INNOVATION IN CHINA: HARMONIOUS TRANSFORMATION?
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[email protected] ABN 87 091 432 567 Affiliates in: Sydney, Amsterdam, Palo Alto A special issue of the Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice journal: Volume 8 Issue 1–2 (July 2006) ISSN 1447-9338 Innovation in China: Harmonious Transformation? Bibliography ISBN 0-9757422-4-8 1. China industries. 2. Innovation systems. 3. Economic development. 4. Social transformation [Series: Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice (Maleny QLD): vol. 8/1–2] © 2006, eContent Management Pty Ltd This publication is copyright. Other than for purposes of and subject to the conditions prescribed under the Copyright Act, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the Publisher at:
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INNOVATION IN CHINA: HARMONIOUS TRANSFORMATION? INNOVATION: MANAGEMENT, POLICY & PRACTICE
CONTENTS 1
27
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VOLUME 8
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ISSUE 1–2
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JULY 2006
INTRODUCTION: China’s innovation system and the move toward harmonious growth and endogenous innovation — Shulin Gu and Bengt-Åke Lundvall LEARNING AND INNOVATION: THE KEY TO LONG-TERM SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT Regional innovation systems in Asian countries: A new way of exploiting the benefits of transnational corporations — Bjorn Asheim and Jan Vang
45
Work globally, develop locally: Diaspora networks as springboards of knowledge-based development — Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Charles F. Sabel
62
Twin innovation systems, intermediate technology and economic development: History and prospect for China — Andrew Tylecote
84
DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES The evolving role of research consortia in East Asia — Mark Dodgson, John Matthews and Tim Kastelle
102
The interaction between regulation and market and technology opportunities: A case study of the Chinese mobile phone industry — Hengyuan Zhu, Yan Yang, Marin T. Tintchev and Guisheng Wu
113
Policy design and intervention in the innovation diffusion process: The cases of China’s communication sector — Jiang Yu and Xin Fang
120 128
DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING IN TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES Learning in local cluster in the context of global value chain: A case study of the Yunhe wood toy cluster in Zhejiang, China — Yanwei Zheng and Shihao Sheng Institutional innovation for technology transfer: Some new patterns of regional agro-innovation systems in China — Jun Tu Continues .../
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INNOVATION IN CHINA: HARMONIOUS TRANSFORMATION? INNOVATION: MANAGEMENT, POLICY & PRACTICE
CONTENTS 144 153
160
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Enterprise patenting in Zhejiang province — Minghua Xu, Jinqi Chen and Haibo Bao ‘Patent pool’ initiatives in manufacturing clusters in Zhejiang — Haibo Bao, Minghua Xu and Shulin Gu REGIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS China’s consumer goods manufacturers – with special reference to Wenzhou footwear cluster — Jici Wang
171
Regional innovation performance: Evidence from domestic patenting in China — Xibao Li
193
From trade hub to innovation hub: The role of Hong Kong’s innovation system in linking China to global markets — Erik Baark and Naubahar Sharif
210
APPENDIX: Innovation with Chinese characteristics: Towards harmonious transformation. Report on speech by President Hu Jintao at China’s Fourth National Conference on Science & Technology, Beijing, 9 January 2006 — Adapted from Zhang Lihong (Editor), Xinhua (Source)
N O W AV A I L A B L E S E PA R AT E LY I N N O V AT I O N I N C H I N A : H ARMONIOUS T RANSFORMATION ? ISBN 0-9757422-4-8; iv + 212 pages; softcover; July 2006 A special issue of Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice (Volume 8 Issue 1–2 July 2006) is available for purchase as a book, Innovation in China: Harmonious Transformation?
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Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
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INTRODUCTION China’s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous innovation BENGT-ÅKE LUNDVALL
SHULIN GU Visiting Professor School of Economics and Management Tsinghua University Beijing, China
1. INTRODUCTION
O
bservers around the world are impressed by the rapid growth of China’s economy, some with hope and others with fear. Some hope that China will offer the unique experience of successful economic growth and catch-up under the new World Trade Organization (WTO) regime; some see the rise of China as a threat to the current world order and to the powers that currently dominate the world in terms of economy, technology and politics. While outside observers tend to focus on the success story of unprecedented growth, policy documents and recent domestic debates in China have pointed to the need for a shift in the growth trajectory, with stronger emphasis on ‘endogenous innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’. In this paper we make an attempt to capture the current characteristics of China’s production and innovation system; how they were shaped by history and what major challenges they raise for the future. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
Professor Department of Business Studies Aalborg University Aalborg, Denmark, and Special Term Professor School of Economics and Management Tsinghua University Beijing, China
In Section 2 we present data on China’s postwar growth experience. We show how the shift in policy around 1980 toward decentralization, privatization and openness established an institutional setting that, together with other factors such as the presence of a wide ‘Chinese Diaspora’, has resulted in extremely high rates of capital accumulation, especially in manufacturing. The section ends by pointing to some inherent contradictions in the current growth pattern. In Section 3, we take a closer look at how the policy shift in the ’80s affected the institutional framework shaping R&D activities in particular, and learning and innovation in general. The attempt to break down the barrier between the science and technology infrastructure on the one hand and the production sphere on the other was highly successful, as compared to the development in the former Soviet Union. However, the original intentions were not fully realized. Rather than establishing markets for science and technology, the reforms led knowledge producers to INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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engage in mergers or forward vertical integration and they became, to a large extent, involved in production activities. Referring back to analysis of the sustainability of the growth model and the unfinished reform of the innovation system, Section 4 introduces the recent decision by China’s government to promote endogenous innovation and harmonious development. Applying the innovation system perspective, we argue that these broadly defined objectives can be realized only through a strategic adjustment towards ‘innovation driven growth and learning based development’ and we discuss what important policy elements such a strategic adjustment needs to encompass. In Section 5, we conclude that imperfections, in the division of labour and in the interaction between users and producers of knowledge and innovation behind the reforms of the ’80s, remain central concerns. In order to raise the long-term efficiency of the massive accumulation of production capital, it is necessary to promote the formation of social capital and to be more considerate when exploiting natural capital.
2. TRANSITION OF CHINA’S ECONOMY How do we explain the extraordinary growth performance of China? What are the unique features of its production system? In this section, we will see how the development paths of the past define the strengths and weaknesses of the TABLE 1: GROWTH
OF
CHINA’S
ECONOMY
Farming, Fishery & Forestry Industry Construction Transport & Communications Commerce & Restaurants Other Services (incl. Government) GDP Per Capita GDP Export Volume
2
national production systems, as well as the bottlenecks and challenges that confront China today. It is useful to distinguish between two periods in China in the second half of the 20th century. The crucial shift takes place in 1978 when DENG Xiaoping took over the political leadership after Chairman MAO and initiated economic reform and the opening of the economy to international trade. The first was a period of development under a centrally planned economic regime and the second a period with market-oriented reforms and economic transition. To characterize the economic performance of the two periods, we use data summarized by Angus Maddison (1998) depicted in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2. At the time of the revolution, the economy was still dominated by agriculture; in 1952 about 60 percent of GDP was generated by the agricultural (primary) sector, as shown in Figure 2. Both the first and the second period were dominated by industrialization, rather than the ‘post-industrialization’ that took place after WWII in developed and most less developed countries. As a result, China was highly ‘industrialized’ by the end of the century. In 2003, its GDP structure was 12.5 per cent primary, 46 per cent secondary and 41.5 per cent tertiary. The growth in manufacturing and the relative shrinkage of agriculture continued in the 1990s, and the value addedshare of the service sectors remained almost unchanged until the late 1990s.
1890–1995 (AT
CONSTANT PRICES )
1890–1952
1952–1978
1978–1995
1952–1995
0.3 1.7 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.0 1.6
2.2 9.6 7.2 6.0 3.3 4.2 4.4 2.3 6.4
5.1 8.5 11.1 10.0 9.9 6.7 7.5 6.0 13.5
3.4 9.2 8.7 7.6 5.9 5.2 5.6 3.8 9.2
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China’s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous innovation 140 120
USA UK Japan China Korea
100 80 60 40 20 0 1820
1870
1900
1913
1950
FIGURE 1: PER CAPITA GDP
IN
1973
1992
COMPARISON , USA=100
100% 80% Services
60% Industry & construction
40%
Agriculture
20% 0% 1890
1952
FIGURE 2: GDP STRUCTURE
OF
1978
1995
CHINA’S ECONOMY
AT CONSTANT PRICES
Source: Maddison 1998: 56, Tables 3.1 and 3.2
As we shall see below, however, the economic structure looks quite different when the focus is employment rather than value-added. The proportion of the labour force working in agriculture remains as high as 50% in the beginning of the new millennium. The growth in manufacturing value-added reflects more than anything a very high rate of accumulation of fixed capital accompanied by high rates of growth in labour productivity. Behind high growth rates and restructuring of the economy in the second period lie extraordinary rates of savings and capital accumulation. In order to understand how these could be realized in a poor country like China, it is necessary to look at the institutional changes that took place with the shift in the political climate. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
Reforms and development performance in the 1980s and 1990s The policies transforming the economy from a centrally planned towards a market-oriented regime may be seen as following two parallel and mutually reinforcing lines of action, aimed at decentralization and privatization (Wu 2003: Ch. 2). The first line of action, ‘bureaucratic decentralization’, began with increasing the autonomy of firms in decision-making on production planning, investment and acquisition of technology, marketing, pricing and personnel and with more autonomy to local governments in financial, budgetary and administrative issues. Initially, decentralization was based on ad hoc negotiations in individual cases. It was not until the mid-1990s, that nationwide reforms formalized INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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the relationships and introduced more transparent and coherent rules. This was the period when reforms in taxation, the banking system and governance structure of state-owned enterprises – ‘corporatization’ of previous state ownership – were initiated. This policy learning dynamic, where experiences from local and regional experimentation were gradually diffused at the national level, has been one major characteristic of the reform period. The second line of action loosened restrictions first for township and village enterprises in the early 1980s and later for private initiatives in the mid-1990s. It included the creation of ‘Special Economic Zones’ for FDI-related investment with various favorable regulations. In provinces like Zhejiang, this led to private initiatives by entrepreneurs. Here limited arable land, poor mineral deposits, high population density and little accumulation in modern industry, in combination with local historical experience in commercial activities, led to the start-up of private firms based on small family workshops (Xu, Chen and Bao (2006): this issue pp. 144–52; and Bao, Zu and Gu (2006): this issue pp. 153–59). But most importantly it gave local governments greater opportunities to engage in initiatives promoting local accumulation of capital. They did so by establishing and expanding Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) sometimes owned by the local governments, sometimes representing joint enterprises with private capital or through initiatives which attracted private capital from local, national or international sources. ‘Diaspora networks’ played an important part in re-enforcing rapid capital accumulation from foreign investment (Kuznetsov (2006): this issue pp. 45–61). Throughout the ’80s, the opening to FDI and international trade attracted partners mainly from the Greater China area – Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, Singapore, and overseas Chinese from other continents. It was not until the second half of the ’90s that multinational companies from North America and West Europe came into China on a large scale. Hong 4
INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
Kong, together with Taiwan, remains the first and primary source of FDI, holding about half of China’s total FDI. The fact that members of the Diaspora could communicate directly with local authorities reduced investor uncertainties. The second line of action, also called ‘incremental reform’, opened up new spaces for economic activities outside the entities inherited from the central planning era. As a result, the ownership structure of industrial enterprises changed rapidly. As can be seen from Figure 3, by 2003, each of the three types of ownership – state-owned, FDI-related and other domestic – were responsible for roughly one-third of output. It is important to note that a large proportion of firms belonging to the category of ‘other domestic’ enterprise primarily reflects the rapid growth in number and size of township and village firms over which local governments have some influence. The township and village enterprises – that played a major role in industrialization in many regions in China – outnumber both domestic private and state-owned firms undergoing a transformation from collective to private ownership in the mid-1990s.
Export-led growth International trade was initially pushed by favourable policies and gradually pulled by FDI and intra-trade within global value chains. Today China’s economy has reached a much higher level of openness than all other large economies in the world, developed or developing (Table 2 and Figure 4). Export structures have been upgraded (Figure 5). The share of primary products, such as foodstuffs, agricultural products and mineral fuels, has been reduced from half of the total in 1980 to less than 10 percent by 2002, while the share of manufactured goods increased to more than 90 percent. In manufactured exports, electric and machinery products, including electronic products, demonstrated the fastest growth rate, although light and textile products and apparel also increased considerably. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
China’s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous innovation 100% 90% 44505
80% 70%
123393 Other domestic
60% 44358
50%
FDI related State owned
40% 30%
38581
20%
53408
10%
34248
0% Firm number
Turnover
FIGURE 3: OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE : I NDUSTRY BY
2003
Source: based on China statistical yearbook Table 14-2 2004http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm Note: the calculation is for all the firms which have annual turnover higher than 500 million
TABLE 2: OPENNESS
OF
CHINA
GDP (¥100 million) Sum import and export (¥100 million)
TO THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY
1978
1989
3624.1
16917.8
355.0
4156.0
1997
2002
2003
78973
120333
135823
26967.2
51378.2
70483.5
Source (for Table 2 and Figure 4): based on China Statistical Yearbook 2004; http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004c/indexch.htm, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjdt/zygg/P020060109431083446682.doc.
60
Percentage of firms
50 40 30 20 10 0 1978
1989
1997
FIGURE 4: OPENNESS
Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
2002
2003
TO GLOBAL ECONOMY
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Shulin Gu and Bengt-Åke Lundvall 100% 15.7
80%
4.7
12.7 2.8
22.1
60%
34.6
31.1
33.1
39
17.1
16.3
14.4
10.2
8.8
1995
2000
2002
36.7 20.4
16.4 9 21.1 20.3
40%
21.1 50.2
50.6
20% 25.5
0% 1980
1985
1990
1 Primary products
2 Chemicals
3 Light & textile products
4 Electric & machinery products
5 Miscellaneous incl. Apparel
6 Other products
FIGURE 5: EXPORT STRUCTURE Source: Reproduced based on Wu (2004) Table 8.7
Beyond quantitative growth, qualitative or structural change has been radical. It is useful to make a distinction between global production chains driven mainly by demand factors – buyerdriven chains and those driven mainly by supply factors – and producer-driven chains (Gereffi 1999; UNIDO 2002). For products of buyerdriven chains such as apparel, footwear and toys (included in Category 3 and partly in Category 5 in Figure 5), China has become the preferred manufacturing location of a global ‘Triangle relationship. The consumption sites are largely in North America and West Europe while Hong Kong and Taiwanese businesses play a role as relational coordinators. Many of these goods are produced in factories owned by Taiwanese or Hong Kong investors, and some are produced in Chinese-owned firms but produced in subcontracting relationships (Zheng Y and Sheng S (2006): this issue pp.120–27). In the producer-driven industries such as computer and IT products (included in Category 4, Figure 5), exports are mainly manufactured in 6
INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
factories owned by Western and Taiwanese investors. For 2003 it was reported that 61.9 percent of high-tech export was produced by fully foreign-owned and 21.4 percent by partly foreign-owned firms; altogether FDI-related manufacturing produced more than 80 percent of high-tech export from China (China S&T Indicators 2004). This reflects overall trends in China’s innovation system characterized by easy access to foreign technology, while remaining weak in local and domestic clustering. We discuss this point in Sections 3 and 4.
Domestic demand and investment The domestic market has also played a role in development during this period. Domestic demand experienced at least two rounds of surge and growth, the first through the 1980s and early ’90s, led by household durables and necessities, as illustrated by color televisions in Table 3 and Figure 6. The centrally planned economy had left huge shortages in consumer goods industries. The combination of bureaucratic decentralizaVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
China’s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous innovation TABLE 3: GROWTH
IN REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS
Year
Air-conditioner 10000 set
Color television 10000 set
1978 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0.02 1.32 12.35 37.47 24.07 63.03 158.03 346.41 393.42 682.56 786.21 974.01 1156.87 1337.64 1826.67 2333.64 3135.11 4820.86
0.38 3.21 435.28 940.02 1033.04 1205.06 1333.08 1435.76 1689.15 2057.74 2537.60 2711.33 3497.00 4262.00 3936.00 4093.70 5155.00 6541.40
Rolled steel products Cement Passenger car 10000 ton 10000 ton 10000 set 2208.00 2716.00 3693.00 4859.00 5153.00 5638.00 6697.00 7716.00 8428.00 8979.80 9338.02 9978.93 10737.80 12109.78 13146.00 16067.61 19251.59 24108.01
6524.00 7986.00 14595.00 21029.00 20971.00 25261.00 30822.00 36788.00 42118.00 47560.59 49118.90 51173.80 53600.00 57300.00 59700.00 66103.99 72500.00 86208.11
Microcomputer 10000 set
0.54 0.90 3.58 3.50 6.87 16.17 22.29 26.87 33.70 38.29 48.60 50.71 57.10 60.70 70.36 109.20 202.01
7.54 8.21 16.25 12.62 14.66 24.57 83.57 138.83 206.55 291.40 405.00 672.00 877.65 1463.51 3216.70
7000
10000 9000
6000 8000 5000
7000 6000
4000 5000 3000 4000 3000
2000
2000 1000 1000 0
0 1978 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Air-conditioner 10000 set
Color television 10000 set
Rolled steel products 100000 ton
Cement 100000 ton
Passenger car 1000 set
Microcomputer 10000 set
FIGURE 6: GROWTH
IN REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS
Source (for Table 3 and Figure 6): China Statistical Yearbook 2004; http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm
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tion and incremental reforms stimulated investment in the supply capacity of these industries. The second surge begun around 1999 and was focused on real estate, passenger cars and personal computers and telecommunications, as illustrated by microcomputers and passenger cars in Table 3 and Figure 6. Cement and rolled steel products are intermediate products and both surges stimulated demand, although the second period of demand-led growth (strongly weighted towards large-scale activities such as construction and car production, which consume those products in great quantities) explains the accelerated growth of the latter years. To expand production capacity a very high rate of growth in investment was necessary. This second surge in manufacturing was more directly induced by central monetary and industrial policies. In order to cope with the stagnation and deflation that appeared in 1998– 1999, diagnosed as being caused by lack of effective demand, the government engaged in ‘active fiscal policies’ to increase public investment in highways, telecommunications and power generation stations. The banking system was also engaged to stimulate ‘domestic demand’ in consumption. It created loans for individual housing and car consumers at reduced interest rates.
A unique pattern of economic growth For about a quarter of a century, China’s economy has been characterised by high rates of economic growth and capital accumulation. Some of the mechanisms behind that growth pattern are unique while some have parallels with the institutional set up that promoted capital accumulation in England in the 18th century (Qian 1996). Reforms initiated more than 25 years ago unleashed restrained material needs. It was explicitly argued that some concentration of wealth among the few was a first step toward making everybody better off; making the strive for material wealth ideologically legitimate. 8
INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
Slumbering entrepreneurship was awoken to engage in production and trade both within and outside the public sector. The most important driver behind capital investment and economic growth was a specific local fusion of political and economic interests. Local authorities and local entrepreneurs were able to promote simultaneously their political career and own economic interests by stimulating industrial growth in their region, province, town or village. Most of the extra income created remained under local control and the incentives to reinvest the surplus were strong. Foreign direct investment, initially emanating primarily from overseas Chinese investors and subsequently from wider sources, is also an important factor. Joint ventures offer good opportunities for public and private rewards for local policy makers. The same is true for attracting direct investment of purely foreign-owned enterprises to the locality. Building infrastructure and supplying cheap labour, energy and land are now key concerns for local administrators. This mixture of political and economic interests constitutes a new kind of concentration of power at the local level, not always balanced by local political democracy and local rule of law, and it may explain why local administration is less popular than the central government among Chinese citizens (Saich 2004). The dynamics of reform have also been driven by competition between localities to provide the most attractive framework conditions, sometimes by offering cheap resources and lax regulations in relation to environment and workers’ safety. But there are also examples of forward-looking ideas developed locally and then spread nation-wide.
Limits to growth The development trajectory behind this high speed growth is now confronted with barriers for further growth. Some of these are external and refer to potential trade conflicts. Others reflect domestic problems regarding social and ecologiVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
China’s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous innovation
rates, the impact upon other countries’ trade balances is significant; an upper limit for China’s trade surplus may have to be set before trade quotas or other forms of retaliation are triggered. The current trend of massive penetration into global markets may not last much longer.
cal sustainability. There are indications of serious weaknesses in the innovation system and the call for ‘harmonious development’ may be interpreted as an attempt to give new direction to recognized unsustainable growth patterns.
Remarkable global impact and trade disputes
‘Jobless growth’
China’s economic growth has had a very visible impact on the global economy. With China’s exports and imports growing at double digit
In terms of GDP structure (Figure 7 and Figure 8 compare China with four big developing or transitional economies: Brazil, South Africa,
100% 90%
23.7
80%
32
34.4
41.5
51
70%
62
65
59
60% 48.2
50%
43
40%
47.5
24
46
30%
29
20% 28.1
10%
25
18.1
25 12.5
9
2003
Brazil 1999
0% 1978 First
1989
1997
Second
34
30
Tertiary
FIGURE 7: GDP STRUCTURE
IN
7
5 S Africa India 2000 1999
Russia 1999
COMPARISON
Source: For the data on China: Statistical Yearbook 2004 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm ), for the Data on Brazil, South Africa, India and Russia: World Facts and Figures at http://worldfactsandfigures.com
100% 12.2
90% 80%
18.3
26.4
18 29.3
17.3 23.7
60%
45
53.2
21.6
70%
15
55
21.6
50% 25
40%
70.5
30%
60.1
20%
23.7 49.9
67
30
49.1 30
23.1
10%
15
0% 1978 First
1989 Second
1997
2003 Tertiary
Brazil 1999
FIGURE 8: EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE
Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
S Africa India 2000 1999 IN
Russia 1999
COMPARISON
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Shulin Gu and Bengt-Åke Lundvall
India and Russia) China appears to be overwhelmingly ‘industrialized’. However, China is faced with the challenge of ‘jobless growth’ in the manufacturing sector. Figure 8 shows that, in terms of employment structure, China appears as an agricultural economy, half of its labour remaining in this sector. Only India has a bigger proportion of the labour force in agriculture. Combining the two sets of data, it is obvious that China is characterized by high and rapidly growing capital–labour ratio in the manufacturing sector. While there was net job creation in the first years of the reform period, the increase in employment slowed in the 1980s and has stagnated since the 1990s. This displacement of employment exacerbates ‘structural unemployment’ (Lewis 1955). Jobless growth, in addition to inequality in wealth distribution and redistribution, entails social instability and endangers sustainable development.
Widening income gaps and negative environmental externalities Gaps between the urban and the rural, between regions, and between the rich and poor in the same region are widening. Working conditions and workers’ safety have been largely neglected. Negative externalities also include environmental degradation such as pollution of air and water and exploitation and wasteful use of other nonrenewable resources. The current development mode entails intense consumption of non-renewable raw materials and energy sources. Especially when these inputs are under the control of local groups with vested interests, there may be a tendency to set prices too low and to be lax in terms of safety regulations.
Slow pace in competence and competitiveness upgrading The industrialization process has not resulted in building a widespread and robust indigenous innovation capability in Chinese firms. After 20 years as the origin of manufactured goods ‘madein-China’, China’s economy has not been able to 10
INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
embark upon the competence upgrading track. This contrasts with the catch-up history of the United States and Japan where ‘made-in-USA’ and ‘made-in-Japan’ were preludes to those countries, within one generation, reaching a world frontier in innovativeness and competitiveness. China remains specialized in low value-added products with profit margins trapped at a meager 2–5 percent, or in some areas even lower.1 Recent policy documents and the general debate have pointed to these problems and contradictions, and to the need for a shift in development strategy with stronger emphasis on ‘harmonious development’ and ‘endogenous innovation’. What adjustments of the development strategy are needed to realize the intentions signaled by these concepts? Before discussing this issue in Section 4, it is necessary to analyze the innovation system reform that accompanied decentralization and privatization. Analysis of reform and its outcome points to weaknesses in the current innovation system, which helps us to specify the reforms required to make innovation endogenous and for it to contribute to harmonious development. We will argue that efforts to stimulate endogenous innovation may go hand in hand with promoting harmonious development.
3. TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA’S INNOVATION SYSTEM
We now turn to the transformation of the innovation system in China, in the context of marketoriented economic reform. It is interesting to note that motivation for reform of the R&D-system initiated in 1985 was ‘highly systemic’ in the sense that the focus was on re-shaping the division of labour and the interaction between producers and users of knowledge and innovation. As we shall see, problems remaining after the reform can also be defined as ‘highly systemic’. The fundamental weakness of the system, having a negative impact both on absorption of foreign technology and on domestic innovation, has to Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
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do with an economic structure that does not support learning by interaction in organized markets.
Attempt to reconfigure user–producer relationships China has an old civilization and historically has made important contributions to global science and technology (such as the compass, gunpowder and paper). In China’s older history, however, science and technology as it evolved in Western Europe was not regarded as important or as carrying social status. While Confucious’ heritage gave high prestige to intellectuals, it was to those engaged in humanistic science and in TABLE 4: CHINA’S INVESTMENT
IN
political and administrative affairs. Scientific and technological knowledge was seen as based upon practical experience, rather than as a modern type of scholarship. Whereas Research and Development (R&D) establishments commenced elsewhere throughout the 1920s and ’30s, China only began the process of nationwide institutionalization of modern science and technology in 1950. The R&D system established in the first period of development was designed in accordance with the centrally planned regime. One prominent feature was its huge size, a reflection of the Marxist idea of science as a societal force of pro-
R&D
Year
Percentage of R&D Expenditure Based on National Income
Year
Percentage of R&D Expenditure Based on GDP
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.8 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 (1.5 of GDP)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1.5 (1.8 of national income) 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology various issues; National Statistics Bureau 1990: 207, and http://www.sts.org.cn/KJNEW/maintitle/MainTitle.htm.
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duction, and also a result of the self-reliance development strategy in that centrally planned period (Table 4). The second feature was the separation of industrial R&D centres from productive enterprises. The centrally planned regime introduced mechanisms to link R&D activity with production: All R&D institutes, except those belonging to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (assigned as the national top organization for comprehensive natural and engineering science) were organized under the jurisdiction of sector specific ministries or bureaus, independently outside enterprises. The ministries or bureaus took responsibility for planned production tasks as well. They were therefore in command of both R&D and production (Gu 1999: 151–176). It is interesting to note that this model of specialization according to product category, both for R&D centres and enterprises, and separation of firms from innovative activities, was common for all former centrally planned economies (Granick 1967 – for former Soviet Union; Hanson and Pavitt 1987 – for more general discussion). Organizational separation between innovation and production blocked the system of vital and intimate interactions between producers and users, which was important especially for innovation in sophisticated producer goods technology (von Hippel 1994; Kline and Rosenberg 1986; Lundvall 1988). The institutional setting was reflected in innovation characteristics. For example, the machinery industry of China was strong in ‘general purpose’ machinery, and weak in technologies fulfilling particular machining tasks since these could only be developed through interactive learning and close producer–user communications (Gu 1999: 127–135). The low degree of effectiveness of the centrally planned institutional settings was well acknowledged at the end of the 1970s. This became an important motive for the launch of reforms. The crucial event for R&D system reform came in 1985, lagging slightly behind agricultur12
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al and industrial reforms which started in 1978 and 1984 respectively. A 1985 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China initiated reforms in Science and Technology System Management. The central theme for reform was to rearrange the relationship between knowledge producers and users and their relationships with the government. In a context where demand, supply and coordination factors were changing, reform of the S&T system was seen as essential. The size and complexity of the S&T system made reform crucial for economic growth. By 1980 there were 4,690 research institutes affiliated to administration bodies higher than ‘county’ level, i.e. to central, provincial and regional/city governments, with some additional 3000 institutes at county level, the lowest level of the nation’s administration hierarchy with an independent budget (White Paper No. 1: 232, 235). 323,000 scientists and engineers worked in these institutes. The then Prime Minister Mr. Zhao Ziyang interpreted the reform as follows: The current science and technology institution in our country has evolved over the years under special historical situations. The advantages embodied in this system manifested themselves in concerted efforts to tackle major scientific and technological projects, which were achieved with great success. However, there is growing evidence to show that the system can no longer accommodate the situation in the four modernizations programme, which depends heavily on scientific and technological progress. One of the glaring drawbacks of this system is the disconnection of science and technology from production, a problem, which is a source of great concern for all of us … By their very nature, there is an organic linkage between scientific research and production. For this linkage a horizontal, regular, many-leveled and many-sided channel should be provided. The management system as practiced until now has actually clogged this direct Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
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linkage, so that research institutes were only responsible to the leading departments above, in a vertical relationship, with no channels for interaction with the society as a whole or for providing consultancy services to production units. This is the root cause of the inability of our scientific research to meet our production needs over the years.... This state of affairs can hardly be altered if we confine ourselves to the beaten track. The way out lies in a reform. (Zhao Ziyang 1985)
Adaptive policy process and the recombination of competences To reform the S&T system, a two-pronged policy was designed. On the one hand, ‘technology markets’ were established to function as distributive institutions for R&D outputs (Decision: Section III). On the other hand, excellence-based allocation mechanisms were introduced for allocation of public R&D funds (Decision: Section II). In order for R&D institutes to be able to respond to opportunities in the market place, some degree of autonomy, in terms of hiring personnel, engaging in contracted projects, and acceptance and use of contractual fees, were assigned (Decision: Section VII). At the same time subsidies from the government were gradually reduced (Decision: Sections I and II). It was expected that by push and pull, previously publicly funded R&D institutes would move to serve their clients via regular and multiple linkages.2 The actual process of S&T system reform, as with reforms of the overall economic system, unfolded through trial and error and entailed continuous policy adjustment (Gu 1999). The technology market solution, central to the initial design, was soon recognized as being difficult to realize in its original form. Users were not capable of absorbing transferred technology, and the market was too small to secure R&D institutes with enough earnings. Buyers and sellers experienced serious uncertainty in assessing the use value of technology, giving rise to disputes during the writing and implementing of contracts. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
In response, in 1987, reform policy began to promote the merger of R&D institutes into existing enterprises or enterprise groups. The merger process was however not easy to realize. Huge gaps between the merging parties, from differences in work culture and administrative affiliations, were difficult to overcome immediately. In 1988, the Torch Programme was launched to encourage organizations akin to spin-off enterprises – called New Technology Enterprises (NTEs) – from existing R&D institutes and universities. Local governments contributed to investment in infrastructure and supporting institutions for New and High-Tech Industry Zones that became incubation bases for NTEstartups. Scientists and engineers, often with support from their parent institutions, sought commercial application of their inventions and expertise by means of the NTEs. By the early 1990s, reform policy included a solution to change individual R&D institutes into production entities. This was also an adaptation of the actual evolution already realized by many industrial R&D institutes. The reforms came to a form of conclusion when, in 1999, an official decision pointed to the need to clarify the actual character of previously government-run industrial technology R&D institutes. By 2001 some 1,200 industrial technology R&D institutes had re-registered their business type.3 Of them more than 300 were merger cases, having cancelled their independent position and become part of an enterprise. Six-hundred plus became profitable firms and a few joined universities. Table 5 indicates the changed structure of R&D performers. In 2000 the proportion of R&D performed by ‘enterprises’ leaped abruptly (Table 5: Line 3) largely because many R&D institutes registered as enterprises or part of existing enterprises. Table 4 also depicts the scope of technology market and spin-offs, growing steadily over time (Lines 1 and 2), and illustrating the complementary effects of various transformation means. Lines 3, 4 and 5 show the changed structure in technology INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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Shulin Gu and Bengt-Åke Lundvall TABLE 5: SELECTIVE
INDICATORS TO CHANGES OF THE
CHINA NIS (All measures at current price)
1985 (1) Technology Market Contract fees (RMB Billion)
2.30
(2) Spin-offs Number of NTEs Annual turnover (RMB Billion) Export (USD Billion)
– – –
(3) Domestic R&D expenditure (RMB Billion) in which Enterprises (%) Independent R&D institutes (%) Universities (%) (4) Import of capital goods (USD Billion) (5) FDI (USD Billion)
1990 7.51
1995
2000
26.83
65.07
12,937 151.2 1.55
20,796 920.9 13.81
12.54 n.a.
34.87 43.7
89.57 60.0
54.7 15.9
n.a. n.a.
42.1 12.1
28.8 8.6
16.24
16.85
52.64
69.45 (1999)
1.96
3.49
37.52
40.72
1,690 5.94 0.69 (RMB Billion)
6.74 (1987) 29.3
Sources: China Statistical Year Book on Science and Technology various issues; http://www.most.gov.cn; http://www.stats.gov.cn/ndsj/zgnj/2000/Q05c.htm; http://www.moftec.gov.cn/article/200303/20030300072333_1.xml; http://www.sts.org.cn/REPORT_3/documents/2002/0220.htm; http://www.sts.org.cn/REPORT_3/documents/2002/02hdb01.htm
sources. China, not so long ago almost closed to international exchange in technology and knowledge, has developed a widely open innovation system, with enormous inflows of technology in forms of international capital goods and FDI. Adaptive policy, evolving through trial and error, characterizes ‘gradual reforms’ in the whole process of China’s economic transition. The great uncertainties associated with foreseeing the impact of major political reform made adaptive policy learning necessary. Only policy-making that was responsive and adaptive to feedback on reform impacts could preserve the feasibility for success of any radical social innovation program (Metcalfe 1995; Gu and Lundvall 2006).
Review of the transformation of the innovation system On the basis of discussion above, Figure 9 illustrates China’s National Innovation System as it looked before (Part A) and after (Part B) the transformation, embracing: 1. innovation actors – R&D institutes, capital goods industries that embodied technology 14
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for user sectors, domestic end-product manufacturers; 2. inflows of technology – by means of technology licensing (TL), sample machine procurement (SMP), equipment procurement (PE), foreign direct investment (FDI) and original equipment manufacturing (OEM); 3. interactive relationships between actors and with domestic and international markets. Arrows with different line boldness illustrate the intensity of various links and provide an impression of the significant changes transformation has brought into the system. The transformation was constructive in safeguarding and recombining technological capabilities in the context of market reform. It not only opened China to the global economy but supported rapid economic growth as a whole. For example, a number of NTEs like Huawei, Datang and Linovo grew into key ICT enterprises, leading to a fundamental restructuring of China’s ICT industry (Gu and Steinmueller 1996/2000). The achievements are especially Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
China’s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous innovation
A
B
TL, SMP
R&D Institutes
Capital Goods Industries
TL, PE, FDI + academic exchange
R&D Institutes and Universities
Domestic Manufactures
Capital goods Industries
Domestic Manufactures
PE, FDI, TL
OEM
Domestic Market Domestic and International Markets TL: Technology Licensing SMP: Sample Machine Procurement PE: Procurement of Equipment FDI: Foreign Direct Investment OEM: OEM Assembly
Figure 9 Transformation of the China’s NIS
FIGURE 9: TRANSFORMATION
impressive when compared with Russia where scientific and technological capabilities were destroyed on a huge scale. Nonetheless, the system still has some prominent weaknesses.
Easy access to foreign technology while remaining weak in local and domestic clustering Firstly, the system resulted in weaker domestic links and interactions, although mastery of international links remained passive, dominated by import of the foreign technology embodied in machinery and other process equipment. The capital goods industry has not played a role as an innovation centre for the whole economy by providing appropriately advanced production means for various users; they were instead largely integrated into respective global value chains. Many regions of China, for which the autonomy of policy decision-making was strengthened during the market reform, are weak in geographical proximity-based clustering or networking even when there is some firm agglomeration (Wang and Tong 2000). In general potential local or domestic links along and between value chains have been slow to develop and hard to expand. Small firms in tradiVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
OF THE
CHINA’S NIS
tional manufacturing sectors, and agriculture and rural development, have received inadequate support from the national and regional technological infrastructures, showing a separation between the modern and traditional parts of the system (Tylecote (2006): this issue pp. 62–83).
Missing technological infrastructure and supportive institutional development Second, the transformation ignored the development of technological infrastructure and supportive institutions. The remarkable aspect of the reform is that the initial intention – to establish technology markets for existing R&D institutes and existing enterprises – was not realized. Instead unforeseen adaptations ‘saved’ the reform. A general tendency was for vertical integration of R&D and design with production activities, either through merger into enterprises or through establishment of downstream production. This was true not only for R&D institutes for industrial technology, but also for institutes engaged in health and agricultural R&D, and even for universities. As a result, the reconfiguration of the scientific and technological infrastructure was not INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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completed during the market reforms, which has resulted in a weak capability to provide S&T inputs and supportive services to innovation in firms; a capability that is fundamentally important for knowledge-based growth (Nelson 2004; David 2003). There were several reasons for the drive toward vertical integration. One reason was the peculiar pattern of division of labour for R&D institutes inherited from the centrally planned system in which they had already been involved in many ‘down-stream’ activities.4 Weak absorptive capacity and less developed social capital were other reasons for the difficulties in establishing technology markets. The phenomenon of factories integrating vertically at all stages in their production process was common in centrally planned economies (Granick 1967). Kornai (1980) explained this as a combination of the factories’ hunger for investment and paternalistic relations with the planning authority. Vertically integrated factories were left almost untouched by the market reforms, and this obstructed networking in the core part of the economy. Vertically integrated enterprises survived, mainly in what had been seen as strategic sectors, and especially in the machinery industry which was given high priority before the reform.
4. PROBLEMS, DEBATES AND CHALLENGES
By the end of 1990, symptoms increasingly indicated that the development dynamics created by reforms were about to be exhausted and negative sides of the growth model came into focus. The accession to WTO added to the need for China to move into a new period of economic and NIS transition. This was the background for the 1999 Decision by the Communist Party and the State Council, where it declared the need for ‘enhancing technological innovation, developing high technologies and promoting commercial production of S&T achievements’ (White Paper No. 1 1985: 238).5 However there has not been much 16
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change in economic policy and in the orientation of development, except in ‘active fiscal policies’ which targeted material infrastructure construction and a considerable increase in public investment in R&D. With the further accumulation of problems, the government has now decided to make ‘endogenous innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’ key components of its renewal of the development strategy. In this section, we analyze the problems and introduce policy debate around ‘endogenous innovation’. Starting from the innovation system perspective and taking into account its historical transition, we propose an interpretation of endogenous innovation where it is understood as a move toward innovation-driven growth and learning-based economic development.
Endogenous innovation6 and policy debates In October 2005, the Communist Party Central Committee and China’s Government stipulated the Guiding Vision for the 11th National Economic and Social Development Program (2006– 2010). It emphasizes the importance of a development strategy which economizes on material inputs; upgrades economic structures and innovative capabilities; considers environmental protection; balances urban and rural development and that between eastern, middle and western regions; and maintains job creation and social equality (CCCPC 2005). The key for realizing the new strategy is endogenous innovation (zizhu-chuang-xin) and continuous reforms to build harmonious development. One can see that the new strategic vision accommodates several of the problems discussed above. Policy debates on endogenous innovation following this decision may be considered as followup on earlier long-lasting debates.7 A first focus concerns the theoretical rationale for alternative development strategies – whether the strategy should be based on comparative advantages, or if it should involve strategic industrial policy aimed at catch-up and leapfrogging. Another debate Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
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focus relates to the buy-or-make question of technology. Here, one opinion insists on the necessity of increasing investment in domestic R&D so as to develop national brands, competence in core technologies and technological capabilities, and to build independent capabilities in relation to defense, health care and other national specific needs. The opposing view argues in favor of buying/borrowing technologies from abroad, claiming that high R&D investment to date has brought advantages for neither the country nor enterprises. A third focus is on FDI policies. Whether, and to what extent does FDI contribute to technology acquisition and upgrade? Were policies successful that aimed at attracting FDI by opening the huge domestic market? Should favorable treatment for FDIs continue or should regulatory conditions be identical for domestic and FDI-related businesses? The several different issues of the debate have not always been clearly focused. The emphasis on promoting free market and trade liberalization in policy spheres was, to some extent, unavoidable in a period when China was engaged in economic and social transition away from its centrally planned regime. Nonetheless, current debate recognises that free markets alone have their limits when it comes to guiding social and economic transition and development.
Endogenous innovation as a strategic element of innovationdriven growth and learning-based economic development In order to clarify the current debates, we believe it is necessary to elevate the central theme: ‘how to embark on innovation-driven growth and learning-based economic development’. Otherwise much of the debate might go nowhere. For example, purchasing technology from overseas and domestic development of technology are both important; they are complementary in most innovation processes. To see policies that encourage domestic firms’ innovation as conflicting with policies that aim to acquire foreign techVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
nologies would be misleading. Comparative advantages are necessary reference points for operational planning, while strategic planning needs to consider how existing comparative advantages can be renewed and upgraded. To promote endogenous innovation, a conventional and simplistic response would be to invest more in science and technology, and reinforce the tendency of R&D organizations to move into downstream activities. It is highly questionable if such an effort would make any major difference and overcome the weakness in competence upgrading at the firm level and in internal clustering and dynamics. The crucial question is how to overcome the weaknesses encountered by the Chinese economy and innovation system; and for this it is essential to define endogenous innovation as a strategy for innovation-driven growth and learning-based development. We believe that the fundamental challenge is still to make the innovation system as a whole work in such a way that it contributes to economic growth and harmonious development. This is actually what the Chinese Government’s Guiding Vision for the 11th National Economic and Social Development Program (2006–2010) declares.
Reconfiguring innovation systems in the context of the globalizing learning economy The idea that economic development is a process where the degree of specialization and division of labour grows and become more complex, and mastery of knowledge generation and application becomes increasingly sophisticated, goes back to Adam Smith, and has been discussed widely by economic historians (Madisson 1991; Fei & Ranis 1997; Hayami 1997). Human learning, which takes place by doing and through sciencebased innovation, is the most important source of economic growth and involves the deepening of the division of labour and increasing scale economies as well as dynamic effects (North 1996; Lundvall and Johnson 1994). In the curINNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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rent context of global competition, deregulation and radical technical change, the dynamic effects become increasingly important. Acceleration of the rate of change implies that the speed of learning become increasingly important for firms’ competitiveness and national systems. One of the authors has referred to this change in context as ‘a globalizing learning economy’ (Lundvall and Borras 1998; Archibugi and Lundvall 2002). China’s experience has shown that, to facilitate a rapid learning pace and intensify development, a globalizing learning economy is essential. One of the major focuses of the innovation system perspective (Nelson and Winter 1982; Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993) is about how an innovation system generalizes and diffuses knowledge through learning. Learning takes place in specialized R&D centres that transform local experiences and laboratory experiments into more general knowledge, diffused through training and publication. But learning also takes place in production and consumption. Producer learning does result in productivity growth and consumer learning can alter the composition of final demand (Pasinetti 1981). Learning by using enables users of complex systems or advanced process equipment to become more proficient as they experience and solve problems (Rosenberg 1982). However, development of new products and processes, especially capital goods and sophisticated devices, has to involve an interaction and information exchange between users and producers (Lundvall 1985). Interactive learning is pervasive in a modern economy, which is characteristic of sophisticated patterns in division of labour. More fundamentally, ‘learning by interacting’ generalizes and spreads initial, local learning consequences throughout the whole economy, in the form of new machinery, new components or new software-systems embodying knowledge, and tacit and human-embedded competences and business solutions (Lundvall 2006). How a system becomes interactive and works well is crucial for innovation and development performance of a national economy. Interactive 18
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learning is carried out in a hybrid structure of governance consisting of markets, organizations and networks, called ‘organized markets’ (Lundvall 1985). Perfect competition at arm’s length, with anonymous relationships between customers and sellers, cannot support product innovation. Vertically integrated firms also exclude product innovation and an economic structure dominated by such firms would make an economy less rich in terms of learning experiences, as well as more rigid and therefore quite vulnerable to market turbulence (Lundvall 2006; Richardson 2002). Learning takes place through user–producer interaction when, for instance, a producer of machinery absorbs information about user experiences from many diverse users. Interaction at this level may be seen as an important dynamo for innovation-driven economic growth. Different from conventional thought, the perspective of interactive learning points to the importance of the structure of the production and innovation system: the absence of a strong domestic capital goods sector would constitute a serious handicap for the innovation system. Similar considerations apply to knowledge intensive business services. Today such services play an increasingly important role for economic growth. While it is necessary for production enterprises to have in house R&D-activities in order to absorb knowledge from the outside, having access to knowledge intensive business services is a great advantage. Empirical studies from different countries show that firms that outsource the production of such services experience rapid productivity growth (Tomlinson 2001). Network formation is crucial for the improvement of interactive learning by augmenting and mediating ‘complementary’ but not ‘similar’ innovative activities (Saxenian 1996; Baldwin and Clark 1997; Langlois 2003). Social capital supports networking and interactive learning across organizational boarders (Woolcock 1998) and may, in this connection, be defined as ‘the willingness and capability of citizens and organizations to make commitments to each other, colVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
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laborate with each other and trust each other in processes of exchange and interactive learning.’ The above paragraphs illustrate the importance of applying a systemic perspective when designing a policy aimed at endogenous innovation. From the NIS-perspective the promotion of endogenous innovation needs to be built upon an understanding of two major themes: interactive learning and system efficiency. The policy discussion in the following sections draws on ideas developed above. We see some of the major challenges for reform of China’s innovation system as having to do with a need to reconfigure user–producer relationships and to stimulate new forms for user–producer interaction in the context of innovation.
Innovation policies to overcome the limits to growth and foster endogenous innovation and harmonious development At the end of Section 2, we listed a number of problems from China’s current trajectory of economic growth. Section 3 pointed to weaknesses of the current innovation system. In what follows we will, from the innovation system perspective, briefly present some ideas for the next transition of the innovation system to respond to these problems and weaknesses and to take the global context into account.
Address domestic needs An inexorable factor for innovation is demand characteristics; requiring both incentives and demand information. China’s enterprises should not miss the rich domestic market resources, reflecting heterogeneous regional, habitual and cultural variation in needs, both advanced and basic. A general shift toward home markets would also reduce international trade friction. One way to promote harmonious and sustained development is to direct innovation activities toward domestic social and ecological needs such as health services, education, transport, energy and environment. China has the necesVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
sary planning capacity to coordinate R&D and to develop industrial competence and qualified demand, using a pragmatic mixture of market and administrative governance.8 To respond to the demands emerging domestically would open ways to stimulate and nurture novel ideas for endogenous innovation. In the longer run that would eventually make it possible for China to contribute both to international market demands and to human wellbeing. In short, addressing domestic needs is a necessary ground for ‘peaceful’ and harmonious development.
Engage in product innovation and improve engineering capability At the level of a single firm, product innovation addresses new market needs and is therefore an important factor in market growth. Process innovation, on the other hand, improves the efficiency of the production process. Both types of innovations are important for survival of the firm. But for the innovation system as a whole, product innovation may be more efficient in promoting innovation-driven growth and job creation because it enriches the division of labour and provides greater opportunities for interactive learning. While product innovation creates jobs, process innovation alone tends to reduce jobs (Pianta 2005). This distinction is especially important in an economy with big labour reserves and jobless growth in its most dynamic sector. Jobless growth results partly from lack of product innovation, and partly from a weak engineering capability, reflected in the massive import of production means such as machinery and poor indigenous provision. Engineering capability is the ability to implement and realize innovation based upon innovative ideas, which in themselves are experiencing dramatic change and improvement (Dodgson, Gann and Salter 2005). Policies that stimulate domestic firms to develop new products, in the form of new process equipment for use by domestic firms, would certainly promote endogenous innovation INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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through stimuli for interaction at the core of the system it represents. Product innovation takes place also in the form of new services and increasingly the knowledge intensive business services that have become strategic parts of the innovation system (Tomlinson 2001). They interact with many users who profit from development of more efficient services that embody the requirements of those diverse users. From a strategic perspective, building a strong and dynamic business services sector may be a necessary step toward innovation-driven growth in China. Growth in this sector has until recently been slow and there is also great potential for job creation here.
