International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
Associate Editors Heinz Eulau, Political Science Lloyd A. Fallers, Anthropology William H. Kruskal, Statistics Gardner Lindzey, Psychology Albert Rees, Economics Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Sociology Edward Shils, Social Thought
Special Editors Elinor G. Barber, Biographies John G. Darley, Applied Psychology Bert F. Hoselitz, Economic Development Clifford T. Morgan, Experimental Psychology Robert H. Strotz, Econometrics
Editorial Staff Marjorie A. Bassett, Economics P. G. Bock, Political Science Robert M. Coen, Econometrics J. M. B. Edwards, Sociology David S. Gochman, Psychology George Lowy, Bibliographies Judith M. Tanur, Statistics Judith M. Treistman, Anthropology
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W Allen Wallis CHAIRMAN, EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES DAVID L. S I L L S EDITOR
VOLUME
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International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
[ C O N T I N U E D ]
PSYCHOANALYSIS The articles under this entry provide an introduction to psychoanalytic theory and methods of therapy. The biography of FREUD should also be consulted; it includes the historical background of Freud's thought, his major contributions to psychoanalysis, and a critique of his theories. Some major implications of psychoanalysis for behavior are discussed in ANXIETY; BODY IMAGE; CONFLICT, article On PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; DEFENSE MECHANISMS; EMOTION; IDENTITY, PSYCHOSOCIAL; NATIONAL CHARACTER; PERSONALITY, POLITICAL;
SELF CONCEPT; SOCIALIZATION, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; SUICIDE. Discussions that are relevant to an evaluation of the libido concept are contained in AFFECTION; AGGRESSION, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; DRIVES; INSTINCT; MOTIVATION. The relevance of psychoanalysis for the study of mental disorders is discussed in CHARACTER DISORDERS; DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS; HYSTERIA;
NEUROSIS; OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDERS; PARANOID REACTIONS; PHOBIAS; PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY; PSYCHOSIS; PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS; SCHIZOPHRENIA. Psychoanalytic interpretations of the products of human behavior are contained in DREAMS; FANTASY; LITERATURE, article On THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LITERATURE; RELIGION,
article on PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. Methods of studying phenomena of interest to psychoanalysis are discussed in DREAMS; HYPNOSIS; INTERVIEWING, especially the article on THERAPEUTIC INTERVIEWING; PROJECTIVE METHODS. Different and often contrasting views of personality are found in ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY; FIELD THEORY; GESTALT THEORY;INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY; LEARNING THEORY; PERSONALITY; PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY
VIEWPOINTS; PHENOMENOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGY, article On EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY; THINKING, article on COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION AND PROCESSES. Different conceptions of mental disorders and their treatment are described in CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; MENTAL DISORDERS; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; MENTAL HEALTH; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHOLOGY, article on EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Biographies of important figures (in addition to Freud) relevant either to Freud's work or the psychoanalytic movement are ABRAHAM; ADLER; ALEXANDER; BLEULER; CHARCOT; FERENCZI; HORNEY; JONES; JUNG; KLEIN; KRIS; RANK; RAPAPORT; REICH; ROHEIM; RORSCHACH; SULLIVAN. i. ii. in. iv.
CLASSICAL THEORY EGO PSYCHOLOGY THERAPEUTIC METHODS EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
Charles Brenner George S. Klein Rudolph M. Loewenstein Ernest R. Hilgard
CLASSICAL THEORY
The term "psychoanalysis" is commonly used in three different senses: a form of treatment for mental illness, a method for investigating the workings of the mind (the psychoanalytic method), and a branch of psychological or behavioral science. The term was coined by Sigmund Freud, who devised, developed, and applied the method over a period of fifty years and who is responsible for the major part of the theoretical formulations called psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis began as a method of treating mentally ill patients, and the theoretical formulations which Freud first made on the basis of his clinical experience concerned psychopathology. However, in the course of his work Freud came to recognize that there are close similarities between 1
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psychopathology and certain aspects of normal mental functioning. Thus by 1900 it was clear that psychoanalysis had definite contributions to make to the psychology of dreams, of jokes, and of various slips and errors of everyday life, which Freud proposed to call normal or everyday psychopathology. These were momentous discoveries which proved to be fruitful as well. Even more momentous was the discovery of the vital importance of childhood sexuality in both normal and pathological mental development, a discovery which was contained in a monograph published in 1905 and entitled Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The subsequent development of psychoanalytic theory, based on the application of the psychoanalytic method to an increasingly large number of cases, seems to justify the claim that it constitutes by far the most important contribution to the psychology of man that has been made up to this time. Psychoanalysis has been described epigrammatically as human nature viewed as conflict. And indeed it appears to be the case that many of the most important aspects of human mental development and functioning are intimately related to conflicts which have their origins in childhood and in particular in the sexual conflicts of childhood. This statement is as true of character traits and attributes which we class as normal as it is of those aspects of behavior which we class as symptoms of mental illness. This, then, is the most important and the most unexpected contribution of psychoanalysis to normal psychology: the vital significance of instinctual conflict in normal as well as pathological mental functioning and development. Closely allied to this is the importance in mental life of unconscious mental phenomena, that is, of mental processes of which the subject himself has no conscious knowledge. In fact, the conflicts just mentioned, which play such an important part in mental life, are largely unconscious in later childhood and adult mental life. It may be noted parenthetically that in psychoanalytic terminology at present "unconscious" usually means "accessible to consciousness only with difficulty, or not at all," while "preconscious" means "readily accessible to consciousness, though not conscious at the moment." However, current psychoanalytic usage is not wholly consistent with respect to the meanings of "unconscious" and "preconscious," since their meanings have varied somewhat in the course of the development of Freud's theories concerning the mental apparatus. A third contribution of psychoanalysis to normal
psychology is its demonstration of the continuity or determinism of mental life. If one depends on simple introspection for one's knowledge of what goes on in the mind, there appear to be many gaps and discontinuities in the current of mental life. It often happens that an idea comes to consciousness which bears no apparent connection with what one was consciously thinking a moment before. Similarly, behavior may bear no apparent connection to conscious volition or conscious thoughts. If, however, one is able to apply the psychoanalytic method, one is in a position to adduce evidence for the existence of unconscious mental processes that fill in the gaps and discontinuities which appear to be present in mental life if one judges only by the data of conscious introspection. Finally, in addition to demonstrating the causal relationship between the present and the immediate past in mental life, the application of the psychoanalytic method has made it possible to establish relationships between current modes of thought and behavior, on the one hand, and various crucially important experiences and conflicts of early childhood, on the other. The emphasis on the relationship between the present and the more remote past in mental life, which is so characteristic of psychoanalytic psychology, is often referred to as the genetic point of view. In summary, we may repeat that psychoanalysis, which began as a theory of psychopathology, has gradually developed into an important part of general psychology. The application of the psychoanalytic method has contributed more to our understanding of the important aspects of human mental functioning and development than has any other method of observation or experiment. Assumptions and method As a behavioral science, psychoanalysis is primarily concerned with the inner life of man. It assumes that man's thoughts and ideas, his plans and fantasies, and his fears and daydreams are legitimate objects of study. It also assumes, as does biological science in general, that man is an animal. For the psychoanalyst, psychology is a branch of biology. The importance of somatic or organic influences on mental functioning is always borne in mind, particularly with relation to the instinctual drives, which, according to psychoanalytic theory, are assumed to be the basic motivational forces in mental life. Free association. The method of psychoanalysis is often referred to, rather inexactly, as free association. The subject, who usually lies on a couch
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Classical Theory facing away from the observer or analyst, is instructed to communicate freely to the analyst, without reserve or editing, whatever thoughts occur to him, as well as whatever physical or bodily sensations intrude upon his consciousness. The analyst may, and often does, suggest that the patient associate to some particular idea or experience that he has communicated in this way. For example, he may suggest that the subject associate to one or another part of a dream which he has related. In addition, he may intervene with what are usually called interpretations in psychoanalytic terminology; that is, he may point out to the subject evidences of conflict, often unconscious conflict, within the subject's mind. At other times, the analyst may attempt to reconstruct the nature of childhood experiences and fantasies which are important determinants of present behavior or mental activity. [See DREAMS.] From these very brief examples it should be clear that the term "free association" is far from a satisfactory description of the psychoanalytic method, although it does point to certain essential elements of the method. Indeed the assumption that underlies the application of the psychoanalytic method is that if conscious control of one's thoughts is given up, the direction of one's thoughts, far from being free, will then be determined even more clearly than before by other motivational forces within the mind which are not subject to conscious volition and which are in many instances unconscious. To be more precise, the application of the psychoanalytic method reveals more clearly the presence and the consequences of inner conflict, conflict of which the subject himself often has little or no knowledge. Since, by the nature of things, the recognition of such conflict within oneself gives rise to shame, guilt, anxiety, or other unpleasant emotions, there is generally a strong resistance to revealing the presence of such conflict to another individual or even to oneself. In human mental life the most important things of all are often those which one least wants to tell. A conscious determination not to be influenced by one's reluctance to speak of certain things is only partially helpful. The reluctance itself is in fact lifelong and to a large extent unconscious. It is for this reason that the satisfactory application of the psychoanalytic method is generally possible only in a therapeutic situation. Fortunately for our scientific curiosity, though unfortunately for each of us personally, there is enough that is neurotic even in the most normal of us so that any psychoanalysis soon becomes a therapeutic one, even though it may have been originally under-
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taken merely out of scientific curiosity or as part of a course of training. Behavioral observation. In addition to listening to what the subject tells him of what is going on in his mind, the analyst observes the subject's behavior during the entire time when it is accessible to his observation, neglecting no aspect or detail of it. It should be obvious that evidence of strong emotions, for example, tears, laughter, blushing, or anger, will be as important to the analyst as is the verbal content of what his subject tells him. Just as important are the subject's tone of voice, his incidental gestures, and his behavior both before he lies down on the couch and after he rises from it. In general, the psychoanalytic method may be described as a descriptive method as opposed to a quantitative one, a naturalistic approach as opposed to an experimental one. It is not apparent a priori that the psychoanalytic method is a reliable one. Its reliability is attested by the regularity with which observations can be confirmed or repeated by the same analyst on the same subject, by the same analyst on different subjects, and by different analysts on different subjects. Other methods of study. Although the application of the psychoanalytic method has been and remains the chief source of data as far as psychoanalysis is concerned, it must not be supposed that it is the only one. In recent years in particular, the method of direct observation of children over a period of months or years of their development has come to occupy an increasingly important place in the field of psychoanalytic research. Other observations of human behavior also have contributed data of various sorts, in particular the observation of the behavior of mentally ill patients in clinical settings other than the psychoanalytic treatment situation. Finally, mention should be made of the importance of the study of the various products of man's imagination. These include such examples of collective or folk creativity as myths, legends, religion, fairy tales, and, to a certain degree, the entire range of man's social institutions or systems. Equally important are the products of individual creativity, such as works of literature or the visual arts, and closely allied to this is the study of individual history or biography. In the psychoanalytic literature, studies of this sort are generally referred to as applied psychoanalysis. The explanatory value of psychoanalytic theory in these various areas of human activity affords a valuable, if subsidiary, additional confirmation of the validity of the primary observations which are obtainable by the ap-
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plication of the psychoanalytic method—and of the theories which are primarily based upon those observations. [See FANTASY; LITERATURE, article on THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LITERATURE.]
The instinctual drives Psychoanalytic theories of the mind are often divided into two major parts, the first of which comprises those aspects of the theory that have to do with the instinctual drives and the second those aspects that have to do with what Freud called the mental apparatus. Although this division has the disadvantage of being excessively schematic, it does have the advantage of somewhat simplifying the problem of presenting an extremely complex subject. We shall therefore adhere to it, and begin our presentation with a discussion of the instinctual drives. As the term "drive" implies, the instinctual drives are assumed to be forces within the mind which impel it to activity. They are the driving forces of mental life. In addition to their impulsive quality, they have certain other characteristics, namely, a source, an object, and an aim. The source of an instinctual drive is assumed to be some bodily part or bodily process. The object is the person (or thing) which is necessary for the satisfaction of the drive. The aim is the particular activity or action by means of which satisfaction is achieved. The capacity of an instinctual drive to impel the mind to activity is accounted for by assuming that in mental life an instinctual drive possesses energy. This energy is assumed to be quantitatively variable, to be increased at times of instinctual tension or need and to be discharged in the process of instinctual gratification. The quantity of instinctual energy which is associated with a particular memory or idea is referred to as the cathexis of that mental element. [See DRIVES; INSTINCT; MOTIVATION.] Erotic and aggressive drives. Instinctual drives are divided into two major groups or types. The first is called the erotic or libidinal drive and the second the aggressive drive. The relationship of the erotic drive to bodily parts and processes is much clearer than is that of the aggressive drive, and the erotic drive in general has been more thoroughly studied and is better understood than the aggressive one. The principal sources of erotic drive tension or need in the body are referred to as erotogenic zones. The most important of these appear to be the mouth and related structures, the anus, and the genitalia. In the normal course of development it appears that the oral manifestations of the erotic drive are of particularly great importance
during the first year of life, the anal ones during the next year and a half, and the phallic ones thereafter. However, the sexual life of childhood is not dominated exclusively by any one erotogenic zone or by any single aim, as is normally the case in adult life after adolescence. On the contrary, the sexual wishes and satisfactions of childhood are characterized by their diversity and manifold quality rather than by uniformity. What is normally characteristic for childhood sexuality, therefore, would be called perverse in adult life. Since the somatic sources, if any, of aggression (the aggressive drive) are less clear than those of the erotic drive, it is not possible to describe phases of development of the aggressive drive in childhood in the same way that one can describe the erotic drive. It appears that there is a close relationship between manifestations of the aggressive and the erotic drives throughout life, however—a fact which is explained by assuming a degree of fusion between the two drives. It follows therefore that the oral, anal, and phallic phases of childhood sexuality are characterized by aggressive as well as by erotic wishes, fantasies, and behavior, so that it is proper to speak of oral, anal, or phallic aggressive impulses. An important characteristic of the aggressive drive is its differentiation with respect to its object. Freud was led to the assumption of a special aggressive drive in the first place by his recognition of the very great importance in mental life of selfinjurious and self-destructive tendencies. It is clearly of utmost importance to any individual whether his aggressive impulses are directed toward himself or toward the mental representations of other persons and objects. It must not be assumed however that self-directed aggression is to be considered always pathological. On the contrary, it plays an important, indeed an essential role in normal mental life, for example, in the functioning of the superego, as well as a very important one in abnormal mental life. [See AGGRESSION, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
The instinctual drives are of particular importance with respect to the emotional or affective life. In general, an intensification of instinctual need, or an increase in instinctual energy striving for discharge, is experienced as a source of pain and discomfort. A discharge of instinctual energy, that is, the gratification of an instinctual wish or need, which leads to a diminution in tension, is experienced as pleasurable. Evaluation. The following summary statement may be of some value in helping to avoid certain misunderstandings concerning the current status
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Classical Theory of the psychoanalytic theory of the instinctual drives. The fact is that some aspects of that theory are considered to be much better validated than others. For example, it seems certain that any qualified observer who is in a position to apply the psychoanalytic method to the study of human mental life must agree that the sexual life of man begins long before puberty. The fact of infantile sexuality (childhood sexuality) appears to be incontrovertible. Equal validity would appear to accrue to the importance of sexual and aggressive wishes, as well as conflicts concerning those wishes, in the whole of mental development and functioning throughout life. Validating evidence is much less adequate concerning such aspects of instinctual-drive theory as the concepts of instinctual energy, cathexis, fusion, and related concepts of a quantitative nature. We may add, parenthetically, that in the psychoanalytic literature the quantitative aspect of instinctual-drive theory is frequently referred to as its economic aspect. The psychic apparatus The primary purpose of the psychic apparatus is assumed to be the regulation, control, and discharge of instinctual energy. It tends to function according to the pleasure principle, that is, in such a way as to achieve the pleasure of gratification which results from a discharge of instinctual energies. Formulated more generally, it may be said that the avoidance of discomfort or pain, which is associated with instinctual tension, and the achievement of pleasure, which is associated with gratification, is a basic tendency or regulatory principle of the psychic apparatus. Psychoanalytic theories concerning the psychic apparatus are firmly based on the fact that the adult organization and functioning of the mind is the result of a period of gradual evolution and development during the course of the many years of childhood. In the last analysis, this is due to biological factors, that is, to the fact that the human infant is born into the world in a largely undeveloped state, both with respect to mental and physical functioning. As a result, during the first several years of its life, it is dependent on its parents for its very survival, as well as for the gratification of its instinctual needs. The offspring of no other mammal is so dependent on its parents for such a long period of time as is the human, and this fact is of profound importance in the mental life and development of man. Structure of the psychic apparatus. In its mature form or organization the psychic apparatus is divided into three groups of related functions.
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The id. That group of psychic functions which represents the instinctual drives in mental life and plays the role of stimulating or impelling the psychic apparatus to activity is called the id. The id is the part of the psychic apparatus which is in closest or most direct communication with the somatic processes of an instinctual nature, and it has often been referred to for that reason as the vital or somatic stratum of the psychic apparatus. The ego. The ego is that part of the psychic apparatus which comprises the group of functions that have to do with the individual's relationship to his environment. Ego functions include such gradually developing capacities of the mind as sensory perception, memory, thought, and voluntary motor control. These functions cannot appear before the neuromuscular apparatus which is a prerequisite for them has matured. The development of ego functions, therefore, is a result of interaction between maturation of the nervous system and various experiential factors. What is particularly characteristic of the psychoanalytic theory of the psychic apparatus, however, is the following additional consideration. Ego functions appear to serve primarily the purpose of gratification of instinctual drives. They are, so to say, the executants of the wishes or urges which are the mental representations of the drives. There is thus from the very beginning the most intimate connection between the functioning and, indeed, the development of the mental capacity to cope with the external environment, on the one hand, and the instinctual needs and wishes of each individual, on the other. The superego. The third group of functions that constitute the psychic apparatus is known as the superego. These functions develop into a more or less coherent unity rather late in childhood, probably not before the sixth or seventh year. In general they are that group of mental functions which have to do with the moral prohibitions and ideals of the individual. Conflict. It is of particular importance to bear the following fact in mind in considering the psychoanalytic theory of the psychic apparatus: The functional groupings of id, ego, and superego which are assumed to constitute the mental apparatus are sharply differentiated from one another only in situations of inner conflict. Indeed, the very divisions reflect the characteristic varieties of conflict within the mind as they can be observed by means of the psychoanalytic method. Thus, one frequent type of conflict is between an instinctual wish on the one hand and those aspects of mental activity on the other which have to do with the
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individual's relationship to those about him, that is, between a wish of the id and various ego functions. Characteristically, in later life at least, the moral prohibitions (superego) are arrayed on the side of the ego against the id. Other frequently observed conflicts are between the so-called ego functions, on the one hand, and the self-punitive or self-destructive aspect of the moral demands of the mind (superego), on the other. Thus, in these typical situations of conflict, one can distinguish properly between groups of functions that have to do with instinctual demands, those that have to do with the external world, and those that have to do with moral prohibitions and ideals. In other situations, however, where there is no such inner conflict, there is no sharp line of division or cleavage that enables us to distinguish clearly between or among the three systems, or structures as they are often called, of the psychic apparatus. If ego functions are acting as executants of the drives without conflict, one can no longer distinguish clearly what is ego from what is id. All one sees is a harmoniously functioning whole. The same is true when superego demands or prohibitions are in harmony with the instinctual needs or wishes of the individual and with the demands of his environment. [See CONFLICT, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.] The id The id is that part of the mental apparatus which functions to impel the mind toward the gratification of the instinctual drives. The impulsive aspect of mental life is that which is most directly associated with the id. Since the controlling and adaptive aspects of mental functioning, which are subsumed under the concept of the ego, are only developed gradually during the course of infancy and childhood, the id gives the impression of being the most archaic as well as the most infantile part of the psychic apparatus. In many senses it is correct to say that it represents the mind of the child that lives on in the mind of the grown man. Those processes which we assume constitute the id proceed according to the pleasure principle with little or no concern for the restrictions or demands either of external reality or of morality. These are the aspects of mental functioning which poets and philosophers in the past have referred to as demonic. The functioning of the id is characterized by an insistent or imperious demand for gratification, that is, for discharge of mental energy. This mode of mental functioning is called the primary process in psychoanalytic terminology. As we have just
noted, its essential attribute is a persistent striving for prompt and complete discharge of instinctual energy, that is, for prompt and full gratification. In keeping with this basic tendency, there is a propensity to substitute one or another instinctual object or instinctual aim for the primary one. Such substitution is called displacement, the reference being to the displacement of instinctual energy from one to another mental element. In addition to displacement, there may occur convergence of various instinctual cathexes on one particular aim or object which, because of its availability, or for other reasons, permits more ready and complete discharge of energy. Such a phenomenon is called condensation. These two related phenomena of displacement and condensation are typical and characteristic of mental phenomena which proceed according to the primary-process mode of discharge. The ego The ego is that group of mental functions which has to do primarily with the relation of the individual to the external environment. These functions operate as the executants of the instinctual drives and may thus be considered to mediate between the inner needs of the individual and his environment. Some of the functions that are grouped together as the ego appear to be directly related to the form and functioning of the nervous system, as, for example, sensory perception and the control of voluntary muscular activity, while others, such as the ability to distinguish between subjective and objective reality (originally called reality principle}, are more complex and more obviously related to experiential or learning processes in the course of development. From a subjective, psychological point of view, the single most important object in an infant's environment is his own body. His experiences of gratification and distress, and consequently his wishes and memories, are all centered about this unique object. Other objects of the environment, for example, his mother, although they may be of the greatest importance as far as his physical survival is concerned, do not compare with his own body in the first months and years of life as far as their psychological significance to him is concerned. These relationships are reflected in psychoanalytic theory by the statements, first, that the ego is first and foremost a body ego, and, second, that the infant's instinctual orientation is at first largely a narcissistic one, that is, at first largely directed toward himself. The proper development and organization of
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Classical Theory various ego functions as the infant grows appear to be intimately dependent upon a satisfactory balance between the instinctual gratifications which are supplied by the persons in his environment and the frustrations imposed by them. Proper mothering and, later, proper fathering as well are essential to proper development of the psychic apparatus and, more broadly, of the personality as a whole. The particular details of this complex interrelationship have been the object of many clinical and developmental studies. In psychoanalytic terminology, the most general formulation to express this relationship is that satisfactory object relationships promote the proper development of ego functions, while unsatisfactory ones impede their development. Identification and ego development. Among the more obvious reasons why satisfactory object relationships are of importance in the development of ego functions is the fact that many ego functions develop by means of identification with the persons in the child's or infant's environment. This is most clearly apparent with respect to the acquisition of language, an accomplishment which is of the utmost importance for the individual's capacity to adapt satisfactorily to his environment. However, it is true to an important extent for other ego functions as well. In psychoanalytic terminology, identification may be defined as the tendency to become like an object of one's environment in one or more ways. It is also used to describe the end result of such a tendency. Identification appears to be intimately and necessarily connected with the objects of one's instinctual wishes. The child identifies or tends to identify with those persons in his environment with whom he has a strong emotional tie. He wishes and tends to be or become like those whom he loves and hates most intensely. [See IDENTITY, PSYCHOSOCIAL; IMITATION.] Delayed gratification. The most general characteristic of the ego, one which is of fundamental importance in the development of most, if not all, of its other functions, is the capacity to postpone instinctual gratification, that is, to delay the discharge of instinctual energy. In psychoanalytic terminology, instinctual energy whose discharge is thus delayed is referred to as bound energy, in contradistinction to free energy. The introduction of delay into the process of instinctual discharge or gratification represents a modification of the pleasure principle and a deviation from the tendency to immediate discharge of instinctual energy, which, as noted above, is characteristic of the primary process. It is an essential capacity of the ego to impose delay or postponement of the gratification of an instinctual wish. This capacity
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permits a more efficient exploitation of the environment in the service of the individual's search for gratification. The fact that the flux of mental energies which is characteristic of ego functions differs from that which characterizes the functioning of the id led Freud to the formulation that whereas the id functions according to the primary process, the ego functions according to the secondary process. Defense mechanisms and anxiety. In addition to its capacity to delay the discharge of instinctual energies, the ego also includes among its functions those mental mechanisms which are referred to as defenses. It will be recalled from the introduction that the study of the consequences and nature of intrapsychic conflict occupies a central position in psychoanalytic theory. It is impossible to understand these conflicts without a thorough discussion of the mode of operation of the ego's defenses, which is part and parcel of the psychoanalytic theory of anxiety. Because of their centrally important position in mental functioning, therefore, the topics of ego defenses and of anxiety will be treated rather more extensively than the other ego functions. Freud based his theory of anxiety on the assumption that whenever the mental apparatus is subjected to an influx of stimuli which exceeds the capacity of the apparatus either to discharge or to bind the energies of the stimuli, a traumatic state develops. The affect which accompanies this traumatic state is anxiety. In early infancy and childhood, the capacity of the mental apparatus to bind stimuli and to discharge them is normally much less than it is later on in life. For this reason traumatic states accompanied by anxiety appear relatively frequently in early life. In particular, such traumatic states develop in the infant when an instinctual need arises in the absence of the object, usually the mother, necessary for the gratification of that need, that is, for the discharge of the instinctual energy connected with it. As the infant grows and as its ego functions develop, particularly the functions of memory and of sensory perception, it comes to recognize the absence of its mother (absence of the need-satisfying object) as a prelude or signal that traumatic anxiety may develop. In other words, the infant learns by experience of the danger that when its mother is absent an instinctual need may arise which the infant itself cannot satisfy and which will give rise to anxiety on the basis just described. What happens then is that the danger situation is reacted to with anxiety. This type of anxiety, which is connected with danger or, later, with the anticipation of danger, is called signal anxiety, since it
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is in effect a signal that a traumatic state may develop. When signal anxiety does develop it sets into operation the pleasure principle, according to which the mind functions in such a way as to avoid pain or discomfort. Thus it becomes necessary that the instinctual need or wish, which might give rise to a traumatic state in the absence of the mother, be prevented from developing into an urgent need. The various ways by which this can be accomplished are referred to in psychoanalytic terminology as the defenses or defense mechanisms of the ego. We shall discuss them in more detail presently. In normal childhood development there is a regular sequence of danger situations which are associated with signal anxiety. The first of these is the one described above, which is referred to as loss of the object. The situation which next comes to be recognized by the infant as a danger is the possibility of loss of love or affection of the parent on whom it is dependent for instinctual gratification. This is referred to as loss of love. The term "separation anxiety" is often used to indicate anxiety related to either or both of these typical dangers. The third typical danger of childhood, which is characteristic of the phallic or Oedipal phase of instinctual development, is the fantasy of castration in the little boy or of analogous genital injury in the case of the little girl. The term "castration anxiety" designates anxiety related to this danger. The fourth danger, which appears only after the formation of the superego, an event to be described below, has to do with superego disapproval or prohibition. It is sometimes referred to as superego anxiety but more often simply as guilt. In psychoanalytic terminology, the term "guilt" is often used to refer as well to the need for selfpunishment and also to the various associated phenomena of remorse, penance, and retribution. It should be noted that the typical danger situations just described do not simply succeed one another in the sense that the first disappears from prominence in mental life as the second develops. On the contrary, as each new source of anxiety appears in the child's mental life, the earlier ones continue to exist alongside of the new, and all the danger situations are important in everyone, though to varying degrees in each, depending on the life experiences of the individual and possibly on his constitutional endowment as well. [See ANXIETY.] In considering the defense mechanisms, it is important to recognize that the ego may use anything which is available to it as a defense against an instinctual wish or an unconscious need for self-punishment which arouses anxiety. Thus, for
example, a diversion of attention may serve a defensive purpose, or muscular immobility may be used to defend against the possibility of being sexually or aggressively active. It may even happen that one instinctual derivative is gratified at least partly as a defense against the emergence of another. Thus, homosexual fantasies or even homosexual activity may appear as defense against dangerous heterosexual wishes, or vice versa. In order to avoid possible misunderstanding in this connection, it must be emphasized that, in general, instinctual wishes are reacted to as dangerous in adult life because they were conceived to be so in early childhood. It frequently happens that an adult vigorously defends himself unconsciously against the emergence of a dangerous instinctual wish which, as an adult, he considers either entirely permissible and natural or even trivial and unimportant. Thus it is fairly accurate to say that mental conflict in adult life derives from childhood or, to use psychoanalytic terminology, infantile sources. [See DEFENSE MECHANISMS.] Repression. While bearing in mind that the defensive activities of the ego may be extremely varied, we may mention and define briefly several defense mechanisms which are referred to frequently in psychoanalytic literature by specific names. The one which was first identified and has been most extensively discussed is called repression. In psychoanalytic terminology, repression signifies an active forgetting of the memories and other ideational representations of a dangerous wish, whether instinctual in origin or self-punitive. Repressed memories are no longer accessible to consciousness. Since they remain cathected with psychic energy, however, they are constantly striving for some sort of expression in conscious mental life and behavior, however remote from the original wish that expression may be. Thus a repressed wish or need may exert a considerable, even a decisive, influence in the mental life of an individual. The counterforce which is required to keep such a powerful urge repressed is referred to as a countercathexis. Reaction formation. Another important defense mechanism is reaction formation. In reaction formation one mental tendency is emphasized in order to prevent the emergence of its opposite. Thus, for example, dangerous aggressive wishes may be kept in check by the development of a character trait of kindness and gentleness. In the same way, the reverse may happen, that is, an individual may be bold and vigorous in his overt behavior partly in order to defend himself against a dangerous tendency to be submissive or passive. Similarly, cleanliness may appear as a reaction
PSYCiOANALYSIS: Classical Theory formation against dirtiness, particularly against coprophilia, etc. The most dramatic reaction formations are those in which love appears as a reaction formation against hate, or vice versa. Isolation. The term "isolation," though sometimes used in different senses, generally refers to what is more precisely called isolation of affect. In this defense mechanism, a wish or impulse is allowed to appear directly in consciousness but devoid of emotional significance. It seems to the individual "just an idea" rather than a desire or wish. Isolation, as used in this sense, is closely related to defensive intellectualization in general. Identification as a defense. Identification, a phenomenon of mental life which we have seen to be of general significance in mental development, especially of the ego functions, often plays a defensive role. In psychoanalytic literature much emphasis has been put on the important part played by identification in connection with separation anxiety. However, it also plays a vitally important role in connection with castration anxiety in childhood and is of particular significance in superego formation. Projection. The term "projection" refers to that phenomenon whereby an individual attributes to others wishes or impulses which in fact are his own but which would give rise to anxiety or guilt if he acknowledged them as such. Projection as a defense plays a particularly important part in the psychopathology of paranoid conditions, but it is of considerable significance in normal mental life as well. Prejudices of all sorts—for example, those directed against an enemy in time of war—are often closely dependent on projection. Denial and undoing. The term "denial" is used to refer to a certain defensive attitude toward one or several aspects of the external world. One may fail to perceive an event in one's environment in order to avoid the guilt or anxiety that would result if the event were perceived. Fairy tales and daydreams in general make considerable use of denial. The misperceptions of the environment that play such a large role in many psychoses are mainly related to the defensive use of denial in those conditions. The term "undoing" refers to actions which are performed in order to undo or render harmless unconscious wishes or fantasies which are considered dangerous. They represent a kind of unconscious magical penance. Regression. Regression is a mental tendency or capacity which often serves a defensive function. The dangers associated with Oedipal wishes or fantasies, for example, may be avoided by regressing to anal or oral wishes. This process is
9
known is instinctual regression. Regression may also affect various of the ego functions in a defensive vay. In general, if regression is permanent and not merely temporary, the greater its degree and the more extended its role in mental life and the moB severe the distortion of personality or the mertal illness that results. The Oelipal phase and superego formation At tht age of two and a half or three the child normally enters into a phase of psychosexual development called the Oedipal period or phase. This lasts for about two and a half or three years and corresponds approximately with what we have earlier referred to as the phallic phase of libidinal developnent. The violent intrapsychic conflicts which a^e caused by the sexual wishes of the Oedipal period are of crucial importance in mental developnent and later mental functioning. They profoundly influence character development in general and are responsible for superego development ard organization in particular. In addition, they form the basis or groundwork for the vast majority of whatever neurotic symptoms may appear in ater life. [See DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY; PmsoNALiTY, article on PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT.] Freud used the term "Oedipal" to designate this period o' mental development because of the similarity beween certain of the wishes that characterize it in the little boy and the legend of Oedipus as recounted in Sophocles' play. The little boy in the Oedipal period normally is passionately enamored of his mother, wishes to marry her, and to displace his father in his mother's bed. The corresponding wish to marry her father and take her mother's place is equally characteristic of the little gir? in the Oedpal period. Thus, the sexual wishes of the Oedipal period revolve around the fateful themes of incest and parricide. In fact, however, the wishes and conflicts of the Oedipal period are somewhat more complex than the narre would indicate. In his psychosexual life, man is dearly bisexual. This is nowhere more evident in the normal human being than during the years of early childhood. In the usual family constellatioi the little boy of the Oedipal period has sexual f3elings toward both parents and jealously murdercus wishes toward each, although normally the heterosexual wishes and the jealousy connected vith them considerably outweigh the homosexual (nes. The same is true for the little girl during rer Oedipal period. For a variety of reasons, not all of which are clearly mderstood, the Oedipal boy fears castration, specifically the loss of his penis, in connection
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with his incestuous and parricidal wishes, and the little girl during the same period fears some analogous genital injury. In the case of the girl, the conflict of feelings is complicated by an awareness that she has no penis, a fact which she regularly interprets as a sign of inferiority. Because of the castration anxiety aroused by their instinctual wishes, children of both sexes attempt to control their Oedipal wishes with a great variety of defensive reactions. [See SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, article On SEXUAL DEVIATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
Among the most important of these for the future development and functioning of the child's mind are the reactions which give rise to what is called the superego. This group of mental functions may be denned as comprising those functions of the mind which are concerned with either moral prohibitions or exhortations. The functions which have to do with exhortation are sometimes referred to as the ego ideal. Activity of superego functions results either in a limitation of behavior to morally acceptable modes of instinctual gratification or to that particular state of unpleasant inner tension which is variously referred to as guilt or remorse and which leads to acts of penitence, of reparation, of self-punishment, and—in the most extreme instances—to self-injury or self-destruction. Identification and the superego. The principal mental mechanism involved in superego formation is identification. Normally, the little child identifies with the prohibiting and punishing aspects of the parent who is his chief rival. By making the latter's threats and prohibitions his own, he defends himself against the fantasied danger of castration. He thus achieves a considerable degree of control over the instinctual wishes which for him constitute an overwhelming danger. At the same time, however, this identification results in an appreciable degree of permanent limitation of opportunities for instinctual gratification. Thus, superego formation normally results in a considerable degree of interference with the operation of the pleasure principle, or at the very least it considerably complicates its operation. It follows from what has been said that the core of every individual's morality and, consequently, the invariant elements that one would expect to find at the center of the moral code of every human society, consist of a prohibition against incest, particularly between parent and child, and against parricide. One may add that for many, or perhaps most, individuals, one of the results of superego formation is a considerable degree of guilt over genital masturbation, since this is usually the physically gratifying activity which accompanies
the sexually exciting wishes of the Oedipal period. It is also interesting to note that the threats and punishment associated with superego functioning in early childhood, and persisting unconsciously into later life, follow the principle of lex talionis. It would appear that the mind of the child, like the mind of the primitive, follows the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. It seems correct to say that the major share of superego formation is the result of the fateful conflicts of the Oedipal period. It should be noted, however, that a considerable degree of superego formation occurs gradually during the ensuing years of childhood. Some of the identifications with teachers and with childhood heroes, whether historic or contemporary, contribute their share to the growing child's superego. It is also true that even in adult life, substantial changes may take place in superego functioning, sometimes in a dramatic way, as for example in cases of religious conversion. Freud also emphasized the changes in superego functioning that are characteristic of mob psychology. According to Freud, identification with a group leader—for example, with a political dictator—may produce as considerable an alteration in the superego functioning of many of his followers as results from religious conversion. [See MASS PHENOMENA; MORAL DEVELOPMENT.]
Latency and adolescence. The institution and organization of the superego normally result in a considerable subsidence of instinctual conflict beginning at about six years of age. Although this subsidence is by no means complete, still the whole picture of a relative quiescence of psychosexual activity and conflict during the years between six and twelve is in considerable contrast to the turbulence and conflict so characteristic of the Oedipal period, which precedes it, and of adolescence, which follows it. Freud proposed to call this interim period a period of latency. When the physical, particularly the sexual, changes of adolescence begin, there is a recrudescence of sexual wishes and sexual conflicts. The course of these adolescent stirrings and conflicts is to a considerable degree predetermined by the defenses already established during the Oedipal period. Thus, to a greater degree than is usually appreciated, the psychosexual development of adolescence and early adult life is a recapitulation of childhood psychosexual development. [See ADOLESCENCE.] The foregoing is an extremely brief summary of psychoanalysis as a general science of behavior. Because of its brevity, it is inevitable that the reader may often be misled in attempting to under-
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology stand a subject which is at once so complex and so extensive. This is not, however, the most serious source of difficulty to the reader. A much greater difficulty is likely to arise from two rather different sources. The first of these is a lack of familiarity and experience with the use of the psychoanalytic method. As mentioned in the introduction, the data concerning human behavior which are available only by application of the psychoanalytic method are, generally speaking, quite foreign to the experience of anyone who has not had an opportunity to apply it. Lack of such opportunity, therefore, makes it difficult for one to form an adequate judgment concerning the validity of many psychoanalytic propositions. The second source of difficulty results from what astronomers call the personal equation. In the case of childhood sexuality, the personal equation is very great indeed. Each adult individual, as a result of having passed through the conflicts of the Oedipal period himself, has stubborn defenses within himself against his own childhood wishes. Even to recognize their existence in others is likely to arouse considerable guilt and anxiety. It is much more comfortable— that is, less frightening—to minimize the importance of childhood sexuality in human mental life or to deny its significance altogether. It is no accident, as Freud pointed out, that every adult has an extensive amnesia for the events of early childhood. Most individuals can overcome their inner conflicts over childhood sexual wishes only with the help of personal psychoanalytic treatment. For this reason, a personal analysis is a usual prelude to psychoanalytic practice, that is, to the systematic, usually therapeutic, application of the psychoanalytic method. The unavoidable limitations which, until now, have been imposed by the above facts on the acceptance of psychoanalysis by many social and behavioral scientists are unfortunate. The fact is that psychoanalysis can supply to the social and behavioral scientist, as to the student of art and literature, a more profound, more complex, and more accurate knowledge of the nature of man— his needs, his fears, his conflicts, and his motives —than is available from any other source. Such knowledge is frequently important and often vital. It should properly be part of the education of all who deal professionally with man and his works. CHARLES BRENNER BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARLOW, JACOB A.; and BRENNER, CHARLES 1964 Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory. New York: International Universities Press.
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BRENNER, CHARLES 1955 An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. FENICHEL, OTTO 1945 The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. New York: Norton. FREUD, SIGMUND (1895-1926) 1953-1963 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. 24 vols. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. HARTMANN, HEINZ (1939) 1958 Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. Translated by David Rapaport. New York: International Universities Press. -> First published as Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem, HARTMANN, HEINZ 1960 Psychoanalysis and Moral Values. New York: International Universities Press. -» Freud anniversary lecture, given in 1959 at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. KRIS, ERNST 1947 The Nature of Psychoanalytic Propositions and Their Validation. Pages 239-259 in Sidney Hook and Milton R. Konvitz (editors), Freedom and Experience. A New School for Social Research publication. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. RUITENBEEK, HENDRiK M. (editor) 1962 Psychoanalysis and Social Science. New York: Button. -> A useful selection of essays on the impact of psychoanalytic thought upon anthropology, sociology, and the social sciences generally. WAELDER, ROBERT 1960 Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. II
EGO PSYCHOLOGY
Although the term "ego" has meanings that go back to the beginnings of philosophy, it is only its place in psychoanalytic theory that will be the concern of this article. For this reason it is necessary from the start to rid the term of some of its popularly understood, nonpsychoanalytic meanings. The ego is not simply intelligence; neither is it an inflated sense of one's own importance, nor does it refer to its traditional philosophical meaning of self-consciousness. It was not meant by Freud to be strictly a phenomenological concept. The ego is not simply the subject of experience, in contrast to the objects of experience, nor is it one's own person (self), in contrast to others. These exclusions are neither arbitrary nor a matter of preference, but reflect the place that the concept is meant to fill in psychoanalytic theory -. specifically, Freud's need for suiting the meaning of the term "ego" as a "representative of reality" to the requirements of the parent body of psychoanalytic theory. Thus, in Freud's last and most fully developed conception of the ego, self-feelings, the capacity to reflect on oneself as a person, and the capacity to experience distinctions between self and others are functions within the ego system, part of the ego's adaptational repertoire of controls and defenses as a subsystem of the personality. The ego's fundamental mean-
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ing for Freud was a hypothetical array of processes standing generally for self-preservation and survival and having to do with the structuring of purposive action in relation to various aspects of reality. This is not to say that psychoanalytic theorists are always clear and consistent in their usage. Sometimes, the term is merely a taxonomical device to refer to defensive and adaptational motives and their instrumentalities. Sometimes, it is used in the more ambitious connotation of a distinctive subsystem of the personality whose regulatory functions extend to the control of two other subsystems, superego and id. In this sense it becomes more an independent variable that has a role in "affecting" behavior; it is not simply a taxonomy of motivational phenomena or of functions but an entity whose parameters, mode of operations, and functions are potentially capable of being specified in some model of self-regulation. Confusion in psychoanalytic usage developed from the fact that while the ego concept was present from the very beginnings of Freud's theory, it underwent a number of changes and shifts of emphasis in response to developments in psychoanalytic theory at large, a fact which Freud sometimes failed to acknowledge. Part of the intent of this review is to draw attention to invariant meanings that have clung to the term throughout its history in psychoanalysis, as well as to changes of emphasis. Of equal concern will be the logical place of the ego concept within psychoanalytic theory and its distinctive character as a framework for explaining behavior. Since the history of the ego concept has been described several times (e.g., Hartmann 1939; Kris 1951 a), we will touch on historical considerations only to the extent of indicating how changes in the ego concept reflected conditions in the parent body of psychoanalytic theory —particularly the gradual emergence of the ego concept from its setting within a theory of illness to one concerned with normal development—and to the present status of the concept as constituting a distinctive field of psychoanalytic enterprise called ego psychology. A final and important consideration will be an assessment of its current status in psychoanalysis. The ego in Freud's earliest model From the start, Freud needed a concept of ego. Indeed, it is a curious fact that his concept antedated his theory of psychosexual drives, generally considered to be the cornerstone of psychoanalysis. It is fair to say that Freud's early theory of the mind was as unavoidably dependent on a concept
of ego as his later theories were on a concept of instinctual drives. Believing that he had discovered the primary etiological basis of hysterical symptomatology—a psychical "lesion" traceable to a traumatic sexual experience in childhood—he envisioned, in a burst of temporary enthusiasm, the mechanics of neurosis, within a comprehensive neuropsychological model of normal behavior. In a work published posthumously as Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), he developed his first systematic account of the fundamental forces in man's behavior. Behavior, he said, is ultimately the expression both of the discharge of pressureful build-ups of internally and externally generated tensions through appropriate and effective actions upon the environment and of structural complications that develop in the organism in the course of its efforts to find the most effective means of discharge. He called these the primary and secondary functions of psychical structures, respectively. The ego was conceived as an essential structural means of accomplishing the secondary function— the agency of effective discharge, one that could respond simultaneously to the demands of energic tension and to environmental conditions suited to tension reduction, that could monitor motoric instrumentalities of discharge (because effective discharge is achievable only through action) and that could be implemented by perceptual-cognitive operations of thought which guarantee the proving of reality or "reality testing." The ego, then, was a coherent organization that was endowed with capacities for inhibiting energy flow and that operated in coordination with processes having to do with the "representation of realities"—thought, perception, judgment, reflection, etc. Freud even specified a latticelike arrangement of neurons with special capabilities of retaining excitation and directing energic transmission. In the Project, defense, which later was to be a dominant property of the ego, was construed, in both a broad and a narrow sense, as part of the secondary function: in the broad sense, as an inhibiting, but adaptational, process which directs the course of discharge and, in the narrow sense, as a specific form of inhibition or "repression." The point is of interest because for two whole decades following the Project, the latter, narrow sense of "defense" preempted all other meanings of "ego." In this remarkable document, which merits more detailed study than is possible here, Freud spelled out the functions of the ego, which he was not again inclined to do in as systematic a way for some thirty years. [See DEFENSE MECHANISMS.]
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology Status of the concept: 1900-1923 In what is generally regarded as the second and main period of Freud's psychoanalytic writings— the period immediately following his writing of the Project, up to around 1923, and including The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)—Freud's theoretical interest in the ego concept waned, although it frequently appeared as a necessary descriptive term. Functions that had been specifically assigned to the ego in the Project were now dealt with separately, without being explicitly associated with the ego. The term had a variety of descriptive usages, sometimes with the connotation "conscious inhibitive control," sometimes with the meaning "motivations concerned with self-preservation" (e.g., "ego drives"), sometimes in the sense of "the internalized ideals and values of identification figures," and sometimes in the sense of "feelings of self." Mainly, however, it seemed to have the narrow connotation "an instrumentality of defense" and specifically of repression. In this last sense, the ego would refer variously to the conscious acceptable mass of ideas which took part in the conflict, the ideals which precipitated the conflict, or the resisting force in conflict, the agency of the regressive process itself. From the vantage point of both his earlier and later, final conception, these were all partial attributes of the ego concept. The idea of a comprehensive, coherent system of control was put aside. Several reasons have been put forward for this and for the generally unsystematic way in which Freud used the concept in this period. In part, this reflects Freud's style of theorizing. He tended to give main theoretical weight to his immediate empirical concerns, often without attention to the resultant, sometimes dissonant juxtapositions to earlier formulations. The lure of the next bend, beyond which new discoveries might be made, was always distracting him from the labor of theoretical inventory. It is, of course, also true that he wanted to rid himself of the neuronal model, which he considered a failure, and with it went his early strategy of trying to encompass pathological phenomena within a more comprehensive model of normal functioning. Instead, he now gave himself over entirely to the observations and phenomena that he was most immediately confronted with— those of illness, symptoms, and conflict. He not only moved toward a physiologically "neutral" form of theory but also became more specifically and dominantly preoccupied with the dynamics of illness and less with the task of a comprehensive general psychology of adaptation. Concern with
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illness meant a theory of its genesis in conflict and focusing on the roles of sexuality and instinctual drives. In the Project, he had tried to view issues of discharge and control, not simply in relation to sexual wishes and tensions, but in the broader perspective of a general biological enterprise of adaptation to stimulation. There the secondary function of defense was broadly construed; now it became identified with the ego in the narrower sense of repression produced by conflicts in which sexual wishes and desires were pre-eminent. The mental lesions—obsessions, hysterical symptoms, perversions, and the like—and their treatment were placed in the forefront, and elaboration of the principles of neuroses, conflict, and the relation of both to sexual bases became the core of Freud's theoretical enterprise. In this connection two developments were of monumental importance in setting the direction of his work for the next two decades: his retraction of the etiological importance he had given to sexual trauma in childhood and his altered views of the nature of the conflictual bases of neurosis. His first conception of the importance of sexuality in the causation of hysteria (1896a) held that the memory of an actual traumatic sexual experience in childhood (e.g., seduction) was central; in this view, the memory of such a prepubertal experience becomes especially pathogenic in the later period of genital sexuality, creating the condition of neurosis-inducing conflict. However, he gave up the conception that the critical etiological event was an actual seduction when he became convinced that the disturbing idea in hysterical neuroses was not a memory, but a fantasy of seduction woven out of a tabooed sexual wish. This had repercussions on the very fundamentals of psychoanalytic theory, for now it became important to ask how such a fantasy and the wishes involved in it came about. The three main sources of neurotic illness—the sexual core of conflict, the unconscious wishes, and the unsuccessful repressive defense against these wishes —leading to symptoms henceforth became the main themes of Freud's theoretical efforts. He embarked on observations of continuities in sexual experiences at different stages of development and of their pathological miscarriages. His clinical data pointed to the autogenetic connection between both early infantile needs and bodily functions and the later development of genital gratification. It was in this connection that the theory of instinctual sexual drives became a critical anchorage of Freud's thought—the all-determining "reality" to which adjustment must be geared; an internal
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stimulus which, being inescapable through flight and being peremptory and periodic, creates a continuing and unrelenting source of wishes and strivings that has to be discharged through appropriate "objects." The other vital appetitive instincts were not very important, because they seemed to contribute little to an understanding of neurosis. By far the most important source of motivation and of individual development was the sexual drives and the conflicts engendered by their momentum for gratification. Moreover, the sexual drives underwent a developmental change in respect to their aims (wishes) and their potentialities for possible gratification (objects). Indeed, they provided the primary momentum of growth. So great was their structuring power that Freud tended at times to believe that character development itself is patterned exclusively by fixation upon different aims and modes of drive gratification. The environment was accorded little significance as a participant in the development of instinctual drives—only in the conflicts generated by them; family life and rearing create obstacles to the discharge of drives, thereby necessitating indirect forms of discharge or total repression. For Freud, by far the most crucial discovery was that of infantile sexuality—that is, that there is a developmental continuity in requirements of sensual gratification from infantile modes to the usual adult forms of sexuality. Freud wrestled with the formidable theoretical problem of how to fit into a uniform conception the facts of an erotic momentum, its seeming continuity in development, interchangeability of sensual aims and modes of gratification, and pathological deflections into perversion, fixations, and regressions. Freud's theoretical solution was to conceive of an active principle of sensual development, involving an energic quantum, which he called libido, having distinctive qualitative or directional properties. There is inherent in libido an implacable developmental course in respect to the aims of its discharge, these developmental changes appearing in stagelike progression. At the same time, within each stage, libido is capable of some degree of transformation of aim and of displacements in respect to actual objects of discharge. For example, "conscientiousness" could be an instance of the transformation of "anal libido." Libidinal discharge became for Freud the most important single basis of motivation. He believed that the requirements for the relief of libidinal tensions, the conflicts to which they give rise, the shifts in distributions of libido, and the deflections in their discharge are not only the main
issues in neurosis but the essential paradigm for picturing normal motivational development. Through the simplification achieved by attributing directional attributes to a distinctive type of energy, Freud had an attractive and seemingly efficient means of coordinating the complex facts of sexual development and the autogenic heightening and lessening of the desire for sensual gratification in each period. Through the quantitative attributes of libido, the theory could account for intensity of drives, for the pressureful momentum of sensuality; through its qualitative attributes of directionality, it was possible to account for selectivity in respect to the objects which can elicit its discharge. Libidinal energy in its various drive forms had characteristics usually associated with animal instinct; at the same time, it had the crucial property of displaceability, which distinguished it as specifically human. Thus, the forms of transformation from oral to anal, to phallic, and to genital stages are inherited, like the momentum of transition from one phase to the next, but within each stage the options of gratification are considerable. It must be noted, however, that the distinction between the energy, or activation, aspect of sensuality and the executive actions associated with its formation into drives was obscure in Freud's formulation—and has remained so. This uneasy coexistence of quantitative and directional assumptions in the libido theory and their unclarified relationship with each other remain weak points in psychoanalytic theorizing to this day. It should be noted that Freud was also veering away sharply from his early emphasis on the importance of environmental (exteroceptive) stimulation. Sharing the spotlight with libidinal drives at this time was the nature of conflict in neurotic disturbance. For Freud a key factor in neurotic conflict was repression—-the blocking of a wish and its derivatives and associations from conscious understanding and action; symptoms of conflict were a manifestation and outcome of repression—they reflected a strategy of conflict resolution arising out of the impasse which repression imposes upon gratification. That his interest narrowed to the one adaptational function of defensive repression partly reflected the logical momentum of his theory which led to, and was continually fed by, particular emphases of clinical observation. It is also true, however, that clarification of the dynamics of repression seemed to be dictated by therapeutic necessity. For according to the theory, the goal of therapy is to uncover the repressed; therefore, it is crucial to give observational priority to indications of the
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology "return of the repressed" and to the means of overcoming the ill effects of repression. [See CONFLICT, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.] Although the ego was present in this conception, its status was that of a curiously vague entity, identified most of the time, but not exclusively, as the agency of the repressive force. Emphasis was given to its resistive function, in relation to drive and wish, and its inhibitive capacity, rather than to its capacities for promoting effective gratification; it was identified not only with the repressing force but with the body of ideas—internalized value structures, as well as consciously acceptable and accessible ideas, which instigated resistiveness to drive discharge. Freud also tended to link capacities for conscious experience and will with the ego, but this was loosely developed and does not easily fit with the notion of the ego as an agency that promotes elisions of consciousness through repression. The absence of any detailed regard for how these oppositely effective functions are related within the ego is an example of Freud's disinclination, in this period, to systematize the ego conception. It is possible that the reduced importance of a specific environmental etiology of neurosis affected Freud's interest in the ego, if not his assumption that the ego was necessary in his over-all conception of psychical structure; that aspect of the ego which is purely adaptational became less compelling. Parental behavior and family life were significant aspects of the environment—but significant only as potential impediments which produced conflict and provoked defense. The possible supportive importance of environmental structure to normal drive functioning as a molding and implementing influence—not simply an obstacle to the evolutionary-given momentum of libido—was not a natural fulcrum of interest for libido theory and, hence, received little attention. One also wonders if premonitions of possible contradiction with the libido theory contributed to the stasis of the ego concept in this period, since Freud's account of the motivational and structuring force of libidinal drives included attributes that he later, under the pressure of observation, imputed to the ego. As for motivations specifically attributable to the ego, Freud spoke about them only with respect to the ego's role as an instrumentality of the pleasure principle and its role of defense. He did for a time speak of "ego drives," but he gave up the notion, possibly because of difficulties in making it compatible with the libido theory. It seemed necessary to emphasize only reactivity to instinctual drive and
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containment of drive by defense. Indeed, this emphasis is common even today. Clinicians are still inclined to regard the ego mainly in the light of its participation in conflict and in its partnership with instinctual drives pressing for discharge. Freud, nonetheless, had much to say about thinking processes in their adaptive, as well as driverelated, aspects. However, he did not bring these considerations into a single taxonomic concept of an ego system of control. Thus, in The Interpretation of Dreams appears his epoch-making distinction between primary and secondary thought processes. Secondary thought shows characteristics that follow the precepts and rules of logic, maintaining an identity or coordination with reality structures and events; in marked contrast, thought processes of the primary process are wholly in the service of drives, of promoting peremptory discharge. The distinction implies that there is an "objective reality" and that thought (in the secondary process) is capable of representing it without distorting it. However, Freud left largely unexplained and undescribed the developmental origins and nature of the secondary process. In fact, it never again received the attention he had given it in the Project. It is possible that some of the difficulties that have persistently clung to the ego concept since Freud's time are traceable to the fact that the secondary process and its reality-testing functions were not explicitly made a part of ego theory in this period; its status as a means of implementing effective drive control, as well as a means of representing reality relationships generally, was implicit but not developed. Also, the question of whether the mechanisms of symbolization, condensation, and displacement of the primary process are best viewed as ego manifestations to this day is unresolved. To have confronted such questions— and generally that of making primary and secondary processes comprehensible within a conception of ego—would have drawn attention to the crucial issue of the independence of ego processes from libidinal control. Moreover, there was something contradictory in the view of the ego as primarily a reactive, defensive agency whose vital biological mission is to insure self-preservation. There are, in his writing, any number of hints that it was difficult to avoid the assumption of an autonomously active force in the ego. The critical point is that Freud did not consider in detail the problem of instrumentalities of control in general, whether in the service of drive or in nondrive adaptations. Had he done so, we would have had a psychological conception more consistent with the then cur-
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rent, as well as present, preoccupations of most psychologists. It seems fair to conclude that during this period the assumptions of his libido theory muted Freud's interest in an interaction of adaptive motivations and environment as a major motivational source of behavior. It required repeated clinical indications of the explanatory insufficiency of the theory of libidinal drives for him to widen the orbit of the ego's meaning to embrace these phenomena. Later development: 1924-1938 The decision to confront more directly and systematically the ego's position in psychoanalytic theory was gradually forced upon Freud. Actually, this renewed interest picked up themes of the early Project. Clinical observations and considerations had much to do with forcing the issue—facts and special theoretical formulations that had no firm position in the general theory as it stood had been accumulating. We will consider several of these: (1) phenomena of unconsciously manifested resistance in psychoanalytic treatment; (2) a radically different appreciation of the meaning of anxiety; (3) the role of unconscious guilt and internalized parental commands and morality; and (4) psychotic breakdowns of thought functions. Unconscious resistance. Freud became increasingly impressed with a peculiar resistance to being helped or understood that patients displayed. The patient could proclaim with conviction his willingness to participate in the treatment, but there were many indications that he was undermining it in a variety of ways. The patient seemed to resist knowing not only the repressed ideas but, more importantly, resisted knowing and acknowledging that he was repressing. The resistance seemed to operate quite unconsciously, indeed seemed even to gain in force from the fact that it was not conscious. These facts profoundly affected the strategy of therapy itself and also moved Freud toward a reformulation of the ego concept. Accordingly, a great change eventually came about in psychoanalytic therapy—an emphasis upon working with defenses themselves and with resistances; a great deal of attention was now given to their various forms and vicissitudes in treatment. No longer was analysis considered to be simply the uncovering of repressed memories through catharsis. The conception of repression itself underwent change. Repression is a process that not only affects memory but promotes breaks in the conscious appreciation of associative links with the conflictual core of the neurotic symptoms; such "splits" produced by repression have different be-
havioral manifestations. Thus, even the meaning of uncovering repression became different; it could mean not only recovering a memory but the reestablishing of a conscious appreciation of causal connections among ideas. The phenomena of resistance seemed also to point to an active principle in the structuring of behavior, independent of, and rivaling, that of instinctual drive. Defense could not simply be a reactive response fashioned out of repeated frustrations of drive discharge and modeled upon the discharge modes of instinctual drives. Moreover, the unconscious aspect of this seemingly driveresistive force cast doubt upon the logic of Freud's previous tendency to associate all unconscious determinants with instinctual drives alone. The new theory of anxiety. Freud revised his views of anxiety, and his new conception had reverberations throughout the body of psychoanalytic theory and therapeutic practice. Previously, Freud had resolved the question of whether anxiety is a reaction to danger or a transformation of libido, by what seemed a parsimonious solution in terms of libido theory alone. Anxiety was simply a product of libidinal drive blocked from discharge, an overflow of libidinal energy which induced a passive reaction of inchoate restlessness and diffuse feelings of fearfulness. However, a number of clinical considerations—among them, the facts of resistance and the problem of how repression itself is initiated—compelled him to assign an active role to anxiety in a regulative system of response to danger. He proposed that small quanta of anxiety had utility as a signal, an informational sign of impending danger, in response to which defenses are alerted. Thus, anxiety became associated with a directive function distinct and separable from libido and able to determine the course of behavior independently of libido. He underscored the separation of libidinal drive discharge, but he avoided confronting the issue (If it did not originate from libido, whence the energic basis of anxiety?) by making it an ego function and part of the ego's regulative system of defense. The importance of this new view of anxiety can hardly be overemphasized; it brought into the foreground an anticipatory capacity in the schema of regulation. Effective regulation meant functioning guided by anticipated danger. The anxiety signal is more than a realistic response of fearfulness to actual danger. It reflects a regulatory system capable of initiating defensive action on the basis of a premonition; it indicates a system capable of the developmental feat of turning passively experienced, full-blown anxiety into a finely tuned means
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology of anticipatory defense. Moreover, the anxiety signal is capable of mobilizing a great variety of defenses in this fashion. The new theory also emphasized the qualitative, or configurational, aspects of anxiety, in contrast with the earlier, purely quantitative energic conception. In general, anxiety is indicative of a state of mind in which a person is preoccupied with preserving, rather than with gratifying, himself. Anxiety is linked to internal representations of danger situations; these prototypic dangers differ at the various stages of psychosexual development, producing different anxiety configurations. For example, separation can provoke in the infant an experience of loss of love, which is internalized as a potential danger and is thereafter an occasion for anxiety. Separation and object loss are especially potent sources of anxiety in the period of infant helplessness; later, the dangers of retribution, castration, and fantasied loss of potency become sources of anxiety. Freud, thus, implied that the controlling system which embodied the anxiety signal had a developmental aspect coordinate with, and separate from, that of libidinal development, one in which different focuses of anxiety at different ages result in correspondingly different defensive patterns. The theory also led to a further elaboration of neurosis as the retention and reactivation of past or obsolete conditions of anxiety —for example, loss of love, castration, etc. [See ANXIETY.] The importance now attached to developmental circumstances that promote anxiety broadened psychoanalytic concerns to include the bases and content of ontological insecurities, their epigenesis and relation to social development. It began to turn attention to the patient's personal construction of reality—that is, reality as he interprets it, whether of environment or of drive. The impact on psychoanalytic therapy was great and helped to redirect it. Now, in addition to asking what the patient desires, one has to ask what he is afraid of and what he does if he is afraid. Only by understanding the configuration of his anxiety and the modes of control associated with it can one get a complete picture of his conflicts and fears. But the new conception posed a difficult problem for existing instinctual-drive theory. Since the link between anxiety and libido theory has been weakened by attributing anxiety's essential quantitative factor only vaguely, if at all, to libido, how does one relate anxiety to the parent theory? Freud resolved the issue, not by revision, but by addition: by broadening the ego conception to include properties of activity that he had not before assumed
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it to have and by including anxiety among its signaling capacities. He thought that by endowing the ego with its own energy, he had an expedient solution which did not threaten the existing edifice of psychosexual theory, a solution which seemed to retain its explanatory usefulness and to accommodate certain observations that had stubbornly resisted interpretation. Unconscious moral strictures and guilt. Observations of patients who hold on to suffering out of a need for punishment and of the phenomenon of guilt seemed also to be better provided for if one assumed some grade of regulative capacity independent of instinctual libidinal drive. The fact, too, that the qualms of conscience can be effective without being conscious called further attention to the inadequacy of a theoretical bias Freud had shown toward equating conscious and unconscious events with the polar participants in conflict. He now assigned motivational importance to this facet of regulation and termed it superego. The superego gives commands; it is an internal "must" system which can mount urgent motivational pressure. However, after so internalizing and elevating the motivating forces of a morality system, Freud had to cope with conceiving another system that was responsive to it, one that was responsible for modulating and implementing its demands. Freud called upon the ego concept to provide the supplement: the activity of internalized moral strictures and values became part of a general system of ego control, which is coordinate with the id and which is capable of imposing restraints, of staking out the range of permissible drive discharge, of determining different forms of conflict, and of bringing about their resolution. [See MORAL DEVELOPMENT.] Psychotic thought disorders. Psychoanalytic experiences with psychotics pointed to impairments of adaptive capacities and to defective personal constructions of reality as primary issues. For example, the difficulties that psychotics have in sustaining emotional investments (transference) seemed to Freud to indicate a fundamental adaptational deficit in the affective sphere, which was itself a precondition, rather than a result, of the breakthrough of drives into cognitive forms (the primary thought processes). Clearly, clinical observations increasingly pointed up limitations of the existing model, which regarded libidinal drives as the dominant regulatory force in behavior, counterpoised by a vaguely defined inhibiting ego. Expansion of the ego concept In confronting the insufficiencies of the general theory, Freud could have revamped his conceptions
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of psychosexual (libidinal) determinism, conflict, and defense. The solution Freud adopted consisted, instead, of broadening the ego concept; he converted it into a hypothetical system of regulation endowed with an activity principle of its own, one that was coordinate with instinctual drives. All processes of selectivity of thought and action in their adaptive aspect were assigned to it. No longer was the ego simply an ad hoc passive outcome of impulses meeting implacable external barriers to discharge. This seemed to take care of the principal requirements of the new data—providing for adaptational motive tendencies and for decision, choice, and integration; control of drives was now viewed as but one aspect of the organism's development. Moreover, the new schema brought to psychoanalytic theory a symmetry that it had previously lacked, for now the two main regulative principles, the pleasure and reality principles, were unequivocally associated with two coordinate and corresponding structuring instrumentalities— the pleasure principle with the id and the reality principle with the ego (and superego) system. Freud stated his final conception of the ego as follows: Here are the principal characteristics of the ego. In consequence of the pre-established connection between sense perception and muscular action, the ego has voluntary movement at its command. It has the task of self-preservation. As regards external events, it performs that task by becoming aware of stimuli, by storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation), and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events, in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favorable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations entirely. (An Outline of Psychoanalysis [1940] 1964, vol. 23, pp. 145-146) Through the critical functions of inhibition, detour, postponement, and integration via thought and action, the functions of defense, of realistic drive implementation, and of adaptation were joined to a single regulative system, coordinate with the drive system itself. Perhaps the most critical capacity attributed to the ego was an autonomous integrative function (actually developed more explicitly by Hartmann) that specifically cast the ego in a much more active role than Freud had ever before accorded it. According to Hartmann, "The most incisive change which took place in
Freud's model of psychic personality . . . [was] its representation as a (more or less) integrated whole, subdivisible in centers of mental functioning—these substructures being defined by their functions, and their demarcation being based on the fact that empirically he found greater coherence among some functions than among others" (Hartmann [1927-1959] 1964, pp. 146-147). This reference to "centers of mental functioning" represents the "structural point of view" in psychoanalysis. Adjustment, control, and integration, and not simply the direct and indirect forms of drive discharge, thus became the main concerns of psychoanalytic theory. The achieving of harmony, balance, and general equilibrium, as well as the equilibria which result from conflict-determined defensive maneuvers, became a legitimate and even necessary focus of psychoanalytic observation. There is even a hint that the ego not only is coordinate with drives but also serves as organizer of drives, as a kind of omnibus regulator in the personality. In general, the key change in Freud's conception of the ego from his previous uses of the term was his recognition of an active principle independent of libidinal drive energy, which involves the turning of enforced responses into ego-initiated processes. The new conception brought into the foreground the proposition that the causal matrix of human behavior cannot be limited to unconsciously active instinctual drives and was the first explicit recognition of this in Freud's thinking. The motivations that develop from this activity are "ego motivations" as distinguished from "drive motivations." The ego's dominion over the pleasure principle became, as Hartmann remarks, a possibility that was unthinkable in the earlier theory. Indeed, so far did Freud go in his appreciation of the regulative power of the ego that in a later, sobering reflection on negative therapeutic reactions in analysis, he even proposed that there might enter into a person's ego development a peculiar characteristic or deformity of its growth that predisposes it to conflict, whatever the drive components of the conflict—an inherent tendency of the ego to promote the conditions of conflict. Clearly, it was implied that the ego has a degree of organizational independence giving it capabilities of motivating behavior independently of drives. Although Freud intended to solve problems in the general theory, it is ironic that his respect for the organizing momentum of ego activity actually created a dilemma in psychoanalysis, raising the critical problem of what the energic basis of the
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology ego's autonomy is. Freud's hint that the ego was energized by a "neutral," nondrive quantity had the effect of sharpening issues of incompatibility with libido theory, which his expanded ego conception was intended to resolve. It has raised questions about the tenability of his drive and energic conceptions as explanatory tools. We will return to these issues. Freud's final conception of ego created the prospect of a new field of psychoanalytic endeavor concerned with ego development; it drew attention to a primary biological fact: a protracted period of helplessness in the child, which had a great influence on the development of adaptational apparatuses and controls. Psychoanalysts were urged to consider in more detail the gradual emergence of control and internalized values that are attached to relationships and the manner in which these become means of regulation. The purely ego aspect of "object relations" thus became an area of possible study. Freud's final conception, although clear enough in its outlines, was hardly more than a series of programmatic hints and was ambiguous in a number of respects, such as the following. (1) The line of distinction between conflict and adaptational problem was by no means clear. The ego, in the new conception, was seen as an active adaptational participant, implying that neither all encounters nor all experienced impasses necessarily involve conflict. But, the distinctions between disequilibrium and conflict—and, for that matter, between the varieties of disequilibria and of conflict themselves—were by no means clear. (2) Although the new conception implied a distinction between specifically defensive encounters and other modes of adaptational controls, Freud still tended to emphasize the ego's regulation of conflict through defense, although it was an ego working with "its own energies." However, the new conception encouraged the broader view that behavior has a "multiple function"—that the organism is responsive to a complex array of "realities," not simply to the drive-defense polarities of conflict. But Freud had said little about the varieties of adaptational encounter or about developmental "tasks" other than those involving instinctual drives. (3) There was still no explicit recognition of self as a grade of ego organization with which may be associated distinctive organizing functions and motivations. (4) One could say with justification that Freud still intended to view the ego's functions in relation to reality mainly from the perspective of an environment that embodied actual and potential dangers and frustrations. Thus, the ego's functions in the
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positive role of creator, rather than defender or adjuster, were only hinted at. (5) Finally, the issues of the nature and bases of the ego's autonomy were left hanging, as was the problem of how one might now conceptualize the ego's development independent of drive development. A reflection of this incompleteness was a curious ambiguity that remained in Freud's notion of the anxiety signal: the new conception of anxiety did not distinguish libidinal from nonlibidinal sources of anxiety, although it implied that there was such a distinction. Post-Freudian development The concepts of the new ego psychology were amplified and systematized by Heinz Hartmann and supplemented by Ernst Kris, Rudolph Loewenstein, and David Rapaport, the torchbearers of the new ego psychology. Erik Erikson's efforts to delineate a biosocial conception of adaptational development are also pertinent, although he does not explicitly use an ego-psychological frame of reference. Erikson's work, in fact, highlights certain of the difficulties inherent in ego psychology's attempts to distinguish between drive "structure" and ego. Hartmann perceived the central importance of Freud's assumption of an autonomous activity principle (he calls it the synthetic, or organizing, function of the ego) and made it the key feature of his conception of an ego system which undergoes a development that is coordinate and interactive with that of drives yet remains distinctive. Within Hartmann's scheme the ego emerges more clearly as a general adaptational "organ," reflecting in the range of its responsiveness responsibility to "realities" in the broad sense, as well as in the narrow sense of serving the pleasure principle. He views the ego in a problem-solving role, not simply as mediator of conflict; responsiveness to conflict becomes but one aspect of the ego's function in the adaptational task of "fitting in" with an "average expectable environment." Even the scope of conflict itself is greater than the clash of drive impulse and defense. As a self-regulative system, the ego responds to the requirements of different types of "disequilibria." A central theme is Hartmann's conception of the autonomy of the ego's functions—that is, the degree of independence of ego activities from drives and from involvements in conflict. Phylogenetic development has ensured that the human child will come into the world with an array of functions potentially adaptive to an average expectable environment, provided adequate environmental opportunity is supplied. These functions include the basic
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capacities and abilities of the organism: the abilities to perceive, to learn, to remember, to think, to move, and to act; talent and inborn gifts of all kinds, as well as dispositions to organize, to synthesize, to achieve balance from disequilibrium. The development of these functions is also relatively independent of drive, guided in large measure by the necessities of stimulation or contact with an environment that supports the actualizing of these potentials. (Relevant to this point is the great difficulty experimenters encounter in demonstrating consistent effects of needs on perception.) The assumption of conflict-free structures is extended even to functions that are responsive to parental and social realities. For instance, there is a conflictfree superego aspect of ego development. This framework makes it possible to accommodate such nonpsychoanalytic developmental theories as that of Piaget, for whom stages of the development of thinking are essentially the outcomes of interactions of perception and of action accompaniments of cognitive operations. [See DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, article on A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT.] These assumptions of primary autonomy of functions signify recognition of a range of phenomena that do not owe their essential form to psychosexual influence. Indeed, the issue of the participation of drive and more generally of libido on ego development now becomes a more troublesome matter. Hartmann is careful to point out that "conflict-free" does not mean "drive-free" and that actually, many ego functions are molded on the pattern of such instinctual drive manifestations as giving and taking, introjection and projection, holding on and letting go; in these instances the ego functions have their analogue in the modes of motor functioning of the various erogenous zones. For Erikson, this has been a departure point for developing a psychosocial conception of drives. For example, each of the zones that successfully attain a place of principal importance in the discharge of drive tension has one or more modes of operation that are basic for dealing with reality. The mouth lends itself to getting (i.e., receiving) and taking, the anus to holding on and letting go, and so forth. A critical point is that there takes place a process of estrangement, or autonomous separation, of the modes from their original locus in zones. They become, then, general ways of approaching the world. Erikson offers clinical examples from play configurations, dreams, neurotic symptoms, social behavior, etc. which show the utility of this way of viewing consistencies in behavior. It should be pointed out, however, that Erikson's
mode-zone conception is actually more a reformulation of drive theory than an extension of the new ego conception of autonomy, for the core of his theory is that the kinds of functions associated with autonomous ego functions in the Hartmann scheme (e.g., perception, motor, etc.) are present as a part of drive structure from the very first. It is no solution—-nor is it meant to be—to the dilemma created by Hartmann's notion of how much primary autonomy is to be allowed to ego. Erikson proposed that drives are always implicated in psychosocial adaptational modes, having a formative influence on the modes as well as being themselves shaped by the modes, but this seems to undermine the conception of a drive-autonomous development, in contradiction to Hartmann's view. Conflict retains its importance in Hartmann's schema as an important condition for the emergence of new varieties of motivation and of action structures. There are two distinctly novel features, however, in his view of the relation of conflict to development. One is his proposal that structures of regulation can undergo a "change of function" from defense to adaptation. A regulative process that developed as a means of coping with conflict can be used for purposes other than defense; a defense such as intellectualization or denial may turn into a means of nondefensive adaptation. It becomes, as it were, a generalized mode of cognitive control suited to a range of encounters requiring resolution. These are examples of secondary autonomy in the sense that, although they originated from conflict in the service of drive control, they developed into effective instrumentalities of adaptation generally. Secondary autonomy is a reminder that the conflict-free realm of primary autonomous functioning can be enlarged by the development of new structures. The natural course of development is seen, then, to be enlargement of the conflict-free sphere, building on the base of the primarily autonomous structures additional structures that serve to contain the drives, slow them, and harness them to useful work. A second novel feature of Hartmann's views has to do with alternative origins of defense itself. It is possible for the primary autonomous structures to play a role in predisposing the person toward certain modes of defense when he experiences conflict. In Freud's earlier views adaptive modes of control (usually termed character defenses) themselves originated in defensive reactions and/or in fixations on one or another mode of drive gratification. Now Hartmann is saying that characterological style and adaptive control may not only be fashioned from defenses but that the reverse is also possible
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology —defenses may be patterned on an autonomous behavioral tendency. Thus, a special talent may affect the distribution of libidinal and aggressive energies; it may itself be useful as a means of resolving conflict and, therefore, become a factor in determining habitual forms of defense. In this connection, the relationship between special sensitivities of infants and subsequent development of defenses in neurotic conflict is incorporated in this principle. The developmental momentum of the conflictfree functions constitutes a source of independent motivation, of incentives for contacting the environment, and of adaptive control—a "third force," on a par with drive and social reality. For instance, one source of motivation arises from the appearance, motivationally, of an anticipatory capacity which makes possible what Erikson calls timelocked motives. Hartmann attributes great importance to the anticipation function in ego development. Drives by themselves cannot guarantee adaptation to reality; neither is a heightened appreciation of reality enough to guarantee success for the ego's primary role nor renouncing an immediate pleasure enough to secure a greater and more certain one in the future. Neither are fear of pain nor the lure of pleasure, for that matter, in themselves precise indicators of direction and selection. It is necessary to assume a factor for anticipating the future, for orienting actions according to it, and for correctly relating means and ends to each other. This effort, if successful, yields pleasure secondarily; thus, integrative efforts become themselves a source of motives for contacting the environment and for developing interests and talents —none being derivable from drives directly. Thus, Hartmann's formulation gives a place in psychoanalytic theory to function pleasure—that is, the intrinsically pleasurable aspects of the sheer exercise of functions—as a motivational source. Indeed, there is a hint that such motivations and the search for opportunities of exercising these functions without drive discharge as their basis are even necessary to normal development. Such intrinsic activity motivations guarantee, in Rapaport's view, the "stimulus nutriments" required for growth; Rapaport suggested that the seeking of stimulus nutriment is the basis of many activities described as "curiosity," "search for novelty," etc. Incidentally, another implication of these views is that growth itself and motives that stimulate activity to a great extent depend on the environment, not on the instinctual drives, in the sense that contact with the environment seems to be essential for the development and persistence of certain psy-
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chological structures. The pleasures of such contact—and particularly of successful and effective contact—enlarge the organism's repertoire of motivations, beyond those originating in instinctual drives alone. [See STIMULATION DRIVES.] It must be noted that in enlarging the picture of the sources of human motivation—motivations for dealing with reality that originate at least relatively independently of drives—Hartmann has also produced a more complex picture than heretofore of the potential conditions of, and participants in, conflict. For instance, motivations having to do with the function motives or intrinsic activity of the type mentioned above are not always consonant with those which derive from drives nor with internalized values. The disequilibria produced by conflict over drives, as well as those arising from within the ego system itself, become, then, a matter of psychoanalytic concern. Through his insistence on the importance of processes of adaptation to reality, Hartmann focuses attention on conflicts within, as well as between, systems: between drives and superego, between ego and superego, and between ego motives themselves. The contemporary emphasis on the ego as a synthesizing system reflects a broader perspective of motivation than the earlier view, which saw it as a means of responding to drive tension. In the current view, the ego is a balance-inducing system, not simply a system for reducing tensions. Resolving the conflict of drive and superego demands is only one such task of the ego. The basic motivational conditions are still regarded as disequilibria, but these are not always assumed to implicate drive, nor do they always imply the reduction of tension; indeed, some conditions of balance and harmony may require an increase in the tension level of the organism. Because the ego's synthesizing function is essential in modulating tension and achieving balance in a condition of disequilibrium, the ego is established as the prime—in fact, only—regulative system of the psychic apparatus to which the claims of drives and of superego are subordinated. The new ego psychology has irresistibly moved away from the tripartite model of control to a single control system in which the id and the superego are forces. The ego becomes the embodiment of all active purposive realignments of behavior. "Loss of control" in the new scheme connotes "ego deficiency." While the dominance of the ego system is not an acknowledged precept of the Hartmann, Kris, and Rapaport conceptions, it is a logical implication of their views. Ego functioning seen as a developmentally au-
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tonomous process extends psychoanalytic interest to the study of particular functions, such as perception and memory. A program for the analysis of thought functions encompasses the ways thought and behavior become alienated from reality, the conditions of conflict and drive investment that determine this alienation, and the behaviors that characterize it. For example, one might ask about the conditions under which, and the forms in which, perception develops adaptively in giving rise to effective psychical representations of reality; the conditions under which it may become sexualized or drawn into conflict; its role as helper or opponent of drives—that is, in its defensive, as well as drive-facilitative, forms; and its modification in relation to the equilibrating requirements of superego motivations. Pathological phenomena can be conceptualized through consideration of conditions which produce a loss of "ego autonomy"—that is, a loss of the ego's integrative capacity when drive and superego demands are beyond the organism's tolerances. This derives from the view that ego autonomy is always relative; it is never absolute. Drives and their traces can invade thought organization and action. In emphasizing the possibility that ego autonomy may be lost under conditions of increased drive pressure or weakened ego functions or, in Rapaport's view, under conditions of an altered state of consciousness, provision is made for the fact that adaptations can take regressive, as well as progressive, forms. At the same time, the effort for adaptive synthesis and mastery (an ego motive) may come about in a temporary abeyance of ego control and may yield unique and novel forms of integration and insights into environmental realities—a conception which Kris brought into prominence while attempting to determine the conditions necessary for artistic creativity. Two other contributions to the expanded significance given to the ego construct deserve mention. One is Rapaport's attempt to reinstate consciousness as a decisive force in selection and action to a high place in the ego's repertoire of regulative functions. While Freud emphasized the distinction between conscious and unconscious forces, the delineation of the functions of consciousness in adaptation and in the motivation of behavior was not one of his major interests. In the early period of the Project, consciousness was more or less identified with ego and was assigned adaptational importance, but later, when ego became virtually synonymous with defenses, consciousness receded in significance as a determining force of behavior.
However, the anxiety concept did reopen the general issue of the independently motivational importance of conscious states of feeling and affect and of modes of experience generally. The qualitative distinction between conscious and unconscious cognitive activity again assumed importance. For instance, Freud's view that ego functions have different behavioral consequences in different states of consciousness exemplifies this concern. Rapaport has described a variety of states and types of awareness and their behavioral effects. Perhaps the most important of his suggestions is the proposition that the less the capacities for vigilance, for reflective awareness, and for directing attention at will, the more do thought processes take on passive characteristics (i.e., show evidence of the primary process) and the less effective is secondary-process thinking. Ego psychology within the general theory The radical reorientation within psychoanalysis brought about by the advent of ego psychology is perhaps most prominently exemplified in the development of psychoanalysis from a theory of pathology and illness to one that has ambitions of embracing all psychological disequilibria, whether specifically pathological or not. The change may be summarized as a shift from the conception of ego as an instrumentality of discharge of sexual and aggressive instinctual drives—and specifically as defense against those drives—to a concept of ego motivations derived from functions of adaptation and the resolution of crises. Several aspects of the changed emphases in the parent theory deserve comment. From conflict to crisis resolution. Psychoanalytic theory resists single-trend interpretations of behavior; its propositions deal mainly with contrasting and incompatible forces, either actual or those of fantasy. It was the resolution of a particular form of opposition—the conflict between defense and drive—that occupied Freud in the main. This original insight into conflict as a source of motivation is now better regarded as a restricted expression of a more general view of life as a developmental process in which the resolution of incompatibility, crisis, and impasse is a critical condition of growth. The conflicts stressed by Freud are one aspect of a process of constant "adjudication" of incompatible polarities—for example, that we live in a phantom world of I-other relationships, whose code has to be understood by every person. Partly as a result of the impact of current ego psychology, the terms or polarities of potential impasse are more inclusive, encompassing a wide
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology variety of conflicts, including those forms not previously provided for in the theory. For example, Hartmann refers to conflicts within, as well as between, subsystems. Important emphasis is now given to developmental crises, in which modes of action and adaptation perfectly suited to the biosocial conditions of one stage are no longer appropriate to new maturational conditions and to social expectations tied in with these. Crisis, impact, and dilemma produce a requirement for adjudication, and out of the variety of such felt or actual incompatibilities, including conflicts in the narrower sense of psychosexuality and defense, emerge motives of action and thought. The development of psychoanalysis has consisted in part of an even more discriminating appreciation of varieties of conflict and generally of the conditions of incompatibility that demand mastery. Psychoanalysis is still a psychology of motivation with emphasis on motives arising out of incompatibility, and this key principle is central to its clinical applications. From defense to adaptation. It is also recognized that not all adaptational efforts are defense in the narrow sense. The emphasis on defense originated in a concern with illness and neurosis, the concept of conflict being the core of the theory. Now, as ego psychology becomes more explicitly a conception of adaptation and of developmental solutions, it is logical that it embody the assumption that adaptation is multiple faceted, with defense only one of its forms. From instinctual drives to motivational diversity. The distinction between drive-originated and nondrive-originated motivations is increasingly a sensitive issue in contemporary psychoanalysis. The important clinical concern with motivational genesis—how the patient's goals came to be what they are—often turns out not to implicate psychosexuality. Clearly, not all motivations—in the sense of purposively instigated contact with the environment—can be referred to the main driving causes —sexuality and aggression. Confronting psychoanalytic theory is the problem of embracing the uneasy recognition of extrainstinctual motivations without repressing the hard-won realization that such drives as sexuality and aggression indeed have a plasticity not given to other sources of motivations—for example, displaceability of drive aims and objects, a not easily inhibited peremptoriness, and a higher potential for involvement in conflict. The strength and ubiquity of unconscious love and hate, including their self-directed aspects, must be incorporated into a comprehensive motivational theory in the future. Erikson's formulations are the
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closest approximation we have at the present time. The capacity of traditional libido theory to effect this reconciliation is highly doubtful, and in fact, the uncritical acceptance of libido theory within the newer emphases of ego psychology sharpens the theoretical dilemma. From explanatory priority of unconscious wishes to explanatory parity of conscious purpose. The polarity of consciousness-unconsciousness was always significant to Freud, but mainly in respect to consciousness as reactive to unconscious forces, particularly in his early formulation of the conscious-ego system. Mainly because of Rapaport's efforts, the causal importance of consciousness and of modes of experience is generally acquiring increasing respect in psychoanalytic theory. One aspect of this emphasis is a set of new possibilities opened up in respect to the importance of affects, previously considered as part of the anxiety-signal theory. One possibility is that an affective experience can be an independent source of motivation. The possibility has even been suggested that only via affect signals do drives themselves become motivations—that is, directional influences. At any rate, affect signals have been increasingly regarded as antecedents that determine realistic and unrealistic implementations of drive activation. This change of emphasis in contemporary psychoanalysis is well illustrated by a reinterpretation of depression offered by Bibring to replace the traditional theory (1953). In the older theory, guilt over oral and aggressive strivings were assumed to be central in depression. In Bibring's theory, depression is considered to be primarily an ego phenomenon "representing an affective state of helplessness" which comes about because two incompatible sets of ego cognitions are simultaneously active: feelings of lowered self-esteem, on the one hand, and, at the same time, unrequited aspirations and a not yet relinquished sense of potential. Low self-esteem, inhibition of ego aspirations, and helplessness are the important focuses of the syndrome. Bibring actually assigns a peripheral role to the drive factors that are central in the accepted theory. Drives may precipitate or complicate depression or be exacerbated as a result of the ego state, but they are not primary determinants of depression, the crucial factor being the ego state. The theory is truly a radical reformulation in several respects: (1) It assigns priority, not to instinctual drives, but to an affective state of the ego. (2) It assigns importance to goals and motivations that are explicitly of the ego and not of drives. The incompatibility is "intrasystemic" and does not implicate the id. (3) It assumes con-
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scious experience to be an active force in determining behavior, in asserting that the experience of helplessness is a key event in the depressive syndrome. (4) It draws attention to dilemma in the broad sense, rather than to conflict in the narrow sense, as a dynamic principle. (5) It accords a determining influence—even as a "fourth force" —to a grade of ego structure having to do with self-esteem. (6) Overlapping with the above, it regards instinctual sexual drives and aggression as complications, but not prior determinants, of the depressive state. [See DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS.] The effects of the expanded conception of the psychoanalytic enterprise and of the newer emphasis on the ego have been both vitalizing and humbling. It has, for example, decisively checked the earlier pansexual reductionism with which psychoanalytic therapy and theory were burdened for years. Moreover, recent developments have brought a broadened appreciation of social and cultural influences into psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis has come a long way from its beginnings, when the ego was the contravening agent against the id and against the culture, to appreciation of the fact that only a supporting society and a loving mother can make a functioning ego. Ego psychology attempts to correct the earlier de-emphasis, while avoiding a simple environmentalism. At the same time ego psychology has been a vitalizing influence in making psychoanalysis aware of the processes by which reality is engaged, of the varying modes and styles of such adaptational approaches, and of the pathological consequences of a break in the equipment of effective engagement with the environment. This last aspect has been a particularly important spur to experimental work in nonclinical settings. Also prominent has been the burst of interest in conceptions of ego development, a field of study distinct from the study of cognitive development per se or of intelligence, and emotions. Furthermore, psychoanalytic therapy no longer regards its main task to be the uncovering of unconscious memories. It is now more a matter of deciphering and revealing the pattern of object relationships and of specifying the scope of these patterns of relationship in behavior and experience. The goals of psychoanalysis have thus become more ambitious and more difficult, and the hopes of success, consequently, more modest. Some psychoanalysts have cast a jaundiced eye on the current ego psychology, viewing it as a throwback to attempts to undo the importance of sexuality and aggression in behavior—to re-repress
the insights gained from Freud's long period of concern with instinctual drives. This is a misleading interpretation of the development. It seems more likely that it reflects an attempt to deal with motivations in behavior that cannot be easily explained in terms of libido theory. The explicit aim of ego psychology is not at all to pre-empt the importance of the hard-won clinical facts descriptive of conflict, defense, transference, regression, fixation, unconscious fantasy, and screen memories— all of which require proper understanding of the powerful forces of sexuality and hate—but to make them part of a larger framework which will encompass facts which these concepts are either not consistent with or insufficient to deal with. Evaluation of the concept This seeming vitality and broadened perspective ought to be the happy note on which to end the present account. Ego psychology would appear to be a vigorous development on the psychoanalytic scene, one of increasing explanatory promise. Unfortunately, for all of the incentives to investigation promoted by ego psychology, there are grave doubts about its viability as theory in its present form. A suspicious sign is the very inclusiveness of ego psychology. The ego has come to connote all those structures of man which, in the face of peremptory drive motivations, make him responsive to reality. Here is a summary of ego functions offered by two spokesmen for the new ego psychology: (1) consciousness; (2) sense perception; (3) the perception and expression of affect; (4) thought; (5) control of motor action; (6) memory; (7) language; (8) defense mechanisms and defensive activity in general; (9) control, regulation, and binding of instinctual energy; (10) the integrative and harmonizing function; (11) reality testing; and (12) the capacity to inhibit or suspend the operation of any of these functions and to regress to a primitive level of functioning (Arlow & Brenner 1964, p. 39). And this list does not even include the functions of the superego, which could quite properly be included as an ego "subsystem." It is freely admitted, moreover, that ego theory offers no systematic principles by which to order its component functions hierarchically; which functions are most central and which most peripheral to ego as a structure are by no means clear. One result is vagueness in distinguishing ego development as a process from the development of intelligence, affect, and cognition generally and, indeed, from drive development. Scientific theories have a way of hiding difficul-
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology ties by attempting to resolve impasses by complication. Certainly, current ego psychology complicates the picture of conflict, motivation, and determinism of behavior, compared to the earlier psychoanalytic conceptions. Conceptual complexity is no sure sign of better theory; indeed, it may well signify weakness and error. Some of the ambiguities and difficulties in current ego psychology therefore deserve scrutiny. Four unresolved issues in ego psychology cast doubt on the fundamental viability of the concept. Entity or taxonomy? One difficulty in current formulations has to do with confusion over the appropriate data language to be used in designating ego phenomena. An aspect of this problem has to do with specifying the essential referent of the ego concept: whether the ego is a hypothetical unit or system of self-regulation with as yet unknown operational parameters, simply a taxonomical device for grouping functions according to their relation to id and superego, or a class of nonlibidinal motivations. Proponents of ego psychology are equivocal on this matter, and various theorists have even tried to dismiss the issue altogether. The first meaning—the ego as a regulative system— has definitely the ring of reification. In some accounts a definite structure, in some sense, of a hypothetical central mechanism is implied—structure in the "hard sense," as in holistic references to the ego as "strong" or "weak" or to "autonomy of ego" from id. On the other hand, reification is often and vigorously disclaimed; it is said that the ego's "existence" is a matter of convenient metaphor (e.g., Waelder 1960). Something of the same type of usage, it is said, is seen in modern physics; an electron can be located only when it sends a message—that is, when it emits the ray in transmission from one energy level to another. And so it is with ego, superego, and id. The ego has its usefulness as an agent in sharpening the picture of the forces of conflict. Despite such disclaimers, it is difficult to wave aside the possibility that the structural point of view carries inescapable assumptions of agency and process. In the early phases of his theorizing, Freud did not consider the ego simply as a grouping of functions; it had specifiable operational characteristics. Even if one takes the notion of the ego as a "group of functions"—that is, in its most popular current, taxonomical meaning—the very word "group" brings up questions of the processes of grouping, the nature of coherence, of why and how certain functions collaborate and others do not.
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Moreover, avoiding the ego as a motivational organization—a meaning also encountered—carries with it the assumption of interlocking purposes and development, and again, the nature of the coherence becomes an issue. Loewald has made this point well. There is a distinction, he says, between processes and the structures between and within which subprocesses take place. He and Eissler raise the question of how the three structures of personality function. It is difficult to see how current ego psychology working from the "structural point of view" can avoid assuming some kind of operational model of a system working as a whole, especially in presenting itself as an explanatory theory of causation and in eschewing the more modest and achievable goal of being a descriptive psychology of meaning and purpose. But failing to confront its covert assumptions of a process model, the causal explanations offered by ego psychology are bound to appear to beg the question. There is more than mere suspicion that the new ego psychology does indeed lean upon a model of hypothetical process without acknowledging it as such—namely, the tension-discharge-equilibrium model. Disclaiming reification, ego psychology, nevertheless, does implicitly hold to the pseudoneurological conception of psychical structure that is embodied in Freud's energy conception of drives, and to the extent that it does, it inevitably has to reflect the limitations and inadequacies of this model of process and structure. Some theorists (e.g., Rubenstein 1967) propose that ego theory ought to be directed toward the development of a model of self-regulation, one which would fill the gap in an uncertain metapsychology of mechanism, which the theory implies. Thus, there have been proposals to conceptualize autonomy in terms of some actual—perhaps physiological—model of information processing. This would put ego psychology squarely into the business of investigating central processes. Most psychoanalytic theorists are understandably reluctant to move in these directions, for to do so would commit theorists to a data language not easily suited to the observables and aims of the clinical situation and would very likely even require data of a different order than are obtainable in the consulting room. More important are wellfounded doubts as to whether such models could ever be productive to clinical work or could ever move beyond the stage of simply translating the purposivistic concepts of clinical work to a seemingly nonteleological cast. The challenge to those calling for psychoanalysis to move toward develop-
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PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology
ing models of operational process is this: unless such models have built into them capacities for consciousness, modes of experience, and reflection on social responsibility, they are not likely to be of much use to the clinician. One could try to wave aside the issue by democratic gesture: Let those who wish go the direction of mechanism; live and let live. This is well and good, but it requires the existence of an alternative course. It is doubtful, however, that the currently popular structural point of view provides such a clear alternative. Proponents of the structural point of view—certainly the prevalent one—shun the responsibility of developing the operations model they implicitly avow, in hopes that an explicit concern with the functions through which realityadaptive efforts are carried out will suffice. However, a serious contributor to theoretical ambiguity is the fact that several meanings of "function" are used interchangeably and confounded in contemporary ego psychology: "function" in the sense of "survival utility," "function" as "purpose" or "motivational aim," "function" with the nonmotivational meaning of "capacity" (e.g., perception, memory). Vagueness in the conception of functions affects the meaning and utility of the key concept of primary and secondary autonomy of functions. A common illustration of primary autonomy is the great extent to which perception, motility, and learning are relatively independent of conflict and drive. Here the word "function" clearly has the meaning of "capacity," "faculty," or "apparatus," without implication of "purpose." But, if "perception" and "motility" are not motivational terms, in what sense can they be autonomous, especially since perception can be an instrumentality both of ego and id motivations? Secondary autonomy almost always refers to a "change of function" in the purposive sense, rather than in the sense of "capacity." Defense, for instance, can become a generalized character trait. Thus, the seemingly unitary term "autonomy" lacks theoretical symmetry. The notions of primary and secondary autonomy are anchored to different meanings of "function," and in the theory what is presumed to be autonomous is ambiguous. Relationship to drive. Ego psychology presents a paradox, rather than offering a solution, in assuming, on the one hand, that certain functions undergo a development outside of conflict, and, on the other, that "conflict-free" does not mean "drive-free." Autonomy means "autonomy from conflict," not "autonomy from drive."
Ego psychology seems not to have confronted the implication that if there is only one set of instrumentalities of perceiving, motility, etc., involved in the structuring of drives and, indeed, of all motivations, the necessity of assuming an agency distinct from id (and therefore two sets of instrumentalities, one for drives and one for ego motivations) becomes rather less urgent, even superfluous; if the distinct agency is retained, it becomes simply another and redundant way of referring to selfregulation in the organism as a whole, which includes drive as one aspect of its totality. A key change in Freud's later conception of the ego was his recognition of an active motivational principle of growth that went beyond the pleasure principle of libidinal gratification—the turning of enforced responses into ego-initiated responses. The explication of this critical precept of ego psychology is still in its beginnings (Erikson's formulations are a most promising start). The unsettled question is whether there is a psychoanalytic version of ego development that is distinguishable from psychosexual development. Catch-all or distinctive theory? In this sense, contemporary ego psychology is a reminder to psychoanalysis of theoretical tasks hardly begun. Merely to list the ego's functions is not to account for the logic of their grouping and the dynamic principles by which functions cohere and differentiate. What Hartmann and his collaborators have done in acknowledging conflict-free processes, as Loevinger points out, is to give ego functions "a local habitation and a name within systematic psychoanalysis" (1966, p. 433). This is an achievement, but it is not yet an integration of ego psychology into psychoanalysis. Acknowledging a "synthetic," or "integrative," function of the ego is not to state a dynamic principle by which to explain behavior in terms of synthesis activity. It is less important to assert that motivations can emerge from a process of "secondary autonomy" than to specify the dynamic principles that account for their origin and their subsequent predominance over developmentally earlier motivations. Lacking such dynamical principles of epigenesis, many of the concepts of ego psychology, such as primary or secondary autonomy, seem less like explanations than descriptive and classificatory formulations of phenomena that psychoanalytic theory had previously made it difficult to recognize. The fundamental issue, then, confronting ego psychology is the question of whether the broad conception of the ego as an arbiter of realitv is a parsimonious theory, which, under a few prin-
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology ciples, systematizes the seemingly diverse and unrelated purposes and motives observable in behavior, or is a means of developing ad hoc propositions to provide for observations that do not square with the theory of libidinal energy. It should be pointed out that the discoveries of the pervasive influences of sexuality in pathology and the observations of developmental continuity in sexuality are the bases of, but are not identical with, the libido theory. The conception of a libido energy which is inherently directional and has an inherited developmental course is a special hypothesis designed to pull together diverse manifestations and developmental aspects of sensual pleasure. Thus, confirmation of the pervasiveness of sexuality is by no means confirmation of the libido theory. There is extraordinary resistance to making the separation, even though it has been many times demonstrated that the libido theory far from suffices to deal with many strands of evidence and observation of sexuality. Yet, these inadequacies forced Freud to revise his account of the nature of motivation, and these revisions are a prominent part of ego psychology. To appreciate better the link between the ego conception and the libido theory, recall Freud's early model, which assumed a flow of energy into the mental apparatus from two peripheral sources, external and internal. Drive, the internal source, pervades and energizes the mental apparatus as an uncoded stimulus; "drive" thus had the dual connotation "stimulus and energizer." The ego concept was introduced to provide a responsible controlling agent, some means by which the uncoded stimulus is made cognitively sensible and given direction and which accomplishes and modulates the drive's "aim" of discharge. In libido theory, too, the notion of an energy which builds up tension, requires discharge, and is modulated to an equilibrium is fundamental. In the libido conception the notion of ego control came to place more emphasis on defense, variously described in terms of censor, repression, and even for a short time ego drive. However, the challenge of how to conceive of the ego apparatus was a much more formidable one in the context of the libido theory than in the simplistic model of "endogenous" and "exogenous" energies of the Project. In the latter, drive was simply an internal energic quantity. The ego concept could accommodate that. But, the libido theory proposes something more: it connotes an energy quantum having its own aims, range of objects of discharge, epigenesis, and even its own mecha-
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nisms (e.g., displacement, consideration). In the later, tripartite model, id is truly an agency of impetus, requiring a very special agency of control. It gradually became evident that not all motivational phenomena could be encompassed by the libido conception. Freud faced a choice: Was the trouble to be diagnosed as a defect of the libido conception or as an inadequate picture of ego? Freud's decision was unequivocal. The conception of the ego as a controlling agent was changed, not the libido theory. Thus, a case can be made for the proposition that every change made thereafter in the ego conception was indirectly a supportive effort to retain the libido conception unaltered. With expansion of the ego concept, however, the strains of coexistence have become even more evident. Ego theory in its late development has had to take account of the adaptive plasticity of behavior, cognitive autonomy from stimulation, capacities for choice and volition, and the independence of abilities and intelligence. But, the libido concept presents an impediment to such a picture of the ego; it assumes a distinctive quality of energy, having its own aims and structuring implementations independent of the ego and undergoing its own distinctive development, and requires an ego whose dominant function is to serve as a control over the claims for discharge of sexual and aggressive energies. This simply contradicts the trend toward a broadened conception of an ego as an autonomously motivating agent. The trouble began with accumulated evidence of reality-adaptive motivations that had no easily determined relationship to sexuality. It is to Hartmann's great credit that he confronted the motivational phenomena that forced extension of ego theory, but recourse to continuous enlargement of the ego concept is no strategy of parsimonious solutions. The signs of strain are evident in the ingenious recourse to the concept of neutralized drive energy as a solution to this dilemma. Libido retains its status as an independent energic force. However, this hardly clarifies how the allegedly independent drive energy can come under the sway of the structuring functions of the organism. There seems to be evidence that for sexuality to develop, the right psychosocial setting and adaptive instrumentalities must be present; in Rapaport's terms, drives also need their "appropriate supplies" of environmental stimulation. Solution of this dilemma still confronts contemporary psychoanalysis. [See SEXUAL BEHAVIOR.] It seems likely that resolution of the difficulties in meshing libido theory and ego psychology will
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PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology
come neither by further expansion of the ego concept nor by inventions of bridging concepts such as neutralization, but through a different theory of psychosexual development, which will replace the libido concept. Erikson's conception points the way. Erikson's is a configurational, rather than an energic, conception of psychosexuality; qualitative aspects of mode (apparatus) and zone are fundamental. If one were to look at these in the conventional psychoanalytic framework, one would have to say that such mode-zone applications are simultaneously ego-drive structures. But, obviously the latter terminology and the tripartite model of ego, superego, and id, whose sense rests on the assumption of distinguishable energic forces, simply does not suit such a schema as Erikson's, in which the configurations of mode—zone relationships are the drive structure. Equilibria versus motivational explanation. Analysts waver between two modes of theoretical explanation, and ego theory reflects this uncertainty. One mode of explanation uses the impersonal terms "tension reduction," "equilibria," and "discharge." The other mode is couched in terms of purpose in the extended sense of direction and aim of behavior. For the early Freud, only a nonteleological mode of explanation was satisfactory, and when he failed to accomplish this in a neurophysiological model, he kept on trying with a neutral language of energy, cathexis, delay of discharge, and the like. This model persists to this day and with it the conflict between the "clinical" side of psychoanalysis (i.e., its bias toward motivational explanation in the extended sense) and its nonteleological, impersonal focus on alleged energic processes. Despite the fact that everyday clinical work is nothing if not an investigation of the purposes or motivations of behavior, when it comes to explanation, theoreticians feel this is to be avoided like the plague. Thus, Hartmann ([1927-1959] 1964, p. 89) comments that Freud's regulative principles protect psychoanalysis from teleology. Directions and aims are construed as reflecting trends toward different types of equilibria —for example, self-preservation (reality principle), pleasure principle, nirvana principle, repetition compulsion. The regulation set in motion by equilibration requirements is accomplished through particular functions—for example, the organizing function of the ego, the trend toward synthesis, and the trend toward independence from environmental stimuli. On this level of explanation, the purposivistic cast of the clinical explanation of specific goals and objects is not explicitly acknowledged; the causative principle is equilibration.
This duality of orientation in explanation lends uncertainty to ego theory. [See HOMEOSTASIS.] The uncertainty consists in the fact that attempts to cast explanation in nonteleological form logically moves ego psychology toward a theory of self-regulation which, if it is to have empirical utility, requires theoretical models of system operation—of how such equilibria are actually established. At the same time, to accept this challenge distracts from the fundamental clinical tasks of the psychoanalytic enterprise, which is to account for behavior purposivistically, with reference to its aims, directions, and goals; the conflicts that enmesh purposes and generate others, conscious and unconscious; their developmental epigenesis; and their consequences in pathology. Moreover, if ego functions rather than operational structure are to be the central concerns of ego psychology, it is surely not the ego apparatuses as such, but mainly their engagement in purposes and meanings, that is properly the focus. Certainly, the latter program seems more natural to psychoanalytic clinical objectives. Such a focus would offer ego psychology the sorely needed basis on which to distinguish itself, on the one hand, from a psychology of intelligence and cognitive functioning and, on the other, from a psychophysiological theory of sexual and aggressive drives. But, this commitment is far from clear in present ego theory. Two different theoretical enterprises are implied in the two modes of explanation with which ego psychology is identified. Current ego psychology tries to straddle both, with no gain to either. When these two explanatory focuses are combined, the result is often unhappy. As an example, take Rapaport's conception of "autonomy of the ego from drive." This combines a seemingly telic concept of autonomy—but not developed as such—with a special conception of drive as a directionless, contentless quantity seeking discharge. (Rapaport, in fact, avoids the libido conception, arguing that it is expendable, and reverts to Freud's earliest conception of a nonspecific drive quantity.) Rapaport presumes to explain behavior in the nonteleological terms of an assumed state of equilibrium. "Autonomy" is not meant in an experiential or phenomenological sense as Erikson uses it (as a "sense of autonomy" which characterizes selfidentity), but as a purely hypothetical condition of the status of an energy quantity. If one chooses to dispense with the notion of a directionless drive energy which banks up against psychical dikes and flows to its discharge, Rapaport's autonomy notion holds little appeal. It is once again Freud's notion of endogenous, undirected energy demanding dis-
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Ego Psychology charge. As in Freud's original model, the environment is essentially a matter of demands and noxious impingements of impersonal stimuli. At the same time, the energic conception of drive and of libido in particular obscures the distinctive motivational aspects of ego theory by foisting upon it a dubious data language of cathexis, energy, and discharge. This burden will remain with the ego concept as long as the parent model, of which it is a part, holds that there are independent, "blind" forces to be controlled and that there must be an agency of such control. The language of psychoanalysis has, thanks to ego psychology, become enriched with references to nonsexual factors in motivation, but it has not yet become a theory of such motivations. Contemporary ego psychology is to be likened more to a melting pot of phenomena and propositions that are not readily encompassable by a tension-reduction, stimulus conception of drive. Psychoanalytic theory currently faces the choice either of continuing to explicate a model of the ego as a regulatory mechanism—building into it more detailed process assumptions to implement its heretofore implied, but unspecified, reifications and, with this, to take on a commitment for types of nonpsychological data on physical and physiological processes—or of frankly restricting its scope and its terms to the orientation that brought the theory into being, an endeavor concerned with motivational meanings of behavior and with understanding behavior in relation to psychological dilemma and conflict, an enterprise termed by Waelder the exploration of the multiple functions of action. Further efforts in this direction would have to shed all pretense of offering a nonteleological mechanistic picture, such as are implied by impersonal processes of homeostasis, equilibria, cathexis, energy and its modifications, and the like, which imply and require a different domain of data. The direction would be the use of theoretical terms and a data language that has a frank and direct reference to basic purposivistic tendencies of man and their evolution and epigenesis in a lifetime. This is actually what analysts do in their clinical work; it is not yet fully reflected in the systematic theoretical enterprise of psychoanalysis. GEORGE S. KLEIN [Directly related are the entries CONFLICT, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; DEFENSE MECHANISMS; DRIVES, article on ACQUIRED DRIVES; IDENTITY, PSYCHOSOCIAL; INSTINCT; MOTIVATION, article On HUMAN MOTIVATION. Other relevant material may be found in ANXIETY; PERCEPTION, article on PERCEP-
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TUAL DEVELOPMENT; PERSONALITY; PERSONALITY:
CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS; and in the biographies of FREUD; KRIS; RAPAPORT.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
APFELBAUM, BERNARD 1965 Ego Psychology, Psychic Energy, and the Hazards of Quantitative Exploration in Psycho-analytic Theory. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 46:168-182. ARLOW, JACOB A.; and BRENNER, CHARLES 1964 Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory. New York: International Universities Press. BENJAMIN, J. D. 1966 Discussion of Hartmann's Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. Pages 28— 42 in Rudolph M. Loewenstein et al. (editors), Psychoanalysis; A General Psychology: Essays in Honor of Heinz Hartmann. New York: International Universities Press. BERES, DAVID 1965 Structure and Function in Psychoanalysis. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 46: 53-63. BIBRING, EDWARD 1941 The Development and Problems of the Theory of the Instincts. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 22:102-131. BIBRING, EDWARD 1953 The Mechanism of Depression. Pages 13-48 in Phyllis Greenacre (editor), Affective Disorders: Psychoanalytic Contribution to Their Study. New York: International Universities Press. EISSLER, K. R. 1962 On the Metapsychology of the Preconscious: A Tentative Contribution to Psychoanalytic Morphology. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 17: 9-41. ENGEL, GEORGE L. 1962 Anxiety and Depression—Withdrawal: The Primary Affects of Unpleasure. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 43:89-97. ERIKSON, ERIK H. (1950) 1964 Childhood and Society. 2d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Norton. ERIKSON, ERIK H. 1959 Identity and the Life Cycle: Selected Papers. Psychological Issues, Vol. 1, No. 1. New York: International Universities Press. FAIRBAIRN, WILLIAM R. (1952) 1954 An Object-relations Theory of the Personality. New York: Basic Books. -» First published as Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality. FREUD, ANNA (1936) 1957 The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York: International Universities Press. -» First published as Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen. FREUD, SIGMUND (1893-1895) 1955 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume 2: Studies on Hysteria, by Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published in German. FREUD, SIGMUND (1894) 1962 The Neuro-psychoses of Defence. Volume 3, pages 43-61 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. H> First published as "Die Abwehr-neuropsychosen." FREUD, SIGMUND (1895) 1966 Project for a Scientific Psychology. Volume 1, pages 283-397 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> Written in 1895; first published as Entwurf einer Psychologic in 1950. FREUD, SIGMUND (1896a) 1962 The Aetiology of Hysteria. Volume 3, pages 191-221 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
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Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Zur Atiologie der Hysterie. FREUD, SIGMUND (1896£>)1962 Further Remarks on the Neuro-psychoses of Defence. Volume 3, pages 157185 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as "Weitere Bemerkungen iiber die Abwehr-neuropsychosen." FREUD, SIGMUND (1900) 1953 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volumes 4-5: The Interpretation of Dreams. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Die Traumdeutung. FREUD, SIGMUND (1905) 1953 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Volume 7, pages 123-245, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published as Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. FREUD, SIGMUND (1911)1959 Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning. Volume 12, pages 215-226 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published as Formulierungen iiber die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens. FREUD, SIGMUND (1915)1962 Instincts and Their Vicissitudes. Volume 14, pages 117-140 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published as Triebe und Triebschicksale. FREUD, SIGMUND (1920) 1955 Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Volume 18, pages 7-66 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Jenseits des Lustprinzips. FREUD, SIGMUND (1923) 1961 The Ego and the Id. Volume 19, pages 12-63 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Das Ich und das Es. FREUD, SIGMUND (1926) 1959 Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Volume 20, pages 77-178 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published as Hemmung, Symptom und Angst. FREUD, SIGMUND (1932) 1962 New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis. Volume 22, pages 3-158 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse. See especially pages 81—111, "Anxiety and Instinctual Life." FREUD, SIGMUND (1937)1964 Analysis Terminable and Interminable. Volume 23, pages 216-253 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse. FREUD, SIGMUND (1940) 1964 An Outline of Psychoanalysis. Volume 23, pages 141-208 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published as "Abriss der Psychoanalyse."
GARDNER, RILEY W. et al. 1959 Cognitive Control: A Study of Individual Consistencies in Cognitive Behavior. Psychological Issues, Vol. 1, No. 4. New York: International Universities Press. GILL, MERTON M. 1959 The Present State of Psychoanalytic Theory. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 58:1-8. GILL, MERTON M. 1963 Topography and Systems in Psychoanalytic Theory. Psychological Issues 3, no. 2. New York: International Universities Press. GILL, MERTON M.; and KLEIN, GEORGE S. 1964 The Structuring of Drive and Reality: David Rapaport's Contributions to Psycho-analysis and Psychology. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 45:483-498. GLOVER, E. 1947 Basic Mental Concepts, Their Clinical and Theoretical Value. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 16: 482-506. GUNTRIP, HARRY 1961 Personality Structure and Human Interaction. New York: International Universities Press; London: Hogarth. HARTMANN, HEINZ (1927-1959) 1964 Essays on Ego Psychology: Selected Problems in Psychoanalytic Theory. New York: International Universities Press. HARTMANN, HEINZ (1939) 1958 Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. Translated by David Rapaport. New York: International Universities Press. -> First published as Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem. HARTMANN, HEINZ; KRIS, ERNST; and LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH 1964 Papers on Psychoanalytic Psychology. Psychological Issues, Vol. 4, No. 2. New York: International Universities Press. HOLT, ROBERT R. 1960 Recent Developments in Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology and Their Implications for Diagnostic Testing. Journal of Projective Techniques 24:254-266. HOLT, ROBERT R. 1965 Ego Autonomy Re-evaluated. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 46:151-167. JACOBSON, E. (1953) 1960 The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities in Relations to Psychic Discharge Processes. Volume 1, pages 38-66 in Rudolph M. Loewenstein (editor), Drives, Affects, Behavior: Contributions to the Theory and Practice of Psychoanalysis and Its Applications. New York: International Universities Press. JONES, ERNEST 1957 The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud. Volume 3: The Last Phase 1919-1939. New York: Basic Books. KLEIN, GEORGE S. 1958 Cognitive Control and Motivation. Pages 87-118 in Gardner Lindzey (editor), Assessment of Human Motives. New York: Rinehart. KLEIN, GEORGE S. 1959 Consciousness in Psychoanalytic Theory: Some Implications for Current Research in Perception. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 7:5-34. KRIS, ERNST (1939) 1952 On Inspiration. Pages 291302 in Ernst Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art. New York: International Universities Press. -* First published in Volume 20 in the International Journal of Psycho-analysis. KRIS, ERNST 1950a Notes on the Development and on Some Current Problems of Psychoanalytic Child Psychology. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 5:24-46. KRIS, ERNST 1950b The Significance of Freud's Earlier Discussions. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 31:108-116.
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Therapeutic Methods KRIS, ERNST 1951a Ego Psychology and Interpretation in Psychoanalytic Therapy. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 20:15-30. KRIS, ERNST 1951Z? The Development of Ego Psychology. Samiksa 5:153-168. KRIS, ERNST 1955 Neutralization and Sublimation: Observations on Young Children. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 10:30-46. KRIS, ERNST 1956 The Recovery of Childhood Memories in Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 11:54-88. LOEVINGER, JANE 1966 Three Principles for a Psychoanalytic Psychology. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 71:432-443. LOEWALD, HANS W. 1951 Ego and Reality. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 32:10-18. LOEWALD, HANS W. 1966 [A Book Review of] Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory, by J. A. Arlow and C. Brenner. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 35: 430-436. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1951 The Problem of Interpretation. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 20:1-30. RAPAPORT, DAVID 1951 Consciousness: A Psychopathological and Psychodynamic View. Pages 18-57 in Conference on Problems of Consciousness, Second, 1951, Transactions: Problems of Consciousness. New York: Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation. RAPAPORT, DAVID 1953 On the Psycho-analytic Theory of Affects. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 34:177-198. RAPAPORT, DAVID 1957 Cognitive Structures. Pages 157200 in Colorado, University of, Psychology Department, Contemporary Approaches to Cognition: A Symposium. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. RAPAPORT, DAVID 1958 The Theory of Ego Autonomy. A Generalization. Menninger Clinic, Bulletin 22:1335. RAPAPORT, DAVID 1959 A Historical Survey of Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology. Pages 5-17 in Erik H. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle: Selected Papers. Psychological Issues, Vol. 1, No. 1. New York: International Universities Press. RAPAPORT, DAVID 1960 On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Motivation. Volume 8, pages 173-247 in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Edited by Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. RAPAPORT, DAVID The Collected Papers of David Rapaport. Edited by Merton M. Gill. New York: Basic Books, 1967. RUBENSTEIN, B. R. 1967 Explanation and More Description: A Metascientific Examination of Certain Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Motivation. Pages 20-79 in Robert R. Holt (editor), Motives and Thought: Psychoanalytic Essays in Memory of David Rapaport. New York: International Universities Press. SHAKOW, DAVID; and RAPAPORT, DAVID 1964 The Influence of Freud on American Psychology. Psychological Issues, Vol. 4, No. 1. New York: Internationa] Universities Press. SPERLING, SAMUEL J. 1958 On Denial and the Essential Nature of Defence. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 39:25-38. SPITZ, RENE A. 1960 A Genetic Field Theory of Ego Formation: Its Implications for Pathology. New York: International Universities Press. STEIN, M. 1965 States of Consciousness in the Analytic
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Situation, Including a Note on the Traumatic Dream. Volume 2, pages 60-86 in Max Schur (editor), Drives, Affects, Behavior: Essays in Memory of Marie Bonaparte. New York: International Universities Press. STONE, LEO 1962 The Psychoanalytic Situation: An Examination of Its Development and Essential Nature. New York: International Universities Press. WAELDER, ROBERT 1936 The Principle of the Multiple Functions: Observations on Overdetermination. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 5:45-62. WAELDER, ROBERT 1960 Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. WHITE, ROBERT W. 1963 Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory: A Proposal Regarding Independent Ego Energies. Psychological Issues, Vol. 3, No. 3. New York: International Universities Press. Ill THERAPEUTIC METHODS
The psychoanalytic technique is a method of treating psychoneurosis which is based on uncovering the forces and motives that underlie the patient's symptoms. It originated in a chance discovery made in 1882 by Josef Breuer while treating a severely disturbed hysteric (the famous case of "Anna 0."). When she was in a hypnotic state, this patient would talk to Breuer either spontaneously or in answer to his questions and would recount painful, upsetting events of her life that appeared to relate to elements of her symptoms or to words she would utter while in twilight states. The patient herself called this treatment "chimneysweeping," because each recall of a traumatic event was followed by the disappearance of symptoms related to that event. For instance, her inexplicable terror of drinking water from a glass vanished after she remembered that she had once seen her governess let a lap dog drink out of a glass and that the sight had aroused considerable disgust in her. Freud's development of psychoanalytic therapy In 1889 Freud began to apply this cathartic method, as it was called, to other hysterical patients and was able to confirm Breuer's discovery. Freud and Breuer described their experiences in their Studies on Hysteria (1893-1895). In a later work (1914a), Freud made a record of some additional observations concerning the technique evolved by him. He stressed that for a satisfactory therapeutic result it was essential that the patient remember all traumatic events: the earliest and the most recent, as well as all intermediate ones; moreover, the remembering of traumatic situations had to be accompanied by the re-experiencing and verbal discharge of the affects connected with the
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traumata, affects that had been "strangulated." [See HYPNOSIS; HYSTERIA.] As he continued to treat patients in this way, Freud met with two shortcomings of the cathartic method. Some patients could not be hypnotized; others, although susceptible to hypnosis, experienced only temporary relief of their symptoms. In brief, he found hypnosis an unreliable therapeutic tool. For a short time he experimented with what he called the method of concentration, which consisted in prompting the patient to remember the forgotten events while pressing his hand on the patient's forehead. He described how the patient would respond to this prompting with ideas that occurred to him (free associations), which were either the looked-for traumatic events or some other experiences or thoughts or fantasies or dreams. In these seemingly unrelated associations, Freud soon learned to discern connections, allusions, and hints referring to symptoms, on the one hand, and to some as yet unremembered traumatic situations, on the other. Gradually he became able to guess or to infer, from all this material, the traumata on which the neurosis was based. At this point he developed the framework of what later was to be called the method of interpretation and reconstruction (1900; 1916-1917; 1937«; 1937Z?). At the time he developed this method, Freud made another discovery which was to become fundamental for psychoanalytic technique. His patients had great difficulties in remembering and were reluctant to communicate even seemingly innocuous ideas. Freud concluded that these inner obstacles —-resistances, as he called them, borrowing a term from physics—were in fact the counterpart of the forces that kept the relevant memories and related affects shut off from consciousness. The actual psychoanalytic technique, as we know it today, started when Freud replaced the method of concentration with that of free association. This technique has progressed throughout the past decades, but its essential features were laid down by Freud between 1900 and 1915 (1905a ; 1908; 1909a; 1909k; 1911-1915; 1941a). Freud's gradual development of the method over those years resulted in successive changes in his theoretical views on the etiology and pathogenesis of neuroses. Freud's early ideas on the nature of pathogenic traumatic events were epitomized in his theory of sexual seduction during childhood. The realization that many such sexual traumata had not really occurred, but represented the patient's unconscious fantasies, opened the way to his first discovery of childhood sexuality (1905Z?). Neu-
rotic symptoms were recognized as determined not merely by some fortuitous traumatic event but by an interplay of forces: by pathogenic conflicts between warded-off (repressed) instinctual demands and warding-off (defensive) forces of the ego. The psychoanalytic method strives to make conscious both the warded-off and the wardingoff unconscious elements involved directly or indirectly in the patient's symptoms. It leads to therapeutic results on the basis of this transformation. The investigative and therapeutic aspects of the psychoanalytic method overlap partly, but not to the same extent in each case. Free association. The method of free association expects the patient in analysis to say whatever occurs to him, without "censoring." This is called the basic rule of psychoanalysis. The method leads to a gradual unfolding of preconscious derivatives of the conflicting forces. In practice, this process is initiated by a compact made between the psychoanalyst and his patient: the patient promises complete candor; the analyst, total discretion. That is how Freud (1940) denned the psychoanalytic situatiori. The practical arrangements, consisting of regular and frequent treatment sessions, commonly of fifty minutes' duration and held four to six times per week, with the patient lying on a couch and the analyst seated in a chair behind him, have valid technical reasons. The psychoanalytic process unfolds in the most favorable way under these conditions. The rationale for the method of free association is based on the observation that when conscious, goal-directed thinking is partly relinquished in favor of spontaneously emerging thought contents, part of the habitual defense against preconscious and unconscious material can be bypassed. The analysand's supine position tends to eliminate or weaken a further source of automatic censorship; it facilitates the verbalization of thoughts which would automatically be left unspoken in the usual face-to-face conversation. The result may be that the patient remembers situations he had forgotten, or expresses thoughts that at first seem foreign to him, or that familiar memories appear unexpectedly in a new psychological context. Or again, during some session a number of thoughts and memories may emerge in which the analyst will discern a common theme or denominator. The frequency and relative length of psychoanalytic sessions promote a gradual reactivation of past emotions, fantasies, memories, and thoughts, which are thus made available to the conscious ego of the patient.
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Therapeutic Methods The initial psychoanalytic situation develops into a process of interaction between analyst and patient in which each has a task to perform. The patient gradually learns to comply with the basic rule. The analyst assists him in doing so, learns to understand him, and communicates this understanding to him. It is a lengthy and highly complex procedure, mainly because some derivatives of pathogenic conflicts are, or become, involved in the process of free association itself and interfere with the patient's ability to follow the basic rule. Resistance and transference. The way in which a given analysand observes the basic rule results in a variety of individual modes of free associating. These diverse modes are influenced, above all, by the particular resistances against the basic rule which inevitably emerge in every psychoanalytic treatment. Despite sincere efforts to be candid, patients cannot avoid censoring some of their thoughts. Either they are ashamed or feel guilty about certain actions or wishes, or what occurs to them seems too irrelevant or stupid, too indiscreet or too offensive, to be uttered. At times, they go to any length to avoid expressing such a thought; or they recount it but omit some detail that is essential for its understanding. Or again, they communicate important thoughts or memories in a clinical and impersonal fashion, without being aware of, or able to express, the corresponding affect. And sometimes, although they feel they have very much to tell, they find it impossible even to utter a single word. These inner obstacles (resistances) to free association represent effects of the defensive forces, transferred from the pathogenic conflicts as such onto the psychic material which might reveal them during treatment. The unconscious struggle against bringing the warded-off pathogenic conflicts to consciousness reveals the underlying, unconscious, individually variable trend to preserve the neurosis. Often the thoughts which patients are most reluctant to express have to do with the person of the analyst. The material of the free associations is connected either with the neurosis or with reactions to the analyst, and these reactions, feelings, and general attitude of the patient toward the analyst are so important that the outcome of the treatment may depend upon them. Freud took an essential step in elaborating the psychoanalytic technique when he recognized them as transferences, i.e., as transpositions from an infantile object onto the analyst or as modified unconscious repetitions, in the treatment situation, of early
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warded-off tendencies and experiences, but now with the analyst as object. This objective approach in dealing with the patient's reactions to the analyst has become an essential tool in analyzing those resistances which are of particularly far-reaching influence on the treatment: the so-called transference resistances. These may manifest themselves as direct obstacles to free association or may influence the associations in more subtle ways. For instance, the basic rule may be made inoperative by being taken too literally; it may be used for concealed parody of the analytic treatment or used in various indirect ways to gratify complex, unconscious transference reactions. The diverse transference resistances comprise old defenses and the instinctual demands themselves. Thus they represent a new version of infantile pathogenic conflicts unconsciously relived in the patient's efforts to associate. The genetic approach. The fact that the psychoanalyst understands the patient's reactions toward him as manifestations of transference, and analyzes them from a dynamic as well as an ontogenetic point of view, is referred to as the genetic approach (Hartmann & Kris 1945). It calls for the use of genetic interpretations and of reconstructions of the patient's warded-off past experiences. This genetic approach is particularly prominent in the analyst's work when dealing with those phenomena which constitute a transference neurosis or, better, transferred neurosis; that is, when transferences are no longer isolated manifestations, but a considerable part of the patient's symptoms becomes involved with the person of the analyst or the process of analysis itself. The work of interpreting becomes effective mainly when applied under favorable conditions and in particular ways. An important aspect of the analyst's work consists in working through the resistances which oppose progress and success of the treatment (Freud 1914a; 1914£>). When the patient has difficulties in following the basic rule of free association, the task of the analyst is twofold. He must assist his patient in overcoming these obstacles. On the other hand, he must understand, and help the patient to understand, what they reveal with regard to the neurosis. For example, if he becomes aware that the patient's free associating is hampered by an effort to avoid the expression of hostile thoughts against him, he will point out this conflict and will strive to understand and to interpret it as a modified repetition of similar situations that the patient has encountered with other persons. These actions of
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the analyst further the process of free association, and at the same time affect the patient in a therapeutic sense. Interpretation. The analyst has at his disposal a number of possible interpretations that are characteristic and specific for the psychoanalytic method. In psychoanalysis the term "interpretation" is applied to those explanations which add to the patient's knowledge of what has been warded off in himself. Interpretations aim at both the defensive and the instinctual motivational aspects of the conflict. In the example mentioned above, the interpretation can stress the struggle against aggression (resistance analysis'); it can stress the aggressive (instinctual) character of the wardedoff thought; ultimately, it should encompass both in their genetic perspective. Although Freud had early emphasized the crucial importance of the analysis of resistances (1912(7; 19121?), his major scientific interest for a long time focused on the study of instinctual drives. The psychoanalytic investigation of his patients' pathogenic conflicts led him to important discoveries concerning the repressed (or otherwise warded-off) instinctual impulses. These could be understood as derivatives of the libidinal and aggressive drives. He thus was able to reconstruct the maturational and developmental sequences of those drives in early childhood, as well as the specific types of object relations that correspond to their various developmental stages. The Oedipal phase of development is the best-known example. [See PERSONALITY, article on PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT.] In the course of the treatment, the existence of these drives, and their impact upon the patient's behavior in me past and in the present, are pointed out to him by interpreting his dreams, associations, symptoms. This is often referred to as id interpretation. However, these interpretations alone do not generally enable the patient to become conscious of the drive derivatives in a genuine, therapeutically effective way. They must therefore be preceded or supplemented by an analysis of his resistances, which makes the patient's adult ego better capable of tolerating his hitherto warded-off drives. The therapeutic objective of psychoanalysis is to change the balance of psychic forces that prevailed when the pathogenic conflicts were formed to a new balance better adapted to the patient's adult condition. Both the warded-off and the defensive forces are inaccessible to change so long as they remain unconscious. Hence the importance of analyzing the latter as well and making them conscious.
Elaborations on Freud's initial contribution Since Freud laid down the principles of psychoanalytic technique, our knowledge both of normal psychic functioning and of mental illness has grown considerably, and progress in psychoanalytic technique proper has been made. Many analysts have contributed to this technical progress and refinement. Of the many, I should like to mention only a few: Freud, in his papers "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937«) and "Constructions in Analysis" (1937Z?); Ferenczi (19081933); Ferenczi and Rank (1924); Abraham (1907-1925); Nunberg (1920-1942). Other books are devoted entirely to psychoanalytic technique: Glover (1928); Lorand (1946); Menninger (1958); Nacht (1950); Alexander and French (1946). Ego psychology. A particularly important development in psychoanalysis was the introduction of ego psychology. The scientific basis for a systematic, effective analysis of resistances (defenses) had been lacking before Freud's reformulation, in the 1920s, of certain fundamental propositions. The new theoretical concepts he advanced at that period laid the ground for a psychoanalytic ego psychology. Most important for the progress of analytic technique were his new formulations referring to unconscious defenses of the ego, to unconscious self-critical or self-punitive forces (the superego), and to anxiety as a signal operating as a trigger of defenses (1923; 1926). Technical innovations based on Freud's theoretical reformulations were introduced by Wilhelm Reich (1933) and in a particularly fruitful way by Anna Freud. The application of ego psychology to psychoanalytic technique was further elaborated by such authors as Fenichel (1941); Hartmann (1951); Hoffer (1954); Kris (1951; 1956fl; 1956k; 1956c); Loewenstein (1951a; 19511?; 1954; 1956; 1957; 1958; 1963); Nacht (1951); Stewart (1961). The importance of the defenses of the ego has influenced the analyst's approach to the patient's free association. In the treatment situation the analyst thus pays attention not only to the material emerging when the patient follows the basic rule but equally to his struggles against it (Anna Freud 1936). The latter tend to reveal the characteristics of particular mechanisms of defense. For instance, whether a patient reacts to a hidden aggressive impulse against the analyst with fear of punishment, with exaggerated solicitude, with sudden silence, or in some other way may disclose a great deal about the character of his relevant defenses against aggression, not only in the present but also
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Therapeutic Methods in the past, and hence shed light on their role in his pathogenic conflicts. Thorough understanding of an individual patient's defensive mechanisms, and of their impact upon his neurosis, his general behavior, and the course of his analysis, is as important as the understanding of his instinctual drives. [See DEFENSE MECHANISMS.] The functions of the ego are not limited to defensive mechanisms; some are relatively independent of the disturbing influence of drive derivatives. This has an important bearing on psychoanalytic technique, for the patient's ability to associate, to recover childhood memories, to gain insight, rests upon the autonomy of the relevant ego functions (Hartmann 1939). Their roles in the psychoanalytic process are of paramount significance (Hartmann 1951; Kris 1951; 1956a; 1956b; Loewenstein 1951a; 1951b; 1957; 1963). Sources of resistance. In Freud's earliest formulation, the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis had been attributed to the recall of forgotten traumatic events and to trie abreaction of strangulated affects. That assumption has long since been discarded. Current psychoanalytic theory sees the major therapeutic agent in the overcoming of resistances and in the bringing to consciousness of warded-off material: recovery of memories, reestablishment of disrupted connections, gaining of insight. Psychoanalytic treatment must overcome many obstacles in order to achieve satisfactory results (Bibring 1937). Resistances to cure originate in the three "systems" of the psychic apparatus—the ego, the id, and the superego—and in external reality as well. Rigidity, primitiveness, and the relative strength of defensive mechanisms represent the major part of observable resistances. Also, in most instances, the patient's ego derives advantage from his neurosis (epinosic, or "secondary" gain), causing him to cling to it, which can be a serious hindrance (Freud 1926). Such disturbances of specific autonomous ego functions impair analyzability (Hartmann 1951). The strength and tenacity of pregenital components of the instinctual drives and, conversely, the weakness of their genital components constitute barriers to cure. These quantitative factors in the id must be considered in relation to the strength of the ego and not in terms of absolute values (Freud 1937a; 1937fo). Unconscious self-punitive demands of the superego often play a decisive role among the resistances to cure. While somatic illness usually
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activates or complicates neurosis, it produces the opposite effect in a category of patients known as moral masochists. Their neurotic symptoms disappear when they are affected by a somatic disease. Once well again physically, they relapse into their neurosis. In these cases one can best observe the so-called negative therapeutic reaction (Freud 1923). Social, cultural, and economic conditions can contribute to neurotic illness in some cases, to favorable conflict resolution in others. Familial circumstances especially may hold the balance in this respect. The momentous impact of parental behavior upon psychic development in childhood is well known. But also the presence or absence of neurotic disorder in other members of the family, or in the patient's husband or wife, may prove decisive for the outcome of an analytic treatment. The recent advances in our knowledge, briefly outlined above, have not changed the technique of psychoanalysis itself. Rather, they have led to some shifts of emphasis and considerable refinements in its use. These modifications have broadened the applicability of psychoanalytic treatment and have improved its efficacy. In many instances, they can make the difference between failure and success. Originally, psychoanalysis was found effective exclusively in the treatment of symptom neuroses in adults. Its successful use in treating the neuroses of children and adolescents opened up an important area for psychoanalytic therapy. Except for some changes in the procedure, e.g., substitution of the play technique for free association, the method in child analysis is basically the same as in the treatment of adults (see Anna Freud 1936). The application of psychoanalysis to an ever greater variety of behavioral disorders, even to psychoses, produce striking results but also a number of disappointing failures. Many patients, and some analysts as well, set their aims too high. They expect psychoanalysis to achieve not merely a cure of neurotic illness, or even the emergence of a new and better personality, but—above all— lasting happiness for the patient. These hopes have obviously not been realized. The widening scope of analytic treatment led, in its turn, to a greatly increased use of psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. The dividing line may be tenuous at times, but most forms of psychotherapy differ technically from psychoanalysis in rationale as well as in practical use. However, virtually all contemporary forms of psychotherapy draw to some degree upon psychoanalysis,
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PSYCHOANALYSIS: Therapeutic Methods
either as a method or as a body of knowledge. Psychoanalysis has enriched and profoundly influenced the entire fields of psychiatry and psychology. RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN [Directly related is the entry INTERVIEWING, article on THERAPEUTIC INTERVIEWING. Other relevant material may be found in CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, especially the article On PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT; NEUROSIS; PSYCHIATRY; and in the biographies of ABRAHAM; ALEXANDER; FERENCZI; FREUD; RANK; REICH.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY ABRAHAM, KARL (1907-1925) 1953-1955 Selected Papers. 2 vols. New York: Basic Books. -> Papers and essays translated from the German, including Abraham's more important psychoanalytic works. ALEXANDER, FRANZ; and FRENCH, THOMAS M. 1946 Psychoanalytic Therapy: Principles and Application. New York: Ronald. BIBRING, EDWARD 1937 Versuch einer allgemeinen Theorie der Heilung. Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse 23:18-37. FENICHEL, OTTO 1941 Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique. New York: Psychoanalytic Quarterly. FERENCZI, SANDOR (1908-1914) 1952 First Contributions to Psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth. -> A selection of Ferenczi's essays originally published in German. First published in English as Contributions to Psycho-analysis. FERENCZI, SANDOR (1908-1925)1927 Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-analysis. New York: Liveright. -> A collection of some of Ferenczi's most important contributions to psychoanalysis. Translated from the German. FERENCZI, SANDOR (1908-1933) 1955 Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth. -* Contains Ferenczi's papers, translated from the German, that were written after 1926, «s well as papers, fragments, and notes published posthumously. FERENCZI, SANDOR; and RANK, OTTO (1924) 1925 The Development of Psychoanalysis. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs. -> First published as Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse. FREUD, ANNA (1936) 1957 The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York: International Universities Press. -> First published as Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen. FREUD, SIGMUND (1895-1926) 1953— The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Worhs of Sigmund Freud. 24 vols. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published in German. Twentythree volumes have been published as of 1967. FREUD, SIGMUND (1897-1902) 1954 The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes, 1887-1902. New York: Basic Books. -> Translated from the German. FREUD, SIGMUND (1900) 1953 The Interpretation of Dreams. Volumes 4-5 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1905a) 1953 Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Volume 7, pages 3-122 in
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1905b) 1953 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Volume 7, pages 123-245 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1908) 1955 From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Volume 17, pages 3-122 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1909a) 1955 Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy. Volume 10, pages 3-149 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1909&) 1953 Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis. Volume 10, pages 151-249 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1911-1915) 1953 Papers on Technique. Volume 12, pages 85-173 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1912a) 1953 The Dynamics of Transference. Volume 12, pages 97-108 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1912b) 1953 Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-analysis. Volume 12, pages 109-120 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1914a) 1957 On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement. Volume 14, pages 7-66 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1914&) 1953 Remembering, Repeating and Working-through (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-analysis II). Volume 12, pages 145-156 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1916-1917) 1953 Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis. Part III: General Theory of the Neuroses. Volume 16 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1923) 1961 The Ego and the Id. Volume 19, pages 12-63 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1926) 1959 Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Volume 20, pages 77-178 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1937a) 1959 Analysis Terminable and Interminable. Volume 5, pages 316-357 in Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers. International Psychoanalytic Library, No. 10. New York: Basic Books; London: Hogarth. -> First published as Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse.
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Experimental Studies FREUD, SIGMUND (1937Z?) 1959 Constructions in Analysis. Volume 5, pages 358-371 in Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers. International Psycho-analytic Library, No. 10. New York: Basic Books; London: Hogarth. ~> First published in German. FREUD, SIGMUND (1940) 1949 An Outline of Psychoanalysis. New York: Norton. FREUD, SIGMUND (1893-1895) 1955 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume 2: Studies on Hysteria, by Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. GLOVER, EDWARD (1928) 1955 The Technique of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. GREENACRE, PHYLLIS 1956 Re-evaluation of the Process of Working Through. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 37:439-444. HARTMANN, HEINZ (1939) 1958 Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation. New York: International Universities Press. -> First published in German in the Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse und Imago. HARTMANN, HEINZ 1951 Technical Implications of Ego Psychology. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 20:31-43. HARTMANN, HEINZ; and KRIS, ERNST 1945 The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 1:11-30. HOFFER, W. 1954 Defensive Process and Defensive Organization: Their Place in Psycho-analytic Technique. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 35: 194-198. KRIS, ERNST 1951 Ego Psychology and Interpretation in Psychoanalytic Therapy. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 20: 15-30. KRIS, ERNST 1956a On Some Vicissitudes of Insight in Psycho-analysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 37:445-455. KRIS, ERNST 1956& The Recovery of Childhood Memories in Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 11:54-88. KRIS, ERNST 1956c The Personal Myth: A Problem in Psychoanalytic Technique. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 4:653-681. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1951a The Problem of Interpretation. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 20:1-14. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1951b Ego Development and Psychoanalytic Technique. American Journal of Psychiatry 107:617-622. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1954 Some Remarks on Defences, Autonomous Ego and Psycho-analytic Technique. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 35: 188-193. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1956 Some Remarks on the Role of Speech in Psycho-analytic Technique. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 37:460-468. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1957 Some Thoughts on Interpretation in the Theory and Practice of Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 12:127150. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1958 Remarks on Some Variations in Psycho-analytic Technique. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 39:202-210. LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. 1963 Some Considerations on Free Association. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 11:451-473. LORAND, SANDOR 1946 Technique of Psychoanalytic Therapy. New York: International Universities Press.
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MENNINGER, KARL A. 1958 Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique. New York: Basic Books. NACHT, SACHA 1950 De la pratique a la theorie psychanalytique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. NACHT, SACHA 1951 Les nouvelles theories psychanalytiques sur le moi et leurs repercussions sur 1'orientation methodologique. Revue francaise de psychanalyse 15:569-576. NUNBERG, HERMANN (1920-1942) 1948 Practice and Theory of Psychoanalysis: A Collection of Essays. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs. REICH, WILHELM (1933) 1961 Character-analysis. 3d ed., enl. New York: Noonday Press. -» First published in German. STEWART, WALTER 1961 The Development of the Therapeutic Alliance in Borderline Patients. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 30:165-166. IV EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
The impact of Sigmund Freud upon psychology and the social sciences generally has been very great. Freud is to be compared with other great figures in the history of science over the last century such as Darwin, Pavlov, and Einstein. His observations and discoveries about people, brilliantly set forth, assure him a place in history regardless of the changes that may be wrought in the theories that he proposed. The clarification of the place of psychoanalytic facts and theories within the social sciences must rest eventually on their absorption into the social sciences after they have been reconstructed and validated in their new form. Such reconstruction and validation can take place by applying the methods of empirical study, model building, and hypothesis testing already familiar within these fields, or perhaps by new methods invented to deal with the subtleties of the clinical interaction between analyst and patient. Historical background Psychoanalysis has a special history because it was dominated for such a long time by Sigmund Freud, who began theory construction at the very start of his career and fought the social battles for recognition. There had been defections from the ranks during his lifetime by such early favorites as Adler, Jung, and Rank, so that the central core of psychoanalysis was defined by and remained dominated by Freud. During his lifetime a unity within a developing theory could be maintained by accepting his leadership; after his death those who remained in the mainstream of psychoanalysis felt they needed to be free to modify their views, as Freud would have done were he still alive, but they felt some obligation to show that they followed Freud's main teachings in reference to
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PSYCHOANALYSIS.- Experimental Studies
both method and theory, enough at least to preserve unity among themselves. This inevitably resulted in a certain amount of in-group rigidity and out-group antagonism, understandable in view of the social history of psychoanalysis during Freud's lifetime. Within institutionalized psychoanalysis the main cleavage has come between those who hold to the instinct theory and the universality of the Oedipus complex, on the one hand, and those who believe in the relatively greater importance of sociocultural influences and learning, on the other. There are some consequences for research that lie in the history of psychoanalysis as a movement. Earlier psychoanalysts, whose motivations were primarily therapeutic and who were untrained in the use of experimental methods in the investigation of psychoanalytic phenomena, tended to disparage the use of such methods. Some still do, believing that the essence of psychoanalysis is displayed only in the continuous relationship between the patient and analyst, resting upon free association in the context of transference. For them, special research on psychoanalysis is often believed to be unnecessary, and simulation of psychoanalysis outside the patient-therapist relationship is thought to be either trivial or misleading. Because of their commitment to the method of psychoanalysis, younger psychoanalysts familiar with research methods seldom turn their attention to psychoanalysis as being itself in need of investigation, but instead study psychotherapy, which is less codified, or turn to topical investigations which do not question the central tenets of psychoanalysis. Those who favor an examination of the role of sociocultural influences are likely to select their problems ±nore as anthropologists or sociologists select theirs. Now that many years have passed since Freud's death, there are signs that these institutional influences upon research are lessening. However, the official institutes for the training of psychoanalysts have as yet given relatively little attention to research; for example, in a careful account of training in psychoanalysis in the United States (Lewin & Ross 1960), only 4 of 460 pages were devoted to research, and it was reported that only 3 of the 14 institutes had brought research at all prominently into the training pattern. The task of consolidating psychoanalysis as a science will continue to call for the collaboration of others if it is to move ahead with any rapidity. The others who have interested themselves in psychoanalytic research are primarily psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists, each with his own methods and preoccupations. There was great enthusiasm for investigating psychoanalytic
problems after World War n, and a number of social scientists underwent both personal analyses and training in the psychoanalytic institutes in order to qualify themselves better for such research. However, as pointed out by Shakow (1962), in the early 1960s there was evidence of a growing dissatisfaction and disenchantment with psychoanalysis even on the part of persons fundamentally sympathetic to it. He believed that these reactions were due to the relative absence of research and scholarly activity around psychoanalysis proper, with the result that psychoanalysis was not attracting its share of "the restless souls with questioning minds who were attracted to it in the early days." Shakow recommended that serious consideration be given to the psychoanalytic education of social and behavioral scientists for research. Psychoanalysis, as a body of facts and theories about behavior and about therapy, cannot have any official spokesmen. The facts and theories are in the public domain, to be studied by any who are interested and competent. Therefore, one interested in psychoanalysis as science need not be concerned about the problems within psychoanalysis as a movement, although it is inevitable that the attitudes of the official psychoanalysts will make the field more or less inviting as an area in which to do research or in which to make a research career. Psychoanalytic observation as research Kris (1947) distinguished between the validation of psychoanalytic propositions through psychoanalytic observation and other "objective methods." He pointed out that the total course of the association between observer and subject provides the equivalent of an experimental setting which permits the testing of long-range predictions; each interview, he said, potentially provides a number of opportunities for the testing of forecasts. The simplest examples of confirmatory evidence are given through interpretations that help the subject to fill in gaps of recall, later confirmed by evidence for the veridicality of the recall. Thus FrenkelBrunswik (1940) reported an illustration from her own analysis in which the analyst interpreted her reactions as a "Cordelia motive," referring to the youngest daughter of King Lear, who, while the most deserving, lost favor to the other daughters who were more flattering to him. She denied having ever read King Lear and at first refused the interpretation, but she later discovered that at the age of 15 she had copied all of Cordelia's lines. Thus we have evidence of repression and support for an analytic reconstruction. Kris recognized
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Experimental Studies that Freud had used this method successfully on himself, although he saw that there were many issues within psychoanalysis that did not get resolved by psychoanalytic observations and required other methods. Kubie (1953), while recognizing many contributions of psychoanalytic observation to basic science, detailed the following limitations within current psychoanalysis as a scientific research method: limitations with respect to the gathering of primary data, conceptual limitations and ambiguities, lack of quantitative methods of validation, lack of control groups, and deficiencies in specific instruments for measuring many of the processes whose interplay lies at the heart of psychoanalytic theory. Freud's observations within psychoanalysis (including his own) served as the sole basis for his many insights, and doubtless fresh insights will continue to come from such observations by other psychoanalysts. In view of the limitations noted by both Kris and Kubie, however, it is essential that these observations be supplemented by data of a different kind if psychoanalytic science is to progress. Appropriateness of experimental investigation. A full-fledged psychoanalysis is such a rich and complex process that dissecting out parts of it for special study presents hazards. According to Rapaport, most of those who tried to test psychoanalytic theory either did not understand it or they ignored what they knew: "The overwhelming majority of experiments designed to test psychoanalytic propositions display a blatant lack of interest in the meaning, within the theory of psychoanalysis, of the propositions tested" (1959, p. 142). Although the warning should be heeded that psychoanalysis must be understood if relevant experiments are to be designed, there are ample precedents for gaining insight into psychoanalysis outside the analytic hour itself. While Freud was in no sense an experimentalist, he set the stage for considering observations made outside the analytic hour not only in his Psychopathology of Everyday Life but also in his analyses of historical figures, such as Leonardo da Vinci. It is in the nature of experimental science that it must abstract from the totality of actual events and thus lose some of the richness of events in nature. This applies as inevitably to psychoanalytic investigations as to other kinds of scientific research. The problem confronting the investigator is not that of being made to study everything at once, but of being careful not to simplify his conditions in such a way as to sacrifice relevance to significant aspects of theory. Experimental tests of the
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Freudian theory of repression illustrate these problems. Early investigators, doing what Rapaport said others have done, oversimplified the theory by making it assert that anything pleasant is favored in recall over anything unpleasant. Hence they tested whether the words "quinine" and "bitter" would be forgotten more readily than "sugar" and "sweet" from a list containing these and affectively neutral words. Zeller (1951), representative of later experimenters, created a paradigm for inducing repression through experienced failure and then lifted the repression, thus coming much closer to psychoanalytic theory. Others have gone on to show that there are individual differences, so that the circumstances which produce repression for one subject do not do so for others (e.g., Truax 1957). With such refinements, experiments gradually become more sophisticated and relevant. Not all aspects of psychoanalysis are open to experimental inquiry, but the ingenuity of investigators has opened up areas of study that at first seemed unpromising. Thus it has not proved possible to assert in advance which propositions were most suitable for study. Because psychoanalysis is not an internally consistent and highly integrated theory, the investigator has had to choose which propositions to test or has had to formulate as best he could a few precise propositions for testing. The purpose of experimental study is not only to test or validate the theoretical structure as it now stands, but also to correct and refine it. A scientific psychoanalysis, developed from and supported by controlled investigations, doubtless will differ in some respects from contemporary psychoanalytic theory. There is by now a sizable literature showing that many workers have been able to formulate testable propositions on the basis of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Freud was raised in the scientific tradition of Hermann von Helmholtz and Ernst Briicke that made him propose psychoanalysis in a form such that much of it is subject to test, at least in principle. That is, it is stated as a deterministic system with lawful relationships expressed in terms of force and energy. While these force and energy concepts have proved troublesome in trying to conceptualize psychoanalysis, they are to be contrasted, for example, with the romanticism and mysticism of Jung. The differences between Freud and Jung are somewhat comparable to the differences between Darwin and Lamarck. Thus Darwin's position, unlike that of Lamarck, permitted the congenial development of the mathematical approach
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PSYCHOANALYSIS: Experimental Studies
of modern genetics to the problems of evolution, although Darwin was not himself mathematical. In a somewhat similar sense, Freud, in contrast to Jung, expressed his theories in a form that makes possible experimental testing, although he was not an experimentalist. [See ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY and the biography of JUNG.] Some representative empirical approaches In dealing with experimental studies of psychoanalysis, emphasis need not be placed on a narrow definition of experiment; the main point is that some aspects of psychoanalysis are open to empirical studies done in the spirit of experimental science—that is, using methods that are objective, quantitative, and controlled. For example, when apparatus is attached to the patient in order to measure physiological changes associated with verbally expressed anxiety, this approximates an experiment, even though the interaction between the therapist and patient is not experimentally manipulated. In what follows, instead of organizing experimental studies around an outline of psychoanalytic propositions, nine disparate approaches to the investigation of psychoanalysis—as both a theory of behavior and a therapeutic technique—are used to illustrate the possibilities open for research. Within each of these, one or more specimen studies are cited. The study of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The recording of what goes on within psychoanalysis by means of electromagnetic tape or sound motion pictures has opened up psychoanalysis for detailed study. It yields more precise and detailed observations than would otherwise be possible, and the data can be used for hypothesis testing, thus approaching the conditions of experimental investigation. One illustration of subsequent analyses of two recorded psychotherapeutic interviews is provided in a symposium in which psycholinguistic aspects of the communication between therapist and patient were studied in relation to some physiological changes that were also recorded (American Psychiatric Association 1961). A number of related studies have not yet come to fruition. The data obtained by appropriate recording techniques are not only detailed and accurate, but they are also in permanent form and can be reviewed for various purposes. Various content analyses are possible (based, for example, on typetoken ratios, silences, kinesic and other paralinguistic features, dyadic interactions, the effects of interpretations). It is possible to place the coded
material, with various transitional probabilities, into a computer and then test hypotheses by asking questions of the computer. One of the unresolved problems in this kind of study is the degree to which the analysis should be microscopic or macroscopic (thematic). To some extent, each analytic hour has a "topic," and it may be that this will in some cases be lost in the detailed linguistic analysis. The answers will not come a priori but only after much work has been done to find the methods most fully appropriate to the subject matter under investigation. Care has to be taken not to obtain so much data that there is an information overload upon the investigator; selectivity with due regard for objectivity and criteria of relevance will have to be worked out here as in all quantitative investigations. Outcome versus process studies. An important distinction has to be made within studies of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy between outcome studies and process studies. While there is a place for outcome studies ("What proportion of the treated patients improve or get well?"), these are extremely difficult to do in the case of psychotherapy, for a great many reasons: (1) Diagnosis of the severity of the presenting symptoms can be made on a quantitative basis with only the greatest of difficulty. For one thing, a patient who appears more severely disturbed may be in a temporary crisis that would disappear spontaneously, while another patient who appears less disturbed may have a deep-seated character disorder very resistant to change. A long-standing illness, which is usually more difficult to cure than one of more recent origin, may be brought to the therapist's attention because for some reason the patient is now ready to be cured and presents himself for treatment at a time when the therapeutic result can be quickly achieved. (2) Estimates of degree of improvement are hard to obtain, even with careful follow-ups, for the patient and his relatives are subject to the same difficulties in estimating improvement that the therapist faces in diagnosing severity of ailment. (3) The degree of skill of the therapist and his appropriateness for the given patient are not sufficiently stated by a record of his training or by a knowledge of the general method that he claims to use. (4) Appropriate control groups of patients with similar severity of symptoms treated either by other methods, or not treated at all, are hard to establish. The reported success of easier and superficially more objective therapies, such as the so-called behavior therapies, have to be judged against the successes of all sorts
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Experimental Studies of magical and faith cures that take place without the benefit of science. Although outcome studies are difficult, improved ones are very much needed to establish the therapeutic value of alternative therapies. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article on BEHAVIOR THERAPY.] Studies of process, that is, of movement (whether progressive or regressive) taking place within and between psychotherapeutic sessions, are at present much more promising, although these too are hard to design and the results yielded to date are not very striking. In the careful study by Bellak and Smith (1956) of progress in therapy, it was found that the judges were in substantial agreement about the patients, but what they agreed on was the persisting personality structure of the patients, not the dynamic changes taking place as therapy progressed. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article On PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT.]
