Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method Hector-Neri Castaneda Noûs, Vol. 13, No. 2. (May, 1979), pp. 235-260. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28197905%2913%3A2%3C235%3AIAIIHA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0 Noûs is currently published by Blackwell Publishing.
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Critical Study and Discussion
Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method
When somebody asks me about philosophical method I know what it is. But when nobody asks me, and I am philosophizing, I often do not know what it is. OSCAR THEND
Alvin Goldman's A Theory of Human Action ([I]) is one of the best introductions in English to the topics of the philosophy of action. The book is, besides, more than an introduction to the field. Princeton University Press has re-issued it in a nice paperback edition. I welcome this edition; but I do so with some misgivings. Given Goldman's brilliant pedagogical style and the doctrinal merits of the book, by simply re-issuing the early edition, the Princeton Press missed the opportunity of publishing, in a thoroughly revised edition, an excellent textbook for the philosophy of action. The book needs drastic revisions both in content and in method. Perhaps a clarification of the issues and a criticism of the method can help orient future discussions of human action.
1. T H E IDENTITY O F ACTIONS: A NON-ISSUE
Consider the following short story: (A) Francesca di Verona is in love with Romeo di Calabria. She is now in his apartment, wearing a red blouse and high-heeled brown shoes. She is nervous. She is sweating. She has a gun in her right hand. The bell of a nearby church tolls 9 a.m.; just then: (1) Francesca moves her finger,
(2) Francesca pulls the gun trigger, (3) Francesca fires the gun,
(4) Francesca shoots Romeo, and (5) Francesca kills Romeo-who dies three hours later.
~ 0 0 1s3 (1979)
" 1979 by Indiana University
235
How many actions did Francesca perform? Anscombe in [2], Shwayder in [44], and Davidson in [25] claim that Francesca just performed one action. They are, in Thalberg's terminology ([46]), unfiers. On the other hand, according to Goldman's detailed arguments in [I], pp. 1-10, that morning at 9 a.m. Francesca committed an infinity of actions. For Thalberg he is a multiplier. Francesca performed not only the five actions (1)-(5),but also the actions of shooting Romeo while wearing a red blouse, killing Romeo while sweating and wearing brown shoes, killing him in his apartment, killing him with a gun, shooting him with her right hand, etc. For every truth (fact, or existing state of affairs) thatp, Francesca performed these actions: firing the gun, it being the case thatp; and shooting Romeo while it was the case thatp. These actions are generated from (3) and (4) by what Goldman calls simple generation ([I]: 26). Clearly, there is an infinity of such actions generated from (1)-(5).And Goldman recognizes additional forms of action generation. The discrepancy between the unifiers and Goldman is abysmal: one action vs. an infinity of actions. The issue in dispute seems, however, very simple. Both claims seem to be trivially true. How can one, either one, of the parties at this dispute be mistaken? Given the abysmal discrepancy, it is natural to suspect that there really is no issue between the unifiers and Goldman, that they differ in how they use the word 'action'. Yet underlying that frustrating polemic are some important issues and insights, on both sides of the polemic. They ought to be brought into the open. 1.l. Goldman characterizes actions twice. Naturally, he believes that the two characterizations coincide. His first characterization is the one relevant for his dispute against the unifiers. It is an follows:
.
. . . A n act-type is simply an act-property . .an act-token is the exemplifyingof a property by an agent at a time, it is natural so to individuate act-tokens that two act-tokens are identical ifand only ifthey have the same agent, the samep.opeq, and the same time. ([I], 10; Goldman's italics.) The exemplifying of a property by an agent at a time is the sort of thing that some philosophers call true propositions, or existing states of affairs, or facts. Let us for convenience speak of them as facts or truths. To highlight the threefold analysis that Goldman makes of act-tokens let us represent them as ordered triples of the form [x, P, t], where 'x' denotes a person, 'P' an action property, and 't' a time. This notation has been used by Martin ([36]) and bv Kim (r321). For convenience let us use our symbols autonymously. Now, Goldman holds that: \L
>,
(I) [x, P, t ] = [x', P ' , t ' ] ,wheneverx andx' are co-referential, t and t' are also co-referential, and the property predicates P and P' are synonymous ([I]: 12).
Hence, an act-token is as first characterized by Goldman, not just a truth about an agent's doing something, but a class of truths, or facts.
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1.2 In a letter to me Goldman has written: Admittedly, I do not use the term 'particular' in thebook, but that is because I find that term rather ambiguous. . . However, if one means by 'particular' any entity that is not an abstract entity, or a universal, then I certainly do believe that act-tokens are particulars. . . Also, I do believe that they occupy time.
,
The time occupied by act-token [a, P, t] is the time t constituting it. Clearly, empirical facts and truths also occupy time in that sense: they occur at the time constituting them. For example, the truth or existing state of affairs that Socrates drank the hemlock at a time t exists, in that sense, at t. The crucial thing is that a truth is, in that sense, out there in the world, not in (or not merely in) the mind. Facts and truths are thus not abstract, and are not universal. Hence, they are particulars (but not substances) in the sense of Goldman's. Here one question intrudes: Aren't we multiplying entities by distinguishing act-tokens from existing states of affairs, truths, or facts? Kim, who has worked with Goldman on the concept of event and action ([I]: 10, n12), has introduced the notion of event by means of the following stipulation: (E) [a, P, t] exists, iff a exemplifies P at t. Goldman assumes (E)in [I]. But what sort of entity is [a, P, t] over and above a exemplij??~ P at t, which is a state of affairs (or a proposition)? Do we need such an entity? There is, besides, the serious methodological question as to whether we can introduce entities by stipulation. Just consider this stipulation: (E') John's soul exists (in heaven) at time t, if and only if John is smiling at t. In any case, perhaps (E) cannot be supported by a proof that there are particulars of the agreed form [a, P, t] over and above the truths or existing states of affairs of the form P(a, t). But those truths or states of affairs are certainly in the world. At any rate, Goldman's act-tokens are, by (E) and (I), dispensable in favor of certain converging materially equivalent classes of truths, namely, those about the same agents and times and with synonymous act types. 1.3. Now, have the unifiers ever denied that there is an infinity of Goldman's actional truths or act-tokens whenever an agent does something? I believe not. Those unifiers would (or should) agree with Goldman that in example (A) above, Francesca is the subject of an infinity of truths of the formFrancesca didA (exempliesA-ing) at t it being the case thatp, and of the other forms of what Goldman calls level-generated act-tokens. Nor do the unifiers deny that there are the infinities of truth equivalences that Goldman calls act-tokens. Does Goldman really deny that there is one action in the sense of the unifiers? I don't think so. He himself belatedly recognizes this:
Now Anscombe's or Davidson's notion o f a single action, I think, corresponds to our notion of a single act-tree. Their singleaction corresponds to the set of all acts o n a single act-tree, or perhaps to whatever "underlies" the acts on a single act-tree. ([I], 37; the italics in 'whatever "underlies"'are mine.)
