Information, Interaction, and Agency
INFORMATION, INTERACTION, AND AGENCY
Wiebe van der Hoek
Reprinted from Synthese 139:2 and 142:2 (2004), Special Section Knowledge, Rationality & Action
123
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN-10 1 4020-3600-0 ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3600-0
Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Cover design by Vincent F. Hendricks
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved © 2005 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed in the Netherlands.
Contents
Foreword Wiebe van der Hoek Logics for Epistemic Programs Alexandru Baltag and Lawrence S. Moss
vii
1
A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation Hans Rott
61
Comparing Semantics of Logics for Multi-Agent Systems Valentin Goranko and Wojciech Jamroga
77
A Characterization of Von Neumann Games In Terms of Memory Giacomo Bonanno
117
An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Perspective on Learning in Multi-Agent Systems Karl Tuyls, Ann Now é, Tom Lenaerts and Bernard Manderick
133
Evolution of Conventional Meaning and Conversational Principles Robert van Rooy
167
vi Nonmonotonic Inferences and Neural Networks Reinhard Blutner
203
A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence Franz Dietrich and Christian List
235
A SAT-Based Approach to Unbounded Model Checking for Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic M. Kacprzak and W. Penczek
263
Update Semantics of Security Protocols Arjen Hommerson, John-Jules Meyer and Erik de Vink
289
Index
329
WIEBE VAN DER HOEK
FOREWORD
1. Introduction It was in 2002 that the idea arose that the time was right for a journal in the area of reasoning about Knowledge, Rationality and Action; a journal that would be a platform for those researchers that work on epistemic logic, belief revision, game and decision theory, rational agency, planning and theories of action. Although there are some prestigious conferences organised around these topics, it was felt that to have a journal in this area would have lots of added value. What such a journal would typically be a platform for, would be the kind of problems addressed by researchers from Computer Science, Game Theory, Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, Knowledge Representation, Logic and Agents. Problems that address artificial systems that have to gather information, reason about it and then make a sensible decision about what to do next. It is for this reason, that I am very happy that Knowledge, Rationality & Action (KRA) now exists as its own Section at Springer. For the clear and obvious links that the scope of KRA has with Philosophy, it was decided that KRA would be launched as a series within the journal Synthese. This book collects the first two issues of KRA. Its index shows that these first two issues indeed address its ‘core business’: all the chapters refer explicitly to knowledge, for instance, and rationality is represented by the many contributions that address games, or reasoning with or about strategies. Actions are present in many chapters in this book: whether they are epistemic programs, or choices by a coalition of agents, or moves in a game, or votes by the members of a jury. All in all, there is an emphasis on Information and a notion of Agency. What is furthermore striking, is that almost all chapters study these concepts in a multi -agent perspective. In no paper in this book we have an isolated decision maker that only reasons about his own information and strategies, but always this is placed in a context of other agents, with some implicit or explicit assumptions about the Interaction.
viii
FOREWORD
Finally, this volume demonstrates that ‘classical’ approaches to Information and Agency co-exist very well with more modern trends that show how Knowledge, Rationality and Action can achieve a broad and refreshing interpretation; there is a chapter on ‘classical AGMlike’ belief revision, but also two on a modern approach in the area of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. There is a chapter on von Neumann games, but also two that defend Evolutionary Game Theory, a branch of game theory that attempts to loosen the ‘classical assumptions’ about ‘hyperrational players’ in games. There are chapters solely on logical theories, but also one that suggests how we can bridge the gap between symbolic and connectionist approaches to cognition. Finally, there is a chapter on voting that relativises Condercet’s ‘classical’ Jury’s Theorem. In the next section I will briefly give some more details about the themes of this book. While this can be conceived as a ‘top-down’ description of the contents, in Section 3 I will give a more ‘bottom-up’ picture of the individual chapters.
2. Themes in this Book The first two chapters (Logics for Epistemic Programs and A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation), as well as the fourth (A Characterization of Von Neumann Games) and the last two (A SAT-Based Approach to Unbounded Model Checking for Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic (Chapter 9) and Update Semantics of Security Protocols) explicitly deal with information change. It is also subject of study in part of Chapter 3, Comparing Semantics of Logics for Multi-Agent Systems. Whereas the first chapter, in order to develop a Dynamic Epistemic Logic, uses a powerful object language incorporating knowledge, common knowledge and belief, the second chapter formulates and analyses six simple postulates, in a metaand semi-formal language. A main difference in the two approaches is that in Chapter 2, the theory has to explain how ‘expectations’ implicitly encoded in a belief set determine the next belief (when a conjunction has to be given up, say), whereas in the first chapter, this is not an issue: there, the effect of the learning is exhaustively described by an epistemic program. Moreover, in the first chapter, the ‘only’ facts prune to change are epistemic facts (for instance, one agent might learn that a second agent now does know whether a certain fact holds), where they are ‘objective’ in the second. Chapter 10 uses a mix of both kinds of information change: there, it can be both objective and ‘first order’. Chapters 3
WIEBE VAN DER HOEK
ix
and 9 analyse the dynamics of knowledge in the context of Alternating Transition Systems, where we have several agents that jointly determine the transition from one state to another. These two chapters do not have operators that explicitly refer to the change of knowledge: it is encoded in the epistemic and action relations in the model. Knowledge in extensive games is treated in a similar way, where it is represented in the information partition of the underlying game trees. Chapter 3 demonstrates that, indeed, there is a close relation between Alternating Transition Systems and Concurrent Game Structures, of which the latter are often conceived as a generalisation of game trees. The chapters 9 and 10 take a genuine Computer Science perspective on some of the issues analysed in chapters 1 and 3. More in particular, both chapters address the problem of (automatic) verification of complex agent systems. The systems of study in chapter 9 are the Alternating-time Transitions Systems of chapter 3, more precisely those which incorporate an epistemic component. The problem addressed in this chapter is that of model checking such systems: given a description of a transition system model, and a property expressed in an appropriate logic, can we automatically check whether that property is true in that model? Chapter 10’s aim is to develop verification methods for the epistemic program-type of action of Chapter 1, in the area of security protocols. Since the use of encryption keys in such protocols is to hide information in messages from specific agents, but make it available to others, Dynamic Epistemic Logic seems an appropriate tool here. Games, or at least, game like structures, are the object of study in the chapters 3, 4 and 5 (An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Perspective on Learning in Multi-Agent Systems). The fist of the two address knowledge or belief in such games, whereas the emphasis on the fifth chapter is more on lack of it. Chapter 4 studies memory of past knowledge for players playing a game in extensive form. If a player knows ϕ now, is he guaranteed to always know that he ever knew ϕ? The chapter gives a necessary and sufficient condition for it, and shows that players having perfect recall is closely connected to the notion of a von Neumann game. The other two chapters (i.e., 3 and 5) have in common that they try to combine and relate different formalisms. Chapter 3 compares and relates several semantics for game like logics, including Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) and Coalition Logic. Chapter 5 rather relates three disciplines: evolutionary game theory, reinforcement learning and multi-agent systems. The key trigger for this work is the insight that in many realistic multi-agent systems one has to weaken the ‘classical’ game theoretic assumptions about ‘hyper-rational’ agents, by players
x
FOREWORD
referred to as ‘bounded rational’ agents, who only have partial information about the environment and the payoff tables, and who have to learn an optimal ‘policy’ by trial and error. The sixth chapter questions exactly the same assumptions that classical game theory makes on ‘hyper-rational agents’ as are debated in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 addresses the question how to explain which equilibria are chosen in signalling games, games that try to shed a light on language use and language organisation. The chapter proposes to replace current explanations for such selection, which rely on strong assumptions about rationality and common knowledge (thereof) by the players, i.e., the language users, by explanations that are based on insights from evolutionary game theory. Whereas Chapter 3 relates, on a technical level, several semantics for games like logics, and Chapter 5 makes a case to combine three disciplines in order to study the dynamics of rationality in multi-agent systems, Chapter 7 (Nonmonotonic Inferences and Neural Networks) uses a semantics in one research paradigm, i.e., non-monotonic logic as a symbolic reasoning mechanism, to bridge a gap to another paradigm, i.e. to connectionist networks in the sub-symbolic paradigm. Doing so, the chapter is a step toward bridging the gap between symbolic and sub-symbolic modes of computation, thus addressing a long standing issue in Philosophy of Mind. Finally, Chapter 8 (Evolution of Conventional Meaning and Conversational Principles) addresses the issue of rational decision making in a group, or voting. It discusses a classical result that says that, in the scenario of majority voting, if every juror is competent, the reliability that the group decision is correct, converges to certainty, if the group size increases. Thus, this chapter also sits in the multi-agent context, but rather than accepting that the result of a joint action is given by some transition function, this chapter discusses the rationality of a specific way to merge specific actions, i.e., those of voting. Moreover, again, it appears that knowledge is crucial here, because the chapter proposes, rather than to assume independence of the voters given the state of the world, we should conditionalize on the latest evidence.
3. Brief Description of the Chapters In Logics for Epistemic Programs, by Alexandru Baltag and Lawrence S.Moss (Chapter 1), the authors take a general formal approach to changes of knowledge, or, better, changes of belief in a multi-agent context. The goal of their paper is to show how several epistemic actions
WIEBE VAN DER HOEK
xi
can be explained as specific update operations on ‘standard’ Kripke state-models that describe ‘static’ knowledge. Updates describe how we move from one state-model to another, and an epistemic action specifies, how such an update ‘looks like’, for every agent involved in it. An example of an epistemic action is that of a public announcement: if ϕ is publicly announced in a group of agents A, the information ϕ is truthfully announced to everybody in A, and that this is done is common knowledge among the members of A. However, in more private announcements, it may well be that agent b learns a new fact, whereby c is aware of this, without becoming to know the fact itself. The approach of the authors is unique in the sense that they also model epistemic actions by Kripke-like models, called action models. In A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation (Chapter 2), Hans Rott reconsiders six principles that are generally well accepted in the areas of non-monotonic reasoning, belief revision and belief contraction, principles of common sense reasoning. They can all be formulated just by using conjunction and disjunction over new information, or information that has to be abandoned. Rott then pictures a reasoner who initially ‘expects’ that from a set of possible alternatives a, b, or c, none will be chosen. He then sketches three possible (but different) scenarios in which the reasoner learns in fact that a ∨ b, a ∨ b ∨ c and c do hold, after all. Depending on how each new information is in line or goes against the reasoners ‘other expectations’, he will infer different conclusions in each scenario. Interestingly, the six principles are then tied up with principles in the theory of rational choice, most prominently to the Principle of Independence of Irrelevant Choices: one’s preferences among a set of alternatives should not change (within that set of alternatives), if new options present themselves. Rott argues that, in the setting of belief formation, the effect of this additional information should exactly be accounted for and explained. The chapter concludes negatively: logics that are closer to modelling ‘common sense reasoning’ seem to have a tendency to drift away from the nice, classical patterns that we usually ascribe to ‘standard logics’. Alternating Transition Systems are structures in which each joint action of a group of agents determines a transition between global states of the system. Such systems have inspirations from areas as diverse as game theory, computation models, epistemic and coalition models. Chapter 3 (Comparing Semantics of Logics for Multi-Agent Systems, by Valentin Goranko and Wojciech Jamroga) uses these structures to show how (semantically) several frameworks to reason about the abilities of agents are equivalent. One prominent framework in their analyses is that of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), a logic intended to reason about what coalitions of agents can achieve, by choosing an
xii
FOREWORD
appropriate strategy, and taking into account all possible strategies for the agents outside the coalition. The chapter first of all shows that the three different semantics that were proposed for ATL are equivalent. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that ATL subsumes (Extended) Coalition Logic. Last but not least, they show that adding an epistemic component to ATL (giving ATEL), can be completely modelled within ATL, the idea being, to model the epistemic indistinguishability relation for each agent as a strategic transition relation for his ‘associated epistemic agents’. In Chapter 4, (A Characterization of Von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory), Giacomo Bonanno analyses knowledge, and the memory of it, in the context of extensive games with incomplete information. In such a game, it is assumed that each player can be uncertain about the nodes in which he has to make a move. First of all, Bonanno extends this notion to an information completion, in which a player can have uncertainties about all nodes, not just the ones that are his. For such games, he defines a notion of Memory of Past Knowledge (MPK) in terms of the structure and the information partition in that game. If a game only allows for uncertainty for every player at his decision nodes, the the analogue of MPK is called Memory of Past Decision Nodes (MPD). Syntactically, MPK is related to perfect recall: it appears to be equivalent to saying that, at every node, a player remembers everything he has known before: if he knew ϕ in the past, then now he knows that he previously knew ϕ. This notion is then connected to that of von Neumann games, which, roughly, are games in which all players know the time. The main result of the chapter tells us that an extensive form game with incomplete information allows for an information completion satisfying MPK if, and only if, the game is von Neumann satisfying MPD. Note that from this, it follows that if we start with a game with Memory of Past Decision Nodes, this game can be extended to a game with Memory of Past Knowledge, if and only if it is a von Neumann game. Chapter 5 (An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Perspective on Learning in Multi-Agent Systems) by Karl Tuyls, Ann Now´e, Tom Lenaerts and Bernard Manderick, is a survey paper that argues how three currently loosely connected disciplines can use and contribute to each other’s development. They first of all take the stance that crucial assumptions in ‘classical game theory’ make their applicability to multi-agent systems and the real world rather limited: in the latter, we cannot always assume that participants have perfect knowledge of the environment, or even of the payoff tables. Rather than assuming that players are ‘hyper-rational’, who correctly anticipate the behaviour of all other players, they propose players that are ‘boundedly
WIEBE VAN DER HOEK
xiii
rational’, who are limited in their knowledge about the game and the environment, as well as in their computational resources. Moreover, such players learn to respond better by trial and error, which adds to the dynamics of the multi-player, or multi-agent system. Given these assumptions about the partially known dynamic environment, is seems natural to assume that learning and adaptiveness are skills that are important for the agents in that environment. The chapter argues how reinforcement learning, a theoretical framework that is already established in single-agent systems, has to solve several technical problems in order to be applicable to the multi-agent case. The problem is that in such richer systems, the reinforcement an agent receives, may depend on the actions taken by the other agents. This absence of ‘Markovian behaviour’ may make convergence properties of reinforcement learning, as they hold in the single agent case, disappear. In order to fully understand the dynamics of learning and the effects of exploration in multi-agent systems, they propose to use evolutionary game theory in such systems, which adds a solution concept to the classical equilibria, namely that of a strategy being evolutionary stable. A strategy has this property if it is robust against evolutionary pressure from any appearing mutant strategy. Apart from giving several examples illustrating the main concepts, they show how evolutionary game theory can be used as a foundation for modelling new reinforcement algorithms for multi-agent systems. Evolution of Conventional Meaning and Conversational Principles by Robert van Rooy (Chapter 6) questions exactly the same assumptions that classical game theory makes on ‘hyper-rational agents’. This chapter addresses the question how to explain which equilibria are chosen in signalling games, games that try to shed a light on language use and language organisation. The chapter proposes to replace current explanations for such selection, which rely on strong assumptions about rationality and common knowledge (thereof) by the players, i.e., the language users, by explanations that are based on insights from evolutionary game theory, especially that of an evolutionary stable strategy. Rather than obtaining Nash equilibriua in language games by relying on almost reciprocal assumptions about mutual (knowledge of) rationality, or using a psychological notion of salience to explain selection of a so-called conventional equilibrium, the chapter shows how that equilibrium will ‘naturally’ evolve in the context of evolutionary language games. It also uses evolutionary game theory to explain how conventions that enhance efficient communication are more likely to be adapted than those that do not. Finally, this chapter shows how costly signalling can account for honest communication.
x iv
FOREWORD
The aim of Chapter 7 (Nonmonotonic Inferences and Neural Networks), by Reinhard Blutner, is mainly a methodological one, i.e., to show that model-theoretic semantics may be useful for analysing properties of connectionist networks. Doing so, the chapter is a step toward bridging the gap between symbolic and sub-symbolic modes of computation, thus addressing a long standing issue in philosophy of mind. The chapter demonstrates first of all that certain activities of connectionist networks can be seen as non-monotonic inferences. Secondly, it shows a correspondence between the coding of knowledge in Hopfield networks, and the representation of knowledge in Poole systems. To do so, the chapter makes the latter systems weight-annotated, assigning a weight to all possible hypotheses in a Poole system. Then, roughly, links in the network are mapped to bi-implications in the logical system. In sum, the chapter contributes to its goals by encouraging us to accept that the difference between symbolic and neural computation is one of perspective: we should view symbolism as a high-level description of properties of a class of neural networks. Chapter 8 (A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence by Franz Dietrich and Christian List) addresses the issue of rational decision making in a group, or voting. The setting is a simple one: the decision is a jury’s decision about a binary variable (guilty or not) under the assumption that each juror is competent (predicts the right value of the variable with a probability greater than 0.5). Under this scenario, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem predicts that the reliability of a jury’s majority decision converges to 1 if the size of the jury increases unboundedly. This holds under the assumption that different jurors are independent conditional on the state of the world, requiring that for each individual juror, a new independent view on the world is available. The authors propose a framework in which the jurors are independent on the evidence, rather than the world. This evidence is called the latest common cause of evidence of the jurors votes. This framework seems to have a realistic underpinning: a jury typically decides on the basis of commonly presented evidence, not on independently obtained signals about the world–the latter often not even being allowed for use in the court room. The chapter’s jury’ theorem then shows that the probability of a correct majority decision is typically less than the corresponding probability in the Condorcet’s model. It also predicts that, as the jury size increases, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to the probability that the evidence is not misleading. Chapter 9 (A SAT-Based Approach to Unbounded Model Checking for Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic), by M. Kacprzak and W. Penczek address the problem of (automatic)
WIEBE VAN DER HOEK
xv
verification of complex agent systems. The systems of study in chapter 9 are the Alternating-time Transitions Systems of chapter 3, more in particular those which incorporate an epistemic component. The problem addressed in this chapter is that of model checking such systems: can we, given a description of a transition system model, and a property expressed in an appropriate logic (ATEL, an epistemic extension of ATL), automatically check whether that property is true in that model? To do so, this approach fixes one of the semantics for ATL given in Chapter 4, to apply a technique from unbounded model checking to it. Then, for a given model T and ATEL-property ϕ, a procedure is given to express them as Quantified Boolean Formulas, which, using fixed point definitions, in turn yield purely propositional formulas. A main theorem of the chapter then states that ϕ is true of T if and only if the obtained propositional formula is satisfiable. Hence, model checking ATEL is reduced to a SAT-based approach, an approach that has computational advantages over model checking using for instance Binary Decision Diagrams. The last chapter, chapter 10, (Update Semantics of Security Protocols by Arjen Hommerson, John-Jules Meyer and Erik de Vink) addresses verification of security protocols. This becomes more and more important in an era where agents send more and more private, secret or sensitive messages over an insecure medium. Decryption keys are introduced to make specific messages only readable to specific agents, which makes the need to reason about higher order information (knowledge about knowledge) in a multi-agent protocol obvious. This chapter takes three kinds of updates, or messages (or, in the terminology of Chapter 1, ‘epistemic programs’): the public announcement of an object variable, the private learning of a variable and the private learning about the knowledge of other agents about variables. The chapter first of all gives a Dynamic Kripke Semantics for these specific actions, not unlike the semantics using action models as proposed in Chapter 1, and then puts this semantics to work to model and reason about two specific security protocols, in which encrypted messages are sent and received. This chapter might well be a first step to apply the model checking techniques described in Chapter 9 to the dynamic logic framework of Chapter 1, in the area of security and authorisation protocols.
ALEXANDRU BALTAG and LAWRENCE S. MOSS
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
ABSTRACT. We construct logical languages which allow one to represent a variety of possible types of changes affecting the information states of agents in a multi-agent setting. We formalize these changes by defining a notion of epistemic program. The languages are two-sorted sets that contain not only sentences but also actions or programs. This is as in dynamic logic, and indeed our languages are not significantly more complicated than dynamic logics. But the semantics is more complicated. In general, the semantics of an epistemic program is what we call a program model. This is a Kripke model of ‘actions’, representing the agents’ uncertainty about the current action in a similar way that Kripke models of ‘states’ are commonly used in epistemic logic to represent the agents’ uncertainty about the current state of the system. Program models induce changes affecting agents’ information, which we represent as changes of the state model, called epistemic updates. Formally, an update consists of two operations: the first is called the update map, and it takes every state model to another state model, called the updated model; the second gives, for each input state model, a transition relation between the states of that model and the states of the updated model. Each variety of epistemic actions, such as public announcements or completely private announcements to groups, gives what we call an action signature, and then each family of action signatures gives a logical language. The construction of these languages is the main topic of this paper. We also mention the systems that capture the valid sentences of our logics. But we defer to a separate paper the completeness proof. The basic operation used in the semantics is called the update product. A version of this was introduced in Baltag et al. (1998), and the presentation here improves on the earlier one. The update product is used to obtain from any program model the corresponding epistemic update, thus allowing us to compute changes of information or belief. This point is of interest independently of our logical languages. We illustrate the update product and our logical languages with many examples throughout the paper.
1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional epistemic puzzles often deal with changes of knowledge that come about in various ways. Perhaps the most popular examples are the puzzles revolving around the fact that a declaration of ignorance of some sentence A may well lead to knowledge of A. We have in mind the scenarios that go by names such as the Muddy Children, the Cheating Spouses, the Three Wisemen, and the like. The standard treatment of these matters (a) introduces the Kripke semantics of modal logic so as to formalize the Synthese 139: 165–224, 2004. Knowledge, Rationality & Action 1–60, 2004. © 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
[1]
166
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
informal notions of knowledge and common knowledge; (b) formalizes one of the scenarios as a particular model; (c) and finally shows how the formalized notions of knowledge and common knowledge illuminate some key aspects of the overall scenario. The informal notion of knowledge which is closest to what is captured in the traditional semantics is probably justified true belief. But more generally, one can consider justifiable beliefs, regardless of whether or not they happen to be true or not; in many contexts, agents may be deceived by certain actions, without necessarily losing their rationality. Thus, such beliefs, and the justifiable changes affecting these beliefs, may be accepted as a proper subject for logical investigation. The successful treatment of a host of puzzles leads naturally to the following THESIS I. Let s be a social situation involving the intuitive concepts of knowledge, justifiable beliefs and common knowledge among a group of agents. Assume that s is presented in such a way that all the relevant features of s pertaining to knowledge, beliefs and common knowledge are completely determined. Then we may associate to s a mathematical model S. (S is a multi-agent Kripke model; we call these epistemic state models.) The point of the association is that all intuitive judgements concerning s correspond to formal assertions concerning S, and vice-versa. We are not aware of any previous formulations of this thesis. Nevertheless, some version of this thesis is probably responsible for the appeal of epistemic logic. We shall not be concerned in this paper with a defense of this thesis, but instead we return to our opening point related to change. Dynamic epistemic logic, dynamic doxastic logic, and related formalisms, attempt to incorporate change from model to model in the syntax and semantics of a logical language. We are especially concerned with changes that result from information-updating actions of various sorts. Our overall aim is to formally represent epistemic actions, and we associate to each of them a corresponding update. By “updates” we shall mean operations defined on the space of all state models, operations which are meant to represent welldefined, systematic changes in the information states of all agents. By an “epistemic action” (or program) we shall mean a representation of the way such a change “looks” to each agent. Perhaps the paradigm case of an epistemic action is a public announcement. The first goal is to say in a general way what the effect of a (public) announcement should be on a model. It is natural to model such announcements by the logical notion of relativization: publicly announcing a sentence causes all agents to restrict attention to the worlds where the
[2]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
167
sentence was true (before the announcement). Note that the informal notion of announcement takes situations to situations, and the formal notion of relativization is an operation taking models to models. In this paper, we wish to consider many types of epistemic actions that are more difficult to handle than public announcements. These include half-transparent, half-opaque types of actions, such as announcements to groups in a completely private way, announcements that include the possibility that outsiders suspect the announcement but this suspicion is lost on the insiders, private announcements which are secretely intercepted by outsiders etc. We may also consider types of actions exhibiting information-loss and misinformation, where agents are deceived by others or by themselves. THESIS II. Let σ be a social “action” involving and affecting the knowledge (beliefs, common knowledge) of agents. This naturally induces a change of situation; i.e., an operation o taking situations s into situations o(s). Assume that o is presented by assertions concerning knowledge, beliefs and common knowledge facts about s and o(s), and that o is completely determined by these assertions. Then (a) We may associate to the action σ a mathematical model which we call an epistemic action model. ( is also a multi-agent Kripke model.) The point again is that all the intuitive features of, and judgments about, σ correspond to formal properties of . (b) There is an operation ⊗ taking a state model S and an action model and returning a new state model S ⊗ . So each induces an update operation O on state models: O(S) = S ⊗ . (c) The update O is a faithful model of the situation change o, in the sense that for all s: if s corresponds to S as in Thesis I, then again o(s) corresponds to O(S) in the same way; i.e. all intuitive judgements concerning o(s) correspond to formal assertions concerning O(S), and vice-versa. Our aim in this paper is not to offer a full conceptual defense of these two theses. Instead, we will justify the intuitions behind them through examples and usage. We shall use them to build logical languages and models and show how these can be applied to the analysis of natural examples of “social situations” and “social actions”. As in the case of standard possibleworlds semantics (for which a ‘strong’, ontological defense is hard, maybe even impossible, to give), the usefulness of these formal developments may [3]
168
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
provide a ‘weak’, implicit defense of the philosophical claims underlying our semantics. Our method of defining updates is quite general and leads to logics of epistemic programs, extending standard systems of epistemic logic by adding updates as new operators. These logical languages also incorporate features of propositional dynamic logic. Special cases of our logic, dealing only with public or semi-public announcements to mutually isolated groups, have been considered in Plaza (1989), Gerbrandy (199a, b), and Gerbrandy and Groeneveld (1997). But our overall setting is much more liberal, since it allows for all the above-mentioned types of actions. We feel it would be interesting to study further examples with an eye towards applications, but we leave this to other papers. In our logical systems, we capture only the epistemic aspect of these real actions, disregarding other (intentional) aspects. In particular, to keep things simple we only deal with “‘purely epistemic” actions; i.e., the ones that do not change the facts of the world, but affect only the agents’ beliefs about the world. However, this is not an essential limitation, as our formal setting can be easily adapted to express fact-changing actions. On the semantic side, the main original technical contribution of our paper lies in our decision to represent not only the epistemic states, but also (for the first time) the epistemic actions. For this, we use action models, which are epistemic Kripke models of “actions”, similar to the standard Kripke structures of “states”. While for states, these structures represent in the usual way the uncertainty of each agent concerning the current state of the system, we similarly use action signatures to represent the uncertainty of each agent concerning the current action taking place. For example, there will be a single action signature that represents public announcements. There will be a different action signature representing a completely private announcement to one specified agent, etc. The intuition is that we are dealing with potentially “half-opaque/half-transparent” actions, about which the agents may be incompletely informed, or even completely misinformed. The components (“possible worlds”) of an action model are called “simple” actions, since they are meant to represent particularly simple kinds of actions, whose epistemic impact is uniform on states: the informational features of a simple action are intrinsic to the action, and thus are independent of the informational features of the states to which it can be applied. This independence is subject to only one restriction: the action’s presuppositions or conditions of possibility, which a state must satisfy in order for the action to be executable. Thus, besides the epistemic structure, simple actions have preconditions, defining their domain of applicability: not every action is possible in every state. We model the update [4]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
169
of a state by an action as a partial update operation, given by a restricted product of the two structures: the uncertainties present in the given state and the given action are multiplied, while the “impossible” combinations of states and actions are eliminated (by testing the actions’ preconditions on the state). The underlying intuition is that, since the agent’s uncertainties concerning the state and the ones concerning the simple action are mutually independent, the two uncertainties must be multiplied, except that we insist on applying an action only to those states which satisfy its precondition. On the syntactic side, we use a mixture of dynamic and epistemic logic, with dynamic modalities associated to each action signature, and with common-knowledge modalities for various groups of agents (in addition to the usual individual-knowledge operators). In this paper, we present a sound system for this logic. The logic includes an Action-Knowledge Axiom that generalizes similar axioms found in other papers in the area; (cf. Gergrand 1999a, b; Plaza 1989). The main original features of our system is an inference rule which we call the Action Rule. This allows one to infer sentences expressing common knowledge facts which hold after an epistemic action. From another point of view, the Action Rule expresses what might be called a notion of “epistemic (co)recursion”. Overall, the Action-Knowledge Axiom and the Action Rule express fundamental formal features of the interaction between action and knowledge in multi-agent systems. The logic is studied further in our paper with S. Solecki (Baltag et al. 1998). There we present the completeness and decidability of the logic, and we prove various expressivity results. For Impatient Readers. The main logical systems of the paper are presented in Section 4.2, and to read that one would only have to read the definition in Section 4.1 first. To understand the semantics, one should read in addition Sections 2.1, 2.3, and 3.1–3.4. But we know that our systems would not be of any interest if the motivation were not so great. For this reason, we have included many examples and discussions, particularly in the sections of the paper preceding the introduction of the logics. Readers may read as much or as little of that material as they desire. Indeed, some readers may find our examples and discussion of more interest than the logical systems themselves. The main logical systems are presented in Section 5. Technical Results. Concerning our systems will appear in other papers. The completeness/decidability result for the main systems of this paper will appear in a paper (Baltag et al. 1998) written with Sławomir Solecki;
[5]
170
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
this paper also contains results on the expressive power of our systems. For stronger systems of interest, there are undecidability results; (cf. Miller and Moss (2003)).
