International Institutional Law
International Institutional Law Unity within Diversity Fifth Revised Edition
By
Henry G. Schermers Niels M. Blokker
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011
This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schermers, Henry G. International institutional law : unity within diversity / by Henry G. Schermers, Niels M. Blokker. — 5th rev. ed. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-90-04-18796-2 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-18798-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. International agencies. 2. International courts. 3. International cooperation. I. Blokker, Niels. II. Title. KZ4850.S337 2011 341.2—dc23 2011020351
ISBN 978 90 04 18798 6 (PB) ISBN 978 90 04 18796 2 (HB) Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
PREFACE
We depend for our future on international order. Our destiny is increasingly influenced by the activities – or lack thereof – of international organizations. These activities affect our daily life more than we often realize. They are also more and more important when natural and man-made disasters occur. At the time of writing, an earthquake, a tsunami and a severe nuclear accident have struck Japan. The United Nations (UN), the International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization play an important role in dealing with the effects of these events by assisting Japan and by providing information on the spread of radiation. At the same time, an armed conflict is taking place in Libya, in which a key role is played by the UN, the League of Arab States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is difficult to imagine life today without international organizations. The growing significance of international organizations makes it necessary to analyze their law and practice. Each organization has its own unique law and practice, designed for the realization of its objectives. A large number of studies have therefore already been devoted to specific organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the European Union, and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Nevertheless, international organizations also have much in common, and are confronted with a large number of similar day-to-day questions. For example, may international organizations exercise powers that have not been given to them by the members? May members withdraw from an international organization if the constitution of the organization does not contain provisions on withdrawal? May members refuse to pay part of their contribution to an organization because they do not agree with certain activities? Should international organizations accept funds from private enterprises to finance their activities? How can non-governmental organizations be involved in the work of international organizations? Should the chairman of an international organ remain in office when a subject on the agenda directly concerns his country? Should the secretariat of the organization be composed of civil servants selected exclusively on the basis of their professional qualifications, or should it have a certain number of nationals of all member states as staff members? Should specific organs be created to deal with disputes between the organization and its personnel? How can effect be given to the desire of the organization to invite persons to its meetings despite the fact that the host state would normally refuse these persons access to its territory? With respect to voting, should each member state have one vote (reflecting the formal rule of sovereign equality of states) or should members have different voting strength (reflecting factual inequalities between member states)?
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These examples demonstrate that international organizations, despite their widely diverging objectives, powers, fields of activity and number of member states, share all kinds of similar problems. The rules for dealing with these problems are often similar. When a new organization is established, a number of its rules are copied – mutatis mutandis – from other organizations. Many writers take the view that in practice, although each organization has its own legal order, common rules and principles have developed. These shared problems, rules and principles of international organizations particularly relate to institutional legal matters. Institutional law does not differ dramatically from one organization to the next: each organization needs rules concerning, for example, its internal structure, membership, decision-making, financing, relations with the host state, and these rules often bear strong similarities. This book offers a comparative study of the institutional law of international organizations. Although each organization has its own legal order, institutional problems and rules of different organizations are often more or less the same, and an impressive body of institutional rules has been developed. This explains the subtitle of this book: unity in diversity. Much has changed in our field of study since 1972, when the first edition of this book was published. The international political context has changed, and this has affected the functioning of international organizations. The Cold War era passed by. The United States continues to be a superpower that plays a key role in many international organizations. But other states (such as China, Brazil and India) have also become powerful players in international relations. Another change is the different attitude of governments towards international organizations. For a considerable number of years following the end of the Second World War, an international organization was established almost automatically as soon as an international problem arose and the need to cooperate to solve it was identified. In more recent years, however, the opposite attitude has become predominant: at present, governments almost instinctively prefer not to create a new organization when a problem presents itself and the need to cooperate arises. With regard to existing organizations, the organization’s responsibility for its own acts, as well as larger questions of accountability, are now hotly debated issues in academic writings and in practice. Nevertheless, while much has changed, much also has remained the same. Plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose. In practice, new international organizations continue to be created. They are confronted with similar institutional questions, whether old or new. Often, the answers given to these questions are not given in isolation; the law and practice of other international organizations is frequently taken into account. Henry Schermers passed away on 31 August 2006. He conceived the idea of this book and created the name of this field of law. From the beginning until the very end of his professional life, international institutional law was close to his heart. Working in the Dutch Foreign Ministry in the 1950s, Henry Schermers was confronted with a great number of institutional issues regarding international orga-
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nizations, and the academic reflection of this practical experience was laid down in his doctoral thesis on the specialized agencies (1957). At the end of his professional life, in his farewell lecture at Leiden University (2002), he announced that he would finance a Chair in this field of law. Although Henry Schermers has not been involved in this fifth edition of his magnum opus, I am confident that he would have supported it. Since much of the substance, the structure, and most of all, the key ideas behind this book have remained the same, it is obvious that he has also remained the first and main author. Henry Schermers taught a specialized course on international institutional law beginning in 1963, first at the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam and subsequently, from 1978, at the Law Faculty of the University of Leiden. From 1984, this course was given together by Henry Schermers and myself. I joined the legal service of the Dutch Foreign Ministry in 2000. In 2003, I was appointed on a part-time basis to the abovementioned Schermers Chair at Leiden University, and teach two specialized annual courses in this field. It is almost always a privilege to work both in practice and in academia. Le monde du spectateur est bien différent de celui de l’acteur. My experience at the ministry has certainly influenced my work for this new edition, but the views expressed here are personal. In the previous editions of this book, published in 1972, 1980, 1995 and 2003, acknowledgements were made to many people. For the present, fifth edition I would like to repeat these acknowledgements. Although the text has been updated and revised, the previous editions have been the foundations without which no fifth edition would have been possible. The preparations for this fifth edition started two years ago. Many people have assisted me. I thank my colleagues and friends in the Dutch Foreign Ministry and at Leiden University for their help and suggestions. Numerous staff members of international organizations have provided me with valuable written and unwritten information. I have benefited from, and enjoyed the research support of, a number of students in the Advanced LLM Programme Public International Law of Leiden University, during the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 academic years. During the last few hectic weeks, excellent work was done by Claire Achmad, Carolin Beverungen, and Alessandro Tonutti. I am particularly grateful to Peter Holcombe Henley, who read and edited the whole manuscript and made many improvements to the text, relating both to language and to substance. Finally, from the very beginning of work on this fifth edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, part of Brill Publishers, has supported this in numerous ways; I would like to thank Peter Buschman and Ingeborg van der Laan in particular. Academic work is by definition of a largely solitary nature. This was even more so when preparing this edition without Henry Schermers. But without the assistance of the many people mentioned here, I could not have completed this fifth edition. Our field of study is vast, institutional rules are numerous and sometimes complex, and practical developments have also been legion. In a general comparative study, it is impossible to discuss every aspect in detail, and omissions are
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unavoidable. Suggestions for improvement are therefore most welcome at the Law School of Leiden University, P.O. Box 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands, or at
[email protected]. Leiden, March 2011 Niels Blokker
CONTENTS
Preface ................................................................................................................... List of abbreviations and notes on terminology ............................................ Chapter One Introduction I. International institutional law .............................................................. A. A classic theme: interdependence and state sovereignty ........... B. Objectives ........................................................................................... 1. To describe and analyze international institutional law ........ 2. To contribute to improvements in practice ........................... 3. To contribute to a better understanding of international institutional law ........................................................................... a. Legal research into the law of international organizations .......................................................................... b. Constitutionalism .................................................................. c. Global administrative law .................................................... d. Political science and international organizations ............ e. Virally and the concept of ‘function’ ................................. C. Unity within diversity? .................................................................... D. Method ............................................................................................... II. Definition ................................................................................................. A. International cooperation, international organizations, (con)federations ................................................................................ B. A definition: three elements ........................................................... 1. International agreement ............................................................. 2. At least one organ with a will of its own ................................ 3. Established under international law ........................................ C. International organizations, international corporations, Non-Governmental Organizations ................................................ III. Classification ............................................................................................ A. Criteria for classification ................................................................. B. Universal versus closed organizations .......................................... 1. Universal organizations .............................................................. 2. Closed organizations .................................................................. C. Intergovernmental versus supranational organizations ............. 1. Intergovernmental organizations ............................................. 2. Supranational organizations ...................................................... D. Special versus general organizations ............................................. 1. Special organizations .................................................................. 2. General organizations ................................................................. IV. Conclusion ...............................................................................................
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§1 §1 §6 §7 §12 §13 §13 §13B §13H §14 §15 §22 §26 §29 §29 §32 §34 §44 §45 §46 §48 §48 §51 §51 §53 §58 §58 §60 §63 §63 §64 §65
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Chapter Two Participants I. Full members ............................................................................................ A. Subjects of membership ................................................................... 1. States ............................................................................................... 2. Territories which are not independent states ......................... 3. Groups of states ............................................................................ 4. International organizations ........................................................ B. Commencement of membership .................................................... 1. Establishment of the organization ............................................ 2. Re-admission of ex-members ..................................................... 3. Admission of new members ....................................................... a. Admission by constitutional amendment ........................... b. Conditions imposed by the constitution ............................ 4. Acceptance of membership ........................................................ 5. Date of commencement of membership .................................. 6. Establishment of new states ....................................................... C. Termination of membership ........................................................... 1. Withdrawal by the member ....................................................... a. Constitutional provisions ...................................................... b. Withdrawal without constitutional provision ................... (i) Interpretative declarations ........................................... (ii) Practical experience ...................................................... (iii) Legality ............................................................................ c. Partial withdrawal .................................................................. 2. Expulsion from the organization ............................................... a. The notion ‘expulsion’ ........................................................... (i) Expulsion versus suspension ....................................... (ii) Expulsion as a sanction ................................................ (iii) Expulsion to protect the organization ....................... b. Constitutional provisions ...................................................... c. Expulsion without constitutional provision ...................... 3. Disappearance of the member or loss of essential qualifications ................................................................................. 4. Dissolution of the organization ................................................. D. Rights and obligations of full members ........................................ 1. Individual rights and obligations .............................................. 2. Collective rights and obligations ............................................... II. Associate members .................................................................................. III. Partial members ....................................................................................... IV. Affiliate members ..................................................................................... V. Observers ................................................................................................... A. General ............................................................................................ B. Categories of observers ..................................................................... 1. Non-member states and entities ................................................ 2. National liberation movements ................................................. 3. Public international organizations ............................................
§71 §71 §71 §75 §79 §81 §85 §85 §87 §88 §88 §90 §100 §102 §103 §118 §119 §120 §123 §123 §125 §134 §136 §137 §138 §139 §140 §141 §143 §146 §149 §154 §155 §156 §162 §166 §169 §172 §173 §173 §179 §180 §182 §185
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4. Private organizations ................................................................... 5. Individuals and private companies ........................................... VI. Concluding observations ........................................................................
§188 §196 §198
Chapter Three Rules for International Organs I. Powers ........................................................................................................ A. Attribution of powers ....................................................................... 1. General ........................................................................................... 2. Attribution of powers to the organization .............................. 3. The concept of domestic jurisdiction ....................................... 4. Attribution of powers to organs of the organization ............. B. Delegation of powers ........................................................................ C. Sacrifice of powers ............................................................................. D. Implied powers .................................................................................. II. Composition of organs ........................................................................... A. Size ..................................................................................................... B. Representation of members ............................................................. 1. Representation by a delegation .................................................. a. Denomination ......................................................................... b. Instructions .............................................................................. c. Size of delegations .................................................................. d. Composition of delegations .................................................. (i) Governmental delegates ............................................... (ii) Delegates representing specific interests ................... (iii) Delegates from national parliaments ......................... (iv) Foreign delegates ........................................................... (v) Multinational delegations ............................................ e. Obligation to send a delegation ........................................... f. Credentials ............................................................................... 2. Representation by proxy ............................................................. C. Use of individual experts ................................................................. D. Use of civil servants .......................................................................... E. Equitable representation of interests .............................................. 1. Equitable geographical representation ..................................... a. Need for regional representation ......................................... b. Composition of regions ......................................................... 2. Equitable representation of specific interests .......................... 3. Means of strengthening representation .................................... F. Election of non-plenary organs ...................................................... 1. Election by the entire organization ........................................... 2. Election by the region or group concerned ............................. 3. Election or rotation? .................................................................... 4. Co-option ...................................................................................... 5. Term of office ............................................................................... 6. Dates of replacement ................................................................... G. Quorum ............................................................................................
§206 §206 §206 §209 §211 §217 §224 §231 §232 §237 §237 §238 §239 §239 §240 §242 §243 §243 §250 §251 §253 §254 §255 §256 §264 §267 §275 §276 §276 §276 §277 §280 §282 §285 §286 §289 §295 §296 §297 §299 §302
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III. Functioning ............................................................................................... A. Sessions ............................................................................................ 1. Characteristics ............................................................................... 2. Frequency and duration .............................................................. 3. Specialized sessions ...................................................................... 4. Costs ............................................................................................ 5. Place ............................................................................................ 6. Public and private meetings, publicity and transparancy ....... 7. Documentation ............................................................................. 8. Privileges and immunities at sessions ...................................... a. Definition ................................................................................. b. Why are privileges and immunities granted to international organizations? ................................................. c. Instruments laying down privileges and immunities ......... d. Subjects of privileges and immunities ................................ (i) Individual experts .......................................................... (ii) Delegates of members ................................................... (iii) Delegates of non-members .......................................... (iv) Delegates of other public international organizations .................................................................... (v) Delegates of private international organizations and individuals .............................................................. 9. Procedure ....................................................................................... a. Agenda ..................................................................................... b. General debate ........................................................................ c. Discussion of agenda items .................................................. d. Statements of delegations ...................................................... e. Limits to freedom of speech ................................................. f. Procedural motions ................................................................ B. Officers ............................................................................................ 1. Chairman ....................................................................................... a. Appointment ........................................................................... b. Powers and obligations .......................................................... 2. Vice-presidents and bureau ........................................................ 3. Rapporteurs ................................................................................... C. Languages ............................................................................................ IV. Concluding observations ........................................................................ Chapter Four Policy-Making and Administrative Organs I. Classifying international organs ............................................................ II. Policy-making organs .............................................................................. A. Plenary policy-making organs ......................................................... 1. General congress or council of ministers ................................ a. Denomination ......................................................................... b. Task ........................................................................................... 2. Junior congress .............................................................................
§306 §306 §306 §309 §312 §313 §317 §321 §322 §323 §323 §324 §325 §326 §326 §327 §332 §333 §334 §337 §338 §340 §342 §343 §346 §349 §354 §354 §354 §361 §365 §366 §367 §376
§384 §389 §390 §390 §390 §391 §393
contents 3. Specialized congresses ................................................................. 4. Plenary commissions ................................................................... a. Congressional commissions ................................................ b. Plenary functional commissions ......................................... B. Non-plenary policy-making organs ............................................... 1. The need for non-plenary policy-making organs ................... 2. The board ....................................................................................... a. Executive board ..................................................................... (i) Task ................................................................................. (ii) Composition ................................................................... b. Governing board ................................................................... (i) Task ................................................................................. (ii) Composition ................................................................... 3. Commissions and committees ................................................... a. Functional commissions ...................................................... b. Consultative commissions of interest groups .................. c. Ad hoc advisory commissions ............................................. d. Procedural committees ......................................................... e. Regional commissions and regional groups ..................... 4. President of the organization ..................................................... III. Secretariat ............................................................................................ A. Description ......................................................................................... B. Tasks and influence of the secretariat ........................................... 1. Functions ....................................................................................... a. Administrative and clerical functions ............................... b. Budget ..................................................................................... c. Information ............................................................................ d. Recording ................................................................................ e. Collection of reports from member states ........................ f. Collection of information from member states ............... g. Coordination .......................................................................... h. Representation of the organization .................................... i. Assistance to members ......................................................... j. Observation of elections ...................................................... k. Depositary of treaties ............................................................ l. Executive functions ............................................................... m. Right of initiative .................................................................. n. Good offices, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration ................................................................................. o. Performance of instructions ................................................. 2. Power and accountability ........................................................... 3. Delegation of tasks; outside experts .......................................... C. Seat ..................................................................................................... 1. Requirements ................................................................................ 2. Centralization ................................................................................ 3. Decentralization: regional offices ..............................................
xiii §396 §400 §401 §404 §406 §406 §409 §410 §410 §412 §415 §415 §418 §421 §422 §424 §426 §427 §428 §432 §434 §434 §439 §442 §442 §443 §444 §445 §446 §447 §448 §450 §454 §456 §457 §459 §461 §462 §464 §465 §466 §469 §469 §478 §489
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D. International civil servants .............................................................. 1. Appointment ................................................................................. 2. Number of international civil servants ..................................... 3. Qualifications ................................................................................ 4. Geographic distribution .............................................................. 5. Conditions of employment ......................................................... a. Grades ....................................................................................... b. Remuneration .......................................................................... c. Pension and social security ................................................... d. Obligations ............................................................................... e. Permanent or temporary employment ............................... f. Internships ............................................................................... 6. Independence ................................................................................ a. Relation with the national governments ............................ b. Privileges .................................................................................. (i) Exemption from taxation ............................................. (ii) Other privileges ............................................................. c. Immunity from jurisdiction ................................................. (i) Immunity for official acts ............................................ (ii) Immunity for other acts ............................................... (iii) Waiver of immunity ..................................................... 7. The safety of personnel ............................................................... 8. Legal position ................................................................................ a. Law governing the service ..................................................... b. Legal protection ...................................................................... IV. The European Commission .................................................................... A. Task ............................................................................................ B. Composition ....................................................................................... V. Concluding observations ........................................................................
§491 §492 §496 §498 §500 §506 §508 §511 §515 §516 §518 §523 §524 §525 §529 §530 §533 §534 §534 §535 §536 §538 §539 §539 §542 §547 §547 §550 §551
Chapter Five Advisory and Supervisory Organs I. Parliamentary organs .............................................................................. A. Need for parliamentary organs ....................................................... B. International organizations with parliamentary organs ............. C. Composition of parliamentary organs ........................................... 1. Size ............................................................................................ 2. Election of members .................................................................... 3. Parties ............................................................................................ D. Tasks of parliamentary organs ........................................................ 1. Control over the executive ......................................................... 2. Control over the budget .............................................................. 3. Advisory functions ....................................................................... a. Advising national parliaments ............................................. b. Advising international organs .............................................. c. Participation in decision-making and in legislation ........ E. Functioning of parliamentary organs .........................................
§558 §558 §564 §568 §568 §570 §574 §576 §576 §582 §584 §585 §587 §589 §594
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II. Judicial organs ....................................................................................... §597 A. The need for judicial organs ......................................................... §597 1. Control of the legality of decisions ........................................ §599 2. Administrative jurisdiction over staff members .................. §602 3. Control of the application of acts within the national legal orders ......................................................................................... §603 4. Private law .................................................................................. §604 B. Existing judicial organs ................................................................. §605 1. Universal judicial organs ......................................................... §605 a. The International Court of Justice .................................. §605 b. Ad hoc tribunals on war crimes and the International Criminal Court ................................................................... §608 c. The Human Rights Committee ........................................ §609 d. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ...................................................................................... §610 e. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination .................................................................... §611 f. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ................................................................... §612 g. The Committee against Torture ...................................... §613 h. The Committee on the Rights of the Child ................... §614 i. The Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families .. §615 j. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ........................................................................... §615A k. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances ............... §615B l. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ........ §616 2. Regional judicial organs ........................................................... §617 a. The Court of Justice and the European Union ............. §618 b. Benelux Court of Justice ................................................... §622 c. The EFTA Court of Justice ............................................... §623 d. The Andean Court of Justice ............................................ §624 e. The European Court of Human Rights .......................... §625 f. American organs for human rights ................................ §629 g. African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, African Human Rights Court, and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights ................................................ §630 h. Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine .. §631 i. Other river commissions .................................................. §632 j. European Tribunal on State Immunity .......................... §633 k. Tribunal of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency ........... §634 l. Tribunal of WEU ............................................................... §635 m. Tribunal of International Composition in the Saar ....... §636 n. Central American Court of Justice ................................. §637 o. Judicial Commission of the OAPEC ................................ §638 p. East African Court of Justice ............................................. §639
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q. ECOWAS Community Court of Justice .......................... r. Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa ............................................................ s. Tribunal of the South African Development Community ............................................................................. t. Caribbean Court of Justice ................................................ u. MERCOSUR Permanent Review Tribunal ..................... 3. Staff administrative tribunals .................................................. a. The UN Dispute and Appeals Tribunals ......................... b. The ILO Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT) ................... c. The World Bank Administrative Tribunal ...................... d. The Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund .................................................................... e. Regional administrative tribunals ..................................... 4. Arbitration, conciliation, mediation and fact-finding commissions ............................................................................... 5. Other bodies ............................................................................... C. Composition of judicial organs .................................................... 1. Number of members ................................................................ 2. Nationality of the members ..................................................... 3. Qualifications ............................................................................. 4. Appointment .............................................................................. 5. Independence of judges ........................................................... 6. Advocates-General .................................................................... 7. Registrar’s office ......................................................................... D. Procedure before judicial organs ................................................. 1. Access to the court .................................................................... a. Plaintiff .................................................................................. b. Defendant ............................................................................. 2. Decision ...................................................................................... a. Judgment ............................................................................... b. Other decisions .................................................................... 3. Separate opinions ...................................................................... III. Concluding observations ..................................................................... Chapter Six Decision-Making Process I. The concept of a decision .................................................................... II. Legal basis ......................................................................................... III. Initiative ......................................................................................... A. Necessity for initiatives .................................................................. B. Initiatives by governments ............................................................ C. Initiatives by organs of the organization .................................... 1. Secretariat ................................................................................... 2. Organs of independent experts ............................................... D. Initiatives by other international organizations ........................ E. Initiatives by interest groups ........................................................ F. Initiatives by individuals ...............................................................
§640 §641 §641A §641B §641C §642 §642 §643 §645 §646 §647 §648 §670 §672 §672 §675 §679 §680 §683 §684 §685 §686 §687 §688 §692 §693 §693 §694 §695 §700
§706 §708 §710 §710 §711 §712 §712 §715 §719 §720 §721
contents IV. Drafting of the text .................................................................................. A. Preparation of proposals .................................................................. 1. Submission .................................................................................. 2. The draft ...................................................................................... 3. Two examples ............................................................................. a. Law-making in the UN ........................................................ b. Decision-making and legislation in the European Union ........................................................................................ B. Discussion of proposals .................................................................... 1. Date of submission .................................................................... 2. Sponsors ...................................................................................... 3. Amendments ............................................................................... 4. Time-limits, marathon sessions ............................................... 5. Package deals .............................................................................. 6. Informal consultation, pressure ............................................... 7. Caucuses ...................................................................................... 8. Negotiating groups .................................................................... 9. Withdrawal of proposals and amendments .......................... 10. Financial implications of resolutions ..................................... 11. Closure of discussions ............................................................... V. Decision-making by consensus ............................................................. A. Introduction ....................................................................................... B. Some examples ................................................................................... C. Explaining the decline of majority voting and the rise of consensus ............................................................................................ VI. Voting .................................................................................................... A. Unanimity ........................................................................................... 1. Organizations requiring unanimity ........................................ 2. Exceptions to unanimity ........................................................... B. Voting power ..................................................................................... 1. Equality of voting power .......................................................... 2. Inequality of voting power ....................................................... a. Permanent seats and weighted representation ................ b. Weighted voting .................................................................... (i) Desirability ..................................................................... (ii) Some examples .............................................................. c. Veto ......................................................................................... C. Required majority .............................................................................. 1. Kinds of majorities .................................................................... 2. Calculation of majorities .......................................................... a. Majority of membership ...................................................... b. Majority of the votes ............................................................ c. Abstention .............................................................................. d. Non-participation in the vote (or in a consensus) ......... e. Absence .................................................................................. f. Invalid vote ............................................................................
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3. Unqualified majority ................................................................. a. Voting between two alternatives ...................................... b. Voting between several alternatives ................................. c. Multiple elections ................................................................ 4. Qualified majority ..................................................................... a. Two-thirds majority ........................................................... b. Other qualified majorities .................................................. 5. Qualified minorities ................................................................. 6. Factors influencing the majority to be preferred ................ a. The need for a decision ...................................................... b. The effect of the decision ................................................... c. Structure and procedures of the decision-making organ........................................................................................ D. Methods of voting .......................................................................... 1. Simultaneous open voting ....................................................... 2. Roll-call or recorded vote ........................................................ 3. Secret vote .................................................................................. 4. Vote by correspondence .......................................................... 5. Alteration of votes cast ............................................................ E. Conditional voting ......................................................................... VII. Entry into force of decisions ............................................................... A. Immediate entry into force ........................................................... B. Previous agreement of other organs ........................................... C. Previous agreement of member states ........................................ VIII. Termination of decisions ..................................................................... A. Amendment and revocation ......................................................... 1. Amendment ............................................................................... 2. Revocation ................................................................................. 3. Withdrawal ................................................................................ B. Termination of membership ........................................................ C. Dissolution of the organization ................................................... D. Political annulment ........................................................................ E. Judicial annulment ......................................................................... 1. Possibility of annulment .......................................................... 2. Initiative for judicial annulment ............................................ 3. Grounds of illegality ................................................................. IX. Concluding observations .....................................................................