What is Anscombe's and Davidson's notion of action? Is an action for them merely a class of truth equivalences of the sort that Goldman calls act-tokens? Is it a class as ordered by what Goldman calls level-generation? Is it something more profound that underlies a Goldman act-tree? Patently, an affirmative answer to any of these questions is compatible with Goldman's claim that there are exemplifications of the form [a, P, t] and also classes of these. 1.4. Anscombe, Shwayder, and Davidson use the word 'action' to refer to the agent's bodily movements that constitute the agent's intervention in the causal order. Their decision is not arbitrary: it highlights the fact that once an agent has performed his relevant bodily movements, he has finished acting. For instance, in our example (A) above, once Francesca has moved her finger on the gun trigger, she has done everything that she has to do to kill Romeo. Anscombe, Shwayder, and Davidson are talking about something different from Goldman's topic when they claim that in (A) Francesca committed just one action, and that that action is described differently in (1)-(5).There is nothing that Goldman can say to show that the unifiers are mistaken: obviously, Francesca, in making (1)-(5) true, performed just one relevant bodily movement, namely, the movement of her right index finger. Such movements I call doings. 1.5 Davidson emphasizes that actions are for him events, and that events are particulars, in the same category as individuals, and not properties. They are not truths, or exemplifications of properties by agents. Thus, he would analyze our above example (5) Francesca killed Romeo at 9 a.m. as
(5.D)3e(Killing(Francesca, Romeo, e) & At(9 a.m., e)). This contrasts with Goldman's analysis: (5.G) [Francesca, killing Romeo, 9 a.m.], construed as representative of a truth equivalence or fact that constitutes or determines an act-token. The differences between (5.D) and (5.G)are of the utmost importance. First, a Goldmanian act-token turns out to be a class of truths, or a mysterious eliminable particular; a Davidsonian action is an ineliminable particular, a doing. Second, a Goldmanian act-token does not examplify the act properties composing it, e.g., (5.G) does not exemplify the property killing; a Davidsonian action exemplifies act properties, together with the agent (and the patient, if any), as showd in (5.D). Third, a Goldmanian act-token is located at the time of the action, in that it includes the time as a constituent; a
INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY
239
Davidsonian action is an event located at the time of action, but not including it as a constitutent. Fourth, there is no incompatibilitybetween (5.D) and (5.G).There is no reason why anybody should object to (5.G)as givingus the elements of (5); and there is no need for the unifiers or anybody else to object to Goldman's truth equivalence classes. On the other hand, Davidson's analysis (5.D) is far~,fromtrivial: it involves a commitment to the subcategory of events within the category of particulars. Perhaps Goldman also wants an additional subcategory of particular, as noted in 1.2. Some philosophers find that commitment grave and questionable. See, for instance, Clark ([22]), Chisholm ([20] and [21]), and Horgan ([31]); see also Martin ([36]) and Sellars ([43]). In the letter referred to in 1.2, Goldman expresses, tantalizingly, his temptation to endorse Clark's rejection of Davidson's event particulars. I do not find Clark's arguments in [22] powerful enough to show that events are not a subcategory of irreducible particulars. But how can Goldman endorse Clark's claim while holding that events are particulars?
2. CONTINGENT IDENTITY OF ACTIONS
Clearly, Goldman's arguments cannot refute the one-action view. Yet they are not worthless. They muster valuable data. 2.1. Goldman's first argument against the Anscombe-Davidson's thesis is this, transformed from his example to ours ([I], 2): (11) Francesca's pulling the trigger caused the gun to fire; (12) Francesca's killing Romeo did not cause the gun to fire; Therefore, (13) Francesca's pulling the trigger # Francesca's killing Romeo. What exactly are the terms of this argument? There are several interpretations, of which two deserve special attention: (i) each of the gerundial terms formulates (denotes, expresses, signifies, whatever your favorite semantical term for this may be is not important) a truth, in the sense above described; (ii)each of the gerundial terms denotes an action, and actions are events of certain kinds, i.e. particulars. On interpretation (i),conclusion (13)is the obvious truth that the truths (2) and (5) above, namely, Francesca pulled the trigger and Francesca killed Romeo, are different truths. This has no bearing on the dispute between Goldman and the unifiers. On interpretation (ii), (13) is important and non-trivial. But is this argument (11)-(13)sound? We may accept the premises as true. Is it valid? Undoubtedly, causal connections depend essentially on the causally related events having certain properties. They are intensional in that the change in the properties in question alters the truth value of the causal claim. On the other hand, the particular events involved in a causal connection do not matter: causal connections are extensional with respect to the particulars entering into them. This double feature requires that in understanding a
causal claim we separate the particulars involved from the causally relevant properties. Perhaps a scheme like the following will help as the basic form of singular causal sentences:
(CS) (A, (4, . . . ,i,,), (el, . . . ,G )) caused (B, ,& ' . . . ,$), (4, . . . ,eL)) where A and B are the causally relevant properties, each of thee's are the (irreducible) events related by those properties, and the i's are individuals involved in those events. Thus, Goldman's argument (11)-(13)is of the form below, with the property expressions underscored: (11.c) (Pulling, (Francesca, trigger), (Francesca's pulling the trigger))
caused (Firing, (the gun), (the gun's firing)).
(12.c) (Killing, (Francesca, Romeo), (Francesca's killing Romeo)) does
not cause (Firing, (the gun), (the gun's firing)).
Therefore, (13.c) Francesca's pulling the trigger
=
Francesca's killing Romeo.
This argument is not valid. By transposition, the argument "(ll), (12), therefore (13)" is valid, if and only if the argument: "(ll), denial of (13), therefore, denial of (12)" is valid, i.e., the argument: (11) Francesca's pulling the trigger caused the gun to fire (13I.c) Francesca's pulling the trigger $ Francesca's killing Romeo. Therefore, (12.I.c) (Killing, (Francesca, Romeo), (Francesca's killing Romeo)) caused (Firing, (the gun), (the gun's firing)). But this argument is invalid. From (11) and (13I.c) we can only infer correctly: (14.c) (Pulling, (Francesca, the trigger), (Francesca's killing Romeo)) caused (Firlng, (the gun), (the gun's firing)). How can we read (14.c) in ordinary English? The following seems to me to be one of several alternatives: (14) Francesca's act of killing Romeo, which was a pulling of the trigger by her, caused the gun to fire. This does not seem as odd as Goldman thinks, correctly, the denial of (12)to be. Thus his first argument against Anscombe and Davidson fails because it neglects to consider the essential role of properties in causal statements.
2.2. Goldman's second argument is of the same form as his first one:
INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY
241
Suppose that John is playing the piano, and that his playing causes Smith to fall asleep while also causing Brown, who was already asleep, to wake up. John has performed the following acts: (1) he has played the piano, (2) he has put Smith to sleep, and (3) he has awakened Brown . . . Consider the following two events: (el)Smith's falling asleep, and (q)Brown's waking u p . . . Clearly, while John's playing the piano caused (el), . . .John's awakening Brown did not cause (el). Similarly, . . . Hence, John's playing the piano cannot be identical with John's putting Smith to sleep and cannot be identical with John's awakening Brown. ([I]: 2f; his italics.)
Goldman's second argument is simply a complication of his first argument and runs afoul of the intensional feature of causal statements.
2.3. Goldman's third argument is different: it deals with causes, rather than with effects: John answers the telephone and says "hello." He says "hello" because he wishes to greet the caller. But he has been quarrelling with his wife and . . . he says "hello" very loudly . . .John's act of saying "hello" loudly is an effect, at least in part, of his being in a tense emotional state. But John's act of saying "hello" (simpliciter) is not at all an effect of his emotional state, since John would have said "hello" whether or not he had been angry or tense. Thus, there is a causal factor of John's saying "hello" loudly that is not a causal factor of John's saying "hello." [Hence, they are different acts.] ([I]: 3.)
We find here the difference in the truthsJohn said "hello" andJohn said "hello" loudly. With this difference nobody quarrels. But there is no clear way as to how the differencesin truths about what John did can preclude what John did from being one and the same particular event, one that has both the generic property of being a case of saying "hello" and the specific property of being a case of saying "hello" loudly. To be sure, that event has these properties from different causal sources, but why should the difference in sources require a difference in the endpoints of the causal lines? If actions are irreducible particulars, as Davidson wants them to be, why shouldn't they have properties arising from different causal lines-just as ordinary individuals do? Clearly the cause of John's being tall lies in certain genes of his parents, while the cause of his having a dark complexion lies in different genes-yet it is the same John who has both properties. Goldman is not, it seems, focussing on the unifiers' view.