1.1. Scenarios Probably the best way to enter our our overall subject is to consider some “epistemic scenarios.” These give the reader some idea of what the general subject is about, and they also provide us with test problems at different points. SCENARIO 1. The Concealed Coin. A and B enter a large room containing a remote-control mechanical coin flipper. One presses a button, and the coin spins through the air, landing in a small box on a table. The box closes. The two people are much too far to see the coin. The main contents of any representation of the relevant knowledge states of A and B are that (a) there are two alternatives, heads and tails; (b) neither party knows which alternative holds; and (c) that (a) and (b) are common knowledge. The need for the notion of common knowledge in reasoning about multi-agent interaction is by now standard in applied epistemic logic, and so we take it as unproblematic that one would want (c) to come out in any representation of this scenario. Perhaps the clearest way to represent this scenario is with a diagram:
In more standard terms, we have a set of two alternatives, call them x and y. We also have some atomic information, that x represents the possible fact of the coin is lying heads up and that y represents the other possible fact. Finally, we also have some extra apparatus needed to indicate that, no matter the actual disposition of the coin, A and B think both alternatives are possible. Following the standard practice in epistemic logic, we take this apparatus to be accessibility relations between the alternatives. The diagram should be read as saying that were the actual state of the world to be x, say, then A and B would still entertain both alternatives. SCENARIO 2. The Coin Revealed to Show Heads. A and B sit down. One opens the box and puts the coin on the table for both to see. It’s heads. The result of this scenario is a model which again is easy to grasp. It consists of one state; call it s. Each agent knows the state in the sense that they think s is the only possible state. [6]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
171
We also shall be interested in keeping track of the relation of the model in Scenario 1 and the model just above. We indicate this in the following way:
The first thing to note is that the dotted connection is a partial function; as we shall see later, this is the hallmark of a deterministic epistemic action. But we also will see quite soon that the before-after relation is not always a partial function; so there are epistemic actions which are not deterministic. Another thing to note at this point is that the dotted connection is not subscripted with an agent or a set of agents. It does not represent alternative possibility with respect to anyone, but instead stands for the before-after relation between two models: it is a transition relation, going from input states to the corresponding output states. In this example, the transition relation is in fact a partial function whose domain is the set of states which could possibly be subject to the action of revealing heads. This is possible in only one of the two starting states. SCENARIO 2.1. The Coin Revealed to Show Tails. As a variation on Scenario 2, there is a different Scenario in which the coin is revealed in the same way to both A and B but with the change that tails shows. Our full representation is:
SCENARIO 2.2. The Coin Revealed. Finally, we can consider the nondeterministic sum of publicly revealing heads and publicly revealing tails. The coin is revealed to both A and B, but all that we as external modelers can say is that either they learned that heads shows, or that they learned that tails shows. Our representation is
[7]
172
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Observe that, although non-deterministically defined, this is still a deterministic action: the relation described by the dotted connection is still a function. SCENARIO 3. A Semi-private Viewing of Heads. The following is an alternative to the scenarios above in which there is a public revelation. After Scenario 1, A opens the box herself. The coin is lying heads up. B observes A open the box but does not see the coin. And A also does not disclose whether it is heads or tails.
No matter which alternative holds, B would consider both as possible, and A would be certain which was the case SCENARIO 3.1. B’s Turn. After Scenario 3, B takes a turn and opens the box the same way. We expect that after both have individually opened the boxes they see the same things; moreover, they know this will happen. This time, we begin with the end of Scenario 3, and we end with the same end as in the public revelation of heads:
SCENARIO 4. Cheating. After Scenario 1, A secretly opens the box herself. The coin is lying Heads up. B does not observe A open the box, and indeed A is certain that B did not suspect that anything happened after they sat down. This is substantially more difficult conceptually, and the representation is accordingly more involved. Such cheating is like an announcement that results in A’s being sure that the coin lies heads up, and B learns nothing. But the problem is how to model the fact that, after the announcement, B knows nothing (new). We cannot just delete all arrows for B to represent such lack of knowledge: this would actually increase B’s (false) ‘knowledge’, by adding to his set of beliefs new ones; for example, he’ll believe it is not possible that the coin is lying heads up. Deleting arrows always corresponds to increasing ‘information’ (even if sometimes this is just by adding false information). But this seems wrong in our case, since B’s possibilities should be unchanged by A’s secret cheating. Instead, our representation of the informational change induced by such cheating should be:
[8]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
173
(1)
The main point is that after A cheats, B does not think that the actual state of the world is even possible. The states that B thinks are possible should only be two states which are the same as the “before” states, or states which are in some important way similar to those. In addition to the way the state actually is, where A knows the coin lies heads up or rather as an aspect of that state, we need to consider other states to represent the possibilities that B must entertain. We have indicated names s, t, and u of the possibilities in (1). (We could have done this with the scenarios we already considered, but there was less of a reason.) State s has a different status from t and u: while t and u are the states those that B thinks could hold, s is the one that A knows to be the case. Note that the substructure determined by t and u is isomorphic to the “before” structure. This is the way that we formalize the intuition that the states available to B after cheating are essentially the same as the states before cheating. SCENARIO 5. More Cheating. After Scenario 4, B does the very same thing. That is, B opens the box quite secretly. We leave the reader the instructive exercise of working out a representation. We shall return to this matter in Section 3.5, where we solve the problem based on our general machinery. We merely mention now that part of the goal of the paper is precisely to develop tools to build representations of complex epistemic examples such as this one. SCENARIO 6. Lying. After Scenario 1, A convinces B that the coin lies heads up and that she knows this. In fact, she is lying. Here is our representation:
SCENARIO 7. Pick a Card. As another alternative to Scenario 3, C walks in and tells both A and B at the same time that she has a card which either says H, T, or is blank. In the first two cases the card describes truly the
[9]
174
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
state of the coin in the box, and in the last case the intention is that no information is given. Then C gives the card to A in the presence of B. Here is our representation:
The idea here is that t and u represent states where the card was blank, s the state where the card showed H, and t the state where the card showed T. SCENARIO 8. Common Knowledge of (Unfounded) Suspicion. As yet another alternative to Scenario 3, suppose that after A and B make their original entrance, A has not looked, but B has some suspicion concerning A’s cheating; so B considers possible that she (A) has secretely opened the box (but B cannot be sure of this, so he also considers possible that nothing happened); moreover, we assume there is common knowledge of this (B’s) suspicion. That is, we want to think of one single action (a knowing glance by A, for example) that results in all of this. The representation of “before” and “after” is as follows:
One should compare this with Scenario 7. The blank card there is a parallel to no looking here; card with H is parallel to A’s looking and seeing H; and similarly for T. This accounts for the similarity in the models. The main difference is that Scenario 7 was described in such a way that we do not know what the card says; in this scenario we stipulate that A definitely did not look. This accounts for the difference in dotted lines between the two figures.
[ 10 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
175
SCENARIO 8.1. Private Communication about the Other. After Scenario 8, someone stands in the doorway behind A and raises a finger. This indicates to B that A has not cheated. The communication between B and the third party was completely private. Again, we leave the representation as an exercise to the reader. One Goal. of the paper is to propose a theoretical understanding of these representations. It turns out that there are simple operations and general insights which allow one to construct them. One operation allows one to pass, for example, from the representation of Scenario 1 to that of Scenario 4; moreover, the operation is so applicable that it allows us to add private knowledge for one agent in a “private” way to any representation. 1.2. Further Contents of This Paper Section 2 continues our introduction by both reviewing some of the main background concepts of epistemic logic, and also by situating our logical systems with respect to well-known systems. Section 2.1 presents a new “big picture” of the world of epistemic actions. While the work that we do could be understood without the conceptual part of the big picture, it probably would help the reader to work through our definitions. Section 3 begins the technical part of the paper in earnest, and here we revisit some of the Scenarios of Section 1.1 and their pictures. The idea is to get a logical system for reasoning with, and about, these kinds of models. Section 4 gives the syntax and semantics of our logical systems. These are studied further in Sections 5. For example, we present sound and complete logical systems (with the proofs of soundness and completeness deferred to Baltag et al. (2003)). Endnotes. We gather at the ends of our sections some remarks about the literature and how our work fits in with that of others. We mentioned other work in dynamic epistemic logic and dynamic doxastic logic. Much more on these logics and many other proposals in epistemic logic may be found in Gochet and Gribomont (2003), and Meyer and van der Hoek (1995). Also, a survey of many topics the area of information update and communication may be found in van Benthem’s papers (2000, 2001a, b). The ideas behind several of the scenarios in Section 1.1 are to be found in several places: see, e.g., Plaza (1989), Gerbrandy (1999a, b), Gerbrandy and Groeneveld (1997), and van Ditmarsch (2000, 2001). We shall discuss these papers in more detail later. Our scenarios go beyond the work of these papers. Specifically, our treatment of the actions in Scenarios 6 and [ 11 ]
176
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
8 seems new. Also, our use of the relation between “before” and “after” (given by the dotted arrows) is new.
2. EPISTEMIC UPDATES AND OUR TARGET LOGICS
We fix a set AtSen of atomic sentences, and a set A of agents. All of our definitions depend on AtSen and A, but for the most part we omit mention of these. 2.1. State Models and Epistemic Propositions A
A state model is a triple S = (S, → S , · S ) consisting of a set S of A “states”; a family of binary accessibility relations → S ⊆ S × S, one for each agent A ∈ A; and a “valuation” (or a “truth” map) .S : AtSenP (S), assigning to each atomic sentence p a set pS of states. When dealing with a single fixed state model S, we often drop the subscript S from all the notation. In a state model, atomic sentences are supposed to represent nonepistemic, “objective” facts of the world, which can be thought of as properties of states; the valuation tells us which facts hold at which states. The accessibility relations model the agents’ epistemic uncertainty about A
the current state. That is, to say that s → t in S means that in the model, in state s, agent A considers it possible that the state is t. DEFINITION. Let StateModels be the collection of all state models. An epistemic proposition is an operation ϕ defined on StateModels such that for all S ∈ StateModels, ϕ S ⊆ S. The collection of epistemic propositions is closed in various ways. 1. For each atomic sentence p we have an atomic proposition p with pS = pS .1 2. If ϕ is an epistemic proposition, then so is ¬ϕ, where (¬ϕ) S = S \ ϕ S . 3. If C is a set or class of epistemic propositions, then so is C, with {ϕ S : ϕ ∈ C}. ( C)S = 4. Taking C above to be empty, we have an “always true” epistemic proposition tr, with trS = S. 5. We also may take C in part (3) to be a two-element set {ϕ, ψ}; here we write ϕ ∧ ψ instead of {ϕ, ψ}. We see that if ϕ and ψ are epistemic propositions, then so is ϕ ∧ ψ, with (ϕ ∧ ψ)S = ϕ S ∩ ψ S . [ 12 ]
177
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
6. If ϕ is an epistemic proposition and A ∈ A, then 2A ϕ is an epistemic proposition, with (2A ϕ)S
(2)
=
A
{s ∈ S : if s → t, then t ∈ ϕ S }.
7. If ϕ is an epistemic proposition and B ⊆ A, then 2∗B ϕ is an epistemic proposition, with (2∗B ϕ)S
=
∗
B {s ∈ S : if s −→ t, then t ∈ ϕ S }.
∗
B t iff there is a sequence Here s −→
s = u0
→A1
u1
→A2
· · · →An
un+1 = t
where A1 , . . . , An ∈ B. In other words, there is a sequence of arrows B∗ includes from the set B taking s to t. We allow n = 0 here, so −→ the identity relation on S. To see that 2∗B ϕ is indeed an epistemic proposition, we use parts 3 and 6 above; we may also argue directly, of course. 2.2. Epistemic Logic Recalled In this section, we review the basic definitions of modal logic. In terms of our work in Section 2.1 above, the infinitary modal propositions are the smallest collection of epistemic propositions containing the propositions p corresponding toatomic sentences p and closed under negation ¬, infinitary conjunction , and the agent modalities 2A . The finitary propositions are the smallest collection closed the same way, except that we replace by its special cases tr and the binary conjunction operation. Syntactic and Semantic Notions. It will be important for us to make a sharp distinction between syntactic and semantic notions. For example, we speak of atomic sentences and atomic propositions. The difference for us is that atomic sentences are entirely syntactic objects: we won’t treat an atomic sentence p as anything except an unanalyzed mathematical object. On the other hand, this atomic sentence p also has associated with it the atomic proposition p. For us p will be a function whose domain is the (proper class of) state models, and it is defined by (3)
pS
=
{s ∈ S : s ∈ pS }.
This difference may seem pedantic at first, and surely there are times when it is sensible to blur it. But for various reasons that will hopefully become clear, we need to insist on it. [ 13 ]
178
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Up until now, the only syntactic objects have been the atomic sentences p ∈ AtSen. But we can build the collections of finitary and infinitary atomic sentences by the same definitions that we have seen, and then the work of the past section is the semantics of our logical systems. For example, we have sentences p ∧ q, 2A ¬p, and 2∗B q. These then have corresponding epistemic propositions as their semantics: p ∧ q, 2A ¬p, and 2∗B q, respectively. Note that the latter is a properly infinitary proposition (and so 2∗B q is a properly infinitary sentence); it abbreviates an infinite conjunction. The rest of this section studies examples of the semantics and it also makes the connection of the formal system with the informal notions of knowledge, belief and common knowledge. We shall study Scenario 3 of Section 1.1, where A opens the box herself to see heads in a semi-public way: B sees A open the box but not the result, A is aware of this, etc. We want to study the model after the opening. We represented this as
We first must represent this picture as a bona fide state model S3 in our sense.2 The picture includes no explicit states, but we must fix some states to have a representation. We choose distinct objects s and t. Then we take as our state model S3 , as defined by S3
=
{s, t}
A
= =
{(s, s), (t, t)} {(s, s), (s, t), (t, s), (t, t)}
→ B →
H T
= =
{s} {t}
In Figure 1, we list some sentences of English along with their translations into standard epistemic logic. We also have calculated the semantics of the formal sentences in the model S3 . It should be stressed that the semantics is exactly the one defined in the previous section. For example, 2A TS3
A
=
{u ∈ S3 : if u → v, then v ∈ TS3 }
= =
{u ∈ S3 : if u → v, then v = t} {t}
A
We also emphasize two other points. First, the translation of English to the formal system is based on the rendering of “A knows” (or “A has a justified belief that”) as 2A , and of “it is common knowledge that” by 2∗A,B . Second, the chart bears a relation to intuitions that one naturally has about the states s and t. Recall that s is the state that obtains after A looks [ 14 ]
179
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
English the coin shows heads A knows the coin shows heads A knows the coin shows tails B knows that the coin shows head A knows that B doesn’t know it’s heads B knows that A knows that B doesn’t know it’s heads it is common knowledge that either A knows it’s heads or A knows that it’s tails it is common knowledge that B doesn’t know the state of the coin
Formal rendering 2A H 2A T 2B H
Semantics {t} {s} {t} ∅
2A ¬2B H
{s, t}
2B 2A ¬2B H
{s, t}
2∗A,B (2A H ∨ 2A T)
{s, t}
H
2∗A,B ¬(2B H ∨ 2B T) {s, t}
Figure 1. Examples of translations and semantics.
and sees that the coin is lying heads up. The state t, on the other hand, is a state that would have been the case had A seen tails when she looked. 2.3. Updates A transition relation between state models S and T is a relation between the sets S and T . We write r : S → T for this. An update r is a pair of operations r
=
(S → S(r), S → rS ),
where for each S ∈ StateModels, rS : S → S(r) is a transition relation. We call S → S(r) the update map, and S → rS the update relation. EXAMPLE 2.1. Let ϕ be an epistemic proposition. We get an update Pub ϕ which represents the public announcement of ϕ. For each S, S(Pub ϕ) is the sub-state-model of S determined by the states in ϕ S . In this submodel, information about atomic sentences and accessibility relations is simply inherited from the larger model. The update relation (Pub ϕ)S is the inverse of the inclusion relation of S(Pub ϕ) into S. EXAMPLE 2.2. We also get a different update ?ϕ which represents testing whether ϕ is true. Here we take S(?ϕ) to be the model whose state set is ({0} × ϕ S ) ∪ ({1} × S). [ 15 ]
180
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS A
A
The arrows are defined by (i, s) →(j, t) iff s → t in S and j = 1. (Note that states of the form (0, s) are never the targets of arrows in the new model.) Finally, we set =
pS(?ϕ )
{(i, s) ∈ S(?ϕ) : s ∈ pS }.
The relation (?ϕ)S is the set of pairs (s, (0, s)) such that s ∈ ϕ S . We shall study these two examples (and many others) in the sequel, and in particular we shall justify the names “public announcement” and “test”. For now, we continue our general discussion by noting that the collection of updates is closed in various ways. 1. Skip: there is an update 1 with S(1) = S, and 1S is the identity relation on S. 2. Sequential Composition: if r and s are epistemic updates, then their composition r; s is again an epistemic update, where S(r; s) = S(r)(s), and (r; s)S = rS ; sS(r) . Here, we use on the right side the usual composition ; of relations.3 3. Disjoint Union (or Non-deterministic choice): If X is any set of epi stemic updates, then the disjoint union X r is anepistemic update, defined as follows. The set of states of the model X r is the disjoint union of all the sets of states in each model S(r): {(s, r) : r ∈ X and s ∈ S(r)}. A
Similarly, each accessibility relation → is defined as the disjoint union of the corresponding accessibility relations in each model: A
A
(t, r) →(u, s) iff if r = s and t → u in S(r). The valuation p in S( X r) is the disjoint union of the valuations in each state model: {(s, r) : r ∈ X and s ∈ pS(r) }. Finally, the update relation ( X r)S between S and S( X r) is the union of all the update relations rS : t ( r)S (u, s) iff tsS u. p
=
X
4. Special case: Binary Union. The (disjoint) union of two epistemic updates r and s is an update r s, given by r s = {r, s}. [ 16 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
181
5. Another special case: Kleene star (iteration). We have the operation of Kleene star on updates: {1, r, r · r, . . . , rn , . . .} r∗ = where rn is recursively defined by r0 = 1, rn+1 = rn ; r. 1. Crash: We can also take X = ∅ in part 3. This gives an update 0 such that S(0) is the empty model for each S, and 0S is the empty relation. The operations r; s, r s and r∗ are the natural analogues of the operations of relational composition, union of relations and iteration of a relation, and also of the regular operations on programs in PDL. The intended meanings are: for r; s, sequential composition (do r, then do s); for r s, non-deterministic choice (do either r or s); for r∗ , iteration (repeat r some finite number of times). A New Operation: Synamic Modalities for Updates. If ϕ is an epistemic proposition and r an update, then [r]ϕ is an epistemic proposition defined by (4)
([r]ϕ)S
=
{s ∈ S : if s rS t, then t ∈ ϕ S(r) }.
We should compare (4) and (2). The point is that we may treat updates in a similar manner to other box-like modalities; the structure given by an update allows us to do this. This point leads to the formal languages which we shall construct in due course. But we can illustrate the idea even now. Suppose we want to interpret the sentence [Pub H]2A H in our very first model, the model S1 pictured again below:
We shall call the two states s (where H holds) and t. Again, we want to determine [[[Pub H]2A H]]S1 . We already have in Example 2.1 a general definition of Pub H as an update, so we can calculate S1 (Pub H) and also (Pub H)S1 . We indicate these in the picture
The one-state model on the right is S1 (Pub H), and the dotted arrow shows (Pub H)S1 . So we calculate: [[[Pub H]2A H]]S1 = {s ∈ S1 : whenever s (Pub H)S1 t, then also t ∈ [[2A H]]S1 (Pub H) }. [ 17 ]
182
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
In S1 (Pub H), the state satisfies 2A H. Thus [[[Pub H]2A H]]S1 = {s, t}. It might be more interesting to consider Pub H2A H; this is ¬[Pub H]¬2A H. Similar calculations show that [[Pub H2A H]]S1 = {s ∈ S1 : for some t, s (Pub H)S1 t and t ∈ [[2A H]]S1 (Pub H) }. The point here is that we have a general semantics for sentences like [Pub H]2A H, and this semantics crucially uses Equation (4). That is, to determine the truth set of a sentence like [Pub H]2A H in a particular model S, one applies the update map to S and works with the update relation between the S and the S([Pub H]); one also uses the semantics of 2A H in the new model. This overall point is one of the two leading features of our approach; the other is the update product which we introduce in Section 3. 2.4. The Target Logical Systems This paper presents a number of logical systems which contain epistemic operators of various types. These operators are closely related to aspects of the scenarios of Section 1.1. The logics themselves are presented formally in Section 4, but this work takes a fair amount of preparation. We delay this until after we motivate the subject, and so we turn to an informal presentation of the syntax and semantics of some logics. The overall idea is that the operators we study correspond roughly to the shapes of the action models which we shall see in Section 3.5. THE LOGIC OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS. We take a two-place sentential operator [Pub −]−. That is, we want an operation taking sentences ϕ and ψ to a new sentence [Pub ϕ]ψ, and we want a logic closed under this operation. The intended interpretation of [Pub ϕ]ψ is: assuming that ϕ holds, then announcing it results in a state where ψ holds. The announcement here should be completely public. The semantics of every sentence χ will be an epistemic proposition [[χ]] in the sense of Section 2.1. Note that we refer to this operator as a two-place one. This just means that it takes two sentences and returns another sentence. We also think of [Pub ϕ] as a modal operator in its own right, on a par with the knowledge operators 2A . And so we shall think of Pub as something which takes sentences into one-place modal operators. We also consider a dual Pub ϕ to [Pub ϕ]. As one expects, the semantics will arrange that Pub ϕψ and ¬[Pub ϕ]¬ψ be logically equivalent. (That is, they will hold at the same states.) Thus, the intended [ 18 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
183
interpretation of Pub ϕψ is: ϕ holds, and announcing it results in a state where ψ holds. As one indication of the difference, in S1 , y |= [Pub H]true (vacuously, as it were: it is not possible to make a true announcement of H in y). But we do have y |= ¬Pub Htrue; this is how our semantics works out. Once again we only consider true announcements. Our semantics will arrange that ϕ → (Pub ϕψ ↔ [Pub ϕ]ψ). So in working with the example scenarios, the difference between the two modalities will be small. Further, we iterate the announcement operation, obtaining sentences such as [Pub p][Pub q]r. We also want to consider announcements about announcements, as in Pub Pub ϕψχ. This says that it is possible to announce publicly Pub ϕψ, and as a result of a true announcement of this sentence, χ will hold. THE LOGIC OF COMPLETELY PRIVATE ANNOUNCEMENTS TO GROUPS. This time, the syntax is more complicated. If ϕ and ψ are sentences and B is a set of agents, then [PriB ϕ]ψ is again a sentence. The intended interpretation of this is: assuming that ϕ holds, then announcing it publicly to the subgroup B in such a way that outsiders do not even suspect that the announcement happened results in a state where ψ holds. (The “Pri” in the notation stands for “private.”) For example, this kind of announcement occurs in the passage from Scenario 1 to Scenario 4; that is, “cheating” is a kind of private announcement to the “group” {A}. We want it to be the case that in S1 , x |= Pri{A} H(2A H ∧ ¬2B 2A H). That is, in x, it is possible to announce H to A privately (since H is true in x), and by so doing we have a new state where A knows this fact, but B does not know that A knows it. The logic of private announcements to groups allows as modal operators [PriB ϕ] for all sentences ϕ of the logic. We shall show that this logical system extends the logic of public announcements, the idea being that when we take B to be the full set A of agents, Pub ϕ and PriA ϕ should be equivalent in the appropriate sense. THE LOGIC OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF ALTERNATIVES. If ϕ is again and ψ are sentences and B is a set of agents, then [CkaB ϕ]ψ a sentence. The intended interpretation of this is: assuming that ϕ1 holds, then announcing it publicly to the subgroup B in such a way it is common knowledge to the set of all agents that the announcement was one of ϕ [ 19 ]
184
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Syntactic sentence ϕ language L, L(), etc. action signature basic action expression σ ψ program π , action α
Semantic epistemic proposition ϕ state model S update r epistemic program model (, , ψ 1 , . . . ψ n ) canonical action model
Figure 2. The main notions in this paper.
results in a state where ψ holds. For example, consider Scenario 3. In S1 , we have x |= ¬2A H ∧ Cka{A} H, T(2A (H ∧ ¬2B 2A H) ∧ 2B (2A H ∨ 2A T)). The action here is A learning that either the coin lies heads up or that it lies tails up, and this is done in such a way that B knows that A learns one of the two alternatives but not which one. Before the action, A does not know that the coin lies heads up. As a result, A knows this, and knows that B does not know it. At this point, we have the syntax of some logical languages and also examples of what we intend the semantics to be. We do not yet have the formal semantics of any of these languages, of course. However, even before we turn to this, we want to be clear that our goal in this paper is to study a very wide class of logical systems, including ones for the representation of all possible “announcement types.” The reasons to be interested in this approach rather than to study a few separate logics are as follows: (1) it is more general and elegant to have a unified presentation; and (2) it gives a formal account of the notion of an “announcement type” which would be otherwise lacking and which should be of independent interest. So what we will really be concerned with is: THE LOGIC OF ALL POSSIBLE EPISTEMIC ACTIONS. If α is an epistemic action and ϕ is a sentence, then [α]ϕ is again a sentence. Here α is some sort of epistemic action (which of course we shall define in due course); the point is that α might involve arbitrarily complex patterns of suspicion. In this way, we shall recover the four logical systems mentioned above as fragments of the larger logic of all possible epistemic actions. Our Claims in This Paper. Here are some of the claims of the paper about the logical languages we shall construct and about our notion of updates. [ 20 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
185
Figure 3. Languages in this paper.
1. Each type of epistemic action, such as public announcements, completely private announcements, announcements with common knowledge of suspicion, etc, corresponds to a natural collection of updates as we have defined them above. 2. Each type also gives rise to a logical language with that type of action as a primitive construct. Moreover, it is possible to precisely define the syntax of the language to insure closure under the construct. That is, we should be able to formulate a language with announcements not just about atomic facts, but about announcements themselves, announcements about announcements, etc. 2.5. A Guide to the Concepts in This Paper In this section, we catalog the main notions that we shall introduce in due course. After this, we turn to a discussion of the particular languages that we study, and we situate them with existing logical languages. Recall the we insist on a distinction of syntactic and semantic objects in this paper. We list in Figure 2 the main notions that we will need. We do this mostly to help readers as they explore the different notions. We mention now that the various notions are not developed in the order listed; indeed, we have tried hard to organize this paper in a way that will be easiest to read and understand. For example, one of our main goals is to present a set of languages (syntactic objects) and their semantics (utilizing semantic objects). Languages. This paper studies a number of languages, and to help the reader we list these in Figure 2. Actually, what we study are not individual languages, but rather families of languages parameterized by different choices of primitives. It is standard in modal logic to begin with a set of [ 21 ]
186
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
atomic propositions, and we do the same. The difference is that we shall call these atomic sentences in order to make a distinction between these essentially syntactic objects and the semantic propositions that we study beginning in Section 2.3. This is our first parameter, a set AtSen of atomic sentences. The second is a set A of agents. Given these, L0 is ordinary modal logic with the elements of AtSen as atomic sentences and with agent-knowledge (or belief) modalities 2A for A ∈ A. We add common-knowledge operators 2∗B , for sets of agents B ⊆ A, to get a larger language L1 . In Figure 2, we note the fact that L0 is literally a subset of L1 by using the inclusion arrow. The syntax and semantics of L0 and L1 are presented in Figure 4. Another close neighbor of the system in this paper is Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL). PDL was first formulated by Fischer and Ladner (1979), following the introduction of dynamic logic in Pratt (1976). The syntax and the main clauses in the semantics of PDL are shown in Figure 5. We may also take L0 and close under countable conjunctions (and hence also disjunctions). We call this language Lω0 . Note that L1 is not literally a subset of Lω0 , but there is a translation of L1 into Lω0 that preserves the semantics. We would indicate this in a chart with a dashed arrow. Going further, we may close under arbitrary (set-sized) boolean operations; this language is then called L∞ 0 . PDL is propositional dynamic logic, formulated with atomic programs a replacing the agents A that we have fixed. We might note that we can translate L1 into PDL. The main clauses in the translation are: (2A ϕ)t (2∗B ϕ)t
= =
t [a]ϕ [( b∈B b)∗ ]ϕ t
Beginning in Section 4.2, we study some new languages. These will be based on a third parameter, an action signature . For each “type of epistemic action” there will be an action signature . For each , we’ll have languages L0 ( ), L1 ( ), and L( ). More generally, for each family of action signatures S, we have languages L0 (S), L1 (S), and L(S). These will be related to the other languages as indicated in the figure. So we shall extend modal logic by adding one or another type of epistemic action. The idea is then we can generate a logic from an action signature corresponding to an intuitive action. For example, corresponding to the notion of a public announcement is a particular action signature
pub, and then the languages L0 ( pub), L1 ( pub), and L( pub) will have something to do with our notion of a “logic of public announcements.” [ 22 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
187
Figure 4. The languages L0 and L1 . For L0 , we drop the 2∗B construct.
Figure 5. Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL).
