Ideology and practice in modern Japan
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Ideology and practice in modern Japan
The Nissan Institute, Routledge Japanese Studies Series Editorial Board: J.A.A.Stockwin, Nissan Professor of Modern Japanese Studies, University of Oxford and Director, Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies Teigo Yoshida, formerly Professor of the University of Tokyo, and now Professor, The University of the Sacred Heart, Tokyo Frank Langdon, Professor, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Canada Alan Rix, Professor of Japanese, The University of Queensland Junji Banno, Professor, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo Other titles in the series: The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, Peter Dale The Emperor’s Adviser: Saionji Kinmochi and pre-war Japanese Politics, Lesley Connors Japanese Religions, Brian Bocking Japan in World Politics, Reinhard Drifte A History of Japanese Economic Thought, Tessa Morris-Suzuki The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Japan, Junji Banno, translated by J.A.A.Stockwin Japan’s First Parliaments 1890–1910, R.H.P.Mason, Andrew Fraser, and Philip Mitchell Industrial Relations in Japan: the peripheral workforce, Norma Chalmers Banking Policy in Japan: American attempts at reform during the occupation, William Minoru Tsutsui Educational Reform in Contemporary Japan, Leonard Schoppa How the Japanese Learn to Work, Ronald Dore and Mari Sako Militarization in Contemporary Japan, Glenn Hook Japanese Economic Development, Penelope Francks Japan and Protection, Javed Maswood Japan’s Nuclear Development, Michael Donnelly The Soil, by Nagatsuka Takashi; a portrait of rural life in Meiji Japan, translated and introduced by Ann Waswo Biotechnology in Japan, Malcolm Brock Britain’s Educational Reform: a comparison with Japan, Michael Howarth Language and the Modern State: the reform of written Japanese, Nanette Twine Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan: the invention of a tradition, W.Dean Kinzley Japanese Science Fiction: a view of a changing society, Robert Matthew The Japanese Numbers Game: the use and understanding of numbers in modern Japan, Thomas Crump
Ideology and practice in modern Japan
Edited by Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing
London and New York
First published 1992 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1992 Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Ideology and practice in modern Japan. I. Goodman, Roger, 1960– II. Refsing, Kirsten, 1948– 952.04 ISBN 0–415–06102–4 (Print Edition) Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Ideology and practice in modern Japan/edited by Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing. p. cm. —(The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese studies series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–415–06102–4 (Print Edition) 1. Japan—Social conditions—1945—Congresses. 2. Japan— Civilization—1945—Congresses. 3. Japan—Social life and customs— 1945—Congresses. 4. National characteristics, Japanese—Congresses. I. Goodman, Roger, 1960–. II. Refsing, Kirsten. III. Series. HN723.5.I33 1992 306´.0952—dc20 91–27193 CIP ISBN 0–203–03528–3 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0–203–21190–1 (Glassbook Format)
Contents
List of contributors
vii
A note to the reader
ix
General Editor’s preface
xi
Acknowledgements
xiii
Map of Japan
xiv
1 Ideology and practice in Japan: Towards a theoretical approach Roger Goodman
1
2 Symbols of nationalism and Nihonjinron Harumi Befu
26
3 Rivers in Tokyo: A mesological glimpse Augustin Berque
47
4 Individualism and individuality: Entry into a social world Joy Hendry
55
5 When blossoms fall: Japanese attitudes towards death and the otherworld: opinion polls 1953–87 Fleur Wöss
72
6 From farm to urban middle class: A case study of the role of education in the process of social mobility Regine Mathias
101
7 Japanese educational expansion: Quality or equality Kirsten Refsing
116
vi
Contents
8 A beacon for the twenty-first century: Confucianism after the Tokugawa era in Japan Jan van Bremen
130
9 NHK comes to Kuzaki: Ideology, mythology and documentary film-making D.P.Martinez
153
10 The discourse on Japan in the German press: Images of economic competition Rosemary Breger
171
11 Confucianism and gender segregation in Japan and Korea Okpyo Moon
196
12 Self-presentation and performance in the yakuza way of life: Fieldwork with a Japanese underworld group Jacob Raz
210
Index
235
Contributors
Dr Harumi BEFU is Professor of Anthropology at Stanford University, USA. He is author of Japan: An Anthropological Introduction (Harper & Row, 1971), and Ideorogii to shite no Nihon bunkaron (Shiso no kagakusha, 1990), and co-editor of The Challenge of Japan’s Internationalization (Kodansha International, 1983). Augustin BERQUE is Directeur d’études (Professor) at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris, and presently head of the Centre de recherches sur le Japon contemporain. Personal field: cultural geography, Japanese studies. Among his recent publications are: Le Sauvage et l’artifice. Les Japonais devant la nature. Paris, Gallimard 1986; Nippon no fukei, Seio no keikan, soshite zokei no jidai (A Comparative History of Landscape in East Asia and Europe), Tokyo, Kodansha 1990; Médiance: De milieux en paysages, Montpellier, Reclus, 1990. Dr Rosemary Anne BREGER did her MA on ethnicity in social anthropology at the University of Cape Town and her PhD on group identities as expressed in collective images at Ruhr University Bochum, Department of Sociology. She is currently working on a biography of Isabella Bird. Dr Roger GOODMAN is currently Reader in Japanese Studies in the Contemporary Japan Centre and Department of Sociology at the University of Essex, UK. He is the author of Japan’s ‘International Youth’: The Emergence of a New Class of School Children (Oxford University Press, 1990). Dr Joy HENDRY is Reader at the Scottish Centre for Japanese Studies, University of Stirling, and Principal Lecturer in Social
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Anthropology at Oxford Polytechnic. She is the author of Marriage in Changing Japan (Tuttle, 1987), Becoming Japanese (Manchester University Press, 1986), and Understanding Japanese Society (Routledge, 1987). Dr D.P.MARTINEZ is currently a lecturer in Anthropology with special reference to Japan at the School for Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Among her recent publications are ‘Tourism and the Ama’ in Unwrapping Japan (Manchester University Press, 1990) and ‘The Dead: Shinto Aspects of Buddhist Ritual’ in JASO vol. 21:2. Dr Regine MATHIAS is currently Senior Lecturer for Japanese Social and Economic History at the Japanologisches Seminar, University of Bonn, Germany. She is co-author of Japans Wandel von der Agrar-zur Industriegesellschaft (Opladen, 1983). Dr Okpyo MOON is associate professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Academy of Korean Studies. She is the author of From Paddyfield to Ski-slope: The Revitalization of Tradition in Japanese Village Life (Manchester University Press, 1989). Professor Jacob RAZ, previously associate professor in the Faculty of Visual and Performing Arts, Tel Aviv University, is currently at the Department of East Asian Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He is the author of Audience and Actors in Japanese Theatre (Brill, 1983). Dr Kirsten REFSING is associate professor of Japanese at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. She is the author of The Ainu Language: The Morphology and Syntax of the Shizunai Dialect (Aarhus University Press, 1986). Dr Jan VAN BREMEN is currently at the Centre for Japanese and Korean Studies in the University of Leiden, active in the fields of Japanese anthropology and modern intellectual history. Dr Fleur WÖSS is assistant professor of Japanese studies at the University of Vienna. The author of several articles, she has translated Sanbaba by Ariyoshi Sawako into German (‘Die drei Alten’, Galrev Verlag, 1989). She is a co-editor of Nippons neue Frauen (Rowohlt, 1990).
A note to the reader
All Japanese and Korean names are given in the vernacular fashion with the family name first, except in the cases of Harumi Befu and Okpyo Moon, authors of chapters in this volume. Macrons have been used to identify long vowels in Japanese. The only exceptions to this rule are in well-known place names (which have long vowels in Japanese) such as Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto. All monetary values are expressed in yen when discussing the financial situation in Japan since translations into other currencies are rendered almost meaningless by the rapidly changing exchange rates between countries. For the purpose of comparison, however, £1 was approximately ¥250 in late 1990; $1 approximately ¥140.
General Editor’s preface
Now that we are in the 1990s, most would agree that Japan is a nation of absolutely first rate significance. The successes of the Japanese economy and resourcefulness of her people have long been appreciated abroad. More and more people are also becoming aware of her increasing impact on the outside world in a widening variety of fields of endeavour. This tends to produce painful adjustment and uncomfortable reactions. It also leads to the formation of stereotypes and arguments based on outdated or ill-formed ideas. The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series seeks to foster an informed and balanced—but not uncritical—understanding of Japan. One aim of the series is to show the depth and variety of Japanese institutions, practices and ideas. Another is, by using comparison, to see what lessons, positive and negative, can be drawn for other countries. There are many aspects of Japan which are little known outside that country but which deserve to be better understood. It was Ruth Benedict’s pioneering study of Japanese society at the time of the Pacific War, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, that sharpened the perception of some in the west that to understand Japan’s international behaviour it was necessary to appreciate the dynamics of Japanese society. This collection of studies by scholars belonging to the Europe-based Japan Anthropology Workshop demonstrates that an impressive level of sophistication in the analysis of Japanese social behaviour has been achieved in the four decades since Benedict’s book was published. As the debate between a ‘learn from Japan’ and a revisionist ‘Japan-bashing’ school now graphically shows, controversy over the nature of Japanese society has not diminished. The book consolidates the fundamental perception that it is not sufficient to examine social behaviour as such, since ideologies
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of social behaviour may also play a crucial part in its formation and interpretation. The authors also succeed in demonstrating that multifaceted discussion of complex realities is far more convinc-ing than black and white stereotypes masquerading as serious analysis. J.A.A.Stockwin
Acknowledgements
This volume owes its origins to the fourth meeting of the Japan Anthropology Workshop which was held as one of the sessions of the Fifth Triennial European Association of Japanese Studies Conference in September 1988 at the University of Durham, England. The Workshop was greatly aided by the efforts of the President of the European Association of Japanese Studies at that time, Professor Ian Nish, as well as by the Convener of the session and Secretary of the Workshop, Dr Joy Hendry. The editors would like to thank a large number of people for their assistance in putting this collection together. Professor Arthur Stockwin at the Nissan Institute provided encouragement for the whole project. The Danish Research Council provided generous financial support which made publication possible. Sue Joshua and Caroline Wintersgill of Routledge are thanked for their interest and hard work in bringing the book to print. The Computer Services Department at Essex University were instrumental in converting as many of the authors’ discs as possible into a single format, while Geraldine Shanks, Penny Martin and Jackie Pearce efficiently typed up those which were beyond conversion and made corrections to the rest.
JAPAN
Chapter 1
Ideology and practice in Japan Towards a theoretical approach1 Roger Goodman
NATIONALITIES, ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES This volume is the third in a continuing series of publications from the Japan Anthropology Workshop, an organisation which prefers to go under the acronym JAWS. JAWS is an international organisation of over one hundred anthropologists—all specialising to some degree in the study of Japan—which meets every eighteen months to exchange ideas in an academic forum (see Hendry 1987; van Bremen 1989). The first two volumes contained chapters from sixteen and ten contributors respectively (see Hendry and Webber 1986; BenAri, Moeran and Valentine 1990), representing nine different countries of origin. This current collection of twelve chapters also represents no less than nine different countries. One of the most interesting facets of attending the JAWS meetings is to see how scholars from different societies approach the same subject—Japan. The question of different national approaches to the study of Japan is a difficult one. It is not always easy, as contributors to a volume edited by Befu and Kreiner (forthcoming) have pointed out, to isolate the individual national characteristics that play a part in formulating any scholarly account.2 This problem is illustrated in the biographies of some of the scholars whose work is contained in this volume. Harumi Befu, for example, is a Japanese American who received his education in both Japan and the United States; Moon Okpyo is a South Korean who undertook her doctoral studies in England;
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Rosemary Breger comes from Namibia and did her Ph.D. in West Germany. Jan van Bremen and Jacob Raz come from and now teach in Holland and Israel respectively, yet both of them received a significant proportion of their education in North America. D.P.Martinez was born in Spain, educated in the United States and teaches in Britain. In all such cases, one is left asking which has had the greatest influence on their work—their country of origin, their country of study or their country of residence? The significance of personal background can perhaps be seen most clearly in the chapter by Moon. Her study of the different usages of the ‘language of Confucianism’ —a concept which we will examine later—in Japan and South Korea shows that there are also important differences where many scholars have found similarities. It also demonstrates the dynamic, changing nature of a phenomenon that many appear to consider a conservative and unchangeable code. Few scholars have the background that enables Moon to discuss these differences not only in depth but also in an analytical framework which is indigenous to neither society.3 Similarly, when reading the chapters by Kirsten Refsing, Rosemary Breger and Harumi Befu it is important to remember that they are written in the context of Danish, German and American societies respectively. The importance which a Japanese American, Harumi Befu, attaches to respect for the national flag and the monarchy is interesting in comparison with British society where Union Jack underpants and grotesque puppets of the Royal Family are popular sources of humour. Just as a range of national origins is reflected in the chapters in this volume, so one can also see a number of differing methodological approaches to the understanding of Japanese society. Social anthropology is extraordinarily catholic in the range of methodologies it embraces. The most traditional approaches can be seen in the research undertaken by Joy Hendry, D.P.Martinez and Jacob Raz. All three draw on the participant observation approach generally associated with the name of Malinowski. Martinez lived in an ama community for over a year and participated in all their activities, including diving. Indeed, she herself became something of a local celebrity and was the subject of a television documentary. Raz, who not only observed but also, at times, participated in the (legal) activities of the yakuza group he was studying, was clearly aware of how his presence, initially at least, affected the behaviour of the yakuza. Rather than despair, however, at the impossibility of
Ideology and practice in Japan
3
undertaking genuine observation research as a foreigner—one of the criticisms levelled against anthropologists of Japan by such as Mouer and Sugimoto (1986:167) —he cleverly incorporates into his account those performances undertaken especially for his benefit.4 Hendry’s work is based on participant observation over a sixmonth period as a mother of children in a private kindergarten. The high profile of Japanese mothers in the education of their children— at the primary level they often spend a considerable amount of time in school themselves—meant that, even as a foreigner, her presence probably affected the subject she was researching much less than might otherwise be expected. Regine Mathias’ account of social mobility in Japan during the early years of this century is based largely on extensive interviews with a single informant—reminiscent in style of Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s (1984) account of twentieth-century Japan based on a series of life histories. Most of the other chapters are, to a considerable extent, based on the analysis of written documents in circulation in Japan. It is this dimension—the long history of literacy—which renders the anthropology of Japan somewhat different from the more traditional studies of pre-literate or recently-literate societies. Fleur Wöss, for example, examines the published results of opinion polls taken over a twenty-five-year period concerning the views on death of different sections of Japanese society; van Bremen has picked up cheap paperback books and undertaken a close textual analysis of their contents for his discussion of the significance of Confucianism in contemporary Japan. Neither Wöss nor van Bremen discuss here how the texts were constructed, although they both show awareness of the significance of this aspect at the beginning of their chapters. Breger, in contrast, takes a detailed quantitative approach in order to demonstrate how the discourse about Japan in German newspapers is determined by the political leanings of different sections of the German media. Befu also draws on contemporary newspapers and journals, though this time from Japan, in order to try and gain a sense of the current debate concerning Japan’s role in the world. If, at times, his approach appears to be partial—Pyle (1982), for example, offers at least three other mainstream arguments to be found in the same literature5 — this is clearly a deliberate attempt to understand the function and source of a nationalistic viewpoint which he feels is gaining in significance and importance.
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Augustin Berque also makes use of a large range of data— including the view from his desk as he types his chapter—to expound on wider ideas of the relationship between nature and culture in modern Japan. Befu, Berque and, to some extent, van Bremen show how the apparently trivial ephemera of society can be central to the study of social anthropologists. Like a squirrel hoarding nuts, the anthropologist has a tendency to collect any data he or she comes across in case it should prove significant in later analysis. Finally, Refsing offers an account of Japanese education which is undertaken in a way that presents a mirror-image of the type of research undertaken by Hendry. Hendry works from the micro level to the macro, from her observations of children in a Japanese elementary school to concepts of individuality and individualism in wider Japanese society; Refsing works from the macro to the micro by examining education in Japan in the light of debate currently taking place in countries around the world on drastic reforms to their education systems.6
LEVELS OF INTELLECTUAL COHERENCE By this stage, the reader may well feel entitled to ask what is the rationale—apart from the fact that they all examine the subject of Japan—behind bringing together, in a single collection, chapters covering such a wide range of different backgrounds and methodological approaches. At one level, it can be argued that simply the fact that they all examine Japanese society is, in itself, of sufficient value to merit the collection. Anthropological research, particularly at the micro level, does much to undermine accounts of the ‘Japanese’ as if they all behaved and lived in exactly the same way. The chapters in this volume emphasise how crucial differences of class, age, gender and ethnicity are in determining the lifestyle and life chances of individuals in Japan. In the light of the heterogenous nature of Japanese society which is obvious in a reading of this volume, it may seem curious that anthropology as a discipline has been held responsible (see Mouer and Sugimoto 1986) for presenting an image of the Japanese as an homogeneous group.7 Nakane Chie’s Japanese Society (1973) has been particularly heavily criticised on this score (see Hata and Smith
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1983). The problem lies not in the primary level of anthropological data—the ethnographic material—but in the way it is used to make generalisations about Japanese society. One part of the problem of moving from the specific to the general in Japanese society lies in the fact that Japan has one of the highest literacy rates in the world. There is a danger, therefore, that attempts by anthropologists to explore the way Japanese see their world may, by publishing these theses, actually play a part in creating a particular worldview. Benedict’s (1946) tentative suggestion that, on a continuum between shame and guilt, Japanese culture tends towards the ‘shame’ model, or Nakane’s (1973) description of Japan as a ‘vertically-oriented’ society (tate shakai) have become so widely disseminated in Japanese society that they are often offered to new anthropologists entering the field by Japanese informants as an explanation of the way Japanese society works (see Dale 1988:4).8 It is clear that there will always be dangers inherent in moving from the specific to the general in a study of any complex, literate society, even if it is stressed that such general models are heuristic or, in a Weberian sense, ‘ideal types’. The anthropologist, however, has to attempt, at the very least, to try to gain some sense of what it is in Japan that makes an individual think of himself or herself as Japanese—as opposed, say, to identifying with a wider Asia— as well as what it is that they feel makes them a member of a specific group in Japan and what differentiates them from any other group in Japan. In an age of increasing interaction between Japanese and members of other societies, it may be particularly important to try and understand the assumptions of ‘Japaneseness’ that Japanese carry abroad with them. Not all Japanese, of course, accept all these ideas of ‘Japaneseness’ at face value; those whom van Wolferen (1989) calls ‘buffers’ —who serve to make contact with foreigners as smooth as possible—may be especially cynical, for example, about the ideas they pedal to explain trade problems in terms of cultural differences. In anthropological analysis there is a classic tripartite division between what people say they do, what they say that they ought to do, and what the anthropologist perceives them actually to be doing. Values or ideas about ‘Japaneseness’ serve as a model or image of ‘Japanese’ behaviour—what they think they ought to be doing—against which individual Japanese can judge their own behaviour. It will become clear, moreover, from the chapters in
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this volume that the way the Japanese think of themselves is as relevant to the anthropologist as the way they are perceived by others. It is at a broader level of analysis, however, that the greatest attempt has been made to produce an intellectual coherence in these chapters. The meetings of JAWS have concentrated on trying to make sense of human society in general in the light of an enhanced understanding of the particular case of Japan. As Hendry (in Hendry and Webber 1986:3) wrote in the introduction of the first JAWS volume, such meetings have two aims: To draw the attention of anthropologists to some of the insights that studies of Japan may bring to topics of current interest in the field; and to demonstrate to Japanese specialists the value of the contribution anthropologists may make to the general understanding of Japanese society. The theme which authors were asked to consider while writing their chapters for this volume was the significance of, and the relationship between, the concepts of ideology and practice in modern Japan. At the time there was no attempt to define how these terms should be used; authors were left to situate their material in the context of these ideas in any way they wished. It was believed that the authors all shared the same perception of the importance of the concepts of ideology and practice in Japan and accepted prima facie that these were useful and interesting ideas to pursue. It is, therefore, important to spell out some of these assumptions before examining the varying ways in which the writers actually approached the subject.
THE LANGUAGE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN One of the first distinctions any anthropologist embarking on research in Japan learns to make is between tatemae and honne. Tatemae— and like all culturally relative terms it is difficult to render its meaning exactly in English—refers to an individual’s explicitly stated principle, objective or promise; honne refers to what that individual is really going to do, or wants to do.
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At one level, therefore, tatemae refers to the way individuals in Japan know they are expected to behave. This is normally expressed in terms of moral (sometimes Confucian) precepts and social obligations and expectations such as repaying social debts, loyalty in return for benevolence, respect for authority. Honne, on the other hand, refers to the way individuals actually want to behave—in terms of self-interest. Since, as the literature on Japan constantly stresses, self-interest (what Hendry describes in her chapter as ‘individualism’ rather than ‘individuality’) receives wide social disapproval, it is not surprising that one should present one’s actions in terms of tatemae even if one is determined to fulfil them in terms of honne.9 There are numerous other terms in Japanese which express much the same ideas as tatemae and honne. The psychologist Doi Takeo, indeed, uses one such pair—omote (meaning ‘front’) and ura (meaning ‘rear’) —as a shorthand for understanding the whole of Japanese society.10 Hendry (1989), in her study of wrapping in Japanese society, invokes the use of kao (face) and kokoro (mind or soul) to make the same distinction; she reveals how Japanese demonstrate their awareness of the distinction between tatemae and honne in the language that they use.11 The recognition of the difference between what one says one is doing and what one actually does is clearly of fundamental importance in Japanese society. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that the ability to distinguish between the two is one element of social maturity; certainly, little respect is attached to those who are prepared to upset the social harmony by bluntly speaking the truth. It was with such pairs of terms in mind—which might loosely be translated as ‘ideology’ (tatemae) and ‘practice’ (honne) —that participants were expected to write their chapters. It was felt that while many researchers have mentioned the distinction in their writing, few have explored it in any scientific depth. This may, in part, be because the distinction between ideology and practice is a difficult one to pin down in concrete rather than abstract terms. It is also, without doubt, related to the fact that the distinction has powerful emotive overtones for many non-Japanese in Japan who tend to describe it in terms of how it affects them rather than examining its function in Japanese society. Van Wolferen, a recent and widely-read critic of the ‘Japanese System’ (as he terms the society), describes Japanese society as based on ‘particularistic’ ethics as opposed to a system of ‘universalistic’ ethics in other societies. In
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Japan, he boldly states, there is the near absence of any idea that ‘there can be truths, rules, principles or morals that always apply, no matter what the circumstances’ (1989:9). Truth, he suggests (1989:8), is ‘socially constituted’. Van Wolferen complains (1989:10) that scholars of Japan have not made enough of this distinction: ‘Most authors, having dutifully mentioned that the Japanese continually adjust their beliefs to the situation they find themselves in, move on to other topics as though totally unaware of the momentousness of this observation.’ Benedict (1946) is among the few he excuses from this charge. In fact, the emotive nature of van Wolferen’s argument is reflected in the continual complaint of foreign businessmen in Japan that the Japanese are two-faced, that they say one thing and do another, that they are ‘dishonourable’.12 Curiously, some support for van Wolferen’s argument comes from disaffected Japanese academics such as Taira Koji whose left-wing interpretations of Japanese society clash with the generally more conservative accounts presented to the outside world. Taira (1988:24 ff.) suggests that particularistic—he uses the more neutral word ‘pragmatic’ —ethics are endemic not only to Japan but also to China and lead, in both societies, to a substantial latitude of deviousness and double-talk. At the level of the individual, he cites (1988:25) the phrase menju fukuhai (compliance on the surface, revolt beneath; or, smile on the face, resentment in the heart) as a ‘quid pro quo that the weak or the poor have secured in exchange for the deprivation of their human status by general society’. At the societal level, Taira invokes the concept of yoto kuniku (displaying a lamb’s head at the door, but selling dog meat inside) as another example of the mendacity of the Japanese people, giving the example of the loud claims made for life-time employment which omit reference to the much more extensive casual labour markets which allow the life-time system to survive.13 Analyses of the distinction between what people say they do, what they say they ought to do and what they actually do in Japanese society, therefore, have tended to tell us as much about the analysts— Japanese and non-Japanese alike—and their frustrations and beliefs, as about the Japanese themselves. Such analyses fail to answer how the ideology is created, disseminated and manipulated, or how the practice relates to it. Are there two ‘worlds’ —private and public— which are separate and unconnected, as Boling (1990:144), for
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example, has suggested; or does one determine the possibilities of action and speech within the other? How does the distinction between ideology and practice in Japan compare with that of other societies?