2.4. Goldman correctly stresses the fact that the different causal factors involved in John's saying "hello" loudly need not be all present. Indeed, John might have said "hello" very softly, had he been in andifferent emotional state. But this doesnot prove that John's act of saying "hello" is not the same as John's act of saying "hello" loudly. It only proves that: (15) 'John's saying 'hello' is the same as John's saying 'hello' loudly," if true, is a contingent identity. And, it seems, (15) is true just because the circumstances are of the kind Goldman describes. All this is, however, precisely what Anscombe and Davidson have claimed. They have insisted that the identity of actions is not dictated by logic, but is determined by the circumstances.
2.5. Goldman's fourth argument on [I], p.4 is like his third one. Hence, the previous commentary applies mutatis mutandis. The crucial remark is that Goldman merely establishes,just as Anscombe and Davidson claim, that the identity between two actions is contingent.
,
2.6. Goldman's fifth argument on [I], p.4 is also of the same type as the immediately preceding ones, the difference being that he adduces normative rather than causal connections. We have here the obviously different truths: acting supererogatorily, Goldman gave Smith a two-dollar bill, and, thus, Goldman repaid Smith two dollars. Nobody claims that they are the same truth (proposition, or state of affairs), or fact. Yet this is not, once again, incompatible with there being one single act, in the sense of doing, that Goldman performed, namely, the movement of his hand picking up the money from his pocket. That particular event has the property of being supererogatory, as well as having the property of being a case of giving Smith a two-dollar bill and the property of being a case of repaying Smith two dollars, etc. What Goldman shows is that that event is supererogatory by virtue of certain circumstances, and also that those circumstances do not have to obtain for the event to be simply a repaying Smith two dollars. Yet this supports the claim that (16) Goldman's act of repaying Smith two dollars = Goldman's act of giving Smith a two-dollar bill = Goldman's supererogatory act of giving Smith a two-dollar bill is a string of contingent identities. 2.7. Goldman's arguments cannot refute the unifiers' view that in the case of their contingent identities of actions there is one doing. Nevertheless those arguments show that the causal connection, by being intensional, does not involve mere doings but doings qua possessors of certain properties. This insight is very important, although as we shall see, Goldman does not capitalize on it. 2.8. One of the most important data for Goldman's theory is the by-relationship between actions, for example: (17) Francesca killed Romeo by shooting him; (18) Francesca fired the gun by pulling the trigger. Goldman claims that the by-relationship is "asymmetric and irreflexive" ([I]: 5). Certainly, we do not normally say that, e.g., Jones killed Smith by killing him. In the case of our Francesca di Verona, (19) Francesca didn't shoot Romeo by killing him; (20) Francesca didn't pull the trigger by firing the gun. Note that the by-relation in (17)-(20)follows causal lines. This strongly suggests that we must conceive of the by-relation as sharing the features of causality we canonized in our scheme (CS) above. That is, the by-relation is
INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY
243
intensional in that it depends essentially on certain properties, but it is extensional in that the individuals and events involved in it enter into it. regardless of how they are refered to. On the unifiers' view, the by-relation is reflexive; indeed it holds only when identity holds. The asymmetry that Goldman has seized upon is the non-symmetry of the relevant properties. The point is that on the unifiers' view sentences of the form: (21) Xdid Aby doingB are to be analyzed as short for: (22) X's A'ing is qua A'ing a B'ing. [Here the term 'X's A'ing' denotes an action or event, and it can be replaced with any other co-referring term.] Now, how are we to interpret the logical form of (22)? Obviously there are three ways: (a) 'qua A'ing' modifies, i.e. is a part of, the subject; (b) 'qua A'ing' is a part of the predicate, and (c) 'qua A'ing' is a modality modifying the sentence 'X's A'ing is a B'ing'.
In brief, (22) may be in principle analyzed in either of the following ways: (22.a) (X's A'ing qua A'ing) is a B'ing; (22.b) X's A'ing is (qua A'ing a B'ing); (22.c) Qua A'ing (X's A'ing is a B'ing). Patently, (22.a) has the drawback of introducing a new type of particular: the qua-events. On a parallel analysis of individuals, we find quaindividuals. The generalization of the postulation may be fruitful, if we could, for instance, handle all cases of referential opacity by means of . . qua-entities. In contrast, (22.b) multiplies properties (and predicates), rather than particulars. Many philosophers find this course more agreeable. On a program like Quine's of treating all predicates as syncategorematic, multiplying properties (and predicates) is multiplying and complicating the ideology, rather than the ontology, through which we conceive the world. Alternative (22.c) makes the qua-aspects even more syncategorematic. Many philosophers who adopt a second-order logic and take properties to be the values of some quantifiers still refuse to introduce quantifiers that take modalities of propositions (or sentences) as values. Which of the three views (22.a)-(22.c)is the most satisfactory depends both on one's ontological assumptions and on a large comprehensive collection of relevant data. But none of the three analyses supports Goldman's claim that the asymmetry of the by-relation refutes the AnscombeShwayder-Davidsonview that the by-relation relates one and the same action to itself under different properties (or descriptions). 2.9. Goldman's final argument on [I], p.6 against the unifiers isone that he himself recognizes as a personal matter of opinion. It pertains to the partition of actions between basic and non-basic actions. On this see [5], [6], 191, 1231, [45], and the introduction to [ l l ] .
The basiclnon-basic distinction can always be construed by the unifiers as involving one and the same action qua being of a certain type. Thus, the distinction can be treated by means of one's favorite account, as in (22.a)(22.c), of qua-sentences. 3. IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS
Lurking in the vicinity of Goldman's polemic against Anscombe and Davidson are some genuine issues. These are ontological issues about the identity of events and actions. They appear in the context of intentions and wants, and they-have to do with what Quine has called the referential opacity, and others have called the intensionality, of psychological sentences. Yet Goldman does not see this, but actually tries to keep his infinity of actions away from referential opacity: A proponent of the identity thesis might contend that the phrases used in
posing our objections also create referentially opaque contexts, . . . The first point I want to make is that there is a danger here of proliferating opaque contexts. ([I], 6 ; my italics.)
Yet the multiplication of actions in the way Goldman proposes is connected with referential opacity or intensionality-as we have already noted above: the dependence of causality and the by-relation on properties and quu-aspects. In particular, contingent identities and psychological states create at least an apparent need of breaking down the particulars and individuals thought of into aspects,facets, orguises, which both the mind can apprehend and the particulars and individuals in question are made up of. The main points to keep in view are these: (i) the problems of individuation and identity apply to individuals and to events and actions in exactly the same way and for the same reasons; (ii) the intensionality of psychological contexts is the one that makes the problem of individuation extremely pressing; (iii)the mere remark, often made, that we cannot substitute identicals in referentially opaque contexts is not a solution to any problem: it is qt most the name of a serious ontological problem. 3.1. Consider the following Fregean tetrad: (31) King Oedipus believed that the previous king of Thebes was dead; (32) The previous king of Thebes was the same as Oedipus' father; (33) It wasn't the case that King Oedipus believed that Oedipus' father was dead; (34) King Oedipus believed that Oedipus' father was dead. As we all know, identity is governed by the principle (Id) If x is (genuinely)identical withy, then whatever is true ofx is true of y, aqd vice versa. It appears, further, that: (T) The sentential matrix "King Oedipus believes that -was dead" expresses something true of the previous king of Thebes in (31), but, since (33) is true, not of Oedipus' father in (34).
INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY
I Hence, it seems that, by virtue of (Id); (35) Oedipus' father is not (genuinely) identical with the previous king of Thebes.
