Intention and Foresight

Intention and Foresight Bruce Aune The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 63, No. 20, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Sixty-Third Annual Meeting. (Oct. 27, 1966), pp. 652-654. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819661027%2963%3A20%3C652%3AIAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M The Journal of Philosophy is currently published by Journal of Philosophy, Inc..

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http://www.jstor.org Fri Jun 22 07:20:56 2007

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T H E JOURNAL OP PHILOSOPHY INTENTION AND FORESIGHT

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Y comments will chiefly concern the principle, disputed by Kenny, that if a man intentionally performs an action foreseeing with certainty that a particular consequence will ensue, then he intends to bring about that consequence. I shall argue that Kenny's objections to this principle are untenable, that his rejection of it goes hand in hand with what is apparently an oversimplified conception of practical reasoning, and finally that with certain qualificatio~isthe principle is actually acceptable. My aim in defending the principle will be to show that the jurist's conception of intentional action is not so different from that of the plain man as Kenny would have us believe. Kenny's case against the priiiciple in point rests on two counterexamples. The first involves the difference between pushing an enemy out of a lifeboat and leaving the lifeboat oneself to niake room for a more deserving survivor. The second conceriis a man who allegedly intends to act so as to realize an ultimate end but who does not thereby intend to bring about the foreseen consequences of that end. Both of these counterexamples are unfortunately unsuccessful. The first example fails because it does not show that the man who voluntarily leaves the lifeboat foreseeing with certainty that he will perish intends a death to a lesser degree than the nian who, with similar foresight, deliberately pushes an enemy into the shark-infested sea. I t may be granted, with Kenny, that, whereas the latter intends murder, the former need not intend suicide. But this fact is irrelevant to the issue. What niatters is whether a man's death is intended in both cases. And there is in general no basis for thinking that acts of deliberate self-sacrifice are less intentional than acts of cold-blooded murder. The second example fails when measured by Kenny's own (essentially sound) test for intent. Kenny argues that the foreseen favorable consequences of a man's ultimate end would not be intended if, as is possible, they were not reflected in the practical reasoning leading to the man's decision to bring about that end. I shall argue that, even in the case Kenny cites, the idea of the consequences does appear in the reasoning leading to the final decision to act. I n Kenny's case there is an initial decision to bring about a certain end, but this initial decision is implicitly revaluated when the idea of the end's consequences is considered. The final

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'Abstract of a paper to be presented in an A P A symposium, commenting on Anthony Kenny, "Intention and Purpose," this JOURNAL, 63, 20 (Oct. 27, 1966) : 642-651.

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decision reached is to bring about a state of affairs that includes the consequences along with the ultimate end. I n his discussion of this last euaniple, and indeed in several other passages in his paper, Kenny apparently assumes that anyone who intends to bring about certain consequences of an act thereby views those consequences as an end to which the intended act is a means. I shall argue that this assumption is mistaken. My contention will be that, although very often one does a thing in order to bring about its foreseen consequences, this is not true of every case in which one intends the consequences of one's act. If, for example, a man intends to do A but then sees that an unfortunate consequence C will result, he will generally be forced to choose between doing A (good) and bringing about C (bad) or not doing A (bad) and not bringing about C (good). If, after weighing the matter, he inclines to the former alternative and decides to do A anyway, he will thereby intend to bring about C as wellat least as part of a total situation that, while not ideal, is better than the envisaged alternative. My next step is to discuss some of the qualifications required by the principle that, if a man intentionally performs an action foreseeing with certainty that particular consequences will ensue, he thereby intends to bring about those consequences. These qualifications concern ( a ) the moment a t which the consequences are foreseen, (b) the clarity or expliciteness with which they are foreseen, (c) the specific terms in which they are conceived, ( d ) the extent to which they are seen as avoidable, and (e) the sanity and minimal rationality of the agent. Given these qualifications, I shall argue that the principle is acceptable even according to Kenny's test for intentionality. My point will be that, if a t the time of action a man clearly, explicitly, and with certainty foresees that his intended act will have specifically describable consequences, which would not otherwise occur, then those consequences will be reflected in his practical reasoning and will be intended as a part of the total situation he decides to bring about. The acceptability of the principle, so qualified, not only helps to explain the jurist's interest in "the standard test," but also accounts for his emphasis on the importance of foresight and, if I am right, indicates that his conception of intentional action is not quite so different from the plain man's as Kenny is inclined to think. Kenny concludes his paper by saying that, if his own doctrine of intentional action had been applied in the Smith case, the question put to the jury would have been "Did Smith maneuver his car in order to cause him bodily harm?" I n my view the

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question originally asked, "Did Smith intend to cause the o%lcer bodily harm?", is actually preferable for the plain man-so long as it is clearly understood that causing the harm may have been only a part of a complex state of affairs intended, such as escaping and, faute de mieux, causing the harm. BRUCEAUNE U N ~ S I TOFYMASSACHUSETTS

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HE concept of intention embodied in English law concerning murder, as Smith's case shows, is certainly very different from the plain man's notion of intention. But I do not think that Kenny has succeeded in elucidating the latter, and I believe that current legal doctrine is more defensible than his proposed emendation of it. According to Kenny, there are two necessary conditions for intentionality. One cannot quarrel with the first of these-it is evident that if one does not know that one is doing something one cannot be said to be doing it intentionally. But the second condition is open to question, and its interpretation is not clear. For there is plainly a sense in which intentional action does not entail wanting to do the action "for its own sake or to do some other action." I do not want to go to the dentist, but when I walk to his surgery I do so with the intention of keeping my appointment. This is the sense of 'want' in which, when we do not do what we want to do, we act reluctantly and feel frustrated. I n case 1 Eenny appears to treat 'wants to do A' and 'likes doing A' as equivalent. Construed in this sense, some examples falling under Eenny's cases 3 and 4 are cases of intentional action. I t may be said that, although I go intentionally to the dentist without wanting to, I nevertheless do in the required sense want something, viz., to have my teeth filled. But (a) this is not necessarily so, and (b) it does not in any event fall within the scope of Kenny's formula quoted above. Is there some other sense of 'want' in which a necessary connection can be shown between intending and wanting? I think there is, but equally I do not think it will serve Eenny's purpose of illuminating the distinction between intention and mere foresight. "Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium, commenting on Anthony Kenny, "Intention and Purpose," this JOURNAL, 63, 20 (Oat. 27, 1966) : 642-651.

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Intention and Purpose Anthony Kenny The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 63, No. 20, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Sixty-Third Annual Meeting. (Oct. 27, 1966), pp. 642-651. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819661027%2963%3A20%3C642%3AIAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U

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