§838 §838 §842 §849 §851 §851 §855 §856 §857 §858 §861 §863 §868 §869 §871 §873 §876 §882 §884 §888 §888 §889 §892 §897 §898 §898 §905 §907 §908 §910 §911 §912 §912 §914 §915 §917
Chapter Seven Financing I. Expenditure ............................................................................................ A. Total expenditure ........................................................................... B. Classification of costs ..................................................................... 1. Methods of classification ......................................................... a. Budgeting according to instrument or to activity ......... b. Administrative or operational expenditure .................... 2. Fields of activity: some examples ...........................................
§928 §928 §931 §931 §931 §938 §942
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a. General overview ....................................................................... §943 b. Development assistance; “economic and social cohesion” ... §945 c. Peace operations ........................................................................ §951 3. Instruments ....................................................................................... §955 a. Personnel ..................................................................................... §956 b. Sessions of the organs of the organization ............................ §957 c. Buildings ...................................................................................... §960 d. Equipment ................................................................................... §963 e. General expenses ........................................................................ §964 II. Income ......................................................................................................... §965 A. Contributions ......................................................................................... §966 1. Contributors ..................................................................................... §966 2. The sharing of expenditure ............................................................ §967 a. Equal contributions ................................................................... §967 b. Optional classes of contribution ............................................. §969 c. Scales of assessment .................................................................. §974 (i) Capacity to pay ................................................................ §976 (ii) Interest in the work of the organization and other factors ................................................................................ §980 (iii) Flexibility of scales .......................................................... §986 3. Limits to contributions of members ............................................ §992 a. Minimum contribution ............................................................. §992 b. Maximum contribution ............................................................ §993 c. Maximum expenditure ......................................................... §1001 d. Special rates ............................................................................ §1002 4. The organs involved .................................................................... §1005 5. Currencies of contributions ....................................................... §1006 6. Defaults in payment .................................................................... §1010 a. Refusal to pay ......................................................................... §1010 b. Incentives to pay .................................................................... §1014 c. Filling the gap: working capital funds ................................ §1017 7. Table of contributions ................................................................ §1021 B. Voluntary contributions ................................................................... §1022 1. The principle of voluntary contributions ................................ §1022 2. Existing systems of voluntary contributions .......................... §1026 3. Trust funds ................................................................................... §1029 4. International organizations contributing to voluntary programmes .................................................................................. §1032 5. Voluntary contributions from non-members ........................ §1033 6. Raising voluntary contributions ............................................... §1034 a. Pledging ................................................................................... §1034 b. Collection of voluntary contributions ................................ §1037 C. Gifts ..................................................................................................... §1040 1. Gifts that benefit the budget of the organization ................... §1040 2. Gifts for specific programmes ................................................... §1043 3. Acceptance of gifts ...................................................................... §1049
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contents D. Self-support ...................................................................................... 1. Income from services rendered to states ............................... a. Retributions ........................................................................... b. Requested services ................................................................ c. Cost sharing for specific projects ....................................... d. Special payment by the states responsible for the expense ..................................................................................... 2. Income from services rendered to individuals ..................... 3. Income from services rendered to other international organizations ............................................................................... 4. Income from investments and borrowing ............................. 5. Income from staff assessment .................................................. 6. “Book-keeping” income ............................................................ E. Taxation .......................................................................................... 1. Definition of taxation ................................................................ 2. Conditions for international taxation ..................................... 3. Existing systems of taxation ..................................................... III. Budget ................................................................................................... A. Use of the budget ............................................................................ 1. Purpose ........................................................................................ 2. One budget? ................................................................................ 3. Structure ...................................................................................... 4. Explanatory memorandum ....................................................... 5. Budgetary periods ...................................................................... 6. Medium-term financial plans / strategic frameworks............ B. Preparation ....................................................................................... 1. Regular estimates ........................................................................ 2. Revised estimates ........................................................................ C. Adoption and execution ................................................................. 1. The decision establishing the budget ...................................... 2. Power of the organ adopting the budget ............................... 3. Execution and supplementary estimates ................................ 4. Budgetary surpluses ................................................................... D. Audit .......................................................................................... 1. Internal audit .............................................................................. 2. External audit .............................................................................. IV. Concluding observations ......................................................................
Chapter Eight Legal Order I. Introduction .......................................................................................... II. Constitution .......................................................................................... A. Legal force ......................................................................................... B. Characteristics .................................................................................. 1. Creation of a legal person ......................................................... 2. Limitation on reservations ........................................................
§1050 §1051 §1051 §1053 §1056 §1057 §1058 §1062 §1064 §1070 §1073 §1074 §1074 §1075 §1081 §1091 §1091 §1091 §1094 §1097 §1100 §1101 §1103 §1105 §1105 §1108 §1109 §1109 §1111 §1121 §1122 §1123 §1123 §1125 §1131
§1139 §1145 §1146 §1147 §1148 §1150
contents 3. Withdrawal .................................................................................. 4. Tacit renewal ............................................................................... C. Amendment of the constitution ................................................... 1. Necessity for amendments ........................................................ 2. Constitutional requirements for amendments ...................... a. Legal character of constitutional provisions on amendment ............................................................................ b. Existing constitutional requirements ................................ (i) Temporary exclusion of amendments ..................... (ii) Amendment requiring the cooperation of organs in addition to unanimity of the members .............. (iii) Amendment by unanimous approval of the members ....................................................................... (iv) Amendment by qualified majority of the members .......................................................................... (v) Amendment by decision ............................................ (vi) Amendments without general application .............. 3. Amendment procedure ............................................................. a. Competent organ .................................................................. b. Right of initiative .................................................................. c. Time limits ............................................................................ d. Provisional application ........................................................ e. Amendments creating new obligations ............................ f. Entry into force of amendments ........................................ 4. Revision ........................................................................................ III. Decisions of the organization .............................................................. A. Internal rules .................................................................................... 1. Rules concerning the functioning of the organization .......... 2. Internal rules with external effect ........................................... a. Possibility of external effect ................................................ b. Operational activities ........................................................... c. Competence to engage in operational activities ............. B. External rules ................................................................................... 1. Recommendations ...................................................................... a. The notion “recommendation” .......................................... b. Factors which strengthen recommendations ................... (i) Constitutional provisions ........................................... (ii) Structure of the organization .................................... (iii) The method of enactment .......................................... (iv) Formal acceptance ....................................................... (v) The need for a rule ...................................................... (vi) The application by others .......................................... (vii) The moral or legitimizing effect ............................... (viii) Restatement .................................................................. c. Internal effects of recommendations ................................
xxi §1154 §1155 §1157 §1157 §1163 §1163 §1165 §1166 §1168 §1169 §1173 §1178 §1187 §1189 §1189 §1190 §1191 §1192 §1193 §1194 §1195 §1196 §1196 §1201 §1206 §1206 §1208 §1210 §1216 §1217 §1217 §1220 §1221 §1223 §1224 §1231 §1233 §1237 §1238 §1240 §1241
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contents
2. Declarations ................................................................................ a. The notion “declaration” ..................................................... b. Legal effect ............................................................................. 3. Conventions ................................................................................. a. The notion “convention” ..................................................... (i) Denomination .............................................................. (ii) Special forms of conventions .................................... (iii) Characteristics .............................................................. b. Competence to make conventions .................................... c. Legal force before ratification ............................................. d. Ratification ............................................................................. (i) The requirement of ratification ................................. (ii) Pressure to ratify ......................................................... (iii) Negative acceptance (contracting out, tacit acceptance) ................................................................... (iv) Provisional application ............................................... e. Legal effect after ratification ............................................... f. Possible parties to conventions .......................................... (i) Members ....................................................................... (ii) Non-members .............................................................. (iii) Other international organizations ............................ g. Final clauses ........................................................................... h. Amendment ........................................................................... 4. Binding rules ............................................................................... a. Denomination ....................................................................... b. Types of binding decisions ................................................. (i) Decisions addressed to governments ....................... (ii) Decisions addressed to individuals .......................... (iii) General regulations ..................................................... IV. Other elements of the legal order ....................................................... A. International law ............................................................................. B. General principles of law ............................................................... C. Customary law ................................................................................. V. Concluding observations ......................................................................
§1244 §1244 §1248 §1262 §1262 §1262 §1263 §1266 §1271 §1276 §1281 §1281 §1282 §1288 §1295 §1297 §1298 §1298 §1300 §1305 §1306 §1311 §1318 §1322 §1323 §1323 §1330 §1332 §1335 §1335 §1336 §1339 §1340
Chapter Nine Interpretation and Settlement of Disputes I. Means of interpretation ........................................................................ A. The text; practice of the organization .......................................... B. The intention of the law-maker .................................................... C. The object and purpose of the rule concerned .......................... D. Other issues relevant for the means of interpretation .............. II. Authorities charged with interpretation ............................................ A. Interpretation by the members ..................................................... 1. National executives .................................................................... 2. National courts ...........................................................................
§1346 §1347 §1348 §1349 §1350 §1351 §1351 §1351 §1352
contents B. Interpretation by organs of the organization ............................. 1. Policy-making organs ................................................................ 2. Judicial organs ............................................................................ a. Judgments .............................................................................. b. Advisory opinions ................................................................ c. Preliminary rulings ............................................................... III. Competence to request interpretation ............................................... A. Organs of the organization ............................................................ B. Members of the organization ........................................................ C. Private persons ................................................................................. D. National courts ................................................................................ IV. Concluding observations ...................................................................... Chapter Ten Supervision and Sanctions I. Definitions A. Internal supervision ........................................................................ B. External supervision ........................................................................ II. Supervision of the implementation of rules ...................................... A. Supervision by other members acting on their own account ... B. Supervision by or on behalf of the organization ....................... 1. Supervision based on reports of the members ...................... 2. Supervision based on information collected by the organization ................................................................................ 3. Supervision based on inspection ............................................. a. Continuing supervision ....................................................... b. Retrospective fact-finding ................................................... C. Supervision by individuals ............................................................. 1. Petitions ....................................................................................... 2. Court proceedings ...................................................................... 3. National committees .................................................................. 4. Effect .......................................................................................... III. Official recognition of violations ......................................................... IV. Waiver of obligations ............................................................................ V. Sanctions .......................................................................................... A. Sanctions by the other members .................................................. B. Sanctions (authorized) by the organization ................................ 1. The possibility of imposing sanctions .................................... 2. Suspension of voting rights ...................................................... 3. Suspension of representation ................................................... 4. Suspension of services of the organization ............................ 5. Suspension of rights and privileges of membership ............ 6. Expulsion from specific organs ................................................ 7. Expulsion from the organization ............................................. 8. Sanctions through other organizations .................................. 9. Economic sanctions ...................................................................
xxiii §1355 §1355 §1363 §1364 §1366 §1374 §1379 §1379 §1380 §1384 §1385 §1387
§1392 §1392 §1395 §1399 §1400 §1402 §1402 §1406 §1414 §1415 §1424 §1428 §1429 §1435 §1436 §1437 §1439 §1444 §1445 §1449 §1450 §1450 §1455 §1461 §1463 §1466 §1470 §1475 §1476 §1478
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10. Forces of international organizations and military enforcement .............................................................................. 11. Other sanctions ........................................................................ C. Enforcement within the national legal order ............................. 1. Enforcement through national parliaments .......................... 2. Enforcement through national courts .................................... a. Should national courts apply rules of international law? ........................................................................................ (i) Monist and dualist theories ....................................... (ii) Application of constitutional provisions ................. (iii) Application of international decisions ..................... b. Initiative for decisions of national courts ......................... D. Sanctions against individuals ........................................................ VI. Concluding observations ...................................................................... Chapter Eleven Legal Status I. Status in international law ........................................................................ A. Personality of international organizations in international law B. Application of international law ................................................... 1. General principles of law .......................................................... 2. Treaty law .................................................................................... 3. Customary law ............................................................................ 4. Decisions of other international organizations ..................... C. Responsibility and liability under international law ................. II. Status in national law ............................................................................ A. Personality of international organizations in domestic law ....... 1. Personality in the law of member states ................................ a. Constitutional provisions .................................................... b. Provisions in national law ................................................... c. In the absence of express provisions ................................. 2. Personality in the law of non-member states ........................ B. Application of domestic law .......................................................... 1. Competence to make use of national laws ............................ 2. The law to be applied ................................................................ 3. Limits imposed by privileges .................................................... 4. Limits imposed by immunity from jurisdiction ................... 5. Liability under private law ........................................................ III. Duration .......................................................................................... A. Establishment ................................................................................... B. Dissolution of the organization .................................................... 1. Termination or succession ....................................................... 2. Methods of dissolution .............................................................. a. Constitutional provisions .................................................... b. Provisions in other treaties and implied succession ....... c. Acts of the general congress ................................................ d. Agreements with other international organizations ....... e. Disuse ......................................................................................
§1487 §1513 §1518 §1521 §1522 §1522 §1522 §1538 §1541 §1545 §1549 §1553
§1562 §1562 §1572 §1575 §1577 §1579 §1580 §1582 §1591 §1591 §1591 §1591 §1592 §1594 §1598 §1599 §1599 §1601 §1606 §1610 §1613 §1617 §1617 §1623 §1623 §1629 §1629 §1632 §1637 §1639 §1640
contents f. Constitutional amendment .............................................. g. Changed circumstances .................................................... h. Denouncing membership ................................................. i. Conclusion .......................................................................... 3. Consequences of dissolution ................................................. a. Functions of the organization ......................................... b. Legal acts of the organization ......................................... (i) Recommendations and declarations ..................... (ii) Conventions .............................................................. (iii) Internal rules ............................................................. (iv) General regulations .................................................. (v) Binding Decisions .................................................... (vi) Agreements ................................................................ (vii) Contracts .................................................................... c. Personnel of the organization ......................................... d. Property of the organization ........................................... 4. Conclusion ................................................................................ IV. Concluding observations ...................................................................
xxv §1641 §1642 §1643A §1644 §1645 §1645 §1648 §1650 §1651 §1654 §1656 §1657 §1661 §1665 §1666 §1673 §1680 §1681
Chapter Twelve External Relations I. Partners for external relations .......................................................... §1687 A. Relations with states ..................................................................... §1687 1. Non-members .......................................................................... §1687 2. Members ................................................................................... §1688 3. Host states ................................................................................ §1689 B. Relations with other international organizations ................... §1691 1. “Families” of international organizations ........................... §1691 a. The “UN family” ................................................................ §1692 b. The European Union ........................................................ §1698 c. Inter-American organizations ......................................... §1699 d. Other families ..................................................................... §1701 2. Coordination ............................................................................ §1702 a. The need for coordination ............................................... §1702 b. Forms of coordination ...................................................... §1705 c. Coordination at the international level: by whom? ....... §1706 d. Coordination at the international level: how? .............. §1713 (i) Priority for the acts of one organization ............ §1713 (ii) Delimitation of competences ................................ §1718 (iii) Common organs ..................................................... §1721 (iv) Joint sessions and meetings; joint programmes ... §1727 (v) Consultations .......................................................... §1728A (vi) Exchange of observers ........................................... §1729 (vii) Reporting ................................................................. §1730 (viii) Planning ...................................................................... §1732 (ix) Exchanges .................................................................... §1733 (x) Training ....................................................................... §1738 e. Coordination at national level ........................................... §1739
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II. Instruments of external relations ........................................................ A. Agreements ....................................................................................... 1. The notion “agreement” ............................................................ 2. Competence to conclude agreements ..................................... a. The treaty-making capacity of international organizations ......................................................................... b. Mixed agreements ................................................................ c. The competent organ ........................................................... 3. The subject matter of agreements ........................................... a. Agreements on the status of the organization and on relations with others ............................................................ b. Agreements on assistance to members ............................. c. Agreements concerning the organization’s field of operation ................................................................................ d. Law-making agreements ..................................................... e. Establishment of new international organizations §1776 4. The legal force of agreements .................................................. a. Legal character ...................................................................... b. Validity ................................................................................... c. Binding force ......................................................................... 5. The conclusion, entry into force and termination of agreements ................................................................................... a. Negotiation and signature ................................................... b. Ratification ............................................................................. c. Entry into force ..................................................................... d. Reservations ........................................................................... e. Registration ............................................................................ f. Termination ........................................................................... B. Diplomatic relations ........................................................................ 1. The notion “diplomatic relations” ........................................... 2. Passive legation ........................................................................... 3. Active legation ............................................................................. a. The right of active legation ................................................. b. Permanent missions to members ....................................... (i) Missions for development ......................................... (ii) Missions for other purposes ...................................... (iii) National committees ................................................... c. Special missions to members .............................................. d. Missions to non-members ................................................... e. Missions to other international organizations ................. f. Delegations to international conferences ......................... C. Recognition of other subjects of international law .................... 1. Recognition of states .................................................................. 2. Recognition of governments ..................................................... 3. Recognition of territorial sovereignty .....................................
§1742 §1743 §1744 §1748 §1748 §1756 §1763 §1769 §1770 §1771 §1772 §1773
§1783 §1783 §1784 §1787 §1789 §1789 §1791 §1794 §1795 §1796 §1799 §1801 §1801 §1803 §1816 §1816 §1820 §1820 §1829 §1831 §1832 §1834 §1840 §1841 §1843 §1845 §1851 §1852
contents 4. The competent organ ................................................................. 5. “Passive” recognition ................................................................. D. Judicial actions and responsibility under public law ................. 1. Competence to bring and receive international claims ....... 2. The possibility to bring international claims to court ......... E. Convening international conferences ........................................... F. Issuing passports .............................................................................. G. Depositary of treaties ...................................................................... H. Registration of treaties .................................................................... I. Registration of ships and aircraft .................................................. J. Flag, seal and emblem ..................................................................... III. Concluding observations .......................................................................
xxvii §1853 §1855 §1856 §1856 §1859 §1860 §1863 §1867 §1868 §1870 §1872 §1875
Concluding Remarks I. Introduction ........................................................................................... II. The relationship between an international organization and its members ................................................................................................... III. Diversity of the rules of international institutional law .................. IV. Unity of the rules of international institutional law ........................ V. Towards more centralized international law? ...................................
§1885 §1882 §1896 §1900
Index .....................................................................................................................
1225
§1884
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY
ACABQ ACC Albany L. Rev. Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. Annu. Eur. Annu. Eur. d’Adm. Publ. AFDI AJIL AJPS APSCO APSR ASEAN AU Aussenpolit. AVR Benelux BIRPI BIS Boston College Third World L.J. Brooklyn J. Int’l L. BYIL CAC Calif. W.Int’l L.J. CARICOM Case W. Res. L. Rev. CDE CEB CERN Chinese JIL Chr.Pol.ét. Chula. L. Rev.
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions Administrative Committee on Coordination Albany Law Review The American University Journal of International Law and Policy American Review of International Arbitration Annuaire Européen Annuaire Européen d’Administration Publique Annuaire français de droit international American Journal of International Law American Journal of Political Science Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization American Political Science Review Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Aussenpolitik Archiv des Völkerrechts Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg Economic Union Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle Bank for International Settlements Boston College Third World Law Journal Brooklyn Journal of International Law British Year Book of International Law Codex Alimentarius Commission California Western International Law Journal Caribbean Community Case Western Reserve Law Review Cahiers de droit européen United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination European Organization for Nuclear Research Chinese Journal of International Law Chronique de Politique étrangère Chulalongkorn Law Review
xxx
list of abbreviations and notes on terminology
CILSA Comp. L. Yb. CILJ CIM CIV CJTL CMEA CMLR CMLRev. CoE Col.LR Comecon Cornell ILJ CSCE CTBT CTBTO CYIL Dalhousie L.J. Déf. Nat. Denver JILP Dick. J. Int’l L. EA EAEC EBRD ECA ECAFE ECE ECJ ECLA ECLAC ECMWF ECO ECOSOC ECOWAS ECR ECSC ECWA E(E)C EFAR EFTA EHRLR EJIL
The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa Comparative Law Yearbook Cornell International Law Journal International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by Rail Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Common Market Law Reports Common Market Law Review Council of Europe Columbia Law Review Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Cornell International Law Journal Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization Canadian Yearbook of International Law Dalhousie Law Journal Défense Nationale Denver Journal of International Law and Policy Dickinson Journal of International Law Europa Archiv European Atomic Energy Community European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Economic Commission for Africa Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East Economic Commission for Europe European Court of Justice (official name: Court of Justice of the European Union) Economic Commission for Latin America Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasts Economic Cooperation Organization Economic and Social Council Economic Community of West African States European Court Reports European Coal and Steel Community Economic Commission for Western Asia European (Economic) Community European Foreign Affairs Review European Free Trade Association European Human Rights Law Review European Journal of International Law
list of abbreviations and notes on terminology ELR Emory J. Int’l Disp. Res. ENEA Envtl. L. EPIL ESA ESA Bull. ESCAP EU EuConst EuGRZ Eur.Arch. Euratom Eur.Yb. Eutelsat FAO Fla.Int’l L.J. Fordham Int’l L. J. Foreign Aff. GA GAOR Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. GATT GEF Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. GNI GYIL Habitat Hastings L.J. HILJ Harv.L.R. Hous. J. Int’l L. HRLJ Hum. Rts. Q. IAEA IATA IBRD ICAO ICC ICJ ICLQ ICPE ICSID Rev.
