Heidegger Reexamined
Edited w i t h introductions by
Hubert Dreyfus University
of California,
Berkeley
Mark Wrathall Brigham
Young
University
A R O U T L E D G E SERIES
Contents of the Collection Volume 1 Dasein, Authenticity, and Death Volume 2 T r u t h , Realism, and the H i s t o r y of Being Volume 3 A r t , Poetry, and Technology Volume 4 Language and the Critique of Subjectivity
Heidegger Reexamined Volume 1
Dasein, Authenticity, and Death
Edited w i t h introductions by
Hubert Dreyfus University
of California,
Berkeley
Mark Wrathall Brigham
Young University
Published in 2 0 0 2 by Routledge 2 9 West 3 5 t h Street N e w York, N Y 10001 www.routledge-ny.com Published in Great B r i t a i n by Routledge 1 1 N e w Fetter Lane L o n d o n EC4P 4EE www.routledge.co.uk R o u t l e d g e i s a n i m p r i n t o f the T a y l o r & Francis G r o u p . C o p y r i g h t © 2 0 0 2 by T a y l o r & Francis B o o k s , I n c . P r i n t e d i n the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a o n acid-free paper. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or r e p r o d u c e d o r u t i l i z e d i n any f o r m o r b y any e l e c t r o n i c , m e c h a n i c a l , o r o t h e r means, n o w k n o w n o r hereafter i n v e n t e d , i n c l u d i n g p h o t o c o p y i n g a n d r e c o r d i n g , o r i n any i n f o r m a t i o n storage o r r e t r i e v a l system, w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n i n w r i t i n g f r o m the publisher. 1 0
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
L i b r a r y o f Congress C a t a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a H e i d e g g e r r e e x a m i n e d / edited w i t h i n t r o d u c t i o n s b y H u b e r t D r e y f u s , M a r k Wrathall p. cm. I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 1 - 9 (set : a l k p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 2 - 7 (v. 1: a l k . p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 3 - 5 (v. 2 : a l k . p a p e r — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 4 - 3 (v. 3 : a l k . p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 5 - 1 (v. 4 : a l k . p a p e r ) . 1 . Heidegger, M a r t i n , 1 8 8 9 - 1 9 7 6 . I . Dreyfus, H u b e r t L . I I . W r a t h a l l , M a r k A . B3279.H49 H35228 2002 193—dc21 2002005873
Contents vii
Series I n t r o d u c t i o n
xi
Volume Introduction
1
The Young Heidegger and Phenomenology John
35
van
Dasein, the Being that Thematizes Robert
73
R.
Brandom
Heidegger on Being a Person John
85
Buren
Haugeland
H e i d e g g e r a n d Dasein's ' B o d i l y N a t u r e ' : W h a t i s t h e H i d d e n Problematic? David
R.
Cerbone
107 Being and the L i v i n g Didier
Franck
1 2 1 I n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d the S e m a n t i c s o f ' D a s e i n ' M.
Roderick
Stewart
1 3 5 H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i q u e o f t h e Husserl/Searle A c c o u n t o f I n t e n t i o n a l i t y Hubert 157
L.
Sexual D i f f e r e n c e , O n t o l o g i c a l D i f f e r e n c e
Geschlecht: Jacques
177
Dreyfus
Derrida
E x i s t e n c e a n d S e l f - U n d e r s t a n d i n g in Being and Time William
D.
Blattner
191 Heidegger's " A u t h e n t i c i t y " Revisited Charles 211
B.
Guignon
I n d i v i d u a l a n d C o m m u n i t y i n E a r l y H e i d e g g e r : S i t u a t i n g das Man, the M a n - S e l f , a n d S e l f - o w n e r s h i p i n Dasein's O n t o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e Edgar
C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
2 4 8 H e i d e g g e r o n the R e l a t i o n o f O n e s e l f t o Oneself: C h o o s i n g O n e s e l f Ernst
Tugendhat
2 6 7 H e i d e g g e r a n d the Sources o f I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y Pierre Keller and David S. Weberman
ν
Contents
VI
285
Social C o n s t r a i n t s o n C o n v e r s a t i o n a l C o n t e n t : H e i d e g g e r o n Rede a n d Gerede Mark A. Wrathall
3 0 7 T h e C o n c e p t of D e a t h in Being and Time William
D.
Blattner
330 Dasein, Existence, and Death Carol J. 345
White
M e t a p h y s i c s , M e t o n t o l o g y , a n d t h e E n d of Being and Time Steven Galt Crowell
371 Acknowledgments
Series Introduction M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r i s u n d e n i a b l y one o f t h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l p h i l o s o phers o f t h e 2 0
t h
c e n t u r y . H i s w o r k has been a p p r o p r i a t e d b y s c h o l a r s i n
fields as diverse as p h i l o s o p h y , classics, p s y c h o l o g y , l i t e r a t u r e , h i s t o r y , socio l o g y , a n t h r o p o l o g y , p o l i t i c a l science, r e l i g i o u s studies, a n d c u l t u r a l studies. I n t h i s f o u r - v o l u m e series, w e ' v e c o l l e c t e d a set o f articles t h a t w e believe represent some o f the best research o n the m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a n d d i f f i c u l t issues i n c o n t e m p o r a r y H e i d e g g e r s c h o l a r s h i p . I n p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r t h i s c o l l e c t i o n , w e h a v e q u i t e d e l i b e r a t e l y t r i e d t o i d e n t i f y the papers t h a t engage c r i t i c a l l y w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t . T h i s i s n o t just because w e w a n t e d t o focus o n " l i v e " issues i n H e i d e g g e r s c h o l a r s h i p . I t i s also because c r i t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the t e x t is, i n o u r o p i n i o n , the best w a y t o grasp Heidegger's t h o u g h t . Heidegger is a n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t r e a d — i n part, because h e i s d e l i b e r a t e l y t r y i n g t o b r e a k w i t h t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , i n p a r t , because his w a y o f b r e a k i n g w i t h the t r a d i t i o n w a s o f t e n t o c o i n n e o l o g i s m s (a less s y m p a t h e t i c reader m i g h t d i s m i s s it as o b f u s c a t o r y j a r g o n ) , a n d , i n p a r t , because H e i d e g g e r b e l i e v e d h i s task w a s t o p r o v o k e his readers t o t h o u g h t f u l n e s s r a t h e r t h a n p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h a facile a n s w e r t o a w e l l - d e f i n e d p r o b l e m . Because o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , w e believe t h a t i t i s i n c u m b e n t u p o n t h e c o m m e n t a t o r t o keep the m a t t e r f o r t h o u g h t i n t h e f o r e f r o n t — t h e issue t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s t r y i n g t o shed l i g h t o n . W i t h o u t such a n e n g a g e m e n t i n the m a t t e r f o r t h o u g h t , Heidegger scholarship all t o o often devolves i n t o e m p t y w o r d play. So, t h e f i r s t a n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t c r i t e r i o n w e ' v e used i n selecting papers i s t h a t t h e y engage w i t h i m p o r t a n t issues i n H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t , a n d d o s o i n a clear, n o n - o b f u s c a t o r y f a s h i o n . N e x t , w e h a v e b y a n d large a v o i d e d r e p u b l i s h i n g articles t h a t are a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e i n o t h e r c o l l e c t i o n s o f essays o n H e i d e g g e r . W e h a v e m a d e e x c e p t i o n s , h o w e v e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n t h e essay i s l o c a t e d i n a v o l u m e t h a t w o u l d easily b e o v e r l o o k e d b y Heidegger scholars. Finally, as o u r p r i m a r y i n t e n t was to collect and m a k e r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e w o r k o n c u r r e n t issues a n d p r o b l e m s a r i s i n g o u t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t , w e have t r i e d t o select recent r a t h e r t h a n d a t e d a r t i cles. I n selecting t h e m e s f o r each v o l u m e , w e h a v e , i n g e n e r a l , been g u i d e d b y t h e o r d e r i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r , o v e r the c o u r s e o f h i s career, d e v o t e d extended a t t e n t i o n to the p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d . T h u s , the first v o l u m e c o n vii
Series
Vitt
Introduction
t a i n s essays f o c u s i n g o n D a s e i n — t h e h u m a n m o d e o f e x i s t e n c e — a n d " e x i s t e n t i a l " themes l i k e a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d d e a t h , because these w e r e p r o m i n e n t c o n c e r n s i n the years l e a d i n g u p t o a n d i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Being and Time i n 1 9 2 7 . T h e s e c o n d v o l u m e centers o n H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f t r u t h , a n d his c r i t i q u e o f the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , because these w e r e areas o f e x t e n d e d i n t e r e s t i n the 1 9 3 0 s a n d 1 9 4 0 s . T h e t h i r d v o l u m e i s o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d themes i n d i g e n o u s t o the ' l a t e ' H e i d e g g e r — namely, Heidegger's w o r k on art, poetry, and technology. B u t t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t the v o l u m e s are g o v e r n e d b y a s t r i c t n o t i o n o f p e r i o d s i n H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k . I n the past, i t has been c o m m o n p l a c e t o s u b d i v i d e H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k i n t o t w o ( e a r l y a n d late) o r even three (early, m i d d l e , a n d late) p e r i o d s . W h i l e there i s s o m e t h i n g t o b e s a i d f o r s u c h d i v i s i o n s — t h e r e is an o b v i o u s sense in w h i c h Being and Time is t h e m a t i c a l l y a n d s t y l i s t i c a l l y u n l i k e H e i d e g g e r ' s p u b l i c a t i o n s f o l l o w i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r — i t i s also m i s l e a d i n g t o speak a s i f there w e r e t w o o r t h r e e d i f ferent H e i d e g g e r s . T h e b i f u r c a t i o n , a s i s w e l l k n o w n , i s s o m e t h i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w a s uneasy a b o u t , a n d s c h o l a r s t o d a y are i n c r e a s i n g l y h e s i t a n t t o d r a w t o o s h a r p a d i v i d e b e t w e e n the e a r l y a n d l a t e . S o w h i l e the themes o f the f i r s t t h r e e v o l u m e s have been set b y H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n h i s t o r i c a l course t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h y , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f papers i n t o v o l u m e s does n o t respect a d i v i s i o n o f s c h o l a r s h i p i n t o e a r l y a n d late. W e have f o u n d instead t h a t the papers r e l e v a n t t o a n ' e a r l y H e i d e g g e r ' issue o f t e n d r a w o n H e i d e g g e r ' s l a t e r w o r k , a n d vice versa. 1
T h e last v o l u m e i n the series i s o r g a n i z e d less b y H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n t h e m a t i c c o n c e r n s t h a n b y a n i n t e r e s t i n H e i d e g g e r ' s relevance t o c o n t e m porary philosophy. Given mainstream analytic philosophy's preoccupation w i t h language a n d m i n d , h o w e v e r , t h i s v o l u m e does have t w o t h e m a t i c c e n ters o f g r a v i t y — H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k o n the essence o f l a n g u a g e , a n d h i s c r i tique of modernist accounts of subjectivity. I n its focus o n H e i d e g g e r ' s relevance t o o n g o i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e r n s , h o w e v e r , v o l u m e f o u r m e r e l y m a k e s o b v i o u s the i n t e n t i o n o f the series a s a w h o l e . I n his 1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e course o n l o g i c , H e i d e g g e r b e m o a n e d the fact t h a t p e o p l e " n o l o n g e r p h i l o s o p h i z e f r o m t h e issues, b u t f r o m t h e i r c o l league's b o o k s . " I n a s i m i l a r w a y , w e believe t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s d e s e r v i n g o f a t t e n t i o n a s a p h i l o s o p h e r o n l y because h e i s such a n e x c e l l e n t g u i d e t o the issues themselves. W e h o p e t h a t the papers w e have c o l l e c t e d here d e m o n s t r a t e H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n t i n u i n g p e r t i n e n c e t o the m o s t p r e s s i n g issues in contemporary philosophy. 2
NOTES 1
W r i t i n g to Richardson, Heidegger noted:
"The distinction you
make between
Heidegger I and II is justified o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n that this is kept c o n s t a n t l y in m i n d : o n l y b y w a y o f w h a t [ H e i d e g g e r ] I has t h o u g h t does o n e g a i n access t o w h a t
Series
Introduction
tx
is t o - b e - t h o u g h t by [ H e i d e g g e r ] I I . B u t the t h o u g h t of [ H e i d e g g e r ] I becomes possible o n l y i f i t i s c o n t a i n e d i n [ H e i d e g g e r ] I I . " W i l l i a m J . R i c h a r d s o n , " L e t t e r t o
R i c h a r d s o n , " in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought ( T h e H a g u e : M. N i j h o f f , 1963), 8. 1
Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit,
Klostermann, 1995), 84.
Gesamtausgabe 21
( F r a n k f u r t am M a i n :
Volume Introduction H e i d e g g e r ' s Being and Time w a s p u b l i s h e d in 1 9 2 7 a n d r e m a i n s one of the m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k s o f the past c e n t u r y . I n i t , H e i d e g g e r u n d e r t a k e s a n a m b i t i o u s o n t o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t — t h e c e n t r a l task o f the b o o k i s t o d i s c o v e r the m e a n i n g o f b e i n g — o n the basis o f a s u b t l e a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the h u m a n m o d e o f existence. T h e articles c o l l e c t e d i n t h i s v o l u m e focus o n s o m e o f the m o s t v e x i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t g r o w o u t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f h u m a n existence. I n o r d e r t o set u p these papers, w e w o u l d l i k e t o offer a b r i e f i n t r o d u c t i o n t o H e i d e g g e r ' s w a y o f d o i n g p h i l o s o p h y , his a c c o u n t o f h u m a n existence, a n d the c o n c e r n s w i t h a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d d e a t h t h a t g r o w o u t o f t h a t a c c o u n t . H e i d e g g e r ' s e a r l y p h i l o s o p h y w a s p r o f o u n d l y shaped b y his s t u d y o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l w o r k s o f H u s s e r l , D i l t h e y a n d , t o a lesser degree, Scheler. B u t H e i d e g g e r b r o k e v e r y e a r l y o n w i t h any f o r m a l " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d " a n d e v e n t u a l l y d r o p p e d the t e r m ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' a s a s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n , w o r r i e d t h a t r e p r e s e n t i n g his t h o u g h t a s p h e n o m e n o l o g y w o u l d cause h i m t o b e associated w i t h H u s s e r l ' s s u b s t a n t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s . W i t h the o n g o i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s Collected Works, i t has b e c o m e possible t o d o c u m e n t the f o r m a t i v e i n f l u e n c e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y on H e i d e g g e r (see J o h n v a n Buren's p a p e r ) , as w e l l as his e v e n t u a l break w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . O n the l a t t e r p o i n t , see Steve C r o w e l l ' s paper, w h i c h explores Heidegger's struggle w i t h the l i m i t a t i o n s of p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a m e t h o d f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y , a n d his m o v e b e y o n d H u s s e r l i a n phen o m e n o l o g y in the decade f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of Being and Time. D e s p i t e his b r e a k w i t h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m o v e m e n t , H e i d e g g e r c o n s i d e r e d his w o r k t h r o u g h o u t his life t o b e " a m o r e f a i t h f u l adherence t o the p r i n c i p l e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y " ( i n his o w n loose sense o f the t e r m ) . F o r H e i d e g g e r , p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s a n ' a t t i t u d e ' o r p r a c t i c e i n 'seeing' t h a t takes its d e p a r t u r e f r o m l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e . I t a i m s a t g r a s p i n g the p h e n o m e n a o f l i v e d i n v o l v e m e n t i n the w o r l d , before o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w o r l d becomes d e t e r m i n e d a n d a l t e r e d i n ' t h e m a t i c ' o r r e f l e c t i v e t h o u g h t . I n t h i s respect, H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k i s i n m a r k e d c o n t r a s t t o the m e t h o d o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis t h a t has c o m e t o d o m i n a t e p h i l o s o p h y i n the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g w o r l d f o l l o w i n g the " l i n g u i s t i c t u r n " o f the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . F o r H e i d e g g e r , o u r c o n c e p t s a n d l a n g u a g e c o m e t o o late, a n d have a d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e t h a n o u r p r e - p r o p o s i t i o n a l w a y o f c o m p o r t i n g i n the w o r l d . I t i s 1
xi
xii
Volume
Introduction
t h u s n o t possible t o d i s c o v e r the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l features o f h u m a n e x i s tence t h r o u g h a n a n a l y s i s o f l a n g u a g e a n d c o n c e p t s . 2
T h e c o r e o f Being and Time i s a n analysis o f the h u m a n m o d e o f b e i n g , w h i c h H e i d e g g e r names w i t h t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n . ' D a s e i n means existence i n c o l l o q u i a l G e r m a n , b u t H e i d e g g e r used i t a s a t e r m t o refer t o t h e p e c u l i a r l y h u m a n w a y o f e x i s t i n g ( w i t h o u t , o f course, d e c i d i n g i n advance w h e t h e r o n l y h u m a n s e x i s t i n t h i s w a y ) . T r a n s l a t o r s o f H e i d e g g e r have elected t o leave the t e r m u n t r a n s l a t e d , a n d s o i t has n o w passed i n t o c o m m o n parlance a m o n g Heidegger scholars. O n e o f the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g features o f H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f D a s e i n i s the p r i o r i t y he discovers in n o n - c o g n i t i v e modes of b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l i n t e n t i o n a l states t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n has seen a s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f D a s e i n are, i n H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis, d e r i v a t i v e p h e n o m e n a . H u b e r t D r e y f u s ' s a r t i c l e , " H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i q u e o f the Husserl/Searle A c c o u n t o f I n t e n t i o n a l i t y , " explains Heidegger's practice-based account o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , a n d explores the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Heidegger's radical r e t h i n k i n g o f h u m a n b e i n g f o r m a i n s t r e a m a c c o u n t s o f the m i n d - w o r l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . J o h n H a u g e l a n d offers a defense o f the idea t h a t h u m a n existence c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d a s p r i m a r i l y p r a c t i c a l i n n a t u r e . T h i s v i e w o f h u m a n existence, f o r H a u g e l a n d , u n d e r w r i t e s a r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e Kantian/Cartesian t r a d i t i o n of t h i n k i n g a b o u t p e r s o n h o o d . As a result, H a u g e l a n d argues, D a s e i n s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a p a t t e r n o f n o r m s ( a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d m e a n i n g s t h a t are based i n s u c h n o r m s ) . O t h e r i n t e r preters o f H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , argue t h a t w h i l e H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s cert a i n l y emphasizes n o n - c o g n i t i v e states, l a n g u a g e a n d c o g n i t i o n nevertheless p l a y a c r u c i a l r o l e i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n . I n " I n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d t h e Semantics o f D a s e i n , " f o r i n s t a n c e , J o h n S t e w a r t argues t h a t H a u g e l a n d ' s a n d Dreyfus's readings of Dasein underemphasize d e l i b e r a t i o n and other t h e m a t i c states. R o b e r t B r a n d o m s i m i l a r l y argues t h a t l a n g u a g e i s essential t o Dasein's b e i n g . C r i t i c i z i n g " l a y e r - c a k e " m o d e l s o f l a n g u a g e — t h a t is, theories i n w h i c h l a n g u a g e c a n s i m p l y b e a d d e d o n t o a n a l r e a d y h u m a n b u t n o n - l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t y — B r a n d o m argues t h a t a p r e - l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y w o u l d n o t c o u n t as Dasein for Heidegger. O t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t issues r e m a i n s u r r o u n d i n g the n a t u r e a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n of D a s e i n . A c e n t r a l a i m of Being and Time is to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t D a s e i n i s a m o d e o f existence d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t e n j o y e d b y objects i n the w o r l d , a n d t h a t i t c a n n o t b e reduced t o o r g r o u n d e d i n the m o d e o f being o f objects. I n s t e a d , D a s e i n i s essentially a l w a y s i n a w o r l d , w h i c h , i n t u r n , i s a l w a y s o r g a n i z e d m e a n i n g f u l l y . W i t h i n the w o r l d , D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r Daseins, a n d also o t h e r objects w i t h m o d e s o f b e i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m D a s e i n . T h e o t h e r p r i n c i p a l m o d e s o f b e i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r discusses i n Being and Time are t h e ' a v a i l a b l e ' ( o r ' r e a d y - t o - h a n d ' ) a n d the ' o c c u r r e n t ' ( o r ' p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d ' ) . E q u i p m e n t is p a r a d i g m a t i c of the a v a i l a b l e .
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S o m e t h i n g i s a v a i l a b l e w h e n (1) i t i s d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f its place i n a c o n t e x t o f e q u i p m e n t , t y p i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n w h i c h i t i s used, a n d t y p i c a l p u r p o s e s o r goals w i t h w h i c h i t i s used, a n d (2) i t lends i t s e l f t o such use r e a d i l y a n d easily, w i t h o u t need f o r r e f l e c t i o n . T h e c o r e case o f availableness i s a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t o f w h i c h w e have a p r i m o r d i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (i.e., w e k n o w h o w t o use i t ) , a n d w h i c h t r a n s p a r e n t l y lends i t s e l f t o use. T h e o t h e r p r i m a r y m o d e o f b e i n g i s O c c u r r e n t n e s s ' o r 'presence-ath a n d . ' T h i s i s the m o d e o f b e i n g o f t h i n g s w h i c h are n o t g i v e n a w o r l d l y d e t e r m i n a t i o n — t h a t is, t h i n g s c o n s t i t u t e d b y p r o p e r t i e s t h e y possess i n themselves, r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h t h e i r r e l a t i o n s t o uses a n d objects o f use. M o s t a v a i l a b l e t h i n g s c a n also b e v i e w e d a s o c c u r r e n t , a n d i n b r e a k d o w n s i t u a t i o n s , the o c c u r r e n t n e s s o f a n a v a i l a b l e o b j e c t w i l l o b t r u d e . A n i m p o r t a n t t h e m e in Being and Time is H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i e s a n d sciences have t a k e n the o c c u r r e n t a s p r i m o r d i a l , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y f a i l e d t o p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f the a v a i l a b l e . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , H e i d e g g e r argues t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n has also t r i e d t o i n t e r p r e t D a s e i n o n the m o d e l o f o c c u r r e n t e n t i t i e s . A c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , there i s n o w a y t o reduce the m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f the w o r l d o r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d t o a c o l l e c t i o n o f o c c u r r e n t entities w i t h o c c u r r e n t p r o p e r t i e s . A k e y e l e m e n t in H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t is the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the o n t i c a n d o n t o l o g i c a l . Being and Time is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the m e a n i n g of b e i n g — t h a t o n the basis o f w h i c h b e i n g i s u n d e r s t o o d . H e i d e g g e r argues t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l t r e a t m e n t s o f b e i n g have f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h the t w o k i n d s o f q u e s t i o n s w e c a n ask a b o u t b e i n g : the o n t i c q u e s t i o n t h a t asks a b o u t the p r o p e r t i e s o f beings, a n d the o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n t h a t asks a b o u t w a y s o r m o d e s o f b e i n g . D a s e i n , the a v a i l a b l e , a n d the o c c u r r e n t are o n t o l o g i c a l categories. I f one o n t o l o g i c a l l y investigates a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t , say, a p e n , t h e n o n e asks a b o u t the s t r u c t u r e s b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h i t i s a v a i l a b l e o r r e a d y t o h a n d . I n a n o n t i c i n q u i r y , o n the o t h e r h a n d , one asks a b o u t the p r o p e r t i e s , a n d the p h y s i c a l a n d r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s p e c u l i a r t o the p e n . H e i d e g g e r ' s c r i t i q u e o f the t r a d i t i o n c o m e s f r o m the s i m p l e observ a t i o n that an ontic i n q u i r y , no matter h o w exhaustive, cannot tell anyt h i n g a b o u t the o n t o l o g i c a l m o d e o f b e i n g o f a t h i n g . T h i s i s because a listi n g o f a pen's p r o p e r t i e s c a n n o t t e l l m e w h y i t i s a v a i l a b l e r a t h e r t h a n occurrent. O n e o u t c o m e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f D a s e i n i s the c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n features o f h u m a n existence are m e r e l y o n t i c p r o p e r t i e s — t h i n g s l i k e s e x u a l i t y a n d o t h e r features o f o u r e m b o d i m e n t , f o r i n s t a n c e — a n d p l a y n o role i n the o n t o l o g i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n . I n "Geschlecht," D e r r i d a q u e s t i o n s t h i s o u t c o m e , a n d uses i t t o e x p l o r e the v a l i d i t y o f the o n t i c / o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n . D e r r i d a , t o o , i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the difference b e t w e e n e x i s t e n t i e l l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l features. H e q u e s t i o n s H e i d e g g e r ' s readiness t o t r e a t t h i n g s l i k e s e x u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s o n t i c .
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Introduction
S i m i l a r c o n c e r n s are raised b y a n " o n t i c " feature o f h u m a n existence l i k e b e i n g e m b o d i e d (see D a v i d C e r b o n e ' s " H e i d e g g e r a n d Dasein's ' B o d i l y N a t u r e ' : W h a t i s the H i d d e n P r o b l e m a t i c ? " ) o r b e i n g alive (See D i d i e r F r a n c k ' s " B e i n g a n d the L i v i n g " ) . T h e r o l e o f l a n g u a g e i n Dasein's c o n s t i t u t i o n — a t o p i c w e ' v e a l r e a d y t o u c h e d o n — i s d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the " e x i s t e n t i a l " themes o f Being and Time. It is s o m e t i m e s s u p p o s e d t h a t the source of Dasein's t e n d e n c y t o w a r d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y i s the i n h e r e n t b a n a l i t y a n d l e v e l l i n g o f p u b l i c l a n guage. D r a w i n g o n a n a l y t i c w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e , M a r k W r a t h a l l argues t h a t t h i s v i e w i s n o t s u p p o r t a b l e o n the basis o f H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w s o f l a n g u a g e . E v e n i f Dasein's use o f l a n g u a g e i s n o t d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the f a l l i n t o i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , i t i s s t i l l possible t h a t i t p l a y s a r o l e i n i t . T h e p r o b l e m c a n b e p o s e d i n t e r m s o f the f o l l o w i n g p a r a d o x : to fail to acknowledge a constitutive role for language a n d public p r a c t i c e s t h r e a t e n s t o l e a d t o s o l i p s i s m ; t o give t h e m t o o s t r o n g a r o l e , o n the o t h e r h a n d , w o u l d e n t a i l t h a t there i s n o h i g h e r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t h a n e v e r y d a y i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . Heidegger, h o w e v e r , b o t h denies t h a t his v i e w i s s o l i p s i s t i c , a n d , t h r o u g h his v i e w s o n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d his c r i t i q u e o f the b a n a l i t y o f das Man (the source o f p u b l i c i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ) , suggests t h a t there is a higher sort of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y uncovered in authenticity. We've included f o u r articles t h a t s t r u g g l e w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Dasein's i n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d its beholdenness t o p u b l i c sources o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y : " H e i d e g g e r a n d the Sources o f I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , " b y Pierre K e l l e r a n d D a v i d W e b e r m a n , E . C . Boedeker's " I n d i v i d u a l a n d C o m m u n i t y i n E a r l y H e i d e g g e r , " E r n s t Tugendhat's "Heidegger on the Relation of Oneself to Oneself," and Charles Guignon's "Heidegger's ' A u t h e n t i c i t y ' Revisited." T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a u t h e n t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n arises f r o m the fact t h a t , u n l i k e o c c u r r e n t e n t i t i e s , t h e w a y t h a t D a s e i n takes u p its residence i n the w o r l d i s n o t f i x e d o r necessitated. T h a t i s t o say, the r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t D a s e i n enjoys w i t h o t h e r t h i n g s , a n d the s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t o t h e r t h i n g s h o l d f o r D a s e i n , are c o n t i n g e n t a n d a l w a y s subject t o c h a n g e . H e i d e g g e r m a k e s t h i s p o i n t b y s a y i n g t h a t f o r D a s e i n , " i n its v e r y B e i n g , t h a t B e i n g i s a n issue f o r i t . " A n o t h e r w a y o f d e v e l o p i n g t h i s p o i n t , h o w e v e r , p o i n t s o u t the p a r a d o x i c a l i t y o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t f r o m the a c c o u n t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n : " T h e essence o f D a s e i n , " H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , " i s its e x i s t e n c e . " In " E x i s t e n c e a n d S e l f - U n d e r s t a n d i n g in Being and Time," W i l l i a m B l a t t n e r helps d i s s o l v e the p a r a d o x b y u n f o l d i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f Dasein's existence i n t e r m s o f Dasein's s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t D a s e i n , u n l i k e mere o b j e c t s , i s a l w a y s o p e n t o e x i s t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t ways. A consequence o f t h i s i s t h a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r w a y o f e x i s t i n g i n the w o r l d i s necessarily f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n g r o u n d e d — " i t i s the n u l l basis o f its o w n n u l l i t y . " T h i s i s a d i s q u i e t i n g fact, a n d o n e t h a t D a s e i n disguises f r o m 3
4
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i t s e l f — p r i m a r i l y b y t a k i n g u p societal n o r m s a s i f t h e y s o m e h o w r e v e a l e d the t r u t h a b o u t h o w one s h o u l d l i v e . B u t a n x i e t y i n the face o f d e a t h , H e i d e g g e r argues, i f faced u p t o , c a n o p e n the d o o r t o a n a u t h e n t i c existence: " A n x i e t y , " H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , " l i b e r a t e s o n e f r o m p o s s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h ' c o u n t f o r n o t h i n g ' , a n d lets o n e b e c o m e free-for those w h i c h are authentic." 5
A l t h o u g h there c a n b e n o q u e s t i o n t h a t d e a t h p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c of Being and Time, c e r t a i n features of H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t of d e a t h m a k e i t u n c l e a r w h a t e x a c t l y i t i s t h a t ' d e a t h ' refers t o . H e i d e g g e r i s e m p h a t i c t h a t he d o e s n ' t m e a n a m e r e o r g a n i c d e m i s e — t h i s in i t s e l f is e n o u g h t o raise q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e d e a t h h e has i n m i n d , f o r s u r e l y ' d e a t h , ' a t least i n o r d i n a r y uses o f the t e r m , has o r g a n i c demise a s a n i n t e g r a l p a r t . A n d H e i d e g g e r i s clear t h a t d e a t h i s a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s u n a b l e t o b e . A t the same t i m e , H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s t h a t d e a t h , a s " t h e poss i b i l i t y o f the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f existence i n g e n e r a l " i s a w a y o f b e i n g o f D a s e i n . W e have i n c l u d e d t w o d i f f e r e n t efforts a t r e c o n c i l i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s various c o m m e n t s o n d e a t h — C a r o l White's " D a s e i n , Existence and D e a t h , " and W i l l i a m Blattner's " T h e Concept o f D e a t h i n Being and Time." 6
7
8
NOTES Mn W i l l i a m J. R i c h a r d s o n , Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, ( T h e H a g u e : M . N i j h o f f , 1 9 6 3 ) , 4 . See a l s o " M y W a y t o P h e n o m e n o l o g y , " i n M a r t i n Heidegger,
On
Time
and
Being,
trans.
Joan
Stambaugh
(New
York: Harper
&
Row, 1972), pp. 74-82. 2
F o r a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e relevance o f H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k t o c o n t e m p o r a r y a n a l y t -
i c p h i l o s o p h y , see t h e essays i n v o l u m e f o u r o f t h i s c o l l e c t i o n . 3
Being and
Time,
trans.
John
H a r p e r & Row, 1962), p. 32. "Ibid.,
354.
'Ibid.,
395.
«Ibid., 2 9 1 , 2 9 5 . 7
Ibid.,
»Ibid.
307.
Macquarrie
and
Edward
Robinson
(New
York:
Man and World 2 3 : 2 3 9 - 2 7 2 , 1990. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Printed
in
the
Netherlands.
The young Heidegger and phenomenology
JOHN V A N BUREN
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ottawa, 65 University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada KIN 6N5
Ways of t h i n k i n g - for w h i c h the past (Vergangenes) remains indeed what has past, but for w h i c h what has been (Gewesendes) persists in c o m i n g - wait u n t i l at some time t h i n k i n g goes along them. (VA, 7 ) 1
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
In
h i s Being and Time, w h i c h appeared
in t h e
1927
issue of H u s s e r l ' s
Jahrbuch, H e i d e g g e r stated t h a t t h e " b a s i s " o f h i s w o r k h a d b e e n p r e p a r e d f o r by H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations. Being
and Time
was
the
result
(SZ, 5 1 / 6 2 ) He also i n d i c a t e d that
of a l o n g p e r i o d
of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . (SZ, 9 7 , n . 1/102, n . i ; 3 5 6 , n . 3 / 3 1 3 , n . 2
i i i ) T h e recent p u b l i c a t i o n o f m a n y o f h i s y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e c o u r s e s b e f o r e Being and Time n o w a l l o w s us to f o l l o w up these i n d i c a t i o n s , w h i c h he h i m s e l f l e f t f o r the m o s t part u n e x p l a i n e d b o t h a t the t i m e a n d a f t e r w a r d s . I w o u l d thus l i k e t o present a r e - c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g o f h i s y o u t h f u l p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r e n t i c e s h i p b e t w e e n the years 1 9 1 9 a n d 1 9 2 6 . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , I w a n t t o argue, f i r s t , that h i s y o u t h f u l , p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Denkweg i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s i s a u n i q u e p e r i o d i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t a n d thus
cannot
be
absorbed
into
either
his
Being
and
Time
or
his
later
w r i t i n g s , a s h e h i m s e l f a n d others h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o d o ; s e c o n d , I w a n t t o argue f u r t h e r that the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r h a d a l r e a d y w o r k e d o u t the themes o f t h e " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " the " t u r n , " the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y , " and the " o t h e r b e g i n n i n g , " o f w h i c h t h e l a s t - m e n t i o n e d are o f t e n t h o u g h t t o b e l o n g e x c l u s i v e l y t o h i s l a t e r p e r i o d after 1 9 3 0 ; a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , I w a n t t o s h o w , w i t h o u t n e g l e c t i n g the o t h e r d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e s o n his y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t , h o w e x a c t l y i t w a s , t h e n , that h e o r i g i n a l l y w o r k e d o u t h i s question of being through a critical appropriation of Husserl's phenomenol-
1
240
o g y a n d e s p e c i a l l y the s i x t h
investigation
in h i s Logical investigations on
the " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " o f " b e i n g . " O n t h e w h o l e , I w i s h t o s h o w that, i n a l l o w i n g u s t o see a l l t h i s , h i s y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e courses o f f e r a n e w a n d m o r e adequate w a y o f r e a d i n g a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g h i s e n t i r e t h o u g h t . L e t u s b e g i n w i t h a n e x p l o r a t i o n o f the g e n e r a l " h e r m e n e u t i c a l situation"
within
which
the
young
Heidegger was
interpreting
Husserl's
phenomenology.
2. The hermeneutical situation
The
young
Heidegger's
preoccupation
with
Husserl's
phenomenology
w e n t , i n fact, a s far b a c k a s h i s e a r l i e s t p u b l i s h e d essays ( 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 1 6 ) , his 3
doctoral dissertation (1914), and his habilitation w r i t i n g (1916). ( F S ) It was
only
financial
reasons
that
had
prevented
him
from
going
to
Göttingen t o d o h i s d o c t o r a l a n d h a b i l i t a t i o n w o r k u n d e r H u s s e r l , instead o f s t a y i n g i n F r e i b u r g u n d e r the N e o - K a n t i a n H e i n r i c h R i c k e r t .
4
I n his
e a r l i e s t s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s , h e used H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a l o n g w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , t o p u r s u e " p u r e l o g i c , " the " d o c t r i n e o f j u d g m e n t , " " a p r i o r i g r a m m a r , " the " d o c t r i n e o f c a t e g o r i e s , " a n d also the " d i v i s i o n o f the e n t i r e f i e l d o f ' b e i n g ' i n t o its v a r i o u s m o d e s o f r e a l i t y . " (FS, 186) H e later c a l l e d t h i s use o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y a m e t a p h y s i c a l " o n t o l o g i c . " ( F S , 55) I n the c o n c l u s i o n t o his h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g o n D u n s Scotus,
which
also
drew
on
Meister
Eckhardt,
German
Idealism
( e s p e c i a l l y H e g e l ) a n d R o m a n t i c i s m ( N o v a l i s , S c h l e g e l ) , a n d the c o n t e m porary
Neo-Hegelian
theology
of
Carl
Braig,
he
used
Husserl's
phenomenology in a speculative, religious "metaphysics," whose "genuine o p t i c " w a s " t h e t r u e r e a l i t y a n d the r e a l t r u t h " o f t h e " a b s o l u t e s p i r i t o f G o d . " (FS, 3 9 9 - 4 1 1 ) H e r e h e w a s a p p r o p r i a t i n g p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n the c o n t e x t o f w h a t h e w o u l d later c a l l " o n t o t h e o l o g y , " i.e., t h e a c c o u n t o f b e i n g a s a d i v i n e g r o u n d . I n spite o f a f e w i n t i m a t i o n s o f w h a t w e t o d a y k n o w o f a s h i s " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " h i s e a r l y s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s f r o m 1912 t o 1916 a n d h i s use o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n t h e m r e m a i n e d c a u g h t u p w i t h i n metaphysics. I n 1916 H u s s e r l t o o k u p the c h a i r o f p h i l o s o p h y i n F r e i b u r g . B u t d u e t o H e i d e g g e r ' s absence f r o m the u n i v e r s i t y i n 1917 a n d 1918 because o f h i s w a r service, it was not u n t i l
1 9 1 9 that h e r e a l l y " m e t H u s s e r l i n h i s
w o r k s h o p " (SD, 8 5 / 7 8 ) a n d a c l o s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m developed.
5
B y that t i m e H e i d e g g e r h a d d i s a s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f f r o m b o t h
2
241
his N e o - K a n t i a n teacher H e i n r i c h R i c k e r t a n d his C a t h o l i c - p h i l o s o p h i c a l affiliations.
(BK,
541)
He
became
Husserl's
assistant
6
(1919-23),
his
7
" f a v o r i t e s t u d e n t , " a n d the " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c h i l d . " D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , 8
H u s s e r l o f t e n s a i d : " Y o u a n d I are p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " I n t u m , H e i d e g g e r w r o t e i n 1923 that " H u s s e r l g a v e m e m y eyes." (HF, 5 ) Because o f h i s c l o s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y , the 1920s h a v e been c a l l e d h i s 9
"phenomenological decade," even though he ascribed to phenomenology b o t h b e f o r e t h i s p e r i o d i n h i s s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s a n d after t h i s p e r i o d i n h i s later w r i t i n g s , a l t h o u g h i n different ways. T h e titles t o r o u g h l y h a l f o f his l e c t u r e courses a n d s e m i n a r s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d c o n t a i n s o m e f o r m o f t h e w o r d " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " ("Phenomenological Exercises i n enological Interpretations o f . . . " , e t c . ) .
1 0
"Phenom-
A l t h o u g h his thought d u r i n g this
p e r i o d certainly w o u l d not have been possible w i t h o u t his dialogues w i t h o t h e r t r a d i t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y A r i s t o t l e a n d C h r i s t i a n a u t h o r s , his p h i l o s o p h i c a l l e x i c o n i s , a s w e s h a l l see, p r i m a r i l y a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o n e . H i s n e w p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y after 1 9 1 9 w a s n o t a n u n c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f i t , a s h a d b e e n the case f o r the m o s t p a r t in his doctoral dissertation and habilitation w r i t i n g . He was n o w very m u c h concerned w i t h c a r r y i n g out a " d e s t r u c t i o n " of Husserl's p r i m a r i l y logical self-understanding of his fundamental notion of " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " by t r a c i n g i t b a c k i n t o the concreteness a n d h i s t o r i c i t y o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e . " I n d e e d , a s e a r l y a s 1910, h e h a d w r i t t e n the f o l l o w i n g m a r g i n a l n o t e beside H u s s e r l ' s sentence i n h i s " P h i l o s o p h y a s a R i g o r o u s S c i e n c e " " N o t from
philosophies
but
from
issues
(Sachen)
and
problems
must
the
1 1
His
i m p u l s e t o research p r o c e e d " : " W e w i l l t a k e H u s s e r l at h i s w o r d . "
h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g h a d h i n t e d a t the necessity o f p u s h i n g H u s s e r l ' s " p u r e l o g i c " i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a " p h i l o s o p h y o r i e n t e d t o w o r l d - v i e w . " (FS, 2 0 5 , n . 10) I n 1 9 1 7 , h e w r o t e t o t h e m e d i e v a l i s t M a r t i n G r a b m a n n t h a t h i s m o s t i m m e d i a t e plans i n v o l v e d a " c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h v a l u e - p h i l o s o p h y and p h e n o m e n o l o g y from
the
inside
out."
(BG,
104)
Indeed,
we
find
him
c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s c r i t i q u e i n d e t a i l i n h i s f i r s t l e c t u r e c o u r s e o f 1919. (IP) I n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , h e p r e s e n t e d w h a t e v e n t u a l l y b e c a m e " D i v i s i o n O n e " a n d t h e f i r s t t h i r d o f " D i v i s i o n T w o " o f Being and Time a s a "fundamental
critique
of phenomenological
inquiry."
(GZ,
420/304,
1 9 2 / 1 4 1 - 2 ) A s w e s h a l l see, h e also l a u n c e d t h i s c r i t i q u e i n o t h e r l e c t u r e courses i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s .
1 2
I t w a s n o t r e a l l y u n t i l 1919 a n d t h e years
f o l l o w i n g that his earlier suspicions about Husserl's p h i l o s o p h y were g i v e n actual expression in a full-scale c r i t i q u e . T h e later Heidegger c o u l d thus r e p o r t that at this t i m e he w a s e n g a g e d in a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l b a t t l e
3
242
o f t h e g i a n t s w i t h H u s s e r l a b o u t die Sache selbst, the " t h i n g " o r " t o p i c i t s e l f o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " I s i t c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d its o b j e c t i v i t y , " h e a s k e d h i m s e l f , " o r i s i t the b e i n g o f b e i n g s i n its u n c o n c e a l m e n t a n d c o n c e a l i n g ? " (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 , 4 7 / 4 4 ) Husserl's
Logical
Investigations
1 3
H i s s t a t e m e n t in Being and Time that
laid t h e
"basis"
for
this
work
must,
t h e r e f o r e , b e u n d e r s t o o d i n reference n o t t o his f i r s t n a i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s t e x t i n h i s e a r l y s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s , b u t r a t h e r t o h i s subsequent, v e r y c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n b e g i n n i n g around 1919. I n the l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s o f h i s d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n a n d h i s h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g , he had
relied
o n H u s s e r l ' s Ideas a n d e s p e c i a l l y
on the first
v o l u m e o f his Logical Investigations i n w h i c h H u s s e r l d e v e l o p s h i s i d e a o f a n a n t i - p s y c h o l o g i s t i c " p u r e l o g i c . " B u t his n e w r e t r i e v a l o f H u s s e r l ' s w o r k after
1919 t u r n e d t o w a r d t h e s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n the s e c o n d
v o l u m e . H e r e p o r t e d l a t e r that i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s h e " w o r k e d o n t h e Logical Investigations e v e r y w e e k i n s p e c i a l s t u d y s t u d e n t s . " (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 )
1 4
groups w i t h advanced
E v e n t h o u g h a t that t i m e t h e " m a s t e r n o l o n g e r
h e l d h i s w o r k i n v e r y h i g h e s t e e m , " H e i d e g g e r , s o w e are t o l d , h a d h i s " o w n reasons t o p r e f e r the Logical Investigations f o r the p u r p o s e s o f a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " (US, 8 6 / 5 ) I n d e e d , i n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , w e f i n d h i m b o l d l y d e c l a r i n g t h a t H u s s e r l ' s e a r l y Logical Investigations, a n d n o t a n y o f h i s l a t e r ' ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " w o r k s , i s t h e "fundamental book
of phenomenology."
(GZ,
30/24)
He
came
to
see
Husserl's
later
"transcendental" self-understanding" ( G Z , 188/139, 124/91) of his earlier, "philosophically
neutral"
(SD,
84/77)
Logical Investigations
as
a
"fall"
(GZ, 1 7 9 / 1 2 9 ) i n t o m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e j u d i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y those o f D e s c a r t e s , F i c h t e , a n d N e o - K a n t i a n i s m (SD, 4 7 / 4 4 , 8 4 / 7 7 ; BR, x i v / x v ) . W h a t interested the y o u n g Heidegger in Husserl's s i x t h investigation w a s h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e "acts o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " i n k n o w i n g a n d espec i a l l y the s p e c i f i c acts o f " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " i n w h i c h " b e i n g " i s " g i v e n " a s a n object o f consciousness. T h u s , i n his key discussions o f t r u t h and time
in h i s Being and Time, he c o u l d refer t h e reader to H u s s e r l ' s
sixth investigation.
1 5
In
1 9 7 3 , h e h e l d a s e m i n a r o n the i n f l u e n c e o f
H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n o n h i s y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t (S, 3 7 2 - 4 0 0 ) a n d b r i e f l y s k e t c h e d o u t w h a t h e h a d m e a n t b y h i s e a r l i e r s t a t e m e n t i n Being and
Time
that
Husserl's
Logical
Investigations
had
provided
the
"basis"
(S, 3 7 8 ) f o r h i s w o r k . I n H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f t h e " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " o f b e i n g , h e h a d seen, w e are t o l d , t h e "essential d i s c o v e r y " a n d " b u r n i n g p o i n t o f H u s s e r l ' s t h i n k i n g , " s i n c e i t was here t h a t H u s s e r l " b r u s h e d against
the
question
of
being."
(S,
4
373,
376)
Husserl's
notion
of
243 " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " b e c a m e a n " e s s e n t i a l s p r i n g - b o a r d " (Triebfeder) f o r the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n p r o j e c t o f r e - t h i n k i n g the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g . (S, 3 7 7 ) I n h i s 1963 essay " M y W a y i n P h e n o m e n o l o g y , " h e w r o t e : A s I m y s e l f after 1 9 1 9 , t e a c h i n g a n d l e a r n i n g i n H u s s e r l ' s p r o x i m i t y , p r a c t i c e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l seeing . . . m y interest l e a n e d a n e w t o w a r d the Logical Investigations, a b o v e a l l the s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n in the first e d i t i o n . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h i s w o r k e d o u t there b e t w e e n sensuous a n d c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n r e v e a l e d i t s e l f t o m e i n its scope f o r the determ i n a t i o n o f t h e " m a n i f o l d m e a n i n g o f b e i n g . " (SD, 8 6 / 7 8 , 4 7 / 4 4 ; c f . BR, x i / x )
W e d o i n d e e d f i n d that i n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , one o f m a n y f i r s t drafts
of
his
Being
and
Time,
Heidegger
presented
what
eventually
b e c a m e " D i v i s i o n O n e " a n d t h e f i r s t t h i r d o f " D i v i s i o n T w o " o f Being and Time a s a " r e t r i e v a l , " a n " i m m a n e n t c r i t i q u e " o f H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , w h i c h w a s the f o c a l p o i n t o f h i s a l m o s t t w o h u n d r e d page i n t r o d u c tory discussion of Husserl's phenomenology. ( G Z , 32/26, 192/141-142, 4 2 0 / 3 0 3 , 124/91 ) draft
of his
"Dasein
1 6
Being
and
I n h i s 1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e c o u r s e (LW), s t i l l a n o t h e r e a r l y and Time
(primarily
Temporality"),
his
what
discussion
became
Division T w o ,
of human
existence
and
t e m p o r a l i t y w a s p r e c e d e d b y a n a l m o s t one h u n d r e d page d i s c u s s i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " t r u t h . " I n o t h e r l e c t u r e courses h e h e l d b e t w e e n 1919 a n d 1926, o n e also f i n d s , a s w e s h a l l see, d i s c u s s i o n s a n d a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o f the basic c o n c e p t s o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y . The
y o u n g H e i d e g g e r saw
indication"
or "hermeneutical
H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations concepts"
(GZ,
58/44,
as " f o r m a l
109/79)
which
pointed interpretively to "the things themselves" and were to be c r i t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e d i n l i g h t o f a r e n e w e d s h o w i n g o f these " t h i n g s " a s the u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l research. (IP, 109; PA, 1 9 1 ; G Z , 103/75) (GZ,
"Phenomenology,"
178/128)
H e thus
he
maintained,
"is
unphenomenologicall"
felt c o m p e l l e d t o o u t s t r i p t h e " a c t u a l " "self-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g " o f the mens auctoris a n d p u r s u e H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n its " p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " ( G Z , 6 3 / 4 7 , 1 8 4 / 1 3 6 ) H e c a l l e d t h i s the " w o r k i n g o u t o f the h e r m e n e u t i c a l s i t u a t i o n " (PA, 3 ) , i.e., the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f past t h o u g h t i n l i g h t o f its f u t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the present s i t u a t i o n o f philosophy.
His o w n philosophy was to be a "more radical internal
d e v e l o p m e n t " o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y (GZ, 6 2 / 4 6 ) a n d i n d e e d t h e " m o s t r a d i c a l p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h begins i n the g e n u i n e sense ' f r o m b e l o w ' " (PA, 1 9 5 ) , " i.e., f r o m t h e basis o f f a c t i c a l l i f e . " T h e q u e s t i o n o f
5
244
b e i n g , " h e w r o t e , " i s s p r u n g l o o s e t h r o u g h the i m m a n e n t c r i t i q u e o f the natural
trend
of phenomenological
research
itself."
(GZ,
124/91)
In
1 9 2 1 - 2 2 , he called his o w n philosophy "ontological phenomenology." (PA, 6 0 ) I n 1925, h e t o l d h i s s t u d e n t s that h e was s t i l l a " l e a r n e r i n r e l a t i o n t o H u s s e r l " a n d expressed t h e h o p e t h a t H u s s e r l , w h o s e " q u e s t i o n i n g i s s t i l l f u l l y i n f l u x , " w o u l d take u p his suggestions for radically transformi n g phenomenology. He understood h i m s e l f as a phenomenologist, if not a Husserlian phenomenologist.
(GZ,
1 6 7 - 1 6 8 / 1 2 1 ) T h u s , later i n
1931,
H u s s e r l c o u l d w r i t e t o Pfänder, e v e n i f s o m e w h a t i n e x a g g e r a t i o n , that, d u r i n g the early 1920s, H e i d e g g e r "behaved entirely as if he w e r e my f o l l o w e r a n d f u t u r e c o - w o r k e r , w h o w o u l d stand o n the g r o u n d o f m y c o n s t i t u t i v e p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n a l l essentials o f m e t h o d a n d p r o b l e m atic."
1 7
W h a t t o o k place i n the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s w h a t G a d a m e r has c a l l e d a h e r m e n e u t i c a l "fusion of horizons"
1 8
between Husserl's thought and Heidegger's o w n
c o n c e r n t o r e - t h i n k t h e q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e . " I n k e e p i n g w i t h G a d a m e r ' s n o t i o n o f " f u s i o n , " the p o s i t i o n H e i d e g g e r o p e n e d u p b e t w e e n t h e t w o d i a l o g u i n g p a r t n e r s w a s n e i t h e r t h e one nor the other, but rather an agreement in w h i c h both had been, as it were, w o u n d e d i n the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l b a t t l e o f g i a n t s . were
motivated
o r i g i n a l l y had
not only been
by
the
tradition
1 9
Heidegger's concerns
of western
ontology
that
transmitted to h i m through Brentano's w o r k on
A r i s t o t l e a n d C a r l B r a i g ' s On Being: Outline of Ontology, b u t also v e r y m u c h by a cluster of anti-metaphysical traditions w h i c h consisted of D i l t h e y ' s philosophy of life, Aristotle's practical w r i t i n g s , skepticism, Confessions,
"original Luther's
Christianity"
"theology
of
the
(Paul's cross,"
letters, Pascal,
2 0
ancient
Augustine's Kierkegaard),
Jasper's " p h i l o s o p h y o f e x i s t e n c e , " D o s t o e v s k y ' s n o v e l s , a n d V a n G o g h ' s letters. W h a t these t r a d i t i o n s m a d e t h e m a t i c f o r h i m w a s t h e h o r i z o n o f concrete, h i s t o r i c a l l i f e i n terms o f w h i c h h e c o u l d r a d i c a l l y r e - t h i n k the traditional
question
of being.
If Husserl
could
say
"you
and
I
are
p h e n o m e n o l o g y , " Heidegger c o u l d w e l l have replied: y o u and I - and D i l t h e y a n d K i e r k e g a a r d a n d A r i s t o t l e . H u s s e r l l a t e r c a m e t o see that "unfortunately I d i d not determine his p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o r m a t i o n , o b v i o u s l y h e w a s a l r e a d y i n t o his o w n t h i n g w h e n h e s t u d i e d m y w r i t i n g s . "
2 1
The
y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s project o f r a d i c a l i z i n g Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g posed w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l l i f e is n o w h e r e m o r e c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d t h a n i n a passage f r o m
6
245 his
1919-21
essay on K a r l Jaspers' Psychology of World-Views;
I n the f i r s t b r e a k t h r o u g h o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n its s p e c i f i c g o a l o f o r i g i n a l l y r e - a p p r o p r i a t i n g the p h e n o m e n a o f theoretical e x p e r i e n c i n g a n d k n o w i n g ( L o g i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , i.e., p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the t h e o r e t i c a l l o g o s ) , there w a s t o b e f o u n d a w i n n i n g o f a n u n s p o i l e d seeing o f the m e a n i n g o f t h e o b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c e d i n such t h e o r e t i c a l e x p e r i e n c i n g a n d a l s o o f the h o w o f i t s b e i n g - e x p e r i e n c e d i n the g o a l o f research. B u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r a d i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a g e n u i n e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t e n d e n c i e s d e p e n d s u p o n the fact that n o t o n l y the " o t h e r " d e p a r t m e n t a l i z e d " r e g i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e " ( t h e aesthetic, the e t h i c a l , the r e l i g i o u s ) c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o s o m e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n are t h o r o u g h l y researched i n a n " a n a l o g i c a l " w a y . R a t h e r , it d e p e n d s o n the fact that e x p e r i e n c i n g i n its f u l l sense is seen i n its a u t h e n t i c a l l y f a c t i c a l c o n t e x t o f e n a c t m e n t i n the h i s t o r i c a l l y e x i s t i n g self. T h i s s e l f i s s o m e h o w the u l t i m a t e issue i n p h i l o s o p h y . . . w h a t i s r e l e v a n t i s that the c o n c r e t e s e l f i s t o b e t a k e n i n t o t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r ture f o r the p r o b l e m s a n d i s t o b e b r o u g h t t o " g i v e n n e s s " a t the a u t h e n t i c a l l y f u n d a m e n t a l l e v e l o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i.e., the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h r e m a i n s r e l a t e d t o the f a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f l i f e a s such. ( A / , 3 4 - 3 5 )
H i s p r o j e c t o f r e - t h i n k i n g H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s t o h a v e been s k e t c h e d o u t n o t o n l y i n his essay o n Jaspers ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d o n l y i n 1 9 7 3 ) , b u t also i n a large b o o k o n A r i s t o t l e , e n t i t l e d " P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Interpretations of A r i s t o t l e , "
2 2
w h i c h he had planned to publish in H u s -
s e r l ' s Jahrbuch in 1 9 2 3 , as w e l l as in a s e v e n t y - p a g e essay e n t i t l e d " T h e Concept of T i m e " w h i c h was unsuccessfully submitted to a j o u r n a l in 1924.
2 3
When,
instead
of his
book
on
Aristotle,
h i s Being
and Time
appeared f o u r years later in H u s s e r l ' s Jahrbuch, it c e r t a i n l y p r e s e n t e d the results o f h i s " f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s " w i t h H u s s e r l ' s t h o u g h t . B u t i t p r o v i d e d few details about h o w
H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations a n d e s p e c i a l l y
his
s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n a c t u a l l y p r o v i d e d the " b a s i s " f o r t h i s w o r k . F o r o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l , w e h a v e been i n t h e past d e p e n d e n t o n h i s s k e t c h y r e m a r k s i n h i s Being and Time a n d i n his
later b r i e f a c c o u n t s o f t h e e a r l y d e v e l o p m e n t o f his
thought.
He
p u b l i s h e d n o t h i n g i n t h e years 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 6 a n d later, e x c e p t f o r h i s essay o n Jaspers, s t i l l d i d n o t p u b l i s h a n y t h i n g f r o m h i s y o u t h f u l p e r i o d . B u t H a n n a h A r e n d t has said that d u r i n g the e a r l y 1920s the r e p u t a t i o n o f the y o u n g Privatdozent M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r spread t h r o u g h o u t G e r m a n y l i k e t h e " r u m o r o f the h i d d e n
king."
2 4
F o r decades,
student t r a n s c r i p t s o f h i s
y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e courses c i r c u l a t e d f r o m h a n d t o h a n d a s " e s o t e r i c a " i n a
7
246
kind of philosophical underground,
2 5
s u r f a c i n g o c c a s i o n a l l y i n t o the w i d e r
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p u b l i c i n r e p o r t s g i v e n b y h i s earliest students s u c h a s O s k a r Becker, Helene Weiss, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah A r e n d t , and K a r l Löwith. U n t i l the p u b l i c a t i o n o f his early F r e i b u r g and M a r b u r g lecture c o u r s e s i n t h e last d e c a d e , h i s y o u t h f u l r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l (as w e l l a s o f A r i s t o t l e and K i e r k e g a a r d )
2 6
has h a d t o r e m a i n t o a great e x t e n t o n the
level of "rumor." I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o a t t e m p t , o n t h e basis o f t h e p u b l i s h e d t e x t s o f his l e c t u r e courses b e t w e e n 1919 a n d 1 9 2 6 , a m o r e d e t a i l e d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e m a j o r d i r e c t i o n s o f the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s " f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s " w i t h Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y and especially the s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n in his Logical Investigations.
21
I
themes of his project
will
begin
with
a short sketch
o f the general
f o r r e - t h i n k i n g the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g a n d t h e n
proceed to show h o w he critically appropriated Husserl's phenomenology i n d e v e l o p i n g these t h e m e s . T h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r saw h i s p r o j e c t a s that o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y " a n d a " g e n u i n e b e g i n n i n g " f o r the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g .
2 8
By
" p h i l o s o p h y , " h e meant the w h o l e h i s t o r y o f western t h o u g h t , w h i c h h e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f a " f i r s t b e g i n n i n g " w i t h the G r e e k s that u n d e r w e n t v a r i o u s " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s " a n d " r e - s t r u c t u r i n g s " i n the o t h e r t w o " e p o c h s " o f t h e M i d d l e A g e s a n d m o d e r n i t y . (PA, 2 - 3 , 170, 9 2 ; IP, 2 0 ) H i s y o u t h f u l
f o r m u l a t i o n of the Seinsfrage was "Seinsfraglichkeit," the " q u e s t i o n a b l e ness o f b e i n g . " (PA, question
of b e i n g
189) H e e x p r e s s e d h i s " g e n u i n e b e g i n n i n g " f o r the in t h e
following
formula:
"Leben
= Dasein,
in
und
durch Leben 'Sein'," " l i f e = t h e r e - b e i n g , 'being' in and t h r o u g h l i f e " . (PA, 85,
187) He c a l l e d this his " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l e x i s t e n t i a l t o p i c , " the
" p l a c e " (Ort) (PA, 3 1 ) o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e " a s the " o r i g i n " o f a l l m e a n i n g . B u t he understood this place of l i f e precisely as the " t h e r e " of b e i n g . He was not developing some f o r m of mere existentialism or philosophy of life. A l t h o u g h his t h o u g h t d i d c h a n g e after 1930, i t i s n o t the case that h i s t h o u g h t here u n d e r w e n t a m i r a c u l o u s c o n v e r s i o n f r o m a p u r e l y h u m a n centred philosophy to a Being-centred o n e .
2 9
A s w e s h a l l see m o r e c l e a r l y ,
m a n y o f the basic n o t i o n s w h i c h h e f i r s t m a d e p u b l i c i n his
1927 Being
and Time a n d i n h i s w r i t i n g s after 1 9 3 0 , e.g., the " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " t h e "first
beginning,"
philosophy,"
the
the
three
"step-back,"
"epochs" the
of
"turn,"
metaphysics, the
"other
"end
of
beginning,"
the
the
" m e a n i n g o f b e i n g , " t h e " t r u t h " c h a r a c t e r o f b e i n g , the " p l a c e " c h a r a c t e r o f b e i n g , " E r e i g n i s , " t h e " w o r l d i n g " o f the w o r l d w e r e e i t h e r a l r e a d y e x p l i c i t l y used o r else o p e r a t i v e i n his u n p u b l i s h e d y o u t h f u l t e x t s , e v e n i f
8
247
in a f o r m peculiar to this p e r i o d of his thought. F o r the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r , H u s s e r l b o t h b e l o n g e d t o the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h was to be b r o u g h t to an end, and was to occupy a special p l a c e i n the r a d i c a l r e p e t i t i o n o f t h i s t r a d i t i o n . A d o p t i n g the l a n g u a g e o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , he articulated his n o t i o n of " b e i n g - m e a n i n g " i n t o the three
intentional moments of "content-meaning" (intentional
object), "relational
m e a n i n g " ( m a n n e r o f i n t e n d i n g ) , and "enactment-
m e a n i n g " o r " t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g " (performance o f the i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n a s t e m p o r a l i z i n g ) . (PA, 5 2 - 5 3 ) B u t h i s " d e s t r u c t i o n " a t t e m p t e d t o " u n - b u i l d " (abbauen) within
"factical
Husserl's
life"
by
phenomenology back
exposing
the
into
"founded"
its
"origin"
character
of
his
" t h e o r e t i c a l " a r t i c u l a t i o n o f these three i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t s a s n o e m a t i c "objectivity,"
"noesis"
"making-present."
(to
use
Heidegger's
the
language
"retrieval"
of
o f H u s s e r l ' s Ideas), these
three
aspects
and of
intentionality attempted to re-think them more o r i g i n a l l y as " w o r l d , " " c a r e , " a n d " t e m p o r a l i z i n g " w i t h i n the " g e n u i n e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y p r i m o r d i a l s t r a t u m (life in and for itself)." (PW, 1 2 1 ) He thus d e s c r i b e d h i s radicalization Sprung)
o f phenomenology
as
an
"original
i n t o t h e " o r i g i n " (Ursprung), a " c r i t i c a l
(Erörterung)
(GZ,
phenomenology
178/128, back
140/102)
i n t o the
which
original
leap"
(ursprüngliche
p l a c i n g in d i s c u s s i o n " would
place
"phenomenological
t o p i c , " the " p l a c e " (Ort) o f f a c t i c a l l i f e .
3 0
Husserl's existential
Phenomenology was to be
r e t r i e v e d f r o m t h i s o r i g i n o f "'being' i n a n d t h r o u g h l i f e . " Let us n o w consider, in turn, Heidegger's destructive appropriations of the H u s s e r l i a n a r t i c u l a t i o n s o f the t h r e e i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t s o f " b e i n g meaning."
3. Intentional w o r l d i n g
I begin w i t h Heidegger's critical appropriation of Husserl's articulation of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t o f " c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g " (Gehaltssinn). M y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , here a n d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g sections, f o l l o w s the general directions o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n interpretation p r i m a r i l y , b u t n o t e x c l u s i v e l y , i n his 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e (GZ, 6 3 - 1 0 3 / 4 7 - 7 5 ) . I n c h a p t e r six ("Sense a n d U n d e r s t a n d i n g " ) o f his s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , H u s s e r l o v e r s t e p s the e m p i r i c i s t a n d K a n t i a n r e s t r i c t i o n o f " i n t u i t i o n " t o "sense i n t u i t i o n " o f sensual o b j e c t s . H e s h o w s h o w w e are a l w a y s p e r f o r m i n g acts o f " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " i n w h i c h the c a t e g o r i a l e l e m e n t s o f
9
248
p e r c e p t u a l statements ( e . g . , the ' t h i s ' a n d t h e ' i s ' i n ' t h i s p a p e r i s w h i t e ' ) are b r o u g h t t o o b j e c t i v e " g i v e n n e s s . " F o r H e i d e g g e r , w h a t w a s d e c i s i v e here w a s t h a t " b e i n g " i s c o n c e i v e d a s a " p h e n o m e n o n " o f l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e and as capable of b e c o m i n g an e x p l i c i t p h e n o m e n o n for p h e n o m e n o l o g i cal investigation. H u s s e r l e x p l a i n s that i n t u i t i o n i s a f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n w h i c h f i l l s a n e m p t y i n t e n t i o n w i t h the i m m e d i a t e g i v e n n e s s o f the m a t t e r i t s e l f . F o r e x a m p l e , m y i n t e n t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f w h i t e p a p e r ( e . g . , the i m a g i n e d p a p e r ) c a n b e f u l f i l l e d b y m y i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n o f the w h i t e p a p e r ( t h e p e r c e i v e d paper t h a t i s b o d i l y t h e r e b e f o r e m y e y e s ) . B u t H u s s e r l insists that t h e e m p t y m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n i n a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f a n o b j e c t ('the paper is w h i t e ' , 'the w h i t e paper') cannot be f u l f i l l e d merely t h r o u g h my "sensuous i n t u i t i o n . " W h a t I understand and express in my statement 'the paper-fcemg-white',
'the paper-as-white' - cannot be
found
in the
sensuously intuited object, even t h o u g h it is g i v e n " w i t h " this object. H u s s e r l w r i t e s : "Being is no real predicate [ K a n t ] . . . I c a n see c o l o u r , b u t not being-coloured.
I can
feel
smoothness,
b u t n o t being-smooth.
I can
hear a s o u n d , b u t n o t t h a t s o m e t h i n g is s o u n d i n g . B e i n g is n o t h i n g in t h e object
...
being
31
is absolutely imperceptible."
Therefore,
he c a l l s " b e i n g "
a n "excess (Überschuss) o f m e a n i n g . " E v e n t h o u g h , i n m y s t a t e m e n t ' t h e p a p e r is w h i t e ' , I say o n l y w h a t I see, w h a t I see ( i n t h e w i d e r sense of i n t u i t ) i s also t h e b e i n g - w h i t e , t h e a s - w h i t e , w h i c h e x c e e d s the sensuous aspect o f the w h i t e paper. A g a i n H u s s e r l w r i t e s :
I see w h i t e p a p e r a n d say ' w h i t e p a p e r ' , t h e r e b y I e x p r e s s , w i t h p r e c i s e a d e q u a c y , o n l y w h a t I see . . . W e are n o t t o let o u r s e l v e s b e l e d astray b y s u c h w a y s o f s p e a k i n g ; t h e y are i n a c e r t a i n m a n n e r c o r r e c t , y e t are r e a d i l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d . . . I n this k n o w i n g a n o t h e r act i s p l a i n l y present, w h i c h p e r h a p s i n c l u d e s the f o r m e r o n e , b u t i s n o n e t h e l e s s d i f f e r e n t f r o m i t : the paper i s k n o w n a s w h i t e , o r rather a s a w h i t e t h i n g , w h e n e v e r w e e x p r e s s o u r p e r c e p t i o n i n the w o r d s ' w h i t e p a p e r ' . T h e i n t e n t i o n o f the w o r d ' w h i t e ' o n l y p a r t i a l l y coincides w i t h the colour-aspect o f the a p p e a r i n g o b j e c t ; there r e m a i n s a n excess o f m e a n i n g , a f o r m , w h i c h f i n d s n o t h i n g i n the appearance t o c o n f i r m i t . W h i t e , i.e., being w h i t e paper. I s t h i s f o r m n o t also repeated, e v e n i f r e m a i n i n g m o r e h i d d e n , i n t h e n o u n ' p a p e r ' ? (LU, 6 5 9 - 6 6 0 / 7 7 5 )
I n a n act o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , I c a n b r i n g w h a t w a s p r e v i o u s l y o n l y e m p t i l y i n t e n d e d i n " t h e l i t t l e w o r d ' i s ' , " i.e., the p a p e r - " a s " - w h i t e , t o a n explicit
self-givenness.
"[The
is]
is,
however,
self-given
or
at
least
p r e s u m a b l y g i v e n i n the fulfillment w h i c h u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n v e s t s t h e
10
249 j u d g m e n t : i n the becoming aware o f the p r e s u m e d state o f a f f a i r s . N o t o n l y w h a t i s m e a n t i n the p a r t i a l m e a n i n g gold i t s e l f appears, n o r o n l y w h a t is m e a n t in the p a r t i a l m e a n i n g yellow, b u t a l s o gold-being-yellow appears." (LU, 6 6 8 / 7 8 2 ) F o r H u s s e r l , the " b e i n g " (Sein) o f a p a r t i c u l a r " b e i n g " (das Seiende) is able to appear, as it w e r e , " b e f o r e o u r e y e s . " (LU, 6 7 1 / 7 8 5 ) I n t u r n , m y h i g h e r l e v e l act o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , w h i c h i s s t i l l f o u n d e d o n sensuous i n t u i t i o n , c a n b e c o m e the basis f o r a n o t h e r t y p e o f categorial i n t u i t i o n , namely, "universal i n t u i t i o n " o r " i d e a t i o n . " I n this u n i v e r s a l i n t u i t i o n , I n o l o n g e r c o - i n t e n d the f o u n d i n g sensuous o b j e c t ( t h e w h i t e piece o f paper) o f m y categorial i n t u i t i o n , but rather abstractively i n t e n d its a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i a l e l e m e n t ( b e i n g - w h i t e , w h i t e n e s s ) , w h i c h w a s p r e v i o u s l y o n l y u n t h e m a t i c a l l y u n d e r s t o o d . T h e " ' a s - w h a t ' , the u n i v e r s a l character of house,"
Heidegger comments,
"is
itself not expressly
ap-
prehended in w h a t it is, but is already co-apprehended in simple i n t u i t i o n a s that w h i c h t o s o m e e x t e n t here i l l u m i n a t e s w h a t i s g i v e n . " (GZ, 9 1 / 6 7 ; c f . LU, 6 7 0 / 7 8 4 , 6 9 0 / 7 9 9 ) H u s s e r l later c a l l e d t h i s i d e a t i o n " i n t u i t i o n o f essence" gives
(Wesensschau).
access
to
and
It
is
this categorial
organizes
the
or eidetic
various
intuition
"regional
which
ontologies"
of
p h e n o m e n o l o g y . (HF, 2; GZ, 9 3 - 9 7 / 6 8 - 7 1 ) H e i d e g g e r f o u n d H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f the c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n o f b e i n g s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a n u m b e r o f reasons. F i r s t , b e i n g i s freed f r o m its t r a d i t i o n a l c o n f i n e m e n t t o the f u n c t i o n o f the c o p u l a , i.e., the m e r e b i n d i n g t o g e t h e r o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d c o n c e p t s i n a j u d g m e n t . (GZ, 7 2 / 5 4 )
3 2
N o r is being
seen t o b e d e r i v e d f r o m r e f l e c t i o n o n i n n e r sense ( e m p i r i c i s m ) o r c o n c e i v e d a s a s u b j e c t i v e f o r m w i t h w h i c h sensuous m a t e r i a l i s o r d e r e d ( K a n t ) . (GZ, 7 8 / 5 8 , 9 6 / 7 0 ) N o r is it d e s c r i b e d as a r e a l part of an o b j e c t , a b e i n g , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s a l w a y s the b e i n g o f a b e i n g . (GZ, 7 8 / 5 8 , 2 3 7 / 1 7 5 , 362/262)
3 3
R a t h e r , b e i n g i s c o n c e i v e d here i n s u c h a w a y that i t i s able t o
b e b r o u g h t t o a n "originary self-giving
in corresponding
acts o f g i v i n g . "
(GZ, 8 0 / 6 0 ) B e i n g c a n b e c o m e a p h e n o m e n o n , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h appears, " s h o w s " i t s e l f . (GZ, 9 7 / 7 1 ) O n t h i s basis, o n e c a n raise the q u e s t i o n o f the "meaning" o f t h i s b e i n g , o f w h a t is meant b y the w o r d " b e i n g . " (GZ, 73/54,
193/143)
3 4
" B e i n g " is t h u s n o t a " m e r e flatus vocis." (GZ, 9 8 / 7 1 )
S e c o n d , H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s that H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n a s "universal
i n t u i t i o n " provides
investigating
the
categorial
the
empirical
structures
methodological
of being.
Husserl
basis
showed
for how
c a t e g o r i a l - o n t o l o g i c a l structures c a n b e b r o u g h t t o " e v i d e n t i a l " g i v e n n e s s . (GZ, 9 7 - 9 8 / 7 1 - 7 2 ) T h i r d , b y c o n s i d e r i n g b e i n g a s " o b j e c t i v i t y , " H u s s e r l ' s phenomenology
i m p l i c i t l y takes u p the research o f " a n c i e n t o n t o l o g y "
11
250
( G Z , 9 8 / 7 2 ) , the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g i n G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . B u t p r e c i s e l y h o w H e i d e g g e r a p p r o p r i a t e d these three b r e a k t h r o u g h s b e c o m e s c l e a r o n l y i n t h e l i g h t o f h o w h e a t the same t i m e c r i t i c a l l y " u n b u i l t " t h e m back into their o r i g i n w i t h i n factical l i f e . He c l a i m e d to be d o i n g n o t h i n g other than f o l l o w i n g up D i l t h e y ' s critique and appropriation o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f his o w n project o f a " p h i l o s o p h y of l i f e . "
3 5
H e w r i t e s that D i l t h e y s o u g h t a " p s y c h o l o g y a s a d e s c r i p t i v e
s c i e n c e , a n d w e are i n d e b t e d t o h i m f o r v a l u a b l e i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t the i d e a o f t h i s science . . . T h e secret l o n g i n g o f h i s l i f e b e g a n t o b e f u l f i l l e d b y p h e n o m e n o l o g y . . . B u t he was no l o g i c i a n , and he saw i m m e d i a t e l y the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations
which
h a r d l y n o t i c e d a n d i n d e e d m i s u n d e r s t o o d . . . " (PW,
at that
time
were
164-165) Heidegger
f o l l o w e d D i l t h e y ' s a t t e m p t to use H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations n o t , as H u s s e r l h a d s o u g h t t o d o , f o r the sake o f a " p u r e l o g i c , " b u t r a t h e r f o r t h e sake
of a
"fundamental
" D i l t h e y , " he
science
maintained,
"was
of l i f e . " the
first
(GZ,
30/24;
PA,
to understand
the
80,
117)
aims of
p h e n o m e n o l o g y . . . t h e essential p o i n t here i s n o t s o m u c h t h e c o n c e p t u a l p e n e t r a t i o n a s the sheer d i s c l o s u r e o f n e w h o r i z o n s f o r the q u e s t i o n o f the being
o f acts
and,
164-165/118-119)
in In
the
broadest
sense,
the
this
passage,
Heidegger
being
of man."
mentions
what
(GZ, these
h o r i z o n s o p e n e d u p b y D i l t h e y are. A s w e s h a l l see, t h e y c o r r e s p o n d exactly
with
the three
"being-meaning,"
i.e.,
intentional moments of Heidegger's notion of content-meaning,
relational
meaning,
and
e n a c t m e n t - m e a n i n g . R e g a r d i n g the m o m e n t o f c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g p r e s e n t l y u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h e paraphrases D i l t h e y ' s thesis that " t h e p e r s o n i n h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e l f h o o d f i n d s h i m s e l f o v e r a g a i n s t a w o r l d u p o n w h i c h h e acts a n d w h i c h reacts u p o n h i m . " H e r e D i l t h e y pushes H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f the i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t o u t o f the r e a l m o f l o g i c a n d i n t o the sphere o f t h e l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f the p r a c t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l w o r l d . T h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r f o l l o w e d h i m i n this project. T h u s he argued that Husserl's characterization of b e i n g is taken f r o m the s p e c i f i c w a y that i t i s e x p e r i e n c e d i n " t h e o r y , " the s i m p l e " g a z i n g " u p o n the w o r l d w h i c h c o n s u m m a t e s i t s e l f i n j u d g m e n t a n d a s s e r t i o n . T h e basic sense o f b e i n g here i s o b j e c t - b e i n g , t h i n g - b e i n g , r e a l i t y , n a t u r e , " b o d i l y n e s s " (Leibhaftigkeit). (IP,
108, 8 7 ,
100,
109; PA, 9 1 ; G Z , 8 3 / 6 1 .
1 6 5 / 1 1 9 ) H u s s e r l f u r t h e r sees v a l u a t i v e a n d aesthetic r e a l i t i e s a s f o u n d e d o n t h i s basic s t r a t u m . W h i l e a p p r e c i a t i n g H u s s e r l ' s passionate i n t e n t i o n t o w a r d s " t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , " H e i d e g g e r nonetheless m a i n t a i n s t h a t h e has n a i v e l y t a k e n o v e r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l idea o f b e i n g a s present a t h a n d
12
251 t h i n g h o o d f r o m Descartes a n d u l t i m a t e l y f r o m G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . (GZ, 1 3 9 / 1 0 1 ) H e f a i l s t o discuss e x p l i c i t l y " t h e q u e s t i o n o f the m e a n i n g o f b e i n g . " (GZ,
1 7 9 / 1 2 9 ) M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , H e i d e g g e r describes H u s s e r l ' s
approach
the
to
being
of
the
world
as
an
alienating
process
of
" t h e o r i z a t i o n " a n d " o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , " w h i c h l e a d t o the " e x t i n g u i s h i n g " a n d the
"de-worlding"
(Entweltlichung)
of
the
immediate
weitet) o f the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l , p r a c t i c a l w o r l d .
3 6
"it
worlds"
(es
"The ' i t worlds'," Heideg-
ger w r i t e s , " i s a l r e a d y e x t i n g u i s h e d i n [ t h i n g h o o d j . T h e t h i n g i s m e r e l y s t i l l there as s u c h , i.e., it is r e a l , it e x i s t s . R e a l i t y is t h e r e f o r e n o t a charact e r i z a t i o n o f w h a t has t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e w o r l d a r o u n d u s (Umwelt), b u t r a t h e r a s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , w h i c h lies i n the essence of t h i n g h o o d .
What
has
the c h a r a c t e r o f s i g n i f i c a n c e
(Bedeutsamkeit)
is
d e - s i g n i f i e d d o w n t o the r e m n a n t : b e i n g - r e a l . " (IP, 8 9 ) F o l l o w i n g u p D i l t h e y ' s c r i t i c a l r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r ' s basic i n t e n t i o n w a s t o reverse t h i s process o f t h e o r i z a t i o n a n d d e - w o r l d i n g a t w o r k in Husserl's characterization of intentional "content-meaning" and to b u i l d - b a c k " t h i s " c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g " i n t o its " o r i g i n " i n t h e "Lebenswelt," the " l i f e - w o r l d . " (IP, 4 ; PA, 6 , 9 4 , 9 7 , -115) H e r e w e c a n h i g h l i g h t three focal points of Heidegger's critical appropriation. First, Husserl's notion o f b e i n g a s o b j e c t - b e i n g (substance, a c c i d e n t , p r o p e r t y , e t c . ) w a s t o b e rethought as the " s i g n i f i c a n c e " ("being-ready-to-hand-there," " f r o m w h i c h , " " f o r w h i c h , " " t o w a r d s w h i c h , " " f o r the sake o f ) a n d the l i v e d " s p a t i a l i t y " o f t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r l d a r o u n d us, w h i c h i s t h e " e v e r y d a y w o r l d . " (HF, 8 5 , 9 3 - 1 0 4 ) " W o r l d , " H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " i s the f u n d a m e n t a l c a t e g o r y o f c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g i n the p h e n o m e n o n o f l i f e . " (PA, 8 6 ) Second,
Husserl's
"ideation"
was
"hermeneutical
to
theoretical be
intuition,"
method
transformed the
"lived
into
of
"universal
Heidegger's
experience
of l i v e d
intuition"
own
method
experience"
or of (IP,
117) w h i c h " i n t e r p r e t i v e l y e x p l i c a t e s " the f a c t i c a l " p r e - c o n c e p t i o n " o f being w h i c h belongs to factical l i f e .
3 7
"The phenomenological criterion,"
h e w r i t e s , " i s s o l e l y the u n d e r s t a n d i n g e v i d e n c e a n d the e v i d e n t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e s , o f l i f e i n a n d f o r i t s e l f i n its e i d o s . " (PW, 1 2 6 ) T h i s c o n c r e t e , i n t e r p r e t i v e a p p r o a c h t o the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f b e i n g i s s u c c i n c t l y expressed i n the t i t l e t o his
1923 lecture course, " O n t o l o g y
( H e r m e n e u t i c s o f F a c t i c i t y ) . " H e was i n f l u e n c e d here also b y D i l t h e y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t o f " h e r m e n e u t i c s " a s the m e t h o d o f h i s t o r i c a l a n d i n t e r p r e tive understanding Moreover,
in the h u m a n sciences. (HF,
for Heidegger,
philosophy
was not
1 3 - 1 4 ; SZ, 5 2 6 / 4 5 0 ) to arrive at
3 8
Husserl's
a t e m p o r a l "essences" t o w h i c h a f i x e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y
13
252
w o u l d correspond. He thought that p h i l o s o p h y is l i m i t e d to g i v i n g " f o r m a l i n d i c a t i o n " or "hermeneutical concepts,"
w h i c h can o n l y
p o i n t t o the
things themselves and have to be constantly re-appropriated,
since the
" t h i n g s " o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y are c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a r a d i c a l f a c t i c i t y a n d historicity. (PA,
3 9
A l o n g w i t h Aristotle's method of providing a rough "outline"
192) for practical life and Kierkegaard's n o t i o n of "indirect c o m -
munication" Husserl's
(AJ,
41),
notion
in
Heidegger his
Logical
"occasional expressions" (e.g., " i n d i c a t e " the e s s e n t i a l l y
T,
here
radicalized
Investigations 'here',
of
and
a
universalized
certain
' y o u ' ) , whose
class
function
of
is to
variable, situational m e a n i n g of such expres-
sions. T h i r d , Husserl's recovery of Greek o n t o l o g y was thus to be pushed in the d i r e c t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n e x i s t e n t i a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o n t o l o g y , w h i c h h e c a l l e d a " s c i e n c e o f the o r i g i n , " a " p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l o r t r a n s t h e o r e t i c a l , in a n y case a n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l science, a g e n u i n e t / r - s c i e n c e o u t o f w h i c h the t h e o r e t i c a l i t s e l f takes its o r i g i n . " (IP, 9 6 )
4. I n t e n t i o n a l life
Heidegger manner
in
(Bezugssinn)
likewise which of
performed Husserl
a
had
intentionality,
destructive worked
i.e.,
the
out "how"
retrieval the of
of
the
"relational the
specific meaning"
relation
to
the
intentional object. T h i s becomes visible w h e n we consider Heidegger's r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f " t r u t h " i n his Logical Investigations. T h e q u e s t i o n o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n w a s f o r H u s s e r l p r e c i s e l y the issue of
the
truth
present
in
the
sphere
of
categorial
intentions.
(LU,
6 5 1 - 6 5 6 / 7 6 5 - 7 7 0 ) H e d e f i n e s t r u t h a s the " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " w h i c h I a c h i e v e w h e n the object gives itself i m m e d i a t e l y in my i n t u i t i v e , f u l f i l l i n g intention just as I had signified it in my e m p t y intention: " W e experience h o w the same o b j e c t i v e s o m e t h i n g w h i c h w a s ' m e r e l y t h o u g h t ' i n a s y m b o l i c act i s n o w i n t u i t i v e l y p r e s e n t e d i n i n t u i t i o n , a n d that i t i s i n t u i t e d a s b e i n g p r e c i s e l y the d e t e r m i n a t e so-and-so that i t w a s a t f i r s t m e r e l y t h o u g h t t o b e (merely
s i g n i f i e d ) . " (LU, 5 6 6 / 6 9 4 )
He
identifies t w o meanings
o f the
t r a d i t i o n a l A r i s t o t e l i a n a n d s c h o l a s t i c n o t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " (on hos alethes; ens tanquam verum): f i r s t , b e i n g i n the sense o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the s i g n i f i e d a n d
the i n t u i t e d ( ' t h e p a p e r [ r e a l l y ]
is
w h i t e ' ) ; s e c o n d , b e i n g i n the sense o f the " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g , " the i n t u i t e d " b e i n g " w h i c h b e s t o w s fullness o n m y e m p t y s i g n i f i c a t i o n . H e p o i n t s o u t
14
253 that these t w o senses o f t r u t h u n d e r l i e the s t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n o f t r u t h a s the " c o r r e c t n e s s o f o u r i n t e n t i o n . . . the p r o p o s i t i o n ' d i r e c t s ' i t s e l f t o the t h i n g i t s e l f , i t says t h a t i t i s so, a n d i t r e a l l y i s s o . " (LU, 6 5 3 / 7 6 6 ) I n t h e case of c a t e g o r i a l i n t e n t i o n s , t r u t h is e x p e r i e n c e d as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n I a c h i e v e w h e n i n m y f u l f i l l i n g c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n t h e t h i n g i t s e l f (paperbeing-v/h'ile,
paper-oj-white)
"appears"
in
its
"self-appearance"
(LU,
651/765) just as it was intended in my empty categorial meaning-intent i o n . O n H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g , t h i s m e a n s t h a t " t h e f o u n d e d acts disclose t h e s i m p l y g i v e n o b j e c t s anew
..." (GZ,
8 4 / 6 2 ) " C a t e g o r i a l acts," h e
e x p l a i n s , " c o n s t i t u t e a n e w o b j e c t i v i t y . . . [ C o n s t i t u t i n g ] m e a n s l e t t i n g the b e i n g b e seen i n its o b j e c t i v i t y . " ( G Z , 9 7 / 7 1 ) H u s s e r l m a i n t a i n s that e s p e c i a l l y i n the " s t a t i c u n i o n s " o f s i g n i f i e d a n d intuited, w h i c h we have already achieved and in w h i c h we habitually l i v e , we
"experience"
truth
as
"identity"
without,
however,
thematically
a p p r e h e n d i n g i t . (LU, 5 6 9 - 5 7 0 / 6 9 7 , 6 5 2 / 7 6 6 ) H e i d e g g e r ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n this Husserlian theme runs a s f o l l o w s : " I n the c o m i n g into coincidence o f t h e p r e s u m e d w i t h the i n t u i t e d , I a m s o l e l y a n d p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e subject m a t t e r i t s e l f . . . T h i s i s the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l sense o f s a y i n g t h a t i n e v i d e n t p e r c e p t i o n I d o n o t t h e m a t i c a l l y s t u d y the t r u t h o f t h i s p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f , b u t r a t h e r l i v e in the t r u t h . B e i n g - t r u e is e x p e r i e n c e d as a distinctive
relation,
a
comportmental
relation
between
presumed
and
i n t u i t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the sense o f i d e n t i t y . " ( G Z , 6 9 - 7 0 / 5 2 ) I n m y disclosive categorial i n t u i t i o n of the t h i n g itself as-something ( b e i n g ) , I focus i n t e n t i o n a l l y o n the t h i n g itself w i t h o u t t h e m a t i c a l l y c o n s i d e r i n g m y c a t e g o r i a l m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n , w h i c h r e m a i n s i n the b a c k g r o u n d . I t i s o n l y i n a subsequent i n t e n t i o n a l act that I c a n m a k e t h e " i d e n t i t y " i n v o l v e d here i n t o a t h e m a t i c o b j e c t or, f u r t h e r , t h e m a t i z e the o p e r a t i v e a p r i o r i d i m e n s i o n o f the c a t e g o r i a l i t s e l f ( i d e a t i o n ) . W h a t captivated Heidegger's attention i n Husserl's analysis o f " t r u t h " w a s that t r u t h w a s i n v e s t i g a t e d here at a m o r e basic l e v e l t h a n its t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n a s t h e " c o r r e c t n e s s " o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , H u s s e r l refers t o b e i n g i t s e l f a s " t r u t h " i n the sense o f the appearance o f beings in their b e i n g (the " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g " w h i c h is disclosed), a n o t i o n w h i c h , according t o Heidegger, i s first f o u n d i n the G r e e k meaning o f truth
as
aletheia,
169-182) Second,
i.e.,
literally
"unconcealment."
(GZ,
71/51;
LW,
H u s s e r l ' s c o n c e p t o f t r u t h a s b e i n g - t r u e ( t h e act o f
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ) p o i n t s t o the act o f " d i s c l o s u r e , " o f " l e t t i n g appear," w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , i s w h a t A r i s t o t l e m e a n t b y aletheuein, " b e i n g true," "unconcealing." (GZ, 7 1 - 7 3 / 5 3 - 5 4 )
15
254
B u t a g a i n H e i d e g g e r ' s r e t r i e v a l a t t e m p t e d t o trace these t w o m o r e basic senses o f t r u t h b a c k i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l sphere o f f a c t i c a l l i f e . H e r e , t o o , he was t a k i n g u p D i l t h e y ' s c r i t i c a l appropriation o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e s e c o n d basic thesis f r o m D i l t h e y , w h i c h H e i d e g g e r m e n t i o n s a s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g h i s o w n u n i q u e use o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i s " t h a t i n e v e r y aspect o f b e i n g the p e r s o n , the t o t a l p e r s o n , reacts, n o t s i m p l y i n w i l l i n g , f e e l i n g , a n d r e f l e c t i n g , b u t a l l t o g e t h e r a l w a y s a t the same t i m e . " ( G Z , 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 / 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 ) " [ D i l t h e y ] , " H e i d e g g e r also w r i t e s , " w a n t s t o get a t the t o t a l i t y o f the s u b j e c t w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s the w o r l d a n d n o t t o a b l o o d l e s s t h i n k i n g t h i n g w h i c h m e r e l y i n t e n d s a n d t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h i n k s the w o r l d . " (GZ,
302/220)
H e i d e g g e r thus a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w t h a t H u s s e r l ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e " h o w " o f i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e w a s d r a w n o n e - s i d e d l y f r o m the a t t i t u d e o f ' " m e r e b e i n g d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s ' " (WU, 2 0 7 ) w h i c h b e l o n g s t o " t h e o r y " a n d its r e l a t e d c o m p o r t m e n t s o f " i n t u i t i o n " (PA, 1 5 3 ) , "sense p e r c e p t i o n " (PA,
40;
GZ,
"assertion" thinking
246-247/182,
(GZ, or
219/163).
objective
254/188), "The
"knowing,"
so-called
theoretical
logical
knowing,"
"judgment,"
and
comportments
Heidegger
" r e p r e s e n t o n l y a p a r t i c u l a r a n d n a r r o w sphere w i t h i n
of
criticizes,
the d o m a i n o f
intentionality . . . " ( G Z , 106-107/78; cf. 73/54, 124/91) A g a i n he writes: "Every
directing-itself-toward
(fear,
hope,
love)
has
the
feature
of
d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d w h i c h H u s s e r l c a l l s noesis. I n a s m u c h as noein is t a k e n f r o m the sphere o f t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w i n g , a n y e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e p r a c t i c a l here i s d r a w n f r o m t h e t h e o r e t i c a l . " ( G Z , 6 1 / 4 5 ) H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s f u r t h e r , v i e w s h u m a n b e i n g a s a present a t h a n d o b j e c t , s i n c e h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s the h u m a n b e i n g , w h i c h has i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f o r its basic s t r u c t u r e , p r i m a r i l y a s i t i s g i v e n t o t h e o r e t i c a l observation.
In
phenomenology
Husserl's under
later the
"transcendental" influence
of
self-interpretation
Neo-Kantianism
of
(GZ,
1 2 4 - 1 2 8 / 9 1 - 9 3 ) , t h e p e r s o n appears e x p l i c i t l y a s a t h i n g - l i k e c o m p o s i t e o f a p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l a n i m a l and an intentional consciousness, w h i c h c o n sciousness i s u l t i m a t e l y s u p p o s e d t o b e " a b s o l u t e b e i n g " i n r e l a t i o n t o the c o n t i n g e n t a n d f o u n d e d b e i n g o f the e m p i r i c a l self. T h e f a c t i c a l h u m a n b e i n g gets c h a r a c t e r i z e d
as ' " a real object l i k e others
in
the n a t u r a l
w o r l d ' , " a n ' " a n i m a l b e i n g ' . " ( G Z , 1 3 1 / 9 6 ) T h e g u i d i n g i d e a o f b e i n g here i s a g a i n that o f b e i n g - r e a l , b e i n g a n a t u r a l o b j e c t . ( G Z , 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 / 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 ) H u s s e r l f a i l s t o raise t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e " b e i n g o f t h e h u m a n , " " t h a t o f w h i c h i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s the structure." ( G Z , 6 2 - 6 3 / 4 6 - 4 7 , 148/108) T h e q u e s t i o n o f the " s u m " o f the t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l " c o g i t o " i s left u n a s k e d . (PA, 1 7 3 )
16
255 H e i d e g g e r r e a d i l y a d m i t s that H u s s e r l ' s " r e d u c t i o n " f r o m o u r " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " b a c k t o p u r e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s does i n d e e d b e g i n w i t h a n attempted description o f our concrete being i n everyday l i f e . B u t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , h e argues, i s a l r e a d y c o l o r e d b y a v e r y u n n a t u r a l t h e o r e t i c a l a n d o b j e c t i f y i n g a t t i t u d e . " I n t h e n a t u r a l w a y o f e x p e r i e n c e , does m a n e x p e r i e n c e h i m s e l f , to p u t it c u r t l y , z o o l o g i c a l l y ? Is t h i s a t t i t u d e a natural attitude o r i s i t n o t ? I t i s a n e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h i s t o t a l l y u n n a t u r a l . " ( G Z , 155/113) A f t e r such an unnatural description of natural everyday life, Husserl
then
performs
his
"reduction"
back
to
transcendental-eidetic
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h , a s h e says, i s " n o t h u m a n . " T h i s r e d u c t i o n t h e r e b y i n v o l v e s "precisely g i v i n g u p the g r o u n d u p o n w h i c h alone the question o f the b e i n g o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l c o u l d b e b a s e d . " ( G Z ,
150-151/109; cf.
157/113-114) H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n s , t h e n , that H u s s e r l ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the p e r s o n i s derived not so m u c h f r o m "the things themselves" as f r o m his " f a l l i n g " t o w a r d s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f the h u m a n b e i n g a s the "rational a n i m a l , " w h i c h derives f r o m Greek thought and still prevails in Descartes
and
Neo-Kantianism.
(PA,
47,
173;
GZ,
147/107,
1 7 8 - 1 8 0 / 1 2 8 - 1 3 0 ) H i s emphasis o n the role o f " i n t u i t i o n " i n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s d e r i v e d f r o m the G r e e k o r i e n t a t i o n t o theorein ( l i t e r a l l y " g a z i n g " ) , w h i c h gets t a k e n u p i n A u g u s t i n e ' s n o t i o n o f the " e n j o y m e n t o f G o d "
(fruitio Dei), A q u i n a s ' "contemplation Descartes' "clara et distincta perceptio," K a n t ' s "intuitus derivativus," a n d the d i a l e c t i c a l "noesis noeseos'
1
of H e g e l .
(LW,
56,
115-123;
GZ,
381/276)
Heidegger
saw
Husserl's characterization of the "relational m e a n i n g " of intentionality as b e l o n g i n g t o o m u c h to what he at that t i m e ( f o l l o w i n g L u t h e r and K i e r k e g a a r d ) c a l l e d the " o c u l a r , " " a e s t h e t i c , " a n d " q u i e t i v e " c h a r a c t e r o f w e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . (AJ, 2 3 , 4 - 5 ; PA, 1 1 1 , 1 4 0 ) He described (WU,
210)
practical
Husserl's
toward
mere
"modification to "objects"
"lived-experience"
as
theoretical
a "de-living"
(Er-lebnis).
In
theory,
comportment"
(Ent-leben) my
of o u r
"emotional
r e l a t i o n " (WU, 2 1 1 ) t o the w o r l d a n d m y p r a c t i c a l w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d s p e a k i n g are suppressed. T h e o r e t i c a l c o m p o r t m e n t i s a n act o f "selfa l i e n a t i o n " (HF,
1 5 ) , w h i c h d r i v e s a w a y t h e p e r s o n a l character o f m y
e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e w o r l d a s a n " o w n m o s t e v e n t " (Er-eignis), i n w h i c h "ich
selbst Idas Er-leben]
mir er-eigne,"
"I
event
(ap-propriate)
lived
ex-
p e r i e n c e t o m y s e l f , " a n d i n t u r n m y e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d "er-eignet
sich seinem Wesen nach," "e-vents ( a p - p r o p r i a t e s ) i t s e l f a c c o r d i n g to its essence." (IP,
73-75)
"The lived-experience-of-the-environing
17
world,"
256
H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " i s d e - l i v e d t o the r e m n a n t : k n o w i n g s o m e t h i n g r e a l a s such
... Thing-experience
(Erfahrung)
is
undoubtedly
l i v e d experience
(Erlebnis), b u t u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f its o r i g i n o u t o f the l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f the e n v i r o n i n g w o r l d i t i s a l r e a d y d e - l i v i n g , u n - l i f e (Ent-lebnis)." (IP, 89-90)
Theoretical
comportment
is,
therefore,
a
"derived
mode"
of
intentional experience. ( G Z , 215/160) I t w a s o n t h e basis o f t h i s d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e that H e i d e g g e r ' s science o f the
origin
attempted
to
retrieve
Husserl's account
of intentional
" r e l a t i o n a l m e a n i n g . " He defined his task precisely as that of g o i n g back to the
original
starting
point of Husserl's
transcendental
and
eidetic
r e d u c t i o n s i n the " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " a n d here b e g i n n i n g a g a i n b y i n v e s t i g a t i n g the " b e i n g
o f the
w h o l e concrete m a n . " ( G Z ,
148-152/107-110,
173/125) In contrast to Husserl's " d e - l i v i n g " of factical l i f e , Heidegger's hermeneutics was to be a " r e p e t i t i o n " or " r e t r i e v a l " of factical life and thus an " e n - l i v e n i n g "
(Verlebendigung)
of phenomenological philosophy.
(PA, 8 0 , 166) H i s basic a p p r o a c h t o t h e H u s s e r l i a n t h e m e o f i n t e n t i o n a l t r u t h w a s t o investigate it not p r i m a r i l y as "the t r u t h of theoretical k n o w i n g , " but rather p r i m a r i l y a s the t r u t h o f " p r a c t i c a l i n s i g h t . " (LW, 8 ) H e r e h e w a s t a k i n g u p the A r i s t o t e l i a n t h e m e o f a d i s t i n c t i v e t y p e o f " p r a c t i c a l t r u t h " (aletheia praktike)
which
is
given
in
phronesis,
"practical
understanding."
(HF,
1 0 - 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 6 - 2 7 ) R e g a r d i n g H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " as the "self-appearance" of beings in their o b j e c t i v i t y (the disclosed " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g " ) , H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t e d t o r a d i c a l i z e i t i n t o the n o t i o n o f the " d i s c l o s e d n e s s " o f the p r a c t i c a l " s i g n i f i c a n c e " o f " r e a d y t o h a n d " b e i n g s . (HF, 9 3 ; G Z , 3 4 8 - 3 4 9 / 2 5 3 ) H u s s e r l ' s o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h , " i.e., the i n t e n t i o n a l act o f d i s c l o s i n g b e i n g s i n the " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " o f t h e s i g n i f i e d a n d t h e i n t u i t e d , w a s t r a n s f o r m e d b y Heidegger in a number of ways. First, he placed Husserl's theoretically biased n o t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as a d i s i n t e r e s t e d " d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d s " b a c k i n t o its o r i g i n a l m e a n i n g a s " b e i n g - i n - a - w o r l d . " (HF, 102) T h e basic c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s " b e i n g - i n " i s i n fact " c a r i n g " o r " c o n c e r n " (HF, 7 0 ; c f . AJ, 2 2 ; G Z , 4 2 0 / 3 0 3 - 3 0 4 ) ,
4 0
which
takes t h e f o r m s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , m o o d , a n d l a n g u a g e . I n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s s o m e t h i n g " u l t i m a t e , " H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , b u t t h i s u l t i m a c y has t o b e properly characterized: W h a t has a l w a y s d i s t u r b e d m e : d i d i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f a l l f r o m h e a v e n ? I f s o m e t h i n g u l t i m a t e : in w h i c h u l t i m a c y is it to be taken? C e r t a i n l y not secured in a s p e c i f i c a l l y theoretical d i s c o v e r y and experience. T h a t I
18
257 must l i v e i n t e n t i o n a l l y and must ' b e ' i n t e n t i o n a l l y , ' e l u c i d a t e ' ! . . . i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s the f o r m a l and f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e f o r a l l c a t e g o r i a l structures o f f a c t i c i t y . C a r i n g i s the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g o f the r e l a t i o n o f l i f e
... F u l l
m e a n i n g o f intentionality i n w h a t i s o r i g i n a l ! T h e t h e o r e t i c a l a t t i t u d e f a d e d . {PA, 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , 9 8 ) Second, H e i d e g g e r attempted t o r e - t h i n k Husserl's n o t i o n o f e m p t y and h a b i t u a l c a t e g o r i a l m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n such t h a t i t c o u l d n o w m e a n the unthematic
"prestruction"
being,
anticipatory
the
(Prestruktion)
or
"preconception"
"being-ahead-of-itself'
(Vorgriff)
(sich-vorweg-sein),
of
which
belongs to pre-theoretical, factical l i f e . In other w o r d s , he re-interpreted it t o m e a n the p r i o r n o n - o b j e c t i v e " d i s c o v e r e d n e s s " o f t h e " w o r l d h o o d " o f p r a c t i c a l " s i g n i f i c a n c e . " (GZ, 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 / 2 5 4 ; HF, 9 7 ; LW,
146-147)
He
w r i t e s : " P r e s t r u c t i o n . . . a s a n e x p r e s s i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y : the f o r m a l a n d p r i m o r d i a l s t r u c t u r e o f f a c t i c i t y ( o f the m e a n i n g o f the b e i n g o f l i f e ) . " (PA, 131) A g a i n h e w r i t e s : " W h a t i s m e a n t b y i n t e n t i o n a l i t y - the bare a n d i s o l a t e d d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d s - m u s t s t i l l b e set b a c k i n t o t h e u n i f i e d a n d basic s t r u c t u r e o f b e i n g - a h e a d - o f - i t s e l f - i n - a l r e a d y - b e i n g - i n v o l v e d - i n . " (GZ,
420/303-304)
Third,
he
pushed
Husserl's
notion
of
the
disclosing
activity
of
c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , w h i c h f u l f i l l s the e m p t y m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n ( b e i n g t r u e ) , i n the d i r e c t i o n o f h i s o w n t h e m e o f the " i n t e r p r e t i v e " a c t i v i t y o f factical life,
w h i c h " f u l f i l l s " the p r i o r u n t h e m a t i c disclosedness o f s i g -
nificance ( w o r l d h o o d ) w i t h the interpretive disclosure o f beings i n their " a s " - s t r u c t u r e , s i g n i f i c a n c e , or b e i n g . (GZ, 2 2 6 / 1 6 7 , 7 3 / 5 4 , 3 2 8 / 2 3 8 ; PA, 3 3 ; HF, 2 9 , 8 0 )
4 1
H u s s e r l ' s static " a p o p h a n t i c a l ' a s ' " ( t h e a s s e r t o r i c paper-
as-white) was transformed into Heidegger's m o r e situational and interpretive
"hermeneutical
throwing,
etc.)
of
'as'"
(the
practical
interpretation.
(GZ,
paper-as-for-writing-wiping-
73/54,
116/85;
LW,
135-161)
M o r e o v e r , w h e r e a s , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , H u s s e r l v i e w s sense p e r c e p t i o n a s the basic s t r a t u m o n w h i c h c a t e g o r i a l i n t e n t i o n s ( e x p r e s s i o n s ) are f o u n d e d , H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w i s h e s t o m a k e p r i m a r y p r e c i s e l y the p r i o r unthematic
categorial
"interpretedness"
or
"expressedness"
of all
ex-
p e r i e n c e i n p r e c o n c e p t i o n , w i t h o u t w h i c h the sensed o b j e c t w o u l d n e v e r h a v e been a c c e s s i b l e . W h a t i s p r i m a r y i s n o t sense p e r c e p t i o n b u t r a t h e r interpretation. F o c u s i n g o n the w a y i n w h i c h our i m m e d i a t e experience o f things is articulated in advance t h r o u g h public everyday understanding, he w r i t e s : " . . . o u r s i m p l e s t p e r c e p t i o n s a n d c o n s t i t u t i v e states are a l r e a d y
19
258
expressed, e v e n m o r e , are interpreted i n a c e r t a i n w a y . . . T o p u t i t m o r e p r e c i s e l y : w e d o n o t say w h a t w e see, b u t r a t h e r t h e reverse, w e see w h a t one says a b o u t t h e m a t t e r . " ( G Z , 7 4 - 7 5 / 5 6 ; c f . 6 5 / 4 8 , 3 7 3 / 2 7 0 , 4 1 6 / 3 0 0 ) F o u r , r e g a r d i n g H u s s e r l ' s t h e m e o f the h a b i t u a l , u n t h e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r of categorial
meaning
intentions
in
the
only
"experienced"
and
not
e x p l i c i t l y " k n o w n " identification o f signified and intuited, Heidegger t r a n s f o r m e d t h i s t h e m e i n t o h i s n o t i o n o f h o w f a c t i c a l l i f e has the t e n d e n c y t o " f a l l " t o w a r d s t h e b e i n g s i n w h i c h its " c a r e " i s a b s o r b e d , such t h a t its p r i o r discoveredness o f the w o r l d and i t s e l f i n p r e c o n c e p t i o n remains u n t h e m a t i c . F a c t i c a l l i f e has the t e n d e n c y t o i n t e r p r e t i t s e l f s o l e l y i n t e r m s of beings. T h u s , for Heidegger, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " r e d u c t i o n " meant a l e a d i n g b a c k n o t t o the a p r i o r i o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - e i d e t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t r a t h e r t o t h e a p r i o r i o p e r a t i v e w i t h i n the p r e c o n c e p t i o n o f f a c t i c a l l i f e ( " h e r m e n e u t i c a l i n t u i t i o n " ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s notes f o r h i s course read: " T h e ruinant f l i g h t
into the w o r l d ;
p o s i t i v e m e a n i n g o f H u s s e r l ' s ' r e d u c t i o n ' . " (PA, 3 9 )
1 9 2 1 - 2 2 lecture
away
f r o m objects;
4 2
F i n a l l y , f o r H e i d e g g e r the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f f a c t i c a l l i f e w a s n o t t o b e investigated in Husserl's manner as an impersonal, thing-like " w h a t " (essence) b e l o n g i n g t o t h e e q u a l l y t h i n g - l i k e " t h a t " o f the p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l subject ( p a r t i c u l a r ) w h i c h has t h i s i n t e n t i o n a l reason a s its u p p e r s t o r e y . Rather, he wanted to understand the " w h a t " (intentional consciousness) a n d the " t h a t " ( e m b o d i m e n t ) u l t i m a t e l y i n t e r m s o f a " h o w " o f a p o s s i b l e " w a y to be" or "exist" for a personal " w h o , " w h i c h is always " m i n e " and is
characterized by
(GZ,
the
finitude
of temporal
"awhileness"
(Jeweiligkeit).
151-152/109-110, 205-207/152-154)
5. Intentional history
F i n a l l y , the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s t r u c t i v e r e t r i e v a l w a s also d i r e c t e d t o Husserl's
characterization
o f the
"enactment-meaning"
(Vollzugssinn)
or
" t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g " (Zeitigungssinn) o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . T h i s t e m p o r a l e n a c t m e n t u l t i m a t e l y d e f i n e s the " h o w " o f t h e w h o l e i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n itself. I n h i s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , H u s s e r l refers t o the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e f u l f i l l i n g intentions in w h i c h an identification of signified and intuited, i.e., t r u t h , i s a c h i e v e d . H e d e s c r i b e s the f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n a s a n act o f
" m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " (gegenwärtigen) or " p r e s e n t i n g " (präsentieren): " T h e intentional character of p e r c e i v i n g . . .
20
is making-present (presenting)."
259 (LU, 6 4 6 / 7 6 1 ) " T h e o b j e c t i s a c t u a l l y ' p r e s e n t ' o r ' g i v e n ' , a n d present a s just
what
we
have
"presents"
the
sensuous
"temporalizes
intended
(zeitigt)
it."
object
a
(LU,
anew
new
647/762) in
its
Categorial
categorial
consciousness
of
intuition
structure
objectivity."
and
The
c a t e g o r i a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o b j e c t , the b e i n g i n its b e i n g , b e c o m e s " ' p r e s e n t ' , "
is "set before our eyes." (LU, 6 7 0 - 6 7 5 / 7 8 4 - 7 8 7 ; c f . G Z , 8 5 - 9 0 / 6 3 - 6 6 , 9 6 - 9 7 / 7 0 - 7 1 ) I n t h e s e c o n d v o l u m e o f h i s Ideas, h e c a l l s t h i s m a k i n g present
"appresentation."
4 3
In
his
Logical
Investigations,
he
does
not
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s c u s s the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts, b u t i n h i s
early
Lectures
on
the
Phenomenology
of Internal
Time-Consciousness,
w h i c h w e r e later e d i t e d b y H e i d e g g e r , h e does g i v e d e t a i l e d analyses o f " m e m o r y , " "expectation," and "presentation." W h a t a p p e a l e d t o H e i d e g g e r i n H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n s o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y w a s t h a t here " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " p o i n t e d i n the d i r e c t i o n o f its basic m e a n i n g a s t i m e : T h e d i s c l o s e d " t r u e m a k i n g t h i n g " b e c o m e s " p r e s e n t " f o r the " m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " o f m y d i s c l o s i v e f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n . B u t a g a i n h i s r e t r i e v a l o f these i n d i c a t i o n s passed t h r o u g h the c r u c i b l e o f h i s d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e . H e r e h e t o o k u p D i l t h e y ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the t h e m e o f h i s t o r y i n t o H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e t h i r d basic thesis o f D i l t h e y , w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , w a s o p e r a t i v e i n the f o r m e r ' s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l , w a s that " t h e l i f e c o n t e x t o f the p e r s o n i s i n e v e r y s i t u a t i o n one o f d e v e l o p m e n t . " ( G Z , 164-165/118-119)
4 4
H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s o u t that, i n h i s r e f u t a t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g i s m , H u s s e r l d r a w s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n " b e t w e e n t h e real b e i n g o f the p s y c h i c a l a n d the i d e a l b e i n g o f p r o p o s i t i o n s i n j u d g m e n t s - a n d m o r e o v e r , b e t w e e n the t e m p o r a l h a p p e n i n g o f the r e a l a n d the a t e m p o r a l subsistence o f the i d e a l . " (LW, 5 0 ) Thus,
in
h i s Logical Investigations,
Husserl
writes
that " w h a t is t r u e
is
a b s o l u t e , i s true ' i n i t s e l f ; t h e t r u t h i s i d e n t i c a l l y the same, w h e t h e r h u m a n s o r n o n - h u m a n s , angels o r g o d s c o m p r e h e n d i t i n j u d g m e n t s . " (LU, 1 2 5 / 1 4 0 ) H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t s t o s h o w that H u s s e r l u n d e r s t a n d s b e i n g a n d t r u t h w i t h i n the t e m p o r a l h o r i z o n o f the static " p r e s e n c e " o f i d e a l m e a n i n g o v e r against t h e t e m p o r a l
v a r i a n c e o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts. H e subscribes,
H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n s , t o the t r a d i t i o n a l ' " c o u p l e t s o f o p p o s i t i o n ' r e a l - i d e a l , s e n s i b l e - n o n s e n s i b l e , b e i n g s - t h e v a l i d , the h i s t o r i c a l - t h e t r a n s h i s t o r i c a l , the
temporal-the
atemporal."
(LW,
92-93)
For
Husserl,
the
acts
of
" m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " are thus a t b o t t o m i n d i v i d u a t i n g acts that i n s t a n t i a t e i d e a l m e a n i n g i n the s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l w o r l d . H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s t h a t i n t h i s regard
Husserl belongs to a t r a d i t i o n w h i c h begins w i t h Plato's and
21
260
Aristotle's notion
o f b e i n g a s " a l w a y s - b e i n g " (aei on)
(ousia),
correlated
which
is
to
"theorein"
"gazing."
and "presence"
(LW,
67-72,
56)
Husserl's notion of m e a n i n g as " i m m u t a b l e and invariant i d e n t i t y " is " i d e n t i c a l w i t h the d i s c o v e r y o f the c o n c e p t o f b e i n g i n P a r m e n i d e s a n d i n P l a t o . " ( G Z , 9 2 / 6 8 , 1 0 2 / 7 5 ; HF, 4 2 ) T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g c o m e s t o H u s s e r l , h e f u r t h e r argues,
via L o t z e ' s n o t i o n of " v a l i d i t y " and
also
t h r o u g h the N e o - K a n t i a n i s m o f N a t o r p , W i n d e l b a n d , a n d R i c k e r t , w h o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the v a l i d i t y o f t h e a t e m p o r a l , i d e a l c o n t e n t ( l o g i c a l t r u t h , v a l u e ) o f j u d g m e n t s a n d the r e a l t e m p o r a l act o f j u d g i n g .
(LW,
6 2 - 8 8 ; PA, 4 7 , 1 1 1 , 1 6 3 ) H e w r i t e s : " W h a t k i n d o f b e i n g stands here i n p r e - h a v i n g ? B e i n g p r e s e n t at h a n d , b e i n g p r e s e n t (Gegenwärtigsein) ..." "...
p u r e presence
(Gegenwart). T h i s
temporal
determination
comes
into
p l a y in the characterization of o b j e c t i v i t y . W h y this is so must be made u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . " (HF, 4 3 , 6 5 ) M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s H u s s e r l ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f the i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n ( i . e . , the c o r r e l a t i o n o f t h e static presence o f i d e a l m e a n i n g a n d p a s s i v e o c u l a r m a k i n g - p r e s e n t ) a s t h e " e x t i n g u i s h i n g o f t h e s i t u a t i o n " (WU, 2 0 5 - 2 0 7 ) , t h e " d e - h i s t o r i c i z a t i o n " (Entgeschieht lie hung)
o f the
"ownmost
event"
of one's
lived
experience
a n d o f the " i t w o r l d s . " " T h e h i s t o r i c a l I , " h e w r i t e s , " i s d e - h i s t o r i c i z e d t o t h e r e m n a n t o f a s p e c i f i c I-ness a s the c o r r e l a t e o f t h i n g h o o d . . . " (IP, 8 9 , c f . 8 5 ) " T h e p u r e e g o , " h e s a i d i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n i n 1919, " w o u l d d e r i v e f r o m t h e ' h i s t o r i c a l e g o ' v i a the r e p r e s s i o n o f a l l h i s t o r i c i t y . " In
his
"critique
o f the
[Neo-Kantian
and
Husserlian]
4 5
critique
of
p s y c h o l o g i s m " (LW, 8 7 ) , H e i d e g g e r t o o k u p n o t o n l y D i l t h e y ' s t h o u g h t , b u t also t h e i m p u l s e s o f a n c i e n t s k e p t i c i s m a n d m o d e m p s y c h o l o g i s m , since
he
thought
that
they
made
problematic
precisely
the
relation
(methexis) o f t h e i d e a l t o " l i v i n g t h o u g h t . " (LW, 8 8 ; c f . 5 2 , 5 4 , 9 2 )
4 0
He
a t t e m p t e d t o a p p r o p r i a t e H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n s o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e f u l l p h e n o m e n o n o f h i s t o r i c a l t i m e i n f a c t i c a l l i f e . F i r s t , h e r e - i n t e r p r e t e d H u s s e r l ' s P l a t o n i c n o t i o n o f the a p r i o r i ( l i t e r a l l y t h e " b e f o r e , " the " e a r l i e r " ) t o m e a n t h e f u t u r a l b e i n g a h e a d - o f - i t s e l f o f f a c t i c a l l i f e , its " n o t y e t , " a n d " h o r i z o n o f e x p e c t a t i o n . " (IP, 115; G Z , 9 9 / 7 2 ; AJ, 2 2 ) S e c o n d , h e t r a n s f o r m e d H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " m a k i n g present," a s the act o f static i n d i v i d u a t i o n , i n t o h i s o w n n o t i o n o f the " t e m p o r a l i z i n g " o f one's futural understanding, w h i c h i n t e r p r e t i v e l y "presents"
(HF,
55-56,
79),
"makes-present,"
or
"appresents"
47
beings
w i t h i n a p r a c t i c a l " s i t u a t i o n " that i s shaped also t h r o u g h t h e past. ( G Z , 2 9 2 / 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 , 3 5 9 / 2 6 0 ; LW, 1 9 2 )
4 8
" T h e l i f e - r e l a t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n - I , "
22
261
he writes, "is no mere being-directed to mere objects. E v e r y l i v e d experience is intentional, it contains a ' v i e w t o w a r d s ' something or other ( t h e v i e w w h i c h g r a s p s , foresees a n d r e m e m b e r s i n a v e r y p r e f e r e n t i a l m a n n e r ) . T h e v i e w has a ' q u a l i t y ' ( q u a l i t y o f the a c t - c h a r a c t e r ) . " (WU, 206-207)
4 9
F i n a l l y , H e i d e g g e r a c c o r d i n g l y saw the " p r e s e n c e " o f b e i n g s
i n t h e i r b e i n g n o t a s the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f t i m e l e s s m e a n i n g , but r a t h e r a s e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r p r e t i v e a n d h i s t o r i c a l presence. " T h e f u l l m e a n i n g o f a p h e n o m e n o n , " h e m a i n t a i n s , " e n c o m p a s s e s its i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n - c h a r a c ter, c o n t e n t - c h a r a c t e r , a n d e n a c t m e n t - c h a r a c t e r . . . " (AI, 2 2 )
5 0
6. C o n c l u s i o n
I n c o n c l u s i o n , I w o u l d l i k e t o s k e t c h b r i e f l y t h e fate o f t h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s w i t h H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n h i s subsequent d e v e l o p m e n t a n d f i n a l l y e n d w i t h s o m e c o m m e n t s o n the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f his y o u t h f u l existential-phenomenological way for our understanding of his w h o l e t h o u g h t . A l r e a d y a r o u n d the t i m e o f the c o m p o s i t i o n o f his Being and Time i n 1926, H e i d e g g e r b e g a n t o d i s t a n c e h i m s e l f f r o m h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . F o r e x a m p l e , the a l m o s t t w o h u n d r e d p a g e i n t r o d u c t o r y discussion o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h had o r i g i n a l l y appeared a t the start o f o n e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s f i r s t drafts o f " B e i n g a n d T i m e , " n a m e l y ,
his
1925 lecture course e n t i t l e d The History of the Concept of Time,
d i s a p p e a r e d in the p u b l i s h e d t e x t Being and Time in 1 9 2 7 .
S 1
H i s detailed
discussions o f h o w his c r i t i c a l appropriation o f Husserl was carried out a n d a l s o his a d o p t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s t e r m i n o l o g y s u f f e r e d the same fate. W h a t m a r k e d Being and Time as a d i s t a n t i a t i o n f r o m h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h H u s s e r l w a s h i s n e w l y e m e r g i n g p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the t r a n s c e n d e n tal thought of K a n t .
His
1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e c o u r s e w a s t o h a v e been a
reading o f the n o t i o n o f t r u t h i n Husserl and A r i s t o t l e , but h a l f - w a y through
the
semester h e
instead
turned to an examination of K a n t ' s
t r e a t m e n t o f t i m e i n his " d o c t r i n e o f s c h e m a t i s m . " I n a l e c t u r e c o u r s e devoted
to
Kant's
Critique
of Pure
Reason
in
1927-28,
he
told
his
students: " W h e n I b e g a n a g a i n to s t u d y K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason a f e w years a g o a n d r e a d i t , a s i t w e r e , against the b a c k g r o u n d o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i t w a s a s i f t h e b l i n d e r s f e l l f r o m m y eyes, a n d K a n t b e c a m e f o r m e the c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e correctness o f the w a y f o r w h i c h I was s e a r c h i n g . " (IK, 4 3 1 ) H i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f K a n t ' s a n a l y s i s o f t i m e i n
23
262 the " d o c t r i n e o f s c h e m a t i s m " p l a c e d h i s w h o l e w o r k Being and Time i n the l a n g u a g e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t h o u g h t . H e c a l l e d t h i s n e w 1927 d r a f t o f "Being
and T i m e "
"fundamental
ontology," which
was
supposed
to
p r o v i d e "transcendental k n o w l e d g e . " (SZ, 51/62) H i s n e w l e x i c o n f o r the three
intentional
"structures"
moments
of "being-meaning"
(content-meaning),
a
transcendental
appeared "Dasein"
as
worldly
(relational
m e a n i n g ) w h i c h seemed t o b e a n e x i s t e n t i a l i z e d v e r s i o n o f K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and t e m p o r a l " s c h e m a t a " ( t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s Being and Time is r e a l l y o n l y one i n t e r p r e t i v e d r a f t of h i s y o u t h f u l p r o j e c t o f e x p l o r i n g the r e l a t i o n o f " B e i n g a n d T i m e " - a n d a late o n e a t that. T h u s , O s k a r B e c k e r , w h o a t t e n d e d H e i d e g g e r ' s l e c t u r e courses f r o m 1 9 1 9 o n w a r d s , c o u l d say, e v e n i f s o m e w h a t i n e x a g g e r a t i o n , that Being and Time is " n o l o n g e r the o r i g i n a l H e i d e g g e r . "
5 2
T h e earlier drafts
o f h i s " B e i n g a n d T i m e " are t o b e f o u n d i n h i s l e c t u r e courses f r o m 1919 o n w a r d s , i n h i s 1 9 1 9 - 2 1 essay o n K a r l Jaspers, i n h i s p l a n n e d b o o k o n A r i s t o t l e i n 1 9 2 2 - 2 3 , and i n h i s 1924 essay " T h e C o n c e p t o f T i m e . " T h u s , I c o n s i d e r h i s 1927 Being and Time to be a l m o s t o n e of h i s ' l a t e r w r i t i n g s ' a n d c o n s i d e r the a u t h o r t o b e a l m o s t a l r e a d y the ' l a t e r H e i d e g g e r ' . T h i s m a k e s a mess o f o u r p r e v i o u s l y adequate d i v i s i o n i n t o " t h e e a r l y H e i d e g g e r " a n d the " l a t e r H e i d e g g e r , " b u t w i t h the o n g o i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f his y o u t h f u l w r i t i n g s , I t h i n k w e w i l l be f o r c e d t o start r e - t h i n k i n g o u r m a n n e r o f m a k i n g d i v i s i o n s i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f his t h o u g h t . I n the 1930s, after h i s r e a l i z a t i o n that h i s a d o p t i o n o f the l a n g u a g e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t h o u g h t in his Being and Time was an a b e r r a t i o n w h i c h l e d to an "inadequate interpretation of my o w n
i n t e n t i o n " (BR, x v / x i v ) ,
H e i d e g g e r t u r n e d t o the e a r l y G r e e k t h i n k e r s , Hölderlin, a n d N i e t z s c h e a s his
preferred
allowed,
dialoguing
now
his
partners.
If such
n e w draft of " B e i n g
a crude
and
schematization
Time"
appeared
as
is the
" f o u r f o l d " o f " e a r t h a n d s k y , g o d s and m o r t a l s " ( c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g ) , p o e t i c "dwelling"
(relational
(temporalizing-meaning).
meaning),
and
the
"destiny
of
Husserl's phenomenology, along w i t h
being" Aris-
totle's practical w r i t i n g s and Kierkegaard's existential thought, slipped more
and
more
into
his eschatological
" f o r g e t f u l n e s s o f b e i n g . " (S, 3 7 9 , 3 8 7 - 3 9 4 )
n o t i o n o f the 5 3
history
o f the
I n h i s 1969 L e T h o r s e m i n a r ,
h e d i v i d e d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f h i s q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g
i n t o the
three
" t h o u g h t - p a t h s " o f the " m e a n i n g o f b e i n g " (Being and Time), t h e " t r u t h o f b e i n g " ( 1 9 3 0 s a n d 4 0 s ) , a n d the " t o p o s o f b e i n g " ( 1 9 4 0 s o n w a r d s ) . ( 5 , 3 4 4 ) H e m a d e t h i s d i v i s i o n r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y w i t h the t h e m e s o f h i s later t h o u g h t after 1 9 3 0 i n m i n d , i.e., a t a t i m e w h e n h i s y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t i n the
94
263 early twenties no longer interested h i m , a situation w h i c h is further i n d i c a t e d b y t h e fact that h e m a d e n o p l a n s t o h a v e h i s e a r l y F r e i b u r g l e c t u r e courses i n c l u d e d i n the Collected Edition o f his w r i t i n g s .
5 4
I a m a r g u i n g , t h e n , that a m o r e adequate r e a d i n g o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Heidegger's
thought
involves
viewing
his
p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " t h o u g h t - p a t h " o f "'being'
youthful
existential-
i n a n d t h r o u g h l i f e " as at
least a f o u r t h w a y i n w h i c h h e t h o u g h t h i s e n d u r i n g q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , o r , better, a s the original w a y subsequent
which
thought-paths.
he t o o k up
Moreover,
a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n his
his
youthful
existential-
phenomenological w a y provides us w i t h a different language for t a l k i n g a b o u t a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g h i s c o n c e r n s , one w h i c h i s n e i t h e r t h e q u a s i t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l a n g u a g e of Being and Time n o r t h e m y t h o - p o e t i c l a n g u a g e o f t h e H e i d e g g e r after 1 9 3 0 .
5 5
I n r e a d i n g a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g H e i d e g g e r i n these w a y s , w e s h o u l d n o t b e i n t i m i d a t e d b y the fact that h e h i m s e l f m i g h t n o t h a v e l o o k e d o n i n a p p r o v a l , p e r h a p s i n m u c h t h e same w a y that the l a t e r H u s s e r l l o o k e d o n i n d i s a p p r o v a l w h e n i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s H e i d e g g e r p r e f e r r e d h i s e a r l y
Logical Investigations to h i s later Ideas as an i n t r o d u c t i o n to p h e n o m e n o l o g y . (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 ) T o stress t h i s p o i n t , I w o u l d l i k e t o c l o s e w i t h t w o b r i e f passages. T h e f i r s t i s f r o m H e i d e g g e r , w h o states that the deeper m e a n i n g o f f i d e l i t y t o a t h i n k e r a l w a y s m e a n s f i d e l i t y t o the Sache, the m a t t e r o f h i s or her thought:
" W h o e v e r gets
involved
in
being-on-the-way
to
the
s o j o u r n i n the o l d e s t o f the o l d , w i l l b o w t o the n e c e s s i t y o f l a t e r b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d d i f f e r e n t l y t h a n h e m e a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d h i m s e l f . " (WM, i x ) T h e s e c o n d passage, w h i c h speaks f o r i t s e l f , i s f r o m o n e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e a r l y students i n the t w e n t i e s , H . - G . G a d a m e r : " O n e needs t o h a v e a l o t o f c o u r a g e t o a d m i t t o o n e s e l f that a great m a n can h i m s e l f nonetheless u n d e r e s t i m a t e h i s o w n r a d i a n c e a n d a b o v e a l l the p r o m i s i n g r i c h n e s s o f h i s b e g i n n i n g s . . . I can e v e n i m a g i n e that H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w o u l d h a v e found
many
new
things
in
this
his
youthful
text
[Phenomenological
Interpretations of Aristotle], h a d he been able to r e a d it w i t h the eyes w i t h w h i c h s o m e o n e reads, w h o i s n o t h i m . "
5 6
Notes 1. The f o l l o w i n g abbreviations for Heidegger's writings w i l l be used i n parentheses in the body of my essay (the page numbers given after the slash are those of the available English translation; however, I take responsibility for all translations appearing in this essay):
25
264 GA
M a r t i n Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am M a i n : V i t t o r i o Klostermann, 1976 - ) .
Earliest FS BG
BK
(1910-1917)
Frühe Schriften ( G A , v o l . 2). " B r i e f an G r a b m a n n " ( i n Hermann Köstler, "Heidegger Grabmann," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 87 [1980]).