I Therefore, since (32) is true, it appears that
(C) The relation expressed by the locution 'the same as' in (32) is not genuine identity: it is, of course, what is called contingent identity; hence, contingent identity is not (genuine)identity. 3.2. The preceding argument is not demonstrative, but only suggestive of a line of thinking that, fi it is to be fruitful, must end up with the development of an ontological account of both the sameness relation involved in (32) and of how the entitie-let us call them guises, or facetsOedipis'father and the previous king of Thebes, who are not identical, but nevertheless the same, manage somehow to form a unitary entity vis-a-vis entities like Oedipus, Jocasta, the present queen of Thebes. I cannot go into this here, but see [I51 and [16a], where consubstantiation is the theoretical counterpart of the contingent identity of (32) above. We have, thus, the Guise-ConsubstantiationTheory. Naturally, another viable alternative is to reject (35) and view contingent identity as a special case of genuine identhy. But then one must do something drastic: (i) reject (Id); or (ii) reject (T); or (iii) reject (32). The point that cannot ever be overemphasized is that none of these rejections by itself is of any value--unless it is accompanied by a theory. Simply to say that (Id), for instance, fails in psychological contexts is to say nothing. Indeed, how can identity be anything else than (Id)? To reject (Id) without putting a theory of identity in its place is to do nothing. The same holds for the rejection of (T): we need, then, a carefully worked out theory of properties, predication, and of what can be true of anything. The rejection of (32) requires a theory of predication and of negation. A combination of those moves merely compounds the urgent need of the required theory.
'
3.3. The case of events and actions is exactly the same as that of individuals illustrated above with Oedipis'father and the previous king of Thebes. To begin with, we have beliefs about events and actions, so that we can parallel the argument in Section 3.1. Nevertheless, there is something special about actions: we do some of them intentionally or at will. And this intentionality is a form of opacity or intensionality. We can, thus, parallel the argument as follows: (41) Oedipus intended to do A; (42) Oedipus A'ing (or, Oedipus to A) is the same as Oedipus B'ing (Oedipus to B);
1
1
(42a) For Oedipus: to do A is the same as to do B; (43) It was not the case that Oedipus intended to do B; (44)
Oedipus intended to do b.
expresses (T') The sentential matrix "Oedipus intended to " something true of Oedipus A'ing (or of Oedipus to do A) in (41), but, since (43) is true, not in (44).
Hence, by (Id), (45) Oedipus A'ing (or, Oedipus to do A) is not (genuinely) identical
with Oedipus B'ing (or, Oedipus to do B).
Therefore, since (42) is true, it appears that (C') The relation expressed by the locution 'the same as' in (42) is not
genuine identity: it is of course what is called contingent identity.
Again, there is no compulsion to take the theoretical course delineated by the preceding argument. It is clear, however, that the same types of theoretical choices, and the same demands for theorization we found for the case of individuals in Sections 3.1-3.2, appear now for the case of actions. Without an ontological theory of attribution of properties to actions and events, without a theory as to how actions can be the same without being genuinely identical, etc., the mere rejection of any of the steps (41)-(45)(Id)-(T1)-(C')is worth nothing. The sameness of (42) is very much like that of (32), yet it is not appropriate to call the sameness of (42) "consubstantiati~n".w e should, if we follow the theory suggested by the preceding argument, call it coevenZuation, or co-actuation. 3.4. The preceding argument is not Goldman's. As noted above he is anxious to put referential opacity aside. Moreover he is most likely not prepared to adopt the argument of Section 3.1 that breaks ordinary individuals into facets or guises. Yet his view of infinitely many actions that are equivalent under the same level-generation schema is very much the view to which the argument in Section 3.3 leads. Goldman's level-generation and same-level generation are together, as he conceives them pre-theoretically, very much like co-actuation. But I hasten to add that this statement must be qualified: Goldman's act-tokens are not clearly Davidsonian events, but classes of truths. I f his analysis of act-tokens as ordered triples of agents, act-types, and times is pushed, ontologically, in the Davidsonian direction, then Goldman's triplets can be considered as enumerations of the components of action guises related by co-actuation. Actually, the Guise-Coactuation theory is much finer-grained than Goldman's, and it has a clearer base.' 4. LEVEL-GENERATION OF ACTIONS
Chapter 2 of Goldman's A Theory ofHuman Action is the most original of the book. It contains the central core of his theory of human action. The nucleus of that core is his concept of level-generation. 4.1. Crucial data for Goldman's central theory are the data discussed in his first six arguments against Anscombe and Davidson, namely: (i) the non-symmetry of the byrelation; (ii)the fact that actions on the same causal line that involve earlier states are said to cause the later states involved in other actions, but not vice versa: e.g., Francesca's pulling the trigger causes the gun to fire, but Francesca's firing the gun is not said to cause the trigger to move.
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But in Chapter 2 Goldman introduces, almost casually, a datum that unexpectedly turns out to be perhaps the most significant of them all: (iii) the co-temporality of acts: The criterion of co-temporality is the correctness of saying that one of the acts is done "while also" doing the other. It is correct to say that S wiggled his toes "whilealso"strumming a guitar; hence these two acts are co-temporal. But it is incorrect to say that S checkmated his opponent "whilealso" moving his queen to king-knight seven (or vice versa), and it is incorrect to say that S turned on the light "whilealso"flipping the switch (or vice versa).Hence, neither of these pairs of acts is co-temporal.Pairs of acts are related by level-generation only if they fail to be co-temporal. ([I]: 22; Goldman'sitalics in 'while also' and 'fail';the others are mine.)
Chapter 2 also introduces other data: (iv) The use of the locutions 'and then' and 'and later' between verbs of action. When S does Aand later (or,and then) he does B, his B'ingissubsequent to his A'ing. (v) The use of the preposition 'in' between action verbs, as in "Jones outjumped Mary in outjumping George". Concerning the time of actions see [7], [28], [47], [49], [50], [53], and [14], Chapter 12, and [18a]. 4.2. Goldman's procedure is admirable. He offers many examples and he has the data (i)-(iv)above. Nevertheless, I have a serious methodological complaint. Goldman does not examine the data, but proceeds to build a theory upon them without any exegesis. Yet before any theoretical step is taken one should raise the question about the compatibility of the data.
4.3. I carried out a survey about the following: (B) Smith had a red shirt on. He was the one to jump last in the competition. Before him Brown hadjumped the highest: 6' 1 0 ; the next highest was George, who jumped 6' 3 . Mary jumped just before Smith and jumped 6'. Everybody in the audience was excited. It seemed as if Brown was to be the winner. Very few people thought that Smith could even jump as high as George. In that atmosphere of impatience and lack of interest, Smith jumped, and he jumped 7'! Nine upper undergraduates (U) and nine faculty members (F) at Indiana University were asked to judge for incorrectness or inaccuracy certain sentences, among which are the following, the numerals indicating the numbers of those who objected to the sentences they precede. U 1 6 3 6 0 0
F 2 7 4 7 1 3
Sentences (c) Smith outjumped George while also outjumping Mary. (d) Smith outjumped George while also wearing a red shirt. (f) Smith jumped 7' while also outjumping George. (h) Smith jumped 7' while also jumping more than 6' 3 . (i) By jumping 7' Smith outjumped George. (j) By outjumping Brown, Smith outjumped Mary, and everybody else.
1
1
7 7
8 8
9
7
7
8 8
8
(k) In outjumping George, Smith outjumped Mary. (1) In outjumping Mary, Smith outjumped George. (m)Smith outjumped George while also not swimmingin the lake. (n) Smith jumped 7' while also jumping 7' or jumping less than 7'. (q) Smith jumped while also keeping his faith in America. (r) Smith jumped 7' while also not writing a letter to his mother.
Note that by the prepositional criterion, in (i)-(k) we have instances of level-generation; yet these instances do not meet the condition of clearly failing to be co-temporal, as (c) and (f)show. The most striking result is the widespread differences in idiolect between the use of 'while also', 'by', and 'in'.2 4.4. Another methodological complaint is that Goldman did not examine the data in order to determine the formal properties of the by-relation. He simply stipulates that (G*.O) level-generation is intended to be an asymmetric, irrefixive, and transitive relation. ([I], 21.)