Miniaturized procedures with nonpatients. Rather than study the records of a patient in psychoanalysis, it is possible to select out certain features, such as free association, and study them. A start in this direction was made by Colby (1960a), who had a subject free associate alone with a tape recorder and then with a silent observer present; the differences in the subject's productions were noted. A number of possible parameters come to mind: sitting up, lying down, facing or not facing the therapist, note taking and recording, the number of days between sessions, having parallel sessions of husband and wife, mother and child. Many of these focal points recur in treatises on psychoanalytic method, but few have been put to actual comparative tests. The early studies of Masserman (Masserman & Yum 1946) show how aspects of therapy can be studied through the treatment of experimentally induced neuroses in animals, particularly aspects of "working through" in the overcoming of fears, and aspects of the influence of drugs (alcohol) in relation to conflict. While these studies are limited when done with nonverbal subjects, they pose some searching questions for psychoanalysis. For example, if the experimental neurosis can indeed be defined as a neurosis, it raises doubts about a very central psychoanalytic dictum, namely, that the Oedipus complex constitutes the nuclear complex of every neurosis. Hypnosis as a means of study. The fact that psychoanalysis grew out of Freud's experience with hypnosis, of which the psychoanalytic couch is a historical residual, makes the bridges between
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what happens in hypnosis and what happens in psychoanalysis easy to construct. Although Freud turned his back upon hypnosis early in his career, other psychoanalysts have continued to see its relevance. Two illustrations may serve to show some of the many experimental possibilities. Some psychoanalysts, particularly Franz Alexander, have proposed what has been called the specificity hypothesis regarding psychosomatic symptoms—that is, that under defined kinds of stress some people will give symptoms of one kind while others will yield different symptoms. Using hypnosis, Graham, Stern, and Winokur (1958) induced differential attitudes hypothesized as appropriate to Raynaud's disease and to urticaria (hives) in subjects not suffering these ailments. When these subjects were placed under stress, the physiological responses were indeed found to be the ones more nearly appropriate to the ailment corresponding to the induced attitude. In somewhat related experiments, Kehoe and Ironside (1963) produced depressive reactions under hypnosis and then studied both the gastric secretions and other correlates of the experimentally evoked depression. The possible services of hypnosis in the study of various motivational and psychodynamic problems have been reviewed by Hilgard [1964; see also HYPNOSIS]. Psychophysiological studies. In establishing a functional system, Freud somewhat reluctantly turned away from the neurophysiology in which he was trained, which he had used extensively and not unwisely in his early theorizing. At a number of times, however, Freud indicated that he hoped eventually for a physiological basis for psychoanalysis (e.g., 1920). Some contemporary investigators in the field of psychoanalysis believe that the time is now ripe to provide a better neurophysiological anchorage for psychoanalytic propositions, and their research endeavors illustrate this concern. Weiner and others (1957) were able to predict which of a number of inductees would become peptic ulcer casualties as a result of the strains of military service. They used data on serum pepsinogens in defining the sample, and then, using psychological information alone, predicted that ten cases among a much larger number would be most likely to develop ulcers during basic training. Of these, seven had proven ulcers before the end of training; of the remaining inductees in the sample, only two developed ulcers. Hence, the psychological tests not only had picked out the promising cases but had missed very few.
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PSYCHOANALYSIS: Experimental Studies
The psychological factors emphasized as predisposing to ulcers were an intense need to maintain relations with others, a need to please and placate authority figures, and fears of expressing hostility or of experiencing loss. The newer physiological methods of studying dreams have made possible another contact between experiment and psychoanalysis. Thus the function of dreams as tension reducers is supported by studies of dream deprivation in which the sleeper "catches up" by dreaming more frequently on nights following those during which his dreaming has been interrupted [Dement I960; see also DREAMS and PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS]. Studies of motivational conflicts. Psychoanalysis can be considered a motivational psychology with primary emphasis upon motivational conflicts and their consequences. These areas lend themselves well to experimental study, including animal studies. One of the experimental studies of the derivatives of conflicting motives is that of Clark (1952), in which he aroused sexual motives by displaying nude pictures to college students and studied the overt and symbolic expression of sex under various conditions, including mild intoxication at a fraternity beer party. He found that anxiety under ordinary circumstances (for example, being in a college classroom) inhibited manifest sexual expression but gave rise to increased symbolic expression of sex; the reverse occurred under the influence of alcohol—that is, there was more manifest sexual expression and less symbolic expression [see CONFLICT, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; MOTIVATION].
Studies of cognitive processes. There is by now a large literature based upon tachistoscopic perception and related methods, much of it motivated by an interest in psychoanalytic concepts. Many of the studies on tachistoscopic perception relevant to psychoanalysis were reviewed by Charles Fisher in the introduction to a monograph translating two classical studies (Potzl et al. 1960). We may take as representative of these the study by Paul and Fisher (1959) which investigated the hypothesis that the exposure of a figured visual stimulus below the level of awareness would produce images that would reflect, both directly and in transformed ways, the influence of the stimulus, its meanings, and its forms. The experimental procedure was to expose a simple double-profile figure within a circular outline at 1/1CO of a second, slightly out of focus; this alternated with the exposure of a blank slide. After each exposure the subject was asked to draw whatever images
came to mind. These drawings were then sorted by a number of experienced judges as more likely to have followed the figured stimulus or the blank one. The judges were only moderately successful, but taken together the results were highly significant statistically, indicating some influence from the exposed figure. From the published figures it is evident that there was little direct representation of the exact figure as exposed; the most directly representative figures consisted of overlapping or multiple circles. Some degree of transformation would, of course, be implied by psychoanalytic theory as well as by other theories [see ATTENTION and PERCEPTION, article on UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION]. Studies of learning and retention. The concept of motivated forgetting is represented in psychoanalysis through some aspects of repression, in which memories, while active, are not available to direct recall. Clemes (1964) gave a Kent-Rosanoff test to subjects of known hypnotic susceptibility in order to find the words which in the normal waking state were affect-laden and caused difficulties in response ("complex indicators"), such as long reaction times. He hypothesized that these words should be appropriate targets for repression relative to words more neutral for the subject. He tested the hypothesis by constructing for each subject a list of words to be memorized, half neutral and half affect-laden for him. The list was memorized under hypnosis, and then the suggestion was given that half the words would be forgotten (posthypnotic amnesia) until a release signal was given. Counting only the words that fitted the paradigm of repression (temporarily forgotten but recovered), he found that these were disproportionately the target words selected on the basis of the word association test. Thus hypnosis served conveniently to test an appropriate hypothesis about repression. A study of associative priming by Schwartz and Rouse (1961) illustrates another convergence between research formulated within a psychoanalytic frame of reference and the kinds of study generally familiar within the laboratories of academic psychology. These investigators found, for example, that in a test of immediate memory words that were forgotten had nevertheless "primed" their associates, so that the associated words were selected beyond chance expectation on a subsequent recognition test from which the original stimulus words were omitted. Thus their results bear on free association in relation to recall, as
PSYCHOANALYSIS: Experimental Studies well as upon the experimental psychology of learning, recall, and recognition. Maturation and development. Psychoanalysis is also a developmental psychology. The formal theory of psychosexual stages is well known, with the child experiencing and coping with various stages of development on the way to maturity (the characteristics of each of which have been correlated under the general headings termed oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital stages). The addition of the psychosocial stages by Erikson (1959) has enriched the theory, showing that eventually early identifications become welded into either a healthy or a pathological identity. He also carried the scheme through adolescence into later maturity. Erikson's psychosocial scheme is an appealing one, but so far it has received essentially literary treatment; it needs both theoretical and empirical clarification [see IDENTITY, PSYCHOSOCIAL]. The success with which Whiting and Child (1953) were able to predict, on the basis of reported child-rearing practices, certain beliefs about illness on the part of adults in many nonliterate cultures gives some support to the significance of early childhood in shaping personality structure. Of course, these same children are brought up by the very adults who trained them in childhood, so that the impact of their training is not over once and for all. A learning-theory interpretation fits the facts as well as a psychoanalytic one, and indeed, Whiting and Child use such an interpretation. Yet the influences they chose to study (feeding, toilet training, sex, aggression, dependency) have their origins in psychoanalytic modes of thought. The corresponding animal studies, initiated by Hunt (1941), showed that white rats which experienced early feeding frustration hoarded food excessively later on, when new frustrations presumably reactivated the early patterns of insecurity. The attempts to support psychoanalytic conceptions about the importance of breast feeding, weaning, toilet training, and the like have led to somewhat equivocal results, with Orlansky (1949) concluding from his review of cross-cultural data that the ground plan of formal psychosexual stages through which infantile libidinal drives are channeled is less satisfactory than some sort of sociocultural interpretation. However, it is clear that the answers have not all been found, and psychoanalysis has made an abiding contribution by calling attention to the significance of the early years and of appropriate mothering to personality
43
development [see PERSONALITY, article on PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT; SOCIALIZATION]. Personality structure, defenses, and cognitive styles. Psychoanalytic personality theory assumes that in the course of his history (particularly, but not exclusively, early history), the individual achieves a personality structure which is relatively stable. If some kinds of influences are extreme, a personality "syndrome" such as anal compulsivity may emerge, with the triad of traits—-orderliness, stinginess, and obstinacy (Sears 1943). Another such syndrome is said to be the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950). These personality structures are relatively stable, but may change slowly, as within a successful psychoanalysis. [See PERSONALITY, POLITICAL, article on CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM.]
Empirical assessment of personality structures, cognitive styles, defense preferences, and coping mechanisms has assumed large proportions, one evidence of it being the prominence of projective tests (Rorschach inkblots, the Thematic Apperception Test, Blacky dog pictures) designed to reveal aspects of the personality structure not always manifested in outward behavior [see DEFENSE MECHANISMS]. The literature on cognitive styles is represented by Witkin and others (1962) and by Gardner and others (1959). Witkin and his associates have been concerned with field dependency and field independency, aspects of cognition with personality correlates. Gardner and his associates have given more emphasis to such distinctions as that between the sensitizers and the levelers. While these studies have a background in gestalt conceptions as well as in psychoanalytic ones, what makes them relevant to psychoanalysis is their demonstration that personality structure and momentary needs affect cognitive activity. This is, of course, a prominent conception in psychoanalysis—as, for example, in rationalization and projection. Studies of a more ecological character are also possible, as in the investigations of differences in defense preferences of children of blue-collar workers and white-collar workers (Miller & Swanson 1960). It is difficult to intervene experimentally in the upbringing of children to study the longterm effects, but it is possible to capitalize upon some naturally occurring events which produce similar data to those that would be obtained from a controlled experiment. One such naturally occurring event is the loss in childhood of a parent through death. The consequence of such a loss can be studied in groups as though an experiment had
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PSYCHOANALYSIS: Experimental Studies
been undertaken to see what happens to the child if a parent is permanently removed. Such studies have been done and through a combination of statistical and clinical observations have reached two major conclusions. First, the age at which a mother has been lost in childhood provides a target date for personality disturbance or mental illness, the illness being triggered when the child who suffered loss has grown to adulthood and has a child of the age at which the loss occurred (J. R. Hilgard & Newman 1959). Second, the incidences of certain mental illnesses, particularly schizophrenia, are related to these losses of a parent in childhood (J. R. Hilgard & Newman 1961). Such studies give support to the role of parents in normal personality development and to the reactivation at times of adult crisis of the stresses associated with periods of deprivation in childhood. Because too many inferences are involved it is not possible to draw up a Scoreboard to mark the successes and failures of experiments in validating psychoanalytic propositions. However, those nonpsychoanalysts who have summarized experimental investigations of psychoanalytic theories have found a great deal of the evidence favorable to psychoanalysis (Blum 1953; Farrell 1951; Hilgard 1952; Hilgard & Bower 1966; Sarnoff 1962; Sears 1943). Unfortunately they have not been able to point to many experimental findings that have clarified and strengthened psychoanalysis, or, indeed, that have had much impact on either its theories or its practices. The full impact of experiment will not be felt until psychoanalysis is moved forward and enriched by the results that are reported. Experimental studies cannot be expected to do all the work of theoretical reconstruction as psychoanalysis advances and becomes assimilated within social science, but the interaction between experiment and theory should prove to be a vital part of that reconstruction. ERNEST R. HILGARD [Directly related are the entries EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; MENTAL DISORDERS, article on EXPERIMENTAL STUDY. Other relevant material may be found in FANTASY; INTERVIEWING, article on THERAPEUTIC INTERVIEWING; OBSERVATION; PROJECTIVE METHODS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ADORNO, THEODOR W. et al. 1950 The Authoritarian Personality. American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series, No. 3. New York: Harper. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 1961 Comparative Psycholinguistic Analysis of Two Psychotherapeutic Interviews. New York: International Universities Press.
BELLAK, LEOPOLD 1961 Research in Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 30:519-548. BELLAK, LEOPOLD; and SMITH, M. BREWSTER 1956 An Experimental Exploration of the Psychoanalytic Process. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 25:385-414. BLUM, GERALD S. 1953 Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill. CLARK, RUSSELL A. 1952 The Projective Measurement of Experimentally Induced Levels of Sexual Motivation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 44:391-399. CLEMES, STANLEY C. 1964 Repression and Hypnotic Amnesia. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 69:62-69. COLBY, KENNETH M. 1960a Experiment on the Effects of an Observer's Presence on the Imago System During Psychoanalytic Free-association. Behavioral Science 5:216-232. COLBY, KENNETH M. 1960& An Introduction to Psychoanalytic Research. New York: Basic Books. CONFERENCE ON EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY, WESTERN PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE AND CLINIC, 1959 1961 Lectures on Experimental Psychiatry. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press. CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN PSYCHOTHERAPY, 1958 1959 Research in Psychotherapy: Proceedings. Edited by Eli A. Rubinstein and M. B. Parloff. Washington: American Psychological Association. CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN PSYCHOTHERAPY, 1961 1962 Research in Psychotherapy: Proceedings. Edited by Hans H. Strupp and L. Luborsky. Washington: American Psychological Association. DEMENT, WILLIAM 1960 The Effect of Dream Deprivation. Science 131:1705-1707. ERIKSON, ERIK H. 1959 Identity and the Life Cycle: Selected Papers. Psychological Issues 1, Monograph no. 1. FARRELL, BRIAN A. (1951) 1954 The Scientific Testing of Psychoanalytic Findings and Theory. Pages 448— 457 in Howard Brand (editor), The Study of Personality. New York: Wiley. -» First published in Volume 24 of the British Journal of Medical Psychology. FEIGL, HERBERT; and SCRIVEN, MICHAEL (editors) 1956 The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, ELSE 1940 Psychoanalysis and Personality Research. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 35:176-197. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, ELSE 1954 Psychoanalysis and the Unity of Science. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80:271-350. FREUD, SIGMUND (1920)1950 Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Authorized translation from the 2d ed., by C. J. M. Hubback. International Psycho-analytic Library, No. 4. New York: Liveright. -» First published under the title Jenseits des Lustprinzips. A paperback edition, translated by James Strachey, was published in 1959 by Bantam Books. GARDNER, RILEY W. et al. 1959 Cognitive Control: A Study of Individual Consistencies in Cognitive Behavior. Psychological Issues 1, Monograph no. 4. GILL, MERTON M. 1963 Topography and Systems in Psychoanalytic Theory. Psychological Issues 3, Monograph no. 10. GRAHAM, DAVID T.; STERN, JOHN A.; and WINOKUR, GEORGE 1958 Experimental Investigation of the Specificity of
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY Attitude Hypothesis in Psychosomatic Disease. Psychosomatic Medicine 20:446-457. HALL, CALVIN S.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER 1954 Psychoanalytic Theory and Its Applications in the Social Sciences. Volume 1, pages 143-180 in Gardner Lindzey (editor), Handbook of Social Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. HILGARD, ERNEST R. (1952) 1956 Experimental Approaches to Psychoanalysis. Pages 3-45 in Eugene Pumpian-Mindlin (editor), Psychoanalysis as Science. New York: Basic Books, HILGARD, ERNEST R. (1962) 1965 The Scientific Status of Psychoanalysis. Pages 184-205 in Irwin G. Sarason (editor), Science and Theory in Psychoanalysis. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. HILGARD, ERNEST R. 1964 The Motivational Relevance of Hypnosis. Volume 12, pages 1-44 in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Edited by David Levine. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. HILGARD, ERNEST R.; and BOWER, GORDON H. 1966 Freud's Psychodynamics. Pages 264-296 in Ernest R. Hilgard, Theories of Learning. 3d ed. New York: Appleton. -> First published in the second (1956) edition of Hilgard's Theories of Learning. HILGARD, JOSEPHINE R.; and NEWMAN, MARTHA F. 1959 Anniversaries in Mental Illness. Psychiatry 22:113121. HILGARD, JOSEPHINE R.; and NEWMAN, MARTHA F. 1961 Evidence for Functional Genesis in Mental Illness: Schizophrenia, Depressive Psychoses and Psychoiieuroses. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 132: 3-16. HOOK, SIDNEY (editor) 1959 Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy. New York Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Grove. HUNT, JOSEPH McV. 1941 The Effects of Infant Feeding-frustration Upon Adult Hoarding in the Albino Rat. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 36: 338-360. JANIS, IRVING L. 1958 The Psychoanalytic Interview as an Observational Method. Pages 149-181 in Gardner Lindzey (editor), Assessment of Human Motives. New York: Rinehart. KEHOE, MICHAEL; and IRONSIDE, WALLACE 1963 Studies on the Experimental Evocation of Depressive Responses Using Hypnosis. II: The Influence of Depressive Responses Upon the Secretion of Gastric Acid. Psychosomatic Medicine 25:403-419. KRIS, ERNST 1947 The Nature of Psychoanalytic Propositions and Their Validation. Pages 239-259 in Sidney Hook and Milton R. Konvitz (editors), Freedom and Experience. A publication of the New School for Social Research. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. KUBIE, LAWRENCE S. 1953 Psychoanalysis as a Basic Science. Pages 120-145 in Franz Alexander and Helen Ross (editors), 20 Years of Psychoanalysis. New York: Norton. LEWIN, BERTRAM D.; and Ross, HELEN 1960 Psychoanalytic Education in the United States. New York: Norton. MASSERMAN, JULES H.; and YUM, K. S. 1946 An Analysis of the Influence of Alcohol on Experimental Neuroses in Cats. Psychosomatic Medicine 8:36-52. MILLER, DANIEL R. ; and SWANSON, GUY E. 1960 Inner Conflict and Defense. New York: Holt. ORLANSKY, HAROLD 1949 Infant Care and Personality. Psychological Bulletin 46:1-48.
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PAUL, I. H.; and FISHER, CHARLES 1959 Subliminal Visual Stimulation: A Study of Its Influence on Subsequent Images and Dreams. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 129:315-340. POTZL, OTTO; ALLERS, RUDOLF; and TELER, JAKOB 1960 Preconscious Stimulation in Dreams, Associations, and Images: Classical Studies. Psychological Issues 2, Monograph no. 7. PUMPIAN-MINDLIN, EUGENE (editor) (1952) 1956 Psychoanalysis as Science. New York: Basic Books. RAPAPORT, DAVID 1959 The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt. Pages 55-183 in S. Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study of a Science. Volume 3: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context. New York: McGraw-Hill. SARASON, IRWIN G. (editor) 1965 Science and Theory in Psychoanalysis. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. SCHWARTZ, FRED; and ROUSE, RICHARD O. 1961 The Activation and Recovery of Associations. Psychological Issues 3, Monograph no. 9. SEARS, ROBERT R. 1943 Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts. Bulletin No. 51. New York: Social Science Research Council. SHAKOW, DAVID 1962 Psychoanalytic Education of Behavioral and Social Scientists for Research. Pages 146161 in Academy of Psychoanalysis, Science and Psychoanalysis. Volume 5: Psychoanalytic Education. New York: Basic Books. SHAKOW, DAVID; and RAPAPORT, DAVID 1964 The Influence of Freud on American Psychology. Psychological Issues 4, Monograph no. 13. Symposium on Psychoanalysis and Validation. 1961 British Journal of Medical Psychology 34:1-21. TRUAX, CHARLES B. 1957 The Repression Response to Implied Failure as a Function of the Hysteria-Psychasthenia Index. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 55:188-193. WEINER, HERBERT et al. 1957 Etiology of Duodenal Ulcer. I: Relation of Specific Psychological Characteristics to Rate of Gastric Secretion (Serum Pepsinogen). Psychosomatic Medicine 19:1—10. WHITE, ROBERT B. 1961 Recent Developments in Psychoanalytic Research. Diseases of the Nervous System 22:609-616, 671-679. WHITING, JOHN W. M.; and CHILD, IRVIN L. 1953 Child Training and Personality: A Cross-cultural Study. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. WITKIN, HERMAN A. et al. 1962 Psychological Differentiation: Studies of Development. New York: Wiley. ZELLER, ANCHARD F. 1951 An Experimental Analogue of Repression. Ill: The Effect of Induced Failure and Success on Memory Measured by Recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology 42:32-38.
PSYCHOGENETICS See GENETICS, article on GENETICS AND BEHAVIOR. PSYCHOLINGUISTICS See LANGUAGE, article on THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE; LINGUISTICS, article On THE FIELD.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY See CULTURE AND PERSONALITY.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEMS See under SYSTEMS ANALYSIS. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE Psychological warfare is a term that came into vogue in the United States during World War n to identify an activity as old as the history of conflict. Although the term gained wide currency in popular and scientific discussions in the United States and Europe within a decade after the end of World War 11, meanings ascribed to it were not always clear, and there were several views concerning its nature and scope. Some have limited its meaning to that range of activity which clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the armed forces and which is centered on the dissemination of propaganda to specified target audiences for the purpose of supporting the attainment of a given military mission. This view of psychological warfare, however, is too limited in scope for most journalists, politicians, and scholars who discuss the subject. As used in popular and scientific journals, a much wider variety of meanings has been attached to the term. First, there is the view that psychological warfare is the sum total of a nation's efforts to influence the opinions and behavior of foreign peoples and governments in desired directions through means other than the employment of a nation's political, economic, and military resources. Those who subscribe to this view generally agree that propaganda is the principal, but not the sole, ingredient of psychological warfare. Second, there is the view that psychological warfare involves an even wider range of activity, including symbolic acts of violence and terror designed to intimidate or to persuade an adversary to adjust his behavior. Those who hold to this view of psychological warfare would include within its scope various undercover activities such as espionage and subversion, assassinations and other forms of terrorism, and censorship, when they are designed to mold the opinion or behavior of specific groups. A third view holds that the term includes such activities as the premeditated twisting of personality through techniques popularly described as "brainwashing," hypnosis, and the employment of psychopharmaceutical agents allegedly used by some communist states [see BRAINWASHING]. There is still a fourth view, which holds that psychological warfare includes the molding of public attitudes of one's own people and extends across the spectrum of political—military action to hit-and-
run guerrilla raids and other acts of a paramilitary character conducted in enemy rear areas. Thus, at times the term has been used as though it were synonymous with political indoctrination or orientation, political persuasion, indirect aggression, "protracted conflict," or a "strategy of subversion." In the twenty years that followed the end of World War n, doctrine concerning psychological warfare in the United States and western Europe —its nature, its uses, and its role in modern international relations—tended to coalesce to form a consensus. Thus, increasingly, those who discuss it accept the basic conclusion that unless a technique involves the premeditated manipulation of opinion through the use of one or more of the media of communications it does not involve psychological warfare. History The British military analyst and historian J. F. C. Fuller is believed to have been the first to employ the term "psychological warfare"—in 1920—although the activities it describes go back to ancient times. In discussing implications to be drawn from World War I advances in military technology, he suggested that traditional means of warfare may in time be "replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not even used or battlefields sought . . . but [rather] . . . the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished" (1920, p. 320). Fuller's use of the term at the time attracted no unusual attention in either British or American military and scholarly circles. Twenty years later, as the British were "tooling up" for a propaganda effort similar to the one that General Fuller had forecast, they adopted the expression "political warfare." Only in January 1940 did the term come into American use, when an article was published entitled "Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It." Over a year later the Committee for National Morale used the term in the title of a book (Farago & Gittler 1942) but ascribed to it a meaning far different from that in postwar usage. During World War n "psychological warfare" was widely used to denote the organization and, more especially, the activity of propagandists who served with or supported the U.S. armed forces. But the term was not generally applied to broader, longerrange propaganda efforts. "Information," "strategic services," and "political warfare" were preferred and were used in titles and names of agencies, e.g., Coordinator of Information (COI), Ministry of In-
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE formation, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), etc. The major British agency for the overseas effort that was later described as psychological warfare was the Political Warfare Executive (PWE). In the United States the civilian-directed effort was entrusted to the Office of War Information (OWI). The psychological warfare support provided U.S. and allied combat forces during World War n, while significant, was largely the result of ad hoc improvisations. Neither the Americans nor the British had made plans before the war to employ combat propaganda. Civilian propagandists from the OWI and PWE were casually included among Eisenhower's forces and organized into propaganda units and staff sections. Later on, experience gained in Africa induced General Eisenhower to create a special staff section for psychological warfare at his headquarters in Europe. The British and American personnel from both civilian and military agencies were selected, trained, and assigned to army group, field army, and army corps headquarters. Psychological warfare operations in the action against Japan were even more improvised: the OWI sent small civilian staffs to major reararea headquarters—Hawaii, Australia, China, and India. In every instance they first had to convince the theater commander that psychological warfare could make a contribution to victory; next they had to induce military commands to assign qualified personnel to ad hoc units; and then it was necessary to win the cooperation of combat commanders to enable these units to practice their skills. Psychological warfare units were generally attached to intelligence sections. Propaganda operations were therefore seldom adequately integrated into operational plans and were generally employed in addition to, not as a part of, regular military operations. The War Department in Washington assigned headquarters personnel to monitor overseas operations only intermittently, and even then no operational or planning function was performed for the overseas commands. The impetus and planning for the use of psychological warfare in overseas areas came from those within each command; the pattern of organization, therefore, varied from one theater of operations to another. After the war all psychological warfare units and special staff sections were disbanded. The Office of War Information was dissolved, and a greatly curtailed foreign information service was established in September 1945 by executive order as an interim operation under State Department auspices. In 1948 Congress first authorized its continuance. Thus the civilian-sponsored program remained under direct State Department jurisdiction until 1953,
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when the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was established as a quasi-autonomous organization. During the years that the foreign information program remained under State Department jurisdiction, it increasingly became the practice for the general public to describe its operations as psychological warfare. With the increased tensions growing out of the "cold war," the outbreak of conflict in Korea, and the launching of a "great new campaign of truth," by President Truman in 1950, there was recognition of a need for a new instrument to coordinate the overseas propaganda effort of the several departments and agencies involved. It was natural, in view of the growing acceptance of the term psychological warfare, for a term like psychological strategy to be adopted to label the agency given responsibility for the coordination of the over-all foreign information program. In August 1950 President Truman established a national Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to coordinate "foreign information and psychological strategy" where more than one agency was involved. In 1953 the PSB was replaced by an Operations Coordinating Board, which in turn was abolished by President Kennedy in 1961. Modern doctrine and methods Relatively early in the Korean War the U.S. Army created, as a special staff section, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) and a center and school in North Carolina for the codification of doctrine and the training of military personnel in what came to be called, in short, "psywar." With the establishment of OCPW and a psywar center and school, interest in psychological warfare spread throughout the U.S. armed forces. With increased interest came new concepts, definitions, and a crystallization of doctrine. Psychological warfare, as previously defined, gave way to new terms—psychological operations (psyops) and psychological activities. Psyops were defined as political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral, or friendly foreign groups emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the accomplishment of national objectives. The American approach to psychological warfare that grew out of World War n and the cold war experience has had a significant impact on the thought and behavior of allied nations. The American term psychological warfare has largely displaced terms these nations previously used. More important than this, however, is the widespread recognition now given to the need for specially trained and equipped units to conduct psycholog-
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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
ical warfare operations in time of crisis. In preparing for this responsibility, many nations have sent officer personnel to the United States for specialized training in American military schools. Modern psychological warfare on both the national level and within the armed services differs markedly from propaganda operations conducted in the past during times of national crisis in several ways. First, there is official recognition that the psychological warfare element, taken in its broadest sense, is one of four major forces employed during both peace and war to give maximum support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and lessen chances of defeat. Thus, in the highest councils of government the psychological factor in international relations is considered along with political, economic, and military factors in making major foreign policy decisions. Second, technological advances in the science of communications have made available to the modern propagandist a variety of means for reaching audiences that previously could only have been reached after great effort and much uncertainty. Short-wave radio transmitters and receivers, films, the growing distribution of television outlets, and the availability of high-speed printing presses combine to increase the likelihood that any given audience a propagandist desires to reach can be exposed to the message he wants it to receive. Third, modern developments in public opinion polling, audience sampling, panel interviewing, intelligence analysis, and the new techniques for assessing cultural traits of foreign groups enable one to make more accurate predictions of group and mass behavior. Thus it is possible for modern psychological warfare operations to be more nearly manageable and predictable than were the hitor-miss operations of the past. Communications media. The choice of communications media for psychological warfare operations depends on the target audience to be addressed and the time one has to prepare and deliver the message. In combat situations, printed leaflets and newssheets disseminated by airdrops and voice broadcasts amplified by electronic loudspeakers are the most commonly employed media. Operations conducted from areas farther to the rear or to audiences far removed from combat zones utilize mobile and fixed long-wave and medium-wave radio transmitters. Media employed in strategic or national-level operations are commonly classified as either slow or fast. Slow media include news magazines, books, pamphlets, motion picture films, and lectures.
They are so described because there is a considerable time lag between the sending and the receiving of the message. Fast media are those that rely largely on electronic communications. In addition to short-wave radio broadcasts, fast media include carefully timed statements by statesmen deemed to be of sufficient interest to be picked up and transmitted as news and a daily news file transmitted by wireless to overseas outlets for local disseminaation. Intelligence requirements. Intelligence requirements for effective psychological warfare operations are both enormous and varied. There are three major types of intelligence required. The first is background data, in great detail, concerning the predispositions and vulnerabilities of the target or targets to be addressed. This type of intelligence is described as target analysis. A second type of intelligence needed is that employed in propaganda output. The writings, press releases, and speeches of leading adversaries are thus combed for material that can be usefully employed against the target. Finally, it is necessary to provide a means for checking the results of one's work. Is the message getting through? Is it clearly understood? In what ways can a more favorable response be elicited? Answers to these and other questions are sought by such means as are appropriate to the situation. In time of conflict, and with respect to closed societies, it is sometimes necessary to employ clandestine means for gathering data to assess effectiveness. With respect to societies more or less open to direct approach, variations of techniques employed in domestic public opinion polling and market surveys may be employed. In both World War n and the Korean War, carefully selected panels of prisoners of war were found to be useful in pretesting and post-testing messages and in making critiques of the format of presentation or the media of communications. Where such panels were used, extreme care had to be taken to insure that they were as nearly representative as possible of target groups yet to be addressed. Furthermore, the fact that prisoners had either defected or had been captured set them apart from those still within enemy ranks, and great care had to be taken in extrapolating findings based on such groups [see INTELLIGENCE, POLITICAL AND MILITARY]. Research. Recognition of the need for psychological warfare target intelligence in both depth and breadth has had a great impact on American social science scholarship in the period since the outbreak of the Korean War. Social scientists in the United States, since 1950, have devoted consider-
PSYCHOLOGY ably more attention to studies of elites, would-be elites, and communications and other behavioral patterns in foreign societies than in any previous period. Great attention has been given to the identification of research criteria of significance in the study of alien cultures. Likewise, great effort has been devoted to the systematic development of more sophisticated tools for the effective identification and assessment of such material as is useful to psychological warfare practitioners. [See COMMUNICATION, MASS.] Since 1950 the national government, through the facilities of the State Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), and its predecessors, the USIA and the three service branches of the Defense Department, has subsidized university groups, individuals, and nonprofit organizations to undertake specific research projects that might not otherwise have been undertaken, or tailored them to meet the needs of the so-called "psychological warfare community." From the findings of this government-sponsored and other research there has emerged a clearer understanding of the requirements for an effective psychological warfare effort in times of peace and of crisis. Whatever media of communications are employed, psychological warfare can contribute to the attainment of a nation's objectives only if the messages transmitted are credible, clearly understood, and seek to elicit a response within the capability of the target audience. What is credible is not to be equated necessarily with truth. What is credible to any given audience is what it believes to be true, not what is in fact true. Credibility is a complex goal and not easily achieved. What is credible is determined by the audience, not the content of a message. The development of credibility thus must be constantly and persistently pursued in every psychological warfare campaign. Without this important element much of a propagandist's effort will go for nought.
WILLIAM E. DAUGHERTY [See also COMMUNICATION, POLITICAL; PROPAGANDA; WAR.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BARGHOORN, FREDERICK C. 1964 Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton Univ. Press. BARRETT, EDWARD W. 1953 Truth Is Our Weapon. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. BUREAU OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1956 International Communication and Political Opinion: A Guide to the Literature, by Bruce L. Smith and Chitra M. Smith. Princeton Univ. Press. CLEWS, JOHN C. 1964 Communist Propaganda Techniques. New York: Praeger.
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DAUGHERTY, WILLIAM E. (compiler) 1958 A Psychological Warfare Casebook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. -> A compilation of articles and case studies covering various problems, techniques, and requirements of psychological warfare. Contains an extensive list of references. DAVIDSON, PHILIP 1941 Propaganda and the American Revolution: 1763-1783. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. DYER, MURRAY 1959 The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. FARAGO, LADISLAS; and GITTLER, LEWIS F. (editors) 1942 German Psychological Warfare. New York: Putnam. -» Contains an extensive list of references to German language material published before 1939. FULLER, J. F. C. 1920 Tanks in the Great War, 19141918. London: Murray. HOLT, BOBERT T.; and VAN DE VELDE, ROBERT W. 1960 Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy. Univ. of Chicago Press. HUNTER, EDWARD 1956 Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who Defied It. New York: Farrar. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. (1927) 1938 Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Smith. LERNER, DANIEL 1949 Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day. New York: Stewart. LERNER, DANIEL (editor) 1951 Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American Policy. New York: Stewart. LINEBARGER, PAUL M. A. (1948) 1954 Psychological Warfare. 2d ed. Washington: Combat Forces Press. MOCK, JAMES R.; and LARSON, CEDRIC 1939 Words That Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917—1919. Princeton Univ. Press. Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It. 1940 Current History and Forum 51, no. 5:52-53. SMITH, BRUCE L.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and CASEY, RALPH D. 1946 Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide. Princeton Univ. Press. THOMSON, CHARLES A. H. 1948 Overseas Information Service of the United States Government. Washington: Brookings Institution. Yu, TE-CHI 1964 Mass Persuasion in Communist China. New York: Praeger. ZEMAN, Z. A. B. 1964 Nazi Propaganda. Oxford Univ. Press.
PSYCHOLOGY Five major fields of psychology are described under this heading; other major fields are described under CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY; EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY; LEARNING; PERCEPTION; PERSONALITY; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. The subject matter traditionally referred to as experimental psychology is found in the article on PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY under this heading, as well as in DRIVES; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; FORGETTING; LEARNING; MOTIVATION; PERCEPTION; THINKING. Important and large-scale psychological theories are discussed in FIELD THEORY; GESTALT
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THEORY; LEARNING, articles Oil CLASSICAL CONDITIONING and INSTRUMENTAL LEARNING; LEARNING THEORY; PSYCHOANALYSIS; THINKING, article On COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION AND PROCESSES.
I. COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY 11. in. iv. v.
Rolland H. Waters and Bradford N. Bunnell Clifford T. Morgan PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY W. L. L. Rees CONSTITUTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY Rollo May and EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY Sabert Basescu Anne Anastasi APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Comparative psychology is concerned with the behavior of different species of living organisms. While some work is occasionally done with plant life, the field is typically limited to the behavior of animals. Its investigations lead to the specification of similarities and differences in behavior between species. These findings are of interest because it is assumed that they are correlated with the animals' positions on the phylogenetic scale. Interspecific comparisons should thus provide a means of relating an animal's behavior to its evolutionary background and contribute an important kind of information to psychology. The accomplishments of the field have not, thus far, completely matched expectations. During the past century a vast amount of data on the behavior of infrahuman animals has been accumulated, but only a small fraction of this information has been used, or indeed proven useful, for comparative purposes. This has led some to deny the existence of comparative psychology as a distinct content area, and many more have used the title simply as the name for a method of study. Since World War 11, interest in comparative psychology has increased sharply. Some of the current trends in thinking and research that are beginning to revitalize comparative psychology will be presented in the sections below. For the purpose of this introduction, however, a few comments on some of the major characteristics of the field are in order. (1) The term comparative psychology has often been used indiscriminately to include all work done on the behavior of infrahuman animals. Such animals are frequently used in behavioral studies because it is impractical, for economic or humanitarian reasons, to use human subjects and because the use of animals may be necessary in order to achieve an acceptable level of experimental control. There is nothing inherent in this practice
to justify calling it comparative psychology. Such studies typically have as their objective the analysis of a particular behavioral process, the animal subject being nothing more than a convenient vehicle for that behavior. The assumption implicit in this procedure is that the principles of behavior found in a particular species are relevant for all animals. This assumption is tempered somewhat by the circumstances that mammals are commonly used in such studies and that generalizations are usually made only to other mammals. Nevertheless, the assumption remains, even though it is this very assumption that comparative psychology is supposed to test. The point is, then, that some of what has been called comparative psychology is not only not comparative psychology but, in addition, assumes the validity of the evolutionary hypothesis on which the rationale for a comparative psychology is based. (2) A second characteristic of comparative psychology is related to the first: from the beginning, comparative psychology has been highly anthropocentric in its orientation. In spite of the fact that man may be looked upon as just another species in the study of the evolution of behavior, he has not often been viewed in that way. Instead, comparative psychology has concentrated on the goal of achieving a better understanding of man through the study of the behavior of lower animals. This goal, which provided the original raison d'etre for comparative psychology in Darwin's time, has continued to overshadow all others throughout the history of the field. (3) The application of comparative methodology in comparative psychology has been very different from its application in other biological fields. For example, in classical zoological work concerned with the phylogenetic development of structure and function, comparisons are typically made between species within a genus. Except in the growing field of behavior genetics, little behavioral work has been done within genera and interspecific comparisons are usually made only across broad taxonomic groups—for example, a species of fish is compared with an amphibian, a reptile, or a mammal. The comparative psychologist's procedure is thus quite gross; he tends to select animals that are representative of relatively large morphological differences along the phylogenetic continuum. Therefore, the relationships sought by the comparative psychologist between an animal's evolutionary background and its behavior are of a very general nature. He justifies this approach by pointing out that his major interest is in the causal
PSYCHOLOGY: Comparative Psychology analysis of behavior and only secondarily in the origins of behavior. Most of his data are relevant only to the former question. This approach is thus quite different from that of the ethologist, whose interest extends beyond causal analysis to include a primary concern with the evolutionary origins and adaptive significance of behavior. In ethology intrageneric comparisons have been used successfully in the identification and study of homologous behavior patterns. (4) Finally, since the beginning of the twentieth century, comparative psychology has limited itself mainly to laboratory investigations. This practice developed out of a reaction against the anecdotal nature of much of the data collected during the latter half of the nineteenth century. These attempts to put behavior in a test tube, and to achieve rigorous experimental control, have been successful in producing reliable data and in reducing the teleological interpretations made by many early investigators. Comparative psychologists have been criticized on the grounds that many of their behavioral testing procedures, since they ignore the natural history of their subjects, do not provide an adequate sampling of the animal's behavioral repertoires and may actually yield spurious results because they impose conditions that strain or exceed the limits of the animal's capacities to respond. In response to this criticism, there has been a trend toward obtaining more and better information about an animal's behavior capacities before bringing it into the laboratory. The emphasis on laboratory experimentation continues, however, and the use of field studies and investigation of behavior under conditions and situations designed to give the animal full opportunity to express his "natural" responses serve to complement, rather than to supplant, the laboratory work. Historical aspects It has been pointed out that man's interest in animal behavior is very nearly as old as man himself and that such information may well have been essential in order for man to eat and to avoid being eaten (Hale 1962). From a philosophical point of view, Aristotle taught that human and infrahuman behavior can be directly compared, that such characteristics as "gentleness or fierceness, mildness or cross temper, courage or timidity, fear or confidence, high spirit . . . or low cunning, and . . . sagacity" can be observed in animals below man (Historia animalium 588a). Such a belief was almost certainly a product of Aristotle's rational approach to man and nature rather than the re-
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sult of the application of the observational techniques he defended in other connections. Aristotle's view yielded to the doctrine of "special creation" and the belief in qualitative differences between animals and men. It was not until this latter belief was challenged by the Darwinian theory of evolution that the seeds were sown for the development of contemporary comparative psychology. The Darwinian theory denied the "special creation" explanation of the origin of man, erased the Cartesian dichotomy between besouled man and the soulless and mindless animal, and thus elevated the importance of animal study as a source of data for supporting evolutionary hypotheses. In order to demonstrate evolutionary continuity, it was necessary to show that man possessed many of the simpler, "brute" instincts present in lower animals and to show that these animals, in turn, exhibited capacities for reasoning, emotional behavior, social organization, and communication. That man and animals possess the simpler forms of behavior in common was never a matter of serious controversy, although later debates over the validity of the instinct concept are related to this question. Of greater importance was the search for higher mental processes in infrahuman animals. Examples of the first attempts to gather this sort of data are to be found in the writings of G. J. Romanes (1883). Such materials were largely anecdotal, however, and were harshly criticized because neither the validity of the observations reported nor the adequacy of the resulting interpretations could be checked by other workers. Demonstration of evolutionary principles was more a matter of anthropomorphic argument than scientifically derived fact. Within experimental psychology, Wundt had championed the comparison of the behavior of man and animals as a means of better understanding man ([1864-1865] 1907, pp. 11, 340). Wundt thus threw the weight of his authority and position in psychology behind any future movement making the psychology of animals respectable. [See WUNDT.] It was in this context that comparative psychology emerged as a highly anthropomorphic, anthropocentric area of investigation. The first major modification of this approach occurred in the 1890s. Loeb's tropism theory (1918), while not denying the animal mind, represented a return to the mechanistic view of Descartes. In 1894 C. Lloyd Morgan's "canon" appeared. This was a formulation of the principle of parsimony for the interpretation of animal behavior: "In no case may
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we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale" ([1894] 1906, p. 53). Together, Loeb and Morgan may be regarded as the fathers of scientific comparative psychology. Their writings stressed an objective approach and pointed the way to the use of experimental procedures in gathering data on animals (Warden 1927). It is important to note, however, that while anecdotalism was eliminated, the questions under study changed very little. Despite the new experimental fervor, investigators were still primarily concerned with describing the animal mind or consciousness, and with charting its evolutionary course. It was not until the arrival of behaviorism, some twenty years later, that the subject matter of comparative psychology shifted from the study of consciousness and volitional choice to the study of behavior qua behavior. In the meantime, another development had occurred which was to have an important influence on the developing field. Thorndike, in his Animal Intelligence: Experimental Studies, came to the conclusion that all vertebrates "manifest fundamentally the same sort of intellectual life" ([18981901] 1911, p. 283). He found no important differences in the manner in which fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals learned the solutions to problems. The difference between a fish and a monkey was quantitative rather than qualitative—the monkey could form more complex associations more quickly and could retain them better than the fish. Man's intellect was said to be a further elaboration of the same sort of associative processes. This hypothesis was emphasized by Watson, and many came to accept the idea that the laws of learning were fixed and that there were no qualitative discontinuities in animal learning. This belief justified the use of rats and other infrahuman animals as human surrogates and tended to discourage comparative research. [See WATSON; THORNDIKE.] Not everyone accepted Thorndike's conclusion, and some argued that although animals might not differ much in the capacity for simple associative learning, they might show significant differences on more complex tasks involving ideational or symbolic processes. Animals were tested on delayed response, double alternation, multiple choice, insight, and other such problems. Unfortunately, difficulties in providing standardized test situations and finding methods of quantifying the data were never resolved. By 1940 this approach had about died out. In consequence, at least in the United
States, the study of animal behavior no longer carried the flavor of a comparative approach. A paper by Beach (1950) appeared as a protest against the then unsatisfactory status of comparative psychology. It had become almost exclusively limited to studies of the animal, with few, if any, applications of comparative methodologies. Animals were used as tools, or instruments, for the testing of different hypotheses about behavior that could not be tested on human subjects. With the publication of Tinbergen's The Study of Instinct (1951) psychologists in the United States became increasingly aware of studies conducted by European scholars who referred to their area of research as ethology. The rapid postwar development of the field of ethology exerted a most important influence on the course of comparative psychology. These students of animal behavior were not interested in stopping with causal analyses of behavior. Their major objective was the determination of the way in which behavior evolved, and to this end they stressed the adaptive significance of certain species-specific behavior patterns. Presumably behavioral differences can arise in two ways: through genetic transmission during the evolution of the species and through learning during the ontogeny of the individual. For the ethologists, the most important behavioral elements were the highly stereotyped, relatively unmodifiable motor patterns, which were presumed to be innate and which were held to be the key to the evolution of behavior. These concepts, and the theories of instinctive behavior that were derived from them, clashed violently with the ideas of American psychologists who emphasized the importance of environment and experience. The past ten years, beginning with Lehrman's criticism (1953) of Lorenz' instinct theory, have witnessed a lively international debate between psychology and ethology. [For a typical rebuttal by the ethologists, see Eibl-Eibesfeldt & Kramer 1958, pp. 204207; see also ETHOLOGY.] Both fields have benefited from this debate. Following the lead of the psychologists, ethologists are now showing serious concern with the ontogeny of behavior, while ethology has stimulated psychology to a renewed interest in the field of behavior genetics. All the differences between the two have not yet been resolved. Arguments concerning the innateness of behavior, for example, may be expected to persist for some time. These two events, Beach's protest on the negative side and the work of the ethologists on the positive side, have helped to revive interest in comparative psychology among American students.
PSYCHOLOGY: Comparative Psychology Evolution—structure and function An increase in behavioral capacity presumably accompanies an increase in anatomical complexity. This generalization is usually true, although in some cases the presence of structural elements may have no apparent behavioral significance. For example, despite the presence of color receptors in the eye of the cat, it has been extremely difficult to demonstrate that this animal has functional color vision. Futhermore, an increase in behavioral complexity may appear without any apparent accompanying structural changes. Resolution of these problems will be, at least in part, dependent upon the development of better tests of behavioral "complexity" and upon improvement of anatomical, physiological, and chemical techniques applicable to the identification of structural changes in development. With respect to the evolution of behavior, the problem of relating structure and function is difficult when function is defined in terms of the molar classifications that behavior psychologists generally use, such as learning, motivation, perception, etc. (In contrast, ethologists have emphasized a molecular behavioral unit, the "fixed action pattern," in their more successful attempts to trace the evolution of some aspects of behavior: e.g., Lorenz 1958.) Since behavior does not exist in fossil form, an additional difficulty is that evidence for the evolutionary course of behavior is necessarily indirect. It must also be recognized that the behaviors available for study are exhibited by highly specialized creatures that structurally, and presumably behaviorally as well, differ considerably from the ancestral source of the evolutionary branch. [See EVOLUTION, especially the article on EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR.]
Comparative psychologists have tended to emphasize central, as opposed to peripheral, mechanisms. Within any broad taxonomic group, such as a phylum, or even a class, there typically exists a tremendous range of sensory and motor development. For example, the visual systems of coelenterates range from pigmented dermal spots to relatively sophisticated lens eyes (Maier & Schneirla 1935). Across phyla there are many instances in which a particular representative of a "lower" position may be better equipped for receiving a particular kind of energy than a representative of a "higher" group; for example, many arthropods have color vision, while many mammals apparently do not. While a number of investigators have been interested in the functional correlates of different
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types of peripheral systems, those psychologists who study learning, motivation, and perception stress the role of the central nervous system and typically concern themselves only with making certain that sensory information is reaching the animal and that the overt responses being measured are within its behavioral repertoire. Their interest is in how the animal uses the information it receives and in what effect the information has on the response system. They usually assume some sort of intervening process, or processes, mediated by the internuncial structures of the organism. "Intelligence" is typically thought of as such a central process that is highly correlated with the level of neural organization possessed by the organism. This is the working hypothesis behind much of American comparative psychology [see "Learning," below; see also NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN; SENSES.] These factors go a long way toward explaining the fact that in comparative psychology comparisons are typically made across broad groups, a procedure that is not employed by the zoological taxonomist and one that is not very useful for the delineation of the phyletic history of a given bit of behavior. The procedure may be justified, however, on the grounds that these are comparisons between representatives of different levels of neural organization and that this is a most useful type of information, particularly when one considers the categories of behavior in which the psychologist is most typically interested. Instinct, ontogeny, and motivation Instinct. Beginning in the 1920s the entire discipline of psychology underwent what has been called the "anti-instinct" revolt (Beach 1955). The major objection was to the use of instinct as an explanatory concept. It was pointed out that calling a behavior an instinct did not in any way demonstrate the causes of that behavior and that the use of such a label tended to keep people from doing the research necessary to determine causal factors. It was felt that if such research were done, the behavior would prove amenable to analysis in behavioristic terms and that the instinct concept was superfluous (Kuo 1924). In support of this position, it was possible to point to work such as that of Kuo (1930), who analyzed the rat-killing "instinct" of the cat and showed it to be heavily dependent upon the past history of the organism. The cat's behavior, with respect to rats, could be modified extensively, and a wide range of responses to rodents could be developed. This and similar studies fit well with the contemporary behavioristic
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emphasis upon behavioral plasticity and the importance of experience and learning. In terms of the interests of psychologists, many "instinctive" behaviors could be considered as little more than special applications of the principles being generated in the learning laboratories. The net result of all this was to banish the instinct concept from psychology. Along with it, with a few significant exceptions, went most of the interest in behavior genetics and in the study of behavioral constancy. Conceptually, the essential importance of accepting an epigenetic interpretation of instinctive behaviors, an interpretation that stresses the interaction between heredity and environment, was recognized (Carmichael 1927). In actual fact, psychologists emphasized experiential factors to the exclusion of almost everything else. In the 1950s the debate over the instinct concept arose once more, stimulated in large part by the work of the ethologists. The central question again was whether or not instinct, if there was such a thing, was a meaningful class of behavior. Instinctive behavior, defined essentially as the product of innate neural patterns laid down by the genetic constitution of the organism, was the basic behavioral datum for the program of the ethologists. Given the evolutionary interests of ethology, behavior that was typical of a species commanded its greatest attention. [See INSTINCT.] American psychologists once again reacted negatively to the instinct concept and again defended the hypothesis of an interaction between genetic constitution and experience; "instinct" could not be either learned or inherited. As has been noted, the net result of the entire debate was a shift of emphasis to studies of the ontogeny of behavior and a reawakened interest in behavior genetics. [See GENETICS, article on GENETICS AND BEHAVIOR.] An example of the contemporary American approach to the study of instinctive, or species-typical, behavior patterns is the work of Lehrman on the analysis of the reproductive behaviors of the ring dove (for summaries of this work, see Lehrman 1932; 1964). He has been able to demonstrate experimentally several of the mechanisms by which hormonal-environmental interactions give rise to the expression of complete behavior patterns. In doing this, Lehrman (1962) has called attention to the fact that experience may have an effect on behavior—by altering rates of growth, producing changes in sensitivity, facilitating behaviors that occur later in a sequence, etc.—which does not fit the standard definitions of 'learning," but which nevertheless can be crucial for the normal develop-
ment of the behavior pattern. The generalization is drawn that learning and heredity cannot be meaningfully distinguished, and the traditional view that learning is dominant in higher animals and instinct in lower animals is no longer considered valid by most investigators. Some, however, still find the dichotomy useful (e.g., Thorpe 1956). Schneirla puts the situation in these words: . . . heredity influences all behaviour in all animals, its influence is more direct in some animals (evidently the more primitive) than in others and may be very different on different phyletic levels. . . . [It is] likely that behaviour evolves through new and increasingly complex reorientations, with the old rebuilt and extended in terms of the new, [rather] than through the replacement of the "innate" by the "learned." . . . [It] is therefore probable that the relationship of behaviour to survival, always important in evolution, is very different on various phyletic levels. As it is realized that assumptions of innateness in apposition to the acquired can explain no activity, increasing emphasis is placed upon the need for analytical investigation. (1963, p. 692) Ontogeny. In addition to the ontogenetic approach, which constitutes the mainstream of American comparative psychologists' work with speciestypical behavior patterns, there is a continuing interest in ontogenetic development for its own sake. This is reminiscent of the traditional stress by Freud and Watson on the effects of the early history of the organism. Beach and Jaynes (1954) cite the following examples of animal studies in this area that serve as an indication of the scope of the work on the effect of early experience: rats, pigeons, and chimpanzees, raised in darkness, exhibit marked but not permanent disturbances in later visual adjustments; the appearance of normal motor activities in chimpanzees raised under conditions of restricted movement is temporarily delayed; chickens raised in the dark and prevented from pecking are less accurate in pecking but rapidly improve with practice; some evidence of a "need to suck" is reported when puppies are deprived of the sucking activity; the effects that depriving infant rats of food and water has on their hoarding of food and water as adults are somewhat ambiguous; egglaying behavior in some species of insects can be elicited by other than the normal host when they are raised on a nonpreferred host; mating behavior in certain species of fish, ring doves, and pigeons can be elicited by a species different from their own when the former are raised alone or with the foreign species; reproductive behavior of such mammals as rats, the American bison, antelopes, and
PSYCHOLOGY: Comparative Psychology others is modified under conditions of captivity; species recognition and gregariousness in insects, birds, and domestic chicks are subject to modification through early experiences, as is song acquisition in birds; social behaviors in the dog, in the lambs of both wild and tame sheep, and in chimpanzees are all modifiable during early infancy; wildness and aggressiveness, and the ability to adapt to differing learning situations, in rats have been modified by "gentling" procedures and by varying the type of environmental conditions present during infancy. Contemporary examples of research in this area, to mention only a few, are the work of Scott and Marston (1950) on the effects of early experience on the development of adult behavior in dogs, which called attention to the presence of critical periods in that development; the studies of imprinting, which also emphasized the critical-period concept (see Hess 1959); the studies of stress effects (e.g., Levine 1962); and Harlow's (1958) work on affectional responses in infant monkeys. A model proposed by Fuller and Waller (1962) brings together some of the explanations that have been proposed to account for early experience effects. One set of explanations rests on the concept of learning: ability to learn a specific type of response may change with age, a change that cannot at present be correlated with any known neurophysiological change; it may also be that what the results show is the persistence of early habits resulting from such conditions as change in drive, amount and kind of reinforcement, lack of interfering or competing habits, or similar influences. A second set of explanations rests on the concept of maturational changes. Such changes may be inferentially applied to the learning changes given above; they may contribute to the structural and neurophysiological conditions underlying sensory, neural, and muscular equipment employed in specific responses because of stimulation during early experience; and, lastly, the finding of socalled critical periods in development, times during which mastery of particular acts or the effect of stimulation is more marked, may be a reflection of the fact that the systems supporting such activities have reached maturity. A third set of concepts is couched in terms of the relatively greater sensitivity of the young organism to all sorts of physical and chemical variation. Presumably, then, they are more susceptible to nonspecific stresses in early life and might as a result undergo permanent modifications in basic physiological functions. Such alterations in meta-
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bolic, autonomic, and endocrine systems would be expected to produce variations in adult behavior patterns. [Sec INFANCY.} Motivation. The approach to many of the problems of the energizing and directive processes operative in such maintenance activities as feeding, drinking, and reproduction has already been mentioned. The current emphasis is upon the analysis of the entire behavior pattern, rather than on the measurement of the amount of consummatory activity alone. Aronson (1959), for example, has pointed out that phylogenetic trends in the relationships between sex hormones and reproductive behaviors are often discernible only when careful attention is paid to the individual components of the behavior pattern. When motivation is considered in terms of consummatory behavior, as Ratner and Denny (1964, chapter 9) point out, the higher an animal is on the phylogenetic scale, the greater is the variety of stimulation that can elicit or control the behavior. Studies of the sexual behavior of male mammals below the primates (e.g., Hale & Almquist 1956; Fisher 1962) have shown that ungulates, and even rodents, are very responsive to stimulus variation. A similar trend with regard to the operation of experiential effects is illustrated by work on cats (Rosenblatt & Aronson 1958), rats (Zimbardo 1958), and guinea pigs (Valenstein, Riss, & Young 1955). While this work generally supports the notion that increasing behavioral flexibility accompanies increases in phylogeny, perhaps the most interesting finding of all has been that environmental and experiential influences are more ubiquitous and are of critical importance further down the scale than had previously been thought. In the past, feeding, drinking, and sleeping have been investigated more by zoologists and physiologists than by comparative psychologists. Newer methods of approach, particularly those which have made the central nervous system accessible to experimental approach, now seem to be leading to increased interest in comparative studies of these fundamental processes. Beyond the study of basic maintenance functions, the work of Butler (1953) on exploratory drives and of Harlow and his associates (e.g., Harlow, Harlow, & Meyer 1950; Harlow & McClearn 1954) on the manipulative drive in monkeys suggest evidence for "supraphysiological" drives, at least in higher animal forms. Berlyne (1960) provides a good discussion of curiosity and investigative motives as "higher" drives. Finally, the idea that some drives may be learned (Miller
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1951) and that motivated behavior may be controlled by secondary reinforcement mechanisms is widely accepted. Presumably such learning is more characteristic of the higher animals. [See DRIVES; MOTIVATION; STIMULATION DRIVES.] Learning The field of learning has traditionally been the major area of interest in American comparative psychology. In fact, this emphasis has resulted in the strongest criticism of comparative psychology by other students of animal behavior. Many feel that significant aspects of the animal's behavior are often missed completely or are given an erroneous interpretation because of the concentration on only one facet of behavior. There are several problems involved in the learning area. The first is the definition of learning itself. The emphasis in much of the work of comparative psychologists has been upon classical conditioning and instrumental learning paradigms. The establishment of a link between a stimulus and a response is, however, only one of the ways by which organisms modify their behavior as a result of environmental change or as a consequence of their past activities. Many of the techniques by which the organism adapts to its environment are not "true" learning. Fatigue effects represent one such example. While fatigue may not be hard to understand, the phenomena of sensitization and habituation, which typically have been controlled out of laboratory learning situations as being unwanted "noise," cannot be disregarded so easily. These types of behavioral modification appear to be universal in the animal kingdom and deserve more attention than they have been given as possible precursors of true associative learning. It is probable that as psychologists conduct more studies on the invertebrates, these phenomena will be more carefully analyzed. Such emphasis is deserved since, at the mammalian level, studies (reviewed in Livingstone 1959) have clearly demonstrated central nervous control of peripheral sensory processes, which appears to be a critical mechanism in habituation. Other special phenomena, such as provisional orientation (Maier & Schneirla 1935), imprinting (Hess 1959), and the type of behavioral modification shown by Lehrman's ring doves, are being given the increased attention they merit. [See FATIGUE; IMPRINTING; LEARNING.]
A second problem is the question of the lowest phyletic level at which learning occurs. This problem has been attacked using the traditional paradigms for associative learning. At present it is certain that arthropods and at least some mollusks
are capable of such learning. Also, the evidence is good that annelids and flatworms can be trained by means of both classical conditioning and instrumental techniques (Jacobson 1963). Below this level reports of learning are not convincing, although the reader is referred to the work of Gelber (1952) and of Jensen (1957) for a debate over the presence of associative learning in onecelled animals. Questions for future study will be: whether there is any difference in the relative primitiveness of classically, as opposed to instrumentally, conditioned responses; and whether the various types of learning, as now defined, are mediated by the same neural and/or chemical processes. It is at least possible that the same result, in terms of a learning proficiency score, is obtainable through more than one mechanism. A third problem is the search for the relationship between phyletic position and learning capacity. In general, it has been found that as one ascends the phylogenetic scale there is a corresponding increase in the ability of organisms to modify their behaviors when they are subjected to environmental changes. This behavioral plasticity is revealed by the fact that "higher" animals are able to learn more complex problems than are "lower" forms. However, this generalization has frequently broken down, for there are many reports in which no apparent differences have been revealed between representative phyla or classes, and some instances in which "lower" forms surpassed "higher" forms in performance on learning tasks. It is this sort of finding that challenges the evolutionary hypothesis of behavioral development. It does not disprove such a hypothesis, but it does mean that close attention must be paid to the situations in which the tests are conducted and to the methods used in obtaining the scores that are to be compared. [See LEARNING, article on LEARNING IN CHILDREN.] A partial resolution of conflicts between evolutionary theory and data is found when one explores the proposition that certain "lower" species may have evolved highly specialized abilities to learn particular things in particular situations. It is part of the task of the comparative psychologist to recognize such occurrences and to try to identify the mechanisms that mediate their appearance. The acknowledgment of species-specific learning capacities does not help very much in demonstrating a general relationship between phyletic position and learning capacity, however. As has been noted, Thorndike's failure to find differences in the problem-solving performance of many different species diverted many from the use of comparative methods. The finding that if an animal could do a sim-
PSYCHOLOGY: Comparative Psychology pie learning task at all, it could do it about as well as any other animal was repeatedly corroborated. Some investigators, however, felt that differences between species might become apparent if more complex tests of animal "intelligence" were used. Delayed-response, multiple-choice, and doublealternation problems were among the many early tests devised to tap the higher mental processes of animals. More recently, such techniques as complex multiple-cue tasks (such as oddity, matching, and conditional-discrimination problems), probability-matching techniques, and both reversal learning-set and discrimination learning-set problems have been introduced. In the interpretation of results of comparative studies of learning a useful distinction can be made between quantitative and qualitative comparisons of performance. Almost all the early work consisted of attempts at quantitative comparison. Typically, scoring was on a continuum of some sort (number of seconds of delay possible, number of errors, running time, trials to criterion, etc.), and the idea was that different species ought to fall at different places on such a continuum. Since interspecific differences in sensory and motor capacities, to say nothing of motivational—emotional factors, are frequently considerable, the investigator who uses such an approach is faced with the difficult task of defining standard test situations and scoring procedures. A study by Schneirla (1946), in which the maze performance of rats and ants was compared, provides an illustration of what is meant by qualitative comparison. Schneirla demonstrated that rats learned more quickly than ants (a quantitative difference), but he emphasized his discovery that the way in which ants went about learning the maze was very different from the processes exhibited by the rats. Ants learned one section of the maze at a time, and the learning of one section resulted in an increase in errors on succeeding sections, as if the maze were "new" after each portion of the maze was completed. In addition, the ants eliminated blind alleys in the maze differently than did the rats, making successively shallower penetrations into cul-de-sacs while the rats tended to eliminate each wrong entry in an all-or-none fashion. When the maze was reversed after learning had been completed, the rats showed considerable savings, but ants acted as though the situation were totally new and had to be relearned from the beginning. Finally, ants did not show any goal gradient effect (earlier elimination of the blinds near the goal), while the rats did. Thus, a meaningful differentiation between the two species could
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be made on qualitative grounds in terms of how the animals went about learning and of what was learned. Bitterman (1960) and his associates have been among the first to adopt this qualitative approach. They have, for example, shown that the "Humphreys effect" (greater resistance to extinction after training under partial, as compared with continuous, reinforcement) does not occur in fish in the same manner as it does in rats. This indicates that, for fish, the relationship between the outcome of a response (its reinforcement) and the response is much more direct, and presumably simpler, than in higher vertebrates. A current trend in the comparative psychology of learning thus emphasizes a search for qualitative differences—a comparison of animals in terms of the extent to which they follow the same principles in their learning and whether the functions plotted from raw scores exhibit similar shapes or other characteristics. Warren (1965) has provided a comprehensive summary of both qualitative and quantitative comparative data on vertebrate learning performance. A final problem, cutting across all of the problems mentioned so far, is that of finding ways of equating testing situations so that comparisons can be made. As was noted earlier, the experimenter cannot be sure that in a "standard" situation an animal of one species can receive the same sensory information as one of another species, can perform the response with equal facility, or is similarly motivated. Failure to control these conditions can prevent any meaningful comparisons. Unfortunately, except perhaps with animals that have very similar sensory and motor capacities, it is difficult to control these factors by equating the tasks at hand, and even were this done, the problem of equating motivational state and controlling for different ecological backgrounds is extremely difficult. The way around these difficulties, as proposed by Bitterman (1960), is to employ the method of control by variation. If, for example, the absence of the Humphreys effect in fish is duplicated under different motivational states, and over other testing situations, etc., it would be fairly safe to say that a meaningful difference exists between these animals—fish and rats—relative to this effect. It would not be necessary to argue that the animals were tested under "culture free" conditions. Social behavior In its broadest sense "social behavior" refers to behavior elicited by and directed toward another individual or group. Such behavior is clearly interactive when the behavior of the first individual is
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modified by the response of the second individual or group. Social behavior as thus defined may be readily observed taking place between individuals of different species: the sheepherder's dog responds to signals given by his master as well as to the movements of the members of the flock; a predatory animal elicits "alarm" and "escape" or "defense" reactions from its potential prey; the mockingbird drives birds of another species away from its territory; and so on, with numerous other instances of interaction between species and between genera. More critical and significant for the purpose of the present review, however, is the social behavior taking place within species. It is from these studies that principles of group organization and types of social relationships are being uncovered. A comparative psychology of social behavior should be interested in such general questions as: Where, on the phylogenetic scale, does social behavior first occur? What is the relationship between position on the phyletic scale and the types of social behavior observed? On what bases may a classification of social behavior be made so that such comparisons are possible for both phylogenetic and ontogenetic development? With regard to the first question, one attempt at a solution has been to focus on the concepts of cooperation and competition. The animal sociologist W. C. Alice (1931; 1938) believed that even among simple organisms there exists an automatic, unconscious "protocooperation," which is a fundamental biological principle. This principle says that at the level of the social group the interrelations between individuals in the group are more helpful than harmful. True social behavior is thought to have developed from animal aggregations which, while initially formed by nonsocial forces, survived because of advantages obtained through proximity. According to Allee, subsequent development followed a familiar pattern: "Each advance in complexity came from the natural selection of an increased ability in natural cooperation on the part of the evolving stock; the greater natural cooperation came first, then it was selected. Cooperation is a biological necessity both in individual evolution and in the evolution of groups" ([1938] 1951, p. 211). One very important factor was the evolution of the cooperative functions involved in sexual reproduction. Allee (1931) thought it likely that sex originally arose from interorganismic stimulation produced as a consequence of the aggregation of simple asexual organisms. The appearance of sexual reproduction thus provided for the appear-
ance of the family, one of the basic units in true social groupings and social behavior. Closely allied with the concept of cooperation has been the problem of competition between individuals and the ways that have been developed for handling aggressive behavior (e.g., territoriality, dominance—subordination relationships, and the like). Aggressive behavior occurs in some of the higher invertebrates, but with few exceptions studies of aggression and fighting have been confined to vertebrates. The role of aggressive behavior in vertebrates has been described in a classic paper by Collias (1944). A more recent summary of concepts and data in the area of competition and cooperation (as well as papers on reproductive behaviors, socialization, and the evolution of signaling devices) can be found in the book Social Behavior and Organization Among Vertebrates, edited by Etkin (1964). It is quite possible that principles other than those of cooperation and competition underlie the evolutionary development of social behaviors, but alternative conceptual and theoretical models are not available. The question of the relation between phyletic level and the types of social behavior present has received little systematic study. There are a number of studies dealing with the social behavior of a given species, but they have not been ordered in a fashion that permits an approach to the determination of the relation between phyletic level and types of behavior exhibited. Not all investigators in the area have shown a desire for a classificatory system of social behavior, many apparently preferring to take the behavior as they see it without attempting to force it into rigid categories. It is clear, however, that some sort of classification is necessary if the search for phylogenetic relationships is to be taken seriously. The schema proposed by Scott is an example of an attempt at such a classification, and an example of its application for comparative purposes is available (1960, pp. 261-264). Tinbergen (1953) has provided an analysis of social behavior from the ethological point of view. Neither the Scott nor the Tinbergen classification in itself implies anything about the mechanisms by which social behavior is established. In actual fact, Tinbergen emphasizes the innateness of such behaviors, while Scott has stressed a "socialization" concept in which the effects of experience are presumed to play an important role. Insofar as flexibility and the ability to learn are related to the complexity of social responses, it may be suggested
PSYCHOLOGY: Comparative Psychology that "higher" animals are capable of assuming a wider variety of roles and relationships and that these are more interchangeable than they are in "lower" forms. This generalization has not, however, been extensively tested. Finally, the development of language provides for a tremendous increase in the communications that are so essential to social behavior, giving a significant advantage in the potential for social behavior. [See SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, ANIMAL.]
HOLLAND H. WATERS AND BRADFORD N. BUNNELL [See also ETHOLOGY. Other relevant material may be found in COMMUNICATION, ANIMAL; EVOLUTION; GENETICS; IMPRINTING; INSTINCT; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, article on ANIMAL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, ANIMAL; and in the biographies of DARWIN and MORGAN, C. LLOYD.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALLEE, W. C. 1931 Animal Aggregations: A Study in General Sociology. Univ. of Chicago Press. ALLEE, W. C. (1938) 1951 Cooperation Among Animals, With Human Implications. Rev. & enl. ed. New York: Schuman. -» First published as The Social Life of Animals. ARONSON, LESTER R. 1959 Hormones and Reproductive Behavior: Some Phylogenetic Considerations. Pages 98-120 in Columbia University Symposium on Comparative Endocrinology, Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y., 1958, Comparative Endocrinology: Proceedings. New York: Wiley. BEACH, FRANK A. 1950 The Snark Was a Boojum. American Psychologist 5:115-124. BEACH, FRANK A. 1955 The Descent of Instinct. Psychological Revieiv 62:401-410. BEACH, FRANK A.; and JAYNES, JULIAN 1954 Effects of Early Experience Upon the Behavior of Animals. Psychological Bulletin 51:239-263. BERLYNE, D. E. 1960 Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill. BITTERMAN, M. E. 1960 Toward a Comparative Psychology of Learning. American Psychologist 15:704-712. BUTLER, ROBERT A. 1953 Discrimination Learning by Rhesus Monkeys to Visual-exploration Motivation. Journal of Comparative and Plu/siological Psychology 46:95-98. CARMICHAEL, LEONARD 1927 A Further Study of the Development of Behavior in Vertebrates Experimentally Removed from the Influence of External Stimulation. Psychological Review 34:34-47. COLLIAS, N, E. 1944 Aggressive Behavior Among Vertebrate Animals. Physiological Zoology 17:83-123. ElBL-ElBESFELDT, IRENAUS; and KRAMER, SOL
1958
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ology: The Comparative Study of Animal Behavior. Quarterly Review of Biology 33:181-211. ETKIN, WILLIAM (editor) 1964 Social Behavior and Organization Among Vertebrates. Univ. of Chicago Press. FISHER, ALAN E. 1962 Effects of Stimulus Variation on Sexual Satiation in the Male Rat. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 55:614-620.
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FULLER, JOHN L.; and WALLER, MAREUS B. 1962 Is Early Experience Different? Pages 235-245 in E. L. Bliss (editor), Roots of Behavior: Genetics, Instinct, and Socialization in Animal Behavior. New York: Harper. GELBER, BEATRICE 1952 Investigations of the Behavior of Paramecium aurelia: 1. Modification of Behavior After Training With Reinforcement. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 45:58-65. HALE, E. B. 1962 Domestication and the Evolution of Behaviour. Pages 21-53 in E. S. E. Hafez (editor), The Behaviour of Domestic Animals. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. HALE, E. B.; and ALMQUIST, J. O. 1956 Effect of Changes in the Stimulus Field on Responsiveness of Bulls to a Constant Stimulus Animal. Anatomical Record 125: 607 only. HARLOW, HARRY F. 1958 The Nature of Love. American Psychologist 13:673-685. HARLOW, HARRY F.; HARLOW, M. K.; and MEYER, D. R. 1950 Learning Motivated by a Manipulation Drive. Journal of Experimental Psychology 40:228-234. HARLOW, HARRY F.; and MCCLEARN, GERALD E. 1954 Object Discrimination Learned by Monkeys on the Basis of Manipulation Motives. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 47:73-76. HESS, ECKHARD H. 1959 Imprinting. Science 130:133141. JACOBSON, ALLAN L. 1963 Learning in Flatworms and Annelids. Psychological Bulletin 60:74-94. JENSEN, DONALD D. 1957 Experiments on "Learning" in Paramecia. Science 125:191-192. Kuo, ZING YANG 1924 A Psychology Without Heredity. Psuchological Revieiv 31:427-448. Kuo, ZING YANG 1930 The Genesis of the Cat's Responses to the Rat. Journal of Comparative Psychology 11:1-35. LEHRMAN, DANIEL S. (1932) 1961 Hormonal Regulation of Parental Behavior in Birds and Infrahuman Mammals. Volume 2, pages 1268-1382 in W. C. Young (editor), Sex and Internal Secretions. 3d ed. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. LEHRMAN, DANIEL S. 1953 A Critique of Konrad Lorenz's Theory of Instinctive Behavior. Quarterly Review of Biology 28:337-363. LEHRMAN, DANIEL S. 1962 Interaction of Hormonal and Experiental Influences on Development of Behavior. Pages 142-156 in E. L. Bliss (editor), Roots of Behavior: Genetics, Instinct, and Socialization in Animal Behavior. New York: Harper. LEHRMAN, DANIEL S. 1964 Control of Behavior Cycles in Reproduction. Pages 143-166 in William Etkin (editor), Social Behavior and Organization Among Vertebrates. Univ. of Chicago Press. LEVINE, SEYMOUR 1962 Psychophysiological Effects of Infantile Stimulation. Pages 246-253 in E. L. Bliss (editor), Roots of Behavior: Genetics, Instinct, and Socialization in Animal Behavior. New York: Harper. LIVINGSTONE, ROBERT B. 1959 Central Control of Receptors and Sensory Transmission Systems. Volume 1, pages 741-760 in Handbook of Physiology. Section 1: Neurophysiology. Washington: American Physiological Society. LOEB, JACQUES 1918 Forced Movements, Tropisms, and Animal Conduct. Philadelphia: Lippincott. LORENZ, KONRAD Z. 1958 The Evolution of Behavior. Scientific American 199, no. 6:67-78.
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MAIER, NORMAN R. F.; and SCHNEIRLA, T. C. 1935 Principles of Animal Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. MILLER, NEAL E. 1951 Learnable Drives and Rewards. Pages 435-472 in S. S. Stevens (editor), Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: Wiley. MORGAN, C. LLOYD (1894) 1906 An Introduction to Comparative Psychology. 2d ed. New York: Scribner; London: Scott. RATNER, STANLEY C.; and DENNY, M. RAY 1964 Comparative Psychology: Research in Animal Behavior. Homewood, 111.: Dorsey. RIOPELLE, ARTHUR J. 1960 Complex Processes. Pages 208-249 in R. H. Waters, D. A. Rethlingshafer, and W. E. Caldwell (editors), Principles of Comparative Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. ROMANES, GEORGE J. (1883) 1910 Animal Intelligence. 9th ed. London: Routledge. ROSENBLATT, JAY S.; and ARONSON, LESTER R. 1958 The Decline of Sexual Behavior in Male Cats After Castration With Special Reference to the Role of Prior Sexual Experience. Behavior 12:285-338. SCHNEIRLA, T. C. 1946 Ant Learning as a Problem in Comparative Psychology. Pages 276-305 in P. L. Harriman (editor), Twentieth Century Psychology: Recent Developments in Psychology. New York: Philosophical Library. SCHNEIRLA, T. C. 1963 Comparative Psychology. Volume 18, pages 690-703 in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago: Benton. SCOTT, J. P. 1960 Comparative Social Psychology. Pages 250-288 in R. H. Waters, D. A. Rethlingshafer, and W. E. Caldwell (editors), Principles of Comparative Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. SCOTT, J. P.; and MARSTON, MARY V. 1950 Critical Periods Affecting the Development of Normal and Maladjustive Social Behavior of Puppies. Journal of Genetic Psychology 77:25-60. THORNDIKE, EDWARD L. (1898-1901) 1911 Animal Intelligence: Experimental Studies. New York: Macmillan. THORPE, WILLIAM H. (1956) 1963 Learning and Instinct in Animals. 2d ed., rev. & enl. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS 1951 The Study of Instinct. Oxford: Clarendon. TINBERGEN, NIKOLAAS 1953 Social Behaviour in Animals, With Special Reference to Vertebrates. London: Methuen. VALENSTEIN, ELLIOT S.; Riss, WALTER; and YOUNG, WILLIAM C. 1955 Experiential and Genetic Factors in the Organization of Sexual Behavior in Male Guinea Pigs. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 48:307-403. WARDEN, C. J. 1927 The Historical Development of Comparative Psychology, 4: From the Sixteenth Century to Darwin. Psychological Revieiv 34:135-168. WARREN, J. M. 1965 Primate Learning in Comparative Perspective. Pages 249-281 in Allan M. Schrier, Harry F. Harlow, and Fred Stollnitz (editors), Behavior of Nonhuman Primates: Modern Research Trends. New York: Academic Press. WUNDT, WILHELM (1864-1865) 1907 Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology, New York. Macmillan. -> First published in German. ZIMBARDO, PHILIP G. 1958 The Effects of Early Avoidance Training and Rearing Conditions Upon the Sexual Behavior of the Male Rat. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 51:764-769.
II PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Physiological psychology is the study of the physiological basis of behavior and mental life. In other words, it is concerned with the role of various organs of the body in psychological phenomena. Of these organs, the brain is clearly the most important, for it is the great coordinator and organizer of mental and behavioral events. The subdivision of physiological psychology concerned exclusively with the brain is known as neuropsychology—the title of the chair held by Karl Lashley at Harvard from 1937 until 1955. But other organs of the body also play important roles. These fall into two main categories: the sensory (receptor) systems and the motor (effector) systems. The motor systems include not only the skeletal and smooth muscles but also the endocrine glands. These latter, through their various effects on sensory and motor organs as well as on the nervous system itself, are proving to play an important role in the determination of behavior. Their role is, of course, biochemical. Also biochemical and included in physiological psychology are the influences of diet and of drugs. The general field of chemical influences on behavior has come to be called psychochemistry. That which is restricted to the effects of drugs is psychopharmacology. [See DRUGS, article on PSYCHO-PHARMACOLOGY; MENTAL DISORDERS, article on BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS; NERVOUS SYSTEM; SENSES.] In principle physiological psychology covers both human and animal activities, but in practice it has been more concerned with animal behavior. This is because the techniques for studying physiological correlates in man are limited largely to clinical observations or measurements, and these are not so illuminating or powerful as the experimental methods that can be used with animals. For example, experimental surgery and both electrical stimulation and recording deep within the organs of the body are seldom possible with human beings, but they are with animals. Similarly, there are restrictions on the use of drugs and biochemical agents which apply to human beings but not to animals. The situation is changing somewhat as new techniques become available, and the special field that emphasizes physiological correlates of human psychological phenomena has recently been called psychophysiology. Relationship to other fields. It should be noted that physiological psychology is related to three other fields: experimental psychology, psychobiology, and comparative psychology. Historically the term experimental psychology, introduced about
PSYCHOLOGY: Physiological Psychology 1880, meant the application of the experimental method to problems of psychology formerly addressed through philosophical reflection and observation. Today the term covers not only the method but the body of facts and principles acquired with the method. Since most of what is known in physiological psychology was learned from the experimental method, physiological psychology is largely a subdivision of experimental psychology. Psychobiology was a term widely used in the first part of the twentieth century, and then it fell into disuse. It has recently been revived, particularly among biologists, with the flowering of interest in differences in behavior among species. Etymologically, psychobiology could very well apply to any and all relations between psychological and biological phenomena, including physiological psychology. But scientific usage, being determined by scientists rather than etymologists, has narrowed the term primarily to species differences in behavior. Thus, psychobiology refers to the study of the behavior often observed in natural settings or in quasi-experimental situations as it relates to the biological and genetic characteristics of the species under study rather than to the functions of internal organs of the body. The term ethology has been used by European zoologists to refer to this kind of psychobiology. In the United States the term comparative psychology has come, at least among psychologists, to displace psychobiology. Comparative psychology, as the term implies, is supposed to be a comparison of the behavior of different species along the phyletic scale. However, because of the convenience and cheapness of the laboratory rat, so much of American comparative psychological research, until recently, was done with the rat that the term "comparative" was hardly justified. The situation has changed somewhat, but American experimental work with animal behavior is still better characterized as animal psychology than as comparative psychology. The ethology of the European zoologists is closer to the meaning of comparative psychology, even though it is more naturalistic and less exact than experimental animal psychology. [See ETHOLOGY and PSYCHOLOGY, article on COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY.] Methods. Physiological psychology employs the methods of several fields but principally, of course, those of psychology and physiology. A typical experiment or study consists of correlating a psychological variable and a physiological variable. That 18 to say, any psychological experiment of interest be combined with some physiological inter-
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vention. Since psychological experiments are well covered in other articles in this encyclopedia, only physiological methods will be discussed briefly here. These fall into four main groups: (1) neuroanatomical methods, (2) electrical recording, (3) stimulation methods, and (4) hormonal and biochemical methods. Neuroanatomical methods usually consist first of some means of destroying some particular part of the nervous system and then of determining exactly what was destroyed so that the loss of a structure may be correlated with some behavioral variable. Destruction of a neural structure results in a lesion or an ablation, lesion being the more general and frequently employed term. Two methods of making lesions are in general use: (1) The classical method is one of open, or gross, surgery, in which the brain is exposed and the lesion is made by cutting or burning the structure of interest; (2) a newer and, for many purposes, more precise method that is particularly suited for work with deep structures is the electrolytic method. In this case the lesion is made by passing current through the tip of an electrode located in the structure of interest. To determine afterward what lesion has been made by one or the other of these methods, the brain is usually sliced, mounted on slides, and stained to show cells that have been destroyed or left intact. Because injury to any part of a neuron in the central nervous system causes destruction of the whole neuron, the method of degeneration, that is, of tracing the pathways and centers of dead cells, is often used in reconstructing the lesions that have been made. A second major technique used in physiological psychology is that of electrical recording of potential changes in various parts of the nervous system. The galvanic skin response (GSR) is one such recording made on peripheral nervous effects. Recordings made from the central nervous system fall into three main categories: (1) an electroencephalogram (EEC) of the spontaneous fluctuations in potential ("brain waves"), (2) gross action potentials of nerves or of sensory pathways, and (3) microelectrode recordings made from single cells or small groups of cells. The last two types of recording are usually "time locked," that is, made with reference to some sensory or electrical stimulus applied at a given time for a given duration. [See NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY.]
Stimulation methods, a third class of methods, consist of the electrical or chemical stimulation of the brain. In the past, electrical methods have been most prevalent, but recently techniques for chem-
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ical stimulation have been improved and are coming into greater use. Either method may be used in exploratory or chronic form. In exploratory form the stimulus is applied at different points in the exposed brain, and the effects are noted. The electrical-stimulation method was first used to map the motor cortex; in recent years it has sometimes been used with conscious human patients to map motor, sensory, and association areas of the cerebral cortex. Chronic stimulation may be achieved by setting in place surgically an implanted electrode (for electrical stimulation) or cannula (for chemical stimulation) and after surgical recovery, using the implant, at will, to stimulate the otherwise normal, intact animal. Electrical stimulation applied in this way may be either aversive or rewarding. Chemical methods of stimulation through implants are chiefly being used to study the structures involved in such physiological drives as hunger, thirst, and sex. [See NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on BRAIN STIMULATION; see also DRIVES.] The fourth general class of physiological methods, namely the hormonal and biochemical methods, consists of any intervention in the biochemical systems of the body. The oldest form of this method is the removal of an endocrine gland, such as the gonads, to determine its effects on behavior. This gland removal may be combined with replacement therapy, in which the hormone normally made by a gland is injected in its absence. Replacement therapy has the advantage of allowing the reversal of hormonal conditions by the experimenter at some later time. In recent years, with advancing knowledge in psychopharmacology and in biochemistry, chemical methods increasingly employ the administration of drugs or of other biochemical substances through the mouth, directly into the blood stream, and sometimes to the brain itself. [See DRUGS, article on PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, article on SEXUAL DEVIATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
Major areas Physiological psychology concerns the same areas as human and animal experimental psychology: (1) sensory processes, (2) motor functions, (3) motivation, (4) learning, and (5) complex processes, including language, thinking, and social behavior. The amount of information available about each area is progressively smaller in the order mentioned. This comes about partly because techniques for the psychological study of sensory and motor functions are more highly developed and partly because more complex processes are most prominent in higher animals and man, where
it is difficult or sometimes impossible to employ the appropriate physiological techniques. The remainder of this article will summarize the principal conclusions that can be drawn from the field of physiological psychology at the present time. The purpose is to give an over-all picture that will integrate and supplement the several articles in this encyclopedia covering or touching upon specific topics in physiological psychology. Sensory systems. Elsewhere in this encyclopedia are separate articles covering the various senses. They therefore will not be discussed separately here. Rather we shall be concerned with the general features of sensory function. Each of the senses responds to a different form of energy: electromagnetic, mechanical, chemical, etc. Whatever the energy of stimulation, however, the first step in the processing of sensory information is a transduction of energy into an electrical form known as the generator potential. This is a graded, fluctuating potential that does not follow the well-known all-or-none law. Rather its magnitude is proportional to the intensity of the impinging stimulus. When the stimulus is a vibration or oscillation, as in hearing, the generator potential also oscillates and reflects rather faithfully the transitory changes in the stimulus. When the stimulus is a steady one, as in continuous stimulation of the eye by light, the generator potential also rises to, and maintains, some steady value. The transduction process in which the generator potential arises is different in the different senses. In the eye a photochemical event intervenes; light decomposes photosensitive molecules, and this decomposition gives rise to generator potentials. In the ear, pressure changes in the inner ear act on hair cells, which generate a potential. Other senses have not been so carefully studied in this regard, but in each case the intervening event giving rise to the generator potential seems to be either mechanical or chemical. The generator potential in turn gives rise to the now-familiar nervous impulse. This follows the allor-none law of either not occurring at all or of appearing at a fixed amplitude. These nervous impulses, or in physiological parlance, spike potentials, propagate inward from the sense organ to the central nervous system and are the sensory messengers. Their number is proportional to the size of the generator potential and hence reflects the intensity of the stimulus. The identity of different kinds of receptors is maintained fairly well in the sensory pathways but not in any simple fashion. In the eye, for example, there are at least three different kinds of color
PSYCHOLOGY: Physiological Psychology receptors, each most responsive to a different part of the visible spectrum. Farther along the visual pathways, in the thalamus and cerebral cortex, one can find, using microelectrodes, nerve cells that respond specifically to different parts of the spectrum. At this level, however, there is evidence of an interaction of receptors. Different receptors play upon the same central neuron, some exciting and some inhibiting it, and its response therefore is a complex function of the activities of different receptors. Similar statements can be made for all the senses. Many central neurons respond specifically to certain patterns of stimulation on the periphery. All sensory systems have a topographical projection. That is to say, they maintain in various degrees the spatial relations of the peripheral receptors. The most precise case of topographical projection is found in the visual system, where there is a point-to-point projection of the retina on the visual cortex. Such a projection distorts the peripheral map, a relatively larger area of the cortex being given over to the highly acute fovea than to the less acute peripheral retina. This kind of distortion is seen in all the senses, but topographical relations are nevertheless maintained. Generally speaking, spatial and qualitative aspects of sensory experience are mediated at the cortical level, and the intensive aspects of experience are processed subcortically. In higher vertebrates, for example, removal of the visual cortex causes pattern blindness but leaves the animal able to discriminate differences in intensity. Similarly, animals deprived of auditory cortex are deficient in sound localization and in pitch discrimination but are able to respond to the presence or absence of sounds if they are not too weak. Similar examples could be given in the other senses. To summarize, then, peripheral stimuli impinging on receptors are first transduced into graded generator potentials. These give rise to all-or-none spike potentials which propagate centrally. Many central neurons have specific functions representing different kinds of peripheral stimulation, but they reflect interaction of many neurons playing u pon them. All sensory systems maintain a topographical orientation. In general, the cerebral cortex is necessary for responding to the spatial and qualitative aspects of stimulation but not to its intensive aspects. [See NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN.] Motor functions. Let us turn now to the motor functions. These may be considered, for the present Purposes, in three general classes: (1) skilled acts, (2) postural reactions, and (3) emotional reac-
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tions. In higher vertebrates the ability to make highly skilled motions, such as the manipulation of objects, depends on the integrity of the cerebral cortex and even more specifically on the motor (precentral) area of the cortex lying just in front of the central fissure. Removal of this area, including some fringe portions of it lying behind the central fissure, causes paralysis. The maintenance of tone in skeletal muscles, the keeping of one's balance and upright posture, and certain other specific reactions, such as righting reflexes, are included in the term postural reactions. These depend on a complex system in the brain which includes several parts of the cerebral cortex, principally those lying in front of and behind the motor cortex, several subcortical structures, and the cerebellum of the hindbrain. There are certain specific effects of injury to any one of these structures, but the system also tends to work as a whole, so that the more of it that is intact the better the postural adjustment of the organism. Emotional reactions depend upon both cortical and subcortical structures of the cerebrum, but the most important ones are subcortical. The cerebral cortex exercises considerable control over the timing and intensity of emotional reactions, but the primary emotional mechanisms are to be found in a complex of centers and pathways known as the limbic system. Of these, three structures are most prominent: the septal area, the amygdala, and the hypothalamus. The hypo thalamus seems to be the principal organ of integrating patterns of emotional expression, but it is controlled or modulated by opposing influences from the septum and amygdala. In general, the septum is inhibitory; removing it causes an animal to be hyperemotional. The amygdala, on the other hand, is mostly, though probably not entirely, excitatory; removing it causes docility. [See EMOTION.] Motivation. Turning now to a third area of physiological psychology, that of motivation, we may note that rapid progress has been made in this area in recent years, largely through the use of electrodes and cannulas implanted in the deep structures of the brain. The general picture emerging from this work is as follows: Physiological drives such as hunger, thirst, and sex are based in chemical conditions of the blood. What these conditions are is not always precisely known, but whatever they are, they come to affect behavior by circulating in the blood to the hypothalamus and there affecting certain specific cells and centers. There are, for example, certain cells in the hypothalamus that respond to the female hormone, estrogen, and are responsible for the behavior of, say, a cat in
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heat. This is demonstrated by bringing animals into heat by applying small quantities of estrogen to the cells of the hypothalamus and then, by carbon 14 tagging of the estrogen, determining that the estrogen has been taken up by certain cells and not by others. Although not all experiments are as dramatic, many lead to the conclusion that motivated behavior is aroused by certain hypothalamic cells responding much like chemical receptors to chemical conditions in the blood. Within the hypothalamus, motivational centers appear to work in pairs. This statement is well substantiated for hunger and sleep but is not yet so clear for thirst and sex. In hunger a satiety center is found in the ventromedial region of the thalamus, and a hunger center in the ventrolateral region. One is called a satiety center because its removal causes an enormous increase in food intake (hyperphagia); the other, a hunger center, because its removal causes the opposite effect, namely, such a remarkable loss of hunger that animals starve to death unless artificial means of keeping them alive are employed. A thirst center is difficult to distinguish anatomically from the hunger center, for damage to the hunger center causes a primary disturbance of thirst (adipsia), but there are probably different cells in this region subserving hunger and thirst. Substantial increases and decreases in sexual behavior may follow experimental lesions in the hypothalamus, but the arrangement of hypothalamic centers for sexual behavior has not been clearly defined. In any case, fundamental mechanisms for the control of physiological drives are located in the hypothalamus. These are aroused by chemical conditions in the blood, and they are also, of course, affected by inputs from sense organs and from higher cerebral structures, including the cerebral cortex. [See DRIVES; MOTIVATION; SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, article on
as raising of the paw to a signal in order to avoid shock. The difficulty is partly that decortication considerably reduces the motor ability of the animal and partly that the decorticate is more easily aroused emotionally by the noxious shock. If care is taken to keep the animal quiet, by presenting a weak shock and allowing a considerable interval between conditioning trials, even an instrumental response may be conditioned. Although we are certain that the cerebral cortex is not necessary for conditioning, it is hard to say just what parts of the nervous system are. Although some work has been done on spinal animals, it is doubtful that conditioning can take place at the level of the spinal animal. On the other hand, conditioning has been obtained in decerebrate animals whose brains have been transected at the midbrain level. Hence, it appears that the simple phenomenon of conditioning can occur at the level of the hindbrain. In recent years there has been considerable interest in the electrical correlates of conditioning. This interest has been pursued by recording the electroencephalogram or other oscillations in brain activity at different sites in the brain during the course of conditioning. It is difficult as yet to draw many conclusions from this work. One result, however, does turn up repeatedly. In the reticular activating system, as well as in other structures related to it, an increase in electrical activity accompanies the early stages of conditioning. As the conditioned response is perfected, however, this activity usually subsides. This electrical correlate appears to reflect attention and arousal. As conditioning trials proceed, the animal becomes more alert and attentive to the conditioning situation. But later, as the conditioned response becomes more "automatic," such attention wanes and along with it its electrical correlate. [Sec LEARNING, articles on CLASSICAL
ANIMAL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR.]
CONDITIONING, INSTRUMENTAL LEARNING, AVOIDANCE LEARNING; S66 also ATTENTION.]
Conditioning and learning. A fourth major area of physiological psychology is the study of the neural mechanisms of conditioning and learning. This area is conveniently divided into three subareas: (1) conditioning, (2) discriminative learning, and (3) problem solving and maze learning. [See LEARNING, especially the article on NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
Contrary to Pavlov's assumption in his early work on conditioning, the cerebral cortex is not necessary for conditioning to take place. Animals that are completely decorticate can be conditioned in the classical sense to make some response to a signal. Difficulty arises, however, when an attempt is made to produce an instrumental response, such
and
Discriminative learning is learning in which the organism learns to make one response to one stimulus and another response (sometimes this is the withholding of response) to another stimulus. Most of the results of research on the neural mechanisms of discriminative learning can be predicted from a knowledge of the sensory mechanisms discussed above. Each sensory system has its area of projection in the cerebral cortex. This projection is concerned primarily with spatial and qualitative aspects of a stimulus. Hence, an animal lacking its visual cortex is unable to learn a visual-pattern discrimination, and one deprived of its auditory cortex is unable to make good sound localizations.
PSYCHOLOGY: Physiological Psychology In each case, however, the deficit appears to be one of sensory capacity rather than an inability to learn apart from sensory capacity. The problem becomes more intricate, however, when we turn to intensity discrimination. The capacity to make such a discrimination is not dependent upon the cerebral cortex. Yet animals that have learned a discrimination and are then subjected to removal of the relevant projection area usually lose all memory of the discrimination they have learned. On the other hand, however, they are capable of relearning it in about the same number of trials as they required originally. It is this phenomenon, which has been obtained many times, that led Lashley to propose the principle of equipotentiality, namely, that when one part of a sensory system is injured, other parts of the system have the capacity to take over the function impaired by the injury. This, however, is not a very satisfying explanation, and the matter is still under study. [See LEARNING, article on DISCRIMINATION LEARNING.]
Problem solving and maze learning are in the class that Edward L. Thorndike called trial-anderror learning. Put in a problem box, the animal tries one thing, then another, and finally strikes on the "trick"—which might consist of operating a latch—that solves the problem, say, of obtaining food. Or put in a maze, the subject wanders in and out of blind and correct alleys until it finally comes to the reward. In general, the ability to learn by trial and error depends on the cerebral cortex. If the problem is very simple, requiring only some gross movement like stepping on a pedal, most of the cortex can be removed without impairing this learning ability. The more complex the problem, however, the more the cerebral cortex is required. In fairly difficult problems, whose solution borders on requiring the use of reasoning, very small cortical lesions may seriously impair problem-solving ability. However, in all cases a distinction must be made between learning and retention. A lesion made after a problem has been learned may seriously impair retention, but if more training trials are given, the subject may learn the solution again. This is another instance of what Lashley called equipotentiality. Also, for fairly complex problems there is not much localization of function; the mass of cortex intact rather than a particular locus is what determines degree of retention or of learning ability. This is what Lashley called mass action. In making these statements, we must qualify them according to the species we are talking about. The primate brain is more highly organized than
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the rat's brain, and there is a correspondingly higher degree of localization in it than in the rat's brain. In the primate brain, for example, there is a well-defined area of the temporal lobe that is concerned with the learning and retention of visual discriminations. If this area exists in the rat brain, it is not well delineated. Language and complex processes. A fifth major area of physiological psychology is the study of complex processes, such as language and thinking, and their neural correlates. Although the most interesting of all the areas of physiological psychology, it is the one about which the least is known. This is partly because of the difficulty of studying brain functions in man, in whom these processes are most highly developed, and partly because the processes are inherently difficult to study with any precision. There are, however, certain conclusions that can be drawn at this time. One is that there is generally more localization of function in man and primates than in lower animals, although this localization is by no means precise. More specifically, we find that the prefrontal lobes lying in front of the motor areas are concerned with expressive functions, particularly with those that require planning and doing things in a prescribed order. The posterior cortex is more concerned with receptive functions. In it are the primary sensory projection areas found in lower animals, but also quite massive "association" areas. Many of these areas have either an unknown or a diffuse function, but some are clearly concerned in certain kinds of memory and recognition abilities. Language, of course, holds a peculiar fascination because it is the most complex of all behavior functions and is uniquely human. For just that reason, however, our knowledge of its physiological mechanisms is limited, being based solely on clinical cases of brain injury. It is fairly well established, however, that the left side of the cerebral cortex is almost always the seat of language functions. Injuries to the right cerebral cortex seldom affect language ability, while those to the left, if of any consequence, almost always do. A large area of the left hemisphere is concerned in language; it extends forward into the frontal lobes and backward into the temporal and parietal lobes. Within this large area there is some localization of different kinds of language functions, but not a great deal. As research proceeds and our methods of analysis become more refined, we should gain a clearer picture of the way the brain coordinates complex functions. [See LANGUAGE and MENTAL DISORDERS, article on ORGANIC ASPECTS.] CLIFFORD T. MORGAN
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[Directly related are the entries DRUGS, article on PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY; MENTAL DISORDERS, article On BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS; NERVOUS SYSTEM; SENSES.
Other relevant material may be found in HEARING; PAIN; SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS; TASTE AND SMELL; VISION; and in the biographies of BROCA; FLOURENS; LASHLEY.] BIBLIOGRAPHY COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES 1961 Brain Mechanisms and Learning. Edited by R. W. Gerard, A. Fessard, and J. Konorski. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. DETHIER, V. G.; and STELLAR, ELIOT (1961) 1964 Animal Behavior: Its Evolutionary and Neurological Basis. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Handbook of Physiology. Section 1: Neurophysiology. Edited by John Field et al. 3 vols. 1959-1960. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. ISAACSON, ROBERT L. (editor) 1964 Basic Readings in Neuropsychology. New York: Harper. LASHLEY, KARL S. (1915-1958) 1960 The Neuropsychology of Lashley: Selected Papers. Edited by Frank A. Beach et al. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» Published posthumously. MORGAN, CLIFFORD T. (1943) 1965 Physiological Psychology. 3d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. POLIDORA, V. J.; and BOWMAN, R. E. 1966 Psychochemistry. Pages 183-208 in Joseph E. Sidowski (editor), Experimental Methods and Instrumentation in Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. SHEER, DANIEL E. (editor) 1961 Electrical Stimulation of the Brain: An Interdisciplinary Survey of Neurobehavioral Integrative Systems. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press. SYMPOSIUM ON THE FRONTAL GRANULAR CORTEX AND BEHAVIOR, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, 1962 1964 The Frontal Granular Cortex and Behavior. Edited by J. M. Warren and K. Akert. New York: McGraw-Hill. SYMPOSIUM ON INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, 1955 1958 Biological and Biochemical Bases of Behavior. Edited by Harry F. Harlow and Clinton N. Woolsey. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. TEITELBAUM, PHILIP 1967 Physiological Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. UHR, LEONARD; and MILLER, JAMES G. (editors) 1960 Drugs and Behavior. New York: Wiley. WOOLDRIDGE, DEAN E. 1963 The Machinery of the Brain. New York: McGraw-Hill. ZANGWILL, O. L. 1960 Cerebral Dominance and Its Relation to Psychological Function. Edinburgh: Oliver. Ill CONSTITUTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
The term human constitution refers to the sum total of the morphological, psychological, physiological, and biochemical characteristics of an individual which are mainly determined by genetic factors but which are influenced in varying degrees by environmental conditions. One of the main objectives of the study of the human constitution is the discovery of significant relationships among
these characteristics and between them and pathological and behavioral characteristics. The field of study includes ascertaining the nature of individual variations, their determinants, and the extent to which they are governed by genetic and environmental influences respectively. Those attributes that show marked variability between individuals and relative constancy within the individual are the ones most likely to be useful for research purposes. Historical perspective. Throughout the ages there has been interest in finding clues to a person's personality, temperament, behavior, and susceptibility to disease. Aristotle, for example, founded the science of physiognomy, which attempted to relate a person's mental and moral qualities to his external lineaments. Hippocrates and Galen described specific physical types with characteristic temperamental dispositions and specific susceptibility to different diseases. In more recent times, Beneke (1881) published data on organ size in various diseases and in relation to various physical types. During the same period, Giovanni, the founder of clinical anthropometry, tried to establish that the cause of the special morbidity of an organ was based on its disproportionate development relative to other parts of the body (1891). Kretschmer (1921) published his classic study Physique and Character, in which he described relationships between different types of physique and predisposition to different psychiatric illnesses. He considered that there is a clear biological affinity between manic-depressive illness and the broad or pyknic type of body build and that schizophrenic patients commonly exhibit the characteristic features of the narrow or leptosomatic physique and certain types of dysplasia, or physiques in which there is uneven growth in different body regions. Kretschmer also extended the scope of his theory to the relationship between physique and normal personality types. He considered that there is a gradation of temperament characteristics from the manic-depressive through the cycloid psychopathological form to the normal cyclothymic personality and, likewise, a gradation of characteristics from schizophrenia through schizoid psychopathology to the normal, welladjusted schizothyme. He considered that schizoids and schizothymes tend to have leptosomatic, athletic, and dysplastic physiques and that cycloids and cyclothymes tend to have pyknic physiques. Kretschmer's work stimulated a great deal of research and, in fact, was responsible for the recrudescence of interest in constitutional psychology, which had, up until then, been relegated to the
PSYCHOLOGY: Constitutional Psychology background by the growth of knowledge in pathology and bacteriology relating to the causation of disease. [See the biography of KRETSCHMER.] Major approaches In recent years there have been considerable advances in the study of constitutional psychology through the development of new techniques and methods of investigation. The following are the main approaches: Factor analysis and other statistical procedures for elucidating the variables underlying body build; Sheldon's classification of somatotypes; Lindegard's method of assessing body build; analysis of tissue components; studies of androgyny; and genetic and growth studies. From the time that Hippocrates divided physiques into the habitus phthisicus, or narrow type, and the habitus apoplecticus, or broad type, many different systems of classifying physiques have appeared. These are summarized by Rees (1960), who noted that the majority of authors had independently described more or less corresponding physical types with a dichotomy of contrasting, antithetical types as extremes, and with intermediate types in some classifications. The basis of these classifications was not scientific but reflected preconceived ideas about the nature of variations of physique and suppositions based on alleged physiological, dietetic, and developmental characteristics. The concept of physical types as disparate or mutually exclusive categories has now been replaced by the concept of a continuous variation in body build. The field of constitutional research had been handicapped by the fact that the full extent of the variations in physique in the normal population was not made known and that the various proposed typological classifications were based on unverified hypotheses. What was needed was an inductive method that would ascertain the nature of the variations of physique in the normal population and describe these variations most effectively and economically. Factor analysis, which had proved fruitful in the study of intelligence, provided one such method. Factor analysis. Factor analysis provided a relatively objective and inductive method of elucidating the variation of physique in the normal population and describing it in an economical and effective way. Factor analysis reduces a large number of variables to a smaller number of categories or factors that can account for the correlations between the original variables. It has a special advantage for the study of the human constitution in that it can account for a representation of human
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physique which is far more comprehensive than that given by anthropometric measurements alone. [See FACTOR ANALYSIS.] The method of factor analysis may be applied to traits or to persons. The factor analysis of persons provides a method of determining how true an individual is to a particular type and involves the specification of the type in question by a set of representative measurements expressed in standard measure. The correlation between the person's measurements and those of a standard pattern indicates how nearly he approximates a perfect representative of that type. This method presupposes that the characteristics of the type have already been clearly established; it is, therefore, not used for ascertaining the nature of the variations in human physique that are useful in delineating physical types. Most factor analyses of physique deal with traits; the steps required for employing factor analysis on physical constitution in this way are as follows: First, a random and representative sample of the normal population is selected and a comprehensive series of anthropometric measurements covering all parts and dimensions of the body is taken on the sample. Each measurement is correlated with all the other measurements for the total group, providing a correlation matrix. One of the primary assumptions in factor analysis is that when a correlation exists between any two variables, they must share a common factor. The next step is the discovery of the factors accounting for the correlations. The effect of each discovered factor is removed from the matrix before extracting the next factor. This process is repeated until the residual correlations are statistically insignificant. Some factor techniques may extract factors that are independent, that is, factors that are themselves uncorrelated or orthogonal. Other techniques involve matrix rotation, in an attempt to get a better description of groups of correlations and produce correlated or oblique factors. Factor analysis also indicates which measurements are likely to be most effective for discriminating physical types. Such measurements may be combined to form indexes of body build, either in the form of suitably constructed ratios or in the form of regression equations of weighted measurements. To illustrate the use of factor methods in analyzing physique, the results obtained by Rees (1950a) for a group of 200 adult men and a group of 200 adult women are presented briefly. Some 18 anthropometric measurements were taken on both groups and were intercorrelated and factor analyzed. For
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both men and women the correlation coefficients between all physical measurements were positive. A general factor was extracted first and was found to contribute 34 per cent of the variance. The second factor extracted was bipolar, having positive saturations with length measurements and negative saturations with breadth and circumference measurements. These two factors were found in both the male and female groups. This second factor clearly differentiates two extremes: the linear type of physique—length measurements preponderant in relation to breadth and circumference; and the broad type—breadth, width, and circumference measurements preponderant over length. In the males two measurements, namely, stature and transverse chest diameter, had particularly high loadings on the second factor. These measurements were combined as follows to form the Rees-Eysenck index of body build: Stature x 100 Transverse chest diameter x 6 In the female group there were four measurements with high loadings on the second factor: stature, height of the top of the symphysis pubis from the ground, hip circumference, and chest circumference. It was not feasible to construct a simple female index along the lines of the one for men; thus, the Rees index of female body build was devised as a regression equation based on standard measurement units (Rees 1950a): 0.59 stature + 0.47 symphysis height + 0.31 chest circumference — 0.64 hip circumference. These indexes have been calculated for large groups of subjects and in all instances there was a unimodal frequency distribution approximating the normal frequency curve. There was no evidence of multimodality or bimodality as there would be if the physical types represented mutually exclusive, disparate categories. What was found was a continuous variation in physique from one extreme to the other, the extremes of the distribution being present only as easily noticeable but infrequently occurring types. Any such division into physical types, although convenient and sometimes necessary for research, is arbitrary. One standard deviation above and below the mean were considered to be statistically acceptable arbitrary demarcation points dividing the distribution into three classes: (1) leptomorphs, with a preponderance of length dimensions compared with breadth, width, and circumference; (2) eurymorphs, with large circumference, breadth,
and width measurements in comparison to length; (3) mesomorphs, with an intermediate relationship between lateral and circumference dimensions on the one hand and linear measurements on the other. These categories of physique are not intended to convey the impression of disparate types and are, in fact, ranges of body build objectively measured by new indexes of physique and demarcated by statistical criteria for purposes of description and research. These findings, derived from groups of adult British men and women, are consistent with those of a large number of other researchers using factor methods in groups of different ages, racial composition, and socioeconomic status. Burt (1938), who was the pioneer of the factor analysis of physique, described the results he obtained for groups of British children and adults and found a well-marked general factor, as well as factors accounting for disproportionate growth in length on the one extreme and breadth, thickness, circumference, and weight on the other extreme. A summary of these studies is presented in detail by Rees (1960). The factors obtained from factor analysis of anthropometric measurements will, of course, depend on the selection and the number of original measurements used. Howells (1952) carried out a factor analysis on physical measurements of university students; the data included a large number of head and face dimensions. There were three limb measurements and three facial-length measurements. Howells extracted a factor for limb and facial length and concluded that the extraction probably depended more on the measurements chosen than on growth patterns. In all, he found seven factors, which he interpreted as relating to general body size, long-bone length, cranial size, brain size, lateral facial cranial development, face length, and ear size. These can be grouped into four size factors, two length factors, and a breadth factor. Sheldon's varieties of physique. Sheldon's system of classifying physique (1940) was based initially on the inspection of standardized photographs of a large number of individuals. He concluded that there are three components in physique: endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy. These, he considered, consist of tissues derived from the three germinal layers: the endoderm, the mesoderm, and the ectoderm. Each subject was observed and rated on three 7-point scales, one for each component. For example, a rating of 7-1-1 represents extreme endomorphy, preponderant in breadth and circumference measurements; a 1-7-1 rating
PSYCHOLOGY: Constitutional Psychology represents extreme mesomorphy, with marked bone and muscle developments, broad shoulders, and muscular limbs; a rating of 1—1—7 reflects extreme ectomorphy, characterized by linearity and relatively poor development of breadth, width, and circumference measurements. Sheldon's method was an advance over previous typologies, which tended to regard physical types as disparate and mutually exclusive categories. Sheldon's method has been criticized because of its subjectivity and because of evidence showing that an individual somatotype, contrary to Sheldon's claim, is not necessarily constant for a particular individual. Changes in a person's somatotype occur with changes in his diet and with increase in his age. In spite of its subjectivity, it has been demonstrated that retest reliability of ratings by experienced workers is high. Sheldon's assumption that his three components are composed of tissues derived from the three primary germinal layers has not been established, and the number of components underlying variations of physique described by Sheldon is now under considerable doubt because a number of workers have demonstrated that the data can be fully explained in terms of two components rather than three. Humphreys (1957) found that the correlations between endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy provided by Sheldon indicate the existence of only two independent (but not necessarily valid) types of physique. Furthermore, Howells (1952), using factor analysis of persons who were markedly dominant in one or another of the three components, found that the factors extracted do not correspond with Sheldon's three components. He found that ectomorphy and endomorphy are not independent factors but are opposite extremes of a continuum and manifestations of a single factor. Modifications of Sheldon's method. Parnell (1958) pointed out some inherent disadvantages in Sheldon's system, namely, the subjectivity of the method of estimating somatotype dominance, personal objections by subjects to being photographed in the nude, and technical difficulties in obtaining the equipment necessary for carrying out photography for somatotyping. Parnell's method involves taking measurements of height, weight, bones, muscle, girth, and skinfolds of subcutaneous fat. Parnell uses ratings of fat, muscularity, and linearity in place of Sheldon's endoroorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy (bone development is included in the estimate of muscularity), and an individual is rated according to these three factors. Primary dominance is indi-
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cated by the capital letters F, M, L and secondary dominance by the small letters f, m, and /. The disadvantage of this system is the use of fat and muscularity, which can show relatively marked variation in the individual during his lifetime, sometimes within a comparatively short period of time. Lindegard's assessment of body build. Lindegard (1953) concluded from his studies that there are four factors responsible for the variations in body build: length, sturdiness, muscle, and fat. His method involves rating a person's dimensions on scales representing each of these factors. The length factor is derived from the length of the radius and tibia; the sturdiness factor is derived from the breadth of the femoral condyle, bimalleolar and bistyloid breadths, and the distance between the nasion and the sella turcica, measured by X-ray cephalometry; the muscle factor is derived from dynamometer readings of hand grip and foot press; and the fat factor is derived from girth and body weight and girth of the extremities. The length, sturdiness, and muscle factors are determined directly, but the fat factor is deduced by comparing the weight and extremital girths with the skeletal build and muscle factor. The four factors are plotted on a graph in terms of standard deviation. Lindegard found that length, sturdiness, and muscle factors are interdependent, and he dealt with this by regression techniques, which yield a relative sturdiness factor and a relative muscle factor. The relative sturdiness factor expresses the skeletal sturdiness in relation to the length factor. The relative muscle factor is expressed in terms of the dynamometer readings in relationship to stature. The weakness of Lindegard's system is the probable inconstancy of dynamometric recordings in an individual and the possibility that they might be altered within a short space of time by training and exercise and are influenced by age, disease, etc. Tissue components, androgyny, gynandromorphy. The measurement of the relative development of bone, connective tissue, fat, and muscle is a comparatively recent development and could be a useful complementary method to factorial studies of physique and to Lindegard's system and Sheldon's somatotyping method. The usual method is to use standardized X rays of the calf to measure the relative thickness of bone, fat, and muscle. The relative amounts of these factors in the calf have been found to be more or less independent of each other. The terms androgyny and gynandromorphy refer respectively to the degree of femininity of body
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build in the male and the degree of masculinity of body build in the female. Two distinct methods have been employed to assess androgyny: subjective procedures, consisting of assessment and rating of general appearance and special features, and objective anthropometric measurements, such as those described by Tanner (1951). Tanner used the method of discriminant analysis to ascertain the best possible discrimination between males and females with regard to biacromial diameter and bi-iliac diameter. He found that the best index for discriminating the sexes is Biacromial diameter x 3 — Bi-iliac diameter — 82. Tanner (1955) considers that androgyny, in contrast to somatotype, is determined by events taking place at adolescence. Androgyny scores have been used recently to study relationships with academic and athletic performance, physical efficiency, and various diseases. Genetic factors and growth processes. Important morphological characteristics such as body size, body shape, and body composition are a function of growth rates, which, in turn, are determined by genes in interaction with environmental influences. Polymorphism, or natural variability, is a consequence of genetic and physiological reaction to the environment. Twin studies are useful in ascertaining the relative importance of genetic and environmental factors in determining various bodily dimensions. Dahlberg (1926) compared the variability in anthropometric measurements between nonidentical and identical twins. It was found that 90 per cent of the variability of body length measurements, and slightly less for body breadth, head, and face dimensions, was determined by heredity. The majority of bodily dimensions, as well as variations in body size and body shape, are distributed along a normal frequency curve. This is in keeping with the hypothesis of multifactorial inheritance of these characteristics. It has been demonstrated in animals that general body size is largely determined by genetic factors. It is particularly interesting to note that Gregory and Castle (1931) demonstrated that differences in growth, measured by the number of blastomeres as early as 36 hours after fertilization, exist between large and small varieties of rabbits. Skeletal age, measured by the degree to which ossification centers and epiphyses are developed, has been shown by Reynolds (1943) to be largely genetically determined, with a correlation of .71 in identical twins, a correlation of .28 in siblings, .1 in first cousins, and .01 in unrelated persons.
Age at menarche is a convenient measure of the rate of growth. According to Tanner (1960), the age at menarche is closely related to the growth spurt in body measurements and to the maturation of the skeleton. The age at menarche is normally distributed, which suggests that menarcheal age depends upon the combined action of genes at many different loci rather than any single allele. Tanner reports that in identical twins the average difference in months of age at menarche is 2.8, in nonidentical twins 12, in sisters 12.9, and in unrelated girls 18.6. It has been known for many years that girls are physically more mature than boys at all ages from birth until adulthood. The recent discovery of some persons with chromosomal formulas XXY or XO has provided an opportunity of studying genetic factors that influence differential sex growth rates. Persons with an XXY chromosome complement suffer from Klinefelter's syndrome and in appearance are males but have small, atrophic testicles, abnormally long legs, and narrow shoulders. Those with XO chromosomes suffer from Turner's syndrome and are apparently females but lack ovaries, are short in stature, and have no development of the secondary sex characteristics at puberty. [See SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, article on SEXUAL DEVIANCE.- PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.] The question arises whether the skeletal maturity of an XXY child would follow that of the male or the female. Tanner (1960) reports an investigation into the ratio of skeletal age to chronological age in children with Klinefelter's syndrome compared with normal boys. It was found that the ratios failed to differ significantly, but if they were compared with girls, great differences occurred. Thus, XXY follows the course of XY. Similarly, 16 persons with Turner's syndrome were rated and found to follow the normal pattern for girls. Thus, XY and XXY have the male initial retardation of skeletal development, XO and XX do not. The inference is clear that this retardation in males is due to genes located on the Y chromosome. It is clear that individual differences in adult physique must come about through differential local and general growth rates during childhood. Tanner (1960) points out that there is much evidence to show that the child's measurements at birth reflect almost entirely the action of the uterine environment and are thus dependent on maternal genotype and maternal environmental factors only. The genotype of the child is practically without effect; it is only subsequently that the child's genes exert their action and become a basis for predicting the child's adult status and that the
PSYCHOLOGY: Constitutional Psychology child's resemblance to his genetic parents becomes increasingly marked. Personality and physique It will be convenient to consider studies relating personality and physique according to the particular system used for classifying body build. Kretschmer's typology. Kibler (1925), utilizing questionnaires, was able to confirm an association between leptosomatic body build and schizothymic temperament, on the one hand, and pyknic body build and cyclothymic temperament, on the other. However, Pillsbury (1939), using similar methods, found no evidence to support Kretschmer's theory. A variety of psychological attributes have also been studied in relationship to Kretschmer's physical types. Enke (1928), for example, found that persons of pyknic physique were more easily distracted in reaction-time experiments and were poorer in tachistoscopic perception of nonsense syllables than were those of leptosomatic physique. Pyknics tended to respond predominantly to color in tachistoscopic experiments and also tended to react to colors on the Rorschach test. Lindberg (1938) found that pyknic body build was associated with a greater tendency to color reaction and leptosomatic body build with a greater reaction to form. Keehn (1953), however, has thrown doubt on the interpretation of the tests used as measures of color-form reactivity. According to Misiak and Pickford (1944), leptosomes are more persevering at tasks and have a lower tendency to perseverate responses than pyknics. Smith and Boyarsky (1943) found that leptosomes had a higher tempo, as measured by their tapping rate, and quicker reaction time than pyknics. In a variety of tests, other workers (such as Klineberg, Asch, & Block 1934) found no significant differences between leptosomes and pyknics. Factor analyses. Burt (1938), in a study of children, found correlations between stoutness of build and cheerful emotions and between thinness of body build and inhibited and depressive tendencies. Rees and Eysenck (1945) andRees (1950a; 19501?; 1950c), in studies of adults of both sexes, found that leptomorphs have a greater tendency to introversion and a higher tendency to somatic manifestations of emotional tension and autonomic dysfunction, whereas eurymorphs had a greater tendency to extroversion and a greater tendency to hysterical symptoms. Sanford and his associates (1943) obtained similar results, finding the tall, narrow type of physique to be associated with autonomic dysfunction and manifestations indicative of dysthymia.
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The wide, heavy type correlated negatively with autonomic dysfunction and positively with secure feelings and lively self-expression. Sheldon's somatotypes. Sheldon (1942) postulated three components of personality: viscerotonia, somatotonia, and cerebrotonia. Viscerotonia is characterized by relative love of comfort, pleasure in digestion, need for affection and approval, and the need of company when in trouble. Somatotonia is characterized by an assertive posture, need for exercise, directness of manner, unrestrained voice, and a need for action in trouble. Cerebrotonia is shown by restrained posture, quick reaction, inhibited social reactions, vocal restraint, and need of solitude when in trouble. In a group of 200 university men between 17 and 31 years of age, Sheldon (1942) found high positive correlations between the components of physique and the components of temperament: between endomorphy and viscerotonia, the correlation coefficient was .79; between mesomorphy and somatotonia, .82; and between ectomorphy and cerebrotonia, .83. Humphreys (1957) criticized Sheldon's methods and stated that the evidence provided by Sheldon supported not more than two independent (but not necessarily valid) types of temperament. Child and Sheldon (1941) reported only low correlations between somatotype and various other psychological attributes. Tanner (1951) found little to support Sheldon's claims for high correlations between somatotype and temperament. Parnell (1958), in a study of a group of 7-yearold children, found that fat children had fewer handicaps in the first seven years, were able to express feelings easily, and were confident and sociable. Muscular children were relatively free from anxiety shyness. Linear children were oversensitive, shy, and had greater difficulty in communicating their thoughts and feelings to people around them; they had signs of emotional unrest such as nightmares, panics, temper tantrums, and nail biting and also tended to be meticulous and conscientious and to exhibit high standards. Studies based on Lindegard's method. Lindegard and Nyman (1956) studied a group of 320 men whose physiques were rated according to Lindegard's method (1953). It was found, for example, that the muscle factor was correlated with expansivity and self-confidence versus unobtrusiveness; the more muscular person is more expansive and confident, the less muscular person is emotionally cool and sophisticated. Wretmark (1953) found that stability (identified as emotional warmth, rather than emotional
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coldness, together with sophistication and proficiency of motor activity) was the only attribute correlated with body build. He found that substable individuals were relatively wide and heavy and that extraordinarily stable individuals tended to be narrow in body build. Physical attributes and intelligence For many years research has been carried out to discover whether some physical attribute would provide some clue to a person's intellectual ability. This has been a matter of interest to educators and psychologists who aim to provide objective aids for assessing intelligence. Rees (1960), reviewing other literature as well as his own investigations, concluded that the evidence indicated no relation between absolute anthropometric measurements and intelligence level. When the relationship between body type or body build and intelligence is considered, Rees (1960) found that there was a slight tendency for leptomorphs to be higher in intelligence than eurymorphs. Parnell (1958) investigated the intelligence level of a group of 7-year-old children and found that children with linear physiques were best in reading ability. At the age of 11, linear children did better than general expectation on the entrance examination for British grammar schools. Studies by Parnell (1958) of university students again provided evidence that linear men tend to do better. On the other hand, the best order of performance at work and at games was achieved by Mf men, that is, those in whom muscle is the dominant factor and fat the secondary factor. Rees's conclusion (1960) still holds: the correlation between physique and intelligence is so low that a knowledge of a person's physical status will be of no value in the prediction of intelligence in the individual case. Body size. The Rees index of body size, represented by the product of stature and transverse chest diameter, was obtained for a sample of 1,100 military personnel admitted to the Mill Hill Emergency Neurosis Centre; the frequency distribution was normal and was arbitrarily divided at points one standard deviation above and below the mean into three groups: microsomatics, mesosomatics, and macrosomatics. A detailed analysis of psychological attributes in these groups showed, for example, that neurotics with large body size tend to be more active and to have a more stable personality, better musculature, a higher intellectual level, and a better prognosis
for return to military duties. The microsomatic group tend to be of inadequate personality makeup: i.e., they have a higher incidence of weak, dependent, anxious, and hypochondriacal traits of personality and narrow interests and hobbies. It is interesting to note that the psychological correlates of body size differ from those associated with physical type. Whereas the extremes of body type, the eurymorph and the leptomorph, are associated respectively with hysterical and anxiety reactions, there were no significant relations between these reactions and body size. Body disproportion. Seltzer (1946) paid particular attention to disproportionate development of the body, which he denned as values of the index derived from anthropometric measurements which are markedly divergent from the mean, usually in one direction. One such disproportion might be a combination of wide shoulders and thin legs; another, broad hips relative to shoulder width. The term "disproportion" must not be confused with the term "dysplasia." It does not carry any stigma of abnormality; it represents deviations within the normal range of variation. Seltzer found that individuals, and particularly linear individuals, with unstable autonomic functioning showed a greater tendency to bodily disproportion. He found excesses of one or more bodily disproportion to be associated with the following characteristics: unstable autonomic functions, mood fluctuations, personal instability, inability to adjust, sensitivity, meticulousness, selfconsciousness, and introspection. There were significant deficiencies associated with those traits indicative of stability and ease of making adjustment. It was found that disproportions were commoner in marked ectomorphs and least common in marked endomorphs. Androgyny. Using Turner's androgyny scale, Rees (I960) found that a group of 200 soldiers suffering from effort syndrome (neurocirculatory asthenia), a disorder in which breathlessness and various autonomic symptoms accompany exercise, showed more marked feminine attributes in body build than normal, healthy soldiers. Coppen (1958), using the same index, found that patients who developed toxemia in pregnancy had a higher incidence of masculine features in body build than those who did not. Parnell (1954) compared the relationship between the relative incidence of masculine and feminine physical traits and academic and athletic performance in men and found that academic distinction was associated with a significant trend
PSYCHOLOGY: Constitutional Psychology toward feminine traits and that athletes, as would be expected, showed a higher incidence of strong masculine traits. Lindegard (1956), using a scale based on a regression equation using biacrorm'al and bi-iliac measurements, found no significant relationships with personality variables. Seltzer and Brouha (1943) found that excellent degrees of physical fitness could be achieved only by persons with a strong masculine component in their physique and that individuals weak in masculinity tended to have poor effort tolerance, that is, the ability to undertake effort without suffering unduly from distress. Physique and mental illness Neurosis. Rees and Eysenck (1945) studied a group of 400 soldiers admitted to Mill Hill during World War u. Rees extended this study to 1,000 soldiers (1960) and to 400 women serving in the armed forces who developed neurotic illness (1950a; 1950k; 1950c). Using the Rees-Eysenck index of body build, it was found that leptomorphic individuals of both sexes tend to have dysthymic symptoms, whereas eurymorphs tend toward hysterical characteristics and symptoms. Parnell (1958) in an analysis of a survey of 2,000 hospitalized psychiatric patients suggests that if breakdown occurs in Lf types it more often occurs before the age of 25. Male patients under age 25 with a diagnosis of depression, anxiety state, psychopathy, or suicidal tendency were found to be generally of the Lf physique. Among schizophrenics under age 25. the males tended to be most commonly of Lf type, and next most commonly Lra. Among female schizophrenics the most frequent type was Fl. Lm types of both sexes are more disposed to breakdown from 25 to 35 years of age. Ml types of both sexes are more predisposed to breakdown from 35 years of age onward. Paranoid schizophrenia and paranoid illnesses are their commonest examples of thought disorders. Depression is the major affective illness in both sexes. Mf types were the most stable in both sexes. When they become mentally ill they are usually over 30 years of age. Thought disorder usually takes the form of a paranoid illness, but an affective disorder with depression is the commoner form of illness. [See NEUROSIS.] Manic-depressive illness. In a review of the literature and his own studies, Rees (1960) concluded that there is some correlation between Pyknic habitus and manic-depressive psychosis, but
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the correlation is not, by any means, as great as suggested by Kretschmer. Rees (1960) also pointed out that the age factor accounts for part of this correlation but does not completely invalidate Kretschmer's theory. [See DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS.] Schizophrenia. Rees (1943) carried out a detailed anthropometric investigation on a sample of schizophrenics as well as on a control group of normal men of similar age distribution. He found that schizophrenic patients are significantly smaller in stature, chest circumference, hip circumference, biacromial diameter, supersternal height, and symphysis height. Body build indexes showed that they are significantly more leptosomatic than the normal group. There is some evidence of a relation between type of physique and specific form of schizophrenia. Connolly (1939) reported that paranoid schizophrenics are of larger body size and more pyknic in physique than other types of schizophrenic patients. Rees (1960), reviewing the literature, states that a number of authors have suggested that schizophrenics with a leptomorphic body build tend to have an earlier age of onset and show a greater degree of withdrawal, apathy, and thought disorder, whereas schizophrenics of eurymorphic body build tend to have a later age of onset, better preservation of personality, and better affective relations with the environment. There is also some evidence to suggest that physique may have some bearing on the course and prognosis of a schizophrenic illness. Kallman (1953) found that high linearity and low athletic components in physique are associated with a tendency to marked deterioration during the course of the schizophrenic illness, whereas patients with high athletic and low linear components do not show such deterioration; these last are usually paranoid schizophrenics. Kallman (1953) found that monozygotic twins who both suffer from schizophrenia and are of similar body build tend to have similar types of schizophrenic illness with onset at the same age and similar outcomes. When there are differences in physique, there are also differences in the age of onset as well as in the severity of schizophrenic symptoms. In monozygotic twins discordant with regard to schizophrenia, the twin remaining completely free from schizophrenia had significantly greater physical strength and was higher in body weight from early childhood. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on GENETIC ASPECTS.] Parnell (1958) found that the Lf type has the longest hospital stay and also tends to onset before
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the age of 25, whereas the Mf type stays in the hospital the shortest time and least often succumbs to schizophrenia. [See SCHIZOPHRENIA.] Psychosomatic disorders Investigations relating physique to physical and psychosomatic disorders have generally been handicapped by methodological difficulties, mainly the absence of appropriate control groups and failure to control for age. However, some of the better studies are discussed here. Peptic ulcer, asthma, gall bladder disease. Wretmark (1953), in a carefully planned and adequately controlled study, found that duodenal ulcer patients were more linear in physique than a control group and that the more linear the body build, the worse was the prognosis. Brouwer (1957) was unable either to replicate the findings of Draper et al. (1944), who claimed that mesomorphic body build is characteristic of ulcer patients, or to support the views of Sheldon (1940) that endomorphic mesomorphy characterizes them. Brouwer found, in agreement with Wretmark, that duodenal ulcer patients are more inclined to leptosomatic body build but do not differ significantly in ectomorphy, as measured by Sheldon's system, from healthy male controls or from groups of male patients with other disorders. Draper et al. (1944) considered that gall bladder disease is associated with a broad, stocky type of physique. Sheldon (1940) also found that gall bladder patients are mesomorphic-endomorphic. Age was not adequately controlled and Brouwer (1957), using Sheldon's method, found a preponderance of endomorphy in female gallstone patients, though not significantly more than in the comparable healthy female control group. Rees (1957) and Brouwer (1957), using quite different methods, found that asthma is associated with a variety of somatotypes and patients do not differ significantly in physique from the normal population. Cardiovascular disorders. Rees (1963) reported that military patients at Mill Hill suffering from effort syndrome, cardiac neurosis, and neurocirculatory asthenia were significantly more leptomorphic in body build than normal groups. In a comparison of effort syndrome patients, Rees (1944) found that the majority of leptomorphic patients had suffered from effort intolerance and autonomic dysfunction from an early age and had long-standing personality traits of timidity, anxiety, and neuroticism. Eurymorphic patients, on the other hand, were characterized by short duration of illness, which tended to be precipitated by a great
number of exogenous factors, such as severe environmental stress and severe enemy action. In other words, leptomorphic effort syndrome patients exhibited a predominance of constitutional factors, whereas eurymorphic effort syndrome patients had only recently shown effort intolerance, usually brought on by extrinsic factors such as traumatic experiences and febrile illness. Gertler, Garn, and Levine (1951) showed that endomorphs have a higher level of blood cholesterol than ectomorphs, both in the normal population and among patients suffering from coronary disease. [See PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS.] Delinquency and criminality Glueck and Glueck (1950), in a study of 500 delinquent boys ranging in age from 11 to 18 years, found that in comparison to the normal control group, the delinquents were more mesomorphic and less ectomorphic. Epps and Parnell (1952) studied a group of 177 women undergoing Borstal training and compared them with a group of 123 university women similar in age distribution. They found that the delinquents were heavier in body build, more muscular, and had more fat. These results are in good agreement with the Rees-Eysenck findings of a correlation between extroversion and eurymorphic body build and Eysenck's theory linking extroversion with psychopathy and criminality (Eysenck 1960). During recent times, the study of the human constitution has advanced significantly as a result of the introduction of new mathematical techniques and improved methods of recording and measuring constitutional attributes. This has led to the discovery of efficient and valid methods of assessing various aspects of physique. The relationships between physical attributes and personality, health, disease, and abnormality of behavior may prove to have a genetic basis, with the genes responsible for physical attributes influencing the manifestation of the genetic determinant of personality, psychiatric, physical, and psychosomatic disorders. One of the most urgent needs in this field is for longitudinal studies of size and form combined with genetic, biochemical, and endocrine studies. W. L. L. REES [Other relevant material may be found in EUGENICS; GENETICS; MENTAL DISORDERS, articles on BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS, GENETIC ASPECTS, ORGANIC ASPECTS;
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY; RADIATION.]
PSYCHOLOGY: Constitutional Psychology BIBLIOGRAPHY
BENEKE, FRIEDRICH W. 1881 Konstitution und konstitutionelles Kranksein des Menschen. Marburg (Germany) : Elwert. BROUWER, D. 1957 Somatotypes and Psychosomatic Diseases. Journal of Psychosomatic Research 2:23—34. BURT, CYRIL 1938 The Analysis of Temperament. British Journal of Medical Psychology 17:158-188. CHILD, IRVIN L.; and SHELDON, WILLIAM H. 1941 The Correlation Between Components of Physique and Scores on Certain Psychological Tests. Character and Personality 10:23-34. CONNOLLY, CORNELIUS J. 1939 Physique in Relation to Psychosis. Catholic University of America, Studies in Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol. 4, No. 5. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. COPPEN, ALEC J. 1958 Psychosomatic Aspects of Preeclamptic Toxaemia. Journal of Psychosomatic Research 2:241-265. DAHLBERG, GUNNAR 1926 Twin Birth and Twins From a Hereditary Point of View. Stockholm: Tidens. DRAPER, GEORGE; DUPERTUIS, C. W.; and CAUGHEY, J. L. JR. 1944 Human Constitution in Clinical Medicine. New York: Harper. ENKE, W. 1928 Experimentell psychologische Studien zur Konstitutionsforschung. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Neurologic und Psychiatrie 114:770-803. EPPS, PHYLLIS; and PARNELL, R. W. 1952 Physique and Temperament of Women Delinquents Compared With Women Undergraduates. British Journal of Medical Psychology 25:249-255. EYSENCK, HANS J. (editor) (1960) 1961 Handbook of Abnormal Psychology: An Experimental Approach. London: Pitman; New York: Basic Books. GERTLER, MENARD M.; GARN, STANLEY M.; and LEVINE, SAMUEL A. 1951 Serum Uric Acid in Relation to Age and Physique in Health and in Coronary Heart Disease. Annals of Internal Medicine 34:1421-1431. GIOVANNI, ACHILLE DE (1891) 1909 Clinical Commentaries Deduced From the Morphology of the Human Body. London: Rebman. -» First published as Morfologia del corpo umano: Studi. GLUECK, SHELDON; and GLUECK, ELEANOR 1950 Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency. New York: The Commonwealth Fund. GREGORY, PAUL W. ; and CASTLE, WILLIAM E. 1931 Further Studies on the Embryological Basis of Size Inheritance in the Rabbit. Journal of Experimental Zoology 59:199-211. HOWELLS, W. W. 1952 A Factorial Study of Constitutional Type. American Journal of Physical Anthropology New Series 10:91-118. HUMPHREYS, LLOYD G. 1957 Characteristics of Type Concepts With Special Reference to Sheldon's Typology. Psychological Bulletin 54:218-228. KALLMAN, FRANZ 1953 Heredity in Health and Mental Disorder. New York: Norton. KEEHN, J. D. 1953 An Experimental Investigation Into the Validity of the Use of Attitude to Colour and Form in the Assessment of Personality. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of London. KIBLER, M. 1925 Experimentalpsychologie: Beitrag zur Typenforschung. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Neurologic und Psychiatrie 98:524-544. KLINEBERG, OTTO; ASCH, SOLOMON E.; and BLOCK, HELEN 1934 An Experimental Study of Constitutional Types. Genetic Psychological Monographs 16:145-221.
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KRETSCHMER, ERNST (1921) 1936 Physique and Character: An Investigation of the Nature of Constitution and the Theory of Temperament. London: Routledge. -> First published in German. LINDBERG, BENGT J. 1938 Experimental Studies of Colour and Non-colour Attitude in School Children and Adults. Acta psychiatrica et neurologica scandinavica, Supplement No. 16. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. LINDEGARD, BENGT 1953 Variations in Human Body Build: A Somatometric and X-ray Cephalometric Investigation on Scandinavian Adults. Acta psychiatrica et neurologica scandinavica, Supplement No. 86. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. LINDEGARD, BENGT (editor) 1956 Body-build, Body-function, and Personality: Medical Anthropological Investigations on 320 Swedish 20-year-old Healthy Army Men. Lund (Sweden): Gleerup. LINDEGARD, BENGT; and NYMAN, G. EBERHARD 1956 Interrelations Between Psychologic, Somatologic and Endocrine Dimensions. Lund (Sweden): Gleerup. MISIAK, HENRYK; and PICKFORD, R. W. 1944 Physique and Perseveration. Nature 153:622 only. PARNELL, R. W. 1954 Somatotyping by Physical Anthropometry. American Journal of Physical Anthropology New Series 12:209-240. PARNELL, R. W. 1958 Behaviour and Physique. London: Arnold; Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. PILLSBURY, W. B. 1939 Body Form and IntroversionExtroversion. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 34:400-401. REES, W. L. L. 1943 Physique in Relation to Effort Syndrome, Neurotic and Psychotic Types. M.D. thesis, Univ. of Wales. REES, W. L. L. 1944 Physical Constitution, Neurosis and Psychosis. Royal Society of Medicine, Proceedings 37:635-638. REES, W. L. L. 1950a A Factorial Study of Physical Constitution in Women. Journal of Mental Science 96:620-632. REES, W. L. L. 1950b Body Build, Personality and Neurosis in Women. Journal of Mental Science 96:426434. REES, W. L. L. 1950c Body Size, Personality and Neurosis. Journal of Mental Science 96:168-180. REES, W. L. L. 1957 Physical Characteristics of the Schizophrenic Patient. Pages 1—14 in Derek Richter (editor), Schizophrenia: Somatic Aspects. Oxford: Pergamon. REES, W. L. L. (1960) 1961 Constitutional Factors and Abnormal Behaviour. Pages 344-392 in Hans J. Eysenck (editor), Handbook of Abnormal Psychology: An Experimental Approach. London: Pitman; New York: Basic Books. REES, W. L. L. 1963 An Appraisal of the Concept of Cardiac Neurosis. Acta psychotherapeutica et psychosomatica 11:242-252. REES, W. L. L.; and EYSENCK, HANS J. 1945 A Factorial Study of Some Morphological and Psychological Aspects of Human Constitution. Journal of Mental Science 91:8-21. REYNOLDS, EARLE L. 1943 Degree of Kinship and Pattern of Ossification. American Journal of Physical Anthropology New Series 1:405-416. SANFORD, R. NEVITT et al. 1943 Physique, Personality and Scholarship: A Cooperative Study of School Children. Society for Research in Child Development, Monographs 8, no. 34.
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SELTZER, CARL C. 1946 Body Disproportions and Dominant Personality Traits. Psychosomatic Medicine 8: 75-97. SELTZER, CARL C.; and BROUHA, LUCIEN 1943 The "Masculine" Component and Physical Fitness. American Journal of Physical Anthropology New Series 1:95104. SHELDON, WILLIAM H. 1940 The Varieties of Human Physique: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology. New York: Harper. SHELDON, WILLIAM H. 1942 The Varieties of Temperament: A Psychology of Constitutional Differences. New York: Harper. SMITH, H. C.; and BOYARSKY, S. 1943 Relationship Between Physique and Simple Reaction Time. Character and Personality 12:46-53. TANNER, JAMES M. 1951 Current Advances in the Study of Physique: Photogrammetric Anthropometry and an Androgyny Scale. Lancet [1951] no. 1:574-579. TANNER, JAMES M. 1955 Growth at Adolescence. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. TANNER, JAMES M. 1960 Genetics of Human Growth. Volume 3, pages 43-57 in Symposia of the Society for the Study of Human Biology, Human Growth. Edited by James M. Tanner. Oxford: Pergamon. WRETMARK, GERDT 1953 The Peptic Ulcer Individual: A Study in Heredity, Physique, and Personality. Ada psychiatrica et neurologica scandinavica, Supplement No. 84. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. IV EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Existentialism is a broad cultural movement showing itself in almost all aspects of contemporary culture: literature, art, philosophy, theology. We can best see the meaning of this development in psychology and psychiatry by first defining the term. "Existence" comes from the Latin root ex-sistere, which means literally "to stand out," "to emerge." Every being, whether a tree or dog or man, "stands out" from being in general to the extent that it has individual existence. But the human being is characterized by his capacity to be aware of the fact that he stands out; that is to say, I can be conscious of the facts that I am this particular man (middlewestern American) who stands at this particular point in history (mid-twentieth century), who exists in a given physical and social world (New York City), who has the intention at this moment of writing this article, and so on. The term our German colleagues use for the human individual is Dasein, composed of Sein, "being," plus da, "there." Man's capacity to become aware of his existence—which distinguishes him as a human being, separate from the rest of nature— implies that he can respond to the facts of his own existence and thus exercise some responsibility for it.