Youthful AJ
Works
works
schreibt
an
(1919-1925126)
" A n m e r k u n g e n zu K a r l Jaspers 'Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" (1919-1921)" (in G A , vol. 9) " B r i e f an K r e b s " (1919) ( i n Bernhard Casper, " M a r t i n Heidegger und die Theologische
Fakultät
Freiburg,"
in
Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv,
1980,
Kirche am Oberhein, hrsg. Remigius Bäumer, K a r l Suso Frank, Hugo Ott [Freiburg: V e r l a g Herder, 1980]) Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs ( G A , v o l . 20; translated as History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, tr. Theodore K i s i e l [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1985]) HF Ontotogie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) ( G A , v o l . 63) IP " D i e Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem" (in G A , v o l . 56/57) LW Logic. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit ( G A , v o l . 21) PA Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung ( G A , v o l . 61) P W "Phänomenologie und transzendentale W e r t p h i l o s o p h i e " ( i n G A , v o l . 56/57) WU "Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen S t u d i u m s " ( i n G A , v o l . 56/57) GZ
Later BH
Works
(1927-1976)
" B r i e f an Husserl" ( i n Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana, ΓΧ, ed. Walter B i e m e l [The Hague: M a rt in us N i j h o f f , 1968], pp. 600-602)
B K B " B r i e f a n Krämer-Badoni" ( i n Rainer A . Bast, " B e r i c h t : E i n B r i e f M a r t i n Heideggers an R u d o l f Krämer-Badoni über die K u n s t , " Phänomenologische Forschung, 18 [ 1 9 8 6 ] , pp. 175-182) BR " B r i e f an Richardson" (German and English) ( i n W i l l i a m J. Richardson, EM
Through Phenomenology to Thought [The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1963]) Einführung in die Metaphysik ( G A , v o l . 40; translated as An Introduction to Metaphysics,
GP
tr.
Ralph M a n n h e i m
[ N e w Haven: Y a l e University
Press,
1959]) Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie ( G A , v o l . 24; translated as Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. A l b e r t Hofstadter [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1982])
26
265 IK
Phänomenologische ( G A , v o l . 25)
KM
Ρ
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik ( G A , v o l . 3; translated as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. C h u r c h i l l [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1965]) Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz ( G A , v o l . 26; translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. M i c h a e l H e i m [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1984]) " D i e Idee der Phänomenologie" ( i n E d m u n d Husserl, Phänomenologische
S
Psychologie, Husserliana, IX, ed. Walter B i e m e l , pp. 2 5 6 - 2 6 3 ; translated as "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. Thomas J. Sheehan, Listening, 12 [1977], pp. 111-117) Seminare ( G A , v o l . 15)
ML
SD SZ
Interpretation
von
Kants
Kritik
der
reinen
Vernunft
Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: M a x Niemeyer, 1976); translated as On Time and Being, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New Y o r k : Harper & R o w , 1972) Sein und Zeit ( G A , v o l . 2; translated as Being and Time, tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson [ O x f o r d : Basil B l a c k w e l l , 1967])
US
Unterwegs zur Sprache ( G A , v o l . 12; translated as On the Way to Language, tr. Peter D. Hertz [San Francisco: Harper & R o w , 1971]) VA Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1985) W M Wegmarken ( G A , v o l . 9 ) ZP
"Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im D e n k e n der Seinsfrage" ( i n Phänomenologie - lebendig oder tot?, hrsg. Helmut Gehrig [Karlsruhe Badenia, 1969], p. 47; translated as "The Understanding of T i m e in Phenomenology and in the T h i n k i n g of the Being-Question," tr. Thomas Sheehan and Frederick Elliston, The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 [1979]: 200-201) A shorter version of my essay was presented in June, 1988 at the Semicentennial Meeting of the North American Husserl Circle at W i l f r i d Laurier University, Ontario, Canada. I am grateful to especially Burt Hopkins for his helpful comments, as w e l l as for his m a k i n g available copies of Husserl's letters to Heidegger between 1916 and 1932, the originals of w h i c h are preserved in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, B e l g i u m .
2. For a list of his already published youthful writings, as w e l l as those planned for publication, see the publisher's prospectus: Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Stand: Juni 1989 ( V i t t o r i o Klostermann). As of 1988, his unpublished youthful writings planned for publication have been turned over to the respective editors and thus presumably w i l l all be published by the turn o f the century. 3. In his later reflections on the origins of his early thought, Heidegger reported that he had been studying Husserl's Logical investigations " f r o m 1909 onwards" and had expected "decisive a i d " from it for the question of being which he had discovered in Franz Brentano's On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle and in Carl Braig's On Being: An Outline of Ontology. (SD, 8 1 - 8 2 / 7 4 - 7 5 ; FS, 56/translated by Hans Seigfried as "A Recollection,"
27
266 in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Precedent Publishing, 1981], p. 21). 4. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1982), p. 340.
Sheehan
Movement
(The
[Chicago: Hague:
5. T h e i r philosophical collaboration p r i o r to 1919 was apparently restricted to some correspondence and Husserl's assistance in getting Heidegger's habilitation w r i t i n g on Duns Scotus published in 1916. (FS, 191) 6. Thomas J. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical B i o g r a p h y , " Listening 12 (1977): 7. 7. K a r l Jaspers, " O n Heidegger," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 7 (1978): 108. 8. D o r i o n Caims, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, ed. Richard M. Zaner (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1976), p. 9. 9. Theodore J. K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," in A Companion to Heidegger's "Being and Time," ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D C : Centre for A d v a n c e d Phenomenological Research and U n i v e r s i t y Press of A m e r i c a , 1986), p. 24. 10. See "Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von M a r t i n Heidegger," in W i l l i a m J. Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1963), pp. 6 6 3 - 6 6 5 ; K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," pp. 2 8 - 2 9 . 1 1 . Quoted in Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," p. 5. 12. For example, his unpublished 1923-24 lecture course The Beginning of Modern Philosophy (Introduction to Phenomenological Research) contains a detailed discussion of Husserl's Logical Investigations (see Theodore K i s i e l , " O n the W a y to Being and Time; Introduction to the Translation of H e i d e g ger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs", Research in Phenomenology, X V , p. 196). 13. Cf. SZ, 51/63; BR, x i i i / x i i ; S, 379; ZP, 4 7 / 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 . 14. In 1923, he held an o f f i c i a l seminar entitled "Phenomenological Exercises (Husserl's Logical Investigations, V o l . I I ) " and, in 1922-23, held another seminar entitled "Husserl, Ideas, I . " 15. SZ, 67, n. 9/75, n. x; 289, n. 15/261, n. x x x i v ; 480, n. 10/414, n. x x i i i . 16. Regarding p. 192 (lines 22-29)/pp. 141 (lines 3 9 - 4 0 ) - 1 4 2 ( I i n e s 1-5), see the "Errata" published at the beginning of PA, I I . 17. E. Husserl, A. Pfänder, "Fünf B r i e f e , " in Pfänder-Studien, hrsg. Η. Spiegel berg, Ε. Ανέ-Lallemant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 345. 18. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger's Wege (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1983), pp. 130, 118; Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1986), p. 484; "Der Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," in Jahresgabe der MartinHeidegger-Gesellschaft, 1986, p. 13. Heidegger's interpretations of the history of philosophy in the early 1920s became a model for Gadamer's notion o f "fusion o f horizons." 19. When Husserl finally became aware of the differences between h i m s e l f and his "phenomenological c h i l d " Heidegger, he took up in his o w n way Heidegger's suggestions for r e - t h i n k i n g phenomenology in terms of "factical
78
267 l i f e " and undertook his o w n "fusion of horizons" w i t h Heidegger's new version of phenomenology. He d i d this in the r e w o r k i n g of his Cartesian Meditations and in his Crisis, w h i c h for the first time systematically introduced his notion of the " l i f e - w o r l d . " See Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 56; Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D o r i o n Cairns (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1970), p. 158. In his later introduction to his Ideas, Husserl discussed Heidegger's new version of phenomenology and spoke of how "transcendental phenomenology" "includes all questions that are raised concerning concrete human l i f e " ( E d m u n d Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie and phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, Husserliana, Bd. V [ D e n Haag: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1952), p. 141). Husserl once remarked that Heidegger's analyses of the environing w o r l d were rooted in paragraph 27 of Husserl's o w n Ideas (Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's ' I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Phenomenology of R e l i g i o n ' , 1 9 2 0 - 2 1 , " in The Personalist, 60 [ 1 9 7 9 ] : 318). 20. He maintained that " A r i s t o t l e [was] really in De A n i m a phenomenological (without the e x p l i c i t Reduction)" (quoted in Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl to Heidegger; F r o m a 1928 D i a r y by W . R . Boyce G i b s o n , " Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2 [ 1 9 7 1 ] : 73). 2 1 . Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 4 1 . 22. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 118. See also Theodore K i s i e l , "The M i s s i n g L i n k in the Early Heidegger," in Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D C : University Press of America, 1988), pp. 1-40. 23. See Theodore K i s i e l , " W h y the First Draft of Being and Time was Never Published," in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 20 (1989): 3-22. Heidegger's essay was an expanded version of his 1924 M a r b u r g talk w h i c h bore the same title and w h i c h Gadamer has called the " o r i g i n a l f o r m of Being and Time" (Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 29). Cf. SZ, 356, n. 3/313, n. i i i . 24. Hannah Arendt, " M a r t i n Heidegger at E i g h t y , " in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. M i c h a e l M u r r a y ( N e w Haven and L o n d o n : Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 . 25. K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," p. 24. 26. For a general account of Heidegger's youthful period, w h i c h also deals w i t h his readings of Aristotle and Christian authors, see my "The Y o u n g Heidegger: Rumor of a Hidden K i n g ( 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 6 ) , " Philosophy Today (1989) (forthcoming). 27. In addition to those already cited, the f o l l o w i n g studies of the y o u n g Heidegger's relation to Husserl have also influenced my o w n study: Jacques Taminiaux, "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations: In remembrance of Heidegger's last seminar (Zähringen)," in Radical Phenomenology, ed. John Sallis (Atlantic Highlands, N J : Humanities Press, 1978), pp. 5 8 - 8 3 ; Theodore K i s i e l , "Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorial," in Continental Philosophy in America, eds. H u g h J. Silverman,
29
268 John Sallis, Thomas Μ. Seebohm (Pittsburgh: Duquesne U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983),
pp.
177-185;
Phänomenbegriffs,"
Otto
Pöggeler,
Phänomenologische
"Heideggers
Forschung
9
Neubestimmung
(1980):
des
124-162.
28. See PA, 35: "Skepticism is a beginning, and as the genuine beginning it is also the end of p h i l o s o p h y . " In a 1919 letter to Engelbert Krebs, his Catholic patron at the university in Freiburg, Heidegger wrote that "epistemological insights, extending to the theory of historical knowledge, have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me - not, however, Christianity and metaphysics (these, though, in a new sense) . . . " (BK, 541) He w r o t e to K a r l Löwith in 1921 that he was "not a 'philosopher' in any sense at a l l , " but rather someone " w h o has the single task (completely unsuitable for the schoolroom and progress) of c r i t i c a l l y destroying the traditional conceptuality of western philosophy and theology, where it can indeed also turn out that sometimes he is o n l y threshing ' e m p t y straw'." ( K a r l Löwith, Heidegger:
Denker in dürftiger Zeit,
2.
Aufl.
[Göttingen:
Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, I 9 6 0 ] , p. 106) In his 1923 lecture course, he told his students "that, as far as he was concerned, philosophy was over." (reported in Thomas Sheehan, " T h e ' O r i g i n a l F o r m ' of Sein und Zeit: Heidegger's Der B e g r i f f der Zeit ( 1 9 2 4 ) , " in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 10 [ 1 9 7 9 ] : 82) 29. In his letter to W i l l i a m Richardson, Heidegger explained that there was a " b e n d " or " t w i s t " (Wendung) in his thought around 1930, w h i c h , however, was not really a " t u m " (Kehre) or "reversal" (Umkehr) f r o m a "Heidegger I" to a "Heidegger I I . " (BR, x v i i ) "Heidegger Π , " he insisted, was already contained i n " H e i d e g g e r I . " T h a t i s t o say, the basic " i n t e n t i o n " (Vorhaben) (BR, x v ) of his questioning remained the same f r o m the early 1920s onwards, namely, to ask what "'being' in and through l i f e " means, or, put in other words, to think the relation of being and factical life. Since this intention originated in the early twenties, one can rightly conclude, in the words of one commentator, that "Heidegger I I put i n a n appearance before Heidegger I . " (David
Farrell
Heidegger's
K r e l l , Intimations of Mortality:
Thinking
of
Being
[University
Time, Park:
Truth,
and Finitude
Pennsylvania
in
State
U n i v e r s i t y , 1986], p. 180, n. 3) The " b e n d " in his thought after 1930 concerns not so m u c h a transformation in the basic intention of his thought as rather the realization that the quasi-Kantian, "transcendental" language of his Being and Time led to an "inadequate interpretation of my o w n i n t e n t i o n " (BR, x v ) , w h i c h realization forced h i m to search for new and what he though! were more adequate ways of realizing his intention. If there is anything l i k e a basic " t u m " in his development, it is to be found rather in his y o u t h f u l turn away from the " o n t o - l o g i c " and the " o n t o t h e o l o g y " of his doctoral dissertation and his habilitation w r i t i n g . In his 1920-21 lecture course, he thus spoke of the necessity of a " c o m p l e t e tuming-around (Umwandlung) of p h i l o s o p h y . " He also
spoke
of his
philosophy
as
"the
going-back
(Rückgang)
into
the
o r i g i n a r y - h i s l o r i c a l . " (reported in Sheehan, "Heidegger's ' I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Phenomenology o f R e l i g i o n ' , 1 9 2 0 - 2 1 , " pp. 316, 317) T h i s notion o f " g o i n g back", along w i t h that of phenomenological " r e - d u c t i o n " as a "leading back"
30
269 from beings to being, are his first appellations for what he later called the "step back" out of metaphysics into an "other b e g i n n i n g . " After 1919, he turned away f r o m his earlier metaphysical lexicon of being as objectivity and value (content-meaning) for a transcendental consciousness (relational meaning), both of w h i c h were conceived w i t h i n the horizon of the fixed presence of l o g i c a l atemporality and the eternity of G o d (temporalizingmeaning). As I attempt to show below, what he turned towards was the "genuine b e g i n n i n g " of being as the " i t w o r l d s " of the w o r l d (contentmeaning) for the factical self (relational meaning), w h i c h happens as an " e v e n t " {Ereignis) (temporalizing-meaning). T h i s " e v e n t " o f the " i t w o r l d s " is more being than consciousness. As Gadamer has said, this is "the t u m before the t u m . " ( " D e r Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," pp. 14-15) For Heidegger's
critique of m o d e m
"ego-metaphysics" f r o m
Descartes to
G e r m a n idealism and N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , see PA, 173, 88, 9 1 ; IP, 7 1 - 7 3 . For his critique of m o d e m technology, where he discusses Spengler's Decline of the West, see PA, 26, 74; PW, 130, 136; LW, 37; cf. AJ, 9. 30. Cf. Heidegger's later discussion of his early appropriation of the theme of intentionality as a " r e v o l u t i o n in the place of t h i n k i n g , " a "shift of place" from "consciousness" to " D a s e i n . " (S, 379-385). 3 1 . E d m u n d Husserl, Logische
Untersuchungen, Husserliana,
(Den
Bd. ΧΓΧ.Ι2
Haag; Martinus N i j h o f f , 1984), pp. 665-666; translated as Logical Investiga tions, Vol. 11, tr. J . N . Findlay ( L o n d o n : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 7 8 0 - 7 8 1 . A l l further references to this w o r k w i l l be given w i t h the abbrevia tion LU i n parentheses i n the body o f m y essay. 32. For a f u l l discussion of the traditional restriction of being to the copula in judgment, see Chapter 4 of Heidegger's 1927 lecture course (GP), w h i c h undoubtedly draws on his early reading of Husserl's s i x t h investigation. See also SZ, 212/202, 476/411. 33. In a later seminar, Heidegger described the Greek experience of being as a "superabundance" (Überfülle) and "excess (Übermass) of presence" (S, 331), thereby echoing Husserl's notion of being as an "excess" (Überschuss) (S, 334). Husserl's notion has to be seen as the precedent for Heidegger's talk of "transcendence," the "ontological difference," "ecstasis" and "existence" in Being
and
Time
and
his
1927
lecture
course
Grundprobleme
der
Phänomenologie (GP) (see especially Chapter 1 of the latter, w h i c h discusses Kant's statement that "being is not a real predicate"). See also Jacques Taminiaux, Likewise,
"Heidegger
and
Husserl's Logical Investigations," pp.
Heidegger's description of being as
77-83.
the " n o t h i n g " and
his
preference for saying of being not being ' i s ' , but rather es gibt, there is/it gives/it is given hearken back to Husserl's discussion of how, even though being is " g i v e n , " it is not a thing w h i c h is (SZ, 281/255; GP, 13-14/10). For other passages w h i c h hearken back to Husserl's notion of being as an "excess," see EM, 3 6 - 3 9 / 3 3 - 3 6 ; SD, 3/3. 34. See also .9, 3 7 7 - 3 7 8 : "Husserl's accomplishment consisted precisely in this m a k i n g present of being, w h i c h is phenomenally present in the category. T h r o u g h this accomplishment . . . I finally had a basis: ' b e i n g ' is no mere
31
270 concept, is no pure abstraction, w h i c h arises in the course of a derivation." (cf. 334) 35. For a discussion of D i l t h e y ' s influence on the young Heidegger, see Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), pp. 3 0 - 3 6 ; K i s i e l , "Heidegger ( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 2 7 ) : The Transformation of the Categorial," pp. 173-176; Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers" pp. 11-12. See also SD, 48/45. 36. IP, 7 1 - 7 3 , 8 8 - 8 9 ; WU, 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 ; PA, 9 1 , 97; GZ, 266/196, 300-301/219. 37. See also SZ, 67, n. 9/75, n. x: " B u t disclosing the a p r i o r i is not 'a-prioristic' construction. T h r o u g h E. Husserl we have once again learned not only to understand the meaning of all genuine philosophical e m p i r i c i s m , but also to make use of the necessary tools. ' A - p r i o r i s m ' is the method of every scientific philosophy w h i c h understands itself. There is nothing constructivistic about it. B u t for this very reason research on the a p r i o r i requires the proper preparation of the phenomenal basis. The horizon w h i c h is closest to us, w h i c h must be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness." 38. See K i s i e l , "Heidegger ( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 2 7 ) : The Transformation of the Categorial," pp. 173-176. 39. IP, 13-15; PA, 3 4 - 3 5 , 47, 88; HF, 10, 16, 7 1 ; GZ, 190/140. 40. See also Oskar Becker's report on Heidegger's 1923 lecture course in his "Mathematischer Existenz: Untersuchungen zur L o g i k und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene," Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, 8 (1927), p. 626. 4 1 . See also SZ, 201/193: "Dasein o n l y 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be ' f u l f i l l e d ' through the beings w h i c h are discoverable i n i t . " For Heidegger's acknowledgment o f Husserl's sixth investigation as the "basis" for his long discussion of " t r u t h " in Being and Time, see SZ, 289, n. 15/261, n. x x x i v . 42. Cf. Heidegger's c r i t i c a l appropriation of Husserl's " r e d u c t i o n " in his 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GP, 29/21). 43. E d m u n d Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch, Husserliana IV (Haag: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1952), pp., 161-169. 44. In his Being and Time, Heidegger presents his analysis of " h i s t o r y " as an "appropriation of D i l t h e y ' s w o r k " (SZ, 525/449). 45. Quoted in Thomas Sheehan, ' " I n t r o d u c t o r y N o t e ' to ' T h e Understanding of T i m e in Phenomenology and in the T h i n k i n g of the Being-Question," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) : 199. 46. The lecture course w h i c h Heidegger scheduled for the winter semester of 1922-23 was entitled Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy (Phenomenological Interpretations of Sextus Empiricus, Hyporyposeon, I I I ) . See also W i l h e l m Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," in Martin Heideggers Einßuss auf die Wissenschaften (Bern: A. Franke A G . Verlag, 1949), pp. 7 5 - 7 6 . In his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger calls his o w n philosophy "skepticism." (PA, 35, 197) H i s interest in ancient skepticism belonged
32
271 together w i t h his interest in ancient rhetoric and the ethics of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, since all these have the virtue of making "factical l i f e " thematic. 47. In his 1925 lecture course, Heidegger notes that he has been studying the unpublished manuscript of the second v o l u m e of Husserl's Ideas (GZ, 168/121), in w h i c h the term "appresentation" occurs. He uses the terms "making-present" and "appresentation" interchangeably throughout this lecture course. 48. In his Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl's notion of "making-present": "Husserl uses the expression ' m a k i n g present' to characterize sense perception . . . The intentional analysis of perception and i n t u i t i o n in general must have suggested this ' t e m p o r a l ' description of the phenomenon. That and h o w the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded i n the ecstatical temporality o f Dasein w i l l be shown in the f o l l o w i n g [never published] section" (SZ, 480, n. 10/414, n. xxiii). 49. Cf. Heidegger's comment in his 1928 lecture course (ML, 264/204): "That w h i c h Husserl s t i l l calls time-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of time, is precisely time itself, in the p r i m o r d i a l sense . . . Temporality in its temporalizing is the p r i m o r d i a l i y self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention and making-present." 50. In GZ, 106/78, Heidegger says thai the "matter itself" of Husserl's phenomenology is "intentionality in its apriori, understood in the t w o directions of intentio and internum." Here, in a glance, we can see his f u l l description of the "matter i t s e l f to w h i c h phenomenological i n q u i r y is supposed to be directed in accord w i t h Husserl's slogan " B a c k to the things themselves": first, the intentio-intentum relation is to be studied w i t h i n the sphere of factical life; and, second, the t h i r d moment of historical "temporalizing-meaning" is to be e x p l i c i t l y added. Here we n o w have the f u l l "matter i t s e l f o f the "phenomenon" o f intentionality. Heidegger's insight into especially the intentional moment of "temporalizing-meaning" is the genesis o f his life-long "matter" or " t o p i c " (Sache), w h i c h he w i l l pursue on his many later "thought-paths" ( p r i m a r i l y "the meaning of being," the "truth of being," and the "topos of being"). 5 1 . The general plans in Heidegger's t w o texts, his 1925 lecture course and his Being and Time, are v i r t u a l l y the same. 52. Quoted in Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 3 5 1 . Cf. HansGeorg Gadamer, Philosophische Lehrjahre: Eine Rückschau (Frankfurt: V i t t o r i o Klostermann, 1977), p. 173. 53. The w o r d "phenomenology" no longer occurs in the titles of Heidegger's lecture courses and seminars after 1929 ("Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen v o n M a r t i n Heidegger," pp. 6 6 3 - 6 6 5 ) . The later Heidegger does still consider his thought to be some form of phenomenology, e.g., a "phenomenology of the inconspicuous" (S, 399, cf. 288, 297; SD, 48/45, 90/82; BR, x v / x i v , x v i i / x v i ; WM, 357; ZP, 4 7 / 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ) . See also Bernard Boelen, " M a r t i n Heidegger as Phenomenologist," in Phenomenological
33
272 Perspectives: Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1975), pp. 9 3 - 1 1 4 ; Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 4 0 1 ^ t 0 7 . But the later Heidegger reads Husserl's phenomenology no longer in the light of D i l t h e y , A r i s t o t l e ' s practical thought, and Kierkegaard, but rather in the light of especially the Pre-Socratics. See his 1973 seminar on his youthful appropriation of Husserl's Logical Investigations, in w h i c h he concludes by retrieving Husserl's notion o f truth f r o m the point o f v i e w o f Parmenides' concept o f aletheia (S, 133-138; cf. SD, 7 1 - 8 0 / 6 4 - 7 3 ) . Husserl's thought is here v i r t u a l l y eclipsed. One of the participants of Heidegger's 1973 seminar, Jacques T a m i n i a u x , found " s u r p r i s i n g " Heidegger's "reservation" and "silence" regarding the "extent of insight that this fascinating text had exerted on h i m " ( T a m i n i a u x , "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations," pp. 75, 82). 54. Friedrich W i l h e l m von Herrmann, " D i e E d i t i o n der Vorlesungen Heideggers in seiner Gesamtausgabe letzter H a n d , " Heidegger Studies 2 (1986): 154. 55. See my " D e m y t h o l o g i z i n g Heidegger," in Philosophy in Canada, V o l . 1, ed. Fiore G u i d o ( M i l l i k e n , Ontario: A g a t h o n Books, 1989) (forthcoming). For an example of e m p l o y i n g Heidegger's y o u t h f u l language in an interpretation of his w h o l e thought, see John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, De construction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987). 56. Gadamer, " D e r Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," p. 9.
34
Dasein, the Being that Thematizes
ROBERT B R A N D O M
I . Background
D
OES t h e s t r u c t u r e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t c o m m i t h t m to understanding
D a s e i n a s i n v o l v i n g language
in
p r i n c i p l e ? I w i l l argue h e r e t h a t h e is c o m m i t t e d t o
t h e c l a i m t h a t the sort o f l i n g u i s t i c assertional practice h e
c a l l s " t h e m a t i z i n g " i s a n essential feature o f D a s e i n , a n d so, t h a t n o t h i n g c o u l d b e D a s e i n unless i t t r e a t s s o m e t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . T o see w h y t h i s w o u l d b e a n
interesting and
i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t , i t i s necessary t o rehearse some o f t h e basic features t h a t m a k e Heidegger's a p p r o a c h d i s t i n c t i v e a n d o r i g inal.
Being and T i m e c a n be u n d e r s t o o d as p r o p o u n d i n g a
n o r m a t i v e p r a g m a t i s m . T h e e x p l a n a t o r y strategy i n v o k e d b y this expression comprises t w o d i s t i n c t c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e first regards t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d t h e f a c t u a l
'"Das thematisierende Seiende, das Da$em" (364; English 415). A l l references w i l l be given i n this form: the page numbers i n the German original ot the Gesamtausgabe ( v o l . 2) are given first, and the Macquarrie and Robinson English translation page numbers or Being and Time are given thereafter, e.g., (364; English 415).
35
1
realms; t h e s e c o n d regards t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n n o r m s t a k i n g t h e e x p l i c i t f o r m o t rules a n d n o r m s t a k i n g t h e i m p l i c i t t e r m of proprieties of practice. I n e a c h case t h e q u e s t i o n i s o n e o f c o n c e p t u a l a n d e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n treats t h e f a c r u a l a s t h e basic f o r m o f t h e r e a l a n d seeks t o e x p l a i n t h e n o r m a t i v e b y adding s o m e t h i n g , w h i c h m i g h t g e n e r i c a l l y b e c a l l e d v a l ues. W h a t i s o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l has a c l o a k o f s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e s o r s i g n i f i c a n c e s t h r o w n o v e r i t b y its r e l a t i o n t o h u m a n i n t e r ests or desires.
2
By c o n t r a s t , H e i d e g g e r t r e a t s as p r i m i t i v e a
c e r t a i n k i n d o f s o c i a l n o r m a t i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n a n d seeks t o d e f i n e t h e f a c t u a l as a s p e c i a l case p i c k e d o u t by subtracting something, namely certain kinds of relations to h u m a n projects. A g a i n ,
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n treats n o r m s as
c a n o n i c a l l y c o d i f i e d i n t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t rules w h i c h d e t e r m i n e w h a t i s c o r r e c t b y saying o r d e s c r i b i n g w h a t i s c o r r e c t . E a c h p r o p r i e t y o f practice,
t h e grasp o f w h i c h consists
k n o w i n g how t o d o s o m e t h i n g c o r r e c t l y ,
in
is c o n c e i v e d as
u n d e r w r i t t e n b y a pnnciple, t h e grasp o f w h i c h consists i n k n o w i n g thai a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t o f p e r f o r m a n c e i s c o r r e c t . B y c o n t r a s t , H e i d e g g e r treats a s p r i m i t i v e a c e r t a i n k i n d o f n o r m t h a t is implicit in p r a c t i c e a n d seeks to d e f i n e explicit r u l e s , principles, and claims in terms of the practical proprieties o f using t h e m . H e i d e g g e r sets o u t these c o m m i t m e n t s i n t h e f o r m o f a n account of the relations between three fundamental o n t o l o g i c a l categories, o r m o r e o f f i c i a l l y , r e g i o n s o f b e i n g w i t h i n which
different
sorts
of entities
Zuhandensein, a n d Vorhandensein.
2
are
disclosed:
Dasein,
Dasein is the k i n d of b e i n g
Heidegget formulates his view by opposition to this: " I n inter-
pretinE we do not.
so to speak, throw a 'signification over some naked
t'hin^ which is p r e s e n t - a t - h a n c i , we do nor stick a value on i t " (150; English 191). See also (68; English 97) and (99; English 132).
36
w e ourselves h a v e . ' A l t h o u g h t h e task o t t h e w h o l e b o o k i s t o l a y o u t t h e basic make-Lip (Cmmdverfassung) o f D a s e i n , t w o features m a y b e s i n g l e d o u t b y w a y o t i n t r o d u c t i o n . F i r s t , D a s e i n is an e s s e n t i a l l y social sort of b e i n g . H e i d e g g e r ' s t e r m 4
(cir o u r s o c i a l i t y is .Mitsein, or b e i n g - w i t h . S e c o n d , an essent i a l s t r u c t u r e o f D a s e i n i s t h a t i r a l w a y s alreadv f i n d s i t s e l f i n a worlds To say t h i s is to say t h a t t h e o n t o l o g i c a l categories of D a s e i n a n d Zu/iandensein ( a v a i l a b i l i t y ) are i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d .
6
F o r apart f r o m o t h e r s w h o s e w a y o f b e i n g i s also t h a t o f D a s e i n , t h e w o r l d consists o f w h a t i s zuhanden, t h a t is, readyto-hand,
or
available.
The
available
comprises
what
H e i d e g g e r c a l l s e q u i p m e n t ( Z e u g ) — t h i n g s t h a t are used o r d e a l t w i t h i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s a n d s o are t h i c k w i t h p r a c t i c a l proprieties or significances that d e t e r m i n e h o w it is appropriate t o t r e a t t h e m . T o c a l l s o m e t h i n g a v a i l a b l e i s t o t r e a t i t a s s o m e t h i n g t h a t c a n b e used c o r r e c t l y o r i n c o r r e c t l y , a c c o r d i n g t o proprieties i m p l i c i t i n practices i n s t i t u t e d a n d pursued b y D a s e i n . H a m m e r s are a p a r a d i g m o f a k i n d o f e n r i t y t h a t e x h i b i t s t h i s sort o f b e i n g — t h e y are p r o p e r l y used i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f d r i v i n g n a i l s , a l t h o u g h i t i s possible t o use t h e m a s
'The section titled "The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein" states "We are ourselves the entity to be analyzed" ( 4 1 ; English 67). '"Dasein in itself is essentially Being-wirh" (120; English 156). "So tar as Dasein is at all. it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being" (125; English 163). s
"'Being-in' is thus the formal existential expression for the Being ot
Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state" (54; English nö). "'Dasein' means Being-m-ilie-woud" (165, English 208). 6
1 use category here not in Heidegger's technical sense (for Existenz is
not in that sense a category), but in the sense of "ontological category" 'hnt I detail in "Heideggers Categories in Being and Time." which was reprinted in Heidegger A Ctiu'iui Rcudey. pages 45—64· This essay, to which the present one is a companion, is hereafter referred to as "HCBT."
37
ballast o r weapons.
7
T h e practical norms d e t e r m i n i n g the cor-
rect way o f u s i n g bits o f e q u i p m e n t t y p i c a l l y reiate t h e m t o o t h e r hits o f e q u i p m e n t — h a m m e r s t o nails, nails t o boards, tires to cars, cars to roads, a n d so o n . T h e w o r l d is a h o l i s t i c t o t a l i t y o f such p r a c t i c a l n o r m a t i v e e q u i p m e n t a l i n v o l v e m e n t s . " V'or/ujndensein ( o c c u r r e n c e ) is t h e r e a l m of o b j e c t i v e facts. It consists o f o b j e c t s t h a t are m e r e l y present a n d o f t h e i r m a t t e r of-factual,
non-normative
properties.
Treating
things
as
vorhanden i s t a k i n g t h e m t o b e w h a t t h e y are, i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any p r o p r i e t i e s o f p r a c t i c e i n s t i t u t e d b y Dasein's a c t i v i t i e s . T h u s o c c u r r e n c e i s Heidegger's w a y o f t a l k i n g a b o u t w h a t t h e p h i l o sophical t r a d i t i o n talked about under the h e a d i n g of Reality. W h a t i s o c c u r r e n t differs f r o m w h a t i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h a t i t i s n o t made t o b e w h a t i t i s b y b e i n g c a u g h t u p i n n o r m a t i v e s o c i a l practices, w h i c h situate i t w i r h respect t o D a s e i n ' s p r o j e c t s . '
'"But the 'indicating' of the sign and the 'hammering' of the hammer are not properties of entities. A n y t h i n g ready-to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others" (83; English 114-15). "Serviceability, too, however, as a constitutive state of equipment . . . is not an appropriateness of some entity; it is rather the condition (so far as Being is in question) which makes it possible for the character of such an entity to be defined by its appropriatenesses" (83; English 115). s
" A s the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself
discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements" (85; English 118). "Being-in-the-world, according to our interpretation hitherto, amounts to a nonthematic circumspective absorption in references or assignmenrs constitutive for the readiness-tohand of a totality of equipment" (67; English 107). 'These projects are not to be understood as explicitly conceived and adopted. "Projecting" is an implicit practical attitude or orientation: "Projecting has norhing to do w i t h comporting oneself towatds a plan thar has been thought out. The character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects—thai is to say, possibilities" (145; English 185).
38
ι - ft ft ι
M«-
l A u e m . ihe Being injc Tncrr,.
I n Being and Time H e i d e g g e r ' s p r i m a r y c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t t h e t r a d i t i o n i s t h a t i t gives o n t o l o g i c a l a n d e x p l a n a t o r y p r i d e o f place
ro
this
category—attempting
to
understand
and
e x p l a i n D a s e i n , t h e p r o p r i e t i e s D a s e i n i n s t i t u t e s b y its s o c i a l practices, a n d t h e e q u i p m e n t a l roles defined by those prac tices i n t e r m s o f w h a t i s m e r e l y o c c u r r e n t . ' " T h i s a p p r o a c h , he thinks,
is wrong-headed and doomed to failure. T h e
t h o u g h t u n d e r l y i n g this c l a i m i s t h a t i f n o r m - l a d e n prac t i c e s are t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n w h a t i t i s t o treat t h i n g s a s matters o f fact, w h i l e i f o n e starts w i t h matters o f fact, n o r m s o f a l l sorts w i l l b e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e — c o n s t r u a b l e o n l y i n t e r m s o f e s s e n t i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e responses to
facts."
Heidegger
What pursues
matters the
for
the
direction
present
story
of explanation
is
how
that
he
endorses, r a t h e r t h a n h o w h e t h i n k s t h e r e v e r s e d i r e c t i o n c a n be seen to be d e f e c t i v e . A s was a l r e a d y r e m a r k e d , H e i d e g g e r i s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s n o e q u i p m e n t w i t h o u t Dasein, a n d n o Dasein w i t h o u t equip ment
Dasein
and
Zuhandensein
mutually
presuppose
one
a n o t h e r a s s u b s t r u c t u r e s o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . Vorhandensein, by c o n t r a s t , is a d e r i v a t i v e c a t e g o r y , to be u n d e r s t o o d a n d explained in terms of the o t h e r t w o . 1 2 H o w is the occurrent d e r i v e d f r o m t h e o t h e r t w o sorts o f b e i n g . ' T h i s i s a l o n g story, for w h i c h o n l y t h e barest s k e t c h c a n b e p r o v i d e d h e r e . I n o u t l i n e , i t goes l i k e t h i s : S o m e o f t h e e q u i p m e n t t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e
' " I n general our understanding (it being is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as occurrent" (225; English 268, transla tion revised). "1 argue tor this interpretation of Heidegger's project in H C D T . I!
"
rhe nntolo«ical meaning of c o g n i t i o n , w h i c h we have exhib
ited as a jounded mode of being-m-the-world. To lay bare what is just occurrent and no more, cognition must first penetrate beyond what is available in our concern" (71; English 101, translation revised).
39
Dmem
l'ic Being J u l
in
/
r^mauia
the
·* ρ ο t h r
environing
totality
of equipmental
involvements
p r a c t i c a l l y disclosed i n t h e w o r l d i s s p e c i f i c a l l y linguistic e q u i p m e n t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , o n e sort o f e q u i p m e n t i s sentences, used i n practice
t o m a k e assertions o r c l a i m s .
H e i d e g g e r calls
using
s e n t e n c e s a s o n e does i n t h e p a r a d i g m case o f a s s e r t i o n thematiding. 1 3 T h e basic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s u c h sentences consists i n b e i n g able
to distinguish
in
practice
between correct
and
i n c o r r e c t uses, as w i t h a n y sort o f e q u i p m e n t . T h e p r o p r i e t i e s o f p r a c t i c e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f s e n t e n c e use i n t h e m a t i z i n g are o f t h r e e f u n d a m e n t a l sorts o n Heidegger's a c c o u n t : n o n i n f e r e n t i a l uses i n m a k i n g p e r c e p t u a l r e p o r t s , i n f e r e n t i a l uses (as premises and
conclusions),
and
interpersonal
communicative
Grasping the significance of the claims made
uses.
b y sentences
consists i n p r a c t i c a l mastery o f these k i n d s o f p r o p r i e t i e s o f use. T h i s i s t h e p r a c t i c a l k n o w i n g how i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e capac i t y t o t h e m a t i z e e x p l i c i t l y , k n o w i n g that s o m e t h i n g is t h e case, is to be e x p l a i n e d . H O r d i n a r i l y , H e i d e g g e r t h i n k s , a t h i n g i s first d i s c l o s e d t o D a s e i n a s a v a i l a b l e i n t e r m s o f t h e p r a c t i c a l p r o p r i e t i e s gov erning what it would be correct to do w i t h it. Even unfamiliar t h i n g s first c o m e i n t o o u r w o r l d a s e q u i p m e n t w e d o n o t k n o w what to do w i t h . 1 5 Responding to s o m e t hin g as merely occur r e n t requires a c e r t a i n s o r t o f h o l d i n g b a c k f r o m p r a c t i c a l
"E.g., (149; English 189) and (354; English 405). l4
For derails on how to read Heidegger this way, see H C B T .
,;
" T h e question simply remains as to how entities are discovered in
this previous encountering, whether 2S mere thip.gs
w
' h i c h occur, , ί γ
rather as equipment which has not yet been understood—as something available w i t h which wc have hitherto not known 'how to begin' A n d here again, when the equipmental characters of the available arc still cir'••'rr,ri>art-ly
undiscovered
tHev 3te not to be Interpreted as bsre
Thinghood presented for an apprehension of what is just occurrent and no more" ( 8 1 ; English 112, translation revised).
40
·-(>'/<
i >
Dasein. ?·ν D€>ng ;h^ii TVunmiij.'ö
ι-
involvcmenf.
1 6
I n s t e a d o f t r e a t i n g t h e t h i n g a s a v a i l a b l e for
v a r i o u s sorts o f p r a c t i c a l uses, o n e treats i t a s a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e s p o n d e d t o only b y m a k i n g a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t i t . t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n a p r a c t i c a l response,
1 7
T h i s is a
t h e difference
b e i n g m a r k e d o u t b y t h e fact t h a t t h e assertional o r j u d g m e n t a l responses are themselves available or serviceable
18
for f o r m u l a t i n g
t h e u p s h o t o f p e r c e p t i o n , u s i n g a s f o d d e r for i n f e r e n c e s , o r f o r
" " I f knowing is to be possible as a wav of determining the nature of the occurrent by observing it, then there must be tirsr a deficiency in our having-to-do-with the world concernfully. W h e n concern holds back from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside. T h i s kind of being towards the world is one which lets us encounter entities withm-the-world purely in the way ihey look" (61; English 88). "Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first 'posit' the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine rheir character 'Objectively'. Being w h i c h Objectifies and which is alongside the occurrent within-the-world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-present. This making-present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection in that—above all—the kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the occurrent. We shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence. It is enough for now if we understand that rhe thematirmg of entities within-the-world presupposes Being-in-the-world n< the basic state of Dasein" (363; English 414, translation tevised). 1
Thus one can themati:e (make assertions about! what is nor present-
ar-hand "Even that which is ready-to-hand can be made a theme for scientific investigation. The teady-to-hand can become the O b j e c t ' of a science without having to lose its character as equipment" (361; Enuli^h 413). M u c h of Being and Time does just that (cf. the title of section La: "The task ol a themanc analysis of Being-in"), "'"The assertion is something available" (224; English 267, translation revised)
41
L\'iSL'in
inc' B o n g irml i h i ' m a t i i v i
c o m m u n i c a t i n g t o o t h e r s . T h e assertions w i t h w h i c h i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o respond t o s o m e t h i n g p e r c e p t i b l e d o n o t d e p e n d on the particular practical projects t h a t a n i m a t e the a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e assertor ( a l t h o u g h t h e p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s i n w h i c h o n e goes on
to
use
those
assertions
as premises
may
well
so
depend). T h e h o l d i n g - b a c k t h a t underlies treating something a s m e r e l y occuiTent, t h e " j u s t l o o k i n g " a t i t , consists i n m e d i a t i n g one's p r a c t i c a l responses b y a l e v e l o f a s s e r t i o n , t h e p r a c t i c a l p r o p r i e t i e s o f w h i c h s w i n g free o f p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c a l p r o j e c t s . T h i s i s w h y " o c c u r r e n c e . . . i s t h e s p e c i a l t y o f assert i o n " (158; E n g l i s h 2 0 1 ) . " I t i s i n this way t h a t k n o w - h o w , p r a c t i c a l mastery o f w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s s p e c i f i c a l l y l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e , distances o b j e c t s a n d states o f affairs f r o m t h e p r o j e c t s o f D a s e i n b y r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e m ( f o r i n s t a n c e , perceptually). Knowing-that is founded on knowing-how. A s p e c i a l case o f t h e t h e m a t i z i n g use o f s e n t e n c e s i s t o state rules. W i t h respect t o t h i s p r a g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y o f n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n practice over those e x p l i c i t i n rules, H e i d e g g e r belongs i n a b o x w i t h t h e later W i t t g e n s t e i n . F o r i n t h e investigations, W i t t g e n s t e i n argues t h a t e x p l i c i t rules c a n n o t b e t h e o n l y f o r m t a k e n b y n o r m s , o n t h e basis o f t h e regress t h a t i s r e v e a l e d w h e n i t i s n o t i c e d that f o l l o w i n g a rule is itself s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be done correctly or incorrectly. C a l l i n g a rule t h a t governs the a p p l i c a t i o n of another rule
an "interpretation," Wittgenstein
argues t h a t " t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e w a y o f f o l l o w i n g a r u l e t h a t does n o t c o n s i s t i n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b u t i n f o l l o w i n g o r
" T h e whole passage reads: "This leveling of the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the 'as' with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion. Only so does it obtain the possibiliry ot exhibiting something in such a way that we just look at it." (See also 162; English 89] concerning the relation between perception and assertion, which is discussed below in connection w i t h curiosity.)
42
1 • ι > < > I 11 < -
U a s c m . ihe Being th*u
g o i n g against
i t i n p r a c t i c e " (Phibsophical investigations 2 0 1 ) .
T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o t m a k i n g n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f rules, w h i c h determine
what
is correct and
i n c o r r e c t b y saying
w h a t does a n d does n o t q u a l i f y , d e p e n d s o n a n u n d e r l y i n g possibility o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n t h e practice o f doing t h i n g s c o r r e c t l y a n d
incorrectly and responding
to such performances n o n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y as correct and incorrect. W i t h o u t s u c h p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s , rules c o u l d n o t b e a p p l i e d — i t c a n n o t b e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( i n t h i s sense) a l l t h e w a y d o w n . 2 0 These,
then,
are
the
two
n o r m a t i v e p r a g m a t i s m : first,
components
of
Heidegger's
understanding the factual
in
t e r m s o f t h e n o r m a t i v e ( v i a t h e n o r m s g o v e r n i n g t h e use o f assertions, w h i c h
are
t h e o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e response t o t h e
o c c u r r e n t as such); a n d second, u n d e r s t a n d i n g g o v e r n m e n t by n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y s t a t a b l e rules i n terms o f g o v e r n m e n t b y n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n the f o r m o f skillful practical discriminations of appropriate and inappropriate performances ( i n particular, applications to i n d i v i d u a l unre p e a t a b l e cases o f t h e r e p e a t a h l e s e n t e n c e s t h a t express g e n e r a l rules).
T h e first
is
u n d e r s t a n d i n g Vorhandensein
in
terms of
Zuhandensein, a n d t h e s e c o n d is u n d e r s t a n d i n g Zuhandensein as i n t h e first i n s t a n c e a m a t t e r o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e r a t h e r t h a n individual propositionally contentful cognition or intellectual a c h i e v e m e n t ( " t h e m a t i z i n g " ) . I t i s n a t u r a l t o u n d e r s t a n d these p r i o r i t y claims in terms of a "layer cake" m o d e l , according to which
there
could
be
Dasein
and
Zu/ianaensem
without
Vorhandensein, w h i c h arises f r o m t h e m o n l y i f D a s e i n a d o p t s c e r t a i n o p t i o n a l practices a n d p r a c t i c a l attitudes, i n v o l v i n g t h e use o f c e r t a i n sorts o f s o p h i s t i c a t e d e q u i p m e n t , n a m e l y sentences used
t o m a k e c l a i m s a n d state
rules. T h i s
is an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e c l a i m t h a t "assertion i s
discuss this line of thought in more detail in the first chapter of Making It Explicit.
43
I r^cmauiei
:Λζν:η
epoch*
[ho fvir.i; thai nwmdli^e^
derived f r o m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g " (160; E n g l i d i 2 0 1 ) i n v o k e s d e r i v a t i o n i n a sense i m p l y i n g t h e autonomy o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g layet o t " c i r c u m s p e c t i v e ' ' ( t h a t is, p t a c t i c a l ) acknowledgments of proprieties in dealing w i t h equipment. T h e l e v e l o f assettions. a n d s o o t a d o p t i n g t h e p t a c t i c a l a t t i t u d e o f t r e a t i n g t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t , l o o k s l i k e a n o p t i o n a l super structure, w h i c h m i g h t b e erected o n t o p o f h u m a n existence (Dasein) and the being of equipment
(Zutanderisein),
but
w h i c h equally w e l l m i g h t n o t b e found along w i t h t h e m . 2 1 I n a n s w e r i n g t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n " B y what existential-
ontological modifications does assertion arise from circumspective interpretation?" ( 1 5 7 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 0 ) , H e i d e g g e r a p p a r e n t l y says n o t h i n g t h a t w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t , g i v e n t h e sort o f b e i n g f r o m w h i c h t h e y are d e r i v e d , a s s e r t i o n a n d presentness must arise. I t w o u l d seem possible, a n d i n t h e s p i r i t o f t h e e n t e r p r i s e , t o sup pose t h a t o n e c o u l d c o h e r e n t l y t a k e s o m e c o m m u n i t y t o consist o f e n t i t i e s w i t h Dasein's k i n d o f b e i n g , i n s t i t u t i n g b y t h e i r p r a c t i c e s a w o r l d o f zuhanden e q u i p m e n t , w h i l e n o t supposing t h a t they c a n talk, a n d do so w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t t h e y t r e a t a n y t h i n g a s vorhanden. O n t h i s r e a d i n g , H e i d e g g e r portrays
an
autonomous,
preconceptual,
prepropositional,
prelinguistic level of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y — n a m e l y practical, skillladen, n o r m - g o v e r n e d directedness t o w a r d e q u i p m e n t treated as available. As b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , Dasein can already be d i s c e r n e d a t t h i s l e v e l . I t m a y o r m a y n o t b e t h e case f o r a n y particular c o m m u n i t y o f e x i s t i n g entities, entities whose way o f b e i n g i s t h a t o f D a s e i n , t h a t o n t h i s p r a c t i c a l base a t h e o r e t i cal superstructure of c o n c e p t u a l , p r e p o s i t i o n a l , linguistic, or i n Heidegger's t e r m i n o l o g y , t h e m a t i c i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , i s e r e c t e d
: i
l n tact, 1 endorse priority of implicit practical norms over the
capacity to make anything explicit ;r. Mating Ii Explicit. Bur 1 have come to believe that, tempting as it is to attribute this view to Heidegger, as I argue below, he is in fact committed to rejecting i t .
44
'-A^cir. iMe Bern? inc.: i ncrr.,inzL.
«' ρ <» < t i «-
T h o ^ e i n t e r p r e t e r s of Being and Time w h o take it to be a p r a g m a t i s t w o r k i n s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h e d u a l sense d e l i n e a t e d above, most p r o m i n e n t l y Dreyfus, H a u g e l a n d , a n d O k r e n t , t y p ically u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r i o r i t y H e i d e g g e r a c c o r d s t o p r a c t i c a l over
propositional
intentionality
accotding
to
this
"layer
c a k e " m o d e l - I t i s t h e thesis o f t h i s essay t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n o f this m o d e l of the p r i o r i t y d o c t r i n e is a mistake — H e i d e g g e r is c o m m i t t e d to the c l a i m that there is no Dasein (and hence no Zuhandensein) w i t h o u t language, w i t h o u t t h e m a t i z i n g , w i t h o u t t r e a t i n g t h i n g s as vorhanden. A s t h e passage q u o t e d i n t h e t i t l e indicates, Dasein is t h e being ( e n t i t y ) t h a t thematizes. A n o t h e r way o f p u t t i n g t h i s c l a i m i s t o say t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y t o treat t h i n g s as e x t a n t or o c c u r r e n t is an existentiaie, a p e r m a n e n t a n d c o n s t i t u t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n . T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t t h e r e c a n n o t b e n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n social p r a c t i c e s w i t h o u t n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f rules, w h i c h d e t e r m i n e w h a t i s c o r r e c t by saying or describing w h a t is correct, a n d hence, w i t h o u t l i n g u i s t i c practices i n c l u d i n g assertion. It is to say t h a t s u c h a prelinguistic
community
would
not
count
as
Dasein.
An
i n s t r u c t i v e case i n p o i n t is H a u g e l a n d ' s r i c h a n d o r i g i n a l r e n d e r i n g o f the n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n t h e practices t h a t institute e q u i p m e n t . H e e x p l a i n s these n o r m s i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n s o f d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t q u a l i f y a s " c o n f o r m i s t . " H e asks u s t o i m a g i n e u n d e r t h i s h e a d i n g creatures w h o n o t o n l y c o n f o r m t h e i r b e h a v i o r t o t h a t o f o t h e r c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s i n t h e sense o f i m i t a t i n g e a c h o t h e r , a n d s o t e n d t o act a l i k e ( n o r m a l l y i n t h e sense o f t y p i c a l l y ) i n s i m i l a r c i t c u m s t a n c e s , b u t also sanc tion
each
orhet's
perfotmances,
positively
and
negatively
r e i n f o r c i n g responses t o s t i m u l i s o a s t o m a k e i t m o r e l i k e l y t h a t f u t u r e b e h a v i o r w i l l c o n f o r m t o t h e e m e r g e n t standards.
n
C.<
H u h e n L. Dreyfus, Being m the world: A Commentary on
Heidegger's
Being and Time; John Haugeland, "Heidegger;" Mark
Okrent, Heidegger's Pragmatism.
45
T h e clusters that coalesce can he cailed " n o r m s " ( a n d n o t just
groups or rypes,) precisely because they are generated and main tained by censoriousness; the censure attendant on deviation automatically gives the standards (the extant clusters) α de f a c t o normative force. ( H a u g e l a n d , " H e i d e g g e r " 1 6 )
I t is i n t e r m s o f n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e i n t h i s sense that he explains the proprieties constitutive of equipment and the constitution of the norm-governed c o m m u n i t y as the anyone
(das
Man),
the
conforming
individual
creatures.
Dasein is t h e n identified w i t h this c o m m u n i t y and any n o r m a t i v e structures i n s t i t u t e d b y i t ( H a u g e l a n d , " H e i d e g g e r " 1 9 ) . M y thesis i s t h a t a l t h o u g h s u c h a n a c c o u n t i s n o d o u b t o f crucial i m p o r t a n c e in understanding h o w Heidegger approa ches i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , 2 3 i t c a n n o t b e c o r r e c t a s a n a c c o u n t o f w h a t D a s e i n a n d Zuhandensein c o n s i s t i n . F o r t h i s account c a n be t o l d a b o u t pre- or n o n - l i n g u i s t i c creatures, as e x e m p l i f y i n g an a u t o n o m o u s l e v e l o f f u n c t i o n i n g o n w h i c h t h e c a p a c i t y for l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e is causally a n d c o n c e p t u a l l y parasitic, a n d , i t w i l l b e argued, H e i d e g g e r i s c o m m i t t e d t o t h e c l a i m t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t does
n o t have
language a n d does
not make
assertions ( a n d t h e r e f o r e does n o t t r e a t t h i n g s a s v o r h a n d e n ) c a n n o t qualify as Dasein, a n d so c a n n o t i n s t i t u t e proprieties r h a t q u a l i f y as a w o r l d of Zuhandensein.
23
u
1 take issue w i t h the reduction of the normative to regularities of
behavior and disposition (even to censure) in chapter I of Maiung it Explicit, and 1 would take issue w i t h it also as a reading ot Heidegger 24
Haugeland does say, " I n my pains to avoid any hidden presupposi
t i o n of mentality or reason, I have spoken exclusively of dispositions, behavior, and know-how—making everything sound 'mindless' and inarticulate. But of coutse it isn't. A m o n g Dasein's many institutions are those of language" (Haugeland, "Heidegger" 23). The question is thus one of the status of this institution. We have also been told that among
46
*• ρ ο r h c
W h y n o t say t h a t o n e c a n g i v e a separable a c c o u n t o f a n autonomous
level
of
practice
that,
for
instance,
Dasein's
b e i n g - i n - a - w o r l d o f e q u i p m e n t consists i n , h o p i n g later t o a d d t h o s e features r e q u i r e d t o e x p l a i n o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f D a s e i n , for i n s t a n c e its b e i n g b e i n g a n issue for i t , o r care, which
need
approach
is
n o t be exhibited precluded
on
at the
basic
base
level.' S u c h an
methodological
grounds.
Heidegger claims t h a t in his discussion of Dasein he is n o t just d o i n g a n t h r o p o l o g y , but f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . Part o f t h e cash value o f t h i s c l a i m m u s t b e t h a t h e i s n o t m e r e l y o f f e r i n g u s a set o f d e s c r i p t i o n s , i n h o w e v e r r i c h a v o c a b u l a r y , w h i c h a l l j u s t h a p p e n t o b e t r u e o f us. R a t h e r , h i s c h a r a c t e r i : a t i o n s f o r m a t i g h t l y i n t e r l o c k e d set o f features, n o o n e o f w h i c h could be e x h i b i t e d w i t h o u t all t h e others. W h e n he t e l l s us t h a t D a s e i n is b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , D a s e i n is its disclosedness, a n d t h a t D a s e i n i s t h e e n t i t y w h o s e b e i n g i s a n issue f o r i t , * 5 for i n s t a n c e , p a r t o f t h e s p e c i f i c a l l y ontologicai f o r c e o f these c l a i m s , ontic
force
w h a t raises t h e m a b o v e
of anthropological
observations
the merely
or generaliza
t i o n s , i s t h e i r i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n . I n effect t h e c o m m i t m e n t being u n d e r t a k e n is t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t is correctly specified a s w o r l d e d m u s t t h e r e f o r e also b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h its d i s c l o s e d ness, a n d m u s t c o u n t a s h a v i n g i t s b e i n g a s a n issue f o r i t , t h a t n o t h i n g w h o s e b e i n g i s a n issue for i t c o u l d f a i l t o b e w o r l d e d o r t o b e i t s disclosedness, a n d s o o n . T h e existentielle o f D a s e i n c o m e as a package. T h u s to c l a i m t h a t e n t i t i e s c o u l d e x h i b i t s o m e o f these wavs o f b e i n g w i t h o u t o t h e r s i s t o c l a i m t h a t
Dasein's institutions are chemistry, philately, Christmas, and C i n c i n n a t i (19). For all Haugeland says here, language could be as optional and latecoming in Dasein's development as these are. It is this possibility that the present reading attempts to close off. :3
E.g., see (165; English 208), (133; English 171), and (143; English
182).
47
[λΐ5(Νπ,
rht
' • [ M i l
Beine Out T t e m d n r c s
t I «"
t h e r e i s n o s u c h t h i n g a s D a s e i n , t h a t H e i d e g g e r has g o t t e n i t w r o n g . I t i s b y t h a t same t o k e n t o cast d o u b t o n one's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f w h a t i s r e q u i r e d t o c o u n t as, for e x a m p l e , w o r l d e d , o r s t r u c t u r e d b y care, r e l a t i v e t o a n a l t e r n a t e r e a d i n g t h a t does n o t p e r m i t these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Dasein's basic c o n s t i t u t i o n t o f a l l a p a r t f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . If, 1 w i l l argue h e r e , i t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t a s s e r t i o n a l l a n g u a g e i s a n essential s t r u c t u r e o f t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n , t h e n i t w i l l f o l l o w t h a t , f o r Heidegger, n o t h i n g c a n be w o r l d e d , a n d so treat t h i n g s as e q u i p m e n t a v a i l a b l e unless i t c a n also t r e a t t h i n g s a s o b j e c tively occurrent.
II.
D i r e c t A r g u m e n t s f o r Dasein's H a v i n g Sprache
T h e basic a r g u m e n t t o b e p r e s e n t e d c a n b e p u t s c h e m a t i c a l l y i n f o u r steps: 1 . T h e r e c a n b e n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede ( d i s c o u r s e ) . 2. T h e r e c a n be n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i d l e t a l k ) . 3. T h e r e c a n be n o Gerede w i t h o u t Sprache ( l a n g u a g e ) . 4. T h e r e c a n be n o Sprache w i t h o u t Aussage ( a s s e r t i o n ) . T h i s a r g u m e n t w i l l t h e n b e s i t u a t e d w i t h i n a larger f r a m e , w h i c h argues m o r e g e n e r a l l y t h a t 5 . T h e r e c a n b e n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Verfallen ( f a l l i n g ) . Verfallen e x h i b i t s t h r e e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c substructures, Gerede, Neugier ( c u r i o s i t y ) , a n d Zu/eideutig/<eit ( a m b i g u i t y ) . Gerede is d e a l t w i t h i n t h e first a r g u m e n t . T o c o m p l e t e t h e f r a m i n g a r g u m e n t , i t i s argued t h a t 6. T h e r e c a n be n o Neugier w i t h o u t Aussage. 7. T h e r e c a n be n o Zweideutigkeit w i t h o u t Aussage. T h e conclusion is that 8 . T h e r e c a n b e n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Aussage. A n d so: T h e r e can be no Dasein rhat c a n n o t treat things as jrhanden. E a c h o f these steps requires e x p l a n a t i o n a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
48
e- ρ ο <: he
Dasein,
the öt'in£ that Themaurcs
A s s u m i n g for t h e m o m e n t t h a t s u c h j u s t i f i c a t i o n s c a n b e given,
the
a r c h i t e c t o n i c c o m m i t m e n t s a t t r i b u t e d b y these
premises w i l l r e q u i r e r e j e c t i o n o f t h e "layer c a k e m o d e l " o f t h e c o n c e p t u a l p r i o r i t y o f t h e way o f b e i n g o f t h e a v a i l a b l e o v e r that of the occurrent, in view of the untenability of the picture o f a n a u t o n o m o u s s t r a t u m o f p r a c t i c e i n w h i c h e n t i t i e s already c o u n t a s h a v i n g Dasein's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c b e i n g a n d a s o p e r a t i n g a m i d s t a w o r l d o f e q u i p m e n t b u t are n o t y e t t a k e n t o b e able t o t a l k . T h e p r i o r i t y thesis must t h e n b e u n d e r s t o o d t o address t h e order of e x p l a n a t i o n — o n e
cannot
understand
Vorhandensein
unless o n e first u n d e r s t a n d s Zuharidensein. T h e reason for t h i s e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y i s t h a t i n d i c a t e d a b o v e : t o t r e a t somet h i n g as merely o c c u r r e n t is to treat it as o n l y appropriately r e s p o n d e d t o b y m a k i n g t h e sort o f j u d g m e n t s a b o u t i t t h a t are expressed b y assertions ( i n c l u d i n g t h e j u d g m e n t s t h a t are t h e output of perception).
2 6
B u t s u c h assertions are a k i n d o f e q u i p -
m e n t , s o m e t h i n g a v a i l a b l e , w h o s e use m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d as governed by proprieties i m p l i c i t in practice—paradigmatically intrapersonal inference and interpersonal c o m m u n i c a t i o n . By contrast, the proprieties of practice that institute prelinguistic equipment can be understood in advance of any understanding of specifically linguistic e q u i p m e n t . T h i s c a n be true even t h o u g h , as w i l l be argued, unless s u c h p r e l i n g u i s t i c p r o p r i e t i e s o f p r a c t i c e are a c c o m p a n i e d by l i n g u i s t i c ones, t h e y w i l l n o t count as instituting a world, and the i n s t i t u t i n g entities w i l l n o t c o u n t a s h a v i n g t h e sort o f b e i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f D a s e i n .
26
" ! n this kind of 'dwelling' as holding-oneself-back from any manip-
ulation or utilisation, the perception of the occurrent is consummated. Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. W h a t is thus perceived and made determinate C2T\ he expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted" (62; English 89, translation revised).
49
P*ücin.
β^αι^- dial ι hcmatizcs
I I I . N o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede
D a s e i n , w e are t o l d , i s its disclosedness ( 1 3 3 ; E n g l i s h 171 ) . "Disclosedness"
is
Heidegger's
t e r m for,
roughly,
: 7
Dasein's
o n t o l o g i c a l access t o a n y e n t i t y ' s sort o f b e i n g . ( H i s t e r m f o r m e r e l y o n t i c access t o e n t i t i e s , a s o p p o s e d t o t h e i r b e i n g , i s " d i s c o v e r y . " ) T h e first t h i n g w e are t o l d a b o u t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f disclosedness i s t h a t " t h e f u n d a m e n t a l existentialia w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e b e i n g o f t h e ' t h e r e ' [ D a s e i n ] , t h e disclosedness of
being-in-the-world,
understanding
are
[Verstehen]"
situatedness
(160;
English
[Befindlichkeit] 203).
and
"Existenaale"
i s a t e r m H e i d e g g e r uses f o r s t r u c t u r e s o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g w i t h o u t w h i c h i t w o u l d n o t q u a l i f y a s D a s e i n . T h e l i s t o f existentialia a s s o c i a t e d w i t h D a s e i n ' s d i s c l o s e d n e s s is g i v e n i n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s i n d i f f e r e n t places ( m o r e w i l l b e said a b o u t t h e o t h e r f o r m s l a t e r ) . A l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y , t h o u g h , w e are t o l d , w i t h e m p h a s i s , t h a t " D i s c o u r s e [Rede] i s e q u i p r i m o r d i a l [existenzial gieich-ursprüngüch]
w i t h situatedness and
under-
s t a n d i n g " ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 3 ) . T o say t h i s i s t o say t h a t o n e c a n n o t h a v e Befindlichkeit o r Verstehen w i t h o u t Rede. S i n c e t h e f o r m e r are enstentialia, so is t h e l a t t e r .
28
T h u s t h e r e is no
D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede. T h i s m u c h is n o t in any way a controversial c l a i m . But if i t i s n o t c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h a t Rede i s p a r t o f t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n of Dasein, t h e n can it n o t immediately be concluded that language
is? A f t e r a l l , Rede i s t h e o r d i n a r y G e r m a n
w o r d for discourse, for t e l l i n g , for a r t i c u l a t i n g i n language. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is n o t i m m e d i a t e , h o w e v e r , for Heidegger uses Rede as a t e c h n i c a l t e r m , w h i c h at least i n c l u d e s , a n d is
27
The best discussion of this docttine
is Haugeland's "Dasein'';
Disclosedness." 2 8
A t (165; English 209) we hear about "the basic α prion structure of
discourse as an existenuale."
50
ο ρ ο t. r i
often taken ro be l i m i t e d to, various kinds of prelinguistic a r t i c u l a t i o n . T h u s H a u g e l a n d offers t h e f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n :
Telling ( R e d e ) is the articulation of significance or intelligibility, both in the sense of separating or c a r v i n g u p , a n d in the sense of
expressing in words. T h e carving up is .. an essentially public or shared way of distinguishing determinate entities in determinate regards. ( " D a s e i n ' s D i s c l o s e d n e s s " 6 4 )
T h u s Rede i s t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n b y w h i c h a shared w o r l d o f e q u i p m e n t i s i n s t i t u t e d b y s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . T h e gloss, H a u g e l a n d suggests, o n t h i s i s t h a t t h e basic n o t i o n i s t h a t o f t e l l i n g , i n t h e sense o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i n p r a c t i c e those p e r f o r m a n c e s t h a t are appropriate o r i n accord w i t h i m p l i c i t n o r m s f r o m those t h a t are n o t : " T h e u r - p h e n o m e n o n o f t e l l i n g i s t e l l i n g w h e t h e r b e h a v i o r does o r does n o t a c c o r d w i t h t h e c o m m o n n o r m s — i n effect t e l l i n g r i g h t f r o m w r o n g " ("Dasein's D i s c l o s e d n e s s " 6 5 ) . O n e i m p o r t a n t c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s p r a g m a t i c r e a d i n g o f Rede, a s h e goes o n t o p o i n t o u t , i s t h a t " s u c h t e l l i n g w o u l d i n d e e d be the originary a r t i c u l a t i o n of significance, and w o u l d , at the same t i m e , b e f u n d a m e n t a l t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o r r e c t n e s s — f o r e x a m p l e o f assertions." T h i s i s a n i m p o r t a n t b e n e f i t o f t h e pragmatic
interpretation,
because
Heidegger
emphasizes
( i n v o k i n g h i s sense o f " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " a s " c i r c u m s p e c t i v e " practical, prelinguistic k n o w - h o w ) , "Discourse is t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies b o t h interpretation and a s s e r t i o n " ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 4 ) , a n d " w e h a v e seen t h a t assertion is d e r i v e d f r o m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d is a n e x t r e m e case o f i t . . . .
T h e existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk iRede] 1 ' ( ί ό ΰ - ό ί ; E n g l i s h 2 0 3 ) . H e r e a g a i n , t h e n , w e see expressions o f t h e p r i o r i t y thesis c o n c e r n i n g t h e g r o u n d i n g o f linguistic practice
in prelinguistic know-how,
which
it
is
t e m p t i n g to interpret as c o m m i t m e n t s to the possibility of an autonomous level of practical circumspective interpretation by Dasein of e q u i p m e n t m a k i n g up
a w o r l d o f Zuhandensein.
51
A g a i n , the c l a i m to be defended here by contrast is t h a t a l t h o u g h such a n a u t o n o m o u s l e v e l o f p r a c t i c e i s n o d o u b t p o s s i b l e — t a l k i n g does n o t d e v e l o p ex nihilo—it w o u l d n o t be p r o p e r to describe it in Heidegger's t e r m i n o l o g y as c h a r a c t e r i z e d by Dasein,
being-in-the-world,
Zuficmdensem,
or,
the
presently
r e l e v a n t p o i n t , as a r t i c u l a t e d by Rede. H e i d e g g e r says t h a t " T h e w a y i n w h i c h discourse \Rede] gets expressed is l a n g u a g e [Sprache]" ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 4 ) . T h i s i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t Rede c o m e s i n t w o f o r m s , a n i m p l i c i t f o r m i n w h i c h i t consists i n p r a c t i c a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t i n g the proprieties that institute a w o r l d and an optional, derivative
form
in
which
those
proprieties
can
be
explicitly
expressed a n d discussed. T h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r i t i s o p t i o n a l t h a t t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n t h a t i s Rede b e expressed. T h e c l a i m t h a t i t must be e x p l i c i t l y expressed c a n be u n d e r s t o o d i n e i t h e r a l o c a l o r a g l o b a l sense. I n t h e l o c a l sense, t h e c l a i m w o u l d b e that no particular practical articulation or discrimination of p r o p r i e t i e s c o u l d c o u n t as d i s c u r s i v e
(redend)
unless it was
expressed e x p l i c i t l y , t h a t is, i n language, i n t h e g l o b a l sense, the claim w o u l d be that no practical articulation or discrimin a t i o n o f p r o p r i e t i e s c o u l d c o u n t a s d i s c u r s i v e unless some s u c h a r t i c u l a t i o n s o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s are expressed e x p l i c i t l y in
language.
T h e stronger
local
claim would
seem
to be
i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a n y v e r s i o n o f t h e p r i o r i t y thesis. I t i s clear that not all "articulation of intelligibility according to signif i c a t i o n s " ( t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f Rede) takes t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t assertions.
2
29
I n a n y case, i t i s t h e w e a k e r , g l o b a l c l a i m t h a t i s
' " l n discourse the intelligibility of being-in-the-world . . . is articula-
ted according to significations" (162; English 205). It is tempting to identify "significations" with signs and to take this as an endorsement of the exclusively explicit nature of Rede. But this would be incorrect. "Significations" is ''Bedeutungen,'' which is used to refer to the purely practical references and assignments that articulate the world of equipment. W h e n he talks
52
to be d e f e n d e d h e r e . H e i d e g g e r does seem to say t h a t it is n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t Rede b e expressed i n t h i s g l o b a l sense:
Because discourse [ R e d e j is constitutive for the being of the there (that means
is,
for
situatedness and understanding),
ßemg-m-the-u>or!d,
Dasein
as
discursive
while
"Dasein"
Being-in
has
already expressed itself. Dasein has language. M a n shows himself as the entity which talks. This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to h i m , hut that he is the entity which is such as
to discover the world and Dasein itself. ( 1 6 5 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 8 ) R e c a l l t h e p r e v i o u s a r g u m e n t t o t h e effect t h a t H e i d e g g e r s h o u l d n o t b e t e l l i n g u s a b o u t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t D a s e i n just h a p p e n s t o h a v e , o n t i c features o f s o m e i n t e r e s t i n g e n t i t i e s , but o n l y about d e f i n i t i v e , i n t e r n a l l y related o n t o l o g i c a l characteristics. S i n c e i t i s n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t D a s e i n b e d i s c u r s i v e b e i n g - i n , i t i s n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t i t express itself, a n d s o i t i s n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t i t h a v e language. A n o t h e r d i r e c t a r g u m e n t i s available for t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Sprache. T h i s has t o d o w i t h t h e r o l e
about the special sort of equipment that consists of actual signs, Heidegger uses "Zeichen." We are told explicitly that not all Rede has propositional form: "we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do so in accordance w i t h significations: and this articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering rhem theoretically and which we express in sentences" (165; English 209). This specific wording of the definition of Rede cited above is significant, however. "According to significations" is "bedeutungsmassige'' and the word that Kant uses to talk about norms explicit in the form of rules is "regelmässige." Heidegger may be picking up on this usage and therebv emphasizing the second thesis of his normative pragmatism, that norms i m p i i c i i in prac tice must be presupposed in explaining those explicit in rules.
53
ι-Λΐΐιΐπ. rnt? Seine tnat Themauzc
o f e x p l i c i t expressions o f t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n s c o m p r i s i n g Rede i n 5
communication, - t h e r o l e o f s u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n b e i n g - w i t h , and t h e r o l e o f b e i n g - w i t h i n b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . T h e c l a i m i s t h a t a l l o f these are necessary features o f D a s e i n . H e r e i s t h e c e n t r a l passage:
Discoursing or t a l k i n g is the way in which we articulate "signifi c a n t l y the intelligibility of Being-in-the-ii'orid. Being-with belongs to B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , which in every case maintains itself in some
definite
way
of concemful
Being-with-one-another.
is
[redend]
Being'With'one'another
discursive
as
Such
assenting
or
re/using [ z u - u n d a b s a g e n ] , as demanding, or warning, as pro nouncing lAussprache./,
consulting/Rücksprache],
or
interceding
[Fürsprache], as "making assertions," a n d as talking in the way of "giving a talk" [ R e d e n h a l t e n ] . ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 4 )
Every m e m b e r o f t h i s l i s t o f p a r a d i g m a t i c ways i n w h i c h b e i n g w i t h is articulated discursively is e x p l i c i t l y and essentially
J0
"Discourse w h i c h expresses itself is communication [Mitteilung!"
(168; English 211). We see again that it is n o t optional that Rede be expressed ( i n the global, not the local sense), for communication is n o t an optional structure of Dasein. Thus: "For rhe most part (zumeist), discourse [Rede] is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language [Sprache]" (167; English 211). These passages cannot yet be taken to be decisive, however, because they are balanced by others such as: " ' C o m m u n i c a t i o n ' in w h i c h one makes assertions— giving information, for instance —is a special case of that communication which is grasped in principle existentially" (162; English 205). Heidegger is not contradicting himself here, because there is more to language than assertion—not a l l Sprache is Aussage. I t w i l l be argued below, however, that there is no iprache without Aussage ( i n the global sense that the capacity to talk at all requires the capacity to make assertions).
54
«
p u t
Μ «*'
D o s e m , uui Being [na: T n e m a l l r e s
l i n g u i s t i c . S i n c e b e i n g - w i t h i s n o t a n o p t i o n a l feature o f D a s e i n , b u t r a t h e r a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f its Grundverfassung, a n d since Rede l i k e w i s e has t h i s status, t h e e x c l u s i v e l y l i n g u i s t i c character o f this b o t a n i z a t i o n o f modes o f discursive beingw i t h c e r t a i n l y suggests, t h o u g h i t falls s h o r t o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g , t h a t t h e r e c a n b e n o Rede, a n d t h e r e f o r e n o D a s e i n , w i t h o u t SpToche.
IV.
Rede a n d Gerede
H o w e v e r , t h e strongest a r g u m e n t for t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e i s n o Rede ( a n d t h e r e f o r e n o D a s e i n ) w i t h o u t Sprache i s n o t a d i r e c t a r g u m e n t r e l y i n g o n passages s u c h a s t h e s e , b u t a n i n d i r e c t o n e . T h i s proceeds i n t w o steps: T h e r e i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i d l e t a l k ) ,
a n d n o Gerede w i t h o u t
Sprache. T h e s e p o i n t s w i l l be addressed s e q u e n t i a l l y . Gerede i s a s p e c i a l f o r m o f Rede: " D i s c o u r s e , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o t h e e s s e n t i a l s t a t e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g a n d has a share i n c o n s t i t u t ing
D a s e i n ' s disclosedness, has t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e c o m i n g
idle t a l k " (169; E n g l i s h 213). T h e first question is w h e t h e r it is o p t i o n a l t h a t this possibility be realized. C o u l d entities qualify as a r t i c u l a t i n g practical significances in t h e f o r m of Rede i f t h e y n e v e r a r t i c u l a t e t h e m i n t h e f o r m o f Gerede? A g a i n i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t w o ways i n w h i c h t h i s question c a n be understood. It is clear t h a t n o t every articu l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o s i g n i f i c a t i o n s takes t h e f o r m o f Gerede. T h u s t h e stronger, l o c a l f o r m o f t h e c l a i m t h a t there i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede does n o t h o l d — n o t e v e r y b i t o f Rede is a b i t o f Gerede N o n e t h e l e s s i t w i l l h e c l a i m e d t h a t t h e weaker, g l o b a l f o r m o f t h e d e p e n d e n c e c l a i m does h o l d — u n l e s s s o m e a r t i c u l a t i o n s t a k e t h e f o r m o f Gerede, n o n e c o u n t a s R e d e — a n d so the creatures in question, a l t h o u g h t h e y m i g h t by t h e i r social practices i n s t i t u t e n o r m s t h a t t h e y i m p l i c i t l y acknowledge
as governing
their performances,
c o u n t as Dasein.
55
would
not
.9α.ίάί.7:.
the
ΰέ:ης
inj:
e ρ ο c Ii
Thematik*
e
W h a t sort of m o d i f i c a t i o n of Rede is Gerede? T h e first p o i n t is t h a t Gerede is j u s t t h e everyday (alltäglich) f o r m o f Rede. " T h e e x p r e s s i o n ' i d l e t a l k ' [Gerede] i s n o t t o b e used h e r e i n a ' d i s p a r a g i n g ' s i g n i f i c a t i o n . . . i t signifies a p o s i t i v e p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e k i n d o f B e i n g o f e v e r y d a y Dasein's u n d e r 3
standing and interpreting" (167; English 211). ' T h e i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n thus becomes w h e t h e r it is o p t i o n a l t h a t Rede sometimes appear i n its e v e r y d a y f o r m . H e i d e g g e r says o f Gerede:
This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In i t , o u t of it, and against i t , all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all rediscovering and appropriating anew, are performed. ( 1 6 9 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 3 ) T h u s Gerede,
t h e e v e r y d a y f o r m o f Rede, f o r m s t h e b a c k -
g r o u n d f o r t h e o t h e r f o r m s . I t i s n o t a n o p t i o n a l species, b u r a f u n d a m e n t a l o n e . T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s p r i v i l e g e d status i s t h a t "idle talk i s the k i n d o f B e i n g t h a t belongs t o B e i n g - w i t h - o n e a n o t h e r i t s e l f " ( 1 7 7 ; E n g l i s h 2 2 1 ) . B e i n g - w i t h , o f course, i s itself n o t o p t i o n a l .
It is a
fundamental
characteristic
of
Dasein's GTundver/assung. T h e s e passages m a k e i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s n o Rede ( a n d therefore
no
Dasein)
without
its
everyday
form,
Gerede.
H o w e v e r , i n o r d e r t o see t h a t Gerede i s a n e s s e n t i a l l y linguistic p h e n o m e n o n , i t i s necessary t o l o o k m o r e c l o s e l y a t w h a t i d l e t a l k is, a s t h e e v e r y d a y f o r m i n w h i c h s i g n i f i c a n c e s are a r t i c u l a t e d - Its essence is, as t h e w o r d suggesrs, gossip. H e r e is t h e c e n t r a l passage t o b e u n p a c k e d :
'Talk
r ,
f interpreting (a form of understanding) w- talk of Rede, for
Reap underlies all these forms of intelligibility: "Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies borh interpretation and assertion" (161; English 203-04).
56
ο
fi
ο «
Ii.
tt/hai is said-m-the-iaili /das G e r e d e t e ] as such, spreads i n w i d e r circles a n d takes on an authoritative character.
Things are so
because one says so. Idle talk is c o n s t i t u t e d by just such gossiping and passing the w o r d a l o n g — a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on f B o d e n s t ä n d i g k e i t ] becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness / B o d e n l o s i g k e i t J . ( 1 6 8 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 2 )
Gerede
is f u n d a m e n t a l l y a s t r u c t u r e of a u t h o r i t y , a w a y in
w h i c h justificatory grounds can be treated in practice. ( T h i s is o n e o f m a n y places w h e r e i t c a n seem t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s s i n n i n g against h i s o w n p r e c e p t t h a t Gerede i s n o t t o b e t a k e n i n a d i s p a r a g i n g sense. T h i s i m p r e s s i o n o u g h t t o b e a l l e v i a t e d b y t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t , a l t h o u g h H e i d e g g e r i s far f r o m r e c o m m e n d i n g this structure of authority, he t h i n k s t h a t it provides t h e p e r v a s i v e b a c k g r o u n d against w h i c h a l o n e i t i s possible t o understand
the
possibility
of more
authentic
justificatory
s t n i c t u r c s . ) Gerede consists i n t h e t h o u g h t l e s s passing o n o f what
is s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k , das
Geredete.
Understanding
what
this means requires r e v e r t i n g to the f u n d a m e n t a l structure o f Rede:
T h e items constitutive for discourse are: what the discourse is about (what is talked about) fdas Worüber d e r R e d e (das B e r e d e t e ) J ; w h a t is said'in'the'talk, as such [das G e r e d e t e als s o l c h e s ] ; the communication [die
Mitteilung];
and
the m a k i n g - k n o w n
/die
Bekundung], (162; English 206)
O n l y t h e f i r s t t w o o f these, w h a t i s t a l k e d a b o u t a n d w h a t i s s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k . das Beredete a n d das Geredete, m a t t e r h e r e . T h e other t w o can b e understood i n terms o f t h e m , since c o m munication
is
making-known
the is
p a s s i n g a l o n g o f das Geredete, the
establishment
of a
and
relation
to
the das
Beredete b y such passing a l o n g . W h a t i s s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k a n d w h a t i s t a l k e d a b o u t are t h e t w o e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s i n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s p e c i f i c a l l y linguistic c o n t e n t s , t w o aspects o f a
57
Doic'ir,
rhc Hang; ihat ι aeTruiciit-
distinctive k i n d of equipment, equipment employed in order to communicate and make-known. T h u s these e l e m e n t s h a v e a l l b e e n i n t r o d u c e d before w e ever h e a r a b o u t i d l e t a l k . W h a t - i s - s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k i s i n t r o d u c e d , w i t h o u t u s i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t e r m , w h e n w e first h e a r a b o u t assertion, a s t h e essence o f t h e r o l e assertion plays i n communication:
As something communicated, that which has been put forward in the assertion is something that Others can "share" with the per son making the assertion, even though the entit-y which he has pointed o u t a n d to which he has given a definite character is n o t close enough for them to grasp and see i t . That which is put forward in the assertion is something which can be passed along in "further reteUing." There is a widening of the range of that mutual shanng which sees.12 ( 1 5 5 ; E n g l i s h 1 9 7 )
A g a i n before w e are i n t r o d u c e d t o Gerede, w e hear a b o u t t h e o t h e r s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t a n d its r e l a t i o n t o t h e first:
Talking is talk about something [ R e d e n ist R e d e überj. What the discourse is about is a s t r u c t u r a l i t e m that it necessarily possesses; for discourse helps to constitute the disclosedness of Being-m-theu w l d , a n d in its own structure it is modeled upon this basic state of Dasein. Inany talk or discourse, there is s o m e t h i n g s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k as such f e i n G e r e d e t e s als solches/ whenever one wishes, asks, or expresses oneself about something. In this "something said," discourse communicates. ( 1 6 2 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 5 )
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d Gerede i n t e r m s o f these t w o struct u r a l e l e m e n t s , das Geredete a n d das Beredete. Gerede is discourse
ii
Notice thar communicating by asserting is the sharing of seeing,
that is, of treating things as occurrent.
58
('(><><
h >•
ΐλι<πη
the Bein£ that i kcrntia-.
t h a t pays a t t e n t i o n o n l y t o das Geredete, t o w h a t is s a i d - i n - t h e talk, but n o t to w h a t the talk is about:
W h a t is said-m-tfie-taik f G e r e d e t e n J gets understood; but what the
talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. We have t h e same t h i n g in view, because it is in t h e same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said. ( 1 6 8 ; English 212)
I t w i l l emetge t h a t for l i n g u i s t i c e q u i p m e n t g e n u i n e l y t o b e i n play, b o t h s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t s o f saying m u s t i n fact b e p t e s e n t — w i t h o u t t h e m n o g e n u i n e c o n t e n t s are i n s t i t u t e d b y t h e practice of using t h e m to communicate, and so no knowledge o r i n f o r m a t i o n i s a c t u a l l y shared b y passing t h e m a r o u n d . W h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e of Gerede is n o t t h a t das Beredete, w h a t is t a l k e d a b o u t , i s absent, b u t r a t h e r t h a t i t s c r u c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to
the
authority
acknowledged
by
structure
distinctive
of talking
t h o s e w h o are n o n e t h e l e s s
is
not
dependent on
that structure. T o understand exactly w h a t i m p l i c i t presuppositions o f l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e Gerede fails t o a c k n o w l e d g e , i t is h e l p f u l t o apply a m o d e l of the structure of a u t h o r i t y t h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e of specifically
linguistic equipment.33
D e c l a r a t i v e sentences,
w h i c h are e q u i p m e n t for asserting, are g o v e r n e d b y t w o d i f f e r e n t d i m e n s i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y , o n e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e i r use i n communication, t h e o t h e r t o t h e i r use i n inference. T h e s e c o r respond
t o t w o d i f f e r e n t ways i n w h i c h o n e c a n
become
e n t i t l e d t o t h e sort o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d c o m m i t m e n t
3,
T h e case that this general model is found in Being and Time is
argued in detail in H C B T . Only the barest sketch of this argument can be presented here. 1 undertake, rather than attribute to Heidegger, com mitment to a recognizable, similar model in the first tour chapters ot Making h Explicit.
59
e ρ υ c h e
t h a t i s expressed b y a n assertion. B y t h e first m e c h a n i s m , c o m m i t m e n t s c a n become shared, spreading f r o m one i n d i v i d u a l to
another,
as
the
communicates to and
speaker
w h o expresses
possibly
infects a n
an
assertion
audience.
In
this
way, e n t i t l e m e n t t o m a k e a c l a i m c a n b e i n h e r i t e d b y t h e c o n s u m e r o f a n a s s e r t i o n f r o m its p r o d u c e r . I n s u c h i n h e r i tance of e n t i t l e m e n t by c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the c o n t e n t of the commitment
is
preserved
intact
and
merely
transferred.
H o w e v e r , this i s n o t t h e o n l y way i n w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l c a n b e c o m e e n t i t l e d t o a c l a i m . I t i s also possible t o j u s t i f y a c o m m i t m e n t inferentially by e x h i b i t i n g it as a consequence of f u r t h e r premises t o w h i c h o n e i s c o m m i t t e d a n d e n t i t l e d . T h e particular c o n t e n t determines what follows f r o m c o m m i t m e n t to that content, and w h a t that content follows from, w h a t it justifies a n d w h a t j u s t i f i e s i t . T h a t i t i s c a u g h t u p i n s u c h i n ferences b o t h as p r e m i s e a n d as c o n c l u s i o n is w h a t m a k e s it a s p e c i f i c a l l y propositional ( o r assertible) c o n t e n t a t a l l . T h a t i t e x h i b i t s t h e particular i n f e r e n t i a l grounds a n d consequences t h a t i t does makes i t t h e p a r t i c u l a r d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t e n t t h a t it
i s — s e t t l i n g , for instance, w h a t i n f o r m a t i o n
it conveys,
the significance that undertaking a c o m m i t m e n t w i t h that c o n t e n t w o u l d h a v e for w h a t else o n e i s c o m m i t t e d a n d e n t i t l e d t o . T h e first, or c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l , m e c h a n i s m is interpersonal, intracontent commitment.
inheritance The
of entitlement
second,
intrapersonal, intercontent propositional
commitment
or
to
inferential,
a
propositional mechanism
inheritance of e n t i t l e m e n t (since
the
to
is a
c o n t e n t s o f premises
a n d conclusions w i l l differ in any inference that is n o n t r i v i a l i n t h e sense o f b e i n g a v a i l a b l e t o d o j u s t i f i c a t o r y w o r k ) . T h e f u n c t i o n s p e r f o r m e d b y b o t h m e c h a n i s m s are essential t o t h e use o f sentences a s e q u i p m e n t for expressing p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t s i n t h e f o r m o f assertions. W i t h o u t t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n provided by proprieties governing the practice of interring, i n c l u d i n g inferences f r o m t h e c o m m i t m e n t s t h a t agents f i n d themselves
with
perceptually,
60
sentences
would
not
express
CWm.
the
Beine
determinate proposirional contents at all. W i t h o u t acknowledgment in practice ot the propriety ot i n h e r i t i n g e n t i t l e m e n t t o c l a i m s f r o m t h e assertions o f o t h e r s , t h e r e w o u l d b e n o c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d assertion w o u l d b e socially i d l e , i n s t i t u t i n g n o sort o f e q u i p m e n t a t a l l . W i t h t h i s c o n c e p t u a l apparatus, i t i s possible t o characterize straightforwardly
the
practical
attitude
Heidegger
calls
Gerede. Gerede consists i n a c k n o w l e d g i n g o n l y t h e c o m m u nicative
structure
of authority
and
not
the
inferential.
" W h a t - i s - s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k " is passed a l o n g , b u t n e v e r g r o u n d e d i n " w h a r - i s - t a l k e d - a b o u t " — i t does n o t h a v e t o answer t o a n y justificatory
demands
beyond
a
communicational
prove-
nance. T h o s e repeating a c l a i m they overhear do n o t take p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t , m e r e l y d e f e r r i n g t o w h a t " t h e y " (das
Man)
say:
T h e fact that something has been said groundlessly, a n d then gets passed along in further retelling, a m o u n t s to p e r v e r t i n g the act o] disclosing [ErschliessenJ into an act of closing o / / [ V e r s c h l i e s s e n J . F o r uihat is said is always understood proximail-y as "saying" something—that is, an uncovering something. Thus, try its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something w h i c h it leaves u n d o n e . ( 1 6 9 ; English 213)
T h u s t h e f u n c t i o n of w h a t is t a l k e d a b o u t , das Beredete, is to ground t h e authority o f t h e c o n t e n t s t h a t are c o m m u n i c a t e d . T a k i n g a c l a i m b a c k t o its g r o u n d i s j u s t i f y i n g i t i n s o m e w a y other t h a n b y a p p e a l t o w h a t o t h e r s say. I t i s t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t oneself, j u s t i f y i n g i t b y appeal t o o t h e r c l a i m s , i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o p e r c e p t u a l l y a c q u i r e d ones, t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l also takes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for. Gerede is a p r a c t i c a l stance t h a t ignores s u c h g r o u n d i n g i n das Beredete, a n d cieaves o n l y t o das Geredete, i g n o r i n g g r o u n d i n g i n f a v o r o f j u s t passing t h i n g s a l o n g . T h e t r o u b l e i s t h a t e n t i t l e m e n t c a n
61
ch^iTficin^iiiZ'is
Dasein. tAe Being thxxt T h e m a t i k
f ρ ο c Ιί
b e i n h e r i t e d f r o m , a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y deferred t o , a n o t h e r o n l y if the other i n d i v i d u a l is e n t i t l e d or can fulfill the justificatory responsibility i m p l i c i t in m a k i n g a c l a i m . If everyone adopts the
attitude
o f Gerede,
and
defets
responsibility
without
a c c e p t i n g i t , t h e n a l l o f t h e t i t l e s supposedly passed a r o u n d b y c o m m u n i c a t i n g are d e f e c t i v e a n d e m p t y . T h a t is, i n t h e w o r d s quoted
above:
What is saidAn-the-talk [das G e r e d e t e ] as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so, idle talk is constituted by j u s t such gossiping and passing the word along—a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on [ B o d e n s t a n d i g k e i t J becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness [ B o d e n l o s i g k e i t j . ( 1 6 8 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 2 )
Gerede i s t h e e v e r y d a y , i n a u t h e n t i c v e r s i o n o f Rede p r e cisely because o f t h e f a i l u r e t o t a k e p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t i s i t s essence. T o c o m e i n t o a n a u t h e n t i c p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n t o one's c o m m i t m e n t s i s t o t a k e o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r justifying t h e m , rather t h a n deferring it or evading it by a p p e a l t o w h a t e v e r y o n e (das Man) says. O n e a l w a y s a l r e a d y f i n d s o n e s e l f " f a i l i n g , " t h a t is, e q u i p p e d w i t h a n d c o n s t i t u t e d b y a set o f c o m m i t m e n t s o n e j u s t f i n d s o n e s e l f w i t h , w i t h o u t i n general b e i n g able t o justify t h e m b y g r o u n d i n g t h e m i n w h a t t h e y arc a b o u t . T h i s i s w h y t h e p r a c t i c e o f Gerede i s t h e background out o f w h i c h every a u t h e n t i c c l a i m i n g and justi f y i n g m u s t arise a n d f r o m w h i c h i t m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h itself.'" To
undertake
practice
a
responsibility
basic
oneself is
ontological
featute
to of
1
acknowledge
in
Dasein—that
it
c o m e s i n w h a t H a u g e l a n d calls " u n i t s o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , " o r "primitive
l o c i o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y (je m e i n e s ) " : " H e i d e g g e r
places t h i s s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h h e calls ' i n - e a c h - c a s e - m i n e n e s 5 '
" A s i n che passage quoted above from (169; English 213).
62
ο ρ ο c h
D a s e i n , thi* i S c i n g ι λ α : J ,'ιίτπαιι^
(Jememigkeit), a m o n g Dasein's m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s tics
( H a u g e l a n d , " H e i d e g g e r " 2 1 , 2 4 ) . G e r e d e precisely refuses
t o assign a c c o u n t a b i l i t y for t h e p r o p r i e t y o f a c l a i m t o a n y par ticular i n d i v i d u a l , deferring demands for j u s t i f i c a t i o n instead t o t h e g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e , a p p e a l i n g t o " w h a t o n e says" o r " w h a t i s said." I n f a c t , h o w e v e r , t h e p u b l i c s o c i a l p r a c t i c e o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g and the undertaking of individual responsibility presuppose a n d c o m p l e m e n t o n e a n o t h e r . U n l e s s b o t h w e r e always a l r e a d y
i n play, n o g e n u i n e l y c o n t e n t f u l c l a i m s ( o r
e q u i p m e n t for asserting a n d i n f o r m i n g ) w o u l d b e i n s t i t u t e d a t a l l . Gerede e x c l u s i v e l y a c k n o w l e d g e s t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e public communicative dimension,
while
ignoring
that
of
Jemeinigfceit ( h e r e t h e i n d i v i d u a l u n d e r t a k i n g o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) . O n e t h i n g lost w h e n t h e d u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a u t h o r i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c l a i m i n g i s c o l l a p s e d b y Gerede i n t o a single d i m e n s i o n sense),
in
which
i s experience
claims
and
( i n something concepts
are
like
Hegel's
winnowed
and
groomed as the c o m m i t m e n t s one undertakes responsibility t o r oneself ( i n c l u d i n g those o n e finds oneself w i t h p e r c e p t u a l l y , a n d t h e i r i n f e r e n t i a l c o n s e q u e n c e s ) are c o n f r o n t e d b y those o n e w o u l d b e e n t i t l e d t o p i c k u p f r o m t h e assertions o f o t h e r s . I t i s t h e i n t e r p l a y o f these t w o d i m e n s i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y t h a t makes i t possible for w h a r i t i s c o r r e c t t o say t o e x h i b i t a k i n d of independence b o t h from what 1 happen to be c o m m i t t e d to a n d f r o m w h a t o t h e r s h a p p e n t o b e saying. T h i s i s a n s w e r i n g
" Heidegger introduces the idea in the first two sentences of the body of part I ot Being and Time. "We Are Ourselves the Entities to Be Analysed: The Being of anv such entity is in each case mine \je meines]" (42; English 67). He says just a bit further along: "Because Dasein has in each case mmeness [Jememigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: I am,' 'you are'" (42; English 68). ( I ' m not sure how well chemistry, Christmas, and philately score on this criterion for being cases of Dasein.)
63
t u t h e w a y t h e objects are, a n d , i n t h i s sense, b e i n g a b o u t objects.
This
objectivity
is
what
Heidegger
talks about
as
assertions r e p r e s e n t i n g t h i n g s as o c c u r r e n t , as f a c t u a l a n d c o n s t r a i n i n g in a different way f r o m the social proprieties of practice t h a t institute e q u i p m e n t , by settling a c o m m o n way i n w h i c h o n e uses ( t h a t is, o u g h t t o use) a h a m m e r .
3 6
It s h o u l d be clear at t h i s p o i n t t h a t Gerede is a t h o r o u g h l y linguistic
phenomenon,
indeed
a s p e c i f i c a l l y assertional o n e .
T h e c o n c e p t o f gossip c a n n o t b e made sense o f i n p r e l i n g u i s t i c terms. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n between c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d inference as t w o structures of a u t h o r i t y — p a s s i n g a l o n g w h a t is said-int h e - t a l k (das Geredete), a n d t a k i n g i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for g r o u n d i n g w h a t i s said i n w h a t t h e t a l k i s a b o u t (das Beredete)—defines e q u i p m e n t for m a k i n g a n d
communicating
p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y c o n t e n t f u l claims. I n d e e d , t h e specific p r a c t i cal failure to c o m p r e h e n d this dual structure of a u t h o r i t y that H e i d e g g e r i d e n t i f i e s w i t h Gerede ( f o c u s i n g o n das Geredete t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f das Beredete) a m o u n t s t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d i s t i n c t l y linguistic assertional e q u i p m e n t employed i n expressing a n d c o m m u n i c a t i n g a d i s c u r s i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f i m p l i c i t significances b y a s s i m i l a t i n g i t t o o r d i n a r y e q u i p m e n t s u c h a s h a m m e r s . T h e p r o p r i e t i e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e l a t t e r are e x h a u s t e d by h o w o n e uses a h a m m e r — t h e r e is o n l y " w h a t o n e does w i t h h a m m e r s , " i n t h e sense o f h o w i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e for a n y o n e t o use a h a m m e r . T h e p u b l i c p r o p r i e t i e s o n e p i c k s u p f r o m o t h e r s are a l l t h e r e i s t o s u c h n o n l i n g u i s t i c e q u i p m e n t — i f o n e uses h a m m e r s a s o t h e r s d o , t h e n o n e uses t h e m c o r r e c t l y . Gerede fails t o a p p r e c i a t e h o w t h e d u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a u t h o r i t y g o v e r n i n g t h e use o f e q u i p m e n t for m a k i n g
36
These few remarks cannot pretend to be mote than an indication
of the region w i t h i n which we should look for an account of objectivity. 1 discuss the issue further in H C B T and in much greater detail in chapter 8 of Making it Explicit
64
t* ρ Ο Γ I i f
assertions differs f r o m t h e u n i d i m e n s i o n a l s t r u c t u r e g o v e r n i n g t h e use ot p r e l i n g u i s t i c e q u i p m e n t . 1 hus Gerede is a l i n g u i s t i c phenomenon
i n v o l v i n g t h e use o t assertions.
Since
i t has
already been a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e is n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i n t h e g l o b a l , r a t h e r t h a n t h e l o c a l sense), a n d n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede, i t t o l l o w s t h a t t o t a k e s o m e t h i n g a s e x h i b i t i n g t h e k i n d o f b e i n g H e i d e g g e r calls D a s e i n i s t o t a k e i t t o b e a l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t y , o n e t h a t c a n m a k e assertions, a n d s o o n e t h a t can treat t h i n g s as o c c u r r e n t .
V.
F a l l i n g : G e r e d e , Neugier, Zweideutigkeit T h i s a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e linguistic a n d assertional
n a t u r e o f Gerede, t h e m a t r i x o f e v e r y d a y n e s s o u t o f w h i c h t h e expression o f o t h e r forms o f t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y m u s t arise, c a n b e c o n f i r m e d a n d e x t e n d e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g i t i n t h e larger f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f Gerede o c c u r s . R e c o r d e d a t t h e close o f t h e s e c t i o n s o f d i v i s i o n 1 t h a t are b e i n g discussed. H e i d e g g e r offers t h e f o l l o w i n g s u m m a r y :
Our theme has been the ontological constitution of the dischsedness which essentially belongs to Dasein. The Being of that disclosedness is constituted
by
situatedness
[Befindlichkeit./,
understanding
/ V e r s t e h e n / , a n d discourse / R e d e / . Its everyday kind of being is characterized by idle talk / G e r e d e J , curiosity / N e u g i e r / , a n d ambiguity / Z w e i d e u t i g k e i t / . These show us the m o v e m e n t of falling/Verfallen/.37
(180;
English
224,
translation
revised)
''Also, "Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity chatacterize the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its 'there'—the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. In these, and in the way they ate intetconnected in their being, thete is revealed a basic k i n d of Being w h i c h belongs to everydayness [AütäglichkeU]; we call this the '/ailing' [V'erfaiienl of Dasein. This term does nor express any negative evaluation" (175; English 219-20).
65
ο ρ ο c
Ii
e
F a l l i n g i s r h e e v e r y d a y f o r m o f disclosedness, a n d t h e r e l a r i o n b e t w e e n Gerede a n d Rede is s i m p l y a special case of t h e rela t i o n b e t w e e n f a l l i n g a n d disclosedness. A s w e saw t h a t , i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r case, t h e r e i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i n t h e g l o b a l r a t h e r t h a n t h e l o c a l sense), so, i n t h e g e n e r a l case, t h e r e i s n o disclosedness w i t h o u t f a l l i n g . " B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d i s always f a l l e n " ( 1 8 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 2 5 ) . A s w e saw t h a t i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r case, Gerede is a t h o r o u g h l y l i n g u i s t i c p h e n o m e n o n — d e p e n d i n g o n t h e use o f sentences a s e q u i p m e n t for c o m m u n i c a t i o n b y a s s e r t i o n — s o i s i t i n t h e g e n e r a l case for t h e o t h e r forms o f e v e r y d a y disclosedness: c u r i o s i t y a n d a m b i g u i t y . C o n s i d e r f i r s t c u r i o s i t y , w h i c h t r a n s l a t e s Neugier, l i t e r a l l y "greed for w h a t is new." It is associated w i t h a " t e n d e n c y just to perceive" (172; English 216)
and is i n t r o d u c e d as the
e v e r y d a y f o r m ot u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( j u s t as Gerede is t h e everyday f o r m ot Rede):
In our analysis of understanding [ V e r s t e h e n ] a n d of the dis
closedness of the "there" in general, we have . . . designated the disclosedness of being-in as Dasein's clearing, in which it first
becomes possible to have something Uke sight. Our conception of "sight" has been gained by looking at the basic kind of disclosure which is characteristic of D a s e i n — n a m e l y , u n d e r s t a n d i n g . The
basic state of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency-of'Being which belongs to everydayness—the tendency towards
"seeing."
We designate this tendency by the term "curiosity" [ N e u g i e r ] ,
which characteristically is not confined to seeing, but expresses the
tendency
towards a peculiar way of l e t t i n g the w o r l d be
encountered by us in perception. ( 1 7 0 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 4 )
T h r e e features o f p e r c e p t i o n are o f i n t e r e s t h e r e . First, m e r e l y p e r c e i v i n g i n v o l v e s b r a c k e t i n g one's p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s a n d concerns w i t h proprieties of action. Second, this bracketing is accomplished by making c l a i m s — t h e output of perception for
Heidegger is an
assertion.
66
As
has
been
pointed
out,
assertions are a v a i l a b l e as e q u i p m e n t f o r i n f e r e n c e , b o t h p r a c t i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l . T h a t is, one responds a p p r o p r i a t e l y to
assertions
as
such
by
drawing
conclusions from
them,
either using t h e m to justify n o n s e n t e n t i a l performances or f u r t h e r assertions. B u t t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s a s responses t o an
observable
situation
are
not
hostage
to
any
particular
practical project. T h i r d , responding to things perceptually, by
making
noninferential
reports
(which
t h e n available for further inferences),
are
themselves
is t r e a t i n g t h e m as
occurrent. W e f i n d all three themes c o m b i n e d i n a n earlier passage d e a l i n g w i t h p e r c e p t i o n :
in
this k i n d of "dwelling" as a holding-oneself-back from any
m a n i p u l a t i o n or utilization, the p e r c e p t i o n of the occurrent is con summated. Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something αν something a n d discusses it as such. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as w h a t has thus been asserted. (62: English 89)
A d o p t i n g the attitude of perceiving can be done authentically, w h e n the ultimate concern is w i t h understanding, or it can be i n a u t h e n t i c , a f o r m o f f a l l i n g , a s c u r i o s i t y , w h e n t h e assertions i t results i n are e m p l o y e d o n l y i n a k i n d o f i n f e r e n t i a l play. ( I n t h e discussion o f a m b i g u i t y below, t h i s s o r t o f i n f e r e n t i a l p l a y w i l l be called " s u r m i s i n g " [ahnen]).
When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, n o t in order to understand what is seen . . . but j u s t in order to see i t . i t seeks noi'eit-y only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty. It concerns itself with a kind of k n o w i n g , but just in order to have known. ( 1 7 2 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 6 - 1 7 )
I t s h o u l d h e clear t h a t c u r i o s i t y , n o less t h a n Gerede, is, for Heidegger, a p h e n o m e n o n t h a t presupposes language, specifically
67
Dasein,
Oit
Being inat
<- l_» <_» < 11 «-
Tnemaiizcn
assertional
language, a n d so t h e c a p a c i t y to t r e a t t h i n g s as
occurrent. As a form of falling, it amounts to an inauthentic w a y o f t r e a t i n g t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . I t contrasts w i t h science, w h i c h is an a u t h e n t i c way of understanding things as merely 8
present.' E a c h o f these depends o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s p o n d i n g to things by m a k i n g claims about t h e m . T h e t h i r d f o r m o f f a l l e n disclosedness, a m b i g u i t y , i s equally a l i n g u i s t i c affair. By t h i s t e r m Heidegger refers to a w a y of t a l k i n g a b o u t t h i n g s t h a t b o t h evades a n y g e n u i n e search for u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d separates i t s e l f i n p r i n c i p l e f r o m t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c t i o n . A m b i g u i t y i s a k i n d o f speaking, w h i c h substitutes for actual
understanding:
When, in our everyday being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not. This ambiguity f Z w e i d e u t i g k e i t ] extends not only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein's Being towards itself. Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not. ( 1 7 3 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 7 ) F a l l i n g i n t o social practices e m b o d y i n g a m b i g u i t y i n v o l v e s h o l d i n g back f r o m a c t i o n i n a stronger sense t h a n m e r e l y m a k i n g
'-"The kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the occurrent. This awaiting ot disroveredness has its existentiell basis in a resoluteness bv which Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-Being in the ' t r u t h ' . Thi.i projection is possible because Being-in-the-truth makes up a definite way in which Dasein may exist. We shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence" (36S>; English 414, translation revised).
68
e ρ <->«. ii e
assertions does.
Dasein,
Indeed,
the practices
the Being that TKrmntirrs
instituting ambiguity
d e m a n d t h a t o n e refuse t o c o m m i t o n e s e l f t o assertions. For these c a n be used as premises for i n f e r e n c e s ,
i n c l u d i n g the
p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s w h o s e c o n c l u s i o n s are a c t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s t o a c t . I n s t e a d , o n e m e r e l y entertains c l a i m c o n t e n t s , e m p l o y i n g t h e m o n l y i n surmises.
Even supposing that what "they" have surmised and scented out should someday be actually translated into deeds, ambiguity has already taken care that interest in w h a t has been realized will
p r o m p t l y die away. Indeed, this interest persists, in a kind of curiosity and idle talk, only so long as there is a possibility of a non-committal
just-surmising-with-someone-else.
When
con
fronted with the carrying-through of what "they" have surmised together, idle talk readily establishes that "they" "could have done that too." In the end, idle talk is even i n d i g n a n t that w h a t it has
surmised and constantly demanded now a c t u a l l y happens. In that case, indeed, the opportunity to keep on surmising has been snatched away.
In the ambiguity of the way things have been publicly
interpreted, talking about things ahead of the game and making surmises about them curiously, gets passed off as what is really
happening, while taking action and carrying something through get stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant. ( 1 7 4 ; English 218)
T h e cash value o f t h i s i s t h a t t h e c l a i m c o n t e n t s are e m p l o y e d o n l y i n hypothetical reasoning, r e a s o n i n g o f t h e " w h a t i f " sort. F o r m a l l y t h i s means t h a t t h e y appear n o t a s p r o p o s i t i o n s w i t h a s s e r t i o n a l force, t o w h i c h t h e speaker i s u n d e r t a k i n g a c o m m i t m e n t , b u t o n l y as e m b e d d e d as t h e unasserted a n t e c e d e n t s o f asserted c o n d i t i o n a l s .
However, the c l a i m contents that
appear t h u s e m b e d d e d a c q u i r e t h e i r c o n t e n t s f r o m t h e i r asser t i o n a l use. I n p a r t i c u l a r , o n e m u s t b e able t o m a k e a c t u a l i n f e r e n c e s u s i n g an a s s e r t i o n as a p r e m i s e in o r d e r to be able t o use a c o n d i t i o n a l
i n w h i c h t h a t same c o n t e n t appears
69
unasserted. For t h e c o n d i t i o n a l m e r e l y makes e x p l i c i t , i n t h e form of a c l a i m , w h a t is i m p l i c i t in the actual performing ot an inference. T h e possibility of merely surmising is thus a sophisticated, l a t e c o m i n g possibility, one that is b u i l t on a n d depends o n t h e c a p a c i t y t o t a k e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for o r d i n a r y assertions, w h i c h are a v a i l a b l e , as mere surmises are n o t , for e m p l o y m e n t i n p r a c t i c a l inferences l e a d i n g t o a c t i o n . T h e p r a c t i c a l m i s t a k e u n d e r l y i n g f a l l i n g a s a m b i g u i t y consists i n t r e a t i n g t h i s parasitic f o r m o f discourse a s i f i t were a u t o n o m o u s , a game o n e c o u l d p l a y t h o u g h o n e p l a y e d n o other. Thus
all
Heidegger
o f GeTede,
essentially
Neugier,
linguistic
and
Zweideutigkeit
are
phenomena—further,
for ones
t h a t d e p e n d o n t h e c a p a c i t y t o m a k e assertions, a n d s o t o t r e a t t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . T h e s e are t h e e s s e n t i a l substructures o f Verfallen, w h i c h i s a n existentielle o f D a s e i n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e y are t h e f a l l e n f o r m s o f Dasein's disclosedness, a n d D a s e i n i s its disclosedness. T h u s t h e r e is n o D a s e i n w h i c h does n o t f a l l i n t o these p r a c t i c e s , a n d h e n c e n o D a s e i n t h a t c a n n o t a n d does n o t m a k e assertions a n d t r e a t t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . T h e widespread interpretive
impression to the contrary
a m o n g readers o f Being a n d T i m e i s t h e r e s u l t o f m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r e e sorts o f passages. T h e first
sort asserts
the
o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y o f Zuhandensein o v e r Vorharidensein. T h e s e passages are t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y — t h a t assertion is to be u n d e r s t o o d as a k i n d of e q u i p m e n t (assertions
are
something available"
[224;
English
267]),
w h i l e e q u i p m e n t is n o t to be understood in terms of matter-offactual presence plus s o m e t h i n g . T h i s does n o t e n t a i l t h a t i t i s c o h e r e n t t o describe a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n has t h e c a p a c i t y ro treat t h i n g s as zuhanden a n d n o t to t r e a t t h i n g s as vorhanden. T h e second sort o f passage insists t h a t t h e r e c a n b e
" T h i s view of Heidegger's treatmenr of assertion is not common currency. I argue for it in H C B T
70
e ρ ο c h «
Dzsein.
che
Being thai
cases o f c i r c u m s p e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d e v e n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h i c h d o n o t take t h e f o r m o f assertion, o r i t makes t h e same sort o f c l a i m o f p r i o r i t y for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o v e r assertion. 4 0 H e r e i t i s necessary t o k e e p i n m i n d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n l o c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e — i t m u s t b e a d m i t t e d t h a t n o t a l l cases o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are cases o f a s s e r t i o n — a n d t h e g l o b a l c l a i m t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y t o i n t e r p r e t c o u l d exist w i t h o u t b e i n g a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e c a p a c i t y t o assert. T h e s e passages d o n o t s u p p o r t t h e stronger, g l o b a l c l a i m , w h i c h i s t h e o n e b e i n g d e n i e d h e r e . A l s o , i t i s n o t d e n i e d t h a t creatures t h a t d o n o t q u a l i f y a s D a s e i n , because t h e y d o n o t h a v e Rede, Gerede, a n d s o o n , m i g h t nonetheless have practices t h a t i n s t i t u t e s o m e t h i n g a l o t like equipment and do something a lot like interpreting according to it.
I t i s c l a i m e d t h a t such creatures w o u l d n o t q u a l i f y a s
D a s e i n , a n d so, g i v e n t h e package-deal t h a t Heidegger's o n t o logical claims i n v o l v e , that w h a t they institute c a n n o t qualify a s Zunandensein, a n d w h a t t h e y are d o i n g i s n o t s t r i c t l y i n t e r p r e t i n g . F i n a l l y , t h e r e are passages t h a t p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e r e is m o r e t o t a l k i n g t h a n a s s e r t i n g — t h a t n o t a l l Sprache is Aussage, because t h e r e i s also w i s h i n g , c o m m a n d i n g , a n d s o o n . 4 1 A g a i n , h o w e v e r , these passages d o n o t speak against t h e g l o b a l c l a i m t h a t o n e c o u l d n o t h a v e t h e c a p a c i t y t o d o these t h i n g s unless o n e also h a d t h e c a p a c i t y t o assert, t h o u g h o f course n o t a l l instances o f e x e r c i s i n g t h e o n e c a p a c i t y are instances o f exer cising the other. T h e c o n c l u s i o n , t h e n , i s t h a t w h e n H e i d e g g e r talks a b o u t Dasein, he
i s t a l k i n g a b o u t a k i n d o f b e i n g t h a t essentially
i n v o l v e s t h e c a p a c i t y t o use language. M o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t essen t i a l l y i n v o l v e s t h e c a p a c i t y t o use assertional language, t h a t is, t o m a k e c l a i m s w h o s e correctness a s c l a i m s does n o t d e p e n d
- E g . , 0 4 9 ; English 189-90), *. 154; English 195), (158; English 201), (160-61; English 203), and (223; English 266). 4l
E.g., (162; English 205), (161; English 204),and (165-66; English 209).
71
I'hemauze?
<· p <> C IΊ
o n t h e p a r t i c u l a r projects o f those w h o m a k e t h e m . T h u s i t essen tially
involves
the
capacity
to
treat
things
as
occurrent.
Heidegger is indeed a n o r m a t i v e pragmatist in t h e sense of t h e t w o theses stated a t t h e o p e n i n g o f t h i s essay. B u t t h e sort o f e n t i t y about w h i c h he is s u c h a p r a g m a t i s t is, as t h e passage q u o t e d in t h e t i t l e puts i t , ' D a s e i n , t h e b e i n g ( e n t i t y ) t h a t thematizes." 1 -
42
Special thanks are due to John Haugeland for many conversations
and much assistance with the topics discussed here, to Bill Blattner, to my fellow staff members, and to the participants at the N E H Summer Institute on Heidegger and Davidson during which the original version of this paper was written, and to the N E H for supporting that form of Dasein.
WORKS
CITED
Brandom, Robert. "Heidegger's Categories in Being and Time." Mcmw 66 (1983): 387-409. Rpr. in Heidegger: A Critical Reader. Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison H a l l . Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 45-64. . Making It Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994. Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time. Cambridge: M I T Press, 1991. Haugeland, John. "Dasein's Disclosedness." Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1989). ."Heidegger on Being a Person." Nous 16 (1982): 15-26. Rpt. in Heidegger: A Criacai Reader. Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison H a l l . Oxford: Blackwell. 1992. Heidegger, M a r t i n . Being and Time. Trans. Macquarrie and Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. .. Sem und Zeit Ed. Friedrich W i l h e l m von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. Vol. 2 of Gesamtausgabe. 80 vols. 1976. Okrent, Mark. Heidegger's Pragmatism. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmiilan, 1953.
72
Heidegger on Being a Person JOHN HAUGELAND UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
This
paper
presents
a
non-standard
t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Being and Time,
and
rather
free-wheeling
in-
w i t h e m p h a s i s on t h e first d i v i s i o n .
1
I
m a k e H e i d e g g e r o u t t o b e less l i k e H u s s e r l a n d / o r S a r t r e t h a n i s u s u a l , and more like
D e w e y a n d (to a lesser e x t e n t ) Sellars a n d t h e l a t e r
Wittgenstein. My central point will be Heidegger's radical divergence from
the
Cartesian-Kantian
tradition
regarding
the
fundamental
q u e s t i o n : W h a t is a p e r s o n ? A c c o r d i n g to Aristotle, m a n is a logical or " w o r d - u s i n g " a n i m a l , a political or " c o m m u n i t y - p a r t i c i p a t i n g " a n i m a l , a n d a featherless b i p e d . I n a sense e a s i e r t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a n t o e x p l a i n , t h e l a s t i s o n l y i n c i d e n t a l , while the first t w o are i m p o r t a n t ; b u t those t w o are not o u r o n l y i m p o r t a n t differentia. People (and probably o n l y people) m a k e a n d use
tools,
play
games, j u d g e
develop cultural traditions.
themselves
and
others critically,
and
I t m a y seem t h a t apes a n d social insects
share s o m e o f t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a t least p r i m i t i v e l y ; yet p e o p l e a r e clearly q u i t e d i s t i n c t i v e . A satisfactory a c c o u n t of w h a t it is to be a person w o u l d expose the roots of this distinction, thereby s h o w i n g w h y certain differentia are i m p o r t a n t , a n d others only incidental. For
instance,
Christian
and
modern
philosophers
interpreted
Aristotle's "logical" as "rational," a n d proposed this rationality as o u r fundamental distinction.
Thus
Descartes h e l d
that
people can
talk
because t h e y c a n r a t i o c i n a t e ; a n d h e c o u l d w e l l h a v e s a i d t h e s a m e f o r m a k i n g a n d u s i n g tools. Similarly, H o b b e s t r i e d b o t h t o e x p l a i n a n d t o j u s t i f y o u r l i v i n g i n a c o m m o n w e a l t h b y s h o w i n g t h a t i t i s r a t i o n a l . I see Heidegger, on the other hand, as
starting f r o m
Aristotle's second
d e f i n i t i o n — t r y i n g , i n effect, t o g r o u n d all o t h e r i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n t i a o n o u r basic c o m m u n a l n a t u r e . B u t h o w can we conceive animals that are " p o l i t i c a l " in the relevant sense, w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e y a r e r a t i o n a l o r w o r d - u s i n g ? M y reconstruction of Heidegger's answer to this question is the f o u n d a t i o n of my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I m a g i n e a c o m m u n i t y of versatile a n d interactive creatures,
not
otherwise
specified
73
except
that
they
are
conformists.
NOUS
16
" C o n f o r m i s n i " h e r e m e a n s n o t j u s t i m i t a t i v e n e s s ( m o n k e y see, m o n k e y d o ) , h u t a l s o c e n s o r i o u s n e s s — t h a t is, a p o s i t i v e t e n d e n c y t o see t h a t one's n e i g h b o r s do likewise, a n d to suppress v a r i a t i o n . T h i s is to be t h o u g h t of as a c o m p l i c a t e d behavioral disposition, w h i c h the creatures have by n a t u r e ( " w i r e d i n " ) . Ii p r e s u p p o s e s in t h e m a capacity 10 react d i f f e r e n t i a l l y (e.g.,
perception), and
also s o m e
p o w e r to alter one
a n o t h e r ' s d i s p o s i t i o n s m o r e o r less p e r m a n e n t l y ( c o m p a r e r e i n f o r c e m e n t , p u n i s h m e n t , etc.). B u t i t does not p r e s u p p o s e t h o u g h t , reasoning, language, or any other "higher" faculty.
2
T h e net effect of this c o n f o r m i s n i is a systematic p e e r p r e s s u r e w i t h i n the c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h can be v i e w e d as a k i n d of m u t u a l attract i o n a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s m e m b e r s ' b e h a v i o r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s . U n d e r its i n f l u e n c e , these d i s p o s i t i o n s d r a w " c l o s e r " t o each o t h e r , i n t h e sence t h a t t h e y b e c o m e m o r e s i m i l a r ; t h a t is, t h e c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s t e n d t o act a l i k e ( i n l i k e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . T h e result i s a n a l o g o u s t o t h a t o f gregariousness a m o n g range animals:
given only their tendency
a g g r e g a t e , t h e y will t e n d also to f o r m a n d
to
maintain distinct herds.
O t h e r factors ( i n c l u d i n g chance) will d e t e r m i n e h o w m a n y herds f o r m , o f w h a t sizes, a n d w h e r e ;
gregariousness determines only that there
w i l l be h e r d s — d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , r e i d e n t i f i a b l e clusters o f a n i m a l s , separ a t e d b y c l e a r g a p s w h e r e t h e r e a r e n o a n i m a l s (save t h e o d d s t r a y ) . W h e n behavioral dispositions aggregate t i n d e r the force of"conf o r m i s m , i t i s n ' t h e r d s t h a t c o a l e s c e , b u t norms. O t h e r f a c t o r s ( i n c l u d i n g chance) will d e t e r m i n e the n u m b e r o f n o r m s , h o w n a r r o w (strict) they are, a n d w h e r e t h e y are i n the "space" o f feasible b e h a v i o r ; c o n f o r m i s n i d e t e r m i n e s o n l y t h a t t h e r e will be n o r m s — d i s t i n c t , e n d u r i n g clusters o f d i s p o s i t i o n s i n b e h a v i o r a l f e a s i b i l i t y s p a c e , s e p a r a t e d i n t h a t s p a c e byc l e a r g a p s w h e r e t h e r e a r e n o d i s p o s i t i o n s (save t h e o d d s t r a y ) . L i k e herds, n o r m s are a k i n d of "emergent" entity, w i t h an identity a n d life o f their o w n , over a n d above that o f their constituents. N e w animals slowly replace the o l d , a n d thus a single h e r d can outlast m a n y generat i o n s ; l i k e w i s e , t h o u g h e a c h i n d i v i d u a l ' s d i s p o s i t i o n s e v e n t u a l l y pass away, t h e v beget t h e i r successors i n c o n f o r m i s t y o u t h , a n d t h e r e b y t h e n o r m s are h a n d e d d o w n t o the generations. T h e clusters t h a t coalesce can
be called " n o r m s "
(and
n o t just
g r o u p s o r types) precisely because t h e y are g e n e r a t e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d by censoriousness; gives the standards
the censure attentant on deviation automatically ( t h e e x t a n t c l u s t e r s ) a d e facto
normative
force.
O u t - o f - s t e p b e h a v i o r is not just atypical, b u t a b n o r m a l a n d unacceptab l e ; i t i s w h a t o n e i s " n o t s u p p o s e d t o " d o , a r i d i n t h a t sense i m p r o p e r . N o r m s should not be confused w i t h conventions (in
David Lewis',
1 9 6 9 , s e n s e ) , w h i c h a r e " t a c i t " o r "as i f " a g r e e m e n t s , w h e r e t h e p a r t i e s have settled on a certain a r r a n g e d b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n , f o r m u t u a l benef i t . T h o u g h n o t h i n g i s i m p l i e d a b o u t the o r i g i n o f these a r r a n g e m e n t s , their persistence is e x p l a i n e d by s h o w i n g h o w , for each i n d i v i d u a l , it is
74
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON
17
rational to go along w i t h whatever pattern is already established. T h e difference between appeal:
n o r m s a n d c o n v e n t i o n s lies i n t h i s e x p l a n a t o r y
conformisni
does
not depend
on
any
rational or
interest-
m a x i m i z i n g decisions (and thus the n o r m s themselves need not be beneficial).
Also,
insofar as conventions depend on
r a t i o n a l self-
interest, they f o r f e i t the n o r m a t i v e force o f n o r m s . The
total
assemblage o f n o r m s
for a c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y
largely d e t e r m i n e s the behavioral dispositions of each
non-deviant
m e m b e r ; in effect, it defines what it is to be a " n o r m a l " m e m b e r of the community.
Heidegger
calls
this
assemblage
the
anyone.
3
(Perhaps
Wittgenstein meant something similar by "forms of life.") I regard it as the
pivotal
notion
for
u n d e r s t a n d i n g Being and Time.
U n l i k e a scatter of herds, the a n y o n e is elaborately o r g a n i z e d a n d s t r u c t u r e d , because the n o r m s that m a k e it up are h i g h l y i n t e r d e p e n dent. It is c r u c i a l that w h a t get n o r m a l i z e d are not, strictly s p e a k i n g , actual instances of behavior, but r a t h e r dispositions to behave, c o n t i n gent o n the circumstances.
Thus,
norms
have a
kind of "if-then"
s t r u c t u r e , c o n n e c t i n g v a r i o u s sorts o f c i r c u m s t a n c e t o v a r i o u s sorts o f behavior. It follows that the c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y (in the d i f f e r e n t i a l responses o f n o r m a l b e h a v i o r a n d n o r m a l censorship) m u s t effectively categorize b o t h behavior a n d behavioral circumstances into various distinct
sorts.
We
say
that the
a n y o n e institutesthese
sorts.
I m a g i n e , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t t h e r u l e s o f chess w e r e n o t e x p l i c i t l y codified, but were observed o n l y as a body of conformists n o r m s — "how one acts"when in chess-playing circumstances. T h u s , it is p r o p e r (socially acceptable) t o m o v e t h e k i n g i n a n y o f e i g h t d i r e c t i o n s , b u t o n l y one square at a t i m e . F o r this to be a n o r m , players a n d teacher/censors must b e able t o " t e l l " ( r e s p o n d d i f f e r e n t i a l l y , d e p e n d i n g o n ) w h i c h piece is t h e k i n g , w h a t t h e squares a n d d i r e c t i o n s are, w h a t c o u n t s as a m o v e , a n d s o o n . A c c o r d i n g t o o t h e r n o r m s , t h e k i n g starts o n a g i v e n square,
must
be
protected
whenever
attacked,
cannot
cross
a
t h r e a t e n e d s q u a r e , c a n castle u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , etc. T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i s t h a t i t i s t h e same k i n g , t h e s a m e i n s t i t u t e d s o r t , t h a t ' s involved in each n o r m ; hence, the n o r m s themselves are i n t e r r e l a t e d in d e p e n d i n g o n the same s o r t i n g of circumstances. We call a sort w h i c h is i n v o l v e d i n m a n y i n t e r r e l a t e d n o r m s a role—e.g., t h e r o l e o f t h e k i n g i n chess. M a n y n o r m s a r e a l s o r e l a t e d t h r o u g h t h e s o r t i n g o f s q u a r e s , moves, threats, o t h e r k i n d s o f pieces a n d w h a t have y o u ; o b v i o u s l y , i n fact, a l l t h e n o r m s a n d r o l e s o f chess a r e b o u n d u p i n a d e e p l y i n t e r d e pendent
bundle.
Heidegger
makes
these
points
in
terms of the e q u i p m e n t a n d
p a r a p h e r n a l i a o f e v e r y d a y life; b u t the u p s h o t i s the same. H a m m e r s , nails, b o a r d s , a n d d r i l l s , s c r e w d r i v e r s , screws, a n d g l u e are all b o u n d together in a (large) nexus of i n t e r t w i n e d roles, i n s t i t u t e d by the n o r m s of carpentry
practice;
and
that's
what
75
makes t h e m what
they are.
18
NOUS
C o n s i d e r w h a t m a r k s o f f o u r u s e o f t o o l s f r o m t h e uses a p e s s o m e t i m e s m a k e o f sticks, o r ants o f a p h i d s . I t isn't t h a t p e o p l e use t h i n g s m o r e c l e v e r l y , o r m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y , o r t h a t o n l y w e use t h e m t o f a s h i o n o t h e r t h i n g s , t h o u g h all o f these m a y b e t r u e . T h e m a i n d i f f e r e n c e i s that t o o l s h a v e p r o p e r u s e s — f o r e a c h t o o l , t h e r e i s " w h a t it's f o r . " I f a n a p e uses a s t i c k t o g e t b a n a n a s , w h e t h e r c l e v e r l y o r n o t , w h e t h e r succ e s s f u l l y o r n o t , i t has i n n o sense u s e d i t e i t h e r p r o p e r l y o r i m p r o p e r l y . Y o u o r I , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , m i g h t use a s c r e w d r i v e r p r o p e r l y t o d r i v e i n screws, o r i m p r o p e r l y t o carve g r a f f i t i o n the s u b w a y w a l l ; a n d either w a y , t h e p r o p r i e t y i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r c l e v e r n e s s o r success. O n e misues ( o r abuses) a s c r e w d r i v e r to g o u g e walls—that's n o t w h a t screwd r i v e r s are f o r . An ape c o u l d n o t misuse a stick, no m a t t e r w h a t it d i d . B e i n g a s c r e w d r i v e r , like b e i n g a chess-king, is b e i n g that w h i c h plays a c e r t a i n r o l e , in r e l a t i o n to o t h e r t h i n g s w i t h i n t e r - d e t e r m i n e d roles. T h e s e m u t u a l l y d e f i n i n g role relations are c o n s t i t u t i v e o f e q u i p ment or paraphernalia as such. T h o u g h Heidegger distinguishes and n a m e s q u i t e a few v a r i e t i e s (especially sections 15-17), we n e e d o n l y his generic
term,
referral.
4
T a k e n strictly, there never "is" a n e q u i p m e n t . . . . I n the structure [essential to e q u i p m e n t ] t h e r e lies a referral of o n e t h i n g to a n o t h e r . . . . E q u i p m e n t always a c c o r d s w i t h its [ o w n ] e q u i p m e n t a l i t y A y b e l o n g i n g t o o t h e r e q u i p m e n t : p e n , n i b , i n k , b l o t t e r , table, l a m p , f u r n i t u r e , w i n d o w s , d o o r s , r o o m . ( p . r>8) 5
T h e t o t a l i t y o f a l l p a r a p h e r n a l i a cum "referral
nexus of significance";
referral relations is called the
b u t since
paraphernalia
is taken
broadly e n o u g h to include practically everything w i t h which we o r d i n a r i l y w o r k , cope, or b o t h e r (except o t h e r people), this totality is t a n t a m o u n t , i n fact, t o the e v e r y d a y w o r l d . T h e everyday w o r l d , of course, is not the universe or the planet Earth, but rather the " w o r l d " o f daily life a n d affairs—the w o r l d w h i c h has t h e business w o r l d a n d t h e w i d e w o r l d o f s p o r t s a s s p e c i a l i z e d portions.