In any case, (G*.O) is one of Goldman's chief theoretical desiderata. 4.5. Goldman's level-generation of act-tokens is at bottom his account of the contingent identity of actions. His level-generation is, thus, his most important theoretical definition: (G*) Property-instance A level-generates property-instance B if and only if (1) A and B are distinct property-instances of the same subject [that is, A and B are distinct truths]; (2) the properties of which A and B are instances do not differ merely in containing different individual concepts of the same object; (3) (i) neither property-instance A nor property-instance B is subsequent to the other; (ii) neither is a temporal part of the other; and (iii) they are not co-temporal;
(4) there is a set of conditions C* such that (a) the conjunction of A and C* entails B, but neither A nor C* alone entails B; (b) if the subject, S, had not exemplified property A (at t), then S would not have exemplified B (at t); (c) if C* had not obtained, then even though S exemplified property A (at t), S would not have exemplified property B (at t). ([I], 45; I have put 'B' instead of 'A", and have inserted the labels '(i)', '(ii)', and '(iii)'.)
This definition generalizes the by-relation and is supposed to deliver a relation conforming with (G*.O).
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4.6. Consider example (B) above in section 4.3, concentrating on (47) By jumping 7' Smith jumped more than 6' 3". This is a statement that many English speakers make in the light of the data in (B). Condition (3)(iii)of (G*) is satisfied for most speakers I surveyed, as sentence (h) shows. But condition (4)(a)is not met: "Smithjumped 7'" entails by itself and, hence, does not level-generate, "Smith jumped more than 6' 3." 4.7. Still with data (B) in view, consider (48) By jumping 7' Smith outjumped George. This isjust a variation of Goldman's first example of causal generation at [I], p. 27. Is condition (3)(iii)satisfied?Please look at the chart in Section 4.3 and ponder (0.Less than half of the 18 persons who responded to my survey found it, in the light of the data in (B), to be incorrect to say that Smith jumped 7' while also outjumping George. Obviously Goldman does find it incorrect. Shall we conclude that more than half of the people I surveyed have a different conception of action from Goldman's? If so, what use is Goldman's theory to them? Why should a philosophical theory of human action be tied down to the use of a locution like 'while also' in one's idiolect? Should linguistic brainwashing be a pre-condition for accepting Goldman's theory? 4.8. Let us suppose that (48) satisfies, as it does in Goldman's idiolect, condition (3)(iii).From (B)we can choose many sets of circumstances. Let us choose C* to be: Georgejumped 6' 3". Clearly, condition (4)(a)is met. Let us attend to (4)(b).Given that George jumped 6' 3", if Smith had notjumped 7'-would he have failed to outjump George? Not necessarily: he might have jumped 7' 2 , or 6' 10" or 6' 4". Thus, condition (4)(b)is not met. This does not show that Smith's jumping 7' does not level generate Smith's outjumping George. As Goldman correctly points out, in an unofficial addition to (G*): (4)(d) In choosing our C* we must also be careful to select the minimal set of conditions necessary for generating B. If we include some additional, inessential element in C*, then the negation of C* does not ensure that act B would not be performed. ([I]: 42 n. 10; his italics.)
4.9. In fact, there is a simple proof that given two logically independent truths A and B, there is always a very simple condition C* that satisfies the four conditions (4)(a)-(d).Condition (a) requires that the three truths A, B, and C* be pairwise independent, but it also requires that: (i) A & C* entails B; that is: (it) C* entails that if A, then B. Condition (b) is satified if C* necessitates that if not-A, not-B. Thus, together (a) and (b) require, or can be jointly satisfied by: (ii) C* entails (A if and only if B).
What can the minimal condition C*, in accordance with Goldman's requirement (4)(d),be that satisfies (ii)?Obviously, that minimal condition is: (49) C*: A if and only if B, i.e., A = B. Since by hypothesis A and B are independent of each othcr, so is each independent of the biconditional "A = B." Since, furthermore, both A and B are true, the material biconditional is also true. Thus, conditions (4)(a)-(4)(b) are satisfied given C*, i.e., given A = B, had A not been the case, B would not have been the case. It remains only to consider 4(c). Suppose: (50) C* is not the case: -(A = B). This is equivalent to:
To test whether A level-generates B, we want, by (4)(c) ,
.
(52) A. Hence, from (51) and (52): Hence, condition (4)(c) is fully met by our C*. Obviously, by parity of reasoning, conditions (4)(a)-(c)are satisfied taking B as level-generating A. A trivial objection that A and B are acts, not conditions is irrelevant. For condition (4)(a)to be met A must occur in C*. Furthermore, Goldman allows on [I], p.28 that actions be treated as conditions for level-generation. Moreover, the generality of (G*) is deliberate: Goldman uses (G*) to define act-tokens; see Section 5 below. 4.10. Patently, the force of Goldman's (G*) lies, not in condition (4), but in conditions (1)-(3).Of these (1) and (2) are clear; conditions (3)(i)-(iii)are symmetrical, and of these the hardest one to meet is (3)(iii),co-temporality. As the chart in Section 4.3 shows, the differences in idiolect about the use of 'while also' are significant. It is a serious drawback of (G*) that the pivotal condition is an obscure datum of ordinary language. In any case, the following theorem holds for Goldman's theory: THEOREM. If A and B are logically independent of each other (neither implies the other), whenever in one's idiolect it is incorrect to say "X A'ed (at t) while also B'ing (at t)," X's A'ing level-generates X's B'ing, and vice versa. 4.11. It is important to note that the fact that the strong and unexpected Theorem in Goldman's theory just established does not preclude that some non-trivial conditions also show level-generation not to be asymmetric. For instance, the causal conditions, or Francesca's intentions, may make it the case that she kills Romeo if and only if she shoots him, and that she has set in motion a guillotine scheduled to stop just before cutting Romeo's throat. Thus, if the conditions were different, although she still kills him she wouldn't shoot him. 4.12. Look at entry (d) on the chart in Section 4.3. For most speakers, then:
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(58) Smith's outjumping George both level-generates and is level-
generated by Smith's wearing a red shirt (during the jump).
Consider entry (m) now. For even more people than those for whom (58) holds, it is the case that for them ( 5 9 ) Smith's outjumping George both level-generates and is levelgenerated by Smith's not swimming in the lake.
Similarly, from entry (r), (60) Smith's jumping 7' both level-generates and is level-generated by Smith's not writing a letter to his mother (during the time of the jumping). Note that Goldman's definition (G*) applies to all properties, not only to act properties. Thus, the reply that wearing a red shirt, not swimming in the lake, and jumping 7' or jumping less than 7' are not actions or actproperties is beside the point. 4.13. Evidently the reason why entry (d) Smith outjumped George while also wearing a red shirt on the chart in Section 4.3 is regarded as incorrect by most speakers is this: 'while also' suggests a homogeneity of the component sides, so that (d) is incorrect because one side is clearly a doing and the other is not. Of course, this informal consideration does nothing to save Goldman's theoretical definition (G*),since this definition was built on unexamined data, and has, as a consequence, no way of straining out the unhomogeneous cases of incorrect 'while also' constructions. 4.14. Consider again entry (d) above. Obviously, it will yield equally incorrect constructions whatever action sentence we put for "Smith outjumped George," for instance: (d') Smith turned his head while also wearing a red shirt. Hence, by the general principle established in Section 4.11, we have: (62) Smith's turning his head (whilejumping) both level-generates and is
level-generated by Smith's wearing a red shirt (while jumping).
Now, if level-generation were transitive, as Goldman wants it to be, from (58) and (62) we should derive: (63) Smith's outjumping George both level-generates and is level-
generated by Smith's turning his head (during his jumping).