xxxi
European Law Review Emory Journal of International Dispute Resolution European Nuclear Energy Agency Environmental Law Encyclopedia of Public International Law European Space Agency ESA Bulletin Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific European Union European Constitutional Law Review Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift Europa Archiv European Atomic Energy Community European Yearbook European Telecommunications Satellite Organization Food and Agriculture Organization Florida International Law Journal Fordham International Law Journal Foreign Affairs General Assembly of the United Nations General Assembly Official Records Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Global Environmental Facility The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics Gross National Income German Yearbook of International Law UN Centre for Human Settlements Hastings Law Journal Harvard International Law Journal Harvard Law Review Houston Journal of International Law Human Rights Law Journal Human Rights Quarterly International Atomic Energy Agency International Air Transport Association International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) International Civil Aviation Organization International Criminal Court International Court of Justice International and Comparative Law Quarterly International Centre for the Promotion of Enterprises ICSID Review
xxxii
list of abbreviations and notes on terminology
ICTR ICTY IDA IEA IFAD IFC IJIL ILC ILM ILO ILR IMCO IMF IMO IMSO Infofish
INMARSAT INTELSAT Int.Conc. Int. Geneva Yb Int.Soc.Sci.J. Int’l Tax & Bus. Law. Internat. Stud. Internat. Aff. Internat. Business Lawyer Internat. Rel. Internat. J. Interpol Int.Spect. IOM IRENA Ir. Stud. Int’l Aff. ITU It.YIL JAIL JAL JALC JCMS JDI JICJ
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia International Development Association International Energy Agency International Fund for Agricultural Development International Finance Corporation Indian Journal of International Law International Law Commission International Legal Materials International Labour Organization International Law Reports Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization International Mobile Satellite Organization Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information and Technical Advisory Services for Fishery Products in the Asia and Pacific Region International Maritime Satellite Organization International Telecommunications Satellite Organization International Conciliation International Geneva Yearbook International Social Science Journal International Tax and Business Lawyer International Studies International Affairs International Business Lawyer International Relations International Journal International Criminal Police Organization Internationale Spectator International Organization for Migration International Renewable Energy Agency Irish Studies in International Affairs International Telecommunication Union Italian Yearbook of International Law Japanese Annual of International Law Journal of African Law Journal of Air Law and Commerce Journal of Common Market Studies Journal du Droit International Journal of International Criminal Justice
list of abbreviations and notes on terminology JIEL JIU JR JSL JWT JWTL J. Interam. Stud. & Wld. Aff. J. Media L. & Pract. J. Mod. Af. Stud. J. Space L. J. Internat.Aff. LAFTA LAIA LCI LIEI LJIL LNTS LoN LQR Max Planck UNYB Mercosur MichLR MIGA NAFTA NATO NCJ Int’l L. & Com. Reg. NedTIR NGO Nigerian J. Int’l Aff. NILR NJB Nord. J. Int’l L. NorTIR Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. NYIL NYUJILP NZLJ OAPEC OAS OAU Ocean Yb. ODECA
xxxiii
Journal of International Economic Law Joint Inspection Unit The Juridical Review Journal of Space Law Journal of World Trade Journal of World Trade Law Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Journal of Media Law and Practice The Journal of Modern African Studies Journal of Space Law Journal of International Affairs Latin American Free Trade Association Latin American Integration Association La comunità internazionale Legal Issues of European Integration Leiden Journal of International Law League of Nations Treaty Series League of Nations The Law Quarterly Review Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market) Michigan Law Review Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Carolina Journal of International law and Commercial Regulation Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht Non-Governmental Organization Nigerian Journal of International Affairs Netherlands International Law Review Nederlands Juristenblad Nordic Journal of International Law Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business Netherlands Yearbook of International Law New York University Journal of International Law and Politics The New Zealand Law Journal Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Ocean Yearbook Organization of Central American States
xxxiv
list of abbreviations and notes on terminology
OECD OEEC OJ ONUC OPCW OPEC OR OSCE Österr. Z. öffentl. Recht u. Völkerrecht OTIF PCIJ Peaslee
PLO Publication of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs PYIL Pub. Admin. & Dev. Quart. J. Adm. Quest. Int’l L. RBDI RdC RDI REDI Regards sur l’Actual. REIO Rev. Algér. Rel. Internat. Rev. Internat. Aff. Rev. Internat. Stud. Rev. Internat. Sci. Adm. RGDIP RHDI RIW/AWD RMC Round Table RTDE
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for European Economic Cooperation Official Journal of the European Communities United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Official Records Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail Permanent Court of International Justice Amos J. Peaslee, International Governmental Organizations (rev. 3rd ed., five volumes, 1974-1980) Palestine Liberation Organization Series of publications including, inter alia, reports on the annual meetings of the UN General Assembly Polish Yearbook of International Law Public Administration and Development The Quarterly Journal of Administration Questions of International Law Revue belge de droit international Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international Revue de Droit International Revue Egyptienne de Droit International Regards sur l’Actualité Regional Economic Integration Organization Revue Algérienne des Rélations Internationales Review of International Affairs Review of International Studies Revue International des Sciences Administratives Revue Générale de droit international publique Revue Hellenique de Droit International Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft. Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebsberaters Revue du Marché Commun The Round Table Revue trimestrielle de droit européen
list of abbreviations and notes on terminology RW SADC SAYIL SC SCO SCOR SELA SEW SJIR
xxxv
Rechtskundig Weekblad Southern African Development Community South African Yearbook of International Law Security Council of the United Nations Shanghai Cooperation Organization Security Council Official Records Latin American Economic System Sociaal Economische Wetgeving Schweizerische Jahrbuch für internationales Recht (Annuaire suisse de droit international) SRIEL Swiss Review of International and European Law Staff Papers Staff Papers of the International Monetary Fund Stanford L. Rev. Stanford Law Review Stud. Diplom. Studia Diplomatica SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organization Syr. J. Int’l L. & Com. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce TEU Treaty on European Union Tex. Int’l L.J. Texas International Law Journal TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Trb. Tractatenblad (Netherlands Treaty Series) UAR United Arab Republic UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAT United Nations Administrative Tribunal UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund UNCIO United Nations Conference on International Organization UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEF United Nations Emergency Force UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFICYP United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNJY United Nations Juridical Yearbook UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNTS United Nations Treaty Series U. Miami Inter-Am. University of Miami Inter-American Law Review L. Rev. UNCTAD Rev. UNCTAD Review UPU Universal Postal Union
xxxvi US USSR VJIL VJTL VN VRÜ WEOG WEU WFP WHA WHO WIPO Wld. Today WLR WMO YEL YbILC YbWA YIO YUN ZaöRV ZLW ZÖR
list of abbreviations and notes on terminology United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Virginia Journal of International Law Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Vereinte Nationen Verfassung und Recht in Übersee Western European and Other Group Western European Union World Food Programme World Health Assembly World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization The World Today Weekly Law Reports World Meteorological Organization Yearbook of European Law Yearbook of the International Law Commission Yearbook of World Affairs Yearbook of International Organizations Yearbook of the United Nations Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht
Notes on terminology • International institutional law is a field of law full of abbreviations. The text will often refer to international organizations by using their full name, but for reasons of brevity or style, abbrevs cannot be avoided. • Occasionally, reference is made to the EEC. Created in 1957 as the European Economic Community, this name was changed into European Community by the 1992 Treaty on European Union. When the text refers to “EEC”, this relates to legal situations dating from before November 1993 (when the Treaty on European Union entered into force). On 1 December 2009, the European Community was replaced and succeeded by the European Union (EU). As much as possible, reference is made to the EU, even when, strictly speaking, the text refers to a legal situation prior to 1 December 2009. • “European Court of Justice” refers to the Court of Justice of the European Union and to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, as this Court was named before 1 December 2009. • For reasons of brevity, the text does not usually use the alternative pronouns “he or she”, but only refers to “he”. This should always be interpreted in a gender neutral way, unless explicitly indicated otherwise. • Regarding references to websites in footnotes: between brackets, reference is made to the month of last access to a website only in cases of references to specific websites, or specific entries presented on general websites.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
I. International institutional law A. A classic theme: interdependence and state sovereignty §1 As human beings, we are constantly drawn closer to our fellow men and women. Today, the people of Amsterdam see and hear more of the peoples of the United States, Russia, China and Africa than they did two hundred years ago of the townspeople of The Hague. The world is increasingly being transformed into a ‘global village’. As a consequence of modern means of communication, the world beyond our borders is brought into our living rooms, broadening horizons and heightening awareness of the major problems of our world. Many of these problems have attained a dimension stretching far beyond national boundaries, requiring international solutions. §2 Such international solutions must be developed in a world which is primarily organized in a state-centric way. Although in the era of globalization a multitude of players is acting in what is often referred to as global governance,1 the state continues to be the supreme form of political organization in the world.2 This is reflected in the concept of state sovereignty. However, it cannot be denied that states have become increasingly interdependent. For example, modern weaponry, international terrorism and other security threats have necessitated international cooperation. States alone are no longer in a position to defend or preserve national security, one of the classic functions of the state. Equally, it is in the mutual interest of states that unhampered post, telephone, fax and internet communication between their citizens is guaranteed. Similarly, with regard to international rivers, it is in the common interest of riparian states that freedom of navigation is assured (Rhine, Danube) or that arrangements are made for the development of water resources (Niger river, Mekong basin). Additionally, it has been gradually recognized since 1945 that international cooperation
1 See e.g. the Millennium Report by Secretary-General Kofi Annan of the United Nations (UN Sales Publication, 2000, also published at www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/), in particular paras. 1-65. “Global governance is generally defined as an instance of governance in the absence of government. There is no government at the global level . . .” ( J.G. Ruggie, Foreword, in T.G. Weiss and R. Thakur, Global Governance and the UN – An Unfinished Journey xv (2010)). 2 Cf. the Lisbon judgment of the German constitutional court: “[t]he state is neither a myth nor an end in itself but the historically grown and globally recognized form of organization of a viable political community” (judgment of 30 June 2009, para. 224 (www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (March 2011))).
2
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§3
is imperative for the protection of human rights. Human rights conventions and other standards have been drafted and supervisory mechanisms created to ensure their respect. §3 Thus, a tension can be seen to exist between the formal independence (sovereignty) of states and their actual interdependence. This can be identified as a classic theme, since it has frequently emerged in early as well as more recent writings. This may be illustrated by the following quotations. I. “The foundation-stone of this work [ – of the United Nations – ] is and must remain the state. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress”. II. The “vision of a world divided into isolated compartments is not a true reflection of facts as they exist in a large portion of the earth today. A modern state . . . is not an isolated independent unit. . . . It is in perpetual and intimate and intricate relationship with other states; it cannot carry on the work of internal government, legislative or administrative, which modern conditions of life require, without continual cooperation . . .; complete independence today is merely a legal fiction”.
At first sight, it may be somewhat difficult to believe that the first quotation dates from 1992 (the Agenda for Peace, prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations), while the second quotation is taken from L.S. Woolf’s book International Government, published in 1916. This demonstrates, however, that even in the beginning of the 20th century, the mutual dependence of states was recognized, and also that, even at the end of that century, the notion of state sovereignty still retained its fundamental importance.3 §4 This classic theme has produced the paradox that, in order to exercise their functions and to remain as independent as possible, states are forced to cooperate due to the unavoidable reality of interdependence and globalization. To a certain extent, international cooperation allows them to control external influences.4 Some specific examples illustrate this paradox. In 1992, Foreign Secretary Hurd of the United Kingdom stated in a speech about the Treaty on European Union: “[i]t is against our fundamental interests so to isolate ourselves from the continent of Europe that policies are organized there which deeply affect our security or our prosperity but in which we have no important say. If that were to happen we could keep our sovereignty as a slogan but its substance would have gone”.5 The 2004 Sutherland Report, prepared at the request of the Director-General of the World Trade Organization, observed the following: “[i]n committing to the WTO and its proce-
3 The quotations are from para. 17 of the Agenda for Peace (UN Doc. A/47/277 and S/24111), and from International Government, at 345-346. Both quotations are taken from parts of these publications, in which attention is also given to the other element, i.e. interdependence in the case of the Agenda for Peace, and state sovereignty in the case of Woolf’s book. See also R.-J. Dupuy, Le dédoublement du monde, 100 RGDIP 313-321 (1996). 4 See also J.-V. Louis, The Community Legal Order 14 (3rd rev. ed., 1995). 5 Speech to the European Policy Forum, London, 1 October 1992. The text of this speech has been obtained from the Information Section of the British Embassy in the Netherlands.
§5
introduction
3
dures and disciplines, governments are returning to themselves a degree of ‘sovereignty’ lost through the process of globalization. If governments are losing the capacity to regulate meaningfully at the domestic level, they are reclaiming some control of their economic destinies at the multilateral level”.6 In 1999, Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga became member states of the United Nations. Following the decision of the UN General Assembly to admit these countries, Micronesia addressed the General Assembly as the Chair of the South Pacific Forum and stated, inter alia, the following: “[f]or small island states like Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga, as with most members of the South Pacific Forum, joining the United Nations is indeed a great sacrifice of scarce resources. Yet we have decided that we can no longer be mere bystanders. The smallness of our Pacific Islands and our remoteness and isolation have not insulated us from the impacts of decisions made elsewhere in the world”.7 In 1993, the German constitutional court considered in its judgment concerning the Treaty on European Union: “The member states have established the European Union in order to exercise a part of their functions in common and to that extent to exercise their sovereignty in common (‘um . . . ihre Souveränität gemeinsam auszuüben’)”.8
§5 It is not purely accidental that these examples all deal with international organizations. Particularly since the end of World War II, international cooperation has increasingly been structured within the framework of international organizations, which are created by states to cope with the consequences of increasing interdependence.9 They reconcile the wish of states to remain independent with the reality of a growing list of transboundary problems. Such reconciliation has been achieved since the first international organizations were established in the 19th century. An example is the Universal Postal Union, created in 1874. According to Article 1.1 of its constitution, “[t]he countries adopting this Constitution shall comprise, under the title of the Universal Postal Union, a single postal territory for the reciprocal exchange of letter-post items”. This creation of a fictitious, functional territory in which the organization has jurisdiction is an example of global governance avant la lettre. The creation and functioning of international organizations on the international stage did not relegate sovereign states to the wings. On the contrary, states remain the leading actors in international relations.10 There is neither a universal state
6 The Future of the WTO – Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium, report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (2004). On this report, see the Forum discussion in 2 IOLR 127-225 (2005). 7 UN Doc. A/54/PV.1, at 12-13. 8 The judgment has been reproduced in 20 EuGRZ 429-446 (1993); quotation at 439. The English translation has been published in CMLR 57-109 (1994); quotation at 90. 9 See also M. Virally, Panorama du droit international contemporain – Cours général de droit international public, 183 RdC (1983 V), at 251 ff.; K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, in P.F. Diehl (ed.), The Politics of Global Governance – International Organizations in an Interdependent World 9-43 (2nd ed. 2001); Weiss and Thakur, op. cit. note 1, in particular the introductory chapter and chapter 1. 10 As former UN Secretary-General Annan stated in his final annual report: “while nation-states are no longer the sole players in international relations, they are still the most important” (UN Doc. A/61/1, at 2 (para. 6)). Cf. the observation by the International Court of Justice in the Reparation for Injuries Case that the United Nations is “certainly not” a state, and still less “a super-state” is as much true today as it was in 1949 (ICJ Rep. 1949, at 179). See further C.-A. Morand, La souveraineté, un concept dépassé à l’heure de la mondialisation?, in L. Boisson de Chazournes and V. Gowlland-Debbas (eds.), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality – Liber
4
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§6
nor a world government.11 Nevertheless, international organizations, the subject of our study, perform an important supporting role and indeed, it is impossible to imagine contemporary international life without them. Next to states and other actors in international relations (such as private enterprises, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, local authorities), international organizations have become familiar players in global governance.12 The proliferation of international organizations is one of the characteristics of modern society.13 B. Objectives §6 This study aims to fulfil three objectives. First, to examine in detail the institutional law of international organizations, and to see how different organizations have dealt with similar institutional problems. The second goal is much more practical: to contribute to improvements in the structure and functioning of international organizations. Thirdly, we aim to offer a general framework for a better understanding of the (similarities and differences between) institutional rules of international organizations. 1. To describe and analyze international institutional law §7 Our first goal is to examine in detail the institutional law of international organizations, to see how different organizations have dealt with similar institutional problems. The institutional law of international organizations comprises those rules of law that govern their legal status, structure and functioning. Although each organization has its own legal order, institutional problems and rules of different organizations are often more or less the same. In practice, an impressive body of institutional rules has been developed. These rules often bear strong resemblance to one another, or are even identical. This explains the subtitle of this book: unity within diversity. §8 The increased need for international cooperation has changed the substance and structure of international law. The present substance of international law includes a number of issues that previously belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of states. Trade and monetary policy, social policy, human rights, international criminal justice and environmental protection are some striking examples.14 As far
Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (2001) 153-176; Ruggie, op. cit. note 1, at xvii: “[i]nternational organizations remain anchored in the state system”. 11 P. Capps, The rejection of the universal state, in N. Tsagourias (ed.), Transnational Constitutionalism 17-43 (2007). 12 See particularly with respect to the economic field C. Tietje, Global Governance and InterAgency Cooperation in International Economic Law, 36 JWT 501-515 (2002). 13 See on a number of legal issues involved N.M. Blokker and H.G. Schermers (eds.), Proliferation of International Organizations (2001). 14 Cf. Serbian and Brazilian Loans Case, PCIJ Rep. 1929, Series A Nos. 20/21. At that time, the Permanent Court could still come to the conclusion that “it is a generally accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency” (at 44, 122), while nowadays the IMF (created in
§9
introduction
5
as the structure of international law is concerned, the most significant development is the increasing number of international organizations and the expansion of their activities. In particular since 1945, states have sought to structure their cooperation to a large extent in the form of international organizations: from general organizations such as the United Nations to specific organizations like the International Coffee Organization and the World Tourism Organization. International organizations, whether they be large or small, general or specific, provide interstate cooperation with a permanent framework.15 §9 International law has sometimes been described as horizontal, in contrast to the vertical nature of modern domestic law, where law-making is centralized, where courts have compulsory jurisdiction and where judgments by courts can be enforced.16 This fundamental difference between domestic and international law can be explained by the notion of state sovereignty. The classic definition of sovereignty was formulated in 1928 by Max Huber in the Palmas Arbitration: “[s]overeignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state”.17 As has become common practice, the notion of sovereignty will be given its relative meaning under contemporary international law, and not the traditional, absolute sense dominant in the 19th century. Sovereignty “denotes the basic international legal status of a state that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental, executive, legislative or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign state or to foreign law other than public international law”.18 The fact that, since the early twentieth century, public international law has increasingly imposed substantial limitations upon the freedom of states does not take away their legal status as sovereign entities, as long as the essence of state functions is retained.19 The notion of state sovereignty as it is used here means that states are internally and externally the supreme form of political organization. Legally, this is reflected
1944) imposes a number of limitations upon the freedom of its members ‘to regulate their own currency’. 15 See in this context M. Ruffert and C. Walter, Institutionalisiertes Völkerrecht (2009), at 2: “[a]ls institutionelles Völkerrecht bietet es [– das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen –] dem materiellen Völkerrecht das organisatorische Rückgrat und ist seinerseits nur unter Einbeziehung der materiell völkerrechtlichen Regelungen und der Organisationsaufgaben aus der materiellen Völkerrechtsordnung zu verstehen”. 16 See e.g. R. Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 Temple Law Quarterly 295-320 (1959); Bin Cheng, Custom: the Future of General State Practice In a Divided World, in: R.St.J. MacDonald and D.M. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory 513-554 (1983), at 519-522; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case IT-94-1-AR72 (The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić), 2 October 1995, para 11 (reproduced in 35 ILM (1996), at 32, and 105 ILR (1997), at 453. 17 Published in 22 AJIL 867-912 (1928), at 875. 18 H. Steinberger, Sovereignty, EPIL Vol. 4 (2000), at 511-512. See also Steinberger’s extensive bibliography on the concept of sovereignty (id., at 518-521). Of particular interest for the present study is: D. Ninčić, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations (1970). 19 Steinberger, op. cit. note 18, in particular at 512-513.
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§10
(internally) in the basic rule that states are forbidden to intervene in the internal affairs of other states, and (externally) in the basic rule of the formal equality of states. More generally, this can be illustrated by what is probably the primary attribute of sovereignty: the state’s monopoly over the use of force. Internally, the state has the exclusive right to legitimate use of force. Externally, at the global level, a monopoly of force is lacking; instead, Article 2.4 of the UN Charter imposes a general obligation on states to refrain from the threat or use of force as a cornerstone of the UN collective security system, established to maintain international peace and security. Thus, at the same time, state sovereignty ensures and explains the unity of domestic legal orders, as well as the looseness, and the lack of coherence, of international law.20 §10 International organizations have, to some extent, narrowed the differences between international and municipal law, and each has given international law a more vertical character within its own field of operation. In this way, the lack of a central, supranational authority at the global level and the resulting horizontal nature of international law have partly been compensated for by the creation and functioning of international organizations. International organizations have therefore remedied, to some extent, what has been called the carence institutionelle of the international legal order.21 They embody the institutionalization of the international society.22 Their existence led Mosler to the conclusion that “they now form a kind of superstructure over and above the society of states”.23 These organizations constitute legal orders in themselves, which are not similar to domestic legal orders, but are instead partial legal orders, concerning only the field of activity of the organization and only those states that choose to participate in them. The constitutions of these organizations lay down a number of substantive ground rules. Organs are created with their own powers. An institutional framework is established within which the member states can further the objectives of the organization, adapt its substantive rules to changing circumstances, and supervise the implementation of obligations by the members. §11 Most changes in international law since 1945 have occurred within the framework of international organizations. The importance of these organizations for the development of international law, and for international cooperation in general, has been widely recognized.24 To study the institutional law of international
20 Again, these two offsprings of the notion of state sovereignty should not be regarded as absolute concepts. A growing number of exceptions to these two basic rules have been generally accepted. 21 I.e. the “institutional deficiency” of the international legal order; G. Scelle, Manuel de droit international public 21 (1948). 22 T. Ben Salah, Institutions internationales (2005), at 48: “[i]l y a là l’amorce d’une institutionnalisation de la société internationale”. 23 H. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, in: 140 RdC 1-320 (1974 IV), at 189. 24 See for instance J.L. Kunz, General International Law and the Law of International Organizations, 47 AJIL 456-462 (1953), at 462; C. Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (1958), at 175 ff.; R. Ago, Die internationalen Organisationen und ihre Funktionen im inneren Tätigkeitsgebiet der Staaten, in: W. Schätzel and H.J. Schlochauer (eds.), Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisationen, Festschrift für Hans Wehberg 20-38 (1956); R. Ago, The State and International Organi-
§12
introduction
7
organizations is to discover to what extent these organizations have given international law a more vertical character. Not a more vertical character in general (like domestic law), but only in the specific field within which these organizations are active.25 To some extent, in the horizontally structured international society, international institutional law is what constitutional and administrative law is in the vertically structured domestic society. State sovereignty explains both the unity of the domestic legal order, characterized by one coherent body of constitutional and administrative law, and the disunity of the international society, characterized by a large number of international organizations, each with its own legal order and institutional law. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the creation and functioning of international organizations has partly compensated for the lack of a central, supranational authority. Therefore, there is a need for a systematic mapping of institutional rules of international organizations. 2. To contribute to improvements in practice §12 This systematic overview will analyze the institutional rules that currently exist in all their varieties, and examine how similar institutional problems encountered by different international organizations have been solved. It will be presumed that solutions found by one organization might also be useful for others. Comparisons may eventually lead to the identification of potential improvements in the structure and functioning of international organizations. However, two provisos must always be borne in mind when drawing such comparisons. Firstly, institutional rules must not simply be copied from one organization to another, without taking into account differences in the objectives and structure of those organizations (see below, §24). Secondly, it should be realized that international institutional law cannot establish an ideal blueprint for all organizations. Institutions are not ends in themselves, but instead are necessary instruments largely in the hands
zation, in: International Law In a Changing World 12-21 (1963), at 20-21; M. Lachs, Le role des organisations internationales dans la formation du droit international, in: Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin 157-170 (1964); W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), Part V and at 376-379; J.Abr. Frowein, Der Beitrag der internationalen Organisationen zur Entwicklung des Völkerrechts, in: 36 ZaöRV 147-167 (1976); D. Vignes, The Impact of International Organizations on the Development and Application of Public International Law, in: MacDonald and Johnston (eds.), op. cit. note 16, at 809-855; R.P. Anand, Sovereign Equality of States in International Law 197 RdC (1986 II), at 9-228 (at 33: “[t]he most serious and important inroads into the traditional concept of sovereignty have been made by the creation of international organizations”); G. AbiSaab, La ‘communauté internationale’ saisie par le droit – essai de radioscopie juridique, in: Boutros Boutros-Ghali Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber – Peace, Development, Democracy 81-108 (1998) (at 94: “l’approche du droit de coopération est foncièrement institutionnel” . . . “les normes issues de l’approche du droit de coopération, aussi ambitieuses soient elles, ne peuvent avoir une emprise sociale réelle sans arrangements institutionnels adéquats pour leur mise en oeuvre”). See also the 1984 UNITAR study on the Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order (UN Document A/39/504/Add.1), at 70: “. . . the international law of cooperation is by necessity an institutional law, and has always been intimately associated with international organizations”. 25 Cf. R.-J. Dupuy, Le droit international (4th ed. 1972), at 75-76, 121-125; W. Meng, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen – eine Entwicklungsstufe des Völkerrechts 209-212 (1979).
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§13
of states, which have been created to perform specific functions.26 It is these functions which, in the final analysis, determine the optimal institutional structure of international organizations.27 The functional nature of the institutional structure of international organizations, and the fact that institutions are crucial but not ends in themselves, may be illustrated by referring to the opening provision in the Treaty on European Union on the institutions of the Union: “[t]he Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the member states, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions”.28
3. To contribute to a better understanding of international institutional law a. Legal research into the law of international organizations §13 We are faced with a rapidly growing wealth of institutional law and practice of international organizations. It was therefore suggested, as early as 1968, that scholars in this field should cooperate; no single person would be able to cover the field even if research were limited to the most important organizations.29 Why then should we embark upon this impossible research project? For precisely the same reason: because of the rapidly growing wealth of institutional law and practice of international organizations. If no attempt is made to step back from the mass of rules and reflect on them, it will be impossible to distinguish the wood from the trees. If no such attempts are made, we run the risk of drowning in an ever-increasing flood of rules and facts, with no opportunity to keep our heads above water. We need to have some understanding of this field, in order to make well-informed decisions in practice about the question of whether or not to create a new organization, and about a myriad more specific institutional questions that emerge within existing international organizations on a daily basis. In his classic study of the United Nations system, Virally observed that this system is little understood, partly because there has not been much theoretical reflection in the field of international organizations. In his view, such reflection would need to depart from a comparative study of all types of contemporary international organizations.30 This book aims to fulfil this role, at least with regard to the institutional law of international organizations. On the basis of a comparative analysis of the existing areas of international institutional law, which we have
26 Cf. I. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (4th ed. 1971), at 84: “[o]ne of the major tasks of twentieth-century statesmanship is to strike a balance between obsessive concern with institutional problems – which makes international organization an end in itself, and exclusive concentration upon substantive issues of current world politics – which neglects the building of an adequate institutional apparatus for international relations”. 27 See e.g. UN Doc. E/AC.62/9 (A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation), at 1-4. 28 TEU, Art. 13.1. 29 L.B. Sohn, The Growth of the Science of International Organizations, in: K. Deutsch and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The Relevance of International Law 328-353 (1968), in particular at 351-353. 30 M. Virally, l’Organisation mondiale 25 (1972).