Building user competences and institutions supporting SME competence Since user–producer interaction is crucial for the success of innovation, it is not sufficient merely to promote supplier competence and knowledge creation. One important reason why the 1985 reform did not succeed in building markets for science and technology was that the potential users had no competence to absorb advanced knowledge. This is why the dominant pattern became vertical integration and knowledge producers moved into production. To improve interactive learning, user competence is as important as the competence of the producer, and in China this constitutes a major bottleneck for learning and innovation. Competence refers to scientific capabilities as well as to the capacity to engage in learning by doing and organizational learning. To promote scientific capabilities, incentives for enterprises to engage in R&D-activities may be combined with incentives to hire highly educated personnel. To stimulate the diffusion of organizational learning among firms, a combination of benchmarking good practice in terms of organizational and inter-organizational learning may be combined with competence-based selection and job rotation among top managers. 20
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For small and medium-sized firms in traditional sectors, including agro-food business, specific institutes and self-organizing initiatives with the task of diffusing technical innovations and good organizational practice may be supported by the public sector. Such firms have a need for inexpensive access to technological services and knowledge institutions. Especially in periods of unemployment for graduate engineers and scientists, public support might be considered for such firms to hire their first engineer/graduate.
Develop a responsive science and engineering base The 1985 reform resulted in a structure where universities and other institutions with responsibilities for basic research were strongly involved in commercial activities. With improvement of competency levels within firms, universities and public R&D centres should redefine their roles and withdraw gradually from downstream commercial activities that are not easily combined with the search for excellence in science and technology. Improvement of public funds management, and development of scientific community-based academic evaluation, would largely increase the efficiency of knowledge production. Such a shift may actually be combined with a more intense communication with industry, both in research and in higher education.9 In a greater global knowledge society, it is also important to participate in international academic communities and to expose academic research to international competition. Such changes would certainly increase the rate of return from the increased investment in R&D that the Chinese Government is beginning to implement.
Develop new forms of participatory governance of economic organizations There are different forms of governance, and the degree to which people tolerate social gaps differs even in wealthy nations. Some advanced counVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
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tries operate with wide social gaps while others are more egalitarian. The first group includes the United States and United Kingdom where ordinary people are less participatory; they are expected to adapt passively to new technologies. The second group includes the small European welfare states where ordinary workers take an active part in innovation as well as sharing in the benefits that innovation creates. In China, one way to stimulate participation in change processes is to establish cooperative ownership of firms. This might be especially relevant for densely populated agricultural regions. The International Labour Office (ILO 2003) calls for rediscovery of the cooperative advantage to reduce poverty, warning at the same time that people have to learn lessons from negative experiences of the past. One lesson is to let cooperatives grow through self-organization and learning; another is to support development of the qualifications of leaders and participants.
Improving education and stimulating the mobility of skilled labour The most fundamental and dynamic resource in the innovation system is people. Every single person is a potential user and producer of technology and knowledge. One of the basic means of enhancing user competence and facilitating interaction between users and producers is improvement of education and training. Universal secondary education in poor rural areas would prepare residents for participation in knowledge and skill-intensive agricultural and related activities, or to join the new generation of urban residents. The curricula design and pedagogical methods of the education system must be modified to promote the problem-solving capacity of students. Increasingly interaction will depend upon experts who are creative and co-operative. Elite education needs to be complemented with uniVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
versal and life-long continuous education as a strategy of endogenous innovation and harmonious development. But not all competencies emanate from formal education and training. With rapid change the learning that takes place at work ill become more and more important. Stimulating diffusion of ‘learning organization’ practices among enterprises is fundamental for endogenous innovation and for the ongoing upgrade of skills in the workforce. The mobility of people across organizational borders shapes social connections and interaction. Enterprise employees and managers with a university education will have the least difficulty establishing collaboration with university researchers. Therefore schemes that make it attractive to move back and forth between academia and the enterprise sector may be especially important.
Develop networking and learning regions Regions can be springboards for endogenous innovation, if they develop and exploit specialized strengths based on firm networks with tacit knowledge (Cooke and Morgan 1998). The local and regional dimension has become crucial for growth in China through reforms leading to bureaucratic decentralization, but development of learning regions has been less impressive. There is a need for a new incentive structure and for policy capacity-building at a regional and local level. Reform should aim at rewarding innovative solutions that promote networking and save scarce resources. There is also a need to give central government a stronger role in the redistribution of wealth between provinces and regions. Central government could also play a more important role as promoter of regional policy and managerial learning within the regions.
Social capital and endogenous innovation In summary, endogenous innovation and harmoINNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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nious development require a new set of efforts, rather different from those of the 1980s and 1990s. It will involve reform of institutions that support markets and make contracts trustworthy but must also involve broader social changes to support the interaction between economic agents. Corruption and irregularities in the use of legal systems undermine trust and thereby undermine a critical prerequisite for interactive learning across organizational borders. Innovation, because of its inherently uncertain character, is especially vulnerable to lack of trust. To foster the rule of law and a competent and honest public administration is therefore an integral element of any strategy for innovation and learning-based development. In the current context, fostering good governance, especially at the local and enterprise level, may be a key to enhancing innovation. One way to illustrate the promotion of endogenous innovation and harmonious development is to present it in terms of four types of capital (Table 6). Production capital can be relatively easily produced and reproduced. The same is true for intellectual capital. But production capital loses much of its user value when natural capital is eroded – once the land and drinking water are polluted, it is immensely expensive to clean it up. Intellectual capital is created through interactive learning and depends strongly on social capital. In a society where people trust institutions and each other, and are ready to co-operate willingly even outside the most narrow group, learning will flourish. Endogenous innovation and harmonious development implies a growth model that gives attention not only to production capital and
intellectual capital. Avoiding the degradation of natural capital must be a key element in any strategy favoring harmonious development. Stimulating the formation of social capital is a key to long-term success in promoting endogenous innovation. Social capital is the basis for interactive learning and therefore the lubrication that will make the innovation system work smoothly.
5. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have analysed the forces behind China’s rapid growth. We have shown that pragmatic policies and policy learning have been central to its success. We have also identified challenges posed by its growth pattern and remaining weaknesses in its innovation system. These challenges and weaknesses are reflected in the new political signals giving priority to concepts of endogenous innovation and harmonious development. Building upon the historical experience, we argue that the best way to interpret these concepts is to see them as signalling innovation-driven economic growth and learningbased economic development. The global context and historical starting point is different than it was in 1985 but the basic perspective for reform, with its focus on interaction between users and producers of knowledge and technology, remains pertinent when designing the next major transition. Strengthening domestic demand and the competence of domestic technology users is a key to success. Enhancing the knowledge base of strategic sectors producing processing equipment and knowledge-intensive business services for the market is another important element. Investing in social capital – designing institutions so that
TABLE 6: RESOURCES
FUNDAMENTAL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH REPRODUCIBLE DIMENSIONS
22
–
COMBINING TANGIBLE AND
Easily reproducible resources
Less reproducible resources
Tangible resources
Production capital
Natural capital
Intangible resources
Intellectual capital
Social capital
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citizens more readily collaborate and learn from each other – is a way to promote endogenous innovation. Many aspects of the successes and problems that China has experienced were unforeseen in its previous catch-up history and in its existing theories of economic development. This is true for the limits of export-led development strategies, the inadequacy of manufactured exports in spreading learning effects, the extreme rate of substitution of capital for labour, and the severe structural unemployment phenomenon. The response to these accumulated challenges sees China embark on a new development strategy characterized by endogenous innovation and harmonious development, which we have interpreted as a strategy of innovation-driven growth and learning-based development. As China pursues harmonious development, it will become clear that it represents no economic threat to other countries. For those who wish China a uniquely successful experience, we must point out that the actual process of adjustment will unavoidably involve uncertainties and setbacks. We trust that innovation studies can serve an instrumental and positive role, and believe that these studies can also learn from China’s transition in future years.
2
3 4
Endnotes 1 Low profitability of commodities made in China is common knowledge, although the 2–5 percent is a rough estimation. For example, the TV industry, which has a well developed competitive advantage, has rather thin profit margins because key components for final products are imported from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. It is reported that in 2005 average net profit of the TV industry was as low as or less than 3 percent, and for some firms it was lower than 1 percent, even though the industry had introduced flat panel TV sets a year ago and these were expected to improve the industry’s profitability record (Shangwu shoukan (Business Watch Magazine) 28 October 2005). Ninbo City, Zhejiang province, is an important exportmanufacturing base. It exported US$12 billion Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
5 6
7
of products such as clothing, cigarette lighters and air-conditioners in 2003. Possessing weak negotiating capacity with international buyers and being engaged in the low end of value chains, the exporting firms had net profits of around 10 percent with some lower than 5 percent. (IT jingli shijie (CEO & CIO China) 9 November 2004). Note that the Decision recognized the diversity of R&D institutes in terms of function. It divided them into ‘technology development type’, ‘basic research type’, and ‘public welfare and infrastructure services type’. The reduction of public funds was mainly applied to the technology development type and it was done gradually for completion over five years. Consequently by 1991, the 2000 plus, out of 4000 in total, technology development institutes had had their public ‘operation fees’ entirely or partly cut. Roughly the sum of the reduction accounted to slightly less than RMB 1 billion (or USD 200m), or about one-tenth of the overall government S&T budget in 1985. See: http://www.sts.org.cn/report_3/documen ts/2002/0207.htm. Data show that in 1985 the centrally affiliated R&D institutes engaged mainly in ‘experiment development’ and ‘design and production engineering’. According to international standards. half of their works were not ‘R&D’ but downstream innovation-related activities such as ‘design and production engineering’ and ‘diffusion and technical services’. Locally affiliated R&D institutes went downward even further, and to a lesser extent, similar phenomenon were observed in other centrally planned systems. For the full document, refer to http://www. most.gov.cn/t_a3_zcfgytzgg_a.jsp. There are different English translations of the Chinese term zi-zhu-chuang-xin; here we use ‘endogenous innovation’.We tend to disagree with ‘independent innovation’ which appears quite often in English versions of Chinese media reports, as it is misleading. In Chinese to put an adjective ‘zi-zhu’ to ‘innovation’ is to emphasize that strategically China has to be proactive to do something new and not passively remain with existing and imported technologies. Readers should better understand the fashionable Chinese term zi-zhu-chuang-xin simply as ‘innovation’. The discussion is based on various sources from media reports and personal exchanges.
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Shulin Gu and Bengt-Åke Lundvall 8 It is interesting to note that the market economy par excellence, the United States, has a much more active government policy to support science and technology than Japan and Europe. But these policies appear as part of health and space-related programs, not as industrial policy. 9 A stronger element of practical experience and a more problem-oriented learning method in the academic training of scientists, engineers and managers would be a most efficient way to create stronger links between universities and enterprises. The same would be true for more systematic efforts by universities to offer lifelong learning in these categories. But the most important change would come from increased hiring of academic personnel by the enterprises.
References Archibugi D and Lundvall B-Å (Eds) (2001) Europe in the Globalising Learning Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Baldwin CY and Clark KB (1997) Managing in an age of modularity, Harvard Business Review, Sept/Oct. Bao H, Xu M and Gu S (2006) ‘Patent pool’ initiatives in manufacturing clusters in Zhejiang, Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice 8(1–2): 153–159. China Science and Technology Indicator (1988) (in Chinese), Centre for Science and Technology for Development of China and the Information Centre, State Science and Technology Commission 1990, China. China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2004) Accessible at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj /ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm, updated 2005. Accessible at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjdt /zygg/P020060109431083446682.doc. Christensen JL and Lundvall B-Å (Eds) (2004) Product Innovation, Interactive Learning and Economic Performance, Elsevier, Amsterdam. Cooke P and Morgan K (1998) Evolutionary Processes and Regional Practices in Cooke P and Morgan K The Associational Economy, Ch. 8, Oxford University Press, Oxford. David PA (2003) The Economic Logic of ‘Open Science’ and the Balance between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 02-30. Dodgson M, Gann D and Salter A (2005) Think, 24
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Play, Do, Technology, Innovation and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Dosi G (1982) Technological paradigms and technological trajectories. Research Policy 11: 147–162. Fei JC and Ranis G (1997) Growth and Development From an Evolutionary Perspective, Blackwell Publishers, Malden USA and Oxford UK. Freeman C (1987) Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, Pinter, London. Gereffi G (1999) International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain. Journal of International Economics 48: 37–70. Granick D (1967) Soviet Metal-Fabricating and Economic Development, Practice versus Policy, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, London. Gu S (1999) China’s Industrial Technology, Market Reform and Organizational Change, Routledge with UNU Press, London and New York. Gu S and Lundvall B-Å (2006) Policy learning as a key process in the transformation of the Chinese Innovation Systems, in: Lundvall B-Å, Intarakumnerd P and Vang J (Eds) Asian innovation systems in trasition, Edward Elgar, London. Gu S and Steinmueller WE (1996/2000) National Innovation Systems and the Innovative Recombination of Technological Capability in Economic Transition in China: Getting Access to the Information Revolution, UNU/INTECH Discussion Paper 2002-3, Maastricht, The Netherlands. Hanson P and Pavitt K (1987) The Comparative Economics of Research Development and Innovation in East and West: A Survey, Harwood Academic, London. Hayami Y (1997) Development Economics, from the Poverty to the Wealth of Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford. International Labour Office (2003) Rediscovering the cooperative advantage: Poverty reduction through self-help, Johnston Birchall, Cooperative Branch, ILO, Geneva. Kline SJ and Rosenberg N (1986) An Overview of Innovation, in: Landau R and Rosenberg N (Eds) The Positive Sum Strategy, Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth, National Academy Press, Washington DC. Konai J (1980) Economics of Shortage, NorthHolland Publishing Company, The Netherlands. Langlois RN (2003) The Vanishing Hand: the Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Industrial and Corporate Change April 12(2): 351–385. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
China’s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous innovation Lewis WA (1970) (9th edn.) Theory of Economic Growth, Allen & Unwin, London. Lundvall B-Å (1985) Product Innovation and User–Producer Interaction, Aalborg University Press, Aalborg, Denmark. Lundvall B-Å (1988) Innovation as Interactive Process: From User–Producer Interaction to the National System of Innovation, in: Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg and Soete (Eds) Technical Change and Economic Theory, Ch. 17: 349–369, Pinter, London. Lundvall B-Å (Ed) (1992) National Systems of Innovation, Pinter, London. Lundvall B-Å (1992) Explaining Inter-firm Cooperation and Innovation – Limits of the Transaction Cost Approach, in: Grabher G (ed.) The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks, Routledge, London. Lundvall B-Å and Johnson B (1994) The learning economy, Journal of Industry Studies 1(2): 23–42. Lundvall B-Å and Borras S (1998) The Globalising Learning Economy: Implications for Innovation Policy, European Commission, Brussels. Lundvall B-Å (2006) Interactive learning, social capital and economic performance, in: Foray D and Kahin B (Eds) Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. Maddison A (1998) Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, OECD Paris. Maddison A (1991) Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development, A long-run Comparative View Oxford University Press, Oxford. Metcalf JS (1995) The Economic Foundations of Technology Policy: Equilibrium and Evolutionary Perspectives, in: Stoneman P (Ed.) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Blackwell, Oxford. National Statistical Bureau China (1990) zhongguo kexue jishu sishi nian (Statistics on Science and Technology of China 1949–1989), zhongguo tongji chubanshe (Statistics Publishing House of China). Nelson RR (Ed.) (1993) National Innovation Systems: A comparative analysis, Oxford University Press, New York. Nelson RR (2004) The market economy, and the scientific commons, Research Policy 33: 455–471. Nelson RR and Winter SG (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. North D (1996) Organizations, institutions and Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
market competition. Working paper, Washington University, St Louis MD. Pasinetti L (1981) Structural Change and Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Piñata M (2005) Innovation and Employment, in: Fagerberg J, Mowery DC and Nelson RR (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, Ch. 21, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Qian Y and Weingast BR (1996) China’s Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style, Journal of Policy Reform 1(2): 149–185. Richardson GB (2002) The organisation of industry revisited, Druid working paper no. 02-15. Rosenberg N (1982) Inside the black box: Technology and economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Saich A (2004) (2nd edn) The Governance and Politics of China, Palgrave Macmillan, London. Saxenian AL (1996) Inside-Out: Regional Networks and Industrial Adaptation in Silicon Valley and Route 128, Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, May 2(2): 41–60. Tomlinson M (2001) A new role for business services in economic growth, in: Archibugi D and Lundvall B-Å (Eds) Europe in the Globalising Learning Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Tylecote A (2006) Twin innovation systems, intermediate technology and economic development: History and prospect for China Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice 8(1–2): 62–83. UNIDO (2002) Industrial Development Report 2002–3. von Hipple E (2004) The Source of Innovation, Oxford University Press, Oxford. von Hippel E and Tyre M (2005) How learning by doing is done: Problem identification and novel process equipment, Research Policy 24(1): 1–12. Woolcock M (1998) Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy framework, Theory and Society 27(2): 151–207. Wang J and Tong X (2000) Industrial Clusters in China: Alternative Pathways Towards local–local Linkages, paper presented at the International High-Level Seminar on Technological Innovation, co-sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Technology of China and United Nations University, Beijing, September 5–7. Wu J (2004) dangdai zhongguo jingji gaige (China’s Economic Reform, in Chinese), Shanghai yuangong chubanshe (Shanghai Far East Publisher). White Paper No. 1 (1986) State Science and INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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Shulin Gu and Bengt-Åke Lundvall Technology Commission (SSTC) zhongguo kexue jishu zhengce zhinan 1986, kexue jishu baipishu di’yihao (Guide to China’s Science and Technology Policy for 1986, White Paper on Science and Technology No. 1). Xu M, Chen J and Bao H (2006) Enterprises’ Patenting in Zhejiang, Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice 8(1–2): 144–152.
Zhao Z (1985) Speech to the National Working Conference of Science and Technology (6 March in White Paper No. 1: 293–297). Zheng Y and Sheng S (2006) Learning in local cluster in the context of global value chain: A case study of the Yunhe wood toy cluster in Zhejiang, China, Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice 8(1–2): 120–127.
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INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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Copyright © eContent Management Pty Ltd. Innovation: management, policy & practice (2006) 8: 27–44.
Regional innovation systems in Asian countries: A new way of exploiting the benefits of transnational corporations SUMMARY
KEY WORDS regional innovation system; regional development; social capital; absorptive capacity; embeddedness
This paper argues for the importance of using the regional innovation systems (RIS) approach as both an analytical framework and a policy tool for generating economic development in developing countries. The paper reconceptualizes the RIS model to developing countries. RIS is normally based on endogenous growth models; however, in this paper we extend it to external capital, transnational knowledge sources and transnational corporations (TNCs). In particular we stress in this paper: (a) the importance of developing firm and regional absorptive capacity; (b) the importance of embedding TNCs in the region; and (c) regional policies for attaining these goals. These factors, we argue, are important for achieving sustainable economic development, building on exogenous sources of capital and knowledge. Finally, we illustrate the relevance of RIS for analyzing as well as formulating regional development policies by referring to two of Asia’s most significant cases: the regional innovation systems of Shanghai (China) and Bangalore (India). Received 9 June 2005
Accepted 18 October 2005
BJORN ASHEIM Professor Center for Innovation, Research and Competence in the Learning Economy (CIRCLE), and Department of Social and Economic Geography Lund University, Sweden, and Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture University of Oslo, Sweden
INTRODUCTION
D
uring the last decade, regional analysts, scientists, consultants and policymakers have reached the conclusion that earlier state-driven regional policies based on standardized formulas Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
JAN VANG Assistant Professor Center for Innovation, Research and Competence in the Learning Economy (CIRCLE), and Department of Social and Economic Geography Lund University, Sweden
and incentive programs aimed at the atomistic firm have failed (Amin 1999). Regional innovation systems (RIS) have increasingly been recognized as a fruitful alternative analytical framework and tool for generating economic policies in the
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Bjorn Asheim and Jan Vang
developed world (Amin 1999; Barthelt et al. 2004; Asheim 2001; Asheim and Gertler 2005; Asheim and Isaksen 2002; Cooke 2001, Cooke et al. 2000; Maskell and Malmberg 1999). There have however been only a limited number of studies addressing the relevance of RIS for regionally and socially cohesive economic development in developing countries (for exceptions, see Hassink 2002). The study of RIS in developed countries has traditionally focused on local linkages. However, RIS in developing countries seem to be much more dependent on external linkages (Giuliani et al, 2005). This points to the need of unpacking the relevance of the RIS framework for developing countries. The main task of the paper is to assert how RIS can be used for analyzing and generating industrial upgrading policies for two of the most remarkable cases of regional economic development in Asia: Shanghai’s and Bangalore’s ‘regional innovation systems’.1 The two RISs are interesting in several ways. Most paradigmatic studies on rapid economic development, growth and upgrading have until recently focused on the Tiger economies (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) (Amsden 1989, Hassink 2002) or their younger siblings in South East Asia (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and (earlier) Indonesia). There is however a need for decomposing other development models. Especially development models resulting in rapid economic growth based on other means than the state-centered models characterizing East Asia. The RISs in China and India live up to these criteria. This does not imply that their success can be copied uncritically to other countries, as central in RIS are the institutional and systemic dynamics. Institutional and systemic dynamics tend to display idiosyncratic and path-dependent traits. RIS has so far been applied mostly in the context of developed countries. Traditionally, RIS is based on mobilizing and refining endogenous economic potentials in a region. However, developing countries, due to limited capital, limited training and formal education, and limited developed industrial knowledge bases, often have to 28
rely on exogenous sources of capital, technology and knowledge. This paper pays special attention to the strategic coupling between the absorptive capacity of the region (RIS) and these transnational sources of capital, technology and knowledge (Dicken et al. 2002; Dicken 2000) widening the RIS concept to capture the specific characteristics of developing countries. Particularly the paper focuses on TNCs and to minor extent transnational communities as the external sources (thus other external sources are bracketed). Special attention is paid to: a) the regional absorptive capacity, aiming at building an institutional framework that stimulates ‘the firm’s ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment (Cohen and Levinthal 1990); and b) the strategy for embedding the TNCs in a local network based on traded and untraded interdependencies between TNCs and local firms as well as between the local firms, thus increasing the ‘exit costs’ for the TNCs. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with a presentation of the RIS concept where the differences in respect to National Systems of Innovation (NSI) are stressed. The differences are considered crucial as we argue in favor of placing the regional government bodies in a more central position than is the case in NSI. Subsequently, RIS is adapted to the specificities characterizing developing countries; particularly the frequent need to rely on transnational corporations (TNCs) as a central source of capital, technology and knowledge. This is followed by a section paying attention to the importance of building the regional absorptive capacity required for embedding these transnational flows of knowledge, technology and capital in the regional context. This is what Dickens and colleagues have labeled ‘strategic coupling’ (Coe et al. 2004). As it is beyond the scope of the paper to engage in a thorough theoretical stocktaking and empirical assessment of the entire TNC literature this section focuses mainly on strategic coupling (and how we position ourselves in contrast to general positions within TNC literature). The theoretical
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part is followed by two illustrative cases: the Shanghai regional innovation system and the Bangalorian regional innovation system. The paper is rounded of with some concluding remarks.
RIS: AN INTRODUCTION This section presents the central concepts in the RIS approach and adapts it to the particularities of developing countries. It provides the background for the following sections on development and upgrading in developing countries as well as the derived implications on the RIS policies in the context of regions in developing countries. The success stories in the nineties of Emilia-Romagna, (Piore and Sabel 1984), Baden Württemberg (Staber 1996) and Silicon Valley (Cohen and Fields 1998; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Saxenian 1994,) has turned the attention of many researchers and policymakers to the region as the designated scale for innovation support. In many OECD countries this led to a strong focus on constructing or building selfcontained regional innovation systems (Asheim 2002; Bathelt 2003; Morgan 2004) in an attempt to emulate the success of the triad regions. The relevance of the traditional self-contained regional innovation systems to construct competitive advantage (Sabel 2005; Isaksen 2001) for developing countries is often limited as the have to rely on TNCs, thus the challenge is to develop an exogenously driven RIS that allows regions in developing countries to benefit from TNCs investments. Thus the RIS needs to be re-conceptualized.