THE LANGUAGE OF IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Few of the authors in this volume—Martinez and Wöss excepted — make explicit their understanding of the terms ‘ideology’ and ‘practice’ in the wider sense. This may be because the authors assume that their usage is self-evident. The range of ways in which the terms have been used, however, suggest that this latter assumption, if it exists, is mistaken. It is the purpose of the rest of this introduction to situate the chapters in the context of these wider theoretical discussions about the nature of ideology in society. Few terms in the social science vocabulary can have deeper connotations than the term ‘ideology’. It is common when discussing the concept to trot out the famous sociological aphorism: ‘I have a social philosophy, you have political opinions, he has an ideology’ (see Geertz 1973:194; Whittemore 1986:20). Part of the problem with the term, as Geertz points out (1973: 194), is that it is itself ideologised. For some it concerns ‘false consciousness’ and a vehicle for the expression of the material interests of specific groups of people. This, of course, is a tradition linked with Marx that can also be found in the work of leading anthropologists such as Godelier (1982) and Gellner (1979). For others, ideology refers to any system of meaning or worldview—from religion to manners—that can be studied in the context of any particular society. Such an approach is perhaps most visible in contemporary anthropology in the work of Clifford Geertz (1973). Moreover, it is clear that there are at least two different aspects to ideology: function and content—what ideologies do and what they say. One can examine ideologies as systems for maintaining social solidarity, providing charters for social order or preventing social disintegration; alternatively one can examine how ideologies are symbolically represented. There are a number of different ideologies in Japanese society which can be seen either as a Japanese worldview or as a closed system adopted by groups within society for specific purposes. Moon, for example, points out that it has been common in recent
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times to explain the economic success of Japan and the nearby ‘Newly-Industrialised Countries’ (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) in terms of a shared Confucian background that has proved particularly effective in mobilising an efficient workforce. This thesis, of course, raises numerous subsidiary questions—Foster-Carter (1988), for example, points out that for many years the ‘burden’ of Confucianism was used to explain why the same economies had failed to develop—but there is strong evidence to suggest that Confucianism now presents an ideology or world view along the same lines as Preston (1967), for example, talks about capitalism, socialism, communism and fascism presenting different ideological worldviews in western countries.14 As Moon’s chapter shows, however, Confucianism as an ideology is utilised in different ways in different societies. Rather than talk about Confucianism, therefore, one should talk about the ‘language of Confucianism’. This ‘language’ of Confucianism includes the idea that there are certain rules which define conduct between individuals. Juniors should show respect for their seniors which will be repaid by benevolence; loyalty will be returned with security. Relationships are hierarchically organised—no two individuals are exactly equal. Such relationships, however, are not the same in all Confucian societies. As McMullen (1987), among others, has pointed out, there is a major difference in terms of the idea of loyalty between Japanese Confucianism and the Chinese tradition from which it is derived. Whereas the moral code of Chinese Confucianism and neoConfucianism required that subjects saw it as their duty to rise up against corrupt or inept rulers, such an idea did not serve the purpose of the Tokugawa hegemons when they invoked the ‘language of Confucianism’. Indeed, in the potential conflict between loyalty to a father and to a ruler, they clearly meant their subjects to choose the latter. This example from the feudal period may appear of little significance in understanding contemporary Japan. Crawcour (1978), however, has suggested that in the modern period, too, Confucian ‘language’ was mobilised by those in power for their own ends. The employers’ organisations of the 1930s, faced by growing worker unrest, invoked the ‘tradition’ of Confucianism as an ideology of workplace practice wherein worker loyalty had always been repaid by employer benevolence. The comparison of this practice with descriptions of factories in the late Meiji and early Taisho periods provided by such as Hane (1982) gives the lie to it being, in any
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meaningful sense, a ‘traditional’ form of labour practice. This is just one of the many examples from Japanese history of what van Bremen calls the ‘distinct ideologies’ of Confucianism being mobilised by the ruling classes as a means of rationalising their rule by disguising it as the ‘natural state of things’.15 The ‘language of Confucianism’ is closely related to the Nihonjinron literature which is discussed by several of the authors in this volume. If, as Roth and Whittemore (1986:6) suggest, ‘ideology refers to the sociopolitical beliefs and aims characteristic of a nation or culture’, then Nihonjinron clearly constitutes an ideology described by some as ‘Japanism’. Nihonjinron literally means ‘theories of Japaneseness’ and refers to a genre of literature and stream of ideas which suggest that Japan is different from all other societies (see Dale 1986). Although there is evidence that a form of Nihonjinron existed in the Meiji period at the end of the nineteenth century (see Gluck 1985; Minami 1973), Befu argues that it has come to the fore in the post-war period only as a replacement for the militarist nationalism which had kept the country together in the 1930s and 1940s. Nihonjinron ideas essentially propose that the Japanese people, simply by the fact that they are born of two Japanese parents in Japan, share certain important characteristics which differentiate them from other people. The features which constitute this ‘unique Japaneseness’ include the ideas that the Japanese are a particularly homogeneous people, that they are naturally harmonious, and that the society is based on hierarchical interpersonal relations that involve respect for authority. For many Japanese, it has been argued, such ideas constitute their worldview. Throughout the 1980s, the Nihonjinron genre has increasingly become the focus of scholarly scrutiny with the suggestion by some (see Kawamura 1980; Dale 1986) that it represents the ideology of the ruling class in Japan—the leading industrialists, bureaucrats and politicians—who wish to promote a sense of nationalism that disguises internal inequalities of age, gender, geographical region and class, and encourages economic growth through propounding the idea that all will benefit equally from Japan’s new wealth. This idea, of course, is closely aligned to the Marxist concept of ‘false consciousness’ —the inability to recognise what is in their own best interests—of the majority of the society.16 Instead of identifying with class interests, individuals accept the ruling class ideology that Japan is essentially a classless, harmonious and
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‘unique’ society and they work for the good of the nation as a whole, thereby ensuring the maintenance of the status quo and legitimating the position of those in power (see Eccleston 1989 for a broader discussion of this idea). Befu, who has been one of the leading analysts of Nihonjinron, discusses in his chapter in this volume how other symbols of nationalism (of which he considers Nihonjinron one) have also become increasingly visible in Japan in recent years—including the national flag, national anthem and reverence for the emperor. His chapter raises several important questions about the nature of the relationship between ideology and practice. First, it is important to recognise the common occurrence of such symbols as the monarchy being used in attempts to create a sense of national identity. Cannadine (1983) gives a good account of this process in the case of the British monarchy in Hobsbawm and Ranger’s appropriately entitled volume, The Invention of Tradition. Thailand and South Korea appear to have even more in common with the Japanese example: all three countries deny a role for selfperceived minority groups in their emphasis on national identity; all three emphasise the uniqueness of their writing systems, language, religion—Shintoism, Confucianism and Buddhism in Japan, Korea and Thailand respectively—and the significance of their national flags and anthems.17 On the other hand, Befu shows in the example of the Okinawans that not all groups and individuals in society blindly accept the dominant ideology. This is a crucial point, since much of the critical literature on the Nihonjinron genre proposes too mechanistic a connection between the dissemination of the ideology and its acceptance. Here, indeed, lies one of the major problems with the Marxist idea of ‘false consciousness’, since it suggests that the rulers in a society can see what is in their own interests more clearly than those over whom they rule.18 Indeed, the ability of individuals to invest in themselves can clearly be seen in the area of Japanese education discussed in the chapters by Refsing and Mathias in this volume. Much is made of the ‘meritocratic’ nature of Japanese society and the fact that if an individual does well then he or she does so through his or her own efforts. Social status is largely determined by success in the education system. There is increasing evidence, however, that individuals with sufficient financial resources are able to manipulate the system, to make their chances ‘more equal than others’.
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Amano Ikuo, one of Japan’s leading educational sociologists, has discovered signs of growing educational inequality in recent years. He shows (Amano 1990) how an increasingly large proportion of entrants to Japan’s most prestigious university— Tokyo—come from a private school background. In particular, he emphasises the growing number of privileged students who have attended private six-year secondary schools as opposed to three years of junior high school followed by three years of senior high school. These private schools, which charge considerable fees and cater to the ‘professional classes’, not only offer a heightened possibility of educational success but also pass on what Bourdieu (1977) calls the ‘cultural capital’ of the elite to their students.19 Two other areas where financial investment can improve children’s chances in the education system are the special after-school cram institutions (juku) and the full-time cram institutions known as yobiko where students can retake the university entrance examinations. Tsukada (1988) shows that there is a close correlation between the amount of money invested in these institutions and the quality of the end product. Parents who can afford to send their children to more expensive institutions greatly improve those children’s educational chances. It is important to point out, moreover, that there are also significant differences in the experience within the education system of different ethnic and gender groups. These have been all but ignored by the authorities in Japan (see Rohlen 1981; Mizuno 1987; Shimahara 1984; Mitsui 1985). All these factors, which can be uncovered only through a detailed analysis of the practice of the education system, have to be borne in mind when examining the ideology of meritocracy in Japan and the other functions of education discussed by Refsing.20 Despite this evidence to the contrary, however, most Japanese continue to subscribe to the ideology of a meritocratic system while trying to maximise their own chances within it. In this context, ideology can be seen as the order created within society or, as Shils (1968) puts it, ‘the product of man’s need for imposing intellectual order on the world’; whereas practice is the way in which individuals behave within that imposed or self-imposed order. Ideology, therefore, is the way groups are defined and define themselves symbolically; practice is the way individuals act within that symbolically defined universe. It should be clear by now that in order to obtain a full picture of the way in which a society works, one needs to look at both what people say they do or ought to do and what they actually do.
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Individuals are multifaceted with both public and private sides. The fact that so many scholars have insisted on looking at only one side of the equation has led to serious imbalances in descriptions of societies. Both sides should be included in the same account; as Whittemore (1986:37) writes, we cannot escape from ideology, our only freedom is to make better or worse choices.21 The authors of the chapters in this volume have tended to start from an emic approach (which examines a society in the terms of those being studied) which they have then situated in a wider theoretical, etic, context (which allows comparison of their material with other societies). 22 The variety of these wider theoretical approaches is examined in the final section of this introduction. Moon and Hendry rely on a traditional British anthropological approach which emanates from the Oxford school of anthropology and the tradition of E.E.Evans-Pritchard. This is a theoretical view which traces its origins to work such as Radcliffe-Brown’s structuralfunctionalism in which societies are interpreted as a system of interlocking institutions where change in one area causes change in another. Where Evans-Pritchard and his followers differed from this earlier generation lay in the way that they did not simply examine the function of the different institutions but also looked at the meaning which was ascribed to them. They also introduced a historical element which explained how societies changed over time and interacted with other societies, as well as removing some of the stress on the ‘scientific’ nature of the discipline. Evans-Pritchard was also, significantly, sceptical about the implication in Radcliffe-Brown’s work that everything functions for the good of ‘society’, and he thus opened up the possibility of looking at how ideologies can be used differently by different members of society. Hendry shows how, in Japan, the institution of the school serves to attach significance to the important concepts of individuality and groupism. She shows how these values are not innately Japanese but created and negotiated and thereby susceptible to change. More importantly, she shows how any ideology contains within it its exact opposite. This is particularly important when discussing the Japanese ideology of group orientedness—the idea that Japanese somehow innately prefer to act in groups rather than as individuals. Some (Krauss et al. 1984; Eisenstadt and Ben-Ari 1990) indeed suggest that the Japanese ideology of groupism may in fact be so strong simply in order to resist a more ‘natural’ tendency towards individualism and individual conflict. Such an
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ideology, therefore, provides social cohesion in what would otherwise be a ‘naturally’ centripetal society, although it is unclear in these theses why, if groupism is not innate, then individualism should be. Some of the same theoretical concerns of Hendry’s work can be seen in the chapter by Moon: the ideology of the relationship between men and women in the Japanese countryside is not bound by immanent Japanese values but affected by important factors such as technological and economic change. As the practice has been forced to change, so the ideology has changed with it. Moon has broadened her argument in a recently-published monograph, From Paddy Field to Ski Slope (1989), where she shows that technological change can lead to the revitalisation of so-called ‘traditional’ household patterns as well as their breakdown. In the context of her chapter in this volume, which discusses the relationship between men and women in the economic sphere, it is important to point out that the ‘historical’ ideology was in fact much more egalitarian for most of the society than today. The bushido ethic largely based on the ‘language of Confucianism’ greatly influenced the lives of the upper classes in feudal (Tokugawa) Japan but was much less important in the lives of the remaining 94 per cent of the population. It was only the ‘samuraisation’ process—the dissemination of samurai ideology— in the early Meiji period which led to the spread throughout the society of the idea that women should be restricted to the domestic sphere.23 Like Moon, van Bremen also discusses the significance of Confucianism in contemporary Japan, but his theoretical approach is quite different and informed by a strong structuralist method that combines Durkheim with Lévi-Strauss as well as implicitly appearing to draw on Jung. He demonstrates how Confucian ‘heroes’ are archetypes of good and bad, presenting models for individuals to act on in their everyday lives; heroes represent certain ‘Japanese’ qualities which provide charters for the behaviour of all Japanese. The chapter by Martinez follows a related structuralist approach to that of van Bremen. She discusses the ‘rural mystique’ archetype which the Japanese broadcasting companies are so keen to capture and disseminate. She shows how the ‘rural mystique’ is exploited both by urban tourists and the supposedly rustic fishermen-divers; the idealised countryside image, as Martin Wiener (1981) has described in the case of Britain, is a common ‘utopia’ for people living in industrialised societies.
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Martinez’ chapter can be compared with Berque’s critique of westerners who think that the answer to the problems of modern society may have been found in a ‘mystical’ Japan. Berque offers a post-modernist analysis of the relationship between man and nature which places the individual in direct relation to his environment and ignores the classical intermediary, in anthropological study, of social institutions. This is an interesting departure which reflects the growing fascination with post-modern, post-Fordist 24 approaches to society in general; indeed, this is a debate which has recently reached the shores of Japan (see Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989). As the Marxist-inclined sociologist Sugimoto Yoshio has eloquently argued (1989), in several important ways Japan may not be a post-modernist society. Many of the elements of modern society which should have broken down in a postmodernist world remain defiantly in place in Japan: there are few signs of a fundamental collapse of the work ethic or any greater emphasis on a better quality of life; there is probably even less evidence of a more choice-oriented post-modernist style of learning; and as for the Japanese family, although it has clearly changed from extended to nuclear, there is little sign that the nuclear family itself is about to disintegrate. There is probably least evidence of all of the appearance of a genuinely multi-cultural society. Sugimoto wonders, however, whether in their dismissal of modern society there is not perhaps a tendency for post-modernist scholars to be attracted to pre-modern society. Berque certainly could not be accused of this. His argument does much to undermine those western post-modernist socio-ecologists who are attracted by the supposedly Oriental tradition of man living in harmony with his environment. Sugimoto concludes that Japan is a postindustrial society if not a post-modernist one; it is difficult to see how Berque could fail to come to the same conclusion if he decided to take his analysis further. Like van Bremen and Martinez, Breger also discusses the way in which ideology is disseminated through society. She is less interested in the power of the myth itself, but rather in the manner in which it is created and negotiated. Her use of the word ‘discourse’ in the title of her chapter points towards the influential discourse theorists such as Foucault who were so popular in the late 1970s. Discourse theorists emphasise the need to analyse systems of thought in terms of the language in which they are expressed, such as, for example, the language of Confucianism or Nihonjinron.
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Breger takes this further by discussing the relationship between power and information transmission. While the message that is being presented (such as the image of Japan) may be multivalent, or in Turner’s (1967) language ‘multivocal’, the value that is ascribed to it in any particular context is determined by the relative power and interests of the image producers. As Breger’s analysis demonstrates, media images may well tell as much, if not more, about the producers of the image as those who are the subject of the image. In short, perception is a social construction, not a natural given. Mathias also talks about the social creation of perception, and the maintenance of that perception in the face of contradictory evidence. How, for example, was the ideology of an educational meritocracy maintained in the Taisho and early Showa periods where there was the phenomenon of unemployed university graduates and academics? Mathias suggests that new myths of self-advancement through education came into being, centred not around those who went to university but on individuals further down the social scale who had more modest goals which could still be met through educational success. Raz’ chapter—like that by Martinez—discusses the manipulation and inversion of the dominant ideology by a sub-culture in Japan. The manner in which yakuza present themselves in Japan is clearly largely determined by the ideology of the mainstream society. Raz describes it as a mixture of inclusiveness and exclusiveness: the yakuza see themselves both as inside Japanese society (‘we are the true upholders of Japanese values’) and outside it (‘we are outlaws’). He skilfully draws on ideas from labelling theory (including labelling by self as well as others), semiotics and theatre studies in his discussion of the creation of ideology of, and by, the modernday yakuza. The use that Fleur Wöss makes of the term ‘ideology’ goes back to the fundamental dichotomy of the Enlightenment thinkers between religion and science. This is a distinction which has had a major influence on anthropology and sociology. She uses ideology in the sense of ideas which do not bear close scientific scrutiny and discusses Japanese views of death and the afterworld in this context. This distinction between ideology and science explains why so much effort is often expended to provide scientific support for certain ideologies. Wöss gives examples of scientists ‘proving’ the nature of the other-world; the science of superstition (such as
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seimeigaku, the science of numbers—see Lewis 1986; Crump 1986) is particularly popular in Japan. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the manner in which science is used in attempts to endorse more grandiose ideologies. In the realm of Nihonjinron, the work of Tsunoda (1985) —a neurophysiologist who has suggested that, due to linguistic influence, the hemispheres of the Japanese brain function in exactly the opposite manner to those of other people—has been used as evidence of Japanese uniqueness. The fact that such work is produced by scholars from top universities and published by reputable companies does much to enhance its ‘scientific’ status. The crucial point for anthropologists, however, is that ideologies, even if not seen as ‘real’, still have important functions and meaning in the context in which they appear. Such was the argument of Auguste Comte—one of the ‘fathers’ of sociology—who in opposition to the ‘scientists’ of the Enlightenment Period insisted on the value of studying ideology as a means of ordering society. The foregoing has presented just some of the examples of the ways in which the term ideology has been used in this volume. Despite the different backgrounds of, and methodologies employed by, individual authors, each contributes not only towards an understanding of different elements of Japan and Japanese society as a whole, but also to the manner in which ideas of ideology and practice function, and are used, in other societies throughout the world. Japan has often appeared to be considered too ‘different’ to be used in comparative anthropological analyses; in many introductory texts to anthropology, it is not mentioned at all. Anthropologists of other societies, however, can learn much by looking at Japan; Japan helps us examine not only taken-forgranted assumptions about other societies which we study, but also those assumptions we have about our own societies and ourselves.
NOTES 1 The author would like to thank David Gellner for his thought-provoking comments on an earlier draft of this introduction. 2 The Befu and Kreiner volume will include discussion of the different approaches to the study of Japan by scholars from France, Germany, Austria, Holland, India, South Korea, the Soviet Union, the UK, the USA and Japan itself.
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3 Such types of detailed case studies, as Moon herself points out, allow the study of Japan to break out of the narrow paradigm of a direct west vs. Japan perspective that has dominated the subject for so long by demonstrating the weakness of the assumption that if something is present in Japan and not in the west, then it is unique to Japan—and vice versa (see also Goodman 1984). 4 For discussion about the relationship between observer and observed in participant observation research, see the papers in Clifford and Marcus, eds, 1986. 5 Pyle (1982:242) calls these other approaches the ‘progressive’, the ‘liberalrealist’ and the ‘mercantilist’. 6 For overviews of these reform proposals in Japan, South Korea and England, see Goodman 1989; in the Soviet Union, see Muckle 1988. 7 For a vigorous defence of anthropology against these charges, see van Bremen 1986. 8 For a similar cautionary parable, this time from Africa, see Clifford (1986:116–17) where he comments that ‘Suddenly cultural data cease to move smoothly from oral performance into descriptive writing…. Both informant and researcher are readers and re-writers of a cultural invention.’ 9 It should be made clear, however, that the idea of honne need not necessarily refer to the individual looking after his or her own interests in a purely Hobbesian sense; indeed it may often refer to an individual identifying with the interests of their group rather than those of some wider social unit. For an excellent overview of the variety of meanings associated with the word ‘individual’ in western societies, see Lukes 1973. 10 This book, entitled in Japanese Omote to Ura, is translated into English as The Anatomy of Self: The Individual Versus Society (1986), which shows the problems of rendering such terms into another language. 11 The nature of the Japanese language is such that quite discrete language forms are used when talking to people of different relative social levels. It is the use of these different forms to which Hendry refers. The awareness of these distinctions is important in understanding the relationship between ideology and practice. As Friedman (1985:375–6) points out, ideology and practice have traditionally been discussed in terms of a dualism of mind and body which suggests that individuals are aware of the difference between the two levels. In recent years, however, some theorists have proposed that individuals do not always consciously distinguish one level from the other. ‘Praxis theory’, for example, puts forward the proposition that individuals first change or affect their environment, and then think about it; they are often not aware of working against any particular ideology. 12 One of the weaknesses inherent in this type of complaint—which has been made by westerners about all others from at least the nineteenth century—is its failure to recognise the ideological nature of the western belief in truth and honesty. As Goffman and the symbolic interactionist school have shown, westerners also adapt concepts to context, even if they are not always aware of so doing.
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13 For a graphic description of the casual labour market and its deprivations, see Kamata 1984. 14 Others have discussed ideology in terms of the role of government in the political, rather than, as Preston does, simply economic, life of the nation. One example is the American idea of individualism (see Kaplan 1986). National ideologies can also be a reflection of individual ‘charismatic’ leaders, such as Maoism in China (see Hsiung 1970), Peronism in Argentina, or Thatcherism in Britain. 15 Such an analysis, of course, need not be restricted only to Japanese society and the use of Confucianism for ideological purposes. Indeed, Marxist analysts of ideology tend to concentrate on bringing out such examples, such as examining the paternalism of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Church of England landlords. 16 Marx’s idea of the distinction between appearance and reality is actually considerably more sophisticated than the dominant ideology thesis at first appears. If applied to the contemporary Japanese scene, for example, it would include the idea that Japanese workers are aware of how their wage form may not constitute a fair return for what they produce, but are prepared to accept the wage in return for an improved quality of life, security and future benefits. 17 The fact that comparisons between Japan and other Asian countries are so seldom carried out exemplifies the political context in which all research is undertaken. Direct comparisons with South Korea and Japan, for example, are avoided not for academic but for historical and social reasons. For South Korean scholars, there is the legacy of Japan’s harsh colonisation of the country; in the case of Japanese researchers, it is a continuation of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s famous nineteenth-century plea for Japan to turn its back on Asia and set itself squarely in a western perspective (Datsu-A Ron). 18 The question that is normally asked in this context is how was it possible for Marx to escape his own class position in order to construct his theory. This is sometimes answered by the idea of the relative independence of intellectuals in the social order, but this appears to smack of special pleading. Much of the sociological and anthropological work on Japan during the 1980s has attempted to undermine the Nihonjinron models by concentrating on examples of conflict, coercion, self-interest and heterogeneity in Japanese society (see Sugimoto and Mouer 1989:1–35 for a good overview of this literature). 19 Amano (1990:6) calls this cultural capital (in Japanese) ‘school colour’ in the sense that while most Japanese schools try to stress equality by being as much like each other as possible, these private schools stress their differences. Holmes (1989), a British sociologist of education, offers a surprisingly naive account of these schools in the light of their obvious similarities with the British public school system. 20 See Apple and Weis (1983) for a discussion of the same questions in the study of education in general. 21 One must remember, however, that there are always a number of ideological systems within any one society. Just as Smith (1984) points
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out, for example, in his discussion of kinship ideology in Latin America, that one must not speak of ‘Latin American kinship’, but ‘kinship in Latin America’, so one must be equally aware of regional and local ideologies in Japan. The work by Hendry (1981) on marriage and kinship patterns in Japan shows that there is no single pattern of kinship ideology but numerous models depending on regional and class backgrounds. Further, along the same lines, Kamishima (1990) suggests that certain important ideologies in Japan pertain only to very small groups; the reason that individuals appear to accept a wider national ideology is simply to avoid conflict when they cannot even guess the ideological values of those with whom they come into contact. Mannheim (1936) talks about two levels of ideology—that of the individual and that of the state. One should also talk of intermediary levels that relate to the region and the group. 22 For a fuller discussion of the differences between emic and etic approaches to Japan, see Befu 1989 and Goodman 1990. 23 There are interesting and, as far as I know, unexplored similarities between the idea of ‘samuraisation’ and Srinivas’ (1967) notion of ‘Sanskritisation’. On the one hand, ‘Sanskritisation’, by which Srinivas means the adoption by lower castes of the practices of the Brahmin, has been useful for creating a greater sense of national consensus; on the other hand, Srinivas’ ethnography suggests that this was a process instigated by the lower castes themselves, rather than being instigated by the ruling class as was the case with ‘samuraisation’. 24 Few terms are used as freely in contemporary social theory as ‘postmodernism’ or ‘post-Fordism’ which often appear to have quite different meanings to different people. The terms are used here to signal theories which perceive an end to the mass-consumption, mass-regulated society (exemplified by the Ford factory-line) which will be replaced with more choice-oriented, individualistic social models.