6
It is essentially a c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t , g i v e n d e t e r m i n a t e char-
acter b y — i n s t i t u t e d b y — t h e n o r m s o f the c o n f o r m i s t s w h o live i n it. T h e anyone itself . . . articulates the r e f e r r a l nexus of significance, (p. 129) T h i s i s a c e n t r a l t h e s i s o f Being a n d Time, w h i c h I v e n t u r e t o s u m u p i n a
m e m o r a b l e s l o g a n : All constitution is institution. L a n g u a g e , n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , i s e n t i r e l y o n a p a r w i t h t h e (rest o f the) everyday w o r l d , as fundamentally instituted a n d d e t e r m i n e d by c o n f o r m i s t n o r m s . T h i s is o n e area, h o w e v e r , w h e r e recent "social
76
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON practice"
accounts
are
19
decidedly
more
sophisticated
t h a n Being and
Time; s o 1 r e s t w i t h q u o t i n g t w o p a s s a g e s e x h i b i t i n g t h e b a s i c i d e a : B u t signs are a b o v e a l l themselves e q u i p m e n t , w h o s e specific e q u i p m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r consists in indicating. . . . I n d i c a t i n g can be d e f i n e d as a "species" o f r e f e r r a l , ( p . 7 7 ) and [ T h e r e f e r r a l nexus o f ] significance. . . harbors w i t h i n itself the o n t o l o g i cal c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y . . . [ o f d i s c l o s i n g ] " s i g n i f i c a t i o n , " on w h i c h are f o u n d e d i n t u r n the possible b e i n g o f w o r d a r i d l a n g u a g e , ( p . 8 7 ; c o m p a r e p . 161) T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is that l i n g u i s t i c f o r m s are u n d e r s t o o d as (special) equipment, a n d hence the w o r d / o b j e c t reference relations are j u s t a s p e c i a l case o f i n t e r e q u i p i n e n t a l another
slogan:
All
intentionality
referral is
instituted
relations—which
suggests
referral.
W e a r e a t last i n a p o s i t i o n t o a d d r e s s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n f o r a n y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Being and Time:
W h a t i s Dasein? A c c o r d i n g t o t h e
text, the a n y o n e ( p p . 126-30), the w o r l d ( p p . 6 4 , 3 6 4 , a n d 3 8 0 ) , l a n guage ( p . 166), a n d e v e n t h e sciences ( p .
11) a U h a v e "Dasein's k i n d o f
b e i n g . " W e c a n m a k e sense o f t h i s a s t o n i s h i n g d i v e r s i t y i f w e u n d e r s t a n d Dasein t o b e t h e a n y o n e a n d e v e r y t h i n g i n s t i t u t e d b y i t : a vast intricate
pattern—generated
and
maintained
by
conformisni—of
n o r m s , n o r m a l dispositions, c u s t o m s , sorts, roles, r e f e r r a l relations, public institutions, a n d so o n .
7
On this reading, the anyone, the (every-
day) w o r l d , a n d l a n g u a g e are d i f f e r e n t c o h e r e n t " s t i b p a t t e r n s " w i t h i n the
grand
pattern
that
i s Dasein;
they
h a v e Dasein's
kind
of b e i n g
b e c a u s e e a c h o f t h e m i s Dasein ( t h o u g h n o n e o f t h e m i s a l l o f D a s e i n ) . W i t h i n t h e a n y o n e a n d all it institutes, t h e science of c h e m i s t r y is a coherent
subpattern:
chemistry
is
Dasein—and
so
are
philately,
Christmas, and Cincinnati. T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , o n e c r u c i a l o m i s s i o n f r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g list. A c c o r d i n g to the first sentence of the b o o k p r o p e r (p. 41), we are ourselves Dasei«. B u t this is the most m i s u n d e r s t o o d sentence in all of H e i d e g g e r . F o r r e a d e r s h a v e s u r m i s e d t h a t 'Dasein' i s j u s t a n e w f a n g l e d t e r m f o r ' p e r s o n ' ( o r ' e g o ' o r ' m i n d ' ) — i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h a t eac h o f u s i s o r has o n e Dasein, a n d t h e r e i s a Dasein
f o r e a c h of us. T h i s is w r o n g ;
and the first i n d i c a t i o n is a s i m p l e t e x t u a l p o i n t . 'Person' is a c o u n t n o u n ( w e c a n " c o u n t " a p e r s o n , s e v e r a l p e o p l e , a n d s o o n ) ; Dasein i s ( v i r t u a l l y ) never used as a c o u n t n o u n .
8
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , it isn't a mass n o u n
e i t h e r ( s u c h a s ' w a t e r ' o r ' g o l d ' ) ; Dasein c a n n o m o r e b e m e a s u r e d o u t (e.g., i n g a l l o n s o r o u n c e s ) t h a n i t c a n b e c o u n t e d . G r a m m a t i c a l l y , 'tuberculosis' is a closer analogy. We neither c o u n t "tuberculoses" n o r
77
NOUS
20
m e a s u r e a m o u n t s o f i t ; i t c o m e s , r a t h e r , i n d i s t i n c t o c c u r r e n c e s o r cases (which can, of course, be counted). A person is like an occurrence or "case" o f D a i « ' n - e x c e p t t h a t o n e d o e s n ' t c a t c h i t , let a l o n e g e t o v e r i t . Dasein i s n o t a s p e c i e s o f w h i c h w e a r e s p e c i m e n s , a t y p e o f w h i c h w e a r e t o k e n s , a f e a t u r e w h i c h we h a v e , a s p i r i t w h i c h is in us, a c o n d i t i o n w h i c l i w e are i n , o r e v e n a w h o l e o f w h i c h w e are parts ( t h o u g h that's closest).
P e o p l e a r e t o Dasein
as baseball g a m e s are
to baseball, as
u t t e r a n c e s a r e t o l a n g u a g e , a s w o r k s a r e t o l i t e r a t u r e . Dasein
is the
o v e r a l l p h e n o m e n o n , c o n s i s t i n g e n t i r e l y o f its i n d i v i d u a l " o c c u r r ances," a n d y e t p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a n v o f t h e m b e i n g w h a t i t is. E n g l i s h l a c k s a c o n v i n c i n g w o r d f o r t h i s r e l a t i o n ; so 1 w i l l s e t t l e f o r s a y i n g t h a t a person
is a case
of Dasein.
9
P e o p l e a r e , i n o n e sense, o n a p a r w i t h e v e r y t h i n g else t h e a n y o n e institutes; they are identifiable coherent subpatterns w i t h i n the overall p a t t e r n t h a t i s Dasein. I n t u i t i v e l y , e a c h p e r s o n i s t h a t p a t t e r n o f n o r m a l dispositions a n d social roles that constitutes a n i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r o f the c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y . N o w , it is a f u n d a m e n t a l r e q u i r e m e n t of the story so far t h a t D i w m t h a v e such " m e m b e r - p a t t e r n s " (conformists); but
n o t h i n g has b e e n
either
from
one
said about w h a i
another,
or
from
d i s t i n g u i s h e s these p a t t e r n s
other
subpatterns
o f Dasein—in
effect, a " t o p - d o w n " version of the personal identity p r o b l e m . We can emphasize b o t h this r e m a r k a b l e d o c t r i n e a n d the special d i f f i c u l t y it raises
with
a cryptic
third
s l o g a n : People are primordial institutions.
In
o t h e r w o r d s , y o u a n d I are institutions, like G e n e r a l M o t o r s , m a r r i a g e , a n d the c o m m o n law, except that we are " p r i m o r d i a l . " W h a t c o u l d that mean? T r y t o i m a g i n e a c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y whose m e m b e r s are ( p h y s i c a l l y ) l i k e b e e h i v e s ; t h a t is, e a c h b e e i s j u s t a n o r g a n o r a p p e n d a g e o f some c o n f o r m i s t hive, a n d m a n y such hives m a k e u p the g r o u p . T h e s e hives i m i t a t e a n d censure one another, thus s u s t a i n i n g n o r m s o f h i v e b e h a v i o r . B u t w h a t is h i v e b e h a v i o r ? If a p a r t i c u l a r bee visits a f o r b i d d e n f l o w e r , h o w i s t h a t t h e h i v e ' s d o i n g , a n d n o t t h e bee's? W e l l s u p p o s e , a s a m a t t e r o f p h y s i o l o g i c a l fact, t h a t s t i n g i n g any o n e bee w o u l d t e n d t o s u p p r e s s w h a t e v e r a n y bees i n h e r h i v e w e r e ( r e c e n t l y a n d c o n s p i c u o u s l y ) e n g a g e d i n ; so, t o k e e p b e e s a w a y f r o m f o r b i d d e n f l o w e r s , i t suffices t o s t i n g t h e sisters o f a n y o n e t h a t w a n d e r s . I n e f f e c t , t h e h i v e a s a w h o l e i s h e l d t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e a c t i v i t y o f its p a r t s ; a n d i t ( t h e h i v e ) i s m a d e t o c h a n g e its w a y s . C o m p a r e t h i s w i t h s p a n k i n g a c h i l d ' s b o t t o m w h e n i t ( i h e c h i l d ) s t e a l s w i i h its f i n g e r s , o r b l a s p h e m e s w i t h its m o u t h . T h e w h o l e h i v e , l i k e t h e w h o l e c h i l d , i s o n e " u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , " a n d t h e r e f o r e the "subject" o f the b e h a v i o r , because i t is w h a t lakes the heat, a n d learns f r o m "its" mistakes. By t h e same t o k e n , it can be one m e m b e r of a c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y .
78
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON
21
U n i t s of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y are as s t r u c t u r e d a n d m u l t i f a r i o u s as the norms t o w h i c h they are h e l d . T r i v i a l l y , for instance, institutions o f enduring ownership and debt require e n d u r i n g owners and debtors. More i m p o r t a n t , m a n y n o r m s require "sorting" c o m m u n i t y members in the s t a n d a r d s o r t i n g of b e h a v i o r a l circumstances; thus, if y o u ' r e a sargeant a n d y o u e n c o u n t e r a c a p t a i n , t h e n salute.
In other words,
w h a t a u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s a c c o u n t a b l e f o r i s a f u n c t i o n o f its official r a n k — o r , m o r e g e n e r a l l y , its v a r i o u s social a n d i n s t i t u i i o n a l roles. T h e r e i s a n o b v i o u s a n a l o g y b e t w e e n t h e s e s o c i a l r o l e s , a n d t h e roles w h i c h d e f i n e e q u i p m e n t ; b u t p a r a p h e r n a l i a a r e n e v e r h e l d t o account ( c e n s u r e d ) , n o m a t t e r h o w b a d l y t h e y p e r f o r m . Social roles ("offices") a r e r o l e s w h o s e p l a y e r s a r e a c c o u n t a b l e f o r h o w t h e y p l a y them. Each u n i t of accountability, as a pattern of n o r m a l dispositions a n d social r o l e s , i s a s u b p a t t e r n o f Dasein—an i n s t i t u t i o n . B u t i t i s a d i s t i n c tive i n s t i t u t i o n , i n t h a t i t c a n h a v e b e h a v i o r a s " m y " b e h a v i o r , a n d c a n be c e n s u r e d
if that
behavior
is
improper;
it
is
a
case
o f Dasein.
Moreover, i n s t i t u t i o n s o f this k i n d are essential t o all others; f o r w i t h out a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t h e r e w o u l d b e n o c e n s o r s h i p , h e n c e n o n o r m s , n o anyone,
n o Daesin
a t a l l . T h u s , a c c o u n t a b l e cases a r e " p r i m o r d i a l "
institutions. H e i d e g g e r places t h i s s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h h e calls " i n - e a c h case-mineness"
(Jemeinigkeit;
p. 4 2 ) ,
a m o n g Dasein's
most
fundamental
characteristics. T h e r e i s m o r e , h o w e v e r , t o p r i m o r d i a l cases o f Dasein t h a n c o n f o r m i s t a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . T o see w h a t i t is, w e m u s t u n p a c k a f o u r t h slogan—this t i m e , o n e w h i c h
H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f states a n d e m p h a -
sizes: The "essence" of Dasein lies in its being extant.
10
" B e i n g e x t a n t , " o f c o u r s e , i s o n e o f t h e b a s i c t e c h n i c a l n o t i o n s o f Being and Time; i t i s n o t a t a l l t h e s a m e a s " b e i n g r e a l " — i n d e e d , t h e s e a r e contrasted.
R e a l i t y i s t h e m o d e o f b e i n g o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l res, t h e
i n d e p e n d e n t " t h i n g " o r s u b s t a n c e . Dasein, i t s h o u l d b e c l e a r b y n o w , i s not a t h i n g i n a n y t r a d i t i o n a l s e n s e ; i t i s n o t r e a l , b u t e x t a n t . B y t h e s a m e token, electrons a n d galaxies are n o t extant ( b u t real). T h e contrast is not i n v i d i o u s i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n — t h e r e g e n u i n e l y are b o t h e x t a n t a n d real b e i n g s ( e n t i t i e s ) . N o r , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , i s i t e x h a u s t i v e : m u t u a l l y defining ( i n t e r d e p e n d e n t ) p a r a p h e r n a l i a are neither real ( i n d e p e n d e n t t h i n g s ) n o r e x t a n t (Dasein), b u t " a v a i l a b l e " ; a n d t h e r e a r e o t h e r modes as w e l l .
1 1
R o u g h l y , to be extant is to be instituted; but H e i d e g g e r doesn't put it that w a y . T h e closest he c o m e s to a d e f i n i t i o n is m o r e l i k e : s o m e t h i n g i s e x t a n t i f w h a t ( o r " w h o " ) i t i s , i n e a c h case, i s i t s o w n e f f o r t s t o
79
22
NOÜS
u n d e r s t a n d w h a t ( o r w h o ) i t i s (see. e . g . . p p . 5 3 , 2 3 1 . a n d 3 2 5 ) . N o w t h e r e m a y b e s o m e p l a u s i b i l i t y t o s a y i n g t h a t w h o w e a r e is, i n p a r t , a f u n c t i o n of o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g : I ' m a pacifist or a baseball fan if I t h i n k I a m . B u t n o t h i n g I c o u l d t h i n k w o u l d m a k e m e e m p e r o r , let alone N a p o l e o n ; a n d m u c h m o r e t h a n m y self-image seems i n v o l v e d i n my b e i n g a p h i l o s o p h y teacher, an electronics hobbyist, a middle-aged m a n , a n d so o n . T h e p r o b l e m concerns the n o t i o n o f " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ; Heidegger says: We s o m e t i m e s use . . . t h e e x p r e s s i o n " u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o m e t h i n g " to m e a n " b e i n g able t o m a n a g e a n u n d e r t a k i n g , " " b e i n g u p t o i t , " [ o r ] " k n o w i n g h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g . " ( p . 143 Understanding something is equated with competence or know-how. S o , t h e p e r s o n w h o " r e a l l y u n d e r s t a n d s " r a c e c a r s i s t h e o n e w h o can m a k e t h e m g o fast, w h e t h e r b y f i n e t u n i n g o r f i n e d r i v i n g ( t w o w a y s t o understand
them);
understanding formal
mathematics amounts to
mastery o f the f o r m a l i s m s , ability t o f i n d p r o o f s , a n d such like. But w h a t , i n t h i s sense, c o u l d b e m e a n t b y " . ^ / / - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ? W h a t w o u l d be the relevant " k n o w - h o w " ? r
W ell, it w o u l d be each i n d i v i d u a l ' s ability to be h i m or herself, to m a n a g e h i s o r h e r o w n l i f e — i n o t h e r w o r d s , k n o w i n g h o w ( i n each case) t o b e " m e " . A n d w h a t k n o w - h o w i s that? A c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , a n y a n d a l l k n o w - h o w t h a t I m a y h a v e i s ipso facto s o m e p o r t i o n o f m y k n o w i n g h o w t o b e m e . I f I u n d e r s t o o d race cars i n the w a y thai mechanics d o , t h e n I w o u l d k n o w h o w to be a race-car mechanic— w h i c h , i n p a r t , i s w h a t I w o u l d b e . E v e n t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , e.g., :
of e l e c t r o n s , is a s o p h i s t i c a t e d a n d specialized aspect of k n o w i n g how to b e a p e r s o n o f a c e r t a i n s o r t : a q u a n t u m m e c h a n i c , say. So far, h o w e v e r , this is o n l y "dispersed" self-understanding, in t e r m s o f separate w o r l d l y roles; i t lacks a n y character o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n e s e l f a s a c o m p l e t e i n d i v i d u a l — a s a self. I m a g i n e a c h e s s - p l a y i n g d e v i c e w h i c h c a n c o m e u p vvith a s t r o n g m o v e f o r a n y g i v e n p o s i t i o n , b u t w h i c h l a c k s a n y o v e r a l l sense o f t r y i n g t o w i n . T h e c o l l e c t e d m o v e s of such a device do not really a d d up to a c o m p l e t e game, but are o n l y a series o f u n c o n n e c t e d exercises; i t d o e s n ' t r e a l l y p l a y chess. A n a l o g ously, a collection of dispersed roles does not really a d d up to a whole p e r s o n , a c o m p l e t e " l i f e " . W h a t is left o u t istrymg to u n d e r s t a n d oneself (as s u c h ) . T w o p r e l i m i n a r y observations are i n o r d e r before proceeding. First, every n o r m a l c o n f o r m i s t is at the same t i m e a u n i t of accountability a n d a censorious g u a r d i a n of the t r a d i t i o n . Each n o r m a l disposition t o d o A i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s C is, b y t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f c o n f o r m i s n i , p a i r e d
80
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON
23
with a n o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n to censure a n y failures to do A in C. B u t these dispositions are distinct, m e a n i n g that it is possible to censure one's o w n failures.
T h u s , a c o n f o r m i s t u n i t of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y is also a p o t e n t i a l
unit o f s e l f - a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . S e c o n d , i n m y pains t o a v o i d any h i d d e n presupposition of mentality or reason, I dispositions,
behavior,
and
have s p o k e n exclusively of
know-how—making everything sound
"mindless" a n d i n a r t i c u l a t e . B u t of course it isn't.
Dasein's
institutions are those of language a n d explicit c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
many
These c a n
be p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t to a serious e f f o r t at s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g : w h a t I say a b o u t m y s e l f , f o r e x a m p l e , a n d w h y . M o r e o v e r , t h e y e n a b l e a case o f Dasein t o j u d g e i t s o w n d i s p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y a c t i n g t h e m o u t . I t d o e s n ' t h a v e t o w a i t a n d see w h a t i t w o u l d d o i n a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n ; i t can "ask i t s e l f . A n d i f i t t h e n d i s a p p r o v e s , i t d o e s n ' t h a v e t o s p a n k i t s o w n b o t t o m ; i t c a n " c h a n g e its m i n d " . I n v a r i a b l y , a case o f Dasein p l a y s m a n y r o l e s . W h a t i s p r o p e r f o r i t on any o c c a s i o n w i l l be a f u n c t i o n o f w h a t roles these are; s o m e priests, for i n s t a n c e , a r e n ' t s u p p o s e d t o h a v e l o v e a f f a i r s , t h o u g h o t h e r b a c h e lors m a y . A l s o i n v a r i a b l y , t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e s e r o l e s w i l l o f t e n c o n f l i c t . What is a p p r o p r i a t e for me, the b r e a d w i n n e r , may not be compatible with what is a p p r o p r i a t e for me, the a s p i r i n g artist, not to m e n t i o n me, the s h o p f o r e m a n ,
me, the political activist, a n d
me, the would-be
adventurer, d r e a m i n g o f the o r i e n t . T h i s gives s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the ability to be m e , a m o r e c h a l l e n g i n g aspect. A l l these c o m p e t i n g p r o p r i e t i e s m u s t s o m e h o w b e j u g g l e d ; a n d there are basically t w o ways t o d o t h a t . O n e , o f c o u r s e , i s j u s t t o " s l i d e , " t o take a t e a c h m o m e n t t h e p a t h o f least resistance. T h a t m e a n s a t t e n d ing to w h a t e v e r p r o p r i e t i e s h a p p e n , at that m o m e n t , to be the most conspicuous or pressing, f o r g e t t i n g about w h a t e v e r others are t e m p o rarily o u t of sight. T h i s is to r e m a i n dispersed in the w o r l d l y . T h e opposite possibility is to c o n f r o n t the conflicts, a n d resolve t h e m : that is, t o m a k e u p o n e ' s m i n d .
1 2
T r y i n g to understand oneself is seeking
out a n d p o s i t i v e l y a d j u d i c a t i n g the c o n f l i c t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s o f one's various roles, i n the exercise o f a h i g h e r - l e v e l d i s p o s t i o n w h i c h w e m i g h t c a l l " s e l f - c r i t i c i s m " ( I t h i n k it's close t o w h a t H e i d e g g e r m e a n s b y "conscience"). A case o f Dasein
is g e n u i n e l y self-critical
when,
in
response
to
d i s c o v e r e d t e n s i o n s a m o n g its r o l e s , i t d o e s s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e m . Thus, I m i g h t quit the priesthood a n d embrace my lover, or decide to subordinate e v e r y t h i n g to my art. T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is that I don't just let s o m e d i s p o s i t i o n s o v e r r i d e o t h e r s ( w h i c h m a y b e w e a k e r a t t h e moment); rather, in the light of some, I resolutely alter or eliminate others. As a u n i t of s e l f - a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , I find a n d r o o t o u t an inconsistency i n m y o v e r a l l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i n s t e a d o f v a c i l l a t i n g u n w i t tingly b e t w e e n
one
"me"
and another,
81
I
become one of t h e m
(or
NOUS
24 perhaps a t h i r d ) constantly and explicitly, and
thereby achieve a
"truer" self-understanding. A l l s e l f - c r i t i c a l a d j u d i c a t i o n i s a m o n g c u r r e n t r o l e s . I n t e r m s o f the whole, some may be rejected, others adjusted; but there is no external or h i g h e r s t a n d a r d against w h i c h all are j u d g e d . T h e o n l y e n d is self-constancy—a clearer, m o r e coherent self-understanding ability to be me. W h e n a role survives such critical scrutiny (perhaps adjusted), H e i d e g g e r says i t i s " t a k e n o v e r a s o n e ' s o w n " (zugeeignet; M & R : a p p r o p r i a t e d ) . It is no l o n g e r my role j u s t because 1 h a p p e n to play it, but mine
because
I
claim
it,
by
my
own
choice.
Insofar
as
self-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g c r i t i c a l l y t a k e s o v e r its r o l e s , i t i s s a i d t o b e self-owned (eigentlich;
M&R:
authentic).
Inconstant
(dispersed
and
wavering)
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g is, i n t h e s a m e t e r m s , disowned ( b u t , o f c o u r s e , it's s t i l l / V meines: i n e a c h c a s e m i n e ) . A d i s o w n e d case of Dasein d o e s n o t lack a s e l f o r " p e r s o n a l i t y , " e v e n a s u b t l e a n d d i s t i n c t i v e o n e ; it's j u s t u n s e l f - c r i t i c a l . " W h o " i t i s i s s t i l l d e t e r m i n e d b y its s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t this u n d e r s t a n d i n g remains u n e x a m i n e d a n d dispersed in the w o r l d . T h e o p p o s i t e o f d i s p e r s a l , s e l f - o w m e d - n e s s , is, r o u g h l y , " g e t t i n g y o u r act t o g e t h e r . " A s t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f c o n f l i c t s t h a t l e a d t o w a v e r i n g i n c o n s i s t e n c y , i t i s a l s o resoluteness. E v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s o w n e d , e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s g o t t e n t o g e t h e r o r r e s o l v e d u p o n , i s a d o p t e d i n t h e first place f r o m the a n y o n e ; e x c e p t for small variations, t h e r e is no o t h e r source for ways of u n d e r s t a n d i n g oneself. To be self-owned ("authentic") is n o t t o rise above t h e a n y o n e , n o t t o wash away the taint o f c o m m o n sense a n d v u l g a r c u s t o m , b u t r a t h e r t o e m b r a c e ( s o m e p a r t o f ) w h a t these have to o f f e r in a p a r t i c u l a r selective way. T h e result is a critically realized, m a x i m a l l y self-constant ability to lead an i n d i v i d u a l , cohesive, l i m i t e d life: w » i f ! T h i s is what's at stake in t r y i n g to u n d e r s t a n d oneself. It
is also t h e rest of w h a t is
m e a n t b y s a y i n g t h a t p e o p l e are
" p r i m o r d i a l " institutions. N o b o d y is every wholly disowned or wholly s e l f - o w n e d ; m o s t l y , we're i n b e t w e e n . M o r e o v e r , that's essential. T h e v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f m u l t i p l e r o l e s , a n d t h u s o f c o m m u n i t y a n d Dasein i n any
nontrivial
sense,
depends
on
a
fair
measure
of routine
self-
c o n s t a n c y i n t h e m e m b e r "cases". T h a t p e o p l e t r y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m selves, a n d h e n c e a r e a l w a y s s e l f - o w n e d i n s o m e m a n n e r a n d d e g r e e , i s a s m u c h a p r e r e q u i s i t e o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f Dasein primitive
loci
of accountability
(je
meines).
as t h a t t h e y are
H e e d i n g the call
to
this
self-critical e f f o r t (conscience), a n d not mere c o n f o r m i s t accountabili t y , i s f u l l y - h u m a n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h u s H e i d e g g e r c a n say t h a t t o b e e x t a n t i s t o b e t h a t b e i n g t h e cases o f w h i c h t r y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m selves: i n b e i n g w h a t t h e y a r e , w h o t h e y a r e i s a n issue t o t h e m . P o r t i o n s o f these last f e w p a r a g r a p h s m a y s o u n d d i s c o n c e r t i n g l y "existentialist,"
as,
indeed,
do
large
tracts
o f Being and
Time.
But,
t h o u g h the comparison is not empty, it is more often misleading than
82
HEIDEGGER O N B E I N G A PERSON
25
helpful. T h e central question is not h o w to be a " k n i g h t of faith" or a " s u p e r m a n , " let a l o n e a " f u t i l e passion," b u t r a t h e r w h a t it is to be a person at all. I have t r i e d to sketch an a c c o u n t of h o w o u r distinctively h u m a n use o f t o o l s a n d l a n g u a g e , sense o f c u s t o m a n d p r o p r i e t y , a n d capacity
for
self-criticism
m i g h t all
be
grounded
in
o u r distinctive
c o m m u n a l i t y . A c c o r d i n g to the analysis, a p e r s o n is n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y a t a l k i n g a n i m a l o r a t h i n k i n g t h i n g , b u t a case o f Dasein: a c r u c i a l s o r t o f subpattern in an overall pattern instituted by c o n f o r m i s m , a n d h a n d e d d o w n f r o m g e n e r a t i o n t o g e n e r a t i o n . I f t h e s a m e a c c o u n t t u r n s o u t also to l e n d an i n s i g h t i n t o the special existentialist c o n c e r n s of p e r s o n a l integration a n d self-ownership . . . well t h e n , so m u c h the b e t t e r . 1 3
NOTES 'Heidegger (1927); all page citations are to this text, unless otherwise indicated; translations are my o w n . For reference, the German pagination is reproduced in the margins of the Macquarrie and Robinson (1962) translation; when necessary, this trans lation will be cited by the initials " M & R " . ' C o n f o r m i s n i is deeply related to the crucial n o t i o n of " f a l l i n g " ; compare also the discussion of "Sorge um . . . Abstand" (p. 126). 3 Das Mau ( M & R : the "they"); see, e.g., pp. 126f, 194. and 288. l Verweisung ( M & R : reference o r assignment); the sense o f the G e r m a n is roughly "being sent or directed, by or away f r o m one t h i n g , toward another," for w h i c h English lacks a comfortable equivalent. B u i nuances in the o rigin al are at best a guide; α priori, it's just as likely that no G e r m a n w o r d is exactly r i g h t as thai no English w o r d is. Philosophical sense is ultimately d e t e r m i n e d not by dictionaries or etymologies, but by examples and the doctrines themselves. 5 Dewey makes a similar point: "A tool is a particular t h i n g , but it is more than a particular t h i n g , since it is a t h i n g in which a connection, a sequential bond of nature is embodied. It possesses an objective relation as its own d e f i n i n g property. . . . its p r i m a r y relationship is to other external things, as the hammer to the nail, and the plow to the soil." (1925, p. 103) "Compare Well, sense 3, p. 65, and Uniuelt, p. 66. ' C o m p a r e this w i t h Dewey's remark about " m i n d " (which he clearly distinguishes from personal consciousness): ". . . the whole history of science, art, and morals proves that the m i n d that appears in individuals is not as such i n d i v i d u a l m i n d . T h e f o r m e r is in itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and rejections, of expectancies and appraisals of meanings w h i c h have been instituted under the influence of custom and t r a d i t i o n . " (1925, ρ . 180; compare p. 184) 8 T h e M a i q u a r r i e and Robinson translation, however, is poor in this regard; thus, they render the o p e n i n g sentence (just mentioned) as: "We are ourselves the entities t o b e analysed [i.e., Dasein]." T h e p l u r a l 'entities' w o u l d suggest a count n o u n , but the German is singular; such errors are c o m m o n . (But on rare occasions, Heidegger himself seems to slip up; see e.g , pp. 240 and 336 ) "German doesn't have a terrific t e r m for it eilher; when Heidegger wants to speak of individuals, he qualifies with 'je' or 'jeweilig', meaning, roughly, " i n each case," or " i n the given case." 10 p . 42 (italics and scarequotes in original); compare pp. 117. 212, 2 3 1 , 318, etc. " I have been t a k i n g s o m e liberties. ' B e i n g e x t a n t ' translates 'Existenz' (German lacks the cognate pair we have in English); being real' translates 'Vorhandensein' ( M & R : presence-at-hand), w h i c h is n o l strictly correct, but pedagogically defensible in the context of Being and Time; 'being available' translates 'Zuhandensem' ( M & R : readiness-iohand). For relevant texts, see pp. 42. 69, 92, 21 I f , and 313f.
83
26
NOUS
''Readers familiar with Being and Time will notice thai "forgetting," "remaining dispersed in the w o r l d l y , " and "resolution" (and also several ocher expressions in the following paragraphs) are theoretical notions, discussed at length by Heidegger. T h i s paper would not have been possible were it not for years of close and fruitful collaboration with B e n Dreyfus. I am also grateful for comments and questions from Bob B r a n d o m , Jerry Massey, Nick Rescher, and the audiences ai O h i o State University, Yale University, and the Council for Philosophical Studies Summer Institute on Phenomenology and Existentialism, where earlier versions were read and discussed. J 3
BIBLIOGRAPHY Dewey, J o h n (1925; second edition, 1929). Experience and Nature, La Salle. 1L: Open Court. Heidegger, M a r t i n (1927). Sein und Zeit, T u b i n g e n : Max Niemeyer Verlag. Lewis. David (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press Marquarrie, John, and Robinson, Edward, translators, (1962). Being and Time (a translation of Sein und Zeit), New Y o r k : Harper and Row.
84
International
journal
of
Philosophical
Studies
Vol.8(2),
209-230
Heidegger and Dasein's 'Bodily Nature': What is the H i d d e n Problematic?
David R. Cerbone Abstract In Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly defers any consideration of ourselves (Dasein) as embodied. I try to account for Heidegger's reluctance to talk about 'the b o d y ' in connection w i t h his explication of Dasein, by arguing that doing so w o u l d be at odds w i t h the k i n d of investigation his 'phenomenology of everydayness' is meant to be. That Heidegger omits discussion of the body in Being and Time might lead one to t h i n k of the human body in terms of the other categories Heidegger deploys: readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand (Being and Time) and biological organisms (Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics). I argue that any such idenlificalion ought to be resisted, as these categories serve only to deprive our bodies of their specifically human dimension. Indeed, by surveying the failure of these categories as proper to the h u m a n body, we gain further insight i n t o Heidegger's i n i t i a l deferral: only given the existential analytic can one begin to offer a proper account of ourselves in bodily terms. Keywords: Heidegger; body; embodiment; interpretation; organism
T h e b o d y p h e n o m e n o n i s the m o s t d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m .
1
In the course of his discussion of spatiality in the t h i r d chapter of D i v i s i o n I of Being and Time, H e i d e g g e r r e m a r k s t h a t D a s e i n ' s " " b o d i l y n a t u r e " h i d e s a w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c o f its o w n ' (BT, 1 4 3 ) . H e c o n c l u d e s t h e sentence b y n o t i n g t h a t ' w e s h a l l n o t t r e a t i t h e r e ' . T h i s d e l i b e r a t e o m i s s i o n on H e i d e g g e r ' s part is especially f r u s t r a t i n g given the character of the 'exist e n t i a l a n a l y t i c ' o f D a s e i n , t o w h i c h D i v i s i o n I i s d e v o t e d . T h a t is, i n t h i s analytic, Heidegger is p r i n c i p a l l y concerned to u n d e r m i n e the p r e d o m i n a n t C a r t e s i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n beings, n a m e l y t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s are 2
1
International Journal of Philosophical Studies I S S N 0 9 6 7 - 2 5 5 ' ) p r i n t 1 4 6 6 - 4 5 4 2 o n l i n e © 2 0 0 0 T a y l o r & F r a n c i s Ltd hltp://www.tandf.cu.uk/journals
85
I N T E R N A T I O N A L JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES essentially
minds
or
egos,
which
are
autonomous
and
self-contained,
a n d w h o s e p r i m a r y r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d i s best u n d e r s t o o d i n e p i s t e m i c 1
t e r m s ( p e r c e i v i n g , b e l i e v i n g , k n o w i n g , etc.)." I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n , H e i d e g g e r offers an account of w h a t it is to be h u m a n in terms o f w h a t h e calls ' D a s e i n ' . H e a r g u e s t h a t a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f D a s e i n r e v e a l s its w a y o f b e i n g t o b e b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , w h e r e t h i s m e a n s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e b e i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h i n a p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t w h i c h i s s t r u c t u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o i m p e r s o n a l l y articulated norms. O n this c o u n t e r - c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t it is to be h u m a n , o u r p r i m a r y r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d is one of practical engagement, rather than detached, theoretical contemplation or b e h o l d i n g . In o t h e r words, w h a t a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of everydayness reveals i s agents w h o s e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l a c t i v i t y i s the s k i l f u l m a n i p u l a t i o n o f e q u i p m e n t i n t h e s e r v i c e o f a v a r i e t y o f tasks. O n l y o n t h e basis o f t h i s p r i m a r y a c t i v i t y , H e i d e g g e r argues, c a n t h e e p i s t e m i c a c t i v i t i e s a t the h e a r t o f the C a r t e s i a n e n t e r p r i s e b e m a d e i n t e l l i g i b l e .
5
G i v e n t h e p r o m i n e n c e , a n d i n d e e d the p r i o r i t y , o f p r a c t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the w o r l d w i t h i n Heidegger's conception of w h a t it is to be h u m a n , an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r s e l v e s
as embodied agents w o u l d
seem
to
be
a
central concern, and not something whose treatment c o u l d be casually d e f e r r e d . O n a C a r t e s i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n beings, e m b o d i m e n t is, t o b e sure, a p r o b l e m ( i n d e e d , a p o t e n t i a l l y i n t r a c t a b l e p r o b l e m g i v e n t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h a t t e n d d u a l i s m ) , b u t i t c a n b e seen a s h a v i n g a s e c o n d a r y o r d e r i v a t i v e status r e l a t i v e t o t h e c e n t r a l p r o j e c t o f a d e q u a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the ' i n n e r ' w o r k i n g s o f a c o g n i z i n g s u b j e c t . F o r H e i d e g g e r , however,
the
b o d y w o u l d seem
to be
immediately implicated in
his
p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f e v e r y d a y a c t i v i t y , i n w h a t h e calls ' c i r c u m s p e c t i v e , n o n thematic
absorption'.
For
this
activity
involves
the
manipulation
of
c o n c r e t e i t e m s such a s h a m m e r s , pens, d o o r k n o b s , a n d t h e l i k e , a n d t h o s e m a n i p u l a t i o n s are e f f e c t e d b y m e a n s o f the b o d y . A s H e i d e g g e r tells us, D a s e i n ' s d e a l i n g s are w i t h ' t h i n g s w h i c h are r e a d y - t o - h a n d a n d used f o r t h e b o d y ' , a n d m a n y o f his c e n t r a l e x a m p l e s i n v o l v e a ' c r a f t s m a n ' s t o o l s [ s u c h a s a h a m m e r ] w h i c h are h e l d i n the h a n d a n d m o v e d w i t h i t ' (BT, 143). So, w h e r e a s D e s c a r t e s in the c o u r s e of his Meditations can d e c l a r e h i m s e l f t o b e i d e n t i f i e d s o l e l y w i t h his m i n d a n d c a n d o u b t t h a t h e e v e n has a b o d y , o n H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f D a s e i n , o n e w o u l d e x p e c t t h e b o d y to occupy a m o r e central role. Thus, Heidegger's unwillingness lo engage i n the l a s k o f a d d r e s s i n g i h e ' w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c ' h i d d e n i n D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' a p p e a r s t o b e m o r e t h a n j u s t a casual o v e r s i g h t : e i t h e r i t c o n s t i tutes
a serious e r r o r on Heidegger's part or he
has g o o d
reasons
for
deferring consideration of the body. Many
commentators
appear
to
lean
toward
the
former possibility.
F o r e x a m p l e , D i d i e r F r a n c k w r i t e s : ' N o w i t i s essential - a l t h o u g h t h i s necessity was s o m e t h i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r n e v e r t o o k i n t o a c c o u n t - t h a t Dasein have h a n d s s o t h a t , a l l m e t a p h o r s aside, t h e b e i n g o f the b e i n g
86
Η EI I) EG (ί ER
A N D
t h a i it is could be n a m e d being-al-hand'.
D A S E I N 6
H e r e , Heidegger is criticized
f o r n e g l e c t i n g o u r e m b o d i m e n t i n his a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n . I n d e e d , F r a n c k c o n c l u d e s his p a p e r w i t h t h e v e r d i c t t h a t ' t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e b o d y is
the phenomenological price
of t h e
appearance
of
Being',7
which
suggests
t h a t t h e b o d y i s c o n d e m n e d t o b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d o n l y i n t e r m s o f priva tion, a n d s o n e v e r a s i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g . A f u r t h e r example
is
David
suggests
Philosophy,
Krell, that
who,
in
Heidegger's
his
Daimon
neglect
of
Life: the
Heidegger body
and
(and
Life-
of
the
c a t e g o r y o f life m o r e g e n e r a l l y ) r e v e a l s d e f i c i e n c i e s i n his p h i l o s o p h y . A t o n e p o i n t , K r e l l asks: D i d H e i d e g g e r s i m p l y f a i l t o see t h e a r m o f t h e e v e r y d a y b o d y r i s i n g i n o r d e r t o h a m m e r shingles o n t o the roof, d i d
he overlook
the
q u o t i d i a n gaze d i r e c t e d t o w a r d I h e t i c k i n g w a t c h t h a t o v e r t a k e s b o t h s u n a n d m o o n , d i d h e miss t h e b o d y p o i s e d d a i l y i n its b r a z e n car, a c a r e q u i p p e d w i t h t u r n signals f a b r i c a t e d b y a n d f o r the h a n d a n d eye o f m a n , d i d h e n e g l e c t t h e h u m a n b e i n g c a p a b l e d a y - i n , d a y - o u t o f m o v i n g i t s b o d y a n d s e t t i n g i t s e l f i n m o t i o n ? I f so, w h a t c o n c l u sion must we d r a w ? s K r e l l ' s a n s w e r t o t h e f i n a l q u e s t i o n i s t h a t ' D a s e i n seems d e s t i n e d t o s h a r e the
fate
of the
cherubim and seraphim."' Despite
the
heal
of Krell's
r h e t o r i c , il's unclear to me precisely w h a t the a r g u m e n t is to show that H e i d e g g e r i s mistaken i n o m i t t i n g t h e b o d y f r o m his e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n ; p e r h a p s i t i s d u e t o his r e a l i z a t i o n o f h o w m i s l e a d i n g i t i s t o t a l k o f the b o d y , a s
it
i m m e d i a t e l y invites
a c o n t r a s t w i t h the m i n d .
C o n s i d e r , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e f o l l o w i n g passage, i n w h i c h i t i s c l e a r t h a t Heidegger
has
not
s i m p l y forgotten
our
embodiment:
W h e t h e r [ D a s e i n ] Ms c o m p o s e d of the physical, psychic, a n d spiri tual
and
how
these
realities
are
to
be
determined
is
here
left
c o m p l e t e l y u n q u e s t i o n e d . W e place ourselves i n p r i n c i p l e outside o f this e x p e r i e n t i a l a n d i n t e r r o g a t i v e h o r i z o n o u t l i n e d b y the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e m o s t c u s t o m a r y n a m e f o r t h i s e n t i t y , m a n : homo animal ratio nale. W h a t i s t o b e d e t e r m i n e d i s n o t a n o u t w a r d a p p e a r a n c e o f t h i s e n t i t y b u t f r o m t h e o u t s e t a n d t h r o u g h o u t s o l e l y its way t o be, n o l t h e w h a t of t h a t of w h i c h and
the
characters
of this
it
is c o m p o s e d b u t the how of its being
how. (HCT,
154)
F i n a l l y , t h o u g h n o t e x a c t l y c r i t i c a l o f H e i d e g g e r , H u b e r t D r e y f u s , i n his c o m m e n t a r y , d i s p l a y s a c e r t a i n d e g r e e o f d i s c o m f o r t i n his h a n d l i n g o f t h e issue o f e m b o d i m e n t . D r e y f u s t w i c e c i t e s H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k c o n c e r n i n g the p r o b l e m a t i c h i d d e n in Dasein's b o d i l y nature, and concludes that,
87
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
for Heidegger,
J O U R N A L
'having a
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
b o d y does n o t
belong to
S T U D I E S
Dasein's essential
structure', that ' D a s e i n is not necessarily e m b o d i e d ' , a n d that 'the b o d y is not essential'.
10
T h e s e r e m a r k s c o m e p r e c a r i o u s l y close t o t h e C a r t e s i a n
p o s i t i o n ("the r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m i n d a n d b o d y ' ) H e i d e g g e r ( a n d D r e y f u s ) i s o t h e r w i s e s o c a r e f u l t o a v o i d . T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t needs t o be
addressed
is
whether Heidegger's deferral
of a
discussion
of the
b o d y c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d i n such a w a y t h a t o n e i s n o t l e f t t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n ( o r e x p l a i n a w a y ) t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i s e m b o d i e d D a s e i n . T h a t is, c a n H e i d e g g e r a t o n e a n d t h e same t i m e m a i n t a i n t h a t h a v i n g a b o d y ( b e i n g e m b o d i e d ) i s n o t a f e a t u r e o f D a s e i n ' s e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e and t h a t D a s e i n is n e v e r w i t h o u t a b o d y ? I n t h i s p a p e r I w a n t t o resist these n e g a t i v e assessments, a n d i n s t e a d ask w h a t it is a b o u t t h e p r o j e c t of Being and Time t h a t d i c t a t e s a d e f e r r a l o r p o s t p o n e m e n t o f t a l k a b o u t the b o d y . " A s 1 s h o w below, e x p l i c i t conside r a t i o n o f t h e b o d y , o r o f D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' , m a y b e seen t o b e a t odds w i t h the k i n d o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n H e i d e g g e r takes h i m s e l f t o b e engaged in, namely a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f those
f e a t u r e s w h i c h are
distinctive of Dasein's ( o u r ) way of being. G i v e n Heidegger's apparent refusal to i n c l u d e e m b o d i m e n t as one of the c o n s t i t u t i v e features of Dasein's w a y of b e i n g , it is t e m p t i n g to l o o k for a place for the b o d y in o n e o f t h e o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s o f w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s H e i d e g g e r d e p l o y s : Being and
Time p r o v i d e s t w o such c a n d i d a t e s ,
n a m e l y the
ready-to-hand
(or
e q u i p m e n t ) a n d the present-at-hand ( o r mere things). M o r e o v e r , it w i l l p r o v e t o b e u s e f u l t o e x a m i n e a s u b s e q u e n t l e c t u r e c o u r s e , his 1929/30 Fundamental
Concepts
of Metaphysics:
in
these
later
lectures,
Heidegger
d e v o t e s c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e 'essence' o f o r g a n s a n d o r g a n i s m s , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g us w i t h a t h i r d c a n d i d a t e . I w i l l a r g u e , h o w e v e r , t h a t n o n e o f these t h r e e c a n d i d a t e s p r o v e s t o b e a s a t i s f a c t o r y c a t e g o r y f o r the h u m a n b o d y . '
:
Nevertheless, by w o r k i n g t h r o u g h the various cate-
g o r i e s o f e n t i t i e s w h i c h don't h a v e D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g , a n d b y s e e i n g the difficulties a n d deficiencies i n v o l v e d i n t r y i n g t o locate the b o d y w i t h i n them, we will come to a better understanding o f Heidegger's initial deferral o f a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' and w e w i l l b e g i n t o see h o w that investigation ought to proceed. We w i l l , i n other words, begin t o see w h e r e t h e p r o b l e m a t i c i s h i d d e n a n d w h a t i t consists i n .
I In t h e first I n t r o d u c t i o n to Being and Time, H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s : D a s e i n is an e n t i t y w h i c h does not just occur a m o n g o t h e r entities. R a t h e r i t i s o n t i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y t h e fact t h a t , i n its v e r y b e i n g , t h a t b e i n g is an issue f o r i t . (BT, 3 2 )
88
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
T h i s passage m a k e s c l e a r t h a t f o r H e i d e g g e r , D a s e i n i s a n e n t i t y , a l b e i t a distinctive one. Thus, it is t e m p t i n g to t h i n k of Dasein as a b o d i l y entity, a n d t h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y n o t h i n g w r o n g w i t h s u c c u m b i n g t o this t e m p t a t i o n i n t h e sense t h a t H e i d e g g e r g i v e s u s n o r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e i n t h e possib i l i t y o f d i s e m b o d i e d D a s e i n (as D e s c a r t e s does w i t h t h e m i n d ) . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a l q u e s t i o n w o u l d seem t o b e w h e t h e r e m b o d i m e n t i s p a r t o f t h e essence o f D a s e i n , w h e t h e r b e i n g e m b o d i e d , a n d e v e n b e i n g e m b o d i e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, is part of w h a t it is to be D a s e i n . Put this way, H e i d e g g e r w o u l d , I t h i n k , b e m o r e r e l u c t a n t t o g o a l o n g , a s c a n b e seen i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage: The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. A c c o r d i n g l y those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h c a n b e e x h i b i t e d i n t h i s e n t i t y are n o t " p r o p e r t i e s ' present-at-hand of some entity w h i c h ' l o o k s ' so and so and is i t s e l f p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d ; t h e y are i n e a c h case p o s s i b l e w a y s f o r i t t o be, and no more than that. A l l t h e b e i n g - a s - i t - i s w h i c h t h i s e n t i t y possesses is p r i m a r i l y b e i n g . So w h e n w e d e s i g n a t e t h i s e n t i t y w i t h t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n ' , w e are e x p r e s s i n g n o t its " w h a t ' (as i f i t w e r e a t a b l e , h o u s e , o r t r e e ) b u t its b e i n g . (BT, 67; s e c o n d i t a l i c s m i n e ) Thus, w h i l e D a s e i n is i n d e e d an entity, one w h i c h can be e n c o u n t e r e d w i t h i n the w o r l d , H e i d e g g e r i s e m p h a t i c i n r e s t r i c t i n g the t e r m "Dasein' to designating o n l y that entity's way of being, and 'no m o r e than that'. S u c h a r e s t r i c t i o n i n t h e scope o f t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n ' e n t a i l s a r e s t r i c t i o n in the characteristics w h i c h can be p r o p e r l y ascribed to it: A l l explicata t o w h i c h t h e a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n g i v e s rise are o b t a i n e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e - s t r u c t u r e . Because D a s e i n ' s c h a r a c ters o f b e i n g are defined i n t e r m s o f existentiality, w e call t h e m 'existentialia'. T h e s e are t o b e s h a r p l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m w h a t w e c a l l 'categories' - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of b e i n g f o r e n t i t i e s w h o s e c h a r a c t e r is not that of Dasein. (BT,
70)
This division of characteristics into 'existentialia' and 'categories' appears e x h a u s t i v e : D a s e i n qua D a s e i n s h o u l d o n l y b e d e s c r i b e d i n t e r m s o f exist e n t i a l i a , a n d n o w h e r e does H e i d e g g e r suggest t h a t e m b o d i m e n t i s o n e o t t h e m . I f t h i s i s so, t h e n i t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t o n l y ' c a t e g o r i e s ' r e m a i n , a n d s o t h a t t h e b o d y i s a n e n t i t y "whose c h a r a c t e r i s n o t t h a t o f D a s e i n ' . W e w i l l r e t u r n t o this i m p l i c a t i o n s h o r t l y . 1 1
H e i d e g g e r ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o i n c l u d e b o d i l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n his e x p l i c a t i o n o f D a s e i n (because such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e ' c a t e g o r i a l ' ) c a n b e seen b y p r o b i n g f u r t h e r i n t o his basic c o n c e p t i o n o f D a s e i n , n a m e l y a s
89
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
b e i n g - i n - l h e - w o r l d : Heidegger is careful to p o i n t out that the ' i n ' c o n t a i n e d in this d e f i n i t i o n is not to be u n d e r s t o o d as d e n o t i n g spatial c o n t a i n m e n t ; D a s e i n i s n o t i n t h e w o r l d i n t h e same w a y a s a q u a n t i t y o f w a t e r i s i n a glass. I n s t e a d , t h e ' i n ' i s m e a n t t o s i g n i f y i n v o l v e m e n t o r e n g a g e m e n t w i t h o r i n t h e w o r l d . T h e sense o f ' i n ' b e i n g a p p e a l e d t o h e r e i s a k i n t o t h e sense i n w h i c h o n e i s i n t h e a r m y o r i n business: a l t h o u g h b e i n g i n v o l v e d in such things m a y by and large c o m m i t one to b e i n g spatially c o n t a i n e d i n t h i n g s l i k e b a r r a c k s a n d mess h a l l s i n t h e f i r s t e x a m p l e , o r offices a n d c o n f e r e n c e r o o m s i n t h e s e c o n d , t h e ' i n ' i n q u e s t i o n c a n n o t b e reduced t o these s p a t i a l senses. ( O n e i s n ' t i n t h e a r m y s i m p l y b y b e i n g i n s i d e a mess h a l l , n o r does o n e cease t o b e i n t h e a r m y j u s t b y s t a y i n g a w a y f r o m all b u i l d i n g s a n d structures associated w i t h i t . ) A t t e n t i o n to D a s e i n as a p h y s i c a l l y e m b o d i e d a g e n t m i g h t b l u r these k i n d s o f d i s t i n c t i o n s , w h i c h are c e n t r a l to H e i d e g g e r ' s project. T h e r e are, I t h i n k , d e e p e r r e a s o n s f o r H e i d e g g e r ' s refusal t o i n c o r p o r a t e a n a c c o u n t o f t h e b o d y i n t o his e x p l i c a t i o n o f D a s e i n . T h e s e reasons have to do w i t h the kinds of conclusions he wishes to d r a w c o n c e r n i n g D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g . T h a t is, H e i d e g g e r ' s a i m i s t o c o n d u c t a k i n d o f transcendental i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e p u r p o s e o f w h i c h i s t o r e v e a l v a r i o u s n o n c o n t i n g e n t features o f Dasein's w a y o f b e i n g . For e x a m p l e , i n the second I n t r o d u c t i o n to Being and Time, H e i d e g g e r o u t l i n e s w h a t he e x p e c t s an investigation of 'Dasein's everydayness' to uncover: I n t h i s e v e r y d a y n e s s t h e r e are c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h w e s h a l l e x h i b i t - n o t j u s t a c c i d e n t a l f e a t u r e s , b u t essentia] ones w h i c h , i n e v e r y k i n d o f b e i n g t h a t f a c t i c a l D a s e i n m a y possess, persist a s d e t e r m i n a t i v e f o r t h e c h a r a c t e r o f its b e i n g . T h u s b y h a v i n g r e g a r d f o r t h e basic state o f D a s e i n ' s e v e r y d a y n e s s , w e s h a l l b r i n g o u t t h e b e i n g of this entity in a preparatory fashion. (BT,
38)
A t t e n d i n g t o D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' m a y b e seen t o b e a t o d d s w i t h this c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of everydayness is meant to achieve: o u r e m b o d i m e n t , especially o u r b e i n g e m b o d i e d in this particular way, may be considered t o o contingent to be part of the existential analytic. H e i d e g g e r may w a n t to leave it an o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r there c o u l d be b e i n g s w h o are e m b o d i e d i n r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f b o d i e s , b u t w h o n o n e t h e l e s s possess o r e x h i b i t o u r w a y o f b e i n g , a n d a r e thus, i n a d e e p sense, t h e same k i n d o f b e i n g s a s u s . 14
G i v e n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c h a r a c t e r o f his p r o j e c t , H e i d e g g e r i s c a r e f u l t o insist t h a t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n n o t b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h , o r b e t a k e n t o b e c o m p e t i n g w i t h , v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s o f t h e ' p o s i t i v e sciences'; i n s t e a d , his a n a l y t i c m u s t b e seen a s c o m i n g b e f o r e the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f h u m a n b e i n g s u n d e r t a k e n b y t h e s p e c i a l sciences. T h u s , H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s :
90
H E I D E G G E R
A N Π
D A S E I N
| I | n t h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n w e also m a k e h e a d w a y w i t h a
task
that
is
hardly
less
pressing
being itself - the
task of l a y i n g b a r e
be
the question
visible
before
than
that
of
the
question
of
t h a t a priori basis w h i c h m u s t
of "what
man
is" c a n
b e discussed
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . T h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o t D a s e i n c o m e s before a n y psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology. While these t o o are w a y s i n w h i c h D a s e i n c a n b e i n v e s t i g a t e d , w e c a n d e f i n e the t h e m e of o u r analytic w i t h greater precision if we distinguish it from
these. (BT.
In
the section
immediately
f o l l o w i n g this p a r a g r a p h
(§10),
71)
Heidegger
c o n t i n u e s t o d e l i n e a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n his e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein
and
the
various
investigations of h u m a n
beings
undertaken
by
a n t h r o p o l o g y , p s y c h o l o g y a n d b i o l o g y , a n d c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e y "all f a i l t o give
an u n e q u i v o c a l a n d o n t o l o g i c a l l y adequate answer to the q u e s t i o n
a b o u t t h e kind o f being w h i c h b e l o n g s t o t h o s e e n t i t i e s w h i c h w e o u r s e l v e s are'
(BT.
75).
T h i s insistence on special The
sciences
Metaphysical
is
t h e p r i o r i t y o f his i n v e s t i g a t i o n o v e r t h o s e o f t h e
further
Foundations
revealed of Logic,
in
his
where
1928 he
lectures,
stresses
published
the
as
importance
o f firel u n d e r s t a n d i n g D a s e i n i n w h a t h e calls its ' n e u t r a l i t y ' . T h i n k i n g o f D a s e i n i n b o d i l y t e r m s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , H e i d e g g e r insists, o c c l u d e s a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f its m e a n i n g . I n §10, w h i c h i s d e v o t e d t o e x p l i cating what
H e i d e g g e r calls ' D a s e i n ' s
transcendence', w h i c h
is
another
n a m e f o r its b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , h e p o i n t s t o t h i s ' n e u t r a l i t y ' o f D a s e i n : T h e p e c u l i a r neutrality o f t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n ' i s e s s e n t i a l , because the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this being must be c a r r i e d o u t p r i o r to every factual c o n c r e t i o n . T h i s n e u t r a l i t y also i n d i c a t e s t h a t D a s e i n i s n e i t h e r o f the
t w o sexes.
...
Γ η its n e u t r a l i t y D a s e i n i s n o t
the i n d i f f e r e n t
n o b o d y a n d everybody, but the p r i m o r d i a l p o s i t i v i t y and potency o f t h e essence. (MF I . .
136-7)"
A s t h i s passage i n d i c a t e s . H e i d e g g e r r e g a r d s m a i n t a i n i n g t h e n e u t r a l i t y o f D a s e i n a s e s s e n t i a l t o s e c u r i n g a p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f its w a y o f b e i n g . T h i s is n o t to say t h a t t h e r e e v e r is s u c h a t h i n g as n e u t r a l D a s e i n , as H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s o u t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage: N e u t r a l D a s e i n i s n e v e r w h a t exists; D a s e i n exists i n e a c h case o n l y i n its f a c t i c a l c o n c r e t i o n . B u t n e u t r a l D a s e i n i s i n d e e d the p r i m a l source of i n t r i n s i c possibility that springs up in every existence and m a k e s i t i n t r i n s i c a l l y possible. (MFL,
91
137)
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
W i t h i n ' f a c t i c a l c o n c r e t i o n ' i n t h e a b o v e t w o passages, H e i d e g g e r i n c l u d e s e m b o d i m e n t : 'as f a c t i c a l , D a s e i n is, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , d i s p e r s e d i n a b o d y and c o n c o m i t a n t l y , a m o n g o t h e r things, d i s u n i t e d in a p a r t i c u l a r sexuality'. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n H e i d e g g e r d r a w s b e t w e e n D a s e i n ' s ' n e u t r a l i t y ' a n d its ' f a c t i c a l c o n c r e t i o n ' d i s p l a y s just h o w s l i p p e r y his p o s i t i o n i s w i t h respect t o t h e issue o f e m b o d i m e n t . . C o n s i d e r a g a i n t h e r e m a r k s b y D r e y f u s n o t e d above: (1) ' h a v i n g a b o d y does not b e l o n g to Dasein's essential structure'; ( 2 ) ' D a s e i n i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e m b o d i e d ' ; a n d ( 3 ) ' t h e b o d y i s n o t essent i a l ' . R e m a r k s ( 1 ) a n d ( 3 ) a p p e a r t o a c c o r d w i t h w h a t H e i d e g g e r says b o t h in
Being
and
Time
and
in
The
Metaphysical
Foundations
of Logic
(for
the
latter w o r k , just replace 'essential' w i t h ' n e u t r a l ' ) . H o w e v e r , (2) is m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c ; is it s i m p l y e q u i v a l e n t to ( 1 ) a n d (3)? D o e s ' n o t necessarily e m b o d i e d ' m e a n ' p o s s i b l y d i s e m b o d i e d " ? I f so, h o w d o e s o n e t h e n u n d e r s t a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m t h a t ' n e u t r a l D a s e i n i s n e v e r w h a t exists'? W h a t is the m o d a l force of 'never'? If ' n e v e r ' means 'necessarily never', t h e n ( 2 ) i s false, b u t t h e n i f ( 2 ) i s false, ( 1 ) a n d ( 3 ) b e c o m e h a r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d , l e t a l o n e j u s t i f y . " ' T h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d i c a t e t h a t c o n s i d e r a b l e care must
be
taken
in
properly
locating Dasein's
'bodily
nature', w i t h i n
H e i d e g g e r ' s o v e r a l l project: in p a r t i c u l a r , the contrast b e t w e e n essential and accidental is likely to prove misleading. Heidegger's talk of 'neutrality' and 'dispersal' is indeed likely to mislead, a s s u c h t a l k m a k e s i t t e m p t i n g t o t h i n k o f t h e b o d y a s s o m e t h i n g other t h a n D a s e i n , i n t o w h i c h i t , u n d e r s t o o d i n its ' p e c u l i a r n e u t r a l i t y ' , i s dispersed.
17
I n other words, the exclusion o f e m b o d i m e n t f r o m a n e x p l i -
c a t i o n of n e u t r a l D a s e i n m a y lead one to t h i n k that the b o d y is not so m u c h secondary r e l a t i v e to the e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c as it is a m e m b e r of a n o t h e r category altogether. In the next section, I w a n t to e x p l o r e this t e m p t a t i o n , if o n l y to show u l t i m a t e l y that it ought to be avoided.
II Since i t i s c l e a r t h a t H e i d e g g e r d o e s n o t w a n t i n a n y w a y t o i d e n t i f y D a s e i n w i t h its b o d y o r e v e n i n c l u d e t a l k o f its ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' i n a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f its ' p e c u l i a r n e u t r a l i t y ' , i t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t t h e b o d y b e l o n g s i n o n e o f those c a t e g o r i e s o f e n t i t i e s w h i c h d o n ' t h a v e D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g . H e i d e g g e r o f f e r s t w o c a n d i d a t e s in Being and Time, w h i l e in a s u b s e q u e n t l e c t u r e c o u r s e f r o m 1929/30, a t h i r d c o m e s i n t o v i e w . A s w e s h a l l see, h o w e v e r , n o n e o f these c a t e g o r i e s p r o v i d e s a d e q u a t e r e s o u r c e s f o r c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e b o d y as a s p e c i f i c a l l y human b o d y ; t h e f a i l u r e of these t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s u n d e r s c o r e s , i n t u r n , H e i d e g g e r ' s i n i t i a l reluctance t o discuss t h e b o d y , r a t h e r t h a n r e l e g a t e i t t o a n o t h e r c a t e g o r y . I s t h e b o d y a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t , i.e. s o m e t h i n g r e a d y - t o - h a n d , o r i s i t i n s t e a d a m e r e t h i n g , s o m e t h i n g p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d ? H e i d e g g e r insists t h a t
92
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
D a s e i n is n e v e r lo be r e g a r d e d as a b e a r e r of p r o p e r l i e s , as s o m e t h i n g e n c o u n t e r e d present-at-hand, b u t this insistence m a y not e x t e n d lo the b o d y . A f t e r a l l , the b o d y can be the p r o p e r subject of a scientific i n q u i r y , indeed many different such inquiries, all the w a y d o w n to chemistry and physics a n d all the w a y up to a n a t o m y a n d physiology. W h e n the b o d y is t r e a t e d i n s u c h a m a n n e r , its p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d aspects are r e v e a l e d a n d s y s t e m a t i z e d . T h u s , t h e r e i s a sense i n w h i c h t h e b o d y , a s o n e m o r e k i n d of c o r p o r e a l o b j e c t , c a n be r e g a r d e d as s o m e t h i n g p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d , as a b e a r e r o f p r o p e r t i e s such a s h e i g h t a n d w e i g h t ( a n d c h e m i c a l c o m p o s i tion . . . ) . 1 8
S e v e r a l p r o b l e m s arise, h o w e v e r , i n c o n s i d e r i n g p r e s e n c e - a l - h a n d a s the category for the h u m a n b o d y To b e g i n w i t h , t r e a t i n g the b o d y as a mere t h i n g w h i c h D a s e i n i n s o m e w a y infuses o r i n h a b i t s i s a p t t o b r i n g w i t h i t t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t d u a l i s m has n o t s o m u c h b e e n o v e r c o m e , a s s i m p l y redescribed. G i v e n the a n t i - C a r t e s i a n aspirations that i n f o r m m u c h o f Being and Time a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s o t h e r e a r l y w r i t i n g s , t h i s s u s p i c i o n s h o u l d b e p a r t i c u l a r l y u n w e l c o m e . B u t t r e a t i n g the b o d y a s a m e r e t h i n g b r i n g s w i t h i t other, m o r e pressing, difficulties i n terms o f h o w t o characterize w h a t a b o d y does: t h e p o v e r t y o f t h i n k i n g o f o u r b o d i e s a s j u s t m o r e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l t h i n g s a m o n g o t h e r s c a n be seen b y t h i n k i n g o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g h u m a n a c t i o n s a n d gestures i n t e r m s o f the concepts associated w i t h presence-at-hand. R a i s i n g m y a r m , f o r e x a m p l e , treated as a m e r e b o d i l y m o v e m e n t , can be described in the l a n g u a g e s o f p h y s i c s a n d b i o l o g y , a s t h e m o t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g w i t h such a n d s u c h mass w i t h v a r i o u s g o i n g s - o n a t t h e m i c r o - a n d m a c r o - p h y s i c a l l e v e l . S u c h d e s c r i p t i o n s d o n o t , h o w e v e r , c a p t u r e t h e significance o f t h e m o v e m e n t : 1 m a y , f o r e x a m p l e , be r a i s i n g my a r m to ask a q u e s t i o n at a c o l l o q u i u m , t o w a v e t o a f r i e n d , o r t o d r i v e a n a i l i n t o a piece o f w o o d . U n d e r s t a n d i n g h u m a n a c t i o n s a n d gestures i n t h i s l a t t e r way, a s h a v i n g a significance that cannot be c a p t u r e d in p u r e l y physical or b i o l o g i c a l terms, moves the b o d y out of the r e a l m of the present-at-hand, and i n t o the d o m a i n o f m e a n i n g f u l w o r l d l y activity. T h i s brings u s t o o u r second c a n d i d a t e , r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d , since t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n u n d e r s t a n d i n g entities as mere things a n d as significant items w i t h i n the e v e r y d a y w o r l d c a n b e seen i n h o w o n e i s t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t i t i s f o r a n e n t i t y t o b e a n i t e m of equipment. Consider one of Heidegger's favourite examples: a h a m m e r . For Heidegger, what it is for something to be a h a m m e r cannot b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s (shape, w e i g h t , c o l o u r , m o l e c u l a r c o m p o s i t i o n , etc.) o f a n o b j e c t . T o say w h a t a h a m m e r is, o n e m u s t d e s c r i b e hammering; o n e m u s t , t h a t is, d e s c r i b e t h e w a y s in w h i c h a h a m m e r i s used. I n d o i n g so, o n e w i l l i n e v i t a b l y m e n t i o n o t h e r ' t h i n g s ' s u c h as nails, saws, a n d l u m b e r , a n d purposes s u c h as h o l d i n g t w o pieces o f w o o d t o g e t h e r , c o n s t r u c t i n g a h o u s e o r p i e c e o f f u r n i t u r e , a n d roles such as b e i n g a c a r p e n t e r or c r a f t s p e r s o n .
93
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
Ο Γ
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
W h a t a h a m m e r is, first a n d f o r e m o s t , is a p i e c e of equipment, a n d in s a y i n g w h a t a n y o n e p i e c e o f e q u i p m e n t is, o n e m u s t r e f e r t o o t h e r pieces o f e q u i p m e n t , as w e l l as t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e uses i n f u l f i l l i n g v a r i o u s a i m s a n d p u r p o s e s . T h a t i s w h y H e i d e g g e r says t h a t ' t a k e n s t r i c t l y , t h e r e " i s " n o s u c h t h i n g a s a n e q u i p m e n t ' (BT, 9 7 ) . H e c o n t i n u e s : To the being of any e q u i p m e n t there always belongs a t o t a l i t y of e q u i p m e n t , i n w h i c h i t c a n b e t h i s e q u i p m e n t t h a t i t is. E q u i p m e n t i s e s s e n t i a l l y " s o m e t h i n g - i n - o r d e r - t o . . .'. A t o t a l i t y o f e q u i p m e n t i s c o n s t i t u t e d by various ways of the ' i n - o i d e r - t o ' , such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, m a n i p u l a b i l i t y . (BT, 9 7 ) Thus, any piece of e q u i p m e n t is n o t m e r e l y some discrete, s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l t h i n g : w h a t i t i s i s c a p t u r e d o n l y b y d e s c r i b i n g its p l a c e w i t h i n a h o l i s t i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d b y a n a r r a y o f tasks a n d p u r p o s e s , a l o n g w i t h o t h e r items of e q u i p m e n t .
A h a m m e r i s s o m e t h i n g with
to h a m m e r in
which
n a i l s in order to h o l d pieces of w o o d t o g e t h e r toward t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of s o m e t h i n g for the sake
of D a s e i n ' s s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g as
a
carpenter.
B u t is, say, m y a r m , o r m y b o d y a s a w h o l e f o r t h a t m a t t e r , l i k e i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t s u c h a s h a m m e r s a n d nails? C a n t h e h u m a n b o d y b e l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h i s s t r u c t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d b y the w i l h - w h i c h / i n - o r d e r - t o / l o w a r d w h i c h / f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h s y s t e m o f r e l a t i o n s ? A p a r t f r o m the o d d n e s s of treating the h a n d and other parts of the b o d y as themselves ready-toh a n d , u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e b o d y a s o n e m o r e i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t m a y a t first a p p e a r p r o m i s i n g a s a n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t o f its w a y o f b e i n g . T h r e e c o n s i d erations
i m m e d i a t e l y present
themselves:
First, consider again the e x a m p l e o f m y raising m y a r m : this episode m a y be explicated in such a m a n n e r that my a r m plays a role analogous t o o n e p l a y e d b y a h a m m e r i n t h e w o r k s h o p . W e m i g h t b e i n c l i n e d t o say s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h i s : my a r m is s o m e t h i n g with which I w a v e to a f r i e n d toward t h e act of e x t e n d i n g a g r e e t i n g in order to in fact g r e e t t h a t f r i e n d for the sake of my
being a
friendly
person.
( O f course,
the
arm
is
an
e x t r e m e l y v e r s a t i l e p i e c e o f e q u i p m e n t , since w h a t i t ' s e q u i p m e n t f o r i s m u c h m o r e o p e n - e n d e d t h a n , say, a h a m m e r : I c a n use m y a r m t o w a v e , ask a q u e s t i o n , g r a b s o m e t h i n g , p o k e s o m e t h i n g , a n d s o o n a n d s o o n . ) S e c o n d , t h e k i n d o f h o l i s t i c s t r u c t u r e H e i d e g g e r r e g a r d s a s necessary f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the w a y o f b e i n g o f e q u i p m e n t m i g h t b e suitably a p p l i e d to parts of the b o d y : in o r d e r for s o m e t h i n g to be a h a n d , it must be inte grated p r o p e r l y w i t h i n a larger structure; it must be connected to an a r m , w h i c h i s c o n n e c t e d t o a t o r s o , etc. A h a n d t h a t has b e e n s e v e r e d f r o m the rest o f t h e b o d y i s n o l o n g e r a h a n d , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , since i t n o l o n g e r has t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h hands. T h i r d , p a r t s o f t h e b o d y h a v e the same k i n d o f •transparency' a s s m o o t h l y f u n c t i o n i n g i t e m s
94
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
o f e q u i p m e n t . W h a t I m e a n h e r e c a n best b e seen i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage, w h e r e i n H e i d e g g e r describes e q u i p m e n t ' s tendency t o ' w i t h d r a w ' insofar as i t ' s b e i n g u s e d : T h e p e c u l i a r i t y o f w h a t i s p r o x i m a l l y r e a d y - l o - h a n d i s t h a t , i n its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, w i t h d r a w in order to be readyto-hand quite authentically. That w i t h w h i c h our everyday dealings p r o x i m a l l y d w e l l is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that w i t h w h i c h we c o n c e r n ourselves p r i m a r i l y is the w o r k - that w h i c h is to be p r o d u c e d at the t i m e . (BT,
99)
In the same way, it m i g h t be a r g u e d that the parts of the b o d y have this same t e n d e n c y t o w i t h d r a w i n s o f a r a s w h e n w e are a c t i v e l y c o p i n g w i t h o u r e n v i r o n m e n t , w e d o n o t , f o r t h e m o s t p a r t , focus o u r a t t e n t i o n o n t h e p a r t s o f t h e b o d y w e are e m p l o y i n g b u t i n s t e a d w e focus o n t h e a c t i v i t y itself. I f I h a d t o t h i n k a b o u t a l l t h e v a r i o u s m o v e m e n t s I m u s t effect t o t y p e , say, o r t o w a l k f r o m m y a p a r t m e n t t o c a m p u s , I w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o 1
act i n a n y t h i n g l i k e t h e s m o o t h a n d seamless m a n n e r I u s u a l l y d o . ' ' D e s p i t e the apparent s u b s t i t u t a b i l i l y of my a r m for a h a m m e r in the above e x a m p l e of w a v i n g to a f r i e n d , the holistic structure of parts of the body, and the 'transparency' or tendency to w i t h d r a w of b o t h e q u i p m e n t a n d t h e b o d y m o s t l a t e l y n o t e d , t h e r e s t i l l seems t o be s o m e t h i n g o d d a b o u t t r e a t i n g o u r b o d i e s a s just m o r e i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t t o b e s k i l f u l l y m a n i p u l a t e d l i k e s o m a n y h a m m e r s a n d f o u n t a i n pens. A s w e s h a l l see shortly, b o t h the a l l u r e a n d the oddness o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t the b o d y and its p a r t s i n t e r m s o f e q u i p m e n t p r o v i d e , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , a p o i n t of entry for a r r i v i n g at a p r o p e r understanding of biological organisms. Indeed, it is precisely by distinguishing organs and organisms f r o m items o f e q u i p m e n t t h a t he, i n his 1929/30 l e c t u r e s , b e g i n s t o a r t i c u l a t e w h a t h e c o n s i d e r s t o b e t h e 'essence' o f t h e o r g a n i s m . T o a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h o s e lectures w e n o w t u r n . Part
II
of
the
Fundamental
Concepts
lectures
is
concerned
primarily
w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n , ' W h a t i s w o r l d ? " I n o r d e r t o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , h o w e v e r , H e i d e g g e r m a k e s a l e n g t h y d e t o u r t h r o u g h a n u m b e r o f theses, t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f w h i c h h e r e g a r d s a s necessary t o a n s w e r i n g his f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n . T h r e e o f these s u b s i d i a r y theses are t h e f o l l o w i n g : ( 1 ) M a n i s w o r l d - f o r m i n g ; (2) T h e a n i m a l i s p o o r i n w o r l d ; and (3) T h e stone i s w o r l d l e s s . B y a t t e n d i n g t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n a n d a m o n g stones, a n i m a l s , a n d h u m a n beings, H e i d e g g e r h o p e s t o c l a r i f y w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n a n s w e r i n g his p r i m a r y q u e s t i o n . W i t h i n his c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e s e c o n d o f t h e t h r e e s u b s i d i a r y theses, n a m e l y t h a t t h e a n i m a l i s p o o r i n w o r l d , H e i d e g g e r b r o a c h e s t h e issue o f j u s t w h a t it is f o r s o m e t h i n g to be an organism, a n d it is h e r e t h a t he
95
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
Ο Γ
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
t u r n s his a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n b o d i l y o r g a n s a n d i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t . H o w t h e p l a c e m e n t o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i t h i n his c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the
essence
o f animals affects t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h w e c a n a p p l y
c o n c l u s i o n s t o human
bodies w i l l . b e considered
the
later.
H e i d e g g e r begins by n o t i n g that ' b o t h unicellular and m u l t i c e l l u l a r l i v i n g b e i n g s a l i k e possess a unity of t h e i r o w n in e a c h case, i.e. t h e y h a v e a specific
essential
(FCM, 2 1 2 ) . is
an
by
wholeness
virtue
of
the
fact
that
B u t , as H e i d e g g e r i m m e d i a t e l y goes on
organismV
(FCM,
212),
and
answering this
they
are
to ask,
question,
it
organisms'
'whatprecisely turns
out,
requires a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of various k i n d s of beings: "purely m a t e r i a l things, equipment,
instrument,
apparatus,
device,
machine,
organ,
organism,
a n i m a l i t y ' (FCM, 2 1 3 ) . U n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t a n o r g a n i s m is, t h e n , r e q u i r e s a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h this range of different kinds of beings in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h a t m a r k s or features distinguish organisms as organisms f r o m that e n t i r e array. H e i d e g g e r b e g i n s t h e task o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g o r g a n s f r o m e q u i p m e n t b y n o t i n g the difference
in
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f use.
He
observes
that whereas
i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t are a v a i l a b l e f o r use b y m o r e t h a n o n e p e r s o n , t h e same i s n o t t r u e f o r b o d i l y o r g a n s : ' R a t h e r , e v e r y l i v i n g b e i n g c a n o n l y e v e r see w i t h its eyes' (FCM, 2 1 9 ) . U n l i k e e q u i p m e n t , w h i c h e n j o y s a k i n d of independence
relative
to various
potential
users, o r g a n s ' a r e
incor
p o r a t e d i n t o t h e b e i n g t h a t m a k e s use o f t h e m . T h u s w e c a n r e c o g n i z e a n initial distinction by s a y i n g t h a t an o r g a n is an i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e u s e r ' (FCM, 2 1 9 ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s p o i n t h e r e is t h a t t h e sense o f ownership sense
in
the
case
of ownership
there
of a
body
might
be
is
hardly
in
t h e case
on
a
par w i t h whatever
of particular items
of
e q u i p m e n t : w h i l e I m a y be able to ' l e n d y o u a h a n d ' , my d o i n g so is a v e r y d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f act t h a n
my lending you my hammer.
Items of
e q u i p m e n t are t h i n g s w h i c h c a n b e h e l d i n c o m m o n , a n d c a n b e used i n the same way b y anyone, w h e r e a s t h i s is c l e a r l y n o t t h e case w i t h m y o r a n y o n e else's b o d y . To r e t u r n to the example of my raising my a r m , w h i l e it is certainly t r u e t h a t y o u c a n raise m y a r m f o r m e , y o u r d o i n g s o a n d m y d o i n g s o o n m y o w n a r e t w o r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f act. I raise m y a r m directly, w h e r e a s s o m e o n e else w o u l d f i r s t h a v e t o l o c a t e m y a r m a n d b y m e a n s o f h e r a r m get m i n e t o m o v e : t h e m o v e m e n t is, w e m i g h t say, o n l y i n d i r e c t i n t h e l a t t e r case. 2 " M y a r m i s n o t s o m e t h i n g o u t s i d e o f m y s e l f , w h o s e m o v e m e n t I effect b y m e a n s o f s o m e t h i n g else: I j u s t m o v e m y a r m . T h e idea of there b e i n g a direct c o n n e c t i o n between parts of the b o d y a n d the
organism
is h i n t e d
at
in
Heidegger's
talk
o f o r g a n s a s incorporated
i n t o the entity: my a r m , for example, is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o my body, w h i c h i s w h y I c a n m o v e i i i n a d i f f e r e n t w a y t h a n s o m e o n e else c a n . 2 1 H e i d e g g e r continues,
however,
by
noting
that
the
idea
of
incorporation
being
a p p e a l e d t o h e r e i s q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g , since w h a t a n o r g a n i s i n c o r p o r a t e d
96
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
i n t o i s a n o r g a n i s m , b u l i l i s t h e essence o f I h e o r g a n i s m w h i c h i s b e i n g investigated. I n c o r p o r a t i o n , t h e n , serves t o m a r k o n l y a n i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e q u i p m e n t a n d b o d i l y o r g a n s ; s o m e t h i n g m o r e needs t o b e said i n o r d e r t o m a k e the d i s t i n c t i o n c l e a r e r . I n d e e d , e v e n w i t h t h e a p p e a l t o i n c o r p o r a t i o n , organs a n d items o f e q u i p m e n t still have this m u c h i n c o m m o n : b o t h are used f o r s o m e t h i n g ( t h e h a m m e r f o r h a m m e r i n g , t h e eye f o r s e e i n g ) ; b o t h are, H e i d e g g e r notes, c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y b e i n g w h a t h e calls 'serviceable'. B u t w h a t is i t , then, w h i c h distinguishes equipment f r o m b o d i l y o r g a n s i f b o t h ' f i n d t h e i r essence i n s e r v i c e a b i l i t y ' ? I t has b e e n seen t h a t t h e w a y i n w h i c h these t w o k i n d s o f e n t i t i e s are s e r v i c e a b l e i s d i f f e r e n t i n t h a t i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t are a v a i l a b l e f o r use b y m o r e t h a n one
creature,
whereas
bodily
organs,
by
being
incorporated
into
an
o r g a n i s m , are a v a i l a b l e f o r use o n l y b y t h a t o n e b e i n g . B u t t h i s o n l y seems t o d e m a r c a t e b o d i l y o r g a n s a s a s p e c i a l class o f e q u i p m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n an altogether different k i n d of things. A f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n i s c a l l e d f o r , w h i c h takes i n t o a c c o u n t b o t h t h e idea of i n c o r p o r a t i o n and w h a t I have called the 'directness' of the connect i o n b e t w e e n t h e o r g a n i s m a n d its v a r i o u s organs. T h e s e ideas are c a p t u r e d i n H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t ' s readiness a n d a
bodily
o r g a n ' s capacity:
R e a d i n e s s i n t h i s specific a n d w e l l - d e f i n e d sense b e l o n g s t o e q u i p m e n t . A s e q u i p m e n t the p e n i s r e a d y f o r w r i t i n g , b u t i l has n o c a p a c i t y f o r w r i t i n g . As a p e n il is n o t capable of w r i t i n g . It is a matter
of
distinguishing
readiness,
as
a particular
kind
of potentiality
w h i c h w e a s c r i b e t o e q u i p m e n t , f r o m capacity. (FCM,
220)
E q u i p m e n t i s a l w a y s r e a d y f o r s o m e t h i n g , a n d a n o r g a n has a c a p a c i t y f o r s o m e t h i n g , b u t e q u i p m e n t i s r e a d y f o r use regardless o f w h e t h e r i t ' s a c t i v e l y b e i n g t a k e n h o l d o f o r g a t h e r i n g d u s t i n the b a c k o f the w o r k s h o p ; o r g a n s , b y c o n t r a s t , h a v e the c a p a c i t i e s t h e y h a v e , t o see, t o g r i p , t o p u m p b l o o d , a n d s o f o r t h , o n l y i n s o f a r a s t h e y are i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a l i v i n g o r g a n i s m , a n d t h e r e is n o sense t o be m a d e o f an o r g a n ' p r i o r ' t o its b e i n g i n t e g r a t e d ; t h i s i s w h y H e i d e g g e r insists t h a t a n o r g a n 'is n e v e r f i r s t a n i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h subsequently also gels i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o s o m e t h i n g else'. I n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r goes s o far a s t o say t h a t t h e e x p r e s s i o n , ' A n o r g a n has a c a p a c i t y ' i s i t s e l f m i s l e a d i n g , a n d h e suggests i n s t e a d t h a t t h e r e v e r s e i s t r u e : ' w e c a n n o t say t h a t t h e o r g a n has c a p a c i t i e s , b u t m u s t say t h a t the capacity has organs' (FCM, 2 2 1 ) . U n l i k e an i t e m of e q u i p m e n t , w h i c h i s s e r v i c e a b l e f o r s o m e t h i n g , the o r g a n , H e i d e g g e r m a i n tains, is in t h e s e r v i c e of s o m e t h i n g , n a m e l y the c a p a c i t y w h i c h is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r its p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s r e v e r s a l o f t h e p o s s e s s i o n - r e l a t i o n
97
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
b e t w e e n a n o r g a n a n d a c a p a c i t y s u c h t h a t i t ' s m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o say t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y has a n o r g a n serves t o u n d e r s c o r e t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e o r g a n i s m o v e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l parts. R e c a l l a r e m a r k o f H e i d e g g e r ' s I c i t e d p r e v i o u s l y : h e b e g i n s his d i s c u s s i o n o f o r g a n s a n d o r g a n i s m s b y e m p h a sizing the 'essential wholeness' o f a n o r g a n i s m . I l i s i n terms o f that e s s e n t i a l w h o l e n e s s t h a t a n o r g a n i s t h e k i n d o f t h i n g i t is. F u r t h e r m o r e , w e are n o w i n a p o s i t i o n t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s ' e s s e n t i a l w h o l e n e s s ' o f a n o r g a n i s m : t h e o r g a n i s m i s its c a p a c i t i e s , o r a n i n s t a n t i a t i o n o f a set o f c a p a c i t i e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e o r g a n i s m , t a k e n a s its c a p a c i t i e s , has a k i n d o f a u t o n o m y t h a t m a k e s i t d i f f e r e n t f r o m a m a c h i n e . W h i l e m a c h i n e s c e r t a i n l y h a v e c a p a c i t i e s i n some sense, t h e y l a c k t h e k i n d o f essential wholeness o f organisms b y standing i n need o f s o m e t h i n g o r s o m e o n e else t o " a c t i v a t e ' o r e x e r c i s e t h o s e capacities, a n d , m o r e o v e r , t o maintain
and
repair
them
when
malfunctions
occur.
Organisms,
by
c o n t r a s t , are "essentially w h o l e ' i n t h a t t h e y possess a n d exercise t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s i n d e p e n d e n t l y ; t h e r e is, i n o t h e r w o r d s , n o n e e d f o r s o m e f u r t h e r t h i n g o r a g e n t t o e x e r c i s e a n o r g a n i s m ' s capacities. A n o r g a n i s m i s c a p a b l e , o n its o w n , o f such t h i n g s a s m o v e m e n t , e a t i n g , a n d d i g e s t i o n ; its p a r t s , its v a r i o u s o r g a n s , are i n s o m e sense t h e p r o d u c t o f those c a p a c i t i e s , o r , perhaps, the m a t e r i a l r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e m . ( T h i s is w h y , I take i l , H e i d e g g e r insists on s a y i n g t h a t a c r e a t u r e d o e s n o t see because it has eyes, b u t r a t h e r has eyes because i t c a n see.) B o d i l y o r g a n s are, t h e n , t h e m a n i f e s tation
of an
o r g a n i s m ' s c a p a c i t i e s a n d serve
t o effect
the o r g a n i s m ' s
e x e r c i s i n g o f t h e m . T h i s a g a i n serves t o m a r k a f u n d a m e n t a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n organs and items of e q u i p m e n t , b e t w e e n serviceability and w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls ' s u b s e r v i e n c e ' . A s H e i d e g g e r p u t s i t , ' t h e o r g a n stands i n s e r v i c e o f t h e c a p a c i t y t h a t d e v e l o p s i t ' (FCM, 2 2 6 ) a n d s o i s s u b s e r v i e n t t o t h a t c a p a c i t y . 'This i s i n m a r k e d c o n t r a s t t o t h e s e r v i c e a b i l i t y o f t h e pen, for example, w h i c h , once
produced, is no longer tied
to what
produced it. Heidegger's talk of subservience as opposed to serviceability is meant t o r e i n f o r c e the d i r e c t n e s s o f t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n a n o r g a n i s m a n d its parts: the b o d i l y o r g a n is a part of the o r g a n i s m insofar as it is subservient to a capacity a n d is the r e a l i z a t i o n of i t . I t e m s of e q u i p m e n t , by contrast, are n o t s u b s e r v i e n t t o a n y p a r t i c u l a r c a p a c i t y : t h e y are r e a d y t o b e used, b u t n o t b y a n y o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r . A h a m m e r m a y b e t a k e n u p a n d used b y s o m e o n e o r o t h e r , o r a g a i n i t m a y s i m p l y b e cast aside. W h o uses t h e h a m m e r a n d w h e n i s i r r e l e v a n t t o its b e i n g the h a m m e r t h a t i l is; i n d e e d , w h e t h e r it's u s e d a t a l l m a k e s n o d i f f e r e n c e , a s i l w e r e , t o the h a m m e r . A s H e i d e g g e r n o t e s : "The h a m m e r i s c e r t a i n l y r e a d y f o r h a m m e r i n g , b u t t h e b e i n g of t h e h a m m e r is not an urge toward h a m m e r i n g . By c o n t r a s t s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h e eye, f o r e x a m p l e , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o a c a p a c i t y a n d subserves the c a p a c i t y of s e e i n g , c a n do so o n l y because t h e capacity is itself intrinsically subservient a n d
as such
can
98
lake something i n t o service'
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
(FCM, 2 2 6 ) . B o d i l y o r g a n s are a n u r g e t o w a r d t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s by b e i n g caught up in a n e t w o r k of self-activating capacities.
Ill Heidegger's
discussion
of
organs
and
organisms
in
his
Fundamental
Concepts l e c t u r e s p r o v i d e s at t h e v e r y least a s k e t c h of t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a n o r g a n i s m a n d its p a r t s o n the o n e h a n d , a n d m a c h i n e s a n d i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t o n t h e o t h e r . Parts o f a n o r g a n i s m f o r m a n i n t e g r a t e d w h o l e a n d are s u b s e r v i e n t t o t h e c a p a c i t i e s o f w h i c h i l i s c o m p o s e d ; t h e o r g a n i c b o d y i s a n essential w h o l e , i n t h a t i t i s a u t o n o m o u s a n d selfp e r p e t u a t i n g . H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n , m o r e o v e r , serves t o fill i n a g a p i n Being and Time in t h a t he has l i t t l e to say in t h a t e a r l i e r w o r k a b o u t b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m s . H o w e v e r , t h e q u e s t i o n I w a n t t o pose i s w h e t h e r his d i s c u s s i o n fills i n t h e g a p w i t h w h i c h w e h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d ; does i t , i n o t h e r words, help t o clarify the ' w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c ' h i d d e n i n Dasein's ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' , t o w h i c h H e i d e g g e r , a s w e h a v e seen, a l l u d e s w i t h o u t further commentary It
might
answered
seem
by
in
that
means
Being and various
of
the
Time!
questions
array
of
about
the
concepts
human
afforded
body
are
by
the
us
Fundamental Concepts l e c t u r e s : h u m a n b e i n g s are, at least in p a r t , b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m s , a n d are t h u s ( a g a i n , a t least i n p a r t ) b u n d l e s o f c a p a c i t i e s , for movement, ingestion and digestion, and so forth.
P r o b l e m s arise,
h o w e v e r , i n s o f a r a s w e t r y t o s p e l l o u t those c a p a c i t i e s , since w h a t a h u m a n b e i n g , a n d s o a h u m a n b o d y , does, a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the b e h a v i o u r o f a n a n i m a l . Recall that H e i d e g g e r s i t u a t e s his d i s c u s s i o n o f o r g a n s a n d o r g a n i s m s w i t h i n a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e thesis t h a t t h e a n i m a l i s ' p o o r i n w o r l d ' . T h e a n i m a l ' s p o v e r t y i s d i r e c t l y related
to
its
existence
as
a
collection
of capacities,
namely
as
an
a u t o n o m o u s , e s s e n t i a l l y c l o s e d s y s t e m o f i n s t i n c t u a l responses a n d b i o l o g i cal d r i v e s . H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s t h e a n i m a l a s ' c a p t i v a t e d ' , a n d a s ' e n c i r c l e d b y a d i s i n h i b i t i n g r i n g ' , a n d t h e a n i m a l ' s c a p t i v a t i o n i s a p r o d u c t o f its c a p a c i t i e s ; a s c a p t i v a t e d a n d e n c i r c l e d , t h e a n i m a l i s n o t o p e n t o the w o r l d i n the way i n w h i c h h u m a n beings a r e .
:2
A t o n e p o i n t i n his d i s c u s s i o n , H e i d e g g e r n o t e s t h a t ' i t i s i n d e e d quest i o n a b l e w h e t h e r w h a t w e c a l l h u m a n seeing i s t h e same a s a n i m a l seeing. S e e i n g a n d s e e i n g are n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g , a l t h o u g h h u m a n b e i n g s a n d a n i m a l s b o t h possess eyes a n d e v e n t h e a n a t o m i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e eye is alike
i n b o t h cases'
(FCM, 2 1 9 ) , a n d f u r t h e r o n ,
he
is even m o r e
e m p h a t i c i n his d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f h u m a n b e i n g s f r o m a n i m a l s : ' [ W ] e s h o u l d not c o m p a r e o u r o w n seeing w i t h that o f the a n i m a l w i t h o u t f u r t h e r ado, since
the
seeing
and
the potentiality
to
see
w h e r e a s our potentiality to see u l t i m a t e l y possibility
and
possesses
a
quite
different
99
of the
has a manner
animal
is
a
capacity:
quite different character of of being'
(FCM,
231).
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P H I L O S O P H I C A L S T U D I E S
Heidegger's point in
these passages i s t h a t
h u m a n seeing, a n d h u m a n
p e r c e p t i o n i n g e n e r a l , i s c o n c e p t u a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d : h u m a n b e i n g s see t h i n g s a s the t h i n g s t h e y are, w h i c h i s t o say t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s are c a p a b l e o f b r i n g i n g the o b j e c t s i n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t u n d e r c o n c e p t s , a n d s o o f f o r m i n g j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e m , w h i c h i s s o m e t h i n g e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the animal's m e r e l y d i f f e r e n t i a l responses.
11
T h a t is why, when Heidegger turns
t o t h e thesis t h a t ' m a n i s w o r l d - f o r m i n g ' , h e d e v o t e s c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n to the nature of assertion. Heidegger's p o i n t about p e r c e p t i o n a n d specifically linguistic capacities e x t e n d s t o h u m a n a c t i v i t y i n g e n e r a l , w h i c h h e p r e f e r s t o c a l l comportment r a t h e r t h a n
behaviour:
T h e specific manner in w h i c h
m a n is we s h a l l c a l l comportment a n d
t h e specific manner in
the
which
animal
is we
shall
call
behavior.
T h e y are f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . . . . T h e b e h a v i o r of the a n i m a l is n o t a doing and acting, as in h u m a n c o m p o r t m e n t , but
a
driven performing.
In
saying
this
we
mean
to
suggest
that
instinctual drivenness, as it were, characterizes all such a n i m a l p e r f o r mance. {FCM.
237)
C o m p o r t m e n t , i n c o n t r a s t t o the b e h a v i o u r o f the a n i m a l , consists o f m e a n i n g f u l a c t i o n s , a n d t h u s i s m o r e t h a n i n s t i n c t u a l responses t o e n v i r o n m e n t a l cues; m o r e o v e r , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f h u m a n a c t i o n p o i n t s t o its l a c k o f a u t o n o m y : D a s e i n , we are t o l d in Being and Time, j u s t is its c a p a b i l i t y t o be, b u t h o w t h o s e c a p a b i l i t i e s are s p e l l e d o u t i s i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d n o r m s a n d practices. In this way, a h u m a n being, u n d e r s t o o d a s D a s e i n , d o e s n o t h a v e c a p a b i l i t i e s i n the a u t o n o m o u s w a y i n w h i c h a b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m has c a p a c i t i e s , a n d t h i s l a c k o f a u t o n o m y , I w o u l d suggest, e x t e n d s t o h o w t h e b o d y i t s e l f i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d .
2 4
As we have
a l r e a d y seen, H e i d e g g e r e x p l i c i t l y w a r n s against a p p r o a c h i n g q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g o u r w a y o f b e i n g f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f b i o l o g y , a n d i n d e e d , echoes o f t h i s s e n t i m e n t c a n b e f o u n d i n his l a t e r ' L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m ' , where he writes: T h e fact t h a t p h y s i o l o g y a n d p h y s i o l o g i c a l c h e m i s t r y c a n s c i e n t i f i cally e x p l a i n m a n as an o r g a n i s m is no p r o o f that in this O r g a n i c ' t h i n g , t h a t is, i n t h e b o d y s c i e n t i f i c a l l y e x p l a i n e d , the essence o f m a n exists. (BW,
205)
T h i s last passage suggests a d i s t i n c t i o n t o b e d r a w n b e t w e e n the ' b o d y s c i e n t i f i c a l l y e x p l a i n e d ' , as, t h a t is, o n e m o r e b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m , a n d t h e body u n d e r s t o o d as a locus of Dasein's way of being. ^ 2
100
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
T h e h u m a n b o d y , a n a t o m i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , has m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h the bodies of animals: H e i d e g g e r c e r t a i n l y c a n n o t d e n y that we have hearts, l i v e r s , k i d n e y s , etc., b u t h e d o e s r e f e r t o such t h i n g s i n ' L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m ' a s p a r t o f O u r a p p a l l i n g a n d scarcely conceivable b o d i l y k i n s h i p w i t h t h e b e a s t ' (BW, 2 0 6 ) .
E l s e w h e r e i n t h i s essay, H e i d e g g e r
remarks that 'the h u m a n b o d y is s o m e t h i n g essentially o t h e r than an a n i m a l o r g a n i s m ' (BW, 2 0 4 ) . T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s p o s e d b y D a s e i n ' s b o d i l y n a t u r e lie i n h o w t o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n these t w o ideas, h o w , i n o t h e r w o r d s , t o sort out w h a t features o f o u r e m b o d i m e n t m a r k o u r k i n s h i p w i t h the beast, a s o p p o s e d t o w h a t i n o r a b o u t o u r b o d i e s i s ' e s s e n t i a l l y o t h e r ' t h a n a n i m a l . T o d o s o i n v o l v e s , I w o u l d suggest, a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h a t t h e r e i s a b o u t t h e b o d y t h a t i s o p e n t o interpretation, r a t h e r t h a n e x p l a n a t i o n .
2 6
I n t e r p r e t i n g the b o d y means placing b o d i l y performances w i t h i n a b r o a d e r s t r u c t u r e a n d so r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e b o d y not be t r e a t e d as a c l o s e d s y s t e m o f c a p a c i t i e s ; r a t h e r , t h e b o d y m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a s y s t e m o f capabilities, as a l o c u s of c o m p o r t m e n t as o p p o s e d to ( m e r e ) b e h a v i o u r . B u t this b r o a d e r s t r u c t u r e i n t o w h i c h the b o d y must be p l a c e d in o r d e r to be p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a human b o d y is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e world i n H e i d e g g e r ' s ' o n t o l o g i c a l - e x i s t e n t i a l ' sense, n a m e l y t h a t w o r l d w h i c h i s p a r t l y c o n s t i t u t i v e o f Dasein's w a y o f being. Thus, i n o r d e r t o sort out the b o d y i n t o its a n i m a l - l i k e aspects a n d its c a p a b i l i t i e s , t o s o r t o u t w h i c h f e a t u r e s o f t h e b o d y are o p e n t o e x p l a n a t i o n a n d w h i c h t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d m u s t first b e m a d e clear, w h i c h i s j u s t w h a t D i v i s i o n I of Being and Time sets o u t to d o . In t h i s w a y , we see a g a i n w h y H e i d e g g e r insists o n d e v e l o p i n g his e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n , a n d s o his a c c o u n t o f t h e w o r l d , f i r s t : u n t i l t h a t ' s c o m p l e t e d , t h e w h o l e problematic of Dasein's b o d i l y nature must r e m a i n h i d d e n . West
Virginia
University,
Morganstown,
West
Virginia,
2 7
USA
Notes 1 2
3
M a r t i n Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heracliius Seminar, trans. C. Siebert (Evanston: N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993), p. 146. I make use of the f o l l o w i n g abbreviations to cite works by Heidegger: BT = Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson ( N e w Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1962); BW = Basic Writings, ed. D. K r e l l (New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1977); FCM = Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. trans. W. M c N e i l l and N. Walker ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1995); HCT = The History of the Concept of Time, trans. T. Kisiel ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985); MFL = Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. trans. M. H e i m ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1984). A s translated by Macquarrie and Robinson, the full passage from which this sentence is taken reads as follows: O u t of this directionality arise the fixed directions of right and left. Dasein constantly lakes these directions along w i t h it, just as it does its
101
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P H I L O S O P H I C A L S T U D I E S
de-severances. Dasein's spatialization in its 'bodily nature' is likewise marked out in accordance w i t h these directions. (This bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of ils o w n , though we shall not neat it here.) Thus things which are ready-to-hand and used for the body - like gloves, for example, which are to move w i t h the hands - must be given directionality towards right and left. A craftsman's tools, however, which are held in the hand and moved w i t h i t . do not share (he hand's specifically 'manual' movements. So although hammers are handled just as much w i t h the hand as gloves are, there are no right- or left-handed hammers. (BT, 143) The parentheses, and likewise the repetition of "bodily nature', are an artifact of the translation; the original G e r m a n for the central sentence is: Die V e r r a u m l i c h u n g des Daseins in seiner " ' L e i b l i c h k e i l " , die eine eigene hier nicht zu behandelnde Problematik in sich birgt, ist mit nach diesen Richtungen ausgezeichnet.' Note the use of scare quotes around the phrase ' b o d i l y natute' ( " L e i b l i c h k e i t ' ) , w h i c h suggests a certain uneasiness on Heideggers part in t a l k i n g of Dasein as having a bodily nature and thus that he regards it as only a k i n d of loose talk. 4
Descartes is discussed at length in Chapter 3 of D i v i s i o n I. However, two points should be noted concerning Heidegger's engagement w i t h Cartesianism: first, the most immediate target for Heidegger's attack is the phenomenology of Husserl, whose m e t h o d of 'bracketing' or 'phenomenological r e d u c t i o n ' performs a function similar to, and clearly influenced by, Descartes's M e t h o d of D o u b t ; second, Heidegger's interest in D i v i s i o n 1 is not restricted to underm i n i n g Cartesianism; rather he wishes to examine the credentials of an entire way of t h i n k i n g , roughly the subject-object distinction, of which Cartesianism is a sophisticated product.
5
That is, Heidegger wants to claim that k n o w i n g is what he calls a 'founded mode' of Dasein's being-in-the-world, where founded' means thai another mode serves as a c o n d i t i o n for its possibility. See Being and Time, D i v i s i o n I, Chapter 2, §13. See D i d i e r Franck, Being and the L i v i n g ' , in E. Cadava, P. Connor, and J. Nancy (eds) Who Comes After the Subject? ( L o n d o n : Routledge, 1991). p. 144. Ibid., 146. David Farrell Krell. Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press. 1992), p. 52. Ibid., 52. H u b e r t Dreyfus, Being-in-the-Worlil: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1991), pp. 41 and 137. In his The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. R. Lilly ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1993), M i c h e l Haar asks: 'Can one phenomenologically and ontologically justify placing the body in a secondary position in the existential analytic?' (p. 34). In this paper, my aim is to show why Heidegger thinks that the answer to this question is yes'. Haar maintains, I think correctly, that Heidegger does not acknowledge the body as an 'existential', and justifies this by holding that transcendence (in other words, understanding) like the other existenlials such as attunement and " t i n ownness" - b o t h permeated w i t h transcendence - are siructuies more original than the body' (p. 35). The question that remains, and which I w i l l try at least lo sketch an answer to here, is what the "secondary position' occupied by the body looks like: is it a category w h o l l y different from Dasein,
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such as readiness-to-hand? Or does one need to w o r k through Dasein's existential features in order to characterize the body us Dasein's! 12 To put it more carefully, none of these categones proves to be satisfactory for the human body understood as a distinctively human body. 13 In a recent paper. W i l l i a m Blattner has argued that we must accept that Heidegger is operating w i t h a subterranean f o r m of dualism', between 'natural and self-interpreting characteristics'. He argues that this dualism is integral to one of Heidegger's principal claims in Being ami Time, namely that Dasein is its ability-to-be. On Heidegger's behalf, Blattner offers what he calls 'the D u a l i t y Thesis', namely that 'Dasein can be considered both in its proper ontological make-up, as essentially self-understanding, and in an abstracted, factual way. as something that merely occurs (esp.. naturally).' On this reading, embodiment and bodily characteristics w o u l d be part of the abstracted, factual way' of considering Dasein, as opposed to its proper ontological make-up'. See his 'Existence and Self-Understanding in Being and Time', in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(1) ( M a r c h , 1996), pp. 97-110. 14 It's w o r t h n o t i n g that M e i leau-Ponty. a post-Heideggerian phenomenologist who does give the body a central place in investigations, holds that even what I ' m calling the particularities of our bodily existence cannot be regarded as merely contingent features of our existence. In Phenomenology of Perception (trans. C. Smith ( N e w Y o r k : Routledge, 1962)). he writes that ' i f we conceive man in terms of his experience, that is to say. of his distinctive way of patterning the w o r l d , and if we reintegrate the "organs'' into the functional totality in which they play their part, a handless or sexless man is as inconceivable as one without the power of thought'. Further on in the same paragraph, he writes: E v e r y t h i n g in man is a necessity. For example, it is no mere coincidence that the rational being is also the one who holds himself upright or has a t h u m b which can be brought opposite to the fingers. On the other hand everything in man is a contingency in the sense that this human manner of existence is not guaranteed to every human c h i l d through some essence acquired at b i r t h , and in the sense that it must be constantly reforged in h i m t h r o u g h the hazards encountered by the objective body. (p. 170)
15
Even w i t h o u t going so far as M e i leau-Ponty does here, his remarks help to render problematic the appeal to the 'transcendental' character of Heidegger's investigation as a reason for ignoring questions concerning the body. That is. even if it is not conceded that every feature of our embodiment is necessaty to our way of being, it still may be true that being embodied (even if not in the particular way that human beings are) is a non-contingent feature, and so is a structure that is. as Heidegger puts it. determinative for the character o f Dasein's way o f being. This peculiar neutrality' has been explored by Jacques D e r r i d a . in 'Geschlecht: Sexual Difference. O n t o l o g i c a l Difference' (in P. K a m u f (ed.) A Derrida Reader: Benveen the Blinds ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1991), pp. 380-402). Derrida is principally concerned to understand the m o t i vations for Heidegger's insistence that Dasein is neither of the two sexes', and the consequences that insistence has for our understanding of gender and sexuality. I should note here that Derrida's conclusions regarding Heidegger's
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placement of sexuality in a secondary position apply to the category of the body more generally. Thus, when D e r r i d a writes: 'There is no properly sexual predicate; at least there is none that does not refer, for its sense, to the general structures of Dasein' (p. 400), the assertion can be extended to the body more generally. What D e r r i d a in this essay calls Heidegger's 'order of implications' means that sexual (and, 1 w o u l d contend, b o d i l y ) predicates rely for their sense on the 'general structures of Dasein', but not the other way around. That is, one can spell out what it is to be Dasein w i t h o u t reference to sexuality (the b o d y ) , but one cannot spell out human sexuality (what a human body is) w i t h o u t first explicating what it is to be Dasein. That this is so for Heidegger w i l l become clearer as we proceed through his categories of entities w h i c h don't have Dasein's way of being in Section I I . 16 For his part. Dreyfus does not appear to address these difficulties, though his appeals to Merleau-Ponty in his commentary display his discomfort w i t h this aspect of Heidegger's position. 17 M o r e t r o u b l i n g still are Heidegger's remarks about embodiment in his Davos debate w i t h Ernst Cassirer in Kunl and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. R. Taft ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1990), A p p e n d i x I I ) . There Heidegger speaks of Dasein as being ' t o a certain e x t e n t . . . fettered in a body' (p. 181). It is, however, through this 'fetteredness in the body' that Dasein stands in a particular c o n d i t i o n of being bound up w i t h beings' (p. 181). In other words, embodiment, as a dimension of thrownness, places Dasein in 'the midst of beings'. Despite this apparently essential role, Heidegger here speaks of Dasein's 'incursion' into beings as 'always spiritual and, in the ultimate sense, accidental' (p. 181). These remarks thus underscore, at the very least, the secondary status of the body, relative to Heidegger's attempts to delimit 'the original unity and the immanent structure of the relatedness of a human being' (p. 181). Whether they relegate the body to a different category (or make for its "disappearance' altogether) is an issue I address i n Sections I I and I I I . 18
Heidegger does, however, say that 'even entities which are not worldless Dasein itself, for example - are presenl-at-hand " i n " the w o r l d , or, more exactly, can w i t h some rights and w i t h i n certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand' (BT, 82). What I take Heidegger to mean here is that there is a standpoint f r o m which Dasein can be regarded as a thing, as something which has physical attributes. He is quick to point out that such a standpoint involves a neglect of just those characteristics that pick out Dasein as Dasein: "To do this [take Dasein as something present-at-hand], one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of being-in' (BT, 82). I try to spell out what Heidegger means here by 'disregard' in the discussion to follow.
19
Of course, the body can break d o w n , and so become an object of our explicit attention, but this fact does not, in and of itself, m a r k a separation between the body and items of equipment (except, perhaps, for the degree of interest we take in bodily breakdowns, as opposed to those in other items of equipment). See D i v i s i o n 1, Chapter 3, §16 of Being and Time for Heidegger's discussion of the
20
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I move external objects w i t h the aid of my body, w h i c h takes h o l d of them in one place and shifts t h e m to another. B u t my body itself I move directly, I do not find it at one point of objective space and transfer it to another, 1 have no need to look for it. it is already w i t h me - I do not need to lead it towards the movement's c o m p l e t i o n , it is in contact w i t h it f r o m the start and propels itself t o w a r d that end. (p. 94) 21
22
23
One may get the impression here that I am glossing over i m p o r t a n t distinc tions in speaking of limbs like arms, internal organs like hearts and kidneys, and body parts like eyes all as organs. There w o u l d seem to be serious differ ences among these items, most p r o m i n e n t l y manifest in the distinction between voluntary and involuntary movements: the animal excercises its capacity to walk by m o v i n g its legs, but it's unclear, to say the least, that a similar locu t i o n applies to the functioning of its liver. In his discussion, it does not appear that Heidegger is particularly sensitive to these sorts of distinctions, but I do not t h i n k that this is simply carelessness on his part. On the contrary, given his ultimate conception of animal life, discussed below, the distinction between what an animal voluntarily excercises and what, in its body, just happens of its o w n accord is ultimately a specious one: what Heidegger denies in the case of animals is any sense of agency on the basis of w h i c h such distinctions might be supported. M a i l e r s are more complex in the case of h u m a n beings, where the n o t i o n of agency does apply: 1 discuss some of these complexities below. These kinds of distinctions between animals and h u m a n beings have lately been discussed at some length by John M c D o w e l l , in his Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994), especially at pp. 114-23. It is interesting to note that on this issue, M c D o w e l l acknowledges that he is b o r r o w i n g heavily f r o m Gadamer's discussion in Truth and Method, which in t u r n owes a considerable debt to Heidegger's philosophy. 1 have not. however, been able to find in Gadamer a reference to these specific lectures. See also Simon G l e n d i n n i n g , "Heidegger and the Question of A n i m a l i t y ' (International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4(1), pp. 67-86), which, on roughly D e r r i d e a n grounds, is highly critical of Heidegger's sharp distinction between animals and human beings (though, surprisingly, G l e n d i n n i n g cites M c D o w e l l as a corrective to Heidegger's position). I am not concerned, in this paper, to defend Heidegger's insistence on the separation between the human and the animal; rather, my aim here is to assess the impact o f this insistence on the question of where to place the h u m a n body in his phenomenology. Consider the f o l l o w i n g passage: When we say that the lizard is lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the w o r d ' r o c k ' in order to indicate that whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, and yet it is not k n o w n to the lizard as a rock. If we cross out the w o r d we do not simply mean to i m p l y that something else is in question here or is taken as some t h i n g else. Rather we i m p l y that whatever it is is not accessible to it as a being. (FCM. 198)
24
We have thus come full circle back to the criticisms levelled at presence-athand: the concepts associated w i t h preserice-at-hand were seen to be insufficient for picking out bodily movements as meaningful gestures and
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actions, and the same holds for the n o t i o n of a capacity. In the lirst instance, those criticisms led to a consideration of readiness-to-hand as a candidate category lor the human body, but it was precisely for the deficiencies in this latter category that Heidegger's appeal to capacities seemed to promise a remedy. The three candidates thus push and pull against one another, so that no one of them seems exactly suitable. Similar remarks can be found in his Nietzsche, for example: O u r being embodied is essentially other than merely being encumbered w i l h an organism. Most of what we k n o w f r o m the natural sciences about the body and the way it embodies are speciticalions based on I h e established misinterpretation of the body as a mere natural body.
26
See Nietzsche. V o l . 1 (The Will to Power as Art), trans. D. F. K r e l l ( N e w Y o r k : Harper and Row. 1979). Chapter 14 (citation from pp. 99-100). These later remarks contrast sharply w i t h Heidegger's talk of ' n e u t r a l i t y ' and 'fetteredness', and may even appear to contradict his earlier o u t l o o k . It's not clear to me that this is so, since Heidegger's concern in I h e earlier material is p r i m a r i l y to distance his explication of Dasein from any consideration of the workings of "a mere natural body'- What I ' m suggesting in this paper is that Heidegger's existential analytic helps to remedy such a 'misinterpretation' of o u t e m b o d i ment, and helps lo b r i n g I h e more appropriate interpretation into view. The distinction I ' m after appears to be under discussion in the following difficult passage, wherein Heidegger writes: Every explanation, when we speak of an explanation of nature, is distinguished by its involvement in the incomprehensible. It can be flatly staled that explanation is the expository interpretation of the incomprehensible. . . . Nature is in principle ' explainable and to be explained because il is in principle incomprehensible. Il is the incomprehensible pure and simple. A n d it is the incomprehensible because il is the 'unworlded' world, insofar as we take nature in this extreme sense of I h e entity as it is discovered in physics. (HCT. 217-18)
27
Though Heidegger in this passage refers to explanation as a k i n d of interpretat i o n , 'expository interpretation', he clearly dislinguishes it from his usual meaning of interpretation, namely m a k i n g explicit the as-stiucture of the ' w o r l d e d ' w o r l d . The body-as-interpreted (in Heidegger's standard sense of interpretation) means the body-as-meaningful, as intentional, and thus as something worldly. Recall, for example, i h e difference discussed above between describing a bodily event as an action (like waving) and an arm's going up (at a certain speed and in a certain direction): the former characterization is an interpretive rendering of the body, whereas the latter might play a role in scientific explanations. Versions of this paper were presented to the Continental Philosophy W o r k s h o p at the University of Chicago, and to the Philosophy Departments at D a r t m o u t h College and West V i r g i n i a University. I w o u l d like to thank the members of the audiences for their questions, comments, and criticisms. I w o u l d also l i k e lo thank H u b e r l Dreyfus, Randall Havas. Wayne M a r t i n . K a r e n P i l k i n g l o n , D a v i d Stern, and an anonymous referee for comments on w r i t t e n versions of the paper. 1 am especially grateful to Steven A f f e l d t and Irad K i m h i for discussing earlier drafts at'length w i t h me.
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W h o are we? W h a t essence do we bear, and whence is this essence determined? Do we s t i l l have an essence, or have we become the provisional figure for the decaying of essence? Are we as m u c h as ever, or almost as much, as we say, the rational animal? But are a n i m a l i t y or rationality, body, soul, or m i n d , adequate to our being? In other words, has not the metaphysical interpretation of man as a rational animal reached its l i m i t in that absolutization of human subjectivity that demarcates the end of philosophy by opening onto the truth of Being? Is it not through a constraint on Being itself that our essence is originally constituted? A n d how might we arrive at this Being, how might we properly be that which we have to be without destroying the history of that long error about ourselves—I he history of ontology? But to destroy is not merely to return to the things themselves, it is also to take account of a t r a d i t i o n by starting out Iroin what made the tradition possible. It is thus just as necessary to define the essence of man as Dasein, while ceasing to understand it against the horizon of subjectivity, as it is to endorse, albeit in a restricted way, the concept of the rational animal. Since man's rationality is the d i s t i n c t i v e mark of his a n i m a l i t y , the specific trait of his l i f e , we cannot lake the name of Dasein and assume the tasks that this name imposes upon us without first e x a m i n i n g if and how our life, life as it manifests itself in us, can acquire an existential meaning. bet us return to the context in which this problem first emerges. Having established that ;i Ituulamenlal ontology must follow the path of an analytic of Dasein, and having sketched out its g u i d i n g lines and set in place its cardinal concepts, Heidegger secures the originality of such an analytic with regard lo all those d i s c i p l i n e s with w h i c h it might he confused. In Section 10 of Being and Time, in order lo d i s t i n g u i s h his phenomenology of existence from a philosophy of life or a general biology that would include the fields of anthropology and psychology, he
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affirms that " l i f e , in its own r i g h t , is a k i n d of B e i n g ; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative interpretat i o n ; it determines what must be the case if there can be a n y t h i n g l i k e mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben].
Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand [Vorhandensein],
nor
1
is it Dasein." T h i s thesis is taken up again in Section 4 1 , w h i c h Heidegger devotes to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the Being of Dasein, and where he shows that care cannot be brought back to elementary drives that, on the eontrary, are ontologically rooted in i t . He goes on to point ovit that " t h i s does not prevent w i l l i n g and w i s h i n g from being ontologically constitutive even for entities that merely ' l i v e ' , " and that "the basic ontological state of ' l i v i n g ' is a problem in its own right and can be tackled only r e d u c t i v e l y and p r i v a t i v e l y in terms of the ontology of Dasein."
The same
stance reappears finally in Section 4 9 , w h i c h aims at rejecting any medical characterization of death. If Heidegger acknowledges that "death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of l i f e " and that " l i f e must he understood as a k i n d of Being to w h i c h there belongs a B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , " it is only to add right away that "we can fix its character o n t o l o g i c a l l y only if this k i n d of Being is oriented in a privative way to Dasein," whereas biology and physiology can always treat Dasein as a theme by c o n s i d e r i n g it as pure life on the same basis as animals and plants. W h i l e a d m i t t i n g that Dasein is also a l i v i n g being since life is accessible in i t , and conceding that Dasein can have a physiological death "co-determined by its p r i m o r d i a l mode of 3
B e i n g , " Heidegger nonetheless argues for the p r i o r i t y of the existential concept of death over any science or ontology of l i f e . These b r i e f references d e a l i n g w i t h the B e i n g of life raise a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s . These concern Dasein i t s e l f a n d , beyond this, fundamental ontology in its entirety. C e r t a i n l y , Dasein does not begin as a l i v i n g being to w h i c h existence is subsequently added o n , hut rather, in the manner of everything that lives, it is b o m , reproduces, 4
and d i e s . How then can death, as the phenomenon of a life that does not exist, be co-determined by the p r i m o r d i a l mode of Dasein: ecstatic temporal existence? A n d conversely, in what way can death, as the supreme possibility of existence, be cod e t e r m i n e d by a l i f e whose mode of B e i n g is different? In short, is the life in Dasein, the life of Dasein, c o m p a t i b l e w i t h its existence? How can something ontologically foreign to Dasein be ostensible, thanks to Dasein, and in Dasein? How can existence he reduced to life? W h a t significance can be granted to the phenomenological m e t h o d , according to w h i c h access to a b e i n g is governed by its B e i n g , if in order to grasp l i v i n g and " l i f e " one must proceed p r i v a t i v e l y , starting w i t h a being that is ontologically other? Supposing this privative channel to be practicable, what pre-understanding of life w o u l d guide its trajectory? W h e r e i n would this preunderstanding find its legitimacy and pertinence if understanding is precisely a structure of Dasein, an existential! More generally, against what horizon of meaning of B e i n g and of negation can it be said that " l i f e is not Being-present-at-hand nor Dasein" if universal phenomenological ontology is shared between these two modes of B e i n g that have t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y in two temporalities, one of w h i c h is d e r i v e d from the other, and if the meaning of negation depends on the meaning of Being?
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A r e life and l i v i n g phenomena forever at a remove from the clearing of Being, refractory to a l l ontology, "phenomena" that time cannot constitute, that have no temporal meaning, absolutely incomprehensible? As disconcerting as this question might be, it has been if not exactly asked then at least formulated by Heidegger h i m s e l f w h e n , h a v i n g described the temporality of feeling and disposition, he ends Section 6 8 b of Being and Time w i t h this strange reservation: " I t remains a problem in i t s e l f to define ontologically the way in w h i c h the senses can be stimulated or touched in something that merely has l i f e , and how and whether the Being of animals, for instance, is constituted by some k i n d of Hirne.' "
5
But can the temporal constitution of life and the l i v i n g be considered a separate, that is to say, in the e n d , a secondary problem? From the moment Being is understood in terms of t i m e , does not the ontological analysis of a n i m a l i t y assume on the contrary a decisive role? Is it not liable to disconnect Being from t i m e , opening up once again the issue of the determination of the essence of man as Dasein, and shattering the very ground of fundamental ontology? Indeed, if the being of an a n i m a l were to be excluded from t i m e , Being itself would thereby lose the e x c l u s i v i t y of its temporal meaning, a n d , if we live only by being incarnate in 6
a body that testifies to our k i n s h i p w i t h the a n i m a l , the ontological detemporalization of the a n i m a l w o u l d i m p l y that the l i v i n g incarnate that we are is existentially inconceivable, and that we must abandon the name of Dasein. T h e interpretation of a n i m a l i t y and of life is in part the topic of a course given in the w i n t e r semester of 1 9 2 9 - 3 0 , entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik) and dealing w i t h
the concept of
w o r l d . H a v i n g described in Being and Time the worldly character of the being w i t h w h i c h we d a i l y enter into relation, and having retraced, in The Essence of Reason (Vom Wesen des Grundes), the history of the word " w o r l d " along w i t h the various meanings that have been attributed to i t , Heidegger takes the path of a "comparative c o n s i d e r a t i o n , " whose g u i d i n g thread is furnished by the following three theses: " T h e stone is without w o r l d , the a n i m a l is poor in w o r l d , man is formative of w o r l d . " If each of these theses determines the essence of the stone, the a n i m a l , and man, it is not a matter, regarding the second thesis, of understanding animality from the standpoint of the w o r l d and its impoverishment, but of understanding poverty-inw o r l d from the standpoint of a n i m a l i t y . A n d to conceive the essence of a n i m a l i t y , says Heidegger, is "to conceive the essence o f life i n g e n e r a l . "
7
The phenomenology of the l i v i n g must first of a l l make sure of its theme by answering the question of k n o w i n g whether or not we can have access to the a n i m a l . For this p o s s i b i l i t y to be offered to us, it is necessary that the animal itself relate to something other than itself. Now whereas the stone does not enter into any relation w i t h the Earth that supports i t , whereas the stone is without w o r l d , the animal that stalks its prey or builds its nest is essentially open to its surroundings. The a n i m a l itself, therefore, points to a possible sphere of access. But an animal is not Dasein, and is thus not p r i m o r d i a l l y constituted by b e i n g - w i t h , and we cannot both share the same rapport to being. If w o r l d is the condition for any rapport to
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b e i n g , the a n i m a l has a w o r l d because b e i n g is open to i t , bul it has no w o r l d because this o p e n i n g is foreclosed. To have and not to have a w o r l d is to be poori n - w o r l d in the sense of a p r i v a t i o n , for only a being capable of having a w o r l d can be d e p r i v e d of one. W h a t is this p o v e r t y - i n - w o r l d that characterizes a n i m a l i t y , and how can one define it positively if not by c a r r y i n g out an ontological analysis of life oriented around the animal? A n d where might this hermeneutic begin if not w i t h the fundamental proposition of zoology, according lo w h i c h everything that lives is an organism? What then is an organism? It is that w h i c h has organs. What does " o r g a n " mean? T h e term comes from the Greek opyetvov: tool. An organism then, f o l l o w i n g W i l h e l m Roux's formula, is a complex of tools. B u l conceived in this way, is not the organism s i m i l a r to a machine, and are the organs nothing but tools? N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g that a machine is not purely and simply an arrangement of tools, if the eye serves to see and the hammer to hammer, this s i m i l a r i t y should not be a l l o w e d lo cover up more definitive differences. Whereas several people can use the same hammer, a l i v i n g being sees only w i t h its own eyes. "The organ is therefore 8
a tool b u i l t into the user." Such a d e f i n i t i o n supposes, however, that the organ is s t i l l understood as a tool, i . e . , misunderstood. Where then is the essence of the organ to be sought? Generally speaking, that which can he used for something opens up a p o s s i b i l i t y for something else. To do so, thai w h i c h is useful must, as s u c h , be in possession of a possibility that constitutes its Being. In other words, to establish the difference between an organ and a tool, or more generally between an organ a n d an i t e m of e q u i p m e n t , the difference must be defined right down to what it is they are capable of d o i n g , to the mode ol being and the ontological d i s t i n c t i o n of their p o s s i b i l i l y . A hammer is used to hammer, and the m a k i n g of it is complete when it can fulfil this f u n c t i o n , when il is end-ready. Being ready for something (Fertigkeit für etwas) defines the c o n s t i t u t i v e p o s s i b i l i l y of ihe i l e m of equipment as such. The hammer, however, w i l l never be capable of h a m m e r i n g i n the way the eye is capable of seeing.
B e i n g capable of something (Fähigkeit zu etwas) defines the constitutive
p o s s i b i l i t y of the organ as such, that is, in its appurtenance to the organism. It is therefore the organism that possesses the capacity of seeing lo w h i c h ihe ocular organ then belongs, and hence it is the capacity that is endowed w i t h an organ, and not the organ that is endowed w i t h a capacity. W h a t is ihe l i n k helween the capabilities of an organism and the organs assigned to them? W h i c h organ might b r i n g out this l i n k most concrelely? Heidegger chooses to describe not the complex organism of a higher animal b u l that of a lower, protoplasmic, s i n g l e - c e l l a n i m a l that, since it seems to have no organs, is l i k e l y to reveal lo us the essence of this l i n k more clearly. Protoplasmic animalcules have no fixed form and have to create for themselves the necessary organs, w h i c h they afterward destroy.
" T h e i r organs are instantaneous organs (Augenblicksorgane)."
In infusoria, lor e x a m p l e , the prehensile organs and the organs for movement remain in place w h e n those used for n u t r i t i o n come into effect. " A r o u n d each
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m o u t h f u l , observes J. V. U e x h i i l l , "there forms a pockel w h i c h becomes at first a 0
m o u t h , then a stomach, then the intestines and finally an a n u s . " ' The n u t r i t i o n a l capacity is thus p r i o r to the n u t r i t i o n a l organs, whose appearance and disappearance it moreover regulates. At this stage in the analysis Heidegger raises an objection and points out a p r o b l e m . If one acknowledges that an organism produces its organs, is one not surreptitiously a d m i t t i n g that these are its equipment? Certainly, in the case of the infusoria, the very instantaneity of the organ precludes making it into an item of e q u i p m e n t ; but one cannot distinguish between an organ and an item of equipment on the basis of their d u r a t i o n since a number of animals have permanent organs. Heidegger then adds: " I t is also clear that the organ and the item of equipment differ precisely and fundamentally in their relationship to lime,
and this marks an
essential difference between their modes of b e i n g . " " This brief allusion indicates that the organ and the i t e m of equipment must each have their mode of temporalization through w h i c h , in accordance w i t h the main p r i n c i p l e of fundamental ontology, their respective modes of being can take on meaning. Conversely, it is only when their appropriate temporalities have been exposed that it w i l l be possible and legitimate to d i s t i n g u i s h the Being of an organ from that of an item of equipment, the organism from the w o r l d , life from existence or from Being-present-at-hand. Thus it is solely the determination of the rapport of the organism and the organs to t i m e that w i l l i n the end decide the ontological meaning of life. We shall leave open the question of the temporal constitution of the l i v i n g to take up the e l u c i d a t i o n of the l i n k between the organ and the organism, and to tackle the objection mentioned above. If the item of equipment is end-ready, if it is a finished product, the organ, subject to vital processes, knows nothing of this finishedness. T h i s means that the organ remains assigned to the organism as capacity. The f o l l o w i n g fact is proof of this: in order to move, pseudopodes produce something that they then reabsorb by amalgamating it into the remaining protoplasm. But when this protoplasmic prolongation comes into contact w i t h another m i c r o o r g a n i s m , this latter w i l l not absorb i t . The organ is thus held i n place by the very capacity that alone can annihilate i t . The organ is retained in the service of the capacity, it is in its service. But how can the capacity make possible such a subservience if not hy itself having p r i m o r d i a l l y the property of service? The eye serves to see and c o u l d not do so were the capacity of seeing not itself in the service of the organism. It is not the eye that sees but the organism, and, i n g i v i n g rise to the organ, the capacity gives itself over to itself, practices, advances toward that of w h i c h it is properly capable. Can we, s t i l l in contrast to the u t i l i t y of the item of equipment, i l l u m i n a t e this subservience of the organ and the capacity w h i c h founds it? Equipment is usable according to its " d i r e c t i o n s for use," a prescription that is not given w i t h or by its Being-end-ready-for . . . since it springs from that which has presided over its fabrication. " B y contrast, that which is capable is not subordinated lo any prescription but brings its own rule with it and rules itself. It propels itself in a specific way
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in its being capable of. . . . T h i s s e l f - p r o p e l l i n g and this being-propelled toward that of w h i c h it is capable [sein Wozu[ is only possible, for that w h i c h is capable, if being-capable is in general a d r i v e - a c t i v i t y [triebhaft]. There is capacity only where there is d r i v e . "
1 2
It is therefore because i h e capacity of the organ —ihe mode
of constitutive p o s s i b i l i t y of its B e i n g — i s i m p u l s i v e that the organ is ontologically d i s t i n c t from the i t e m of e q u i p m e n t . There is nothing impulsive in the readiness to h a m m e r of a hammer; e v e r y t h i n g is i m p u l s i v e in tbe being-capable-of seeing of an eye. If w i t h the d r i v e (Trieb) wc have a r r i v e d at the essence of capacity, w h i c h is to say the essence of Ihe organ in its appurtenance to the organism, it should now be possible to gain access to the Being of the organism itself. Being-capable-of . . . is lo be self-driven toward that of w h i c h the capacity is capable; toward itself. Capacity therefore i m p l i e s a relationship to self that one finds in the concepts of self-regulation and self-preservation by w h i c h the organism is customarily defined. How is this "self" that is i m p l i e d in the capacity to be thought? In function of the capacity alone, and without having recourse to an entelechy or any sort of vital force. To say that the capacity drives itself toward that of w h i c h it is capable is not to say that it turns away from i t s e l f to expend or lose itself in something else: on the contrary, in this d r i v e - m o v e m e n t , the capacity i t s e l f never stops appropriating itself (sich zu eigen), never ceases to be in the process of its own appropriation of itself. T h e fundamental trait of capacity is property (Eigentümlichkeit), w h i c h here obviously has no significant or categorical attribute, b u l w h i c h denotes a mode of being as i r r e d u c i b l e to existence as it is to Being-present-at-hand, that d i v i s i o n that runs through and sustains a l l of fundamental ontology. The drive's self-appropriation takes place without reflection, and this is why Heidegger refuses lo speak of an ipseity of the capacity or the organism. " W e reserve," he writes, "the expressions ' s e l f and 'selfhood' to characterize the specifically human property,
its b e i n g - i n -
appropriation-of-itself, and for this reason we say: everything w h i c h has the nature of a self, of a b e i n g w h i c h , in a general sense, has the character of a person (everything w h i c h is personal) is property, but not a l l property has the nature of a self o r o f a n I . " "
We are s t i l l far from having a r r i v e d at a sufficient concept for the organism, for we have left aside that of w h i c h the capacity is capable, that "for w h i c h " or in view of w h i c h {wozu) there is capacity. Capacity is, for example, capable of seeing. But what is vision here? T h e worm sees the mole; this means: it flees before the mole, it behaves in a certain way toward the mole. Being-capable-of . . . is thus capable of a behavior (Benehmen). To ascertain the behavior we must proceed from what we have already learned, namely the i n s t i n c t u a l property of the capacity and of the organism. By p r o p e l l i n g i t s e l f toward that of w h i c h it is capable, the capacity doesn't d w i n d l e away in self-expropriation. There is consequently in this appropriation .something held back that cannot fail to affect the behavior. In behaving amidst that
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w h i c h surrounds it an a n i m a l does not expulse itself outside of itself; on the contrary, it withdraws into itself, absorbed in and by its drive. "Behaviour as a general mode of being is only possible on the basis of the being absorbed [Eingenommenheit] in itself of the a n i m a l .