In Baltag et al. (2003), we compare the expressive power of the languages mentioned so far. It turns out that all of the arrows in Figure 3 correspond to proper increases in expressive power. (There is one exception: L0 turns out to equal L0 (S) in expressive power for all S.) It is even more interesting to compare expressive power as we change the action signature. For example, we would like to compare logics of public announcement to logics of private announcement to groups. Most of the natural questions in this area are open as of this writing. 2.6. Reformulation of Test-only PDL In PDL, there are two types of syntactic objects, sentences and programs. The programs in PDL are interpreted on a structure by relations on that structure. This is not the way our semantics works, and to make this point we compare the standard semantics of (a fragment of) PDL with a language closer to what we shall ultimately study. To make this point, we consider the test-only fragment of PDL in our terms. This is the fragment built over the empty set of atomic programs. So the programs are skip, the tests ?ϕ and compositions, choices, or iterations of these; sentences are formed as in PDL We give a reformulation in Figure 6. The point is that in PDL the programs are interpreted by relations on a given model, and in our terms programs are interpreted by updates. We have discussed updates of the form ?ϕ in Example2.2. Given that we have [ 23 ]
188
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Figure 6. Test-only PDL, with a semantics in our style.
an interpretation of the sentence ϕ as an epistemic proposition [[ϕ]], we then automatically have an update ?[[ϕ]]. For the sentences, the main thing to look at is the semantics of sentences [π ]ϕ; here we use the semantic notions from Section 2.3. The way the semantics works is that we have [[π ]] and [[ϕ]]; the former is an update and the latter is an epistemic proposition. Then we use both of these to get an overall semantics, using Equation (4). In more explicit terms, [[[π ]ϕ]]S
= =
([[[π ]]][[ϕ]]])S {s ∈ S : if s [[π ]]S t, then t ∈ [[ϕ]]S }
2.7. Background: Bisimulation We shall see the concept of bisimulation at various points in the paper, and this section reviews the concept and also develops some of the appropriate definitions concerning bisimulation and updates. DEFINITION. Let S and T be state models. A bisimulation between S and T is a relation R ⊆ S × T such that whenever s R t, the following three properties hold: 1. s ∈ pS iff t ∈ pT for all atomic sentences p. That is, s and t agree on all atomic information. A s , there is some state t 1. For all agents A and states s such that s → A such that t → t and s R t . A t , there is some state s 2. For all agents A and states t such that t → A such that s → s and s R t . EXAMPLE 2.3. This example concerns the update operation ?ϕ of Example2.2. Fix an epistemic proposition ϕ and a state model S. Recall that [ 24 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
189
(?ϕ)S relates each s ∈ ϕ to the corresponding pair (0, s). We check that the following relation R is a bisimulation between S and S(?ϕ): R
=
(?ϕ)S ∪ {(s, (1, s)) : s ∈ S}.
The definition of S(?ϕ) insures that the interpretations of atomic sentences are preserved by this relation. A t in S and s R (i, s ). Then we must have s = s. Next, suppose that s → A (1, t). Further, the definition of R tells us that t R (1, t), and (i, s) → A Finally, suppose that s R (i, s ) and (i, s ) → (j, t). Then s = s and A A in S(?ϕ) implies that s → t in S. j = 1. In addition, the definition → And as above, t R (1, t). This concludes our verifications. Recall that L0 is ordinary modal logic, formulated as always over our fixed sets of agents and atomic sentences. The next result concerns the language L∞ 0 of infinitary modal logic. In this language, one has conjunctions and disjunctions of arbitrary sets of sentences. We have the following well-known result: PROPOSITION 2.4. If there is a bisimulation R such that s R t, then s and ∞ t agree on all sentences in L∞ 0 : for all ϕ ∈ L0 , s ∈ [[ϕ]]S iff t ∈ [[ϕ]]T . A pointed state model is a pair (S, s) such that s ∈ S. The state s is called the designated state (or the “point”) of our pointed model, and is meant to represent the actual state of the system. Two pointed models models are said to be bisimilar if there exists a bisimulation relation between them which relates their designated states. So, denoting by ≡ the relation of bisimilarity, we have: (S, s) ≡ (T, t) iff T such that s R t.
there is a bisimulation R between S and
This relation ≡ is indeed an equivalence relation. When S and T are clear from the context, we write s ≡ t instead of (S, s) ≡ (T, t). We say that a proposition ϕ preserves bisimulations if whenever (S, s) ≡ (T, t), then s ∈ ϕ S iff t ∈ ϕ T . We also say that an update r preserves bisimulations if the following two conditions hold: 1. If s rS s and (S, s) ≡ (T, t), then there is some t such that t rT t and (S(r), s ) ≡ (T(r), t ). 2. If t rT t and (S, s) ≡ (T, t), then there is some s such that s rS s and (S(r), s ) ≡ (T(r), t ). [ 25 ]
190
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
PROPOSITION 2.5. Concerning bisimulation preservation: 1. The bisimulation preserving propositions include the atomic propositions p, and they are closed under all of the (infinitary) operations on propositions. 2. The bisimulation preserving updates are closed under composition and (infinitary) sums. 3. If ϕ and r preserve bisimulations, so does [r]ϕ. Proof. We show the last part. Suppose that s ∈ ([r]ϕ)S , and let (S, s) ≡ (T, t). To show that t ∈ ([r]ϕ)T , let t rT t . Then by condition (2) above, there is some s such that s rS s and (S(r), s ) ≡ (T(r), t ). Since s ∈ ([r]ϕ)S , we have s ∈ ϕ S(r) . And then t ∈ ϕ T(r) , since ϕ too preserves bisimulation. Endnotes. As far as we know, the first paper to study the interaction of communication and knowledge in a formal setting is Plaza’s paper “Logics of Public Communications” (Plaza 1989). As the title suggests, the epistemic actions studied are public announcements. In essence, he formalized the logic of public announcements. (In addition to this, (Plaza 1989) contains a number of results special to the logic of announcements which we have not generalized, and it also studies an extension of the logic with non-rigid constants.) The same formalization was made in Gerbrandy (1999a, b), and also Gerbrandy and Groeneveld (1997). These papers further formalize the logic of completely private announcements. (However, their semantics use non-wellfounded sets rather than arbitrary Kripke models. As pointed out in Moss (1999), this restriction was not necessary.) The logic of common knowledge of alternatives was formulated in Baltag et al. (1998) and also in van Ditmarsch’s dissertation (2000). Our introduction of updates is new here, as are the observations on the test-only fragment of PDL. For connections of the ideas here with coalgebra, see Baltag (2003). One very active arena for work on knowledge is distributed systems, and the main source of this work is the book Reasoning About Knowledge Fagin et al. (1996). We depart from Fagin et al. (1996) by introducing operators whose semantics are updates as we have defined them, and by doing without temporal logic operators. In effect, our Kripke models are simpler, since they do not incorporate all of the runs of a system; the new operators can be viewed as a compensation for that. REMARK. Our formulation of a program model uses a designated set of simple actions. There are other equivalent formulations. Another way would be to use a disjoint union of pointed program models; It would be [ 26 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
191
possible to further reformulate some of our definitions below and thereby to give a semantics for our ultimate languages that differs from what we obtain in Section 4.2 below. However, the two semantics would be equivalent. The reason we prefer to work with designated sets is that it permits us to draw diagrams with fewer states. The cost of the simpler representations is the slightly more complicated definition, but we feel this cost is worth paying.
3. THE UPDATE PRODUCT OPERATION
In this section, we present the centerpiece of the formulation of our logical systems by introducing action models, program models, and an update product operation. The leading idea is that epistemic actions, like state models, have the property that different agents think that different things are possible. To model the effect of an epistemic update on a state, we use a kind of product of epistemic alternatives. 3.1. Epistemic Action Models Let be the collection of all epistemic propositions. An epistemic action A A , pre), where is a set of simple actions, → model is a triple = ( , → is an A-indexed family of relations on , and pre : → . An epistemic action model is similar to a state model. But we call the members of the set “simple actions” (instead of states). We use different notation and terminology because of a technical difference and a bigger conceptual point. The technical difference is that pre : → (that is, the codomain is the collection of all epistemic propositions). The conceptual point is that we think of “simple” actions as being deterministic actions whose epistemic impact is uniform on states (in the sense explained in our Introduction). So we think of “simple” actions as particularly simple kinds of deterministic actions, whose appearance to agents is uniform: the agents’ uncertainties concerning the current action are independent of their uncertainties concerning the current state. This allows us to abstract away the action uncertainties and represent them as a Kripke structure of actions, in effect forgetting the state uncertainties. As announced in the Introduction, this uniformity of appearance is restricted only to the action’s domain of applicability, defined by its preconditions. Thus, for a simple action σ ∈ , we interpret pre(σ ) as giving the precondition of σ ; this is what needs to hold at a state (in a state model) in order for action σ to be “accepted” in that state. So σ will be executable in s iff its precondition pre(σ ) holds at s. [ 27 ]
192
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
At this point we have mentioned the ways in which action models and state models differ. What they have in common is that they use accessibility relations to express each agent’s uncertainty concerning something. For state models, the uncertainty has to do with which state is the real one; for action models, it has to do with which action is taking place. Usually we drop the word “epistemic” and therefore refer to “action models”. EXAMPLE 3.1. Here is an action model:
A B A B Formally, = {σ, τ }; σ → σ, σ → τ, τ → τ, τ → τ ; pre(σ ) = H, and pre(τ ) = tr, where recall that tr is the “always true” proposition. As we shall see, this action model will be used in the modeling of a completely private announcement to A that the coin is lying heads up. Further examples may be found later in this section.
3.2. Program Models To model non-deterministic actions and non-simple actions (whose appearances to agents are not uniform on states), we define epistemic program models. In effect, this means that we decompose complex actions (’programs’) into “simple” ones: they correspond to sets of simple, deterministic actions from a given action model. An epistemic program model is defined as a pair π = ( , ) consisting of an action model and a set of designated simple actions. Each of the simple actions γ ∈ can be thought as being a possible “deterministic resolution” of the non-deterministic action π . As announced above, the intuition about the map pre is that an action is executable in a given state only if all its preconditions hold at that state. We often spell out an epistemic A A , pre, ) rather than (( , → , pre), ). When program model as ( , → drawing the diagrams, we use doubled circles to indicate the designated actions in the set . Finally, we usually drop the word “epistemic” and just refer to these as program models. EXAMPLE 3.2. Every action model and every σ ∈ gives a program model by taking {σ } as the set of designated simple actions. For instance, in connection with Example 3.1, we have
[ 28 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
193
with pre(σ ) = H, pre(τ ) = tr, as before. Program models of this type are very common in our treatment. But we need the extra ability to have sets of designated simple actions to deal with more complicated actions, as our next examples show. EXAMPLE 3.3. A Non-deterministic Action. Let us model the nondeterministic action of either making a completely private announcement to A that the coin is lying heads up, or not making any announcement. The action is completely private, so B doesn’t suspect anything: he thinks no announcement is made. The program model is obtained by choosing = {σ, τ } in the action model from Example 3.1. The picture is
with pre(σ ) = H, pre(τ ) = tr, as before. Alternatively, one could take the disjoint union of with the one-action program model with precondition tr. EXAMPLE 3.4. A Deterministic, but Non-simple Action. Let us model the action of (completely) privately announcing to A whether the coin is lying heads up or not. Observe that this is a deterministic action; that is, the update relation is functional: at any state, the coin is either heads up or not. But the action is not simple: its appearance to A depends on the state. In states in which the coin is heads up, this action looks to A like a private announcement that H is the case; in the states in which the coin is not heads up, the action looks to A like a private announcement that ¬H. (However, the appearance to B is uniform: at any state, the action appears to him as if no announcement is made.) The only way to model this deterministic, but non-simple, action in our setting is as a non-deterministic program model, having as its ‘designated’ actions two mutually exclusive simple actions: one corresponding to a (truthful) private announcement that H, and another one corresponding to a (truthful) private announcement that ¬H.
with pre(σ ) = H, pre(τ ) = tr, and pre(ρ) = ¬H. [ 29 ]
194
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
3.3. The Update Product of a State Model with an Epistemic Action Model The following operation plays a central role in this paper. A Given a state model S = (S, → S , · S ) and an action model = A ( , → , pre), we define their update product to be the state model S⊗
=
A , .), (S ⊗ , →
given by the following: the new states are pairs of old states s and simple actions σ which are “consistent”, in the sense that all preconditions of the action σ “hold” at the state s (5)
S⊗
=
{(s, σ ) ∈ S × : s ∈ pre(σ )S }.
The new accessibility relations are taken to be the “products” of the corresponding accessibility relations in the two frames; i.e., for (s, σ ), (s , σ ) ∈ S ⊗ we put (6)
A (s , σ ) iff (s, σ ) →
A A s→ s and σ → σ ,
and the new valuation map .S : AtSen → P (S ⊗ ) is essentially given by the old valuation: (7)
pS⊗
=
{(s, σ ) ∈ S ⊗ : s ∈ pS }.
Intended Interpretation. The update product restricts the full Cartesian product S × to the smaller set S ⊗ in order to insure that states survive actions in the appropriate sense. A on the output frame represFor each agent A, the product arrows → ent agent A’s epistemic uncertainty about the output state. The intuition is that the components of our action models are “simple actions”, so the uncertainty regarding the action is assumed to be independent of the uncertainty regarding the current (input) state. This independence allows us to “multiply” these two uncertainties in order to compute the uncertainty regarding the output state: if whenever the input state is s, agent A thinks the input might be some other state s , and if whenever the current action happening is σ , agent A thinks the current action might be some other action σ , and if s survives σ , then whenever the output state (s, σ ) is reached, agent A thinks the alternative output state (s , σ ) might have been reached. Moreover, these all of the output states that A considers possible are of this form. [ 30 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
195
As for the valuation, we essentially take the same valuation as the one in the input model. If a state s survives an action, then the same facts p hold at the output state (s, σ ) as at the input state s. This means that our actions, if successful, do not change the facts. This condition can of course be relaxed in various ways, to allow for fact-changing actions. But in this paper we are primarily concerned with purely epistemic actions, such as the earlier examples in this section. 3.4. Updates Induced by Program Models Recall that we defined updates and proper epistemic actions in Section 2.3. Right above, in Section 3.2, we defined epistemic action models. Note that there is a big difference: the updates are pairs of operations on the class of all state models, and the program models are typically finite structures. We think of program models as capturing specific mechanisms, or algorithms, for inducing updates. This connection is made precise in the following definition. DEFINITION. Let ( , ) be a program model. We define an update which we also denote ( , ) as follows: 1. S( , ) = S ⊗ . 2. s ( , )S (t, σ ) iff s = t and σ ∈ . We call this the update induced by ( , ). Bisimulation Preservation. Before moving to examples, we note a simple result that will be used later. PROPOSITION 3.5. Let be an action model in which every pre(σ ) is a bisimulation preserving epistemic proposition. Let ⊆ be arbitrary. Then the update induced by ( , ) preserves bisimulation. Proof. Write r for the update induced by the program model ( , ). Fix S and T, and suppose that s ≡ t via the relation R0 . Suppose that s rS s , so s ∈ S(r) is of the form (s, σ ) for some σ ∈ . Then (t, σ ) ∈ T(r), and clearly t rT (t, σ ). We need only show that (s, σ ) ≡ (t, σ ). But the following relation R is a bisimulation between S(r) and T(r): (s , τ1 ) R (t , τ2 ) iff
s R0 t and τ1 = τ2 .
The verification of the bisimulation properties is easy. And R shows that (s, σ ) ≡ (t, σ ), as desired. [ 31 ]
196
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
3.5. The Coin Scenario Models as Examples of the Update Product We return to the coin scenarios of Section 1.1. Our purpose is partly to indicate how one may obtain the models there as examples of the update product, and at the same time to exemplify the update product construction itself. In this section, the set A of agents is {A, B}, and the set AtSen of atomic propositions is {H, T}. We remind the reader that T represents the coin lying tails up, while tr is our notation for the true epistemic proposition. EXAMPLE 3.6. We begin with an example worked out with many details, and then the rest of our examples will omit many similar calculations. This example has to do with Scenario 4 from Section 1.1, where the coin lies heads up and A takes a look at the coin in such a way that she is certain that B does not suspect anything. We take as S1 and 4 the structures shown below:
(We remind the reader that T is the atomic sentence for “tails” and tr is for “true”.) S1 is from Scenario 1. In 4 , we take the set of distinguished states to be {σ }. comes from Examples 3.1 and 3.2. To take the update product, we first form the cartesian product S1 × 4 : {(s, σ ), (s, τ ), (t, σ ), (t, τ )} Of these four pairs, we only want those whose first component satisfies (in S) the precondition of the second component. We do not want (t, σ ), / [[H]]S . But the other three pairs do satisfy our since pre(σ ) = H and t ∈ condition. So the state model S1 ⊗ 4 will have three states: (s, σ ), (s, τ ), and (t, τ ). The atomic information is inherited from the first component, so we have [[H]]S1 ⊗ 4 = {(s, σ ), (s, τ )} and [[T]]S1 ⊗ 4 = {(t, τ )}. The A B and → are those of the product. For example, accessibility relations → B B B s and σ → τ . But we do not have we have (s, σ ) → (s, τ ), because s → A A (s, σ ) → (s, τ ), because σ → τ is false. Now, we rename the states as follows: (s, σ ) ; s
(s, τ ) ; t
(t, τ ) ; u
And then we get a picture of this state model, the same one we had in Scenario 4: [ 32 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
197
The dotted line here shows the update relation between s and (s, σ ). This is the only update relation. For example, we do not relate s and (s, τ ) because τ ∈ / = {σ }. Let S4 = S1 ⊗ 4 . EXAMPLE 3.7. 4 from Example 3.6 represents the action where A cheats, learning heads or tails in a way which is oblivious to B. It is also natural to consider an action of A privately learning the state of the coin. (This action may take place even if the state is tails.) We could use the following program model 4 :
This program model consists of two disjoint components. We leave it to the reader to calculate S1 ⊗ 4 , and also the relation between “before” and “after”. EXAMPLE 3.8. Next we construct the model corresponding to Scenario 5, where B cheats after Scenario 4. We consider the update product of the state model S4 from Example 3.6 above with the program model 5 shown below:
It represents cheating by B. The update product S4 ⊗ 5 has five states: (s, σ ), (t, σ ), (s, τ ), (t, τ ), and (u, τ ). Notice that (u, σ ) is omitted, since u∈ / [[H]]S4 . We leave it to the reader to calculate the accessibility relations in S4 ⊗ 5 ; and to draw the appropriate figure. Incidentally, we posed in Section 1.1 the exercise of constructing this representation from first principles. Many people are able to construct the five state picture, and some others construct a related picture with seven states. The seven state picture is bisimilar to the one illustrated here. EXAMPLE 3.9. We next look back at Scenario 2. The simplest action structure is 2 : (8) [ 33 ]
198
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
It represents a public announcement to A and B that the coin is lying heads up. Here, the distinguished set is the entire action structure. For the A Pub record, we formalize 2 as a singleton set {Pub}. We have Pub → B and Pub → Pub. Also, we set pre(Pub) = H. We did not put the name Pub in the representation in (8), but in situations where we want the name we would draw the same picture except that instead of H we would say Pub : H. Let us call the same structure S2 when we view it as a state model; formally these are the same object. Let S be any model with the property that every action has both a A B where H is true, and also a successor in → where H successor in → is true. Then S ⊗ 2 is bisimilar to S2 . In particular, S1 ⊗ 2 is bisimilar to S2 . EXAMPLE 3.10. Let 3 be the following program model:
3 represents an announcement to A of heads in the manner of Scenario 3. That is, B knows that A either sees heads or sees tails, but not which. Similarly, let let 3 represent the same kind of announcement to B:
Then we have the following: S1 ⊗ 3 ∼ = denotes = S3 , where S3 is the model in Scenario 3 and ∼ isomorphism. S3 ⊗ 3 ∼ = S2 . This conforms with the intuition that successive semiprivate viewings by the two parties of the concealed coin amount to a public viewing. S3 ⊗ 3 ∼ = S3 . There is no point for A to look twice. S4 ⊗ 3 is a three-state model bisimilar to the model S4 from Scenario 4.
EXAMPLE 3.11. To obtain the model in Scenario 7, we use the following program model 7 : [ 34 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
199
with pre(ρ) = tr, pre(σ ) = H, and pre(τ ) = T. As illustrated, the set is the entire set 7 of simple actions. More generally, the general shape of 7 is the frame for an action which has three possibilities. A learns which one happens, and B merely learns that one of the three happens. Further, these two aspects are common knowledge. We omit the calculation that shows that S1 ⊗ 7 is the model drawn in Scenario 7. EXAMPLE 3.12. The program model employed in Scenario 8 is 8 , shown below:
Again we take pre(ρ) = tr, pre(σ ) = H, and pre(τ ) = T. The difference between this and 7 above, is that instead of = 7 , we take to be {s}. Then S1 ⊗ 8 ∼ = S8 . 3.6. Operations on Program Models 1 and 0. We define program models 1 and 0 as follows: 1 is a one-action A σ for all A, P RE(σ ) = tr, and with distinguished set set {σ } with σ → {σ }. The point here is that the update induced by this program model is exactly the update 1 from Section 2.3. We purposely use the same notation. Similarly, we let 0 be the empty program model. Then its induced update is what we called 0 in Section 2.3. Sequential Composition. In all settings involving “actions” in some sense or other, sequential composition is a natural operation. In our setting, we would like to define a composition operation on program models, corresponding to the sequential composition of updates. Here is the relevant definition. [ 35 ]
200
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
A A Let = ( , → , pre , ) and = (, → , pre , ) be program models. We define the composition
;
=
A , pre ; , ; ) ( × , →
to be the following program model: 1. × is the cartesian product of the sets and . A in the composition ; is the family of product relations, in the 2. → natural way: A (σ, δ) → (σ , δ )
iff
A A σ→ σ and δ → δ.
3. pre ; (σ, δ) = ( , σ )pre (δ). 4. ; = × . In the definition of pre, ( , σ ) is an abbreviation for the update ( , {σ }), as defined in Section 3.4 i.e., the update induced by the program model ( , {σ }). EXAMPLE 3.13. This example constructs a program model for lying, as we find in Scenario 6. Lying in our subject cannot be taken to be simply a case of private or public announcement: this will not work out. In our given situation, B simply knows that A doesn’t know the side of the coin, and hence cannot accept any lying announcement that would claim such knowledge. One way to make sense of the action of A (successfully) lying to B is to assume that, first, before the lying, a suspicion was aroused in B that A might have privately learnt (e.g., by opening the box, or been told) which side of the coin was lying up; then second, that B subsequently receives an untruthful announcement that A knows the coin is lying heads up, an announcement which is known to be false by A herself (but which is believable, and now believed, by B). Obviously, we cannot express things about past actions in our logic, so we have to start right at the beginning, before the lying announcement is sent, and capture the whole action of successful lying as a sequential composition of two actions: B’s suspicion of A’s private learning, followed by B’s receiving (and believing) the lying announcement. This is what we shall do here.4 Let ϕ be ¬2A H and let ψ be H ∧ 2A H. Let 6 be
The idea is that B “learns” a false statement, namely that A knows the state of the coin. Further, we saw 8 in Example 3.12. We consider 8 ; 6 . One can check using Proposition 3.14 that S1 ⊗ ( 8 ; 6 ) ∼ = (S1 ⊗ 8 ) ⊗ 6 ∼ = [ 36 ]
201
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
S8 ⊗ 6 ∼ = S6 . In addition, one can calculate 8 ; 6 explicitly to see what a reasonable one-step program for lying would be. The interesting point is that its preconditions are complex sentences having to do with actions in our language. A A , pre , ) and = (, → , pre , ), Disjoint Union. If = ( , → we take to be the disjoint union of the models, with union of the distinguished actions. The intended meaning is the non-deterministic choice between the programs represented by and . Here is the definition in more detail, generalized to arbitrary (possibly infinite) disjoint unions: let A { i }i∈I be a family of program models, with i = ( i , → i , prei , i ); we define their (disjoint) union A
i =
i , → , pre,
i∈I
i∈I
to be the model given by: 1. i∈I i is i∈I ( i × {i}), the disjoint union of the sets i . A A (τ, j ) iff i = j and σ → 2. (σ, i) → iτ . 3. pre(σ, i) = prei (σ ). 4. = i∈I (i × {i}). Iteration. Finally, we define an iteration operation by ∗ = N}. Here 0 = 1, and n+1 = n ; .
n { : n ∈
We conclude by verifying that our definition of the operations on program models are correct in the sense that they are faithful to the corresponding operations on updates from Section 2.3. PROPOSITION 3.14. The update induced by a composition of program models is the composition of the induced updates. Similarly for sums and iteration, mutatis mutandis. Proof. Let ( , ) and (, ) be program models. We denote by r the update induced by ( , ), by s the update induced by (, ), and by t the update induced by ( , ); (, ). We need to prove that r; s = t. A Let S = (S, → S , [[.]]S ) be a state model. Recall that S(r; s)
=
S(r)(s)
=
(S ⊗ ( , )) ⊗ (, ).
We claim that this is isomorphic to S ⊗ ( ; , ; ), and indeed the isomorphism is (s, (σ, δ)) → ((s, σ ), δ). We check that (s, (σ, δ)) ∈ S ⊗ ( ; ) iff ((s, σ ), δ) ∈ (S ⊗ ) ⊗ . Indeed, the following are equivalent: [ 37 ]
202 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
(s, (σ, δ)) ∈ S ⊗ ( ; ). s ∈ pre ; (σ, δ)S . s ∈ ( , σ )pre (δ)S . (s, σ ) ∈ S ⊗ and (s, σ ) ∈ pre (δ)S⊗ . ((s, σ ), δ) ∈ (S ⊗ ) ⊗ .
The rest of verification of isomorphism is fairly direct. We also need to check that tS and (r; s)S are related by the isomorphism. Now tS
=
{(s, (s, (σ, δ))) ∈ S ⊗ ( ; ) : σ ∈ , δ ∈ }.
Recall that (r; s)S = rS ; sS(r) and that this is a relational composition in left-to-right order. And indeed, rS sS(r)
= =
{(s, (s, σ )) : (s, σ ) ∈ S ⊗ , σ ∈ } {((s, σ ), ((s, σ ), δ)) ∈ S(r) ⊗ : δ ∈ }.
This completes the proof for composition. We omit the proofs for sums and iteration. Endnotes. The work of this section explains of how complex representations of naturally occurring scenarios may be computed from state models before the scenario and program models. Indeed, this is one of our main points. There are precursors to our work in special cases, most notably Hans van Ditmarsch’s dissertation (2000). That work is about examples like 7 , where some agent or set of agents knows that the current action belongs to some set, but does not know which action it is. But to our knowledge, the work in this section is the first time that anything like this has been obtained in general. We have taught the material in this section in several courses at different levels. Our experience is that the material here is highly appealing to students and makes the case for formal representations in the first place (for students not familiar with formal logic) and for the kind of technical work that we pursue in this area (for those who are). The idea of representing epistemic actions as Kripke models (or variants of them) was first presented in our earlier paper with S. Solecki (Baltag et al. 1998). However, the proposal of that paper was to employ Kripke models in the syntax of a logical language directly. Many readers have felt this to be confusing, since the resulting syntax looked as if it depended on the semantics. Proposals to improve the language were developed in several papers of Baltag (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003). The logics of these papers were more natural than those of Baltag et al. (1998). What [ 38 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
203
is new in this paper is the overall apparatus of action signatures, epistemic actions, etc. We present what we hope is a natural syntax, and at the same time we have programs as syntactic entities in our logical languages (see Section 4 just below) linked to program models in the semantics.
4. LOGICAL LANGUAGES BASED ON ACTION SIGNATURES
This section presents the centerpiece of our formal work, the logical systems corresponding to types of epistemic action. Our overall goal is to abstract from the propositional language earlier, in a way which allows us to fix only the epistemic structure of the desired actions, and vary their preconditions. 4.1. Action Signatures We have presented many examples of the update product in Section 3.5. These allow us to represent many natural updates, and this is one of our goals in this paper. But the structures which we have seen so far are not sufficient to get logical languages incorporating updates. For example, we have in Example 3.7 a program model that represents a private announcement to the agent A that a proposition H happens, and this takes place in a way that B learns nothing. The picture of this was
What we want to do now is to vary things a bit, and then to abstract them. For example, suppose we want to announce a different proposition to A, say ψ. We would use
Varying the proposition ϕ, all announcements of this kind could be thought as actions of the same type. We could then represent the type of the action by the following picture:
And the previous representations include the information that what actually happens is what A hears. To vary this, we need only change which world is designated by the doubled border. We could switch things, or [ 39 ]
204
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
double neither or both worlds. So we obtain a structure consisting of two action types:
The oval on the left represents the type PriA of a fully private announcement to agent A, while the oval on the right simply represents the type of a skip action (or of an empty, or trivial, public announcement). By inserting any given proposition ψ into the oval depicting the action type PriA , we can obtain specific private announcements PriA ψ, as depicted above. (There is no reason to insert any proposition into the right oval, since this comes already with its own precondition tr: this means that the type of a skip action uniquely determines the corresponding action skip, since it contains all the information needed to specify this action.) Another example would be the case in which we announce ψ to A in such a way that B is misled into believing ¬ψ (and is also misled into believing that everyone learns ¬ψ). Now we use
In itself, this is not general enough to give rise to an action type in our sense. But we can more generally consider the case in which ψ 1 is announced to A in such a way that B thinks that some other proposition ψ 2 is publicly announced:
By abstracting from the specific propositions, we obtain the following structure consisting of two action types:
Observe that if we are given now a sequence of two propositions (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ), we could use them to fill in the oval with preconditions in two possible ways (depending on which proposition goes into the left oval). So, in order to uniquely determine how an action type will generate specific announcements, we need an enumeration without repetition of all the action types in the structure which do not come equipped with trivial preconditions (i.e., all the empty ovals in the diagram, since we assume the others have tr inside).
[ 40 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
205
So at this point, we can see how to abstract things, leading to the following definition. DEFINITION. An action signature is a structure
=
A , (σ1 , σ2 , . . . , σn )) ( , →
A ) is a finite Kripke frame, and σ1 , σ2 , . . . , σn is a desigwhere = ( , → nated listing of a subset of without repetitions. We obviously must have n ≤ | |, but we allow the case n = 0 as well, which will produce an empty list. We call the elements of action types, while the ones which are in the listing (σ1 , . . . , σn ) will be called non-trivial action types.
