what might have otherwise been a bruising fight.
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President Chen also launched a movement to get rid of the vestiges of the former government: Chiang Kai-shek’s statues and his memorial and the names of company and government organisations that used “China” or in some way indicated Taiwan was part of China. Chen thus grasped leadership of the local identity movement, which would be central to the DPP’s strategy to win the late 2007 legislative election and the 2008 presidential election. Chen thus restored some confidence in his ability to lead. Yet the elections will produce other leaders and the president’s lame duck status will again become evident. Also, as the end of Chen’s term comes closer, this question will gain salience: Will a new DPP president pardon Chen or will he flee the country before a KMT president is sworn in?
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W
hat to Expect from the
17th Party Congress WANG Zhengxu
The Congress scheduled for the second half of 2007 is the 17th since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. In the Party’s 85-year history, it is in the last two decades that the Party Congress has gradually been institutionalised and followed increasingly predictable patterns. In the Party’s early years, its first six Congresses were held in the space of seven years, from 1921 to 1928. The Congress did not meet again until 18 years later, in 1945 after the Party had survived the Long March and re-settled in Yan’an. The Eighth Congress met in 1956, 11 years after the Seventh. The Ninth did not meet until 13 years later in 1969, which was followed only four years later by the 10th Congress in 1973. The arrest of the Gang of Four and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 made another Party Congress inevitable, which met in 1977. It is under Deng Xiaoping that the Party Congress began to stabilise. Since the 12th of 1982, Party Congresses have met every five years, and starting from the 14th of 1992, the Congress gradually assumed two most important roles: successions and consensus building. Now at every Party Congress there is either succession or adjustments to the top Party leadership, and an emphatic effort by the Party to achieve ideological unity. At the 17th Party Congress, this pattern will be institutionalised even further.
Harmonious Society: The Party’s New Focus One major function of the Party Congress is for the Party leadership to set the ideological platform of the Party. The work report read at the opening session of each Congress normally bears the most significance
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in expressing the Party’s ideological thinking and policy orientations. This report always gives a comprehensive reexamination of the Party’s work record in the past five years, while at the same time setting the goals and directions for the Party for the coming years. One or a few central concepts are emphasised in official documents throughout the Congress, and will dominate Party discourse in the years to come. By informing party members of the most important goals and policy directions of the Party the leadership hopes to achieve ideological unity within the Party. Past Congresses have articulated all of the Party’s major ideological formulations. For example, the 12th of 1982 officially embarked on economic reform, the 13th of 1987 recognised China as at the “preliminary stage” of socialism, and the 14th of 1992 called for transition into “socialist market economy”. The 15th Congress of 1997 called for the whole nation to strive toward a “comprehensive well-off society” by the end of the century, while at the 16th of 2002, the “three-represents” theory was officially hailed. This year’s 17th Party Congress, for sure, is going to see the comprehensive articulation of Hu Jintao’s policy thinking. Since he took over as the Party Secretary General in late 2002, Hu Jintao has been promoting two doctrines: “scientific development” and “harmonious society”. “Scientific development” calls for China’s shift towards a more balanced and more sustainable mode of development, such as reducing economic inequality among the population and achieving environmentfriendly economic development. On various occasions, Hu characterised the “scientific development” concept as the “newest advancement” in the “Marxist theory of development”. The “harmonious society” is a broader concept reflecting Hu Jintao’s understanding of the present challenges China faces. On top of a “scientific” way (that is, more balanced and more sustainable) of development, China needs to introduce more social and political elements in order to build a harmonious society. These include social justice, democratic and efficient governance, rule of law as well as cultural, educational and moral developments. In the last two and a half decades, the Party’s mission had centred on economic development. With the “harmonious society” concept, Hu is telling the people that the Party can and will deliver more than just economic development.
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WHAT
TO
EXPECT
FROM
THE
17TH PARTY CONGRESS
79
This does not mean the Party is ready to put up its political power for electoral competition and judicial checking, but rather the Party is hoping to make the government more responsive, more accountable and more open. In any case, Hu hopes to use the concept of “harmonious society” and “scientific development” to rally the whole Party, and to continue to win public allegiance to the Party. Hence, in the upcoming Party Congress, Hu’s work report will very likely be structured around these two concepts. “Harmonious society”, in particular, will be the main catchword of the work report.
Personnel: Mid-Term Adjustments Succession for the top leadership now takes place every ten years at the Party Congress. That is, each cohort of central leadership will serve two terms or two Party Congresses. By the end of the first term, however, some adjustments to the leadership team may be made. Within this framework, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin at the 16th Congress of 2002, and will serve until the 18th Congress of 2012. The 17th Congress will amount to a mid-term adjustment under Hu’s leadership. Mid-term adjustments include a re-composition of the Central Committee, retiring those older than 63 and replacing them with younger ones. Because the Central Committee members are also serving as provincial party secretaries, governors and cabinet ministers, recomposing the Central Committee also means reshuffling cadres of those positions. What is most significant at the Congress is what will be the new makeup of the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. No age limit on Politburo membership has been explicitly set, and exceptions may be made in some rare cases, but those of 68 or older will very likely give way. Because of this, the retirement of up to five from the current nine members from the Politburo Standing Committee, and another three to four from the Politburo can be expected. In the Politburo Standing Committee, Luo Gan (aged 72), Huang Ju (69), Wu Guanzheng (69), are above the 68-limit, while Zeng Qinghong (68) and Jia Qinglin (67) are on the borderline. All these people are likely to retire, with probably the only exception of Zeng Qinghong. Based on the 68-year limit, Zeng may be obliged to go, especially if the younger Jia
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Qinglin is already set to. But because this age rule has not been explicitly set, given that Zeng has played a rather important role in Hu’s governing team, and his rather clean record in terms of corruption, it is likely he will stay. Among the Politburo members, Wu Yi (70), Cao Gangchuan (73), Zhang Lichang (69) and Zeng Peiyan (70) will retire. Related is who will fill the seats. They will mostly be young (born around or after 1950, for example), highly educated and with a proven work record. Among these newly admitted to the Politburo and its Standing Committee, a few of them will emerge as the successors to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao five years down the road in 2012. At the moment, it looks like Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang (born 1955), Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao (1950) and Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai (1949) are the forerunners. Exactly who will take which seat, however, will be difficult to know until the Congress concludes.
Political Reform: Beyond the Congress In the last few years, within and without the Party, the call for major political reforms is increasing. But one should not expect political reform to be a dominant theme at the upcoming 17th Party Congress, even less of concrete measures of political reform to be adopted. Because each Party Congress is occupied with building ideological unity and personnel changes, it normally does not deliver concrete policy plans. At best, some general policy directions may be stated at the Congress, but operational arrangements will only take shape at the Plenums of the Central Committee that will follow in the years after the Congress closes. The work report at the Congress will very likely repeat the Party’s commitment to continuing political reform towards democracy and rule of law, but will avoid giving out concrete action plans regarding how to achieve those goals. In the five years after this Congress and before the next one, however, some political reforms may take place, such as expanding grassroots elections to the upper levels, building a more accountable and transparent government and enhancing judicial independence. That is to say, for political reform, what can be expected from this Congress is, alas, not much.