REFERENCES Amano Ikuo (1990) ‘Shiken shakai no shintenkai (The new development of an examination society)’ in Amano Ikuo and Iwaki Hideo (eds) Hendo Suru Shakai no Kyoiku Seido (The Education System in a Changing Society), Vol. 2, Tokyo: Kyoiku Kaihatsu Kenkyusho. Apple, Michael W. and Weis, Lois (1983) ‘Ideology and Practice in Schooling: A Political and Conceptual Introduction’ in Michael Apple and Lois Weis (eds) Ideology and Practice in Schooling, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Befu Harumi (1989) ‘The Emic-Etic Distinction and Its Significance for Japanese Studies’ in Sugimoto Yoshio and Ross E.Mouer (eds) Constructs for Understanding Japan, London and New York: Kegan Paul International. —— and Kreiner, Josef (eds) (forthcoming) Otherness of Japan: Historical and Cultural Influences on Japanese Studies in Ten Countries.
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Ben-Ari, Eyal, Moeran, Brian and Valentine, James (eds) (1990) Unwrapping Japan, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Benedict, Ruth (1946) The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (repr. 1977). Boling, Patricia (1990) ‘Private Interest and the Public Good in Japan’, The Pacific Review, 3, 2: 138–50. Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cannadine, David (1983) ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the “Invention of Tradition”, c. 1820–1977’ in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clifford, James (1986) ‘On Ethnographic Allegory’ in James Clifford and G.E.Marcus (eds) Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Clifford, James and Marcus, G.E. (eds) (1986) Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Crawcour, E.S. (1978) ‘The Japanese Employment System’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 4, 2: 225–45. Crump, Thomas (1986) ‘The Pythagorean View of Time and Space in Japan’ in Joy Hendry and Jonathan Webber (eds) Interpreting Japanese Society: Anthropological Approaches, Oxford: JASO. Dale, Peter N. (1986) The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, London, Sydney and Oxford: Croom Helm and the Nissan Institute. —— (1988) ‘The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness Revisited’, Nissan Occasional Paper Series, Oxford, Nissan Institute: No. 9. Doi Takeo (1986) The Anatomy of Self: The Individual Versus Society, trans. Mark Harbison, Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International. Eccleston, Bernard (1989) State and Society in Post-War Japan, Cambridge: Polity Press. Eisenstadt, S.N. and Ben-Ari, Eyal (eds) (1990) Japanese Models of Conflict Resolution, London and New York: Kegan Paul International. Foster-Carter, Aidan (1988) ‘What “Confucian Ethic”? The Role of Cultural Factors in Korean Economic Development: Some Notes and Queries’, Papers of the 5th International Conference on Korean Studies: Korean Studies, Its Tasks and Perspectives, Vol. II, Songnam (Korea), The Academy of Korean Studies: 695–709. Friedman, Jonathan (1985) ‘Ideology’ in Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper (eds) The Social Science Encyclopedia, London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books Inc. Gellner, Ernest (1979) Spectacles and Predicaments: Essays in Social Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gluck, Carol (1985) Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
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Godelier, Maurice (1982) ‘The Ideal in the Real’ in Raphael Samuel and Gareth Stedman Jones (eds) Culture, Ideology and Politics: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Goodman, Roger (1984) ‘Is there an “I” in Anthropology? Thoughts on Starting Fieldwork in Japan’, Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, XV, 2: 157–68. —— (1989) ‘Who’s Looking At Whom? Japanese, Korean and English Educational Reform in Comparative Perspective’, Nissan Occasional Paper Series, Oxford, Nissan Institute: No. 11. (1990) ‘Sociology of the Japanese State, the State of Japanese Sociology: A Review of the 1980s’, Japan Forum, 2, 2: 273–84. Hane Mikiso (1982) Peasants, Rebels and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan, New York: Pantheon Books. Hata Hiromi and Smith, Wendy A. (1983) ‘Nakane’s “Japanese Society” as Utopian Thought’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 13, 3: 361–88. Hendry, Joy (1981) Marriage in Changing Japan: Community and Society, London: Croom Helm. —— (1987) ‘The Japan Anthropology Workshop’, Current Anthropology, 28, 4: 104–6. —— (1989) ‘To Wrap or Not to Wrap: Politeness and Penetration in Ethnographic Inquiry’, Man, 24, 4: 620–35. —— and Webber, Jonathan (eds) (1986) Interpreting Japanese Society: Anthropological Approaches, Oxford: JASO. Holmes, Brian (1989) ‘Japan: Private Education’ in Geoffrey Walford (ed.) Schools in Ten Countries: Policy and Practice, London and New York: Routledge. Hsiung, James Chieh (1970) Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism, London: Pall Mall Press. Kamata Satoshi (1984) Japan in the Passing Lane: An Insider’s Account of Life in a Japanese Auto Factory, London: Unwin Paperbacks, Counterpoint. Kamishima Jiro (1990) ‘Society of Convergence: An Alternative for the Homogeneity Theory’, Japan Foundation Newsletter, XVII, 3: 1–6. Kaplan, Morton A. (1986) ‘Is There an American Ideology?’, in John K. Roth and Robert C.Whittemore (eds) Ideology and American Experience: Essays on Theory and Practice in the United States, Washington: The Washington Institute Press. Kawamura Nozomu (1980) ‘The Historical Background of Arguments Emphasizing the Uniqueness of Japanese Society’, Social Analysis, No. 5/6 [Special Issue: Japanese Society: Reappraisals and New Directions]: 44–62. Krauss, Ellis S., Rohlen, Thomas P. and Steinhoff, Patricia G. (eds) (1984) Conflict in Japan, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Lewis, David C. (1986) ‘“Years of Calamity”: Yakudoshi Observances in a City’ in Joy Hendry and Jonathan Webber (eds) Interpreting Japanese Society: Anthropological Approaches, Oxford: JASO. Lukes, Stephen (1973) Individualism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. McMullen, I.J. (1987) ‘Rulers or Fathers? A Casuistical Problem in Early Modern Japanese Thought’, Past and Present, 116: 56–97.
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Mannheim, Karl (1936) Ideology and Utopia, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Minami Hiroshi (1973) ‘The Introspection Boom: Whither the National Character?’, Japan Interpreter, VIII, 2: 159–84. Mitsui Mariko (1985) ‘A Package for Sexism: Education in Japanese Senior High Schools’, Japan Christian Quarterly, LI, 1: 6–18. Miyoshi Masao and Harootunian, H.D. (eds) (1989) Post-Modernism and Japan, Durham and London: Duke University Press. Mizuno Takaaki (1987) ‘Ainu: The Invisible Minority’, Japan Quarterly, 34, 2: 143–8. Moon Okpyo (1989) From Paddy Field to Ski Slope: The Revitalisation of Tradition in Japanese Village Life, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Morris-Suzuki, Tessa (1984) Showa: An Inside History of Hirohito’s Japan, London: The Athlone Press. Mouer, Ross and Sugimoto Yoshio (1986) Images of Japanese Society: A Study in the Social Structure of Reality, London, New York, Sydney and Henley: Kegan Paul International. Muckle, James (1988) A Guide to the Soviet Curriculum: What the Russian Child is Taught in School, London, New York and Sydney: Croom Helm. Nakane Chie (1973) Japanese Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Preston, Nathaniel Stone (1967) Politics, Economics and Power: Ideology and Practice Under Capitalism, Socialism, Communism, and Fascism, London: Collier-Macmillan. Pyle, Kenneth B. (1982) ‘The Future of Japanese Nationality: An Essay in Contemporary History’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 8, 2: 223–63. Rohlen, Thomas P. (1981) ‘Education: Policies and Prospects’, in Lee Changsoo and George De Vos (eds), Koreans in Japan: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation, Berkeley: University of California Press. Roth, John K. and Whittemore, Robert C. (1986) ‘Introduction: One, and Yet Many’ in John K.Roth and Robert C.Whittemore (eds) Ideology and American Experience: Essays on Theory and Practice in the United States, Washington: The Washington Institute Press. Shils, Edward (1968) ‘Ideology: The Concept and Function of Ideology’ in David L.Sills (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press: Vol. 7. Shimahara Nobuo (1984) ‘Toward the Equality of a Japanese Minority: The Case of Burakumin’, Comparative Education, 20, 3: 339–53. Smith, Raymond T. (1984) ‘Introduction’ in Raymond T.Smith (ed.) Kinship Ideology and Practice in Latin America, Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press. Srinivas, M.N. (1967) ‘The Cohesive Role of Sanscritisation’ in Philip Mason (ed.) India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, London: Oxford University Press. Sugimoto Yoshio (1989) ‘Taking the Sociological Pulse of Contemporary Japan’, Japan Foundation Public Lecture, Sixth Conference of the Japanese Studies Association, Sydney University. —— and Mouer, Ross E. (eds) (1989) Constructs for Understanding Japan, London and New York: Kegan Paul International.
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Taira Koji (1988) ‘Disadvantages of Success: Pains of Behavior Adjustment to Role Changes’ in David C.Evans and Louis Tremaine (eds) Proceedings of the Symposium on Japanese and Third-World Development, Richmond, Virginia. Tsukada Mamoru (1988) ‘Institutional Supplementary Education in Japan: The Yobiko and Ronin Student Adaptations’, Comparative Education, 24, 3: 285–303. Tsunoda Tadanobu (1985) The Japanese Brain: Uniqueness and Universality, trans. Oiwa Yoshinori, Tokyo: Taishukan Publishing Company. Turner, Victor (1967) The Forest of Symbols, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. van Bremen, Jan (1986) ‘The Post-1945 Anthropology of Japan’ in Joy Hendry and Jonathan Webber (eds) Interpreting Japanese Society, Oxford: JASO. —— (1989) ‘The Japan Anthropology Workshop’, Japan Forum, 1, 2: 291– 4. van Wolferen, Karel (1989) The Enigma of Japanese Power, London: Macmillan. Whittemore, Robert C. (1986) ‘The Philosophical Antecedents of American Ideology’ in John K.Roth and Robert C.Whittemore (eds) Ideology and American Experience: Essays on Theory and Practice in the United States, Washington: The Washington Institute Press. Wiener, Martin J. (1981) English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850–1980, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Chapter 2
Symbols of nationalism and Nihonjinron Harumi Befu
INTRODUCTION In 1947 Kiku to Katana, the Japanese translation of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Ruth Benedict (1946), was published in Japan. It became an instant bestseller, and has been on the shelves of bookstores in Japan ever since. By now the Japanese version has seen eight separate editions, and has been reprinted at least 144 times. It is quite proper to say that the postwar Nihonjinron—the search for Japan’s identity, and cultural uniqueness—was inaugurated by Benedict, and has increasingly enraptured the Japanese ever since. While there are many reasons for this boom, I would like to suggest one of them in this chapter, namely that the use of major symbols of national identity and pride was rendered problematic by the Second World War, and hence Nihonjinron moved into this relative ‘symbolic vacuum’.
INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY Cultural manifestations of nationalism come in a variety of forms: physical symbols, personages, rituals and discourses. Every nation uses these instruments as a way of creating a sense of national identity, reminding its citizens of the importance of patriotism and bolstering loyalty to the nation. The most obvious symbols of national identity
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are the national flag, the national anthem, the national emblem, and national monuments and rituals, which are all physical representations of national identity and national pride. These symbols acquire an aura of sacredness and inviolability and are designed to cause a surge of patriotic emotion when displayed in the proper place at the proper time. Every modern nation state has these symbols, and makes use of them at every available occasion to instil and reinforce sentiments of national unity and patriotism. They are a reminder of the importance of the nation which in theory both protects its people but, at the same time, can ask them to sacrifice themselves for it. These symbols, it is important to note, are a creation of the nation state. They did not simply ‘emerge’ from the grassroots, but were consciously created by the state to promote national integration and to represent it. Desecration of these symbols is thus an insult to the state if not an outright crime. Japan has had such symbols ever since it entered the modern period and began to have intercourse with western nations. To be counted among the ranks of western nations, Japan had to acquire the proper accoutrements of a modern nation, and these included national symbols. These symbols were used with near-universal acceptance until the end of the Second World War in 1945. The hypothesis I want to develop in this chapter is that the popularity of Nihonjinron in postwar Japan is a consequence of Japan’s inability to exploit effectively the most important symbols which express national identity and nationalism. By these symbols, I refer to the imperial institution, the ‘national’ flag, the ‘national’ anthem, the ‘national’ emblem, and national monuments and rituals. Let us examine each in turn. Imperial institution Royalty, if a nation has such, is one of the most obvious symbols of national identity. Most monarchies nowadays are stripped of real power, which makes them less problematic as a symbolic source of national unity. With power, royalty can be a target of criticism for potential or actual misuse of that power; without power, no one can blame royalty, who can simply enjoy the prestige and honour inherent in a venerable institution. Witness Denmark, whose queen is the pride of the nation; or Great Britain, whose queen is also an undisputed national symbol. This is not to say that there are not citizens who
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are indifferent or apathetic to royalty in these countries, but that there is little deep-seated resentment or outright opposition to the institution. Such is not the case with Japan. The emperor and the imperial institution are perhaps the most outstanding symbols of Japan as a political entity. Before 1868, when Japan launched its modernisation programme, the emperor occupied a relatively unimportant place in the minds of ordinary people. Many did not even know who the emperor was. One of the first tasks of the Meiji government was to ‘modernise’ the emperor and the imperial institution, which meant to make the emperor into a national symbol by Europeanising him (Fujitani 1988). The emperor was made to dress in western clothing reminiscent of European royalty, and was prominently displayed on all major occasions of national celebration. He was shown in western-style military uniform for the review of armed forces. Indeed, the emperor’s uniformed figure was seen increasingly frequently during the 1930s and early 1940s. As the emperor was the ultimate source of authority, all wars were, needless to say, fought under the imperial command and with his authorisation. It is this imperial involvement in past wars, especially the last world war, which rendered the emperor a tainted and ambiguous symbol. Apart from a small faction of ultra-right-wing reactionaries, Japanese agree now that war in general is bad and the last war in particular was a horrendous mistake. Although they have not agreed on whom to lay the blame and responsibility for the war, for many Japanese the emperor is at least in part implicated. This fact was dramatised at the death of Emperor Showa. Immediately upon his death, one of the critical issues on which the media focused was his responsibility for initiating, continuing and terminating the last war. The Japanese government, under the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, takes the position along with other conservatives that the emperor was not responsible for initiating the Second World War. The decision to start the war was made by politicians, and the emperor as a constitutional monarch had no choice but to accept this political decision. This is in fact the position the emperor himself took. The establishment view, however, gives credit to the emperor for terminating the war. According to this view, his intervention in this political decision was necessitated by the fact that the factions for continuing the war and for terminating it and surrendering were evenly split, thus forcing the emperor to make the decision. Being benevolent, he made the right decision for the people. Some
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Japanese, however, feel that such reasoning is not logically consistent (Kato 1976). If the emperor had the authority to make a political decision to end the war, they argue, he must have had the authority to make a political decision to initiate or not initiate the war as well. Moreover, wartime records are clear that the emperor rejoiced over Japan’s military victories, demonstrating his approval of the war effort. Guidelines for elementary and secondary school education issued in 1982 require students to ‘deepen their understanding, respect and love towards the emperor’. This was the first time since 1945 that government guidelines set forth requirements regarding education about the emperor. This 1982 directive was at least balanced with an instruction to teach students about popular sovereignty. In the 1989 guidelines, however, mention of popular sovereignty disappeared, while the requirement to learn about the emperor as the symbol of the Japanese nation remains. These guidelines are not accepted as a matter of course in schools; they are debated heatedly by teachers, school administrators and scholars of education who do not necessarily see the symbol of the emperor in modern Japan in an entirely positive light. The ill-feeling which many Japanese feel towards the emperor and the imperial institution he represents is poignantly expressed in the tragic experience of the Okinawans. The emotions Okinawans feel when they think about the past war is well expressed in the following excerpts from an article which Arasaki Moriteru, President of Okinawa University, wrote for the 10 January 1989 issue of the Mainichi Shinbun soon after the death of Emperor Hirohito. The English translation was provided by the Asia Foundation Translation Service Centre, and appeared in the 17 March 1989 issue of The Pacific Citizen: Japan is in mourning for the late Emperor Hirohito, but many Okinawans harbour mixed emotions about the monarch. In the second world war, Okinawa was the only major home island to experience ground fighting. Thousands of noncombatants committed suicide to avoid capture. In the bitter three-month battle 12,500 American and 110,000 Japanese military personnel, and 150,000 civilians were killed…. It was a shock to learn after the war that Hirohito could have prevented the invasion. In February 1945, with Allied Forces closing in, Prince Konoe Fumimaro, former prime
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minister and imperial confidant, urged Hirohito to end the war quickly. The monarch refused…. The fateful decision turned the Ryukyus into a killing ground. Although the occupation of Japan proper ended in 1952, the [Okinawa] prefecture remained under U.S. control until 1972. Japan agreed in 1952 to prolong American military control over Okinawa as a condition for regaining national sovereignty…. Today 75% of all US [military] installations [in Japan] are located in Okinawa…. Shortly after World War II, Hirohito toured Japan to emphasize that the people, not the emperor, were sovereign, a principle enshrined in the new [postwar] constitution. He did not go to Okinawa, however…. Nor did he visit the prefecture in 1972 to welcome Okinawa back into the national fold. An Okinawan tour [by the emperor] required elaborate planning to ensure the emperor’s safety…. In 1975, the crown prince and princess tested the water and found it dangerous. The visit sparked violent protests, including a firebomb attack on the royal couple. Another 12 years passed before Tokyo officials were ready to risk an imperial visit. In 1987, they announced that Hirohito, Crown Prince Akihito and his son, Prince Hiro, would attend the 42nd National Athletic Meet in Okinawa in October…. When the emperor fell ill and was hospitalised in September 1987, Akihito, the crown prince, the crown princess and Prince Hiro went, anyway. Many Ryukyuans protested the trip. The most famous incident occurred in Yomitan village, the site of a softball match. Chibana Shoichi, then 39, a supermarket owner and member of the village assembly, hauled down the Japanese flag at the opening ceremony and burned it. Hirohito’s death may signal the end of a distinctive Okinawan identity. With neonationalist sentiment on the rise, the end of Showa resembles the era’s chauvinistic beginning. Okinawans see themselves, first, used as a buffer between the rest of Japan and the Allied Forces at the end of the war. Second, they see themselves made into a sacrificial lamb which the emperor offered to the Allied Occupation to save the rest of Japan from prolonged occupation. Third and last, with most American military installations based in Okinawa, they see themselves used as a buffer between the USA and the communist bloc in the postwar cold war.
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Okinawans thus single themselves out as occupying a special and tragic place in contemporary Japanese history. Yet their suffering may be regarded as a heightened experience of what all Japanese feel—sufferings caused by the last war; the loss of loved ones in war and in the Allied bombings of the home islands; military occupation; and the entire Japanese island chain serving as a buffer between the United States and the communist bloc. The public pronouncement by the Mayor of Nagasaki in 1989, at the time when the emperor was gravely ill, that Emperor Hirohito was, in fact, responsible for the last war echoed the opinion of many Japanese both in and north of Okinawa. To be sure, since Nagasaki was atom-bombed in the last war, it, too, had a special place in the war, which gave the Nagasaki Mayor license for his pronouncement. But, again, the difference between Nagasaki and other areas of Japan is like the difference between Okinawa and the rest of Japan. Nagasaki and Hiroshima suffered more intensely what all other Japanese experienced; hence the pronouncement of the Mayor of Nagasaki rang true for Japanese elsewhere. The issue of the emperor’s responsibility in the Second World War had been brewing under the surface until his death on 7 January 1989. Immediately the issue surfaced and was much debated in the media, indicating the extent to which the Japanese public had previously been equivocal about the subject. On the day of his funeral on 24 February the Japan Communist Party boycotted the funeral. Socialists did attend, but only after objecting to the lack of a clear separation between the state and religion in the funeral. Many groups held meetings throughout the country to voice their objections to the use of state funds for the funeral and to discuss the emperor’s role in the last war. These considerations make it clear that the imperial institution in Japan is not a clear and unequivocal symbol of national unity. Rather it contains a dangerously divisive element. Thus we cannot equate the role of the imperial institution in Japan with the role of royalty in England, Norway or Denmark. In Norway, in the last war, when the issue of surrendering to the Nazis was raised by the government, the king threatened to abdicate his position if the country surrendered. Hirohito did not suggest a similar threat to the military when it deliberated the possibility of starting a war. The ‘mistake’ of the last emperor of leading his people into war is deeply felt by many Japanese, and this feeling is in part expressed in the extent to which they have overwhelmingly defended the ‘peace
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constitution’, of which Article Nine renounces war. It is well known and now widely acknowledged in Japan that the constitution was drafted by General Douglas McArthur’s staff and was forced upon the Japanese. In spite of such infelicitous origins, the majority of Japanese are, none the less, willing to defend the constitution, above all defend Article Nine, even though ultra-conservatives would like to see constitutional revision to allow Japan to take up arms legitimately. While not all those who are against war directly link this belief to the role of the emperor in the last war, many are convinced that there is a link. The ‘national’ flag If the imperial institution is in jeopardy as a symbol of national identity and unity, so are the Japanese flag, the ‘national’ anthem and the ‘national’ emblem. It is as well to remember, in understanding the controversy over the ‘national’ flag and the ‘national’ anthem, that their legal status is in question (Anzu 1972). There is nothing in the current constitution or the postwar statute book which specifies and defines the official flag or the official song of the Japanese state. It is only by convention carried over from before the war that the flag with a round red centre and white background—commonly called Hinomaru—is regarded as the national flag and the song which begins ‘Kimi ga yo wa…’ the national anthem. This fact gives critics of the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo ammunition for fighting their use as official symbols. But the important point is that critics take advantage of this legal loophole because they are opposed to their use to begin with. Absence of consensus for the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, not their legal status, is at the bottom of the issue. Critics thus do not refer to Hinomaru as kokki (the national flag) nor Kimigayo as kokka (the national anthem). Before 16 August 1945 the Japanese flag was displayed on every occasion of national celebration, be it New Year’s Day, the emperor’s birthday or the Vernal Equinox. On these days, every house was required to display the Japanese flag, tied to a long bamboo post of about seven or eight feet. More importantly for our discussion, the flag was an integral part of the war effort. Whenever Japan won a war, be it the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 or the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5, the flag was displayed to celebrate victory. Closer to modern times, during the Pacific War, too, the flag was an indispensable symbol when celebrating Japan’s military victories, such as the fall of
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Nanking or the takeover of Shanghai. Flags were displayed in front of houses; in victory marches, small flags were held by each marcher. The flag was indispensable for seeing new military recruits off to war. On the day a recruit was to leave home, neighbours gathered in front of his house, where the Japanese flag was displayed. The recruit, the head of the neighbourhood association and other public officials made speeches, and all shouted banzai for the send-off, while waving smaller flags. After the Second World War, display of the national flag was restricted, though not totally banned by the Occupation. Even after the Occupation, however, displaying the flag was such an anathema that for many years it was seldom displayed even on major national holidays (Anzu 1972). Even now many Japanese hesitate to display it in front of their homes for fear of being misidentified as ultraright-wing conservatives. Businesses, too, shy away from using the national flag. The appropriateness of displaying the flag is still widely debated in the media, since the use of the national flag has become associated with reactionary politics and right-wing hooliganism. A 1989 manual issued by the Ministry of Education specifies that the flag be raised and the national anthem sung at the ceremony for new students and at graduation; on other occasions the Ministry leaves the matter up to the discretion of school administrators. The fact that the Ministry had to issue a directive urging the use of the national flag and national anthem is a comment on the controversial nature of their use in Japan. It points to the fact that not all schools had been displaying the flag on these occasions. It also indicates a lack of consensus on the part of school officials as to when to display the national flag and sing the national anthem. During the stormy anti-security treaty demonstrations of 1960 and the equally turbulent anti-establishment movement of the late 1960s, demonstrators used anything but the national flag as the symbol of their cause. At the annual ‘Spring Offensive’ labour demonstrations, huge, over-size red banners dominate the scene, and the national flag, if ever carried, is buried under them. Thus it is not a surprise that a Korean youth should ask Chung In-Wha (1987), a reporter writing for Shokun, ‘Why do Japanese demonstrators carry red flags but not the national flag?’ The aforementioned flag-burning incident in Okinawa should be seen in its full context (Shimojima 1988). Towards the end of the Second World War, the Japanese army built an air strip in the village of Yomitan, where the flag burning took place. When Allied
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Forces began to land on Okinawa, this village was not spared. Villagers, 139 in number, fled to a nearby valley known as Chibirigama; some 82 of them killed one another to escape capture by the enemy. It is a story so painful and gruesome to recall that everyone in the village wanted to obliterate it from memory, and they had, until the incident was unearthed by a writer from north of Okinawa (Shimojima 1984). The blame for this tragedy, as far as the villagers are concerned, has to be laid with the wartime Japanese authorities, including the emperor. After the war, the American occupation moved into the village and established military facilities, the removal of which became the prime political issue for the village. After their removal, an athletics field was constructed on the site. The wartime and the postwar experiences of Okinawans, including those of Yomitan village, are well expressed by their treatment of the Japanese flag. According to a 1985 government survey, only 6 per cent of middle schools and no high schools in Okinawa raised the Japanese flag at their graduation ceremony (Noda 1988:158). This led to the issuance of ‘administrative guidance’ by the Prefectural Board of Education, addressed to school principals, which read in part: We ask you to provide strong guidance to ensure that students deepen their understanding of the educational significance of the national flag and the national anthem and to take positive steps to raise the national flag and sing the national anthem at school events. (Sekai 1988) Only under such pressure, including sanctions against those not following the guidance, 70 per cent of schools in Okinawa, including Yomitan High School, raised the flag at their graduation ceremony in 1986. In the following year, however, one female student pulled down the flag during the ceremony in protest ‘against the symbol of aggression which began the Second World War’. What happens when teachers fight against this pressure from the top? In 1986 twenty high school teachers who opposed this forcible adoption of the flag and anthem were penalised. In their appeal, the teachers’ union argued that since the law does not specify a national flag or a national anthem, there is no legal basis on which to enforce their adoption. ‘This attempt at forced
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adoption aims to foster loyalty to the state; the danger is that it may lead to another war’, observed Noda, writing for Shokun (1988). In December 1986, the village assembly of Yomitan passed a resolution opposing the government’s attempt to force people to accept the Japanese flag and anthem. In February of the following year, a citizens’ group in the village collected signatures from more than half the voters for a similar resolution. In March, Mayor Yamauchi of the village made a public statement as follows: A brute force is now attacking the citizens of this prefecture. It is…the second coming of the ideology of loyalty and patriotism, which should have been negated under the new postwar constitution. This is a return to the pre-war situation. Forty-two years have elapsed since the end of the war without the Japanese government apologising for or repenting their aggression towards Asian countries. In the meantime the government has ignored the issue of the responsibility for the war raised by the people, and has not taken steps with regard to legislation on the national flag and the national anthem. Moreover the government, without repenting the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, is forcing schools to adopt them through the procedure of ‘administrative guidance’. This is most regrettable. I am concerned about the dreadful results of administrative authority controlling fundamental human rights. (Noda 1988) When Yomitan was selected as the site of the softball game for the National Athletic Meeting in 1987, it was natural that the village assembly voted not to sing the national anthem and not to raise the Japanese flag for the occasion. But only four days before the event, the Softball Association president threatened to move the site of the game if the village did not agree to raise the flag. This was seen by many local residents as a clear attempt to take advantage of a sports event for political indoctrination. Chibana’s flag burning thus was not an isolated act carried out by an estranged villager. Instead, it expressed the widespread feeling not only of his fellow villagers, but of a large number of Okinawans and Japanese north of Okinawa. Burning a national flag is sacrilege;
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for that very reason, flag burning is a powerful means of communicating strong emotions of protest. In 1988, the flag issue continued to plague schools in Okinawa. At Urazoe Industrial High School, only about half of the graduating seniors rose to their feet when the flag was raised. At Nakanishi Middle School, graduating seniors initially boycotted the ceremony because the flag was being displayed. In short, in the absence of a national consensus on the use of national symbols, be it the emperor, the national flag, or the national anthem, the government is imposing nationalism upon students by forcing school officials to ‘demonstrate nationalism’ even though some may not be prepared to do so. The ‘national’ anthem Both the national anthem and the national emblem are integrally tied to the imperial institution. Herein lies the problem. The national anthem, which starts with the phrase ‘Kimi ga yo wa…’, celebrates the eternal existence of the imperial line. In 1989 the Ministry of Education issued an instructor’s manual which specified the term kimi, which has several dictionary meanings, including ‘you’ and ‘emperor’, to mean ‘the emperor’. The Ministry thus made explicit the imperial reference of the national anthem. According to Ministry guidelines, the national anthem ‘is a song which wishes our nation to prosper’. Here, ‘our nation’ and the emperor are treated synonymously. Professor Yamazumi Masaki of the Tokyo Metropolitan University, a critic of the mandatory use of the national flag and the national anthem, argues that students should be taught how the anthem was exploited before and during the last war (Yamazumi 1989). Given the above background, it is not surprising that in Okinawa Kimigayo is not welcome. Even after administrative guidance to show respect to the national anthem, half of the graduating students at Urazoe Industrial High School remained seated, instead of standing as expected, when Kimigayo was broadcast at the graduation ceremony in 1988. (Had the school abandoned any attempt to have students themselves sing Kimigayo?) According to a survey by the Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education, only at 3.4 per cent of elementary schools and 7.8 per cent of middle schools was Kimigayo sung at graduation ceremonies in 1988. At
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high school level, at only two schools was Kimigayo used at graduation and only taped recordings at that (Sekai 1988). What is noticeable here is that the percentage of schools adopting Kimigayo is much lower than that adopting Hinomaru. For example, 100 per cent of elementary schools adopted the use of the flag at graduation ceremonies in 1988, whereas Kimigayo was sung at only 3.4 per cent of these schools. The reasons why percentages are significantly lower for singing Kimigayo than for raising the Japanese flag are not hard to find. For one, singing requires active participation by students, whereas one need only passively observe a flag being raised. Students seem to be willing to be bystanders of nationalism, or at least prepared to tolerate it, but not to be active participants in it. For another reason, the narrative meaning of the flag—what the red and white colours signify—is rather muted. On the other hand, Kimigayo, of course, clearly informs singers in its verses of the centrality of the emperor for the Japanese nation. Resistance to actively singing a song whose words remind singers of hateful and dreadful wartime experiences is naturally higher than to passively observing a symbol whose meaning is hidden behind red and white colours. The ‘national’ emblem As the imperial institution is tainted, the national emblem, too, is necessarily implicated. For the national emblem—a stylised chrysanthemum flower—is the emblem of the imperial family. However, the burden of a simple emblem is certainly not as weighty as the person of the emperor or the imperial institution. Not much use is made of it in postwar Japan; and it creates little fuss. During the war, however, kiku no gomon, as the imperial emblem is called, was embossed on rifles issued to soldiers as a reminder that they belonged to the emperor and that soldiers were entrusted with them to fight in his name. It was also printed on the wrapper of cigarettes that soldiers received from time to time as a reward for fighting the imperial war. Such uses, of course, enhance the association of the emblem with war and serve as an unpleasant reminder. It is somewhat of a surprise, therefore, to find this emblem on the cover of the passport which every Japanese citizen travelling abroad carries. Do they no longer associate the emblem with the emperor? Or, if they do, do they not care?