The way this works for us is that an action signature together with an assignment of epistemic propositions to the non-trivial action types in
will give us a full-fledged action model. The trivial action types will describe actions which can always happen, so they will get assigned the trivial precondition tr, by default. And this is the exact sense in which the notion of an action signature is an abstraction of the notion of action model. We shall shortly use action signatures in constructing logical languages. EXAMLPES 4.1. Here is a very simple action signature which we call A skip for all agents A, and we
skip . is a singleton {skip}, we put skip → take the empty list () of types as listing. So we have only one, trivial, type: skip. In a sense which we shall make clear later, this is an action in which “nothing happens”, and moreover it is common knowledge that this is the case. The type of a public announcement can simply be obtained by only changing our listing in skip , to make the type non-trivial; we also change the name of the type to Pub, to distinguish it from the previous one. So the A Pub for signature pub of public announcements has = {Pub}, Pub → every agent A, and the listing is just (Pub). So Pub is the non-trivial type of a public announcement action. Note once again that we have not said what is being announced. We are purposely separating out the structure of the announcement from the content, and Pub is our model of the structure. The next simplest action signature is the “test” signature ? . We take A A skip, and skip → skip
? = {?, skip}, with the listing (?). We also take ? → for all A. So the test ? is the only non-trivial type of action here. This turns out to be a totally opaque form of test: ϕ is tested on the real world, but nobody knows this is happening: when it happening, all the agents think nothing (i.e., skip) is happening. The function of this type will be to generate tests ?ϕ, which affect the states precisely in the way dynamic logic tests do. [ 41 ]
206
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
For each set B ⊆ A of agents, we define the action signature PriB of completely private announcements to the group B. It has = {PriB , skip}; the listing is just (PriB ), which makes skip into a trivial type B C PriB for all B ∈ B, PriB → skip for C ∈ B, again; and we put PriB → A and skip → skip for all agents A. The action signature CkaB k is given by: = {1, . . . , k}; the listing is B i for i ≤ k and B ∈ B; and (1, 2, . . . , k), so all types are non-trivial. i → C j for i, j ≤ k and C ∈ B. This action signature is called the finally i → signature of common knowledge of alternatives for an announcement to the group B. Signature-based Program Models. Now that we have a general abstract notion, we introduce some notation to regain the earlier examples. Let
be a action signature, let (σ1 , . . . , σn be the corresponding listing of non = ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n be a list of epistemic trivial types, let ⊆ , and let ψ propositions. We obtain an epistemic program model ( , )(ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) in the following way: 1. The set of simple actions is , and the accessibility relations are those given by the action signature. 2. For j = 1, . . . , n, pre(σj ) = ψ j . We put pre(σ ) = tr for all the other (trivial) actions. 3. The set of distinguished actions is . In the special case that is the singleton set {σi }, we write the resulting signature-based program model as ( , σi , ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ). To summarize: every action signature, set of distinguished action types in it, and corresponding tuple of epistemic propositions gives an epistemic program model in a canonical way. 4.2. The Syntax and Semantics of L( ) Fix an action signature . We present in Figure 7 a logic L( ). The first thing to notice about this is that for the first time in a great while, we have a genuine syntax. In this regard, note that n is fixed from
; it is the length of the given listing (σ1 , . . . , σn ). In the programs of the form σ ψ1 , . . . , ψn we have sentences ψ rather than epistemic propositions (which we had written using boldface letters ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n in Section 2.3). Also, the signature figures into the semantics exactly in those programs σ ψ1 , . . . , ψn ; in those we require that σ ∈ . The program model ( , σ, [[ψ1 ]], . . . , [[ψn ]]) is a signature-based program model as in the previous section. [ 42 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
207
Figure 7. The language L( ) and its semantics.
The second thing to note is that, as in PDL, we have two sorts of syntactic objects: sentences and programs. We call programs of the form σ ψ1 , . . . , ψn basic actions. Note that they might not be “atomic” in the sense that the sentences ψj might themselves contain programs. The basic actions of the form σi ψ1 , . . . ψn (with i ≤ n) are called non-trivial, since they are generated by non-trivial action types. We use the following standard abbreviations: false = ¬true, ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), 3A ϕ = ¬2A ¬ϕ, 3∗B ϕ = ¬2∗B ϕ, and π ϕ = ¬[π ]¬ϕ. The Semantics. Defines two operations by simultaneous recursion on L( ): 1. ϕ → [[ϕ]], taking the sentences of L( ) into epistemic propositions; and 2. π → [[π ]], taking the programs of L( ) into program models (and hence into induced updates). The formal definition is given in Figure 7. The main thing to note is that with one key exception, the operations on the right-hand sides are immediate applications of our general definitions of the closure conditions on epistemic propositions from Section 2.1 and the operations on program models from Section 3.6. A good example to explain this is the clause for the semantics of sentences [α]ϕ. Assuming that we have a program model [[α]], we get an induced update in Section 3.4 which we again denote [[α]]. We also have an epistemic proposition [[ϕ]]. We can therefore form the epistemic proposition [[[α]]][[ϕ]] (see equation (4) in Section 2.3). Note that we have overloaded the square bracket notation; this is intentional, and we have done the same with other notation as well. Similarly, the semantics of skip and crash are the program models 1 and 0 of Section 3.6. We also discuss the definition of the semantics for basic actions σ ψ. This is precisely where the structure of the action signature enters. For this, recall that we have general definition of a signature-based program [ 43 ]
208
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
model ( , , ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ), where ⊆ and the ψ’s are any epistemic propositions. What we have in the semantics of σ ψ is the special case of this where is the singleton {σ } and ψ i is [[ψi ]], a proposition which we will already have defined when we will come to define [[σ ψ]]. At this point, it is probably good to go back to our earlier discussions in Section 2.1 of epistemic propositions and updates. What we have done overall is to give a fully syntactic presentation of languages of these epistemic propositions and updates. The constructions of the language correspond to the closure properties noted in Section 2.1. (To be sure, we have restricted to the finite case at several points because we are interested in a syntax, and at the same time we have re-introduced some infinitary aspects via the Kleene star.) 4.3. Epistemic Program Logics L(S) We generalize now our signature logics L( ) to families S of signatures, in order to define a general notion of epistemic program logics. Logics Generated by Families of Signatures. Given a family S of signatures, we would like to combine all the logics {L( )} ∈S into a single logic. Let us assume the signatures ∈ S are mutually disjoint (otherwise, just choose mutually disjoint copies of these signatures). We define the logic L(S) generated by the family S in the following way: the syntax is defined by taking the same definition we had in Figure 7 for the syntax of L( ), but in which on the side of the programs we take instead as basic actions all expressions of the form σ ψ1 , . . . , ψ n where σ ∈ , for some arbitrary signature ∈ S, and n is the length of the listing of non-trivial action types of . The semantics is again given by the same definition as in Figure 7, but in which the clause about σ ψ1 , . . . , ψn refers to the appropriate signature: for every ∈ S, every σ ∈ , if n is the length of the listing of , then [[σ ψ1 , . . . , ψn ]]
=
( , σ, [[ψ1 ]], . . . , [[ψn ]]).
EXAMPLE 4.2. This example constructs the logic of all epistemic programs. Take the family S
=
{ : is a finite signature }
of all finite signatures5 . The logic L(S) will be called the logic of all epistemic programs. [ 44 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
209
Preservation of Bisimulation and Atomic Propositions. We note two basic facts about the interpretations of sentences and programs in the logics L(S). PROPOSITION 4.3. The interpretations of the sentences and programs of L(S) preserve bisimulation. Proof. By induction on L(S), using Propositions 2.5 and 3.5 PROPOSITION 4.4. The interpretations of programs of L(S) preserve atomic sentences in the sense that if s [[π ]]S t, then for all atomic sentences p, s ∈ pS iff t ∈ pS([[π]]) . Proof. By induction on π . 4.4. Formalization of the Target Logics in Terms of Signatures We formalize now the target logics of Section 2.4 as epistemic program logics L(S). We use the action signatures of Examples 4.1 and the notation from there. The Logic of Public Announcements. This is formalized as L( Pub ). We have sentences [Pub ϕ]ψ, just as we described in Section 2.4. Note that L( Pub ) allows announcements inside announcements. If ϕ, ψ, and χ are sentences, then so is Pub [Pub ϕ]ψχ. We check that L( Pub ) is a good formalization of the logic of public announcements. Fix a sentence ϕ of L( Pub ) and a state model S. We calculate: S([[Pub ϕ]])
= = =
S( Pub , Pub, [[ϕ]]) S ⊗ ( Pub , Pub, [[ϕ]]) {(s, Pub) : s ∈ [[ϕ]]S }
The state model has the structure given earlier in terms of the update product operation. The update relation [[Pub ϕ]]S relates s to (s, Pub) whenever the latter belongs to the state model S([[Pub ϕ]]). The model itself is isomorphic to the sub-state-model of S induced by {s ∈ S : s ∈ [[ϕ]]S }. Under this isomorphism, the update relation is then the inverse of inclusion. This is just how the action of public announcement was described when we first encountered it, in Example 2.1 of Section 2.3. Test-only PDL. was introduced in Section 2.6. Recall that this is PDL built over the empty set of atomic actions. Although it was not one of the target languages of Section 2.4, it will be instructive to see how it is formalized in our setting. Recall that test-only PDL has actions of the form ?ϕ. We want [ 45 ]
210
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
to use our action signature ? . The action types of it are ? and skip, only the first one being non-trivial: n = 1. So technically we have sentences of the following forms: (9)
[? ϕ]χ
and [skip ϕ]χ
Let us study the semantics of the basic actions ? ϕ and skip ϕ. Fix a state model S. We calculate: S([[? ϕ]])
= = =
S( ? , ?, [[ϕ]]) S ⊗ ( ? , ?, [[ϕ]]) {(s, ?) : s ∈ [[ϕ]]S } ∪ {(s, skip) : s ∈ S}
A t in S, then The structure of S([[? ϕ]]) is that for each A, if s → A A (s, ?) → (t, skip). Also (s, skip) → (t, skip) under the same condition, and there are no other arrows. The update relation [[? ϕ]]S relates s to (s, ?) whenever the latter belongs to the updated structure. Overall, this update is isomorphic to what we described in Example 2.2 of Section 2.3. Turning to the update map of skip ϕ, we again fix S. The model S([[skip ϕ]]) is again literally the same as what we calculated above. However, the update relation [[skip ϕ]]S now relates each s ∈ S to the pair (s, skip). This relation is a bisimulation. We shall formulate a notion of action equivalence later, and it will turn out that the update [[skip ϕ]] is equivalent to 1. For now, we can also consider the semantics of sentences of the form [skip ϕ]ψ. We have
[[[skip ϕ]ψ]]S
= = =
{s ∈ S : if s [[skip ϕ]]S t, then t ∈ [[ψ]]S([[skip ϕ]]) } {s ∈ S : (s, skip) ∈ [[ψ]]S([[skip ϕ]]) } {s ∈ S : s, ∈ [[ψ]]S }
This last equality is by Proposition 4.3 on bisimulation preservation. The upshot is that [[[skip ϕ]ψ]]S = [[ψ]]S . So for this reason, we might as well identify the sentences [skip ϕ]ψ and ψ. Or to put things differently, we might as well identify the basic action skip ϕ and (the constant of L( ? )) skip. Since we are already modifying the syntax, we might also abbreviate [skipϕ]ψ to ψ. Doing all this leads to a language which is exactly test-only PDL as we had it in Section 2.6, and our semantics there agrees with what we have calculated in the present discussion. In conclusion, test-only PDL is equivalent to the logic L0 ( ? ); i.e., the 2∗ -free fragment of L( ? ). The Logic of Totally Private Announcements. Let Pri be the family Pri [ 46 ]
=
{PriB : ∅ = B ⊆ A}
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
211
of all signatures of totally private announcements to non-empty groups of agents (as introduced in Examples 4.1). Then L(Pri) formalizes one of our target logics: the logic of totally private announcements. For example, in the case of A = {A, B}, L(Pri) will have basic actions of the forms: PriA ϕ, PriB ϕ, P ri A,B ϕ, skipA ϕ, skipB ϕ, skipA,B ϕ. As before, we may as well identify all the programs skipX ϕ with skip, and abbreviate [skipX ]ψ to ψ. The Logic of Common Knowledge of Alternatives. Can be formalized as L(Cka), where Cka
=
{CkaB k : ∅ = B ⊆ A, 1 ≤ k}.
4.5. Other Logics Logics Based on Frame Conditions. Many other types of logics are easily representable in our framework. For example, consider the logic of all S4 programs. To formalize this, we need only consider the disjoint union of all finite action signatures whose underlying accessibility relations are preorders. For the logic of S5 programs, we change preorders to equivalence relations. Another important class is given by the K45 axioms of modal logic. These systems are particularly important because the K45 and S5 conditions are so prominent in epistemic logic. Announcements by Particular Agents. Our modeling of the notion of the public announcement that ϕ is impersonal in the sense that the announcement does not come from anywhere in particular. It might be best understood as coming externally, as if someone shouted ϕ into the room where the agents were standing. We also want a notion of the public announcement by A of ϕ. We shall write this as PubA ϕ. For this, we identify PubA ϕ with the (externallymade) public announcement that ϕ holds and A knows this. This identification does not represent the fact that A intends to inform the others of ϕ. But as we know, intentions are not modeled at all in our system. We claim, however, that on a purely propositional level, the identification works. And using it, we can represent announcements by A. One way to do this is via abbreviation: we take PubA ϕψ to be an abbreviation for Pub ϕ ∧ 2A ϕψ. (A different way to formalize PubA ϕ would be to use a special signature constructed just for that purpose. But the discussion here shows that there is no need to do this. One can use Pub .) [ 47 ]
212
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Lying. We can also represent misleading epistemic actions, such as lying. Again, we want to fix an agent A and then represent the action of A (successfully) lying that ϕ to the other agents. To all those others, this action should be the same thing as an announcement of ϕ by A. But to say that A lies about ϕ, we want to assume that ϕ is actually false. Further, we want to assume that A moreover knows that ϕ is false. (For if ϕ just happened to be false when A said ϕ, we would not really want to call that “lying.”) The technical details on the representation go as follows. We take a A given as follows. signature Lie A
Lie
=
{SecretA , PubA }.
We take (PubA , SecretA ) as our non-repetitive list of types. The structure is A B SecretA ; for B = A, SecretA → PubA ; finally, given by taking SecretA → A B A for all B, Pub → Pub . A ) contains sentences like [SecretA ϕ, ψ]χ. The extra arguL( Lie ment ψ is a kind of secret condition. And we can use [LieA ϕ]χ as an abbreviation of [SecretA ϕ ∧ 2A ϕ, ¬ϕ ∧ 2A ¬ϕ]χ. That is, for A to lie about ϕ there is a condition that ¬ϕ ∧ 2A ¬ϕ. But the other agents neither need to know this ahead of time nor do they in any sense “learn” this from the announcement. Indeed, for the other agents, LieA ϕ is just like a truthful public announcement by A. As with private announcements, we take the family of signatures A : A ∈ A}. This family then generates a program logic. In this logic { Lie we have actions which represent lying on the part of any agent, not just one fixed agent. Other Effects: Wiretapping, Paranoia etc. It is possible to model scenarios where one player believes a communication to be private while in reality a second player intercepts the communication. We can also represent gratuitous suspicion (“paranoia”): maybe no “real” action has taken place, except that some people start suspecting some action (e.g., some private communication) has taken place. With these and other effects, the problem is not so much deciding how to model them. Once one has clear intuitions about a social scenario, it is not hard to do the modeling. The real issue in their application seems to be that in complex social situations, our intuitions are not always clear. There is no getting around this, and technical solutions are of limited value for conceptual problems. [ 48 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
213
Endnote. This section is the centerpiece of this paper, and all of the work in it is new. We make a few points about the history of this approach. Our earlier paper with S. Solecki (Baltag et al. 1998) worked with a syntax that employed structured objects as actions. In fact, the actions were Kripke models themselves. This type of syntax also is used in other work such as van Ditmarsch et al. (2003). But the use of structured objects in syntax is felt by many readers to be awkward; see, e.g., remarks in chapter 4 of Kooi’s thesis Kooi (2003). We disagree with the assertion that our earlier syntax blurs the distinction between syntax and semantics. But in order to make the subject more attractive, we have worked out other approaches to the syntax. Baltag (2001, 2002, 2003) developed logical systems that streamline the syntax using a repertoire of program operations, such as learning a program and variable-binding operators. This paper is the first one to formulate program logics in terms of action signatures.
5. L OGICAL S YSTEMS
We write |= ϕ to mean that for all state models S and all s ∈ S, s ∈ [[ϕ]]S . In this case, we say that ϕ is valid. In this section, we fix an arbitrary family S of mutually disjoint action signatures, and we consider the generated logics. We present a sound proof system for the validities in L(S), and sound and complete proof systems for two important sublogics: the iteration-free fragment L1 (S) and the logic L0 (S) obtained by deleting both iteration and common knowledge operators. In particular, our results apply to the logics L( ), L1 ( ) and L0 ( ) given by only one signature. However, the soundness/completeness proofs will appear in Baltag (2003). So the point of this section is to just state clearly what the logical system is, and to illustrate its use. Sublanguages. We are of course interested in the languages L(S), but we also consider sublanguages L0 (S) and L1 (S). Recall that L1 (S) is the fragment without the action iteration construct π ∗ . L0 (S) is the fragment without π ∗ and 2∗B . It turns out that L0 ( ) is the easiest to study: it is of the same expressive power as ordinary multi-modal logic. On the other hand, the full logic L(S) is in general undecidable: indeed, even if we take a family consisting of only one signature, of public announcements Pub, the corresponding logic L(Pub) is undecidable (see Miller and Moss (2003)). L1 ( ) is decidable and we have a complete axiom system for it (see Baltag (2003)). In Figure 8 below we present a logic for L(S). We write ϕ if ϕ can be obtained from the axioms of the system using its inference rules. We often [ 49 ]
214
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Figure 8. The logical system for L(S). For L1 (S), we drop the ∗∗ axioms and rule; for L0 (S), we also drop the ∗ axioms and rules.
omit the turnstile when it is clear from the context. Our presentation of the proof system uses the meta-syntactical notations associated with the notion of canonical action model (to be introduced below in Section 5.1). This could have been avoided only at the cost of complicating the presentation. We chose the simplest version, and so our logical system, as given in Figure 8, can be fully understood only after reading Section 5.1. AXIOMS. Most of the system will be quite standard from modal logic. The Action Axioms are new, however. These include the Atomic Permanence axiom; note that in this axiom p is an atomic sentence. The axiom says [ 50 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
215
that announcements do not change the brute fact of whether or not p holds. This axiom reflects the fact that our actions do not change any kind of local state. The Action-Knowledge Axiom gives a criterion for knowledge after an action. For non-trivial basic actions σi ψ (induced by a non-trivial action type σi ∈ , for some signature ∈ S), this axiom states that (9)
A ϕ ↔ (ψi → [σi ψ]2
A : σi → {2A [σj ψ]ϕ σj in })
In words, two sentences are equivalent: first, an agent A will come to know ϕ after a basic action σi ψ is executed; and second, whenever this action σi ψ is executable (i.e., its precondition ψi holds), A knows (already before this action) that ϕ will come to be true after every action that A considers as possibly happening (whenever σi ψ is in fact happening). This axiom should be compared with the Ramsey axiom in conditional logic. One should also study the special case of it for the logic of public announcements in Section 5.3. The Action Rule then gives a necessary criterion for common knowledge after a simple action. (Simple actions are defined below in Section Since common knowledge 5.1. They include the actions of the form σ ψ.) ∗ is formalized by the 2B construct, this rule is a kind of induction rule. (The sentences χβ play the role of strong induction hypotheses.) (For the induction rule for common knowledge assertions without actions, see Lemma 5.5.) 5.1. The Canonical Action Model Recall that we defined action models and program models in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. At this point, we define a new action model called the canonical action model of a language L(S). DEFINITION. Let S be a family of mutually disjoint signatures. Recall that a basic action of L(S) is a program of the form σ ψ1 , . . . , ψn , where σ ∈ , for some signature ∈ S, and n is the length of ’s list of nontrivial action types. A simple action of L(S) is a program of L(S) in which neither the choice operation nor the iteration operation π ∗ occur. We use letters like α and β to denote simple actions only. A simple sentence is a sentence of L1 (S) in which neither action sum nor action iteration occur. So all programs in simple sentences are simple actions. The Canonical Action Model of L(S) We define a program model in several steps. The simple actions of are the simple actions of L(S) as [ 51 ]
216
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
A defined just above. For all A, the accessibility relation → is the smallest relation such that A skip. 1. skip → A A then σ ϕ → σ ψ. 2. If σ → σ in some signature ∈ S and ϕ = ψ, A A A 3. If α → α and β → β , then α; β → α ; β .
PROPOSITION 5.1. As a frame, is locally finite: for each simple α, A∗ β. there are only finitely many β such that α −→ Proof. By induction on α; we use heavily the fact that the accessibility relations on are the smallest family with their defining property. we use the assumption that all our For the simple action expressions σ ψ, signatures ∈ S are finite and mutually disjoint. Next, we define P RE : → L(S) by recursion so that P RE(skip) P RE(crash) P RE(σi ψ) P RE(σ ψ) P RE(α; β)
= = = = =
true false
ψi for σi in the given listing of
true for all trivial typesσ αP RE(β)
REMARK. This function P RE should not be confused with the function pre which is part of the structure of a program model. P RE(σ ) is a sentence in our language L(S), while pre was a purely semantic notion, associating propositions to simple actions in a program model. However, there is a connection: we are in the midst of defining the program model , and its pre function is defined in terms of P RE. This is also perhaps a good place to remind the reader that neither P RE nor pre is a first-class symbol in L(S); they are defined symbols. Completing the Definition of . We set pre(σ )
=
[[P RE (σ )]].
This action model is the canonical (epistemic) action model; it plays a somewhat similar role in our work to the canonical model in modal logic. PROPOSITION 5.2 (see Baltag et al. (1998) and Miller and Moss (2003)). For every family S of action signatures, the logical systems for L0 (S) and L1 (S) presented in Figure 8 are sound, complete, and decidable. However, for every signature which contains a (copy of the) “public announcement” action type Pub, the full logic L( ) (including iteration [ 52 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
217
π ∗ ) is undecidable and the proof system for L( ) presented in Figure 8 is sound but incomplete. Indeed, validity in L( ) is 11 -complete, so there are no recursive axiomatizations which are complete. (The same obviously applies to L(S) for any family of signatures S such that ∈ S.) 5.2. Some Derivable Principles LEMMA 5.3. The Action-Knowledge Axiom is provable for all simple actions α: A (10) [α]2A ϕ ↔ (P RE(α) → {2A [β]ϕ : α → β in }) The proof is by induction on α and may be found in Baltag et al. (2003). LEMMA 5.4. For all A ∈ C, all simple α, and all β such that α →A β, 1. [α]2∗C ψ → [α]ψ. 2. [α]2∗C ψ ∧ P RE(α) → 2A [β]2∗C ψ. Proof. Part (1) follows easily from the Epistemic Mix Axiom and modal reasoning. For part (2), we start with a consequence of the Epistemic Mix Axiom: 2∗C ψ → 2A 2∗C ψ. Then by modal reasoning, [α]2∗C ψ → [α]2A 2∗C ψ. By the Action-Knowledge Axiom generalized as we have it in Lemma 5.3, we have [α]2∗C ψ ∧ P RE(α) → 2A [β]2∗C ψ. LEMMA 5.5 (The Common Knowledge Induction Rule) From χ → ψ ∧ 2A χ for all A, infer χ → 2∗A ψ. Proof. We apply the Action Rule to the simple action skip, recalling that A skip for all A. P RE(skip) = true, and skip → 5.3. Logical Systems for the Target Logics We presented a number of target logics in Section 2.4, and these were then formalized in Section 4.1. In particular, we have logics L1 ( ) for a number of interesting action signatures . What we want to do here is to spell out what the axioms of L1 (S) come to when we specialize the general logic to the logics of special interest. In doing this, we find it convenient to adopt simpler notations tailored for the fragments. The logic of public announcements is shown in Figure 9. We only included the axioms and rule of inference that specifically used the structure of the signature pub. So we did not include the sentential validities, the normality axiom for 2A , the composition axiom, modus ponens, etc. Also, we renamed the main axiom and rule to emphasize the “announcement” aspect of the system. [ 53 ]
218
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Figure 9. The main points of the logic of public announcements.
Our next logic is the logic of completely private announcements to groups. We discussed the formalization of this in Section 4.4. We have actions PriB ϕ and (of course) skip. The axioms and rules are just as in the logic of public announcements, with a few changes. We must of course consider the relativized operators [PriB ϕ] instead of their simpler counterparts [Pub ϕ].) The actions skip all have true as their precondition, and since (true → ψ) is logically equivalent to ψ, we certainly may omit these actions from the notation in the axioms and rules. The most substantive change which we need to make in Figure 9 concerns the Action-Knowledge Axiom. It splits into two axioms, noted below: [PriB ϕ]2A ψ ↔ (ϕ → 2A [PriB ϕ]ψ) for A ∈ B for A ∈ /B [PriB ϕ]2A ψ ↔ (ϕ → 2A ψ) The last equivalence says: assuming that ϕ is true, then after a private announcement of ϕ to the members of B, an outsider knows ψ just in case she knew ψ before the announcement. Finally, we study the logic of common knowledge of alternatives. This, too, was introduced in Section 2.4 and formalized in Section 4.1. The Action-Knowledge now becomes B A ψ ↔ (ϕ1 → 2 for A ∈ B [CkaB ϕ]2 A [Cka ϕ]ψ) B B i A ψ ↔ (ϕ1 → 0≤i≤k 2A [Cka ϕ ]ψ) for A ∈ /B [Cka ϕ]2
where in the last clause, (ϕ1 , . . . , ϕn )i is the sequence ϕi , ϕ1 , . . . , ϕi−1 , ϕi+1 , . . . , ϕk . (That is, we bring ϕi to the front of the sequence.) [ 54 ]
219
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
5.4. Examples in the Target Logics This section studies some examples of the logic at work. We begin with an application of the Announcement Rule in the logic of public announcements. We again work with the atomic sentences H and T for heads and tails, and with the set {A, B} of agents. We show 2∗A,B (H ↔ ¬T) → [Pub H]2∗A,B ¬T. That is, on the assumption that it is common knowledge that heads and tails are mutually exclusive, then as a result of a public announcement of heads it will be common knowledge that the state is not tails. We give this application in detail. Recall that pub has one simple action which we call Pub. We take χPub to be 2∗A,B (H ↔ ¬T). In addition A Pub for all A, and there are no other arrows in pub. We take α Pub → to be Pub H; note that this is the only action accessible from itself in the canonical action model. To use the Announcement Rule, we must show that 1. 2∗A,B (H ↔ ¬T) → [Pub H]¬T. 2. (2∗A,B (H ↔ ¬T) ∧ H) → 2A 2∗A,B (H ↔ ¬T), and the same with B replacing A. From these assumptions, we may infer [Pub H]2∗A,B ¬T. For the first statement, (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
2∗A,B (H
↔
¬T)
→
T ↔ [Pub H]T Atomic Permanence (a), propositional reasoning (H ↔ ¬T) → (H → ¬[Pub H]T) Partial Functionality [Pub H]¬T ↔ (H → ¬[Pub H]T) Epistemic Mix 2∗A,B (H ↔ ¬T) → (H ↔ ¬T) (d), (b), (c), propositional reasoning 2∗A,B (H ↔ ¬T) → [Pub H]¬T
And the second statement is an easy consequence of the Epistemic Mix Axiom. What Happens when a Publicly Known Fact is Announced? One intuition about public announcements and common knowledge is that if ϕ is common knowledge, then announcing ϕ publicly does not change anything. Formally, we express this by a scheme rather than a single equation: (11)
2∗ ϕ → ([Pub ϕ]ψ ↔ ψ)
(In this line and in the rest of this section, we are omitting the subscripts on the 2∗ operator. More formally, the subscript should be A, since we are [ 55 ]
220
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
dealing with knowledge which is common to all agents.) What we would like to say is 2∗ ϕ → ψ ([Pub ϕ]ψ ↔ ψ), but of course this cannot be expressed in our language. So we consider only the sentences of the form (12), and we show that all of these are provable. We argue by induction on ϕ. For an atomic sentence p, (12) follows from the Epistemic Mix and Atomic Permanence Axioms. The induction steps for ∧ and ¬ are easy. Next, assume (12) for ψ. By necessitation and Epistemic Mix, we have 2∗ ϕ → (2A [Pub ϕ]ψ ↔ 2A ψ) Note also that by the Announcement-Knowledge Axiom 2∗ ϕ → ([Pub ϕ]2A ψ ↔ 2A [Pub ϕ]ψ) These two imply (12) for 2A ψ. Finally, we assume (12) for ψ and prove it for 2∗B ψ. We show first that ∗ 2 ϕ ∧ 2∗ ψ → [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ. For this we use the Action Rule. We must show that (a) 2∗ ϕ ∧ 2∗ ψ → [Pub ϕ]ψ. (b) 2∗ ϕ ∧ 2∗ ψ ∧ ϕ → 2A (2∗ ϕ ∧ 2∗ ψ). (Actually, since our common knowledge operators 2∗ here are really of the form 2∗A , we need (b) for all agents A.) Point (a) is easy from our induction hypothesis, and (b) is an easy consequence of Epistemic Mix. To conclude, we show 2∗ ϕ ∧ [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ → 2∗ ψ. For this, we use the Common Knowledge Induction Rule of Lemma 5.5; that is, we show (c) 2∗ ϕ ∧ [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ → ψ. (d) 2∗ ϕ ∧ [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ → 2A (2∗ ϕ ∧ [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ) for all A. For (c), we use Lemma 5.4, part (1) to see that [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ → [Pub ϕ]ψ; and now (c) follows from our induction hypothesis. For (d), it will be sufficient to show that ϕ ∧ [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ → 2A [Pub ϕ]2∗ ψ This follows from Lemma 5.4, part (2). [ 56 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
221
A Commutativity Principle for Private Announcements. Suppose that B and C are disjoint sets of agents. Let ϕ1 , ϕ2 , and ψ be sentences. Then we claim that [PriB ϕ1 ][PriC ϕ2 ]ψ ↔ [PriC ϕ2 ][PriB ϕ1 ]ψ. That is, order does not matter with private announcements to disjoint groups. Actions Do Not Change Common Knowledge of Non-epistemic Sentences. For yet another application, let ψ be any boolean combination of atomic sentences. Then for all actions α of any of our logics, ψ ↔ [α]ψ. The proof is an easy induction on ψ. Even more, we have 2∗C ψ ↔ [α]2∗C ψ. In one direction, we use the Action Rule, and in the other, the Common Knowledge Induction Rule (Lemma 5.5). Endnotes. Although the general logical systems in this paper are new, there are important precursors for the target logics. Plaza (1989) constructs what we would call L0 ( Pub ), that is, the logic of public announcements without common knowledge operators or program iteration. (He worked only on models where each accessibility relation is an equivalence relation, so his system includes the S5 axioms.) Gerbrandy (1999a, b), and also Gerbrandy and Groeneveld (1997) went a bit further. They studied the logic of completely private announcements (generalizing public announcements) and presented a logical system which included the common knowledge operators. That is, their system included the Epistemic Mix Axiom. They argued that all of the reasoning in the original Muddy Children scenario can be carried out in their system. This is important because it shows that in order to get a formal treatment of that problem and related ones, one need not posit models which maintain histories. Their system was not complete since it did not have anything like the Action Rule; this first appears in a slightly different form in Baltag (2003). 5.5. Conclusion We have been concerned with actions in the social world that affect the intuitive concepts of knowledge, (justifiable) beliefs, and common knowledge. This paper has shown how to define and study logical languages that contain constructs corresponding to such actions. The many examples in this paper show that the logics “work”. Much more can be said about specific tricky examples, but we hope that the examples connected to our scenarios make the point that we are developing valuable tools. [ 57 ]
222
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
The key steps in the development are the recognition that we can associate to a social action α a mathematical model . is a program model. In particular, it is a multi-agent Kripke model, so it has features in common with the state models that underlie formal work in the entire area. There is a natural operation of update product at the heart of our work. This operation is surely of independent interest because it enables one to build complex and interesting state models. The logical languages that we introduce use the update product in their semantics, but the syntax is a small variation on propositional dynamic logic. The formalization of the target languages involved the signature-based languages L( ) and also their generalizations L(S). These latter languages are needed to formulate the logic of private announcements, for example. We feel that presenting the update product first (before the languages) will make this paper easier to read, and having a relatively standard syntax should also help. Once we have our languages, the next natural step is to study them. This paper presented logical systems for validities, omitting many proofs due to the lack of space.