§13A
introduction
9
sought to address in the separate chapters of this book, an attempt will be made to conclude each chapter with some general reflections that seek to increase our understanding of the law of international organizations. §13A While it is true that theoretical reflection in the field of international organizations has been limited, this does not mean that such entities have not been studied from a legal perspective. Since the establishment of the first international organizations in the 19th century, organizations and their law have been the subject of legal research, in a wide variety of countries and languages.31 Klabbers has analyzed this research, and distinguishes between three stages. In his view, during the first stage (with a peak after the creation of the League of Nations), authors mostly attempted to capture and understand international organizations and their law as new phenomena. The second stage (dominant from 1945 until the early 1970s) was characterized by the solving of practical problems, often following comparative approaches. The third stage commenced in the early 1990s. According to Klabbers, while earlier works assume that international organizations are “inherently good”, the trend since the early 1990s is not to start from this assumption, but to look at international organizations in a more conceptual and critical way. Klabbers is careful not to suggest that this is a linear development in relevant legal research: for example, critical studies have also been published long before the ‘beginning’ of the third stage. Rather, these stages reflect what he calls the changing image of international organizations and the developing emphasis in research.32 Since the 1990s, there has been an increased interest amongst lawyers in theoretical reflection in the field of the law of international organizations. Two approaches should be briefly discussed here, as they have deep roots and have met with considerable support: constitutionalism and global administrative law. There are others as well, of which the public law approach in particular should be mentioned, which is the result of a project of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (Heidelberg, Germany).33 This latter approach focuses on the exercise of international public authority. Since international public authority is mostly exercised by international organizations, international institutional law is used as a basis for analysis. International public authority is both constituted and limited by public law. The public law approach aims to facilitate the legal analysis of global governance, and to develop legal standards for legitimate governance.34
31
Sohn, op. cit. note 29, gives an excellent overview of such research until the mid 1960s. J. Klabbers, The Life and Times of the Law of International Organizations, in 70 Nord.J.Int’lL. 287-317 (2001); see also J. Klabbers, The Changing Image of International Organizations, in J.-M. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Organizations 221-255 (2001). 33 A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions – Advancing International Institutional Law 575-605 (2010). See in particular the introductory article in this book: A. von Bogdandy, P. Dann & M. Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities (at 3-32). As these authors indicate (at 22), their project is inspired by the constitutionalist approach. 34 Id., at 5. 32
10 b.
chapter one
§13B
Constitutionalism
§13B Constitutionalism has a long history in national contexts. It concerns the relationship between law and politics. While constitutionalism has been defined in different ways, a common starting point is the principle that political power must be exercised within the limits of the law.35 Constitutionalism has been named as such since, at the national level, the constitution is the foundation of the national legal order, providing for basic institutional and substantive rules for national political communities. Those communities, therefore, do not function in a lawless limbo, but in accordance with the rule of law, as a Rechtsstaat. To implement this key principle, national constitutions usually include two types of provisions: those providing for a separation of powers (trias politica), and those laying down fundamental rights. §13C Since political power is also increasingly exercised at the international level, constitutionalism is relevant at this level as well, as has been demonstrated in numerous academic writings.36 Key elements of constitutionalist thinking can already be found in such early works as Grotius’ treatise De Iure Belli ac Pacis, which was written based the conviction that “there is a common law among nations, which is valid alike for war and in war”.37 It is now generally accepted that international relations do not take place in a lawless limbo, but within boundaries set by international law. At the same time, however, the substance of these boundaries, as well as the way in which they are implemented, is different from the substance and modalities of implementation of their more mature national equivalents. It is generally recognized that there is no Rechtsstaat at the international level similar to that which exists at the national level. For example, at the international level there is no separation of powers between a legislature, an executive branch, and a judiciary as commonly exists at the national level. And although during the last few decades an impressive web of international human rights obligations has been developed, those obligations essentially serve to protect individuals against states, not against some Global Sovereign. §13D While there is no Rechtsstaat at the international level similar to that which exists at the national level, it has nevertheless been suggested that the international
35 See e.g. T. Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions – A Comparative View (2003), at 245: “[i]n its simplest form, constitutionalism means that the powers of the State are not exercised arbitrarily, reflecting the mere will of the political leaders of the day, but in accordance with the law, which creates or recognizes permanent institutions and organizes the powers to be exercised by them”. 36 E.g. H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1933); T. Opsahl, An International Constitutional Law?, 10 ICLQ 760-784 (1961); Tsagourias, op. cit. note 11; J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman, Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (2009); J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009). 37 The Law of War and Peace, translation by F. Kelsey (1925), Prolegomena, para. 28.
§13E
introduction
11
legal order has a constitution of its own, and that the UN Charter could be considered not only as the constitution of the UN, but also as the constitution of the international community.38 These suggestions are by no means generally accepted. Views diverge, partly because different definitions are used: the narrower one’s definition of a constitution, the more difficult it is to conclude that the international community has its own constitution. But it cannot be denied that the international legal order has certain substantive and institutional ground rules that resemble ground rules of national constitutions; or that the UN Charter has a number of characteristics that make it comparable, to a greater or lesser degree, to national constitutions. Although the Charter does not contain separation of power provisions similar to those at the national level, the Charter has a number of provisions governing the principal organs of the UN and their interrelationship. Furthermore, while the Charter does not include a catalogue of fundamental rights, it does refer to the promotion of human rights as one of the UN’s purposes, and in practice a catalogue of such rights has been elaborated through separate general and specific treaties. Neither can it be denied that the international legal order is developing in a ‘more constitutional’ direction – reference is sometimes made to a process of ‘constitutionalization’ – and that initial views concerning the abovementioned suggestions may need to be revised over time.39 It is therefore necessary to approach these issues with an open mind, keeping a close eye on developments in practice, while always taking into consideration the fundamental differences between national legal orders and the international legal order. §13E The application of constitutionalism above the level of the state is not limited to the universal level and to the UN, but can also be observed regionally. At the European regional level, it has been authoritatively concluded that key European treaties are of a constitutional nature. For example, in 1986 the European Court of Justice referred to the (then) EEC Treaty as “a basic constitutional charter”;40 and in 1995 the European Court of Human Rights described the European Convention on Human Rights as “a constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public)”.41 More recently, in 2004, the governments of the (then) 25 EU member
38 Classical works in this area have mostly written by German scholars, see A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926); A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (1976; 3rd ed. 1984); B. Simma, From bilateralism to community interest in international law, in 250 RdC (1994-VI), in particular at 256-285; B. Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (2009). See also R. Chemain and A. Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, constitution mondiale? (2006). 39 See e.g. D.Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (2005), for a careful and critical analysis of the claim that the WTO is ‘constitutionalizing’. See also J.L. Dunoff, The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious Case of the World Trade Organization, in Dunoff and Trachtman, op. cit. note 36, at 178-205 (in which the WTO is analyzed as a “curious case”, since the constitutionalization of the WTO is a key issue in scholarly writings about the WTO, but not at all in WTO practice). 40 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, ECR 1986, at 1339 (para. 23). 41 Loizidou Case, Appl. No. 15318/89, judgment of 23 March 1995 (para. 75).
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states signed a draft “Treaty Establishing a European Constitution”. However, referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected this draft. Apparently for many citizens the idea of having a formal European constitution was a bridge too far, even though in practice the founding European Treaties have widely been accepted as being of a constitutional nature.42 Following a period of reflection, the governments of the EU member states decided not to adopt a new constitution, but to introduce somewhat less ambitious changes in the form of amendments of the existing EC and EU Treaties.43 Nonetheless, these changes are significant from the perspective of constitutionalism, inter alia because they include a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In addition, the EC and EU Treaties have always contained provisions resembling separation of powers provisions in national constitutions, and the European Court has developed the principle of institutional balance, which governs relations between EU institutions (see below, §220-221). §13F Constitutionalism may therefore be relevant for international organizations. Their constitutions establish a legal framework for their operation. Exercising political power in the context of an international organization is therefore different from doing so outside this context, for example in bilateral interstate relations, ad hoc conferences and informal settings. To the extent that international organizations exercise political power, they do not do so “arbitrarily, reflecting the mere will of the political leaders of the day”.44 International organizations are usually created by treaties that define their competences and create quasi-permanent institutional structures. These treaties lay down legal boundaries for what the organizations may do. Amongst these boundaries are the attribution principle (see below, §206-236), the decision-making rules of the organization (see below, Chapter 6) and, in exceptional cases, review or scrutiny by judicial or quasi-judicial organs (see below, Chapter 5, Section II). While constitutions of international organizations, unlike national constitutions, usually lack fundamental rights provisions, they typically have specific provisions relating to the organs of the organization and their inter-relationship. At the same time, it may not always be easy in concrete cases to identify the applicable law and the precise limits it prescribes. For example, while it was not unlawful for the UN Security Council to impose financial sanctions on individuals, constitutionalism may help to explain why such sanctions were nevertheless widely considered illegitimate, absent any independent review mechanism (see below, §1483). There are, however, reasons why the relevance of constitutionalism for international organizations is limited. Many international organizations exercise little or no political power. In addition, most of their activities concern cooperation
42 There is a vast amount of literature on this, see e.g. J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (2003); N. Walker, Reframing EU Constitutionalism, in Dunoff and Trachtman, op. cit. note 36, at 149-176. 43 These amendments are laid down in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Art. 1 of this Treaty contains the amendments to the EU Treaty, Art. 2 contains the amendments to the EC Treaty. 44 Koopmans, op. cit. note 35.
§13G
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between governments, and only affect individuals indirectly.45 The World Meteorological Organization, the International Cocoa Council, the International Network on Bamboo and Rattan, and hundreds of other organizations were deliberately created as frameworks for technical, depoliticized cooperation. This does not mean that highly political issues (such as apartheid in the 1960s and 1970s) cannot arise in the context of their work. However, this is the exception, not the rule. Only some of the most well-known organizations, such as the UN, the EU, and a handful of others, exercise political power to a significant extent. This should be reflected in our analysis: the greater the diversity, the more there is a need for nuance. §13G Against the background of these fundamental debates, this book will follow a rather modest approach. It does not seek answers to questions such as the question of whether the international community has a constitution, or whether constitutionalist ideas should require a reform of international organizations. This book is largely based on a comparison of the institutional law and practice of international organizations. Its approach is more ‘bottom up’ than ‘top down’. International organizations are usually created by treaty. These treaties may have different names, such as Covenant, Charter, Statute, or Constitution (see below, §1146). The generic term given to these treaties is either “constituent instrument” or “constitution”.46 This book will use the term “constitution”. All constitutions of international organizations have characteristics comparable to those of national constitutions, some more than others. A key difference between international organizations and states, however, is that almost all organizations, except for the UN, the EU and some other general regional organizations (such as the OAS and the AU), do not have a general field of operation, but are instead ‘functional’ in the sense that they have been created to perform specific functions in a particular area in which institutionalized cooperation is desired. Examples are the Universal Postal Union, the International Organization of Vine and Wine, and the Mekong River Commission. Because these and most other international organizations lack the state’s general, overall scope of operation, their constitutions are also different in scope than national constitutions. The legal order of an international organization is a partial and functional legal order, because it is limited to the field of operation of the organization and to those states that participate in it, whereas the domestic
45 For many international organizations it therefore still holds true to some extent what Tammes has written in an early international institutional law study: “[t]he activities of international organizations, at the present stage of their development, take place on the surface of social reality. International organizations mainly have contact with international legal persons, either states, other organizations, or further bearers of international rights and obligations. It is relatively rare that they have contact with people, other than with people as representatives of organs. Nearly all implementation and realization of international decisions takes place at the national level.” (A.J.P. Tammes, Hoofdstukken van Internationale Organisatie, eerste stuk (1951), at 1 (our translation)). 46 The ILC has generally used the term “constituent instrument” when preparing conventions in which definitions were given of treaties creating international organizations (see e.g. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 5; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (1986), Art. 2.1(j) and Art. 5). The ICJ has used both “constituent instrument” and “constitution”.
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legal order is integral (see below, §1139-1144). Nonetheless, even constitutions of organizations with very limited, specific functions have characteristics that distinguish them from ordinary treaties and make them comparable to national constitutions to some degree. For example, constitutions of international organizations may formulate certain substantive ground rules for international cooperation in a particular area, or provide for a distribution of competences among the organs of the organization. An alternative title for this book could therefore have been “International Constitutional Law”.47 Indeed, while preparing the first edition of this book, consideration was given to naming this field of study “international constitutional law”. This alternative title was rejected, however, “as constitutional law was a wider notion also including fundamental human rights”.48 “A second option was to reserve ‘constitutional law’ for national constitutions and use ‘institutional law’, inspired by the institutions of the [then] recently established European Communities, for the constitutions of international organizations”.49 Moreover, because this field of study considers not only the ground rules of international organizations, but also the much more detailed rules relating to the functioning of international organizations, “international institutional law” is a more appropriate term than “international constitutional law”. Indeed, such more detailed rules often resemble those of administrative law at the national level. This brings us to another approach that has been suggested in more recent years and that is relevant to the study of the law of international organizations: global administrative law. c. Global administrative law §13H Global administrative law deals with the growing number of rules and decisions that originate from a wide variety of bodies at the international level: not only international organizations, but also institutions such as the International Association of Insurance Supervisors,50 the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),51 and hybrid public-private organs such as the World Anti-Doping Agency.52 What these regulatory bodies have in common
47 On the term ‘international constitutional law’, see Opsahl, op. cit. note 36. See also J.H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (2006), in particular at 49-56, 222-227 and 266-268. Jackson is in favour of strengthening international organizations and a development from international institutional law to international constitutional law. 48 H.G. Schermers, The Birth and Development of International Institutional Law, 1 IOLR 5-8 (2004), quotations at 6. 49 Id. 50 See www.iaisweb.org. 51 See www.icann.org. ICANN is a non-profit corporation under Californian law. On this Corporation, see M. Hartwig, ICANN – Governance by Technical Necessity, in Von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), op. cit. note 33, at 575-605. 52 See www.wada-ama.org. WADA was established in 1999 as a private foundation under Swiss law. On this Agency, see L. Casini, Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: The World AntiDoping Agency (WADA), 6 IOLR 421-446 (2009).
§13I
introduction
15
is the fact that, at the international level, they make rules or take decisions that resemble national administrative law. Traditionally, administrative law existed only at the national level. However, growing interdependence amongst states has resulted in increased international regulation and administration by international organizations, NGOs, informal groups and public-private forms of cooperation. This development has created an accountability deficit. At the national level, administrative law is embedded in national legal orders that have their own national accountability mechanisms. National administrative law provides for secondary rules for administrative decisions and practices. These are rules about rules, which lay down a framework regulating administrative decisions and practices. In the absence of a global government, such an overarching regulatory framework and similar accountability mechanisms exist only in rudimentary form at the international level. Therefore, to compensate for the absence of such a framework, greater openness, participation and transparency is required in the context of international administrative law.53 Global administrative law has been defined as “comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make”.54 It has been suggested that this emerging field of law may provide a conceptual framework for addressing some of the practical legal problems of international organizations, which “may contribute to the reframing and deepening of the existing field of international institutional law”.55 §13I Like constitutionalism, global administrative law has deep roots. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, international administrative law developed as a separate field of study.56 After a long period of relative silence, this field of study has received renewed attention since the early years of this century. It has been rebranded as “Global Administrative Law” (GAL) and is now developed much further, in particular by Kingsbury and Stewart at the NYU Institute for International Law and Justice,57 and by S. Cassese and Casini. While constitutionalism is about basic, fundamental rules for the international society, about the establishment of a Rechtsstaat at the international level, global administrative law is more oriented towards specific executive or implementing rules and decisions. What
53 S. Cassese, Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 NYUJILP 663-694 (2005). 54 B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R.B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15-61 (2005); see also B. Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 EJIL 23-57 (2009). 55 B. Kingsbury and L. Casini, Global Administrative Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law, 6 IOLR 319-358 (2009). 56 See e.g. P. Kazansky, Théorie de l’administration internationale, 9 RGDIP 353-367 (1902); P.S. Reinsch, International Administrative Law and National Sovereignty, 3 AJIL 1-45 (1909). 57 See www.iilj.org/GAL.
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§14
these approaches have in common is that they seek to deal with emerging international cooperation in the absence of a State at the global level. Global administrative law is both wider and narrower than international institutional law. It is narrower in that it does not cover all types of institutional rules of international organizations, such as (most of the) rules on membership, decisionmaking and legal status.58 At the same time, it is also wider, because it is not limited to the law of international organizations. Global administrative law also encompasses the law of all kinds of other public and private bodies. Its focus is on the output of these bodies: the rules and decisions that they produce. By contrast, the focus of international institutional law is on formal international organizations, and on the question: in the absence of a State at the global level, how has the international community organized itself ? The renaissance of this field of study in recent years is to be welcomed, as it enriches our understanding of a number of developments in practice. It is to be welcomed specifically for the study of the law of international organizations. Although global administrative law has a different orientation than international institutional law (focusing more on ‘administrative output’ than on the phenomenon of international organization), it enhances our insight into important parts of international institutional law, in particular those that are related to the rules and decisions of international organizations, and to their operational activities.59 d. Political science and international organizations §14 While there is no strongly established tradition of developing theories on international organizations in the land of legal science, notwithstanding the recently developed schools of constitutionalism and international administrative law, the situation is different for the neighbouring discipline of political science. Within this discipline, there are a respectable number of specific studies of international organizations, as well as works on international relations in general, that pay some attention to international organizations.60 These studies, of course, approach international organizations from a different perspective. They pose different questions, and use a different methodology. As a discipline, they are more interested in matters of power and influence, while legal studies have rules as their departure
58 This is also one of the reasons why the public law approach does not use the notion of administration as a foundational concept; see Von Bogdandy, Dann and Goldmann, op. cit. note 33, at 16. 59 See further Kingsbury and Casini, op. cit. note 55, in particular at 334-356, in which the authors discuss five areas of operational practice of international organizations to which, in their view, a global administrative law approach may make some contribution: emergency actions by international organizations; human rights dimensions of their operations; the administration of field offices and field missions; public-private partnerships; and the increasing use of soft law. 60 Cf. the overview given by J.M. Rochester, The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study, 40 International Organization 777-813 (1986); F. Kratochwil and J.G. Ruggie, International Organization: a State of the Art or an Art of the State, 40 International Organization 753775 (1986); M.P. Karns and K.A. Mingst, International Organizations – The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (2004), in particular at 35-60.
§15
introduction
17
point. Naturally there is some degree of overlap,61 not only because questions of law can never be neatly separated from questions of power and influence, but also because widely diverging views can be distinguished within both disciplines. While some political scientists pay little attention to institutional rules (because they are considered less relevant), others take the view that rules are important for understanding and explaining practice (for example, institutionalists and regime theorists).62 While some lawyers, in their study of international organizations, are well-known for their view that legal science should be pure, and free of non-legal elements,63 others (for example, McDougal and Lasswell, Falk) focus so much on the role of law in practice that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish their work from studies by political scientists. Nevertheless, all legal studies of international organizations share the assumption that the rules of these organizations are more or less relevant. This assumption is also the starting-point for the present study, which does not seek to answer questions such as: what roles and functions are performed by international organizations in international relations? How can the management of international organizations be improved?64 Do international organizations contribute to international stability or international peace, and in what ways?65 It is assumed for the purposes of this book that international organizations have a role to play in reality. e. Virally and the concept of ‘function’ §15 In this attempt to better understand international institutional law, we can benefit from the pioneering work of Virally, which is hardly known outside the French-speaking parts of the world.66 It suffices here to indicate briefly the gist
61 Not many studies have been carried out on the borderline between the two disciplines. Probably the most classical exception is L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2nd ed. 1979). See for an overview of the interdisciplinary landscape: A.-M. Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: a Dual Agenda, in: 87 AJIL 205-239 (1993). 62 Institutionalists and regime theorists have sought explanations, inter alia, for the persistence of the sovereign state, notwithstanding increasing interdependence. There is a wealth of literature in this area. To mention just a few studies: R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (1989); S.D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (1983); S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty (An Institutional Perspective), 21 Comparative Political Studies (April 1988), at 66-94. 63 See e.g. H. Kelsen’s voluminous study: The Law of the United Nations (1951). 64 This is discussed in D. Dijkzeul and Y. Beigbeder (eds.), Rethinking International Organizations – Pathology and Promise (2003). 65 Questions like these are addressed in international relations studies. See e.g. R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye, S. Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (1993); M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World – International Organizations in Global Politics (2004) (viewing international organizations as bureaucracies). Another example is C. Archer, International Organizations (3rd ed. 2001), with many further references. Chapter 4 of Archer’s book gives a survey of the literature on international organizations, distinguishing between three divisions of writings: writings representing the more traditional ‘realist’ view of international organizations (based primarily on the state-centric model of international affairs), reformist views and the radicals. The first edition of the present book is classified by Archer as “traditionalist”, like all other international law studies (at 128-129). 66 M. Virally, La notion de fonction dans la théorie de l’organisation internationale, in: Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau – La communauté internationale 277-300 (1974). This article is reproduced in M. Virally, Le droit international en devenir – Essais écrits au fil des ans 271-288 (1990).
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§16
of his ideas. In his view, the general theory of international organizations has two “poles”: state sovereignty and the concept of “function”. “Function” is a core notion, intended to provide theory in this field with the necessary coherence and unity.67 The notion of function comprises, inter alia, one very important element for the analysis of international organizations: the finality of the function, or the objective(s) of the organization. This element gives the notion of function its dynamic character and deserves special attention. §16 International organizations never come into being spontaneously, without reason. Their creation is the result of the need felt by states to cooperate within an institutional framework. This need arises because states no longer consider themselves capable of performing a given task independently. However, there is an important difference between the tasks or functions of international organizations, and those of the state (the common good, the general interest, the security and prosperity of the nation, and so forth). The latter tasks, of course, confer on the state its raison d’être; but in practice states, sovereign as they are, do not necessarily have to justify their existence time and again by referring to these tasks. This can be contrasted with international organizations, the existence of which is entirely instrumental, directly related to the performance of certain functions. In other words: the finality of the state is integral ( finalité intégrée), whereas the finality of international organizations is functional ( finalité fonctionnelle).68 Therefore, decisions taken by organs of international organizations often refer to provisions in the constitution attributing the power to these organs to take the decisions in question. In the UN, such references are often lacking, although since the 1990s they have been included in a large number of Security Council resolutions. Within the EU, the decision-making organs are obliged to refer to the legal basis of the decision; according to the European Court of Justice, “the choice of the legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an
The importance of this work has mainly been recognized by French and Italian authorities; see e.g. R. Monaco, Les principes régissant la structure et le fonctionnement des organisations internationales, in: 156 RdC 79-225 (1977 III), in particular at 96-97. Monaco, correctly in our view, implicitly rejects Virally’s opinion that the law of organizations aiming at integration cannot be compared to the law of organizations aiming at cooperation; in fact, his study is to a considerable extent based on a comparison between EC and UN practice. 67 Virally, La notion de fonction, op. cit. note 66, at 278, 296. Virally’s ideas concerning the other “pole”, state sovereignty, have been elaborated in Une pierre d’angle qui résiste au temps: avatars et pérennité de l’idée de souveraineté, in: Les relations internationales dans un monde en mutation, a collection of essays on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales (1977), at 179-195. 68 Cf. also C. Rousseau, L’indépendance de l’Etat dans l’ordre international, in: 73 RdC 167-254 (1948 II), at 248: “. . . la compétence de l’Etat est par définition une compétence plénière. Alors que les compétences des autres collectivités publiques sont des compétences d’attribution, nécessairement limitées quant à leur object, la compétence étatique reste indéterminée ratione materiae – ou plutôt l’Etat est entièrement libre de déterminer l’étendue de sa compétence ratione materiae . . .”. See also Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996, at 78 (para. 25): “[t]he Court need hardly point out that international organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike states, possess a general competence. International organizations are governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that is to say, they are invested by the states which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those states entrust to them”. See further below, §209-210.
§17
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19
institution’s conviction as to the objective pursued but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review”.69
§17 From a strictly legal point of view, functional finality embodies three normative aspects. First, the authorization aspect (habilitation). Functions authorize international organizations to have a structure, competences and instruments of substantive law, which do not operate aimlessly, within a vacuum, but are geared towards realizing the objectives of the organization. The second aspect, moderation (or limitation; in French mesure or limite), is complementary to the first, and contains the limits to this authorization. In other words, the objectives of an organization determine what it may do and what it may not do. An example related to the structure of organizations is laid down in Article 22 of the UN Charter: “[t]he General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”. The General Assembly is thus authorized to create subsidiary organs, but this authorization is limited: the creation of such organs must be deemed necessary for the performance of the Assembly’s functions. An example related to the competence of international organizations is Article 2.7 of the UN Charter: “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state [. . .]”. This is a clear limitation on what the UN is authorized to, but the limitation itself is restricted to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction. The scope of this restriction is not the same now as it was in 1945, and can be determined by an interpretation of the functions of the UN. The third normative aspect of the functional finality of international organizations is the obligation aspect (obligation): the organs of the organization are obliged to perform the functions entrusted to them by the members. In other words, the obligation aspect determines what the organization must do. An example can be found in Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: “[i]f action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures” (emphasis added). §18 It is clear that, in practice, a tension is perceptible between Virally’s two poles – state sovereignty and the function of international organizations – in relation to all three normative aspects. The member states of an international organization frequently question the competence of the organization to deal with a specific matter.70 Similarly, although the organization is sometimes obliged to act,
69
Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, ECR 1987, at 1520. See e.g. with respect to the UN Security Council: report of the meeting of 29 November 1990, S/PV.2963, at 58 (Cuba); report of the meeting of 3 April 1991, S/PV.2981, at 21-35 (Iraq); report of the meeting of 5 April 1991, S/PV.2982, at 17 (Iraq), 27-30 (Yemen), 31 (Zimbabwe), 44-52 (Cuba). A well-known earlier denial of the competence of the UN General Assembly was put forward by the 70
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§19
disagreement among its members often prevents the organs of the organization, in which those members are represented, from functioning. For example, although the original Article 75 of the EEC Treaty (now, as amended, Article 91 TFEU) obliged the Council to enact a number of rules to create a common transport policy before 1970, disagreement among the member states prevented the Council from carrying out this obligation; it took a judgment by the European Court of Justice in 1985 to prompt cooperation in this field.71 The decision of states to create an international organization does not alter the fact that the same states are regularly the organization’s most significant opponents.72 In practice, member states regularly frustrate the operation of ‘their’ organizations. A number of writers have even argued that the existence of organizations has sometimes been used by states as an excuse for doing little or nothing to achieve the goals of the organization.73 This can be explained by the horizontal structure of international law and the enduring predominant role played by state sovereignty. More generally, the observation that “international organization reflects the view that world order is not more important than national interests, but that it is important to national interests” seems to encapsulate the position precisely.74 §19 Virally was aware of this practice, and criticized it by concluding the article in which he developed his theory of functionality with the following rhetorical question: “from the moment when states have acknowledged the existence of common interests, which justify the establishment of an international organization and the attribution to this organization of functions destined to be of service to them, are they still allowed to consider their sovereignty as an unlimited power to dissociate themselves and to pursue dysfunctional activities, no matter what damage might result from this for the international community to which they have adhered?”.75 §20 Fortunately, not only academics are aware of this danger. When creating international organizations, states also display some degree of self-knowledge, and
USSR with regard to the creation of the first United Nations Emergency Force by the Assembly in 1956 (see GAOR, PV + Annexes, 1st Emergency Special Session, 1956, at 127-128). 71 Case 13/83, European Parliament v. Council, ECR 1985, at 1556. 72 Cf. P. Reuter, Institutions internationales 213 (7th ed. 1972). 73 G. Myrdal, The Challenge of World Poverty 308 (1970). S. Strange distinguishes three purposes of international organizations: strategic, adaptive and symbolic purposes. She defines the latter as “allowing everybody to declare themselves in favour of truth, beauty, goodness, and world community, while leaving governments free to pursue national self interests and to do exactly as they wish”, in: Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis, 36 International Organization, 479-496 (1982), at 484. See also the 1982 Annual Report of the UN Secretary General: “[t]here is a tendency in the United Nations for governments to act as though the passage of a resolution absolved them from further responsibility for the subject in question” (UN Doc. A/37/1, at 3). See furthermore the appeal to the member states, in the introduction to the 2003 Annual Report by the UN SecretaryGeneral, “that they should be ready to use the Organization to achieve mutual objectives and to accommodate different national interests. In calculating their national interests, they should give due weight to the value and importance of a just and stable world order” (UN Doc. A/58/1, at 2). 74 I. Claude in: The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 8 (1968), at 35. 75 Virally, op. cit. note 66, at 300 (our translation).