We characterize the being-alongside-itself specific to the ani-
mal—which has n o t h i n g to do w i t h an ipseity of man behaving as a person—we characterize this being-absorbed in itself of the animal w h i c h makes any behaviour possible,
as
captivation
(obnubilation:
Benommenheit).""
In
the
same
way
that
b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d is fundamentally constitutive for Dasein, captivation is the essential structure of a n i m a l i t y and must be explicated in terms of the animal's behavior, its drive-capacity. How does this captivation manifest itself in behavior? f o l l o w i n g Heidegger, let us borrow an observation from entomology. A bee is set in front of a bowl w i t h enough honey so that it cannot take it a l l in at one sitting. It begins to eat and then, a moment later, stops and flies away, leaving the remainder. What has happened? The bee has noticed that there was too m u c h honey, that it c o u l d not suck it a l l up and it has therefore terminated its drive activity. This explanation is unacceptable. In effect, the f o l l o w i n g experiment has been carried out: if, w h i l e the bee is s u c k i n g in the honey, its stomach is carefully cut open, the bee continues to suck in w h i l e the honey runs off b e h i n d i t . T h i s proves that the bee had not noticed the abundance of h o n e y — n o r moreover the disappearance of its abdomen—and that it continues to persist in its d r i v e . Absorbed in and by this, it does not have the opportunity to en-counter the honey in order to ascertain its presence. W h y then does the bee stop t a k i n g in the honey when it is not deprived of its abdomen and remains organically whole? Because it is satisfied, and the satiation i n h i b i t s the d r i v e . But the fact that the satiation is necessarily l i n k e d to the food in no way implies that it is connected to the bee's having noticed the abundance of food. Strictly speaking, the d r i v e is not directed toward an object, it has no object; it is a behavior relating to something that is never perceived as such. In our example the drive is captivated by the honey, a n d , when it becomes i n h i b i t e d , the bee tlies off to the hive. T h i s new behavior is just as captivated as the first. How does the bee find its way back? T h a n k s to experiments conducted by Betlie, R a d l , in his Investigations into the Phototropism of Animals of 1905, is able to offer an explanation. A hive is set up in a meadow. T h e bees become used to i t . The hive is then moved back several meters. Now, when returning to the hive, the bees first head for the spot that now stands e m p t y , and only return to their colony after having looked all around. W h y ? What draws them in that direction if neither the scent around the hive nor even the landmarks on the ground can direct them on their way since the bees' territory ranges over several kilometers? How does the bee return to its dwelling? It takes its cue from the sun. W h e n it (lies away, the bee has the sun behind it at a certain angle.
Given that little time elapses between the bee's
departure and its r e t u r n , the position of the sun barely changes at a l l , and so it finds its way back to the hive by positioning itself in front of the sun at the same angle. Another experiment confirms this interpretation: if one captures a bee at the
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spot where it has come to gather honey and encloses il in a box long enough for the sun to change p o s i t i o n , then when it is released it flies off at an angle i d e n t i c a l lo the one il made when il left the hive. W h a t is h a p p e n i n g in this behavior and what does it teach us about captivation? T h e bee does not, in one way or another, take its bearings in order lo orient itself, for, absorbed in its d r i v e , it is given over to the sun as to a structural element of that d r i v e . T h e bee never apprehends the sun as sun. The animal's captivation signifies this i m p o s s i b i l i t y of apprehending a being as being and this i m p o s s i b i l i t y is the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y of its absorption in and by the d r i v e . To state that c a p t i v a t i o n is the essence of a n i m a l i t y is to say that the a n i m a l is not self-sustained in the manifestation of the being as such. P r o p e l l i n g itself from d r i v e lo d r i v e , it is essentially at a remove from the revelation of Being, and this is why "the a n i m a l is so to speak suspended between itself and its environment without either of these b e i n g experienced as b e i n g . "
1 5
In short, the drive does not understand the as.
The a n i m a l nevertheless has access to that toward w h i c h it behaves. How might we describe this openness specific to c a p t i v a t i o n , and also that to w h i c h the a n i m a l is open and w h i c h nevertheless cannot be present to it in its being? The d r i v e that absorbs the bee in the movement toward the hive is in the service of ihe n u t r i t i o n a l d r i v e . Each d r i v e is thus in itself pushed toward or by o i l i e r drives, and this d r i v e from d r i v e to d r i v e keeps the a n i m a l w i t h i n a circle (Ring) of drives that it cannot get out of. E n c i r c l e d by its drives, the a n i m a l is, however, open to somelhing else. In what way? In the mode of a setting aside. T h e behavior of the drive always has the character of a setting aside (Beseitigung).
Exemplary in this respect is the
sexual behavior of c e r t a i n insects. After c o p u l a t i n g , the female devours the male. Thus for the female the male is not s i m p l y a l i v i n g fellow creature but a sexual partner or her prey, and ihe one excludes the other. "The behaviour 'sets aside,' that is lo say il is in relation to . . . hut in a way such thai the being as being can 6
never essentially manifest i t s e l f . " ' The a n i m a l is open to something else only in a repulsive mode thanks to w h i c h it can be absorbed in the drive proper. H a v i n g defined the openness characteristic of c a p t i v a t i o n , it is now possible to d e t e r m i n e the essence of that to w h i c h ihe a n i m a l relates in its drive behavior. The a n i m a l does not relate to its environment as to a manifest surrounding w o r l d , nor is it associated w i t h it in a mechanical way. Inasmuch as it is capable o f . . . , the a n i m a l opens onto something else in such a way that this other t h i n g can play a role in the d r i v e capacity. The bee is open lo the sun as lo a beacon, as lo that w h i c h sets in m o t i o n and d i s i n h i b i t s its d r i v e . But why must the drive be d i s i n h i b i t e d ? Let us consider the d r i v e itself, leaving aside the behavior to w h i c h it gives rise. It 1
possesses an " i n t e r n a l ex-tension [innere Gespanntheit]" '
a tense restraint,
an
a c c u m u l a t e d l o a d , a c o n s t r i c t i o n , an i n h i b i t i o n that needs to be lifted in order to become a behavior. T h i s means that the d r i v e must he a p r i o r i open to a d i s i i i h i b i t i n g factor that w i l l never be manifest to it since it is what allows the behavior, and therefore the a n i m a l , to appropriate its " s e l f . " E n c i r c l e d by its drives, the a n i m a l is thus necessarily open lo a c i r c l e of d i s i n h i b i l i o n , and ibis " s e l f - e n c i r c l i n g is not
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an encapsulating but precisely the draiving open of a surrounding [ein öffnendes Ziehen eines Umrings[ w i t h i n w h i c h any d i s i n h i b i t i n g factor can d i s i n h i b i t . " "
1
We are now in a position to establish the conditions of possibility for the e x c i t a b i l i t y in terms of w h i c h certain physiologists have defined " l i v i n g matter," and to answer the question of how the senses of a being that is merely alive can be stimulated and affected. E x c i t a t i o n and reflex occur only whenever there is d i s i n h i b i t i o n . That w h i c h is merely alive must first be open to whatever is l i k e l y to concern i t , and " i t is only when this preliminary relation of the excitable to that w h i c h can excite has already the character of a drive and of the drive encounter {Entgegen) that something l i k e the release of excitation is possible in g e n e r a l . " " We can also understand why different species o( animal do not react to the same s t i m u l i ; they are not constituted hv the same circle of d i s i n h i b i t i o n for, among other reasons, they do not all l i v e in the same m i l i e u . Whatever the intensity of a sensory s t i m u l a t i o n may be, for example, it can s t i l l remain without effect. The lizard that hears the slightest r u s t l i n g in the grass does not hear a rifle discharged in its nearest v i c i n i t y , a noise that makes even a distant b i r d flee. Let us recapitulate before proceeding. The phenomenology of the l i v i n g and of the organism began w i t h a comparison between the organ and the item of equipment, and was developed by advancing the organism as the constitutive capacity of the organ, and ended up bv emphasizing behavior as the mode of being of the organism and captivation as the c o n d i t i o n of possibility of the drive behavior. The organism is thus as such neither a complex of tools nor a collection of drives or reflexes but 2
"the capacity of behaviour in the unity of c a p t i v a t i o n . " " It cannot be reduced to the body, and the relation to an environment belongs to its very essence. T h e organization of the orgatvism is not a morphological fact but must be conceived in function of the c i r c l e of possible d i s i n h i b i t i o n . To K.J.J. Buytendijk's argument that "the l i n k between the animal and its environment is almost as intimate as unity of b o d y , " Heidegger r i g h t l y rejoins that "the animal's unity of body is founded, as u n i t y of the a n i m a l body, in the unity of captivation, that is the self-encircling by the circle of disinhibition w i t h i n w h i c h , for the a n i m a l , the environment can unfold. Captivation is the fundamental essence of the o r g a n i s m . "
21
Should not this last proposition now replace the second of our g u i d i n g theses? Is not the captivation of the animal more essential than its poverty-in-world? In light of what has been learned, let us return to the i n i t i a l determination of a n i m a l i t y . If w o r l d means h a v i n g access to being, then the animal has a w o r l d since it is open to something else, but if the world means having access to being as being, then the animal does not have a w o r l d since it is captivated. Hence can one s t i l l speak, using the word in its fullest sense, of the poverty of the world of an animal whose openness to that w h i c h d i s i n h i b i t s the drives forecloses the as? Is not to qualify the a n i m a l as poor in w o r l d lo tacitly understand it as a modification of ourselves and not the way it is in itself? Must not the thesis that the animal is poor in world be abandoned on account ol its phenomenological i n n u l h e n l i i i t y ? If this were the ease, otie w o u l d have to conclude that c a p t i v a t i o n , as the e s s e n c e of the animal but
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separate from i t , situates the p o v e r t y - i n - w o r l d as an expression of our own rapport to the a n i m a l . Is this not however a premature conclusion? Apart from the fact that the concept of w o r l d has not been adequately elaborated, the objection Heidegger makes here against his own thesis presupposes that the retreat of being outside of manifestation constitutes the totality of captivation and that the essence of the organism has been e n t i r e l y constructed. But the expulsion of the animal outside of the manifestation of being as such is only a moment in captivation, and the foregoing analysis of the organism is i n c o m p l e t e . O n l y an exhaustive characterization of the organism w i l l allow us to decide i f the p r i m o r d i a l p r i n c i p l e o f a n i m a l i t y consists i n captivation or in poverty-in-world.
We can now assess the importance that the interpretation of the merely alive assumes in universal phenomenological ontology. This is not a problem of local or secondary interest. T h e i r r e d u c i b i l i t y of life to being and to time would be of l i t t l e significance if Dasein were not alive and c o u l d be thought without organs. Now it is e s s e n t i a l — a l t h o u g h this necessity was something that Heidegger never took into account—that Dasein have hands so that, a l l metaphors aside, the being of the being that it is c o u l d be named being-at-hand. A n d as indispensable as it may be to d i s t i n g u i s h between organ and e q u i p m e n t , the being of the equipment as beingat-hand presupposes the being of the h a n d , something that nothing in the hermeneutic gives us to understand since the ecstatic constitution of existence cannot be reconciled w i t h its i n c a r n a t i o n .
22
Is this to say, however, that the being that we are must posit the name of Dasein in order to be able to echo the life that is incarnate in it? Can the necessity of such a m u t a t i o n be t r u l y established when it stems from the being-at-hand or close-athand that we are not? In brief, for incarnate life to prompt the designation of our b e i n g as Dasein, il does not suffice thai we be alive; it is above a l l necessary that Dasein i t s e l f witnesses that the life that does not exist is "more essential" to it than existence. A n d where m i g h t such a witnessing lake place if nol there where Dasein properly appears to itself: in anxiety? It is hardly necessary to go over in detail the analysis of anxiety that assumes such a c a r d i n a l methodological function in the existential hermeneutic. At the end of Section 40 of Being and Time, after h a v i n g justified the privilege of anxious disclosure, Heidegger makes an odd r e m a r k , w h i c h he goes on to comment on in an even odder way. " A n x i e t y , " he notes, "is often conditioned by ' p h y s i o l o g i c a l ' factors." Of course, this is indeed a descriptive moment, but in view of the context w i t h i n w h i c h it is i n s c r i b e d il cannot fail lo surprise. H a v i n g made this observation, Heidegger adds: " T h i s fact, in its f a c t i c i t y , is a problem ontologically, not merely w i t h regard lo its o n t i c a l causation and course of development. Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its B e i n g , does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically."
23
W h y does this etiology of anxiety pose, as Heidegger
emphasizes, an ontological problem? If anxiety can have an organic cause, this
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is subject to conditions, and that life belongs
to the being proper of Dasein. Now it is possible, except for the major ontological c o n t r a d i c t i o n , that the anxious freedom of Dasein is a c o n d i t i o n a l freedom and that l i f e , w h i c h is c a p t i v a t i o n , is profoundly rooted in Dasein, w h i c h is understanding of B e i n g . W h e r e is the source of this contradiction to be located if not in the Being of the b e i n g that anxiety reveals? We have already seen that the physiological release of an e x c i t a t i o n cannot come about without that w h i c h is excitable first being open, in the form of the drive and the drive encounter (I'encontrepulsionnel), to that w h i c h can excite. Consequently, the Dasein whose anxiety is physiologically 25
c o n d i t i o n e d c o u l d never reveal itself to itself, in the t r u t h of its e x i s t e n c e , if it is not firstly a l i v i n g d r i v e n being ( t i n etant pulsionnel vivant) whose meaning is neither ecstatical nor categorical. O n the other h a n d , a life d r i v e w i l l never release anxiety, w h i c h is essentially Being-toward-death, if it is not first to some extent l i n k e d to anxiety. A n d how w o u l d it be so without being a death drive w o r k i n g on the p r i n c i p l e of a life drive? A n x i e t y thus has its o r i g i n in the i n t e r t w i n i n g of the death and life drives, and this is precisely where the e l u c i d a t i o n of the organism stumbles, and incarnate life is "more essential" than existence because it precedes the truth of existence. Therefore, resoluteness being motivated by the d r i v e , we must stop understanding ourselves as Dasein and temporality and t h i n k ourselves as l i v i n g , d r i v e n flesh [chair pulsionnelle vivante], a property on the basis of w h i c h d r i v e , path, and thought must henceforth be interrogated. But does this resignation of existence enable us ipso facto to t h i n k our incarnate relationship w i t h the animal? W h a t does "to stop understanding ourselves as Dasein" mean? N o t h i n g less and n o t h i n g other than ceasing to make the ontological difference. F o r m u l a t i n g this idea for the first time, Heidegger declared: "The d i s t i n c t i o n is there, that is to say, it has the mode of being of the Dasein: it belongs to existence. Existence means, as it were, "to be in the performance of this d i s t i n c t i o n . O n l y a soul that can make this d i s t i n c t i o n has the aptitude, going beyond the animal's soul, to become the soul of a human being. The difference between
being
and
beings
is
temporalized
in
the
2
temporalizing of temporality." ''
W h a t does this mean if not that in the operation of ontological difference—and this operation is its whole existence—Dasein institutes the abyss that separates it from the a n i m a l or, the other way a r o u n d , that only the relegation of ontological difference can render our b o d i l y a n i m a l i t y t h i n k a b l e . A n d since temporality exclusively constitutes the meaning of the B e i n g of Dasein, or already of subjectivity, is this not also to say that life is incarnate without either Being or time? This last proposition means, first, that the m o b i l i t y of that w h i c h is alive is ungraspable w i t h i n the vulgar or ecstatic horizon of concepts of time, and, further, that in order lo think incarnate life one must either construct a new concept of t i m e — b u t why persist in c a l l i n g time something that has never been conceived in that way?—or else one must go back to that property of w h i c h time is only a mode among other possible modes. It is therefore necessary to cease to determine the essence of man as Dasein if due consideration is to be given to its incarnation and to its l i f e . T h i s necessity
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Didier
Franck
cannot, however, be taken as established and assured in its possibility as long as Dasein has not once more and by itself witnessed, in short as long as it has not r e n o u n c e d , so to speak spontaneously, the understanding of Being. A n d where m i g h t this happen if not, once again, in anxiety? Now what does anxiety i n c l u d e and disclose? " I t discloses the world as world."
But is this statement comprehensible if
the two meanings of the as, the hermeneutic and apophantic, as these are d i s t i n guished a n d a r t i c u l a t e d in the analysis of understanding and the statement, presuppose the disclosure of the world? T h e w o r l d as w o r l d , the a p r i o r i of a l l understandi n g , is i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e if one takes existential understanding as one's measure; and if the as designates the t r u t h of Being itself,
then anxious Dasein, g i v i n g rise
lo a life o f drives that is refractory to existence, ceases to relate to Being by d e m i t t i n g its own B e i n g [en se demettant de son etre]. Therefore the incarnate life d r i v e that is ignorant of the as can never become, as Heidegger once wrote, "the other echo [Widerklang[ of Da-sein, ' i n d e e d ' the b e g i n n i n g of overtness [die beginnliche Eröffnung] of the b e i n g in view of b e i n g . "
2 9
T h i s is no doubt the reason why Heidegger held the phenomenon of body to be " t h e most d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m . "
3 0
I n d e e d , since we are incarnate, the body ought to
be rooted, in the manner of e v e r y t h i n g that results from our Being, in existence, but as alive it cannot be so. Body, w h i c h presents itself as outside of Being in the heart of that w h i c h is o n l y through B e i n g , constitutes then the greatest d i f f i c u l t y in a t h i n k i n g of B e i n g that it exposes to its l i m i t s . The ecstatic determination of man's essence i m p l i e s the total exclusion of his l i v e a n i m a l i t y , and never in the history of metaphysics has the B e i n g of man been so profoundly disincarnated. If it might be necessary, in order to pose the question of Being and to understand our Being in this q u e s t i o n , to reduce that w h i c h the t r a d i t i o n a l definition of man as rational a n i m a l concedes to c a p t i v a t i o n , it nonetheless remains that the disappearance of the body is the phenomenological price of the appearance of Being.
Notes
1. Being and Time,
trans.
John Macr|iiarrie and E d w a r d
R o b i n s o n (New
York:
Harper and
Row,
1 9 6 2 ) , p . 5 0 . P a g e r e f e r e n c e s a r e l o the p a g i n a t i o n o f the G e r m a n e d i t i o n , a s i n d i c a t e d i n the margins of Macquarrie and Robinson's edition. 2.
I b i d . , p.
194
3.
I b i d . , pp. 2 4 6 and 2 4 7 .
4.
Cf. i b i d . , pp. 3 7 4 and 3 8 5 concerning "generations."
5.
I b i d . , p . 3 4 6 . W e a r e q u o t i n g from the text o f the e a r l i e r e d i t i o n s h e r e .
6.
Of.
Leiter on
Humanism,
in
Basir
Writings
of Martin Heidegger ( N e w
York:
Basic
Hooks,
1976),
p. 2 0 6 . 7. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, in Gesamtausgabe ( F r a n k f u r t am M a i n : K l o s t e r m a n n , 2 9 / 3 0 , p. 3 0 3 .
118
1986), vol.
Being
H. I b i d . , p.
321.
9.
327.
Ibid.,
p.
and
the
Living
I
147
10. Q u o t e d by H e i d e g g e r , i b i d . 11.
Ibid.,
p.
12.
Ibid.,
pp.
328.
13.
Ibid.,
p.
340.
14.
Ibid.,
p.
347.
15.
I b i d . . p. 361.
333-34.
16.
Ibid.,
p.
368.
17.
Ibid.,
p.
370.
18.
Ibid.
19.
Ibid.,
p.
373.
20.
Ibid.,
p.
375.
2 1 . Quoted by Heidegger, i b i d . , pp. 3 7 5 - 7 6 . 22. Cf.
my Heidegger el le probierte de Vespace ( P a r i s : M i n u i l ,
23.
Bring
and Time,
p.
24.
Cf.
I b i d . , p.
266.
25.
Cf.
I b i d . , p.
307.
26.
The
Basic
Problems
of Phenomenology,
trans,
A.
Hofstadter
Press, 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 3 1 9 . 2 7 . Being and Time, 29.
Cf.
ibid.,
2 9 . Beiträge 3 0 . Heraclitus,
p.
187.
§33.
zur Philosophie, seminar,
1986).
190.
1936-38.
1966-67.
119
(Bloomington:
Indiana
University
Intentionality and the Semantics of 'Dasein' RODERICK M. STEWART West
One
Virginia
of the
University
striking
features
of M a r t i n
Heidegger's
magnum
opus,
Sein
1
und Zeit, is t h a t , w h i l e it e x p l i c i t l y c l a i m s to be c a r r y i n g o u t a v e r s i o n of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h e n o m e n o l o g y ( S Z , H } 8 / E 6 i ) , there i s scarcely a m e n t i o n o f perhaps the key n o t i o n o f H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , the fact a n d phenomenon of human
intentionality.
1
This seemingly g l a r i n g omission
is, o f c o u r s e , s t r i k i n g even o n the r e a s o n a b l e h i s t o r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s t h a t H e i d e g g e r w a n t e d t o b r e a k r a d i c a l l y w i t h his f o r m e r teacher a n d m e n t o r a t the t i m e o f the w r i t i n g o f S Z . ' F o r , surely his b r e a k w o u l d b e a t its sharpest i f i t w a s e x p l i c i t l y set i n c o n t r a s t t o its i m m e d i a t e predecessor. Moreover,
one
may
well
ask
why
did
he
overtly
label
his
work
"transcendental p h e n o m e n o l o g y " at all, only apparently to ignore w h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y h a d been its p r i m a r y p h e n o m e n o n f o r analysis? Part o f t h i s p u z z l e c a n b e s o l v e d b y r e c a l l i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s o p e n i n g call i n S Z t o recover the a n c i e n t q u e s t i o n o f the ( m a n i f o l d ) m e a n i n g o f B e i n g ( r a t h e r t h a n , say, C a r t e s i a n consciousness) a s the p r i m a r y focus f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t i v i t y .
'
M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , Sein und Zeit ( T ü b i n g e n : M a x N i e n i c y e r V e r l a g , 1 9 6 7 ] , h e r e a f t e r c i r e d a s S Z ; E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n b y J o h n M a c q u a r r i e a n d E d w a r d R o b i n s o n , Heini; ami Time ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1 9 6 z ) . A l l c i t a t i o n s i n t h i s e s s a y w i l l g i v e t h e G e r m a n p a g i n a t i o n f i r s t , t h e n the E n g l i s h : e.g., H 1 1 / E 4 1 .
*
C f . , e.g., H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s a t H 4 8 / F . 7 ! a b o u t H u s s e r l ' s a n d S e n d e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n s o f a p e r s o n as a p e r f o r m e r of i n r c n t i o n a l acts, w h e r e H e i d e g g e r objects t h a t the " o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g " o f a p e r s o n a s s u c h a " p e r f o r m e r " has n o t been " p o s i t i v e l y " a s c e r t a i n e d . O t h erwise, there is very lirtle e x p l i c i t " t h e m a t i / a r i o n " of the p h e n o m e n o n of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y in SZ.
'
H e i d e g g e r ' s b r e a k w i r h H u s s e r l c a n b e seen q u i t e c l e a r l y i n t h e i r c o l l a b o r a t i o n o n H u s serl's
"Phenomenology"
notes collected i n
article
f o r t h e Encyclopedia
W a l t e r Bieniel, ed.,
Hitsserliana
Britannia. IX:
See
Heidegger's critical
Phänomenologische
Psychologie
( T h e H a g u e : N i j h o f f , 1 9 6 1 ) , p p . 1 1 7 - 3 0 1 . F o r a h e l p f u l d i s c u s s i o n o f these d o c u m e n t s , see H e r b e r r S p i e g e l b e r g , " O n r h c M i s f o r t u n e s o f E d m u n d H u s s e r l ' s E n c y c l o p a e d i a B r i -
tannica
Arricle
'Phenomenology',"
The Journal of the British Society for
Phenome-
nology 1 ( 1 9 7 1 ) : 7 8 - 9 0 .
I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y AND T H E SEMANTICS
121
OF
'OASEIN'
93
F o r t u n a t e l y , there are also n o w a v a i l a b l e H e i d e g g e r ' s p r e - S Z M a r b u r g lectures,
especially
Grundprobleme
der
Phänomenologie,*
where
more
t h a n a passing reference i s m a d e t o the p h e n o m e n o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d especially to the need to " c l a r i f y " {verdeutlichen) the c o n c e p t as used by H u s s e r l (e.g., i n a n a l y s i n g p e r c e p t i o n ) i n t e r m s o f a m o r e p r i m o r d i a l w a y of relating or
"behaving"
(Vcrbalten-zu)
t o w a r d a w o r l d of practical
p r o j e c t s ( o p . c i t . , p . 81). F i n a l l y , f u r t h e r l i g h t can b e shed o n this puzzle a b o u t H e i d e g g e r ' s b r e a k w i t h H u s s e r l i f w e e x a m i n e some recent s c h o l a r s h i p o n H e i d e g g e r , f r o m o t h e r w i s e u n e x p e c t e d q u a r t e r s , w h i c h sees H e i degger's b r e a k w i t h H u s s e r l i a n C a r t e s i a n i s m a s o n a p a r w i t h the a t t a c k s by Dewey, Ryle, Wittgenstein and other " o r d i n a r y language" philosophers o n C a r t e s i a n n o t i o n s o f the e p i s t e m i c a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l status o f the M e n t a l . I n p a r t i c u l a r , i n this essay the focus w i l l be o n J o h n H a u g e l a n d ' s n o v e l r e a d i n g o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r means b y ' D a s e i n ' i n S Z , a s w e l l a s related i n t e r p r e t i v e w o r k b y R o b e r t B r a n d o m , C h a r l e s G u i g n o n , a n d Hubert Dreyfus.' H a u g e l a n d advances a t least t w o b o l d a n d i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t e r p r e t i v e theses:
( 1 ) O n the basis o f v a r i o u s t e x t u a l clues, t h a t ' D a s e i n ' refers n o t t o persons i n any t r a d i t i o n a l sense, b u t t o a c o n c r e t e " e m e r g e n t e n t i t y " ; o r , m o r e f o r m a l l y , t h a t ' D a s e i n ' has a semantics d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f t r a d i t i o n a l c o u r t - a n d m a s s - n o u n s . A n d , o n the basis o f ( t ) ,
(2)
( A l o n g w i t h B r a n d o m ) t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s r e j e c t i o n of H u s s e r l i a n C a r t e -
s i a n i s m ( w h i c h f o l l o w s f r o m the f o r m e r ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis o f o u r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d ) i s s t r o n g l y a k i n , i f n o t t a n t a m o u n t , t o a social b e h a v i o r i s t strategy i n recent p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d a n d language (i.e., w h e r e a l l reference t o h u m a n
'
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is to be
T h e s e a r e f o u n d a s v o l u m e 1 4 o f H e i d e g g e r ' s n e w Gesamtausgabe ( F r a n k f u r t a . M . : V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n V e r l a g , 1 9 7 5 ) . T h e r e i s also a recent E n g l i s h r r a n s l a r i o n o f these b y Albert
Hofstadter:
Martin
Heidegger,
The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology
(Bloom-
i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 8 1 ) . 5
Robert B r a n d o m , "Heidegger's Categories in
Being and Time," The Monist
(16 ( 1 9 8 3 ) :
3 8 7 - 4 0 9 ; m o r e w i l l be said later on the i m p o r t a n r difference between H a u g e l a n d a n d Brandom.
Charles
Guignon,
Heidegger
and
the
Problem
of Knowledge
(Indianapolis:
H a c k c t t P u b l i s h i n g C o . , 1 9 8 3 ) , especially c h a p . 1 , § 8 , e n r i t l e d , " D a s e i n a s the ' A n y o n e ' . " w h e r e G u i g n o n offers a line of interpreration similar to Haugeland's. Finally, H u b e r t Dreyfus,
"Holism and
Hermeneutics,"
Review o f Metaphysics
34
( 1 9 8 0 ) ; also his a n d
H a u g e l a n d ' s , " H u s s e r l a n d Heidegger: Philosophy's Last Stand," i n : M i c h a e l M u r r a y , e d . , Heidegger and Modern Philosophy ( N e w H a v e n :
Yale,
1978), pp.
1 2 1 - 3 8 . I t is f a i r
t o n o t e h e r e t h a t D r e y f u s has p r o v i d e d t h e o r i g i n a l " B e r k e l e y c o n n e c t i o n " l i n k i n g these works.
94
RODERICK
Μ.
STEWART
122
replaced in o u r Fuitdantcntalontologie to e x c l u s i v e t a l k of a " m e m b e r ' s " n o r m a l i z e d d i s p o s i t i o n s t o behave w i t h i n some " h e r d " o r set o f o n g o i n g social practices). In this paper, 1 shall evaluate the t e x t u a l evidence H a u g e l a n d cites f o r thesis ( i ) , a s w e l l a s cite o t h e r t e x t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h c o u n t against i t . F i n a l l y , I shall argue a g a i n s t t h e s i s ( i ) t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f o u r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d m o r e r e a d i l y bears the m a r k s o f a b r o a d l y A r i s t o t e l i a n a p p r o a c h t o the M e n t a l , i n p a r t i c u l a r , o n e w h i c h helps itself t o a n i d i o m of practical intentionality.
The
Semantics
of
'Dasein'
T h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e a d i n g o f ' D a s e i n ' w h i c h H a u g e l a n d wishes t o s u p p l a n t p u t s this t e r m o n a p a r s e m a n t i c a l l y w i t h C a r t e s i a n uses o f 'ego' o r ' m i n d ' , K a n t i a n uses o f ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ego', a n d Husserl's use o f ' i n t e n t i o n a l consciousness'
and 'transcendental
e g o ' ; hence, the t r a d i t i o n a l
para-
phrase or gloss of Dasein as a " p e r s o n " in some s u i t a b l e n o n - C a r t e s i a n sense. H a u g e l a n d m a i n t a i n s , h o w e v e r , t h a t this is a f u n d a m e n t a l m i s u n derstanding of Heidegger's p o i n t , that 'Dasein' is n o t to be treated like m o s t general t e r m s . Indeed, i f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o r r e c t , then the t r u e radicalness of H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis vis-ä-vis the m o d e r n C a r t e s i a n t r a d i t i o n has yet to be fully a p p r e c i a t e d . Haugeland's interpretation draws heavily on Heidegger's description o f Dasein (for n o w , h u m a n existence) i n its " u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d " f o r m i n the p h e n o m e n o n of das Man (the i m p e r s o n a l A n y o n e ) . In brief, the latter p h e n o m e n o n (or, u n d e r l y i n g t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s t r u c t u r e ) is o u r existence as social creatures, a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s e x t e n d e d discussions o f i t bear the clear m a r k s o f his c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the 19th c e n t u r y debate b e t w e e n the H e g e l i a n n o t i o n o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g , conscious f r e e d o m w i t h i n the goals, " g o o d , " a n d even " r a t i o n a l i t y " o f a n o n g o i n g Sittlichkeit, a n d the K i e r kegaardian
and
Nietzschean
attacks on
the
"levelling c r o w d "
and
1
" h e r d . " ' For H a u g e l a n d , the das Man discussions suggest t h a t ' D a s e i n ' is
6
M o r e precisely, this debate emerged " f i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t " for Heidegger t h r o u g h his c o n tact w i t h W i l h e l m D i l t h e y ' s c o n c e r n s t o d e m a r c a t e the h u m a n o r " h i s r o r i c a l " sciences f r o m t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . I n f a c r , as G u i g n o n h a s p o i n t e d o u t ( o p . c i t . , p . 45 f t ' . ) , D i l t h e y ' s allegedly " i r r e d u c i b l e " notions o f " l i f e " ( h o r r o w e d f r o m some early w r i t i n g s o f Hegel) a n d objektiver Geist ( a l s o a d a p t e d f r o m H e g e l ) a n t i c i p a t e q u i t e c l e a r l y t h e s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e . H o w e v e r , w h a t G u i g n o n sees a s a w e a k n e s s ( i n c o n s i s t e n c y ? ) i n D i l t h e y , s t e m m i n g f r o m a p r i o r Cartesian epistemological starring p o i n t (op. cit., p. 53 f f . ) , n a m e l y , that i n d i v i d u a l conscious lives t u r n e d o u t to be m o r e t h a n mere place-hold-
INTENTIONALITY
AND T H E
123
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
95
best v i e w e d a s p i c k i n g o u t a vast, m e t a p h y s i c a l l y " e m e r g e n t " p h e n o m e n o n o r p a t t e r n o f n o r m s , n o r m a l b e h a v i o r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s , social roles, customs, and
i n s t i t u t i o n s generated
and
maintained
by
the o f t e n
blind
c o n f o r m i s m o f some " h e r d " o f creatures.' O n this view, i t i s p r o b l e m a t i c , b u t n o t a b s u r d , t o say t h a t D a s e i n b o t h consists e n t i r e l y o f its i n d i v i d u a l occurences a n d yet i s " p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a n y o f t h e m b e i n g w h a t i t i s " ( p . 2.0). As an " e m e r g e n t " e n t i t y , i n s o m e sense D a s e i n has a life o f its o w n o v e r a n d a b o v e its c o n s t i t u e n t s ; i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s c o m e a n d go, h a n d i n g d o w n s i m i l a r b e h a v i o r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s t o succeeding g e n e r a t i o n s . O n Haugeland's view, t h e n , all h u m a n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d social practices, n o t just the t r a d i t i o n a l p e r s o n w h o p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e m , are e q u a l l y ( u n i v o cally?) the " a s t o n i s h i n g d i v e r s i t y " t h a t i s D a s e i n . O n this v i e w o f D a s e i n , w h a t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been c a l l e d a " p e r s o n " i s n o w to be identified w i t h an i m p o r t a n t sub-pattern or sub-institution of n o r m a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d s o c i a l roles t h a t g o t o m a k e u p a n " a t o m i c " m e m b e r of an a p p r o p r i a t e c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y . T h u s , on such a v i e w , i t is o n l y c o n t i n g e n t l y t h e case t h a t a g i v e n m e m b e r is i d e n t i c a l w i t h w h a t w e w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y describe a s a n i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b o d y ( o r , even, w i t h a n d i n d i v i d u a l s o u l ) . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n ( b o t h for r e c o g n i z i n g LTS in a social n e t w o r k (given their p o w e r ot self-reflection), can arguably be r a k c n as a s t r e n g t h , a n d o n e w h i c h H e i d e g g e r saw a n d s o u g h t o n l y r o " c l a r i f y " a n d n o t reject o u t o f h a n d (sec S Z ,
H47/E71,
p r i o r t o his r e m a r k s referred to before a b o u t Husserl's a n d
Scheler's n o t i o n s o f persons a s " p e r f o r m e r s " o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts). I n fact, t o a n t i c i p a t e m y o w n p o s i t i o n here, 1 w o u l d urge t h a t m o r e i n t e r p r e t i v e mileage can be g o t t e n f r o m SZ if it i s r e a d d i a l e c r i c a l l y , h e r e i n t h e sense o f p r e s e n t i n g t w o a p p a r e n t l y i n c o m p a t i b l e v i e w s o f h u m a n p e r s o n h o o d (say, H e g e l vs. K i e r k e g a a r d ) a s necessary " m o m e n t s " o r aspects o f o n e , c o n c e p t u a l l y " l a r g e r " p h e n o m e n o n . I n t h i s w a y , t h o u g h t h e das Man d i s c u s s i o n s a r e " f i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t " i n t h e o r d e r o f d i s c o v e r y , t h e y b e c o m e " e q u i p r i m o r d i a l " (gleichurspriinglicb) i n t h e o r d e r o f ( h u m a n ) b e i n g w i t h t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n s i n SZ
concerning
resoluteness
(Dilthey's
Selbstbesinnung}),
Angst,
and
bcing-towards-
d e a t h . T h e s e l a t t e r , K i e r k e g a a r d i a n n o t i o n s are f o u n d i n b o r h D i l t h e y a n d H e i d e g g e r (cf. G u i g n o n , o p . cir., p . 5 4 f f . ) : i n d e e d , w h a t b e t t e r w a y t o c a p t u r e these features o f u n i q u e , i n d i v i d u a l existence t h a n b y c h o o s i n g the terms 'Dasein' a n d 'Existenz', w h i c h K i e r k e g a a r d d e l i b e r a t e l y chose a s signs o f r a d i c a l p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c o n r r a s t t o H e g e l i a n a b s t r a c t a s u c h a s ' S e i n ' ! See K i e r k e g a a r d ' s Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, t r a n s l a t e d b y D .
S w e n s o n a n d W a l t e r L o w r i e ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, Here we may
distinguish
t w o strands of social
behaviorism
and
1968),
p.
99
idenrify each
F.
ff. wirh
Haugeland's a n d B r a n d o m ' s positions, rcspecrively. Whereas H a u g e l a n d is prepared to speculate parenthetically about some sort of " h a r d - w i r i n g " w h i c h m i g h t underlie the c o n f o r m i s t tendency of a given h e r d of creatures, reserving such latter stories as even m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l versions of the Scientific Image t h a n social b e h a v i o r i s m , B r a n d o m e x p l i c i t l y rejects s u c h s p e c u l a t i o n s a s i r r e l e v a n t a n d a d o p t s a m o r e r a d i c a l ,
Rortyan
e x t e n s i o n o f w h a t w e m i g h t call the Sellarsian p r o g r a m m e i n w h i c h even the Scientific I m a g e o f t h e w o r l d a n d o u r s e l v e s i s n o less a set o f c o n t i n g e n t " s o c i a l c o n v e n t i o n s " o r p r a c t i c e s t h a n a n y o t h e r ser o f d e s c r i p t i v e o r e x p l a n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s . See B r a n d o m , a r t . cit., footnore
96
10 on p.
RODERICK
Μ.
409.
STEWART
124
a n d being) one m e m b e r i s i n t e r m s o f w h a t H a u g e l a n d calls " u n i t s o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , " i.e., w i t h a subset o f m o r e o r less i n t e g r a t e d a n d ( i n H e i degger's phrase) " r e s o l v e d " roles a n d n o r m a l d i s p o s i t i o n s subject t o the m e c h a n i s m s o f (self-)censure a n d a p p r o v a l b y the m e m b e r s o f the h e r d (cf. H a u g e l a n d ' s discussion o f G a u g i n t r y i n g unsuccessfully t o b e b o t h a n a r t ist a n d a p a r e n t ) . T h u s , i f w e t a k e seriously H a u g e l a n d ' s e x a m p l e o f a n e n t i r e beehive b e i n g one u n i t of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ( p . 10), t h e n c o n c e i v a b l y o n his r e a d i n g o f ' D a s e i n ' t w o o r m o r e b o d i e s , o r even parts o f several b o d i e s , c o u l d f u n c t i o n a s a m o r e o r less basic " u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " i n some h e r d . I n s u m , f o r H a u g e l a n d , a " h e r d - m e m b e r " o r " p e r s o n " t u r n s o u t t o b e w h a t e v e r p h y s i c a l s t u f f c o u n t s a s the m o s t p r i m i t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n o r " u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " i n the h e r d ; o r , f o r H a u g e l a n d ' s t r u l y m e m o r a b l e H e i d e g g e r , " p e r s o n s " are p r i m a r i l y " p r i m o r d i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " a n d n o t p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i t i o n e r s o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s . T o b e sure, these i n s t i t u t i o n s are a l w a y s i n s t a n t i a t e d o r m a n i f e s t e d i n some i n d i v i d u a l o r o t h e r . But,
because
of
their
"emergent"
status,
qualitatively
the
same
" i n s t i t u t i o n " i s n o t a l w a y s e x h i b i t e d i n n u m e r i c a l l y the same i n d i v i d u a l . T h u s , t h o u g h " p e r s o n s " t o o are a l w a y s m a n i f e s t e d i n some i n d i v i d u a l o r o t h e r , they are n o t necessarily m a n i f e s t e d in the same i n d i v i d u a l . L e t us n o w t u r n to Haugeland's textual argument for d r a w i n g this novel c o n c l u sion. H a u g e l a n d argues t h a t since i ) persons can b e c o u n t e d , i.e., s e m a n t i c a l l y ' p e r s o n ' i s a c o u n t - n o u n , b u t i ) ' D a s e i n ' i s ( v i r t u a l l y ) never used i n this w a y by H e i d e g g e r , t h e r e f o r e 3) ' p e r s o n ' w o u l d n o t be a g o o d renderi n g o f ' D a s e i n ' . H a u g e l a n d t h e n s u p p l e m e n t s t h i s negative c o n c l u s i o n w i t h a n o t h e r : ' D a s e i n ' also s h o u l d n o t be v i e w e d as a m a s s - n o u n , such as ' g o l d ' o r ' w a t e r ' , since u n l i k e t h e referents o f the l a t t e r t e r m s , Dasein cannot be measured or weighed. Rather, H a u g e l a n d concludes, 'Dasein' s h o u l d be in a d i f f e r e n t s e m a n t i c a l c a t e g o r y of n o u n s t h a t stands f o r a p e c u l i a r sort o f p a r t / w h o l e r e l a t i o n s h i p . H e suggests t h a t ' D a s e i n ' bears a likeness ( t h o u g h i n e x a c t ) t o ' t u b e r c u l o s i s ' , w h i c h h e says f u n c t i o n s n e i t h e r as a c o u n t - n o u n n o r as a m a s s - n o u n . Y e t , m u c h as there are ( c o u n t able) cases of t u b e r c u l o s i s , there are ( c o u n t a b l e ) cases of some w i d e s p r e a d p h e n o m e n o n D a s e i n . T h e cases o f D a s e i n , t h e n , are the v a r i o u s l y d i s c r i m i n a b l e , m o r e a n d less p r i m o r d i a l " u n i t s o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " w i t h i n the c o n f o r m i n g h e r d . L e t u s evaluate this a r g u m e n t . I t a k e the f i r s t premise t o b e u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l . W e s h o u l d n o t e , h o w e v e r , H a u g e l a n d ' s o w n q u a l i f i c a t i o n t o his second p r e m i s e w i t h the phrase " v i r t u a l l y " a n d t h e t w o e x a m p l e s o f count-uses o f ' D a s e i n ' h e cites i n his f o o t n o t e s ( S Z , 240, "das eine D a s e i n " ; 336, " e i n D a s e i n " ) . In the same v e i n , there i s H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k a b o u t the q u a s i - e t h i c a l feature o f D a s e i n
INTENTIONALITY
AND
THE
125
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
97
called
"in-each-case-my-ownness"
Jemeinigkcit,
one
must
always
"Because
jemeinigkcit):
use
a
personal
Dasein
has
when
one
pronoun
addresses i t : Ί a m ' , ' y o u a r e ' . " ( N o t e H e i d e g g e r ' s italics f o r ' p e r s o n a l ' . ) T o the best o f m y k n o w l e d g e , H e i d e g g e r never seriously considers a t t r i b u t i n g Jemeinigkeit (needless to say Angst or h e i n g - t o w a r d s - d e a t h ) * to G. M . o r C h r i s t m a s , needless t o say c a l l i n g t h e m b y first o r second p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s . I n d e e d , surely h a d H e i d e g g e r , w h o s o c a r e f u l l y crafted the ter m i n o l o g y o f S Z , c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d the v i e w o f the " a s t o n i s h i n g d i v e r s i t y " o f D a s e i n H a u g e l a n d i s t e m p t e d b y , t h e n h e w o u l d have m a d e the m o s t o f such r h e t o r i c a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Secondly, surely the c o u n t e r - i n s t a n c e s w h i c h H a u g e l a n d h i m s e l f cites a l l o w f o r the e q u a l l y , i f n o t m o r e , p l a u s i b l e h y p o t h e s i s t o b e t h a t H e i d e g ger o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y appears to be u s i n g ' D a s e i n ' in a n o n - c o u n t - n o u n w a y a s (say) a treatise o n w h a l e s m i g h t b y s p e a k i n g o f the W h a l e d o i n g , h a v i n g , etc., w h e n i n fact the a u t h o r c o u l d have said " t h e species w h a l e " o r " w h a l e s " d o such a n d such. A t the very least, t h e n , H a u g e l a n d ' s t e x t u a l evidence i s a m b i g u o u s . M o r e o v e r , i t seems reasonable t h a t o n l y i f the m a j o r i t y o f o c c u r r e n c e s o f ' D a s e i n ' c o u l d o n l y b e read i n his n o v e l w a y , w o u l d H a u g e l a n d have a s t r o n g t e x t u a l a r g u m e n t based o n a n u n e q u i v o cal a p p e a l to p r e p o n d e r a n c e of use. B u t , as he h i m s e l f i m p l i e s , this is n o t the case. I c o n c l u d e , t h e n , t h a t H a u g e l a n d ' s t e x t u a l a r g u m e n t w i l l n o t work. F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f w e accept H a u g e l a n d ' s f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t t h a t ' D a s e i n ' f u n c t i o n s l i k e ' t u b e r c u l o s i s ' , w e w o u l d s t i l l need a n i n d e p e n d e n t a r g u m e n t w h y even the l a t t e r t e r m presents u s w i t h a d i f f e r e n t s e m a n t i c a l category a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y describes a d i f f e r e n t m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a n the m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n types a n d t o k e n s , species a n d specimens, universals a n d p a r t i c u l a r s . Prima facie, there w o u l d seem t o b e n o reason n o t t o v i e w t a l k o f ' T . B . ' a s t a l k o f i n d i v i d u a l bodies i n s t a n t i a t i n g a c o m p l e x p r o p e r t y o r fact o f v a r i o u s b o d i l y states caused b y specimens of a c e r t a i n b a c i l l u s species. F i n a l l y , w h e n H a u g e l a n d w r i t e s t h a t " t h e a n y o n e . . . , the w o r l d , language, a n d even the sciences
. . .
a l l have ' D a s e i n ' s k i n d o f b e i n g ' "
(p. 19), it is r e a d i l y a r g u a b l e t h a t H a u g e l a n d has n o t been s u f f i c i e n t l y a t t e n t i v e t o h o w H e i d e g g e r uses the a d j e c t i v a l c o r r e l a t e o f ' D a s e i n ' , n a m e l y , 'daseinsmäßig'. ( I n o w start m y c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t f r o m t e x t u a l g r a m m a t i c a l clues.) T h e "—mäßig" suffix is a s t a n d a r d G e r m a n device for
making
an
adjective
or
adverb
out
of
a
noun,
but
with
the
a p p r o x i m a t e m e a n i n g s o f " — l i k e " o r " i n the m a n n e r o f . " H e i d e g g e r ' s
1
A s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n has been m a d e by D o r o t h y L e l a n d , " A b s t r a c t of C o m m e n t s : H a u g e land's Heidegger," N o u s (1981): 17-18.
98
RODERICK
Μ.
STEWART
126
coinage here can r e a s o n a b l y be c o n s t r u e d as m e a n i n g t h a t the p h e n o m e n a o f language, a w o r l d o f c o n c e r n s , a n d the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f science are " l i k e " o r " i n the m a n n e r o f " D a s e i n . T o m y k n o w l e d g e , H e i d e g g e r o n l y says o f i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d practices t h a t they are daseinsmäßig, a n d never says persons (or cases of Dasein) are. Cases of Dasein are s i m p l y t h a t — D a s e i n . O n the basis o f t h i s t e x t u a l s u b t l e t y , I p r o p o s e t h a t w e t a k e H e i d e g g e r ' s c o i n a g e a s s a y i n g t h a t statements a b o u t l a n g u a g e , a w o r l d o f concerns, a n d the sciences are in some ( t o be e x p l o r e d ) w a y a d j e c t i v a l u p o n statements a b o u t the m o r e p r i m i t i v e l o g i c a l subjects i n H e i d e g g e r ' s Fundamentalontnlogie, n a m e l y , statements a b o u t i n d i v i d u a l cases of D a s e i n . In any event, this s o r t o f " f r e e - w h e e l i n g " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s s u r e l y n o w e a k e r t h a n H a u g e l a n d ' s g r a m m a t i c o - s e m a n t i c a l detective w o r k . I n fact, o n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t there are n o occurrences i n S Z o f i n d i v i d u a l s b e i n g described as daseinsmäßig, my c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l w o t d d p r e s u m a b l y be even s t r o n g e r t h a n H a u g e l a n d ' s w i t h its a d m i t t e d t e x t u a l c o u n t e r - i n stances. I c o n c l u d e , t h e n , t h a t H a u g e l a n d ' s n o v e l r e a d i n g is n o t c o n c l u sively a r g u e d f o r o n the basis o f t h e k i n d o f evidence h e cites. B u t i f H a u g e l a n d ' s r e a d i n g i s n o t ( a n d c a n n o t be) c o n c l u s i v e l y a r g u e d f o r , w h a t r e a d i n g s h o u l d be p u t in its place? T h i s b r i n g s us to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f H a u g e l a n d ' s second thesis ( w h i c h h e h o l d s i n c o m m o n w i t h Brandom). -iiIf the second thesis is accepted, t h e n it is reasonable f o r us to t a k e H e i d e g g e r ' s r e j e c t i o n o f H u s s e r l i a n C a r t e s i a n i s m a s t a n t a m o u n t t o some f o r m o f social b e h a v i o r i s t strategy i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d a n d language.
In p a r t i c u l a r , the results of H e i d e g g e r ' s Fnndamentalontologie
o r analysis o f Dasein's b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d (especially g i v e n its emphasis on the necessary, das Man aspect of o u r existence) s h o u l d be v i e w e d as an a t t e m p t t o replace a l l statements a b o u t h u m a n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y w i t h statements a b o u t v a r i o u s creatures' n o r m a l i z e d d i s p o s i t i o n s to behave as m e m b e r s o f some " h e r d , " i.e., t o behave i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h some o n g o i n g set o f social p r a c t i c e s . ' T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this second thesis has been a n t i c i p a t e d i n p a r t i n o u r discussion of the first one. In the p r e v i o u s section we m e n t i o n e d the cases of Dasein's Jemeinigkeit, Angst, a n d B e i n g - t o w a r d s - d e a t h . Each of these e x i s t e n t i a l features c l e a r l y seems to r e q u i r e t h a t D a s e i n be a " p e r s o n " in a
* G u i g n o n docs n o t seem c o m m i t t e d to this stronger r e a d i n g , even t h o u g h he embraces a v e r s i o n o f H a u g e l a n d ' s s e m a n t i c c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f ' D a s e m ' ( o p , c i t . , §8, p . 1 0 4 ) . I n §9, however, he clearly attributes to Heidegger a " i d e o l o g i c a l " conception of everydayness. See e s p e c i a l l y p . 1 1 8 .
INTENTIONALITY
AND
THE
127
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
99
t r a d i t i o n a l c o u n t - n o u n sense; at the very least, the onus is on H a u g e l a n d t o s h o w c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d social practices l i t e r a l l y have such features a n d are n o t just daseinsmäßig in the sense a l l u d e d to p r e v i o u s l y . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h o u g h , these self-reflective e x i s t e n t i a l features presuppose f o r H e i d e g g e r t h a t D a s e i n i n general b e the k i n d o f b e i n g f o r w h o m its o w n B e i n g m a t t e r s o r i s a n issue. M o r e o v e r , h a v i n g one's B e i n g m a t t e r t o i t H e i d e g g e r e v e n t u a l l y describes a s b e i n g capable o f e x i s t e n t i a l " r e s o l v e " a b o u t w h e t h e r o r n o t t o " a p p r o p r i a t e " o r " m a k e one's o w n " (zueignen) a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l a n d social s i t u a t i o n (cf. S Z , H199/E345 f f . ) . F i n a l l y , i t i s this d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature o f Dasein (as o p p o s e d t o w h a t is n o n - D a s e i n ) w h i c h H e i d e g g e r calls by the general n a m e " c a r e " (Sorge). T h e p r o b l e m , t h e n , f o r the second H a u g e l a n d ( - B r a n d o m ) thesis i s t h i s : surely a b e i n g d e s c r i b e d as the locus of " c a r e " w o u l d seem to be replete w i t h i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , i n fact w i t h w h a t w e m i g h t call a p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l ity i n the classical G r e e k sense o f t h a t t e r m m a d e f a m o u s b y A r i s t o t l e i n his Ethics. As we shall see, H a u g e l a n d a n d , especially, B r a n d o m are a w a r e of this p r o b l e m a n d c o n s i d e r w a y s t o c i r c u m v e n t i t . B u t before w e e x a m i n e the p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e i r strategy, let us e x p a n d the case for the p r a c t i c a l intentionality of Dasein. Heidegger's E x i s t e n t i a l A n a l y t i c i n S Z p u r p o r t s t o describe the t r a n scendental features o r " p h e n o m e n a " o f h u m a n existence; o r , e q u i v a l e n t l y , it p u r p o r t s to p r o v i d e a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of w h a t it means for a b e i n g such as D a s e i n to e x i s t - i n - a - w o r l d . P r i o r to his analysis of Dasein's n o r m a l i z e d b e h a v i o r as an instance of das Man ( S Z , §17), H e i d e g g e r presents a r a t h e r f a m o u s p o r t r a i t of D a s e i n as a p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r w h o m u s t deliberate a b o u t the m o s t efficient means t o its i n n e r w o r l d l y projects ( S Z , §§15-18). I n this p o r t r a i t , the " p r i m o r d i a l " o r c o n c e p t u a l l y m o s t basic " m e a n i n g , " o r m o d e o f B e i n g o f any b e i n g , i s t o c o m e t o sight either as the p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r D a s e i n itself ( p r e s u m a b l y , w i t h all the beliefs, desires, and purposes of such a b e i n g ! ) , or as the i n s t r u m e n t a l " i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t s " r e a d y - t o - h a n d (zuhanden) for such a p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r . T h e " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " o f such e x i s t e n c e - i n - t h e - w o r l d comes o u t m o r e clearly i n the c o r r e s p o n d i n g passages in the probleme der Phänomenologie. T h e r e ,
1917 M a r b u r g lectures, Die Grundas
was
noted
earlier,
Heidegger
argues for the need t o " c l a r i f y " the r a r i f i e d f o r m s o f p e r c e p t u a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , w h i c h H u s s e r l c l a i m e d t o have s t u d i e d i n a n i s o l a t e d o r " b r a c k e t e d " C a r t e s i a n consciousness, b y s h o w i n g t h e m t o b e special f o r m s o f b e i n g i n s t r u m e n t a i l y related t o one's w o r l d o f e v e r y d a y c o n c e r n s .
1 0
See
Grundprobleme,
§§9-12.
10
I n i t s s t r o n g e s t f o r m h e r e , H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t is t h a t i f
a n y sense a t a l l i s t o b e m a d e o f a " b r a c k c r e d " a n d d i s i n t e r e s t e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e n s u c h states p r e s u p p o s e c o n c e p t u a l l y a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t i t i s l i k e t o b e a n " i n t e r e s t e d , "
ΙΟΟ
RODERICK
M.
STEWART
128
A s S Z proceeds, t h o u g h , even t h i s i n i t i a l t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - p h e n o m e n o logical portrait must be expanded. T h e i n n e r w o r l d l y instrumental significance o f beings i s f u r t h e r s h o w n t o b e a f o r m o f w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l W e b e r i a n Sinn o r s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e .
Projects a n d rules f o r a p p r o p r i a t e
a n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n are h a n d e d d o w n t o each case o f D a s e i n b y p r i o r e x i s t i n g social p r a c t i c e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s ; i n a w o r d , D a s e i n exists i n das Man ( S Z , §§25-27). A n d here, o f c o u r s e , t h e H a u g e l a n d p o r t r a i t gains its strongest
foothold.
B u t t h e p o r t r a i t i s n o t c o m p l e t e here e i t h e r . D a s e i n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g n o t o n l y comes t o s i g h t a s t h a t o f a p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r , r e q u i r i n g b o t h t h e various technical j u d g m e n t a l capacities for d e l i b e r a t i n g a b o u t the m o s t efficient means-ends t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d t h e b o d i l y s k i l l s t o c a r r y o u t these p l a n s . " R a t h e r , D a s e i n i s also d e s c r i b e d b y H e i d e g g e r a s t h a t l o c u s o f " c a r e " w h o s e m o d e o f B e i n g i s a l w a y s a n issue f o r i t , w h o s e h i s t o r i c a l a n d s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n m u s t b e v a r i o u s l y " a p p r o p r i a t e d . " T h i s l a t t e r aspect o f Dasein's " c a r e " requires the deliberative and j u d g m e n t a l capacities to assess the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f c o m p e t i n g , o v e r a l l ends o r p r o j e c t s , a n d espe c i a l l y t o raise q u e s t i o n s o f t h e f o r m , " W h a t o v e r a l l g o o d , o r o r d e r i n g o f g o o d s ( h a n d e d d o w n t o m e ) d o I t h e agent ( a n d n o t just c o n s u m e r - p r o d u c e r ) w a n t ( n o w ) ? " I t i s i n t h i s l a t t e r sense, t h e n , t h a t D a s e i n ' s i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i n its w o r l d o f c o n c e r n s i s p r a c t i c a l ( a n d n o t just t e c h n i c a l ) i n A r i s t o t le's sense." M o r e o v e r , i n o r d e r t o lessen t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f h u m a n " c a r e " m e r e l y bears a c o i n c i d e n t a l r e s e m b l a n c e t o cer t a i n features o f A r i s t o t l e ' s a c c o u n t o f h u m a n praxis, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o stress the s t r o n g l y A r i s t o t e l i a n f l a v o r o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t e a c h i n g a n d w r i t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e w r i t i n g o f S Z , especially his v a r i o u s M a r b u r g lectures o n A r i s t o t l e w h i c h c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e S Z - f o r m a t i v e p e r i o d (the several years p r i o r t o 1927)." W i t h a l l t h i s , t h e n , i t w o u l d seem t h a t t h e s e c o n d concerned World and
consciousness Our
Knowledge
in-action of It
and
in-a-world.
(Dordrecht:
Reidel,
See
h o w e v e r Jay
1980),
especially
Rosenberg, chap,
6,
One
lor
a
defense o f t h e c l a i m t h a t w e c a n o n l y a t t r i b u t e p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y t o a n agent i f w e presuppose t h a t agent's being able already t o m a k e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s o f the f a m i l i a r K a n t i a n , caregorial types. " "
C f . S Z , H 3 5 9 / E 4 1 0 ff. T h a t " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " i s n o t m e r e l y a n a n a c h r o n i s t i c s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n o n A r i s r o r l e ' s psy chology
and
R o r t y , ed.,
a c c o u n t o f h u m a n praxis, see D a v i d Essays on
Aristotle's
Ethics
(Berkeley:
Furley,
Universiry
"Self-Movers," of California,
in:
Amelie
1980), pp.
55-68. "
See v o l u m e 1 8 o f t h e Gesamtausgabe f o r l e c t u r e s o n A r i s t o t l e ' s Rhetoric ( 1 9 2 4 ) a n d v o l u m e 2 1 o n A r i s t o t l e ' s Logic ( 1 9 1 5 - 2 6 ) ; a l s o S Z $ 2 9 , H i 3 8 / E 1 7 8 , w h e r e H e i d e g g e r c a l l s t h e Rhetoric t h e
first
systematic hermeneutic o f everydayness. A g a i n , the impact o f this
research o n the seemingly alien concerns o f H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y comes o u t nicely i n t h e Grundprobleme, § § 9 - 1 1 . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e h e r e t h a t t h e s e l a t t e r l e c t u r e s a r e r e w o r k i n g s o f rhe m i s s i n g T h i r d D i v i s i o n o f p t . 1 o f S Z p r o m i s e d b y H e i d e g g e r a t S Z
INTENTIONALITY
AND
THE
129
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
ΙΟΙ
Haugeland(-ßrandom) e l i m i n a t i v i s t - t h e s i s can receive l i t t l e o r n o t e x t u a l support. 4
B r a n d o m , in particular, is aware of this sort of p r o b l e m . ' This becomes clear w h e n h e i n t e r p r e t s H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s a b o u t Dasein's MitseiulMitdasein, i.e., in a c c o u n t i n g f o r Dasein's b e h a v i o r (for B r a n d o m , Dasein's w a y o f r e s p o n d i n g ) n o t just t o beings r e a d y - t o - h a n d a s e q u i p m e n t , b u t t o beings w h o are l i k e w i s e seeming agent-consumers ( a r t . c i t . , p. 397 f f . ) . B r a n d o m ' s d i f f i c u l t y is to e l i m i n a t e a l l i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s o f Hegel's f a m o u s case o f " m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n , " o f t w o beings t a k i n g each o t h e r a s s o m e o n e w h o takes the O t h e r s i m i l a r l y . " T a k i n g . . . as" seems to be an i r r e d u c i b l e r e s i d u u m of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y in
Dasein's
Mitsein.
B r a n d o m ' s s o l u t i o n , h o w e v e r , i s t o d i s t i n g u i s h levels o f b e h a v i o r a l response b y D a s e i n : o n the f i r s t level, Jones responds d i f f e r e n t i a l l y t o objects a n d strategies r e a d y - t o - h a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r they are efficient Zeug or n o t . On a second l e v e l , Jones can r e s p o n d d i f f e r e n t i a l l y t o those beings w h o r e s p o n d s i m i l a r l y ( o r n o t ) t o the Zeug (objects a n d strategies) Jones i s i n c l i n e d t o r e s p o n d t o ; a n d these O t h e r s can o f course r e s p o n d s i m i l a r l y t o h o w Jones responds t o t h e i r Z e i i g a n d p e r f o r m a n c e s w i t h t h a t Zeug, a n d s o f o r t h . T h u s , w h e r e there i s such " r e c o g n i z e d " s i m i l a r i t y o f response, there i s c o m m u n i t y o r Mitdasein. T h u s , o n the B r a n d o m social b e h a v i o r i s t r e a d i n g , even the p h e n o m e n o n o f Mitsein can be seen as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n v a r i o u s levels of response-possibilities, all of w h i c h i s made antecedently possible b y the h e r d . A n d , t h u s , a l l signs o f the M e n t a l / I n t e n t i o n a l i n H e i d e g g e r ' s E x i s t e n t i a l A n a l y t i c can b e dispensed with.
H39/K64,
u n d e r t h e t i t l e , " T i m e a n d B e i n g . " F i n a l l y , t h e r e is a l s o t h e c r u c i a l t e s t i m o n y o f
G a d a m e r , Jacob K l e i n , a n d others of b e i n g y o u n g students excited to hear an u p - a n d coming Ethics. fornia, 1 4
young See
Professor
H.-G.
Heidegger open
Gadamer,
1976), especially
p.
up
Philosophical
Arisrotle's w o r k s
Hermeneutics
to
(Berkeley:
them,
especially
University
the
of Cali-
196.
I n i n f o r m a l c o n v e r s a r i o n s , H a u g e l a n d t o o has d e f e n d e d h i s p o s i t i o n b y p o i n t i n g t o H e i degger's "formal-existential" definition o f third
aspect
of
Dasein's
care
as
"being
Sorge
at S Z
alongside
§41, Η191/E237, |better:
especially to the
at-home-wirh"
[Sein-hci)\
(beings e n c o u n t e r e d w i t h i n - t h e - w o r l d ) . T h i s T r u n c a t e d p h r a s e refers t o H e i d e g g e r ' s dis cussions of h o w each of us q u i t e n a t u r a l l y a n d u n p r o b l e m a r i c a l l y is " a b s o r b e d " i n t o the f a m i l i a r i t y o f o u r everyday "cares" a n d interests (even c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d ) , w i t h a n e q u a l l y n a t u r a l ( c o n f o r m i s t ) t e n d e n c y t o tlee o u r s u b l i m i n a l a w a r e n e s s o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f o u r w a y o f l i f e o r " c a r i n g " versus o t h e r p o s s i b l e o n e s . P e r h a p s e v e n t h e u n i q u e f e a t u r e o f D a s e i n , t h a t i t s o w n B e i n g i s a n i s s u e f o r i r , c a n b e seen t o b e j u s t a n o t h e r n o r m a l i z e d disposirion to behave, b u t (in a n t i c i p a t i o n of B r a n d o m ' s m o v e ) at a second-level a n d in response to first-level dispositions a n d behaviors. Indeed, such social b e h a v i o r i s m m i g h r even b e a u g m e n r e d b y some sort o f e v o l u t i o n a r y - b i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a r i o n o f rhe " s e l e c t i o n " for such a second-level d i s p o s i t i o n .
Γ Ο Ζ
RODERICK
Μ.
STEWART
130
As subtle a n d p e n e t r a t i n g as this m a n e u v e r is, t h o u g h , there is g o o d reason t o believe i t i s n o t w h a t H e i d e g g e r h a d i n m i n d i n S Z . F i r s t , s i m p l y the fact t h a t H e i d e g g e r t a l k s a t great lengths a b o u t n o r m a l i z e d b e h a v i o r i n his f a m o u s das Man discussions is n o t e n o u g h by i t s e l f to w a r r a n t either a necessary
or
probable
inference
to
Fnndamentalontologie
as
social
b e h a v i o r i s m . F o r , o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s have analysed so-called "conventional" behavior, but w i t h no intention of carrying out eliminativist strategies. ( C f . , e.g., D a v i d L e w i s ' w o r k o n c o n v e n t i o n w h i c h b o t h H a u g e l a n d a n d B r a n d o m are clear t o d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m t h e i r o w n o n p r e cisely this p o i n t . ) Is there, t h e n , any place w h e r e H e i d e g g e r even h i n t s at t h e i r strategy? B r a n d o m cites the f o l l o w i n g , t a n t a l i z i n g passage: I n t h a t w i t h w h i c h w e c o n c e r n ourselves e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y , the O t h e r s are e n c o u n t e r e d
as w h a t they
do;
they
are w h a t they
do.
(SZ,
H126/E163) T h e last clause w o u l d seem t o b e just w h a t B r a n d o m ( a n d H a u g e l a n d ) are l o o k i n g f o r . I n fact, this social b e h a v i o r i s t r e a d i n g w o u l d b e a reasonable assessment of H e i d e g g e r ' s i n t e n t if the last clause s i m p l y said " t h e y are t h e i r ( b o d i l y ) b e h a v i o r ( a n d n o t h i n g else)." T h a t , o f course, w o u l d b e clear evidence f o r thesis 1. H o w e v e r , the clause s i m p l y does n o t say t h i s . In the first instance, the G e r m a n "sie s i n d das, was sie b e t r e i b e n " is r e a d i l y ( a n d I t h i n k m o r e r e a s o n a b l y ) c o n s t r u e d as m e a n i n g " t h e y are w h a t they pursue/are busy a b o u t . " F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f the M a c q u a r r i e a n d R o b i n son t r a n s l a t i o n o f ' b e t r e i b e n ' a s ' d o ' i s k e p t , this o f course does n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y r u l e o u t h e a r i n g ' d o ' a s a r i c h a c t i o n c o n c e p t instead o f one r e f e r r i n g to mere b o d i l y b e h a v i o r . T h u s , w h a t e v e r else this passage says against essentialist a n d t r a d i t i o n a l substance theories o f p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y , i t does n o t c l e a r l y e l i m i n a t e i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f r o m f u n d a m e n t a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f cases o f D a s e i n . I n d e e d , i n the b r o a d e r c o n t e x t o f S Z I have sketched above, Heidegger's
Fnndamentalontologie c l e a r l y seems
to have a
mini-
m a l c o m m i t m e n t t o e m b o d i e d p u r p o s i v e b e h a v i o r ( w h i c h i n c l u d e s the " a c t i o n " o f creatures replete w i t h p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d r a t i o n a l i t y ) . T h u s , i t seems reasonable t o c o n c l u d e t h a t the second
Hauge-
l a n d ( - B r a n d o m ) thesis, w i t h its s o c i a l b e h a v i o r i s t r e n d e r i n g o f H e i d e g ger's a n t i - C a r t e s i a n i s m , is t e n d e n t i o u s at best. To close this d i s c u s s i o n , I shall m a k e a f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t i v e p r o p o s a l a n d a n i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n a b o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g the u n i t y o f S Z a s a w h o l e . F i r s t , I r a t h e r c a u t i o u s l y suggest t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s discussions of n o r m a l i z e d b e h a v i o r a n d the pervasiveness o f social practices i n h u m a n a c t i o n b e m o v e d i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a strategy i n the p h i l o s o p h i e s o f m i n d
I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y AND T H E SEMANTICS
131
OF
'DASEIN'
I03
a n d language l i k e t h a t of J o n a t h a n B e n n e t t in his
Linguistic Behavior.'*
B e n n e t t argues persuasively {pace Q u i n e ) t h a t we can m a k e sense of h o w c o m p l e x , observable p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r can be t a k e n as evidence for a t t r i b u t i n g t o v a r i o u s l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d creatures a range o f capacities t o " r e g i s t e r , " even believe, c e r t a i n t e c h n i c a l o r p r a c t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s , t o desire c e r t a i n objects i n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s , o n u p the " i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c l a d d e r " t o t h e i r h a v i n g G r i c e a n i n t e n t i o n s o f a c o m plexity
sufficient
for
"speaker
meaning."
Just
how
these
individual
" i n t e n t i o n a l l i v e s " get subject t o s o c i a l practices o r " c o n v e n t i o n s , " i s h a n dled by Bennett according to D a v i d Lewis' model of a " c o o r d i n a t i o n p r o b l e m " b e t w e e n a t least t w o r a t i o n a l l y self-interested players w i t h v a r i ous " r e g i s t e r i n g s " a n d desires. O n t h i s strategy, a m o r e o r less c o m p l e x p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d t e l e o l o g y (even r a t i o n a l i t y ) i s a t t r i b u t e d t o creatures o p e r a t i n g o n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s a s the best w a y t o e x p l a i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r b e h a v i o r s . ' 6 I t w o u l d seem, t h e n , t h a t t h i s B e n n e t t - G r i c e L e w i s strategy w o u l d i n general d o m o r e justice t o the q u a s i - A r i s t o t e l i a n p r o g r a m 1 a m a r g u i n g H e i d e g g e r lays o u t i n his E x i s t e n t i a l A n a l y t i c . M y dispute w i t h H a u g e l a n d and B r a n d o m , then, can be s u m m e d up as fol l o w s : H e i d e g g e r ' s a n t i - C a r t e s i a n i s m ( i n his b r e a k w i t h H u s s e r l ) i s n o t a n a t t a c k on the M e n t a l / I n t e n t i o n a l per se, b u t on a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n t h a t separates i t ( a n d o u r k n o w l e d g e o f i t ) f r o m o u r p r a c t i c o - i n t e n t i o n a l b o d i l y existence. H e i d e g g e r ' s m o v e is t h e r e b y a n a l o g o u s to r e j e c t i n g Plat o n i s m n o t b y a d o p t i n g n o m i n a l i s m b u t A r i s t o t l e ' s i n rebus v i e w . Yet, even t h i s c o u n t e r - p r o p o s a l f o r " r a t i o n a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t i n g " H e i degger's p r o j e c t i n S Z i n l i g h t o f c u r r e n t w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d m u s t b e t a k e n w i t h great c a u t i o n . H e i d e g g e r ' s p u z z l i n g r e m a r k s a b o u t truth
as
"disclosedness"
"historicity"
and
(Erschlossenbeit)
"situatedness"
at
SZ
§44
and
about
the
o f Dasein's u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' ^ m a k e i t
e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o see S Z a s u l t i m a t e l y c o n t a i n i n g a n y t h i n g a k i n t o m o s t t r a d i t i o n a l a n d recent w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d . I m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s n o t e o f c a u t i o n covers n o t o n l y the e l i m i n a t i v i s t a n d dual-aspect, m a t e r i a l i s t strategies m e n t i o n e d s o far, b u r also the " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " strategy H e i d e g g e r c l e a r l y opens w i t h i n S Z . A n y a n d a l l such strategies
1976).
"
J o n a t h a n B e n n e t t , Linguistic Behavior ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i r y Press,
"
I am i g n o r i n g here h o w B e n n e t t w o u l d h a n d l e questions of w h y a g i v e n creature has a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " p a c k a g e " a s o p p o s e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n t i o n a l state. B e n n e t t seems c o m m i t t e d t o p u r e l y m e c h a n i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n s (say, i n t e r m s o f a d a p r a t i o n , n a t u ral selection, a n d c o n d i t i o n i n g ) for the f o r m e r a n d , for h i m , m o r e " b a s i c " why-qtiesrions. See h i s d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e r i s i n g a n d f a l l i n g o f S t a b l e L a k e , o p . c i t . , § § 11-34, P- 7 5 ff-. especially p.
17
81.
F o r a h e l p f u l d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e p a r t s o f S Z , sec D a v i d H o y , " H i s t o r y , H i s t o r i c i t y , a n d H i s t o r i o g r a p h y i n Being and Time," i n M i c h a e l M u r r a y , o p . c i t . , p p .
1 0 4
RODERICK Μ.
STEWART
132
319-53.
w o u l d surely seem t o r u n a f o u l of, i n d e e d b e c o n t r a d i c t e d b y , " l a t e r " s t a t e m e n t s i n S Z a b o u t t h e situatedness a n d h i s t o r i c i t y o f a l l h u m a n understanding
and
"disclosedness"
(including,
quite
explicitly,
Heideg
ger's o w n ) . A c a r e f u l r e a d i n g o f these p a r t s o f S Z , a s w e l l a s r e l a t e d texts,'* i n d i c a t e s t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s p o s i t i o n i s m u c h m o r e r a d i c a l t h a n any f o r m o f s c e p t i c i s m a n d f a l l i b i l i s m : the very idea o f T r u t h , the w a y tlje W o r l d i s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f h u m a n efforts a t c o g n i t i o n , a n d o f o u r m e n t a l events a n d l i n g u i s t i c items c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h a t W o r l d , i s d i s m i s s e d a s i n c o h e r e n t ( n o t just u n k n o w a b l e ) . " ' I n a w o r d , H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s seem t o b e t a n t a m o u n t t o w h a t R o r t y a n d P u t n a m have r e c e n t l y d e f e n d e d as A n t i - R e a l i s m . 1 0 T h u s ,
if such
a
radical
"Anti-Realism"
is the u l t i
m a t e 1 ' result o f S Z , t h e n a l l Images o f ourselves ( i n Sellars' p h r a s e ) , w h e t h e r M a n i f e s t a n d I n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c o r Scientific a n d v a r i o u s l y e l i m i n a t i v i s t i c , o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r a l l " s t a n c e s " t o w a r d ourselves ( i n D e n n e t t ' s phrase11),
whether
physical,
design, or
intentional,
are
nothing but
Images a n d Stances w h i c h reflect m o r e o f a d e c i s i o n o r " r e s o l v e " o n o u r p a r t o v e r t i m e a b o u t h o w t o v i e w ourselves t h a n t h e y d o the w a y w e r e a l l y are b y N a t u r e . " N o p a r t i c u l a r I m a g e o r Stance, t h e n , c a n i n t e l l i g i b l y b e
, s
Sec H e i d e g g e r ' s " O n t h e F.sscncc o f T r u t h , " a n d " T h e O n g m o f t h e W o r k o f A r t , " i n Basic Writings, D a v i d K r e l l , e d . ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w ,
"*
I9",7), pp.
ι ι i-XK.
T w o n o t e s h e r e . F i r s r , t h e r e is a t l e a s t o n e p a s s a g e w h i c h d o c s n o t s q u a r e e a s i l y w i t h t h i s more radical thrust. CI. SZ
§39,
Η ι
89/K12.8.
S e c o n d , t h e r e is a n u n d e n i a b l e a n d ( I t h i n k )
u n a v o i d a b l e "(social) v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t " air t o this w h o l e p o s i t i o n o f w h i c h Heidegger s e e m s t o h a v e s o m e a w a r e n e s s . See h i s r e m a r k s a t S Z
H151-1
5i/K
193
about the differ
ence b e t w e e n b e i n g m e a n i n g f u l a n d m e a n i n g l e s s . "°
Sec
Richard
s i t y Press, and Kegan "
Rorty,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ( P r i n c e t o n :
1979); H i l a r y P a u l , 1978).
Putnam,
Meaning and the Moral Sciences
Princeton
(London:
Univer
Routledge
I say " u l t i m a t e " h e r e t o c o m p l e m e n t m y t h u s t a r " p r o g r e s s i v e " r e a d i n g o f t h e r e s u l t s o t S Z . In fact, I t h i n k the w o r k is d i a l e c t i c a l , as n o t e d earlier: it begins w h e r e the t r . u l i t i o n . i l a p p a r e n t a n t i n o m i e s i n the debate are a n d m o v e s b e y o n d t h e m . H o w e v e r , given H e i d e g ger's a p p a r e n t A n t i - R e a l i s m , " b e y o n d " loses its H e g e l i a n , a b s o l u t i s t a n d R e a l i s t o v e r tones a n d p r e s u m a b l y comes to have the force of a W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n " d i s s o l u t i o n " of a p s e u d o - p r o b l e m . At least, I t h i n k t h a t this is a fair d e s c r i p t i o n of the r h e t o r i c a l d y n a m i c s i n v o l v e d i n c u r r e n t d i s c u s s i o n s o f A n t i - R e a l i s m . See R i c h a r d R o r t y , " H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i
c i s m of N i e t z s c h e , " 11
Daniel
Dennett,
1984
Chapel Hill Colloquium m
Brainstorms ( M o n t g o m e r y , V e r m o n t :
Philosophy. Bradford
Books,
1 9 7 8 } , espe
c i a l l y h i s f i r s r essay. "
C p . H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s ar S Z
569b
a b o u t the " d e r i v a t i v e " status of Science f r o m o u r
intercsr-relativc, " r e a d y - t o - h a n d " understanding of o u r w o r l d . For a helpful discussion o f t h i s p o s i t i o n , see J o s e p h R o u s e , " K u h n , H e i d e g g e r , a n d S c i e n t i f i c R e a l i s m , " Man and
World 14(1981): 169-90;
also G u i g n o n , o p . cit.,
5 13,
pp.
181-94.
H o w e v e r , for a m o r e
d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m o f r e a l i s t s t r a t e g i e s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f s c i e n c e g e n e r a l l y , see L a r r y Laudan,
19-49.
" A Confutation
of Convergent
Realism,"
Philosophy of Science 48 (1981):
L a u d a n , h o w e v e r , stops s h o r t o f e m b r a c i n g A n t i - R e a l i s m a n d seems c o n t e n t for
I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y AND T H E SEMANTICS O F ' D A S E I N '
133
105
s a i d to be a p r i v i l e g e d o n e . O n t h i s last n o t e , t h e n , i t w o u l d seem t h a t H e i d e g g e r o n l y appears i n i t i a l l y to be r e j e c t i n g ( H u s s e r l i a n ) C a r t e s i a n i s m in SZ as a b a d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis ( o r , " d e s c r i p t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s " ) o f o u r e m b o d i e d , practical i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . If read dialectically, however, as SZ progresses C a r t e s i a n i s m comes t o b e rejected m o r e f o r the realistic pres u p p o s i t i o n s i t shares w i t h b o t h m a t e r i a l i s t a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l strategies. T r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d , t h e n , falls f o r H e i d e g g e r because t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s - a s - r e a l i s m has f a l l e n . I t w o u l d seem t h a t o n l y w i t h such a r a d i c a l a t t a c k , t h e n , does H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f Dasein i n S Z e v e n t u a l l y address c u r r e n t w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d . A n d , i f m y a r g u m e n t is persuasive, it is n o t by a n t i c i p a t i n g in 1917 a n y e l i m i n a t i v i s t metaphysical programs currently afoot.
n o w t o p l a y the role o f sceptic a b o u t o u r ever k n o w i n g i f o u r theories adequarely " c o r r e s p o n d . " F i n a l l y , f o r a c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f s u c h v i e w s , see J a y R o s e n b e r g , o p . c i t . , a n d C . L . H a r d i n a n d A l e x a n d e r R o s e n b e r g , " I n D e f e n s e o f C o n v e r g e n t R e a l i s m , " Philosophy of Science
106
RODERICK
49
(1981):
M.
604-15.
STEWART
134
Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality*/
IN
Being
and
Time,
/ / / / BY H U B E R T L. DREYFUS
Heidegger
seeks
to
undermine
the
Cartesian t r a d i t i o n of the p r i o r i t y of knowledge over practice. A t f i r s t i t l o o k s a s i f H e i d e g g e r seeks s i m p l y t o i n v e r t t h i s t r a d i t i o n by a r g u i n g that detached c o n t e m p l a t i o n is a privative m o d i f i c a t i o n o f everyday i n v o l v e m e n t . M o r e specifically, h e s e e m s t o b e s a y i n g t h a t t h e d e t a c h e d , m e a n i n g - g i v i n g , knowing subject, still a t the center o f H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , m u s t b e r e p l a c e d b y a n i n v o l v e d , m e a n i n g - g i v i n g , doing s u b j e c t . B u t i f one simply inverts the t r a d i t i o n , one risks being m i s u n d e r stood and r e a p p r o p r i a t e d , a n d , indeed, D a g f i n n Follesdal, the best i n t e r p r e t e r o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , has b e e n l e d t o u n d e r e s t i m a t e H e i d e g g e r ' s o r i g i n a l i t y o n j u s t this p o i n t . I n a n article
on
the
role
of action
in
Husserl
and
Heidegger,
Follesdal interprets H e i d e g g e r as h o l d i n g that Husserl a n d the tradition
overemphasized
detached
contemplation,
and
he
agrees w i t h w h a t h e takes t o b e H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m that p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t v i s t h e basic w a y s u b j e c t s g i v e m e a n i n g t o o b j e c t s :
I t has c o m m o n l y been h e l d t h a t p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e w o r l d . . . H e i d e g g e r rejects this. H e r e g a r d s o u r p r a c t i c a l ways o f d e a l i n g w i t h the w o r l d a s m o r e basic t h a n the t h e o r e t i c a l . . . . T h i s idea o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h a t . . . h u m a n a c t i v i t y plays a r o l e in o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n of the w o r l d , S O C I A L R E S E A R C H , Vol. 60, No. 1 (Spring 1993)
135
S O C I A L
18
and
his
analyses
Heidegger's
main
of
how
R E S E A R C H
this
contribution
to
happens,
I
philosophy.
regard
. . .
as
1
Follesdal reports that "after he came to Freiburg in 1916 . . . Husserl clearly became more and more aware that our practical activity is an important part of our relation to the w o r l d . " He then tries to determine who deserves credit for this new interest in the phenomenology of practical activity. " I t is possible that Husserl influenced Heidegger in this 'practical' direction," he notes. "However, it is also possible," he admits, "that it was Husserl who was influenced in this direction through his discussion with the younger Heidegger." Once one sees the depth o f Heidegger's difference from Husserl on this issue, however, one sees that the question of influence is irrelevant. Much more is at stake than the relation of practice to theory. T h e real issue concerns two opposed accounts of intentionality. As used by Franz Brentano and then Husserl, "intentionality" names the fact that mental states like perceiving, believing, desiring, fearing, doubting, etc. are always about something, i.e., directed at something under some description, whether the extramental object exists or not. T h e mental property that makes this directedness possible is called the representational or intentional content of the mental state. By focusing his discussion on the primacy of the intentional content of action over the intentional content of thought, Follesdal misses Heidegger's radical claim that an account of intentionality in terms of mental content presupposes but 2
3
' Dagfinn Follesdal, "Husserl and Heidegger on ihe Role of Actions in the Constitution o f the W o r l d , " i n Essays m Honour of Jaakko Hmlikka, ed. E. Saarinen et al., (Dordrecht, H o l l a n d : D. Reidel, 1979), p. 3 7 1 . A similar trivializing reduction of Heidegger's work to a practical variation on Husserl's is assumed by M a r k O k r e n t : "[A]s as soon as one realizes that, for Heidegger, intentionality is always practical rather than cognitive and that the p r i m a r y f o r m of intending is d o i n g something for a purpose rather than being conscious of something, the structural analogies between the a r g u m e n t strategies of Husserl and Heidegger become apparent" ( M a r k O k r e n t , Heidegger's Pragmatism [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988], p. 10). 2
:1
Follesdal, Ibid.,
p.
"Husserl and Heidegger," 372. 376.
136
H E I D E G G E R S
19
C R I T I Q U E
overlooks a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l sort o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y — a k i n d o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y that does n o t i n v o l v e i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t at all. Heidegger primary;
does he
not
merely
claim
that
practical
activity
is
w a n t s t o s h o w t h a t neither p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y nor
contemplative
knowing
can
be
understood
as
a
relation
b e t w e e n a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t s u b j e c t w i t h its i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t a n d an i n d e p e n d e n t object. What
Follesdal
traditional
assumes
and
representational
Heidegger
view
of
opposes
practice.
To
is
the
this
day
philosophers such a s J o h n Searle a n d D o n a l d D a v i d s o n , w h o d o n o t a g r e e o n m u c h else, a g r e e t h a t a c t i o n m u s t b e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f m e n t a l states w i t h i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t . H e i d e g g e r ' s attempt to break o u t of the philosophical t r a d i t i o n is focused in his a t t e m p t t o get b e y o n d t h e subject/object d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t such
views
essential
presuppose.
intention
is
In a to
lecture
first
pose
in
1929
the
h e says,
problem
"My
[of
the
subject/object r e l a t i o n ] a n d w o r k it o u t in such a way that t h e e s s e n t i a l s o f t h e e n t i r e W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n w i l l be c o n c e n t r a t e d 4
i n t h e s i m p l i c i t y o f a basic p r o b l e m . " T h e basic p r o b l e m i s n o t w h i c h k i n d o f intentionality—theoretical o r practical—is m o r e fundamental, b u t what sort o f experience makes b o t h kinds o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y possible. Husserl
defined
phenomenology
as
the
study
of
the
intentional content r e m a i n i n g in the m i n d after the bracketing o f t h e w o r l d , i.e., a f t e r t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n . J e r r y F o d o r calls s u c h a n a p p r o a c h solipsism."
Heidegger
to the m i n d
opposes
the
"methodological
claim
underlying
this
m e t h o d —the c l a i m that a person's relation to the w o r l d a n d the things in it m u s t always be m e d i a t e d by i n t e n t i o n a l content, so that o n e c a n p e r f o r m a r e d u c t i o n that separates t h e m i n d a n d its c o n t e n t f r o m t h e w o r l d . A s h e p u t s i t : T h e usual conception o f intentionality . . . misconstrues the struc-
* M a n i n Heidegger, The Metaphysical University Press, 1984), p. 132.
Foundation
137
of Logic
(Bloomington:
Indiana
S O C I A L
20
tu re
of
the
R E S E A R C H
self-directedness-loward,
the
intention.
This
misin-
t e r p r e t a t i o n lies in an erroneous subjectivizing of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . . . . T h e idea of a subject w h i c h has i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . capsulated
within
itself is
an
absurdity
which
.
. en-
misconstrues
the
basic o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e b e i n g t h a t w e o u r s e l v e s a r e .
5
T h i s makes H e i d e g g e r s o u n d like what w o u l d n o w be called an e x t e r n a l i s t . I t i s a s i f h e w e r e c l a i m i n g t h a t m e n t a l states g e t t h e i r intentional content by way of some connection w i t h the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . B u t a s w e s h a l l see, H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w i s m o r e radical. He wants to introduce a k i n d of intentionality that avoids the n o t i o n of mental content altogether. Before
we
can
fully
appreciate
Heidegger's
project
and
d e c i d e w h e t h e r he succeeds, we have to s h a r p e n as m u c h as possible the intentionalistic t h e o r y o f m i n d h e opposes. Just h o w is the subject/object d i s t i n c t i o n supposed to be b u i l t i n t o all ways o f r e l a t i n g t o the w o r l d w h e t h e r they b e k n o w i n g o r acting? Since H e i d e g g e r focuses on a c t i o n as the area in w h i c h i t i s easiest
t o see
that o u r experience
need
not
involve
a
m i n d / w o r l d split, I too will concentrate o n action. B u t since Husserl never w o r k e d o u t a theory o f action, I will t u r n to the w o r k o f J o h n Searle, w h o d e f e n d s a n intentionalist account o f action o f the sort H e i d e g g e r opposes. I will therefore
first
spell
o u t Searle's f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e w a y t h e m i n d / w o r l d s p l i t i s supposedly
built
into
the
experience
of acting,
and
then
present Heidegger's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l critique. ( W h e r e Searle agrees w i t h D o n a l d D a v i d s o n I w i l l also r e m i n d t h e r e a d e r o f Davidson's view.) It is generally agreed
that o u r commonsense concepts of
p e r c e p t i o n a n d action are causal concepts. Paul Grice s h o w e d that
our
concept
of
perception
is
that
of
a
perceptual
experience caused in the r i g h t way by the object p e r c e i v e d .
6
In
"' M a r t i n Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology' ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 0 3 - 6 4 . " Paul Grice, " T h e Causal T h e o r y o f Perception," in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. Robert Swartz (New Y o r k : A n c h o r Books, 1905).
138
H E I D E G G E R S
21
C R I T I Q U E
t h e p a r a l l e l case o f a c t i n g , S e a r l e a n d D a v i d s o n a r g u e t h a t o u r c o n c e p t of an action is likewise causal. An action is a b o d i l y m o v e m e n t w h i c h is u n d e r s t o o d as h a v i n g been caused in the r i g h t way by something mental. movement
to c o u n t as caused
Davidson thinks that,
in
the
r i g h t way,
it
for a
must be
i n t e r p r e t e d a s c a u s e d b y b r a i n states t o k e n i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e beliefs
and
desires
that
count
as
reasons
for
the
action.
D a v i d s o n gives a n a c c o u n t t h a t r e q u i r e s a t t r i b u t i n g s o m e t h i n g like a
prior intention.
actions
can
be
Searle denies
spontaneous,
but
this
requirement,
suggests
that
two
since other
conditions must be met before a b o d i l y m o t i o n qualifies as an action.
First,
a
representation
of the
goal of the action
must
exist t h r o u g h o u t the m o t i o n a n d m u s t play a c o n t i n u i n g causal role
in
shaping
representation
the
of
the
action. goal
Searle
the
calls
this
"intention
in
continuing
action,"
thus
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g it f r o m the " p r i o r i n t e n t i o n " w h i c h corresponds to the initial representation of the goal of the action p r i o r to the
initiation
subject
of
must
intention
in
motion.
Second,
Searle
maintains
that
the
between
the
experience
the
causal
connection
action
the
bodily
movement continuously.
and
I n d e e d , a c c o r d i n g t o Searle, the e x p e r i e n c e o f a c t i n g i s j u s t the experience
of
the
bodily
movement
being
caused
by
the
intention in action. N o t e that i n his account o f a c t i o n , a s elsewhere i n his a c c o u n t of
intentionality,
logical
Searle
conditions
standard
analysis
and
attempts
a
unique
phenomenological
of action
is
"bodily
integration
description.
motion
caused
of The
by
a
reason." Searle i n c o r p o r a t e s a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a n a l o g of this analysis
into
his
account
of action
by
maintaining
that
the
experience of an action must include a direct experience of the causal r e l a t i o n between the i n t e n t i o n i n action a n d the b o d i l y motion. intention
He
argues
that
in
action
are
both
the
causally
prior
intention
self-referential.
and
They
the both
i n c l u d e in their conditions of satisfaction the r e q u i r e m e n t that the
intention
to
bring about
a
goal
139
cause
the
goal-directed
22
S O C I A L
R E S E A R C H
action. T h u s an action is a b o d i l y m o v e m e n t experienced as caused by my i n t e n t i o n to p e r f o r m it. In
his
attempt
to
overthrow
the
subject/object
account,
H e i d e g g e r seeks t o s h o w ( 1 ) t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y w i t h o u t t h e experience of self-referential content is characteristic of the u n i m p e d e d m o d e of everyday activity, whereas Husserl's (and Searle's)
mentalistic i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is a d e r i v a t i v e m o d e that
occurs o n l y w h e n t h e r e i s so m e d i s t u r b a n c e , a n d (2) that b o t h these m o d e s of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y p r e s u p p o s e b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l f o r m o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y t h a t H e i d e g g e r calls o r i g i n a r y transcendence, and that he claims is the c o n d i t i o n of the possibility o f b o t h active a n d c o n t e m p l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . I n h i s l e c t u r e c o u r s e t h e y e a r Being and Time w a s p u b l i s h e d , h e refers to this double
task ( w h e n
he speaks of Dasein
he is
speaking o f h u m a n beings): T h e task o f b r i n g i n g t o l i g h t Dasein's e x i s t e n t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n leads f i r s t o f all t o t h e t w o f o l d task, i n t r i n s i c a l l y o n e , o f i n t e r p r e t i n g m o r e radically the p h e n o m e n a o f intentionality and t r a n s c e n d e n c e . W i t h this task . . . w e r u n u p against a c e n t r a l p r o b l e m t h a t has r e m a i n e d u n k n o w n t o a l l p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h y . I t w i l l t u r n o u t t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is f o u n d e d i n Dasein's t r a n s c e n d e n c e a n d is possible solely f o r this reason — t h a t transcendence cannot conversely be e x p l a i n e d in terms of intentionality. 7
Heidegger's
Account
of
Primordial
Intentionality
I n u s i n g S e a r l e ' s a c c o u n t as a s t a n d - i n f o r H u s s e r l ' s , I w i l l h i g h l i g h t t w o aspects o f Searle's v i e w t h a t H u s s e r l p r e s u m a b l y w o u l d have shared, b o t h of w h i c h
H e i d e g g e r rejects.
8
Searle
points out that the experience of acting is phenomenologically
7
Heidegger, Basic Problem of Phenomenology, p. 162. T h i s is not to say that Searle was influenced by Husserl, nor that their accounts of the intentionality of perception and action are identical. Searle's account of the logical role of causality and thus of the necessary self-refereniiality of the intentional content of the experience involved in perception and action is not f o u n d in Husserl. 8
140
H E I D E G G E R ' S
23
C R I T I Q U E
distinguishable f r o m the experience of being acted u p o n . I can have
the
experience
of acting
even
if
I
am
deluded —for
e x a m p l e , p a r a l y z e d — a n d the b o d i l y m o v e m e n t I take it I am c a u s i n g is in fact n o t t a k i n g place. Conversely, if electrodes are a p p l i e d to my b r a i n , my b o d y can be caused to m o v e w i t h o u t m y h a v i n g a n experience o f acting. I t follows f r o m the above considerations that the experience of acting a n d the b o d i l y m o v e m e n t i t causes b e l o n g t o t w o t o t a l l y separate d o m a i n s . T h u s , a c c o r d i n g t o Searle, the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m i n d a n d w o r l d , w h a t H u s s e r l a n d H e i d e g g e r w o u l d call the distinction between subject a n d object, is b u i l t d i r e c t l y i n t o the logic of acting:
[J]ust
as
the
components, and
the
an
case
of
seeing
Intentional
conditions
of
the
table
component
satisfaction
involves (the
of
visual
that
two
related
experience)
component
(the
p r e s e n c e a n d f e a t u r e s o f t h e table), s o t h e act o f r a i s i n g m y a r m involves
two
components,
experience
of acting)
component
(the
and
movement
an
the
Intentional
conditions
of my
arm).
component
o f satisfaction
(the
of that
9
H e i d e g g e r questions p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l claims of the sort that a c c o m p a n y Searle's
analysis o f the
logic of perception
and
a c t i o n . H e d e n i e s first t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f a c t i n g m u s t b e a n experience
of
my
causing
e x p e r i e n c e of a c t i n g m u s t the action.
the
action,
and
second
that
represent the conditions o f satisfaction
the of
1 0
Searle begins his account o f intentions i n a c t i o n b y p o i n t i n g o u t that w e always seem t o k n o w d u r i n g a n a c t i o n that w e are
9
J o h n Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 88. Searle could give up his phenomenological claims and stick to the logical conditions of perception and action, viz., [hat thev both must in some way be able to succeed or fail, and that action must be something we do, not what is done to us (and perception vice versa). B u t as long as he accepts the causal theory, he accepts the existence of the terms between which the causal relation holds, viz., physical events and mental experiences, and it is ultimately this ontology that Heidegger is challenging. 10
141
24
S O C I A L
R E S E A R C H
a c t i n g — a t least i n t h e s e n s e t h a t w e e x p e r i e n c e o u r s e l v e s a s t h e source of o u r activity about.
rather than
a s b e i n g passively
Heidegger w o u l d agree, b u t he w o u l d
only
in
deliberate
experience
action
o f one's
is
the
intention
experience
in
action
moved
point out that of
acting
c a u s i n g one's
an
move-
ment. In everyday absorbed c o p i n g , the experience of acting is instead the experience of a steady flow of skillful activity in response
t o one's
sense
of the
environment.
Part
of that
e x p e r i e n c e i s a sense t h a t w h e n o n e ' s s i t u a t i o n d e v i a t e s f r o m some
optimal
body/environment
relationship,
one's
motion
takes o n e closer t o that o p t i m a l f o r m a n d t h e r e b y relieves t h e "tension" of the deviation. As M a u r i c e Merleau-Ponty w o u l d p u t i t , one's b o d y i s s o l i c i t e d b y t h e s i t u a t i o n t o get i n t o t h e r i g h t relation to it. W h e n everyday coping is going well, one experiences s o m e t h i n g l i k e w h a t athletes call f l o w , o r p l a y i n g o u t of t h e i r heads. One's activity is c o m p l e t e l y geared i n t o the demands
of
the
situation.
One
does
not
distinguish
one's
experience o f acting f r o m one's o n g o i n g activity, a n d t h e r e f o r e one
has
no
self-referential
experience
of oneself as
causing
that activity. Aron
Gurwitsch,
a
student
of Husserl's,
yet
a
perceptive
r e a d e r of H e i d e g g e r , gives,
in
h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Being and
Time,
of
this
an
excellent
account
nonself-referential,
[Wjhat
is
nonintentionalistic,
i.e.,
awareness:
imposed
on
us
to
do
is
not
determined
by
us
as
someone standing outside the situation simply looking on at it; what
occurs
situation
and
and
is
imposed
its o w n
are
structure;
rather
and
we do
prescribed more and
by
the
greater
j u s t i c e t o i t t h e m o r e w e l e t o u r s e l v e s b e g u i d e d b y i t , i . e . , t h e less reserved we are in i m m e r s i n g ourselves in it a n d s u b o r d i n a t i n g ourselves
to
interwoven into it.
1 1
Aron
University
it. with
We it,
find
ourselves
encompassed
in
by it,
a
situation
and
are
indeed just "absorbed"
1 1
Gurwitsch, Press,
1979),
Human p.
Encounters
in
the
67.
142
Social
World
(Pittsburgh:
Duquesne
To
get
the
H E I D E G G E R ' S
C R I T I Q U E
phenomenon
focus,
Merleau-Pontyan Merleau-Ponty Heidegger's
example
such
attended
account
of
in
as
a
25
w e »can tennis
Gurwitsch's
consider
swing.
lectures
comportment
in
a
(Since
explaining
terms
of
gestalt
perception, there may well be a direct line of influence here.) If o n e is a b e g i n n e r or is o f f one's f o r m , one m i g h t find oneself m a k i n g a n e f f o r t t o keep one's eye o n the ball, keep t h e racket p e r p e n d i c u l a r t o t h e c o u r t , h i t t h e b a l l s q u a r e l y , etc. B u t i f o n e is expert at the game a n d
things are g o i n g well,
what
is
e x p e r i e n c e d i s m o r e l i k e o n e ' s a r m g o i n g u p a n d its b e i n g d r a w n to the a p p r o p r i a t e position, the racket f o r m i n g the appropriate angle w i t h the c o u r t — a n angle we need not even be a w a r e o f — a l l this so as to c o m p l e t e the gestalt m a d e up of t h e c o u r t , one's r u n n i n g o p p o n e n t , a n d the o n c o m i n g ball. The
phenomenon,
then,
t a x o n o m y as p r e s e n t e d
in
requires
us
to
modify
h i s b o o k , Intentionality.
12
Searle's
Action d o e s ,
as Searle claims, have a w o r l d - t o - m i n d d i r e c t i o n of fit—our actions b r i n g the w o r l d into line w i t h what w e w o u l d want i f w e thought
about
it—but,
experience
of acting
has
contrary
a
to
world-to-mind
Searle's
direction
account, of
the
causation
also. W e e x p e r i e n c e t h e s i t u a t i o n a s d r a w i n g t h e a c t i o n o u t o f us. Searle applies to p e r c e p t i o n t h e same analysis he applies to a c t i o n . H i s e x a m p l e is seeing a f l o w e r : The
seeing consists o f t w o c o m p o n e n t s ,
and
the
flower,
where
the
presence
f l o w e r cause t h e visual e x p e r i e n c e a n d the
presence
and
features
c o n d i t i o n s of satisfaction.
of
the
the
visual
of (and
experience
features
of)
the
t h e v i s u a l e x p e r i e n c e has
flower
as
the
rest
of
its
T h e c o n t e n t of the visual experience is
t h a t t h e r e i s a f l o w e r t h e r e a n d i t i s s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i n t h e sense that,
unless
the
fact
that
there
is
a
flower
there
causes
e x p e r i e n c e , t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n d o n o t o b t a i n , i.e., not
actually
flower.'
I J
1:1
Searle,
see
that
there
is
a
flower
3
Intrntionalitx,
p.
95.
Ibid.
143
there,
n o r do
I
see
this I do the
S O C I A L
26
R E S E A R C H
B u t j u s t as s k i l l f u l a b s o r p t i o n does n o t i n v o l v e an e x p e r i e n c e o f a c t i n g separate f r o m a n a c t i o n t h a t i t causes, s o p e r c e p t i o n does n o t i n v o l v e a subjective visual experience separate f r o m a n d c a u s e d b y its o b j e c t . A n o n m e n t a l i s t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f perception
that
parallels
Heidegger's
phenomenology
of
a b s o r b e d a c t i o n i s f o u n d i n M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s Phenomenology
of
Perception.
There
Merleau-Ponty
describes
the
experience of perceiving as the experience of o u r openness to the
world:
The
child
lives
in
a
world
which
he
unhesitatingly
believes
is
accessible t o all a r o u n d h i m . H e has n o awareness o f h i m s e l f o r of others as private subjectivities. . . heads
turned
towards
e v e r y t h i n g takes place. unsophisticated
. F o r h i m m e n are e m p t y
one
single,
. . .
I t m u s t b e t h e case
thinking
of our
self-evident
earliest
years
world .
.
where
. that the
remains
as
an
indispensable acquisition u n d e r l y i n g that of maturity, if there is to be f o r the adult one single intersubjective w o r l d .
1 4
W h i l e t h e i m a g e o f a n e m p t y h e a d gets a t t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g ical t r u t h of direct realism, it is m i s l e a d i n g in a n o t h e r respect. In
perception
we
do
not
experience
ourselves
as
passive
receivers. By t u r n i n g my attention to s o m e t h i n g I experience myself as enabling it to show up. Moreover, I can z o o m in on it a n d reveal it in greater a n d greater detail. In the activity of l o o k i n g I f e e l I a m r e s p o n s i b l e f o r w h a t I see. T h u s looking a s experienced h a s a m i n d - t o - w o r l d d i r e c t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n . Common person
and
sense a
an
unstable
mixture
of a first-
third-person—an
maintains
internal
and
external-
account of p e r c e p t i o n a n d action. or
is
caused
ontologically
by
something
unstable
idea
in
is
an
A private e x p e r i e n c e c a u s e s the
public
expressed
world.
in
our
This
everyday
concepts of perception a n d action. T h e r e t h e n seem to be t w o possible positions for m a k i n g the concepts consistent. D a v i d s o n accepts
objective
causation
of b r a i n
u
states
M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Phenomenology of Perception ( L o n d o n : P a u l , 1979), p. 3 5 5 .
144
in
the
case
of
Routledge & Kegan
H E I D E G G E R ' S
27
C R I T I Q U E
p e r c e p t i o n a n d b y b r a i n states i n t h e case o f a c t i o n , a n d t r e a t s the first-person e x p e r i e n c e as a m a t t e r of a t t r i b u t i o n . Searle starts
from
the
first-person
experience
and
builds
the
t h i r d - p e r s o n causal account i n t o the i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f the experience.
Thus
Merleau-Ponty and
both
speaks
are
led
of "the
to
distort
prejudice
the
phenomena.
of c o m m o n
sense,"
Heidegger warns:
The
most
dangerous
and
stubborn
prejudices
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of intentionality are
not the
form
of philosophical
the
from
the
natural
theories
apprehension
but and
relative
to
explicit ones
in
implicit
ones
interpretation
that
the the arise
of things
by
. . . e v e r y d a y " g o o d sense." T h e s e l a t t e r m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e exactly
the
ones
that
are
least
noticeable
and
hardest
to
1
repulse. '
Phenomenology
rejects
common
sense
in
the
name
of the
phenomena of everyday involved perception and action. H e i d e g g e r ' s s e c o n d p o i n t a m o u n t s t o a r e j e c t i o n o f Searle's claim that the intentional content of the experience of acting is a representation of the action's c o n d i t i o n s of satisfaction, viz., a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f m y b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e state o f a f f a i r s I a m t r y i n g to achieve. B u t p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n shows that in a wide variety of situations h u m a n beings relate to the w o r l d in an organized purposive manner w i t h o u t the constant accompaniment what
the
of
action
a
is
representational aimed
at
state
which
accomplishing.
specifies
Examples
are
skillful activity like playing tennis; habitual activity like d r i v i n g t o t h e o f f i c e o r b r u s h i n g one's t e e t h ; casual u n t h i n k i n g activity like
rolling over
speaking;
and
in
bed
spontaneous
or
m a k i n g gestures activity
such
as
while one fidgeting
is
and
d r u m m i n g o n e ' s f i n g e r s d u r i n g a d u l l l e c t u r e . I n a l l t h e s e cases of action it is possible to be w i t h o u t any representation of what one is d o i n g as one p e r f o r m s the action. I n d e e d , at times one is actually surprised w h e n the action is accomplished, as w h e n
u
Heidegger. Basic Problems, p. 59.
145
S O C I A L
28
R E S E A R C H
one's t h o u g h t s are i n t e r r u p t e d by one's a r r i v a l at the office. We should t r y to impress on ourselves w h a t a h u g e a m o u n t of o u r lives — w o r k i n g , g e t t i n g a r o u n d , t a l k i n g , e a t i n g , d r i v i n g , e t c . —is s p e n t i n t h i s i m m e d i a t e c o p i n g m o d e , a n d w h a t a s m a l l p a r t is spent in the deliberate, p u r p o s e f u l , subject/object m o d e , w h i c h is. o f c o u r s e , t h e m o d e w e t e n d t o n o t i c e , a n d w h i c h h a s therefore
formed
our
commonsense
concepts
and
been
studied in detail by philosophers. From recent
Aristotle's accounts
discussion
of action
of the
such
as
practical
Davidson's,
svllogism
to
philosophers
have held that we must e x p l a i n action as caused by the attempt to achieve some goal. A c c o r d i n g to Searle, e v e n w h e n t h e r e is n o p r i o r setting o f a goal, a s w h e n I j u m p u p a n d pace a b o u t the r o o m , I must have in m i n d what I am d o i n g . A c c o r d i n g to H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , s k i l l f u l c o p i n g does n o t r e q u i r e a m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f its g o a l a t a l l . I t c a n b e purposive w i t h o u t t h e a g e n t e n t e r t a i n i n g a purpose. player
Larry
Bird's
Heidegger w o u l d like basketball
description
of
the
experience
c o m p l e x p u r p o s i v e act o f passing the ball i n
of
the
the midst of a
game: [ A lot o f t h e ] t h i n g s I d o o n t h e c o u r t are j u s t reactions t o s i t u a t i o n s . . . . A l o t o f t i m e s , I've passed t h e b a s k e t b a l l a n d n o t r e a l i z e d I've passed it u n t i l a m o m e n t or so later."* We
can
return
to
Merleau-Ponty's
account
of action
to
u n d e r s t a n d this experience. R e m e m b e r the gestalt account o f the experience of an expert tennis stroke.
If one is expert at
tennis a n d things are g o i n g w e l l , w h a t is e x p e r i e n c e d is one's a r m g o i n g u p a n d its b e i n g d r a w n t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o s i t i o n so
as
to complete
the gestalt
made
up
of the
court,
one's
r u n n i n g o p p o n e n t , a n d the o n c o m i n g ball. W e not o n l y feel t h a t o u r m o t i o n was caused b y t h e p e r c e i v e d c o n d i t i o n s , b u t also t h a t it was caused in s u c h a w a y t h a t it is c o n s t r a i n e d to
" ' Q u e u e d i n L . D . L e v i n e , Bird: McGraw
Hill,
The Making o f a n American Sports Legend ( N e w Y o r k :
1988).
146
H E I D E G G E R S
29
C R I T I Q U E
r e d u c e a sense o f d e v i a t i o n f r o m s o m e s a t i s f a c t o r y g e s t a l t . N o w we* c a n a d d
t h a t the nature of that satisfactoiy gestalt is in no way
represented. To
help convince
us
that the
representation
of the
final
gestalt need play n o role i n a c h i e v i n g the result, M e r l e a u - P o n t y uses
the analogy of a
soap
bubble.
T h e b u b b l e starts
as
a
d e f o r m e d f i l m . T h e bits o f soap j u s t r e s p o n d to local forces a c c o r d i n g to laws w h i c h h a p p e n to w o r k so as to dispose t h e e n t i r e system to e n d up as a sphere, but the spherical result does not play a causal r o l e in p r o d u c i n g the b u b b l e . T h e same h o l d s f o r the f i n a l gestalt o f b o d y a n d racket ( a l t h o u g h , u n l i k e t h e b u b b l e , t h e a c t o r h a s a sense t h a t h e i s c o o p e r a t i n g i n t h e movement
and
could
stop
it
at
will).
Indeed,
I
cannot
r e p r e s e n t h o w I a m t u r n i n g m y r a c k e t since I d o n o t k n o w w h a t I do w h e n I r e t u r n the ball. I may once have been t o l d to h o l d mv racket p e r p e n d i c u l a r to the court, a n d I may have s u c c e e d e d i n d o i n g so, b u t n o w e x p e r i e n c e h a s s c u l p t e d
my
s w i n g to the situation in a far m o r e subtle a n d a p p r o p r i a t e w a y t h a n I c o u l d have achieved as a b e g i n n e r f o l l o w i n g this r u l e . A n e v e n m o r e s t r i k i n g case, w h e r e t h e g o a l t h e b o d y i s t o a c h i e v e is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a c t o r as s o m e t h i n g t o a i m at, w i l l m a k e the p o i n t clear. I n s t r u c t o r pilots teach b e g i n n i n g pilots a rule
for
determining
the
order
in
which
to
scan
their
instruments —a rule the instructor pilots were taught and, as f a r a s t h e y k n o w , s t i l l use. A t o n e p o i n t , h o w e v e r , A i r F o r c e psychologists
studied
the
eye
movements
of the
instructors
d u r i n g simulated flight a n d f o u n d , to everyone's surprise, that the instructor pilots were not f o l l o w i n g the rule they were t e a c h i n g ; i n fact, t h e i r eye m o v e m e n t s v a r i e d f r o m s i t u a t i o n t o . situation
and did
n o t seem
to
follow any
rule at all.
The
instructor pilots h a d no idea of the way they were scanning their
instruments
and
so
could
not
have
represented
to
themselves what they were d o i n g . Searle's r e s p o n s e t o s u c h o b j e c t i o n s i s t h a t o n l y t h e b r o a d e r action of w i n n i n g a tennis point or f i n d i n g out h o w e v e r y t h i n g is g o i n g bv scanning the i n s t r u m e n t s is i n t e n t i o n a l , a n d it is this
147
S O C I A L
30
goal
that
is
represented
in
R E S E A R C H
the
intentional
content
of the
i n t e n t i o n in action. Searle points o u t that an e x p e r t skier does n o t have to f o r m a separate i n t e n t i o n to shift his w e i g h t f r o m one ski to the other or to execute each t u r n . He just intends to ski
down
the
mountain.
This
is
a
safe
response
since
the
i n t e n t i o n a l i s t can, i n d e e d , always f i n d a level at w h i c h the actor is t r y i n g to achieve s o m e t h i n g , a n d the experience of acting can be d e f i n e d as the experience of causing my body to b r i n g about that end. T h e r e is no d o u b t s o m e t h i n g r i g h t about this response, b u t s o m e t h i n g t r o u b l i n g about it too. T h e tennis plaver m i g h t well b e t r y i n g t o w i n a p o i n t , b u t w h a t h e o r she i s d o i n g seems t o b e m u c h m o r e fine-grained. For example, expert tennis players l e a r n to rush the net a n d slam the ball b e h i n d t h e i r o p p o n e n t , a n d go on d o i n g so w h e t h e r they are aware of d o i n g so or not. O f c o u r s e , a s Searle p o i n t s o u t , t h e y a r e also w i n n i n g a p o i n t , w i n n i n g t h e set, g e t t i n g e x e r c i s e , m o v i n g a i r m o l e c u l e s , u s i n g e n e r g y , etc. H o w d o w e d e t e r m i n e w h a t t h e y a r e r e a l l y d o i n g ? Searle has a n a n s w e r w h i c h seems r i g h t : A s k t h e a g e n t .
He
argues that there m u s t b e goal-awareness i n action, since, i f one
is
stopped
and
questioned
even
while
acting
in
a
n o n d e l i b e r a t e w a y , o n e c a n say w h a t o n e i s d o i n g . T h i s , S e a r l e concludes,
shows
that
even
in
nondeliberate
activity
our
m o v e m e n t s are b e i n g g u i d e d by a self-referential i n t e n t i o n in action w h i c h represents o u r goal. B u t the agent in o u r tennis e x a m p l e m i g h t w e l l j u s t say i f a s k e d t h a t h e w a s p l a y i n g t e n n i s . W e c o u l d , o f course, t h e n restate o u r question, insisting that h e t e l l u s w h a t h e w a s d o i n g right then. B u t t h e n h e m i g h t a n s w e r h e w a s t r y i n g t o w i n a p o i n t , o r h e m i g h t e q u a l l y w e l l say t h a t h e w a s r u s h i n g t h e n e t , o r , l i k e L a r r y B i r d , h e m i g h t say h e w a s s o a b s o r b e d h e does n o t k n o w w h a t h e was d o i n g . T h e p o i n t i s t h a t i f w e a r e t o t r u s t w h a t t h e a g e n t says h e i s d o i n g , a s S e a r l e says w e s h o u l d , w h a t t h e a g e n t i s d o i n g n e e d n o t b e t h e s a m e a s the conscious i n t e n t i o n that initiated the flow of activity. So it seems w e have n o reason t o d e n y t h a t these are u n i t s o f a c t i v i t y
148
H E I D E G G E R ' S
C R I T I Q U E
31
that count as w h a t the agent is d o i n g but whose conditions of satisfaction are n o t represented
by the agent.
H e i d e g g e r has a n a l t e r n a t i v e a c c o u n t o f o u r a b i l i t y
t o say
w h a t w e are d o i n g , n o t based o n the i n s p e c t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a l m e n t a l state. C o m p o r t m e n t i s n o t s i m p l y a n u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d flow.
O n e can
recognizable
m a k e sense o f i t a s
having a direction
chunks—"toward-whichs"
is
Heidegger's
and
nonin-
t e n t i o n a l i s t i c t e r m f o r these e n d - p o i n t s w e use i n m a k i n g sense of a f l o w of d i r e c t e d activity. F o r e x a m p l e , I leave h o m e , d r i v e to w o r k , park, enter my office b u i l d i n g , o p e n my office door, enter my office,
sit d o w n
at
m y desk,
and
begin
working.
These are all action segments d e f i n e d by t h e i r t o w a r d - w h i c h s . We
thus
make
sense
of our
own
comportment,
and
the
c o m p o r t m e n t of others in terms of a directedness t o w a r d the sort o f l o n g - r a n g e a n d p r o x i m a l ends that are sometimes o u r e x p l i c i t goals. T h a t i s w h y , i f asked w h a t w e o r others are i n the process
of d o i n g ,
we
always
have
an
answer.
But
this
fact
should
not mislead us into postulating mental intentions in
a c t i o n . T h e r e i s n o e v i d e n c e t h a t o u r s h a r e d social segmentation of flows of activity into intelligible subunits is in the m i n d o f the p e r s o n w h o i s absorbed i n the activity. H e i d e g g e r notes explicitly that it is a mistake to t h i n k of the t o w a r d - w h i c h as the goal o f t h e a c t i v i t y , i . e . , a s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s a t i s f a c t i o n t h e a c t o r has i n m i n d : " T h e a w a i t i n g o f t h e ' t o w a r d s - w h i c h ' i s n e i t h e r a considering o f the 'goal' n o r a n expectation o f the i m p e n d i n g finishing of the w o r k to be p r o d u c e d . "
1 7
T h e p h e n o m e n o n of purposive action w i t h o u t a purpose is n o t l i m i t e d to b o d i l y activity. I t occurs i n a l l areas o f s k i l l f u l coping,
including
intellectual
coping.
Many
instances
of
apparently c o m p l e x p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g w h i c h seem to i m p l e m e n t a l o n g - r a n g e s t r a t e g y , as,
for example,
a
masterful
m o v e in
chess, m a y b e b e s t u n d e r s t o o d a s d i r e c t r e s p o n s e s t o f a m i l i a r p e r c e p t u a l gestalts. A f t e r years o f s e e i n g chess g a m e s u n f o l d , a
1
'
Martin
Heidegger.
Being and Time ( N e w Y o r k :
149
Harper
Sc
Row.
1962),
p.
405.
32
S O C I A L
R E S E A R C H
chess g r a n d m a s t e r c a n , s i m p l y b y r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e p a t t e r n s o n t h e c h e s s b o a r d , p l a y m a s t e r - l e v e l chess w h i l e h i s d e l i b e r a t e , analytic m i n d is absorbed in s o m e t h i n g else.
1 8
Such play, based
as it is on previous attention to thousands of actual a n d book games, incorporates a t r a d i t i o n w h i c h determines the a p p r o p r i a t e response to each s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e r e f o r e makes possible long-range,
strategic,
purposive
play
without
the 1
n e e d i n g to have in m i n d any p l a n or purpose at all. '
player
1
Notice that e x p l a i n i n g Heidegger's objections to Husserl a n d Searle
I
Heidegger
have
had
might
to
well
speak grant
of
activity
Husserl
rather
and
than
Searle
action.
that
their
intentionalistic account reflects o u r c o m m o n s e n s e concept o f action.
He is not, however, t r y i n g to explicate o u r c o m m o n -
sense c o n c e p t , b u t t o m a k e a p l a c e f o r a s o r t o f a c t i v i t y t h a t has been overlooked philosophical
b o t h b y c o m m o n sense a n d a fortiori b y
tradition.
Indeed,
Heidegger
holds
that
the the
c o m m o n s e n s e c o n c e p t o f a c t i o n c o v e r s u p o u r m o s t basic m o d e o f i n v o l v e m e n t i n the w o r l d . H e t h e r e f o r e i n t r o d u c e s his o w n t e r m , Verhalten, t r a n s l a t e d " c o m p o r t m e n t , " f o r t h e w a y h u m a n b e i n g s n o r m a l l y c o p e . H e i d e g g e r uses " c o m p o r t m e n t " t o r e f e r to o u r directed mentalistic
activity,
overtones.
precisely because
But
he
claims
the
that
term
has
no
comportment,
nonetheless, exhibits intentionality. H u s s e r l i a n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is o f t e n called "aboutness," because m e n t a l c o n t e n t i s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n object u n d e r a n aspect. H e i d e g g e r ' s m o r e p r i m o r d i a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s also a p p r o p r i a t e l y c a l l e d a b o u t n e s s , b u t i n t h i s case i t i s n o t t h e mind w h i c h i s t h i n k i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , b u t t h e embodied person g o i n g a b o u t
1 8
For a full discussion o f this p h e n o m e n o n , see H . Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine (New Y o r k : Free Press, 1988). * Pierre B o u r d i e u , influenced as he is by Merleau-Ponty, lias seen the same p h e n o m e n o n : "The conditionings associated w i t h a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, s t r u c t u r e d structures predisposed to function as s t r u c t u r i n g structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends" (Pierre B o u r d i e u , The Logic of Practice [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 8 0 ] , p. 5 3 ; my italics). ,!
150
H E I D E G G E R ' S
his
or
her
business.
This
C R I T I Q U E
active
aboutness,
33
like
the
kind
d e s c r i b e d b y H u s s e r l , i s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h i n g s u n d e r aspects. I c a n be t r a n s p a r e n t l y c o p i n g in s u c h a w a y as to use my d e s k i n o r d e r t o w r i t e o n , o r t o r e a d at, o r t o k e e p t h i n g s i n . T h u s , d e p e n d i n g o n w h a t I a m a b o u t , i.e. u p o n t h e " t o w a r d - w h i c h " of my activity, Heidegger
I
can
r e v e a l t h e d e s k u n d e r d i f f e r e n t aspects. S o say:
"Comportments
have
the
structure
of
d i r e c t i n g - o n e s e l f - t o w a r d , of b e i n g - d i r e c t e d - t o w a r d . . . . [ P ] h e n o m e n o l o g y c a l l s t h i s s t r u c t u r e intentionality."
20
B u t , as we have
s e e n , f o r H e i d e g g e r " c o m p o r t m e n t " d e n o t e s n o t m e r e l y acts o f consciousness, b u t h u m a n activity i n general. T h u s , i n t e n t i o n ality is a t t r i b u t e d n o t to consciousness b u t to Dasein: Because
the
usual
separation
between
a
subject
with
its
i m m a n e n t s p h e r e a n d a n o b j e c t w i t h its t r a n s c e n d e n t s p h e r e — because,
in
general,
the
distinction
between
an
inner and
an
o u t e r is c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d c o n t i n u a l l y gives occasion f o r f u r t h e r constructions, we shall in the f u t u r e no l o n g e r speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, b u t shall u n d e r s t a n d the b e i n g to w h o m i n t e n t i o n a l c o m p o r t m e n t s b e l o n g a s Dasein, a n d way
that
properly
it
is
precisely
understood,
the b e i n g o f Dasein.'^
that
with
the
aid
we
attempt
of
indeed
in
intentional
to characterize
such
a
comportment, suitably
1
Heidegger's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Dasein's c o m p o r t m e n t enables h i m t o contrast his view w i t h that o f the t r a d i t i o n . H e explains w h y i n t h e t r a d i t i o n k n o w l e d g e w a s m i s t a k e n l y t a k e n a s basic, a n d w h y e v e n a c t i o n was i n t e r p r e t e d a s a k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e : T h e previous concept ul conception
.
.
.
intentionality proves to be a restricted
[Bjecause
of this
restriction,
intentionality
is
c o n c e i v e d p r i m a r i l y a s " t a k i n g a s " [as m e a n i n g - g i v i n g ] . . . . T h u s every
act
of directing
oneself
characteristic of k n o w i n g ,
toward
for example,
T h e point is that for Husserl (and
Heidcggei,
Basic
Problems,
p.
58:
first
italics
- ' Ibul.. p . O t . Heidegger.
Metaphysical Foundation,
p.
134.
151
something in
Husserl.'-
receives
the
2
Follesdal a n d Searle too)
mine.
S O C I A L
34
intentionality
always
something, t a k i n g it
R E S E A R C H
amounts
to
my
taking
u n d e r s o m e aspect.
something
So w h e t h e r
I
as take
w h a t I am seeing as a house, or take w h a t I am d o i n g to be r e a c h i n g f o r t h e salt, I a m p e r f o r m i n g t h e same s o r t o f m e n t a l a c t . O n e w a y t o see t h i s i s t o n o t e t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o H u s s e r l a n d Searle, t h e r e m u s t always be an ego d o i n g t h e t a k i n g . I must represent to m y s e l f that my bodily m o v e m e n t is meant to b r i n g a b o u t a s p e c i f i c state o f a f f a i r s . T h e gestalt a c c o u n t o f purposive action, however, shows that one can dispense w i t h this active m e a n i n g - g i v i n g a n d still r e s p o n d to the situation under
one
aspect
or
another.
This
is
why
Heidegger,
G u r w i t s c h , Sartre, a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y each criticized Husserl's egological c o n c e p t i o n o f consciousness. Lest
it
appear
that
Heidegger's
account
of our
dealings, d e n y i n g as it does a self-referential acting,
is
committed
zombie-like behavior,
to
interpreting
we can
in
experience of
involved
summary
everyday
see
activity that
as
skillful
c o p i n g d i f f e r s i n a t least t h r e e w a y s f r o m m i n d l e s s , m e c h a n i c a l behavior: 1. Skillful uses
coping
is
a
mode
of awareness.
t h e t e r m experience (Erfahrung),
characterized private
only
event
as
(Erlebnis,
Heidegger
actually
b u t this e x p e r i e n c e can be
openness.
It
Husserl's
is
not
term),
a
mental,
aware
of
inner,
itself
as
separate f r o m , a n d d i r e c t e d t o w a r d , things i n the w o r l d . 2.
Comportment
is
adaptable
and
copes
with
the
situation
in
a
variety o f icays. I n o n g o i n g c o p i n g o n e r e s p o n d s t o t h i n g s o n t h e basis o f v a s t p a s t e x p e r i e n c e o f w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d i n p r e v i o u s situations, or, m o r e exactly, one's b e h a v i o r manifests dispositions
that have
dealings,
so
been
that
in
shaped
by a
most
cases
vast a m o u n t o f p r e v i o u s when
we
exercise
these
dispositions e v e r y t h i n g works w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n . 3. If the deliberate
going
gets
subject/object
difficult
we
intentionality.
pay
attention
One
then
and has
so a
switch sense
to of
e f f o r t w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t m y e f f o r t causes the
appropriate
goal-directed
movements.
Such
representa-
tions certainly have a place in the overall e x p l a n a t i o n of h o w it
152
H E I D E G G E R ' S
C R I T I Q U E
35
i s t h a t w e m a n a g e t o act i n a w i d e r a n g e o f s i t u a t i o n s . I n d e e d , w h e n the situation is n e w or especially c o m p l e x , m a n i p u l a t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s seems
to be the
p r i m a r y way we have of
carefully c o n s i d e r i n g o u r options a n d o r i e n t i n g ourselves.