NOTES 1 It is important for us that the sentence p be a syntactic object, while the proposition p
be a semantic object. See Section 2.5 for further discussion. 2 The subscript 3 comes from the number of the scenario; we shall speak of corresponding
models S1 , S2 , etc., and each time the models will be the ones pictured in Section 1.1. 3 We are writing relational composition in left-to-right order in this paper. 4 In Section 4.5, we shall consider a slightly simpler model of lying. 5 To make this into a set, instead of a proper class, we really mean to take all finite
signatures whose action types are natural numbers, and then take the disjoint union of this countable set of finite signatures.
REFERENCES
Baltag, Alexandru: 1999, ‘A Logic of Epistemic Actions’, (Electronic) Proceedings of the FACAS workshop, held at ESSLLI’99, Utrecht University, Utrecht. Baltag, Alexandru: 2001, ‘Logics for Insecure Communication’, in J. van Bentham (ed.) Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on Rationality and Knowledge (TARK’01), Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, pp. 111–122. Baltag, Alexandru: 2002, ‘A Logic for Suspicious Players: Epistemic Actions and Belief Updates in Games’, Bulletin Of Economic Research 54(1), 1–46. Baltag, Alexandru: 2003, ‘A Coalgebraic Semantics for Epistemic Programs’, in Proceedings of CMCS’03, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 82(1), 315–335.
[ 58 ]
ALEXANDRU BALTAG AND LAWRENCE S. MOSS
223
Baltag, Alexandru: 2003, Logics for Communication: Reasoning about Information Flow in Dialogue Games. Course presented at NASSLLI’03. Available at http://www.indiana.edu/∼nasslli. Baltag, Alexandru, Lawrence S. Moss, and Sławomir Solecki: 1998, ‘The Logic of Common Knowledge, Public Announcements, and Private Suspicions’, in I. Gilboa (ed.), Proceedings of the 7th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK’98), pp. 43–56. Baltag, Alexandru, Lawrence S. Moss, and Sławomir Solecki: 2003, ‘The Logic of Epistemic Actions: Completeness, Decidability, Expressivity’, manuscript. Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Y. Vardi: 1996, Reasoning About Knowledge, MIT Press. Fischer, Michael J. and Richard E. Ladner: 1979, ‘Propositional Modal Logic of Programs’, J. Comput. System Sci. 18(2), 194–211. Gerbrandy, Jelle: 1999a, ‘Dynamic Epistemic Logic’, in Lawrence S. Moss, et al (eds), Logic, Language, and Information, Vol. 2, CSLI Publications, Stanford University. Gerbrandy, Jelle: 1999b, Bisimulations on Planet Kripke, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam. Gerbrandy, Jelle and Willem Groeneveld: 1997, ‘Reasoning about Information Change’, J. Logic, Language, and Information 6, 147–169. Gochet, P. and P. Gribomont: 2003, ‘Epistemic Logic’, manuscript. Kooi, Barteld P.: 2003, Knowledge, Chance, and Change, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Groningen. Meyer, J.-J. and W. van der Hoek: 1995, Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Miller, Joseph S. and Lawrence S. Moss: 2003, ‘The Undecidability of Iterated Modal Relativization’, Indiana University Computer Science Department Technical Report 586. Moss, Lawrence S.: 1999, ‘From Hypersets to Kripke Models in Logics of Announcements’, in J. Gerbrandy et al. (eds), JFAK. Essays Dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday, Vossiuspers, Amsterdam University Press. Plaza, Jan: 1989, ‘Logics of Public Communications’, Proceedings, 4th International Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems. Pratt, Vaughn R.: 1976, ‘Semantical Considerations on Floyd-Hoare Logic’, in 7th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE Comput. Soc., Long Beach, CA, pp. 109–121. van Benthem, Johan: 2000, ‘Update Delights’, manuscript. van Benthem, Johan: 2002, ‘Games in Dynamic Epistemic Logic’, Bulletin of Economic Research 53(4), 219–248. van Benthem, Johan: 2003, ‘Logic for Information update’, in J. van Bentham (ed.) Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on Rationality and Knowledge (TARK’01), Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, pp. 51–68. van Ditmarsch, Hans P.: 2000, ‘Knowledge Games’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Groningen. van Ditmarsch, Hans P.: 2001, ‘Knowledge Games’, Bulletin of Economic Research 53(4), 249–273. van Ditmarsch, Hans P., W. van der Hoek, and B. P. Kooi: 2003, in V. F. Hendricks et al. (eds), Concurrent Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Synt. Lib. vol. 322, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[ 59 ]
224
LOGICS FOR EPISTEMIC PROGRAMS
Alexandru Baltag Oxford University Computing Laboratory Oxford, OX1 3QD, U.K. E-mail:
[email protected] Lawrence S. Moss Mathematics Department Indiana University Bloomington, IN 47405, U.S.A. E-mail:
[email protected]
[ 60 ]
HANS ROTT
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF BELIEF FORMATION
ABSTRACT. In recent years there has been a growing consensus that ordinary reasoning does not conform to the laws of classical logic, but is rather nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions previously drawn may well be removed upon acquiring further information. Even so, rational belief formation has up to now been modelled as conforming to some fundamental principles that are classically valid. The counterexample described in this paper suggests that a number of the most cherished of these principles should not be regarded as valid for commonsense reasoning. An explanation of this puzzling failure is given, arguing that a problem in the theory of rational choice transfers to the realm of belief formation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Part of the cognitive state of a person is characterized by the set of her beliefs and expectations. By the term ‘belief formation’, we will refer to two different kinds of processes. The first one is that of drawing inferences from a given set of sentences. Ideally, as a result of this process the reasoner arrives at a well-balanced set of beliefs in reflective equilibrium, sometimes referred to as the ‘belief set’. The second process is that of readjusting one’s belief set in response to some perturbation from outside (‘belief transformation’ might be a better term in this case). We will consider two subspecies of belief change that may be triggered by external perturbations. If there is some cognitive ‘input’, a sentence to be accepted, we speak of a belief revision. If the reasoner has to withdraw one of her beliefs, without accepting another belief in its place, she performs a belief contraction. We will be dealing with the three topics of inference, revision and contraction in turn. For each of them, we consider two qualitative principles that have up to now been regarded as very plausible ones. We shall then tell a story with a few alternative developments which is intended to show that all of these principles fail. They do not fail due to the contingencies of some particular system that is being proposed, but indeed as norms for good reasoning. Based on recent reconstructions of belief formation in terms of the theory of rational choice, we give an explanation Synthese 139: 225–240, 2004. Knowledge, Rationality & Action 61–76, 2004. © 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
[ 61 ]
226
HANS ROTT
of why these principles fail. It turns out that well-known problems of this very general theory transfer to the special case where the theory is applied in operations of belief formation. In fact, it will turn out that this special case has features that block one of the standard excuses for the problem at hand. We end up in a quandary that poses a serious challenge to any future conception of belief formation procedures. For a long time, the notion of inference has been thought to be identical with the notion of logical consequence or deduction. Partly as a result of the problems encountered in research in artificial intelligence and knowledge representation during the 1960s and 1970s, however, logicians have come to realize that most of our reasoning proceeds on the basis of incomplete knowledge and insufficient evidence. Implicit assumptions about the normal state and development of the world, also known as expectations, presumptions, prejudices or defaults, step in to fill the gaps in the reasoner’s body of knowledge. These default assumptions form the context for ordinary reasoning processes. They help us to generate conclusions that are necessary for reaching decisions about how to act, but they are retractible if further evidence arises. Thus our inferences will in many contexts be defeasible or non-monotonic in the sense that an extension of the set of premises does not generally result in an increase of the set of legitimate conclusions. This, however, does not mean that the classical concept of logical consequence gets useless, or that our reasoning gets completely irregular. For the purposes of this paper, we can in fact assume1 that the set of our beliefs (and similarly: the set of our expectations) is consistent and closed with respect to some broadly classical consequence operation Cn. This combined notion of logical coherence (consistency-cum-closure) may be viewed as a constraint that makes the processes of inference and belief change a non-trivial task.2
2. SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF BELIEF FORMATION
2.1. In the last two decades, a great number of systems for non-monotonic reasoning have been devised that are supposed to cope with the newly discovered challenge.3 Many classical inference patterns are violated by such systems, but it is equally important to keep in mind that quite a number of classical inference patterns do remain valid. Let us now have a look at two properties that have usually been taken to be constitutive of sound reasoning with logical connectives like ‘and’ and ‘or’ even in the absence of monotonicity. First, if the premise x allows the reasoner to conclude that y is true, then y may be conjoined to the premise x, without spoiling any of the [ 62 ]
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
227
conclusions that x alone permits to be drawn. This severely restricted form of the classical monotony condition is usually called Cumulative Monotony or Cautious Monotony: (1)
If y is in Inf(x), then Inf(x) ⊆ Inf(x ∧ y).
Here Inf(x) denotes the set of all conclusions that can be drawn if the premise is x. The reasoner may in fact possess an arbitrary finite number of premises which are conjunctively tied together in x. More importantly, Inf(x) is meant to denote what can be obtained if x is all the information available to the agent. Second, if a reasoner wants to know what to infer from a disjunction x ∨ y, she may reason by cases. She will consider first what would hold on the assumption of x, and then consider what would hold on the assumption of y. Any sentence that may be inferred in both of these cases should be identifiable as a conclusion of an inference starting from x ∨ y. This is the content of a condition called Disjunction in the Premises: (2)
Inf (x) ∩ Inf (y) ⊆ Inf (x ∨ y).
Cumulative Monotony and Disjunction in the Premises hold in most defeasible reasoning systems that have been proposed since non-monotonic logic came into being, and especially in those systems that are semantically well-motivated. There is one important and striking exception. Reiter’s (1980) seminal system of Default Logic violates both Cumulative Monotony and Disjunction in the Premises. However, no advocate of Reiter’s logic has ever argued that Cumulative Monotony and Disjunction in the Premises should be violated. These violations have usually been taken to be defects of the system that need to be remedied.4 Conditions (1) and (2) have never lost their normative force. 2.2. Let us now turn to the revision of belief sets in response to new information. If someone has to incorporate a conjunction x ∧ y, she has to accept both x and y. One idea how to go about revising by the conjunction is to revise first with x. If it so happens that y is accepted in the resulting belief set, then one should be sure that every belief contained in this set is also believed after a revision of the original belief set by x ∧ y. In the following, B ∗ x denotes the set of beliefs held after revising the initial belief set B by x (and likewise for the input sentence x ∧ y). (3)
If y is in B ∗ x, then B ∗ x ⊆ B ∗ (x ∧ y).
Another approach to circumscribing the result of a revision by the conjunction x ∧ y is to revise first with x, and then to just add y set-theoretically [ 63 ]
228
HANS ROTT
and take the logical consequences of everything taken together. This is not always a good idea, since y may be inconsistent with B ∗ x, and thus the second step would leave us with the inconsistent set of all sentences. But even if we may end up with too many sentences, this strategy seems unobjectionable if it is taken as yielding an upper bound for the revision by a conjunction. This is the content of principle (4)
B ∗ (x ∧ y) ⊆ Cn ((B ∗ x) ∪ {y}).
2.3. Finally, we consider the removal of beliefs. Here again, we focus on upper and lower bounds of changes with respect to conjunctions. If a person wants to remove effectively a conjunction x ∧ y, she has to remove at least one of the conjuncts, that is, either x or y. So if the second conjunct y is still retained in the result of removing the conjunction, what has happened is exactly that the first conjunct x has been removed. We will be content here with a weaker condition that replaces the identity by an . inclusion. Here and elsewhere, B − x denotes the set of beliefs that are retained after withdrawing x from the initial belief set B (and likewise for the case where x ∧ y is to be discarded): (5)
. . . If y is in B − (x ∧ y), then B −(x ∧ y) ⊆ B − x.
Another approach to circumscribing the result of a contraction with respect to the conjunction x ∧ y is to consider first what would be the result of removing x, and then consider what would be the result of removing y. It is not always necessary to take into account both possibilities, but doing so should certainly be suitable for setting a lower bound. Any sentence that survives both of these thought experiments should surely be included in the result of the removal of x ∧ y. This is the content of principle (6)
. . . B − x ∩ B − y ⊆ B − (x ∧ y).
Principles (3)–(6) have been endorsed almost universally in the literature on belief revision and contraction. The classic standard was set by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985). Conditions (4) and (6) are the seventh of their eight ‘rationality postulates’ for revision and contraction, conditions (3) and (5) are considerably weaker – and thus considerably less objectionable – variants of their eighth postulates.5 There exist sophisticated ‘translations’ between operations of nonmonotonic inference, belief revision and removal which show that notwithstanding different appearances, conditions (1), (3) and (5) are essentially different sides of the same (three-faced) coin, as are conditions (2), (4) and (6).6 [ 64 ]
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
229
Some methods of belief formation suggested in the literature violate one or the other of the six principles. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that these principles have retained their great intuitive appeal and have stood fast up to the present day as norms to which all good reasoning is supposed to conform. But this is wrong, or so I shall argue. The following section presents an example that shows, I think, that not a single one of the six principles listed above ought to be endorsed as a valid principle of rational belief formation.
3. THE COUNTEREXAMPLE
The story goes as follows. A well-known philosophy department has announced an open position in metaphysics. Among the applicants for the job there are a few persons that Paul, an interested bystander, happens to know. First, there is Amanda Andrews, an outstanding specialist in metaphysics. Second, we have Bernice Becker, who is also definitely a very good, though not quite as excellent a metaphysician as Andrews. Becker has in addition done some substantial work in logic. A third applicant is Carlos Cortez. He has a comparatively slim record in metaphysics, but he is widely recognized as one of the most brilliant logicians of his generation. Suppose that Paul’s initial set of beliefs and expectations includes that neither Andrews nor Becker nor Cortez will get the job (say, because Paul and everybody else thinks that Don Doyle, a star metaphysician, is the obvious candidate who is going to get the position anyway). Paul is aware of the fact that only one of the contenders can get a job. 3.1. Consider now three hypothetical scenarios, each of which describes a potential development of the selection procedure. The scenarios are not meant as describing consecutive stages of a single procedure. At most one of the potential scenarios can turn out to become real. In each of these alternative scenarios, Paul is genuinely taken by surprise, because he learns that one of the candidates he had believed to be turned down will – or at least may – be offered the position. (Doyle, by the way, has told the department that he has accepted an offer from Berkeley.) To make things shorter, we introduce some abbreviations. Let the letters a, b and c stand for the sentences that Andrews, Becker and Cortez, respectively, will be offered the position. Paul is having lunch with the dean, a very competent, serious and profoundly honest man who is also the chairman of the selection committee. [ 65 ]
230
HANS ROTT
SCENARIO 1. The dean tells Paul in confidence that either Andrews or Becker will be appointed. This message comes down to supplying Paul with the premise a ∨ b. Given this piece of information, Paul concludes that Andrews will get the job. This conclusion is based on his background assumptions that Andrews has superior qualities as a metaphysician and that expertise in the field advertised is the decisive criterion for the appointment. From his background knowledge that there is only one position available, Paul further infers that all the other candidates are going to return empty-handed. SCENARIO 2. In this scenario the dean tells Paul that either Andrews or Becker or Cortez will get the job, thus supplying him with the premise a ∨ b ∨ c. This piece of information triggers off a rather subtle line of reasoning. Knowing that Cortez is a splendid logician, but that he can hardly be called a metaphysician, Paul comes to realize that his background assumption that expertise in the field advertised is the decisive criterion for the appointment cannot be upheld. Apparently, competence in logic is regarded as a considerable asset by the selection committee. Still, Paul keeps on believing that Cortez will not make it in the end, because his credentials in metaphysics are just too weak. Since, however, logic appears to contribute positively to a candidate’s research profile, Paul concludes that Becker, and not Andrews, will get the job. This qualitative description should do for our purposes, but for those who prefer the precision of numbers, the following elaboration of our story can be given (see Figure 1). Suppose that the selection committee has decided to assign numerical values in order to evaluate the candidates’ work. Andrews scores 97 out of 100 in metaphysics, but she has done no logic whatsoever, so she scores 0 here. Becker scores 92 in metaphysics and a respectable 50 in logic. Cortez scores only 40 in metaphysics, but boasts of 99 in logic. In scenario 1, Paul takes it that metaphysics is the only criterion, so clearly Andrews must be the winner in his eyes. But in scenario 2, Paul gathers that, rather unexpectedly, logic has some importance. As can easily be verified, any weight he may wish to attach to the logic score between 1/10 and 1/2 (with metaphysics taking the rest) will see Becker ending up in front of both Andrews and Cortez. SCENARIO 3. This is a very surprising scenario in which Paul is told that Cortez is actually the only serious candidate left in the competition. There is little need to invest a lot of thinking. Paul accepts c in this case. Let us summarize the scenarios as regards the conclusions Paul would draw from the various premises that he may get from the dean of the [ 66 ]
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
231
Figure 1. Becker is ahead of both Andrews and Cortez if logic is assigned a weight between 0.1 and 0.5.
faculty. In scenario 1, Paul infers from a ∨ b that a and ¬b (along with ¬c and ¬d which we will not mention any more). In scenario 2, he infers from a ∨ b ∨ c that ¬a and b. In scenario 3, he infers from c that ¬a and ¬b. Now we first find that this situation does not conform to Cumulative Monotony. Substitute a ∨ b ∨ c for x and a ∨ b for y in (1). Even though Paul concludes that a ∨ b is true on the basis of the premise a ∨ b ∨ c, it is not the case that everything inferable from the latter is also inferable from (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ (a ∨ b) which is equivalent with a ∨ b. Sentences ¬a and b are counterexamples. Second, the example at the same time shows that Disjunction in the Premises does not hold. Take (2) and substitute a ∨ b for x and c for y. Then notice that ¬b can be inferred both from a ∨ b and from c, but it cannot be inferred from a ∨ b ∨ c. Summing up, even though Paul’s reasoning is perfectly rational and sound, it violates both Cumulative Monotony and Disjunction in the Premises. 3.2. Let us then turn to the dynamics of belief. The case of potential revisions of belief is very similar to the case of default reasoning. What we have so far considered as the set of all sentences that may be inferred from a given premise x, will now be reinterpreted as the result of revising a belief set by a new piece of information. This is best explained by looking at the concrete case of the selection procedure. Paul’s initial belief set B contains ¬a, ¬b, ¬c and d (among other things). Paying attention to the fact that the structure of (3) is very [ 67 ]
232
HANS ROTT
similar to the structure of (1), we can re-use the above argument. If Paul’s set of initial beliefs and expectations is revised by a ∨ b ∨ c, then the resulting belief set includes a ∨ b (because it includes b). However, the revised belief set B ∗ (a ∨ b ∨ c) is not a subset of the belief set B ∗ ((a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ (a ∨ b)) = B ∗ (a ∨ b), as is borne out by sentences like ¬a and b. Thus (3) is violated. In principle (4), substitute a ∨ b ∨ c for x and a ∨ b for y. Then the lefthand side is changed to B ∗(a ∨b), while the right-hand side consists of the set of all logical consequences of B ∗ (a ∨ b ∨ c) and a ∨ b taken together. Since a ∨b is already included in B ∗(a ∨b∨c), we need only consider this latter set. But as we have by now seen several times, the two revised belief sets just mentioned cannot be compared in terms of the subset relation. So (4) is violated. 3.3. For the consideration of belief contractions, we have to change our story slightly. Suppose now that in the different scenarios Paul may be going through, the dean does not go so far as to tell him that Andrews or Becker (or Cortez) will get the offer, but only that one of them might get the offer. Paul’s proper response to this is to withdraw his prior belief that none of Andrews and Becker (and Cortez) will get the job, without at the same time acquiring any new belief instead. In all other respects the story is just the same as before. So this time, in scenario 1 , when Paul is given the information that Andrews or Becker might get the job, he withdraws his belief that ¬a, but he keeps ¬b. And in the alternative scenario 2 , when Paul learns from the dean that Andrews or Becker or Cortez might get the job, he again understands that competence in logic is regarded as an asset by the selection committee, and so he withdraws ¬b while retaining ¬a. Scenario 3 just leads Paul to withdraw ¬c. Now we can see that the prescriptions of the above principles for belief contraction are not complied with. First consider principle (5) and substi. tute ¬a ∧ ¬b for x and ¬c for y. Then we get ¬c in B − (¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c), . but this belief set is not a subset of B − (¬a∧¬b), since ¬a is in the former but not in the latter set. Finally, the same substitutions serve to refute principle (6). The belief . . ¬b is retained in both B − (¬a ∧ ¬b) and B − ¬c, but it is withdrawn in . B − (¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c). In sum, then, we have found that Paul’s reasoning which is perfectly rational and adequate for the situations sketched leads to belief formation processes that violate each of the six fundamental principles (1)–(6). How can this be explained?
[ 68 ]
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
233
4. FIRST REACTION : A PROBLEM OF FORMALIZATION
A first intuitive reaction to the puzzle is to simply deny that the example exhibits the formal structure that it has been represented as having here, and to claim instead that the various messages Paul may receive from the dean are incompatible with one another. When the dean says that either Andrews or Becker or Cortez will be offered the job, isn’t she, in some sense, saying more than when she says that either Andrews or Becker will be the winner of the competition? Namely, that it is possible that Cortez will be offered the position, while the latter message, at least implicitly, excludes that possibility. Shouldn’t we therefore represent the dean’s message in a somewhat more explicit way? Three things can be said in reply to this objection. First, it is true that a∨ b implicitly conveys the information that Cortez is not among the selected candidates. However, the kind of reasoning that turns implicit messages into explicit beliefs is exactly what is meant to be captured by theories of nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change. It is therefore important to insist that ¬c is not part of the dean’s message, but that it is rather inferred (perhaps subconsciously, automatically) by the reasoner. Representing the dean’s statement in scenario 1 as (a∨b)∧¬c would simply not be adequate. Second, it is of course true that the message a ∨ b ∨ c does not in itself exclude the possibility that c will come out true. But it is not necessary that each individual disjunct is considered to be a serious possibility by any of the interlocutors. For instance, nothing in the story commits us to the view that either the dean or Paul actually believes that Cortez stands a chance of being offered the position. So the dean’s statement in scenario 2 must not be represented as saying that each of a, b and c is possible. As is common in the literature on belief formation, we presuppose in this paper that our language does not include the means to express autoepistemic possibility, something like c (read as, ‘for all I believe, c is possible’). We just saw that we do not need such means for the present case, and we want to limit the expressiveness of the propositional language. Admitting autoepistemic operators immediately makes matters extremely complicated and invalidates almost all of the logical principles that have been envisaged in the theory of belief formation.7 We conclude that the problem is not caused by a sloppy translation of a commonsensical description of the case into regimented language. What, then, does the problem arise from?
[ 69 ]
234
HANS ROTT
5. PROBLEMS OF RATIONAL CHOICE ARE PROBLEMS FOR BELIEF FORMATION
Principles of nonmonotonic inference and belief change can be systematically interpreted in terms of rational choice.8 In this view, the process of belief formation is one of resolving conflicts among one’s beliefs and expectations by following through in thought the most plausible possibilities. According to a semantic modelling, the reasoner takes on as beliefs everything that is the case in all of the most plausible models that satisfy the given information, where the most plausible models are determined with the help of a selection function. A syntactic modelling, closely related to the semantic one, describes the reasoner as eliminating the least plausible sentences from a certain set of sentences that generates the conflict within her belief or expectation set. And again, the task of determining the least plausible sentences is taken over by a selection function. It is not possible here to give a description of these nicely dovetailing mechanisms even in the barest outlines. Suffice it to say that there are elaborate theories exhibiting in full mathematical detail striking parallels between the ‘theoretical reason’ at work in belief formation processes and those parts of ‘practical reason’ that manifest themselves in processes of rational choice. On this interpretation, Disjunction in the Premises (2) and its counterparts for belief change, (4) and (6), turn out to be instantiations of one of the most fundamental conditions – perhaps the most fundamental condition – of the theory of rational choice. This condition, called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, the Chernoff property or Sen’s Property α, says that any element which is optimal in a certain set is also optimal in all subsets of that larger set in which it is contained. Cumulative Monotony (1) and its counterparts, (3) and (5), have turned out to be instantiations of another important condition in the theory of rational choice, namely to Aizerman’s axiom. The above scenarios are modelled after well-known choice situations in which Property α is violated, cases which also happen to disobey Aizerman’s axiom. These properties may fail to be satisfied if the very ‘menu’ from which an agent is invited to choose carries information which is new to the agent. The locus classicus for the problem is a passage in Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 288). They tell a story about a customer of a restaurant who chooses salmon from a menu consisting of salmon and steak only, but changes to steak after being informed that fried snails and frog’s legs are on the menu, too. This customer is not to be blamed for irrationality. The reason why he changes his mind is that he infers from the extended menu [ 70 ]
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
235
that the restaurant must be a good one, one where no risk is involved in taking the steak (which is the customer’s ‘real’ preference as it were). Sen calls this phenomenon the ‘epistemic value’ or the ‘epistemic relevance of the menu’.9 Luce and Raiffa chose to avoid the problem by fiat: This illustrates the important assumption implicit in axiom 6 [=essentially Sen’s Property α], namely, that adding new acts to a decision problem under uncertainty does not alter one’s a priori information as to which is the true state of nature. In what follows, we shall suppose that this proviso is satisfied. In practice this means that, if a problem is first formulated so that the availability of certain acts influences the plausibility of certain states of nature, then it must be reformulated by redefining the states of nature so that the interaction is eliminated.
Luce and Raiffa thus explain away the problem of the restaurant customer because the extended menu conveys the information that the restaurant is a good one. The customer’s choice is not really between salmon and steak, but basically between salmon-in-a-good-restaurant and steak-in-agood-restaurant (assuming that he does not like fried snakes and frog’s legs). Analogously, we may say that in the above example, Paul’s doxastic choice is not simply one between the belief that Andrews gets the job and the belief that Becker gets the job. Given the information in scenario 2, his choice is rather between the belief that Andrews gets the job and logic matters, and the belief that Becker gets the job and logic matters. So it seems that the two scenarios cannot be compared in the first place. Have we solved the puzzle now? No, we haven’t. To see this, we have to understand first what is not responsible for the problem. In Luce and Raiffa’s example, the reason for the trouble is not that the extended menu introduces a refinement in the customer’s options, nor is it that his preferences change, nor is it that the second situation cannot be compared with the first. The customer is well aware right from the beginning that there are good restaurants and bad restaurants, and that he would prefer steak in a good, but salmon in a bad restaurant. What the availability of snails and frog’s legs signals, however, is that the customer is actually in a good restaurant, whereas he had at first been acting on the assumption that he is in a bad one.10 Luce and Raiffa are right in suggesting that the point is that the extended menu carries novel information about the state of the world. Luce and Raiffa’s argument thus may make good sense as a rejoinder in the context of the general theory of choice and decision. It is simply not this theory’s business to explain how information is surreptitiously conveyed through the particular contents of a certain menu. So Luce and Raiffa have a justification for refusing to deal with that problem. Unfortunately, no analogous defense is available against the problem highlighted in the present [ 71 ]
236
HANS ROTT
paper. It is the business of theories of belief formation (which include expectation-based inference and belief change) to model how one’s prior information is affected by information received from external sources. This is precisely what these theories are devised to explain! Therefore, the anomaly cannot be pushed away into a neighbouring research field.