What is meant by RIS? According to Cooke et al. (1998), a RIS is defined as a system in which firms and other organizations are systematically engaged in interactive learning through an institutional milieu characterized by local embeddedness. The crux of this definition lies in the notion of embeddedness. This refers to the importance of personal relations and networks ingrained in local social and cultural institutions Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
(Granovetter 1985). Without it the definition would equal the definition of a national innovation system written small. Additionally, a regional innovation system can be conceptualized as regional clusters surrounded by ‘supporting’ knowledge organizations (Asheim and Isaksen 2002). Thereby the regional innovation system is boiled down to two main types of actors and the interactions between them. The first concerns the companies in the main industrial clusters in a region, as well as their support industries (e.g. customers, suppliers). The second type of actors – those backing up the innovative performance of the first – include research and higher education institutes (universities, technical colleges and R&D institutes), technology transfer agencies, vocational training organizations, business associations and finance institutions. These knowledge-creating and diffusing organizations hold important competence, train labor and provide necessary funding for the innovativeness of the RIS; it is however not assumed that they always function either in developed or in developing countries. To avoid confusions RIS does not maintain that innovation is mainly an activity in high tech industries in developed countries/ regions but that innovation (and interactive learning) might take place in all industries. The concept ‘region’ recognizes the existence of an important level of industry governance between the national and the local (cluster or firms) (Asheim and Cooke 1999). Regions are thus seen as important bases of economic coordination at the meso-level: ‘the region is increasingly the level at which innovation is produced through regional networks of innovators, local clusters and the cross-fertilizing effects of research institutions’ (Lundvall and Borrás 1997: 39).2 The systemic dimension of RIS derives in part from this partner-based character associated with innovation in networks. While, as Lundvall (1992) puts it, an innovation system is a set of relationships between entities or nodal points involved in innovation, it is really much more than this. Such relationships, to be systemic,
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must involve some degree of inter-dependence; not all relationships may be equally strong all of the time, but some may. Stressing interdependency is crucial in a developmental context where the challenge for regions in developing countries often seems to be to attract TNCs (and other capital influxes) investments (and outsourced activities) and gradually develop a situation of interdependency between the TNC and local/ regional firm as well as between TNCs and the institutional support system. This aims at making the TNCs investments and commitments ‘sticky’. ‘Sticky’ refers to that when regional cost advantages diminish, the TNCs exit costs (costs of relocating the investment to another region) will be high and cause several problems. Finally, RIS stresses the importance of interactive learning. For firms and regions to engage efficiently in interactive learning and thus upgrading, a prerequisite is a developed and continuously developing absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Narula 2004; Zahra and George 2002). Absorptive capacity as conceptualized in this paper is considered a dynamic capability (capability because it refer to skills, routines and habits constituting absorptive capacity) (Nelson and Winter 1982) that allow firms and/or regions to benefit from knowledge and information in their environment, process it and use it for upgrading purposes. We argue that: (a) in accordance with Cohen and Levinthal (1990) a firm’s absorptive capacity is a function of its prior internal knowledge – being tacit or codified – and the institutional setting within which the firm is embedded. The latter refers among other aspects to how social capital shapes knowledge dissemination and knowledge spillovers and to how public organizations can support knowledge dissemination. (b) a region has an collective absorptive capacity (which is a function of the individual firms absorptive capacity, as well as the local human and social capital; that is, goes beyond the individual firm’s capabilities). 30
Hence we oppose seeing regional absorptive capacity as simply an aggregate of individual firms’ absorptive capacity. Contrary to more traditional definitions, we emphasize the dynamic and systemic propensities of the absorptive capacity. Following among others Narula (2004) this requires developing and applying a systemic approach to absorptive capacity that addresses the required changes in the organizational structure and support systems to respond to the needs of the firms with upgrading potential. Absorptive capacity building is about investing in formal training (human capital) including vocational training and possible engaging in collaboration (i.e. interactive learning) between firms and universities (not necessarily co-located universities due to the high reliance on codified practices and modular processes). It is also about interacting with other organizations (other firms, universities, etc). This allows firms to develop their internal absorptive capacity as well as utilizing other firms’ and organizations’ competencies. Regional government bodies might play a crucial role in building absorptive capacity by for example financing development projects that include private firms.
RIS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Building absorptive capacity As pointed out in the previous section, developing countries are much more dependent on external sources of knowledge and technology. In order to attract external flows of technology and knowledge they need to build their absorptive capacity, which is based on local endowments of: • physical capital (hard infrastructure); • social capital (soft infrastructure); • human capital (formal education and training); and • financial capital. These variables are generally acknowledged to be important facilitators or constraints for devel-
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opment, growth and upgrading in developing countries. The RIS-approach contributes to this literature by emphasizing the systemic propensities between these variables; the systemic propensities have previously been treated in an insufficient manner. Central in this is conceptualizing regional absorptive capacity in a systemic perspective. In this chapter we pay special attention to the role of human and social Capital (soft infrastructure). Hard infrastructure we consider more of a contingency than an actual part of more theoretical aspects, thus it will be treated only in this manner. Lack of financial capital in most developing countries is taken as an assumption with no further elaboration.3 Most attention will be paid to the latter with special attention to absorptive capacity and the development of local embeddedness of the TNCs. The importance of the different factors varies across industries and regions, depending on the dominant industrial knowledge base and the regions human and social capital ‘endowment’.4
Social capital (soft infrastructure) Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions... Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together. (The World Bank 1998) Soft infrastructure varies significantly across regions and is strongly dependent on local culture (however heterogeneous and dynamic that might be measured in terms of normative dispositions, values and subsequent behavioral regularities).5 Social capital consists of at least two dimensions: (a) Trust, which can be divided into generalized trust (to society as such) and specific trust (constrained to one group), and (b) Cooperative ability, or people’s ability to work together (Paldam 2000). Trust is considered a precondition for the type of interactive learning involved in upgrading. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
Social capital (and the related concept as trust) might facilitate the interaction between agents/ nodes in the RIS for example interactive learning between TNCs and local firms or between local firms. Contrary to that envisioned by standard economists, economic interaction of relevancy for upgrading and growth cannot primarily be conceptualized as a market-based exchange of (tangible) goods by anonymous agents regulated by a complete contract (in the context of efficient contract enforcement). On the contrary, knowledge exchange (i.e. interactive learning) relies on incomplete contracts, either due to the lack of possibilities for creating complete contracts (because of the disadvantages in terms of a low degree of flexibility build into complete contracts) or because of inefficient contract enforcement, thus knowledge exchange and interactive learning depend on the mutual trust of partners involved in the transaction. Unless there is trust fear of opportunistic behavior will prevent exchange of valuable knowledge. Hence unless there is a high degree of generalized social capital-based cooperation interactive learning is likely to be limited or at least confined to the ‘in-groups’ which greatly reduces the localized knowledge spillovers. Therefore the social capital and trustworthiness of local firms influences the TNCs incentive to engage in extensive collaboration with local firms in activities involving critical and valuable knowledge. Thus it shapes the morphology of input/output linkages (i.e. interactive learning) between TNCs and local firms and the possibilities for more general localized spillovers. Additionally, absence of dense local input/output linkages increases the TNC degree of ‘footlooseness’, hence ceteris paribus reduces the TNCs exit costs. A dense local network between the TNCs and the local firms might counterbalance the decreased cost advantages derived from a certain degree of development. Otherwise, TNCs might consider re-locating elsewhere. In short, absence of social capital in turn reduces the local firms’ prospects of getting access to relevant knowledge for upgrading, constraints
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general knowledge spillovers and reduces the regions bargaining power and thus constrains upgrading, growth and development. Having said this we wish to emphasize that we do not subscribe to a view of the social capital rich region as conflict-free. Nor do we suggest that intra-regional competition is not conducive to regional development. We merely state that the destructive elements of conflicts and competition can be somewhat avoided in the context of a high degree of generalized non-exclusive social capital.
Human capital According to Gary Becker ‘Human capital refers to the skills, education, health and training of individuals’ (1998: 1). Human capital is considered crucial for upgrading, growth and development (Romer 1990). Human capital of relevance to modern industrial production in general tends to be scarce in developing countries. There are limited resources for formal education; at least after primary school. According to the World Bank (World Development 2003), secondary school enrolment in developing countries is typically around 50 percent while about 90–100 percent in the developed world. For example, the enrolment number for the two countries, China and India, included in this study is respectively 55 and 44 percent. Thus formal training including the socialization into working with codified abstract concepts – which follows enrolment in the formal educational system at a higher level – is scarce. This has implications for the type of industrial activities that can be undertaken by the TNCs subsidiaries or outsourced to the local firms, thus for the type of localized knowledge spillovers. OECD states it this way: While FDI inflows create a potential for spillovers of knowledge to the local labour force, at the same time the host country’s level of human capital determines how much FDI it can attract and whether local firms are able to absorb the potential spillover benefits. (OECD 2002:10) 32
Not only basic human capital constrains type of FDI, TNCs possibilities for outsourcing to the region and the subsequent possibilities for interactive learning and knowledge spillovers managerial skills are also crucial. As a result of scarce management skills in developing countries (even in those with a successful development strategy such as India and China), the application of modern management techniques aiming at mastering the processes involved in upgrading tend to be scarce. Additionally, the competences needed for valuable incremental improvement, reorganization of production processes and so forth are also considered scarce. Hence the local firms tend to have a limited absorptive capacity only which prevents them from taking advantage of TNCs investments (Kaplinsky 2005). Additionally, the regions in developing countries often lack the organizational setting providing the formal and vocational training that is needed for supporting the local firms that aim at upgrading by interacting with TNCs but lacks the managerial and ‘blue color’ competencies. Human capital can be developed through nonformal interactions with agents located in other regions or through analyzing published information (e.g., websites, business magazines) (Gertler 2003). While this type of information tends to be downplayed in the literature, its value depends on absorptive capacity of the agents/firms; that is the ability to transform the inputs into competencies in the firms. In short, absence of human capital reduces the relevance of a given region as a locational choice for TNCs to establish offshore plants or outsource to local subcontractors (at least for industrial activities that require some competencies). This limits the options for local firms to gain access to relevant the knowledge (i.e., engage in interactive learning) for moving up the global value chain (or to be included in global value chains at all). Therefore, even in regions characterized by a high degree of generalized social capital, absence of human capital prevents utilization of the social capital for upgrading, growth and
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development in which the TNCs could have played an active role or rather been forced to play an active role in.
Strategic coupling with TNCs How can RIS facilitate economic development in developing countries? We begin by stressing the strategic coupling with the TNCs. Then we turn to more traditional RIS policy measures. There is not a best practice for this type of strategic coupling with TNCs as it varies accordingly to the regional particularities and specificities; being the institutional endowment/support system, the local firms’ competencies and human capital in general, the social capital, and, to paraphrase Schmitz’s (2004), the structure of the global value chains (more particular if it is a buyer- or supplier-dominated value chain) (Gereffi 1999). We suggest paying most attention to the weakest link in the system, while continuing to strengthen areas in which regions hold some degree of competitive advantage. These policy measures are developed with the aim of increasing regional absorptive capacity and embedding the TNCs.
TNCs and spillovers While transnational capital can be acquired through numerous sources (the World Bank, IMF and members of the transnational community), we mainly focus on TNCs and to a lesser degree transnational communities. TNCs have always been a controversial source of capital, technology and knowledge (Lipsey 2002; Gorg and Strobl 2001; Smarzynska 2002; Guerrieri and Pietrobelli 2004; Lall and Narula 2004). They provide foreign direct investment (FDI) and outsource industrial activities, thus indirectly reduce the scarcity of financial capital in the host developing country; they also increase local competition, thus eliminating inefficient producers (Narula and Marin 2005) and occasionally promising local producers. But, numerous studies also illustrate that TNCs use developing countries mainly as cheap labor pools and hence suggests that TNCs do not play a central role in facilitating the knowledge spillover Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
that is needed for upgrading in the local firms and hence for growth and development. Studies focusing explicitly on indirect spillovers, for example, do not find strong support suggesting that abundant indirect spillovers are frequent phenomena (and where it does, there are major methodological problems involved) (Narula and Marin 2005). When it comes to direct spillovers the situation is not significantly different. According to Fosfuri et al. (2001), TNCs only provide investment in training of subsidiaries located on offshore locations when they are in need of specific superior capabilities. TNCs also reduce unintended knowledge spillovers (i.e. employees leaving and working for a local firm) by maintaining wage incentives – that is paying higher wages than local firms – for the local competent workers to keep them working for their firm (Fosfuri et al. 2001; Narula and Marin 2005). Contrary to suggestions for regional policies in the developed world, developing countries do not have the same possibilities to ground development on indigenous capital and knowledge. Thus, despite the difficulties summarized above, developing countries often have to rely on TNCs. It is not a question of relying on local buzz and importing knowledge via global pipelines (Depner and Bathelt 2003; Bathelt et al. 2004) or applying similar strategies as is currently being suggested for developed countries. Regional innovation systems in developing countries are ‘doomed’ to rely on TNCs and the TNCs impact on regional development depends significantly on the type of strategic coupling between regional and TNCs assets (Coe et al. 2004); tradeable and untradeable (Storper 1997; Dosi 1988). Thus the challenge is to embed transnational capital, TNCs and knowledge ‘flows’ in the potential regional innovation system and to build an absorptive capacity at firm and regional levels. This is crucial for developing regions that wishes to push a development strategy based on moving up the global value chain by facilitating the local firms upgrading strategies.6 The political economy literature emphasizes
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that TNCs locate labor-intensive and mature industries with limited direct and indirect spillover effects into the local economy. They often out-compete the local industry and remain footloose, relocating the production facility when the host regions comparative (cost) advantages decline. This is even more evident in developing regions/countries which are weak on the stipulated measures of hard and soft infrastructure (social capital and human capital). These often have only few resources to offer the TNC’s, apart from cheap labor, hence their bargaining power is limited. The result is that they enter the ‘race to the bottom’ with other regions and countries not having more to offer than cheap labor, low taxes, poor environmental regulation and ‘flexible’ labor market laws (Schmitz 2004). In a RIS perspective it is not considered a law of nature that TNCs cannot provide valuable input into the economic development process in regions in developing countries. By emphasizing interactive learning, knowledge spillovers and the involvement of regional government bodies, the literature on RIS suggests that the role of the TNCs in the regional development depends on the following factors:7 (a) The bargaining power of the host country/ region (Coe et al. 2004). Regions with only ubiquitous competencies to offer do not have a bargaining position where they can ‘force’ the TNCs to make commitments to local economic development (i.e. transfer knowledge to local firms or engage in collaborative projects with local firms). (b) The right allocation of decision making powers between the central and regional government bodies in the host country (Lundvall et al. 2006 in press). It is often the case that regions need to have autonomy, competencies and formal decision power to engage in direct negotiations with TNCs as central government tend not to have the required local knowledge on competencies etc. and might also have less clear cut incentives for hard negotiations with the TNCs. Central govern34
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
ments should, however, prevent regions from entering the ‘race to the bottom’ and could occasionally reduce the power of local corrupted bureaucrats and firms (Lundvall et al. 2006 in press). The local firms absorptive capacity. TNCs investments might have spillover potential but if the local firms lack absorptive capacity these are not utilized and the investment does not lead to regional development (Lall and Narula 2004). The ability of the regional government to exploit the already developed absorptive capacity in a way that stimulates the development of interactive learning between the TNC and the local firms so that it creates an interdependency that increases the TNCs exit costs. The quality and size of the local training and competency building institutions, where these do exist, and more specifically their ability to focus explicitly on the specific needs of the activity or industry in question. The need for being able to provide an efficient hard infrastructure and provision of services such as health care, since without these services TNCs tend to avoid particular regions. This is, however, outside the RIS domain.
Role of transnational communities When regions possess the important ingredients in this cocktail and there are possibilities that is can initiate the processes that stimulates interactive learning between the TNC and the local firms and subsequent facilitate knowledge spillovers. In other words RIS gives a certain perspective on how TNCs can function as important sources of capital, technology and knowledge in a way that underpins the local development processes. In the longer run firms embedded in these types of regions have been witnessed to start to move up the global value chain by providing services and goods to other customers and eventually develop more strategic localized learning alliances, as we have witnessed in the Dragon
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economies (Mathews 2002) and in certain regions in India (Vang and Chaminade, 2006). The discussion on the usefulness of different types of strategic coupling with TNCs cannot be reduced to the structure of the value chain nor the degree of maturity of the industry in question, as is often the case within global value chains or global commodity chain studies (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2004) as well as some versions of RIS, but depends on local conditions as the support structure, social capital and human capital etc., as explained above. Centrally placed members of a country or region’s transnational community can function as an important source of knowledge about the host country (Vang and Overby 2006 in press; Saxenian 1994, 2002). Usually working in a TNC, members of the transnational community can provide knowledge of market demands, sources of finance, new innovations and possible collaboration partners. Transnational communities can also provide capital (remittance) and venture capital; influence outsourcing decision-making in the host country; help establish local firms; stimulate knowledge transfer in terms of entrepreneurial start-up; and provide policy recommendations based on experience abroad, and consultancy and teaching (Vang and Overby 2006 in press; Saxenian 1994, 2002). They might also function as a boundary spanner between the different cultural or institutional setting (Depner and Bathelt 2003) which could have prevented the TNCs from investing in their ‘home’ country. Moreover, transnational communities can help reduce the mistrust between TNCs and their local counterparts since they can use their local network as partners (these networks are often regional and not national). These aspects are crucial for many developing countries where institutional immaturity and non-transparency can cause TNCs to refrain from investment in developing countries from fear of opportunistic behavior such as abuse of patents or copyrights, thus preventing the TNCs from engaging in interactive collaboration with local firms (Vang and Overby 2006 in press). Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
SHANGHAI AND BANGALORE: ILLUSTRATIVE CASES We have outlined above the motivation, potentials and theoretical aspects of RIS. The aim of this section is to provide some illustrative cases – read through the RIS lens – to demonstrate the relevancy of RIS as an analytical framework and critical tool for policy prescriptions. The cases are chosen as so-called critical cases (Flyvbjerg 2004) since they are among the most successful cases of regional development, but nonetheless their development strategy can be greatly improved. The cases are merely illustrative and do not claim in any way to exhaust the complexity of the two regional development models.
Shanghai’s regional innovation system Situated on the coast in China, Shanghai, with a population of 20 million, has always been one of the most important regions for economic development in communist China (Chen 2004; Depner and Bathelt 2003); the other two being Beijing, where the most important public institutions including prestigious universities are located, and Guangzhou, which has benefited from its proximity to Hong Kong and served as an entry point to mainland China for foreign investments (including illegal investment from Taiwan). Shanghai is host to eight major clusters (Depner and Bathelt 2003): • the steel industry in the north; • the chemical industry in the south (including BPBASF and BAYER); • microelectronics in the southeast (including Intel and IBM); • automobile industry in the northwest; • electrical power equipment industry in the southwest; • aerospace industry in the southwest; • ship building in the east; and • biotech and pharmaceutical industry in the east.
Shanghai’s autonomy Shanghai has been one of the most important
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manufacturing centres in China and especially since Deng Xiao Ping introduced his economic market reforms which included a gradual dissolution of the central planning system – including spatial planning where industry was located, according to developmental needs, in poor regions – and decentralization of the decision structure in China, giving regions such as Shanghai a high degree of autonomy (Yeung et al. 2006). To illustrate this, Shanghai can decide, collect and use local taxes (and does it as part of the incentive structure by providing tax breaks and tax return to TNCs) although the Shanghai government does not have decision power in relation to the federal tax; this is controlled by Beijing.
Strategies behind Shanghai’s RIS: Transnational connections Shanghai’s regional innovation system that supports these eight clusters is the result of a deliberate and well-functioning strategy on strategic coupling with TNCs, the Chinese transnational community located in the US, and development of an important absorptive capacity (Leydesdorff and Guoping 2001).8 Initially the city region’s industrial profile was manufacturing but, since the 1990s, the Shanghai regional government has worked deliberately to attract foreign investment in high tech industries having a tremendous success. Manufacturing industries have been relocated to less central areas in the Shanghai city region, now redeveloped as one of China’s most important high tech centers. Initially, what made China attractive – as in the Bangalorian case described below – were pure Ricardian factors. China could offer low wages, a disciplined work force and limited environmental regulations. Moreover, when the Chinese economy opened up, it was a gigantic unexplored market for foreign firms. The Shanghai regional government did not settle for remaining a cheap subcontractor region but worked actively on attracting foreign knowledge-intensive investment. For doing so, it invested heavily in the qualification of human capital, 36
for example supporting national universities in Shanghai. Initially, TNCs offshored their production or outsourced to local Chinese firms with the aim of re-exporting or adjusting products to their local market but the TNCs investments and outsourced industrial activities have gradually included industrial activities higher up on the global value chain. Today, TNCs locate research subsidiaries locally as part of a global strategy of knowledge input into global products. On an anecdotic level the US GE Global Research Center located in Shanghai employs approximately 500 top engineers and, according to Chen (2004) plans to employ 2000 within a few years. These firms are increasingly being embedded in the Shanghai city region due to an aggressive educational policy from the Shanghai regional government. That is, human capital becomes a crucial element to attract knowledge intensive activities to the region.
Human capital The Shanghai government has worked on building human capital. Although the best universities are in Beijing, the Shanghai government has worked hard to improve the standard of its local universities and targeted underfinanced national universities in Shanghai to engage them in an economic partnership (Chen 2004). Universities are thus more tuned to the needs of the regional economy. Shanghai has thus produced the necessary candidates with high scientific qualifications, though with limited experience of practical application of their skills/competencies. Universities are, for example, involved in collaboration with private firms in the biotech industry and in speech technology development in the telecommunications industry.
Embedding the TNCs: The social capital challenge The Shanghai regional government has also established a degree of network relations between TNCs and local subcontractors. However, the
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structure of the social capital in the Shanghai region and in China as such is an obstacle that needs further development. Taking trust as an example, China is to a large extent a family-oriented society (i.e. specific trust) while trust outside the family is low (i.e. generalized trust), partly owing to Chinese history and the Cultural Revolution. The family is not to be misunderstood as an atomistic unit. Families and individuals are connected to other individuals and families through their guanxi or trans-family connections, which play a crucial role for individuals in deciding with whom to corporate. Guanxi has not reduced fear of opportunism in China when it comes to the relationship between TNCs and subcontractors. Hence, R&D is usually in-house, and seldom collaborative. Even with ‘collaboration’, it is often subcontracted as a one-time deal or basic research, with no immediate monetary value to the subcontractor. In short, one can argue that the absence of a high degree of generalized social capital still limits the embeddedness of TNCs in respect to engaging in interactive learning with local. The Shanghai government has deliberately targeted Chinese members of the transnational community in the US, offering them favorable economic deals such as low taxes, high salaries and minor housing costs to return to China (Yeung and Li 2000). Returning Chinese have been motivated by the financial incentives but even more by a nationalistic pride in building China’s capabilities. This community has been targeted to help establish trust (social capital) between TNCs and local subcontractors, initially by reducing uncertainty in the business environment through unclear or undeveloped institutional structures/formal regulations, and use of hooligan methods by Chinese subcontractors to solve conflicts with smaller TNCs. Lately this transnational community has functioned more as a cultural bridge, or boundary spanner, especially between the US and China (Shanghai) where they can take advantage of their social and cultural capital. While Chinese firms often provide qualified Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
technical staff, management skills (human capital) are still scarce and hinder firms’ development of an absorptive capacity (already constrained by lack of generalized social capital and reduced knowledge spillovers from TNCs). Chinese subcontractors therefore tend to be dependent on lead firms in the global value chain. Moreover, own brand manufacturing is still scarce. (Although we do not look at the dark side of the Chinese model in this paper, one should be aware of the country’s working conditions and other factors.)