But (63) is false, since it is correct, and perhaps true, to say that Smith outjumped George while also turning his his head. Thus, (G*) yields contradictions. 4.15. Goldman's (G*) does not, patently, illuminate the data he gathered round the ordinary by-relation. Since this relation is connected with co-actuation, or the contingent identity of act guises, Goldman's levelgeneration of act-tokens does not illuminate co-actuation.
5. ACTIONS
After his polernic against Anscombe and Davidson, in [I], Chapter 1, Goldman provides a second characterization of actions. He toys with the idea that "an act-property is a property that can be exemplified intentionally"; but he finds the proposal "too strong . . .misspeaking,miscalculating or miscounting are act-properties though they seem to Fecluak intentionality." ([I]: 17; his italics.) Goldman decides to bypass the "serious problems" lurking in that approach. He proposes, in order to gain generality and avoid circularity, to analyze act-tokens directly by means of his crucial notion of level-generation. ([I]: 17 and 44.) That is why, as we noted, his definition of level-generation is couched in terms of general property-exemplification. The plan is good; but it is fraught with troubles. 5.1. His analysis of act-token is this: (G*.l) (1) If A is a basic act-token, then A is an act-token. (2) If A is on the same level as an act-token, then A is an act-token. (3) If-A is level-generated by an act-token, then A is an act-token. (4) If A is a temporal part of an act-token, then A is an act-token. (5) If A is a temporal sequence of act-tokens, then A is an act-token.
( 6 ) Nothing else is an act-token. ([I], 45.)
Clause (1) is given an analysis (which I call (G*.5)),on p. 72 of [I]. Roughly, a basic act-token is a truth about a sequence of bodily movements that one can bring about at will. Let us concentrate on the other clauses. 5.2. Consider clause (3). As we have noted, 'while also' does not link an ordinary action sentence with one about states, for instance: (61) Smith jumped the puddle while also being pushed by Jones (while also being pale, being short, f-ired,married, a habitual drunk, etc.) It is clear that every property of Smith at or during the time of jumping meets the temporal tests of condition (3) of (G*). If those properties are not implied by jumping, then they are level-generated by his jumping. It is easy to see that all of Smith's properties at the time of his jumping are generated by his jumping, or by his not swimming in the lake, or by his not writing a letter to his mother. This is too sweeping a result. It runs counter to Goldman's correct desideratum to exclude states and sufferings from the category of act-tokens ([I]: 46). 5.3. Goldman is very little concerned with the logical structure of actions. This affects several of his discussions (E.g., his analysis of ability in Ch. 7). Yet he is definite enough about certain forms:
.
. . my definition of acts makes no provision for disjunctive acts, conditional acts, biconditional acts, or other "truth-functional"acts, with the exception of conjunctive (compound) acts and negative acts. . . ([I]: 47.)
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This is very perplexing. Goldman's definition (G*) of level-generation does exclude disjunctive acts. As noted above, the crucial test is cotemporality. In Section 4.1 1 we noted how some disjunctive acts can pass it, and combined with a negative act they came out canonized:
not
(62) Smith was (not)being pushed by Jones while also kicking or crying. The act of Smith's (not)being pushed by Jones generates his act of kicking or crying. Indeed, every disjunctive act will pass the 'while also' test when combined with a state of the agent. But this is not the only way. We have noted how the non-homogeneity of the clauses makes the 'while also' test successful. In fact, some speakers find the 'while also' construction incorrectjust by the mere presence of a disjunction after 'while also'. 5.4. Goldman's opposition to disjunctive acts is perplexing, besides, because he allows conjunctive and negative act-tokens. Why isn't disjunction forthcoming as either equivalent to, or an abbreviation of, "not(neither A'ing nor B'ing)," for instance, not leaving both handr unraised is equivalent to rain'ngat least one hand. Indeed the more complex the logical structure of an act,'the easier it is for it to pass the 'while also' test. 5.5. Let us leave Goldman's theory and turn to the relevant data. We cannot but be impressed with the ubiquity of disjunctions among the data. First, disjunctive acts are often intended, thus meeting the pre-theoretical test to which Goldman inclines on p. 17. Often one intends to do, and can do intentionally, A or B, without caring about which one turns out to be realized. Second, \actions are precisely what one ought to, should, must, is required to, do. And many a time one ought or is required to A or B, without it being the case that one is required to A or that one is required to B. There are serious issues here. (See [14], Chapters 6 and 7.) 6. INTENTIONAL ACTION
In [I], Chapter 3, Goldman continues his utilization of his chief theoretical definition (G*) of level-generation. The main result of this chapter is his analysis of intentional action. Some preliminaries are helpful. Goldman calls act-tree an array of act-tokens related by level-generation to one or more basic actions, which are intentional bodily movements. A simple example is the act-tree composed by the array (1)-(5) of Francesca's performance in example (A) above in Section 1. 6.1. Goldman considers an agent's beliefs about possible act-trees and his wants to actualize such act-trees. For instance, Francesca may be supposed both to have believed that the tree or line (1)-(5)would be realizable and to have wanted its realization. Goldman defines: (G*.2) The combination of an agent's action-wantsand hisprojectedact-tree I shall call an action-plan. In other words, an action-plan consists of a desire (a predominant desire) to do some act A' and a set of beliefs (of greater or less certitude) to the effect that, if one were to perform basic act A,, this would generate . . . act A'. ([I]: 56.)
The idea of an action-plan is the most brilliant idea in the whole of Goldman's book. I cannot overstress the significance of treating wants, beliefs, and intentions as concerned with structures of possible act-tokens, and not with isolated acts. 6.2. Armed with his idea of action-plan, Goldman proceeds to analyze the concept of intentional action, as follows: (G*.3) Suppose S has an action-plan which includes A,, . . . , A,, where A, is a
basic act and n 3 1. S wants to do A,,, and S believes (to some degree) of
each of the acts A,, . . . ,A,, firstly, that it will either be generated by A, or
be on the same level as A,, and secondly, that it will either generate A,, or
be on the same level as A,,.
[ l ] If this action-plan,in a certain characteristicway, causes S's doing A,, then A, is intentional. And [2] if some of the acts A,, . . . ,A,, are performed in the way conceived in the action-plan, then these are also intentional. [3] All other acts on the (actual) act-tree are non-intentional. ([I]: 57; italics and labels '[I]'-'[3]' are mine.)
The pattern underlying (G*.3) is excellent. The ensuing five criticisms are meant only to suggest modifications. 6.3. First, (G*.3) assigns too much significance to the basic bodily movements. He insists that: (i) a "complete action-plan, . . . i.e., a plan that includes a relevant basic act" is required for the intentionality of a goal action, and (ii) the plan must "feature the basic actions that actually generate" the goal act ([I]: 60). Against both (i) and (ii), most action-plans one conceives do not include particular possible bodily movements, because these are substitutable by other movements. Presumably in the case of our example (A), Francesca, being right-handed, believed implicitly that she would shoot Romeo with her right hand. But did she know which finger she was going to use? Most likely her action-plan did not include any belief about any particular bodily movement. Suppose, however, that Francesca believed that she would pull the trigger with her right-hand index finger. Suppose further that she had lost the feel of her fingers, and that when she entered Romeo's apartment she grabbed her gun and, explicitly believing that she was pulling the trigger with her right index finger, she was in fact not moving it, but pulled the trigger with her middle finger. What is her basic act-token? Did she perform the moving of her finger intentionally? By (G*.3) neither her firing the gun nor her shooting or killing of Romeo is intentional! Alternatively, suppose that Francesca fires two guns, and believes both that her moving her right index will shoot the bullet that will kill Romeo, and that the bullet she will fire with her left index will miss; she wants to fire both guns in order to frighten Romeo. It happens that her right-hand fired bullet misses Romeo, but her left-hand fired bullet hits him fatally. Obviously,she killed Romeo intentionally, even though her action-plan included an ineffective basic act-token and her effective act-token was not even connected, in the projected act-tree, with her killing of Romeo. But not on (G*.3).