6. CONCLUSION
What is the moral of our story? We began by reviewing six of the most important and central logical principles that have generally been taken to be valid in common-sense reasoning and that have widely been endorsed as yardsticks for evaluating the adequacy of systems of non-classical logics intended to capture such reasoning. We have seen, however, that there are situations in which these reasoning patterns should not be expected to hold. This comes down to declaring them invalid, not as a contingent property of some particular system that has been proposed in the literature, but as norms to which rational belief formation ought to conform. We have dismissed as premature the idea that the formalization should be puffed up in order to represent what is only implicit in the dean’s message. In the context of theories of belief formation, it seems more appropriate to obey a First maxim of formalization: Do not put into the formalization what is not part of the ordinary language expression. Another lesson to be drawn from the above discussion is that a choicetheoretic modelling of belief formation processes does not only inherit the elegance and power of the theory of rational choice, but also its problems. This is not a trivial observation. Problems encountered in a general theory need not necessarily persist if this theory is applied to a restricted domain. The processes involved in belief formation are of a broadly logical kind, and one might expect that this domain is particularly well-behaved so that one would not encounter the strange phenomena haunting the notion of rational choice. Our example has shown that this is not the case. The problems do carry over from the general to the more specific domain. Fundamental principles of belief formation are as affected by the anomaly of the ‘informational value of the menu’ as the principles of rational choice. I have then argued that things are even worse as regards this special domain. The reason is that a natural defense – Luce and Raiffa’s defense – which makes sense for the general theory is not open for the special case of belief formation. The problem of the informational value of the menu [ 72 ]
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
237
may appear to be alien to the concerns of rational choice theory. However, it is clear that theories of belief formation are theories just about the processing of information that comes in propositional form. The source of the trouble concerns a paradigm problem for belief formation theories rather than something that may be discharged into some other field of research. But perhaps the solution lies in the formalization after all. Compare the dean’s statement that a ∨ b ∨ c with other ways of obtaining this information. Suppose for example, that Paul hears about Doyle’s new job, that he observes all the other candidates except Andrews, Becker and Cortez leaving the place with long faces, but that he is not sure whether he has missed anyone else wearing a long face. The information Paul has in this scenario seems to be the just same as the one obtained in scenario 2 above: Andrews or Becker or Cortez will get the job. But this time, of course, Paul would not conclude that logic is important.11 Why is this? I suggest that the case points to the converse to the maxim above, namely to the Second maxim of formalization: Put into the formalization everything that is part of the ordinary language expression. By ‘expression’, I now do not mean the type, but the token. The expression is not to be taken here as separated from its context of production. What Paul really learns in scenario 2 is not just that either Andrews, Becker or Cortez will get the job, but that the dean says so. And it is part of Paul’s background assumptions that the dean would not say this without very good reasons. The most plausible reason is, according to Paul’s background beliefs, that the selection committee regards Cortez’s scientific profile as impressive and suitable. No such reasoning takes place in the alternative scenario in which a ∨ b ∨ c is obtained by inductive elimination of the other candidates. The fact that a piece of information comes from a certain origin or source or is transmitted by a certain medium conveys information of its own. In a short slogan, there is no message without a medium. What the example seems to teach us is that at least in some cases, the reasoner should receive not just the content of a message, but take account of the message-with-the-medium. Unfortunately, this leaves us with a dilemma. Formalization is translation into a formal language, and this translation is done with a view to processing the formulas obtained. This is the Third maxim of formalization: The results of a formalization should be efficiently processable by an appropriate system of formal reasoning.
[ 73 ]
238
HANS ROTT
Usually, the processing is handled by some kind of logic that allows the reasoner to combine her bits and pieces of information and draw conclusions from them. It is easy to take a ∨ b ∨ c, say, and use it together with other statements about Andrews, Becker and Cortez to infer more about the relevant facts. For example, if the reasoner receives further information that ¬c, then she can conclude that a ∨ b. But it is much harder to work with X-says-that-(a ∨ b ∨ c), since adding Y-tells-me-that-(¬c) does not give him any logical consequences. The medium screens off the message, as it were, from the reasoner’s attempt to exploit its content. Formalization is more accurate if it keeps track of the sources, but it is not very useful any more. The reasoner needs to detach the message from the medium, in order to be able to utilize its content for unmediated inferences. So our discussion has a negative end. Once we make logic more ‘realistic’ in the sense that it captures patterns of everyday reasoning, there is no easy way of saving any of the beautiful properties that have endeared classical logic to students of the subject from Frege on. We have identified a formidable problem, but we haven’t been able to offer an acceptable solution for it. But problems there are, and creating awareness of problems is one of the important tasks of philosophy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Luc Bovens, Anthony Gillies, Franz Huber, Isaac Levi, David Makinson, Erik Olsson, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Krister Segerberg, Wolfgang Spohn and two anonymous referees of this journal for many helpful comments. It is only lack of space and time that prevents me from taking up more of the interesting issues they have raised.
NOTES 1 Along with Dennett (1971, pp. 10–11) and Stalnaker (1984, p. 82), as well as the
majority of the more technical literature mentioned below. 2 What has been said in this little paragraph takes the position that the nonmonotonicity
of commonsense reasoning is an effect of a certain way of using classical logic, rather than a result of applying some irreducibly non-classical, ampliative inference operation (see e.g., Morgan 2000 and Kyburg 2001). The counterexample below is independent of any particular philosophical stand in this matter. 3 For a an excellent survey of the logical patterns underlying nonmonotonic reasoning, see Makinson (1994). 4 See for instance the discussions in Brewka (1991), Giordano and Martelli (1994) and Roos (1998).
[ 74 ]
A COUNTEREXAMPLE TO SIX FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
239
5 For comprehensive treatments of this topic, see Gärdenfors (1988), Gärdenfors and Rott
(1995) and Hansson (1999). 6 See Makinson and Gärdenfors (1991) and Rott (2001, chapter 4). 7 Some of the relevant problems are highlighted by Rott (1989) and Lindström and Ra-
binowicz (1999). – As for the underlying language, it is worth noting that our challenge to the theory of belief formation does not depend on any extension of standard propositional language, as other counterexamples to prominent logical principles do. Compare the much-debated riddles raised by McGee’s (1985) counterexample to modus ponens and Gärdenfors’ (1986) trivialization theorem, which both depend on the language’s including non-truth functional conditionals. 8 The theory of rational choice I am referring to here is the classical one deriving from economists like Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow and Amartya Sen. A beautiful and concise summary of the most relevant ideas is given by by Moulin (1985). This theory is applied to the field of belief formation by Lindström (1991) and Rott (1993, 2001). 9 Sen (1993, pp. 500–502; 1995, pp. 24–26) has brought the problem to wide attention. There are other reasons why Property α may fail without the chooser being irrational; see for example Levi (1986, pp. 32–34) and Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002) about decision making on the basis of multiple preference relations. It remains to be seen how many of the reasons that speak against Property α as a general requirement for rational choice apply to the rather special domain of belief formation. 10 Two sorts of reasons come to mind that might account for the customer’s pessimism. Either his experience is that there are more bad restaurants than good ones, which makes is more likely that the one he is just visiting is bad. Or the pessimistic assumption is made because it is the relevant one for finding out which decision minimizes maximal damage, and the customer indeed wishes to be on the safe side. 11 I wish to thank Wlodek Rabinowicz for inventing such a scenario in a discussion at a conference in Prague. Wolfgang Spohn came up with a similar point independently a little later in an email message.
REFERENCES
Alchourrón, Carlos, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson: 1985, ‘On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction Functions and Their Associated Revision Functions’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510–530. Brewka, Gerd: 1991, ‘Cumulative Default Logic: In Defense of Non-Monotonic Inference Rules’, Artificial Intelligence 50, 183–205. Dennett, Daniel: 1971, ‘Intentional Systems’, Journal of Philosophy 68, 87–106. The page reference is to the reprint in D.D.: 1978, Brainstorms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–22. Gärdenfors, Peter: 1986, ‘Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals’, Philosophical Review 95, 81–93. Gärdenfors, Peter: 1988, Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Gärdenfors, Peter and Hans Rott: 1995, ‘Belief Revision’, in D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, and J. A. Robinson (eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming Volume IV: Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 35–132.
[ 75 ]
240
HANS ROTT
Giordano, Laura and Alberto Martelli: 1994, ‘On Cumulative Default Logics’, Artificial Intelligence 66, 161–179. Hansson, Sven O.: 1999, A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and Database Updating, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Kalai, Gil, Ariel Rubinstein, and Ran Spiegler: 2002, ‘Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales’, Econometrica 70, 2481–2488. Kyburg, Henry E., Jr.: 2001, ‘Real Logic is Nonmonotonic’, Minds and Machines 11, 577– 595. Levi, Isaac: 1986, Hard Choices, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lindström, Sten: 1991, ‘A Semantic Approach to Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Inference Operations and Choice’, Uppsala Prints and Preprints in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala. Lindström, Sten and Wlodek Rabinowicz: 1999, ‘DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents’, Erkenntnis 50, 353–385. Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa: 1957, Games and Decisions, John Wiley & Sons, New York. Makinson, David: 1994, ‘General Patterns in Nonmonotonic Reasoning’, in D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, and J. A. Robinson (eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol. 3: Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Uncertain Reasoning, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 35–110. Makinson, David and Peter Gärdenfors: 1991, ‘Relations between the Logic of Theory Change and Nonmonotonic Logic’, in A. Fuhrmann and M. Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change, Springer LNAI 465, Berlin, pp. 185–205. McGee, Van: 1985, ‘A Counterexample to Modus Ponens’, Journal of Philosophy 82, 462– 471. Morgan, Charles G.: 2000, ‘The Nature of Nonmonotonic Reasoning’, Minds and Machines 10, 321–360. Moulin, Hervé: 1985, ‘Choice Functions over a Finite Set: A Summary’, Social Choice and Welfare 2, 147–160. Reiter, Raymond: 1980, ‘A Logic of Default Reasoning’, Artificial Intelligence 13, 81–132. Roos, Nico: 1998, ‘Reasoning by Cases in Default Logic’, Artificial Intelligence 99, 165– 183. Rott, Hans: 1989, ‘Conditionals and Theory Change: Revisions, Expansions, and Additions’, Synthese 81, 91–113. Rott, Hans: 1993, ‘Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 58, 1426–1450. Rott, Hans: 2001, Change, Choice and Inference, Oxford Logic Guides, Vol. 42, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Sen, Amartya K.: 1993, ‘Internal Consistency of Choice’, Econometrica 61, 495–521. Sen, Amartya K.: 1995, ‘Is the Idea of Purely Internal Consistency of Choice Bizarre?’, in J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics. Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 19–31. Stalnaker, Robert C.: 1984, Inquiry, Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Department of Philosophy, University of Regensburg 93040 Regensburg, Germany E-mail:
[email protected]
[ 76 ]
VALENTIN GORANKO and WOJCIECH JAMROGA
COMPARING SEMANTICS OF LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT. We draw parallels between several closely related logics that combine – in different proportions – elements of game theory, computation tree logics, and epistemic logics to reason about agents and their abilities. These are: the coalition game logics CL and ECL introduced by Pauly in 2000, the alternating-time temporal logic ATL developed by Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman between 1997 and 2002, and the alternating-time temporal epistemic logic ATEL by van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2002). In particular, we establish some subsumption and equivalence results for their semantics, as well as interpretation of the alternating-time temporal epistemic logic into ATL. The focus in this paper is on models: alternating transition systems, multi-player game models (alias concurrent game structures) and coalition effectivity models turn out to be intimately related, while alternating epistemic transition systems share much of their philosophical and formal apparatus. Our approach is constructive: we present ways to transform between different types of models and languages.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this study we offer a comparative analysis of several recent logical enterprises that aim at modeling multi-agent systems. Most of all, the coalition game logic CL and its extended version ECL (Pauly 2002, 2000b, 2001), and the Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL (Alur et al. 1997, 1998a, 2002) are studied. These turn out to be intimately related, which is not surprising since all of them deal with essentially the same type of scenarios, viz. a set of agents (players, system components) taking actions, simultaneously or in turns, on a common set of states – and thus effecting transitions between these states. The game-theoretic aspect is very prominent in both approaches; furthermore, in both frameworks the agents pursue certain goals with their actions and in that pursuit they can form coalitions. In both enterprises the objective is to develop formal tools for reasoning about such coalitions of agents and their ability to achieve specified outcomes in these action games. An extension of ATL, called Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) was introduced in van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2002) in order to enable reasoning about agents acting under incomplete informaSynthese 139: 241–280, 2004. Knowledge, Rationality & Action 77–116, 2004. © 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
[ 77 ]
242
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
tion. Although the semantics for ATEL is still under debate, the original version of that logic is certainly worth investigating. It turns out that, while extending ATL, ATEL can be interpreted into the former in the sense that there is a translation of models and formulas of ATEL into ATL that preserves the satisfiability of formulas. This does not imply that logics like ATEL are redundant, of course – in fact, the way of expressing epistemic facts in ATL is purely technical, and the resulting formulas look rather unnatural. Similarly, each of the three alternative semantics for ECL and ATL, investigated here, has its own drawbacks and offers different advantages for practical use. The rest of the paper is organized a follows: first, we offer a brief summary of some basic concepts from game theory; then we introduce the main “actors” of our study – logics and structures that have been used for modeling multi-agent systems in temporal perspective. In order to make the paper self-contained we have included all relevant definitions from Pauly (2002, 2001, 1998a), Alur et al. (2002), van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2002).1 In Sections 3 and 4 the relationships between these logics and structures are investigated in a formal way. We show that: 1. Specific classes of multi-player game models are equivalent to some types of alternating transition systems. 2. ATL subsumes CL as well as ECL. 3. The three alternative semantics for Alternating-time Temporal Logic and Coalition Logics (based on multi-player game models, alternating transition systems and coalition effectivity models) are equivalent. 4. Formulas and models of ATEL can be translated into its fragment ATL. The paper partly builds on previous work of ours, included in Goranko (2001) and Jamroga (2003).
2. MODELS AND LOGICS OF STRATEGIC ABILITY
The logics studied here have several things in common. They are intended for reasoning about various aspects of multi-agent systems and multi-player games, they are multi-modal logics, they have been obviously inspired by game theory, and they are based on the temporal logic approach. We present and discuss the logics and their models in this section. A broader survey of logic-based approaches to multi-agent systems can be found in Fagin et al. (1995) and van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2003b). [ 78 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
243
Figure 1. Extensive and strategic form of the matching pennies game: (A) perfect information case; (B) a1 does not show his coin before the end of the game.
2.1. Basic Influences 2.1.1. Classical Game Theory Logics of agents and action build upon several important concepts from game theory, most of them going back to the 40s and the seminal book (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). We will start with an informal survey of these concepts, following Mostly Hart (1992). An interested reader is referred to Aumann and Hart (1992), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for a more extensive introduction to game theory. In game theory, a game is usually presented in its extensive and/or strategic form. The extensive form defines the game via a tree of possible positions in the game (states), game moves (choices) available to players, and the outcome (utility or payoff) that players gain at each of the final states. These games are usually turn-based, i.e., every state is assigned a player who controls the choice of the next move, so the players are taking turns. A strategy for player a specifies a’s choices at the states controlled by a. The strategic form consists of a matrix that presents the payoffs for all combinations of players’ strategies. It presents the whole game in a ‘snapshot’ as if it was played in one single move, while the extensive form emphasizes control and information flow in the game. [ 79 ]
244
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
EXAMPLE 1. Consider a variant of the matching pennies game. There are two players, each with a coin: first a1 chooses to show the heads (action h) or tails (t), then a2 does. If both coins are heads up or both coins are tails up, then a1 wins (and gets score of 1) and a2 loses (score 0). If the coins show different sides, then a2 is the winner. The extensive and strategic forms for this game are shown in Figure 1A. The strategies define agent’s choices at all ‘his’ nodes, and are labeled appropriately: q1 hq2 t denotes, for instance, a strategy for a2 in which the player chooses to show heads whenever the current state of the game is q1 , and tails at q2 . Note that – using this strategy – a2 wins regardless of the first move from a1 . The information available to agents is incomplete in many games. Classical game theory handles this kind of uncertainty through partitioning every player’s nodes into so called information sets. An information set for player a is a set of states that are indistinguishable for a. Traditionally, information sets are defined only for the states in which a chooses the next step. Now a strategy assigns choices to information sets rather than separate states, because players are supposed to choose the same move for all the situations they cannot distinguish. EXAMPLE 2. Suppose that a1 does not show his coin to a2 before the end of the game. Then nodes q1 and q2 belong to the same information set of a2 , as shown in Figure 1B. No player has a strategy that guarantees his win any more. A general remark is in order here. The concept of coalitional game, traditionally considered in game theory, where every possible coalition is assigned a real number (its worth), differs somewhat from the one considered here. In this study we are rather concerned with qualitative aspects of game structures rather than with quantitative analysis of specific games. It should be clear, however, that these two approaches are in agreement and can be easily put together. Indeed, the intermediate link between them is the notion of (qualitative) effectivity function (Pauly 2002). That notion naturally transfers over to alternating transition systems, thus providing a framework for purely game-theoretic treatment of alternating temporal logics. 2.1.2. Computational Tree Logic and Epistemic Logic Apart from game theory, the concepts investigated in this paper are strongly influenced by modal logics of computations (such as the computation tree logic CTL) and beliefs (epistemic logic). CTL (Emerson 1990; [ 80 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
245
Figure 2. Transitions of the variable controller/client system, together with the tree of possible computations.
Huth and Ryan 2000) involves several operators for temporal properties of computations in transition systems: E (for all paths), A (there is a path), X (nexttime), F (sometime), G (always) and U (until). ‘Paths’ refer to alternative courses of events that may happen in the future; nodes on a path denote states of the system in subsequent moments of time along this particular course. Typically, paths are interpreted as sequences of successive states of computations. EXAMPLE 3. As an illustration, consider a system with a binary variable x. In every step, the variable can retain or change its value. The states and possible transitions are shown in Figure 2. There are two propositions available to observe the value of x: ‘x = 0’ and ‘x = 1’. Then, for example, EF x = 1 is satisfied in every state of the system: there is a path such that x will have the value of 1 at some moment. However, the above is not true for every possible course of action: ¬AF x = 1. It is important to distinguish between the computational structure, defined explicitly in the model, and the behavioral structure, i.e., the model of how the system is supposed to behave in time (Schnoebelen 2003). In many temporal models the computational structure is finite, while the implied behavioral structure is infinite. The computational structure can be seen as a way of defining the tree of possible (infinite) computations that may occur in the system. The way the computational structure unravels into a behavioral structure (computation tree) is shown in Figure 2, too. Epistemic logic offers the notion of epistemic accessibility relation that generalizes information sets, and introduces operators for talking about [ 81 ]
246
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
individual and collective knowledge. Section 4 describes them in more detail; a reader interested in a comprehensive exposition on epistemic logic can be also referred to the seminal book by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (Fagin et al. 1995), or to van der Hoek and Verbrugge (2002) for a survey. 2.2. Coalition Game Logics and Multi-Player Game Models Coalition logic (CL), introduced in Pauly (2000b, 2002), formalizes reasoning about powers of coalitions in strategic games. It extends the classical propositional logic with a family of (non-normal) modalities [A], A ⊆ Agt, where Agt is a fixed set of players. Intuitively, [A]ϕ means that coalition A can enforce an outcome state satisfying ϕ. 2.2.1. Multi-Player Strategic Game Models Game frames (Pauly 2002), represent multi-player strategic games where sets of players can form coalitions in attempts to achieve desirable outcomes. Game frames are based on the notion of a strategic game form – a tuple Agt, { a | a ∈ Agt}, Q, o} consisting of: – a non-empty finite set of agents (or players) Agt, – a family of (non-empty) sets of actions (choices, strategies) a for each player a ∈ Agt, – a non-empty set of states Q, – an outcome function o: a∈Agt a → Q which associates an outcome state in Q to every combination of choices from all the players. By a collective choice σA we will denote a tuple of choices σa a∈A (one for each player from A ⊆ Agt), and we will be writing o(σA , σAgt\A ) with the presumed meaning. REMARK 1. Note that the notion of “strategy” in strategic game forms is local, wrapped into one-step actions. It differs from the notion of ‘strategy’ in extensive game forms (used in the semantics of ATL) which represents a global, conditional plan of action. To avoid confusion, we will refer to the local strategies as choices, and use the term collective choice instead of strategy profile from Pauly (2002) to denote a combination of simultaneous choices from several players. REMARK 2. A strategic game form defines the choices and transitions available at a particular state of the game. If the identity of the state does not follow from the context in an obvious way, we will use indices to indicate which state they refer to. [ 82 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
247
Figure 3. Transitions of the variable controller/client system.
The set of all strategic game forms for players Agt over states Q will be Agt denoted by Q . A multi-player game frame for a set of players Agt is a Agt pair Q, γ where γ : Q → Q is a mapping associating a strategic game form with each state in Q. A multi-player game model (MGM) for a set of players Agt over a set of propositions is a triple M = Q, γ , π where Q, γ is a multi-player game frame, and π : Q → P () is a valuation labeling each state from Q with the set of propositions that are true at that state. EXAMPLE 4. Consider a variation of the system with binary variable x from Example 3. There are two processes: the controller (or server) s can enforce the variable to retain its value in the next step, or let the client change the value. The client c can request the value of x to be 0 or 1. The players proceed with their choices simultaneously. The states and transitions of the system as a whole are shown in Figure 3. Again, we should make the distinction between computational and behavioral structures. The multi-player game model unravels into a computation tree in a way analogous to CTL models (cf. Figure 2). 2.2.2. Coalition Logic Formulas of CL are defined recursively as: ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | [A]ϕ, where p ∈ is a proposition, and A ⊆ Agt is a group of agents. The semantics of CL can be given via the clauses: – M, q |= p iff p ∈ π(q) for atomic propositions p; – M, q |= [A]ϕ iff there is a collective choice σA such that for every collective choice σAgt\A , we have M, oq (σA , σAgt\A ) |= ϕ. EXAMPLE 5. Consider the variable client/server system from Example 4. The following CL formulas are valid in this model (i.e., true in every state of it): [ 83 ]
248
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
1. (x = 0 → [s]x = 0) ∧ (x = 1 → [s]x = 1): the server can enforce the value of x to remain the same in the next step; 2. x = 0 → ¬[c]x = 1: c cannot change the value from 0 to 1 on his own; 3. x = 0 → ¬[s]x = 1: s cannot change the value on his own either; 4. x = 0 → [s, c]x = 1: s and c can cooperate to change the value. 2.2.3. Logics for Local and Global Effectivity of Coalitions In CL, the operators [A]ϕ can express local effectivity properties of coalitions, i.e., their powers to force outcomes in single ‘rounds’ of the game. Pauly (2000b) extends CL to the Extended Coalition Logic ECL with iterated operators for global effectivity [A∗ ]ϕ expressing the claim that coalition A has a collective strategy to maintain the truth of ϕ throughout the entire game. In our view, and in the sense of Remark 1, both systems formalize different aspects of reasoning about powers of coalitions: CL can be thought as reasoning about strategic game forms, while ECL rather deals with extensive game forms, representing sequences of moves, collectively effected by the players’ actions. Since ECL can be embedded as a fragment of ATL (as presented in Section 2.4), we will not discuss it separately here. 2.3. Alternating-Time Temporal Logic and its Models Game-theoretic scenarios can occur in various situations, one of them being open computer systems such as computer networks, where the different components can act as relatively autonomous agents, and computations in such systems are effected by their combined actions. The Alternatingtime Temporal Logics ATL and ATL∗ , introduced in Alur et al. (1997), and later refined in Alur et al. (1998a, 2002), are intended to formalize reasoning about computations in such open systems which can be enforced by coalitions of agents, in a way generalizing the logics CTL and CTL∗. 2.3.1. The Logics ATL and ATL∗ In ATL∗ a class of cooperation modalities A replaces the path quantifiers E and A. The common-sense reading of A is: The group of agents A have a collective strategy to enforce regardless of what all the other agents do.
ATL is the fragment of ATL∗ subjected to the same syntactic restrictions which define CTL as a fragment of CTL∗ , i.e., every temporal operator must be immediately preceded by exactly one cooperation modality. The original CTL∗ operators E and A can be expressed in ATL∗ with [ 84 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
249
Agt and ∅ respectively, but between both extremes one can express much more about the abilities of particular agents and groups of agents. Since model-checking for ATL∗ requires 2EXPTIME, but it is linear for ATL, ATL is more useful for practical applications, and we will not discuss ATL∗ in this paper. Formally, the recursive definition of ATL formulas is: ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ | AXϕ | AGϕ | AϕUψ The ‘sometime’ operator F can be defined in the usual way as: AF ϕ ≡ Aϕ. It should be noted that at least three different versions of semantic structures for ATL have been proposed by Alur and colleagues in the last 7 years. The earliest version (Alur et al. 1997), involves definitions of a synchronous turn-based structure and an asynchronous structure in which every transition is controlled by a single agent. The next paper (Alur et al. 1998a) defines general structures called alternating transition systems where the agents’ choices are identified with the sets of possible outcomes. In the concurrent game structures from Alur et al. (2002), labels for choices are introduced and the transition function is simplified. The above papers share the same title and they are often cited incorrectly in the literature as well as citation indices, which may lead to some confusion. 2.3.2. Alternating Transition Systems Alternating transition systems – building on the concept of alternation developed in Chandra et al. (1981) – formalize systems of transitions effected by collective actions of all agents involved. In the particular case of one agent (the system), alternating transition systems are reduced to ordinary transition systems, and ATL reduces to CTL. An alternating transition system (ATS) is a tuple T = , Agt, Q, π, δ where: – is a set of (atomic) propositions, Agt is a non-empty finite set of agents, Q is a non-empty set of states, and π : Q → P () is a valuation of propositions; – δ: Q×Agt → P (P (Q)) is a transition function mapping a pair state, agent to a non-empty family of choices of possible next states. The idea is that at state q an agent a chooses a set Qa ∈ δ(q, a) thus forcing the outcome state to be from Qa . The resulting transition leads to a state which is in the intersection of all Qa for a ∈ Agt and so it reflects the mutual will of all agents. Since the system is required to be deterministic (given the state and the agents’ decisions), Q1 ∩ . . . ∩ Qk must always be a singleton.2 [ 85 ]
250
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
Figure 4. An ATS for the controller/client problem.
DEFINITION 1. A state q2 ∈ Q is a successor of q1 if, whenever the system is in q1 , the agents can cooperate so that the next state is q2 , i.e., there are choice sets Qa ∈ δ(q1 , a), for each a ∈ Agt such that
suc a∈Agt Qa = {q2 }. The set of successors of q will be denoted by Qq . DEFINITION 2. A computation in T is an infinite sequence of states q0 q1 . . . such that qi+1 is a successor of qi for every i ≥ 0. A q-computation is a computation starting from q. 2.3.3. Semantics of ATL Based on Alternating Transition Systems DEFINITION 3. A strategy for agent a is a mapping fa : Q+ → P (Q) which assigns to every non-empty sequence of states q0 , . . . qn a choice set fa (q0 . . . qn ) ∈ δ(qn , a). The function specifies a’s decisions for every possible (finite) history of system transitions. A collective strategy for a set of agents A ⊆ Agt is just a tuple of strategies (one per agent from A): FA = fa a∈A . Now, out(q, FA ) denotes the set of outcomes of FA from q, i.e., the set of all q-computations in which group A has been using FA . REMARK 3. This notion of strategy can be specified as ‘perfect recall strategy’, where the whole history of the game is considered when the choice of the next move is made by the agents. The other extreme alternative is a ‘memoryless strategy’ where only the current state is taken in consideration; further variations on ‘limited memory span strategies’ are possible. While the choice of one or another notion of strategy affects the semantics of the full ATL∗ , it is not difficult to see that both perfect recall strategies and memoryless strategies eventually yield equivalent semantics for ATL. [ 86 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
251
Let [i] denote the ith position in computation . The definition of truth of an ATL formula at state q of an ATS T = , Agt, Q, π, δ follows through the below clauses. Informally speaking, T , q A iff there exists a collective strategy FA such that is satisfied for all computations from out(FA , q). (A, X) T , q AXϕ iff there exists a collective strategy FA such that for every computation ∈ out(q, FA ) we have T , [1] ϕ; (A , G) T , q AGϕ iff there exists a collective strategy FA such that for every ∈ out(q, FA ) we have T , [i] ϕ for every i ≥ 0. (A, U) T , q AϕUψ iff there exists a collective strategy FA such that for every ∈ out(q, FA ) there is i ≥ 0 such that T , [i] ψ and for all j such that 0 ≤ j < i we have T , [j ] ϕ. EXAMPLE 6. An ATS for the variable client/server system is shown in Figure 4. The following ATL formulas are valid in this model: 1. (x = 0 → sX x = 0) ∧ (x = 1 → sX x = 1): the server can enforce the value of x to remain the same in the next step; 2. x = 0 → (¬cF x = 1 ∧ ¬sF x = 1): neither c nor s can change the value from 0 to 1, even in multiple steps; 3. x = 0 → s, cF x = 1: s and c can cooperate to change the value. 2.3.4. Semantics of ATL, Based on Concurrent Game Structures and Multi-player Game Models Alur et al. (2002) redefines ATL models as concurrent game structures: M = k, Q, , π, d, o, where k is the number of players (so Agt can be taken to be {1, . . . , k}), the decisions available to player a at state q are labeled with natural numbers up to da (q) (so a (q) can be taken to be {1, . . . , da (q)}); finally, a complete tuple of decisions α1 , . . . , αk from all the agents in state q implies a deterministic transition according to the transition function o(q, α1 , . . . , αk ). In a concurrent game structure the type of a strategy function is slightly different since choices are abstract entities indexed by natural numbers now, and a strategy is a mapping fa : Q+ → N such that fa (λq) ≤ da (q). The rest of the semantics looks exactly the same as for alternating transition systems. REMARK 4. Clearly, concurrent game structures are equivalent to Pauly’s multi-player game models; they differ from each other only in notation.3 [ 87 ]
252
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
Thus, the ATL semantics can as well be based on MGMs, and the truth definitions look exactly the same as for alternating transition systems (see Section 2.3.3). We leave rewriting the definitions of a strategy, collective strategy and outcome set in terms of multi-player game models to the reader. The next section shows how this shared semantics can be used to show that ATL subsumes coalition logics. 2.4. Embedding CL and ECL into ATL Both CL and ECL are strictly subsumed by ATL in terms of the shared semantics based on multi-player game models.4 Indeed, there is a translation of the formulas of ECL into ATL, which becomes obvious once the ATL semantic clause (A, X) is rephrased as: [A] T , q AXϕ iff there exists a collective choice FA = {fa }a∈A such that for every collective choice F
Agt\A = {fa }a∈Agt\A , we have
T , s ϕ, where {s} = a∈A fa (q) ∩ a∈Agt\A fa (q) which is precisely the truth-condition for [A]ϕ in the coalition logic CL. Thus, CL embeds in a straightforward way as a simple fragment of ATL by translating [A]ϕ into AXϕ. Accordingly, [C ∗ ]ϕ translates into ATL as AGϕ, which follows from the fact that each of [C ∗ ]ϕ and AGϕ, is the greatest fixpoint of the same operator over [C]ϕ and AXϕ respectively (see Section 2.5). In consequence, ATL subsumes ECL as the fragment ATLXG involving only AXϕ and AGϕ. We will focus on ATL, and will simply regard CL and ECL as its fragments throughout the rest of the paper. 2.5. Effectivity Functions and Coalition Effectivity Models as alternative semantics for ATL As mentioned earlier, game theory usually measures the powers of coalitions quantitatively, and characterizes the possible outcomes in terms of payoff profiles. That approach can be easily transformed into a qualitative one, where the payoff profiles are encoded in the outcome states themselves and each coalition is assigned a preference order on these outcome states. Then, the power of a coalition can be measured in terms of sets of states in which it can force the actual outcome of the game (i.e., sets for which it is effective), thus defining another semantics for ATL, based on so called coalition effectivity models (introduced by Pauly for the coalition logics CL and ECL). This semantics is essentially a monotone neighborhood semantics for non-normal multi-modal logics, and therefore it enables the results, methods and techniques already developed for modal logics to be applied here as well. [ 88 ]
253
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
Figure 5. A coalition effectivity function for the variable client/server system.