Being-in-the- World
as
Originary
Intentionality
H a v i n g a r g u e d so far that m u c h of o u r everyday activity does
not
involve
a
mental
state
whose
intentional
content
r e p r e s e n t s its c o n d i t i o n s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n , b u t r a t h e r i n v o l v e s a n o p e n responsiveness to a gestalt,
H e i d e g g e r next argues that
all h u m a n activity, w h e t h e r absorbed or deliberate, requires a b a c k g r o u n d o r i e n t i n g that makes d i r e c t e d activity possible. S o f a r w e h a v e seen t h a t i n n o n d e l i b e r a t e activities w e e x p e rience ourselves o n l y as an o p e n responsiveness to w h a t solicits o u r activity. H e i d e g g e r n o w adds that such u n t h i n k i n g activity provides
the
nonsalient
background,
both
for
specific
acts
of
ongoing coping and for deliberately focusing on what is u n u s u a l o r d i f f i c u l t . T h e basic i d e a i s t h a t f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n to be d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a p a r t i c u l a r piece of e q u i p m e n t , w h e t h e r using it, perceiving it, or whatever, there must be a correlation between that person's general capacity f o r skillful c o p i n g a n d t h e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d e q u i p m e n t a l w h o l e i n w h i c h t h e t h i n g has a place. F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n I enter a r o o m I n o r m a l l y cope w i t h w h a t e v e r i s t h e r e . W h a t e n a b l e s m e t o d o t h i s i s n o t a set o f beliefs a b o u t r o o m s , n o r a r u l e f o r d e a l i n g w i t h r o o m s i n g e n e r a l a n d w h a t t h e y c o n t a i n ; i t i s a sense o f h o w r o o m s n o r m a l l y behave, a skill f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t h e m , that I have developed by crawling a n d w a l k i n g a r o u n d m a n y rooms. Such familiarity i n v o l v e s n o t o n l y a c t i n g b u t also n o t a c t i n g . I n d e a l i n g w i t h r o o m s I am s k i l l e d at n o t c o p i n g w i t h t h e dust, unless I am a j a n i t o r , a n d not p a y i n g attention to w h e t h e r the w i n d o w s are o p e n e d o r c l o s e d , u n l e s s i t i s h o t , i n w h i c h case I k n o w h o w t o do what is appropriate. My competence for dealing with rooms determines b o t h w h a t I will cope w i t h by using it, a n d w h a t I
153
S O C I A L
36
R E S E A R C H
w i l l c o p e w i t h b y i g n o r i n g i t , w h i l e b e i n g r e a d y t o use it s h o u l d the a p p r o p r i a t e occasion arise. H e r e Heidegger's account sounds deceptively similar to the a p p e a l t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d i n t r o d u c e d b y Searle i n his a c c o u n t of intentionality, Heidegger,
2 3
holds
b u t i n fact i t i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Searle, l i k e that
the
background
of
intentionality
i n v o l v e s " a b i l i t i e s , " "capacities," a n d "practices," b u t h e insists that
these
are
not a
kind
of intentionality,
but
rather
the
n o n i n t e n t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s that makes i n t e n t i o n a l action possible. F o r H e i d e g g e r , o n the c o n t r a r y , the sort o f b a c k g r o u n d f a m i l i a r i t y that f u n c t i o n s w h e n I take in a r o o m as a w h o l e a n d d e a l w i t h w h a t i s i n i t i s n e i t h e r a set o f s p e c i f i c g o a l - d i r e c t e d actions
nor
merely
a
capacity
that
must
be
activated
by
a
s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i n t e n t i o n a l state. R a t h e r , w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls the background c o n s i s t s i n a c o n t i n u a l i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i v i t y t h a t h e calls
ontological
transcendence.
I n a n early lecture, H e i d e g g e r describes this transcendence as "the b a c k g r o u n d o f . . . . p r i m a r y familiarity, w h i c h itself is not conscious a n d i n t e n d e d b u t is rather present in [an] u n p r o m i nent way."
2 4
I n Being and Time h e s p e a k s o f " [ T ] h a t f a m i l i a r i t y
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h D a s e i n . . . ' k n o w s i t w a y a b o u t ' [sich ,r
"auskennt \
in
its
public
environment."
2 5
In
c a l l s i t t h e " s i g h t o f p r a c t i c a l circumspection .
Basic .
Problems
he
. o u r practical
e v e r y d a y o r i e n t a t i o n . " t h i s f a m i l i a r i t y has a c r u c i a l f u n c t i o n : C i r c u m s p e c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o t h e presence o f w h a t i s o f c o n c e r n p r o v i d e s each s e t t i n g - t o - w o r k , p r o c u r i n g , a n d p e r f o r m i n g w i t h the w a y t o w o r k i t o u t , t h e means t o c a r r y i t o u t , the r i g h t occasion, a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e . T h i s s i g h t o f c i r c u m s p e c t i o n i s the s k i l l e d p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n c e r n e d d i s c o v e r i n g . 2 6
O n a n a l o g y w i t h t h e w a y s o u r eyes a r e a l w a y s a c c o m m o d a t i n g
23
See Searle, Intentionality, ch. 5. M a r t i n Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time University Press, 1985), p. 189. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 405. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 274. 21
23
26
154
(Bloomington:
Indiana
H E I D E G G E R S
37
C R I T I Q U E
to the l i g h t , we m i g h t call this b a c k g r o u n d activity " a c c o m m o dation."
It
is
the
way
we
are
constantly
adjusting
to
our
s i t u a t i o n . H e i d e g g e r has n o s p e c i f i c t e r m f o r t h i s m o s t basic a c t i v i t y . I t i s s o p e r v a s i v e a n d c o n s t a n t t h a t h e s i m p l y calls i t being-in-the-world:
"Being-in-the-world
.
.
. a m o u n t s to a
non-thematic circumspective absorption in . . . an equipmental 2 7
whole."
I n response, t h e n , t o H u s s e r l a n d Searle, H e i d e g g e r points out
that,
whenever
we
are
revealing
entities
by
using
or
c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e m , we must simultaneously be exercising a general
skilled
grasp of o u r circumstances.
It
is
this
back-
g r o u n d o r i e n t i n g that makes everyday c o p i n g possible. T h u s even if we n o r m a l l y experienced acting as an effort directed t o w a r d a c h i e v i n g some goal ( w h i c h H e i d e g g e r does n o t f i n d i n his n o r m a l c o p i n g e x p e r i e n c e ) t h e r e w o u l d still b e g o o d reason to
deny
that
goal-directed
action
was
the
only
kind
of
intentional activity. J u s t a s i n o r d i n a r y cases o f c o p i n g , D a s e i n i s a b s o r b e d i n its a c t i v i t y i n s u c h a w a y t h a t its e x p e r i e n c e d o e s n o t h a v e a n y s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t , so, i n g e n e r a l ,
Dasein is
a b s o r b e d i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o p i n g t h a t discloses t h e w o r l d a s familiar in such Dasein's
a way
disclosing
Heidegger
tells
that there is
comportment
us:
"[W]e
no separation
and
define
the
world
[concerned
between disclosed.
being-in-the-
w o r l d ] a s absorption i n t h e w o r l d , b e i n g d r a w n i n b y i t . "
Self and
world
belong together in
the single entity,
2 8
Dasein.
Self
a n d w o r l d are n o t t w o entities, like subject a n d o b j e c t . . . b u t self and unity
world
are
of the
the
basic
structure
determination
of
Dasein
of being-in-the-world.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 107. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. ""·' Heidegger. Basic Problems, p. 297. JH
155
196.
2 0
itself
in
the
38
S O C I A L
Or,
even
more
directly,
R E S E A R C H
"Dasein
. . .
concerned absorption in the w o r l d . " Our
general
background
coping,
is
nothing
but
.
.
.
3 0
our
familiarity
with
the
w o r l d , w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls o r i g i n a r y t r a n s c e n d e n c e , t u r n s o u t to be what Heidegger means by o u r understanding of being.
That
wherein
Dasein
already understands
itself . . .
i s always
something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity w i t h the w o r l d . . . goes to m a k e up Dasein's u n d e r s t a n d i n g of being. And
3 1
H e i d e g g e r is explicit that this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b e i n g is
m o r e basic t h a n e i t h e r p r a c t i c e o r t h e o r y .
In whatever wav we conceive of k n o w i n g , it is . . . a c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d beings. . . . B u t all practical-technical c o m m e r c e w i t h beings
is
also
a
comportment
toward
beings.
. . .
In
all
c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d beings — w h e t h e r it is specifically cognitive, which
is
most
frequently
practical-technical —an
called
theoretical,
understanding
or
of being
whether is
already
it
is in-
v o l v e d . F o r a b e i n g can be e n c o u n t e r e d by us as a b e i n g o n l y in the light of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b e i n g .
It
is
the
discovery
of the
primacy
3 2
o f this
understanding of
being, not of the p r i m a c y of practical activity, that H e i d e g g e r rightly
holds
to
be
his
unique
contribution
to
Western
philosophy.
30
Ibid.,
31
Heidegger. Being and Time, p.
32
Heidegger.
p.
197. Basic
Problems,
p.
119. 275.
* Some of the ideas in this paper were first expressed in Jerry Wakefield a n d H u b e r t L . Drevfus, "Action and the First Person," in John Searle and His Critics, ed. E. Lepore a n d R. V a n Gulick (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 1990).
156
Geschlecht sexual difference, ontological difference*
JACQUES DERRIDA
Ecole
normale
superteure
to Ruben Berezdivin 1928 O f sex, o n e c a n r e a d i l y r e m a r k , y e s , H e i d e g g e r speaks a s l i t t l e a s p o s s i b l e , p e r h a p s h e has n e v e r s p o k e n o f i t . P e r h a p s h e has n e v e r s a i d a n y t h i n g , b y t h a t n a m e o r the n a m e s u n d e r w h i c h w e r e c o g n i z e i t , o f the "sexual-relation," "sexual-difference," o r indeed o f " m a n - a n d - w o m a n . " T h a t s i l e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , i s e a s i l y r e m a r k e d . W h i c h m e a n s t h a t the r e m a r k i s s o m e w h a t f a c i l e . A few i n d i c a t i o n s , c o n c l u d i n g w i t h " e v e r y t h i n g happens a s i f . . . , " and i t w o u l d b e satisfied. T h e dossier c o u l d then b e shut, a v o i d i n g t r o u b l e i f n o t r i s k : i t i s a s i f , i n r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r , there
•First
and
wholly
preliminary
part
of an
interpretation
by
which
I
wish
lo
situate
Gesclileclu w i t h i n H e i d e g g e r ' s p a t h o f t h o u g h t . W i t h i n t h e p a t h o f h i s w r i t i n g s l o o , a n d t h e m a r k e d i m p r e s s i o n o r i n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e w o r d Geschlecht w i l l n o t b e i r r e l e v a n t . T h a t w o r d , I leave it here in its l a n g u a g e f o r reasons t h a i s h o u l d b e c o m e b i n d i n g in the c o u r s e of this v e r y r e a d i n g . A n d i l is i n d e e d a m a t t e r of "Geschlecht" ( s e x , r a c e , f a m i l y , g e n e r a t i o n , l i n e a g e , s p e c i e s , g e n r e / g e n u s ) a n d n o t o f the Geschlecht: o n e w i l l n o t p a s s s o e a s i l y t o w a r d t h e t h i n g i t s e l f ( t h e Geschlecht), b e y o n d t h e m a r k o f t h e w o r d (Geschlecht) i n
which, much
l a t e r , H e i d e g g e r w i l l r e m a r k t h e " i m p r i n t " o f a b l o w o r a s t a m p (Schlag). T h i s h e w i l l d o i n a text w e shall n o t discuss here b u t t o w a r d w h i c h this r e a d i n g w i l l c o n t i n u e , b y w h i c h in t r u t h I k n o w i l i s a l r e a d y m a g n e t i s e d : " D i e S p r a c h e i m G e d i c h t , E i n e Erörterung v o n G e o r g T r a k l s G e d i c h t " ( 1 9 5 3 ) in
Unterwegs zur Sprache ( 1 9 5 9 , p p .
157
36 f f . ) .
66
Jacques
Derrida
Geschleclu:
sexual difference,
ontological difference
were no sexual difference, n o t h i n g of that in m a n , or put otherwise in woman,
to
interrogate
or
suspect,
nothing worthy
of questioning,
fragwürdig. I t is as i f , o n e m i g h t c o n t i n u e , s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e d i d n o t rise t o the h e i g h t o f o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e , o n the w h o l e a s n e g l i g i b l e , i n r e g a r d t o the q u e s t i o n o f the sense o f b e i n g , a s a n y o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e , a determinate d i s t i n c t i o n or an ontic predicate. N e g l i g i b l e for thought, of c o u r s e , e v e n i f n o t a t a l l for s c i e n c e o r p h i l o s o p h y . B u t i n s o f a r a s i t i s o p e n e d u p t o the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , i n s o f a r a s i t has a r e l a t i o n t o b e i n g , i n t h a t v e r y r e f e r e n c e , Dasein w o u l d n o t b e s e x e d . D i s c o u r s e o n s e x u a l i t y c o u l d t h e n b e a b a n d o n e d t o the sciences o r p h i l o s o p h i e s o f l i f e , t o a n t h r o p o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , b i o l o g y , o r p e r h a p s even t o r e l i g i o n o r m o r a l i t y . Sexual
difference,
it was
ontological difference.
said,
could
not
rise
to
the
height of
If one wished to find out w h a t height is in
q u e s t i o n , the thought of difference not r i s i n g to any, the silence w o u l d not be lacking. T h a t could then be found arrogant or, precisely, provoking, in a c e n t u r y w h e n s e x u a l i t y , c o m m o n p l a c e o f a l l b a b b l i n g , has a l s o b e c o m e the c u r r e n c y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a n d s c i e n t i f i c " k n o w l e d g e , " t h e i n e v i t a b l e Kampfplatz o f e t h i c s a n d p o l i t i c s . N o t a w o r d f r o m H e i d e g g e r ! I t c o u l d e v e n b e f o u n d a m a t t e r o f g r a n d s t y l e , t h i s scene o f s t u b b o r n m u t i s m a t the very center o f the c o n v e r s a t i o n , i n the u n i n t e r r u p t e d and distracted b u z z i n g o f t h e c o l l o q u i u m ; f o r i n i t s e l f i t has a w a k i n g a n d s o b e r i n g v a l u e ( b u t w h a t e x a c t l y is one speaking about a r o u n d this silence?): W h o , i n d e e d , a r o u n d o r e v e n l o n g b e f o r e h i m has n o t c h a t t e d a b o u t s e x u a l i t y a s s u c h , a s i t w e r e , a n d b y t h a t n a m e ? A l l t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s i n the t r a d i t i o n have
done
so,
from
Plato
to
Nietzsche,
who
for their part
were
irrepressible on the subject. K a n t , H e g e l , H u s s e r l have all reserved it a p l a c e ; t h e y h a v e t r i e d a t least a w o r d o n i t i n t h e i r a n t h r o p o l o g y o r i n t h e i r philosophy of nature, and really everywhere. I s i t i m p r u d e n t t o t r u s t H e i d e g g e r ' s m a n i f e s t silence? W i l l w h a t is t h u s a s c e r t a i n e d l a t e r b e d e r a n g e d f r o m its p r e t t y p h i l o l o g i c a l a s s u r a n c e b y s o m e k n o w n o r u n e d i t e d passage w h e n , w h i l e s e a r c h i n g o u t the w h o l e o f H e i d e g g e r , s o m e r e a d i n g m a c h i n e w i l l h u n t o u t t h e t h i n g a n d s n a r e it? S t i l l , o n e m u s t t h i n k o f p r o g r a m i n g the m a c h i n e , o n e m u s t t h i n k , t h i n k o f i t a n d k n o w h o w t o d o i t . R e l y i n g o n w h i c h w o r d s ? O n l y o n names? A n d o n w h i c h s y n t a x , v i s i b l e o r i n v i s i b l e ? B r i e f l y , i n w h i c h signs w i l l y o u r e c o g n i z e his s p e a k i n g o r r e m a i n i n g s i l e n t a b o u t w h a t y o u n o n c h a l a n t l y call sexual difference? W h a t d o y o u t h i n k b y those w o r d s o r t h r o u g h them? In o r d e r t h a t such an i m p r e s s i v e silence be t o d a y r e m a r k e d o n , to let it appear as such, m a r k e d and m a r k i n g , w h a t , on the w h o l e , w o u l d be satisfactory? U n d o u b t e d l y this:
Heidegger w o u l d have said n o t h i n g
a b o u t s e x u a l i t y b y n a m e i n t h e p l a c e s w h e r e the best e d u c a t e d a n d
158
Research in
Phenomenology
Volume XIII
67
e n d o w e d " m o d e r n i t y " e x p e c t e d i t w i t h a f i r m f o o t , u n d e r its p a n o p l y o f "everything-is-sexual-and-everything-is-political-and-reciprocally" (note i n p a s s i n g t h a t the w o r d " p o l i t i c a l " i s o f r a r e usage, p e r h a p s n u l l , i n Heidegger, another not quite irrelevant m a t t e r ) . E v e n before a statistic w e r e t a k e n , t h e m a t t e r w o u l d s e e m a l r e a d y s e t t l e d . B u t t h e r e are g o o d g r o u n d s t o b e l i e v e t h a t the s t a t i s t i c here w o u l d o n l y c o n f i r m the v e r d i c t : a b o u t w h a t w e g l i b l y c a l l s e x u a l i t y H e i d e g g e r has r e m a i n e d s i l e n t . T r a n s i t i v e a n d s i g n i f i c a n t s i l e n c e ( h e has s i l e n c e d s e x ) w h i c h b e l o n g s , a s
he says, to a c e r t a i n Schweigen ("hier in der transitiven Bedeutung gesagt"), t o t h e p a t h o f a w o r d [parole] h e seems t o i n t e r r u p t . B u t w h a t are the p l a c e s o f t h i s i n t e r r u p t i o n ? W h e r e i s the s i l e n c e w o r k i n g o n t h a t d i s c o u r s e ? A n d w h a t are the f o r m s a n d d e t e r m i n a b l e c o n t o u r s o f t h a t non-said? Y o u c a n bet o n i t , t h e r e ' s n o t h i n g i m m o b i l e i n the p l a c e s w h e r e t h e a r r o w s o f the a f o r e s a i d p a n o p l y w o u l d assign the p o i n t n a m e d : o m i s s i o n , r e p r e s s i o n , d e n i a l , f o r e c l o s u r e , e v e n the u n t h o u g h t . B u t t h e n , i f the b e t w e r e l o s t , t h e t r a c e o f t h a t s i l e n c e w o u l d n o t m e r i t detouring? He doesn't silence a n y t h i n g , no m a t t e r w h a t , the trace does n o t c o m e f r o m n o m a t t e r w h e r e . B u t w h y the
bet? B e c a u s e b e f o r e
p r e d i c t i n g a n y t h i n g w h a t e v e r about " s e x u a l i t y , " i t m a y b e v e r i f i e d , one must i n v o k e chance, the a l e a t o r y , destiny. L e t it be, t h e n , a so-called " m o d e r n " r e a d i n g , an i n v e s t i g a t i o n a r m e d w i t h psychoanalysis, an enquiry authorized by complete anthropological c u l t u r e . W h a t d o e s i t seek? W h e r e d o e s i t seek? W h e r e m a y i t d e e m t o h a v e t h e r i g h t t o e x p e c t a t least a s i g n , a n a l l u s i o n , e l l i p t i c a l a s i t m a y b e , a reference, to s e x u a l i t y , the sexual r e l a t i o n , to sexual difference? To b e g i n w i t h , i n Sein und Zeit. W a s n o t the e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein near e n o u g h t o a f u n d a m e n t a l a n t h r o p o l o g y t o h a v e g i v e n rise t o s o m a n y misunderstandings
a n d m i s t a k e s r e g a r d i n g its p r e t e n d e d "realite-humaine"
o r h u m a n r e a l i t y a s i t w a s t r a n s l a t e d i n F r a n c e ? Y e t e v e n i n the a n a l y s e s o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d a s b e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s , o r o f c a r e e i t h e r i n its s e l f o r as Fürsorge, i t w o u l d be v a i n , it s e e m s , t o s e a r c h e v e n f o r the o u t l i n e o f a discourse on desire and sexuality.
H e n c e the consequence c o u l d be
d r a w n t h a t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e i s n o t a n e s s e n t i a l t r a i t , t h a t i t does n o t b e l o n g t o t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f Dasein. B e i n g - t h e r e , b e i n g there, the there o f b e i n g a s s u c h , bears n o s e x u a l m a r k . T h e s a m e t h e n goes f o r the r e a d i n g of t h e sense of b e i n g , s i n c e , as Sein und Zeit c l e a r l y states (§ 2), Dasein r e m a i n s in s u c h a r e a d i n g the e x e m p l a r y b e i n g . E v e n w e r e it a d m i t t e d that a l l reference to s e x u a l i t y isn't effaced or remains i m p l i e d , t h i s w o u l d o n l y b e t o the degree t h a t s u c h a r e f e r e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s quite
general
Räumlichkeit,
structures
Rede,
Sprache,
(In-der-Welt-sein
Geworfenheii,
159
als
Mit-
Sorge,
und
Selbst-sein,
Zeitlichkeit,
Sein
68
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
zum Tode) a m o n g m a n y o t h e r s . Y e t s e x u a l i t y w o u l d n e v e r b e t h e g u i d i n g t h r e a d f o r a p r i v i l e g e d access t o these s t r u c t u r e s . T h e r e the m a t t e r s e e m s s e t t l e d , i t m i g h t b e s a i d . A n d y e t !
Und
dennoch] ( H e i d e g g e r uses m o r e o f t e n t h a n o n e w o u l d f a i n b e l i e v e t h i s rhetorical turn: and yet, e x c l a m a t i o n m a r k , next paragraph).
A n d y e t the m a t t e r w a s s o l i t t l e o r i l l u n d e r s t o o d t h a t H e i d e g g e r h a d t o e x p l i c a t e h i m s e l f r i g h t a w a y . H e w a s t o d o i t i n t h e m a r g i n s o f Sein und Zeil, i f w e m a y c a l l m a r g i n a l a c o u r s e g i v e n a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a r b u r g / L a h n i n the S u m m e r Semester 1 9 2 8 . ' T h e r e h e recalls c e r t a i n
" d i r e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e s " on "ihe problem of transcendence and the problem of SEIN UND ZEIT" (§ 1 0 ) . T h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c of Dasein c a n o n l y o c c u r w i t h i n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . That's w h y it is not a matter of an " a n t h r o p o l o g y " or an " e t h i c . " Such an a n a l y t i c i s o n l y " p r e p a r a t o r y , " w h i l e t h e " m e t a p h y s i c s o f Dasein" i s n o t yet
" a t the
center"
of the
enterprise, clearly suggesting that
it
is
nevertheless being p r o g r a m m e d . It is by the n a m e of "Dasein" t h a t I w o u l d here i n t r o d u c e the q u e s t i o n of sexual difference. W h y n a m e Dasein
the
b e i n g w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s the
theme of this
a n a l y t i c ? W h y d o e s Dasein g i v e its " t i t l e " t o t h i s t h e m a t i c ? I n Sein und Zeit H e i d e g g e r h a d j u s t i f i e d the c h o i c e o f t h a t " e x e m p l a r y b e i n g " f o r t h e reading o f t h e sense o f b e i n g : " U p o n w h i c h b e i n g s h o u l d o n e r e a d o f f the sense o f b e i n g . . . ? " I n the l a s t i n s t a n c e , t h e r e s p o n s e leads t o t h e "modes o f being o f a determinate
b e i n g , that
being w h i c h we the
q u e s t i o n e r s o u r s e l v e s a r e . " I f t h e c h o i c e o f t h a t e x e m p l a r y b e i n g , i n its " p r i v i l e g e . " b e c o m e s the o b j e c t o f a j u s t i f i c a t i o n ( w h a t e v e r o n e t h i n k o f i t a n d w h a t e v e r b e its a x i o m a t i c s ) , H e i d e g g e r o n the o t h e r h a n d seems t o p r o c e e d b y d e c r e e , a t least i n t h a t passage, w h e n i t b e c o m e s a m a t t e r o f naming that e x e m p l a r y b e i n g , o f g i v i n g i t o n c e a n d for a l l its t e r m i n o l o g i c a l t i t l e : " T h a t b e i n g w h i c h w e o u r s e l v e s are a n d w h i c h i n c l u d e s q u e s t i o n i n g
as o n e o f its p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f B e i n g {die Seinsmöglichkeit des Fragens\, w e n a m e being-there | w e grasp i t , arrest i t , a p p r e h e n d i t " t e r m i n o l o g i c a l l y , '
fassen
wir terminologisch als Dasein]." T h a t " t e r m i n o l o g i c a l "
choice
u n d o u b t e d l y f i n d s its p r o f o u n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the w h o l e e n t e r p r i s e a n d i n the w h o l e b o o k by u n f o l d i n g a there a n d a being-there w h i c h ( n e a r l y ) no other p r e - d e t e r m i n a t i o n s h o u l d be able to c o m m a n d . B u t that does not remove
the
decisive,
brutal,
and
elliptical
appearance
from
that
p r e l i m i n a r y p r o p o s i t i o n , that d e c l a r a t i o n o f name. O n the c o n t r a r y , i n the M a r b u r g C o u r s e , t h e t i t l e of Dasein—its sense as w e l l as its n a m e —
160
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in
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Volume XIII
69
can be found to be more patiently qualified, explained, evaluated. N o w , t h e f i r s t t r a i t t h a t H e i d e g g e r u n d e r l i n e s i s its neutrality. F i r s t d i r e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e : " F o r the being w h i c h constitutes the theme o f this a n a l y t i c , the title
'man'
Dasein.'
[Mensch)
has
not been chosen,
b u t the
neutral
t i t l e 'das
"
A t f i r s t t h e c o n c e p t o f n e u t r a l i t y seems q u i t e g e n e r a l . I t i s a m a t t e r o f reducing or subtracting every anthropological, ethical or metaphysical p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by means of that n e u t r a l i s a t i o n , so as to keep n o t h i n g b u t a r e l a t i o n t o i t s e l f , b a r e r e l a t i o n , t o t h e B e i n g o f its b e i n g ; t h a t is, a m i n i m a l r e l a t i o n t o i t s e l f a s r e l a t i o n t o B e i n g , t h a t t h e b e i n g w h i c h w e are, a s q u e s t i o n i n g , h o l d s w i t h i t s e l f a n d its o w n p r o p e r essence. T h i s r e l a t i o n t o s e l f i s n o t a r e l a t i o n t o a n ego n o r t o a n i n d i v i d u a l . T h u s Dasein designates the b e i n g that " i n a d e t e r m i n e d sense" is not " i n d i f f e r e n t " to its o w n essence, o r t o w h o m its o w n B e i n g i s n o t i n d i f f e r e n t . N e u t r a l i t y , t h e r e f o r e , i s f i r s t o f a l l the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n o f e v e r y t h i n g n o t b e a r i n g the n a k e d t r a i t o f t h i s r e l a t i o n t o i t s e l f , o f t h i s i n t e r e s t f o r its o w n B e i n g f i n t h e w i d e s t sense o f t h e w o r d " i n t e r e s t " ) . T h i s i m p l i e s a n i n t e r e s t o r a p r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e o p e n i n g u p f o r t h e sense o f B e i n g a n d for the q u e s t i o n s t h u s o r d a i n e d . A n d yet! A n d y e t t h e u n f o l d i n g o f t h i s n e u t r a l i t y w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h a l e a p , w i t h o u t t r a n s i t i o n a n d f r o m the f o l l o w i n g i t e m o n ( s e c o n d d i r e c t i v e principle) towards a sexual asexuality
(Geschlechtslosigkeit)
neutrality, and even towards a certain of being-there.
The
leap
is
surprising.
I f H e i d e g g e r w a n t e d t o o f f e r e x a m p l e s o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t o b e left o u t o f the
analytic
o f Dasein,
especially
of
anthropological
traits
to
be
n e u t r a l i s e d , his o n l y q u a n d a r y w o u l d b e w h i c h t o c h o o s e . Y e t h e begins w i t h a n d keeps h i m s e l f l i m i t e d t o s e x u a l i t y , m o r e p r e c i s e l y t o s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e . I t t h e r e f o r e h o l d s a p r i v i l e g e a n d seems t o b e l o n g i n the f i r s t p l a c e — t o f o l l o w the statements i n the l o g i c o f t h e i r e n c h a i n i n g ( t o g e t h e r | — t o t h a t " f a c t u a l c o n c r e t i o n " w h i c h the a n a l y t i c o f Dasein s h o u l d b e g i n b y neutralising.
I f t h e n e u t r a l i t y o f t h e t i t l e "Dasein" i s e s s e n t i a l , i t i s
p r e c i s e l y because t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h a t b e i n g — w h i c h w e a r e — i s t o be
engaged before
a n d outside o f a c o n c r e t i o n o f t h a t t y p e . T h e f i r s t
e x a m p l e o f " c o n c r e t i o n " w o u l d t h e n b e b e l o n g i n g t o one o r another o f the
two
sexes.
Heidegger doesn't
doubt
that
they
are
two:
"That
n e u t r a l i t y m e a n s also | I u n d e r l i n e — J . D . | t h a t Dasein i s n e i t h e r o f the
t w o sexes [keines von beiden Geschlechtern ist]." M u c h l a t e r , a n d a t a n y rate t h i r t y y e a r s l a t e r , t h e w o r d "Geschlecht" w i l l be c h a r g e d w i t h a l l its p o l y s e m i c r i c h n e s s : sex, g e n r e , f a m i l y , s t o c k , race, lineage, generation. H e i d e g g e r w i l l retrace in language, by means of irreplaceable path-openings ( t h a t is, inaccessible to a c u r r e n t t r a n s l a t i o n ) .
161
70
Jacques Derrida
Geschlecht:
se.xual difference,
ontological difference
t h r o u g h l a b y r i n t h i n e , s e d u c t i v e a n d d i s q u i e t i n g w a y s , the i m p r i n t o f roads usually shut. S t i l l shut, here, by the t w o . T w o : that can not c o u n t a n y t h i n g b u t sexes, i t s e e m s , w h a t are c a l l e d sexes. I ' v e u n d e r l i n e d the w o r d " a l s o " ( " t h a t n e u t r a l i t y m e a n s a l s o . . . " ) . B y its p l a c e i n t h e l o g i c a l a n d r h e t o r i c a l c h a i n , t h i s " a l s o " r e c a l l s t h a t a m o n g the n u m e r o u s m e a n i n g s o f t h a t n e u t r a l i t y , H e i d e g g e r j u d g e s i t necessary to begin not so m u c h w i t h s e x u a l n e u t r a l i t y — w h i c h is w h y he also says " a l s o " — y e t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , immediately w i t h i t after the only g e n e r a l m e a n i n g t h a t has m a r k e d n e u t r a l i t y u p t o t h i s p o i n t i n the passage, t o w i t t h e human c h a r a c t e r , t h e t i t l e "Mensch" f o r t h e t h e m e o f t h e a n a l y t i c . T h a t is t h e o n l y m e a n i n g w h i c h u p t i l l t h e n he has e x c l u d e d or neutralised. Hence a k i n d of precipitation or acceleration w h i c h can not be neutral or indifferent: a m o n g a l l the traits of man's h u m a n i t y f o u n d t h u s n e u t r a l i s e d w i t h a n t h r o p o l o g y , e t h i c s , o r m e t a p h y s i c s , the f i r s t t h a t the v e r y w o r d " n e u t r a l i t y " m a k e s o n e t h i n k of, the f i r s t t h a t H e i d e g g e r t h i n k s o f i n a n y case, i s s e x u a l i t y . T h e i n c i t e m e n t c a n n o t b e due m e r e l y t o g r a m m a r , t h a t ' s o b v i o u s . T o pass f r o m Mensch, i n d e e d f r o m Mann, t o Dasein, i s c e r t a i n l y t o pass f r o m t h e m a s c u l i n e t o the n e u t r a l , w h i l e t o t h i n k o r t o say Dasein a n d t h e D a o f Sein f r o m t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t w h i c h i s
das Sein
("Sein
ist das transcendens schlechthin," Sein
und Zeit,
p.
2 8 ) , i s t o pass i n t o a c e r t a i n n e u t r a l i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , s u c h n e u t r a l i t y has t o d o w i t h the n o n g e n e r i c a n d n o n s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r o f B e i n g : " B e i n g a s fundamental Gattung)..."
t h e m e of p h i l o s o p h y
(ibid.).
is
B u t once again,
not
a genre
if sexual
of a
b e i n g (keine
difference
can't
exist
w i t h o u t relation to saying, w o r d s , or language, still it can't be reduced to a g r a m m a r . H e i d e g g e r rather t h a n d e s c r i b i n g it designates it as an e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f Dasein. B u t w h y d o e s h e a l l o f a s u d d e n i n s i s t w i t h s u c h haste? W h i l e i n Sein und Zeit h e h a d s a i d n o t h i n g o f i t , asexuality traits
(Geschlechtslosigkeit)
mentioned
n e u t r a l i t y o f the The
first
when
figures
here
r e c a l l i n g Dasein's
t i t l e "Dasein."
at
the
forefront
neutrality,
or
of the
rather
the
Why?
r e a s o n m a y be s u s p e c t e d . T h e v e r y w o r d Neutralität (ne-
uter) i n d u c e s a r e f e r e n c e to b i n a r i t y . If Dasein is n e u t r a l , a n d if it is n o t m a n (Mensch),
t h e first c o n s e q u e n c e
to d r a w
is
that it
may
not be
s u b m i t t e d to the b i n a r y p a r t i t i o n that one most spontaneously thinks of in s u c h a case, t o w i t " s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e . " I f " b e i n g - t h e r e " does n o t m e a n " m a n " (Mensch), a fortiori i t d e s i g n a t e s n e i t h e r " m a n "
nor " w o m a n . "
B u t i f the c o n s e q u e n c e i s s o n e a r c o m m o n - s e n s e , w h y r e c a l l it? A b o v e a l l , w h y s h o u l d o n e g o t o s o m u c h t r o u b l e t o get r i d o f a t h i n g s o c l e a r a n d secure i n the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e C o u r s e ? S h o u l d o n e i n d e e d c o n c l u d e t h a t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e d o e s n ' t d e p e n d s o s i m p l y o n w h a t e v e r the a n a l y t i c
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can and should neutralise, metaphysics, ethics, and especially anthropology, o r indeed any other d o m a i n o f o n t i c k n o w i n g , for e x a m p l e b i o l o g y or zoology? S h o u l d one suspect that sexual difference c a n n o t be r e d u c e d t o a n e t h i c a l o r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theme? H e i d e g g e r ' s p r e c a u t i o n a r y i n s i s t e n c e leaves o n e t h i n k i n g , i n a n y case, that
here
things
are
not
a
matter
of course.
Once
anthropology
( f u n d a m e n t a l o r n o t ) has b e e n n e u t r a l i s e d a n d o n c e i t has b e e n s h o w n t h a t i t c a n ' t engage t h e q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g w h e r e i t i s e n g a g e d a s s u c h , o n c e it has been o b s e r v e d thai Dasein is r e d u c i b l e n e i t h e r to h u m a n - b e i n g n o r t o the ego n o r t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d the u n c o n s c i o u s n o r t o the s u b j e c t o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l , n o r e v e n t o a n animal rationale, o n e m i g h t c o n c l u d e t h a t the q u e s t i o n o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e d o e s n ' t h a v e a c h a n c e o f m e a s u r i n g u p t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e sense o f b e i n g o r o f the o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t even
its v e r y
riddance
w o u l d n ' t deserve p r i v i l e g e d treatment.
Yet
i n c o n t e s t a b l y i t i s t h e c o n t r a r y t h a t h a p p e n s . H e i d e g g e r has j u s t r e c a l l e d Dasein's n e u t r a l i t y , a n d t h e r e h e i s r i g h t a w a y t r y i n g t o c l a r i f y : n e u t r a l i t y also as to sexual difference. Perhaps he was then responding to more or less e x p l i c i t , n a i v e o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d , q u e s t i o n s o n the p a r t o f his h e a r e r s , readers,
students,
or colleagues,
still
held,
aware
or
not,
within
a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l s p a c e : W h a t a b o u t t h e s e x u a l life o f your Dasein! t h e y m i g h t h a v e s t i l l a s k e d . A n d after h a v i n g a n s w e r e d t h e q u e s t i o n o n t h a t t e r r a i n b y d i s q u a l i f y i n g i t , i n s u m after h a v i n g r e c a l l e d the a s e x u a l i t y o f a b e i n g - t h e r e w h i c h i s n o t a n anthropos, H e i d e g g e r w i s h e s t o e n c o u n t e r another question,
even
perhaps
a
new objection.
T h a t ' s where the
difficulties w i l l grow. W h e t h e r a macter o f n e u t r a l i t y o r a s e x u a l i t y (Neutralität, Geschlechtslosigkeit) the w o r d s a c c e n t u a t e s t r o n g l y a n e g a t i v i t y w h i c h m a n i f e s t l y runs counter to w h a t Heidegger thereby wishes to m a r k out. It is not a m a t t e r o f l i n g u i s t i c o r g r a m m a t i c a l signs a t the s u r f a c e o f a m e a n i n g t h a t remains
f o r its
part untouched here.
By means of such manifestly
negative predicates there should become legible w h a t Heidegger doesn't h e s i t a t e t o c a l l a " p o s i t i v i t y " (Positivität), a r i c h n e s s , a n d , i n a h e a v i l y c h a r g e d c o d e , e v e n a p o w e r (Mächtigkeit). the
a-sexual
ontological
n e u t r a l i t y does
negativity
is
not
not
S u c h p r e c i s i o n suggests t h a t
desexualize.
unfolded
with
on
the
contrary,
r e s p e c t t o sexuality
its itself
( w h i c h i t w o u l d i n s t e a d l i b e r a t e ) , b u t o n its d i f f e r e n t i a l m a r k s , o r m o r e
strictly
on
sexual duality.
There
would
be
no
Geschlechtslosigkeit
except w i t h respect to " t w o " ; a s e x u a l i t y c o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d as such o n l y t o the degree t h a t s e x u a l i t y w o u l d m e a n i m m e d i a t e l y b i n a r i t y o r s e x u a l d i v i s i o n . " B u t s u c h a s e x u a l i t y i s n o t the i n d i f f e r e n c e o f a n e m p t y
n o t h i n g (die Indifferenz des leeren Nichtigen), the feeble n e g a t i v i t y of an
163
72
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
i n d i f f e r e n t o n t i c n o t h i n g . I n its n e u t r a l i t y , Dasein i s n o t j u s t a n y o n e n o m a t t e r w h o , b u t t h e o r i g i n a r y p o s i t i v i t y {ursprüngliche Positivität) a n d
p o w e r of essence [etre] (Mächtigkeit des
Wesens)."
I f Dasein a s s u c h b e l o n g s t o n e i t h e r o f t h e t w o sexes, t h a t d o e s n ' t m e a n t h a t its b e i n g i s d e p r i v e d o f sex. O n t h e c o n t r a r y , here o n e m u s t t h i n k o f a pre-differential, rather a pre-dual, s e x u a l i t y — w h i c h doesn't necessarily m e a n u n i t a r y , homogeneous, or undifferentiated, as we shall later v e r i f y . T h e n , f r o m that s e x u a l i t y , m o r e o r i g i n a r y t h a n the d y a d , one m a y t r y t o t h i n k to the b o t t o m a " p o s i t i v i t y " and a " p o w e r " that Heidegger is c a r e f u l n o t t o c a l l s e x u a l , f e a r i n g u n d o u b t e d l y t o r e i n t r o d u c e the b i n a r y l o g i c t h a t a n t h r o p o l o g y a n d m e t a p h y s i c s a l w a y s assign t o t h e c o n c e p t o f s e x u a l i t y . H e r e indeed it is a m a t t e r of the positive and p o w e r f u l source of e v e r y p o s s i b l e " s e x u a l i t y . " T h e Geschlechtlosigkeit w o u l d n o t b e m o r e n e g a t i v e t h a n aleiheia. O n e m i g h t r e c a l l w h a t H e i d e g g e r s a i d r e g a r d i n g
the Würdigung des "Positiven" im privativen Piatons Lehre von der Wahrheit).
Wesen der Aleiheia ( i n
F r o m hence, the C o u r s e sketches a q u i t e singular m o v e m e n t . It is v e r y d i f f i c u l t to isolate in it the t h e m e of sexual difference. I am t e m p t e d to interpret this as f o l l o w s : by a k i n d of strange and quite necessary d i s p l a c e m e n t , i t i s s e x u a l d i v i s i o n i t s e l f w h i c h leads t o n e g a t i v i t y , s o n e u t r a l i s a t i o n i s a t once t h e effect o f t h i s n e g a t i v i t y a n d t h e e f f a c e m e n t t o w h i c h thought must subject it to a l l o w an o r i g i n a l p o s i t i v i t y to become manifest. F a r f r o m c o n s t i t u t i n g a p o s i t i v i t y that the asexual n e u t r a l i t y of Dasein w o u l d a n n u l , s e x u a l b i n a r i t y i t s e l f w o u l d b e r e s p o n s i b l e , o r rather w o u l d belong to a d e t e r m i n a t i o n that is itself responsible, for this n e g a t i v a t i o n . T o r a d i c a l i z e o r f o r m a l i z e t o o q u i c k l y t h e sense o f t h i s m o v e m e n t before r e t r a c i n g it m o r e p a t i e n t l y , we c o u l d propose the f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a : i t i s s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e i t s e l f a s b i n a r i t y , i t i s the d i s c r i m i n a t i v e b e l o n g i n g t o one o r a n o t h e r sex, that destines o r d e t e r m i n e s to a negativity that must then be e x p l a i n e d . G o i n g a bit further, sexual d i f f e r e n c e thus d e t e r m i n e d ( o n e o v e r t w o ) , n e g a t i v i t y , a n d a c e r t a i n " i m p o t e n c e " m i g h t b e l i n k e d t o g e t h e r . W h e n r e t u r n i n g t o the o r i g i n a l i t y o f Dasein,
of this
Dasein
said
to
be
sexually
neutral,
"originary
p o s i t i v i t y " and " p o w e r " can be reconsidered. In other w o r d s , despite appearances, the asexuality and n e u t r a l i t y that should first of all be s u b t r a c t e d f r o m t h e s e x u a l b i n a r y m a r k , i n t h e a n a l y t i c o f Dasein, are i n t r u t h o n the s a m e s i d e , o n t h e side o f t h a t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e — t h e b i n a r y — to w h i c h one m i g h t have thought t h e m s i m p l y opposed. D o e s this interpretation sound too violent? T h e three f o l l o w i n g s u b - p a r a g r a p h s o r i t e m s ( § 3 , § 4 , § 5 ) , d e v e l o p the m o t i f s o f n e u t r a l i t y , p o s i t i v i t y a n d o r i g i n a r y p o w e r , the o r i g i n a r y itself, w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t reference t o sexual difference. " P o w e r " becomes
164
Research
t h a t o f a n o r i g i n (Ursprung,
in
Volume X I I I
Phenomenology
Urquell), w h i l e
elsewhere
73
Heidegger w i l l
never d i r e c t l y associate the p r e d i c a t e " s e x u a l " t o the w o r d " p o w e r , " the f i r s t r e m a i n i n g a l l t o o e a s i l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the w h o l e s y s t e m o f s e x u a l difference that m a y , w i t h o u t m u c h risk of error, be said t o b e inseparable f r o m every a n t h r o p o l o g y a n d e v e r y m e t a p h y s i c s . M o r e o v e r , the adjective "sexual"
(sexual,
knowledge,
sexuell,
used,
only
is
geschlechtlich) the
nouns
never,
Geschlecht
or
at
least
to
my
Geschlechtlichkeit,
w h i c h i s n o t w i t h o u t i m p o r t a n c e , these n o u n s b e i n g a l l t h e m o r e c a p a b l e o f i r r a d i a t i n g sense t o o t h e r s e m a n t i c z o n e s . L a t e r w e w i l l f o l l o w t h e r e some other paths of thought. B u f w i t h o u t s p e a k i n g o f i t d i r e c t l y , these t h r e e s u b - p a r a g r a p h s p r e p a r e t h e r e t u r n t o t h e t h e m a t i c o f Geschlechtlichkeit. T h e y f i r s t o f a l l efface a l l t h e n e g a t i v e signs a t t a c h e d t o t h e w o r d " n e u t r a l i t y . " T h i s w o r d does n o t h a v e t h e e m p t i n e s s o f a n a b s t r a c t i o n , n e u t r a l i t y r a t h e r leads b a c k t o t h e " p o w e r o f t h e o r i g i n " w h i c h bears w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f h u m a n i t y i n its c o n c r e t e f a c t u a l i t y . Dasein, i n its n e u t r a l i t y , m u s t n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e e x i s t e n t . Dasein o n l y e x i s t s i n its f a c t u a l c o n c r e t i o n , t o b e s u r e , b u t t h i s v e r y e x i s t e n c e h a s its o r i g i n a r y s o u r c e (Urquell) a n d i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n Dasein as n e u t r a l . T h e a n a l y t i c o f t h i s o r i g i n d o e s n o t deal w i t h the existent itself. Precisely because it precedes t h e m , such an analytic c a n n o t be confused w i t h a p h i l o s o p h y of existence, w i t h a wisdom
(which
could
be
established
only
w i t h i n the " s t r u c t u r e o f
m e t a p h y s i c s " ) , or w i t h a prophesy t h a t w o u l d teach such or such a " w o r l d v i e w . " It is therefore not at all a " p h i l o s o p h y of l i f e . " W h i c h is to say that a discourse o n s e x u a l i t y w h i c h w o u l d b e o f t h i s o r d e r ( w i s d o m , k n o w l e d g e , m e t a p h y s i c s , p h i l o s o p h y o f l i f e o r o f e x i s t e n c e ) falls s h o r t o f e v e r y r e q u i r e m e n t o f a n a n a l y t i c o f Dasein i n its v e r y n e u t r a l i t y . H a s a d i s c o u r s e o n s e x u a l i t y e v e r b e e n p r e s e n t e d n o t b e l o n g i n g t o a n y o f these registers? I t m u s t b e n o t i c e d t h a t s e x u a l i t y i s n o t n a m e d i n t h a t last paragraph n o r in the one that w i l l treat (we w i l l r e t u r n to i t ) a certain " i s o l a t i o n " o f Dasein. I t i s n a m e d i n a p a r a g r a p h i n Vom
Wesen des
Grundes ( t h e s a m e y e a r , 1 9 2 8 ) w h i c h d e v e l o p s t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t . T h e w o r d i s f o u n d i n q u o t a t i o n m a r k s , a s i f i n c i d e n t a l l y . T h e l o g i c o f α fortiori raises its t o n e s o m e w h a t t h e r e . F o r i n t h e e n d , i f i t i s t r u e t h a t s e x u a l i t y m u s t be n e u t r a l i s e d " w i t h a l l t h e m o r e
r e a s o n " ("a plus forte raison"),
as H e n r i C o r b i n ' s t r a n s l a t i o n s a y s , o r a fortiori, erst recht,
w h y insist?
W h e r e is the risk of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g ? U n l e s s the m a t t e r be d e c i d e d l y n o t o b v i o u s , and there is s t i l l a risk of m i x i n g up once m o r e the q u e s t i o n o f sexual difference w i t h that o f B e i n g and the o n t o l o g i c a l difference? I n that context,
it
is
a m a t t e r of d e t e r m i n i n g the
i p s e i t y o f Dasein,
its
Selbstheil o r being-a-self. Dasein e x i s t s o n l y for its o w n sake [a dessein d e soi\ (umwillen seiner), i f o n e c a n p u t i t t h u s , b u t t h a t does n o t m e a n
165
74
Jacques Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
either the f o r - i t s e l f of consciousness n o r egoism n o r s o l i p s i s m . It is starting
from
Selbstheit
that
an
alternative
between
"egoism"
and
" a l t r u i s m " has a c h a n c e o f a r i s i n g a n d b e c o m i n g m a n i f e s t , a s w e l l a s a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n " b e i n g - I " a n d " b e i n g - y o u " (Iclisein/Dusein). A l w a y s presupposed, ipseity is therefore " n e u t r a l " w i t h respect to b e i n g - m e and b e i n g - y o u , " a n d w i t h all the m o r e reason w i t h regard to ' s e x u a l i t y ' "
(und
erst
recht
etwa
gegen
die
"Geschlechtlichkeit"
neutral).
The
m o v e m e n t o f t h i s a fortiori i s l o g i c a l l y i r r e p r o a c h a b l e o n o n l y o n e c o n d i t i o n : It w o u l d be necessary that such " s e x u a l i t y " ( i n q u o t a t i o n m a r k s ) b e the a s s u r e d p r e d i c a t e o f w h a t e v e r i s m a d e p o s s i b l e b y o r f r o m i p s e i t y , here f o r i n s t a n c e t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f " m e " a n d " y o u , " y e t a s " s e x u a l i t y " n o t b e l o n g t o the s t r u c t u r e o f i p s e i t y , a n d i p s e i t y t h a t w o u l d not as yet be determined as h u m a n being, me or y o u , conscious or unconscious subject,
man or woman.
Y e t i f H e i d e g g e r insists and
underlines ( " w i t h a l l the m o r e r e a s o n " ) , it is because a s u s p i c i o n c o n t i n u e s t o w e i g h o n h i m : W h a t i f " s e x u a l i t y " a l r e a d y m a r k e d the m o s t o r i g i n a r y Selbstheit! I f i t w e r e a n o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f i p s e i t y ? I f t h e D a o f Dasein w e r e a l r e a d y " s e x u a l " ? W h a t i f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e w e r e a l r e a d y m a r k e d i n t h e o p e n i n g u p o f t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e sense o f B e i n g and o f the o n t o l o g i c a l difference? A n d w h a t if, t h o u g h not self-evident, n e u t r a l i s a t i o n were already a v i o l e n t operation? " W i t h all the m o r e r e a s o n " m a y h i d e a m o r e feeble r e a s o n . I n a n y case, t h e q u o t a t i o n m a r k s a l w a y s s i g n a l s o m e k i n d o f c i t i n g . T h e c u r r e n t usage o f the w o r d " s e x u a l i t y " i s " m e n t i o n e d " r a t h e r t h a n " u s e d , " o n e c o u l d say i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f speech act theory; i t i s c i t e d t o b e c o m p a r e d , w a r n e d a b o u t i f n o t a c c u s e d . A b o v e a l l o n e m u s t p r o t e c t t h e a n a l y t i c o f Dasein f r o m t h e risks o f a n t h r o p o l o g y , p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , even o f b i o l o g y .
S t i l l there
p e r h a p s r e m a i n s s o m e o p e n d o o r for o t h e r w o r d s , o r a n o t h e r usage a n d a n o t h e r r e a d i n g o f t h e w o r d "Geschlecht," i f n o t o f the w o r d " s e x u a l i t y . " P e r h a p s a n o t h e r " s e x , " o r r a t h e r a n o t h e r "Geschlecht," w i l l c o m e t o be i n s c r i b e d w i t h i n i p s e i t y , o r w i l l c o m e t o d e r a n g e the o r d e r o f a l l its derivations,
for e x a m p l e t h a t o f a m o r e o r i g i n a r y Selbstheit m a k i n g
p o s s i b l e the e m e r g e n c e o f the ego a n d o f y o u . L e t u s l e a v e t h i s q u e s t i o n suspended. I f t h i s n e u t r a l i s a t i o n i s i m p l i e d i n e v e r y o n t o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f Dasein. t h a t does n o t m e a n t h a t " t h e Dasein i n m a n , " a s H e i d e g g e r o f t e n says, need b e a n " e g o i s t i c " s i n g u l a r i t y o r a n " i n d i v i d u a l o n t i c a l l y i s o l a t e d . " T h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e w i t h i n n e u t r a l i t y d o e s n o t l e a d b a c k t o the i s o l a t i o n o r i n s u l a r i t y (Isolierung) o f m a n , t o his f a c t u a l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l s o l i t u d e . A n d y e t t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e w i t h i n n e u t r a l i t y does i n d e e d mean, Heidegger carefully observes, a certain o r i g i n a l isolation of man: n o t , p r e c i s e l y , i n the sense o f f a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e , " a s i f the p h i l o s o p h i s i n g
166
Research in Phenomenology
Volume XIII
75
b e i n g w e r e t h e c e n t e r o f the w o r l d , " b u t a s the "'metaphysical isolation o f m a n . " I t i s the a n a l y s i s o f t h i s i s o l a t i o n w h i c h t h e n raises a g a i n t h e t h e m e o f s e x u a l difference a n d o f the d u a l p a r t i t i o n w i t h i n Geschlechtlichkeit. A t the c e n t e r o f t h i s n e w a n a l y s i s , the v e r y s u b t l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a certain l e x i c o n already signals t r a n s l a t i o n p r o b l e m s w h i c h w i l l o n l y b e c o m e a g g r a v a t e d f o r us. I t w i l l r e m a i n e v e r i m p o s s i b l e t o c o n s i d e r them
as either
accidental
or secondary.
At a
certain
moment we
o u r s e l v e s w i l l be a b l e t o n o t i c e t h a t the t h o u g h t o f Geschlecht a n d t h a t o f t r a n s l a t i o n are e s s e n t i a l l y the s a m e . E v e n here t h e l e x i c a l h i v e b r i n g s t o g e t h e r ( o r s w a r m s s c a t t e r i n g ) the series " d i s s o c i a t i o n , " " d i s t r a c t i o n , " " d i s s e m i n a t i o n , " " d i v i s i o n , " " d i s p e r s i o n . " T h e dis- i s s u p p o s e d t o t r a n s l a t e , t h o u g h o n l y b y m e a n s o f t r a n s f e r s a n d d i s p l a c e m e n t s , the zer-
of Zerstreuung,
Zerstreutheit,
Zerstörung,
Zersplitterung,
Zerspaltung.
B u t a n i n t e r i o r a n d s u p p l e m e n t a r y f r o n t i e r s t i l l p a r t i t i o n s the l e x i c o n : dis- a n d zer- o f t e n h a v e a n e g a t i v e sense, y e t s o m e t i m e s a l s o a n e u t r a l or n o n - n e g a t i v e sense ( 1 w o u l d h e s i t a t e here t o say p o s i t i v e o r a f f i r m a t i v e ) . L e t u s a t t e m p t t o r e a d , t r a n s l a t e a n d i n t e r p r e t m o r e l i t e r a l l y . Dasein i n general hides, shelters in itself the i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y of a factual dispersion
or
dissemination
(faktische
Zerstreuung)
in
its
own
body
(Leiblichkeil) a n d " t h e r e b y in s e x u a l i t y " (und damit in die Geschlechtlichkeit).
E v e r y p r o p e r b o d y o f o n e ' s o w n \corps propre] i s s e x e d , a n d
t h e r e i s n o Dasein w i t h o u t its o w n b o d y . B u t t h e c h a i n i n g t o g e t h e r p r o p o s e d b y H e i d e g g e r seems q u i t e c l e a r : the d i s p e r s i n g m u l t i p l i c i t y i s n o t p r i m a r i l y d u e t o the s e x u a l i t y o f o n e ' s o w n b o d y ; i t i s its o w n b o d y i t s e l f , the f l e s h , t h e Leiblichkeit, t h a t d r a w s Dasein o r i g i n a l l y i n t o t h e d i s p e r s i o n a n d in due course \par suite] i n t o s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e . T h i s " i n d u e c o u r s e " (damit) i n s i s t s t h r o u g h a f e w l i n e s ' i n t e r v a l , as if Dasein w e r e s u p p o s e d t o h a v e o r b e a p r i o r i (as its " i n t e r i o r p o s s i b i l i t y " ) a b o d y f o u n d to be sexual, and affected by sexual d i v i s i o n . Here
again,
an
insistence
on
Heidegger's
part
to
observe
that
d i s p e r s i o n l i k e n e u t r a l i t y ( a n d a l l the m e a n i n g s in dis- or zer-) s h o u l d n o t be understood in a negative manner. T h e " m e t a p h y s i c a l " neutrality of i s o l a t e d m a n a s Dasein i s n o t a n e m p t y a b s t r a c t i o n o p e r a t i n g f r o m o r i n t h e sense of t h e o n t i c , it is n o t a neither-nor, b u t r a t h e r w h a t is p r o p e r l y concrete
i n t h e o r i g i n , the " n o t y e t " o f f a c t u a l d i s s e m i n a t i o n , o f
dissociation, Zerstreutheit
of being dis-sociated
or of factual
d i s - s o c i e t y : faktische
here a n d n o t Zerstreuung. T h i s b e i n g d i s s o c i a t e d , u n b o u n d ,
o r d e s o c i a l i z e d ( f o r i t goes t o g e t h e r w i t h the i s o l a t i o n o f m a n a s Dasein) is
not
a
fall
nor
an
accident
nor
a
decline
\decheance\
that
has
s u p e r v e n e d . I t i s a n o r i g i n a r y s t r u c t u r e a f f e c t i n g Dasein w i t h the b o d y , a n d hence w i t h s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e , o f m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d l a c k - o f - b i n d i n g \deliaison\. these t w o s i g n i f i c a t i o n s r e m a i n i n g d i s t i n c t t h o u g h g a t h e r e d
167
76
Jacques Derrida
t o g e t h e r i n the
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
a n a l y s e s o f d i s s e m i n a t i o n (Zerstreuung o r Zerstreutheil).
A s s i g n e d t o a b o d y , Dasein
i s s e p a r a t e d i n its f a c t i c i t y , s u b j e c t e d t o
d i s p e r s i o n a n d p a r c e l l i n g o u t (zersplittert), and t h e r e b y (ineins damit) a l w a y s d i s j u n c t , i n d i s a c c o r d , s p l i t u p , d i v i d e d (zwiespältig) b y s e x u a l i t y
toward
a
determinate
sex
(in
eine
bestimmte
Geschlechtlichkeit).
T h e s e w o r d s , u n d o u b t e d l y , have at first a negative resonance: d i s p e r s i o n , p a r c e l l i n g o u t , d i v i s i o n , d i s s o c i a t i o n , Zersplitterung,
Zerspaltung,
quite
l i k e Zerstörung ( d e m o l i t i o n , d e s t r u c t i o n ) , as H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s ; t h i s resonance is l i n k e d w i t h negative concepts from an ontic point of v i e w , i m m e d i a t e l y d r a w i n g f o r t h a m e a n i n g o f lesser v a l u e . " B u t s o m e t h i n g else i s a t issue h e r e . " W h a t ? A n o t h e r m e a n i n g , m a r k i n g t h e f o l d o f a mani-fold
multiplication.
The
characteristic
sign
(Kennzeichnung)
by
w h i c h s u c h a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n c a n b e r e c o g n i z e d i s l e g i b l e t o u s i n the i s o l a t i o n a n d f a c t u a l s i n g u l a r i t y o f Dasein. H e i d e g g e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h i s multiplication nigfaltigkeit),
(Mannigfaltigung)
from
diversity.
from
The
a
simple
representation
multiplicity of a
grand
(Man-
original
b e i n g w h o s e s i m p l i c i t y w a s s u d d e n l y d i s p e r s e d (zerspaltet) i n t o v a r i o u s s i n g u l a r i t i e s m u s t a l s o b e a v o i d e d . I t i s r a t h e r a m a t t e r o f e l u c i d a t i n g the i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h a t m u l t i p l i c a t i o n f o r w h i c h Dasein's o w n b o d y r e p r e s e n t s a n " o r g a n i s i n g f a c t o r . " T h e m u l t i p l i c i t y i n t h i s case i s n o t a s i m p l e f o r m a l p l u r a l i t y o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o r o f d e t e r m i n i t i e s (Bestimmtheiten),
it
belongs
to
Being
itself.
An
"originary
dissemination"
(ursprüngliche Streuung) belongs a l r e a d y to the B e i n g of Dasein
in
g e n e r a l , " a c c o r d i n g t o its m e t a p h y s i c a l l y n e u t r a l c o n c e p t . " T h i s o r i g i n a r y d i s s e m i n a t i o n (Streuung) dispersion
is
from
a
fully
determined
point o f view
(Zerstreuung): d i f f i c u l t y o f t r a n s l a t i o n w h i c h forces m e
here
to distinguish somewhat arbitrarily between dissemination and dispersion, in order to m a r k out by a c o n v e n t i o n the subtle trait w h i c h distinguishes Streuung
from
Zerstreuung.
The
latter
is
the
determination
of
the
former. It determines a structure of originary possibility, dissemination (Streuung), a c c o r d i n g t o a l l the m e a n i n g s o f Zerstreuung ( d i s s e m i n a t i o n , dispersion, scattering, diffusion, dissipation, distraction). T h e w o r d Streuung
appears
but
once,
it
seems,
to
designate
that
originary
possibility, that disseminality ( i f this be allowed). A f t e r w a r d s , it is a l w a y s Zerstreuung, w h i c h w o u l d a d d — b u t i t i s n ' t t h a t s i m p l e — a m a r k of determination
and
negation,
had
not
Heidegger warned
us
the
previous instant of that value of negativity. Yet, even if not totally legitimate, it is hard to avoid a certain c o n t a m i n a t i o n by negativity, i n d e e d w i t h e t h i c o - r e l i g i o u s a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h a t w o u l d seek t o b i n d t h a t dispersion to a fall and a c o r r u p t i o n of the pure o r i g i n a r y p o s s i b i l i t y (Streuung), w h i c h a p p e a r s t h e n t o b e a f f e c t e d b y a s u p p l e m e n t a r y t u r n . I t w i l l indeed be necessary t o elucidate also the p o s s i b i l i t y o r fatality o f that c o n t a m i n a t i o n . W e w i l l r e t u r n t o this later.
168
Research in Phenomenology
Some
Volume X I I I
i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h a t d i s p e r s i o n (Zerstreuung).
77
F i r s t o f a l l , Dasein
n e v e r r e l a t e s t o a n o b j e c t , t o a sole o b j e c t . I f i t d o e s , i t i s a l w a y s i n t h e m o d e o f a b s t r a c t i o n o r abstention f r o m other beings w h i c h always coa p p e a r a t the s a m e t i m e . A n d t h i s m u l t i p l i c a t i o n does n o t s u p e r v e n e because t h e r e i s a p l u r a l i t y o f o b j e c t s ; a c t u a l l y i t i s the c o n v e r s e t h a t takes place. It is the o r i g i n a r y d i s s e m i n a l structure, the dispersion of Dasein, t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e t h i s m u l t i p l i c i t y . A n d t h e same h o l d s f o r Dasein's r e l a t i o n t o itself: i t i s d i s p e r s e d , c o n f o r m a b l y t o t h e " s t r u c t u r e o f h i s t o r i c i t y i n t h e w i d e s t sense," t o the e x t e n t t h a t Dasein o c c u r s a s Erslreckung,
a
word
whose
translation
remains dangerous.
The
word
" e x t e n s i o n " c o u l d a l l t o o e a s i l y be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h exiensio, w h i c h Sein und Zeil i n t e r p r e t s as the " f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the w o r l d " according to Descartes (§ Erslreckung
names
a
spacing
1 8 ) . H e r e s o m e t h i n g else i s a t issue.
which,
"before"
the
determination
of
space a s exiensio, c o m e s t o e x t e n d o r s t r e t c h o u t b e i n g - t h e r e , the there o f B e i n g , between b i r t h a n d d e a t h . E s s e n t i a l d i m e n s i o n o f Dasein, t h e Erslreckung o p e n s u p t h e between t h a t l i n k s i t at o n c e t o its b i r t h a n d t o i t s d e a t h , t h e m o v e m e n t o f s u s p e n s e b y w h i c h i t is tended o u t a n d e x t e n d e d o f i t s e l f between b i r t h a n d d e a t h , these t w o r e c e i v i n g m e a n i n g o n l y f r o m t h a t i n t e r v a l l i c m o v e m e n t . Dasein affects itself, a n d t h a t a u t o a f f e c t i o n b e l o n g s t o the o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f its h i s t o r i c i t y : "DIE
SPEZIFISCHE NENNEN WIR Zeit
links
BEWEGTHEIT DAS Geschehen
together precisely
DES erstreckten DES DASEINS" (§
this
intervallic
tension
Sicherstreckens 7 2 ) . Sein und and dispersion
(Zerstreuung) ( n o t a b l y i n § 7 5 , p . 3 9 0 ) . Between b i r t h a n d d e a t h , t h e s p a c i n g o f t h e between m a r k s a t o n c e the d i s t a n c e a n d the l i n k , b u t t h e link according to a k i n d of distension. This " b e t w e e n - t w o " as rapport (Bezug) d r a w n i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p (trait) w i t h b o t h b i r t h a n d d e a t h b e l o n g s t o t h e v e r y B e i n g o f Dasein, " b e f o r e " a n y b i o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n , f o r
instance
("Im
Sein
des Daseins
liegt schon
das
'Zwischen' mit Bezug
auf Geburl und Tod" p . 3 7 4 ) . T h e l i n k thus e n t e r - t a i n e d , h e l d o r d r a w n b e t w e e n | entre-tenu, entre-tendu\, o v e r or t h r o u g h t h e d i s - t a n c e b e t w e e n \enlre\ b i r t h a n d d e a t h , is i t s e l f e n t e r t a i n e d u/7/ι d i s p e r s i o n , d i s s o c i a t i o n , u n b i n d i n g (Zerstreuung,
Unzusammenhang, etc. C f . p. 3 9 0 for e x a m p l e ) .
T h a t l i n k , t h a t b e t w e e n , could not lake place w i t h o u t t h e m . Y e t t o t a k e t h e m a s n e g a t i v e forces w o u l d b e t o p r e c i p i t a t e the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , f o r instance render it d i a l e c t i c a l . The
Erslreckung
is
thus
one
of
the
determinate
essential d i s p e r s i o n (Zerstreuung). T h a t " b e t w e e n "
possibilities
of
w o u l d be impossible
w i t h o u t d i s p e r s i o n y e t c o n s t i t u t e s o n l y o n e o f its s t r u c t u r a l d e p e n d e n t s , t o w i t t e m p o r a l i t y and h i s t o r i c i t y . A n o t h e r dependent, another p o s s i b i l i t y — c o n n e c t e d a n d e s s e n t i a l — o f o r i g i n a r y d i s p e r s i o n : the o r i g i n a r y s p a t i a l i t y o f Dasein,
i t s Räumlichkeit.
The
spatial
169
or spacing dispersion
is
78
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
manifested in language determined
by
for i n s t a n c e .
spatial
ontological difference
E v e r y language
is 2
significations
(Raumbedeutungen)} '
first o f a l l The
phe-
n o m e n o n of so-called spatialising metaphors is not at all accidental, nor w i t h i n t h e r e a c h o f the r h e t o r i c a l c o n c e p t o f " m e t a p h o r . " I t i s n o t s o m e exterior fatality. Its essential i r r e d u c i b i l i t y can't be elucidated outside of t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein, o f d i s p e r s i o n , h i s t o r i c i t y o r s p a t i a l i t y . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h e r e f o r e m u s t b e d r a w n , i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r the v e r y language
o f the
existential
analytic:
a l l the w o r d s
H e i d e g g e r uses
n e c e s s a r i l y refer b a c k t o these Raumbedeutungen. b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e w o r d Zerstreuung ( d i s s e m i n a t i o n , d i s p e r s i o n , d i s t r a c t i o n ) w h i c h n a m e s the v e r y o r i g i n o f s p a c i n g a t the m o m e n t w h e n a s l a n g u a g e i t s u b m i t s t o its l a w . T h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n " (as H e i d e g g e r s t i l l names i t ) thus belongs
t o the
essence o f Dasein
in
its
neutrality.
"Metaphysical"
essence, w e are m o r e p r e c i s e l y t o l d i n a C o u r s e p r e s e n t e d a b o v e a l l a t that
time
as
a
metaphysical
ontology
o f Dasein,
whose
analytic
constitutes o n l y a phase, u n d o u b t e d l y p r e l i m i n a r y . T h i s must be taken i n t o a c c o u n t i n o r d e r t o s i t u a t e w h a t i s here s a i d a b o u t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e i n p a r t i c u l a r . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e v e r y dissociation
and
parcelling
out
(Zersplitterung,
Zerspaltung)
into
factual existence. It is itself " f o u n d e d " on that o r i g i n a r y character of Dasein
t h a t H e i d e g g e r t h e n c a l l e d Geworfenheit. O n e s h o u l d b e p a t i e n t
w i t h that w o r d , s u b t r a c t i n g i t f r o m s o m a n y usages, c u r r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s or translations (for instance d e r e l i c t i o n , b e i n g - t h r o w n ) . T h i s should be d o n e f o r e s e e i n g w h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e — w h i c h r i g h t a w a y f o l l o w s — r e t a i n s i n i t s e l f o f t h a t Geworfenheit a n d , " f o u n d e d " o n i t , o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n . | T h e r e is] n o d i s s e m i n a t i o n t h a t f a i l s t o assume
such
Thrown
a "throw"
"before"
all
the
[jetee],
the Da
modes
of Dasein
as
o f t h r o w i n g [jetee]
thrown that
will
[jetee]. later
determine i t , project, subject, object, abject, trajectory, dejection; t h r o w t h a t Dasein c a n n o t m a k e its o w n i n a p r o j e c t , i n t h e sense o f throwing itself as
a
s u b j e c t m a s t e r of the
t h r o w . Dasein
is geworfen:
that means
t h a t b e f o r e a n y p r o j e c t o n its p a r t i t i s t h r o w n , b u t t h i s b e i n g - t h r o w n i s n o t y e t submitted t o the a l t e r n a t i v e o f a c t i v i t y o r p a s s i v i t y , these | c o n c e p t s ] s t i l l t o o m u c h i n s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the c o u p l e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t a n d h e n c e w i t h t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n , o n e c o u l d e v e n say w i t h t h e i r o b j e c t i o n . T o i n t e r p r e t b e i n g - t h r o w n a s p a s s i v i t y c o u l d r e i n s c r i b e i t w i t h i n the d e r i v a t i v e p r o b l e m a t i c o f s u b j e c t i ( v i ) t y ( a c t i v e o r p a s s i v e ) . W h a t does " t h r o w " m e a n b e f o r e these s y n t a x e s ? A n d b e i n g - t h r o w n e v e n b e f o r e the i m a g e o f the f a l l , be i t P l a t o n i c or C h r i s t i a n ? T h e r e is a b e i n g - t h r o w n o f Dasein " b e f o r e " there e v e n a p p e a r s — i n o t h e r w o r d s , " b e f o r e " t h e r e o c c u r s f o r it there—any thought of throwing amounting to an operation, activity, or
170
Research
in
Phenomenology
Volume X I I I
79
a n i n i t i a t i v e . A n d t h a t b e i n g - t h r o w n o f Dasein i s n o t a t h r o w i n space, i n w h a t i s a l r e a d y a s p a t i a l e l e m e n t . T h e o r i g i n a r y s p a t i a l i t y o f Dasein i s d r a w n t o w a r d [ o r has t o d o w i t h , tieni ά\ t h e t h r o w . I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t the t h e m e o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e m a y r e a p p e a r . T h e d i s s e m i n a l t h r o w o f b e i n g - t h e r e ( u n d e r s t o o d s t i l l i n its n e u t r a l i t y ) i s p a r t i c u l a r l y m a n i f e s t i n t h e f a c t t h a t Dasein
is Mitsein w i t h Dasein. A s
a l w a y s i n t h i s c o n t e x t , H e i d e g g e r ' s f i r s t gesture i s t o o b s e r v e a n o r d e r o f i m p l i c a t i o n : s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e , o r b e l o n g i n g t o a genre, m u s t b e e l u c i d a t e d s t a r t i n g f r o m b e i n g - w i t h , i n o t h e r w o r d s , f r o m the d i s s e m i n a l t h r o w , a n d n o t inversely. B e i n g - w i t h does not arise f r o m some factual c o n n e c t i o n , " i t cannot b e e x p l a i n e d f r o m some p r e s u m a b l y o r i g i n a r y generic b e i n g , " by a being whose o w n b o d y w o u l d be partitioned according to a sexual
difference contrary,
(geschlechtlich
gespaltenen
leiblichen
On
Wesen).
the
a c e r t a i n g e n e r i c d r i v e o f g a t h e r i n g t o g e t h e r (gattungshafte
Zusammenstreben), the u n i o n o f genres ( t h e i r u n i f i c a t i o n , r a p p r o c h e m e n t , Einigung),
Dasein
has
as
as " m e t a p h y s i c a l
such,
and
thereby
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n " the dissemination of
The
Mitsein.
of Mitsein
Mit
is
an
e x i s t e n t i a l , n o t a c a t e g o r i a l , a n d the same holds for the adverbs of place (Sein und Zeit,
§
26).
W h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s here t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
m e t a p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f Dasein is n o t t o be d e r i v e d f r o m a n y g e n e r i c o r g a n i s a t i o n or f r o m a c o m m u n i t y of l i v i n g beings as such. H o w d o e s t h i s q u e s t i o n o f order m a t t e r t o t h i s " s i t u a t i o n " o f s e x u a l difference?
Thanks
problematic
for
us,
to
a
prudent
derivation
Heidegger can
at
least
that
in
reinscribe
turn the
becomes theme
of
sexuality, in rigorous fashion, w i t h i n an ontological questioning and an e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c . A s s o o n a s i t i s n o t p l a c e d u p o n a c o m m o n doxa o r a bio-anthropological
science,
the
one
and
other
sustained
by
some
m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , s e x u a l difference r e m a i n s t o b e t h o u g h t . B u t the price o f t h a t prudence? I s i t n o t t o r e m o v e s e x u a l i t y f r o m every o r i g i n a r y s t r u c t u r e ? D e d u c e it? O r i n a n y case d e r i v e i t , c o n f i r m i n g a l l the m o s t t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e m e s , r e p e a t i n g t h e m w i t h the force of a new rigour? A n d that d e r i v a t i o n , does it not begin by a neutralisation whose n e g a t i v i t y was l a b o r i o u s l y denied? A n d once the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n i s e f f e c t e d , does o n e s t i l l a r r i v e a t a n o n t o l o g i c a l o r " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " d i s p e r s i o n , at t h a t Zerstreuung w h o s e n e g a t i v e v a l u e w a s so d i f f i c u l t t o efface? I n this f o r m these q u e s t i o n s r e m a i n , u n d o u b t e d l y , s u m m a r y . B u t t h e y c o u l d n ' t be e l a b o r a t e d s i m p l y i n a n e x c h a n g e w i t h t h e passage i n t h e Course of M a r b u r g w h i c h names sexuality. W h e t h e r it be a matter of neutralisation,
negativity,
dispersion,
or
distraction
(Zerstreuung),
i n d i s p e n s a b l e m o t i f s h e r e , f o l l o w i n g H e i d e g g e r , f o r p o s i n g the q u e s t i o n of s e x u a l i t y ,
it
is
necessary
to return
171
to Sein
und Zeit.
Although
80
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
s e x u a l i t y i s n o t t h e r e n a m e d , its m o t i f s are t r e a t e d i n a m o r e c o m p l e x f a s h i o n , m o r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , w h i c h d o e s n o t m e a n , o n the c o n t r a r y , i n a n easier o r m o r e f a c i l e m a n n e r . W e m u s t r e m a i n c o n t e n t here w i t h s e v e r a l p r e l i m i n a r y i n d i c a t i o n s . R e s e m b l i n g in the C o u r s e a m e t h o d i c a l procedure, n e u t r a l i s a t i o n is not w i t h o u t l i n k t o w h a t i n Sein und Zeit is c a l l e d the " p r i v a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " (§
1 1 ) . O n e c o u l d even speak o f m e t h o d , since H e i d e g g e r appeals t o a n
ontology to be
accomplished
by or on
the
"way"
of a
privative
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h a t w a y a l l o w s the " a p r i o n ' s " t o b e e x t r a c t e d , w h i l e a n o t e o n the s a m e p a g e , c r e d i t i n g H u s s e r l , says t h a t i t i s w e l l k n o w n t h a t " a p r i o r i s m i s the m e t h o d o f e v e r y s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h u n d e r s t a n d s i t s e l f . " T h i s p r e c i s e l y i n the c o n t e x t o f p s y c h o l o g y a n d b i o l o g y . A s sciences t h e y are f o u n d e d o n a n o n t o l o g y o f b e i n g - t h e r e . T h e m o d e o f b e i n g o f l i f e i s a c c e s s i b l e , e s s e n t i a l l y , o n l y t h r o u g h b e i n g - t h e r e . I t i s the o n t o l o g y of life that requires a " p r i v a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " : " l i f e " being neither a pure
Vorhandensein n o r a Dasein ( H e i d e g g e r says t h i s w i t h o u t
c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e issue r e q u i r e s m o r e t h a n a m e r e a f f i r m a t i o n : i t seems to
be obvious),
it
is
accessible
only
by
a
negative
operation
of
s u b t r a c t i o n . I t m a y t h e n b e a s k e d w h a t i s the b e i n g o f a life w h i c h i s nothing but l i f e , w h i c h is n e i t h e r t h i s n o r t h a t , n e i t h e r Vorhandensein n o r Dasein. H e i d e g g e r has n e v e r e l a b o r a t e d t h a t o n t o l o g y o f l i f e , b u t o n e can
i m a g i n e a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s i t w o u l d
h a v e r u n i n t o , s i n c e the
" n e i t h e r . . . n o r " c o n d i t i o n i n g i t e x c l u d e s o r o v e r f l o w s the m o s t b a s i c structural ( c a t e g o r i a l o r e x i s t e n t i a l ) concepts o f the w h o l e existential a n a l y t i c . I t i s the w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c t h a t i s here i n q u e s t i o n , the o n e t h a t subjects
positive
knowings
to
regional
ontologies,
and
these
to
a
fundamental o n t o l o g y , w h i c h itself at that t i m e was p r e l i m i n a r i l y opened u p b y the e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein. N o c h a n c e ( o n c e m o r e , o n e m i g h t s a y , a n d s h o w ) i f i t i s the m o d e o f b e i n g o f the living, the a n i m a t e d ( h e n c e a l s o o f t h e p s y c h i c a l ) w h i c h raises a n d s i t u a t e s t h a t e n o r m o u s p r o b l e m , o r i n a n y case g i v e s i t its m o s t r e c o g n i s a b l e n a m e . T h i s m a t t e r c a n n o t b e e n g a g e d h e r e , b u t i n u n d e r l i n i n g its a l l t o o o f t e n u n n o t i c e d necessity,
it should
a t least b e o b s e r v e d
that the theme of sexual
difference c o u l d not be dissociated f r o m it. L e t u s f o r the m o m e n t k e e p t o t h a t " w a y o f p r i v a t i o n , " the e x p r e s s i o n picked up by H e i d e g g e r in §
1 2 , a n d t h i s t i m e a g a i n t o d e s i g n a t e the a
p r i o r i access t o t h e o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i v i n g . O n c e t h a t r e m a r k is elaborated, H e i d e g g e r enlarges
u p o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f those
negative
statements. W h y do negative determinations impose themselves so often w i t h i n this o n t o l o g i c a l characteristic? N o t a t all b y " c h a n c e . " I t i s because one m u s t d e t a c h the o r i g i n a l i t y o f the p h e n o m e n a f r o m w h a t has d i s s e m b l e d , disfigured, d i s p l a c e d or v a r n i s h e d t h e m , f r o m the Verstellungen
172
Research
and
Verdeckungen,
from
a l l those
in
Phenomenology
Volume XIII
SI
pre-interpretations whose negative
effects s h o u l d i n t h e i r t u r n b e a n n u l l e d b y the n e g a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s w h o s e v e r i t a b l e " s e n s e " i s t r u l y " p o s i t i v e . " I t i s a s c h e m a t h a t w e have r e c o g n i s e d b e f o r e . T h e n e g a t i v i t y o f the " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " i s t h e r e f o r e n o t f o r t u i t o u s any m o r e than the n e c e s s i t y o f a l t e r a t i o n s o r d i s s e m b l a n c e s w h i c h it a t t e m p t s in some m a n n e r methodically to c o r r e c t .
Verstellungen
a n d Verdeckungen are n e c e s s a r y m o v e m e n t s i n the v e r y h i s t o r y o f B e i n g a n d its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e y c a n n o t b e a v o i d e d l i k e c o n t i n g e n t f a u l t s ; o n e m a y n o t r e d u c e i n a u t h e n t i c i t y (Uneigentlichkeit) to a f a u l t or s i n i n t o w h i c h one s h o u l d n o t h a v e f a l l e n . A n d y e t . I f H e i d e g g e r uses s o e a s i l y the w o r d "negative" w h e n i t i s a m a t t e r o f q u a l i f y i n g s t a t e m e n t s o r a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , h e n e v e r does i t , i t seems t o m e ( o r , m o r e p r u d e n t l y , m u c h less o f t e n a n d m u c h less e a s i l y ) , t o q u a l i f y w h a t , i n pre-interpretations o f B e i n g , makes still necessary those
methodical
corrections
of a
negative
Uneigentlichkeit, t h e Verstellungen a n d the
or
neutralising
form.
Verdeckungen are n o t in
the o r d e r o f n e g a t i v i t y ( t h e false o r e v i l , e r r o r o r s i n ) . A n d o n e c a n w e l l u n d e r s t a n d w h y H e i d e g g e r c a r e f u l l y a v o i d s s p e a k i n g i n this case o f n e g a t i v i t y . H e t h u s a v o i d s r e l i g i o u s , ethical, i n d e e d e v e n d i a l e c t i c a l Schemas, p r e t e n d i n g to rise "higher" t h a n t h e y . It should then be said that no negative signification is o n t o l o g i c a l l y a t t a c h e d t o the " n e u t e r " i n g e n e r a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n (Zerstreuung) o f Dasein.
Thus,
w i t h o u t speaking of negative
v a l u e o r o f v a l u e i n g e n e r a l ( H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s t r u s t f o r the v a l u e o f v a l u e i s w e l l k n o w n ) , w e s h o u l d take a c c o u n t o f the d i f f e r e n t i a l and h i e r a r c h i c a l a c c e n t w h i c h r e g u l a r l y in Sein und Zeit c o m e s to m a r k the n e u t r a l a n d dispersion.
I n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s , d i s p e r s i o n m a r k s the m o s t g e n e r a l
s t r u c t u r e o f Dasein. T h i s w e h a v e seen i n the C o u r s e , b u t i t was a l r e a d y
the case in Sein und Zeit, for e x a m p l e in § 12 ( p . 5 6 ) : " T h e being-inthe-world of Dasein
is,
with
its
factivity,
(zerstreut) o r e v e n p a r c e l l e d out(zersplittert)
always
already dispersed
into determinate modes of
being-in." F u r t h e r m o r e , H e i d e g g e r p r o p o s e s a l i s t o f these m o d e s a n d o f their irreducible m u l t i p l i c i t y . Yet elsewhere, dispersion and distraction (Zerstreuung Dasein,
in
both
senses)
t h a t of Man-selbst,
characterise
the
of t h a t One w h i c h
inauthentic has
ipseity
of
been d i s t i n g u i s h e d
f r o m i p s e i t y (Selbst) a s a u t h e n t i c a n d p r o p e r (eigentlich). A s " a n y o n e , " Dasein is d i s p e r s e d or d i s t r a c t e d (zerstreut). T h e w h o l e of t h a t a n a l y s i s i s well k n o w n , w e ' r e o n l y d e t a c h i n g t h a t w h i c h c o n c e r n s d i s p e r s i o n ( c f . § 2 7 ) , a c o n c e p t one c a n a g a i n f i n d a t the c e n t e r o f the a n a l y s i s o f c u r i o s i t y (Neugier, § 3 6 ) . T h a t , let u s r e c a l l , i s o n e o f the three m o d e s o f f a l l i n g (Verfallen) of Dasein in its e v e r y d a y - b e i n g . L a t e r we s h a l l h a v e to return to
Heidegger's warnings:
173
f a l l i n g , a l i e n a t i o n (Entfremdung),
82
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
a n d e v e n d o w n f a l l (Absturz)
are
not
ontological difference
m e a n t here
as the t h e m e of a
" m o r a l i s i n g c r i t i q u e , " a " p h i l o s o p h y of c u l t u r e , " a dogmatic religious a c c o u n t o f the f a l l (Fall) f r o m a n " o r i g i n a l c o n d i t i o n " ( o f w h i c h w e h a v e neither ontic experience nor ontological interpretation) or of a " c o r r u p t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e . " M u c h l a t e r , w e w i l l h a v e t o r e c a l l these w a r n i n g s a n d their p r o b l e m a t i c character, w h e n w i t h i n the " s i t u a t i o n " o f T r a k l , H e i d e g g e r w i l l i n t e r p r e t the d e c o m p o s i t i o n and the dessentialisation (Verwesung), t h a t i s t o say a l s o a c e r t a i n c o r r u p t i o n , o f t h e f i g u r e o f m a n . I t w i l l s t i l l be a m a t t e r , e v e n m o r e e x p l i c i t l y t h i s t i m e , o f a t h o u g h t o f "Geschlecht" o r o f Geschlecht. I p u t i t i n q u o t a t i o n s b e c a u s e t h e issue touches as m u c h on the name as on w h a t it names; a n d it is here as i m p r u d e n t to separate t h e m as to translate t h e m . We shall ascertain i t , it is there
a m a t t e r o f t h e i n s c r i p t i o n o f Geschlecht a n d o f Geschlecht a s
inscription, stamp, and i m p r i n t . D i s p e r s i o n is t h u s m a r k e d twice, as g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e of Dasein a n d as m o d e o f i n a u t h e n t i c i t y . O n e m i g h t s a y t h e s a m e f o r t h e n e u t r a l : i n the Course, w h i l e
i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f Dasein's n e u t r a l i t y ,
no negative or
p e j o r a t i v e i n d e x ; y e t " n e u t r a l , " i n Sein und Zeit m a y a l s o b e u s e d t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the " o n e , " t o w i t w h a t b e c o m e s the " w h o " w i t h i n e v e r y d a y i p s e i t y : t h e n the " w h o " i s t h e n e u t r a l (Neutrum), "the one" ( §
27).
T h i s b r i e f r e c o u r s e to Sein und Zeit has p e r h a p s a l l o w e d us b e t t e r to understand
t h e sense
and
n e c e s s i t y of t h a t order of implications t h a t
H e i d e g g e r tends t o preserve. A m o n g o t h e r things, that o r d e r m a y also r e n d e r a n a c c o u n t o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s m a d e use o f b y a l l d i s c o u r s e o n s e x u a l i t y . T h e r e i s n o p r o p e r l y s e x u a l p r e d i c a t e ; t h e r e i s n o n e a t least t h a t d o e s n o t r e f e r , f o r its sense, t o t h e general s t r u c t u r e s o f Dasein. S o t h a t t o k n o w w h a t o n e speaks o f . a n d h o w , w h e n o n e n a m e s s e x u a l i t y , o n e m u s t i n d e e d r e l y u p o n the v e r y t h i n g d e s c r i b e d i n t h e a n a l y t i c o f Dasein. I n v e r s e l y , i f t h i s b e a l l o w e d , t h a t d i s i m p l i c a t i o n a l l o w s the general sexuality or sexualisation of discourse to be understood: sexual c o n n o t a t i o n s c a n o n l y m a r k d i s c o u r s e , t o the p o i n t o f i m m e r s i n g i t i n t h e m , t o the e x t e n t t h a t t h e y are h o m o g e n e o u s t o w h a t e v e r y d i s c o u r s e implies,
for
example
the
topology
of
those
"spatial
meanings"
(Raumbedeutungen) w h i c h are i r r e d u c i b l e , b u t a l s o a l l t h o s e o t h e r t r a i t s we have situated in passing. W h a t w o u l d a " s e x u a l " discourse or a d i s c o u r s e " o n - s e x u a l i t y " b e w i t h o u t e v o k i n g farness \eloignement], a n inside and an outside, dispersion and p r o x i m i t y , a here and a there, b i r t h and death, a b e t w e e n - b i r t h - a n d - d e a t h , a b e i n g - w i t h and discourse? T h i s order of i m p l i c a t i o n s opens up t h i n k i n g to a sexual difference that w o u l d not yet be sexual d u a l i t y , difference as d u a l . As we have already o b s e r v e d , w h a t t h e C o u r s e n e u t r a l i z e d w a s less s e x u a l i t y i t s e l f t h a n the " g e n e r i c " m a r k o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e , b e l o n g i n g t o o n e o f two sexes.
174
Research in Phenomenology
Volume X I I I
83
H e n c e , i n l e a d i n g b a c k t o d i s p e r s i o n a n d m u l t i p l i c a t i o n (Zerstreuung, Mannigfaltigung),
may
one
not
begin
to
think
a
sexual
difference
( w i t h o u t n e g a t i v i t y , let u s c l a r i f y ) n o t sealed b y a t w o ? N o t t w o y e t o r n o longer? B u t t h e " n o t yet*' o r " n o l o n g e r " w o u l d s t i l l m e a n , a l r e a d y , s o m e dialectical appropriation. The
withdrawal
\retrait\
of the d y a d
leads t o w a r d
another sexual
difference. I t m a y also prepare other questions. F o r instance, this one: How
is
difference
deposited
a m o n g two?
Or
again,
if one
kept to
consigning difference w i t h i n dual o p p o s i t i o n , how can m u l t i p l i c a t i o n be s t o p p e d i n d i f f e r e n c e ? O r i n s e x u a l difference? I n the C o u r s e , f o r the a b o v e g i v e n r e a s o n s , Geschlecht a l w a y s n a m e s s e x u a l i t y s u c h a s i t i s t y p e d b y opposition o r b y d u a l i t y . L a t e r ( a n d sooner)
matters
will
be
different,
and
this
opposition
is
called
decomposition.
NOTES
( 1 ) Metaphysische
Anfangsgrunde
Ausgabe,
26.
Volume
der
Logik
( 2 ) C f . a l s o Sein und Zeil. p . 1 6 6 .
175
im
Ausgang
von
Leibniz,
Gesamt-
Existence and Self-Understanding in Being and Time WILLIAM D.
Georgetown
BLATTNER
University
1
E a r l y in Being and Time
H e i d e g g e r a n n o u n c e s t h a t the p r i m a r y c o n c e p t by
m e a n s o f w h i c h h e a i m s t o u n d e r s t a n d D a s e i n (us h u m a n s ) i s the c o n c e p t t o w h i c h he gives the name 'existence.' B u t w h a t is existence? Existence is, r o u g h l y , that feature o f D a s e i n that its s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f its b e i n g w h a t o r w h o i t i s . I n a n i m p o r t a n t sense, t h i s c o n c e p t e m b o d i e s H e i d e g g e r ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . A t t h e c e n t e r o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m lies t h e c l a i m t h a t h u m a n s are g i v e n t h e i r c o n t e n t n e i t h e r b y a n a h i s t o r i c a l , t r a n s c u l t u r a l essence, n o r b y n a t u r e . R a t h e r , D a s e i n i t s e l f d e t e r m i n e s t h i s c o n t e n t i n i t s act o f self-understanding. K i e r k e g a a r d expressed this i n his famous ( i f m u r k y ) f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t " T h e s e l f i s that w h i c h relates i t s e l f t o i t s e l f ; " O r t e g a i n h i s c a t c h y phrase, " M a n has n o n a t u r e ; " a n d Sartre i n h i s n o t o r i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n , 1
"Existence c o m e s b e f o r e essence." A l l o f these d i c t a a r t i c u l a t e the same idea. B u t h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s c l a i m , a n d w h a t m u s t w e p r e s u p p o s e t o render it plausible? I shall argue for t w o hypotheses. First, we cannot render t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i d e a p l a u s i b l e i n its H e i d e g g e r i a n c o n t e x t w i t h o u t p a y i n g s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o h o w i t i s l i n k e d i n Being and Time t o the c o n c e p t o f a n a b i l i t y . Heidegger interprets Dasein's characteristics p r i m a r i l y as ability-chara c t e r i s t i c s , t h a t i s , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t are n o t states, b u t r a t h e r c a p a c i t i e s . S e c o n d , the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c l a i m i s s u b j e c t t o i m m e d i a t e a n d fatal c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s , u n l e s s w e a c c e p t that H e i d e g g e r i s o p e r a t i n g w i t h a s u b t e r r a n e a n f o r m of d u a l i s m . It is not a Cartesian d u a l i s m of consciousness and matter; it is, r a t h e r , a d u a l i s m o f n a t u r a l a n d s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . W e s h a l l
A l l references to Being and Time are to the 15th German edition: Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (henceforth, S&Z). (Citations to all other sources will be in short title form, with complete bibliographic entries at ihe end of Ihe paper.) A l l translations of S&Z are my own, although of course I have relied heavily on Macquarrie and Robinson's English translation: Heidegger, Being and Time (B&T) . I have tried to indicate most of my divergences from Macquarrie and Robinson's ( M & R ) translations of technical terminology, usually by giving the German in parentheses along with M & R ' s translation. Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 13; Ortega y Gasset, "History as a System," p. 185; Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, p. 26.
177
see, m o r e o v e r , that these hypotheses, i f true, and i f l i n k e d w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , e n t a i l further unusual, o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s about D a s e i n .
Existentiality,
Self-Understanding,
and
Ability
In §9 of Being and Time, w h o s e a i m is the p r e l i m i n a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n of " T h e T h e m e o f the A n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n " (the t i t l e o f the s e c t i o n ) , H e i d e g g e r explains
' e x i s t e n c e ' thus: "The
'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence.
... A l l
o f t h i s e n t i t y ' s b e i n g - s o i s p r i m a r i l y b e i n g , " (S&Z, p . 4 2 ) . O r a s h e puts i t i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t w a y , " t h i s e n t i t y , i n its b e i n g , c o m p o r t s i t s e l f t o its bei n g . . . . It is being that is in each case at issue f o r t h i s e n t i t y , " {S&Z, p p . 4 1 - 4 2 ) . H e enlarges o n this d e f i n i t i o n later, this t i m e i n t r o d u c i n g the l a n guage o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g : " D a s e i n i s the e n t i t y that i n its b e i n g c o m p o r t s i t s e l f u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y t o this b e i n g . T h e f o r m a l c o n c e p t o f existence i s h e r e w i t h i n d i c a t e d , " (S&Z, p p . 5 2 - 5 3 ) . D a s e i n is the e n t i t y w h o s e b e i n g is a l w a y s at issue i n w h a t i t does, that is, the e n t i t y w h o a l w a y s has a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t self, a n d w h o s e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f its " b e i n g - s o , " its b e i n g w h a t o r w h o i t is. T h i s c e n t r a l , e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thesis lies a t the heart o f H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n b e i n g . L e t u s f o r m u l a t e i t thus: the Existentiality Thesis:
If D a s e i n is A, then it is A because it understands i t s e l f as A.
T o c l a r i f y this thesis, w e m u s t specify w h a t H e i d e g g e r means b y ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ' To see the dangers of not d o i n g so, c o n s i d e r a rather s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , or perhaps u n t u t o r e d , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s , one based o n the a s s u m p t i o n that b y ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' H e i d e g g e r has i n m i n d s o m e t h i n g l i k e k n o w l e d g e . I n this case, the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s w o u l d e n t a i l that D a s e i n k n o w s about e v e r y t h i n g that it is (Cartesian transparency taken to an e x t r e m e ! ) . T h i s w o u l d render i t i m p o s s i b l e that D a s e i n h a v e any features i t does not k n o w a b o u t a n d w o u l d p r o b a b l y m a k e s e l f - d e c e p t i o n i m p o s s i b l e ( d e p e n d i n g o n one's analysis o f that p h e n o m e n o n ) . F o r t u n a t e l y , w e need not d e f e n d this c l a i m , since H e i d e g g e r makes clear that b y ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' h e does not have i n m i n d some f o r m o f awareness o r cognition: If we
Interpret
phenomenon
is
•understanding' tinguished
from
[understanding] conceived in
the
as
as a fundamental existentiale, we thereby a
fundamental
s e n s e o f one
'explaining,'
mode
o f the
being
possible sort of c o g n i t i o n
must thereby
of
among
i n d i c a t e that this
Dasein. others,
In
contrast,
perhaps dis-
be Interpreted as an existential derivative of
p r i m a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h c o - c o n s t i t u t e s the b e i n g o f the T h e r e . ( 5 < 4 Z , p .
178
143).
Rather, h e uses the t e r m t o p i c k o u t c o m p e t e n c e , c a p a b i l i t y : 3 In onlical discourse we often able t o manage a t h i n g ' sen
sein«],
use
the e x p r e s s i o n
[»einer Suche
vorstehen
Ί ο be capable o f something'
tentiale, that of w h i c h one
is capable
is
Ίο understand something' können«).
[»etwas
to mean
Ί ο be equal t o i t '
können«]
In
'to be
[»ihr gewach
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as a n e x i s -
not a W h a t , but rather b e i n g as e x i s t i n g .
(SaZ, p .
143)
I n fact, the w o r d ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' has a n u m b e r o f c l o s e l y r e l a t e d m e a n i n g s . P r i n c i p a l l y , w e use i t i n t w o w a y s : t o d e s c r i b e a c o g n i t i v e stance o r p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s a c o n t e n t , such a s w h e n w e say, " I u n d e r s t a n d the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s ; " a n d t o describe a sort o f a b i l i t y w e have, a s w h e n w e say, 4
" I u n d e r s t a n d the G e r m a n s . " I n the l a t t e r statement w e express the idea not that w e grasp s o m e c o n t e n t ( t h o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e G e r m a n s w i l l l i k e l y i n v o l v e t h a t ) , b u t rather that w e are c o m p e t e n t w i t h c e r t a i n sorts o f p e o p l e , that w e are c a p a b l e o f h a n d l i n g o u r s e l v e s a m o n g s t t h e m . ( W e c a n use the w o r l d ' k n o w ' this w a y t o o : " B o k n o w s baseball.") T h u s , i n H e i d e g g e r ' s v o c a b u l a r y , t o say that Jones understands s o m e t h i n g is to say that she is c a p a b l e of i t . To say, t h e r e f o r e , that Jones u n d e r s t a n d s h e r s e l f a s b e i n g ( o r , t o be) A , i s t o say that she i s c a p a b l e o f b e i n g A . A n d i n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r endorses this consequence, w h e n he w r i t e s , "Understanding is
the
existential
being
of Dasein's
own
ability-to-be
[Seinkönnen,
M&R:
5
p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g ] , " (SaZ, p . 1 4 4 ) . T h u s , i f w e w e d the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s t o H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e see that the f o r m e r c l a i m s n o t that D a s e i n i s a w a r e o f w h a t e v e r i t is, b u t rather that i t i s c a p a b l e o f w h a t e v e r i t is. N o w , t h i s is a s u r p r i s i n g c l a i m . S u p p o s e that Jones is s i x feet t a l l . T h e E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s t h e n seems t o c l a i m that Jones i s c a p a b l e o f b e i n g s i x feet t a l l . B u t w h a t c o u l d that mean? Jones m a y be s i x feet t a l l , b u t i s she able to be, or capable'' of b e i n g , or competent at b e i n g s i x feet t a l l ? Jones's h e i g h t is o n e o f her p r o p e r t i e s , not ( c a p ) a b i l i t i e s . Jones is s i x feet t a l l , a n d is able to
T h i s i n t e r p r e t i v e t h e s i s i s p r o m i n e n t i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . S e e f o r e x a m p l e , D r e y f u s . Being-
in-the-Wortd; man.
Guignon,
Heidegger
and
Knowledge.
Schmitt,
Heidegger
on
Being
Hu-
I t m a y b e that the f i r s t use i s a c t u a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n the s e c o n d , i f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c o n t e n t i s a s o r t o f a b i l i t y , p e r h a p s a n a b i l i t y t o use ( a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f ) t h e c o n tent. It is not necessary to take a p o s i t i o n on that question. R i c h a r d S c h m i t t i s t h e f i r s t t o see t h a t t h i s l i n e s h o u l d b e r e a d t h i s w a y . See S c h m i t t ,
Heidegger on Being Human, p.
179.
O n e m u s t bear in m i n d that the w o r d s ' c a p a b l e ' and ' a b l e '
h a v e a t l e a s t t w o uses. O n t h e
o n e h a n d , w e say that Jones i s able t o b e h u n g r y , b y w h i c h
w e m e a n t h a t she c a n b e
h u n g r y , t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t she b e h u n g r y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e o f t e n use and
'capable'
i n t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e y refer t o a n a b i l i t y o r c o m p e t e n c e .
'able'
'Jones is
able t o d r i v e ' a l m o s t a l w a y s has this m e a n i n g . It states that she has a c e r t a i n s k i l l o r
c o m p e t e n c e . F o r t h e s a k e o f c l a r i t y , / will use 'ability' and 'capability' only in the Un-
ter
sense.
179
r u n ten m i l e s per h o u r . L e t u s c a l l these t w o sorts o f i t e m , r e s p e c t i v e l y , 'state-characteristics' and ' a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ' H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , then, that a l l o f D a s e i n ' s characteristics are a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . the Ability Thesis:
A l l of D a s e i n ' s characteristics are a b i l i t y - c h a r acteristics.
" B u t s u r e l y , " one m i g h t object, " t h i s A b i l i t y T h e s i s is i n d e f e n s i b l e : Jones has lots o f state-characteristics, e.g., b e i n g six feet t a l l . " T o d e f e n d the A b i l i t y T h e s i s I shall argue, first, that the state-characteristic of b e i n g six feet t a l l is c l o s e l y associated w i t h a s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and second, that D a s e i n i s o n l y t o b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the related ability-char"acteristic, not w i t h the state-characteristic. Jones is s i x feet t a l l . She also, h o w e v e r , u n d e r stands that p h y s i c a l state-characteristic in s o m e d e f i n i t e w a y : she understands h e r s e l f t o b e t a l l . T h i s l a t t e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s not p u r e l y p h y s i c a l , i s not the sort o f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a tree o f the same p h y s i c a l h e i g h t can have. A t least, i t can be seen to be so, w h e n we r e c o g n i z e that b e i n g t a l l is a w a y of c o m p o r t i n g o n e s e l f i n the w o r l d . B e i n g t a l l has i n t h i s w a y t o d o w i t h o n e ' s stature, not j u s t o n e ' s p h y s i c a l h e i g h t . A person w h o understands h e r s e l f as u n u s u a l l y t a l l m i g h t t a l k d o w n t o p e o p l e , use her h e i g h t t o l o r d i t o v e r t h e m ; o n the other h a n d , she m i g h t be embarrassed by her h e i g h t , m o r e shy about p h y s i c a l e n c o u n t e r s . S i m i l a r l y , a l t h o u g h b e i n g a f e m a l e is a b i o l o g i c a l fact a b o u t Jones, b e i n g f e m i n i n e i s her w a y o f i n t e r p r e t i n g that b i o l o g i c a l fact. ( T h i n k o f the w a y i n w h i c h w e speak o f degrees o f f e m i n i n i t y a n d m a s c u l i n i t y , a n d the w a y i n w h i c h baby name b o o k s s o m e t i m e s c a t e g o r i z e b a b y names b y 7
h o w f e m i n i n e o r m a s c u l i n e they a r e . ) T h u s , c l o s e l y related t o the state-characteristics of b e i n g six feet t a l l and female are the s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics o f b e i n g t a l l a n d f e m i n i n e . S e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics are, f u r t h e r m o r e , a b i l i t i e s . O n e m u s t know how to be t h e m . B e i n g six feet t a l l or b i o l o g i c a l l y f e m a l e is a state, not an a b i l i t y ; i t i n v o l v e s n o k n o w - h o w . B u t b e i n g t a l l ( i n the stature sense) o r f e m i n i n e i s a n a b i l i t y . I t i s a w a y o f h a n d l i n g o n e s e l f a n d r e l a t i n g t o others. A b i l i t i e s are easiest to n o t i c e w h e n they break d o w n . I m a g i n e s o m e o n e bad at b e i n g t a l l , say, s o m e o n e w h o tries t o l o r d i t o v e r others p h y s i c a l l y , but f a i l s . H e w o u l d seem r a t h e r f o o l i s h t r y i n g . H e sets his s h o u l d e r s b a c k , c o c k s his head d o w n w a r d , a n d says
" U r n , excuse m e , please." B e i n g t a l l i s l e a r n e d ,
s o m e t i m e s mastered, and can be done better and w o r s e . We are s o c i a l i z e d i n t o o r are t a u g h t o u r s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e stature-characteristics, j u s t a s w i t h m a n y other, m o r e o b v i o u s l y s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics ( b e i n g A m e r i c a n , b e i n g m i d d l e class, etc.). T h e s e characteristics are one a n d a l l a b i l i t i e s . H e n c e , each
7
F o r an a m u s i n g v e r s i o n of this, l o o k at the chapters " F r o m M a d o n n a to M e r y l " and " F r o m R a m b o t o S y l v e s t e r " i n L i n d a R o s e n k r a n l z a n d P a m e l a R e d m o n d S a t r a n , Beyond Jennifer und Jason,
(New
York:
St.
Martin's
Press,
180
1990).
of ihe state-characteristics we have c o n s i d e r e d ( b e i n g six feet t a l l , f e m a l e ) is c l o s e l y associated w i t h a s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ( b e i n g t a l l , feminine). O n e m i g h t t h i n k that the force o f the a r g u m e n t above depends o n contrasti n g a physical state-characteristic w i t h a self-interpretive a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . B u t this is not so. Jones is not o n l y s i x feet t a l l , but also, say, the leader of her w e e k l y b o o k d i s c u s s i o n g r o u p . T h a t is c l e a r l y s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e : one is not the leader of a g r o u p n a t u r a l l y , but rather o n l y by b e i n g s o c i a l l y and i n t e r p r e t i v e l y s i t u a t e d in a c e r t a i n w a y . B u t is it a state-characteristic? H e i d e g g e r w o u l d argue not. Jones must know how to be a g r o u p leader; she m u s t be cap a b l e o f i t . B e i n g a g r o u p leader i s h a v i n g and e x e r c i s i n g a set o f a b i l i t i e s : the a b i l i t y to o r g a n i z e a g r o u p ' s m e e t i n g , the a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l a d i s c u s s i o n , e v e n the a b i l i t y to use a p h o n e . So, w h a t appear to be i n t e r p r e t i v e state-chara c t e r i s t i c s t u r n o u t , in the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , also to be a i u / i ' / v - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , none of D a s e i n ' s i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics are state-characteristics, and thus, the a r g u m e n t does not trade on n a r r o w i n g o u r focus on statecharacteristics to p h y s i c a l ones. T h e second l e g o f the defense o f the A b i l i t y T h e s i s i s the m o r e d i f f i c u l t one: the c l a i m that D a s e i n is o n l y to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h these s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , not w i t h its factual state-characteristics. S i n c e I have already a r g u e d that w h a t appear to be s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e state-characteristics are r e a l l y a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , I can n o w argue that D a s e i n is o n l y its a b i l i t y - c h a r a c teristics by a r g u i n g that D a s e i n is o n l y is its s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics. I n the passage i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r d r a w s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the f a c t i cal ( i . e . , i n t e r p r e t i v e ) and the factual ( i . e . , n o n - i n t e r p r e t i v e ) , we can see that D a s e i n ' s p u t a t i v e factual characteristics are not r e a l l y p r o p e r t o i t . ..
e n t i t i e s that are n o t w o r l d l e s s , e . g . , D a s e i n i t s e l f , are a l s o o c c u r r e n t
more
precisely
s t a t e d , can, w i t h a c e r t a i n
legitimacy and
" i n " the w o r l d , or
w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s , be
conceived
as m e r e l y occurrent. To do this, it is necessary to l o o k c o m p l e t e l y a w a y f r o m , or better, not t o see t h e e x i s t e n t i a l m a k e - u p o f b e i n g - i n [ D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g i n the w o r l d ) . T h i s p o s s i ble conception of " D a s e i n " as something occurrent and o n l y occurrent should fused
with
Dasein's
own
m a n n e r of " o c c u n e n t n e s s . "
(S&Z,
p.
55,
note
the
not be c o n -
scare-quotes)
H e i d e g g e r makes three s i g n i f i c a n t c l a i m s here. ( 1 ) O n e can " w i t h a c e r t a i n l e g i t i m a c y " c o n c e i v e D a s e i n a s s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t . I n this c o n t e x t , the t e r m ' o c c u r r e n t ' (vorhanden, M & R : present-at-hand) appears s i m p l y t o p i c k o u t t h i n g s u n l i k e D a s e i n , that is, n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l e n t i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g I t h i n k , w h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the ' a v a i l a b l e ' (zuhanden, M & R : r e a d y - t o - h a n d ) , that is, the p a r a p h e r n a l i a o f the s o c i a l w o r l d . " So, one can " w i t h a c e r t a i n l e g i t i m a c y "
The term means "to
be
Occurrent'
h a s t w o s e n s e s i n S&Z.
"to exist independently or to
'available,'
be
dependent
of human
upon
human
In its n a r r o w
practices and practices."
In
a n d m o r e frequent sense, i t
interpretation," as this
sense
it
opposed
contrasts
to
with
w h i c h p i c k s out those n o n - h u m a n things that p l a y a role in o u r practices,
181
c o n c e i v e D a s e i n a s n o n - h u m a n , n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l . ( 2 ) I n d o i n g this one m u s t p r e s c i n d f r o m D a s e i n ' s " e x i s t e n t i a l m a k e - u p . " T h a t is, one can c o n c e i v e Jones f a c t u a l l y , i f one abstracts a w a y f r o m Jones's p r o p e r l y D a s e i n i s h , o r exi s t e n t i a l features. T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n thus grasps a n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l e l e m e n t or aspect o f Jones, i n the f i r s t instance, one w o u l d t h i n k , her b i o l o g y . ( 3 ) T h i s n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l a b s t r a c t i o n is not the same as D a s e i n ' s " p r o p e r o c c u r r e n c e , " i.e., its f a c t i c i t y . ' F a c t i c i t y ' is the n a m e that H e i d e g g e r gives to D a s e i n ' s det e r m i n a c y as an e x i s t e n t i a l e n t i t y . "Dasein's
9
D e s p i t e H e i d e g g e r ' s r e f e r r i n g to it as
own m a n n e r o f O c c u r r e n t n e s s , ' " o r e v e n , p r e c i s e l y b y u s i n g
' o c c u r r e n t n e s s ' here i n scare-quotes, h e w a n t s t o contrast i t w i t h w h a t e v e r m i g h t b e n a t u r a l i n D a s e i n . L e t m e f o r m u l a t e the o v e r a l l c l a i m o f this parag r a p h i n another thesis: the Duality Thesis:
D a s e i n can be c o n s i d e r e d b o t h in its p r o p e r o n t o l o g i c a l make-up, as essentially self-und e r s t a n d i n g , and in an abstracted, factual w a y , as s o m e t h i n g that m e r e l y o c c u r s (esp., n a t u rally).
I w a n t to suggest that this D u a l i t y T h e s i s is c e n t r a l to H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g y . O f i m m e d i a t e relevance i s t h i s : o n l y w i t h the help o f the A b i l i t y and D u a l i t y Theses can H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y Thesis. T h e general strategy f o r r e s p o n d i n g to p o t e n t i a l c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s to the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y Thesis is to d i s t i n g u i s h factual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f r o m the e x i s t e n t i a l a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that are i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e m . T h e three theses c o m e together as a package deal in Being and Time. W e c a n c l a r i f y the A b i l i t y T h e s i s further b y a p p r o a c h i n g i t a g a i n f r o m a slightly different angle. Let us begin w i t h a deceptively direct c o m m e n t by H e i d e g g e r early in Being and Time: T h e characteristics that can be e x h i b i t e d by
[ D a s e i n ] are thus not o c c u r r e n t
a n o c c u r r e n t e n t i t y t h a t " l o o k s " s u c h a n d so, b u t r a t h e r p o s s i b l e w a y s
"properties" of
for [Dasein]
in each
c a s e t o b e a n d o n l y t h a t . (S&Z, p . 4 2 )
O n e m i g h t t h i n k this passage s i m p l y says that w h a t e v e r D a s e i n is (its charact e r i s t i c s ) are p o s s i b l e for i t . B u t i n fact, i t has the A b i l i t y T h e s i s b u r i e d i n i t . If H e i d e g g e r i n t e n d e d here o n l y to say that D a s e i n ' s characteristics are possib i l i t i e s for i t , then h e w o u l d assert n o t h i n g s o d r a m a t i c a s t h e A b i l i t y T h e s i s .
p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y , e q u i p m e n t . I n its b r o a d sense. ties, i.e.,
both the occurrent in the n a r r o w
Occurrent'
picks out non-human enti-
sense a n d the a v a i l a b l e .
S e e Sa'Z, p . 4 5 f o r
a n e x a m p l e o f a b r o a d use o f t h e t e r m . I d o n o t have the space here t o d e v e l o p i n d e t a i l a n a c c o u n t o f f a c t i c i t y . I a i m i n subseq u e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s t o c l a r i f y the c o n c e p t u a l relations b e t w e e n e x i s t e n t i a l i t y a n d f a c t i c ity.
182
Of course, the w e a k e r c l a i m is a t r i v i a l i t y dressed up as a thesis, since it j u s t states that a l l of D a s e i n ' s ( a c t u a l ) characteristics are possible ( c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) . I n o r d e r to see the passage as m o r e than m e r e l y t r i v i a l , w e m u s t f i g u r e o u t w h a t special c o n t e n t i s c a r r i e d b y H e i d e g g e r ' s phrase, " p o s s i b l e w a y s for D a sein to be." H e i d e g g e r suggests that there is a special n o t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y that applies lo D a s e i n , one q u i t e u n l i k e that w h i c h applies t o , say, a tree. P o s s i b i l i t y , w h i c h D a s e i n i n each case i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y . i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d j u s t a s m u c h f r o m e m p t y , l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y a s f r o m the c o n t i n g e n c y o f s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t , i n s o far a s w i t h the latter this and that can " h a p p e n . " As a m o d a l category of b e i n g - o c c u r r e n t , p o s s i b i l i t y m e a n s t h e not yet a c t u a l a n d t h e not ever n e c e s s a r y .
It c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e
merely p o s s i b l e
..
P o s s i b i l i t y as an existentiale, on the other hand, is the most o r i g i n a r y and last, p o s i t i v e , o n t o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f D a s e i n . . . . (S&Z, p p .
143-44)
H e i d e g g e r i s here c l e a r l y t r y i n g t o argue for a t h i r d sort o f p o s s i b i l i t y o t h e r t h a n l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y and the " c o n t i n g e n c y o f s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t " ( w h i c h I s h a l l c a l l O c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y ' ) . B u t w h a t sort o f p o s s i b i l i t y i s that? T o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , i t i s h e l p f u l t o e x a m i n e his c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f o c c u r r e n t possibility. R i c h a r d S c h m i t t is the o n l y i n t e r p r e t e r , so far as I k n o w , w h o has ad1
d r e s s e d t h i s passage d i r e c t l y . " M u c h o f w h a t h e says i s i l l u m i n a t i n g a n d h e l p f u l . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , one aspect o f his r e a d i n g i s c l e a r l y w r o n g . H e i n t e r prets o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y a s " p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . " B u t this i s n o t r i g h t f o r t w o reasons. F i r s t , o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y i s supposed t o a p p l y not o n l y t o the n a t u r a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y o c c u r r e n t , but t o any sort o f o c c u r r e n t i t e m , w h e t h e r i t b e p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , m a t h e m a t i c a l , o r w h a t e v e r . S e c o n d , since H e i d e g g e r does n o t c a r v e o u t any s p e c i a l n o t i o n for the a v a i l a b l e , I suggest that he is here u s i n g the t e r m O c c u r r e n t ' i n its b r o a d sense t o a p p l y t o a n y t h i n g u n l i k e D a s e i n . " I f so, " p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y " i s yet m o r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e , because n o t o n l y i s the a v a i l a b l e far f r o m e x c l u s i v e l y p h y s i c a l , b u t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that g o v e r n e v e n the p h y s i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e are n o t p r i m a r i l y p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s (e.g., h o w a h a m m e r can be used). H e i d e g g e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f the c o n c e p t o f o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y m a k e s n o m e n t i o n o f " p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . " H e says s i m p l y , and u n f o r t u n a t e l y d a r k l y , that o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y i s the " c o n t i n g e n c y o f the o c c u r r e n t , " and that " w i t h the latter, this and that can h a p p e n . " T h e idea seems to be t h i s . L e t me r e g i m e n t the p h r a s e o l o g y , ' w i t h the latter, t h i s and that can h a p p e n , ' a s ' w i t h respect t o s o m e t h i n g , s o m e event can take p l a c e . ' C o n s i d e r the tree: w i t h respect to the tree, a b u r n i n g d o w n can take place. Put s o m e w h a t m o r e p e r s p i c u o u s l y , the tree can b e the subject o f a b u r n i n g d o w n . I f t h i s p a r s i n g o f H e i -
S c h m i t t , Heidegger on
Being Human, p p .
178ff.
See n o t e # 8 a b o v e .
183
d e g g e r ' s language is c o r r e c t , then o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y is s i m p l y the c o n t i n gent t a k i n g place of an event. N o w , D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are, a c c o r d i n g to this passage, supposed to be d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d . H o w ? T h e rest o f the paragraph i n w h i c h this passage occurs focuses o n D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y - t o - b e . T h i s leads n a t u r a l l y t o the s u g g e s t i o n — this i s S c h m i t t ' s s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n — t h a t D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are a b i l i t i e s . W e can say, " T h e tree can b u r n d o w n , " b u t w e s h o u l d not t h e r e b y m e a n , " T h e tree has the a b i l i t y to b u r n d o w n , " at least not in the precise sense that the tree has s o m e c o m p e t e n c e . B u t t h i s is w h a t it is to say of Jones that she can be a translator; it is to say that she is able to translate, that she has that competence. S c h m i t t ' s r e a d i n g o f H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y fits i n neatly w i t h the o v e r a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I am o f f e r i n g . D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are a b i l i t i e s , and as H e i d e g g e r says on p. 4 2 , a l l D a s e i n ' s characteristics are e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i.e., a b i l i t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the v e r y idea o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t w o d i f f e r e n t sorts o f p o s s i b i l i t y , o c c u r r e n t and e x i s t e n t i a l , reflects the D u a l i t y T h e s i s . W e o u g h t not, i n a c a r e f u l , o n t o l o g i c a l analysis, conflate the t w o d i f f e r e n t w a y s i n w h i c h w e can c o n s i d e r D a s e i n : abstractly a s o c c u r r e n t and p r o p e r l y as e x i s t e n t i a l . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n runs so deep that we m u s t even i n t r o d u c e d i s t i n c t n o t i o n s o f possibility t o d o i t j u s t i c e . T o reiterate: the H e i d e g g e r i a n defense o f the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y Thesis i s c a r r i e d o u t b y w a y o f the A b i l i t y and D u a l i t y Theses. W e e n d u p w i t h a d u a l i s t i c p i c t u r e o f D a s e i n , w h o w h e n c o n c e i v e d p r o p e r l y is characterized o n l y as h a v i n g s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s , but w h e n c o n c e i v e d i m p r o p e r l y ( a b s t r a c t l y ) is also characterized as having
state-characteristics.
Understanding
and
Projection
We have seen that for D a s e i n ( p r o p e r l y ) to be A, it m u s t understand i t s e l f as A . N o w , w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g oneself a s A ? H e i d e g g e r answers this q u e s t i o n b y i n t r o d u c i n g his n o t i o n o f p r o j e c t i o n (Entwurf). T h e G e r m a n word
'Entwurf
does
not
have
all
the
meanings
that
the
English
word
' p r o j e c t i o n ' has. Its c e n t r a l sense is that of a p l a n , sketch, or b l u e p r i n t . H o w ever, H e i d e g g e r goes o u t of his w a y to i n d i c a t e that by ' p r o j e c t i o n ' he does not have in m i n d a n y t h i n g so e x p l i c i t a n d t h o u g h t o u t as a b l u e p r i n t : " P r o j e c t i n g has n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h c o m p o r t i n g oneself t o w a r d s a t h o u g h t o u t p l a n , i n accordance w i t h w h i c h D a s e i n arranges its b e i n g , " (S&Z, p . 1 4 5 ) . So, w h a t i s H e i d e g g e r after w i t h the language o f ' p r o j e c t i o n ? ' H e also p l a y s u p o n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the G e r m a n w o r d t h r o w o r cast f o r t h .
1 2
'projection:'
ent-werfen i s t o
H e seems rather t o w a n t t o e m p h a s i z e this m e t a p h o r .
T h u s , at the b e g i n n i n g of the paragraph in w h i c h he i n t r o d u c e s p r o j e c t i o n , he writes, 1 2
See C a p u l o ,
"Hermeneuiic
Phenomenology."
184
W h y d o e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h alt e s s e n t i a l d i m e n s i o n s o f w h a t c a n b e d i s c l o s e d i n i t , a l w a y s p r e s s a h e a d i n t o [dringt ... i n ...)
possibilities'?
h a s i n i t s e l f t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t w e c a l l projection. (S&Z,
p.
Because understanding 145)
W e can see w h y H e i d e g g e r makes these c l a i m s , i f w e bear the A b i l i t y T h e s i s in mind. D o w e relate t o o u r a b i l i t i e s a s t o t h o u g h t o u t plans? I m a g i n e that after f i n i s h i n g her c o l l e g e degree in G e r m a n , Jones decides to b e c o m e a s i m u l t a n e ous i n t e r p r e t e r . She sketches o u t a p l a n for b e c o m i n g o n e : she w i l l g o to G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y ' s S c h o o l o f L a n g u a g e s and L i n g u i s t i c s t o learn the c r a f t a n d t h e n a p p l y f o r an a p p r e n t i c e s h i p at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h a t is a p l a n f o r b e c o m i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , is it not? It is a p l a n f o r the project of becoming
a
simultaneous
interpreter.
It
is
not
a
plan
for
or
b l u e p r i n t of the ability to be a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r . A n d note that b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r i s a n a b i l i t y : o n e has t o k n o w h o w t o b e o n e . T h e r e i s n o s k e t c h , p l a n , o r b l u e p r i n t f o r b e i n g this a b i l i t y .
1 3
In understand-
i n g h e r s e l f as a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , Jones does not sketch o u t a p l a n of the p r o j e c t of b e c o m i n g one; rather, she w o r k s at and exercises the a b i l i t y to be one. A n d this is w h a t H e i d e g g e r means by " p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o " a p o s s i b i l i t y , an ability. B u t there i s a d i f f i c u l t y i n d e v e l o p i n g the c o n c e p t o f p r o j e c t i o n .
1 4
When
H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s the language o f p r o j e c t i o n , h e m a k e s t w o c l a i m s a b o u t its r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s . F i r s t , h e w r i t e s , " . . . i n c a s t i n g , p r o j e c t i o n casts the p o s s i b i l i t y as p o s s i b i l i t y before i t s e l f a n d lets it be as s u c h , " (S&Z, p. 145). So, p r o j e c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s p o s s i b i l i t y or "lets it be." S e c o n d , " U n d e r s t a n d i n g is, a s p r o j e c t i o n , the sort o f b e i n g o f D a s e i n , i n w h i c h i t i s its p o s s i b i l i t i e s a s p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " (S&Z, p . 145). T h u s , i n v i r t u e o f p r o j e c t i o n , D a s e i n i s its p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t w o u l d seem that these t w o s t a t e m e n t s stand in t e n s i o n . On the one h a n d , p r o j e c t i o n s e e m i n g l y has as its o b j e c t a l l the p o s s i b l e w a y s i n w h i c h D a s e i n c o u l d be. I f t h i s w e r e so, t h e n J o n e s — w h o n o w c o n f r o n t s a range o f p o s s i b l e w a y s t o be, i n c l u d i n g b e i n g a G e r m a n d o c t o r a l student, b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s interpreter, b e i n g a c o m m e r c i a l transl a t o r — t h u s projects a l l o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . A f t e r a l l , one w o u l d t h i n k , t h e y are a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r her, a n d i t i s p r o j e c t i o n that lets t h e m be. O n the o t h e r hand, it w o u l d seem that p r o j e c t i o n has as its o b j e c t that (those) d e f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t y ( i e s ) f o r the sake o f w h i c h Jones i s n o w a c t i n g , her " f o r - t h e s a k e ( s ) - o f - w h i c h . " H e i d e g g e r says that Jones is her p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
This
i s one o f the
principal
burdens of Chs.
4 - 6 of Dreyfus,
15
She is the
Being-in-the-World.
I was first made aware of this difficulty by Ted Schatzki, w h o objected to my t a k i n g p r o j e c t i o n i n j u s t t h e n a r r o w sense e x p l o r e d b e l o w . B u t w h y w o u l d H e i d e g g e r t h e n use the p l u r a l ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' w h e n d e s c r i b i n g t h i s f u n c tion of projection? Because Dasein is never just one for-the-sake-of-which, but rather several or m a n y of t h e m at once
Jones is a s i m u l t a n e o u s interpreter, a l o y a l sister, a
c o n s c i e n t i o u s e m p l o y e e , etc.
185
p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , because she i s c u r r e n t l y p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o that p o s s i b i l i t y . She i s n o t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g a G e r m a n d o c t o r a l student, because she is not c u r r e n t l y pressing ahead i n t o that one. She is her f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h , a n d not the o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s that she forgoes. T h u s , there are t w o f u n c t i o n s here: o p e n i n g u p the range o f p o s s i b i l ities, a n d pressing ahead i n t o one o f t h e m ; H e i d e g g e r seems t o s u b s u m e b o t h o f t h e m under the n o t i o n o f p r o j e c t i o n . T h e r e i s g o o d reason t o b e l i e v e , h o w e v e r , that ' p r o j e c t i o n ' refers o n l y t o the
second
phenomenon,
namely,
determining
oneself as
someone
by
pressing ahead i n t o a p o s s i b l e w a y t o be. R e c a l l that H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s w h y understanding
always
presses
ahead
into
possibilities
by
pointing
to
projection: W h y does understanding, in accordance w i t h a l l essential dimensions of what can be disc l o s e d i n i t , a l w a y s press a h e a d i n t o p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? B e c a u s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g has i n i t s e l f the existential
structure
that
w e c a l l projection. (S&Z, p .
145)
U n d e r s t a n d i n g presses ahead i n t o p o s s i b i l i t i e s , p r e c i s e l y because u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y p r o j e c t i o n a n d p r o j e c t i o n j u s t i s p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o s o m e p o s s i b i l i t y . F u r t h e r s u p p o r t f o r this c l a i m can b e f o u n d i n C h a p t e r 2 o f D i v i s i o n T w o . I n his t r e a t m e n t o f w h a t h e calls " g u i l t , " H e i d e g g e r b r i e f l y explores Dasein's i n a b i l i t y to be t w o different possibilities at once. He writes, ...
a s a b l e - l o - b e [seinkiinnend], i t [ D a s e i n ] s t a n d s i n e a c h c a s e i n t h e o n e p o s s i b i l i t y o r t h e
o t h e r ; i t i s c o n s l a n t l y not s o m e o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y a n d h a s g i v e n i t u p i n i t s e x i s t e n t i e l l projection.
(S&Z,
p.
285)
I f p r o j e c t i o n w e r e the o p e n i n g u p o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s a s p o s s i b l e , s i m p l y a s such, then D a s e i n w o u l d n o t have t o g i v e u p one p o s s i b i l i t y i n v i r t u e o f p r o j e c t i n g a d i f f e r e n t one. S i n c e , h o w e v e r , i n p r o j e c t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , Jones presses ahead i n t o that p o s s i b i l i t y , she m u s t g i v e u p b e i n g a d o c t o r a l student. T h o u g h she c o u l d o p e n u p b o t h p o s s i b i l i ties, she c a n n o t press ahead i n t o b o t h o f t h e m . T h e r e f o r e , t o p r o j e c t o n e s e l f u p o n s o m e p o s s i b i l i t y i s t o press ahead i n t o i t . B u t h o w is this c o n c l u s i o n consistent w i t h Heidegger's c l a i m that it is p r o j e c t i o n that lets p o s s i b i l i t i e s bei A f t e r a l l , i f Jones can o n l y p r o j e c t hers e l f u p o n one o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , then i t w o u l d s e e m — i f the p r e c e d i n g a r g u m e n t is c o r r e c t — t h a t the others are n o t p o s s i b l e f o r her. B u t that is a strange c o n c l u s i o n at best! T h e s o l u t i o n to t h i s w o r r y lies in rec a l l i n g that H e i d e g g e r uses the t e r m ' p o s s i b i l i t y , ' w h e n a p p l i e d t o D a s e i n , t o refer t o a b i l i t i e s , not s i m p l y t o w a y s i n w h i c h one c o u l d be. A l t h o u g h i t i s p o s s i b l e for Jones to be a d o c t o r a l student in G e r m a n — s h e c o u l d pursue that w a y of l i f e — s h e has not set o u t to do so, she has n o t d e v e l o p e d any of the r e q u i s i t e s k i l l s , and she i s not i n any w a y p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o that p o s s i b i l -
186
i t y . T h o u g h she has the potential to be a d o c t o r a l s t u d e n t , she is ( c u r r e n t l y ) able to be one." The
Unattainabilit)'
not
1
Thesis
and Death
L e t us see w h e r e the a r g u m e n t thus far has gotten us. Suppose that Jones has some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , A. We k n o w (by the A b i l i t y T h e s i s ) that A is an a b i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . W e also k n o w ( b y the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s ) that Jones understands h e r s e l f as A. F i n a l l y , because u n d e r s t a n d i n g is cashed out in terms of p r o j e c t i o n , that is, in t e r m s of pressing ahead i n t o A, we can see that Jones m u s t be pressing ahead i n t o A. T h i s turns out to have a v e r y s u r p r i s i n g c o n sequence, however. C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g scenario. Jones sets out to d e v e l o p the a b i l i t y to r i d e a b i k e . She w o r k s at it f o r one year. At the e n d of this year, Jones is a s k i l l f u l b i k e r i d e r ; she has the a b i l i t y to r i d e a b i k e . N o w , I take it that she w o u l d c o n t i n u e to be a s k i l l f u l b i k e r i d e r , at least for a year or so, e v e n if she s t o p p e d r i d i n g her b i k e , say, three m o n t h s later. H e r a b i l i t y t o ride a b i k e w i l l deteriorate s l o w l y due to disuse. Nonetheless, it is correct to say that she s t i l l has the a b i l i t y for a w h i l e after she decides never to exercise it again. We can c o n c l u d e f r o m this that there is some p o i n t at w h i c h it is true to say of Jones that she has the a b i l i t y in such a w a y that she need no l o n g e r press ahead i n t o i t , a l t h o u g h i f she does n o t , she w i l l g r a d u a l l y lose i t . I s h a l l h e n c e f o r t h use the w o r d s ' a t t a i n ' and ' a t t a i n a b l e ' in a t e c h n i c a l sense: attainable:
A n a b i l i t y , A , i s attainable j u s t i n case there can b e some p o i n t in t i m e at w h i c h it is true to say of a person that she has A, even if she never tries to exercise A thereafter.