Summing up The Shanghai government has had a high degree of success in building up a high-tech regional innovation system but it still suffers from the constraints of lack of social capital and a low degree of TNC embedding. Local subcontractors’ autonomy from lead firms is still limited. Moreover, the absorptive capacity of local firms is constrained by the absence of management competencies. Thus, there is a need for public procurement in terms of projects to help build trust between firms and individuals not connected through guanxi; that is building generalized trust. This will enable more local sourcing based on competencies than pure networking and thus extent at least the localized interactive learning which in turn will help to boost the absorptive capacity of the involved firms. This in turn will make the local firms attractive as collaborative partners for the TNCs and possible stimulate increased interactive learning between TNCs and local firms and thus spur a virtuous circle.
Bangalore’s regional innovation system Situated 1000 km from Bombay, in Karnataka State, Bangalore has become one of the most important IT clusters outside the US. Bangalore city, with around 1 million inhabitants, is the centre of the Bangalore region. The technical knowledge base of the IT industry draws on a combination of technical and engineering skills. Routine activities basically draw on codified pro-
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gramming skills while sophisticated tasks are based on a combination of codified programming competencies and firm specific – tacit and quasicodified – competencies developed through customized programs.
Regional autonomy Karnataka State is an autonomous state although the degree of autonomy appears smaller than in Shanghai. For example, local governments have little taxation power while the power of state governments is mostly limited to indirect taxes (e.g. sales tax). Development of this particular cityregion is shaped more by industrial development in the US than by local cluster-effects and regional government body policies. While it should be stressed that Bangalore’s growth until the late 1980s (the beginning of the software export boom) relied on local, largely public sector investment in a rather poor physical infrastructure, it should also be noted that Bangalore had a privileged position in comparison to other Indian regions. Bangalore already had a dense organizational setting; it was/is the center for advanced science and military research – mainly for physical, geographical reasons such as dust-free air for military testing – and had a number of good educational institutions already, mainly funded by the central authorities. This human capital advantage in combinations with a rather business friendly and efficient regional government were behind the Bangalore’s ‘first mover’ advantages. This spurred a cumulative causation process which Bangalore benefits from today.
Bangalore: Background Until the late 1980s, when the first US firms set up subsidiaries in India, IT service outsourcing was mainly a Silicon Valley phenomena, while East Coast IT firms were vertically integrated (Saxenian 1994). The earliest were the East Coast firms led by hardware producer Digital Equipment, with Texas Instruments (not East Coast or Silicon Valley) following soon after (Vang and Overby 2006 in press). 38
This is also principally a Ricardian story as Bangalore’s most important advantage is low cost labor, a 12-hour time zone difference, widespread English usage and skilled technicians. However, these factors are not sufficient to explain why India was chosen as a location for outsourcing of these activities. As with other developing countries, India was about to dismantle the ISI-strategy and had not yet developed an internal institutional structure/regulation adapted to the IT industry or pro export-oriented. Apart from providing basic sound macro-economical policies, the state did little to enhance development of an IT industry in India, or subsequently Bangalore (Parthasarathy 2004), although one should not ignore the Government of India’s Computer Policy of 1984 and the National IT Task Force of 1998, and we acknowledge establishment of Information Technology Park in Bangalore as a direct step by the Karnataka government in the early ‘90s. The crucial difference between India and other developing countries, however, was a highly developed human capital infrastructure. The Indian state has developed high quality IT colleges which many Indians consider attractive.
Absorptive capacity and human capital Several studies have documented that, during the first phase, US firms mainly outsourced routine IT services such as maintenance of existing codes or reengineering codes from one programming language to another to India (many of these activities were undertaken onsite by Indian software professionals under the direct guidance of the client’s IT staff or a consultant). The human capital base in India – more particularly Bangalore – was characterized by well-educated engineers perfectly capable of undertaking these activities. The skills needed were simple IT skills and Indians undertaking these activities were most often over-qualified for the task. Body shopping was prevalent in this period (Parthasarathy 2004) and the strategy did not provide much knowledge transfer or interactive
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learning, nor did it enhance local firms’ absorptive capacity since the engineers involved left whenever a more attractive offer was made. This was the case despite high general investment in human capital by the Indian state and an excess of supply of competent engineers. Firms’ absorptive capacity was thus mainly a function of formal technical skills acquired in an IT college or similar, whereas firms’ specific knowledge or specific knowledge of customer demands was scarce. In recent years, Indian firms have to some extent moved up the global value chain, as a result of building up absorptive capacity. This is partly as a result of change in strategy from ‘body shopping’ to distance work (in Bangalore), which is in part facilitated by advances in ICT technologies, as well as deliberate strategies among TNCs to modularize and standardize IT processes. This provides a distance work background which in turn allowed Indian firms to maintain a broader knowledge base at home (Parthasarathy 2004) hence securing better absorptive capacity. They have also invested in development of management competencies; an important constraint for Indian firms to moving up the value chain. The broader knowledge base, combined with the existence and gradual building of reputation in the US market, plus an aggressive certifying strategy by most Indian firms, has allowed their upgrading in the global value chain (Vang and Chaminade 2006).
Social capital and the transnational connections The social capital of the Indian transnational community played (and is playing, for qualifying interpretations, see Vang and Overby 2006 in press) a crucial role in the upgrading industry. To secure access to orders, capital and more sophisticated knowledge, Indian firms were forced to target transnational corporations. However, US IT firms had only limited experience with outsourcing IT activities to developing countries. Combined with poorly developed regulations, the lack of experience generated a high degree of uncertainty for US Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
firms in terms of subcontractor competencies and trustworthiness, bureaucratic obstacles and cultural dilemmas they might face. This uncertainty enabled the Indian transnational community, with important positions in US firms, to play a significant role in shaping US outsourcing decisions (Vang and Overby 2006 in press). Thus the Indian transnational community helped overcome the distance between US and Bangalore by reducing uncertainties. Moreover, its cultural capital functioned as a bridge builder between different cultural settings.
Autonomy of local firms and the limited embedding of TNCs In recent years, there has been significant growth in interaction between Bangalorian, US and European firms, as well as a diversification of the profiles of firms investing in Bangalore. Today, for example, pharmaceutical firms are also outsourcing to Bangalore. Bangalorian firms have developed a certain degree of autonomy from lead(ing) firms in the US and Europe. As this autonomy is a function of investments in human capital and new managerial strategies, they can now provide all types of services from the highest end of the value chain to the bottom, which has allowed them to move up the chain. Part of this process has been facilitated by increased cluster effect and spin-offs from different universities in Bangalore. However, Indian firms engage to only a limited extent in mutual learning and knowledge exchange, compared to firms in Silicon Valley (the exception is in embedded software) (Vang and Chaminade 2006). The regional state has not done sufficient to spur a new development model based on local interaction and public procurement. Hence, we can picture Indian firms in Bangalore as small islands where the main knowledge transfer takes place between clients abroad, especially in the US, and the US firm (Parthasarathy 2004) while only including minor interactive learning between the TNC and their local first tier supplier.9 Lately however, a number of professional institutions and
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industry–academy partnerships have been promoted to strengthen the technical community, particularly in niche areas such as chip design. If and how this will strengthen social capital in this industry remains to be seen.
Summing up with some implications for RIS policies Bangalore diseconomies of agglomeration have also been revealed, as salaries have increased by up to 40 percent and eroded cost advantages. Thus Bangalore’s competitive advantage (or the Bangalorian model) is diminishing and there is a need for RIS-based policies such as strategic procurement from the state or regional authorities. These policies should stress the regional collaboration dimension and aim to bring Indian firms closer together. Despite the difficulties of building social capital, this aim should be clearly integrated in public procurement polices. Individual firms have the technical skills (human capital) to take advantage of more local cooperation and, apart from limitations in the general level of management, absorptive capacity is highly developed. However, in industry where this physical proximity to lead users is crucial, Bangalore suffers a major drawback.
CONCLUSION In conclusion, we have provided arguments for the importance of RIS as an approach for analyzing and generating policies for economic development in developing countries. We have extended RIS from being primarily based on endogenous growth models towards a development model relying on external capital, transnational knowledge sources and TNCs. In this respect, we have stressed the importance of developing firms and regions absorptive capacity. In this context we have paid special attention to the importance of collective absorptive capacity, hence on human capital and generalized social capital. In both cases we have found that human capital and especially lack of generalized social capital has prevented the local firms upgrading process, and 40
thus constrained the regional development process. Moreover, we have aimed at highlighting the systemic dimensions of the interactive learning between TNCs and local firms as well as alluded to the role that the public sector plays or can play in terms of providing support and use public procurement. The latter aspect however requires more research on government capacity, government failures, etc. to be operationalized. Additionally, we have emphasized the importance of involving the regional government bodies in the development process as this is a prerequisite for efficient policies . We do however nuance the regional devolution ideas that seems to dominate at least parts of contemporary economic geography. Finally, we have also underscored the importance of ‘gluing’ the TNCs to the region as well as economic policies related to this to stimulate more sustainable economic development. The general aim is to stimulate interactive learning and knowledge spillovers and this is a precondition for long term economical sustainable growth and development. The relevancy of these insights is discussed in two specific illustrative cases: the Shanghai and Bangalore regional innovation systems. The paper does not attempt to cover all aspects of the cases but merely illustrate how applying a RIS can be useful for capturing aspects not normally caught by standard economics and thus point to different types of policies.
Acknowledgements Professor Yun-Chung Chen (Hong Kong University on Science and Technology) and Drs. Ping Gao (Copenhagen Business School) for valuable information on China; Drs. Tine Aage (Copenhagen Business School) for stimulating discussions on absorptive capacity; Prof. Balaji Parthasarathy, India, for information on Bangalore, India; and As. Prof. Cristina Chaminade for invaluable assistance in finishing, sharpening and editing the paper.
Endnotes 1 Emphasis is on how RIS can be used rather than on typological discussions about whether Shang-
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3
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hai and Bangalore qualify as being RIS, clusters or merely a co-location of related firms. This supports the plea in favor of some degree of devolution of decision-making structures in most developed and developing countries. The degree of devolution is however a delicate one as national governments tend to have a stronger bargaining power vis-à-vis the TNCs and can prevent a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ but lack local knowledge (Lundvall et al. 2006 in press). To varying degrees, regional governance is expressed in both private representative organizations such as branches of industry associations and chambers of commerce, and public organizations such as regional ministries with devolved powers concerning enterprise and innovation support. In addition while financial capital is crucial in many regions and countries in developing countries this is less the case in the included cases, thus we find it more appropriate to deal with this in a subsequent paper. Physical capital as infrastructure is crucial for economic development but this is not the core area of RIS hence we just refer to UNDP (2004) for detailed elaborations on this topic. We do not disagree with Amin (2004) on the normative implications of defining a culture in singularies (‘Americans’, ‘Indians’, ‘Danes’) but this does not prevent us from pointing to the importance of regularities when discussing empirical realities. By culture we refer to the informal and formal rules of the game (North 1990) which is shared by the relevant – due to the question in mind – segment of the population and provides non-deterministic guidelines for action. Apart from this we refrain from defining culture (see Gertler 2004). It should be stressed that upgrading to fullfledged regional innovation systems in developing countries – at least outside the Asia NIC’s – remains to be seen. It is possible to distinguish between resources and management issues. Notably, the bargaining power of the host country or the ability of the regional government to exploit the absorptive capacity refer to how the government manages the resources of the region. Those resources can be the absorptive capacity of the firms, the organizations providing knowledge to the local firms or the hard infrastructure. In other words, the government might provide the resources but this is not enought unless it has the capacity to manage efficiently those resources to atract the Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
TNC to the region and build the right linkages with the local productive systems. 8 Due to China’s importance as a future market, embedding TNCs has been an almost automatic process. 9 Occasionally, the TNCs operate with a three layer subcontractor system: gold, silver and bronze. Only gold firms are involved in important interactive learning.
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Becker G (1998) Human capital and poverty. Religion and Liberty 8(1), Available at: http://www.acton.org/publicat/randl/article .php?id=258. Chen YC (2004) Restructuring the Shanghai Innovation Systems: The Localization of Multinational Corporation R&D Centers in Shanghai, presented at the First ASIALICS International Conference: Innovation Systems and Clusters in Asia – Challenges and Regional Integration, Bangkok Thailand, April 1–2 2004. Coe NM, Hess M, Yeung H, Dicken P and Henderson J (2004) ‘Globalizing’ regional development: a global production networks perspective. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 29(4): 468–484. Cooke P (2001) Regional Innovation Systems Clusters and the Knowledge Economy. Industrial & Corporate Change 10: 945–974. Cooke P and Morgan K (1998) The Associational Economy. OUP: Oxford. Cooke P, Uranga M G and Etxebarria G (1998) Regional Systems of Innovation: An Evolutionary Perspective. Environment and Planning A 30: 1563–1584. Cooke P, Boekholt P and Tödtling F (2000) The Governance of Innovation in Europe. Regional Perspectives on Global Competitiveness. London, Pinter. Cohen S and Fields G (1998) Social Capital and Capital Gains, or Virtual Bowling in Silicon Valley. BRIE working paper. http://ist-socrates. berkeley. edu/~briewww/ publications/ WP132.pdf Cohen W and Levinthal D (1990) Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 128–152. Depner H and Bathelt H (2003) Cluster growth and institutional barriers: The development of the automobile industry cluster in Shanghai P.R. China. SPACES 2003 09. Marburg: Fachbereich Geographie Philipps-Universität. Dicken PJ, Henderson M, Hess N, Coe HW and Yeung C (2002) Global production networks and the analysis of economic development. Review of International Political Economy 9: 436–464. Dicken P (2000) Places and flows: situating international investment, in Clark G, Gertler 42
M and Feldman M-A (eds) A Handbook of Economic Geography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 14. Dosi G (1988) The nature of the innovative process, in Dosi G, Freeman Ch, Nelson R, Silverberg G and Soete L (eds) Technical Change and Economic Theory. Pinter, London/New York, 221–238. Flyvbjerg B (2004) Five misunderstandings about case-study research, in Seale C, Gobo G, Gubrium JF and Silverman D (eds) Qualitative Research Practice. London, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 420–434. Fosfuri A, Motta M and Roende T (2001) Foreign direct investment and spillovers through workers’ mobility. Journal of International Economics 53: 205–222. Gereffi G (1999) International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain. Journal of International Economics 48(1): 37–70. Gertler M (2003) Tacit knowledge and the economic geography of context or The indefinable tacitness of being (there). Journal of Economic Geography 3: 75–99. Gertler M (2004) Manufacturing Culture, The Institutional Geography of Industrial Practice. New York: Oxford University Press. Gorg H and Strobl E (2001) Multinational Companies Technology Spillovers and Plant Survival: Evidence for Irish Manufacturing, European Economy Group Working Papers 8. European Economy Group. Granovetter M (1985) Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91: 481–510. Guerrieri P and Pietrobelli C (2004) Industrial districts’ evolution and technological regimes: Italy and Taiwan. Technovation 24(11): 899–914. Hassink R (2002) Regional Innovation Support Systems: Recent Trends in Germany and East Asia. European Planning Studies 10: 153–164. Isaksen . (2001) Building regional innovation systems: Is endogenous industrial development possible in the global economy? Canadian Journal of Regional Science 24(1): 101–123. Kaplinsky R 2005 Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between A Rock And A Hard Place, London: Polity Press. Lall S and Narula R (2004) FDI and its Role in
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Economic Development: Do We Need a New Agenda? European Journal of Development Research 16(3): 447–464. Leidersdorff L and Guoping Z (2001) University– Industry–Government relations in China: an emergent national system of innovation. Industry and Higher Education 15(3):179–182. Lipsey R (2002) Home and host country effects of FDI, NBER Working Paper No. 9293. Lundvall B-Å (ed.) (1992) National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. London: Pinter Publishers. Lundvall B-Å and Borras S (1997) The Globalising Learning Economy: Implications for Innovation Policy. Luxembourg: European Communities. Lundvall B-Å, Intarakumnerd P and Vang J (2006) Asia’s innovation systems in transition – an introduction, in Asia’s innovation systems in transition, London: Elgar, in press. Maskell P and Malmberg A (1999) Localised learning and industrial competitiveness. Cambridge Journal of Economics 23: 167–86. Mathews J (2002) Dragon Multinational: A New Model for Global Growth, New York: Oxford University Press. Morgan K (2004) The exaggerated death of geography: learning, proximity and territorial innovation systems. Journal of Economic Geography 4 (1): 3–22. Narula R (2004) Understanding absorptive capacities in an ‘innovation systems’ context: consequences for economic and employment growth, Research Memoranda 004 Maastricht: MERIT Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. Narula R and Marin A (2005) Exploring the relationship between direct and indirect spillovers from FDI in Argentina, MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series 2005-024. Nelson R and Winter S (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. North D (1990) Institutions Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Norton OECD (2002) Foreign Direct Investment and Intellectual Capital Formation in Southeast Asia. DEV Centre WP 194. Paldam M (2000) Social Capital: One or Many? Definition and Measurement. Journal of Economic Surveys 14 (5): 629–53. Parthasarathy B (2004) India’s Silicon Valley or Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
Silicon Valley’s India? Socially Embedding the Computer Software Industry in Bangalore. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28(3): 664–85. Pietrobelli C and Rabellotti R (2004) Upgrading in Clusters and Value Chains in Latin America Boston MA: The MIT PRESS for the InterAmerican Development Bank. Piore M and Sabel C (1984) The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New York: Basic Books. Putnam RD (1993) Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. Romer P (1990) Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political Economy 98(5): 71–102. Sabel C (2005) Globalisation, New Public Services, Local Democracy: What’s the Connection? in Local Governance and the Drivers of Growth, Paris: OECD: 111–131. Saxenian AL (1994) Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. Cambridge: Harvard University Press USA. Saxenian AL (2002) Transnational Communities and the Evolution of Global Production Networks: Taiwan China and India. Industry and Innovation 9(3): 183–202. Schmitz H (2004) Local Upgrading in global chains: recent findings. Druid paper. Available at: www.druid.dk. Smarzynska B (2002) Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms, in Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages. World Bank Working Papers 2923. Staber U (1996) Accounting for variations in the performance of industrial districts: The case of Baden-Württemberg. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20: 299–316. Storper M (1997) The regional world. Territorial development in a global economy. New York and London: The Guilford Press. UNDP (2004) Unleashing entrepreneurship: Making business work for the poor. UNDP report. Vang J and Chaminade C (2006) Building RIS in Developing Countries: Policy Lessons from Bangalore, India. CIRCLE Electronic Working Paper n. 2006/04. Available at http://www. circle.lu.se. INNOVATION: management, policy & practice
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company case studies from Shanghai, China. The Professional Geographer 52(4): 624–635. Yeung, H, Lui, L and Dicken P (Forthcoming 2006) Transnational corporations and network effects of a local manufacturing cluster in mobile telecommunications equipment in China. World Development 34. Zahra SA and George G (2002) Absorptive capacity: A review reconceptualization and extension. Academy of Management Review 27(2):185–203.
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Edited by Gabriela Dutrénit and Mark Dodgson Metropolitan Autonomous University and UQ Business School Introduction co-authored by Jorge Katz A special issue of Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice ( Volume 7 Issue 2–3 April–August 2005) Contents, Abstracts, Editorials, Articles and Order Form at: www.innovation-enterprise.com/7.2/ ‘... the real challenge for policy and decision makers is how to progress from circumstantial activities to a “pro-active” technological strategy that would allow major innovation effort and technological generation activity to drive the development process.’ – Introduction Course co-ordinators are invited to contact the Publisher for an adoption copy. eContent Management Pty Ltd, PO Box 1027, Maleny QLD 4552, Australia Tel.: +61-7-5435-2900; Fax. +61-7-5435-2911;
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Copyright © eContent Management Pty Ltd. Innovation: management, policy & practice (2006) 8: 45–61.
Work globally, develop locally: Diaspora networks as entry point to knowledge-based development SUMMARY KEY WORDS diasporas of highly skilled; economic development; diaspora networks; search networks; serendipity
This article examines ways to increase the chances that migration of high-skill workers will benefit sending countries. It explores the formation of diaspora networks as search networks or bridge institutions linking global opportunities to the local capabilities of sending countries. It contributes to an emerging literature that sees the development of problem-solving skills and certain types of managerial culture as at least as crucial to economic development as such traditionally cited factors as clearly defined property rights or anti-inflationary monetary policies. Received 9 June 2005
Accepted 19 October 2005
CHARLES F. SABEL YEVGENY KUZNETSOV
Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law Columbia Law School New York, NY
Senior Economist World Bank Institute Washington, DC
CO-EVOLUTION OF DIASPORAS AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
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ctors in developing economies must have the capacity to acquire new knowledge – to learn new ways of doing things – if they are to compete in the world economy. Learning, in turn, supposes and contributes to the ability to search out and usefully recombine scattered information about production methods, markets and resources. Because development depends on learning and learning on searching, development almost Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
invariably depends on linking the domestic economy to the larger, foreign world, for even the strongest economies quickly rediscover (if they have ever forgotten) that they cannot generate all world-beating ideas in isolation. Historically, contact with the outside world was often established through skilled migrants and the ethnic or religious communities they founded in the host country. Examples include the contribution of the Huguenots in France; the Jews in Monterrey, Mexico; the Chinese in Indonesia,
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Malaysia and the Philippines; and the Indians in East Africa and later Great Britain. During much of the twentieth century, multinational firms facilitated knowledge transfers by establishing facilities – usually for the manufacture or assembly of mature products – in developing countries, often with the assistance of local elites. Viewed from this historical perspective, network diasporas are but the latest bridge institutions connecting developing economy insiders, with their risk-mitigating knowledge and connections, to outsiders in command of technical know-how and investment capital. At least for developing economies, the attraction of diaspora networks over immigrant communities and multinational firms is that networks promise to depoliticize the relation between domestic actors and the foreign actors from whom they learn, transforming a volatile, often irrational struggle for power into a mutually beneficial economic exchange. Learning is often connected to ugly frictions. Economically powerful ethnic minorities have traditionally been suspected of having greater loyalty to their ethnic community than to the host country and of being tempted to exploit the latter to benefit the former. Powerfully autonomous and often footloose, multinational firms are viewed as the agents, even the masters, of economic imperialism rather than partners in development. The actors in diaspora networks, in contrast, are native sons and daughters. Even if they are wealthy or connected to wealthy families or important multinationals, they seldom command the resources attributed to economically potent minorities (whose riches, though real enough, are often magnified by envy), and they are not manifestly at the command of the world’s largest companies. They are, at least potentially, a connection to the indispensable world of foreign knowledge that can be domesticated and then used to discipline the behavior of ethnic communities and multinationals. That the members of network diasporas are likely to be suspected in their host countries of putting personal gain or ethnic ties above managerial professionalism makes them, 46
from the point of view of the sending country, more pliant and more willing to cooperate on a truly equal footing. That diaspora networks seem to form spontaneously, as the result of both the shortcomings and the successes of the mesh of individual and national strategies for economic advancement, only completes the picture of the new institution as the market/manna solution to a crucial problem of coordinated learning too long fraught with political passions. The reality of network diasporas is far more complex and unruly than this juxtaposition suggests. Whether diasporas are seen as adjuncts to rather than adversaries of domestic elites depends on how the two groups have interacted historically. Whether, and in what way, diasporas connect domestic and world economies depends on the interaction of changes in the global production or supply chain patterns, changes in domestic growth opportunities, and changes in the economic activities and strategies of the diaspora members themselves. Diasporas are thus mirrors of national development, reflecting the migratory pushes of national crises and the pull of the global economy. Network diasporas are not a self-generating, context-free solution to the perennial problem of learning from abroad without being victimized by the foreign master; they co-evolve with the political and economic contexts within which they operate.