DEFINITION 4. A (local) effectivity function is a mapping of type e: P (Agt) → P (P (Q)). The idea is that we associate with each set of players the family of outcome sets for which their coalition is effective. However, the notion of effectivity function as defined above is abstract and not every effectivity function corresponds to a real strategic game form. Those which do can be characterized with the following conditions: 1. Liveness: for every A ⊆ Agt, ∅ ∈ / e(A). 2. Termination: for every A ⊆ Agt, Q ∈ e(A). 3. Agt-maximality: if X ∈ / e(Agt) then Q \ X ∈ e(∅) (if X cannot be effected by the grand coalition of players, then Q \ X is inevitable). 4. Outcome-monotonicity: if X ⊆ Y and X ∈ e(A) then Y ∈ e(A). 5. Super-additivity: for all A1 , A2 ⊆ Agt and X1 , X2 ⊆ Q, if A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, X1 ∈ e(A1 ), and X2 ∈ e(A2 ), then X1 ∩ X2 ∈ e(A1 ∪ A2 ). We note that super-additivity and liveness imply consistency of the powers: for any A ⊆ Agt, if X ∈ e(A) then Q \ X ∈ e(Agt \ A). DEFINITION 5. An effectivity function e is called playable if conditions (1)–(5) hold for e. DEFINITION 6. An effectivity function e is the effectivity function of a strategic game form γ if it associates with each set of players A from γ the family of outcome sets {Q1 , Q2 , . . .}, such that for every Qi the coalition A has a collective choice to ensure that the next state will be in Qi . THEOREM 5 (Pauly 2002). An effectivity function is playable iff it is the effectivity function of some strategic game form. EXAMPLE 7. Figure 5 presents a playable effectivity function that describes powers of all the possible coalitions for the variable server/client system from Example 4, and state q0 . DEFINITION 8. A coalition effectivity frame is a triple F = Agt, Q, E where Agt is a set of players, Q is a non-empty set of states and E: Q → (P (Agt) → P (P (Q))) is a mapping which associates an effectivity [ 89 ]
254
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
function with each state. We shall write Eq (A) instead of E(q)(A). A coalition effectivity model (CEM) is a tuple E = Agt, Q, E, π where Agt, Q, E is a coalition effectivity frame and π is a valuation of the atomic propositions over Q. DEFINITION 8. A coalition effectivity frame (resp. coalition effectivity model) is standard if it contains only playable effectivity functions. Thus, coalition effectivity models provide semantics of CL by means of the following truth definition (Pauly 2002): E, q |= [A]ϕ iff {s ∈ E | E, s |= ϕ} ∈ Eq (A). This semantics can be accordingly extended to semantics for ECL (Pauly 2001) and ATL (Goranko 2001) by defining effectivity functions for the global effectivity operators in extensive game forms, where they indicate the outcome sets for which the coalitions have long-term strategies to effect. This extension can be done using the following fixpoint characterizations of AGϕ and AϕUϕ as follows: AGϕ := νZ.ϕ ∧ AXZ, AϕUψ := µZ.ψ ∨ ϕ ∧ AXZ.
3. EQUIVALENCE OF THE DIFFERENT SEMANTICS FOR ATL
In this section we compare the semantics for Alternating-time Temporal Logic, based on alternating transition systems and multi-player game models – and show their equivalence (in the sense that we can transform the models both ways while preserving satisfiability of ATL formulas). Further, we show that these semantics are both equivalent to the semantics based on coalition effectivity models. The transformation from alternating transition systems to multi-player game models is easy: in fact, for every ATS, an equivalent MGM can be constructed via re-labeling transitions (see Section 3.2). Construction the other way round is more sophisticated: first, we observe that all multiplayer game models obtained from alternating transition systems satisfy a special condition we call convexity (Section 3.2); then we show that for every convex MGM, an equivalent ATS can be obtained (Section 3.3). Finally, we demonstrate that for every arbitrary multi-player game model a convex MGM can be constructed that satisfies the same formulas of ATL (Section 3.4). [ 90 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
255
We show also that the transformations we propose preserve the property of being a turn-based structure, and that they transform injective MGMs into lock-step synchronous ATSs and vice versa. 3.1. Some Special Types of ATSs and MGMs DEFINITION 9 (Pauly 2002). A strategic game form Agt, { a | a ∈ Agt}, Q, o is an a-dictatorship if there is a player a ∈ Agt who determines the outcome state of the game, i.e., ∀σa ∈ a ∃q ∈ Q∀σAgt\{a} o(σa , σAgt\{a} ) = q. An MGM Q, γ , π is turn-based if every γ (q) is a dictatorship.5 We note that the notion of a-dictatorship is quite strong: it presumes that any choice of the dictator forces a chosen state as the outcome. A meaningful alternative, which one can aptly call a-leadership, is when some choices of a can force the next state (the “wise choice of the leader”). It should be interesting to investigate whether the dictatorship-based and leadership-based strategic game forms lead to equivalent semantics for ATL. DEFINITION 10. A strategic game form is injective if o is injective, i.e., assigns different outcome states to different tuples of choices. An MGM is injective if it contains only injective game forms. EXAMPLE 8. Note that the variable client/server game model from Figure 3 is not injective, because choices reject, set0 and reject, set1 always have the same outcome. The model is not turn-based either: s is a leader at both q0 and q1 (he can determine the next state with σs = reject), but the outcome of his other choice (σs = accept) depends on the choice of the client. On the other hand, the game tree from Figure 1A can be seen as a turn-based MGM: player a1 is the dictator at state q0 , and player a2 is the dictator at q1 and q2 (both players can be considered dictators at q3 , q4 , q5 and q6 ). DEFINITION 11 (Alur et al. 1997). An ATS is turn-based synchronous if for every q ∈ Q there is an agent a who decides upon the next state, i.e., δ(q, a) consists entirely of singletons. Every ATS can be “tightened” by removing from every Q ∈ δ(q, a) all states which can never be realized as successors in a transition from q. Every reasonably general criterion should accept such tightening as equivalent to the original ATS. [ 91 ]
256
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
DEFINITION 12. An ATS T = , Agt, Q, π, δ is tight if, for every q ∈ Q, a ∈ Agt and Qa ∈ δ(q, a), we have Qa ⊆ Qsuc q . COROLLARY 6. For every ATS T there is a tight ATS T which satisfies the same formulas of ATL. DEFINITION 13. An ATS is lock-step synchronous if the set of sucof every cessor states Qsuc q state q can be labeled with all tuples from some Cartesian product a∈Agt Qa so that all choice sets from δ(q, a) are ‘hyperplanes’ in Qsuc q , i.e., sets of the form {qa } × b∈Agt\{a} Qb , 6 where qa ∈ Qa . In other words, the agents act independently and each of them can only determine its ‘private’ component of the next state. It is worth emphasizing that lock-step synchronous systems closely correspond to the concept of interpreted systems from the literature on reasoning about knowledge (Fagin et al. 1995). Note that every lock-step synchronous ATS is tight.
3.2. From alternating transition systems to MGMs First, for every ATS T = , Agt, Q, π, δ over a set of agents Agt = {a1 , . . . , ak } there is an equivalent MGM M T = Q, γ T , π where, for q each q ∈ Q, the strategic game form γ T (q) = Agt, { a | a ∈ Agt}, oq , Q is defined in a very simple way: q
– a = δ(q, a), – oq (Qa1 , . . . , Qak ) = s where
ai ∈Agt Qai
= {s}.
EXAMPLE 9. Let us apply the transformation to the alternating transition system from Example 6. The resulting MGM is shown in Figure 6. The following proposition states that it satisfies the same ATL formulas as the original system. Note that – as T and M T include the same set of states Q – the construction preserves validity of formulas (in the model), too. PROPOSITION 7. For every alternating transition system T , a state q in it, and an ATL formula ϕ: T , q |= ϕ iff M T , q |= ϕ. The models M T defined as above share a specific property which will be defined below. First, we need an auxiliary technical notion: a fusion of n-tuples (α1 , . . . , αn ) and (β1 , . . . , βn ) is any n-tuple (γ1 , . . . , γn ) where γi ∈ {αi , βi } , i = 1, . . . , n. The following is easy to check. [ 92 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
257
Figure 6. From ATS to a convex game structure: M T for the system from Figure 4.
PROPOSITION 8. For any game form Agt, { a | a ∈ Agt}, Q, o, where Agt = {a1 , . . . , ak }, the following two properties of the outcome function o: a∈Agt a → Q are equivalent: (i) If o(σa1 , . . . , σak ) = o(τa1 , . . . , τak ) = s then o(ςa1 , . . . , ςak ) = s for every fusion (ςa1 , . . . , ςak ) of (σa1 , . . . , σak ) and (τa1 , . . . , τak ). (ii) For every s ∈ Q there are a ⊆ a such that o−1 (s) = a∈Agt a . DEFINITION 14. A strategic game form Agt, { a | a ∈ Agt}, Q, o is convex if the outcome function o satisfies (any of) the two equivalent properties above. A multi-player game model M = (Q, γ , π ) is convex if γ (q) is convex for every q ∈ Q. PROPOSITION 9. For every ATS T , the game model M T is convex. Proof: Let M T be defined as above. If oq (Q1a1 , . . . , Q1ak ) = oq (Q2a1 , j . . ., Q2ak ) = s then s ∈ Qa for each j = 1, 2 and a ∈ Agt, therefore
ja j1 jk 1 1 a∈Agt Qa = {s} for any fusion (Qa1 , . . . , Qak ) of (Qa1 , . . . , Qak ) and (Q2a1 , . . . , Q2ak ). [ 93 ]
258
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
REMARK 10. Pauly has pointed out that the convexity condition is known in game theory under the name of ‘rectangularity’ and rectangular strategic game forms which are ‘tight’ in sense that their α – and β – effectivity functions coincide are characterized in Abdou (1998) as the normal forms of extensive games with unique outcomes. PROPOSITION 11. 1. Every turn-based game model is convex. 2. Every injective game model is convex. Proof. (1) Let M = Q, γ , π be a turn-based MGM for a set of players Agt, and let d ∈ Agt be the dictator for γ (q), q ∈ Q. Then for q −1 every s ∈ Q, we have oq (s) = a∈Agt a where d = {σd ∈ d | q oq (. . . , σd , . . .) = s}, and a = a for all a = d. (2) is trivial. Note that the MGM from Figure 6 is convex, although it is neither injective nor turn-based, so the reverse implication does not hold. 3.3. From Convex Multi-Player Game Models to Alternating Transition Systems As it turns out, convexity is a sufficient condition if we want to relabel transitions from a multi-player game model back to an alternating transition system. Let M = Q, γ , π be a convex MGM over a set of q propositions , where Agt = {a1 , . . . , ak }, and let γ (q) = Agt, { a | M a ∈ Agt}, Q, oq for each q ∈ Q. We transform it to an ATS T = , Agt, Q, π, δ M with the transition function δ M defined by δ M (q, a) = {Qσa | σa ∈ aq }, q
Qσa = {oq (σa , σAgt\{a} ) | σAgt\{a} = σb1 , . . . , σbk−1 , bi = a, σbi ∈ σbi . Thus, Qσa is the set of states to which a transition may be effected from q while agent a has chosen to execute σa . Moreover, δ M (q, a) simply collects all such sets. For purely technical reasons we will regard these δ M (q, a) as indexed families, i.e., even if some Qσ1 and Qσ2 are set-theoretically equal, they will be considered different as long as σ1 = σ2 . By con
vexity of γ (q) it is easy to verify that a∈Agt Qσa = {oq (σa1 , . . . , σak )} for every tuple (Qσa1 , . . . , Qσak ) ∈ δ M (q, a1 ) × · · · × δ M (q, ak ). Furthermore, the following propositions hold. PROPOSITION 12. For every convex MGM M the ATS T M is tight. [ 94 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
259
PROPOSITION 13. For every convex MGM M, a state q in it, and an ATL formula ϕ, M, q |= ϕ iff T M , q |= ϕ. Note that the above construction transforms the multi-player game model from Figure 6 exactly back to the ATS from Figure 4. More generally, the constructions converting tight ATSs into convex MGMs and vice versa are mutually inverse, thus establishing a duality between these two types of structures: PROPOSITION 14. T
1. Every tight ATS T is isomorphic to T M . M 2. Every convex MGM M is isomorphic to M T . T
Proof. 1. It suffices to see that δ M (q, a) = δ(q, a) for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ Agt which is straightforward from the tightness of T . q 2. Let M = Q, γ , π be a convex MGM and γ (q) = Agt, { a | a q ∈ Agt}, Q, oq for q ∈ Q. For every σa ∈ a we identify σa with Qσa defined as above. We have to show that the outcome functions oq in M and TM oq in
M agree under that identification. Indeed, oq (Qσa1 , . . . , Qσak ) = s iff a∈Agt Qσa = {s} iff oq (σa1 , . . . , σak ) = s. The following proposition shows the relationship between structural properties of MGMs and ATSs: PROPOSITION 15. 1. For every ATS T the game model M T is injective iff T is lock-step synchronous. 2. For every convex MGM M, the ATS T M is lock-step synchronous iff M is injective. 3. For every turn-based synchronous ATS T the game model M T is turnbased. Conversely, if M T is turn-based for some tight ATS T then T is turn-based synchronous. 4. For every convex MGM M the ATS T M is turn-based synchronous iff M is turn-based. Proof. (1) Let T be lock-step synchronous and oq (Qa1 , . . . , Qak ) = s ai ∈ δ(q, ai ), i = 1, . . . , k. Then Qai = {sai } T× a1 , . . . , sak for some Q suc Q where Q = a q a∈Agt\{ai } a∈Agt Qa , whence the injectivity of M . T can be labeled Conversely, if M is injective then every state s ∈ Qsuc q . . . , Qak such that oq (Qa1 , . . . , Qak ) = s, with the unique tuple Qa1 , i.e., Qsuc q is represented by a∈Agt δ(q, a), and every Qai ∈ δ(q, ai ) can be identified with {Qai } × a∈Agt\{ai } δ(q, a). [ 95 ]
260
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
q (2) If M is injective then Qsuc by a∈Agt a where every q can be labeled Qσai ∈ δ(q, ai ) is identified with {σai } × a∈Agt\{ai } δ(q, a). Conversely, if T M is lock-step synchronous then every two different Qσa and Qσa from δ(q, a) must be disjoint, whence the injectivity of M. (3) and (4): the proofs are straightforward. 3.4. Equivalence between the Semantics for ATL Based on ATS and MGM So far we have shown how to transform alternating transition systems to convex multi-player game models, and vice versa. Unfortunately, not every MGM is convex. However, for every MGM we can construct a convex multi-player game model that satisfies the same formulas of ATL. This can be done by creating distinct copies of the original states for different incoming transitions, and thus ‘storing’ the knowledge of the previous state and the most recent choices from the agents in the new states. Since the actual choices are present in the label of the resulting state, the new transition function is obviously injective. It is also easy to observe that the below construction preserves not only satisfiability, but also validity of formulas (in the model). PROPOSITION 16. For every MGM M = Q, γ , π there is an injective (and hence convex) MGM M = Q , γ , π which satisfies the same formulas of ATL. q Proof. γ (q) = Agt, { a | a ∈ Agt}, Q, oq we define Qq = For every q {q}× a∈Agt a and let Q = Q∪ q∈Q Qq . Now we define γ as follows: – for q ∈ Q, we define γ (q) = Agt, { a | a ∈ Agt}, O q , Q , and O q (σa1 , . . . , σak ) = q, σa1 , . . . , σak ; – for σ = q, σa1 , . . . , σak ∈ Qq , and s = oq (σa1 , . . . , σak ), we define γ (σ ) = γ (s); – finally, π (q) = π(q) for q ∈ Q, and π (q, σa1 , . . . , σak ) = π(oq (σa1 , . . . , σak )) for q, σa1 , . . . σak ∈ Qq . q
The model M is injective and it can be proved by a straightforward induction that for every ATL formula ϕ: – M , q |= ϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for q ∈ Q, and – M , σa1 , . . . , σak |= ϕ iff M, oq (σa1 , . . . , σak ) σa1 , . . . , σak ∈ Qq .
|=
ϕ for
Thus, the restriction of the semantics of ATL to the class of injective (and hence to convex, as well) MGMs does not introduce new validities. Since every ATS can be reduced to an equivalent tight one, we obtain the following. [ 96 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
261
Figure 7. Construction of a convex multi-player game model equivalent to the MGM from Figure 3.
Figure 8. ATS-style transition function for the convex game model from Figure 7.
COROLLARY 17. For every ATL formula ϕ the following are equivalent: 1. ϕ is valid in all (tight) alternating transition systems. 2. ϕ is valid in all (injective) multi-player game models. We note that the above construction preserves validity and satisfiability of ATL∗ formulas, too. EXAMPLE 10. We can apply the construction to the controller from Example 4, and obtain a convex MGM equivalent to the original one in the context of ATL. The result is displayed in Figure 7. The labels for the transitions can be easily deduced from their target states. Re-writing the game model into an isomorphic ATS, according to the Construction from Section 3.3 (see Figure 8), completes the transformation from an arbitrary [ 97 ]
262
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
multi-player game model to an alternating transition system for which the same ATL formulas hold.
3.5. ATS or MGM? Alur has stated7 that the authors of ATL switched from alternating transition systems to concurrent game structures mostly to improve understandability of the logic and clarity of the presentation. Indeed, identifying actions with their outcomes may make things somewhat artificial and unnecessarily complicated. In particular, we find the convexity condition which ATSs impose too strong and unjustified in many situations. For instance, consider the following variation of the ‘Chicken’ game: two cars running against each other on a country road and each of the drivers, seeing the other car, can take any of the actions: ‘drive straight’, ‘swerve to the left’ and ‘swerve to the right’. Each of the combined actions for the two drivers: drive straight, swerve to the left and swerve to the right, drive straight leads to a non-collision outcome, while each of their fusions drive straight, drive straight and swerve to the left, swerve to the right leads to a collision. Likewise, in the ‘Coordinated Attack’ scenario (Fagin et al. 1995) any non-coordinated one-sided attack leads to defeat, while the coordinated attack of both armies, which is a fusion of these, leads to a victory. Thus, the definition of outcome function in coalition games is more general and flexible in our opinion. Let us consider the system from Example 4 again. The multi-player game model (or concurrent game structure) from Figure 3 looks natural and intuitive. Unfortunately, there is no ATS with the same number of states and transitions that fits the system description. In consequence, an ATS modeling the same situation must be larger (Jamroga 2003). The above examples show that correct alternating transition systems are more difficult to come up with directly than multi-player game models, and usually they are more complex, too. This should be especially evident when we consider open systems. Suppose we need to add another client process to the ATS from Example 6. It would be hard to extend the existing transition function in a straightforward way so that it still satisfies the formal requirements (all the intersections of choices are singletons). Designing a completely new ATS is probably an easier solution. Another interesting issue is extendibility of the formalisms. Game models incorporate explicit labels for agents’ choices – therefore the labels can be used, for instance, to restrict the set of valid strategies under uncertainty (Jamroga and van der Hoek 2003). [ 98 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
263
Figure 9. Coalition effectivity model for the variable client/server system.
3.6. Coalition Effectivity Models as Equivalent Alternative Semantics for ATL Effectivity functions and coalition effectivity models were Introduced in Section 2.5, including a characterization of these effectivity functions which describe abilities of agents and their coalitions in actual strategic game forms (playable effectivity functions, Theorem 5). We are going to extend the result to correspondence between multi-player game models and standard coalition effectivity models (i.e., the coalition effectivity models that contain only playable effectivity functions). Every MGM M = Q, γ , π for the set of players Agt corresponds to a CEM E M = Agt, Q, E M , π , where for every q ∈ Q, X ⊆ Q and A ⊆ Agt, we have X ∈ EqM (A) iff ∃σA ∀σAgt\A ∃s ∈ Xo(σA , σAgt\A ) = s. The choices refer to the strategic game form γ (q). Conversely, by Theorem 5, for every standard coalition effectivity model E there is a multiplayer game model M such that E is isomorphic to E M . Again, by a straightforward induction on formulas, we obtain: PROPOSITION 18. For every MGM M, a state q in it, and an ATL formula ϕ, we have M, q |= ϕ iff E M , q |= ϕ. EXAMPLE 11. Let M be the multi-player game model from Example 4 (variable client/server system). Coalition effectivity model E M is presented in Figure 9. By Proposition 9 and Corollary 17, we eventually obtain: [ 99 ]
264
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
THEOREM 19. For every ATL formula ϕ the following are equivalent: 1. ϕ is valid in all (tight) alternating transition systems, 2. ϕ is valid in all (injective) multi-player game models, 3. ϕ is valid in all standard coalition effectivity models. Thus, the semantics of ATL based on alternating transition systems, multi-player game models, and standard coalition effectivity models are equivalent. We note that, while the former two semantics are more concrete and natural, they are mathematically less elegant and suitable for formal reasoning about ATL, while the semantics based on coalition effectivity models is essentially a monotone neighborhood semantics for multi-modal logics. The combination of these semantics was used in Goranko and van Drimmelen (2003) to establish a complete axiomatization of ATL. 4. ATEL: ADDING KNOWLEDGE TO STRATEGIES AND TIME
Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic ATEL (van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2002, 2003a) enriches the picture with epistemic component. ATEL adds to ATL operators for representing agents’ knowledge: Ka ϕ reads as “agent a knows that ϕ”. Additional operators EA ϕ, CA ϕ, and DA ϕ refer to “everybody knows”, common knowledge, and distributed knowledge among the agents from A. Thus, EA ϕ means that every agent in A knows that ϕ holds, while CA ϕ means not only that the agents from A know that ϕ, but they also know that they know that, and know that they know that they know it, etc. The distributed knowledge modality DA ϕ denotes a situation in which, if the agents could combine their individual knowledge together, they would be able to infer that ϕ is true. 4.1. AETS and Semantics of Epistemic Formulas Models for ATEL are called alternating epistemic transition systems (AETS). They extend alternating transition systems with epistemic accessibility relations ∼1 , . . . , ∼k ⊆ Q × Q for modeling agents’ uncertainty: T = Agt, Q, , π, ∼a1 , . . . , ∼ak , δ. These are assumed to be equivalence relations. Agent a’s epistemic relation is meant to encode a’s inability to distinguish between the (global) system states: q ∼a q means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot really determine whether it is in q or q . Then: T , q |= Ka ϕ iff for all q such that q ∼a q we have T , q |= ϕ [ 100 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
265
Figure 10. An AETS for the modified controller/client problem. The dotted lines display the epistemic accessibility relations for s and c.
REMARK 20. Since the epistemic relations are required to be equivalences, the epistemic layer of ATEL refers indeed to agents’ knowledge rather than beliefs in general. We suggest that this requirement can be relieved to allow ATEL for other kinds of beliefs as well. In particular, the interpretation of ATEL into ATL we propose in Section 4.4 does not assume any specific properties of the accessibility relations. Relations ∼EA , ∼CA and ∼D A , used to model group epistemics, are derived from the individual accessibility relations of agents from A. First, ∼EA is the union of the relations, i.e., q ∼EA q iff q ∼a q for some a ∈ A. In other words, if everybody knows ϕ, then no agent may be unsure about the truth of it, and hence ϕ should be true in all the states that cannot be distinguished from the current state by even one member of the group. Next, ∼CA is defined as the transitive closure of ∼EA . Finally, ∼D A is the intersection of all the ∼a , a ∈ A: if any agent from A can distinguish q from q , then the whole group can distinguish the states in the sense of distributed knowledge. The semantics of group knowledge can be defined as below (for K = C, E, D): T , q |= KA ϕ iff for all q such that q ∼K A q we have T , q |= ϕ
The time complexity of model checking for ATEL is still polynomial (van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2003a). EXAMPLE 12. Let us consider another variation of the variable controller example: the client can try to add 1 or 2 (modulo 3) to the value of x; the server can still accept or reject the request (Figure 10). The dotted lines show that c cannot distinguish being in state q0 from being in q1 , while s isn’t able to discriminate q0 from q2 . Some formulas that are valid for this AETS are shown below: [ 101 ]
266 1. 2. 3. 4.
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
x x x x
= 1 → Ks x = 1, = 2 → Es,c ¬x = 1 ∧ ¬Cs,c ¬x = 1, = 0 → sXx = 0 ∧ ¬Ks sXx = 0, = 2 → s, cX(x = 0 ∧ ¬Es,c x = 0).