Existence versus essence. In Western thought there are traditionally two philosophic concepts— "existence" and "essence"—customarily used in contrast to each other. "Essences" refer to discrete entities which can be separated out and formulated, such as Plato's "ideas" or Hegel's panrationalistic concepts. In science, essences have come to refer to attributes such as weight, density, color, or in the study of the human being to neurological patterns, reflexes, drives, and so on. By and large, Western thought since the Renaissance has been concerned with essences; traditional science, assuming an essentialist metaphysics, has sought to discover these substances and discrete relationships. The existential psychologists and psychiatrists hold, in contrast, that if we try to understand man as a bundle of discrete drives or a composite of reflex patterns, we may end up with brilliant generalizations but we have lost the man to whom these things happen, the human being we set out to understand in the first place. They are obviously not against the study of dynamisms, neurological and chemical relationships, and patterns of behavior as such. But they hold that these cannot be understood in any given individual—such as a patient in therapy—except in the context of the overarching fact that here is a person who exists, who is; and how this person relates to his existence at this given moment is essential to the meaning of a given pattern of behavior. The existential approach is thus dynamic in the fundamental sense that it takes the person always as emerging, always in process of becoming. The term "being," indeed, is not a static noun but a verb form. Thus the existentialist view of science is close to that of the modern physicists Niels Bohr and Werner K. Heisenberg, who insist that the Copernican separation of subjective man from objective nature is no longer tenable and that the ideal of a natural science which is completely objective is an illusion. Also it is to be noted that the contemporary existential emphasis on being is, in one sense, a rediscovery in the West of emphases which Eastern thought has held for centuries but which have been lost in Western overrationalistic and objectivistic concerns since the Renaissance. History Existential psychology has many illustrious progenitors in Western history, of whom we shall mention only three. Socrates, whom Kierkegaard later took as his model, is the prototype of the existentialist in his method of dialogue and his belief that truth is discovered through rigorous, inward
PSYCHOLOGY: Existential Psychology self-examination. Augustine is prominent in this heritage in his concern with will and with psychological time. Pascal, a distinguished scientist who saw clearly the limits of natural science for understanding man, emphasized the human being's affective grasp of truth: "The heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." S0ren Kierkegaard. Modern existential psychology took its specific form a hundred years ago in Kierkegaard's passionate attack on Hegel, in whose philosophy, as in other aspects of nineteenthcentury culture, essentialism came to its peak. Kierkegaard proclaimed that Hegel's identification of reality with abstract concepts was trickery and that it seduced men away from their central concern, which was their own understanding and their own decisive actions. Kierkegaard and the existentialists following him (Schopenhauer, Marx, Dilthey, and particularly Nietzsche) fought against the rationalists and idealists who would see man only as subject. But even more strongly they attacked the opposite tendency which was emerging in the nineteenth century to become dominant in the twentieth—namely, the vast pressures to treat man as an object to be calculated, manipulated, and controlled. They saw this trend developing in the application of science to man, and they feared this would sap man's capacity for decision and individual responsibility. The trend was also present in the growing industrialism and capitalism, where it was attacked by Marx in his early existential statements asserting that the money economy would dehumanize man. The distinctive quality of revolt which characterizes existentialists arises from their common protest against these tendencies toward the objectification of man. William James. The American psychologist William James was a participant in the existential development; he came back from Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century protesting against Hegelian rationalism just as Kierkegaard had protested half a century earlier. James's existential elements include, first, his passionate emphasis on the immediacy of experience. Second, he emphasized xvill and decision; he held that commitment is a prerequisite to the discovery of truth. Third, like Kierkegaard, he distrusted thought separated from action. James's epistemology has striking similarities to that of Nietzsche in the first Part of the Will to Power, where Nietzsche held that truth is the way a biological group actualizes itself. Finally, James's devotion to social and hupianistic values as the overarching context, the enveloping wider order," in which natural science
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plays only one part, makes him similar to the existentialists; he was thus able to bring art and religion into his psychological thought without sacrificing his scientific integrity. James was also, of course, in the natural science tradition, and it is unfortunate that, although his natural science orientation was followed, these broader emphases were ignored or treated with contempt until recently. [See the biography of JAMES.] Sigmund Freud. Freudian psychoanalysis is also, on one side, an expression of what we have broadly designated as the existential development. Freud stands in the line of those explorers of human nature of the nineteenth century—including Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer—who rediscovered the significance of the irrational, dynamic, "unconscious" elements in personality which had been repressed by the essentialistic presuppositions of Western thinking since the Renaissance. Freud sought to bring the irrational springs of human behavior back into the accepted area of scientific investigation. At the same time, Freud saw himself as an enthusiastic champion of natural science, his goal being to make the irrational elements explicable in terms of the mechanistic Newtonian model in nineteenth-century physics and biology. The existentialists radically disagree with this model of man. In their famous discussions, Binswanger (1956) endeavored to show his friend Freud that the latter's determinism was a metaphysical assumption and needed to be analyzed like any other assumption. But while Freud held resolutely to his determinism in his theoretical model of the mind, in his therapeutic practice he inconsistently remained to a great extent existential. [See the biography of FREUD.] Contemporary contributions The existential approach sprang up among men of diverse views in various parts of Europe beginning in the early part of the twentieth century. Eugene Minkowski in Paris, Erwin Straus in Germany and later in the United States, and V. E. von Gebsattel in Germany represent chiefly the first, or phenomenological, phase of this development. The psychiatrist Karl Jaspers, who was later to become a leading German philosopher, wrote a textbook on psychopathology in which he presented a phenomenological analysis of the different kinds of pathology. The book went through many editions and widely influenced psychiatry and research on the Continent; it is now available in English (Jaspers 1913). The second phase, which is more specifically existential, is represented by Ludwig
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Binswanger, A. Storch, Medard Boss, Gustav Bally, and Roland Kuhn in Switzerland, F. J. Buytendijk and J. H. Van den Berg in the Netherlands, and others. The fact that this development emerged spontaneously—some of these existential thinkers often scarcely knowing about the remarkably similar work of their colleagues—and the fact that it owes its creation to diverse psychiatrists and psychologists rather than to any one leader, argue that it is a response to a widespread need in our time. The variety of schools can be seen when we note that Minkowski and Straus, for example, were psychiatrists and neurologists, not psychoanalysts; von Gebsattel, Boss-, and Bally were Freudian analysts; Binswanger, although remaining in Switzerland, became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society at Freud's recommendation when the Zurich group split off from the international group; other existential therapists had also been under the influence of Carl G. Jung. All of these men shared grave doubts about the theory of man assumed in contemporary psychiatry and psychology, and specifically in psychoanalysis. They had become disquieted over the fact that although they were effecting cures by the techniques they had learned, they could not, as long as they confined themselves to the generally accepted assumptions, arrive at any clear understanding of why or why not these cures occurred. They were unwilling to postulate unverifiable agents such as "libido," or "censor," and they asked trenchant questions about what it really means when one says a patient "projects" or "transfers" something to someone else. These explanatory devices, they argued, as often as not actually cover up rather than reveal precisely the empirical data in the patient we wish to understand. They shared the belief that the serious difficulties in the accepted theories of man, including psychoanalysis, would not only gravely limit research in the long run but would also seriously hamper the effectiveness and development of therapeutic techniques. These psychologists and psychiatrists were also concerned with events prior to the observed patterns of behavior; they asked questions about how particular kinds of behavior are made possible in the patient's experience. Thus their approach was chiefly concerned not with types of pathology but with norms and structures of being human; the patient's pathology is a distortion of these. They used psychological terms with an ontological meaning. Kierkegaard held that anxiety is ontological in that it is a constitutive element for the self; a person never actualizes a potentiality without go-
ing through what Kierkegaard called the "intermediate determinant" of anxiety (1844). Similarly, Tillich described anxiety as the state of the struggle of "being with non-being" (1952). Nietzsche's "will" is ontological in that it is necessary for the individual's self-actualization. Tillich also made "courage" ontological in his trenchant phrase "the courage to be." In their therapy, the existential psychologists and psychiatrists also asked such prior questions. Transference, they agreed, is one of Freud's greatest discoveries, but it can be understood only on the basis of the prior norm of encounter, of which transference is a distortion. As the existentialists describe it, encounter includes not only sexual elements (eros) but such normal elements as mutual esteem and concern between persons (agape) and realistic friendliness (philia). Likewise, Freud's concepts of resistance and repression refer to observable behavior, but they can be understood only as distortions of the patient's freedom, that is, of his capacity to actualize some awareness or experience, a freedom which assumedly arouses too much anxiety for the patient to face at the moment. Admittedly, these ontological questions sound alien to most American psychological thinking, accustomed as it is to "essentialist" behavioristic presuppositions. But research is now going on, to which we shall refer below, which not only may make a bridge to various forms of psychology, but which can bring new and significant empirical data to bear upon our psychology. Central theoretical orientations Prior to presenting concepts, it is valuable to see the place of existential psychology in relation to psychology as a whole. Van Kaam (1966) distinguishes between "differential psychologies," whose concern is the observation and explanation of isolated behavioral processes and functions, and "comprehensive psychologies," whose aim is the full understanding of human behavior as a whole and in terms of its uniquely human characteristics. Most psychologies have been differential psychologies and have not been integrated into a total image of man. Existential psychology is a comprehensive psychology whose aim is an integration of the observations of differential psychologies into an explanatory theory about human behavior in its lived intentional entirety. Existential psychologists and psychiatrists share several basic theoretical orientations. First, they deny the subject-object dichotomy that has been dominant in Western thought since Descartes. They emphasize, in contrast, that man exists as
PSYCHOLOGY: Existential Psychology subject and object at the same time. May (1966a) holds that a dialectical relationship between subjective and objective factors occurs in every human action and that in this relationship lie the sources of human freedom and creativity. Every act of consciousness is consciousness of something; that is, it has its objective as well as its subjective pole. Consciousness is an active process; the man who is doing the experiencing and the objective world which is the object of consciousness can never be separated. Second, these psychologists and psychiatrists share a method of scientific investigation—phenomenology—which undercuts the usual objectification in traditional science, employing an unbiased approach. As Straus points out in his Phenomenological Psychology, science takes for granted precisely what a true psychology must focus upon, namely, our capacities to see, to observe, and to describe. The task of the phenomenologist is less to examine the things observed and more to reflect upon the situation of the observer. The structure and constitution of everyday life (the Lebenswelt) becomes the object of examination because it is this that makes possible the very acts of seeing, observing, and describing, and that gives them their uniquely human qualities. It can be questioned whether phenomenology in psychology and psychiatry is "absolutely" unbiased. For the mere act of listening to a patient in therapy or to a subject in an experiment presupposes some concepts and symbols by which we listen. Nevertheless, the experience of many psychotherapists is that the phenomenological method represents a radical "breakthrough" as a method for understanding the human being. It raises "participant observation," to use Sullivan's phrase, to a broader dimension and gives it a structural base as an epistemology. A third concept, "being-in-the-world," is hyphenated to indicate again that the being and its world cannot be separated. On the human level world is defined as the meaningful structure of events in which the human being experiences himself; self implies world, and world self, and one is not possible without the other. Furthermore, three modes of world are distinguished. Umwelt, literally the "around world," is what is customarily called environment, the "natural world." Mitwelt, literally the "with-world," is the world of one's relationships with his fellow man, a description on a broader structural level of the world of "interpersonal relations." Buber has made a significant contribution to understanding Mitwelt through his analysis of I-thou" relationships (1936). Eigenwelt, literally
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the "own world," has to do with the self's relation to itself. A fourth theory in existential psychology and psychiatry has to do with the time dimension. Heidegger's great contribution, writes Straus (1936), was to "vindicate time for existence," and he adds that time is to psychology what mathematics is to physics. Existential psychotherapists, following Heidegger here (1927), place particular emphasis on how the patient relates to the future time dimension : they do not rule out concern with the past but see it as having meaning in terms of the present and the future. The depressed patient, as Minkowski has indicated (see May et al. 1958, p. 127), is characterized by being unable to live in the future, unable to hope, or to project himself into the morrow. Minkowski reverses the usual explanation that the patient cannot hope because he is depressed and proposes that the more useful approach explains that the patient is depressed because he has lost the capacity to live in this future dimension of time. May (1966a) points out that in therapy the acceptance and working through of the subject-object dilemma gives the patient a new sense of freedom with respect to time and the capacity to use time in the service of self-chosen goals. [See TIME, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.] A fifth common theory, already alluded to, emphasizes choice, responsibility, and freedom. As Laing puts it, ". . . the task in psychotherapy [is] to make . . . an appeal to the freedom of the patient" (1960, p. 64). Freedom is real, not illusory, and it derives from the self-constitutive powers of the Dasein. I am the object, for example, of conditioning, of bodily factors, of limitations of time and space, to say nothing of limitations of understanding and perceptions and all the outside forces determining me. But insofar as I am conscious of these facts I am subject, and I can, and to some extent must, choose the attitude I will take toward them. A person exercises choice in structuring his modes of being and his world. He bears the responsibility for his being-in-the-world even as it manifests itself in his dreams; in other words, one is responsible even where least free. Sartre (1943) has made the famous statement "existence precedes essence," which in effect implies that the human being has unlimited freedom to transform himself. Such an extreme existentialism, however, is not held by adherents of the other existential theories, who emphasize that both essentialist and existentialist elements are necessary for any comprehensive psychology. Existential psychotherapy by no means ignores the infinite number of deterministic elements in the patient's life and
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problems, but it believes that helping the patient explore and become aware of these deterministic elements enlarges the sphere of the patient's freedom to choose his relationship to these determining facts. The acceptance of limitations is thus not a negative process but itself gives the basis for creative self-actualization. Maurice Friedman has compiled a comprehensive and critical anthology of selections from the whole range of existentialist writings. Organizing the material around the central issues rather than around authors, Friedman is able to highlight the differences between disparate philosophies of existentialism, but more importantly, to demonstrate the common emphasis on the dynamics, the concrete, personal involvement and commitment. Furthermore, he makes clear the area of intersubjectivity, which is most crucial for understanding similarities and differences among contemporary existentialists. "A distinction must be made between such thinkers as Heidegger, Sartre, and Tilrich, for whom the intersubjective tends to remain a dimension of the self, and such thinkers as Buber, Marcel, Jaspers, and Camus, who in one way or another see the relations between man and man as central to human existence" (Friedman 1964, p. 173). Current research We shall mention a variety of research studies, the first having to do with precisely the problem we have just been discussing. It is represented by a recent study by Vera Gatch (1963) on the effect of philosophical commitments to psychic determinism or freedom on the behavior of the psychotherapist. Gatch matched a group of ten existentialist therapists against ten orthodox Freudian therapists who were committed to the theory of determinism. One highly significant difference she found between these two groups was that the existential therapists referred to issues of choice, decision, and responsibility with their patients much more frequently than did the Freudian therapists. Another type of research is Erwin Straus's classical work on sensory experience. Straus shares a major concern of the phenomenological-existential psychiatrists and psychologists, which is the extent to which traditional theoretical commitments implicitly structure experimental investigations and consequently predetermine the results. "Experiments alone do not guarantee pure empiricism," he writes ([1936] 1963, p. 4) and goes on to point out how contemporary empirical, "objective" psychology is shot through with limiting and distorting metaphysical biases. In an extensive and detailed analysis of Pavlov's work and its Cartesian
underpinnings, Straus demonstrates that Pavlov ignored the basic difference between the relationship of an organism to stimuli and of an experiencing being to the world of objects (p. 21). In reducing sensing to epiphenomena of physiological processes occurring within an organism, violence is done to the observable facts. The essence of sensory experience is its intentionality. Sensory impressions imply questioning, seeking, and expecting orientations to the world (p. 101). Straus forcefully demonstrates the inadequacy of conditioning theory, as well as its theoretical derivatives, in explaining even the behavior of Pavlov's dogs, let alone the behavior of humans. His critique is based on a careful phenomenological study of the descriptions of the dogs' behavior given by Pavlov himself. Straus shows that Pavlov was highly selective, since he chose to deal with only those aspects of the total experimental situation that fit his philosophical presuppositions. Straus's concern, however, is not primarily to criticize Pavlov. His major aim is to reclaim sensory experience from the reductionism of physics and physiology and to restore it to its central position in a psychology of human experience. In a similar vein, Joseph Lyons (1963) has set himself the task of re-evaluating fundamental concepts of contemporary clinical psychology. He claims that psychology has been dominated by the intention to predict and control behavior rather than by an interest in understanding the reality of the human person. A scientific psychology of people can only be established on a phenomenological basis and requires two conditions: (1) that the perceived be a person, not an "impersonal other," and (2) that the perceiver act as a full human being. Psychology then becomes "the science of persons as they are apprehended by other persons." Lyons analyzes a host of concrete, traditional clinical problems in the context of this perspective, emphasizing, as does Straus, the central role of intentionality. For example, he argues that even the stimulus in the typical stimulus-response experimental situation partakes of the subject's intentional state. The stimulus is given special meaning by virtue of the subject's readiness for it, and a full description of such a stimulus must take that into account. Another type of research going on at several universities is the study of subjects' responses, on the Rorschach or similar tests, not with the question of what the response itself means, but with the question of what it means that the subject is able to give such and such a response. The question, then, is not simply how does the subject structure his world, but what is occurring that enables him to structure his world this way or that, and
PSYCHOLOGY: Existential Psychology what decision and selective processes go on in this structuring. Such studies are examining the intentionality—-in the phenomenological-existential sense—that goes into responses and the potentiality that makes the responses possible. Caligor and May (1967) made a study of the intentionality shown in the symbols in one patient's dreams through an entire psychoanalysis. They propose that a clearer and more trustworthy prediction of what is occurring and going to occur in the patient's therapy could be made from noting how the patient forms and reforms his symbols at various stages in the therapy than from the patient's conscious verbal communications with the therapist. Ronald Laing (e.g., Laing & Esterson 1965), a leading exponent of the applications of the phenomenological approach to psychoanalysis, has been studying the family interaction processes of schizophrenic patients. Combining the interpersonal and phenomenological frameworks, Laing maintains that schizophrenia becomes intelligible as the result of ambiguous and contradictory environmental processes. It is a protective device for living in an otherwise hopelessly confusing environment—a strategy for survival. Laing avoids the concepts of "disease" and "pathology" and demonstrates that what happens in a group will be intelligible if one can retrace the steps from what is going on to who is doing what. His work suggests modifications of traditional views of such phenomena as regression, acting out, catatonia, and transference. The focus of study for Leslie Farber (1966) has been a psychology of will, a subject notably absent in psychological theory and research. Farber observes that although we recognize the presence of many causes for any behavior, we attribute the motivating power to a single aspect of the causal nexus, such as libido, sexuality, or anxiety. However, the only prime mover that is held accountable, answerable, is will, man's power of volition. When a personality theory does not deal with an explicit, accountable will, it smuggles it in under another name and makes it an irresponsible, that is, unaccountable, prime mover. The focus then shifts to motives as the prime causes of behavior. As a consequence, the phenomenological understanding of both will and motives suffers. Farber points out that will and motive are superficially similar in that both may be involved in provoking action. But a motive cannot be responsible for an action of will. For example, acting disparagingly may be motivated by envy. But since one could also choose not to disparage, even though envious, it is will that is responsible for the action, not envy. Farber concretely applies his concept of the privileges and
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limitations of the will to a range of clinical issues such as anxiety, schizophrenia, and sex. Existential analysis ("Daseinsanalyse") Existential analysis, in contradistinction to existential psychotherapy, is a type of phenomenological, empirical investigation of specific and actual forms and patterns of existence. In other words, given the essential structure of human nature described by Heidegger (1927) as "being-in-theworld," the existential analysts, among whom are the Swiss psychiatrists Binswanger and Boss, direct their attention to the particular, concrete modes of being-in-the-world of a particular person. They attempt to understand (in contrast to explaining} the subjectively experienced complex of meanings that constitute a given person's world designs. Understanding versus explanation. It is in the contrast between understanding and explanation that the difference between existential analysis and psychoanalytic theory may be explicated. Understanding involves comprehending the object on its terms, to see in it structures that emerge from its side, and not from ours. . . . In explanation, the phenomena as they appear are transformed in the sense that they are either subsumed under laws that relate them to other, different phenomena, or they are broken down into parts that somehow are taken as more real than the configuration of those parts that are taken to make up the phenomenon in question. (Binswanger [1922— 1957] 1963, pp. 38-39) In this sense psychoanalytic theory is an explanatory system, and Freud's conception of man as Homo naturalis, that is, as essentially a biophysical organism, places psychoanalytic theory within the domain of natural science. As such, the "psychic apparatus" is a derivative of biological instincts, and the experienced world is explained by transforming it into its biological components. Binswanger pays great tribute to Freud's genius in developing the first thoroughgoing natural science view of man. His criticism of Freud is not that his theoretical structure is erroneous but that it is limited. Psychoanalytic theory deals with but one mode of being-in-the-world, namely, what Heidegger calls "thrownness." The mode of "thrownness" is that which is structured or determined by one's biological and constitutional make-up (the Umwelt} and conditioned by one's past experience. It is the mode of being-in-the-world without freedom. Psychopathology. Although existential analysis examines the person and his world without regard to criteria of health or pathology, the very notion of the essential structure of Dasein generates a concept of psychopathology. The essence of Dasein
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is openness to multiple modes of being-in-the-world and readiness to experience meaning in these multiple modes. Any modification of the essential structure that results in "constriction," "narrowing," or "flattening" of the world, so that experience can be organized in only one, or a few, categories, involves a loss of existential freedom and is therefore pathological. Thus far, the only world designs that have been subjected to existential analyses are severely constricted ones. The published existential analytic case studies of both Binswanger (1956; 1962) and Boss (1957; 1962) are all of psychotic or severely neurotic patients. It is hoped that analyses of nonconstricted modes of being-in-the-world may shed light on the structure of creative world designs. Creative phenomena. The existential analysts have always showed special interest in creative and spiritual phenomena. They believe that these kinds of phenomena cannot be explained in terms of antecedent or biological components, for the essence of the phenomenon is precisely the emergence of the new. The essence of the creative man is his being-in-the-world in freedom. The existential analysts similarly emphasize that in therapeutic practice a total commitment to psychic determinism rules out seriously entertaining the possibility of freedom of choice and leaves one only able to foster "the illusion of freedom." Whether or not existential analysis will shed light on the problems of creativity remains to be seen, but at least its methods open up the possibility. We should add that some analysts in the Freudian tradition, and some others who go under the ambiguous rubric "ego psychologists," do expand the presuppositions of psychoanalytic theory, implicitly and explicitly, and have made contributions which have something in common with the existential approach. Psychotherapy Binswanger and Boss make a sharp distinction between psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalytic therapy. They have much to say about the limitations of the theory, but they value and use the therapy within a new context. Binswanger actually concerns himself less with psychotherapy, being interested chiefly in the "philosophical anthropology" on which therapy is based. Aside from a few descriptive references to the task of therapy as a process of assisting man in his ability to structure his world and a statement about the therapist's orientation toward encounter with, and understanding of, the whole person, Binswanger accepts Freudian therapy as a potent and effective clinical instrument. Boss, on the other hand, deals extensively and explicitly with psychotherapeutic practice. Whereas
Binswanger's case histories are exclusively analyses of modes of being-in-the-world, Boss's case studies are cast in the framework of the therapeutic process. Furthermore, Boss undertakes a detailed examination of the procedures of Freudian therapy and concludes that Freud the therapist is radically different from Freud the mechanistic theorist. Although Boss's case studies are instructive in casting traditional psychodynamic concepts into the broader, more meaningful phenomenological framework of existential analysis, there seems to be an oversimplification in both Boss's image of man and his view of psychotherapy. For example, Boss claims that all anxiety can be removed by love and trust, whereas one of the major contributions of existential thought is its recognition of anxiety as an ontological condition of existence. What does the designation "existential psychotherapy" mean? Certainly it does not refer to a self-contained depth therapy that is counter to Freudian psychoanalytic psychotherapy, as is the therapy of Jung or Reich. Nor does it refer to a body of special techniques or procedures, although it has made and will presumably make significant contributions to technique. It is more accurate, indeed, to speak of the existential attitude toward, or context of, psychotherapy, since existentialists have thus far focused their attention on the presuppositions underlying all psychotherapies. There are, however, a number of attributes that are descriptive of the existential attitude. Existential psychiatrists and psychologists believe that this attitudinal framework—which is the application to clinical practice of theories mentioned earlier— fosters psychotherapeutic functioning which is more directly relevant to the problems of human beings in our contemporary age and is more consistently efficacious. The first attribute may be described as observation in the phenomenological mode. That is, the therapist must learn to perceive the patient in terms of his (the patient's) phenomenal reality and not in terms of the therapist's theoretical models. The therapist can never know the patient's experiential world in the same sense that he can know his own. The critical problem is that of participation in the patient's world, whether one calls the means by which this is done empathy, intuition, partial identification, presence, or encounter. This is obviously such an essential process in any psychotherapy, indeed in all kinds of human interaction, that it is surprising it has not been subjected to research investigation. Hopefully, a future area of psychotherapy research will be the study of the therapist's inferential processes. A second attribute is the experiential mode of
PSYCHOLOGY: Existential Psychology knowing. "A psychotherapy on existential-analytic bases," writes Binswanger, "thus proceeds not merely by showing the patient where, when, and to what extent he has failed to realize the fullness of his humanity, but it tries to make him experience this as radically as possible . . ." (1962, p. 20). The experiential mode applies to the therapist as well. An aspect of his "presence" in the "encounter" with the patient is his experiencing the patient's communications on many different levels of his own being. Third, the existential attitude emphasizes a primary, but not exclusive, focus on the "here and now." It is destructive of the meaningfulness of existence to interpret essential potentialities as solely genetic developmental processes. A person's whole history is built into all present relationships and is one of the constitutive determinants of them. But to say that the past is the sufficient cause of the present and to examine the past in therapy in this context is an instance of the kind of reductionism the whole existential movement adamantly opposes. At the same time, we caution against the omission of the genetic dimension in the phenomenological approach. Such an omission points to one of the shortcomings of existential analysis— namely, its lack of treatment of psychological development. Some phenomenological purists claim that the developmental processes can never be the subject of phenomenological investigation, but in our opinion a phenomenology of human development makes sense and has in fact been demonstrated in the illuminating studies by Schachtel (1959). In any case, the therapeutic consequences of verbalizations about the patient's past history is a question which suggests itself as a fruitful area for research. In practice, many therapeutic schools seem to be moving toward emphasis on the patient's present situation. It is interesting to note that in her study comparing Freudian and "existential" analysts Gatch found that neither group made many references to the patients' previous experiences, nor did they make many causal interpretations. Fourth, the existential approach keeps intentionality always at the heart of the therapeutic process. May (1966a) points out that intentionality is shown, in one aspect, in the movements and gestures of the body; thus the body and "instincts" come directly into existential therapy, not as a set of discrete drives but as the totality of movement of the organism. Intentionality is seen as the source °f will and decision and also as the area in which human wishing, including the Freudian wish, operates. This central emphasis on intentionality has opened up some areas for constructive therapy
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which were previously thought to be resistive to all psychotherapy, such as drug addiction, Bugental (1965) has attempted to elucidate the meanings of the concepts of existentialism within the framework of psychotherapeutic practice. He sees the therapeutic task as the pursuit of authenticity, and this task has two phases. The analytic phase is reparative and is essentially an attack upon the distortions of awareness and being that cripple a person's existence. The second phase, the ontogogic, "is concerned with the realization of the potential for liberated being" (1965, p. 183). We conclude with a comment that arises out of the fact that existentialists, because of their commitment to the "inviolability of human experience" and to the phenomenological method of investigation, have tended to eschew systematization and scientific theory construction (Ford & Urban 1963, p. 480). But both approaches are necessary to the advancement of knowledge. Neither scientific conceptualization nor experimentation as such need violate meaningful experience. The best safeguard against their doing so is a thorough clarification of their implicit presuppositions. Existential analysis has insisted on such clarification. It may also construct thereon a broader humanistic scientific theory, as Binswanger and Straus have already begun to do. ROLLO MAY AND SABERT BASESCU [See also PHENOMENOLOGY. Other relevant material may be found in ANXIETY; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article On CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING; MOTIVATION; PERSONALITY-. CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS; PSYCHOANALYSIS; RELIGION; and in
the biographies of BUBER and HUSSERL.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BASESCU, SABERT 1962 Human Nature and Psychotherapy: An Existential View. Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 2:149-157. BINSWANGER, LUDWIG (1922-1957) 1963 Being-in-theWorld: Selected Papers. Translated by Jacob Needleman. New York: Basic Books. -» First published in German. Contains a critical introduction to Binswanger's existential psychoanalysis. BINSWANGER, LUDWIG (1956) 1957 Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences of a Friendship. New York: Grune. -» First published as Erinnerungen an Sigmund Freud. BINSWANGER, LUDWIG 1962 Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy. Pages 17-23 in Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (editor), Psychoanalysis and Existential Philosophy. New York: Dutton. Boss, MEDARD (1957) 1963 Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis. New York: Basic Books. -» First published in German. Boss, MEDARD 1962 Anxiety, Guilt and Psychotherapeutic Liberation. Revieiv of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 2:173-195.
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BUBER, MARTIN (1936) 1958 I and Thou. 2d ed. New York: Scribner. -» First published in German. BURER, MARTIN 1957a Distance and Relation. Psychiatry 20:97-104. BUBER, MARTIN 1957& Guilt and Guilt Feelings. Psychiatry 20:114-129. BUGENTAL, J. F. C. 1965 The Search for Authenticity. New York: Holt. CALIGOR, LEOPOLD; and MAY, ROLLO 1967 Dreams and Personality Change. New York: Basic Books. FARBER, LESLIE H. 1966 The Ways of the Will: Essays Toward a Psychology and Psychopathology of Will. New York: Basic Books. FORD, DONALD H.; and URBAN, HUGH B. 1963 Systems of Psychotherapy: A Comparative Study. New York: Wiley. FRIEDMAN, MAURICE 1964 The Worlds of Existentialism. New York: Random House. GATCH, VERA 1963 The Effect of a Philosophic Commitment to Psychic Determinism on the Behavior of the Psychotherapist, Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Oklahoma. HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1927) 1962 Being and Time. New York: Harper. -> First published as Sein und Zeit. JASPERS, KARL (1913) 1963 General Psychopathology. Univ. of Chicago Press. -> First published in German. KIERKEGAARD, S0REN A. (1844) 1957 The Concept of Dread. 2d ed. Princeton Univ. Press. -» First published as Begrebet angest. LAING, RONALD D. 1960 The Divided Self: A Study of Sanity and Madness. Chicago: Quadrangle Books; London: Tavistock. LAING, RONALD D.; and ESTERSON, A. 1965 Sanity, Madness and the Family. Volume 1: Families of Schizophrenics. New York: Basic Books. LYONS, JOSEPH 1963 Psychology and the Measure of Man. New York: Free Press. MAY, ROLLO 1950 The Meaning of Anxiety. New York: Ronald. MAY, ROLLO (editor) 1961 Existential Psychology. New York: Random House. MAY. ROLLO 1966a Psychology and the Human Dilemma. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. MAY, ROLLO I966b Love and Will. New York: Norton. MAY, ROLLO; ANGEL, E.; and ELLENBERGER, H. F. (editors) 1958 Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology. New York: Basic Books. SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL (1943) 1956 Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. New York: Philosophical Library. -> First published as L'etre et le neant: Essai d'ontologie phenomenologique. SCHACHTEL, ERNEST G. 1959 Metamorphosis: On the Development of Affect, Perception, Attention, and Memory. New York: Basic Books. STRAUS, ERWIN W. (1936) 1963 The Primary World of Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience. New York: Free Press. -» First published as Vom Sinn der Sinne. STRAUS, ERWIN W. Phenomenological Psychology: The Selected Papers of Erwin W. Straus. New York: Basic Books, 1966. TILLICH, PAUL 1944 Existential Philosophy. Journal of the History of Ideas 5:44-70. TILLICH, PAUL 1952 The Courage to Be. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. -* A paperback edition was published in 1959. VAN KAAM, ADRIAN L. 1966 Existential Foundations of Psychology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
Although formerly used in a narrower sense to include only business and industrial psychology, today the term applied psychology designates the professional practice (as distinguished from the basic science) of psychology in all areas. It covers applied research and service functions in the fields of personnel, engineering, consumer, clinical, and counseling psychology. In addition, some applied psychologists work with members of other professions as consultants or in the training of other professional personnel. Before World War n, psychology was primarily an academic discipline. Today over half of America's psychologists work outside of universities, in such settings as government agencies, industrial organizations, school systems, hospitals, clinics, and counseling centers. The science and profession of psychology Applied psychology does not differ in any fundamental way from the rest of psychology. In terms of orientation and training, every applied psychologist is a psychologist first and an applied specialist only secondarily. All have taken essentially the same types of courses; specialization occurs chiefly at the level of practicum training and on-the-job experience. The clinical, counseling, or personnel psychologist, for example, has received training in experimental psychology, and the experimental psychologist utilizes in his research concepts or hypotheses that may have originated in the clinic or factory. The unique contribution of the applied psychologist, as distinguished from that of other specialists, stems largely from his research approach to problems of human behavior. When the psychologist goes to work in an applied setting, he brings with him not a set of rules or specific facts but a method for attacking problems. It is essentially the scientific method, common to all sciences. This method consists in the empirical observation and recording of facts under systematically controlled conditions. By controlling conditions through appropriate experimental designs, the psychologist can identify cause-and-effect relations and can isolate the influence of individual variables. The scientific method also requires replication of observations and a determination of the margin of error inherent in its procedures. Since applied psychology follows the same fundamental procedures as basic psychological research, how can the two be differentiated? When the applied psychologist is engaged in research— as is true much of the time for many applied psy-
PSYCHOLOGY: Applied Psychology chologists—the distinction hinges on the difference between basic and applied research. This difference is one of degree. Although examples can be found that fall clearly into the basic or the applied category, some research can be classified in either one. One determining factor is the reason for choosing a problem: to help in theory construction (basic) or in making administrative decisions (applied). For instance, is the investigation concerned principally with the nature of learning or with the most effective method for teaching children to read? Another difference pertains to the specificity or generality of the findings. The results of basic research can be generalized more widely than those of applied research. The latter typically yields results pertaining only to narrowly limited contexts. Similarly, applied research permits less analysis of causal relations, since situations are likely to be compared in their totality rather than being broken down into more elementary components. For example, applied research may demonstrate that one of two training procedures—in all their operational complexities—yields better results than the other in a particular situation. But it may not be possible under these circumstances to specify why the one method was superior. Some applied psychologists spend most of their time in service rather than in research functions. How does such a psychologist use scientific method when engaged, for instance, in psychotherapy with a neurotic patient, in testing a child with a reading disability, in interviewing an applicant for an executive position, or in planning a consumer survey for an automobile manufacturer? He does so in at least two ways. First, he evaluates and chooses his procedures, not on the basis of subjective opinion, but in the light of available published research conducted in comparable situations. Being unable under the circumstances to carry out his own empirical evaluations, he is nevertheless guided by whatever empirical data are available regarding tests, questionnaire techniques, varieties of psychotherapy, or any other procedure he plans to use. In a still more general way the psychologist's scientific training influences his approach to every problem he encounters in his service functions. Through such training he has formed habits of accurate and objective observation and recording of facts, and he has learned to guard against preconceived notions and premature acceptance of conclusions. He has learned to reserve judgment and to modify and discard conclusions as fresh facts become available. In his service functions, a s in his research, the applied psychologist often formulate hypotheses and verify them against
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subsequent data. In trying to discover the sources of a client's neurotic fears, the causes of a child's reading difficulties, or the leadership potential of a job applicant, the psychologist forms a succession of tentative hypotheses. Each hypothesis suggests what further facts must be elicited and is in turn either confirmed or disproved by such facts. This type of problem-solving attitude represents an important difference between the professional psychologist and both the well-intentioned but untrained "psychologizer" and the deliberate impostor. The problem of charlatanism. Some of the areas in which applied psychologists work have traditionally proved attractive to charlatans and selfstyled experts (see Anastasi 1964, pp. 10-13). In this flourishing psychological underworld are found phrenologists, physiognomists, and others who try to diagnose aptitudes and personality traits or recommend a specific career on the basis of irrelevant physical signs. Here too are the many pseudoscientific systems for improving personality, developing one's memory or selling ability, and overcoming emotional problems. On the borderline are the practitioners who assume a semblance of respectability by administering tests. They may, however, be relying on a single test of unknown validity for which they make extravagant claims. Or they may send a set of tests by mail, to be taken under uncontrolled conditions and interpreted with no other knowledge about the examinee. All these practices represent gross misuse of tests and yield meaningless results. The prevalence of charlatanism in the field of human behavior arises partly from inadequate understanding of the nature of psychology. Since psychology is a relatively young science, the public is still unclear about the functions of psychologists and is thus more receptive to the claims of charlatans. Even more important in accounting for the survival of charlatanism is the public's strong desire for the sort of help offered by charlatans. Unhampered by facts, the charlatan promises easier and quicker solutions to life's problems than does the reputable psychologist. He either omits all mention of any margin of error in his procedures or gives a bland assurance of near-perfect accuracy. In support of his claims he is likely to cite an impressive array of selected cases, thereby capitalizing on chance results. Relying on analogies, figures of speech, and popular stereotypes, his writings create a spurious semblance of plausibility. A favorite procedure of charlatans is to provide personality descriptions in terms of vague generalities applicable to most people. When confronted with such a description of himself, the individual
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is often impressed with its apparent accuracy and insight and becomes convinced that the procedure is valid. This subjective pseudovalidation has been called the "Barnum effect" (Dunnette 1957) after Phineas T. Barnum, the famous showman, who is credited with remarking, "There's a sucker born every minute." The readiness with which these general personality descriptions are accepted as true has been demonstrated experimentally with such groups as personnel managers and college students (Stagner 1958). In these demonstrations a standard personality inventory is first administered to the group, and the papers are collected for scoring. Before getting the actual scores, each participant receives an identical copy of a fake "personality analysis." The analysis consists of a list of descriptive statements in which the same statements have been marked for each person. The marked statements, most of which are flattering, are such as to apply to the large majority of people. They are interspersed with unmarked statements, which are generally unfavorable. When asked to evaluate their self-descriptions, the majority of participants rate them as "amazingly accurate," while most of the others rate them as "rather good." Few if any disagree with them. Upon being told about the hoax and learning that their own description is identical with all the others, subjects typically show great surprise. The Barnum effect accounts for much of the popular acceptance of pseudoscientific systems of personality analysis. These systems provide random assortments of universally applicable generalities and fail to differentiate one person from another. Identifying applied psychologists. The prevalence of charlatanism provides one reason for inquiring into ways of identifying genuine psychologists. In addition, the phenomenal growth of applied psychology since World War n means that more and more psychologists are working with laymen or with members of other professions who may lack the technical knowledge to appraise the psychologist's qualifications. Hence, it has become increasingly important to establish procedures for identifying psychologists and judging their special competencies. A significant step, both in raising professional standards and in helping the general public to evaluate psychological practitioners, has been the enactment of licensing and certification laws for psychologists. Before World War n there was virtually no legal control over either the practice of psychology or the use of the title "psychologist." Today most of the states in which large numbers
of psychologists are employed either have such laws or are in the process of enacting them (Anastasi 1964, p. 584). In such states psychologists may be identified by the possession of a certificate indicating that certain standards of training and experience have been met. Typical requirements for certification include the PH.D. degree in psychology from an accredited university, two years of relevant experience, and the passing of a written qualifying examination. At a still higher level, specialty certification is handled by the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology (ABEPP), established in 1946. Requiring the PH.D. degree, five years of experience, and intensive written and practical examinations, this board issues diplomas in three specialties : clinical, counseling, and industrial psychology. ABEPP publishes a directory of diplomates in each specialty, which is available in libraries and may also be obtained by interested organizations or individuals. The function of ABEPP is essentially to provide information about qualified psychologists. As a privately constituted board within the profession, it has no legal authority for enforcement. On the other hand, the various state laws pertaining to psychology do carry such authority. In a state having such laws a person without the appropriate certificate who presents himself as a psychologist is subject to legal penalties. Another major source of information about psychologists is the American Psychological Association (APA), the national association to which most psychologists belong. Membership in this association does not imply qualifications for the performance of any service functions—only state certificates and ABEPP diplomas serve that purpose. Nevertheless, the annual directory of the APA provides considerable information about the location, training, and professional functions of its members. The APA has also undertaken many other activities designed to improve and systematize training standards, raise the level of professional practice, work out effective relations with other professions, and clarify the public image of psychology. It has participated in the preparation of two booklets designed to inform the public about the work of psychologists, Psychologists in Action (Ogg 1955) and The Psychologist in Industry (American Psychological Association, Division of Industrial Psychology 1959). Of particular importance was the formulation of a professional code of ethics, "Ethical Standards of Psychologists" (American Psychological Association 1963). First published in 1953 and revised in 1963, this code is
PSYCHOLOGY: Applied Psychology especially relevant to the problems encountered by applied psychologists in their relations with the public. Personnel psychology One of the major areas of personnel psychology is that of personnel selection and classification. In industry the techniques of personnel selection and classification are used not only in hiring new employees but also in connection with promotions, transfers, discharges, and other personnel decisions. Nor are such techniques limited to industrial psychology. Essentially the same procedures are applicable to the selection and classification of military personnel, the admission of students to colleges and professional schools, and the identification of patients most likely to benefit from a particular form of therapy. Although first developed within the context of industrial psychology, these techniques provide an introduction to methodology that is of basic importance in most fields of applied psychology. [See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, article on INDUSTRIAL AND BUSINESS PSYCHOLOGY.] A useful distinction is that between selection and classification of personnel. Selection always involves a decision to accept or reject. Decisions as to whether or not to hire a job applicant, admit a student to medical school, or accept a candidate for officer training are examples of selection. In classification, on the other hand, every individual must be utilized. The question is where to assign each person so as to maximize the total effectiveness of the organization. The development of a program for either selection or classification of personnel involves four principal steps: job analysis, preparation and preliminary tryout of predictors, validation of predictors, and formulation of a strategy for personnel decisions (Anastasi 1964, chapters 2-5). Job analysis defines the problem by specifying worker qualifications for which predictors are needed. Through a variety of techniques for the systematic observation of workers on the job, a job description can be prepared that is specific to each job. A description in terms of vague generalities that would be equally applicable to many jobs is of little use for personnel selection or classification. Moreover, effective job analysis identifies critical requirements, that is, those characteristics that differentiate most sharply between better and poorer workers on each job. On the basis of the job analysis suitable predictors are chosen or developed. These include not °nly tests but also other assessment procedures,
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such as application forms, reference checkups, and interviewing. Application forms (or biographical inventories) have proved successful in a wide variety of selection situations, particularly when their items are empirically chosen and weighted by checking them against criteria of subsequent job performance. Although more time-consuming than other techniques, intensive interviewing provides opportunities for thorough individual assessment. Interviewing techniques are employed especially in the evaluation of executives and other high-level personnel and in the judging of many personality traits for which no satisfactory tests may be available. At a more basic level considerable research has been conducted on the development of rating scales and other systematic procedures for improving personal judgments (Anastasi 1964, pp. 7688). [See INTERVIEWING.] Every major type of test has been used in personnel selection and classification (Anastasi 1961). Traditional intelligence tests measure principally verbal comprehension and other abstract functions required for academic achievement. Several short intelligence tests have been developed for screening industrial personnel. Research on creative talent has produced many new testing techniques that are relevant to certain selection problems. Among the earliest tests applied to personnel selection are tests of special aptitudes in motor skills, spatial aptitudes, mechanical comprehension, and clerical speed and accuracy. Classification programs are making increasing use of multiple aptitude batteries, which combine the traits measured by traditional intelligence tests with some of the broader abilities covered by special aptitude tests. Achievement tests measure current proficiency following relatively uniform training or experience. Many consist of standardized work samples, such as taking dictation, operating a punch press, or handling the matters in an executive's in-basket. Personality tests may be used with any type of worker but have found their chief application in jobs requiring extensive interpersonal contacts, such as selling and supervisory positions. It is especially important in this area to guard against common misuses of tests, including undue reliance on test scores in the absence of other information and the use of inadequately validated instruments. Among the most successful personality tests are interest inventories, whereby the individual may compare his interests with those typical of persons engaged in different occupations. [See APTITUDE TESTING; INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE TESTING; PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT; VOCATIONAL INTEREST TESTING.]
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Prior to their operational use all predictors should be validated within a representative sample of the population for whom the selection program is designed. The most common procedure is to correlate predictive measures (e.g., test scores, interviewer's ratings) with a criterion of subsequent job success. On the basis of such predictive validity some of the instruments will be retained and others discarded or modified. The validation data also permit an evaluation of the effectiveness of the final selection program and a determination of the margin of error to be expected in its operation. [See PSYCHOMETRICS.]
The final stage in the development of the program requires the choice of a strategy for applying the predictive measures so as to reach a decision about individuals (Cronbach & Gleser 1957). Scores on the different predictors may be combined through a regression equation, which yields the single best estimate of each individual's criterion performance. Through such a procedure deficiencies in one qualification may be compensated by superior standing in another. In jobs where minimum standards must be met in each of several essential skills, a multiple-cut-off strategy is more appropriate. When tests or other predictors are employed in the intensive study of individual cases, as in the selection of high-level personnel, evaluation of executives, and clinical diagnosis, it is a common practice for the examiner or interviewer to combine and interpret scores through "clinical judgment," with no further statistical analysis (Meehl 1954). A growing area within personnel psychology is that of development and training (Anastasi 1964, chapter 5; Gagne 1962, chapters 9-11). Although the psychology of learning has much to contribute to the improvement of training procedures, welldesigned applied research in this area is still rare. Industrial training is a continuing process that can benefit all employees, from beginners to experienced workers and from unskilled labor to top management. Training programs in industry serve a variety of functions, including orientation, development of job skills, technical and professional training, management development, and general education. The development of a training program should include task analysis to define what must be learned, development of appropriate training procedures, and objective evaluation of the program. The choice of training media and procedures depends in part upon what is to be taught and to whom. In developing training procedures, one can
also be guided by the results of available training research in connection with such questions as motivation, stress, practice, feedback, and transfer of training. The effectiveness of a training program should be evaluated in terms of job criteria as well as training criteria. Recent developments in the automation of training procedures are illustrated by training devices, simulators, and teaching machines. The rapidly growing area of management development covers many types of training and utilizes a diversity of training techniques. Much of it is concerned with the development of human-relations skills and attitudes through group discussion of specific cases, problem-solving interviews, and role playing (Maier, Solem, & Maier 1957). In other aspects of management development two techniques of special interest are management games (or simulation) and creativity training through "brainstorming." The former provides practice in executive decision making, often utilizing computers to furnish rapid feedback on the probable consequences of decisions (Fleishman 1961, pp. 219-238). The latter endeavors to stimulate creative productivity by requiring participants to separate in time the production of ideas from their evaluation (Fames & Meadow 1963). It is hypothesized that the individual is thus freed from the customary inhibitory effects of self-criticism. A third and relatively broad area of personnel psychology is concerned with employee motivation and morale (Anastasi 1964, chapter 6; Fleishman 1961, sees. 4-6). Variously designated as "industrial social psychology," "employee relations," "human relations in industry," and "the psychology of management," this division of personnel psychology dates from the classic Hawthorne studies, which first focused attention on the effect of employee attitudes upon productivity (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939). Incidentally, the Hawthorne studies also served to highlight the need for controlling attitudinal variables in the design of psychological experiments. The term "Hawthorne effect" is now commonly used to designate the influence that participating in an experiment may have upon the subject's behavior. The principal procedures used in gathering data on employee motivation, attitudes, and morale include interviews, opinion questionnaires, attitude scales, projective and other indirect techniques, nominating or sociometric techniques, and continued observation of small groups by a trained observer. When rating the factors that make for job satisfaction, workers usually place as high a
PSYCHOLOGY: Applied Psychology value on security, opportunity for advancement, interest in their work, feeling of pride in the company, and relations with co-workers and supervisors as they do on pay. However, the relative weight given each factor varies somewhat with the age, sex, and education of the worker, as well as with type of work and job level. Favorable employee attitudes are associated with a lower accident rate and with less absenteeism, tardiness, and job turnover. The relation between attitudes and productivity, however, is more complex and depends upon other individual and situational variables. There is also evidence to suggest that favorable job attitudes more often arise from intrinsic characteristics of the work itself, while unfavorable job attitudes more often arise from the job context (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman 1959). Moreover, favorable attitudes bear a more direct relation to productivity than do unfavorable ones. The attitudes and morale of any group are deeply influenced by the supervisory practices, the communication system, and the organizational structure under which it operates (Likert 1961). Research on supervisory and leadership behavior has identified two independent dimensions: "consideration," characterized by a friendly, warm, considerate supervisory relationship, as contrasted with an impersonal and authoritarian relationship; and "initiating structure," pertaining to the extent to which the supervisor actively plans and directs group activities oriented toward goal attainment (Fleishman 1961, pp. 311-328). Both dimensions are related to employee attitudes and productivity. Research on industrial communication has covered such varied problems as the relative merits of different media; legibility, content, and readability of written communications; the development of communication skills; factors influencing the persuasiveness of communication; sources of communication barriers and breakdowns; and the nature and effectiveness of communication networks (Fleishman 1961, sec. 6). Organizational structures have been analyzed from many points of view, and this diversity of approach is reflected in the proposals for improving organizational effectiveness (Foundation for Research on Human Behavior 1959; Bass 1965). Although controlled experiments pertaining to organizational theory are few, some research is available on the effectiveness of such organizational practices as employee participation in decision making, sociometric work-group assignments, and the redesigning of jobs with reference to attitudinal factors (Fleishman 1961, sees. 4-6). While all
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these approaches are promising, it must be borne in mind that no single organizational formula, management procedure, or supervisory practice fits all jobs and all individuals. Engineering psychology In current usage engineering psychology is a rather flexible term. This flexibility also characterizes its various synonyms—human engineering, human-factors engineering, and ergonomics. All these terms are sometimes used in a broad sense to cover practically every topic in industrial psychology, including selection, training, motivation, work methods, working environment, and equipment design. A more common usage restricts the coverage to the last three topics, as is done in this article. It should also be noted that the techniques of engineering psychology extend beyond industrial psychology and are being applied more and more to the designing of consumer goods. Psychologists are contributing not only to the designing of industrial machinery, military equipment, and space vehicles but also to the designing of such products as kitchen stoves, radios, and telephone dials. [See ENGINEERING PSYCHOLOGY.] A major objective in the improvement of work methods is the reduction of fatigue (Anastasi 1964, chapter 7; Barnes 1958, chapter 14; Fleishman 1961, sec. 7). Fatigue has been variously defined in terms of feelings of tiredness, changes in output, and physiological conditions. Increase in the energy cost of work, as measured by the respiration calorimeter, illustrates the physiological concept of fatigue. Vigilance tests provide a promising behavioral index of fatigue. Feelings of monotony and boredom are difficult to differentiate from the subjective experience of fatigue, especially from socalled mental fatigue. Human efficiency can be increased through the design of work and rest schedules. Suitably scheduled rest pauses generally increase total output, although the improvement may not occur immediately. Lengthening the work week beyond an optimal number of hours has usually lowered rather than raised total output. Shift work involves a disruption of daily physiological rhythms, especially for workers on rotating shifts. Individuals differ widely in their ability to adjust to changing activity cycles. Beginning with the early contributions of Frederick W. Taylor and Frank B. Gilbreth, time-andmotion study has now become part of more comprehensive methods-improvement programs (Barnes 1958). The principal objective of time-and-motion
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study is the elimination of unnecessary movements in work processes. Modern methods-improvement programs are broader in scope than early time-andmotion study, and they give more attention to individual differences and worker participation in methods development. Accident prevention is a recognized objective of modern methods improvement, besides being related to nearly every other aspect of industrial psychology (Anastasi 1964, chapter 7; Fleishman 1961, sec. 8). Data on the relation of personal characteristics to accident rate are often difficult to interpret because of the interrelation of many personal variables. Accident-proneness can be conclusively demonstrated only through the comparison of individual accident records over different time periods. Studies of "psychological climate" in different industrial settings have shown accident rates to be significantly related to several situational variables. With the recognition of the importance of such variables as causes of traffic accidents, the methods of engineering psychology are being used increasingly to improve the layout, illumination, and marking of highways. Accidents can be regarded as one indicator of the deterioration of performance under adverse conditions. It has long been known that working efficiency depends in part upon the characteristics of the working environment. It is apparent that such problems pertain not only to factories and offices but also to schools, libraries, homes, waiting rooms, and any other environments designed for prolonged human use. From a different angle, recent developments in space travel have stimulated intensive research on the effects of certain extreme environmental conditions upon human performance. With regard to illumination, research has concentrated on the optimum intensity of light for different types of work, the distribution of light to minimize glare and other conditions producing visual fatigue, and the use of different colors of light (McCormick 1964, chapter 13). The primary object of ventilation is to enable the body to give off excess heat through evaporation, radiation, and convection (McCormick 1964, chapter 15). Industrial studies have shown significant effects of ventilating conditions upon the quantity and quality of production, accident rates, and absenteeism. Suggestive results on the behavioral effects of weather, seasons, and climate were obtained in a number of early studies (Anastasi 1964, pp. 203-204). Recently there has been a revival of interest in these problems, known collectively as "psychoclimatology." Research is also being conducted on the psychological consequences of exposure to ex-
treme atmospheric conditions, among which oxygen deprivation has received the greatest attention from psychologists. Chief among the special psychological problems of space travel are those arising from extreme and stressful environmental conditions (McCormick 1964, chapter 16). The physical conditions investigated in this connection include weightlessness, rotation, high accelerative forces, and conflicting sensory cues leading to spatial disorientation. A major source of psychological stress is isolation, comprising the factors of confinement, detachment, and sensory deprivation. [See SPACE, OUTER, article on SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.] Noise has been investigated as a cause of temporary or permanent hearing impairment, as a source of interference with auditory communication, and as a major form of distraction (McCormick 1964, chapter 14; Fleishman 1961, pp. 512-519). The effects of noise distraction upon behavior depend upon the interaction of various characteristics of the distracting stimuli, the task, and the individual. Their proper interpretation requires data not only on output but also on energy expenditure, adaptation, and emotional response to the source of distraction. A suggestive hypothesis, for which some experimental evidence is available, is that performance is most effective when the subject is at an optimum level of arousal (McBain 1961). Thus the introduction of a varying noise should improve the performance of an intrinsically monotonous task, since it brings the initially low arousal level closer to the optimum. Although foreshadowed by the contributions of Taylor, Gilbreth, and other early investigators, research on human factors in equipment design dates largely from World War n (Anastasi 1964, chapter 9; Barnes 1958, chapters 16-17; McCormick 1964, chapters 5-12). As the complexity of machines began to outstrip man's capacity to operate them, it became necessary to redesign equipment in such ways as to make the operators task less demanding. One of the problems of equipment design concerns the spatial layout of work. This is illustrated by the pre-positioning of pens, screwdrivers, and other small tools in holders and by the semicircular work space within which all materials or controls are easily reached by the operator's hands. Another problem pertains to the improvement of displays through which information is transmitted to the operator. For example, extensive research has been conducted on the factors influencing speed and accuracy of dial reading, such as dial si/c and shape, length of scale units, number and spacing of scale markers, direction of pointer movements,
PSYCHOLOGY: Applied Psychology and the size and style of letters and numerals. Research on control problems is illustrated by the hundreds of experiments on tracking. Another example is provided by research on the coding of controls in terms of position, size, shape, or color. Confusion among controls can be reduced by standardizing each control, increasing the discriminability of different controls, and utilizing meaningful associations for their identification. The broadening scope of engineering psychology is best typified by its growing concern with manmachine systems (Fleishman 1961, sec. 9; Gagne 1962; McCormick 1964, chapters 17-19). By describing the functions of the human operator in engineering terminology, such an approach makes it possible to transfer some of these functions from the man to the machine. The systems approach also permits the efficient arrangement of men and machines within a complex system. It is through the study of man—machine systems that the greatest improvements in speed and accuracy of operation have been achieved. It is also through this approach that engineering psychology is most likely to contribute to the advancement of basic psychological knowledge. Consumer psychology While personnel and engineering psychology are concerned chiefly with the behavior of the individual as producer, consumer psychology deals with his behavior as consumer (Anastasi 1964, chapters 10-12). This field of psychology began with the psychology of advertising and selling, whose objective was effective communication from the manufacturer or distributor to the consumer. Through advertising the consumer is informed about available goods or services and about the ways in which they may meet his needs. More recently, consumer psychology has broadened to cover two-way communication—from consumer to producer as well as from producer to consumer. Communications from the consumer were first sought as a means of preparing more effective advertisements. Systematic surveys of consumer needs and wants enabled the advertiser to identify those features of his product that were of greatest interest to the consumer. Such consumer surveys led directly to the next step, which involved the consideration of consumer wants and preferences in the designing of Products. The methods of consumer psychology are applicable to a number of fields other than that of developing and marketing industrial goods and services. One such application is to be found in Public opinion polls, whose procedures are essen-
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tially the same as those of consumer surveys. Another example is provided by the well-designed research on food preferences conducted by the armed services as an aid in the planning of meals for military personnel. A final illustration is the use of advertising campaigns in connection with problems of public interest, ranging from the prevention of forest fires to the promotion of mental health. [See CONSUMERS, article on CONSUMER BEHAVIOR; MARKET RESEARCH, article on CONSUMER RESEARCH.]
Modern consumer psychology covers a wide variety of problems, and its methods are correspondingly diverse. One of its most active areas deals with procedures for testing the effectiveness of printed advertisements, such as readership surveys, analysis of coupon returns, and controlled surveys of brand use and sales records. Specialized techniques have been developed for measuring the extent to which an ad attracts and holds attention, is understood and recalled, arouses appropriate associations and feeling tones, and leads to the desired action. Through controlled field or laboratory investigations, the effectiveness of ads in all these respects has been related to such ad characteristics as size, color, amount of white space, illustrations, printing type, content of the written message, position in the medium, and number of repetitions. Research on trade names has dealt with such questions as ease of identification and recall, arousal of appropriate feeling tone, and avoidance of confusion with other trade names. In radio and television research a variety of specialized techniques has likewise been employed to gather data on audience size and composition, audience reaction to specific programs or to types of programs, and sales effectiveness of advertising. A flurry of public agitation regarding subliminal advertising has proved to be largely unfounded (McConnell, Cutler, & McNeil 1958). Subliminal perception is the process of responding to stimuli that fall below the threshold of verbally reported awareness. The results of laboratory experiments indicate that subliminal stimulation cannot appreciably affect the behavior of mass audiences, contrary to the claims of certain popular writers and of the promoters of this type of advertising. Cutting across several areas of consumer psychology, motivation research utilizes depth interviewing and projective techniques to study buying motives. The principal contribution of this approach lies in providing hypotheses for subsequent testing by more objective, quantitative methods applicable to large samples. Information regarding consumer motivation can also be obtained by more direct
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forms of inquiry if suitable experimental designs are employed. The "product image," which refers to the composite of ideas and feelings associated with a product, has been investigated by the methods of motivation research as well as by more controlled techniques such as adjective checklists and the semantic differential. [See ADVERTISING, article On ADVERTISING RESEARCH.]
Personal salesmanship may be regarded as the most flexible and individualized form of advertising. Because of the many varieties of selling, generalizations about effective salesmanship are likely to be of little value. Psychologists have concentrated on procedures for the selection and training of salesmen for specific jobs. Available research on the sales process is still relatively meager. Clinical psychology Characterized by intensive work with individual cases, clinical psychology is concerned chiefly with intellectual and emotional disorders (Anastasi 1964, chapters 13-15; Shaffer & Shoben 1956). Today clinical psychologists work in a variety of settings, including not only hospitals and outpatient clinics but also industry, schools, prisons, courts, government agencies, and the armed services. The practice of clinical psychology utilizes findings and techniques from many branches of psychology, such as abnormal psychology, personality theory, and psychological testing. The specific activities of clinical psychologists consist chiefly of diagnosis, therapy, and research, although the relative emphasis placed upon each varies widely with the work setting and with the individual psychologist. Moreover, these three functions are frequently intertwined. Research may be specifically concerned with the validity of diagnostic tools or with the effectiveness of different types of therapy. Similarly, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures are indistinguishable in certain types of psychotherapy that emphasize the therapeutic value of the client's insight into the nature and origin of his problems. [See CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY.] In its broadest sense, diagnosis corresponds to the fact-finding aspect of clinical practice. Its objectives include screening and classification, personality description, prediction of outcome, and attainment of insight by the client. In the classification of psychological disorders a basic distinction is that between mental deficiency and emotional problems, the latter being subdivided into psychoses and neuroses. More specific syndromes have been identified, but the application of these traditional psychiatric categories has many drawbacks. Characteristically the clinical psychologist is inter-
ested in a detailed personality description of the individual case, with its unique combination of problems, adjustment mechanisms, and antecedent circumstances. The major sources of data available to the clinician include the case history, psychological testing, and the diagnostic interview. Considerable discussion and some research have been devoted to the nature and effectiveness of "clinical judgment" (Meehl 1954). With regard to both data gathering and interpretation, there are a number of ways in which the services of a skilled clinician are needed. Whether objective diagnostic techniques and statistical prediction formulas can eventually assume the entire diagnostic function remains a moot point. Many kinds of therapy are used today in treating emotional disorders. The choice of therapy depends partly upon the nature and severity of the disorder and partly upon such client characteristics as age and intelligence. To a considerable extent, however, the type of therapy employed reflects the training and theoretical persuasion of the therapist, available facilities, and other extraneous factors. The same behavioral symptoms may be treated quite differently by different therapists; and several types of therapy may be combined in treating a single individual. There are few forms of treatment that are wholly specific to a given emotional disorder. In psychology, as contrasted to medicine, one rarely if ever finds a disorder in which the diagnosis completely determines the treatment. Evaluating the relative efficacy of different forms of therapy for emotional disorders is very difficult. Owing to methodological difficulties, there is as yet little evidence to demonstrate that one therapy is better than another for any given case or even that any therapy is effective at all. Since the practical demands of the situation call for some action, the therapist does the best he can within the limits of available knowledge. Available therapies for emotional disorders include somatic therapies, environmental therapies, psychotherapy, and preventive procedures. Somatic therapies, requiring the services of a licensed physician, are illustrated by psychosurgery, shock therapies, and various applications of psychopharmacology. The introduction of tranquilizers has led to a spectacular rise in the recovery rate of patients in American state mental hospitals. A major factor in these results appears to be the role of tranquilizers in making patients more amenable to psychotherapy and, indirectly, improving staff morale. Other, more direct effects of such drugs have not yet been conclusively established in adequately con-
PSYCHOLOGY: Applied Psychology trolled experiments. Environmental therapy includes the therapeutic manipulation of environmental conditions both in community contexts (e.g., home, school, job, or recreational centers) and in institutions. A growing emphasis upon milieu therapy is rapidly transforming mental hospitals from custodial institutions into therapeutic communities. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article on SOMATIC TREATMENT.] Psychotherapy is practiced in many forms, reflecting the diverse theoretical orientations of the therapists. In the most general terms, psychotherapy can be described as the use of verbal or other means of communication in a nonthreatening interpersonal situation that facilitates the alleviation of anxiety and the elimination of maladaptive behavior through a learning process. Two widely used types of psychotherapy are psychoanalysis (Dollard & Miller 1950) and client-centered therapy (Rogers 1951). Group therapy is increasingly being employed, either in place of individual psychotherapy or in conjunction with it. Psychodrama and role playing are special variants of group therapy. Play therapy is commonly utilized with children, in lieu of the predominantly verbal techniques employed with adults. The current mental health movement is concerned not only with the treatment and rehabilitation of institutionalized mental patients but also with preventive measures and with the fostering of positive mental health through comprehensive social and educational programs. [See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, articles On CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING and GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY.]
It is in research that the clinical psychologist, as contrasted with other mental health professionals, can make his most distinctive contribution (Conference on Research in Psychotherapy 1962,). Even in his service functions, the clinical psychologist with a research orientation can operate more effectively than one who is trained only as a practitioner. With research training he is better able to evaluate innovations and incorporate new developments into his practice. In a rapidly evolving field rigid commitment to existing techniques can only retard progress. A major area of applied research in clinical psychology deals with the validity of diagnostic procedures, particularly projective techniques and other special clinical instruments. Research on the Process of psychotherapy has been concerned with changes in client behavior in the course of therapy, the specific ways in which different therapists function, and the interactions among therapist, client, a nd process variables (Rogers & Dymond 1954).
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Special techniques have been developed to measure changes in the client's self concept in the course of therapy. The outcome of therapy is particularly difficult to measure satisfactorily. Among the criteria of outcome employed for this purpose are client reports, the therapist's evaluation of progress, objective measures of behavioral changes during therapy sessions, ward behavior of institutionalized cases, and follow-up data in real-life situations. Research on the causes of mental disorders is an interdisciplinary venture spanning many fields, from biochemistry to anthropology. The sources of intellectual and emotional disorders have been sought in heredity, environmentally produced organic conditions, and experiential factors. Basic research that integrates clinical and experimental approaches is beginning to make vital contributions both to clinical practice and to the science of psychology. The reformulation of clinical concepts in terms of learning theory has been especially productive of research that cuts across clinic and laboratory lines (Bollard & Miller 1950; Grossberg 1964). Counseling psychology While there is much overlapping between the work of clinical and counseling psychologists, the latter typically deal with relatively normal persons having minor emotional problems or wanting help in vocational, educational, or other practical decisions (Anastasi 1964, chapter 16; Rordin 1955; Tyler 1961). Like psychotherapy, counseling relies largely on verbal communication and an accepting interpersonal relationship. In contrast to psychotherapy, however, counseling is less concerned with changing the individual's basic personality structure and more concerned with the effective utilization of his present resources. Counseling is also likely to be of shorter duration than psychotherapy and to involve the giving of more factual information to the client. Counseling psychologists work in many settings and perform a variety of functions. Although they may specialize in one type of counseling, such as vocational, educational, employee, rehabilitation, old-age, marriage, or personal counseling, they recognize the interrelation of all adjustment problems and concentrate on counseling the whole person. [See COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY.]
To increase the client's self-knowledge and assist him in making decisions, counseling psychologists utilize several types of tests, notably intelligence tests, educational achievement tests, special aptitude tests, multiple aptitude batteries, interest inventories, and personality inventories. Because of
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the importance of vocational decisions in most counseling activities, counseling psychologists need to make current occupational information available to their clients. Both tests and occupational data should be integrated in the counseling process in such a way that the client accepts the information and uses it effectively (Bordin 1955; Goldman 1961; Tyler 1961). An important objective of counseling is to facilitate decision making, not only by providing self-knowledge and occupational or other relevant information but also through training in the decision process. One of the principal areas of counseling research concerns the process of occupational choice and the nature of vocational development throughout the life span (Anastasi 1964, chapter 17; Roe 1956; Super 1957; Super & Overstreet 1960). In selecting an occupation, the individual chooses a way of life. One's occupation is likely to affect not only his income level and general social status but also many specific aspects of daily life. Job satisfaction and general mental health are contingent upon the extent to which the individual's work satisfies needs and values that are significant to him. Considerable information is available on personality patterns characteristic of persons in different occupations, but the results are often difficult to interpret because of procedural inadequacies. Some research has also been done on the role of childhood experiences in vocational choice. [See VOCATIONAL INTEREST TESTING.] Psychology and other professions Chief among the fields in which psychologists work in consulting or collaborative relations with other professional personnel are education, medicine, and law (Anastasi 1964, chapters 18-20). In education, psychologists may serve as school psychologists or as educational psychologists. The functions of school psychologists consist largely in the diagnostic testing and interviewing of individual pupils, followed by recommendations for remedial action. Educational psychologists are concerned principally with teacher training and educational research. While their chief focus is on the psychology of learning, they also draw upon other areas, notably developmental psychology, differential psychology, psychological testing, the psychology of adjustment, and social psychology. [See EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.] The potential contributions of psychology to medicine are still largely undeveloped. Although psychological techniques and knowledge can aid in every stage of medical practice, including diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention, contacts between psychology and general medicine
prior to World War 11 were negligible. Since midcentury the participation of psychologists in medical school teaching has grown rapidly. There have been corresponding increases in the utilization of psychologists as members of interprofessional teams, as for example, in the rehabilitation of the physically handicapped. Psychologists are likewise engaging more and more in collaborative research projects conducted in medical settings. [See VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION.] The earliest applications of psychology to law were concerned with the evaluation of testimony and other courtroom procedures. A related area is that of lie detection. In an effort to identify the causes of antisocial behavior, psychologists have studied the characteristics of delinquents and criminals. Although the conditions that lead to crime are manifold, research findings give increasing prominence to emotional and motivational factors stemming, at least in part, from childhood experiences. The work of psychologists in court clinics, prisons, training schools for juvenile delinquents, and other penocorrectional settings falls chiefly within the fields of clinical and counseling psychology. At a more basic level, psychologists may aid in the development, revision, and interpretation of laws by submitting relevant research findings in court testimony, by serving as consultants to legislative committees, and by collaborating in law school teaching and research. Empirically established facts about human behavior are basic to many types of laws, such as those pertaining to insanity, drug addiction, alcoholism, sexual offenses, child development, education, and minority groups. ANNE ANASTASI [Directly related are the entries ADVERTISING, article On ADVERTISING RESEARCH; CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY;
CONSUMERS, article on CONSUMER BEHAVIOR; COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY; EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY;
ENGINEERING PSYCHOLOGY; INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, article on INDUSTRIAL AND BUSINESS PSYCHOLOGY; MARKET RESEARCH, article on CONSUMER RESEARCH; MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY. Other relevant material may be found in APTITUDE TESTING; FATIGUE; LEARNING, article on ACQUISITION OF SKILL.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 1963 Ethical Standards of Psychologists. American Psychologist 18:56-60. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1959 The Psychologist in Industry. Washington: Research Institute of America. ANASTASI, ANNE 1961 Psychological Testing. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan. -> The first edition was published in 1954. ANASTASI, ANNE 1964 Fields of Applied Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
PSYCHOMETRICS BARNES, RALPH M. 1958 Motion and Time Study. 4th ed. New York: Wiley. ~» First published in 1942 as Motion and Time Study Applications. BASS, BERNARD M. 1965 Organizational Psychology. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. BORDIN, EDWARD S. 1955 Psychological Counseling. New York: Apple ton. CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN PSYCHOTHERAPY, 1961 1962 Research in Psychotherapy: Proceedings. Edited by Hans H. Strupp and L. Luborsky. Washington: American Psychological Association. CRONBACH, LEE J.; and GLESER, GOLDINE C. (1957) 1965 Psychological Tests and Personnel Decisions. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. BOLLARD, JOHN; and MILLER, NEAL E. 1950 Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking and Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» A paperback edition was published in 1965. DUNNETTE, M. D. 1957 Use of the Sugar Pill by Industrial Psychologists. American Psychologist 12:223225. FLEISHMAN, EDWIN A. (editor) 1961 Studies in Personnel and Industrial Psychology. Homewood, 111.: Dorsey. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1959 'Modern Organization Theory: A Symposium. Edited by Mason Haire. New York: Wiley. GAGNE, ROBERT M. (editor) 1962 Psychological Principles in System Development. New York: Holt. GOLDMAN, LEO 1961 Using Tests in Counseling. New York: Appleton. GROSSBERG, JOHN M. 1964 Behavior Therapy: A Review. Psychological Bulletin 62:73-88. HERZBERG, FREDERICK: MAUSNER, BERNARD; and SNYDERMAN, BARBARA BLOCH 1959 The Motivation to Work. 2d ed. New York: Wiley. -» The first edition was published in 1957. LIKERT, RENSIS 1961 Xe
J.;
and
DlCKSON,
WILLIAM
J.
(1939) 1961 Management and the Worker: An Account of a Research Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Cliicago. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1964 by W7iley.
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ROGERS, CARL R. 1951 Client-centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ROGERS, CARL R.; and DYMOND, ROSALIND F. (editors) 1954 Psychotherapy and Personality Change: Coordinated Research Studies in the Client-centered Approach. Univ. of Chicago Press. SHAFFER, LAURANCE F.; and SHOBEN, EDWARD J. JR. 1956 The Psychology of Adjustment. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -> The first edition was published in 1936. STAGNER, Ross 1958 The Gullibility of Personnel Managers. Personnel Psychology 11:347-352. SUPER, DONALD E. 1957 Psychology of Careers. New York: Harper. SUPER, DONALD E.; and OVERSTREET, PHOEBE L. 1960 Vocational Maturity of Ninth Grade Boys. Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute of School Experimentation, Career Pattern Study, Monograph 2. New York: Columbia Univ., Teachers College. TYLER, LEONA E. 1961 The Work of the Counselor. 2d ed. New York: Appleton. H> The first edition was published in 1953.
PSYCHOMETRICS Psychometrics, broadly defined, includes all aspects of the science of measurement of psychological variables and all research methodologies related to them. In addition to this article, the area of psycho-metrics is also discussed in ACHIEVEMENT TESTING; APTITUDE TESTING; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; FACTOR ANALYSIS; INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE TESTING; LATENT STRUCTURE; PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT; PsYCHOPHYSICS; QUANTAL RESPONSE; RESPONSE SETS; SCALING; SOCIOMETRY; VOCATIONAL INTEREST TESTING. Also of relevance are ATTITUDES and PROJECTIVE METHODS. This article deals with five major topics: measurement, item analysis, reliability, validity, and test norms. Measurement Measurement is generally considered to be any procedure whereby numbers are assigned to individuals (used herein to mean persons, objects, or events) according to some rule. The rule usually specifies the categories of an attribute or some quantitative aspect of an observation, and hence defines a scale. A scale is possible whenever there exists a one-to-one relationship between some of the properties of a group of numbers and a set of operations (the measurement procedure) which can be performed on or observed in the individuals. Scales of measurement are commonly classified as nominal scales, ordinal scales, interval scales, and ratio scales; the variables they measure can be discrete (i.e., providing distinct categories that vary from each other in a perceptibly finite way) or continuous (i.e., not readily providing dis-
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elements (say, a,b,c,d,---) the relation > must tinct categories; varying by virtually imperceptible obey the following postulates: degrees). Nominal scales. In a nominal scale the numIf a ^ b, then a > b or b > a. bers merely identify individuals or the categories If a > b, then a^b. of some attribute by which individuals can be clasIf a > b and b > c, then a > c. sified. Letters or words or arbitrary symbols would do just as well. Simple identification is illustrated If a, b, c, • • • , are the positive integers and > means by the assignment of numbers to football players; "greater than," these postulates define the ordinal classification by assigning numbers to such attrinumerals. If a, b, c, • • • , are chicks, and > means butes as sex, occupation, national origin, or color "pecks," the postulates define the behavioral conof hair. We can cross-classify according to the cateditions under which a "pecking order" exists. If gories of two or more attributes; e.g., sex by occu<7, b, c, • • • , are minerals and > means "scratches," pation, or sex by occupation by national origin. conformity to the postulates determines the existWith nominal scales that classify, the variables ence of a unique scratching order. If it is suggested are always treated as discrete. Sex, occupation, and that aggression implies pecking or that hardness national origin are genuine discrete variables. Color implies scratching, conformity of the behavior of of hair, on the other hand, is a multidimensional chicks or minerals to the postulates indicates continuous variable. If, for instance, we treat it as whether aggression or hardness, each assumed to a discrete variable by establishing the categories be a single variable, can be measured on an ordinal blond, brunette, and redhead, the measure becomes scale in terms of observations of pecking or by unreliable to some degree, and some individuals scratching experiments. will be misclassified. Where such misclassification Where the variable underlying the presumed can occur, the scale may be termed a quasi-nominal order is discrete or where it is possible for two or scale. Subject to the limitation of unreliability, it more individuals to have identical or indistinguishhas the properties and uses of any other nominal ably different amounts of this variable, we must scale. enlarge the concept of order to include equality. The basic statistics used with nominal scales are To do so we define > ("not greater than," "does not the numbers, percentages, or proportions of indifollow," "not older than," "does not scratch," "does viduals in the categories of an attribute or in the not peck," "is not an ancestor of," etc.) and add the cells of a table of cross classification. Hypotheses postulate: about the distribution of individuals within the If a > b and b > a, then a = b. categories of one attribute, or about the association of attributes and categories in a table of cross For example, two chicks are equally aggressive classification, are usually tested with the chi-square if neither one pecks the other, and two minerals test. Descriptive statistics used include the mode are equally hard if neither scratches the other. (the categoiy which includes the largest number For an ordinal scale, the relation between the of individuals) and various measures of associaordinal numerals and the attribute they measure tion, the commonest of which is the contingency is monotonic. If one individual has more of the coefficient. These statistics remain invariant when attribute than another does, he must have a higher the order of the categories of each attribute is rank in any group of which they are both memrearranged and when the numbers that identify bers. But differences in this attribute are not necthe categories are changed. If the categories of an essarily associated with proportionately equal difattribute have a natural order, this order is irreleferences in ordinal numerals. The measurements vant to nominal scaling, and nominal-scale statismay in fact be replaced by their squares or their tics do not use the information supplied by any logarithms (if the measurements are positive), such order. [See COUNTED DATA; STATISTICS, DEtheir cube roots, or any one of many other monoSCRIPTIVE, article on ASSOCIATION; SURVEY ANALtonic functions without altering their ordinal posiYSIS, article on THE ANALYSIS OF ATTRIBUTE DATA.] tions in the series. Ordinal scales. An ordinal scale is denned by Medians and percentiles of ordinal distributions a set of postulates. We first introduce the symbol are themselves seldom of interest because each of ">," and define it broadly as almost any asymthem merely designates an individual, or two indimetrical relation; it may mean "greater than," viduals adjacent in the order. Hypotheses involving "follows," "older than," "scratches," "pecks," "ancesordinal scale data may be tested by the Wilcoxontor of," etc. We also define 'V to mean "is unequal Mann-Whitney, Kruskal-Wallis, Siegel-Tukey, and to" or "is different from." Then, given any class of other procedures. (Interval-scale data are often
PSYCHOMETRICS converted by ranking into ordinal scales to avoid the assumption of normality.) Both the Kendall and the Spearman rank correlation procedures apply to ordinal scales. [See NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS, articles on ORDER STATISTICS and RANKING METHODS.]
Quasi-ordinal scales. Rankings made by judges are of course subject to errors. These are of two types: within-judge errors, where judges fail to discriminate consistently, and between-judge errors, where judges disagree in their rankings. Within-judge discrimination can be evaluated, and the errors partially "averaged out," by the method of paired comparisons. A set of judgments such as a > b, h > c, c > a, which violates the third postulate, is termed a circular triad. If a judge's rankings provide some but not too many circular triads, a "best" single ranking is obtained by assigning a score of 1 to an individual each time he is judged better than another, summing the scores for each individual, and ranking the sums. This procedure yields a quasi-ordinal scale. A true ordinal scale exists only if there are no circular triads. Between-judge agreement can be estimated by the coefficient of concordance or the average rank correlation, when several judges have ranked the same set of individuals on the same attribute. A true ordinal scale exists if all judges assign the same ranks to all individuals, so that the coefficient of concordance and the average rank correlation are both unity. If these coefficients are not unity but are still fairly high, the "best" single ranking of the individuals is obtained by summing all ranks assigned to each individual by the several judges, and then ranking these sums. This case is again a quasi-ordinal scale: an ordinal scale affected by some unreliability. All statistical procedures which apply to ordinal scales apply also to quasi-ordinal scales, with the reservation that the results will be attenuated by scale unreliability. Interval scales. An interval scale has equal units, but its zero point is arbitrary. Two interval scales measuring the same variable may use different units as well as different arbitrary zero points, but within each scale the units are equal. The classic examples are the Fahrenheit and centigrade scales of temperature used in physics. For an interval scale, the relation between the scale numbers and the magnitudes of the attribute Measured is not only monotonic; it is linear. Hence, if two interval scales measure the same variable lr i different units and from different zero points, the relation between them must be linear also. The
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general linear equation, for variables X and Y, is of the form Y = a + bX. Thus, for the Fahrenheit and centigrade scales we have °F = 32 + 1.8°C; °C = .5556°F - 17.7778. On interval scales, differences in actual magnitudes are reflected by proportional differences in scale units. Thus, if two temperatures are 18 units apart on the Fahrenheit scale, they will be 10 units apart on the centigrade scale, no matter where they are located on these scales (e.g., 0° to 18°F or 200° to 218°F). Interval-scale units may be added and subtracted, but they may not be multiplied or divided. We cannot say that Fahrenheit temperature 64° means twice as hot as Fahrenheit 32°. Almost all ordinary statistical procedures may be applied to intervalscale measurements, with the reservation that measures of central tendency must be interpreted as depending upon the arbitrary zero points. Almost all other statistical procedures are functions of deviations of the measures from their respective means and, hence, involve only addition and subtraction of the scale units. [See MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, articles on CORRELATION; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE, article on LOCATION AND DISPERSION.] Quasi-interval scales. Suppose that to each successive unit of an interval scale we apply a random stretch or compression. In this context randomness means that if the actual length of each unit is plotted against its ordinal position, there would be no trend of any sort: the larger units would not occur more frequently at one end, at both ends, in the middle, or in either or both intermediate regions. If the largest unit is small compared with the range of the variable in the group measured, we have a quasi-interval scale. All ordinary statistical procedures apply to quasi-interval scales, with the reservation that they have reduced reliability: errors of measurement are built into the scale units. Ratio scales. A ratio scale has the properties of an interval scale and in addition a true zero point, the scale-value zero meaning absence of any amount of the variable measured. Classic examples from physics are length and weight. The relation between the actual quantities and the scale values is linear, and the equations, moreover, have no constants and are of the form Y = bX. If two ratio scales measure the same variable in different units, any measurement on one scale is the same multiple or fraction of the corresponding measurement on the other scale. Thus, if the length of an object is X inches, its length is also 2.54X centimeters. And if the length of another object is Y centimeters, its length is also .3937Y inches.
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Ratio-scale units may be multiplied and divided as well as added and subtracted. A man who is six feet high is exactly twice as tall as is one who is three feet high. Statistics applicable to ratio scales include geometric means, harmonic means, coefficients of variation, standard scores, and most of the common transformations (square root, logarithmic, arcsine, etc.) used to achieve improved approximations to normality of data distributions, homogeneity of variances, and independence of sampling distributions from unknown parameters. [See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF, article on TRANSFORMATIONS OF DATA.] Quasi-ratio scales. A quasi-ratio scale is a ratio scale with random stretches and compressions applied to its units, in much the same way described for quasi-interval scales. All of the statistics appropriate to ratio scales apply also to quasi-ratio scales, with the reservation of reduced reliability. Operational definitions. For many of the variables of the physical sciences, and some of the variables of the social sciences, the variable itself is denned by the operations used in measuring it or in constructing the measuring instrument. Thus length can be defined as what is measured by a ruler or yardstick. If we have first a "standard inch," say two scratches on a piece of metal (originally, according to story, the length of the first joint of a king's index finger), we can lay off successive inches on a stick by using a pair of dividers. For smaller units we can subdivide the inch by successive halving, using the compass and straightedge of classical Euclidean geometry. Height, in turn, may be defined as length measured vertically, with vertical defined by a weight hanging motionless on a string. Psychological and social variables, on the other hand, can less often be defined in such direct operational terms. For example, psychophysics and scaling have as major concerns the reduction of sensory, perceptual, or judgmental data to interval scale, quasi-interval scale, ratio scale, or quasi-ratio scale form. [See PSYCHOPHYSICS; SCALING.] Test scores as measurements. In the context of this discussion, a test is usually simply a set of questions, often with alternative answers, printed in a paper booklet, together with the instructions given by an examiner; a test performance is whatever an examinee does in the test situation. The record of his test performance consists of his marks on the test booklet or on a separate answer sheet. If he is well motivated and has understood the examiner's instructions, we assume that the record of his test performance reflects his knowledge of
and ability in the field covered by the test questions. For the simpler types of items, with a simple scoring procedure, we credit him with the score +1 for each item correctly marked and 0 for each item incorrectly marked. We know that the organization of knowledge of an area in a human mind is complex and that an examinee's answer to one question is, in consequence, not independent of his answers to other questions. His score on the test is supposed to represent his total knowledge of the field represented by all the items (questions and alternative answers). In order to justify using such a score, we must be able to make at least two assumptions: (1") that knowledge of the area tested is in some sense cumulative along a linear dimension and (2) that there is at least a rough one-toone relation between the amount of knowledge that each individual possesses and his test score. The scores on a test, then, should form a quasiordinal scale. But suppose we have a 100-item, five-alternative, multiple-choice test with items arranged in order of difficulty from very easy to extremely hard. Individual A gets the first 50 right and a random one-fifth of the remainder. Individual B gets all the odd-numbered items right and a random one-fifth of all the even-numbered items. If a simple scoring formula that credits each correct response with a score of +1 is used, the score of each is 60. Yet most persons would tend to say that individual B has more of the ability measured by the test than has individual A. These cases are of course extreme, but in general we tend to attribute higher ability to an individual who gets more hard items right, even though he misses several easy items, than to one who gets very few hard items right but attains the same score by getting more easy items right. Thorndike (1926) distinguishes between altitude of intellect and range of intellect (at any given altitude) as two separate but correlated variables. He discusses ways of measuring them separately, but his suggestions have so far had little impact on the mainstream of psychometric practice. [Additional discussion of test scores as measurements is provided in the section "Item analysis," subsection on "Indexes of difficulty"; see also THORNDIKE.] Correction for guessing. When an objective test is given to an individual, the immediate aim is to assess his knowledge of the field represented by the test items or, more generally, his ability to perform operations of the types specified by these items. But with true-false, multiple-choice, matching, and other recognition-type items, it is also possible for the examinee to mark right answers by
PSYCHOMETRICS guessing. It is known that the guessing tendency is a variable on which large individual differences exist, and the logical purpose of the correction for guessing is to reduce or eliminate the expected advantage of the examinee who guesses blindly instead of omitting items about which he knows nothing. [See RESPONSE SETS.] The earliest derivations were based on the all-ornone assumption, which holds that an examinee either knows the right answer to a given item with certainty and marks it correctly, or else he knows nothing whatever about it and the mark represents a blind guess, with probability I/a of being right (where a is the number of alternatives, only one of which is correct). Under this assumption we infer that when the examinee has marked a — 1 items incorrectly, there were really a items whose answers he did not know, and that he guessed right on one of them and wrong on the other a — 1. Hence, for every a — 1 wrong answers we deduct one from the number of right answers for the one he presumably got right by guessing. The correction formula is then S = R - W / ( a - 1), where S is the corrected score (the number of items whose answers the examinee presumably knew), R is the right number, and W is the number wrong. It is assumed that this formula will be correct OH the average, although in any particular case an examinee may guess the correct answers to more or fewer than \Y/(a — 1) items. There is empirical evidence (Lord 1964) that correction for guessing corrects fairly well for high guessing tendency, but not so well for extreme caution, since the examinee is credited with zero knowledge for every item he omits. If an examinee omits items about which he has some, but not complete, knowledge, he will still be penalized. Hence, instructions should emphasize the point that an item should be omitted only if an answer would be a pure guess. If an examinee has a "hunch," he should always play it; and if he can eliminate one alternative, he should always guess among the remainder. This is a matter of ethics applying to all tests whose items have "right" answers; an examinee should never be able to increase his most probable score by disobeying the examiner's instructions. A timed power test should begin with easy items continue to items too hard for the best examinee. The time limit should be so generous that every examinee can continue to the point where his knowledge becomes substantially 0 for every re-
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maining item. In this case the correction formula will cancel, on the average, the advantage that would otherwise accrue to those examinees who, near the end of the test period, give random responses to all remaining items. There are only three conditions under which the correction for guessing need not be used: (1) there is no time limit, and examinees are instructed to mark every item; (2) the time limit is generous, examinees are instructed to mark every item as they come to it, and a minute or two before the end of the session the examiner instructs them to record random responses to all remaining items; (3) the test is a pure speed test, with no item having any appreciable difficulty for any examinee. In this case, errors occur only when an examinee works too fast. Item analysis In the construction of standardized tests, item analysis consists of the set of procedures by which the items are pretested for difficulty and discrimination by giving them in an experimental edition to a group of examinees fairly representative of the target population for the test, computing an index of difficulty and an index of discrimination for each item, and retaining for the final test those items having the desired properties in greatest degree. Difficulty refers to how hard an item is, to how readily it can be answered correctly. A test item possesses discrimination to the extent that "superior" examinees give the right answer to it oftener than do "inferior" examinees. "Superior" and "inferior" are usually defined by total scores on the experimental edition itself. This is termed internal consistency analysis. When the less discriminating items are eliminated, the test becomes more homogeneous. A perfectly homogeneous test is one in which the function or combination of related functions measured by the whole test is also measured by every item. A test may, however, be designed for a specific use—e.g., to predict college freshman grades—in which case "superior" and "inferior" may be defined externally by the freshman grade-point average. Wherever possible, the experimental edition is administered to the item-analysis sample without time limit and with instructions to the examinees to mark every item. If the experimental session has a time limit, the subset of examinees who mark the last few items form a biased subsample, and there is no satisfactory way to correct for this bias (Wesman 1949). The experimental group for an item analysis
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should be reasonably representative of the target population, and particularly representative with regard to age, school grade(s), sex, socioeconomic status, residence (city or country), and any other variables that might reasonably be expected to correlate substantially with total scores. Its range of ability should be as great as that of the target population. Beyond this, it does not have to be as precisely representative as does a norms sample. Item analyses based on a group from a single community (e.g., a city and the surrounding countryside) are often quite satisfactory if this community is representative of the target population on all of the associated variables. There are two major experimental designs for item analysis. The first is called the upper-andlower groups (ULG) design. On the basis of the total scores (or some external criterion scores) an upper group and a lower group are selected: usually the upper and lower 27 per cent of the whole sample, since this percentage is optimal. With the ULG design, the only information about the total scores (or the external criterion scores) that is used is the subgroup membership. Hence, this design calls for large experimental samples. In the second design all the information in the data is used: for each item the distribution of total scores (or external criterion scores) of those who mark it correctly is compared with the distribution of those who mark it incorrectly. This is the itemtotal score (ITS) design. Here the sample size can be smaller. Indexes of difficulty. With either design, a quasi-ordinal index of the difficulty of an item is provided by the per cent of the total sample who respond correctly. With the ULG design, a very slightly biased estimate is given by the average per cent correct in the upper and lower groups; a correction for this bias is found in the tables compiled by Fan (1952). For many purposes, however, an index of difficulty with units which in some sense form a quasi-interval scale is desired. With free-choice items, and the assumption that the underlying ability is normally distributed in the experimental sample, the normal deviate corresponding to the per cent correct yields a quasiinterval scale of difficulty. But under this assumption the distribution of difficulty of a recognitiontype item will be skewed, with amount of skewness depending on the number of alternatives. The precise form of this distribution is not known. Common practice involves discarding items with difficulties not significantly higher than chance, even if they show high discrimination; redefining per cent correct as per cent correct above chance,
p' — (p - I / a ) / ( I - I/a), where p and p' are now proportions rather than percentages; and treating as a very rough quasi-interval scale the normal deviates corresponding to these adjusted proportions. Another method first replaces the raw total scores (or external criterion scores) with normalized standard scores to form a quasi-interval score scale. The distributions of these normalized standard scores for those who pass and fail the item are then formed and smoothed, and the difficulty of the item is taken as the score corresponding to the point of intersection of the two distributions. This is strictly an ITS procedure. When item difficulties have a rectangular distribution ranging from easy for the least able examinee to hard for the most able, and when items are all equally discriminating on the average, the distribution of the test scores will be approximately the same as the distribution of the ability which underlies them; and these scores will form a quasiinterval scale. Almost the only tests which actually are so constructed are those for the measurement of general intelligence, such as the Stanford-Binet. Most tests have roughly normal, or at best mildly flat-topped, distributions of item difficulties. When applied to a group for which the mean item difficulty corresponds to the mean ability level and in which the ability is approximately normally distributed, the resulting score distribution tends to be flat-topped. Empirical data support this theoretical conclusion. Tests constructed with all items of almost equal difficulty are useful for selection purposes; they have maximum reliability at the given ability level. With a rectangular distribution of item difficulties, a test is equally reliable at all scale levels, but its reliability at any one level is relatively low. With a normal or near-normal distribution of item difficulties, the reliability is at a maximum in the region of the modal difficulty and decreases toward the tails, but this decrease is less marked than it is in the case of a test whose items are all equally difficult. Although scores on tests with near-normal distributions of item difficulties are frequently treated as forming quasi-interval scales, they should more properly be treated as forming only quasi-ordinal scales. All the strictures against treating percentile ranks as interval scales apply to such raw-score scales with only slightly diminished force. Indexes of discrimination in ULG design. For some purposes we need only to eliminate items for which the number of right answers is not significantly greater in the upper group than in the lower
PSYCHOMETRICS group, using the chi-square test of association. This procedure is often used in the selection of items for an achievement test. In other cases we may wish, say, to select the 100 "best" items from an experimental test of 150. Here "best" implies a quasi-ordinal index of discrimination for each item. Widespread-tails tetrachoric correlations are often employed (Fan 1952; Flanagan 1939). The correlation indexes are statistically independent of the item difficulties. Where we may need quasi-interval scales, the Fisher z'-transformation is commonly applied to the widespread-tails tetrachoric correlation, yielding at least a crude approximation to an interval scale. A less common procedure is to use the simple difference between the per cents correct in upper and lower groups as the index of discrimination. This index is precisely the percentage of cases in which the item will discriminate correctly between a member of the upper group and a member of the lower group (Findley 1956). Indexes of discrimination in ITS design. With the ITS design, a t-test may be used to test the hypothesis that the mean total (or external criterion) scores of those who do and do not mark the right answer to the item are equal. If we cannot assume normality of the score distribution, we can replace the raw scores with their ranks and use the two-group Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test with only slight loss of efficiency. [See LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, for a discussion of the t-test; see NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS, article on RANKING METHODS, for a discussion of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitncy test.] To obtain an ordinal index of discrimination, the biserial, point-biserial, or Brogden biserial correlation (1949) between the item and the total (or external criterion) scores may be used. A crude approximation to interval scaling is given by applying the Fisher z'-transformation to the biserial or Brogden biserial correlations. [See MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, articles on CORRELATION.] Item analysis with wide-range groups. Some tests are designed to be used over several consecutive ages or grades, and the mean growth of the underlying variable may be assumed to be roughly linear. In such cases an item may be very hard at the lowest level but very easy at the highest, and highly discriminating at one level but quite undiscrirninating at another. In such cases we may plot tor each item the per cent correct at successive a ges or grades, or the intersections of the score distributions for those who pass and fail the item at each age or grade. Before using this latter procedure, the raw scores may be scaled by first assign-
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ing normalized standard scores at each age or grade, assuming that the underlying variable is normally distributed at each level, and then combining them into a single scale by adjusting for the mean differences from age to age or grade to grade. An item is then retained if it shows a regular increase from age to age or grade to grade, or if it shows a large increase from any one age or grade to the next and no significant decrease at any other level. The scale difficulty of each item is the score level at which the per cent correct is 50, or for recognition items, the score level at which p', defined as above, is .50. Two-criterion item analysis. When a test is designed to predict a single external criterion, such as freshman grade-point average, success in a technical training course, or proficiency on a given job, we can do somewhat better than merely to select items on the basis of their correlations with the criterion measure. The original item pool for the experimental edition is deliberately made complex, in the hope that items of different types will assess different aspects of the criterion performance. The best subset of items will then be one in which the items have relatively high correlations with the criterion and relatively low correlations with the total score on the experimental edition. Methods of item selection based on this principle have been discussed by Gulliksen (1950, chapter 21) and by Horst (1936), using in both cases the ITS design. Inventory items. Aptitude, interest, attitude, and personality inventories usually measure several distinct traits or include items of considerable diversity, subsets of which are scored to indicate similarity between the examinee's answer pattern and those of a number of defined groups. The items are usually single words or, more commonly, short statements, and the examinee marks them as applicable or inapplicable to him, true or false, liked or disliked, or statements with which he agrees or disagrees. The scoring may be dichotomous (like or dislike), trichotomous (Yes, ?, No), or on a scale of more than three points (agree strongly, agree moderately, uncertain, disagree moderately, disagree strongly). Often the statements are presented in pairs or triplets and the examinee indicates which he likes most and which least, or which is most applicable to him and which least applicable. The distinction between inventories based on internal analysis and those based on external criteria is a major one. For internal analysis, the items are first allocated by judgment to preliminary subscales, often on the basis of some particular theoretical formulation. Each item is then correlated with every sub-
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scale and reallocated to the subscale with which it correlates highest; items which have low correlations with all subscales are eliminated. If the subscales are theoretically determined, all items which do not correlate higher with the subscales to which they were assigned than to any other are eliminated. If the subscales are empirically determined, new subscale scores are computed after items are reallocated, and new item—subscale correlations are obtained; this process is repeated until the subscales "stabilize." Purely empirical subscales may also be constructed by rough factor analyses of the item data or by complete factor analyses of successive subsets of items. [See FACTOR ANALYSIS.] For a normative scale, the job is finished at this point. (All aptitude and achievement tests form normative scales.) But when the statements are presented in pairs or triplets, they form an ipsative or partly ipsative scale. For a perfectly ipsative scale, the items of each subscale must be paired in equal numbers with the items of every other subscale, and only differences among subscale scores are interpretable. The California Test of Personality and the Guilford and Guilford-Martin inventories are examples of normative scales. The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule is perfectly ipsative, and the Kuder Preference Record is partly ipsative. In filling out inventories of these types, whose items do not have right or wrong answers, we want examinees to be honest and accurate. Normative inventories are easily fakeable; ipsative inventories somewhat less so. Response sets also affect inventory scores much more than they do aptitude and achievement test scores. Most of the better inventories therefore have special scales to detect faking and to correct for various types of response sets. In forming pairs and triplets, efforts are made to equalize within-set social desirability or general popularity, while each statement represents a different subscale. [See ACHIEVEMENT TESTING; APTITUDE TESTING; PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT, articles On PERSONALITY INVENTORIES and THE MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY; RESPONSE SETS; VOCATIONAL INTEREST TESTING.]
Inventories constructed on the basis of external criteria use a base group, usually large ("normal" individuals, "normal" individuals of given sex, professional men in general, high school seniors in general, high school seniors of given sex, and the like), and a number of special groups (hospital or clinic patients with the same clear diagnosis, or men or women in a given occupation). An answer (alternative) is scored for a special group if the
people in that group mark it significantly more often (scored positively) or significantly less often (scored negatively) than do the people in the base group. In some inventories the more highly significant or highly correlated answers are given greater positive or negative weights than are the less significant or less highly correlated answers. Inventories of this type are almost always normative, and new subscales can be developed whenever new special groups can be identified and tested. The outstanding examples are the Strong Vocational Interest Blank and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. In inventories of this type, the same item may be scored for several subscales. In consequence there are inter-key correlations, and the reliabilities of differences between pairs of subscale scores vary with the numbers of common items. A further consequence is that general subscales based on factor analyses of individual subscale intercorrelations are difficult to evaluate, since the individual subscale scores are not experimentally independent. Similar difficulties arise in the interpretation of factor analyses of ipsative and partly ipsative scale scores. Reliability Reliability is commonly defined as the accuracy with which a test measures whatever it does measure. In terms of the previous discussion, it might be defined in some cases as a measure of how closely a quasi-ordinal or quasi-interval scale, based on summation of item scores, approximates a true ordinal or interval scale. The following treatment assumes quasi-interval scales, since reliability theories based entirely on the allowable operations of ordinal arithmetic, which do not define the concepts of variance and standard deviation, have not been worked out. However, definitions and results based on correlations probably apply to quasiordinal scales if the correlations are Spearman rank correlations. [See MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, articles On CORRELATION.]
The raw score of an individual on a test may be thought of as consisting of the sum of two components: a true score representing his real ability or achievement or interest level or trait level, and an error of measurement. Errors of measurement are of two major types. One type reflects the limitation of a test having a finite number of items. Using ability and aptitude tests as the basis for discussion, the individual's true score would be his score on a test consisting of all items "such as" the items of the given test. On the finite test he may just happen to know the right answers to a greater
PSYCHOMETRICS or lesser proportion of the items than the proportion representing his true score. Errors of this type are termed inconsistency errors. A second type of error reflects the fact that the working ability of an individual fluctuates about his true ability. On some occasions he can "outdo himself": his working ability exceeds his true ability. On other occasions he cannot "do justice to himself": his working ability is below his true ability. Working ability fluctuates about true ability as a result of variations in such things as motivation, inhibitory processes, physical well-being, and external events that are reflected in variation in concentration, cogency of reasoning, access to memory, and the like. Such fluctuations occur in irregular cycles lasting from a second or two to several months. Errors of this type are termed instability errors. If a second test samples the same universe of items as does the first and in the same manner (random sampling or stratified random sampling with the same strata), the two tests are termed parallel forms of the same test. Parallel forms measure the same true ability, but with different inconsistency errors. The basic theorem which underlies all formulas of reliability, and of empirical validity as well, may be stated as follows: In a population of individuals, the errors of measurement in different tests and in different forms of the same test are uncorrelated with one another and are uncorrelated with the true scores on all tests and forms. Coefficient and index of reliability. The reliability coefficient, R, may be defined as the ratio of the true score variance to the raw score variance; it is also the square of the correlation between the raw scores and the true scores. The index of reliability is the square root of the reliability coefficient; it is the ratio of the standard deviation of the true scores to the standard deviation of the raw scores, or the correlation between the true scores and the raw scores. These definitions are purely conceptual. They are of no computational value because the true scores cannot be measured directly. Furthermore, where RA and R,; are the reliability coefficients of the two parallel forms and />.,/, is the correlation between them, it is implied in the basic theorem that V#7H7 - p.u: • If, moreover, as is usually the case, the two forms are equally reliable, RA = Ra = yo 1 / s ; i.e., the correlation between the two forms is the reliability coefficient of each °f them. When we estimate pAK by computing r A K , the correlation in a sample, the estimate is not unbiased, but the bias is usually small if the sample is reasonably large.
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Consistency coefficient. If two equally reliable parallel forms of a test are administered simultaneously (e.g., by merging them as odd and even items in the same test booklet), the reliability coefficient becomes a consistency coefficient, since instability errors affect both forms equally. The split-half correlation (e.g., the correlation between odd and even items) provides the consistency coefficient of each of the half-tests. The consistency coefficient of the whole test, as estimated from the sample, is then derived from the Spearman—Brown formula: -1+"
l+r,1B'
where rAI{ is the correlation between the half-tests. The more generalized Spearman-Brown formula is r>
"n
__
WfAB
i + (Tz-l)r. 1 B
where rAB is again the correlation between the halftests and jR,, is the consistency coefficient of a parallel form n times as long as one half-test. In deriving the Spearman—Brown formula, we must assume that the half-tests are equally variable as well as equally reliable, but these requirements are not very stringent. Kuder and Richardson (1937) also present several formulas for the consistency of one form of a homogeneous test. Their most important formula (formula 20) was generalized and discussed at some length by Cronbach (1951). Interform reliability coefficient. If two equally reliable parallel forms of a test are administered to the same group of examinees at two different times, the correlation between them is an interform reliability coefficient. The interform reliability is lower than the consistency because it is affected by instability errors, which increase with time. Reports of interform reliability should include the length of the time interval. Stability coefficient. Instability errors are related to the interval between testings and are independent of the inconsistency errors. The stability coefficient may be defined as the interform reliability that would be found if both forms of the test were perfectly consistent. It may be estimated by the formula where rAR is the interform reliability coefficient and C.i and CB are the consistency coefficients of the two forms, each computed from the split-half correlation and the Spearman-Brown formula, or from the Kuder-Richardson formula 20. Its value is independent of the lengths of the two forms of
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the test but dependent upon the time interval separating their administration. The increase in interform reliability resulting from increase in test length may be estimated by the formula _ 1 + (n- l)CAli ' where r 1/; is the interform reliability and CAn is the consistency of each form. The two forms must be assumed equally consistent, and CAIi is computed as C 1/; = \/C-i CH. Then R,, is an estimate of the interform reliability of a parallel form n times as long as one of the two actual forms. If n — 2, the formula
gives the interform reliability of scores on the two forms combined. Test-retest correlation. When the same form is given to the same examinees on two different occasions, the correlation is not a stability coefficient, and it would not be a stability coefficient even if every examinee had total amnesia of the first testing (and of nothing else) on the second occasion. In addition to the quantitative fluctuations in working ability which give rise to instability errors, there are qualitative fluctuations in perceptual organization, access to memory, and reasoning—procedure patterns. In consequence, the same set of items, administered on different occasions, gives rise to different reactions; and in consequence there are still some inconsistency errors. Perseveration effects, including but not limited to memory on the second occasion of some of the responses made to particular items on the first occasion, introduce artificial consistency, in varying amounts for different examinees. In consequence, test-retest coefficients cannot be clearly interpreted in terms of reliability theory. Standard error of measurement. If several parallel forms, all equally reliable and with identical distributions of item difficulty and discrimination, could be given simultaneously to one examinee, the standard deviation of his scores would be the standard error of measurement of one form for him. Such a standard error of measurement is an estimate of the average standard error of measurement for all members of an examinee group. The formula is SEm = S V I -TAB,
where s is the standard deviation of the total scores and r IK is their consistency, computed by the splithalf correlation and the Spearman-Brown formula.
The standard error of measurement may also be defined, for the whole sample or population of examinees, as the standard deviation of the inconsistency errors or the standard deviation of the differences between raw scores and the corresponding true scores. With this last definition we can also compute a standard error of measurement which includes instability errors over a given time period, by letting s represent a pooled estimate of the standard deviation of one form based on the data for both forms, and rAK an interform reliability coefficient. In this case, SEm is the standard error of measurement of one (either) form. Reliability and variability. The variance of true scores increases with the variability of ability in the group tested, while the variance of the errors of measurement remains constant or almost constant. By the variance-ratio definition of the reliability coefficient, it follows that this coefficient increases as the range of ability of the group measured increases. The reliability coefficient of a particular test is higher for a random sample of all children of a given age than for a sample of all children in a given grade, and lower for all children in a single class. When a reliability coefficient is reported, therefore, the sample on which it was computed should be described in terms which indicate as clearly as possible the range of ability of the subjects. The formula relating variability to reliability is o—
where s 2 and rAB are the variance and the reliability coefficient of the test for one group, and S2 and RAB are the variance and reliability coefficient for another group. The group means should be similar enough to warrant the assumption that the average standard error of measurement is the same in both groups. If a test author reports rAB and s2 in his manual, a user of the test need only compute S2 for his group, and RAR for that group can then be computed from the formula. Note that this formula applies exactly only if the test-score units form a quasi-interval scale over the whole score range of both groups. Reliability at different score levels. If the testscore units do not form a quasi-interval scale, the standard error of measurement will be different at different score levels. If two forms of the test or two halves of one form are equivalent, and the experimental sample is large enough, the standard error of measurement may be computed for any given score level. Two parallel forms or half-tests are equivalent if their joint distributions of item
PSYCHOMETRICS difficulty and item discrimination are essentially identical. In this case, their score distributions will also be essentially identical. To compute the standard error of measurement at a given score level, we select from a large experimental sample a subgroup whose total scores on the two forms or half-tests combined are equal within fairly narrow limits. The standard error of measurement of the total scores is then the standard deviation of the differences beween the halfscores. When, as is usually the case, the half-scores are based on splitting one form into equivalent halves administered simultaneously, the standard errors of measurement at different score levels are based only on inconsistency errors. The reliability coefficient at a given score level, still referred to the variability of the whole group, is given by TAR = 1 - SEl/s2, where SEm is defined as above and s2 is the totalscore variance of the whole group. Comparability. Two forms of a test, or two tests measuring different true-score functions, are termed comparable if and only if their units of measurement are equal. If the units do not form quasiinterval scales, they can be made comparable only if their score distributions are of the same shape and their standard errors of measurement are proportional at all score levels. Only equivalent forms have comparable raw-score units. If two different tests have proportionally similar joint distributions of item difficulties and discriminations, they will meet these conditions. Meaningful interpretations of profiles of scores on different tests can be made only if the scores are comparable. Validity Test validity has to do with what a test measures and how well it measures what it is intended to measure, or what it is used to measure in any particular application if it is a multiple-use test. Content validity. Content validity applies mainly to achievement tests, where the questions themselves define the function or combination of related functions measured and there is no external criterion of achievement with which the scores can be compared. The test developer should provide a detailed outline of both the topics and the processes •—such as information, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, evaluation, etc.—that the test measures. A more detailed list of processes, with illustrative test questions from several fields, is given in Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (1963-1964). The item numbers of the test items
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are then entered in the cells of the outline, along with their indexes of difficulty and discrimination. Evaluations of content validity are essentially subjective. The prospective user of the test may agree or disagree to a greater or lesser extent with the outline or the basis on which it was constructed, with the allocation of items to topics and processes, or with the author's classification of some of the items. If all such evaluations are positive, the test's validity is equal, for all practical purposes, to its interform reliability over some reasonable time period. In constructing an achievement test, item analysis ordinarily consists only of the elimination of nondiscriminating items. If the test is to yield a single score, the various topics and processes must be sufficiently homogeneous to permit every item to correlate positively and significantly with the total score. All further elimination occurs in the balancing of the item contents against the requirements of the topic-by-process outline. In discussing school achievement tests, content validity is often termed curricular validity. Empirical validity. Empirical validity is concerned with how well a test, either alone or in combination with others, measures what it is used to measure in some particular application. The empirical validity of a test is evaluated in terms of its correlation with an external criterion measure: an experimentally independent assessment of the trait or trait complex to be predicted. The term "prediction" is used here, without regard to time, to designate any estimate made from a regression equation, expectancy table, or successive-hurdles procedure. The term "forecast" will be used when we explicitly predict a future criterion. Empirical validity is also termed statistical validity and criterion validity. There are two basically different types of criteria. The first may be termed sui generis criteria, criteria that exist without any special effort made to predict them. Examples include persistence in college, success or failure in a training course, dollar volume of sales, years of service in a company, and salary level. The unreliability of the criterion measure sets a natural upper limit for the validity of any predictor. The validity of a predictor or predictor battery is simply its correlation or multiple correlation with the criterion. We term such a correlation an index of raw validity. The second type of criteria may be termed constructed criteria, and are developed upon the basis of a trait concept such as academic ability, job proficiency, or sales accomplishment. For academic achievement such a criterion might be grade-point
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average in academic subjects only. For job proficiency it might be based on quantity of output, quality of output, material spoilage, and an estimate of cooperation with other workers. For sales accomplishment it might be based on number of sales, dollar volume, new customers added, and an estimate of the difficulty of the territory. In any event, it must be accepted as essentially an operational definition of the trait concept and, hence, intrinsically content-valid. And since the error of measurement is no part of the operational definition of a trait concept, it is evident that we should predict true criterion scores rather than raw scores. Concurrent and forecast validity. We can recognize two types of assessments of true validity: concurrent true validity and forecast true validity. In the first case, the criterion measure is usually one which is expensive or difficult to obtain, and the predictor is designed to be a substitute measure for it. In this case the predictor test or battery should be administered at the middle of the time interval over which the criterion behavior is observed; otherwise, instability errors will distort validity estimates. For forecast true validity, the predictor test or battery is administered at some "natural" time: at or shortly before college entrance or admission to training or initial employment, and the criterion data should cover the later time period over which they will be most valid in terms of the criterion trait concept. In this case, the instability errors resulting from the earlier administration of the predictor test or battery are intrinsic to the prediction enterprise. To obtain a quick rough estimate of forecast value, an investigator often tests present employees, students, or trainees at essentially the same time that the criterion data are obtained. This procedure should not be termed concurrent validation but, rather, something like retroactive validation. Test selection and cross-validation. A common type of empirical validation study consists in administering to the experimental sample more predictors than are to be retained for the final battery. The latter then consists of that subset of predictors, of manageable length, whose multiple correlation most nearly approximates that of the whole experimental battery. Predictors commonly include scored biographical inventories, reference rating scales, and interview rating scales as well as tests. When a subset of predictors is selected by regression procedures, its multiple correlation with the criterion is inflated: sampling error determines in part which predictors will be selected and what their weights will be. In cross-validation, the re-
duced predictor battery is applied to a second criterion group, using the weights developed from the first group. The aggregate correlation in the second group (now no longer a multiple correlation) is an unbiased estimate of the battery validity. In estimating forecast true validity, two criterion measures for each examinee are required only in the cross-validation sample. [See LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on REGRESSION.] The same situation arises in even more exaggerated form when predictor items are selected on the basis of their correlations with an external criterion measure. Each predictor requires a separate itemanalysis sample. A different sample is required to determine predictor weights. And a still different sample is required to estimate the validity of the whole predictor battery. Various split-sample methods have been devised to use limited data more effectively. Thus, test selection may be carried out on two parallel samples, keeping finally the subset of tests selected by both samples. The validity of the battery is estimated in each sample by using the weights from the other. The average of the two validity indexes is then a lower bound for the battery validity when the weights used are the averages of the weights from the two samples. Validation procedures. The commonest methods of test selection and use are those described above, using multiple regression as the basic procedure. These procedures assume that the criterion elements are all positively and substantially correlated, and can be combined with suitable weights into a single criterion measure of at least moderate homogeneity. It is then further assumed that a low score on one predictor can be compensated for by high scores on others, a weighted total score on all predictors being accepted as a single predictor of criterion performance. Some criteria, however, consist of elements which are virtually uncorrelated. In such cases the elements must be predicted separately. In practice there is usually one predictor for each element, although it is possible to predict an element by its multiple regression on two or more predictors. In this situation, the preferred procedure is the multiple cutoff procedure. Each criterion-element measure is dichotomized at a critical (pass-fail) level, the corresponding predictor level is determined, and a successful applicant must be above the critical levels on all predictors. A further refinement consists in rating the criterion elements on their importance to the total job and requiring a successful applicant to be above the critical levels on the predictors of all the more important elements, but
PSYCHOMETRICS permitting him to be a little (but not far) below this level on one or two of the predictors of the less important elements. In predicting a dichotomous criterion, the most accurate predictions are made when the predictor cutoff score is at the point of intersection of the smoothed frequency curves of predictor scores for the upper and lower criterion groups. If the applicant group is large, however, the predictor cutoff score may be set one or two standard errors of measurement above this point. Correction for attenuation. Correction for attenuation is a procedure for estimating what the correlation between two variables would be if both of them were perfectly reliable or consistent; i.e., if the correlation were based on the true scores of both variables. The unreliabilities of the variables attenuate (reduce) this correlation. To determine the proper correction, the experimental design must be such that the instability errors in the intercorrelation(s) are identical with those in the reliability or consistency coefficients. Index and coefficient. In discussing formulas for validity, the term "index" rather than the term "coefficient" has been used, although the latter is the term commonly used. The square of each of these correlations, however, is a coefficient of determination (of raw criterion scores by raw predictor scores, true criterion scores by raw predictor scores, or true criterion scores by true predictor scores). The reliability coefficient is also a coefficient of determination (of true scores by raw scores on the same variable), and the index of reliability is its square root. As the intrinsic validity (the true validity of a perfectly reliable predictor) approaches unity, the index of true validity approaches the index of reliability of the predictor, since in this case the predictor and criterion true scores are identical; and an unreliable predictor cannot predict anything better than it predicts its own true scores. The statement "The upper limit of a test's validity is the square root of its reliability" is erroneous: the upper limit of its validity is its reliability when both are expressed cither as indexes or as coefficients. The error is due to the common practice of calling "indexes" of validity "coefficients" of validity. Synthetic validity. Synthetic validation is test selection without a criterion variable; and synthetic validity is an estimate of empirical validity, also without a criterion variable. The procedure is based °n job analysis and the accumulated experience from many previous empirical validation studies. The number of possible jobs, and the number of
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real jobs as well, greatly exceeds the number of distinct job elements and job-qualification traits. If previous studies have shown which qualification traits are required for each job element of a given job, and what predictors best predict each of these traits, predictors can be selected for the given job on the basis of a job analysis without a new empirical study, and rough estimates can even be made of the probable validity of the prediction battery. The procedures of job analysis are by now fairly well refined; there are substantial bodies of data on the qualification requirements for many job elements; and there are also fairly large amounts of data on the correlations between predictors and qualification traits and the intercorrelations among such predictors. Hence, synthetic validation is by now at least a practical art, and its methodology is approaching the status of an applied science. Synthetic validation is the only procedure which can be used when the number of positions in a given job category is too small to furnish an adequate sample for an empirical validation study. Factor analysis of validity. Factor analysis provides a way of answering the question "What does this test measure?" The simplest answer is merely a collection of correlations between the given test and a variety of other better-known tests. However, if the given test and several others have all been administered to the same large sample, the factor structure of the given test provides a much better answer. When a large number of tests are administered serially in a factor analysis study, the instability errors are greater for tests far apart in the series than for tests administered consecutively. This leads to the generation of small instability factors and complicates making the decision about when to stop factoring. If there are two forms of each test, all the A forms might be given serially, and then after an interval of a week or more all the B forms might be given in a different serial order. Two parallel factor analyses could then be performed, one (for tests 1 and 2, say) using the correlation between 1A and 2B; the other, the correlation between IB and 2A. The correlations between 1A and 2A and between IB and 2B would not be used. Interform reliabilities consistent with the intercorrelations would be given by the correlations between 1A and IB and between 2A and 2B. [See FACTOR ANALYSIS.] Construct validity. Construct validation is an attempt to answer the question "Does this test measure the trait it was designed to measure?" when no single criterion measure or combination of criterion measures can be considered a well-defined,
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agreed-upon, valid measure of the trait; and there is in fact no assurance that the postulated trait is sufficiently unitary to be measurable. We start with a trait construct: a hypothesis that a certain trait exists and is measurable. Then we build a test we hope will measure it. There are two questions, to be answered simultaneously: (1) Does the trait construct actually represent a measurable trait? (2) Does the test measure that trait rather than some other trait? From the trait construct we draw conclusions about how the test should correlate with other variables. With some it ought to correlate fairly highly, and if in every such case it does, the resulting evidence is termed convergent validity. Variables of this type are in a sense partial criteria. With other variables it should have low correlations, and if in every such case it does, the resulting evidence is termed discriminant validity. Consider the trait construct "general intelligence" and the Stanford— Binet Scale. (a) General intelligence should increase with age during the period of growth. Mean scores on the Stanford—Binet increase regularly throughout this period, but so do height and weight. (Z?) General intelligence can be observed and rated with some validity by teachers. Children rated bright by their teachers make higher Stanford— Binet scores than do children of the same age rated dull. There is some judgmental invalidity, however; docile and cooperative children are overrated, and classroom nuisances are underrated. (c) The extremes of general intelligence are more certainly identifiable. Individuals judged mentally deficient make very low scores, but so do prepsychotics and children with intense negative attitudes toward school. Outstanding scholars, scientists, writers, and musical composers make high scores. Equally outstanding statesmen, executives, military leaders, and performing artists make somewhat lower but still quite high scores. This finding also agrees with the hypothesis, for people in the latter categories need high, but not so very high, general intelligence; and they also need special talents not so highly related to general intelligence. (d) Items measuring diverse cognitive traits should correlate fairly highly with one another and should generate a large general factor if general intelligence is indeed a relatively unitary measurable trait. The items of the Stanford-Binet clearly do measure diverse cognitive traits, and their intercorrelations do generate a large general factor. (e) Reliable homogeneous tests of clearly cognitive traits should correlate fairly highly with general intelligence. Tests of vocabulary, verbal and nonverbal reasoning, arithmetic problems, and
visual-space manipulation correlate fairly highly with the Stanford-Binet, and not quite so highly with one another. (f) Tests judged "borderline cognitive" should have positive but moderate correlations with general intelligence. Tests of rote memory, verbal fluency, mechanical knowledge, and the like do have positive but moderate correlations with the Stanford-Binet. (g) Wholly noncognitive tests should have nearzero correlations with general intelligence. Tests of writing speed, visual acuity, physical strength, and the like do have near-zero correlations with the Stanford-Binet. The full combination of these predictions and results, along with others not cited above, leads us to place considerable confidence in the trait status of the construct "general intelligence" and in the Stanford-Binet Scale (along with others) as a measure of this trait. If there is even a single glaring discrepancy between theory and data, either the theory (the trait construct) must be revised, or the test must be considered invalid. A test of "social intelligence" was shown to correlate as highly with a test of general—verbal intelligence as other tests of general-verbal intelligence did. From this one finding we must conclude either that social intelligence is not a trait distinct from general-verbal intelligence, or that the test in question is not a discriminatingly valid measure of social intelligence because it is a valid measure of general-verbal intelligence. [See INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE TESTING.] Construct validity is, in the end, a matter of judgment and confidence. The greater the quantity of supporting evidence, the greater the confidence we can place in both the trait construct and the test. But the possibility of a single glaring discrepancy is never wholly ruled out by any quantity of such evidence (see especially Cronbach & Meehl 1955). Test norms Since the raw scores on educational and psychological tests consist of arbitrary units with arbitrary zero points—units which in most cases vary systematically as well as randomly with score level —these individual scores can be interpreted intelligently only by comparing them with the distributions of scores of defined groups, or norms. The comparisons are facilitated by using various types of score transformations based on these distributions. Norms may be local, regional, or national; they may refer to the whole population or to defined subgroups, such as sex and occupation. Local norms
PSYCHOMETRICS are usually determined by testing everyone in a particular group: all children in certain grades of a school system, all freshmen applying to or admitted to a college or university, all employees in specified jobs in a company, etc. Regional and national norms must be determined by sampling. Since random sampling of the whole defined population is never practical, much care is necessary in the design of the sampling procedure and in the statistical analysis of the data to assure the representativeness of the results. The principles and procedures of survey sampling are beyond the scope of this article, but one caution should be noted. Use of a "pick-up" sample, depending upon the vagaries of cooperation in various communities, however widespread over regions, rural and urban communities, etc., followed by weighting based on census data, is never wholly satisfactory, although it is the method commonly employed. When norms are based on a sample which omits some major regions or population subgroups entirely, no weighting system can correct the bias, and such norms must be used with extreme caution in these other regions and with omitted subgroups. [See SAMPLE SURVEYS.] Grade norms. For elementary and junior high school achievement tests, grade norms are commonly employed. The data used are the mean or median scores of children in successive grades, and the unit is one-tenth of the difference between these averages for successive grades. There is probably some error in assuming one month of educational growth over the summer vacation, but this error in interpreting grade scores is small in comparison with the standard errors of measurement of even the best achievement tests. Age norms. Age scores are used mainly with general intelligence tests, where they are termed mental ages. The data are the average scores of children within one or two months (plus or minus) of a birthday, or the average scores of all children between two given birthdays, and the unit is onetwelfth of the difference between the averages for successive ages; i.e., one month of mental age. For ages above 12 or 13, extrapolations and corrections of various sorts are made, so that mental ages above 12 or 13 no longer represent age averages but, rather, estimates of what these averages would be if mental growth did not slow down during the period from early adolescence to maturity. Thus, when we say that the mental age of the average adult is 15, we do not mean that for most people mental growth ceases at age 15. What we do mean is that the total mental growth from age 12 to maturity is about half the mental growth from a ge 6 to age 12; so that at age 15 the average per-
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son would have reached the mental level he actually reached at maturity (in the early or middle twenties) if mental growth from 12 to 15 had continued at the same average rate as from 6 to 12. Age norms have been used in the past with elementary and junior high school achievement tests also, defining "arithmetic age," "reading age," "educational age," etc., in like manner; but they and the corresponding "arithmetic quotient," "reading quotient," and "educational quotient" are no longer used. Quotient scores. The TQ as defined originally, for children up to age 12 or 13, is 100(MA/CA), the ratio of mental age to chronological age, multiplied by 100 to rid it of decimals. For older ages the divisor is modified so that the "equivalent chronological age" goes from 12 or 13 to 15 as the actual age goes from 12 or 13 to mental maturity. The de facto corrections have usually been crude. The IQ would have the same standard deviation at all ages if the mental growth curve were a straight line, up to age 12 or 13, passing through true zero at birth, and if the standard deviation of mental ages were a constant fraction of the mean mental age at all chronological ages. These conditions are met very roughly by age scales such as the Stanford-Binet and are not met at all well by any other tests. In consequence, and because of the troubles encountered in the extrapolation of mental age scales and the derivation of equivalent chronological ages beyond age 12 or 13, IQs are no longer computed for most tests by the formula 100(MA/CA). They have been replaced quite generally by "deviation IQs," which are standardized scores or normal-standardized scores for age groups; and even the names "intelligence" and "IQ" are tending to be replaced by other names because of their past widespread misinterpretation as measuring innate intellectual capacity. [See INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT; INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE TESTING.]
Modal-age grade scores. As we proceed from the first grade to the ninth, the age range within a grade increases, and the distribution of ages becomes skewed, with the longer tail in the direction of increased age. The reason is that retardation is considerably more common than acceleration, and the consequence is that in the upper grades the grade averages on tests are no longer equal to the averages for pupils making normal progress (one grade per year) through school. Modal-age grade scores are used to compare the level of an individual child's performance with the level representing normal school progress. The data are the means or medians, not of all children in a given grade but, rather, of those children whose ages are within
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six to nine months of the modal age (not the median or mean age) for the grade. The units are otherwise the same as those of total-group grade scores, with all the interpretive difficulties noted previously. Modal-age grade scores are recommended for judging the progress of an individual child; total-group grade scores for comparing classes, schools, and school systems. When total-group grade scores are based on grade medians, they are about one-third closer to the corresponding modal-age grade scores than when they are based on grade means. Standard scores and standardized scores. When individual scores are to be compared with those of a single distribution, rather than with the means or medians of successive groups (as is the case with grade and age scores), scores based on the mean and standard deviation of the distribution are frequently employed. Originally, standard scores were defined by the formula Z = (x — x)/s, where x is a raw score, x is the group mean, and s is the standard deviation. Thus Z-scores have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity; the variance is also unity, and the product-moment correlation between two sets of Z-scorcs is the same as the covariance: rAB = ^ZAZit/N. For raw scores below the mean, Z-scores are negative. Thus the Z-score 1.2 corresponds to the raw score which is 1.2 standard deviations above the mean, and the Z-score —.6 corresponds to the raw score which is six-tenths of a standard deviation below the mean. Because of the inconveniences in using negative scores and decimals, Z-scores are usually converted via a linear transformation into some other system having an arbitrary mean and an arbitrary standard deviation. These other systems are commonly termed standard-score systems, but the present writer prefers, like Ghiselli (1964), to reserve the term "standard score" for Z-scores and to call the other systems "standardized scores." The units of a standardized-score system form a quasi-interval scale if and only if the raw scores form such a scale. When the item-difficulty distribution is roughly normal rather than rectangular, the units are smallest near the score corresponding to the modal difficulty, and they become progressively larger with distance in either direction from this level. Normal-standardized scores. Normal-standardized scores are standard or standardized scores for a normal distribution having the same mean and standard deviation as the raw-score distribution. They are found by looking up in a table of the normal distribution the Z-scores corresponding to the percentile ranks of the raw scores in the actual distribution, and then subjecting these Z-scores to
any desired arbitrary linear transformation. This procedure corrects for departure of the score distribution from normality, but it does not insure equality of units in any practical sense, even if the distribution of the underlying ability is also normal. The phrase "normal-standardized scores" is to be preferred to the more common "normalized standard scores." To a mathematician, "standardizing" means reducing to Z-scores, and "normalizing" means producing scores each equal to Z/yN, with sum of squares (instead of standard deviation) unity, and has no reference to the normal distribution. Percentiles and percentile ranks. A percentile is denned as that score (usually fractional) below which lies a given percentage of a sample or population. The median is the 50th percentile: half the group make scores lower than the median and half make scores higher. The lower quartile is the 25th percentile and the upper quartile is the 75th percentile. All score distributions are grouped distributions, even though the grouping interval may be only one score unit. Percentiles are computed by interpolation under the assumption that the abilities represented by the scores within an interval are evenly distributed across that interval. Percentile ranks are the percentiles corresponding to given scores. Since a single score represents an interval on a continuous scale, its percentile rank should be the percentage of individuals who make lower scores plus half the percentage who make the given score. In practice they are frequently computed as simply the percentage who make lower scores, and occasionally as the percentage who make the same or lower scores. Neither of these errors is large in comparison with the error of measurement. Percentiles and percentile ranks are sometimes given for grade groups, age groups, or normal-age grade groups with elementary and junior high school achievement tests and intellience tests. They are used more commonly with high school and college tests, with the reference group all students in a given class (grade), or all college applicants, in the case of college entrance tests. For tests in particular subject areas, the reference groups are more commonly all students who have studied the subject for a given number of years in high school or college. Strict warnings are commonly given against treating percentile ranks as though they form quasiinterval scales; but as noted above, raw scores, standardized scores, and normal-standardized scores may be little, if any, better in this respect when item-difficulty distributions are far from rectangu-
PSYCHOMETRICS ]ar. It is quite possible, in fact, that for some not uncommon item-difficulty distributions, the percentile ranks may have more nearly the properties of an interval scale than the raw scores have. Score regions. Gentiles and deciles are the regions between adjacent percentiles and sets of ten percentiles. The first centile is the score region below the first percentile. The 100th centile is the region above the 99th percentile. The /?th centile is the region between the (k — l)th and /?th percentiles. The first decile is the region below the tenth percentile, sometimes termed the first decile point. The tenth decile is the region above the 90th percentile or ninth decile point. The kih decile is the region between the 10(k — l)th and lOfeth percentiles, or the (k — l ) t h and feth decile points. The term "quartile" is often used also to represent a region. The lower quartile, the median, and the upper quartile are the three quartile points. The first quartile is the region below the lower quartile, the second quartile the region between the lower quartile and the median, the third quartile the region between the median and the upper quartile, and the fourth quartile the region above the upper quartile. Gentiles, deciles, and quartiles are equal-frequency score regions. Stanines and stens define equal standard score or normal-standard score regions, with unequal frequencies. Scaled scores. A few intelligence and achievement tests and test batteries are designed to cover wide ranges of ability, e.g., grades 3-9 inclusive. More commonly, however, they are issued for successive levels, such as primary, elementary, advanced (junior high school), and in some cases secondary (senior high school) and adult. In achievement test batteries, additional subject areas are usually included at the higher levels; and at the primary level, picture tests may replace tests which at other levels require reading. The successive levels usually have similar materials differing in average difficulty, but with the harder items at one level overlapping in difficulty the easier items at the next higher level. With wide-range tests and tests issued at several levels, grade scores, age scores, modal-age grade scores, and grade, age, or modal-age grade percentile ranks or standardized scores may represent quite unequal units at different levels. Scaled score systems are designed to have units which are equal in some sense, at least on the average, from level to level throughout the range. They are based on assumptions about the shape of the underlying ability distribution within a grade or age group, and are derived by considering both the score distributions at successive grades or ages and the
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mean or median gains from grade to grade or age to age. None of these methods are wholly satisfactory. Further problems arise when attempts are made to scale tests of different abilities in comparable units, since the relations between mean gains and within-grade or within-age variability are quite different for different functions. Thus, mean annual gain in reading is a much smaller fraction of withingroup standard deviation than is mean annual gain in arithmetic; or, stated in terms of growth units, variability in reading is much greater than in arithmetic. Equating. Before the scores on two tests, or even the scores on two forms of the same test, can be compared, the relations between their score scales must be established. The preferred experimental design is to give both tests to the same group of examinees: to half the group in the A-B order and to the other half in the B-A order. The simplest method of establishing comparable scores is termed line-of-relation equating. Scores on test A and test B are considered comparable if they correspond to the same standard score. This method is satisfactory only if the item-difficulty distributions are of the same shape and are equally variable, which is seldom the case. The preferred method is termed equipercentile equating. Scores are considered comparable if they correspond to the same percentile. Selected percentiles are computed for each distribution, such as percentiles 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 85, 90, 95, 97, 98, and 99. A two-way chart is prepared, with the scores on one form as ordinates and the scores on the other form as abscissas. For each of the selected percentiles a point is plotted representing the scores on the two tests corresponding to this percentile, and a smooth curve is drawn as nearly as possible through all these points. If, but only if, this curve turns out to be a straight line, will lineof-relation equating have been satisfactory. If the two distributions are first smoothed, the equipercentile points are more likely to lie on a smooth curve, and the accuracy of the equating is improved. This method of equating is satisfactory if the two tests are equally consistent. If they are not, the scores on each test should all be multiplied by the consistency coefficient of that test, and the resulting "estimated true scores" should be equated. When new forms of a test are issued annually, a full norms study is usually conducted only once every five or ten years, and the norms for successive forms are prepared by equating them to the "anchor form" used in the last norms study. Standards. In a few cases, standards of test performance can be established without reference
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to the performances of members of defined groups. Thus, in typing 120 words per minute with not more than one error per 100 words is a fairly high standard. "Quality scales," in areas such as handwriting and English composition, are sets of specimens at equal intervals of excellence. A standard of handwriting legibility can be set by measuring the speed with which good readers read the various specimens. The standard would be the poorest specimen which is not read significantly slower than the best specimen. Units above this standard would then represent mainly increases in beauty; units below the standard, decreases in legibility. In English composition, the poorest specimen written in substantially correct grammar could be identified by a consensus of English teachers. Then units above the standard would represent mainly improvements in style; units below the standard, decreases in grammatical correctness. Research is in progress to determine standards for multiple-choice tests of subject-matter achievement. When the items of such a test are arranged in order of actual difficulty, experienced teachers expert in the subject might be able to agree on the item which barely passing students should get right half the time. Given this item and the item-analysis data, the passing score for the test can be determined fairly readily. Expectancy tables. When the regression of a test or battery on a criterion has been determined from a representative sample of the same population, norms for the population can be expressed in terms of expected criterion scores. The predictor scores are usually expressed in fairly broad units. Then, if the criterion is dichotomous, the expectancy table gives for each score level the probability that a person at that score level will be in the upper criterion group. If the criterion is continuous, the criterion scores are grouped into quartiles, deciles, stanines, stens, or grade levels; and for each predictor score level the table gives probabilities for the several criterion levels. Thus if the criterion is a grade in a course, the expectancy table will show for each predictor score level the probabilities that the grade will be A, B, C, D, or F. EDWARD E. CURETON [Directly related are the entries INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE TESTING; MATHEMATICS; PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT; SCALING. Other relevant material may be found in FACTOR ANALYSIS; MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, articles On CORRELATION; PARAMETRIC
STATISTICS;
NON-
STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE;
and in the biographies of BINET; PEARSON; SPEARMAN; THORNDIKE; THURSTONE.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The standard work in psychometrics is Guilford 1936. It includes psychophysics and scaling, as well as the topics covered in this article. A somewhat more elementary treatment is given in Ghiselli 1964, and a somewhat more advanced treatment in Gulliksen 1950. Another general work is Stevens 1951, which treats with some care the foundations of measurement, a topic not covered by Guilford, Ghiselli, or Gulliksen. BROGDEN, HUBERT E. 1949 A New Coefficient: Application to Biserial Correlation and to Estimation of Selective Efficiency. Psychometrika 14:169-182. CRONBACH, LEE J. 1951 Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests. Psychometrika 16:297-334. CRONBACH, LEE J. ; and MEEHL, P. E. (1955) 1956 Construct Validity in Psychological Tests. Pages 174-204 in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (editors), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. -» First published in Volume 52 of the Psychological Bulletin. FAN, CHUNG-TEH 1952 Item Analysis Table. Princeton, N.J.: Educational Testing Service. FINDLEY, WARREN G. 1956 A Rationale for Evaluation of Item Discrimination Statistics. Educational and Psychological Measurement 16:175-180. FLANAGAN, JOHN C. 1939 General Considerations in the Selection of Test Items and a Short Method of Estimating the Product-moment Coefficient From the Data at the Tails of the Distribution. Journal of Educational Psychology 30:674-680. GHISELLI, EDWIN E. 1964 Theory of Psychological Measurement. New York: McGraw-Hill. GUILFORD, JOY P. (1936) 1954 Psychometric Methods. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. GULLIKSEN, HAROLD 1950 Theory of Mental Tests. New York: Wiley. HORST, PAUL 1936 Item Selection by Means of a Maximizing Function. Psychometrika 1:229-244. KUDER, G. F.; and RICHARDSON, M. W. 1937 The Theory of the Estimation of Test Reliability. Psychometrika 2:151-160. LORD, FREDERIC M. 1964 An Empirical Comparison of the Validity of Certain Formula-scores. Journal of Educational Measurement 1:29-30. LYERLY, SAMUEL B. 1951 A Note on Correcting for Chance Success in Objective Tests. Psychometrika 16:21-30. STEVENS, S. S. (1951)1958 Mathematics, Measurement, and Psychophysics. Pages 1-49 in S. S. Stevens (editor), Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: Wiley. -> See especially pages 13-15 and 21-30. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. Edited by Benjamin S. Bloom. 2 vols. 1956-1964 New York: McKay. -> Handbook 1: The Cognitive Domain, by B. S. Bloom and D. R. Kratwohl, 1956. Handbook 2: The Affective Domain, by D. R. Kratwohl, B. S. Bloom, and B. B. Masia, 1964. THORNDIKE, EDWARD L. et al. 1926 The Measurement of Intelligence. New York: Columbia Univ., Teachers College. THORNDIKE, ROBERT L. 1951 Reliability. Pages 560-620 in E. F. Lindquist (editor), Educational Measurement. Washington: American Council on Education. WESMAN, ALEXANDER G. 1949 Effect of Speed on ItemTest Correlation Coefficients. Educational and Psychological Measurement 9:51-57.
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY PSYCHONEUROSIS See NEUROSIS. PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY The term psychopathic personality was for many years the officially approved designation of the American Psychiatric Association for a great many types of maladjustment in people who were otherwise regarded as free from psychosis, psychoneurosis, and mental deficiency. A large number of heterogeneous disorders, many of which have little in common, were included in this category. In 1952 the association officially replaced this term with the general category personality disorders. This category also includes many deviations, maladjustments, and disorders that vary widely in type and in degree. In the present scheme of nomenclature the subclassification sociopathic personality: antisocial reaction includes the type of patient well known to psychiatrists and for many decades referred to by the informal term psychopath. Definition. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual., Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association defines antisocial reaction as follows: This term refers to chronically antisocial individuals who are always in trouble, profiting neither from experience nor punishment, and maintaining no real loyalties to any person, group, or code. They are frequently callous and hedonistic, showing marked emotional immaturity, with lack of sense of responsibility, lack of judgment, and an ability to rationalize their behavior so that it appears warranted, reasonable, and justified. The term includes cases previously classified as "constitutional psychopathic state" and "psychopathic personality." As defined here the term is more limited, as well as more specific in its application. (1952, p. 38) Patients classified in this group are distinguished from other sociopaths, a category that includes those suffering from sexual deviation, alcoholism, and drug addiction; this group is also distinct from those exhibiting dyssocial reaction, which the Manual defines as follows: This term applies to individuals who manifest disregard for the usual social codes, and often come in conflict with them, as the result of having lived all their lives in an abnormal moral environment. They may be capable of strong loyalties. These individuals typically do not show significant personality deviations other than those implied by adherence to the values °r code of their own predatory, criminal or other social group. The term includes such diagnoses as "pseudosocial personality" and "psychopathic personality with asocial and amoral trends." (1952, p. 38)
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It should be noted that the patients defined as showing dyssocial reaction are nonetheless capable of loyalties and seem in their rebellion against society to have some standards of their own, even though these may be immoral and condemned by law. This classification apparently covers the ordinary purposive criminal who works consistently toward antisocial but comprehensible goals. This article will concern itself primarily with patients showing antisocial reaction, to whom we shall refer by the informal but now classic term psychopath. This term is familiar to all psychiatrists, and it clearly designates and distinguishes a well-known clinical entity. Few modern definitions have surpassed J. C. Prichard's 1835 description of certain key aspects of the psychopathic personality: . . . the moral and active principles of the mind are strongly perverted or depraved; the power of selfgovernment is lost or greatly impaired and the individual is found to be incapable not of talking or reasoning upon any subject proposed to him, but of conducting himself with decency and propriety in the business of life. (Quoted by Cleckley 1959, p. 569) Prichard is generally credited with formulating the concept moral insanity, which is still used in some parts of the world to designate the abnormality shown by psychopaths. In a recent study McCord and McCord give another definition that is helpful: The psychopath is an asocial, aggressive, highly impulsive person who feels little or no guilt and is unable to form lasting bonds of affection with other human beings. (1956, p. 2) Characteristics of the psychopath The psychopath does not give the impression, even on careful examination, of being mentally ill, handicapped, or emotionally disturbed. Nor does he, typically, show any attitude or outlook that would indicate he lacked conscience or had chosen rebellious or antisocial aims. His reasoning is excellent. What he tells of his allegiances, aims, and understandings indicates that he is normal, reliable, and utterly sincere. Despite this, his past conduct and what will emerge in the future are very likely to bear out the truth of Lindner's statement that here we encounter "the most expensive and most destructive of all known forms of aberrant behavior." The typical psychopath is a person who appears to have at least average, and often unusual, ability and who seems to be clearly aware of the amenities and to affirm the moral code. Frequently he demonstrates superior intelligence and other assets and is likely to succeed brilliantly for a time in work,
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in studies, and in all his human relations. But inevitably, and repeatedly, lie fails, losing his job, alienating his friends, perhaps losing his wife and children. It is difficult to account for these failures. Seldom can one find adequate motivation to explain why a person has, in the midst of success, grossly shirked his immediate responsibilities, and perhaps abandoned his work, at the behest of impulses that seem to the observer no more compelling than a trivial whim. However effective he may show himself to be over a limited period, when given sufficient time, he proves himself inadequate. His failures deprive him of what he tells us are his chief objectives and also bring hardship, shame, and disaster to his wife, children, parents, and all those closely connected with him (Cleckley 1941). In addition to such relatively passive types of failure most fully developed psychopaths also commit aggressive antisocial acts. They forge checks, swindle, steal repeatedly, lightly indulge in bigamy, and show little or no compunction about their sexual behavior, regardless of the consequences. Some psychopaths who have attracted wide public attention committed murder or other shocking felonies, usually with little or no provocation, often without comprehensible motivation (Cleckley 1941). The majority, despite many conflicts with the law, appear to avoid crimes sufficiently grave to result in their removal from society for long prison terms. The psychopath may repeatedly receive punishment that would be likely to cause an ordinary person to mend his ways. But he appears to learn nothing important from experience. He is quite familiar with the correct ethical criteria, claims allegiance to such criteria, and can formulate in words excellent rules and plans for himself to follow. He does not seem to be lying as simply as the ordinary liar, whose motives are usually comprehensible. Sometimes the psychopath does not seem to be aware that he is lying or even to grasp emotionally the essence of falsehood and how falsehood differs from truth. Sometimes such people seem to mean for the moment to do what they promise so convincingly, but the resolution passes almost as the words are spoken. The psychopath expresses normal reactions (love, loyalty, gratitude, etc.) with a most impressive appearance of sincerity and depth, but the emotional ties and the attitudes he professes fail to deter him from deeds that continually contradict his verbal claims. There appears to be in him a strange lack of insight or, perhaps more accurately, a total lack of one of the dimensions that constitute insight. After innumerable lies that he knows have been detected, he still speaks confidently of giving
his word of honor, apparently assured that this will settle the issue immediately and absolutely. Although he may demonstrate, over considerable periods, adequate general abilities, or even extraordinary talent, he always throws away what he has gained, what he insists are his chief objectives. No adequate motivation can be found or even imagined to account for his conduct. Conceivable temptations are often extremely trivial, but they inevitably evoke actions that lead to the loss of fortune and the respect of friends, the destruction of marriage, and imprisonment or confinement in a psychiatric institution. The psychopath seems to be almost totally immune to real remorse or deep feelings of guilt or shame. An example. At this point it is appropriate to consider the case of a young woman in her early twenties whose appearance of high intelligence is confirmed by psychometric examination and by excellent achievement in her studies and at work during the limited, sporadic periods during which she applied herself. Despite this intelligence she has been a serious problem to her parents since early childhood. She has repeatedly stolen from her family, from strangers, and from stores. Often she has bought unneeded clothes and other articles and has habitually lied with equanimity and effectiveness. At times she has run up such large, unauthorized bills that her father found himself in serious financial difficulties. No punishment or deprivation has influenced her in the slightest degree. As a girl she had been frequently truant from school and violated every agreement made about suitable hours to return from dances or dates. Yet she has almost never been openly or directly defiant and has usually admitted herself in the wrong when her cool and ingenious falsehoods were exposed. She regularly promises, in a convincing and apparently sincere manner, to reform completely but after varying periods of good behavior always returns to her old patterns of irresponsibility and folly. She has had a number of boy friends but apparently feels less than the average sexual interest. Often she has seemed to be mildly bored but seldom distinctly unhappy. During the year before her admission to the hospital she spent hours each week writing sentimental and rather perfunctory letters, chiefly to boys in military service or at college. Some of these she knew only slightly. When one of the boys, whom she knew much better and actually considered her sweetheart, was killed in an automobile accident, she manifested little sign of grief or concern. She remained a virgin until she was 18 years old. Then one day, without apparent
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY provocation or strong incentive, she left home secretly and was not heard from until two weeks later when police located her in a city approximately a hundred miles away. She showed no remorse about the anxiety her parents had suffered and neither disillusionment nor resentment about the fruitlessness of her venture or the rather brutal treatment she had occasionally experienced. In explanation of her conduct she said that she had left home with the intention of visiting a boy friend stationed at an army camp in another state. She admitted that she had in mind the possibility of marrying this man, but that no final decision had been made by her, much less by him. She admitted that she had given the matter little thought, and from her attitude one would judge she was moved by little more than a casual whim. She had left with only a few dollars in her purse. Getting off the bus in a town fifty miles from home, she tried to reach the boy by telephone and ask him to telegraph funds to her. She could not reach him and decided to go to the home of another boy, then overseas, whose family lived in the town where she found herself. She asked these people to let her spend the night. They welcomed her. After being there an hour or two, she became suspicious that they might have notified her parents. Without a word to them she slipped out of the house, took a bus in another direction and, late at night, got off in a small, strange town. For a little while she sat in a hotel lobby, apparently calm and unworried. Soon a man approached her and drew her into conversation. On hearing her story, he offered to pay for a room so she could rest. She realized he meant to spend the night with her, but she made no objection. As far as one could tell by discussing the experience with her, she was neither alarmed, excited, repulsed, nor attracted by a prospect that most carefully raised virgins could not have regarded with indifference. The man apparently handled her in a crude, inconsiderate fashion and showed plain contempt for her and her role, addressing her in unnecessarily derogatory terms. During sexual relations with him she experienced moderate pain and no sexual excitement or response. He gave her a few dollars, which she was pleased to accept. The next day she telephoned her soldier friend a t his camp. She had not discarded her idea of Perhaps marrying him, nor had she progressed any further toward a firm decision to do so. He discouraged her strongly against coming, refused to send her money, and emphatically urged her to return home. Apparently she was not upset by this turn of events and, with little consideration of the
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matter, decided to go to the city where she was eventually discovered. She admits that she had no definite purpose in going there, was prompted by no overmastering thrill of adventure, and was not aware of any strong reason for not returning home or for having left in the first place. In the strange city she got smal] jobs for a day or two, but these did not pay enough for room and board. She therefore began to spend the nights with various men in search of light sexual adventure. She experienced no real erotic enjoyment from these experiences or any serious qualms of conscience. When detected by police and, later, on meeting her friends at home, she never showed embarrassment or any sign of remorse about what had occurred. Somewhat similar episodes recurred time after time. On various occasions she expressed the wish to go into training as a student nurse, to do secretarial work, or to get a job in a government agency. At considerable expense and trouble her family enabled her to try all these plans and many others. Each time, she expressed the most confident assurance that she would have no further trouble. In each new venture she made a favorable impression at first and showed herself capable of succeeding and often of excelling. Soon, however, she abandoned each position, sometimes running away to other towns and living more or less as a vagabond. Once she absconded with money obtained from a lending agency operated by the corporation she worked for. She often stole things for which she had no use. Sometimes without any particular reason she simply quit going to the office and in this way lost good positions in which she had expressed great interest and at which she was succeeding with minimal effort. After dozens of such failures she continued to express the most complete optimism, and her attitude always implied buoyant self-satisfaction. After coming to the hospital a number of times for psychiatric observation and treatment, she wrote to her physician: You have given me a new outlook and a new life; shown me things in a different light—and I am happy: —and have every hope of making those who, you could even say, have saved me, proud of me. Whether I turn out finally to be a nurse, a business girl or just a wife, I have a new hope for a happy and useful life which I thought would never be mine. If in this new life I ever become discouraged and lose hope I will look at you and have courage and hope again. I now understand myself and my problems, thanks to you. I will go on and succeed and be happy.
After several prompt repetitions of previous failure she continued to give her psychiatrist's name
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as a recommendation for positions on the basis of her "good character," "reliability," "high moral standards," etc. She seemed perfectly assured that such recommendations would be in the highest terms and without qualification. It is not easy to fathom the motivation of such a person. If in hallucinations she had heard God's voice urging her to leave home or had believed she was being invited to spend the night by a famous motion picture star or a princely lover, her conduct would be easier to understand; it would, in an important sense, be less unreasonable. It would also be easier to account for if she had been tempted by strong and persistent sexual desire or some other major incentive to sacrifice her good name and perhaps her chances of future happiness for a foolish but fascinating or wildly exciting adventure. Distinguishing characteristics. The patient whose history has just been briefly summarized shows many of the characteristics that seem to distinguish the real psychopath from other people, including other psychiatric patients. The following is a list of some of the characteristics that have emerged in the study of many patients of this type: (1) Easy charm and good technical intelligence. (2) A confident and forthright manner that inspires trust. (3) An apparent dignity and seriousness that give the impression of profound sincerity. (4) The absence of delusions, hallucinations, and all other signs of psychotic or irrational thinking. (5 ) Freedom from abnormal anxiety and other manifestations of psychoneurosis. (6) Ability to formulate excellent life plans that seem to indicate sound judgment and steadfast resolution. (7) Allegiance to moral codes and conventions of society, expressed cogently and with the appearance of deep conviction. These points are likely to be impressive during psychiatric examination or in any other encounter confined to the patient's verbal performance as contrasted with his behavior. When we study his behavior over a considerable period of time, other points emerge that are strikingly incompatible with those listed above : (1) Unreliability and irresponsibility in behavior even when very important issues are at stake and personal welfare is involved. (2) Lack of remorse or shame despite eloquent protestations of such feelings. (3) Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior repeated again and again despite interludes of good adjustment. (4) Conduct that demonstrates extremely poor judgment and failure to learn by experience. (5) Inability to love another, and pathologic egocentricity. (6) Shallowness and poverty in the major human emotions. (7) A specific loss of insight despite
ability to use words that convincingly give the opposite impression. (8) Unresponsiveness to the important issues that arise in interpersonal relations. (9) Uninviting and outlandish behavior, often with little discernible provocation. (This is particularly prone to emerge when drinking.) (10) Tendency to threaten suicide frequently but rarely to attempt it, despite circumstances that would make strong impulses toward suicide readily understandable. (11) Shallow, impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated sex life. (12) Failure to follow consistently any life plan. (Although brilliant successes occur, the results of these are often dissipated or destroyed on impulses that appear to be little more than caprice.) Nature of the disorder—etiology The disorder of the psychopath varies considerably in degree, and some of these patients, despite their technical sanity, prove themselves much less competent, less able to live their lives effectively or without serious damage to themselves and to others than people who show plain manifestations of psychosis. The psychopath, although entirely free of irrationality and often brilliant in all verbal tests, carries on a career that is difficult to account for as a product of sanity. What is the nature of the disorder or defect in these people? Since the mid-nineteenth century various answers have been offered to this question. It has been said that they suffer from pathologic changes confined to a hypothetical "moral faculty." It has also been said that they are affected by general constitutional inferiority, subtle hereditary taint, the deprivations of slum life, the influence of evil companions, and parental neglect. Some of these explanations have probably emerged from the observation of patients now distinguished as showing dyssocial reaction and of other types of disorder differing fundamentally from that of the true psychopath but arbitrarily placed in the same category. During recent decades increasing attention has been paid to the influence of environmental or psychogenic factors rather than possible inborn or organic defects. Some observers have expressed the conviction that the psychopath is a product of extreme parental spoiling. Others have seemed as confident that early and subtle rejection by the parents is a major factor in his development (Cleckley 1941). Franz Alexander's formulation. Since the 1930s the concepts of Franz Alexander have attracted much attention and have, indeed, been accepted by many psychiatrists as furnishing a scientific explanation of the problem. According to Alexander's
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY formulation, the psychopath's maladjustment and antisocial behavior arise from inner conflict similar to that widely believed to underlie psychoneurotic symptoms. Despite the striking lack of ordinary anxiety or self-condemnation in psychopaths, even under circumstances in which these reactions would be normal, Alexander maintains that there is an inner unconscious conflict and sense of guilt (1930). In reaction to such a conflict the patient with psychoneurosis is thought to develop subjective symptoms and to complain of anxiety, headache, weakness, and other physical disturbances or perhaps to become disturbed by compulsive rituals, obsessive thinking, hysterical paralysis, and temporary blindness. Alexander maintains that the psychopath, instead of passively developing such unpleasant subjective symptoms, reacts to the postulated unconscious conflict by indulging in destructive, self-damaging, antisocial behavior. This process is thought of by Alexander as an "acting out" of the inner problems in relation to society and to the environment (1930). Many of those who accept this hypothesis believe that the psychopath deliberately but unconsciously seeks failure and persistently commits crimes and other acts of aggression to obtain punishment, which he unwittingly desires as an expiation of intense but completely unconscious feelings of guilt and remorse. In this interpretation the psychopath can be thought of as having genuine and adequate reasons for the apparently foolish, antisocial, and uncalled-for acts he commits, damaging himself and others. It is assumed that he knows nothing of these reasons or of their effect upon him. This is in many respects an ingenious formulation. It is widely regarded as offering a "dynamic" explanation of the psychopath. It tends also to make him a dramatic figure and. to arouse sympathy for his alleged blind struggle for redemption. [See ALEXANDER.] Adelaide Johnson's formulation. Another and more recent explanation has been offered by Adelaide Johnson (1959). She also maintains that there are factors operating in the unconscious, not only of the patient but also of his parents. According to this formulation, the parents have criminal impulses of which they remain completely unaware and, without realizing it in the least, work deliberately and persistently to influence their son or daughter to carry out irresponsible, immoral, and destructive antisocial activity in order to obtain for themselves a vicarious satisfaction they do not dare seek more directly. According to this theory, the child, even after he has reached adult life, does not
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become conscious of this alleged motivation or of the beguiling influence said by Johnson to be exercised unwittingly by the parents. Through this purposive training, the child is said to be inducted by the parent into a career of unrewarding delinquency and self-defeating antisocial behavior. Evaluation of these formulations. Johnson's hypothesis, like Alexander's, seems to offer a "dynamic" explanation in the popular terms of unconscious motivation. Perhaps for this reason both have attracted much attention and have been widely accepted. They are regarded by many as scientific discoveries based on demonstrable evidence. Let us not forget that both of these intriguing theories rest entirely on arbitrary assumptions about what is in a hypothetical unconscious. None of the patients I have studied have shown anything that could reasonably be regarded as evidence of the hidden sense of guilt and the desperate quest for redemption through punishment attributed to psychopaths by Alexander. Nor have I found anything to indicate that their parents wanted them to indulge in misconduct and, without realizing it, actively influenced them toward it. Such motives and feelings, or any others, may of course be assumed to be present not only in psychopaths but in anybody else if we also assume that they remain unconscious. Care, however, must be taken to distinguish between assumption and proof. Popular methods in psychiatry and psychology generally regarded as dynamic make it easy to ascribe with confidence virtually anything to the unconscious and to obtain pseudoevidence for whatever one might seek to establish, using analogy and the arbitrary interpretation of dreams and symbols. The psychiatric literature abounds in examples of these methods being so used to discover specious explanations of psychiatric disorder in events imagined by the psychiatrist, in accordance with his theory, to have occurred decades earlier, during the first few months of a patient's life; or, indeed, even during the patient's intra-uterine existence as an embryo (Cleckley 1957). Perhaps some people carry out criminal acts repeatedly because of guilt they do not know they experience and do so in order to obtain punishment they do not know they seek. Perhaps there are law-abiding and respected parents who unconsciously want their children to rebel against society and indulge freely in forgery, burglary, bigamy, prostitution, and other forms of misconduct. However, no evidence has emerged in my own experience with psychopaths to indicate that such influences are likely to play a part in their disorder.