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National monuments The use of national monuments, such as tombs of unknown soldiers, serves to create and reinforce patriotism. Although Japan does have such a tomb, like the soldiers entombed therein it is virtually unknown to the public. Much better known—in fact universally known in Japan—are Yasukuni jinja in Tokyo and the Gokoku jinja distributed throughout the country. The former enshrines the souls of all soldiers who died for the country in wars since around the Meiji Restoration, while the latter are for soldiers from the local provinces who so died. Yasukuni, of course, is of national significance whereas Gokoku jinja are only of local import. Until the end of the last war, Yasukuni jinja played a pivotal role in bolstering patriotism (Sugiyama 1986). It is of critical importance for us that the only significant criterion for being enshrined at Yasukuni is ‘to die in war for the emperor’. At present 2,453,199 souls are enshrined there (Oe 1984). Because Shintoism is a unique, indigenous religion, it was convenient for the Japanese government to exploit it for defining Japan’s national identity, as was done before and during the war. Elevating Shintoism from folk belief to state religion, and setting up the emperor as its centre piece, the Japanese state managed to create a unique religious basis for its nationalism. Yasukuni was easily integrated into the state Shinto theology, where the war dead became Shinto gods and spiritual protectors of the nation. Nationalism and militaristic jingoism thus became one in Yasukuni. Whereas the tombs of unknown soldiers in western countries are not explicitly religious, the Shinto character of Yasukuni renders a ready aura of sacredness. This religious basis made it convenient for drumming up patriotism, since patriotism —and nationalism, for that matter—is a form of civil religion (Hiro and Yamamoto 1986). Until the end of the war, Yasukuni and most other major Shinto shrines were supported by the state, and they in turn aided the state by supporting the nationalistic and imperial efforts of the country. After the Second World War, due to the constitutional separation of the state and religion, Yasukuni became a private religious corporation (National Diet Library, Research and Legislative Reference Department 1976). The problematic nature of Yasukuni lies in the fact that in spite of the constitutional requirement for total
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separation of state and religion, the conservative government wishes to use Yasukuni for its political goals, as was done before and during the last war (Eto and Kobori 1986; Kogawa 1988). Precisely because, however, Yasukuni Shrine memorialises and commemorates, nay even celebrates, those who died not only in war but for the cause of wars Japan fought—including the war criminals who were tried in the Tokyo war tribunal and hanged for ‘their crime against humanity’ —this shrine is problematic and controversial as a symbol of national unity. In fact, it is so problematic that every year as 15 August—the anniversary of the end of the last war when memorial services for the war dead are held—approaches, public debate is held (as surely as the return of the summer heat) as to whether high government officials—the prime minister and his cabinet members—would or should visit Yasukuni Shrine (Kamiya 1987). It was Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru who, in October 1951, first visited Yasukuni as prime minister. His visit to Yasukuni was followed by succeeding prime ministers. No public debate ensued from their visits in these early years, possibly because they were not associated with any public event, such as the 15 August memorial for the war dead. On 15 August 1975, Prime Minister Miki visited Yasukuni ‘as a private citizen’. Since then virtually all prime ministers have done the same until Nakasone made his visit ‘in his public capacity’. In 1989 Prime Minister Kaifu decided not to visit Yasukuni on the occasion of the Memorial Day, ‘for personal reasons’; but the media speculated that this decision was in deference to China and Southeast Asian nations, who suffered through Japanese invasion and occupation during the Second World War and whose resentment towards Japan for its military role in the Pacific War is still strong. Sixteen out of the twenty cabinet members, however, visited the Yasukuni Shrine, fourteen of them ‘as private citizens’, in order to avoid the constitutional issue of the separation of the state and religion. Two ministers, however, were sufficiently hawkish to announce that their visits to Yasukuni were in the capacity of public officials. Objections to government officials’ visits to Yasukuni have been raised by many sectors of society, but in particular they have come from one most unexpected corner. On 15 August 1988, on the anniversary of the end of the Second World War, over a hundred relatives of the war dead enshrined at Yasukuni, organised by the National Alliance for Peace of Relatives of War Dead (Heiwa Izoku-
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kai Zenkoku Renraku-kai), marched in Tokyo with the slogan, ‘Don’t glorify war; Stop official visits to Yasukuni Shrine’. Even right-wing ultra-conservatives riding around in vans blaring out the national anthem were, according to newspapers, respectful of these marchers. In addition to the objections on constitutional basis, visits of government officials to Yasukuni are also opposed, as we saw, by Japan’s neighbours, who were victims of the last war. They, particularly China, see government officials’ visits to Yasukuni as Japan’s attempt to legitimate the war and acts done in the name of the war by the Japanese military, such as the Nanking Massacre. It is probably because of this problematic nature of Yasukuni that no foreign head of state ever visits it, whereas visits to the tombs of unknown soldiers in other countries are regularly scheduled events and a way of paying respect to the country visited. Thus three issues overlay one another with respect to Yasukuni Shrine. First, there is the popular disdain of Yasukuni as a symbol of the patriotism which led Japan to disaster and as a means to legitimate an illegitimate war. Second, there is the issue of the constitutional separation of religion and the state, which is covertly and overtly violated by government high officials visiting the shrine. Third, there is the delicate question of international politics, where Japan’s Asian neighbours who suffered untold sufferings in the last war watch with the eyes of a hawk for any signs of a resurgence of militarism in Japan (Futaba and Umehara 1976). Public rituals Public rituals are an effective means of fostering and bolstering nationalism. Every nation takes advantage of seasonal or cyclical rituals for this purpose. National rituals are important for calling forth a sense of belonging to a nation and oneness with the state. The coronation of a king or a queen (Cannadine 1983) is an obvious example of an occasion when a whole nation is expected to participate in the celebration of a national rite of passage. In the United States, the presidential inauguration, which takes place every four years, rivals a coronation if only in the amount of money spent. Anzac Day in Australia (Kapferer 1988), Remembrance Day and Independence Day in Israel (Handelman 1990) are also examples of rituals of national and nationalistic import.
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We saw above how the school graduation ceremony is being used by the Japanese government to promote patriotism, loyalty and nationalism through the forced adoption of the Japanese flag and the national anthem. As this case illustrates, in Japan, as long as state rituals are associated with the imperial institution, they create problems, are divisive and provoke anxiety. A good example is the funeral of the last emperor. As the visit by government officials to Yasukuni Shrine illustrates, debate about the appropriateness of Emperor Showa’s funeral is often couched in terms of the constitutional separation of the state and religion (Sasagawa 1989). In short, controversy was concerned with whether or not the funeral, which involved Shinto rites, could be sponsored by the government. As a result of this controversy, the funeral was divided into two parts, the first half being state-sponsored and entirely secular, and the second half involving Shinto rites and funded by the imperial household’s own budget. This government concession turned out to be pure tatemae, and only thinly disguised Shinto involvement in the funeral, for the two parts were indivisible, and all participants had to attend both. Members of the Japan Socialist Party, who wished to attend only the secular part, eventually had to attend from the beginning to the end. As for the coronation of the new emperor, citizens groups raised objections to the ceremony, held in November 1990. The National Conference to Guard against the Erosion of Separation of the State and Religion (Seikyo Bunri no Shingai o Kanshi suru Zenkoku Kaigi) passed a resolution objecting to the coronation and began signature drives in September 1989 to present to the parliament. While the issue in terms of tatemae is the constitutional requirement of separation of the state and religion, as a honne agenda, these groups are attempting to limit the role of the imperial institution in fostering a nationalistic and patriotic spirit in Japan.
CONCLUSION All these cases, whether it be Emperor Showa’s funeral, Emperor Akihito’s coronation, or government officials’ visits to Yasukuni, point to the equivocal and controversial nature of major national symbols and institutions for integrating the nation and defining the national identity.
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Japan lacks physical symbols of strong emotive content which unequivocally unify the country and are accepted universally. All the major symbols discussed inhere divisiveness. Problems arise with these symbols because what is symbolised by them is the legitimacy of war which Japanese reject and moreover renounce in their constitution. What they reject and renounce are the possibility of turning Japan into a battlefield and dying in the name of the emperor and the state, as well as the possibility of causing war either at home or abroad. Since all the major symbols of the nation are ‘tainted’ in this respect, and are deeply implicated in having legitimated the war efforts which most Japanese now reject, it is difficult to use these symbols as a means of unifying the country and calling forth people’s patriotism. Indeed, these symbols have the potential to cause the opposite effect of turning people against the state. It is in the absence of major symbols which can serve to define cultural identity, express national unity and demonstrate national pride that Nihonjinron comes in as a convenient substitute. Nihonjinron is not suggested here as a 100 per cent functional substitute, since Nihonjinron, as a discourse, lacks the strong emotional content which the national flag and other physical symbols have. Let us examine the relationship between the discourse of nationalism and national symbols, which form a continuum in terms of the amount of narrative content on the one hand and emotional content on the other. These two variables are negatively correlated. At one end are symbols with a minimum of descriptive or discursive contents, such as the flag; at the other end is the Nihonjinron literature, which defines in discourse national and cultural identity. Somewhere in the middle are national symbols with some discursive elements, such as the national anthem which in a few terse lines tries to inform of the distilled essence of nationalism. Rituals, though usually lacking in extensive narrative content, do provide some descriptive meaning in the speeches which usually go with them. Nihonjinron is strong precisely where symbols are weak, namely it gives explicit explanation as to what national identity consists of and why one should be proud of one’s nation. In so far as emotional commitment and hortative content are concerned, physical symbols, monuments and rituals are as strong as discourses are weak. They conjure up emotional identification with the nation and motivate citizens to be patriotic with few words or without words at all. Some discourses of nationalism, such as
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Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Mao’s Red Book, or Kokutai no Hongi can bring out emotion; but most of them lack the powerfully emotional force which symbolic forms of nationalism have. In the absence of major national and nationalistic symbols which unequivocally unify the Japanese nation, Nihonjinron, as a discourse on nationalism, can substitute to the extent that these symbols have discursive functions, both descriptive and hortative, and to the extent that Nihonjinron can arouse readers emotionally as physical symbols do. It is, in part, in this relative symbolic vacuum that Nihonjinron has entered the arena of nationalism as a means of defining Japan’s new identity, unblemished by past symbols. The convenience of Nihonjinron is that its contents can be readily altered. The Nihonjinron of the war years is not the same as that of the 1980s. Its contents have been altered. Yet discursive means of national identification live on, and have gained an importance they never had before. Flexibility allows different contents to be put into the discourse. In the history of Nihonjinron, from time to time, contents differed radically. In fact, they have turned around completely since the last war. The wartime Nihonjinron was, needless to say, dominated by state-sponsored, emperor-centered ideology, illustrated by the aforementioned Kokutai no Hongi drafted by the Ministry of Education. The postwar Nihonjinron, while still discoursing on Japan’s uniqueness, totally obliterated the imperial institution from its literature. This flexibility is absent in physical symbols. No doubt symbols need to be interpreted and can be given new meaning, and this is done discursively. However, interpretation of a flag or a monument cannot vary a great deal. It remains within fairly narrowly prescribed parameters, within which history can assign different meaning at different times. Moreover, even if the meaning is altered, the mental association of specific physical symbols with the past cannot be erased. This ‘substitution’ of nationalistic symbols with Nihonjinron in effect, while rejecting the ideology directly related to war, allows continuity of nationalistic ideology. What is common to the wartime Nihonjinron and the postwar neo-Nihonjinron is that both rely heavily on primordial sentiments inherent in the presumed ‘ethnic essence’ of the Japanese—blood, purity of race, language, mystique— which are the basic ‘stuff’ of Nihonjinron, pre- and post-war. For example, the idea of the Japanese people being homogeneous and
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Japanese culture being pure and unique was the very basis of the wartime nationalistic ideology, and is repeated in the post-war Nihonjinron. There are more concrete carryovers in the content of Nihonjinron from the wartime. For example, the familial basis of the society, argued by Murakami, Kumon and Sato (1979), in the postwar neoNihonjinron mirrors the wartime argument, with the emperor as the father figure of a nation conceived as a family, as Kawashima (1950, 1957) demonstrates so persuasively. The notion that Japanese spiritualism can win over western material-ism, used as propaganda during the last war to cover up for the paucity of war materials, is very much alive now. The notion that Japan is the best nation in the world, now prominently argued by ideologues of Nihonjinron, was, of course, part and parcel of the wartime Nihonjinron. What contemporary Nihonjinron basically does is to strip wartime Nihonjinron of its imperial elements, and re-dress it in a language which is devoid of war and militarism. This ‘symbolic vacuum’ hypothesis is not a complete and adequate explanation for the current popularity of Nihonjinron. I have discussed other reasons elsewhere (Befu 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987). Nor am I arguing that Nihonjinron entirely or adequately replaces symbols of nationalism in Japan. But much of the popularity of Nihonjinron can be explained by the fact that Japan is groping for more adequate, unifying symbols.
REFERENCES Anzu Motohiko (1972) Kokki no Rekishi [History of the National Flag], Tokyo: Ofusha. Befu Harumi (1980) ‘The group model of Japanese society: a critique’, Social Analysis, No. 5/6 (special issue: Japanese Society: Reappraisals and New Directions): 29–49. —— (1983) ‘Internationalization of Japan and Nihon bunkaron’, in Mannari Hiroshi and Harumi Befu (eds) The Challenge of Japan’s Internationalization: Organization and Culture, Nishinomiya and Tokyo: Kwansei Gakuin University and Kodansha International: 232–66. —— (1984) ‘Civilization and culture: Japan in search of identity’, Senri Ethnological Studies, No. 16 (special issue: Japanese civilization in the modern world: life and society, (eds) Umesao T., H.Befu and J.Kreiner): 59–75. —— (1987) Ideorogii to shite no Nihon Bunkaron [Nihonjinron as Ideology], Tokyo: Shiso no Kagakusha.
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Benedict, Ruth (1946) The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Cannadine, David (1983) ‘The context, performance and meaning of ritual: The British monarchy and the “invention of tradition”, c. 1820–1977’ in Eric J.Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 101–64. Chung In-Wha (1987) ‘Soru no Atsui Natsu’ [A Hot Summer in Seoul], Shokun (September issue): 104–11. Eto Jun and Kobori Keichiro (eds) (1986) Yasukuni Ronshu [Essays on Yasukuni] Tokyo: Nihon Kyobunsha. Fujitani Takashi (1988) Japan’s Modern National Ceremonies: A Historical Ethnography, 1868–1912. Doctoral dissertation (History). Berkeley: University of California. Futaba Kenko and Umehara Masaki (eds) (1976) Tennosei to Yasukuni [The Emperor System and Yasukuni], Tokyo: Gendai Shokan. Handelman, Don (1990) Models and Mirrors: Towards an Anthropology of Public Events, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hiro Sachiya and Yamamoto Shichihei (1986) ‘Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese Spirit World’, Japan Echo, Vol. XIII, No. 2: 73–80. Kamiya Antonio (1987) ‘Nationalism: Is Japan Turning to Right?’, Intersect, Vol. 3, No. 2: 6–7, 10–11. Kapferer, Bruce (1988) Legends of People, Myths of State, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution. Kato Shuichi (1976) Nihonjin to wa Nanika [Who are the Japanese People?], Tokyo: Kodansha. Kawashima Takenori (1950) Nihon Shakai no Kazoku-teki Kosei [The Familistic Structure of Japanese Society], Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha. —— (1957) Ideorogii to shite no Kazoku Seido [The Family System as an Ideology], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Kogawa Tetsuo (1988) ‘Gaiatsu Seiji no Tasogare to Yasukuni’ [Dusk in pressure politics and Yasukuni], Sekai, October: 316–21. Murakami Yasusuke, Kumon Shunpei and Sato Seizaburo (1979) Bunmei to shite no Ie Shakai [Ie Society as a Civilization], Tokyo: Chuokoron sha. National Diet Library . Research and Legislative Reference Department (1976) Yasukuni Jinja Mondai Shiryoshu [Materials on the Yasukuni Shrine problem], Tokyo: National Diet Library. Noda Masaaki (1988) ‘Kanashii Shocho—Okinawa to Hinomaru’ [A sad symbol—Okinawa and the Japanese flag], Shokun, March: 252–76. Oe Shinobu (1984) Yasukuni Jinja [Yasukuni Shrine], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Sasagawa Norikatsu (1989) ‘Gikai-sei Minshu Shugi to Shocho Tennosei’ [Parliamentary democracy and the symbolic emperor system], Sekai, January: 131–41. Sekai (1988) ‘Hinomaru “100%” no naka de’ [In the midst of 100% flag raising], Sekai, May: 208–9. Shimojima Tetsuro (1984) Painukaji no Fuku Hi—Okinawa Yomitan Mura Shudan Jiketsu [The day southerly wind blows—Mass suicide in Yomitan Village, Okinawa], Tokyo: Doshinsha.
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—— (1988) ‘Sanju-Hachi-Nen-Kan Bokura wa Nani o Shiteita no daro— “Hinomaru Yakisute Jiken” no Oku ni aru Mono’ [For 38 years what have we been doing? What is behind the ‘Japanese flag-burning incident’], Shokun, March: 241–51. Sugiyama Kyoshiro (1986) ‘Facts and Fallacies about Yasukuni Shrine’, Japan Echo, Vol. XIII, No. 2: 69–72. Yamazumi Masaki (1989) Asahi Shinbun, 8 June, US satellite edition.
Chapter 3
Rivers in Tokyo A mesological glimpse Augustin Berque
INTRODUCTION The theme of amenity—mainly embodied as urban amenities— will probably remain as a major ideological trend of the present fin de siècle in Japan, together with post-modernism. Both trends have in common a hedonistic exaltation of the senses. This is quite extraneous to instrumental rationality (Zweckrational) and the teleology of profit, which have dominated the evolution of Japanese cities since the High Growth era. Yet the question here is not to augur whether beauty and pleasure will take precedence over efficiency and benefit in Japanese town planning in the next millenium. What is at stake is the conceptual problem which amenity poses, in that it cannot be reduced to either a mere object or a mere subjective representation. Amenities are both material equipment and ways of perceiving this equipment. These two aspects are integrated, in reality, by dint of certain practices, which are proper to a given milieu, that is, historically and geographically defined. But the fact is that such integration proves quite often rebellious to modern analytical means (including both instrumental and conceptual ones), in as much as these means are based on the touchstone of modernity: the distinction between subject and object. Hence arises a disassociation between the approach of the engineer and that of the artist, the result of which is a juxtaposition or superposition of heterogeneous urban elements (e.g. a functional expressway stepping over a decorated Nihonbashi).
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It is here advocated that the amenity of a city cannot be properly dealt with if one does not conceive it in terms of mesological rationality. Such a rationality would acknowledge the ambivalence of any milieu—milieu being defined as the relationship of a society with space and nature—and, more precisely, the ambivalence of the sense of any milieu; a sense both physical and phenomenal, ecological and symbolical, which I have proposed to call mediance (Berque 1986). Mediance is both the objective tendency (the evolutional trend of a milieu), the sensus communis (overlapping the distinction between individual and group, mind and body, object and subject) and the subjective significance which are proper to a given milieu. Needless to say, such views could not have developed if not in the wake of concepts like Stimmung (Simmel 1913), ‘the social construction of reality’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966), habitus (Bourdieu 1980), and some other conceptions broadly related to phenomenology. But it must be added that mesology (understood as the study of milieux) is, by definition, more concerned with ecological facts than is ordinarily the case in such conceptions (which mainly deal with social and psychological facts). In this perspective, reality is not only a social construct, it is a medial construct: that is, something which arises from the interrelationship of culture and nature. The following is an attempt to show the mesological rationale of some urban realities in present-day Tokyo.