4.2. Extending Multi-Player Game Models and Coalition Effectivity Models to Include Knowledge Multi-player game models and coalition effectivity models can be augmented with epistemic accessibility relations in a similar way, giving way to multi-player epistemic game models M = q, γ , π, ∼a1 , . . . , ∼ak and epistemic coalition effectivity models E = Agt, Q, E, π, ∼a1 , . . . , ∼ak for a set of agents Agt = {a1 , . . . , ak } over a set of propositions . Semantic rules for epistemic formulas remain the same as in Section 4.1 for both kinds of structures. The equivalence results from Section 3 can be extended to ATEL and its models. COROLLARY 21. For every ATEL formula ϕ the following are equivalent: 1. ϕ is valid in all (tight) alternating epistemic transition systems, 2. ϕ is valid in all (injective) multi-player epistemic game models, 3. ϕ is valid in all standard epistemic coalition effectivity models. We will use multi-player epistemic game models throughout the rest of this chapter for the convenience of presentation they offer. 4.3. Problems with ATEL One of the main challenges in ATEL is the question how, given an explicit way to represent agents’ knowledge, this should interfere with the agents’ available strategies. What does it mean that an agent has a strategy to enforce ϕ, if it involves making different choices in states that are epistemically indistinguishable for the agent, for instance? Moreover, agents are assumed some epistemic capabilities when making decisions, and other for epistemic properties like Ka ϕ. The interpretation of knowledge operators refers to the agents’ capability to distinguish one state from another; the semantics of A allows the agents to base their decisions upon sequences of states. These relations between complete vs. incomplete information on one hand, and perfect vs. imperfect recall on the other, has been studied in Jamroga and van der Hoek (2003). It was also argued that, when reasoning about what an agent can enforce, it seems more appropriate to require the agent to know his winning strategy rather than to know only that such a strategy exists.8 Two variations of ATEL were proposed as solutions: [ 102 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
267
Alternating-time Temporal Observational Logic (ATOL) for agents with bounded memory and syntax restricted in a way similar to CTL, and full Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic with Recall (ATELR∗) where agents were able to memorize the whole game. The issue of a philosophically consistent semantics for Alternating-time Temporal Logic with epistemic component is still under debate, and it is rather beyond the scope of this paper. We believe that analogous results to those presented here about ATEL can be obtained for logics like ATOL and ATELRs and their models. 4.4. Interpretations of ATEL into ATL ATL is trivially embedded into ATEL since all ATL formulas are also ATEL formulas. Moreover, every multi-player game model can be extended to a multi-player epistemic game model by defining all epistemic accessibility relations to be the equality, i.e. all agents have no uncertainty about the current state of the system – thus embedding the semantics of ATL in the one for ATEL, and rendering the former a reduct of the latter. Interpretation the other way is more involved. We will first construct a satisfiability preserving interpretation of the fragment of ATEL without distributed knowledge (we will call it ATELCE), and then we will show how it can be extended to the whole ATEL, though at the expense of some blow-up of the models. The interpretation we propose has been inspired by Schild (2000). We should also mention (van Otterloo et al. 2003), as it deals with virtually the same issue. Related work is discussed in more detail at the end of the section. 4.4.1. Idea of the Interpretation ATEL consists of two orthogonal layers. The first one, inherited from ATL, refers to what agents can achieve in temporal perspective, and is underpinned by the structure defined via transition function o. The other layer is the epistemic component, reflected by epistemic accessibility relations. Our idea of the translation is to leave the original temporal structure intact, while extending it with additional transitions to ‘simulate’ epistemic accessibility links. The ‘simulation’ – like the one in van Otterloo et al. (2003) – is achieved through adding new “epistemic” agents, who can enforce transitions to epistemically accessible states. Unlike in that paper, though, the “moves” of epistemic agents are orthogonal to the original temporal transitions (‘action’ transitions): they lead to special ‘epistemic’ copies of the original states rather than to the ‘action’ states themselves, and no new states are introduced into the course of action. The ‘action’ and “epistemic” states form separate strata in the resulting model, and [ 103 ]
268
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
Figure 11. New model: ‘action’ vs. ‘epistemic’ states, and ‘action’ vs. ‘epistemic’ transitions. Note that the game frames for ‘epistemic’ states are exact copies of their ‘action’ originals: the ‘action’ transitions from the epistemic layer lead back to the ‘action’ states.
are labeled accordingly to distinguish transitions that implement different modalities. The interpretation consists of two independent parts: a transformation of models and a translation of formulas. First, we propose a construction that transforms every multi-player epistemic game model M for a set of agents {a1 , . . . , ak }, into a (pure) multi-player game model M ATL over a set of agents {a1 , . . . , ak , e1 , . . . , ek }. Agents a1 , . . . , ak are the original agents from M (we will call them ‘real agents’). Agents e1 , . . . , ek are ‘epistemic doubles’ of the real agents: the role of ei is to ‘point out’ the states that were epistemically indistinguishable from the current state for agent a1 in M. Intuitively, Kai ϕ could be then replaced with a formula like ¬ei X¬ϕ that rephrases the semantic definition of Ka operator from Section 4.1. As M ATL inherits the temporal structure from M, temporal formulas might be left intact. However, it is not as simple as that. Note that agents make their choices simultaneously in multi-player game models, and the resulting transition is a result of all these choices. In consequence, it is not possible that an epistemic agent ei can enforce an ‘epistemic’ transition to state q, and at the same time a group of real agents A is capable of executing an ‘action’ transition to q . Thus, in order to distinguish transitions referring to different modalities, we introduce additional states in model M ATL . States q1ei , . . . , qnei are exact copies of the [ 104 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
269
original states q1 , . . . , qn from Q except for one thing: they satisfy a new proposition ei , added to enable identifying moves of epistemic agent ei . Original states q1 , . . . , qn are still in M ATL to represent targets of ‘action’ moves of the real agents a1 , . . ., ak . We will use a new proposition act to label these states. The type of a transition can be recognized by the label of its target state (cf. Figure 11). Now, we must only arrange the interplay between agents’ choices, so that the results can be interpreted in a direct way. To achieve this, every epistemic agent can choose to be “passive” and let the others decide upon the next move, or may select one of the states indistinguishable from q for an agent ai (to be more precise, the epistemic agents do select the epistemic copies of states from Qei rather than the original action states from Q). The resulting transition leads to the state selected by the first nonpassive epistemic agent. If all the epistemic agents decided to be passive, the “action” transition chosen by the real agents follows. For such a construction of M ATL , we can finally show how to translate formulas from ATEL to ATL: 1. Kai ϕ can be rephrased as ¬{e1 , . . . , ei }X(ei ∧ ¬ϕ): the epistemic moves to agent ei ’s epistemic states do not lead to a state where ϕ fails. Note that player ei can select a state of his if, and only if, players e1 , . . . , ei−1 are passive (hence their presence in the cooperation modality). Note also that Kai ϕ can be as well translated as ¬{e1 , . . . , ek } X(ei ∧ ¬ϕ) or ¬{a1 , . . . , ak , e1 , . . . , ek }X(ei ∧ ¬ϕ): when ei decides to be active, choices from a1 , . . . , ak and ei+1 , . . . , ek are irrelevant. 2. AXϕ becomes A ∪ {e1 , . . . , ek }X(act ∧ ϕ) in a similar way. 3. To translate other temporal formulas, we must require that the relevant part of a path runs only through ‘action’ states (labeled with act proposition). Thus, AGϕ can be rephrased as ϕ ∧ A ∪ Agte XA ∪ Agte G(act ∧ ϕ). Note that a simpler translation with A ∪ Agte G(act ∧ ϕ) is incorrect: the initial state of a path does not have to be an action state, since Aϕ can be embedded in an epistemic formula. A similar method applies to the translation of AϕUψ. 4. Translation of common knowledge refers to the definition of relation ∼CA as the transitive closure of relations ∼ai : CA ϕ means that all the (finite) sequences of appropriate epistemic transitions must end up in a state where ϕ is true. The only operator that does not seem to lend itself to a translation according to the above scheme is the distributed knowledge operator D, for which we seem to need more ‘auxiliary’ agents. Thus, we will begin with presenting details of our interpretation for ATELCE – a reduced version [ 105 ]
270
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
of ATEL that includes only common knowledge and ‘everybody knows’ operators for group epistemics. Section 4.4.3 shows how to modify the translation to include distributed knowledge as well. We note that an analogous interpretation into ATL can be proposed for the propositional version of BDI logic based on CTL. 4.4.2. Interpreting Models and Formulas of ATELCE into ATL Given a multi-player epistemic game model M = Q, γ , π, ∼a1 , . . . ∼ ak for a set of agents Agt = {a1 , . . . , ak } over a set of propositions , we construct a new game model M ATL = Q , γ , π over a set of agents Agt = Agt ∪ Agte , where: 1. Agte = {e1 , . . . , ek } is the set of epistemic agents; 2. Q = Q ∪ Qe1 ∪ · · · ∪ Qek , where Qei = {q ei | q ∈ Q}. We assume that Q, Qe1 , . . . , Qek are pairwise disjoint. Further we will be using any S ⊆ Q. the more general notation S (ei ) = {q ei | q ∈ S} for 3. = ∪ {act, e1 , . . . , ek }, and π (p) = π(p) ∪ i=1,...,k π(p)ei for every proposition p ∈ . Moreover, π (act) = Q and π (ei ) = Qei . q
For every state q in M, we translate the game frame γ (q) = Agt, { a | q a ∈ Agt}, Q, o to γ (q) = Agt , { a | a ∈ Agt }, Q , o : q
q
1. a = a for a ∈ Agt: choices of the ‘real’ agents do not change; q 2. ei = {pass} ∪ img(q, ∼ai )ei for i = 1, . . . k, where img(q, R) = {q | qRq } is the image of q with respect to relation R. 3. the new transition function is defined as follows:
⎧ ⎨ oq (σa1 , . . . , σak ) if σe1 = · · · = σek = pass σei if ei is the first active oq (σa1 , . . . , σak , σe1 , . . . , σek ) = ⎩ epistemic agent.
The game frames for the new states are exactly the same: γ (q ei ) = γ (q) for all i = 1, . . . , k, q ∈ Q. EXAMPLE 13. A part of the resulting structure for the epistemic game model from Figure 10 is shown in Figure 12. All the new states, plus the transitions going out of q2 are presented. The wildcard ‘∗ ’ stands for any action of the respective agent. For instance, reject, ∗ , pass, pass represents reject, set0, pass, pass} and reject, set1, pass,pass. Now, we define a translation of formulas from ATELCE to ATL corresponding to the above described interpretation of ATEL models into ATL models: tr(p) = p, [ 106 ]
for p ∈
271
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
Figure 12. Construction for the multi-player epistemic game model from Figure 10.
¬tr(ϕ) tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ) A ∪ Agte X(act ∧ tr(ϕ)) tr(ϕ) ∧ A ∪ Agte XA ∪ Agte G(act ∧ tr(ϕ)) tr(ψ) ∨ (tr(ϕ) ∧ A ∪ Agte XA ∪ Agte (act ∧ tr(ϕ))U(act ∧ tr(ψ))) tr(Kai ϕ) = ¬{e1 , . . . , ei }X(ei ∧ ¬tr(ϕ)) ei ∧ ¬tr(ϕ)) tr(EA ϕ) = ¬Agte X(
tr(¬ϕ) tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) tr(AXϕ) tr(AGϕ) tr(AϕUψ)
= = = = =
ai ∈A
tr(CA ϕ) = ¬Agt XAgte ( e
ai ∈A
ei )U(¬tr(ϕ) ∧
ei )
ai ∈A
LEMMA 22. For every ATELCE formula ϕ, model M, and ‘action’ state q ∈ Q, we have M ATL , q |= tr(ϕ) iff M ATL , q ei |= tr(ϕ) for every i = 1, . . . , k. Proof sketch (structural induction on ϕ): It suffices to note that tr(ϕ) can only contain propositions act, e1 , . . . , ek in the scope of AX for some A ⊆ Agt . Besides, the propositions from ϕ are true in q iff they are true in q e1 , . . . , q ek and the game frames for q, q e1 , . . . , q ek are the same. LEMMA 23. For every ATELCE formula ϕ, model M, and a state q ∈ Q, we have M, q |= ϕ iff M ATL , q |= tr(ϕ). [ 107 ]
272
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
Proof: The proof follows by structural induction on ϕ. We will show that the construction preserves the truth value of ϕ for two cases: ϕ ≡ AXψ and ϕ ≡ CA ψ. The cases of AGψ and AψUϑ can be reduced to the case for AXψ using the fact that these operators are fixpoints (resp. greatest and least) of certain operators defined in terms of AXψ (see Section 2.5). For lack of space we omit the details. An interested reader can tackle the other cases in an analogous way. case ϕ ≡ AXψ, ATELCE ⇒ ATL. Let M, q |= AXψ, then there is σA such that for every σAgt\A we have oq (σA , σAgt\A ) |= ψ. By induction hypothesis, M ATL , oq (σA , σAgt\A ) |= tr(ψ); also, M ATL , oq (σA , σAgt\A ) |= act. Thus, M ATL , oq (σA , σAgt\A , passAgte ) = oq (σA , σAgt\A ) |= act∧tr(ψ), where passC denotes the strategy where every agent from C ⊆ Agte decides to be passive. In consequence, M ATL , q |= A ∪ Agte Xtr(ψ). case ϕ ≡ AXψ, ATL ⇒ ATELCE. M ATL, q |= A ∪ Agte X(act ∧ tr(ψ)), so there is σA∪Agte such that for every σAgt \(A∪Agte ) = σAgt\A we have M ATL, oq (σA∪Agte , σAgt\A ) |= act ∧ tr(ψ). Note that M ATL, oq (σA∪Agte , σAgt\A ) |= act only when σA∪Agte = σA , passAgte , else the transition would lead to an epistemic state. Thus, oq (σA∪Agte , σAgt\A ) = oq (σA , σAgt\A ), and hence M ATL , oq (σA , σAgt\A ) |= tr(ψ). By the induction hypothesis, M, oq (σA , σAgt\A ) |= ψ and finally M, q |= AXψ. case ϕ ≡ CA ψ, ATELCE ⇒ ATL. We have M, q |= CA ψ, so for every sequence of states q0 = q, q1 , . . . , qn , qi ∼aji qi+1 , aji ∈ A for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, it is true that M, qn |= ψ. Consider the same q in M ATL . The shape of the construction implies that for every sequence q0 = q, q1 , . . . , qn in which every qi+1 is a successor of qi and every qi+1 ∈ Qeji , eji ∈ Ae , we have M ATL , qn |= tr(ψ) (by induction and Lemma 22). Moreover, M ATL, qi |= eji for i ≥ 1, hence M ATL , qi |= aj ∈A ej . Note that the above refers to all the sequences that can be enforced by the agents from Agte , and have aj ∈A ej true along the way (from q1 on). Thus, Agte have no strategy from q such that aj ∈A ej holds from the next state on, and tr(ψ) is eventually false: M ATL , q ATL Agte XAgte ( aj ∈A ej )U( aj ∈A ej ∧ ¬tr(ψ)), which proves the case. ATL e e case ϕ≡ CA ψ, ATL ⇒ ATELCE. We have M , q |= ¬Agt XAgt ( aj ∈A ej )U( aj ∈A ej ∧ ¬tr(ψ)), so for every σAgte there is ATL , q σAgt \Agte = σAgt q (σAgte , σAgt ) = q ∈ Q and M such that o e |= ¬Agt ( aj ∈A ej ) U( aj ∈A ej ∧ ¬tr(ψ)). In particular, this implies that the above holds for all epistemic states q that are suc[ 108 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
273
cessors of q in M ATL, also the ones that refer to agents from A (∗ ). Suppose that M, q CA ψ (∗∗ ). Let us now take the action counter ∈ Q of q . By (∗ ), (∗∗ ) and properties of the construction, part qact occurs also in M, and there must be a path q0 = q, q1 = qact , qact . . . , qn , qi ∈ Q, such that qi ∼aji qi+1 and M, qn ATEL ψ. Then, M ATL, qn ATL tr(ψ) (by induction). This means also that we have a sequence q0 = q, q1 = q , . . . , qn in M ATL , in which every qi ∈ Qeji , aji ∈ A, is an epistemic counterpart of qi . Thus, for every i = 1, . . . , n: M ATL , qi |= eji , so M ATL , qi |= aj ∈A ej . Moreover, M ATL , qn ATL tr(ψ) implies that M ATL , qn ATL tr(ψ) ATL , qn |= ¬tr(ψ). Thus, M ATL , q |= (by Lemma 22), so M Agte ( aj ∈A ej )U( aj ∈A ej ∧ ¬tr(ψ)), which contradicts (∗ ). As an immediate corollary of the last two lemmata we obtain: THEOREM 24. For every ATELCE formula ϕ and model M, ϕ is satisfiable (resp. valid) in M iff tr(ϕ) is satisfiable (resp. valid) in M ATL. Note that the construction used above to interpret ATELCE in ATL has several nice complexity properties: – The vocabulary (set of propositions ) only increases linearly (and certainly remains finite). – The set of states in an ATEL-model grows linearly, too: if model M has n states, then M ATL has n = (k + 1)n = O(kn) states. – Let m be the number of transitions in M. We have (k + 1)m action transitions in M ATL. Since the size of every set img(q, ∼a ) can be at most n, there may be no more than kn epistemic transitions per state in M ATL, hence at most (k + 1)nkn in total. Because m ≤ n2 , we have m = O(k 2 n2 ). – Only the length of formulas may suffer an exponential blow-up, because tr(AGϕ) involves two occurrences of tr(ϕ), and the translation of AϕUψ involves two occurrences of both tr(ϕ) and tr(ψ).9 Thus, every nesting of AGϕ and AϕUψ roughly doubles the size of the translated formula in the technical sense. However, the number of different subformulas in the formula only increases linearly. Note that the automata-based methods for model checking (Alur et al. 2002) or satisfiability checking (van Drimmelen 2003) for ATL are based on an automaton associated with the given formula, built from its ‘subformulas closure’ – and their complexity depends on the number of different subformulas in the formula rather than number of [ 109 ]
274
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
symbols. In fact, we can avoid the exponential growth of formulas in the context of satisfiability checking by introducing a new propositional variable p and requiring that it is universally equivalent to tr(ϕ), i.e., adding conjunct φG(p ↔ tr(ϕ)) to the whole translated formula. Then AGϕ can be simply translated as p ∧ A ∪ Agte XA ∪ Agte G(act ∧p). ‘Until’ formulas AϕUψ are treated analogously. A similar method can be proposed for model checking. To translate AGϕ, we first use the algorithm from Alur et al. (2002) and model-check tr(ϕ) to find the states q ∈ Q in which tr(ϕ) holds. Then we update the model, adding a new proposition p that holds exactly in these states, and we model-check (p ∧ A ∪ Agte XA ∪ Agte G(act ∧ p)) as the translation of AGϕ in the new model. We tackle tr(AϕUψ) likewise. Since the complexity of transforming M to M ATL is no worse than O(n2 ), and the complexity of ATL model checking algorithm from Alur et al. (2002) is O(ml), the interpretation defined above can be used, for instance, for an efficient reduction of model checking of ATELCE formulas to model checking in ATL. 4.4.3. Interpreting Models and Formulas of Full ATEL Now, in order to interpret the full ATEL we modify the construction by introducing new epistemic agents (and states) indexed not only with individual agents, but with all possible non-empty coalitions: Agte = {eA | A ⊆ Agt, A = ∅} Q = Q ∪
QeA ,
A⊆Agt,A =∅
where Q and all QeA are pairwise disjoint. Accordingly, we extend the language with new propositions {eA | A ⊆ Agt}. The choices for complex epistemic agents refer to the (epistemic copies of) states accessible via eA Then we distributed knowledge relations: e A = {pass} ∪ img(q, ∼D A) modify the transition function (putting the strategies from epistemic agents in any predefined order): ⎧ ⎨ oq (σa1 , . . . , σak ) if all σeA = pass if eA is the first active σeA oq (σa1 , . . . , σak , . . . , σeA , . . .) = ⎩ epistemic agent
[ 110 ]
275
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
Again, the game frames for all epistemic copies of the action states are the same. The translation for all operators remain the same as well (just using e{i} instead of ei ) and the translation of DA is: tr(DA ϕ) = ¬Agte X(eA ∧ ¬tr(ϕ)). The following result can now be proved similarly to Theorem 24. THEOREM 25. For every ATEL formula ϕ and model M, ϕ is satisfiable (resp. valid) in M iff tr(ϕ) is satisfiable (resp. valid) in M ATL. This interpretation requires (in general) an exponential blow-up of the original ATEL model (in the number of agents k). We suspect that this may be inevitable – if so, this tells something about the inherent complexity of the epistemic operators. For a specific ATEL formula ϕ, however, we do not have to include all the epistemic agents eA in the model – only those for which DA occurs in ϕ. Also, we need epistemic states only for these coalitions. Note that the number of such coalitions is never greater than the length of ϕ. Let l be the length of formula ϕ, and let m ¯ be the cardinality of the “densest” modal accessibility relation – either strategic or epistemic – in M. In other words, m ¯ = max(m, m∼1 , . . . , m∼k ), where m is the number of transitions in M, and m∼1 , . . . , m∼k are cardinalities of the respective epistemic relations. Then, the “optimized” transformation gives ¯ transitions, while the new formula tr(ϕ) is us a model with m = O(l · m) again only linearly longer than ϕ (in the sense explained in Section 4.4.2). In consequence, we can still use the ATL model checking algorithm for model checking of ATEL formulas that is linear in the size of the original structure: the complexity of such process is O(ml ¯ 2 ). 4.4.4. Related Work The interpretation presented in this section has been inspired by Schild (2000) in which a propositional variant of the BDI logic (Rao and Georgeff 1991) was proved to be subsumed by propositional µ-calculus. We use a similar method here to show a translation from ATEL models and formulas to models and formulas of ATL that preserves satisfiability. ATL (just like µ-calculus) is a multimodal logic, where modalities are indexed by agents (programs in the case of µ-calculus). It is therefore possible to ‘simulate’ the epistemic layer of ATEL by adding new agents (and hence new cooperation modalities) to the scope. Thus, the general idea of the interpretation is to translate modalities of one kind to additional modalities of another kind. Similar translations are well known within modal logics community, including translation of epistemic logic into Propositional Dynamic Logic, [ 111 ]
276
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
translation of dynamic epistemic logic without common knowledge into epistemic logic (Gerbrandy 1999) etc. A work particularly close to ours is included in van Otterloo et al. (2003). In that paper, a reduction of ATEL model checking to model checking of ATL formulas is presented, and the epistemic accessibility relations are handled in a similar way to our approach, i.e., with use of additional ‘epistemic’ agents. We believe, however, that our translation is more general, and provides more flexible framework in many respects: 1. The algorithm from van Otterloo et al. (2003) is intended only for turnbased acyclic transition systems, which is an essential limitation of its applicability. Moreover, the set of states is assumed to be finite (hence only finite trees are considered). There is no restriction like this in our method. 2. The language of ATL/ATEL is distinctly reduced in van Otterloo et al. (2003): it includes only ‘sometime’ (F ) and ‘always’ (G) operators in the temporal part (neither ‘next’ nor ‘until’ are treated), and the individual knowledge operator Ka (the group knowledge operators C, E, D are absent). 3. The translation of a model in van Otterloo et al. (2003) depends heavily on the formula one wants to model-check, while in the algorithm presented here, formulas and models are translated independently (except for the sole case of efficient translation of distributed knowledge).
5. C ONCLUDING R EMARKS
We have presented a comparative study of several logics that combine elements of game theory, temporal logics and epistemic logics, and demonstrated their relationship. Still, these enterprises differ in their motivations and agendas. We wanted to show them as parts of a bigger picture, so that one can compare them, appreciate their similarities and differences, and choose the system most suitable for the intended applications. Notably, the systems studied here can benefit from many ideas and results, both technical and conceptual, borrowed from each other. Indeed, ATL has already benefited from being related to coalitional games, as concurrent game structures provide a more general (and natural) semantics than alternating transition systems. Moreover, coalition effectivity models are mathematically simpler and more elegant, and provide technically handier semantics, essentially based on neighborhood semantics for nonnormal modal logics (Parikh 1985; Pauly 2000a). Furthermore, the pure [ 112 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
277
game-theoretical perspective of coalition logics can offer new ideas to the framework of open multi-agent systems and computations formalized by ATL. For instance, fundamental concepts in game theory, such as preference relations between outcomes, and Nash equilibria have their counterparts in concurrent game structures (and, more importantly, in the alternating-time logics) which are unexplored yet. On the other hand, the language and framework of ATL has widened the perspective on coalitional games and logics, providing a richer and more flexible vocabulary to talk about abilities of agents and their coalitions. The alternating refinement relations (Alur et al. 1998a) offer an appropriate notion of bisimulation between ATSs and thus can suggest an answer to the question ‘When are two coalition games equivalent?’.10 Also, a number of technical results on expressiveness and complexity, as well as realizability and model-checking methods from Alur et al. (1998a, 2002) can be transferred to coalition games and logics. And there are some specific aspects of computations in open systems, such as controllability and fairness constraints, which have not been explored in the light of coalition games. There were a few attempts to generalize ATL by including imperfect information in its framework: ATL with incomplete information in Alur et al. (2002), ATEL, ATOL, ATELRs etc. It can be interesting to see how these attempts carry over to the framework of CL. Also, stronger languages like ATL∗ and alternating-time µ-calculus can provide more expressive tools for reasoning about coalition games. In conclusion, we see the main contribution of the present study as casting a bridge between several logical frameworks for multi-agent systems, and we hope to trigger a synergetic effect from their mutual influence.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Valentin Goranko acknowledges the financial support during this research provided by the National Research Foundation of South Africa and the SASOL Research Fund of the Faculty of Science at Rand Afrikaans University. He would like to thank Johan van Benthem for sparking his interest in logical aspects of games, Marc Pauly for stimulating discussions on coalition games and valuable remarks on this paper, Moshe Vardi for useful suggestions and references, and Philippe Balbiani for careful reading and corrections on an earlier version of the text. Wojciech Jamroga would like to thank Mike Wooldridge and Wiebe van der Hoek who inspired him to have a closer look at logics for multi-agent systems; and Barteld Kooi as well as Wiebe van der Hoek (again) for their remarks and suggestions. [ 113 ]
278
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
NOTES 1 We make small notational changes here and there to make the differences and common
features between the models and languages clearer and easier to see. 2 Determinism is not a crucial issue here, as it can be easily imposed by introducing a
new, fictitious agent, ‘Nature’, which settles all non-deterministic transitions. 3 The only real difference is that the set of states Q and the sets representing agents’
choices are explicitly required to be finite in the concurrent game structures, while MGMs and ATSs are not constrained this way. However, these requirements are not essential and can be easily omitted if necessary. 4 Note that the coalition logic-related notions of choice and collective choice can be readily expressed in terms of alternating transition systems, which immediately leads to a semantics for CL based on ATS, too. Thus, ATL and the coalition logics share the semantics based on alternating transition systems as well. 5 In Pauly (2002) these game frames are called dictatorial, but we disagree with that term. Indeed, at every local step in such game one player determines the move, but these players can be different for the different moves. 6 The definition in Alur et al. (1998a) requires the whole state space Q to be a Cartesian product of the ‘local’ state spaces; Lomuscio (1999) calls such structures ‘hypercube systems’. We find that requirement unnecessarily strong. 7 Private communication. 8 This problem is closely related to the distinction between knowledge de re and knowledge de dicto. The issue is well known in the philosophy of language (Quine 1956), as well as research on the interaction between knowledge and action (Moore 1985; Morgenstern 1991; Wooldridge 2000). 9 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 10 Cf. the paper ‘When are two games the same’ in van Benthem (2000).
REFERENCES
Abdou, J.: 1998, ‘Rectangularity and Tightness: A Normal Form Characterization of Perfect Information Extensive Game Forms’, Mathematics and Operations Research 23(3). Alur, R., T. A. Henzinger, and O. Kupferman: 1997, ‘Alternating-Time Temporal Logic’, in Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE Computer Society Press, pp. 100–109. Available at http://www.citeseer.nj.nec.com/170985.html. Alur, R., T. A. Henzinger, and O. Kupferman: 1998a, ‘Alternating-Time Temporal Logic’, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1536, 23–60. Available at http://wwwciteseer.nj.nec.com/174802.html. Alur, R., T. A. Henzinger, and O. Kupferman: 2002, ‘Alternating-Time Temporal Logic’, Journal of the ACM 49, 672–713. Updated, improved, and extended text. Available at http://wwwwww.cis.upenn.edu/ alur/Jacm02.pdf. Alur, R., T. A. Henzinger, O. Kupferman, and M. Vardi: 1998b, ‘Alternating Refinement Relations’, in CONCUR’98. Aumann, R. and S. Hart (eds.): 1992, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 1, Elsevier/North-Holland.
[ 114 ]
LOGICS FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
279
Chandra, A., D. Kozen, and L. Stockmeyer: 1981, ‘Alternation’, Journal of the ACM 28(1), 114–133. Emerson, E. A.: 1990, ‘Temporal and Modal Logic’, in J. van Leeuwen (ed.), Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. B, Elsevier, pp. 995–1072. Fagin, R., J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi: 1995, Reasoning about Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Gerbrandy, J.: 1999, ‘Bisimulations on Planet Kripke’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam. Goranko, V.: 2001, ‘Coalition Games and Alternating Temporal Logics’, in J. van Benthem (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK VIII), Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 259–272, Corrected version. Available at http://wwwhttp://general.rau.ac.za/maths/goranko/papers/gltl31.pdf. Goranko, V. and G. van Drimmelen: 2003, ‘Complete Axiomatization and Decidability Submitted of the Alternating-Time Temporal Logic’. Hart, S.: 1992, ‘Games in Extensive and Strategic Forms’, in R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 1, Elsevier/North-Holland, pp. 19–40. Huth, M. and M. Ryan: 2000, Logic in Computer Science: Modelling and Reasoning about Systems, Cambridge University Press. Jamroga, W.: 2003, ‘Some Remarks on Alternating Temporal Epistemic Logic’, in B. Dunin-Keplicz and R. Verbrugge (eds.), Proceedings of Formal Approaches to Multi-Agent Systems (FAMAS 2003), pp. 133–140. Jamroga, W. and W. van der Hoek: 2003, ‘Agents that Know how to Play’, submitted. Lomuscio, A.: 1999, ‘Information Sharing among Ideal Agents’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham. Moore, R.: 1985, ‘A Formal Theory of Knowledge and Action’, in J. Hobbs and R. Moore (eds.), Formal Theories of the Commonsense World, Ablex Publishing Corporation. Morgenstern, L.: 1991, ‘Knowledge and the Frame Problem’, International Journal of Expert Systems 3(4). Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein: 1994, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Parikh, R.: 1985, ‘The Logic of Games and its Applications’, Ann. of Discrete Mathematics 24, 111–140. Pauly, M.: 2000a, ‘Game Logic for Game Theorists’, Technical Report INS-R0017, CWI. Pauly, M.: 2000b, ‘A Logical Framework for Coalitional Effectivity in Dynamic Procedures’, in Proceedings of the Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT4), To appear in Bulletin of Economics Research. Pauly, M.: 2001, ‘Logic for Social Software’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam. Pauly, M.: 2002, ‘A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games’, Journal of Logic and Computation 12(1), 149–166. Quine, W.: 1956, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy 53, 177– 187. Rao, A. and M. Georgeff: 1991, ‘Modeling Rational Agents within a BDI-Architecture’, Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pp. 473–484. Schild, K.: 2000, ‘On the Relationship between BDI Logics and Standard Logics of Concurrency’, Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems pp. 259–283. Schnoebelen, P.: 2003, ‘The Complexity of Temporal Model Checking’, Advances in Modal Logics, Proceedings of AiML 2002, World Scientific.
[ 115 ]
280
VALENTIN GORANKO AND WOJCIECH JAMROGA
van Benthem, J.: 2000, ‘Logic and Games’, Technical Report X-2000-03, ILLC. van der Hoek, W. and R. Verbrugge: 2002, ‘Epistemic Logic: A Survey’, Game Theory and Applications 8, 53–94. van der Hoek, W. and M. Wooldridge: 2002, ‘Tractable Multiagent Planning for Epistemic Goals’, in C. Castelfranchi and W. Johnson (eds.): Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-02), ACM Press, New York, pp. 1167–1174. van der Hoek, W. and M. Wooldridge: 2003a, ‘Cooperation, Knowledge and Time – Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic and its Applications’, Studia Logica 75(1), 125–157. van der Hoek, W. and M. Wooldridge: 2003b, ‘Towards a Logic of Rational Agency’, Logic Journal of the IGPL 11(2), 135–160. van Drimmelen, G.: 2003, ‘Satisfiability in Alternating-Time Temporal Logic’, in Proceedings of LICS’2003 IEEE Computer Society Press, pp. 208–217. van Otterloo, S., W. van der Hoek, and M. Wooldridge: 2003, ‘Knowledge as Strategic Ability’, Electronic Lecture Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 85(2). von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern: 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Wooldridge, M.: 2000, Reasoning about Rational Agents, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Valentin Goranko Department of Mathematics Rand Afrikaans University, South Africa E-mail:
[email protected] Wojciech Jamroga Parlevink Group, University of Twente, the Nether