T h u s t y p i c a l l y , a b i l i t i e s are a t t a i n a b l e , because there is ( o r better, c a n be) s o m e p o i n t a t w h i c h one i s able t o exercise t h e m , e v e n i f one never tries t o do so again. Nevertheless, H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y does not perm i t a t t a i n a b i l i t y . R e c a l l that t o b e s o m e a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x i s t e n t i a l l y , D a s e i n m u s t press ahead i n t o i t . B u t a t t a i n a b i l i t y i s p r e c i s e l y that feature o f a b i l i t i e s that one can ( c o m e t o ) be able w i t h o u t h a v i n g further to press ahead i n t o t h e m . I n other w o r d s , H e i d e g g e r ' s account entails yet another thesis, the Unattainability Thesis:
D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are not a t t a i n able.
This contrast makes plain what is w r o n g w i t h Macrjuarrie and Robinson's translation of
'Seinki/nnen'
as
'potentiality-for-Being,'
rather than
187
as
'ability-to-be.'
B u t a s w e have seen w i t h the e x a m p l e o f r i d i n g a b i k e a b o v e , a b i l i t i e s d o seem to be attainable. So, H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t appears to e n t a i l an unacceptable c o n c l u s i o n . H e r e a g a i n the D u a l i t y T h e s i s u n d e r l i e s H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m , f o r t h e U n a t t a i n a b i l i t y Thesis applies o n l y to Dasein's self-interpretive abilities. T h a t is to say, since it is s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s that b e l o n g p r o p e r l y to D a s e i n , whereas factual a b i l i t i e s b e l o n g to D a s e i n o n l y as c o n c e i v e d as occurrent, the analysis o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y applies o n l y t o D a s e i n ' s s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s . Jones can attain the a b i l i t y to r i d e a b i k e , because she can w o r k o n her r i d i n g s k i l l s , d e v e l o p t h e m t o the p o i n t w h e r e she can r i d e w i t h ease, e v e n after she decides never to r i d e a g a i n . T h i s a b i l i t y is o c c u r r e n t , and Jones possesses it o n l y in so far as she can be c o n c e i v e d o c c u r r e n t l y ,
w
But
the a b i l i t y to be, say, a w e e k e n d b i k e enthusiast is a s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ( W h a t w e o r d i n a r i l y c a l l "the a b i l i t y t o r i d e a b i k e " i s a m i x o f a n o c c u r r e n t a b i l i t y to stay b a l a n c e d a n d m o v e f o r w a r d on a c o n t r a p t i o n of a c e r t a i n sort and a s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ) Jones is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t y , H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , o n l y in so far as she is c u r r e n t l y pressing ahead i n t o i t . I f she w e r e t o g i v e u p o n her h o b b y , she w o u l d t h e n c e f o r t h n o l o n g e r b e a w e e k e n d b i k e enthusiast. W e are, m o r e o v e r , not d e a l i n g here s i m p l y w i t h a n i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l a n d r e m o t e repercussion of the arcana of H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g y . T h e m a n y theses I have d r a w n out of Being and Time do not c o n s t i t u t e j u s t the o n t o l o g i c a l i n frastructure o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c . T h e y also m a k e space f o r one 1
of his m o r e c o n c r e t e and salient c o n c e p t s , death. 1 have a r g u e d e l s e w h e r e * that ' d e a t h , ' as H e i d e g g e r uses i t , does not p i c k out the event that happens at the end o f every h u m a n b e i n g ' s l i f e . I t denotes, rather, a c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h one can f i n d oneself, the c o n d i t i o n o f not b e i n g able t o b e a n y o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r . T h i s i n a b i l i t y , here c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n terms o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y , is the same p h e n o m e n o n that H e i d e g g e r describes a f f e c t i v e l y in his d i s cussion of anxiety. To be anxious is to find all ways to be Dasein equally irr e l e v a n t o r u n i n t e r e s t i n g . S u c h a n affective d i s p o s i t i o n w o u l d disable D a s e i n f r o m b e i n g anyone, because D a s e i n w o u l d not have the a f f e c t i v e g r o u n d s for e x e r c i s i n g any p a r t i c u l a r a b i l i t y - t o - b e . W h a t i s r e l e v a n t here i s t h i s : i f one o f D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t i e s - t o - b e w e r e att a i n e d , D a s e i n c o u l d n o t then, and f o r a w h i l e thereafter, d i e i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense. Suppose that Jones c o u l d a t t a i n the a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r . I f she attained i t i n F e b r u a r y , then i t w o u l d s i m p l y be false to describe her then as not able to be a n y o n e : she w o u l d be able to be 1 1
R e c a l l the d i s t i n c t i o n ( d r a w n above on p. 7) between and
occurrent'
Occurrent'
i n the n a r r o w sense,
i n the b r o a d sense. T h e a b i l i t y t o r i d e a b i k e i s o c c u r r e n t i n the b r o a d
sense, but n o t in the n a r r o w . ( I t s u r e l y does d e p e n d u p o n h u m a n p r a c t i c e s ) '*
T h e interpretation of
d e a t h ' that 1 sketch here is unusual
and justify it at length in my article, "Concept of Death."
188
I spell it out in greater detail
a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r . T h i s a b i l i t y w o u l d b e l i k e the factual a b i l i t y t o r i d e a b i k e . E v e n i f she r e n o u n c e d i t , she w o u l d s t i l l b e able t o exercise i t . So, n o matter w h a t a f f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n she fell i n t o i n M a r c h , i t w o u l d s t i l l be true that she is able to be a s i m u l t a n e o u s interpreter. She c o u l d not die in M a r c h , i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense. B u t i t i s c e n t r a l t o H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g that it can d i e , in this sense, at any t i m e . T h i s last c l a i m i s f o u n d a t i o n a l for m u c h o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r says after C h a p t e r 1 o f D i v i s i o n T w o , w h e r e h e i n t r o d u c e s and d e v e l o p s his c o n c e p t o f d e a t h . W i t h o u t i t , h e c a n n o t p r o c e e d t o his d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , since they are w a y s o f r e s p o n d i n g t o the p o s s i b i l i t y o f death, and e s p e c i a l l y ( i n the case of a u t h e n t i c i t y ) to its u n i v e r s a l and constant p o s s i b i l i t y . W i t h o u t the c o n c e p t o f death, h e also cannot get his d i s c u s s i o n o f t e m p o r a l i t y o f f the g r o u n d .
1 9
I n fact, the entirety o f D i v i s i o n T w o o f Being
and Time is d e p e n d e n t u p o n the l e g i t i m a c y of H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t of d e a t h . A n d I h a v e been a r g u i n g that t h i s c o n c e p t w o u l d b e i d l e w i t h o u t the U n a t t a i n a b i l i t y T h e s i s . L o o k i n g at the e x t e n d e d a r g u m e n t of Being and Time f r o m the other e n d , we can see that H e i d e g g e r departs f r o m the c o m m o n exist e n t i a l i s t p r o n o u n c e m e n t captured by the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s , and this d r i v e s h i m t o the A b i l i t y , D u a l i t y , a n d U n a t t a i n a b i l i t y Theses. T h i s last i n t u r n , then, leads h i m , via his concept o f death, i n t o his discussions o f a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d t e m p o r a l i t y . A l l o f the theses here e x p l o r e d c o n t r i b u t e t o H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g y o f the h u m a n , w h i c h w e can n o w see t o b e a d u a l i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a n e n t i t y c o n s t i t u t e d b y its u n a t t a i n a b l e , s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s 2
tics. "
References B l a t t n e r , W i l l i a m D. " T h e C o n c e p t of D e a t h in Being and Time." Man and World 27 ( 1 9 9 4 ) : 4 9 - 7 0 . B l a t t n e r , W i l l i a m D . " E x i s t e n t i a l T e m p o r a l i t y i n Being and Time ( W h y H e i -
degger is not a P r a g m a t i s t ) . " In Heidegger: A Critical Reader, edited by H u b e r t L . D r e y f u s and H a r r i s o n H a l l , pp. 9 9 - 1 2 9 . O x f o r d : B a s i l B l a c k well,
1992.
C a p u t o , J o h n . " H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r , and the Q u e s t i o n o f a ' H e r m e n e u t i c '
P h e n o m e n o l o g y . " In A Companion to Martin Heidegger's
"Being and
Time, e d i t e d b y Joseph J . K o c k e l m a n s , p p . 1 0 4 - 1 2 6 . W a s h i n g t o n , D C : T h e U n i v e r s i t y Press o f A m e r i c a , 1986.
A g a i n , m y o w n v i e w s l i e p a r t l y i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d h e r e , t h o u g h o n Ihe g e n e r a l assert i o n m a n y i n t e r p r e t e r s w o u l d a g r e e . See B l a l l n e r , " E x i s t e n t i a l T e m p o r a l i t y . " 1
want to thank Terry
Pinkard, Wayne
D a v i s , and t w o a n o n y m o u s referees
h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s o n a n earlier v e r s i o n o f this paper, and the G e o r g e t o w n
for their
University
G r a d u a t e S c h o o l for a S u m m e r A c a d e m i c Research G r a n t for S u m m e r , 1993, w h i c h I used to w r i t e this paper.
189
Dreyfus,
Hubert
L.
Being-in-the-World.
Cambridge:
Massachusetts
Institute
o f T e c h n o l o g y Press, 1 9 9 1 . Guignon,
Charles
B.
Heidegger and the
Problem
of Knowledge.
Indianapolis:
H a c k e t t P u b l i s h i n g , 1983. H e i d e g g e r , M a r t i n . Being and Time. T r a n s l a t e d by John M a c q u a r r i e and E d w a r d R o b i n s o n . N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r and R o w , 1962. H e i d e g g e r , M a r t i n . Sein und Zeit.
15th ed. Tübingen: M a x N i e m a y e r V e r l a g ,
1979. Kierkegaard,
S0ren.
The Sickness
Unto
Death.
Translated
by
Howard
V.
H o n g and E d n a H . H o n g . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980. O r t e g a y Gasset, Jose. " H i s t o r y as a S y s t e m . " T r a n s l a t e d by H e l e n e W e y l . In History
as
a
System
and
Other
Essays
Toward
a
Philosophy
of History.
N e w Y o r k : W . W . Norton, 1961. Sartre,
Jean-Paul.
Existentialism
and
Humanism.
Translated
by
Philip
M a i r e t . L o n d o n : M e t h u e n , 1948. Schmitt,
Richard.
Martin
Heidegger on
Being Human.
H o u s e , 1969.
190
New
York:
Random
HEIDEGGER'S
"AUTHENTICITY" CHARLES
REVISITED
B. GUIGNON
I N h i s r e c e n t b o o k o n H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t o f a u t h e n t i c i t y , Eclipse o f the Self, M i c h a e l Z i m m e r m a n p o i n t s o u t H e i d e g g e r ' s l i f e - l o n g a t t e m p t to l i n k the theoretical-ontological questions of t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y w i t h t h e p e r s o n a l - e x i s t e n t i a l issues o f e v e r y d a y l i f e .
1
T h e a i m o f g r o u n d i n g t h e " q u e s t i o n o f B e i n g " i n a deeper, m o r e a u t h e n t i c w a y o f b e i n g h u m a n i s m o s t s t r i k i n g l y e v i d e n t i n Being and Time.
There the seemingly m o s t abstract of a l l metaphysical
q u e s t i o n s — W h a t i s t h e m e a n i n g o f B e i n g ? — i s posed i n t e r m s o f the most intensely personal question facing any i n d i v i d u a l — W h a t is
the
meaning
of
human
existence?
To
answer
the
former
question appropriately, Heidegger claims, we must t r a n s f o r m our approach
to
the
latter.
And
this
a l t e r a t i o n in the q u a l i t y of our lives.
in
turn
requires
a radical
Despite Heidegger's insistence
t h a t his ontological findings have no evaluative i m p o r t , the exhort a t i v e tone of the account of a u t h e n t i c i t y is u n m i s t a k a b l e .
He
quotes w i t h full approval C o u n t Yorck's description o f his o w n philosophy: "The p r a c t i c a l a i m of o u r standpoint is pedagogical in t h e b r o a d e s t sense o f t h e w o r d " ( p . 4 0 2 ) .
2
Its goal is "to make
p o s s i b l e t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y " ( p . 403).
E m e r g i n g out
1
Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity ( A t h e n s , O h i o : O h i o U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1981). P a g e r e f e r e n c e s in p a r e n t h e s e s a r e to Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: M a x N i e m e y e r V e r l a g , 1972). I h a v e g e n e r a l l y followed the M a c q u a r r i e a n d R o b i n s o n t r a n s l a t i o n of Being and Time ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r & R o w , 1962), a l t h o u g h r e v i s i o n s h a v e been m a d e w h e r e n e c e s s a r y . T o w a r d the end of Being and Time, H e i d e g g e r cites the letters of C o u n t Y o r c k f r o m h i s correspondence w i t h W i l h e l m D i l t h e y . D i l t h e y h a d m a d e the s a m e c l a i m about the p r a c t i c a l e n d s o f h i s philosophy: ' T h e f r u i t a n d goal o f a l l t r u e philosophy is pedagogy in the b r o a d e s t sense, the c u l t i v a t i o n of m a n " (Gesammelte Schriften, 8: 7, quoted by M i c h a e l E r m a r t h in Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason [ C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1981], p.35). 2
Review of Metaphysics 38 (December 1984): 321-339. Copyright © 1985 by the Review of
Metaphysics
191
322
CHARLES
of an
age
period
that
shaken
perceived by
i t s e l f as
intellectual
a
GUIGNON
of p r o f o u n d c r i s i s ,
time of
currents
Β.
relativism,
a
scientific
m a t e r i a l i s m , D a r w i n i s m , and the complete secularization of life, Being
and
enlosigkeit)
Time of
attempts
the
to
combat
contemporary
the
world
"groundlessness"
by
uncovering
(Bod-
enduring
v a l u e s a n d m e a n i n g s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f " w o r l d l i n e s s " (Welt lichkeit)
and
human
finitude.
The
"question
of
Being"
is
no
e x e r c i s e i n a r c a n e s p e c u l a t i o n ; i t s a i m i s t o r e s t o r e a sense o f t h e gravity
and
responsibility
of
existence
by
recovering
a
more
p r o f o u n d g r a s p o f w h a t i t i s t o be. 3 Z i m m e r m a n ' s book provides a useful c o r r e c t i v e to some pop ularized " e x i s t e n t i a l i s t " readings of the concept of a u t h e n t i c i t y as a m a t t e r o f b e i n g " t r u e t o oneself," w h e r e t h i s " s e l f " i s u n d e r s t o o d a s c o n s i s t i n g o f " i n n e r " f e e l i n g s , needs, a n d d r i v e s .
By character
i z i n g i n a u t h e n t i c i t y a s " e g o i s m , " Z i m m e r m a n frees t h e n o t i o n o f authenticity
from
its
associations
with
self-preoccupation
and
reminds us of Heidegger's emphasis on i n v o l v e m e n t in the w o r l d a s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e self. 4 Being and
Time is
B u t Z i m m e r m a n ' s c e n t r a l thesis t h a t
"subjectivistic,"
and
t h a t it p r e s e n t s
a "volun-
5
as solely a
taristic-individualistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a u t h e n t i c i t y "
m a t t e r o f p e r s o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , seems o n e - s i d e d a n d
mis
leading,
that
especially
in
the
l i g h t of Heidegger's
this w o r k had overcome subjectivism.6
later claims
By overlooking the p r o g r a m
3
H e i d e g g e r ' s a i m of " r e t r i e v i n g " a " m o r e p r i m o r d i a l " s e n s e of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e a s teleological a n d a s b e l o n g i n g t o a w i d e r s o c i a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t finds a p a r a l l e l in A l a s d a i r M a c l n t y r e ' s After Virtue ( N o t r e D a m e : U n i v e r s i t y o f N o t r e D a m e P r e s s , 1981). 4 N e v e r t h e l e s s Z i m m e r m a n ' s c l a i m t h a t " i t i s n a t u r a l for u s t o objectify o u r s e l v e s s i n c e we live in a w o r l d of o b j e c t s " (Eclipse of the Self, p. 47) b e t r a y s a deep confusion a b o u t t h e c o n c e p t i o n of w o r l d h o o d in Being and Time. F o r H e i d e g g e r , we do not live in a w o r l d of objects; we live, for the m o s t p a r t , in a " r e a d y - t o - h a n d " c o n t e x t of e q u i p m e n t a l r e l a t i o n s o r g a n i z e d into a web o f m e a n s / e n d s r e l a t i o n s . F o r t h e s a m e r e a s o n it is w r o n g to s a y t h a t o u r everyday s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g is e g o i s t i c a l o r self-objectifying. J u s t a s i t i s t h e c a s e t h a t a n e q u i p m e n t a l c o n t e x t c a n be e n c o u n t e r e d as a c o l l e c t i o n of b r u t e o b j e c t s ( t h e " p r e s e n t a t - h a n d " ) only w i t h the breakdown of B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , so t h e " s e l f " c a n b e e n c o u n t e r e d a s a n "ego" o n l y w h e n e v e r y d a y n e s s h a s c o l l a p s e d . 5
Eclipse of the Self, p. 199. F o r instance, in " T h e L e t t e r on H u m a n i s m " w h i c h states that Being and Time " a b a n d o n s s u b j e c t i v i t y , " and in " T h e E s s e n c e of T r u t h " according to w h i c h "every kind of anthropology and a l l subjectivity of m a n as s u b j e c t is . . . left b e h i n d in t h a t w o r k " ( b o t h in D. F. K r e l l , ed., 6
192
HEIDEGGER'S
for
Being
"AUTHENTICITY"
and
Time
as
a
REVISITED
whole,
323
Eclipse
of
the
Self
t r i v i a l i z e the achievement of Heidegger's greatest w o r k .
tends
to
Zimmer-
m a n ' s t r e a t m e n t of a u t h e n t i c i t y in Being and Time seems d e f i c i e n t i n a t least t h r e e i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s .
First, it fails to account f o r
the methodological role of the concept of a u t h e n t i c i t y in fundamental ontology.
Second, i t ignores a n a p p a r e n t inconsistency i n
Heidegger's account of a u t h e n t i c i t y w h i c h , when examined caref u l l y , reveals t h e d e p t h a n d c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n existence
in
Being
and
Time.
And,
third,
it
tends
to
treat
the
d i s c u s s i o n o f " a u t h e n t i c h i s t o r i c i t y " i n a n excessively s u b j e c t i v i s t i c w a y , a n d hence f a i l s t o s h o w i t s i n t e g r a l place i n t h e p l a n f o r t h e w o r k as a w h o l e .
7
I s h a l l t a k e u p each o f these i n t e r r e l a t e d issues
in turn.
I The m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r o l e t h a t the concept o f a u t h e n t i c i t y plays i n Being and Time w i l l b e c o m e a p p a r e n t i f w e r e v i e w t h e p r o g r a m of that work.
Heidegger's e x p l i c i t a i m is to w o r k out the "question
of B e i n g " : t h a t is, to d e v e l o p a "science of Being as such" ( p . 230) w h i c h w i l l provide "a genealogy o f the different possible w a y s o f B e i n g " ( p . 11) a n d a c c o u n t f o r i t s " m o d e s a n d d e r i v a t i v e s " ( p . 18). B u t such a n i n q u i r y r e m a i n s " n a i v e a n d o p a q u e , " w e a r e t o l d , i f
B a s i c Writings [ N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r & R o w , 1977], p. 207 a n d p. 141, respectively). Z i m m e r m a n ' s d i s m i s s a l of Heidegger's own comments on his e a r l i e r w o r k s w i t h the a s s e r t i o n t h a t "Heidegger's s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s m u s t be t a k e n w i t h a g r a i n of s a l t " (Eclipse of the Self, p. 77) s e e m s slightly cavalier. T h a t Z i m m e r m a n sees H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f h i s t o r i c i t y a n d h i s t o r y at the end of the p u b l i s h e d p a r t of Being and Time as e x t r a n e o u s t o the p r o j e c t a s a w h o l e i s r e v e a l e d b y h i s c o m m e n t i n a n e a r l i e r e s s a y : " I t s e e m s a s i f the e n t i r e a n a l y s i s o f D a s e i n ' s ' h i s t o r i c a l i t y ' w a s o n l y 'tacked on' to the end of Being and Time a n d s e e m s not to h a v e p l a y e d a v i t a l role in t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e l e a d i n g i d e a of t h e w o r k itself" ( " T h e F o u n d e r i n g of Being and Time" Philosophy Today 19 [ S u m m e r 1975]: 104). In Eclipse of the Self, t h e a t t e m p t to d e s c r i b e t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n D a s e i n ' s t e m p o r a l i t y a n d t h e a u t h e n t i c h i s t o r i c i t y of a people i s t e r m e d " u l t i m a t e l y u n s a t i s f y i n g " (p. x x i v ) for r e a s o n s t h a t a r e n e v e r made very clear. T h e d i s c u s s i o n of h i s t o r y in Being and Time is f o u n d to be i n a d e q u a t e b e c a u s e it f a i l s to a c c o u n t for t h e l a t e r c o n c e p t of "the h i s t o r y o f B e i n g " a s opposed t o h u m a n h i s t o r y . I n m y o p i n i o n , h o w e v e r , the l a t e r t a l k o f Seinsgeschick o r " d e s t i n y o f B e i n g " o n l y m a k e s s e n s e i n t e r m s o f the i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t i o n o f h i s t o r y i n t h e e a r l i e r w o r k . 7
193
324
CHARLES
Β.
GUIGNON
i t f a i l s t o f i r s t c o n s i d e r " t h e meaning o f B e i n g i n g e n e r a l " ( p . 1 1 ; my emphasis).
The investigation i n t o the m e a n i n g of B e i n g makes
u p t h e f i r s t stage o f f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y .
This investigation
itself, however, requires a p r e l i m i n a r y i n q u i r y i n t o the B e i n g of t h e e n t i t y w h i c h understands w h a t i t m e a n s t o be.
The "funda
m e n t a l q u e s t i o n , " H e i d e g g e r says, i s " t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B e i n g , f r o m w h i c h a l l specific questions relative to B e i n g arise."8
O n l y i f w e have c l a r i f i e d t h e
h o r i z o n i n w h i c h B e i n g i s u n d e r s t o o d c a n w e pose t h e q u e s t i o n o f Being
in
the
proper
way.
C o n s e q u e n t l y Being and
Time
begins
w i t h a n " e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c " w h i c h examines h u m a n existence o r "Dasein" as the arena in w h i c h there is an understanding of Being. The goal is to find c e r t a i n "essential s t r u c t u r e s " or " e x i s t e n t i a l i a " t h a t c o n s t i t u t e D a s e i n b y i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e " e x i s t e n t i e l l " o r specific instances of Dasein—ourselves. The route to the question of B e i n g therefore begins w i t h a self-interpretation. proper
mode
of
B u t t h i s a p p r o a c h raises t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e
access
to
the
entity
being
examined.
Since
f u n d a m e n t a l ontology is supposed to lay a f o u n d a t i o n f o r such r e g i o n a l sciences a s taking
over
particular, it
their
biology and psychology, it cannot assumptions
m u s t set aside
about
the
the
nature
of
begin man.
by In
presuppositions of t r a d i t i o n a l
epistemology w h i c h compress h u m a n existence i n t o the status of a k n o w i n g subject collecting and processing "experiences."
More
over, Heidegger's c r i t i q u e o f C a r t e s i a n i s m reveals t h a t t h e r e can be no " i m m e d i a t e " self-knowledge a r r i v e d at t h r o u g h introspection or reflection.
O u r " d i r e c t " u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ourselves is always
the product of a template of t r a d i t i o n a l schematizations w h i c h c i r c u l a t e a s " c o m m o n sense" i n o u r c u l t u r e , a n d t e n d t o d i s t o r t a n d disguise as m u c h as they reveal. ourselves
and
our
world
is
Since o u r w a y of i n t e r p r e t i n g
mediated
by
social
and
historical
c a t e g o r i e s a n d c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s , o u r n o r m a l , " s e l f - e v i d e n t " selfi n t e r p r e t a t i o n is generally a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In order to start f r o m a neutral standpoint, then, the existential a n a l y t i c b e g i n s b y l a y i n g o u t o u r p l a i n sense o f w h a t i t i s t o b e a s this
is found
" p r o x i m a l l y and for the most p a r t "
8
in everyday
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, t r a n s . J. S. C h u r c h i l l ( B l o o m ington: I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962), p. 240. I h a v e modified the t r a n s l a t i o n to m a k e it c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Being and Time
194
HEIDEGGER'S
"AUTHENTICITY"
REVISITED
325
active situations p r i o r to reflection. Our n o r m a l , involved practical d e a l i n g s in t h e w o r l d a l w a y s e m b o d y a "vague average understanding of Being" (p. 5 ) , H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , a n d t h i s " p r e - o n t o l o g i c a l understanding of B e i n g " can be described in order to develop a " p r e l i m i n a r y " basis f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g D a s e i n . B u t i n s o f a r a s t h i s e v e r y d a y p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s s t i l l i n f e c t e d b y d i s t o r t i o n s conveyed t o u s b y o u r s o c i a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , i t i s necessary t o engage i n a deep i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f " e v e r y d a y n e s s " t o r e v e a l i t s u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e a n d c o n t e n t . H e i d e g g e r ' s use o f t h e t e r m " h e r m e n e u t i c s " f o r t h e m e t h o d o f t h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c i n d i c a t e s t h a t h e sees our ordinary self-understanding as a k i n d of text-analogue w h i c h can be i n t e r p r e t e d to b r i n g to l i g h t its hidden m e a n i n g . In conceiving of Dasein's existence as l i k e a t e x t w h i c h is to b e i n t e r p r e t e d , h o w e v e r , H e i d e g g e r exposes t h e a n a l y s i s o f D a s e i n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e " h e r m e n e u t i c c i r c l e . " A t t h e o u t s e t o f Being and Time (sec. 2) he c o n s i d e r s one v e r s i o n of t h i s p r o b l e m . It is generally agreed t h a t a p a r t of a t e x t can o n l y be understood in t e r m s o f some p r e l i m i n a r y g r a s p o f t h e w h o l e . In order to u n d e r s t a n d a parable in the Gospels, for instance, I m u s t unders t a n d i t i n t e r m s o f t h e C h r i s t i a n message o f t h e N e w T e s t a m e n t . S i m i l a r l y , Heidegger argues, i n o r d e r t o i n q u i r e i n t o the B e i n g o f D a s e i n , I m u s t h a v e some p r e l i m i n a r y g r a s p o f w h a t Being i n general is, f o r o t h e r w i s e h o w w o u l d I k n o w i t i s t h a t e n t i t y ' s Being I a m d i s c o v e r i n g b y t h e a n a l y s i s a n d n o t s o m e t h i n g else? B u t since t h e m e a n i n g o f B e i n g i n g e n e r a l w a s t o b e u n c o v e r e d b y f i r s t e x a m i n i n g D a s e i n , t h e r e seems t o b e a c i r c l e : w e c a n o n l y i d e n t i f y the Being of Dasein if we have a p r i o r grasp of Being in general, y e t we can only d e t e r m i n e the m e a n i n g of B e i n g in general by w o r k i n g out the Being of Dasein. Heidegger's solution to this p r o b l e m is to begin w i t h our vague average u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B e i n g a n d use i t a s a " p r e l i m i n a r y " and "tentative" horizon of understanding for i n q u i r i n g into the B e i n g o f D a s e i n . O n t h e basis o f t h i s f i r s t a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n , i t w i l l t h e n be necessary t o r e v i s e o u r i n i t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B e i n g . T h i s revision w i l l then generate a new horizon o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B e i n g t h a t w i l l e n a b l e us t o " r e p e a t " t h e a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n " o n a h i g h e r a n d a u t h e n t i c a l l y o n t o l o g i c a l b a s i s " ( p . 17). B u t i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t t h i s n e w a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n w i l l once a g a i n disclose a new horizon for u n d e r s t a n d i n g B e i n g in general, and so on into a seemingly i n t e r m i n a b l e s p i r a l of back a n d f o r t h movements
195
326
CHARLES
Β.
GUIGNON
between the grasp of Being as a whole and the interpretation of the Being of Dasein. Our pre-understanding of Being assures us that we can initiate the inquiry. What is problematic here is how there can be a closure for the hermeneutic of Dasein. This problem is aggravated by Heidegger's claim that we are "constantly com pelled to face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and universal horizon" at each stage (p. 26), so that the need may always arise for new repetitions. What is required, then, is some criterion that will determine when we have arrived at the ultimate horizon for understanding the meaning of Being. The second version of the problem of the hermeneutic circle arises because of the need for a background of presuppositions in any interpretation. Every interpretation is mediated by a "forestructure" of anticipations and assumptions about what is being interpreted. Since these presuppositions regulate the ways in which things can stand out for us, Heidegger says that there can be no such thing as a "presuppositionless apprehending of some thing presented to us" (p. 150). Even when one is engaged in exact textual interpretation and wants "to appeal to what 'stands there' . . . one finds that what stands there in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption of the person who does the interpreting" (p. 150). There can be no direct encounter with "bare facts" or "things in themselves" independent of the prior assumptions projected by the understanding. It follows, then, that the interpretation of Dasein is regulated in advance by a "totality of 'presuppositions'" which is called the "hermeneutical situation" (p. 232). In the case of the existential analytic, what is presupposed is a "formal idea of existence" (p. 314). But the question arises of how we are to justify this initial presupposition. In section 63, Heidegger asks about the "evidence" for the correctness of his interpretation (p. 312). Since the analytic of Dasein has been "already illumined by the 'presupposed' idea of existence," he asks, "where does this idea get its justifica tion?" (p. 313). What makes it "binding for everyone?" (p. 312). Starting from different presuppositions, one might have arrived at very different conclusions. The problem here, then, is how to provide a confirmation for the presuppositions that have guided the interpretation. In the context of Being and Time it seems that the solution to the problems of closure and confirmation is to be found in the
196
HEIDEGGER'S
notion
"AUTHENTICITY"
of authenticity.
327
REVISITED
H e i d e g g e r says
that "truth
which
is
p r i m o r d i a l and authentic must guarantee the understanding of t h e B e i n g o f D a s e i n a n d o f B e i n g i n g e n e r a l " ( p . 316).
W h e n one
has become a u t h e n t i c , one w i l l a c h i e v e a " c l e a r i n g a w a y o f c o n cealments and
obscurities"
(p.
129)
in
order
to
" t r a n s p a r e n t " a b o u t " t h e truth of existence" (p. 221). to
the
confirmation
of
the
presuppositions
that
become
fully
W i t h respect make
up
the
" h e r m e n e u t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , " b e c o m i n g a u t h e n t i c w i l l e n a b l e us t o j u s t i f y t h e " f o r m a l i d e a o f e x i s t e n c e " t h a t has g u i d e d t h e i n t e r pretation.
When
whether,
the
has
as
been
Dasein
entity
disclosed
it
in
the
Heidegger's emphasis).
is
is,
authentic,
it
has
projection
the
it
can
composition
of its formal
"decide for itself of Being
aspects"
(p.
which 315;
W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e closure
o f t h e cycle o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , H e i d e g g e r suggests t h a t b e c o m i n g a u t h e n t i c w i l l also e n a b l e us t o k n o w w h e n w e h a v e r e a c h e d t h e " u l t i m a t e " horizon for understanding Being. the
deepest h o r i z o n
of understanding,
We have a r r i v e d at
according to
Heidegger,
w h e n w e have u n c o v e r e d t h e p r i m o r d i a l "sources," " w e l l s p r i n g s , " "origins," and native " s o i l " of our everyday way of grasping w h a t i t is t o be. layers
A s a u t h e n t i c , w e w i l l be able t o peel off t h e h a r d e n e d
of "customary,
traditional
theories
and
opinions
about
B e i n g " (p. 6 ) i n o r d e r t o r e c o v e r " t h e s o i l [Boden] f r o m w h i c h t h e basic o n t o l o g i c a l concepts g r e w " ( p . 3 ) .
The a i m is to demonstrate
" t h e o r i g i n o f o u r basic o n t o l o g i c a l concepts b y a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e i r b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e i s d i s p l a y e d " ( p . 22), a n d t h i s c a n b e achieved o n l y w h e n w e h a v e become a u t h e n t i c . C l a r i f y i n g t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r o l e o f a u t h e n t i c i t y helps t o explain w h y this notion is not merely normative in intent. also s h o w s placed
on
that the
there
is
a
tremendous
concept o f a u t h e n t i c i t y .
methodological If authenticity
But it burden refers
m e r e l y t o decisiveness a b o u t one's " o w n specific p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " a s Z i m m e r m a n a s s e r t s , t h e n i t w i l l n o t be a b l e t o m e e t i t s m e t h o d ological obligations.
9
F o r t h o s e specific p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e " e x i s t e n -
9
Eclipse of the Self, PP- 72 a n d 75. See a l s o p. 6 1 : " t h e r e s o l u t e i n d i v i d u a l is always open to a p a r t i c u l a r group of possibilities: his o w n " ; a n d p . 75: " a n i n d i v i d u a l m u s t r e l i n q u i s h t h e n u m e r o u s s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f f e r e d b y t h e ' t h e y ' [ i . e . , das Man]." B e c a u s e o f t h i s e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l willfulness and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , cut off f r o m any social r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , Z i m m e r m a n can say t h a t " H e i d e g g e r tends t o i n t e r p r e t authenticity in a romantic way: the self-willed individual struggling
197
CHARLES
328
Β.
GUIGNON
t i e l l " a n d , a s w e s h a l l see l a t e r , d r a w n f r o m t h e r a n g e o f selfi n t e r p r e t a t i o n s m a d e accessible i n t h e p u b l i c w o r l d , s o t h a t r e l a t i n g t o t h e m , even w i t h
the
" t r a n s p a r e n c y " o f r e s o l u t e n e s s , does
not
seem t o p r o m i s e t h e k i n d o f o n t o l o g i c a l " c o n t e n t " needed t o g r o u n d fundamental ontology.
A n d w i t h o u t s u c h a c o n t e n t , i t seems t h a t
Heidegger's project o f developing a "science o f B e i n g " w i l l have to be scuttled.
In the interpretation of authenticity that follows,
t h e n , i t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y t o k e e p t h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d e s i d e r a t u m in mind. II There
are
a
number
of
inconsistencies
in
Being
and
Time
w h i c h m u s t b e h a n d l e d b y o p t i n g f o r one l i n e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n rather than another.
F o r e x a m p l e , H e i d e g g e r g e n e r a l l y speaks o f
two "modes" of Dasein's way of b e i n g — a u t h e n t i c i t y and
inauth
e n t i c i t y — b u t o n a t l e a s t one o c c a s i o n h e m e n t i o n s a n " u n d i f f e r entiated mode," suggesting t h a t there m i g h t be three.
There
is
also some u n c e r t a i n t y as to w h e t h e r "everydayness," o u r essential i n v o l v e m e n t in day-to-day preoccupations, is necessarily i n a u t h e n t i c or not.
Z i m m e r m a n deals w i t h these inconsistencies b y c o n c l u d i n g
t h a t the undifferentiated mode of everydayness is " n e u t r a l , " w h i l e authenticity and
i n a u t h e n t i c i t y i n v o l v e d e l i b e r a t e choices
h o w one w i l l l i v e . 1 0
concept of a u t h e n t i c i t y , one
of
the
most
as
to
B u t , s u r p r i s i n g l y in a book devoted to t h e he fails to consider w h a t appears
glaring
inconsistencies
in
Being
and
to
be
Time—one
w h i c h , w h e n analyzed, lights up the richness of Heidegger's view of being human.11
m i g h t i l y to b r e a k free f r o m c o n v e n t i o n a l v a l u e s so he can achieve his own possibilities" (p. 96; my e m p h a s i s ) . No c l u e is g i v e n as to w h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s "own p o s s i b i l i t i e s " m i g h t be. 10 Eclipse of the Self, pp. 44fT. It s h o u l d be noted, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e is a g r e a t d e a l of t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e against t h i s l i n e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Heidegger's statement that " D a s e i n a l w a y s understands itself in terms of i t s e x i s t e n c e — i n t e r m s of a p o s s i b i l i t y of itself: to be i t s e l f or n o t i t s e l f " (p. 12) s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e a r e r e a l l y o n l y two p o s s i b i l i t i e s , a s does t h e c o n f u s i n g l y t r a n s l a t e d p a s s a g e on p. 68 of the E n g l i s h e d i t i o n : " A n d because D a s e i n is in each case essentially its own possibility, it c a n , i n its B e i n g , 'choose' i t s e l f a n d w i n itself; i t c a n [ a l s o ] lose itself, i.e., n e v e r w i n i t s e l f a n d o n l y ' s e e m ' to do s o " (p. 42). 11 T o the best o f m y k n o w l e d g e t h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y h a s o n l y been d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l b y J o a n S t a m b a u g h i n " A n I n q u i r y into A u t h e n t i c i t y
198
H E I D E G G E R ' S "AUTHENTICITY" REVISITED
329
T h e inconsistency arises i n the f o l l o w i n g w a y .
In the early
stages o f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f D a s e i n i n i t s " a v e r a g e e v e r y d a y n e s s , " Heidegger points out Dasein's tendency to c o n f o r m i s m . everyday affairs, we tend
to
In our
handle equipment in standardized
ways and d r i f t i n t o the socially approved slots laid out in the public w o r l d .
W e a c t a s a n y o n e does.
The " I " o f everyday agency
i s n o t s o m e t h i n g u n i q u e , H e i d e g g e r t e l l s us; i t i s "das Man," t h e anonymous "one" or the "Anyone."
Our temptation to f a l l
in
w i t h t h e c r o w d i s t h e basis f o r t h e w e l l - k n o w n i n d i c t m e n t o f t h e Anyone
in
Being
and
Time.
But
at
the
end
of
his
critique
H e i d e g g e r says t h a t b e i n g t h e A n y o n e i s n o t j u s t a n e r r o r t h a t could be avoided. or
essential
On the c o n t r a r y , the A n y o n e is an existentiale
f a c e t of D a s e i n ' s
positive constitution"
(p.
129).
Being, For
this
and
it
reason
"belongs
to
Dasein's
Heidegger
claims
that authenticity is only an "existentiell mode" of our essential w a y of b e i n g as the Anyone: A u t h e n t i c B e i n g - o n e ' s - s e l f [eigentliche Selbstsein] does not r e s t u p o n an e x c e p t i o n a l condition of the subject, a c o n d i t i o n t h a t h a s been detached f r o m the A n y o n e ; it is rather an existentiell modification of the Anyone—of the Anyone as an essential existentiale. (p. 130) The p r i o r i t y of the A n y o n e is reemphasized
later in
the
text:
" A u t h e n t i c Being-one's-self takes the definite f o r m of an e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e A n y o n e . . . " ( p . 267).
B u t H e i d e g g e r seems
t o r e v e r s e t h i s o r d e r o f p r i o r i t i e s e l s e w h e r e w h e n h e suggests t h a t i t i s authenticity t h a t i s p r i o r , a n d t h a t b e i n g a n A n y o n e i s a n "existentiell mode."
He states t h a t
p r o x i m a l l y a n d for the m o s t p a r t D a s e i n is not itself b u t is lost in the A n y o n e - s e l f [Man-selbst], w h i c h is an e x i s t e n t i e l l modification of the A u t h e n t i c s e l f [eigentlichen Selbst], (p. 317) A s a r e s u l t w e f i n d t h a t " i n a u t h e n t i c i t y i s based o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a u t h e n t i c i t y " ( p . 259). Is this an o u t r i g h t contradiction?
N o t necessarily.
A close
r e a d i n g o f these passages r e v e a l s t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n i s b e i n g m a d e between
the
" A u t h e n t i c self"
and
the
"Anyone"
a s existentialia,
and I n a u t h e n t i c i t y in Being and Time," Research in Phwomenology 7 (1977): 153-61. W h e r e a s s h e s a y s t h a t her a i m i s t h a t o f "at l e a s t softening t h a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n " (p. 154), I w i l l a r g u e t h a t t h e r e is no contradiction.
199
330
CHARLES
Β.
GUIGNON
on the one hand, and "authentic Being-one's-self" and the "Anyoneself"
as
existentiell
modifications,
on
the
other.
If
we
are
to
resolve the apparent contradiction, then, we must show how Dasein is simultaneously both an "Authentic s e l f and the "Any one." Only then will it be clear in what sense authentic Beingone's-self and inauthentic being an Anyone-self are existentiell modes of Dasein's essential being. The dual nature of Dasein as both an Authentic self and the Anyone comes to light in Heidegger's characterization of being human. One of the central goals of Being and Time is to describe Dasein in such a way as to bypass the traditional conception of man as a "substance" or "thing," whether psychic, physical, or "personal." In order to capture the dynamic nature of life, Heidegger begins by portraying Dasein's Being as a "happening" or "event" (Geschehen) extending "from birth to death." Just as the Being of an event is denned in terms of its outcome (i.e., "what happened"), so the Being of Dasein is denned in terms of the achievement of its life as a whole. I can only be an atheist all my life, for example, if I do not fall prey to any last-minute conversions. If I succumb to my family's entreaties and repent on my deathbed, the description "life-long atheist" is no longer true of me. For humans, "Being" is a success verb: it is an accomplishment that is realized in one's "Being-a-whole." But Heidegger notes that it seems paradoxical to say that I can only be something when I am no longer, that is, when my life is finished. He therefore defines Dasein's "Being-a-whole" as "Being-towwd-the-end" or "Beingtoward-death," characterizing this as a way of living in relation to one's end. Each of us, whether we realize it or not, will be complete at some point, and what we are is determined by our stance toward that final realization. The characterization of Dasein as the "happening" of a life as a whole provides the basis for the "formal" determination of the self as a "movement" (Bewegung) along a "temporal" axis.12 What is definitive of "the formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole" (p. 192), according to Heidegger, is that is has a certain "Being-relation" to itself. Dasein is unique among entities in that, "in its Being, it has a Being-relation to 12 S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g i t i s not m o v e m e n t along a t e m p o r a l a x i s , b u t the movement t h a t is constituted by " t e m p o r a l i t y t e m p o r a l i z i n g itself."
200
HEIDEGGER'S
"AUTHENTICITY"
t h i s B e i n g " ( p . 12).
331
REVISITED
In order to understand this definition of
D a s e i n as a " s e l f - r e l a t i o n , " we m u s t see t h a t D a s e i n is c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s h a v i n g t w o aspects w h i c h a r e c a l l e d "essence" a n d " e x i s t e n c e . " Regarded
a s "essence," D a s e i n
is
"thrown"
(geworfen)
into the
task o f l i v i n g w h i c h i t m u s t take u p i n some w a y o r other. find ourselves
as
an
"ability-to-be"
(Seinkönnen),
and
s t a n d b e f o r e u s a s s o m e t h i n g w e h a v e " t o b e " (zu sein).
13
our
We lives
It belongs
t o D a s e i n ' s "essence" t h a t " i n each case i t has i t s B e i n g a s i t s o w n to be" ( p . 12; my e m p h a s i s ) .
We find o u r s e l v e s "already-in" a
specific c u l t u r a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t w h i c h p r o v i d e s u s w i t h t h e d e t e r m i n a t e r a n g e o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t shape o u r " f a c t i c i t y . "
Seen
a s passive, D a s e i n i s a l w a y s " n o t y e t " s o m e t h i n g : " t h e r e i s a l w a y s something s t i l l outstanding w h i c h , as an ability-to-be of Dasein i t s e l f , has n o t y e t become ' a c t u a l ' " ( p . 236). R e g a r d e d as " e x i s t e n c e , " h o w e v e r , D a s e i n is a l r e a d y "aheadof-itself."
To be h u m a n is to be u n d e r w a y in the enterprise of
l i v i n g , t o b e " p r o j e c t i n g " (entwerfen) oneself t o w a r d t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f one's l i f e a s a w h o l e .
Heidegger characterizes h u m a n existence
a s e s s e n t i a l l y teleologicaL i n each o f o u r a c t i o n s w e e x p r e s s g o a l s w h i c h p o i n t o u t w a r d t o s o m e sense o f o u r l i v e s as a final, d e f i n i t i v e configuration of meaning.
W h e n I accept l i f e ' s m i n o r i r r i t a t i o n s
w i t h e q u a n i m i t y or w h e n I explode in rage, I m a k e a c o m m i t m e n t , w h e t h e r consciously o r not, concerning m y overview o f w h a t m y l i f e amounts to as a t o t a l i t y — c o n c e r n i n g w h a t sort of person I am.
Because o u r l i v e s m a t t e r t o us—because w h o w e a r e i s " a t
i s s u e " o r " a t s t a k e " f o r u s — w e a l w a y s t a k e s o m e s t a n d o n specific roles and self-interpretations in l i v i n g out our lives.
This "Being-
a-whole," w h i c h is the u l t i m a t e goal of life, is called "existence": H e i d e g g e r says t h a t " t h e B e i n g i t s e l f t o w a r d w h i c h D a s e i n c a n c o m p o r t i t s e l f , a n d a l w a y s does c o m p o r t i t s e l f s o m e h o w , w e c a l l 'existence'" ( p . 12).
Dasein is always already "beyond itself" in
t a k i n g a stand on its life.
As a projection towards its c u l m i n a t i o n ,
Dasein is defined as a "self-projective B e i n g t o w a r d its o w n m o s t a b i l i t y - t o - b e " ( p . 191). The Being of Dasein is determined by the w a y it relates itself to the task of l i v i n g by t a k i n g a concrete stand on its l i f e as a
1 3
1 am i n d e b t e d to E r n s t T u g e n d h a t ' s Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger ( B e r l i n : W a l t e r de G r u y t e r & C o . , 1970) for my a c c o u n t o f t h e " f o r m a l " definition o f D a s e i n .
201
332
CHARLES
whole.
The "Being-relation"
that
Β.
GUIGNON
is definitive of Dasein only
w o r k s i t s e l f o u t i n t h e specific p o s s i b i l i t i e s o n e t a k e s o v e r i n t h e enterprise of living. of Dasein
T h i s is w h y H e i d e g g e r s a y s t h a t "the 'essence'
lies in its existence"
(p.
42).
S i n c e who
and
what
I
am
i s defined b y t h e a c t u a l r o l e s I t a k e o v e r i n m a k i n g choices f o r m y life, my B e i n g is defined by t h e goal-directedness w i t h w h i c h
I
take up pregiven possibilities in dealing w i t h the c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n . T h i s s t r u c t u r e of Dasein as a t h r o w n p r o j e c t i o n t h a t is engaged in the w o r l d makes up the f o r m a l definition of "care," and its "ontological meaning" is found in the "temporalizing" (literally: " b r i n g i n g to f r u i t i o n " ) of t e m p o r a l i t y . responsible for w h a t his or her
Because each o f u s i s s o l e l y
l i f e adds u p
to
"in
the
H e i d e g g e r says t h a t D a s e i n i s " i n e a c h case m i n e " ( p . 42).
end,"
No one
c a n fill i n f o r m e i n t h e p r o j e c t o f m a k i n g s o m e t h i n g o f m y l i f e as a totality. The " f o r m a l " s t r u c t u r e of Dasein's existence " h a p p e n i n g " i s t h e " A u t h e n t i c self."
as a t e m p o r a l
It is i m p o r t a n t to realize
t h a t this t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e of t h r o w n goal-directedness is the "essential s t r u c t u r e " of a l l instances of Dasein, w h e t h e r they live authentically or not.
We are a l l " B e i n g - t o w a r d - t h e - e n d " in the
d u a l sense o f f a c i n g o u r p o s s i b l e e x t i n c t i o n
and of having this
finitude as s o m e t h i n g we alone can b r i n g to r e a l i z a t i o n .
Each of
u s i s u n i q u e t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t o u r l i v e s will h a v e a f i n a l p a t t e r n a n d can h a v e a p a t t e r n t h a t i s c o h e r e n t a n d i n t e g r a t e d .
Heidegger
says t h a t only insofar as [Dasein] is in its essence s o m e t h i n g w h i c h can be a u t h e n t i c — t h a t is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity are both grounded in the fact t h a t Dasein in general is characterized by mineness. (pp. 42-43) 1 4 O n l y because D a s e i n i s a n A u t h e n t i c s e l f a n d does t a k e a s t a n d o n its life can i t f l e e f r o m itself a n d live i n a n i n a u t h e n t i c mode. The temporal
axis of Dasein's B e i n g as a
purposive t h r u s t
t o w a r d self-completion is intersected at every p o i n t by an axis of involvement in the world. w o r l d " and as such and
routines.
14
In
Dasein
is essentially "Being-in-the-
is unavoidably caught up in our everyday
lives
we are
My emphasis on "can be" a n d "modes."
202
m u n d a n e tasks
generally occupied
HEIDEGGER'S
"AUTHENTICITY"
333
REVISITED
w i t h contexts o f e q u i p m e n t i n t r y i n g t o realize practical goals. The ways we handle the tools we find around us and the ways we conduct our lives are r e g u l a t e d by n o r m s a n d conventions made accessible i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d i n t o w h i c h w e a r e t h r o w n .
Only
because w e h a v e been i n i t i a t e d i n t o a s h a r e d " w e - w o r l d " c a n w e h a n d l e ourselves i n c o h e r e n t , n o r m a l i z e d w a y s .
B u t t h i s means
t h a t a l l of the possible roles a n d s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s we can t a k e o v e r h a v e been l a i d o u t i n a d v a n c e b y t h e A n y o n e .
Since w e are
w h a t w e make o f ourselves i n t a k i n g over possibilities f r o m the p u b l i c w o r l d , t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e A n y o n e define u s w i t h o u t residue.
As the A n y o n e , we are "place-holders" in a nexus of
r o l e s , offices, v o c a t i o n s , a n d s t a t u s r e l a t i o n s opened u p i n t h e c u l t u r a l context i n w h i c h w e f i n d ourselves. our Being in everydayness
H e i d e g g e r says t h a t
is "representable" or "delegatable":
" a n y o n e " c o u l d fill o u r places because those places are t h e A n y o n e ' s . If the A n y o n e is an "essential existentiale" of Dasein, authent i c i t y c a n n o t b e a m a t t e r o f " t r a n s c e n d i n g t h e h e r d " i n a n y sense. Rather, authenticity must be understood as an "existentiell m o d i f i c a t i o n " of our essential A u t h e n t i c self.
being
a s both t h e
Anyone
and
an
T o b e a u t h e n t i c i s t o b e r e s o l u t e a b o u t one's
a b i l i t y t o l i v e one's l i f e a s a c o h e r e n t t o t a l i t y , b u t H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t "even r e s o l u t i o n s r e m a i n d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e A n y o n e a n d i t s w o r l d " ( p . 299).
The " t r a n s p a r e n c y " of a u t h e n t i c i t y reveals
t h a t resolute existence cannot be disengaged f r o m the public w o r l d : I n r e s o l u t e n e s s t h e i s s u e for D a s e i n i s its o w n m o s t a b i l i t y - t o - b e w h i c h , a s s o m e t h i n g t h r o w n , c a n p r o j e c t i t s e l f o n l y upon definite factical possibilities. R e s o l u t i o n does not w i t h d r a w i t s e l f f r o m " a c t u a l i t y , " b u t d i s c o v e r s first w h a t i s f a c t i c a l l y possible; a n d i t does so by s e i z i n g upon it in w h a t e v e r w a y is p o s s i b l e for its o w n m o s t a b i l i t y - t o - b e in the Anyone, (p. 299; my e m p h a s i s )
T h e r e can b e n o e x i t f r o m t h e A n y o n e t o d i s c o v e r m y " o w n " p o s s i b i l i t i e s p r e c i s e l y because t h e A n y o n e i s t h e source o f a l l possibilities, both a u t h e n t i c and i n a u t h e n t i c . L a c k i n g such a coherent s t r u c t u r i n g of public possibilities, humans would be not s o m u c h " k n i g h t s o f f a i t h " o r " o v e r m e n " a s u t t e r l y diffuse b u n d l e s o f r a w capacities, captives t o every m o m e n t a r y caprice, w i t h o u t a n y basis f o r d i r e c t i o n o r c h o i c e . I f the A n y o n e i s t h e locus o f a l l o u r possibilities a n d i s d e f i n i t i v e o f w h a t i t i s t o b e a self, w h a t m o t i v a t e s H e i d e g g e r ' s c r i t i q u e o f its w a y o f life? I t i s clear t h a t w h a t Heidegger i s
203
334
CHARLES
Β.
GUIGNON
a t t a c k i n g is not the role of the A n y o n e in c o n s t i t u t i n g concrete possibilities, b u t the w a y it tempts us i n t o the u n t h i n k i n g conform i s m of being an inauthentic "Anyone-self."
By maintaining an
established order and i n s i s t i n g on the p a r a m o u n t importance of f a l l i n g i n t o s t e p w i t h a l l i t s l a t e s t fads a n d t r e n d s , t h e A n y o n e levels d o w n o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s a n d keeps u s f r o m f a c i n g u p t o o u r unique r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r our lives.
We tend to be dissipated and
rootless, s k i d d i n g f r o m one d i v e r s i o n t o a n o t h e r , t h r o w i n g ourselves i n t o t h e busy-ness o f e v e r y d a y t a s k s , a n d w e t h e r e b y f o r g e t o u r ownmost possibility of Being-toward-death.
B u t w h e t h e r one i s
dispersed and uncentered as an i n a u t h e n t i c Anyone-self or i n t e grated
and
coherent
as
authentic
Being-one's-self,
the
actual
p o s s i b i l i t i e s one t a k e s u p f o r one's l i f e a r e d r a w n f r o m t h e p u b l i c range of interpretations of the Anyone.
I t w o u l d appear, t h e n ,
t h a t a u t h e n t i c i t y is not so m u c h a m a t t e r of the " c o n t e n t " of a l i f e a s i t i s o f t h e " s t y l e " w i t h w h i c h one lives.
The distinction
b e t w e e n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y seems t o h i n g e n o t o n what one i s i n t h e sense o f w h a t specific p o s s i b i l i t i e s one t a k e s u p , b u t r a t h e r o f how one l i v e s .
Ill T o say t h a t D a s e i n i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e A n y o n e , t h e n , i s t o say t h a t a l l o f its possible w a y s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t s e l f a n d its w o r l d are d r a w n f r o m the social c o n t e x t i n t o w h i c h i t i s e n c u l t u r a t e d . N o possibility i s u n i q u e l y m y o w n except m y " o w n m o s t " p o s s i b i l i t y of a r t i c u l a t i n g the social roles I take over i n t o a configuration of meaning for my life as a whole.
B u t i t seems t h a t i f a u t h e n t i c i t y
refers solely to the " s t y l e " of a l i f e , t h e n the concept w i l l n o t be able to f u l f i l l its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l role of p r o v i d i n g a f o u n d a t i o n f o r fundamental ontology.
For if a l l possibilities of understanding
are d r a w n f r o m the A n y o n e , a n d i f the A n y o n e ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t it is to be is shot t h r o u g h w i t h misinterpretations and misunderstandings, then
there
becoming authentic can
provide us w i t h
meaning of Being.
appears to
be
no
way in
which
a deeper grasp of t h e
I n o r d e r t o see h o w a u t h e n t i c i t y offers u s a
m o r e p r i m o r d i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t i t i s t o be, t h e n , w e m u s t expand
our
interpretation
to
embrace
"authentic historicity."
204
Heidegger's
account
of
HEIDEGGER'S " A U T H E N T I C I T Y " REVISITED
335
A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e f i f t h c h a p t e r o f t h e second d i v i s i o n o f Being and Time t h e r e is a m a r k e d s h i f t of e m p h a s i s in t h e a n a l y s i s of Dasein. Heidegger now tells us t h a t "the orientation of our a n a l y t i c h a s s o f a r r e m a i n e d ' o n e - s i d e d ' " ( p . 373) i n i t s c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n D a s e i n ' s f u t u r i t y a s B e i n g - t o w a r d - d e a t h . W h a t i s needed is "a more radical approach to the existential analytic" w h i c h w i l l embrace the origins of Dasein's happening—its " B e i n g - t o w a r d t h e - b e g i n n i n g " — a n d w i l l account f o r the "connectedness o f l i f e " as a w h o l e (pp. 372-73). The characterization of " a u t h e n t i c h i s t o r i c i t y " is supposed t o fill o u t t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e " a u t h e n t i c h a p p e n i n g (Geschehen) o f D a s e i n " (p. 382) b y e x p o s i n g t h e " s o u r c e s " o f its ways o f being and c l a r i f y i n g its possibility o f l i v i n g w i t h c o n t i n u i t y a n d i n t e g r i t y a s a u n i f i e d self. Heidegger begins the account of h i s t o r i c i t y by i n q u i r i n g i n t o the origins of Dasein's ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g itself. The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t these c o u l d b e d r a w n f r o m one's stance t o w a r d s d e a t h i s e x p l i c i t l y r u l e d out: "those possibilities o f existence w h i c h have been f a c t i c a l l y d i s c l o s e d a r e n o t t o b e g a t h e r e d f r o m d e a t h " ( p . 383). W h a t t h e n i s t h e s o u r c e o f o u r f a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? T h e answer r e m a i n s t h e same as before: the A n y o n e . Dasein " u n d e r stands i t s e l f in t e r m s of those possibilities of existence w h i c h 'circulate' i n the 'average' public w a y o f i n t e r p r e t i n g Dasein t o d a y " ( p . 383). B u t i t i s n o w e v i d e n t t h a t a u t h e n t i c D a s e i n a p p r o p r i a t e s the possibilities floating in the "today" in a unique way. In r e s o l u t e n e s s , H e i d e g g e r says, D a s e i n "discloses c u r r e n t f a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a u t h e n t i c e x i s t i n g as from the heritage [aus dem Erbe]" ( p . 383). I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e c o n c r e t e " c o n t e n t " o f D a s e i n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t s e l f a n d i t s w o r l d consists i n the p u b l i c possib i l i t i e s of t h e A n y o n e — b u t t a k e n o v e r as a "heritage." The concept of a " h e r i t a g e " is introduced in contrast to w h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s t h e " t r a d i t i o n . " W e s a w above t h a t o u r e v e r y d a y sense o f w h a t i t i s t o b e i s p r e s h a p e d b y a g r i d o f c a t e g o r i e s a n d concepts m a d e accessible i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d . I n H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w , t h i s social p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g is handed d o w n to us by h i s t o r y . To say t h a t " D a s e i n ' i s ' i t s p a s t " ( p . 20) i s t o say t h a t i t s c o n c r e t e projects a n d goals are a l w a y s a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m its h i s t o r i c a l c u l t u r e a n d are a l w a y s projected along the guide r a i l s t h a t have been l a i d o u t b y t h e p a s t . T h e A n y o n e i s t h e b e a r e r a n d m e d i u m o f these h i s t o r i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . B u t t h e c u r r e n t s o c i a l w o r l d generally conveys t h i s f r a m e w o r k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g to us in the
205
336
CHARLES
warped and distorted f o r m of a " t r a d i t i o n . "
Β.
GUIGNON
The t r a d i t i o n domi
nates o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , " i n s u c h a w a y t h a t w h a t i t ' t r a n s m i t s ' i s made s o inaccessible, p r o x i m a l l y a n d for the most part,
t h a t it rather
T r a d i t i o n " b l o c k s o u r access ['Quellen'] f r o m w h i c h
to
becomes c o n c e a l e d " ( p .
those p r i m o r d i a l
21).
'wellsprings'
the categories and concepts handed d o w n
t o u s have been i n p a r t q u i t e g e n u i n e l y d r a w n " ( p . 2 1 ) .
Caught
in the "self-evidence" of t r a d i t i o n a l ways of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we have f o r g o t t e n t h e " o r i g i n s , " " r o o t s , " a n d " s o i l " f r o m w h i c h o u r possibilities have emerged. When Heidegger claims t h a t authentic Dasein can appropriate its possibilities as a "heritage," then, he means t h a t Dasein can break t h r o u g h the crust o f t r a d i t i o n i n order t o get i n touch w i t h the most p r i m o r d i a l ways of understanding in its history.
These
possibilities of understanding are always present w i t h i n the inter pretations c i r c u l a t i n g in the public w o r l d , b u t they are usually disguised and concealed. gests,
Dasein
recovers
I n b e c o m i n g a u t h e n t i c , H e i d e g g e r sug the
deeper
undercurrents
of
historical
meanings t h a t course beneath the fads a n d fancies o f t h e " t o d a y " a n d takes t h e m over a s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l resources f o r i t s o w n being.
A s a u t h e n t i c a l l y h i s t o r i c a l , D a s e i n e x i s t s a s " f a t e " (Schick
sal): i n i t s r e s o l u t e , " s i m p l i f i e d " p r o j e c t i o n o n t o d e a t h , i t t a k e s o v e r t h e m o s t basic p o s s i b i l i t i e s i t h a s i n h e r i t e d f r o m h i s t o r y a n d appropriates t h e m as its o w n .
B u t H e i d e g g e r observes t h a t s i n c e
Dasein is always contextualized in a c o m m u n i t y — s i n c e the hap pening of its
life
always dovetails
into
the
"world-historical
h a p p e n i n g " of a people—its " a u t h e n t i c h a p p e n i n g " is possible o n l y as a "co-happening" w i t h its c o m m u n i t y . Heidegger
calls
Dasein's
"destiny"
This "co-happening"
(Geschick):
"Our
fates
have
a l r e a d y been g u i d e d i n a d v a n c e i n o u r B e i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r i n the same w o r l d a n d i n o u r resoluteness f o r d e t e r m i n a t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s " ( p . 384). O n t h i s v i e w , t h e n , o u r deepest p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e d r a w n f r o m t h e s h a r e d h i s t o r i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s m a d e accessible in our culture.
M y o w n personal quest f o r m e a n i n g i s o n l y possible
against the backdrop of the c o m m u n a l projection of meaning of a h i s t o r i c a l people.
T h i s indebtedness to h i s t o r y m a y n o t be e x p l i c i t :
H e i d e g g e r says t h a t " i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t i n r e s o l u t e n e s s o n e s h o u l d explicitly k n o w t h e o r i g i n o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s u p o n w h i c h t h a t r e s o l u t e n e s s p r o j e c t s i t s e l f " ( p . 385).
206
In other words, a grasp
HEIDEGGER'S
"AUTHENTICITY"
REVISITED
337
of the heritage as historical is not necessary to resoluteness. But when authentic Dasein does have an explicit understanding of its basic possibilities as historical, then authenticity takes the form of a "retrieval" or "repetition" ( W i e d e r h o l u n g ) of the possibilities that have come before. Understanding itself as implicated in the same historical destiny as its forebears, Dasein recognizes its obligation to take over the possibilities of the "Dasein who has been there" in taking a stand on the shared sending of its people. Authentic Dasein follows in the footsteps of "the sole authority a free existing can have . . . the repeatable possibilities of existence" (p. 391). Far from being "subjectivistic" or "individualistic," then, the vision of authenticity in Being and Time points toward a communal sense of responsibility for realizing goals implicit at the dawn of Western history. Authentic existence has a determinate "content" for its understanding because it has penetrated the traditional interpretation of its current world in order to retrieve the enduring ideals and aims of its "heritage." Even the project of posing the question of Being is understood as indebted to the past. Since any human activity is dependent on and made possible by history, it follows that the activity of engaging in fundamental ontology is also historical. It draws its findings not from some transcendental, ahistorical source, but from the work of its predecessors. Hence Heidegger says, From the ownmost ontological meaning of inquiry itself as historical, it follows that the working out of the question of Being has the assignment of inquiring into the history of that inquiry itself—that is, of undertaking a historical study—in order to bring itself into the positive appropriation of the past, into the full possession of its own most proper possibilities of inquiry, (pp. 20-21) The inquiry into the meaning of Being has the "assignment" of appropriating the history of ontology precisely because it understands itself as a product of that history. The account of authentic historicity clarifies the way in which becoming authentic enables us to determine the confirmation and closure of fundamental ontology. The presuppositions that guide the hermeneutic of Dasein are confirmed when they are found to be consonant with the most primordial ways of understanding Being that have been "retrieved" from our heritage. This retrieval, which breaks through the concealments of the tradition in order
207
CHARLES
338 to demonstrate the
"birth
certificates" of our
Β.
basic o n t o l o g i c a l
c o n c e p t s , was s u p p o s e d t o h a v e been a c c o m p l i s h e d i n lished
second
part
of
GUIGNON
the unpub
the
"phenomenological
destruction of the history of ontology, w i t h
the problematic of
Being
and
T e m p o r a l i t y as our clue" (p. 39).
Time, 15
W h e n we have recovered the
deepest u n d e r s t a n d i n g of B e i n g i n o u r h i s t o r y , we w i l l also have determined
the closure
for fundamental
ontology.
Because
the
historical investigation provides the bedrock for the question of B e i n g , H e i d e g g e r s a y s t h a t " t h e q u e s t i o n o f B e i n g does n o t a c h i e v e i t s t r u e concreteness u n t i l w e have c a r r i e d t h r o u g h t h e process o f d e s t r o y i n g t h e o n t o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n " (p. 26). Zimmerman's
Eclipse of the Self focuses
p r i m a r i l y on
Heideg
ger's a t t e m p t t o i d e n t i f y t e m p o r a l i t y a s t h e u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e o f h u m a n existence, a p r o j e c t p a r t l y i n s p i r e d b y K a n t , a n d i n s o d o i n g i t tends t o h i g h l i g h t t h e m o r e i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c conception o f D a s e i n t h a t a p p e a r s i n d i v i s i o n t w o o f Being and Time.
As I have
t r i e d t o show, however, t h i s l i m i t e d perspective conceals t h e fact that,
for
concrete
Heidegger,
temporality
history of an
is
always
ongoing culture.
bound
up
with
Zimmerman's
therefore tends to d i s t o r t Heidegger's e a r l y conception human.
When
overlooked,
it
the
is
historical
natural
to
dimension
see
of
the
account of being Time
is
the concept of a u t h e n t i c i t y
as
Being
and
r e f e r r i n g to a life encapsulated in a shell of personal c o m m i t m e n t s w i t h o u t concrete content.
A u t h e n t i c i t y t h e n appears as a version
o f w h a t P h i l i p Rieff calls " a w a y o f u s i n g a l l c o m m i t m e n t s , w h i c h amounts to loyalty to none."16 More also
importantly,
tends
writings,
to such
obscure
transitional
and his later w r i t i n g s . the
"turn"
in
Zimmerman's
the c o n t i n u i t y
history of Being."
to
as
the
Heidegger's
Time early
Introduction to Metaphysics,
Z i m m e r m a n is quite r i g h t in interpreting
Heidegger's
anthropocentrism
works
r e a d i n g o f Being and between
the
thought
later
as
a
shift
"anti-humanist"
from notion
his of
early "the
B u t he is unable to account for the fact t h a t ,
t h r o u g h o u t H e i d e g g e r ' s w r i t i n g s , t h i s h i s t o r y r e m a i n s our h i s t o r y ,
15
I h a v e d i s c u s s e d the r e l a t i o n of the two p a r t s of Being and Time i n m y essay, " T h e T w o f o l d T a s k : H e i d e g g e r ' s F o u n d a t i o n a l H i s t o r i c i s m , " in M i c h a e l Z i m m e r m a n , ed., The Thought of Martin Heidegger, Tulane Studies in Philosophy 32 (1984). 16 The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r & R o w , 1966), p. 21.
208
HEIDEGGER'S
"AUTHENTICITY"
REVISITED
a n d n o t t h a t of, say, I n d i a o r C h i n a .
339
The "history of Being,"
s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e G r e e k s a n d p r o c e e d i n g t h r o u g h t h e stages o f Western t h o u g h t , is a h i s t o r y w h i c h makes a c l a i m on us a n d defines u s because o u r r e l a t i o n t o i t i s one o f w h a t G a d a m e r c a l l s "belongingness."
I t c a n m a k e a c l a i m o n u s p r e c i s e l y because i t
speaks t o u s i n t h e c o n c r e t e l a n g u a g e o f a " h e r i t a g e . "
If we are
to understand Heidegger's later vision of an authentic relation to t h e h i s t o r y o f B e i n g , I w o u l d suggest, w e need t o see i t i n t h e l i g h t of the earlier account of authentic historicity as the retrieval and a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f those e n d u r i n g meanings laid o u t i n o u r h i s t o r y . W h e n t h e c o n c e p t o f a u t h e n t i c i t y i s severed f r o m t h e c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t m a k e s sense, i t i s i n d a n g e r o f lapsing back i n t o the same amorphous, c r y p t o - r e l i g i o u s concerns w i t h w e l l - b e i n g a n d s e l f - f u l f i l l m e n t t h a t Z i m m e r m a n has s o effectively criticized.
The
209
University
of
Texas
at
Austin
Individual and Community in Early Heidegger: Situating das Man, the Man-self, and Self-ownership in Dasein's Ontological Structure E d g a r C . B o e d e k e r , Jr. University of Northern Iowa
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims that ( i ) das Man is an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and ( 2 ) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man-ae\i, but can also be eigentlich, which I translate as ;selfowningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning ( 2 ) , and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning (1). 1 offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible w i t h both (1) and ( 2 ) , thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Man and the Man-se\i. Das Man is one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes; either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existentieVf, i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essential. Self-ownership and the Μίΐιι-self are the two basic existentiell modes of being oneself, i.e. projecting everyday possibilities of oneself appropriated from the horizon of das Man. What differentiates these two modes is the stance one takes to the possibility of death, the existential horizon of being oneself.
I . Introduction Contemporary classically Politics,
philosophy
addressed
about
the
in
relation
is
witnessing
such
texts
between
as the
a
resurgence
Plato's
Republic
individual
and
of
the
and
question, Aristotle's
society.
What
is
d e c i d e d l y n e w a b o u t the w a y s i n w h i c h this q u e s t i o n i s dealt w i t h t o d a y i s that it figures centrally not just in discussions of ethics or p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , but i n p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d and language a s w e l l . O n e c e n t r a l question that recurs i n t h e s e d e b a t e s i s t h i s : m u s t s o m e o n e b e i n s o m e sense a m e m b e r o f a h u m a n c o m m u n i t y , t r a i n e d i n its practices a n d b e h o l d e n t o its n o r m s , i n o r d e r t o have a
'self? Although
Martin
Heidegger's
thought
t e r m s o f these q u e s t i o n s , t h e r e h a v e b e e n
was
not
several
originally
addressed
recent efforts'
to turn
in to
H e i d e g g e r as a f r u i t f u l s o u r c e o f i n s i g h t i n t o t h e s e i s s u e s . T h e s e s t u d i e s h a v e (J
211
2001
T a y l o r & Francis
64
Edgar C. Baedeker, Jr.
rightly
focused
on
Heidegger's
claim
i n Sein
und Zeil
2
roughly,
that
our
" i n t e n t i o n a l ' e n c o u n t e r s w i t h t h i n g s i n s o m e w a y take p l a c e i n t e r m s o f w h a t we can c a l l , to e m p l o y a visual metaphor, an essentially social ' h o r i z o n ' ; H e i d e g g e r ' s t e r m f o r the s o c i a l
h o r i z o n of h u m a n life
t e r m is a n e o l o g i s m f o r m e d by t u r n i n g
is
'das Man'. T h i s
'man' - the G e r m a n t h i r d - p e r s o n
p r o n o u n e q u i v a l e n t t o the f o r m a l E n g l i s h O n e ' a n d t o i n f o r m a l E n g l i s h uses o f ' t h e y ' , o r e v e n ' y o u ' - i n t o a n e u t e r n o u n . I n G e r m a n , Ίηαη' is u s e d t o express
such
normative
statements
as
One o u g h t n o t b e h a v e
that
way
in
p u b l i c ' , or s u c h r e p o r t s of c o m m o n b e l i e f s as 'They say he's a great s i n g e r ' . 'Das Man'
has a c c o r d i n g l y been t r a n s l a t e d i n a n u m b e r o f w a y s , e a c h w i t h
its advantages a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . 3 I n o r d e r t o a v o i d the latter, a n d t o k e e p a t b a y as m a n y p r e c o n c e p t i o n s as p o s s i b l e , I w i l l l e a v e t h e t e r m 'das Man' untranslated. It is c l e a r t h a t das Man p l a y s a c r u c i a l r o l e in SZ. H e i d e g g e r d e v o t e s a t h r e e - s e c t i o n c h a p t e r t o i t (SZ 1 1 3 - 3 0 ) , a n d m e n t i o n s i t r e p e a t e d l y t h r o u g h o u t the w o r k , e s p e c i a l l y i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f ' e v e r y d a y n e s s ' a n d ' f a l l i n g ' (SZ 166— 8 0 ) . I t i s also c l e a r t h a t das Man has s o m e t h i n g t o d o w i t h s o c i a l i t y a n d a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n f o r m i t y to social norms. B e y o n d this, however, little is i m m e d i a t e l y o b v i o u s f r o m the t e x t s . T h e o b s c u r i t i e s i n H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f das Man h a v e g i v e n rise t o t w o e x t r e m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h e s e p o s i t i o n s are r e p r e s e n t e d b y t w o p r o m i nent C a l i f o r n i a H e i d e g g e r scholars: F r e d e r i c k O l a f s o n and H u b e r t D r e y f u s . 4 B o t h f u l l y recognize that their interpretations d o not cohere fully w i t h the texts, a n d b o t h b l a m e t h i s l a c k o f c o h e r e n c e o n H e i d e g g e r . R o u g h l y , D r e y f u s conceives
of
das
as
Man
the
set
of
shared
background
practices
of
a
c o m m u n i t y . A l o n g w i t h the s k i l l s a n d h a b i t s that a l l o w us, a s e s s e n t i a l l y e m b o d i e d , s o c i a l , a n d a c c u l t u r a t e d b e i n g s , t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n these p r a c t i c e s , das
Man
constitutes
fundamental
the
source
of
meaning,
including
the
m e a n i n g s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h o n e u n d e r s t a n d s oneself. F o r e x a m p l e , D r e y f u s w r i t e s : 'all s i g n i f i c a n c e a n d i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s the p r o d u c t o f the o n e [ i . e . o f das Man]'. A n d he a t t r i b u t e s to H e i d e g g e r the v i e w t h a t das Man is the ' u l t i m a t e ' t h e e n d o f the l i n e o f e x p l a n a t i o n s o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ' . ' 1 F o r
r e a l i t y ' , i.e. Dreyfus,
this
ownership,
6
presents
major difficulties
for Heidegger's
concept
o f self-
in w h i c h Dasein (on Dreyfus's reading) is s o m e h o w supposed to
t r a n s c e n d das Man. A c c o r d i n g l y , D r e y f u s c h a r a c t e r i z e s H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t of
self-ownership
as
'incoherent',
'confused',
and
'incomprehensible'.7
O l a f s o n , o n the o t h e r h a n d , takes H e i d e g g e r ' s t a l k o f das Man a s c u l t u r a l c r i t i c i s m o f the ' u b i q u i t o u s a n o n y m i t y ' o f m o d e r n l i f e a n d mass s o c i e t y . 8 Despite
its
importance
in
Dasein's
Being,
das
Man
can
for
Olafson
n e v e r t h e l e s s b e o v e r c o m e i n rare m o m e n t s o f s e l f - o w n e r s h i p . S i n c e h e reads the d e n i a l that a l l m e a n i n g d e r i v e s f r o m das Man a s b u i l t i n t o H e i d e g g e r ' s position
f r o m the
beginning,
Olafson
sees n o
particular
problem
with
H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f s e l f - o w n e r s h i p . I n s t e a d , he sees d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g
212
Individual and Community in Early Heidegger
65
f r o m w h a t he regards as H e i d e g g e r ' s t r e a t m e n t of das Man as a ' h y p o s t a t i z e d entity'.
9
In t h i s paper, I p r o p o s e to set the r e c o r d s t r a i g h t o v e r the n a t u r e a n d status o f das Man. M y strategy f o r d o i n g so w i l l be to s o m e e x t e n t i n d i r e c t . M o s t o f the
paper
will
be
concerned
with
providing
an
understanding
of
the
b a c k g r o u n d r e q u i r e d f o r s i t u a t i n g these issues i n t h e i r p r o p e r c o n t e x t : the s t r u c t u r e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . I a r g u e that D a s e i n ' s B e i n g c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d t o h a v e three " p e r s p e c t i v e s ' - r o u g h l y , t h r e e basic w a y s o f e n c o u n t e r i n g e n t i t i e s . Each perspective
has
a corresponding
'horizon',
i.e.
roughly,
a set
of
p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h e n t i t i e s are e n c o u n t e r e d i n the c o r r e s p o n d i n g w a y . B o t h the p e r s p e c t i v e s a n d t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e h o r i z o n s are ' e x i s t e n t i a l s ' , i.e. essential s t r u c t u r e s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . A s s u c h , n o D a s e i n can e v e r b e w i t h o u t t h e m as l o n g as i t e x i s t s . A s I w i l l a r g u e , D a s e i n m u s t at any t i m e ' e n a c t ' {vollziehen) e a c h o f these h o r i z o n a l - p e r s p e c t i v a l p a i r s i n o n e o f t w o m u t u a l l y exclusive ' e x i s t e n t i e l l '
1 0
m o d e s , i.e. w a y s that are p o s s i b l e , a l t h o u g h n o t
necessary. L i k e a l l e x i s t e n t i e l l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , the p a r t i c u l a r m o d e i n w h i c h D a s e i n enacts a g i v e n h o r i z o n a l - p e r s p e c t i v a l p a i r i s n o t d i c t a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e . A l t h o u g h these e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e s are m a d e p o s s i b l e b y the e x i s t e n t i a l h o r i z o n a l - p e r s p e c t i v a l c o r r e l a t e s , the e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e i n w h i c h D a s e i n a t a g i v e n t i m e enacts any o f these c o r r e l a t e s i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , b u t n o t a necessity. S e c t i o n I I I i n c l u d e s a d i a g r a m i n E n g l i s h d e p i c t i n g the o v e r a l l s t r u c t u r e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . ( A n o t h e r w i s e i d e n t i c a l d i a g r a m i n G e r m a n i s i n c l u d e d a s a n A p p e n d i x . ) T h e reader m a y f i n d i t h e l p f u l t o refer t o t h i s d i a g r a m f r o m t i m e t o t i m e , i n o r d e r t o see h o w the i n d i v i d u a l phenomena I discuss fit i n t o this structure. T h e w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g D a s e i n ' s B e i n g that I suggest here w i l l a l l o w us t o i d e n t i f y a d i s t i n c t i o n that appears t o h a v e g o n e u n n o t i c e d i n the D r e y f u s O l a f s o n debate. On the one h a n d , das Man is an existent/«/: n a m e l y , the o v e r a r c h i n g n e t w o r k o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n t p o s s i b l e w a y s f o r others t o be, a n d also the ' r e s e r v o i r ' f r o m w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l a p p r o p r i a t e s her o w n e v e r y d a y 1
w a y s t o be. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the A i i i « - s e l f i s a n e x i s t e n t / i / / m o d e o f enactment
o f the p e r s p e c t i v e
Heidegger calls
of 'Being-oneself:
'unownedness',
namely
the
'everydayness', or "falling'.
mode
that
Besides the
i W f l / i - s e l f , the o t h e r p r i m a r y e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f i s self-
o w n e r s h i p (Eigentlichkeit). principle
capable
T h e Man-seU,
of being
'transcended'
but in
not
das Man.
moments
is thus
o f resolute
in self-
o w n e r s h i p . U n d e r s t a n d i n g the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the e x i s t e n t i a l das Man a n d the e x i s t e n t i e l l Man-se\f, h o w e v e r , r e q u i r e s a n o v e r v i e w o f the s t r u c t u r e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g as a w h o l e , e s p e c i a l l y the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n Man-sdf a n d s e l f - o w n e r s h i p . G r a s p i n g the r o l e that das Man a n d the Man-seli p l a y in t h i s g e n e r a l o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e c a n h e l p u s t o see a w a y c l e a r o f the i m p a s s e i n the D r e y f u s - O l a f s o n debate, a n d - m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y - to g a i n a c l e a r e r v i e w o f the issues t h e m s e l v e s .
213
66
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
I I . The Three M o m e n t s of Dasein's Being F o r H e i d e g g e r , the B e i n g o f a n e n t i t y i s the w a y i n w h i c h i t s h o w s i t s e l f t o s o m e o n e . H e i d e g g e r refers t o h u m a n b e i n g s w i t h a n o r d i n a r y G e r m a n t e r m f o r e x i s t e n c e , ' D a s e i n ' (SZ 1 i ) ; a n d he adopts the t e r m ' e x i s t e n c e ' (Existenz; S Z 12) a s a n i n i t i a l t i t l e f o r D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . D a s e i n ' s B e i n g c a n b e a n a l y z e d i n t o three essential a n d c o - c o n s t i t u t i v e ' m o m e n t s ' , o r s t r u c t u r a l features: Dasein's a b i l i t y to encounter entities, ' p r o j e c t i o n ' , and ' t h r o w n n e s s ' . Since Dasein's
B e i n g is existence,
the
m o m e n t s o f its B e i n g can
be called
' e x i s t e n t i a l s ' (SZ 12 f . ) . A l t h o u g h D a s e i n ' s B e i n g is a u n i t a r y p h e n o m e n o n (SZ 180 f., 1 9 1 - 3 , 196, 3 1 7 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 1 ; c f . 5 3 , 2 3 3 ) , it c a n be u n d e r s t o o d to be structured, or articulated, i n t o these three m o m e n t s . T h e y are ' e q u i o r i g i n a r y ' (gleichurspriinglich; SZ 133, 1 6 1 , 3 4 9 ) ; that is, t h e y are w o v e n t o g e t h e r in a web of mutual presupposition. E a c h o f the three e x i s t e n t i a l m o m e n t s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g i s i d e n t i f i e d b y a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c relation i n w h i c h D a s e i n stands t o its p o s s i b i l i t i e s . H e i d e g g e r ' s crucial term
'possibility'
(Möglichkeit) s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d not
in
the
l o g i c a l sense as a p o t e n t i a l o b j e c t or state of affairs that is free of c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I n s t e a d , s o m e o n e ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are w h a t she is able to a c c o m p l i s h , b e c o m e , o r o t h e r w i s e e x p e r i e n c e (SZ 1 4 3 - 5 ) . A p o s s i b i l i t y i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense is a l w a y s a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r encountering s o m e e n t i t y . F o r e x a m p l e , we c o u l d say that the a c t i v i t y o f h a m m e r i n g these n a i l s i n t o these boards i s a practical possibility of someone w h o k n o w s h o w to hammer. W h e n someone uses a h a m m e r , she i n t e r p r e t s i t p r a c t i c a l l y i n t e r m s o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f h a m m e r i n g , i.e., as for h a m m e r i n g . H e i d e g g e r i a n p o s s i b i l i t i e s are thus m u c h l i k e w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l s o m e o n e ' s capacities. Let
us b e g i n w i t h the m o m e n t we c a n c a l l 11
entities.
Dasein's ability to encounter
I i b e l o n g s e s s e n t i a l l y t o . D a s e i n ' s B e i n g that i t c a n e n c o u n t e r , o r
' d i s c o v e r ' , entities ( c f . GA 2 6 : 161 f.; c f . SZ 6 0 - 6 2 ) . T h i s p o s i t i o n b u i l d s on H u s s e r l ' s v i e w that b e i n g d i r e c t e d t o w a r d an intentional object b e l o n g s to the essence o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , rejects H u s s e r l ' s v i e w that the m o s t basic i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are t o e n t i t i e s e n c o u n t e r e d i n the w a y o f B e i n g o f ' p r e s e n c e - a t - h a n d ' (Vorhandenlwit), i.e. a s m e r e o b j e c t s o r states o f a f f a i r s , e s s e n t i a l l y u n r e l a t e d t o o u r p r a c t i c a l interests. H e i d e g g e r h o l d s that D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y t o e n c o u n t e r p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d e n t i t i e s i s d e r i v a t i v e , i.e., that i t i s f o u n d e d i n its a b i l i t y t o e n c o u n t e r p h y s i c a l , i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s i n a n o t h e r w a y o f B e i n g , w h i c h h e c a l l s ' r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d ' (Zuhandenheit). H e i d e g g e r thus d e v o t e s his m o s t d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f D a s e i n ' s e n c o u n t e r s w i t h i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s t o its d e a l i n g s w i t h r e a d y - t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s . R e a d i n e s s - t o h a n d i s the w a y o f B e i n g o f those i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s e n c o u n t e r e d a s e q u i p m e n t u s e f u l ( o r useless) f o r a c h i e v i n g o u r p r a c t i c a l purposes. A l t h o u g h D a s e i n ' s e n c o u n t e r s w i t h e n t i t i e s are b y n o m e a n s r e s t r i c t e d t o the r e a d y - t o - h a n d - n o r e v e n to i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s as s u c h - H e i d e g g e r ' s
214
Individuell
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
67
analysis o f D a s e i n ' s e n c o u n t e r s w i t h r e a d y - t o - h a n d e q u i p m e n t i s i n d i c a t i v e o f his v i e w s o f a l l o f its e n c o u n t e r s w i t h e n t i t i e s . F o r H e i d e g g e r , a l l e n c o u n t e r s with
entities
are
interpretative;
that
is,
they
all
have
the
structure
of
e n c o u n t e r i n g the e n t i t y as s o m e t h i n g (SZ 1 4 8 - 5 1 ) . W h a t we i n t e r p r e t an e n t i t y as is the e n t i t y ' s m e a n i n g (Bedeutung; SZ 8 7 , 161) in the e n c o u n t e r . To interpret an i t e m of ready-to-hand equipment as something is to encounter it a s for, o r ' r e f e r r i n g t o ' ( S Z 6 8 - 8 1 ) , s o m e p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y .
1 2
Besides D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y t o e n c o u n t e r e n t i t i e s , a s e c o n d e x i s t e n t i a l m o m e n t of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g is projection (SZ 145). In i n t e r p r e t i n g an e n t i t y as r e f e r r i n g to a m e a n i n g - p o s s i b i l i t y , D a s e i n projects the e n t i t y u p o n that p o s s i b i l i t y . W h a t D a s e i n projects is a l w a y s an e n t i t y ; w h a t it p r o j e c t s the e n t i t y upon is always a p o s s i b i l i t y . To project an entity upon a p o s s i b i l i t y is to a l l o w what w a s p r e v i o u s l y a mere p o s s i b i l i t y to be actualized. upon
a possibility,
one
thus
allows
o n e s e l f to
In p r o j e c t i n g an e n t i t y m o v e o n e s e l f toward the
r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y . W e a l l o w o u r s e l v e s t o b e c a r r i e d i n t o the future b y p r o j e c t i n g e n t i t i e s u p o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n some cases, p r o j e c t i o n requires w h a t w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y c o u n t as trying, or striving, to a c t u a l i z e a p o s s i b i l i t y ( e . g . e n g a g i n g i n p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l e x e r t i o n ) . I n o t h e r cases, h o w e v e r , i t can o c c u r m o r e a s a m a t t e r o f h a b i t . F u r t h e r m o r e , n o t a l l cases o f p r o j e c t i o n must be c o n s c i o u s . O n e c a n tacitly p r o j e c t an e n t i t y u p o n a p o s s i b i l i t y . T h i s can o c c u r , for e x a m p l e , w h e n one is e n g a g e d in a task - l i k e d r i v i n g a car on a s t r a i g h t e m p t y r o a d - that i n v o l v e s s k i l l a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n , b u t not necessarily a t h e m a t i c , c o n s c i o u s awareness o f w h a t one i s d o i n g . To i n t e r p r e t an e n t i t y as ' r e f e r r i n g t o ' a p o s s i b i l i t y is to seize or grasp (ergreifen)
that
possibility
expressly
(eigens).
li
For
someone
to
seize
a
p o s s i b i l i t y expressly is thus f o r her to project an e n t i t y u p o n that p o s s i b i l i t y . W h e n t h i s o c c u r s , D a s e i n also a l l o w s the e n t i t y i n q u e s t i o n t o s h o w i t s e l f i n t e r m s o f , o r t o b e ' i l l u m i n a t e d ' b y , the p o s s i b i l i t y t o b e a c t u a l i z e d i n the future.
In
keeping
with
the
'lighting'
function
of
expressly
seized
p o s s i b i l i t i e s , H e i d e g g e r refers to the t o t a l i t y of m e a n i n g - p o s s i b i l i t i e s as a ' l i g h t e d c l e a r i n g ' (Lichtung; e.g. SZ 133), the ' t h e r e ' (Da; 132 f., 142 f . ) , or "the
open'
The
(das
third
Offene).
existential
14
moment
of
Dasein's
Being
is
its
(Geworfenheit; SZ 135), w h i c h H e i d e g g e r s o m e t i m e s also c a l l s its
thrownness "facticity'
(Faktizität). D a s e i n is t h r o w n i n t o a l l of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s disclosed to i t , i.e. i n t o e v e r y t h i n g i t i s able t o a c c o m p l i s h , b e c o m e , o r o t h e r w i s e e x p e r i e n c e . D i f f e r e n t ranges o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s are d i s c l o s e d t o d i f f e r e n t D a s e i n s , and are l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e d b y a host o f s o c i a l , h i s t o r i c a l , g e o g r a p h i c a l , and e v e n b i o l o g i c a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s not o f her c h o o s i n g . I n t h i s w a y , D a s e i n p l a y s a n e s s e n t i a l l y passive r o l e in the d i s c l o s u r e of p o s s i b i l i t i e s - a feature that Heidegger
characterizes
as
Dasein's
'finding
itself
thrown
into
its
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . H e also uses the e x a m p l e o f m o o d s t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t (SZ 1 3 4 - 7 ) . Just a s w e a l w a y s f i n d o u r s e l v e s a l r e a d y i n s o m e m o o d o r o t h e r ( e v e n
215
68
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
i f this i s one o f e v e n - t e m p e r e d e q u a n i m i t y ) , s o t o o d o w e a l w a y s r i n d ourselves already t h r o w n into some field of possibilities. S i m i l a r l y , just as we are n e v e r e n t i r e l y i n c o n t r o l o f the m o o d s that w e are i n , s o t o o d o w e h a v e , a t best, l i m i t e d c o n t r o l o v e r j u s t w h i c h p o s s i b i l i t i e s are d i s c l o s e d t o us. A s m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r i n this s e c t i o n , each o f the three e x i s t e n t i a l m o m e n t s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g i s i d e n t i f i e d b y a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c relation i n w h i c h D a s e i n stands
to
its
possibilities.
In
particular,
Dasein
encounters
entities
by
i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m as r e f e r r i n g to s o m e p o s s i b i l i t y , it projects entities u p o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s b y a l l o w i n g these p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o b e a c t u a l i z e d i n the f u t u r e , a n d i t f i n d s i t s e l f thrown i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s d i s c l o s e d t o i t . W h e n t a k e n t o g e t h e r , these three m o m e n t s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g i n d i c a t e that D a s e i n i s not a selfc o n t a i n e d substance. R a t h e r , it is in its v e r y B e i n g ' e c - c e n t r i c a l l y ' (GA 5 8 : 247; GA 9:
1 6 2 n 5 9 ) d i r e c t e d o u t s i d e itself, t o w a r d the e n t i t i e s that i t can
e n c o u n t e r . A s D a s e i n i n l e r p r e t a t i v e l y e n c o u n t e r s e n t i t i e s , i t 'steps o v e r ' , o r 1
'trans-cends', '
1
them,
Heidegger exploits
into
the r o o t
the
meaning-possibilities
m e a n i n g s o f the
terms
that
it
projects.
'ec-sistence'
(GA
9:
3 2 3 - 3 7 ; cf. SZ 12) a n d 'ec-stasis' (SZ 3 2 9 , 3 3 9 , 3 6 5 ; GA 2 4 : 3 7 7 f . ) to c h a r a c t e r i z e the w a y i n w h i c h D a s e i n 'stands o u t ' i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that m a k e up the l i g h t e d c l e a r i n g , or ' t h e r e ' ('Da'). In his w r i t i n g s after SZ, he c a m e t o h y p h e n a t e 'Da-sein' ( l i t e r a l l y , ' b e i n g - t h e r e ' ) . H e does this i n o r d e r t o stress the fact that D a - s e i n is the e n t i t y that has to be (sein) its ' t h e r e ' (Da; SZ 1 3 2 f . ; c f . , e . g . , 135,-139. 143, 160, 2 7 0 , 3 3 5 ) . T h e Da is f o r H e i d e g g e r the set of possibilities into w h i c h a Dasein finds itself t h r o w n . The term ( ' b e i n g ' ) in ' D a - s e i n ' is a transitive v e r b .
1 6
'sein'
F o r D a - s e i n to be its Da is f o r it to
project an e n t i t y u p o n s o m e subset of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that m a k e up the Da.
I I I . T h e T h r e e P e r s p e c t i v e s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g , a n d (he C o r r e l a t i v e H o r i z o n s of the Da I w i l l a r g u e s h o r t l y that das Man is one o f three e x i s t e n t i a l h o r i z o n s o f the ' t h e r e ' - n a m e l y the o n e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f its B e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s . F i r s t , h o w e v e r , i t w i l l be necessary t o sketch o u t the c o n c e p t s of existential horizon a n d existential perspective.
I
p r o p o s e to do t h i s
here b y d e v e l o p i n g the v i s u a l m e t a p h o r i m p l i c i t i n these t e r m s . T h e basis o f this
metaphor
is
the
likeness of Dasein's
encounters
of entities
to
an
o b s e r v e r ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f o b j e c t s . ( S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , since v i e w i n g o b j e c t s i s a particular k i n d of encountering entities,
this
illustration
is more of a
synechdoche than a metaphor.) F i r s t o f a l l , each o b s e r v e d o b j e c t stands i n some p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n t o the o b s e r v e r . I t is, f o r e x a m p l e , i n f r o n t o f , b e l o w , o r a b o v e her. A n a l o g o u s l y , i n each o f D a s e i n ' s e n c o u n t e r s w i t h e n t i t i e s , the e n c o u n t e r e d e n t i t y stands i n s o m e o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n . T h e r e are three s u c h basic o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s : b e i n g useful ( o r use less) to D a s e i n , b e i n g a fellow of D a s e i n , a n d
216
Individual and Community in Early Heidegger b e i n g a p o s s i b i l i t y of myself that
69
is ( o r is n o t ) b e i n g a c t u a l i z e d .
What
H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the ' w a y o f B e i n g ' o f the e n t i t y i n a n e n c o u n t e r i s a f u n c t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n i n w h i c h i t stands t o the D a s e i n that e n c o u n t e r s i t . S o m e t h i n g e n c o u n t e r e d a s u s e f u l ( o r useless) has the w a y o f B e i n g o f readiness-io-hand (SZ 6 9 ) ,
fellow
or
usefulness
Dasein
has
the
(Bewandtnis;
way
of
SZ 8 4 ) ;
Being
something
encountered 11
of co-Dasein;
and
as
a
something
e n c o u n t e r e d a s s o m e t h i n g that I m y s e l f a m b e c o m i n g has the w a y o f B e i n g of Dasein i t s e l f . As is the case w i t h the v i s u a l a n a l o g u e , the v e r y same e n t i t y c a n b e e n c o u n t e r e d i n d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s - and thus i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s o f B e i n g - by d i f f e r e n t D a s e i n s , or by the same D a s e i n at d i f f e r e n t t i m e s . F o r e x a m p l e , a h u m a n b e i n g m i g h t b e e n c o u n t e r e d i n the w a y o f B e i n g o f D a s e i n b y herself, i n the w a y o f B e i n g o f c o - D a s e i n b y s o m e o t h e r p e r s o n (say, b y a f r i e n d ) , and i n the w a y o f B e i n g o f r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d b y yet another p e r s o n (say, by a s l a v e - o w n e r or a p a r t i c u l a r l y m e r c i l e s s f a c t o r y boss). N o t e that the r e l a t i o n i n w h i c h a n o b j e c t appears t o a n o b s e r v e r d e p e n d s u p o n the d i r e c t i o n
o f the o b s e r v e r ' s gaze,
which
w e c a n also c a l l
the
o b s e r v e r ' s perspective. F r o m one p e r s p e c t i v e , f o r e x a m p l e , a n o b j e c t m i g h t appear i n f r o n t o f the o b s e r v e r , w h e r e a s f r o m a n o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e the same o b j e c t m i g h t appear t o her side o r b e l o w her. A l l o b s e r v a t i o n o f objects o c c u r s f r o m some such p e r s p e c t i v e . L e t u s b o r r o w a t e r m used b y H e i d e g g e r i n his 1
later w r i t i n g s , a n d d e f i n e an e x i s t e n t i a l perspective * as an a b i l i t y of D a s e i n to e n c o u n t e r e n t i t i e s s t a n d i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n t o i t , R e c a l l that D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y t o e n c o u n t e r e n t i t i e s i s a n e x i s t e n t i a l m o m e n t o f its B e i n g . T h i s a b i l i t y c a n n o w b e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t o the e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e s that i t takes o n the e n t i t i e s that i t e n c o u n t e r s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s r e a d y t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f f l e i / n j - r / r ^ - e n t i t i e s , i t e n c o u n t e r s its fellow
co-Daseins
from
the
perspective
of
Being-witli-others.
and
it
e n c o u n t e r s the future p o s s i b i l i t i e s that i t a l l o w s i t s e l f t o b e c o m e f r o m the perspective
of
Being-itself.
Since
Dasein's
ability
to
encounter
entities
b e l o n g s to its B e i n g , so t o o does each such e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e . 1 w i l l t h e r e f o r e speak o f a n e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e a s a p e r s p e c t i v e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . It is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that an e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e is not p r i m a r i l y a p a r t i c u l a r w a y of l o o k i n g at D a s e i n . R a t h e r , it is a d i s t i n c t i v e stance that D a s e i n c a n take i n its e n c o u n t e r s w i t h e n t i t i e s . W e saw a t the b e g i n n i n g o f s e c t i o n I I that f o r H e i d e g g e r a l l o f D a s e i n ' s basic e n c o u n t e r s w i t h e n t i t i e s are i n t e r p r e t a t i v e . T h a t is, each such e n c o u n t e r is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by D a s e i n ' s t a k i n g the e n t i t y as s o m e t h i n g . W h a t the e n t i t y is t a k e n as is a meaning. T h e d i s c l o s u r e of m e a n i n g - p o s s i b i l i t i e s is thus r e q u i r e d f o r e n t i t i e s t o b e e n c o u n t e r a b l e b y D a s e i n . N o t e that i n o u r v i s u a l a n a l o g u e t o D a s e i n ' s e n c o u n t e r s w i t h e n t i t i e s , o b j e c t s i n a n o t h e r w i s e d a r k a n d dense forest are v i s i b l e o n l y i n the l i g h t shed b y a c l e a r i n g . H e n c e the m e t a p h o r o f the t o t a l i t y o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s a s c o n s t i t u t i n g the l i g h t e d c l e a r i n g , a s w e s a w a t the e n d o f s e c t i o n I I .
217
70
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
T o r e t u r n t o o u r v i s u a l a n a l o g u e , a n o b s e r v a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s a stance that a n o b s e r v e r takes n o t j u s t t o v i s i b l e o b j e c t s , but also t o the o p e n c l e a r i n g i n w h i c h these o b j e c t s are v i s i b l e . T h u s a d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n o f the c l e a r i n g i s visible
from
each
observational
perspective.
Similarly,
an
existential
perspective is not just Dasein's a b i l i t y to encounter entities of a particular w a y o f B e i n g . S u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e i s also D a s e i n ' s openness t o the d i s c l o s u r e o f a p a r t i c u l a r set of m e a n i n g - p o s s i b i l i t i e s - n a m e l y , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that it c a n i n t e r p r e t these e n t i t i e s as. N o t o n l y d o the e n t i t i e s that D a s e i n c a n e n c o u n t e r f r o m a g i v e n p e r s p e c t i v e a l l stand i n the same o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n , b u t s o d o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h these e n t i t i e s are e n c o u n t e r e d . A n e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s t h u s D a s e i n ' s openness t o the d i s c l o s u r e o f the set o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s s t a n d i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n . W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen the w a y o f B e i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the e n t i t i e s that D a s e i n c a n e n c o u n t e r f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s : r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d . A n d w e have also seen that r e a d y - t o - h a n d entities stand t o D a s e i n i n the r e l a t i o n o f b e i n g useful ( o r useless) t o i t . T h e m e a n i n g s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h r e a d y - t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s are e n c o u n t e r e d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , are p o s s i b l e p r a c t i c a l uses o f r e a d y - t o - h a n d e q u i p m e n t . T h u s w h a t i s d i s c l o s e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r D a s e i n f r o m her e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s i s the set o f t h i n g s that she k n o w s h o w t o d o w i t h e q u i p m e n t . O n e o f the tasks o f the rest o f this s e c t i o n w i l l be to i d e n t i f y a n d d e s c r i b e the m e a n i n g - p o s s i b i l i t i e s d i s c l o s e d t o the o t h e r t w o e x i s t e n t i a l perspectives,
Being-with-others
and
Being-oneself.
Before
we
do
this,
h o w e v e r , w e need t o e x p l o r e H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t o f a n e x i s t e n t i a l h o r i z o n . A s I suggested a t the b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n , the c o n c e p t o f a n e x i s t e n t i a l h o r i z o n can b e u n d e r s t o o d b y a n a l o g y w i t h that o f a v i s u a l h o r i z o n . A t least f o u r features o f s u c h a h o r i z o n w i l l be i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r purposes. F i r s t , a h o r i z o n is e s s e n t i a l l y r e l a t e d to an o b s e r v a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . In p a r t i c u l a r , a h o r i z o n f o r m s a b a c k g r o u n d against w h i c h objects c a n be seen f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e . As s u c h - a n d as is f a m i l i a r f r o m p a i n t i n g - the h o r i z o n f o r m s a c o n t e x t that c o n d i t i o n s the w a y s i n w h i c h o b j e c t s i n t h e c l e a r i n g c a n b e p e r c e i v e d . S e c o n d , because o f t h i s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n a h o r i z o n a n d a p e r s p e c t i v e , a l l o f the e l e m e n t s o f a h o r i z o n c a n b e seen f r o m a s i n g l e d i r e c t i o n o f the o b s e r v e r ' s gaze. T h i r d , a h o r i z o n encloses, l i m i t s , o r b o u n d s all of the c l e a r i n g that one c a n see f r o m a g i v e n p e r s p e c t i v e {GA 24: 4 3 7 ; GA 2 6 : 2 6 9 ; GA 2 4 : 3 5 6 ; GA 2 9 / 3 0 : 2 1 8 - 2 2 ) . F o u r t h , a h o r i z o n is e s s e n t i a l l y u n r e a c h a b l e . N o m a t t e r h o w far o n e t r a v e l s i n a g i v e n d i r e c t i o n , the h o r i z o n always remains o u t s t a n d i n g .
2 0
E a c h o f these f o u r aspects o f a v i s u a l h o r i z o n i s reflected i n H e i d e g g e r ' s phenomenological concept of an existential h o r i z o n .
2 1
A s I a m u s i n g the t e r m
here, a set o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s the h o r i z o n o f a g i v e n e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e i f and o n l y i f ( H I ) these p o s s i b i l i t i e s are c a p a b l e o f b e i n g t a k e n a s a ' r e f e r e n c e ' o f the e n t i t i e s that D a s e i n c a n e n c o u n t e r f r o m that p e r s p e c t i v e ;
218
Individual
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
71
( H 2 ) e a c h o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s stands i n the same o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n t o Dasein; ( H 3 ) n o n e o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s stands i n a r e f e r e n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o any further p o s s i b i l i t y , n o t i n c l u d e d i n the set o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n q u e s t i o n , s t a n d i n g i n t h i s ontological relation to Dasein; and ( H 4 ) i t i s n o t t h e case that a n y D a s e i n c a n e x p e r i e n c e the s i m u l t a n e o u s a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a l l o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 1 w i l l a r g u e b e l o w t h a t t h e h o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s is the w o r l d , the h o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s i s das Man, a n d the h o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f i s o n e ' s o w n d e a t h . T h i s i s d e p i c t e d i n the d i a g r a m . L e t us turn first to
the p e r s p e c t i v e
of Dasein's
Being-at-iiUraworldly-
Daseiti's ontological structure
DEATH
for-lhc-sakes-of-whom -ahilities-lo-be ^everyday possibilities of the self
••self-care"
Being-oneself
Da-sein =ec-sisience
CO-
transcendence =caie
. ς.-
,4
Key:
italics:
encountered
entities
underlined: existential perspective CAPITALS: EXISTENTIAL HORIZON OF THE
THERE"
219
72
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
e n t i t i e s ( o r " B e i n g - a t ' f o r s h o r t ) , a n d its c o r r e l a t i v e h o r i z o n , the w o r l d .
2 2
B e i n g - a t i s the p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s r e a d y - t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s . D a s e i n can i n t e i p r e t r e a d y - t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s a s h a v i n g t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c a l uses o n l y because o f the p r i o r d i s c l o s u r e o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s a n " e n v i r o n m e n t ' ( S Z 6 6 ) , i.e. a r e f e r e n t i a l context o f p r a c t i c a l u s e - m e a n i n g s . I n g e n e r a l , m a n y such p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s are d i s c l o s e d t o a n i n d i v i d u a l D a s e i n . A l l n o r m a l h u m a n a d u l t s , after a l l , k n o w h o w t o f u n c t i o n i n m a n y d i f f e r e n t e n v i r o n m e n t s ( i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense), such a s d r e s s i n g , b a t h i n g , t a k i n g p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , etc.
H e i d e g g e r uses the t e r m
'world'
t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the
totality of cross-referential practical meanings disclosed to an i n d i v i d u a l D a s e i n (SZ 8 6 ) . W o r l d (Welt) thus encompasses e v e r y e n v i r o n m e n t (Umwelt). S o m e o n e ' s w o r l d is the t o t a l i t y of w a y s that she c o u l d use e q u i p m e n t - o n l y a s m a l l subset o f w h i c h she c a n s t r i v e t o a c t u a l i z e a t any t i m e . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o note that H e i d e g g e r uses the t e r m ' w o r l d ' t o c h a r a c t e r i z e n o t a t o t a l i t y o f entities
(as do such
p h i l o s o p h e r s as
Husserl),
b u t r a t h e r the
totality
of
practical meanings i n t o w h i c h an i n d i v i d u a l D a s e i n finds i t s e l f t h r o w n (SZ 64 f.). W e can see that the w o r l d f u l f i l l s the f o u r r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r b e i n g a n e x i s t e n t i a l h o r i z o n , as e n u m e r a t e d e a r l i e r in t h i s s e c t i o n . S i n c e a D a s e i n ' s w o r l d consists o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g e n t i t i e s ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , r e a d y - t o hand
entities),
it
fulfills
condition
(HI).
Furthermore,
the
practical
p o s s i b i l i t i e s that c o n s t i t u t e the w o r l d share a u n i q u e , i f c o m p l e x , o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n , n a m e l y b e i n g s o m e t h i n g a t w h i c h D a s e i n w o r k s with e q u i p m e n t in order to a c c o m p l i s h s o m e purpose. F o r this reason, the w o r l d f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H 2 ) . N o w p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g s are ( b y d e f i n i t i o n , a s i t w e r e ) the o n l y t h i n g s s t a n d i n g i n j u s t t h i s o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n . A n d the w o r l d i s (also b y d e f i n i t i o n ) the t o t a l i t y o f such p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g s . T h e w o r l d thus f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H 3 ) , f o r there c a n b e n o f u r t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s s t a n d i n g i n t h i s o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n besides those c o n s t i t u t i n g the w o r l d . Finally,
it
is
impossible
for
Dasein
to
experience
the
simultaneous
a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a l l o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that c o n s t i t u t e its w o r l d . I t i s true that a l l o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s are disclosed t o D a s e i n a t a n y g i v e n t i m e . B u t the great m a j o r i t y o f t h e m are m e r e l y part o f a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s tacit k n o w - h o w . P o s s i b i l i t i e s d i s c l o s e d i n this m o d e are m e r e l y t h i n g s D a s e i n p o t e n t i a l l y could d o , not f u l l y a c t u a l i z e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s . S u r e l y D a s e i n does f r o m t i m e t o t i m e e x p e r i e n c e the a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f some p r o p e r subset o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that c o n s t i t u t e its w o r l d . T h i s o c c u r s , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n e v e r s o m e o n e c o m p l e t e s a task. It is i m p o s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , f o r it e v e r to e x p e r i e n c e the s i m u l t a n e o u s a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f all o f its w o r l d l y p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T o d o so, after a l l , i t w o u l d have t o b e s o m e h o w s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n the process o f c o m p l e t i n g a l l o f the tasks that i t c o u l d e v e r a c c o m p l i s h o n the basis o f its p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s . S i n c e such a n e x p e r i e n c e i s c l e a r l y i m p o s s i b l e ,
2 3
for being an existential horizon.
220
the w o r l d f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H 4 )
Individual
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
73
L e t u s t u r n n o w f r o m the e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - a t - i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s a n d its h o r i z o n , the w o r l d , t o the e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f ' B e i n g with-one-another'
(Miteinandersein),
or s i m p l y
'Being-with'
{Milsein).
As
I
suggested a b o v e , t h i s i s the p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h D a s e i n c a n e n c o u n t e r o t h e r p e o p l e , o r c o - D a s e i n s . H e i d e g g e r stresses that D a s e i n ' s r e l a t i o n s t o others are d i s t i n c t f r o m those t o e i t h e r r e a d y - t o - h a n d e q u i p m e n t o r itself. ' B e i n g t o w a r d o t h e r s i s . . . a u n i q u e [eigenständiger], i r r e d u c i b l e r e l a t i o n o f B e i n g ' ( S Z 125). N e v e r t h e l e s s , H e i d e g g e r insists that D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - w i t h b e l o n g s j u s t as e s s e n t i a l l y to D a s e i n ' s B e i n g as does its B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s (SZ 120 f . ) .
2 4
T h a t is, e v e n t h o u g h D a s e i n c a n o f c o u r s e be i s o l a t e d f r o m o t h e r s , i t
nevertheless has n o c h o i c e b u t t o b e able t o e n c o u n t e r o t h e r D a s e i n s i n t h e i r distinctive w a y o f B e i n g (SZ 120). As pointed out above, Dasein's encounters w i t h entities always i n v o l v e i n t e r p r e t i n g the e n t i t y i n t e r m s o f s o m e m e a n i n g - p o s s i b i l i t y . A n d j u s t a s the e n t i t i e s that D a s e i n c a n e n c o u n t e r f r o m a g i v e n e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e stand t o D a s e i n i n a s i n g l e o n t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n , s o d o the m e a n i n g - p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r encountering
such
entities.
Whereas
p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - a t are p o s s i b l e D a s e i n , the
the
meanings
disclosed
ways for equipment
to
the
t o b e used b y
m e a n i n g s d i s c l o s e d f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - w i t h are
p o s s i b l e w a y s f o r other Daseins to he (SZ 1 1 8 ) . In g e n e r a l , 'the others are e n c o u n t e r e d as w h a t t h e y are; t h e y are w h a t t h e y b u s y t h e m s e l v e s w i t h [was sie beireiben]' (SZ 1 2 6 ) . H e i d e g g e r g i v e s a f e w e x a m p l e s in a l e c t u r e - c o u r s e : b e i n g 'a c o b b l e r , a t a i l o r , a teacher, a b a n k e r ' (GA 2 0 : 3 3 6 ) . In SZ, he lists t w o e x t r e m e s : b e i n g ' "at w o r k " o r "just h a n g i n g a r o u n d " , . . . the u n c o n c e r n e d , u n c i r c u m s p e c t i v e t a r r y i n g at e v e r y t h i n g a n d at n o t h i n g ' ( S Z 120). Just as the w o r l d l y m e a n i n g s stand t o g e t h e r i n c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s o f ' r e f e r e n c e ' , s o t o o d o the m e a n i n g s f o r e n c o u n t e r i n g c o - D a s e i n s . B u t a g a i n , the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g these m e a n i n g s are d i f f e r e n t f r o m those a m o n g w o r l d l y ones. T a k e the e x a m p l e o f e n c o u n t e r i n g c o - D a s e i n s i n t e r m s o f t h e i r s o c i a l roles o r s o c i a l statuses.
25
V i r t u a l l y any s o c i a l r o l e gets its m e a n i n g i n p a r t f r o m the r e l a t i o n s
i n w h i c h i t stands t o o t h e r such roles. H e i d e g g e r g i v e s the e x a m p l e o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ' b e i n g ' t a i l o r e d t o p r o f e s s i o n s , classes, a n d ages' ( S Z 2 3 9 ) . B e i n g the o w n e r o f a f a c t o r y , f o r e x a m p l e , i s p o s s i b l e o n l y because o f the r e l a t i o n s that the o w n e r stands t o s u p p l i e r s o f r a w m a t e r i a l s , w o r k e r s , d i s t r i b u t o r s , c o n s u m e r s , etc. O r b e i n g a parent i s p o s s i b l e o n l y because o f the r e l a t i o n s i n w h i c h one stands t o o n e ' s c h i l d r e n . Das Man, I suggest, is the t o t a l i t y of i n t e r r e l a t e d meanings in t e r m s of which
co-Daseins
are
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t possibilities
encountered.
It
is
f o r others to be:
the
overarching
the t o t a l i t y
network
of
of ' f o r - t h e - s a k e s -
o f - w h o m ' (Worumwillen) that c a n g u i d e t h e i r p r a c t i c a l p r o j e c t s . A n y D a s e i n , i n c l u d i n g oneself, c a n ' r e p r e s e n t ' , o r ' s t a n d i n f o r ' (vertreten), these p o s s i b l e w a y s to be ( S Z 126, 2 3 9 (.). It is n e i t h e r any p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n o c c u p y i n g s u c h s o c i a l r o l e s , n o r is it the ' s u m - t o t a l ' (die Summe Aller; SZ 126; cf. 127) of a l l
221
74
Edgar
such
persons
C.
Baedeker, taken
Heidegger's term
Jr.
together.
'das Man'
This
impersonality
is
one
reason
why
is n e i t h e r m a s c u l i n e n o r f e m i n i n e , but r a t h e r
neuter (SZ 126). L i k e w o r l d l i n e s s (SZ 6 4 , 8 8 ) , it is an e x i s t e n t i a l (SZ 127, 1 2 9 ) , i.e. a n essential feature o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . T h u s d e f i n e d , das Man c a n be seen to satisfy the c o n d i t i o n s f o r b e i n g the h o r i z o n o f B e i n g - w i t h - o n e - a n o t h e r . S i n c e i t i s the n e t w o r k o f p o s s i b l e w a y s f o r D a s e i n s t o be, i t i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o w h i c h D a s e i n c a n t a k e others as r e f e r r i n g . Das Man t h u s satisfies c o n d i t i o n ( H I ) . It also satisfies c o n d i t i o n ( H 2 ) . F o r i t consists e n t i r e l y o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s that are r e l a t e d t o D a s e i n in a p a r t i c u l a r w a y , n a m e l y as a way it can encounter another Dasein. A n d since we d e f i n e d das Man as the totality of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s , it also satisfies c o n d i t i o n ( H 3 ) . F i n a l l y , f o r D a s e i n t o e x p e r i e n c e the s i m u l t a n e o u s a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a l l o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that m a k e u p das Man w o u l d b e f o r i t t o e x p e r i e n c e the c o m p l e t i o n o f a l l p o s s i b l e w a y s t o b e a h u m a n b e i n g . A n d since a t least s o m e s u c h p o s s i b i l i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y those i n v o l v e d i n f l e x i b l e , c r e a t i v e careers, are i n p r i n c i p l e i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g c o m p l e t e d , such a n e x p e r i e n c e m u s t be i m p o s s i b l e . Das Man thus satisfies c o n d i t i o n ( H 4 ) f o r b e i n g the h o r i z o n o f B e i n g - w i t h . W e can n o w t u r n t o the f i n a l e x i s t e n t i a l p e r s p e c t i v e : B e i n g - o n e s e l f . T h e e n t i t y that one e n c o u n t e r s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f is, n a t u r a l l y e n o u g h , oneself: w h o o n e is. H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s the t o p i c o f the s e l f i n connection w i t h Dasein's dealings w i t h ready-to-hand entities. T o b o r r o w Heidegger's hammering
example, (a
nail),
imagine then
with
someone what
has
working been
with
a
hammered
hammer at
at
securing
s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e n with s o m e t h i n g s e c u r e d at p r o t e c t i n g against i n c l e m e n t w e a t h e r . F i n a l l y , the p r o t e c t i o n against i n c l e m e n t w e a t h e r '"is" for the sake of h o u s i n g D a s e i n ' (SZ 8 4 ) . H e i d e g g e r stresses that h o u s i n g D a s e i n is n o t a p o s s i b l e w a y in w h i c h an i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t y ( s u c h as a h a m m e r , a r o o f , or a h o u s e ) c a n b e useful t o D a s e i n . I n s t e a d , i t i s ' a p o s s i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g ' (SZ 8 4 ) itself, f o r the sake of w h o m (urn . . . willen) D a s e i n protects i t s e l f against i n c l e m e n t w e a t h e r . H e c o n t i n u e s :
The totality ot usefulness itself, however, finally goes back to an in-order-to that has no further usefulness; w h i c h itself is not an entity in the way of Being of ready-iohand entities w i t h i n the w o r l d , but rather an entity whose Being is determined as Being-in-the-wodd, [and] to whose constitution of Being worldliness itself belongs. This primary in-order-lo is not an in-order-to as a possible at-what w i t h a use. The primary 'for-what' is a for-the-sake-of-whom. The 'for-the-sake-of-whom', however, always concerns the Being of Dasein, the entity that goes about its Being essentially for the sake o/ii.s o w n Being [dem es in seinem Sein wesenhaft um dieses Sein seihst geht). (SZ 84)
T h e basic p o i n t here i s that the p r a c t i c a l u s e - m e a n i n g s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s r e a d y - t o - h a n d i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s are u l t i m a t e l y ' j o i n e d
222
Individual t o g e t h e r ' (SZ 192; cf.
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
75
122, 3 5 9 ) - v i a o f t e n c o m p l e x c h a i n s o f o v e r l a p p i n g
r e f e r e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s - to some final p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r f r o m that o f r e a d y - t o - h a n d m e a n i n g s . I n s t e a d o f b e i n g e n c o u n t e r e d a s useful i n order
to
accomplish
some
further
task,
this
final
possibility
is
thus
e n c o u n t e r e d a s a n e n d i n itself. I n s t e a d o f b e i n g s o m e t h i n g that D a s e i n c a n use an e n t i t y for, it is one that D a s e i n i t s e l f can be or become. H e i d e g g e r refers to this final p o s s i b i l i t y as a f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m (Worumwillen). T h e self, f o r H e i d e g g e r , exists i n the p r o j e c t i o n o f f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m . It
is crucial
to note
that
the e n t i t i e s
p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - i t s e l f are
that
Dasein encounters
f r o m the
t h e m s e l v e s p r i m a r i l y possibilities. T h u s h e
w r i t e s : ' D a s e i n a l w a y s i s its p o s s i b i l i t y ' ( S Z 4 2 ; c f . 4 3 , 1 4 5 ) , and that D a s e i n ' i s p r i m a r i l y B e i n g - p o s s i b l e . D a s e i n i s a l w a y s w h a t i t c a n b e a n d h o w i t i s its p o s s i b i l i t y ' (SZ 143). T h e s e l f a t a g i v e n t i m e consists j u s t o f D a s e i n ' s c u n e n t p r o j e c t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m . F o r this reason, H e i d e g g e r characterizes the s e l f as c o n s t i t u t e d by ' a b i l i t i e s - t o - b e ' (Seinkönnen; SZ 143). T h i s t r u l y r a d i c a l v i e w a l l o w s H e i d e g g e r t o reject t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w s o f the s e l f as a substance ( S Z 3 0 3 ; c f . GA 22: 1 8 4 ) , or e v e n as a K a n t i a n n o n - o b j e c t i f i a b l e transcendental u n i t y .
2 6
F o r H e i d e g g e r , o n the o t h e r h a n d , the s e l f i s rather the
d y n a m i c m o v e m e n t f r o m p o t e n t i a l i t y t o a c t u a l i t y o f the specific p o s s i b l e f o r t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m t h a t one is c u r r e n t l y p r o j e c t i n g as a p o s s i b i l i t y of oneself. N a t u r a l l y , not all f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m need be p o s s i b i l i t i e s of oneself. F o r e x a m p l e , o n e c a n b u i l d s o m e t h i n g , such a s a house, f o r the sake o f s o m e o n e , e v e n i f the i n t e n d e d i n h a b i t a n t i s not oneself. I n s u c h a case, o n e ' s p r a c t i c a l d e a l i n g s w i t h t h i n g s w o u l d b e f o r the sake o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n , o r c o D a s e i n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , e v e n such a c t i o n s arc p e r f o r m e d ultimately f o r the sake o f a p o s s i b i l i t y o f oneself. F o r e x a m p l e , m y d o i n g s o m e t h i n g f o r the sake o f s o m e o n e else is f o r the sake of m y s e l f as a f r i e n d , p a r t n e r , b e n e f a c t o r , etc. T h i s i s a large part o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r m e a n s b y his f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f D a s e i n : ' T h e b e i n g / o r the sake of whom t h i s e n t i t y [ i . e . D a s e i n ] goes a b o u t its b e i n g , i s i n each case m y o w n . '
2 7
' A s a n e n t i t y that goes a b o u t f o r the sake o f
its B e i n g , D a s e i n uses itself, w h e t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or not, p r i m a r i l y for itself. U s i n g i t s e l f f o r the sake o f itself, D a s e i n "uses i t s e l f u p " ' (SZ 3 3 3 ) . D a s e i n ' s i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s , l i k e its d e a l i n g s w i t h i n t r a w o r l d l y t o o l s , are g u i d e d u l t i m a t e l y b y its o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f i t s e l f . "
8
I V . J u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d C l a r i f i c a t i o n o f this I n t e r p r e t a t i o n On the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I have suggested so far, D a s e i n exists s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a n d e q u i o r i g i n a r i l y f r o m o u t o f three i n t e r r e l a t e d p e r s p e c t i v e s ( B e i n g - a t entities, B e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s , and Being-oneself). Each such perspective corresponds to Dasein's a b i l i t y to encounter a distinctive way of B e i n g ( i n t r a w o r l d l y r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d , c o - D a s e i n , a n d D a s e i n ' s self) i n t e r m s o f a
223
76
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
p a r t i c u l a r h o r i z o n o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s (the w o r l d , das Man, a n d d e a t h ) . T h i s v i e w o f the a r c h i t e c t o n i c o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g i s l i k e l y t o b e s o m e w h a t c o n t r o v e r s i a l . C o m m e n t a t o r s o f t e n c o n c e i v e o f the t o t a l h o r i z o n o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s that H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the d i s c l o s e d n e s s of the undifferentiated m a n n e r , w o r l d a n d the s e l f . admittedly
not
3 0
2 9
"there'
(Da) e i t h e r in a r a t h e r
o r a s c o n s i s t i n g o f j u s t two s u c h h o r i z o n s : the
N o w the t r i p a r t i t e h o r i z o n a l i t y o f the
immediately
evident on
the
surface
'there'
is
o f the t e x t o f SZ.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , there i s a m p l e t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e that t h i s i s i n fact h o w H e i d e g g e r saw t h i n g s . F i r s t , this p a r t i c u l a r t r i p a r t i t e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n permeates b o t h S Z a n d the
lecture-courses
s u r r o u n d i n g its p u b l i c a t i o n .
3 1
Second,
because H e i d e g g e r m o s t c o n c r e t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e s D a s e i n ' s w h o l e B e i n g a s care {Sorge; SZ 192), he a d o p t s a d i s t i n c t t e r m f o r the m o d e of D a s e i n ' s c a r i n g a b o u t , o r m e a n i n g f u l l y e n c o u n t e r i n g , e n t i t i e s i n each o f these basic w a y s o f B e i n g i n t e r m s o f its r e s p e c t i v e h o r i z o n . C o n c e r n ( ö e s o r g e / i ) i s the w a y i n w h i c h D a s e i n deals w i t h r e a d y - t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s i n t e r m s o f t h e i r p r a c t i c a l usefulness ( S Z 6 7 , 1 2 1 , 143, 146, 1 9 3 ) . ' C a r i n g - f o r ' (Fürsorge) is H e i d e g g e r ' s n e u t r a l o n t o l o g i c a l t e r m f o r the w a y i n w h i c h D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r p e o p l e (SZ 121—4). A n d he suggests ' s e l f - c a r e ' ( 5 W / w s o r g e )
3 2
as a
p o s s i b l e t e r m f o r the w a y i n w h i c h one deals w i t h o n e s e l f . T h i r d , because h e uses the m e t a p h o r s of ' l i g h t i n g ' (Lichtung; SZ 132 f . ) a n d ' s i g h t ' (Sicht) f o r the d i s c l o s u r e o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h w e e n c o u n t e r s u c h e n t i t i e s , h e e x p r e s s l y a p p r o p r i a t e s t e r m s f o r e x a c t l y three k i n d s o f " s i g h t ' , each one o f w h i c h i l l u m i n a t e s the k i n d s o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s that c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t i c u l a r h o r i z o n (SZ 146). C i r c u m s p e c t i o n ( t / m s i c h t ) , o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , f o r e - s i g h t ( V o r - s i c h t ; S Z 150), i l l u m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that c o n s t i t u t e each o f the r e g i o n s o f the w o r l d that H e i d e g g e r c a l l s a n ' e n v i r o n m e n t ' (Umwelt).
"Considerateness'
-
(/?(/c &sicht),
or,
alternately,
looking-after'
(A'tvr/isicht; SZ 123), i l l u m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of das Man in t e r m s of w h i c h one e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r D a s e i n s . F i n a l l y , t r a n s p a r e n c y ( D i H r / j s i c h t / g keit), o r i n s i g h t ( f » i s i c h t ; G A 2 4 : 3 9 3 ) , i l l u m i n a t e s o n e ' s o w n d e a t h , t h u s a l l o w i n g D a s e i n t o take ' o w n e r s h i p ' o f i t s e l f .
3 3
T h e r e are a f e w i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s to note about these three h o r i z o n a l perspectival pairs.
F i r s t , each o f D a s e i n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e s ,
a l o n g w i t h its
r e s p e c t i v e h o r i z o n , is an existential. T h a t is, each is an essential s t r u c t u r e of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g : s o m e t h i n g that D a s e i n can never d o w i t h o u t . I n this respect, the three h o r i z o n a l - p e r s p e c t i v a l p a i r s are l i k e the three m o m e n t s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g : its a b i l i t y t o e n c o u n t e r e n t i t i e s , p r o j e c t i o n , a n d t h r o w n n e s s . S e c o n d , h o w e v e r , the m o m e n t s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g d o not o v e r l a p w i t h the h o r i z o n a l p e r s p e c t i v a l p a i r s . I n s t e a d , they c u t across t h e m . T h a t is, each p e r s p e c t i v e is a particular w a y in w h i c h Dasein can encounter entities in a particular w a y of Being, by projecting them upon possibilities into w h i c h it finds itself t h r o w n . T h i r d , these h o r i z o n a l - p e r s p e c t i v a l p a i r s d o not e x i s t i n i s o l a t i o n . I n s t e a d , they
are
intimately
related
to
each
other.