THE NATURAL AND THE ARTIFICIAL The Maison Franco-Japonaise (Nichi-Futsu Kaikan), at the top of the knoll of Surugadai, overlooks Kanda-gawa from a ground height of about 100 feet. The river flows at the bottom of a winding gorge, which, near Ochanomizu Bridge, bears the literary name of Meikei— the Vale of Tea—a double allusion to a classical Chinese landscape and to an episode of Shogun Hidetada’s reign (1605–23). The northern side of the gorge is afforested with various species of trees, and shrills all summer through with the chirrups of cicadas. Maples in autumn, tangerine trees in winter, cherry trees and rape for the springtime…the whole cycle of natural seasons is here more than represented: it is made sensible, and even pressing. Does not the river (kawa), to begin with, embody this presence of nature in the heart of
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the city? Of what use would it be, after all, to remind people that almost everything here is owed to the work of man—the groves (which were planted), the gorge (which was dug out at the beginning of Edo era), the river (which in spite of its name, Kanda-gawa, is but a canal which diverted the ancient Hirakawa)? As a matter of fact, this constructed nature does not only appear as natural to the eyes of the townspeople, that is on the plane of representations; it is also to some degree natural on an ecological plane, as a biotope, which, year after year, reconstitutes itself here and the spontaneity of which is vigorously asserted by the cicadas. Thus, at Ochanomizu, history reestablished nature and culture into a consubstantial relationship which man had only momentarily severed. An always moving relationship indeed, for the tension between its two terms never vanishes. Have the nuisances of the city polluted the Kanda, the rank and opaque waters of which do not sustain any other traffic than, from time to time, a rubbish barge? This ecological and economical distress is more than compensated by the romantic image which Minami Kosetsu’s hit song, Kanda-gawa, instituted in the early seventies. And this image is no decoy: it has, among hundreds of other factors, induced the present vogue of river amenities, and consequently a series of measures for making rivers healthier and more attractive, which have already borne quite appreciable ecological and aesthetic results. This is typically a mesological phenomenon: a spiral relationship in which metaphor and causality, the mythical and the physical, feed each other. For all that, is nature reduced to a mere ingredient in a process which would, anyway, be dominated in the last analysis by man’s action and passions? This would be too easily said. Society (at this juncture, the technical services of Tokyo municipal government) must in fact assign considerable means to the prevention of flood hazards, the potential scale of which is continuously rising because of ground impermeabilisation1 (which increases overland flow rates and consequently makes floods more sudden and more violent) and because of the building of houses in flood plains (which were traditionally avoided by human settlements). In both cases, the prime cause is indeed urbanisation, that is man’s action. But this action has released natural processes of an unexpected scale, in the face of which the countermeasures of society always remain one stage behind. For instance, a huge underground outlet is presently being bored under the northern side of Ochanomizu
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gorge. This will considerably alleviate upstream flood hazards. But if, technically speaking, such equipment is no problem for the present society, from the point of view of the budget, they are so unwieldy as to be constantly belated or reduced in size, which entails a chronic insufficiency when confronting an occasional outburst of natural forces. This example shows that it is society’s incapacity to control itself (that is to say, to regulate urbanisation) which prevents it from controlling nature. Thus is perpetuated the creative tension which, between the two theoretical poles of nature and culture, makes milieux historically evolve. The fact that, physically, nature is ceaselessly being transformed by man and thus, in principle, receding in front of culture, does not in the least belittle the fact that, mesologically, nature and culture indefinitely recompose each other into a new equilibrium.
SIGNIFICATION AND SENSE This perpetual recomposition implies two things. One is that—as we have just had a glimpse of—that which has been built by culture tends to return to nature in one way or another: through the inveterate nature of habits, the release of new natural processes, the regeneration of secondary biotopes, and so on. The other is that, on the plane of significance, society strives to retrieve nature through culture itself, that is by way of various representations of nature. From a medial point of view, such representations involve the risk of developing into self-sufficient rhetorical constructs, aloof and astray from any ecological or even technical sense; the result of which is an impairing of mediance—exactly the opposite of what environmental design should be seeking. The rivers of Tokyo show many instances of such a risk. This is the case of Kanda-gawa in its middle course, where it runs along the scarp of Mejiro-dai. The scarp has been designed into a park, Edogawa koen. This park bears witness to the well-known Japanese mastery of garden art, both in its formal composition and in the numerous historical allusions which refer this composition to the past of the city. An artificial brooklet evokes an ancient outlet of the river Kanda Josui which, among others, irrigated the famous garden Korakuen. Several placards copiously detail these historical memories. In short, diverse languages concur here in giving to the
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park an explicit significance, that of taking root in nature and history. But, in fact, this rhetoric is severed from the local mediance on two planes. First, a technical and hydrological plane: the Kanda, owing to flood prevention works, flows here at the bottom of a trench with vertical concrete walls nearly 30 feet high. Second, a socio-cultural plane: the park bears no relationship to an old sanctuary dedicated to the god of water, Sui-jinja, which was built there in Matsuo Basho’s time, when Kanda Josui was dug. The shrine and its remarkable site are neglected, and their approach is disfigured by some shanties and a small car park. Owing to this double discrepancy (both ecological and symbolical), the designers of Edogawa koen did not only fail to vivify the genius loci; their studied rhetoric only makes more evident a fundamental loss of sense—a mistranslation of mediance, as it were. It would not have been impossible, though, to find some ways to restore the link which had been lost, here, between the river and the city through something like a stepped bank. Further upstream, in Suginami ward, the Kanda shows another instance of this kind of disassociation. A double promenade has been designed, one on each side of the river: two asphalted tracks, with a metal guard rail to the waterside (or, more exactly, to the side of the concrete trench at the bottom of which runs the indigent low-water flow of the Kanda).2 This design only makes more tangible the mesological disparagement which has here disjoined technical constraints (that is the function of evacuating floods, which has imposed overdigging and facing the riverbed with concrete walls and base) from traditional representations and uses of the river. As a matter of fact, the disassociation—the loss of mediance—is less pronounced where such promenades have not been designed: houses and small gardens directly edge the river, and from place to place a futon aired on a balcony, or a branch of tangerine encroaching on the river wall, maintain between the city and the river a sensible continuity—which the aforementioned promenades, contrary to their explicit purpose, have served only to undo a little more. Be the matter technical, or aesthetical, or ecological, or related to any other of the multiple dimensions of a milieu, the first condition for making the most of a local mediance is to abstract as little as possible from its context the dimension one is working on; that is, to keep it in a certain relationship with the other dimensions of the concerned milieu. As the example of Edogawa koen suggested, this
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condition is particularly necessary when environmental design aims precisely at giving sense to a place; for, in such matters, there is nothing more insignificant than a significance not underlain with a certain emotion of the senses and, beyond, with a certain ecological functionality.
GARDENS AND LANDSCAPES Here arises another problem: to prevent environmental design degenerating into a purely formal game is one thing; but is not play, indeed, an outstanding means—for the child as well as for young animals—for learning the functions which are necessary to life, while sparing the substance of these functions, that is by simulating only their appearance? We also know the rising importance of simulation in our technological civilisation, be it for learning how to pilot a plane or for designing a road. Hence the following question: what happens to the sense of milieu, with its landscape expressions, when one crosses this technological tendency with the Japanese tradition of garden making, especially the tradition of mitate (landscape allusion, evocation of famous sceneries)? May we consider that in such case a formal elaboration (the garden) not only establishes the matrices of a virtual substance (nature) but, to some degree, even gives rise to this substance? From a positivistic point of view, such an eventuality cannot but be discarded as magic. From a mesological point of view, we have to understand how temporal forms (rituals, habits…) can commute into spatial forms (objects, environment…) and vice versa, as far as a given mediance establishes regular commutative patterns between the phenomenal matrices and the physical imprints of a landscape (i.e. regular sets of metonymies and metaphors between the material and immaterial traits of this landscape) (Berque 1987a; 1987b). One can, for example, raise such a question when seeing how Shakujii-gawa has been designed near Otonashibashi. The real course of the river has been diverted underground, leaving vacant the former riverbed, which has been arranged into the shape of a brooklet: half for dabbling in as in a real stream; half for appreciating various ancient-style decors (a bridge, a little boat, a tiny mill), like a fake river in a real garden. In front of such scenery, one may also think that everything here smacks of simulacrum and regret that it was not, rather, the real Shakujiigawa which had been more soberly and
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more ecologically reshaped. One may also think, when seeing swarms of children playing and splashing around here, that they are better than in front of the video. And lastly, one can reckon that they acquire in that way the aesthetic schemata which, all their life long, will make them feel for nature and be satisfied with it, where the stranger, formed after other matrices, will only long after the ‘true’ nature. Be that as it may, the first character of such an environmental design is its limitation. What is at hand is a garden, not a landscape. Landscaping the rivers of Tokyo, particularly the Sumida (which was once to Edo what the Seine is to Paris), is a demiurgic task, considering the sordid state into which it has degenerated from an aesthetical and ecological point of view. The Sumida cannot generally be seen from its banks, due to the concrete walls which have been built to provide against storm tides. Indeed it does not stink so violently as it used to do in the sixties, but its water is still far from alluring, either to the fish or to the promenader’s reverie. Seen from a boat it is but a dismal channel between two walls. Some beautifying is now being done, which endeavours to replace these walls with lower quays or more gently sloping levees, furnished with grass and reeds. For the moment, only a little part of the riverside (the approaches of Sakurabashi) has been reshaped that way. Several decades at least will be necessary for landscaping the whole course, because real estate structures—private property reaches the brink of the water —make it very difficult to acquire the land which is necessary for replacing ‘razor dikes’ (vertical concrete walls) with ‘superdikes’ (sloping levees, which take much more room). Here again, it is because society does not conveniently manage one of its institutions (the system of land tenure) that the city is abstracted from nature, or, in other words, that the separation between culture and nature which the razor dikes (among other factors) had produced is perpetuated, notwithstanding that these walls do not protect the city from natural hazards as well as large levees would. This example suggests, a contrario, that caring for mediance might be a wiser form of reason, on the whole, than the prevailing economic and instrumental rationality.3
NOTES 1
Due to the extension of roofs, roads, etc. which replace natural permeable ground.
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The insufficiency of the flow in low water is also due to urbanisation: soil impermeabilisation and underground conduits prevent ground water from being normally supplied. The fieldwork from which this chapter originates was done during the three year cooperative programme (1986–8) of which I was in charge at the Maison Franco-Japonaise, ‘La qualité de l’environnement urbain au Japan’. Other results and a synthesis of the programme have been published in A.Berque (ed.) (1987c).
REFERENCES AMR (Amenity Meeting Room) (1984) Amenity o kangaeru (Thinking about Amenity), Tokyo: Miraisha. Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas (1966) The Social Construction of Reality (French transl.: La Construction sociale de la réalité, Paris: Méridiens). Berque, Augustin (1986) Le Sauvage et l’artifice. Les Japonais devant la nature, Gallimard, Paris (Japanese transl.: Fudo no Nihon, Chikuma, Tokyo, 1988). —— (ed.) (1987a) ‘Milieu et motivation paysagère’, L’Espace géographique, XVI: 241–50. —— (ed.) (1987b) La Qualité de la Ville. Urbanité francaise, urbanité nippone. Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonaise. —— (ed.) (1987c) La Maîtraise de la Ville. Urbanité francaise, urbanité nippone, II. Paris: Editions de L’Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales. Bourdieu, Pierre (1980) Le Sens pratique, Paris: Ed. de Minuit. Nihon Toshi Keikaku Gakkai (1987) Amenity toshi e no michi (The Road towards Amenity Cities), Tokyo: Gyosei. Simmel, Georg (1913) Philosophie der Landschaft, in: Das Individuum und die Freiheit, Wagenbach, Berlin 1 984: 130–9. Takahashi Yutaka (1988) Toshi to mizu (City and Water), Tokyo: Iwanami.
Chapter 4
Individualism and individuality Entry into a social world1 Joy Hendry
INTRODUCTION Individualism and individuality are notions sugared with a heady dose of western ‘freedom’ in a Japanese view. Alone, and without further modification, they probably stand for more ideology than any other western concepts which have been introduced into Japanese ways of thinking. Opposed to allegedly Japanese notions of ‘groupism’ and ‘collectivity’, they have been evoked to explain all manner of differences between ‘the Japanese’ and a wide variety of western peoples, often enough presented as virtually indistinguishable from each other. In recent years, attempts are being made in the rhetoric of educational reform to introduce more opportunities for Japanese children to develop their individual qualities, partly as a response to western criticism of the Japanese system, although the extent to which such words will bring about practical change is far from clear. This chapter will attempt to disentangle some of the rhetoric and practical application of notions of individualism and collectivity, both in Japan and, more briefly, elsewhere. It will examine in some detail the stage in the Japanese life cycle when such notions are formed, cognitively if not linguistically, and it will try to place the findings in a context of wider anthropological theory which should help to break down Japanese/western dichotomies. I hope to show that much of the ideology is based on fairly fundamental misinterpretations of the concepts under consideration, both by Japanese of the western notions, and by western commentators of the Japanese situation.
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In part, the exercise is a plea for a move away from the oversimple classification of Japanese society, as, for example, collectivistic, as opposed to individualistic; or a ‘consensus’ society, giving rise to ‘consensus studies’, which emphasise the high value attached to achieving a consensus for a decision, as opposed to ‘conflict studies’, which in reaction turn their attention to examples of discord.2 In any society, there will be both ways to express conflict and ways of dealing with it (cf. Roberts 1979). The argument will emphasise that in any society, too, there are constraints, and areas of freedom and choice, whichever of these is presented as the ideal. In other words, it will argue not only for the individuality of the Japanese in a society where an ideal is to subject that individuality to the needs of the group; it will also note in passing that those who place individual freedom on an ideal pedestal seek also to subject their individual wills to the constraints of interaction with others.
INDIVIDUALISM AND INDIVIDUALITY: A DISTINCTION Much ink has been spilled on the development of the individual, and on the corresponding notion of individualism, in the western world. For the purposes of this chapter, it is unnecessary to review the literature on this vast subject, but it is important to make a clear distinction between individualism, with its connotations of self-assertion and individual rights, and individuality, or the opportunity for an individual to develop his or her own particular talents or character. The former I see as having arisen in many societies in response to increasing complexity and anomie, not necessarily as a measure of the sophistication or civilisation of that society, as some would have it, but perhaps better described as a strategy for survival. The latter exists, not necessarily with the former, in any society which recognises individual differences and qualities. In the Japanese case, I hope to argue that the former is ideally quite unnecessary and superfluous, whereas the latter is by no means ignored. The Japanese language makes a clear distinction between the two concepts, the former (kojinshugi) a notion with negative connotations implying selfishness and immaturity, the latter (kosei) an idealised notion which is much drawn upon in advertising and
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modern literature. In this complex society, apparently with as much anonymity, if not anomie, as other complex societies throughout the world, there is evidently some mechanism for avoiding the need for selfish assertion. My research on the means and methods of child rearing has thrown considerable light on this seeming paradox. The following section will provide some ethnographic detail in preparation for further analysis.
A CHILD-CENTRED WORLD3 First of all, small children are made much of in Japan. The early years are thought to be so important that where possible babies are afforded the individual attentions of one adult for, if necessary, twenty-four hours a day. Highly educated mothers will give up their careers to dedicate themselves to a task which they see as ‘professional’, or a grandparent will be relieved from all other family duties to attend to the newest member. There are day nurseries, ready to care for children whose families are unable to cope, but they are thought to be less than ideal, at least for the early ‘suckling’ period.4 ‘The soul of the three-year-old lasts till a hundred’, runs the saying, and child specialists are fond of reminding parents that 80 per cent of a child’s brain cells are formed by that time. The newborn babe is like a white sheet, and adults should take care to make the right impressions upon it.5 During this early period, a child should be enveloped in a secure and harmonious environment. Ideally, it should remain in its own home in close contact with its caretakers, who should try to anticipate its every need. Many commentators have noted that Japanese babies are rarely left to cry, and even when they start to move around, they are usually accompanied as much as possible by adult caretakers. A tiny child is often strapped to someone’s back, or, more recently, front, for its naps, and an adult will usually lie down beside it at bedtime until it falls asleep. Where possible the child should not be crossed, and great efforts are made positively to divert a child from an activity which is dirty or dangerous, rather than issuing it with negative injunctions. There are, of course, lapses in the programme, as holes in the paper walls will attest, but on the whole Japanese caretakers are so successful at remaining positive with their small charges that western observers often describe these children as totally indulged. This, in
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my view, is a mistake, for much of the time children are being carefully trained and taught to carry out a whole range of mundane tasks, such as eating, washing, dressing and toilet training, in a way which their parents see as appropriate, by patient demonstration and repetition. If children fail at first to catch on to the task, they are simply encouraged to try again, and again, and again…until it becomes a routine for them.6 In this early stage a clear distinction is being taught between the uchi or inside of the house, together with the people who belong there, and the soto or outside world. In ritual ways, such as the removal of shoes and the pronunciation of fixed phrases,7 the spatial distinction is established, and human beings are assigned to inside and outside roles according to the way they are received and addressed. Efforts are made to associate the inside with security and safety. This is opposed to the outside, where danger may lurk, and caretakers build up the opposition by attributing any negative sanctions, or threats of the same, to outside agents such as demons, ghosts, big dogs, or even foreigners.8 All this individual attention is reflected in the expectation of adults that a child will learn early to reply to its personal name. Other members of the family tend to have an elusive knack of being absorbed by their roles, so that mothers and fathers even address themselves as such, as do grandparents. Children only a little older than the baby are addressed as ‘big brother’ and ‘big sister’, though their names may be included too, but the baby is addressed over and over by its name, its personal name, and it is a time of some rejoicing when it learns to reply ‘hai’ (yes) in recognition that this word applies to itself. As the child begins to play with other children, perhaps its cousins and neighbours, it begins to learn about interpersonal relations. It is always clear which children in a group are older and which younger, and the older ones are encouraged to give in to the younger ones as proof of their greater understanding and experience. This is the time when the child must learn not to be selfish (wagamama), and mothers reason with their children that they must ‘lend’ their toys to their friends. Children are encouraged to put themselves in the position of others and imagine how they would feel, and it is a measure of maturity, of being a big brother or sister, when a child can be benevolent towards another. The child thus learns to feel for others through understanding itself, and to mete out some of the indulgence it has itself received.
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For a few years, then, the child will play with siblings and neighbours, where possible outside as well as in, and small children are generally allowed to play in the neighbourhood from as early as two and a half years of age if the environment is relatively safe. On the whole in Japan, neighbours know one another, and they will watch informally over any children who happen to be in the near vicinity. Adults in passing cars will slow down for children playing, and shopkeepers will attend to them most graciously, even if they have only a few yen to spend. The child thus builds up a new set of ‘inside’ personal relations, neighbours who live nearby and who know well who they are.
AN INTRODUCTION TO GROUP IDENTITY Informal face-to-face interaction gives way at the age of four or five, at the latest, to the institutionalised group life of kindergarten or day nursery. The child now finds itself just one among up to forty peers, all equally entitled to the teacher’s attention. Here, too, efforts are made to create a congenial and harmonious environment, and children are expected to have fun and enjoy themselves. Many activities are carried out together, and there is much corporate and cooperative activity. Some children cry for a while and refuse to join in, but they find themselves left outside with little to do. The teacher is busy making life fun for the class as a whole and, though she will encourage a reluctant child to join in, she will make little fuss. The outsider is dubbed okashii (strange, peculiar) and other children may laugh at one who cries. This is consistent with a sanction threatened by mothers and other caretakers that people will laugh at a child who fails to comply. It also reinforces the notion that security and satisfaction is on the inside, joining in with the new uchi group of fellow kindergarteners, and few children stand outside for long.9 They soon realise that there is little choice about cooperating with the group, that the way to gain attention and benefit personally is to be an active participant. They thus learn to have an identity appropriate for group activities in which they subject their individual needs to those of the group as a whole. Contrary to the expectations of some western observers, however, this does not mean that they lose their individuality.
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First of all, for example, each child has its own personal belongings to take care of, similar to those of the others, but inscribed with its own name and subject to its own treatment. Each day, the teacher reads the register, calls each child’s name, and waits for the response, ‘hai’, just as before.10 On entering a child in kindergarten, parents fill in forms about their strengths and weaknesses, likes and dislikes, friends, siblings and a wealth of other details to help the teacher deal with each individual on the basis of full background knowledge. Messages are carried to and fro daily between the parents and the teacher about the child’s progress, and teachers usually visit the child’s home at least once during each academic year. Parents are also often issued with the names and addresses of all the other children in the class, and there are numerous occasions when the families have an opportunity to meet. The child thus finds itself one of a new uchi group of familiar faces, who gradually become extremely well known to one another, and who may well continue through nine years of compulsory schooling together, although in a big school they may not always remain in the same class. Alongside the group identity which they are learning, they also become well aware of the individual characteristics of their peers, and they learn to think of each other as they cooperate in group endeavour. Internal discipline is generally achieved through the encouragement of peer pressure, a teacher simply playing a pre-lunch tune over and over until the children seat themselves in the appropriate fashion. At first, the hungry ones bustle the others into place, but gradually the fear of keeping everyone waiting is an effective sanction, even for adults.11 Duties within the group usually rotate amongst the members so that each takes a turn to discipline the others, to serve them, and to represent them while the others cooperate, secure in the knowledge that their chance will come round. Thus roles which, taken out of context, could be seen as ‘superior’ or ‘inferior’ are experienced by all, as is the notion of role play itself. Competition within the class is kept to a minimum, with sports day featuring events where individuals run for their class or neighbourhood, and everyone returns home with a medal. Individual effort does not pass unnoticed, however, since children need to know each other’s skills in order to choose their representatives. It is to the benefit of the group as a whole to know and take advantage of each individual’s personal strengths.
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LIFE IN A FACE-TO-FACE GROUP Before a Japanese child even enters school, then, it has learnt how to live within various face-to-face groups: first in the family, next in the neighbourhood, then in the formal situation of the kindergarten or day nursery. It has learnt to pitch in and cooperate, to put its own will second to that of the group as a whole, but to think of the others in the group and take advantage of their skills and strengths as well as offering its own. In such a context there is ideally no need for the self-assertive side of individualism, for it is in the interest of each member of the group to care about the others, who are well known to them, and to encourage them to take advantage of their own individual qualities. It is thus quite possible, on the other hand, to develop a notion of individuality. These principles may well operate in any society which is able to maintain long-term face-to-face groups of interested individuals. I have argued elsewhere that Japan has managed to maintain face-toface groups in many areas of society, and it thus lends itself well to social anthropological analysis (Hendry 1986a: 10–13). In an introductory text to anthropology, Barber (1981) discusses one of the aspects of face-to-face groups, namely the maintenance of order through the use of diffuse sanctions. This is where members of a group put pressure on one another to conform to the norms of the group, since the whole group may suffer if an individual transgresses. She points out that the system works only if everyone identifies with the group and is closely involved in all its activities. She writes, ‘On the one hand it is entirely democratic and egalitarian, on the other it means that people have little choice and must take care to conform to precise expectations’ (1981:88). Barber is writing, in the main, about African societies, but I would like to suggest again that in many ways the benefits of small group interaction have in fact been skilfully maintained in large and important areas of the Japanese population, including some of the most technologically sophisticated. It might, at first sight, seem extraordinary to describe as ‘entirely democratic and egalitarian’ a society whose very language imprisons its members in constant expressions of hierarchy. The activities of the kindergarten class conform pretty closely, however, and the opportunity for advancement shared by peers is by no means confined to this limited age group. A good deal of interpersonal hierarchy in Japanese society generally is based on age and length of service, quite democratic
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principles since all grow up and grow old eventually. Within this formal hierarchical structure, it is my contention that individual characteristics are encouraged and developed, although individual glory may be somewhat subdued. Another characteristic of face-to-face society, where people spend a lot of time with others known well to them, is that of role play. De Vos and Wagatsuma have suggested that Japan’s overall stability, in spite of rapid change, ‘is due in no small part to the manner in which role behaviour within the family has remained relatively satisfying to individual Japanese’ (De Vos 1973:11–12). They advocate that role behaviour becomes a means of self-realisation as opposed to a western emphasis on the concept of a more independent individual. Be this as it may, role play may well contribute to the smooth running of interpersonal relations, particularly within a group context. In the kindergarten, for example, taking a turn at being on duty allows children to experience various roles. They have a turn at bossing the others around, and they have a turn at being bossed around; they have a turn at serving and a turn at being served. Cooperation is thus ensured, since all know that they will have to play each of the roles themselves at some point. This principle operates in other areas of Japanese society, too. In the village or neighbourhood, for example, the fact that houses take it in turns to collect the community funds ensures that most people not only pay, but even thank the person who has come to collect the money for their trouble. In hierarchical relations, too, one defers not to an individual who is intrinsically superior in some way, but to a superior role which one may be called upon to play oneself some day. It is also therefore possible for members of the same company who play hierarchically quite distant roles during the day to drink themselves into oblivion together in the evening. This is, in fact, one of the ways in which they come to know one another as individuals. The same principle was illustrated in a comment made about the psychological orientations of Japanese mother-child relations, suggesting that the mother is not concerned to maintain a superior role of final arbiter (as an American mother may be), but takes pains to develop in the child a conscience that voluntarily administers and controls itself: ‘Her desire is to build character rather than to enforce compliance through outwardly administered constraints’ (Lanham 1966:324). Role play suggests, however, that there is a person behind the mask who is acting out a part, and although there are arguments that in some small-scale societies an individual lives in a ‘multiplicity
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of roles’, rather than developing an individual personality, there is also another argument based on a public/ private distinction. This has been put forward by Charlotte Hardman writing about the Lohorung Rai of Eastern Nepal. She argues that although individuality is stressed in technological modern society, the line between public and private or formal and informal behaviour is not very clear so that a person is quite likely to take some of their public image into the private sphere: Whereas in the West, the clothes, behaviour, work-situation and character chosen by individuals within the public sphere tends to become their ‘image’ so that the individual public personality is carried over into the private sphere, for the Lohorung the public formal image is not chosen but is so well defined by society that it is totally separate from any personality or behaviour which is given free expression in private, intimate relationships. This freedom in informal situations allows for a striking range of personalities. (Hardman 1981:178). In Japan, too, there is a clear distinction between the public face and the private self behind it, between formal behaviour appropriate for particular situations and the informal behaviour allowed in more intimate circles, between uchi and soto, or the tatemae of role playing and the honne of the thoughts behind it. Here, too, public behaviour is often ‘not chosen’ but clearly defined; here, too, surely no one can deny, there is a striking range of individual personalities. Robert Smith has argued a rather similar point in his discussion about the idiosyncracies of personal names in Japan. He notes that ‘a great many personal names and a not inconsiderable number of family names can be rendered with assurance only by the individual, his or her kin and intimate friends’ (1985:88–9).