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Until real evidence, as contrasted with mere assumption, can be offered to establish the concepts of Alexander and Johnson, let us regard them with skeptical interest. For a long time it has been the custom to assume that in unconscious conflict can be found the explanation of psychiatric disorder, of delinquency, and, indeed, of human behavior in general. Jenkins (1960) suggests that it may be worthwhile for us to consider possible effects of the opposite, of a lack of conflict under circumstances that would normally cause anxiety and conflict to develop and that would actually make this imperative. He very pertinently points out that it became known early in the history of medicine that what a person ate could produce illness. Only much later did it become known that what he did not eat might cause a more subtle illness through avitaminosis. Masked personality disorder. Is there some defect or disorder within the psychopath that causes him to lack the capacity to feel guilt? If so, this hypothetical deficiency seems also to interfere with his reacting to, and pursuing consistently, the normal goals of life. And he seems to lack the ability to participate adequately in the major emotional experiences of life. The typical psychopath's excellent intellectual abilities and his freedom from the manifestations of ordinary psychiatric disorder make it difficult to believe that deep within him may be concealed a deficiency that leads not to conflict or unconscious guilt but, instead, makes him incapable of feeling normal remorse and of appreciating adequately the major emotional experiences of human life (Cleckley 1941). The outer characteristics of the psychopath strongly indicate warmth of feeling, kindness, sincerity, pride, courage, a deep sense of honor, and genuine capacities for love and loyalty. Such an outer appearance could be the result of excellent peripheral function in the organism, which gives strong and convincing promise of robust health within and makes it difficult to suspect that there may be a central and very serious inner defect. The psychopath's conduct, however, is consistent with a serious defect in the very qualities for which his superficial aspect and verbal performance give such rich promise. The peripheral mechanisms, one might say, of his functional entity are undamaged and operate well. They demonstrate technical intelligence and convincingly mimic the expression of normal inner experience. But the implied inner experience, the glowingly promised emotional participation in life, is not there. If we compare speech disorders with personality disorders, an analogy emerges that may be helpful
in conveying this concept. When the outer physiologic apparatus involved in the production of speech is damaged, the disability is overt, and its cause is usually easy to understand. When the tongue is mutilated or its motor nerve damaged, there is likely to be gross difficulty in enunciating words and perhaps even in moving the tongue itself. Efforts to speak may give rise only to inarticulate sounds that communicate nothing. The inner use of language, however, and its meaning to the person who has suffered the injury, is preserved intact. In contrast with dysarthria, in which the peripheral apparatus of speech is affected, let us consider the aphasias which are caused by lesions more centrally located in the brain. In these the outer mechanisms of speech are preserved. Let us consider particularly semantic aphasia as described by Henry Head (1926). In this very deep-seated disorder of speech, words are clearly and accurately enunciated, and often complete and grammatical sentences are fluently spoken. These utterances, however, have little or no meaning. They are not related, within the person, to ideas or feelings that they seem to indicate and seem intended to convey. The words of this ostensible communication are, in a very important sense, not really words but only a mimicry of words, produced mechanically by the peripheral mechanisms of speech that have become isolated from the inner source that gives rise to thought, feeling, and intention. Despite this more or less reflex simulation of real speech, a deep loss has occurred that prevents the person from using language inwardly to think. [See LANGUAGE, article on SPEECH PATHOLOGY.] If the psychopath has a profound and centrally located defect that prevents him from participating significantly in man's deepest fulfillments and joys, is it not possible that this inability to participate might contribute to restlessness and boredom? And might this not in turn prompt him to indulge in unprofitable or damaging indiscretions and destructive behavior that would not be particularly tempting to others who are devoting their attention to major goals and responding to major fulfillments? This hypothesis—of an extremely serious central pathology or a biological deficit concealed by misleading peripheral functions, by what one might call an impressive "mask of sanity"—cannot be established by objective evidence at present but is, in many important respects, consistent with the psychopath's behavior (Cleckley 1941). It may be helpful to consider the case of patients who are affected by what has often been called "masked schizophrenia." Though these patients do not have delusions or hallucinations and are often
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY rational in their verbal expression of thought, the psychosis may be as genuine and its degree as great as in the hebephrenic patient, whose extremely disabling disorder is obvious. The patient with masked schizophrenia, unlike the psychopath, nearly always shows on examination a brittleness, some undefinable peculiarity of manner, an emotional coolness, or, perhaps, certain subtleties of posture, gesture, expression, or attitude that indicate he is by no means normal. It might be said that his psychosis is concealed but that it is concealed by the appearance of lesser abnormality, by the outer disguise of a very eccentric and peculiar person. In contrast to this, the mask of the psychopath is that of complete and robust health. Treatment Over the years most observers have been impressed by the failure of psychopaths to respond to any treatment or be changed fundamentally by any other influence (Cleckley 1941). A few psychiatrists have expressed encouragement about psychoanalytic treatment of patients they regarded as psychopaths (Johnson 1959; Karpman 1955; Schmideberg 1949). Lindner enthusiastically reported success with the use of hypnoanalysis (1944). Others have occasionally reported improvement through the use of drugs, through the effects of simple counseling, through milieu therapy, through the methods of general semantics, and through various other types of psychotherapy (Lipton 1961; Lynn 1938; McCord & McCord 1956; Thompson 1953). Occasionally psychiatrists have been favorably impressed by reports of the use of electric shocks (Darling 1945) and lobotomy operations (Banay & Davidoff 1942). Perhaps some of these optimistic reports, which conflict so sharply with the experience of most observers, can be accounted for by the psychopath's tendency to use his excellent abilities temporarily—and perhaps one might also say, capriciously—to succeed for a while in whatever he undertakes. These spontaneous remissions, like those long familiar in multiple sclerosis, may lead the therapist to an erroneous belief that they are the result of his treatment. Most psychiatrists share the opinion that there is no effective treatment available today for genuine and typical psychopaths [see MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; see also Cleckley 1941; Grcenacre 1947]. "reposals for dealing with the problem It would seem that important steps can be taken toward working out a better means of dealing with tne many problems posed by the psychopath. First, a more general recognition is needed that his dis-
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order is a genuine incompetency or psychiatric abnormality, a specific pattern of malfunctioning that, in severe cases, causes maximal disability and makes it impossible for him to maintain his role as a responsible member of the community. At present most psychopaths elude restriction. Neither penal institutions nor psychiatric hospitals possess the legal means of holding them long enough to afford the community protection or to give an adequate trial to any therapeutic measures that may be attempted. Although the psychopath's record of extreme incompetency may facilitate his efforts to obtain exoneration or leniency in the courts when faced with imprisonment, it does not, as matters now stand, enable society to keep him under psychiatric supervision through commitment. Scores of times patients repeat apparently purposeless thefts, forgeries, embezzlements, bigamies, swindlings, distasteful or indecent acts in public, and yet, because the official medical category in which they are placed makes them sane and competent according to the books and tradition, they cannot be committed to psychiatric institutions for medical care or for the protection of themselves and others. If by chance they are committed, which is exceptional, their "sanity" is soon re-established by a staff of able psychiatrists at the institution to which they are sent, who correctly diagnose them as cases of psychopathic personality. However genuine their real disorder, this frees them (as legally competent persons) from control or supervision. On the other hand, these patients frequently, and in most courts usually, are able to evade prison sentences for their antisocial acts. Their lawyers are able to point out the obviously incompetent features in their careers, and the jury, despite expert psychiatric testimony to the contrary, is often unwilling to punish persons whose conduct shows such plain evidence of mental abnormality. The Durham Rule—that the accused is absolved from criminal responsibility if his act was a product of mental disease—lias apparently not resulted in any improvement in this confused situation [see PSYCHIATRY, article on FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY]. If a means could be made available of obtaining adequate control over psychopaths who plainly show themselves not fitted for unrestricted freedom in the social group, it would then be possible to set up facilities specifically designed to deal with their problems. Large state and federal psychiatric institutions in the United States, organized for the treatment of patients psychotic in the traditional sense, are not at present well adapted to handle the psychopath. Numerous private hospitals, whether primarily designed for the needs of the psycho-
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neurotic patient or for the psychotic, lack the means of restraining the psychopath and are unable to deal adequately with the problems he creates. There would be no use in establishing institutions primarily for psychopaths unless legal means of controlling them were made available. The expense of building and operating specialized institutions of this sort would be great. There is good reason to believe, however, that even this would cost less than what the psychopath is costing the public today. And even if no effective treatment should ever be discovered, systems of parole and probation specifically set up for the psychopath and carefully designed in the light of his needs and his proclivities could give each patient as much freedom from restraint as he showed himself capable of utilizing safely. In a properly and persistently controlled situation it might be possible for many psychopaths to use their excellent abilities constructively and eventually achieve a much better adjustment than is possible for them today. If laymen were to become more acquainted with this enigmatic figure behind his misleading mask of sanity, and with the ever-accumulating sorrow, damage, despair, confusion, farce, and disaster that each psychopath leaves in his wake, organized effort might be mobilized to devise adequate medicolegal means of restraining him in his now virtually unhindered career of folly and purposeless destruction. HERVEY M. CLECKLEY [Directly related are the entries CHARACTER DISORDERS; CRIME; DELINQUENCY; DEVIANT BEHAVIOR. Other relevant material may be found in MENTAL DISORDERS; MORAL DEVELOPMENT.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ALEXANDER, FRANZ 1930 The Neurotic Character. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 11:292-311. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS (1952) 1963 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental Disorders. Washington: The Association. BAN AY, RALPH S.; and DAVIDOFF, L. 1942 Apparent Recovery of a Sex Psychopath After Lobotomy. Journal of Criminal Psychopathology 4:59-66. CLECKLEY, HERVEY M. (1941) 1964 The Mask of Sanity. 4th ed. St. Louis, Mo.: Mosby. CLECKLEY, HERVEY M. 1957 The Caricature of Love. New York: Ronald. CLECKLEY, HERVEY M. 1959 Psychopathic States. Volume 1, pages 567-588 in American Handbook of Psychiatry. Edited by Silvano Arieti. New York: Basic Books. DARLING, HARRY F. 1945 Shock Treatment in Psychopathic Personality. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 101:247-250. GREENACRE, PHYLLIS 1947 Problems of Patient-Therapist Relationship in the Treatment of Psychopaths. Pages 378-383 in Robert Lindner and Robert V. Seli-
ger (editors), Handbook of Correctional Psychology. New York: Philosophical Library. HALL, JEROME 1963 The M'Naghten Rule and Proposed Alternatives. Journal of the American Bar Association 59:960-964. HEAD, HENRY 1926 Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech. 2 vols. Cambridge Univ. Press. JENKINS, RICHARD L. 1960 The Psychopathic or Antisocial Personality. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 131:318-334. JOHNSON, ADELAIDE M. 1959 Juvenile Delinquency. Volume 1, pages 840-856 in American Handbook of Psychiatry. Edited by Silvano Arieti. New York: Basic Books. KARPMAN, BENJAMIN 1955 Criminal Psychodynamics: A Platform. Archives of Criminal Psychodynamics 1:3-100. LINDNER, ROBERT 1944 Rebel Without a Cause. New York: Grune. LIPTON, HARRY R. 1961 The Psychopath. Archives of Criminal Psychodynamics 4:542-549. LYNN, JOHN G. 1938 Preliminary Report of Two Cases of Psychopathic Personality With Chronic Alcoholism Treated by the Korzybskian Methods. Pages 90-100 in American Congress of General Semantics, First, Ellensburg, Washington, 1935, General Semantics: Papers. New York: Arrow. McCoRD, WILLIAM; and McCoRD, JOAN 1956 Psychopathy and Delinquency. New York: Grune. PRICHARD, J. C. 1835 Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind. London: Gilbert & Piper. SCHMIDEBERG, MELITTA 1949 Psychology and Treatment of Criminal Psychopaths. Pages 174-189 in K. R. Eissler (editor), Searchlights on Delinquency. New York: International Universities Press. THOMPSON, GEORGE N. 1953 The Psychopathic Delinquent and Criminal. Springfield, 111.: Thomas.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY See MENTAL DISORDERS. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY See under DRUGS. PSYCHOPHYSICS Psychophysics is the study of physical stimuli and their relation to sensory reactions. Of the energy that strikes the sensory surfaces of man and the animals, only a restricted fraction is capable of eliciting a reaction. Thus, visual responses in man are triggered by a narrow band of the vast electromagnetic spectrum (wavelengths between about 400 and 750 millimicrons); and auditory responses result from periodic displacements of the eardrum in the frequency range from about 20 to 20,000 cycles per second (cps). Over these stimulus ranges, neither the eye nor the ear is uniformly responsive: to produce a sensation may require thousands of times more energy at one wavelength or frequency than at another. It is the goal of psychophysics to map out the relations between the physical events and the psychological re-
PSYCHOPHYSICS sponses of organisms, and thus to provide a basic, over-all description of the function of the senses. Major problems. The traditional questions posed by psychophysics fall into four groups. For a given sense modality we may ask about (1) the smallest detectable energy (the measurement of sensitivity); (2) the smallest detectable change in energy (the measurement of resolving power); (3) the configurations of energy that produce an invariant sensory effect, such as a constant loudness or color (the measurement of static invariances); (4) the way in which the magnitude of a sensory effect depends functionally on the stimulus (the measurement of dynamic properties ). Sensitivity The problem of sensitivity involves the determination of the smallest detectable intensity of a stimulus (called the absolute threshold), often as a function of another stimulus dimension, such as wavelength, frequency, duration, or areal extent. The threshold of audibility, for example, depends on the frequency of the tone; sensitivity is greatest to frequencies between about 2,000 and 3,000 cps. In the vicinity of 20 and 20,000 cps (which are conveniently but arbitrarily called the "limits" of hearing), the threshold energy may rise to roughly 108 times the minimal value. A similar relation exists between the threshold of visibility and the wavelength of the stimulating light, except that the shape of the visibility curve depends on what part of the sensory surface is stimulated; foveal (cone) vision has maximum sensitivity at about 555 millimicrons; peripheral (rod) vision, at about 505 millimicrons; and the "limits" of visibility are also different for the two populations of receptors. Variation in sensitivity. The absolute threshold is not a rigidly fixed value. Sensitivity fluctuates irregularly, so that a given stimulus level may trigger a response at one time but not at another. The threshold is usually defined statistically, e.g., as the energy level that is detected as often as not over a series of presentations. Sensitivity is also subject to systematic variation, either of the permanent kind encountered in aging °r in pathology of the sensory tissues, or of a temporary kind observed, for example, in the relatively ra pid decline of visual sensitivity under exposure to light (light adaptation) and the subsequent gradual recovery of sensitivity in the dark (dark adaptation). These and many other systematic changes ln sensitivity are frequently expressed as alterations °f the absolute threshold. The study of absolute thresholds reveals the exquisite sensitivity of the sense organs under opticonditions. A periodic displacement of the ear-
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drum through a distance equal to the diameter of a hydrogen molecule may suffice to produce an audible sound, and a couple of quanta of light absorbed at the retina may suffice to arouse a faint visual sensation. Methods of measurement. Because it fluctuates, the threshold is difficult to measure, and the various methods that have been tried do not always yield the same value. The method of adjustment provides a rapid approximation; the observer is required to set the level of the stimulus so that it is just perceptible. The threshold may be defined as the average of several settings. In the method of limits, either the stimuli are presented in order of increasing magnitude until the observer reverses his response from "imperceptible" to "perceptible," or they are presented in order of decreasing magnitude until the observer reverses his response from "perceptible" to "imperceptible." The threshold may be defined as the average value that marks the reversal in response over several ascending and descending series. In the method of constant stimuli, fixed stimulus levels are presented several times, each in irregular order. The threshold may be defined as the stimulus value that is perceived on half the presentations. This value is interpolated from a plot relating the percentage of positive responses to the stimulus magnitude. The methods of adjustment, limits, and constant stimuli are known as the classical psychophysical methods because they have continued in widespread use ever since G. T. Fechner described them in his Elemente der Psychophysik (1860), the monumental work that marks the establishment of psychophysics, (Reviews of the classical methods are given by Urban 1908; Titchener 1905; and Boring 1942.) One of the difficulties inherent in these methods is the observer's awareness that a stimulus event actually takes place on each trial. When a "catch trial" (a feigned presentation of a stimulus) is given, observers will occasionally give an affirmative response (a "false alarm"). The knowledge that the observer's expectations and motivations come into play has stimulated the invention of new methods that offer the hope of better understanding and controlling the observer's response biases. An example is the forced choice method, in which at regular intervals a stimulus is presented or withheld and the observer must decide each time whether or not he detected it. Results obtained under this procedure reveal that detection may depend not only on the magnitude of the stimulus but also on the prearranged probability of a stimulus event. A high proportion of "no-stimulus" trials causes a relatively high incidence of "false alarms";
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a low proportion of "no-stimulus" trials, on the other hand, causes a lower incidence of correct detections of actual stimulus events. The probability of a "Yes" or "No" response can also be systematically influenced by rewarding correct detections and punishing the false alarms. The forced-choice experiments have done much to underscore and clarify the role of response variables in the measurement of thresholds. It is sometimes suggested that the "detection" model may actually do away with the conception of the threshold as a simple, determinable value marking the critical terminus of sensory experience. According to this view, the detection of a stimulus (the "signal") has much in common with the mathematical process of statistical decision. The observer is confronted with two distributions: that of the persistent background noise and that of the signal added to the noise. He decides from which of the two distributions a sample is taken in much the way that a statistician tests a statistical hypothesis. The decision will depend on the overlap of the distributions and also on the "pay-off matrix"—the consequences of false detections and failures of detection (see Swets 1964; Luce et al. 1963). Interesting technological advances have recently been made in the field of threshold measurement. The Bekesy audiometer, for example, uses the method of tracking for the efficient measurement of the just-audible intensity as a function of tonal frequency (Von Bekesy 1928-1958). The observer "tracks" his threshold by pressing a key whenever the tone is audible and releasing it whenever the tone becomes inaudible. While the key is pressed, the level of the tone steadily decreases; while the key is not pressed, the level steadily increases. The observer may continue to track the threshold while the tonal frequency changes from one end of the audible spectrum to the other. On a moving paper chart, the stimulus level, which weaves back and forth across the threshold, is recorded continuously as a function of the frequency. The tracking method has also been used to determine the visual thresholds of human observers and has been adapted to mapping the sensitivity functions of animals. Resolving power The second major concern of psychophysics is to measure the smallest detectable change in a stimulus (the so-called difference threshold*). The problem may be to measure the just-noticeable differences in intensity, e.g., in the brightness of a light or in the concentration of a sweet solution, or in quality, e.g., in the hue of a colored light.
The capacity for resolving stimulus differences is expressed in terms of the Weber fraction, AI/I, where AI stands for the increment that produces a just-noticeable change when added to the stimulus level I. The smaller the value of AJ, the keener is the ability to discriminate. Methods of measurement. Like the absolute threshold, the difference threshold is a fluctuating quantity, so that AI must be assessed by a statistical treatment of a series of measurements. Most of the methods used are versions of those used to measure absolute thresholds. In the method of adjustment, for example, the observer sets a comparison stimulus to match a standard fixed stimulus. The threshold, AI, may be defined as the average error or the standard deviation of several settings. The greater the variability of the settings, the grosser the discrimination and the larger the Weber fraction. A difference threshold may be regarded either as a measure of the precision or as a measure of the variability or "noisiness" of the sensory process. In the method of constant stimuli, the observer judges whether each of a set of fixed discrete stimulus levels appears greater or smaller than a standard stimulus (a judgment of "equal" is also permitted by some experimenters). The difference threshold may be defined as the difference between a standard stimulus and a comparison stimulus that is perceived as being greater (or smaller) than the standard stimulus on a certain percentage of the trials. This value can be interpolated from a poikilitic (scatter) function. In Figure 1 the ordinate represents the relative frequency with which the comparison stimulus is judged greater than the standard. The threshold, AI, is the difference between the stimulus magnitude that is perceived as being greater than the standard on 75 per cent of the trials (L) and the stimulus magnitude that is so perceived on 50 per cent of the trials (E), i.e., the stimulus that appears to match the standard stimulus. Often there is a small difference, called the time error, between the standard stimulus (S) and the stimulus value associated with the 50 per cent point. Urban (1908) provides a detailed discussion of poikilitic functions. The nature of the difference threshold has often been studied by the method of quantal increments. From time to time, a small increment, AI, is added briefly to a steady stimulus, I. The task is to indicate whether the increment was detected. Of theoretical concern is the mathematical form of the poikilitic function that relates the proportion of detections to the size of the increment. If the precision were ultimately limited by nothing but the
PSYCHOPHYSICS
48 STIMULUS MAGNITUDE (HYPOTHETICAL VALUES)
Figure 7 — A poikilitic (scatter) function determined by the method of constant stimuli
random "noisiness" of the sensory process, then the function would be expected to have the sigmoid shape (the integral of a bell-shaped distribution) that is predicted by the theory of random error. The usual result approximates this form. When pains are taken to aid the attention and to eliminate the extraneous sources of error, the obtained function may assume a linear rather than a sigmoid form and conform to a predictable slope. According to the neural-quantum hypothesis, a linear function of the appropriate slope demonstrates that discrimination is basically all-or-none and that sensation grows by the addition of minute but finite (or quantal) steps (see Von Bekesy 1928-1958; S. S. Stevens 1961; Luce et al. 1963; Swets 1964). Weber's law. A major aim in threshold measurement has been to test the famous generalization, credited to Ernst H. Weber but formalized and promoted by Fechner, that the Weber fraction is constant along a given sensory continuum, or that AI/I = k. In other words, a just-noticeable change should occur when a constant fractional increment is added to a stimulus of any magnitude. Under good conditions the increment is about 1 per cent for brightness, 2 per cent for loudness, and 20 per cent for saltiness. The sensory systems differ greatly in their resolving power, but for any °ne system it is the percentage change that matters most. On most continua Weber's law holds over a substantial portion of the stimulus range (for loud-
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ness and brightness over at least 99.9 per cent of the range), but the law fails near the absolute threshold, where discrimination is relatively gross. Nevertheless, Weber's law stands as one of the oldest and broadest empirical generalizations of psychophysics—psychology's "law of relativity," as one writer put it (S. S. Stevens 1951). Fechner's law. If discrimination has seemed to receive more than reasonable attention among students of the senses, the explanation is likely to be found in the significance that the founder of psychophysics attached to the subject. For Fechner, discrimination provided the key to the measurement of sensory magnitude. He began with the postulate that on a given sensory continuum all just-noticeable differences (fad) represent subjectively equal units. Subjective equality of jnds is a powerful (if questionable) assumption, because the integration of such units would provide a true scale of subjective magnitude. Since by Weber's law a jnd corresponds to a constant fractional increase in the stimulus, it follows that the number of jnds grows in an arithmetic series when the stimulus intensity grows in a geometric series. Fechner concluded, therefore, that the magnitude of sensation is a logarithmic function of the stimulus. The logarithmic function implies that equal ratios of stimulus magnitude give rise to equal differences in subjective magnitude. Plateau's power function. In contrast to the indirectness of the Fechnerian approach to the measurement of sensory magnitudes was an early experiment by the Belgian physicist Joseph A. F. Plateau, who asked a group of artists each to paint a gray that seemed to lie midway between a white sample and a gray sample (a version of a scaling method later termed equisection}. Of historical interest is Plateau's conclusion that sensation grows as a power function rather than a logarithmic function of the stimulus. But the power function was subsequently given up by Plateau and virtually forgotten until the 1950s. With new techniques for the direct assessment of sensory magnitude, it was shown that Plateau's early conjecture about the form of the psychophysical function happened to be correct. The current approach to the problem is generally to regard as separate properties the resolving capacity of the sensory system and the functional dependence of sensory magnitude on the stimulus. The static invariances of sensory systems A third major problem of psychophysics is to determine those arrangements of stimuli that produce responses that are equivalent in some respect.
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PSYCHOPHYSICS
The goal of this kind of measurement is to specify all the energy configurations in the environment that produce an invariant or equivalent sensory response. For example, the goal may be to determine the combinations of intensity and duration of a flash target that produce the same apparent brightness. The level or the duration of a comparison flash is adjusted to match the brightness of a standard flash of fixed intensity and duration. The judgment requires a degree of abstraction because the task is to match for brightness without regard to a difference in apparent duration. A plot relating the duration and intensity that produce a constant (standard) brightness provides an example of an equal sensation function. Usually it is desirable to map the family of these equal sensation functions for a pair of parameters. In the present example this means that a function is obtained for each of a set of representative standard brightnesses along the brightness continuum. We learn from this family that, up to a critical duration (roughly 150 milliseconds), a decrease in the stimulus level can be offset by lengthening the flash. Moreover, the critical duration gets systematically shorter as the brightness is increased. Measurement of the static invariances is common in psychophysics. Examples include the equal brightness functions relating energy and wavelength, the equal loudness functions relating sound pressure and tonal frequency, the equal pitch functions relating frequency and sound pressure (within limits, the apparent pitch of a tone can be altered by a change in sound pressure level), and the equal hue functions relating wavelength and light intensity. (The change in hue when intensity is altered has long been known as the Bezold-Briicke phenomenon.) The measurement of invariance may call for complete equivalence. An example is the concept of metamerism in color vision. The measurement of metameric pairs (sample lights of identical appearance but different wavelength compositions) has made it possible to state the laws of color mixtures and to predict the color of a sample of any spectral composition. Methods of measurement. Because of its speed and immediacy, the method of adjustment usually recommends itself for the mapping of equivalents. Other usable procedures, however, include constant stimuli, limits, and tracking. The measurement of equivalence is straightforward in principle, but any procedure is usually beset by constant errors, such as the "time error" (see Figure 1).
Dynamic properties of sensory systems It is one thing to know the stimulus conditions that produce an invariant sensory effect and another thing to know how much larger one sensory effect is than another—e.g., how much brighter one luminance level appears than another or how much two tones seem to differ in pitch. A major problem of psychophysics is to learn how much the magnitude of the sensory response grows when the stimulus intensity increases. The direct scaling methods. In the 1930s it became apparent to students of hearing that the logarithmic function fails to agree with the reports of observers who are asked to judge the relative loudness of stimuli. Attempts were made to measure the loudness function by a variety of direct methods. Subsequently, the direct methods were expanded and refined and finally applied to the study of all the major sensory continua. The main feature of the direct methods is the attempt to match segments of the number continuum directly to segments of the sensory continuum. In the method of magnitude estimation, various fixed levels of the stimulus are presented one by one in irregular order, and the observer attempts to assign numbers to these levels in proportion to their subjective magnitude. The inverse of this procedure is magnitude production: a set of numbers is called out one by one to the observer, who adjusts the level of the stimulus so as to produce subjective magnitudes that are proportional to the numbers. In ratio production, a comparison stimulus is adjusted to appear in some fractional or multiplicative relation to a standard stimulus, and in ratio estimation, the observer estimates numerically the apparent ratio that corresponds to a pair of stimulus magnitudes. Variations on these procedures are numerous (S. S. Stevens 1958). Two classes of continua. For a few continua, of which pitch is a noteworthy example, a scale of integrated jnds turns out to agree well with direct judgment. S. S. Stevens (1957) called these continua metathetic and distinguished them from the large class of prothetic continua on all of which the jnd does not afford a constant unit of subjective magnitude. (Table 1 provides a partial list of prothetic continua.) The psychophysical power functions. S. S. Stevens has also proposed a general psychophysical relation pertaining to all prothetic continua (1957). Equal stimulus ratios are held to correspond to equal sensation ratios (rather than to equal sensation differences, as Fechner had conjectured). In
PSYCHOPHYSICS other words, the apparent magnitude i|/ grows as a power function of the stimulus magnitude, or j, = &£, where k is a constant of proportionality and ft is the exponent. The size of ft varies from one continuum to another. In Figure 2A are plotted the power functions in linear coordinates for three continua: apparent length (ft = 1), brightness (ft - 0.33), and the apparent intensity of an electric current passed through the fingers (/3 = 3.5). When plotted in log-log coordinates, as in Figure 2B, these same functions become straight lines whose slopes equal the values of the exponents. This is true because the logarithmic form of the power function is log i// = log k + (3 log <£. Table 1 shows that the size of the exponent may depend not only on the sense organ stimulated but also on the conditions of the stimulation. Note the difference between the monaural and the binaural loudness functions and the exponent's dependence on frequency for vibration magnitude. Although the simple equation »// = k^ holds for large stimulus values, in the neighborhood of the absolute threshold a more precise form is needed. The power equation can be written as i|/ = k (4> — 4>(i ) /3 , where 00 approximates the absolute threshold. The
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(A) Linear coordinates
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
STIMULUS MAGNITUDE (ARBITRARY UNITS)
(B) Log—log coordinates
100 LJJ
§
50
^ to 'in Z Ot
I)
10
-fe7
Table 1 — Representative exponents of the power functions relating
psychological
magnitude
to
stimulus magnitude on prothetic continua Continuum Loudness Loudness Brightness Brightness Lightness Smell Smell Taste Taste Taste Temperature Temperature Vibration Vibration Duration Repetition rate Finger span Pressure on palm Heaviness F °rce of handgrip Vocal effort Electric shock Tactual roughness Actual hardness Viscosity Visual velocity Vl 'sual length V 'sual area
Exponent 0.6
0.54 0.33 0.5 1.2
0.55 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.5
0.95 0.6 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.1
1.45 1.7 1.1 3.5 1.5 0.8 0.5
1.2 1.0 0.7
Stimulus condition binaural monaural 5° target—dark-adapted eye point source—dark-adapted eye reflectance of gray papers coffee odor heptane saccharine sucrose salt cold—on arm warmth—on arm 60 cps—on finger 250 cps—on finger white-noise stimulus light, sound, touch, and shocks thickness of wood blocks static force on skin lifted weights precision hand dynamometer sound pressure of vocalization 60 cps—through fingers felt diameter of emery grits rubber squeezed between fingers stirring silicone fluids moving spot of light projected line of light projected square of light Source: Adapted from S. S. Stevens 1957.
o< i u CO
•—
CM co
o o o o CN co
«->
STIMULUS MAGNITUDE (ARBITRARY UNITS) Figure 2 — The power
function
for
three
prothetic
continua plotted in (A) linear coordinates and (B) log-log coordinates Source: S. S. Stevens 1957.
correction for threshold brings into coincidence the zero of the stimulus scale and the zero of the sensation scale (Luce et al. 1963). The properties of sensory systems may reveal themselves as parametric shifts in the values of <j>, k, and ft. The changes in visual sensitivity that occur under light adaptation provide an example (Stevens & Stevens 1963). Light adaptation causes (1) an elevation in the absolute threshold (i.e., 00 increases), (2) an increase in the luminance necessary to produce a given subjective brightness (i.e., k decreases), and (3) a slight increase in the exponent ft. The mapping of these parametric changes has made it possible to write the power
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PSYCHOSIS
function that pertains to any given level of adaptation and consequently to predict the subjective brightness produced by any luminance level when viewed by an eye adapted to any other luminance level. Cross-modality validations. A method has been devised that circumvents the need for the observer to make numerical estimates of his sensation but leads to the same psychophysical power function (see S. S. Stevens 1961; and Luce et al. 1963). In cross-modality matching the task is to make the sensations in two different sense modalities appear equal in strength. The pairs of physical intensities that produce equal apparent intensities can be plotted as an equal sensation function. It turns out that the equal sensation function relating any two prothetic continua a and b is itself a power function of the form d>it = hty, where ( , and <£h stand for physical intensity. The size of the exponent y depends on which two continua are matched. Within the experimental error, y is predictable from the psychophysical function governing the two continua. Given that i|//( = ffi and «//,, = £ (with suitable units of measurement), and given that i//a = i///,, the equation of the equal sensation function becomes (^ = ffi/01. The exponent y thus turns out to be the ratio of the exponents a and (3. Any continuum could be substituted for the number continuum and used as a "yardstick" to measure sensory magnitudes on all of the other sensory continua. In one set of experiments, for example, force of handgrip as registered on a dynamometer was used to assess subjective magnitudes on nine other prothetic continua (S. S. Stevens 1961). Many other examples could be cited to show that the psychophysical power law is able to predict both the form and the exponent of the equal sensation function obtained by cross-modality matching. JOSEPH C. STEVENS [See also SCALING. Other relevant material may be found in ATTENTION; HEARING; INFORMATION THEORY; PAIN; SENSES; SKIN SENSES AND KINESTHESIS; TASTE AND SMELL; VISION; and in the biographies of FECHNER; HELMHOLTZ; TITCHENER; WEBER, ERNST HEINRICH; WUNDT. Statistical techniques applicable to psychophysical methods are described in QUANTAL RESPONSE.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY BORING, EDWIN G. 1942 Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology. New York: Appleton. FECHNER, GUSTAV T. (1860) 1907 Elemente der Psychophysik. 3d ed. 2 vols. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Hartel.
LUCE, R. DUNCAN; BUSH, ROBERT R.; and GALANTER, EUGENE (editors) 1963 Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. Volume 1. New York: Wiley. PIERON, HENRI (1945) 1952 The Sensations: Their Functions, Processes, and Mechanisms. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; London: Miiller. -> First published as Aux sources de la connaissance: La sensation, guide de vie. STEVENS, J. C.; and STEVENS, S. S. 1963 Brightness Function: Effects of Adaptation. Journal of the Optical Society of America 53:375-385. STEVENS, S. S. (editor) 1951 Handbook of Experimental Psychology. New York: Wiley. STEVENS, S. S. 1957 On the Psychophysical Law. Psychological Review 64:153-181. STEVENS, S. S. 1958 Problems and Methods of Psychophysics. Psychological Bulletin 55:177-196. STEVENS, S. S. 1961 To Honor Fechner and Repeal His Law. Science 133:80-86. STEVENS, S. S. 1966 A Metric for the Social Consensus. Science 151:530-541. STEVENS, S. S.; and GALANTER, EUGENE 1957 Ratio Scales and Category Scales for a Dozen Perceptual Continua. Journal of Experimental Psychology 54: 377-411. SWETS, JOHN A. (editor) 1964 Signal Detection and Recognition by Human Observers: Contemporary Readings. New York: Wiley. SYMPOSIUM ON PRINCIPLES OF SENSORY COMMUNICATION, ENDICOTT HOUSE, 2959 1961 Sensory Communication: Contributions. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. TITCHENER. EDWARD B. 1905 Experimental Psychology: A Manual of Laboratory Practice. Volume 2: Quantitative Experiments. London and New York: Macmillan. URBAN. FRIEDRICH M. 1908 The Application of Statistical Methods to the Problems of Psychophysics. Philadelphia: Psychological Clinic Press. VON BEKESY, GEORG (1928-1958) 1960 Experiments in Hearing. New York: McGraw-Hill.
PSYCHOSIS It is a generally accepted statistic that about half of all the hospital beds in the United States are occupied by psychiatric patients. Since neurotics are rarely hospitalized, one can define the public health aspect of the problem of the psychoses simply by saying that psychotics occupy about half the beds of the nation on any given day. Approximately half of these beds again are occupied by people diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, the major so-called functional psychosis. The majority of the remaining psychiatric beds are occupied by those with a variety of organic psychoses, predominantly aged people suffering from senile or arteriosclerotic psychoses. From the standpoint of the numerical significance of the problem alone, psychoses merit major interest. If one keeps in mind that schizophrenics are likely to become incapacitated early in life, with the mean onset occurring between 20 and 30 years of age, the
PSYCHOSIS problem gains in importance. Although the average length of hospitalization of psychiatric patients decreased by 10 per cent between 1954 and 1964, the number of admissions per year nearly doubled during that period. Statistics, of course, are only a small part of the problem. They do not tell about the immense human suffering involved in psychoses, nor do they picture the fascination which the topic has aroused from time immemorial. By and large, the term "psychosis" is used as an equivalent of "a major psychiatric disorder," with all the limitations of any such generalization. It has been equated with being possessed by spirits or by the devil, as well as, on the other hand, being revered as a manifestation of divinity. It is also often referred to as "craziness" and is considered by many as a profound revelation of all that goes on in the deep recesses of the human mind. The fact is that most American clinicians today do not consider a person suffering from a psychosis (a psychotic) to be basically or qualitatively different from so-called normal people. These psychotics may be quantitatively different. They presumably are less able to keep the "deeper" layers of their minds (the primary process) from showing in their daily activities; in some ways, then, they may be more profoundly human. If one would make a tentative and very limited attempt at denning psychosis, one would have to say it refers to a major psychiatric disorder, one aspect of which is usually some obvious conflict with reality, or a difference from the way a majority of the population perceives reality, or a difference from the expected cultural norms concerning behavior. In the first place, this definition alone makes quite clear that there are areas for disagreement. Not everyone showing such difference or conflict is psychotic. Furthermore, not all people considered psychotic by specialists are necessarily manifestly disturbed in the ways mentioned— either in those actions which are to their own detriment or in those detrimental to society. During most of their lives they may show no obvious sign °f any major disorder at all. It may either erupt suddenly or make itself felt only latently and subtly, or be disguised in culturally acceptable forms, such as religious or political fanaticism. The fact that abnormal behavior of psychotics involves social and cultural norms makes it quite obvious that psychoses are an appropriate concern °f such social sciences as sociology, cultural anthropology, and social psychology, and also of allied fields such as jurisprudence and criminology, is more, psychotic manifestations are also
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clearly influenced by cultural factors. This holds true not only for different cultures and subcultures but also for temporal changes—for example, within Western culture. What used to be thought possession by the devil has become paranoid ideation involving electric influencing machines, radio, television, radar, or electronic snooping devices. The etiology of psychoses also spans the physical sciences and the social sciences, and there has been much argument over the primacy of organic or "functional" (often equated with psychogenic) causes of psychoses. The American Psychiatric Association (1952) categorizes psychotic disorders as follows: Involutional psychotic reaction Affective reactions: manic—depressive reactions (manic type, depressed type, other), psychotic depressive reaction Schizophrenic reactions: simple type, hebephrenic type, catatonic type, paranoid type, acute undifferentiated type, chronic undifferentiated type, schizo-affective type, childhood type, residual type Paranoid reactions: paranoia, paranoid state Diagnosis and definition Psychiatry does not abound in operational definitions, and the term "psychosis," unfortunately, provides no exception. Definition and diagnosis are often closely related in medicine. Therefore, we can say that traditionally and clinically, a patient was diagnosed as psychotic by some simple clinical rules of thumb—if there was a disturbance in orientation regarding time, place, and person; if affect was not appropriate; if the thought processes were found not to be intact (not coherent, relevant, and connected); if the memory of recent or past events was disturbed; if the behavior was inappropriate or obviously influenced by delusions and hallucinations. This definition includes, of course, both organic and "functional" psychoses. With regard to these terms, there are some more subtle problems of definition, for there are traditionally two basic schools of thought: (1) that psychotics are qualitatively different from nonpsychotic people; this concept is held primarily by those who see schizophrenia or other "functional" psychoses as diseases with a clear-cut somatic matrix; (2) that psychotics in general, and schizophrenics in particular, are only quantitatively different from nonpsychotic normal personalities. Adolf Meyer, pioneering the concept of psychobiology, formulated the concept of psychotic reaction types in keeping with the idea that psychoses are a variation of ordinary "reaction types." Most of all, the psychoanalytic
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school of thought comprises psychoses within its general theory of personality. Neither school of thought necessarily excludes organic etiologic factors. Certainly, black-and-white thinking about the concepts "organic" and "functional" seems to be outdated, although the journals hardly reflect this fact. Furthermore, one of the difficulties with the classical scheme of static classification of psychoses is the fact that so many labels are obviously artificial. For, to the chagrin of clinicians, patients often do not seem content to stay in an assigned group, and not only overlap symptomatologically but tend to behave in such a way as to lead clinicians to change their diagnosis of manic—depressive psychosis to schizophrenia, and occasionally vice versa. What is more, diagnoses such as puerperal psychoses, involutional psychoses, arteriosclerotic and senile psychoses often are hardly more than superficial labels. In many patients labeled "psychoses with arteriosclerosis," one is hard put to find evidence of arteriosclerosis, or at least more arteriosclerosis than is found in people of the same age group who are not so diagnosed in vivo or post mortem. In many of these patients, symptoms, character traits, and fragile defenses seem to have been present long before pregnancy, involution, or old age; and the best one can surmise is that the advent of any of these events— hormonal changes, psychological trauma, decreased oxygenation due to an aged circulatory system, decreased social usefulness and esteem— has finally either added the necessary strain or has decreased the integrative capacity, thus producing the change from the latent to the manifest disorder. [See AGING, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.] A useful definition—and theory—of psychosis has to accommodate all these observed clinical facts and allow for forces of primarily somatic and primarily experiential factors to play their roles singly and in combination, on different levels of interaction: molecularly as well as grossly (for instance, in the case of bacterial or physical trauma), psychologically as well as sociologically and anthropologically. In my own thinking, it appears that a unified theory of psychosis can be formulated that integrates the organic and the experiential vantage points and offers many advantages. The conceptual framework, as suggested before, would be that of psychoanalytic ego psychology. The manifestation of any psychosis with any etiology could then be described and understood in terms of changes in ego functioning within a given cultural setting. For this purpose, psychosis is seen
as a behavioral syndrome, not a single disease. The somewhat variable symptoms generally associated with this diagnostic label must be understood as the final common path of a number of conditions which may lead to, and manifest themselves in, a severe disturbance of the ego. These conditions may range from a relatively purely psychogenic (experiential) weakness of the ego to afflictions of ego functioning caused by disturbances brought about by infections, by arteriosclerotic, enzymatic, or toxic states, or by traumatic, constitutional, or genetic factors: in short, by any number of chemogenic, histogenic, genogenic, sociogenic, or psychogenic factors, or by any combination thereof. While an outstanding somatic factor may be present, usually this must be accompanied by some psychological predisposition (in terms of ego patterns) to produce the psychotic picture. Conversely, certain somatic factors are probably secondarily brought about by the psychogenic etiology of psychosis, at least for those cases of early onset and severe outcome. In brief, the multiple-factor, psychosomatic theory of psychoses permits one to understand psychosis as the common result of a variety of individually differing etiologic factors. It enables one to make a prognosis on the basis of a careful study of the specific etiology involved in a specific case, and permits optimal therapeutic control of the highly individual constellation of forces resulting in the manifestly common path of the syndrome, by directly or indirectly, somatically, psychologically, or environmentally, producing better ego functioning. Patterns of ego functions and disturbances. Psychoanalytic theory is predicated upon propositions concerned with the dynamic interaction of environmental and organismic (maturational and congenital) forces with learned responses. Character and personality can thus be understood as patterns of compromise, as resultants of a field of diverse forces. Ego functioning, more specifically, must be described in terms of its pattern: While it may be rather uneven—one ego function may be "better" than another—and the blend ultimately unique, each given pattern may be classified roughly under diagnostic or descriptive headings. Inasmuch as assessments of the degree of functioning are involved in descriptions of patterns of ego functioning, quantitative assumptions cannot be avoided. Psychoanalytic theory includes many quantitative statements, as might be expected in a theory in which concepts of force and economy play leading roles. The entire concept of libidinal cathexis in object relations and internal representations is, of course, a basically quantitative one.
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Table I — Ego functions and their disturbances EGO FUNCTIONS Relation to reality A. Adaptation to reality a. Differentiation of figure and ground b. Role playing c. Spontaneity and creativeness; regression in the service of
the ego B. Reality testing a. Accuracy of perception b. Soundness of judgment c. Orientation in time, place, person C. Sense of reality a. Good "self boundaries" b. Unobtrusiveness of ordinary functioning
2. Regulation and control of drives a. Ability to engage in detour behavior b. Frustration tolerance (neutralization of drive energy) c. Anxiety tolerance d. Integrated motility e. Tolerance of ambiguity f. Sublimation
DISTURBANCES 1. Disturbances in relation to reality A. Disturbances in adaptive capacity a. Inappropriate behavior with subjective or objective difficulties b. Inability to cope with deviations in normal routine c. Failure in social adaptation; rigidity B. Disturbance in reality testing a. Projection, rationalization, denial and the distortion of reality by hallucinations and delusions C. Disturbances in sense of reality a. Feelings of estrangement and lack of spontaneity b. Excessive feelings of deja vu c. Oneirophrenia d. Cosmic delusions e. Confused body images f. Intrusion of self as subject or object g. Physiological manifestations 2. Disturbances in drive control a. Conduct and habit disorders (temper tantrums, nail-biting, etc.) b. Accident proneness c. Excessive impulsivity • d. Tension states e. Catatonic and manic excitement f. Psychomotor slow-up of catatonia and depression g. Lack of or incomplete acquisition of control of excretory functions h. Physiological manifestations
3. Object relations a. Capacity to form satisfactory object relations b. Object constancy
3. Disturbances in object relations a. Psychotoxic and psychic deficiency diseases (in infancy) b. Narcissism, autism c. Symbiotic relationships d. Anaclitic relationships e. Hypercathexis of the self; ambivalence, fear of incorporation, sado-masochism
4. Thought processes a. Selective scanning b. Ability to avoid contamination by inappropriate material or drives c. Good memory d. Sustained ability to concentrate e. Abstracting ability
4. Disturbances in thought processes a. Thinking organized and compelled by drives b. Preoccupation with instinctual aims c. Autistic logic d. Loose and "nonsensical" types of associative links e. Distortion of reality f. Lack of referents in time and place, anthropomorphism, concretism, symbolism, syncretism, etc. g. Magic thinking
5. Defensive functions a. Repression (as a barrier against external and internal stimuli) b. Sublimation, reaction formation c. Projection d. Denial, withdrawal, and other defenses
5. Disturbances in defensive functions a. Emergence of primary thought process b. Overreaction to stimuli c. Deja vu experiences d. Lack of drive control e. Frightening hypnagogue phenomena f. Increase in parapraxes g. impairment in emotional control
6. Autonomous functions a. Perception b. Intention c. Intelligence d. Thinking e. Language f- Productivity g. Motor development
6. Disturbance in autonomous functions a. Corresponding impairment of these ego functions
' • Synthetic functions a - To unite, organize, bind, and create—the ego's ability to form gestalten b. Neutralization c. Sublimation d. Somatic "homeostasis"
7. Disturbances in synthetic functions a. Tendency to dissociation b. Inability to tolerate change or trauma c. Inability to "bind" psychic energy Source: Adapted from Bellak 1958, pp. 7-8.
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PSYCHOSIS
However, psychoanalysts generally have not addressed themselves to attempts at precise quantification. It should be possible, though, to adapt the experimental methods of measurement to psychoanalytic variables. Meaningful methods of measuring ego strength are possible if ego strength is defined as "the totality of the ego's capacity to perform its many functions." Each individual ego function could be quantitatively assayed, given a weighted score, and combined into a total score, much as the IQ is arrived at in the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Test. Also, ego strength must be viewed globally, very much like Wechsler's view of intelligence (1939). The ego cannot be conceptualized as a perfect sphere, of course, with each area of ego functioning constituting a radius, nor can it even be compared in this context to the segments of an orange. The image that suggests itself is that of an uneven raspberry on which each surface point constitutes the terminus of one of the many ego functions. Furthermore, this protean raspberry might be made of stretchable rubber which would change its shape developmentally and would be subject to momentary and daily variations. Table 1 presents some important groups of ego functions and disturbances. Multiple-factor theory. The concept of psychoses as disorders that have many different etiologies but share a final common path of ego disturbance leads quite logically to the concept that the diagnosis of psychosis at present can best be made on the basis of the degree of ego disturbance in a given patient. It also follows that the degree of ego disturbance that we are willing to call psychosis is based on rather arbitrary decisions. As mentioned, there are variations of ego functioning in every person—that is, healthy people exhibit certain ego functions which are of a very high quality and others which are less so. It is probably true that a surprising number of ego disturbances, sometimes of considerable severity, appear in a large number of people who are generally considered normal statistically and in terms of lifelong functioning. These are still "normal" people, however, by virtue of the fact that the ego disturbance occurs in a relatively small segment of their personality or one which, in their particular setting, does not crucially interfere with functioning. A fear of deep water, for instance, is not likely to be a vital disturbance in an inland state such as Kansas. Obviously, forms and expectations of ego functions will vary culturally. Also, one may find, on taking a careful life history, that there was some episode in ego disturb-
ance at a certain age which, although fairly severe, was self-limited and had no further consequence. Chance is involved in such matters: a marked disturbance in military service may become a matter of troubling public record and later secondary pathology; some private disturbance may forever remain unknown and become a subject of amnesia. Under certain conditions, e.g., those of extreme deprivation, some delusions or hallucinations (of food, water, companions) must be considered virtually as adaptive functions of the ego which usually promptly disappear when the emergency does; they may in fact have definite survival value during the emergency: for example, they may bolster the person with the irrational feeling that a special deity is guarding him and with the certainty that all will be well. Then there are, of course, a wide variety of neurotic ego disturbances that must be considered. All these facts will serve to highlight further the difficulties in forming a diagnosis of psychosis on the basis of one specific syndrome. It is to be remembered that from a theoretical viewpoint we postulate that psychosis is not one condition, not one point on a continuum of ego strength, but a range along a continuum: within a group diagnosed as psychotic one could classify those who are sicker and less sick, patients with more and less over-all ego strength (also varying ego strength in different areas at different times). In this sense ego functioning not only must be seen as a quantitative proposition but also must be viewed as greater or lesser in different areas at different times. It is useful to remember that, in essence, the diagnosis of psychosis is a phenomenological diagnosis predicated upon the observable failure of ego functions (including reported ones, of course), rather than upon assumptions concerning dynamic structure or other criteria. The diagnostic continuum. Psychosis can be conceptualized as ranging at the low end of the continuum of ego strength, while normality covers a range at the other end. Presumably, schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, obsessive—compulsive neurosis, severe character disorders, phobias, anxiety hysterias and neuroses, and hysterias lie approximately in that order, reading from left to right, between these two points. Figure 1 depicts this continuum. However, this traditional viewpoint is of limited value, since each of these conditions is characterized only by a symptom picture that expresses a single outstanding defensive compromise formation. There can be no question that a severe hysteria may involve a weaker ego and may
PSYCHOSIS Manic—Depressive Psychoses
Schizophrenias
Normality Neuroses, Character disorders, and so on
Figure 1 — A schematic representation of the diagnostic continuum (oversimplified and with no quantitative implications)
be a condition relatively closer to a psychosis (schizophrenia) than to a mild obsessive-compulsive disorder or a circumscribed phobia. A psychosis may sometimes be difficult to diagnose in its early stages because the clinical picture may involve a vast variety of patterns of ego functioning. These might, of course, also be present in neurosis, circumscribed neurological disorders, character disorders, psychopathic (sociopathic) personalities, perversions, and other disorders, and the psychosis may overlap with them. It is not the intention here to discuss in detail the clinical problems of differential diagnosis but, rather, to attempt a conceptual clarification: the clinical diagnosis of early psychosis must be predicated upon the judgment that the degree of ego disturbance is so severe and the defenses so pathological that one may expect the development of a full-blown psychosis if there is no skilled intervention. Just as there are many varieties of full-blown psychoses, so there are many forms of early psychotic symptomatology. Sociopathic irresponsibility is indicative of poor integration of the superego and poor frustration tolerance; poor reality testing and poor object relations (by the ego) may occur in a person previously conscientious, polite, and kind to children and animals. Thus tabloids frequently print lurid accounts of choir-member offspring of pillars of the community who, apparently, suddenly become psychotic and commit criminal acts. Yet it is quite possible that signs of disturbance had been present for a long time. Seclusiveftess, as well as sudden extreme "extroversion," may i De a first indication of a psychotic break. Lability °r mood often signifies impaired control. Nor are the specific manifestations of ego disturbance the only prodromal signs of psychosis: the prepsychotic personality may be sociopathic, lr ifantile (little control, many pregenital drives), brilliantly high-strung (artistic or intellectual a chievement at the cost of other development), Xcessively religious (i.e., a reaction formation to Poorly controlled hostility), dull and apathetic (bea use of early disturbance of autonomous functions J
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and object relations), or have poor achievement (because of preoccupation with fantasies, etc.), despite high intelligence. A good account of the great variety of lull-blown psychoses has yet to be written. I n essence, one psychotic may differ almost as much from another as any individual may differ from another. There are those who never progressed, and those who regressed from the highest levels of achievement; those who are obviously bizarre and hard to empathize with, and those w7hom one is likely to consider less disturbed than they actually are because of a good facade. Some psychotics are very kind; others are cold and sadistic. Some are very productive and sensitive; others are seemingly without drive or ability. Psychotics have been unjustly downgraded and romantically overestimated as artists, intellectuals, or, as some would have it, revolutionaries whom society of necessity secludes. It is easier to be categorical about psychotics if one does not have too much understanding and knowledge of them. Differential diagnostic concepts. In the diagnosis of psychosis a number of diagnostic labels of secondary order are frequently used, sometimes in unclear and confusing ways. Borderline psychosis. Borderline psychosis can be quite accurately defined as a condition of ego strength and personality functioning which lies on the continuum between a psychotic and a neurotic condition. In an appraisal of the ego strength of such a patient, one finds that thinking, affective control, perceptual reliability, and object relations are all of questionable soundness without being quite disturbed enough to merit the diagnosis of psychosis. The diagnosis of borderline psychosis is indicated if the condition described refers to an apparently stable condition of functioning, perhaps even a lifelong one, without signs of progressive deterioration. In that sense, "borderline" is identical with the term psychotic character, and it relates to a character formation with many unfortunate defensive traits that are likely to make a person appear quite peculiar (even though he may often be quite brilliant and useful in isolated areas) without his ever developing a frank psychosis. Incipient psychosis. If the picture of dubious functioning described as borderline psychosis is present and is accompanied by signs of increasing lability of mood, progressive inability to control impulses, increasing emergence of the primary process, and increasing crumbling of defenses, with dejd vu experiences, feelings of unreality, impaired sleep, impaired appetite, and a rising anxiety level,
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then we are dealing with incipient psychosis, and steps must be taken to avoid its further progress. This discussion implies quite clearly that in diagnosis it is important to judge not only the nature of functioning and the quality of the defense patterns but also the stability of the defensive patterns. Clinical experience permits little doubt that many people arrive at certain character formations— more or less pathological or normal—which they maintain all their lives. Not only do some people remain "borderline" all their lives, but some psychotics remain stabilized at certain levels of illness and do not regress further; others do regress. Some psychotics have four, five, or more episodes during their lives which always take the same form and which then show spontaneous remission. And some people have character peculiarities—psychotic or otherwise—which are lifelong, without any progression or regression of note. Clinical experience suggests the hypothesis that each person has a certain amount of ego strength—or, more specifically, strength of the synthetic functions of the ego—and this very often involves the stabilizing at a certain level of pathology, below which a person does not go under ordinary or possibly even extraordinary life circumstances. Potential psychosis. Potential psychosis seems a useful diagnosis if one can observe poor ego functioning together with defenses that could eventually lead to a psychosis. That is. one might note the same symptoms that occur in borderline conditions, but accompanied by less stability in the defensive pattern. In the potential psychotic one may note previous episodes of increasing precariousness of balance between drive and defense, with outstanding defenses of denial and projection, and signs of loss of perceptual and motor control. In other words, the diagnosis "potential psychosis" may be useful to connote a condition ranging between "borderline" and "incipient," that is, more labile than the former and less labile than the latter. Latent psychosis. The designation "latent psychosis" might be employed when there is evidence of an existing psychosis which is, for practical purposes, covered up most of the time: i.e., in psychotherapy one might see that somebody is usually under the influence of primary process thinking and constantly beset by severe distortions of reality, but he manages to keep all these problems private by the use of intelligence and clever rationalizations. Such a person requires a favorable environment in order to continue to appear manifestly normal. Usually a forced change in environment or a change in living circumstances will suddenly disrupt the delicate arrangement; the pa-
tient will then surprise the world with the emergence of full-blown delusions of obviously long standing. The concept of latency thus refers in essence to the social impression which this individual makes. This nonpsychotic impression may also prevail in an ordinary clinical examination if the patient feels uncooperative, but it is extremely likely to appear in projective and other diagnostic testing, and in prolonged psychoanalytic interviews. Therapy and prevention The problem of a systematic and effective therapy for the psychoses is, of course, related to the matter of etiology: one usually wants to affect the causes of a disturbance. Since there is no general agreement on the causes of the "functional" psychoses and even very little on the etiology or pathogenesis of the organic psychoses, e.g., the so-called arteriosclerotic or senile psychoses, there is not much consensus about therapy for any of them. If one accepts the proposition that there are multiple etiologies, it follows that one must attempt to treat each patient as much as possible within the individual constellation of causative factors. A few therapies enjoy particularly widespread usage. Of the "shock treatments," insulin therapy has lost the importance it had in the decade after World War n, but it is still used in some cases of schizophrenia. Its relative expense in terms of personnel and the need for considerable experience essential for its use are responsible in part for its decline. Electroshock therapy, or, as it is more often called, ECT (for electroconvulsive therapy), at first replaced insulin treatment to a large extent both for schizophrenia and, especially, for depressions. In turn, it lost popularity with the development of psychotropic drugs in the 1950s. By 1965 the tide seemed to have turned to a certain extent. The antidepressants, for instance, have not proved miracle drugs after all, although undoubtedly they are often clinically useful (Cole 1964). ECT has been greatly refined by use of intravenous anesthetics and muscle-relaxing drugs, obviating the panic some patients felt and the danger of fractures. [See ELECTROCONVULSIVE SHOCK; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article On SOMATIC TREATMENT.]
The psychotropic drugs were the most important therapeutic modality in the mid-1960s. Popularly, the "tranquilizers" are most widely known and, among them, especially the phenothiazines. There is little question that the psychotropic drugs have changed much of psychiatric practice, for they often decrease or remove psychotic symptoms, make disturbed patients behave without violence, and decrease panic, delusions, and hallucinations-
PSYCHOSIS Thus, state hospital stays have been decreased, rehabilitation is markedly helped, and hospitalization in general hospitals is made possible. Nevertheless, the psychotropic drugs are by no means curative, nor is their over-all effectiveness proved beyond doubt or the mode of their beneficial effect agreed upon. Empirically, however, they seem to create at least the conditions in which other therapy, spontaneous improvement, or at least socially acceptable behavior is possible for many psychotics who could not profit similarly without them. As in all therapy, controlling variables other than the therapeutic agents, providing comparable groups of patients, and ruling out the effect of time alone are very difficult. The most promising development might well be Chassan's development of the intensive design (Chassan & Bellak 1966). [See DRUGS, article on PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY.] Social aspects of therapy have found their expression especially in community psychiatry (Bellak 1964). Keeping the patient close to home and providing early treatment in community clinics and follow-up in the community after a rather prompt hospital discharge play a marked role. Rehabilitation programs, as well as group therapy and familycentered therapy, play an often-constructive role. The psychotherapy of psychoses plays more of a role for the extramural patient, if for no other reason than that the large state hospitals still rarely have enough staff for it. In clinic and private office practice, however, it often leads to empirically satisfying results. The adjunct treatment, by drugs, milieu therapy, and other measures, is becoming more popular. For some of the organic psychoses, such as acute alcohol psychoses, there are specific, somatic treatment forms. It is difficult to generalize about the effectiveness of treatment of psychoses as a group. In the case of an acute schizophrenic or depressive psychosis, it is not unusual today that as high as 80 per cent °f all first admissions to a therapeutically active hospital may be discharged within 30 days. On the other hand, for about 7 per cent of all schizophrenics, the length of hospitalization still remains 20 years. Primary prevention in the public health sense is closely related to concepts of etiology. Since even most geneticists admit the significance of environmental factors at least for the manifestation °f latent liabilities, and hardly anybody doubts the effect of experiential factors, a great deal more c °uld be done for prevention of psychoses by public education, psychiatric well-baby clinics, and, where
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need be, legislation concerning the disposition of children with unsuitable parents, or whose parents are divorced or otherwise separated. Secondary prevention, by early treatment of incipient disturbances, is making progress by virtue of greater federal and state investment in community mental health. Similarly, tertiary prevention (of chronicity) by rehabilitation is in the process of development. Social and legal aspects As long as psychotics were considered to suffer from a disease, they were usually studied as individuals in isolation, as it were. With an increasing awareness of the importance of interpersonal relationships, both the genesis and the cause of psychosis in relation to social interaction have attained more importance. Also, the ward setting and its effect on psychoses have been described by Stanton and Schwartz (1954), and social and epidemiological aspects of psychoses have been formulated by Hollingshead and Redlich (1954), Paris and Dunham (1939), Lemkau and Crocetti (1958), and others. The differing patterns in the family structure, especially of schizophrenics, have been discussed, e.g., by Opler and Singer (1956) and Sanua (1963). [See PSYCHIATRY, article on SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY.] Because of the impairment of judgment and the lack of impulse control in many psychotics, and the occasional commission of crime by psychotics, special social-legal problems exist with regard to the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill to hospitals and the observation of their constitutional rights under such circumstances. Furthermore, the specific problem of legal responsibility for crimes has to be considered [Roche 1964; see also PSYCHIATRY, article on FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY]. Research Research in psychoses has suffered greatly from a lack of conceptual clarity. And a lack of methodological sophistication among clinicians who usually engaged in research only as a by-product of clinical and therapeutic work has bedeviled the field. As examples one might mention the tremendous popularity of Kretschmer's morphological classification (athletic, asthenic, pyknic) and the complete absence of valid supporting data for it from controlled studies. The same can be said for the welter of genetic studies: if anywhere there are diagnoses of family members which have been made under blind, controlled conditions so as to avoid contamination of diagnostic judgment of the incidence of psychoses in the relatives of the pa-
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tient (as compared with a control group), I have never run across them. As Tienari points out (1963), most of the genetic studies have been particularly poor methodologically. [Sec MENTAL DISORDERS, article on GENETIC ASPECTS; PSYCHOLOGY, article on CONSTITUTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.] There are some methodologically sophisticated studies by social scientists and by physicians with training in the various medical and basic sciences. These researchers do not usually have clinical psychiatric experience and are rarely psychodynamically trained. Rather than cast aspersions on their undertakings, one simply has to acknowledge that psychoses are protean manifestations of all facets of human life and that research has suffered from the fact that it is difficult to marshal all the knowledge and experience needed to deal with the many facets involved. There is no bodily system or organ which has not been more or less extensively implicated in the cause of psychoses, especially of schizophrenia (Bellak 1948). Psychoanalysts and psychologists have described psychotogenic mothers, fathers, and general family settings, aside from specifics of individual development (Lidz et al. 1956). Sociologists have shown relationships to urban and rural populations and socioeconomic classes (Paris & Dunham 1939). Cultural anthropologists differ on whether more advanced cultures may have a greater incidence of psychoses than do primitive ones (Benedict 1958). Semanticists have related schizophrenia to the double bind and to semantic confusion. Geneticists have had a field day only occasionally interrupted by careful studies (Tienari 1963). Physical anthropology, by way of Kretschmer and Sheldon, has not lacked a voice, nor has such a factor as birth date (season of the year) been neglected (Barry & Barry 1964). In fact, hardly a week goes by without some etiological claim being mentioned in the popular or scientific press, and hardly a year without the total crop of claims being thoroughly discredited. Just as the implication of the spirochetes in general paresis and the ensuing fever treatment raised the hope for similar etiology and therapy of psychoses, so the physical treatment modalities, by inference, were held a promising road for the uncovering of etiology. Sakel, Meduna, Cerletti and their followers were thus influenced, respectively, by insulin, metrazol, and electric shock treatment; they all formulated etiological theories which did not bear the burden of systematic investigation. The latest flurry of this type of research was produced by the advent of psychotropic drugs: if tranquilizers produce symptomatic changes in psychotics, and if these tranquilizers seem to have
an effect, for example, on serotonin metabolism, then one might suggest that a serotonin disorder produces psychoses. By the same reasoning, if monoamine oxidase (MAO)-inhibiting drugs benefit depressions, it was felt that maybe MAO is etiologically implicated in the production of depression. Of course, it quickly turned out that different tranquilizers have their effect by different pathways and that drugs not affecting MAO also could lift depressions (for instance, amitriptyline). [See MENTAL DISORDERS, article on BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS.] Some of the most ambitious research was carried out by means of the so-called model psychoses and experimental analogues. Long ago, it was known that certain drugs, notably mescaline, bulbocapnine, and others could produce psychoses not unlike schizophrenic psychoses. The most widely heralded drug in the 1960s was LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide-25). The most ambitious hope was to produce psychoses experimentally, then to be able to abolish them with a tranquilizer. As it happens, LSD-induced psychosis has only little resemblance to schizophrenia (except in borderline schizophrenics, in whom LSD, like many other traumata, can apparently induce a genuine psychosis, if one is not cautious enough to screen subjects). Other physiological experimental investigations only suffered from oversimplification and artifacts. To confound the issue further, or, rather, to clarify the fact that psychosis is apparently a condition which is merely the final common path of many different effects on ego functions, interesting experiments in sensory deprivation or perceptual isolation (Lilly 1956) showed that psychosis-like conditions with hallucinations and delusions could be induced in some subjects put into these experimental conditions. [See PERCEPTION, article on PERCEPTUAL DEPRIVATION.]
The subject of research in psychosis can, therefore, be summarized by saying that hardly any of a worthwhile nature exists so far, with the exception of some rather careful work refuting a variety of heuristic claims (Kety 1959). Such claims have usually been the result of oversimplification, lack of controls, and lack of sophistication. It is my strong personal belief that progress will come only when an integrated, highly coordinated, multidisciplinary, extremely extensive and intensive approach is made, preferably under one roof, such as a "national institute for psychoses research." Because of a lack of coordination and integration of research, the awarding of individual research grants has so far shown nothing but disappointment, from any basic standpoint. LEOPOLD BELLAK
PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS [Directly related are the entries DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS; MENTAL DISORDERS; NEUROSIS; SCHIZOPHRENIA. Other relevant material may be found in MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; MENTAL HEALTH;
PSY-
CHIATRY; PSYCHOANALYSIS, especially the article on EGO PSYCHOLOGY; PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS; and
in
the biographies of FREUD; MEYER; SULLIVAN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS (1952) 1963 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental Disorders. Washington: The Association. BARRY, HERBERT; and BARRY, HERBERT JR. 1964 Season of Birth in Schizophrenics in Relation to Social Class. Archives of General Psychiatry 11:385-391. BELLAK, LEOPOLD 1948 Dementia Praecox. New York: Grune. BELLAK, LEOPOLD (editor) 1958 Schizophrenia: A Reviexv of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. -» Reviews work in the field between 1946 and 1956; contains 4,000 references. BELLAK, LEOPOLD (editor) 1964 Handbook of Community Psychiatry and Community Mental Health. New York: Grune. BENEDICT, PAUL K. 1958 Socio-Cultural Factors in Schizophrenia. Pages 694-729 in Leopold Bellak (editor), Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. CHASSAN, J.; and BELLAK, LEOPOLD 1966 An Introduction to Intensive Design of the Evaluation of Drug Efficacy During Psychotherapy. Pages 478-499 in Louis A. Gottschalk and Arthur H. Auerbach (editors), Methods of Research in Psychotherapy. New York: Appleton. COLE, JONATHAN 1964 Efficacy of Antidepressant Drugs. Journal of the American Medical Association 190: 448-455. PARIS, ROBERT E. L.; and DUNHAM, H. WARREN (1939) 1960 Mental Disorders in Urban Areas: An Ecological Study of Schizophrenia and Other Psychoses. New York: Hafner. HOLLINGSHEAD, A. B.; and REDLICH, F. C. 1954 Schizophrenia and Social Structure. American Journal of Psychiatry 110:695-701. KETY, SEYMOUR S. 1959 Biochemical Theories of Schizophrenia. Science 129:1528-1532, 1590-1596. LEMKAU, PAUL V.; and CROCETTI, GUIDO M. 1958 Vital Statistics of Schizophrenia. Pages 64-81 in Leopold Bellak (editor), Schizophrenia: A Review of the Syndrome. New York: Logos. LIDZ, THEODORE; PARKER, BEULAH; and CORNELISON, ALICE 1956 The Role of the Father in the Family Environment of the Schizophrenic Patient. American Journal of Psychiatry 113:126-132. LILLY, JOHN C. 1956 Mental Effects of Reduction of Ordinary Levels of Physical Stimuli on Intact, Healthy Persons. Psychiatric Research Reports 5:1-9. MEYER, ADOLF 1948 The Commonsense Psychiatry of Dr. Adolf Meyer. Edited by Alfred Lief. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» Consists of 52 selected papers. OPLER, MARVIN K. ; and SINGER, JEROME L. 1956 Ethnic Differences in Behavior and Psychopathology: Italian and Irish. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 2:11-23. ROCHE, PHILIP Q. 1964 Psychiatry, Law and Community. Pages 409-430 in Leopold Bellak (editor), Handbook of Community Psychiatry and Community Mental Health. New York: Grune.
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SANUA, VICTOR D. 1963 The Socio-Cultural Aspects of Schizophrenia: A Comparison of Protestant and Jewish Schizophrenics. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 9:27-36. STANTON, ALFRED H.; and SCHWARTZ, M. S. 1954 The Mental Hospital: A Study of Institutional Participation in Psychiatric Illness and Treatment. New York: Basic Books. TIENARI, PEKKA 1963 Psychiatric Illnesses in Identical Twins. Acta psychiatric a scandinavica 39 (Supplement 171). -» The entire issue is devoted to Tienari's study. WECHSLER, DAVID (1939) 1958 The Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelligence. 4th ed. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. -» First published as The Measurement of Adult Intelligence.
PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS Investigations into psychosomatic illness have focused on the relationships between emotional life and bodily processes—both normal and pathological—and not on the isolated problems of the diseased mind or the diseased body. The mind-body dichotomy is eliminated through the thesis that there is no duality of mind and body, mental and physical, but only a unity of the total being. It is assumed that the physiology of mood, instinct, and intellect differs from other physiology in degree of complexity but not in quality. Hence, while divisions of medical disciplines such as physiology, internal medicine, and psychiatry may be convenient for academic administration, biologically and philosophically these divisions have no validity. Psychic and somatic phenomena take place in the same biological system and are two aspects of the same process. The ever-increasing flow of observations concerning the relation of psychological and physiological processes in the human organism supports this orientation. The influence of specific emotional tensions upon biochemical, endocrinological, and physiological changes has been studied both clinically and experimentally, as has the influence of physiological changes upon the emotional life of man. Modern endocrinology and biochemistry may well be the progeny of the earlier humoral theory that medicine sought to refute or disregard. The whole man, not just his cells, tissues, and organs, becomes the subject of study for the modern psychosomatic researcher. Facts are seen as elements of the whole. The gestalt of man is studied with the appreciation that the whole is more than the sum of the parts; but these parts, nonetheless, are integrated in such fashion as to contribute to the whole. Personality is the expression of the unity of the organism. Neurology, neurophysiology, general physiology, endocrinology, biochemistry, pharmacology, and genetics contribute to our knowledge
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of the structure and function of the body. Psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis contribute knowledge of the subjective phenomena which are reflections of physiological processes but are also the products of past social, cultural, and interpersonal relationships that have become internalized and thus are part of the integrity of the organism. Franz Alexander observed: The body, that complicated machine, carries out the most complex and refined motor activities under the influence of such psychological phenomena as ideas and wishes. The most specifically human of all bodily functions, speech, is nothing but the expression of ideas through a refined musical instrument, the vocal apparatus. All our emotions we express through physiological processes; sorrow, by weeping; amusement, by laughter; and shame, by blushing. All emotions are accompanied by physiological changes: fear by palpitation of the heart; anger by increased heart activity, elevation of blood pressure and changes in carbohydrate metabolism; despair by a deep inspiration and expiration called sighing. All these physiological phenomena are the results of complex muscular interaction under the influence of nervous impulses, carried to the expressive muscles of the face and to the diaphragm in laughter, to the lacrimal glands in weeping, to the heart in fear, and to the adrenal glands and to the vascular system in rage. The nervous impulses arise in certain emotional situations which in turn originate from our interaction with other people. The originating psychological situations can only be understood . . . as total responses of the organism to its environment. (1950, pp. 38-39) Various somatic manifestations may accompany different transitory emotional states in the normal organism. Thus, disturbances of the stomach, bowels, cardiovascular system, or respiratory system may be expressions of anxiety. These upsets are usually reversible, and in such cases morphological changes of the cells, tissues, or organs involved are nonspecific. The anatomical structure is not permanently or grossly altered; only the function is disturbed. Since these functional disturbances are triggered by emotional factors, the psychological understanding of the diseased patient is necessary if one is to assist him fully. This may not require formal psychotherapy, since the removal of the emotionally stressing external situation may by itself re-establish a level of equilibrium. When external rearrangements are not possible, the understanding of the anatomical and physiological mechanisms involved may allow for biochemical and pharmacological interventions that can temporarily interfere with abnormal pathways of discharge and thus alleviate symptoms during the period of equilibrium re-establishment. Often an emotionally disturbing situation triggers a conflict which exacerbates a previous con-
flict constellation that has been rendered unconscious and largely inactive. In such cases, the functional distress may not be easily reversed, and chronic symptomatology results. Thus, a functional disturbance of long duration or of overwhelming intensity may lead to definite and demonstrable anatomical changes and to the clinical picture of severe organic illness. Research in such diseases as duodenal ulcer, ulcerative colitis, bronchial asthma, neurodermatitis, essential hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis, thyrotoxicosis, diabetes mellitus, glaucoma, migraine, and anorexia nervosa indicates the probability of particular personality constellations having particular vulnerability to specific conflict situations. The particular conflicts associated with the individual disorders have been detailed in Studies in Psychosomatic Medicine (Alexander et al. 1948). In peptic ulcer, for example, it has been found that the individual has a basic core of infantile oral dependency, which he copes with in various ways, such as overcompensation, aggression, or assertiveness. When such an individual's coping mechanisms are impaired, or his oral-dependent cravings increase, he may no longer manage the internal conflict at a psychological level. Increased gastric secretion and/or gastric vasoconstriction may give rise to symptoms of gastric distress. If there is a decrease in stress on the organism, or a bolstering of the internal or organic system, strain may be diminished without symptomatic progression and with symptom remission. If psychic stress continues, what was originally dysfunction may result in an actual organic lesion, the peptic ulcer. The oral-dependent characteristics can be detected in dreams, behavior, and general character structure. Other conflicts have been linked with particular diseases: repressed hostility with essential hypertension, fear of separation with bronchial asthma, and fear of destruction of the self with thyrotoxicosis. These conflicts have been described in detail in Psychosomatic Specificity (1968). For the present, the functional theory of organic disorders associated with the psychosomatic concept includes the recognition of three etiological components acting together. Certain external causative factors can act as precipitators of imbalance and give rise to functional or structural disruption. These external factors have their effect upon underlying internal systems of equilibrium and integration. Thus many chronic disturbances are not caused by external, mechanical, chemical, or infectious agents, but by the stresses of the struggle for existence. These emotional conflicts arise during daily living, in the social interchange with signifi-
PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS cant figures in the environment that have symbolic as well as actual significance. Finally, one must bear in mind the predispositions to disequilibrium which reflect constitutional and experiential influences upon the organism. These include genetic factors, the influence of intrauterine and extrauterine physiological and pathological agents, the crucial parent-sibling relationships during critical personality developmental periods of the first decade of life, especially as they relate to mental functioning, and the impact of personal, social, and cultural influences in child-care and child-rearing practices. These predisposing factors constitute the underlying matrix of vulnerability to certain situations occurring later in life. Continuous and repressed fears, aggressions, and libidinal wishes can, for susceptible individuals, result in permanent chronic emotional tensions which disturb the functions of various organ systems. In this way such activities as digestion, respiration, and circulation may at first show signs and evoke symptoms of functional distress; later, if nothing is done to alleviate the disturbed situation, organic disease may follow. Many researchers are concerned with the study of specific emotional conflicts and personality organizations as they relate to particular organic syndromes. For example, the cardiovascular responses intimately linked with rage seem to be related to essential hypertension, in which inhibited expression of rage is found to be a crucial conflict (Alexander 1939a; 1939Z?; Saul 1939). Dependent help-seeking tendencies seem to have a close relationship to gastrointestinal activity, as is found in many duodenal ulcer patients (Alexander 1947; Alexander et al. 1934; Van der Heide 1940). The psychosomatic concept. Although the clinical and experimental study of the mind-body relationship is a comparatively recent development in medicine, the concept is one that dates back to antiquity. The term "psychosomatic" was first used by Johann Christian August Heinroth (1818, part 2, paragraph 313, p. 49), who regarded the body and soul as one, and madness as a disease of the entire being. Christian Friedrich Nasse stated in 1838: "The business of recognizing, preventing, and treating conditions of mental disorder rests upon the fundamental investigation of the simultaneously psychic and somatic activity of man. Here it finds its scientific support, from here on it gains light and learns the road" (in Overholser 1948, P- 231). This statement, echoing an ancient principle of the organism-as-a-whole, is still accepted a § an operational concept. For clarification, one must differentiate the psychosomatic approach, process, disorders, and ill-
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nesses. Many reactions, disorders, or illnesses cannot be fully understood unless the investigator can understand the individual's total situation. The psychosomatic approach includes both the philosophical orientation to the whole individual and the methodological means of getting data in order to assess reactions to present and past stresses. It attempts to obtain the data—genetic, physical, psychological, and sociocultural—necessary to interpret the forces affecting the life of the individual. The investigator uses varied techniques of data gathering, including interviews, tests, clinical examinations, and laboratory studies. The psychosomatic process refers to that temporal sequential chain of events which occurs in the individual. The end result may be a transitory functional, physiological, and emotional response (psychosomatic disorder} that does not result in alteration of the basic organic structure of the individual, or the end result may be a particular syndrome that shows temporary or permanent organic changes (psychosomatic illness or disease}. Psychosomatic medicine has come into general clinical use with the reintroduction of the word "psychosomatic" by Felix Deutsch, Viktor von Weizsacker, Helen Flanders Dunbar, Franz Alexander, and others, all of whom stressed the necessity for considering the individual in his totality, and not just as a composite of separate entities and organs (e.g., mind-body). Deutsch introduced the psychosomatic concept into psychoanalysis by recognizing the influence of repressed emotional conflicts and the unconscious on the functioning of an organ. Deutsch explained that psychosomatic symptoms are the end products of long-existing psychic dynamic processes that always have their origins in past disorders. He demonstrated that the dysfunction of the organic process disappears when unconscious conflicts are made conscious. He defined psychosomatic medicine as the "systematized knowledge of how to study and treat organ processes that are associated and amalgamated with the emotional processes." Deutsch (1964) postulated that the dissolution of psychosomatic symptoms always requires treatment not of the symptoms but of the underlying illness, including the unconscious psychic conflict associated with it. In the instance of psychosomatic disorders, the notion of a single cause for each disturbance is no longer tenable; in each patient many factors—acting singly or in combination—play significant roles. The psychosomatic approach seeks to identify and understand these variables, their relationships, and their specific contributions toward upsetting the state of equilibrium.
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Homeostasis. The essential feature of homeostasis is the tendency to maintain a steady state or a state of equilibrium at a given time. Homeostasis is a property of psychological, emotional, and physiological processes, and involves the interplay of various mechanisms. The organism has a constant internal environment, first conceptualized by Claude Bernard, as well as an external environment. Since organisms are functionally indivisible, they cannot be split into the conventional compartments that reflect categories of specialization. Organism and environment form an inseparable pair in dynamic equilibrium. The biological internal environment is the result of natural selection and evolutionary processes. The psychological internal environment, aside from its biological substratum, is the product of the individual's personality development and reflects the sociocultural milieu in which he lives. Although the psychological predisposition to particular patterns of stress reactions may result in part from this psychogenetic developmental process, adaptation may allow various forms of stress and tension to be handled by means of different defense or coping mechanisms and with different pathological results. W. B. Cannon's concept of homeostasis (1932) clearly emphasized the features of the organization of living systems whereby they tend to maintain themselves as functioning, complete organisms. His pioneering work on the relation of emotions to bodily changes set the theoretical and experimental stage for many of the later clinical and experimental studies in the field of psychosomatic medicine. [See HOMEOSTASIS; and the biography of CANNON.] Stress, strain, and stimulus. Harold Wolff (1953) has considered stress as the internal or resisting force brought into action by external forces or loads. The change in size or shape of an entity as a result of the application of external force is called strain or deformation. Stimuli or external environmental agents are loads; they may be static and sustained, repeated or of brief impact with high intensity. The interaction between external environment and organism is stress. Strain is the alteration or deformation in the organism that ensues. The magnitude of the deformation and the capacity of the organism to withstand the strain determine whether or not there will be re-establishment of homeostasis or a breakdown, with disruption, disorder, disease, and finally death. Unlike Cannon, Wolff views affect and bodily changes not as being causally connected but as being separate manifestations of response to stimulus, tempered by previous experience. Bernard saw
disease as the outcome of attempts at homeostasis in which adaptive responses to noxious forces, although appropriate in kind, are nonetheless deficient. Wolff suggests that as man is confronted by threats, especially those which involve his values and goals, he initiates responses inappropriate in kind as well as in magnitude. Such reactions, appropriate to one protective purpose, may be inappropriately used for another and can, when inappropriate, be damaging or destructive to the individual. Threats and symbols of danger may call forth emotional and physiological reactions which in vulnerable individuals differ little from the responses to actual physical assault. Freud first called attention to the signal function of anxiety as an internal reaction to such internal or external dangers. Thus, the stress response resulting from a situation (load) is based in part on the way the affected person perceives the stimulus and the conflict it then sets in motion. Perception and the subsequent interpretation of what is perceived may be dependent upon many factors, including genetically determined responsivity, basic needs and longings, conditioning experiences during formative years, parental and sibling relationships, and identification patterns, as well as other experiences having familial and sociocultural determinants. [See ANXIETY.] Stress disorders can be expressed psychologically and physiologically. The human organism reacts actively to stress in life situations. The proneness to stress response, the sensitivity and level of threshold, and the specific mode of response are the end products of many factors. Freud described this continuum of factors from the biological to the emotional and sociocultural as a "complementary series." The group of illnesses in which stress seems to be a principal factor has been called stress disorders, in order to avoid using the term "psychosomatic." The form of mental and bodily response is determined by the biological diathesis, the personality pattern, and the character of the situation. When the source of the stress is outside of conscious awareness, or when action is blocked by inner censorship or outward restraints, disharmony or a nonhomeostatic state results, and symptoms of illness appear. It must be noted that stress is the reaction inside the organism, not the force acting on it from the outside. Thus, the inner psychological and physiological dynamics and economics of the individual, as well as the prior and current social and cultural factors, seem to be significant. There are complex intrapsychic phenomena behind every illness, as well as metabolic,
PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS physiological, and even anatomical alterations. These may relate to underlying unconscious fantasies as well as to the emotional significance that different parts of the body and their functions have for the patient. They may be regressions under stress to earlier modes of operation or reflective of earlier fixations. [See STRESS.] While clinical impressions suggest that there is a specific relation between the psychological stress and the physical disorder that follows, it is not clear how this transformation occurs. The World Health Organization report on psychosomatic disorders (1964, p. 9) summarizes the prevailing ideas on the sequence of involvement as follows: (a) constitutional predisposition based on heredity; (Z?) constitutional predisposition laid down as a result of early experience and development (both physiological and psychological experience, and the prenatal period as well as infancy, are included here); (c) personality changes of later life that affect organ systems; (d) the weakening of an organ, as by an injury or infection; (e) the fact that an organ is in action at the moment of strain or emotional upheaval; (f) the symbolic meaning of the organ in the personality system of the individual; (,g) organ-fixation as a result of arrested psychological development. Empirical, clinical, demographic, and laboratory experimental research involving man and other animals has investigated the effects of psychological stress in symptom-free subjects, as well as in patients suffering from such diseases as duodenal ulcer, ulcerative colitis, bronchial asthma, neurodermatitis, thyrotoxicosis, essential hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes mellitus, glaucoma, migraine, and coronary heart disease. Clinical studies of human patients have revealed the temporal relation between the onset and the exacerbation of the patient's disease with characteristic emotional upsets. When such patients were treated intensively, e.g., with psychoanalysis, and over a long period of time, much information was obtained, and higher-level abstractions could be formulated for the psychological patterns observed. Some of these empirical clinical studies were published in a volume by Alexander and his associates (1948). The differentiability of the formulations for seven of these diseases is discussed in Psychosomatic Specificity (1968). In one such study, two Batched teams of psychoanalysts and internists studied identical interview protocols obtained from patients having one of seven diseases (peptic ulcer, ulcerative colitis, bronchial asthma, neuroderma-
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titis, essential hypertension, rheumatoid arthritis, or thyrotoxicosis). These interviews, carefully edited to remove all possible references or cues to the disease of the patient, were evaluated by the two groups from the point of view of formulation and diagnosis of the disease. From the primary clinical information, formulations were prepared which were to explain how psychosocial and emotional conditions predisposed, precipitated, and perpetuated the disease. These comparative diagnoses (by analysts and internists) were statistically evaluated and compared. The results indicate that by and large it was possible to distinguish most of the seven diseases correctly on the basis of psychological abstractions. These abstractions had earlier been derived from the empirical observations of patients seen diagnostically or for therapeutic purposes. These formulations are now being tested by additional studies of families of patients who have psychosomatic diseases, by studying children who have psychosomatic diseases, by detailed investigation of the therapeutic interactions of patients with these illnesses, and by newer laboratory and experimental researches utilizing artificial stresses, such as films, and recording physiological and psychological data following exposure to the conflict situations. Experimental studies of patients and control groups have been able to reproduce and verify some aspects of the relation between emotional stimuli and the pathophysiological changes of particular diseases. Such studies do not, however, demonstrate pathogenesis in the total etiological sense. What they do show is that particular emotional stresses in sensitive, vulnerable, and predisposed individuals may activate pathophysiological mechanisms which can eventually give rise to anatomical alteration and, thence, to characteristic patterns of disease syndromes. (See Alexander 1950 for discussion of such specific studies.) The precipitating or aggravating situations have specific emotional meaning for the patient because of their connection to his earlier life experiences, his personality development and structure, and his unresolved conflicts that may have been cornpens atorily handled in various ways until the external situation resulted in too great a stress, with a resulting internal disequilibrium. In this regard, one must recognize that decompensation of adaptive mechanisms may result from too great external demands that cannot be successfully mediated internally, or from a breakdown or weakening of internal control or integrating mechanisms, making the individual more susceptible to disequilibrium effects.
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Major developments Three major developments occurred early in the twentieth century: the monumental discoveries and theories of Sigmund Freud; the classic and basic physiological and neurophysiological experiments and theories of Walter Cannon; and Ivan Pavlov's research and studies of conditioned reflexes. Contributions were made to the psychosomatic field at two theoretical levels: the first sought to construct general theories and to derive universal principles and concepts, while the second dealt with theories related to studies of particular diseases in which psychosomatic stress is of major significance. Research has continued in both areas. The second level of somewhat limited theory formation offers an opportunity for testing the explanatory aspects of more general and universal theories of psychosomatic functioning. The psychoanalytic and physiological contributions will be discussed here in fuller detail. [See LEARNING, article on CLASSICAL CONDITIONING; and the biography of PAVLOV.] Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis contributed to the understanding of psychosomatic relationships by providing a procedure—free association—which made it possible to study sequences connecting psychological and physiological phenomena. It included the previously undiscovered linkage of unconscious ideas. In addition to improved observation and data gathering, psychoanalytic theory provided a plausible means of reasoning and of understanding previously unintelligible and irrational phenomena, such as dreams and neurotic symptoms. The psychoanalytic method not only permitted the reconstruction of unconscious motivational links and conflicts, but also allowed them to be brought to consciousness and, thus, to be used therapeutically. Freud's discovery of unconscious mental phenomena and the process of repression threw new light on many bodily expressions of mental phenomena. These mental tensions can be discharged somatically into (1) muscular activities leading to a change of the body in relation to its environment; (2) laughter, crying, screaming, or speech; (3) respiratory, cardiovascular, and other visceral systems. The end effects of these modes of discharge are subjectively experienced as feelings, affects, or emotions. Affects and emotions can be repressed and then are no longer experienced as such, although the processes discharging them into specific somatic systems can still occur. In his study of the unconscious, Freud discovered that strongly charged but repressed fantasies, conflicts, and memories found distorted expression in somatic symptoms
and in impairments of somatic functions. It was discovered that these symptoms were expressions, in symbolic body language, of psychological conflicts. They were called "conversion symptoms": the conflict was "converted" from a purely psychological one into a disorder manifesting itself primarily through somatic symptoms which had no organic pathological correlate. Thus one could see hysterical paralysis, hysterical amnesia, hysterical vomiting, etc. [See HYSTERIA.] According to Freud, the physiological manifestations of anxiety have a psychological meaning. In his early works he wrote that they consist of a repetition of the physiological manifestations which occurred at the time of the individual's birth. In later writings Freud likened anxiety to a signal used to alert the individual to danger from either internal or external sources. Thus, later threats to survival would evoke physiological responses which occurred in the earliest stress situation, the birth process. [See the biography of RANK.] Hysterical conversion symptoms should not be called psychosomatic disorders, for they do not result in pathological organic processes or lesions, even though they involve the body. They can, however, result in secondary organic disturbances. For example, if a hysterical paralysis of the arms or legs persists, there will be progressive atrophy of the involved limbs because of muscular inactivity. At its outset psychoanalysis had only a single aim, that of understanding something of the nature of what were then known as the "functional" nervous diseases. The neurologists, with their high respect for physiochemical and anatomical—pathological facts, sought further to establish an intimate and possibly exclusive connection between certain functions and particular parts of the brain. They were puzzled by the psychical factor and did not seem to understand it. In fact, it was believed unscientific to consider these phenomena without neurological explorations. As late as 1885, when Freud was studying at the Salpetriere, he found that hysterical paralyses were explained by slight functional disturbances of the same parts of the brain which, when severely damaged, led to the corresponding organic paralyses. In the 1880s, hypnotism provided convincing proof that striking somatic changes could be brought about solely by mental influences which had been set in motion by the patient and were "unconscious" processes. Hypnosis played an important role in Freud's study of hysteria. Charcot's experiments greatly impressed him, especially when Charcot, by suggesting a trauma under hypnosis, was able artificially to induce paralyses.
PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS Charcot's pupil Pierre Janet was able to show, with the help of hypnosis, that the symptoms of hysteria depended on certain unconscious thoughts (idees fixes}. Janet attributed to hysteria a supposed constitutional incapacity for holding mental processes together—an incapacity which led to a disintegration (dissociation) of mental life. [See HYPNOSIS; and the biographies of CHARCOT and JANET.] Josef Breuer was the first to study and treat hysteria with hypnosis. His work with a young woman patient made it possible for the first time to obtain a more complete view of a case of hysteria, see the meanings of the symptoms, and note that these symptoms arose in a situation of mental conflict: an impulse toward action had been suppressed because of contrary moral prohibitions, and symptoms appeared in place of the suppressed action. The patient's emotions, involved in a psychic conflict, precipitated the illness, although the traumatic precipitating causes and all the mental impulses relating to them were lost to the patient's memory. Under hypnosis, memories were recovered and, with the subsequent catharsis of affect, the symptoms disappeared. Breuer and Freud (1893-1895) stated that in hysteria, blocked affect was changed into an unusual somatic innervation (conversion) and resulted in symptoms. Soon after this publication, Breuer and Freud parted, and Freud went on to develop psychoanalysis. He gave up hypnosis for free association and developed his theories of resistance, transference, repression, mental conflict, unconscious mental functioning, and the nature and development of sexual and aggressive drives, including the importance of infantile sexuality. Freud also suggested that hypochondria and somatic delusions, and their relationship to the pathological return (regression) to an earlier state of psychological organization, are other clinical entities related to psychosomatic syndromes, even though no demonstrable organic pathology is noted in these disorders, as it is in the conversion hysterias. His descriptions and theories of pain and pleasure, and their relationship to feelings and emotions, provide us with an understanding of states of tension. His writings on anxiety and Psychic trauma permit us to understand psychic disorganization, its manifestations, and its signal ^unctions. Thus, from the nosological point of view, t? ^reud introduced, described, and explained three c h'nical categories that are still important: conversion hysteria, anxiety states, and hypochondria a nd somatic delusions. His concept of the actual neuroses is also of importance, since it states that
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the buildup of tension and toxic products without discharge can affect the organism. Freud noted (1910) that not all somatic changes caused by psychological forces were conversions, just as not all physical symptoms were expressions of specific fantasies or conflict compromises. He pointed out that unconscious attitudes may influence organic functions in a physiological way, without the changes having any definite psychic meaning. Although Freud did not directly address himself to the somatic aspect of affect, his student Karl Abraham wrote about various anatomical zonal correlates of personality (oral and anal stages), and Sandor Ferenczi dealt more directly with the relationship of emotion and mental functioning to organically demonstrable disease. Ferenczi described (1916) pathoneuroses that supervene as a consequence of actual organic illness or injury. Unlike hypochondria, where demonstrable changes in the organ are absent and have never been present at all, pathoneuroses are found in states of actual insult to bodily integrity. In 1922, Hollos and Ferenczi's Psychoanalysis and the Psychic Disorder of General Paresis described psychological reactions following central nervous system syphilis. This diagnosis of pathoneurosis is now more generally used to describe the psychic reactions to organic diseases. Ferenczi also described transference manifestations, having psychosomatic implications, that clearly demonstrate Freud's initial idea of fixation and temporary regression to an earlier state of physiological functioning induced by a current situation. [See the biographies of ALEXANDER; FERENCZI.] Ferenczi also differentiated organ neuroses from conversion hysteria (1926). In the latter there are mainly symbolic and subjective disturbances involving the body, while in the former initially there are mainly objective and demonstrable difficulties affecting organ functioning. Ferenczi described nervous asthma, upper gastric disturbances, intestinal difficulties, cardiac disorders, headaches, fainting, and seasickness as organ neuroses. He noted that purely organic complaints may leave organ-neurotic disturbances behind after they have healed. These may be considered as "secondary gain" phenomena, a situation in which there are psychological advantages of a neurotic variety secondarily connected with the previously present but now absent organic disease. Among other early psychoanalysts who pioneered in the psychosomatic field, Georg Groddeck (1923) saw purposive activity in all morbid afflictions. Thus, a cold was seen as the wish to avoid smelling, and gynecological disorders as the unconscious
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wish for chastity. Groddeck's theory is perhaps the most extreme representative of a panpsychological orientation. He introduced the term Es ("id" or "it") as the unconscious formative principle of all normal and abnormal bodily processes. The early writings of Deutsch also indicate the application of Freud's concept of conversion to all dysfunctions of the body. Smith Ely Jelliffe in the United States also attempted to explain all psychosomatic phenomena as direct expressions of highly specific repressed ideas or fantasies (1939). His work, based on careful clinical studies, began as early as 1916, when he first published a paper on psoriasis. Subsequently he and his associates wrote about psychological aspects of tuberculosis, multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, bone disease, postencephalic disorders, endocrinopathics, and eye disorders. Jelliffe was the first American scientist to apply psychoanalytic concepts to organic diseases. Physiological contributions. Early investigators did not distinguish between (a) hysterical conversions based on changes in sensory organs or organs under voluntary nervous control (Freud's view) and (fo) changes in internal vegetative organs which are involved with basic visceral functions and are not involved in expressing details of psychological content and in the communication of ideas, thoughts, and feelings. The vocal apparatus, facial expressions, weeping, laughter, blushing, and motor actions discharge and express specific emotional tensions. The internal organs are involved with various bodily processes involving digestion, respiration, circulation, endocrinology, integration, etc. The heart can only beat, the stomach secrete, the bowels contract, the blood vessels constrict or dilate. Although these internal organs respond to emotions, the range of their reactions is limited. Internal organs do not react to specific repressed ideas such as those which underlie hysterical symptoms, but to general emotional states. Neither do these processes, as is true of conversion symptoms, discharge tensions; instead, they are sustained by them. Alexander made the important distinction between hysterical conversion symptoms and adaptive changes in vegetative functions stimulated by emotional tensions. His ideas followed the concepts of Cannon, who related emotional states, such as fear and rage, to consequent activated physiological functions involving the digestive, endocrine, and cardiovascular systems. Interest in psychological factors in organic disease became noticeable in Germany after World War i; the work of Leopold Alkan (1930) is especially noteworthy. He indicated that psychogenic disturbances within the autonomic nervous system
may result finally in organic changes, the morphological mechanisms of which form the last link of an intricate causal chain. He postulated that intrapsychic conflicts may be expressed somatically and can result in organic disease which is not reversible. Karl Fahrenkamp demonstrated the influence of emotions on fluctuations of blood pressure and presented a strong case for the psychogenic origin of essential hypertension (1926). Viktor von Weizsacker, strongly influenced by Freudian views, emphasized the influence of emotions upon bodily disturbances and of bodily disease upon the psyche (1925; 1925/1926; 1926; 1933). His clinical presentations demonstrated the emotional components and antecedents of bodily disease. Bergmann (1913a; 1913k) and Westphal (1914) suggested the neurotic origin of duodenal ulcers. Conditioning studies. Much research in psychosomatic phenomena has also been carried out within the framework of conditioning theory. Animal studies of psychosomatic disturbances are now on the increase, and there has been considerable study of conditioning of biological functions in humans (e.g., Hofer & Hinkle 1964; Moutsos etal. 1964). Much interest has been shown in patterns of autonomic responses in normal persons and in patients suffering from psychosomatic disorders, at rest and under stress. Stress can be induced through hypnotic suggestion, interviews, "staged" situations, various test situations—including movies —and by total or partial perceptual isolation. Its effects can be assessed. Physiological variables studied include skin potential, skin temperature, finger pulse volume, cardiac and respiratory rates, blood pressure, and muscle activity. Individual differences in various emotional states, and differences between various psychosomatic disorders, have been reported. Conditioning experiments demonstrating the effects of anxiety have been carried out on humans and animals (see Dykman et al. 1962; Edwards & Acker 1962; Moss & Edwards 1964; Porter et al. 1958). Predictive studies on the relationship between ovarian activity and psychological processes have been made by Benedek and Rubenstein (1942); on the relationship between emotional states and thyroid function by Dongier and his colleagues (1956); on the etiology of peptic ulcer by Mirsky and his colleagues (1952) and Weiner and his colleagues (1957); and on the appearance of bronchial asthmatic symptoms by Knapp (1963). Cultural studies indicate that with the extension of Western civilization into rural areas little touched by such acculturation, there is a rising frequency of psychosomatic disturbances (e.g.,
PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS Collomb 1964; Yap 1951). Contrary evidence has appeared about the existence of culture-specific factors determining the choice of symptoms and of disease. GEORGE H. POLLOCK [Directly related are the entries HYSTERIA; MENTAL DISORDERS, article on BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS; PAIN; STRESS. Other relevant material may be found in EMOTION; GESTALT THEORY; ILLNESS; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHOANALYSIS; and in the biographies of ALEXANDER; FREUD.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ALEXANDER, FRANZ 1939a Emotional Factors in Essential Hypertension. Psychosomatic Medicine 1:173-179. ALEXANDER, FRANZ 1939b Psychoanalytic Study of a Case of Essential Hypertension. Psychosomatic Medicine 1:139-152. ALEXANDER, FRANZ 1947 Treatment of a Case of Peptic Ulcer and Personality Disorder. Psychosomatic Medicine 9:320-330. ALEXANDER, FRANZ 1950 Psychosoniatic Medicine: Its Principles and Applications. New York: Norton. ALEXANDER, FRANZ et al. 1934 The Influence of Psychological Factors Upon Gastro-intestinal Disturbances: A Symposium. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 3:501-588. ALEXANDER, FRANZ et al. 1948 Studies in Psychosomatic Medicine: An Approach to the Cause and Treatment of Vegetative Disturbances. New York: Ronald Press. ALKAN, LEOPOLD 1930 Anatomische Organhrankheiten aus seelischer Ursache. Stuttgart (Germany): Hippokrates-Verlag. ALTSCHULE, MARK D. 1953 Bodily Physiology in Mental and Emotional Disorders. New York: Grune. APLEY, JOHN; and MACKEITH, RONALD 1962 The Child and His Symptoms: A Psychosomatic Approach. Philadelphia: Davis. ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH IN NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 1939 The Inter-relationship of Mind and Body. Research Publications, Vol. 19. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH IN NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 1950 Life Stress and Bodily Disease. Research Publications, Vol. 29. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. BENEDEK, THERESE; and RUBENSTEIN, BORIS 1942 The Sexual Cycle in Women: The Relation Betiveen Ovarian Function and Psychodynamic Processes. Psychosomatic Medicine Monographs, Vol. 3, Nos. 1-2. Washington: National Research Council. BERGMANN, GUSTAV VON 1913a Das Spasmogene Ulcus pepticum. Miinchener medizinische Wochenschrift 60:169-174. BERGMANN, GUSTAV VON 19l3b Ulcus duodeni und vegetatives Nervensystem. Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 50:2374-2379. BERGMANN, GUSTAV VON 1927 Zum Abbau der "Organneurosen" als Folge interner Diagnostik. Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 53:2057-2060. BREUER, JOSEF; and FREUD, SIGMUND (1893-1895) 1962 Studies on Hysteria. Volume 2, pages 3-305 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published as Studien iiber Hysteric. BYKOV, KONSTANTIN M. (1942) 1957 The Cerebral Cortex and the Internal Organs. Translated and edited
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by W. Horsley Gantt. New York: Chemical Publishing. -> First published as Kora golovnogo mozga i vnutrennie organy. CANNON, WALTER B. (1915) 1953 Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage: An Account of Recent Researches Into the Function of Emotional Excitement. 2d ed. Boston: Branford. CANNON, WALTER B. (1932) 1963 The Wisdom of the Body. Rev. & enl. ed. New York: Norton. COLLOMB, H. 1964 Psychosomatic Conditions in Africa. Unpublished manuscript, Dakar, Senegal. -» An abstract was published in 1964 in Transcultural Psychiatric Research, Volume 1, pages 130-134. DEUTSCH, FELIX 1949 Applied Psychoanalysis: Selected Objectives of Psychotherapy. New York: Grune. DEUTSCH, FELIX (editor) 1953 The Psychosomatic Concept in Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press. DEUTSCH, FELIX 1964 Training in Psychosomatic Medicine. Advances in Psychosomatic Medicine 4:35-46. DONGIER, M. et al. 1956 Psychophysiological Studies in Thyroid Function. Psychosomatic Medicine 18:310323. DUNBAR, HELEN FLANDERS (1935) 1954 Emotions and Bodily Changes: A Survey of Literature on Psychosomatic Interrelationships, 1910-1953. 4th ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. DUNBAR, HELEN FLANDERS 1943 Psychosomatic Diagnosis. New York: Hoeber. DUNBAR, HELEN FLANDERS 1947 Mind and Body: Psychosomatic Medicine. New York: Random House. DUNBAR, HELEN FLANDERS 1948 Synopsis of Psychosomatic Diagnosis and Treatment. St. Louis, Mo.: Mosby. DUNBAR, HELEN FLANDERS 1959 Psychiatry in the Medical Specialties. New York: McGraw-Hill. DYKMAN, ROSCOE A. et al. 1962 Inhibition of Urine Flow as a Component of the Conditional Defense Reaction. Psychosomatic Medicine 24:177-186. EDWARDS, ALLAN E.: and ACKER, LOREN E. 1962 A Demonstration of the Long-term Retention of a Conditioned GSR. Psychosomatic Medicine 24:459-463. FAHRENKAMP, KARL 1926 Die psycho-physischen Wechsehvirkungen bei den Hypertonieerkrankungen: Eine klinische Studie iiber die praktischc Bcdeutung der Blutdruckkurve. Stuttgart (Germany): HippokratesVerlag. FERENCZI, SANDOR 1916/1917 Von Krankhcits- oder Pathoneurosen. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse 4:219-228. FERENCZI, SANDOR 1923 Ptyalismus bei Oralerotik. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Psychoanalyse 9:67 only. FERENCZI, SANDOR (1926) 1964 Organ Ncurosen und ihre Behandlung. Volume 3, pages 294-301 in Sandor Ferenczi, Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse. 2d ed. Stuttgart (Germany): Huber. FRENCH, THOMAS M. et al. 1941 Psychogenic Factors in Bronchial Asthma. Psychosomatic Medicine Monographs, Vol. 1, No. 4; Vol. 2, Nos. 1-2. Washington: National Research Council. FREUD, SIGMUND (1910)1957 The Psycho-analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision. Volume 11, pages 209-218 in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published in German. GREGG, ALAN 1937 The Future of Medicine. Federation Bulletin 23:5-12.
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GRINKER, ROY R. 1953 Psychosomatic Research. New York: Norton. GRINKER, ROY R.; and ROBBINS, FRED P. 1954 Psychosomatic Case Book. New York: Blakiston. GRODDECK, GEORG W. (1923) 1950 The Book of the It. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. -> First published as Das Buch vom Es. HEINROTH, JOHANN C. A. 1818 Lehrbuch dcr Storungen des Seelenlebens oder der Seelenstorungen und ihrer Behandlung. Leipzig: Vogel. HOFER, MYRON A.; and HINKLE, LAWRENCE E. JR. 1964 Conditioned Diuresis in Man: Effects of Altered Environment, Subjective State and Conditioning Experience. Psychosomatic Medicine 26:108-124. HOLLOS, STEFAN; and FERENCZI, SANDOR (1922) 1925 Psychoanalysis and the Psychic Disorder of General Paresis. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph No. 42. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Publishing. -> First published in German. JELLIFFE, SMITH E. 1939 Sketches in Psychosomatic Medicine. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph No. 65. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Publishing. KNAPP, P. H. 1963 Short-term Psychoanalytic and Psychosomatic Predictions. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 11:245-280. LIEF, HAROLD I. et al. (editors) 1963 The Psychological Basis of Medical Practice. New York: Harper. MARGETTS, EDWARD L. 1950 The Early History of the Word "Psychosomatic." Journal of the Canadian Medical Association 63:402-404. MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL, BOSTON, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICE 1952 Case Histories in Psychosomatic Medicine. Edited by H. H. W. Miles, Stanley Cobb, and Harley C. Shands. New York: Norton. MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH FUND, CONFERENCE, SECOND, OXFORD, 1958 1960 Stress and Psychiatric Disorder: The Proceedings. Edited by J. M. Tanner. Oxford: Blackwell. MIRSKY, I. A. et al. 1952 Blood Plasma Pepsinogen: The Activity of the Plasma From "Normal" Subjects, Patients With Duodenal Ulcer and Patients With Pernicious Anemia. Journal of Laboratory and Clinical Medicine 10:188-199. Moss, THELMA; and EDWARDS, ALLAN E. 1964 Conflict vs. Conditioning: Effects Upon Peripheral Vascular Activity. Psychosomatic Medicine 26:267-273. MOUTSOS, SPERO E. et al. 1964 A Study of Conditioning and Reactivity as Determinants of Pressor Responses to Noxious Stimuli. Psychosomatic Medicine 26:274286. NODINE, JOHN H.; and MOYER, JOHN H. (editors) 1962 Psychosomatic Medicine: The First Hahnemann Symposium. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger. OVERHOLSER, WiNFRED 1948 Psychiatry and General Medicine. Mental Hygiene 32:226-234. PORTER, R. W. et al. 1958 Some Experimental Observations on Gastro-Intestinal Lesions in Behaviorally Conditioned Monkeys. Psychosomatic Medicine 20: 379-394. Psychosomatic Specificity. Volume 1: Experimental Study and Results. Edited by Franz Alexander, Thomas M. French, and George H. Pollock. 1968 Univ. of Chicago Press. RUESCH, JURGEN (1909)1946 Chronic Disease and Psychological Invalidism: A Psychosomatic Study. New York: American Society for Research in Psychosomatic Problems.
SAUL, LEON J. 1939 Hostility in Cases of Essential Hypertension. Psychosomatic Medicine 1:153-161. SCHNEER, HENRY I. (editor) 1963 The Asthmatic Child: Psychosomatic Approach to Problems and Treatment. New York: Harper. SELYE, HANS 1956 The Stress of Life. New York: McGraw-Hill. SOCIETY FOR PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 1959 The Nature of Stress Disorder. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. SOCIETY FOR PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 1965a Psychosomatic Disorders in Adolescents and Young Adults. Edited by John Hambling and Philip Hopkins. Oxford and New York: Pergamon. SOCIETY FOR PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 1965b The Role of Psychosomatic Disorder in Adult Life. Edited by John O. Wisdom and H. H. Wolf. Oxford and New York: Pergamon. VAN DER HEIDE, CAREL 1940 A Study of Mechanisms in Two Cases of Peptic Ulcer. Psychosomatic Medicine 2:398-410. WEINER, HERBERT et al. 1957 Etiology of Duodenal Ulcer. Psychosomatic Medicine 19:1-10. WEISS, EDWARD; and ENGLISH, O. SPURGEON (1943) 1957 Psychosomatic Medicine: A Clinical Study of Psychophysiologic Reactions. 3d ed. Philadelphia: Saunders. -> The 1943 edition was subtitled The Clinical Application of Psychopathology to General Medical Problems. WEIZSACKER, VIKTOR VON 1925 Randbemerkungen iiber Aufgabe und Begriff der Nervenheilkunde. Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Nervenheilkunde 87:1-22. WEIZSACKER, VIKTOR VON 1925/1926 Uber neurotischen Aufbau bei inneren Krankheiten. Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Nervenheilkunde 88:264-271. WEIZSACKER, VIKTOR VON 1926 Der neurotische Aufbau bei den Magen- und Darmerkrankungen. Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift 52:2103, 2105, 2150^ 2152. WEIZSACKER, VIKTOR VON 1933 Korpergeschehen und Neurose: Analytische Studie iiber somatische Symptombildungen. Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse 19:16-116. WESTPHAL, KURT 1914 Untersuchungen zur Frage der nervoesen Entstehung peptischer Ulcera. Deutsches Archiv fur klinische Medizin 114:327-395. WESTPHAL, KURT; and BAR, R. 1926 Uber die Entstehung des Schlaganfalles. Deutsches Archiv fiir klinische Medizin 151:1-109. WESTPHAL, KURT; and WELTI, M. H. 1930 Tuberkulose und Schizophrenic. Klinische Wochenschrift 9:10251026. WHITE, BENJAMIN et al. 1939 Mucous Colitis: A Psychological Medical Study of Sixty Cases. Washington: National Research Council. WITTKOWER, ERIC D.; and CLEGHORN, R. A. (editors) 1954 Recent Developments in Psychosomatic Medicine. Philadelphia: Lippincott. WOLFF, HAROLD 1953 Stress and Disease. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EXPERT COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH 1964 Psychosomatic Disorders: Thirteenth Report of the WHO Expert Committee on Mental Health. World Health Organization, Technical Report Series No. 275. YAP, P. M. 1951 Mental Diseases Peculiar to Certain Cultures: A Survey of Comparative Psychiatry. Journal of Mental Science 97:313-327.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PSYCHOTHERAPY See MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; PSYCHOANALYSIS. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION The process of public administration consists of the actions involved in effecting the intent or desire of a government. It is thus the continuously active, "business" part of government, concerned with carrying out the law, as made by legislative bodies (or other authoritative agents) and interpreted by courts, through the processes of organization and management. The field of study—putatively a science or discipline—of Public Administration focuses upon public administration as a process. (In this article, public administration is used to refer to the relevant governmental phenomena; Public Administration, to refer to the study of these phenomena.) Historically and conventionally, Public Administration has been primarily concerned with problems of how to apply or effect law faithfully, honestly, economically, and efficiently. More recently, Public Administration has become concerned with the processes by which public administration participates in creating and interpreting law—with how such creating and interpreting can be done "correctly," "wisely," or in the "public interest." As a process, public administration is as old as government. That is, as soon as there is sufficient institutional evolution and differentiation to enable one to speak of the government of a society, there are actions by which law (as an expression of government's authoritative allocation of values) is made and actions by which an attempt, more or less successful, is made to carry the law into effect. In simple societies the objectives of public administration are simple, limited to such matters as preserving order; and the institutions or organs by which administration is carried on are simple, comparatively small, and often not completely differentiated from institutions or organs with other purposes. As societies increase in size and complexity, as governments grow larger and take on more functions, and as their institutions become more differentiated and specialized, administrative processes become more specialized and the institutions that carry on administration activities—known by such names as councils, commissions, departments, bureaus, and agencies—become large, complex, and highly differentiated. As public administration becomes more specialized and complex, increasing attention is likely to
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be given to the training of persons who are to perform administrative functions, training which may be given either before or after entry into service. As the processes of administration become more complex, considerable attention also may be given to means of improvement of some part or process. Systematic education or training for performance in public administration, however, is for the most part a development of the modern era. And systematic, continuous study of ways to improve public administration and make it more efficient is an even more recent development, associated with various modern developments such as the rise of the nation-state as the dominant governmental form and the rise of science as an acceptable or characteristic way of thought. In the United States during the past generation the study of public administration has been especially intense, and this intensity of effort has resulted in a new level of self-consciousness. This is reflected in the idea that the study of public administration is sufficiently important and sufficiently autonomous to become a science or discipline in itself. The conception of a more or less autonomous science or discipline called Public Administration is primarily, if not indeed uniquely, an American idea. Terminological difficulties. A note on terminology is in order. It is difficult to be either brief or accurate—and more difficult to be both—in speaking of Public Administration in the United States. The key terms, such as administration, execution, and management, have no precise and agreed meanings but rather overlap and conflict, and the differences in usage relate not simply to carelessness and accident but to matters of disciplinary doctrine and methodological and professional dispute. Centrally relevant is the fact that the U.S. constitution has established a threefold separation of institutions and organs, legislative, executive, and judicial, yet relates the three in a complicated fashion in which each of the three branches has functions that in a logic of strict separation would belong to the other two; and this general scheme of construction is repeated in the constitutions of the constituent states. Moreover, the word administration does not occur in the federal constitution. Thus the general question of how administration (or management^) relates to executive as used in the constitution—particularly, what institutions and persons are to direct and control administration—is open to dispute. Students in Public Administration have traditionally had and expressed an antilegal bias. The preface of the first Public Administration textbook explicitly states the thesis that "the study of administration should start from
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the base of management rather than the foundation of law" (White 1926). It is vitally necessary to understand that the rise of Public Administration represented an assertion that the traditional view of public administration as simply the application of legal rules was quite inadequate. The field in the United States In the 1950s and 1960s Public Administration changed very greatly. But the nature and significance of these changes can only be understood in terms of past doctrines and interests. For this it is necessary to sketch out the historical and institutional context for the rise of the discipline. The first two general textbooks of Public Administration in the United States, written by L. D. White and W. F. Willoughby, were published in 1926 and 1927 respectively. In a sense these signified the birth of Public Administration as a discipline. Before these general textbooks appeared, however, there had been several decades of preparation. Origins. Some of the framers of the U.S. constitution and some early U.S. political leaders—for example, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson—gave attention to problems of public administration and wrote on them in ways that foreshadowed later developments. Indeed, there is no sharp point in history where the story of Public Administration begins. However, an essay by the then young Woodrow Wilson (1887) is often taken as the symbolic beginning. Certainly it was a remarkable essay in its perceptiveness, persuasiveness, and influence [see the biography of WILSON]. Wilson's basic postulate was that "it is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to frame one" ([1887] 1953, p. 67). Up to the nineteenth century, he noted, the predominant concerns of the study of governmental affairs were political philosophy, constitutional arrangements, and lawmaking. However, increasing complexities in economic and social life and a concomitant increase in governmental size and activity were forcing a change of emphasis. European countries, he observed, had begun taking very seriously the training of civil servants and the scientific study of administration. The United States should do likewise. In fact, it should study European methods, to learn from them—taking care in the borrowing of these efficient means not to borrow their monarchical or autocratic ends. The United States should rather seek to perfect its republican-democratic constitutional system through the new science: "There should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to
make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness" (ibid.*). The rise of Public Administration as a discipline, and the reforms and changes in public administration that stimulated it and that it in turn stimulated and guided, must be understood in relation to developments in national life. Public Administration, that is, represented a response to threats to old values, an adjustment to new conditions of life. As a body of thought and techniques it has been an attempt to preserve the essential parts of the republican-democratic heritage, conceived and developed under comparatively simple rural conditions, under the extremely complex conditions posed by a large industrial nation, itself situated in an international setting of increasing complexity. Also important to the rise of Public Administration was the rise to self-consciousness of the discipline of political science, evidenced by the creation of the American Political Science Association in 1903. It is important that almost without exception those who might be called the founding fathers of Public Administration were trained as political scientists (rather than, say, jurists or economists) and tended to view Public Administration as a part or subdiscipline of political science. American higher education generally—the modern university with its professional schools—was developing swiftly in these decades. Specialization and expertise were replacing amateurism in many realms, and the development of political science was but an aspect of a movement; the other major social sciences also were achieving differentiation and separate status in the same period. The 1920s and 1930s. Public Administration acquired certain distinctive characteristics in the 1920s and 1930s. Public Administration as a synthesis. As it emerged in the mid-1920s Public Administration was a confluence and mixture of three main currents. One of these was the movement for governmental reform, a movement that had been swelling for several decades, which sought to purify government and adjust its institutions to the conditions of modern, industrial, urban society. The second current was scientific management, or what often came to be called the "management movement": the attempt, centered in private industrial enterprise but extending out from it, to apply the techniques of science to solving problems of organizing and administering with economy and efficiency. The techniques and spirit of scientific management began also to pervade governmental administration and to influence the thinking of those interested
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION in governmental reform and improvement. Its use of the increasingly honorific term science, its promise to reduce cost and increase efficiency, and its aim of replacing ignorance and conflict with knowledge and harmony were extremely appealing to the founding fathers of Public Administration. Scientific management also influenced Public Administration through the concurrently developing discipline of business administration. The third current was the new discipline of political science, which inherited the political philosophies and governmental knowledge of the centuries but was also trying to apply science in a new and more rigorous way to politics and government. Other influences—foreign and domestic—are readily recognizable, but these three constitute the essential ingredients. The core beliefs. The new Public Administration of the 1920s had certain core, orienting beliefs. Centrally, its leaders thought of their enterprise as an attempt to achieve the republican-democratic ends of freedom and equality by making government simultaneously strong and efficient, responsible and responsive. A program of political reform as well as a mere science of administration was involved. Against the nineteenth-century idea of dividing powers and sharing functions widely among the citizenry was posed a new formula, necessitated by the need for expertise and by modern conditions generally: concentrate power for effectiveness and then watch it closely for responsibility. Indeed, the concentration is as necessary for achieving responsibility as for effectiveness; for only if the citizen's task is simplified and he knows whom to hold responsible, through his vote and by other means, can he make his influence felt. In the envisaged reconciliation of "true democracy" and "true efficiency" one postulate is very important, namely, that government is analytically divisible into two different functions, or types of action: first, to decide; and second, to carry out the decision. These two types of action are identified with and by the words politics and administration., respectively. The role of public opinion, the activities of political parties, the functions of legislative bodies—these are identified with politics. Here the clash of opinion and the conflict of values are in order, and science can have only a limited role, efficiency a limited meaning. But once a decision is authoritatively made and a law enacted, then other values and techniques are primarily appropriate; this is the realm of administration. For this, economy and efficiency are the central criteria, and science is the proper method for developing the criteria. This division of government between politics and
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administration had many sources—including, again, Wilson's essay—but one especially influential book must be mentioned: Frank Goodnow's Politics and Administration (1900). In the idiom of that day, Goodnow spoke of the "will of the state" and identified politics with the expression arid administration with the execution of this will. The problem of government, as he viewed it, is to achieve harmony between the expression of the will and its execution, the alternative being conflict or paralysis. But while politics should have a certain control over administration, it should not extend to certain levels and aspects thereof, which embrace "fields of semi-scientific, gwasi-judicial and quasi-business or commercial activity—work which has little if any influence on the expression of the true state will" (p. 85). Goodnow made recommendations for various reforms to achieve this necessary and desirable, but limited, control of administration by politics. Goodnow himself did not identify politics simply with the legislative organs or the lawmaking process, nor administration simply with the executive branch or the process of law enforcement. However, as time passed, the student of public administration tended to identify his subject—and indeed himself—with executive institutions and processes and to presume that his subject had qualities of "hardness" lacking in politics and policy making, which made it possible to use science as the central method in study and to take efficiency as the central criterion of success in operation. [See the biography of GOODNOW.] The period of orthodoxy. The expression orthodoxy is now often used with reference to Public Administration in the 1920s and 1930s to indicate a quality of general agreement and self-assurance. To be sure, there were differences of seemingly great import among the scholars of the day, but in retrospect certain general beliefs and interests predominated. The early textbooks afford a summary view of the interests of the newly founded discipline. The most widely used textbook in the period was Leonard D. White's Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1926). In the first edition, Chapter 1 is entitled "Administration and the Modern State." Here are set forth some of what have been designated above as core beliefs: the importance of administration in an increasingly complex and interdependent society, the necessity for efficiency, the possibility and desirability of approaching administration scientifically, and so forth. The second textbook, W. F, Willoughby's Prin-
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ciples of Public Administration (1927), differs significantly from White's in regard to the constitutional authority to control public administration: White regards the president as the chief administrator by constitutional right, whereas Willoughby regards Congress as holding the administrative power by constitutional right, delegating it to the president or other officers at its discretion. In terms of subject matter the chief difference lies in the fact that Willoughby devotes a large part of his book to financial and budgetary aspects of administration and has a section as well dealing with "materiel"—purchasing, storage, and so forth. Textbooks appearing in the 1930s—a revision of White, and others—included treatment of governmental financial-budgetary matters and at least touched lightly on "materiel." The word principles in the title of Willoughby's book indicates an important doctrinal aspect of the older Public Administration that has not yet been mentioned: It was customary to speak of "principles of (public) administration." A principle was what one arrived at by proper and diligent study; it summed up what had been learned. At the same time, it was a guide to good and efficient administration, a light thrown by research and logic on present and future problems. The core beliefs may now be summarized. Government is divisible into two functions or processes, decision and execution. Making decisions is the realm of politics and policy making. It is the area in which the processes of democracy are relevant—expression of opinion, voting, organization of political parties, and so forth. Executing decisions, however, which is the realm of administration, presents other problems and needs other criteria. To the processes of administration the methods of science, proved so powerful elsewhere, are relevant. The criteria here are economy and efficiency; and economy can on close analysis be viewed as an aspect of efficiency. Through scientific research of the phenomena of administration we can derive principles of administration, which simultaneously summarize what we have learned and provide formulas for the efficient conduct of administration. By this process of analysis and division we can reconcile the values of democracy with the necessities of efficiency and science in the modern world. Criticism and transition—the 1940s. Roughly speaking, the period of so-called orthodoxy in Public Administration coincided with the years between the two world wars. In the 1940s the discipline was subjected to searching criticism of its core beliefs, and heterodoxy came to replace orthodoxy. The
criticism and new orienting ideas were clearly foreshadowed in the 1930s. In 1937 a work appeared that is commonly regarded as the epitome of orthodoxy, Papers on the Science of Administration, edited by Luther H. Gulick and Lyndall Urwick. But this work not only represented orthodoxy in its most cogent and influential form; it presented papers dealing with the psychological dimensions of administration, which were to become so important in the postwar years. Moreover, in 1936 there had appeared The Frontiers of Public Administration, a series of essays by John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, and Marshall E. Dimock, in which these prominent figures of the orthodox period introduced points of view later to become important. Other works of the prewar period criticizing old ideas or introducing new could be cited, but World War ii diverted normal streams of scholarly activity, and it was not until the second half of the decade of the 1940s that the most influential critical works appeared. At the same time, however, it should be recognized that the war itself was important in stimulating dissatisfaction with old perspectives and encouraging new ones. Most of the university students and teachers of Public Administration either were engaged in some form of emergency administrative activity or were in some military organization, and they concluded that the textbooks of the day did not adequately describe organization and administration as they had experienced it. The critical ideas of the younger students were indicated by Robert A. Dahl in 1947, in an essay entitled "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems." The first problem arises from the "frequent impossibility of excluding normative considerations from the problems of public administration" (p. 1), as had been the intent or tendency with the politics-administration dichotomy and the accompanying focus upon scientific means to achieve efficiency. Dahl argued that we must "recognize that the study of public administration must be founded on some clarification of ends" (p. 3). The second problem arises from the "inescapable fact that a science of public administration must be a study of certain aspects of human behavior" (p. 4). He criticized the prevalent tendency to treat organization in formal, technical terms and to regard the human beings that constitute organizations more or less as "material." The study of administration must, he argued, embrace the whole psychological man and must not presume that man is a simple machine responding only and fully to goals of self-interest narrowly conceived. The third
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION problem concerns the conception of principles of administration. The study of Public Administration in the United States, he argued, has been too narrow, too parochial. We have hoped, he said, indeed presumed, that we were enunciating universal principles, but our study has, after all, been limited to a few examples in a few national and historical settings, and we presume too much. "The study of public administration inevitably must become a much more broadly based discipline, resting not on a narrowly defined knowledge of techniques and processes, but rather extending to the varying historical, sociological, economic and other conditioning factors . . . " (p. 11). Herbert A. Simon's Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organization (1947) was probably the most important work of the 1940s. It contained a searching critique of the older Public Administration, particularly of its use of "principles." These socalled principles, he observed, are similar to maxims of folk wisdom and. in fact, given the loose and unscientific way in which they have been derived and stated, cannot be regarded as more than proverbs. Administrative Behavior represents the direct and vigorous impact on Public Administration of the perspectives and methodology associated with behavioralism (a movement in the social sciences aimed at a higher level of achievement by more careful study of actual behavior, using techniques whose value has been demonstrated in the physical sciences ). According to Simon, the founders of the older Public Administration failed to appreciate many of the rigorous requirements of true scientific method, but their fundamental deficiency lay in their lack of understanding of the distinctions they had drawn. They failed to appreciate that their rough separation of politics from administration did not preclude a valuational component in many things they presumed they were treating scientifically. In fact, their principles typically represented a conflation and a confusion of the two elements of fact and value. The philosophical-methodological concerns of the book and the more purely substantive materials (on such subjects as communication and authority) are joined centrally through the concept of decision making: "If any 'theory' is involved, it is that decision-making is the heart of administration, and that the vocabulary of administrative theory *ftust be derived from the logic and psychology of human choice" (Simon [1947] 1961, p. xiv). As for the psychology of human choice, Simon selected
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what seemed to him relevant theories from psychology and various social sciences. Administrative Behavior was paradoxically a radical and a conservative work with respect to Public Administration. It was radical in its rejection of the politics-administration dichotomy and the simultaneous injection of the perspective of logical positivism in approaching questions of policy making and the relation of means and ends, in its proposal to adopt what was becoming a very fashionable term and set of concepts in the social sciences, decision making, into Public Administration; and in its insistence that standards of scientific rigor in Public Administration be sharply raised. At the same time, Administrative Behavior was faithful to some essential beliefs of the older Public Administration. At a time when its claim to be a science was under attack as pretentious, Simon argued forcefully that administrative phenomena are indeed the proper subjects of scientific study—if properly conceived and executed. At a time when the concept of efficiency was under criticism as too narrow and unimaginative a criterion, he carefully defined and refined the concept, made a distinction between pure and practical sciences, and argued that efficiency is a proper criterion as applied to the factual aspects of a practical science of administration. Even the sharp distinction between fact and value, while a much more subtle matter than the distinction between politics and administration, resembles the latter in the formal sense that it is a sweeping twofold division of the universe of administrative phenomena. Main currents of recent years. Since the critical analyses of the 1940s, Public Administration as a discipline has lacked the self-confidence and coherence of the inter war period. Various approaches or emphases have competed, but none has succeeded in winning the general acceptance of scholars identified with the discipline. No new synthesis has been achieved; no new orthodoxy has replaced the old. In general, Public Administration has grown tremendously in the sense of accepting data, concepts, and perspectives from many sources, chiefly the various social sciences; but it has discarded little, and no organizing framework into which everything will fit has been achieved— or, if achieved, has not been recognized and accepted as such. There are several major currents and emphases, but these often overlap and mingle and, while separated for purposes of discussion, are not necessarily separated in particular books, courses of study, and so forth. Continuation of the traditional. First, it should be noted that although the 1940s undoubtedly mark
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a period of criticism and even rejection of the discipline as it emerged in the interwar period, still there has been much continuity with the older Public Administration. Scholars and teachers have naturally varied in their rejection of the traditional and their acceptance of the new. New data and concepts were added to the old; traditional points of view were presented—but qualified and criticized. Most teachers, for example, would present the organization theory of the 1930s because of its wide acceptance and practical importance, whatever criticism they might make or whatever other concepts of organization they might introduce in addition. No teacher would speak confidently of principles of administration. Still, faced with teaching students interested in careers in public administration, he would likely find himself falling back upon some of the "managerial," efficiency-oriented attitudes and materials of his predecessors. Politics and policy making. The belief that the practice of administration is a technical problem focused upon efficiency in operation was characteristic of the older Public Administration. The leading students and writers of the postwar period have adopted sharply different attitudes—whatever their other differences—on this matter. It has been generally agreed that while the phenomena of politics and the amount of policy making may decrease as one moves from the top of an administrative agency to its bottom, or into some of the technical processes or functions, still they are generally present in significant degree; and at the level of chief executive or top management, where so much interest is focused, they are important matters indeed. The results of this recognition have manifested themselves in a variety of approaches. For example, Simon's decision-making schema attempts to include the valuational as well as the factual. Some writers, for example Paul H. Appleby (1952), have written searchingly on the interaction of politics and administration in a democracy. Some, for example Norton E. Long (1962), have concentrated more sharply on politics-in-administration, on the power factor in administration. Some, for example Emmette Redford (1958), have reflected on how the ethical or public-policy component is brought to bear on the technical component. Development of a case method. One important development of the postwar period, closely related to the abandonment of the politics—administration dichotomy, has been the development of a case method of study and teaching. There had, indeed, been case programs earlier, but in the mid-1940s at
Harvard University there were new beginnings and a development of new objectives and new techniques. An interuniversity program followed the Harvard initiative, and since 1951 the enterprise, further expanded, has operated under the title Inter-University Case Program. Essentially, those who developed the new case style and format were dissatisfied with older Public Administration as doctrinaire and limited, failing to present and deal adequately with real public administration. As developed, the case is a narrative, an account of a particular, real administrative episode, as written after the events from information gathered from all possible sources. The perspective of the writer might be characterized as "interested but impartial observer," but he often tries to re-create the perspective of an important participant (or participants) in the episode—a man in a situation having to make a decision. There is an effort to present the "entire situation," i.e., everything that is relevant to the decision; and the emphasis is more on personal interaction, politics, and policy making than on technical factors. The production of such cases has been and continues to be a major enterprise of the group of scholars who produce much of the literature in the field. Since in an important sense the focus in case writing is decision making, this might seem to join them to, or at least bring them into relationship with, Simon's proposal to center the study of administration on decision making. In fact, however, serious philosophical-methodological differences have separated the two despite the formal use of the same term. "Human relations," psychology, sociology. In the late 1920s a series of famous experiments focusing upon work groups was carried out at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company (see Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939). The impact of these experiments was very great on both the study of business administration and that of public administration, though in the case of the latter the full effect was not felt until the postwar period. The Hawthorne experiments demonstrated not only the limitations of the scientific-management approach to increased efficiency by concentration upon monetary rewards and the physical aspects of the work situation but also the importance of psychological and, more broadly, social factors. The Hawthorne experiments signaled a vogue: the "human relations" approach to management. More recently, this term has lost its appeal, as associated with certain excesses and naivete. However, the human relations movement set in train a vast
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION amount of serious scientific research on the psychosociological aspects of work and administration [see INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS]. The questions to which psychological research is directed are, for example: What is morale, what factors affect it, and how is it related to work effectiveness? How do factors in a worker's perceptions and attitudes relate to the stimuli in the work situation? What factors affect the formation of face-to-face work groups, and what is their significance in administration? How does informal group life generally relate to the formal organization structure and to the official organizational goals? What are the factors involved in the phenomenon of leadership, and how do they relate to the important matter of authority? What makes for conflict, what for cooperation, between groups or organizations? [See LEADERSHIP.] Research in administration by sociologists has become increasingly important during the postwar period. Only a small part of this research has taken public organizations as its focus, but this part has a high scientific relevance; and all of it has a high potential relevance. Sociology has brought many and varied concepts to administration, but most have clustered about the term bureaucracy, an ideal type set forth by Max Weber. The research findings of sociology have less obvious relevance to immediate problems of efficiency than do those of psychology, but the range of interests and techniques embraced may hold greater promise for coping with organizational problems as they relate to the whole of society. [See BUREAUCRACY.] In general, however, Public Administration stands to benefit from the research interests and techniques of both psychology and sociology. Theory of organization. In recent years there has been great scholarly and scientific interest in organization, and a resultant outpouring of essays, books, and research reports designated by the term theory of organization. It is the view of some that organization itself, as a widespread social phenomenon, warrants the full concentration of many students. There is a widely held belief that there are universals in organizational behavior, that organization can be studied simply as organization, with a resulting body of valid theory of general applicability. One group of students, identified with general systems theory, conceives of human organization as but a type or representative of a still more general phenomenon: systems (which may be biological or physical as well as social) [see SYSTEMS ANALYSIS]. Some students of public administration are con-
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tributing to theory of organization; others, not identified with Public Administration, focus their research effort on public organizations. To the extent that there may be universals of organization, they are by definition relevant to public organizations. In any event, theory of organization is one of the very active areas of contemporary social science related to and contributing to Public Administration. [See ORGANIZATIONS.] Comparative Public Administration. Within Public Administration proper, perhaps the area of greatest current scholarly activity—and some would say of greatest promise—is the comparative study of public administration. This interest grows out of the fact that, beginning with World War n, continuing into the postwar military occupations, and accelerating with the many technical assistance programs of the United States, the United Nations, and private foundations, American students and teachers of Public Administration by the hundreds have found themselves engaged in professional work in foreign lands. This exposure to foreign, often non-Western, governmental systems and cultures has stimulated a sense of "comparativeness" in general, and in particular raised questions either about the appropriateness or the sheer possibility of transferring familiar administrative devices or applying what had been presumed to be good or scientific principles of administration. The comparative study of administrative systems parallels the comparative study of political systems —comparative politics. Both movements are characterized by the comparative youth of their participants, by a general commitment to the outlooks identified with behavioralism, by an effort to be interdisciplinary in interests and techniques, and by an effort to arrive at concepts, formulas, and theories that are truly universal, bridging and embracing all cultures. [See POLITICS, COMPARATIVE.] Nezv technologies and techniques. Recent years have seen the rapid development of various physical devices of significance for administration and a parallel development of various systems of logical thought applicable to the practice of, and to research on, administration. The former include a range of new machines, mostly electronic, that greatly extend the range of—or replace—the hand and, particularly, the brain. These devices, of which the electronic computer in its various forms is the best known, perform certain work, particularly the storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data and the making of complex calculations, with such speed and accuracy that they open up a new range of human experience and potentialities. The sys-
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terns of logical thought that have been newly developed for or applied in administration include certain branches of mathematics and certain quasimathematical systems of precise statement and reasoning. The effect of these developments is to open new and enlarged opportunities for increasing administrative efficiency and rationality—both directly, through application of what is already known or already exists, and indirectly, through opening opportunities for new types of research on problems of organization and management. An example of direct application is operations research, which combines various specialized competences to analyze systems and solve problems. Developed in World War n as a technique for attacking certain problems in military strategy and logistics, operations research is now a speciality with an independent professional organization. Simulation is an example of the expanded potentialities for research. The new physical inventions, plus new or improved systems of logical thought, permit an unprecedented type and scale of simulation. Certain administrative situations (for example, decisionmaking problems) can be reproduced (simulated) in their essentials, thus helping to solve a perennial problem of social science: how to control and repeat experiments. [See OPERATIONS RESEARCH; SIMULATION.] Many of these machines, logical systems, and what might be called social technologies, such as operations research, are now used in various branches of public administration; in some branches, such as military logistics and tax administration, they are widely used. On the whole, however, their development and use tends to center in business administration and schools of business administration. Perhaps, on the whole, they are more applicable (both presently and potentially) to business administration than to public administration. Nevertheless, increased knowledge about and use of them is on the agenda of Public Administration. The field outside the United States As indicated above, wherever there is government there is public administration, but Public Administration—in the sense of a more or less autonomous discipline of alleged general applicability—was conceived and developed in the United States and is still strongly identified with its place of origin and greatest acceptance. This is not to assert, however, that in countries in which the American idea and content of Public Administration is not accepted the matter of training for pub-
lic administration is not taken seriously or that there may not be an application of science to the conduct of public administration. Training for performance of some function in the governmental bureaucracy is a prime object of the system of public education of any country, in some cases nearly the sole object. In all advanced countries there is also some sort of special or differentiated training conceived as preparation for the positions of greatest responsibility and power in public administration—although other factors, such as social class, wealth, party membership, ideological purity, and religion, obviously are likely to enter in as selective criteria. In ancient China, as in modern Great Britain, for example, the regular and officially preferred training for high administrative positions was a humanistic education. The most commonly accepted and approved training for high position, however, has been law (at least after and apart from training in military pursuits, for military organization is often the training ground for, and a source of supply of, governmental administrators for civil as well as military functions, especially in preindustrial societies). Presumably, this practice grows naturally from the fact that the making and enforcement of law are close to the heart of government; and in widely separated times and places people who know the law and have had their minds sharpened in its study have occupied the highest positions. In AngloAmerican countries of the common law, though there is an important private quality in law, there has been a notable amount of this phenomenon; and in continental Europe, with its more immediate Roman background and its civil-law experience, where law is more strongly identified with the idea of the state, the predominant approach to preparation for high position is through study of law and jurisprudence, more particularly, that branch or aspect of the law identified as administrative law. This is not to say, again, that law and only law in a technical and formal sense is all that is taught and regarded as important. While in some situations it is substantially true that public administration is deemed to start and end with a reading and application of the book of detailed legal regulations, in some countries and in some courses of study law is deemed to be only a framework and is supplemented by other materials, including not only those from accepted social sciences (particularly economics), but perhaps from the "management science" around which Public Administration is formed. Considerable discussion has taken place during the past generation between American and Conti-
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION nental students on the question whether it is more correct and fruitful to think and speak in terms of an administrative science or the administrative sciences. The American point of view has been that it is proper to speak of a science of administration, or a science of public administration (though the implications of these two expressions are rather different). Continental students, while willing to concede the importance of administration, have tended to see it rather as a place or process in which various disciplines or sciences closely interrelate. To some extent, this controversy reflects a formal rather than a substantive difference: curriculums prescribed by the two camps for the training of public administrators might be very similar—for example, both might include sociology and economics, and perhaps administrative law and social psychology as well. At some point, however, there would likely come a parting of the ways, with the Europeans less likely than the Americans to include materials relating to "management science," more insistent upon materials closely related to their national experiences and traditions, particularly in regard to law. The communist countries share the Continental legal approach to the study and practice of public administration, though their heritage was in large part through the "second Rome" of Byzantium. This approach remains very strong, although the institutions and theories of communism make for important differences in public administration, and there are other influences, for example, the fact that some of the spirit and techniques of scientific management have been absorbed into communist administration. Trends, problems, and prospects A review of the present situation in Public Administration should note some factors pertaining to the conduct and direction of public affairs in the United States that presumably will, or should, relate importantly to the development of the discipline—to the allocation of intellectual resources and the development of doctrines. One factor is a continuing gradual increase in both the absolute and relative number of public employees. Approximately one in eight employed civilian persons is publicly employed, and while large numbers of these (publicly employed teachers, for example) are engaged in "line" functions, with little administrative responsibility, still the increase J n numbers creates a growing problem in public administration: the increase in scale itself poses new problems for those who administer and teach
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administrators, and the problems are intensified by an increasingly complex technology and an increasingly complex society. For example, to the extent that functions become more differentiated, and specialization and professionalization more advanced, in such fields as health, welfare, and education, the problem is posed of where and how the teaching of administration of such functions should take place. This is a problem of physical location and organizational arrangements; but it is also a problem in the evolution of science, or at least doctrine, posing the theoretical question whether administration is a "universal," and the practical one whether it should be taught "in general" or as related to the content of the various fields. [See ADMINISTRATION; CIVIL SERVICE.] Other factors concern changes and trends in public administration. In its origins Public Administration was concerned with certain problems of reform, conceptualized as problems in honesty and competence, and with such problems as departmentalization, executive control, and staff services, in which efficiency and economy were prime concerns. There has been much change and addition: human relations, communications, and so forth. But it is questionable whether recent and contemporary interests are as responsive as they should be to the content and direction of present governmental activities. Taking money as the measure, we might say that Public Administration pays relatively slight attention to two areas that represent more than half of public administration, namely, education and defense. Other important developments are inadequately represented in current professional attention; for example, the urbanmetropolitan revolution in American life; the tremendous expansion of "government by contract and grant," which has blurred the lines between the public and private sectors and between the federal and state spheres; and the rise of scientific research to the status of a pre-eminent national concern, a rise in which government at every level is involved in ways that lack even simple description and elementary understanding. Public Administration since the 1940s obviously presents a spectacle of travail and transition, of controversy and confusion. The questions now are posed: Is Public Administration properly regarded as a discipline? Will it continue to be spelled with capital letters in connection with the organization of the intellectual life of the social sciences into curriculums, departments, professional societies, and so forth? The answer to the first of these questions is both a matter of definition and a matter of the unknowns of the future. The answer to the second
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is very probably positive -. Public Administration as an organizing concept will continue and probably grow in importance, although there is presently discernible some tendency to merge its activities and interests with related activities and interests under the broader term public affairs. If discipline is defined very strictly as an intellectual enterprise with a body of consistent and agreed theory, then Public Administration is not a discipline and almost certainly will not become one. But few if any social sciences, or branches or disciplines thereof, fit this description. Indeed, few if any of the physical sciences do. If discipline is defined in terms of what has been called a core of unifying beliefs, then it is quite possible that in the future one of the now competing perspectives will achieve dominance, or a new synthesis will be achieved. Meanwhile, however, it should be emphasized both that there is no agreement on what constitutes a discipline and that intellectual progress does not await tidy definitions and agreements of opinion. In regard to the question whether Public Administration will continue as an organizing concept, present trends indicate that its extent and importance, at least in the United States, will almost certainly increase. Concomitantly, there will certainly continue to be an increase in the complexity and difficulty of the problems of public administration in an increasingly complex society and a multiplication of new sciences and technologies bearing upon the processes and problems of administration, as well as continued advances in the old. There is likely to be more, not less, attention to the problems of organizing knowledge to bring it to bear on public administration as well as more, not less, training for and in public administration; and Public Administration will probably provide the organizing framework and the usual name for the central aspects of these enterprises. We may achieve more clarity of concepts, more agreement among opposing schools of thought, or even a new synthesis; but it is clear that the value of Public Administration for designation of a focus of inquiry and activity, for the organization of research and instruction, does not depend on these eventualities. In fact, at the present stage of development, it may be better to regard Public Administration not as a single "thing," but as the customary and accepted collective term to designate a focus of interest and activity, in the way that the plural term the administrative sciences is used in Europe for a similar (but not identical) purpose. So used, it is analogous to engineering and medicine in indi-
cating a unifying focus for a wide array of sciences and technologies. The recent history of Public Administration, and its present problems and opportunities, should be viewed from the perspective of the rejection in the 1940s of the division of politics and administration. That the political process reaches deeply into public administration and that the making of public policy is an important activity of public administration have since been all but universally recognized. But the response has been varied: there is still no general agreement on what conclusions follow, what the methodological implications are, what lines of inquiry are indicated as most appropriate and fruitful, what the implications are for programs of education and training. The discipline is presently trying to find its way through the tangle of issues. Many of the issues are posed in putative dichotomies and verbal antinomies: politics and administration, political science and Public Administration, science and art, pure science and practical science, fact and value, prescription and description, administrative science and administrative sciences, diversity and similarity, absolutism and relativism, universality and uniqueness, generality and concreteness. Whether in general or in any particular case the dichotomies are properly conceived, the antinomies properly opposed, is questionable, and they undoubtedly present a tangled skein to the student. In the last analysis, however, it must be universally conceded that important problems are involved. The two most important immediate responses to the rejection of a separation between politics and administration were the application of the case method to the study of public administration and the reformulation presented in Simon's Administrative Behavior. These two responses were rather near the opposite ends of the spectrum of methodological possibilities. The case approach has been motivated by a commitment to the objectives and methods of the social sciences, to be sure, but it has been shaped also by a considerable sensitivity to traditional concerns of the humanities and by a practical interest in pedagogy as against research. It sought the truth about administration by trying, dispassionately and painstakingly, to tell the story about what takes place in administration, in actual events, in context, and in all relevant dimensions. A large number of the abler students of the postwar generation in Public Administration were attracted to the case approach, and it continues to be of major importance.