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P ART II GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
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C
hina’s Major Economic Challenge: Sustaining High Growth Whilst Fixing Its Growth Problems John WONG
The Chinese economy had indeed displayed spectacular performance for the whole period of 1979–2005, growing at an average annual rate of 9.6 percent. In 2006, it further chalked up a 10.7 percent growth. As shown in Figure 1, the growth process fluctuated a lot in the 1980s, a result of the so-called “reform cycles”. Since 1990, the growth process has experienced two spurts of high growth: one sparked off by Deng Xiaoping’s Nanxun (tour of South China) in early 1992 and the other by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. The Nanxun signals China’s march into the market economy while the WTO membership marks the rapid integration of China into the global economy. Both the Nanxun effect and the WTO effect combined to fuel China’s continuing high economic growth for the past 15 years through a sustained rise in domestic investment and exports. The second spurt caused by the WTO effect was by far the most significant, not just because it chalked up an average rate of 10 percent growth for five years (2001– 2006), but also because it occurred at the tail-end of China’s long period of high growth when China’s economic base had grown quite large. China’s economy in 2006 was 70 percent bigger than what it was in 2001. This is a clear example of the dynamics of “speed compounded by scale”. When Deng introduced economic reform and the open-door policy at the historic Third Party Plenum in December 1978, China’s total GDP was only 365 billion yuan. By 2006, total GDP increased to 21 trillion yuan or 50 times more. In 1978, China’s nominal GDP per capita was only 381 yuan. In 2006, it increased 37 folds to 15,500 yuan. In 1978, the Chinese
83
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84
16%
30% 15.2%
14%
14.2%
14.0%
13.5%
12%
11.7%
11.6% 10.9%
11.3% 18.8%
10% 9.1%
8% 7.6%
25%
24.1% 13.1%
GDP
20%
10.9%
18.0%
10.7% 10.2% 10.0% 10.1%
17.1% 10.0% 9.2%
8.8%
9.3%
14.7%
15%
9.1% 8.4% 8.3%
7.8%
7.8%
7.6%
10%
9.3%
6%
8.3% 6.5%
6.0% 5.2%
7.3%
6.4%
4%
4.1% 2.4%
2.0% 0.7%
2%
1.9% 1.5%
2.8%
5% 3.9%
3.8% 3.4% 3.1%
2.8%
CPI -0.8%
1.8% 1.5%
1.2%
0.4% 0.7%
0%
-0.8%
-1.4%
5/17/2007 10:22:40 AM
Source: China Statistics Year Book, 2006.
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
-5% 1978
0%
I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
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Figure 1. China’s Economic Growth and Inflation, 1978–2006
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85
economy was insignificant in the global context, as China’s total GDP was estimated to be just about 0.5 percent of the world’s total. By 2006, China’s share of the world’s GDP in nominal terms had increased to about 6 percent. Converted into US dollar at current exchange rate, China’s total GDP in 2006 reached US$2.8 trillion to become the world’s fourth largest economy after the USA, Japan and Germany even though its percapita GNP, at US$1,900, was still close to the world’s bottom hundred. Nonetheless, China’s economy today belongs to what the World Bank used to categorise as one of the lower middle-income economies. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP (i.e. pricing Chinese output at international or US levels), China has already been the world’s second largest economy after the US for many years. In late 2006, China’s official TV channels featured a popular documentary entitled “The Rise of Great Powers”. Following this, many Chinese officials and intellectuals have started to perceive their country as a rising power (da guo). However, politically, militarily and technologically, China is far from being a great power. Socially, China’s backwardness is just too obvious. Only in the economic area can China claim its place on the international stage. Still, China is a rising economic power (jingji daguo) only as an aggregate economic entity, certainly not in per-capita terms.
Significant International Impact Since the start of economic reform some 27 years ago, the Chinese economy has also been radically transformed from a closed system based on Mao’s tenet of “self reliance” to one that is actively participating in the global economic system in terms of trade and foreign investment. China’s exports have indeed been growing very rapidly, averaging at 16 percent a year since 1978 and over 20 percent since 2001, rising from US$9.8 billion in 1978 to US$970 billion in 2006, or 100 times more. By 2006, China had become the world’s third largest exporting country after Germany and the US. China’s share of the world’s export markets in 2006 reached 7 percent, compared to the tiny 0.6 percent in 1979. For foreign direct investment (FDI), China has since the late 1990s become one of the world’s most favoured destinations. By the end of 2006,
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China had attracted a total of US$685 billion in FDI. It may be noted that China has continued to promote FDI primarily as a vehicle for technology transfer and the development of export markets. Not surprisingly, over 80 percent of the world’s Fortune 500 largest corporations and its top 100 information technology firms have set up businesses in China. Indeed, the massive influx of foreign capital into China has continued unabated despite the fact that China has already become a capital-surplus economy on account of its persistent “twin surpluses” in both capital and current accounts. The problem of capital surplus got more serious in 2006 because of China’s record trade surplus of US$177 billion and the rapid accumulation of its foreign reserves to the record level of US$1 trillion (the world’s highest). Hence, the Renminbi or the yuan has since 21 July 2005 been gradually revalued. China is expected to continue chalking up a sizeable trade surplus because of the very nature of China’s exports. As the world’s manufacturing hub for processing activities, China needs to import before it exports, and its exports must produce a surplus (as the value-added of the processing activities) for China. Accordingly, China is confronted with the acute problem of how to profitably and smoothly recycle its bulging foreign reserves back to the international financial system. The Chinese government recently declared that it would set up a specialised agency, modelled after Singapore Temasek Holdings or the Singapore Government Investment Corporation (GIC), to invest part of its hefty foreign reserves. As China’s economy continues to grow and expand rapidly, it will inevitably produce a strong external impact, at first, regionally, but now globally. A few years back, China was mostly referred to as a rising regional economic power as its growth had significantly impacted only its neighbouring economies in East Asia, which traded with China and invested in China greatly. By 2006, China’s economic growth had, beyond any doubt, far-reaching global implications. By its sheer size, China’s levels of production, consumption, imports and exports carry significant worldwide ramifications. On account of its massive industrialisation, China has become the world’s top consumer of a wide variety of natural resources and primary commodities from iron-ores and aluminum to oil and gas. China’s rising demand for these products in recent years has driven up their world prices. In fact, China has been responsible for about 50 percent
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87
of the cumulative growth of these economically sensitive commodities. At the same time, China’s large-scale fabrication of a wide range of industrial products has also brought down their world prices. For boom or for bust, therefore, the movement of China’s economy has become a significant force in the global economy. A few years ago, the economic rise of China helped Japan out of its prolonged recession. More recently, it has been argued that the current global economic boom is basically the combined effects of US consumption and Chinese production! China’s external economic impact is best manifested in its unique pattern of trade balances with its major trade partners. Figure 2 shows how China in recent years has continued to run substantial trade deficits with its neigbhouring economies, from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the ASEAN-5 to Australia and India, and how China turned around by incurring a large trade surplus with the US and the EU. In this way, China could still end up with an overall trade surplus. But China’s trade deficits with its East Asian neighbours also mean that China has opened up its vast domestic market for their exports (both manufactured products and primary commodities), thereby operating as an engine for their economic growth. The underlying economic implications of China’s overall trade pattern and its trade balances are actually more profound. Because most of China’s exports are processed products (55 percent of total exports in 2005) or final products generally with low domestic value-added and low domestic contents (domestic value-added usually no more than 40 percent and only 20 percent or even lower for most products), China must import in order to export. Since over half of China’s exports are handled by foreign invested enterprises (58 percent on average in 2005, with much higher proportions for some high-tech products), particularly those from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, China’s foreign trade is a highly internationalised economic act incorporating foreign trade activities of many other countries. Viewed from a different angle, China operates as a critical link in the East Asian supply chains, spawning numerous regional and global production networks. It can further be argued that, as shown in Figure 3, China has in fact become an important “integrator” of global and regional production networks, partly due to China’s special trade patterns as shown earlier, and partly because China is home to numerous regional and global
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88
Figure 2. China’s Trade Balance with Selected Countries (In US$ Billions)
�
Australia Thailand
I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
Indonesia Philippine Malaysia Taiwan Korea Japan Singapore HK USA Europe ���
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Trade Balance 2006
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Trade Balance 2005
5/16/2007 2:36:20 PM
Source: China’s Customs Statistics, 2005–2006.