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6.4. Second, according to Goldman's (G*.3),only those acts in the path from the basic act A, to the goal act & are intentional. Side acts not in that path, even if foreseen, are not intentional. Goldman is adamant on this point:
. . . the act of getting my hand wet was o n my projected act-tree, was part of my action-plan . . . This fact might make us think that the act of getting my hand wet would be intentional, but a closer look at condition [(G*)]shows this to be false. ([I], 59; my italics.) I find this perplexing. In the very example he gives, the side action is considered by the agent, and his putting it in the projected act-tree, with deliberation, does signify that it is not undesirabb enough so as to lead him to the cancellation of the projected act-tree. For contrast suppose that Francesca wants to wound Romeo very seriously, but considers his death merely as a side effect. She is prepared to risk killing him, just as much as Goldman was prepared to risk wetting his hand when he signalled by extending his hand out the car window. When Romeo dies, it seems too unrealistic to say that Francesca killed him non-intentionally. An action that one ponders and places as a side action in a plan leading to a goal action, is an action that one tolerates and accepts in spite of how painful it is, in order to attain that goal. This deliberate toleration is of the same family as the acceptance we call intending. It is harsh to cast a tolerated action aside and declare it non-intentional, just because it is not in the path of the goal. 6.5. Third, suppose that Francesca intended to kill Romeo by putting a bullet straight through the middle of his heart. She is a good markswoman. But Romeo moves when she fires and the bullet fatally pierces his brain. It seems to me that she killed him intentionally, even though the killing of Romeo is not connected in the conceived way, in the projected path, with Francesca's bodily movements. 6.6. Fourth, Goldman's analysis of intentional action, quite properly, requires in (G*.3)[1] that the agent's action plan cause him in "a certain characteristic way" to do the projected basic acts. What is this characteristic way of causation? Goldman proclaims: But neither do I think that it is incumbent on me, qua philosopher, to give an answer to this question. ([I]: 62.)
This is, however, not wholly right. Since, as he explains later on ([I]: Chapter 6), the wants and beliefs involved in the causation of intentional action are occurrent wants and beliefs, there is a lot to be said about them. There is, first, the question as to what exactly those occurrences are. Since those occurrences are psychological acts, there is, second, the question about the contents of those mental acts. Undoubtedly, those occurrences have the causal role in intentional action they do precisely because of the kinds of contents they have. There is, third, the question about the logical form of such contents. This is a philosophical problem; some stabs at dealing with it have been made already, e.g., in [42], [14], Chapters 10-11, [29], and [lOa].
6.7.Fifth, Goldman's definition (G*.3) of intentional action should have been complemented with a discussion of intentions and intending. See, e.g., [3], [4], [12], [14] Chapters 6 and 10, [19], [38], [39], and [40]. 6.8. Goldman's neglect of intentions and intending makes his analysis of basic action-type unsatisfactory, namely: (G*.4) Property A is a basic act-type for S at t if and only if: (a) If S were in standard conditions with respect to A at t , then if S wanted to exemplify A at t , S's exemplifying at t would result from this want; and (b) the fact expressed by (a) does not depend on S's level-generational knowledge nor on S's cause-and-effect knowledge, except possibly the knowledge that his exemplifying A would be caused by his want. ([I]: 67).
,
6.9. The first point to note is that the deficienciesof Goldman's analysis of level-generation (G*) bear heavily on (G*.4). 6.10. Goldman characterizes the general sense of 'wanting x' that he desires as roughly equivalent with "feeling favorably toward x", "being inclined towardx" ([I]: 49). Consider now a small child who wants to be fed, is in normal conditions for her want to be satisfied by her mother, expresses her want by crying (as is the normal situation with babies), has not yet learned anything about the causal connection between her wants, her cries, and the realization of her wants, and is fed instantly by her mother. By (G*.4) it seems that for that child at the appropriate time, beingfed is a basic act-type. Clause (G*.4)(b)gives too much weight to the person's ignorance. It is easy to generalize from the above example to cases in which an ignorant, but fortunate person will have hasic act-types that would no longer be so, once he knows how they result from his wants-even if he continues to realize his wants in the usual way. Yet it seems incorrect to suppose that we would no longer be acting at will, or intentionally, if we acted as usual but knew how our wants or volitions work on the brain. 7.GOLDMAN'S PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT AND METHOD
There are many topics in Goldman's book that also deserve careful appraisal. But I want to conclude with some remarks about the type of philosophical project Goldman carries out in A Theory of Human Action. 7.1. Goldman's positive philosophical project is chiefly to develop a philosophical theory of human action. To this effect he considers a large array of data. This is admirable, since we must at all costs avoid the error chastised by Wittgenstein of "nourishing one's thinking with only one kind of example" ([54], No. 593.) Yet, as we noted in discussing Goldman's level-generation of actions, one must scrutinize the data and prologue every philosophical theorization with a careful proto-philosophy : collect rich and complex data, examine them, so as to bring out their tensions and conflicts,
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weigh their significance,and distill from them problems and crucial criteria of adequacy for any theory about the topic. Often philosophers gather their data in the course of attacking theories in competition with theirs. This is important not only because of the additional data brought in but also because the contrasts among theories are illuminating. Yet in the absence of a systematic proto-philosophical gathering and examination of data, the attacks on other theories often fail to provide rich data and often also lead to unnecessary polemics on spurious issues. 7.2. Goldman's philosophical theory is a carefully worked out sequence of definitions analyzing ordinary concepts, or generalizations thereof (as in the case of his level-generation). Thus, his theory is a magnificent example of a philosophical theory in the classical sense of analytic philosophy. That conception of theory is, however, too narrow. In philosophy we want to understand certain general and pervasive structures of the world and experience. Those structures are constituted by complexes of general relationships linking different types and families of concepts (or aspects of reality)to each other. There is no reason at all to suppose that those relations are just of the form appropriate to explicit definitions. At least four points must be made against a program of stringing explicit definitions after one another. 7.3. First, besides the definitional relationships among concepts or situations, we must have non-definitional connections. Otherwise we are not producing the deep and broad understanding of the philosophical structures we are interested in. Some of the connections we miss when we pursue a program of definitions may very well be biconditional principles. But many of the principles we miss provide either necessary or sufficient conditions, but not both. To illustrate, consider the following principle: (1.W) If X wants to A the object which is F, then X believes that there is an object which is F and wants to A it, and vice versa. For example: "If Joan wants to paint the house her brother bought, then she believes that her brother bought a house and she wants to paint it." This principle is not a definition: it would be circular, since 'wants' appears in both the antecedent and the consequent. Yet this principle is a very important one connecting wanting and believing. Goldman, naturally, bother neither with (1.W) nor with its like. (For (I.W.) and its cousins see [42], [3], [18], and [14], Chapters 7 and 11, especially p. 272.) Yet principles like (I.W.) are crucial to the theory of action. 7.4.Second, if definitions are taken at face value, we should regard them as telling us how certain terms are eliminable and how certain situations are complex. This is informative only to the extent that there is an implicit existential postulate in the background, namely: that such complex situations are exemplified in the world or in experience. We already noted this in Section 1.2 above. That existential postulate is implicit in every proposed philosophical analysis. Because of it philosophical theories areempirical.The widespread dogma that analyses are a priori is due to two facts: that the
existential postulate is never formulated, and that we are dealing with pervasive structures: it is easy to think that what is so pervasive as to be obvious is not established by experiencing it. Here we must keep firmly in mind that, as Quine has argued, the analytic-synthetic, the a prioriempirical, and the necessary-contingent distinctions are all unsharp and can be drawn at different places in our body of beliefs, depending on our plans of inquiry.