FACILITATING SERENDIPITY: INSTITUTIONALIZING NASCENT DIASPORA NETWORKS
In 1997 Ramón L. García, a Chilean applied geneticist and biotechnology entrepreneur with a PhD from Iowa State University, contacted Fundación Chile. Fundación is a private–public innovation organization that, among other missions, helps provide the technical infrastructure that allows Chilean agribusiness to develop domestically viable variants of crops typical of California’s Central Valley. García is the chief executive officer of InterLink Biotechnologies, a
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Princeton, New Jersey, company he co-founded in 1991. Interlink developed a way to identify novel chemical entities derived from microorganisms for use in new pharmaceuticals and enzyme additives for human food, animal feed, and biocontrol agents. It markets its technical expertise to other firms interested in transferring and licensing new biotechnologies. After jointly reviewing their portfolios of initiatives, Interlink and Fundación founded a new, co-owned company, Biogenetic S.A., to undertake the long-term research and development projects needed to transfer to Chile technologies key to the continuing competitiveness of its rapidly growing agribusiness sector. Without García’s deep knowledge of Chile, advanced U.S. education, exposure to U.S. managerial practice, and experience as an entrepreneur, the new company would have been inconceivable. Biogenetic has successfully developed a technology platform that uses biotechnology to improve grapes and stone fruits, two export crops that are very important to the Chilean economy. The company genetically modified grapes to make them resistant to diseases and was instrumental in developing a program for developing pine trees resistant to an important insect pest. It is developing the technology to introduce important quality traits in stone fruits. The fact that skilled expatriates can create enormous benefits for their countries of origin has come to attention in recent years through the conspicuous contributions that the large, highly skilled, and manifestly prosperous and wellorganized Chinese and Indian diasporas have made to their home countries. But García’s collaboration with Fundación Chile suggests that diasporas do not need to be large to have an impact: ten Ramón Garcías could transform entire sectors of the economy in relatively small countries, such as Chile or Armenia. Moreover, García’s collaboration with Fundación Chile suggests that even the sparsely populated, informal diaspora networks linking small home countries with their talent abroad are not without some Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
institutional resources and may prove capable of developing more. However, this is as far as the anecdote takes us. García’s collaboration with Fundación Chile was serendipitous. While the story tantalizes and inspires those who search for keys to economic development, it scarcely hints at how to proceed from the happy accidents of the Ramón Garcías in the emerging business diasporas of Chile and other countries to the robust and systematic diaspora involvement exemplified by China and India. Indeed, on closer inspection there seems to be a schism between the demonstrated success of mature diaspora networks in triggering knowledge-intensive activities in their home countries and the disappointing results in promoting diasporas’ engagement in development of home countries. This paper seeks to bridge this divide. It presents a compact framework for understanding the large and related transformations in labor and product markets and in industrial organizations that are reflected in and furthered by the growing role of diasporas of both relatively low-skill workers as well as highly educated professionals. It then analyzes what has worked and what has not in facilitating diaspora networks and extracts some tentative and preliminary policy recommendations, addressed primarily to leaders of business communities and public organizations anxious to learn from and scale up the Ramón García case. To illustrate this co-evolution of network diasporas with their environments and to identify potential obstacles, this introductory paper describes the development of the ‘mature’ diasporas of China, India, and Armenia which are related in more detail in the paper. All three are large, well organized, and centuries old. The first two have been enormously successful. The success of the Chinese diaspora grew out of – although it is no longer limited to – the traditional investment behavior of emigrant families that made their fortunes overseas. The success of the Indian diaspora is much more closely tied to recent changes in
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supply-chain organization and the pattern of linkage, as opposed to the investment-based investing these changes make possible. Although a decade ago its success seemed nearly certain, the Armenian diaspora has failed to contribute substantially to domestic development (at least relative to its potential). The political divisions between the diaspora and the post-Soviet political class in Armenia combined with the philanthropic generosity of the overseas Armenians thwarted development and buffered domestic actors from the costs of their actions. This experience suggests that the political context requires as much attention as the economic setting. Following this review, the paper looks at South Africa’s efforts to institutionalize relations with its diaspora. Examination of South Africa’s successes and failures suggests how policymakers can address the crucial problems of turning an emerging diaspora into a mature institution of economic development by bootstrapping (making a series of incremental steps, each suggested by the lessons learned in the preceding ones).
PERSPECTIVE ON THE LITERATURE The focus of this paper – interaction of expatriate talent with their countries of origin – has been treated at some length in the literature. In a broad brush, the literature on brain drain evolved in three quite distinct generations. The first generation of the literature is illustrated by the 1968 debate between Harry Johnson and Don Patinkin, in one of the first anthology of papers on the ‘brain drain’ (Adams 1968). Harry Johnson set forth ‘cosmopolitan liberal argument’ emphasizing individual welfare gains for the migrating talent while Don Patinkin stressed welfare losses for the country of origin. These welfare losses are particularly significant when the country looses certain ‘critical mass’ of skills with a risk of its intellectual community turning into ghetto. The differences in these positions notwithstanding, a common focus was on physical movement of people and the policy preoccupation was physical return of migrants to their home countries – 48
return migration (Bhagwati.& Partington 1976). By the 1980s the debate about brain drain had dissipated and did not receive attention again until the 1990s. The sharp increase in skilled emigration from developing countries renewed the brain drain debate (that flow increased due to the increase of highly skilled immigrants to US, Canada and Western Europe). The focus of the second generation of literature are the networks of professionals organized in diasporas and other forms of brain circulation networks (Scientific diasporas 2003; Saxenian 2000; Brown 2003; Kapur 2004). Partly because the physical return of expatriate professionals has proved plainly unrealistic, a new focus is how to leverage the expertise and capital of expatriate professionals without physically returning them to their country of origin. This literature is insightful in outlining a potential of expatriate professionals as a source of capital and knowledge, yet skilled diasporas in this literature tend to fall as manna from heaven. Diasporas and the brain circulation network appear to be a newly found magic solution allowing leveraging expatriates abroad for the benefit of countries of origin. The literature recognizes, of course, that the reality is more complex and that much more understanding is needed to uncover intricacies of the evolution of diaspora networks and their endogenous dynamics. Yet, since little systematic information on the internal diversity of diasporas is usually available, this subject does not receive a proper examination. This paper seeks to summarize and contribute to a third generation of the literature which, while barely emerging, is nonetheless quite promising (Ellerman 2004; Saxenian 2005). Co-evolution of home country institutions and diasporas (as a rule, non-linear) is a central thrust of this emerging approach. Such a co-evolution can be summarized in four themes. First theme is the emphasis on both heterogeneity of a country’s talent abroad and its mode of interaction with the home countries. We focus on a diversity of different loosely organized dias-
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pora networks (self-organized groups of expatriates) rather than a traditional notion of diaspora as a relatively homogeneous whole bringing together the majority of expatriates living outside home countries. The critical importance of institutions in the home country is a second central theme. However large and entrepreneurial are networks of diaspora professionals, one needs institutions at home which are interested in, and capable of, joint projects with expatriates abroad. Foundation Chile is one such example. But institutions at home are also heterogeneous: some are better and more capable than others. Diaspora networks are conceptualized as search networks linking better performing segments of home country institutions with forward looking segments of diaspora and have a potential to generate a virtuous cycle which develops both home country institutions and diaspora networks abroad. The search network theme is a third major theme of the paper. Finally, a non-linearity of home country– diaspora interaction is a most promising hypothesis from a policy perspective. The non-linearity means that small interventions can make both a big difference (positive feedback mechanism) and a slow and flat learning curve, a sense of being ‘stuck’ (negative feedback mechanism). The Ramon Garcia story and discussion on India (under ‘Mature diasporas’, below) provide an example of a positive feedback mechanism while the discussion on Armenia (under ‘Mature diasporas’) is an example of a negative feedback mechanism.
DIASPORA NETWORKS AS SEARCH NETWORKS
The global circulation of high-skill and low-skill labor from poor economies to rich and back is opening new possibilities for economic development. The changes are most noticeable in the behavior of the highest skilled workers. The brain-drain pattern of migration long drew many of the most promising students from poor countries to lucrative and challenging careers in develVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
oped countries. Today this pattern shows signs of turning into a back and forth movement, or diaspora network, in which talented students still go abroad to continue their studies and work in the developed economies but then use their own global networks, and especially those of their diasporas, to help build new establishments in their home countries. There are also signs that emigrants with fewer skills, forced by poverty to go abroad but long confined to dead-end jobs in developed economies, are also finding new career possibilities. Increasingly, the entry-level jobs they take in factory production or the health care sector in host countries demand and teach problem-solving skills that blur the line between management and labor. Whether these new skills can be redeployed back home is an open question. But the changing nature of migrants’ work suggests the possibility that these ‘birds of passage’, traditionally in transit between a native land that cannot support them and a rich country that remains alien, may one day form distinctive, medium-skill diaspora networks that complement the diasporas of managers and entrepreneurs. Behind these developments is the long-term, accelerating decentralization of decision-making responsibility from end-producers in the public and private sectors to their suppliers, and the decentralization within public and private establishments from managers to front-line work teams. To take a frequently cited example, recognizing that they cannot possibly remain abreast of all the key technologies that make a car, automakers have largely divested themselves of their component-producing capacity. They codesign virtually every subassembly of the vehicle with independent suppliers. Facing analogous limits to their own managerial capacities, public administrations in developed countries routinely outsource the provision of new services to not-forprofit organizations and certain routine functions, such as servicing complaints, to for-profit call centers. This decentralization of production often allows firms to relocate activity in developing
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countries, creating many of the investment opportunities within reorganizing supply chains that members of the high-skill diaspora networks seize. The managerial limits that propel decentralization of production to suppliers also compel a shift from hierarchy to teamwork in end-producers and suppliers alike. As product lifecycles shorten from years to months (in consumer electronics, cell phones, and computers, for instance) and quality expectations rise, it is impossible to shift from one production set-up to another – and to solve the inevitable start-up problems each changeover brings – without the active cooperation of the workers who will be doing the assembly. Organized as production and problem-solving teams, front-line workers are routinely asked to criticize and suggest improvements in the set-up of their workplaces, the flow of production, and the provision of support services. They are asked to share in the quintessentially managerial task of co-designing the organization within which they are working. New programs in problem solving and teamwork help equip them for this task. This entry-level exposure to problem solving and the new forms of training with which it is associated create a bridge between the traditional world of the immigrant worker and the knowledge economy. In doing so, they may open the way to the formation of a medium-skill diaspora. The decentralization of production to suppliers, as well as the shift from hierarchy to teamwork by end-producers and suppliers, can be viewed as part of a profound change in the principles of organizational design. In traditional organizations – the kind found in mass-production factories and large public bureaucracies – complex operations are accomplished by decomposing them into tasks sufficiently limited to be manageable by actors with ‘bounded rationality’. Hierarchy is the result. But as a rapidly changing world has made decomposition of tasks too time consuming and costly to be practicable, organizations have stumbled on an alternative solution. Instead of responding to bounded rationality by 50
simplifying the problems actors face, organizations create the infrastructure that allows actors charged with a task to find other actors – outside the organization as well as within – who are already solving (part of ) the problem. Put another way, organizations shift from hierarchies in which subordinates execute their superiors’ plans to search networks in which collaborators, through the very process of identifying one another, come to define the tasks they will jointly accomplish. In a world of search networks, changes in labor markets (who works with whom) can easily lead to changes in product markets (what businesses make) and even industrial organization (how firms are structured internally and connected to one another). From this point of view, modern diasporas networks, as the García–Fundación Chile anecdote suggests, are just an especially conspicuous (because publicly visible) variant of the search networks under rapid construction in firms worldwide. The shift from brain drain to brain circulation marks the shift from a world in which the function of (long-range) labor markets was to fill jobs with relatively fixed requirements to a world in which filling a job changes not only the definition of what needs to be done but also the setting in which future needs are defined. The emergence of diasporas as a type of search network – a network that lets members find and collaborate with those who already know what they need to learn – poses new challenges for the articulation of coordinated training and economic development strategies within individual sending and receiving countries and for increased coordination between senders and receivers as distinct but more and more intricately connected groups. Individual sending countries will presumably want to encourage the formation of diaspora networks by helping high-skill emigrants stay in touch with one another and the home country and by creating individual and corporate incentives for their re-engagement with the domestic economy. A key aspect of increasing the attractiveness of the domestic economy to potential
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investors will be introducing problem-solving skills in the public school curriculum and in continuing education programs, in order to create a domestic workforce with the skills required by the new wave of decentralizing firms. Broad provision of these skills will also increase the chances that young job seekers who do not find work at home will be able to take advantage of new career possibilities afforded by entry-level jobs abroad. Receiving countries have reasons of their own to encourage diaspora networks. Obstructing mobility in an epoch of decentralization imposes stay-or-go choices on energetic, ambitious immigrant elite, potentially spurring the return en masse of high-skill expatriates. Promoting the circulation of high-skill labor from home country to adopted home and back reduces this risk and is thus almost surely in the long-term economic interest of the receiving countries. With their aging populations and low birth rates, traditional receiving countries will also likely find it useful to recruit immigrants for low-level jobs in the (public) service sector and manufacturing. But the blurring of managerial and executive tasks means that foreign entry-level workers – even those familiar with the new problem-solving – will need complementary training in ‘soft’ social skills particular to the host country if they are to use their abilities to good effect. Ideally, of course, sending and receiving countries will develop these new, complementary programs in concert. The content of the problem-solving training in developing countries should profit from the extensive experience that global firms and host country training systems have already accumulated. Host countries’ ‘softskill’ acculturation programs will benefit from ongoing consultation with sending countries about the best ways to address cultural frictions that arise. By the same token, both sending and receiving countries can gain from meshing their efforts to support diaspora networks, and there is likely to be strong pressure from the high-skill members of such networks for them to do so. Both have interests in jointly regulating the workVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
ing conditions and environmental responsibilities of decentralizing supply chains in order to prevent protectionist reactions to offshore ventures by rich countries and local protests against multinational imperialism in poorer ones. Political realities, of course, will often obstruct the realization of potential gains. But an appreciation of the possibilities will help improve outcomes even when ideal solutions are beyond reach.
TALE OF TWO MIGRATION STREAMS Global labor migration today can be divided into high-skill and low-skill streams. The superficial differences between the two conceal important common sources, features and even consequences. The high-skill stream is made up of diaspora networks. In the past decade, expatriates have come to play a critical and highly visible role in accelerating technology exchange and foreign direct investment in China, India, Israel, and the United States. Some expatriates became pioneer investors before the widespread decentralization of supply chains and internal decentralization of authority assured major capital markets that these developing economies had rosy futures. Some of these pioneers had, and continue to have, nonfinancial motives for early-stage participation. Others had, and have, means of mitigating risk unavailable to other investors by virtue of their knowledge of language, culture, institutions and counterparts. The contribution of US-based Indian managers to a spectacular surge in information technology and related services in India is a paradigmatic win–win situation, in which migration of highly skilled professionals benefits both the sending and receiving country. Other countries may be nearing the threshold of repeating the Indian or Chinese experience, in that they have both successful expatriate communities and high-risk economies that scare off mainstream investors but provide the opportunities from which diaspora networks grow. Still other economies, such as those in Latin American and the European Union accession countries, are struggling to move to more knowledge-inten-
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sive development, despite significant foreign direct investment in recent decades. Their hope is that diaspora networks can overcome obstacles to deeper integration by serving as an entry point into new markets. Discovered only recently, diaspora networks mesh so well with the architecture of the modern knowledge society that they are coming to be seen as one of its natural building blocks. Workers in the low-skill migration stream have no advanced degrees; they may not be able to show prospective employers any school-leaving certificate or indeed any official documentation at all. They are not entrepreneurs, at least not founders of high-tech firms. They often live in poor, high-crime neighborhoods, and their children are frequently at home neither in their parents’ culture nor in their country of residence. Where the diaspora networks seem to have emerged from nowhere to become part of a new cosmopolitan elite, low-skill immigrants are frequently depicted as unchanging, indeed determined not to change, out of loyalty to the pre-modern cultures from which they come. Official and public reaction to the two migratory streams underscores these differences: highskill talent is welcomed in virtually every country, while most low-skill immigrants are illegal. Highskill professionals provide tangible benefits to receiving country in terms of new business creation and human capital; unskilled immigrants are perceived as draining the budget for social expenditures and threatening solidarity. Despite the apparent differences between the two streams, there are common features that do not figure in public discussion. First, the acquisition and development of skills is crucial to both streams. This is obvious in the case of the Indian with a PhD who emigrates to the United States, but it is also true of the secondary school graduate from Mali who emigrates to take a cleaning job in a nursing home in France. Given the paucity of its current developmental possibilities, Mali is likely to have a comparative advantage in the production of such human capital. And as the health system crisis revealed by the European heat 52
wave in the summer of 2003 showed, the need for the kinds of skills such workers offer is high in advanced countries. Put another way, many ‘lowskill’ migrants are low skilled only in comparison to certified professionals. They are far from unskilled compared with the bulk of the population in their country of origin, and they have skills that are in demand in the host country. Managerial skills are a case in point. After working for several years in Japan, Luis Miyashiro, a Peruvian national, came to Lima and founded Norkys, a chain of chicken restaurants. The chain, the first of its kind in an Andean country, combined Western standards of cleanliness and efficiency with the familiar corner foodstand concept common in Latin America. The idea for, and expertise needed to manage, the chain were acquired in Japan. Second, both migratory streams are being redirected and transformed by profound and pervasive economic restructuring that creates important opportunities and entry points. For skilled workers, the global restructuring of supply chains is turning brain drain into brain circulation, creating or strengthening network diasporas in the process. In the case of the unskilled and illegal, the restructuring of the public administration that provides key social services, together with the restructuring of shop-floor work, is beginning to create career opportunities where earlier generations in similar positions faced dead ends. This is not to romanticize entry-level work in the new economy. But there is at least anecdotal evidence that even hamburger-flipping jobs now often lead somewhere and that public-sector restructuring – just now coming to public notice – will accelerate this tendency. Third, in both migration streams, social networks emerge as naturally occurring or spontaneous solutions to complex coordination problems: like manna, they fall from the sky, allowing emigrants to match themselves to jobs or entrepreneurial possibilities. In connecting emigrants to the world, these networks create new possibilities for policymakers to learn, from and with key
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social actors, how to redirect institutions and incentives to meet emerging needs. Much of labor market theory in the late twentieth century focused on industrial jobs. It was common, perhaps standard, to treat migration between countries as concerning low-skilled workers and to treat skill acquisition as occurring through learning on the job within a large, hierarchically organized corporation. Given the organization of production in these firms, most learning was plant or firm specific. It followed from the decomposition of large projects, such as design and production of a car, into small, linked tasks, that the machines needed for any step would be highly specialized and tightly matched in specifications to the machine that produced its input and the machine that used its output. Machines designed to be used only with other machines in such a sequence are called asset specific; they have no value for any other use. By the same logic, the skills needed to operate each machine consisted of the largely tacit knowledge of the peculiarities of each machine in relation to upstream and downstream operations. (The knowledge was almost sure to be largely tacit, because the machines were effectively unique; formalization, at least in the then current view, was the statement of the general features of some process or situation.) Workers with little or no formal education learned these skills by progressing from machine to machine, acquiring the highly specialized knowledge they needed from more experienced colleagues, not from papers. These job sequences are called job ladders. It was a sign of the importance of tacit knowledge in these job ladders and the economy as a whole that returns to formal education were low. For many workers in the United States, for instance, there was little penalty, in terms of lifetime earnings, for quitting high school or skipping college, because in many cases the skills needed for highpaying jobs could be acquired by an industrial apprenticeship in a factory or firm. In this world view, migration and skill acquisition were viewed as distinct phenomena. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
Migrants were presumed, correctly, to be seeking higher incomes and vastly increased possibilities for savings, not new skills, when they went abroad. Their goal was to remit as much as possible to their families at home while working in the receiving country and to return as soon as possible, with as much wealth as possible, to their home countries. They were not interested in investing in skill acquisition, because they were not planning to stay abroad long enough to reap the returns to their investment. Unattractive, lowskill jobs were acceptable, because they paid wages that were extraordinarily high by home country standards. Given these goals, these migrants were birds of passage, living in a no man’s land between their home and temporary countries, often circulating back and forth between the two, as economic and family circumstances dictated. The guest workers brought to Western European factories in the 1960s and 1970s fit this pattern perfectly, but they had many forebears from the late nineteenth century on. A central problem for these birds of passage was, and remains, the identification of plentiful, geographically concentrated supplies of low-skill jobs over long distances. The jobs had to be plentiful and close together because, being low skilled and thus undifferentiated, there could be no guarantee that any particular job would prove stable. The potential instability of any one job was compensated for by the availability of others, sufficiently close to each other, that changing jobs did not require changing homes. Finding such jobs required scanning many possible destinations to determine whether jobs were available there for unskilled immigrants. An efficient way to scan was to rely on a network of relatives, friends and acquaintances from one’s home village, who were looking for similar jobs themselves. Members or nodes in this network know little about each other – they have rarely worked or done business together – but they know all that migrants need to know, for the purposes of joint search, about labor market conditions. Links of this kind – rich in information about a
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particular, thin slice of the world; poor in information about the character and abilities of the network members – are called weak ties. The migration flows that result from a network of weak ties directing migrants from a given origin to follow the news of plentiful, low-skill jobs to a common destination is a migration chain. A key consequence of the shift to networked, organization-based search networks rather than hierarchy is to ‘despecify’ machines and skills – to make both more general purpose. Assume that a firm knows in advance that it cannot be sure what products it will be making two years hence or how any of those products will be designed. In this case, it sacrifices some of the efficiency that comes with using a machine that can do only one thing and buys general purpose machines that can easily be reprogrammed to do many different operations. That change means learning to shift from operation to operation with a given, large domain and, more broadly, learning to learn and master skills, each based on substantial bodies of formal knowledge. There is less and less wholly unskilled work, and even the relatively unskilled work is no longer plant specific (think of the general team-working skills needed by workers in just-in-time factories). A crude but revealing measure of this shift is the rapidly increasing returns to formal education and the corresponding increase in the gap between the lifetime wages of unskilled and skilled workers. Potential migrants notice this shift. Those with good educational prospects at home go abroad to take advantage of still better opportunities, finding jobs that enable them to learn more than they could at home. Those with fewer opportunities at home start to think about improving their prospects by going abroad, fearing that their long-term employability depends on doing so. Instead of looking for destinations with plentiful unskilled jobs, migrants begin to look for destinations that offer many possibilities for skill acquisition, at work or school. As job ladders are transformed into more open, inter-firm, and formally skilled labor markets, and weak ties among 54
migrants begin to communicate information about learning possibilities, migration chains become open mobility networks – means for discovering where to go to learn how to prosper in the reorganizing economy. High-skill diasporas are a conspicuous example of such networks. The proliferation of professional associations of diaspora members is evidence of this transition from thin to thick search networks. Associations such as the association of doctors of Armenian origin in the United States or the Association of Engineers from Latin America are thick networks that help members identify opportunities for professional advancement. Mentoring is a central feature of these associations. Perhaps the most successful organization of this kind, the Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), was started in 1992 as a conduit for experienced Indians to mentor others and provide a broad forum for networking and learning for its members. TiE is an institutionalized search network that helps its members move up their migration chains. This change now extends beyond migrants with tertiary degrees. Hometown associations of migrants of Mexican origin (of which there are more than 70 in the United States) were started in the 1950s with the primary objective of defending the rights of (often illegal) labor migrants from Mexico, the vast majority of them unskilled. Hometown associations used to be paragons of institutionalized but thin search networks that identified job opportunities and provided mutual help (including practical ways to live and work as an illegal immigrant). Migrants from Zacatecas (a poor state in the center-north of Mexico), for instance, have a hometown association in almost every major US city. With time, and as many migrants became legal and progressed in their migration chains from hamburger-flippers to supervisors of hamburgerflippers, two things have started to happen. First, an acute shortage of native-speaking supervisors and shop-floor managers has emerged. Migrants from Mexico do not speak fluent English. For this reason alone, they prefer to work for Mexi-
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can managers. So significant is the shortage of Spanish-speaking immigrants in certain managerial positions that identifying and training such managers is now a central task of the Association of Latin American Professionals. Open-ended migrants’ organizations, such as Mexico’s hometown associations, have contributed to this transformation by also introducing mentoring. For example, they direct their members to appropriate training programs and other job advancement opportunities. What started as a paragon of a thin search network of low-skilled migrants is showing signs of transformation to thick search networks to move members along their migration chain (Torres 2004). Second, as migrants progress along their migration chain and acquire the self-confidence that comes with personal and professional success, they start thinking about giving to and helping not just their families but their home communities. Hometown associations from Zacatecas, in collaboration with the state government of Zacatecas, designed and cofinanced a highly successful 3 × 1 program of investment in community infrastructure (secondary roads, schools, hospitals) in their home communities (Torres 2004). The program is called 3 × 1 because for every peso the hometown associations put in, state and federal governments each contribute another peso. Although the vast majority of members of hometown associations is not wealthy, the binding constraint for this program of collective remittances has always been contributions from the Mexico government, not the donations of the migrants. Financial transfers are not the most important aspect of collective remittance; governance and monitoring are. Community infrastructure projects need to be identified, financed and managed through a network of very diverse stakeholders – municipal government, users of the infrastructure, migrants, and others – that (used to) have little trust in one another. As migrants are contributing their own money, they are highly motivated to make the project succeed, avoiding the Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
decay that often characterizes public works projects. To make these projects work, migrants need to monitor them, both from abroad and through frequent visits to their home towns. The diaspora network in this example is a transnational search network: diaspora members work with stakeholders at home to design, co-finance, and govern projects to benefit their communities at home. Studying diaspora networks helps uncover the partial solutions that are working. It helps formalize the networks, rendering them more effective as incubators for new programs and as governance structures for new projects. It also reveals potential win–win dynamics benefiting both sending and receiving countries. Such a potential has already been realized in case of mature diaspora networks as illustrated by China and India.