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Figure 3. China at the Centre of Global Production Networks
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90
I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
production networks. Thus, China’s exports embody raw materials, parts and components, technology and equipment, and financial and economic services from different Asian economies. China’s major manufacturing hubs in the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta operate as big economic “concrete mixers”, converting “Made-in-Asia” into “Made-inChina” products for the world market. Most international supply chains, be they Asian or global, have been operating efficiently and smoothly in China’s various industrial hubs along its coast, thanks to their efficient and low-cost infrastructure and transport networks. In this way, China’s exports also generated multiplier effects in other economies, often more than in China itself. Accordingly, China’s own economic growth is at the same time a source of economic growth of other economies. By doing this, China is also a catalyst for regional and global economic integration.
Is High Growth Sustainable? China’s highly creditable economic performance after its successful economic reform has inevitably given rise to one critical question. Is such dynamic economic growth sustainable? To begin with, China’s past high growth, though very impressive, is actually not so exceptional or really unprecedented if viewed in the historical context of the dynamic East Asia region, which comprises many high-performance economies like Japan, the four “NIEs” (newly industrialised economies) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the four ASEAN economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Historically speaking, the East Asian growth process is marked by three waves of high growth. Japan was the first non-Western country to become industrialised. Its high growth dated back to the early 1950s amidst its rapid post-war recovery and to the 1960s and much of the 1970s. Japan’s economic growth engine was initially based on the export of labour-intensive manufactured products. It was soon forced by rising wages and increasing costs to shed its comparative advantage for labourintensive manufacturing in favour of the four NIEs, which started their industrial take-off in the 1960s. These four NIEs, once dubbed “Asia’s
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Four Little Dragons”, were arguably the most dynamic economies in Asia, as they had sustained near double-digit rates of growth for three decades, from the early 1960s to the 1980s and even the 1990s. The rise of the NIEs constituted the second wave of the region’s growth and integration. By the early 1980s, high costs and high wages had also caught up with these four NIEs, which had to restructure their economies towards more capital-intensive and higher value-added activities by passing their comparative advantage in labour-intensive products to the late-comers of China and the four ASEAN economies (dubbed “Asia’s Tiger Economies”), thereby spreading economic growth to the latter. In this way, China and some ASEAN economies were able to chalk up high growth rates through the 1980s and the 1990s. Many Japanese scholars like to depict this pattern of development in Asia as the “Flying Geese” model, which is still a highly intuitive way of explaining the splendid economic success of East Asia. (See Table 1). By putting China’s economy in the East Asian context one can thus easily yield a compelling empirical argument to support China’s long-term growth prospects. Clearly, China has been one of the “geese” in the rapid EA flight formation, and all the “geese” have taken turns to experience their dynamic economic growth, one after another. In simple parlance, it should run like this: If it is possible for the Japanese to achieve successful industrialisation, why not the Koreans? And why not the Chinese — first from Hong Kong, then Taiwan, and now the Mainland? Furthermore, if Japan had historically over 25 years of high economic growth while the four NIEs had well over 30 years, why not China? China’s present run of high growth covers only about 25 years, and it could easily continue for another decade or more. In fact, since China’s economy is a much larger and more diverse economy, it should have much more internal dynamic to sustain higher growth for a longer period. Considering the historical pattern of East Asian economic growth, it is not over-optimistic to say that China has the ability to sustain its high growth potential for quite a while, say, over the next decade.
Fixing Many Growth Problems Whether China can realise its future growth potential still depends much on its ability to overcome a number of important institutional and
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PPP GNP Population estimates of per-capita (Mn) GNP per(US$) capita (US$) 2004
Growth of GDP (%)
2004
Total GDP (US$ bn), 2004
1960–70
1970–80
1980–90
1990–2001 2000–2004
2005
2006
China
1,297
1,290
5,530
1,930
5.2
5.5
10.3
9.7
9.2
10.2
10.7
Japan
128
37,180
30,040
4,623
10.9
4.3
4.1
1.3
1.3
2.7
6.4
South Korea
48
13,980
20,400
680
8.6
10.1
8.9
5.7
4.7
4
5.2
Taiwan
23
14,033
n.a.
321
9.2
9.7
7.9
5.7
3.3
4.1
4.3
Hong Kong
7
26,810
31,510
163
10
9.3
6.9
3.8
3.2
7.3
6.4
Singapore
4
24,220
26,590
107
8.8
8.3
6.7
7.4
2.8
6.4
6.9
Indonesia
218
1,140
3,460
258
3.9
7.2
6.1
3.8
4.6
5.6
5.2
Malaysia
25
4,650
9,630
118
6.5
7.9
5.3
6.5
4.3
5.3
5.5
Philippines
83
1,170
4,890
86
5.1
6
1
3.3
4.2
5.1
5
Thailand
62
2,540
8,020
163
8.4
7.1
7.6
3.8
5.3
4.5
4.5
1080
620
3,100
692
3.4
3.6
5.8
5.5
5.9
8.5
8.8
NIEs
ASEAN-4
India 5/8/2007 10:39:50 AM
Source: EIU Database.
I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T
2004
92
Table 1. East Asia Economic Performance Indicators
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structural constraints. These include continuing efforts to complete the unfinished business of political, social and economic reforms and efforts to address the resource constraint and the environment. With over two decades of near double-digit rates of unbridled growth, China’s economy has inevitably created a lot of structural strains and accumulated a great deal of socio-economic side-effects, which are crying out for attention. Chinese top policy makers in 2006 and again at the 2007 National People’s Congress had pledged their determination to step up structural adjustment by re-balancing the economy and re-orienting development policies towards more socially desirable goals. Thanks to its continuing high economics, China now has the capacity and the resources to deal with the many negative consequences of economic growth if it also has the required political will and social consensus. It may be noted that the many problems created by fast growth from income inequalities to rural-urban disparities are not new but are actually familiar to development economists. It may be helpful to take a leaf from a standard economic development textbook to put them in proper perspective. To begin with, as pointed out by Nobel Laureate W. Arthur Lewis, all development processes are inherently inegalitarian as development cannot take place in all economic sectors and embrace all peoples and all classes at the same time. Hence, regional disparities and income inequalities are inevitable, particularly in the initial phase of development. Such is also the underlying wisdom of Deng Xiaoping when he embarked on China’s economic reform with the pragmatic policy of allowing some people to “get rich first”. Specifically on the issue of income inequality, Simon Kuznets, another Nobel Laureate, has argued that the relation between income distribution and development typically follows an inverted U-shaped curve: income distribution can be equal before development but gets unequal as development proceeds. Eventually, income distribution will become more equal again after further development. Such is the celebrated notion of the “trickle-down” process. Furthermore, most developing countries have experienced, in varying degrees, urban-biased patterns of development, simply because
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industrialisation itself is basically a process of transferring rural surplus to the urban areas for industrial development. In most cases, even in the success stories of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, their peasants used to carry a heavy burden in the initial phase of industrialisation, e.g. the extremely regressive land tax at the time of the Meiji Restoration. In the Chinese case, regional disparities are serious but inevitable, given the historical circumstances of China’s economic reform and development. The government has implemented several “regional development policies”, e.g. the “Western Development”, to address the problem, efforts which will take years to produce concrete results. Further development will certainly reduce regional disparities. However, the many negative social by-products of development still need immediate attention from policy makers. It seems strange that Chinese leaders, from the centre to the localities, are all committed to the relentless pursuit of GNP growth, with no automatic built-in measures for effective “redistribution” in the process. It has been argued that rapid economic development in China took place at the same time as economic reform (system transformation). In its earnest to introduce the market system, the Chinese government had not put in place an effective institutional framework to regulate or guide the operation of the market. Without such safeguards, the market tends to work for efficiency at the expense of equity. Accordingly, Chinese economic development has not been accompanied by an effective “trickle-down” process; in some cases, development benefits have actually been “trickled up”, as evidenced by the worsening pattern of income distribution. Whatever their causes, such glaring inequalities are getting increasingly unacceptable, both politically and socially. Above all, most Chinese peasants remain very poor in the wake of successful industrialisation. The rural-urban income gaps have been widening instead of narrowing. Worse still, bad politics has reinforced bad economics. Sad to say, many socio-economic problems in China are often aggravated by poor governance and widespread corruption of local officials. The case in point is the frequent compulsory appropriation of peasants’ land for development without adequate compensation. The rural problem, if left unresolved, can be a real time-bomb for Beijing.