7.5.Third, leaving aside the existential postulate implicit in every analyzing definition, one thing is clear: the important types of situations are not mentioned in the definientia of analyzing definitions. They are the ones we must understand. For this we need the laws relating them to each other. In short, definitions cannot substitute for laws, and laws are the fundamental core of theories: definitions are merely devices that make the formulations of laws more economic or more intelligible. In the case of the very general structures that philosophers deal with, the laws characteristic of philosophical accounts have often been called "conceptual", "conceptually necessary", "(broadly) analytic," etc., in order to stress their not being merely difinitional or "trivially analytic." They were, of course, the synthetic a priori of the preceding generations. The difficulty with the synthetic a priori was not its being a priori, but its lacking evidential data. Of course, the data that were absent were never carefully scrutinized, and philosophers proposed laws not suggested by scrutinized data. 7.6. Fourth, aiming merely at analyzing definitions, rather than at laws, easily leads to serious neglect of philosophical topics crucial to our understanding the most general and pervasive structures of the world. In particular, definitions at a molar level characteristicallyleave out the logical form of the sentences (propositions, states of affairs, facts, situations) of the forms involving the concepts being defined. The study of logical form requires the decomposition of the sentence (or proposition) into components, and these require laws that distinguish them from each other, and from other components in related sentences (or propositions). We have seen how Goldman's inattention to the logical form of action sentences is at the core of his polemic against the unifiers. (It is also the source of some deficiencies of his account of practical inference in Chapter 4.) In order to deal with the ontology of human action, or the logic of practical reasoning, we must theorize in the full sense, and use our definitions as mere aids in the formulation of our theoretical theses. REFERENCES [I] Goldman, Alvin, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). [2] Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957). [3] Audi, Robert, "Intending," The Jountal of Philosophy 70(1973): 387-403. [4] Baier, Annette C., "Actand Intent," TheJournal ofPhilosophy 67(1970):467-75. "The Search for Basic Actions," American Philosophical Quarterly [5] , 8(1971): 161-70. [6] Beardsley, Monroe, "Actions and Events:' American Philosofihical Quarterly 12(1975): 263-76.
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[7] Bennett, Jonathan, "Shooting, Killing, and Dying," Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 2(1973): 315-23. [8] Binkley, Robert, "A Theory of Practical Reason," The Philosophical Review 64(1965): 423-48. 2(1968): 187-90. [9] Brand, Myles, "Danto on Basic Actions," N O ~ S (ed.) The Nature of Human Action (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman [lo] , and Company, 1970). "The Fundamental Question in Action Theory," N O ~ S13 (1979): [lOa] , 131-51. [I 11 Care, N. S:, and Landesman, C., (eds.)Readings in the Theory ofAction (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1968). [12] Castafieda, Hector-Neri, "Intentions and the Structure of Intending," The
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"The Logic of Change, Action, and Norms," The Journal of Philosophy
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Thinking and Doing (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975). [14] , "Identity and Sameness," Philosophia 4(1974): 121-50. [15] , "Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects and of
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(ed.) Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars [17] , (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1975). "Some Reflections on Sellars' Theory of Intentions," in [17]: 27-54. [18] , [18a] , "Conventional Aspects of Human Action: Its Time and Its Place," Dialogue (forthcoming). [19] Chisholm, Roderick M., "The Structure of Intention," TheJournal of Philosophy 67(1970): 633-47. "Events and Propositions," NO& 4(1970):15-24. [20] , "States of Affairs Again,'' N O ~ S 5(1971): 179-89. [21] , [22] Clark, Romane, "Conerning the Logic of Predicate Modifiers," N O ~ S 4(1970): 31 1-35. [23] Danto, Arthur, "Basic Actions," American Philosophical Quarterly 2(1965): 14148. [24] Davidson, Donald, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," The Journal of Philosophy 60(1963): 685-700; reprinted in [lo] and [ l l ] . "The Logical Form of Action Sentences," in [41]: 81-95. [25] , "Events as Particulars,'' N O ~ 4 S(1970): 25-32. 1261 , "Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events," N O ~ S 5(1971): 333-49. [27] , [28] Davis, Lawrence, "Individuation of Actions," The Journal of Philosophy 67(1970): 520-30. [29] Falk, David, "'Ought' and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48(1967-68). [30] Gustafson, Donald, "The Range of Intentions:' Inquiry 18(1975): 83-95. [31] Horgan, Terence L., "The Case Against Events," The Philosophical Review (forthcoming in 1978). [32] Kim, Jaegwon, "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event," The Journal of Philosophy '70(1973): 2 17-36. [33] Landesman, Charles, "Actions as Universals,"American Philosophical Quarterly 6(1969): 247-52. [34] Lehrer, Keith, (ed.) Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House, 1966). [35] Martin, Jane R., "Basic Actions and Simple Actions," American Philosophical Quarterly 9(1972): 59-68. [36] Martin, Richard M., "Facb: What They Are and What They Are Not," American Philosophical Quarterly 4(1967): 269-80.
McCann, Hugh, "Volition and Basic Action," The Philosophical Review 83(1974): 451-73. Meiland, Jack W., The Nature of Intention (London: Methuen; New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970). O'Shaughnessy, Brian, "Trying (as the Mental 'Pineal Gland'):' The Journal of Philosophy 70(1973): 365-86. Pitcher, George, "In Intending and Side Effects," The Journal of Philosophy 67(1970): 659-68. Rescher, Nicholas, (ed.) The Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967). Sellars, Wilfrid, "Thought and Action," in [34]: 105-39. , "Actions and Events," N O ~ 7 S(1973): 179-202. Shwayder, D. S., The Stratification of Behavior (New York: Humanities Press, 1965). Stoutland, Frederick, "Basic Actions and Causality," The Journal of Philosophy 65(1968): 467-75. Thalberg, Irving, "Singling Out Actions, Their Properties and Components," The Journul of Philosophy 68(1971): 781-7. Thomson, Judith Jarvis, "The Time of a Killing:' The Journal of Philosophy 68(1971): 115-32. Todd, William, "Intentions and Programs," Philosophy of Science 38(1971): 530-41. Vollrath, John, "When Actions Are Causes:' Philosophical Studies 27(1975): 329-39. Van-Wright, G. H.,NormandAction (New Yryk: The Humanities Press, 1963). Woods,John, (ed.)Engineering Death: Abortion, Suicide, Euthanasia, and Saecide (Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, 1978). Ware, Robert, "Acts and Action," The journal of Philosophy 70(1973): 403-18. Weil, Vivian, and Thalberg, Irving, "The Elements of Basic Action," Philosophia 4(1974): 111-38. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952).
'The Guise-Coactuation theory is finer-grained than Goldman's because it is built in parallel with and upon the Guise-Consubstantiation theory. Thys, each of Goldman's ordered triples is, or corresponds to, an action particular, and Goldman's act-tokens, which are equivalence classes of truths, are or correspond to classes of such particulars. The Guise-Coactuation theory is founded, as noted, on the general type of argument that in referentially opaque contexts suggests the distinction between identity and other sameness relations. To me it seems that ontologically speaking the best based theories are the most extreme Guise-Coactuation theory and the unifier's view that there is just one particular that is described, conceived, or presented as one or another guise. But there are other theories that have been proposed as intermediaries between the unifiers' and Goldman's views. Some of them are valuable. See [6], [28], [45], [46], [47], and [53]. *I am grateful to my eighteen respondents and to Roger Higgins, my colleague in the Indiana University Linguistics Department. Higgins explained to me some iinportant features of the English syntactical constructions that are part of Goldman's data. I am grateful to Annette Baier, Myles Brand, Paul Eisenberg, Alvin Goldman, Douglas Husak, Frank Snare, Irving Thalberg and John Woods for helpful comments on the first version of this essay. Jonathan Bennett sent me valuable comments during the printing.