§21
introduction
21
many constitutions contain general obligations for the member states to cooperate, or to act in good faith. These obligations generally boil down to a prohibition on the member states from acting against the goals of the organization, and if necessary to subordinate their own interests to those of the organization.76 Article 2.2 of the UN Charter stipulates: “All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter”.77 This provision demonstrates that UN members have to fulfil their Charter obligations for reasons of reciprocity: the obligation of one member is the right or benefit of another; and the notion of good faith is meant as a guide for the execution of Charter obligations.78 Another example is Article 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union: “. . . The member states shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The member states shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”. In this provision, a clear distinction is made between a (positive) obligation for member states to cooperate and a (negative) obligation to refrain from obstructive activities. The effect of such general obligations to cooperate varies. Within the European Union, the Court of Justice has used it as a basis for further development of the obligations of the member states.79 Other organizations lack judicial organs with powers similar to those of the EU Court; in those contexts, the application of such general obligations to cooperate usually remains a plaything in the arena of politics. Only exceptionally has the International Court of Justice referred to the obligation in Article 2.2 of the Charter.80 §21 It is clear that these general good faith obligations can never completely remove the basic tension that exists between the two poles of state sovereignty and the function of international organizations, even if organizations have judicial organs. The tension can in fact never be removed ‘from above’, by political decisions or rules of law, but only ‘from below’, by a process of social integration.81 Only then will states fully come to recognize that “world order is more important than national interests” and that they can no longer “consider their sovereignty
76 E. Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public 157 (1977). See also the review essay of Zoller’s book by M. Virally in 77 AJIL 130-134 (1983). 77 It has been argued that the words “good faith” in this provision are superfluous, “for it is impossible to “fulfil” an obligation in bad faith” (Kelsen, op. cit. note 63, at 89). 78 Zoller, op. cit. note 76, at 158. See also Virally, op. cit. note 9, at 271. 79 H.G. Schermers and P.J. Pearson, Some Comments on Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, in: J.F. Baur, K.J. Hopt, K.P. Mailänder (eds.), Festschrift für Ernst Steindorff 1359-1378 (1990); M. Blanquet, L’article 5 du Traité CEE, Recherche sur les obligations de fidélité des États membres de la Communauté (1994). 80 See in particular Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1948, at 63. 81 Cf. C. de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (1957) (translation from the original French edition), at 88-100; M. Bourquin, L’Etat souverain et l’organisation internationale 4-5 (1959).
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as an unlimited power to dissociate themselves and to perform dysfunctional activities”.82 As long as this process of social integration has not advanced sufficiently far, sovereign states and international organizations will continue to exist, as will the tension mentioned above which is so characteristic of the functioning of international organizations. This tension is of fundamental importance for most of the issues of institutional law discussed in the following chapters. It will therefore be the central theme in the concluding paragraphs of those chapters. C. Unity within diversity? §22 Having presented our objectives, it is clear that the most basic assumption underlying the present study is that there is something like international institutional law, that there is some unity within diversity. However, is this assumption justified? This question deserves closer attention, because it may not be immediately self-evident that there is anything more than the law of each individual international organization. Indeed, not all academics specializing in this field agree that there is a separate discipline of international institutional law.83 International organizations differ widely in a number of respects. Some have only a few members (for example the Andean Community, Benelux, the Mekong River Commission or NAFTA), whereas others include nearly all existing states (for instance, the United Nations and most of its specialized agencies). Some organizations have limited powers (for instance, to function only as a forum for consultations: examples are the International Copper Study Group and the Asian and Pacific Coconut Community), while others can take majority decisions binding the member states and even individuals within the jurisdiction of the member states (the European Union). Each organization has its own constitution, makes its own rules and performs its own functions. There is little coordination of the activities of international organizations. Thus, international organizations vary greatly. The same is of course true for states.84 Differences between states are immense as well, as far as the size of their territory and population is concerned, their political systems, economic characteristics, the cultures of their peoples and so forth. Nevertheless, states, even failed states, have something that international organizations do not have: a territory. This partly explains why states are sovereign and international organizations are not, and why the principle of sovereign equality of states does not have a ‘brother’ or ‘sister’ principle of the equality of international organizations.
82
Cf. the quotations above from the studies by Claude (§18) and Virally (§19). This is questioned in particular by J. Klabbers, see his The Paradox of International Institutional Law, 5 IOLR 151-173 (2008). 84 See F. Morgenstern, Legal Problems of International Organizations 1 (1986); N. Blokker, Comparing Apples and Oranges? Reinventing the Wheel? Schermers’ book and Challenges for the Future of International Institutional Law, 5 IOLR 197-213 (2008), at 204; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, Droit international public 642 (8th ed. 2009). 83
§23
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23
Each organization is unique. Therefore, the danger exists that comparing institutional law of one organization to that of another is like comparing apples and oranges. §23 Nevertheless, international organizations also have much in common. Three common characteristics may be distinguished. (1) International organizations are influenced by the same political factors that shape present-day international relations. In the Cold War era, many international organizations were affected in one way or another by the tensions between the two opposite blocs. The end of the Cold War resulted in a re-orientation or a new spirit of cooperation within existing organizations (for example, NATO), or even in the birth or the demise of international organizations (the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Warsaw Treaty Organization respectively). At the beginning of the 21st century, a new situation has emerged in which there is only one superpower, the hegemony of which is so substantial that it often can impose its will on other states, even if this will is against existing rules of international law.85 This dominant position of the US also has its influence on the law of international organizations. The participation of the US in these organizations often plays a crucial role. On the one hand it may provide the necessary leadership, while on the other hand this may also lead to decisions or policies that are or may become a source of tension amongst the members. Apart from this dominant position of the US, during the first decade of the 21st century a few other states have also become powerful players in international relations. Examples are China, Brazil and India. Together with Russia, these countries have created an informal framework for cooperation, BRIC, which had a first official summit meeting in June 2009. It is within this general political context that all international organizations have to perform their functions. International organizations are all formed by sovereign states – some more powerful than others – that bring their own national interests with them. Having established an international organization, its member states strive to remain the masters of their own creation. They provide ‘their’ organization with powers and with the financial and other means to enable it to realize its objectives. Organizations have not (yet?) become institutional versions of Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice, and have not outgrown the control of the member states. Basically, all international organizations seek to reconcile the wish of the member states to remain as independent as possible with the reality of interdependence and the need to cooperate in a certain area. In this respect, there is unity. (2) Having this common background, international organizations are confronted with a large number of similar day-to-day problems. All organizations of which the Soviet Union once was a member needed to respond to the disintegration of this state: could and should the Russian Federation step into the shoes of
85 See further M. Byers and G. Nolte (eds.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (2003).
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the Soviet Union, without being formally admitted as such, or did it need to be admitted as a new member? Could and should the Russian Federation become a permanent member of all organs of which the Soviet Union was a permanent member? Many other examples can be given. Under what conditions and procedures may states become, or cease to be, a member? Can and should Kosovo or Palestine be admitted as a member to international organizations? Can the European Union become a member of another international organization, even if the constitution of the latter only allows states to become a member? Should the chairman of an international organ remain in office when a subject matter on the agenda directly concerns his country? Should the secretariat of the organization be composed of civil servants selected exclusively on the basis of their professional qualifications, or should it have a certain number of nationals of all member states as staff members? Should specific organs be created to deal with disputes between the organization and its personnel? Is it lawful to remove from office the Director-General of an international organization, even though the constitution of that organization only provides for the power to appoint him? How can effect be given to the desire of the organization to invite persons to its meetings despite the fact that the host state would normally refuse these persons access to its territory? With respect to voting, should each member state have one vote (reflecting the formal rule of sovereign equality of states) or should members have different voting strength (reflecting factual inequalities between member states)? Should the organization’s activities be financed by compulsory or voluntary contributions from the member states, or should it have its own resources? If governments of member states decide to limit their expenses, and those of international organizations, would it be possible to discuss certain agenda items, or to have meetings of the supreme organ of the organization on a bi-annual instead of on an annual basis? May an organ, when adopting the budget of the organization, refuse to allocate finances for activities initiated by another organ that is exclusively competent to decide upon such activities? These examples demonstrate that international organizations, despite their widely-diverging objectives, powers, fields of activity and number of member states, have all kinds of similar problems with legal aspects. (3) However, to conclude that international organizations have similar problems with legal aspects is not the same as concluding that there are any common rules for dealing with such problems. Nevertheless, most writers take the view that, although each organization has its own legal order, they often benefit from each other’s rules and practical experience, and they do follow common rules or principles.86 This view is supported by legal practice, as may be illustrated by a few examples.
86 M. Virally, L’ONU devant le droit, 99 JDI 247 (1972); E. Lauterpacht, The Development of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of International Tribunals, 152 RdC (1976 IV), in particular at 396-402; Monaco, op. cit. note 66, at 92-93; P. Reuter, Sur quelques limites du droit des organisations internationales, in: E. Diez et al. (eds.), Festschrift Bindschedler 491-507 (1980); C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2nd ed. 2005), in
§23
introduction
25
In 1949, a special arbitral tribunal was set up by UNESCO to answer a question concerning the eligibility for re-election for a second term of members of the Executive Board. The tribunal reached its conclusion mainly by following a textual interpretation. However, this interpretation was confirmed, as the Tribunal put it, “by scrutiny of the provisions regarding eligibility for re-election in the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice”.87 Another example is offered by the case law of two regional courts, the Andean Court of Justice and the East African Court of Justice. In its first preliminary rulings, the Andean Court has found that Andean community law takes precedence over national law, and has referred to the Costa-ENEL ruling of the European Court of Justice (EU Court).88 Likewise, the East African Court in one of its first cases referred to case law of the EU Court.89 Further examples may be found in the case law of international administrative tribunals. In 1993, the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization referred to rulings of the EU Court and stated that, although it is not bound by these rulings, they “do carry persuasive authority”.90 The same Tribunal referred to “the established case law of all international administrative tribunals” in its 2003 judgment in the Bustani case (see below, §544).91 Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Court regularly refer to judgments of other international courts and decisions of supervisory institutions such as the Human Rights Committee.92 The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly held, more generally, that the European Convention on Human Rights93 or the principles underlying that Convention,94 “cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum”. Furthermore, the Human Rights Committee, established by
particular at 17-20 and 344-348; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Daillier, Forteau and Pellet, op. cit. note 84, at 642; P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (6th ed. 2009), at 16. 87 Quoted in Lauterpacht, op. cit. note 86, at 401. 88 J. Polakiewicz, Andean Common Market, Court of Justice, EPIL Vol. 1 (1992), at 163-164. 89 Anyang’ Nyong’O et al. v. Attorney General of Kenya, judgment of 30 March 2007, available at www.eacj.org; for a brief analysis of this case, see A.P. van der Mei, Regional Integration: The Contribution of the Court of Justice of the East African Community, 69 ZaöRV 403-425 (2009). 90 Judgment 1296 (Cook). 91 Judgment 2232 (Bustani). 92 E.g. European Court of Human Rights: Lawless Case, Judgment of 14 November 1960, Publ. ECHR, Series A, 1960-1961, at 14-15; Marckx Case, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Publ. ECHR, Series A No. 31, at 26; cf. also Sigurjónsson Case, Judgment of 30 June 1993, Publ. ECHR, Series A No. 264, para. 35; Case of Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 May 2001, 35 EHRR 30, paras. 85-97; Case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 February 2005, Appl. nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99. E.g. Court of Justice of the European Communities: Case C-432/92 (Anastasiou), Judgment of 5 July 1994, ECR 1994, at I-3087, paras. 35, 49. For a detailed study relating to the European Court of Human Rights, see M. Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights (2010). For an analysis of the relevant case-law of the EU Court, see A. Rosas, With a Little Help from my Friends: International Case-Law as a Source of Reference for the EU Courts, in 5 The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2005, at 203-230 (2005); M. Bronckers, The Relationship of the EC Courts with Other International Tribunals: Non-committal, Respectful or Submissive? 44 CMLRev. 601-627 (2007). 93 E.g. Al-Adsani Case, Judgment of 21 November 2001, 34 EHRR 11, para. 55; Cudak Case, Judgment of 23 March 2010, Appl. no. 15869/02, para. 56. 94 E.g. Loizidou Case, Judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, para. 43; Banković Case, Judgment of 12 December 2001, para. 57 (reproduced in 41 ILM 517 (2002)).
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has clearly been inspired by the case law of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights.95 In addition, the International Court of Justice has referred to case law of other international courts and tribunals. For example, in interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it has taken into account the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, in order “to achieve the necessary clarity and consistency of international law”.96 It has also observed that, when it is called upon to apply a regional instrument for the protection of human rights, “it must take due account of the interpretation of that instrument adopted by the independent bodies which have been specifically created, if such has been the case, to monitor the sound application of the treaty in question”.97 These examples demonstrate that, over the years, growing interconnections have developed between these international judicial bodies. What Mosler wrote in 1974 is even more true today: international organizations “now form a kind of superstructure over and above the society of states”.98 The abovementioned examples concern (organs of) international organizations that face a particular problem and benefit from the rules and practice of other organizations in finding solutions. But there are also examples of the existence of common rules or principles for international organizations. In 1981, the World Bank Administrative Tribunal observed, in its first decision, that some judgments of the various existing international administrative tribunals “speak of general principles of international civil service law or of a body of rules applicable to the international civil service”; it also referred to “the tendency toward a certain rapprochement”.99 Furthermore, the practice of granting privileges and immunities to international organizations is so general that national courts have occasionally decided that every organization enjoys such privileges and immunities in its member states or in its host state under customary international law.100 In addition, it has been observed that certain rules of procedure applied by international organizations and international conferences “have achieved near universal
95 See D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1991), at 158-160; T. Zwart, The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions, The Case Law of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee (1994), at 98, 123, 130, 215; M. Bossuyt and O. Lins, La prise en considération de la jurisprudence de Strasbourg par le Comité des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies, in G. Cohen-Jonathan and J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Le rayonnement international de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme 83-100 (2005). 96 ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. DRC), Judgment of 30 November 2010, para. 66. 97 Id., para. 67. 98 Op. cit. note 23. 99 Decision No. 1 (de Merode et al.). 100 An example is the judgment of 20 December 1985 of the Dutch supreme court in Iran – United States Claims Tribunal v. A.S., reproduced in ILR Vol. 94, at 329 (also in 18 NYIL 357 (1987)). See also I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Failure of Controls in the Sixth International Tin Agreement, in N. Blokker and S. Muller, Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations – Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers (1994), Vol. I, at 271; R. Higgins, Problems & Process – International Law and How We Use it (1994), at 90-91.
§24
introduction
27
application and may well by now have the status of customary international law”.101 Another example is offered by the existence of general rules concerning treaties to which international organizations are parties: the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations.102 A further example is provided by the draft rules on responsibility of international organizations, adopted on first reading by the International Law Commission in 2009.103 §24 Therefore, while each international organization is unique, for the abovementioned three reasons they have sufficient characteristics in common to justify comparison of them, to support the claim that there is unity within diversity, and to consider international institutional law to be a sub-discipline within the larger field of public international law. This is confirmed in practice. Whenever a new international organization is established, and a constituent instrument and more specific rules (such as rules of procedure for the organs of the new organization) have to be agreed upon, there is no ‘start from scratch’. Key institutional rules cannot be avoided, and rules of existing organizations are normally used in the process of drafting. In this process, on the one hand it may be decided to depart from existing rules because the new organization is considered to have different needs or – as a much more mundane but certainly not less accurate explanation – because other people are involved. On the other hand, it is also very common to rely on existing rules of existing organizations, notwithstanding differences between the relevant organizations. Such existing rules have proven their worth, and it may be wise to rely on such rules rather than on proposed rules that come out of the blue: why re-invent the wheel? The development of new rules in the law of international organizations often is characterized by a tension between the ‘apples-and-oranges-argument’ on the one hand, and the ‘why-reinvent-the-wheel argument’ on the other.104 §25 The shared problems and rules of international organizations particularly relate to institutional legal matters. Institutional law does not differ dramatically from one organization to the next: each organization needs rules on issues of, for example, its internal structure, membership, decision-making, financing, relations with the host state, and these rules often bear strong similarities.105 However, the situation is different for the substantive law of international organizations, which mainly consists of the rules made by the organization to regulate the conduct of
101 R. Sabel, Procedure at International Conferences – A study of the rules of procedure at the UN and at intergovernmental conferences 6 (2nd ed. 2006). 102 Text published in UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15. This convention has not yet entered into force. As at 5 March 2011, it was ratified by 29 states and 12 international organizations (see below, §1743 and §1773). 103 Reproduced in UN Doc. A/64/10, at 13-178. 104 Blokker, op. cit. note 84, in particular at 200-201. 105 Monaco even observes that “les organisations internationales possèdent, en principe, une structure de base qui devient de plus en plus semblable” (op. cit. note 66, at 122).
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(individuals, enterprises within) the member states, such as the EU’s agricultural regulations, the monetary rules of the IMF, the labour conventions of the ILO, and prohibitions or catch limits for commercial whaling set by the International Whaling Commission. Unlike institutional law, the content of these substantive rules differs between organizations because it directly reflects the diverging tasks and fields of competence of those organizations. D. Method §26 There are basically two methods for studying the law of international organizations. First, the law of one single international organization can be analyzed, in whole or in part. Secondly, a comparative method can be employed. In view of our objectives, the comparative method is the most appropriate. The institutional structure of one or a few specific international organizations does not form the focus of this work. Rather, it is hoped that a cross-section of institutional law of international organizations in general can be given. Our analysis distinguishes between 11 areas of institutional law: these are covered in the following 11 chapters of this book. In these chapters, a systematic overview of the respective institutional rules of international organizations will be presented. In principle, all existing public international organizations are included in this overview, as well as the few organizations that no longer exist (for example, the League of Nations, Comecon). For practical purposes, however, attention will focus primarily on the United Nations and its related organizations, the European Union, and the most important other regional organizations. §27 While there is general agreement that, in principle, the comparative method is useful,106 there is a difference of opinion as to the scope of this method. Is it possible and useful to compare the law of all international organizations, or do some organizations differ so much from others that a comparison is no longer meaningful? In particular, some writers question whether the law of the European Union can still be compared to the law of organizations like the United Nations, the International Telecommunications Union and the Organization of American States.107 In their view, this is to compare apples and oranges.
106 According to W.E. Butler “it is natural that they [international organizations] should invite comparative analysis on a variety of levels”, in view of the large number of organizations now in existence; in: Comparative approaches to international law, 190 RdC 9-90 (1985 I), at 38. According to M. Sørensen, “it is clear that a rich field has opened here for the comparative lawyer, not only inasmuch as organizational problems relating to national and international constitutions may be compared, but also owing to the fact that the legal structures and functions of individual international organizations are sufficiently similar and at the same time sufficiently diverse to permit profitable comparative studies”, in: Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a Systems Analysis of International Organizations in the World Legal Order, 32 ICLQ 559-576 (1983), at 563. 107 See e.g. P.J.G. Kapteyn in a review of the Dutch version of the second edition of this book; 33 SEW 537-538 (1985).
§28
introduction
29
The most profound expression of this view is given by Virally,108 who considers that a distinction should be made between two sorts of international organizations: those having international cooperation as their function, and those aiming at integration. Virally argues that “organizations whose function is cooperation consequently leave intact the basic structure of the present-day international community, composed of sovereign states”, whereas “organizations whose function is integration are responsible for bringing their member states closer together by taking over certain of their functions, to the extent of merging them together in a composite whole, in the sector in which they exercise their activity, that is, in their field of competence . . . Concomitantly, certain essential functions of states (legislation, statutory regulations) will be exercised by the organs of the organization for and on behalf of the organs of states”.109 Those who take the opposite point of view hold that organizations like the European Union can be compared to organizations like the United Nations, as long as the member states remain sovereign and, thus, their relations within the framework of the organization are based on treaties, as opposed to the relations between states within a federal state, which are founded on a constitution.110 §28 The latter view is the point of departure in this study. The members of the EU continue to be sovereign states, as is clear from a number of characteristics of the Union. This situation has not changed after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009). For instance, the principle of conferred powers continues to apply (see below, §209-210), and member states now have the explicit right to withdraw from the Union.111 In Germany, complaints were brought before the German Constitutional Court, in which it was argued that the Act Approving the Lisbon Treaty would result in the loss of statehood for Germany. The Court rejected this analysis, and recalled that the German Basic Law does not allow Germany to abandon its sovereignty by joining a federal state, and only provides for taking part in the EU as an association of states that remain sovereign. Analyzing the Lisbon Treaty, the Court concluded that “[a] will that aims at founding a state cannot be ascertained”.112 It will be demonstrated that, although the European Union imposes much stronger constraints on domestic policies of the member states than other international
108 M. Virally, Definition and classification of international organizations: a legal approach, in: 29 Int. Soc. Sci. 58-72 (1977), in particular at 61-63. (This article has also been published as Chapter 2 of: G. Abi-Saab (ed.), The Concept of International Organization 50-66 (1981)). 109 Id., at 62. 110 E.g. I. Seidl-Hohenveldern and G. Loibl, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen, einschließlich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften (7., überarbeitete Auflage, 2000), at 8; W. Meng, op. cit. note 25, at 52; P. VerLoren van Themaat, Restructuring the International Economic Order – Some Keynotes, in: P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. Koers, K. Mortelmans (eds.), Restructuring the International Economic Order: The Role of Law and Lawyers 1-8 (1987), at 1. Cf. also D. Simon, L’interprétation judiciaire des traités d’organisations internationales (1981), in particular at 469, footnote 200. 111 TEU, Art. 50. 112 Judgment of 30 June 2009, op. cit. note 2, in particular paras. 111, 228-229 (quotation at para. 277).
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organizations, its institutional law can be compared to that of other organizations. It is clear that in this comparison, the more far-reaching objectives of the Union need to be taken into account. In some respects, it is precisely these objectives that explain institutional differences. Of course, some aspects of EU law can be compared more easily to the law of organizations like the UN than other aspects, where EU law is closer to municipal law. Nevertheless, even with regard to the latter, a comparison is useful. It may contain lessons for other organizations, or it could indicate possible directions for the future development of the law of these organizations.113 This study is therefore based on the presumption that all international organizations, including those which according to Virally aim at cooperation rather than integration, affect the basic structure of the present-day international community and more specifically, as elaborated above, give international law a more vertical character.