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Not Just High Growth, But Better Growth and Its Sustainability Suffice it to say that the sustainability of China’s future high growth much depends on how the Chinese government tackles the aforementioned socio-economic problems. On environmental protection, the physical constraints on growth related to the environment and resource utilisation have also been put on the high agenda. China’s environmental degradation from water to air pollution has indeed become very serious. But most by-products of industrial development are not created by design — hence the economist uses the term “negative externalities”. China’s environmental problems are largely the result of its mammoth scale of industrialisation at a very high speed, though the government’s indiscriminately pro-growth policies together with its weak regulatory regime have also been significant contributing factors. Most developing countries, particularly those in East Asia, have followed the time-honoured policy of “develop first, clean up later”. But in China, the big Song Hua River contamination accident in 2005 plus 159 serious accidents of environmental pollution in 2006 should be a signal that the time has come for the Chinese government to act urgently on its environmental problems. It may be argued that China’s long-term challenges are not food, not even energy, but the environment, including the question of water. Thanks to technological progress, Chinese agriculture basically has the capability to feed the nation, leaving only a small deficit to be met by international trade. For energy, China still enjoys a relatively low degree of external dependency (e.g. oil imports currently constitute only 48 percent of total demand), much less than other Asian countries. However, the environment is a different matter, recently much heightened by the world-wide concern over global warming. The Kyoto Protocol came into effect in 2005, which required 38 industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions from 2008. China was not on its list. On its own, however, China announced its willingness to do so on account of the rapid deterioration of its own environment. Back in 2004, China attempted formulating a crude “Green GDP” index, which showed the cost of pollution to be about 3 percent of the GDP. Really that serious!
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In 2006, the first year of China’s 11th Five-Year Programme, the government set some environmental improvement targets: For instance, to reduce COD (chemical oxygen demand) in water and SO2 (sulphur dioxide) emissions each by 2 percent a year or 10 percent by 2010. But the SO2 emissions in 2006 actually went up 1.89 percent and COD, 1.2 percent! China’s utilisation is notoriously inefficient. Recent figures show that China accounted for 15 percent of global energy consumption but generated only 5.5 percent of global GDP. It may be argued that it is exceedingly difficult for an overheated economy growing at 10 percent to reduce pollution or reduce energy consumption. But the long-term challenge is there. With a rapidly ageing population and a rapidly deteriorating environment, China has no other option but to maximise economic growth in order to generate the needed resources to fight pollution. In the past, China went for an all-out growth or growth at all costs. But this is no longer viable. Future growth has to trade off some quantity for quality, i.e. growing and cleaning up at the same time. And that will give rise to long-term sustainable economic growth. Suffice it to say that the Hu-Wen leadership has come to realise that China’s past development patterns are physically unsustainable, and politically and socially unacceptable. They have embraced the need to change. The new development paradigm is embodied in the 11th FiveYear Programme. However, implementation is far from easy, and there is still a great deal of uncertainty.
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C
hina’s Twin Surpluses YU Yongding
International balance of payments consists of three entries: current account, capital account and changes in foreign exchange reserves. Current account in turn consists of three entries: trade account, investment income and unilateral transfers. Capital account comprises Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), portfolio investment and bank claims, and liabilities. Under capital mobility and a free floating exchange rate regime, the sum of current account and capital account should be zero. As a result, there will not be any change in foreign exchange reserves. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, imbalances between capital account and current account will end up with changes in foreign exchange reserves. China is the only country in history which has run the twin surpluses for 15 years (except 1993) since 1990 (Figure 1) and probably will continue to do so in the next decade. China already surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest foreign exchange reserve holding country in 2006. Figure 1. China’s Twin Surpluses ������
In US$ Millions
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97
2_17 China Twin Surpluses.indd 97
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Causes of Twin Surpluses The underdevelopment of China’s financial market is one of the most important contributing factors to China’s persistent twin surpluses. In general, China’s financial sector is primarily bank-based, which is heavily dominated by the four state banks. China’s banking system tends to discriminate against local small and medium enterprises (SMEs). China’s bond markets are not well developed. Until the early 2000s, China’s bonds/GDP ratio was less than 30 percent. The share of corporate bonds in total bonds was less than 5 percent. China’s stock markets are still suffering from many structural problems. In short, it is very difficult to channel financial resources from surplus sectors to deficit sectors or from surplus units to deficit units among the same sector. Policy-led market distortion is also an important contributing factor to China’s twin surpluses. China’s preferential policy towards FDI has played a very important and positive role in attracting FDI. However, preferential policies also distort market signals. The artificially low land, energy and infrastructural construction prices, favourable tax treatment result in the wrong FDI both in terms of quality and quantity. China’s trade surplus is a result of the Chinese government’s export promotion policy (weak currency, export subsidies and tax rebates). The Chinese government was very aware of the possibility of FDI-related current account deficits leading to an international balance payments crisis. Therefore, the government required each foreign funded enterprise (FFE) to balance its own foreign exchange needs. As a result of the selfbalancing requirement, FDI-related imports were minimised, while the exports were maximised. Processing trade is a favourable form of trade for the Chinese government because it guarantees that trade deficits and hence the loss of foreign exchange reserves will not happen. The Chinese government has encouraged the development of this type of trade for decades. Owing to the domination of processing trade, the import content of China’s exports was more than 57 percent in 2005. Multinationals were responsible for more than 60 percent of China’s exports in 2005. In this sense, trade surplus has become structural.
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Capital controls have also made important impact on the twin surpluses. Because of the lack of a clearly defined ownership structure, the Chinese government is afraid of losing control over state-owned assets once they are no longer under government’s jurisdiction. As a result, China’s overseas direct investment was very restrictive. The economic and administrative cost to overseas direct investment is very high. In many circumstances, overseas investment has been prohibited outright.
Why Are China’s Twin Surpluses Unsustainable China’s twin surpluses have created great revaluation pressures on the RMB. The continuation of twin surpluses consolidates RMB’s appreciation expectations in the foreign exchange market. The appreciation expectations in turn cause more speculative capital inflows. A vicious circle has thus been established. To avoid a revaluation of the RMB, the Central Bank has to sterilise the increase in liquidity caused by foreign capital influx. In general, sterilisation can be achieved by the following policy measures: open market operations (sell Treasury bills and other instruments to the public through the central bank);encourage private investment overseas; allow foreigners to borrow from the local market; implement wider-band exchange rate policies; permit forward exchange market intervention; shift government deposits; allow foreign exchange swaps, and launch capital control measures. In recent years, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) already exhausted its major assets-government bonds in the process of sterilisation. Now the instrument for sterilisation is central bank bills. In just over three years, the volume of central banks bills sold by the PBOC is almost equivalent to the volume of government bonds issued over the past ten years. The rolling over burden has become increasingly heavy. Losses caused by sterilisation operations are difficult to measure and probably much more serious than what most people have realised. According to a study, enterprises that are foreign exchange rich and have sold the lion’s share of foreign exchanges to the central bank are export-oriented joint ventures. On the other hand, enterprises that rely on banks are mostly stateowned enterprises in energy and raw materials sectors. Consequently,
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sterilisation worsened the financial conditions of large-sized state-owned enterprises in energy and raw materials sectors. The rapid increase in the share of central bank bills in commercial banks’ assets has lowered commercial banks efficiency and profitability, creating dire consequences to commercial banks performance. In short, it is wrong to assume that the Central bank can resort to sterilisation in whatever manner and length of time it prefers. The increase in current account surplus (trade surplus) will worsen trade frictions. China’s exports are already targeted by the United States, European Union and many developing countries, including Mexico and Brazil. The damage on China’s economic growth made by protectionism will be very grave indeed. The devaluation of the US dollar is necessary for the correction of global imbalances. The US dollar has begun its so called strategic devaluation since 2002. Although in 2005 the US dollar had rebounded against the Japanese Yen and the Euro, the US twin deficits have been worsening continuously. Therefore, economic fundamentals are still pointing to the direction of further devaluation by the US dollar. Furthermore, the Fed is likely to stop raising the Federal Funds rate under the new chairman, Ben Bernanke. Recently, the Bank of Japan declared the end of the “quantitative easing” policy. As a result, the interest rates in Japan are likely to rise in the future. All these factors will add more weight to push down the dollar. With US$1 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, potential losses for China’s foreign exchange reserves, due to the devaluation of US dollar, are enormous. Following the increase in FDI stock, the investment income by FFEs will increase steadily. Currently, China’s accumulated FDI has surpassed US$600 billion. However, nobody knows what the exact figure of FDI stock is. Assuming that by the end of 2003, China’s FDI stock was US$300 billion, average profitability for FDI was 10 percent and foreign investors remitted all the investment income back home, the outflows of investment via current account would be US$30 billion. To balance the current account alone, China must run US$30 billion trade surplus. The increase in trade surplus that has to be used to pay foreign investors’ investment incomes will become a heavy drag on China’s national income (Gross National Product).