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The reformulation set forth in Administrative Behavior did not, paradoxically, attract many students in Public Administration—to whom it was presumably addressed—but it was and is highly regarded by students of business administration and apparently has been very influential in research in that field. Simply put, students in Public Administration were inclined to feel that Simon's work did not describe the world of public administration as they had experienced and observed it. To a generation emancipated from the politicsadministration dichotomy, Simon's separation of fact and value seemed but another artificial division of the universe into two realms. Simon's commitment to a "hard" interpretation of social science, his philosophical and methodological program, were unappealing. However, younger students, more familiar with and affected by behavioralism, probably find the formulations more meaningful and appealing, and it is possible that the work thus may have a delayed, direct impact on the discipline, in addition to the indirect influence that it has already exercised. The most significant development in Public Administration, currently engaging the attention and energies of a large number of students both young and mature, is the focusing of attention on comparative public administration and the related problems of "development administration." This attention grows out of personal experience, is related importantly to world-wide developments that are likely to continue, and is addressed to a wide spectrum of interests from concrete policy questions to the abstractions of the pure social sciences. [Sec TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE; see also FOREIGN AID.] For the most part, it is the younger students in Public Administration who are active in the comparative movement, and certainly it is they who are chiefly interested in the theoretical-scientific questions. For the most part and in a general sense these younger students are behavior ally oriented; they are knowledgeable about and have a concern with the central problems of the social sciences. But the paradox noted above is further exemplified: They are not especially attracted by the formulations and interests of Simon, but find their inspiration, models, and techniques in other parts of the contemporary social sciences, most notably in the companion movement in political science—comparative politics—and in sociology. From the point of view of the scientific study of public administration, the course of future developments would seem to rest in large measure on the respective futures of the comparative public ad-
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ministration movement and the administrative science point of view. By the latter is meant the outlook and research interests (including but not limited to those of Simon) that are identified in a general way with business administration: in a general way they grow out of the old scientificmanagement movement as modified by the Hawthorne studies; are strongly oriented historically toward efficiency and currently toward the related, but broader, "rationality" (or the even broader decision-making schema); make considerable use of mathematics; include but are not limited to the new technologies and techniques discussed above; and aspire to a science of administration in every essential way as scientific as current physical science. Administrative science as an approach or movement is closely joined with, but still distinguishable from, the theory-of-organizations movement. Both movements—particularly the theory of organizations—are sometimes concerned with "comparativeness" in some aspect, but their concern is largely with intracultural, not intercultural comparison. In the broadest sense, the future of Public Administration is engaged with the future of political science, on the one hand, and with administrative science, on the other. It has, from its beginnings, represented a joining of certain interests of political science with the "management" movement; and it still does, granted all the additional factors, the new developments, the broadened spectra. What meaning and importance will be given to the Public in Public Administration, whether it will evaporate or remain significant, perhaps even become more significant, will depend in large part on what developments take place in political science and in the social sciences—indeed in contemporary thought—as a whole. DWIGHT WALDO [Directly related are the entries ADMINISTRATION; CIVIL SERVICE; DECISION MAKING; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, article on ADMINISTRATION; POWER; PUBLIC POLICY. Other relevant material may be found in BUREAUCRACY; GOVERNMENT; LAW; ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL SCIENCE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY APPLEBY, PAUL H. 1952 Morality and Administration in Democratic Government. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press. DAHL, R. A. 1947 The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems. Public Administration Review 7:1—11. -> A brief, incisive critique of "orthodoxy." DAVY, THOMAS J. 1962 Public Administration as a Field of Study in the United States. International Review of Administrative Sciences 28:63-78. -» An excellent re-
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view of trends, in which the major contemporary orientations are treated under four headings: managerial, political, psychological, and sociological. DE GRAZIA, ALFRED 1960 The Science and Values of Administration. Administrative Science Quarterly 5:363397, 557—582. -» Observations and conclusions by a leading behavioralist, presenting an "action" schema for the understanding of administration. GAUS, JOHN M.; WHITE, LEONARD D.; and DIMOCK, M. E. 1936 The Frontiers of Public Administration. Univ. of Chicago Press. -> An outstanding work of the period, foreshadowing later developments. GOODNOW, FRANK J. 1900 Politics and Administration: A Study in Government. New York: Macmillan. -> A classic work in American political science and Public Administration. GULICK, LUTHER H.; and URWICK, LYNDALL (editors) (1937) 1954 Papers on the Science of Administration. New York: Institute of Public Administration. -> Regarded as the high-water mark of "orthodoxy"; much of it still interesting and relevant to present concerns. HEADY, FERREL 1966 Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall. -> Discusses the significance of comparative studies for Public Administration and relates public administration to political systems. LANDAU, MARTIN 1962 The Concept of Decision-making in the "Field" of Public Administration. Pages 1-28 in Sidney Malick and Edward H. Van Ness (editors), Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. -> An incisive essay, critical of present intellectual orientations and urging a sharper scientific approach centered on decision making. LONG, NORTON E. 1962 The Polity. Chicago: Rand McNally. MOLITOR, ANDRE 1959 The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Public Administration. Paris: UNESCO. -> A valuable world-wide review, discussing among other matters the issue of "administrative science" versus "administrative sciences." MOLITOR, ANDRE 1961 Public Administration Towards the Future. International Review of Administrative Sciences 27:375-384. -> Observations and estimates on present and future developments, distinguishing between developed and developing countries. MOSHER, FREDERICK C. 1956 Research in Public Administration: Some Notes and Suggestions. Public Administration Review 16:169-178. -> Contains valuable reflections on the status and problems of Public Administration. PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF, ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE CENTER 1959 Comparative Studies in Administration. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press. -> See especially the Foreword and the Introduction for a statement of the administrative science point of view. REDFORD, EMMETTE S. 1958 Ideal and Practice in Public Administration. University: Univ. of Alabama Press. ROBSON, WILLIAM A. 1961 The Present State of Teaching and Research in Public Administration. Public Administration (London) 39:217-222. -> A British view of current trends, rather negative regarding American theories and hopes. The journal is the main source of information on the British approach to the study of public administration.
ROETHLISBERGER,
FRITZ
J.;
and
DlCKSON,
WILLIAM
J.
1939 Management and the Worker: An Account of a Research Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Chicago. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1964 by Wiley. SAYRE, WALLACE S. 1958 Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging. Public Administration Review 18:102-105. SIMON, HERBERT A. (1947) 1961 Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative Organization. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan. -> A seminal work, offering both a critique of accepted doctrine and a program for reconstruction. WALDO, DWIGHT 1948 The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration. New York: Ronald Press. -> A thorough historical review of the rise of Public Administration, containing also a critique of doctrines. WALDO, DWIGHT 1955 The Study of Public Administration. New York: Random House; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. WALDO, DWIGHT 1965 The Administrative State Revisited. Public Administration Revieiv 25, no. 1:5-30. -> Discusses doctrinal developments and problems in Public Administration since the publication of The Administrative State in 1948. WHITE, LEONARD D. (1926) 1955 Introduction to the Study of Public Administration. 4th ed. New York: Macmillan. WILLOUGHBY, WILLIAM F. 1927 Principles of Public Administration: With Special Reference to the National and State Governments of the United States. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. WILSON, WOODROW (1887) 1953 The Study of Administration. Pages 65-75 in Dwight Waldo (editor), Ideas and Issues in Public Administration. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» An interesting and significant historical document in Public Administration.
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE See MEDICAL CARE; PLANNING, SOCIAL, article On WELFARE PLANNING; SOCIAL PROBLEMS; SOCIAL WORK; WELFARE STATE. PUBLIC DEBT See DEBT, PUBLIC. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE See NATIONALIZATION.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES In dealing with the theory of public expenditures, two approaches may be taken. We may take a normative view and explore the role that public expenditures should play in an efficiently functioning economy. Or we may examine the sociology or politics of fiscal behavior, explaining the forces that determine actual expenditure policy in the
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES prevailing historical and institutional context. This essay is directed largely to the normative question, attention being given in turn to three major aspects of expenditure policy—the allocation, distribution, and stabilization functions. In conclusion, brief consideration is given to fiscal sociology or politics. Allocation function The central issue in the theory of public expenditures, and, indeed, in the theory of public finance, is how to determine the proper level and pattern of public services. Putting it differently, the question is how available resources should be divided between the satisfaction of "private" and of "social" wants. Looked at as an economic problem, this immediately poses a second issue. If resources are to be used for public services or for the satisfaction of social wants, which private services or satisfactions are to be forgone? As public services must be justified in terms of their opportunity cost, the theory of expenditure-making cannot be separated from the theory of expenditure-financing. Basically, the theory of public expenditures and the theory of taxation are but different sides of the same coin. Attempts at dealing with this problem have a long and frustrating history. Adam Smith, in Book v of The Wealth of Nations, squarely addressed himself to both its aspects. Certain services, so he argued, must be provided by the state, including the upkeep of the sovereign, defense, some phases of education, and certain public works that require too much capital or are too distant in their payoff to be undertaken privately. The finance in turn should be provided through taxes levied so that all will contribute "as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state" (Smith 1776, vol. 2, P- 307 in 1910 edition). Ingeniously embedded in a single formula, this rule contains the roots of both the "ability to pay" and the "benefit" theory, the two approaches that were to provide the major strands of future discussion. The ability-to-pay doctrine became the dominant view among British writers. It was reformulated by J- S. Mill in 1848 in terms of equality of sacrifice, translated by Edgeworth in 1897 into a requirement of least total sacrifice, and refined by Pigou in 1928 mto a choice between equality of absolute, proportional, or marginal sacrifice. As a doctrine, it was attractive both to social reformers, who looked upon lt as an instrument of income equalization, and to conservatives, who shied away from the more positive view of public expenditures embedded in the benefit approach.
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Notwithstanding its wide and sustained popularity, the ability-to-pay approach has severe shortcomings. By its very nature, it deals with taxation only and fails to establish a link between the tax and the expenditure sides of the budget problem. At best, it can determine how a given tax total is to be distributed among various taxpayers, independently of the budget composition. And even this achievement, unsatisfactory as it is because the crucial problem of opportunity cost is neglected, has become increasingly dubious. The determination of equal sacrifices involves direct interpersonal utility comparisons. Such comparisons, which were the foundation of welfare economics up to the 1930s, were discarded thereafter as lacking operational content, The new formulation, by which there is a gain in total welfare only if A's position is improved without worsening B's, overcomes this difficulty but is also much more limited in application. In particular, it is inherently useless in dealing with distributional problems. If this new formulation is accepted, the ability-to-pay concept merely survives as a reflection of what is considered a socially desirable distribution of income; and once this view is taken, there is no reason why the scope of redistribution should be limited to the financing of public expenditures on goods and services, rather than including transfers as well. [See WELFARE ECONOMICS.] The benefit approach, from the beginning, had the advantage of linking the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget problem. The question, however, is whether these individual gains can be measured, since otherwise the benefit principle lacks operational meaning. A first answer was given by Smith's hypothesis that the essential service of government is protection and that the value of protection received may be measured in terms of income. This protection version of the benefit approach was subsequently adopted by many Continental writers. In many instances, it provided a vehicle for imposing severe limits on the scope of budget activity, and through most of the nineteenth century the benefit discussion fell far short of its inherent possibilities. These possibilities, indeed, did not become apparent until the close of the century when the then new economics of marginal utility calculus came to be applied to the problems of public finance. The participants in this debate included Sax in 1887, Pantaleoni in 1883, Mazzolo in 1890, Viti de Marco in 1928, and many others; but the most important contribution, from the modern point of view, was made by Wicksell (1896). This was followed by the subsequent elaboration of his work
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by Erik Lindahl in 1910 and 1919 (see Musgrave & Peacock 1958 for excerpts from these writers). Wicksell began with the assumption that there exists a "proper" distribution of income, holding that otherwise there can be no just determination of tax shares. Voters are then called upon to vote on various budget proposals, including a wide range of tax-expenditure combinations. For an expenditure plan to be passed, it should be paired with a financing plan so that it receives unanimous acceptance or, at least, acceptance by a substantial majority vote. With remarkable intuition, Wicksell thus advanced a solution under which the budget plan results in a gain in welfare, even as judged by the severe standards of modern welfare economics. It is important to note that the approach of these writers takes a strictly individualistic view of social wants. Social wants, along with private wants, are included in the preference system of the individual, and social no less than private wants should be satisfied in accordance with the sovereign choice of consumers. But if there is no difference in the psychology of private and of social wants, why need the distinction be drawn? And if private wants are satisfied through the market, why cannot the same be done for social wants, i.e., why is a public budget needed? The answer is that there is an important difference; but it is technical, not psychological. In the extreme case of a purely social want—or a purely social good provided to satisfy such a want —-we are dealing with a good whose benefits are altogether "external," that is, they are not limited to any particular consumer. This has two important implications that explain why social wants cannot be satisfied through the market mechanism but must be provided for through the budget process. First of all, note that the nature of social goods is such that all consumers are confronted with more or less the same quantity supplied. The benefits of national defense accrue to all citizens, and smog removal helps everyone in the area. While individual consumers may purchase private goods in whatever particular amounts they find suitable, all must purchase more or less the same amount of public goods. Assuming two taxpaying consumers A and B, A's demand schedule together with the total cost schedule for public services will determine the price at which the service is available to B, and B's demand schedule will, in turn, determine the price to A. According to Lindahl, the optimal supply of public services and the determination of proper cost shares is arrived at where both demand schedules intersect. This is the point
at which both A and B agree on the amount of public services which they prefer, given the underlying cost distribution. Following Bowen's version (1948) of a similar view, total demand is determined by adding individual demand schedules vertically (as distinct from horizontally for the case of private goods). Output is determined by the intersection of the total demand and supply schedules; and the offer-price indicated by each demand schedule indicates the proper cost shares of the various demands. Thus the determination of expenditure level and tax-price is again seen as proceeding analogously to that of market supply and market price for private goods. Restating the argument in terms of general welfare theory, Samuelson (1954) denned a social good as one the consumption of which by A does not reduce its availability for consumption by B. Because of this "joint consumption" feature, the condition of Pareto optimality for the social good is shown to differ from that for the private good. Assuming preferences to be revealed, a planner may determine a set of Pareto-optimal solutions, involving various divisions of total output between social and private goods, and distributions of private goods between A and B. While the Lindahl solution gives one such point on the utility frontier, it is not the only one. The choice among the points on the frontier becomes a distributional issue, to be decided in the context of a general social welfare function. At the same time, the Lindahl solution has certain unique characteristics (analogous treatment of social and private goods from the point of view of the consumer) that render it especially attractive. Second, note that this formulation, although complex enough, greatly oversimplifies the problem. It assumes that true consumer preferences are, or will be, revealed readily through the voting process. This assumption is unrealistic. In the case of private wants, a consumer must pay at the counter if he wishes to purchase the requisite private good; and in competing with other consumers for the supply of such goods, he is forced to reveal his preferences. The market, as it were, functions as an auction system. In the case of social wants the situation differs. A consumer may enjoy the supply of social goods without having to qualify by paying at a counter. This being the case, he is not induced to bid for such services. But cannot this difficulty be overcome by having the budget office issue a bill and enforce payment? Unfortunately, this is no solution. The real difficulty lies not in enforcing payment of taxes once they are properly deter-
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES mined, but rather in determining what and how much should be spent, and how much particular individuals should be called upon to contribute. In order to induce revelation of consumer preferences, a political voting process is needed, parallel in function to the private voting (bidding) process in the market. The complication arises because—unlike the case of market bidding—voters (consumers) cannot be simply assumed to record their true preferences. Since any particular individual cannot be excluded from the enjoyment of social goods, he will be tempted to understate his true preferences. If the number of voters (consumers) is large, the effect of any one contribution on the total supply of social goods will be negligible. If the number of voters is small, collusion and imperfections (analogous to interference with competition in the private market) will develop. Strategy will enter, and the result will differ from that which would be obtained under the above solution in which true preferences were revealed. A dilemma arises because the type of voting mechanism (for example, point voting) best designed to give efficient results in the absence of strategy also lends itself most to abuse by strategy; whereas a system less sensitive to strategy (for example, a crude majority vote) does not permit the voter to record the degrees of intensity of his preferences required for an efficient solution. It is thus left to the "art" of politics to establish a workable system of preference determination and tax assessment, where a constructive compromise is reached between these two sides of the problem. Indeed, this is one of the central tasks of government in a democratic society. The question arises whether the specific characteristic of the social good lies in the "joint consumption" feature or in "non-excludability." It appears that the former is more basic because application of exclusion would be undesirable for the social good even if it were possible. Since B's consumption does not interfere with A's, it would be inefficient to exclude him. We have seen that, for reasons inherent in the technical nature of social goods, social wants must be provided for through the public budget. To avoid misunderstanding, the expression "provided for" needs brief interpretation. Budgetary provision for social goods does mean that the supply of such goods and the assignment of their cost must be determined through the tax-expenditure process of government. It does not mean that social goods (i-e., goods supplied to meet social wants) must be Produced under public management. Highways and
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planes may be provided for publicly, yet be purchased from private construction or aviation companies. (The market can function in supplying such goods once government appears as a demander. The problem is in establishing government demand.) Similarly, the government may produce private goods and distribute them through sale on the market, as illustrated by the traditional tobacco monopoly. The issue of public versus private production is the essential issue of capitalism versus socialism, but not of fiscal theory. It must not be confused with the fiscal problem of allocating resources between the satisfaction of social wants and the satisfaction of private wants. Indeed, this fiscal problem exists in the confines of a socialist as well as a capitalist system. Complications. We now turn to some major qualifications or objections that may be raised regarding this statement of expenditure theory. (1) The argument, so far, has been presented as if there existed a clear-cut distinction between two types of goods—some that are purely private (benefits accruing to the owner only) and others that are purely social (benefits being altogether external). Actually, most goods involve both characteristics to varying degrees. It is hard to find budget items, other than defense, that do not involve private-want components. Education expenditures, in particular, are of the mixed type. Similarly, many privately purchased goods involve socialwant aspects, be they positive (shade trees next door) or negative (smoke nuisance). This qualification is quite in order, but it is not in conflict with the above approach. Our argument may be readily adapted to the case of mixed goods, so that budgetary provision is made for that part of the cost reflecting benefits of the social-want type, while private payment is made for that part reflecting benefits of the private-want type. The theory of taxation is thus converted into a more general theory of subsidy, the case of the 100 per cent social good (and the 100 per cent tax finance) being reduced to that of a limiting case only, matched at the other end by the 100 per cent private good (and 0 per cent tax finance). (2) Our formulation bases the distinction between social and private wants on the technical (externality) characteristics of social goods. As far as the psychology of wants is concerned, both private and social wants are considered homogeneous parts of the individual's preference system, and both are to be satisfied in line with the principle of consumer sovereignty, i.e., in line with the preferences of the individual consumer. In contrast to
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this view, some writers (especially in the German literature) have argued that social wants should not be interpreted in terms of individual preferences but should be considered as deriving from collective or community needs. The question is how and by whom these community needs are experienced and determined. If an "organic" view of the state is taken, it remains to be shown how the organism reveals its choice. If the expenditure choice and cost allocation are made by a set authority (tribal chief, king, dictator), the problems here posed are much simplified, but the resulting theory of the public sector is hardly satisfactory in a democratic setting. [See CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY.] An alternative formulation of the criticism, more acceptable to the democratic setting (Colm 1955), may be that the choice should be made through the democratic process, but that the individual (while participating therein) should be taken to be acting in the social interest rather than in his personal interest. This makes sense where matters of national concern, such as defense policy, are at stake. In such cases the social interest will be reflected in individual preferences. But there are many other instances (e.g., highways for private or commercial use) where the good is neither more nor less trivial than is the ordinary type of private good and where the ordinary motivation of consumer choice is altogether appropriate. The mere fact that externalities are attached to certain goods complicates the process of resource allocation; but it establishes no presumption that such goods serve more noble purposes or that basic preferences for such goods must be set on a different moral basis. (3) Nevertheless there are instances, even in the most democratic of societies, where individual consumer choice is overruled. On the negative side, minors are not permitted to buy guns, and the availability of drugs to adults is restricted as well. On the positive side, certain services, the supply of which could be made subject to purchase payments (for example, education), are supplied free of charge or subsidized because individual outlays thereon are considered insufficient. Or, redistributional measures are taken through payments in kind (subsidized low-cost housing, for example) rather than through cash transfers. Such infringements on consumer choice cannot be banned altogether from a democratic society. Constructively used, they can be a helpful aid in the social learning process. This part of the budget process—which I have referred to in another context (Musgrave 1959, p. 13) as the satisfaction of "merit wants"—cannot readily be fitted into the
above theory of expenditure determination. While this is a shortcoming, merit wants are the exception rather than the rule; and their existence does not invalidate the usefulness of our model, which covers the major and more manageable part of the budget problem. (4) The benefits to be derived from particular expenditure projects are frequently difficult to assess, so that the voter (or his representative) needs expert guidance in making the appropriate choices. It is here that the role of the civil servant and budget expert is of great importance. Recently, this problem has received special attention with regard to outlays on public investment. Any given public investment should be undertaken only if the rate of return exceeds or equals that of an alternative public or private investment. The problem then is how to measure the rate of return on public investment. This involves a number of important issues. One is the determination of the appropriate rate of discounts, the issue on which much of the recent discussion has focused. Another less explored but perhaps more important matter is the development of techniques by which secondary benefits resulting from a particular project may be measured. Finally, there is the problem of developing rules of thumb (e.g., various types of cost-benefit ratios) that can be used for guidance in actual policy making. [See INVESTMENT, article on THE INVESTMENT DECISION; WATER RESOURCES.] (5) In the modern democratic society, budgetary matters are not decided by referendum but in the legislature. This does not mean that the decision is made without relation to the preferences of the individual voter. The legislator acts by representing his constituents and is elected by exhibiting a platform more or less reflecting their preference patterns. By engaging in coalition with other legislators, he serves to establish bundles of issues on which a consensus can be reached. All this is an important part of preference determination and may be looked upon as a means of expediting, rather than displacing, individual choice. Of course the party mechanism, in some of its manifestations, may also act as an interfering factor. (6) The assumption that all citizens are confronted with the very same supply of social goods needs to be qualified, especially with regard to regional differentials. The regional aspects of expenditure theory (for example, regional differences in benefit incidence or spillover of benefits between regions with different government) cannot be dealt with here, nor can the qualifications needed as the model of a unitary government (implicit in our
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES discussion) is replaced by one of fiscal federalism. [See LOCAL FINANCE.] Distributional function So far, we have dealt with budgetary provision for goods and services designed to satisfy social wants. This "allocation" aspect of the public household, although perhaps the most basic function of the revenue-expenditure process of government, is by no means the only one. Distributional adjustments must also be considered. If tenets of modern welfare economics are accepted, economics, as previously noted, has nothing to say on the basic issue of income distribution. While the economic analyst may explore the consequences (with regard to the level of output, growth, and other factors) of various changes in distribution, he cannot compare the merits of alternative distributions of a given output. This could be done only if interpersonal utility comparison is admitted and an operational procedure of comparison could be devised. However this may be, distribution does present a policy issue. This is obvious in the socialist setting, where the return to capital accrues to the state and wages paid need not equal the return to labor as a planning cost. But even in the most capitalistic of countries, distribution is not left entirely to the ownership of factors (labor as well as capital and natural resources) and the market system of factor pricing. Some degree of intervention is held necessary, if only to provide for the indigent. Beyond this, society may consider the unadjusted state of distribution to be less or more equal than is held desirable and choose to make the necessary adjustments. The necessity for some distributional adjustments is thus generally accepted, even though the desired degree of adjustment is highly controversial. [See POVERTY.] The most direct and efficient tool for carrying out such adjustments as are desired is provided through the tax-transfer process. Use of the taxtransfer instrument is superior to interference with factor pricing, which gives rise to inefficient resource use in the private sector of the economy. It is superior as well to interference with product prices (subsidies) or redistribution in kind (e.g., distribution of free goods rather than cash), since transfers do not interfere with the option of consumer choice. Such at least is the case unless redistributional objectives coincide explicitly with situations where interference with consumer choice 18 held desirable in order to satisfy merit wants. Reasoning along these lines, an orderly budget system would provide for two subbudgets. There
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would be a tax-purchase budget, designed to provide for goods and services needed to satisfy social wants. Also, there would be a tax-transfer budget designed to make such distributional adjustments as are held desirable. Assuming correction in the direction of greater equality, the latter budget would involve progressive taxes combined with regressive transfers. The distribution of taxes in the former budget would depend on the income and price elasticities of demand for public services. The resulting distribution of taxes in the allocation budget could be proportional, progressive, or regressive, depending on the circumstances of the case. Given these two subbudgets, one may then think of a combined budget, where the two sets of taxes are combined and netted out against transfers. Assuming the tax distribution under the allocation budget to be proportional to income, with tax transfers toward greater equality in the distribution budget, the net budget would show a progressive structure, with transfers at the lower end of the income scale. In this way, the tax-transfer pattern in the net budget may be interpreted in a rational manner, and the vague and unsatisfactory notion of "ability to pay" is replaced by a more clear-cut system of budget determination. All this is but a way of formalizing the Wicksellian principle of separating the issue of budget policy for redistribution from that of budget policy for the satisfaction of social wants. This separation has great merit for an orderly view of budget policy. At the same time, it must be granted that complete separation is not possible. Merit-want objectives may coincide with distributional purposes, the assumption being (presumably) that low-income consumers are most in need of consumption guidance. Moreover, we have seen that the very nature of social wants does not assure a single best solution to the budget problem and, in a sense, requires a distributional decision to choose among the points on the utility frontier. How may this be squared with the Wicksellian dictum that a "just" allocation of the cost of public services requires a "just" distribution of income? As has been pointed out by modern welfare economists, a proper state of distribution must be defined in welfare terms. Assume that there are private goods only. A given state of income distribution may then lead to different welfare distributions (different points on the utility frontier) depending on which pricing rule is used. Since there is more than one efficient rule, a meaningful concept of "proper" income distribution must be linked with a specific pricing rule. In the case of private goods,
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this is supplied conveniently by uniform pricemarginal cost pricing in a competitive market. An analogous argument holds if the allocation and distribution problems are separated in the case of social goods. If a given income distribution is said to be proper, it must be specified as such on the assumption that a given pricing rule is followed with regard to social goods. One such rule is given by the Lindahl solution, where the tax price paid by each consumer is such that his marginal rate of substitution of public for private goods must equal the ratio of public goods prices payable by him to private goods prices. Stabilization and growth Having considered the allocation and distribution function, it remains to note the stabilization function of budget policy. In a decentralized market system, there is no assurance that the level of aggregate demand may not at times be excessive (inducing inflation) or deficient (inducing unemployment). To provide the necessary corrective, monetary and/or fiscal measures may be needed. Expansionary fiscal action may be taken in various ways, including expenditure increase, tax reduction, and balanced budget expansion. In the context of a general theory of expenditure determination, the stabilization function is to be performed in such a way as not to interfere with the previously examined allocation and distribution functions. This suggests that expansionary action takes the form of proportional tax reduction (or transfer increase), while restrictive actions take the form of proportional tax increase (or transfer reduction). Putting it differently, the level of government expenditures on goods and services should be so set as to provide for proper allocation of resources under the condition of full resource use, leaving it to the tax—transfer mechanism to secure full employment; and the use of this mechanism should be such that it will not affect the "proper" state of distribution. It does not follow, however, that the level of goods and service expenditures should never be varied over the cycle. The very factors that make for changes in the level of private expenditures (for example, changes in investment opportunity) may affect (in the opposite direction) the demand for public services; problems of unemployment may be regionally confined and require regionally focused action; public jobs may be more desirable socially than the public dole, and so forth. Thus, countercyclical expenditure policy cannot be ruled out, even though there is a prima facie argument for tax—transfer adjustments.
Recent emphasis in fiscal policy discussion has been upon the growth, rather than the countercyclical, aspects of stabilization policy. This has important bearing on the allocation function of expenditure policy. Given the level of resource utilization, increased growth requires a higher level of capital formation relative to consumption. This means (a) emphasis on public investment, relative to public consumption, in the allocation function of budget policy; and (b) a mixture of fiscal and monetary policy that is inducive to a high rate of private capital formation. Under favorable conditions (a high level of potential investment in the private sector), this may be secured by combining easy availability of credit with a tight (high-tax) budget policy. Under less favorable conditions, expansion of public investment and special (tax or transfer) incentives to private investment may be needed. Following the procedure suggested for the distribution function, we may now visualize a third budget, addressed to the stabilization function. In securing high employment and price-level stability, and doing so without interference with the other purposes of budget policy, the stabilization budget calls for proportional taxes when restriction of private spending is needed and for transfers when expansion is required. Whereas the distribution budget is always balanced (taxes on A being used to make transfers to B) and the allocation budget is balanced over time (consumption expenditures being tax financed and capital expenditures being amortized over the life of the asset), the stabilization budget by its very nature is either overbalanced or underbalanced. Accordingly, we may now think of the over-all budget as reflecting a consolidated version of the three subbudgets, reflecting the net patterns of expenditure and tax payments, as well as the state of net balance. While this is the budget that, in effect, comes to be administered, disaggregation is needed to understand the policy issues involved. Fiscal politics The preceding discussion was addressed to the question of how to secure efficient conduct of the public sector in a democratic society. An alternative approach to the theory of public expenditures is to provide an explanation of the actual conduct of expenditure policy. This approach, which will be noted but briefly, may be referred to as fiscal sociology or fiscal politics. Karl Marx, in the Communist Manifesto, held that capitalism might be undermined by progressive taxation, just as it would be weakened (and
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES this should be added to place his judgment in proper perspective) by popular education. Adolph Wagner predicted a rising ratio of public expenditures to Gross National Product as a law of social and political development. Wicksell foresaw the possibility that a fiscal mechanism guided by majority voting could lead to the exploitation of the rich by the poor, thereby reversing the earlier concern of social reformers. Rudolf Goldscheid presented a sweeping theory of budget behavior, cast in the context of a Marxist view of history. The wealthy state of feudal society, so he argued, gave way to the impoverished modern state, precisely as the ruling class relinquished control over the state to the people (see Musgrave & Peacock 1958 for excerpts from these writers). Joseph Schumpeter (1918), taking off from Goldscheid, re-examined the change of fiscal forms in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and so forth. The present writer has stressed the importance of political interaction between the various functions of budget policy as an explanatory as well as distorting factor in budgetary decision making. Emphasis has been placed by Giinter Schmolders (1955) on the psychological basis of taxpayer behavior, and various attempts have been made— including those by Downs (1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), and Black (1958)—to explore the consequences of party behavior and majority voting. Some have argued that the political process tends to result in an excessive level of public expenditures because voters tend to underestimate the cost of public services, expecting it to be paid by the next fellow. Others have held the opposite, whether it is, as suggested by Galbraith (1958), because the need for private services is overrated in response to advertising, because the political mechanism is biased toward inaction rather than action, or because benefits from public services are less urgently required. Moreover, the intrusion of distribution or stabilization considerations into the allocation budget may lead to a distortion of the expenditure level, rendering it unduly high when expansionary action is needed or when the ruling Majority considers budget expansion as a means toward increased redistributional gains, and vice versa under opposite conditions. Finally, it has been suggested by Peacock and Wiseman (1961) that the growth of public expenditures is related to the tendency for increases in tax rates during crisis Periods such as war to be nonreversible, thus periodically sucking up the level of public outlays for civilian purposes. None of these explanations is altogether convincing; but they suggest that fiscal
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sociology, or fiscal politics, is a fascinating, if as yet largely unexplored, area of research. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE [See also BUDGETING, article on GOVERNMENT BUDGETING; FISCAL POLICY; TAXATION; WELFARE ECONOMICS; and the biographies of PIGOU and WICKSELL.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARROW, KENNETH J. 1951 Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley. BLACK, DUNCAN 1958 The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge Univ. Press. BOWEN, HOWARD R. 1948 Toward Social Economy. New York: Rinehart. BUCHANAN, JAMES M. 1960 Fiscal Theory and Political Economy: Selected Essays. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. BUCHANAN, JAMES M.; and TULLOCK, GORDON 1962 The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press. COLM, GERHARD 1955 Essays in Public Finance and Fiscal Policy. Oxford Univ. Press. DOWNS, ANTHONY 1957 An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. ECKSTEIN, OTTO 1961 A Survey of the Theory of Public Expenditure Criteria. Pages 439-504 in UniversitiesNational Bureau Committee for Economic Research, Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization. National Bureau of Economic Research, Special Conference Series, No. 12. Princeton Univ. Press. -» This survey includes extensive references to the literature. GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH 1958 The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. JOHANSEN, L. 1963 Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of Determination of Public Expenditures. International Economic Review 4:346-358. MARGOLIS, JULIUS 1955 A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditures. Review of Economics and Statistics 32:347-349. MARGOLIS, JULIUS 1957 Secondary Benefits, External Economies and the Justification of Public Investment. Review of Economics and Statistics 39:284-291. MUSGRAVE, RICHARD A. 1959 The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» See especially Parts 1 and 2. MUSGRAVE, RICHARD A.; and PEACOCK, ALAN T. (editors) 1958 Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. London and New York: Macmillan. -» Contains excerpts from the more important European writers. PEACOCK, ALAN T.; and WISEMAN, JACK 1961 The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom. National Bureau of Economic Research, General Series, No. 72. Princeton Univ. Press. SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1954 The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures. Review of Economics and Statistics 36: 387-389. SAMUELSON, PAUL A. 1955 Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditures. Review of Economics and Statistics 32:350-356. SCHMOLDERS, GUNTER 1955 Finanzpolitik. Berlin: Springer. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1918) 1954 The Crisis of the Tax State. International Economic Papers 4:5-38. -» First published as Die Krise des Steuerstaats.
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SMITH, ADAM (1776) 1952 An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 39. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica. -» A two-volume paperback edition was published in 1963 by Irwin. WICKSELL, KNUT 1896 Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen nebst Darstellung und Kritik des Steuerwesens Schwedens. Jena (Germany): Fischer.
PUBLIC FINANCE For an overview of the economic aspects of government receipts and expenditures, see BUDGETING, article on GOVERNMENT BUDGETING; FISCAL POLICY; LOCAL FINANCE. The most general treatment of government expenditures is PUBLIC EXPENDITURES; more specialized aspects are treated in SUBSIDIES; CREDIT, article on GOVERNMENT CREDIT. For receipts, see TAXATION; for government borrowing, see DEBT, PUBLIC.
PUBLIC HEALTH As far back in time as one can ascertain, men have lived in the organized groups that we call communities and have had to deal in one way or another with health problems arising from their biological attributes and needs and from their social circumstances. The major areas of concern have been the provision of food and water in sufficient supply and of acceptable quality, the control of the physical environment, the prevention or control of epidemic and endemic diseases, the provision of health care, and the relief of physical and social disability. Out of the need for dealing with the health problems of group living, there has evolved, with increasing clarity over the centuries, a recognition of the signal importance of community action in the promotion of health and the prevention and treatment of disease. This recognition and its consequences for action are summed up in the concept of public health. It has its roots in such rudimentary measures as the rituals and incantations against pestilence of ancient Mesopotamia and in the advanced administrative systems of imperial Rome, the ruthless isolation by the medieval community of the person afflicted with leprosy or plague, the needs of kings and princes to achieve and maintain power through large populations, as well as in the continuing efforts and devotion of numerous men and women who have desired only to better the condition of their fellows. Concepts and practices Health and ill health have their biological roots, but the biological processes and phenomena have been and are being influenced, impeded, and facili-
tated in contexts of changing political, economic, social, and cultural elements. Indeed, the changing character of community health action is due to the circumstance that health problems do not exist in the abstract but have always been linked with the varying conditions of particular groups of people. One may almost say that each period of history has its own ideal of health and its own public health. For example, the concept of health in medieval Europe was limited by the theological concept of sin. This was particularly true in the case of mental health; not until the realm of health was extensively secularized was it even possible to begin to consider mental health in a public health context. In this sense, the concept of public health must of necessity be asymptotic. The goals of public health are not Platonic ideas, absolute and unchanging. They represent in some form the dominant values of a society, and public health activities have been explained or justified on several grounds, such as religion, humanitarianism, or scientific interest. An extremely pervasive consideration, furthermore, has been economic or social utility. Historical analysis of public health reveals two major components that have been involved in its evolution. One is the development of medical science and technology. Understanding the nature and cause of disease provides a basis for prevention and control. Thus, faced with problems of epidemic disease, communities have acted in terms of some prevailing concept of the nature of disease. On the primitive level of knowledge, such action is generally couched in supernatural terms. For thousands of years epidemics were looked upon as divine judgments on the wickedness of mankind, and it was believed that these punishments were to be avoided by appeasing the wrathful gods. Alongside this theurgical theory of disease, however, there gradually developed the idea that pestilence is due to natural causes involving physical, biological, and social factors, that is, causes that can be studied rationally by the human mind. Beginning with the efforts of the Greeks, men have endeavored to combine speculations, theoretical inferences, observations, and experimental facts into theories that would explain the occurrence of diseases and provide a rationale for their prevention or control. Effective action, however, depends on a variety of nonscientific elements, which are basically political, economic, and social. Disease may seriously disturb the life of the group. This is particularly true when people fall ill with contagious diseases and thus menace the health of their fellow men, or when individuals become a burden on the community because of illness or disability. To deal with such matters society creates agencies, establishes
PUBLIC HEALTH laws, and institutes procedures to implement laws. Public administration, in a simple form, is found early in human history, and from the beginning public health has been closely linked with governmental activity. Thus, the administration of public health is in large measure a political act. Any endeavor to understand public health practice must take account of the political dimension, because it lies at the base of the activity. Because public health is an expression of the aims and values of a society and is so closely linked with government, the practice of public health has been influenced not alone by the state of scientific knowledge but equally, if not more so, by prevailing theories of society and the state. The work of Johann Peter Frank in the eighteenth century is inconceivable apart from mercantilism and enlightened absolutism, just as that of Edwin Chadwick in the nineteenth century has its roots in philosophical radicalism and classical economics. Similarly, public health policy in the Soviet Union derives a characteristic stamp from communist doctrine, just as, in the United States, it has been molded by federalism, free enterprise, liberalism, and social reform. The Greco-Roman world Evidence of activity related to community health has been found in the earliest civilizations. Bathrooms, drains, and water supply and sewerage systems testify to the achievements of the ancient Cretans, Egyptians, and others. Services today associated with public health are not mentioned frequently in antiquity; nevertheless, there were specific administrative arrangements for such matters as drainage and water supply, for which designated officials were responsible. An important theoretical contribution of antiquity was the idea developed by the Greeks that disease is due to natural causes, involving the natural environment and especially climate. Ill health developed when there was an imbalance between man and his environment. This view is clearly expressed in the Hippocratic work The Airs, Waters and Places, the first known systematic endeavor to elucidate the causal relations between disease and environmental factors (climate, soil, water, mode of life, and nutrition). For more than two thousand years this basic approach provided the theoretical underpinning for an epidemiological understanding of endemic and epidemic disease. No fundamental change occurred in this respect until late in the nineteenth century, when the sciences of bacteriology and immunology were developed. n Rome conquered the Mediterranean world
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and took over the culture of the Greeks, it also accepted Greek ideas on health and disease but adapted them to Roman purposes. The Romans were no theoreticians, but they left their mark on history as engineers and administrators, builders of sewerage systems and baths, and providers of water supplies and other health facilities. Thus the waterworks of Rome were supervised by a board which had at its disposal a permanent staff of workers. Similarly, the maintenance and cleansing of the sewerage system was under the supervision of specially designated officials, who had a staff of public slaves. Equally significant was the organization of medical care. By the second century A.D. there was a public medical service, and hospitals had been created. These were first provided for soldiers, slaves, and public functionaries, later for civilians. Eventually, under the influence of Christianity, motives of charity and benevolence led to the creation of hospitals and related facilities in many localities. The foundation of hospitals for the sick, the disabled, and the indigent in the medieval period derives from Roman institutions. Public health in Rome can clearly be seen as a social subsystem of the community with an organizational structure, a set of functions in terms of defined objectives, functionaries to carry out the necessary activities, a rationale to explain what was done, and techniques and tools for these purposes. Furthermore, this system had relationships with other parts of the social organization of Rome; the growth of the administrative system can clearly be seen as a consequence of the expansion of the community. The Middle Ages The disintegration of the Greco-Roman world led to a decline of urban culture and with it to a decay of public health organization and practice. However, the East Roman, or Byzantine, Empire was to a large extent able to carry on the tradition and culture of the classical world. Here the GrecoRoman legacy was preserved, and from this center it was first transmitted to the Arabs in the East and later to the peoples of Europe. In the West during the earlier medieval period (A.D. 500-1000), communal activities in the interest of health were undertaken under the aegis of the church and particularly the monastic orders; they undoubtedly provided models for the urban communities that began to develop in Europe about the tenth century. Many of the public health problems of the medieval community were simply due to the circumstance that an increasing population had to be accommodated within a limited space and that for a long time most of the inhabitants maintained a
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rural mode of life. The problems were in essence those already indicated for antiquity, but to deal with them the medieval municipalities had to create anew the institutions needed for a hygienic mode of life. While the medieval community did not have an organized public health system in the present-day sense, it did have administrative machinery for disease prevention, sanitary supervision, and, in general, protection of community health. The character of this machinery was closely related to the general administration of the medieval municipality. The city or town was run by a council that had charge of finances, organized its provisioning, ordered and supervised public works, and also dealt with health and welfare problems. Physicians were not involved in public health administration but were employed for specific duties, such as the provision of expert counsel in times of pestilence or in medico-legal matters, the diagnosis of leprosy and similar conditions, and the provision of medical care to the indigent, to prisoners, or to other public charges as required. The institution of quarantine. Medieval man was far from passive when faced by the problem of epidemics. He did what he could to protect himself, but in a manner consistent with the prevailing climate of thought and belief. Thus, his protective ideas were based on an amalgam of medical and religious views. The need to control leprosy was recognized early and led to a mode of public health action that is still with us, namely, the isolation of persons with communicable diseases. When the community believes itself menaced by such individuals it feels justified, acting through its institutions, in subjecting such people to restraints and sanctions in order to protect itself; people suffering from certain communicable diseases have to be reported to the authorities, and in some cases the freedom of the individual may be severely circumscribed. Thus, following policies adopted at the third Later an Council in 1179, lepers were expelled from the medieval community, deprived of their civil rights, and consigned to a legal and social death. At the same time, places of refuge (leper or lazar houses) were provided for these unfortunate people. The preventive principle used to combat leprosy was amplified and carried further in dealing with that other great scourge of the Middle Ages, bubonic plague, popularly known as the Black Death. From this preventive endeavor grew a basic contribution to public health practice, namely, the institution of quarantine. Beginning at Venice in 1348, public officials in Italy, southern France, and the neighboring area created a system of sanitary control to combat plague and other infectious dis-
eases, with observation stations, isolation hospitals, and disinfection procedures. Based on more accurate knowledge and organized more rigorously, quarantine is still a part of contemporary public health practice. Other areas of public health to which the Middle Ages made significant contributions were health education and the development of the hospital. Even though medieval hospitals had little in common with the modern institutions, they provided one of the sources from which our hospitals evolved. The modern era With minor modifications, the public health pattern created by the medieval urban community continued in use from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. With the development of national states in Europe, central governments took action increasingly but sporadically; on the whole, public health problems were handled by the local community. During this period, however, basic scientific knowledge was being acquired on which the structure of modern public health would eventually be erected. The great scientific outburst of this period began to make possible the more precise recognition of diseases and a better understanding of their nature. At the same time, ideological form was given to the possibility and importance of applying scientific knowledge to the health needs of the community. Concurrently, a quantitative approach to health problems developed out of the political and economic needs of the modern state. To increase national power and wealth, a large population was considered necessary. It was in relation to this concern that political arithmetic, that is, the collection and analysis of quantitative data bearing on national life, developed. The founder of this approach was William Petty, a seventeenth-century physician and economist; but the first solid contribution to vital statistics was made by his friend John Graunt, whose classic book Natural and Political Observations . . . Upon the Bills of Mortality appeared in 1662. The application of statistical analysis to community health problems was to prove extraordinarily fruitful for the development of public health. The consideration of health problems in connection with the aim of maintaining and augmenting a population that could be economically productive and provide fighting men logically implied a health policy for the entire dominion of a monarch or of a nation. This implication was recognized and began to be developed in England and on the Continent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While a number of thinkers and men of affairs endeavored to deal with public health on a
PUBLIC HEALTH national scale, it was not until the nineteenth century, with the advent of the new industrial and urban civilization, that the problem of organizing the larger community to protect its health became a matter of national concern and led to concrete results. The earlier efforts reached a high point in the work of Johann Peter Frank, whose career spanned the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and who is best known as a pioneer in public health administration and social medicine. During the eighteenth century the cultural and economic movements known as the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution provided the seedbeds in which the new ideas, tendencies, and methods that revolutionized public health in the nineteenth century germinated and developed. In Britain, France, the countries of central Europe, and the United States, similar problems were attacked in the name of reason, order, human welfare, economy, and community concern. Among these were alcoholism, infant mortality, epidemics, the care of the insane, the creation or improvement of hospitals and dispensaries, improvement of the physical environment in towns, and the health conditions of specific groups such as soldiers, sailors, scholars, prisoners, miners, metalworkers, and various kinds of artisans. This interest is linked to the development of the health survey. The method was applied to the investigation of regions, communities, institutions, or population groups. Thus, John Howard published his account of the State of the Prisons in 1777 and proposed means to ameliorate social and health conditions which he had found. When applied to regions or communities, these investigations were known as medical topographies. Comprising sanitary surveys, epidemiologic studies, and social investigations, they prepared the way for the more specialized surveys and analyses that were carried out during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Today the survey as a tool for studying community health problems is an important component of the public health armamentarium. Public health and sanitary reform Modern public health developed out of the sanitary reform movement of the nineteenth century, which began in England, where the impact of the industrial revolution on health was first recognized as a matter of community concern requiring governmental action on a continuing basis. Nevertheless, wherever industrialism developed, whether in France, Germany, or the United States, the consequences were similar and called for similar remedies. The human cost of industrialization and urbanization in terms of ill health and premature death was great, and the sanitary reformers en-
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deavored to reduce it by organizing the community to protect the health of its members. This aim was coupled with a recognition that disease for which the individual could not be held responsible was an important factor in the cost of public assistance and that it would be good economy to undertake community-wide measures for the prevention of disease. In England. The industrial revolution found England without any effective system of local government or any national agency to deal with the health problems which it created or intensified. At the same time urban communities grew and became more congested, and more and more people became aware of the cities' novel, powerful, and alarming qualities. It was apparent that endemic or epidemic diseases tended to seek out the poorer districts, but they were not limited to them. This awareness and the consequent desire to reduce or eliminate disease and the destitution which it produced are among the major roots from which the sanitary reform movement sprang. One of the first products of this reform movement was the Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Gt. Britam, a fundamental document dealing with modern public health which appeared in 1842. Prepared by Edwin Chadwick, lawyer, administrator, and one of the creators of sanitary reforms, the Report showed that communicable diseases were associated with filthy environmental conditions. In Chadwick's view, what was needed was an administrative organ to undertake a preventive program by applying engineering knowledge and techniques in an efficient and consistent manner. He also recognized the need for a physician to see that action was taken when necessary and to keep watch on health conditions in the community. The Public Health Act of 1848, passed by Parliament after six years of agitation, established the General Board of Health. This step was a major landmark in the history of public health, because it created a basis for the further evolution of public health administration in England and led eventually to the establishment of the Ministry of Health in 1919. Moreover, it set an example whose influence was felt far beyond England. The impact of British sanitary reform was nowhere more pervasive than in the United States, where, as in England, one of the basic problems involved in the genesis and development of public health was the need to create an effective administrative mechanism for the supervision and regulation of community health. In America. Between 1800 and 1830, only five major American cities had boards of health. Even
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as late as 1875 many large urban communities had no health departments. Beginning in the 1830s, however, increasing immigration and urban growth produced situations that required urgent attention. Inadequate provision for housing, water supply, sewerage, and drainage brought into being a whole brood of evils that expressed themselves in the urban slum. Recurrent epidemics of smallpox, typhoid and typhus, cholera, and yellow fever impressed upon the public the urgent need for effective public health organization. In 1866 the New York Metropolitan Board of Health was established, an event which marked a turning point in the development of American public health. This example was soon followed by other states and municipalities in establishing effective health departments: Massachusetts, 1869; California, 1870; District of Columbia, 1871; Minnesota, 1872; Virginia, 1872; Michigan, 1873; Maryland, 1874; Alabama, 1875; Wisconsin, 1876; and Illinois, 1877. As state and local health departments were organized, the idea of a national health agency seemed the logical next step. However, it should be remembered that until practically the end of the nineteenth century the U.S. government had no concern with public health matters. Organization and action for the protection of community health were considered a local responsibility to be carried out by the state or the locality. Thus, the doctrine of state sovereignty continued to hold sway in the health field and handicapped public health action on a national basis for many years. Congress created the National Board of Health in 1879, but it was of little significance and disappeared after 1883. The establishment of a national health agency was not achieved in the United States until 1953, when the Federal Security Administration became the cabinet Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which included the Public Health Service, the Children's Bureau, and the Food and Drug Administration, as well as other health, welfare, and educational services of the federal government. Development of the health sciences This evolution has gone hand in hand with the development of a complicated urban industrial society and has been one of the responses to the need for a more organized, efficient administration of health services. At the same time, the provision of a stable administrative structure has made it easier to incorporate new scientific knowledge into public health practice and to deal with new problems as they occur. Public health action depends not only on govern-
mental organization and public attitudes but also on the health sciences and their technology. Understanding the nature and cause of disease provides a basis for preventive action and control. This was accomplished for many of the communicable diseases through the development of bacteriology and immunology, the sciences that have exercised the most profound influence on community health from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. It is almost impossible to overemphasize the consequences of this development. Based on the researches of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, as well as on the studies of their co-workers and successors, scientists identified the microorganisms responsible for specific diseases and uncovered their mode of action. The way was thus opened for public health action on a more specific, accurate, and rational basis. An example is the prevention and control of diphtheria through the use of antitoxin and toxoid. Beginning about 1870 there was a continuing downward trend in mortality because of a decline in the frequency of certain diseases: chiefly smallpox, typhoid and typhus, yellow fever, malaria, and tuberculosis. These trends were roughly the same in the municipalities of western Europe and the United States and undoubtedly reflected first the impact of the earlier sanitary reform movement and then that of the bacteriological era. This period also saw an increasing concern with the health of mothers and children, problems of nutrition, health education, occupational health, and the organization and provision of health services on a community basis. The twentieth century—international trends The past fifty years have witnessed an unprecedented over-all trend toward the improvement of community health. Yet, this advance has not been uniform either within communities or between various parts of the world. A large group of countries, generally underdeveloped in an economic and technologic sense, and often newly independent, still have problems of preventable disease like those with which the countries of western Europe and the United States had to cope one hundred years ago. Their problems are still the control of infectious diseases, the provision of uncontaminated water supplies and proper sewerage, and the elevation of the standard of living to a minimum acceptable level. In short, the underdeveloped areas of the world confront the twentieth-century public health workers with the same kind of problems that the sanitary reformers faced on a national scale in the nineteenth century. International health action has grown out of a
PUBLIC HEALTH broadening realization that in a world which for more than a hundred years has been contracting because of technological development and increasingly complex economic and political interdependence, the presence of disease in one area constitutes a continuing danger for many others. To deal with such problems, the World Health Organization was created in 1946, on the basis of experience obtained from earlier governmental and private organizations. In the economically more advanced countries such as the United States and Great Britain, the actual problems of community health are different. As the diseases of infancy, youth, and early adulthood have been reduced so that people no longer die of them in great numbers, many more individuals live into the older years. As a result, among the current problems are the prevention or control of chronic conditions such as cancer, diabetes mellitus, arthritis, musculoskeletal diseases, and the mental changes associated with aging. As problems of communicable disease have declined in urgency, community health programs have been altered to include other elements and conditions that may adversely affect the physical, social, and psychological well-being of people. In recent years the widening horizons of public health have brought to our attention problems of chronic disease, but also such problems as accident prevention, mental health, addictive diseases, the organization of medical care, and increasing needs for social services. Also important in the light of current problems is the renewed emphasis on control of the physical environment. Our expanding and changing technology has led to environmental alterations of increasing complexity. The once dominant problems of bacterially contaminated water and food have been replaced to a considerable degree by chemical pollution. In this category is the new and important field of radiation control, The welfare state. These developments must be seen in the perspective of a world-wide historical evolution that has brought into being the modern state with its concern for individual, family, and community needs in health and welfare. There is probably no more fascinating process in recent history than that through which the laissez-faire "night watchman" state of the nineteenth century has been transformed into the present welfare state. The same broad developments occurred in a tt the leading industrial countries, although with numerous variations and, above all, differences in tempo due to varying historical traditions and conditions. Today, the principle of state intervention a nd control in health matters is accepted; the only difference is the greater or lesser efficiency of the
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intervention and the means by which it is accomplished. Its emergence has resulted from the effects of important political, economic, and social trends. Thus, during this period, the typical trend of political and economic organization has been the continuous and progressive replacement of smaller units by larger ones. Another factor has been the need for national efficiency and the planned utilization of resources. These developments have necessarily led to the widespread acceptance of the need for a strong central authority entrusted with large powers to promote social well-being. This change has brought about an increasing rationalization and bureaucratization of health services, and it explains in part why in our time the social sciences have become an increasingly important element in public health. The modern concept that a national government is responsible for the health of the people is an extension of the earlier view whereby the local community provided for such needs. As the center of power has moved from the small political unit to the large one, this shift has affected the provision of health services. Although the function of health promotion and protection is today lodged basically in the executive organ of the national community, the individual localities, as well as groups and persons in them, must still take an important part in the preservation of individual and collective health. Thus voluntary health agencies, that is, organizations not supported by tax funds, play an important role on the American health scene. The relations of the national health service to local health organizations and personnel show wide variations throughout the world. In some countries, such as Great Britain and the Soviet Union, all health services are essentially socialized. In other countries, like the United States, the national health authority deals with international and interstate problems, carries out and stimulates extensive programs of research, encourages state and local health departments through financial support, and provides guidance where needed. Increasingly over the past forty years, the public health worker, in order to deal with the complex problems of contemporary communities, has had to become a highly trained, specialized professional. To provide the required education and training, institutions known as schools of public health have been established. Public health has moved a long way from its beginnings. More and more, man can consciously plan for better health because available knowledge and resources make it possible in many instances to act with a clear understanding of what he is
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doing. Many health problems have been solved basically, but knowledge awaits application in practice. In all countries there are problems of community health that require political and social action guided by available knowledge. In this sense, the dynamic and changing character of community health action and the significant trends and issues involved in it must be viewed as an aspect of the process of social change in society. GEORGE ROSEN [See also HEALTH; ILLNESS; MEDICAL CARE; MEDICAL PERSONNEL; VITAL STATISTICS; and the biographies of GRAUNT; PETTY.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
FISCHER, ALFONS 1933 Geschichte des deutschen Gesundheitswesens. 2 vols. Berlin: Rothacker. FRAZER, WILLIAM M. 1950 A History of English Public Health: 1834-1939. London: Bailliere. GRAUNT, JOHN (1662) 1939 Natural and Political Observations Made Upon the Bills of Mortality. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. GREAT BRITAIN, POOR LAW COMMISSIONERS (1842) 1965 Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Gt. Britain, by Edwin Chadwick. Edinburgh Univ. Press. HANLON, JOHN J.; ROGERS, FRED B.; and ROSEN, GEORGE 1960 A Bookshelf on the History and Philosophy of Public Health. American Journal of Public Health 50:445-458. HOWARD, JOHN (1777) 1929 The State of the Prisons. New York: Button. H> First published as The State of the Prisons in England and Wales. LESKY, ERNA 1959 Osterreichisches Gesundheitswesen im Zeitalter des aufgeklarten Absolutismus. Archiv fur osterreichische Geschichte 122, part 1. PARISOT, JACQUES 1933 Le developpement de I'hygiene en France. Nancy (France): Thomas. ROSEN, GEORGE 1958 A History of Public Health. New York: MD Publications. SIEGERIST, HENRY E. 1956 Landmarks in the History of Hygiene. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. SIMON, JOHN (1890)1897 English Sanitary Institutions. 2d ed. London: Smith. SMILLIE, WILSON G. 1955 Public Health: Its Promise for the Future. New York: Macmillan. WINSLOW, CHARLES E. A. 1943 The Conquest of Epidemic Disease: A Chapter in the History of Ideas. Princeton Univ. Press.
PUBLIC INTEREST The public interest is a concept that can be defined in several ways. It is often treated as an ideal standard to which appeals for validation of political claims and policies are directed. References to the public interest commonly occur in editorials, political speeches, and other utterances of an admon-
itory or edifying character. The term is also often encountered in judicial and regulatory pronouncements. The significance of the conception is normative rather than analytical. Attempted definitions In efforts made to define the term systematically, several categories appear. There is the formal meaning wherein the public interest is viewed as the objective of the duly authorized organs of government or as the expression of majority rule. In substantive or policy terms, the public interest may be envisaged as embracing those activities necessary to the safety of the state and the welfare of the community: defense, police protection, education, and public health and sanitation. The public interest has no a priori content waiting to be revealed. Public responsibilities regarded as being in the public interest in one setting may not be so regarded in a different context. The fact that the concept is elastic and relative rather than fixed and absolute makes it of greater utility in the quest for a supporting consensus as social changes occur and efforts at accommodation are made. The public interest then serves to remind the parties immediately concerned that there are considerations extending beyond their own goals or their particular rivalries or negotiations. Thus in labor-management disputes, or when subsidies or favorable tariff rates are sought for special groups, the consumer interest may be identified as the public interest. The individual may find himself in one role seeking to advance his self-interest and in another capacity allied with the larger good. Hence the term, whether for manipulative ends or for hortatory or inspirational purposes, is neither the device nor exclusive goal of any one group or class. As an aim to be articulated or an ideal to be enunciated, the public interest stands for the broad versus the narrow, the more inclusive versus the limited. Indeed the very existence of the state as a collectivity would seem to prompt the formulation of basic common purposes. Thus the public interest is akin to the statements of ultimate ends that characterize political philosophy, varying from Plato's concern with the moral development of citizens as the purpose of the city-state to Hobbes's emphasis on order, Locke's protection of natural rights, and the utilitarian's assertion of the greatest good for the greatest number. As these illustrations indicate, the existence of a common interest is an implicit assumption, although its more specific manifestation cannot always be readily agreed upon. Yet both in traditional political thought and in contemporary organization theory, it has been noted
that despite uncertainty about exactly what the shared interests may be, some measure of sharing exists for every human association. The public interest can be visualized as a continuum that represents the values, aspirations, and objectives of the community or polity. There are values that are clearly central, such as health; and there are objectives that are controversial, such as fluoridation of water or discouragement of cigarette smoking. There are aspirations that are nearly universal, such as world peace; but there are numerous policy objectives to this end, which are subjects for debate. It is impossible to state with precision where any given item belongs on the continuum, yet there is general acceptance that a range of activities and goals exists above irrational or selfish individual interests. Granted that a wide consensus supports freedom, justice, and compassion, the problem is to objectify these ideals in public policies bearing concretely on such areas as civil rights, race relations, juvenile delinquency, or narcotics addiction. The public interest cannot be thought of as a compromise struck between the desires of dope addicts and moralists or between hoodlums and the police. The public interest is clearly more than the sum of competing interests. It is an insistent reminder that morality must have a central place in any society that respects the freedom of its members. The concept of public interest holds the ultimate ethical justification for the demands that the state makes on the individual. The high value placed upon freedom and justice calls for the readiness of the citizen to make sacrifices if necessary and to share responsibility for sustaining the values of the polity. The concerns of the philosopher and the needs of the official and the politician will call for continuing reference to the public interest if for no other purpose than as a symbol, as a shorthand device for directing attention to considerations that transcend the immediate, the selfish, and the merely expedient. The public interest, as a concept, seems to be employed in situations that involve a conflict of interests or a problem of defending or interpreting broader or longer-range considerations against special or more immediate factors. Thus T. H. Green in his Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation refers to the "common good" in analyzing the rights and duties of the state and the citizen. Brief reference is made to the public interest in the following context: "If the injured individual were likely to fail in the institution of proceedings for his own redress or defence, the public inter-
est would require that the matter should be taken out of his hands" ([1882] 1960, p. 240; italics added). Similarly Robert Maclver in The Web of Government refers to the general welfare and community, but when he describes the conflicting interests of modern industrial states, he writes that "government cannot afford to sit by while the disputants bring economic pressure to bear on one another. . . . In the public interest it must devise whatever measures are expedient . . . to prevent any interruption of vital services" ([1947] 1963, p. 350). Uses of the concept The fact that the term is imprecise does not mean it is disappearing from ordinary usage; this is evident from the frequent references to the public interest in political polemics and in day-today discussions of public policy. The term then is justified as a useful working hypothesis: if it were abolished today, some other polar term would be coined to contrast the selfish goals of the few with the larger good, or sheer majority power with the proper rights of a minority. The occasional debasement and abuse of the term, it is argued, is no reason for its rejection (Colm 1960, p. 127). And as for ambiguity: Is "individual freedom" any more precise than "public interest"? The concept of the public interest has won acceptance in the context of a functionally differentiated political system and a modern, industrial, and bureaucratized society that has a strong tradition of constitutionalism and rule of law. The term is closely associated with the growth and professionalization of the civil service. The existence of a "neutral bureaucracy," officeholders neither subservient to the will of a monarch nor dependent upon a political party, calls for some focus of loyalty. The public interest helps to meet such a need. Felix Frankfurter, in his The Public and Its Government, uses the concept in referring to the public officials "pitted" against the utilities experts, for whom they are no match "except for occasional men of great capacity and exceptional devotion to the public interest" (1930, p. 115). There are also occasions when officials are accused of exceeding their authority to the detriment of the public interest. Where clearly distinguishable interests compete and policies can be seen as expressions of group desires, the public interest can be determined with some degree of specificity. Industrialization and improved means of communication and transportation have brought about conditions of complexity
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requiring more competence and expertise to determine the public interest in particular cases. In negative terms one can list the efforts made to protect the public interest from threats to public order, safety, and morals (laws and ordinances with respect to crime, accidents, vice) and in the economic sphere regulations applying to fraud, monopolies, vote fixing, fair employment practices, and consumer protection. Institutionally and procedurally, legislative bodies must rely upon special agencies to discover and protect the public interest within their respective jurisdictions. From the standpoint of jurisprudence it would appear that the concept has a firm position. According to one- spokesman, "the lawmen have a vested interest in 'the public interest' as an operational concept: They would be tongue-tied without it" (Cohen 1962, p. 160). Nor have judges refrained from definition: "Public interest means something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected" (State v. Crockett, 206 Pac 816, 817, quoted in Montgomery 1962, p. 222). And Munn v. Illinois states, "Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. . . . When . . . one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he ... must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good" (94 U.S. 113, 126). Technological development and economic growth have resulted in industries whose activities go beyond the owners, shareholders, employees, competitors, and direct customers and affect the interests of a wide community, as in the case of the railroads and power companies. Recent scholarly discussion The literature of recent years indicates a wide range of views concerning the significance of the concept. The differences of opinion result from the varying emphases with respect to its normative aspects and questions concerning its usefulness for analytical purposes. Since there is no generally accepted definition of the term, several different formulations are offered. According to Walter Lippmann, "the public interest may be presumed to be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently" (1955, p. 42). Alfred Verdross regards the public interest as
"the establishment of social conditions under which individual persons are able to build, through industry and productive work, a life which is in consonance with the dignity of the human being" (Bodenheimer 1962, p. 213). Charles Frankel writes: The ideal of the public interest calls on men, despite their egoism, to set their preferences side by side with the preferences of others and to examine them all with the same disinterestedness and impartiality. It asks them to seek as tolerable and comprehensive a compromise among these interests as is possible. And it reminds them that every decision they make is a limited one, that some interests may have been overlooked, that something better may be possible. (1962, p. 200) Stephen Bailey (1962) calls public interest "the central concept of a civilized polity. Its genius lies not in its clarity but in its perverse and persistent moral intrusion upon the internal and external discourse of rulers and ruled alike" (p. 106). He also notes: "There is perhaps no better example in all language of the utility of myth than the phrase 'the public interest'" (p. 97). The work of nearly a score of writers on the public interest is collected in Nomos No. 5 under the editorship of Carl J. Friedrich, who notes that it is not possible to discern "any distinctly philosophical, legal or political-scientific approach, though some of the authors lean more in one direction, some more in the other" (Friedrich 1962, p. viii). Frank J. Sorauf (1962) has given thoughtful attention to "the conceptual muddle" concerning the "public interest"; his conclusions are as follows: No single criterion or standard, such as the public interest, can subsume or encompass all that is good and desirable for society—regardless of the system of values one prefers or propounds. The matter of the goals of a contemporary industrial society consists in reality of a series of specific, policy-centered questions which involve the entire range of our concern, from a realistic approach to the emerging nationalism of Africa, through care for the ill among the aged, to the resolution of domestic racial conflict and tension. The answers to these policy questions will be hammered out painfully and pragmatically, and they will certainly be expressed in alternatives and wisdom considerably more specific and vastly less grandiose than the allencompassing guise of a "public interest." If one argues that a public interest exists in all these problem areas, and if he can go the next step and identify it, all well and good. But why then resort to a concept of the public interest? (p. 188) That the "public interest" has meaning for some public officials and interest groups is an incontestable fact. That it may in these terms affect the shaping and
PUBLIC INTEREST administration of public policy is equally incontestable. Observation of American politics will also afford instances of its effective use as a unifying symbol and a social myth. Even should scholars reject the public interest for their own analysis, they must observe and record its prevalence and influence in the political system. But it is only as political datum that the public interest has a definable relevance to the study of politics and public policy, (p. 190) Glendon A. Schubert has reviewed definitions and usage in an effort to discover whether the term could be used as a standard susceptible to empirical verification. His conclusion, if practicable, would point to a wide range of investigations : If we assume that the peaceful adjustment of conflicting interests is not only the consummate art of the politician, but that it is also the fundamental task of all policy processes in a democratic polity, then a model of administrative due process would be empirically verified if, in practice, the decisions actually made resulted in the maximal accommodation of the affected interests, in comparison with the relative capacities of alternative structures for making the same decisions, and measured by a reciprocally minimal recourse to other centers for public policy change (i.e., the legislature, the chief executive, courts, etc.). . . . There would be technical problems in the construction of realistic models, and there would be practical problems in inducing political support for the translation into actuality of any models that went beyond the description of existing agencies and processes. (1957, p. 368) Schubert concludes that in spite of these difficulties the task is worthwhile. In a later paper, however, he suggests that political scientists might do better to concentrate on concepts other than the public interest, concepts that promise more usefulness as scientific tools (1962, p. 176). Research needs and opportunities From an analytical viewpoint, the concept of the public interest may be best understood when viewed within a specific context or continuum. There is ample opportunity for research into decisions of regulatory bodies and judgments by the courts where the concept is interpreted in the light of specific issues. Inquiry into the purposes to which the concept is put, by whom, under what conditions, and with what consequences may lead to a clear understanding of the dilemmas and choice points that face opinion leaders, legislators, officials, judges, and all others who would engage in the contest of politics. A history of the usage of the concept might be undertaken. What relationship can be
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traced between the public interest and ideas of the general welfare or the national interest? Have significantly different shades of meaning or emphasis occurred? Moreover, international civil servants have yet to classify the public or publics they serve and the interests to which their energies are dedicated. Many of these problems can currently be examined in the new "modernizing" countries where officials are uncertain of their status and their standards. While a civil servant may feel that the public interest has been served if he follows the inner check of conscience or the course dictated by the highest technical or scientific standards of his profession, the problem of responsibility is not thereby resolved. The community's values are also involved in the public interest: public debate, discussion by the press, and legislative action or judicial intervention may be called for before an equilibrium is reached that appears to satisfy the articulate elements. There can obviously be no definitive adjustment "in the public interest" but rather a temporarily acceptable accommodation of interests and values. In this process of interaction there is opportunity for innovation and creativity and the public interest may be newly forged. The frontiers of scientific inquiry and problems of foreign aid in exotic cultures, for example, confront civil servants (and military officers) with necessities and opportunities for seeking fresh solutions for policy problems and unprecedented courses for governmental decision and activity. A fresh perspective is gained if the public interest concept is viewed against the conditions that obtain in the developing countries. The problem of governance begins in the identification and articulation of interests. In traditional societies the peasant is a spectator or a pawn rather than a self-conscious participant. In the absence of effective interest groups, the charismatic leader rather than the politician qua broker has full opportunity. An underdeveloped society by definition lacks a welldefined infrastructure, and leaders accordingly are prone to make emotional appeals to a mass public and to stimulate nationalistic sentiments. Moreover, problems are not met through legal processes and administrative procedures of an essentially rationalistic character. Governmental sanctions are to be found in custom or in the will of the ruler or the authority of a dominant class rather than in appeals to the public interest. The ruler is the symbol or expression of power; governance is not thought of as a process of formulating issues and of analyzing, negotiating, manipulating, and adjust-
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ing special interests to reach generally acceptable outcomes and thereby to articulate the public interest. As Lucian Pye writes: Although in transitional societies there is generally a somewhat greater awareness of the potentialities of politics as a means of rationally solving social problems than there is in traditional systems, the expressive aspects of politics usually continue to occupy a central place in determining the character of political behavior. The peculiar Western assumption that issues of public policy are the most important aspect of politics, and practically the only legitimate concern of those with power, is not fully accepted in non-Western politics. Indeed, in most non-Western societies the general assumption is not that those with power are committed to searching out and solving problems, but rather that they are the fortunate participants in an excithig and emotionally satisfying drama. (1962, pp. 28-29) Lippmann has argued (1955, p. 136) that "the art of governing well has to be learned. If it is to be learned, it has to be transmitted from the old to the young, and the habits and the ideas must be maintained as a seamless web of memory among the bearers of the tradition, generation after generation." New nations, for example in Africa, need governmental institutions to provide justice and order. They need wise public policy to provide education, employment, and social welfare services for their rapidly growing populations. Here are newly enfranchised voters aspiring to the fruits of modernity but arriving at the status of citizenship without the historical experience or traditions out of which grew the polities of the West. Can the concept of the public interest be introduced; or can these new societies get along without such a unifying and disciplining concept? One answer offered is the theory of "one party rule." Loyalty to the leader of a single party can be quickly though not always permanently imposed, as Nkrumah and many other leaders have demonstrated. Acceptance of the public interest as a guiding belief would mean restraint on the ambitions of politicians and limits to the demands of the electorate. In the developing countries, as industry advances, problems of administrative discretion can emerge, but whether the public interest will become an influential concept is uncertain. Will the civil service be motivated to serve the public? Will the courts be called upon to bring large economic enterprises within their jurisdiction? Will a recognition of individual rights requiring adjudication between adversary parties lead judges to apply criteria of public interest? Will the ties of kinship or loyalty to village tribe, community, or region permit an
awareness of the larger configuration of "public"? Will the acceptance of tradition stand in the way of the rational pursuit of "interest"? Does the concept strengthen nationalism? Dictatorship? The answers to such questions will determine whether the term public interest has a universal applicability or whether it will remain a feature of Western jurisprudence and political thought. The rule of law, due process, a free press, a loyal opposition, and the public interest are all valueladen concepts the limits and substance of which are difficult to define with precision, but all are significant in the maintenance of democratic government. Sport without the idea of fair play would lose zest—so, too, politics bereft of appeal to the public interest. The task of the umpire, in both situations, is probably made easier psychologically by reliance on such abstractions; but the responsibility of decision is in no way lessened, and the readiness of participants to question and of other observers to object remains. The public interest is a concept that leaves open the way to change, as general acceptance for new policies is won and officials remain accountable for their decisions. Since there are many ways for seeking public acceptance and for safeguarding administrative responsibility within a democratic polity, it is doubtful that anything would be gained by insistence upon a precise definition of the public interest. PENDLETON HERRING [See also BUREAUCRACY; CIVIL SERVICE; CONFLICT OF INTEREST; DEMOCRACY; GENERAL WILL; NATIONAL INTEREST; PUBLIC POLICY; RESPONSIBILITY.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BAILEY, STEPHEN K. 1962 The Public Interest: Some Operational Dilemmas. Pages 96-106 in Carl J. Friedrich (editor), The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton. BODENHEIMER, EDGAR 1962 Prolegomena to a Theory of the Public Interest. Pages 205-217 in Carl J. Friedrich (editor), The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton. COHEN, JULIUS 1962 A Lawman's View of the Public Interest. Pages 155-161 in Carl J. Friedrich (editor), The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton. COLM, GERHARD (1960) 1962 The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy. Pages 115-128 in Carl J. Friedrich (editor), The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton. DOWNS, ANTHONY 1962 Public Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy. Social Research 29:1-36. FRANKEL, CHARLES 1962 The Democratic Prospect. New York: Harper. FRANKFURTER, FELIX (1930) 1964 The Public and Its Government. Boston: Beacon. FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (editor) 1962 The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton.
PUBLIC LAW: The Field GREEN, THOMAS HILL (1882) 1960 Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation. London: Longmans. -» Published posthumously. HERRING, PENDLETON 1936 Public Administration and the Public Interest. New York: McGraw-Hill. LEYS, WAYNE A. R.; and PERRY, CHARNER M. 1959 Philosophy and the Public Interest. Chicago: Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy. LIPPMANN, WALTER 1955 Essays in the Public Philosophy. Boston: Little. MACIVER, ROBERT M. (1947) 1963 The Web of Government. New York: Macmillan. MEYERSON, MARTIN; and BANFIELD, EDWARD C. 1955 Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1965. MONTGOMERY, JOHN D. 1962 Public Interest in the Ideologies of National Development. Pages 218-226 in Carl J. Friedrich (editor), The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton. PYE, LUCIAN 1962 Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. SCHUBERT, GLENDON A. 1957 The Public Interest in Administrative Decision-making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory? American Political Science Review 51: 346-368. SCHUBERT, GLENDON A. 1961 The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept. New York: Free Press. SCHUBERT, GLENDON A. 1962 Is There a Public Interest Theory? Pages 162-176 in Carl J. Friedrich (editor), The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton. SORAUF, FRANK J. 1957 Public Interest Reconsidered. Journal of Politics 19:616-639. SORAUF, FRANK J. 1962 The Conceptual Muddle. Pages 183-190 in Carl J. Friedrich (editor), The Public Interest. Nomos No. 5. New York: Atherton.
PUBLIC LAW The articles under this heading deal with public law as a field of study. A detailed guide to related articles can be found under LAW. i. THE FIELD n. COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW
David J. Danelski Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Gerhard Casper
THE FIELD
Public law, viewed in its broadest terms as a field of inquiry in political science, embraces the study of all legal phenomena connected with politics or government. Whether specific phenomena— e -g., theories, rules, institutions, processes, and behaviors—are to be characterized as "legal" or "connected with politics or government" depends u pon how law, politics, and government are defined. An earlier conception of the field, which derived from the work of European legal scholars, was
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somewhat narrower. The terms public law, droit public, and offentliches Recht were understood as implying a functional dualism of the two main branches of positive law—private and public. Subdivisions of the former—e.g., commercial law— were viewed as dealing with the resolution of conflicts among individuals, and subdivisions of the latter—e.g., criminal, administrative, and constitutional law—were viewed as dealing with the resolution of conflicts between individuals and government, governmental regulation of individual and corporate activity, and the powers and limits of government (Walz 1934). American public law scholars have had diverse conceptions of their field. Some have viewed public law as identical with constitutional law; others have seen it as limited to the study of courts and judges; and still others have taken the view that it covers all rule making and rule interpretation intended for the guidance of governmental agencies. Noting these competing conceptions of the field, Swisher (1946) reported that most specialists saw no advantage in formulating a theoretical definition that would isolate the field's distinguishing characteristics. They were content to define public law in terms of the areas in which they taught and did research, such as constitutional law, administrative law, jurisprudence, and judicial biography. Topics like civil liberties, judicial processes, and judicial behavior were later added on the same basis. Closely related to practically every other field in political science, public law is one of the core fields of the discipline. Given the legal orientation of modern societies, there are few areas of government that do not have legal dimensions. Thus, constitutional law is linked with national and comparative politics, administrative law with public administration, jurisprudence with political theory, judicial behavior with political behavior, and so forth. When the American Political Science Association was established in 1903, the central position of public law was clearly recognized in the association's stated purpose—"the scientific study of Politics, Public Law, Administration and Diplomacy." Public law is as old as political science itself, and at times the two have been almost indistinguishable. In the nineteenth century and early in the present century, the work of Europeans dominated the field. Krabbe, Duguit, and Laski are still familiar names in public law. But in the past several decades innovation and development in the field have occurred, for the most part, in the United States, where modern political science has made
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greatest strides as an autonomous discipline. For that reason, the work of American political scientists since World War n is emphasized. Approaches The analytical approach. The influence of Staatslehre thought lay heavily on public law in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Law was viewed as the command of the sovereign, and sovereignty was ascribed to the state, source and enforcer of all law. Analytical scholars explored the "true nature" of the state and constructed elaborate theories of sovereignty. Analysis was formal and deductive; its main purpose was to give coherence and logical consistency to accepted legal doctrines. The works of W. W. Willoughby (esp. 1896; 1924) are prime examples of the analytical approach. Influenced by the writings of Austin, Jellinek, and Laband, he devised a highly abstract, juristic theory of government. Ironically, because of the rise of pragmatism and realism in political science early in Willoughby's career, his work was already something of an anachronism during his lifetime. Nevertheless, it was taken seriously and discussed even as late as the 1940s (Cairns 1935; Cole 1948). But long before that, most political scientists had rejected Willoughby's abstract theoretical writings as sterile legalism, and today they are of little more than historical interest [see WILLOUGHBY]. As in the earlier period, when the analytical approach was dominant, the significant contributions in this recent area have come from European-trained legal scholars (e.g., Kelsen 1945; Hart 1961), not from political scientists [see KELSEN]. The juridical approach. Although it stems from analytical jurisprudence, the juridical approach is relatively unconcerned with general abstract theories of law, government, or the state. It views law primarily as a system of concepts, rules, and principles that are supposedly the basis of legal decisions. It focuses on constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions, and related phenomena, which are described, clarified, analyzed, and sometimes evaluated. Analysis emphasizes legal reasoning and probes the logic and consistency of legal decision making. Since the approach is concerned with the formal results of decision making, usually in terms of legal doctrine, it is necessarily formal; nevertheless, it can be tempered with considerable political realism. The rise of the juridical approach and pragmatism coincide, and some juridical scholars (e.g., Powell 1918) clearly were influenced by the writ-
ings of pragmatists like John Dewey. Early in the twentieth century the foremost juridical scholar was Frank J. Goodnow, whose works in comparative and American administrative law (1893; 1905) are considered classics. His work was highly descriptive and based on extensive case analysis, yet it contained an incipient political realism, especially noticeable in his analysis of American constitutional law (1911). And in this regard, his teaching was as important as his writing. "Goodnow," wrote Haines and Dimock, "was constantly telling his students that government could not be understood and lasting improvements could not be made unless the political behavior and the political motivation underlying and eventually controlling constitutional and administrative law were properly mastered" (1935, p. xiii). [See GOODNOW.] Goodnow's students—Thomas Reed Powell and Charles Grove Haines, among others—carried forward political realism in public law. Together with Edward S. Corwin, they called attention to the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States, in interpreting the constitution, was making public policy. Powell, who emerged as the leading juridical scholar of the 1920s and 1930s, brilliantly analyzed the logic and rhetoric of Supreme Court opinions and showed that at times personal preference, not ineluctable legal logic, was the basis of constitutional decisions. Haines (1922) went even further and suggested, in an article now considered a forerunner of judicial behavioralism, that constitutional law might be systematically explained in terms of psychological motivation. It must be emphasized that not all juridical scholarship is characterized by political realism. When Powell and Haines were writing, many juridical scholars were doing formal legal analysis of judicial decisions, and, to a lesser extent, this is so today. The juridical approach reached its peak during the interwar years. Public law scholars of the period concentrated on constitutional law. Their work was published in leading law reviews as well as in political science journals; they were sought as members of law faculties; and a few of them were given legal posts in government. Powell, who had been trained in law before taking his doctorate in political science, spent most of his career teaching at the Columbia and Harvard law schools. Walter F. Dodd, a political scientist without a law degree, joined the Yale law faculty in the 1920s. And Corwin and Carl B. Swisher, who also had no formal legal training, were special assistants to the U.S. Attorney General in the 1930s. Perhaps the most significant tribute to public law specialists
PUBLIC LAW: The Field of the period was the prominence of their work in the Selected Essays on Constitutional Law (1938), which was edited by a committee of the Association of American Law Schools. About 40 per cent of the signed articles in the work were by political scientists—Powell and Corwin led all others with 23 and 14 articles, respectively. The work of Cushman, Haines, Dodd, Grant, Fairman, and Field also was represented. During this period juridical scholars were also highly esteemed in political science •. Corwin, Powell, Haines, Cushman, and Dodd all became presidents of the American Political Science Association. The juridical approach is still significant in public law. Constitutional law, usually taught by the case method, is the main public law course in American colleges and universities. As in the past, leading juridical scholars—e.g., David Fellman, William M. Beaney, and John P. Roche—still publish much of their work in law reviews. But the era of intellectual leadership by political scientists in constitutional law is over. Leadership has now passed to law professors, many of whom have been law clerks to Supreme Court justices. The quality of juridical analysis has often been said to be the best in American political science. "If our scholarship in this general area is worthy of high praise," wrote Hyneman (1959, p. 44), "it is because of distinguished achievement in describing, evaluating, and criticizing public policies which interpret, extend, and modify the language of the United States Constitution." Juridical scholarship has relevance beyond its contribution to the literature of political science. Corwin once said that if judges make law, so do legal commentators. Articles and books by juridical scholars are often cited in appellate briefs, arguments, and opinions. Thus their work in clarifying, criticizing, and analyzing legal doctrine is useful and perhaps influential in the judicial process. Mere citation of judicial scholarship in judicial opinions does not prove influence, but it does indicate that political scientists are often participants in, as well as observers of, the judicial process. The historical approach. Early in his career, Corwin identified his approach to public law study as primarily historical. He took the position that because law is so avowedly historical in its manner and growth, it has to be understood historically. In practically every area of the historical approach, Corwin did pioneering work, and in many of these areas his contributions remain unsurpassed. His conception of law showed the influence of historical jurisprudence, but it differed little from the juridical conception. This has been generally true of
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historically oriented public law specialists, many of whom were students of Corwin's. The principal difference between the historical and juridical approaches lies not so much in the conception of law as in the method and the universe of phenomena regarded relevant for study. The historical scholar's forte is genetic explanation, which, at its best, is based on sound historical method—use of primary sources, critical evaluation of evidence, and conclusions drawn strictly from the evidence. If he is interested in the American constitution, he will, like the juridical scholar, study judicial opinions, but his universe of phenomena embraces much more—public opinion, group activity, presidential decisions, congressional behavior, and anything else that may account for constitutional growth (see Swisher 1943). Historical scholarship in public law has included legal ideas (e.g., Corwin 1928-1929), constitutional development (e.g., Swisher 1943), constitutional concepts and doctrines (e.g., Wright 1938), judicial institutions (e.g., McCloskey 1960), and case studies (e.g., Westin 1958). But the area that has received greatest attention since 1930 has been judicial biography. Judicial biography began in an important way in the United States with the publication of the first two volumes of Beveridge's Life of John Marshall (see 1916-1919), but Corwin's brief biography (1919) of the same judge was equally important, for it set the model most judicial biographers in political science were to follow. The typical judicial biography, as distinguished from studies of the legal "philosophy" of judges, is based on private papers of the subject and other primary sources. The judge's childhood is usually covered briefly; his legal and political career is covered in greater detail; and the bulk of the biography dwells on the judicial period, which gains focus from the judge's opinions, private correspondence, conference memoranda, diaries, and intracourt communications. All of this is usually set against and woven into the political history of the period. When it is done well, the biography contributes significantly to the understanding of an era of history. Even when it does not rise to such heights, it often provides insights into judicial behavior and decision making. Among the political scientists who have written significant judicial biographies are Swisher (1935), Fairman (1939), Mason (1956), and Magrath (1963). Journalists, lawyers, and law professors have also written judicial biographies similar in approach to those of political scientists, and it appears that leadership in this area, as in constitutional law, is passing to those law profes-
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sors who have been law clerks of Supreme Court justices, for they often have special access to necessary private papers, as well as personal experience with the judges about whom they write. Historical scholarship in public law has often received high praise from historians. Some political scientists, such as Swisher and Mason, have used historical method so well that they are acknowledged as leading American constitutional historians. Criticism of historical scholarship has come largely from political scientists who maintain that such work is atheoretical and yields no systematic generalizations about legal and political phenomena. Although this is a fair characterization of most historical work in public law, the criticism is inapplicable to the historical approach generally, for historical inquiry can be informed by theory and can yield systematic generalizations. Such inquiry in public law, however, has barely begun. Historical scholarship can play an important role in the judicial process. That is what Holmes had in mind when he wrote that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" (256 U.S. 345, 349), and that is why Cardozo (1921) designated history as a conscious method of judicial decision making. Interpretations of constitutional provisions often turn upon historical assumptions that research can clarify and sometimes show to be unfounded. With a few exceptions (e.g.. Graham 1938), relatively little work has been done in this area. The ethical approach. The ethical approach raises the question of justice in regard to legal rules, decisions, behaviors, and similar phenomena. It is invariably taken by those who have an ideal conception of law, e.g., the proponents of natural law, who maintain that an unjust law is no law at all. But the ethical approach can also be used by those having other conceptions of law. For centuries the leading ethical approach has been natural law, which asserts the existence of an absolute, transcendent standard knowable through the use of reason [see NATURAL LAW]. Except for studies of natural law as a historical phenomenon (e.g., Corwin 1928-1929; Haines 1930), American public law scholars have had little to do with it. This was probably because of the field's early commitment to analytical jurisprudence. The only major study using an ethical approach that comes close to natural law is Berns (1957). The question of justice has been dealt with in terms other than natural law [see JUSTICE]. Cardozo (1921; 1924; 1928) defined justice in terms of social values empirically ascertained. Brecht (1959) discussed justice similarly and indicated how ethi-
cal questions concerning law and politics might be approached in terms of scientific method. Brecht's work opens a fruitful area of public law scholarship yet to be developed [see BRECHT]. The group-process approach. Articulated initially by Arthur F. Bentley (1908), the conception of law underlying the group-process approach is that of a multitude of complexly related activities indicating the formation, systematization, struggle, and adaptation of group interests. Law, according to Bentley, does not result from government; it is the same phenomenon, "only stated from a different angle" ([1908] 1949, p. 272). What distinguishes legal and governmental activity from all other activity is its connection with governmental agencies. "The law at bottom," wrote Bentley, "can only be what the mass of the people actually does and tends to some extent to make other people do by means of governmental agencies" (ibid., p. 276). Courts are obvious governmental agencies, but their activity, Bentley maintained, can be explained only in relation to all other connected activity—i.e.. the group struggle—and not in terms of logic, ideas, or theories propounded by judges in their official opinions. The implications of Bentley's conception of law were enormous, for it expanded the universe of phenomena relevant to public law to include the activity of criminals, policemen, prosecutors, lawyers, trial and appellate judges, law clerks, and anyone else whose actions are connected with the legal-governmental process. For its time, Bentley's work was an important contribution. It was a kind of sociological jurisprudence, but it differed from Pound's ideas in that area and was more advanced than Ehrlich's work. Thus, it is almost incredible that Bentley's work was ignored for more than two generations. Bentley's eventual "rediscovery" was by a law professor, Karl N. Llewellyn. "Bentley," Llewellyn wrote, "saw and said in 1908 all that should have been necessary to force constitutional theory into total reconstruction" (1934, p. 1). Thereafter some political scientists (e.g., Shepard 1939) also recognized Bentley's contribution to public law, but another generation went by before it had a substantial impact on the field. Then, in the early 1950s, a number of group-process studies touching public law were published (Truman 1951, chapter 15; Latham 1952; Peltason 1953; 1955). [See BENTLEY; LLEWELLYN.] Peltason's work had a special relevance to public law because he emphasized the role of courts and judges as participants in the group process. He
PUBLIC LAW: The Field iterated and clarified Bentley's basic ideas and used them as the foundation for two studies concerning the federal judiciary (1955; 1961). Others, following his lead, extended group-process analysis to the state judiciary (e.g., Jacob 1965) and to the impact of judicial decisions on society (e.g., Patric 1957). The rise of the group-process approach in public law also stimulated a number of other studies, which, although not emphasizing Bentleyan thought, viewed interest groups or the group process as central (e.g., Vose 1958; 1959; Grossman 1965). The group-process approach has grown in importance since the 1950s. Its main contribution has been the description of a broad universe of legal phenomena. But in theoretical terms, groupprocess studies in public law have gone little beyond Bentley's basic insights in 1908. The future importance of the approach turns on whether it is able to offer sophisticated explanation based on verifiable theory, and not merely careful description of legal-governmental processes. [See POLITICAL GROUP ANALYSIS.] The behavioral approach. The behavioral approach seeks to explain legal phenomena in terms of operationally denned concepts and empirically verifiable hypotheses concerning human behavior. Focusing on the behavior of individuals in legal processes, it draws heavily on individual and social psychology. The approach involves prediction, usually understood in terms of probability; i.e., if phenomena X, Y, and Z are observed in some postulated relationship, then the probability is that R', not R", will occur (see Lasswell & McDougal 1943, p. 238). In order to confirm hypotheses underlying such a statement and to determine probability, quantitative methods are often used, but quantification per se does not characterize the behavioral approach. Political and legal realism (e.g., Haines 1922; Frank 1930) were forerunners of behavioralism in public law, but the approach received greatest impetus in its early years from Charles E. Merriam. Critical of narrow legalism, he urged political scientists to use psychology, psychopathology, sociology, and statistics in their research. Statistical study of the judiciary, he pointed out in 1921, was a research frontier that could be profitably penetrated. He exhorted public law specialists to spend less time in the law library reading cases and more time doing empirical research (1926). And at the University of Chicago, Merriam provided the conditions for creative behavioral work [see MERRIAM]. Mott, one of his colleagues, responded early to his
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call for empirical research in public law (see, e.g., Mott et al. 1933). But Merriam's greatest impact in public law came in the 1940s, through the work of two of his former students and colleagues, Harold D. Lasswell and C. Herman Pritchett. Lasswell's important work in public law began soon after he joined the Yale law faculty. In an article with McDougal (1943), he presented a profound criticism of the juridical approach (which he characterized as "syntactics"), sketched the outlines of a theory of judicial decision making, and indicated how the study of legal phenomena might be approached as a policy science. Although the article had an impact in legal circles, political scientists in public law manifested greater interest in one of Lasswell's later works (1948), in which he presented psychoanalytical case histories of three judges (Judges X, Y, and Z) to illustrate basic political character types. Lasswell's work in public law perhaps has not yet been fully appreciated. It appears that his influence in this area has been greater in law than in political science. Modern behavioralism in public law began with the first of Pritchett's pioneering studies (1941) that identified and described bloc voting in the Supreme Court of the United States by means of quantitative analysis of nonunanimous decisions. His novel methodology stemmed from the work of another Merriam student, Herman C. Beyle (1931), but Pritchett's contribution was not just methodological. His study of the Roosevelt court (1948) skillfully blended behavioral, juridical, and historical approaches. Although it was one of the most innovative studies in more than a generation, initial response to it was critical on the ground that quantitative analysis was inappropriate in the study of the Supreme Court. Pritchett's contribution then lay fallow for almost a decade, and even he began to move away from quantitative analysis (see 1954). But by the mid-1950s a number of scholars (e.g., Bernard 1955; Kort 1957; Schubert 1958) had become interested in the quantitative study of the judiciary, and judicial behavior became firmly established as a subfield of public law. After Pritchett, the study of judicial behavior owes more to Glendon Schubert than to any other scholar. Influenced by the work of Pritchett, and also by Beyle, Schubert developed a number of quantitative methods others had explored, e.g., bloc analysis, cumulative scaling, and factor analysis. He was the first to use game theory in the analysis of judicial behavior and was also the first to set forth a psychometric model of judicial decision making. A prolific scholar, he wrote or edited most
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of the basic books in judicial behavior in the late 1950s and early 1960s (see, e.g., 1965). His review of the subfield's literature (1963) comprehensively covers the work of such other judicial behavioralists as S. Sidney Ulmer, Joseph Tanenhaus, Harold Spaeth, John R. Schmidhauser, Stuart Nagel, Fred Kort, and David J. Danclski. [See JUDICIARY, article On JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR.]
Judicial behavioralism has been criticized on the grounds that its methods have been too crude to measure the subtle art of judging (Mendelson 1963), that it has ignored the question of justice (Berns 1963), and that often its use of social science theory and methods has been improper (Becker 1965). It is true that some of the early behavioral work seemed crude because it was empiricipm uninformed by theory, and when theory developed elsewhere was employed, it was sometimes used rather loosely. Nevertheless, there is nothing peculiar about judicial decision making that makes it less susceptible to behavioral analysis than are other kinds of subtle political decision making. And such analysis can even be used, at least in a limited way, in dealing with questions of justice. As the behavioral approach becomes theoretically sophisticated and is used in a number of areas of public law, current criticisms are apt to be obviated. The work of behavioralists in public law is potentially useful to participants in legal processes. If, for instance, judicial decision-making theory develops to the point where it has high predictability, it will probably be used by lawyers in deciding whether to settle or appeal individual cases. Such theory, of course, will also be useful to judges in understanding their own behavior. Evaluation The field in perspective. Although public law has responded to the major intellectual currents in law and political science, its response has often been late and then only partial. The field has given up old approaches reluctantly and has sought to accommodate the old with the new rather than to attempt bold reconstruction. That is illustrated by the juridical approach's growing out of its analytical predecessor and making only mild concessions to pragmatism and realism. One of the reasons for the criticisms of the behavioral approach is that it is not susceptible to easy integration in the field. To accept behavioralism entirely would mean that much, though not all, in the older approaches would be forsaken. Given the field's historically conservative attitude in such matters, most of its
specialists are unwilling to go that far. Indeed, it is probably because of its conservatism that public law has in recent years followed rather than led the discipline. Public law in the United States has been preoccupied with the Supreme Court and its decisions. The court is prominent even in the work of those who use the group-process approach (see Vose 1959; Peltason 1961). That is not surprising, for the Supreme Court is a public law phenomenon par excellence; it is simultaneously a legal and a political institution, making decisions that have a corresponding dual character. Although studies of the Supreme Court and its decisions have been the core of public law in the United States, there has always been some interest in public law phenomena in the states and in foreign countries (see, e.g., Mitau 1965; Grant 1958). The approaches taken have usually been juridical or historical (e.g., Bayley 1962), but recently the behavioral approach has also touched this area, and scholars in a number of countries have begun to study judicial behavior much in the manner of American behavioralists (e.g., Hayakawa 1962). An examination of the rise of various approaches indicates a trend away from formalism toward rigorous empiricism. This was due, apparently, to successive responses to pragmatism, political realism, legal realism, and behavioralism. The only major exception is the work of Berns (1957), which has not started a countertrend. On the contrary, the trend in ethical analysis in public law appears to be consistent with modern scientific method (see Brecht 1959). Despite public law's importance in political science during certain periods of its history, it is difficult to point to significant theoretical contributions. To be sure, there was Willoughby's juristic theory and there were Bentley's insights concerning the legal-governmental process. But in regard to other areas of public law scholarship the theoretical contributions have been slight. Behavioralists are now developing microtheories of judicial decision making, but whether their work will be significant remains to be seen. All in all, the greatest single failing in public law appears to have been in the area of theory. The current state and prospects. Public law has fallen from the high place it once occupied in political science. In terms of significance of its recent work, a survey (Somit & Tanenhaus 1964) has shown that it ranks lowei than any other field in political science except political theory. Also, in recent years there has been a relative decline in
PUBLIC LAW: The Field the number of political scientists entering the field. These phenomena are probably related to the field's failure to keep abreast with the discipline, deep divisions within it concerning approaches and assumptions, and the fact that today an adequate training in public law requires proficiency in practically all of its approaches. Nevertheless, there are some indications that the field is experiencing a resurgence. In the early 1950s, a committee of the American Political Science Association expressed concern about the neglect of public law in the discipline, and not long thereafter one public law specialist was ready to concede that the field had "all but disappeared as a recognized object of study of political science" (Sherwood 1958, p. 87). Despite such estimates, the field is very much alive today. The group and behavioral approaches, if they did nothing else, at least brought public law into the main stream of political science. There have been some attempts at integration of approaches. Some public law specialists have taken the position that for certain purposes all of the approaches can be useful and that much can be learned by integrating old and new approaches. For example, Johnson (1965) has used groupprocess and behavioral approaches in his study of the impact of Supreme Court decisions; Danelski (1961; 1964) and Murphy (1964) have used historical and behavioral approaches in their studies of the Supreme Court. Public law is a field in transition. Convergence of approaches will facilitate transition, but the direction of movement seems clear. The field will acquire a measure of unity in a sophisticated, broad-gauged behavioralism that will take into account knowledge gained through the use of the other approaches. The change will be evolutionary, and traditional approaches, somewhat modified, will probably be used for some time to come. As the field moves toward the behavioral approach, it is likely to make theoretical contributions that will have significance beyond the study of public law. If important theoretical contributions are forthcoming from the study of collegial judicial decision making, they will be useful in the study of legislative committees, administrative bodies, and other similar decision-making groups. The highest achievement of the field would be the development of a general theory of public law. If that is accomplished, public law will perhaps regain the high place it once occupied in political science. DAVID J. DANELSKI
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[See also ADJUDICATION; JUDICIAL PROCESS; JUDICIARY; JURISPRUDENCE; LAW; LEGAL REASONING; LEGAL SYSTEMS; POLITICAL SCIENCE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 1938 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law. 4 vols. Chicago: Foundation Press. -» A supplement was published in 1963 by West as Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, 1938-1962. BAYLEY, DAVID H. 1962 Preventive Detention in India: A Case Study in Democratic Social Control. Calcutta: Mukhopadhyay. BECKER, THEODORE L. 1964 Political Behaviorism and Modern Jurisprudence: A Working Theory and Study in Judicial Decision-making. Chicago: Rand McNally. BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. (1908) 1949 The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures. Bloomington, Ind.: Principia Press. BERNARD, JESSIE 1955 Dimensions and Axes of Supreme Court Decisions: A Study in the Sociology of Conflict. Social Forces 34:19-27. BERNS, WALTER 1957 Freedom, Virtue, and the First Amendment. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press. BERNS, WALTER 1963 Law and Behavioral Science. Law and Contemporary Problems 28:185-212. BEVERIDGE, ALBERT J. 1916-1919 The Life of John Marshall. 4 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -» Volume 1: Frontiersman, Soldier, Lawmaker, 1755-1788. Volume 2: Politician, Diplomatist, Statesman, 1789-1801. Volume 3: Conflict and Construction, 1800-1815. Volume 4: The Building of the Nation, 1815-1835. BEYLE, HERMAN C. 1931 Identification and Analysis of Attribute-cluster-blocs: A Technique for Use in the Investigation of Behavior in Governance. Univ. of Chicago Press. BRECHT, ARNOLD 1959 Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-century Political Thought. Princeton Univ. Press. CAIRNS, HUNTINGTON 1935 Law and the Social Sciences. New York: Harcourt. CARDOZO, BENJAMIN N. (1921)1960 The Nature of the Judicial Process. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. CARDOZO, BENJAMIN N. 1924 The Growth of the Law. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. CARDOZO, BENJAMIN N. 1928 The Paradoxes of Legal Science. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. COLE, KENNETH C. 1948 The Theory of the State as a Sovereign Juristic Person. American Political Science Review 42:16-31. CORWIN, EDWARD S. (1919) 1921 John Marshall and the Constitution: A Chronicle of the Supreme Court. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. CORWIN, EDWARD S. (1928-1929) 1959 The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. DANELSKI, DAVID J. 1961 The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process. Pages 497-508 in Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett (editors), Courts, Judges, and Politics. New York: Random House. DANELSKI, DAVID J. 1964 A Supreme Court Justice Is Appointed. New York: Random House. Essays on the Law and Practice of Governmental Administration: A Volume in Honor of Frank J. Goodnow.
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Edited by Charles Grove Haines and Marshall E. Dimock. 1935. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. FAIRMAN, CHARLES 1939 Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court: 1862-1890. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. FRANK, JEROME (1930) 1949 Law and the Modern Mind. New York: Coward. GOODNOW, FRANK J. (1893) 1903 Comparative Administrative Law: An Analysis of the Administrative Systems, National and Local, of the United States, England, France and Germany. 2 vols. New York: Putnam. GOODNOW, FRANK J. 1905 The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States. New York: Putnam. GOODNOW, FRANK J. 1911 Social Reform and the Constitution. New York: Macmillan. GRAHAM, HOWARD J. 1938 The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yale Law Journal 47: 371-403. GRANT, J. A. C. 1958 The Viet Nam Constitution of 1P56. American Political Science Review 52:437-462. GROSSMAN, JOEL B. 1965 Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection. New York: Wiley. HAINES, CHARLES GROVE 1922 General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges. Illinois Law Review 17:96-116. HAINES, CHARLES GROVE 1930 The Revival of Natural Law Concepts: A Study of the Establishment and of the Interpretation of Limits on Legislatures With Special Reference to the Development of Certain Phases of American Constitutional Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. HART, H. L. A. 1961 The Concept of Lcra. Oxford: Clarendon. HAYAKAWA, TAKEO (1962) 1964 Civil Liberties in the Japanese Supreme Court. Pages 325-334 in Glendon A. Schubert (editor), Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. Chicago: Rand McNally. -> A partial reprinting of "Legal Science and Judicial Behavior, With Particular Reference to Civil Liberties in the Japanese Supreme Court," Number 2, pages 1-27 in the Kobe University Laxu Review. HYNEMAN, CHARLES S. 1959 The Study of Politics: The Present State of American Political Science. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. JACOB, HERBERT 1965 Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process. Boston: Little. JOHNSON, RICHARD M. 1965 Separation of Church and State: The Dynamics of Supreme Court Decisionmaking. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Illinois. KELSEN, HANS (1945) 1961 General Theory of Law and State. New York: Russell. KORT, FRED 1957 Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the "Right to Counsel" Cases. American Political Science Review 51:1-12. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. 1948 Power and Personality. New York: Norton. LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and McDoucAL, MYRES S. 1943 Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest. YaZe Law Journal 52:203295. LATHAM, EARL (1952)1965 The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-point Legislation. New York: Octagon Books.
LLEWELLYN, KARL N. (1934) 1935 The Constitution as an Institution. Pages 277-322 in Legal Essays in Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray. Edited by Max Radin and A. M. Kidd. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. MCCLOSKEY, ROBERT G. 1960 The American Supreme Court. Univ. of Chicago Press. MAGRATH, C. PETER 1963 Morrison R. Waite: The Triumph of Character. New York: Macmillan. MASON, ALPHEUS T. 1956 Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law. New York: Viking. MENDELSON, WALLACE 1963 The Neo-behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Critique. American Political Science Review 57:593-603. MERRIAM, CHARLES E. 1921 The Present State of the Study of Politics. American Political Science Review 15:173-185. MERRIAM, CHARLES E. 1926 Progress in Political Research. American Political Science Review 20:1-13. MITAU, THEODORE G. 1965 What Has Happened to the Study of State Public Law by Political Scientists? A Note on Achievements and Lacunae in the Study of State Constitutional Law Since 1950. Journal of Public Law 14:90-104. MOTT, RODNEY L.; ALBRIGHT, S. D.; and SEMMERLING, H. R. 1933 Judicial Personnel. American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals 167:143-155. MURPHY, WALTER F. 1964 Elements of Judicial Strategy. Univ of Chicago Press. PATRIC, GORDON 1957 The Impact of a Court Decision: Aftermath of the McCollum Case. Journal of Public Law 6:455-464. PELTASON, JACK W. 1953 A Political Science of Public Law. Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 34, no. 2:51-56. PELTASON, JACK W. 1955 Federal Courts in the Political Process. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. PELTASON, JACK W. 1961 Fifty-eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation. Introduction by Paul Douglas. New York: Harcourt. POWELL, THOMAS REED 1918 The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15:645-658. PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN 1941 Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court: 19391941. American Political Science Review 35:890-898. PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN (1948) 1963 The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 19371947. New York: Octagon Books. PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN 1954 Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court. Univ. of Chicago Press. SCHUBERT, GLENDON 1958 The Study of Judicial Decision-making as an Aspect of Political Behavior. American Political Science Review 52:1007-1025. SCHUBERT, GLENDON 1963 Behavioral Research in Public Law: Bibliographical Essay. American Political Science Review 57:433-445. SCHUBERT, GLENDON 1965 The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. Press. SHEPARD, MAX 1939 Law and Obedience. American Political Science Review 33:783-810. SHERWOOD, FOSTER H. 1958 The Role of Public Law in Political Science. Pages 86-96 in Roland Young (editor), Approaches to the Study of Politics. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. Press. SOMIT, ALBERT; and TANENHAUS, JOSEPH 1964 American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline. New York: Atherton.
PUBLIC LAW: Comparative Public Law SWISHER, CARL B. (1935) 1961 Roger E. Taney. Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press. SWISHER, CARL B. (1943) 1954 American Constitutional Development. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. SWISHER, CARL B. 1946 Research in Public Law: Report of the Panel on Public Law. American Political Science Review 40:552-562. TRUMAN, DAVID B. (1951) 1962 The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Knopf. VOSE, CLEMENT E. 1958 Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity. American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals 319:20-31. VOSE, CLEMENT E. 1959 Caucasians Only. The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. WALZ, GUSTAV ADOLPH 1934 Public Law. Volume 12, pages 657-659 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. WESTIN, ALAN F. 1958 The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case; Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer: The Steel Seizure Decision. New York: Macmillan. WILLOUGHBY, W. W. 1896 An Examination of the Nature of the State: A Study in Political Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. WILLOUGHRY, W. W. 1924 The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law. New York: Macmillan. WRIGHT, BENJAMIN F. 1938 The Contract Clause of the Constitution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. II COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW
Comparative public law is that academic discipline which investigates problems of public law by use of the comparative method. Scope, aims, and potentialities Constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law, tax law, labor law, welfare law, and antitrust law, as well as the law relating to civil and criminal procedure, are now considered to be "public law" even in countries which traditionally did not differentiate between public and private law along the lines followed by legal theory in continental Europe. It can hardly be denied that these fields deal with quite disparate matters involving great varieties of social, political, and organizational problems, and have little in common. Any attempt to define public law in terms of a self-contained category suffers from the ambiguities inherent in the dichotomy of "public" and "private" or in such distinction as that between the interests of the individual and the commonweal. Historically the bipartition found its classical formulation in Ulpian's statement: publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privctum quod ad singulorum utilitatem ("Public law is that which focuses upon the status of the Roman commonWealth, while private law pertains to the interests °f individuals": Digest i, 1, 1, 2). It played a
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shadowy role during the Middle Ages and gained new currency during the seventeenth century with the emergence of the modern state. During the nineteenth century, when the distinction between private and public law had its heyday, it paralleled the supposed dualism between state and society. Currently, however, this antinomy has been abandoned because it rests on a contraposition of the state, conceived as an independent entity, to society, likewise conceived as an independent entity, a theory closely linked to nineteenth-century European liberal doctrine. Yet the views regarding the antithesis between public and private law are significant from a comparative point of view, since they suggest varying notions about the relationships between the individual and collective spheres in time and space. No less perplexing than the borderline between comparative public law and comparative private law is the line of demarcation which separates comparative public law from comparative studies in the fields of sociology of law and political science. Although at the turn of the century links between law and the newly emerging disciplines of political science and sociology were still rather close, the subsequent emphasis of political science and sociology on "factual" inquiries rather than on "normative" data led to an increasing divergence. The legal perspectives in early political science are exemplified by the impact of the German allgemeine Staatslehre on Burgess (1890-1891) and of European administrative law on Goodnow (1893); Max Weber's work in sociology also reflects his legal background. Conversely, modern legal scholarship, stimulated by contemporary schools of jurisprudence, such as Roscoe Pound's sociological school, the legal realists, the policy-oriented approach of Lasswell and McDougal, and the psychoanalytical interpretation, has embarked on a methodological reorientation and endeavors to utilize the full scope of historical, economic, sociological, and behaviorist techniques. As a result, disciplinary boundaries have become of secondary importance. Perhaps it can be said that the main distinction between comparative public law and other comparative social sciences is the vantage point from which phenomena are selected and viewed. Another set of boundaries of the scope of comparative public law results from restrictions inherent in the comparative method itself. Except for cases of mere cataloging or sheer contrast, fruitful comparison is predicated on some similarity of political or economic organization, technological advance, or value scales.
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The difficulties attending upon the requisite comparability are least pronounced with respect to institutional techniques devised to respond to common problems and needs, e.g., social security arrangements established to alleviate the effects of economic dependency flowing from an industrialized society. In such areas, public law comparison is similar to comparative private law studies and can benefit from their methodology: functional analysis applied to the solution of specific policy problems. In fields where political habits, institutions, and value judgments play a dominant part, comparative studies must properly assess the role of these factors. Needless to say, the elements of the requisite comparability vary greatly with the nature, range, and purposes of the comparative inquiry. The aims of comparative public law, like the purposes of comparative law in general, are both cognitive and normative. In this respect it has the protean aspects of all legal studies. In the cognitive perspective comparative public law parallels comparative empirical research in the social sciences. In the normative perspective it manifests the specific attributes of all legal research, i.e., it is directed toward law reform. In designating comparative legal studies as primarily cognitive, one does not, of course, exclude normative elements altogether, since a better understanding of the way in which legal institutions operate may in turn influence their acceptance or rejection. From this vantage point comparative public law possesses major educational significance. The practical value of comparative public law has traditionally been emphasized in two areas: negotiation and application of multinational treaties, and law reform. A modern example of the importance of comparative public law in the interpretation of multinational agreements is furnished by the construction of the term "misuse of power" as a ground for the annulment of administrative acts (see Coal and Steel Community Treaty, art. 33; European Economic Community Treaty, art. 173; Euratom Treaty, art. 146). In arriving at the proper meaning, the Court of Justice for the European Economic Community, basing its holding on the comparative discussions of the advocate general, searched for a common core in the administrative laws of the community countries. In the field of law reform, the examples of the use of comparative public law are countless. It can be said without exaggeration that since the beginning of the twentieth century no major constitutional revision or introduction of important new legal institutions has taken place without extensive
comparative studies. The establishment of separate courts for deciding constitutional questions in several European countries, the creation of the social security system in the United States, and the development of the Mexican writ of amparo in analogy to habeas corpus provide good illustrations. Although it has been suggested by pioneers in legal comparison, such as H. C. Gutteridge (1946), that the extent to which the comparative process may yield valuable results is open to doubt when problems of political significance are under consideration, experience seems to have shown that given proper awareness of the ideological ramifications, even the transplantation of major political institutions is possible. Gneist's studies of British local self-government (1857-1860) furnished a powerful impetus toward a restructuring of Prussian municipal organization. Moreover, in some Western countries, recent interludes of departure from established principles, especially in the area of civil liberties, have led to re-examinations of the legal systems of these countries intended to test their consonance with accepted values and goals of the Western tradition. Certainly much of modern German and Italian legal literature is the outgrowth of such efforts in comparative law. History The growth of comparative public law came in the wake of the emergence of the modern nation-state, as an aftermath of the rise of different social and political patterns within the orbit of the Western world, and as a result of the acceptance of comparison as a tool of scholarly inquiry. The work of Jean Bodin at the end of the sixteenth century may be considered as the starting point and an early masterpiece of the modern discipline [see BODIN]. His analysis of the state and the role of government was buttressed by an impressive and far-flung comparison of the existing realities of his time seen in the light of legal principles derived from Roman law. The works of Leibniz and Vico in the next century and a half reflect the effort to arrive at the essence of legal authority and government on the basis of historical and comparative insights. [See the biography of Vico.] In contrast, the writers of the subsequent period emphasized the effects of environmental factors as causes of diversity and attempted comparisons on that basis. Undoubtedly Montesquieu's L'esprit des lois (1748) heralded a new era in comparative constitutional law and made an indelible impression on his time [see MONTESQUIEU]. Although Montesquieu's comparison of the French and English constitutions was tendentious and lop-
PUBLIC LAW: Comparative Public Law sided, it proved the value and inherent political potentialities of such studies. Accordingly, comparative surveys and critiques in Montesquieu's fashion were widely used by authors following him. The most notable studies of that type are Robertson's "View of the Progress of Society in Europe, With Respect to Interior Government, Laws and Manners," which was an essay preliminary to his comprehensive History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles the Fifth (1769), and Filangieri's Science of Legislation (1780-1785). Robertson's essay was familiar to and quoted by members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, especially in conjunction with the discussion of judicial review, and Filangieri's treatise is known to have elicited Franklin's admiration. Moreover, Filangieri. whose chapter on the divisions of criminal law demonstrably relied on Blackstone's genius for systematization, exerted a far-reaching impact on the early continental European codifications made not long after his death. During the nineteenth century, comparative public law in Europe, and particularly in Germany, shifted its principal focuses to criminal law and administrative law. In criminal law it was particularly Anton Mittermaier who, following the precepts of his teacher Ludwig Feuerbach, most fruitfully employed the comparative inquiry which gained him international repute. His penchant for comparison was manifested in all of his literary efforts but was most fruitfully employed in his endeavors toward a far-reaching reform of criminal procedure based on insights gained from French, English, and American practice. His predilection for comparison caused his rejection of the doctrinalconceptualistic approach then in vogue with many of his contemporaries. In 1829, Mittermaier and Heinrich Albert Zachariae founded the Kritische Zeitschrift fur Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes, which was the first periodical in the world devoted to the study of comparative law. The works of Gneist in administrative law and their importance have already been mentioned. During the middle of the nineteenth century, scope and methodology of comparative law, including comparative public law, became a matter of academic discussion and controversy. Emerico Amari set off that debate with his Critica di una scienza delle legislazioni comparate (1857). Although the work itself was soon forgotten and properly appreciated only much later, its initial impact persisted. The questions whether comparative law was a subject of its own or merely a Method and whether it should be treated from a Philosophical or historical-sociological point of
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view especially became and remained matters of much discussion. In Germany, the work of Joseph Kohler and his school concentrated on the ethnological-cultural aspects of the field. But the theoretical disputes were soon pushed into the background by the increasing institutionalization of the field: the establishment of societies for the study of comparative legislation, the creation of institutes of comparative law, and the publication of periodicals devoted exclusively to comparative law and comparative legislation. This development started in France in 1869, with the formation of the Societe de Legislation Comparee. In the year of its establishment the society commenced publication of its celebrated Bulletin. Even prior to that date the French jurist Foelix published the Pievue etrangere de legislation et d economic politique, which, under various titles, appeared between 1833 and 1849. It counted on its roster of distinguished foreign collaborators such eminent American jurists as Joseph Story and Francis Lieber. Likewise, in 1869 the Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee, printed in Belgium, was established by Asser, Rolin-Jacquemyns, and Westlake. The German Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, edited by Bernhoft, Cohn, and, after the first two volumes, Kohler, followed in 1878. In England the Society of Comparative Legislation was formed in 1895 and commenced to publish the Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law in 1899. During the twentieth century, especially in the wake of World War i, the study of comparative law has become much expanded and intensified. Institutes of comparative law have been established in many universities of the world. During this period comparative public law has emerged as a separate branch of comparative legal studies. In Germany this development found an outward manifestation in the establishment, by the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften, of a separate Institut firr Auslandisches Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht (now the Max-Planck-Institut in Heidelberg) alongside the Institut fur Auslandisches und Internationales Privatrecht in 1926. In France the Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et a I'etranger, established in 1894, devoted special attention to comparative constitutional and administrative law. In the United States, the University of California instituted a course of lectures in comparative public law, given in 1917 by Ludwik Ehrlich; and the Harvard Law School appointed Joseph Redlich, a specialist in comparative public law, as its first
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professor of comparative law in 1926. The increased importance of comparative studies in the various branches of public law led to the gradual emergence of a number of relatively independent subfields. Major areas of comparative public law Comparative constitutional law. Comparative constitutional law is probably the oldest branch of comparative public law. The notions of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, which demanded that all powers of government be fixed in a fundamental charter, determining the organization and powers of the authorities, gave a powerful impetus to studies of that type [see SOVEREIGNTY]. Among English-speaking people they were manifested in the Utopian literature, particularly in Harrington's Commonwealth of Oceana. During Cromwell's regime its author actually undertook a comparative study of constitutions, and his ideas exerted a demonstrable impact both on the constitution makers in the United States and on the political conceptions of Montesquieu. The American experiment, in turn, had its repercussions on the constitutional ideas of the French Revolution. During the middle of the nineteenth century the quest for written constitutions found a fertile ground in Germany. The acquisition of independence by the Spanish colonies in the New World was followed by the adoption of written constitutions by the newly formed states. The constitution of Argentina of 1853 was directly modeled after the constitution of the United States, although other constitutional arrangements were not neglected, and the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States were frequently relied upon and quoted in the adjudications of the Argentine Supreme Court. The British North America Act of 1867 and the Australia Constitution Act of 1900, which, on a federal basis, form the governmental framework of Canada and Australia, respectively, likewise were the product of comparative studies and in turn provided a strong motivation for further comparative researches. In modern days many new nations formed in other parts of the globe have been confronted with the problem of the extent to which they should borrow from existing constitutional models [see CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM]. In addition, the creation of supranational communities in Europe and elsewhere has given new significance to comparative studies of federal structures [see FEDERALISM]. Other matters which have attracted particular attention from students of comparative constitu-
tional law are the constitutional recognition and judicial protection of human rights and the experiences with the judicial control of the constitutionality of legislation. [See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.]
Comparative administrative law. Comparative administrative law is a more recent branch of comparative law. It has taken its subject matter from an assessment of the Council of State of France, which during the second half of the nineteenth century developed into the supreme administrative tribunal of that nation and succeeded in building up administrative law as a separate body of legal principles governing administrative action. The success of this court inspired Otto Mayer in the late nineteenth century to develop comparative administrative law as a special field of comparative inquiry. Scholars in other countries, especially Frank Goodnow in the United States, followed in his footsteps [see GOODNOW]. Comparison in administrative law has focused on three major issues concerning the relationship between the citizen and public authorities that were prompted by the ever-increasing scope of the activities of the modern state: (1) the judicial control of the legality of administrative action, (2) the attribution of such control to separate administrative tribunals instead of to the ordinary courts, and (3) the organization of such tribunals. Contemporary critics maintain that the ordinary courts in Great Britain and the United States have failed to exercise adequate supervision over legality and abuse of discretion in administrative action and to advocate the use of Continental models. Against them, however, it has been argued that bifurcation of the administration of justice results in unnecessary conflicts between jurisdictions and in a break in the uniformity of the legal system. Moreover, this different attitude regarding the scope of judicial control stems from different ideas about the range of policy judgments properly left to the bureaucracy and from different emphases placed on policy-making stage and policy execution. [See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.] Comparative criminal law. Research in comparative criminal law received its original impetus from the publication of Beccaria's An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1764) and the resulting reform movement [see BECCARIA]. It prompted the announcement of a prize for the best work proposing a plan for complete and detailed legislation covering substantive criminal law and criminal procedure, including the process of proof. Voltaire took a leading part in that venture. Since those days the problem of the proper treatment of crirni-
PUBLIC LAW: Comparative Public Law nals has been much discussed both internationally and comparatively in Europe and elsewhere. The University of Paris established a special chair for comparative criminal law as early as 1846, Joseph Louis Ortolan being its first incumbent. In England the "Fourth Report" of the Royal Commissioners of Criminal Law (Great Britain . . . 18341845) noted expressly that their reform proposals were based on a study of the contemporary criminal codes in Europe and the United States and the writings of foreign jurists, and in Germany the preparation of a new penal code induced the German Ministry of Justice to sponsor the systematic comparison of foreign criminal legislation. A 16-volume treatise entitled Vergleichende Darstellung des deutschen und auslandischen Strafrechts (1905-1909) was produced, a work which has been hailed as a landmark in the history of comparative studies. Today such institutions as the indeterminate sentence, preventive measures, and adult and juvenile authorities have been subjects of elaborate comparative study. The whole range of the causes and control of delinquency is particularly appropriate for such types of inquiry, and criminological research has become truly international in scope. [See CRIMINAL LAW.] Comparative civil procedure. The range of comparative legal studies has also been extended to the field of civil procedure and related subjects, such as bankruptcy. The roles of the judge and of the parties in a civil trial, the rules of evidence and testimonial privileges, and the effect of adjudications are the subject of numerous modern comparative studies in various countries. Comparative labor and social security law. The process of industrialization has given rise to many institutions which have developed in a parallel fashion in many countries, for example, collective bargaining and social insurance systems. In many instances the legislation of certain pioneer nations in the field has been transplanted and adapted by other nations. Much of the comparative work is done through international organizations such as the International Labor Office or international associations such as the International Association for Social Security. Comparative tax and antitrust law. The tremendous growth of the functions of the modern state has been accompanied by a parallel increase in its need for revenues. As a result, the law of taxation has become one of the most important branches of public law, and thus has become the subject of a vast number of comparative studies. Moreover, the harmonization of tax laws is one of
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the difficult tasks to be faced by the new supranational organizations. Finally, it should be noted that the current efforts to create economies of scale and the policy of relying on untrammeled market forces as a means of economic progress have led to the growth of comparative antitrust law as a new and extended discipline [see ANTITRUST LEGISLATION; TAXATION]. STEFAN A. RIESENFELD AND GERHARD CASPER [See also CONFLICT OF LAWS; LEGAL SYSTEMS, article On COMPARATIVE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS. Other
relevant material may be found in INTERNATIONAL LAW; POLITICS, COMPARATIVE; and in the articles listed in the guide to the reader under LAW.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS AND ARTICLES
AMARI, EMERICO 1857 Critica di una scienza delle legislazioni comparate. Genoa (Italy): Sordomuti. BECCARIA, CESARE BONESANA (1764) 1953 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments. Stanford, Calif.: Academic Reprints. -» First published in Italian under the title Dei delitti e delle pene. A paperback edition was published in 1963 by Bobbs-Merrill. BERLIN, MAX-PLANCK-!NSTITUT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1962 Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Gegenwart: Ldnderberichte und Rechtsvergleichung; Internationales Kolloquium. Beitrage zum auslandischen offentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht, No. 36. Cologne (Germany): Heymann. BOWIE, ROBERT R.; and FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (editors) 1954 Studies in Federalism. Boston: Little. BURGESS, JOHN W. (1890-1891) 1902 Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law. 2 vols. Boston: Ginn. -» Volume 1: Sovereignty and Liberty. Volume 2: Government. EHRLICH, LUDWIK 1921 Comparative Public Law and the Fundamentals of Its Study. Columbia Law Review 21:623-646. FILANGIERI, GAETANO (1780-1785)1806 The Science of Legislation. 2 vols. London: Ostell. -» First published as La scienza della legislazione. FONTANA, GIOVANNI (1938)1954 Introduzione al diritto pubblico comparato. Florence (Italy): CYA. FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (1937) 1950 Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America. Rev. ed. Boston: Ginn. -> First published as Constitutional Government and Politics: Nature and Development. GNEIST, RUDOLF (1857-1860) 1871-1884 Das heutige englische Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht. 3 parts, 3d ed. Berlin: Springer. -> Volume 1: Das englische Verwaltungsrecht der Gegenwart in Vergleichung mit den deutschen Verwaltungssystemen, 1883-1884. 2 parts. Volume 2: Self government: Communalverfassung und Verwaltungsgerichte in England, 1871. GOODNOW, FRANK J. (1893) 1903 Comparative Administrative Law: An Analysis of the Administrative Systems, National and Local, of the United States,
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Er>gland, France and Germany. 2 vols. New York: Putnam.
GREAT BRITAIN, COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW 18341845 First— [Eighth] Report From His Majesty's Commissioners on Criminal Law. 2 volt. London: Printed by W. Clowes and Sons for His Majesty. . . . -» See especially the "Fourth Report." GUTTERIDGE, HAROLD C. (1946) 1949 Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press.
HALL, JEROME 1963 Comparative Law and Social Theory. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press. KAISER, J. H. et al. 1964 Vergleichung im offentlichen Recht. Zeitschrift fur ausldndisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 24:391-471. KULZ, HELMUT R.; and NAUMANN, RICHARD (editors) 1963 Staatsbiirger und Staatsgewalt: Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Vol. 1. Karlsruhe (Germany): Miiller.
LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED W. (1667) 1768 Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae. Volume 4, part 3, pages 169-624 in Gottfried W. Leibniz, Opera omnia. Geneva: Fratres de Tournes. LINARES QUINTANA, SEGUNDO V. 1953— Tratado de la ciencia del derecho constitucional argentino y comparado. Vol. 1 —. Buenos Aires: Alfa. -> Nine volumes were published as of 1966. MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES (1748) 1962 The Spirit of the Laws. 2 vols. New York: Hafner. -> First published in French. RIESENFELD, STEFAN 1938 The French System of Administrative Justice: A Model for America? Boston University Law Review 18:48-82, 400-432, 715-748. ROBERTSON, WILLIAM (1769) 1916 The History of the Reign of Emperor Charles the Fifth. 3 vols. Philadelphia: Lippincott. Vergleichende Darstellung des deutschen und ausldndischen Strafrechts. 16 vols. 1905-1909 Berlin: Liebmann.
Vico, GIOVANNI BATTISTA (1720) 1858 Dell'unico principio e dell'unico fine del diritto universale. Milan (Italy): Agnelli. -> First published in Latin. SERIES AND JOURNALS HARVARD UNIVERSITY, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM IN TAXATION World Tax Series. -> Published since 1957. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. -» Published since 1952. Supersedes the Journal of Comparative Legislation and the International Law Quarterly.
INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION Publications. -> Published since 1951. A series of short studies on international and comparative fiscal law. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY ASSOCIATION Bulletin. -> Published since 1948. Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart New Series. -» Published since 1951. Kritische Zeitschrift fur Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes. -> Published between 1829 and 1856. Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee. ->• Published from 1869 to 1940. Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et a I'etranger. -> Published since 1894. Zeitschrift fur ausldndisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht. -» Published since 1929. Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft. -» Published since 1878.
PUBLIC OPINION i. INTRODUCTION ii. POLITICAL OPINION
W. Phillips Davison Avery Leiserson
INTRODUCTION
There is no generally accepted definition of "public opinion." Nevertheless, the term has been employed with increasing frequency since it came into popular usage at the time of the French Revolution, when Louis xvi's finance minister, Jacques Necker, referred to public opinion as governing the behavior of investors in the Paris money market. Later efforts to define the term precisely have led to such expressions of frustration as: "Public opinion is not the name of a something, but a classification of a number of somethings." (See Childs 1965, pp. 12-28, for some fifty different definitions.) In spite of differences in definition, students of public opinion generally agree at least that it is a collection of individual opinions on an issue of public interest, and they usually note that these opinions can exercise influence over individual behavior, group behavior, and government policy. Because public opinion is acknowledged to play a role in several diverse areas, leading writers on the subject have included sociologists (Tonnies 1887; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Albig 1956), political theorists (Bryce 1888; Lasswell 1927; Lippmann 1922), social psychologists (Airport 1937; Cantril 1966), and historians (Bauer 1929). Those who are engaged in manipulating public opinion have also made important contributions: for example, politicians (Lenin 1929) and public-relations specialists (Bernays 1923). Differences in definition and approach can be accounted for largely by the differing interests of various categories of students and practitioners. The principal approaches to the study of public opinion may be divided into four partially overlapping categories: quantitative measurement of opinion distributions; investigation of the internal relationships among the individual opinions that make up public opinion on an issue; description or analysis of the political role of public opinion; and study both of the communication media that disseminate the ideas on which opinions are based and of the uses that propagandists and other manipulators make of these media. Some researchers have simultaneously contributed to knowledge in several of these categories. An investigation in Erie County, Ohio, of the 1940
PUBLIC OPINION: Introduction U.S. presidential election campaign not only provided statistical measurements of voting intentions over time but also explored the influence of group membership on individual opinions and evaluated the impact of mass communications on the outcome of the election (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Another example may be taken from a study of Norwegian opinions on a number of foreign policy issues between 1959 and 1964 (Galtung 1964). In this case the researcher was able to contribute to the body of theory regarding political behavior in a democracy by analyzing the relationship between foreign policy attitudes and social position while also taking into account the role of group affiliation and the communication structure of the society. Quantitative measurement of opinions A definition offered by a specialist in polling is suggestive of the approach to public-opinion research of those who are primarily interested in measurement: "Public opinion consists of people's reactions to definitely worded statements and questions under interview conditions" (Warner 1939, p. 377). Those focusing on measurement usually investigate such questions as the following: How widely (and, sometimes, how intensely) is a given opinion held? In which geographic, religious, ethnic, or socioeconomic sectors is the opinion encountered most frequently? With what other opinions is it most closely associated? Measurement of opinions based on polling representative samples of larger populations came into prominence in the United States following the presidential election of 1936. At that time George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley, then the most prominent exponents of the sample-survey method, correctly predicted the outcome, while the Literary Digest, relying on nearly 2.5 million unrepresentative straw ballots, was off by nearly twenty percentage points. Use of the sample-survey method spread rapidly thereafter and was scarcely affected by the failure of the principal polling organizations to pick the winner in the presidential election of 1948. This failure did, however, lead to important improvements in polling methods. (For a succinct description of polling procedures in recent election surveys, see Perry 1960.) By 1965 public-opinion polling had spread throughout the world. The World Association for Public Opinion Research had membeis from more than forty countries, and numerous polling organizations were reported to be working in communist a nd other countries that were not represented in
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the association's membership. The New Yorkbased International Research Associates, headed by Elmo C. Wilson, had branch offices or affiliates in 34 countries, and the Gallup poll counted 32 affiliates and conducted frequent polls in nearly fifty countries. In the United States several hundred survey organizations existed on a national, state, or local level, with university research bureaus accounting for a substantial number of these. Data gathered in the course of numerous surveys throughout the world are centralized in a number of "data banks," the oldest of which is the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College. The Council of Social Science Data Archives, a cooperative organization of American university and non-profit research groups, helps to promote the exchange of these basic data for purposes of secondary analysis. Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research serves as a secretariat for the council. A selection of poll results from the United States appears in each issue of the Public Opinion Quarterly, and selected results from throughout the world are carried in Polls, a magazine published by Systemen Keesing in Amsterdam. Quantitative studies have led to numerous generalizations about public opinion, most of which, however, do not hold for every time and place. One is that large numbers of people pay surprisingly little attention to political personalities and issues, even when these are featured by the mass media. For instance, in 1964 one out of four adult Americans did not know that there was a communist government on mainland China (Michigan, University of ... 1964). Polls taken since World War n in the United States have consistently shown that large proportions of the respondents were unaware of such crises as those of 1959 and 1961 in Berlin, or of 1955 in the Formosa Straits. As of 1959, 22 per cent of adult Americans said that they had not heard or read anything about Fidel Castro (Erskine 1963, pp. 661-662). Surveys conducted in western European countries have disclosed similar results: more people are familiar with the names of leading sports and entertainment figures than with all but the most prominent politicians. As of 1961, 95 per cent of rural Brazilians were unable to identify the president of the United States (Institute for International Social Research 1961, p. 3). Stating the same proposition in another way, one can say that relatively small numbers of people regularly show a serious concern for public affairs. This has led some students to distinguish between
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the "general public," the "attentive public" (which is at least aware of important issues), and the "informed public," which participates in discussion of the issues (Almond [1950] 1960, p. 138). It has also led to the polling of "elites," which are variously defined as being composed of those with a high degree of wealth, education, prominence, or influence. For example, numerous polls have been conducted using samples of legislators, businessmen, or those listed in Who's Who. The other side of the coin is that people are likely to be most concerned with matters that they see as affecting them directly. A survey of the principal worries of adult Americans found that 80 per cent of the respondents answered solely in terms of personal and family problems; only 6 to 8 per cent mentioned national or world problems, including war, as being among the things they worried about most, in spite of the fact that the survey was conducted during a period when there was an active atomic-arms race with the Soviet Union (Stouffer 1955). Another study, using cross sections in more than twenty countries throughout the world—including several communist countries and developing countries—found a similar pattern of concerns, although with important national variations (Cantril 1966). Nor is it a simple matter to raise the level of information about public issues (Hyman & Sheatsley 1947). Repeated experiments and observations in several countries have indicated that people have a remarkable ability to ignore easily available facts when these facts are of little interest to them. Merely increasing the amount of information available will not necessarily increase public knowledge, although this generalization probably will not hold true in developing areas where there is a strong unfulfilled demand for more mass media. What seems to be the case is that a proportion of each population, ranging from a very small group up to about two-thirds of the adults, experiences a need for at least some information on matters of public concern. Once the needs of these people have been satisfied, further information flows over the population like water over a saturated sponge. Opinion measurement has also disclosed strong correlations between educational, religious, geographic, socioeconomic, and ethnic factors, on the one hand, and the opinions that people hold on political subjects, on the other. Indeed, in several areas of the United States it has been found that a person's voting behavior can be predicted with considerable reliability if information is available about his socioeconomic status, his place of residence (urban or rural), and his religious or ethnic background (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, p. 26). In
general, political interest and activity are greater among upper socioeconomic and educational levels, men, middle-aged groups, and urban residents than among lower socioeconomic and educational levels, women, older and younger adults, and rural residents (ibid., pp. 42-51). A number of surveys have also found a relationship between political opinions and personality factors—although this relationship has usually been weaker and more difficult to document satisfactorily. A final example of the kind of generalization that can be developed through quantitative measurement is that people tend to adjust their opinions to conform to the situation in which they find themselves. During racial integration of schools in the United States, for instance, public opinion in the areas affected tended to become more favorable toward integration following, rather than before, the action of school authorities to admit Negroes to formerly all-white schools (Hyman & Sheatsley 1964). Similarly, the attitudes that the people of two nations have toward each other are likely to result from the state of relations between their governments, as well as being a cause of good or bad relations (Buchanan & Cantril 1953). The use of public-opinion studies. The rapid spread of public-opinion measurement around the world is a reflection of the number of uses to which it can be put. Governments have increasingly found surveys to be useful tools for guiding their public-information and propaganda programs and occasionally for helping in the formulation of other kinds of policies. The U.S. Department of Agriculture was one of the first government agencies to sponsor systematic and large-scale surveys. It was followed by many other federal bodies, including the U.S. Information Agency, which has conducted opinion research in all parts of the world in which such activities are permitted. Publicopinion studies made abroad following the orbiting of the first Soviet satellite contributed to the decision of the United States to speed up its own space program. Similarly, governments of many other countries now either commission polls on questions of domestic and foreign policy or pay close attention to surveys made under private auspices. France, West Germany, and Japan are among the most frequent users of this kind of research, and there are few major countries that have not commissioned one or more surveys for policy purposes. India and Indonesia are among the newer nations that have occasionally turned to opinion measurement (Free 1967). Individual politicians, as well as governments, have found polls useful. Opinion surveys can give
PUBLIC OPINION: Introduction them a rough estimate of their chances of election and can also help them gauge the salience of various issues with the voters and evaluate the effectiveness of their campaign propaganda. Once in office they can use polls to keep in touch with opinion trends in their constituencies. As of 1953, 48 members of the U.S. House of Representatives were known to be sponsoring opinion surveys, and 14 more said they intended to do so; significantly, most lawmakers in question were in the younger age groups, a fact that suggests that more congressmen may be using polls at the present time (Hawver 1954, p. 125). Politicians and political parties in western European countries are known to have shown similar interests in survey research. Private businesses and associations have made even more frequent use of polling techniques. Most of the surveys done for business come under the heading of market rather than opinion research and are primarily concerned with product preferences, but large numbers are concerned with public issues, such as government regulation, the economic outlook, or community relations. There are also numerous studies of the public image of individual enterprises or whole industries. Such studies fall somewhere between market and opinion research, and many of them are commissioned by public-relations counsel working on behalf of the business or industry concerned. Labor unions, churches, and professional bodies have also used polls on occasion; the medical profession has been especially active in this regard. Innumerable small polls (and some large ones) have been conducted by academic researchers working with students. Indeed, it has been said that more is known about the opinions of American college sophomores than about the opinions of any other group in the world. A very different but equally important use of measurement is made by those who are primarily interested in other approaches to public-opinion research. Quantitative studies have provided many of the building blocks for those who study the internal relationships among opinions on public issues, the political role of public opinion, and the impact of communications. Measurement techniques have thus contributed importantly to the formation of theories and hypotheses in all branches of public-opinion research. Public opinion as a form of organization Long before techniques for systematically measuring opinions were developed, it was noted that public opinion seemed to have qualities that made it something more than the sum of individual opinions on an issue. It was presumed to have a
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force and vitality unconnected with any specific individual. The German poet Wieland (1799) spoke of it as "an opinion that without being noticed takes possession of most heads," and the sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies ([1887] 1957, p. 256) observed that "whatever may come to be considered a public opinion, it confronts the individual with an opinion which is in part an extraneous power." Some scholars postulated the existence of a "group mind" with a will of its own, and observation of crowd behavior seemed to confirm the existence of some psychic entity that could seize hold of many individuals at once and lead them to behave in ways that no one of them would have behaved under other circumstances [see COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR]. The concept of a group mind was soon discarded, since no empirical referent for it could be found, but the search continued for an explanation of the way public opinion differed from a simple summation of individual opinions. One explanation that has been advanced by a number of twentieth-century social scientists is that individual opinions are sometimes related to each other in such a way as to form a kind of organization. Charles Horton Cooley described public opinion as "no mere aggregate of separate individual judgments, but an organization, a cooperative product of communication and reciprocal influence" ([1909] 1956, p. 121). Ideas such as these have resulted in the abandonment of the search for an entity or content labeled "public opinion" that can be discovered and then analyzed; emphasis has been placed instead on the study of multi-individual situations and of the relationships among the opinions held by various people in these situations (Allport 1937, p. 23). If public opinion is viewed as a species of organization or as a bundle of relationships, questions arise as to what the nature of these relationships is, how they are formed, how they persist, and why they dissolve. The relationship most frequently examined is that between leaders and followers— that is, between political influentials and the mass of the people. A number of writers have analyzed the techniques by which politicians and statesmen are able to develop a common will among masses of disparate individuals by manipulating concepts and symbols (Lippmann 1922; Lasswell 1927; 1935). Woodrow Wilson, for instance, used his Fourteen Points to mobilize a common opinion out of the wide varieties of opinions churned up by World War I. Later investigations have found that opinion leaders, or those who are influential in determining what others think about current issues,
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are not concentrated only at the top of the social and political pyramids but can be found throughout the population. Each socioeconomic group has its own opinion leaders, who play an important part in determining the attitudes of other members of their group. The same leaders are not necessarily influential in all subject areas, however; one may be considered an authority on political questions, another on economic questions, and so on (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955). Studies of the way in which group membership influences individual opinions have contributed substantially to understanding the relationships involved in public opinion. For example, researchers have found that soldiers transferred from one unit to another during World War ii adopted attitudes prevalent in the unit to which they had been transferred (M. B. Smith 1949). Knowledge about the internal structure of public opinions, nevertheless, is still limited and lags far behind measurement. This is largely because of the difficulties involved in this type of research, both in conducting experiments that enable the investigator to make systematic observations of the relationships among those holding individual opinions and in quantifying such observations as can be made about these relationships in real-life situations, outside the laboratory. Despite the relatively undeveloped state of our knowledge about the internal relationships among opinions, some of the implications of this approach have found recognition among practitioners engaged in trying to influence popular thinking. It is common for public-relations specialists or propagandists to compile lists of "influentials," often on the basis of sociological criteria, on the assumption that ideas reaching people on these lists ™dll spread to a wider public. Some public-relations practitioners have spoken of their task as the "crystallization" of public opinion —that is, the transformation of individual attitudes into a collectivity that can exert influence (Bernays 1923). People concerned with building viable democratic polities in new nations may also find it useful to think of public opinion as a form of organization. Students of developing areas have noted that private citizens who take an interest in political questions in emerging nations are frequently out of touch with each other and unable to interact constructively (Shils 1963). There is thus no infrastructure of private organizations and public opinion between the government and the population masses, and this lack tends to facilitate sudden and radical shifts in governments and policies. These shifts, it is hypothesized, would be less extreme if a way could be found to engage all those with po-
litical interests, both in and out of government, in a dialogue that would lead to an increasing degree of consensus on important national issues. The problem is thus to relate individual opinions to each other in such a way that fairly stable bodies of opinion, capable of exerting political influence on each other and on the government, will be formed. The political role of public opinion Political scientists and historians have been most interested in the part that public opinion has played and is playing in political life. Accordingly, they have looked upon it primarily as an expression of opinion from the public that reaches the government and that the government finds prudent to heed (Speier 1950; Key 1961, p. 14). Some students have added the concept of latent public opinion, that is, public opinion that governmental officials expect will form if they do or do not do something and that thus influences their actions even though it has not yet taken shape (Truman 1951, pp. 511-512). This approach may bypass such questions as how opinions are distributed and what kinds of relationships they have with each other, but it does not necessarily do so. Numerous political thinkers have been interested in the measurement and organizational structure of public opinion. Although the term "public opinion" was not used prior to the eighteenth century, historians have identified phenomena very much like it in both ancient and medieval civilizations (Bauer 1929), and the relationship between government and mass opinion receives attention in the work of Plato, Aristotle, and other classical as well as medieval writers. Following the Protestant Reformation and the Renaissance in Europe, both of which resulted in more widespread and intensive discussion of competing beliefs and ideas, popular opinion was increasingly seen as playing a part in governmental decisions. Machiavelli believed that princes should take this opinion into account as one element in their calculations, and by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries leading political philosophers were paying tribute to its power. Rousseau held that all laws were ultimately based on public opinion and regarded the free expression of it as a major safeguard against despotism. Bentham stressed that the legislator could not ignore it (Palmer 1936). By the nineteenth century the concept of public opinion had entered into the mainstream of political theory. In Europe it was frequently seen as a weapon of the middle class against the old order.
PUBLIC OPINION: Introduction priedrich J. Stahl, a Prussian conservative, described public opinion as the "will of the middle class" and believed that with the aid of the press the middle class would prevail over the crown. Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, the Swiss legal scholar, wrote that public opinion was "predominantly the opinion of the middle classes, which form their own judgments and express these in unison" (Lenz 1956, p. 60). James Bryce saw public opinion in western Europe as being substantially the opinion of the class that "wears black coats and lives in good houses" (1888, p. 260 in 1891 edition). Observers of the United States held that public opinion there rested on a far wider population base. Bryce, writing in the 1880s, described the American system as government by public opinion and believed that popular attitudes were expressed primarily by the press, political parties, and elections. Half a century earlier Tocqueville had likewise considered the mass basis of American public opinion, and he saw in its influence a threat to independence of thought: "In America, the majority raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion" (1835, p. 117 in 1956 edition); "I am not the more disposed to pass beneath the yoke because it is held out to me by the arms of a million of men" (ibid., p. 149). The current concerns of those who are primarily interested in the interplay between public opinion and government center on questions denned in the previous century, but the discussion of these questions customarily draws upon quantitative data from opinion polls, content analyses, or other sources. A large portion of this literature consists of arranging and analyzing poll data in order to disclose the content and characteristics of opinions with which governments are or should be concerned (Key 1961). Thus, one can find a substantial number of studies that deal with public opinion and foreign policy, public opinion and social legislation, or public opinion and economic issues. Many of these studies focus on population subgroups of presumed political significance. Closely related to analyses of public opinion on Political issues are studies that are concerned with the ways in which public opinion influences government. In addition to using poll data, these studies usually describe the activities of pressure groups and political parties and the techniques of individuals who attempt to affect government Policy (for a selective bibliography, see Childs 1965, pp. 257-260). Included in this group are ^alyses of mail reaching executive or legislative officials. Although most such treatments have dealt w ith the United States, there is a growing body of
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literature both on pressure groups in other countries and on efforts by individuals in other countries to participate in official decisions. A recent study compared citizens' attitudes toward their own ability to influence governmental policy in West Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United States (Almond & Verba 1963 ). The weakness of most studies dealing with the influence of public opinion on government policy is that they cannot trace the effectiveness of the attempts that are made to exert influence. The equation of activity with effectiveness is simply assumed. Nevertheless, there are some notable exceptions. For example, the West Coast fishing industry was found to play a major part in the negotiation of a settlement with Japan following World War ii (Cohen 1957). The other side of the coin—government efforts to influence public opinion—has also been dealt with extensively. Tools most frequently used by governments for this purpose include publicity, propaganda, censorship, and a number of techniques of news management (Childs 1965, pp. 305-308). Although the manipulative attempts of government in the United States have received the lion's share of the attention of scholars, the rulers of totalitarian states have been most active in trying to mold public opinion. Efforts of the Nazi government to control public attitudes in Germany were notorious, and Soviet domestic propaganda has also received fairly extensive attention (Inkeles 1950). More recently, scholars have begun to focus on the activities of Communist China in this field (Yu 1964). As with studies of popular efforts to influence governments, treatments of governmental efforts to manipulate opinion have ordinarily been unable to show a clear connection between cause and effect. A possible exception is the case of the Soviet Union, where even anticommunist citizens appear to have adopted many of the principal categories of thought prescribed for them by the government. Cutting across all these aspects of the relationship between government and public opinion are studies of voting behavior. These have registered the distribution of opinions on a wide variety of issues, have explored the impact of special interest groups on election outcomes, and have contributed to our knowledge about the effects of government propaganda and policy. Since voting is the method by which the largest numbers of citizens of any democracy participate in policy, analysis of the behavior of potential voters during and between election campaigns contributes fundamentally to an understanding of the democratic process. Those
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who believe in democracy often find the results of such studies discouraging, in that they may show widespread prejudice and ignorance or little popular appreciation of important issues, but the results are rarely irrelevant. To generalize about the effects of the enormous amount of theorizing, philosophizing, and research that has been done on the relationship between public opinion and government is a difficult task. It seems safe to assume that the behavior of some political leaders has been influenced by political theories that are based in part on thinking about public opinion. It can also be argued that publicopinion research has enhanced the prospects for democratic government by helping to acquaint major groups in the population with each other's attitudes and values. When, however, one looks for specific examples of ways in which the study of public opinion has affected the political process, the examples one finds are likely to be relatively minor and to involve measurement rather than theory. For instance, officials have sometimes been able to discount the importance of what they hear from pressure groups when they have learned about the distribution of the opinions of the population as a whole on the same issues. It is also probable that both governmental manipulators of public opinion and private groups seeking to influence official policy have been able to conduct their activities with greater sophistication because of increased knowledge about the nature of the relationship between the government and the public. Communication research The task of communication research has been defined by Lasswell as that of answering the question: who says what to whom through what channel and with what effect? ([1948] 1964, p. 37). Thus, communication researchers who follow this formula have not focused their attention directly on opinions regarding public issues, but they have made a number of important indirect contributions to the understanding of public opinion. In particular, studies of symbol manipulators (those who speak), audiences (those who are exposed to communications), the role of the mass media, and the effects of the ideas that are communicated are relevant to such questions as how opinions take hold among large numbers of people, why they are distributed as they are, how they are related to each other, and how they change. Those who are concerned with the ways in which ideas are spread have studied the activities of government spokesmen, private publicists, and propaganda and news organizations as well as the rela-
tionships between communications and policy. Few adequate generalizations have been made about propagandists. One analysis found them to have abnormally strong cravings for power, highly extroverted personalities, unreasoning intolerance for rivals, and a gift for organization and management when these are related to self-aggrandizement (B. L. Smith et al. 1946). This unflattering characterization was, however, based in large part on attention to Nazi, Fascist, and Communist spokesmen. Modern propaganda organizations are characterized by elaborate mechanisms for setting policy, operating media, studying audiences, and evaluating effectiveness (Davison 1965). The task of coordinating the output of such vast organizations with the policy of the sponsoring group (usually a government) has frequently led to clashes between propagandists and policy makers. Studies of news media have indicated that they, too, tend to structure opinions, even though usually unintentionally. One way this is done is by giving large numbers of people a common focus of attention. An operating definition of news used by most journalists is that a subject is newsworthy if it is already in the headlines. Thus, there tends to be a circular reinforcing process, in that a subject is featured if it is already being given attention and it is given more attention because it is featured (Cohen 1963). News media also help to assure cohesion among members of major population groups. In many nations there is a "prestige paper" that is read by a large proportion of influential persons and that keeps members of this group of influentials informed about what others in the group are thinking. It also serves as a forum for exchange of ideas among them. In 1961, for example, a survey found that the New York Times was subscribed to by 60 per cent of American news editors, 46 per cent of utility executives, 30 per cent of college presidents, and 28 per cent of bank officers throughout the country (Kraft 1961). Newspapers such as Le Monde, Pravda, and The Times of London may occupy an even more central position. Propagandists and the mass media do not, however, have it all their own way. Audience studies have shown that people give their attention selectively to the communications that are available to them and that they frequently derive meanings from these that are quite different from the ones intended. Even very intensive publicity drives have failed to increase knowledge about given subjects when people have no interest in acquiring more information. This was found to be the case in Cincinnati shortly after World War n, when civic
PUBLIC OPINION: Introduction organizations and mass media experimented with a campaign to stimulate interest in the UN; in spite of the fact that the entire population was deluged with information about the world body, those who were uninformed prior to the campaign remained uninformed (Star & Hughes 1950). Conversely, news of events that are not given extensive publicity can circulate with amazing rapidity by word of mouth. Attention seems to be governed primarily by two factors: habit, in that people grow accustomed to relying on certain sources for information, and interest, in that people tend to look for information that they think will help them satisfy their wants or needs [see COMMUNICATION, MASS, article on EFFECTS]. As far as the effects of communications on opinions are concerned, a major finding of researchers has been that well-formed attitudes are highly resistant to change. Even the most skillful propaganda or advertising is unlikely to bring about shifts in attitudes that are firmly based on a person's own experience or that are shared by those with whom he comes in frequent and close contact. On the other hand, casual attitudes can be changed fairly easily. In nonpartisan local elections, where the candidates are not well known, even a small amount of information or an endorsement by a respected newspaper can sway a substantial number of votes. Similarly, the editorial stand of a newspaper can sometimes tip the scales for or against an issue in a community where opinions are fairly evenly divided and feelings do not run high. Communications can also reinforce existing attitudes and activate latent ones. Agitators frequently make use of activating and reinforcing communications in order to whip up enthusiasm for an idea and bring people to the point where they are willing to vote, demonstrate, or take some other action. Such effects may also be achieved unintentionally. During 1955, when a number of West German newspapers started to publicize crimes committed by American military personnel in West Germany, largely as a circulation-building device, they whipped up latent emotions to a point where at least one town council requested the withdrawal of American forces from the area. It later turned out that the "crime wave" represented no more than the usual number of violations with which American and West German authorities were customarily plagued and that the press had not intended to stimulate political action. Insights from communication research are used in both the political and the commercial realms. Political uses are made most frequently by those concerned with propaganda and psychological war-
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fare. In democratic elections, for instance, the political propagandist frequently tries to find an issue that is favorable to his side or unfavorable to the opposition and about which there are widespread latent attitudes; he then tries to activate these attitudes by means of emphasizing the issue in the public media. The psychological-warfare specialist often seeks the "marginal man," one who is in the opponent's camp without being firmly dedicated to it, and makes him the principal target for propaganda. In the commercial world, communication research makes it possible for the advertiser to select media that are already being given attention by the audience he wishes to reach and also to test the effectiveness of varying advertising appeals. The same principles of selection and testing can be used by those who are merchandising political ideas. One of the most important applications of communication research is in connection with national development. The mass media play a critical role in turning traditional societies into modern ones by preparing people psychologically for life in an industrial society, by helping to build new political institutions engaging in mass education, and by providing information that is necessary for economic development (Lerner 1958; Conference on Communication . . . 1963). Accordingly, modernizing nations have been advised to examine the channels for the flow of information within their borders and to plan for the growth of the mass media in phase with the growth in other sectors. The mass media are necessary for development not only because they link people with government and disseminate information that is needed in educational and economic programs but also because they draw diverse people together around common national problems and interests and make it possible for them to participate in public affairs (Schramm 1964). Future prospects Although there is little agreement on a precise definition of "public opinion," and many of its facets remain hazy, constantly increasing use of the term during the past two centuries testifies to its utility. As societies have become more complicated and ever larger masses of people have become involved in political and economic life, students have felt a growing need for some concept that refers to collectivities falling between the undifferentiated mass, on the one hand, and primary groups and formal organizations, on the other. In modern society people do not behave like isolated individuals, but neither can their behavior
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be explained exclusively in terms of their organizational and group membership. This became abundantly apparent just prior to and during the French Revolution, when the middle class began acting much as though it were an organized force, even though no principle of organization was immediately apparent. True, the middle class had its salons and coffeehouses, where information and ideas were exchanged, and sometimes its newspapers, but were these communication facilities alone sufficient to threaten the stability of the ancien regime? The ferment of the times could be explained only in terms of some greater force, and this force was labeled public opinion. As a result of increases in literacy and proliferation of communication media, public opinion soon ceased to be exclusively a middle-class phenomenon in the principal industrialized areas of the world. Less-advantaged members of the community have also been able to achieve a consensus on some issues, although less frequently and intensely than those at higher socioeconomic levels. The civil rights movement in the United States has succeeded in mobilizing public opinion far beyond the middle class. It is probable that public opinion in the developing countries will evolve in similar fashion but will take less time to do so. Public opinion has played a smaller role in communist countries than in the democracies. The efforts of the state to control the principal channels of public communication and to prevent nonofficial links among the citizenry have made it more difficult for individual opinions to become related and for consensuses to develop. Nevertheless, this has occurred in some instances, either because independent-minded artists and writers have given expression to widely shared ideas or because it has been made possible by word-of-mouth communication. Both rebellious writers and interpersonal channels seem to have played a role in the growth of public opinion that led to the antiregime uprising in Hungary in 1956. Communist spokesmen occasionally assert that public opinion does exist in countries having a totalitarian-socialist form of government but that it is a common opinion in which the entire population shares and is adequately expressed in single-list elections and mass demonstrations. It is improbable that such asseverations are made seriously, especially since publicopinion studies that recognize important differences among individuals and population groups have been reported from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with increasing frequency. Our understanding of the role that public opinion plays in political, economic, cultural, and other
areas can be expected to increase during the coming years as research and thinking at all levels is pursued throughout the world. Further comparisons of public-opinion processes in various societies would be especially helpful. Even more important would be empirical and theoretical studies linking together the four approaches described above, so that each would contribute to an interlocking and mutually reinforcing whole. Only when this integration has been achieved will a coherent theory of public opinion be possible. W. PHILLIPS DAVISON [See also ATTITUDES; CENSUS; COMMUNICATION, MASS; COMMUNICATION, POLITICAL; DIFFUSION, article on INTERPERSONAL INFLUENCE; MASS SOCIETY; PROPAGANDA; PUBLIC RELATIONS; REFERENCE GROUPS; and
the biographies of BRYCE; COOLEY; DICEY; MACHIAVELLI; TOCQUEVILLE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALBIG, WILLIAM 1956 Modern Public Opinion. New York: McGraw-Hill. ALLPORT, FLOYD H. 1937 Toward a Science of Public Opinion. Public Opinion Quarterly 1: 7-23. ALMOND, GABRIEL A. (1950) 1960 The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger. ALMOND, GABRIEL A.; and VERBA, SIDNEY 1963 The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton Univ. Press. BAUER, WILHELM 1929 Die offentliche Meinung in der Weltgeschichte. Potsdam (Germany): Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaioii. BERNAYS, EDWARD L. 1923 Crystallizing Public Opinion. New York: Boni & Liveright. BRYCE, JAMES (1888) 1931-1933 The American Commomvealth. 3d ed. 2 vols. New York and London: Macmillan. -» An abridged edition was published in 1959 by Putnam. BUCHANAN, WILLIAM; and CANTRIL, HADLEY 1953 How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. BUREAU OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1956 International Communication and Political Opinion: A Guide to the Literature, by Bruce L. Smith and Chitra M. Smith. Princeton Univ. Press. CANTRIL, HADLEY 1966 The Pattern of Human Concerns. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press. CHILDS, HARWOOD L. 1965 Public Opinion: Nature, Formation and Role. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. COHEN, BERNARD C. 1957 The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement. Princeton Univ. Press. COHEN, BERNARD C. 1963 The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton Univ. Press. CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DOBBS FERRY, N.Y., 1961 1963 Communications and Political Development. Edited by Lucian W. Pye. Princeton Univ. Press. COOLEY, CHARLES H. (1909) 1956 Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind. In Charles H. Cooley, Two Major Works: Social Organization and Human Nature and the Social Order. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> Each title reprinted with individual title page and
PUBLIC OPINION: Political Opinion pagination. Separate paperback editions were published in 1962 by Schocken. DAVISON, W. PHILLIPS 1965 International Political Communication. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Praeger. ERSKINE, HAZEL G. 1963 The Polls: Exposure to International Information. Public Opinion Quarterly 27: 658-662. FREE, LLOYD A. 1967 The Role of Public Opinion in International Relations. Unpublished manuscript. GALTUNG, JOHAN 1964 Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position. Journal of Peace Research 1:206-231. HAWVER, CARL 1954 The Congressman and His Public Opinion Poll. Public Opinion Quarterly 18:123-129. HYMAN, HERBERT H.; and SHEATSLEY, PAUL B. 1947 Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail. Public Opinion Quarterly 11:412-423. HYMAN, HERBERT H.; and SHEATSLEY, PAUL B. 1964 Attitudes Toward Desegregation. Scientific American 211, July: 16-23. INKELES, ALEX (1950) 1958 Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion. 3d printing, enl. Russian Research Center Studies, No. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL RESEARCH 1961 Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians. Princeton, N.J.: The Institute. KATZ, ELIHU; and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1955 Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. KEY, V. O. JR. 1961 Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf. KLAPPER, JOSEPH T. 1960 The Effects of Mass Communication. Glencoe, III.: Free Press. KRAFT, JOSEPH 1961 The Future of the New York Times. Esquire 55, no. 4:121-122. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. (1927) 1938 Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Smith. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. 1935 World Politics and Personal Insecurity. New York and London: McGrawHill. -» A paperback edition was published in 1965 by the Free Press. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. (1948) 1964 The Structure and Function of Communication in Society. Pages 37-51 in Institute for Religious and Social Studies, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, The Communication of Ideas: A Series of Addresses. Edited by Lyman Bryson. New York: Cooper Square. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; BERELSON, BERNARD; and GAUDET, HAZEL (1944) 1960 The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. 2d ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. LENIN, V. I. 1929 Agitation und Propaganda. Berlin: Verlag fur Literatur und Politik. -> Published posthumously. Contains a collection of Lenin's earlier writings on the subject first published in Russian. LENZ, FRIEDRICH 1956 Werden und Wesen der offentlichen Meinung. Munich: Pohl. LERNER, DANIEL 1958 The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: Free Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1964. LIPPMANN, WALTER (1922) 1944 Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan. -» A paperback edition was published in 1965 by the Free Press. MALETZKE, GERHARD 1963 Psychologic der Massenkommunikation: Theorie und Systematik. Hamburg (Germany) : Verlag Hans Bredow-Institut.