II. Definition A. International cooperation, international organizations, (con)federations §29 While the term “international organization” was probably used for the first time in the 19th century,114 it is only since the Second World War that the terms “intergovernmental organization” and “(public) international organization” have received wide acceptance for the phenomenon discussed in this study.115 We will mainly use the terms “international organization”, or simply “organization”. Other terms are occasionally used, in particular the French notion “institution internationale”, based on the concept of “institution” introduced by Maurice Hauriou.116 This term is sometimes used as a synonym for international organizations, sometimes also for states or organs of international organizations, or even for international law in general.117
113 Cf. the authoritative study by M. Bertrand of the Joint Inspection Unit, Some Reflections on Reform of the United Nations, UN Doc. JIU/REP/85/9 or A/40/988 (1985), at 61-62, where the suggestion is made to transpose the Council-Commission structure of the EU to the level of the UN. 114 By the Scottish jurist James Lorimer. See P.B. Potter, Origin of the term international organization, 39 AJIL 803-806 (1945). 115 “Public international organization” is used in, e.g., ICJ Statute, Art. 34; ILO Constitution, Art. 12. “Intergovernmental organization” is used in, e.g., OAS Constitution, Art. 124; the Agreement Establishing the Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation as an Intergovernmental Organization (2002), Art. 1. “International organization” is used in, e.g., the Agreement establishing the Pacific Islands Forum (2005), Art. I.1; the Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2009), Preamble; the Agreement for the Establishment of the International Anti-Corruption Academy as an International Organization (2010), Art. I.1. 116 See S. Bastid, Place de la notion d’institution dans une théorie générale des organisations internationales, in: L’évolution du droit public, études offertes à Achille Mestre 43-51 (1956). 117 For example, the principal EU organs are called “institutions” (see Art. 13.1 TEU). Reuter’s book “Institutions internationales” (1st ed., 1955) refers to states as the principal international institutions. It is used as a synonym for international organizations in Bowett’s book on the law of international organizations, bearing the title “Law of International Institutions” (1st ed., 1964; 6th ed. by Sands and Klein (2009), op. cit. note 86). A very broad definition is given by J. Charpentier:
§29A
introduction
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§29A The International Law Commission (ILC) has preferred the term “intergovernmental organization” for a long period of time, and has decided, on a number of occasions, not to elaborate a precise definition.118 The ILC approach has been followed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character (1975), and in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (1986), which in their provision on the use of terms stipulate: “ ‘international organization’ means an intergovernmental organization”. The purpose of this stipulation is indicated in Paragraph (14) of the ILC commentary to Article 2 of the draft articles on the law of treaties (subsequently the 1969 Vienna Convention): “. . . in order to make it clear that the rules of nongovernmental organizations are excluded”.119 In 2003, the ILC decided to follow a different approach, within the context of its work on the responsibility of international organizations. Within this context – as opposed to its previous approach – it agreed upon the following definition: “the term ‘international organization’ refers to an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality. International organizations may include as members, in addition to states, other entities”.120 This definition is largely similar to the one used in this book (see further below, §32-45). One small difference is the ILC requirement of international legal personality. This excludes organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from the scope of the ILC work. This difference may be explained by the fact that the ILC definition is given for the purpose of the articles on responsibility of international organizations:
“ Les institutions internationales . . . sont à la fois: – les organismes – Etats et organisations internationales – qui composent la société internationale, et les règles de droit qui régissent leurs rapports”, in: Institutions internationales 1 (17th ed., 2009). A somewhat similar definition is used by Ben Salah : “[l]’étude des institutions internationales tend à la description des règles et mécanismes qui gouvernent les rapports entre les membres de la société internationale” (op. cit. note 22, at 2). 118 See in particular Yearbook of the ILC 1985, Vol. II, Part One, at 105-107. 119 Yearbook of the ILC 1966, Vol. II, at 190. See also UNJY 2008, at 438 (where the UN Office of Legal Affairs referred to this “laconic” definition of international organizations in these three Vienna Conventions). 120 UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.636/Add.1, at 5 (at 6-7 the ILC indicates the shortcomings of the approach followed previously); this is the definition as now included in Art. 2(a) of the draft articles on responsibility of international organizations adopted by the ILC on first reading, see UN Doc. A/64/10, at 43. The ILC does not define “members”. Such a definition is of some importance as it is recognized that under certain circumstances members of an organization may be held responsible for wrongful acts by ‘their’ organization. It could be assumed that “members” refers to full members (see below, §69 ff.), since only full members may participate with full rights in all activities of the organization and determine its acts and policies. However, the ILC also refers to the associate members and the affiliate members (see below, §166 ff.) of the World Tourism Organization as examples of private entity members, while these categories have only limited rights (e.g. no voting right) (UN Doc. A/64/10, at 49). For a criticism of the proposed definition, see M. Mendelson, The Definition of ‘International Organization’ in the International Law Commission’s Current Project on the Responsibility of International Organizations, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today – Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter 371-389 (2005).
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if an international organization has no legal personality, it is not the organization but only the members that can be held responsible.121 The change of approach by the ILC was triggered by Gaja, the ILC’s Special Rapporteur on responsibility of international organizations, in his first report.122 Gaja convincingly demonstrated that the traditional ILC approach could not be followed in the articles on responsibility of international organizations, which required a more precise definition. Gaja suggested to use the term “international organization” for “an organization which includes states among its members insofar it exercises in its own capacity certain governmental functions”.123 This definition was extensively discussed within the ILC in 2003. An openended working group was established. The outcome of these discussions was the definition mentioned above, which is somewhat different from Gaja’s proposal. Whereas Gaja’s proposed definition focuses on the members (not only states) and functions (governmental) of the organization, the somewhat more classical ILC definition concentrates on the way in which an organization is created (by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law) and on the requirement of legal personality. A final difference is the absence in the ILC definition of a reference to the “governmental functions” included in the definition proposed by Special Rapporteur Gaja.
§30 It is not the purpose of this book to cover forms of international cooperation occurring outside the framework of international organizations. There are many examples of flexible, informal, more or less structured frameworks for cooperation that cannot be qualified as international organizations. To name just a few: the Quartet on the Middle East; the Group on Earth Observations (established in 2005 to coordinate efforts to build a Global Earth Observation System of Systems);124 BRIC (a forum of newly emerging economies in which Brazil, Russia, India and China cooperate); the G-8; and the G-20. It is the intention of the participants in these groupings not to structure their cooperation in the form of an international organization. In practice, it is clear that such cooperation is indeed more flexible than that within an international organization. For example, in 2011, BRIC was changed into BRICS when South Africa joined it, without any formal admission procedures, ratification, and so forth. Another example is the G-20. Whereas, in the past, the G-8 has been a high-level framework for policy coordination, following the 2008 financial crisis it was decided not to use the G-8, but rather the G-20 as a forum for the coordination of financial policies, because the G-20 was widely seen as more representative of the existing international economic power relations. In contrast, it is much more difficult to adapt formal international organizations to changes in international relations, as is illustrated by the now more than 20-year history of unsuccessful attempts to reform the UN Security Council. It is necessary to define international organizations in order to make clear when the line is crossed: when forms of international cooperation have become
121 See also the first report on responsibility of international organizations by ILC Special Rapporteur Gaja, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, at 15. 122 Id. 123 Id., at 18. 124 See www.earthobservations.org (March 2011). As at March 2011, this Group has 86 “members” (states and the European Commission), 61 “participating organizations”, and seven “observers”. Its Secretariat is located at the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva.
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so institutionalized and structured that they should be classified as international organizations. However, this is easier said than done. In practice, the boundary between international organizations and less structured forms of international cooperation is less clear-cut than any definition of these organizations would suggest. Moreover, the institutional intensity of cooperation may change over time: less structured forms of international cooperation may develop into an international organization. For example, when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was concluded in 1975, and the so-called participating states decided to have follow-up meetings at regular intervals, it was explicitly agreed that the CSCE would not be established as an international organization. Nevertheless, in practice, the CSCE has increasingly been given a formal structure: the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted on 21 November 1990, created, inter alia, a Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, a Committee of Senior Officials and a Secretariat; and it also provided for the creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly at a later date.125 In December 1994 at the Budapest Summit, this process of institutionalization culminated in the decision to change the name of the Conference to ‘Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’ (OSCE).126 However, at the same time there was reluctance to transform the CSCE into a fully-fledged international organization. It was decided that OSCE’s participating states should not become “members”, but should continue to be named “participating states”. In addition, more problematically, no legal personality was given to the OSCE (see further below, §1569). Earlier, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had undergone a similar development. Created in 1947 as an executive agreement, it was gradually transformed into an international organization.127 A former Director of the Legal Affairs Division of the GATT Secretariat has observed that “jurists may differ on the question of whether the GATT is also an international organization in a formal legal sense. The administrators of that institution are as fascinated by that issue as birds are by ornithology. The fact that counts for them is that the GATT has been
125 The text of the Charter of Paris is reproduced in Europe Documents No. 1672 (1990). See on this process of institutionalization of the CSCE, E.B. Schlager, The Procedural Framework of the CSCE: from the Helsinki consultations to the Paris Charter, 1972-1990, in: 12 HRLJ 221-237 (1991). In 1991, the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly was established through a resolution adopted by delegations of the parliaments of countries participating in the CSCE (meeting in Madrid in April 1991). See for the text of this resolution: 30 ILM 1344-1347 (1991). See also R. Szafarz, CSCE: an International Organization in Statu Nascendi?, in A. Bloed and W. de Jonge (eds.), Legal Aspects of a New European Infrastructure 15-21 (1992); I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Internationale Organisationen aufgrund von soft law, in: U. Beyerlin et al. (eds.), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung – Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt 229-239 (1995); M. Sapiro, Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: legal aspects of a political transformation, 89 AJIL 631-637 (1995); J. Bortloff, Die Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa: eine völkerrechtliche Bestandsaufnahme (1996); C. Bertrand, La nature juridique de l’Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (OSCE), 102 RGDIP 365-406 (1998). 126 OSCE Handbook (2007), at 8. This decision took effect on 1 January 1995. 127 J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 119-122 (1969); W. Benedek, Die Rechtsordnung des GATT aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht (1990), in particular at 248-280; see further below, §44A.
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acting consistently as an entity legally separate from its contracting parties and has been treated as having legal capacity”.128 Nevertheless, strictly seen, GATT still remained a provisional trade agreement. In practice, it was considered necessary to make the formal status of this organization more clear and to create a firmer and permanent institution for cooperation in international trade.129 In 1994, it was agreed, therefore, that the World Trade Organization should be established to replace the GATT.130 Another example is the 1957 Antarctic Treaty, which originally did not establish an international organization. However, a gradual process of institutionalization has taken place, and following years of discussions a permanent Secretariat was created in 2001.131 In 2003, it was agreed that the plenary organ (the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting) has the capacity to conclude a headquarters agreement with host state Argentina. So far, similar developments have not occurred with respect to a treaty regime for the other end of the globe, the Arctic Council, which has been described as a “forum without legal personality”,132 a “standing conference”,133 and “not an international organization but a form of cooperation sui generis”.134 In 1996, at the G-7 Summit in Lyon (France), US President Clinton announced the creation of the International Commission on Missing Persons for the former Yugoslavia (ICMP). The ICMP estimated that there could be some 40,000 persons still missing as a result of the armed conflict. Its task was to assist families in locating and identifying these persons.135 The ICMP was not created as an international organization at the time. However, in practice, a gradual process of institutionalization is taking place. In 1998, the ICMP concluded a headquarters agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which refers to the Commission as something “comparable to an international organization”. Subsequently, ICMP – benefiting from its experience in the former Yugoslavia – has also carried out activities in other regions of the world. It has assisted in identifying thousands of victims in Thailand and the Maldives after the December 2004 tsunami, and it has operated or is operating in, for example, Iraq, Kuwait and Chile. It identified victims of the hurricane Katrina (US, 2005) and of the typhoon Frank (Philippines, 2008-2009).136 This is one of the reasons why suggestions have been made to transform this Commission into a formal organization having legal personality (even though such personality could be implied from the existence of a headquarters agreement). This would give the Commission the necessary status to operate in countries and to conclude agreements with states, other international organizations and private entities. As a final example we refer to the multilateral agreements in the environmental field that create some institutional framework. Although in practice these frameworks are often
128 F. Roessler, The Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, in J.H.J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod & E. Gippini Fournier (eds.), The Uruguay Round Results – A European Lawyers’ Perspective 67-85 (1995), at 69. 129 J.H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (1990). 130 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994). This Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1995. 131 K. Scott, Institutional Developments within the Antarctic Treaty System, 52 ICLQ 473-487 (2003). 132 E.T. Bloom, Establishment of the Arctic Council, 93 AJIL 712-722 (1999), at 721. 133 F. Griffiths, Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy, 69 ZaöRV 579-624 (2009), at 598. 134 R. Wolfrum, The Arctic in the Context of International Law, 69 ZaöRV 533-543 (2009), at 542. 135 See www.ic-mp.org. 136 Id.
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not considered to be international organizations, this is in fact what they sometimes are or have become. Usually, these multilateral environmental agreements create a “conference” or “meeting” of the parties (in which all parties to the agreement are represented) and a secretariat.137 Examples are the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. One study has analyzed these agreements, applying the definition of international organizations used in this book. It came to the conclusion that “these self-governing, treaty-based [arrangements] may be considered to be intergovernmental organizations, albeit of a less formal, more ad hoc nature than traditional intergovernmental organizations”.138 Numerous studies have indicated the need to make these arrangements in the environmental field more formal, and some have even suggested the creation of a new global environmental organization,139 or have proposed to give the UN Trusteeship Council the task of overall supervision of global environmental protection.140
§31 On the other hand, it is possible that states may gradually attribute so many powers to an international organization that it comes to resemble a confederation or a federation. This is illustrated by the development of the European Union, which is generally considered to be an international organization,141 but which is also often called a “supranational organization” in view of its special characteristics (see below, Section III).142 In this respect, it is clear that the discussions on a reference in the 1992 Treaty on European Union to a federal goal are not purely of semantic significance.143 In the distant past, other examples of cooperation between autonomous political entities that gradually developed into one new
137 See on the question of legal personality of the Secretariat created under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: UNJY 1995, at 452-453. 138 R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: a little-noticed phenomenon in international law, 94 AJIL 623-659 (2000), quotation at 658. 139 K.T. Farr, A New Global Environmental Organization, 28 Ga.J.Int’l&Comp.L. 493-525 (2000); S. Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 323-362 (2002). 140 Suggested in 1997 by the UN Secretary-General (UN Doc. A/51/950, at 27). See also B.H. Desai, Revitalizing International Environmental Institutions: the UN Task Force Report and Beyond, 40 IJIL 455-504 (2000); B. Desai, Institutionalizing International Environmental Law (2004). 141 See e.g. P. Fischer, Is the European Community an International Organization?, in: K. Ginther et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Realität – Festschrift für Karl Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag 179-202 (1994); R. Bernhardt, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und das Recht internationaler Organisationen: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede, in: G. Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern – in honour of his 80th birthday 25-35 (1998). 142 Cf. the working paper by A. El-Erian, Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, in: Yearbook of the ILC 1963, Vol. II, at 169: “Supranational organizations lie on the outer limit of international organizations and on the border of federalism. They are hybrids which draw both on international law and municipal public law in their functioning techniques. As such, they are subject to the law of international organizations, but not in an exclusive way”. 143 Cf. Article A of the Treaty on Political Union in the version proposed by the Dutch Presidency, and in the revised version approved by the Heads of State and Government at the Maastricht European Council – after firm opposition by the United Kingdom against a reference in this Treaty to the so-called F-word. The version as proposed by the Dutch Presidency: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process leading gradually to a Union with a federal goal”. The revised version: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe . . .”. Europe Documents No. 1750/1751 (1991).
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single sovereign entity can be found: the Swiss Confederation, the Dutch Republic, the American Confederation and the German Confederation.144 In other words, there is a smooth transition from loose cooperation between states to structured cooperation within an international organization, just as there is a smooth transition between some international organizations and sovereign states. A sliding scale of institutionalization of international cooperation can be identified. Hence, a definition of what constitutes an international organization is necessary to indicate the limits of this book, and to provide an answer to the question of precisely when interstate cooperation is to be regarded as having the form of an international organization. B. A definition: three elements §32 Occasionally the constitution of an international organization explicitly states that the entity created will be an international organization.145 Equally, there have been instances in which a treaty has explicitly stated that no international organization is created by it.146 To create, or not to create, an international organization: what exactly does this mean? While there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes an international organization,147 most studies on international organizations are limited to public international organizations, and exclude nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). General agreement seems to exist regarding most of the defining elements of public international organizations. The qualification of an organization as a (public) international organization is important, not merely to indicate the scope of the present study, but also for practical reasons: it affects the legal status of the organization (see below, Chapter Eleven) and, more specifically, its capacity to act under international law (see below, Chapter Twelve).
144 See on the process of decision-making in these early confederations Tammes, op. cit. note 45, at 18-38. It should be noted that the direction of change is not necessarily one of integration: while the examples given above all concern processes of integration, more recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in former Yugoslavia show that developments in the opposite direction are far from impossible. 145 According to Art. 3.1 of the constitution of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): “SADC shall be an international organization [. . .]”. (The Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community was signed in 1992 and is reproduced in 32 ILM (1993), at 116ff.) Another example is Art. I.1 of the 2010 Agreement for the Establishment of the International Anti-Corruption Academy as an International Organization: “There is hereby established the Academy as an International Organization” (this Agreement is reproduced on the website of the Academy, at www.iaca-info.org/IACAcontent/IACAdocuments/Treaty/IACA_ AGREEMENT_E.pdf (November 2010). 146 Agreement relating to the Establishment of the Functional Airspace Block “Europe Central” between Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland (2 December 2010), Art. 2.2: “This Agreement does not create an international organization with international legal personality”. See www.fabectreaty.tv/downloads/FABEC_Treaty_English_version.pdf (March 2011). 147 Virally, op. cit. note 108, at 59; for further literature, see id., at 71.
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In this study, international organizations are defined as forms of cooperation
(1) founded on an international agreement; (2) having at least one organ with a will of its own; and (3) established under international law. The three elements of this definition will now be discussed in more detail. It is difficult to determine how many international organizations there are today. It appears that their number has increased over the last decades. According to the best available estimates, there are probably more than 500 and fewer than 700 public international organizations.148
1. International agreement §34 The first element relates to the way in which international organizations come into being: through an international agreement. The most common form of the agreement creating an organization is a treaty; the vast majority of international organizations are based on a multilateral treaty. But these agreements can also be expressed in other ways.149 Government representatives, assembled in a conference, may decide to establish an international organization without using a treaty, and without the usual proviso for subsequent ratification. This is how, inter alia, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee,150 the Inter-American Defense Board,151 the International Wool Study Group152 and the Restructured Global Environmental Facility153 were established. In addition, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance worked for ten years on the basis of an informal agreement between the participating states before its statute was laid down in the form of a treaty.154 Another example is the Parliamentary Forum of the Southern African Development Community (SADC Parliamentary Forum, or SADCPF). Members of parliaments of the member states of SADC drew up the constitution of SADCPF. National parliaments of SADC member states are members of SADCPF. They accepted this constitution in May 1995. This constitution entered into force not by subsequent ratification, but “upon the approval of the creation of the SADC Parliamentary Forum by the summit of Heads of State or Government” of SADC.155 This approval was given on 8 September 1997.156
148 Amerasinghe, op. cit. note 86, at 6 (footnote 10); Virally, op. cit. note 9, at 252 (footnote 86). See further N.M. Blokker, Proliferation of International Organizations: an Exploratory Introduction, in Blokker and Schermers (eds.), op. cit. note 13, at 2-4. 149 See also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 678 (7th ed. 2008); SeidlHohenveldern, op. cit. note 125; Seidl-Hohenveldern and Loibl, op. cit. note 110, at 5; UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.636/Add. 1, at 7-8. 150 Peaslee I(1), at 79. As of 2001, the name of this organization is the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization. 151 Id., I(2), at 805. 152 Id., II, at 533. 153 See below, §38. 154 Peaslee I(1), at 326. 155 Constitution of the SADCPF, Art. 1. 156 See www.sadcpf.org for futher details.
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The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created at a conference of representatives of the governments of Iran, Iraq Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela that took place in Baghdad, September 1960.157 The Statutes of OPEC were adopted by the second OPEC Conference (Caracas, January 1961).158 A final example is the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. This is an international organization, established in 1996 by resolution adopted by the states signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (see further below, §1619).159
§35 Even without an express decision by government representatives, an agreement on the creation of an organization may emerge. The Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau became an international organization through development over many years. It had its roots in the Imperial Agricultural Research Conference of 1927.160 At that time, it could be seen as a purely British affair. The international agreement gradually emerged when the members of the British Commonwealth became independent, and their continued membership of the organization was taken as proof of their agreement. Different views have been expressed in relation to the question of whether the Commonwealth (the former British Commonwealth of Nations) as such is an international organization. Writers taking the more formal position support the view that it is not an organization.161 In their view, the Commonwealth is an informal grouping of states with some common historical and cultural ties, primarily used for consultation among the members. It has no written constitution and, moreover, a memorandum agreed at the 1965 meeting of the Prime Ministers of Commonwealth countries explicitly states that “the Commonwealth is not a formal organization”, and that it does not “require its members to seek to reach collective decisions or to take united action”.162 Others take the view (which is also supported in this book) that a written constitution is not a necessary requirement, and that the agreement to establish an organization may also be expressed in other ways, such as, in the case of the Commonwealth, the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles (Singapore, 1971).163 The Nordic Council was established by parallel decisions of the parliaments of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The governments of these states demonstrate their approval by cooperating in the organization.
In these cases, there is also an agreement between states, although it may be more difficult to prove its existence. The borderline may be vague. Government participation in the Nordic Council has been so active that this Council can be classified as an intergovernmental organization. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), on
157 Res. I.2 adopted by this conference, para. 1 (see OPEC publication Official Resolutions and Press Releases 1960-1983 (1984), at 1-2). 158 Res. II.6 (see id., at 4-8). See further I.F.I. Shihata and A.R. Parra, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, EPIL Vol. 3 (1997), at 828-832. 159 Resolution adopted 19 November 1996, Doc. CTBT/MSS/Res/1. See para. 7 of the Annex to this Resolution: “The Commission shall have standing as an international organization, authority to negotiate and enter into agreements, and such other legal capacity as necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes”. 160 Peaslee II, at 55. 161 E.g. I.A. Shearer, Starke’s International Law 105-106 (11th ed. 1994). 162 The Memorandum is reproduced in Peaslee I(1), at 290. 163 See further W. Dale, Is the Commonwealth an International Organization?, 31 ICLQ 451-473 (1982); YIO 2008-2009, Vol. 1, at 533-536.
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the other hand, was also created by national parliaments, but its purpose is strictly limited to parliamentary cooperation. Governments do not take part. The IPU is therefore generally classified as a non-governmental organization; it also has this status with the United Nations (see below, §189-194). However, the IPU is presently examining the possibility of concluding a convention on the IPU, by which it would be transformed from a private into a public international organization. Such a transformation would make it possible to give privileges and immunities to delegates to IPU meetings and to IPU officials.164 §36 The agreement to create an international organization must be concluded between at least two states. Most organizations have three or more members, but there are some examples of organizations with only two member states.165 An agreement creating an international organization may provide that the organization needs to have a minimum number of members.166 The agreement will usually be concluded between states, but increasingly international organizations or other entities are also parties to the agreements in which new organizations are set up.167 For example, among the parties to the agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are the EEC (now EU) and the European Investment Bank. The European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research was established in 1974 on the basis of an agreement between the UN and Austria.168 Another example is the Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT), created in the May 1988 Agreement between the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme. According to this agreement, CIMMYT “is hereby established as an international organization possessing full juridical personality . . .”.169 (See below, §81-84 and §1776-1782.)