FREEDOM IN A JAPANESE VIEW Lack of choice was, of course, mentioned in the second half of Barber’s (1981) statement: ‘on the other [hand] it means that people have little choice and must take care to conform to precise expectations’. It will be evident to anyone with experience of Japan that it is important to conform to precise expectations, and many Japanese
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complain about their lack of choice. This is a matter quite closely related to ‘freedom’, that highly prized component of western ideology which would appear to be intrinsically bound up with the rights and dignity of the individual. According to Doi (1973), however, there is considerable difference between this western concept and the ancient Japanese concept of jiyu. Doi argues that the concept of freedom in Japan is a concept of freedom to depend on others, to amaeru, ultimately to behave as one pleases without consideration for others, which is quite different from the western notion of freedom to be independent of others. In the western view, too, the concept includes the idea of freedom to do as one pleases, but it is tempered in this case by the need to ensure that one’s behaviour does not impinge on the freedom of others.12 This distinction imbues the western concept with good qualities, he points out, whereas the traditional Japanese concept involved a trace of criticism, at least in ancient writing. The modern Japanese concept is thus ambiguous, containing elements of both, claims Doi (1973:85). It is seen as rather close to the concept of ‘selfishness’ or wagamama, which is precisely the word often quoted as synonymous with individualism in a Japanese sense. As we have already seen, this is something with which mothers and kindergartens are expected to deal. The word wagamama implies an untrained state, expected of babies and small children, but hardly of a mature adult. On this subject, Walter Edwards (1989:126) has recently made some interesting observations in pointing out that, in a Japanese view: Anyone who asserts he is his own man, complete in himself, is by definition wagamama—selfish, heedless of his interdependence with others, unwilling to recognise and accede to the constraints that social relations invariably entail. In short, like the child who thinks only of himself, he is immature. Edwards thus clearly points out that characteristics which make an American mature are precisely the same as those which are described as immature in Japan. He thus notes also that the classification of Japan as collectivistic and the west as individualistic is a way in which each nation is in fact ‘snubbing’ the other in their own terms.13 Edwards’ argument is part of a more complex interpretation of the trappings of a wedding celebration as a huge statement about the incompleteness of an individual, a demonstration that full
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maturity ‘is achieved only through full recognition and acceptance of the inevitable consequences of one’s incompleteness, of one’s interrelatedness with others’ (1989:129). He also makes an implicit point that Americans are perhaps indeed ‘selfish’ in failing to recognise this indebtedness to others (1989:134). Edwards is also aware of the danger, in focusing on a ritual, of losing sight of the differences between images and reality. He emphasises that as individuals, ‘the Japanese are indeed aware of the selves that stand apart from their social roles and give continuity to the “portfolio of identities” they hold in the larger society’ (1989:126). Robert Smith cites several examples of quite clear expressions of freedom and individuality in Japanese society. The first is in religious practice, relations with the ancestors in particular (Smith 1974:344; cf. Mouer and Sugimoto 1986:199–200), and others have noted the great variety available of responses to illness and misfortune (Ohnuki-Tierney 1984). Another example is in the development of literary, artistic and performing skills14 ‘to an extent not even remotely approached in the United States’ (Smith 1985:103; cf. Reischauer 1977:149–51), a third is how one ‘may legitimately indulge in self-reflection and introspection’ (Smith 1985:102). Smith confirms, nevertheless, that apart from a few noble heroes of non-conformity, the subjects of drama and popular literature, ‘ordinary mortals’ are daily encouraged to endure (gaman suru) and come to terms with the demands of society, ‘and thereby demonstrate neither submissiveness nor passivity, but true maturity’ (Smith 1985:98).
THE VIRTUES OF CHILDHOOD Doi’s argument about freedom is of course part of his wider argument about the importance of the notion of dependence (amae) in Japanese society. His overall argument leaves much to be desired, particularly where he claims that the notion of amae is unique to Japan and thereby explains the Japanese people, but he makes some interesting points. One is to emphasise the value of dependence, rather than independence, another aspect of the opposing values already discussed, and he illustrates the status accorded amae by citing the case of the emperor. The emperor is in a position to expect those around him to make all decisions, deal with problems and run the government, but he still retains
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superior status. He is in fact entirely dependent on those around, ‘no different from a babe in arms, yet his rank is the highest in the land, a fact which is surely proof of the respect accorded infantile dependence in Japan’ (1973:58). In fact it is necessary to temper one’s dependence and use amae carefully, as Doi himself concedes, noting that one should maintain control as a measure of selfhood. Japanese caretakers do emphasise the dangers of the outside world, and the importance of sticking close to them, while at least British and American ones would probably encourage a good deal more independence and adventurousness,15 but they also describe children who fail to learn certain tasks by expected ages as amaeteru. This is a compound verb (contraction of amaete iru), derived from the notion of amae, and like the adjectival form in the expression amaekko, suggests a connotation similar to the English notion of a child being ‘spoilt’. Nevertheless, Doi persists in his idea that ‘the essence of the Japanese experience lies in the period of infancy’ (1973:83). This idea is supported by some rather interesting evidence from studies of Japanese Americans. De Vos, for example, found some striking differences in psychological tests administered to Japanese Americans born in the USA and those who had grown up in Japan and then moved there (1973:xiii). Another study, comparing issei, nisei and sansei (first, second and third generation Japanese Americans, respectively) showed that while sansei were very much like their Caucasian counterparts in many respects, they still seemed to retain their dependency needs and their young mothers still practised many Japanese methods of childcare (Connor 1977:305–6). Mothers probably pass on rather unconsciously to their own children much of the treatment they received when they were small, thus making childcare an aspect of culture relatively impervious to change. Where infancy, itself, takes on the importance it appears to have in Japan it will become correspondingly difficult to change certain basic components of the society at large. I suggest not only that these components are some of the very ones which are incompatible with western individualism, but also that in Japan demands for individuality may be met in quite different ways: first with a strong early individual security, then with the mutual care encouraged in small, long-term face-to-face groups. As Bester, the translator, writes in the introduction to Doi’s book on amae, ‘where amae is so important to the individual, the organisation of society as
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a whole will take corresponding account of the individual’s needs’ (1973:9).
SUMMARY The argument is nicely expressed in a symbolic way by two writers whose observations of Japan were made rather casually. The first was an architect who visited Japan only briefly, but who took an interest in writings about Japanese buildings, particularly shrines and temples. Of these, she commented, it appears that more than elsewhere the buildings are seen not only as beautiful wholes, but made up of individually fashioned pieces of wood, each a work of art in its own right, yet harmonising one with the other to create the complete construction. The fact that each part of the building contributes to the whole does not detract from the individual existence of each, rather it enhances it since they may better be appreciated playing a part in the greater edifice. The second writer was an artist who visited Japan at the turn of the century and commented in a book of paintings by her father: It is in the children that the national artistic and poetic nature of the Japanese people most assuredly finds expression…when watching a group of children, maybe on a fête day, one instinctively compares them with a gallery of pictures, each of which is a masterpiece, painted by an artist whose individuality is clearly expressed therein. (Menpes 1901:137) Like the individually fashioned pieces of wood, and the small artistic masterpieces of the fête day, I would like to argue that personal individuality is and has been clearly evident in practice in Japanese society, whatever may be said at an ideological level. The recent rhetorical nods to western individuality may perhaps make little change, but they could be seen as an attempt to soften the snubbing. Meanwhile, the self-assertive aspect of western individualism, which perhaps correlates with anomie and externally enforced obedience in children, would still seem to have little place in Japan, at either an ideological or a practical level. It would take another chapter to prove it, but I suspect that an examination of American
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practice would show, too, that the ideology of individualism is in practice tempered by some fairly strong expressions of the human need to create bonds of dependence and indebtedness, or, as Plath puts it ‘ways by which we can continue to grow on one another’ (1980:227). This is reminiscent of Doi’s argument that the western concept of freedom ‘never existed outside the world of faith’ (1973:95). In general, anthropological theory has shown that in any society there are notions of the self (see, for example, Carrithers et al. 1985; Heelas and Lock 1981) and the notion of individuality as I have presented it here follows from this, whether it is made into an ideology or not. Where it is, there are also necessarily, for the notion of a society to exist, requirements for that individual to subject him or herself to the constraints of wider social relations. In any particular case the freedom of that individual will be defined according to the society concerned, perhaps freedom to fulfil moral capacities (Watson 1982). In any case individuality is of little avail if there is no surrounding society to appreciate it. As Raum pointed out many years ago in another study of childhood, ‘individuals realise themselves only in society’ (1940:386).
NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
This chapter is largely based on fieldwork supported by the Japan Foundation. A recent survey of some of the major works which purport to ‘explain’ Japanese society, many of them in these simplistic sorts of ways, is to be found in Kamishima 1990. Further detail on this subject is to be found in Hendry 1986b. About the self in the collectivity, for example, there is a section between pp. 171–4. The early period before a child is weaned is separated linguistically as the ‘suckling period’ (nyujiki). See, for example, the ideas of a former head of the Sony corporation, Ibuka Masaru, who points out all these things in a book entitled Yochien dewa Ososugiru (Kindergarten is too late). This process is characteristic of the Japanese ‘learning’ process more generally. Another example is to be found in Kamata’s (1983:42) description of ‘learning’ on a Toyota assembly line. For further details on the building up of this distinction, see Hendry 1984. As the Vogels commented in 1961, Japanese threats to remove a child from the house if it misbehaves is in contrast to the American punishment
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10
11
12
13
14
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where a child would be more likely to be kept in. Lee (1984) also discussed this opposition between inside and outside extensively. The popularity of an autobiographical book describing the childhood life of a girl who persisted in resisting the pressure to conform (Kuroyanagi 1981) would suggest, however, that many more may have resented the pressure. These customs contrast with those of many British kindergartens, where equipment is held in common for the whole class, and registers are only taken informally so that some children attend for weeks without learning the names of the others. On a kindergarten outing, this principle was well illustrated when a reminder from the headmistress that those who returned late for the bus would keep everyone waiting insured that every single member of the party of four busloads had returned to their seats by ten minutes before departure time! A good current example of the differences is to be found recently in the divergent attitudes to smoking in Japan and in several western countries. The anti-smoking lobby in the west has been so successful in defending the individual’s freedom from smoke that severe restrictions have been imposed on smokers, even in fairly intimate surroundings. In Japan, it is precisely in those intimate surroundings that Japanese smokers feel most free to impose their habit on their closest associates. This ‘snub’ is also accepted by some Japanese social scientists, of course, who subscribe to theories of modernisation which see cooperative behaviour, exemplified in Japanese communities, as a stage preceding one in which individualistic behaviour is predominant. Moon (1989:9 fn.5) not only lists some of these theorists, but also offers an excellent antidote in her study of one such community. There will, of course, be less freedom for many years in the artistic accomplishments being developed by members of the traditional Japanese iemoto, schools in which very precise skills are passed down from teacher to pupil. While out with my own small children in Japan, I noted often that I would translate the warnings of Japanese friends about ‘danger’ (abunai) as ‘be careful’ rather than as ‘that’s dangerous’.
REFERENCES Barber, C.R. (1981) Life Journeys: An Anthropological Primer, Exeter: Wheaton. Carrithers, Michael, Collins, Steven and Lukes, Steven (1985) The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Connor, John (1977) Tradition and Change in Three Generations of Japanese Americans, Chicago: Nelson-Hall. De Vos, George (ed.) (1973) Socialization for Achievement, Berkeley: University of California Press.
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Doi Takeo (1973) The Anatomy of Dependence, trns. John Bester, Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International. Edwards, Walter (1989) Modern Japan Through Its Weddings: Gender, Person and Society in Ritual Perspective, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Hardman, Charlotte (1981) ‘The Psychology of Conformity and Selfexpression Among the Lohorung Rai of East Nepal’, in Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock (eds) (see below): 161–80. Heelas, Paul and Lock, Andrew (eds) (1981) Indigenous Psychologies: the Anthropology of the Self, London: Academic Press. Hendry, Joy (1984) ‘Shoes: the Early Learning of an Important Distinction in Japanese Society’, in Gordon Daniels, (ed.) Europe Interprets Japan, Tenterden, Kent: Norbury Publications. —— (1986a) ‘Introduction’ in Joy Hendry and Jonathan Webber (eds) Interpreting Japanese Society, Oxford Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, Occasional Publication No. 5. —— (1986b) Becoming Japanese, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ibuka Masaru (1976) Yochien dewa Ososugiru (Kindergarten is Too Late), Tokyo: Goma Books. Kamata Satoshi (1983) Japan in the Passing Lane (An Insider’s Account of Life in a Japanese Auto Factory), London: Allen and Unwin. Kamishima Jiro (1990) ‘Society of Convergence; An Alternative for the Homogeneity Theory’, Japan Foundation Newsletter, Vol. XVII, 3: 1–6. Kuroyanagi Tetsuko (1981) Madogiwa no Tottochan, Tokyo: Kodansha. Lanham, Betty (1966) ‘The Psychological Orientation of the Mother-Child Relationship’ Monumenta Nipponica, 21: 322–33 Lee O-Young (1984) Smaller is Better: Japan’s Mastery of the Miniature, Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International. Menpes, Mortimer (1901) Japan: A Record in Colour, trns. Dorothy Menpes, London: Adam Charles Black. Moon Okpyo (1989) From Paddy Field to Ski Slope: The Revitalisation of Tradition in Japanese Village Life, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Mouer, Ross and Sugimoto Yoshio (1986) Images of Japanese Society, London and New York: K.P.I. Ohnuki-Tierney Emiko (1984) Illness and Culture in Contemporary Japan: an Anthropological View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plath, David (1980) Long Engagements: Maturity in Modern Japan, Stanford, California: Stanford Press. Raum, O.F. (1940) Chaga Childhood, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reischauer, Edwin O. (1977) The Japanese, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press. Roberts, Simon (1979) Order and Dispute: an Introduction to Legal Anthropology, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Smith, Robert (1974) Ancestor Worship in Contemporary Japan, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. —— (1985) Japanese Society: Tradition, Self and the Social Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Vogel, Ezra and Vogel, Suzanne H. (1961) ‘Family Security, Personal Immaturity and Emotional Health in a Japanese Sample’, Marriage and Family Living, Vol. 32: 161–6. Wagatsuma Hiroshi and De Vos, George A. (1984) Heritage of Endurance: Family Patterns and Delinquency Formation in Urban Japan, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. Watson, David (1982) ‘Idealism and Education: T.H.Green and the Education of the Middle Class’, British Educational Research Journal, Vol. 8, 1: 73–83.
Chapter 5
When blossoms fall Japanese attitudes towards death and the otherworld: opinion polls 1953–87 Fleur Wöss
The term ‘ideology’ has been used in so many different senses that one might despair of using it in any precise manner at all. I will try to outline in the following paragraphs the meaning it has to me. The word ‘ideology’ was used in a pejorative way for the first time by Napoleon I, who made fun of a then-fashionable philosophical school of the Institut National de France. Its representatives were supposed to be, according to Napoleon, ‘men, too much wrapped up in their ideas and thoughts to perceive and understand the realities of life’ (Durant and Durant 1979:318). This usage of ‘ideology’ as mere fancy and as opposed to reality is in wide use nowadays and has gained general acceptance in most western countries: ideology is thus characterised by a perception of reality which is mainly determined by ideas and which is conceived as unreal from a different concept of reality (Dierse 1976:174). Recently philosophers and social scientists are showing increased interest in the problem of ideology. There exist several views as to the nature of ideology, but it is not my aim to delve into this debate. Common to most theories is the gap between ideology and science. Ideology can thus be, according to my understanding, a set of internalised values of a part of the society which do not bear closer scientific examination. The people believe in it firmly as being unshakable reality. If discrepancies between ideology and real actions of people (as defined by science) exist, they are largely ignored. Frequently an ideology is taken on by a group because of specific
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theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests (Berger and Luckmann 1971:141). Any part of the Nihonjinron genre, for example, would fall into this category of ideology. The Nihonjinron theories served very adequately to present to the world community the necessity of certain indispensable economic actions. Here the Japanese acted as part of the world community and the Nihonjinron theories presented a lovely picture to the outside (the Japanese were eager to counterbalance the image of mere ‘economic animals’) whilst acting as a stabiliser to the inside, providing the Japanese population with a self-image when the new situation of being in the limelight of the international stage could have shaken the foundations of society. The ideology of the uniqueness of Japanese culture is backed up by several Japanese scientists and is therefore seriously considered as more or less true by the general public. The prevailing ideology often suggests the choice of topic and how it should be treated. But this is often not perceived by the people concerned. It is easier to recognise a value as ideology from the distance of time or space. Therefore the critique of Nihonjinron has come mainly from non-Japanese. Thus on one hand ideology can be the set of values voiced on the surface whereas on the other hand the actual practice, the actions of the people, can differ widely. One area in the Nihonjinron literature seems to be left out nowadays. That is the Japanese ‘art’ of dying and death. One of the favourite topics before the Second World War, it served the interests of the warfaring state very well at that time. The incrimination of this topic resulted in a general restraint after the war about resuming statements about the specific Japanese attitude towards death. There are, however, people even nowadays who dig up the samurai tradition of ‘good death’ and present it as the general Japanese attitude. The Buddhist and Jungian scholar Mokusen Miyuki writes, for instance, in his article ‘Dying Isagi-yoku’: ‘I became aware of the uniqueness of the Japanese attitude toward death…and this realization led me to further consideration of the Japanese perception of death and dying because it seems so different from common Western attitudes’ (Mokusen 1978:37). Mokusen further points out that dying isagi-yoku is the Japanese approach to dying, which means ‘leaving no regrets’, ‘with a clear conscience’, ‘with no reluctance’. He proves his assumption by describing the reaction of a nisei-friend when he was informed of his approaching death: ‘He knew he was
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approaching death, and I found I could offer him no words of consolation. When we shook hands he said to me, “I am ready to go”.’ This calm attitude is shared, according to Mokusen, by other Japanese, like the famous scientist Kishimoto Hideo, who has written about his experiences of suffering from cancer and his thoughts on death; or Basho, the poet who stressed the necessity to think of every moment in life as if it were one’s last. Mokusen asks why it was so desirable for Kishimoto and for Basho to have a calm mind, undisturbed by the fear of death? He assumes, according to Kishimoto’s statements, that: The place occupied by death in the East and West differs because of the socio-cultural traditions involved. In the West death is outside of life as well as the negation of life, and people tend to make an issue of whether or not the dying person physically suffered. In the East death or dying is regarded as one’s last enterprise in life: death exists inside, or as a part of the journey of life. The concern is therefore not with physical pain or suffering, as in the West, but rather with the kind of attitude the person had when he or she met death. What is most important for the Easterner is the demonstration of control over the fear of death and this control is considered to be the result of a lifelong effort to keep the mind calm and serene in the face of any emotional experiences…. Thus, in death the Easterner is concerned with inner attitude, or readiness to confront the horror of death, and in conducting oneself well in these last moments of life. (Mokusen 1978:41) This ‘unique’ Japanese attitude—it cannot be all that unique because Mokusen himself cites European thinkers like Seneca or Montaigne who propagate the same attitude—comes in very handy when dying. It is ‘necessary’ for the sake of the state. Mokusen does not leave out the best-known stereotype of the dying Japanese, the kamikaze: The attitude that life should be like the flower blossoms on the trees that fall to the ground was embodied in the archetypal image that gripped the kamikaze pilots in World War II. A common expression in the Japanese language is ‘to make the flower of death bloom (shini-bana o sakaseru)’, and in the minds of the kamikaze warriors this archetype of death must have
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been activated and played an important role in giving meaning to their lives. (Mokusen 1978:43) Statements like these are individual opinions and not ideology. But they can be used very well to suit ideological interests, and there lies the danger. The archetypal image of falling blossoms did not ‘grip’ the kamikaze pilots by accident. Here the state played a vital role in reactivating for its own ends attitudes which were propagated by some philosophical and religious schools. Here lies the danger of ideology dealing with death and dying. This ideology can reactivate at any time ‘old traditional attitudes’ which are then used for concrete political purposes. European writers, on the other hand, often tend to idealise everything eastern and to present to their readers this ideal as a fact of everyday life: Finally the (Japanese) elderly is approaching death, which is in its way the summit of life like birth. Since man is reborn again —provided that he has not reached buddhahood—death is no real end, but is fulfilment of the present life and temporary union with the cosmic order. (Stucki 1978:261) This statement mystifies rather than gives an adequate impression of the present Japanese attitude towards death. I would, therefore, like to contribute to a better balanced understanding by viewing this subject from a different angle. I chose to analyse all questions dealing with attitudes towards death and dying in opinion polls of the last three decades. Although I am fully aware of the drawbacks of opinion polls, they do offer us a different approach to this problem. Opinion polls cannot be expected to yield an overall picture of a certain topic, but they can give us a glimpse into the different attitudes towards death and show which ones are dominant among certain sections of the Japanese population. Equally, it cannot be presumed that the choice of topic in opinion polls is led only by scientific interests. The fact that very seldom do questions concerning death occur in opinion polls shows that there is no great public interest in this topic (which might be reassuring for those who fear a revival of death ideology). On the following pages I would like to examine whether there is
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What comes to mind when you hear the word ‘death’? (Choose only one item)
Figure 5.1 Source: NHK yoron chosabu (1984: Appendix 90)
more to Japanese attitudes towards death than the falling cherry blossoms. I will present some opinion polls dealing with the nature of death and the belief in an afterlife and analyse them.
THE IMAGE OF DEATH In Japan the word ‘death’ has dark and somewhat negative connotations. Figure 5.1 shows a Japanese investigation of the associations connected with the word death (NHK yoron chosabu 1984). The question was: ‘What comes to your mind when you hear the word death?’ Only one out of five possible answers could be chosen: fear, uncertainty, void, farewell and nature. The suggested answers are quite different from what would be given in a western culture with a Christian tradition. The possibility of salvation, for example, is not included; and several other possibilities such as reincarnation or paradise are also missing. The question itself is therefore quite ‘this-worldly’ and related to a specific way of thinking.