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Policy Remedies for China To reduce current account surplus, the saving-investment gap should be reduced by increasing the investment. As China’s current investment rate is already too high, the focus should be on increasing consumption. In order to do so, the government expenditures on public goods must be increased. The major areas of expenditure increase should be on social security, healthcare and education. The government’s recent decision to increase funds to support rural development will “kill two birds with one stone”. Furthermore, government investment in infrastructure, such as railways, expressways, airports and harbours, and government-supported R & D should also be increased. Preferential policies towards FDI should be abolished so that domestic and foreign companies are given equal treatment in terms of credit access, tax treatment and environmental requirement. Export promotion policy should also be abolished gradually for all enterprises, regardless of their products’ destinations; they should have equal rights and responsibilities. Imports, which are more competitive than their domestic counterparts, will increase. Financial reforms should be speeded up. SMEs should not be discriminated against. Corporate bond markets should be developed and stock markets made more effective and less speculative. The reform will allow domestic savings to be channelled effectively to enterprises so that they will have less incentive to attract FDI for the purpose of credit substitution. FFEs should be allowed to tap China’s domestic capital market, so that there will be less need for new cross-border FDI. Chinese enterprises should be encouraged to invest abroad both in the form of Greenfield investment and Mergers and Acquisitions. However, the outflows should be strictly monitored by the government. Capital account liberalisation should be carried out gradually and orderly. However, the completion of financial reforms and the revitalisation of China’s financial institutions and banks must be followed by the final liberalisation of the RMB, i.e. the RMB must be made convertible. RMB exchange rates continue to appreciate gradually. Compared with large scale government purchases, this is a more efficient way to increase imports.
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The twin surpluses are a result of long-term imbalances in the past 25 years. The pattern of twin surpluses cannot be changed overnight. The problem cannot be solved in a rush. However, with the Chinese government’s heavier reliance on domestic demand, China will solve the problem of twin surpluses and establish a more rational international balance of payments pattern.
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E
xplaining High Productivity Growth WU Yanrui
The Chinese economy has been growing at an average rate of 9.8 percent per annum since 1978 when the economic reform programme was initiated. This spectacular growth is likened to the economic miracle of the four East Asian Tigers in the 1960s and 1970s. Has productivity growth played an important role in China’s high sustained growth over the past 29 years? The answer would probably be no if one were to ask Paul Krugman (1994) and his supporters such as Alywn Young (1994), Jong-Il Kim and Lawrence Lau (1994) who argued that East Asian economic growth has been driven mainly by the expansion of factor inputs with little technological progress and is hence not sustainable in the long run. Krugman is however terribly wrong about the economic growth of East Asia which, though interrupted by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has outperformed other regions and is still to date the engine of world economic growth. Whether productivity growth has played a role in China’s recent growth can be investigated by examining the source of growth. Economists conventionally attribute the rate of GDP growth to the combined growth in labour and capital inputs in a nation. The difference between these two growth rates is known as the “residual”, defined as a measure of the rate of technological progress or total factor productivity (TFP) growth. While growth in labour and capital is limited and diminishes over time, technological progress can be long-lasting and even unlimited. Thus, the rate of technological progress determines whether economic growth in a nation is sustainable or not in the long run. Though a more precise estimate is difficult to be derived, the existing studies and the author’s own research have shown that productivity growth has indeed played an important role in China’s economic growth in the last decades, accounting
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for an average of about one-third to a half of China’s growth (Table 1). This is a good indication of sustainable growth in the long run. Table 1. Sources of Economic Growth in China Estimates by Total
Time Period
Growth Contributions (%) (%) Capital Labour TFP Total
Maddison (1998)
1978–1995
7.5
49
21
30
100
Chow and Li (2002)
1978–1998
9.3
55
13
32
100
Wu (2006)
1980–2004
9.5
52
11
37
100
Hu and Khan (1997)
1979–1994
9.3
46
13
41
100
Swamy (2003)
1980–1997
10.0
39
16
45
100
World Bank (1997)
1978–1995
9.4
37
17
46
100
Bosworth and Collins (2003)
1980–1990
9.2
23
31
46
100
Bosworth and Collins (2003)
1990–2000
10.1
32
18
50
100
Note: Statistics in this table are according to the author’s own compilation from the studies cited. Modifications where applicable were made so that the statistics become compatible.
Factors Affecting Productivity Growth Productivity growth can appear in two forms, i.e. efficiency improvement and technological advancement. The former represents gains in output by utilising existing resources more efficiently through institutional changes, improvement in resource allocation, microeconomic management, infrastructure and so on. In the last 29 years, especially at the early stage of economic reforms, China’s productivity growth largely resulted from efficiency improvement associated with economic reforms which brought about reallocation of resources among sectors such as labour movement from the farming sector to the more productive manufacturing sector and diversion of capital from loss-making state-owned enterprises to the private sector. The contribution of this type of productivity gains alone amounted to one to three percentage points of China’s economic growth (World Bank, 1997).
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The contribution of such efficiency improvement can however be a one-off gain or a level effect. As a result, the second component of productivity growth, i.e. technological advancement, becomes more important. This component can have a long-lasting effect or a growth effect. In China, as economic reform deepens, the potential in efficiency improvement is gradually being exhausted or marginalised. Technological advancement is thus vital to long-term economic growth. Existing studies have shown that, in the 1990s, technological advancement was already the main driving force behind productivity growth (Wu, 2007; Zheng and Hu, 2007). Technological advancement has become possible because of China’s embracement of foreign capital and technology as well as China’s increasing investment in education and Research and Development (R&D) in the last 29 years, particularly during the last decade. The impact of investing in education is reflected in the number of students enrolled in various institutions, for instance. In 1978, about 870,000 students including 11,000 postgraduates were enrolled in Chinese tertiary institutions. In 2005, the number of tertiary students reached 15.6 million including 978,610 postgraduate students. In addition, nearly a million students went overseas to pursue their postgraduate studies. Furthermore, the total number of patent applications granted in China jumped from merely 138 in 1985 to 22,588 in 1990 and 214,007 in 2005. The total value of transaction in the technologies market also grew from about 10 billion yuan in 1991 to 65 billion yuan in 2000 and 155 billion yuan in 2005.