164
See e.g. IPU Doc. www.ipu.org/cnl-e/186/rpt-convention.htm ( January 2011). The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Nederlandse Taalunie (“Dutch language union”). The latter organization is based on a treaty concluded in 1980 between The Netherlands and Belgium; see N. Sybesma-Knol and K. Wellens, Enige volkenrechtelijke vragen rond de Nederlandse Taalunie (1987). Another example is the Czech-Slovak Customs Union; see M. Bogdan, The Czech-Slovak Customs Union, in O. Bring and S. Mahmoudi (eds.), Current International Law Issues, Nordic Perspectives (Essays in Honour of Jerzy Sztucki, 1994), at 11-23. A further example is the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (“CARU”), established under the Statute of the River Uruguay, a treaty concluded in 1975 between Argentina and Uruguay (UNTS Vol. 1295, No. I-21425, at 340). 166 E.g. Art. XXV.1 of the Convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency (1975), according to which this organization “shall be dissolved if the number of member states becomes less than five”; Art. 42 of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (establishing the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization): “This Convention shall be automatically terminated if and when, as the result of withdrawals, the number of Contracting Parties drops below 4”. 167 Even though their capacity or power to do so has sometimes been questioned, in particular in the more distant past. See for a somewhat restrictive view expressed in the early 1990s by the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat: UNJY 1991, at 296-301 (in particular para. 4). 168 YIO 2008-2009, Vol. I, at 848-849. 169 See P. Szasz, The Complexification of the United Nations System, 3 Max Planck UNYB 1999, at 1-57 (this example is mentioned at 46). 165
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On the other hand, agreements between branches of different governments or between particular public authorities do not normally create international organizations.170 This distinction may not, however, always be entirely clear. For example, there is difference of opinion as to the status of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).171 Formally, Interpol is not based on an agreement between states. However, such an agreement may in fact be deduced from a number of factors. Although any official police bodies whose functions come within the framework of activities of the organization may be members of Interpol (Article 4), these members are instructed by their governments. Furthermore, requests for membership have to be submitted “by the appropriate governmental authority” (Article 4). Finally, the financial contributions from members come from the national budgets. For a number of years, Interpol had NGO status with the UN. However, in 1975 it was designated as an intergovernmental organization to participate in the work of ECOSOC on a continuing basis, in accordance with Rule 79 of ECOSOC’s rules of procedure.172 Further proof of its intergovernmental status is the 1982 headquarters agreement concluded between Interpol and France.173
§37 Since it is still difficult to obtain general recognition of the status and the rights of international organizations under national and international law, it seems advisable to define the notion “international organization” rather narrowly. Organizations not created by a treaty will have to prove the existence of an international agreement when they claim a public, intergovernmental status. A first reason for establishing an international organization through an international agreement is that this is a clear indication of such a status in most cases. The existence of an agreement has also been accepted by the UN as the main criterion for distinguishing these organizations from non-governmental organizations.174 §38 A second reason why an international agreement is needed is to establish the separate legal personality of the new organization,175 and thus distinguish it from
170 E.g. the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), which was founded in 1913 under Belgian law and has local governments (such as the Amsterdam municipality, the Dubai municipality, Lomé city) and associations of local governments as members. 171 A. Gallas, Interpol, EPIL Vol. 2 (1995), at 1414: “Interpol is not an international organization”. The Yearbook of International Organizations, however, states: “Interpol currently functions as an international intergovernmental organization” (YIO 2008-2009, Vol. I, at 1672). For an extensive analysis, see R.S.J. Martha, The Legal Foundations of INTERPOL (2010). Martha concludes that Interpol is an international organization based on an agreement under international law. 172 ECOSOC Decision 109 (LIX). See also YUN 1975, at 742. In 1982, the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN carried out an analysis of the status of Interpol. It concluded that “the present constitutional provisions of Interpol fully justify the decisions of the Economic and Social Council to consider Interpol as an intergovernmental, rather than a non-governmental, organization” (published in UNJY 1982, at 179-180). 173 For the text of this agreement, see www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/LegalMaterials (March 2011). Interpol has also concluded headquarter agreements with other countries in which its offices or bureaux are located. 174 ECOSOC Resolutions 288 B(X), 1296 (XLIV) and 1996/31. 175 In exceptional cases, no separate legal personality is given; see below, §44 and Chapter Eleven.
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mere organs of organizations. This separate legal identity gives organizations a degree of independence that organs usually lack. Nevertheless, practice demonstrates that a certain measure of independence is sometimes also provided for when organs are created, or is acquired by these organs in practice. In 1966, Resolution 2152 (XXI) of the UN General Assembly, originally setting up the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), provided that UNIDO, “established as an organ of the General Assembly, shall function as an autonomous organization within the United Nations”. In 1986, UNIDO became a separate international organization, the 16th specialized agency within the UN family. Even prior to 1986, UNIDO membership did not coincide with that of the UN. Still an organ of the General Assembly, UNIDO already had its seat elsewhere (in Vienna). A similar provision was included in the Statute of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR),176 and in Resolution 2186 (XXI) establishing the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). UNITAR and UNCDF have operational budgets of their own, as did UNIDO until 1986. Resolution 1995 (XIX) of the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as an organ of the Assembly. The resolution is less outspoken on the autonomous character of this organ than the UNIDO and UNCDF resolutions. In practice, however, this organ also quickly developed into an autonomous body within the UN. Although UNCTAD’s Secretariat is an integral part of the UN Secretariat, it was removed from New York at the insistence of the developing countries and placed “in a milieu more conducive for independent action and growth” (following bitter negotiations, Geneva was chosen).177 Similarly, although its budget is part of the UN budget, UNCTAD has a certain amount of autonomy in budgetary matters.178 Another example is the Global Environmental Facility. Created in 1991 as a World Bank organ,179 it was restructured in 1994 and may now be characterized as an international organization.180 In 1994, the 73 countries participating in the GEF agreed to transform it into a permanent financial mechanism. The restructured GEF was not created by a World
176 UNITAR was established by the Secretary-General, pursuant to GA Res. 1934 (XVIII), as an “autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations” (Statute, Art. 1). On the autonomous status of UNITAR, see UNJY 2008, at 427-434. 177 B. Gosovic, UNCTAD – Conflict and Compromise 180 (1972). 178 Id., at 183-185. 179 The GEF was created in 1991 as a three-year pilot program under which grants or concessional loans were provided to developing countries to help them implement programs that protect the global environment. It was established by Res. 91-5 of the Executive Board of the World Bank. Procedural arrangements were made with UNEP and UNDP for operational cooperation under the GEF. The GEF was administered by the Bank, and the Bank’s internal rules were applicable to it. See 30 ILM (1991), at 1758 ff. 180 Although an attempt was made to avoid the creation of a new bureaucracy (see 33 ILM (1994), at 1273). In 1993, the GEF was evaluated, and one of the findings was that the program suffered from a number of organizational shortcomings. Opinions seem to differ on the precise legal status of the GEF. While the World Bank takes the view that it is no longer an organ without, for example, the competence to conclude agreements, the UN Secretariat takes a more restrictive position, defending the view that GEF is a joint subsidiary body of the World Bank and the UN, acting through UNEP and UNDP (information obtained from the GEF Secretariat, January 1995). The GEF Secretariat itself has indicated that it “is functionally independent of the implementing agencies but is supported administratively by the World Bank” (YIO 2008-2009, at 1272). On the GEF, see M. Ehrmann, Die Globale Umweltfazilität (GEF), 57 ZaöRV 565-614 (1997); L. Boisson de Chazournes, The Global Environmental Facility Galaxy: On Linkages among Institutions, 3 Max Planck UNYB 1999, at 243-285; Szasz, op. cit. note 169, in particular at 44-45; I.F.I. Shihata, Techniques to avoid proliferation of international organizations – the experience of the World Bank, in: Blokker and Schermers (eds.), op. cit. note 13, 111-134 (in particular at 125-127).
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Bank resolution, mainly to meet concerns of the developing countries that the GEF was too closely associated with the World Bank, but by the ‘Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environmental Facility’, accepted by representatives of the 73 participating states181 and adopted subsequently by the three agencies charged with the implementation of the activities to be financed under the GEF (UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank).182 This instrument was amended in 2002 and 2006.183 The restructured GEF has an Assembly (consisting of representatives of all participants), a Council (composed of 32 members, representing constituency groupings), and a Secretariat.
These examples show that the formal distinction between organizations and organs is far from clear-cut in practice. Nevertheless, the value of this distinction is not merely theoretical, but also has practical significance, as was demonstrated by the conversion of UNIDO from an organ of the General Assembly into an independent organization. This conversion took place on the initiative of developing countries, to increase and further develop the autonomy and powers of UNIDO.184 §39 Some international organizations are closely interrelated because a ‘mother organization’ determines how they are established and what their constitutions contain; but they may nevertheless ultimately be based on separate international agreements. The action committees of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) may be established by the SELA Council or by SELA member states that are interested in particular projects. They are financed by the participating members and operate as separate organizations, but in close connection with SELA. Other members are always free to join them.185
§40 In several cases it was only a matter of chance that a new institution was established as an organization based on a treaty, rather than as an organ based on a resolution by another organization. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established by resolution, probably because the urgency of the situation did not allow the use of the slow treaty making procedure. The comparable United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was a treaty creation. The International Refugee Organization (IRO) had its constitution approved by Resolution 62 (I) of the General Assembly of the UN; but this constitution was subsequently signed and ratified by the participating states.186
181 Not in a treaty but by approval of this ‘Instrument’ during an international meeting that took place in Geneva, 14-16 March 1994. As indicated in §34 above, according to our definition it is not strictly required that an international organization is treaty-based, although this is usually the case. 182 33 ILM (1994), at 1283 ff. 183 For the text of the amended instrument, see Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility (a GEF publication, March 2008), also reproduced on the GEF website: www.thegef.org. 184 P. Bretton, La transformation de l’ONUDI en institution spécialisée, in: 25 AFDI 567-578 (1979), at 568. 185 SELA, Arts. 20-26 (15 ILM 1092-1093 (1976)); Rule 11 of SELA action committees (15 ILM 1121 (1976)). 186 W. Dale, UNRWA – A Subsidiary Organ of the United Nations, in: 23 ICLQ 581 (1974).
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§41 The existence of intermediate forms between independent organizations and organs of organizations is not objectionable. On the contrary, it reflects practical needs. No sharp theoretical distinction should present obstacles to the effective organization of governmental functions at the international level. In some cases, however, it will be necessary to determine whether an institution constitutes an individual organization or an organ of an organization. These cases will be encountered when discussing issues such as withdrawal and expulsion from organizations, and privileges and immunities. The existence of an international agreement creating an institution is the best possible criterion for distinguishing between organs and organizations. §42 An international agreement is important for a third reason: it contains a mutual commitment by the participating states, requiring a certain amount of cooperation within, and with, the organization. This commitment may be weaker than a normal treaty obligation, since it is often possible to end it unilaterally by withdrawing from the organization. If no previous notice is required for withdrawal, it could even be claimed that there is no real legal commitment for the states concerned.187 Even in these extreme cases, however, states remain legally bound until they have withdrawn. They cannot legally withdraw from certain obligations only. Usually, the international agreement binds all members to all other members. The Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization is an exception to this general rule. Most parts of this Agreement do not apply between a member and a new member if the former does not consent to such application vis-à-vis the new member.188 §43 Finally, there is a fourth, ‘democratic’ reason why an international agreement is needed. In most states, a treaty needs approval by parliament before it may be ratified. For democratic reasons, it would be objectionable if states could establish a new organization and attribute powers to it without involving their national parliaments. This involvement may result in the withholding of approval and, consequently, the state in question will be unable to ratify the agreement establishing the organization. In practice, if the participation of this state is a conditio sine qua non for an effective functioning of the organization, other states may also decide not to participate, and the organization may never commence operation. This happened when, in December 1950, US President Truman decided not to submit the Havana Charter to Congress.189 Other states also decided not to ratify the Charter, and the International Trade Organization never came into operation. The same effect occurs if an agreement requires ratification by all signatory states before it can enter into force, and one of these states decides not to ratify. Thus, when the Dutch
187
So Seyersted (quoting Castberg), 34 NorTIR 50 (1964), and 4 IJIL 44 (1964). Art. XIII of this Agreement; cf. also Art. XXXV GATT. See for an overview of invocations of Art. XXXV: GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice 958-960 (1994). 189 See W. Diebold, The End of the ITO (Princeton Essays in International Finance No. 16, 1952). 188
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Upper Chamber decided to withhold approval of the Agreement establishing the European Foundation, the Netherlands could not ratify, and the Agreement did not enter into force. (Approval was withheld because, inter alia, there would be too much overlap with the activities of other European organizations in the field of culture (particularly the Council of Europe), and because there was no direct democratic control over the activities of the Foundation, which would have been created outside the framework of the (then) European Communities).190
2. At least one organ with a will of its own §44 The second element in our definition of an international organization is the requirement that the organization should have at least one organ with a will of its own. In, among others, German and French literature the same term is used for the requirement of “a will of its own”: der eigene Wille, volonté distincte. The French term is particularly apt as it expresses not only the independent will of the organ, but also, implicitly, that from which it should be distinguished: the volonté of the members. This second element is fundamental, as it makes clear that the decisions taken by the organ concerned emanate not from an ad hoc grouping of states, but from a separate body upon which powers have been bestowed to adopt such decisions, a body that is therefore more than the sum of its members. Such separate bodies are, in the words used by the International Court of Justice, “subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy”.191 Constitutions of international organizations generally do not refer to the requirement of a volonté distincte. To the extent that they mention the separate identity of the organization, the term ‘legal personality’ is used. When an international organization is created, it is usually created as a legal person. This means that it has the capacity to bear rights and obligations. Only in exceptional cases have international organizations been created without such capacity.192 For example, according to the Statutes for the Global Water Partnership Network and the Global Water Partnership Organization, “[t]he Network does not have legal personality”.193 With regard to some other organizations, there is (for instance, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe) or has been (for instance, the European Union) considerable debate concerning their legal personality (see below, §1569). Therefore, in exceptional cases international organizations do not become legal persons. There is also an example of the reverse situation (legal person, but no organization): an organization that may be dissolved while its legal personality
190 See the Reports of the meetings of the Upper Chamber: Eerste Kamer, 12 November 1985, at 72-93, and 19 May 1987, 30-1309/1310. 191 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996, at 75 (para. 19). On the autonomy of international organizations, see R. Collins and N.D. White (eds.), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the International Legal Order (forthcoming in 2011); N.M. Blokker, International Organizations as Independent Actors: Sweet Memory or Functionally Necessary?, in J. Wouters et al. (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organizations 37-50 (2010). 192 See also Amerasinghe, op. cit. note 86, at 10-11; Brownlie, op. cit. note 149, at 678. 193 Art. I.2 (Trb. 2002, 93).
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continues for the purpose of winding up the organization.194 The issue of legal personality of international organizations will be further discussed in Chapter Eleven. As they are usually legal persons, international organizations can be distinguished from so-called treaty organs, which do not have this quality. Organs of international organizations are created by the agreement establishing an international organization, or subsequently by organs of the organization, whereas treaty organs are generally created by treaties separate from the constituent instrument of the organization. Examples of treaty organs are the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, meetings of the parties to multilateral arms control treaties (such as the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions), and the International Narcotics Control Board. Some authors also classify the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of environmental conventions such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change as treaty organs.195 Treaty organs lack legal personality. They are usually more or less loosely embedded in the structure of a pre-existing international organization, and may benefit from the latter’s administrative services and from its political and other forms of support.196 Various problems may arise when membership of the treaty organ is not identical to membership of the ‘sponsoring’ organization. Treaty organs will be discussed somewhat further in Chapter Four (see below, §386-387). §44A The “organ with a will of its own” should be formed by delegates of two or more members of the organization, and should not be dependent on any particular state.197 Merely by allocating tasks to a national organ, an international agreement will not transform that organ into an international organization. An organization fully dependent on one national government will not be an international organization even if a lower organ is partly formed by officials from other states. The requirement that the organ in question have a will of its own distinguishes organizations from bilateral or multilateral treaties, whereby parties lay
194
See the 1997 Eurocontrol Revised Convention, Art. 38.5; see also below, §1629. E.g. G. Ulfstein, Treaty Bodies, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 877-889 (2007). 196 According to Szasz, they are therefore “isolated organs that in effect operate under the care of the sponsoring [intergovernmental organization]” (op. cit. note 169, at 17). See also B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations – a commentary (2nd ed. 2002), at 228-229. The Yearbook of the United Nations 1998 (at 1445) refers to treaty organs as bodies “not subsidiary to any principal organ of the United Nations but . . . established by an international treaty instrument or arrangement sponsored by the United Nations and . . . thus related to the Organization and its work. These bodies . . . are serviced by the United Nations Secretariat and may be financed in part or wholly from the Organization’s regular budget, as authorized by the General Assembly, to which most of them report annually”. Cf. also Sands and Klein, op. cit. note 86, who in their Chapter 4 (entitled: “Other autonomous organizations”) refer to “treaty organizations” (in particular at 115). In their Chapter 4, both treaty organs (such as the examples given above) and fully-fledged international organizations (such as the OPCW and the International Coffee Organization) are discussed. 197 Seyersted in 34 NorTIR 47 (1964); 4 IJIL 40-41 (1964). 195
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down a common will, which remains their own, however, and is not entrusted to a newly created body.198 Nevertheless, it should be recognized that even when from a formal legal point of view it is clear that an organization has a will of its own, in practice it is often difficult for organizations to develop and maintain their own identity. A discrepancy may exist between the legal and the factual situation. Behind the legal personality veil of the organization its sovereign members remain visible. In this context, R.-J. Dupuy has referred to the ‘transparency’ of international organizations.199 The GATT was originally only an agreement between states. It had no real organs, although Article XXV referred to the possibility of joint action being taken by the participating states. For that reason, for a number of years the status of international organization was denied to the GATT. Gradually, however, organs were established, in such a way that GATT was increasingly recognized as an international organization. According to Benedek, GATT has had the status of international organization since 1960, when the Council of Representatives was created, composed of all contracting parties willing to accept the responsibilities of membership therein.200
3. Established under international law §45 The third element in our definition of an international organization is that the organization be established under international law. An agreement between governments to erect a power station under the national legal system of one of them does not create a public international organization. Even if there were an organ responsible only to both states collectively, this would not endow the organization with public international status. Thus the Donaukraftwerk-Jochenstein A.G., established in 1952 by agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany, the Free State of Bavaria and Austria is not a public international organization.201
198 See also G. Abi-Saab, The Concept and Evolution of International Organization: a Synthesis, in: M.A. Boisard and E.M. Chossudovsky (eds.), Multilateral Diplomacy – The United Nations System at Geneva, A working guide 3-14 (2nd rev. ed. by J. Lemoine, 1998), at 5; Higgins, op. cit. note 100, at 46; Sands and Klein, op. cit. note 86, at 15; Seidl-Hohenveldern and Loibl, op. cit. note 110, at 5. Cf. also Bastid, op. cit. note 116, at 46, referring to Georges Renard, who compared the notion of institution with a contract; the latter “n’est que la rencontre de deux volontés qui suivent chacune leur idée”. 199 Op. cit. note 25, at 121: “En dépit de son autonomie juridique, elle laisse voir les Etats toujours présents derrière ses structures”. See also P. Reuter, Institutions internationales (7th ed. 1972), at 192-193, 200-201. Brölmann has demonstrated how the law of treaties and the law of international responsibility have difficulties in dealing with such ‘transparant’ actors: C. Brölmann, A Flat Earth? International Organizations in the System of International Law, 70 Nord.J.Int’lL. 319-340 (2001), and C. Brölmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law – International Organizations and the Law of Treaties (2007). 200 Benedek, op. cit. note 127, at 262. See also above, §30. 201 The example is taken from I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen, einschließlich der Supranationalen Gemeinschaften (1st ed., 1966), para. 118.
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Another example is the agreement between France and Switzerland concerning the BâleMulhouse airport, which declares that, as a rule, French law shall apply to the enterprise.202 A final example is the Institut du Monde Arabe, established as a foundation under French law by twenty states.203 For international organizations that perform their tasks mostly in one country, it may be of special importance that they are not created under the national law of that country, in order to be able to perform their international role. An example is the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, which has to receive and decide claims for real property in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As indicated by a member of this Commission, “legislative and political developments should not jeopardize the independence and efficiency of such body”.204 This Commission has therefore been established under international law. Created in Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, its international character was also recognized in the 1996 headquarters agreement concluded with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which explicitly confirms that it is “an international independent body”.205
International agreements are normally concluded under international law. It can therefore be assumed that this requirement is fulfilled whenever there is an international agreement. Only when an international agreement clearly indicates that the organization is not established under international law will it not be considered to be an international organization.206 C. International organizations, international corporations, Non-Governmental Organizations §46 Having clarified our definition of international organizations, these organizations can now be distinguished from other types of organizations. It is usually not difficult to distinguish between international organizations and international corporations (for example, Microsoft and Unilever), since the latter are generally not based on treaties. However, some international corporations have been created in this way, or by a decision of an international organization. These so-called public international companies are different from international organizations because they are not established under international law. For example, Air Afrique was established by a treaty in 1961 as a limited liability company.207 The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) has created four international companies, based on treaties, three of them concerning petroleum and one
202
See I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations in and under International Law 115 (1987). Mentioned in UN Doc. A/64/10, at 46. 204 H. van Houtte, Mass Property Claim Resolution in a Post-War Society: the Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 48 ICLQ 625-638 (1999), at 628. 205 Id., at 629. 206 The distinction is not always sharp. See I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Gemeinsame zwischenstaatliche Unternehmen, in: F.-W. Baer-Kaupert, G. Leistner, H. Schwaiger (eds.), Liber Amicorum B.C.H. Aubin 193-216 (1979); H.T. Adam, Les organismes internationaux spécialisés, 5 Vols. (e.g. Tome V, published in 1992, covering not only organizations such as MIGA and EBRD, but also Eurotunnel and Scandinavian Airlines (SAS)). See also Seidl-Hohenveldern and Loibl, op. cit. note 110, at 56-59. 207 See YIO 2003-2004, Vol. I, at 71. Air Afrique was dissolved in 2002. 203
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concerning ship-building.208 Euratom has established a number of joint undertakings (see Articles 45-51 of the Euratom Treaty).209
On the other hand, some organizations might resemble international corporations because they operate to some extent on a commercial basis. However, since they are established under international law and also fulfil the other two requirements indicated above, they are considered to be international organizations. The World Bank and regional development banks (such as the Inter-American Development Bank) borrow in international financial markets and makes long-term loans at nearmarket interest rates. The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) owned satellites and operated them as commercial enterprises.210 INTELSAT and Inmarsat were created as public international organizations but were privatized in 1999 (Inmarsat) and in 2001 (INTELSAT; its name was changed to Intelsat).
§47 Nor is it usually difficult to distinguish between (public) international organizations and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The notion “non-governmental” refers to the function of these organizations: they are not endowed with governmental tasks. NGOs are not created by treaty; nor are they established under international law. Apart from these characteristics, NGOs have little in common. The observation in one of the earlier editions of the Yearbook of International Organizations that “a clear and unambiguous theoretically acceptable definition of international NGOs remains to be formulated” still seems accurate.211 The Union of International Associations, itself an NGO, has recognized 7628 international NGOs as such (using a rather narrow definition).212 They vary from large and influential organizations, such as Amnesty International, the International Chamber of Commerce and the Roman Catholic Church, to smaller organizations like the Commonwealth Legal Education Association, the International Diabetes Federation, the International Federation of Bodybuilders, the International Skeletal Society and the United Elvis Presley Society.
208 M. Al Saqqaf, Les entreprises communes créées au sein de l’OPAEP, in: 23 AFDI 709-729 (1977). 209 Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, The Law of the European Union and the European Communities (4th rev. ed., edited by P.J.G. Kapteyn, A.M. McDonnell, K.J.M. Mortelmans, C.W.A. Timmermans and the late L.A. Geelhoed, 2008), at 1231. 210 INTELSAT: 10 ILM 909-945 (1971). Inmarsat: 15 ILM 1052-1075 (1976). Art. IV(a) of the INTELSAT Constitution and Art. 5(3) of the Inmarsat Constitution refer to the commercial nature of the activities of these organizations. Art. 5(3) of the Inmarsat Constitution stipulates, inter alia, that this organization operates “on a sound economic and financial basis having regard to accepted commercial principles”. 211 YIO 1992/93, Vol. I, at 1650. Cf. also M. Bettati and P.-M. Dupuy, Les ONG et le Droit International (1986), in particular at 1-21. 212 YIO 2008-2009, Vol. I, at 2945. The criteria used in this Yearbook to classify an organization as an (international) NGO are mentioned in YIO 1994/95, Vol. I, at 1617-1618.
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Many NGOs have obtained some sort of official recognition by the United Nations (see below, §189-194), by other intergovernmental organizations (see below, §195) or in treaties concluded between states. Such official recognition has also been given to organizations that do not qualify as NGOs (in view of their public functions) nor as intergovernmental organizations. Examples of such hybrid organizations are two organizations that are part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).213 ICRC’s activities particularly concentrate on the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict and the dissemination of international humanitarian law. The IFRC’s key field of operation is the coordination of international relief assistance, as well as the support to the work of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The ICRC is a private association composed of a maximum of 25 members of Swiss nationality, which was established under Swiss law, not under international law. The mandate of the ICRC is incorporated in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, which are the core international instruments in the field of international humanitarian law. The ICRC has concluded a number of agreements, for example headquarters agreements. It is widely recognized that the ICRC is not a public international organization, but that it has international legal personality.214 The IFRC has a similar status: it is a private Swiss association. Its members are the 186 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. A large number of states have concluded status agreements with the IFRC in which privileges and immunities are given to this organization.215 Both ICRC and IFRC have observer status in the UN General Assembly. A number of organizations have been transformed from private into public international organizations, well-known examples being the World Meteorological Organization and the World Tourism Organization. Less well-known examples are the International Civil Defence Organization,216 the International Development Law Institute217 and the Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation.218
213 The third component of this Movement is formed by the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 214 D. Bindschedler-Robert, Red Cross, EPIL Vol. 4 (2000), at 56-63; C. Dominicé, La personnalité juridique internationale du CICR, in C. Swinarski (ed.), Studies and essays on international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles in honour of Jean Pictet 663-673 (1984); P. Reuter, La personnnalité juridique internationale du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, in id., at 783-791; Seidl-Hohenveldern and Loibl, op. cit. note 110, at 5. Cf. also Brownlie, op. cit. note 149, at 678. 215 See IFRC, International disaster response laws, principles and practice: reflections, prospects and challenges (2003), in particular at 128-137; P. Gautier, O.N.G. et personnalité internationale: à propos de l’accord conclu le 29 novembre 1996 entre la Suisse et la Fédération internationale des sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, 30 RBDI 172-189 (1997). 216 Established in 1958 as an NGO, and transformed into a public international organization in 1966. See YIO 2008-2009, Vol. I, at 1593. 217 Established in 1983 as an NGO, and transformed into a public international organization in 1989, when the “Agreement of Internationalization of the Institute” came into force. See YIO 2008-2009, Vol. I, at 1680. 218 Established in 1998 as an association under Swiss law (as an initiative of, and exclusively financed by, the Swiss government), a number of countries soon decided that this Agency should be transformed into a public international organization, in view of “[t]he increasing difficulties of poor countries in participating in WTO negotiations . . .” and the need to respond more effectively to the demand for AITIC’s services, “[b]y broadening AITIC’s funding base and putting in place an inclusive governance structure”. On 9 December 2002, the Agreement Establishing the Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation as an Intergovernmental Organization was signed. See www.aitic.org.