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What comes to mind when you hear the word ‘death’? (Choose only one item)
Figure 5.2 Source: NHK yoron chosabu (1984: Appendix 90)
Let us look now at the results. Most of the people chose the answer ‘nature’, followed by ‘uncertainty’. The pronounced difference between men and women is striking. Men preferred the answer ‘nature’, an answer which is likely to be given from a philosophical point of view. Most interestingly, this answer is also reserved for the elderly people, as Figure 5.2 will show. Women, in contrast, have no such conspicuous preferences. ‘Nature’ is followed directly by ‘uncertainty’ and ‘farewell’. Figure 5.2 suggests that the image of death differs widely according to age. Young people admit to fearing death most. With increasing age, however, this association seems to decline in importance. The notion that death is part of the course of nature seems to appeal more to those over the age of forty. But even in old age the difference between men and women is significant: 70 per cent of the men but only 57 per cent of the women over seventy chose the answer ‘nature’. ‘Insecurity’ is a relatively stable association in all age groups, but it seems to be a little lower for
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the more elderly. Old age, therefore, can be characterised by a lesser degree of fear and uncertainty towards death. Old people acknowledge death as the inevitable presupposition of the natural course of life. The answer ‘void’ is, on the other hand— if chosen at all—a privilege of a younger way of thinking. Being the most abstract choice, it is appreciated only up to the age of twenty-five. By this age very few people nowadays have experienced the death of a beloved person. Between sixteen and twenty-five, death is rather encountered in novels, poems and as a philosophical, abstract idea. A more concrete aspect of death is the fact that it is a separation from life, a separation from loved ones. This social component of death, the ‘farewell’, is mostly felt by people between twenty and fifty years old, especially women. To sum up: ‘uncertainty’ is an answer independently chosen by every age group; death as a ‘void’ comes to the mind of only younger people, when death seems to be far away. Those in middle age think of death mainly as a farewell, and the fatalistic notion, that death is part of the course of nature, is reserved for people of advanced age.
DEATH AS DESTINY In Japan, as in various other cultures, the place of birth and of death is believed to be significant. Astrology, which is in fashion lately, also stresses the significance of the place and date of birth. It is, therefore, interesting to find out if, according to general Japanese belief, the place and date of birth and death is determined by destiny (see Figure 5.3). This was the question of investigation which also took into consideration the level of individual religiousness. The investigators thought it useful to distinguish between two kinds of religiousness. One group consisted of people where ‘real’ religiousness could be presumed. They had some kind of daily contact with religion such as daily prayers, ascetic practices, and religious reading or missionary work. The other group was called ‘utilitarians’, and used religious services only for their own immediate ends: talismans for traffic-security and success in business, fortune-telling and so on. Additionally these two groups
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Percentage of those who believe that ‘When and where one is born and dies has been determined by one’s destiny, and cannot be changed by human power’.
Figure 5.3 Source: Maruyama, Hayashi and Kamisasa (1981:38 and 40)
were separated by the terms ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ (Maruyama et al. 1981). It seems that the majority of Japanese (60–70 per cent) believe in the interference of destiny when it comes to the place of birth and death. It is apparently important for Japanese to know where somebody has died. This is documented not only by several stories handed down but also when Japanese die in a foreign country. When an airplane crash occurs somewhere in the world, it is mainly the Japanese relatives who visit the place of the accident. Figure 5.3 also shows something else. The distinction between religious faith and utilitarian faith is obviously not relevant. Regardless of whether or not their actions are religious in a way that is accepted as truly religious, almost three-quarters of
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religiously-inclined people believe in a predestined birth and death place.
IMPURITY OF DEATH The dead person and his or her surroundings are thought of as impure. The defilement is transferred to all objects and people coming into close contact with the dead. In ancient times it is reported that people cleansed themselves ritually after burial by taking a bath in a river; nowadays the house where death has taken place is ritually purified by scattering salt. During the past few decades, however, there have been quite a few changes in the way dead people are treated so that it may not be too far fetched to suggest that something has changed in feelings about the impurity of death. Take, for instance, the growing importance of institutions. The majority of Japanese die today in hospitals, whereas forty years ago the number amounted to less than 10 per cent. Death rarely occurs within one’s own four walls and may be seen as something outside everyday life. The handling of the corpse, which was undertaken in former times by neighbours and friends, is today the responsibility of the undertaking business. This is a direct consequence of the increasingly mobile religious population. Direct contact with the corpse can be totally avoided nowadays. Another development is the rapid change from burial to cremation. Buddhism was not able to convince the Japanese over 1500 years to cremate corpses. Industrialisation, on the other hand, has succeeded in about a hundred years to propel the cremation rate from about 25 per cent (1896) to over 90 per cent in the 1980s (in large cities it is practically 100 per cent). Fujii Masao, whose research focuses on burial rites and related topics, suggests that the association of death as impure must have weakened because of cremation. The corpse is removed very quickly by the fire, which is traditionally thought of as a cleansing agent. The decomposition of the corpse is therefore avoided. It is removed quickly leaving no traces of potential danger. Fujii concludes, therefore, that the fear of becoming defiled by death must have weakened in recent years (Fujii 1983:47). The traditional forty-nine days when sutras are read and the spirit of the dead is seen as especially dangerous has also been shortened,
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due to the scattering of families and the impossibility of taking more than a few days off work for the funeral. For most bereaved families the rituals are over either on the day of the funeral or a week after. The handling of the corpse has been transferred to strangers, the removal has become ‘cleaner’ and the rituals accompanying death have been reduced. Has this contributed to a weakened awareness of the impurity of death? Unfortunately, the eagerness of modern people, especially of the Japanese, to conduct opinion polls is only a recent phenomenon. We cannot therefore find evidence for this change of attitude in opinion polls. We can, how ever, find out about current feelings. Cleansing oneself ritually after a funeral from the impurity of death is done nowadays by scattering salt around the house. The question asked in Figure 5.4 was whether people would feel uncomfortable if they had forgotten to purify themselves ritually in this way. Twenty-five per cent said they would be very afraid in such a case and one-third admitted to feeling some fear. This suggests that the majority still believe to varying degrees in the impurity of death. This extends also to young people, the majority of whom felt uncomfortable if they had forgotten to scatter salt. Another way of determining the potentially contagious power of the dead is the belief that on tomobiki-days funerals should not be held, otherwise the dead person will ‘lead a friend’ (which is the literal meaning of tomobiki) with him away into death. If those questioned responded that they did not feel uncomfortable, they would—at least verbally—not be affected by the idea of the contagious power of the dead. Such was the case with only a quarter of respondents. Few Japanese are unimpressed by traditional beliefs about the dangerous potential of a dead person’s spirit (see Figure 5.4). The older the people, the greater the fear if a funeral is undertaken on an inauspicious day. Younger people chose the answer ‘I feel a little afraid’ rather than ‘I feel great fear’. Women are usually more prone to believe in the danger of a tomobiki-day than men. Only in old age is the proportion balanced. The outward attitude towards the dead person may have changed over time. Institutionalisation, the shortening of the rituals and cremation may have brought a weakened consciousness of the defilement of death. But at least the feelings concerning this defilement
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Percentage of those who respond ‘I feel great fear’ to the question ‘What are your feelings when a funeral is held on a tomobiki-day?’
Figure 5.4 Source: Tokei (1978:177)
are still strong nowadays. The majority of people feel uncomfortable about having forgotten to cleanse themselves after a funeral and 80 to 90 per cent feel at least a little afraid to attend a funeral on the inauspicious tomobiki-day.
FOREBODING OF DEATH One of the prevailing ideas concerning death is the belief in the separation of soul/spirit and body at the moment of death, and the continued existence of spirits and their influence on the world of the living. First I will take up the foreboding of death. Death can be announced by several omens. A possible omen is any deviation from the usual course of events. Extraordinary phenomena like the rotting of miso-bean curd or the cry of the cuckoo are indicators from nature informing man of an approaching death (Konno 1972a:783). The first documents listing possible omens of approaching death date back as far as the seventh century (Macé 1986:39–40). The foreboding of death is something which is experienced mainly by blood relatives or by very good friends. It is a sign
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that there is an extraordinary bond between the person experiencing the omen and the one whose death is foreseen. Very often this happens during a dream. The soul/spirit of a dying person is visiting the living relative or friend for a last farewell during his or her sleep. Such an experience is described in the biography of the politician Tanaka Shozo, who lived during the Meiji era. His friend Arai Osui (1846–1922) dreamed two nights before Shozo died that he saw Shozo walking slowly towards him along a river bank: ‘His footsteps were light and made no sound. I asked him, “How is your illness?” He smiled, and answered in his old voice, “I am well….”.’ Arai awoke, then fell asleep a second time, and saw the same dream again (Strong 1977:212). Several opinion polls verify that about 40 per cent of Japanese believe in a possible foreboding of death. Women are more inclined to this belief as are people from rural areas (compare Yomiuri 1981, 1986; Tokei 1978). Questions on the general belief of foreboding suggest that the idea of a ‘sixth sense’ is particularly popular among young people. Among older people, only women believe in forebodings (NHK yoron chosabu 1984: Appendix 93).
THE HITODAMA (SPIRIT CLOUD) Another idea related to the separation of soul/spirit and body just before, during and after death is the concept of hitodama, a word which may best be translated as ‘spirit cloud’. Hitodama is the soul of man, which can separate itself from time to time. Its appearance often resembles a mysterious cloud-like fire and is also reported to be similar to a shooting star, a ball of lightning or a swarm of insects, which floats in the air or hops over the ground. Just after death, it withdraws finally from the body of man. As with other phenomena of folk belief (take, for instance, the European belief that the frog can foresee future weather), natural scientists have supposed that there may be a scientific explanation for the spirit cloud. A professor of aeronautical engineering at Tokyo University, Yamana Masao, is said to have explained this phenomenon scientifically and his theory has been taken up by the mass media. This is probably the reason why
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the believer-pattern differs from the other questions. Whereas usually the believers tend to be women rather than men, older rather than younger, rural rather than townspeople, lowlyeducated rather than highly-educated, people believing in the hitodama are well-educated and are mainly young men. Welleducated young men seem to give more credit to ‘esoteric things’ like the soul and spirit when they think it is proven by science. 1
THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A SOUL The presentiment of death and the hitodama are phenomena presupposing the possible separation of body and soul before death. A pillar of Japanese folk belief, however, is the belief in the separation of the soul/spirit at the moment of death and the continued existence of this soul/spirit. The soul/spirit (reikon) withdraws at the moment of death from the body and continues to live for a very long time if not for ever. The custom of recalling the withdrawing reikon immediately after death (tamayobi) by stepping on the roof, for instance, aims not only at undoing the fact of death but also at pacifying the reikon, and urging it to leave the living alone (Mogami 1972:799). The appeasing of the reikon begins at this point and will be finished only after years of punctiliously observed rituals. The continued existence of the reikon is a constant element of Japanese folk belief but is not explicitly taught as a part of any specific religious belief. It can, however, be deduced from burial customs and ritual practices following the funeral. It is possible, therefore, that fewer people would reply positively to the question in Figure 5.5 than would act according to this belief. About 40 per cent of respondents believe in the continued existence of the soul after death, a fact confirmed by other opinion polls. The ratio of people who cannot answer is quite high, which leaves only about 20 per cent who definitely do not believe in the continued existence of a reikon (Mainichi shinbunsha 1987:509). Figure 5.5 shows the differing answers according to age. Interestingly it is mainly the younger generation, especially young women, who think it likely that a reikon survives after death. We see an S-curve with its peak in teenage years, then falling until the age of forty to forty-nine, to rise again in old age. The predominance of women levels out in middle age, and afterwards
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Percentage who believe in the continued existence of the soul after death.
Figure 5.5 Source: NHK yoron chosabu (1984: Appendix 93)
there is little difference between the sexes. The high percentage of believers in the younger generation parallels the previous question (Figure 5.4), concerning supernatural abilities such as presentiments. There exist similar opinion polls which explain the immortality of the soul in Christian countries. Although the concept of the soul is, of course, very different in Christianity, Buddhism and Japanese folk belief, there are striking similarities in the readiness to believe in a soul, especially among younger people. It seems that young Japanese are the most believing age group when it comes to matters of the soul and spirit. Belief in a religion must be a serious factor when discussing ideas about the afterworld. It seems predictable that a religious person would be more inclined to believe in some form of continued existence after death than an atheist. In his survey of the religious attitudes of men between twenty and forty years old, Fernando Basabe divided his sample into three subgroups according to their religiousness. Two of the statements deal with different ideas of the afterlife:
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1) If a man dies, his spirit is born again into something else 2) If a man dies, his spirit always remains
Agree to the following statement: Believers Indifferent Negative 38.4% 14.2% 5.5% 45.7%
23.4%
5.5%
(Basabe 1968:130–1)
Believers are those who confessed to a specific religion and those who belong to no religious group, but have some sort of personal faith (about 18 per cent of those questioned). The indifferent group consists of people who have generally a positive attitude towards religion, but show no interest (about 60 per cent of those questioned). The negative group consists of those who have never acted in a religious way and who rejected the idea that ‘it would be better when there is religion in this world’ (about 22 per cent of those questioned). The two statements above both deal with continued existence after death, but they represent two entirely different concepts. The first one is the idea of reincarnation, the second one represents the Christian idea of the soul as well as the indigenous concept of growing into an ancestor or becoming a kami (god-like). The small difference between the proportions of answers to the first and the second concepts suggests that people are unsure in which form the soul continues to exist. Their ideas about life after death seem to be blurred. This tendency becomes even clearer when the group of believers is specified by religion. Forty per cent of Christians, for instance, agreed to the idea of reincarnation; 50 per cent chose the second statement. This ignorance of Christian dogma is astonishing considering that most Christian churches fight continually against the idea that man will be reborn. The only religious group of which members favoured the idea of reincarnation w a s t h e Sok a G a k k a i ( 5 0 p e r c e n t ) . T h e i r c o n c e p t o f reincarnation, however, is not the rebirth of an individual who remembers past incarnations. It is rather—according to the teachings of Soka Gakkai—the union of the reikon of the departed with the cosmos. In the following life the image of awakening from sleep is used (Basabe 1968:42–3). 2
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Percentage of those who believe in rebirth.
Figure 5.6 Source: Nihon midori no jujisha (1987:32)
Let us look at the generational differences again. The younger people are, the more likely they are inclined to believe in rebirth and in life after death (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). About as many young people who believe in the continued existence of the soul also believe in life after death, slightly fewer in rebirth. After the age of forty, disbelief in any kind of continued existence after death increases to around 70 per cent. There is a strong tendency among young people to believe in some kind of continued existence after death, but their ideas about it are, in general, not clear cut. Other surveys show that belief in the western paradise of Amida Buddha is nowadays not very attractive and the Christian heaven is unimaginable for all but Christians. Any concrete idea about paradise is held by only uneducated rural women over fifty years old. It seems that the imprecision of Buddhist and Shintoistic teachings concerning life after death is reflected by a general unwillingness to imagine a concrete world where the reikon goes after death.
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Percentage of those who believe
Figure 5.7 Source: Nihon midori no jujisha (1987:30)
CONTACT WITH THE REIKON Figure 5.8 deals with the possibility of talking to a dead person by means of a medium. The tradition of contacting spirits is old in Japan and is practised nowadays mainly in the northeast of Japan by female shamans called itako. They can not only tell the cause of a person’s death (they have even been used lately to solve criminal cases), but are able to interrogate the spirits about their well-being and can even foresee the future of bereaved family members. This aspect of spirit belief does not seem to be very popular among Japanese nowadays. Only very few of those interviewed in Tokyo believe for certain in the ability of itako to talk to a dead person’s reikon. The people in Yonezawa, a city with a population of about 100,000, not far from the centre of itako practice, are not as sceptical but still far from firmly believing in this sort of practice. One-third of Yonezawa people believed in it to some extent, while in Tokyo only 13 per cent took the fact into consideration. In Fernando Basabe’s survey among men between twenty and forty years old there were likewise under 10 per cent who believed in the possibility
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Responses to the statement ‘I have talked to the soul of a dead person with the assistance of an itako’.
Figure 5.8 Source: Tokei (1978:176)
of recalling a dead person’s reikon and talking to it (Basabe 1968:130). An opinion poll conducted throughout Japan in 1984 asked the following questions: Would you like to experience the following things? (Multiple choice possible) 1) To speak with a dead person’s soul/spirit (reikon) 13.5% 2) To be transformed into a supernatural being 8.6% 3) To receive a message from a kami-god or Buddha 11.4% 4) To feel one with nature or the cosmos 9.8% 5) To concentrate one’s mind in prayer or meditation and forget the self 9.2% 6) Don’t want to experience any of these things 56.6% 7) No answer 7.8% (Source: Yomiuri 1986:511)
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It would appear that not many people wish to experience supernatural things in general. The majority apparently do not want to come into close contact with either the cosmos or its spirits and gods. And for some Europeans and Americans it must be astonishing to hear that so few Japanese want the ‘typical eastern’ experience of losing themselves in meditation. One can say that although contact with reikon (kuchiyose) has a long tradition in Japan, only a few Japanese nowadays seem to believe in it. There is, however, at least according to Sasaki Kokan, a researcher of shamanism, a recent tendency for people in big cities like Tokyo to fall back upon the art of the itako. Some itako in city centres like Asakusa draw a huge urban clientele for their clairvoyance services. The belief in reikon is an ancient element in Japanese folk belief, but people nowadays are usually not inclined to believe in the possibility of coming into contact with them via the assistance of itako. Contact is instead restricted to a ritualised welcome at the time of obon, the annual observance festival for the family ancestors. This ritualised form of communication is accepted by three times as many men in Basabe’s survey as the idea of contact through itako (Basabe 1968:130). This is connected with the ancestor cult, which will be examined later.
SPIRITS: PROTECTION OR DANGER? Spirits are a constituent part of many stories and novels in Japan. Anyone who has read some Japanese literature will have noticed the existence of revengeful spirits in the Genji monogatari, will remember the Ugetsu monogatari, and will think of some of the collected stories of Lafcadio Hearn. Similar to the existence of the hitodama (spirit cloud), which can separate from the body during lifetime as well as appear after death, is the yurei-spirit, which is often pictured in woodblock prints and novels. The yurei-spirit can also either leave a living person’s body or be a dead person’s spirit which wanders about the places it loved most. It is often pictured in art as a figure with hair hanging over a bloody face. Usually, however, people see yurei appearing very similar to humans, clad as in real life. Very often the yurei is imagined as a child or an old man and is in general a man rather than a woman (Konno 1972b:771).
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Other wandering spirits are the so-called muenbotoke (literally ‘bodhisattvas without ties’). 3 These spirits are restless because their families have neglected to perform the ancestral rites to appease them. Others became muenbotoke because a life was not lived to the full (when the person had committed suicide or encountered death in some other unnatural way, or when the person died young, especially before being able to marry). They are often seen as identical to the vengeful spirits, onryo. Lately belief in muenbotoke and onryo has revived. After the Second World War there were big religious organisations such as Reiyukai and the Rissho koseikai which propagated the ancestor cult and the appeasement of restless spirits. They promised that by praying for the spirits people could find salvation and solutions to their immediate problems. Increased harmony in the other world will, according to their beliefs, positively influence this world, because the microcosms of this world are deeply connected to the macrocosm (Hardacre 1984:142–3). The newest religious organisations, the so-called ‘New New Religions’, to use the term introduced by Nishiyama Shigeru, a Japanese sociologist of religion, play on the idea of the restless spirits even more. The Mahikari Shukyo and the Agonshu are especially successful and both centre around this belief. The Agonshu plays particularly on the bad conscience of women who have had an abortion. The success of such religions during the past ten years and the popularity of ‘abortion temples’ suggest a strong revival of this kind of spirit belief. There are, however, unfortunately no detailed opinion polls on the subject. Nevertheless, there is an indication in an opinion poll from the 1960s concerning belief in the vengeful spirits, onryo, and the yureispirits. Yurei were not popular then. Only 7 per cent believed in them, whereas 19 per cent thought the existence of the vengeful ghosts (onryo) probable (Abe 1965:131). A different picture was presented recently, when teenagers were questioned about their beliefs. The overwhelming majority believes to some extent in yureispirits (77 per cent) and in the possibility of their curse (76 per cent) (Yomiuri shinbun 1988). But that is not all to be said about the spirits. There are not only vengeful ghosts, but also reikon which protect humans. Ancestors especially fall into this category. Which side of the spirit/ancestor-belief is stronger? Let us look at answers
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concerning different aspects of the spirits given in the middle of the 1980s. The following statements are often heard. If you agree with one or more of them, mark them please (multiple choice possible): 1) A dead person’s spirit protects us 33.7% 2) The spirit of a person who has died with hate in his heart keeps wandering about 18.1% 3) Descendants have no luck in life when they are pursued by the curse of an ancestor 16.3% 4) God (or gods) see through men 13.8% 5) One can forsee the death of a blood-relative 39.4% 6) For man there exists a life after death 26.8% 7) Don’t believe in any of these 29.9% 8) No answer 7.7% (Source: Yomiuri 1986:511)
This extract from a poll shows that nearly 20 per cent believe in restless spirits, but still more people (34 per cent) are ready to acknowledge spirits as possible protective powers. Protection extends, however, mainly to the spirits of family members. It is the ancestors who are thought to hold a protective hand over their descendants. This tie to one’s own ancestors is felt quite strongly.
I feel a strong tie towards my family ancestors
Please mark whether you agree or not: Agree Disagree Neither Don’t know 58.8% 30.9% 7.4% 2.8%
(Source: NHK hoso yoron chosasho 1979:591)
This information from another poll shows that almost 60 per cent feel a strong tie towards their ancestors. This is quite a high number. Whether there is a possible connection between a positive attitude towards religion in general and the feeling of strong ties to the ancestors can be verified by another survey (see Figure 5.9). As mentioned above, it does not apparently make much sense to classify religious acts by the categories ‘religious faith’ and ‘utilitarian faith’. Figure 5.9 again shows that there is not much difference between the two. It reveals, however, quite a strong correlation
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Percentages of those who agree with the following statement: ‘A person’s soul is always tied to the family even after death’.
Figure 5.9 Source: Maruyama, Hayashi and Kamisasa (1981:38 and 40)
between religious acts, whether religious or utilitarian, and the sense of some connection with one’s own ancestors. A basically religious attitude favours conscious ties with one’s ancestors. On the other hand this data suggests that religiously indifferent people still show significantly strong emotional ties to their ancestors. Close to 50 per cent of the people uninterested in religion believed in the continued existence of a soul tied to the family after death. When we recall the question concerning the continued existence of the soul (Figure 5.5) only one-third agreed to the more or less abstract notion of the possible existence of the soul after death. However, when it comes to one’s own family and ancestors, the readiness to believe in the continued existence of the soul is clearly much higher. It seems that belief in continuing family ties beyond death is still one of the pillars of Japanese religious sentiment. The emotional ties to ancestors are based on a long history of ancestor cult (which was incidentally not free from ‘ideology’ in the past). In the beginning I cited two authors talking about the Japanese attitude towards death. Lorenz Stucki proclaimed that the Japanese see death as the summit and the fulfilment of life. The idea of rebirth consoles the Japanese that death is not a real end, but a ‘temporary union with the cosmos’. Mokusen Miyuki, on the other
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hand, stressed the calm mind and the control of the self in confronting death. Death is supposed to be taken as the falling flower blossoms and to die is ‘to make the flower of death bloom’. If one keeps such statements in mind, the results of the above opinion polls look quite different. The idea of rebirth, which should console the Japanese according to Stucki, is quite weak, weaker than in some Christian countries. Very few Japanese seek unity with the cosmos during their lifetime. Hence the idea that death is a kind of summit is not conclusive. It may be true, as Mokusen points out, that Europeans are preoccupied with whether a dying person is suffering or not. But the fear of dying a slow and painful death is also so prominent in Japan that there exist special temples which promise an easy and painless death. These draw huge crowds of old women.4 Whether it is most important to preserve a calm mind when death is approaching is not a subject taken up by opinion polls. Preparation for death is, however, so neglected in Japan and the fact that death is approaching so well hidden from the dying that the ideal of a calm mind is ridiculous.5 There is, mainly among older Japanese, quite a strong tendency to perceive death as an inevitable fact. But even this is no indication that the Japanese would welcome death or be indifferent to it. Some beliefs connected to death, the reikon and the ancestors, are quite pronounced. The Japanese believe in general that destiny has a hand in death and more than one-third believe that approaching death can be foreseen by those close to the dying. The decision as to when and where one dies is made by an unspecified outside force. Belief in God or Buddha is not strong and no clear-cut ideas prevail about the form of existence after death. This does not mean, however, that death is for most Japanese the end. The majority believe that the reikon separates itself from the dead body and becomes a benevolent ancestor, provided that the proper rituals are conducted by family members. The connection with one’s ancestors is the most conspicuous attitude. One more result of this analysis leaps to the eye—the high percentage of young people believing in spirits. Three-quarters of teenagers believe in the existence of yurei-spirits, the same percentage in the curse of malevolent spirits in general; only young people imagine that the hitodama (spirit cloud) can be seen as the essence of man flying away. Twice as many young people as old believe in the continued existence of the soul after death, the same being the case
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with life after death. Almost half of the young respondents believe in rebirth whereas only 10 per cent of those over sixty do so. Additionally, it seems as if the proportion who believe in such things has increased in the past decade.6 There is now apparently a strong readiness among the young to delve into such questions. This trend is documented by the wide circulation of youth magazines like Mu and My Birthday, examining esoteric practices and astrology. The recently flourishing ‘New New Religions’, which serve a cocktail of Japanese indigenous traditions, western spiritualism and Indian Buddhism also draw their clientele mainly from among young people. It is quite difficult to attempt an interpretation as to why this development is taking place. It has to be seen as part of a general change in consciousness which the new prosperity has entailed. First of all, belief in natural science as an absolute value has been shaken. Previously, responsibility for defeat in the Second World War was partly ascribed to religion which was used for ideological indoctrination before the war. Science, on the other hand, was a tool to build up a strong Japan again and with it pride in being Japanese. Since the 1970s this has been achieved. At the same time, the Japanese, like other industrialised peoples, have realised the drawbacks of excessive technical development. Doubts about natural science as an absolute value orientation have caused a more favourable attitude towards religion in general. For most Japanese the primary necessities of life are nowadays fulfilled, allowing secondary ones to come to the fore. The wide attraction of books on anything about Japan shows the eagerness for self-reflection and the search for an identity separate from just material goods. Interest in religious things has risen at the same time, which is also reflected in the expanding religious book sales. Through economic success and their strong position within the world community, the Japanese have regained their pride and selfconfidence. This has brought about a renaissance of indigenous values, also furthered by the renewed interest of Europeans and Americans in Japanese traditions such as Zen, karate, judo, ikebana and so on. Traditional values like filial piety are regaining ground among the Japanese youth and are stimulating the attractiveness of religious ideas, previously dismissed as old-fashioned and feudal (NHK yoron chosabu 1984).