MATURE DIASPORAS: CHINA AND INDIA VERSUS ARMENIA The diasporas of China and India have had a highly beneficial impact on their home countries. In contrast, the wealthy Armenian diaspora has failed to help move the country up global value chains.
China The story of the post-War Chinese diaspora is one of geographic mobility and economic diversification: the construction of a ‘bamboo network’ linking Hong Kong (China), Taiwan (China), Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines to one another and to China through meshed webs of family firms operating first in traditional trading and manufacturing, then in high tech and finance. For many refugees, the years following the Communist victory in 1949 were a time of testing, relieved – some would say redeemed – by rags to riches stories. In the conventional telling, frugal, canny traders, often with nothing but the clothes on their back, worked their way up from factory floor to great wealth. Once they laid the foundations of their enterpris-
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es in one host country, they diversified and expanded geographically. Just as the House of Rothschild’s pater familias sent his sons from Frankfurt to Paris, London and Naples, the overseas Chinese internationalized their businesses, delegating family members to set up firms in other promising locations within what was becoming, from their vantage point, Greater China. The new firms drew on the founder’s capital and his rich social connections. But as the opportunities suggested by these connections were only accidentally connected to the founder’s original business interests, internationalization typically went hand in hand with diversification across areas of business activity. In time the family firms grew into dynasties, operating a myriad of small and medium-size firms in many sectors and countries, all under the direct but secretive control of the founding family. In a vast geographic zone with underdeveloped financial markets and fragile legal institutions, the family and ethnic loyalties of the overseas Chinese – backed by the credible threat to blacklist anyone who violated the community norms of fair dealing – reduced the cost to this group of organizing complex business transaction. The greater the reach of the bamboo network, the greater, in principle, the competitive advantage. Soon the overseas Chinese held key positions in real estate development, component manufacturing and construction – sectors that put a premium on the ability to combine trading and productive skills. At the same time, Taiwan (China) was developing a distinctive style of business organization that fused elements of the traditional small Chinese firm and the Silicon Valley start-up. With the start of Deng Xiaping’s Open Door policy in 1978, China turned away from isolation and autarky and welcomed successful overseas Chinese as investors. The influx from Taiwan (China) and Hong Kong (China) was particularly great because of proximity and historical ties. Multinational firms flocked to the mainland, partly to decentralize existing operations to a lowcost location, partly to participate in the widely 56
anticipated growth of a huge market, and partly because partnering with key members of the Chinese diaspora was often regarded as indispensable to navigating an opaque political environment. Today, traditional lines of business are increasingly being abandoned in favor of the most modern sectors of the economy. Having helped transform China, the Chinese diaspora is now being transformed by the developments it encouraged.
India The contribution of the Chinese network diaspora to Chinese development started and was long sustained by investments in manufacturing. In contrast, the contribution of the Indian diaspora to domestic development began by linking domestic and foreign firms in the service sector. The Chinese experience shows that certain traditional forms of risk-mitigating investment behavior are by no means limited to traditional industries. The Indian experience shows that new models of business organization emerging in the continuing reorganization of supply chains can give rise to new patterns of development, in which economic learning begins through service provision, rather than industrial activity, and in which the key investments are in education and training, rather than equipment and plant. The Indian software industry grew 40 percent a year in the 1990s. Revenues reached $10.2 billion in 2002, $7.7 billion of them from exports. During the same period, employment grew from 56,000 to 360,000, absorbing most of the 75,000 new information technology graduates India produces every year. The number of firms more than quadrupled, from 700 to more than 2800, and the largest firms, such as Wipro and Infosys, are executing increasingly complex and valuable projects. India has demonstrated that success in low-level business services outsourcing can be a building block for higher valueadded services. The emergence of the Indian software industry was in some ways a fortunate accident that
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almost surely cannot be reproduced by other countries. But it was an accident waiting to happen, dependent on structural conditions that can indeed by influenced by policy. The Indian government’s emphasis on higher education, especially scientific education, created a surplus of well-trained scientists, engineers, and technicians just when the Internet and telecom booms and the Y2K problem produced a massive need for these professionals in the West. Still more providentially, excess US demand for programmers developed just when a critical number of Indian expatriates, who had emigrated to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, had become CEOs and senior executives at American technology companies. These executives played a critical role in giving their companies the confidence to outsource work to India. They were also patient sponsors as Indian firms gradually learned how to meet US quality and delivery requirements. Even with these propitious coincidences, however, Western firms could not have outsourced work extensively to India had the Indian government – unaware that software firms could become major employers and producers of tradable goods – not exempted the industry’s largely white-collar workforce from much of the labor regulation that hampers India’s traditional manufacturing. Even India’s much criticized isolationist policy toward the computer industry proved fortuitous: by the early 1990s, when regulations were relaxed, isolation had weaned an entire generation of programmers from mainframes and forced them to master emerging client server and personal computer standards. No other country or industry should expect to duplicate India’s software luck. But India’s experience demonstrates that outsourced business services can make a primary contribution to economic development in the twenty-first century and that diaspora networks can play a crucial role in establishing long-range collaboration in the supply chain. Business service-based growth eases the burden on developing countries in at least two important ways. First, unlike manufacturing, Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
business services do not require (much) advanced infrastructure or large capital investments. The minimal requirements are educational – Englishspeaking workers with various technical proficiencies. Most developing countries have or can be expected to develop such human resources. Second, as a new industry in developing countries, business services face neither entrenched domestic competitors (with, perhaps, privileged access to government officials who set the rules of competition) nor trade unions (allied, perhaps, with ministries of labor). Traditional forms of regulation, however legitimate in the historical context in which they arose, are thus unlikely to burden the development of business relations in a novel and largely uncharted situation. The emergence of the high-skill diaspora also reduces the burden on the developing country. The success of the diaspora equips its members with high-level, internationally current managerial skills of a kind that would, at best, be available to tiny elites at home. The apprenticeship that leads to the acquisition of such skills is long, even in the fast-paced sectors of the world economy: the average CEO of a major US corporation took office at age 48 (Pandey et al. 2004). Purely managerial training, moreover, is complemented by a broader political education which makes the successful members of the diaspora well suited to bridging the differences between home and host cultures. First-generation immigrants typically try to remain inconspicuous in their host countries. They know that their ethnicity can be a disadvantage: at best merely excluding them from the informal associations through which natives mentor their successors; at worst exposing them to outright discrimination. Reticence born of such concerns is noticeable in the Indian American community. Individuals with the ambition and prospects of becoming CEO of a publicly traded company must face and overcome such obstacles. Their success makes them symbols and spokespersons of their community in the host country, and host-country recognition gives new weight to their opinions at home.
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Despite their different starting positions, the relationship of the Chinese and Indian diasporas to home country development seems to be converging. Recent surveys of their disposition to invest in the home country, to discuss possible reforms and business opportunities with national officials, and to consider returning permanently themselves, do not suggest that the Chinese diaspora is more disposed to investment while the Indian diaspora focuses on relations among firms. Whether or not initial differences are being effaced by continuing development, the two diasporas continue to be alike in that both are manna solutions, win–win outcomes that fell from the sky.
ARMENIA When home-country elites see development as at least as great a threat as an opportunity, they may hesitate to cooperate with, let alone systematically enlarge, the role of a capable diaspora in the domestic economy. The case of Armenia illustrates the politics of the diaspora and how, perhaps, to mitigate them. At the beginning of the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia seemed well positioned for transition to a developed, market economy. It was the most educated and most industrial of the Soviet republics. It was considered the Silicon Valley of the Soviet Union, with a major concentration of high-tech industries and developed infrastructure and a workforce known for its tenacity and ability. In addition, Armenia (with about 3.5 million inhabitants in 1990) expected to be supported by its diaspora, which included more than 1 million Armenians living in the United States and at least 1 million living in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. This diaspora is successful both economically and professionally; it is also well organized politically and socially. Another 1.5 million Russian Armenians, traditionally quite influential in the Kremlin, could be counted on as well. The territorial conflict in Karabakh mobilized Armenians worldwide, strengthening ethnic identity and advancing national consolidation. While Armenia also 58
had serious economic disadvantages – its landlocked location, the impact of the 1988 earthquake, and loss of markets in the Soviet Union – on balance the country had a great potential for development. In the event, despite – indeed partly because of – its diaspora, Armenia was unable to realize its potential for rapid growth. The chief obstacle to development was a domestic elite composed – like the elite of many contemporary stalled states – of (communist) bureaucrats, security service officers, and managers of large state-owned enterprises. This elite did, and does, push aggressively for economic liberalization and privatization but in a way that allows its own members (especially enterprise managers) to capture the major benefits of reforms. While such elites, in Armenia and elsewhere, welcome economic and political support from the diaspora, they do not want to see diaspora activists and investors perturb their own privileged position at home. They treat the diaspora primarily as a potential political and economic competitor. The upshot is that the Armenian government has been mostly interested in receiving humanitarian aid and long-term unrestricted loans – sources of funding they can control much more easily than direct investments. And because state officials benefit so much from imports, which remain the most lucrative business, many oppose an influx of investments that could replace them with domestic production. The hostility of insiders has thwarted most of the diaspora’s attempts to invest. Compounding the problem, major diaspora organizations have never systematically tried to protect their members from the elite’s abuse. The diaspora tends to limit its public criticism out of concern for the government’s reputation. It has not attempted to evaluate rigorously the results of the massive assistance it has provided in the past decade. For this diaspora, like others in similar situations, the act of giving seems more important than the actual effect. While the regime in Yerevan has been heavily dependent on the dias-
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pora’s support, the diaspora did not use this reliance to secure a more active role in Armenia’s development process. Just the opposite: the diaspora gave unconditional financial and political support to a regime that has been blocking the diaspora’s attempts to expand productive investments. The diaspora’s support relieves pressure on the domestic elite, thereby undermining demand for further reforms, especially for improvements in the business environment. The ruling elite gets additional resources for survival that provide a breathing space for delaying necessary reforms despite extreme poverty and emigration of the most skilled. The principal lesson of the Armenian experience is that absent a deep knowledge of the depth and direction of domestic reform, massive assistance by the diaspora is not sustainable unless complemented by an active business support and investment program. By itself, assistance fuels emigration and the concentration of economic power and delays resolution of the most important challenges of development. This type of support is manna gone sour, even turned poisonous.
EXPERIENCE OF AN EMERGING DIASPORA: CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA Skilled South Africans began emigrating in large numbers before the end of apartheid and the turn to democracy in 1994. The data do not permit an accurate estimate of the skills lost, as the South African Department of Home Affairs and Statistics takes into account only emigrants who report themselves as such; the actual number of emigrants could be as much as three times the official figures. Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that skilled workers continue to leave South Africa. Fully two-thirds of workers with the potential to emigrate have considered doing so, and the highly skilled – of all races – are most likely to be drawn abroad (Marks 2004). A recent World Bank survey of US-based expatriate alumni of the University of Natal confirms that the professional diaspora of South Africa resembles the mature diasporas in being Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
highly educated (73 percent have graduate degrees or professional certificates); autonomous (35 percent are independent professionals or small business owners); and in intimate contact with South Africa (the majority go home every year or two, 22 percent have ongoing business contact with South Africa, and 20 percent maintain contact through academic exchanges and relationships) (Marks 2004). The survey respondents have substantial power and influence in the United States, with one-third reporting that they have considerable influence over the investment decisions of their organizations. Fully 96 percent of respondents feel that as South African expatriates they have a distinct advantage doing business in South Africa; most cite ongoing personal relationships and personal knowledge of the country as the reason for this. Half of all respondents are involved in professional and business networks, and half of these networks have established contact with or had operations in South Africa. These ties notwithstanding, only 15 percent of respondents see any probability of doing business in South Africa within the next two years – a very low figure compared with those of other diaspora communities (55 percent of the Armenian diaspora, 82 percent of the Cuban.) More than 65 percent of respondents see little or no probability of investing or doing business in South Africa. These results confirm that the South African diaspora is indeed emerging, not mature. As South Africa has struggled to integrate itself into the world economy, while struggling with the AIDS/HIV pandemic, crime and sharp fluctuations in the rand/dollar exchange rate, enhancing relations with the diaspora has become a salient concern. To that end, South Africa has initiated two diaspora networks, one encouraging direct collaboration and other transactions among members, the other encouraging the formation of mentoring relations between members already active in international markets and others aiming to become active. Together these networks suggest the range of activities that public–private partnerships of different sorts can use to explore
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the possibilities for directing diasporas in the direction of manna solutions. The transactions-oriented South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) was established in 1998 by the University of Cape Town’s Science and Technology Policy Research Center and a leading French agency for scientific cooperation, the Institute of Research for Development (IRD). SANSA aims to promote collaboration between highly skilled expatriate scientists and technologists and their counterparts in South Africa. The target group is alumni of all major South African universities and technical institutes. It describes SASA’s objectives and explains how to network with other members through electronic bulletin boards, discussion groups and job postings. As of March 2002, SANSA had 2259 members in more than 60 different countries, 58 percent of whom were South African citizens. In October 2000 the National Research Foundation (NRF), part of South Africa’s National Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, took over responsibility for SANSA. After some initial fumbling, the NRF is managing, with some difficulty, to stabilize the network. SANSA’s strength (the ability to facilitate transactions by enabling partners to find one another directly) is connected with a serious limitation: the inability to track the outcome of exchanges and communications between network members. Because of the way the network is structured, there are no data on the successes and failures of the network, and those who operate it cannot learn from the successes and failures of the transactions they help generate. The second, mentoring network, the South African Diaspora Network (SADN), was developed by the University of Cape Town’s Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, through assistance from the World Bank Development Marketplace. Founded in 2001, this network focuses on developing knowledge and entrepreneurial connections between local South African firms and well-connected individuals in the United Kingdom. Drawing on expatriate organizations such as 60
university alumni associations and the South African Business Club, an organization with members in the United Kingdom and United States, SADN aims to facilitate continuing collaboration between respected and influential exSouth African business people in key overseas markets and young, high-potential South Africanbased start-up ventures. Local clients were recruited through extensive media coverage in South Africa. More than 60 South African companies applied to be part of the project, some of which were selected to participate. About 40 overseas members (most of them well-connected ex-South Africans living in Greater London) were recruited through presentations held at the South African Business Club in London and a meeting of the London paper of the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business Alumni Association. So far, the mentoring model of the network has resulted in some promising connections between growing firms and capable expatriates. But it is clear that the model will take time to yield results and that the network will have to develop the equivalent of a strategic plan to increase the number and improve the quality of the connections it encourages. A network that facilitates direct contacts between members cannot be (nearly) self-organizing. Determining which tools and additional infrastructure can make mentoring and transactional networks more effective is a major problem confronting policymakers aiming to make emerging diaspora networks mature as quickly as possible.
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH The goal, at once humble and ambitious, is to scale up the informal diaspora networks emerging in many countries and render them more accessible to policy interventions. It is ambitiously optimistic because emerging migration ladders open an opportunity of a win–win situation – an evolving virtuous cycle of co-development of migrant human capital and home country institutions. It is humble, however, in recognizing intricacies of policy solutions to
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make it happen. As a previous section showed, creation of a robust diaspora network as a search network requires substantial amount of time, patience and institutional capabilities. Above all, good expatriate networks – as any search networks – tend to generate opportunities and projects but someone else has to act on those opportunities and finance the projects. Capabilities of government and private sector stakeholders remain the key: Diaspora networks are no panacea. The specific experiences reported here reveal something about starting conditions, possibilities, and happy and unhappy endings. But they say little about steering the process of diaspora networking in fruitful directions. One lesson is to be more attentive to the effects, good and bad, of network building than the network builders discussed here have been. Creating databases on who speaks to and works with whom is important. Such information needs to be complemented by careful investigation of why some contacts work and many others do not. It is hard to improve the performance of a network without detailed information about exactly how and why it is performing. A central hypothesis is that successful diasporas co-evolve with corresponding domestic institutions. Changes in one provoke changes in the other, making both more effective. The Ramón García story illustrates this dynamic. García acted as a systems integrator, bringing together key pieces of intellectual property regarding genes and DNA manipulation techniques. Once these pieces were in place, research teams could be assembled in Chile to apply the resources to solving particular problems. Collaboration with Ramón García did not simply bridge existing Chilean capacities with new opportunities; the capacities were the result, not the starting point, of the search for the key elements of the project. Perhaps even more importantly, collaboration with Ramón García taught him and Fundación Chile new forms of network integration and proj-
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ect direction. It could be transferable within Chile, as well as conceivably to other countries. Specifying conditions to institutionalize the kind of nascent search networks as illustrated by the Ramon Garcia anecdote should be, in our opinion, a main thrust of future research.
References Adams W (ed.) (1968) The Brain Drain. New York: Macmillan. Bhagwati J and Partington M (1976) Taxing the Brain Drain: A Proposal, Amsterdam: North Holland. Brown M (2000) Using the Intellectual Diaspora to Reverse the Brain Drain: Some Useful Examples. University of Capetown, South Africa. For SANSA publications, see: http://sansa.nrf.ac.za /interface/Publications.htm. Ellerman D (2003) Policy Research on Migration and Development. World Bank Policy Research Working Papers (3117): 1–64. Kapur D (2001) Diasporas and Technology Transfer. Journal of Human Development 2(2): 265–86. Marks J (2004) Expatriate Professionals As An Entry Point Into Global Knowledge-intensive Value Chains: South Africa, Consultants’ Report for the World Bank. Pandey A, Aggarwal A, Devane R and Kuznetsov Y (2004) India’s Transformation to Knowledge-based Economy – Evolving Role of the Indian Diaspora. Report prepared for the World Bank. Saxenian A L (2000) The Bangalore Boom: From Brain Drain to Brain Circulation? in: Bridging the Digital Divide: Lessons from India Kennistan K and Kumar D (Eds) Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Study. Saxenian A L (2005) The International Mobility of Entreprenuers and Regional Upgrading in India and China. A paper prepared for ECLA-WIDER project on international mobility of talent. Scientific Diasporas (2003) How can developing countries benefit from expatriate scientists and engineers? Institute de Recherche Pour Le Development, Paris. Torres F and Kuznetsov Y (2004) Mexico: Migrants’ Capital for Small-scale Infrastructure and Small Enterprise Development. Report prepared for the World Bank.
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Twin innovation systems, intermediate technology and economic development: History and prospect for China SUMMARY KEY WORDS national system of innovation; intermediate technology; lower-level national system of innovation; mainland China’s technological development
This paper argues that less developed countries (LDCs) need twin national systems of innovation: systems with one, ‘upper’ level or sub-system to engage with advanced technology and develop industries which use it; and (cooperating with the upper level) a ‘lower’ level to help to improve the economy’s existing, traditional technology. The focus is on the lower level. The process there should involve the development and use of intermediate technologies. These are much better suited to the LDC’s factor endowment, and maximise opportunities for learning by doing. Most LDCs lack such a lower level, and lose much from this; Brazil is an example. Japan and Taiwan developed twin NSIs and gained accordingly, until success caused the levels to merge. 19th Century Denmark and Malaysia are other cases in point recently. Mainland China failed to build on its 1950s beginnings and the lower level of its NSI is now weak. Received 9 June 2005
Accepted 6 December 2005
• The traditional part uses more-or-less traditional technology. ANDREW TYLECOTE Professor Economics & Management of Technological Change Sheffield University Management School Sheffield, England
INTRODUCTION: LEVELS OF TECHNOLOGY AND OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION
D
eveloping countries have a fairly clear-cut division of their economies into two parts, ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’: • The modern part uses more-or-less advanced technology derived from developed countries;
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To some extent this division will go by sector: there are inevitably high-technology sectors like aircraft which must be modern to exist at all, and sectors providing traditional staple foods and traditional services to the domestic market which tend mostly to use traditional technology. A sector may however in a given country have both advanced and traditional technology either in distinct sub-sectors (up-market and down-market) or working together – as where transformation processes are advanced and transfer processes traditional (Amsalem 1982, for Brazil). As developed countries continue to innovate, the gap between ‘advanced’ technology and ‘traditional’ technology tends to widen.
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It is with regard to developing country firms and sectors using advanced technology (hereinafter called the ‘modern economy’) that one can recognise an NSI much like that of a typical developed country. The country’s institutions of research and higher education are likely to be mainly focused on needs; as are the banking system and the policy-making parts of government, and state-owned utilities (who provide support in the form of contracts). What is of course unlike a typical developed country is that there is little really innovative activity: most of the effort is devoted to finding, accessing, mastering and, to a modest degree, adapting technology already developed elsewhere. Since there is a great deal of all that taking place in every developed country, the resemblance is still quite close. The concentration of the NSI on the ‘modern economy’ is partly because it genuinely needs help in order to survive, particularly once exposed to international competition. Partly it is because it is believed that progress is about using advanced technology and that nothing less will do. Inevitably such concentration is expensive. Two means of economising on the cost of such progress are now accepted: 1. Foreign direct investment, in which foreign multinational firms bear all or most of the cost of bringing advanced technology into a country. 2. Specialisation for export in labour-intensive sectors (like clothing), and in labour-intensive operations in other sectors (like electronics), in which sufficiently-advanced technology is relatively easy and cheap to acquire and master. To rely mainly on FDI for advanced technology would mean ceding control of the economy to foreigners, and would therefore for most developing countries (including China) be an unacceptable way of saving resources, and in the long run
perhaps an illusory one. As for specialisation, the larger the economy, the less scope there is to specialise in a small number of sectors or sub-sectors. Thus the challenge remains for a large developing economy to master a wide range of modern technology. As for the firms and sectors using traditional technology (hereinafter the ‘traditional economy’), in most developing countries it is hard to recognise anything which deserves the name of an innovation system, or even a technological change system. What changes there mostly trickles in from abroad or from the rest of the economy: there is nothing systematic about it. (One exception may be in agriculture where a new crop strain developed abroad or in domestic research institutes may be taken up by otherwise traditional farmers – high-yielding rice in the 1970s; genetically-modified cotton recently1). The gap between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ economies thus tends to grow wider, and progress is likely to take place by the wholesale importation of advanced technology into a farm or enterprise, or by the growth of ‘modern’ enterprises at the expense of the rest. The relative size of the two economies thus reflects the level of development. This paper will argue, however, that this is a poor way to achieve rapid technological development. The lower-technology parts of the economy need to be integrated within the country’s NSI even though (indeed largely because) it may be by squeezing them that most of the revenues required for nurturing the ‘modern economy’ can be obtained. Further, the ‘modern economy’ can grow much more quickly if there is available to it a large reservoir of human capital, entrepreneurs and whole businesses which already have most of the skills and capabilities required within it – developed while part of the ‘traditional economy’. Initially, however, the sub-systems of innovation of the two economies must be quite distinct. The ‘modern economy’ may replace some mechanised
1 Even here it cannot be assumed that new strains will suit traditional farmers, without adaptation by a lower level of the NSI. The hybrid rice of the Green Revolution for example demands more water and fertilisers than traditional varieties. It therefore favours large farmers using advanced agricultural technology. See under ‘Conclusions’.