Productivity Growth at the Industry Level In addition to productivity studies at the aggregate level, many investigations are also concerned with productivity performance at the industry level, e.g. agriculture, state-owned enterprises and foreigninvested firms. The advantage of an industry level study is its coverage of the role of industry-specific factors in productivity change and hence its relevance to sector-oriented policy formation. In terms of labour productivity, there is considerable variation among the three major sectors, i.e. agriculture, manufacturing and services (Figure 1). Thus, it is sensible to look at the individual sectors.
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I N T E R P R E T I N G C H I N A ’S D E V E L O P M E N T Figure 1. Labour Productivity in Three Sectors
3.5 3
10,000 yuan pc
2.5 2
Agricultural Agriculture Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services
1.5 1 0.5
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0
Note: The unit of labour productivity is 10,000 yuan per head expressed in 1993 constant prices.
Productivity growth and its contributions to China’s agricultural economy have been well documented. The consensus view is that rural reforms such as the introduction of the household responsibility system (HRS) in the late 1970s and early 1980s had boosted productivity growth and thus contributed to agricultural growth. The estimated percentage contributions range from 23 percent to 49 percent. Productivity performance in the industrial sector, especially the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), is however much more controversial. On the one hand, empirical studies show that productivity growth has contributed to the growth of output in industry. On the other hand, some authors presented evidence of occasional falling productivity which hence hinders output growth in the SOEs. In addition, foreign-funded and other non-state owned enterprises are found to be more efficient than the SOEs.
Productivity in China’s Economic Growth In summary, empirical evidence shows that productivity improvement has made substantial contributions to China’s recent economic growth.
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This is good news for the sustainability of China’s growth in the near future. However, in the international perspective, China still has to do a lot more to promote innovation and hence productivity growth so that the country can catch up with the world’s best practice. Table 1 shows that on average productivity growth accounts for about 41 percent of output growth in China while the same figure is 50 percent for Japan, 56 percent for Italy, 57 percent for the UK, 58 percent for Germany and 60 percent for France during the 1960–1989 period. In terms of labour productivity, though considerable progress has been made over the years, there is still a huge gap between China and the world’s best practice. In addition, there is disparity across the sectors. Some sectors are catching up much faster than that in other sectors. The causes for the variation should be investigated and may have important policy implications. Though China’s investment in R&D and education has increased substantially, its share over GDP is well below those in the world’s major economies. For example, most OECD countries spend proportionally twice as much as China does on R&D activities. These countries also invested much more in education than China did. Singapore is a good example. Though the country’s spending on R&D and education as proportions of GDP is much higher (2.1 percent and 3.3 percent) than China’s (1.1 percent and 2.9 percent), Singapore still aims to achieve a higher level of investment on her R&D and education. Overall, China’s human development ranking is far behind that of the world’s major economies. It can be anticipated that the investment in R&D and education in China will continue to grow in the future. This will further boost productivity growth.
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T
he 11th Five-Year Programme Sarah Y. TONG
On 11 October 2005, the 16th Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (CPC) concluded its Fifth Plenary Session where a draft proposal for formulating China’s 11th Five-Year Programme for National Economy and Social Development was approved. Detailed guidelines were prepared and revised in the following months and later approved at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2006. The new guidelines attracted considerable attention. The programme not only provided an important opportunity for the Hu-Wen leadership to outline its vision on the future direction of the country’s economic development, but was an attempt by the leadership to tackle growing economic and social problems following China’s recent rapid economic expansion. Compared to previous five-year plans, the current programme has quite a few distinctive differences. First, to highlight a shift in the function, the plan has been given a new name, from “plan” to “programme” or “guideline”. Second, considerable efforts have been made for the new guidelines to be formed through a more consultative process. The most important change, however, is the shift from a previously strong growth emphasis to a more balanced and sustainable development emphasis or the “scientific approach to development”. The question remains as to whether, and to what extent, the new programme will have a significant impact on the future dynamics of China’s economic and social development. In fact, economic planning in China has experienced dramatic transformation over the past decades. In the earlier years, a Soviet Stalinist mandatory central planning served as the important apparatus to achieve rapid industrialisation with a strong preference for heavy industry
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and state ownership. Since the late 1970s, with the decrease in state dominance in the economy, compulsory central planning has gradually been phased out. The recent 11th Five-Year Programme is better seen as another step in a continuous effort to move away from direct government intervention towards a more indicative planning for economic and social development. In addition to the shift from direct government intervention, recent economic conditions also prompted the government’s decision to modify its development strategies. While there is little doubt that China’s economic reform since 1978 has been largely a success, with annual growth rates of 9.6 percent in GDP and 8.4 percent in per capita GDP between 1979 and 2005, China’s export-oriented and heavily domestic investment driven growth model has engendered a number of problems that threatened China’s further development. The first pressing concern is the increasing income disparity. For example, urban-rural income gap has widened lately due to the relative stagnation of rural income. The ratio of urban to rural per capita disposable income increased from 2.5 in 1996 to 3.2 in 2005. Per 1 capita GDP ratio between the richest region and the poorest region also increased significantly, from seven times in 1990 to 10 times in 1995, and further to 13 times in 2000 and 2004. The situation is aggravated by the rapid expansion of cities into rural China where no effective institutional arrangement exists to protect the interests of displaced farmers. As a result, there has been an increase in the number of cases of rural unrest related to land disputes. In addition to potential social and political consequences, growing income disparity also has serious economic ramifications. For example, rising regional disparities and widening urban-rural divide have impeded domestic consumption growth, raising the economy’s dependence on exports and capital spending. While investment expansion has put further strain on energy and other resources, export expansion may also face increasing challenges due to rising protectionism in China’s major export markets. 1
The regions used here refer to provinces, autonomous regions and province level municipalities.
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China’s recent economic growth has been highly energy and resource intensive, a source of distress on its sustainability. This is another grave concern leading to the recent shift in China’s development strategy. The situation seems to have worsened in recent years. Since 2000 energy and electricity consumption has increased significantly faster than GDP. The dramatic increase in energy consumption is partly responsible for the recent explosion in the number of coal mine accidents. Energy shortages have also hindered economic growth in some regions and industries, leading to growing dependency on energy import, which has ramification on energy security and is a potential source of international conflict. Lastly, high energy consumption is also responsible for high pollution in many Chinese cities. Few would have doubted that international trade has played a crucial role in China’s economic growth in recent decades. Between 1979 and 2005, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.6 percent, while average annual growth of export reached more than 17.5 percent. Since 2004, China has overtaken Japan to become the world’s third largest trader, after the United States and Germany. In 2005, China made up 6.1 percent of world import and 7.3 percent of world export. Export expansion constitutes a crucial element in China’s economic growth. In the future, however, it is unlikely that China can sustain trade expansion at such high pace. The rapid expansion of China’s trade and growing trade surplus in recent years have already led to growing anxiety in a number of China’s major trading partners. Since the mid-1990s, an increase in China’s overall trade has been associated with growing trade surplus of more than US$30 billion a year on average between 1997 and 2004. In 2005 and 2006, China’s trade surplus reached US$102 and US$176 billion, respectively. The ratio of China’s trade surplus to overall trade also increased to 7 percent in 2005 and 10 percent in 2006, from a modest level of less than 5 percent between 2000 and 2004. China’s increasing trade surplus has not only fuelled the constant call for China’s exchange rate reform, but also led to China’s trade tensions with its major trading partners, especially the US and EU. The row over China’s export of textile and clothing in 2005 is one recent example.