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III. Classification A. Criteria for classification §48 International organizations can be classified in many different ways, depending on the purpose of the study for which the classification is used. For example, it could be useful to classify all organizations in the field of environmental protection in one group and distinguish them from organizations in the field of nuclear energy, agriculture or health, or any other field in which international organizations are active. From the institutional perspective chosen in this study, such a distinction is less relevant. What criterion should be used to classify international organizations? A number of authors have suggested and applied different criteria for such a classification.219 The most fundamental criterion and, moreover, the criterion which seems to be most useful in a comparative study of the institutional law of international organizations, seems to be that suggested by Virally. Not surprisingly, his criterion is related to the notion of function discussed above (see above, §15-17). [I]t is an organization’s function that constitutes its true raison d’être. And it is in order that it may perform this function that its member states have established it and take part in its operation, bearing the costs and accepting the constraints that inevitably derive from it. Moreover, the organization’s structure is directly determined by this function or purpose. The structure is designed to enable the organization to fulfil the purpose assigned to it as efficiently as possible having regard to the conditions and limitations that the founding states have deemed it necessary to impose, so that it may be achieved in accordance with their interests, as defined by them. In other words, the organization’s structure is itself subordinate to the requirements of its function. Experience also shows that in many cases modifications occur in the structure as and when these requirements change, and in accordance with them.220
§49 In Virally’s view, the function of international organizations, as a criterion for classification, can be considered principally from three points of view: The first question concerns the extent of the cooperation that it is the organization’s mission to bring about: is it open to the international community as a whole, or reserved for certain of its members only? Second, what is the range covered by this cooperation? Can it extend to all the sectors in which a need for it may be felt, or is it confined to a clearly delimited field of action? Lastly, what are the means used to effect such cooperation, and what type of relations does it institute between the organization and its members (and between the members themselves in their relations with one another)?221
219
E.g. El-Erian, in Yearbook of the ILC 1963, Vol. II, at 167-169, and the literature mentioned
there. 220 221
Virally, op. cit. note 108, at 66. Id., at 66-67.
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In this study we will also use the first and second sub-criteria suggested by Virally, but the third will be adapted somewhat. The third sub-criterion, focusing on the means used to cooperate within the international organization, permits the drawing of a distinction – according to Virally – between standard-setting and operational organizations. In our view, however, the distinction between supranational and intergovernmental organizations is the most significant (this distinction will be explained below). Supranational organizations are in fact more independent of the member states than Virally’s operational organizations. They are not included in Virally’s scheme because – as was indicated in §27-28 – Virally excludes supranational organizations (in his words: “organizations whose function is integration”) from his definition of international organizations. Therefore, although Virally’s distinction between organizations aiming at integration and international organizations proper, aiming at cooperation (in our words: supranational versus intergovernmental organizations) is followed, it is suggested that this distinction is a matter of degree; the view that it is so fundamental as to exclude supranational organizations from the study of international organizations must be rejected. §50 Therefore, using the notion of function as a fundamental criterion, and the three derived, more specific criteria mentioned above, three major distinctions between international organizations will be elaborated. First, greater harmony and cohesion within a group of states appears to offer institutional opportunities to closed organizations (for example, regional organizations) that are beyond the reach of organizations with a universal vocation. Secondly, supranational organizations create relations between different authorities and subjects of their member states, whereas in other, intergovernmental organizations only national governments cooperate. Thirdly, their specialized knowledge and limited purpose may give powers to special or technical organizations that general organizations lack. It should be recognized, of course, that practice is more multifarious than these distinctions may suggest. For example, for many years GATT has been somewhere between a closed and a universal organization. The borders between supranational and intergovernmental organizations, and between technical and general organizations, are just as vague. B. Universal versus closed organizations 1. Universal organizations §51 The 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character describes international organizations of a universal character as “the United Nations, its specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and any similar organization whose membership and responsibilities are on a world-wide scale”. Thus, to be covered by this description, an organization does not have to be truly universal in membership and responsibilities. In fact, with the exception of the UN, no organization exists which would fully fulfil such a condition. ‘Universal organization’
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covers organizations with a universal vocation, thus aiming to have all states as members. This aim is a first characteristic shared by all universal organizations. It is usually implicitly referred to in the constitution of these organizations. For example, Article 1 of the constitution of the World Health Organization states: “The objective of the World Health Organization . . . shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health”. The goal of universal membership has a number of institutional consequences. For example, if the organization is entitled to impose conditions on admission, these conditions – if applied at all – need to be balanced against the universal vocation of the organization. Also, organizations with the power to expel members would in fact undermine their own goal if they were to use this power in practice. To this extent, the power to expel members from a universal organization is an empty shell. §52 A second characteristic shared by universal organizations is their heterogeneous membership. Each universal organization has to cope with the reality of large political, socio-economic and cultural differences among its members. These differences limit the confidence of the members in the organization and their willingness to attribute powers to it. This common problem of universal organizations also has a number of institutional consequences: for example, the need to recruit staff for the secretariat of an organization “on as wide a geographical basis as possible”, despite the fact that international secretariats need to be independent from the member states (see below, §500-505). Because of this second characteristic and the related institutional consequences, universal organizations have more features in common than regional organizations, which are widely divergent in objectives, powers and structure. Partly for this reason, the International Law Commission has limited the scope of the draft of the 1975 Convention to universal organizations.222 2. Closed organizations §53 In contrast to universal organizations, some organizations seek only membership from a closed group of states and no members from outside the group will be admitted.223 These organizations will be described as closed organizations, to emphasize the closed circle from which this membership is drawn.224 There are three types of closed organizations: regional organizations, organizations of states
222
Yearbook of the ILC 1967, Vol. II, at 148. See e.g. the answer of the EC Council to written question 454/85 (“Integration of Morocco into the EEC”), OJ 1985, C 208/34: “. . . it will be remembered that under the terms of the Treaty only European states can apply for membership of the Communities.” A similar reaction was given in 1987, when Morocco officially applied for membership (see Europe No. 4594 (1987)). 224 Similarly Virally, op. cit. note 108, at 60-61. Schwarzenberger’s designation “sectional organizations” is less appropriate, as it suggests that these organizations would cover only specific sections, and that this group would not include general organizations. See his International Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. III (1976), at 6. 223
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with a common background (for example, language or a political system), and closed special organizations. §54 Regional organizations are the most common kind of closed organizations.225 Examples are the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community (Caricom), the African Union, the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Pacific Islands Forum. In fact, the notion ‘regional’ is often not appropriate, since there are few organizations the membership of which is entirely based on geographical factors. Generally, political factors play at least an equally important role.226 Still, organizations such as the Council of Europe, the African Union and the Arab League may well be called regional, despite the fact that not all states of the region were or are entitled to participate. For organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which recruit most of their members from a particular region, but have also admitted members from elsewhere, the denomination becomes more difficult. Regional organizations were rare before the Second World War. Since then, their number and importance have increased. Nowadays, many issues transcending national boundaries are dealt with by regional organizations. In addition, within their framework, the members’ policies are sometimes coordinated to present one regional standpoint in universal organizations. §55 Organizations of states that share a common background are, for example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (the latter was dissolved in 1991). These organizations are, strictly speaking, not regional organizations. Instead, their members share(d) a particular economic system and a particular level of economic development. Other examples are the Organization of the Islamic Conference (established in 1971, inter alia to promote Islamic solidarity among its members),227 the Commonwealth (see above, §35), and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (established to bring together countries linked by their common usage of the French language).228
225 The literature on regional organizations mostly concentrates on individual regional organizations, but there are also some comparative studies, see e.g. A. Acharya and A.I. Johnston (eds.), Crafting Cooperation – Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (2007). 226 Cf. the discussions on the enlargement of the Council of Europe. In January 1994, an initial report was presented to the Parliamentary Assembly (Doc. 6975), which ruled out the possibility of the three Transcaucasian republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) becoming full members of the Council. It was suggested that the Caucasus is part of Asia. However, many members of the Assembly disagreed with this position and, in its second report on the issue (Doc. 7103), the Political Affairs Committee stated that “in view of their cultural links with Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia would have the possibility of applying for membership provided they clearly indicate their will to be considered as part of Europe” (see also Doc. 7148). Georgia became a member in 1999; Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2001. 227 YIO 2008-2009, Vol. I, at 2337-2339; M. Shihab, Organization of the Islamic Conference, EPIL Vol. 3 (1997), at 824-828. 228 YIO 2008-2009, Vol. I, at 2328.
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In fact, all regional organizations also fit into this category. Therefore, the only difference between these categories is that the ‘common background’ organizations include organizations the membership of which is not limited to states of a particular geographical region. §56 Closed special organizations have been established to perform specific functions (see below, §63) for a limited group of states. Several special organizations are closed because not all states perform the relevant function: for example, the production of bauxite. Others have closed their membership by a narrow description of their tasks and by laying down certain criteria for membership: for example, Article 7 of the Statute of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) provides that membership is open to “any . . . country with a substantial net export of crude petroleum . . . [and] fundamentally similar interests to those of member countries” (emphasis added). As a result of the latter (emphasized) criterion, Western countries will not be eligible for OPEC membership.229 §57
Closed organizations have a number of characteristics in common.
(1) In many cases, cooperation between the members has been stimulated by the wish to resist external influence or even to collaborate against a common enemy. Western European cooperation was partly provoked by fear of the USSR; the Organization of African Unity was to some extent a response to the (perceived) threat of neo-colonialism. (2) Membership of closed organizations is more homogeneous than membership of universal organizations. A more or less similar political, socio-economic and cultural background of the members and, consequently, closer ties between the peoples within the member states all facilitate the attribution of powers to the organization concerned. Only in closed special organizations will such cohesion be less prominent. For example, commodity organizations (such as the organization set up by the International Coffee Agreement) usually have a limited number of exporting less-developed members and a limited number of importing developed members; cooperation in the specific fields of these organizations thus takes place despite the very different backgrounds of members. The relatively large degree of homogeneity within closed organizations finds its counterpart in a great heterogeneity between these organizations. This heterogeneity is a result of large differences in the tasks and membership of these organizations.230 (3) Membership of closed organizations is divergent, depending on the function of the organization. The limited objectives of the Benelux result in the participation of only three states. The objectives of the European Union have permitted a gradual increase in membership. Neutral states do not wish to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while non-democratic and non-European
229 See I.F.I. Shihata and A.R. Parra, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, EPIL Vol. 3 (1997), at 828-832. 230 Similarly: A. El-Erian in his second report on the relations between states and intergovernmental organizations, Yearbook of the ILC 1967, Vol. II, at 148.
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states are excluded from membership of the Council of Europe. The membership of organizations uniting states that share particular interests necessarily varies with those interests. C. Intergovernmental versus supranational organizations 1. Intergovernmental organizations §58 A few words are necessary to explain the term ‘intergovernmental organization’. The word ‘government’ has different meanings. Many (particularly American) authors use it in a wide sense, covering all organs that participate in governing the nation: that is to say, the executive as well as the legislative and judicial branches. Others (mainly in Europe) use the word in a more restrictive sense, covering only the executive branch of the government. They may speak of a conflict between government and parliament, which would be impossible in the former, wider sense of the word. As a rule, we will use ‘government’ in the narrow sense, indicating only the executive. This makes the term ‘intergovernmental organizations’ appropriate for most organizations discussed here, since they are in fact concerned with cooperation between the executive branches of the governments of the member states.231 Only a very limited number of organizations covered by this book, in particular the European Union, embody more far-reaching forms of cooperation: the Union has its own parliament and judiciary. For these forms of cooperation, the term supranational organization seems more appropriate. Capotorti has accurately observed that “the criterion for distinguishing such a category is essentially functional: that is to say, it is on the basis of the principal functions with which the ECSC is entrusted (the exercise of powers withdrawn from the sovereignty of the member states) that it was defined as supranational rather than international”.232 §59 The most fundamental characteristics of intergovernmental organizations are: (1) The decision-making powers are in fact exercised by representatives of governments. Organs composed of persons independent of the member states, committees of experts or parliamentary assemblies may play an advisory role, but they will generally not have the power to take final decisions. (2) In important matters, governments cannot be bound against their will. Intergovernmental organizations seek collaboration between governments, and are in no way superior to them. Although intergovernmental organizations can sometimes take binding decisions, this is only possible where the decision in question enjoys the unanimous approval of all members. By voting against a draft decision, a government can thus prevent its adoption.
231 In the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the references to “government” were replaced by references to “country”, to reflect that countries and not governments are members. Although formally more correct, this did not change the situation that in fact only governments collaborate in the organization. 232 F. Capotorti, Supranational organizations, EPIL Vol. 4 (2000), at 738-739.
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2. Supranational organizations §60 In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community was established as an organization with a number of supranational features. Since then, many authors have discussed the concept of the ‘supranational organization’,233 reaching different conclusions, as a result of the fact that the term ‘supranational’ does not have any clear meaning. To date, the term has been used only descriptively and has not acquired a distinct legal meaning.234 The term ‘supranational’ is used in one provision of the original ECSC Treaty. Article 9.5 provided, inter alia, that the members of the High Authority “shall refrain from any action incompatible with the supra-national character of their functions” (repealed by the 1965 Merger Treaty). In Wagner’s view, the term ‘supranational’ was used in the ECSC Treaty in order to avoid a controversial expression like ‘federal’. Disagreement between the founders of the Community would thus have been hidden by the use of an obscure expression.235
§61 The most fundamental characteristics of supranational organizations are the following: (1) The organization should have the power to take decisions binding on the member states. (2) The organs taking the decisions should not be entirely dependent on the cooperation of all the member states. Some independence may be obtained in two ways. First, by allowing binding decisions to be adopted by majority vote, so that the member states can be bound against their will. Secondly, by composing the decision-making organ of independent individuals. (3) The organization should be empowered to make rules that directly bind the inhabitants of the member states. This power enables the organization to perform governmental functions without the need or the possibility for national governments to transform the rules of the organization into domestic law. (4) The organization should have the power to enforce its decisions. Enforcement should be possible even without the cooperation of the governments of the states concerned. It may well be possible that other organs of the member states are used to aid the organization in this field. Thus, a national parliament and the
233 See e.g. A.J.P. Tammes, Wat is “supranationaal”?, NJB 477 (1953); P. Hay, Federalism and supranational organizations (1966); K. von Lindeiner-Wildau, La supranationalité en tant que principe de droit (1970); P. Pescatore, Le droit de l’integration 49-55 (1972); H.-P. Ipsen, Über Supranationalität, in: H. Ehmke et al. (eds.), Festschrift Scheuner 211-225 (1973); L.-J. Constantinesco, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften I (Das institutionelle Recht) 309-350 (1977); Capotorti, op. cit. note 232, at 737-744; K. Lenaerts and P. van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union 11-18 (2nd ed. 2005). Cf. Bernard Shaw’s introduction to L.S. Woolf, International Government xv (1916): “Unless and until Europe is provided with a new organ for supernational action, provided with an effective police, all talk of making an end of war is mere waste of breath” (emphasis added). 234 Capotorti, op. cit. note 232, at 737. 235 H. Wagner, Grundbegriffe des Beschlußrechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 81-82 (1965).
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national judiciary may coerce their government to fulfil the state’s obligations to the organization. (5) The organization should have some financial autonomy. The financing of organizations from funds entirely subscribed by the member states leads to a dependence extending beyond the purely financial field. By refusing to provide the organization with sufficient income to appoint qualified staff members or necessary equipment, governments could hamper the functioning of the organization. The UN is not a supranational organization, but it has the supranational characteristic of taking decisions by majority vote. Although the UN can take decisions on peace-keeping against the wishes of some members, it has encountered difficulties when these members refused to pay the expenses related to these decisions (see below, §1212-1215).
(6) Unilateral withdrawal should not be possible. In a supranational organization, the members should not even have the power collectively to dissolve the organization or to amend its powers without the collaboration of the supranational organs. The organization cannot rank above its members while it depends on their agreement for its continued existence. §62 To be completely supranational, an organization should fulfil all the abovementioned conditions. No such supranational organization currently exists. Even the organization with most supranational features, the European Union, depends to a considerable extent on intergovernmental cooperation. The most important decisions of the Union are made by compromises between the participating governments. Since there is no organization that is fully supranational, we shall use the term ‘supranational’ in a relative, not absolute sense. The closer the abovementioned conditions are to being fulfilled, the more supranational the organization is considered to be. All intergovernmental organizations have some supranational aspects. Binding decisions are taken by majority vote in most organizations (although often only on procedural issues). In many technical organizations, independent committees of experts take decisions that are decisive in practice. Even non-binding recommendations contain supranational aspects. Membership of the organization encourages states to make at least some effort to comply with the organization’s wishes. Overt non-compliance will be resented. Several organizations enjoy financial autonomy, which is a significant aid to independence (see below, §1051, 1081-1090). By using the word ‘supranational’ in a relative sense, the distinction between supranational and intergovernmental organizations becomes blurred. This vagueness has led some authors to reject the notion ‘supranational organization’.236 However, it is submitted that this notion can be used in this relative sense, to indicate that the supranational elements prevail.
236 M.S. Korowicz, Organisations internationales et souveraineté des états membres 283-286 (1961). For a list of authors sharing this opinion, see Hay, op. cit. note 233, at 76 ff.
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D. Special versus general organizations 1. Special organizations §63 Most organizations are established to perform a specific function. For instance, the Universal Postal Union was founded for the development of postal communications, the World Health Organization for improving health, and the International Renewable Energy Agency for promoting renewable energy. Such special organizations are often called functional or technical organizations. Sometimes it is even explicitly indicated that an organization is to limit its work to a specific technical area and may not get involved in political issues. For example, the activities of the International Hydrographic Organization “are of a scientific or technical nature and shall not include matters involving questions of international policy” (in the French version: “. . . des questions touchant à la politique internationale”).237 The main characteristics of special or technical organizations are the limited scope and technical nature of their tasks. Therefore, members will usually delegate experts instead of diplomats to the meetings of these organizations. These experts know the needs and the potential for international cooperation in their particular field. They receive instructions on general political problems, but will spend less time and effort on these problems than diplomats. Technical organizations are therefore, as a rule, less hampered by political controversies, which often enhances their success. If, however, this success is likely to be important for international political relations in general, the participating states may issue more extensive instructions or even add political advisers to their delegations, and the main political issues will receive more attention. On a number of occasions, technical organizations have spent considerable time discussing political issues, such as the representation of China, or the position of South Africa during the era of apartheid. At its sixteenth session, the Universal Postal Union (UPU), decided to exclude practically all questions of a political nature from its debates.238 However, this decision proved fruitless, and the UPU has spent many hours discussing political matters, such as the representation of South Africa.
2. General organizations §64 Some organizations may discuss any subject matter they see fit or any topic not belonging to some specifically excluded field. Such organizations are called general or political organizations. The main characteristics of these organizations are the vastness of the fields they may cover and the presence of diplomats or politicians in the delegations of the
237 238
Art. 2 of the General Regulations of the International Hydrographic Organization. UPU Res. C 4 (1969), UNJY 1969, at 119-120.
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members. These representatives will strive to attain general political goals and are usually not experts on particular issues. The most important general organizations are the United Nations, which is concerned with universal cooperation, and a number of organizations dealing with regional cooperation: the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It is not possible to draw a sharp distinction between special and general organizations. If large fields are excluded from the scope of a general organization, it will become more specific. If a special organization is charged with a very important general task (for example, economic cooperation), it will become more general.
IV. Conclusion §65 Having brought some order to our vast field of study, the time for exploration has now come. In the following chapters, the main institutional characteristics of international organizations will be closely examined. In the concluding sections of each chapter, the issues discussed in this introductory chapter will be touched upon again, in the hope that they will provide some guidance on the wealth of institutional rules and practices of international organizations.
CHAPTER TWO
PARTICIPANTS
§66 One element all international organizations have in common is that they have members. In most organizations, only states may become members. Increasingly, however, international organizations may also have other international organizations as members. For example, nowadays the European Union is a member of numerous international organizations, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN and the World Trade Organization.1 For reasons of brevity, and since in most cases only states are members of international organizations, we will usually refer to member states. Member states play two roles in relation to ‘their’ organizations: an internal and an external role.2 In the former, states are the constituent parts of organs of the organization, and in pursuing their objectives these organs are dependent upon the will of the member states to cooperate. For example, for many years the UN Security Council was unable to perform the task for which it was created, mainly because of fundamental disagreement among its permanent members. The internal role or capacity can easily be recognized in the composition and functioning of non-plenary, executive organs of international organizations. Members of these organs are often expected to act on behalf of all members of the organization.3 For this reason, the constitutions of most universal organizations contain provisions requiring that all geographic areas of the world are represented in these non-plenary organs.4 In practice, non-permanent members of the Security
1 See below, §81-84. Cf. also the definition of international organizations adopted by the ILC in its draft articles on responsibility of international organizations (text adopted on first reading; see above, §29A): “. . . International organizations may include as members, in addition to states, other entities”. 2 See A.J.P. Tammes, Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International Law, 94 RdC (1958 II), at 353-359; L.-J. Constantinesco, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften – Das institutionelle Recht (1977), at 286-287; R. Higgins, Problems and Process – International Law and how we use it (1994), at 93-94; R. Higgins, The legal consequences for member states of the non-fulfilment by international organizations of their obligations toward third parties, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, Session de Lisbonne, Vol. 66-I (1995), at 260-261, 388; R.A. Lawson, Het EVRM en de Europese Gemeenschappen – Bouwstenen voor een aansprakelijkheidsregime voor het optreden van internationale organisaties (1999), at 465 ff. 3 E.g. Art. 24.1 of the UN Charter (“. . . the Security Council acts on their [-all UN members’-] behalf ”). Cf. also H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 280 (1951); J. Delbrück in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations 448-449 (2nd ed. 2002). Sometimes members of the Security Council explicitly state that they take into account interests or concerns of other countries of their region, or even of all UN members, when they have to determine their position in the Council (see e.g. UN Doc. S/PV.2977 (Part II)(closed resumption 3), at 322; UN Doc. S/ PV.3413, at 9). 4 E.g. ICAO, Art. 50(b); IMO, Art. 18(c); UNESCO, Art. V.A.2; WHO, Art. 24.
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Council sometimes explicitly refer to their duty to take into account not only their own interests but also the concerns or interests of their regions.5 In 2005 the Senate of the Dutch Parliament informed the Dutch Minister of Justice that it was of the opinion that the Minister should not participate in consultations in the EU Council relating to a specific item on the agenda. The Minister of Justice however refused to implement this wish of the Senate. One of the reasons for his refusal was his view that “the Minister as member of the Council is not exclusively a Dutch Minister, but also a member of an EU organ. His functioning as such is also governed by what is necessary in the general interest of the Union”.6
In their external role, states are the counterparts of the organization. Organizations are created to influence the policies of the member states; and in pursuing its objectives, the organization takes decisions directed at an environment outside the organization itself. In their external role, members are confronted with these decisions that may have a direct or indirect impact on them, and they must respect such decisions to a degree which is commensurate with their legal effect. The position of members in this external role concerns the external relations of the organization and will therefore be discussed in Chapter Twelve. §67 The distinction between the internal and external role of the member states is not always easy to draw. This is “inherent in most situations where international organs have to deal with conflicts of interests between states and, at the same time, are composed of representatives of states”.7 However, the distinction is fundamental and may have important legal consequences. Only in their internal role do member states cooperate within the framework of the organ and as such must respect the internal rules of the organization. For example, a decision was adopted in a meeting of the EC Council to provide special aid to Bangladesh after it had been devastated by a cyclone in April 1991. The Commission prepared a plan which was examined during a meeting of the Council, although it did not appear on the formal agenda of that meeting. On 14 May the decision was taken to provide special aid to Bangladesh in accordance with the Commission’s plan. The decision was the subject of a press release under the heading “conclusions of the Council”. The European Parliament sought the annulment of this decision, claiming before the Court of Justice that it was a Council decision. It argued that the decision had budgetary implications and should have been adopted in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 203 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 313314 of the TFEU). By failing to adopt the decision under this article, the Parliament contended that the Council had infringed the Parliament’s prerogatives. The Council challenged the admissibility of the action on the ground that the contested act was adopted not by the Council but by the member states and that it could not therefore be the subject of annulment proceedings before the Court under
5 6 7
E.g. UN Docs. S/PV.2977 (Part II), at 311 (India) and 322 (Cuba); S/PV.3413, at 9 (Brazil ). Letter by the Minister of Justice of 20 June 2005, Senate document 2004-2005, 23490, AS. Tammes, op. cit. note 2, at 354.
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Article 173 of the Treaty (now Article 263 TFEU).8 The Court followed a bro