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processes by more labour-intensive ones – for example, components may be moved from one machine to the next by hand rather than by a moving belt, as Amsalem found was common in Brazil. It may save again by buying rather dated, second-hand equipment; or by working that equipment for two shifts rather than one, or three rather than two (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 87 on Japanese cotton-spinning in the late 19th century). Nevertheless, the basic processes of transformation (in a manufacturing industry; mutatis mutandis for others) will be the same as in the developed world, however unsuited they are to the developing country – however much they stretch its technological capability and strain its resources of money and skill. So the upper level of the NSI must mirror, and be closely attached to, the NSIs of the developed world. In the lower-technology parts, the ‘traditional economy’, it is necessarily different. Traditional producers must start from where they are: making traditional products and services with traditional methods and equipment. Yet they may move up and steadily close the gap between themselves and the modern economy. They will only do so, however, if there is a lower-level NSI which assists them to move incrementally through a succession of levels of technology, all of which can be described as intermediate between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’: • intermediate in their relative use of the conventional three factors – labour, capital and natural resources; • intermediate in scale of production; and • intermediate in technological capability. Others describe them as ‘appropriate’: Appropriate technology (AT) is now recognised as the generic term for a wide range of technologies characterised by any one of several of the following features: low investment cost per work-place, low capital investment per unit of output, organizational simplicity, high adaptability to a particular social or cultural 64
environment, sparing use of natural resources, low cost of final product or high potential for employment. (Jequier & Blanc 1985: 9) ‘Appropriate’ seems a potentially misleading term, since while all the features listed by Jequier and Blanc are desirable ones, inevitably the price paid for achieving them (or some of them) will be low labour productivity and probably also low product quality. Such technologies would thus be highly inappropriate to developed countries. This paper will therefore use the term intermediate technologies as defined above. This paper thus makes a strong claim: that the best way to rapid economic development is to have (besides a strong upper level of the NSI) a vigorous lower level. There is a corollary to this proposition: if a vigorous lower level of the NSI confers such an advantage, then we cannot expect to see many (perhaps not any) clear-cut cases among present-day less-developed countries. We must look for them, instead, among the more successful cases of rapid development of the past: and we should not expect to find much trace of them in those countries now, for the natural role of a lower level of the NSI is to eliminate itself. Now you see it – now you don’t. Historical research is needed, and it is not likely to be easy, for few people take much interest in intermediate technology. We are, for example, bound to hear much more about the Chinese man in space than the modest incremental developments in greenhouse technology in China reported later in this paper – whatever their relative contribution to the Chinese economy. This paper reports on work in progress. First, it puts forward the theoretical case – in fact two cases – for ‘incrementalism’. It then presents a number of historical examples, starting with the rather well-documented case of Japan. The Japanese case is particularly valuable because it gives some clues as to what to look for. With those clues, we identify Taiwan and Denmark as virtually certain cases (at the appropriate period) of a strong lower-level NIS; the same appears to be
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true, more recently and perhaps more weakly, of Malaysia. All four of these countries are excellent examples for our argument because they were – over the appropriate period – highly successful economically. The argument also needs a counterpoint: countries which might have been expected to develop rapidly but puzzlingly failed to do so – and turn out to have been entirely devoid of a lower-level NSI. One example is offered here: Brazil. Finally, we turn to China: a case at neither extreme, and all the more interesting for that. We conclude with prescriptions for China, drawn partly from its own experience, partly from that of the other countries discussed.
THEORETICAL CASES FOR ‘INCREMENTALISM’ Case in terms of mainstream economics It can easily be shown that the type of technology most suitable for the needs of less developed country (LDC) users is likely to be quite different from that designed with developed countries in mind (Tylecote & Galvao 2001). This follows from the fact that (in the terms of mainstream economics) there is a large difference in factor endowments and therefore relative factor prices: LDCs have a relative abundance of, and therefore cheaper, low-skilled labour and a relative scarcity of, and therefore more expensive, capital – human, physical and financial. (They will also usually have a shortage of most natural resources, relative to low-skilled labour.) In fact the difference in factor prices is particularly acute if one TABLE 1: FACTOR PROPORTIONS Factor of production Unskilled/ low-skilled labour Skilled labour (‘human capital’) Physical capital
AND
considers social cost: since typically a large proportion of the low-skilled labour force is unemployed or under-employed (largely due to the choice of modern technology which employs few of them), the marginal social cost of their labour is nearly zero (Table 1). The marginal private cost – the cost to the potential employer – is considerably higher, for no-one can be expected to be honest, loyal and diligent without being (or feeling) ‘decently’ paid. There is a range of different possible process technologies which involve combining low-skilled labour with high-skilled labour and physical capital in different proportions. Figure 1, Factor Prices and Choice of Factor Proportions, shows a highly-stylised picture, in which process technology and factor proportions are infinitely variable along a curving isoquant (i.e. output remaining the same) and the optimum, which will be chosen for an optimal allocation of resources, is indicated by the point at which the budget line, showing relative factor prices, touches the isoquant. Two budget lines are given reflecting the factor endowments of developed and less-developed countries respectively. T1 shows the high-capital, low-labour, choice that will be made in a developed country, T2 shows the low-capital, high-labour choice which will be made in a less-developed country. Figure 2 is more realistic. The only technologies which are certainly available in a less developed country are the locally-known traditional technology (Tt) and the state-of-the-art modern technology (Tm). The circles labelled Tt and Tm show respectively the factor proportions in traditional technology (unchanging) and those in
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
IN
DEVELOPED
AND
LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Abundance
Proportions in ‘modern’ DC technology
Opportunity cost in LDC
Effect of use in LDC of modern technology
LDC>DC
Low
Lower marginal social cost
DC>LDC DC>LDC
High High
>DC >DC
Higher marginal social cost Higher marginal social cost
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FIGURE 1: FACTOR
FIGURE 2: TRAJECTORIES
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PRICES AND CHOICE OF FACTOR PROPORTIONS
OF MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND FROM TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGIES
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FIGURE 3: OPTIMUM
SOCIAL AND PRIVATE CHOICES OF TECHNOLOGIES
modern technology (at a point in time). The isoquant shows, for the current state of scientific knowledge, the whole range of technologies which it is possible in principle to develop. There are two dotted lines. The first comes down from Tt, marking out a possible and desirable trajectory of incremental, intermediate technological development. This combines some changes which save all factors with some which substitute capital (human and physical) for labour. (Capitalusing changes do not dominate capital-saving because the relative price of capital is so high.) The second dotted line passes through Tm, showing past and future technological development of modern technology by and for developed counVolume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
tries, which is dominated by the substitution of capital for labour. Figure 3 shows Tt, Tm and their trajectories again, with budget lines which represent relative prices of the factors, with two alternative slopes: the first reflecting marginal social cost in a lessdeveloped country, the second reflecting marginal private cost in the same country. (The difference in slope is because labour is assumed to be cheaper if calculated at MSC – see above.) The optimum choice of technology, according to the logic we are using, is that which is on the innermost budget line: for that shows the lowest cost combinations of factors. So which is optimum? We can best make our comparisons taking two alterna-
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tives at a time. Comparing modern technology with un-improved traditional technology, and considering private costs, Tm is preferable, for MPC(ii) on which Tm stands, passes to the inside of Tt, which stands on the outermost budget line MPC(iii). However if social costs were considered, Tt would be preferable, for MSC(ii) on which Tt stands is inside MSC(iii) on which Tm stands. However improved, intermediate technology, Ti, is preferable to either of the others, whether social or private cost is considered. Its advantage over Tt is greater if private cost is considered (MPC(i), that over Tm, greater if one considers social cost (MSC(i)). The conclusion is clear: the use of intermediate technology will be far more efficient from the point of view of the less-developed economy than the use of modern technology. The advantage from the point of view of a firm in that economy will be less. If there is no intermediate technology available, only traditional, then there may well be no advantage at all: the ‘private optimum’ may be the modern technology – to anyone in a position to get hold of it.
Case in terms of the ‘learning economy’ The economy posited by the national systems of innovation literature is not that of the mainstream, neoclassical economist: it is a learning economy, in which producers move from one technological position to another – with changing combinations of factors of production – only with the assistance of processes of private and social learning (Lundvall 1992; Lundvall & Johnson 1994). Our example in 2.1 in fact to some degree implies a learning economy, because our trajectories in Figures 2 and 3 trace out paths along which – given time and resources for learning – the ‘state of the art’ may move. But there is still a distance from the realities of the learning economy. A choice apparently exists between (at least) Tt and Tm. This choice, however, is not in reality available to firms currently at Tt: they would have to learn a great deal in order to move 68
to Tm, and it is inconceivable that they could get there in one bound, so to speak. Foreign multinationals can choose Tm; perhaps some native firms supported by the cream of the upper-level NSI may do so. But any other firm, to instal the technology of Tm, must be dependent on firms – probably foreign ones – which have the appropriate technological capability. Its installation of Tm does not then represent the relevant learning, and may not be followed by it. Its dependence may remain, and even intensify, because it may learn no faster than Tm moves forward. There is another difference between the respective trajectories which Tt may follow potentially and Tm will follow definitely which is not brought out by the mainstream analysis: the degree of competition. The existence of a substantial number of competing producers in a limited space, such as a developing economy or a region within it, confers three advantages: • variety; • incentive; • selection. Variety: The more producers, the more variety of approach, in terms of technology and organisation, and thus the more likelihood that one producer will come up with a clear improvement. Selection: The more producers, the more intense the competition, and thus those more likely to be driven out of business are producers who cling to inferior technology or organisational methods. Incentive: The more intense the competition, the more effort each producer will make (in generating or copying improvements) to avoid being driven out of business. Almost inevitably there will be more producers on the traditional–intermediate trajectory than on the modern one, since scale is smaller and entry barriers (particularly those of capital and technological capability) are lower. We can conclude that the rate of DUI – learn-
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ing by doing, using and interacting – will be much higher on the traditional–intermediate trajectory than on the modern one; other things being equal. (Of course other things which may not be equal include the availability of resources and outside assistance of various kinds.) Unfortunately the development of each technology has a cost. The optimal policy for an LDC, with scarce resources available for innovation (and diffusion) would appear to be, then: 1. ‘Upgrade’ some traditional technologies, blending them where possible with advanced technologies which represent a particular leap in productivity or which are particularly easy to assimilate. (On ‘technology blending’ see for example Bhalla 1996: Ch. 3.) 2. Take some DC ‘cast-offs’: technology now superseded, embodied in equipment which is cheaply available second-hand (and whose use can be taught by experts who may also now be ‘obsolete’ in the DCs). 3. Adopt DC technology without much adaptation, where it represents a particular leap in productivity or is particularly easy to assimilate. 4. Buy in from the DCs products which seem necessary and not available through routes 1, 2 or 3. Routes 1 and 2 involve intermediate technology: in the first case newly-developed, in the second case borrowed from the technological past of the DCs. In practice they could be combined in various ways – a second-hand motor, say, being used to power a more-or-less traditional loom. On both routes there should be a sequence of intermediate technologies, each requiring more technological capability than its predecessor, and combining each unit of low-skilled labour with more physical and human capital. A technology policy which takes much of the economy on such a sequence of intermediate technologies from traditional to modern could thus be described as incrementalist.
The part of a national system of innovation which assists the development and diffusion of the relevant intermediate technologies could be described as the lower level of the NSI. The theoretical argument for incrementalism – that the best and fastest way to develop is to have a strong lower level of the NSI as well as a strong upper level – has now been made. It may be noted that it becomes the stronger as time goes on, for as developed countries develop further, with higher and higher labour productivity, and technological sophistication, some at least of the less developed countries lag behind, and thus the distance between the most and the least advanced countries (and regions), and between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ technology, increases. The greater that distance, the stronger the case for intermediate technology.
HISTORY OF SUCCESSFUL INCREMENTALISM: JAPAN Meiji beginnings 2 The development of the upper level of the NSI in Japan is well known. After the Meiji Revolution of 1868 the Japanese government was committed to rapid technological development. The central government in Tokyo spent heavily on bringing foreign experts to Japan and on establishing universities. During the 1870s it also set up (initially) state-owned firms in key high-technology industries, selling most of them cheaply during the 1880s to private entrepreneurs who were the progenitors of the zaibatsu conglomerates. Another massive state investment was made in the first decade of the 20th century in the Yawata steelworks, opened in 1901 after going five times over budget, and profitable only from 1910 (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 80). Such direct state intervention was largely due to the unequal treaties forced on it by the United States in 1858, which expired only in 1911 and until then prevented it from imposing any tariffs over 5% (Chang 2002:
2 What follows draws heavily on Morris-Suzuki 1994, and Chang 2002.
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2.2.7). After that, it used tariffs in a conventional way to protect its nascent modern sectors. ‘Preferential public purchasing’, particularly for the military, was used from early on: thus the key move in the development of what became Toshiba was a naval order for torpedoes in 1892 (MorrisSuzuki 1994: 79). Its aggressive policies, first in Korea, then in NE and other parts of China, can be seen largely as a means of expanding its exploited backward sectors – and of seizing the mineral resources required as inputs for the modern sectors. Meanwhile the outline of a lower level of the NSI can be discerned. Note, to begin with, that what can be called the base level of technological competence – among artisans in particular – was relatively high in Japan in relation to the ‘modern’ level of the time (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 86). Moreover the level of literacy was exceptionally high – in fact similar to that of advanced countries of the time. Primary and secondary education was rapidly improved. These were the responsibilities of local government, and it is also noteworthy that for historical reasons local government had substantial responsibility, autonomy and capability. It duly played an active role in raising the technological competences of artisans and farmers (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 89ff.). In 1872, the mayor of Kyoto, for example, even sent a small group (a silk merchant and two weavers) to France to acquire knowledge of French woven textiles and buy weaving machinery (MorrisSuzuki 1994: 92). This was a cheap version of the ambitious central government expeditions to get the highest Western technologies: the Kyoto expedition brought back rather simple equipment and knowledge which was quickly incorporated into local craftsmen’s workshops. The craftsmen and merchants themselves formed trade associations in order to spread knowledge of improved technologies which could be adopted quickly and cheaply by their members (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 94–5). Many of these improvements were developed by Japanese inventors, mostly craftsmen themselves: 70
From 1899–1905, 73% of the patents granted went to Japanese inventors, most of them for new developments in traditional areas such as better weaving looms and improved farm tools …. This grassroots innovation, however, was not just a matter of individual entrepreneurship …. Between central government [which was focusing on the acquisition of high technology for the internal core] and private citizen stood an immensely complex layer of intermediate social institutions – local government, trade associations etc – which were vital to the spread of technological knowledge in the Meiji Era and beyond. The most important contribution of these grassroots institutions was their role as channels for the transmission of new ideas and as instruments in overcoming the innate human fear of the unfamiliar ….. Local trade associations took this process one step further ….. serving as a means of sharing the risks of innovation amongst many producers …. Both prefectural technology centres and trade associations tested and modified new techniques so that they could easily be fitted into existing production systems. (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 96–97) One such new technique was the bicycle, which became the basis of a classic example of ‘innovative technology blending’ (the term is from Bhalla 1996, the example from Morris-Suzuki 1994). A Japanese artisan in the late 1860s had the idea of combining a bicycle with a traditional handpulled carriage. The rikisha (rickshaw) quickly became the main means of passenger transport in East Asian cities – with a capital cost per passenger mile probably lower than the traditional rickshaw, and of course much higher speeds. Again, this spread in its early stages was assisted by local government (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 97). The central government was not slow to notice what was happening below it, though it took time to react. A report by the senior official Maeda Masana in 1882–1884 argued persuasively for strengthening the foundations of tradition-
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al industries. Entrepreneurs who had moved incrementally from traditional technology to major success in export industries became influential – like the Katakura silk firm which had by 1894 gone from a backyard workshop to the largest silk factory in Japan. In 1900 and 1903 laws were enacted to strengthen the position of local trade associations (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 100). In 1903 a law was introduced to encourage and regulate the establishment of technical colleges. These colleges taught middle-level technicians who went to work in private firms – a good source of innovation and in particular of technology-blending. In 1901 the Ministry of Agricultural and Commerce finally began the implementation of Maeda’s proposal for developing networks of prefectural laboratories linked to a national laboratory, though it was another four years before they put money into it. Even the national laboratories, like the Oji sericultural station, the Fermentation Laboratory and the Tokyo Industrial Research Laboratory put most of their resources into using modern science to understand traditional processes and products, so that they could be progressively improved. The lower level was also able rapidly to improve its power sources, starting from the traditional water wheels available in areas close to hills (i.e. most of Japan) and introducing relatively modest improvements following Western practice, until the upper-level NSI had got to grips with steam technology and thus made it cheaply available. (In many cases by that time it was possible to go straight on to hydroelectricity using the same fall of water (Reynolds 1983).) The dissemination of improved traditional technology through the lower level played a vital economic role: it allowed the rapid development of large internationally-competitive cotton and silk textile industries, which earned most of the foreign exchange that paid for the modern part’s imports. These were dominated by small and medium businesses. The lower level of the NSI was expanding the surplus which could be creamed off for the modern economy. Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
Twentieth century Once Japan had got back its freedom of action in tariff matters, modern industry became increasingly profitable and became dominated by the great privately-owned zaibatsu conglomerates, which had used either connections in government (e.g. Mitsubishi) or their own resources as merchant trading houses (Mitsui) to get established. At some point in the 20th century, an important force for the convergence of the upper and lower levels began to appear, in the shape of what became known as kinyu keiretsu (vertical groups): the big modern-economy companies established more and more close relationships with small firms to which they could subcontract relatively simple and labour-intensive processes. Often indeed they would be set up at the instance of the large firm, which might suggest that one of its skilled workers take some of its old machinery back to his own village and supply it from there, more cheaply than it could make it in-house. (That same skilled worker might have learned most of his skills within the lower level before being recruited.) The beauty of this system from an economic point of view was that the smaller the firm, the smaller the village in which it could be located, and the cheaper the labour on which it could draw: peasant labour when it was not required in the fields (or at school) had a very low opportunity cost. In effect, the traditional economy was paying most of the cost of these workers, so long as they stayed on the farm: and the modest contribution of their employment in those subcontractors helped them to do just that. The feudal traditions of the Japanese countryside encouraged the arrangement of these subcontractors in tiers, forming an inverted pyramid, so that Toyota for example developed a three-tier system in which the third tier supplied the second, which supplied the first, which supplied Toyota. They also encouraged the forging of close relationships, which facilitated the concerted upgrading of technology. It is notable that the Japanese motor industry’s leading role in the development of CNC equipment in the 1960s
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and 70s has been explained by the prevalence at the outset of pre-Fordist methods among their subcontractors, who simply had too short production runs to be able to afford dedicated Fordist equipment – but for whom CNC was affordable because it could be re-programmed to deal with a long series of short runs. This could be called the culmination of the co-operation between the Japanese upper and lower levels, and the point at which (in the motor industry at least) they merged. It was however not only subcontractors of firms like Toyota which emerged from the lower level of the NSI. Much bigger firms did that. Toyota did, rather gradually, going from loom manufacture (and invention) to motor vehicles. Others did it in one generation. Soichiro Honda was a mere bicycle mechanic who got hold of a motor cycle engine which he managed to fix to a bicycle. That and the rest is (company) history. Konosuke Matsushita started in business with similar origins by inventing, then making, a simple adaptor which allowed one or two electrical appliances to be powered from the same wire that led to a poor Japanese family’s solitary light bulb. These were highly innovative entrepreneurs whose ultimate ability to run a large high-technology business was based on practice in running a very small one whose technology and markets they thoroughly understood. Only the lower level of the NSI could nurture such people: in the modern economy, success naturally depended much more on ability to get on well with the rich and the powerful. To appreciate the relative merits of the two types of business leader and of firm, contrast the histories of Honda and Nissan, or of Matsushita and Mitsubishi Electric.
FRAGMENTS OF HISTORY Introduction: What to look for The Japanese case gives some clear indications of circumstances in which a strong lower level of the
NSI will develop and continue. First, institutional: there were local government institutions and trade associations which were vigorous and autonomous. Second, social: the general level of literacy at the beginning was high. (There was probably a connection between these two circumstances, in both directions. Thus the vigour of trade associations must depend to some extent on the educational standards of their members. They will probably not be high if local government has not been doing a good job.) This is not to say that circumstances were ideal. National government was slow to respond to, and reinforce, the initiatives of local government. A large proportion of the rural population remained desperately poor until the 1950s, partly due to the pattern of land ownership (land reform only came after the Second World War). This made it difficult to build on the good educational beginning. What then shall we look for? A low Gini coefficient for household income is one sign of favourable social conditions in which one would expect the educational level of the mass of the population to be high (Elsenhans 1983). It may equally be a sign that a lower level of the NSI has begun to deliver: if the poor have access to intermediate technology rather than merely traditional technology they will be less poor. We must also look out for a dense network of lower-level institutions such as in Japan, though not necessarily with so high a degree of autonomy: in a smaller country, and with a committed national government, fairly tight central control may do little harm. Three likely examples emerge: Taiwan, 1950–1980; Denmark, 1850–1910 (approx.); and Malaysia (1960–2000). A counter-example of a virtually non-existent lower level of the NSI appears to be Brazil (1950–2005). We look at them in that order.
Taiwan3 Until 1945 Taiwan had of course been under Japanese rule and to some limited degree shared
3 What follows draws on Fei et al. 1979; Clark and Roy 1997 and Hobday 1995.
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Volume 8, Issue 1–2, July 2006
Twin innovation systems, intermediate technology and economic development
in what has been described above. Under the Guo Min government after 1950 it developed a similar, and equally successful, twin innovation system. Again, of course, the story of the upper level of the NSI is much better known. During the 1950s there was a rather standard policy of industrial tariff protection. (The Guo Min government, like that of Japan and South Korea, had the luxury of complete freedom of action in economic policy, due to the US fear of the PRC. This freedom extended to all sorts of theft of intellectual property; an activity particularly popular in Taiwanese industry.) This protection was refined in the 1960s to include selective support for what could be defined as medium-technology export industries: industries which were able with such support quickly to establish competitive advantage on international markets. Key hightechnology industries were identified by the government, which set up state-owned firms in those sectors. However a key characteristic of the rapid move up-market (and ‘up-technology’) that followed during the 1970s and 80s, was the prominent role of SMEs in Taiwanese exports (Hobday 1995). These do not appear to have been the recipients of substantial government aid, and yet they moved steadily and successfully up-market. No doubt they got some benefit from relatively cheap and high quality inputs provided by the state-owned high-tech firms, and from government spending on research institutes and universities; in other words, from a well-functioning upper-level NSI. Yet, more important are the technological and entrepreneurial capabilities they had before they started exporting. Where did they – that is the entrepreneurs themselves, and their employees – get them from? As with Honda and Matsushita, it appears that most of them originated from the lower level of the NSI. As of 1950 the large majority of the population of Taiwan were peasants, and so that is where
the lower level of the NSI started from. The Japanese had created a fairly good rural infrastructure of dirt roads and other facilities. In the early 50s, the Guo Min government carried through far-reaching land reform, which left the peasantry owners of the smallholdings on which they lived and worked.4 This was followed by a programme of improvement to rural infrastructure, particularly focusing on roads and agricultural extension services. At the same time there was heavy spending on mass education: the emphasis was first on primary and vocational education, later on secondary, and only when economic advance had gone a long way, in the late 1970s and 80s, did the emphasis move up to higher education. These policies provided the basis for a tremendous flowering of manufacturing SMEs using progressively higher technology. Consider a typical Taiwanese peasant family of the 1950s and 60s. Partly thanks to the land reform, its food and shelter (at the minimum) was provided by a farm which was too small to need all its labour except very occasionally