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The guidelines bring to light the current Hu-Wen government’s initiatives for China’s future, which put more emphasis on balanced and sustainable development. Are the objectives achievable and to what extent? From the guidelines, it seems that the Chinese leaders will continue their reliance on developing a functioning market and on various government apparatus. To a large extent, the guidelines follow the practice of indicative planning where certain goals are projected but not actively pursued. For example, China’s total trade in goods is projected to reach US$2.3 trillion by 2010. The actual figure will eventually depend on situations in the marketplace. In addition, the guidelines have identified specific objectives to be achieved through, at least partly, government efforts such as direct investment. For example, key projects for revitalising equipment manufacturing industry, as well as key transportation infrastructure projects, have been listed. Until now, it is far from clear whether the market combined with direct government intervention approach will be effective in redirecting China’s economy towards a more balanced growth path. For example, the guidelines specified an annual growth target of 7.5 percent a year between 2006 and 2010, compared with an actual average annual growth of 9.6 percent from 1979–2005. By lowering the growth target, the central government intends to focus on various development issues, including income disparity, education, healthcare, housing and pollution. In addition, the government also seeks to move its economy away from an over-reliance on investment and export-led growth. Finally, it is evident that the leadership is determined to address the energy issue with a targeted cut in energy consumption per unit of output by 20 percent between 2005 and 2010. 2 Preliminary estimates for 2006 show only slight changes in China’s growth performance. In 2006, GDP grew by 10.7 percent, which is faster than that of 2005 and much higher than the proposed 7.5 percent. Growth continues to rely on investment and trade expansion. Despite various direct
2
“China National Economy Maintained Stable and Relatively Speedy Development in 2006.” National Bureau of Statistics, 25 January 2007 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/ tjfx/jdfx/t20070125_402382298.htm).
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and indirect government measures to control investment surge, fixedasset investment grew rapidly, by 24 percent. Total trade grew by 23.8 percent, 27.2 percent for export and 20.0 percent for import, respectively. In contrast, domestic consumption grew much more modestly. Total retail increased by 13.7 percent. Moreover, urban-rural income gap continues to widen as per capita rural disposable income grew by 7.4 percent and per capita urban disposable income grew by 10.4 percent. China’s growth performance in 2006 had demonstrated little adjustment as proposed in the guidelines. This largely reflects the central government’s limited influence on economic activities which have been mostly decentralised and market driven. Indeed, the guidelines formulated at the central level may contradict with policies of regional leaders which continue to focus on growth. Much more are needed to alter the emphasis of local governments from growth-centred to more balanced development, including a change in inter-government income transfer and in the appraisal system of government officials. As China attempts to address social and environment-related development issues, maintaining growth will remain a crucial element in China’s economic policy. The challenge is how to effectively utilise resources to alleviate some key social grievances, such as escalating costs in education, healthcare and housing. As a large developing country, China cannot afford to lose the battle.
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C
hina’s Drive to Become a Technological Power QUAN Xiaohong
China’s investment in science and technology (S&T) is steadily increasing. Total Research & Development (R&D) expenditure increased from 34.9 billion yuan in 1995 to 245 billion yuan in 2005, with an annual compound growth rate of about 21.5 percent. Meanwhile, gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP was boosted from 0.6 percent (1995) to 1.34 percent (2005). However, it is still low when compared with developed countries. For instance, the R&D expenditure already accounted for 2.51 percent of GDP in 1995 in the US, and about 3 percent as of overall GDP in Japan in recent years. For many years, the government has dominated R&D investment in China. From 1949 to 1977 all research, development, and engineering activities were controlled and coordinated by two agencies, the State Development Planning Commission and the State Science and Technology Commission. The detailed annual and five-year plans that allocated resources throughout the economy come under the purview of the State Development Planning Commission. Each administrative and productive unit made investment, production, pricing, distribution and other operational decisions according to these guidelines. The State Science and Technology Commission oversaw the funding and administration of science and technology activities in Chinese research institutes, firms and universities. R&D was conducted by state-owned research institutes including those doing basic research such as the giant Chinese Academy of Sciences and the hundreds of industrial and local institutes that conducted more applied R&D. In most cases, the relevant ministries of the central government administratively governed the R&D institutes, controlling
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both funding and personnel, as well as the state-owned enterprises that were to implement and exploit the new technology. China’s system of higher education was organised in the same period to both nurture and disseminate scientific and technological knowledge. By 1965, 55 universities had been established across the country; however their focus was on teaching rather than research. By the early 1980s, when China embarked on market-oriented economic reforms, its S&T system was subject to far-reaching challenges for its lack of efficiency, R&D weaknesses, poor technical skills, and dated focus on defence and other heavy technologies. Policy makers launched a series of ambitious initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s for enhancing the nation’s technological capabilities. The efforts included 1) exploiting the international environment by acquiring foreign technology, attracting foreign investment and sending students abroad for training; 2) reforming the S&T system by promoting university-based research (which was barely existent in the pre-reform era), encouraging closer ties between research and production, and encouraging horizontal, marketmediated ties between research institutes, universities and enterprises, as well as supporting the formation of “new technology enterprises”, and 3) promoting programmatic innovations through a variety of funding schemes and institutional innovations to improve the focus and coherence of R&D and technology diffusion efforts, including most famously the “863” Programme. The “863” Programme is a well funded effort to monitor the world’s high technology frontier, train a new generation of researchers and advance Chinese capabilities in fields such as biotechnology, information technology, energy, new materials, space and lasers. These reforms significantly improved the infrastructure for domestic research in China and reduced the direct control of the central government over decisions made by firms and research units. The development of the S&T system has been accelerated since 1995. The Chinese National Science Conference of 1995 featured a document entitled the “Decision to Accelerate the Development of Science and Technology” that called for “revitalising the country through science and education.” The new agenda that resulted from this and subsequent meetings of the Party Congress and the National People’s Congress included 1) a commitment to allocate more resources to R&D, particularly
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C H I N A ’S D R I V E
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BECOME
A
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in enterprises rather than government institutes; 2) greater attention to quality and performance (especially productivity) in resource allocation decisions, and 3) increased international cooperation in S&T, including recognition of the overseas Chinese scientists and engineers as an important resource. Similar to the “863” Programme, a state-led “973” Plan was initiated in March 1997, which focuses on basic research in six areas including agricultural biotechnology, energy, informatics, natural resources and the environment, population and health, and materials science. As one result of these development agenda, R&D investment by Chinese enterprises totalled 164 billion yuan in 2005, which represented a sharp increase from just 29 percent of total domestic R&D expenditure in 1992 to 67 percent of total in 2005. A ratio of over 60 percent as industryfinanced R&D follows the norms in most developed countries. For example, firms accounted for 70 percent of the total R&D investment in the United States in 2005, while the percentage was 76.7 percent for Japan. Despite its inadequacy and inaccuracy in measuring science and technology activities, patent is still the best and most used indicator for national innovation capability. Domestic application for patents increased at an annual rate of 18.6 percent from 69,535 cases in 1995 to 383,157 cases in 2005. Meanwhile, granted patents also reached 190,238 cases in 2005. However, invention patent, which represents more fundamental innovation capability, accounted for only a quarter of the total patents granted. Incremental innovation shown as utility model and external design patents accounted for 75 percent of the total. Furthermore, foreign entities outside of China took the majority of the relatively small number of invention patents registered in China. As a result, although the number of invention patents in China ranked third internationally after Japan and the US, about two thirds of the invention patents were granted to institutions/firms outside of China. Comparatively, fourth-placed South Korea has the majority of invention patents coming from its domestic entities. Impressive progress has been made for scientific publications. The number of national S&T publications in international referencing systems including Science Citation Index (SCI), Engineering Index (EI), and Index to Science and Technical Proceeding (ISTP) accumulated to 153,374 (1994–
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2004) or 6.78 percent of the world total. This earned China the fifth place in world ranking in terms of the production of SCI papers, a big jump from No. 15 a decade ago. Nevertheless, just as in invention patents, foreign institutions and individuals in China have contributed a large part to its international publications. Data on invention patents and S&T papers illustrated the fact that China’s radical innovation capability, which in the long term leads to the change in international S&T competition pattern and subsequent commercial benefits, is still weak. In fact, the level of basic research, which directs radical innovation, has remained quite low. Development and applied research accounted for the majority of the R&D expenditure in China, leaving only about 5 percent for basic research. The size of the scientists and engineers community in China is considerably large and comparable to the leading nations such as the US and Japan. However, the number of scientists and engineers per 10,000 workers in China was only 12 in 2003, while it was over 90 in the US, 101 in Japan, 67 in Germany, 66 in South Korea, to name a few. On the other hand, the percentage of engineering undergraduate enrollment in institutes of higher education declined from about 40 percent of overall students in 1995 to only 30 percent in 2004. Similar declining trend happens in the field of sciences. Furthermore, the relative decrease in graduate enrollment is also evident. The gap between S&T labour supply and demand is widening. National and regional policies on attracting FDI and promoting technology transfer have always been in place ever since the beginning of China’s economic reform in the late 1970s. Although a gigantic amount of FDI has flowed in and played a positive role in advancing technological development in China through knowledge transfer and diffusion, the most up-to-date technology will not be introduced from abroad as a result of national security and international competition. On the other hand, the government has recognised the growing flow of overseas returnees as increasingly important S&T resources for China. Internally, policies favouring state-owned-enterprises have continued to make small technological firms struggle to survive in a harsh environment lacking in sufficient financial support. However, private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are playing an increasingly
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important role in national innovation. In 2005, these non-state owned S&T firms accounted for about 17 percent of the total National S&T Advance Awards. Policies facilitating SMEs’ innovation are critically desired. National S&T research funding has usually been dominated by senior scientists who may be more inclined to protect their own reputation and practical benefits than to advance the development of science and technology. Research efforts of innovative young scientists and engineers often go unrecognised or unrewarded due to a distorted evaluation system under a complicated net of guanxi. As a result, although the Chinese government is adamant in propelling indigenous innovation in all identified strategic fields as articulated in the National Medium- and Long-Term S&T Development Plan (2006–2020), China’s becoming a great technological power in the world is still inconceivable without circumventing the various cultural and institutional barriers.