224
We
have
already
seen
one
Individual
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
11
p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t w a y i n w h i c h t h e y i n t e r a c t . F o r there i s a d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the p e r s p e c t i v e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s a n d that o f B e i n g oneself. R e c a l l that D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s i n t r a w o r l d l y r e a d y - t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s i n t e r m s o f the w o r l d : the c o m p l e x n e t w o r k o f p r a c t i c a l r e f e r e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t a l l o w a t o o l to be used with a n o t h e r t o o l , at an a c t i v i t y , a n d in order to a c c o m p l i s h s o m e p r a c t i c a l g o a l . W e saw that s u c h d e a l i n g s are a l w a y s g u i d e d by a final r e f e r e n c e w i t h a q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r : a "for-the-sake-ofw h o m ' . T h i s f i n a l possibility, w h i c h gives meaning and d i r e c t i o n t o Dasein's c o n c e r n e d d e a l i n g s w i t h i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s , i s a p o s s i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s self. I n t h i s w a y , the e n t i t i e s that D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g i t s e l f d e t e r m i n e the u l t i m a t e p u r p o s e o f its e n c o u n t e r s w i t h r e a d y - l o - h a n d e n t i t i e s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s . A s e c o n d s a l i e n t w a y i n w h i c h the p e r s p e c t i v e s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g i n t e r a c t w i t h each o t h e r can b e seen i n the fact that a n i n d i v i d u a l D a s e i n does not s p o n t a n e o u s l y generate the f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m that i t e n c o u n t e r s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - i t s e l f . I n s t e a d , D a s e i n a p p r o p r i a t e s these p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f its e v e r y d a y B e i n g - i t s e l f f r o m das Man, the h o r i z o n i n t e r m s o f w h i c h D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r s . H e describes t h i s i n d e t a i l i n a l e c t u r e - c o u r s e h e l d less t h a n t w o years b e f o r e the p u b l i c a t i o n o f SZ: [ I | n the 'by and large' of one's everyday concern, one's o w n Dasein is always what il busies itself w i t h . One [ M a n ) is oneself what one [man] does. Dasein's everyday interpretation of itself takes its horizon of interpreting and naming from ils mattet Μ of constant concern. One [ M a n | is a cobbler, a tailor, a teacher, a banker. In this way Dasein is something that others, too, can be and are. The olhers are environmentally there too - one takes their co-Dasein into account - not only insofar as the mailers of concern stand for the olhers in the character of usability and helpfulness [Beiträglichkeit\, but also insofar as the others concern themselves w i t h the same thing [as oneself] . . . Co-Being w i t h [others] is in a relation to them. That is, one's o w n concern is more or less successful or useful w i t h respect to the others and to what they busy themselves w i t h ; [ i t ] is regarded as mote or less excellent, lagging behind, esteemed, or the like, in relation to those thai concern themselves w i t h the same thing. The others are not just merely present-at-hand in one's concern for what one [man] does w i t h , for, and against them. Rather, concern Uses constantly as concern in the care for a difference from them, even if only in order lo level o f f the difference whether one's o w n Dasein lags behind and wants, so to speak, to catch up w i t h respect to the others; or whether it is out to keep the others d o w n in superiority to them. ( G A 20: 336 f.)
I n this w a y , the c o m p l e x n e t w o r k o f i n t e r r e l a t e d m e a n i n g s o f das Man, the h o r i z o n of Dasein's
Being-with-others, provides a
'content'
t o the p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f . E a c h p o s s i b i l i t y oidas Man can i n p r i n c i p l e be
taken
over,
appropriated,
or
'represented'
by
any
Dasein.
'The
repre-
sentahility o f o n e D a s e i n b y a n o t h e r b e l o n g s incontestable' t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f B e i n g o f B e i n g - w i t h - o n e - a n o t h e r i n the w o r l d ' ( 5 Z 2 3 9 ) . N a t u r a l l y , D a s e i n does not create its c u l t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , but rather f i n d s i t s e l f a l w a y s "handed
225
78
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
o v e r ' (überantwortet; SZ 1 3 5 ) to t h e m . C o n v e r s e l y , these p o s s i b i l i t i e s can be thought of as Dasein's
'inheritance'
(SZ 3 8 3 ) .
A n d Dasein acquires
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s because i t 'at f i r s t g r o w s u p '
its
(zunächst
hineinwächst) i n t o the average interpretedness that c o n s t i t u t e s its c u l t u r e (SZ 169; cf. GA 2 0 : 3 3 9 f.; GA 6 3 : 98 f . ) . Because das Man is an e x i s t e n t i a l , D a s e i n ' c a n n e v e r e x t r i c a t e i t s e l f f u l l y f r o m i t (SZ 169). These connections a m o n g B e i n g - o n e s e l f and both Being-at-entities and B e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s r e v e a l that B e i n g - o n e s e l f i s i n s o m e sense the ' c e n t r a l ' p e r s p e c t i v e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . F o r the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that c o n s t i t u t e D a s e i n ' s s e l f are a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m the h o r i z o n o f B e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s , a n d also serve t o guide
its
concerned
Being-at-entities.
Nevertheless,
the
possibilities
of
D a s e i n ' s e v e r y d a y B e i n g - i t s e l f are a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m the h o r i z o n o f das Man, a n d w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o b e f u l f i l l e d w i t h o u t the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - a t e n t i t i e s a n d its h o r i z o n o f the w o r l d . T h i s i s u l t i m a t e l y the w a y i n w h i c h the three
perspectives
of
Dasein's
Being
are
'equioriginary',
or
mutually
supporting.
V . D e a t h a s the H o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - I t s e l f O n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I a m s u g g e s t i n g , the h o r i z o n o f the p e r s p e c t i v e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f i s its o w n d e a t h . N o w since H e i d e g g e r t o m y k n o w l e d g e does n o t m a k e t h i s e n t i r e l y
explicit,
this
suggestion m i g h t
raise
some
c o n t r o v e r s y . I w i l l s u p p o r t m y r e a d i n g b y a r g u i n g that d e a t h as H e i d e g g e r understands i t meets the c o n d i t i o n s f o r b e i n g the h o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g itself, as I e n u m e r a t e d i n s e c t i o n I I I . I w i l l b e g i n w i t h c o n d i t i o n s ( H 2 ) , ( H 3 ) , a n d ( H 4 ) , s a v i n g c o n d i t i o n ( H I ) f o r last. R e c a l l that the e n t i t i e s e n c o u n t e r e d f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f are p o s s i b l e w a y s f o r D a s e i n t o be. O n e ' s o w n death i s a p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n e s e l f i n this sense, a l t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y a h i g h l y u n i q u e one. F o r a s 'the p o s s i b i l i t y .
.
. of the impossibility of existence at all' (SZ 2 6 2 ) , or 'the s i m p l e n e g a t i v i t y
of D a s e i n
[die schlechthinnige Nichtigkeit des Daseins]'
(SZ 3 0 6 ) ,
it
is in fact
the w a y f o r D a s e i n not to be. N e v e r t h e l e s s , o n e ' s o w n death is s u r e l y a p o s s i b l e w a y f o r oneself to be - as o p p o s e d to a p o s s i b l e w a y f o r another Dasein to b e ,
3 4
o r a p o s s i b l e w a y f o r s o m e t h i n g t o b e useful. I n this w a y , d e a t h
thus f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H 2 ) f o r b e i n g the h o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f . H e i d e g g e r discusses several f u r t h e r w a y s i n w h i c h death i s a d i s t i n c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y of oneself. It is c e r t a i n (because it is u n a v o i d a b l e ; SZ 2 5 5 - 8 , 2 6 4 f., 3 0 7 f . ) , i n d e t e r m i n a t e (because i t c o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e o c c u r a t any t i m e ; S Z 2 5 8 , 2 6 5 , 3 0 8 ) , a n d o n e ' s O w n m o s t ' p o s s i b i l i t y (because i t i s the o n l y f o r - t h e s a k e - o f - w h o m that i s i n n o w a y i n h e r i t e d b y D a s e i n f r o m the h o r i z o n o f das Man; S Z 2 6 3 , 3 0 7 ) . D e a t h i s also ' n o n - r e l a t i o n a l ' ( S Z 263 f., 3 0 7 ) . T h i s f o u r t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f death i m p l i e s that i t f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H 3 ) f o r b e i n g the
226
Individuell
und
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
79
h o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f . W e saw e a r l i e r that b o t h the p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the w o r l d a n d the p o s s i b l e s o c i a l roles that c o n s t i t u t e das Man get t h e i r m e a n i n g i n part f r o m the w a y s i n w h i c h t h e y ' r e f e r ' t o o t h e r such p o s s i b i l i t i e s . A h a m m e r gels its m e a n i n g f r o m its p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s t o o t h e r i t e m s o f the w o r k s h o p ( s u c h a s n a i l s a n d b o a r d s ) , f o r e x a m p l e , a n d the s o c i a l r o l e o f a parent i s e s s e n t i a l l y l i n k e d t o that o f a c h i l d . D e a t h i s c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m these p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t h i s respect. N o w o f course i n a sense d e a t h p l a y s a r o l e i n v a r i o u s aspects o f s o c i a l l i f e , s u c h as b u r i a l , m e d i c a l t r e a t m e n t , l i f e i n s u r a n c e , estate m a n a g e m e n t , a n d e v e n t a x a t i o n . W h e n d e a l t w i t h i n these w a y s , h o w e v e r , d e a t h i s e n c o u n t e r e d e i t h e r a s a p o s s i b i l i t y o f s o m e o n e else ( s u c h as a spouse, f r i e n d , or c l i e n t ) , or as a r e l a t i v e l y o r d i n a r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n e s e l f (as w h e n the a n t i c i p a t i o n o f o n e ' s d e a t h structures s o m e e v e r y d a y a c t i v i t y , s u c h a s w r i t i n g a w i l l ) . T o treat d e a t h l i k e t h i s , h o w e v e r , i s not t o e n c o u n t e r i t i n its f u l l e x i s t e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . W h e n e n c o u n t e r e d i n this way,
d e a t h does
not
get
its
meaning
from
being
opposed
t o particular
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f o n e s e l f (as one does w h e n one w r i t e s one k i n d o f w i l l rather t h a n another, o r chooses one l i f e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y o v e r a n o t h e r ) . I n s t e a d , d e a t h stands o p p o s e d to all o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o n e s e l f - as t h e i r a b s o l u t e n e g a t i o n . D e a t h e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h i s w a y t h u s f a l l s e n t i r e l y o u t s i d e o f the w e b o f m e a n i n g s that m a k e u p the w o r l d a n d das Man. D e a t h i s a n e n t i r e l y u n i q u e p o s s i b i l i t y o f oneself, f o r i t ' r e f e r s ' t o n o n e b e y o n d i t s e l f . T h i s i s w h a t H e i d e g g e r m e a n s b y c a l l i n g d e a t h D a s e i n ' s ' o u t e r m o s t ' (äußerste) p o s s i b i l i t y (SZ 2 6 2 ; c f . 2 6 3 ) . A s s u c h , d e a t h f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H 3 ) f o r b e i n g the h o r i z o n of Dasein's Being-itself. There is no further possibility of oneself to w h i c h death A
'refers'. f i f t h a n d final c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of d e a t h is that
it is
'unsurpassable'
(itnUberholbar; SZ 2 6 4 , 3 0 7 ) . In o t h e r w o r d s , d e a t h is u n i q u e a m o n g o n e ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n that i t a l w a y s a n d n e c e s s a r i l y "stands o u t ' a s a n u n a c t u a l i z e d p o s s i b i l i t y as l o n g as one e x i s t s . By t h i s , H e i d e g g e r does n o t m e a n to say that we are a l w a y s t h i n k i n g - e i t h e r c o n s c i o u s l y or u n c o n s c i o u s l y - a b o u t d e a t h . R a t h e r , he m e a n s o n l y that as l o n g as an i n d i v i d u a l D a s e i n has p o s s i b l e w a y s to be, d e a t h is a m o n g t h e m . T h e fact that d e a t h is unsurpassable i m p l i e s that it f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H 4 ) f o r b e i n g the h o r i z o n o f the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g oneself. T h a t is, d e a t h i s a p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n e s e l f w h o s e a c t u a l i z a t i o n one c a n n o t e x p e r i e n c e . N a t u r a l l y , H e i d e g g e r does not m e a n t o say that D a s e i n i s i m m o r t a l . F a r f r o m i t . Rather, h e m e a n s t o say that d e a t h i s the o n l y p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e such that its a c t u a l i z a t i o n w o u l d b e the e n d o f D a s e i n ( e . g . S Z 2 3 4 ) . A n d since o n l y a n e x i s t i n g D a s e i n c a n e x p e r i e n c e a n y t h i n g , o n e ' s o w n d e a t h is n o t a p o s s i b i l i t y w h o s e a c t u a l i z a t i o n one c a n e x p e r i e n c e . L e t u s t u r n n o w t o see the w a y i n w h i c h death f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H I ) for b e i n g the h o r i z o n o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f . E s s e n t i a l l y , i t does s o because i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r D a s e i n to e n c o u n t e r its e v e r y d a y s e l f - i.e. the c o n c r e t e f o r - t h e s a k e s - o f - w h o m that it a p p r o p r i a t e s f r o m das Man - as ' r e f e r r i n g ' to d e a t h . To
227
80
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
d o s o i s f o r D a s e i n l o b e eigentlich, i.e., t o take ' o w n e r s h i p ' o f i t s e l f .
1 1
As
H e i d e g g e r ' s i n i t i a l d e f i n i t i o n i n S Z o f t h i s t e r m i n d i c a t e s , a s e l f i n this m o d e i s one that 'sich zueigen ist' (SZ 4 2 ; cf. GA 2 4 : 2 2 8 ) . M a c q u a r r i e and R o b i n s o n translate this d i f f i c u l t e x p r e s s i o n a s ' [ i s ] s o m e t h i n g o f its o w n ' ; S t a m b a u g h translates it as ' b e l o n g s to i t s e l f . ' I s s e l f - a p p r o p r i a t i n g ' a n d "is s e l f - o w n i n g ' w o u l d be o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s . He later defines the s e l f - o w n i n g s e l f as the ' e x p r e s s l y seized self (SZ 129). L a t e r s t i l l , i n his d i s c u s s i o n o f p r o j e c t i o n , H e i d e g g e r defines s e l f - o w n e r s h i p a s the m o d e o f p r o j e c t i n g o n e s e l f u p o n a f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m i n a m a n n e r that
'emerges o u t o f o n e ' s o w n s e l f a s
s u c h ' (SZ 146). H e i d e g g e r m a k e s i t c l e a r that f o r D a s e i n t o take o w n e r s h i p o f i t s e l f i s f o r i t to " o w n u p ' to itself, i.e. to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for w h a t it is (SZ 2 8 8 ) . T h i s is different actions.
from,
3 6
but
Instead
analogous
of t a k i n g
to,
taking
responsibility
moral for
responsibility
what
one
for one's
does morally
(or
i m m o r a l l y ) , s e l f - o w n e r s h i p i n v o l v e s t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for w h a t one i s existentially.
H e i d e g g e r thus c a l l s s e l f - o w n e r s h i p , or resoluteness,
'the loyally
[ T r e u e ] o f e x i s t e n c e t o its o w n s e l f ( S Z 3 9 1 ) . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t a k i n g o w n e r s h i p of oneself involves
taking responsibility
f o r the
negativity
that
belongs
essentially to Dasein's B e i n g . In this w a y , taking o w n e r s h i p of oneself can be understood
as
a
positive
response
to
the
call
of a
sort
of e x i s t e n t i a l
' c o n s c i e n c e ' , a g a i n f o r m a l l y s i m i l a r t o the m o r a l c o n s c i e n c e (SZ 2 8 3 ) . L i k e the m o r a l c o n s c i e n c e , the e x i s t e n t i a l c o n s c i e n c e i s a ' c a l l ' f r o m o n e s e l f t o o n e s e l f (SZ 2 7 2 - 8 0 ) t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o m e t h i n g that one o w e s , i.e. one's
'debt'
or ' g u i l t '
(Schuld; SZ 2 8 Ü - 9 ) .
W h e r e a s the
moral conscience
c a l l s u s t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r w h a t o n e o w e s m o r a l l y i n v i r t u e o f the a c t i o n s o n e p e r f o r m s , the e x i s t e n t i a l c o n s c i e n c e calls u s t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for w h a t one o w e s e x i s t e n t i a l l y
i n v i r t u e o f the k i n d o f e n t i t y one
is.
F u r t h e r m o r e , a l t h o u g h b o t h m o r a l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l o w i n g are n e g a t i v e , the nature o f w h a t one o w e s d i f f e r s i n the t w o cases. W h a t o n e o w e s m o r a l l y i s w h a t one ought t o have d o n e , but f a i l e d t o d o . S o m e w h a t p a r a d o x i c a l l y , w h a t one o w e s e x i s t e n t i a l l y i s s o m e t h i n g one cannot d o , i n v i r t u e o f o n e ' s B e i n g . Heidegger calls negativity'
what
(Grundsein
Dasein owes existentially einer
Nichtigkeit;
SZ
283).
'being Two
the g r o u n d o f a aspects
of
this
e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i v i t y are e s p e c i a l l y salient. B o t h o f these e x i s t e n t i a l negat i v i t i e s are k i n d s o f finitude c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . A f i r s t k i n d o f e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i v i t y i s a feature o f D a s e i n ' s t h r o w n n e s s i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that m a k e u p the ' t h e r e ' (Da), and w h i c h H e i d e g g e r refers t o a s D a s e i n ' s b e i n g the ( t h r o w n ) g r o u n d :
The self that as such has to lay the ground of itself can never be master of it, and yet has to take over being-the-ground existingly . . . Being-the-ground, i.e. existing as thrown, Dasein constantly remains back behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its ground, but rather always is only from oi)t of it and as it. A c c o r d i n g l y ,
228
Individual
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
81
being-lhe-ground means never being master of one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This 'not' belongs to the existential sense of thrownness . . . Not by itself, but discharged to itself from out of the ground, in order to be us the ground. (SZ 284 f.)
T h i s first k i n d o f e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i v i t y i s a n aspect o f the f i n i t u d e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g s i m i l a r t o the f i n i t u d e that K a n t saw a s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f h u m a n , a s o p p o s e d t o d i v i n e , i n t u i t i o n . G o d ' s i n t u i t i o n i s f o r K a n t i n f i n i t e , i.e., i t c a n create its o b j e c t s at w i l l . H u m a n i n t u i t i o n , h o w e v e r , is
finite,
i.e., its o b j e c t s
m u s t b e p a s s i v e l y g i v e n f r o m o u t s i d e itself. S i m i l a r l y , D a s e i n c a n b e a s e l f o n l y b y p r o j e c t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s that are b y a n d large not o f a n i n d i v i d u a l Dasein's
own
making,
but
are
rather its c u l t u r a l ,
historical,
and even
b i o l o g i c a l i n h e r i t a n c e . A s w e saw a t the e n d o f s e c t i o n IFF, these p o s s i b i l i t i e s of D a s e i n ' s s e l f are w a y s f o r it to be that it a p p r o p r i a t e s f r o m das Man. T h i s f i r s t k i n d o f n e g a t i v i t y , o r f i n i t u d e , o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g thus lies i n the fact that D a s e i n has n o c h o i c e b u t t o b e ( i . e . p r o j e c t ) p o s s i b l e f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m g i v e n to it f r o m das Man. A
second k i n d o f e x i s t e n t i a l
negativity
is
what
Heidegger calls
the
' n e g a t i v e p r o j e c t ' (SZ 2 8 5 ) . H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s :
A b l e to be, [Dasein] always stands in one possibility or other; it is constantly not another possibility and has renounced it in its existentiell projection. . . . Projection as projection is . . . itself essentially negative. . . This negativity belongs to Dasein's being free for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, only is in the choice of the one possibility, and that means in bearing the not-having-chosen and the nolbeing-able-lo-L'hoose-also of the other possibilities. (SZ 285)
N o m a t t e r w h i c h f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m one pursues, m e r e l y d o i n g so w i l l f o r e v e r close o f f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g s o m e t h i n g ( o r s o m e o n e ) else. T h i s i s o f course n o t t o say that a c t u a l i z i n g any f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m p r e c l u d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c t u a l i z i n g any other. F o r there are s u r e l y m a n y for-the-sakeso f - w h o m that one c a n s t r i v e t o a c t u a l i z e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o r c o n s e c u t i v e l y . O n e c a n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y pursue a career a n d have a f a m i l y l i f e , a n d one c a n be c o n s e c u t i v e l y m a r r i e d to d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e . H e i d e g g e r ' s p o i n t here is that the p u r s u i t o f e v e n s u c h p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f o n e s e l f does not leave the e n t i r e range o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s e n t i r e l y u n c h a n g e d . F o r e x a m p l e , the n u m b e r o f d i s t i n c t careers that s o m e o n e c a n s e r i o u s l y pursue i s s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d . A l t h o u g h s o m e o n e c a n be first, say, a l a w y e r a n d then a m e c h a n i c , no one c a n t h e n go on to be a d o c t o r , a p h y s i c i s t , a n d so on ad infinitum. T h i s second k i n d o f n e g a t i v i t y , l i k e the first, i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f D a s e i n ' s essential f i n i t u d e . U n l i k e the f i r s t , h o w e v e r , this l a t t e r k i n d o f f i n i t u d e i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the u n i q u e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e a t h : o n e ' s e n d , o r finale. F o r i f w e w e r e i m m o r t a l , t h e n there w o u l d b e v i r t u a l l y n o l i m i t t o the n u m b e r o f possibilities
of ourselves
that
we
could
229
actualize.
Since
self-ownership
82
Edgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
i n v o l v e s t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r b o t h the f i r s t a n d the s e c o n d k i n d o f e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i v i t y , i t also r e q u i r e s t r a n s p a r e n c y a b o u t o n e ' s m o r t a l i t y . A s w e saw e a r l i e r i n t h i s s e c t i o n , death i s a p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n e s e l f that i s ' u n s u r p a s s a b l e ' . T h a t is, it a l w a y s r e m a i n s O u t s t a n d i n g ' as l o n g as D a s e i n exists. U n l i k e m o r a l o r f i n a n c i a l debts that one m i g h t o w e , death i s a n e s s e n t i a l l y u n c a n c e l a b l e d e b t ( S Z 2 4 2 f.; c f . 3 0 7 ) . T o o w n u p t o i t - i.e. t o take responsibility for it - thus cannot i n v o l v e m a k i n g it go away. Rather, to o w n u p t o i t i s t o t a k e o n e x p r e s s l y the f u l l e x i s t e n t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the debt a n a l o g o u s l y t o s o m e o n e ' s t a k i n g o n the f i n a n c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a f i n a n c i a l d e b t , o r the m o r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e i r a c t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the p r o j e c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of s e l f - o w n e r s h i p ' r u n n i n g a h e a d ' (Vorlaufen; SZ 2 6 2 - 6 , 3 3 6 ) i n t o death. N a t u r a l l y , t o r u n ahead i n t o death i s not t o a t t e m p t t o actualize the p o s s i b i l i t y o f death ( S Z 2 6 1 f . ) . E x i s t e n t i a l c o n s c i e n c e does n o t c a l l Dasein to c o m m i t suicide. Rather, it calls Dasein to appropriate some o r d i n a r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s e l f f r o m das Man - a s r e q u i r e d b y the f i r s t k i n d o f e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i v i t y - but n o w w i t h a f u l l e x p e r i e n c e o f the second k i n d o f e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i v i t y , the n e g a t i v e p r o j e c t . T h a t is, i n t a k i n g o w n e r s h i p o f i t s e l f D a s e i n p r o j e c t s s o m e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s e l f i n f u l l c l a r i t y o f the fact that d o i n g so w i l l i r r e v o c a b l y p r e c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a l i z i n g s o m e o t h e r s . S i n c e this n e g a t i v i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f p r o j e c t i o n i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o D a s e i n ' s m o r t a l i t y , s e l f - o w n e r s h i p r e q u i r e s t r a n s p a r e n c y a b o u t o n e ' s o w n death. There
is
a
further
crucial
element
in
Heidegger's
concept
of
self-
o w n e r s h i p : the e x p e r i e n c e o f f r e e d o m . K a n t has c o n v i n c i n g l y a r g u e d that i n o r d e r t o take m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r o n e ' s a c t i o n s , one m u s t e x p e r i e n c e o n e ' s w i l l as free: i.e. as a u t o n o m o u s l y c h o o s i n g one m a x i m o f a c t i o n f r o m a m o n g a range o f p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s . S i m i l a r l y , t a k i n g o w n e r s h i p o f o n e s e l f r e q u i r e s that one m u s t e x p e r i e n c e o n e s e l f as free in the p r o j e c t i o n of these f o r t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m rather than
those.
T h i s is one reason
w h y Heidegger
w r i t e s that s e l f - o w n i n g D a s e i n 'has c h o s e n i t s e l f (SZ 2 8 7 ) . N o w i n o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e s o f the f r e e d o m t o choose f r o m a m o n g a range o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s , o n e chooses w i t h reference t o some f u r t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y p r e s u p p o s e d a s f i x e d . I n s u c h o r d i n a r y c h o i c e s , one evaluates the p r e s e n t l y a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n s w i t h a n e y e t o t h e i r r e l a t i v e e f f i c a c y f o r r e a l i z i n g this g o a l . F o r e x a m p l e , one m i g h t choose t o a t t e n d o n e o u t o f a range o f p r o f e s s i o n a l s c h o o l s w i t h r e g a r d t o the a n t i c i p a t e d l i k e l i h o o d that d o i n g s o w o u l d lead t o a successful career. B u t t a k i n g responsibility for what one is existentially requires something more: e x p e r i e n c i n g all of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o n e s e l f as merely p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h i s is because one c a n n o t take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p r o j e c t i n g a p o s s i b i l i t y that one has n o t f r e e l y c h o s e n . A n d since t a k i n g o w n e r s h i p o f o n e s e l f i n v o l v e s t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r o n e ' s whole s e l f - a n d not j u s t a part of o n e s e l f - selfo w n e r s h i p presupposes that one e x p e r i e n c e o n e s e l f as free to c h o o s e f r o m a m o n g all p o s s i b l e f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m d i s c l o s e d in das Man. So far, we have seen that s e l f - o w n e r s h i p r e q u i r e s that one a p p r o p r i a t e s o m e
230
Individual
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
83
p a r t i c u l a r f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m f r o m das Man in f u l l t r a n s p a r e n c y a b o u t d e a t h , a n d that t h i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n be e x p e r i e n c e d as an e n t i r e l y free c h o i c e . It is p r e c i s e l y the p o s s i b i l i t y of m a k i n g such a t r a n s p a r e n t c h o i c e that is d i s c l o s e d i n the m o o d o f a n x i e t y . F o r a n x i e t y a c c o m p a n i e s a d i s c l o s u r e o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s that i s u n i q u e i n t w o w a y s . F i r s t , a n x i e t y d i f f e r s f r o m m o o d s such as fear in that it is n o t ' a b o u t ' any i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t y or c o - D a s e i n (SZ 185 f . ) , b u t rather a b o u t o n e ' s o w n m o s t p o s s i b i l i t y : t o d i e (SZ 187, 2 5 1 , 2 6 5 ) . S e c o n d , a n x i e t y pertains n o t j u s t to particular p o s s i b i l i t i e s a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m das Man ( w i t h others r e g a r d e d as f i x e d e n d s ) , b u t rather to all at o n c e .
3 7
T h a t is, in
a n x i e t y w e r e g a r d a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f o u r s e l v e s a s t h i n g s that w e could pursue, w i t h o u t r e g a r d i n g o u r s e l v e s a s i n any w a y b o u n d t o d o so. E v e n p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o n e s e l f that o f t e n c o u n t as a b s o l u t e l y fixed (say, o n e s e l f as a m o r a l i n d i v i d u a l , as b e h o l d e n to G o d ' s c o m m a n d s ,
as a l o y a l
m e m b e r of a
c o m m u n i t y o r a f a m i l y ) are also e n c o u n t e r e d i n a n x i e t y a s matters f o r p o t e n t i a l c h o i c e . F o r t h i s reason:
The discovered totality of usefulness of ready-to-hand and piesent-at-hand intraw o r l d l y entities is as such without significance. In anxiety, neither this nor thai is encountered w i t h w h i c h it could have a relatedness [Bewandtnis]. (SZ 186)
The
radical disclosure
in
anxiety
of our freedom
brings
with
it
what
H e i d e g g e r c h a r a c t e r i z e s as the ' u n c a n n y ' (unheimlich) f e e l i n g of ' n o t b e i n g at h o m e ' i n o n e ' s e v e r y d a y p o s s i b i l i t i e s (SZ 188), a n d w h a t Sartre c a l l s the 3
r a d i c a l ' v e r t i g o o f p o s s i b i l i t y ' . " H e thus characterizes the m o o d characteri s t i c o f s e l f - o w n e r s h i p a s 'readiness f o r a n x i e t y ' (SZ 2 9 6 ) , a n d e x i s t e n t i a l c o n s c i e n c e a s 'the c a l l a t t u n e d b y the m o o d o f a n x i e t y ' (SZ 2 7 7 ) . B e i n g i n a n x i e t y is a necessary - t h o u g h n o t a s u f f i c i e n t - c o n d i t i o n
for t a k i n g
o w n e r s h i p o f oneself. O n e reason w h y e x p e r i e n c i n g a n x i e t y i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r s e l f - o w n e r s h i p i s that i t i s a l w a y s i n p r i n c i p l e p o s s i b l e t o b r u s h a n x i e t y o f f , b u s y i n g o n e s e l f instead e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h o n e ' s d e a l i n g s w i t h i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s a n d the e v e r y d a y f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m that g u i d e t h e m , a n d a l l the w h i l e o c c l u d i n g d e a t h . A l t h o u g h a n x i e t y a n d its a r t i c u l a t i o n i n the c a l l o f c o n s c i e n c e present the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r a d i c a l
c h o i c e o f oneself,
t h e y d o not force i t .
An
u n o w n i n g response t o a n x i e t y o c c u r s , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n one says after the b o u t o f a n x i e t y has s u b s i d e d that
' i t was r e a l l y n o t h i n g ' (SZ 187), thus
i g n o r i n g w h a t c o n s c i e n c e ' t e l l s ' D a s e i n a b o u t its o w n f i n i t u d e . H e i d e g g e r a c c o u n t s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u c h a n u n o w n i n g response t o a n x i e t y a n d the c a l l o f c o n s c i e n c e b y s a y i n g that m a k i n g a transparent r a d i c a l c h o i c e t o a p p r o p r i a t e c e r t a i n f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m f r o m das Man i m p l i e s that one must
first
have
chosen
to
make
such
a
choice
(SZ 2 6 8 ) .
Accordingly,
H e i d e g g e r c a l l s t h i s k i n d o f resolute c h o o s i n g t o c h o o s e n o t j u s t r e s p o n d i n g t o
231
84
Edgar C.
the
call
Boedeker,
of conscience,
Jr. but
'willing-to-have-conscience'
(Gewissenhaben-
wollen; SZ 2 7 0 , 2 8 8 ; GA 2 0 : 4 4 1 ) . N a t u r a l l y , the r e s o l u t e c h o i c e t o a p p r o p r i a t e c e r t a i n p o s s i b l e for-the-sakeso f - w h o m f r o m das Man i n t r a n s p a r e n c y a b o u t o n e ' s e x i s t e n t i a l f i n i t u d e g i v e s a b s o l u t e l y n o c o u n s e l o n which s u c h p o s s i b i l i t i e s D a s e i n s h o u l d c h o o s e . F o r such c o u n s e l c o u l d o n l y b e g i v e n w i t h reference t o s o m e o v e r - a r c h i n g f o r - t h e s a k e - o f - w h o m - e v e n one as v a g u e a n d p r e s u m a b l y p r a c t i c a l l y o m n i p r e s e n t as happiness - r e g a r d e d as f i x e d . As we have seen, h o w e v e r , a D a s e i n c a n take o w n e r s h i p o f i t s e l f i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense o n l y i f i t m a k e s a r a d i c a l c h o i c e o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h o u t r e g a r d i n g any a s f i x e d . T h u s H e i d e g g e r asks r h e t o r i c a l l y : ' B u t u p o n w h a t does D a s e i n r e s o l v e i t s e l f i n resoluteness? T o w a r d w h a t s h o u l d i t r e s o l v e i t s e l f ? ' A n d h e r e p l i e s : 'Only the r e s o l v e i t s e l f can g i v e the a n s w e r ' (SZ 2 9 8 ) . T h i s is because
nothing can be poinied out in ihe content of the call that the voice [ o f the call of existential conscience) recommends and imposes. . . . The call discloses nothing lhat could be as something with which we can concern ourselves positively or negatively, because it means an ontologically entirely different Being: existence. (SZ 294)
In the e x p e r i e n c e of a n x i e t y , there is n o t h i n g that D a s e i n regards as a fixed s t a n d a r d t o g u i d e its resolute c h o i c e f r o m a m o n g the p o s s i b l e for-the-sakesof-whom
of
das
Man.
39
W e c a n n o w see h o w H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s o f the c a l l o f c o n s c i e n c e f o r D a s e i n t o ' o w n u p ' t o its e x i s t e n t i a l debt reveals that death also f u l f i l l s c o n d i t i o n ( H I ) : b e i n g a p o s s i b i l i t y t o w h i c h D a s e i n c a n e n c o u n t e r the c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f i t s e l f a s ' r e f e r r i n g ' . T o b e sure, the m a n n e r i n w h i c h these c o n c r e t e f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m ' r e f e r ' to death is u n i q u e . It is q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the w a y i n w h i c h D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s r e a d y - t o - h a n d e n t i t i e s a s ' r e f e r r i n g ' t o t h e i r p r a c t i c a l uses. F o r o n e ' s o w n death c a n b e o f a b s o l u t e l y n o p r a c t i c a l use t o o n e s e l f i n c a r r y i n g o u t w o r l d l y p r o j e c t s . A n d t h i s k i n d o f ' r e f e r e n c e ' i s also q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the w a y i n w h i c h D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s c o - D a s e i n s as ' r e f e r r i n g ' to p o s s i b i l i t i e s of das Man. As we have seen, the w a y in w h i c h conscience calls Dasein to a l l o w itself to m o v e t o w a r d death is n o t b y r e n o u n c i n g a l l c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f i t s e l f d i s c l o s e d i n the h o r i z o n o f das Man.
Instead,
it
calls
Dasein
to
appropriate
some
subset
of these
p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n a m a n n e r that i s i l l u m i n a t e d b y D a s e i n ' s ' t r a n s p a r e n c y ' a b o u t , o r ' i n s i g h t ' i n t o , its o w n m o r t a l i t y . W h e n e x p r e s s l y seized i n this m a n n e r , death
'illuminates'
these p o s s i b i l i t i e s
o f oneself,
by
r e v e a l i n g the
full
e x i s t e n t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f its p r o j e c t i n g t h e m . I n p a r t i c u l a r , a s w e have seen, t r a n s p a r e n c y a b o u t o n e ' s d e a t h d i s c l o s e s the fact that i n c h o o s i n g t o p r o j e c t one subset o f p o s s i b l e f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m , one s i m u l t a n e o u s l y closes o f f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e v e r r e a l i z i n g c e r t a i n others.
F o l l o w i n g Kierkegaard,
H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the m o m e n t i n w h i c h s u c h i l l u m i n a t i o n o c c u r s the 'Augen-
232
Individual
and
Community
in
Early
85
Heidegger
blick' ( l i t e r a l l y : the b l i n k , o r v i e w , o f a n eye; S Z 3 2 8 , 3 3 8 , 3 4 8 f . ) . I n the Augen-blick, D a s e i n gets a g l i m p s e i n t o w h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the ' s i t u a t i o n ' (SZ 3 2 8 ) . T h e s i t u a t i o n i s s i m p l y the
' t h e r e ' (Da) - the t o t a l h o r i z o n o f
p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t o w h i c h D a s e i n finds i t s e l f t h r o w n - b u t n o w f o r the first t i m e d i s c l o s e d i n the l i g h t shed b y D a s e i n ' s e x p e r i e n c e o f its f i n i t u d e , a n d a s p o t e n t i a l m a t t e r s o f c h o i c e (SZ 2 9 9 f.; cf. 3 3 8 ) . O n l y by c o n f r o n t i n g one's o w n death in this w a y can one ' v i e w '
the
possibilities o f oneself, one's practical dealings w i t h e q u i p m e n t , and one's s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s ' i n the l i g h t o f o n e ' s o w n m o s t p o s s i b i l i t y . I n t h i s w a y , e x p r e s s l y g r a s p i n g o n e ' s o w n d e a t h a l l o w s D a s e i n t o interpret itself as
finite.
T h i s is the sense i n w h i c h D a s e i n c a n e n c o u n t e r the o r d i n a r y
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i t s e l f in terms of d e a t h . A n d it is in p r e c i s e l y t h i s sense that d e a t h i s the h o r i z o n o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f . 4 0
V I . The Man-self and Self-ownership as Existentiell Modes of Being-oneself I n s e c t i o n I I I , w e e x a m i n e d i n d e t a i l the three existential p e r s p e c t i v e s o f Dasein's These
Being:
Being-at-entities,
perspectives
are
Being-with-others,
existential
because
they
and
belong
Being-oneself. 'essentially'
to
Dasein's B e i n g , w h i c h Heidegger calls 'existence'. At any one t i m e , Dasein c a n e x i s t i n ( o r , better, f r o m o u t o f ) a n y o f its three p e r s p e c t i v e s i n e i t h e r o f two term
basic
modes,
existentiell
'existentiell'
is
to
be
or
ways
of
understood
enactment in
The
(Vollzugsweisen).
contrast
with
'existential'.
S o m e t h i n g i s e x i s t e n t i e l l i f i t can b e l o n g t o D a s e i n , b u t does n o t b e l o n g essentially
to
the
structure
of
Dasein's
Being
(SZ
12
f.).
All
that
is
e x i s t e n t i a l l y necessary i s that D a s e i n a t a n y g i v e n t i m e m u s t e x i s t f r o m o u t o f e a c h p e r s p e c t i v e i n e x a c t l y one o f these t w o w a y s . W h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s these t w o e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e s o f e n a c t m e n t o f e a c h p e r s p e c t i v e i s w h e t h e r o r n o t the respective
entities
ergreifen)*1
some
set
are of
encountered possibilities
by that
Dasein belong
expressly to
the
seizing
(eigens
corresponding
h o r i z o n , a s d e f i n e d e a r l i e r . T h e s e e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e s can b e s u m m a r i z e d i n the f o l l o w i n g table:
existentie// existentiri/
perspective:
with
horizon
modes
expressly
of enacting
seized
Beiug-ut-iiiliaworldy-entilies
d e a l i n g w i t h the ready-to-hand
Being-wilh(-others)
'leaping ahead' of the other
Being-oneself
self-ownership/resoluteness
233
the
existential
with
horizon
perspective:
occluded
o b s e r v i n g the present-al-hand 'leaping in'
f o r the other
t h e ΛΥίΐίΐ-self/fallenness
86
Edgar C.
Boedeker,
Jr.
T h e r e are t w o basic w a y s o f B e i n g o f i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s : r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d a n d presence-at-hand. E a c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o a n e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e o f e n a c t m e n t of Dasein's Being-at-entities. In treating a particular e n v i r o n m e n t - and u l t i m a t e l y the w o r l d a s a w h o l e - a s the b a c k g r o u n d i n t e r m s o f w h i c h i t i n t e r p r e t s these e n t i t i e s , D a s e i n s t r i v e s t o a c t u a l i z e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h i t e n c o u n t e r s these e n t i t i e s . I n s o d o i n g , D a s e i n a l l o w s i t s e l f t o b e m o v e d t o w a r d these f u t u r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n such a w a y that they i l l u m i n a t e the entities w i t h w h i c h it is concerned. T h u s Dasein's encounters of i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s i n the w a y o f B e i n g o f r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d a l w a y s i n v o l v e e x p r e s s l y s e i z i n g t h e i r p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . D a s e i n , h o w e v e r , c a n also e n c o u n t e r i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s i n the w a y o f B e i n g o f presence-at-hand. I n t h i s e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e o f B e i n g - a t - e n t i t i e s , i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s s h o w t h e m s e l v e s i n a m a n n e r that H e i d e g g e r c a l l s e n t i r e l y ' d e - w o r l d e d ' (entweltlicht; SZ 6 5 , 7 5 , 112 f . ) . O n l y o n c e an i n t r a w o r l d l y e n t i t y has b e e n e x p e r i e n c e d a s ' c u t o f f (abgeschnitten; S Z 158) f r o m the c o n t e x t o f p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g s i n w h i c h i t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e a s r e a d y - t o - h a n d c a n D a s e i n f o r the first t i m e s t r i v e t o e n c o u n t e r i t a s i t i s ' i n i t s e l f . T h a t is, the e n t i t y i s d i s c o v e r e d not i n t e r m s o f the h o r i z o n o f the w o r l d , but rather s o l e l y i n t e r m s o f the e n t i t y ' s o w n appearance (Aussehen, eidos; S Z 6 1 , 138; c f . 6 3 , 6 9 , 7 3 , 1 7 2 ) . O n l y i n the w a y o f B e i n g o f presence-at-hand i s a n i n t r a w o r l d l y entity observed as a mere object w i t h m e r e l y physical properties. T h e t w o basic e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s ( i n w h i c h D a s e i n 'cares f o r ' o t h e r s ) r e c e i v e c o n s i d e r a b l y less a t t e n t i o n i n S Z t h a n does the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d a n d presence-at-hand. I n a d d i t i o n t o b e i n g e x t r e m e l y s k e t c h y i n S Z , h o w e v e r , H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f the existentiell modes of B e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s is largely irrelevant to o u r concerns. W h a t i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r o u r purposes i s o n l y that h e h o l d s that there are t w o basic
modes
of
encountering
distinguishes them
others,
and
that
he
implies
that
what
i s w h e t h e r o r not the h o r i z o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the
perspective of Being-with-others is expressly grasped.
42
M u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r p u i p o s e s , h o w e v e r , are the t w o e x i s t e n t i e l l modes of existing
from
out
o w n e r s h i p (Eigentlichkeit) a n d which
Heidegger
(Alltäglichkeit),
calls
'falling'
o f the
perspective
its o p p o s i t e .
'unownedness' 43
(Verfallen),
of Being-oneself:
L e t us b e g i n (Uneigentliclikeit),
w i t h the
selflatter,
'everydayness'
o r - m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y f o r o u r purposes
- the 'Λίίϊ/i-self (e.g. S Z 129). H e i d e g g e r e m p l o y s the t e r m ' p u b l i c n e s s ' (Öffentlichkeit)
to characterize
the o n t o l o g i c a l
c h a r a c t e r o f this
mode.
In
p u b l i c n e s s , a l l p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s of the Man-ssW are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a 'subservience'
(Botmäßigkeit) to the others ( S Z
126). T h i s a p p l i e s j u s t as
m u c h to s o m e o n e ' s a t t e m p t s to e s t a b l i s h a d i s t a n c e (Abstand) f r o m t h e m w h e n one attempts to be apart f r o m , d i f f e r e n t f r o m , or s u p e r i o r to t h e m - as it i s does t o s o m e o n e ' s a t t e m p t s t o c o n f o r m t o t h e i r n o r m s a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s . I n a l l such e f f o r t s , D a s e i n s t i l l
understands itself - whether p o s i t i v e l y or
234
Individuell
and
Community
in
Exuly
87
Heidegger
n e g a t i v e l y - e x c l u s i v e l y i n t e r m s o f the o t h e r s . A l l s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n the m o d e o f the Af«/!-self takes p l a c e w i t h i n ' t h e p u b l i c i n t e r p r e t e d n e s s o f das Man'
(SZ 2 5 4 ) .
W h e n o n e u n d e r s t a n d s o n e s e l f exclusively i n
terms of w h a t
' o n e ' (man) does - i.e. w h a t is p e r m i s s i b l e a c c o r d i n g to the o f t e n i m p l i c i t n o r m a t i v e conventions of one's culture or other social g r o u p - then one's self has
the
character
of
'averageness'
(Durchschnittlichkeit;
127).
SZ
Like
s u b s e r v i e n c e , h o w e v e r , averageness i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense i s n o t the s a m e a s c o n f o r m i t y . 4 4 E v e n s o m e o n e w h o t r i e d his u t m o s t t o d i s t i n g u i s h h i m s e l f i n e v e r y w a y f r o m the o t h e r s c o u l d w e l l b e s t i l l e n t i r e l y ' a v e r a g e ' i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense, f o r he c o u l d s t i l l be u n d e r s t a n d i n g his o w n p o s s i b i l i t i e s entirely i n terms of other people. Such a person c o u l d be called an
'average'
non
c o n f o r m i s t . A s e l f w h o i s e n t i r e l y average i n this w a y i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a ' l e v e l i n g ' (Einehmmg) o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f its B e i n g - i t s e l f d o w n t o the l e v e l of the o t h e r s (SZ 1 2 7 ) . H e i d e g g e r a t t i m e s seems t o suggest that u n o w n e d D a s e i n i n s o m e sense becomes o t h e r D a s e i n s . F o r e x a m p l e , h e w r i t e s i n a n i n i t i a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the Man-self: ' t h e o t h e r s are those f r o m w h i c h o n e o n e s e l f m o s t l y does not d i s t i n g u i s h o n e s e l f , a m o n g w h o m o n e also i s '
(SZ 118).
' N o t being i t s e l f
\Nicht es selbst ist], the o t h e r s h a v e t a k e n his B e i n g a w a y f r o m h i m . T h e w h i m of others reigns over Dasein's everyday possibilities of B e i n g ' 126).
Surely,
though,
Heidegger is
taking
some
poetic
license
(SZ
in
such
passages. F o r h e c a n n o t m e a n t o say that D a s e i n i n the u n o w n e d m o d e o f Being-itself is l i t e r a l l y
numerically identical t o o t h e r p e o p l e . 4 1
does the Man-se\f i d e n t i f y i t s e l f w i t h such
as
careful
Hegelian
Geist
statements
Others'
is
sometimes
m a k e his actual
A n d neither
'some "universal subject"' thought
to
v i e w s clearer.
be.
(SZ
128),
Heidegger's
more
F o r h e insists that
to w h o m the Man-se\f is s u b s e r v i e n t 'are n o t particular o t h e r s .
.
the . .
T h e " w h o " [ o f the e v e r y d a y , u n o w n e d M e m - s e l f ] i s n o t t h i s p e r s o n a n d n o t that, n o t oneself, a n d n o t s o m e a n d n o t the s u m o f a l l . T h e " w h o " i s the neuter, das Man' (SZ 126), w h o is, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , ' n o o n e ' (SZ 127 f . ) . U n d e r s t a n d i n g the Man-$e\f r e q u i r e s p r e c i s e l y d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g
between co-
D a s e i n s on the o n e h a n d , a n d das Man - the h o r i z o n of p o s s i b l e for-the-sakeso f - w h o m i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e y are e n c o u n t e r e d - o n the o t h e r . S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , o t h e r D a s e i n s d o n o t d o m i n a t e the e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e o f the Manself. W h a t d o m i n a t e s i s i n s t e a d the horizon i n t e r m s o f w h i c h o t h e r D a s e i n s are e n c o u n t e r e d :
das Man.
To say that the ' w h o ' of the e v e r y d a y Man-se\f is das Man, h o w e v e r , is n o t to
say
that
the
Man-self is
with
identical
das
Man.'[b
They
are,
however,
i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d p h e n o m e n a . F o r H e i d e g g e r c h a r a c t e r i z e s the w a y i n w h i c h 'das
Man
develops
dominance'
(SZ
its 128),
real as
dictatorship' follows:
way of B e i n g of everydayness'
(SZ
l
Das
(SZ Man
126),
i.e.
prescribes
127; e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) .
its
[schreibt
"stubborn vor]
the
I n fact, f o r das
Man t o b e able t o ' p r e s c r i b e ' the w a y o f B e i n g o f the Λίη/ι-self, the t w o c a n n o t
235
88
Edgar C.
be
identical.
Baedeker,
Jr.
He characterizes
the
nature
o f this
'prescription'
as
'the
i n c o n s p i c u o u s . . . d o m i n a t i o n that is u n e x p e c t e d l y already t a k e n o v e r f r o m D a s e i n as B e i n g - w i t h ' (SZ 126). 1 suggest that we i n t e r p r e t this as f o l l o w s . T h e M a n - s e l f i s the e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f i n w h i c h the o n l y p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o n e s e l f - i.e. the o n l y those f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m - that D a s e i n e x p r e s s l y seizes are those that i t takes o v e r f r o m the w e b o f f o r - t h e s a k e s - o f - w h o m that c o n s t i t u t e the h o r i z o n of das Man. H e i d e g g e r c a l l s t h i s D a s e i n ' s b e i n g ' l o s t in the p u b l i c n e s s of das Man' (SZ 175), or 'dispersed i n t o das Man' (SZ 129). We h a v e a l r e a d y seen that t h i s does not i m p l y that the M a n - s e l f i s a c o n f o r m i s t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i l does m e a n that e v e r y f o r - t h e - s a k e o f - w h o m that the M a n - s e l f e x p r e s s l y seizes has a l r e a d y been s t a k e d o u t b y the w e b o f o p p o s i t i o n s , h i e r a r c h i e s , a n d o t h e r r e l a t i o n s that c o n s t i t u t e the h o r i z o n of das Man. ( D a s e i n e x p r e s s l y seizes the f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m of b e i n g a carpenter, f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n i t engages i n c a r p e n t r y - thus a l l o w i n g the f o r the-sake-of-whom of b e i n g a carpenter to guide one's practical dealings w i t h the e q u i p m e n t o f c a r p e n t r y . ) I n p a r t i c u l a r , D a s e i n a s B e i n g - o n e s e l f i n the m o d e o f the M a n - s e l f does not e x p r e s s l y seize the one f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m that i t c a n n o t take o v e r f r o m das Man: its ' o w n m o s t ' p o s s i b i l i t y o f d y i n g . H e i d e g g e r characterizes this b y s a y i n g that i n the m o d e o f the M a n - s e l f D a s e i n 'flees f r o m ' (SZ 2 5 4 ) , ' e v a d e s ' (SZ 2 5 9 ) , or ' c o v e r s u p ' (SZ 2 5 6 ) its o w n death. I n such ' a l i e n a t i o n ' (SZ 2 5 4 , 1 7 8 ) f r o m its m o r t a l i t y , the c e r t a i n p o s s i b i l i t y of o n e ' s o w n d e a t h - p r e c i s e l y because it is an e x i s t e n t i a l - does n o t go a w a y . F o r D a s e i n is essentially B e i n g - t o w a r d - d e a t h (SZ 2 5 4 ) , w h e t h e r o r not i t e x p r e s s l y grasps t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the u n o w n e d M a n - s e l f acts as if a w e r e i m m o r t a l , a n d thus i n f i n i t e (im-end-lich). In o c c l u d i n g its o w n m o s t p o s s i b i l i t y , i t f a i l s t o e n c o u n t e r its e v e r y d a y p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n t e r m s o f the e x i s t e n t i a l h o r i z o n o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f . Besides the M a n - s e l f , the o t h e r p r i m a r y e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f i s s e l f - o w n e r s h i p , o r ' r e s o l u t e n e s s ' . A s w e have a l r e a d y seen, t h i s m o d e i n v o l v e s e x p r e s s l y g r a s p i n g the c e r t a i n a n d unsurpassable p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n e ' s o w n death. A s o n e ' s O w n m o s t ' a n d ' n o n - r e l a t i o n a l ' f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m , death i s the o n l y p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n e s e l f that i s not i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t e r m s o f the n e t w o r k o f s o c i a l r o l e s that m a k e s u p the h o r i z o n o f das Man. T h u s H e i d e g g e r says that the d i s c l o s u r e of death that o c c u r s in s e l f - o w n e r s h i p is at the same t i m e the d i s c l o s u r e o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g ' t o r n a w a y f r o m das Man'
(SZ 2 6 3 ) .
Nevertheless,
it
would
he c o m p l e t e l y
mistaken
to take
H e i d e g g e r t o b e s a y i n g that r e s o l u t e , s e l f - o w n i n g D a s e i n i n some w a y severs its a t t a c h m e n t s t o the w o r l d o r s o c i e t y .
Resoluteness as self-owning Being-oneself does not delach Dasein from its w o r l d , nor does it isolate [Dasein] to a free-floaling I. A n d how should il do this - when as selfo w n i n g disclosedness it is nothing olher than self-owned Being-in-the-world''! Resoluteness brings the self precisely into appropriately concerned Being al ready-
236
Individual and Community in Early Heidegger
89
lo-hand entities, and pushes it into B e i n g - w i t h that cares tor others (SZ 298; cf. SZ 188, 264, 297 f., 299, 326, 328, 338; GA 20: 440). T h u s i n e x p r e s s l y g r a s p i n g o n e ' s o w n d e a t h , one does n o t cease t o p r o j e c t the ordinary
for-the-sakes-of-whom
that
one
appropriates
f r o m das
Man
by
p r o j e c t i n g t h e m a s p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f o n e s e l f . N o r does one cease t o p r o j e c t i n t r a w o r l d l y entities
upon practical
meanings.
4 7
H e i d e g g e r i n d i c a t e s the
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n das Man a n d D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f i n t h e e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e of s e l f - o w n e r s h i p
as
follows:
'Self-owned
c o n d i t i o n of the s u b j e c t ' s e x e m p t i o n
Being-oneself is
f r o m das Man,
not
but
based
on
a
is an existentiell
modification of das M a n as an essential existential' (SZ 130; cf. 2 6 7 ) . I h e existential
horizon
of das Man
provides
the
for-the-sakes-of-whom
that
D a s e i n p r o j e c t s as c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i t s e l f - w h e t h e r or not D a s e i n has expressly o w n e d them. T h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t w o e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e s o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f lies in w h e t h e r D a s e i n , in a p p r o p r i a t i n g these p o s s i b i l i t i e s f r o m das Man, freely
chooses
them
in
the
full
l i g h t o f its
nnilude.
The
'existentiell
m o d i f i c a t i o n ' o f das Man that d i s t i n g u i s h e s the s e l f - o w n i n g s e l f f r o m the Man-self can
thus
be
thought
of as
the
all-important
addition
of o n e ' s
o w n m o s t p o s s i b i l i t y t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that one e x p r e s s l y grasps i n B e i n g o n e s e l f . H e i d e g g e r thus speaks o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f i n the m o d e o f selfo w n e r s h i p a s 'ahead o f the M a n - s e l f (SZ 1 9 3 ) . T h i s does not m e a n that selfo w n i n g D a s e i n has in any sense left the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of das Man b e h i n d . I n s t e a d , a s w e h a v e seen, i t i s ahead o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s because i t f o r the first t i m e p r o j e c t s t h e m i n the l i g h t shed b y its e x p r e s s l y g r a s p i n g its u l t i m a t e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d y i n g . D a s e i n i n the s e l f - o w n i n g m o d e o f B e i n g - i t s e l f thus p r o j e c t s the same c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f i t s e l f a s i t does i n the m o d e o f the M a n - s e l f . W h a t i s d i s t i n c t i v e a b o u t the m o d e o f s e l f - o w n e r s h i p i s that D a s e i n f o r the first t i m e o w n s u p t o the e x i s t e n t i a l c o n s e q u e n c e o f d o i n g s o i m p o s e d b y its o w n m o s t p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e a t h .
4 8
V I I .C o n c l u s i o n Situating
das
Man,
the
Man-self,
and
self-ownership
in
the
context
of
D a s e i n ' s o v e r a l l o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e a l l o w s u s t o see o u r w a y o u t o f the i m p a s s e i n the debate b e t w e e n D r e y f u s a n d O l a f s o n o v e r the status o f w h a t t h e y c a l l 'das Man' in SZ. On the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I h a v e suggested here, das Man
and
the
Man-self
must
essentially, or existentially, always
finds
be
distinguished.
For
to Dasein's Being. T h i s
i t s e l f t h r o w n i n t o a set of p o s s i b l e
das
Man
i s because
belongs Dasein
for-the-sakes-of-whom,
s o m e subset o f w h i c h i t m u s t s t r i v e t o a c t u a l i z e a s i t s e l f . D a s e i n can n o m o r e free i t s e l f f r o m das Man than i t c a n f r o m its w o r l d o r f r o m its d e a t h . T h e
237
90
Eilgar C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
Man-self, o n the o t h e r h a n d , i s one o f the t w o e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e s o f the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f . B e c a u s e the Man-self i s the m o d e i n w h i c h a l l o f the e x p r e s s l y g r a s p e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f o n e s e l f are a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m das Man, the A t o i - s e l f is r e l a t e d to the h o r i z o n of das Man. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the t w o are d i s t i n c t p h e n o m e n a . R e c o g n i z i n g this c a n a l l o w us to see that the D r e y f u s - O l a f s o n debate is l a r g e l y a Scheinstreit, i.e., a pseudo-debate, w i t h b o t h parties ' t a l k i n g past' the o t h e r . D r e y f u s tends t o use the t e r m ' t h e o n e ' ( i . e . 'das Man') to refer to the e x i s t e n t i i / / h o r i z o n that I c h a r a c t e r i z e by the same n a m e , w h e r e a s O l a f s o n tends to use it to refer to the existentie/7 m o d e o f the Man-self. N e v e r t h e l e s s , D r e y f u s a n d O l a f s o n appear t o assume that t h e y are t a l k i n g a b o u t m o r e o r less the same p h e n o m e n o n , t h u s l e a d i n g t o a n e x a g g e r a t i o n o f the
substantive
differences between their interpretations.
D r e y f u s ' s v i e w t h a t das Man is a source of m e a n i n g that is a l w a y s in p l a y in Dasein's
Being
is
essentially
correct,
but
only
when
applied
e x i s t e n t i a l of das Man. A n d O l a f s o n ' s v i e w that w h a t he c a l l s
to
the
'das Man'
c a n b e o v e r c o m e i n rare m o m e n t s o f s e l f - o w n e r s h i p i s also c o r r e c t , but o n l y when
applied
to
the
existentiell
o f the
Man-self.
The
shortcoming
of
D r e y f u s ' s p o s i t i o n is that, in the t e r m s I have used here, he h o l d s that das Man is the only h o r i z o n of D a s e i n ' s Da. T h i s is not c o r r e c t , h o w e v e r , since, as I have a r g u e d , the Da is e q u i o r i g i n a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e d also by the w o r l d a n d one's o w n d e a t h . are
twofold.
4 y
T h e s h o r t c o m i n g s o f O l a f s o n ' s r e a d i n g , o n the o t h e r h a n d ,
First,
Heidegger's
statements
about
the
Man-self
do
not
c o n s t i t u t e a c r i t i c i s m o f c o n t e m p o r a r y mass c u l t u r e i n p a r t i c u l a r , but are rather a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d e i n w h i c h D a s e i n ' b y a n d l a r g e ' a n d regardless o f its c u l t u r e - enacts itself. M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , O l a f s o n fails t o e m p h a s i z e the fact that all of the f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h o m that we p r o j e c t are a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m das Man, a n d the fact that this r e l a t i o n is not b r o k e n w h e n D a s e i n takes o w n e r s h i p o f itself. This distinction
b e t w e e n das Man a n d the Man-self also a l l o w s us to
m a k e sense o f w h a t m i g h t o t h e r w i s e appear t o b e f l a t - o u t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o n H e i d e g g e r ' s part. F i r s t , a n d a s w e saw a t the e n d o f s e c t i o n V I , h e a f f i r m s that s e l f - o w n e r s h i p i s a n e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the e x i s t e n t i a l o f das Man (SZ 130, 2 6 7 ) . We have i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s to m e a n that s e l f - o w n e r s h i p a n d the Man-self are the t w o basic w a y s o f a p p r o p r i a t i n g possible f o r - t h e s a k e s - o f - w h o m f r o m the h o r i z o n of das Man. T h e e x i s t e n t i a l of das Man t h u s has oneself.
ontological
priority
Second, however,
self-ownership
as
o v e r the
t w o existentiell
H e i d e g g e r asserts:
its g r o u n d '
(SZ 2 5 9 ) ;
and:
modes of B e i n g -
' U n o w n e d n e s s has p o s s i b l e ' T h e Man-self . . .
is
an
e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the s e l f - o w n i n g s e l f ( S Z 3 1 7 ) . T h i s second k i n d o f p r i o r i t y i s not the ontological p r i o r i t y o f a n e x i s t e n t i a l p h e n o m e n o n o v e r a n e x i s t e n t i e l l one. R a t h e r , i t i s the p r i o r i t y o f one e x i s t e n t i e l l p h e n o m e n o n ( s e l f - o w n e r s h i p ) o v e r a n o t h e r (the Man-self). H e e x p l a i n s the nature o f t h i s p r i o r i t y as f o l l o w s :
238
Individual
and
Cummunity
in
Early
Heidegger
91
Existentielly, the self-ownership of Being-oneself is indeed closed o f f and repressed in fallenness, bul this closedness is o n l y the privation of a disclosedness that manifests itself phenomenally in the fact that Dasein's flight is a flight before itself. (SZ 184)
T h i s second k i n d o f p r i o r i t y , I t h i n k , i s a p r i o r i t y i n definition. F o r e x a m p l e , since b l i n d n e s s i s j u s t the i n a b i l i t y t o see i n a n o r g a n i s m that o t h e r w i s e c o u l d see, sight i s p r i o r i n d e f i n i t i o n t o b l i n d n e s s . S i m i l a r l y , since the M a n - s e l f i s just
Dasein's
existentiell
occlusion
of a
horizon
(namely,
death)
that
otherwise c o u l d be expressly seized, self-ownership is p r i o r in d e f i n i t i o n to the M a n - s e l f . A f i n a l k i n d o f p r i o r i t y i s p r i o r i t y i n t i m e . H e i d e g g e r m a k e s i t c l e a r that D a s e i n i s b y a n d l a r g e i n the m o d e o f the M a n - s e l f . A s Joan S t a m b a u g h p o i n t s o u t , D a s e i n i s s u r e l y not b o r n i n a s e l f - o w n i n g stance toward death.
5 0
R a t h e r , e x p e r i e n c e s o f a n x i e t y , a n d hence o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r
s e l f - o w n e r s h i p , arise u n e x p e c t e d l y a n d w i t h o u t w a r n i n g f r o m o n e ' s business w i t h the matters o f o n e ' s e v e r y d a y c o n c e r n . T h u s :
'Self-owned e x i s t e n c e i s
n o t h i n g that floats f r e e l y a b o v e f a l l e n e v e r y d a y n e s s , b u t e x i s t e n t i a l l y o n l y a m o d i f i e d s e i z i n g o f i t ' (SZ 179); a n d c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f s e l f - o w n e r s h i p a s 'the e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the M a n - s e l f i n t o self-owning B e i n g - o n e s e l f (SZ 2 6 8 ) . D a s e i n ' s e x i s t i n g i n the m o d e o f the M a n - s e l f i s p r i o r i n t i m e t o its t a k i n g o w n e r s h i p o f itself. W h a t l i g h t d o these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s shed o n the q u e s t i o n w i t h w h i c h w e b e g a n , n a m e l y , that o f the r e l a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s t o s o c i e t y ? I n a n u t s h e l l , Heidegger's v i e w is as f o l l o w s . Relations to society
m a k e a n essential
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the m e a n i n g o f a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f o u r s e l v e s - the s o c i a l r o l e s w e assume, a n d the o c c u p a t i o n s w e engage i n - a l l get t h e i r m e a n i n g f r o m the r e l a t i o n s i n w h i c h they stand t o o t h e r p o s s i b l e w a y s t o b e a self. A s l o n g a s w e are h u m a n , i t i s not w i t h i n o u r c h o i c e t o break free o f this essential r e l a t i o n t o s o c i e t y . F o r i n o r d e r t o b e a s e l f a t a l l , w e m u s t a l w a y s pursue s o m e c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s that are f u l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e o n l y against the b a c k g r o u n d o f o u r c u l t u r a l
and historical
i n h e r i t a n c e . In H e i d e g g e r ' s t e r m s , das Man, a n d hence ' p u b l i c n e s s ' , is o n e of i h e e x i s t e n t i a l h o r i z o n s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h o u r l i v e s h a v e m e a n i n g . D e s p i t e the unavoidable dependence of i n d i v i d u a l s on society, however, our lives as i n d i v i d u a l s are n o t p l a y e d o u t exclusively against t h i s h o r i z o n . F o r the w o r l d a n d o u r o w n deaths are h o r i z o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y that are j u s t a s o r i g i n a r y a s that o f das Man. E x p r e s s l y , o r t r a n s p a r e n t l y , g r a s p i n g o u r o w n deaths does n o t sever the ties that b i n d u s t o s o c i e t y a n d its f i e l d o f m e a n i n g s . T h e m o s t that such t r a n s p a r e n c y a b o u t o u r f i n i t u d e a n d o u r f r e e d o m c a n d o i s t o a l l o w u s t o c h o o s e the m a n n e r i n w h i c h w e w i l l be d e p e n d e n t o n s o c i e t y . T o m a k e such a c h o i c e i s t o c o m e t o O w n ' o u r s e l v e s : n o t , a s w e h a v e seen, a s s o m e t h i n g that we create ex nihilo, b u t as s o m e t h i n g we f a s h i o n f r o m r a w m a t e r i a l s we find at h a n d . H e i d e g g e r ' s e x i s t e n t i a l analyses of das Man, the M a n - s e l f , a n d self-
239
92
Edgar
C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
o w n e r s h i p a i m t o s h o w h o w the s e l f m u s t b e s t r u c t u r e d i n o r d e r f o r u s t o b e able i n this w a y t o take o w n e r s h i p o f o u r lives.
APPENDIX
D i e o n t o l o g i s c h e S t r u k t u r des D a s e i n s
Worumwillen --Seinkönnen alltägliche Möglichkeiten des Selbst
'"Selbstsorge'
Sclbstsein
Da-sein =Ek-sistenz Transzendenz Sorge «3
j i
γ
Schlüssel: Kursive: begegnendes Seiendes Unterstreichung: existentiale Perspektive GROßSCHRIEBUNG: E X I S T E N T I A L E R H O R I Z O N T D E S "DA"
NOTES 1 I have in mind here writings by Robert Brandom, Hubert Dreyfus, John Haugeland, Mark Ükient, and Joseph Rouse. 2 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 16th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986). abbreviated hereafter as 'SZ', followed by the page number. Heidegger's works published in his Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975 ff.) are'cited as 'GA', followed by the
240
Individual and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
93
v o l u m e n u m b e r , a c o l o n , a n d (he p a g e n u m b e r . I n the case o f m u l t i p l e e d i t i o n s , I h a v e u s e d e x c l u s i v e l y the m o s t r e c e n t e d i t i o n s a s o f 1 9 9 4 . A l l t r a n s l a t i o n s are m y o w n . 3 'The one'
is p r o b a b l y the
most grammatically
p r e c i s e t r a n s l a t i o n o f 'das Man', b u t g i v e s
the unfortunate i m p r e s s i o n o f b e i n g s o m e m y s t e r i o u s , o t h e r w o r l d l y force o r e n t i t y , such a s H e g e l ' s Geist i s s o m e t i m e s t h o u g h t t o b e .
' T h e t h e y ' Iiis a c o l l o q u i a l i d i o m , but leaves open
t h e f a l s e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t das Man d o e s n o t i m p l y o n e s e l f , b u t o n l y o t h e r s ( i . e .
'them'). A n d
' t h e a n y o n e ' h a s t h e a d v a n t a g e t h a t i t d o e s n o t e x c l u d e o n e s e l f f r o m das- Man. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t has t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e t h a t ' a n y o n e ' i s n o t g r a m m a t i c a l l y p a r a l l e l t o the G e r m a n p r o n o u n 'man';
f o r it
cannot
be
entirely
idiomatically
substituted
for
One'
and
'they'
in
such
F n g l i s h expressions as the t w o e x a m p l e s in the text above. 4 R e l e v a n t t e x t s a r e ( i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r ) : O l a f s o n ' s i n i t i a l d i s c u s s i o n o f das Man i n h i s Heidegger
and
144-50;
the
Philosophy
Hubert
L.
o f Mind
Dreyfus's
(New
Haven:
criticism
of
Yale
University
Olafson's
Press,
interpretation
in
1987),
pp.
Being-in-the-World
( C a m b r i d g e , M A : M I T Press, 1 9 9 1 ) , p p . 1 4 1 - 6 2 ; O l a f s o n ' s i m p l i c i t response t o D r e y f u s i n
What is a Human Being'.': A Heideggerian View ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1995). p. 6; and O l a f s o n ' s e x p l i c i t response to D r e y f u s in ' H e i d e g g e r ä la W i t t g e n s t e i n or 'Coping'
with
expansion
and defense of D r e y f u s ' s p o s i t i o n in ' O n B e i n g S o c i a l : A R e p l y to O l a f s o n ' ,
Professor
Dreyfus',
Inquiry
37
(1994),
pp.
45-64;
Taylor
Carman's
inquiry 3 7 ( 1 9 9 4 ) , p p . 2 0 3 - 2 3 ; O l a f s o n ' s c r i t i c i s m o f C a r m a n ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f D a s e i n as das Man Inquiry
in
37
'Individualism, (1994),
c r i t i c i s m in
Subjectivity,
331-7;
and
Dreyfus's
Presence:
own
A
defense
Response to T a y l o r C a r m a n ' ,
of his
position
against
Olafson's
' I n t e r p r e t i n g H e i d e g g e r o n Das Man', Inquiry 3 8 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , p p . 4 2 3 - 3 0 ; O l a f s o n ' s
counter-attack 'Mitsein'
pp.
against
(Cambridge:
Dreyfus
Cambridge
in
Heidegger
and
U n i v e r s i t y Press,
the
Ground
1998), esp.
of Elliics:
pp.
A
Study
of
2 6 f , 3 5 - 3 9 ; a n d the
o v e r v i e w o f the debate i n Pierre K e l l e r and D a v i d W e b e r m a n , ' H e i d e g g e r and the Source(s) of
Intelligibility',
Continental
Philosophy
H e r m a n P h i l i p s e has a r g u e d that such opposed Being:
A
directions
Critical
74); and
that
Interpretation
Review
Heidegger's
they
are
31
simply
(Princeton:
(1998),
pp.
v i e w s o f das Man incoherent;
Princeton
369-86.
see
University
Most
recently,
and authenticity his
pull
in
Heidegger's Philosophy o f
Press,
pp.
26-28,
346-
' H e i d e g g e r a n d E t h i c s ' . Inquiry 4 2 ( 1 9 9 9 ) , p p . 4 2 9 - 7 4 , e s p . p p . 4 4 7 - 6 1 . I a r g u e
here that the i m p a s s e b e t w e e n O l a f s o n a n d D r e y f u s , as w e l l as the i n c o h e r e n c e that P h i l i p s e c l a i m s t o see, b o t h r e s u l t f r o m a f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n das Man a n d t h e A i c m - s e l f
1
agree i n large part w i t h K e l l e r ' s and W e b e r m a n ' s general c o n c l u s i o n s , and especially w i t h their
suggestion
which
they
Revisited',
that
follow Review
das Man
may
suggestions
o f Metaphysics
be different made
38
from
the
Atoi-self (ibid.,
by Charles G u i g n o n ,
(1984),
pp.
3 2 1 - 3 9 . esp.
pp.
'Heidegger's pp.
229
377
f.),
in
Authenticity'
f.
5 D r e y f u s , Being-in -the-World, o p . c i t . , p . 1 5 6 ; p . 1 6 1 ; p . 3 5 3 , n . 13. 6 'Self-ownership'
is
my
translation
of
Heidegger's
term
'Eigemlichkeii',
canonicallv
r e n d e r e d a s ' a u t h e n t i c i t y ' . F o r a n e x p l a n a t i o n a n d d e f e n s e o f m y t r a n s l a t i o n , see S e c t i o n s V a n d V I b e l o w , esp. note 35.
7 D r e y f u s , Being-in-the-World, o p . c i t . , p p . 3.33 f. 8 Olafson, 'Heidegger ä la W i t t g e n s t e i n or " C o p i n g " w i t h Professor D r e y f u s ' , op. cit., p. 58. 9
Ibid.
10 See SZ 12 f. f o r H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ' e x i s t e n t i a l ' a n d ' e x i s t e n t i e l l ' . 11 No
doubl
occasioned
considerable
amount
by
Heidegger's
of disagreement
own
lack
among
of consistency
commentators
as
in
SZ,
there
to
how
to
has
been
identify
a
this
m o m e n t o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . S o m e h o l d t h a t i t i s a r t i c u l a t i o n (Rede), o t h e r s h o l d t h a t i t i s f a l l i n g [Verfallen), w h i l e s t i l l o l h e r s h o l d t h a t i t is D a s e i n ' s B e i n g - a t - i n t r a w o r l d l y - e n t i t i e s (Sein-beiin-innerwelilich-Seienden).
1
suggest
the
following
interpretation
of
these
three
c o n s t r u a l s o f t h i s m o m e n t o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g , e a c h o f w h i c h has its t e x t u a l s u p p o r t . F i r s t , H e i d e g g e r s o m e t i m e s i d e n t i f i e s t h i s m o m e n t w i t h a r t i c u l a t i o n ( e . g . S Z 133, 1 6 0 f.; c f . 3 4 9 ) because all o f D a s e i n ' s basic encounters w i t h entities
are i n t e r p r e t i v e ,
and thus
involve
t a k i n g a n e n t i t y a s h a v i n g a m e a n i n g . I n t h i s sense, a l l s u c h e n c o u n t e r s are ' a r t i c u l a t e d ' , i.e., characterized by a s i m u l t a n e o u s h o l d i n g ihe e n c o u n t e r e d e n t i t y 'together' w i t h its m e a n i n g , w h i l e a t the s a m e t i m e s e p a r a t i n g the e n t i t y ' f r o m ' its m e a n i n g i n s u c h a w a y that the t w o are n o t i d e n t i f i e d ( c f . S Z 159,
161). S e c o n d , H e i d e g g e r s o m e t i m e s identifies this m o m e n t
w i t h f a l l i n g (e.g. SZ 191, 222 f, 328, 346, 350) because f a l l i n g is characterized by Dasein's
241
94
Edgar C. Baedeker, Jr. exclusive
concern
with
the entities
that
it can encounter - as opposed to death,
Dasein's
o w n m o s t p o s s i b i l i t y (see s e c t i o n s V a n d V I b e l o w ) . T h i r d , H e i d e g g e r s o m e t i m e s i d e n t i t i e s t h i s m o m e n t w i t h B e i n g - a t - i n t r a w o r l d l y - e n t i t i e s ( e . g . S Z 1 9 2 f., 3 2 8 ; c l " . 3 2 6 ) b e c a u s e t h i s i s the
kind
of encounter
of entities
to
which
especially in D i v i s i o n O n e . (See section encounters
with
Herrmann,
Subjekt und Dasein,
Thomas
"Being
entities.)
Sheehan,
On
this
2nd
'Heidegger's
and Time'",
Research
12 T h i s sort of referential
point,
ed.
in
Heidegger
111 I
am
basically
(Frankfurt:
New
devotes
the
most
attention
in
SZ,
b e l o w for a discussion of the other k i n d s of
Aspect;
Phenomenology
in
agreement
F.-W.
von
1985),
pp.
198-224;
and
Zeitlichkeit
and
The
Klostermann, On
25
In-Sein,
(1995),
m e a n i n g f u l n e s s has been
pp.
with
Genesis
of
211-22.
w e l l characterized by both
D r e y f u s (Being-
in-the-World, o p . c i t . , p p . 8 8 - 1 0 7 ) a n d O l a f s o n (Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind. o p . cit., pp. 3 9 ^ ) 5 ) . 13 W h a t can be e x p r e s s l y seized
i n c l u d e s a s c i e n t i f i c t a s k (SZ
13, 3 8 , 8 6 .
p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y (SZ 1 9 4 ) , o r D a s e i n ' s m o r t a l h n t l u d e (SZ 8 6 , 268, 2 9 1 , 299, 326, 3 8 3 , 3 8 4 ; cf.
12,
144,
122,
153, 3 3 2 , 3 9 3 ) , a
129,
146,
179,
188.
173, 3 4 2 ) . To seize a p o s s i b i l i t y is to do so
e x p r e s s l y (eigens; c f . SZ 1 2 2 , 1 2 9 , 2 6 8 , 3 3 2 ) , i . e . e x p l i c i t l y (ausdrücklich; c f . SZ 8 6 . 2 6 8 ) . 14 Cf.
' Z u r E r ö r t e r u n g d e r G e l a s s e n h e i t ' , i n Gelassenheit ( P f u l l i n g e n :
Neske,
1959), pp. 3 6 -
38. 15 GA 26: 16 CA
169-71,
63:
7;
177,
GA
65:
184; GA 9: 296.
See
137-42, 163-75.
also
Heidegger's
Her
Begriff
der
Zeil
(Oxford:
Blackwell,
1992), p . I I . 17 Heidegger's equipment the
term
is
'Mitdasein'.
Other
Daseins
and t h i n g s , b u t are, a c c o r d i n g
world
in
encountered
the
in
manner
an
of Being
intraworldly
in
arc
'not
only
entirely
different
from
t o t h e i r w a y o f B e i n g a s Dasein, t h e m s e l v e s the
manner.
world These
in
which
entities
are
they
are
neither
at
the
"in"
same
time
present-at-hand
nor
r e a d y - t o - h a n d , b u t r a t h e r a t e like D a s e i n i t s e l f ; t h e y are also there and there with [Dasein]' (SZ 1 1 8 ) . 18 'Perspective' discussion
i s n o t a t e r m t h a t H e i d e g g e r u s e s i n t h i s w a y i n SZ. F o r a r a t h e r l a t e r ( 1 9 3 9 )
of the
Erkenntnis'
relation
of a perspective
at such a picture already in w o r k s f r o m the GA
24:
378;
Niemeyer,
1969], pp.
suggest
this
in
a
horizon,
see
'Der
Wille
zur M a c h t
als
1961). pp. 574, 624. A l t h o u g h Heidegger hints
1928 (cf. GA 26: 2 6 6 ) , he never quite m a k e s this e x p l i c i t in his
SZ period.
Instead,
he tends d u r i n g this
correlative w i t h a particular temporal (SZ 365;
to
(Nietzsche 1 : P f u l l i n g e n : N e s k e ,
GA
26:
269;
period
to think of horizons as
'ecstasy', i.e. a ' r a p t u r e ' , ' d i r e c t i o n ' , or ' d i m e n s i o n ' 'Zeit
und
Sein'
i n Zur Sache des Denkens
(Tübingen:
1 5 - 1 7 ) . I think, however, that this is h i g h l y misleading. As I w i l l
section,
although
each
perspective
has
a
single
corresponding
horizon,
all
three m o m e n t s o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g ( e n c o u n t e r i n g entities, p r o j e c t i o n , a n d t h r o w n n e s s ) are i n fact i n v o l v e d in the d i s c l o s u r e of a p a r t i c u l a r h o r i z o n A n d because each such m o m e n t of D a s e i n ' s sense,
all
three
ecstasies
are
involved
f r o m the c o r r e s p o n d i n g perspective.
B e i n g has a p a r t i c u l a r t e m p o r a l ecstasy
together
in
the
disclosure of each
a s its
such horizon
of
possibilities. 19 SZ
193,
54
f.
'Being-at'
is,
Macquarrie and Robinson's
1
t h i n k , the
best
'Being-alongside'
English translation
of H e i d e g g e r ' s
'Sein-bei'.
is c l e a r l y m i s l e a d i n g , for it suggests m e r e l y
spatial p r o x i m i t y , instead of the practical i n v o l v e m e n t that H e i d e g g e r intends f o r this t e r m to connote. Such suggestions as 'Being-amidst' Theodore be
too
Kisiel's
easily
'Being-with'
misconstrued
as
a n d ' B e i n g - a m o n g ' face s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s .
is s o m e w h a t better, a l t h o u g h it is rather vague, and c o u l d exclusively
restricted
to
inteipersonal
'Being-at',
u n d e r s t o o d not i n t e r m s o f s o m e t h i n g ' s m e r e l y p h y s i c a l
65
north
degrees
senses.
latitude
and
70 degrees
east
longitude),
but
relations.
location (e.g.
rather
in
one of t w o
First, we can say that s o m e o n e is at an a c t i v i t y , such as their b e i n g
play', or s i m p l y
'at i t a g a i n ' .
that t h e y are b o t h
skilled
prefer other
'at w o r k ' ,
S e c o n d , we c a n say that s o m e o n e is at a l m o s t a n y
in o p e r a t i n g , a n d at the
I
being at
m o m e n t are a t least a t t e m p t i n g t o use
p r o p e r l y , s u c h a s w h e n w e say that s o m e o n e i s 'at the h e l m ' , 'at the w h e e l o f the c a r ' , the c o n t r o l s ' , connotations 'among'.
'at the c o m p u t e r ' , etc. T h e s e t w o k i n d s o f uses o f 'at' of
mere
physical
location
that
plague
A further strength of this translation
242
'at
machine
'alongside',
'at
p r e c i s e l y lack t h e
'amidst',
'among',
or
i s t h e fact that b o t h s u c h uses h a v e d i r e c t
Individual and Community in Early Heidegger parallels w i t h the G e r m a n
der Arbeit' 20 Most,
(SZ
'bei', s u c h a s s o m e o n e ' s b e i n g 'beim Hämmern'
95
(SZ 8 4 ) o r 'bei
120).
if not
all,
o f these
phenomenological
aspects
horizon.
In
of a
horizon
roughly
be
found
chronological
can
order,
in
Husserl's
some
of
concept
of a
Husserl's
most
i m p o r t a n t d i s c u s s i o n s o f h o r i z o n s c a n b e f o u n d a t Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Band I, 2. Auflage ( T ü b i n g e n : N i e m e y e r , 1 9 2 2 ) , p p . 164
f.,
293;
passiven
Erfahrung
Synthesis
1966),
pp.
6-12,
Reduktion
1959), p p .
45—17,
62
f.;
(Hamburg:
Band
XI),
The
Meiner,
ed.
Erste
(Husserliana,
146-52;
pp.
Fleischer
Philosophie
Band
of European
Northwestern
Sciences
and
ed.
Rudolf
H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f the concept
of horizon,
(Frankfurt:
Klostermann,
Analysen
Haag:
1970), pp.
(Den
Haag:
1987), p p . 24,
Phenomenology,
149,
zur
Nijhoff,
Theorie der
Boehm
Meiner,
'transcendental
U n i v e r s i t y Press,
27-30,
(Den
(192.1/24). Zweiter Teil:
VIII),
162,
trans.
168.
see ( i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l
f ; G A 2 4 : 3 5 6 f., 3 7 8 f., 4 2 8 f . ; G A 2 6 : 2 6 9 , 2 7 2 ; G A 9 : Subjekt und Pasein
1985),
Margot
Curtesiunitche Meditationen ( H a m b u r g :
Crisis
D a v i d Carr (Evanston: 21 For
Urteil
51-67, 202, 261;
phänomenologischen Nijhoff,
und
(Husserliana.
order) SZ 365
165. See also F . - W . v o n H e r r m a n n ,
1 9 8 5 ) , p p . 92
f.,
118
f.
22 H e i d e g g e r e x p l i c i t l y refers to the w o r l d as a h o r i z o n several t i m e s t h r o u g h o u t the SZ p e r i o d , speaking,
for e x a m p l e , of 'the h o r i z o n of a disclosed w o r l d '
at SZ 2 6 8 ; cf. also CA 9:
165:
G A 2 6 : 2 7 5 . M y use o f the t e r m ' w o r l d ' i n t h e r e l a t i v e l y r e s t r i c t e d sense o f the h o r i z o n o n l y o f practical m e a n i n g s , h o w e v e r , w i l l n o d o u b t b e s o m e w h a t c o n t r o v e r s i a l .
F o r there
are
1 9 2 7 ) i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r uses ' » ο ι I d '
surely texts c o m p o s e d s h o r t l y after S Z ( p u b l i s h e d i n
t o e n c o m p a s s t h e total h o r i z o n o f all p o s s i b i l i t i e s d i s c l o s e d t o D a s e i n , i . e . w h a t i n SZ is c a l l e d t h e 'Da'. I n
1928, for e x a m p l e , he writes that 'the w o r l d , p r i m a r i l y characterized by
the f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m . i s the o r i g i n a r y t o t a l i t y o f w h a t D a s e i n a s free g i v e s i t s e l f t o understand'
26:
(GA
247;
cf.
2 7 2 - 5 ; cf.
also GA
9:
155-67,
esp.
H e i d e g g e r a p p e a r s t o use t h e t e r m ' w o r l d ' w i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l y here. 1 k n o w of no instance in SZ w h e r e he u n a m b i g u o u s l y broad
sense.
And
understanding,
as
his
Ihe
official
definition
iipon-which
of
'world'
of its allowing
Being of usefulness' (SZ 8 6 ) - s u r e l y
-
entities
163).
I n SZ,
however.
m o r e l i m i t e d scope, as 1 do uses t h e t e r m ' w o r l d '
'the
within-which
of
to be encountered in
a p p l i e s better t o t h e n a r r o w sense o f
in the
self-referring
the
way oj
world'
than to
t h e b r o a d o n e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , 1 t h i n k t h a t t h e best w a y t o r e a d H e i d e g g e r o n t h i s issue i s that in
1 9 2 7 h e e m p l o y s ' w o r l d ' t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e h o r i z o n o f t h e t o t a l i t y o f p o s s i b l e use-
meanings, whereas in possibilities
1928 he expands the scope of this t e r m to characterize the totality
of
p e r se.
2 3 W e w i l l see i n s e c t i o n V I t h a t t h e r e is a s e n s e i n w h i c h D a s e i n c a n e x p e r i e n c e t h e w o r l d as a t o t a l i t y . T h i s occurs in Ihe m o o d of a n x i e t y . F o r o u r purposes, all that is needed to note here t h a t i n a n x i e t y D a s e i n e x p e r i e n c e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t m a k e u p i t s w o r l d a s mere ' p o t e n t i a l possibilities' 24 Heidegger practical
-
i.e.
notes
a s t h i n g s i t could d o - a n d n o t a s a l r e a d y a c t u a l i z e d
that
dealings
Dasein
with
'by
and
intraworldly
large'
125)
(SZ
entities
(SZ
encounters
125).
Others,
possibilities.
others for
in
its
example,
everyday are
both
p o t e n t i a l users o f the f r u i t s o f D a s e i n ' s l a b o r s , and also c o - w o r k e r s w i t h w h o m D a s e i n c o o p e r a t e s o n j o i n t p r a c t i c a l p r o j e c t s (SZ 1 1 6 - 1 8 , Dasein's
world
a
'co-world'
(Mitwelt;
SZ
126; cf. 70 f . ) . F o r this reason, he calls a
118).
Heidegger
notes
that
'for
purposes
ot'
s i m p l i f y i n g the e x p l i c a t i o n ' h e does not e m p h a s i z e the s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f the w o r l d i n his p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f w o r l d (SZ 1 1 8 ; c f . G A 2 0 : 3 2 6 I . ; G A 2 1 : 2 3 5 ) . 25 T h i s is not to O n
this
identify
issue,
Heidegger's
a l l for-the-sakes-of w h i c h as s u c h w i t h s o c i a l roles o r s o c i a l statuses.
see
Temporal
Dreyfus,
Idealism
Being-in-the-World,
(Cambridge:
pp.
Cambridge
94-96;
University
and Press,
William 1999),
Blattner. pp.
83-
85. 2 6 T h i s i s the basis o f h i s c r i t i c i s m o f t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w s o f the self, s u c h a s t h o s e o f D e s c a r t e s ( S Z 2 4 f . ) , K a n t ( S Z 2 4 , 3 2 0 f ; G A 21: 4 0 6 ; C A 2 4 : 2 0 9 ) , a n d H u s s e r l ( c f . G A 20:
1 7 : 8 0 f.; C A
1 5 5 f., 1 6 5 ) . H e i d e g g e r h o l d s t h a t s u c h v i e w s a r e b a s e d o n t h e m i s t a k e o f i l l e g i t i m a t e l y
a p p l y i n g w h a t i s t h e case f o r i n n e r w o t l d l y e n t i t i e s t o o t h e r w a y s o f B e i n g , s u c h a s t h e self. Such over-generalizations subject)
which
has the
have
led to c o n c e i v i n g the self as a certain
possibilily
of standing
in certain epistemic
r e l a t i o n s to o t h e r k i n d s of t h i n g s (objects; SZ 114,
243
117).'
k i n d of thing
(a
or other intentional
96
Edgar C. Baedeker, Jr.
2 7 ' D i i . y Sein, d a r u m ex diesem Seienden in seinem Sein gehl, ist je meines' (SZ 4 2 ; c f . SZ 1 2 , 84). 2 8 A s H e i d e g g e r n o t e s (GA 9 : 1 5 7 ; G A 2 6 ; 2 3 9 f . , 2 4 5 ) , t h i s d o e s n o t c o m m i t h i m t o a f o r m o f psychological e g o i s m (and certainly not to an ethical egoism). For such egoistic theories generally
hold
that
t h e pleasure
of the
agent
is
(or
ought
to
be)
the
ultimate
goal
of
s o m e o n e ' s actions. H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , does not h o l d that a n y k i n d o f actual o r a n t i c i p a t e d pleasure is a necessary c o m p o n e n t of p u r s u i n g a f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m . In fact, his p o s i t i o n i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h there b e i n g e n t i r e l y selfless o r altruistic p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f ourselves f o r the sake o f w h o m w e act.
For example,
1 c a n d o s o m e t h i n g f o r s o m e o n e else f o r the sake o f
m y s e l f as a m a r t y r , a d i s c i p l e , a c a r e - g i v e r , a c i t i z e n b o u n d by the p a t r i o t i c d u t y to a i d my country, or s i m p l y as an ethical person. 2 9 See,
e.g.,
Thomas
Encyclopedia
Sheehan,
of Philosophy
Martin
(New
York:
Heidegger', Roulledge,
in
Edward
1998),
vol.
Craig
4,
pp.
(ed.), 311
Routledge
f.;
William
B l a t t n e r , Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, o p . c i t . , p p . 5 9 - 6 3 . 3 0 S e e , e . g . , F . - W . v o n H e r r m a n n , Subjekt und Dasein, o p . e i l . , passim. 3 1 I n his w r i t i n g s f r o m 1919 t h r o u g h 1 9 2 1 , H e i d e g g e r c a l l e d w h a t i s i n S Z s i m p l y the w o r l d the
'environment'
(Umwelt),
the
o n t i c h o r i z o n of the self the GA 9: 30). By
ontic
horizon
'self-world'
of others the
CSelbstwelt'; c f .
'co-world'
('Mitwelt'),
GA 58: 4 3 - 1 0 4 ; CA 60:
and
the
I I ,
13;
1925, h o w e v e r , he had rejected such t e r m i n o l o g y as m i s l e a d i n g (cf. GA 20:
3 3 3 ) , a d o p t i n g i n s t e a d t h e t e r m s o f SZ. A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s n e w t e r m i n o l o g y , e a c h D a s e i n l i v e s i n o n l y o n e w o r l d , a l t h o u g h this i s b u t o n e o f the three h o r i z o n s o f the d i s c l o s e d D a ( c f . S Z 3 6 5 ) . H e i d e g g e r m o d i f i e d h i s t e r m i n o l o g y i n t h i s w a y not b e c a u s e h e t h o u g h t t h a t his o r i g i n a l d i v i s i o n was w r o n g , but rather because he came to h o l d that the t e r m ' w o r l d ' is best a p p l i e d o n l y t o the h o r i z o n o f p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . ' I t i s t r u e t h a t the w o r l d l y a b i l i t y t o e n c o u n t e r Dasein a n d c o - D a s e i n i s c o n s t i t u t i v e for the B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d o f D a s e i n a n d thus for that of others, but it never thereby becomes s o m e t h i n g w o r l d l y . . . T h e w o r l d itself, on the other hand,
is never co-there,
never co-Dasein;
rather,
it is that in w h i c h
Dasein
a l w a y s i s a s c o n c e r n ' (GA 2 0 : 3 3 3 f . ) . F u r t h e r t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e f o r m y t h e s i s t h a t H e i d e g g e r by
SZ
holds
perspectives
that can
Dasein
be
found
exists
simultaneously
in
itself.
SZ
For
and
equioriginarily
example,
Heidegger
in
these
enumerates
three
Dasein's
'essential r e l a t i o n s ' a s ' B e i n g a t the w o r l d ( c o n c e r n ) , B e i n g - w i t h ( c a r i n g - f o r ) , a n d B e i n g o n e s e l f ( w h o ) ' (SZ 1 3 1 ; see t h e s i m i l a r e n u m e r a t i o n s a t S Z 1 1 4 , 1 8 1 , 2 6 3 , 2 9 8 ; G A 2 4 : 4 2 7 f., 4 1 8 - 2 3 ) . Dasein's
Along
Being
the
that
I D a s e i n ' s J Being t o the itself
same
is,
lines,
he
writes:
according
to
its
world w i t h
(SZ 1 2 2 ; e m p h a s i s a d d e d )
which
it
'Caring-for p r o v e s
different
to
be
possibilities,
is c o n c e r n e d , j u s t as w i t h
a constitution
linked
[verklammert]
of to
i t s o w n i n g Being t o
A n y l i n g e r i n g doubts as to w h e t h e r H e i d e g g e r by the t i m e
of SZ s t i l l h e l d that there are three p e r s p e c t i v e s of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g c a n , I t h i n k , be p u t to rest b y a s t a t e m e n t h e m a d e i n a l e c t u r e - c o u r s e h e l d less t h a n t w o y e a r s a f t e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f SZ.
H e r e , he w r i t e s that f r o m his o n t o l o g i c a l
analysis
' i t has a l r e a d y b e c o m e c l e a r that
D a s e i n i s e q u i o r i g i n a r i l y a l w a y s a l r e a d y B e i n g at, B e i n g - w i t h , a n d B e i n g - i t s e l f 148; cf.
(OA 2 7 :
GA 9 : 1 6 3 ) .
32 H e i d e g g e r rejects the t e r m 3 3 See sections V a n d
' s e l f - c a r e ' o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t i s t a u t o l o g i c a l (SZ 1 9 3 , 3 1 8 ) .
VI below.
3 4 See H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s o f the d e a t h o f o t h e r s , a n d h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n f r o m the e x p e r i e n c e of one's o w n death, at SZ 2 3 7 - 4 1 . 35 The canonical
translation
of Heidegger's
neologism
'Eigentlichkeit'
is
'authenticity'.
This,
h o w e v e r , i s h i g h l y m i s l e a d i n g . F o r i t w r o n g l y s u g g e s t s t h a t a n eigentliches s e l f i s o n e t h a t i s a c t u a l i z i n g a c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s e l f t h a t i s i n s o m e sense its ' r e a l '
self, as w h e n we
speak o f f i n d i n g o n e ' s g o a l i n l i f e , o n e ' s true c a l l i n g , etc. I n fact, h o w e v e r , a n ' a u t h e n t i c ' s e l f i n t h i s s e n s e p l a y s n o r o l e i n H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t o f a u t h e n t i c i t y . F o r , as 1 w i l l a r g u e i n t h i s s e c t i o n , o n e c a n b e eigentlich o n l y i f o n e m a k e s a radical c h o i c e o f w h o t o b e , a n d a choice putative
that
receives
no
guidance
from
any
lixed
possibility
of oneself,
thus
including
a
'real s e l f . I t h i n k that ' s e l f - o w n e r s h i p ' captures H e i d e g g e r ' s m e a n i n g better than
a u t h e n t i c ' . T h i s t r a n s l a t i o n i s not, h o w e v e r , w i t h o u t its o w n d i f f i c u l t i e s . H o w , for e x a m p l e , should we translate 'Uneigentlic/ikeir.
and
Heidegger's t e r m for the opposed existentiell its
corresponding
adjective,
mode of Being-oneself,
'uneigenllich'l
For
'lack-of-self-
o w n e r s h i p ' , ' n o n - s e l f - o w n e r s h i p ' , " w i t h o u t o w n i n g i t s e l f ; a n d the l i k e are h i g h l y a w k w a r d ;
244
Individual and Community in Early Heidegger and
'self-disownership'
w o u l d be
positively
misleading,
uneigentliches D a s e i n s o m e h o w chooses l o b e s o .
since
it
97
w r o n g l y suggests that
M y choice o f the f o l l o w i n g
terminology
i s b a s e d p r i m a r i l y o n s t y l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : 1 use ' o w n e d ' a n d ' o w n i n g ' ( w i t h lire p r e f i x 'self-'
elided)
equivalently
"unowningness' 'unowning' 36 It
is
crucial
as
the
as
translations
translation
lo
translate
to
recognize
of the
of the
adjective
substantive
'eigentlich';
'Uneigentlichkeit';
'unownedness' and
or
'unowned'
or
'uneigentlich'. that
this
is
only
an
analogy,
or,
as
Heidegger
calls
il,
a
' f o r m a l i z a t i o n ' ( S Z 2 8 3 ) . H e i d e g g e r r i g h t l y stresses that s e l f - o w n e r s h i p i s n o t a v a l u e , a n d c e r t a i n l y not a m o r a l one ( S Z 167, 176, 2 9 3 ; cf. 2 8 9 - 9 5 ) . Perhaps the o n l y w a y in w h i c h self-ownership is u n a m b i g u o u s l y valuable
is in
s e r v i n g as the basis
for an o n t o l o g i c a l
i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r h o w the s e l f is. 3 7 ' B e i n g a n x i o u s discloses o r i g i n a r i l y a n d d i r e c t l y the w o r l d a s w o r l d ' ( S Z 187), w h e r e the w o r l d , a s w e h a v e seen, i s the t o t a l i t y o f p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . ' W h a t stilles { i n a n x i e t y ] i s n o t t h i s o r t h a t , b u t a l s o n o t e v e r y t h i n g p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d a s a s u m , b u t r a t h e r t h e possibility o f t h e r e a d y - t o - h a n d i n g e n e r a l , i.e. the w o r l d i t s e l f ( S Z 1 8 7 ) . a n x i o u s , a n x i e t y t h u s d i s c l o s e d D a s e i n a s being-possible' Dasein .
(SZ
W i t h the a b o u t - w h i c h o f b e i n g 187
f.).
' A n x i e t y manifests in
. . being free for t h e f r e e d o m o f c h o o s i n g a n d g r a s p i n g o n e s e l f
( S Z 188). T h u s in
a n x i e t y , ' t h e w o r l d i s still a n d more demandingly " t h e r e " \"da"\' ( S Z 1 8 9 ) t h a n i t i s i n other, more everyday, moods.
38 J e a n - P a u l
Sartre,
The
Transcendence
of the
Ego:
An
Existentialist
Theory
of Consciousness,
trans. Forrest W i l l i a m s a n d R o b e r t K i r k p a t r i c k ( N e w Y o r k : Farrar, Straus a n d G i r o u x . n.d.'l, p.
100.
3 9 T h i s passage has been read b y s e v e r a l p r o m i n e n t c o m m e n t a t o r s a s c o m m i t t i n g H e i d e g g e r t o t h e p r o b l e m a t i c d o c t r i n e o f e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n i s m , i.e. - r o u g h l y , a n d i n a n e x t r e m e f o r m - t h e v i e w that a n a c t i o n a s p e r f o r m e d b y a n agent i s e t h i c a l i f a n d o n l y i f that agent decides t o d o i t . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , rests o n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t H e i d e g g e r o f f e r s h i s a c c o u n t o f self-ownership as an account of morality. This is simply mistaken. For Heidegger to poinl o u t f o r m a l s i m i l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n conscience, o w i n g , n e g a t i v i t y , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the m o r a l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l spheres e n t a i l s n e i t h e r that the c o r r e s p o n d i n g m o r a l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l p h e n o m e n a a r e i d e n t i c a l , n o r t h a i e v e r y a c t i o n u n d e r t a k e n b y r e s o l u t e D a s e i n i s ipso fat t o m o r a l . H e i d e g g e r ' s t w o strongest statements about the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e l f - o w n e r s h i p and m o r a l i t y are p r o b a b l y the f o l l o w i n g : itself w i t h what it tactically
' A n e n t i t y w h o s e B e i n g is care can not o n l y laden
o w e s , b u t i s o w i n g i n the g r o u n d o f its B e i n g . T h i s B e i n g -
o w i n g p r o v i d e s for the first l i m e the o n t o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n l o r f a c t i c a l l y e x i s t i n g D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y t o o w e . T h i s essential B e i n g - o w i n g i s e q u i o r i g i n a r i l y the e x i s t e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n o f the possibility
for the " m o r a l l y " g o o d a n d e v i l ,
i.e.
for m o r a l i t y
in general
a n d its
factically
possible v a r i a t i o n s . O r i g i n a r y B e i n g - o w i n g c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d b y m o r a l i t y , because the latter
rather
already
the
presupposes
most
factically owing.
In
the
originary
former
existentiell
understanding
for
itself
(SZ
presupposition
the call,
Dasein
286).
for
allows
'Willing-to-havt-nmscience
the
possibility
its o w n m o s t
of
is
becoming
s e l f t o act
in
itself
f r o m o u t o f i t s c h o s e n a b i l i t y - t o - b e . O n l y s o c a n i t b e r e s p o n s i b l y ' (SZ 2 8 8 1 . E v e n t h e s e t w o passages - in w h i c h H e i d e g g e r m a y w e l l be o v e r s t a t i n g his case f o r the sake of e m p h a s i s d o not e n t a i l m o r a l d e c i s i o n i s m . F o r here H e i d e g g e r here appears o n l y t o c l a i m that t a k i n g complete m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i l y for oneself entails, or presupposes, taking resolute o w n e r s h i p o f o n e s e l f . N o w i t i s t r u e t h a t t h e converse o f t h i s c l a i m - i . e . t h a t t a k i n g r e s o l u t e o w n e r s h i p of
oneself
implies
that
one
is
acting
morally
-
would
come
very
close
to
ethical
d e c i s i o n i s m . N e i t h e r these passages, h o w e v e r , n o r H e i d e g g e r ' s g e n e r a l v i e w o f the r e l a t i o n between m o r a l and existential responsibility, c o m m i t s h i m to this converse c l a i m . For a thoughtful
discussion
Implications of Heidegger's
of
these
'Being
issues,
and Time'
see
Lawrence
(Evanston:
Vogel,
The
Fragile
Northwestern
'We':
University
Ethical
Press,
1994). 4 0 A l t h o u g h H e i d e g g e r d o e s not t o m y k n o w l e d g e e x p l i c i t l y c a l l d e a t h (he ' h o r i z o n ' o f the p e r s p e c t i v e o f B e i n g - o n e s e l f , h e does c h a r a c t e r i z e i t w i t h Ihe v i r t u a l l y metaphor
of
one
thing
lying
before
another
[einem
anderen
vorgelagert
identical sein\.
He
spatial writes:
' D a s e i n a s B e i n g t o w a r d its d e a t h i s a l w a y s r e l a t e d t o the o u t e r m o s t n o l - y e l o f itself, w h i c h all
others
lie
before
[vorgelagert
sind;
perhaps
better:
'which
lies
in
store
behind
all
others')' (SZ 259). Reversing this spatial metaphor - but in a w a y still compatible w i t h
245
98
Edgar C. Baedeker, Jr. u n d e r s t a n d i n g d e a t h as a h o r i z o n - he w r i t e s : ' r e s o l u t e n e s s . . . p r o j e c t s i t s e l f . . . u p o n t h e outermost possibility, be'
w h i c h l i e s b e f o r e [vorgelagert ist[ a l l o f D a s e i n ' s t a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s - t o -
(SZ 3 0 2 ) .
4 1 See n o t e
13 a b o v e .
42 Heidegger explains
that
a
full
'description
Classification'
and
o f the
'lies b e y o n d the l i m i t s of this i n v e s t i g a t i o n '
Being-with-others
various
modes
of
(SZ 1 2 2 ) . H e l i s t s i n s t e a d
c a r i n g - f o r w i t h respect t o its p o s i t i v e m o d e s ' . T h e s e
o n l y the ' t w o e x t r e m e p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' o f
m o d e s a r e p o s i t i v e i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o s u c h ' d e f i c i e n t o r a t l e a s t i n d i f f e r e n t m o d e s ' (SZ 124; cf.
121).
E x a m p l e s of the latter include
other, not-being-concemed-with-each-oiher'
'being-without-each-other, going-past-each-
(SZ
121),
perhaps also the m o d e in w h i c h 'the other is at first heard
of h i m ,
what one
[man]
says
and
knows
about
positive mode of Being-with-others is "leaping i n ' 'dominates'
the
other by
'taking
away'
the
'distance and reserve'
Dasein, and thereby extreme
positive
'frees'
'sets the o t h e r free
(existentiell)
him'
'care'
{SZ
174).
o f its c o - D a s e i n
the o t h e r by
in his f r e e d o m
T h e first extreme
and
taking
'giving "care" back' it
over
its
l e a p i n g ahead' of the
for h i m s e l f
of Being-with-others,
mode
122), and
for the other. I n this m o d e , one D a s e i n
concern. The second extreme positive mode of Being-with-others is other; here, the o n e D a s e i n s o m e h o w
(SZ
" t h e r e " | "da"] f r o m w h a t o n e [man] h a s
to its c o -
(SZ 1 2 2 ) .
would
In the first
appear that
Dasein
t r e a t s o t h e r p e o p l e a t b e s t i n t e r m s o f itself a n d i t s w o r l d l y p r o j e c t s . I n t h e s e c o n d e x t r e m e positive (existentiell) mode of Being-with-others, however,
D a s e i n w o u l d appear t o treat
o t h e r s i n t e r m s o f t h e i r p r o p e r h o r i z o n - das Man a n d p e r h a p s a l s o t h e o t h e r ' s o w n d e a t h t h u s e n c o u n t e r i n g t h e o t h e r s i n t e r m s o f t h e i r own s e l f - p r o j e c t . s a n d t h e c o r r e l a t i v e w o r l d l y d e a l i n g s that they
guide.
43 C f . . e.g., SZ 4 2 - 4 4 ,
1 2 9 f.,
175-80, 259.
4 4 D r e y f u s a p p e a r s t o e q u a t e s u c h a v e r a g e n e s s w i t h c o n f o r m i s m , a t l e a s t i n w h a t h e c a l l s its 'motivational',
or
existentiell'
sense;
see
his
Being-in-the-World,
op.
cit.,
pp.
144,
157,
227. 4 5 T a y l o r C a r m a n ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f das Man i n cit.
approaches
such
an
extreme
claim.
' O n B e i n g Social: A R e p l y to O l a f s o n ' , op.
See
Olafson,
'Individuality,
Subjectivity,
and
Presence: A R e p l y to T a y l o r C a r m a n ' , op. cit., for a c o n v i n c i n g rebuttal. 46 There is a d m i t t e d l y some textual d i f f i c u l t y w i t h a p p l y i n g this interpretation consistently to e v e r y t h i n g that H e i d e g g e r says. O n e s o u r c e of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y lies in the fact that the t e r m " A / m i - s e l i " is first i n t r o d u c e d o n l y at SZ 129. A n d up to t h i s p o i n t ( e . g . at SZ 1 1 4 , 127 f . ) , H e i d e g g e r used the t e r m self.
Even
more
'das Man'
to characterize
problematically,
he
never
what
makes
he m o r e s t r i c t l y the
distinction
terms
' t h e Man-
entirely
explicit.
Nevertheless, in SZ after this p o i n t (e.g. SZ 193, 2 6 3 , 2 6 6 , 2 6 8 , 2 7 2 - 4 ) , he d i s t i n g u i s h e s fairly consistently
between
them.
Perhaps, then,
s u c h uses o f the
t e r m s are
transitional,
e m p l o y e d a s H e i d e g g e r m o v e s f r o m a n a n a l y s i s o f das Man t o t h a t o f t h e e v e r y d a y m o d e o f Dasein's
Being-itself.
In the end,
it
though,
b e t w e e n das Man a n d t h e A / a / i - s e l f m a y
may
well
be
the case
that
the d i s t i n c t i o n
s i m p l y not have been so clear to h i m that they
consistently impressed themselves on his t e r m i n o l o g y . A f t e r a l l . 1 suggest this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n not w i t h the a i m of t r y i n g to s h o w that e v e r y sentence of SZ is e n t i r e l y correct as it stands, or that it coheres w i t h e v e r y other sentence in the w o r k . Rather, I do so in the spirit of t r y i n g t o b r i n g t o l i g h t a s s h a r p l y a s p o s s i b l e t h e i s s u e s (Sachen) o f H e i d e g g e r ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analyses. 47 F a i l u r e to d i s t i n g u i s h a n x i o u s i n d e c i s i o n f r o m resolute self-standing c a n g i v e rise to the suspicion
that
Heidegger
holds
that
the
i n n e r w o i i d l y entities or other people.
resolute
Now
self ceases
to
deal
interestedly
it is true that the e x p e r i e n c e
p o s s i b i l i t i e s as mere p o s s i b i l i t i e s r e n d e r s i n n e r w o r l d t y e n t i t i e s
with
in anxiety of
'entirely unimportant'
(SZ
1 8 7 ) , 'in g e n e r a l n o t " r e l e v a n t " , . . . , w i t h o u t s i g n i f i c a n c e [ a n d a s h a v i n g l t h e c h a r a c t e r o f complete meaninglessness'
(SZ 1 8 6 , 3 4 3 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , w e h a v e s e e n t h a t a n x i e t y i s o n l y a
n e c e s s a r y precursor o f r e s o l u t e
self-ownership.
In
the
latter existentiell
mode, one
returns
to one's interested e n g a g e m e n t w i t h i n n e r w o r l d l y entities and w i t h others, b u t w i t h the essential d i f f e r e n c e that o n e n o w for the first t i m e takes o w n e r s h i p of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 48 It s h o u l d be c l e a r that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I h a v e s u g g e s t e d of s e l f - o w n e r s h i p d i f f e r s f r o m a prevalent
interpretation
Guignon,
'Heidegger's
of this
phenomenon,
"Authenticity"
w h i c h one
Revisited',
246
finds,
Review
id
for e x a m p l e , Metaphysics
38
in
Charles
(1984),
pp.
Individual
and
Community
in
Early
Heidegger
99
3 2 1 - 3 ' ) , esp. p. 3 3 4 . On i h i s v i e w , s e l f - o w n e r s h i p is a m a t t e r of d e v e l o p i n g a p e r s o n a l style - a particular w a y of c o m b i n i n g the possibilities i n t o w h i c h one finds oneself t h r o w n to form
'a pattern that is coherent and integrated'
(p.
332), and hence to develop a unique
personality. I do not t h i n k that this r e a d i n g is correct, since w h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e about a self t h a t o w n s i t s e l f h a s n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h which c o n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s i t p r o j e c t s - i n c l u d i n g t h e ' c o h e r e n c e a n d f o c u s ' w i t h w h i c h i t m a y d o s o ; see G u i g n o n , i n the Early Heidegger',
i n Heidegger: Λ
History and C o m m i t m e n t
Critical Reader, e d . H u b e r t D r e y f u s a n d
Harrison
H a l l ( C a m b r i d g e , M A : B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 9 2 ) . p . 136. Instead, i t has e x c l u s i v e l y t o d o w i t h t h e i r b e i n g r a d i c a l l y chosen in the transparency of the f u l l existential i m p l i c a t i o n s of d o i n g so 49 Dreyfus
has
a
second
Heidegger
cannot
ownership
into
'understanding
criticism
explain
the
unownedness. that
of
Heidegger's
psychological Dreyfus
views
no specific project can
view
of self-ownership.
motivation
for
self-ownership
fulfill
Dasein's as
He
nothing
me or give m y
claims
that
from
self-
falling
life
more
than
meaning'
the
(Being-in-
the-World, p p . 3 2 2 f . ) , a n d t h e p u r s u i t o f w h i c h w i l l g u a r a n t e e a s t a b l e , ' u l t i m a t e o r i n t r i n s i c m e a n i n g ' (ibid., p. 323) in one's life. He views lullenness into unownedness, accordingly, as
what
Sartre calls
'bad
w h o m as essentially
faith':
the stubborn pursuit of some particular
for-the-sakes-of-
o n e ' s o w n . T h e basis o f D r e y f u s ' s c r i t i c i s m o f H e i d e g g e r i s
that
he
offers no a c c o u n t for D a s e i n ' s alleged desire for stable m e a n i n g . A l t h o u g h m u c h is v a l u a b l e in
Dreyfus's
anxiety
and
discussion,
his
sell-ownership,
account fn
crucially
particular,
downplays
»hat
makes
the
role
Dasein
o f radical
anxious
is
not
choice
in
just
the
r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s n o p a r t i c u l a r e v e r y d a y f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h o m t h a t I mast p u r s u e , h u t a l s o t h a t i n o r d e r t o b e a s e l l , 1 m i f . v i c o m m i t m y s e l f t o some p a r t i c u l a r set o f l o r - l h e - s a k e s o f - w h o m , and
that such c o m m i t m e n t
precludes
the p o s s i b i l i l y
of committing
myself to
o t h e r s u c h projects. D r e y f u s , on the o t h e r h a n d , appears to v i e w s e l f - o w n e r s h i p as a m a t t e r o f developing an easy-going altitude i n w h i c h o n e vagaries of the situation.
goes w i t h the flow' o f the unpredictable
D r e y f u s ' s account thus o m i t s the c r u c i a l
aspect o f r a d i c a l c h o i c e
in anxiety. T h i s is an i m p o r t a n t o m i s s i o n , since a l t h o u g h Ihe situation is for H e i d e g g e r the •reservoir'
of possible
no p a r t i c u l a r precisely
this
unpleasant.
for-the-sakes-of-whom f r o m w h i c h Dasein must choose, it imposes
for-the-sakes-of-whom lack
Since,
as
we
saw
in
i.e.
by itself,
of determination
of
who
section V,
to
without be
anxiety
Dasein's
that is
a
makes necessary
resolute anxiety
choice. so
condition
It
is
unbearably for
taking
o w n e r s h i p o f oneself, the desire t o a v o i d i t supplies the m o t i v a t i o n for D a s e i n ' s a v o i d i n g taking ownership of itself missing in Dreyfus's interpretation. For a criticism of Dreyfus's interpretation Response 5 0 Joan
along
in
these
Dreyfus',
Stambaugh,
Research
Received
to
' A n
lines,
Inquiry
38
Inquiry
Phenomenology 7
see
Elizabeth
11995), into
pp.
Authenticity
( 1 9 7 7 ) , p.
Evving,
'Authenticity
in
Heidegger:
A
469-87. and
Inauthenticity
in
Being
and
Time',
156.
12 September 2000
E d g a r C . B o e d e k e r , Jr., D e p a r t m e n t o f P h i l o s o p h y , B a k e r H a l l
135, U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h e r n
I o w a , Cedar Falls, 1Λ 50614-0501, U S A . E-mail:
[email protected]
247
L e c t u r e 10 H e i d e g g e r o n the R e l a t i o n o f O n e s e l f to Oneself, I I I : Choosing Oneself
I w i l l c o n t i n u e i m m e d i a t e l y f r o m t h e p o i n t a t t h e e n d o f t h e last l e c t u r e w h e r e I h a d t o i n t e r r u p t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s e c o n d aspect o f the r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o oneself, n a m e l y , the r e l a t i o n t o one's o w n b e i n g as the for-the-sake-of-which and possibility. I w a n t e d to e x p l a i n t h e t e r m s t h a t a r e f u n d a m e n t a l f o r H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f t h i s side o f the r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o one's o w n b e i n g i n the f o l l o w i n g sequence: for-the-sake-of-which,
possibilily,
understanding,
projection,
and
meaning.
We
are still c o n c e r n e d w i t h the second of these t e r m s . I c l a i m e d that there are t w o reasons w h y H e i d e g g e r designates the activities i n w h i c h m a n c o n c r e t e l y carries o u t his b e i n g as possibilities. First, he w a n t e d to u n d e r l i n e the range of f r e e d o m that pertains to o u r activity on the basis o f t h e y e s / n o p o l a r i t y o f o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e t h e n s a w t h a t t h i s i s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e f u r t h e r thesis t h a t w e c a n o n l y r e l a t e o u r s e l v e s to o u r b e i n g as s o m e t h i n g i m p e n d i n g because we relate ourselves to o u r actions as possibilities of action a n d to o u r b e i n g as potentialityf o r - b e i n g ; a n d i t i s o n l y o n t h i s basis t h a t a c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e f u t u r e emerges. T h e s e c o n d r e a s o n f o r H e i d e g g e r ' s c h o i c e o f t h e t e r m possibility i s still to be i d e n t i f i e d . [ have already p o i n t e d out that H e i d e g g e r neglected to elucidate the t r a d i t i o n a l concepts for the v o l i t i o n a l self-relation by m e a n s o f his e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o o n e s e l f b e c a u s e he w a n t e d to separate h i m s e l f as s h a r p l y as possible f r o m the t r a d i t i o n . T h e c h o i c e o f t h e t e r m possibility f o r t h e c o n c r e t e u n i t s i n w h i c h D a s e i n c a r r i e s o u t its b e i n g s e e m s t o m e t o b e a n e x p r e s s i o n o f t h i s n e g l e c t .
248
201 Heidegger on
the
Relation
of Onesell
to
Oneself,
III
O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e c h o i c e o f t h i s t e r m u n d o u b t e d l y has t h e p o s i t i v e significance o f e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t t h e person relates h i m s e l f t o h i m s e l f i n h i s a c t i v i t i e s , since these a r e d e s i g n a t e d a s p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f b e i n g . I n t h i s w a y t h e c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e basic u n i t s i n w h i c h o n e ' s o w n b e i n g is concretized w i t h the g l o b a l unit of existence is secured, b u t the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e basic u n i t s a s p o s s i b i l i t i e s leaves t h e i r d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r c o m p l e t e l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e . T h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w these p o s sibilities are to be u n d e r s t o o d c o n c r e t e l y — f o r instance, as actions, connections of actions, activities, a n d roles —is left o p e n , a n d the choice o f t h e t e r m possibility s o m e w h a t o b s c u r e s t h i s fact. T h e t h r e e r e m a i n i n g terms—understanding, projection, a n d meaning— c a n b e e x p l a i n e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . Understanding s t a n d s f o r the specific disclosure o f one's o w n b e i n g a s possible-being. T h e best p o s s i b l e m o d e o f access t o w h a t H e i d e g g e r m e a n s b y understanding seems t o m e t o b e t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m e a n i n g , a l t h o u g h H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f does n o t i n t r o d u c e the concept o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t h i s w a y . I p o i n t e d o u t e a r l i e r t h a t w e use t h e e x p r e s s i o n s understanding a n d meaning c o r r e l a t i v e l y a n d t h a t o n e t n u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m e a n i n g o f linguistic expressions a n d the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the m e a n i n g o f a n action. M e a n i n g i n this second sense ( r e a l l y t h e p r i m a r y sense a s i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r ) s i g n i f i e s t h e s a m e thing as purpose and end.
Understanding an action means under-
s t a n d i n g its m e a n i n g , a n d t h i s m e a n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g its p u r p o s e . W e u n d e r s t a n d a t h i n g that was deliberately p r o d u c e d w h e n we u n d e r s t a n d its f u n c t i o n — i t s p u r p o s e — a n d this i n v o l v e s k n o w i n g w h a t e n d i t serves, a n d h o w o n e has t o use i t i n o r d e r t o a t t a i n t h i s . W e u n d e r s t a n d a p e r s o n w h e n w e c o r r e c t l y g r a s p t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f his a c t i o n , t h e i n tet c o n n e c t i o n o f his m o t i v e s f o r a c t i n g . W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen t h a t H e i d e g g e r d o e s n o t c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h litis u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f m e a n i n g f r o m the understanding o f linguistic m e a n i n g . T h i s i s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e fact t h a t h e m a k e s e x c e s s i v e c l a i m s for the concepts of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m e a n i n g . T h u s he advances t h e thesis t h a t " a l l s i g h t i s g r o u n d e d p r i m a r i l y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g " (p. 1 8 7), a n d t h a t m e a n i n g i s t h e focal p o i n t " i n t e r m s o f w h i c h a n y t h i n g b e c o m e s i n t e l l i g i b l e a s s o m e t h i n g " (193). T h i s also l e d H e i d e g g e r t o n e g l e c t t h e s p e c i f i c a l l y p r a c t i c a l , v o l i t i o n a l a s p e c t o f meaning. W e w i l l h a v e t o d i s r e g a r d t h e s e e x c e s s i v e c l a i m s a n d t h i s illicit shift i n t h e concept of m o a n i n g .
249
202 Lecture
10
T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of intentions as I have just described it is a m o d e of k n o w l e d g e . I u n d e r s t a n d an action, a person, a t h i n g , w h e n I k n o w t h e p u r p o s e t h a t t h e a c t i o n has o r t h e e n d t h a t t h e t h i n g serves. T h e v o l i t i o n a l aspect h e r e belongs, n o t t o t h e act o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t t o the object of understanding. But
Heidegger wants the
a w a y that it stands
w o r d understanding t o b e g r a s p e d i n s u c h
for t h e disclosure of one's o w n
possible-being.
Just a s a specific disclosure o f one's o w n b e i n g i n e m o t i o n s a n d m o o d s was e l a b o r a t e d u n d e r t h e t i t l e " t e m p e r a m e n t , " s o t h e specific m o d e of disclosure that pertains to w i l l i n g itself is n o w to be presented u n d e r t h e t i t l e " u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h u s , a k i n d o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s a t issue for w h i c h it is constitutive that it is u n d e r s t a n d i n g in the first person. H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s t h r e e aspects o f s u c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t p e r t a i n t o p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g , a l t h o u g h h e does n o t h i m s e l f d i s t i n g u i s h be t w e e n these aspects. A s t o t h e f i r s t aspect, w h e n I m y s e l f d o s o m e t h i n g , w e w o u l d n o t n o r m a l l y say t h a t I u n d e r s t a n d t h e i n t e n t i o n . T h i s i s c o n n e c t e d w i t h the epistemic
a s y m m e t r y o f "φ"
predicates.
I
do not
first
have
to
interpret a f o r m of behavior in order to know what intention / am p u r s u i n g . I n a c t i n g 1 p u r s u e t h e i n t e n t i o n , a n d I d o n o t first h a v e t o a p p r e h e n d it.
B u t w e h a v e n o w seen t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n o r p u r p o s e
g u i d e s t h e a c t i o n , s o t o s p e a k ; t h e a c t i o n w o u l d l a c k o r i e n t a t i o n i n its absence. A n d this c a n be r e g a r d e d as a first f o r m of the disclosure t h a i p e r t a i n s t o t h e a c t i o n itself. H e i d e g g e r t a k e s r e c o u r s e h e r e t o a n o t h e r m o d e o f use o f i h e w o r d understanding:
"We
sometimes
use . . . t h e
expression
'understand
s o m e t h i n g ' i n t h e sense o f ' b e i n g a b l e t o m a n a g e s o m e t h i n g ' , ' b e i n g a m a t c h f o r i t ' , ' b e i n g a b l e t o d o s o m e t h i n g ' " (183). H e i d e g g e r e v e n uses t h i s p h r a s e t o i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e t h i n k s t h a t t h r o u g h t h i s c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e use o f " u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g " a n d " b e i n g able t o d o s o m e t h i n g " h e can m a k e under s t a n d i n g plausible as t h e m o d e of disclosure that is constitutive for p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a c t i o n . B u t h e r e his d e f i c i e n t a n a l y s i s o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f possibility h a d u n f a v o r a b l e consequences. T h e " c a n " that i s used w h e n w e say " s o m e o n e c a n d o s o m e t h i n g " o b v i o u s l y s t a n d s f o r t h e " c a n " o f ability a n d not for the " c a n " o f the possibilily o f action. N o n e t h e l e s s , H e i d e g g e r seems t o m e t o have seen s o m e t h i n g correct h e r e . I j u s t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t w e u n d e r s t a n d a t h i n g t h a t has a f u n c t i o n w h e n we k n o w h o w it is used.
But o n e can o n l y d e m o n s t r a t e this
250
203 Heidegger on
ihe
Relation
of O n e s e l f to Oneself,
III
k n o w l e d g e a n d ( i f necessary) c o n v e y i t t o others b y actually d e a l i n g w i t h the t h i n g correctly. A n d this w a y o f d e a l i n g w i t h things requires a specific disclosure. H e i d e g g e r designates it as c i r c u m s p e c t i o n .
In
E n g l i s h a n d t h e R o m a n c e l a n g u a g e s o n e c a n use t h e w o r d know i n p l a c e o f t h e w o r d can w h e n i t has t h i s sense, f o r e x a m p l e , " I k n o w h o w t o d r i v e " i n p l a c e o f " I can d r i v e . " T h e specific disclosure t h a t d i r e c t s t h e a c t i v i t y itself, w h i c h H e i d e g g e r c a l l e d c i r c u m s p e c t i o n , w a s later identified and analyzed by G. Ryle as " k n o w i n g h o w . " It is not l i m i t e d t o t h e c o r r e c t w a y o f d e a l i n g w i t h a t h i n g . R a t h e r , w e also speak of a c i r c u m s p e c t m o d e of b e h a v i o r in a situation of action — a n d H e i d e g g e r t r i e s t o t a k e t h i s i n t o a c c o u n t (cf. B T , p . 3 7 3 ) . T o b e sure, H e i d e g g e r d i d n o t analyze this p h e n o m e n o n m o r e closely, a n d it is d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r he even w o u l d have been able to elucidate the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a t h i n g m o r e precisely w i t h o u t the concept of a rule. I t u r n n o w t o t h e s e c o n d aspect.
In the preceding account the
disclosure that guides the action was considered o n l y in the context o f d e t e r m i n a t e a n d particular ends o f action. N o w w e have already seen i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f m o o d s that a b e i n g t h a t v o l i t i o n a l l y r e l a t e s i t s e l f t o its o w n b e i n g d e p e n d s u p o n f i n d i n g a m e a n i n g f o r its l i f e i f its w i l l i s n o t t o f a l l i n t o a v o i d . T h u s i t i s n o w n o t o n l y t h e m e a n i n g o f a n i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n t h a t i s i n v o l v e d b u t also t h e m e a n i n g o f l i f e ; h e r e meaning i m p l i e s s o m e t h i n g l i k e a c o n c e p t i o n o f l i f e o n w h o s e basis o n e c a n u n d e r s t a n d o n e s e l f i n o n e ' s w i l l i n g a n d d o i n g . H e i d e g g e r c o n s i d e r s t h i s a s p e c t r i g h t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f his e x p o s i t i o n ; a f t e r h e has a l l u d e d t o t h e use o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n understand something i n t h e sense o f " b e i n g a b l e t o d o s o m e t h i n g , " h e c o n t i n u e s : " I n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s a n exutentiale, t h a t o f w h i c h w e a r e a b l e i s n o t a w h a t , b u t b e i n g a s e x i s t i n g " (p. 183). T h e u n f o r t u n a t e m i x t u r e o f t h e t w o m e a n i n g s o f can i s r e t a i n e d i n t h i s s e n t e n c e ; i n a d d i t i o n , i t seems unclear h o w one is supposed to be able to a p p l y the idea of " k n o w i n g h o w " t o existing a s such. T h e characterization o f u n d e r standing as " p r o j e c t i o n " that subsequently follows is m o r e i l l u m i n a t i n g (185). F o r H e i d e g g e r , projecting m e a n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n e s e l f i n t e r m s o f a c o n c e p t i o n o f l i f e . T h e t h i n g t h a t i s p r o j e c t e d i s m e a n i n g (193). T h e concept
o f p r o j e c t i o n suggests t h e v i e w t h a t
m a n c r e a t e s his
c o n c e p t i o n o f l i f e h i m s e l f , b u t w h a t is m e a n t is o n l y that this c o n c e p t i o n must be posited in o n e w a y or another; we have no volitional ends that are p r e d e t e r m i n e d by n a t u r e , because we relate ourselves to o u r b e i n g . Since a s H e i d e g g e r says t h e p r o j e c t i o n i s also a l w a y s t h r o w n
251
204 Lecture
10
(BT, p. 315) or p r e g i v e n , we actually f i n d ourselves in the c o n t e x t of socially p r e g i v e n conceptions o f life t o a n e x t e n t that o b v i o u s l y varies a c c o r d i n g t o the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n . W i t h this s t a t e m e n t I a m t o u c h i n g u p o n a social p r o b l e m a t i c t h a t H e i d e g g e r c o m p l e t e l y neglects. Of c o u r s e , h e d o e s a n a l y z e b e i n g - w i t h o t h e r s , a n d h e also a n a l y z e s t h e dependence o f one's self-understanding u p o n w h a t most people c o n s i d e r c o r r e c t u n d e r t h e t i t l e o f t h e " t h e y " (das Man). B u t his a n a l y s i s lacks a p r o p e r a p p r e c i a t i o n o f social a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s , a n d t h e r o l e s t h a t a r e d e t e r m i n e d o n t h i s basis; a n d i t i s d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n e s e l f i n t e r m s o f a c o n c e p t i o n o f life i s even c o n c e i v a b l e o u t s i d e these social i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s . T h i s is o n e of the points in H e i d e g g e r that refer us to the interpretation of M e a d . H e i d e g g e r assigns s t i l l a n o t h e r m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d understanding t o this p r o j e c t i v e aspect o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h I u n d e r s t a n d m y s e l f i n t e r m s o f a m e a n i n g ( a l t h o u g h h e does not d o s o e x p l i c i t l y ) . H e says t h a t i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g D a s e i n " k n o w s " " h o w t h i n g s s t a n d w i t h itself, i.e. w i t h its p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g " (184). H e t h e r e b y a l l u d e s t o a m e a n i n g o f understanding i n t e r m s o f w h i c h o n e c a n say " I understand m y s e l f a s the so-and-so." W e have already encountered this aspect, since i t has b e e n r e p e a t e d l y s h o w n that the q u e s t i o n o f h o w I d e c i d e a b o u t m y p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g i s d e c i s i v e f o r t h e issue o f w h o 1 a m . A t a f i r s t l e v e l who c a n s i m p l y m e a n t h e s o c i a l r o l e t h a t I h a v e , for e x a m p l e , I u n d e r s t a n d m y s e l f as an a u t o m e c h a n i c , as a f a t h e r o f a f a m i l y , a n d s o o n ; b u t o n a b r o a d e r l e v e l who c a n also m e a n the k i n d of person I am. L e t m e r e c a p i t u l a t e . W h e n t h e w o r d understanding i s i n t e n d e d i n t h e sense o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c t i o n s , p e r s o n s , a n d t h i n g s , w e n o r m a l l y use it in s u c h a w a y t h a t it does n o t refer to ourselves; a n d here u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a c o m p l e t e l y n o r m a l ( i f nonetheless distinctive) k i n d of k n o w l e d g e .