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MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF, SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER 1964 The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China: A Report. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. PALMER, PAUL A. 1936 The Concept of Public Opinion in Political Theory. Pages 230-257 in Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard Mcllwain. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. PERRY, PAUL 1960 Election Survey Procedures of the Gallup Poll. Public Opinion Quarterly 24:531-542. SCHRAMM, WILBUR L. 1964 Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries. Stanford Univ. Press. SHILS, EDWARD 1963 Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New States. Pages 64-77 in Conference on Communication and Political Development, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1961, Communications and Political Development. Edited by Lucian W. Pye. Princeton Univ. Press. SMITH, BRUCE L.; LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and CASEY, RALPH D. 1946 Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide. Princeton Univ. Press. SMITH, M. BREWSTER 1949 The Combat Replacement. Pages 242-289 in Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier. Volume 2: Combat and Its Aftermath. Princeton Univ. Press. SPEIER, HANS (1950)1952 The Historical Development of Public Opinion. Pages 323-338 in Hans Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War: Papers in Political Sociology. New York: Stewart. -> First published in Volume 55 of the American Journal of Sociology. STAR, SHIRLEY A.; and HUGHES, HELEN MAcGnx 1950 Report on an Educational Campaign: The Cincinnati Plan for the United Nations. American Journal of Sociology 55:389-400. STOUFFER, SAMUEL A. (1955) 1963 Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind. Gloucester, Mass.: Smith. TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS DE (1835) 1945 Democracy in America. 2 vols. New York: Knopf. -> First published in French. Paperback editions were published in 1961 by Vintage and by Schocken. TONNIES, FERDINAND (1887) 1957 Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). Translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis. East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press. -> First published in German. A paperback edition was published in 1963 by Harper. TRUMAN, DAVID B. (1951) 1962 The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Knopf. WARNER, LUCIEN 1939 The Reliability of Public Opinion Surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly 3:376-390. WIELAND, CHRISTOPH MARTIN 1799 Gesprdch unter vier Augen. Leipzig: Goschen. Yu, TE-CHI 1964 Mass Persuasion in Communist China. New York: Praeger. II POLITICAL OPINION
"Political opinion" is a convenient term for referring to the context of authoritative decision, governmental and nongovernmental, in which persons in positions of discretionary authority anticipate or respond to estimates of the community's demands, expectations, or requirements. As the sam-
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pie survey and other instruments of social science research add precision to the concept of public opinion—defined as the distribution of personal opinions on public objects in the population outside the government—it becomes increasingly apparent that the opinion process is not identical with or completely determinative of the judgments of persons in a position to formulate and shape public policy. The concept of political opinion is thus a shorthand expression for the relation or sets of relations between the opinion-forming and policymaking processes in society. In empirical terms, it leads to the following question: which opinions and views, held by which persons outside the government, are heeded by which persons who make authoritative policy decisions? Philosophically, it also raises the question of meaning: what function does public opinion play in the political process? Public opinion is sometimes considered to be a sanction (legitimizing symbol), sometimes an instrument (data), and sometimes a generative force (directive and limit) in the policy process. Clearly, then, normative assertions about "government by public opinion" do not accurately describe the processes by which opinions are actually utilized by the makers of public policy. Opinion in the public context In order to understand the many ways in which public opinion actually functions in the political process, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of "opinion" and "public." "Opinion" includes the whole range of personal and private sentiments, beliefs, and systematic views, felt and expressed, rational and nonrational, that both affect the legitimacy and stability of the social order and political system and condition the feasibility and acceptability of public policies. In a political setting, the relevant criterion is not the truth or falsity or the Tightness or wrongness of opinions but their significance for the electoral success or failure of officeholders and candidates, for the degree of popular support for existing and proposed policies aimed at the security and prosperity of the community, and ultimately for the viability of the constitutional and political system. Insofar as opinions are expressed, it is useful to distinguish two categories of opinion statements: (1) those of preference, which include expressions of individual feeling, conviction, and value; and (2) those of fact, which purport to describe transpersonal reality in objective terms of verifiable evidence. The important characteristic of opinion statements, as distinct from postulates of knowledge, mystical or religious faith, and matters of
belief beyond discussion (e.g., incest), is that they are recognized as expressing controversial, conflicting ideas, capable of being accepted by rational minds, and hence are appropriate for discussion among individuals and groups. Discussion can lead to agreement and can settle differences of opinion; only violence, authority, or an appeal to a metaphysical or a divine source can resolve differences in objects of faith and belief, which are literally nondebatable and thus fall outside the sphere of opinion. There is a notable tradition in the history of normative thought about the relation of the public and the private in matters of opinion. Milton's Areopagitica, Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, and Mill's On Liberty are classic statements of the moral and political problems posed by the personal freedoms of religious belief, thought, and expression; by a press that is not owned or controlled by the government; and by the respective rights of the majority and of minorities. Through most of the nineteenth century the dominant tradition assumed that the public sphere was defined by the legally coercive acts of government officials acting in the name of the monarch or representing the people organized as a political community. The work of Marx, James, and Freud, coupled with the rise of the "culture" concept in anthropology, shifted the focus of attention to the economic and social-psychological determinants of opinion, almost to the point of obliterating the distinction between "public" and "private." Some writers treated the public and political aspects of opinion as logical derivatives of class or status ideologies; others, as by-products of the personalityforming processes by which individuals are adjusted to society. The term "public" was given the sense of "interpersonal relations." For example, Charles Cooley saw public opinion as the product of social communication and reciprocal influence; John Dewey, as the consequences of interpersonal acts upon persons other than those directly involved in transactions. But these concepts turned out to be virtually identical with the notion "group," measured by "the extent and complexity of interpersonal relations among the members of specified aggregates, . . . which under specified conditions exhibit organization of varying kinds and degrees" (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950). Hence "public" had to be differentiated by specifying the requirement of a more inclusive consensus, within which various opinion aggregates could coexist. These theoretical developments emphasized the roots of public opinion in private and group experience and demonstrated the futility of absolute
PUBLIC OPINION: Political Opinion differentiations between "individual," "group," and "public." However, the conception of the public as a simple extension of interpersonal contact and communication remains unsatisfactory. First, it is not clear that an opinion consensus is a necessary or sufficient condition for a public to exist. Second, the problem of coercion is ignored. Finally, the linkages and adjustments connecting group opinions with the formulation of public policy are vaguely referred to under the heading "pressures" or "compromise." Models of the political process that explicitly recognize the ambiguous relation between conflicting opinion preferences and actual policy decisions are still required. Theories of political opinion The range of individual and group opinions taken into account by political rulers, representatives, and public officials varies widely among political societies, historical and contemporary. In primitive communities and in feudal, caste, or closed-class social systems, the range of political communication seems to have been narrowly confined within limits set by ritual, custom, and social structure. In fractionalized, transitional cultures the ruling group often restricts sharply the scope and subjects of public discussion and indeed controls more or less completely the channels of mass communication. Since World War i it has become fashionable for all governments to claim to be democratic, in the sense that a high degree of correspondence is imputed to exist between the acts of government officials and the majority opinion. However, we may draw a preliminary, fundamental distinction between "constitutional" and "people's" democracies, in terms of the degree of nongovernmental control of the instruments of opinion formation and the relation that is asserted to exist between public opinion and governmental decision making. Under constitutional governments, public officials operate through prescribed, legal procedures for issuing and validating statements of public policy. Nongovernmental institutions of public information and discussion are allowed ample opportunity, before, during, and after the official process, to formulate the issues and to develop a patterned distribution of individual responses from "the country." All this goes on in an atmosphere free from military or private violence, and individuals and groups are free to criticize and respond to governmental programs of information and persuasion. In this context the acts of public officials are interpreted as symbolic, authoritative expressions of the public interest, legally enforceable
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until amended or rescinded by proper constitutional procedures after a period of public reaction, political agitation, and response. Contrariwise, in so-called people's democracies it is held that the will of the "people," the "masses," the "nation," or the Volk is known or available only to the ruler or the party; this "will" is embodied in the ruler's or the party's acts, and only such information and views as are found necessary or appropriate are legitimate matters for public knowledge and discussion. To this end, the channels of public communication and conditions of group association are rigorously limited and controlled by governmental and party officials. Speculative theories of political opinion can be grouped into five classes; each has affinities to one of the two basic types above but may also resemble the other in some features. Elitist theories. Perhaps the oldest theory of political opinion is that of the elite, or ruling class, according to which society is horizontally divided into leaders and followers and vertically divided into hierarchies of racial, functional, socioeconomic, or demographic groups. The ruling class is composed of the leaders of the several verticalgroup hierarchies. The consensual foundations of political community, according to elitist theorists, lie in ethnic ties, qualities of the people, ancient customs, glorious historical events, and symbolic documents embodying self-limiting agreements between the nominal ruler and the elite leaders. In the elitist conception of political opinion, the status and opinion leaders outside government are seen as occupying a hierarchical position above the points of official decision, so that the lower-status governmental officials, by definition, simply execute the decisions made by the ruling class. Representative of this approach is the work of Gaetano Mosca [see MOSCA]. Absolute-sovereignty theories. A second class of theories of political opinion includes those absolutist doctrines of sovereignty, both monarchic and popular, that view society as an abstract mass of individuals. In the absence of rulers, the people are able to act only chaotically or in compulsive unanimity, for example, as a mob. The abstract "people," therefore, find it necessary to abdicate power to a no less abstract absolute ruler, monarch, leader, or party. These entities alone are capable of knowing and expressing the mystical, unifying will variously named volonte generate, Volksgeist, sovereign people, and mass proletariat. Interpreters of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel can point to paragraphs and sections showing that these thinkers were aware that the social structure and opinion
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processes of society are more complex than the simple dichotomy of people and ruler; nonetheless, in answer to the question of where the source of supreme power in the political community is located, each postulated an unlimited governing authority, either in the mass-majoritarian consensus of the people or in the moral and political responsibilities of the state-ruler. None of the LeninistStalinist theories (or their adaptations by Mao Tse-tung) about the relations of the party to the masses overcomes the difficulty of the people-state dilemma. [See SOVEREIGNTY.] Manipulative theories. Closely associated historically with the concept of popular sovereignty is the idea that people have to be educated, guided, induced, or persuaded. In practical terms, this has led to the notion that issues can be created and that new cleavages and changes in the mass distribution of opinion can be brought about by events and adroit acts of opinion leaders, politicians, prestige figures, or persons who control the content of the mass media. War propaganda during World War i, the tremendous increase in commercial advertising and public relations activities thereafter, the deliberate use of propaganda and agitation by totalitarian and revolutionary mass movements, and the conscious development of psychological warfare in World War n, all highlighted what may be called the mass-manipulation theory of political opinion. During the interwar period there was a tendency to overstate the degree to which modern "mass society" can be controlled without legal and political monopolies over the press and other mass media. However, there was also a clear realization that social forces and public opinion are not independent, exogenous variables in the opinion-policy process but are affected by, and indeed are sometimes produced by, leaders and events. [See, for example, LIPPMANN.] Constitutional-democratic theories. The fourth category of political opinion models contains those theories of representative democracy which postulate the idea of a covenant or agreement among people who, by giving up their prepolitical freedom of action, are enabled to establish a government of limited powers in order to secure certain values (union and independence, security of life and property, justice and liberty, the common welfare) that individuals without government cannot obtain by themselves. [See The Federalist; see also LOCKE; SOCIAL CONTRACT.] The metaphorical notion of an "agency" contract allows the imposition of substantive and procedural restraints upon the legitimacy of discretionary acts by elective representatives and
public officials. It also provides guarantees of personal and private rights, requirements for insuring conformity between governmental acts and majority opinion (free elections, freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of assembly and of petition), and a prescribed procedure for amending and revising governmental structures, procedures, and powers. Such widely varying theories of political organization as monarchy, minority or restricted majority rule, and populist democracy have been reconciled with representative-democratic forms, when they admitted prior legitimacy and loyalty to a political order based on the principles of limited powers and the consent of the governed [see LINDSAY]. Rationalist-idealist theories. The fifth category, the rationalist-idealist model of political opinion, was perhaps best formulated by A. L. Lowell and R. M. Maclver, who sought to identify the conditions necessary for individuals and groups to participate rationally in public affairs [see LOWELL and MAC!VER]. The specified conditions were (1) that the people be politically organized and act as a community rather than as a mass or crowd; (2) that the right of minorities to hold their opinions and to organize politically for peaceful opposition be recognized but that the minority submit to and obey majority decisions; (3) that majorities and minorities alike accept and abide by the structure and processes of governmental decision, including the rules for amendment and change; (4) that the members of the political community have access to the facts reasonably necessary to arrive at a rational decision on a given issue; (5) that they engage actively in discussion and participate in public affairs, so as to be capable of assessing political realities; and (6) that they explicitly adjust their votes and other political acts to their conception of the common good and public interest. Lowell's criteria may raise doubt that any human government can be wholly democratic, but they perform the important task of clarifying the qualities of individual and group action needed if the members of a community are to act as a public. Speculative versus empirical theories. The division between speculative and empirical theories is not precise, nor are the two mutually exclusive. Generally speaking, speculative models implicitly or explicitly incorporate the observer's preferences into his conceptual system and attempt to describe and classify human behavior and institutions directly in terms of a priori, complex categories that defy quantitative expression. Empirical or analytical models extrapolate from individual behavior a
PUBLIC OPINION: Political Opinion minimum number of elemental, conceptual variables, supposedly identifiable by standard observational procedures independent of the observer's or respondent's preferences, and attempt to explain behavior indirectly by inferring (predicting or generalizing) the probable covariation between two or more such variables. Certain obstacles confront all empirical theories of political opinion. One is the obvious methodological problem of systematically gaining access to persons in positions of public authority or private influence for purposes of observation. More important, conceptually, is the problem of variations in the setting in which the opinion-policy relation occurs. The two-way relation between opinion and policy formation can be studied on the level of, and within, the individual personality; in the interactions of two or more persons in small groups; in leader-follower behavior within large groups, whether or not they possess formal structure and bureaucratic organization; and in the complex relationships between key individuals in the multigroup process of public, official policy making. Intensive studies of the conditions under which changes can be induced in individual opinion, personality, and behavior have great potential value for research in more inclusive contexts, but the variations of scale and setting often seem to reduce the applicability of concepts employed in personality and small-group studies to analogies and metaphors on the level of political and societal behavior. Empirical research On the macroscopic level of political society, studies of public opinion and policy formation do not agree about the analytical terminology for the different aspects of the opinion-policy relation, nor have they integrated the conceptual tools available. Past approaches to the study of political opinion can be grouped into four categories with respect to the focus of analytical attention: (1) the formal sanctions that justify and limit the exercise of power within the process of public opinion and policy formation; (2) the initiating sources and the environmental conditions that galvanize or inhibit the process in action; (3) the critical decisionmaking components in policy determination; (4) the total opinion-policy process or system, through which opinions are transmitted, policy decisions reached, and behavioral adjustments effected on the part of the members of the political society. Among the social sciences political science has been largely preoccupied with (1) and (3), soci-
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ology with (2) and (4), psychology and economics with (3) and (4), and cultural anthropology with (1) and (4). Since 1945, however, interdisciplinary communication, especially in the United States, has been steadily breaking through such conceptual jurisdictions. Political opinion—role as sanction. The location, organization, and exercise of formal, legal sanctions over the process of public opinion and policy formation has long been a central concern of conventional political theory, comparative government, and constitutional law and history. Not until the distinction between legal and political sovereignty was recognized, however, could public opinion become a respectable subject of academic research, and then new methods, concepts, and even disciplines became necessary. Evidence of the role of political opinion as sanction has been found in (1) the demonstration of widely held faith among the population in the legitimacy of the structures and processes by which public policy decisions are reached; (2) the measurement of divisions of the electorate into organized parties and groups which provide support for, criticism of, or opposition to official government policies; (3) the estimates of the degree of popular satisfaction with the performance of the regime or party in power in promoting the security and prosperity of the political community; (4) the discovery of norms of behavior and procedure expected from public officials in promulgating and enforcing public policies; and (5) the analysis of the moods and qualities of opinion to which policy makers have to adjust their thinking and public behavior. The concept of political opinion has stimulated inquiries into the distinctive calling (vocation) of the politician—the specialist in organizing political controversy, in formulating and discussing issues, in making decisions and taking protective policy positions in public, in return for which he obtains influence over or access to elective office. Opinion research has provided objective data on the variability of popular moods, demands, expectations; on the scope for choice, error, and misjudgment in policy making; and on career opportunities and the rewards and dangers involved in estimating opinion distributions and trends. Finally, research has documented the conception of government by public opinion as a process of identifying, investigating, and adjusting the differences between mass, interest-group, professionally political, and technically expert conceptions of the public interest, as opposed to the old-fashioned method of elaborating
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the distinction between the "partial" interests of groups and the "common" interests of the public or community as a whole. Political opinion as articulation of interests. Of all research into political opinion, studies of social structure and mobility, group organization and activity, and processes of interpersonal and mass communication and their effects upon opinion formation and change have made the greatest advances in precision and sophistication since 1925. However, even in these areas such research has contributed more to an understanding of the sources of public policy formation and of society's responses to the policy than to an understanding of the operation of the whole process. Major contributions have been made toward (1) discriminating the different kinds of opinion aggregates that arouse political controversy (the mass-attention group, the reference group, the attentive public, the opinion-making public, etc.); (2) isolating and measuring the determinants of opinion by correlating self-identified group opinions with those classified by objective measures of sociopolitical stratification (multivariate analysis); (3) extending our cognitive "maps" of policy making in organizations that recruit opinion makers who articulate group interests throughout the whole field of cultural, economic, and political activity; (4) specifying the conditions under which individual and mass attitudes and behavior can be modified, distorted, or transformed by organization, leadership, and manipulation; (5) measuring the content and audience exposure of communications; and (6) analyzing the behavior of voters, consumers, buyers, and members of other functional groups in the making up and changing of their minds as the result of exposure to various forms of communication. The sample survey has been a major vehicle of this progress, but for studying the personal transmission of opinions, the impersonal processes of organizational communication, and the relations between opinion leaders and policy makers, technicians have found it necessary to supplement the sample survey with sociometric, intensive-interview, and other observational methods. The sample survey technique has not yet enabled social scientists to construct a satisfactory general model of how social structure and group organization activate, permeate, and respond to the policy process. It has, however, enormously enhanced their ability to verify, at points of time before, during, and after the process of public decision, the extent to which information, attention, and other attributes of opinion distributions conform to hypothesized
statements, however derived. It may be conjectured that the next major advance in our knowledge of the opinion-policy relation will emerge from developments in the fields of organizational theory and decision-making behavior, where sharper concepts of interaction analysis are being developed. Dimension of decision makers' behavior. Another large body of empirical inquiry into the opinion-policy process centers upon the behavior of persons in positions to make authoritative decisions that bind or control the acts of others. The study of leadership and organizational behavior falls partially into this category, as do case studies of policy formation, analyses of voting behavior of legislative, administrative, and judicial officials, and studies of the personal contacts and the quantity and content of communication coming to decision makers' attention. No more than in the previous categories has one single, unifying conceptual framework emerged. It is, therefore, necessary to resort to a paradigmatic presentation of the significant factors which affect decision makers' judgments and acts. Decision-making theory does not specifically utilize the concept of public opinion but incorporates data on public opinions and policy communications into indexes of perceptual and informational influences upon the perspective of the decision maker. In decision-making vocabulary, "public opinion" means those links or channels of communication with the external setting of the system that are available to the policy maker and the effective rules which define the source and content of communications that are authoritative for him. "Basic" techniques for analyzing communications linkages and rules (networks) for policy makers are still rudimentary, and to describe the role of public opinion in decision making, we still resort to common-sense terms derived from the "applied" skills of intelligence, propaganda, and public relations. Studies of the impact of public opinion on public policy makers have been focused on the following: (1) policy makers' perceptions of whether a policy proposal or issue would be regarded by the public as necessary, would be tolerated, would be controversial, or would be overwhelmingly unpopular, and the extent to which awareness of such attitudes leads to modifications of policies; (2) policy makers' estimates or anticipations of shifts or changes in public opinion that might result if certain "engineered" events took place, if issues and decisions were presented in certain ways at a certain time, if they were presented by certain prestige or authority figures in
PUBLIC OPINION: Political Opinion ways and by means recommended by the opinion specialist or public relations consultant (the first category is generally regarded as the specialty of the researcher, the second of the policy adviser on planned programs of "opinion preparation"); and (3) policy makers' acceptance or sharing of the legal and ethical norms held by the majority or at least by substantial numbers of the public. Policy makers' perceptions of their opinion climate may be rendered more objective by sample surveys. Their estimates of public reactions may be refined by intelligence operations (military, commercial, or political) and employment of the skills of advertising and public relations agencies. Political biographers, journalists, literary artists, and psychological experts have explored the internalized conflicts produced by motivational drives embodying strong compulsions to violate or to conform to societal norms. Whether the context of application be literary, scientific, or practical, empirical analysis supports the assumption of normative theory that public opinion is not a single source of authoritative command; rather, it has at least three different functions: (1) it provides generalized support for the authority and policy-making system; (2) it articulates group interests; and (3) it is a factor in the judgment of individual policy makers. Political opinion and public policy The most pervasive issue dividing theories of the opinion-policy relation bears a striking resemblance to the problem of monism—pluralism in the history of philosophy. The controversy deals with the question of whether the structure of sociopolitical action should be viewed as a more or less centralized process of acts and decisions by a class of key leaders, representing integrated hierarchies of influence in society ("establishment"), or whether it is more accurately envisaged as several sets of relatively autonomous opinion-andinfluence groups (based on wealth, votes, prestige, beliefs, or violence), interacting with representative decision makers in an official structure of differentiated (elective, judicial, bureaucratic) governmental authority. The former assumption interprets individual, group, and official action as part of a single system and reduces politics and governmental policies to a derivative of three basic analytical terms: society (social differentiation), culture (norms of expected behavior), and personality (internalized drives and modes of adaptive behavior by leaders). The pluralistic assumption retains the familiar dualism between society (the interpersonal affinities of interest, loyalty, and
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opinion exhibited in spontaneous groupings and voluntary associations outside of government) and the state (the official role structures of government, based upon the institutionalized control of violence and bureaucratic performance of public duties). This approach elevates to the central focus of attention the political patterns of communication (superior force, bargaining, competition, coalition, etc.) between leaders of societal groupings and the hierarchies of official policy determination. The monistic assumption is theoretically simpler and more easily verified, particularly in static, rural, local communities. The pluralistic model is more flexible, in that it allows for variations in the configuration of power, depending upon the nature of the issue, and accounts for more of the facts of urban, industrialized, technologically developed national states. Under either assumption, public policy is an end product of different patterns of communication between representative leaders of societal and of governmental opinion. AVERY LEISERSON [Directly related are the entries COMMUNICATION, POLITICAL; CROSS PRESSURE; DECISION MAKING; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; POLITICAL PROCESS; and the biographies of KEY; LlPPMANN; STOUFFER.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALMOND, GABRIEL A. (1950) 1960 The American People and Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger. BACK, KURT W. 1961 Power, Influence and Pattern of Communication. Pages 137-164 in Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (editors), Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior. New York: Holt. BENDIX, REINHARD 1961 Social Stratification and the Political Community. Archives europeennes de sociologie 1:181-210. BERELSON, BERNARD (1948) 1960 Communications and Public Opinion. Pages 527-543 in Wilbur L. Schramm (editor), Mass Communications: A Book of Readings. 2d ed. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. CATER, DOUGLASS 1959 The Fourth Branch of Government. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. DAHL, ROBERT A. (1955) 1956 Hierarchy, Democracy, and Bargaining in Politics and Economics. Pages 8389 in Heinz Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (editors), Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. DOOB, LEONARD W. 1948 Public Opinion and Propaganda. New York: Holt. KATZ, ELIHU; and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. (1955) 1964 Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications. New York: Free Press. KEY, V. O. JR. 1961 Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf. KRIS, ERNST; and LEITES, NATHAN C. (1947) 1966 Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda. Pages 267277 in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (edi-
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tors), Reader in Public Opinion and Communication. 2d ed. New York: Free Press. LANE, ROBERT E. 1959 Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1965. LASSWELL, HAROLD D.; and KAPLAN, ABRAHAM 1950 Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. Yale Law School Studies, Vol. 2. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1963. LIKERT, RENSIS 1961 An Emerging Theory of Organization, Leadership, and Management. Pages 290-354 in Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (editors), Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior. New York: Holt. LIPSET, SEYMOUR M. 1960 Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday. PETRULLO, LUIGI; and BASS, BERNARD M. (editors) 1961 Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior. New York: Holt. POLSBY, NELSON W.; DENTLER, R. A.; and SMITH, P. A. (editors) 1963 Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ROSENAU, JAMES N. 1961 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formula. New York: Random House. SHILS, EDWARD; and JANOWITZ, MORRIS (1948) 1966 Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II. Pages 402-417 in Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (editors), Reader in Public Opinion and Communication. 2d ed. New York: Free Press. -» First published in Volume 12 of the Public Opinion Quarterly. SNYDER, RICHARD C. (1957) 1964 A Decision-making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena. Pages 3-38 in Roland A. Young (editor), Approaches to the Study of Politics. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. Press. SOCIETY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES (1954) 1960 Public Opinion and Propaganda: A Book of Readings, by D. Katz et al. New York: Holt. -> See especially pages 1-84, "The Nature and Function of Public Opinion," and pages 381-459, "Group Processes: Interaction, Communication and Influence, Social Reinforcement." SPEIER, HANS 1950 Historical Development of Public Opinion. American Journal of Sociology 55:376-388. TRUMAN, DAVID B. (1951) 1962 The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Knopf.
PUBLIC POLICY As a concept in political science, "policy" has at least two quite distinct meanings. On the one hand, "policies" are often considered to be ways of doing things, decision rules—for example: "It is the policy of this office to handle requests in such-and-such a way." In this sense policy would answer the questions "How do you do things around here?" and "What are your rules and procedures?" and may be called administrative policy. Alternatively, policies are often regarded as substantive
programs, referring specifically to the content of what is being done, and not necessarily to how it is being done. Policy in this sense answers the questions "What do you do around here?" and "What kinds of problems do you handle?" Studies of public policy—the policies of governments—often employ both meanings. Such studies explore not only what agencies of government are doing but how they are doing it, not only the content of the program and its history but its administration as well. The way a program is administered will certainly affect its content and results. Still, the two meanings should be kept distinct, since they refer to analytically separate things. This article will concentrate on the study of the content of governmental activities and will be concerned with administrative policy only insofar as it is studied in conjunction with substantive policy. The field of public policy has as yet been left relatively untouched by the rigorous scientific investigation that has begun to characterize much of contemporary political science. Although political scientists have spent an enormous amount of time, energy, and resources studying political processes and the contexts in which those processes occur, little attention has been paid to policy studies by those in the discipline whose aim it is to apply scientific criteria to the study of political problems. A major reason for this is the obviously overt value content of public policy questions and the temptation, therefore, of any citizen, professional political scientist or not, to comment on such questions. Indeed, some in the profession would regard the solution of value questions as the major function of the political scientist. But even among those who have such a preference there may be disagreement as to the most fruitful method of proceeding. One could opt for a direct strategy of immediately engaging in value discussion and proposing reforms of one sort or another. Or, alternatively, one could take the position that careful empirical and theoretical analysis is a prerequisite to a proper understanding of the problems. Characteristics of policy studies Although there is some indication of a developing interest in policy analysis by political scientists who are concerned with constructing theory, the most prevalent mode of conducting research on questions of public policy may, by and large, be characterized in the following manner. Historical. Most studies of public policy take as their format a chronological ordering of events, often describing the beginnings and changes in a particular program up to the present time. Break-
PUBLIC POLICY ing up the program into convenient historical periods marking major changes in public policy is also a common method of presentation. The historical approach to public policy is often usefully employed to organize a large body of material, and it provides a logical structure for the discussion of the policies under study. Whether chronological ordering of data is useful for theoretical purposes poses quite a different question. If the historical analysis suggests a trend or pattern of behavior which will then be analyzed and explained, the contribution to theory may be quite large. If, as is more often the case, a historical framework is chosen simply to order the data in some convenient way, then the justification for such an ordering lies elsewhere. The point is that historical discussions of public policy, although undoubtedly informative, may not increase our understanding of the relationship between the policy and other significant factors. Descriptive. By and large, studies of public policy stress richness of descriptive detail. Generalizations about political processes or about comparable public policies are quite rare. Also, in relating our observations of any event we select some features arid leave out others, sometimes quite inadvertently. One may legitimately ask, then, of any study, why certain things were described and others not—in other words, what are the criteria employed for the inclusion or exclusion of data? For the most part, in studies of public policies the answer to the criteria question would be "Because it helps to tell the story." But why certain events rather than others? Most researchers, in fact, do have implicit theories which help them to distinguish between the relevant and the irrelevant, the important and the unimportant. To make such criteria explicit is often the beginning of theory and will certainly help the reader decide whether he shares the same generalizations and premises which the author used in choosing events to describe and situations to evaluate. There is no reason why one should have to search for or induce such generalizations from the study. If they are clearly presented by the author, the argument may center on their validity rather than their existence. Legal. As often as not, in policy studies the legal character of the policy is at issue, including its legislative, executive, and judicial history. Other Aspects of the political process are sometimes mentioned (such as public opinion and the activities °f political parties and interest groups), but the legal descriptive history, including changes in the Policy over time, is the more usual framework for Policy analyses. Although the legal framework un-
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doubtedly acts as a constraint on those involved in the making of public policy, its major effects will be constant for most public policies. Researchers will have to turn to other variables, such as the social, economic, and political setting, the personalities of the actors, and organizational factors, to explain variations within and among public policies. Normative. Most discussions of public policy also have a value position, or an evaluative posture. This view may be either in favor of or in opposition to the current operation of the policy, but the latter is most often the case. In the best of these studies the author will make quite explicit what his value premises are, but occasionally these values will be somewhat hidden and implicit. From this normative position the author will then criticize the program. Often these criticisms will be interlaced in the historical-descriptive-legal narrative, but occasionally they will not appear until the last chapter or two, with possibly some mention of them in the first chapter. The study will then usually conclude with some suggestions for improvement of the program, in some cases with a list of reform measures for "solving" the problem. These suggestions for reform will normally take one of two forms. For some authors they are the sine qua non of the study, the major reason why so much time and effort were expended in the collection of historical-legal-descriptive data. For others this reform section is simply pro forma; it is expected that traditional public policy studies will have such a section, and leaving it out would slight the expectations of certain readers. Actually, given the relatively straightforward nature of this kind of study, assuming it is competently done, the section on reform may be the only section which is controversial and argumentative. If the facts are correct, the only argument left is in the interpretation of those facts, and since scientific generalization is not one of the stated goals of these studies, value questions fill the gap. Other features. In addition to the above quartet of characteristics, four related observations may be made about policy studies in general. First, in terms of policy focus, the concern of most writers is with the merits of the policy. Is it a good policy or not? Does it satisfy appropriate values? Is it administered fairly? Is it comprehensive? Are the funds spent too large or too small? By and large, political scientists who are interested in explaining how and why policies develop the way they do have attempted to shy away from these kinds of questions. It is not that these are not questions which all citizens should be asking them-
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selves but rather that they are inappropriate questions for a scientific discipline to be asking of its own data. Second, in terms of approach, the research is problem-oriented, in the sense that the authors speak of problems to be solved with appropriate policies. Again, problem solving of this type is an appropriate form of behavior, but not necessarily for professional political scientists as opposed to political actors. To think in terms of solutions to problems is to direct one's energies away from discovery (the hallmark of the scientific enterprise) and toward a way of doing things which may not be realistically related to the data being studied. How often political scientists propose reforms which are not feasible because they do not square with political realities! Third, the research is action-oriented in that political scientists doing policy studies often would like to have an impact on the policy to which they address themselves. It is not only their fellow colleagues for whom they write—it is governmental decision makers and opinion leaders as well. It may be more useful, however, for those analyzing public policies to provide as much information as possible on how various aspects of the policy are related to one another, what interests support and oppose the policy, and how the policy is related to the institutions of government and the informal governmental processes, and to leave the activist political role to the decision makers and those whose interests are clearly affected by the policy. Fourth, in terms of research design, the research is often on a single policy, a case study. The pitfalls of case studies for theory building are well known, but since traditional studies of public policy are problem-oriented and action-oriented, and focus the debate on the merits of specific policies, the case-study format is perfectly appropriate to the aims of the researchers. But for those interested in developing a scientific inquiry, alternative research designs may be more desirable. Although these observations are meant to be descriptive of most policy studies, there have been departures from this format. For example, there have been several recent efforts to think about the future in certain policy areas. Rather than being concerned with past policy failures, these studies attempt to delineate expected problems sometime in the future, often based on hypothesized trends of certain data. Studies of the population explosion and what to do about it, nuclear strategy, natural and human resources, automation, and other problems have captured the imagination of some researchers. Unlike traditional
studies, they are not as concerned with past or even present problems. Their major concern, rather, is what the world will be like x number of years hence and possible steps which may be desirable given certain developing problems. However, these studies, too, tend to be problem-oriented single cases differing from most traditional studies primarily in their extensive speculations on the future. New directions in policy research The objectives of science, in any discipline, are relatively straightforward. If one is to have some measure of control over his environment, whether that environment is physical, social, economic, or political, he needs theory that is based on empirical generalizations which, in turn, subsume particular facts. The greater the array of facts subsumed, the more general the theory and the better the understanding of the causal nature of whatever phenomena are being discussed. Science clearly aims at theory construction; and where theory has been developed, manipulation and control—engineering, if you will—have not been far behind. Clearly, the ability of economists, for example, to have as much impact as they do in advising decision makers about the economy is in no small measure due to the development of theories in that field which specify, more or less accurately, the causal mechanisms which influence the economy. Let us define "theory" as a logically related set of empirical propositions; let us define "empirical proposition" as a statement which relates one variable to another; and let us define "variable" as a concept which may assume different values. If we employ these definitions in the field of public policy, certain considerations are raised in terms of research strategies. At the minimum we need to transform policy from a constant, an unvarying concept, to a variable. At the present time, for example, it makes little sense to assert that "the more the x policy, the more the y," or "the more the y, the more the x policy." "Policy" is simply not a word which has, as yet, achieved the status of a variable. Traditionally, one possible first step in developing variables is developing typologies, classifications, or taxonomies. A typology (or classification or taxonomy) is a set of concepts or categories which differentiate among various kinds of a higher-order concept. For example, at a very simple level, a typology of a concept like "government" might be "dictatorship" and "democracy." One may then ask a number of questions about
PUBLIC POLICY such a typology—for example, whether the categories are exhaustive and/or mutually exclusive. At a slightly different level, it is also possible to define a typology as a measure of a concept at the nominal level of measurement. When it is viewed as a measurement problem, one can then ask additional questions, such as whether the typology has validity and reliability, and whether operational definitions are easy or difficult to construct. Once a typology has been constructed, it may then be possible to go further, to inspect whether an underlying factor is present which could move the typology from discrete categories to a continuous variable (increase the measurement power from nominal to ordinal or interval). If one can move in this general direction, it becomes a good deal easier to talk of theory building. However, it would be quite possible to solve all of the problems of measurement, reliability and validity, and inclusiveness and mutual exclusiveness, and still not have contributed much to theory. The next problem to be solved is whether the categories successfully differentiate other phenomena. That is, can the categories be related to some other set of categories in such a way that relationships can be observed which might then achieve the status of theory? Fortunately, some efforts have been made in this direction, although for the most part in a very primitive way. At a level quite close to the data, researchers have distinguished among policies in terms of their substance (agriculture, labor, education, foreign policy), the institutions making them (legislative, judicial, administrative), the target of the policy (businessmen, Negroes, lower class), time periods in which policy has taken form (ante-bellum, post-depression, prewar, Eisenhower years), ideology (secular, capitalist, first amendment, liberal, conservative), values (good, bad, dangerous), extent of support (consensus, divisive), and governmental level (national, regional, local, metropolitan). Each of these categories is at a very low level of generalization, and unfortunately very little comparative analysis has taken place within each category. That is, labor policies are seldom contrasted with education policies, national policies are infrequently compared with city policies, etc. Instead, the categories generally are used merely to delineate an area of discourse. At a somewhat higher level of abstraction, public policies have been differentiated in terms of style versus position issues, symbolic versus material issues; and policies have been categorized
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as distributive-regulatory-redistributive, areal-segmental, and collective—private. These distinctions have been useful in developing rather interesting empirical generalizations about how political processes differ, depending upon differences in kinds of policies. For example, it is suggested that political party preference varies more by position issues than by style issues (Berelson et al. 1954, chapter 9); that the interests of organized groups in tangible resources or in substantive power are less easily satiable than are interests in symbolic reassurance, or that the most intensive dissemination of symbols commonly attends the enactment of legislation which is most meaningless in its effects upon resource allocation (Edelman 1964, chapter 2); that political processes themselves will vary, depending upon whether policies attempt to distribute, regulate, or redistribute advantages and disadvantages (Lowi 1964); that policies which affect a whole community are more likely to be successful in homogeneous than in heterogeneous communities, and policies which affect only a segment of a community are more likely to be prevalent in heterogeneous than in homogeneous communities (Froman 1967); and that groups are much more likely to be organized successfully around private than around collective advantages (Olson 1965). A next step, after developing categories by which different kinds of policies may be compared, is to construct hypotheses in an independentdependent variable schema. By and large, in the policy literature to date, policies have been treated as dependent variables or outcomes of the political process. For example: (1) The system of electing the president by the Electoral College tends to favor "liberal" interests. (2) Apportionment of state legislatures on bases other than population tends to have a "conservative" bias. (3) Political activities of elites will tend to have a greater pro-civil liberties bias than will political activities of nonelites. (4) Wealthy, industrial nation-states are more likely to have stable democracies than are poorer, agricultural states. This use of policy as a dependent variable or outcome need not be its only use, however. It is just as possible to treat policy as an explanation of other phenomena, that is, as an independent variable. One could ask whether different kinds of policies help to structure different types of political processes. At an intuitive level this seems quite plausible, but there has been little or no research into the problem.
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Comparative research is also a prerequisite to theory building. Case studies are useful if information about a particular policy is desirable, or if one wishes to explore possible relationships among a wide range of variables. But case studies are manifestly not useful for testing hypotheses or for rigorous theory building. For this, comparative data is essential. Studying two, three, or many policies simultaneously would mean sacrificing factual detail, but it would greatly enlarge the scope of the inquiry and would allow the separation of the unique from the similar. Once one has constructed variables in a comparative framework, empirical generalization with expanded validity may then take place. These generalizations may be about differences as well as similarities. For example, one may observe that direct federal aid to schools in the United States has, in the last thirty years, proceeded from graduate schools to colleges, and finally to secondary and primary schools. Interestingly enough, racial integration has proceeded in the same order. How does one explain these common patterns? Are there also differences? Are there other policies which exhibit the same pattern? Are there policies which indicate an opposite pattern? If so, how does one explain these differences? At this point it becomes quite possible to speak of theory construction in the field of public policy. Once variables are identified and placed in an independent-dependent variable framework, comparative data collected and generalization undertaken, placing generalizations in a rigorous logical framework is certainly a possible next step. Given the time and resources which have been trained on political processes in the last twenty years, there is, therefore, no reason to believe that policy analysis cannot assume its rightful place as an important and necessary part of political theory. LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR. [See also GOVERNMENT; POLICY SCIENCES; PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Specific areas of policy making are discussed in FISCAL POLICY; FOREIGN POLICY; MILITARY POLICY; MONETARY POLICY; NATIONAL SECURITY; PLANNING, ECONOMIC; PLANNING, SOCIAL; WELFARE STATE. Other relevant material may be found in DECISION MAKING; POLITICAL PROCESS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAUER, RAYMOND A.; POOL, ITHIEL DE SOLA; and DEXTER, LEWIS A. 1963 American Business and Public Policy. New York: Atherton. BERELSON, BERNARD; LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MCPHEE, WILLIAM N. 1954 Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Univ. of Chicago Press.
BRAYBROOKE, DAVID; and LINDBLOM, CHARLES E. 1963 A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process. New York: Free Press. BRODIE, BERNARD 1959 Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton Univ. Press. DAHL, ROBERT A. (1961) 1963 Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. EDELMAN, JACOB M. 1964 The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. FROMAN, LEWIS A. JR. 1967 An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities. Journal of Politics 29:94-108. HITCH, CHARLES J.; and McKEAN, R. N. 1960 The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P. 1961 The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. KAHN, HERMAN (1960) 1961 On Thermonuclear War. 2d ed. Princeton Univ. Press. LIPSET, SEYMOUR M. 1960 Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. -» A paperback edition was published in 1963. Lowi, THEODORE J. 1964 American Business, Public Policy, Case-studies, and Political Theory. World Politics 16:677-715. MUNGER, FRANK J.; and FENNO, RICHARD F. JR. 1962 National Politics and Federal Aid to Education. The Economics and Politics of Public Education, No. 3. Syracuse Univ. Press. OLSON, MANCUR JR. 1965 The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. SCHELLING, THOMAS C. 1960 The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. WILDAVSKY, AARON 1962 Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics. Yale Studies in Political Science, Vol. 3. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
PUBLIC RELATIONS
Public relations is the organized effort to communicate information and to modify attitudes and behavior on behalf of a client or a cause. The concept of an organized effort is crucial to this definition, for it points both to the growth in recent decades of a wide assortment of groups seeking to promote some social, political, or economic ideology and to the development of a cadre of specialists whose full-time energies are devoted to winning a greater understanding and acceptance by various publics of an individual, a private business corporation, an agency of government, or other institution. History Such efforts to influence public attitudes are very old indeed, but until the beginning of the twentieth century they were largely carried out in conjunction with other duties and were not defined as constituting a distinct occupation. Politi-
PUBLIC RELATIONS cians gave speeches, travelers wrote accounts of their journeys, religious leaders evangelized, and generals produced memoirs, all without suspecting that they might in subsequent centuries be labeled public relations men. Yet today there are those in the public relations field who claim certain historical figures as early practitioners of their profession: Caesar writing his account of the wars in Gaul; Christ preaching his gospel; Marco Polo writing of his travels to the East, to name but a few. This disarming willingness to pick and choose one's intellectual antecedents is significant chiefly because it reveals a chronic preoccupation of many public relations workers—a sense of insecurity regarding tb,e professional status of their field and a need to legitimatize their work. Today's public relations practitioner had as one of his earlier ancestors the publicists who made their appearance during the eighteenth century. These writers turned out pamphlets and tracts in support of social, political, and religious causes. But it is important to note that their activities were usually ancillary to other professional interests and almost never provided them with any significant amount of income. More often than not, they donated their services to the group for whom they worked. In England publicists tended to address themselves to the social evils which grew out of the industrial revolution. They inveighed against the shocking conditions of factories employing women and children, or they directed attention to the need for prison reforms or the setting up of mental hospitals and similar institutions to care for the poor and helpless. Similar problems attracted publicists in the United States, but there was, in addition, an overriding concern on the part of many of them during the early decades of the nineteenth century with the abolitionist movement. Following the Civil War some publicists in the United States directed their energies to writing about corruption and abuses of power in the business world and in government. Among these were the muckrakers, who in a sense represented a transitional group from the publicists to the public relations practitioners, for they devoted their full working day to these exposes. Public relations as a distinct occupation is almost exclusively a development of'the twentieth century and the mass society which characterizes it. Big governments, big corporations, and big institutions of all kinds have proliferated since 1900. The managers of these big organizations often feel remote from the groups they serve. Headquarters, whether it be of a government bureau or a business corporation, is often psychologically and physically
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distant from its publics. In recent years many managements have employed public relations specialists within their organizations (or as outside consultants) in an effort to overcome hostility, misinformation, or just plain apathy toward themselves. Business corporations in the United States tend to be larger consumers of public relations services than government bureaus, labor unions, or nonprofit social and voluntary groups. Why should this be so? In the case of government agencies, both state and federal, the party out of power is reluctant to permit too much money to be allocated for information and public relations activities which may enhance the opposition's ability to retain power. Moreover, top elective government officials also rely on their particular political parties to carry out public relations efforts on their behalf. In the case of labor unions and a wide array of nonprofit groups, there is a tradition of voluntary work on the part of members of these organizations at the grass-roots level. The business corporation usually does not command these informal loyalties from its members. Even if it did, there is a question whether management would feel comfortable having its lower echelons initiate public relations actions on its behalf without some kind of strict control of these actions. Activities Since the practice of public relations is most fully developed in the private industrial sector of the United States, it is useful, for illustrative purposes, to detail some of the activities carried out by the public relations department of any large American corporation. With modifications, these operations are representative of the gamut of public relations techniques and programs employed by other institutions and organizations. Public relations departments of large private industrial companies are expected to provide certain services to their senior executives. They prepare speeches for these corporate officers, assist in answering particularly important correspondence, and provide counsel and guidance to them on a continuing basis regarding the many demands on them to participate in community activities, fund raising, and cultural and social-welfare programs. Public relations people also have a number of corporate responsibilities. They maintain relations with the press, television, radio, and other media of communications. Requests from these media for information about the company's activities are almost always routed through the public relations department. This department helps to prepare
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statements and white papers when its management takes a public stand on an issue involving a government agency or a community problem. Frequently the public relations department edits a company magazine, which is sent to opinion leaders, shareholders, employees, retailers, and others who are felt to have a particular importance for the firm. It organizes and coordinates film, television, and radio programs on behalf of the company and is charged with developing institutional advertising programs. Institutional advertisements are messages designed primarily to win acceptance of the company per se, rather than specifically aimed at increasing the purchase of its products. (There is obviously a relationship between the kind of product advertising conducted by a company and the impression the public has of that company. In fact, public opinion surveys have found that many people derive their impression of a company from the products it manufactures and the advertising carried out on behalf of those products.) The public relations department also issues booklets about the company and its activities, annual financial reports, and a variety of specific documents and pictorial material, with the intent of furthering an understanding of the company and its policies. To this end it may also organize exhibits explaining aspects of the company's operations, offer a speakers' program to schools and community groups, and provide tours of manufacturing plants. In the implementation of such programs, public relations departments often single out specific subgroups in the population—educators, clergy, officers of civic and community action groups, and similar elite groups—and develop programs aimed at them. All the foregoing activities represent the tangible and predictable duties of public relations people. In addition, senior public relations employees and counselors are expected to give continuing advice to their management on present and potential areas of public misunderstanding regarding the company's operations and policies. This may involve mounting a complex and manyfaceted campaign directed at coping with a new and serious public relations problem. This is sometimes referred to as "fire fighting." On a more recurrent basis, public relations has the responsibility for the early identification of unfavorable attitudes which may subsequently give trouble. Inasmuch as a public relations department represents but one small segment of a large and frequently complex organization, it must develop sound working relations with other departments.
It is likely to discover that other departments take the view that their company is not primarily organized to win a popularity contest but rather to earn a reasonable profit for its owners. And indeed, there may be occasions when difficult corporate decisions have to be taken in the field of product pricing and wage and salary administration even though they may incur the displeasure of the public. In all institutions, whether profit-making or not, public relations considerations must be weighed in the light of other organizational interests. "American" flavor If, as suggested earlier, public relations is primarily a child of the twentieth century, it is also preponderantly the progeny of the United States of America. A majority of all public relations workers live in the United States, and the field has received much of its impetus and direction from that environment. There is no obvious explanation for the strong American influence in the early growth of public relations. Possibly the extensive saturation by the mass media of communication in the United States facilitated the early development of public relations there. Yet, on a comparative basis, western Europe has always had an intensive spread of those media, especially in the area of the popular press and magazines of opinion; and yet it did not witness a significant growth in public relations until after World War n. Why does public relations have such a peculiarly American flavor? At least two disparate lines of speculation offer tempting hypotheses. The first sees in the development of public relations an extension of the alleged concern Americans have with being loved and appreciated by others. For example, critics of U.S. foreign policy and information programs have suggested that these efforts are mistakenly directed at winning the affection of other nations rather than their respect. Essayists and journalists who subscribe to the idea that Americans have a pathological need for love might argue that public relations programs on behalf of impersonal institutions merely represent an extension of this need from the individual to the institutional level. Intriguing as this theory might appear, it is based essentially on a facile and tautological assumption regarding the American character which has yet to be documented. A more plausible theory to account for the early development of public relations in the United States can be based on historical grounds. This would contend that public relations programs are a predictable outgrowth of a very old and respected
PUBLIC RELATIONS American tradition—the democratic belief that all segments of the population should have access to the facts underlying public issues. In such an intellectual context, the emergence of public relations as a distinct field can be seen as a response to the need for more information on a wide variety of political, social, economic, religious, and cultural questions. The relatively simple world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries permitted the average U.S. citizen to believe that he could inform himself on the issues of the day. But as America moved into the complex world of the twentieth century, the average citizen simply did not have the time or resources for gathering information on the flood of new problems facing him and his society. Information programs on behalf of special interest groups recognized this need and supplied Americans with material—both pro and con—on issues of interest to them. By contrast, in the more status-conscious and rigid societies of Europe, Latin America, and Asia a similar tradition was lacking, or at least was muted, during the first four decades of the twentieth century. While their citizens may have had the theoretical right to express opinions on a wide variety of public issues, there was far less precedence for them to do so and less demand from them for the information services provided by public relations programs. The profession As a distinct profession, public relations had its beginnings in the early twentieth century, but until the end of World War I there were few persons in the United States or elsewhere whose full-time jobs involved this work. Best known of these was Ivy Lee, whose clients were several of America's largest corporations. But the war, and especially the activities of the United States Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel, focused public attention on the role that propaganda and information programs play in the struggle for the allegiance of men's minds. The possible commercial application of wartime propaganda techniques was apparent to some executives concerned about public misinformation on business policies. Edward L. Bernays, who had been active in the work of the Committee on Public Information, was a prime mover in the 1920s in developing increased awareness of public relations through a series of successful promotional ventures for important clients. Unhappily, he subsequently identified himself with a phrase, "the engineering of consent," which has reinforced fears in certain intellectual quarters that public relations is essentially a means by which men's minds and
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passions may be manipulated on behalf of the vested interests of any client. During the 1920s and 1930s there was a continued growth in public relations in the United States. Some of the larger advertising agencies took on public relations assignments for their clients. Newspapers and other publications, however, continued to view with suspicion and distaste the "giveaways" of public relations men, feeling that these press releases were efforts to get free advertising. These misgivings lingered in publishing quarters until very recently and contributed to their tendency to equate public relations with publicity. Indeed, the line between public relations and publicity is a blurred one at best, and such distinctions as do exist probably have to do with the time perspectives of these two activities. Publicity seeks to gain maximum and rapid exposure for a client and his program by this exposure per se, as an end in itself. Public relations may also seek wide exposure for a client and his program, but behind this desire for exposure is a detailed program designed to capitalize on the attention won from the public. Public relations experienced its truly phenomenal growth in the period following World War n. Precise data on its present size have only recently become available because statistics on the number of public relations workers in the United States were not gathered prior to 1960. Before that time the United States Census Bureau classified all public relations workers in the category "editors and reporters." In that year, however, a separate classification was set up—-"public relations men and publicity writers"—and 31,141 persons were placed in that category in the 1960 census. Of these, 7,271 were women. The actual number of persons earning a living from jobs involving some aspect of public relations work is probably in excess of 100,000. Public relations workers in the United States tend to cluster in the large metropolitan centers where corporations, trade associations, and government agencies have their headquarters and where the home offices of the mass media are located. For example, in the 1960 census, the New York metropolitan area contained 4,033 of all public relations employees in the United States. The professional association of this field, the Public Relations Society of America, had 5,300 members in 1966. Outside the United States, the field developed almost exclusively after the end of World War n. The International Public Relations Association listed almost 300 members in 1966. The bulk of these are found in North America and western
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Europe. There are, of course, a number of countries where journalists, government information officers, and publicists perform the essential tasks of public relations people but do not choose to take on this title. Public relations and the social sciences. A central assumption of public relations is that its practitioners possess special skills in assessing, interpreting, and modifying public opinion. Committed as they are to understanding the process by which attitudes are formed and changed, they necessarily find themselves working in areas that long have been of theoretical interest to students of social psychology and sociology. One might thus expect that a continuing dialogue would take place between public relations and the social sciences. Such iu not the case. In fact, when it takes place at all, this dialogue has tended to be sporadic and relatively barren of results. Several explanations may account for this disappointing state of affairs. Social scientists, for their part, sometimes profess that public relations problems offer limited intellectual challenge and stimulation. They even suggest that, in actual practice, decisions regarding public relations programs are usually based on intuition rather than on any systematic use of social science knowledge. They may also point out that the field of public relations has made no significant contribution to the body of social science theory or research method, even in the theoretical areas of greatest concern to it: the specifying of variables in the communications process; definition of the role that reference groups play in facilitating or impeding the acceptance of a public relations message; provision of a better description of how the several media of communications are perceived and used by their audiences; and the investigation of the sorting-out process by which audiences choose from the many messages directed at them at any given time. In terms of professional self-interest, the social scientist may therefore complain that the flow of benefits between his discipline and the public relations world has been pretty much a one-way street. Public relations has adapted findings and has utilized and merchandised theories and jargon from the social sciences for its own profit but has given little of intellectual bounty in return. There is, moreover, a belief on the part of certain social scientists that public relations is willing to manipulate information and attitudes on behalf of any client willing to pay for this expertise, regardless of the social and ethical merits of the client's objectives.
Criticisms of public relations. It would be wrong to give the impression that the critics of public relations are drawn solely from academic circles. Novels, films, and other media have frequently pictured the public relations man as a marginal type of operator, interested only in short-term profits and capable of being all things to all people. When these media have chosen not to treat public relations workers in such invidious terms, they have often elected to portray them as comic and impotent figures. Furthermore, within its own ranks, public relations people themselves often evidence an ambivalence and defensiveness about their work. Little wonder, indeed, that the public relations fraternity has become worried over charges that it lacks professional standards and ethical norms in the conduct of its business. The Public Relations Society of America has taken several steps to mitigate these criticisms. It has adopted a Code of Professional Standards for the Practice of Public Relations and has set up a procedure by which charges of unethical practice can be brought against members of the society; several members have been suspended from the society for violations of this code. In addition, the society has set up a procedure by which its members might be tested and accredited as to their professional competence, and by 1966, 1,100 members had received this accreditation. This procedure for accreditation has evoked mixed reactions from members, some of whom have argued that the practice of public relations is so indeterminate that it defies the drawing up of any rigorous set of standards by which the ability and performance of members might be judged. Arguments on this issue are reminiscent of past wrangles within the ranks of psychologists and sociologists on the feasibility and desirability of certification of members. Apart from efforts at internal policing of membership, public relations groups have taken steps to reassure the intellectual community in general and the university world in particular regarding their motives and modes of operation. One part of this endeavor has been the setting up of sessions at annual professional meetings of public relations groups for discussion of the relationship of public relations to the humanities and the social sciences. Frequently, distinguished psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists address these meetings and discuss ways in which better understanding might be promoted between these two worlds. With similar ends in mind, the Public Relations Society of America has sponsored week-long seminars to
PUBLIC RELATIONS provide more intensive exposure for some of its members to the thinking of social scientists and humanists from leading universities. To date, these efforts appear to have served the useful ceremonial function of lessening mutual anxieties and suspicions, but evidence is lacking on whether the day-to-day practices of public relations have been modified because of these interchanges. Certainly a survey of social science journals does not turn up any significant amount of literature reporting on techniques and theories tested in various public relations programs and their possible implications for the study of human behavior. Training and research. Inasmuch as a substantial body of public relations theory rests on an adaptation of research findings and theories from the social sciences, the lack of close liaison between these two worlds is surprising and regrettable. In part, this may be related to the fact that most public relations people are still members of its first generation. They come with a variegated work experience and educational background. A sizable percentage of them are former journalists and free-lance writers, and still others were specialists in the graphic arts, while the rest are former academicians, civil servants, and members of other professions. Many of these public relations workers find social science theory and language remote and apparently impractical in providing answers for the specific, mundane problems of a client. More often than not, the exposure of public relations workers to social science literature has been on a hit-and-miss basis and confined to occasional leisure-time reading, making it easy for them to dismiss social science as the pompous elaboration of the commonplace and obvious. Not all public relations workers are convinced that closer cooperation between themselves and the behavioral scientists is either practical or desirable. For them, public relations demands largely intuitive and creative skills, which do not lend themselves to rigorous scrutiny and categorizing by the fledgling social sciences. On the other hand, there remains a militant body of public relations experts who are committed to upgrading the professional status of their field, and they seek help from colleges and universities in this quest. Largely as a result of their efforts, over 250 universities in the United States and abroad have set up formal courses of study in public relations, and several have developed graduate programs in which a student may receive an advanced degree in public relations. These latter Programs typically require students to spend con-
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siderable time studying sociology and social psychology and the specialized areas of communications and public opinion research. As yet, only a tiny fraction of the public relations world has had this training, and it is impossible to comment on the impact it might have on the ethos, outlook, and practices of public relations in the future. While the social sciences can no longer afford to ignore the field of public relations, by the same token, public relations practitioners must face up to the fact that the intellectual content and theoretical basis of their field have been singularly lacking in exciting new ideas, research practices, or even impressionistic essays on understanding human behavior and the communications process. Areas for research Effectiveness. A central problem for public relations is its lack of any convincing yardstick by which to measure its impact and effectiveness. Clients and employers are accustomed to looking for concrete evidence of results for money and effort expended. Product advertising can be related to sales figures and employee relations programs to data on productivity and absenteeism, but public relations efforts are more difficult to evaluate. Countless studies are made each year in which respondents are tested on the degree to which their level of information or attitudes on some issues has been changed as a result of exposure to a public relations program. To date, however, there is a dearth of studies indicating that these professed attitude changes are linked to actual changes in behavior in the marketplace, the polling booth, or in a family or community setting. Lacking such manifest criteria of performance, public relations continues to be defensive about its work. Relation to power structure. A second area calling for greater study is the manner in which the power structure of a community or society affects the reception given to public relations messages. By its own admission, public relations seeks to locate centers of political, social, economic, and intellectual power and apply effective leverage on them. Yet the literature of public relations is excessively modest in recognizing this fact. Public relations texts contain little or no discussion of the classic theories of power as expounded by political scientists, economists, and sociologists. On many issues facing society there are a variety of possible points of view that can be defended. Clients with conflicting interests and views call upon public relations to help win acceptance
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for their positions. A few years ago the public information programs of the trucking industry and the railroads in the United States were in open contention. In the international realm the contest between communist and noncommunist propaganda efforts represents a continuing effort to intellectually disarm and render impotent the competition. On a more mundane level, public relations has been called upon to help product A displace product B from the shelves of stores or to assist in the election of Mr. X over Mr. Y. Public relations workers are often called upon to take sides in the ordinary as well as in the profoundly important issues of the day. If they do their job well, they may reduce the capacity of other groups in a community to stay alive and sustain their particular economic, social, political, or intellectual positions. Public relations is a force in bringing about social change. Change means that certain ideas, groups, and individuals must move aside and make room for others. Too little recognition has been given in the past to the part public relations plays in modifying the power structure of the society in which it operates. Censorship. Related to the lacuna of data on how the power structure of a society influences the effectiveness of a communications program is the allied topic of censorship—formal and informal. Since public relations programs are designed to create a favorable impression of a client and his cause, facts that might be detrimental to his best interests are often played down or left unmentioned. This is usually justified by saying that one must accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative. The controversy over whether cigarette packages should contr.in a warning pointing out the health hazards incurred in using them is an example of government agencies and tobacco companies placing very different emphasis on "the facts." In the fields of both domestic and international communications most governments impose some degree of censorship on the information they give out. They frequently come under criticism for being too rigid in the security criteria they use in classifying information. From time to time they must defend themselves against the charge of trying to manage the news. Inasmuch as the word "censorship" has unpleasant connotations, one finds little discussion in the literature on public relations about the ground rules that ought to apply in giving out information on behalf of a client or his cause. Social psychologists have studied the relative effectiveness of presenting one side or both sides of an argument in modifying the attitudes of experimental audiences. Public rela-
tions practitioners have been slow in recognizing that the strategic decisions they make about giving out or withholding information are equally deserving of serious thought and study. All public relations programs operate on some heuristic set of beliefs regarding what may or may not be said to various audiences. Here again, however, little research data are available to tell whether these assumptions are valid. Also lacking are any serious studies of the strategy and rationale for deciding not to communicate in certain public relations situations. The role of opinion leaders. In addition to a study of power in the communications process, there is a need for a more precise definition of the concept of "opinion leader." This term has gained enormous popularity in public relations circles. Whole programs are predicated on reaching certain priority groups or individuals with the client's message and largely ignoring less important ones. Again few studies have been undertaken to judge in retrospect the wisdom and success of designating group A as having a higher priority than group B. In fact, there is limited information and speculation in public relations literature on how the opinion leader exercises his power. Is he merely a gatekeeper who gives the communicator access to important persons? Is his job to embellish, translate, or simplify the communicator's message? Or is the opinion leader's role primarily to serve as an authority figure whose personal endorsement attests to the legitimacy of a message? Campaigns designed to reach opinion leaders would vary a great deal depending on the answers to these questions. A broader theoretical question, with considerable implications for the field of public relations, is whether these opinion leaders can absorb all the messages directed at them: What happens when hundreds of professional communicators compete for the limited time, attention, and affect of these relatively few people? Do they learn to set up effective defenses against all kinds of information programs? Do they have the time and energy to distinguish between messages on behalf of trivial and significant causes, or are they disposed instead to tune out all efforts to reach them with special pleading? It would be ironic, indeed, if the inordinate efforts by professional communicators to reach these high priority audiences were to result in their becoming immunized to these messages. Public opinion research. The most widely used social science research tool employed in public relations work is the public opinion research study.
PUBLIC RELATIONS In many instances it has provided necessary bench-mark information for measuring the coverage of a public relations effort. However, there are reasons for suspecting that it sometimes is misused in public relations work and that its findings may be misleading. Survey research is most likely to yield fruitful results when the topic under study has rather broad political, social, cultural, or economic implications. If a client's problems fall into these areas, survey research studies will probably make a contribution to improving his fund of information. On the other hand, if the client's prime concern is merely to increase public awareness and acceptance of him, this research method may have limited value. The reason is fairly obvious. Countless business firms, government bureaus, voluntary associations, religious bodies, educational institutions, and community action groups are clamoring for the limited time and interest of the general public. It is totally unrealistic to expect that the average person has more than a most superficial acquaintance or interest in many of these groups. So it happens that a survey that simply asks whether the public knows and approves of certain of these groups is likely to turn up a very high percentage of Don't Know's or No Answer's. Even those who may profess to know these organizations and to hold an opinion about them often turn out, on more intensive investigation, to have only the barest impression of them. Under these circumstances other social science concepts may offer greater promise for understanding how the public relates to these institutions. For example, it would be useful to know a good deal more about the gratifications and frustrations that people obtain from relating to the impersonal institutions in our society and whether they really expect these institutions to establish an identity and a relationship with them. The literature on personality theory and the socialization of adolescents and adults seems pertinent in such an inquiry. Implicit in all public relations efforts is the belief that favorable attitudes are desirable and unfavorable attitudes are to be avoided by clients. Why? Do favorable attitudes really get translated into action and how is this done? In some instances, public relations programs seem to supplement marketing and advertising efforts in influencing the sale of a product. In political life, they probably play some role in determining how votes are cast. But the effectiveness of many information and public relations programs is blunted simply because they do not provide the
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public with guidance as to what steps it should take to effect the desired change. How often do unfavorable attitudes get translated into actions that are damaging? Every public relations man can cite several horrendous examples of how unfavorable publicity and adverse public reactions led to a drop in sales, the passage of unfavorable legislation, or some other specific action against the offending organization. But these represent specific examples of what happens occasionally when the anger of the public is aroused. We know very little about the significance and possible consequences of a low-grade, unfavorable attitude that persists over time but is not related to any single episode. Does the general public have sufficient involvement in the political process, for example, to translate these simmering disapprovals into action? From the point of view of a client, may there not be penalties associated with encouraging the public to feel that its voice should be heard in the decisions of management? Does it ever happen that a public relations program becomes too successful and generates pressures from outside groups, which intrude needlessly on the decisionmaking process of an organization? In fact, does the public truly expect the many large and relatively remote organizations that make up our society to establish rapport with them? As public relations becomes increasingly a world-wide activity, it is desirable that a careful examination be made of the extent to which its practices and concepts, which have been developed in Western cultures, are applicable to other parts of the world. Public relations programs in Europe and America are predicated on the assumption that their audiences have some level of literacy and free access to the media of communication and that means are available for them to distinguish between the primary and secondary institutions of society. These distinctions may be blurred in cultures where the family and the community take on a far more significant role in the communications network and where an etiquette of listening and responding to strangers may hide the true feeling of an audience. One of the ironies of public relations today is that it continues to draw from the same small reservoir of academic studies for its intellectual rationale, while all the time having within its own files raw data that might make a significant contribution to communications theory. Simply to list a few topics on which public relations people devote considerable research effort will illustrate the wealth of unexploited data that are collected for
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the specific needs of a client but that may be suitable for secondary analysis and publication: pretest studies of how best to organize messages in order to win the attention of an audience; research on how frequently the same message should be repeated in order to attain optimum impact; and studies of the relationship of the creditability of the communicator and his trade-mark to an audience's predisposition to listen and believe. Public relations is a new field. Often its own public relations has been poor, especially in dealing with the intellectual community. But in our fragmented and impersonal society, it is being called upon increasingly by a variety of groups to help them communicate more effectively. Its programs influence the lives of many, and for that reason its methods and philosophy deserve careful scrutiny. It represents an important means of developing consensus on problems facing our society, for it permits specialized groups and interests to articulate their points of view. In addition, public relations may help to serve as one of the consciences of a community. Effective programs on behalf of worthy causes make it difficult for anyone to avoid involvement in serious community and national problems. Still another positive function of public relations is that it has legitimatized the right of any group to speak out in support of an intellectual position, however unpopular it may be. Responsible citizens are forced to ask themselves whether there may not be two or more sides to a public question. Finally, the practice of public relations has made it necessary for those who communicate on behalf of the special interests of a client to stand up and be counted. By readily identifying the sponsors of a particular message, the public is better able to evaluate the message and the context in which it is proffered. Public relations continues to be viewed in a narrow and stereotyped way in many quarters. This is unfortunate, for only as the status of public relations is enhanced can it hope to recruit into its ranks persons of superior talent and ethical responsibility. ROBERT O. CARLSON [Directly related are the entries ADVERTISING and COMMUNICATION, MASS. Other relevant material may be found in ATTITUDES; PROPAGANDA; PUBLIC OPINION; SURVEY ANALYSIS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BAUER, RAYMOND A. 1964 The Obstinate Audience: The Influence Process From the Point of View of Social Communication. American Psychologist 19:319-328.
BARNOUW, ERIK 1956 Mass Communication—Television, Radio, Film, Press: The Media and Their Practice in the United States of America. New York: Rinehart. BERNAYS, EDWARD L. 1923 Crystallizing Public Opinion. New York: Boni & Liveright. -> Of historical importance as an early effort to state the role of public relations. BERNAYS, EDWARD L. 1952 Public Relations. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. BERNAYS, EDWARD L. (editor) 1955 The Engineering of Consent. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. BURTON, PAUL 1966 Corporate Public Relations. New York: Rcinhold. CARLSON, ROBERT O. 1953 How Can the Social Sciences Meet the Needs of Advertisers? Printer's Ink 245:4447. CARLSON, RORERT O. 1957 The Use of Public Relations Research by Large Corporations. Public Opinion Quarterly 21:341-349. CARLSON, ROBERT O. 1961 High Noon in the Research Marketplace. Public Opinion Quarterly 25:331-341. CARLSON, RORERT O. 1966 The Corporate Manager and the Social Scientist: An Alliance Comes of Age. Management Revieiv 55:4-13. CENTER, ALLEN H. 1957 Public Relations Ideas in Action: 500 Tested Public Relations Programs and Techniques. New York: McGraw-Hill. CUTLIP, SCOTT M. (editor) 1966 A Public Relations Bibliography. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. CUTLIP, SCOTT M.; and CENTER, ALLEN H. (1952) 1965 Effective Public Relations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. -> A standard textbook. DARTNELL CORPORATION (1956)1961 The Dartnell Public Relations Handbook. Edited by John C. Aspley and L. F. van Houten. 3d ed. Chicago: The Corporation. FINN, DAVID 1961 The Price of Corporate Vanity. Harvard Business Review 39:135-143. FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR, SYMPOSIUM, GOULD HOUSE, 1961 1963 The Corporation and Its Publics: Essays on the Corporate Image. Edited by John W. Riley, Jr. New York: Wiley. -> The best available discussion by social scientists of the potentials and limits of public relations. HARLOW, REX F. 1957 Social Science in Public Relations: A Survey and an Analysis of Social Science Literature Bearing Upon the Practice of Public Relations. New York: Harper. HARRINGTON, ALAN 1959 Life in the Crystal Palace. New York: Knopf. ->• A whimsical and wise account of one public relations man's view of his work. HILL, JOHN W. 1963 The Making of a Publicity Man. New York: McKay. HYMAN, HERBERT H.; and SHEATSLEY, PAUL B. 1947 Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail. Public Opinion Quarterly 11:412-423. JACOBSON, HOWARD B. (editor) 1961 A Mass Communications Dictionary: A Reference Work of Common Terminologies for Press, Print, Broadcast, Film, Advertising, and Communications Research. New York: Philosophical Library. KATZ, ELIHU; and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1955 Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -* An early and important study of informal opinion leaders. A paperback edition was published in 1964. KLAPPER, JOSEPH T. 1960 The Effects of Mass Communication. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -+ Summarizes
PUNISHMENT a wide range of studies regarding the role of the mass media in information programs. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1957 Public Opinion and the Classical Tradition. Public Opinion Quarterly 21:3953. LERBINGER, OTTO; and SULLIVAN, ALBERT J. 1965 Information, Influence and Communication: A Reader in Public Relations. New York: Basic Books. LESLY, PHILIP (editor) (1950) 1962 Public Relations Handbook. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall. MARSTON, JOHN 1963 The Nature of Public Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill. MERTON, ROBERT K. 1946 Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive. New York: Harper. -> A detailed sociological analysis of an intensive information program. NEWSOM, EARL; CARLSON, ROBERT O.; and KNOTT, LEONARD L. 1959 Feedback: Putting Public Relations in Reverse. Pages 148-162 in Dan J. Fenn, Jr. (editor), Management's Mission in a New Society. New York: McGraw-Hill. NIELANDER, WILLIAM A. 1948 A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Literature on Public Relations. University of Texas, Bureau of Business Research, Bibliography, No. 3. Austin: The Bureau. PIMLOTT, JOHN A. R. 1951 Public Relations and American Democracy. Princeton Univ. Press. Public Relations Journal. -> Published since 1945. Public Relations Neivs. -> Published since 1944. Public Relations Quarterly. -> Published since 1937. PUBLIC RELATIONS SOCIETY OF AMERICA, INC. 1966 An Occupational Guide to Public Relations. New York: The Society. Ross, IRWIN 1959 The Image Merchants: The Fabulous World of Public Relations. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. SAFIRE, WILLIAM L. 1963 The Relations Explosion: A Diagram of the Coming Boom and Shakeout in Corporate Relations. New York: Macmillan. SIMON, RAYMOND (editor) 1966 Perspectives in Public Relations. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press. STEINBERG, CHARLES S. 1958 The Mass Communicators: Public Relations, Public Opinion, and Mass Media. New York: Harper. STEPHENSON, HOWARD (editor) 1960 Handbook of Public Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill. WIEBE, GERHART D. 1951 Merchandising Commodities and Citizenship on Television. Public Opinion Quarterly 15:679-691.
PUBLIC UTILITIES See REGULATION OF INDUSTRY; TRANSPORTATION.
PUNISHMENT The term "punishment," in its psychological sense, is most commonly and appropriately applied to a situation in which a deprivation or unpleasant experience is deliberately imposed by one party upon another because of an actual or supposed misdeed which is knowingly and intention-
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ally committed by the latter. The misdeed may be the violation of a rule, a law, a command, or an expectation and may consist either of an act or of inaction when action is called for. It is generally presumed that both parties to the transaction perceive the "punishment" as unpleasant and the provoking act as a misdeed or at least as punishable. While it is true that innocent persons are sometimes wrongly punished, in principle there can be no such thing as punishment when it is known that there has been no offense. Identical acts may under varying circumstances be perceived as punishment, nonpunishment, or reward by either of the actors involved. The full-fledged punishment situation is thus a complex social relationship in which the perceptions, motives, and intentions of both parties are essential features. At the sociological level, punishment is characteristically defined in terms of collective perceptions and official definitions. Confusion is likely to follow from the failure to distinguish between the sociological and psychological frames of reference. Thus, from an official point of view, a person who is arrested, tried, and acquitted for an alleged crime has escaped punishment, despite the fact that his reputation may have been destroyed in the process. Punishments which are externally equivalent from the societal standpoint may be very differently perceived by the individuals upon whom they are imposed and may, indeed, not be experienced as punishment at all— as, for example, when an offense is committed to obtain free board and lodging in jail during the cold winter months. Those who regard certain laws as immoral, discriminatory, unjust, or tyrannical often feel that the imposed punishment confers honor and distinction upon them; the question in this case is whether it is the ethical duty of citizens to obey the law or to violate it. Extrinsic and intrinsic controls. Punishments and rewards are generally thought of as contrived or extrinsic consequences of behavior, in contrast to those which are natural or intrinsic effects of a given type of conduct (Lewin 1931). Burning one's finger by touching a flame, being avoided because one is a conversational bore, or suffering indigestion after eating inappropriate food are therefore not ordinarily conceived of as punishment. Punishment is usually applied either to induce a person to do something which he does not wish to do or to refrain from doing what he would like to do. A more satisfactory form of control is achieved by causing people to xvant to do desirable acts and to avoid undesirable ones, not because of contrived rewards and punishments,
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but rather because of satisfactions and dissatisfactions inherent in the behavior. The efficacy of rewards and punishments as measures of social control is far inferior to that exerted by intrinsic factors. It is much more desirable that a child study mathematics because he finds it interesting and believes that it will be useful than that he do so merely because of parental reward or punishment. Organized society presupposes that most members conform to social norms because they find it intrinsically satisfying to do so. Unpleasant experiences. In some theoretical systems, the above distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic consequences of behavior is not made (see Hilgard & Marquis 1940). Thus, experimental psychologists working with lower animals sometimes view any unpleasant experience as punishment. The rat subjected to electric shock in a maze may, for example, be said to be "punished." Sociologists have proposed similar theories. If, for example, interpersonal relationships are conceived, according to the economic model, as exchange relationships in which there are costs and values involved for both parties, punishment may obviously be regarded as a kind of cost. Theories of this sort make it difficult to deal specifically with concepts such as those of responsibility, misdeed, crime, law, guilt, remorse, justice, injustice, conscience, redemption, mercy, and revenge. Indeed, these terms are not ordinarily employed at all by those who use punishment to refer to any unpleasant or painful experience. However, it is generally conceded that conditioning experiments involving "aversive stimulation" of lower animals have only an indirect and peripheral applicability to the human punishment situation, as is indicated by the general tendency to avoid the term "punishment" and to substitute other more neutral and more specific terms. It is of interest that extensive experimental investigation of the effects of unpleasant experiences upon lower animals, and on human subjects as well, suggests that such experiences are relatively ineffective and unpredictable as a means of behavior control (Hilgard & Marquis 1940). The reasons usually advanced in explanation are that severe pain or punishment tends to elicit strong emotional reactions, such as fear and anxiety, which disrupt behavior patterns and lead to a variety of responses, some of which, especially in human subjects, negate the purposes of punishment. The experimental evidence suggests that the most effective system of rewards and punishments is one in which the former are emphasized and the latter minimized or avoided whenever possible.
Self-punishment and divine punishment. Selfpunishment and the concept of divine punishment are special cases. Freudian psychologists emphasize that a sense of guilt for a supposed misdeed or sin causes some persons to feel a "need for punishment" and either to punish themselves or to arrange to have others do it for them. In extreme cases, self-punishment may take the form of suicide. It is frequently associated with mental and emotional disorders. The conception of divine punishment may arise from a belief that everything that happens is an expression of God's will and that misfortune, disease, suffering, and death are punishment for sin. If the wicked prosper and the virtuous suffer, it is assumed that the balance will be righted in the life to come. The crime of punishment. The act of punishment in human relations is itself subject to normative control by a wide range of formal and informal rules, the violation of which in some instances transforms the act of punishment into a crime. Parents are generally conceded the right to punish their children for disobedience, but the injury inflicted by a criminal upon his victim for disobedience to his commands is defined as crime, not as punishment. Similarly, excessive parental chastisement of a child may bring formal punishment upon the parent. Critics of current penal practices make frequent use of the phrase "the crime of punishment" (Shaw 1922). Formal and informal punishment Formal punishment is regarded as that which is administered through the courts, and all other kinds are called informal. Informal punishment is of course extensively used in a wide variety of interpersonal and institutional contexts. It is commonly employed in the rearing and education of the young. All types of associations and establishments, such as educational and military institutions, political, occupational, and other types of associations, tend to have established ways of dealing with recalcitrant members. Expulsion from the group is a common sanction in voluntary associations. Punitive sanctions tend to be emphasized when membership is involuntary or in some degree coerced, and they may be specified in relatively formal sets of rules and regulations, as for example in boarding schools, prisons, and other similar establishments. Our concern here, however, will be with punishment for crime. Punitive and restitutive sanctions. While "crime" is denned in different ways by different writers, one may say roughly that it is an act which is viewed as a public rather than a private or per-
PUNISHMENT sonal wrong and one which is prohibited and made punishable by law. Criminal proceedings, which result in the imposition of punitive or repressive sanctions, are contrasted with civil proceedings; the latter concern themselves with what may be called restitutive sanctions, such as money or property settlements, which have the effect of compensating or assuaging the injured party and restoring normal relations, much as an apology does in simple person-to-person relationships (Hardy 1963). The wrongs dealt with in civil proceedings are said to be private rather than public, torts rather than crimes; hence, the fine in a criminal case is paid to the state, whereas the damages assessed for a tort go to the aggrieved party. No criminal stigma is supposed to attach to civil proceedings. There are, however, exceptions and ambiguities in the above distinction. Juvenile courts, for example, are said to be civil in nature, but they produce results which are perceived as punitive by those affected and by the public. The same may be said of compulsory civil commitment as sometimes practiced with respect to sexual psychopaths, alcoholics, drug addicts, and the mentally ill or incompetent. This ambiguity arises largely from the difficulty of determining when deprivation of liberty should be viewed as punishment and when not. The offenders and the general public are little impressed by the doctrine that imprisonment is a means of treatment and rehabilitation rather than of punishment and continue to think that criminal courts punish and that prisons are punitive, even when they are called "therapeutic communities" or "hospitals." Processes of formal punishment The psychological complexities of the punishment relationship, and the variety of its forms, are most strikingly indicated by the elaborate machinery of justice in modern states and by the multiplicity and complexity of the laws, rules, regulations, and principles which control the imposition of punishment. The machinery begins with the legal definition of the kinds of acts deemed to be "criminal" and the selection of those persons who are regarded as "responsible" and therefore fit subjects for court processing; it ends with the release of the offender and the restoration of civil rights. The rules which guide this process are found in constitutions, statutes, and judicial rulings and regulations. In a general way these rules and principles reflect the basic values of the society pertaining to justice, to the nature of the acts for which punishment is appropriate, and to the
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kinds of punishment that ought or ought not to be imposed. Historical evolution. The processes of formal punishment in Western civilization have evolved slowly through the centuries and, from a contemporary perspective, appear to have become progressively more complex, refined, humane, discriminating, and flexible. Corporal punishment in all its many manifestations, exile, the death penalty, and all other older kinds of punishment have been largely supplanted by fines and imprisonment. Even where the death penalty is retained, as in most of the states of the United States, it is used less and less. Executions, which were formerly public spectacles and accompanied by torture and mutilation, are now carried out before severely restricted audiences of officials and in what is regarded as the most painless and "humane" manner possible. Torture, which was once popular both as punishment for the guilty and as a means of securing evidence of guilt, is officially outlawed. Officially, punishment for serious crimes today consists overwhelmingly of imprisonment, or loss of liberty. It is true, of course, that the degradation and loss of status associated with conviction for crime may be more painful than the sheer loss of liberty; but this is a factor which the courts cannot control or measure as they do lengths of sentences, and it is not part of the formal punishment. Primitive and modern societies In the modern nation-state, criminal laws can be promulgated and violations punished only by agencies of the state. Some primitive societies have agencies of central political control, and others do not. None of them, of course, have written legal codes and traditions, and in many it is difficult to identify anything like a court or to distinguish law from custom (Malinowski 1926). If it is held that an offense becomes a crime when it is viewed as a menace to the group as a whole and therefore dealt with by representatives of the group, then it might be said that crime and formal punishment emerge in preliterate society when a central agency (such as a chieftain or a council of elders) adjudicates cases and imposes punitive sanctions. In primitive societies which do not have central governments capable of exercising coercive control over the subgroups which constitute the society, it would not be logical to speak of either crime or formal punishment. The standard example of this type of society is the Ifugao of Luzon (Hoebel 1954). In Ifugao society the kinship groups are sovereign, and most offenses are handled essen-
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tially as torts or private wrongs to be settled by sanctions of the restitutive type, that is, for example, by payments made to the offended party by the offender or his kinship group. In many primitive societies, punishment for crime is rationalized in supernatural terms. The offenses may be viewed as affronts to the deities or the ancestral spirits, who will bring disaster to the entire community or tribe if violations are not appropriately dealt with. Death and expulsion from the group are common modes of punishment for the most serious crimes, such as sorcery, witchcraft, sacrilege, and other magico-religious offenses (which do not even exist in most modern nations). Responsibility is often viewed as communicable and collective, with the familial or kinship group held accountable for the actions of its members; criminal guilt may contaminate the offender's associates, his relatives, and even his possessions. Under primitive codes and those of early history, punishment has sometimes consisted of the complete obliteration of entire communities—including people, buildings, livestock, and even trees (Oppenheimer 1913, p. 121). In the legal systems of modern nations criminal guilt is said to be, with some exceptions, strictly personal. However, the very concept of personal responsibility has been challenged by some contemporary theories of human behavior and has been diluted by such ideas as that of "diminished responsibility" and by a growing sense of collective responsibility for the environmental conditions that are believed to generate crime. According to this view of responsibility, societies have the criminals they deserve. The rehabilitative view of imprisonment may be an indication that the concept of subjective individual responsibility is losing its authority (Fauconnet 1920) or tending to disappear, and that as it does so formal punishment tends to be transformed into something other than "punishment." Theoretical approaches The various theories which attempt to explain punishment are not consistent with one another. While all of the following theories carry a degree of plausibility, none of them seems to account for more than a part of the problem. Origins and functions of punishment. A variety of theories concerning the origins of formal punishment have been proposed, such as that it evolves from private vengeance; that it grows out of conquest and the attempts of ruling elites to control subject peoples; that it originates when the state takes over the disciplinary powers of the
paterfamilias; that it arises from the attempt of the society to guard itself against supernatural dangers or as a religious duty imposed by the divine will; and finally that it is an outgrowth of an aesthetic sense which conceives it as the logical counterpart of a misdeed (Oppenheimer 1913). The most commonly held view is probably that formal punishment originates as a societal reaction to actions which, in accordance with the value system of the society, are viewed as dangerous or injurious to the society as a whole. Durkheim, for example, conceived of crime as a violation of the collective conscience, which consists of values held in common by the members of society. While punishment may be rationalized in terms of supernatural forces and dangers, the latter were viewed by Durkheim as symbols or projections of societal concerns. The purposes or functions usually ascribed to formal punishment are deterrence, reformation, revenge, retribution, and protection of society by incapacitation of the offender. Several of these purposes are commonly combined, and none of them is invariably present. Durkheim's theory. A more systematic and inclusive theory (Durkheim 1893) is that formal punishment for crime is not explained by any or all of the above purposes or functions popularly ascribed to it but that it is essentially a ceremonial reaffirmation of the societal values that are violated and challenged by the crime. Its general function is therefore that of enhancing social solidarity by strengthening the basic social values violated by the offender. From this point of view, the crucial significance of the punishment inflicted on a murderer is that it supports and enhances the general belief in the sanctity of human life, not that it instills fear in the minds of other potential murderers or that it seeks to reform the offender. Punishment of criminals is thus something like the sacrifice of individuals for the common good. This theory accounts for historical changes in punishment in terms of the change from the "mechanical" social solidarity of simple folk societies to the "organic" solidarity of complex societies, which is based on interdependence created by the complex division of labor. In the latter type of social system, punitive sanctions diminish in severity and tend to give way to restitutive ones. Punitive orientation toward crime. Prosecutors and defense lawyers know that individuals differ considerably in the punitiveness of their attitudes toward crime in general and toward specific types of crimes. General impressions and casual observation suggest that a variety of factors such as per-
PUNISHMENT sonality, social status, income, occupation, past experiences, religious affiliation, and many others affect these attitudes. Systematic research concerning the distribution and variation of punitive attitudes is lacking, and the empirical evidence needed to support general theories in this area is therefore inadequate. Svend Ranulf (1938) has proposed the hypothesis that the punitive orientation toward crime and sin is especially concentrated in the lower middle classes. This orientation is thought to arise from moral indignation based on resentment created by the frustration of belonging in this particular class. Historical examples, sketched in very broad outlines, are used to support the theory, but the author himself concedes that much more detailed evidence is needed to test the hypothesis. Ranulf emphasizes the idea that punishment for crime arises not from the indignation of the victim but rather from that of the public; hence, he is concerned with what he calls the "disinterested" desire to inflict punishment. Marxist view. A very different type of theory has been proposed by Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) to account for the historical evolution of penological practices. According to the Marxistoriented view of these authors, the primary determinant of the social reaction to crime is the state of the labor market. Crime is assumed to be primarily a lower-class phenomenon, while lawmaking and punishment are regarded as prerogatives of the upper classes who hold political power. When there is an unsatisfied demand for labor, the upper classes impose few and mild punishments; whereas when the labor market is glutted and there is much unemployment, punishment tends to be severe. The authors argue that corporal and capital punishment were supplanted by forced labor because of the state's need for the latter, that fines were adopted as a revenue measure, and that deportation in the form of penal transportation was a means of providing labor for the colonies. Freudian theory. Other somewhat less systematic theories include the application of Freudian doctrine to formal punishment. From this standPoint, the infliction of punishment is interpreted in terms of personality dynamics, and the punitive orientation is linked with repression and frustration of libidinal urges. The criminal is sometimes viewed as a scapegoat or object of aggression arising from unconscious conflicts within the personality. Class differentials in punishment. Sociologists (Sutherland & Cressey [1924] 1960, p. 300) fre-
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quently emphasize class differentials in the punishment process. They note that brutal punishment flourished at a time when there was great social distance between the upper ruling classes and the lower classes, who suffered most of the punishment. With the development of democratic equalitarian ideals and a broadened base of political power, the social distance between the punisher and the punished diminished, and punishment became milder. It is argued that when the punisher is separated from the offender by a great social gap, he tends to view the latter almost as a lower animal or a foreign enemy. On the other hand, when those inflicting punishment observe that the offender is very much like them, they tend to be more sympathetic and less vengeful. Deterministic and behaviorisdc theories. Earlier in this article we have referred to deterministic and behaviorisdc theories of human behavior which, because they avoid or reject the idea of responsibility, also reject the idea of punishment. For example, the "positive school of criminology," founded by Cesare Lombroso, insisted that a criminal act should be viewed as a natural event (such as a hurricane) which is brought about by antecedent conditions that make it happen. Free will is excluded, and punishment is regarded as inappropriate and is equated with revenge. Behavioristic theory which eschews "mentalistic" concepts such as those of responsibility, guilt, and intention seems to lead logically to similar results. Critics of this position (for example, Hall 1947) contend that it is based on erroneous or oversimplified conceptions of human conduct. They argue that formal punishment is not vengeance; that when intelligently applied it can have constructive effects upon both the offender and the society; and that it is in any case a social necessity, as indicated by the universality of the criminal law in all complex societies. ALFRED R. LINDESMITH [See also CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINOLOGY; LAW; LEGAL SYSTEMS; PENOLOGY; SANCTIONS; SOCIAL CONTROL;
and the biographies SUTHERLAND.]
of
BECCARIA;
DURKHEIM;
BIBLIOGRAPHY BECCARIA, CESARE BONESANA (1764) 1953 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments. Stanford, Calif.: Academic Reprints. H» First published as Dei delitti e delle pene. A paperback edition was published in 1963 by BobbsMerrill. DURKHEIM, EMILE (1893) 1960 The Division of Labor in Society. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» First published as De la division du travail social.
FAUCONNET, PAUL 1920 La responsabilite: Etude de sociologie. Paris: Alcan. HALL, JEROME (1947) 1960 General Principles of Criminal Laiv. 2d ed. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. HARDY, M. J. L. 1963 Blood Feuds and the Payment of Blood Money in the Middle East. Beirut: Privately published. HENTIG, HANS VON (1932) 1937 Punishment, Its Origin, Purpose and Psychology. London: Hodge. -> First published as Die Strafe: Ursprung, Zweck, Psychologie. HILGARD, ERNEST R.; and MARQUIS, DONALD G. (1940) 1961 Hilgard and Marquis' Conditioning and Learning. Revised by Gregory A. Kimble. 2d ed. New York: Appleton. H> First published as Conditioning and Learning. HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON 1954 The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. LEWIN, KURT (1931)1935 The Psychological Situations of Reward and Punishment. Pages 114-170 in Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1926) 1961 Crime and Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge. -» A paperback edition was published in 1959 by Littlefield. OPPENHEIMER, HEINRICH 1913 The Rationale of Punishment. Univ. of London Press. RANULF, SVEND (1938) 1964 Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology. New York: Schocken. -» First published in Danish. RUSCHE, GEORGE; and KIRCHHEIMER, OTTO 1939 Punishment and Social Structure. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. SHAW, GEORGE BERNARD (1922) 1946 The Crime of Imprisonment. New York: Philosophical Library. -> First published as Imprisonment. SUTHERLAND, EDWIN H.; and CRESSEY, DONALD R. (1924) 1960 Principles of Criminology. 6th ed. New York: Lippincott. -> First published as a textbook under the title Criminology, by Edwin H. Sutherland.
PURCHASING POWER PARITY See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ECONOMICS, article On EXCHANGE RATES.
PUTNAM, FREDERIC WARD Frederic Ward Putnam (1839-1915), one of the founders of modern American anthropology, was born in Salem, Massachusetts. He was educated largely by his father, who stimulated the boy's interest in horticulture and in nature generally. This interest led to his election, while still in his teens, to the Essex Institute near his home and to the Boston Society of Natural History, He also met Louis Agassiz, the great Swiss-American naturalist, and under his influence entered the Lawrence Scientific School in 1856, graduating as of 1862. He served as a special assistant under Agassiz until 1864, when he returned to Salem to become curator of vertebrates at the Essex Institute.
Putnam had an early interest in archeological studies. He was among the first to recognize and investigate the archeological remains on the American continent. After holding a. number of positions (at the museum of the East India Marine Society in Salem, the museum of the Peabody Academy of Science, and the Penikese Laboratory of the Anderson School of Natural History), Putnam became in 1875 curator of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology at Harvard University, a position he held until he retired in 1909. He also held a professorship in archeology and ethnology at the university. From his base at the Peabody Museum, Putnam did much to revolutionize American museum methods by inaugurating scientific expeditions. From 1876 to 1879 he participated in the U.S. geographical and geological surveys west of the 100th meridian under the direction of Lt. G. M. Wheeler; Putnam had charge of the archeological collections made on those surveys and prepared for publication the volume Archaeology (1879). He himself directed field research in archeology, especially in New Jersey, Ohio, the southwestern United States, Mexico, Central America, and South America. In 1891 Putnam was appointed chief of the department of archeology and ethnology for the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago. The ethnological and natural history collections which he assembled led to the founding of the Columbian Museum in Chicago, now called the Field Museum of Natural History. At the conclusion of his services there he was appointed curator of anthropology at the American Museum of Natural History in New York; one of his assistant curators was Franz Boas. Putnam remained at the American Museum on a part-time basis until 1903, continuing also his administration of the Peabody Museum at Harvard, until his retirement from professional life at the age of 70. Before he retired, however, he accomplished one more organizational feat for American anthropology. In 1903 he was called to the University of California, where he became professor of anthropology and director of the anthropological museum: this meant that he organized both a museum and a department for the teaching of anthropology at Berkeley. During his lifetime he published some four hundred papers, reports, and notes in the fields of zoology and anthropology. He also served his profession well as an editor: over a period of 25 years he performed editorial services for the American Association for the Advancement of Science ( AAAS) and for all of the museums and departments of
PUTNAM, FREDERIC WARD anthropology with which he was affiliated. He was a founder and editor of the American Naturalist and the Naturalists Directory. After holding the position of secretary of the AAAS for 25 years, he was elected president for 1898-1899. At Putnam's death, his contributions to anthropology were well described in the Massachusetts Memorial •. "His skill as an organizer made him the most potent factor in the development of anthropological institutions all over the country . . . his interests centered in the objective, tangible sides of anthropology, and therefore his chief contribution consisted of the development of museum work." RALPH W. DEXTER [See also ARCHEOLOGY.] WORKS BY PUTNAM
(1871) 1872 PACKARD, ALPHEUS S.; and PUTNAM, FREDERIC W. The Mammoth Cave and Its Inhabitants: Or, Descriptions of the Fishes, Insects and Crustaceans Found in the Cave. Salem, Mass.: Naturalist's Agency. 1875a [Archaeological Researches in Kentucky and Indiana.] Boston Society for Natural History, Proceedings 17:314-332. 1875b [The Swallow Archaeological Collection From New Madrid, Mo.] Harvard University, Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Report of the Trustees 8:16-46. -» Reprinted in 1875 in the American Naturalist as "The Pottery of the Mound Builders." 1878 Archaeological Explorations in Tennessee, 1878. Harvard University, Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Report of the Trustees 11:305-360. -* Reprinted in Volume 10 of the Essex Institute Rulletin. 1879 U.S. GEOGRAPHIC SURVEYS WEST OF THE 100TH MERIDIAN Report. Volume 7: Archaeology. Washing-
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ton: Government Printing Office. -» Putnam both edited and contributed to the Report. 1883a Iron From the Ohio Mounds: A Review of the Statements and Misconceptions of Two Writers of Over Sixty Years Ago. American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass., Proceedings New Series 2:349-363. 1883b Notes on Copper Implements From Mexico. American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass., Proceedings New Series 2:235-246. 1887 Notes on the Copper Objects From North and South America, Contained in the Collections of the Peabody Museum. Harvard University, Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Report of the Trustees 15:83-148. 1896 PUTNAM, FREDERIC W.; and WILLOUGHBY, C. C. Symbolism in Ancient American Art. American Association for the Advancement of Science, Proceedings 44:302-322. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
DEXTER, RALPH W. 1964 Frederic Ward Putnam and the Development of Museums of Natural History and Anthropology in the United States. Unpublished manuscript. -H> This paper was read at the annual meeting of the History of Science Society held in conjunction with the meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Montreal, Canada, 1964. KROEHER, A. L. 1915 Frederic Ward Putnam. American Anthropologist New Series 17:712-718. MEAD, FRANCES H. 1909 Bibliography of Frederic Ward Putnam. Pages 601-627 in Putnam Anniversary Volume. New York: Stechert. Putnam Anniversary Volume: Anthropological Essays Presented to Frederic Ward Putnam in Honor of His Seventieth Birthday, April 16, 1909, by His Friends and Associates. 1909 New York: Stechert. TOZZER, A. M. 1935 Frederic Ward Putnam, 18391915. Volume 16, pages 125-153 in National Academy of Sciences, Biographical Memoirs. Washington: The Academy.
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS For methods of obtaining, analyzing, and describing qualitative data, see CONTENT ANALYSIS; COUNTED DATA; EVALUATION RESEARCH; FIELD WORK; GRAPHIC PRESENTATION; HISTORIOGRAPHY, especially the article on THE RHETORIC OF HISTORY; INTERVIEWING; OBSERVATION; PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT; PROJECTIVE METHODS; PSYCHOANALYSIS, article on EXPERIMENTAL METHODS; SURVEY ANALYSIS; TABULAR PRESENTATION; TYPOLOGIES.
QUALITY CONTROL, STATISTICAL "Quality control," in its broadest sense, refers to a spectrum of managerial methods for attempting to maintain the quality of manufactured articles at a desired level. "Statistical quality control" can refer to all those methods that use statistical principles and techniques for the control of quality. In this broad sense, statistical quality control might be regarded as embracing in principle all of statistical methodology. Some areas of statistics, however, have, both historically and as currently used, a special relationship to quality control; it is these areas that are discussed in the articles under this heading. The methods of quality control described in these articles have applications in fields other than industrial manufacturing. For example, process control has been used successfully as an administrative technique in large-scale data-handling organizations, such as census bureaus. Reliability concepts are important in engineering design and seem potentially useful in small-group research. I. ACCEPTANCE SAMPLING n. PROCESS CONTROL Mi. RELIABILITY AND LIFE TESTING
.
H. C. Hamaker E. S. Page Marvin Zelen
ACCEPTANCE SAMPLING
It is generally recognized that mass-production processes inevitably turn out a small amount of product that does not satisfy the specification requirements. Certainly, however, the fraction of defective product should be kept under control, and acceptance sampling is one of the methods used for this purpose. Although primarily used in manufacturing situations, the techniques of acceptance sampling can also be applied to nonmanufacturing operations, such as interviewing or editing. Mass products are usually handled in discrete lots, and these are the units to which acceptance sampling applies. A sample from each lot is inspected, and on the basis of the data provided by the sample it is decided whether the lot as a whole shall be accepted or rejected. The actual procedures differ according to the nature of the product and the method of inspection. A distinction must be made between discrete products (nuts and bolts, lamps, radios) and bulk products (coal, fertilizer, liquids). Another important distinction is that between inspection by the method of attributes, where each item inspected is simply classified as defective or nondefective, and inspection by the method of variables, where meaningful numerical measurements on the sample are used to sentence a lot. The following discussion will mainly concern attribute inspection, which is the technique most widely applied. Variables inspection will be mentioned only briefly. Systematic investigations of acceptance sampling problems were initiated by two now classic papers of Dodge and Romig (1929-1941), which were later published in book form. Most of the basic
225
226
QUALITY CONTROL: Acceptance Sampling
concepts discussed here, such as the AOQL, the LTPD, and single and double sampling, go back to their work. Further important developments took place during World War n, when acceptance sampling was extensively applied to military supplies. Research was carried out by the Statistical Research Group, Columbia University, and published in two books (1947; 1948). Since then there has been a steady flow of publications concerned with a variety of both theoretical and practical aspects, such as modifications of sampling procedures, economic principles, the development of sampling standards, or applications in particular situations. Method of attributes Basic concepts. Attribute sampling applies to discrete products that are classified as defective or nondefective, regardless of the nature and seriousness of the defects observed. The simplest procedure consists in a single sampling plan: From each lot submitted, a random sample of size n is inspected. The lot is accepted when the number of defectives, x, found in the sample is less than or equal to the acceptance number, c. When x is greater than or equal to the rejection number, c + 1, the lot is rejected. Suppose n — 100 and c = 2; that is, 2 per cent defectives are permitted in the sample. This does not mean that a lot containing 2 per cent defectives will always be accepted. Chance fluctuations come into play; sometimes the sample will be better and sometimes worse than the lot as a whole. Statistical theory teaches that if the size of the sample is much smaller than the size of the lot, then a lot with 2 per cent defectives has a probability of acceptance PA — 0.68 = 68 per cent. On the average, from 100 such lots, 68 will be accepted and 32 rejected. It is clear that the probability of acceptance is a function of the per cent defective, p, in the lot. A plot of PA as a function of p is called the operating characteristic curve, or the O.C. curve. Every sampling plan has a corresponding O.C. curve, which conveniently portrays its practical performance. The O.C. curves for three single sampling plans are presented in Figure 1. O.C. curves always have similar shapes, and for practical purposes they can be sufficiently specified by two parameters only. The most important parameters that have been proposed are the following: (1) Producer's risk point (PRP) = p,,, = that per cent defective for which the probability of acceptance, Pj , is 95 per cent. (2) Consumers risk point (CRP), more often called the lot tolerance percentage defective
p05 = 2.0% p50 = 4.7%
1
1
p10 = 8.0%
i
Figure 1 — O.C. curves for three single sampling plans
(LTPD) = pw = that per cent defective for which P.i = 10 per cent. (3) Indifference quality (IQ) or point of control = p50 = that per cent defective for which P.i = 50 per cent. (4) Average outgoing quality limit (AOQL), which, however, applies only to rectifying inspection, that is, inspection whereby rejected lots are completely screened (100 per cent inspection) and accepted after the removal of all defective items. It can be shown that under rectifying inspection the average outgoing quality (AOQ), that is, the average per cent defective in the accepted lots, can never surpass a certain upper limit, even under the most unfavorable circumstances. This upper limit is the AOQL. These four parameters are essentially characteristics of the O.C. curves or of the corresponding sampling plans. But the choice of a sampling plan cannot be determined by looking at the O.C. curves alone; in some way the choice must be in keeping with the capabilities of the production process under consideration. Realizing this, Dodge and Romig introduced the process average, that is, the average per cent defective found in the samples, as one of the quantities to be used in deciding on a sampling plan. Their sampling plans are such that for lots with a per cent defective equal to the process average the probability of acceptance is always fairly high. In practice this is not quite satisfactory, because it means that the acceptance sampling system is more lenient toward a poor producer with a high process average than toward a good one with a low average. Hence the process average has now been super-
QUALITY CONTROL: Acceptance Sampling seded by the acceptable quality level (AQL). This is again a per cent defective and may be considered as an upper limit of acceptability for the process average. Definitions have varied in the course of time. In the earliest version of the Military Standard 105, the 105'A, which was developed for acceptance sampling of military supplies during World War n and published in 1950, the AQL was defined as a "nominal value to be specified by the U.S. Government." The sampling plans in this standard are so constructed that the probability of acceptance for lots that meet the AQL standard is higher than 90 per cent. This has led other authors to define the AQL instead as the per cent defective with a probability of acceptance of 95 per cent, thus identifying the AQL with the PRP. Thereby, however, the AQL would be essentially a characteristic of a sampling plan and no longer a tolerance requirement of production. The uncertainty seems to have been finally settled by defining the AQL as the maximum per cent defective that, for purposes of acceptance sampling, can be considered satisfactory as a process average. This definition has been adopted in the latest version of the Military Standard 105, the 105D, and in a standard on terminology established by the American Society for Quality Control. Strictly, the O.C. curve of a single sampling plan also depends on the size of the lot, N, but if, as in most cases, the sample is only a small fraction of the lot, the O.C. curve is almost completely determined by the sample size, n, and the acceptance number, c; the influence of the lot size is unimportant and can be ignored. Since, moreover, the per cent defective is generally very low, a few per cent only, the Poisson formula can be used for computing the O.C. curves [see DISTRIBUTIONS, STATISTICAL, article on SPECIAL DISCRETE DISTRIBUTIONS]. An important logical distinction between contexts must be made: does the O.C. curve relate to the specific lot at hand or to the underlying process that produced the lot? Definitions of consumer's risk, etc., also may be made in either of these contexts. In practice, however, the numerical results are nearly identical, whether one regards as basic 3- particular lot or the underlying process. It will be noticed that the O.C. curve of a sampling plan has a close resemblance to the power curve of a one-sided test of a hypothesis [see HYPOTHESIS TESTING]. Indeed, acceptance sampling can be considered as a practical application of hypothesis testing. If on the basis of the findings in the sample the hypothesis H,, : p < PRP is tested with a significance level of 5 per cent, the lot is rejected if the hypothesis is rejected and the lot is
227
accepted if the hypothesis is not rejected. Likewise H (l : p = PRP; HT : p = LTPD can be considered as two alternative hypotheses tested against each other with errors of the first and second kind, of 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Curtailed, double, multiple., and sequential sampling. Curtailed sampling means that inspection is stopped as soon as the decision to accept or reject is evident. For example, with a single sampling plan with n = 100, c = 2, inspection can be stopped as soon as a third defective item is observed. This reduces the number of observations without any change in the O.C. curve. The gain is small, however, because bad lots, which are rejected, occur infrequently in normal situations. Better efficiency is achieved by double sampling plans, which proceed in two stages. First, a sample of size nl is inspected, and the lot is accepted if xl < cl and rejected if x{ ^ c2, xl being the number of defectives observed. But when c1 < xl < c2, a second sample, of size n.,, is inspected; and the lot is then finally accepted if the total number of defectives, x{ +x-,, is < c3 and is rejected otherwise. The basic idea is that clearly good or bad lots are sentenced by the first sample and only in doubtful cases is a second sample required. Multiple sampling operates on the same principle but in more than two successive steps, often six or eight. After each step it is decided again whether to accept, reject, or proceed to inspection of another sample. In (fully) sequential sampling, inspection is carried out item by item and a threeway decision taken after each item is inspected. The basic parameters discussed above apply also to double, multiple, and sequential sampling plans. These procedures can be so constructed that they possess O.C. curves almost identical with that of a given single sampling plan; on the average, however, they require fewer observations. The amount of saving is on the order of 25 per cent for double sampling and up to 50 per cent for multiple and sequential sampling. Disadvantages of these plans as compared with single sampling plans are more complicated administration and a variable inspection load. Double sampling is fairly often adopted, but multiple and sequential sampling are used only in cases where the cost of inspection is very high, so that a high economy is essential. In many situations single sampling is preferred for the sake of simplicity. The choice of a sampling plan. There are many considerations involved in choosing a sampling plan. Sampling standards. If numerical values are specified for two of the four parameters listed above, the O.C. curve is practically fixed and the
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QUALITY CONTROL: Acceptance Sampling
corresponding sampling plan may be derived by computation or from suitable tables. In practice, however, the use of standard sampling tables is much more common. The best known of these tables is the Military Standard 105A (U.S. Department of Defense, Standardization Division 1950), which prescribes a sampling plan in relation to an AQL and the size of the lot; the sample size is made to increase with the lot size so as to reduce the risk of wrong decisions. Three separate tables give single, double, and multiple plans. The user can also choose between different inspection levels, corresponding to systematic changes in all sample sizes; a sample size n — 50 at level i is increased to n = 150 at level in for example. The Military Standard 105 also contains rules for a transition to tightened or reduced inspection. The idea is that, when the sample data indicate that the average per cent defective in the lots received is significantly higher than the required AQL, the consumer should tighten his inspection in order to prevent the acceptance of too many bad lots and to stimulate the producer to improve his production. If, on the other hand, the average per cent defective is significantly lower than the AQL. this indicates that the production process is tightly controlled; inspection is then less essential and the amount of inspection can be reduced. The Military Standard 105 has several times been revised; the successive versions are known as the Military Standard 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D (U.S. Department of Defense, Standardization Division 1963). The differences between A, B, and C are relatively unimportant; but in 105D, issued in 1963, more drastic changes were introduced. These changes were proposed by a special committee of experts jointly appointed by the departments of defense in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. The basic principles underlying the Military Standard 105, however, have not been altered. The Military Standard 105 was originally intended for acceptance sampling of military supplies, but it has also been widely applied in industry for other purposes. Other standards have been established by large industrial firms or by governmental offices in other countries. Sometimes these are only modifications of the Military Standard 105A; sometimes they have been developed independently and from different points of view. The merits and demerits of a number of these standards are discussed by Hamaker (1960). Acceptance sampling as an economic problem. Many authors have attempted to deduce an opti-
mum sampling plan from economic considerations. Given (a) the cost of inspection of an item, (£>) the a priori distribution, that is, the distribution of the per cent defective among the lots submitted for inspection, (c) the loss caused by accepted defectives, and (d) the loss due to rejected nondefectives, one can, in principle, derive an optimum sampling plan, for which the total cost (cost of inspection plus losses) is a minimum. These economic theories have had little practical success except in isolated cases, mainly, I believe, because their basis is too restricted and because they require detailed information not readily available in industry. The a priori distribution is usually not known and cannot easily be obtained; the consequences of rejecting a lot depend to a very high degree on the stock available and may consequently vary from day to day. Rejection often does not mean that a lot is actually refused; it only means that the inspector cannot accept without consultation with a higher authority or some other authorization. Since even the most simple products can show a variety of defects, some much more serious than others, it is not easy to see how the loss due to accepted defectives should be estimated. In the Military Standard 105 this problem has been solved by a classification into critical, major, and minor defects, with a separate AQL for each class. An alternative method, demerit rating, consists in scoring points, say 10, 3, and 1, for critical, major, and minor defects and sentencing the lot by the total score resulting from a sample. The advantage is a single judgment instead of three separate judgments, but the theory of O.C. curves no longer applies in a simple and straightforward manner. There are practical problems as to how different defects should be classified and what scores should be assigned to the different classes. These should be solved by discussions between parties interested in the situation envisaged. Some case studies have been described in the literature. No attempts have so far been made to incorporate the classification of defects into economic theories; that would make them yet more complicated and unworkable. This is a decided drawback because in actual practice the degree of seriousness of the defects observed always has a considerable influence on the final decisions concerning the lots inspected. Besides, the economic theories assume that the prevention of accepted defectives is the only purpose of acceptance sampling and this is not correct. It also serves to show the consumer's interest in good quality and to stimulate the producer to take good care of his production processes. Some large firms
QUALITY CONTROL: Acceptance Sampling have developed vendor rating systems for this very purpose. The information supplied by the samples is systematically collected for each supplier separately and is used in deciding where to place a new contract. It should not be concluded that no attention is devoted to the economic aspects of the problem of choosing a sampling plan. In acceptance sampling there is always a risk of taking a wrong decision by accepting a bad lot or rejecting a good lot. The larger the lot, the more serious are the economic consequences, but the risk of wrong decisions can be reduced by using larger samples, which give steeper O.C. curves. All existing sampling tables prescribe increased sample sizes with increasing lot sizes, and this practice is derived from economic considerations. Also, before installing sampling inspection it is always necessary to make some inquiries about the situation to be dealt with. Do bad lots occur, and if so how frequently? How bad are those bad lots? Do accepted defectives cause a lot of trouble? The answers to such questions as these provide crude information about the a priori distribution and the economic aspects, and in choosing an AQL and an inspection level this information is duly taken into account. Looking at the problem from this point of view, industrial statistics always uses a rough Bayesian approach [see BAYESIAN INFERENCE]. A statistician will never be successful in industry if he does not properly combine his statistical practices with existing technical knowledge and experience and with cost considerations. It is only when an attempt is made to apply the Bayesian principles in a more precise way that problems arise, because the basic parameters required for that purpose cannot easily be estimated with sufficient accuracy. [It is interesting in this connection to compare the empirical Bayesian approach discussed in DECISION THEORY.] Method of variables In sampling by the method of variables a numerical quality characteristic, x, is measured on each item in the sample. It is usually supposed that x has a normal distribution [see DISTRIBUTIONS, STATISTICAL] and that a product is defective when x falls beyond a single specification limit or outside a specification interval: that is, when x < L and/or x > U. The basic idea is that from the mean, x, and standard deviation, s, computed from the sample, an estimate of the per cent defective in the lot can be derived, and this estimate can be compared with the AQL required. For a single
229
specification limit the criterion operates as follows: If x is a quality such as length, and the specification requires that not more than a small percentage, p, of the units in the lot shall have a length greater than U (upper limit), then the lot is accepted when U — x^ks and rejected when U — x < ks, where k is a constant that depends on p and the sample size n and is derived from the theory. For double limits the technique is somewhat more complicated. When the standard deviation is known, s is replaced by cr and a different value of h has to be used. On the basis of earlier suggestions, the theory of sampling by variables was worked out in detail by the Statistical Research Group, Columbia University (1947), and by Bowker and Goode (1952). This theory led to the establishment of the Military Standard 414 in 1957. This standard has a structure similar to the Military Standard 105A; lot size and AQL are the main parameters that determine a sampling plan. Tables are given for one and two specification limits, and for cr both known and unknown. The advantage of sampling by variables is a more effective use of the information provided by the sample and consequently fewer observations. Where the Military Standard 105A prescribes a sample size n = 150, the Military Standard 414 uses 72 — 50 when cr is unknown and n ranging from 8 to 30 when cr is known. Disadvantages are that the performance and handling of measurements require more highly trained personnel and that the assumption of a normal distribution is a risky one when it is not known under what circumstances a lot has been produced. For these reasons sampling by variables has found only limited application; sampling by attributes is often preferred. Present-day reliability requirements have led to an increased interest in life testing procedures and hence to the development of acceptance sampling techniques based on the exponential and the Weibull distributions [see QUALITY CONTROL, STATISTICAL, article on RELIABILITY AND LIFE TESTING]. Acceptance sampling of bulk materials. Acceptance sampling of bulk material constitutes a separate problem. A liquid can be homogenized through stirring, and then the analysis of a single specimen will suffice. Solid material, such as fertilizer or coal, is handled in bales, barrels, wagons, etc. Then, there may be a variability within bales and additional variability among bales. Extensive research is often needed for each product separately before an adequate acceptance sampling
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QUALITY CONTROL: Process Control
procedure can be developed. A good example is Duncan's investigation of fertilizer (1960). The theory of sampling by attributes is fairly complete. Research into the economics of acceptance sampling will probably continue for quite a while, but this seems to be an interesting academic exercise that will not lead to drastic changes in industrial practices. A common international sampling standard would be of great practical value, but since in different countries different standards are already established, this is a goal that will not be easily reached. The theory of sampling by variables may perhaps require some further development. In the Military Standard 414 the sample sizes prescribed when o- is unknown are three times the size of those for
BOWKER, ALBERT H.; ar^l GOODE, HENRY P. 1952 Sampling Inspection by Variables. New York: McGrawHill. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, STATISTICAL RESEARCH GROUP 1947 Selected Techniques of Statistical Analysis for Scientific and Industrial Research, and Production and Management Engineering. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» See especially Chapter 1 on the use of variables in acceptance inspection for per cent defective. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, STATISTICAL RESEARCH GROUP 1948 Sampling Inspection. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» Describes theory and methods of attribute inspection developed during World War n. DEMING, W. EDWARDS 1960 Sample Design in Business Research. New York: Wiley. -» Contains practical examples of the use of samples in business administration; some of these applications can be considered as problems in acceptance sampling. DODGE, HAROLD F.; and ROMIG, HARRY G. (1929-1941) 1959 Sampling Inspection Tables: Single and Double Sampling. 2d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Wiley; London: Chapman. -» This book is a republication of fundamental papers published by the authors in 1929 and 1941 in the Bell System Technical Journal.
DUNCAN, ACHESON J. (1952) 1965 Quality Control and Industrial Statistics. 3d ed. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. -» Contains five chapters on acceptance sampling. DUNCAN, ACHESON J. 1960 An Experiment in the Sampling and Analysis of Bagged Fertilizer. Journal of the Association of Official Agricultural Chemists 43: 831-904. -» A good example of the research needed to establish acceptance-sampling procedures of bulk material. GRANT, EUGENE L. (1946)1964 Statistical Quality Control. 3d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» The merits and demerits of various acceptance-sampling procedures and standards as well as Military Standard 105D are discussed in detail. HALD, H. A. 1960 The Compound Hyper geometric Distribution and a System of Single Sampling Inspection Plans Based on Prior Distributions and Costs. Technometrics 2:275-340. -» Considers sampling from an economic point of view, and contains a fairly complete list of references to earlier literature on this aspect of the sampling problem. HAMAKER, HUGO C. 1958 Some Basic Principles of Acceptance Sampling by Attributes. Applied Statistics 1:149-159. -> Contains a discussion of the difficulties hampering the practical application of economic theories. HAMAKER, HUGO C. 1960 Attribute Sampling in Operation. International Statistical Institute, Bulletin 37, no. 2:265-281. -> A discussion of the merits and demerits of a number of existing sampling standards. Quality Control and Applied Statistics: Abstract Service. -» Published since 1956. A useful source of information giving fairly complete abstracts of papers published in statistical and technical journals. Of special importance are the classification numbers 200-299: Sampling Principles and Plans, and number 823: Sampling for Reliability. TRUEBLOOD, ROBERT M.; and CYERT, RICHARD M. 1957 Sampling Techniques in Accounting. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STANDARDIZATION DIVISION 1950 Military Standard 1Q5A. Washington: Government Printing Office. -» A sampling standard widely applied. In 1959 this standard was slightly revised in Military Standard 105B. Recently, a further, more drastic revision has been effected jointly by the departments of defense in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STANDARDIZATION DIVISION 1957 Military Standard 414. Washington: Government Printing Office. -» A standard for variables inspection corresponding to Military Standard 105A. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STANDARDIZATION DIVISION 1963 Military Standard 105D. Washington: Government Printing Office. -» Earlier versions of this standard are known as Military Standard 105A, 105B, and 105C. VANCE, LAWRENCE L.; and NETER, JOHN 1956 Statistical Sampling for Auditors and Accountants. New York: Wiley. II
PROCESS CONTROL
The present article discusses that aspect of statistical quality control relating to the control of a routinely operating process. The traditional and most common field of use is in controlling the
QUALITY CONTROL: Process Control quality of manufactured products, but applications are possible in fields as diverse as learning experiments, stock exchange prices, and error control in the preparation of data for automatic computers. Process control of this kind is usually effected by means of charts that exhibit graphically the temporal behavior of the process; hence, the subject is sometimes called, somewhat superficially, "control charts." Inspection for control. The concept of quality control in its industrial context and the first widely used methods were introduced by W. A. Shewhart (1931). One of the prime concerns was to detect whether the items of output studied had characteristics that behaved like independent observations from a common statistical distribution, that is, whether groups of such items had characteristics behaving like random samples. If the procedure suggested acceptance of the hypothesis of a single distribution, with independence between observations, the production process was said to be "in control" (Shewhart 1931, p. 3), although at this stage the quality of the output, determined by the parameters of the distribution, might not be acceptable. A major contribution was the explicit recognition that such a state of control is necessary before any continuous control of the process can succeed. When the initial examination of the sample data shows the process to be out of control in the above sense, reasons connected with the operation of the process are sought (the search for "assignable causes"; Shewhart 1931, p. 13), improved production methods are introduced, and a further examination is made to see if control has been achieved. Thus, this initial phase of study of a process employs a significance test of a hypothesis in a way encountered in other applications of statistics. It should be noted, however, that often no alternative hypotheses are specified and that, indeed, they are frequently only vaguely realized at the beginning of the investigation. Inspection of a process in control. When the process is in a state of control and its output has the relevant quality characteristics following a distribution with the values of the parameters at their targets (that is, those values of the parameters chosen to cause the output to meet the design specifications with as much tolerance as possible), one task is to determine when the process departs from this state, so that prompt restoring action may be taken. A quality control scheme for this purpose needs, therefore, to give a signal when action is demanded. One of the features of importance for a process inspection scheme is thus the speed at which it detects a change from target.
231
In conflict with the desire for rapid detection of a change is the necessity for infrequent signals demanding action when no change from target has occurred. The "errors" of signaling a change when none has occurred and of failing to give the signal immediately after a change are similar to the two types of error familiar in hypothesis testing. Whereas in the latter case the probability of such errors is a suitable measure of their occurrence, in quality control the repetition of sampling as the process continues operation and the possibility of combining several samples to decide about a signal make probabilities less convenient measures of error behavior. Instead, the average run length (A.R.L.), defined as the average number of samples taken up to the appearance of a signal, gives a convenient means of comparison for different process inspection schemes (Barnard 1959, p. 240); the A.R.L. is easily related both to the amount of substandard output produced between any change and the signal and to the frequency of unnecessary interference with a controlled process. Ancillary tasks of process inspection. In addition to providing a signal after a change, a process inspection scheme may be required to yield other information. For example, the magnitude of change may need to be estimated so that a dial may be adjusted. Again, coupled with the provision of a signal to take remedial action may be a rule about the destination of any recent production for which there is evidence of a fall in standard, and so the position of any change may need estimation; in this case the scheme is partly one for the deferred sentencing of output, that is, for retrospective acceptance or rejection. In other cases a satisfactory record of a process inspection scheme may guarantee the acceptance of the output by a consumer. In these and other manufacturing applications where the aim is financial gain, a comparison of alternative schemes in monetary terms should be attempted and not, as so frequently has happened in practice, ignored. Although quantification of many aspects of real situations is difficult or impossible, a monetary comparison can avoid the confusion of using in one situation a measure appropriate for comparing schemes in a totally different situation. Types of inspection schemes. Schemes for the various applications base their rules for the appropriate action to be taken on the results either of single samples of observation or of sequences of such samples; the sequences may be of fixed or variable length. All such schemes are closely related, for those employing a single sample or a fixed number of samples can be exhibited as special
232
QUALITY CONTROL: Process Control Action region k(T
A*
Action line
k'cr p + —71
X
Warning region
X
V
X
Warning line X
X X
X
Target value UL
'cr
rfA-
SAMPLE NUMBER X
X
"
o&
G°°
Warning line Warning region
ka-
Action line Action region SAMPLE MEAN Figure 1 — Chart with warning lines
cases of schemes using a variable number of samples. However, the appearance of the graphical records is quite different. In the first two cases the individual sample results are marked on the chart (Figure 1), while in the last case the sums of all the previous observations, corrected for any expected trend, are plotted (Figure 2). The application of such techniques to different distributions changes the schemes only slightly; the constants involved differ, and sometimes attention is concentrated upon evidence of changes in the distribution parameter in one direction only—for example, increases in the fraction of defective articles produced or in the variance of a measured characteristic are often particularly interesting. Besides the normal distribution model to be discussed below, another useful model is the Poisson for applications concerning the number of occurrences of a particular type in a given item or length of time, for example, the number of blemishes in sheets of glass of fixed size. The most commonly used schemes are those for controlling the mean V-mask
SAMPLE NUMBER
Figure 2 — Cumulative sum chart
of a normal distribution; they are typical of those for other distributions, both continuous and discrete, although schemes for each distribution need separate consideration for calculation of their properties. The samples used in this sort of activity are usually small, of perhaps four to six observations. The Shewhart procedure. The classical Shewhart procedure for providing a signal when a process in control departed from its target mean /JL used two "action lines" drawn at /u. ± kcr/ \fn, where ois the process standard deviation estimated from many earlier observations, n is the size of sample, and k is a constant chosen pragmatically to be 3 (Shewhart 1931, p. 277) or 3.09 (Budding & Jennett 1942, p. 64). The signal of a change was received when any sample point, the mean of a sample, fell outside the action lines (Shewhart 1931, p. 290). These rules are such that only about 1 in 500 samples would yield a point outside the action lines if the output were in control with the assumed parameter values; the l-in-500 choice rests on experience and lacks any foundation from consideration of costs, but the success of these schemes has, in many applications, afforded abundant justification of their use and represented a major advance in process control. For processes where information is required about small changes in the mean, the single small-sample schemes were insufficiently sensitive—small changes need large samples for quick detection—but limitations in sampling effort and a reluctance to sacrifice the possibility of rapid detection of large changes with small samples have caused additions to the original Shewhart scheme. Warning line schemes. Charts of warning line schemes have drawn on them the action lines and two other lines—warning lines—at IJL ± k'cr/\/n, where k' is a constant less than k (Budding & Jennett 1942, p. 14; Grant 1946, art. 159). Accordingly, the chart is divided into action, warning, and good regions (Figure 1). A change in parameter is signaled by rules such as the following: Take action if m out of the last n sample points fell in one of the warning regions or if the last point falls in an action region (Page 1955). Schemes using runs of points are special cases (Grant 1946, art. 88); some that are popular base their action rule on runs of sample points on one side of the target mean (case k' = 0, k = <*>, m = n, that is, the action regions disappear and the two warning regions are separated only by a line at the target value: action is taken when a long enough sequence of consecutive points falls in one region). These schemes retain some of the advantages of small samples and seek to combine the results of
QUALITY CONTROL: Reliability and Life Testing a fixed number of samples in a simple way to increase the sensitivity for sustained small changes in parameter. Cumulative sum schemes. An extension of this idea is provided by the cumulative sum schemes (or cusum schemes), which enjoy the advantages of both large and small samples by combining the relevant information from all recent samples (Barnard 1959, p. 270). Instead of plotting individual sample means, x, on the chart, the differences of these means from the target value, x ~ JJL, are cumulated and the running total plotted after each sample is taken (Figure 2). A change in process mean causes a change in the direction of the trend of plotted points. One method of denning the conditions for a signal is to place a V-mask on the chart and take action if the arms of the V obscure any of the sample points. The angle of the V and the position of the vertex relative to the last plotted point (the lead distance) can be chosen to achieve the required A.R.L.s. Tables of these constants exist for several important distributions (Ewan & Kemp I960; Goldsmith & Whitfield 1961; Kemp 1961; Page 1962; 1963). Alternative methods of recording may be adopted for schemes to detect one-sided or two-sided deviations in the parameter. Gauging devices may be used instead of measuring in order to speed the manual operation of such a scheme or to make automatic performance simpler (Page 1962). Recent developments. Attention has been given to schemes for the complete control of the process, that is, procedures for automatically detecting departures from target and making adjustments of appropriate sizes to the control variables (Box & Jenkins 1963; 1964). Naturally, such methods of control are applicable only to those processes for which both measurements of the quality characteristics and the adjustments can be made automatically. Other work has examined different stochastic models of process behavior (Barnard 1959; Bather 1963) and has attempted a comprehensive study of all the costs and savings of a process inspection scheme (Duncan 1956). In industrial applications the financial benefits accruing from the operation of such a scheme are usually of paramount importance, and however difficult it may be to assess them quantitatively, they deserve careful consideration at all stages of the selection and operation of the scheme. E. S. PAGE BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARNARD, G. A. 1959 Control Charts and Stochastic Processes. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 21:239-271. -» Introduces the V-mask cusum chart and estimation methods.
233
BATHER, J. A. 1963 Control Charts and the Minimization of Cost. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 25:49-80. Box, G. E. P., and JENKINS, G. M. 1962 Some Statistical Aspects of Adaptive Optimization and Control. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 24:297— 343. Box, G. E. P.; and JENKINS, G. M. 1964 Further Contributions to Adaptive Quality Control; Simultaneous Estimation of Dynamics: Non-zero Costs. International Statistical Institute, Bulletin 40:943-974. DUDDING, B. P.; and JENNETT, W. J. 1942 Quality Control Charts. London: British Standards Institution. DUNCAN, ACHESON J. (1952) 1959 Quality Control and Industrial Statistics. Rev. ed. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. DUNCAN, ACHESON J. 1956 The Economic Design of x Charts Used to Maintain Current Control of a Process. Journal of the American Statistical Association 51:228-242. EWAN, W. D.; and KEMP, K. W. 1960 Sampling Inspection of Continuous Processes With No Autocorrelation Between Successive Results. Biometrika 47: 363-380. -» Gives tables and a nomogram for onesided cusum charts on a normal mean and fraction defective. GOLDSMITH, P. L.; and WHITFIELD, H. 1961 Average Run Lengths in Cumulative Chart Quality Control Schemes. Technometrics 3:11-20. -> Graphs of V-mask schemes for normal means. GRANT, EUGENE L. (1946)1964 Statistical Quality Control. 3d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. -> Many examples of the Shewhart chart for different distributions. KEMP, K. W. 1961 The Average Run Length of the Cumulative Sum Chart When a V-mask Is Used. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 23:149153. -> Gives tables of cusum schemes for a normal mean. PAGE, E. S. 1954 Continuous Inspection Schemes. Biometrika 41:100-115. -> Introduces cusum schemes. PAGE, E. S. 1955 Control Charts With Warning Lines. Biometrika 42:242-257. PAGE, E. S. 1962 Cumulative Sum Schemes Using Gauging. Technometrics 4:97-109. PAGE, E. S. 1963 Controlling the Standard Deviation by Cusums and Warning Lines. Technometrics 5:307— 315. -> Gives tables of cusum schemes for a normal range. SHEWHART, WALTER A. 1931 Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured Product. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. -» The classic volume introducing control chart methods. Ill
RELIABILITY AND LIFE TESTING
Technology has been characterized since the end of World War n by the development of complex systems containing large numbers of subsystems, components, and parts. This trend to even larger and more complex systems is accelerating with the development of space vehicles, electronic computers, and communications and weapons systems. Many of these systems may fail or may operate inefficiently if a single part or component fails. Hence, there is a high premium on having the
234
QUALITY CONTROL: Reliability and Life Testing
components operate efficiently so that the system operates in a reliable, trustworthy manner. In order to have reliable systems, it is not only necessary initially to design the system to be reliable, but also, once the system is in operation, to have appropriate maintenance and check-out schedules. This requires quantitative estimates of the reliability of the entire system, as well as reliability estimates for the major components, parts, and circuits that make up the system. While formalized definitions of reliability vary, there is general agreement that it refers to the probability of satisfactory performance under clearly specified conditions. Reliability of components and the system. An important problem is to predict the reliability of a system from knowledge of the reliability of the components that make it up. For example, a satellite system may be regarded as composed of subsystems that perform the propulsion, guidance, communication, and instrument functions. All subsystems must function in order for the satellite to function. It is desired to predict the reliability of the satellite from knowledge of the reliability of the basic components or subsystems.
functioning correctly is equal to the product of the probabilities for each major component; that is, Reliability of series system:
R = p^p.2 • • • pn.
It is clear that the reliability of the system is no greater (and generally rather less) than the reliability of any single component. For example, if a system has three major components with reliabilities of .95, .90, and .90, the reliability of the entire system would be R = (.95)(.90)(.90) = .7695. One way of improving the reliability of a system is to introduce redundancy. Redundancy, as usually employed, refers to replacing a low-reliability component by several components having identical functions. These are connected so that it is necessary only that at least one of these components function in order for the system to function. Auxiliary power systems in hospital operating rooms and two sets of brakes on automobiles are common examples of redundancy. Redundant components may be idealized as making up a parallel series (cf. Figure 1£>). When there are n components in parallel, such that each component operates independently of the others, the reliability of the system is given by n
OUTPUT
Reliability of parallel system: # = 1 — 11(1— £>;)• j=i
More abstractly, consider a system made up of n major components, each of which must function in order that the whole system function. An idealization of this system is to regard the components as connected in a series network (Figure la), although the actual connections may be much more complex. The input signal to a component is passed on to a connecting component only if the component is functioning. Let PI refer to the probability that the iih component functions, and assume that the components operate independently of one another. Then the probability of the entire system
Since 1 - R = FLO ~~ P;) ^ 1 ~~ P> f°r anY ^ it: can be seen that R ^ p-, for any i. Consequently using redundancy always increases the reliability of a system (assuming 0 < pt < I). The most frequent use of redundancy is when a single component is replaced by n identical components in parallel. Then the reliability of this parallel system is R = 1 — (1 — p) n , where p refers to the probability of a single component functioning. The formulas for the reliability of series and parallel systems are strictly valid only if the components function independently of one another. In some applications this may not be true, as failure of one component may throw added stress on other components. In practice, also, an entire system will usually be made up of both series and parallel systems. Note that either in the series or parallel network, one can regard the system as functioning if one can take a "path" from the input to the output via functioning components. There is only one such path for components in series whereas there are n possible paths for the parallel system. The concept of finding paths of components for which the system functions is the basis for predicting the reliability of more complicated systems. Consider n components having only two states of performance;
INPUT-
1
^
2
3
—
(a) Series network 1 2 INPUT
n
(b ) P arallel ne twork Figure 7
QUALITY CONTROL: Reliability and Life Testing
235
(a) Two-terminal network: 0(X) =X1[1-(1~ X 2 )(l - X 3 )]
(fc) Bridge network:
= 1 - (1 -
X,X 4 )(1 - X,X 4 X 5 )(1 -X 2 X 3 X 5 )(1
-X 3 X 4 X 5 )
Figure 2 that is, a component is either in a functioning or failing state. Let X ; take the value 1 if component i is functioning and 0 otherwise. Also define a function
parallel system :
max(X 1 ,X 2
Some examples of other structure functions are shown in Figure 2. The reliability of the system with structure function $(X) is obtained by taking the expectation of
^(p) — £[0(X)] = Pr{$(X) = 1}.
Barlow and Proschan (1965) have an excellent exposition of the properties of structure functions, as well as a presentation of optimum redundancy techniques.
Predicting reliability from sample data. The development in the preceding section assumed that the reliability of the individual components was known. In the practical situation, this is not the case. Although experiments may be conducted on each component in order to obtain an estimate of its reliability, it is often more feasible to test subsystems or major components [for a general discussion of these methods, see ESTIMATION]. Suppose that n-t independent components of type i are tested, with the result that s, components function and n, - s-, components fail. Then pi = s-Jrii is an estimate of p - t , the reliability of the component. When such information is available on all components in a system, then an estimate of the reliability of the system, fl(p), is obtained by replacing pi by p,: in (1). However, one often requires an interval estimate which may take the form of a lower confidence interval; that is, one may wish to find a number #<*(»), s = (Sj, s2, • • • , sn), which is a function of the sample information, such that Pr{R(p)
0
for all p. This general problem has not yet been solved satisfactorily, although progress has been made in a few special cases for components in series. These special methods are reviewed in Lloyd and Lipow (1962). A general method of computing confidence intervals is to simulate the operation of the system using the sample information. The simulation consists of "building" a set of systems out of the tested com-
236
QUALITY CONTROL: Reliability and Life Testing
portents, using the data from each component only once. The proportion of times $(X) — 1 is an estimate of H(f»), and one can use the theory associated with the binomial distribution to calculate a confidence interval for -R(p). A good discussion and summary of such simulation techniques is given by Rosenblatt (1963). These same ideas and techniques may be useful for the study of human organizations, particularly in the transmission of information. [See SIMULATION.] Time-dependent reliability. Often the reliability of a system or component is defined in terms of the equipment functioning for a given period of time. When a complex system is capable of repair, the system is usually repaired after a failure and the failure characteristics of the system are described by the time betiveen failures. On the other hand, if a part such as a vacuum tube fails, it is replaced (not repaired) and one refers to the time to failure to describe the failure characteristics of a population of nominally identical tubes. Let T be a random variable denoting the time to failure of a component or times between failure of a system, and define f ( t ) to be its probability density function. Then the probability of the component functioning to time t (or the time between failures of a system being greater than t) is the survivorship function
S(t) = Pr{T
ff(x)dx.
A useful quantity associated with the failure distribution is the hazard function defined by
For small positive At, fe(£)A£ is approximately the probability that a component will fail during the time interval (t, t + At), given that the component has been in satisfactory use up to time t; that is,
Sometimes /z(t) is called the instantaneous failure rate or force of mortality [see LIFE TABLES]. When h(t) is an increasing (decreasing) function of t, then the longer the component has been in use, the greater (smaller) the probability of immediate failure. These failure laws are referred to as positive (negative) aging. If h(t) = constant, independent of t, the conditional probability of failure does not depend on the length of time the
components have been in use. Such failures are called random failures. Knowledge of the hazard function enables one to calculate the survivorship function from the relation
S(t) = exp where H(t) = J0* h(x)dx. A particularly important class of hazard functions is given by
Since H(f) = fj h(x)dx = V/0", the survivorship function is S(t)=exp[-(t/0)*]. This distribution is called the Weibull distribution. The parameter p is termed the shape parameter, and 0 is the scale parameter. If p > 1 (p < 1 ) there is positive (negative) aging. The importance of the Weibull distribution arises from the fact that positive, negative, and no aging depend only on the shape parameter p. When p = l,h(t) = 1/6 (which is independent of t) and the distribution reduces to the simple exponential distribution
S(t) = e-w. [See DISTRIBUTIONS, STATISTICAL, article on SPECIAL CONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTIONS, for more information on these distributions and those discussed below.] Two other distributions that are useful in describing the failure time of components are the gamma and log-normal distributions. With respect to the gamma distribution, negative or positive aging occurs f or 0 < p < 1 and p > 1 respectively. The hazard function for the log-normal distribution increases to a maximum and then goes to zero as £->«,. Buckland (1964), Epstein (1962), Govindarajulu (1964), and Mendenhall (1958) have compiled extensive bibliographies on the topics discussed in this section. The exponential distribution. The exponential distribution (sometimes called the negative exponential distribution) has been widely used in applications to describe the failure of components and systems. One reason for its popularity is that the mathematical properties of the distribution are very tractable. The above-mentioned bibliographies cite large numbers of papers dealing with statistical techniques based on the exponential failure law. One of the properties of the exponential distribution is that the conditional probability of fail-
QUANTAL RESPONSE ure does not depend on how long the component has been in use. This is not true for most applications to components and parts; however, the exponential distribution may be appropriate for some complex systems. If a complex system is composed of a large number of components such that the failure of any component of the system will cause the system to fail, then under general mathematical conditions it has been proved that the distribution of times between failures tends to an exponential distribution when the number of components becomes large (cf. Khintchine [1955] 1960, chapter 5). One of these conditions is that the times between failures of the system be relatively short compared to the failure time of each component. Using the exponential distribution when it is not appropriate may result in estimates, decisions, and conclusions that are seriously in error. This has motivated research into methods that assume only an increasing failure rate (IFR) or decreasing failure rate (DFR). Barlow and Proschan (1965) present a very complete summary of results dealing with IFR and DFR hazard functions. MARVIN ZELEN BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARLOW, RICHARD E.; and PROSCHAN, FRANK 1965 Mathematical Theory of Reliability. New York: Wiley. -» A very good development of specialized aspects of theory. BUCKLAND, WILLIAM R. 1964 Statistical Assessment of the Life Characteristic: A Bibliographic Guide. New York: Hafner. -> A large bibliography on life and fatigue testing. EPSTEIN, BENJAMIN 1962 Recent Developments in Life Testing. International Statistical Institute Bulletin 39, no. 3:67-72. GOVINDARAJULU, ZAKKULA 1964 A Supplement to Mendenhall's "Bibliography on Life Testing and Related Topics." Journal of the American Statistical Association 59:1231-1291. -> An excellent bibliography covering the period 1958-1962. KHINTCHIN, ALEKSANDR IA. (1955) 1960 Mathematical Methods in the Theory of Queueing. London: Griffin. -> First published in Russian. LLOYD, DAVID K.; and LIPOW, MYRON 1962 Reliability: Management, Methods, and Mathematics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. -> Discusses theory and applications. MENDENHALL, WILLIAM 1958 A Bibliography on Life Testing and Related Topics. Biometrika 45:521-543. -> Includes important works up to 1957. ROSENBLATT, JOAN R. 1963 Confidence Limits for the Reliability of Complex Systems. Pages 115-137 in Marvin Zelen (editor), Statistical Theory of Reliability. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. ZELEN, MARVIN (editor) 1963 Statistical Theory of Reliability. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. -» Contains survey and expository articles on reliability theory.