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B
anking Reforms to Meet WTO Obligations Sarah Y. TONG ZHENG Yi
The year 2006 was a significant year for the Chinese banking sector. It marked the fifth anniversary of China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation and the last year of China’s transition period to fully open its markets. On 11 December 2006, China was obligated to fully open its financial market in line with its WTO commitments of ensuring equal national treatment for foreign banks to engage in the Chinese currency business. This poses a big challenge to China’s indigenous banks, as they face not only significantly more intensive competition, but also considerable changes in the regulatory environment. When China became a formal WTO member in late 2001, its banking sector was mired by a devastating non-performing loans (NPLs) crisis, along with many other weaknesses and financial risks. Indeed, NPLs accounted for 26 percent of China’s total bank loans in 2002. Hampered by poor assets quality, Chinese banks were extremely inefficient. In 2002, the average return on equity and the average return on assets of China’s stateowned banks (SOBs) were only 3.6 percent and 0.14 percent, compared to 9.9 percent and 0.41 percent for European Union (EU) banks, respectively. The banking sector is also weak in corporate governance, regulations and risk management so much so that some commentators even warned that China’s banking system could collapse and trigger a serious domestic economic crisis. A weak banking sector was considered one of the most critical and urgent post-WTO challenges facing the country. To prepare China’s banks for the upcoming competition, China accelerated reforms to its shabby banking sector in the five years following its WTO accession.
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The earliest effort was to improve assets quality of the banking sector. The attempt first started in 1998 with the injection of RMB270 billion (US$33 billion) into the four state-owned banks (SOBs). In 1999, the government established four state-sponsored asset management companies (AMCs) to take over RMB1.4 trillion (US$169 billion) of bad debts from the SOBs. In January 2004, a total of US$45 billion was injected into the two better performing SOBs, China Construction Bank (CCB) and Bank of China (BOC), to improve their capital adequacy ratio. The most recent effort came in April 2005 when US$15 billion was injected into the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to increase its capital. The restructuring of ICBC continued in June 2005 with a plan to further dispose US$85.5 billion of NPLs to AMCs and to issue subordinated debts of US$12 billion. In addition to injecting funds into the big SOBs, since January 2005, China’s central bank (PBC), together with the regulator (CBRC), has coordinated with local governments to restructure local deposit institutions, through measures including debt-for-equity restructuring, writing off of bad loans and closing down of some insolvent credit coops and local banks. A total of RMB23.3 billion has since been injected by local governments to carry out debt-for-equity restructuring of 28 city commercial banks. China’s banks have also undertaken structural transformations including incorporatisation and ownership diversification. The government started to incorporate CCB and BOC in 2004. Since 2005, the ICBC has undergone similar incorporatisation. During incorporatisation, the government also encourages the banks to sell their shares to selected foreign “strategic investors”. There have also been considerable efforts to improve and reinforce bank regulation, corporate governance and risk management of the banking industry. In 2003, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established to enforce bank regulation. To improve corporate governance and risk management, CBRC has taken a very stringent stance on requiring 1 banks to meet its Basel I Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of 8 percent . 1
The capital adequacy ratio refers to the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted credit exposure. The bank capital is vital to a bank’s survival and development, as well as a country’s financial security; the global standard is Basel I Capital Adequacy Ratio of 8 percent.
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The various reform measures have led to a remarkable transformation of the banking sector. Instead of a meltdown as some analysts had predicted, China has guided its banks towards solvency and success. Improvement is particularly evident with respect to the three stronger of the four big SOBs. First, NPLs in China’s banking sector have been reduced by more than half in four years, from RMB2.7 trillion in 2002 to RMB1.3 trillion in 2006. By the second quarter of 2006, according to CBRC, overall NPLs of all commercial banks had dropped to RMB1.28 trillion or 7.5 percent of total bank loan, representing a significant reduction from 23.2 percent in 2002. Among the four big SOBs, the CCB had the lowest NPLs ratio of 3.8 percent in 2005. Second, due to the improvement of assets quality and the expansion of new loans, China’s banks have substantially increased their pre-tax profits and provision ratio over the past few years. In three large state banks, namely, CCB, BOC and ICBC, profitability measured by return on equity has improved significantly (to between 13 percent and 22 percent) and is now closer to the world average level of 23 percent, with the exception of the Agriculture Bank of China. In 2005, these three banks demonstrated further improvements in main performance indicators such as NPL ratios, capital adequacy ratio, return on assets and return on equity. As a result, in 2006, according to The Bankers Magazine, UK, 25 Chinese banks were listed as among the world’s top 1000 banks in terms of assets and tier one capital. The CCB, for example, improved its ranking from 25th in 2005 to 2 11th in 2006, followed by ICBC’s 16th, and BOC’s 17th . Three of the four large state banks, CCB, BOC and ICBC have been incorporated into share holding banks, among which CCB and BOC were successfully listed in the Hong Kong Exchange in 2006, raising initial public offerings (IPOs) of US$9.2 billion and US$11.2 billion, respectively. ICBC was listed in both Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Markets on 27 October 2006, raising the largest IPO of US$19 billion. On the other hand, increasing market access to foreign banks has actually proceeded gradually and consistently since 2001 as specified in China’s WTO accession agreement. The amount of foreign investment in 2
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The ranking was before ICBC and BOC raised their IPOs in 2006.
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Chinese banks had risen significantly and indeed accelerated in the past two years. Between 2001 and 2003, foreign banks bought shares worth only US$343 million in domestically-registered Chinese banks. Since 2004, stakes in Chinese banks by foreign investors, including both completed and announced deals, have added another US$21.4 billion. It is expected that rising foreign penetration in Chinese banks through increasing shares will lead to qualitative improvement of the banks’ governance. Foreign banks have maintained high growth momentum in China, with annual growth in assets, deposits and loans all exceeding 30 percent. The amount of capital paid in foreign bank branches and joint ventures rose by 31 percent in 2004. In 2000, there were only 69 foreign banks with 214 representative offices operating in China. The number rose to 173 banks, with 238 representative offices and 238 operational entities, in 2005. The number of banks allowed to conduct local currency business also increased from 32 in 2001 to 138 in 2006. Consequently