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The spirit-belief of the young is interpreted by Shiomi Toshiyuki, the author of the survey on spirit-belief among teenagers, as escape into an unreal world because adults have destroyed—by their education and guidance—the children’s inner cosmos. The teenagers are looking for something they can hold on to (Yomiuri shinbun 1988). The young are very susceptible to this change of consciousness. They increasingly doubt the almightiness of science and fall back upon magic practices and the belief in possible otherworldly forces. Spirits seem to be a familiar idea and they can imagine life after death. They fear death and feel respect for their ancestors. Their quest for a cosmos transcending the living human world ties up with a return to older strata of Japanese religious traditions. Death is for them neither a summit, nor falling blossoms, but a doorway to the spirit world.
NOTES 1 In general about 40 per cent of the Japanese believe in the existence of the hitodama, while another 40 per cent deny the existence of this phenomenon (Tokei: 1978:117 and Abe 1965:181). 2 An international comparison reveals interesting facts: the belief in reincarnation is no monopoly of eastern peoples. It compares the belief in rebirth in Japan, the country to which the west looks for wisdom about Buddhism, to European countries. The rate in Japan is no higher. In Germany, for instance, there are more people believing in reincarnation (25 per cent) than in Japan (Tokei 1969:4). 3 The translation ‘bodhisattva’ for the term hotoke must not be taken literally. The Japanese call all dead people hotoke. 4 For a more detailed description of this cult, see Wöss 1984. 5 Up to now, cancer patients were not told the name of their disease. A heated discussion among medical doctors over whether or not to tell patients is still under way. The word cancer is avoided if possible. It was, for instance, not until after the death of Hirohito, now ShowaTenno, that officials changed the name of his disease from ‘chronic inflammation of the pancreas’ to ‘cancer of the pancreas or the duodenum’. 6 For more detailed information see NHK yoron chosabu 1984, Tokei Suri 1982 and Hayashi 1988.
LIST OF OPINION POLLS USED
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Abe 1965 * 1,500 men and women over twenty in 130 communities from all over Japan (completion rate 84 per cent) ** June 1963 *** Random sampling, face-to-face interviews Basabe 1968 * 1,605 men aged between twenty and forty in 69 urban centres within the Kanto and Kansai areas (completion rate 81 per cent) ** June 1967 *** Mailed questionnaires and questionnaires distributed on visits Mainichi shinbunsha 1987 *3,000 men and women over twenty from all over Japan (completion rate 77 per cent) ** December 1985 *** Random sampling, face-to-face interviews Maruyama, Hayashi and Kamisasa 1981 * 499 valid answers from men and women over twenty in Tokyo ** 1978 *** Multivariate analysis NHK hoso yoron chosasho 1979 * 32,421 men and women over sixteen in all prefectures of Japan (completion rate 77 per cent) ** March and May 1978 *** Random sampling, face-to-face interviews NHK yoron chosabu 1984 *3,600 men and women over sixteen in 300 places all over Japan (completion rate 75 per cent) ** November 1981 *** Random sampling, face-to-face interviews Nihon midori no jujisha 1987 *5,000 men and women over twenty in all prefectures of Japan (completion rate 41 per cent) ** February 1987 *** Random sampling, mailed questionnaires Schmidtchen 1973
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* 3,118 Protestants (1956:1,095) and 2,543 Catholics (1956:818) over eighteen in the Federal Republic of Germany including West Berlin ** 1956 and 1964 *** Details in: IfD-opinion polls 093, 1082/86/87 Tokei 1978 * 900 men and women over twenty in Tokyo and 400 men and women in Yonezawa, Yamagata prefecture (completion rate 82 per cent) ** March 1976 *** Random sampling, face-to-face interviews Yomiuri 1981 * 2,176 men and women over twenty from all over Japan (completion rate 72 per cent) **July 1979 *** Random sampling, face-to-face interviews Yomiuri 1986 * 2,324 men and women over twenty from all over Japan (completion rate 77 per cent) ** July 1979 *** Random sampling, face-to-face interviews.
REFERENCES Abe Kitao (1965) ‘Shinpi no sekai. Reikon no sonzai o shinjiru ka’ (The world of mysticism. Is there a belief in a soul?), in Zennipponjin (The Japanese). Tokyo: Daiyamondosha: 125–45. Basabe, Fernando M. (1968) Religious Attitudes of Japanese Men, Tokyo and Rutland: Sophia University and Tuttle. Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas (1971) The Social Construction of Reality, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Dierse, U. (1976) ‘Ideologie’ in Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer (eds) Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophe, Vol. 4, Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe and Co: 157–85. Durant, Will and Durant, Ariel (1979) Die französische Revolution und der Aufstief Napoleons. München: Südwest. Fujii Masao (1983) ‘Maintenance and Change in Japanese Traditional Funerals and Death-related Behaviour’, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 10/1: 39–64. Hardacre, Helen (1984) Lay Buddhism in Contemporary Japan: Reiyukai kyodan, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Hayashi Chikio (1988) Nihonjin no kokoro hakaru (Measuring the hearts of the Japanese), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha. Konno Ensuke (1972a) ‘Yocho’ (Presentiment) in Otsuka Minzoku Gakkai (ed.): Nihon minzoku jiten (Encyclopedia of Japanese folklore), Tokyo: Kobundo: 783. —— (1972b) ‘Yurei’ (Ghost appearance) in Otsuka Minzoku Gakkai (ed.): Nihon minzoku jiten (Encyclopedia of Japanese Folklore), Tokyo: Kobundo: 771. Macé, François (1986) La wort et les funérailles dans le Japan ancien, Tokyo: Kobundo: 783 Mainichi Shinbunsha (1987) ‘Kokoro no jidai. Zenkoku yoron chosa’ (The era of heart. Opinion poll by the Mainichi publishing house for the whole of Japan) in Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu (ed.): Showa 61 nenpan yoron chosa nenkan (Yearbook of Opinion Polls. 1986 Edition), Tokyo: 508–10. Maruyama Kumiko, Hayashi Fumi and Kamisasa Hisashi (1981) ‘A Multivariate Analysis of Japanese Attitudes toward Life and Death’, Behaviormetrika 10: 37–48. Mogami Takayoshi (1972) ‘Reikon’ (Soul) in Otsuka Minzoku Gakkai (ed.): Nihon minzoku jiten (Encyclopedia of Japanese folklore), Tokyo: Kobundo: 799–800. Mokusen Miyuki (1978) ‘Dying Isagi-yoku’, Journal of Humanistic Psychology 18/4: 35–44. NHK hoso yoron chosasho (1979) ‘Zenkoku kenmin ishiki chosa’ (Research on the consciousness of the Japanese prefectural populations) in Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu (ed.): Showa 54 nenpan yoron chosa nenkan (Yearbook of Opinion Polls. 1979 Edition). Tokyo: 585–591. NHK yoron chosabu (ed.) (1984) Nihonjin no shukyo ishiki (The religious consciousness of the Japanese). Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai. Nihon midori no jujisha (1987) ‘Seimei’ ni kansuru yoron chosa hokokusho (Report on the opinion poll on ‘life’), Tokyo. Nomura Masataka et al. (1985) ‘Ajia ni okeru shiseikan no chigai’ (Differences in the view of life and death in Asia), Shi no rinsho 8: 1–2. Schmidtchen, Gerhard (1973) Protestanten und Katholiken, Soziologische Analyse konfessioneller Kultur, Bern and München: Francke. Strong, Kenneth (1977) Ox against the storm. A biography of Tanaka Shozo, Tenterden: Paul Norbury Publications. Stucki, Lorenz (1978) Japans Herzen denken anders. Die alternative Art modern zu sein. Was wir von der einzigen nicht-westlichen Industriegesellschaft lernen könnten, Bern und München: Scherz. Tokei—Tokei suri kenkyujo (1978) ‘Nihon no shukan, gyoji ni kansuru chosa’ (Research on Japanese folklore and festivals) in Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu (ed.): Showa 52 nenpan yoron chosa nenkan. (Yearbook of Opinion Polls. 1977 Edition). Tokyo: 174–9. Tokei suri—Tokei suri kenkyujo kokuminsei chosa iinkai (ed.) (1982) Dai yon Nihonjin no kokuminsei (Fourth opinion poll: The national character of the Japanese). Tokyo: Idemitsu shoten.
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Wöss, Fleur (1984) ‘Escape into death. Old people and their wish to die’ in Gordon Daniels (ed.): Europe Interprets Japan, Tenterden: Paul Norbury Publications: 222–9 and 271–2. Yomiuri shinbun (1988) ‘Okaruto bumu. Nezukoi higori shiko’ (The occult boom. The firmly rooted intention to be irrational), Yomiuri shinbun, November 6. Yomiuri Shinbunsha (1981) ‘Yomiuri zenkoku yoron chosa (54 nen 7 gatsu)’ (Opinion poll of the Yomiuri publishing house for the whole of Japan— in July 1979 ), Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu (ed.): Showa 55 nenpan yoron chosa nenkan (Yearbook of Opinion Polls. 1980 Edition), Tokyo: 545–554. —— (1986) ’Yomiuri zenkoku yoron chosa (59 nen 7 gatsu)’ (Opinion poll of the Yomiuri publishing house for the whole of Japan—in July 1984) in Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu (ed.): Showa 55 nenpan yoron chosa nenkan (Yearbook of Opinion Polls. 1980 Edition), Tokyo: 507– 12.
Chapter 6
From farm to urban middle class A case study of the role of education in the process of social mobility1 Regine Mathias
INTRODUCTION The so-called interwar period is regarded as a crucial period of economic and social change in Japan. Usually, this change is characterised by terms like industrialisation, urbanisation and the spread of education. The impact of these developments on the society as a whole did not become clearly visible before the years following the Russo-Japanese war; it wholly materialised during the boom years of the First World War, when regional and social mobility, especially the transfer of labour from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations—combined with a move from rural to urban areas— was accelerated by rapid economic growth. Many of those who went to the cities did so because of economic needs. By joining the urban labour force and working in factories and small shops they became part of the lower classes of urban society. However, some succeeded in moving up the social ladder and joined the urban new middle class, which took shape around the change from the Meiji to the Taisho Period, and became a distinguishable component of Japanese society in the 1920s and 1930s. Usually, careers were not as spectacular as described in the ‘from-rags-to riches’ stories of the Meiji period. Rather, a post as an elementary school teacher, as a lower- or middle-ranking official or as a clerk in a shop or a factory was quite an achievement for someone who had
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moved into town from the countryside. Some people, however, went one step further on the career ladder and succeeded in establishing themselves as members of the urban proprietary middle class. Ever since the Meiji period (1868–1914) education has been regarded as one of the major factors, if not the major factor, for social mobility in Japan. In order to utilise fully the intellectual resources of the country for the modernisation process, the leaders of the Meiji government promoted a school system which was to provide equal chances for all young people regardless of their social origins. In accordance with such goals, the ‘Government Order of Education’ (gakusei), promulgated in 1872, stated in its preface that ‘learning is the key to success in life and no man can afford to neglect it’ (cited in Passin 1965:210). Similar ideas can be found in the famous book Gakumon no Susume (An Encouragement of Learning, published in 1872), in which the educator Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835– 1901) also emphasised the importance of learning for all people, saying that ‘there are no innate status distinctions separating the noble and base, the rich and poor. It is only the person who has studied diligently who becomes noble and rich, while his opposite becomes base and poor’ (Dilworth and Hirano 1969:1). Books like Gakumon no Susume, which was a bestseller during the early half of the Meiji period, helped to spread the ideology that education was the key to social advancement, and that there existed equality in ability, in the sense that anyone could succeed if he (or she) made the effort. Neither the fact that the ideal of education as a resource of personal success was soon replaced by the ideal of education for the sake of the nation, nor the gradually widening gap between the ideology of self-advancement and the diminishing chances for it in reality after the turn of the century, could seriously shake the general belief in this ideology. Even nowadays education is seen as the main source of social advancement. Regarding the continuous influence of this ideology, it is generally taken for granted that there existed a high degree of correspondence between ideology and reality. If one looks, however, at social development in prewar Japan, one finds several periods in which academics experienced a high rate of unemployment and even severe economic hardship. The question, therefore, arises as to why and how this ideology was upheld even in times of a relative decline in the social status of academics, when ideology and reality differed quite considerably.
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In order to analyse the sources of social advancement in prewar Japan and the role which education played within this process, this chapter presents the life history of a female teacher, Takemura Shizue, who was born in a small village in Oita prefecture in 1900. Together with her husband, a teacher himself, she moved to Tokyo in the mid1920s. Ever since she has lived there with her family and still occupies the very house in Taito-ku which she and her husband had built in 1937. In the course of her life, Takemura Shizue experienced the whole process of advancing from countryside farming to a whitecollar occupation in the urban middle class. Her life story, therefore, provides us with basic evidence for social changes in prewar Japan. The author is perfectly aware of the problems connected with research centred on the life history of one individual. Since, however, existing research on the social history of teachers allows us to put Takemura Shizue’s life in a more general context, her life history can help us to understand the implications of the anonymous process of social change at the individual level. It can also provide us with valuable insight into not only individual motives, but also the preconditions necessary for social advancement in prewar Japan.
THE PRECONDITIONS: SOCIAL BACKGROUND, SCHOOL CAREER AND MARRIAGE Takemura Shizue was born on 8 May 1900, in Tateishi (Hayamigun, Oita-ken). Her parents were farmers; their living conditions are described by Shizue as ‘poor, but having always had enough to eat’. Nevertheless, the fact that her parents were able to support her with a monthly allowance of ¥12 during her years at normal school shows them not to have been among the poorest farmers in the village. Shizue had the advantage of being a younger sister and was allowed to move on to higher elementary school and finally persuaded her parents to let her go to normal school. After a year of preparation, she passed the examination in 1916 and entered the Oita Prefectural Normal School for Girls (Oita-ken Joshi Shihan Gakko). When Shizue entered Oita Normal School, the profession of an elementary school teacher had already been established as a possible career for women. However, farmers’ families especially were obviously still somewhat reluctant to send their daughters to secondary school at all, and in her village Shizue was clearly an exception.
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Takemura Shizue went to normal school because she wanted to become a teacher. She was fond of learning and did not want to spend her whole life farming. Instead, she wanted to help other people (‘mo chotto hito no tame ni naru yo na shigoto’) and to be of use to society (‘yo naka no tame ni tsukushitai’). Not being rich or— as Shizue put it—a bijin (beautiful woman) or a person of high rank, she thought the teaching profession might help her to become a person worthy of respect and love. These rather idealistic motives are quite consistent with the then common ideas of self-advancement (risshin, mi o tateru), in which learning was seen as the capital for rising in the world (Kinmonth 1981:55). It was not so much in the kind of aspirations which Shizue and the other students at normal schools differed from those aiming at a mainstream career in the national bureaucracy, but the scale of their goals. Driven by a strong will to succeed as well as by feelings of gratitude and filial piety (oyakoko) towards her parents who had allowed her to study, Shizue confined herself solely to her studies and rarely participated in the (limited) social life at school. ‘I thought it would be unexcusable not to study hard because my parents were working hard to support me.’ To show that she was worthy of her parents’ efforts, she had made up her mind to become the best student and, when she graduated in 1920, she actually came top of the class. Even though we may have to concede Shizue expecially strong ambition and will-power, her school career and her way of thinking were not exceptional among the students at the normal schools. Drawing upon several interviews with former (male?) students, Jinnouchi Yasuhiko (1981:156) characterises these students as follows: they come from average rural families, go through elementary and higher elementary school without any irregularities and obtain good grades. Denied of the possibility to go on to middle school, high school and university for personal or financial reasons, they remain buried in the countryside with a burning desire for selfadvancement. For these students normal school was often a compromise between their ambitions and the possibilities of fulfilling those ambitions. The rigid system of the normal schools, often compared to service in the army by former students, submitted the students to a strict schedule and left them little freedom. As life in the schools was based mainly upon traditional values, prospective teachers, besides obtaining all kinds of educational knowledge, were imbued with a
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strong sense of duty, punctuality, obedience and frugality. These attributes, paired with their zeal for learning and their desire to rise socially, were important preconditions for their advancement in society, as the example of Shizue and her husband shows. Shizue graduated in 1920 and soon started teaching at the higher elementary school in Tateishi, which she had attended as a pupil. At the same time, she began to study for another exam (chuto gakko kyoin menkyojo no monbusho kentei shiken), which would qualify her as a teacher at secondary school level. In 1922 she married an elementary school teacher. The marriage was arranged by the headmaster of her school, who happened to be a friend of her future husband. They married on 26 March and the very next day her husband left for Tokyo leaving his newly-wed wife behind. They had agreed on living separately for a couple of years because her husband wanted to take the exam for higher civil servants (koto shiken), for which he was going to prepare in Tokyo. Meanwhile Shizue could also continue with her studies for the secondary school teacher’s exam which she passed in 1923. In the same year she started teaching at a girls’ high school in Oita, earning ¥80 per month, which was quite a good salary. All this shows that Shizue was rather conservative as far as personal matters (like marriage and family) were concerned. With regard to her career, however, she was very ambitious and her husband clearly encouraged her, which was no matter of course in those days. Both aspired to self-advancement, hoping that professional achievements would help them to rise up in society. In 1925, Shizue followed her husband to Tokyo, where—three years after their marriage—they eventually started a normal family life. The decision to move to Tokyo was not on Shizue’s own initiative. But following her career-conscious husband— which she considered her duty as his wife—she became a member of the urban new middle class. Her further development shows that she was well prepared and quite capable of coping with this new situation.
CITY LIFE: FAMILY AND WORK One year after Shizue had come to Tokyo, her husband passed the difficult civil service exam in 1926. This examination qualified him for a career in the higher civil service, but he decided to remain in his teaching position, despite all the effort he had gone through to pass
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the examination. One reason for his decision was the fact that starting a career in the civil service, where he was a mere beginner, would have meant a considerable loss in income: not only would his salary have been lower, but his wife would have been forced to give up her work as well, because as a civil servant he would have been transferred to places all over Japan. It seems that meanwhile he had made up his mind to start a family and set down roots in Tokyo. Employment conditions in the civil service were not compatible with this. This decision, therefore, marks the real starting point of their city life. One year later, in 1927, their first son was born, followed by a daughter in 1931. Despite this, Shizue continued to work, mainly for economic reasons as she explained. This was not uncommon. In the interwar period (1919–37) female teachers amounted to 35 to 37 per cent of all elementary school teachers in Tokyo, and many of them were married. Among the twelve or thirteen female teachers at Shizue’s school in Tokyo only two were not married. For women with small children the school provided a kind of ‘nursing room’, where young mothers could suckle their babies, who were brought in by maids or babysitters several times a day. When Shizue was expecting her first child, the family moved closer to her school to enable her to continue with her work while caring for the baby. They also took in a young girl, who looked after the baby, but did not help her much with other housekeeping tasks. It has to be stressed that this girl was not a full-time maid, a luxury which they could not have afforded at that time, but a lowly-paid babysitter. This is important to note because employing full-time servants is often seen as one characteristic attribute of the middleclass household and, as will be shown later, the Takemura family did not yet belong to this social class. When Shizue came to Tokyo in 1925 she could not find employment at a girls’ high school, and therefore started teaching at an elementary school again. Her high qualifications helped her quickly to gain authority, and she soon obtained a senior position among the female teachers at Matsuba Elementary School. Her husband also gained from his ‘over-qualification’ by having passed the civil service examination. It not only strengthened his self-confidence in his various research and lecturing jobs, but also bettered his position vis-à-vis the educational authorities. It certainly was one of the main reasons why he was promoted to the position of headmaster at the extremely young age of forty-four in 1939.
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So, Shizue and her husband obviously had no difficulties settling into urban society. There may have been some help from former Oita fellow students, living in Tokyo—just as the Takemuras helped young people from the countryside later—but the main reasons for their smooth integration were their good qualifications and their constant efforts to advance in their professional careers as well as in society. While praising their success, one should not forget to look at the reverse side, too. Their advancement in urban society was by no means easy or free of costs. Both of them worked extremely hard and never allowed themselves much rest. Shizue’s husband went to school nearly every day, even on Sundays and holidays, and he did so all the more after having been promoted to the position of headmaster. Shizue recounts that if he took off one week during the summer vacations it was already considered a very long holiday. Since he also spent much time lecturing and participating in research groups, he had little time to spare for his family. Even though his wife was working too, he never helped her with the daily chores or looked after the children. So, it was Shizue who had to shoulder the double burden of working and housekeeping. She worked from early morning into the late evening, having absolutely no time for leisure. She never went with her husband to see a movie or a theatre performance, and had no time to read novels or other books for pleasure. She rarely found enough time to glance over the newspapers which they took regularly. Occasional outings on Sundays, when she took her children to nearby Ueno park for a picnic, was all she could think of when asked about her leisure time. As was quite common in white-collar families before the war, Shizue and her husband frequently received guests in their home who would sometimes stay overnight. But such parties were rather an extension of her husband’s working life than a pleasure, and for Shizue it always meant additional work. All this shows that most of the pleasures and amusements which are commonly associated with the so-called ‘Taisho culture’ (Taisho bunka) and seen as part of the urban life at that time did not exist for Shizue and her husband. Even though their combined income should have been high enough to allow them a more leisurely life, their aspirations and their pursuit of social advancement restricted them to a frugal lifestyle and drove them to work very hard. However, Shizue and her husband may not have regretted this very much. Their success later on amply rewarded them for all these efforts.
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Regine Mathias
CITY LIFE: ECONOMIC SITUATION When the Takemuras moved to Tokyo, the economic boom of the First World War had ended and the following depression(s) caused a rapid deterioration of conditions in the labour market in Tokyo and other cities. But as both Shizue and her husband were highly qualified, they soon found work, although, in the case of Shizue, not in a completely adequate position. Being teachers, Shizue and her husband were civil servants, receiving a fixed salary, which was low but rose steadily owing to regular promotions. Therefore their income was less affected by the economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s than, for example, the wages of factory workers. The development of their family income as shown in the following table clearly reflects the relative stability. When compared to their colleagues, the Takemuras were far better off, considering their total income, which ranged from ¥158 in 1923 to ¥265 in 1942. In 1922, for example, teachers earning up to ¥100 formed the lower income group, while those with ¥100 to ¥200 were the middle, and those with more than ¥200 the higher income group. In 1926, the dividing line between the lower and middle income group had moved up to ¥120, while the higher income group started at the level of ¥160 to ¥180 (Takemura 1988:77–82). Compared with these figures the Takemura family belonged to the middle group right from the beginning of their life in Tokyo. Thus, they did not have to start from the very bottom of the income scale. This is important to note, especially when considering the short period of only fifteen years—between their marriage in 1922 and their purchase of a house in 1937—in which they succeeded in establishing themselves in the urban proprietary middle class. Their favourable starting position was mostly due to Shizue’s income, which accounted for more than 40 per cent of their total income (see Table 6.1). Her husband later acknowledged this, when he said: ‘Looking back on our life I think that the fact that my wife was working as a teacher for fifteen, sixteen years, greatly helped us to establish a solid economic basis for our life’ (Takemura 1988:170). Even though the husband’s salary was average in the beginning and considerably above average later on—the average salary of male elementary school teachers in Tokyo was ¥85.8 in 1922; ¥89 in 1926; ¥88.4 in 1933; ¥87.3 in 1937 (Takemura 1988: 78, 80, 83) —his regular salary accounted for only 50 to 55 per cent of their family income. Ranking the Takemuras’ household only by his earning, they
From farm to urban middle class
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Table 6.1 Income of the Takemura family 1923–42 (in Yen) (calculated from Takemura 1988:168, tabl. 4.4)
*including allowances 1) figures from December 1931 do not show the temporary reduction in salaries which occurred in the middle of the year 2) sudden rise owing to additional income
would have to be placed in the upper part of the lowest income bracket or the lower part of the middle group respectively. Such an income was just sufficient to cover the necessary costs for daily life, providing almost no flexibility in the structure of expenditures (Takemura 1988:96, 105, 112). It thus becomes quite obvious that the regular salary of an elementary school teacher was at