237
QUANTAL RESPONSE The response of an experimental or survey subject is called "quanta!" if it is a dichotomous response—for example, dead-alive or success-failure. Such dichotomous variables are common throughout the social sciences, but the term "quantal response" and the statistical analyses associated with the term refer specifically to situations in which dichotomous observations are taken in a series of groups that are ordered on some underlying metric. The probability of a specific response —for example, dead—is then taken to be a function of this underlying variable, and it is this function (or some characteristic of it) that is of interest. The first developments of techniques for the analyses of quantal response were in psychophysics [see PSYCHOPHYSICS], where the functional relationship between the probability of a psychological response (for example, affirmation of a sensation) and the amount of, or change in, stimulus was of interest. The purpose of this article is to point out the areas in which the techniques for quantal response find application, to describe the techniques, and to discuss in detail a few of the applications in terms of methods and areas of investigation and of fulfillment of the statistical assumptions. Quantal response data arise when subjects (more generally, experimental units) are exposed to varying levels of some treatment or stimulus and when it is noted for each subject whether or not a specific response is exhibited. In psychophysical experiments the stimulus might be a sound (with varying levels of intensity measured in decibels) or a light (with variations in color measured in wave lengths). The subject states whether he has heard the sound or can discern that the light is different in color from some standard. In the assay of a tranquilizing drug for toxicity, the treatment variable is the dose of the drug and the response variable might be the presence or absence of nausea or some other dichotomous indication of toxicity. Descriptive statistics for quantal data Table 1 contains a typical set of quantal response data. The data were treated by Spearman (1908) and represent the proportion (pi) of times a subject could distinguish a sound of varying intensity ( x i ) from a given standard sound. As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of positive responses tends to increase from 0 to 1, in an S-shaped, or sigmoid, curve, as the level of x increases. It is often assumed that points like those plotted in
238
QUANTAL RESPONSE
Table 1 — Proportion of times a sound of varying intensity was judged higher than a standard sound of intensity 1,772 decibels Intensity (decibels) 1,078 1,234 1,402 1,577 1,772 1,972 2,169 2,375 2,579 2,793 3,011
Logarithm of intensity (<•)
Proportion of high judgments (p^)
3.03 3.09 3.15 3.20 3.25 3.30 3.34 3.37 3.41 3.45 3.48
.00 .00
.11 .28
.48 .71 .83 .91 .95 .98
1.00 Source: Data from Spearman 1908.
Figure 1 approximate an underlying smooth sigmoid curve that represents the "true" circumstances. The value of x for which the sigmoid curve has value \ is taken to be the most important descriptive aspect of the curve by most writers. This halfway value of x, denoted by Med, corresponds to the median if the sigmoid curve is regarded as a cumulative frequency curve. For values of x below Med, the probability of response is less than |; for values of x above Med, the probability of response is greater than |. Of course, in describing a set of data a distinction must be made between the true Med for the underlying smooth curve and an estimate of Med from the data. The value Med is often called the threshold value in research in sensory perception (see Guilford 1936). This value is not
3.00
3.10
3.20
3.30
3.40
3.50
LOGARITHM OF INTENSITY (DECIBELS)
Figure 1 — Sigmoid relationship between the logarithm of the intensity of a sound and the proportion of times it is judged higher than a standard sound (intensity 1,772, log intensity 3.25)
to be confused with the conceptual stimulus value (or increment) that induces no response, that is, the 0 per cent response value, sometimes called the absolute threshold. (See Corso 1963 for a review of these concepts.) In pharmacological research the dose at which 50 per cent of the subjects respond is called the E.D. 50 (effective dose fifty), or L.D. 50 (lethal dose fifty) if the response is death. A natural method of estimating Med would be to graph the p, against x-, (as in Figure 1), graduate the data with a smooth line by eye, and estimate Med from the graph. In many cases this method is sufficient. The method lacks objectivity, however, and provides no measure of reliability, so that a number of arithmetic procedures have been developed. Unweighted least squares. One early method of estimating Med was to fit a straight line to the pi by unweighted least squares [see LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on REGRESSION]. This standard procedure leads easily to an estimator of Med,
P + x, where p and x are averages over the levels of x, and B\, the estimated slope of the straight line, is
Minimum normit least squares. The method of unweighted least squares is simple and objective, but it applies simple linear regression to data that usually show a sigmoid trend. Furthermore, the method does not allow for differing amounts of random dispersion in the p-t . Empirical and theoretical considerations have suggested the assumption that the expected value of Pi is related to the Xi by the sigmoidal function,
„, , = Z(p) xr/
Med ,1 1 x. cr
If Xi is plotted against Z(pi) from Table 1, a sensibly linear relationship is indeed obtained (see
QUANTAL RESPONSE
z/i and Wi, slightly different from the normits and weights of the preceding section. The values are obtained from special tables. The modified weighted least squares procedure is iterated, using new weights stemming from the prior computations, until stability in the estimates is achieved. Estimation using the logistic function. Although the cumulative normal distribution has been most heavily used in quantal response analysis, the logistic function was proposed early and has been advocated for quantal assay in several fields (Baker 1961; Emmens 1940). The function is
Z(p)
2.00
1.00
-1.00
239
-
p= Z
-2.00 V/ 3.00
3.10
3.20
3.30
3.40
3.50
LOGARITHM OF INTENSITY (DECIBELS)
Figure 2 — Linear relationship between the normit, Z(p), and the logarithm of sound intensity for Spearman's data
Figure 2), so that the normal assumption seems reasonable for these data. The minimum normit least squares method (Berkson 1955) is to fit a straight line to the Z(pi) by iveighted least squares [see LINEAR HYPOTHESES, article on REGRESSION]. The weights are chosen to approximate the reciprocal variances of the Z(p,). Specifically, letting y, = Z(p ; ) and letting z,- be the ordinate of the standard normal distribution with cumulative probability p,-, the weight, w-}, for y^ will be
Notice that for p = -|, x = Med = —A/B. This function is of sigmoid form and is practically indistinguishable from a cumulative normal, with appropriate choice of A and B. One advantage of the logistic function is that x can be expressed as a simple function of p, that is, Y = In
where x = J^wixi/^Wi and # = Z^iZ/i/lCwi are weighted means and S2 is the estimator of slope, (2)
This method is called the minimum normit chisquared method by Berkson (1955). Maximum likelihood estimators. The method of maximum likelihood, one of general application in statistics, may be applied to quantal response analysis [see ESTIMATION, article on POINT ESTIMATION]. A detailed discussion is given by Finney (1947; 1952). In essence, the technique may be regarded as a weighted least squares procedure, similar to the minimum normit procedure, using
= A + Bx.
Thus, z/i = In p,/(l — p,) will be approximately linearly related to x-, . The method of approximate weighted least squares can be used to fit a straight line to the data. The resulting estimator for Med is X,
where y and x represent weighted means of the yi = In [p;/(l - P;)] and X i , with weights Wi = riipi(l — p ; ), and the estimated slope is z]w-(x- — xY
The resultant estimator of Med is x,
l-p
The method of maximum likelihood could be applied with the logistic function, but again it proves to be an iterative regression method. However, some simplifications in this case allow the maximum likelihood solution to be graphed; this has been done for certain configurations of ^-levels common in drug assay (Berkson 1960). Spearman-Karber estimation. Finally, an important method of estimating Med was described by Spearman (1908) and attributed by him to the German psychophysicists. The method is most convenient when the difference between ac-levels is constant, for then the estimator is (3)
where xk is the highest level of x and d is the constant difference between levels of x. Note that an
240
QUANTAL RESPONSE
additional lower level with p() = 0 would not change the value of M4 . Neither would an additional higher level of x with p/-,, ~ 1, since xk would be increased by d, and an additional d would be subtracted. A more general formula applicable in the case of unequal spacing of the x-t is easily available. The expression for M, above does not require that the group sizes (n-t} be equal. The calculation of M, can be intuitively justified by noting that it is equivalent to reconstructing a histogram from the cumulative distribution formed by graphing the pt against the x-, as a broken line increasing from 0 to 1. The proportion in the histogram between Xj and xi+i would be pi+^ — p i - The mean of the histogram (M^) would be the sum of the midpoints of the intervals, x-t + %d, multiplied by their respective relative frequencies, p i+1 — pi :
where p() — 0, p/ v41 = 1, by definition. It is easily shown that when both are applicable, Af 4 = M( , thus demonstrating that the Spearman estimator is simply the mean of a histogram constructed from the quantal response data. Although $T4 resembles a mean, it can be regarded as an estimator of the median, Med, for the usual symmetrical sigmoidal curve, since mean and median will be equal in these cases. The Spearman-Karber estimator has been criticized because it seems to depend on the possibly fallacious assumption that further x-levels on either end of the series actually used would have resulted in no responses and all responses, respectively. It should be emphasized here that the heuristic justification above makes use of the unobserved values, p,, = 0 and pk^ - 1, but the Spearman-Karber estimator must be judged on the basis of theory and performance, not on the basis of the heuristic reasoning that suggested the method. Theoretical and practical results suggest that the SpearmanKarber method has no superior as a general method for estimating Med from quantal data. (See Brown 1961 for a review and for additional results on this point.) Furthermore, the Spearman-Karber estimator is nonparametric in that no function relating p and x appears in the definition of the estimator. Other methods. Other methods of analyzing quantal data are described by Finney (1952). None seems as desirable for general use as the methods described above. The more frequently mentioned procedures are (a) methods based on moving average interpolation of the p,, ( b ) methods based on the angular function as an alternative to the normal or logistic, and (c) the Reed-Muench and
Dragstedt-Behrens method used primarily in biology. Sequential estimation of Med. Occasionally, data on quantal response can be collected most economically in a sequential way and analyzed as they are gathered. As an example, in a clinical trial of a psychotherapeutic drug, individual patients may be allocated to various dose-levels of drug and placebo as they are admitted to, and diagnosed at, a mental hospital. Since the data on treatment effectiveness will become available sequentially and not too rapidly, the evaluation might well be done sequentially. Sequential collection and analysis of quantal response data will yield values of Med (the L.D. 50, or threshold value, etc.) that are more reliable than the fixed-sample-size investigation for comparable numbers of observations. The added precision of the sequential procedure is attained by choosing levels for further observations in the light of the data observed. The result is a concentration of x-levels in the range where the most information on Med is gained—namely, at x levels in the vicinity of Med. Several sources (Cochran & Davis 1964; Wetherill 1963) give appropriate methods of carrying out sequential experimentation and analysis specifically for quantal data. [See SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS for a general discussion,] Estimation of slope of curve. All of the preceding discussion of computational procedures has been concerned with computation of an estimator for Med. Another characteristic of the data shown in Figure 1 is the steepness with which the p,- rise from 0 to 1 as the level of x is increased. It has been noted that if the function relating p to x is regarded as a cumulative frequency function, then Med is the median of the distribution. Similarly, the steepness is related (inversely) to the variability of the frequency function. In particular, if the normal frequency function is used, the slope of the straight line (eq. 1) relating the normal deviate of p to x is simply the inverse of the standard deviation of the normal function. Therefore, if Ae regression methods that stem from least squares or maximum likelihood are used, the resulting value for the slope, for example, IL in expression (2), could be used to estimate cr. If the logistic functional form is used, the slope can be converted to an estimate of the standard deviation by multiplying the ininverse of the slope by a constant, TT/V3. The nonparametric Spearman-Karber estimation of Med does not provide as a side product an estimator of slope or standard deviation. If a value for the standard deviation is desired, a corresponding Spearman procedure for estimating the standard deviation is available (Cornfield & Mantel 1950).
QUANTAL RESPONSE Occasionally, an estimator of a quantile other than the median is of interest. If the tolerance distribution is of normal form, the pth quantile, xp, can be estimated by xp = $f + zp 6;
where M and 6- are estimators of the median and standard deviation of the tolerance distribution and z,, is the pth quantile of the standard normal distribution. Reliability of estimators The computational procedures described above can be carried out on any set of quantal response data for the purpose of summary or concise description. However, it is apparent that the data are subject to random variation, and this variation, in turn, implies that estimators of Med or cr computed from a given set of quantal response data should be accompanied by standard errors to facilitate proper evaluation. Valid standard errors can be computed only on the basis of a careful examination of the sources and nature of the variation in each specific application, but some widely applicable procedures will be discussed in this section. Measuring reliability of the estimators. The estimators of Med discussed in previous paragraphs will be unbiased, for practical purposes, unless the number of xt levels used is small (say, two or three) or the x-, levels are so widely spaced or poorly chosen that the probability of response is either 0 or 1 at each x{. The ideal experiment will have several x\ levels, with probabilities of response ranging from 5 per cent to 95 per cent. [See ESTIMATION, article on POINT ESTIMATION, for a discussion of unbiasedness.] A simple method for measuring the reliability of an estimator is to carry out the experiment in several independent replications or complete repetitions. This series of experiments will provide a sequence of estimates for the desired parameter (Med, for example). The mean of the estimates can be taken as the estimator of the parameter, and the standard error of this mean can be computed as the standard deviation of the estimates divided by the square root of the number of estimates. It will be a valid measure of the reliability of the mean. Statistical model. The disadvantage of the procedure described above is that it may not yield error limits as narrow as a method that is tailormade to the known characteristics of the particular investigation. Furthermore, the statistical properties of the procedure may not be as easily ascertained as for a method based on a more spe-
241
cific mathematical model. The following model seems to describe quite a number of situations involving quantal response; the estimation procedures discussed above are appropriate to this model. Take Pi to be the expected value of p-,, at the level Xj, with 72, subjects at this ith level of x-, and with i"i ( = p , 7 2 ; ) of the rii subjects responding. Assume that the x\ are fixed and known without error and that each of the 72,- subjects at x-, has a probability, P , , of responding, independent of all other subjects, whatever their x-t level. This implies that the observed pi are independent, binomially distributed proportions. In particular, each p, is an unbiased estimator of its P , , with variance [P,(l — P;)]/72j. The assumption of complete independence among all subjects in the investigation must be carefully checked. For example, if the animals at a given dose-level (x,-) are littermates, or if the persons at each level of ability (x,) are tested as a group, there may be a serious violation of this assumption, and any assessment of standard error must acknowledge the dependence. (See Finney [1952] 1964, pp. 136-138, for a discussion of procedures appropriate for this type of dependence.) In what follows, complete independence is assumed. Standard errors and confidence limits. In the parametric regression methods, either maximum likelihood or minimum normit chi-squared, estimated standard errors for the estimators of Med and or are SF- — 1
Jft2
1
x) 2
B
SF.s =
1
where B, w, , and x are as defined in previous sections. The same formulas apply for logistic applications. If 95 per cent confidence limits are desired, it is usually satisfactory to take the estimate plus and minus two standard errors. A more exact procedure, developed by Fieller, is discussed in detail by Finney (1952). The standard error for the nonparametric Spearman procedure is simple and rapidly computed. From expression (3) it can be seen that the Spearman estimator involves only the sum of independent binomially distributed random variables. The usual estimator of standard error is therefore
although there is evidence that it is slightly better to replace 72; with 72; — 1. It is useful to note that
242
QUANTAL RESPONSE
the Spearman estimator has a standard deviation that depends on or, the standard deviation of the curve relating P to x. If the curve is normal or logistic, the relationship (Brown 1961) is approximately
Thus, if cr can be approximated from past experience, this last expression can be used to plan an investigation, with respect to the choice of d and n. Choice of computational procedure. In many applications a graphical estimate of Med (and, perhaps, cr) seems to be sufficient. However, if a more objective estimator is desired, with a measure of reliability, some one of the computational techniques must be chosen. Finney ([1952] 1964, p. 540) presents a review of work comparing the several computational techniques. The results of this work can be described as follows : (a) The estimators discussed above give quite comparable values in practice, with no estimator clearly more reasonable than another as a descriptive measure. (£>) The reliabilities of the weighted normit or logit least squares, the maximum likelihood, and the Spearman estimator are the same for practical purposes. (c) The choice of specific functional form —that is, normal, logistic, or some other — does not affect the estimators much and should be made on the basis of custom in the field of application and mathematical convenience. In summary, the Spearman-Karber estimator, $f t , or a noniterative, least-squares procedure, Mt , with standard error given by SE#4 or SEfi, respectively, seems acceptable for many applications. If a parametric estimator is used, the choice of functional form can usually be made on the basis of availability of tables and computational ease. Some quantal response investigations Presented below in some detail are several examples of the application of the quantal response techniques discussed above. Quantal response in sensory perception. A typical experiment in sensory perception will call for the presentation of a continuous sound at 1,000 cycles per second, interrupted regularly by sounds with small increment in cycles per second (see, for example, Stevens et al. 1941). The subject tells whether or not he detected the increment. A sequence of increments of the same size may be followed by a sequence of increments of increased size, ending with a sequence of quite easily detect-
able, large increments. Modifications of this procedure call for random ordering of the magnitudes of increment, varying the background signal, or varying the conditions of the observer—for example, his motivation, fatigue, or training. Recent modifications involve random time of presentation of the increment and variations in the length of the signal increment. Other types of stimulus present new possibilities for experimental procedure. In many experimental situations the proportions of positive responses to the sequence of stimuli at varying levels resemble independent binomially distributed proportions, with expected values ranging from 0 for small stimulus (or stimulus increment) to 1 for large stimulus. The proportion of responses as a function of the stimulus level (or increment) often has a sigmoidal shape. Then the methods discussed above for estimating the stimulus (Med, or threshold) that gives 50 per cent positive response, with standard error, are applicable. [See PSYCHOPHYSICS.] The present research emphasis is not on establishing the existence of thresholds and measuring their values, but on determining the factors that cause them to vary. At present, evidence points to great sensitivity of the threshold to the way in which the sequence of stimuli is given, the experimental environment (for example, noise), and the psychological and physiological state of the subject. The work of Stevens, Morgan, and Volkmann (1941) and that of Miller and Garner (1944), among others, indicate that well-trained observers, tested under ideal conditions for discrimination, can produce linear (rather than sigmoid) functions relating probability of response to stimulus (increment) level. These results have been used as a basis for a new theory of discrimination called the neural quantum theory. The statistical methods that depend on a sigmoidal function do not apply to this type of data but could be adapted so that they would apply. Quantal data in pharmacological research. The strength of drugs is often measured in terms of the amount of a drug necessary to induce a welldefined quantal response in some biological subject. (Often, dosage is measured on a logarithmic scale, in order to attain an approximately sigmoid curve.) Since biological subjects vary in their responses to the same dose of a drug, the strength must be carefully defined. If a large number of subjects are divided into subgroups and if these groups are given varying doses, ranging from a relatively small dose for one group to a large dose for another group, the proportion of subjects responding per group will in-
QUANTAL RESPONSE crease gradually from 0 for the smallest-dose group to 1 for the group receiving the highest dose. This curve is called the dose—response curve in biological assay. The E.D. 50, the dose at which 50 per cent of the subjects respond, is used to characterize the strength of a preparation. If the subjects are randomly allocated to the dose groups and if the dose-response curve is sigmoidal in shape, the proportions of responses in the groups often may be taken to be binomially distributed proportions, and the estimation methods discussed above will be appropriate (Finney 1952). It is convenient to regard each subject as having an individual absolute threshold for response to the drug. A dose lower than the threshold of a subject would fail to induce a response; a dose higher than the threshold would induce a response. The thresholds or tolerances of the subjects will form a distribution. The E.D. 50 is the median of this tolerance distribution, and the dose—response function is simply the cumulative distribution of the tolerances or absolute thresholds. It should be emphasized that the dose-response curve is directly estimated by the observed proportions, whereas the underlying tolerance distribution is not ordinarily directly observed. In fact, postulation of the tolerance distribution is not essential to the validity of the assay model or estimation procedure. Experience has shown that characterization of the strength of a drug by its E.D. 50 is unreliable, since the subjects themselves may change in sensitivity over a period of time. It is common practice, at present, to assay a drug by comparing its effect on the subjects to the effect of a standard preparation. The result is expressed as the relative potency of the test preparation compared to the standard preparation. If ZT units of the test drug perform like pzT units of the standard for any zr (that is, if the test drug acts like a dilution of the standard drug) this relation will hold regardless of the fluctuation in the sensitivity of the subjects. This implies that the E.D. 50 for the test preparation will be /r1 times the E.D. 50 of the standard. On the log dose scale the log (E.D. 50)'s will differ by logp, and the estimation is usually carried out by estimating the E.D. 50's for test and standard preparations on the log scale, taking the difference and then taking the antilog of the difference. The estimation methods above can be used for each preparation separately, although some refinements are useful in combining the two analyses. The use of a standard preparation and the potency concept are especially necessary in clinical trials of tranquilizers or analgesics. In these cases, random variation is large, and stability from one
243
trial to the next is difficult to achieve. Inclusion of doses of standard preparation for comparison of dose-response functions seems to be essential for each trial. [See SCREENING AND SELECTION.] Quantal response in mental testing. The theory of mental tests developed by Lawley (1943) and elaborated by Lord (1952) and by others assumes a probability of correct response to each item that depends on the ability level of the responder. This functional relationship between probability of correct response and ability level was taken by Lawley to be a normal function, but Maxwell (1959) proposed the logistic function as an alternative and Baker (1961) presented empirical evidence that the logistic is more economical to use and fits mental-test data as well as the integrated normal. In Lawley's theory of mental testing, each item is characterized by a measure of difficulty, the ability level corresponding to 50 per cent probability of correct response. This is the mean (Med) of the normal cumulative distribution and is called the limen value for the item. The standard deviation of the normal distribution is a measure of the variation in the probability of response over ability levels. The inverse of this standard deviation is defined as the discriminating power of the item. Although Ferguson (1942) and Baker (1961) have described in detail the methods of item analysis for estimating the limen and the discriminating power, with particular reference to the data typical of mental-test investigations, this method is rarely used at present and is not described in the introductory manuals on test construction. There is a noteworthy difference in the typical mental data and the analogous data of psychophysics or drug assay. Although a detailed discussion of the theory of testing is not in order here, it should be noted that the x variable is ability. There would be difficulties in obtaining groups of subjects at specified ability levels. The usual procedure is to administer the test to a large group and to stratify them with respect to their total scores on the test after it is given. If the number of items in the test is large and if the number of ability groups is not too small, the usual assumptions for quantal assay will be well approximated. [See PSYCHOMETRICS.]
Other uses in the social sciences. There are other areas of the social sciences in which the quantal response model may prove useful. In market analysis, for example, the probability of purchasing specific items will depend on some underlying, continuous variable, such as income, amount of education, or exposure to advertising. Data on this dependence might well be available in the
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form of proportions of purchasers or of intending purchasers at increasing levels of the continuous variable. Such data could be summarized by estimating the level at which the probability attains some specified value, such as 50 per cent, and the rate at which the probability increases with the continuous variable. This technique could be adapted to the summary of many sample survey collections of data. The concept of quantal response can be useful in estimating or verifying the validity of an average that might ordinarily be obtained by depending on the memory of persons interviewed. For example, the average age at which a child is able to take several steps without aid might be ascertained by questioning a large group of mothers whose children have been walking for some time. A less obvious, but probably more valid, method of obtaining the estimate would be to interview groups of mothers with children of various ages, ranging from six months to thirty months. The proportion of children walking at each age could be recorded, and this set of quantal response data could be analyzed by the methods discussed above to obtain an estimate of the age at which 50 per cent of the children walk, with a standard error for the estimate. This method has been used to estimate the age of menarche through interviews with adolescent schoolgirls. BYRON W. BROWN, JR. [See also COUNTED DATA; PSYCHOPHYSICS.]
EMMENS, C. W. 1940 The Dose/Response Relation for Certain Principles of the Pituitary Gland, and of the Serum and Urine of Pregnancy. Journal of Endocrinology 2:194-225. FERGUSON, GEORGE A. 1942 Item Selection by the Constant Process. Psychometrika 7:19-29. FINNEY, DAVID J. (1947) 1962 Probit Analysis: A Statistical Treatment of the Sigmoid Response Curve. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. FINNEY, DAVID J. (1952) 1964 Statistical Method in Biological Assay. 2d ed. New York: Hafner. GUILFORD, JOY P. (1936) 1954 Psychometric Methods. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. LAWLEY, D. N. 1943 On Problems Connected With Item Selection and Test Construction. Royal Society of Edinburgh, Proceedings 61 A:273-287. LORD, F. 1952 A Theory of Test Scores. Psychometric Monograph No. 7. New York: Psychometric Society. MAXWELL, A. E. 1959 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Item Parameters Using the Logistic Function. Psychometrika 24:221-227. MILLER, G. A.; and GARNER, W. R. 1944 Effect of Random Presentation on the Psychometric Function: Implications for a Quantal Theory of Discrimination. American Journal of Psychology 57:451-467. SPEARMAN, C. 1908 The Method of "Right and Wrong Cases" ("Constant Stimuli") Without Gauss's Formulae. British Journal of Psychology 2:227-242. STEVENS, S. S.; MORGAN, C. T.; and VOLKMANN, J. 1941 Theory of the Neural Quantum in the Discrimination of Loudness and Pitch. American Journal of Psychology 54:315-335. WETHERILL, G. B. 1963 Sequential Estimation of Quantal Response Curves. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 25:1-48. -> Contains 10 pages of discussion by P. Armitage et al.
QUASI RENT See RENT.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAKER, FRANK B. 1961 Empirical Comparison of Item Parameters Based on the Logistic and Normal Functions. Psychometrika 26:239-246. BERKSON, JOSEPH 1955 Estimate of the Integrated Normal Curve by Minimum Normit Chi-square With Particular Reference to Bio-assay. Journal of the American Statistical Association 50:529-549. BERKSON, JOSEPH 1960 Nomograms for Fitting the Logistic Function by Maximum Likelihood. Biometrika 47:121-141. BROWN, BYRON W. JR. 1961 Some Properties of the Spearman Estimator in Bioassay. Biometrika 48:293302. COCHRAN, WILLIAM G.; and DAVIS, MILES 1964 Stochastic Approximation to the Median Effective Dose in Bioassay. Pages 281-297 in Stochastic Models in Medicine and Biology: Proceedings of a Symposium . . . 1963. Edited by John Gurland. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. CORNFIELD, JEROME; and MANTEL, NATHAN 1950 Some New Aspects of the Application of Maximum Likelihood to the Calculation of the Dosage Response Curve. Journal of the American Statistical Association 45: 181-210. CORSO, JOHN F. 1963 A Theoretico-Historical Review of the Threshold Concept. Psychological Bulletin 60: 356-370.
QUESNAY, FRANCOIS Francois Quesnay (1694-1774), the founder of the economic system that eventually came to be called the physiocratic system, was born in the village of Mere, not far from Versailles. His father, a country lawyer, earned a very small income. Quesnay received no financial aid from his family in securing an education and, indeed, did not learn to read until he was 12. He did, however, somehow acquire a knowledge of medicine, and by 1718, when he was 24 years old, he was practicing medicine in the village of Mantes. Between 1730 and 1758 he wrote several medical treatises that contained original contributions. Quesnay did not acquire a formal medical degree until 1744, but by 1735 his reputation was such that he obtained a position in Paris as physician to the duke of Villeroy. The next important step in his career was to move to Versailles—under the patronage of Mme. de Pompadour—where he not
QUESNAY, FRANCOIS only became consulting physician to Louis xv but also came to know the eminent economists of the day. He remained at Versailles thereafter. Quesnay did not publish his first writing on economics until 1756, when he was in his early sixties; he continued to write on this subject for the rest of his life. Among the several articles he wrote for the Encyclopedic, the last two, "Fermiers" (1756) and "Grains" (1757), were his first contributions to economics. In these articles he introduced the view that agriculture, when pursued under favorable conditions, has a unique capacity to yield a produit net. The favorable conditions he had in mind were large-scale enterprises backed by abundant capital, such as he had observed during his youth in the wealthy Ile-de-France. Quesnay's ideas long baffled his contemporaries. His Tableau oeconomique (1758) contains a comprehensive presentation of his ideas, although it is an extremely brief work. The first edition, consisting of only a few copies, was printed by the king's private press. Rewritten in the form of maxims, it was intended by Quesnay for wider dissemination through publication in an official newspaper. However, Mine, de Pompadour advised him that such publication of a critical view was too risky, and instead Quesnay let his friend the marquis de Mirabeau publish it. Subsequently, he collaborated with the marquis on Philosophie rurale, published in Amsterdam in 1763, which turned out to be the clearest statement of the physiocratic doctrine (see Mirabeau 1763). As a critic of the ancien regime, Quesnay wrote for the Journal de I'agriculture, du commerce et des finances in 1765 and 1766. Until this journal was banned in 1767, it was a favorite vehicle for expounding physiocratic views. Thereafter, Quesnay and his group established another journal, Ephemerides du citoyen, which was entirely devoted to Quesnay's teachings. Taking off from his writings for the Ephemerides, Quesnay, at the end of 1767, did some writing for a wider public; with the support of Du Pont de Nemours, this material was published under the title Physiocratie (17581766). It was this work that provided a name for the physiocratic system of economics and the physiocratic school of economists. Bases of the physiocratic system. The physiocrats assumed that human society is, like the physical universe and analogous to animal societies, subject to natural laws. But whereas, in medieval political philosophy, natural law was simply accepted as the reflection in man of the divine light, or as the participation of a creature endowed with reason in the eternal law, this defini-
245
tion of natural law clearly no longer sufficed in the age of enlightenment. The physiocrats, in presenting more detailed analyses and explanations of the natural social order, were led to offer a series of propositions that were, in effect, an outline of the basic elements of individualistic capitalism. According to the physiocratic view, if the constitution of a society is to reflect natural law, then the structure of that society must be determined by the contributions made by its constituent groups toward the production of the national output, and the right of private property and the right to free choice in economic matters must be at the base of the economic system. However, the entire structure must be topped by a strong central power that guarantees to all individuals the enjoyment of the principles of laissez-faire—a monarch who holds all political power but whose role is strictly confined to the administration of the natural order of things. Of these elements, only the proposition relating the structure of society to the contributions of component groups was original with the physiocrats. The emphasis on private property and liberty derived largely from John Locke. Following Locke, the physiocrats justified private property on two grounds -. if an object is the product of a man's labor, i.e., if it has been created by its owner; or if the object is the result of the owner's performing one of the three characteristic arts of civilized society. These are the social art (government), the productive art (agriculture), and the sterile art (industry and trade). Similarly, the physiocrats followed Locke in their theory of liberty: liberty is tied to property, and to be free means to be unimpeded in acquiring property and to enjoy what has been legally acquired. But Locke and his English successors did not integrate their political theory with a systematic account of the over-all productive processes of their society. That a person could acquire a right to property by performing the "social art" would have been incomprehensible to Locke—indeed, a claim so justified would have appeared to him to be a license to usurpation. The originality of the physiocratic doctrine (apart from a series of technical economic points) lay, therefore, in the structuring of a system of political relations upon an economic fundament and the welding of these two parts into an inseparable whole. The physiocratic system. The classes of society that, according to Quesnay, make a contribution to the national product are the "productive" and the "proprietary" classes. Each of these classes is composed of two subgroups: the productive class includes tenant farmers and farm laborers; the
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proprietary class includes the landowners and those who exercise political power, pre-eminently the sovereign. Since Quesnay regarded the sovereign as also a large landowner, he somewhat blurred the division within the proprietary class, but his treatment of the political prerogative of the monarch leaves no doubt that he did differentiate between the landowners and the sovereign. His disciples Mercier de la Riviere and the abbe Baudeau consistently made this distinction sharply and precisely. All four of the above subgroups make contributions toward the maintenance of society, and these contributions justify a certain return. Thus, the monarch and the landowners have a right to their income, the produit net, not because of their economic power to exploit the rest of society, nor because of their political privilege, but as a consequence of their contribution to the gross product (produit brut*). The income of the landowners is justified provided they contribute their landed property to the productive process, that is, if they make the avances foncieres. Rent, in Quesnay's system, is thus the income landowners receive simply by virtue of owning the only productive agent other than labor. While the net product of labor, whether in agriculture or in industry, is zero, since the laborer consumes as much as he produces, in a "well-regulated kingdom" the net product of land is ordinarily positive. Similarly, the income of the monarch is justified if he makes the avances souveraines, that is, if he constructs roads, canals, and other utilities as well as administering the laws which make property secure and maintain the right balance of the economy. The monarch's proper contribution, in short, is to ensure the operation of the natural social order. The difference between the gross product and the net product represents the income of the tenant farmer and of other persons engaged in agricultural production—the productive class. The tenant farmer also makes a contribution toward the total product: his outlay is composed of two parts, the avances primitives and the avances annuelles. The former are, roughly speaking, expenditures on the maintenance and replacement of the fixed capital of the farm (fences, farm machinery, etc.); the latter are expenditures on raw materials that are used up annually (seed, manure, etc.) and on the wages of agricultural laborers. The total national product, then, is equal to the sum of the avances annuelles, avances primitives, and produit net. It is plain from the foregoing why, in Quesnay's view, those who engage in trade and industry are
considered to be the sterile class: this class does not make a contribution to the national product, since it does not use the only factor of production that yields a net surplus—land. Also, the foregoing explains why the physiocrats advocated the concentration of political power in the hands of a monarch. They did not believe in absolutism for its own sake. If they favored a "unique will," they did so because they felt that only concentrated power could overcome the opposition to the beneficent reforms they proposed; only a centralized power could win against separate class interests and establish a social system that would bring the highest public good. The physiocrats believed that there is only one social system that conforms to the natural order, and its establishment and maintenance must be forever secured against the fickleness of opinion and the arbitrary moods of the masses. Indeed, they feared this arbitrariness of vox populi more than the exercise of despotic powers by a just monarch; they realized that the reforms they proposed were rejected because they threatened strongly established privileges and hurt groups of persons whose interests conflicted with the natural order of things. Quesnay and his colleagues attributed the corruption and degeneracy of late eighteenth-century France to the weakness of the monarchy and the prevalent ignorance concerning the true principles of social order, and believed that only legal despotism could save and rebuild France as the divine creator of the natural social order intended. BERT F. HOSELITZ [See also ECONOMIC THOUGHT, article on PHYSIOCRATIC THOUGHT; and the biographies of MERCIER DE LA RIVIERE; TURGOT.] WORKS BY QUESNAY Fermiers. Volume 6, pages 528-540 in Encyclopedie, ou, dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers. Paris: Briasson. 1757 Grains. Volume 7, pages 813-831 in Encyclopedic, ou, dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers. Paris: Briasson. (1758) 1766 The Oeconomical Table: An Attempt Towards Ascertaining and Exhibiting the Source, Progress, and Employment of Riches, With Explanations by the Friend of Mankind, the Celebrated Marquis de Mirabeau. London: Owen. -» First published as Tableau oeconomique. Published also as part of Mirabeau's L'ami des hommes. (1758-1766) 1768 La physiocratie, ou, constitution naturelle da gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre humain. 2d ed. 2 vols. Paris and Leiden: Merlin. -* A collection of Quesnay's writings. Volume 2 is entitled Discussions et developpemens sur quelques-unes des notions de I'economie politique, pour servir de suite au recueil intitule: Physiocratie. 1756
QUETELET, ADOLPHE Oeuvres economiques et philosophiques de F. Quesnay, fondateur du systeme physiocratique. Paris: Peelman, 1888. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BEER, MAX 1939 An Inquiry Into Physiocracy. London: Allen & Unwin. Francois Quesnay et la physiocratie. 2 vols. 1958 Paris: Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques. -» Volume 1 consists of essays on Quesnay by various authors, and includes a chronological list of works by Quesnay on pages 301—316 and an annotated bibliography of works about Quesnay on pages 317-392. Volume 2 contains short essays and extracts from his works. HIGGS, HENRY (1897) 1952 The Physiocrats: Six Lectures on the French Economistes of the 18th Century. New York: Langland. -> A paperback edition was published in 1963 by Archon. HISHIYAMA, IZUMI 1960 The Tableau economique of Quesnay: Its Analysis, Reconstruction, and Application. Kyoto University Economic Review 30, no. 1:1— 46. MEEK, RONALD L. 1963 The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» The first part includes translations of extracts from various authors. The second part includes four essays by Meek, three of which were previously published between 1951 and 1960. MIRABEAU, VICTOR DE RIQUETI, DE (1763) 1964 Philosophic rurale: Oil, economic generale et politique de I'agriculture, reduite a I'ordre immuable des loix physique et morales, qui assurent la prosperite des empires. 2d ed. 3 vols. Amsterdam: Libraires Associes. -» Chapter 7, "Les rapports des depenses entre elles," was written by Quesnay. SCHELLE, GUSTAVE 1907 Le docteur Quesnay: Chirurgien, medecin de Madame de Pompadour et de Louis XV, physiocrate. Paris: Alcan.
QUETELET, ADOLPHE Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quetelet (1796— 1874), best known for his contributions to statistics, was born in the Belgian city of Ghent. When he was seven his father died, and Quetelet, on finishing secondary school at the age of 17, was forced to earn his own living. He accepted a post as teacher of mathematics in a secondary school at Ghent, but his true inclination at the time was toward the arts, not the sciences. For a time he was an apprentice in a painter's studio, and he later produced several canvases of his own, which were well received. He wrote poetry of some distinction and collaborated on an opera with his old school friend Germinal Dandelin. Only through the influence of Jean Guillaume Garnier, a professor of mathematics at the newly created University of Ghent, was Quetelet finally persuaded to turn from his artistic endeavors to the full-time study of mathematics (although he continued to dabble in poetry until about the age of thirty). His doctoral
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dissertation, in which he announced the discovery of a new curve, la focale, was the first to be presented at the university (on July 24, 1819), and was widely acclaimed as an original contribution to analytic geometry. As a result, at age 23 Quetelet found himself called to Brussels to occupy the chair of elementary mathematics at the Athenaeum. Only a few months later, early in 1820, he was further honored by being elected to membership in the Academic Royale des Sciences et des Belles-Lettres de Bruxelles. The rapid pace set in the first part of Quetelet's scientific career never slackened; his productivity over the next fifty years was phenomenal. The record of his activities during the ten or so years after his arrival at Brussels well illustrates his prodigious capacity for work: Immediately after he assumed the position at the Athenaeum, he began publishing a vast array of essays, mostly in mathematics and in physics; they appeared initially in the Nouveaux memoires of the academy and later in Correspondances mathematiques et physiques, a journal he founded in 1825 and edited (for the first two years together with Gamier) until its dissolution in 1839. For a time this was the foremost journal of its kind in Europe, attracting contributions from the most eminent scientists on the Continent. In 1824 Quetelet added to his duties the task of delivering a series of public lectures at the Brussels Museum, first in geometry, probabilities, physics, and astronomy and later in the history of the sciences. There, as at the Athenaeum, he quickly became renowned as a great teacher, and his lectures were always crowded, by regular students and auditors and by eminent scientists who came from all over Europe to hear him. He continued these lectures until 1834, when the museum was absorbed by the University of Brussels. Offered a chair in mathematics at the new university, he declined in order to devote himself to his many researches. However, the public lectures were resumed in 1836, at the Military School at Brussels, founded two years earlier. During this same period Quetelet published several elementary works in natural science and in mathematics, designed to expose these fields to a wide popular audience. Astronomie elementaire, published in 1826, was soon followed by Astronomie populaire (1827a). (Several biographers—notably Reichesberg [1896] and Hankins [1908]—asserted that the latter work immediately achieved the "distinction," accorded some earlier publications in astronomy, of being placed on the Index librorum prohibitorum. Lottin [1912, pp. 34-37] proved this to be a myth.) In 1827 Quetelet also published a
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summaiy of his course in physics at the museum, entitled Positions dc physique, ou resume dun cours de physique yenerale (1827£>). Robert Wallace, in the preface to his English translation of the work in 1835, signaled its importance as follows: "No other work in the English language contains such an extensive and succinct account of the different branches of physics, or exhibits such a general knowledge of the whole field in so small a compass." The following year, 1828, saw the publication of Instructions populaires sur le calcul des probabilites, which Quetelet identified as a resume of the introductory lectures to his courses in physics and astronomy at the museum. This work marked Quetelet's shift from exclusive concentration on mathematics and the natural sciences to the study of statistics and, eventually, to the investigation of social phenomena. Interestingly enough, Quetelet considered none of these works his main preoccupation or his main accomplishment in the ten years from 1823 to 1832. What concerned him most during this time was the project of establishing an observatory at Brussels. It is still unknown how Quetelet came to adopt this as a prime objective. What is certain, however, is that his activities directed toward establishing the observatory brought about, quite fortuitously, the major change of orientation in his scientific career. Upon accepting Quetelet's proposal for an observatory, the minister of education promptly sent him to Paris to acquaint himself with the latest astronomical techniques and instruments. There he was warmly received by the astronomers Francois Arago and Alexis Bouvard and was introduced by Bouvard to the coterie of French intellectuals gathered around the illustrious mathematicians Poisson, Laplace, and Jean Baptiste Fourier. These men had for some time been engaged in laying the foundations of modern probability theory, and several of them had analyzed empirical social data in their work. It was instruction from these mathematicians, particularly Laplace, together with the stimulation of continual informal contact with their group at the Ecole Polytechnique, that aroused in Quetelet the keen interest in statistical research and theory, based on the theory of probabilities, that was to become the focus of all his scientific work. In later reminiscences he said that after he had become acquainted with the statistical ideas of his French masters, he immediately thought of applying them to the measurement of the human body, a topic he had become curious about when he was a painter. One direct effect of learning the theory of probabilities was to make Quetelet realize "the
need to join to the study of celestial phenomena the study of terrestrial phenomena, which had not been possible until now. . . ." The crucial impact of the Paris experience on his thinking is evident a few sentences later, where he said, "Thus, it was among the learned statisticians and economists of that time that I began my labors . . ." (1870). After his return from Paris in 1823, the project of the observatory moved along by fits and starts, at first held up by difficulties over financing and by some disagreements between Quetelet and the architect and later interrupted by the Belgian revolution of 1830 (during which the half-finished observatory was used as a makeshift fortress and suffered some structural damage). Quetelet finally took up residence in the nearly completed observatory in 1832. Organization of data collection While the observatory was under construction, Quetelet's interest in statistics, which had crystallized during his visit to Paris, coupled with his manifest abilities as an organizer led him to become more and more active in projects requiring the collection of empirical social data. When the Royal Statistics Commission was formed in 1826, he became correspondent for Brabant. (From 1814 to 1830 Belgium was under Dutch rule; thus, "Royal" in this case refers to the House of Orange.) Quetelet's first publications covered quantitative information about Belgium which could be used for practical purposes, including mortality tables with special reference to actuarial problems of insurance. In 1827 he analyzed crime statistics, again with a practical eye to improving the administration of justice. In 1828 he edited a general statistical handbook on Belgium, which included a great deal of comparative material obtained from colleagues he had come to know during his stays in France and also in England. At his urging, a census of the population was taken in 1829, the results of which were published separately for Holland and Belgium after the revolution of 1830. In 1841, largely through Quetelet's efforts, the Commission Centrale de Statistique was organized, and this soon became the central agency for the collection of statistics in Belgium. Quetelet served as its president until his death, and under his direction it performed its functions with remarkable thoroughness and efficiency, setting a standard for similar organizations throughout Europe. In 1833 he was delegated official representative to the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science and there played a key role in the forma-
QUETELET, ADOLPIIE tion of a statistical section. Dissatisfied with the narrow scope of the section, he urged its chairman, Babbage, to organize the Statistical Society of London. This was accomplished in 1834, and the society survives today as the Royal Statistical Society (having been renamed in 1877). In his work in statistics, as in the natural sciences, Quctelet placed great emphasis on the need for uniformity in methods of data collection and tabulation and in the presentation of results. His principal goal, in all his organizational endeavors, was to see this realized in practice. In 1851 Quetelet proposed to a group of scientists gathered at the Universal Exposition in London a plan for international cooperation in the collection of statistical information. The idea was heartily approved, and progress on it was so rapid that in 1853 the first International Statistical Congress was held at Brussels. At the initial session of the congress Quetelet was chosen president, and he naturally devoted his opening address to the importance of uniform procedures and terminology in official statistical publications. During the next twenty-five years the congress was enormously effective in spurring the development of official statistics in Europe, establishing permanent lines of communication between statisticians, and improving comparability. Internal dissension and controversy weakened the congress during the 1870s and eventually led to its collapse in 1880. By that time, however. Quetelet's original proposition that there must be some international organization to maintain uniformity and promote cooperation in the collection and analysis of official statistics had been so fully accepted that it was only a matter of five years before a new organization, the International Statistical Institute, was established to continue the work of the congress. To round out this picture of Quetelet's successes as an organizer, we need only mention the preeminent role he played in the Academic Royale des Sciences et des Belles-Lettres. When he was chosen a member in 1820, the academy was near to closing down, with only about half a dozen superannuated members attending its sessions and virtually no publications to its name. Quetelet brought new life and vigor into the association, quickly assuming the major responsibility for its activities, recruiting into its ranks many of his young scientific colleagues, and fortifying its publications with his own numerous scientific writings. He was made director for the years 1832 and 1833, and in 1834 he was elected perpetual secretary, an office he occupied for the next forty years, during which time he was considered "the guiding spirit of the academy."
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Social research and theory The two memoirs which form the basis for all of Quetelet's subsequent investigations of social phenomena appeared in 1831. By then he had decided that he wanted to isolate, from the general pool of statistical data, a special set dealing with human beings. He first published a memoir entitled Recherches sur la loi de hi croissance de rhomme (183la), which utilized a large number of measurements of people's physical dimensions. A few months later he published statistics on crime, under the title Piecherches siir Ic penchant cm crime aux different ages (1831k). While the emphasis in these publications is on what we would call the life cycle, both of them also include many multivariate tabulations, such as differences in the age-specific crime rates for men and women separately, for various countries, and for different social groups. (As noted by Hankins [1908, p. 55] and by Lottin [1912, pp. 128-138], the core idea contained in the second memoir—the constancy in the "budget" of crimes from year to year in each age group—can be traced back to a memoir read to the academy on December 6, 1828, and published early in 1829. Thus, Quetelet was probably right in claiming priority for the idea [1835; see p. 96 in 1842 edition] over A. M. Guerry, who published it under the title "Statistique comparee de 1'etat de 1'instruction et du nombre des crimes" [1832].) In 1833 Quetelet published a third memoir giving developmental data on weight (1833a). By this time he had formed the idea of a social physics, and in 1835 he combined his earlier memoirs into a book entitled Sur rhomme et le developpement de ses facultes, with the subtitle Physique sociale (see 1835). Quetelet republished this work in an augmented version, with the titles reversed, in 1869. To prevent confusion, the first edition is usually referred to as Sur I'homme, the second as Physique sociale. Included in the later edition, and one of its highlights, is a long essay by the English astronomer John Herschel: it had first been published in the Edinburgh Review (1850) as a review article on Quetelet's Letters . . . on the Theory of Probabilities and other work by Quetelet, and since it was highly favorable, Quetelet made it the introduction to his Physique sociale. To the constancy in crime rates noted earlier, this work added demonstrations of regularities in the number of suicides from year to year and in the rate of marriage for each sex and age cohort. Although Quetelet was convinced that many other regularities existed, these three—in crimes, suicides, and rates of marriage—were the only regularities in man's "moral" characteristics (i.e., those involv-
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ing a choice of action) actually demonstrated in his writings. Thus, with the publication of Sur I'homme, all of Quetclet's basic ideas became available to a broader public. Basic principles. It was in writings published in the 1830s that Quetclct established the theoretical foundations of his work in moral statistics or, to use the modern term, sociology. First there was the idea that social phenomena in general are extremely regular and that the empirical regularities can be discovered through the application of statistical techniques. Furthermore, these regularities have causes: Quetelet considered his averages to be "of the order of physical facts," thus establishing the link between physical laws and social laws. But rather than attach a theological interpretation to these regularities—as Siissmilch and others had done a century earlier, finding in them evidence of a divine order—Quetelet attributed them to social conditions at different times and in different places [see the biography of SUSSMILCH]. This conclusion had two consequences: It gave rise to a large number of ethical problems, casting doubt on man's free will and thus, for example, on individual responsibility for crime; and in practical terms it provided a basis for arguing that meliorative legislation can alter social conditions so as to lower crime rates or rates of suicide. On the methodological side, two key principles were set forth very early in Quetelet's work. The first states that "Causes are proportional to the effects produced by them" (1831&, p. 7). This is easy to accept when it comes to man's physical characteristics; it is the assumption that allows us to conclude, for example, that one man is "twice as strong" as another (the cause) simply because we observe that he can lift an object that is twice as heavy (the effect). Quetelet proposed that a scientific study of man's moral and intellectual qualities is possible only if this principle can be applied to them as well. (The role this principle played in Quetelet's theories is discussed below.) The second key principle advanced by Quetelet is that large numbers are necessary in order to reach any reliable conclusions—an idea that can be traced to the influence of Laplace (1812), Fourier (1826), and Poisson (1837). The interweaving of these principles with the theoretical ideas summarized above is illustrated in the following: It seems to me that that which relates to the human species, considered en masse, is of the order of physical facts; the greater the number of individuals, the more the influence of the individual will is effaced, being replaced by the series of general facts that depend on the general causes according to which society
exists and maintains itself. These are the causes we seek to grasp, and when we do know them, we shall be able to ascertain their effects in social matters, just as we ascertain effects from causes in the physical sciences. (1831fc, pp. 80-81) Quetelet was greatly concerned that the methods he adopted for studying man in all his aspects be as "scientific" as those used in any of the physical sciences. His solution to this problem was to develop a methodology that would allow full application of the theory of probabilities. For in striking contrast to his contemporary Auguste Comte, Quetelet believed that the use of mathematics is not only the sine qua non of any exact science but the measure of its worth. "The more advanced the sciences have become," he said, "the more they have tended to enter the domain of mathematics, which is a sort of center toward which they converge. We can judge of the perfection to which a science has come by the facility, more or less great, with which it may be approached by calculation" (1828, p. 230). Pattern of work. Before proceeding to a more detailed exposition of Quetelet's work in moral statistics, we should note his method of publication. Quetelet's literary background and the fact that his humanist friends remained an important reference group for him help to explain the manner in which he published his works. When he had new data or had developed a new technique or idea, he first announced his discovery in brief notes, usually in the reports of the academy or in Correspondances and sometimes in French or English journals. Once such notes had appeared, he would elaborate the same material into longer articles and give his data social and philosophical interpretations. He would finally combine these articles into books which he hoped would have a general appeal. He obviously felt very strongly that empirical findings should be interpreted as much as possible and made interesting to readers with broad social and humanistic concerns. Quetelet further extended his influence through the voluminous correspondence he maintained with scientists, statesmen, and men of letters throughout Europe and America. Liliane WellensDe Bonder has identified approximately 2,500 correspondents, including such names as Gauss; Ampere; Faraday; Alexander von Humboldt; James A. Garfield, then a U.S. congressman, who solicited Quetelet's advice on means of improving the census; Joseph Henry; Lemuel Shattuck; Charles Wheatstone; Louis Rene Villerme; and Goethe, who befriended Quetelet when the latter visited Germany in 1829 (see Wellens-De Bonder 1964).
QUETELET, ADOLPHE Probably Quetelet's most famous correspondence was with the princes Ernest and Albert of SaxeCoburg and Gotha, whom he tutored in mathematics beginning in 1836, at the request of their uncle, Leopold i, king of the Belgians. Although the princes left Belgium to attend school in Germany shortly after they began studying under Quetelet, the lessons continued for many years by correspondence. Quetelet's second major work on moral statistics, Letters Addressed to H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, on the Theory of Probabilities, as Applied to the Moral and Political Sciences (1846), shows his side of the correspondence. (The title refers only to Ernest, who as reigning duke was head of the house of Coburg.) Du systeme social et des lois qui le regissent (1848), was dedicated to Albert, with whom Quetelet had established an especially close friendship. Quetelet's profound influence on Albert's thinking is clearly shown in the keynote address Albert delivered to the fourth meeting of the International Statistical Congress in London, on July 16, 1860 (see Schoen 1938). The average man. Quetelet's conceptualization of social reality is dominated by his notion of the average man, or homme moyen. In his preface to Du systeme social, he himself identified this as his central concept and traced its development through his writings (1848, pp. vii—ix). In Sur I'homme, he said, he had developed the idea that the characteristics of the average man can be presented only by giving the mean and the upper and lower limits of variation from that mean. In the Lettres he had shown that "regarding the height of men of one nation, the individual values group themselves symmetrically around the mean according to ... the law of accidental causes" (p. viii); and further, that for a nation the average man "is actually the type or the standard and that other men differ from him, by more or by less, only through the influence of accidental causes, whose effects become calculable when the number of trials is sufficiently large . . . . In this new work," Quetelet continued, "I show that the law of accidental causes is a general law, which applies to individuals as well as to peoples and which governs our moral and intellectual qualities just as it does our physical qualities. Thus, what is regarded as accidental ceases to be so when observations are extended to a considerable number of cases" (p. ix). It is no wonder, then, that discussions of Quetelet's theories and researches on society invariably take as a starting point his concept of the homme moyen. His first approach to the concept was through
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the measurement of physical characteristics of man, in particular height and weight (183la). He conceived of the average height of a group of individuals of like age as the mean around which the heights of all persons of that age "oscillate," although just how this oscillation takes place Quetelet could not say. He did suggest, even in this first exposition of the concept, that similar means and oscillations might be observed if moral and intellectual, not just physical, qualities of men were studied. In his essay Recherches sur le penchant au crime, the term homme moyen appears for the first time. There, also, we find the first statement of the idea that if one were to determine the homme moyen for a nation, he would represent the type for that nation; and if he were determined for all mankind, he would represent the type for the entire human species. The next advance in the development of the concept came in a memoir published in 1844, in which Quetelet first took note of the fact that his observations were symmetrically distributed about the mean—in almost exactly the pattern to be anticipated (prevu*) from the binomial and normal distributions—and went on to speculate about the likelihood that all physical characteristics might be distributed in the same way. By applying the theory of probabilities, he was then able to derive a theoretical frequency distribution for height, weight, or chest circumference that coincided remarkably with the empirical distributions in his data for various groups. An interesting result obtained by applying this method, also first published in the memoir of 1844, was Quetelet's discovery of draft evasion in the French army. By noting the discrepancy between the distribution of height of 100,000 French conscripts and his prediction (i.e., the theoretical distribution calculated by assuming a probable error of 49 millimeters), he came to the conclusion that some 2,000 men had escaped service by somehow shortening themselves to just below the minimum height. Thus, quite by accident, Quetelet emerged with the first practical, although perhaps somewhat trivial, application of his statistical techniques. In his discussions of the average man, Quetelet had up to this time limited himself to calculating the means and distributions of only a few physical characteristics. The task he now set for himself was to extend the concept to all of man's physical traits (thus forming the basis for what he called "social physics") and, thence, to all moral and intellectual qualities as well ("moral statistics").
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Furthermore, he planned to apply the concept to collectivities of all sizes, ranging from the small group to the whole of mankind, and expected that it would hold equally well for any time in human history. Quetelet had suggested these extensions in earlier works, but the grand generalization did not emerge in its final form until the publication of Du systeme social. In the first pages Quetelet announced his theme: "There is a general law which governs our universe . . . ; it gives to everything that breathes an infinite variety. . . . That law, which science has long misunderstood and which has until now remained useless in practice, I shall call the law of accidental causes' (1848, p. 16). A few lines later he elaborated his over-all viewpoint: . . . among organized beings all elements vary around a mean state, and . . . variations, which arise from accidental causes, are regulated with such harmony and precision that we can classify them in advance numerically and by order of magnitude, within their limits. One part of the present work is devoted to demonstrating the law of accidental causes, both for physical man and for moral and intellectual man, considering him individually, as well as in the aggregate. . . . (P- 17) Concept of causality. It is obvious that an explanation of what Quetelet meant by "accidental causes" and by "law" is critical for an understanding of his conception of the average man. Quetelet hypothesized that every mean he presented resulted from the operation of constant causes, while the variations about the mean were due to "perturbative" or "accidental" causes. "Constant causes," he explained, "are those which act in a continuous manner, with the same intensity and in the same direction" ([1846] 1849, p. 107). Among the constant causes he named are sex, age, profession, geographical latitude, and economic and religious institutions. (As a category parallel to constant causes, Quetelet sometimes mentioned "variable causes," which are those that "act in a continuous manner, with energies and intensities that change" [ibid.]. The seasons are cited as the type case, although Quetelet meant to include as variable causes all periodical phenomena.) "Accidental causes only manifest themselves fortuitously, and act indifferently in any direction" (ibid.}. Quetelet frequently classed man's free will as an accidental cause (although occasionally he claimed that it played no role at all), but insisted that its operation is constrained within very narrow limits. The essence of Quetelet's theory is that,
given sufficient data over time, the shape and extent of variations about the mean state which result from accidental causes can be "classified in advance" with a high degree of accuracy, through the application of the theory of probabilities of independent events. Quetelet's conception of "law" depended on whether he was talking about man's physical attributes, his moral traits, or all human characteristics. Thus, in Du systeme social we find these three distinct uses of the term. In the early part of the book, he referred to a trend in a series of averages over time as a law: "If we knew what [man's mean] height had been from one century to another, we would have a series of sizes which would express the law of development of humanity as regards height" (1848, p. 11). Later, in presenting the law of propensity to crime, he used the term to denote a regular pattern of correlations: "The propensity to crime increases quite rapidly toward adulthood; it reaches a maximum and then decreases until the very end of life. This law appears to be constant, and varies only with respect to the magnitude of the maximum and the time of life when it occurs" (p. 86). (By way of contrast, his law of propensity to suicide posits a direct variation with age "until the most advanced age" [p. 88].) It is important to note in this connection that Quetelet went far beyond such simple two-variable correlations in his studies of man. Numerous three-variable and four-variable tables appear throughout his work (see esp. 1835, vol. 2). In one case, for example, he presented a table that shows the relationship of mean weight to age, sex, and occupation (ibid., p. 91); similar tables show the breakdown of crimes in various groups by sex and level of education (p. 297), by age and sex (p. 302), and by age, sex, and the type of court in which the crime was tried (p. 308). These remarkable anticipations of modern techniques went largely unnoticed by Quetelet's contemporaries, and only in recent times ha^e social scientists rediscovered and fully explored the possibilities of multivariate analysis—a striking discontinuity in the history of empirical social research that surely deserves further study and explanation. The two uses of the term "law" illustrated above are similar in that they both refer in some way to a correlation—in one case between height and century, and in the other between age and the incidence of some social act. Quetelet's third type of law, the "law of accidental causes," is quite another thing; it is simply the assertion that every human trait is normally distributed about a mean
QUETELET, ADOLPHE and that the larger the number of observations, the more closely the empirical distribution will coincide with the theoretical probability distribution. In sum, the word "law" is used alternatively to refer to a trend in a series of specific empirical findings, an empirical generalization, and an assertion (or, in effect, a theory) that a certain type of regularity exists in all human phenomena. Measurement. Perhaps one reason Quetelet had trouble maintaining a single conception of "law" is that the types of measures he used to substantiate laws were few in number and inadequate to his purpose. Limiting himself to the manipulation of data gathered from available official statistical publications, he was forced to improvise new and different techniques for physical and moral qualities and so emerged with different kinds of laws, according to the type of phenomenon in question. It comes as something of a surprise to realize that in all Quetelet's research on man, for example, he actually used only three kinds of measurements. (He did suggest some others but never applied them to his data or attempted to collect the data that would make them applicable. Lazarsfeld's 1961 essay analyzes the kinds of measures that are mentioned in Physique sociale in the light of modern ideas on quantification.) First, he determined the empirical distribution of some human trait in a group and computed the mean—which he then identified as a characteristic of the average man for the group. He repeatedly asserted that similar distributions and means could be found for moral and intellectual characteristics, presented some rough hypothetical curves, but never performed any such calculations using a set of empirical observations. A second type of measurement involved counting the number of certain social events, such as crimes or marriages, that occurred during a series of years among particular groups; the average of these yearly counts was taken to be the probable number of such events that would occur in each group during the next year. As a third type of measurement Quetelet used rates—the number of crimes or other events in each age group, divided by the number of persons in that group. Quetelet regarded the results a s the respective probabilities of committing a crime at various ages; he called these probabilities the propensity to crime—the penchant au crime °r, alternatively, the tendance au crime—at each a ge. (At one point in Du systeme social [1848, P- 93] he proposed substituting the word possibilite for penchant, but he reverted to the use of penchant
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throughout the later text.) Although Quetelet said again and again that his concern was with groups, not with individuals, there are many instances where he clearly uses the penchant au crime derived by this method to refer to a characteristic of each member of a given age group. Apparent and real propensities. Quetelet developed the concept of penchant in order to overcome the methodological and theoretical problems he encountered in trying to found a science that would deal with all aspects of man. As long as he restricted himself to physical characteristics there was no problem; the technique for obtaining individual measurements was obvious, and moreover, plentiful data of this sort had already been collected by many agencies and was available for analysis. Once he moved on to moral and intellectual traits, however, the only data available were rates (of crime, or suicide, or marriage) for different populations. To parallel his analysis of physical characteristics, Quetelet would have needed measurements taken on each individual in a group over a period of time, and so far no one had collected such data. Occasionally, in the more speculative portions of his writings, Quetelet was able to suggest how such individual measurements might be made: to measure a scholar's productivity, for example, he thought of counting the number of publications the man produced. Unfortunately, he never applied such ideas in his statistical work. Instead, he made do with the data at his disposal by establishing the critical distinction between "apparent propensities" and "real propensities." Apparent propensities are those that can be calculated as outlined above, using the population rates found in official statistical publications. The information needed is only the number of acts (crimes, suicides, marriages), the age of each actor, and the total population, distributed according to age. The real propensity is what causes the observable regularity to appear; and this propensity, Quetelet claimed, cannot be ascertained from direct observation. It can be known only by its effects. The following passage illustrates how Quetelet related the two types of propensities. Commenting on computations of the probability of marriage for certain city dwellers, he said: This probability may be considered as giving, in cities, the measure of the apparent tendency to marriage of a Belgian aged 25 to 30. I say apparent tendency intentionally, to avoid confusion with the real tendency, which may be quite different. One man may have, throughout his life, a real tendency to marry without
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ever marrying; another, on the contrary, carried along by fortuitous circumstances, may marry without having the least propensity to marriage. The distinction is essential. (1848, p. 77) The cue to the way Quetelet visualized the relation between apparent tendencies and real tendencies lies in his repeated statement that "causes are proportional to effects." Thus, if one thinks of the apparent tendencies as being caused by the underlying real tendencies, "the error that may result from substituting the value of the one for the other can be calculated directly by the theory of probabilities" (ibid., p. 78). Rather than solve the problem, this does no more than identify it. Quetelet's difficulty arose from the fact that he never clearly separated the problem into its two components. One is the question that continues to be of interest today: how may manifest data be related to latent dispositions? The other is the methodological problem of whether measurement techniques analogous to those applied to individual physical traits could be developed for moral and intellectual characteristics as well. On the theoretical side, Quetelet failed to recognize that his dispositional concept of penchant could just as reasonably be applied in the study of physical attributes as in the study of moral or intellectual traits. One can, for example, conceive of studying the "tendency to obesity" in a population, which would parallel, in die physical, Quetelet's notion of a penchant au crime. On the methodological side, he failed to realize that some of the techniques he himself suggested for measuring individual personality or intelligence were exact counterparts to his "direct" measurements of physical traits. Especially surprising—in view of his extensive use of crime statistics—is the fact that the idea of analyzing, for example, "repeated offenders," completely eluded him. This would have provided him with quantitative individual "measures" of criminal behavior, corresponding to measures of size or weight. It seems likely that these shortcomings in Quetelet's work were due, not to sheer lack of insight, but, at least in part, to the inadequacies of the data available at the time. It is only benefit of hindsight that allows us to identify such gaps, and one cannot gainsay Quetelet's merit in having made the first attempt to handle what remain to this day crucial problems in the analysis of empirical social phenomena. After Quetelet In 1855 Quetelet suffered a stroke, from which he never totally recovered. He resumed his work
very soon afterward but never again produced any new ideas. His publications from then on, although numerous, were largely compendia of prior essays or summaries of new researches which supported his earlier ideas. His son Ernest virtually took over the running of the observatory after 1855. Quetelet died on February 17, 1874, and as Hankins put it, "was buried with honors befitting one of the earth's nobility." A statue of him, funded by popular subscription, was unveiled at Brussels in 1880. Quetelet's concern with the distribution of human characteristics was destined for an interesting future. His basic idea was that certain social processes (corresponding to his interplay of causes) would explain the final distribution of certain observable data. This notion has been amply justified by modern mathematical models regarding the distribution of, for example, income, words, or city sizes. But Quetelet concentrated exclusively on the binomial and normal (Gaussian) distributions, which presuppose the independence of the events studied. Today many other distributions are known, based on more complicated processes; especially in the social sciences, "contagious events," which depend upon each other, are in the center of interest. Quetelet remained unaware of alternative mathematical possibilities. Nonetheless, his basic idea was not only correct but probably influenced directly writers who had begun to broaden this whole field, such as Poisson and Lexis. In general, however, Quetelet's contemporaries focused their attention primarily on his concept of the average man and his proposition that social phenomena reproduce themselves with extreme regularity. For different reasons these ideas quickly became the subject of the most vigorous and widespread debate among nineteenth-century statisticians, philosophers, and social scientists, while most of Quetelet's other ideas remained largely unnoticed. The debate over the homme moyen was set off by Quetelet's suggestion that the means of various traits could be combined to form one paradigmatic human being, who would represent the "type" for a group, a city, a nation, or even for all of mankind. Typical of the early criticism was that of Cournot (1843), who reasoned from a mathematical analogy: just as the averages of the sides of many right triangles do not form a right triangle, so the averages of physical traits would certainly not be compatible. Combining them would not, as Quetelet claimed, produce a "type for human beauty" or a "type for physical perfection," but a monstrosity. Quetelet's insistence that the average
QUETELET, ADOLPHE man be considered no more than a "fictitious being" was taken as simply an evasion of the issue; his attempts to reply directly to Cournot proved unconvincing. (A recent essay by Guilbaud discusses the Cournot problem as it relates to current statistical concepts like that of "aggregation"; Guilbaud 1952.) Quetelet's inability to refute Cournot's criticism encouraged others to publish similar attacks until, in 1876, Bertillon issued what is usually considered the definitive statement, which pretty well put an end to the debate. Here the criticism was applied not only to Quetelet's notion of combining average physical characteristics but also to his ideas about moral and intellectual traits. Surely, Bertillon said, Quetelet was mistaken in believing that his average man would represent the ideal of moral virtue or intellectual perfection. Such a man would, on the contrary, be the personification of mediocrity or, to use Bertillon's apt phrase, the type de la vulgarite (p. 311). Thereafter the average man was generally viewed as a concept not worth taking seriously, although sporadic attempts have been made to revive it. (The latest is that of Maurice Frechet, who suggests that Quetelet's homme moyen could be "rehabilitated" as the concept of the homme typique; by denning the homme typique as a particular individual in the group—whose traits taken as a whole come closest to the average—Frechet manages to avoid most of the criticisms leveled against Quetelet's concept; Frechet 1955.) A second and even more widespread controversy centered on the question of what implications ought to be drawn from the startling regularities Quetelet had demonstrated in his studies of social phenomena. Did Quetelet's proposition that "society prepares the crime and the guilty person is only the instrument by which it is executed" (1835, p. 108 in 1842 edition) imply that human beings have no free will at all? Quetelet's philosophical speculations on the subject certainly left room for this interpretation. The result was a heated and long-lasting debate between those who supported Quetelet's "deterministic" explanation of social regularities and those who argued that only by taking the individual as the starting point for analysis could one arrive at an explanation of human behavior. Free will, the latter group contended, must be considered a prime determinant of action, not classed as a practically negligible "accidental cause." (One by-product of the debate Was the formation of a "German school" of moral statisticians, headed by Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch, one of Quetelet's most vehement opponents; see
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Drobisch 1867.) The over-all result of the controversy was not so much to refute Quetelet's ideas as to argue them into oblivion. In P. E. Fahlbeck's opinion (1900), its most important effect was that until the end of the nineteenth century statisticians were so involved in discussing the implications of Quetelet's propositions that they made little effort to confirm empirically the nature and extent of the regularities Quetelet had discovered. (A detailed discussion of the controversy over Quetelet's determinism and over the concept of the average man appears in Lottin 1912, pp. 413-458.) Only in recent years has Quetelet's sociological work begun to receive due recognition. His conviction that a scientific study of social life must be based on the application of quantitative methods and mathematical techniques anticipated what has become the guiding principle of modern social research. Some of the specific methods he employed and advocated—e.g., the substitution of one-time observation of a population for repeated observations of the individual, and his early attempts at multivariate analysis—are as important today as they were new in his time. The same may be said of his efforts to transform statistics from the mere clerical task of collecting important facts about the state (hence the term "statistics") to an exact method of observation, measurement, tabulation, and comparison of results, which would serve as the scaffolding upon which he could erect his science of moral statistics. On these grounds alone it is difficult to dispute Sarton's description of Sur I'homme as "one of the greatest books of the nineteenth century" ([1935] 1962, p. 229); or, for that matter, his choice of Quetelet over Comte as the "founder of sociology." DAVID LANDAU AND PAUL F. LAZARSFELD [For the historical context of Quetelet's work, see SOCIOLOGY, article on THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, and the biographies of GAUSS; LAPLACE; POISSON; for discussion of the subsequent development of Quetelet's ideas, see GOVERNMENT STATISTICS; SOCIOLOGY, article on THE FIELD; STATISTICS, DESCRIPTIVE, article on LOCATION AND DISPERSION; and the biographies of BERTILLON; GALTON; GINI, NICEFORO; PEARSON.] WORKS BY QUETELET (1826) 1834 Astronomic elementaire. 3d ed., rev. & corrected. Brussels: Tircher. (1827a) 1832 Astronomic populaire. 2d ed., rev. Brussels: Remy. (1827b) 1834 Positions de physique, ou resume d'un cours de physique generate. 2d ed. Brussels: Tircher. -> An English translation was published by Sinclair
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m 1835, as Facts, Laws and Phenomena of Natural Philosophy: Or, Summary of a Course of General Physics. 1828
Instructions populaircs sur le calcul des probabilites. Brussels: Tarlier. -> Translation of extract in the text was provided by David Landau. An English translation of the entire work was published by Weale in 1849, as Popular Instructions on the Calculation of Probabilities, with appended notes by Richard Beamish. 1831a Recherches sur la loi de la croissance de I'homme. Brussels: Hayez. -» A 32-page pamphlet. Also published in Volume 7 of the Nouveaux memoires of the Academic Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique. (1831b) 1833 Recherches sur le penchant au crime aux differens ages. 2d ed. Brussels: Hayez. -» An 87-page pamphlet. Translations of extracts in the text were provided by David Landau. Also published in Volume 7 of the Nouveaux memoires of the Academic Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgiquc. 1833a Recherches sur le poids de I'homme aux differens ages. Brussels: Hayez. -» A 44-page pamphlet. Also published as part of Volume 7 of the Nouveaux memoires of the Academic Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique. 1833k Lettre a M. Villerme, sur la possibilite de mesurer 1'influence des causes qui modifient les elements sociaux. Annales d'hygiene publique et de medecine legale 1st Series 9:309 only.
(1835) 1869 Physique sociale: Ou, essai sur le developpement des facultes de I'homme. 2 vols. Brussels: Muquardt. -> First published as Sur I'homme et le developpement de ses facultes: Physique sociale. An English translation was published by Chambers in 1842 as A Treatise on Man and the Development of His Faculties. 1844
Sur Fappreciation des documents statistiques, et en particulier sur 1'appreciation des moyennes. Belgium, Commission Centrale de Statistique, Bulletin 2:205286.
(1846) 1849 Letters Addressed to H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, on the Theory of Probabilities, as Applied to the Moral and Political Sciences. London: Layton. -> First published in French. 1848
Du systeme social et des lois qui le regissent. Paris: Guillaumin. -» Translations of extracts in the text were provided by David Landau. 1870 Des lois concernant le developpement de I'homme. Academic Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, Bulletin 2d Series 29:669680. -> Translations of extracts in the text were provided by David Landau. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERTILLON, ADOLPHE 1876 La theorie des moyennes en Statistique. Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris 17:265-271, 286-308. BUCKLE, HENRY THOMAS (1857-1861) 1913 The History of Civilization in England. 2d ed. 2 vols. New York: Hearst.
Correspondances mathematiques et physiques. -» Published from 1825 to 1839. COURNOT, ANTOINE AUGUSTIN 1843 Exposition de la theorie des chances et des probabilites. Paris: Hachette. -» See especially pages 213-214.
Discours [prononces aux funerailles de Quetelet], by N. de Keyser et al. 1874 Academic Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, Bulletin 2d Series 37:248-266.
DROBISCH, MORITZ W. 1867 Die moralische Statistik und die menschliche Willensfreiheit. Leipzig: Voss. DURKHEIM, EMILE (1897) 1951 Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» First published in French. See pages 300-306 for a discussion of Quetelet's concept of the "average man." FAHLBECK, PONTUS E. 1900 La regularite dans les choses humaines ou les types statistiques et leurs variations. Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris 41:188-201. [FOURIER, JEAN BAPTISTS! 1826 Memoire sur les resultats moyens deduits d'un grand nombre d'observations. Volume 3, pages ix-xxxi in Seine (Dept), Recherches statistiques sur la ville de Paris et le departement de la Seine. Paris: Imprimerie Royale. FRECHET, MAURICE 1955 Rehabilitation de la notion Statistique de I'homme moyen. Pages 310-341 in Maurice Frechet, Les mathematiques et le concret. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. GALTON, FRANCIS (1869) 1952 Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry Into Its Laws and Consequences. New York: Horizon Press. -» See the Appendix for a discussion of some of the mathematical aspects of the "average man." A paperback edition was published in 1962 by World. GILLISPIE, C. C. 1963 Intellectual Factors in the Background of Analysis by Probabilities. Pages 431-453 in Symposium on the History of Science, Oxford, 1961, Scientific Change: Historical Studies in the Intellectual, Social, and Technical Conditions for Scientific Discovery and Technical Invention, From Antiquity to the Present. New York: Basic Books. GINI, CORRADO 1914a L'uomo medio. Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica 3d Series 48:1-24. GINI, CORRADO 1914b SuH'utilita delle rappresentazioni grafiche. Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica 3d Series 48:148-155. GUERRY, ANDRE MICHEL 1832 Statistique comparee de 1'etat de 1'instruction et du nombre des crimes. Revue encyclopedique 55:414-424. GUILBAUD, GEORGES TH. (1952) 1966 Theories of the General Interest and the Logical Problem of Aggregation. Pages 262-307 in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Neil W. Henry (editors), Readings in Mathematical Social Science. Chicago: Science Research Associates. -» See especially pages 271-292. First published in French in Volume 5 of Economic appliquee.
HALBWACHS, MAURICE 1912 La theorie de I'homme moyen: Essai sur Quetelet et la Statistique morale. Paris: Alcan. HANKINS, FRANK H. 1908 Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician. New York: Longmans. [HERSCHEL, JOHN F. W.] 1850 [Review of] Letters. . • • Edinburgh Review 92:1-57. KNAPP, GEORG F. 1871 Bericht iiber die Schriften Quetelet's zur Socialstatistik und Anthropologie. Jahrbiicher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik 17:167174, 342-358, 427-445. KNAPP, GEORG F. 1872 A. Quetelet als Theoretiker. Jahrbiicher fiir Nationalokonomie und Statistik 18:89-124. LAPLACE, PIERRE SIMON DE (1812) 1820 Theorie analytique des probabilites. 3d ed., rev. Paris: Courcier.
QUEUES LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1961 Notes on the History of Quantification in Sociology: Trends, Sources and Problems. Isis 52:277-333. LOTTIN, JOSEPH 1912 Quetelet, statisticien et sociologue. Paris: Alcan; Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophic. MAILLY, NICOLAS E. 1875a Essai sur la vie et les ouvrages de Lambert-Adolphe-Jacques Quetelet. Academic Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, Annuaire 41:109-297. MAILLY, NICOLAS E. 1875b Eulogy on Quetelet. Smithsonian Institution, Annual Report [1874]: 169-183. -> Abstract of "Notice sur Adolphe Quetelet," first published in Series 2, Volume 38 of the Bulletin of the Academic Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique. POISSON, SIMEON DENIS 1837 Recherches sur la probabilite des jugements en matiere criminelle et en matiere civile, precedees des regies generales du calcul des probabilites. Paris: Bachelier. REICHESBERG, NAUM 1896 Der beriihmte Statistiker, Adolf Quetelet, sein Leben und sein Wirken: Eine biographische Skizze. Zeitschrift fur schweizerische Statistik 32:418-460. SARTON, GEORGE (1935) 1962 Quetelet (1796-1874). Pages 229-242 in George Sarton, Sarton on the History of Science. Edited by Dorothy Stimson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. SCHOEN, HARRIET H. 1938 Prince Albert and the Application of Statistics to the Problems of Government. Osiris 5:276-318. WELLENS-DE DONDER, LILIANE 1964 La correspondance d'Adolphe Quetelet. Archives et bibliotheques de Belgique 35:49-66. WOLOWSKI, L. 1874 Eloge de Quetelet. Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris 15:118-126.
QUEUES There are many situations in industry and everyday life in which customers require service from limited service facilities. Much work has been done on techniques for predicting the amount of congestion in such systems. Applications include the following: telephone calls requiring service at an exchange; aircraft requiring an opportunity to take off or land; cars requiring a changed traffic light, or an opportunity to turn from a minor road into a major road; products at one stage of an industrial process requiring entrance to the next stage of processing; machines requiring attention from an operator; people requiring transport by bus, train, or airplane; and patients requiring attention by a doctor or admission to a hospital. The objective of most investigations of queueing is to modify the system to make it more efficient. For example, the object of a study of queueing at traffic lights might be to formulate rules for adjusting the timing of the lights to the rates of flow of traffic. Such matters fall within the general subject
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of operations research. There seems to be as yet little work on queueing of a fundamental sociological nature. Methods of investigation. There are, essentially, four methods of investigating queueing problems: (1) direct observation of practical situations, (2) planned experiments under artificial conditions, (3) simulation, and (4) mathematical analysis. Published work is largely on mathematical analysis, but this does not properly reflect the relative importance of the methods. The last sections of this article deal with simulation and mathematical analysis. Some elementary results. Some important theoretical ideas and results can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider customers arriving at a shop having one server who serves only one customer at a time. Unserved customers queue up waiting their turn for service. Suppose that the instants at which customers arrive are distributed in a stable statistical pattern in which the mean interval between the arrival of successive customers is a minutes. Let the time taken to serve a customer have a stable frequency distribution with mean s min. In a very long time, T min., about T/a customers will arrive, whereas, even if the server works continuously, the number of customers served in that time is about T/s. Hence, if T/a > T/s, that is, if s/a > 1, customers arrive more rapidly than they can be served and the queue will grow until the system changes; for example, a second server may be obtained or customers may be deterred from joining the queue. The first step in many queueing investigations is to see whether the average service capability is enough to meet average demands. Suppose that this is so, that is, s/a < 1. It is reasonable to expect a state of statistical equilibrium in which the number of customers queueing fluctuates with a stable frequency distribution. Also, in a long time T, the server will need to work for a total time of about sT/a, in order to serve T/a customers. Hence, there will be no customers in the system for a proportion 1 — (s/«) of the time. The dimensionless quantity s/a, called the traffic intensity, measures the average demand on the system relative to the average service capability. The qualitative behavior of the system is determined in the first place by whether the traffic intensity exceeds, or is less than, one. (Nearly always, the case of exact balance is unstable, leading eventually to very long queues.) The next general point is that when s/a < I the amount of congestion depends on the random flue-
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tuations present. Thus, suppose that a — 1, s = 0.9. If arrivals are perfectly regular every minute and if service always takes 0.9 min., an exact cycle of working is set up and no congestion arises. But if there is appreciable random variation in the arrivals or in the service times, there will, from time to time, be several customers at the service point simultaneously, and congestion will result. It can be shown that if arrivals are completely random (defined later) and the service time is constant, then the mean time spent queueing before the start of service is 4.05 min. and the server is idle 10 per cent of the time. Further, if both arrivals and service times are random and if the standard deviation of service time is equal to the mean, the mean time spent queueing rises to 8.1 min. With regular arrivals and a particular form of distribution of service time with standard deviation equal to the mean, the mean queueing time is 3.76 min. These represent substantial congestion. The important general points are (1) if there is appreciable random variation, substantial congestion may result if the system is loaded near to its limiting average capacity, and (2) the amount of congestion depends in an essential way on the statistical variability in the system. The amount of congestion can be reduced in various ways, for example, by having more servers, by reducing the variability in the system, or by reducing the traffic intensity. Suppose, however, that the traffic intensity is reduced to 0.8, by reduction of the service time to a constant, s — 0.8 min. Then the mean queueing time drops from 4.05 min. to 1.6 min. The proportion of time that the server is idle rises from 0.1 to 0.2. An analysis of the costs associated with congestion and with the service mechanism is usually required to find the best way to run the system. General description of queueing systems. The main features that determine a queueing system are the input or arrival system, the service mechanism, and the queue discipline. Many possibilities arise, only a few being described here. The main features of the input are the average rate of arrival (including its dependence, if any, on time) and the local statistical character of the arrival pattern. The two simplest types of arrival used in mathematical work are regular arrivals and random arrivals. The latter, often called a Poisson process, is a very special form defined as follows. In any small time interval (t, t + At) there is a chance At/a of a customer arriving, quite independently of arrivals in other time periods. The average interval between arrivals is a; the distribu-
tion of x, the interval between successive arrivals, is negative exponential, having density function a-1 exp (— x/a}, x > 0 [see DISTRIBUTIONS, STATISTICAL]. The service mechanism is described by the service capacity, the service availability, and the properties of service time. The service capacity is the maximum number of customers that can be served at a time, one in the single-server queue discussed above. In some applications—for example, many transport problems—service is available only at certain times, and this must be specified; or service may not be available until a group of customers of specified size has collected (batch service). Finally, one must specify the statistical properties of the service time, usually by giving a probability distribution. Perhaps the most common type has a unimodal positively skewed density function with a standard deviation of 20 to 50 per cent of the mean. In mathematical work, a particularly important density is the negative exponential, with equation s-1^''' s , where s is the mean service time. The queue discipline specifies what happens to customers who cannot be served immediately. Sometimes there may be losses, for example, customers may have to be rejected because of lack of waiting room. Then the probability of loss should be calculated. If there are no losses, customers queue awaiting their turn for service. One then needs to specify how customers are selected for service from the queue. Even in a single-server system there are many possibilities: for example, firstcome, first-served, that is, customers queue in order of arrival; random selection from a queue of customers; non-pre-emptive priority, in which the customers are divided into two or more priority classes so that when a customer is to be selected for service the one with the highest priority is chosen; and pre-emptive priority, in which a highpriority customer is served immediately upon arrival. This classification applies to a single point of congestion. Often there will be several such interlinked points. Arrival pattern, service mechanism, and queue discipline determine the system. The resulting amount of congestion can be described by the distributions of three quantities: the number of customers in the system at an arbitrary time, the time a customer spends queueing before being served, and the server's busy and idle periods. Which quantity or combination of quantities should be considered depends on the costs associated with congestion.
QUEUES Investigating the behavior of queues. Several of the usual methods used in investigating queues are described below. Simulation. The structure of the system is specified statistically, for example, by giving numerically the frequency distribution of service time. The behavior of the system is then simulated, that is, reconstructed empirically using pencil and paper (in simple cases), an electrical or hydraulic analogue machine, or, most commonly, digital computation on an electronic computer. The behavior over a long period is found and relevant properties, such as queueing times, measured. The procedure is normally repeated for a range of values of the important parameters. This approach is empirical observation of an idealized statistical model. It is sometimes called the Monte Carlo method (Florida . . . 1956). [See COMPUTATION.] Simulation is not necessary for the one-server queueing model for which numerical results were given above, because simple mathematical results can be found. If used, however, simulation would proceed roughly as follows. From tables of random numbers, or from a computer program for generating pseudo-random numbers, values are formed representing the intervals between the arrivals of customers and the service times of customers. The arrival instants and the instants at which service is started and completed can be built up and anything of interest, such as the frequency distribution of queueing time, measured [see SIMULATION], An important advantage of this method is its extreme flexibility. Systems far too complex for mathematical analysis can be investigated. A disadvantage is that many simulations under a wide range of conditions may be necessary to understand fully the system's behavior. Simulation is, however, the most generally applicable technique for investigating specific practical problems. Mathematical analysis. The theory of stochastic processes deals with systems that change in time probabilistically. To get working results about queues from the theory, it is usually necessary to consider very simplified models of the real problem. The usefulness of the theory is partly that skillful simplification may leave the essential features preserved and, perhaps more importantly, that intensive study of simplified models can lead to valuable qualitative understanding. A good example of qualitative conclusions arising from a simplified mathematical model comes from an investigation by Tanner (1961) of a model of overtaking on a twolane road. Tanner's calculations show that under certain circumstances there is a density of slow
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traffic, well below the capacity of the road, above which overtaking is effectively impossible. In many circumstances, high acceleration is more important than high speed, and a cutting of safety margins makes little difference to the average speed of a fast car over its whole journey. Mathematical investigation of simplified models combined with simulation of more complex models is a powerful method of investigation. Essentially three types of mathematical investigation can be made: (1) to find rigorously the conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium statistical distribution, (2) to find the equilibrium distribution assuming that it exists, and (3) to examine the transient behavior when, for example, the parameters change in time. The answer to (1) is usually qualitatively obvious, although the rigorous proofs often call for delicate arguments. Answers to (2) form the bulk of the literature and are relevant when long-run behavior is investigated. When behavior over a short period or under changing conditions is required, the transient behavior needs consideration, but not many usable results are yet available. Application of Markov processes. The general idea behind the mathematical theory is to relate the probability distributions of the states of the system at different times. Consider the transition probabilities determining the probability distribution of the system at time t + At, given the state at time t. If these transition probabilities depend only on the state at t and not also on what happens before t, the process is a Markov process [see MARKOV CHAINS]. It is in principle then easy to find simultaneous differential equations describing the transient behavior of the system and ordinary linear equations for the equilibrium behavior. The Markov property holds in simple form when arrivals are random and the distribution of service time is negative exponential, with density s~^e~x/s. Simplicity is gained by having random arrivals because the probability of an arrival in the small time interval (t, t + At) is At/a, independently of all other occurrences. The analogous property of the exponential distribution of service time is that if service of a customer is in progress at time t, the probability that service is completed in (t, t + At) is At/s, where s is the mean service time, independently of the length of time for which the particular service operation has been going on. For example, consider the single-server queue with random arrivals and exponentially distributed service time. Let p n ( t ) be the probability at time t that there are n customers in the system, including
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the one, if any, being served. Consider p,,(t + A t ) , where At > 0 is very small. The ways in which the queue may be empty at t + At are that ( 1 ) the queue is empty at t and no customer arrives in (t, t + At), (2) there is one customer present at t whose service is completed in (t, t + At), and (3) two or more events occur in (t, t + At). The probability of (3) is negligible. Thus p0(t, t + At) is the sum of the probabilities of (1) and (2). That is, - At/a} + p 1 (t)At/s,
Po(t + At) from which
CD
&
Similarly, if n ^ 1, p,,(t + At) is the sum of the probabilities that (a) there are n customers at t and there is no arrival or completion of service in (t, t + At), (fo) there are n — I customers at t and one customer arrives in (t, t + At), and (c) there are n + 1 customers at t and service is completed in (t, t + At). Therefore
(2) n= 1,2, This set of simultaneous linear differential equations can be solved to give the transient behavior of the system. The answer is rather complicated. If it is assumed that an equilibrium distribution exists, the equations must have a solution, {pn}, that is independent of time. Thus, directly from (1) and (2), s
,
n= 1,2, • • • Also, since the {pn} form a probability distribution, 1 — p0 + p-^ + p2 + • • • ; the solution is p0=l-r, P^ = r(l -r),
where r = s/a is the traffic intensity. The mean of the distribution is r/(l — r). When r = 0.9, the case examined previously, the mean number in the system is 9; this is the average over a long time of
the number of customers present. Because arrivals are random, an arriving customer also finds on the average 9 customers ahead, each taking on the average 0.9 min. to be served. Thus the mean time spent queueing, for the queue discipline first-come, first-served, is 9 x 0.9 min. = 8.1 min. The general formula is that in a single-server queue, with random arrivals, exponential service time, and the queue discipline first-come, first-served, (3)
mean time spent queueing _ 1 mean service time 1 — r'
where r is the traffic intensity. The method used above to get linear equations can be used for more complex systems, provided that arrivals are independent and random and that service time distributions are exponential. However, consider even the simple single-server queueing system with random arrivals but with a nonexponential distribution of service time; here the argument fails, because the probability that service of a customer is completed in (t, t + At) is not constant but depends on how long service has been in progress. There are various ways round this difficulty, of which, one—the method of the imbedded Markov process—depends on considering the system only at instants at which service of a customer is completed. The generalization of (3) is the Pollaczek-Khinchin formula, -|r(l + c 2 )/(l - r), where c is the ratio of the standard deviation of service time to the mean. Future developments. The number of new queueing situations is unlimited; almost each new application shows a fresh combination of input, service mechanism, and queue discipline. Simulation is usually the best method for tackling the more complex situations, and there is scope for further work on increasing the efficiency of simulation techniques. Two fields where further mathematical work is likely are those of networks of queues and of the automatic control of queueing systems. History. The first major theoretical investigation was made in 1909 by A. K. Erlang, Copenhagen Telephone Co. Between the two world wars, important mathematical work on queueing was done by T. C. Fry (United States), A. la. Khinchin (Soviet Union), and Felix Pollaczek (France). After 1945, interest in the subject grew rapidly, both because of the much increased attention paid to operations research, and because the appropriate mathematical tool, the theory of stochastic processes, was being widely studied in other contexts. There is now an extensive literature on the mathe-
QUOTA SAMPLING matical problems connected with queueing. Except for the special fields of telephone engineering and traffic studies, relatively little has been written about applications. D. R. Cox [See also MODELS, MATHEMATICAL.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
Introductory theoretical books in English are Khinchin 1955, Morse 1958, Cox & Smith 1961, and Riordan 1962. Saaty 1961 gives a more extensive review of the subject and has a long bibliography. Takacs 1962 and Benes 1963 are more specialized and mathematical. Syski 1960 deals particularly with applications to telephone engineering. Empirical and theoretical work on road traffic problems is best approached through the publications of the Road Research Laboratory (Great Britain) and the Highway Research Board (United States). White 1962 contains a critical discussion of work on the somewhat related problem of the sizes of casual groups of people. BENES, VACLAV E. 1963 General Stochastic Processes in the Theory of Queues. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Cox, DAVID R.; and SMITH, W. L. 1961 Queues. London: Methuen; New York: Wiley.
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FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF, GAINESVILLE, STATISTICAL LABORATORY 1956 Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods, Held at the University of Florida . . . March 16 and 17, 1954. Edited by Herbert A. Meyer. New York: Wiley. KHINCHIN, ALEXANDR IA. (1955) 1960 Mathematical Methods in the Theory of Queueing. London: Griffin; New York: Hafner. -> First published in Russian. MORSE, PHILIP M. 1958 Queues, Inventories and Maintenance: The Analysis of Operational Systems With. Variable Demand and Supply. New York: Wiley. RIORDAN, JOHN 1962 Stochastic Service Systems. New York: Wiley. SAATY, THOMAS L. 1961 Elements of Queueing Theory, With Applications. New York: McGraw-Hill. SYSKI, RYSZARD 1960 Introduction to Congestion Theory in Telephone Systems. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd. TAKACS, LAJOS 1962 Introduction to the Theory of Queues. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. TANNER, J. C. 1961 Delays on a Two-lane Road. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 23:38^63. WHITE, H. 1962 Chance Models of Systems of Casual Groups. Sociometry 25:153-172.
QUOTA SAMPLING See SAMPLE SURVEYS, article on NONPROS ABILITY SAMPLING.
RACE The article under this heading discusses both the history of the concept of race and the cultural definition of race. The biology of race is described under GENETICS, especially in the article on RACE AND GENETICS. Social, psychological, and economic aspects of race are described in DISCRIMINATION, ECONOMIC; ETHNIC GROUPS; INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES; INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE TESTING; MINORITIES; PREJUDICE; RACE RELATIONS; SEGREGATION. Also relevant is the article SOCIETAL ANALYSIS. The biography of BOAS should be consulted for its discussion of Boas' pioneering studies of the diversity of cultural forms that occur within and between so-called racial groups.
Race engages the attention of social scientists both as a special constellation of cognitive or ideological categories and as a means of explaining sociocultural phenomena. Race is a recurrent ingredient in the ethnosemantics of group identity and intergroup relations. "Social races" are composed of socially denned and significant groups; the study of social race thus is a fundamental aspect of the study of social structure, especially in stratified state societies. Raciological (biological) explanations of sociocultural differences and similarities have attracted the support of a large and not infrequently preponderant scientific consensus. Evaluation of the relevance of racial differences to sociocultural theory thus becomes an inescapable obligation of the social sciences. Social race The term race, or its various ethnosemantic glosses, is applied in vernacular contexts to human
populations organized along an astonishing variety of principles. Nation-states, such as the Irish, Japanese, or German; tribes such as the Scythian, Iroquois, Zulu; language families such as Slavic, Latin, Semitic; minorities such as the Jews, gypsies, Puerto Ricans; and phenotypically distinct but genetically hybrid aggregates such as whites, Negroes, yellows, and Coloureds are cognitively equivalent in many ethnosemantic contexts. Social scientists have tried to diminish intergroup conflict by exposing the disparity between biologically acceptable definitions of race and those which are entertained at a popular level. Since none of the folk usages is informed by valid genetic principles, the lack of correspondence between social race and biological race should occasion no surprise. Social races encompass both phenotypically similar and phenotypically dissimilar populations; actual gene frequencies, the ultimate goal of infraspecies systematics, are obviously not desiderata in folk taxonomies. The cognitive substratum by which so many disparate aggregates are united cannot therefore be regarded as racial in the biological sense. It is quite obvious that in some societies biologically similar populations may be classified into groups which elsewhere go unrecognized. In this respect, the cognitive treatment of racial identity in Brazil is especially instructive. Despite the presence of distinct Negroid and Caucasoid components, the racial categories recognized by Brazilians are not the same as the categories recognized in the United States. In distinguishing socially defined races, therefore, attention must be directed toward common sociocultural rather than common biological features. Viewed in terms of social structure, the processes by which a group achieves its continuity and by which individuals identify themselves and
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others are especially significant. Social races are composed of subjectively significant groups, unrestricted by age and sex criteria, in which membership is sociocentric (i.e., appears the same to all egos), is established at birth, endures for life, and confers special behavioral obligations or privileges. Social races differ from other stratified groups (such as classes with low rates of outmobility) in their methods of maintaining membership and group identity. Social races accomplish this by a special ideological device, the idea of descent. Although the members of a social race are replaced during each generation, the group maintains a continuing identity through varied applications- of descent rules. The basic cognitive factor of social races thus is present wherever the decisive test of group membership involves the calculation of genealogical relationships. Since all kinship groups identify their membership in part through recognized principles of descent, there is a degree of overlap between kin groups and social race. Unilinear descent groups, in which membership is restricted exclusively to consanguineals, exhibit most of the essential ideological components of folk "races"; because membership is determined by descent, it is unambiguous, endures throughout the life of each member, and is associated with behavioral specialties such as marriage restrictions, rituals, and jural privileges. Unilinear descent groups differ from the more familiar instances of social "races" such as the Jews, gypsies, and Negroes in displaying more harmonious relations with outgroups which are founded on exogamic exchanges. Such differences do not distinguish the case of Indian castes, which in all essentials, including intergroup relations, resemble the classic social races. The composite band and the kindred and other nonunilineal groups in which affiliation is regularly achieved through marriage, voluntary recruitment, or option show a correspondingly more remote resemblance to the classic social races. Racially heterogeneous societies need not be divided into structurally significant social races. If a descent rule is not evolved, categorizations of hybrid phenotypes will tend to correspond to the actual variety of visible intergrades. This is the case in Brazil, where descent plays a negligible role in establishing "racial" identity. In Bahia, full siblings whose phenotypes markedly differ from each other are assigned by different members of their community to contrastive racial categories. Because of the absence of descent rules, pronounced disagreements concerning the identity of individuals frequently occur, and this ambiguity
is compounded by the plethora of "racial" categories—as many as forty in a single community and four or five hundred for the country as a whole. Under these conditions, structurally significant sociocentric groups based on racial criteria can scarcely be said to exist. This conclusion is further warranted by the absence of systematic segregation and discrimination (but not of prejudice) associated with the social categories. Blurred, egocentric, and ambiguous racial identity would thus appear to be a functional correlate of the structural inconsequence of racial factors and the insignificance of descent (Harris 1964, pp. 54-64). The importance of descent in racial ideology is frequently obscured by the apparent adequacy of phenotypical cues for the establishment of unambiguous identity. Most Americans are skilled in detecting phenotypical traces of Negroid admixture among the members of the community. Yet the much-discussed "high visibility" of the Negro group is belied by the phenomenon of the "white Negro," a self-identified Negro-by-descent who refuses to "pass" into the white group. The powerful fictions invented through application of a descent principle are further demonstrated by the treatment of children of mixed marriages. Regardless of phenotype, such children are affiliated with the racial group of the lower-ranking parent. This affiliation is not at all a "natural" reflection of phenotypical character; it is rather a social fiction made possible by the peculiar principles of the descent rule practiced in the United States. One of the most common methodological blunders in scientific studies of the significance of racial differences in the United States is the tacit acceptance of this phantasmic notion of race as the basis for establishing research samples (Fried 1964). Biological race The development of scientific raciological theories is mainly a by-product of ihe development of Euro-American biology, although Carl von Linne's correlation of custom and race in his epoch-making taxonomy, Systema naturae, was certainly not without both learned and popular precedent. Whether the racism that can be discovered in the texts of antiquity, in the Babylonian Talmud, and in the writings of a few Greeks and many Romans deserves to be detached from the underlying matrix of folklore depends on how much emphasis one gives to the distinctive features of post-Galilean science. In Linne's classification of human varieties (1735), the aboriginal American is reddish in color with straight, dense black hair, and so on.
RACE He is "persevering, content, free," and he paints himself with "skillful red lines." Europeans are "light, active, ingenious" and "covered with tailored clothes." Asians are "severe, haughty, miserly" and "covered with loose garments"; while Africans are "crafty, lazy, negligent, anointed with oil" and "governed by whim" (Count 1950, p. 359). Although Linne probably regarded these racial traits as having some degree of permanency, eighteenthcentury biologists generally believed that only the species level of differentiation reflected true hereditary fixity. Linne, like others of that period who believed in the unitary origin of mankind, was obliged to leave the door open for evolution, because if all men were descended from Adam, infraspecies variation had somehow to be explained. Moreover, it was at this time that environmentalism, both social and natural, was being enshrined in radical bourgeois political programs under the influence of Locke's doctrine of the tabula rasa. Indeed, one of the central ideological themes of the French Revolution was the belief that hereditary differences among men were subordinate to the conditioning influences of education and the natural environment. Hence, on the whole, the eighteenth-century monogenesists tended to deprecate the power and permanence of racial differences. Buffon, for example, whose evolutionist inclinations appear at times to embrace the idea of the transformation of species, considered climate and diet to be the principal causes of racial variation. Like Linne, he correlated cultural and psychological characteristics with racial differences, yet so strong was his environmentalism that he believed all such differences would "gradually disappear . . . if the causes which produced them should cease, or if their operation should be varied by other circumstances and combinations" (Count 1950, p. 15). This early version of Lamarckism is conspicuous also in the outlook of men like Rousseau and Monboddo, both of whom were convinced that the great apes were actually human beings whose progress toward civilization had been retarded by adverse environmental conditions (Rousseau 1775, pp. 22 ff. ; Monboddo 1773, pp. 22 ff.). Others, such as Blumenbach, one of the most influential naturalists of the period, continued to support the doctrine of "perfectibility" of the members of nonwhite races. In fact, belief in environmentalism and perfectibility was so strong that respectful attention was given to the possibility that Negroid physical features were not hereditary. In the United States, Samuel Stanhope Smith even argued that dark skin color was a phenomenon similar to freckles and that white people would
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become Negroid with sufficient exposure to the sun. Smith illustrated the reverse process in the celebrated case of Henry Moss, a Virginia slave who appears to have suffered a loss of pigmentation after having moved to the North. At a meeting of the American Philosophical Society in 1797, Benjamin Rush argued that the Moss case provided proof that black skin color was a disease akin to leprosy (Gossett 1963, p. 41). A substantial, perhaps dominant, body of scientific opinion in the eighteenth century was thus heavily committed to the belief that racial differences were rather evanescent and subject to the control of both natural and cultural aspects of the environment. It was this negation of racial determinism that permitted Turgot, Holbach, Helvetius, and Condorcet to attempt social analyses which foreshadowed the modern cultural-ecological approach to the understanding of sociocultural evolution. But the belief that race was relatively unimportant to an understanding of the variety of cultures, past and present, was not destined to flourish in the succeeding century. The equalitarian philosophy of the monogenesists was based on faith in the power of the environment to modify Hottentots into Englishmen. Indeed, equalitarian monogenesists long before Lamarck were quite prepared to believe that a specific transformation from ape to Caucasoid man must have taken place as part of the process by which humanity had emerged from its "state of nature." A necessary but fatal ingredient in these early environmentalist theories was a stanch belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarck merely generalized this point of view to include the entire organic universe. His theory of the use and disuse of organs was in most fundamental aspects perfectly anticipated in the work of Rousseau and Monboddo (Lovejoy 1933). Moreover, there was no significant disagreement between Darwin and Lamarck on the power of the environment to shape the hereditary nature of bioforms. According to Darwin, the use and disuse of organs exerted a direct influence upon the innovations which are subjected to natural selection (Darwin 1859, pp. 133-137 in 1958 edition). Yet Darwin, Wallace, Huxley, Haeckel, Spencer, and every other evolutionist of the late nineteenth century, as well as almost every major social scientist from Marx to Morgan, regarded racial differences as essential to the understanding of human behavior (cf. Zirkle 1959, pp. 109-111; Resek 1960, p. 63). Even before them, the polygenesists, influenced by the skepticism that led them to reject the theologians' idea of "special creation,"
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tended to regard the races as permanent, specieslike divisions, with differential hereditary capacities for achieving civilization. Voltaire, the influential Lord Kames, the English physician Charles White, the Frenchman Virrey, and the American Jefferson were among those who emphasized inequality of the hereditary endowments of the human races and the importance of these differences for an understanding of sociocultural phenomena (cf. Gossett 1963, pp. 42-53). Although post-Darwinian biologists tended to reaffirm the monogenesist view of a unitary origin for all mankind, they drew none of the equalitarian conclusions that had characterized their eighteenth-century predecessors. What had happened to turn a doctrine of equality, optimism, and perfectibility into chauvinistic, imperialistic, competitive, and pessimistic racism? One major scientific development of the early part of the nineteenth century seems especially significant (not to deny that a more fundamental answer would involve social, as distinct from ideological, innovation). A dawning insight into the true dimension of geological time compromised the equalitarianism of the evolutionists and brought them into direct conflict with the Biblically inspired equalitarian monogenesists. Hitherto unimaginably prolonged sequences were revealed, giving a completely new perspective to the transformation of species. Savages could be turned into Englishmen, yes, but not overnight, or in a few generations. According to the new chronology of progress, Caucasoid man came to be regarded as thousands of years "ahead" of the other races. The latter remained perfectible, but along a time scale which effectively removed them from any immediate claim to equal sociopolitical treatment. Characteristics were still acquired and became part of the hereditary repertory, but at a painfully slow pace. The ideological inertia engendered by concepts of racial heritage, racial memory, and racial consciousness enveloped the social and biological sciences and cast a spell over vast domains of EuroAmerican arts and letters. In its most popular version, promulgated principally by the synthesizing genius of Herbert Spencer, the social-to-biological feedback operated through the mechanisms of natural selection and the survival of the fittest: fundamental sociocultural change required equally fundamental biological change. Survival in an environment of unrestricted competition required individualized struggle and the untrammeled exercise of the will to achieve power. Hence, political philosophies such as social Darwinism, the "white man's burden," and "manifest destiny" all moved toward the mass megalomania of German Ary-
anism and twentieth-century race war and genocide (Barzun 1937; Hofstadter 1944; Snyder 1939; Gossett 1963). Not to be omitted from this spectacle is the contribution of the caliper-wielding anthropometrists, from Topinard to Lombroso, with their obsession for quantifying the precise details of physiologically insignificant traits. With slight consideration of the need for experimental control over cultural and physiological variables, minute differences, such as in the angles formed by cranial and facial bones, were used to help explain sociocultural contrast (Boyd 1958). Against the combined weight of the bioevolutionary synthesis, the passionate identification of science with precise measurement, and the problem of reconciling the inequalities of imperialism and capitalism with Christian principles, few intellectuals were able to withstand the appeal of some form of scientific racism. Adherence to this ill-fated conceit was further promoted by an overemphasis, among the great cultural evolutionists of the times, upon parallel evolution and convergence. The simplistic equation of graded physical types with graded cultural types was extremely vulnerable to the test of comparative observation. Documentation of the vast diversity of cultural forms that occur within as well as between racial groups eventually severed racist explanations from every vestige of scientific respectability. Much of the credit for this achievement rests with Franz Boas and the historical particularists and cultural relativists who were nurtured under his tutelage. Boas and his students insisted that there was no causal relationship between race, language, and culture (Boas 1887-1936; 1911). Especially damaging to the racist point of view were the first sophisticated linguistic descriptions of present-day primitive peoples, whereby it was established that variability and complexity of grammar and syntax are totally unrelated to degree of technological or sociopolitical organization (Sapir 1921). The distinctive feature of the modern consensus concerning the relationship between race and culture is that the rate and direction of culture change among the various infraspecies groupings of Homo sapiens is not at present significantly affected by genetic specialties. It is generally believed that if all factors other than race are held constant, similar enculturation experiences will result in similar sociocultural repertories. Indeed, if perfect control over the enculturative process could be achieved, one generation would suffice to equip any two Homo sapiens groups with essentially similar repertories, regardless of their respective racial phy-
RACE logenies. Thus, if Hottentot babies were substituted at birth for English babies, their average cultural performance would probably not differ in any significant fashion from a control group. The evidence for this point of view is overwhelming. Social groups and individuals drawn from every human "race" have shown themselves in countless instances to be susceptible to acculturation influences bearing upon every aspect of sociocultural behavior. American Indians brought up in Brazil show no hereditary resistance to learning African dance rhythms; Englishmen reared in China can learn to speak flawless Chinese; American Negroes who attend conservatories write symphonies in the classical European tradition; the Japanese display not the slightest hereditary disability in acquiring a knowledge of Western electronics; Jews brought up in Germany have German food preferences, while those brought up in Yemen acquire Yemenite tastes; under the influence of Western missionaries, the South Sea islanders learned to govern their sexual affairs in conformity with strict Protestant codes; everywhere the children of illiterate parents, exposed to the proper set of enculturative conditions, acquire within one lifetime the learning and lore contributed by hundreds of generations of men from all the races of the world. Although it is not possible to prove that all large divisions of Homo sapiens have equal learning ability for all kinds of responses, it is beyond dispute that the overwhelming bulk of the response repertory of any human breeding population can be learned by any other human breeding population. Moreover, if average differences in learning ability exist, they are demonstrably insufficient to account for the major cultural and subcultural contrasts which occupy the attention of the social sciences. No one familiar with modern ethnography can doubt the dominant role of enculturative conditioning in the establishment of the behavioral specialties manifested by different human populations. No plausible connection has ever been proposed between specific human genes and such specialties as cross-cousin marriage, bilateral descent, polyandry, divine kingship, monotheism, brideprice, private property in land, or thousands of other small and large chains of less than universal human behavior. On the other hand, the inadequacy of racist explanations of sociocultural differences and similarities is further underscored by the growing success achieved by cultural and ecological explanations of those phenomena. With the exception of a handful of hereditary pathological disabilities, there does not exist a single instance of differential learning ability between populations which cannot
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be explained in terms of differential conditioning experience. Certainly this is the case wherever scores on so-called intelligence tests have been correlated with "racial" groups. Over and over again it has been demonstrated that such sjores reflect, for each individual, the number of years of schooling, the quality of his academic training, his specific training for the test situation, his nuclear and extended family milieu, and an abundance of other nongenetic conditioning parameters (Klineberg 1935; 1951; 1963; Comas 1961; Brown I960; Dreger & Miller 1960). As long as average performance differences are demonstrably embedded in conditioning parameters for which plausible linking hypotheses exist, emphasis upon genetic factors, especially those not significantly related to the behavior traits in question, exposes social science to every sort of occult mystification through the multiplication of superfluous hypotheses. It should be carefully noted that the consensus by which racist explanations in the social sciences have been deprived of all claim to scientific respectability does not diminish the importance of further research concerning the essentially "creative" relation between biological and cultural traits. Such considerations are obviously required for an understanding of the evolution of the human condition, both during the hominoid-hominid transition and during the periods of species changes among the early hominids. Moreover, it is well known that human breeding populations exhibit genetic specialties, such as achondroplasia, myopia, and diabetes, whose frequencies are affected by cultural factors. Certainly, the rejection of racism should not obscure the possibility that differential reproductive and survival rates account for some cultural differences. None of these relationships, however, need run counter to the assumption that learning ability in its widest sense, as enculturation potential, is equal among all Homo sapiens. On the contrary, we may continue to assume that selection for behavioral plasticity, for freedom from gene-specific behavior, for high-order generalized learning receptivity, has been the most important source of biological control over the direction of hominid evolution during the last million and a half years (Dobzhansky & Montagu 1947; Hockett & Ascher 1964). MARVIN HARRIS BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARNES, J. A. 1960 Anthropology in Britain Before and After Darwin. Mankind 5:369-385. BARZUN, JACQUES (1937) 1965 Race: A Study in Superstition. Rev. ed. New York: Harper. ~> First published as Race: A Study in Modern Superstition.
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BENEDICT, RUTH (1940) 1959 Race: Science and Politics. New York: Viking. BERRY, BREWTON (1951) 1965 Race and Ethnic Relations. 3d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -> First published as Race Relations: The Interaction of Ethnic and Racial Groups. BLUMENBACH, JOHANN F. (1775-1811) 1865 The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Translated and edited by Thomas Bendyshe. London: Longmans. -» First published in German. BOAS, FRANZ (1887-1936) 1955 Race, Language and Culture. New York: Macmillan. BOAS, FRANZ (1911) 1963 The Mind of Primitive Man. Rev. ed. New York: Collier. -» A paperback edition was published in 1965 by the Free Press. BOYD, WILLIAM C. 1958 Has Statistics Retarded the Progress of Physical Anthropology? American Journal of Physical Anthropology New Series 16:481-484. BROWN, INA C. 1960 [A Book Review of] The Testing of Negro Intelligence, by Audrey M. Shuey. American Anthropologist New Series 62:544 only. COMAS, JUAN 1961 "Scientific" Racism Again? Current Anthropology 2:303-340. CONFERENCE ON RACE RELATIONS IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE, HONOLULU, 1954 1956 Race Relations in World Perspective: Papers. Edited by Andrew W. Lind. Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press. COON, CARLETON S. 1962 The Origin of Races. New York: Knopf. COUNT, EARL W. (editor) 1950 This Is Race: An Anthology Selected From the International Literature on the Races of Man. New York: Schuman. Cox, OLIVER C. (1948) 1959 Caste, Class and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics. New York: Monthly Review Press. DARWIN, CHARLES (1859) 1964 On the Origin of Species. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. DOBZHANSKY, THEODosius 1962 Mankind Evolving: The Evolution of the Human Species. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS; and MONTAGU, ASHLEY 1947 Natural Selection and the Mental Capacities of Mankind. Science New Series 105:587-590. DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS; and MONTAGU, ASHLEY 1963 Two Views of Coon's Origin of Races: With Comments by Coon and Replies. Current Anthropology 4:360367. DREGER, RALPH M.; and MILLER, KENT S. 1960 Comparative Psychological Studies of Negroes and Whites in the United States. Psychological Bulletin 57:361402. FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN (1957) 1965 Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World. Boston: Beacon. FRIED, MORTON H. 1964 Disastrous Definition: Comment on Dwight J. Ingle's Racial Differences and the Future. Science New Series 146:1526 only. GARN, STANLEY M. 1957 Race and Evolution. American Anthropologist New Series 59:218-224. GOSSETT, THOMAS F. 1963 Race: The History of an Idea in America. Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist Univ. Press. HARRIS, MARVIN 1964 Patterns of Race in the Americas. New York: Walker. HOCKETT, CHARLES F.; and ASCHER, ROBERT 1964 The Human Revolution. Current Anthropology 5:135-168. HOFSTADTER, RICHARD (1944) 1959 Social Darwinism in American Thought. Rev. ed. New York: Braziller.
HUGHES, EVERETT C.; and HUGHES, HELEN M. 1952 Where Peoples Meet: Racial and Ethnic Frontiers. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. KLTNEBERG, OTTO 1935 Race Differences. New York: Harper. KLINEBERG, OTTO (1951) 1953 Race and Psychology. Paris: UNESCO. KLINEBERG, OTTO 1963 Negro-White Differences in Intelligence Test Performance: A New Look at an Old Problem. American Psychologist 18:198-203. KLOOSTERBOER, WILLEMINA 1960 Involuntary Labour Since the Abolition of Slavery: A Survey of Compulsory Labour Throughout the World. Leiden (Netherlands): Brill. KROEBER, ALFRED L. 1915 Eighteen Professions. American Anthropologist New Series 17:283-288. LINNE, CARL VON (1735) 1956 Systema naturae. 10th ed. London: British Museum. LIVINGSTONE, FRANK B. 1962 On the Non-existence of Human Races. Current Anthropology 3:279-281. LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O. 1933 Monboddo and Rousseau. Modern Philology 30:275-296. MACK, RAYMOND W. 1963 Race, CZass and Power. New York: American Book. MONBODDO, JAMES B. (1773) 1774 Of the Origin and Progress of Language. 2d ed. Edinburgh: Balfour. MONTAGU, ASHLEY (1945) 1964 Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race. 4th ed., rev. & enl. Cleveland: World. PUTNAM, CARLETON 1961 Race and Reason: A Yankee View. Washington: Public Affairs Press. RESEK, CARL 1960 Lewis Henry Morgan: American Scholar. Univ. of Chicago Press. RITTERBUSH, PHILIP C. 1964 Overtures to Biology: The Speculations of Eighteenth-century Naturalists. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press ROUSSEAU, JEAN JACQUES (1775) 1941 Discours sur I'origine et les fondements de I'inegalite parrni les hommes. Cambridge Univ. Press. SAPIR, EDWARD A. 1921 Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech. New York: Harcourt. SIMPSON, GEORGE E.; and YINGER, J. MILTON (1953) 1965 Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination. 3d ed. New York: Harper. SNYDER, Louis L. 1939 Race: A History of Modern Ethnic Theories. New York: Longmans. THOMPSON, EDGAR T. (editor) 1939 Race Relations and the Race Problem: A Definition and an Analysis. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press. THOMPSON, EDGAR T.; and HUGHES, EVERETT C. (editors) 1958 Race: Individual and Collective Behavior. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION 1961 The Race Question in Modern Science: Race and Science. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. -> Contains all the brochures that have appeared separately in the UNESCO series "The Race Question in Modern Science." WAGLEY, CHARLES 1958 On the Concept of Social Race in the Americas. Volume 1, pages 403-417 in International Congress of Americanists, Thirty-third, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1958, Actas. San Jose: Lehmann. WAGLEY, CHARLES; and HARRIS, MARVIN 1958 Minorities in the New World. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
RACE RELATIONS: World Perspectives WASHBURN, S. L. 1951 The New Physical Anthropology. New York Academy of Sciences, Transactions Second Series 13:298-304. WASHBURN, S. L. 1963 The Study of Race. American Anthropologist New Series 65:521-531. WILLIAMS, ERIC (1944) 1961 Capitalism and Slavery. New York: Russell & Russell. ZIHKLE, CONWAY 1959 Evolution, Marxian Biology, and the Social Scene. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.
RACE RELATIONS I. WORLD PERSPECTIVES ii. SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
G. Franklin Edwards Thomas F. Pettigrew
WORLD PERSPECTIVES
The term "race relations" refers to those forms of behavior which arise from the contacts and resulting interaction of people with varied physical and cultural characteristics. As defined by Robert E. Park (1939), the concept refers to all relationships which are capable of producing race conflict and race consciousness and which determine the relative status of groups in the community. It should be noted that differences in physical and genetic traits are important in contributing to the observed ecological, economic, social, and political relationships which constitute the subject matter of race relations. However, since contacts among people of diverse racial origins have usually involved groups with markedly variant technologies, patterns of social organization, political systems, and religious beliefs and values, the biological aspect of race has usually been interpreted as reinforcing these other differences rather than as a primary, independent factor in the observed behavior. Expressed in other terms, the association of people belonging to different racial groups also involves the association of groups with different cultural characteristics. Related concepts. A distinction should be made between the usage of the term "race relations," which refers to the social processes and social structures arising from the contacts of different racial groups, and other related usages. The term is variously employed to cover forms of intergroup, interethnic, and majority-minority relationships. In these latter usages, race may or may not be a significant variable in the behavior under question. In general, these cognate concepts, though often used synonymously with that of race relations, encompass other forms of behavior as well. In the United States since World War n, the
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concept "intergroup relations" has been employed widely to cover forms of organized group relations involving tensions, conflict, and group adjustments. These include, in addition to Negro-white relationships, the interaction of religious groups and of organizations representing different economic strata. The major analytical focus in this area of study is upon such social-psychological phenomena as prejudice, discrimination, power relations, leadership roles and strategies, and the impact these make upon group relations and community change. Although the concept "ethnic relations" is often employed to cover what traditionally is studied as race relations, it is not limited to analyses involving people with different racial characteristics. Ethnic groups are separated from others among whom they live by distinctive characteristics which provide a consciousness of difference [see ETHNIC GROUPS]. Besides race, the differentiating features may be religion, language, nationality, or some combination of these, which provide the ethnic group with a strong in-group feeling. In parts of Canada, for example, conflict and acutely selfconscious behavior characterize the relationship between the English-speaking and French-speaking communities, whose people are of the same racial origin but vary in language, religion, national origin, and traditional behavior. Minorities are ethnic or racial groups that occupy subordinate positions in the communities where they reside [see MINORITIES]. In addition to segregation from other members of the community because of some racial, social, or cultural characteristic, they often suffer severe political restrictions. Their status is characterized by accommodation. The rearrangement of political boundaries so that people with different cultural traits are brought within a common national state is one source of the origin of minority groups. The realignment of national boundaries in the Balkan states following World War i is a classic instance of this process. In more recent times, following the end of British colonial rule in India, the emergence, owing to religious differences, of India and Pakistan as separate states—the former predominantly Hindu and the latter Muslim—has witnessed the continued presence of Muslim minorities in India and Hindu minorities in Pakistan. While these related terms can refer to behavior which is shaped by a wide variety of group characteristics, they are sometimes used to describe and analyze phenomena in which race does play an important part. In the United States, for ex-
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ample, the relations of Negroes and whites are conceptualized variously as intergroup, interethnic, and majority-minority relations. European colonization If we leave aside the early migrations of primitive peoples, the era of race relations can be said to have begun with the overseas expansion of the major European powers from the fifteenth century onward. Over the following centuries England, France, Spain, and Portugal colonized the Americas and, with the addition of Dutch and Scottish traders, the Far East. The early settlement of the Dutch in South Africa was followed in the nineteenth century by the division of the African continent among the major European powers. Economic expansion was the primary, but not exclusive, motive for the establishment of foreign settlements and for other contacts of Europeans with indigenous peoples in various parts of the world. Following the industrial revolution it was the need for raw materials and markets which led to the exploitation of non-European labor in different parts of the world and to the forms of social and political control which characterized the relations of European and non-European peoples. E. Franklin Frazier (1957) distinguished three major types of racial and cultural frontiers created by this overseas expansion of European civilization : (1) those in which Europeans founded rather substantial permanent settlements (the United States, Latin America—including Mexico, Central America, South America, the West Indies and the Guianas—South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand); (2) the tropical dependencies, where Europeans were unable to form permanent settlements on a substantial scale (Africa south of the Sahara, southeast Asia, and the Pacific islands of Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia); (3) the older civilizations of Asia (China and Japan), which constitute a relatively recent frontier. The relationships of Europeans with non-European peoples varied according to the type of frontier. Philip Mason (1954) enumerated three factors as having an important influence upon the race relations pattern which developed in each area: the type of climate and territory, the level of the dominated race's civilization, and the attitude of the colonial power. In the United States, where climate was propitious for white settlement, two very distinctive patterns developed as a result of variations in a complex of factors—land and climate, type of production, and labor requirements. In the northern section of the country, climate, soil type, and rain-
fall led to the development of small farm units, fishing, and small industries, the labor requirements of which could be met by family members or free workers. In the South, however, the climate and terrain favored the production of staple crops and a system of plantation agriculture, for which a more abundant supply of cheap labor was necessary. After unsuccessful attempts to enslave the native Indians and to use indentured workers, the labor problem was solved by importing several million Africans as slaves over a period of two centuries. The status of Negroes as slaves throughout this period and their continued residence in the South following emancipation help to explain why race relations in the United States have traditionally been regarded as a "southern problem." A pattern similar to that noted in the American South may be observed in other parts of the world where plantation agriculture developed—Jamaica, Brazil, and Java, to name only a few areas, as well as in South Africa, where mining also became an important industry. These areas lie in the tropics or subtropics, where climate is not conducive to the heavy settlement of whites and therefore precludes the employment of free white labor on an extensive scale. The need to assure a stable labor supply resulted in the exploitation of native people through low wages, forced labor, or enslavement. In Latin America and the West Indies, as in the United States, slave labor was brought from Africa. After the abolition of slavery in the Western world in the nineteenth century, cheap labor was brought from India and China, and the exploitation of native workers was continued. Negroes in the United States continued to be exploited as farm tenants by their white landlords. Variation in colonial policies. The variation in approach to race relations by the European powers may be represented here by the dissimilar attitudes and practices of the English and Portuguese toward native peoples in the Americas, and by the contrasting patterns of the French and Portuguese, on the one hand, and the English and Dutch, on the other, in Africa. In the English colonies in the United States, the establishment of permanent settlements favored the importation of white women in substantial numbers. The colonists did not intermarry with the Indians and were socially distant from both Indians and Negroes. Although moral conflict was engendered by the effort to reconcile the tenets of Protestantism with slave holding, as slavery became institutionalized in response to increasing labor demands, it was rationalized and justified
RACE RELATIONS: World Perspectives by ideologies based upon the conception that the blacks were inferior. The argument most frequently made was that since black men were biologically inferior, slavery was a natural state that was of value to slaves and masters alike; the conception that the institution was ordained by God was often added. Following the emancipation of the slaves, social distance between the races was maintained by a variety of devices. Thus, in the South there developed a caste-like system which was supported by legislation and state constitutions; Negroes not only were regarded as socially unequal but also became the victims of economic and political discrimination. The pattern of relations which developed in Brazil is in contrast with that of the United States. The Portuguese, although holding Negroes as slaves until 1888, manifested a different attitude toward both Negroes and the native Indians (Freyre 1933; Pierson 1942). As Roman Catholics, they proselytized to convert both slaves and Indians to their religion, intermarried with them, and, following the emancipation, recognized the potentiality of members of these other racial groups to assume important positions as Brazilians. Brazilian society today is characterized by a marked absence of prejudice and discrimination based upon color and thus has no race problem of the type found in the United States. The colonial policy of France and Portugal with regard to their African territories was one of eventual assimilation. Whenever educational and economic achievement justified it, Africans in the French and Portuguese colonies could expect to transfer from the status of subjects to that of citizens and to be governed by the laws of the metropolitan community rather than by the customary sanctions of local councils. In general, there was never any serious consideration of independent status for the colonies of these countries; it was expected that in time they would become a part of Greater France or Greater Portugal. The English approach did not contemplate the evolution of African subjects, or those of the southeast Asia territories, to the status of citizens of the mother country. In contrast with the policies of France and Portugal, the long-range English objective was the independence of colonies as they became ready for self-government. In most English colonies the practice of indirect rule was followed. Parallel institutions were developed for the governance of Englishmen and native subjects, and native Africans were governed by their own institutions, with native rulers accountable to repre-
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sentatives of the English government. Under such an arrangement, there was little social mixing, and discrimination in wage payments to native laborers and free white laborers was practiced. The extreme expression of separation of colonists and natives occurred in South Africa, where, during the early history of the colony, the Dutch Afrikaners, with the encouragement and sanction of the Dutch Reformed church, developed a policy of rigid segregation of the native Hottentots and Bantus. Later, the East Indians who came to the area and the Cape Coloured people—a hybrid population resulting from the mixture of Afrikaners and natives—were also subjected to social and moral isolation. The segregation of colonists and natives is expressed in residential patterns; under the present-day policy of apartheid, native peoples are forced to live in designated compounds, apart from the descendants of the European settlers. Even in the large urban areas such as Durban (Kuper et al. 1958), the areas where non-Europeans may live are delimited. The English in South Africa have accommodated their policies to accord with those of the politically dominant Dutch party, especially with regard to segregation in social life. The English approach, however, is tempered by the humanitarian approach of missionaries and the more cosmopolitan views of the English in general, so that it is less restrictive than that of the Afrikaners in the provision of education and welfare services. The approaches described as characteristic of the French and Portuguese, and those of the English and Dutch, must be taken as ideal descriptions. In reality, some variation in practice existed among each of these powers from one colony to another. The French in Algeria, for example, prior to the independence of that country, departed to a considerable extent from the assimilationist doctrine, owing mainly to the presence of large numbers of Muslims in the Algerian population. The English in Kenya, it should be observed, were much less restrictive toward the natives than they were in South Africa. Patterns of contact In those parts of the world where Europeans settled or had extensive contacts with native peoples, a number of fairly uniform patterns and changes may be observed. One of these is demographic. The presence of Europeans exposed natives to a large number of infectious diseases to which they had little or no immunity, such as tuberculosis, syphilis, smallpox, and measles.
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Heavy losses of population from these diseases occurred among the native Indians of the Americas and the West Indies, the Maoris of New Zealand, and native populations in Australia and other countries. After the native population acquired some immunity and public health measures and medical care had been improved, population decline was arrested by the lowering of mortality rates. There followed a period of sharp population increase as birth rates remained constant or increased and mortality continued to be reduced. The Indian population of the United States (now a little over half a million, according to the 1960 census) has, after suffering heavy losses from disease and warfare, increased to a point approximating the estimated number during the pre-Columbian period (Carr-Saunders 1936, p. 300; compare Palmer 1948, p. 261). Among the Maori and other natives of New Zealand and Australia the same tendencies are observed (Price 1950, chapters 8 and 9; compare Carr-Saunders 1936, p. 296). Where native populations have increased, there is often a struggle on their part, especially in plantation areas, for an adequate food supply. Pre-emption of much of the best land by Europeans has resulted in food shortages and an acute struggle for existence. Although disease was a primary contributor to the decimation of population among native peoples during the early period of their contacts with whites, it was not the only cause of population decline; the introduction of firearms also played a part. In some instances, as in encounters with Indian tribes of the Americas, the Tasmanians, the Hottentots of South Africa, and numerous other groups, the European settlers used firearms to inflict severe losses upon the natives before conquering them. Firearms, moreover, made warfare among native groups more destructive and contributed to the more extensive killing of wild animals, an important source of food. The suffering experienced by the Plains Indians of the United States as a result of the virtual elimination of the buffalo illustrates the point. A second observed phenomenon growing out of the contacts of Europeans and native peoples is the formation of mixed-blood, or hybrid, populations. Wherever the races have met, miscegenation has occurred and new population types and culture groups have been formed. A classic instance of race mixing has occurred in Hawaii, where, over time, the native Hawaiians of Polynesian extraction, Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Koreans, Negroes, and other Caucasian and Oriental people have inter-
married or otherwise mixed to produce new population types (Adams 1937; Lind 1938). Race mixture has produced people who are marginal in both their physical and cultural characteristics—hence the term "half-caste" (Dover 1939). On the southeast Asian and Pacific frontiers the mixture has resulted in various Eurasian groups; in South Africa the Cape Coloured are the product of the admixture of the Dutch Roers and native Hottentots; in Latin America the union of the Spanish and the Portuguese with the Indians of the South American mainland resulted in the mestizos; and in the United States the mulatto population is the product of the mixture of white Americans and Negro slaves. These marginal populations not only are physically different from the parent populations but they also live in two cultural worlds. They are not fully accepted by the Europeans, and they, in turn, do not fully identify with the natives. Their intermediate position in the social structure makes them extremely self-conscious (Stonequist 1937). The argument that these marginal people are biologically superior to natives (Reuter 1918) has been rejected, not only because it runs counter to genetic findings but also because it can be shown that the alleged superiority of these groups over indigenous populations results from greater access to available opportunities and social contacts (Wirth & Goldhamer 1944, p. 335). In the United States, for example, many of the mulattoes became free persons, chiefly through manumission, prior to the general emancipation of the slaves in 1863; thus they were able to become literate, purchase property, and develop stable families. With the formation of Negro communities following the emancipation, the mulatto was able to occupy leadership roles in politics and the professions. Since the large-scale urbanization of the Negro population and the resulting broadened opportunities for education, the mulatto no longer enjoys a virtual monopoly over status positions in the Negro community (Edwards 1959). A third outgrowth of the contacts of Europeans and native peoples is the modification of the social organization of the latter. In general, the Europeans' superiority in technology and scientific knowledge resulted in new methods of cultivation and work relationships which served to change the prevailing pattern of most native groups. In those areas where industrialization has developed and a wage system of payment is used, the communal relationships and close kinship ties of native people built around agriculture have been undermined (Wilson 1936).
RACE RELATIONS: World Perspectives European values and ideologies have had an impact on the social relationships of native people and have produced considerable conflict and alienation. In the diffusion of such values, the missionaries, who lived in intimate relationship with the natives, played a significant role. Their teaching of Christianity to native groups introduced an ethic of individualism which disoriented converts from customary communal ties and often produced intratribal conflicts by challenging the moral basis upon which tribal life rested (Schapera 1940). The provision of welfare services often served a similar end. The mission schools made many students disenchanted with native life, and the introduction of modern scientific health practices and beliefs seriously challenged native magic and witchcraft. Some students have abstracted from the history of race relations a sequence of changes which occurs from the time of initial contact until assimilation or some form of accommodation is reached. Park (1926), for example, in his "race relations cycle" theory, refers to the following pattern which he thought progressive and irreversible: initial contact, competition, accommodation, and eventual assimilation or amalgamation. It should be noted, however, that although most students recognize that uniformities and similarities do exist, there is nonetheless a disposition to question attempts to develop a patterned sequence which applies to all situations in which different racial and cultural groups have associated (Berry 1951). Contemporary problems Contemporary interest in race relations centers on developments since the end of World War n, particularly on events in Africa and in the United States. The concern with race relations today, however, is universalistic and transcends local areas and the particularism of the people involved. The United Nations, founded in 1946 as an instrument of international cooperation and peace, is dedicated to the principles of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples. These principles nurtured the rising tide of anticolonialism and nationalism which, during the following two decades, resulted in the emergence of many new nations in Africa and the Near East; 32 of these emergent nations are in Africa south of the Sahara. The new relationships between the white people of the former colonial powers and the colored people of the new nations are, of course, matters of race relations as well as of world economics, politics, and geography. The transformation from former colonial ter-
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ritories to nation-states has produced changes in the social structures of the new states, although not everywhere in the same fashion. There has developed, moreover, a sense of power and national identity as black men serve as heads of state and succeed to important positions formerly occupied by representatives of the colonial powers. This sense of power and identity is expressed in a highly self-conscious literature which began as an expression of protest against colonial rule. A foremost aspect of this literature is an emphasis upon the concept "Negritude," which was developed initially and most fully by the writers of French West Africa. "The theory of Negritude," Balandier (1956, p. 150) points out, "appears as an exaltation of African-Negro specificity, as a kind of highly elaborated counter-racism." South Africa. While most of the countries of west and east Africa have become independent, events have moved in an opposite direction for native peoples of South Africa. In the Republic of South Africa, the policy of apartheid was established in 1948 by the Nationalist party, which is devoted to the doctrine of white supremacy and which has been in power continuously. Apartheid, in essence, has the objective of maintaining the domination of three million whites over eleven million natives through physical separation of the races, both in residential areas and in places of public accommodation. In 1959, the apartheid policy was extended by the passage of the Bantu Self-Governing Act. On the theory that each group could develop to its fullest capacity in its own homeland and that the Bantus were not a homogeneous people, eight reserves, or Bantustans, were established as homelands for the natives. Three million native Africans who lived in urban communities, some of whom were three generations removed from native life, were no longer regarded as permanent residents of such areas. They were, rather, to be considered as belonging to Bantu areas and would be interchangeable with residents of the Bantustans as the labor market required. Although the restrictive character of life in South Africa is rationalized in terms of "separate development" and "peaceful coexistence" of the races, its results have severely penalized the nonwhite groups through land limitations, restrictions on freedom of movement, and differential voting privileges and expenditures for education, health, and other welfare measures. Although apartheid has been criticized within the republic by the National Union of South African Students, the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Women's
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Defense of the Constitutional League (the Black Sash), and the Christian church (excluding the Dutch Reformed church), it has been rigorously enforced. There have been some riots by natives in protest against this regime, but so far such efforts have resulted only in heavy losses of life. To many observers, South Africa is a police state (Bunting 1964). Racial conditions in South Africa are so much at variance with the movement toward freedom and independence of subject peoples throughout the world that they have become the object of world discussion and reaction. Discussion of the problems has been carried on in the United Nations almost continuously since 1946, when the Indian government protested the treatment of Indians in the Union under the Asiatic Land Tenure Act and the reprisals which followed their passive resistance campaigns. The question of South Africa's mandate over South-West Africa also came before the United Nations in 1946, and it has been a matter of continuous concern since 1948, when apartheid policies were introduced into the territory by the Nationalist government. In 1960 Liberia and Ethiopia petitioned the International Court of Justice, asking the court to find that South Africa had violated its obligation in administration of the South-West African territory and requesting that an order be entered to have discriminatory practices cease. In 1966 the court ruled that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. This decision was unexpected, in view of the careful legal preparation that had gone into the petition, which was supported by the United States. United States. In the United States much progress has been made since the end of World War 11 in improving the position of racial minorities. Although the spotlight has been on the status of Negro-Americans, who constitute the largest and the most active group working for change, Mexican-Americans, American Indians, and Orientals have also benefited from antidiscriminatory legislation. In the 1880s and 1890s, segregation became legalized in the South through the passage of various "Jim Crow" laws and changes in state constitutions which were subsequently upheld by Supreme Court decisions; for example, in the precedent-setting case of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) the Court held that state laws requiring racial segregation were constitutional so long as "separate but equal" facilities were provided. Separate institutions were operated for the two major racial groups, separate facilities were maintained in
places of public accommodation, racial intermarriage was forbidden, and the right of suffrage was effectively nullified through legislation and practice. Thus the rights guaranteed Negroes through passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the constitution in the period between 1865 and 1870 were undermined. Furthermore, in the northern cities, to which Negroes migrated in large numbers during World War i and immediately thereafter, large Negro ghettos were formed as a result of discriminatory practices in housing and employment. While segregation in the southern states was based upon both law and custom, in the North de facto segregation resulted from discriminatory actions of groups and individuals. In the 1930s the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People initiated a series of court cases asking that facilities for Negroes be made equal to those provided whites in those states maintaining separate institutions for the two groups. These cases met with some success in terms of improving specific segregated facilities. However, in the 1940s the "separate but equal" theory was rejected by Negro leaders (and gradually by the courts), on the ground that, in practice, segregated facilities never actually provide equal conditions and opportunities. Petitions were entered for Negro plaintiffs on the theory that exclusion from publicly operated institutions and facilities on account of race is a denial of the citizenship rights that had been guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution. In 1954, in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (347 U.S. 483), the Supreme Court held that admission to institutions of public education could not be denied on account of race and ordered those states maintaining separate educational systems to proceed with "all deliberate speed" to desegregate them. This decision was a landmark in the American Negro's struggle for equality; in effect, it nullified f he position taken in Plessy v. Ferguson and provided the precedent for public policy in many areas other than education. By court decisions and executive orders, the public policy of the United States has outlawed segregation in interstate travel on common carriers, the armed forces, public educational institutions, and places of public accommodation. The Negro's right to participate in the formerly "all-white" primary elections in the southern states was affirmed in 1944. Although these court decisions and orders have created new norms, they have not eliminated the fundamental disabilities from which the
RACE RELATIONS: World Perspectives masses of Negroes suffer. Counterdevices such as intimidation and violence are still effectively employed to deny many citizenship rights to Negroes. In what has been termed the "Negro Revolution," Negroes have provided most of the effective leadership. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the leading Negro organization in the struggle for Negro civil rights over the past half century, was at first joined by such newly formed groups as the Congress of Racial Equality, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Although predominantly Negro in composition, these groups had white membership and were the beneficiaries of financial support from the white community. A corps of young Negro leaders emerged, the most celebrated of whom was the Reverend Martin Luther King—a Baptist minister and leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964. The principle of nonviolent resistance espoused by Dr. King, and by the Negro movement in general, owed much to the teachings of Mohandas Gandhi. From 1958, nonviolent demonstrations were held in numerous American cities by various groups for the purpose of presenting the enemy with a moral confrontation over the injustices suffered by Negroes. These demonstrations resulted in imprisonment for thousands of Negroes and their white allies and captured the attention of the nation. So long as the civil rights movement was focused upon the elimination of racial discrimination in public accommodations and differential participation in programs supported by government funds, the organizations spearheading the movement were highly unified. This was expressed through frequent meetings of the Civil Rights Leadership Conference in which heads of the major organizations participated. Judicial proceedings and direct action, moreover, were appropriate techniques for the achievement of the stated objectives, and there was a consensus regarding their use. This period of unity can be said to have lasted at least through 1963, and perhaps through 1964. As greater attention became focused on the elimination of discrimination in housing and employment and the further implementation of school desegregation and voting rights, the movement lost some of its former cohesiveness, and new ideologies and tactics began to be advocated by some of the groups. The doctrine of "black power" was advanced by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and supported by the Congress of
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Racial Equality. This doctrine called for a mobilization of the economic and political power of the Negro community as solutions to the Negro's problems and as a way of providing a sense of racial identity and self-respect. It repudiated the idea that white support of and inclusion as members of Negro organizations were essential to success and viewed past alliances with whites as having contributed to the Negro's present status. Although the doctrine did not repudiate nonviolence as a technique, it asserted that violence was justified in some situations. In 1967 the foremost exponent of "black power" was Stokely Carmichael, a young Negro college graduate and the leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Carmichael pointed to the employment of Negroes as soldiers in the Vietnam war as further evidence of the general maltreatment of Negroes by the "white establishment": while Negroes suffered discrimination at home, they were being used in disproportionate numbers in a war in which they could have no interest. This more militant position of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality was rejected by the NAACP and the Urban League, the older and larger Negro civil rights organizations, which, throughout their history, have been allied with liberal elements of the white community. For these groups, "black power" was a racist and separatist doctrine. They regarded it as an unworkable principle that was not calculated to further the cause of Negro rights. The doctrine also ran counter to the nonviolent ideology of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the other major civil rights organization. In addition to impairing the unity of the civil rights organizations, the "black power" doctrine had resulted, by 1967, in a reduction of the financial support furnished the civil rights movement by whites, with the heaviest losses experienced by the more militant groups. The doctrine, moreover, had provided the rationale for open resistance by reactionary whites in what was described at the time as the "white backlash." This upsurge of white prejudice as a counterforce to Negro militancy was believed to have contributed to the success of reactionary politicians in the elections of 1966. The federal government has played a significant role in advancing the cause of Negro rights, not only through court decisions and executive orders but also through legislation. In 1957 Congress passed the first civil rights legislation since 1875; this act, among other things, established the Civil
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Rights Commission to investigate and make recommendations on racial conditions. This was followed by the civil rights laws of 1960 and 1964. The 1964 act, which is the broadest in its coverage, has titles referring to voting rights, public accommodations, public facilities, public education, and employment opportunities. Among the sanctions it authorizes, upon the finding of discriminatory conduct, is the withholding from state and local districts of funds for federally assisted programs. Its provisions on voting have been reinforced and expanded by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The efforts of both Negro groups and the federal government have been affected by world conditions and world opinion, as well as by the internal changes affecting minorities. The position of the Negro in the United States is obviously inconsistent with the ideologies of freedom and equality which characterize the postwar world. Furthermore, it is embarrassing to the United States government to participate in United Nations discussions and actions on colonial and minority group problems as long as discrimination is practiced within its own boundaries. Since the United Nations now includes a large number of representatives of colored peoples, the United States has become increasingly sensitive to their opinions of its racial problems. The riots occurring in American cities are known in all parts of the world and are used for propaganda purposes in the cold war. Great Britain. Although the major interest in race relations today is in Africa and the United States, some attention is directed to the course of race relations in Britain, where, in the postwar years, large numbers of East Indians, Pakistanis, and West Indians have settled in English cities. With the increasing density of these groups, prejudice and discrimination have been practiced against them, and riots have occurred (Glass 1960). The reaction of the English toward these newcomers is not greatly different from that manifested by whites to the migration of Negroes to northern cities in the United States at the end of World War i, and the British government has been forced to pass legislation limiting the number and type of Commonwealth immigrants. Race relations in the modern world are based upon color as well as upon social and cultural differences. The actions of former colonial peoples in the Near East and Middle East can be interpreted as a revolt of "colored" people against white domination. In a similar sense, the conflict between the Chinese communists and the Western powers involves color differences between the antagonists as
well as variations in ideology. The Asian-African conferences, the first of which was held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, have brought together a wide variety of people who share a common consciousness of being different in color from their former rulers. Thus the question of race relations has become increasingly international, and it is no longer possible for governments to claim that their racial problems are of purely domestic concern. G. FRANKLIN EDWARDS [Directly related are the entries ASSIMILATION; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, article on CIVIL RIGHTS; MINORITIES; PREJUDICE; SEGREGATION. Other relevant material may be found in COLONIALISM; RACE; SLAVERY; and in the biographies of DuBois; FANON; FRAZIER; PARK.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ADAMS, ROMANZO 1937 Interracial Marriage in Hawaii. New York: Macmillan. BALANDIER, GEORGES 1956 Race Relations in West and Central Africa. Pages 145-166 in Conference on Race Relations in World Perspective, Honolulu, 1954, Race Relations in World Perspective: Papers. . . . Edited by Andrew Lind. Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press. BERRY, BREWTON (1951) 1965 Race and Ethnic Relations. 3d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -> First published as Race Relations: The Interaction of Ethnic and Racial Groups. BUNTING, BRIAN (1964) 1965 The Rise of the South African Reich. New York: Smith. CARR-SAUNDERS, ALEXANDER M. (1936) 1965 World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends. New York: Barnes & Noble. CONFERENCE ON RACE RELATIONS IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE, HONOLULU, 1954 1956 Race Relations in World Perspective: Papers. . . . Edited by Andrew Lind. Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press. DAVISON, R. B. 1964 Commonwealth Immigrants. Oxford Univ. Press. DOVER, CEDRIC 1939 Half Caste. London: Seeker & Warburg. EDWARDS, G. FRANKLIN 1959 The Negro Professional Class. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. FRAZIER, E. FRANKLIN (1957) 1965 Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World. Boston: Beacon. FREYRE, GILBERTO (1933) 1956 The Masters and the Slaves (Casa-grande &- senzala): A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization. 2d English language ed., rev. Translated from the 4th definitive Brazilian edition. New York: Knopf. -> First published in Portuguese. An abridged edition was published in 1964 by Knopf. GLASS, RUTH (1960) 1961 London's Newcomers: The West Indian Migrants. Centre for Urban Studies, University College, London, Report No. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> First published as Newcomers: The West Indians in London. HELLMANN, ELLEN (editor) 1949 Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa. Cape Town and London: Oxford Univ. Press. HUGHES, EVERETT C.; and HUGHES, HELEN M. 1952 Where Peoples Meet: Racial and Ethnic Frontiers. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
RACE RELATIONS: Social-psychological Aspects KUPER, LEO 1965 An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class, and Politics in South Africa. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1965. KUPER, LEO; WATTS, HILSTAN; and DAVIES, RONALD L. 1958 Durban: A Study in Racial Ecology. London: Cape; New York: Columbia Univ. Press. LIND, ANDREW 1938 An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii. Univ. of Chicago Press. LITTLE, KENNETH 1948 Negroes in Britain: A Study of Race Relations in English Society. London: Routledge. LOCKE, ALAIN; and STERN, B. J. (1942) 1949 When Peoples Meet. New York: Hinds. MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW (1945) 1961 The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry Into Race Relations in Africa. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. MASON, PHILIP 1954 An Essay on Racial Tension. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. OLIVER, ROLAND A.; and FACE, JOHN D. (1962) 1963 A Short History of Africa. New York Univ. Press. PALMER, EDWARD.N. 1948 Culture Contacts and Population Growth. American Journal of Sociology 53:258262. PARK, ROBERT E. (1913-1944) 1950 Collected Papers of Robert Ezra Park. Volume 1: Race and Culture. Glencoe, 111: Free Press. PARK, ROBERT E. (1926) 1950 The Race Relations Cycle. Pages 149-151 in Robert E. Park, Collected Papers of Robert Ezra Park. Volume 1: Race and Culture. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. PARK, ROBERT E. (1939) 1950 The Nature of Race Relations. Pages 81-116 in Robert E. Park, Collected Papers of Robert Ezra Park. Volume 1: Race and Culture. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. PARSONS, TALCOTT; and CLARK, KENNETH (editors) 1966 The Negro American. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. PIERSON, DONALD (1942) 1947 Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia. Univ. of Chicago Press. PRICE, A. GRENFELL 1950 White Settlers and Native Peoples: An Historical Study of Racial Contacts Between English-speaking Whites and Aboriginal Peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Cambridge Univ. Press. REUTER, EDWARD B. 1918 The Mulatto in the United States. Boston: Badger. RICHMOND, ANTHONY H. 1954 Colour Prejudice in Britain: A Study of West Indian Workers in Liverpool, 1941-1951. London: Routledge. SCHAPERA, ISAAC (1940) 1941 Married Life in an African Tribe. New York: Sheridan. SILBERMAN, CHARLES E. 1964 Crisis in Black and White. New York: Random House. SIMPSON, GEORGE E.; and YINGER, J. MILTON (1953) 1965 Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination. 3d ed. New York: Harper. STONEQUIST, EVERETT V. (1937) 1961 The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict. New York: Russell. THOMPSON, EDGAR T. (editor) 1939 Race Relations and the Race Problem: A Definition and an Analysis. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press. THOMPSON, EDGAR T.; and HUGHES, EVERETT C. (editors) 1958 Race: Individual and Collective Behavior. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. VAN DEN BERGHE, PIERRE L. 1965 South Africa: A Study in Conflict. Middletown, Conn:. Wesleyan Univ. Press.
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WILLIAMS, ROBIN M. JR. 1964 Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in American Communities. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. WILSON, MONICA (HUNTER) (1936) 1961 Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Contact With Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa. 2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press. ->• The first edition was published under the author's maiden name. WIRTH, Louis; and GOLDHAMER, HERBERT 1944 The Hybrid and the Problem of Miscegenation. Pages 249369 in Otto Klineberg (editor), Characteristics of the American Negro. 3d ed. New York: Harper. YOUNG, WHITNEY M. JR. 1964 To Be Equal. New York: McGraw-Hill. II
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
"The problem of the Twentieth Century," wrote W. E. B. DuBois prophetically in 1903, "is the problem of the color line." And, to be sure, together with related concerns it is the problem of the twentieth century. In an era of rising expectations, "the color line" is often the salient common element underlying a diversity of other major concerns—from colonialism to poverty and war. Important as it is, however, social scientists typically view race relations (the social interactions between any two or more socially or biologically defined "races") as merely a particularly potent special case of intergroup relations (the social interactions between any two or more identifiable groups). Concepts and principles which are helpful in understanding relations between racial groups should be of value in understanding intergroup relations in general. Indeed, scientists find this contention repeatedly borne out as the study of these phenomena progresses. Broadly speaking, all intergroup relations are conditioned by four interrelated classes of factors: historical, sociocultural, individual, and situational (adapted from Allport 1954). The first set relates to the unique history of the groups and especially the history of the direct contact between the groups. Thus, no one can fully appreciate the highly patterned "group relations" of the Republic of South Africa without a thorough grounding in the peculiar and complex history of the relations between the Africans, Afrikaners, Coloureds, English, and Indians who inhabit that troubled land. The second general class of variables relates to the sociocultural setting of the intergroup contact. Here a myriad of cultural, economic, political, demographic, and ecological factors come into play. Often these variables can predict at a gross level the status and change in group relations over different geographical areas; for example, in the southern United States, a variety of indexes of
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Negro-white conflict and harmony—from lynching to the desegregation of public facilities—can be reliably predicted from county to county by the use of such demographic variables as the percentages of Negro and urban residents in an area (Pettigrew & Cramer 1959). Individual factors constitute a third broad category. Deep-seated personality dispositions toward outgroup prejudice, as documented by the research on authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950), are important considerations. But so, too, are less deeply rooted personality needs to conform and gain social approval, needs which also lead to outgroup rejection when it is the ingroup sanctioned "thing to do." Likewise, individual phenomenology must be considered, for intergroup behavior is often determined less by objective realities than by the perceptions of these realities. Such perceptions can be shaped by political ideologies and "racial" myths or merely by the individual's need to perceive the situation selectively. The final category—the face-to-face intergroup situation—provides the vital structure connecting these various levels. It is here that the historical, sociocultural, and individual factors come to a focus and, conditioned by the particular characteristics of the situation, produce intergroup relations as such. Hence, this article concentrates on an analysis of the intergroup situation. Intergroup contact A fundamental issue of intergroup and race relations concerns the effects of contact. Some writers maintain that increased contact between groups of markedly different values and origins will lead only to heightened conflict; others hold that increased contact between such groups will decrease prejudice and fear and lead to greater intergroup harmony. Social science evidence supports neither extreme. Increased interaction, whether of individuals or groups, intensifies and magnifies the processes already underway. Hence, more intergroup contact can result in either greater prejudice and rejection or greater respect and acceptance, depending upon the situation in which it occurs. The basic task, then, is to specify the situational conditions under which contact leads to distrust and those under which it leads to trust. Gordon Allport (1954), in his review of the relevant research, concluded that four characteristics of the contact situation are of the utmost importance. Prejudice and conflict are lessened when the two groups possess equal status, seek common goals, are cooperatively dependent upon each other, and interact with the positive support of authori-
ties, law, or custom. Instances throughout the world of intergroup conflict where these situational conditions are not met come readily to mind: caste contact in India, Greek-Turkish contact on Cyprus, racial contact in South Africa. But more solid evidence must come from controlled research. And opportunities for this research abound in a nation such as the United States where intergroup patterns are undergoing extensive alterations. Research evidence. Thus, Allport's contact principles can be seen in operation in a series of studies of newly desegregated situations. Ira N. Brophy (1945) found that white American merchant seamen tended to hold racial attitudes in direct relation to the number of voyages they had taken with equal-status Negro American seamen: the more desegregated the voyages, the more positive their attitudes. Similarly, William M. Kephart (1957) noted that white Philadelphia policemen who had personally worked with Negro policemen were far more favorable toward the further desegregation of their force than other white policemen. Such intergroup bonds built through optimal contact situations can even withstand severe crises. For instance, while Negro and white mobs raged during the Detroit race riot of 1943, desegregated co-workers, university students, and neighbors of long standing peacefully carried on their lives side by side (Lee & Humphrey 1943). Mention of neighborhood desegregation introduces the most solid research evidence available. Repeated studies have found that racially desegregated living in public housing developments that meet all four of Allport's contact criteria sharply reduces intergroup prejudice among both Negro and white neighbors (Deutsch & Collins 1951; Wilner et al. 1955; Works 1961). In addition, these studies demonstrate that living in segregated, but otherwise identical, housing developments structures intergroup contact in such a manner that intergroup bitterness is, if anything, enhanced. The segregated or desegregated pattern of the housing developments fixes a social climate that in turn influences the intergroup expectations, behavior, and attitudes of the occupants. D. M. Wilner and his associates (1955, p. 107) concluded: "Contact and the perceived social climate tend to reinforce each other when their influence operates in the same direction and to cancel each other out when their influence works in opposite directions." In such instances historical and sociocultural factors intersect with the intergroup situation. Consider a comparable study of a multigroup neighborhood in Durban, South Africa (Russell 1961). The area afforded a rare South African example of close
RACE RELATIONS: Social-psychological Aspects contact between Coloureds and Indians, both of relatively high occupational status, and Caucasians; and the situation did enable whites to develop somewhat more positive attitudes toward their nonwhite neighbors. Yet the whites in this unusual situation were defensive about their intergroup contacts, some even attempting to avoid contact as much as possible. Moreover, the contact that did take place was not truly equal and reciprocal. Whites received neighborly aid from nonwhites and entered nonwhite homes far more often than the other way around. In fact, many whites rationalized their intergroup contact in terms of the mildly exploitative aspects of the relationship. Both the whites and nonwhites were fully aware that the social climate of South Africa does not support, in fact punishes, equal-status contact between races— an atmosphere which poisons true neighborliness at the core. A further qualification attends attitude and behavior change through intergroup contact: at least in the early stages, the change is frequently limited to the specific situation involved. Thus, J. D. Lohman and D. C. Reitzes (1952) found that white steelworkers in the northern United States generally approved of the racial desegregation of their union to the point of sharing all union facilities with Negroes and electing Negroes to high office, yet they also sternly opposed the desegregation of their all-white neighborhoods. In this case, as in many others, institutional structures limited the contact effects. Intergroup attitudes and behavior had changed in the work situation, with the support of the union organization; but these changes did not generalize to the neighborhood situation, where a community organization resisted desegregation. In sum, intergroup contact can result in either conflict or harmony, depending upon the situational conditions under wrhich it occurs. When the contact situation involves a combination of equal status, common goals, no competition along group lines, and the support of authorities, law, or custom, improved intergroup relations are likely to result. When these conditions are not met, one of two sharply contrasting negative group stereotypes often emerges. Two contrasting negative stereotypes Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz (1950) have drawn a psychoanalytic distinction between outgroup stereotypes which focus upon superego concerns and those which focus upon id concerns. The superego stereotype ascribes to an entire group such personal traits as being overly am-
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bitious, striving, crafty, clannish, shrewd, intelligent, sly, and dishonest. By contrast, the id stereotype ascribes to an entire group such personal traits as being overly unambitious, lazy, happy-golucky, loud, irresponsible, stupid, dirty, odoriferous, uninhibited, and hypersexed. The psychoanalytic interpretation of these distinctive, though strangely reciprocal, stereotypes is straightforward. These two types of outgroups serve in part as alter egos for the bigot; intergroup animosity in these terms is interpreted as a projection of the bigot's own unacceptable inner impulses onto an outgroup. The prejudiced person thus personifies his own superego sins of ambition, deceit, and egotism in the first type of outgroup, and his own id sins of the flesh in the second type of outgroup (Adorno et al. 1950; Bettelheim & Janowitz 1950). The selection of which stereotype is to be applied to various groups is determined by a complex of historical and sociocultural factors intersecting with individual factors once again at the situational level of analysis. The superego stereotype is typically applied throughout the world to "middleman minorities," that is, groups consisting largely of merchants who are structurally squeezed between the landed and the laboring classes. The id stereotype, however, is typically invoked throughout the world to apply to groups found at the bottom of the social structure. The superego stereotype. The classic middleman situation was that of the European Jews in the Middle Ages. Barred from owning land and encouraged to handle financial matters, they assumed their intermediate status because of the special historical circumstances of the period. This story has been repeated throughout recorded history, partly because the outgroup member may actually perform better than the ingroup member in market situations requiring objectivity and impersonality; Gemeinschaft bonds, in other words, may hinder Gesellschaft relations. Cultural and racial minorities generally occupy this middleman role, probably because they serve as ideal scapegoats, as shock absorbers that protect the elite from the masses. The history of the European Jew bears tragic witness to this buffer function. During episodic crises—from depressions to revolutions and epidemics—the Jew has served as a unifying target of temporary coalitions between landed and laboring elements. Even in relatively peaceful times the Jew has often served the elite in such invidious roles as tax collector, or he has been the object of minor frustrations and competitiveness in market dealings. Hence, the superego stereotype of the Jew as ambitious, sly,
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and dishonest took root. Significant, too, is the fact that this stereotype has also been applied to nonJewish groups caught in the same middleman position. Consequently, the Chinese merchants of Malaysia and Indonesia are often called the "Jews of Asia," and the Muslim Indian merchants of east and south Africa the "Jews of Africa." The id stereotype. The assignment of an impulsive id stereotype to an outgroup occurs in a wider range of intergroup situations; however, these groups are almost invariably at the bottom of the social structure and are generally far less technologically skilled than their detractors. With a history of slavery, segregation, and poverty, Negro Americans have long labored under the image of a lazy, happy-go-lucky, stupid, dirty, hypersexed people. So have the gypsies of central Europe, for centuries an outcaste group. So, too, have the poor of southern Italy. Research reveals that the view held by northern Italians of their fellow countrymen in the south is strikingly similar to the view of Negro Americans that is held by many white Americans (Battacchi 1959). A recent example of the id stereotype has developed in Israel. Higher-status Israelis of European origins often look down on the lower-status Oriental Israelis from north Africa and Asia. The prevailing stereotype of the less technologically advanced Orientals is a familiar one. The assumed group traits are ". . . instability, emotionalism, impulsiveness, unreliability and incompetence . . . habitual lying and cheating, laziness, boastfulness, inclination to violence, uncontrolled temper, superstitiousness, childishness, lack of cleanliness, and in general 'primitivity' and lack of culture'" (Patai 1953, p. 314). Contradictory stereotypes. Sometimes the two types of images are fused into a single contradictory stereotype. In Nazi Germany, for instance, the lack of a significant id type outgroup forced the anti-Semitic image of the Jew to do double duty. Jews had to serve as the personification of both superego and id concerns and were seen as both lazy and too striving, stupid and too intelligent. In most countries, however, bigots possess the luxury of a variety of outgroups, and more differentiated stereotypes have evolved. The prevalence of such stereotypes in the world today raises questions concerning the possibility of relatively permanent safeguards against intergroup conflict. Institutional protections Intergroup and race relations can always be improved; group prejudice and discrimination are by no means inevitable aspects of the human con-
dition. Institutional mechanisms can be established to protect minorities and foster intergroup harmony, and often these institutional changes are won by the minorities themselves. Thus, in the United States, Negro Americans have achieved significant alterations through direct, nonviolent action (Pettigrew 1964). These alterations typically eliminate practices of racial segregation, a prerequisite for allowing and encouraging intergroup contact that meets Airport's four criteria for positive change. Indeed, nationwide public opinion polls have noted major improvements in racial attitudes and linked much of this improvement to the alleviation of segregation (Hyman & Sheatsley 1964). Political coalitions. Political pressures for such institutional changes frequently come about in democracies when a coalition of minorities becomes elector ally powerful. For example, the dominant political party in the United States won seven out of nine presidential elections from 1932 through 1964 as a delicately balanced coalition composed of the predominant share of the nation's Negroes, Jews, and Roman Catholics. It maintained this coalition in large part because of its achievements in establishing institutional protections of minority rights—the most heralded, perhaps, being the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Legally required changes. Appropriate and enforced laws are a principal means of institutionalizing minority acceptance. Yet some repeat the nineteenth-century dictum that "laws cannot change the hearts and minds of men." Changes in race relations in the United States over the past century do not bear this out. A case in point is the 1945 legislation against discrimination in employment enacted by New York State. As a result of this law, many New York City department stores hired Negro Americans as sales clerks for the first time. Two investigations conducted separate tests of the effects of this law-induced desegregation. One study of white sales personnel revealed that those who had experienced the new equal-status job contact with Negroes held more favorable attitudes toward interracial interaction in the work situation (Harding & Hogrefe 1952). Once again, however, the initial effects of this contact did not extend beyond the immediate situation; equal-status clerks were not more likely to accept Negroes in eating and residential situations. The second New York City department store study questioned customers (Saenger & Gilbert 1950). Though reactions to later questioning varied, there was a widespread acceptance of this legally required racial change. Customers were largely
RACE RELATIONS: Social-psychological Aspects concerned with convenient and efficient shopping; many hesitated to challenge the fait accompli firmly established by the law; and for others the new situation was consistent with the national belief in the justice of equal opportunity for all. Behavior and attitudes. Contrary to the old adage, then, law can change the hearts and minds of men. It does so through a vital intermediate step. Enforced law first acts to modify behavior, and this modified behavior in turn changes men's hearts and minds. Notice that this is precisely the opposite sequence commonly believed to be the most effective method of improving intergroup relations. Persuade people to be less prejudiced through informational and good will campaigns, goes the conventional reasoning, and then their intergroup behavior will improve. To be sure, this sequence is sometimes effective, but the preponderance of social psychological evidence attests to the greater efficacy of the opposite approach. Behaving differently is more often the precursor of thinking differently. The basic problem with exhortation as a means of bettering intergroup relations is that it does not require participants to change their behavior. If there is intergroup contact, it is generally brief and artificial. Moreover, a vast body of psychological data indicates that prejudiced individuals avoid tolerance messages altogether, deny the relevance of the messages for themselves, or find ways of twisting the meaning of the messages (Cooper & Jahoda 1947; Hyman & Sheatsley 1947). True, antidiscrimination laws can also be "tuned out" by prejudiced individuals. But if properly enforced, such legislation has a potential for achieving behavioral change that is not possessed by exhortation. Several reasons for this are apparent. There is, of course, the threat of punishment and unfavorable publicity for recalcitrants. But more important is the "off the hook" function such laws provide. Thus, the department stores in New York City may each have been afraid to hire Negro sales personnel as long as there was no assurance that their competitors would follow suit. But the antidiscrimination law, applied to all stores, furnished this needed assurance. And, as noted in the studies previously cited, the legally established fait accompli, unlike exhortations for intergroup tolerance, generates its own acceptance. The situational face lifting it achieves is a year-round process, a constant, institutionalized reminder that intergroup harmony is the sanctioned norm. Finally, the new behavior required by the law commits the individual psychologically; for he who has publicly behaved in a new manner and been rewarded for
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doing so is likely to become personally committed to the intergroup change. A microcosmic case in point The fundamental principles underlying situational factors in intergroup relations are dramatically highlighted by an ingenious field experiment conducted by the eminent social psychologist Sherif (Oklahoma, University of . . . 1961). Twenty young boys, of homogeneous backgrounds but previously unacquainted with one another, attended a summer camp set up for the investigation. From the start, the boys were divided into two groups— "the Rattlers" and "the Eagles." The first stage of the experiment was designed to develop high esprit de corps within each of the groups. Totally separated from each other, the Rattlers and the Eagles engaged in a variety of satisfying experiences, and each group soon developed the pride and sense of "we-ness" characteristic of strong ingroup solidarity. The second stage of the study brought the two groups face-to-face in a series of grimly competitive tasks, such as tug-of-war, baseball and football games, and tent pitching. In all of these contact situations only one group could win and the other had to lose. The inevitable animosity soon appeared. Derogatory songs and slogans were composed; destructive raids on "the enemy's cabin" began; negative stereotypes developed; and even preferences for group segregation were voiced. Competitive contact had wreaked its usual havoc. The experiment's third stage tried to mend the damage. An approach involving more intergroup contact without competition came first. The boys met in such situations as eating good food in the same room, shooting off fireworks, and attending a motion picture. Note that all of these activities involved passive conduct without common goals or group interdependence. And, understandably, intergroup friction between the Rattlers and the Eagles did not abate; in fact, the boys employed these unfocused events as opportunities for further vilification of their hated rivals. Next the investigators introduced carefully contrived problems that required the cooperation of both groups for their solution. Fixing the damaged water tank that supplied the entire camp, jointly raising the funds to show a favorite motion picture, and other such functionally dependent behavior achieved a striking decline in intergroup hostility. While at the close of the competitive second stage more than half of the characteristics assigned by the boys to their group rivals were sharply unfavorable, more than two-thirds of such judgments were favorable at the close of the
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interdspendent third stage. In addition, the percentage of friendship choices across group lines multiplied fourfold. One final result of Sherif's intriguing investigation replicated the limited nature of the attitude change initially induced even under optimal intergroup contact conditions. The first interdependent encounters of the two camp groups by no means removed all of the bad feeling between the Rattlers and the Eagles. But as these socially sanctioned confrontations continued, the prejudice-reducing power of this type of contact accumulated. This finding suggests that as a widespread process of institutionalized change in intergroup relations proceeds, it may well receive increasingly greater support and have increasingly greater effects upon the participants. This possibility is of special relevance to such intergroup processes as India's efforts to end caste discrimination and the United States' efforts to end racial segregation. THOMAS F. PETTIGREW BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADORNO, THEODOR W. et al. 1950 The Authoritarian Personality. American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series, No. 3. New York: Harper. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1954 The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. -> An abridged paperback edition was published in 1958 by Doubleday. BATTACCHI, MARCO W. 1959 Meridionali e settentrionali nella struttura del pregiudizio ethnico in Italia. Bologna (Italy): Societa Editrice II Mulino. BETTELHEIM, BRUNO; and JANOWITZ, MORRIS (1950) 1964 Social Change and Prejudice, Including Dynamics of Prejudice. New York: Free Press. -» A reprinting of Dynamics of Prejudice, with a reassessment of its findings. BROPHY, IRA N. 1945 The Luxury of Anti-Negro Prejudice. Public Opinion Quarterly 9:456-466. COOPER, EUNICE; and JAHODA, MARIE 1947 The Evasion of Propaganda: How Prejudiced People Respond to Anti-prejudice Propaganda. Journal of Psychology 23:15-25. DAVIS, JOHN P. (editor) 1966 The American Negro Reference Book. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall. DEUTSCH, MORTON; and COLLINS, MARY E. 1951 Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a Social Experiment. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. DuBois, W. E. B. (1903) 1963 The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches. Gloucester, Mass.: Smith. HARDING, J. and HOGREFE, R. 1952 Attitudes of White Department Store Employees Toward Negro Co-workers. Journal of Social Issues 8, no. 1:18-28. HYMAN, HERBERT H.; and SHEATSLEY, PAUL B. 1947 Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail. Public Opinion Quarterly 11:412-423. HYMAN, HERBERT H.; and SHEATSLEY, PAUL B. 1964 Attitudes Toward Desegregation. Scientific American 211, no. 1:16-23. KEPHART, WILLIAM M. 1957 Racial Factors and Urban Law Enforcement. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press.
LEE, ALFRED M.; and HUMPHREY, NORMAN D. 1943 Race Riot. New York: Dryden. LOHMAN, J. D.; and REITZES, D. C. 1952 A Note on Race Relations in Mass Society. American Journal of Sociology 58, no. 3:240-246. OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF, INSTITUTE OF GROUP RELATIONS 1961 Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment, by Muzafer Sherif et al. Norman, Okla.: University Book Exchange. PATAI, RAPHAEL 1953 Israel Between East and West: A Study in Human Relations. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. PETTIGREW, THOMAS F. 1964 A Profile of the Negro American. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. PETTIGREW, THOMAS F.; and CRAMER, M. RICHARD 1959 The Demography of Desegregation. Joiirnal of Social Issues 15, no. 4:61-71. RUSSELL, MARGO 1961 A Study of a South African Interracial Neighborhood. Master's thesis, Univ. of Natal. SAENGER, GERHART; and GILBERT, EMILY 1950 Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales Personnel. International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research 4:57-76. WILNER, DANIEL M.; WALKLEY, ROSABELLE P.; and COOK, STUART W. 1955 Human Relations in Interracial Housing: A Study of the Contact Hypothesis. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. WORKS, ERNEST 1961 The Prejudice-Interaction Hypothesis From the Point of View of the Negro Minority Group. American Journal of Sociology 67:47-52.
RADBRUCH, GUSTAV Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949), German philosopher of law and statesman, was born into a well-to-do middle-class family. A baptized Lutheran, Radbruch was for many years critical of his church, but later in life he became increasingly religious, especially when confronted with the Nazi dictatorship. He then practiced a "Christianity-insubstance," professing "the belief of the unbeliever." His excellent education in Latin and Greek at the Liibeck Gymnasium was to make him a friend of the classics for the rest of his life. His interest in social questions dated from an early age, and he began his studies of law and economics while at the University of Munich. He continued his studies in law at the University of Leipzig, where he read the works of Rudolf von Jhering and Rudolf Sohm, famous teachers at that university. At the same time, he was influenced by Lujo Brentano's idea of a liberally tempered socialism. Radbruch attended Binding's lectures at Leipzig, and although he was less impressed by Binding's conservative opinions about the law than he was later by the new ideas that Franz von Liszt was teaching at Berlin, he nevertheless learned from Binding to do careful legal research according to the best historical methods of contemporary juris-
RADBRUCH, GUSTAV prudence. From boyhood Radbruch was interested in legal history, with a special liking for memoirs and anecdotes. His legal research was influenced by Karl Biicher's empirical psychologism, by Wilhelm Wundt's psychological ethnology, and by Karl Lamprecht's sociological history. Other sources of intellectual excitement were certain chapters of Marx's Capital, Gerhart Hauptmann's revolutionary play The Weavers, and Richard Dehmel's Song of a Workman. After he had obtained his doctorate at Berlin, Radbruch became, on Liszt's recommendation, an unsalaried lecturer at the University of Heidelberg. There he became a friend of the philosophers Emil Lask and Heinrich Levy, who brought him into contact with the "Heidelberg Neo-Kantianism" of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. Inspired by this philosophy, Radbruch turned his attention from Liszt's empirical and psychological monism to the problems of a philosophy of values. The results of these various studies were two books, Einfiihrung in die Rechtswissenschaft (1910) and Grundziige der Rechtsphilosophie (1914). Influenced also by Max Weber, Radbruch developed in these books two of the principles of his thought: the difference between "is" and "ought" (what he called "methodological dualism") and the axiom of "relativism" (the idea that values cannot be proved but only confessed). He then tried to combine these philosophical ideas with political theory; relativism, he asserted, stipulates tolerance, which is an indispensable condition of democracy. This thesis led Radbruch to formulate a threefold theory of political ideologies: "individualism" as applied to society produces a laissezfaire economy and gives pre-eminence to individual liberty; from "collectivism" follows the realization of a socialist economy and a general emphasis on the community; "transpersonalism"—in political practice "conservatism"—places a primary emphasis on cultural institutions. A highly skillful teacher, Radbruch influenced a considerable number of talented foreign students, especially Polish and Russian emigrants. Together with his friend Hermann Kantorowicz, the initiator of the free-law movement, Radbruch pleaded for a sociological, functional jurisprudence (Interessenjurisprudenz, jurisprudence of interests) instead of the formalistic approach of the still prevailing Begriffsjurisprudenz (jurisprudence of concepts, analytical positivism), which conceived of the law as a body of rules applicable to every possible case regardless of the interests and social problems involved. Determined to prove his sociolegal ideas, he held positions in Bruchsal as town
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councilor, as a member of the welfare office, and also for a time in the penitentiary. In 1914 Radbruch became a professor of criminal law at Konigsberg. When World War I began, he initially did voluntary work in a military hospital, but toward the end of the war he took part, as an officer, in several battles in France. Although a pacifist, he came to see military service as a moral obligation. "I go to prove my soul," he wrote to a friend, quoting from Browning, and added, "I want to hold solidarity with the simple folk." When the war was over, Radbruch became a professor at Kiel. He established a new institute for adult education there (a Volhshochschule') and wrote articles about the need for civics instruction in the schools. During the revolt of the German army (the Kapp Putsch) in March 1920, Radbruch was arrested for a brief period and threatened with a death sentence, but his courage and ingenuity saved him. Shortly thereafter, he was elected to the German Reichstag and twice held the position of minister of justice; he was particularly influential in the area of penal reform. He resigned from his political positions in 1923, returning to his chair of criminal and legal philosophy at Kiel, and after 1926 he taught at Heidelberg. The subject of his inaugural lecture at Heidelberg was the challenge of political self-education (1927), and on Constitution Day, 1928, he spoke before the Reichstag on the duties of the responsible citizen in a democracy (1929). The 1932 edition of his Rechtsphilosophie contained a new theory of social democracy. The principal thesis expounded was that of the unresolvable antinomies of the fundamental aspects of the idea of law: justice, legal certainty, and expediency. These "jointly govern law in all its aspects, although they may sharply contradict one another" ([1914] 1950, p. 111). Justice demands conformity to fundamental moral values; expediency (Zweckmassigkeit^) pays attention to the social function of law; legal certainty primarily demands formal acknowledgment of the law and of judicial decisions regardless of whether or not they are just. By stressing equally each of these components, Radbruch tried to fight the fatal onesidedness that raises any one of these principles to sole dominion. On the eve of totalitarian monism in Germany, he pleaded for the many-sidedness of the idea of law. In his effort to "spiritualize" socialism—in accordance with Goethe's pattern for an ideal community in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre—Radbruch aimed at a closer relationship between socialism and religion. In 1919 he had published,
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together with Paul Tillich, the Religionsphilosophie der Kultur, and in 1922 he wrote the Kulturlehre des Sozialismus, with the intention of reconciling socialism with humanism. In April 1933, the Nazi regime dismissed Radbruch as an "untrustworthy official." His house was searched and his private papers confiscated. Thus excluded from public activity, he began to write a biography of the famous criminologist, Anselm von Feuerbach. This important work, highly esteemed by Thomas Mann, was published in Vienna in 1934. Another remarkable book, Elegantiae juris criminalis (1938) contains essays on historical subjects. Gestalten und Gedanken (1944), a collection of beautiful studies on art and literature, was written during the war. When Radbruch was reinstated in 1945, he was 67 years old and no longer in good health. His only son had died during the war in Russia. Unable to resume the burden of political activity, he contented himself with giving lectures. He did have the consolation that during his compulsory 12-year absence from the German academic scene, his works were greatly appreciated abroad. In 1935 he had spent several months visiting University College, Oxford, and studying English law. These studies resulted in Der Geist des englischen Rechts (1946a) and in several essays, of which "Gesetzliches Unrecht und iibergesetzliches Recht" (1946&) became the most famous. This essay shows a tendency toward natural-law doctrines, an inclination to evolution, rather than revolution, in Radbruch's views. On his seventieth birthday, on November 11, 1948, a Festgabe entitled Beitrdge zur Kulturund Rechtsphilosophie was dedicated to him (Beitrdge . . . 1948). One year later he had a stroke and died. The works of Radbruch were frequently criticized during his lifetime by German writers who found fault with his "materialistic positivism," his "enlightened rationalism," and his "unscientific relativism." Conservatives blamed him for being revolutionary, liberals for being a socialist, communists for being bourgeois. Idealists called him a realist, historians labeled him a philosopher, and philosophers rebuked his "simple jurisprudence." Sociologists disliked his "poetical sense"; lawyers could not accept his "humanistic bent." The abundance of Radbruch's spirit, his tolerance, and humanity were as irritating to certain narrow-minded people as his versatility was shocking to others. Now he has won recognition, and it is realized that his relativism is of the greatest value for the necessary self-criticism of the law and of lawyers. He revealed the provisional character of all human
laws, the questionable character of all self-righteous jurisdiction, and the inhumanity of all intolerant totalitarianism. He became one of the most important figures in modern legal philosophy in Germany and acquired a receptive audience in the rest of the world. ERIK WOLF [For the historical context of Radbruch's work, see the biographies of BRENTANO; BUCHER; LAMPRECHT; WEBER, MAX; WUNDT. For discussion of the subsequent development of Radbruch's ideas, see JURISPRUDENCE; LAW; POLITICAL THEORY; and the biographies of BRECHT; KANTOROWICZ; KELSEN.] WORKS BY RADBRUCH
(1910) 1961 Einfiihrung in die Rechtswissenschaft. 10th rev. ed. Stuttgart (Germany): Koehler. (1914) 1950 Gustav Radbruch: Legal Philosophy. Pages 43-224 in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin. Translated by Kurt Wilk. 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. 4. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» First published as Grundziige der Rechtsphilosophie. The 1950 edition was translated from the revised and rewritten edition of 1932, published as Rechtsphilosophie. A sixth German edition, edited by Erik Wolf, was published in 1963. 1919 RADBRUCH, GUSTAV; and TILLICH, PAUL Religionsphilosophie der Kultur: Zwei Entwiirfe. Berlin: Reuther. -> "tiber Religionsphilosophie des Rechts," by Gustav Radbruch; "Uber die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur," by Paul Tillich. (1922) 1949 Kulturlehre des Sozialismus: Ideologische Betrachtungen. 3d rev. ed. Berlin: Dietz. 1927 Der Mensch im Recht: Heidelberger Antrittsvorlesung. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. 1929 Verfassungsrede gehalten von prof. dr. Gustav Radbruch bei der Feier der Reichsregierung am 11. august 1928. Berlin: Reichszentrale fur Heimatdienst. (1934) 1957 Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach: Ein Juristenleben. 2d ed., edited by Erik Wolf. Gottingen (Germany): Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1936a Anglo-American Jurisprudence Through Continental Eyes. Law Quarterly Review 52:530—545. 1936b Justice and Equity in International Relations. Pages 1-13 in Justice and Equity in the International Sphere. New Commonwealth Institute Monographs, Series B, No. 1. London: Constable. 1936c Jurisprudence in the Criminal Law. Journal of Comparative Legislation anC. International Law 18: 212-225. (1938) 1950 Elegantiae juris criminalis: Vierzehn Studien zur Geschichte des Strafrechts. 2d ed., rev. Basel: Verlag fur Recht und Gesellschaft. 1944 Gestalten und Gedanken: Acht Studien. Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang. (1946fl) 1958 Der Geist des englischen Rechts. 4th ed. Gottingen (Germany): Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. (1946b) 1950 Gesetzliches Unrecht und iibergesetzliches Recht. Pages 347-357 in Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie. 4th ed. Stuttgart (Germany): Koehler. WORKS ABOUT RADBRUCH
Beitrdge zur Kultur- und Rechtsphilosophie. 1948 Heidelberg (Germany): Rausch. ->• See especially pages 280-287 for a bibliography of Radbruch's works.
RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. BODENHEIMER, EDGAR 1962 Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. ->• See especially pages 131-134. BRECHT, ARNOLD 1959 Political Theory: The Foundation of Twentieth-century Political Thought. Princeton Univ. Press. -> See especially pages 233—236. CAMPBELL, ARCHIBALD H. 1949 Gustav Radbruch's Rechtsphilosophie and the English Jurisprudence. Preface by Dr. E. Wolf. Miinden (Germany): Nowack. CHROUST, ANTON H. 1944 Philosophy of Law of Gustav Radbruch. Philosophical Review 53:23-45. FRIEDMANN, WOLFGANG (1944)1960 Legal Ti eory. 4th ed. London: Stevens. FULLER, LON L. 1954 American Legal Philosophy at Mid-century. Journal of Legal Education 6:457—485. -» See especially pages 481-485 on the legal philosophy of Gustav Radbruch. PATTERSON, EDWIN W. 1953 Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law. New York: Foundation Press. -> See especially pages 399-403. WOLF, ERIK 1958 Revolution or Evolution in Gustav Radbruch's Legal Philosophy. Natural Law Forum 3: 1-23.
RADCLIFFE-BROWN,
A. R.
Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) was one of the most eminent anthropologists of the first half of the twentieth century. By example and teaching he helped to develop and establish modern "social" anthropology as a generalizing, theoretical discipline. The most notable of his many important contributions was his application to primitive societies of some of the ideas of systems theory, which led to a revolution in the analysis and interpretation of social relations. In brief, he may be said to have turned social anthropology from its preoccupation with historical development and psychological extrapolation to the comparative study of persistent and changing social structures. Radcliffe-Brown was born and educated in England. He attended first the Royal Commercial Travellers' School at Pinner, Middlesex, and then for two years was a foundation scholar at King Edward's High School, Birmingham. He left school when not yet 18 years old, undecided on a career and with few prospects. By private study he gained an exhibition at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1901 and held it with increasing distinction until 1906. His original intention had been to study natural science, but his tutor, W. W. Rowse Ball, a mathematician and minor historian, and incidentally a great admirer of Sir James Frazer, diverted him to "moral science." In the curriculum °f the time, moral science included experimental psychology and economics as well as philosophical subjects. Radcliffe-Brown took his bachelor's degree in 1905, being placed in the first division of the first class.
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Of great significance were his university associations with W. H. R. Rivers, A. C. Haddon, and C. S. Myers. All three had been members of the 1898 Cambridge Expedition to Torres Strait. Myers was the exemplar of rigorous and fruitful scientific method, while Haddon and Rivers introduced Radcliffe-Brown to the discipline of anthropology and vitally influenced the shaping of his approach. Haddon, who became one of Radcliffe-Brown's most enthusiastic sponsors, transferred to him his own critical acumen, his interest in classification and morphology, his demand for inductive generalization on the widest possible basis, and his recognition that a strict comparative method demands the intensive field study of particular societies. There is some reason to think it was Haddon, too, who first made him critically aware of the systemic interdependence of social phenomena and who may thus have edged him toward a sympathy for Durkheim's viewpoint. Rivers was an inspiring teacher in psychology, but RadcliffeBrown progressively turned away from Rivers' conception of anthropology, which eventually became a historical fantasy about the diffusion of culture. However, the qualities of mind that Rivers showed in his psychological studies—his insistence on scientific procedures, delight in analysis, and facility in adapting problems to novel experimental conditions—were precisely those which Radcliffe-Brown developed to a striking degree. He dedicated The Andaman Islanders (1922) to both Haddon and Rivers. Given this background, it is not difficult to understand the fixation on the methods of natural science that came to characterize Radcliffe-Brown's approach. It is noteworthy, also, that he studied carefully the writings on the philosophy of science of William Whewell, especially Whewell's work on the processes of inductive thought. In view of the recent rediscovery of Whewell's importance, it says much for Radcliffe-Brown's precocity that he preferred him to J. S. Mill at a time when Mill was generally much more highly regarded. Most of Radcliffe-Brown's working life was spent outside England. He held chairs of social anthropology successively at Cape Town, 1920-1925; Sydney, 1925-1931; Chicago, 1931-1937; and Oxford, 1937-1946, where he was also a fellow of All Souls College. He was visiting professor at Yenching in 1935 and at Sao Paulo from 1942 to 1944. After his retirement from Oxford he was professor of social science and director of the Institute of Social Studies at Farouk i University, Alexandria, from 1947 to 1949, and he later held a special appointment at Rhodes University, Gra-
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hamstown, South Africa, from 1951 to 1954. He was associated in various capacities with several other universities, including Cambridge (where he had been a fellow of Trinity College from 1908 to 1914), London, Birmingham, and Manchester. He devoted a great deal of time to the stimulation and organization of research by others and was restlessly active in promoting large schemes. While in South Africa, he organized the School of African Life and Languages with his own chair as a nucleus. At Sydney, in conjunction with the Australian National Research Council, he founded the journal Oceania and directed a vigorous and successful research program. But there, as at Cape Town and later at Chicago, he was frustrated by a shortage of money, and he had the same problem at Oxford, where there was an interest in research but no substantial funds available until after he had retired. Among his many professional distinctions were membership in the Amsterdam Royal Academy of Sciences, honorary membership in the New York Academy of Sciences, fellowship in the British Academy, first presidency of the British Association of Social Anthropologists, and the presidency of the Royal Anthropological Institute, which awarded him the Rivers Medal in 1938 and the Huxley Memorial Medal in 1951. Only the Australian National Research Council declined to admit him to full membership. A number of his students who attained high academic distinction in the field of anthropology, together with others whom he had influenced less directly, paid him tribute in two collections of essays (Social Anthropology . . . 1937; Fortes 1949) and by two special printings of some of his own outstanding writings ([19231949] 1961; 1958). A tall man with a distinguished air and presence, strikingly handsome in his prime, he often captivated people as much by his charm, wit, and cultivation as by the appeal of his ideas. He was a particularly brilliant teacher who was so much the master of his subject, and of the arts of rostrum and seminar, that he could expound the most difficult topics without notes or any outward hint of preparation. His writings gave the same impression. Throughout his life, his complex personality caused divided reactions to him, arousing devotion, ambivalence, and hostility. In his youth he had a reputation of dash, extravagance, and overbrilliance, and at Cambridge he had been known as "Anarchy" Brown because of a flirtation with anarchism, later transmuted into a mild socialism. (He changed his name by deed poll, in 1926, from
Brown to Radcliffe-Brown, Radcliffe being his mother's family name.) When more mature he tended to keep people at a certain distance and seemed to discourage overintimacy or dependence, rarely permitting himself to show signs of private experience. Although he did not seek disciples, circles did form around him. In congenial company, he was warm and kindly and, with students, he was patient, courteous, and almost always helpful. Several generations of young people thought him inspirational and found that the inspiration lasted. But there were those to whom he showed another side, who felt his cutting wit and memorable power of scorn. He could give an impression of waiting for others to cross a pons asinorum that he had built for them. He was somewhat given to instructing other scholars in their own subjects and his conception of social anthropology emboldened him to call into question the autonomy or status of other disciplines. Many who knew him over long periods thought him, certainly, a man of hubris, yet at the same time without jealousy, malice, or censoriousness. He had no liking for academic politics and was not caught up in the pursuit of power or advantage. He was never affluent, and his health caused him more or less constant concern. Theoretical orientation. Radcliffe-Brown's outlook rested on a highly personal philosophy of science. A primary influence on that philosophy was Wliewell, from whom he appears to have acquired his passion for method. He possessed in a notable degree what Whewell had regarded as an all-important requisite in inductive science—a fertile, sagacious, ingenious, and honest mind—and his work continually exemplified Whewell's formula for the growth of a generalizing science of principle—the "colligation of facts" and the "explication of concepts" by "progressive intuition." In its more general philosophical aspect, his position was a synthesis, or attempted synthesis, of extraordinarily diverse elements: he drew his theory of reality from Heraclitus, his theory of process from Herbert Spencer, and his theory of epistemology from Durkheim. Moreover, his indebtedness was by no means limited to those thinkers. There is evidence that he drew on Hume, Samuel Alexander, Whitehead, and Ralph Barton Perry, and he had a considerable affinity for Chinese philosophy. He freely acknowledged the influence of certain writers of the French Enlightenment, notably Condorcet and Montesquieu, in forming his conception of social science. Comte and Durkheim had considerable attraction for him, and he spent much effort in testing some of Durkheim's ideas against
RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. facts. His debt to these Continental theorists, however, was more for their sociology than for their philosophy, a fact that is somewhat concealed by his proximate debt to Spencer. Although RadcliffeBrown did not reject the agnostic-evolutionist label, he had important disagreements with Spencer, just as he did with Comte and Durkheim: his most serious disagreement with Spencer had to do with the latter's historical speculations, his extreme individualism, and the utilitarianism to which Durkheim also objected. Radcliffe-Brown agreed with Durkheim about the relation between the individual and society but ruthlessly pruned the French sociologist's thought of its reined abstractions. His conviction that the particular events of social life are the facts to which all concepts and theories must be applied rested directly on a Heraclitean view of reality. His critics never realized that his fundamental viewpoint was thoroughly historical, that he merely claimed Hume's "privilege of the sceptic" as to the possibility of making inductive generalizations about history; its entanglement of accident with law seemed to him to rule out the prospect. The Heraclitean logos, with its emphasis on persistence through change, on the necessary interconnectedness of things, and on formal rather than genetic unity, posed an essential problem: to find what is discoverably coherent in the social process. It is not always changing in all respects at once, but is constrained and shaped to be what it is at particular places and times. This view, in amalgam with Spencer's conception of evolution as at one and the same time a process toward higher integration and differentiation, and with some contributions from Durkheim's sociology, led Radcliffe-Brown to the conception of types and forms of social structure as fiduciary equilibria in persistent systems. Theoretical contributions. Radcliffe-Brown formed his theoretical approach as early as 1908, when as a postgraduate student he stated the requirements of a science of human society. He considered them to be threefold: to treat social phenomena as natural facts and thus subject to discoverable necessary conditions and laws; to adhere to the methodology of the natural sciences; to entertain only generalizations that can be tested and verified. He never departed from these rules, although his conceptual thought developed steadily. His ideas and methods did not change essentially from those he put forward in his early works, The Andaman Islanders and two papers, "The Methods °f Ethnology and Social Anthropology" (1923) and "The Mother's Brother in South Africa" ([1924] 1961, pp. 15-31); but their classic formulation
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came somewhat later, in two years, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science" ([1935] 1961, pp. 178-187) and "On Social Structure" ([1940] 1961, pp. 188-204), and in a third study, in which he applied his theoretical approach, The Social Organization of Australian Tribes (1931a). Instead of explaining social phenomena in historical or psychological terms, which he believed to be impossible, Radcliffe-Brown proposed to explain them as persistent systems of adaptation, coaptation, and integration. His main working hypothesis was that the life of a society can be conceived of as a dynamic fiduciary system of interdependent elements, functionally consistent with one another. He had used the notion of "social structure" as early as 1914, but in Frazer's and Rivers' rather ill-defined sense, as almost a doublet of "organization." In the 1920s his use of the notion became more explicit, and in the 1930s quite precise. In his final formulation, structure refers to an arrangement of persons and organization to an arrangement of activities. At the same time, he substituted the concept of "social system" for that of "culture." All these changes were connected. In order to achieve scientific explanation, Radcliffe-Brown urged that anthropology free itself from concern with what Whitehead called "the goading urgency of contingent happenings." Although he was himself a humanist, he saw that a humanist anthropology was premature and could prevent wide induction, comparison, and generalization. His primary goal was the abstraction of general features and the search for comparable types and varieties, and he believed that the only acceptable method for acquiring systematic knowledge is to test successive hypotheses with facts. Some of his contemporaries who admired his empirical and analytical studies nevertheless failed to appreciate the extent to which these studies derived their excellence from his methods and principles; instead, they felt that his anthropology was unduly sparse, rigid, and lacking in human values. The impression that Radcliffe-Brown's work was surrounded by an aura of unreality was created by his abstract conception of anthropology as a science that could move from empiricism, classification, and unguided induction to postulation and many-dimensional theory. It was a conception that anthropologists with a historical, genetical, or psychological outlook, including those of Malinowski's school, could not accept, and indeed his idea of social anthropology as a "comparative sociology," with the fundamental character of a natural theoretical science, did not win the recognition Radcliffe-Brown had hoped for. To be sure, many of
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the empirical and analytical discoveries that he made only by virtue of that conception, as well as his general principles of functional—structural study, came into wide use, but within frameworks of thought and in the service of methods having little in common with his. His published work was slender in bulk, comprising only some 70 items, even including miscellaneous writings such as reviews. All of his writings are marked by clear language, impeccable style, and logical ability, combined with exceptional scientific imagination. He also had a sense for good technical language and for classification and typology. He gave many useful technical notions and terms to anthropology: for example, a precise language for the orders of family and kin relationships; the distinctions between pater and genitor, between rights in rem and in personam, and between organization and structure; and such notions as that of a "corporation" serving an "estate," of "alliance" or "consolidation," of "structural opposition," and of "ritual status" and "ritual value." His schematic ability was well displayed even in his first Australian study, "Three Tribes of Western Australia" (1913). His only extended field expeditions were to the Andaman Islands, in 1906-1908, and to northwestern West Australia, in 1910-1912, but there is no substance to the allegation that he had a temperamental preference for the armchair. Rather, both the studies that resulted from his field trips and those that were produced from secondary research reveal his characteristic use of theory to guide imagination. In "The Mother's Brother in South Africa," not the product of a field expedition, he developed a brilliant hypothesis of correlative, sympathetic, and antithetic functions to account for similar structural patterns of relationships in diverse types of societies. In The Social Organization of Australian Tribes (1931a), which covered the whole of aboriginal Australia as then known, he made a catalogue, classification, analytic generalization, and synthesis of an immense range of data on patterns of sex and age, community of language and custom, possession and occupancy of territory, kinship, marriage, segmentation, and cosmology. From this monumental account of variety within homogeneity there emerged, in addition to a typology that guided thought for a generation, the first forms of the analytical generalizations of relationship systems on which "structure" study was to be based, notably the jural significance of kinship classifications; the structuring of relationships by generation, age, and sex; the "internal solidarity" of sibling groups; and
the "external unity" of lineage. These two studies alone would have assured him a substantial reputation, but he produced 14 others on totemism (1914; 1929), primitive law ([1933] 1961, pp. 212-219), sanctions ([1934] 1961, pp. 205-211), patrilineal and matrilineal succession ([1935] 1961, pp. 32-48), taboo ([1939] 1961, pp. 133152), joking relationships ([1940; 1949] 1961, pp. 90-104, 105-116), religion ([1945] 1961, pp. 153-177), kinship systems ([1941] 1961, pp. 49-89), theory of comparative social anthropology (1958, pp. 42-129), and political systems (1940, pp. xi-xxiii). In constructing his theory of social systems, Radcliffe-Brown considered "phenomenal intelligible reality" to consist of objects or events and the relations between them. The relations are of two kinds, which may be symbolized as R and r. The first kind, H, are spatiotemporal relations of "real interconnectedness"; the second, r, are logicomathematical relations which are "immanent in the universe" and independent of space and time. He conceived of social anthropology as a discipline that ultimately would deal theoretically with both classes. The social anthropology of function, structure, and relational networks (the first phase in the development of social anthropology more generally) deals with the relations of real interconnectedness, with ". . . the continuing arrangement of persons in relationships defined or controlled by institutions, i.e., socially established norms or patterns of behavior" (1958, p. 177). The substance of this study is the "real and concrete" social structure resulting from "role-activities" of persons acting from "positions" in that structure. Interrelation al (R) concepts apply only to what he called "the internal nature" of particular social systems, such as those of Kariera or Aranda, a system being a set or assemblage of interdependent parts forming "a naturally occurring unity," a complex, ordered, and unified whole in a. particular region over a period of time. In the second phase of the development of social anthropology, an effort would be made to deal with r-relations, which Radcliffe-Brown conceived to be, at their simplest, relations of similarity and difference. This would require some sort of nonquantitative mathematics or other system of symbols. Although he held that R-relations were different from r-relations, it was characteristic of him to envisage an eventual theoretical science bringing both within mathematical or symbolic analysis, the task of abstract theory being the conceptualization of "real interconnectedness" in ways that would
RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R. make the analysis possible. He realized such a science existed only "in its most elementary beginnings," and he himself devoted considerable effort to the task of bringing the two classes of relationship together. Radcliffe-Brown's social anthropology is best described by separating two main elements, a general theory and a central one. The general theory produced three connected sets of questions. The first set deals with static, or morphological, problems: what kinds of societies are there? what are their similarities and differences? how are they to be classified and compared? The second set deals with dynamic problems: how do societies function? how do they persist? The third deals with developmental problems: how do societies change their types? how do new types come into existence? what general laws relate to the changes? The general theory dealing with these problems was transposed from biology and bore a heavily Spencerian cast in its emphasis on three aspects of adaptation: ecological adaptation to the physical environment; social adaptation, i.e., the institutional arrangements by which social order is maintained; and the socialization, or "cultural adaptation," of persons. The central theory dealt with the determinants of social relations of all kinds. Radcliffe-Brown phrased it in terms of the coaptation or fitting together or harmonization of individual interests or values that makes possible "relations of association" and "social values." The theory resembles Spencer's "market" model of interaction and draws on the tradition reflected in Ralph Barton Perry's General Theory of Value. The two theories are articulated in the idea that the life of a society can be conceived and studied as a system of relations of association and that a particular social structure is an arrangement of relations in which the interests or values of different individuals and groups are coapted within fiduciary "social values" expressed as institutional norms. The idea of coaptation is fundamental to Radcliffe-Brown's whole outlook, but the logical and conceptual implications are not fully worked out, nor are the static and dynamic aspects of the coaptative process. What he did write is probably best viewed as only a sketch for a "pure" theory dealing with all classes of relations of association and, a fortiori, all classes of functioning systems or social structures. He became increasingly preoccupied with the general theory and, in his later period especially, with the concept of structure, at the expense of the theory of coaptation.
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While Radcliffe-Brown did not regard the study of social structure as the whole of anthropology, he did consider it to be its most important branch; but he asserted that "the study of social structure leads immediately to the study of interests or values as the determinant of social relations" (1940) and that a "social system can be conceived and studied as a system of values" ([1939] 1961, pp. 133-152). W. E. H. STANNER [For the historical context of Radcliffe-Brown's work, see the biographies of COMTE; DURKHEIM; FRAZER; HADDON; KROEBER; MALINOWSKI; RIVERS; SPENCER; WHEWELL; for discussion of his ideas, see ANTHROPOLOGY, article on SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY; CULTURE; ETHNOLOGY; FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS; KINSHIP.] WORKS BY RADCLIFFE-BROWN Dates in brackets in text are dates of first publication and are included in the collection 1923-1949. 1913
Three Tribes of Western Australia. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 43:143-194. 1914 The Definition of Totemism. Anthropos 9:622-630. (1922) 1948 The Andaman Islanders. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. 1923 The Methods of Ethnology and Social Anthropology. South African Journal of Science 20:124-147. (1923-1949) 1961 Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses. London: Cohen & West; New York: Free Press. 1929 Notes on Totemism in Eastern Australia. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 59:399-415. 1930a Editorial. Oceania 1:1-4. 1930fc> Former Numbers and Distribution of the Australian Aborigines. Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia 23:687-696. 1930c The Sociological Theory of Totemism. Pages 295309 in Pacific Science Congress, Fourth, BataviaBandoeng (Java), 1929, Proceedings. Volume 3: Biological Papers. The Hague: Nijhoff. (1931a) 1948 The Social Organization of Australian Tribes. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. 1931Z? Applied Anthropology. Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Report 20:267-280. 1940 Preface. In Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (editors), African Political Systems. Oxford Univ. Press. 1950 Introduction. Pages 1-85 in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde (editors), African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. Oxford Univ. Press. 1958 Method in Social Anthropology: Selected Essays. Edited by M. N. Srinivas. Univ. of Chicago Press. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ELKIN, A. P. 1956 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown: 1881-1955. Oceania 26:239-251. FIRTH, RAYMOND 1956 Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown: 1881-1955. British Academy, London, Proceedings 287-302. FORTES, MEYER (editor) 1949 Social Structure: Studies Presented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. Oxford: Clarendon.
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FORTFS, MEYER 1955 Radcliffe-Brown's Contributions to the Study of Social Organization. British Journal of Sociology 6:16-30. FORTES, MEYER 1956 Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown, F.B.A.; 1881-1955: A Memoir. Man 56:149-153. LOWIE, ROBERT H. 1937 The History of Ethnological Theory. New York: Farrar & Rinehart. -> See especially pages 221-229 on "RadclifPe-Brown." REDFIELD, ROBERT (1937) 1955 Introduction. In Social Anthropology of North American Tribes. Enl. ed. Edited by Fred Eggan. Univ. of Chicago Press. Social Anthropology of North American Tribes. Enl. ed. Edited by Fred Eggan. (1937) 1955 Univ. of Chicago Press.
RADIATION This article is devoted to examining the branch of psychology that is concerned with the behavior of living organisms after their exposure to ionizing radiations. The subject is a relatively new one in the field of psychology and is allied most closely to topics subsumed under the headings "physiological psychology" and "radiobiology." At various times the subject has fallen under the headings "radiation psychology" and "radiopsychology" or, most often, under various forms of the heading "effects of radiation upon behavior." The field has been of practical interest to the medical sciences since the discovery of X rays in 1895, although behavioral scientists did not enter the field formally for another three decades. Since the inception of radiation research, the biomedical literature has reflected concern with behavioral data in terms of their application to diagnosis, abnormal growth patterns, heredity, and lethality. From the beginning, biomedical scientists found that behavioral effects of radiation provided substantive data to aid in the understanding of the structure and function of organ systems. Perhaps the most recent application of this field to applied sciences has taken place since the advent of the space age, when those concerned with the effects of unusual environmental conditions upon man have focused attention on the radiation hazards in space (Hanrahan & Bushnell 1960, pp. 155-188). The influence of radiation no longer remains the exclusive interest of radiation scientists. Nuclear weapons have vastly widened the scope of attention, and the layman has long recognized that he lives in an age when radiation is a highly publicized fact of life. The employment of atomic energy for peaceful uses has led to the introduction of nuclear power plants into community life. It has now become relevant to acquaint the nonspecialist with the legal implications of radiation for labor and management. It is to the general interest of
all to understand the relationship of radiation to all living matter so that appreciation may be developed for the opportunities and the complications now presented to us. Power plants will create more and cheaper energy sources; but power plants will create health hazards and contamination. New concepts of waste disposal will have to be developed, and these must be integrated with the thinking of city planners, oceanographers, sociologists, economists, and others who are concerned with the rapidly changing modern world. Those interested in population change will find the radiation scientists have much to say about processes of aging and heredity. It will be of interest to the geopolitically minded that radiation psychologists are investigating the social dynamics of groups who have been, or who may be, exposed to radiation. To those involved in influencing public opinion, the implications of this field are self-evident in a world of ideological conflict. The problems of studying the effects of radiation are numerous and complex (see Bibliography). The extent of this complexity is well described by Van Cleave (1963, p. 356), who stresses that most new discoveries "lead to new horizons of the unknown." Major variables to be studied. The psychologist interested in radiation is concerned with relating his behavioral data to their underlying physiological processes. This requires that the following variables must be assessed from both the psychological and biological point of view, under comparable environmental conditions: The stimuli. There are two classes of ionizing radiations, material and electromagnetic. The former include neutrons, alpha and beta particles, deuterons, and protons; the latter include X rays and gamma rays. All, by definition, are capable of changing cell structure by dislodgement of electrons from atoms. (The references provide extensive descriptions of the characteristics of these stimuli.) The psychologist studying radiation must concern himself with them individually and in combinations. Thus, he is faced with examining the effects of many energy levels, e.g., from 70 kilovolts to several million electron volts for X rays and gamma rays, from 1,000,000 to 14,000,000 electron volts for fast neutrons, and so on, for each of these radiations. Method of exposure. Radiation is known to affect the target differentially, depending on how it is delivered. For example (Bond et al. 1965), doses of a few hundred rads to the whole body will cause death within days, while doses of several thousands of rads are delivered to focal points of the body
RADIATION in radiation therapy without lethal effect. The effects of exposure, therefore, need to be considered in terms of whether the dose is delivered to the whole body or to a part of it. Both types of exposure must be related to frequency and duration of exposure and to rates of delivery of the dose over various distances from source to target. Any shielding conditions in the exposure environment must likewise be examined. Behavior to be studied. All behavior is the object of the radiation psychologist's investigations. The affective, cognitive, sensory, and motor aspects of an individual organism's behavior, as well as social interaction of the radiated individuals, are considered. Subjects to be employed. All living species are potential objects of investigation. Special consideration must be given to such factors as age at time of exposure, age at time of behavioral study, sex, and inherited and acquired characteristics related to the behavior to be studied. Certain animals become subjects of choice because of their known biological characteristics, the presence of which may aid in the clarification of a specific question related to a radiation effect. Instrumentation and procedures. The equipment and methods employed may be those standardized by experimental psychology, or they may be especially devised to test for unique aspects of behavior elicited by radiation. Experimenters have frequently used normal control subjects for comparison with experimental populations, but they have just as often used radiated subjects as their own controls for preradiation and postradiation capabilities. Nature of studies undertaken. An examination of the experimental findings in the behavioral field reveals attempts in many parts of the world to explore the aforementioned variables. The many recent and comprehensive reviews of the subject permit the reader to follow the work to a degree impossible to duplicate in this brief report (Stahl 1959; I960; Lebedinskii et al. 1958; Russell 1954; Hugh 1962; 1963; Furchtgott 1956; 1963; 1964; Van Cleave 1963; International Symposium . . . 1964; WHO 1957; Northwestern Univ. 1962; Lebedinskii & Nakhil'nitskaia 1963; Bond et al. 1965; Kimeldorf & Hunt 1965). All of these sources call attention to the relevant allied science reviews and Provide extensive bibliographies. Kaplan (1962, pp. 153-160) has provided an additional review, in which he calls attention to the techniques and procedures employed in the field. Although this paper is limited to an analysis °f the rat maze experimentation, it conveys im-
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plications about the problems associated with techniques involving all species, with all behavioral subject matter. The summaries of all the referenced compilations yield the following types of information: (1) A wide assortment of living organisms have been employed as subjects. Men, subhuman primates, dogs, cats, rodents, fowl, fish, and many invertebrate forms have variously been exposed to X, gamma, alpha, beta, and neutron radiation, as well as to mixtures of these. Dose levels have been given from fractions of a roentgen (r) to over 100,000 r. Rates of radiation delivery to both the whole body and to focal points of the body vary from experiment to experiment. Some studies have been devoted to single and others to additive radiation exposures. Studies have utilized both lethal and sublethal doses. (2) Learning, general activity, emotionality, mating behavior, classical and instrumental conditioning, and visual, auditory, vestibular, cutaneous, olfactory, and kinesthetic functions have been explored. The employment of mazes, classical and operant conditioning devices, primate general test apparatus, and open field boxes are among the many testing instruments employed. (3) Differences in procedures and apparatus and failure of behavioral scientists to standardize methods and equipment have led to slow advancement and difficulty in generalizing from available findings. Effects of radiation on behavior. While a vast amount of knowledge has been accumulated by all the disciplines concerned with radiation, there remain unresolved problems. Nonetheless, even with controversial and contradictory evidence casting some doubt, it is relatively safe to state that some points have been established: Developing organisms. The following data seem to be indicative of some of the radiation effects on developing organisms. (1) Deficiencies in maze learning occur in rats irradiated on any gestation day and during the neonatal period. These deficiencies can be elicited by a dose as low as 25r. The extent of the deficit is a function of the time and amount of radiation given and the age at time of testing, the type of maze employed, and the sex of the animal. In general, maze-learning deficiency is more apparent for sublethal doses (100-200r) delivered in utero around the fourteenth day. Testing of animals for acquisition of maze-learning skill when they are around one year of age reveals greater deficit than appears in rats tested at an earlier age. The female is more adversely affected than the male; a Lash-
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ley in type maze, which has been shown to be especially sensitive for studying brain damage (Lashley 1929), is the instrument used to obtain the findings. (2) Alterations in activity and locomotion result from prenatal and neonatal exposure with doses as low as 25r. Radiation in utero seems to enhance these behaviors, while neonatal exposure inhibits them. (3) Prenatally irradiated subjects exhibit greater "fearfulness," a measure of emotionality, than do normals. A 50r dose seems to be sufficient to elicit this behavior. (4) Although there are reports of a few cases of personality aberrations and mental deficiencies in Japanese irradiated in utero, as a result of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there is insufficient data available to draw conclusions regarding this population (Miller 1956). Adult organisms. For adult organisms some of the effects of radiation are: (1) It has been generally accepted that immediately following doses in sublethal and even lethal ranges, higher-order learning processes and their retention are not impaired (Northwestern Univ. 1962; Furchtgott 1963). For example, Kaplan and his associates (see Pickering, Langham, and Rambach 1956) have shown that after exposure to massive doses of gamma radiation, monkeys were able to learn to discriminate between stimuli to which they had never before been exposed. These same animals manifested memory for discriminations they had learned to make before they were irradiated. Exceptions have been reported (Sharp & Keller 1965) which indicate that monkeys exposed to doses which cause death within hours will show impairment of preradiation-learned performances which involve memory of time perception. If the irradiated subject survives beyond a thirtyday period the dose is then not viewed as lethal. For animals receiving nonlethal doses, there is evidence after months and years of changes in performance which are attributable to radiation exposure (Davis 1965). Among the changes noted are alterations in motivation, extent of distractibility, and narrowing of attention, all factors related to higher-order learning and retention. (2) Drive is adversely affected by radiation exposure, in direct association with the reduction of food and water intake and the decrement in general activity. (3) Radiation has been shown to be effective as an unconditioned stimulus. Conditioned avoidance responses can be elicited with as little as lOr, providing a means for testing conditioned responses to sound, light, taste, and object quality.
(4) Sublethal doses up to l,100r have resulted in increases in self-involved, and a diminution in socially oriented, behavior of survivors. This finding was consistent during a period of seven years of observation of subjects. (5) Low doses of X rays have been shown to be visible. Also, it appears that visual functions are depressed by radiation. (6) Cutaneous, gustatory, olfactory, and interoceptive mechanisms are found to have reversible and unstable alterations of response to radiation. Auditory responses, also, reflect these characteristics, with conflicting reports of both increases and decreases of threshold. (7) Very low doses have been shown by some Russians to alter conditioned reflex behavior (Stahl 1959; I960; Lebedinskii et al. 1958). Neurophysiological aspects. Since radiation psychology falls quite logically under the broader fields of physiological psychology and radiobiology, attention should be directed to interrelationships between neurophysiological processes affected by radiation and related behavioral adjustments. The body of biological data is extensive and may be studied in the previously mentioned source books. Some of the most relevant findings can be seen to relate closely to behavioral results: (1) The relative radiosensitivity and resistance of various cells and tissues have been identified, with strong evidence that the greatest sensitivity is in the lymphocytes and granulocytes and the least sensitivity is in the muscle, bone, and nerve cells. (2) Radiation impairs the ability of the cells to maintain metabolic equilibrium and ultimately provides evidence for cell deviancy both morphologically and functionally. (3) For developing organisms, the anatomical changes are maximal if radiation occurs during the period of major organogenesis. There is also considerable morphological data to support the conclusion that radiation delivered at any time to a developing organism has a deleterious effect upon neurophysiological function. (4) It is particularly relevant to mention the many neurological signs observed in organisms after neonatal radiation: tremor, leg dragging, head deviations, uncoordinated gait, elevated pelvic posture, and chronically abducted limbs. (5) Adult neural tissue has for the most part been established as being markedly radioresistant, with doses in the l,000r level failing to create impairment. Nonetheless, a growing body of data from European and Russian laboratories gives functional evidence of neural impairment after minute doses. (6) Innumerable references are available that
RADIATION reflect radiation effects upon the interaction of the nervous system with endocrine, cardiovascular, and gastrointestinal functions. All of these factors are strongly related to the behavioral findings noted. c?
It is too early in the development of the field of radiation to predict the direction it will take. However, evidence does indicate that radiation can be a useful tool in the study of embryonic development (Hicks 1958). Suggestions are being made for the exploration of the use of radiation as a diagnostic tool in clinical psychology and psychiatry, through employment of radioisotopes in chemotherapy and physical therapy. Its usage in studying electronically developed brain models points to a new behavioral domain of investigation allied to computer technology. The need for exploring the sociological implications of a radiated society demands development of behavioral science techniques for identifying radiation factors that interact with other group attributes. Perhaps the most important need in the field today is to standardize procedures when findings appear to be consistent. The reduction of controversial data to a minimum will permit generalization within psychology and between the other disciplines in this field. The fact that so many disciplines are linked to the radiation field demands this type of liaison and interdisciplinary cooperation if the massive task of integrating the knowledge of radiation already obtained in the atomic era is to be accomplished. SYLVAN J. KAPLAN [Other relevant material may be found in NERVOUS SYSTEM; NUCLEAR WAR; SPACE, OUTER.] BIBLIOGRAPHY BOND, VICTOR P.; FLIEDNER, THEODORE M.; and ARCHAMBEAU, J. O. 1965 Mammalian Radiation Lethality: A Disturbance in Cellular Kinetics. New York: Academic Press. DAVIS, ROGER T. 1965 The Radiation Syndrome. Volume 2, pages 495-524 in Allan M. Schrier, Harry F. Harlow, and Fred Stollnitz (editors), Behavior of Nonhuman Primates: Modern Research Trends. New York: Academic Press. ELLINGER, FRIEDRICH P. (1935) 1947 The Biological Fundamentals of Radiation Therapy. London: CleaverHume. -* First published in German. FURCHTGOTT, ERNEST 1956 Behavioral Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Psychological Bulletin 53:321-334. FURCHTGOTT, ERNEST 1963 Behavioral Effects of Ionizing Radiations: 1955-1961. Psychological Bulletin 60: 157-199. FURCHTGOTT, ERNEST 1964 Postscript to "Behavioral Effects of Ionizing Radiations.- 1955—1961." Psychological Bulletin 61:236-238. GLASSER, OTTO et al. (1944) 1961 Physical Foundations of Radiology. 3d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Hoeber.
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GRAY, L. H. 1949 Comparative Studies of the Biological Effects of X-rays, Neutrons, and Other Ionizing Radiations. Pages 114-137 in N. Howard-Jones (editor), Applied Biophysics; Survey of Physical Methods Used in Medicine: A Symposium. New York: Chemical Publishing Company. HANRAHAN, JAMES S.; and BUSHNELL, DAVID 1960 Space Biology: The Human Factors in Space Flight. New York: Basic Books. HICKS, S. P. 1958 Radiation as an Experimental Tool in Mammalian Developmental Neurology. Physiological Reviews 38:337-356. HOLLAENDER, ALEXANDER (editor) 1954-1956 Radiation Biology. 3 vols. New York: McGraw-Hill. -» Volume 1: High Energy Radiation. Volume 2: Ultraviolet and Related Radiations. Volume 3: Visible and Near-visible Light. INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE RESPONSE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM TO IONIZING RADIATION, SECOND, Los ANGELES, 1963 1964 Response of the Nervous System to Ionizing Radiation. Edited by Thomas J. Haley and Ray S. Snider. Boston: Little. KAPLAN, SYLVAN J. 1962 Radiation Research in Psychology: An Analysis of Techniques in Maze Experimentation. Psychological Bulletin 99:153-160. KIMELDORF, DONALD J.; and HUNT, EDWARD L. 1965 Ionizing Radiation: Neural Function and Behavior. New York: Academic Press. LAPP, RALPH E.; and ANDREWS, HOWARD L. (1948) 1963 Nuclear Radiation Physics. 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. LASHLEY, KARL S. 1929 Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence: A Quantitative Study of Injuries to the Brain. Univ. of Chicago Press. LEA, DOUGLAS E. (1947) 1955 Actions of Radiations on Living Cells. 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press. LEBEDINSKII, ANDREI V.; and NAKHIL'NITSKAIA, Z. N. 1963 Effects of Ionizing Radiation on the Nervous System. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier. LEBEDINSKII, ANDREI V, et al. 1958 On the Biological Effect of Small Doses of Ionizing Radiation. Pages 17-28 in International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Second, Geneva, Proceedings. Volume 22: Biological Effects of Radiation. Geneva: United Nations. MILLER, R. W. 1956 Delayed Effects Occurring Within the First Decade After Exposure of Young Individuals to the Hiroshima Atomic Bomb. Pediatrics 18:1-18. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS; and MEDICAL SCHOOL, CHICAGO 1962 Response of the Nervous System to Ionizing Radiation: Proceedings of an International Symposium. New York: Academic Press. PICKERING, JOHN E.; LANGHAM, WRIGHT H.; and RAMBACH, WALTER A. 1956 The Effects From Massive Doses of High Dose Rate Gamma Radiation on Monkeys. USAF, Aerospace Medical Center (ATC), Report No. 60-57. Brooks Air Force Base, Texas: School of Aviation Medicine. RUGH, R. 1962 Ionizing Radiations and Congenital Anomalies of the Nervous System. Military Medicine 127:883-907. RUGH, R. 1963 The Impact of Ionizing Radiations on the Embryo and Fetus. American Journal of Roentqenology, Radium Therapy and Nuclear Medicine 89:182-190. RUSSELL, LIANE B. 1954 The Effects of Radiation on Mammalian Prenatal Development. Volume 1, pages 861-918 in Alexander Hollaender (editor), Radiation Biology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
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SHARP, JOSEPH C.; and KELLER, BARBARA K. 1965 A Comparison Between the Effects of Exposure to a Mixed Fission Spectrum Delivered in a Single "Pulse" and X-rays Delivered at a Slower Rate Upon the Conditioned Avoidance Behavior of Primates. Technical Report No. 4. Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Division of Neuropsychiatry. STAHL, WALTER R. 1959 A Review of Soviet Research on the Central Nervous System Effects of Ionizing Radiations. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 129: 511-529. STAHL, WALTER R. 1960 Recent Soviet Work on Reactions of the Central Nervous System to Ionizing Radiation. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 131: 213-233. VAN CLEAVE, CHARLES D. 1963 Irradiation and the Nervous System. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1957 The Effect of Radiation on Human Heredity. Geneva: The Organization.
RADICALISM The term "radicalism" always points to some analytical or revisionist function. It implies a concentration of the focus of relevance on a particular principle, at the expense of the traditionally sanctioned regard for the complexities of context. The element thus abstracted becomes the salient core on which inference and action are based. Radicalism tends to be comprehensive; no matter where it starts, it tends to assimilate all aspects of life to the initial principle. In its positive sense this tendency implies a projection of a completely new version of human life and enterprise. In its negative sense it implies a threat to all aspects of ongoing life. Although many forms of radicalism eschew violence, there is little doubt that the overthrow of the existing order is part of the radical agenda. The radical reduction and its extension into a comprehensive doctrine need not have the character of logically derived conclusions. Quite often the assertions are the result of directly intuited truth, and the forms of expression range from scholastic demonstrations to rhapsodic prophecy. Whatever the form, the impulse behind it is to announce the sovereignty of a principle and to render a principled, unified, and internally consistent interpretation of the cosmos and the meaning of human life. It is expected that the believer's perception of and attitude toward reality will be synthesized accordingly into an internally coherent outlook and ultimately translated into a principled conduct of life. Zealotry and rationality. There exists a close but somewhat misleading affinity between radicalism and zealotry, particularly in the areas of politics, morality, and religion. Zealotry, being a form of unquestioned and permanent obeisance, may, and
often does, become the routinized pursuit of radical ideals. The zealot's commitment to radical causes is accompanied by deep-seated emotional problems. The particular psychological structure of motives and attitudes that leads to or is compatible with expressions of zealous radicalism has been identified as the "authoritarian personality type" (Adorno et al. 1950). However, even when the attitude of the radical is wholly immersed in feeling, its expression is not compatible with emotional impulsiveness but is always pervaded by its own peculiar rational discipline. The rational structure of radical thought and action is the expressive mold that fits the unconscious-need dispositions of many persons; to others it is a matter of deliberate moral choice and closely reasoned inference; and to some it may be no more than a mask they can plausibly and deliberately display while being motivated by considerations of momentary expediency. The conception of radicalism as rational does not imply that it is ruled by logic, science, or economy but merely that the drive toward some sort of explicit intellectual generalization of the meaning of human action and experience is a constitutive property of radicalism. By methodically correlating its interpretive principles with its maxims of conduct, radicalism provides ultimate, permanent, and "objectively valid" grounds for moral choice. Radicalism usually attaches its singleminded emphasis to something that is already known and valued, albeit as one thing among many. What is new is not the tenet itself but the militant assertion of its sovereign and unqualified supremacy. However, while the banner of radicalism derives from the outlook of the society in which it occurs, its arguments turn against that society. Although radicalism is characteristically rational or at least rationalized, it is clearly and implacably inconsistent with reasonableness. In principle, pure radical thought and action is entirely devoid of practical wisdom, of sensitivity for the occasion, of opportunistic economizing, of the capacity to learn from experience, of flexibility and looseness of interest. In sum, it lacks that bargaining side of intelligence that characterizes the conduct and thinking of "reasonable" persons. Indeed, the principal polemic adversary of the radical is the normally competent, fully franchised member of his society whose orientation to reality is governed by conventional standards of "reasonableness." While the latter moves in a world of ambiguity and uncertainty with apparent ease and comfort, varying the perspective of his interest and judgment in accordance with practical considerations and chang-
RADICALISM ing circumstances, the radical finds in such behavior decadence and philistinism. Because of the radical's dedication to the salience of his reduction, he is, qua radical, divested of realistic concern for the passing complexities of everyday life, and he views them with contempt. He scorns the demands that issue from "the way things are," and eschews partaking in the respect that is accorded to persons and arrangements on purely conventional grounds. The radical ideology. It has been shown that radicalism has its origins and permanent focus of appeal in the socially displaced strata of society (Lipset 1960). Although this phenomenon is probably not present in every form or instance of radicalism, it is immensely important for the understanding of the social structure of radicalism. The socially eccentric locus of origin of radicalism appears to be a particularly auspicious perspective for the deliberate appraisal of the ordinarily takenfor-granted texture of everyday life, and it may well be that man's consciousness of himself and of the world around him is the assimilated aggregate of past and forgotten radicalizations. When men of radical persuasion look into the past, one of two alternative views is obtained. In one. the tendencies contained in mundane history are disregarded entirely in favor of tracing some doctrinal claim to a distant and mythical past. All that happened between some golden age and the radical discernment in its modern setting is defined as an ironic departure from the intended direction of the original state. In the second and more common view, mundane history is seen as a script of a determined sequence of events. In the huge historical panoramas of Hegel and Marx, all that is truly historical is denned as accidental and insignificant, and all that matters is the permanently lawful sequence of general tendencies. What Hegel called die Tucke cles Geistes merely deludes man into thinking that what he does as a free agent matters historically. From either point of view, the polemic highlight of radical historiography is the announcement of an eternal truth. In either case, the image of the past urges that the full meaning of man's misery and degradation cannot be fully grasped by beholding it now and that the proposed remedies cannot be fully justified without considering them as links in a process of cosmic proportion. Knowledge of the past has as its principal function the exemplification and the aggrandizement of the timeless truth contained in the radical doctrine and the demonstration of its compelling necessity. The doctrine and the ethic of radicalism is inevitably invested with tensions. On the one hand, it is systematized by internal standards of warrant
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and sensibility; on the other hand, radical beliefs remain responsive to tests of everyday life experiences. Even while the great goals and the order of the future are within the grasp of the imagination, there remain the petty vexations and distractions of everyday life. Even while he holds steadfast to the grand scheme, the believer must resist temptations to suspend the relevance of the doctrine for considerations of momentary interest. Worse yet, his resoluteness is threatened continuously by counterevidence that tends to discredit the doctrine. In the long run radicals succumb to these worldly pressures; they pay their price in sacrifice, settle for partial gains, and become assimilated. Often when they surrender their totalitarian claims, they become selectively dogmatized and develop the art of casuistry. This process is best exemplified in the transformation of sects into churches. The alternative to the corruption of rational purity and consistency, i.e., the maintenance of radicalism in its pristine state, requires that radical movements impose upon their members a form of discipline that makes doctrinal impurity as difficult and unattractive as possible and that peremptorily discredits the relevance of all possible distraction and counterevidence. Several well-recognized features of extreme radical movements have precisely this effect. Most noteworthy are the following: (1) The believers are organized into a charismatic fellowship. Within this collectivity the tenets of the faith can be exercised freely and, thus, are validated, i.e., the fellowship is "a living example." (2) the distinctness of the radical creed and program from the rest of the world is symbolically emphasized. A common device to accomplish this is to associate it with the inspiration of a prophet. The particularistic access to truth discredits a variety of polemic opponents. (3) There is a sustained concern for the purity of belief and conduct. The state of permanent purge functions at the level of self-critique, as well as that of collective and authoritative discipline. (4) The manner in which the doctrine pertains to the lives of believers is diffusely comprehensive. All interest and activity is "normalized" through participation in the movement. Not only does the movement usurp enormous powers of restraint over its members; it also annuls the significance of all external sources of sanction. (5) The movement monopolizes the commitments of the believers. Loyalty to the movement requires that no personal interest or obligation may be admitted as legitimately contesting a demand issuing from participation in the movement. This condition is substantially satisfied by dissolving all possible human ties
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and by deindividualizing members in the direction of some heroic ideal. (6) Suffering and martyrdom must be made acceptable and be brought within the purview of immediate possibility. While members are desensitized to pain, their conception of the relationship between the assailant and the victim becomes impersonal, and brutality becomes morally neutral. (7) The movement exploits outside sentiments against it to its own organizational advantage. That is, members who are publicly compromised by participation in it are forced to burn their bridges behind them. The development of modern radicalism The original cause with which modern radicalism is associated is the attack on the traditionally inherited corporate structure of power, in the name of an equal and liberal distribution of political franchise—i.e., the ideals of democracy. Although movements of democratic reform and rebellion appear sporadically throughout history, radicalism in this sense became endemic only to the Western world, and only since the late eighteenth century. During the Reformation, the main Protestant denominations, notably the Evangelical Lutheran church and the Church of England, never lost their footing in the established political hierarchy and have settled their quarrels with temporal authority under the doctrine, Cuius regio eius religio. Other sectarian movements, however, have been sporadically involved in partisan warfare against traditional secular privilege. The opening and the closing of this period of complicated plebeian upheavals are marked by the Bauernkriege in sixteenthcentury Germany and the Levellers' movement of the Puritan revolution in England. In 1685, at the time of the suspension of the Edict of Nantes, the fight for religious and political freedom was largely exhausted, muzzled, or confined to insignificant enclaves, from which irreconcilable partisans embarked on their voyages to the New World. Even in eighteenth-century England the dissenting bodies in the Bunyan tradition became reconciled to the status quo. Founded in part upon the largely academic discourses of Locke and Montesquieu, the doctrine of modern democratic radicalism was formulated, by Rousseau and a host of lesser writers, with full awareness of its seditious character. Their relentless argument urged that all existing conditions and customs are unnatural and must be destroyed and replaced by a new and rational order (Talmon 1952). In contrast to the religiously inspired radicalism of the Reformation period, the new formulation was wholly secular.
Foremost among the objects of attack was the belief, never seriously challenged in previous ages of Western civilization, that only a select few, an elite, had the wisdom and right and power to govern. In its place there was formulated a doctrine that proclaimed every man the patron of his own life and established the sovereign right of all the people to order their common affairs. The vision of individual liberty and popular sovereignty was made compelling by the endorsement of reason. Although it is now easily seen that this enlightenment of reason contained a strong admixture of romantic sentimentality, there is little doubt that the protagonists themselves perceived their arguments as appealing to discretion rather than feeling. Of course, the radicals did not invent or monopolize the use of reason as an instrument of politics. Other forms of governing and the opposition to radical innovation also had their rational apologists. None, however, depended to the extent the democratic radicals did on the persuasive power of reason and excluded so completely other considerations. Early radical movements. The American and French revolutions in the closing decades of the eighteenth century were significant expressions of modern radicalism. They did not, however, express all existing radical tendencies, and they encompassed a great deal more than merely radical idealism. More specifically, five movements, all derived from ideals of the enlightenment, show the directions and development of modern radicalism. Jacobinism. The most direct translation of enlightenment ideals into political action was Jacobinism, which had been effectively practiced primarily in France—although Jacobin clubs existed in most European countries and in the United States—and for only a relatively short period of time. Yet it made a permanent contribution to the subsequent organization of all radical agitation. The small, locally based Jacobin clubs were focal points for revolutionary propaganda campaigns and were employed to mobilize mass support whenever the small core of activists needed such support. Furthermore, the tight network of relations within the clubs and the efficient network of communications between clubs provided for a state of permanent purge that made Robespierre's slogan about the tyranny of liberty a practical possibility. Jacobinism is an early model of a movement that requires for its perpetration a very high level of activist tension. Populism. Populism assumed a variety of forms, depending on the place of its occurrence.
RADICALISM In the United States it traces back to the ideals of jeffersonian democracy. Despite Jefferson's own cosmopolitan mind, these ideals contained physiocratic elements that in the hands of Jackson became a permanent radical trend in American politics. The core of strength of American Populism was always agrarian, but Populism directed some of its appeals to, and derived some of its support from, the urban masses. In Russia a variety of influences, most notably Slavophile sentiments, led to the formation of the Narodnik movement around the time of the emancipation of the serfs. Here imported enlightenment ideals combined with romantic nationalism in the revival of the concept of the mir, an ancient Slavic form of agricultural polity. In Germany, starting with Herder, scholars and writers with a romantic medievalist bent cultivated an interest in folklore, ethnic history, and ultimately, national sovereignty. Although the German development concentrated on the intellectual glorification of the concept of Volk and did not lead to the formation of a populist movement in Germany, it furnished the ideological underpinning for a number of populist-peasant parties in eastern and central Europe. The common element of all these trends was a strong belief in the rights and creative powers of the common man, living close to nature, whose interests are naturally opposed to the oligarchic tendencies of large central governments and to professional political administration. Philosophical radicalism. The ideals of Jeffersonian democracy and those of the philosophical radicals of England are similar in that historically both are of Whig origin. The English reformers, however, were of distinctly bourgeois persuasion and appeal. Their idea of reconstructing government according to the principle of utility was an exercise in business rationality. Although the ideals of Bentham, the leading theoretician of this group, were close to the ideals of the Jacobins, and although he was in his own way as much a rationalistic simplifier as they were, the characteristic difference between them is that for the English reformer the fight for a rational social order did not admit the possibility of violence and chaos, even as a tactical instrument [see BENTHAM]. Anarchism. The strongest and most systematically radical version of radicalism is to be found in anarchism. William Godwin first formulated the complete version of anarchism, teaching that to compel men to act according to reason is superfluous and to compel them to act against reason is unjust. On this basis, he called for the abolishment °f all institutions. With Proudhon, anarchism
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adopted a program of economic reform that far exceeded anything contained in other contemporary radical tendencies. Later the movement assumed the character of a quasi political party, always, however, refusing to participate in the affairs of government [see ANARCHISM]. German idealism. German idealism has been called "the theory of the French Revolution." Starting with the powerful influence of Rousseau on Kant and continuing through Schelling and Fichte, this tendency culminated in the work of Hegel. Here the ideas of freedom and reason were wholly emancipated from man as a concrete being and were objectified in the modern state. Hegel's statism is the perfect obverse of anarchism. Whereas for Godwin man in his natural state is the paradigm of reason and freedom, for Hegel reason and freedom are the attributes of a transcendental subjectivity whose only possible concrete manifestations are institutions. Although Hegel's own thinking turned to the glorification of the existing Prussian state, the logic of his argument exerted a powerful influence on the formation of all subsequent radical doctrines. From its beginning and through the first few decades of the nineteenth century, modern radicalism had a certain enthusiastic unity, expressed in the slogan, Pas d'ennemis a gauche! Even Fichte and the young Hegel stood on the left, in opposition to the conservative restoration forces of the post-Napoleonic era. From approximately the middle of the nineteenth century on, there appeared a split into what came to be known as right-wing radicalism and left-wing radicalism. The split was first manifest among the disciples of Hegel and ultimately led to the realignment of all radical forces. Right-wing radicalism. By and large, right-wing radicalism is not readily discernible in nineteenthcentury politics. The consolidation of the European states followed closely the Hegelian blueprint, and right-wing radicalism appeared mainly in the form of programs seeking to perfect an already existing state of affairs. Revisionist radical right-wing tendencies appear only at the close of the century, through the infusion of a new element. Statism achieved a new formulation, in a doctrine that based national sovereignty on historical missions of distinct races. The principal protagonists of this idea were Joseph Arthur de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Although this movement explicitly repudiated the influence of Hegel, it drew heavily on the translation of the idea of Weltbiirgerthum into the idea of the Nationalstaat, and there is little doubt that it absorbed the bulk of the
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forces that were earlier affiliated with the Hegelian right [see GOBINEAU]. The association beween ethnic identity and territorial sovereignty became universally accepted during the nineteenth century and furnished the basis for the political division of Europe at Versailles. During the two decades following World War i, nationalism achieved its most radical expression in the totalitarian dictatorships of Italy, Japan, and Germany. The doctrinal underpinning of these systems varied, emphasizing alternatively race, cultural heritage, or a combination of both. Associated with them are attitudes of superpatriotism and a belief in the superiority of one's ethnic group, and they encompassed policies of belligerent imperialism. Movements of this sort were active and continue to be active in virtually all nations of the world, and many autocrats have found in the rhetoric of radical nationalism the justification for claiming power [see FASCISM; NATIONAL SOCIALISM]. A number of phenomena of somewhat lesser significance deserve mention in the context of right-wing radicalism. In France the Radical Republicans stood in opposition to the "opportunist" left wing of the Parliament of 1875 and subsequently became allied with militarist, proclerical, and royalist groups. This alliance was consolidated during the Dreyfuss affair and remained a sporadically active extreme right-wing faction in French politics. Phenomena such as the Falange in Spain and the Black Guard in Rumania also belong to this category [see FALANGISM]. Standing apart from the above but related to them are anti-civil liberties tendencies in American politics. The latter include, among others, such heterogeneous elements as the radicalism of Thaddeus Stevens and his followers, certain nativist movements, and the outlook referred to as McCarthyism. Left-wing radicalism. The structural affiliation of right-wing radicalism with established political power led to its development as the philosophy of the existing polity, i.e., as an apologia. Hence, the term "radicalism" came to mean left-wing radicalism. But from its very onset this movement was torn by schisms. The last left-wing synthesis, during the two decades following the revolution of 1848, encompassed some socialists of the Jacobin heritage, some English reformers of the labor-class movement, the anarchists under the leadership of Bakunin, disciples of Moses Hess and Ferdinand Lassalle, and, of course, Marxists. By the time of the Paris Commune, this shaky alliance was in shambles. Since then, left-wing radicalism has been divided into numerous factions, which have often fought each other with bitter hostility.
Anarchists have maintained their intransigent alienation from normal political processes. Occasionally they have displayed some strength in the organization of labor movements (e.g., the Industrial Workers of the World in the United States) or in Latin-European politics (e.g., in Spain during the 1930s). On the whole, however, anarchism has remained conspicuous mainly because of real or alleged acts of terrorism. Its occasional associations with criminal elements, i.e., forces inimical not only to the established order but to anarchist ideals themselves, have caused anarchism to be generally regarded as the most virulently destructive form of radicalism. Marxist communism achieved a strong international party organization, maintaining an orthodox revolutionary line, and gained political ascendancy in several European states in the aftermath of World War i. Of these, the Soviet Union is the only one that remained stable. Following World War ii a number of states within the traditional sphere of political influence of Russia came under the domination of the Communist party. These governments instituted nationwide collectivization of productive property and strong central organizations of power, in strict opposition to anarchist teachings. Evolutionary socialism, which is in part a continuation of English philosophical radicalism and in part an offshoot of Marxism, worked toward the assimilation of elements of the radical doctrine into the mainstream of twentieth-century politics, thereby eliminating the very conditions that were the foundation for the Marxist prophecy. Some socialist parties include the word "radical" in their party designation with justification. Others, like the French Radical Socialists under the leadership of Paul Herriot, are more properly located in the center of the general political spectrum. Of the many lesser schismatic left-wing radical movements, syndicalism is perhaps the most important. Although mainly a hybrid offshoot of Marxist and anarchist influences, it contained some original ideas and retained a distinct identity over a protracted period of time. Syndicalism exercised a strong influence in some Latin countries of Europe and the Americas, and contributed, inter alia, to the formulation of the doctrine of Italian fascism [see SYNDICALISM]. Radicalism is still very much alive everywhere, but particularly in those countries that recently became free of European domination. It is in the nature of the situation that those who are in this fight must share the forum and spotlight with others, who irresponsibly exploit vulgar frustra-
RADICALISM tions. But even as the fight against the old tyrannies continues, the very polity that radicalism has built has become the focus of new discontents. The conscious and deliberate effort to bring the human community under the rule of reason has led to the development of complex institutions. Intended to insure and increase freedom, equality, and popular welfare, these institutions have recently been attacked as a new, dehumanized tyranny. The theme of alienation is heard again after a century or dormancy, and on the fringes of society there are groups that view the existing social order as their antagonist. Thus, radicalism, which started by abolishing all sanctions of history, has returned to the fold of history, partly by its triumph and partly by its own sins. While the incorporation of the ethics of political freedom and universal rational justice into human consciousness appears to be a permanent achievement, the shadow of new radical questions about the human condition is cast upon the stage of human life. Radicalism is a part of the general theme of the growth of rationalistic ethics. To the extent that Western civilization has been the most fertile soil for this development, radicalism is native to the West. Of course, neither rationalism nor radicalism is an Occidental monopoly; nor is Western history the record of a sustained development of rational ethics. However, as Max Weber pointed out, the prophetic origin of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the development of a rational economy, the growth of rational science and philosophy, the organization of authority along legal-rational lines, together testify to the fact that reason is the guiding demon of Western man. But the search for an intellectual synthesis of the meaning of life forever transcends life. Reason, like myth, in attempting to grasp and express the roots of being, always idealizes the realities of everyday existence. In radicalism the ideal is the supreme taskmaster. The tension between the activist ethical principle and the exigencies of existence is the core of the radical dilemma. EGON BITTNER [See also ANARCHISM; CONSERVATISM; MARXISM; NATIONALISM; PERSONALITY, POLITICAL; SOCIAL MOVEMENTS; SOCIALISM; TOTALITARIANISM. Also related are the biographies of BAKUNIN; FANON; MARX.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADORNO, THEODOR W. et al. 1950 The Authoritarian Personality. American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series, No. 3. New York: Harper. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 1954 Totalitarianism. Edited with an introduction by Carl J. Friedrich. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» Proceedings of a conference held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 1953.
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BELL, DANIEL (editor) (1955)1964 The Radical Right. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. -> An expanded and updated edition of The New American Right. BITTNER, EGON 1963 Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements. American Sociological Review 28:928-940. BRINTON, CLARENCE CRANE (1930) 1961 The Jacobins: An Essay in the New History. New York: Russell. COHN, NORMAN (1957)1961 The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements. 2d ed. New York: Harper. FISH, CARL R. (1927) 1946 The Rise of the Common Man: 1830-1950. New York: Macmillan. GEYER, CURT 1923 Der Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiter Bewegung: Ein soziologischer Versuch. Jena (Germany): Thiiringer Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei. HALEVY, ELIE 1901-1904 La formation du radicalisme philosophique. 3 vols. Paris: Alcan. HOFFER, ERIC 1951 The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Harper. -> A paperback edition was published in 1958 by New American Library. KORNHAUSER, WILLIAM 1953 Liberal and Radical Political Careers: A Study of Group Loyalty. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago. LANDAUER, CARL 1959 European Socialism: A History of Ideas and Movements From the Industrial Revolution to Hitler's Seizure of Power. 2 vols. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. ~» Volume 1: From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War and Its Aftermath. Volume 2: The Socialist Struggle Against Capitalism and Totalitarianism. LIPSET, SEYMOUR M. 1960 Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. MANNHEIM, KARL (1929-1931) 1954 Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Harcourt; London: Routledge. -» First published in German. A paperback edition was published in 1955 by Harcourt. MARCUSE, HERBERT (1941) 1955 Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. 2d ed. New York: Humanities; London: Routledge. -> A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Beacon. MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH (1924) 1962 Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History. New York: Praeger. -> First published as Die Idee der Staatsrdson in der neueren Geschichte. Contains a general introduction to Friedrich Meinecke's work by W. Stark. MICHELS, ROBERT 1925 Psychologic der antikapitalistischen Massen Bewegungen. Section 9, part 1, pages 241-359 in Grundriss der Sozialokonomik. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. MILOSZ, CZESLAW (1953) 1955 Captive Mind. New York: Vintage. -» First published in Polish. NICOLET, CLAUDE 1957 Le radicalisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. PALMER, ROBERT R. 1959-1964 The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800. Princeton Univ. Press. POHLMANN, ROBERT VON (1893-1901) 1925 Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt. 3d ed. Munich: Beck. -> First published as Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus. POLANYI, MICHAEL 1960 Beyond Nihilism. Cambridge Univ. Press.
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SELZNICK, PHILIP (1952) 1960 The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SHILS, EDWARD 1954 Authoritarianism: "Right" and "Left." Pages 24-49 in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (editors), Studies in the Scope and Method of The Authoritarian Personality. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SHILS, EDWARD 1956 The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SOMBART, WERNER (1896) 1909 Socialism and the Social Movement. London: Dent; New York: Button. -> First published as Sozialismus und soziale Bewegung im 19. Jahrhundert. Title later changed to Sozialismus und soziale Bewegung. The 10th edition was published in 1924 as Der proletarische Socialismus ("Marxismus"). TALMON, JACOB L. .(1952) 1965 The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. 2d ed. New York: Praeger. VEPTTURI, FRANCO (1952) 1960 Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia. New York: Knopf. -» First published as II populismo russo. WILSON, EDMUND (1940) 1953 To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
RADIN, PAUL Paul Radin, American anthropologist, was born in Lodz, Russian Poland, in 1883 and died in New York City in 1959. Despite the fact that he was brought to the United States in infancy, he never severed his European roots, and he could never bring himself to accept the New World completely, except, ironically, for his association of nearly fifty years with the Winnebago Indians of Wisconsin. Radin's personal and social background was complex. He came from a German-Russian Jewish family that had become secularized in the mode of the haskalah, the Jewish strand in the western European Enlightenment. His father was a rabbi of the reform movement, a Hebrew scholar, and a linguist. Herman, his oldest brother, became a physician, and Max, next in line, was a distinguished legal scholar. For the Radins these secular professions, which refocused the traditional Jewish concern with ritual learning but which did not abandon learning as a ritual, were ideologically correlated with a humane, if skeptical, liberalism. The skepticism and rationalism, however, were largely reactive protests against the cramping social and intellectual orthodoxy of the patriarchal and theocratic past. Yet the passion for scholarship, the commitment to human realization in the world, and, in Radin's case, the fascinated concern with religion and ethics, maintained a distinc-
tively Jewish cast. Moreover, Radin's intellectual cosmopolitanism, his radicalism, his conception of learning as a moral enterprise, and his capacity to live almost exclusively the life of the mind, making him, therefore, dependent upon friends for a variety of services, represent further elements that characterized the Jewish scholar en passage from the traditional milieu to the modern industrial and urban world. But Radin never came to terms with modern technology; he never learned to use a typewriter, for example, and laboriously wrote out his voluminous notes and manuscripts in so minute a hand that a magnifying glass was sometimes necessary to decipher the script. Formal resumes of his career are sparse and often inaccurate; he rarely bothered to put himself on record in professional directories. Since he moved from establishment to establishment, state to state, country to country, and job to job, there is little institutional continuity to trace; only his work reflects the inner unity of his life. The host of friends he left behind knew him only in phases and primarily as a teacher, yet his gift for spontaneous intimacy made each feel that he shared with Radin some particular secret. Radin was a creator and formulator of meaning, a "poet-thinker," a "thinker-artist," a "priestthinker," and not a man of action, a layman, to use the terms he chose to describe two contrasting, historical, temperamental types—first in Primitive Man as Philosopher (1927), then in Primitive Religion (1937), and in subsequent works. He could live only in a cerebral "blaze of reality." The degree to which his own commitment to the intellectual life may have led him to see this dichotomy as a universal temperamental division is difficult to determine. Late in life, he adopted the position that these two contrasting temperaments can and usually do complexly coexist in the same person; he seems, therefore, to have invented ideal types, despite his antipathy to such abstract efforts. In spite of the intensity of his intellectual commitment, Radin was never moved to glorify the position of intellectuals. He regarded them as dependent upon the official academy, which was in turn linked to the ruling establishment, and, along with Franz Roas, he therefore viewed them as bound by convention and, for the most part, incapable of pursuing interests other than their own. Although he migrated from post to post, Radin was never at a loss for a job. In the words of Julian Steward, "his charm . . . got him about every job in Anthropology in the country. . ." (personal correspondence, 1964). During the early depression
RADIN, PAUL years, when many of his students and colleagues were unemployed, he managed to find support for anthropology from government agencies previously unconcerned with such efforts. For example, his work on Mexican pamphlets in the Sutro Library in San Francisco was supported by the Works Projects Administration. Moreover, he received support over the years from a variety of foundations; he may have offended bureaucrats, but he nevertheless had a talent for attracting patrons. Radin never conceived of anthropology as merely a specialized discipline; it was for him more a way of life. He was bent on discovering the conditions under which man thrives, and he followed his pursuit where it led him. He objected to professional jargon because it turned the study of man into a mystery. His goal was to attack the "great, recurring, troubling themes in history" (Diamond 1960, p. xviii), to determine basic human nature. "That the cultural pattern hides this knowledge from us forever is a counsel of despair" (1933a, p. 267). Although Radin felt at home in the cognitive worlds of primitive peoples and admired "the ruthless realism and objectivity" (1953, p. 325) with which they analyzed man, he did not believe in any return to the primitive or entertain any notion of the noble savage. Rather, he believed that the primitive experience is part of our historical consciousness. An understanding of it would pave the way toward an understanding of what is basic to human nature and toward a critical evalution of civilization. Radin first studied anthropology in Europe and came to the field of anthropology by way of zoology and history. He became a student primarily of Boas, and it was probably the combined effect of James Harvey Robinson's skeptical humanism and Boas' empiricist insistence on the indivisible potential of primitive and civilized mentalities that originally led Radin to question all notions of primitive inferiority. In Primitive Man as Philosopher (1927) he dismissed theories about the automatism of primitive life as being merely projective of an increasingly routinized modern life. Radin found primitive mentality different in degree but not in kind from civilized mentality. He saw that, despite the variety of cultural forms involved, responses of primitive peoples to the major challenges of life are sophisticated, profound, and—to a civilized person endowed with self-knowledge—understandable ways. Therefore, Radin rejected such theoreticians as the early Levy-Bruhl and other members of the French sociological school, who stigmatized primi-
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tives as being incapable of abstraction, participants in a mystic entity, linguistically inadequate, or lacking individuality. And, although he had some connection with Robert Redfield and the other folk—urban polarity theorists, he was opposed to the view, later adopted by Redfield, that moral consciousness has expanded with civilization. He took great pains to establish moral insights as a primitive characteristic and in general was skeptical of the idea of progress in such areas. In The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology (19551?), for example, he emphasized two themes: first, the ambivalence of the human impulse toward creation and destruction, symbolized in the dual image of the Deity; and second, man's Sisyphean struggle, expressed in trickster mythology, to create, and then constantly to rescue, meaning from a chaos of sensory impressions, biological needs and appetites, enigmas of personal, social, and cosmic origins, and death. Radin's elaboration of the dual conception of the Deity had descended from Andrew Lang and had been anticipated in the work of Ehrenreich, Boas, Kroeber, and Dixon; indeed both the Americanists and the German historical school had been preoccupied with the issue, but Radin explored the nature of God among primitives more fully than any other American ethnologist. Radin believed that the universal human issues are central to the social and ritual lives of primitive peoples. It was his belief that the relative weight given to certain issues differs for primitive and civilized peoples; this led him to assert that although basic human nature is the same everywhere, it is more visible among primitives. Primitive life was for Radin closer in its structure and ideology to the roots of comedy and tragedy. His conception that the universal human drama is actually enacted in aboriginal society made his work memorable to nonanthropologists. He attracted such diverse personalities as Mark Van Doren, Lewis Mumford, C. G. Jung, Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, John Dewey, and Huntington Cairns. Radin was constantly aware of the linked exploitative and creative roles of the "priest-thinkers" and thought this link existed to some degree even in primitive societies. He regarded the priestthinkers as the inventors of religious systems, who thereby reflected their own profound need to create a coherent universe of meaning while catering to the intermittent needs of their laymen followers. He imagined that the priest-thinkers, or shamans, or medicine men, had been the original formulators of the monotheistic synthesis. This synthesis existed
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as a social convention of Judaeo-Christian-Islamic civilization, but as a pure faith it is as uncommon among primitives as among ourselves. The drives of the priest—thinkers may have been neurotic and their hunger economic, but for Radin this did not dim ihe significance of their insights. He was, however, troubled by their exploitative potential. Radin had a thorough grounding in the history and languages of his own culture. He considered this grounding the basis for his conscious understanding of his own alienation from the prevailing values of his culture, without which "the task of understanding the primitive could not be accomplished." Radin's general conception of primitive society is the most effective synthesis attempted thus far. He identified three outstanding positive features of aboriginal civilization: respect for the individual, regardless of age or sex; a remarkable degree of social and political integration; and a concept of personal security that transcends all governmental forms and all tribal and group interests and conflicts. His synthesis of primitive economic and social structure, philosophy, religion, and psychology is an implicit, inductive, historical model of primitive society that also serves as a foundation for a historical theory of human nature. Radin took his first field trip to the Winnebago in 1908 and eventually published monographs and articles on almost every aspect of their lives. In his field work he considered himself a historical reporter and was skeptical of the claims of participant-observers-. To avoid the pretentious impressionism common to their approach the observers would have to become members of the tribe, but Radin doubted that any well-qualified ethnologist would be willing to do that. It was not just that he doubted the results of field work done without knowledge of the language but also that he thought field work should be grounded in the lives of specific individuals and not built up from a generalized conception of the individual. As a linguist Radin was in a class with Sapir and Boas. In addition to the voluminous Winnebago texts, Radin published a series of Wappo (1924), Huave (1929a), and Mixe (1933Z?) texts, a grammar of Wappo (1929&), notes on Tlappanecan (1933c), and a sketch of Zapotec (1930). He was also concerned with historical linguistics, publishing a classification of Mexican languages (1944) and working for an entire decade on Patwin. His most important linguistic contribution was an early monograph (1919a) on The Genetic Relationship of the North American Indian Languages, in which he argued for their essential continental unity. Although Sapir had initially criticized
this idea of unity, he and his student M. Swadesh were later to develop parallel themes on this subject. R. H. Lowie and Sapir were Radin's closest professional friends, and Radin remained affiliated with the Boas school throughout his life. However, he could not accept their ethnological theories. In his Method and Theory of Ethnology (1933a), which, with Lowie's History of Ethnological Theory (1937), remains the only systematic work on ethnological theory written by an American, he attacked Boas' quantitative and distributional approach to cultural data. He believed it led to overgeneralized, external, and patchwork histories of traits, in abstractly deduced time perspectives, rather than to specific histories of societies as experienced and created by their members. Radin always felt that there is a contradiction between this aspect of the Americanists' approach and Boas' insistence on prolonged field work and textual analysis within particular societies. Radin's dispute with Kroeber summarizes his differences with the Americanists. Kroeber's notion of the superorganic and consequent lack of interest in the person in history, his sweeping efforts to classify whole civilizations by configurations of traits and qualities determined by a combination of intuitive and quantitative means, and his insistence on ethnology as a natural science—that is, as having a subject matter composed of discreet, isolable, and objectively determinable elements that can be traced and categorized on their own terms (a view Boas also held)—did violence to Radin's focus on the individual as the locus of culture. Kroeber's view denied Radin's belief that if one probes deeply enough into particular forms, universal meanings will be revealed; Kroeber's view also abused Radin's sense of history as man's agent, as the agency for revealing the nature of man and the necessary conditions for his fulfillment. Radin, despite the strength of his influence, left no school of students. His final academic affiliation was with Brandeis University, first as professor of anthropology and then as chairman of the department. He had thought that in going to Brandeis he would find a congenial home, but he found the new university no less bureaucratic than the older institutions. He died in 1959 a few days after his heart failed him during a professional lecture in New York City. STANLEY DIAMOND [For the historical context of Radin's work, see the biographies of BOAS; KROEBER; LEVY-BRUHL; REDFIELD; ROBINSON; for discussion of the subsequent development of some of Radin's ideas, see LINGUIS-
RADLOV, VASILII, and BARTOL'D, VASILII TICS, article on HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS; RELIGION; and the biography of SAPIR.] WORKS BY RADIN
1906
Zur Netztechnik der siidamerikanischen Indianer. Zeitschrift fur Ethnologic 38:926-938. 1913 On Ojibwa Work, 1913. Canada, Geological Survey, Summary Reports [1913] :374 only. 1919a The Genetic Relationship of the North American Indian Languages. University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol 14, No. 5. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1919b The Relationship of Huave and Mixe. Journal de la Societe des Americanistes de Paris New Series 11: 489-499. 1920 The Sources and Authenticity of the History of the Ancient Mexicans. University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. 17, No. 1. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1924 Wappo Texts. First Series. University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. 19, No. 1. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. (1927) 1957 Primitive Man as Philosopher. 2d ed., rev. New York: Dover. 1929a Huave Texts. International Journal of American Linguistics 5:1-56. 1929b A Grammar of the Wappo Language. University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. 27. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 1930 A Preliminary Sketch of the Zapotec Language. Language 6:64-85. 1931 Concept of Right and Wrong. Pages 818-827 in Victor F. Calverton (editor), The Making of Man: An Outline of Anthropology. New York: Modern Library. 1933a The Method and Theory of Ethnology: An Essay in Criticism. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1933b Mixe Texts. Journal de la Societe des Americanistes de Paris New Series 25:41-64. 1933c Notes on the Tlappanecan Language of Guerrero. International Journal of American Linguistics 8:4572. 1934 The Racial Myth. New York: McGraw-Hill. (1937) 1957 Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin. New York: Dover. 1944 The Classification of the Languages of Mexico. Tlalocan 1:259-265. 1945 The Road of Life and Death: A Ritual Drama of the American Indians. Bollingen Series, No. 5. New York: Pantheon. 1953 The World of Primitive Man. New York: Schuman. ~» A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Grove. 1955a The Literature of Primitive Peoples. Diogenes 12: 1-28. (1955&) 1956 The Trickster: A Study in American Indian Mythology. New York: Philosophical Library. WORKS TRANSLATED OR EDITED BY RADIN
ADLER, ALFRED (1909-1920) 1964 The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology. Translated by Paul Radin. Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt. -> First published as Praxis und Theorie der Individual-Psychologie. Contains 28 papers originally published in medical journals between 1909 and 1920. African Folktales and Sculpture. (1952) 1965 2d ed. Folk tales selected, edited and introduced by Paul Radin. London: Seeker & Warburg.
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[BLOWSNAKE, SAM] (1920) 1963 The Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian. Edited and translated by Paul Radin. New York: Dover. -> The writer is referred to throughout the notes as S. B. The autobiography proper closes with Part I. Part II embodies the system of instruction used among the Winnebago and forms a unit in itself. Part I was also published as Crashing Thunder: The Auto-biography of an American Indian. CALIFORNIA STATE LIBRARY, SACRAMENTO, SUTRO BRANCH, SAN FRANCISCO 1939-1940 Catalogue of Mexican Pamphlets in the Sutro Collection: (1623-1888). Edited by Paul Radin. 2 vols. San Francisco: Mimeographed. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOAS, FRANZ (1887-1936) 1955 Race, Language and Culture. New York: Macmillan. DEWEY, JOHN (1927) 1957 Foreword. In Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher. 2d ed., rev. New York: Dover. DIAMOND, STANLEY (editor) 1960 Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. -» A bibliography of Radin's writings appears on pages 1001-1010. DuBois, CORA 1960 Paul Radin: An Appreciation. Pages ix-xvi in Stanley Diamond (editor), Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. EHRENREICH, PAUL 1906 Cotter und Heilbringer: Eine ethnologische Kritik. Zeitschrift fur Ethnologic 38: 536-610. HYMES, DELL H. 1965 Some North Pacific Coast Poems: A Problem in Anthropological Philology. American Anthropologist New Series 67:316-341. LOWIE, ROBERT H. 1937 The History of Ethnological Theory. New York: Farrar & Rinehart. SCHMIDT, WILHELM 1919-1920 Die kulturhistorische Methode und die nordamerikanische Ethnologic. Anthropos 14/15:546-563. SCHMIDT, WILHELM 1921—1922 Die Abwendung vom Evolutionismus und die Hinwendung zum Historizismus in der Amerikanistik. Anthropos 16/17:487-519. SCHMIDT, WILHELM 1926-1955 Der Ursprung der Gottesidee: Eine historisch-kritische und positive Studie. 12 vols. Miinster (Germany): Aschendorff. VAN DOREN, MARK 1945 Foreword. In Paul Radin, The Road of Life and Death: A Ritual Drama of the American Indians. New York: Pantheon.
RADIO See COMMUNICATION, MASS. RADLOV, VASILII, and BARTOL'D, VASILII Vasilii Radlov, also known as Wilhelm Radloff (1837—1918), was a Russian Turkologist, museum director, explorer, and teacher. His scholarly contributions covered the ethnography, history, folklore, text redactions, archeology, and material culture of the Turkic peoples of central Asia and southern Siberia, and the linguistics, including the comparative lexicography, of all Turkic peoples. In addition, he was a professor, an academician, and a government adviser on Turkic matters.
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Vasilii V. Bartol'd, also known as Wilhelm Barthold (1869-1930), academician and professor at St. Petersburg, specialized in the history of Islam and of the Turkic peoples and Iranians (Tadjiks) of central Asia. He combined a life of scholarship and teaching with long and frequent field trips. Bartol'd's work is being considered here together with Radlov's, since it contained important modifications of Radlov's theories. Of German origin, Radlov was introduced to Oriental studies at the University of Berlin in the 1850s by two of Wilhelm von Humboldt's disciples, A. F. Pott and H. Steinthal. These men were engaged in a struggle against Gobineau's doctrine of the inequality of races, and Radlov also eventually devoted much of his energy to affirming the like potentialities of all human groups. He discounted the influence of biological race on human development and, on the contrary, echoed Humboldt's older ideas: while intelligent occupation does develop the critical faculties, nevertheless sound judgment and sharpness of wit may be found among peoples without letters or education as, for example, among the peoples of central Asia. These ideas of Humboldt's constitute a sort of "noble barbarian" theory. On completing his studies, Radlov taught German and Latin for 12 years at a Gymnasium in Barnaul, Siberia. This period was essential to his future career, for it gave him close and uninterrupted access to the Turkic peoples of the Altai and Sayan mountains, of southern Siberia, and of Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. His ethnographic descriptions, text collections, and linguistic analyses were begun at this time. Following his Siberian period, he went to St. Petersburg. Here he published a series of volumes, Die alttiirkischen Inschriften der Mongolei (18941897), in which Turkic script carved on stelae was deciphered, transliterated, and translated. N. Yadrintsev, Radlov himself, and others had discovered these inscriptions in the region of the upper Yenisei and Orkhon rivers in western Mongolia; Radlov and a Danish contemporary, V. Thomsen, were able to master the script and language. Bartol'd, then a junior colleague of Radlov at the University of St. Petersburg, wrote a chapter in the series on the historical meaning of the inscriptions. Radlov's contributions lie at the foundation of all subsequent work on this civilization; his interpretations, modified and extended by later work, stand to this day. He identified the documents as those of a pastoral Turkic people who built an indigenous state of great extent but simple form in the sixth to eighth centuries A.D. The script
was their own; it had a superficial resemblance to Scandinavian runes, and both were connected ultimately, through diffusion, with alphabetic systems of the ancient Near East. Many of the inscriptions were multilingual, and the inclusion of Chinese translations of the Turkic shows that this civilization had connections with east Asia as well as with the West. At this time Radlov also translated (18911910) the Kudatku (better, Kutadgu) Bilik, a lengthy moral-didactic poem of the medieval Uighurs, Turkic-speaking peoples of central Asia, a poem composed by the royal adviser, Yusuf Khass-hajib of Balasagun. In a preface to the poem, Radlov provided both an account of Uighur society and a general theory of state formation by usurpation, with particular reference to the Uighurs. This was a theory to which he repeatedly adverted and which was further developed by Bartol'd. According to Radlov, pastoral nomadic tribes developed a permanent political state of their own only when a powerful or wealthy person usurped the popular authority. The usurper's group was then eponymously named, whereby the leader sought to stabilize his power within his descent line. Radlov based this theory of the origin of the state upon his ethnographic observations of just such a process among the Kazakhs; subsequently he extrapolated this process to ancient times. The method of applying current ethnographic observation to reconstructions of bygone eras and peoples was used by L. H. Morgan and other theorists of evolutionary stages, especially in the nineteenth century. Radlov worked out a three-stage theory of evolution in his book Aus Sibirien (1884), a general ethnography of central and northern Asia. He believed that human life in this area developed and made the transition from a hunting to a pastoral nomadic stage and then to agriculture. Each stage was characterized not only by the economy associated with its name bui also by a particular social and political organization and a predominant religion. For the pastoral Turkic peoples of central Asia the predominant religion was shamanism. At the same time Radlov noted that the diffusion of Christianity through contact with Russians, the diffusion of Islam through contact with Iranic and Semitic peoples, and the diffusion of Buddhism from India, Tibet, and the Mongols all changed the indigenous religion. The Russian Orthodox church regarded shamanism as evidence of unclean powers at work among the peoples of Asiatic Russia. Radlov controverted this view, asserting that shamanism was a religion to be studied in its own
RADLOV, VASILII, and BARTOL'D, VASILII right. He succeeded to a degree in modifying the official Russian view of shamanism, but his educational ventures among the Turkic peoples were opposed by those who supported education only when it was connected with the propagation of Christianity. His evolutionary views shaped the policies he advocated for the progress of the Turkic peoples. He saw contemporary nomadism as a retarding force. The pastoral empires of Asian history were brilliant developments of the past but could not meet the needs of the peoples in modern times. Radlov's analyses of the ancient and medieval Turkic khanates convinced him that they were essentially autocratic institutions which prevented the Turkic pastoralists from sharing in the progressive changes occurring in European life. This view is the dominant one in Soviet policy regarding the area today. Radlov was active also in collecting the folklore of the Turkic peoples of southern Siberia and central Asia (1866-1907). The material he collected was published (in part) in ten volumes, the first systematic and precise coverage of this ethnographic field. Moreover, he brought out a monumental comparative lexicon of the Turkic dialects and languages. The study of the Turkic peoples was transformed into a scientific undertaking by virtue of these efforts. Radlov's studies were related to the broad ethnographic, historical, lexicographic, and evolutionary problems of his time. His activities in public affairs were as impressive as his scholarly contributions. He advanced an enlightened policy toward the peoples of Asia; he gave material and spiritual support to exiled revolutionary scholars; and he was a vital force in transforming the St. Petersburg Kunstkammer of Peter the Great into the modern Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography. Bartol'd's work was narrower in focus and less theoretical in tone than that of Radlov. He was concerned with the interaction between an individual and society, more particularly with refining Radlov's theory of state formation by usurpation; he examined the role of Chinghiz Khan and of the founders of other pastoral empires of Asia from this point of view. Bartol'd eschewed inferential reconstruction of the past and committed himself straightforwardly to cultural and social history; thus, his interpretations of the personality of Chinghiz Khan are closely related to the textual record. In line with this historical bent, Bartol'd studied the literate peoples of central Asia and their written record; he treated the nonliterate cultures mar-
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ginally, and references to them appear only occasionally in his writings. Nevertheless, he did criticize Radlov's designation of shamanism as the religion of the Turkic pastoral nomads. Bartol'd associated shamanism with the hunting cultures of the polar regions, although he agreed that it is found among those pastoralists living in remote areas such as the Altai Mountains. Bartol'd also criticized Radlov for failing to treat the function of shamanist religion in society; such an approach would have revealed that the role played by shamanism in hunting cultures was even greater than it was among pastoralists. Bartol'd combined in his studies the results of both library and field work and alternated between specialized histories, such as those of cottongrowing in central Asia or of Christianity in Asia, and broader syncretistic topics, such as the cultural history of Turkestan, of Iran, and of the Turkic peoples of central Asia. He also compiled a bibliographic survey La decouverte de I'Asie (1911). His brief and brilliant conspectus of Turko—Mongol history, published in Tashkent in 1929, reduced to a short essay the political dynamics common to all central and inner Asia ([1893-1929] 19561962, vol. 3, pp. 73-170). Of particular importance to Western scholarship are his short characterizations of Turkic peoples—Tadjiks, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Turkmens, Kalmuks, and other peoples of Asia and the Caucasus—in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1913-1936). LAWRENCE KRADER [For the polemical context of Radlov and Bartol'd's work, see the biography of GOBINEAU. The biography of BOAS and the article on BOGORAZ, STERNBERG, AND JOCHELSON contain relevant background material. For discussion of the subsequent development of their ideas, see PASTORALISM.] WORKS BY RADLOV
1866-1907 RADLOV, VASILII V. (compiler and translator), Proben der Volkslitteratur der tiirkischen Stdmme. 10 vols. in 18. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. (1884) 1893 Aus Sibirien: Lose Blatter aus meinem Tagebuche. 2 vols. in 1. Leipzig: Weigel. 1891-1910 YUSUF, KHASS-HAJIB Das Kudatku Bilik des Jusuf Chass-Hadschib aus Bdlasagun. Edited by Wilhelm Radloff. 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. (1893-1911) 1963 Opyt slovaria tiurkskikh narechii: Versuch eines Worterbuches der Tiirk-dialekte. 4 vols. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury. 1894-1897 Die alttiirkischen Inschriften der Mongolei. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. ~> Issued in four parts. Part 4 contains a chapter by Bartol'd, "Die historische Bedeutung der alttiirkischen Inschriften."
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WORKS BY BARTOL'D (1893-1929) 1956-1962 Four Studies on the History of Central Asia. 3 vols. Leiden (Netherlands): Brill. -> First published in Russian. Volume 1: A Short History of Turkestan (1922) 1956; History of the Semirechye (1893) 1956. Volume 2: Ulugh-beg (1918) 1958. Volume 3: Mir 'All-shir (1928) 1962; A History of the Turkman People (1929) 1962. (1900) 1958 Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion. 2d ed., enl. & rev. London: Luzac. ~> First published in Russian. (1911) 1947 La decouverte de I'Asie: Histoire de I'orientalisme en Europe et en Russie. Paris: Payot. -» First published as Istoriia izucheniia vostoka v Evrope i Rossii. 1935 12 Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Tiirken Mittelasiens. Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Islamkunde. Sochineniia. Vols. 1—-. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1963—. -» The first three volumes of this projected ten-volume edition of Bartol'd's collected works have appeared. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
Encyclopaedia of Islam. 4 vols. 1913-1936 Leiden (Netherlands): Brill. -> Bartol'd contributed over 200 articles. KRADER, LAWRENCE 1958 Feudalism and the Tartar Polity of the Middle Ages. Comparative Studies in Society and History 1: 76-99. SAVICKIJ, P. 1931 V. V. Bartol'd: Une page de 1'histoire de la conscience nationale russe. Monde slave [1931]: no. 8:273-288.
RAE, JOHN John Rae (1796-1872) was bom in Scotland, but it was while he was living in Canada that he wrote his most important book, a work on the theory of capital and of economic development. He migrated to Canada in 1822, having acquired at the universities uf Edinburgh and Aberdeen a knowledge not only of the classics but also of mathematics and, to some degree, of medicine. In Canada he held several schoolmaster ships, from the last of which he was discharged in 1848, in part because he had become involved in religious and educational controversy. In financial straits and with poor professional prospects, he traveled across Panama to California, where he remained until 1851, and then went to the Hawaiian Islands, where he hoped to regain his health and resume a professional career. He supported himself at first by teaching, later mainly through medical and judicial posts. In 1871, il1 and without funds, he returned to New York to live with a wealthy friend. He died within a year. The treatise on which Rae's fame mainly rests, Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy Exposing the Fallacies of the
System of Free Trade and of Some Other Doctrines Maintained in the Wealth of Nations, was published in Boston in 1834. The full title is revealing; the book was a by-product of a never completed study of the Canadian economy and was essentially an argument with Adam Smith. Rae's New Principles has been called by Schumpeter "a theory of capital, conceived in unprecedented depth and breadth," containing, as it does, two essential components of the theory that Bohm-Bawerk was to erect: "the proposition that lengthening' the process of production (postponement) will usually increase the physical amount of final product . . . and the proposition that 'the actual presence of the immediate object of desire' will give to it, in our valuation, a decisive advantage over an exactly similar object that is expected to become available at some future date, even if this expectation be perfectly certain" (Schumpeter 1954, p. 469). Apart from his important contribution to the theory of capital, what distinguishes Rae's political economy most strikingly from that of his orthodox contemporaries is his treatment of the neglected subject of invention (with which he was familiar at first hand) and his discussion of the capacity of legislators to foster invention and capital formation by preventing dissipative luxury, by promoting education, morality, and science, by maintaining order, and by affording protection to infant industries with real potential. His emphasis thus reflected his experience in a frontier society, as did his recognition of the role of banks in promoting growth and of the significance of durability and yield for capital allocation; his frontier experience may also have prompted his Veblen-like assessment of luxury. Rae's boyhood ambition, according to his later reminiscences, had been a large-scale study of natural history, especially the natural history of man, of the social attitudes that condition man's behavior, and of changes in these attitudes. He continued all his life to do "research" on this subject, and although he never produced a major work, he did write a number of papers in the general area that we would now call social science. While in Hawaii he wrote an article on the Polynesian language, anticipated Wundt's ideas on the gesture theory of language, and transcribed a Hawaiian legend. In his New Principles he had developed the notion of the "effective desire of accumulation"—a phrase that was adopted by John Stuart Mill, who quoted much from Rae (see Schumpeter 1954, p. 469)—and in correspondence with Mill, Rae developed this idea further,
RANDOM NUMBERS emphasizing the role of social "sentiments" in the formation of capital. In his letters to Mill he attributed the decline of Hawaii's population to a weakening of the "effective desire for offspring," which in turn weakened the "effective desire of accumulation." The New Principles, as R. Warren James (1951) has noted, had rather limited influence in the nineteenth century, despite its support from Nassau Senior and, above all, from Mill; its translation into Italian; and its generally favorable reception in the United States and Canada. Reasons for this limited influence may be the small number of copies printed, Rae's residence in a then poor and undeveloped country, and the unpopularity of capital theory in England. The articles on Rae by C. W. Mixter (1897; 1902) and Mixter's new edition of the New Principles, somewhat rearranged, annotated, and titled The Sociological Theory of Capital, made Rae's work known to a distinguished circle of scholars, among them Bohm-Bawerk, Irving Fisher, and Knut Wicksell. Recently there has appeared John Rae, Political Economist: An Account of His Life and a Compilation of His Main Writings; Volume 1 contains a splendid biography by the editor, R. Warren James, which has finally made Rae's position in the history of economic analysis secure. JOSEPH J. SPENGLER [For the historical context of Rae's work, see the biography of SMITH, ADAM; for discussion of the subsequent development of Rae's ideas, see CAPITAL and the biographies of BOHM-BAWERK; FISHER, IRVING; MILL, article on ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS; WICKSELL; WUNDT.] WORKS BY RAE (1834) 1905 The Sociological Theory of Capital. New ed., annotated by C. W. Mixter. New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy Exposing the Fallacies of the System of Free Trade and of Some Other Doctrines Maintained in the Wealth of Nations. John Rae, Political Economist: An Account of His Life and a Compilation of His Main Writings. Compiled by R. Warren James. 2 vols. Univ. of Toronto Press, 1965. -» Volume 1: Life and Miscellaneous Writings. Volume 2: Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy. Volume 1 contains an excellent biography by the editor, R. Warren James. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GOODWIN, CRAUFURD D. W. 1961 Canadian Economic Thought. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press. JAMES, R. WARREN 1951 The Life and Work of John Rae. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 17:141-163.
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LEHMANN, HELMUT 1937 John Raes Werk: Seine philosophischen und methodologischen Grundlagen. Dresden (Germany): Dittert. MIXTER, CHARLES W. 1897 A Forerunner of BohmBawerk. Quarterly Journal of Economics 11:161—190. MIXTER, CHARLES W. 1902 Bohm-Bawerk on Rae. Quarterly Journal of Economics 16:385-412. SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A. (1954) 1960 History of Economic Analysis. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. SPENGLER, JOSEPH J. 1959 John Rae on Economic Development: A Note. Quarterly Journal of Economics 73:393-406.
RANDOM NUMBERS Random numbers are numbers generated by a mechanism that produces irregularity, in a sense that will be made precise. There are four major uses of random numbers: (1) To protect against selective bias in the acquisition of information from sample surveys and experiments. In these same contexts, random numbers provide a known probability structure for statistical calculations. (2) To gain insight, by simulation, into the behavior of complex mechanisms or models. (3) To study theoretical properties of statistical procedures, such as efficiency of estimation and power of statistical tests. (4) To obtain approximate solutions to other mathematical problems. In each of these applications, random numbers are used to simulate observations from an arbitrary probability distribution. It is often useful to think of random numbers as an idealization of the successive outcomes of a carefully made gambling device, say a roulette wheel. Definitions. A definition of random numbers is a specification of the probabilistic properties of the process that generates them, rather than a specification of the properties of the numbers themselves. One can only partially test and verify the numbers themselves; they are only specific outcomes of the process. To clarify the distinction between a process and an outcome of the process, consider the example of coin tossing. In stating that the probability of getting a head in flipping an honest coin is -|, one implies that before the coin is flipped the process of nipping gives probability £ of observing a head. Once the coin is flipped, however, either a head or a tail shows; the situation is determined and not probabilistic. Two concepts are involved in specifying the process generating random numbers: independence and a specific type of nondeterminism. In terms of the coin-flipping process, independence implies that the process that flips the coin is not
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influenced by prior flips and nondeterminism implies that one cannot state with certainty whether a head or a tail will occur on a flip. In the case of an honest coin one can only say that the probability is | that a head will occur. A process is said to generate random numbers in a strict, or theoretical, sense when the process provides random variables that are (1) independent in the sense of probability and (2) governed by the same continuous uniform distribution. Independence implies that knowledge of some numbers generated by the process cannot help in predicting other numbers. The uniform distribution requirement ensures that the numbers generated lie within an interval; the probability that a random number lies in a subinterval is given by the length of the subinterval divided by the length of the entire interval [see DISTRIBUTIONS, STATISTICAL; PROBABILITY]. A process generates random (decimal) digits when it provides random variables that are independent and take the values 0, 1, • • • , 9 with equal probability , 1 0 , that is, the random variables follow a discrete uniform distribution. Similar definitions apply to random digits for bases other than 10, for any set of contiguous integers, or, in general, for any set following a discrete uniform distribution. No real process can truly generate random numbers in the strict sense, since real processes must always generate rational numbers. The term "random numbers" is, however, often applied to processes that generate independent, equispaced, equally probable rational numbers when those numbers are so numerous that the discrete process may be considered an approximation to a continuous one. It is necessary, nonetheless, to keep this distinction between theory and practice in mind. Similarly the terms "random digits" and "random numbers" are in practice applied to real processes that presumably can never provide values that are exactly independent or uniform. Further, the term "random numbers" is often loosely used to apply to any of the above possibilities. Finally, these terms are even sometimes used to mean any number-producing process—probabilistic or not—where the produced values appear approximately equally often and where there is no evident pattern in the series of outcomes. See Hammersley and Handscomb (1964), Shreider (1962), or Young (1962) for additional discussion. This terminological thicket is not so tangled as might appear at first, since the meaning intended is usually clear from context.
Uses of random numbers. Random numbers, digits, etc. permit the construction of probability samples, which in turn permit the use of presentday statistical inference. In sample surveys, units must be selected from the sampled population by probability sampling if statistical analysis, in the ordinary sense, is properly to be done. The simplest case is that in which each unit of the population has an identification number (from 1 to N, say). Random integers (in the interval 1 to N) are chosen and the corresponding units form the sample. In practice, sampling without replacement is usually used, and here random permutations are needed; these are discussed below. Also in practice, sampling designs of various degrees of complexity are common, using devices of stratification, clustering, etc. [see SAMPLE SURVEYS]. In a similar way, random integers or permutations are used in experimental design for deciding which experimental treatments are to be applied to the various physical units: mice, men, fields, etc. In both these cases, the use of a random device serves to protect against selective bias, for example, assigning the healthiest subjects to one experimental therapy. Of equal importance, however, is the fact that the use of a random device provides a firm foundation for statistical inference [see EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN]. Random numbers can also be very useful in studying models of complex physical mechanisms or abstract theories, whenever a model involves variables with probabilistic (stochastic) elements from arbitrary probability distributions. For example, in models of fatigue or of learning one can simulate the performance of many individuals by generating observations from a hypothetical probability distribution depicting performance and then using the generated results to estimate actual performance. In essence, one is sampling from the hypothetical population to estimate how the "real" population can be expected to perform. Random numbers are used to obtain observations from an arbitrary probability distribution function. If observations {x} are desired from a probability distribution F ( x ) , and if {u} denotes values of random numbers in the unit interval (0,1), that is, observations from the unit uniform distribution, then an observation value x from F(x) is obtained by generating a value for u and solving for x in the relationship x — F~1(u~). For the derivation and conditions necessary for this result, see, for example, Mood (1950, p. 107). More economical ways of obtaining a conversion of random numbers to observational values of F(x) can often be achieved
RANDOM NUMBERS For example, several methods exist for obtaining observations from the normal distribution function (see Box & Muller 1958; Muller 1958; Teichroew 1965; Hull & Dobell 1962). The use of random numbers has also been considered for solving physical or mathematical problems that appear to be completely nonprobabilistic. For example, assume that a mathematical function is given and it is desired to find (by integration) the area under its curve between specified limits of the independent variable. The solution to this problem can be approximated by use of random numbers. Imagine, for convenience, that the area to be estimated lies within the unit square; then by generating pairs of random numbers that lie in the unit square and comparing the number that lie under the curve to the total number of pairs generated, one obtains an estimate of the area under the curve. The general basis for this approach is considered, for example, by George W. Brown (1956, p. 283). With the advent of modern digital computers this approach to mathematical problems has been given considerable attention and is referred to as the Monte Carlo (sampling) approach (see Florida, Univ. of 1956; Hammersley & Handscomb 1964; Shreider 1962). Indeed, the Monte Carlo approach can be used to explore theoretical questions of statistics that are not readily solved by direct analysis (see Teichroew 1965). Without going into detail, it can be stated that random numbers can also be used to mix strategies in complex decision processes, an application of growing usefulness [see DECISION THEORY]. Sources of random numbers. Physical and mathematical processes have both been employed to generate random numbers. It is very difficult to determine whether these sources provide satisfactory numbers; the closeness of agreement between the real-world process and the hypothetical model has been measured by rather general purpose statistical tests, which at best can give only partial answers. Until recently, the major sources of random numbers have been published tables derived primarily by using physical devices, some of which have been improved with the aid of mathematical processing. A list of prepared tables of random numbers is presented below. The physical processes used include (1) drawing capsules from a bowl, with replacement and remixing after each drawing; (2) flashing a beam of light at irregular time intervals on a sectioned rotating disk, so as to obtain section numbers;
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(3) recording digitized electronic pulses whose time distribution of occurrences is supposedly random; and (4) counting the number of output pulses generated by the radioactive decay of cobalt 60 during constant time intervals. Physical processes have several disadvantages as sources of random numbers. Unless one stores the numbers generated by a physical process one cannot have them available and cannot regenerate the specific sequence used if it becomes necessary to check or repeat a computation. Furthermore, the early types of physical processes were difficult to maintain and use. Interest has shifted to the use of mathematical processes that can be programmed for digital computers, since large tables cannot as yet be economically entered and stored in the high-speed memories of computers. Most such mathematical processes center about a recurrence relation, where the next number of a sequence is derived from one or more prior numbers of the sequence. These mathematical processes are deterministic, that is, any number of a sequence is a specified function of prior numbers of the sequence. For this reason, one could easily raise objections to the use of these processes and prefer the use of physical processes. However, as will be noted below, there is a strong pragmatic justification for these mathematical procedures. Several methods use the output of a physical process as initial "random" numbers, which are improved by use of mathematical relationships such as those provided by Horton and Smith (1949). These techniques have been called compound randomization techniques, and they appear to hold much promise. History. Tables of random numbers and random digits are a relatively recent development, having been available only since 1927. This is surprising, considering that, almost a century earlier, mechanical methods and shuffling devices for random numbers were already employed to examine probability problems. Samples for studying theoretical properties of various statistics had been reported in 1908 by "Student" (W. S. Cosset), who investigated the distribution of the standard deviation and the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation of samples by shuffling and drawing at "random" from a population of 3,000 cards (see Cosset 1907-1937). This study and earlier sampling studies using dice to estimate correlations among events—for example, Darbishire in 1907 and Weldon in 1906—are reviewed in Teichroew (1965).
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Even after it was recognized that random numbers would provide a reliable and economical tool in selecting samples, a satisfactory method to generate them still remained to be found. Karl Pearson was instrumental in encouraging L. H. C. Tippett to develop a table of random digits. In the introduction to that table, Pearson mentioned that Tippett found that drawing numbered cards from a bag was unsatisfactory and that better results were obtained by using digits selected from a 1925 census report. With this approach, Tippett (1927) provided a table of 41,600 digits. Subsequently several analyses of this table were made and larger tables using other methods have since appeared. With the introduction of punched-card equipment, calculators, and digital computers, other methods of creating random numbers have been considered. Interest has focused on additional ways to test for the adequacy of numbers produced by various methods. Recognizing that in long sequences of random numbers, one might observe patterns of numbers that might be objectionable for a specific use, Kendall and Smith (1938, p. 153) provided criteria of local randomness by which to judge whether a set of numbers is acceptable for a specific application. One could raise objections to the use of the concept of local randomness to include or exclude specific sequences of numbers because each has one or more sets of subsequences that do or do not occur in some desired order. The practical and philosophical questions here are not solved and they raise doubt in some minds about the very foundations of probability theory. For example, G. Spencer Brown (1957) has given considerable discussion to the apparent paradox resulting from the exclusion of specific patterns of numbers. The first of the mathematical generation processes, which is discussed below, appears to have been suggested by John von Neumann, who proposed the middle square method; this was followed by a multiplicative congruence method by Lehmer, which appeared in 1951. In passing it should be noted that although Fisher did not directly contribute to the development of techniques for random numbers until 1938, when he and Yates provided their tables, his influence in suggesting the use of randomization in experimental design undoubtedly stimulated much interest in the subject. Tables of random digits. Since the publication of the table of 41,600 digits by Tippett in 1927, several major tables have appeared. In 1938-1939 two were published: the first, by Fisher and Yates (1938), contains 15,000 digits based on entries in a table of logarithms; the second, by Kendall and
Smith (1938; 1939), contains 100,000 digits based on readings from a rotating disk. In conjunction with the publication of their table, Kendall and Smith introduced their four tests of randomness and the concept of local randomness. Several workers have examined these three tables. In 1953, Good raised the question of the need for a modification of one of the tests by Kendall and Smith. From 1939 through the middle of the 1950s several other tables were developed. The most ambitious and largest was the one developed by workers at the RAND Corporation, using the output of an electronic pulse generator and a compound randomization technique to "improve the numbers" (see Brown 1951). These tables originally had limited distribution and were also available on punched cards. In 1955, a table appeared as a book under the title A Million Random Digits With 100,000 Normal Deviates (RAND Corp. 1955). This book is now more or less the standard source. The table of normal deviates was derived by converting random numbers to observations from the unit normal distribution by the method of inversion mentioned earlier. Several earlier workers had also published tables of normal deviates based upon, for example, Tippett's table. See Section 13 of Greenwood and Hartley (1962) for an extensive list of tables on random digits and random observations from other distributions. Each publication of random digits contains, in addition, instructions for the use of the tables. There are unresolved questions about the consequences of the repeated use of the same table. As previously mentioned, mathematical methods for producing approximately random numbers were introduced for reasons of convenience and efficiency. When a sequence of random numbers is used in a computation, it is often desirable to be able to reproduce the sequence exactly so that comparisons can be made among related computations that use the same sequence. The mathematical generation processes that have been provided to -date all satisfy the requirement of reproducibility; that is, given a definite starting point in the process, the same sequence of subsequent numbers can be obtained in repeated applications of the process. The mathematical processes that have been introduced reflect the fact that the electromechanical calculators and early digital computers had very limited memories and generally could perform only one arithmetical or logical operation at a time. It was, therefore, not economical to store large volumes of random numbers, and the generation processes, to conserve memory and computer time, usually used at each step only
RANDOM NUMBERS one or two prior numbers of the process, which were combined by simple computer operations. It remains to be seen whether more involved generation processes will be introduced to take fuller advantage of advances in the speed and capacity of computers. Mathematical generation processes. A mathematical process for obtaining sequences of numbers in a deterministic manner cannot generate sequences of truly random numbers. Despite this limitation, however, deterministic processes have a practical advantage over random processes, in that a random process can generate very undesirable, although unlikely, sequences of numbers, which would provide questionable samples or experimental designs. One can, on the other hand, sometimes design a deterministic process that generates numbers in a sufficiently haphazard arrangement to satisfy criteria of approximate randomness essential to an application. Processes can be designed so as to give special importance or weight to specific sequences of numbers. Such weighting techniques are similar to stratification techniques used in sampling applications; these ideas are considered, for example, by George W. Brown (1956), Daniel Teichroew (1965), and H. A. Meyer (Florida, Univ. of 1956). Hammersley and Handscomb (1964, p. 27) use the term "quasi random numbers" when it is known that a sequence of numbers is nonrandom but possesses particular desirable statistical properties. To prevent misunderstanding about the interpretation of numbers generated by a deterministic mathematical process, the process will be referred to as one that generates pseudo random numbers when the numbers are produced with the intent to use them as if they were random numbers. Use of the term "pseudo random numbers" relates to the intent rather than the performance of the process, and the suitability of a process that generates pseudo random numbers must be judged relative to each specific application. For example, assume that in a specific application it is necessary to be able to generate even and odd numbers with the same probability. Further, assume there exists some method for generating statistically independent numbers, with r as the probability that a number generated will be odd and q = 1 — r as the probability that it will be even. It is desired that r equal q. The following device can be employed to satisfy the requirement: Generate and use the numbers in pairs. If the pair is oddodd (with probability r 2 ) or even-even (with probability q2), ignore the pair. If the pair is odd-even, call it an odd occurrence; if the pair is even-odd,
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call it an even occurrence. Note that the probabilities of an odd occurrence or an even occurrence are now equal; namely, r(l — r) = (1 — r)r so that the conditional probabilities are both |. If the generation process is being performed to obtain p-position numbers in a given number system (the number 725 is a three-position decimal number), then the largest number of distinct numbers possible is the base of the number system raised to the pth power. For example, in the decimal base the limit is 1O; thus the number of distinct numbers that can be specified using three positions is limited to 1,000. Although it follows that the number of possible distinct pseudo random numbers is limited by the number system and the number of positions used, this limitation is not necessarily serious. Some of the numbers will be repeated whenever a sufficiently long sequence of p-position numbers is generated. If the sequence being generated begins to consist of numbers in a cycle pattern that will be repeated without interruption, then the length of this cycle is called the period of the process. The early generation methods were designed to provide sequences with a period as large as possible for a given p. This was partially motivated by the belief that it might help ensure adequate haphazardness of the numbers. The period of a specific process can be either smaller or larger than the number of distinct pposition numbers that can be generated. The determination of the period, if any, of a process can be very difficult and can depend on how many prior numbers are used in determining the next number to be generated. It is often felt that it is important for the period to be longer than the number of pseudo random numbers needed for a specific application or experiment. In addition to seeking a long period, it is customary to be sure that a process does not contain the same number too often. Some processes also need to be checked to ensure that they do not degenerate, that is, begin to repeat a single number pattern with a short period. In spite of the deterministic nature of a process, it may be very difficult to analyze its behavior except by subjecting actual outcomes to statistical tests. For example, the behavior of the middle square method, which was proposed by von Neumann, has been difficult to analyze. The method proposed by Lehmer, however, is much more tractable to analysis by number theory, and it has features in common with many other methods proposed by subsequent workers, such as the multiplicative congruence method described below. Hull and Dobell (1962) have compiled a very comprehensive survey of all
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mathematical methods and studies made through the middle of 1962. Multiplicative congruence. The term "congruence" means the following: two integers A and B are said to be congruent modulo M, written A = B (modM), if A and B have the same remainder when divided by M. A sequence X-,, x.,, • • • can be generated by the multiplicative congruence relation, such as xtM =&:*;„(mod M), as follows: Assume that k is a given constant and it is multiplied by the first number of the sequence. The result of the multiplication is divided by M and the remainder of this division process is specified to be the next number of the sequence, x.,. Thereafter x3 is obtained by repeating the multiplication and division process using x., in place of xt. Studies of this process have been made concerning the selection of k and x, relative to M to ensure a large period. As mentioned by Lehmer, the particular relation given here has the undesirable feature that the right-hand digit positions of the generated numbers are not satisfactory individually as random digits. To overcome this limitation and to try to get a period as large as M, Rotenberg suggested modifying the relation by adding a constant, that is, xn^ = kxn + c (mod M). However, the choice of k and c relative to M not only influences the period but also influences the extent of correlation between successive numbers of the sequence. Other recurrence relations. Other types of recurrence relations, such as using two prior numbers instead of one, have been suggested; and these are reviewed in the paper by Hull and Dobell (1962), as is the method suggested by Rotenberg. However, much more work remains to be done before the behavior of the methods that have been proposed is fully understood. Although pseudo random numbers that pass the statistical tests applied to them have been produced, specific digit positions of these numbers have failed to be satisfactory for use as pseudo random digits. One can, however, get pseudo random digits by judicious use of pseudo random numbers or by putting pseudo random numbers through a compound randomization procedure of the type suggested by Horton and Smith (1949) or Walsh (1949). Studies have been made of the digit positions of irrational numbers such as IT and e as pseudo random digits since they have infinite periods. For example, Metropolis, Reitwiesner, and von Neumann (1950) studied some of the properties of the first 2,000 digits of TT and e, and Stoneham (1965) studied the first 60,000 digits of e. It is important to keep in mind that although one can pose and apply a large number of meaningful tests
for randomness, any given sequence of numbers or digits cannot be expected to meet all such tests with an arbitrary level of statistical significance. Random permutations. Random permutations represent a special application of random digits in the design of experiments. Here "permutation" is used to indicate that a set of objects has been assigned a specific order. Random permutations are used when it is desired, for example, to assign (order) a set of n different objects to n positions on a line at random. The number of different arrangements possible for n different objects is n\. For example, three objects labeled 1, 2, 3 can be arranged in 3! (3! = 3 - 2 - l = 6) different ways: 123, 132, 213, 231, 312, 321. A process is said to generate random permutations of size n if each of the n! different possible permutations is independently generated with equal probability. The probability of observing a specific permutation will be \/n\. Random permutations of size n may be based on random digits as follows. If n is a p-position number, then pposition integers will be selected from a table of random digits with the following restrictions: If the number selected is equal to or less than n and if it has not already been selected for the permutation, then it should be included as part of the permutation; otherwise it should be rejected. Continue this process until all n places in the permutation have been filled. Although this method is practicable when n is quite small, there are better methods that do not reject so many random digits (see Cochran & Cox 1950, p. 569; Fisher & Yates 1938, p. 34; Walsh 1957, p. 355). The idea of having random permutations available as a table is due to George W. Snedecor. Tables of random permutations of size 9 and 16 can be found in Cochran and Cox (1950, p. 577) and Moses and Oakford (1963). For other sources, see Greenwood and Hartley (1962, p. 460). Sampling without replacement. Sampling without replacement is a type of probability sampling of a finite population where each item of the population has an equal and independent probability of being selected but each item is allowed to be included in a sample only once. A random permutation of size n represents the extreme situation of sampling without replacement where the entire population of size n is included in the sample in a specified order. If one is interested in selecting, without replacement, random samples of size r from a population of size n, then random permutations of size n can be used to accomplish the selection by using the first r numbers of each permutation. There are other methods of using ran-
RANDOM NUMBERS dom numbers to select samples without replacement. For example, a recent set of techniques that can be used on digital computers is due to Fan, Muller, and Rezucha (1962, p. 387). With respect to the direct use of random digits to select samples without replacement, Jones (1959) has studied how many numbers must be used to obtain a sample of given size, taking into account the need to reject duplicate and undesired numbers. MERVIN E. MULLER [Other relevant material may be found in ERRORS, article on NONSAMPLING ERRORS, and in the biographies of FISHER, R. A.; and COSSET.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
Box, G. E. P.; and MULLER, MERVIN E. 1958 A Note on the Generation of Random Normal Deviates. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 29:610-611. BROWN, G. SPENCER 1957 Probability and Scientific Inference. London: Longmans. BROWN, GEORGE W. 1951 History of RAND's Random Digits: Summary. Pages 31-32 in U.S. National Bureau of Standards, Applied Mathematical Series. Monte Carlo Method. Edited by Alston S. Householder et al. Washington: Government Printing Office. BROWN, GEORGE W. 1956 Monte Carlo Methods. Pages 279-303 in Edwin F. Beckenbach (editor), Modern Mathematics for the Engineer. New York: McGrawHill. COCHRAN, WILLIAM G. (1953) 1963 Sampling Techniques. 2d ed. New York: Wiley. COCHRAN, WILLIAM G.; and Cox, GERTRUDE M. (1950) 1957 Experimental Designs. 2d ed. New York: Wiley. DARBISHIRE, A. D. 1907 Some Tables for Illustrating Statistical Correlation. Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, Memoirs and Proceedings 51, no. 16. FAN, C. T.; MULLER, M. E.; and REZUCHA, I. 1962 Development of Sampling Plans by Using Sequential (Item by Item) Selection Techniques and Digital Computers. Journal of the American Statistical Association 57:387-402. FISHER, RONALD A.; and YATES, FRANK (1938) 1963 Statistical Tables for Biological, Agricultural, and Medical Research. 6th ed., rev. & enl. New York: Hafner. -> Previous editions were published by Oliver and Boyd. FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF, GAINESVILLE, STATISTICAL LABORATORY 1956 Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods, Held at the University of Florida . . . March 16 and 17, 1954. Edited by Herbert A. Meyer. New York: Wiley. GOOD, I. J. 1953 The Serial Test for Sampling Numbers and Other Tests for Randomness. Cambridge Philosophical Society, Proceedings 49:276-284. [COSSET, WILLIAM S.] (1907-1937) 1943 "Student's" Collected Papers. Edited by E. S. Pearson and John Wishart. London: Biometrika Office, University College. -» William S. Cosset wrote under the pseudonym "Student." GREENWOOD, JOSEPH A.; and HARTLEY, H. O. 1962 Guide to Tables in Mathematical Statistics. Princeton Univ. Press. -» See especially pages 454-468, "Tables of Random Samples."
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HAMMERSLEY, JOHN M.; and HANDSCOMB, DAVID C. 1964 Monte Carlo Methods. New York: Wiley. HORTON, H. BURKE; and SMITH, R. TYNES 1949 A Direct Method for Producing Random Digits in Any Number System. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 20:82-90. HULL, T. E.; and DOBELL, A. B. 1962 Random Number Generators. SI AM Review 4:230-254. JONES, HOWARD L. 1959 How Many of a Group of Random Numbers Will Be Usable in Selecting a Particular Sample? Journal of the American Statistical Association 54:102-122. KENDALL, M. G.; and SMITH, B. BABINGTON 1938 Randomness and Random Sampling Numbers. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 101:147-166. KENDALL, M. G.; and SMITH, B. BABINGTON 1939 Tables of Random Sampling Numbers. Cambridge Univ. Press. LEHMER, D. H. 1951 Mathematical Methods in Largescale Computing Units. Pages 141-146 in Symposium on Large-scale Digital Calculating Machinery, Second, 1949, Proceedings. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. METROPOLIS, N. C.: REITWIESNER, G.; and VON NEUMANN, J. 1950 Statistical Treatment of Values of First 2,000 Decimal Digits of e and -n- Calculated on the ENIAC. Mathematical Tables and Other Aids to Computation 4:109-111. MOOD, ALEXANDER M. 1950 Introduction to the Theory of Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill. MOSES, LINCOLN E..- and OAKFORD, ROBERT V. 1963 Tables of Random Permutations. Stanford (Calif.) Univ. Press. MULLER, MERVIN E. 1958 An Inverse Method for the Generation of Random Normal Deviates on Largescale Computers. Mathematical Tables and Other Aids to Computation 12:167-174. RAND CORPORATION 1955 A Million Random Digits With 100,000 Normal Deviates. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SHREIDER, IULII A. (editor) (1962)1964 Method of Statistical Testing: Monte Carlo Method. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier. -* First published in Russian. STONEHAM, R. G. 1965 A Study of 60,000 Digits of Transcendental e. American Mathematical Monthly 72:483-500. TEICHROEW, DANIEL 1965 A History of Distribution Sampling Prior to the Era of the Computer and Its Relevance to Simulation. Journal of the American Statistical Association 60:27-49. TIPPETT, LEONARD H. C. (1927) 1952 Random Sampling Numbers. Cambridge Univ. Press. VON NEUMANN, JOHN 1951 Various Techniques Used in Connection With Random Digits. Pages 36-38 in U.S. National Bureau of Standards, Applied Mathematics Series, Monte Carlo Method. Edited by Alston S. Householder. Washington: Government Printing Office. WALSH, JOHN E. 1949 Concerning Compound Randomization in the Binary System. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 20:580-589. WALSH. JOHN E. 1957 An Experimental Method for Obtaining Random Digits and Permutations. Sankhyd: The Indian Journal of Statistics 17:355-360. WELDON, W. F. R. 1906 Inheritance in Animals and Plants. Pages 81-109 in T. B. Strong (editor), Lectures on the Method of Science. Oxford: Clarendon. YOUNG, FREDERICK H. 1962 Random Numbers, Mathematical Induction, Geometric Numbers. Boston: Ginn.
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RANDOM WALK
RANDOM WALK See MARKOV CHAINS; QUEUES. RANDOMNESS See EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; PROBABILITY; RANDOM NUMBERS; SAMPLE SURVEYS; STATISTICS.
RANK, OTTO Otto Rank (1884-1939), psychoanalyst and social philosopher, was bom of middle-class Jewish parentage in Vienna, lived for many years in Paris, and died in New York a U.S. citizen. At 21 Rank became Freud's brilliant protege and soon one of the leading psychoanalytic figures. Eventually, he set forth his heretical "birth-trauma" theory; and in 1926, after much soul searching, he finally broke with Freud and left Vienna. Unfortunately, today it is commonly believed, even within the profession, that this theory is Rank's main or sole important contribution. Actually, it plays no role in his far more significant works on art and genetic psychology, which, however, were never to emerge from relative obscurity. A precociously intellectual child in an unhappy family, Rank discovered in adolescence the solace of the theater and later of the other arts. He was then greatly stimulated by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. Although financial need propelled him toward an engineering career, Rank diverted enough time from his technical studies to begin a book on the psychology of the artist—for long his master theme. He soon came under the influence of Freud's writings and attended lectures by Alfred Adler, through whom, in 1906, Rank was given entree into the little psychoanalytic circle of Vienna. He was at once made its secretary and Freud's personal aide and, efficiently fulfilling both duties, remained at Freud's side for nearly twenty years. A filial-paternal relationship evolved between "little Rank" and the chief, who gave Rank some financial aid and encouraged him to enter the University of Vienna, from which he received a doctorate in 1912. Benefiting from Freud's criticisms, in 1907 Rank published Der Kiinstler ("The Artist"). There followed a series of psychoanalytic interpretations of myth and literature. Rank made his reputation with The Myth of the Birth of the Hero in 1909 and Das Inzest-Motiv in Dichtung und Sage ("The Incest-motif in Poetry and Myth") in 1912. His increasingly encyclopedic command of what are now called the "humanities" influenced and supplemented the primarily medical outlook of early psychoanalysis. In 1912 he became coedi-
tor of the new psychoanalytic journals Imago and Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse; and he was naturally included in the secret "praetorian guard" (Rank, Ferenczi, Jones, Sachs, Abraham; later Eitingon) that Freud, worried by the defections of Adler and Jung, had mustered to watch over "the cause." During World War i Rank edited the Krakauer Zeitung, which served as the official journal of the Austrian Army. In Cracow, he met his first wife, Beata Tola Mincer (later a prominent child therapist); they were married in Vienna in 1918. After the war Rank renewed with even greater vigor his labors for Freud and "the cause." He helped to organize its new publishing house, the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. and as its director kept it going under the extremely adverse postwar conditions. He also began for the first time himself to practice psychotherapy, and his interest turned to basic theoretical problems. Between 1920 and 1923, he and Ferenczi had a close intellectual alliance, and together they wrote in 1922 The Development of Psychoanalysis (seen by Freud in manuscript, but not published until 1924). It departed somewhat, although not yet fatally, from the Freudian canon. Within the psychoanalytic movement there was now a certain anomie. The glow of its heroic age was fading; Freud had cancer and was nearing 70. Rivalries for the succession inevitably emerged, and the leading contender may have been Rank. A tense situation already existed in the leadership when Rank published his notorious Trauma of Birth (1924
RANK, OTTO party moved to restore theoretical order, Ferenczi before long breaking with Rank. For many months Freud himself tried to patch up the quarrel. But Rank, only half-consciously it seems, had taken a long step toward independence, also evident in his abrupt and successful exploratory sortie to New York that year. Yet the mutual affection and respect between Freud and Rank were still very strong, and it was only after much inner conflict and suffering, and one dramatic but abortive reconciliation, that Rank abandoned his long and distinguished career in Vienna. In 1926 he established a new therapeutic practice in Paris, where most of his subsequent works were written and where he made the acquaintance of a number of artists and writers, including the novelists Anais Nin and Henry Miller. Rank made many lecturing and teaching journeys to America, settling there permanently late in 1934. For many years, through the support of friends in the social work profession, Rank's psychotherapeutic concepts and methods had been quite influential in America, particularly at the School for Social Work at the University of Pennsylvania. But this was largely fortuitous—Rank's ideas, especially in the nonpsychotherapeutic works after 1929, relate to social work only tangentially In 1939 Rank and his wife arranged an amicable divorce, and shortly thereafter he married his secretary, Estelle Buel. A month later Freud died in London, and the following month Rank himself died suddenly of some obscure infection. Early studies of myth