H e i d e g g e r w a n t s t o use t h e w o r d understanding i n
a
p a r t l y u n c o n v e n t i o n a l sense t o d e s i g n a t e t h e d i s c l o s u r e t h a t b e l o n g s t o w i l l i n g a n d t o d e l i b e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y itself. W e h a v e n o w b e c o m e f a m i l i a r w i t h t w o a s p e c t s o f t h i s d i s c l o s u r e . I n t h e f i r s t case t h e w o r d understanding c a n n o t b e u s e d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t i t i s r e l a t e d t o m e a n i n g ; rather, i t refers t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e , a d i s c l o s u r e o f oneself i s s t i l l n o t a t issue h e r e , b u t o n l y t h e c i r c u m s p e c t execution of an action. An understanding of oneself is clearly involved i n t h e case o f t h e s e c o n d a s p e c t , a n d h e r e w e c a n use t h e w o r d i n its
252
205 Heidegger on
the Relation of Oneself 10 Oneself,
III
n o r m a l sense; b u t t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s n o t a k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e : o n e u n d e r s t a n d s oneself— o n e ' s b e i n g — i n t e r m s o f a m e a n i n g . T h e f o r m o f disclosure i n v o l i t i o n a l self-understanding that e m e r g e d in the discussion of the existential concept of possibility comes to the fort* o n l y i n t h e t h i r d aspect. W h e n w e e x p l i c i t l y c o n s i d e r o u r p o t e n t i a l i t y - l o t - b e i n g — a l t h o u g h n o t t h e o r e t i c a l l y — t h i s takes p l a c e b y r a i s i n g the practical question, b y d e l i b e r a t i n g . I n the section i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r deals w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the possibility o f the e x p l i c i t practical disclosure is o n l y t o u c h e d u p o n in passing. T h i s m a y be c o n n e c t e d to t h e fact t h a t d e l i b e r a t i o n i s n o t w e l l s u i t e d t o b e d e s i g n a t e d a s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e w o r d deliberation d o e s n o t o c c u r a t a l l i n Being and Time; we w i l l l a t e r h a v e t o ask o u r s e l v e s w h y t h i s is t h e case. T h e p o i n t at issue i s e x p r e s s e d , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t b y H e i degger: " T h e p r o j e c t i o n i s the existential c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the b e i n g o f
t h e open range (Spielraum) o f t h e a c t u a l p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g " (185, m y emphasis). D e l i b e r a t i o n i n t h e f o r m i n w h i c h i t has b e e n e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a c t i o n i s s t i l l n o t e o ipso e x i s t e n c e i n t h e m o d e of self-determination; for deliberation concerning w h o I w a n t to be can still be o r i e n t e d t o w a r d accepted and conventional points o f v i e w . B u t d e l i b e r a t i o n can a s s u m e t h e f o r m o f t h e p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n t h a t i s u n d e r s t o o d i n a f u n d a m e n t a l sense. E x i s t e n c e i n t h e m o d e o f " a u t h e n t i c i t y " i s a n e x e m p l a r y m o d e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g one's o w n b e i n g i n a n O p e n r a n g e o f possibilities'; a n d this i s w h y the analysis o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g leads d i r e c t l y t o t h e t h i r d stage t h a t I p r o p o s e d for the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Heidegger's conception o f the relation o f oneself t o o n e s e l f — t h a t is, t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o o n e s e l f i n t h e s t r i c t sense o f b e i n g - o n e s e l f a n d self-determination. H e i d e g g e r introduces this p r o b l e m b y raising the question o f the " w h o " o f D a s e i n ( s e c t i o n 25). T h e w a y t h a t h e d e a l s w i t h this q u e s t i o n again reveals a curious m i x t u r e of insight a n d confusion; a n d the c o n f u s i o n seerns t o m e t o r e s u l t o n c e m o r e f r o m a l a c k o f l a n g u a g e analytical reflection. I n a d d r e s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e w h o i t s e e m s p l a u s i b l e , h e says, to proceed f r o m the assumption that " D a s e i n " is the " b e i n g " "that I m y s e l f always a m . " F r o m this o n e m i g h t infer the f o l l o w i n g : " T h e w h o i s d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f t h e I itself, t h a t is, t h e ' s u b j e c t ' o r t h e 'self.' T h e w h o i s t h e t h i n g t h a t m a i n t a i n s its i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h t h e c h a n g e
253
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10
o f b e h a v i o r a n d experiences, a n d i s t h e r e b y related t o this m u l t i p l i c i t y . " Heidegger thus
suggests
that
the concept of the
I
in
the tradition
d e r i v i n g f r o m Fichte arose f r o m such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the w h o q u e s t i o n a n d that for this reason the i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d constancy o f t h e I a r e u n d e r s t o o d a s s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . I n c o n t r a s t , h e insists t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e w h o , t h e self, t h e I , a n d t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d c o n s t a n c y of the
I
must
be
understood
from
the standpoint
of existentiality
(p. 152, cf. a l s o p p . 3 6 9 ( f . ) . H o w does
the
question
appear
from
this
standpoint?
Heidegger
w r i t e s : " I t c o u l d b e t h a t t h e w h o o f e v e r y d a y D a s e i n i s p r e c i s e l y not the I that I m y s e l f always a m " (p. doxical.
We will reply, W h o am I
150). T h i s s o u n d s c u r i o u s l y p a r a supposed to be if not I myself?
H e i d e g g e r answers in response: I n i t i a l l y a n d for the m o s t part I am n o t I m y s e l f , b u t t h e " t h e y - s e l f " (man-selbst) (27). " T h e they . . . a n s w e r s t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e who o f e v e r y d a y D a s e i n " ( p p .
165-166). H e i d e g g e r
t h e r e b y w a n t s t o say, I a l l o w w h a t I r e s p e c t i v e l y d o a n d i n t e n d a n d how
I
u n d e r s t a n d m y s e l f t o b e d e t e r m i n e d b y w h a t one ( t h e t h e y )
regards as good, and
I do not d e t e r m i n e it myself.
" W i t h Dasein's
l o s t n e s s i n t h e t h e y , t h a t a c t u a l p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g t h a t i s closest t o i t — t h e tasks, r u l e s a n d s t a n d a r d s , t h e u r g e n c y a n d e x t e n t o f c o n cernful a n d solicitous b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d —has already been decided u p o n . T h e t h e y has a l w a y s k e p t
Dasein
f r o m taking hold of
these
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f b e i n g . T h e t h e y e v e n h i d e s t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h i t has t a c i t l y r e l i e v e d D a s e i n o f t h e b u r d e n o f e x p l i c i t l y choosing t h e s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s " (312). T h i s also i n d i c a t e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h I a i n Ί m y s e l f : " t h e e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t h e y - s e l f i n t o authentic b e i n g - o n e ' s - s e l f m u s t be carried o u t as the recovety of a choice. But the recovery of c h o i c e m e a n s c h o o s i n g t h i s c h o i c e , i.e., d e c i d i n g f o r a p o t e n t i a l i t y - o f b e i n g o n t h e basis o f o n e ' s o w n s e l f (313). T h u s t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s t h a t H e i d e g g e r has i n m i n d i s n o w c l e a r . In the t e r m i n o l o g y that I used it concerns the practical question insofar as it is posed f u n d a m e n t a l l y . Since we stand e x i s i e n t i a l l y in an o p e n range of possibilities of being, we have the possibility either to consider this range or to conceal it f r o m ourselves, to question ourselves a n d t o choose w h o w e w a n t t o b e o r t o evade this q u e s t i o n . T h e account o f the t h e y n o w indicates h o w this q u e s t i o n can b e evaded, n a m e l y , b y d o i n g those things a n d l i v i n g i n that m a n n e r w h i c h 'one' generally r e g a r d s a s c o r r e c t . T h i s i m p l i e s that o n e c a n n o t s i m p l y exist w i t h i n
254
207 Heidegger on
the Relation of Oneself to Oneself,
III
a possibility; all h u m a n existence apparently must be g r o u n d e d in one w a y or a n o t h e r in s o m e t h i n g that is r e g a r d e d as correct. This m a y be w h a t is generally r e g a r d e d as correct, or w h a t I m y s e l f believe to recognize a s c o r r e c t . I f s o m e o n e does n o t m a k e the choice himself, he must be relieved of it. Thus, w h e n Heidegger distinguishes the " I m y s e l f f r o m the "theys e l f , " h e i s r e f e r r i n g t o a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t h e also d e s i g n a t e s a s o n e b e t w e e n 'authentic' a n d ' i n a u t h e n t i c ' existence. Existing authentically m e a n s e x i s t i n g i n t h e m o d e o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d H e i d e g g e r also e m p l o y s t h e t e r m resoluteness {Entschlossenheit) i n t h i s c o n t e x t (343). W h e n H e i d e g g e r f i r s t p r e s e n t e d his i d e a s i n l e c t u r e s a t M a r b u r g , t h e s t u d e n t s r e m a r k e d j o k i n g l y , " W e are resolute, but w e d o not k n o w t o w h a t p u r p o s e . " T h e w o r d o n e - s i d e d l y e m p h a s i z e s t h e aspect o f t h e o u t c o m e o f a choice.
W e c a n m a k e H e i d e g g e r ' s p o i n t m o r e accessible i f w e
take i n t o account that a decision (resolution) is the e n d t o w a r d w h i c h d e l i b e r a t i o n p r o c e e d s ; t h u s , o n e m i g h t say, t h e t e r m resoluteness r e p resents the e n t i r e t y o f the question, d e l i b e r a t i o n , choice, a n d decision, a l t h o u g h w e w i l l l a t e r see t h a t t h i s d o e s n o t e x a c t l y fit H e i d e g g e r ' s conception. I t r e m a i n s t o b e n o t e d t h a t H e i d e g g e r speaks n o t o n l y o f a c h o i c e b u t also o f " c h o o s i n g t h i s c h o i c e . " T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n addressses t h e fact t h a t w e c a n e i t h e r p o s e t h e p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n o r n o t pose i t : W e h a v e t h e possibility t o m a k e o u r s e l v e s o p e n t o t h e r a n g e o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h u s w e h a v e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c h o o s i n g a m o n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s o r , a s t h i s has also b e e n e x p r e s s e d , w e a r e f r e e e i t h e r t o b e free o r n o t .
For this
r e a s o n c h o i c e a l w a y s i m p l i e s a c h o o s i n g o f c h o o s i n g , a n d since i n c h o o s i n g w e e x i s t i n t h e t n o d e o f b e i n g - o n e s e l f , H e i d e g g e r also speaks o f a " c h o o s i n g o n e s e l f (Sich-selbst-wählens) ( 2 3 2 , 334). T h e last f o r m u l a t i o n leads u s b a c k t o t h e f o r m u l a t i o n s t h a t H e i d e g g e r used i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the question o f the w h o . T h e m e a n i n g o f H e i d e g g e r ' s p a r a d o x i c a l c l a i m that I can be either I m y s e l f or not I m y s e l f has n o w b e e n e l u c i d a t e d . A s H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f n o t e s , t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s r e f e r t o " c e r t a i n w a y s t o b e " ( 1 6 3 ) — t h a t is, t o a p e r s o n ' s existence that is either in the m o d e of self-determination or not. T h e d i s c u s s i o n o f s e l l - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f i n a l l y loses t h e last a p p e a r a n c e o f p a r a d o x w h e n it b e c o m e s clear that it m e r e l y addresses the q u e s t i o n o ( w h e t h e r o r n o t s o m e o n e h i m s e l f chooses w h a t h e does o r w a n t s ; i t i o t h e r w o r d s , t h e issue i s w h e t h e r t h e p e r s o n h i m s e l f d e c i d e s w h o h e is. I n t h e l a t t e r f o r m u l a t i o n — w h e t h e r h e has c h o s e n i t h i m s e l f —
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t h e e m p h a s i s u p o n himself i s s u i t a b l e , b u t i t c a n also j u s t a s w e l l b e o m i t t e d . P e r h a p s y o u w i l l p r o t e s t a n d insist t h a t n o t e v e r y c h o i c e is a s e l f - c h o o s i n g . B u t i n t h i s case y o u s i m p l y m e a n t h a t n o t e v e r y c h o i c e i s a c h o i c e i n w h i c h t h e p e r s o n d e c i d e s a b o u t his b e i n g , a b o u t w h o (how) he wants to be. H e n c e i f t h e w o r d himself i s e v e n d i s p e n s a b l e i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n " w h e t h e r he chooses h i m s e l f , " it is p l a i n l y misused w h e n it is e m p l o y e d outside this c o n t e x t i n o r d e r t o express the m o d e o f b e i n g o f choosing. O n t h i s basis t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r m u l a t i o n " I a m n o t I m y s e l f emerges, f r o m w h i c h H e i d e g g e r h a d proceeded. Heidegger's talk o f b e i n g - o n e s e l f a n d c h o o s i n g o n e s e l f are also t o b e rejected for the s a m e r e a s o n . T h e l a t t e r e x p r e s s i o n c e r t a i n l y w o u l d b e m e a n i n g f u l i f its f u n c t i o n w e r e o n l y t o express i n s h o r t e n e d f o r m t h a t s o m e o n e chooses w h o ( h o w ) h e w a n t s t o b e . I t i s m i s l e a d i n g , h o w e v e r , i f (as i s o b v i o u s l y t h e case w i t h H e i d e g g e r ) i t m e a n s t h a t I c h o o s e m y s e l f o r t o b e m y s e l f . W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen t h a t t h e d e s c r i p t i v e m e a n i n g o f this w a y o f s p e a k i n g is t h a t I choose to choose. T h u s the talk of the self a n d of being-oneself is based u p o n a misuse o f t h e w o r d self t h a t p r o c e e d s i n t w o phases; f i r s t , i t i s t o r n o u t o f its n a t u r a l c o n t e x t and, second, it is c o n v e r t e d i n t o a substantive. This conversion into a substantive always harbors the danger of hypostatizing a s e c o n d s u b j e c t w i t h i n t h e p e r s o n . I n H e i d e g g e r ' s case t h i s d o e s n o t o c c u r , b u t a n a n a l o g o u s p a r a d o x arises: H e p u t s Dasein, w h i c h c a n e i t h e r b e i t s e l f o r n o t itself, i n t h e place o f t h e p e r s o n . W e a r e t o l d t h a t D a s e i n i s n o t s o m e t h i n g p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d , t h a t is, a s u b s t a n c e , s u b j e c t , o r p e r s o n ; rather, i t i s e x i s t e n c e . T h i s i s o n l y t h e m o r e r a d i c a l p o s i t i o n i n appearance. I n t r u t h existence c a n o n l y substitute for substance t h r o u g h a failure to grasp it as w h a t it is — n a m e l y , the being o f a p e r s o n . A n d t h i s h a p p e n s i n H e i d e g g e r t h r o u g h his c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e m o d e s o f b e i n g t h e m s e l v e s i n t o s u b s t a n c e s : h e speaks o f " t h e t h e y , " t h e " b e i n g - o n e s e l f , " a n d s o o n . F o r t u n a t e l y , h e also p r o v i d e s descriptive f o r m u l a t i o n s that p e r m i t an adequate conceptual account o f t h e p h e n o m e n a a n d a r e f r e e o f p a r a d o x . H e has s h o w n t h a t
the
m e a n i n g of the talk of the relation of oneself to oneself is the relation t o one's o w n being; a n d h e shows that the m e a n i n g o f the talk o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n lies i n t h e m o d e o f b e i n g o f c h o o s i n g . T h e d i f f i c u l t y arises t h r o u g h his f a i l u r e t o a d h e r e t o t h e s e v e r b a l f o r m u l a t i o n s a s t h e o n l y o n e s t h a t a r e l e g i t i m a t e f o r these states o f a f i a i r s . I f o n e d o e s t h i s , t h e s u b s t a n t i v a l m o d e o f s p e a k i n g r e m a i n s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e des-
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i g n a t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n . T o b e sure, H e i d e g g e r w o u l d n o t h a v e c o n s e n t e d t o t h i s b e c a u s e (as w e h a v e a l r e a d y seen) h e w a n t e d t o h a v e a rift between existence and the being of the present-at-hand. I t i s n o w also clear t h a t t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d the q u e s t i o n o f the w h o o f Dasein i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y misguided. W e k n o w f r o m our earlier discussions that t h e force of t h e q u e s t i o n w h o is a request for an identification of the relevant person. Thus Heidegger immediately m a k e s a m i s t a k e i n his b a s i c a p p r o a c h w h e n h e a s s u m e s t h a t t h e question " w h o a m I ? " can b e answered b y " I " o r " I myself." W e h a v e seen t h a t I c a n n o t i d e n t i f y m y s e l f b y t h e use o f t h e w o r d / . N o w y o u m i g h t p o i n t o u t that I have m y s e l f repeatedly used expressions s u c h a s " t h e q u e s t i o n a t issue i s w h o I w a n t t o b e . " N o n e t h e l e s s , f o r the purpose of avoiding misunderstanding I have frequently added " w h o signifies h o w , o r w h a t k i n d o f a person, I w a n t t o b e . " T h e w o r d who h e r e i s n o t u s e d f o r i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , b u t f o r socalled qualitative identification. For e x a m p l e , if a beetle collector wants to i d e n t i f y an e x e m p l a r , his g o a l is n o t to i d e n t i f y this e x e m p l a r as an i n d i v i d u a l , b u t to d e t e r m i n e the t y p e to w h i c h it belongs. A n d in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t w h e n w e ask " w h o i s t h a t ? " w i t h reference t o persons, w e can o b v i o u s l y m e a n " w h a t sort o f person i s he?" Just as H e i d e g g e r presented the misleading talk of being-oneself as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the c o n c e p t i o n of the p e r s o n as subject a n d substance, h e also p l a c e d t w o a d d i t i o n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ( b o t h i l l u m i n a t i n g i n themselves) in an analogous contrast. These are the determinations
o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e (Selbständigkeit) a n d c o n s t a n c y (Ständigkeit) o f a u t h e n t i c e x i s t e n c e , o n w h o s e basis h e c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a u t h e n t i c a n d i n a u t h e n t i c existence ( 3 5 1 , 369, 3 8 1 , 426ff.). T h e talk o f i n d e p e n d e n c e o r self-sufficiency i s easily u n d e r s t o o d i n t h i s c o n t e x t : W e c a l l s o m e o n e i n d e p e n d e n t i f h e d o e s n o t act i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h w h a t i s c o m m o n l y believed, b u t deliberates a n d decides himself. B u t if the i n d e p e n d e n c e that is u n d e r s t o o d in this w a y is treated as a c o m p e t i t o r to the A r i s t o t e l i a n concept of self-sufficiency (by means o f w h i c h A r i s t o t l e distinguished substance f r o m the determ i n a t i o n s t h a t a r e o n t o l o g i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t u p o n it), this m e r e l y leads to
unnecessary
paradoxes.
B y means o f the concept o f the constancy o f the self Heidegger w a n t s t o a d d r e s s t h e p r o b l e m o f " t h e ' c o n n e c t e d n e s s o f l i f e ' , i.e., t h e s t r e t c h i n g - a l o n g , m o v e m e n t a n d persistence t h a t are specific for Dase i n " (427ff.). I a l r e a d y a l l u d e d t o this p r o b l e m w h e n I n o t e d that i f
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t h e p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n is posed f u n d a m e n t a l l y it refers to life as a w h o l e . H e i d e g g e r w o r k s o u t this reference t o the t o t a l i t y o f one's o w n b e i n g t h r o u g h the concept o f being-towards-death. T h e possibility o f d e a t h is the p o s s i b i l i t y of n o - l o n g e r - b e i n g . I have so far o n l y r e f e r r e d t o this p o s s i b i l i t y i n H a m l e t ' s q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r i t i s b e t t e r t o b e o r n o t t o be. B u t n o w w e m u s t recognize the m o r e g e n e r a l state o f affairs t h a t i s c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s q u e s t i o n — n a m e l y , t h e fact t h a t o n e o n l y p e r c e i v e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f l i f e ( l i k e e v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y ) i n u n i t y w i t h its negation. But this implies the f o l l o w i n g : T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h m y s e l f (i.e., w i t h m y l i f e a s s u c h ) t h a t i s r e q u i r e d f o r c h o i c e o n l y takes p l a c e in the simultaneous confrontation w i t h the ever-present possibility of t h e e n d o f m y l i f e . H e i d e g g e r ' s t a l k o f b e i n g - t o w a r d - d e a t h has b e e n t h e o b j e c t o f r i d i c u l e , b u t t h i s has b e e n c o m p l e t e l y u n j u s t i f i e d . F r o m Heidegger's point of view, the confrontation w i t h the "unsurpassable" possibility of death concerns "Dasein's being-in-the-world as such" ( 2 9 4 ) . A n d I r e g a r d a s i n c o n t e s t a b l e his thesis t h a t t h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n (a) sets o n e f r e e " f r o m o n e ' s lostness i n t h o s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h m a y a c c i d e n t a l l y t h r u s t t h e m s e l v e s u p o n o n e " (308), a n d (b) i n this r e s p e c t i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y o f c h o i c e ( s e c t i o n 62). H i s thesis i s w e l l g r o u n d e d a n a l y t i c a l l y a n d c a n b e c o n f i r m e d t h r o u g h a t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , the principal i m p o r t a n c e o f the c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h one's d e a t h for the entire p r o b l e m o f self-consciousness m u s t b e a c k n o w l e d g e d . A s u b j e c t o r a n e x p r e s s i o n s t a n d i n g for a subject c a n n o t be negated, b u t o n l y a p r o p o s i t i o n a l content. T h e r e f o r e , f o r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r y o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e r e could not be a correlative relation to one's o w n nonbeing; in 'reflection' the s u b j e c t r e l a t e s i t s e l f s i m p l y t o itself. A n d c o n s e q u e n t l y a s s o o n a s o n e understands the relation of oneself to oneself as a relation of oneself t o o n e ' s o w n l i f e , o n e m u s t also see i t a s a s i m u l t a n e o u s r e l a t i o n o f oneself to the possibility of death. T h e reference of a u t h e n t i c choice to d e a t h (and this means to life as a w h o l e ) leads to a w a y of r e l a t i n g o n e s e l f to o n e s e l f that H e i d e g g e r t e r m s t h e " s t r e t c h e d n e s s " (Enlrecktheü) o f a u t h e n t i c e x i s t e n c e ; a n d t h e t y p e o f c o n t i n u i t y t h a t h e c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y m e a n s o f his c o n c e p t o f c o n s t a n c y i s also p a r t o f this. H e does n o t m e a n that life proceeds a c c o r d i n g to a p r e c o n c e i v e d p l a n , or that one is not o p e n for a change i n o n e ' s l i f e c o n c e p t i o n (cf. p p . 3 0 8 , 3 5 5 f f ) . B u t i f t h e c h a n g e i s c h o s e n a t t h e t i m e f o r a p u r p o s e , t h e r e i s a r e a s o n fbr i t ; a n d i n t h i s w a y t h e c o n t i n u i t y i n t h e d i s c o n t i n u i t y i s also r e s t o r e d . T h i s process s t a n d s i n
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III
contrast to a l l o w i n g oneself to live f r o m day to day, w h i c h is not c o n t i n u o u s l y r e l a t e d i n a n e x i s t e n t i a l sense — i n o n e ' s w a y o f a c t i n g even if it always remains the same. H e i d e g g e r n o t o n l y p r o v i d e d the concept o f self-determination w i t h a s t r u c t u r a l l y s o u n d m e a n i n g , b u t h e also c l a r i f i e d t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e r e a r e t w o l e v e l s o f t h e p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o oneself, a s I i n d i c a t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f these l e c t u r e s . T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e fact t h a t w e r e l a t e o u r s e l v e s t o o u r s e l v e s i n o u r w a n t i n g a n d d o i n g ( a n d i n o u r e m o t i o n s a n d m o o d s a s w e l l ) has b e c o m e c l e a r t h r o u g h Heidegger's c o n c e p t i o n of the relation of oneself to oneself as the r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o o n e ' s o w n t o - b e , a n d t h r o u g h his e l a b o r a t i o n o f this c o n c e p t i o n i n l i g h t o f the facticity a n d possibility character o f this to-be. T h e d u a l possibility w i t h i n such a relation of oneself to oneself o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d o f e v a s i o n i n t h e face o f s u c h s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s a r e s u l t o f (1) t h e y e s / n o p o l a r i t y t h a t p e r t a i n s t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g (or m o r e precisely t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p o s s i b l e - b e i n g ) and (2) t h e fact t h a t t h e r e is a m o t i v e f o r c o n c e a l i n g f r o m oneself the possibility o f p l a c i n g one's o w n b e i n g i n t o question.
1
B u i n o w w e m u s t also e x a m i n e t h e l i m i t s o f H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . W h e n I i n t r o d u c e d the concept o f self-determ i n a t i o n at the b e g i n n i n g of these lectures, I presented it in i m m e d i a t e connection w i t h w h a t I t e r m e d a reflective self-relation. I characterized t h e l a t t e r a s t h a t r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o o n e s e l f w h i c h p l a c e s t h e beliefs i m p l i e d i n o n e ' s a c t i o n s a n d p u r p o s e s i n t o q u e s t i o n ; these i n v o l v e b e l i e f s a b o u t facts a s w e l l a s n o r m a t i v e b e l i e f s . T h u s t h i s s e l f - r e l a t i o n stands for the q u e s t i o n of t r u t h insofar as it pertains to the presupp o s i t i o n s o f o n e ' s o w n a c t i o n . T h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e t e r m refieclive for this m o d e o f the r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o o n e s e l f i s not based u p o n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d reflection i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r y o f selfc o n s c i o u s n e s s ; r a t h e r , i t i s g r o u n d e d i n t h e use o f t h i s w o r d i n t h e sense o f " d e l i b e r a t i o n . " T h u s t h e r e f l e c t i v e s e l f - r e l a t i o n s i g n i f i e s a selfr e l a t i o n t h a i i s d e l i b e r a t i v e . A s w e h a v e a l r e a d y seen, d e l i b e r a t i n g m e a n s p o s i n g a p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n , a n d a d e l i b e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n t o oneself i s o n e i n w h i c h t h e p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n b e c o m e s f u n d a m e n t a l , t h a t is, i n w h i c h i t c o n c e r n s o n e ' s o w n b e i n g . W e h a v e also a l r e a d y seen t h a t w h e n w e d e l i b e r a t e o r p o s e t h e p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n , w e a l w a y s ask, W h a t i s g o o d ? , o r m o r e p r e c i s e l y (since o n e a l w a y s d e l i b e r a t e s a b o u t a l t e r n a t i v e s ) , W h a t i s b e t t e r o r t h e best? A t t h a t p o i n t w e saw t h a i good or better is a w o r d t h a t e x p r e s s e s t h e fact t h a t we p r e f e r s o m e t h i n g ;
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212 Lecture
10
b u t t h i s i s n o t t h e o n l y t h i n g a t issue, s i n c e i n c o n t r a s t t o pleasant t h e w o r d good e x p r e s s e s a n o b j e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e . I n t h e s e n t e n c e " I p r e f e r i t b e c a u s e i t gives t n e m o r e p l e a s u r e , " t h e p r e s e n t s u b j e c t i v e state i s t h e basis o f t h e d e c i s i o n ; i n c o n t r a s t , i f w e say " b e c a u s e i t i s b e t t e r , " this i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e are reasons to prefer it. Sentences w i t h the w o r d pleasant a r e t h e r e f o r e s e n t e n c e s a b o u t m y s e l f ,
t h a t is,
about a
"φ" s t a t e o f m i n e ; s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e w o r d good p r e d i c a t e a c h a r a c t e r o f p r e f e r a b i l i t y o f a state o f affairs, a n d t h e y a r e o b j e c t i v e s t a t e m e n t s that raise a c l a i m to be j u s t i f i e d . A n d it is for this reason that d e l i b e r a t i o n i s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e issue o f t h e b e t t e r a n d t h e best, since w e s u r e l y do n o t have to t r o u b l e ourselves a b o u t w h a t is m o r e pleasant. D e l i b e r a t i o n aims at an objectively justified choice. T h e r e f o r e advice or c o u n s e l i s a l s o p o s s i b l e i n t h o s e cases i n v o l v i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n . W h e n we advise s o m e o n e we are d e l i b e r a t i n g a b o u t w h a t is preferable for h i m t o d o for objective reasons. W e h a v e e n c o u n t e r e d t h e issue o f t h e g o o d i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r o n s e v e r a l levels, a n d t h e r e a c t u a l l y s e e m s t o b e a h i e r a r c h y o f m o d e s o f use o f t h e w o r d good t h a t i s n o t r e a d i l y t r a n s p a r e n t . " O n t h e l o w e s t l e v e l i t o b v i o u s l y d o e s n o t y e t h a v e its o b j e c t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n w e say " i t tastes b e t t e r t o m e . " I f w c c o n s i d e r specific activities a s p a r t o f o u r ' w e l l - b e i n g ' because w e like d o i n g t h e m , w h a t i s g o o d i n t h i s sense o f g o o d n e s s i s s o n o t b e c a u s e i t i s t o b e j u s t i f i e d a s s u c h t h r o u g h d e l i b e r a t i o n , b u t b e c a u s e i t serves a s a basis f o r t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n a b o u t w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e g o o d l i f e f o r m e . W e h a v e a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e case o f t h e e m o t i o n s . The emotions and
m o o d s are
modes of an
immediate s t a t e o f b e i n g -
c o n c e r n e d by s o m e t h i n g that is g o o d or b a d for my being or that affects m e t h r o u g h m y c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t t h e g o o d l i f e i s f o r m e . I t i s f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t o n e c a n a r g u e w i t h s o m e o n e (or a l s o w i t h o n e s e l f o f c o u r s e ) a b o u t t h e j u s t i f i a b i l i t y o f h i s e m o t i o n o r m o o d . ( " Y o u say that things a r e n ' t g o i n g w e l l , that y o u are in despair, but actually y o u have e v e r y reason t o b e satisfied w h e n y o u consider that y o u r c o n d i t i o n s of life are such a n d such.") We obviously have a
m o r e unequivocal
s i t u a t i o n i n t h o s e cases i n w h i c h w e d e l i b e r a t e a b o u t w h i c h p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c t i o n w e s h o u l d choose, since h e r e w e have t o deal w i t h a practical q u e s t i o n . Nonetheless, it m u s t give us pause to realize that precisely i n t h o s e cases i n w h i c h t h e p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n i s p o s e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y a f o r m u l a t i o n w i t h t h e w o r d good d o e s n o t r e c o m m e n d itself; r a t h e r , the q u e s t i o n w h o o r h o w d o I w a n t t o b e seems m o t e a p p r o p r i a t e .
260
213 Heidegger
on
the
Relation
of Oneself to
Oneself,
111
S t i l l , o n e c a n a l w a y s also p o s e t h e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s w a y : W h a t i s t h e b e s t t h i n g f o r m e t o d o ? B u t i n t h i s c o n t e x t , w h e n w e ask s o m e o n e for advice a b o u t a c o n c r e t e life decision, he w i l l
first
a d d u c e reasons,
b u t i n t h e e n d h e w i l l say, " I t i s y o u r l i f e , o n l y y o u c a n d e c i d e w h a t t h e best t h i n g i s f o r y o u , w h o y o u w a n t t o b e . " T h u s , t h e r e i s a n ultimate point in deliberation at w h i c h we simply can no longer justify t h e d e c i s i o n o b j e c t i v e l y ; r a t h e r , w h a t i s best f o r m e a t t h i s p o i n t i s itself o n l y c o n s t i t u t e d in my w a n t i n g it. W h a t is i n v o l v e d here is t h a t second-order w a n t i n g i n w h i c h w e a d o p t p o s i tio n such a n d such t o w a r d o u r i m m e d i a t e wishes a n d inclinations. w a n t i n g i n the
final
I f t h i s w e r e n o t t h e case, i f
instance c o u l d still rest u p o n reasons, t h e w i l l
w o u l d lose its s i g n i f i c a n c e o r f o r c e , s o t o speak;
a n d this m e a n s it
w o u l d no longer be my a d o p t i o n of a position. (You should no longer f e a r t h a t ' t h e Γ i s a g a i n r e t u r n i n g h e r e . I a m c h a l l e n g e d i n fact, b u t this m e a n s I have to take a p o s i t i o n . ) I f w e n o w r e t u r n t o Heidegger's concept o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n after this excursus on
the concept of the reflective self-relation, we must
n o t e that t h e aspect o f r e f l e c t i o n i s m i s s i n g i n H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n a n y case, n o e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e i s m a d e t o t h e aspect o f d e l i b e r a t i o n a t a l l , a n d t h i s i s r e l a t e d t o t h e a b s e n c e o f the
concept
of the
good
from
the
analysis
i n Being and Time.
It
is
present o n l y in the f o r m of the concept of the for-the-sake-of-which. But
this m e r e l y stands for the u l t i m a t e reference p o i n t o f w a n t i n g .
T h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f objective j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e p r a c t i c a l ques t i o n i s r e l a t e d i s m i s s i n g e n t i r e l y . T h i s i s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e fact t h a t a l t h o u g h r e g a r d for the well-being of others is i n c o r p o r a t e d into the p r e l i m i n a r y d i s c u s s i o n o f b e i n g - w i t h i n a p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e w a y (section 26),
it
is m i s s i n g e n t i r e l y (or a l m o s t e n t i r e l y ) f r o m the subsequent
account of self-determination.
If we
understand
by
m o r a l i t y those
n o r m s t h a t specify w h a t i s g o o d o r b a d
for me to do in l i g h t of a
consideration
such
of the
interests
of others,
an
understanding
of
m o r a l i t y i s n o t t o b e f o u n d i n Being and Time. B u t i t w o u l d s e e m c l e a r that
e i t h e r p o s i t i v e l y o r n e g a t i v e l y this aspect p e r t a i n s essentially t o
t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h o o r h o w I w a n t t o be. A n d t h e c l a i m o f o b j e c t i v e justification seems especially apparent l o r this c o m p o n e n t o f practical d e l i b e r a t i o n . O f c o u r s e , i t i s also t h e case h e r e t h a t
the question of
the extent to w h i c h I take the m o r a l point of view into account is ultimately a mattet
to be decided by my choice of what k i n d of a
pet s o n I w a n t t o b e .
261
214 Lecture
10
T h e fact t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e g o o d — a n d c o r r e l a t i v e l y b o t h t h e concept o f deliberation and that o f the justification o f evaluative a n d n o r m a t i v e statements—cannot be f o u n d in Heidegger is a consequence o f his c o n c e p t o f t r u t h . I w o u l d l i k e t o e x a m i n e t h i s p r o b l e m o n l y v e r y b r i e f l y here, since 1 have dealt w i t h it e x t e n s i v e l y in my b o o k Der
Wahrheitsbegriff bei Hussen und Heidegger.
T h e concept
of t h e
good
also falls u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h , s i n c e a l l s t a t e m e n t s c o n t a i n a t r u t h c l a i m (and this m e a n s a c l a i m t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) ; a n d sentences that say t h a t s o m e t h i n g i s g o o d o r b e t t e r are statements. N o w H e i d e g g e r d i d n o t (as m i g h t h a v e b e e n e x p e c t e d ) also j e t t i s o n t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h a l o n g w i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e g o o d . T h e issue h e r e i s m o r e c o m p l e x . H e i d e g g e r began w i t h the a s s u m p t i o n that a statement 'discloses' s o m e t h i n g , a n d h e f o r m a l i z e d t h e concept o f t r u t h i n such a w a y that he u l t i m a t e l y grasped it as coextensive w i t h the concept of d i s c l o s u r e ( s e c t i o n 44).
B u t t h e s p e c i f i c m e a n i n g o f true—namely, t h e
c l a i m to justification a n d p r o o f — t h e r e b y drops out of the account. Y e t s i n c e t h e w o r d truth i s r e t a i n e d , i t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a p p e a r s a s i f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h i s p r e s e r v e d a n d e v e n d e e p e n e d ; a n d o n this basis a p e c u l i a r l y i l l u s i v e s i t u a t i o n arises. F o r e x a m p l e , H e i d e g g e r d e s i g n a t e s r e s o l u t e n e s s , t h a t is, e x i s t e n c e i n t h e m o d e o f a u t h e n t i c i t y , a s " t h e t r u t h o f D a s e i n w h i c h i s m o s t p r i m o r d i a l because i t i s a u t h e n t i c " (p. 3 4 3 ) ; a n d t h i s i s c o m p l e t e l y c o n s i s t e n t , o f c o u r s e , s i n c e r e s o l u t e n e s s is the disclosure in the m o d e of authenticity. If one adheres to the genuine concept of t r u t h , however, one cannot designate authentic existence d i r e c t l y as t r u t h ; r a t h e r , o n e m u s t characterize it as a state o f b e i n g - d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t r u t h i n t h e sense o f t h e p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e t r u e g o o d . T h i s q u e s t i o n i n c l u d e s (1) gnothi seauton, t h e " s e l f - k n o w l e d g e " t h a t i s also t o u c h e d u p o n a t o n e p o i n t b y H e i d e g g e r (BT, p.
186), o r t h e p r o c e s s o f " b e c o m i n g t r a n s p a r e n t t o o n e s e l f i n
t h e m o t i v e s u n d e r l y i n g o n e ' s i n t e n t i o n s . A n d i t also i n v o l v e s (2) t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e f o l l o w i n g set o f a s s u m p t i o n s has b e e n p r o p e r l y j u s t i f i e d : (a) t h e f a c t u a l a s s u m p t i o n s i m p l i e d b y m y i n t e n t i o n s , (b) t h e n o r m a t i v e assumptions r e g a r d i n g m y obligation t o w a r d others that a r e also i m p l i e d i n m y i n t e n t i o n s , a n d f i n a l l y (c) t h e e v a l u a t i v e assumptions regarding my o w n well-being. These objective deliberations c o n s t i t u t e t h e basis f o r t h e d e c i s i o n ( a l t h o u g h i t i s n o t d e d u c i b l e f r o m t h e m ) c o n c e r n i n g w h o (or h o w ) I w a n t t o be. Since H e i d e g g e r d e s i g n a t e s r e s o l u t e n e s s d i r e c t l y a s t h e e s s e n t i a l t r u t h , t h i s o b j e c t i v e basis o f d e liberation that precedes the decision is not m e r e l y overlooked; rather.
262
215 Heidegger on
the
Relation
of Oneself to Oneself
III
the f o r m of resoluteness that is u n d e r s t o o d in this w a y is u n e q u i v o c a l l y separated f r o m the q u e s t i o n of t r u t h precisely because it already is t h e t r u t h itself. I f w e u n d e r s t a n d t h e w o r d reason i n its t r a d i t i o n a l m e a n i n g , a s t h e c a p a c i t y f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , H e i d e g g e r ' s step h e r e m u s t b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d as an attempt to banish reason f r o m h u m a n existence and particularly f r o m t h e r e l a t i o n o f o n e s e l f t o oneself.
A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f these
lectures w e n o t e d t h a t t h e p r o b l e m o f self-consciousness i n m o d e m philosophy up to Fichte and Hegel was regarded as philosophically so c e n t r a l o n l y because self-consciousness a p p e a r e d c o n s t i t u t i v e for a f o r m of life r e l a t e d to reason. It is therefore all the m o r e s u r p r i s i n g that precisely the philosopher w h o first developed an adequate struct u r a l conception o f the relation o f oneself t o oneself abandons the concept
o f reason.
I t m i g h t n o w s e e m p l a u s i b l e t o suspect t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t o f the r e l a t i o n o f oneself t o oneself does not a l l o w for a concept o f r e a s o n a t a l l . I c o n s i d e r t h i s s u s p i c i o n u n j u s t i f i e d . W e h a v e seen t h a t the concept of self-determination as Heidegger developed it can be conceived w i t h o u t violence in conjunction w i t h the concept of delibe r a t i o n , a n d therefore it can be u n d e r s t o o d as a reflective self-relation. Of course, y o u can object that my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was forced to a certain extent. B u t this was d o n e i n t e n t i o n a l l y . M y i n t e n t i o n was n o t t o p r o v i d e a faithful account of Heidegger, but to extract what we need f r o m Fleidegger for o u r actual f o r m u l a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m .
In my view
Heidegger's a p p r o a c h is the only one that permits a structurally irr e p r o a c h a b l e e l u c i d a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n o f oneself t o oneself i n general, and of self-determination in particular. I w o u l d l i k e t o g o a n o t h e r step f u r t h e r a n d a r g u e t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s concept of self-determination not o n l y admits of extension t h r o u g h a r e l a t i o n t o r e a s o n b u t also d e m a n d s t h i s e x t e n s i o n o n its o w n g r o u n d s . In my view, the concept of s e l l - d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i t h o u t reason as pres e n t e d b y H e i d e g g e r i s u n t e n a b l e , a n d e v e n his o w n c o n c e p t i o n i s i m p e r c e p t i b l y s u s t a i n e d b y a r e l a t i o n t o r e a s o n . T h u s , m y thesis i s that there s i m p l y cannot he a f o r m of self-determination that is not u n d e r s t o o d as a r e f l e c t i v e s e l f - r e l a t i o n . T h e p r o o f o f t h i s rests u p o n t h e a n a l y t i c c o n n e c t i o n t h a t w a s est a b l i s h e d i n t h e last l e c t u r e b e t w e e n t h e strict c o n c e p t o f f r e e d o m i n t h e sense o f r e s p o n s i b l e f r e e d o m a n d t h e c o n c e p t o f d e l i b e r a t i o n . W e s a w just n o w t h a t s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m e a n s t h a t t h e i n v o l v e d p e r s o n
263
216
Lecture JO
h i m s e l f chooses w h o (how) he w a n t s to be.
B u t w e also saw t h a t a
decision is f u n d a m e n t a l l y to be u n d e r s t o o d as the o u t c o m e of a de l i b e r a t i o n . T h i s does n o t m e a n t h a t a n actual process o f d e l i b e r a t i o n m u s t precede a decision, b u t it does m e a n t h a t a decision i m p l i e s a d e l i b e r a t i o n . A c h o i c e t h a t c a n n o t e v e n b e j u s t i f i e d a f t e r t h e fact i s not a decision. A choice that is n o t d e l i b e r a t e d , that is not m a d e in l i g h t of reasons, is a choice in w h i c h I leave h o w I choose to accident; a n d i n t h i s r e s p e c t w e h a v e t o say i t w a s n o t I w h o c h o s e . D o e s o u r o l d p h a n t o m ' t h e Γ r e t u r n h e r e f o r o n e last t i m e ? O f c o u r s e n o t , s i n c e w e have a l r e a d y seen
that the m e a n i n g of talking about whether it
was I w h o chose consist in establishing w h e t h e r I have chosen in a certain
way.
A c c o r d i n g to Heidegger, authentic choice is supposed to b r i n g Dasein back
from
its
lostness
in
the
arbitrariness
and
contingency
of the
p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n w h i c h i t a c t u a l l y f i n d s itself. I f t h i s i s t o b e t h e m e a n i n g of t h e choice, it requires a c r i t e r i o n or s t a n d a r d . It b e c a m e clear early i n o u r d i s c u s s i o n t h a t D a s e i n d o e s n o t possess a m a t e r i a l c r i t e r i o n i n s o m e t h i n g l i k e its ' s e l f w h i c h i t w o u l d m e r e l y h a v e t o a p p l y t o its possibilities; i n d e e d , a m a t e r i a l c r i t e r i o n is o u t of the question here. T h e o n l y t h i n g a standard can m e a n here is a way of confronting one's possibilities in authentic choice,
namely,
a m a n n e r of
raising
questions a b o u t t h e m . T h e o n l y c r i t e r i o n that H e i d e g g e r furnishes i s t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h d e a t h , a n d this is c e r t a i n l y a necessary c o n d i t i o n . B u t is it sufficient? Heidegger himself writes:
"One's anticipatory projection on
that
possibility of existence w h i c h is not to be outstripped — o n death — guarantees o n l y t h e t o t a l i t y a n d a u t h e n t i c i t y o f one's resoluteness. B u t those possibilities of existence w h i c h have actually been disclosed are n o t t o b e g a t h e r e d f r o m d e a t h " (p. 4 3 4 ) . B u t t h e n w h e r e a t e t h e y t o b e f o u n d ? H e i d e g g e r ' s a n s w e r i s f r o m one's o w n t h t o w n n e s s , a n d this m e a n s f r o m o n e ' s h i s t o r i c i t y (435—437). A l t h o u g h i t i s c o r r e c t t o say t h a t it is p a r t of a u t h e n t i c existence to accept oneself as what one is a n d h a s b e c o m e , i t i s s t i l l t r i v i a l t o say t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t a r e t o b e c h o s e n a r e t h o s e t h a t a r e i n fact g i v e n ; s u c h a s t r a t e g y p r o v i d e s exactly no criterion
for the choice between
m o v e s in circles here:
possibilities.
Heidegger
On the one hand, the choice is supposed to
free o n e f r o m t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f possibilities i n w h i c h o n e actually f i n d s oneself; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e refers t h e c h o i c e itself t o h i s t o r i c i t y , t o t h e possibilities i n w h i c h o n e a c t u a l l y f i n d s oneself. Since H e i d e g g e r
264
217 Heidegger on
the
Relation
of Oneself to Oneself,
III
envisages n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n for w h y one o f several historically g i v e n possibilities is chosen instead of another, it is an irrational choice in t h e s t r i c t sense o f t h e w o r d . I n t h e case o f a n i r r a t i o n a l c h o i c e w e t e n d t o a d o p t t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i o n : S o m e t h i n g has c h o s e n r a t h e r t h a n I h a v e c h o s e n . W h y ? W e s a w e a r l i e r t h a t i f t h e w i l l c o u l d s t i l l r e l y u p o n r e a s o n s i n t h e final i n s t a n c e , m y a d o p t i o n o f a p o s i t i o n w o u l d lose its f o r c e , a n d w o u l d not be my a d o p t i o n of a position. But the f o l l o w i n g is equally true: I f the w i l l w e r e not o b l i g e d to r e l y u p o n reasons i n the p e n u l t i m a t e instance, m y a d o p t i o n o f a p o s i t i o n w o u l d b e w i t h o u t force, a n d w o u l d not be my a d o p t i o n of a position. T h u s , the upshot of this is that the distinguishing feature of that choice w h i c h can be characterized as self-determination is that the choice is carried out in the m o d e of rational volition. T h e c h o i c e c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n e i t h e r (a) i f o n e d e n i e s its i r r e d u c i b l e v o l i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r , t h a t is, i f o n e c l a i m s t o b e a b l e t o r e d u c e i t t o r a t i o n a l i t y , o r (b) i f ( l i k e H e i d e g g e r ) o n e d e n i e s t h a t i t m u s t b e a b l e t o rest u p o n j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t is, t h a t it is g r o u n d e d in the question of t r u t h even t h o u g h it cannot be fully resolved in this question. T h e fact t h a t H e i d e g g e r s t i l l r e t a i n e d t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h ( t h o u g h in the illusive m o d e suggested) c a n be r e g a r d e d as evidence that even his d e r a t i o n a l i z e d c o n c e p t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o b e i m p e r c e p t i b l y s u s t a i n e d by a r e l a t i o n to reason. T h e consequences of this derationalized conception of choice a n d the derationalized concept of truth, however, c a n be seen in a speech t h a t H e i d e g g e r gave in N o v e m b e r 1933. T h e speech was given i n support o f H i t l e r p r i o r t o the n a t i o n a l r e f e r e n d u m o n G e r m a n y ' s w i t h d r a w a l f r o m the League o f Nations. I t begins i n this w a y :
" T h e G e r m a n people are called u p o n t o choose b y their
l e a d e r [Führer], B u t t h e l e a d e r d o e s n o t d e m a n d a n y t h i n g o f t h e p e o p l e ; l a t h e r , h e offers the p e o p l e the i m m e d i a t e possibility o f the s u p r e m e free d e c i s i o n : w h e t h e r t h e p e o p l e a s a w h o l e w i l l c l a i m t h e i r o w n Dasein, o r w h e t h e r t h e y w i l l fail t o c l a i m it. T o m o r r o w the people c h o o s e n o t h i n g less t h a n t h e i r f u t u r e . " A n d i t t h e n c o n t i n u e s : " W h a t k i n d o f a n o c c a s i o n i s this? T h e p e o p l e r e c o v e r t h e t r u t h o f t h e i r w i l l as Dasein, for t r u t h is the disclosure of what makes a people certain, clear a n d strong in iheir acting a n d k n o w i n g . " * These quotes indicate that H e i d e g g e r ' s N a z i s m was no accidental affair, b u t that a direct p a t h l e d f r o m his p h i l o s o p h y — f r o m its d e r a t i o n a l i z e d c o n c e p t o f t r u t h a n i l the concept o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n d e f i n e d b y this — t o N a z i s m .
265
218 Lecture
10
Nonetheless, w e w o u l d b e r e l i n q u i s h i n g philosophical insight i f w e d i d n o t w a n t t o l e a r n w h a t w e c a n f r o m H e i d e g g e r f o r this r e a s o n . T h e point is to recognize precisely the position that led to irrationalism, and not to t h r o w the baby out w i t h the bath water.
266
Continental Philosophy Review 31: 3 6 9 - 3 8 6 , 1 9 9 8 . © 1 9 9 8 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
369
Heidegger and the source(s) of intelligibility 1
2
PIERRE KELLER, D A V I D W E B E R M A N 'Department of Philosophy. University of California-Riverside. USA; -Department of Philosophy. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wl 53706-1475. USA
A b s t r a c t . Wittgensteinian readings of Being and Time, and of the source of the intelligibility of Dasein's world, in terms of language and the average everyday public practices of das Man are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in correcting overly individualist and existentialist readings of Heidegger. But they are wrong in making Heidegger into a proponent of language or everydayness as the final word on intelligibility and the way the world is disclosed to us. The everydayness of das Man and language are partial sources of intelligibility but only insofar as they are comprehended within the greater unitary structure of care and temporality. Care and temporality constitute the foundational underpinnings for disclosure and the intelligibility of "that wherein Dasein dwells.'"
When,
i n Being and Time. H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s
human
beings or '"Dasein"
a s " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . " the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n h u m a n b e i n g s a n d t h e i r w o r l d i s not a n accidental one. A s H e i d e g g e r makes e x p l i c i t , the w o r l d i n w h i c h D a s e i n exists is n o t s i m p l y a c o l l e c t i o n of objects, but a " r e l a t i o n a l totality . . . w e c a l l significance" w h i c h i s " d i s c l o s e d b e f o r e h a n d w i t h a c e r t a i n i n telligibility
[Verständlichkeit]'\SZ
87,
86).'
Elsewhere
H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s that
t h e w o r l d , the b a c k g r o u n d a g a i n s t w h i c h h u m a n s p r o j e c t t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t i e s , has meaning (Sinn) a n d that m e a n i n g is "'that w h e r e i n t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f a n y t h i n g is sustained" ( S Z 151). T h e w o r l d is f r o m the outset s o m e t h i n g i n t e l l i g i b l e and significant to h u m a n beings. It is not, as other p h i l o s o p h i c a l m o d e l s m i g h t have it, something w h i c h c o u l d turn out to be u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to us. It is true, as H e i d e g g e r points out, that discrete entities s o m e t i m e s s h o w up a s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e (as i n o u r e n c o u n t e r s w i t h n a t u r e ) . Y e t i n s u c h cases, ""unint e l l i g i b l e " n a t u r a l e v e n t s a n d e n t i t i e s a l w a y s m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d l i n e s s o f t h e w o r l d ( S Z 2 1 1 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , it is in l i g h t of w h a t is i n t e l l i g i b l e that the u n i n t e l l i g i b l e appears as u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . So, i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y is a f u n d a m e n t a l feature of o u r w o r l d a n d . w h e t h e r w h o l l y o r d e f i c i e n t l y , o f the e n t i t i e s w i t h i n i t
2
T w o further points deserve
m e n t i o n : First, such i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y is not a matter of theoretical understanding
267
370
PIERRE K E L L E R &
DAVID WEBERMAN
or u n d e r s t a n d a b i l i t y as envisaged w i t h i n the Platonic, L e i b n i z i a n or K a n t i a n traditions. T h e type of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y operative in Heidegger is prior to and in d e p e n d e n t o f t h e o r e t i c a l i n q u i r y . S e c o n d , t o say t h a t t h e w o r l d i s i m m e d i a t e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d t o m e a n that the w a y i n w h i c h the w o r l d i s immediately i n t e l l i g i b l e r e p r e s e n t s i t s m o s t a c c u r a t e r e n d e r i n g . B u t n o w the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n arises: W h a t i s i t that p r o v i d e s f o r this i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and o u r consequent a b i l i t y t o c o m e t o g r i p s w i t h the w o r l d a r o u n d us? W h a t e x a c t l y i s the source o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i n H e i d e g g e r ? Recent W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n interpretations o f H e i d e g g e r deserve credit for b r i n g i n g this q u e s t i o n t o the f o r e f r o n t .
3
T h e i r a n s w e r has b e e n t h a t t h e s o u r c e o f i n t e l -
l i g i b i l i t y lies i n a l t e r n a t i v e l y 1 ) d i s c o u r s e a n d l a n g u a g e o r 2 ) H e i d e g g e r ' s "das Man" ( " t h e t h e y " o r " t h e a n y o n e " ) a n d its " e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s " I n Parts I a n d I I o f t h i s essay, w e a r g u e t h a t t h e s e are i n i s t a k e n , a l b e i t i n s t r u c t i v e , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . I n Part I I I , w e p u t f o r t h o u r o w n c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e s o u r c e o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s w o r l d . I t i s the t e m p o r a l i t y o f the care s t r u c t u r e of Dasein, conceived as underlying and u n i f y i n g in a non-reductive fashion Heidegger's
existentials
(Existenzialien)
or conditions
f o r the
possibility
of
h u m a n existence.
I. L a n g u a g e O n e strategy f o r e x p l a i n i n g the source o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y assimilates the a r g u m e n t o f Being and Time t o t h e t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y " l i n g u i s t i c t u r n " i n p h i l o s o phy, especially i n its W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n dispensation. I n his p i o n e e r i n g account of Heidegger's confrontation w i t h traditional epistemology, Charles G u i g n o n has s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e s o u r c e o f t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s w o r l d l i e s i n Heidegger's
notions
of discourse
(Rede)
and
language
(Sprache).
4
Guignon
writes:
[ [ W ) i t h the c o n c e p t o f " m e a n i n g " H e i d e g g e r i s t r y i n g l o i d e n t i f y a source o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y that lies even deeper than that o f the totalities o f s i g n i f i c a n c e we a p p r o p r i a t e in o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . . . . W h a t is the source o f t h i s m o s t p r i m o r d i a l l e v e l o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ? H e i d e g g e r says t h a t i l i s "discursiveness" or " t a l k "
[Rede].*
A f e w p a g e s l a t e r , h e w r i t e s : " t h e s h a r e d w o r l d o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . . . is u l t i mately found to be maintained in language."
6
S o G u i g n o n holds that, accord-
i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , discourse o r language ( o r b o t h ) are the u l t i m a t e s o u r c e o f the w o r l d ' s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y for D a s e i n . I n w h a t f o l l o w s w e shall e x p l a i n h o w G u i g n o n supports his p o s i t i o n and w h y we regard it as mistaken.
268
IIF.IIJF.GC.KR ANDTHI- SOURCF.(S) OF INTF.U.IGIBII.ITY
371
T o support his c l a i m thai discourse i s the source o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y G u i g n o n c i l c s l l i c f o l l o w i n g c r u c i a l p a s s a g e f r o m Being and Time:
Intelligibility
[Verständlichkeit} has a l w a y s b e e n a r t i c u l a t e d
[gegliedert]
e v e n b e f o r e (here i s a n y a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t . D i s c o u r s e i s the a r t i c u l a t i o n [Artikulation] o f w h a t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . T h e r e f o r e i t u n d e r l i e s b o t h interpretation and assertion. T h a t w h i c h can be articulated in interpretation, and thus even m o r e p r i m o r d i a l l y in discourse, is w h a t we have called " m e a n i n g . " ( S Z 161) D i s c o u r s e i s n o t o n l y a u n i v e r s a l a n d i n v a r i a n t Existemial a n d o n e o f t h e t h r e e equipriniordial
characteristics
of being-in,
alongside
affectedness
(Befind-
lichkeit) a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen). A c c o r d i n g t o G u i g n o n , i t a l s o u n d e r lies a n d g i v e s shapes t o o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f entities a n d o u r assertions about them. W h e n it comes to language, G u i g n o n usefully distinguishes between t w o v i e w s . T h e instrumentalist v i e w of language regards language as an i n strument o r accessory for m a x i m i z i n g the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f w h a t w e have already u n d e r s t o o d p i e - l i n g u i s l i c a l l y . T h e c o n s t i t u t i v e v i e w , o n the other hand, " p i c t u r e s l a n g u a g e n o t so m u c h as a t o o l o n h a n d f o r o u r use as a medium i n w h i c h m a n d w e l l s . O n the c o n s t i t u t i v e v i e w , language generates and f i r s t m a k e s p o s s i b l e o u r f u l l - b l o w n sense o f the w o r l d . "
7
G u i g n o n contends that
H e i d e g g e r i n S Z i s t o r n b e t w e e n t h e t w o v i e w s . W h i l e m a n y passages i n S Z c l e a r l y support H e i d e g g e r ' s h a v i n g held the i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t v i e w , G u i g n o n p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e v i e w i s i ) m o r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the o v e r a l l t h o u g h t o f S Z and i i ) c l e a r l y his c o n s i d e r e d p o s i t i o n i n his later w o r k .
8
I n p o i n t o f fact, w e a g r e e w i t h e v e r y t h i n g j u s t s a i d b u t t a k e e x c e p t i o n w i t h G u i g n o n ' s c o n c l u s i o n s about the source(s) o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . L e t u s begin w i t h l a n g u a g e . T h e r e are s e v e r a l r e a s o n s f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t l a n g u a g e i s n o t the s o u r c e o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f the w o r l d ( a s i d e f r o m t h e fact that its a p p e a r a n c e i n S Z i s r a t h e r l i m i t e d ) . T h e f i r s t i s that H e i d e g g e r e x p l i c i t l y says that language is derivative on something m o r e fundamental, namely, discourse. As
he p u t s it in h i s 1 9 2 5 l e c t u r e c o u r s e : "There is language only because there i s discourse"
9
T h e second is that, as G u i g n o n a c k n o w l e d g e s a n d d o c u m e n t s ,
H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w o f language a t the t i m e o f S Z i s m o r e i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t than c o n s t i t u t i v e . I n S Z , w o r d s c o m e a f t e r t h e f a c t a n d " a c c r u e t o m e a n i n g s " (den Bedeutungen lecture,
wachsen
Worte zu) ( S Z
w h e r e H e i d e g g e r says:
1 6 1 ) . T h i s p o i n t is e x p l i c i t in h i s "Language^makes manifest [offenbar].
not produce anything like discoveredness
[our emphasis].
1925
It d o e s
Rather discovered-
ness a n d its e n a c t m e n t o f b e i n g . . . are c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y f o r s o m e t h i n g becoming manifest."
1 0
B u t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n i s t h i s : E v e n i f t h e rest
o f S Z i s consistent w i t h and m o r e i n the spirit o f the c o n s t i t u t i v e v i e w o f lan-
269
372
PIERRE KELLER & D A V I D W E B E R M A N
guage, this w o u l d not e n t a i l that l a n g u a g e i s the source o f Ihe i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f o u r w o r l d . T h e c o n s t i t u t i v e v i e w says t h a t l a n g u a g e i s t h e " m e d i u m " i n w h i c h w e u n d e r s t a n d t h e w o r l d a n d that i t g e n e r a t e s o u r " f u l l - b l o w n sense o f (he w o r l d . " L a n g u a g e m a y w e l l b e the m e d i u m o f o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and, a s such, i l w o u l d enable a n d shape o u r t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e , d o s o u n a v o i d a b l y , and b e s o m u c h a p a r i o f o u r t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e (hat w c c a n n o t r e a l l y s e p a r a t e o u r s e l v e s f r o m i t . A l l o f t h i s m a y b e t r u e . B u t t o say t h o s e t h i n g s i s n o t t o say t h a t l a n g u a g e i s t h e source o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . T h e l a t t e r c l a i m m a y a l s o b e t r u e , but H e i d e g g e r n o w h e r e c o m m i t s h i m s e l f t o a n y t h i n g l i k e it. T h e constitutive v i e w of language docs not do so either since I he m e d i u m in w h i c h s o m e t h i n g lives need not be (and usually is n o t ) the source of that t h i n g . For Heidegger, t h e n , l a n g u a g e i s a c o r e a s p e c t o f o u r l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e , b u t n o t its s o u r c e . F i n a l l y , c o n s i d e r the r o l e o f d i s c o u r s e . D i s c o u r s e , H e i d e g g e r says, i s "the
a r t i c u l a t i o n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y " {die Artikulation der Verständlichkeit) ( S Z 161). I t i s n o t necessarily c o m p o s e d o f w o r d s , since i l i n c l u d e s , a l o n g w i t h speaki n g and hearing, the p h e n o m e n o n o f r e m a i n i n g silent ( S c h w e i g e n ) . Earlier, H e i d e g g e r a s s o c i a t e s d i s c o u r s e w i t h logos a n d t h e a d d r e s s i n g a n d d i s c u s s i n g (Ansprechen
und Besprechen)
which
lets
something
be seen
(SZ 32).
In
§34
o f S Z , H e i d e g g e r goes o n t o elucidate discourse i n terms o f a n " o n t o l o g i c a l l y b r o a d n o t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n " (Mitteilung) ( S Z
162). T h u s , discourse
is
essentially the shareable and c o m m u n i c a b l e articulatedness of w h a t is unders t o o d w h i c h "lets see" w h a t i s u n d e r s t o o d . B y a c c o r d i n g d i s c o u r s e p r i m o r d i a l status, H e i d e g g e r i s c l a i m i n g that w e l i v e and d i s c l o s e o u r w o r l d b y means not o n l y o f m o o d s and p r o j e c t - o r i e n t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g but also o f the w o r l d ' s essential and " a l w a y s a l r e a d y " shared and c o m m u n i c a b l e articulatedness. T h e r e are e s s e n t i a l l y t h r e e r e a s o n s f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t d i s c o u r s e c a n n o t b e the source o r " m o s t p r i m o r d i a l l e v e l " o f Ihe i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f o u r w o r k ) . F i r s t , d i s c o u r s e is, a l o n g w i t h affectedness o r m o o d s a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , o n e o f the three c o r e aspects o f " b e i n g - i n . " Just a s i t w o u l d n o t b e c o r r e c t t o say t h a t m o o d s are the s o u r c e o r m o s t p r i m o r d i a l l e v e l o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , n o r can w c say t h i s o f d i s c o u r s e e i t h e r . S e c o n d , t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t H e i d e g g e r r e g a r d s t h e r o l e o f d i s c o u r s e a s less i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h a i o f a f f e c t e d n e s s a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W h i l e H e i d e g g e r starts o u t b y t r e a t i n g t h e t h r e e p h e n o m e n a a s e q u i p r i m o r d i a l ( S Z 1 3 3 ) , h e s o m e t i m e s g i v e less c r e d i t t o d i s c o u r s e . F o r e x a m p l e , H e i d e g g e r t w i c e speaks o f the c o n s t i t u t i v e character o f affectedness a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i l e l e a v i n g o u t discourse ( S Z 182, 184) a n d t w i c e replaces d i s c o u r s e w i t h the p h e n o m e n o n o f f a l l i n g ( S Z 3 4 9 , 3 5 0 ) . F i n a l l y , e v e n m o r e d i r e c t t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e c o n t r a d i c t s the v i e w that d i s c o u r s e is the deepest s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . I n t h e passage t h a t G u i g n o n s u p p o r t s a n d r e l i e s o n ( S Z 1 6 1 , q u o t e d a b o v e ) , H e i d e g g e r says t h a t : " D i s c o u r s e i s t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f w h a t i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . T h e r e f o r e i t u n d e r l i e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and assertion." Yet
270
HEIDEGGER A N D
373
THE SOURCE(S) OF I N T E L L I G I B I L I T Y
note that even i f d i s c o u r s e u n d e r l i e s a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i f i t articulates w h a t i s ( a l r e a d y ) i n t e l l i g i b l e , t h e n i l c a n n o t b e the source o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y that i t articulates. To a r t i c u l a t e s o m e t h i n g is to have s o m e t h i n g that a l r e a d y exists that can be a r t i c u l a t e d . T h i s s o m e t h i n g must, then, have s o m e o t h e r source. W c c o n c l u d e then that n e i t h e r discourse n o r language i s the source o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s w o r l d . A l t h o u g h b o t h are c e n t r a l l o o u r e x i s t e n c e a n d t o H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n , t h e ultimate s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y must be sought elsewhere.
I I . Das Man a n d " e v e r y d a y social p r a c t i c e s " W c t u r n n o w t o t h e s e c o n d c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y : das Man. i.e. " t h e t h e y " ( i n t h e E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n s ) o r " t h e o n e " ( D r e y f u s ) o r " t h e a n y o n e " ( G u i g n o n ) a n d its " e v e r y d a y s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . " " Das Man p l a y s a n a l l - i m p o r t a n t a l b e i t a m b i g u o u s r o l e i n Being and Time. O n t h e o n e h a n d it appears as D a s e i n ' s ever-present t e n d e n c y to lose i t s e l f u n c r i t i c a l l y in the a n o n y m o u s w a y s o f s o c i e t y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , das Man i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s h a r e d c h a r a c t e r o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e , i n e f f e c t , t h e fact t h a t w e c a n u n d e r s t a n d e a c h o t h e r . T h e f i r s t aspect o f das Man has b e e n stressed b y t h o s e w h o sec H e i d e g g e r p r i m a r i l y a s a n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h i n k e r . T h e s e c o n d aspect h a s b e e n championed by commentators w h o regard h i m as a k i n d of pragmatist or W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n . W h i l e the p r a g m a t i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is a useful c o r r e c t i v e to the e x t r e m e i n d i v i d u a l i s m o f the o l d e r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e i p r e t a t i o n , w e shall a r g u e that D r e y f u s a n d f o l l o w e r s o v e r s h o o t t h e m a r k b y r e d u c i n g H e i d e g ger's c o n c e r n w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g t o the m a t t e r o f o u r e v e r y d a y social practices. D r e y f u s ' s p o s i t i o n o n the source o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i s m a d e l o u d a n d clear b y t h e t i t l e s o f t w o s e c t i o n s o f C h a p t e r E i g h t o f h i s i n f l u e n t i a l Being-in-theWorld: " T h e P o s i t i v e F u n c t i o n o f t h e O n e : C o n f o r m i t y a s t h e S o u r c e o f I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y " and " T h e O n e a s the Source o f S i g n i f i c a n c e and I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . "
1 2
Mis p o s i t i o n is as f o l l o w s :
For b o t h H e i d e g g e r and W i t t g e n s t e i n , then, the source o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f the w o r l d i s the average p u b l i c practices t h r o u g h w h i c h alone there can be any u n d e r s t a n d i n g at a l l . W h a t is shared is not a conceptual s c h e m e , . . . | b u t ] s i m p l y o u r a v e r a g e c o m p o r t m e n t . O n c e a p r a c t i c e has been e x p l a i n e d by a p p e a l i n g to w h a t one does, no m o r e basic explanat i o n is p o s s i b l e . . . . | T ] h e constant c o n t r o l the one exerts o v e r each D a sein makes a coherent referential w h o l e , shared for-the-sake-of-whichs, and thus, u l t i m a t e l y , significance and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y p o s s i b l e .
271
1 3
374
PIERRE KELLER &
DAVID WEBERMAN
D r e y f u s ' s a r g u m e n t h a s t w o steps. T h e f i r s t step c o n s i s t s i n D r e y f u s ' s c l a i m that, i n S Z (at least i n D i v i s i o n I ) , D a s e i n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h a n d e s s e n t i a l l y d e f i n e d b y das Man a n d i t s e v e r y d a y s o c i a l
practices.
14
The
s e c o n d s t e p c o m e s w i t h t h e c l a i m t h a t s u c h p r a c t i c e s c o n s t i t u t e s the s o u r c e o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s w o r l d . W e s h a l l argue that w h i l e the f i r s t step i s p a r t l y r i g h t and p a r t l y w r o n g , the s e c o n d step i s w h o l l y u n j u s t i f i a b l e . L e t us first e x a m i n e Dreyfus's c l a i m that Dasein's understanding is coex t e n s i v e w i t h t h e a v e r a g e , e v e r y d a y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f das Man. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a tion departs f r o m m o s t earlier Heidegger readings of Heidegger, whether Ger man, French or A n g l o - A m e r i c a n . In this context, it is w o r t h w h i l e to consider Frederick Olafson's recent critique of Dreyfus's interpretation:
[ A l t h o u g h the w o r d " s o c i a l " i s u b i q u i t o u s i n D r e y f u s ' s r e n d e r i n g o f H e i d e g g e r ' s r e l e v a n t v i e w s , t h e r e i s o n l y o n e o c c u r r e n c e i n a l l o i Being and
Time
of each
gesellschaftlich).
It
of the should
two also
German be
treats it as the m a s t e r c o n c e p t c o n c e p t o f Das Man secure.
In
in
words
pointed
out
for that
"social" although
(sozial
and
Dreyfus
f o r e x p l i c a t i n g Dasein, t h e p l a c e o f t h e
Heidegger's
t h o u g h t appears
to have b e e n
less
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology . . . t h e r e is n o m e n t i o n
at a l l o f das Man
Ρ
O l a f s o n i s r i g h t a b o u t t h i s m u c h : H e i d e g g e r i s n o t f u l l y e x p l i c i t a b o u t t h e so c i a l n a t u r e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n Being and Time. B u t a s O l a f s o n h i m s e l f g o e s on to concede, there c e r t a i n l y is a social d i m e n s i o n to Heidegger's analysis of D a s e i n . 1 6 T h e difference between Dreyfus and Olafson, then, concerns the extent and exact nature of the social character of Dasein's existence. As i t t u r n s o u t , f o r O l a f s o n , i t i s H e i d e g g e r ' s " b e i n g - w i t h " ("Mitsein"") a n d its n e g a t i v e c o n f o m i i s m a s das Man t h a t m a k e s u p D a s e i n ' s s o c i a l d i m e n s i o n . F o r D r e y f u s , however, D a s e i n ' s social nature is also very m u c h dependent on a p o s i t i v e , c o n s t i t u t i v e r o l e p l a y e d b y das Man i n t h e e m e r g e n c e o f D a s e i n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . We shall argue that D r e y f u s is r i g h t about the c o n s t i t u t i v e role p l a y e d by
das Man,
though
w r o n g about
several
further claims
about
das
Man. Recall
that " b e i n g - w i t h "
refers
to the character of existence
a s always
lived alongside and shared w i t h other h u m a n beings or Daseins w h i c h is i m m e d i a t e l y given to us and not in need of proof. T h u s , even a s h i p w r e c k e d R o b i n s o n C r u s o e or a B u d d h i s t m o n k in s o l i t a r y m e d i t a t i o n does not depart f r o m the b e i n g - w i t h character o f h u m a n existence. Heidegger writes: " E v e n D a s e i n ' s b e i n g a l o n e is b e i n g - w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . T h e o t h e r c a n b e missing o n l y i n a n d for a b e i n g - w i t h . B e i n g - a l o n e i s a d e f i c i e n t m o d e o f b e i n g - w i t h " ( S Z 1 2 0 ) . 1 7 W h a t t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f das Man o r " t h e a n y o n e " ( i n t r o -
272
375
H E I D E G G E R A N D T H E SOUKCF.(S) O F I N T E L L I G I B I L I T Y
d u c c d i n t h e s a m e c h a p t e r ) a d d s t o b e i n g - w i t h is l i t i s : D a s e i n n o t o n l y shares (he u n i v e r s e w i t h o t h e r D a s e i n s , b u t i t s v e r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t s e l f a n d i t s w o r l d i s shaped a n d m a d e p o s s i b l e b y a shared grasp o f the w o r l d . T h i s i s the p o s i t i v e r o l e o f das Man t h a t i s s o i m p o r t a n t t o D r e y f u s ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t h a t i s n e g l e c t e d b y O l a f s o n a n d o t h e r s . Das Man i s n o t m e r e l y , a s O l a f s o n w o u l d h a v e i t , a " d i s t o r t e d m o d a l i t y o f M i t s e i n , " i.e. o u r b e i n g - w i t h o t h e r s w h e n w e arc i n a n i n a u t h e n t i c a n d c o n f o r m i s t m o d e . " * T h i s i s n o t t o d e n y t h a t das Man is c o n f o r m i s t ( i t i s ! ) , b u t das Man a d d s s o m e t h i n g positive to t h e n o t i o n o f " b e i n g - w i t h . " a s t h e f o l l o w i n g passage f r o m H e i d e g g e r ' s 1 9 2 5 Icclurc course squarely confirms:
Das Man as t h a t w h i c h f o r m s e v e r y d a y b e i n g - w i t h - o n e a n o t h e r . . . c o n s t i t u t e s w h a t w e c a l l p u b l i c n e s s [Öffentlichkeit] i n t h e s t r i c t sense. T h i s means that the w o r l d is a l w a y s already p r i m a r i l y g i v e n as the c o m m o n [gemeinsame] w o r l d . . . . F i r s t of a l l a n d e v e r y d a y . . . t h e r e is p r e c i s e l y the w o r l d i n w h i c h o n e i s w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . I t i s o u t o f t h i s w o r l d t h a t o n e c a n first m o r e o r less g e n u i n e l y g r o w i n t o h i s o w n w o r l d . T h i s c o m m o n w o r l d , w h i c h i s there p r i m a r i l y and into w h i c h every m a t u r i n g Dasein f i r s t g r o w s , g o v e r n s [regelt] a s t h e p u b l i c w o r l d e v e r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the w o r l d and o f D a s e i n .
1 9
So D r e y f u s is q u i t e r i g h t that Dasein's u n d e r s t a n d i n g and Dasein's w o r l d is first oj all a n t l , in a sense to be s p e c i f i e d b e l o w , always s h a p e d by t h e e v e r y d a y social
ways
0
o f das Man}
B u t ( a n d h e r e o u r c r i t i q u e o f D r e y f u s b e g i n s ) das Man i s n o t only t h e locus o f o u i shared understanding o f the w o r l d , i l i s also a d e s c r i p t i o n o f o u t inauthentic, c o n f o r m i s t m o d e o f existence that i s o n l y " f u s t and for the most part."
2 1
T h e r e are o i l i e r m o d e s o f e x i s t e n c e t h a t are d i f f e r e n t f r o m das
Man a n d its e v e r y d a y w a y s . Das Man a n d e v e r y d a y n e s s do n o t , as D r e y f u s suggests, f u l l y c i r c u m s c r i b e the w a y that w e a l w a y s are. I t i s c r u c i a l t o note t h e d i f f e r e n c e , n e g l e c t e d b y D r e y f u s , b e t w e e n p r i m o r d i a l o r e x i s t e n t i a l feat u r e s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d f i r s t a n d f o r t h e m o s t p a r t [zunächst und zumeist] features o f D a s e i n ' s existence, o n the other. T h e latter phrase refers t o w h a t i s t y p i c a l l y , b u l not always, t h e c a s e .
2 2
" E x i s t e n t i a l , " by contrast, refers to
u n i v e r s a l a n d n e c e s s a r y features o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e w h i c h , w h e n " p r i m o r d i a l , " p r o v i d e the i n n e r p o s s i b i l i t y t o b e this w a y o r t h a t . o f average
everydayness
(durchschnittliche
Alltäglichkeit)
2 1
Dasein's patterns
are,
despite
Drey-
fus's r e p e a t e d a s s e r t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , n o t p r i m o r d i a l , b u t r a t h e r p a t t e r n s w h i c h o b t a i n o n l y s o m e o r m o s t o f the t i m e . E v e r y d a y p h e n o m e n a , H e i d e g g e r c l e a r l y says, are " f i r s t a n d f o r t h e m o s t p a r t " ( S Z 4 3 , 3 7 0 ) a n d t h u s n e i t h e r the d e e p e s t m o d e o f a n a l y s i s n o r the o n l y m a n n e r o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e .
273
376
PIERRE K E L L E R & D A V I D W E B E R M A N
O n e m i g h t argue here that H e i d e g g e r does c o n c e i v e o f e v e r y d a y n e s s a s s o m e t h i n g t h a t a l w a y s o b t a i n s b y p o i n t i n g t o t h e f o l l o w i n g passages:
O u t of [everydayness] - and back i n t o it again - is all e x i s t i n g such as it is. ( S Z 4 3 ) . T h i s e v e r y d a y w a y i n w h i c h t h i n g s have been interpreted i s one i n t o w h i c h D a s e i n has p r o x i t n a l l y g r o w n , w i t h n e v e r a p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x t r i c a t i o n . ID it, out of it and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting a n d c o m m u n i c a t i n g , a l l r e d i s c o v e r i n g a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g a n e w are p e r f o r m e d . I t i s n o t t h e case t h a t D a s e i n i s e v e r u n t o u c h e d a n d u n s e d u c e d by this w a y in w h i c h things have been interpreted. . . . ( S Z 169). Y e t these passages d o n o t s h o w t h a t e v e r y d a y n e s s i s w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n . H e i d e g g e r m e a n s t h a t e v e r y d a y n e s s bears a n i m p o r t a n t r e l a t i o n t o a n d shapes a l l m o d e s o f existence because e v e r y d a y w a y s o f b e i n g are a k i n d o f p e r m a nent b a c k g r o u n d experience out o f w h i c h noneveryday understanding (e.g., authentic resoluteness, a n x i e t y or theoretical i n q u i r y ) g r o w s and back into w h i c h i t e v e n t u a l l y recedes. B u t the i n s i g h t that e x p e r i e n c e and u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l w a y s takes place against this b a c k g r o u n d does not m e a n that all e x p e r i e n c e and u n d e r s t a n d i n g is everyday. A f t e r a l l , it is o n l y because "everydayness" is not p e r m a n e n t that the prepositions " i n , " " o u t , " "against," and "back i n t o " in t h o s e passages m a k e sense. H e i d e g g e r f o c u s e s o n e v e r y d a y n e s s n o t h e c a u s e it is everpresent or p r i m o r d i a l , but because it provides a m o r e suitable means by w h i c h to " e x h i b i t . . . the essential structures w h i c h r e m a i n o n t o l o g i c a l l y d e t e r m i n a t i v e " ( S Z I 6 f . ) than does the r a t i f i e d c o n t e m p l a t i v e stance a d o p t e d , for instance, by Descartes
i n h i s Meditations.
D r e y f u s is w r o n g , then, to t h i n k that Dasein's existence is coextensive w i t h e v e i y d a y social practices since D a s e i n c l e a r l y s o m e t i m e s adopts o r falls i n t o n o n e v e r y d a y w a y s . B u t n o w w h a t about D r e y f u s ' s c l a i m that H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s i s a n a n a l y s i s o f D a s e i n ' s social n a t u r e ? A s O l a f s o n n o t e s , H e i d e g g e r h a r d l y e v e r t a l k s a b o u t D a s e i n ' s s o c i a l n a t u r e . Y e t , a s w e saw, H e i d e g g e r believes that D a s e i n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s a l w a y s and f u n d a m e n t a l l y social i n t h a t D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e i s a l w a y s " g o v e r n e d " b y t h e p u b l i c w o r l d o f das Man i n w h i c h D a s e i n c o m e s t o e x i s t . T o say that D a s e i n i s t h o r o u g h l y a n d i r r e m e d i a b l y s o c i a l i n its u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d b e h a v i o r i s thus consistent w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s w r i t i n g s (as w e l l a s w i t h c o m m o n sense). W h i l e D a s e i n ' s existence i s not l i m i t e d t o the m o d e o f e v e r y d a y n e s s , its c h a r a c t e r i s always s o c i a l . B u t d o e s its s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r m e a n t h a t D a s e i n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h das Man's u n d e r s t a n d i n g ?
D r e y f u s says
y e s ; w e say n o . D r e y f u s h o l d s t h a t t h e w a y s o f das Matt a r c p r i m o r d i a l a n d e x h a u s t i v e a n d that H e i d e g g e r ' s g o a l i n the a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n i s s i m p l v a
274
HF.inF.GGF.R Λ Ν Ι ) Τ Ι I K S O U R C B ( S ) O F I N T E L L I G I B I L I T Y
377
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e w a y s o f das Man. W e assert that das Man i s n o t t h e w h o l e s t o r y a n d t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l g o a l s l i e b e y o n d das Mqn's understanding and self-understanding. T h e r e is, a d m i t t e d l y , c o n f l i c t i n g t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e a b o u t t h e e x a c t r o l e a n d s t a t u s o f das Man.
On
the one hand,
H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s das Man a s a n
e x i s t e n t i a l a n d p r i m o r d i a l structure ( S Z 129). Yet, on the very same page, he e x p l i c i t l y says t h a t D a s e i n i s i n t h e m o d e o f das Man o n l y f i r s t o f a l l a n d f o r t h e m o s t p a r t [zunächst und zumeist], n o t p e r m a n e n t l y .
2 4
T h e r e are at least
three strategies f o r r e s o l v i n g the c o n t r a d i c t o r y t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e . T h e first is l o .say that t h e w a y s o f das Man e x h a u s t t h e w a y s o f D a s e i n .
We find this
strategy unacceptable because it is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h n u m e r o u s statements to the c o n t r a r y and w i t h a large part of SZ ( i n b o t h d i v i s i o n s ) that h o l d s out t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p i e c e m e a l o v e r c o m i n g o f das Man. S e c o n d , o n e m i g h t h o l d t h a i this Man i s w i d e s p r e a d h u t n o t p e r m a n e n t a n d n o t e x h a u s t i v e o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e . A l t h o u g h H e i d e g g e r d o e s a t t r i b u t e t o das Man e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t u s , o n e c o u l d a r g u e t h a t he is a c t u a l l y a s s e r t i n g t h a t das Man is a u n i v e r s a l , necessary a n d i n v a r i a n t feature of D a s e i n such that its existence is first and f o r t h e m o s t p a r t i d e n t i c a l t o that o f das Man. T h i s r e a d i n g i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e t e x t . O n t h i s r e a d i n g , t h e r e i s m o r e t o D a s e i n ' s w a y s t h a n t h e w a y s o f das Man ( a n d m o r e t o S Z t h a n D r e y f u s r e c o g n i z e s ) . F i n a l l y , there is a t h i r d , m o r e c o m p l e x strategy. It c o u l d be reasoned that w h i l e das Man always o b t a i n s i n s o f a r as o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a l w a y s r o o t e d in a p u b l i c l y shared language and c u l t u r e , w h a t D a s e i n s o m e t i m e s breaks with
or surpasses
is
n o t das Man,
but
das
Man-selbst,
i.e.
the
anyone-self.
T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s s u p p o r t e d b y the f o l l o w i n g passage:
T h e self of e v e r y d a y
Dasein
i s t h e a n y o n e - s e l f [das Man-selbst], w h i c h
w e d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m t h e authentic self- t h a t is, f r o m t h e s e l f t a k e n h o l d
of in its o w n w a y . . . . Authentic being-one's self does n o t rest u p o n an e x c e p t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t , a c o n d i t i o n t h a t has b e e n d e t a c h e d f r o m 'das Man; it is r a t h e r an e x i s t e n t i e l l m o d i f i c a t i o n of 'das Man' as an essential existential structure. ( S Z 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 ) O n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , D a s e i n i s a l w a y s das Man i n t h a t i t s g r a s p o f t h e w o r l d i s a l w a y s t h e s h a r e d g r a s p o f its s o c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t . W h a t c h a n g e s i s D a s e i n ' s self. S o m e t i m e s D a s e i n i s a n i n a u t h e n t i c a n y o n e - s e l f ; o t h e r t i m e s , t h o u g h m o r e r a r e l y , i t i s a n a u t h e n t i c 1-self, i.e. a s e l f w h o s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s i n d i v i d u a l a n d d i s t i n c t i v e a l b e i t n o t d e t a c h e d f r o m das Man. T h i s m e a n s t h a t w h e n w e b e c o m e a u t h e n t i c a n d r e s o l u t e , w e d o n o t cease t o c o m p r e h e n d t h e w a y others t h i n k about t h i n g s . A u t h e n t i c b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d is not at a l l an erasure o f t h e c o m m o n , a n o n y m o u s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f das Man. r a t h e r a u t h e n t i c i t y i s
275
378
PIERRE K E L L E R & D A V I D W E B E R M A N
a surpassing o f that c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h consists i n r e a p p t o p r i a t i n g it in a w a y that is d i s t i n c t i v e l y one's o w n .
2 5
N o t i c e that o n e i t h e r o f the t w o acceptable
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f das Man,
D a s e i n ' s w a y s are n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e w a y s o f das Man. O n t h e o n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( t h e s e c o n d d i s c u s s e d ) , das Man i s o p e r a t i v e s o m e , b u t n o t a l l o f the l i m e . O n the o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( t h e t h i r d s t r a t e g y ) , das Man f u n c t i o n s a s a p e r m a n e n t ( l e v e l l e d - d o w n ) b a c k g r o u n d g r a s p o f t h e w o r l d that D a s e i n never w h o l l y supersedes. D a s e i n does, h o w e v e r , s o m e t i m e s take h o l d o f a n d r e a p p r o p r i a t e das Man i n a n o v e l , " o w n m o s t " m a n n e r t h a t i s n o t i t s e l f p r o v i d e d f o r b y t h e a n o n y m o u s , s h a r e d h o r i z o n s o f das Man. Man d o e s n o t c i r c u m s c r i b e a b s o l u t e l y
E i t h e r w a y , das
Dasein's possible understanding and
behavior. D r e y f u s o v e r l o o k s the fact that m u c h is i n t e l l i g i b l e to us outside the average, a n o n y m o u s r e p e r t o i r e o f the " a n y o n e " s u c h a s the d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the s u b l i m i t y a n d p o w e r o f n a t u r e , the d i s c o v e r i e s o f f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y o r one's m o s t p r o p e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s u n c o v e r e d b y one's a u t h e n t i c self. W h i l e s u c h " i n t e l l i g i b i l i t i e s " are e n a b l e d p a r t l y b y t h e t r a d i t i o n s o f das Man, they are nonetheless o b s c u r e d b y its l e v e l l i n g tendencies a n d can o n l y b e made accessible in virtue of fundamental m o o d s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis or authentic self-determination.
2 6
W e n o w c o m e t o t h e s e c o n d step o f D r e y f u s ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t das Man a n d i t s e v e r y d a y s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s are n o t o n l y c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e , b u t the s o u r c e o f t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e a n d its w o r l d . A s D r e y f u s says: " [ H e i d e g g e r ' s ] d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f e v e r y d a y n e s s i n D i v i s i o n I a f f i r m s t h e o n e [ d a s M a n ] a s ens realissiimnn - a s t h e e n d o f t h e line of explanations of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . "
2 7
O u r r e j e c t i o n o f this step f o l l o w s f r o m
o u r a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e " l e v e l l e d - d o w n " w a y s o f das Man a n d a v e r a g e e v e r y d a y n e s s are n o t t h e o n l y s o u r c e s o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . I n d e e d n e i t h e r are t h e y t h e o n l y s o u r c e s o f t r u t h ( i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense o f t h e w o r d ) s i n c e , a l t h o u g h D a s e i n i s a l w a y s i n t r u t h , t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f das Man f u n d a m e n t a l l y i n v o l v e s a k i n d o f untruth ( S Z 2 2 1 0 · T h e r e are t w o m o r e r e a s o n s f o r d e n y i n g t h a t das Man i s t h e s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . F i r s t , a s w i t h d i s c o u r s e a n d l a n g u a g e , das Man c a n n o t b e the s o u r c e b e c a u s e i t i s o n l y o n e o f a n u m b e r o f e x i s t e n t i a l structures, a l l o f w h i c h are e q u a l l y necessary and basic c o n d i t i o n s f o r m a k i n g t h e w o r l d i n t e l l i g i b l e a s w e k n o w i t . S e c o n d , das Man c a n n o t b e the s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o r t h e e n d o f t h e l i n e f o r e x p l a i n i n g D a s e i n b e c a u s e das Man i n S Z i s n o t o n l y a s o r t o f e x p l a n a n s b u t a l s o t h e e x p l a n a n d u m
(the
" f a c t " i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n ) . A f t e r a l l , das Man e x p l a i n s t h e s h a r e d a n d c o m m u n i c a b l e a s p e c t o f D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y t o m a k e sense o f t h e w o r l d . B u t w h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e t h i s s h a r a b l e m a k i n g sense o f t h e w o r l d i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e ? W e shall argue in the next section of this paper that
276
according to Heidegger, care
HEIDEGGER
ANDTNESOUKCE(S)OF INTELLIGIBILITY
379
a m i its t e m p o r a l i t y m a k e p o s s i b l e a n d e x p l a i n o u r s e n s e - m a k i n g c a p a c i t i e s ( t h o u g h perhaps not s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e i r p u b l i c and c o m m u n i c a b l e d i m e n s i o n ) . B c l b r c m o v i n g o n t o c a r e a n d t e m p o r a l i t y , let u s m a k e o n e last p o i n t a b o u t these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . O n e m i g h t a r g u e t h a t t h e i r c l a i m s a b o u t t h e s o u r c e ( s ) o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y are n o t m e a n t t o i d e n t i f y a d e e p s t r u c t u r e w h i c h m a k e s p o s s i b l e the w o r l d ' s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , hut rather a structure or p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h produces the concrete c o n t e n t o f each Dasein's w o r l d .
2 8
Indeed, language and
s h a r e d s o c i a l n o r m s p r o b a b l y s h a p e a n d , i n a sense, p r o d u c e m u c h o r a l l o f our concrete experience and k n o w l e d g e . B u t this assertion, w h i c h on some level is rather u n c o n t r o v c r s i a l , does not accurately describe the a r g u m e n t of S Z . First, the l o c u s o r a m b i t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t i n S Z w a s n o t t o s h o w that l a n g u a g e or society or a n y t h i n g else d e t e r m i n e s o u r e x p e r i e n c e at the o n t i c o r e x i s t e n t i e l l l e v e l . S e c o n d , H e i d e g g e r n o w h e r e singles o u t language or social n o r m s as m o r e fundamental than other existential structures (e.g. m o o d s ) i n d e t e r m i n i n g the c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e . O n e o f the questions that is c e n t r a l to SZ is t h i s : W h a t is it a b o u t the stracture or n a t u r e o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d that m a k e s p o s s i b l e a n d e n s u r e s t h e w o r l d ' s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ? It is to this q u e s t i o n that we n o w t u r n .
I I I . C a r e a n d its t e m p o r a l i t y Part o f o u r r e a s o n i n g f o r h o l d i n g t h a t n e i t h e r l a n g u a g e n o r das Man c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d the s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i n S Z d e r i v e s f r o m H e i d e g g e r ' s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h e r e are a p l u r a l i t y o f n e c e s s a r y a n d e q u i p r i m o r d i a l e x i s t e n t i a l structures w h i c h underlie and m a k e possible Dasein's w o r l d . I t w o u l d seem t o f o l l o w , t h e n , t h a t n o " s u p e r " o r " m a s t e r " Existential c o u l d p o s s i b l y s e r v e a s the s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . Y e t w e s h a l l a r g u e n o w (hat c a r e (Sorge) a n d , at a deeper l e v e l , its t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e do in fact serve this r o l e . C a r e i s not j u s t another e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e . I t i s , H e i d e g g e r s a y s , t h e v e r y m e a n i n g o f the s t r u c t u r a l w h o l e that D a s e i n is. T h u s : " [ T h e b e i n g o f D a s e i n is to be m a d e v i s i b l e as care . . . w h e n u n d e r s t o o d ontologically D a s e i n is care" ( S Z 4 7 ) . other
2 9
existential
W h a t m a k e s c a r e s p e c i a l i s t h a t i t i ) e m b r a c e s , u n l i k e the structures,
the
totality
(Seinsganzheit,
Strukturganzheit)
of
D a s e i n ' s existence ( S Z 182, 193, 196, 2 0 9 ) a n d i i ) i s " e a r l i e r " t h a n . . . any o f its w a y s o f b e h a v i n g , [ b e c a u s e i t ] i s t h e " a p r i o r i " c h a r a c t e r o f its c o n s t i t u t i o n o f b e i n g ( S Z 2 0 6 ) . H e i d e g g e r e x p l i c i t l y states t h a t s t r u c t u r e s s u c h a s " b e i n g i n - t h e - w o r l d , b e i n g - i n , b e i n g - w i t h , das Man, d i s c o v e r e d n e s s , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f a l l i n g . . . [ a n d j t h e m a n i f o l d o f s t r u c t u r e s " f i n d t h e i r r o o t s (Verwurzelung) in the structure of care, thus g i v i n g care a p r i v i l e g e d s t a t u s .
3 0
B u t w h a t is care and w h y does it have this c o m p r e h e n s i v e and p r i m o r d i a l character? H e i d e g g e r defines care as " a h e a d - o f - o n e s c l f - b e i n g - a h e a d y - i n - t h e -
277
380
PIERRE K E L L E R & D A V I D W E B E R M A N
world
as
being-alongside
intraworldly
entities"
(Sich-vonveg-schon-sein-in-
der-Welt als Sein-bei innerweltlich begegnendem Seiendem) ( S Z
1 9 2 ) . As its
l e n g t h i n d i c a t e s , m u c h i s c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n : i ) t h a t w e are t h r o w n or find ourselves in a w o r l d w i t h o u t h a v i n g so chosen (being-already-in); i i ) that we tend to b e c o m e transfixed by the t h i n g s a r o u n d us ( b e i n g - a l o n g s i d e ) ; a n d perhaps m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y h i ) that w e are creatures e n g a g e d i n projects d i r e c t e d a t f u t u r e states o f b e i n g ( b e i n g - a h e a d - o f o n e s e l f ) . I t i s t h i s last aspect t h a t H e i d e g g e r stresses i n h i s i n i t i a l d e f i n i t i o n o f D a s e i n as t h a t e n t i t y " w h i c h in i t s b e i n g is c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h i s b e i n g " {"daß es diesem Seienden in seinem
Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht") ( S Z 12, 4 2 ) a n d to w h i c h he so o f t e n r e t u r n s throughout SZ. N o w H e i d e g g e r tells us that all reality as we k n o w it and all understanding o f b e i n g i s "dependent u p o n " and m u s t "be referred back t o " the p h e n o m e n o n o f care ( S Z 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 , 2 3 0 ) . W h y ? Because care u l t i m a t e l y makes p o s s i b l e a n d g i v e s s h a p e t o o u r a b i l i t y t o m a k e sense o f w h a t i s a r o u n d us.
This is
t a n t a m o u n t t o s a y i n g t h a t c a r e (at least p r i o r t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e w l i o l e d i m e n s i o n o f t e m p o r a l i t y a n d t i m e ) i s the p r i m a r y source o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f o u r w o r l d , a s i s s u g g e s t e d m o s t c l e a r l y b y t h e f o l l o w i n g passage:
I n [ c a r e ] the f u l l d i s c l o s u r e o f the there i s g r o u n d e d . T h i s liglitedncs.s [Geliclitetheit] f i r s t m a k e s p o s s i b l e a l l l i g h t i n g a n d i l l u m i n a t i o n , e v e r y grasping, "seeing" and having of something. ( S Z 35()f.) W h y i s care that w h i c h makes possible a n d p r o v i d e s the source f o r the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f t h a t w h i c h w e disclose? T h e argument, w h i c h runs t h r o u g h o u t H e i d e g g e r ' s early w o r k , deserves inore extensive discussion. Here w e g i v e o n l y its g i s t . T h e c l a i m t h a t w e are c a r e e n t a i l s (hat e n t i t i e s a l w a y s s o m e h o w matter t o us. I t i s b e c a u s e e n t i t i e s m a t t e r t o u s t h a t t h e y c a n h a v e m e a n i n g a n d thus b e i n t e l l i g i b l e . T a k e a w a y the m a t t e r i n g and n o basis r e m a i n s f r o m w h i c h w e c a n m a k e sense o f t h a t w h i c h w e e n c o u n t e r . S o , c a r e m a k e s p o s s i b l e t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f t h e w o r l d a n d shapes t h e p a r t i c u l a r w a y s i n w h i c h t h e w o r l d b e c o m e s i n t e l l i g i b l e . I n t h i s sense, c a r e i s t h e i n n e r p o s s i b i l i t y a n d s o u r c e o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f o u r w o r l d . B u t this bare-bones account o f Heidegger's explanation o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o n l y tells part of the story. H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w is that care i t s e l f m u s t be u n derstood in terms of that w h i c h makes it possible, n a m e l y , Dasein's ecstatic n
t e m p o r a l i t y (Zeitlichkeit).
There can be
n o q u e s t i o n a b o u t the e x i s t e n c e o f
textual evidence on this point:
278
I IEIDEÜGER A N D I H K SOIIRCE(S) OF I N T E L L I G I B I L I T Y
38]
| T | h e p r i m o r d i a l o n t o l o g i c a l basis f o r D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y i s temporality. T h e a r t i c u l a t e d s t r u c t u r a l
t o t a l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g a s care c a n
o n l y become intelligible existentially in terms of temporality. ( S Z 2 3 4 ) .
3 2
T e m p o r a l i t y i s the g r o u n d o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f these s t r u c t u r e s o f care. B c i n g - a h c a d - o f - o n c s e l f is a m o d e of t i m e .. . | T ] i m e temporalizes. A n d temporalizing constitutes temporality.
Being-ahead-of-oneself is a
1
mode, in w h i c h time is temporal. ' Ecstatic t e m p o r a l i t y o r i g i n a l l y
lights/clears
[lichtet]
the t h e r e . ( S Z
351) S u c h i s H e i d e g g e r ' s p o s i t i o n ; b u t w h a t are h i s g r o u n d s f o r a t t r i b u t i n g t h i s r o l e t o t e m p o r a l i t y ? I n the space r e m a i n i n g w e c a n o n l y g i v e a s k e t c h o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a n s w e r b y s h o w i n g i ) i n w h a t sense t e m p o r a l i t y i s t h e e n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n and deeper m e a n i n g o f care; i i ) h o w Heidegger's t e m p o r a l i t y differs f r o m o r d i n a r y c o n c e p t i o n s a n d i i i ) h o w i t i s t h a t t e m p o r a l i t y p r o v i d e s the s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f o u r w o r l d or, a s H e i d e g g e r says, " o r i g i n a l l y c l e a r s / l i g h t s the t h e r e . " P e r h a p s H e i d e g g e r w a s n o t e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l i n t h i s last e n d e a v o r . I n a n y case, o u r a t t e m p t t o f i n d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s last step here c a n o n l y b e p r o v i s i o n a l and p r e l i m i n a r y . F i r s t , w h a t i s t h e l i n k b e t w e e n c a r e a n d t e m p o r a l i t y ' . ' A s w e h a v e seen, H e i d e g g e r defines care as " a h e a d - o f - o u e s e l l ' - b e i n g - a l r e a d y - i n - t h e - w o r l d as being-alongside
i n l r a - w o i Idly entities." Of course, this is an o v e r t l y t e m -
p o r a l d e f i n i t i o n . " A l r e a d y - b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o i l d " refers t o o u r h a v i n g - b e e n o r "aheadincss."
1 4
" B e i n g - a l o n g s i d e .. ." signifies o u r a b s o r p t i o n in the present.
M o s t i m p o r t a n t , s i n c e H e i d e g g e r says t h a t t h e f u t u r e i s p r i m a r y ( S Z 3 2 7 , 3 2 9 ) , "being ahcad-of-oncsclf"
is about o u r future and the m a n n e r in w h i c h o u r
p i o j c c l c d n c s s i n t o the f u t u r e s t r u c t u r e s h o w w e p r e s e n t l y u n d e r s t a n d o u r past. P u t t o g e t h e r , D a s e i n i s c a r e i n s o f a r a s D a s e i n i n h e r i t s t h e past, i s p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the p r e s e n t a n d a b l e t o act o n its f u t u r e b y u n d e r s t a n d i n g its past a n d its p r e s e n t i n t e r m s o f its c o n c e r n f o r w h a t i t c a n c o m e t o be. T h i s a c c o u n t i s o n l y a first a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f D a s e i n ' s t e m p o r a l i t y b e c a u s e , a s H e i d e g g e r i n s i s t s , h i s c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e past, p r e s e n t a n d f u t u r e are n o t to be understood a c c o r d i n g to the c o m m o n s e n s e or " v u l g a r " conceptions of these n o t i o n s . F o r H e i d e g g e r , t e m p o r a l i t y i s n o t a m a t t e r o f t h e past a s t h e " n o t a n y l o n g e r n o w - b u t e a r l i e r , " t h e p r e s e n t as a " n o w p o i n t " a n d t h e f u t u r e as a " n o t y e t n o w - b u t l a t e r " ( S Z 3 2 7 ) . T i m e i s n o t a series o f n o w - p o i n t s . R a t h e r , t i m e is grounded in Dasein's temporality w h i c h is essentially a structure of .Y£'//-understanding. " P a s t " t e m p o r a l i t y , o r w h a t has b e e n , has t h e s t r u c t u r e o f c o m i n g b a c k t o o n e s e l f . " P r e s e n t " t e m p o r a l i t y has t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p r e s e n t i n g so t h a t w h a t o n e has b e e n a n d w h a t o n e w i l l b e e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s i n w h a t o n e d o e s . " F u t u r e " t e m p o r a l i t y has t h e s t r u c t u r e o f c o i n i n g t o w a r d s o n e s e l f .
279
382
PIERRE KELLER & D A V I D W E B E R M A N
It is the w a y in w h i c h w h a t lias been is t a k e n up in w h a t is to be. T h e s e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s h e l p u s t o see h o w t h e t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s arc i n t e r d e p e n d e n t yet d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m one another. E a c h i n v o l v e s the others, but in each case t h e p r i m a c y g o e s t o o n e o f t h e d i m e n s i o n s . T h e k e y t o H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f t e m p o r a l i t y i s t h e w a y i n w h i c h past, p r e s e n t a n d f u t u r e c o e x i s t and c o - d e t e r m i n e each other as w a y s in w h i c h h u m a n existence understands i t s e l f a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i n i t s w o r l d : " T e m p o r a l i z i n g d o e s n o t s i g n i f y t h a t ecstasies c o m e ' o n e a f t e r t h e o t h e r . ' T h e f u t u r e i s not later t h a n h a v i n g b e e n , a n d h a v i n g b e e n i s not earlier t h a n t h e p r e s e n t " ( S Z 3 5 0 ) . Past, p r e s e n t a n d f u t u r e are " e c s t a s i e s . " T h e y i n c l u d e a n e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r tenses. I n t h i s sense t h e y are l i t e r a l l y w h a t t h e y are b y b e i n g " o u t s i d e " o f t h e m s e l v e s a n d by taking us outside of ourselves insofar as our possibilities always involve i) more than what one is at any single p o i n t in t i m e and i i ) entities distinct f r o m oneself. W e h a v e seen t h a t i ) c a r e m a k e s p o s s i b l e a n d c l e a r s / l i g h t s a l l g r a s p i n g a n d a l l d i s c l o s u r e , a n d that i i ) t e m p o r a l i t y i s the g r o u n d o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f care. A f o r t i o r i , t e m p o r a l i t y i s the deepest source o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f o u r w o r l d o r , as H e i d e g g e r s a y s , t e m p o r a l i t y is t h e b a s i c e x i s t e n t i a l {"das Grunde.xistcn1
36
tial des Daseins ').
B u t h o w exactly does
Dasein's temporality
provide
for
the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f the w o r l d ? I n S Z H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n s that t e m p o r a l i t y g r o u n d s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a r t i c u l a t i o n and the " h e r m e n e u t i c as-structure" ( S Z 3 6 0 ) , the " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ( S Z 3 6 3 n . ) , a n d the u n i t y o f s i g n i f i c a n c e o f D a s e i n ' s w o r l d ( S Z 3 6 5 ) . T h r o u g h o u t these p a g e s , p a r t o f t h e i d e a i s that o u r a b i l i t y to understand entities as thus and such depends on o u r a b i l i t y to shift t e m p o r a l perspectives and to c o n n e c t those d i f f e r e n t perspectives t o g e t h e r i n o n e e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s a r g u m e n t f o r the t e m p o r a l i t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s s t i l l v e r y m u c h i n the s p i r i t o f H u s s e i T s v i e w that t e m p o r a l i t y p l a y s a v i t a l role i n the synthesis o f different perspectives c o n s t i t u t i v e o f o u r i n t e n t i o n a l directedness toward objects.
3 7
H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , a b a n d o n s the p r i m a c y o f
perceptual perspectives that characterizes Husserl's a p p r o a c h in favor of the t e m p o r a l perspectives o f pre-theoretical concernful i n v o l v e m e n t . B u t perhaps the m o s t H e i d e g g e r i a n strategy for s h o w i n g that t e m p o r a l i t y g r o u n d s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y is a r t i c u l a t e d in the final section of the 1927 lecture Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie ( w h i c h H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e d as a n e l a b o r a t i o n o f d i v i s i o n 3 o f p a r t I o f Being and Time). T h a t s e c t i o n i s e n t i t l e d " B e i n g a n d beings. T h e o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e " and focuses a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y o n the p r o b l e m o f t e m p o r a l i t y . H e i d e g g e r begins this section b y r e i t e r a t i n g that " t e m p o r a l i t y . . . i s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f o u n d e d i n transcendence. . . . It enables Dasein's c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d beings . . . f a n d | the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b e i n g . "
3 8
A f e w pages later he tells us that D a s e i n ' s
understanding of being occurs not by means of a direct relation to being, but
280
HEIDEGGER
ΛΝΟ Till-SOURCE(S)OF INTELLIGIBILITY
383
b y m e a n s o f D a s e i n ' s o c c u p a t i o n w i t h i t s o w n a b i l i t y - t o - b e (Seinkönnen).-
9
So, any understanding of entities and being depends fundamentally on our r e l a t i o n t o p o s s i b i l i t y o r p o s s i b i l i t i e s . F i n a l l y , w e f i n d t h i s passage:
Because the o r i g i n a l d e t e r m i n a n t o f p o s s i b i l i t y , the o r i g i n o f p o s s i b i l i t y i t s e l f , is t i m e , l i m e t e m p o r a l i z e s i t s e l f as t h e a b s o l u t e l y e a r l i e s t . . . . [ T i m e [ i s ] the source o f a l l e n a b l i n g s ( p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) .
4 0
T h e a r g u m e n t - here o n l y a sketch of an a r g u m e n t - is that the w o r l d is intelligible only in light of our "possibilizing"
and that p o s s i b i l i z i n g i s a
m a t t e r o f t i m e a n d D a s e i n ' s t e m p o r a l i t y i n t h e f o r m o f t h e " a h e a d " {vorweg). "already" prcscnting
(schon) a n d
presenting
" w i t h " (bei) o r t h e e x p e c t i n g - f o r g e t t i n g -
(gewärtigend-vergessendes
Gegenwärtigen)
that
constitutes
Da-
sein's care structure. I n d r a s t i c a l l y abbreviated f o r m : T h e w o r l d i s i n t e l l i g i b l e because it matters.
I t m a t t e r s b e c a u s e w e are c a r e . W e are c a r e i n s o f a r a s
w e are " p o s s i b i l i z e r s . " A n d , f i n a l l y , w e can p o s s i b i l i z e insofar a s t i m e a n d t e m p o r a l i t y arc a t t h e r o o t o f o u r e x i s t e n c e . I f t h i s a r g u m e n t i s c o r r e c t , t h e n t h e source of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y is u l t i m a t e l y to be explained in terms of Heidegger's larger philosophical
p r o j e c t , a n n o u n c e d e a r l y on in Being and Time: "[TJime
needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of being and in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein which understands being-(SZ 17). 4 1
IV. C o n c l u s i o n W c h a v e a r g u e d t h a t W i t t g c n s t c i n i a n r e a d i n g s o f Being and Time, a n d o f t h e source o f the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n ' s w o r l d , i n t e r m s o f l a n g u a g e a n d the ave r a g e e v e r y d a y p u b l i c p r a c t i c e s o f das Man are p a r t l y r i g h t a n d p a r t l y w r o n g . T h e y are r i g h t i n c o r r e c t i n g o v e r l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t a n d e x i s t e n t i a l i s t r e a d i n g s o f H e i d e g g e r . B u t t h e y arc w r o n g i n m a k i n g H e i d e g g e r i n t o a p r o p o n e n t o f language or everydayness as the final w o r d on i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and the w a y the w o r l d i s d i s c l o s e d t o u s . T h e e v e r y d a y n e s s o f das Man a n d l a n g u a g e are partial s o u r c e s o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y b u t o n l y i n s o f a r a s t h e y are c o m p r e h e n d e d w i t h i n the greater u n i t a r y structure o f care a n d t e m p o r a l i t y . Care and t e m p o r a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e the f o u n d a t i o n a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s for d i s c l o s u r e and the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f "that wherein Dasein d w e l l s . "
4 2
281
384
riERRE K E L L E R & D A V I D W E B E R M A N
Notes 1. M a r l i n Heidegger. Sein und Zeil. 15th eil. (Tübingen: Max Nietncyer Verlag. 1979). References to this work are indicated by "SZ" and the page number. Pagination of ibc German edition is included in the margins of both English translations. Our translations follow the translation of Macquarrie and Robinson's Being and Time with sonic modifications. 2. On the cctilrality of intelligibility to Heideggers laier occupation with "Ereignis'.' sec Thomas Sheehan. "On Movement anil Destruction." The Monist (>4 (October 198 I ) . 5361 3. By "Wittgensteinian," we mean interpretations that stress the linguistic and social d i mensions of Dasein. The following works are representative of Ibis interpretation: KarlO l i o Apel, "Wittgenstein und Heidegger. Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein und der Sinnlosigkcitsvctdachl gegen alle Metaphysik." i n O l l o P t i g g c l c r (ed.). Ilcidcggci (König stein. Athenäum, 1984). 358-396; Robert Brandom, "Heideggers Categories in Being and Time',' in Hubert L. Dtcyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), Heidegger. Λ Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackweih 1992), 45-64; Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T . 1991): Charles Guignon, Heidegger and tlic Problem of Knowledge (Indi anapolis: Hackcll. 1983): John llaugchmd. "Heidegger on Being a Person" in Dreyfus and H a l l , Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 1-26. 4. Heidegger's "Rede" has been translated as "discourse," "discursiveness," "talk." and "telling." We shall translate il as "discourse" throughout. 5. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 111. 6. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge.
115.
7. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge,
118.
8. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. 118, 126. For a very helpful dis cussion of the constitutive view of language in later Heidegger, see Charles Guignon. "Heidegger: Language as the House of Being" in Chip Sills ( e i l ) . The Philosophy of Discourse (Portsmouth. N . H . : Boynton/Cook Publishers. 1992), 163-187. esp. 177 183. 9. Heidegger: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeilbegriffs: Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 20 (Frank furt a. Μ.: Vittorio Klostcrmann, 1979), 365; English trans, by Theodore Kisiel, I he History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). 265. 10. Heidegger. Prolegomena, p. 361; English trans.. 262. 11. Dreyfus uses different words at different times. "Everyday" is sometimes replaced by the term "average." In place of "social," Dreyfus occasionally says "shared" (terms rarely em ployed by Heidegger) or "public." Dreyfus sometimes attaches to "practices" (rarely used by Heidegger) Ihe word "background." For convenience, we slick to Ihe phrase "everyday social practices." 12. Dreyfus, Being-in-thc-Woiid, 154, 161. 13. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 154f., 161. 14. Dreyfus even goes so far as lo identify "being" with "the intelligibility correlative w i t h our everyday background practices." See Being-in-the-World, 10. 15. Frederick Olafson, "Heidegger ά la Wittgenstein or 'Coping' w i l h Professor Dreyfus." Inquiry 37 (1994): 4.5-64, here 55. On Ihe differences between ihe interpretations of Dreyfus and Olafson. sec Taylor Carman. " O n Being Social: A Reply to Olafson." Inquiry 37 (1994): 203-223. 16. Olafson, "Heidegger ά la Wittgenstein," 55. 17. On "deficient modes," see Klaus Hartninnn. "The Logic of Dclicicnt and Eminent Modes in Heidegger," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 5 (1974): I 18-134 and David Wcberman, 7/ir Pragmatic Turn in Early Hcitleggrr, Ph.D. diss., Columbia U n i versity. 1990, 23-29
282
385
:
HEIDEGGER A N DTHE SOURCElSi OI INTELLIGIBILITY
IS 19
20.
O l a f s o n . "Ilcitl«?(ijz i i .
sec
Olafson
misses
3391.;
I he
Philosophy o\'Mind7New strong nol
linglish Irans
Dreyfus,
theory
constitutive
Haven:
v i Mitsein
realized
246.
living-in-tliv-WorUI. role
Yale
to
For furlhcr passages supporting this inlcrpie
142-146. of
das
University
which
Man
when
Press.
he
1987).
Heidegger commits
writes
146:
in
Heidegger
"|T)he
himself in
and
promise
llcing and
Time
is
ihc
of the simply
. A l t h o u g h i t i s u n d e r s t o o d l l i a t i t i s a n e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f Dasein t h a t t h e
e n t i t i e s i t u n c o v e r s arc. a t least i n p r i n c i p l e , the s a m e e n t i t i e s i n the s a m e w o r l d t h a i o l h c i like entities uncover. . enlily
.
. there is no real account of the w a y in w h i c h » i v u n c o v e r i n g an
as an entity depends on
between
HIV a n d
someone
someone
else's
else's d o i n g so as
uncovering
lies
in
ihc
w e l l . " As discussed, the
fact
thai
we
usually
link
a r e das
Man
a n d have ils u n d e r s t a n d i n g 21.
Ilcidcggci
terms
of
tausgabe. ger's
s
d i s c u s s i o n v i das
conforniism.
V o l . 6.3. ( F r a n k f u r t
earliest
deployment
sec T h e o d o r e
See SZ 370:
in
1923.
Heidegger, a. M :
of the
Kisiel,
ol California. 22.
Man
See
I lie
characterizes
Ontotogie
(hat
Vittoiio Kloslermann.
concept
o f das
Man
Gvnvsis of Heidegger's
notion
(Hermeneutik
in
1988).
his
entirely i n
der
1922
negative
Faktizilät):
3If.. 85L On report
to
GesamHeideg-
Paul
living and Time ( B e r k e l e y :
Natorp,
University
1993), 2491.
In the
p r e c e d i n g analyses we have often used the
l o c u t i o n " f i r s t and f o r the
m o s t part." " F i r s t " signifies the w a y i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s " m a n i f e s t " i n the b e i n g w i t h others of puhlicness. even
i f i t lias also " f u n d a m e n t a l l y " e x i s t e n t i e l l ) ' " o v e r c o m e " e v e r y d a y n e s s .
" F o r Ihc most part" signifies the w a y in w h i c h Dasein shows itself for anyone, not always, h u t "as a r u l e . " 23.
On litis distinction, Hall.
24
Heidegger from"
25.
often
see a l s o J o s e p h Critical
o f das
(SZ
Fell, "The
66
Reader.
speaks
(Sichznriiikholvn)
lassen tuts.. of
Λ
Heidegger.
and
Man
as
or
out
268)
F a m i l i a r and the Strange"
Weberman.
something of
7/ir
which
which
we
Pragmatic
we
can
can he
in Dreyfus and
Turn.
"bring
64-87.
ourselves
summoned
back
(sielt-aitfritfen-
.) ( S Z 2 9 9 ) , f u r t h e r c o n f i r m i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r s e e s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e w a y i
das Man.
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w a s first d e v e l o p e d b y C h a r l e s G u i g n o n . Sec his a n a l y s i s i n " H e i d c g ger's
'Authenticity'
especially 329-330. 2971.; be
Revisited."
" T o this loslncss
understood
in
Review
For evidence
the
| i n das Man\
way
.38
of Metaphysics
(December.
1984):
i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s r e a d i n g , sec S Z 2 6 8 , 2 9 9 , one's o w n
o f resoluteness.
m o d i f i e s b o t h Ihc w a y i n w h i c h the
'world'
But
Dasein can appeal, in
that
case
this
321-339 308. ant
a n d t h i s a p p e a l cat
authentic d i s c l o s e d n e s :
is disclosed and the w a y in w h i c h the Dasein
w i t h of o t h e r s is d i s c l o s e d . T h e ' w o r l d ' . . . d o c s not b e c o m e a n o t h e r o n e ' i n its c o n t e n t , n o r tloes the c i r c l e of others get e x c h a n g e d for a n e w o n e ; hut b o t h . . . are n o w g i v e n definite character in terms of their o w n m o s t potentiality-for-bcing-tliem-selvcs." 26.
The
point
is
not that
w e c o u l d e v e r p e e l o f f o r set a s i d e e v e r y d a y n e s s
and
das Man
an.
f i n d a source o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y that w o u l d p r o v i d e w h o l l y different concepts a n d prac (ices.
R a t h e r w e a r c s a y i n g t h a t das Man g i v e s r i s e t o o n e - s i d e d , d i s t o r t i o n a l a n d l i n i i l c
l e v e l l i n g t e n d e n c i e s t h a t c a n b e c o r r e c t e d b y a p p e a l t o other s o u r c e s o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . 27.
Sec
Dreyfus,
licing-in-the-World.
353.
While
Dreyfus
acknowledges
that
Division
II
c
S Z m i g h t appear t o c o n t r a d i c t this assertion, w e c o n t e n d that (he l i m i t e d o f everydaync* a n d das Man i s a l r e a d y c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d i n D i v i s i o n I . 28.
O i n thanks to T a y l o r C a r m a n for this point.
29.
See SZ 2 3 0 w h e r e care is described as "(he p r i m o r d i a l structure of the b e i n g of D a s e i r
("(/('<'
ursprüngliche
Zeitbegriffs.
Seinsvcifassung
ties
Daseins")
40611.
283
and
Prolegomena
vir
Geschichte
di
386
PIERRE KELLER & DAVID WBBERMAN
30. Heidegger, Prolegemonena, 4 2 1 , English trans, xxx. 3 1 . Interpreters differ as to whether Heidegger's analysis of originary temporality provides an account of all modes of existence or only authentic modes. We are inclined to agree with Blattner that originary temporality underlies all instances of care, authentic and inauthentic. See W i l l i a m D. Blattner, "Existential Temporality in Being and Time ( W h y Heidegger is not a Pragmatist)" in Dreyfus and Hall, Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 99-129. 32. See also SZ 3 0 1 , 323, 326. We agree w i t h Margot Fleischer's rejection of Heidegger's claim that his Division II discussion of temporality is necessitated by D i v i s i o n I's failure to treat Dasein and its care structure as a totality (Ganzheit). We would argue however (concurring w i t h Dahlstrom's response to Fleischer) that the discussion of temporality does add to Division I by showing how temporality is presupposed by and integral to Heidegger's concept of care. See Margot Fleischer, Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers "Sein und Zeit." Aporien, Probleme und ein Ausblick (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1991) and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Concept of Temporality," Review of Metaphysics 49 (1995): 95-115. 33. Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit: Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt a. M . : Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 410. See also Prolegomena, 442, English trans. 319. 34. For a probing and original discussion of Heidegger's concept of Gewesenheil and how it replaces the conventional notion of the past, see Thomas Sheehan, " H o w (Not) to Read Heidegger," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly L X I X (1995): 275-294. 35. See Pierre Keller. "Heidegger's Critique of the Vulgar Notion of Time." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (1996): 43-66 and Sheehan. " H o w (Not) to Read Heidegger." 36. Heidegger, Logik, 403. 37. See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995). §§17-18. 38. Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24 (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 452f.; English trans, by Albert Hofstadter, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1982), 318. 39. Heidegger. Grundprobleme. 456f.; English trans. 321. 40. Heidegger. Grundprobleme 463; English trans. 325. 4 1 . For more discussion of temporality as the source of intelligibility, see Pierre Keller. Husserl, Heidegger and Human Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 42. We would like to thank Taylor Carman. Charles Guignon. Sabina Knight, Roben Schärft" and two anonymous referees of this journal for valuable suggestions on earlier drafts.
284
PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS VOL.
27.
so.
2,
FALL
1999
Socz'fl/ Constraints on Conversational Content: Heidegger on Rede and Gerede
M a r k A. Wrathall Brightim Young University
I. LNTRODUCTION
W h a t role does one's c o m m u n i t y p l a y i n d e t e r m i n i n g one's m e a n i n g — i n f i x i n g the content o f w h a t i s a v a i l a b l e t o i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s o f t h a t c o m m u n i t y to do or to say? Heidegger, for one. has argued that our activities are h e a v i l y constrained by social factors. We a l w a y s act w i t h i n a p u b l i c r e a l m , w h i c h is already o r g a n i z e d and i n t e r p r e t e d in a d e t e r m i n a t e way. As a c o n sequence. H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , w e are " c o n s t a n t l y d e l i v e r e d o v e r t o this interpretedness, w h i c h controls and distributes the p o s s i b i l i t i e s " available to 1
us for a c t i o n . I n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r argues that o u r b e i n g " d e l i v e r e d o v e r " to the p u b l i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f things i s a n inescapable feature o f h u m a n e x i s tence. W h a t is true of a c t i o n in general is also true f o r o u r use of language. H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s that in language i t s e l f there is h i d d e n an " u n d e r s t a n d i n g 2
o f the disclosed w o r l d . " S o n o t j u s t o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r p r a c t i c a l engagem e n t w i t h the t h i n g s and p e o p l e a r o u n d us, b u t e v e n the possible range o f w h a t we can say is subject in some w a y to others. One consequence of social constraints on language. Heidegger believes, is a tendency on the part of speakers to f a l l i n t o a superficial i m i t a t i o n of the
285
k i n d s οΓ I l l i n g s thai others in t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c c n m m u n i l y say. He calls such speech Gerede,
w h i c h is g e n e r a l l y t r a n s l a t e d as " i d l e t a l k . " Gvirdc is the
e v e r y d a y m o d e o f Rede, w h i c h i s g e n e r a l l y t r a n s l a t e d a s " d i s c o u r s e . " F o r reasons t o he e x p l a i n e d later, I w i l l t r a n s l a t e Rede as " c o n v e r s a t i o n , " a n d Gerede as " i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n . " H e i d e g g e r tells us lhat in i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n , one understands t h i n g s " o n l y a p p r o x i m a t e l y and s u p e r f i c i a l l y " : " o n e d o c s not so m u c h understand those entities about w h i c h one converses |
understood, wc
will
see that
Heidegger is not
c o m m i t t e d to (he v i e w that c o n v e r s a t i o n a l c o n t e n t is necessarily subject to p u b l i c n o r m s . A l t h o u g h the i n t c r p e n c t r a t i o n of practices means that it is pos sible to use language to t a l k about t h i n g s we do not g e n u i n e l y understand, it does n o t m e a n that w e have t o d o so. In an e a r l i e r a r t i c l e , I argued that p h i l o s o p h y stands to benefit f r o m the
286
a b i l i t y t o tend past tin- b o u n d a r i e s o l " a n a l y t i c " o r " C o n t i n e n t a l " p h i l o s o 1
p h y . I n the s p i r i t o f that a r g u m e n t . I w i l l b e g i n b y c o m p a r i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s n l i h r s o c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s o n m e a n i n g w i t h a r g u m e n t s made f o r social c x l e m a l i s m i n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y . Philosophers l i k e P u t n a m , Bürge, and H u m m e d have w o r k e d out a dc-lailcd e x p l a n a t i o n o f h o w the content o f nm t h o u g h t s , b e l i e f s , and w o r d s is d e t e r m i n e d at least in part by t h i n g s external to us, i n c l u d i n g the social context in w h i c h w o r d s c o m e to have the m e a n i n g (hat they have." An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of these a r g u m e n t s p r o v i d e s a h e l p f u l b a c k g r o u n d for c x ; m i n i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w . I h c social externalists t e l l us thai Ihc m e a n i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r utterance i s d c l e i m i i u - d b y (he language i n w h i c h i l i s u t t e r e d . S o w e c a n m a k e a m e a n i n g f u l utterance i n (he sense o f s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g thai can b e unders t o o d b y a c o m p e t e n t speaker o f (he language, w i t h o u t ourselves k n o w i n g m u c h about (he ( h i n g o f w h i c h w c speak, o r w i t h o u t k n o w i n g w h a t o u r w o r d s arc t a k e n t o m e a n . T h i s c o n s e q u e n c e o f the e x t e r n a l i s t v i e w — i . e . , (hat the speakers of a l a n g u a g e o f t e n l a c k a g e n u i n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the t h i n g s they ate saying-—might, on (be face of i t , seem l i k e a p r o m i s i n g basis lot j u s t i f y i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m thnt Gerede, i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n , is a pervasive p h e n o m e n o n . I shall u l t i m a t e l y argue, h o w e v e r , that this is not h o w H e i d e g g e r understands idle c o n v e r s a t i o n . T h e a n a l y t i c d i s c u s s i o n o f social e x t e r n a l i s m i s nevertheless i l l u m i n a t i n g , i f o n l y t o s h o w h o w H e i d e g g e r ' s account of i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n s h o u l d ;ir?f be c o n s t r u e d . In fact. 1 b e l i e v e the c o m p a r i s o n docs m o r e than that. Il also helps us sec h o w l i m i t e d the consequences of Garde arc for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the essential features of l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n general.
II. SETTING T H E STAGE: SOCIAL E X T E R N A L I S M
O n e t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w o f Ihc influence o f a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y o n a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s m e a n i n g denies that there is any essential i n f l u e n c e at a l l — t h a t is, i l insists that w h a t those a r o u n d m c m e a n b y t h e i r w o r d s o r i m a g i n e m y w o r d s to m e a n has no b e a r i n g on the m e a n i n g of w h a t I say. W h a t I m e a n w h e n I speak is e n t i r e l y dependent on what I intend to say, and w h a t I i n t e n d t o say i s d e t e r m i n e d b y w h a t I k n o w — n o t b y w h a t those a r o u n d m e k n o w . I n o t h e r w o r d s , w h a t I can express i s restricted t o w h a t , o n the basis o f m y personal history, I c o u l d i n t e n d t o m e a n . W h a t others k n o w c a n n o t f i g u r e i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t I i n t e n d t o say ( a l t h o u g h I w i l l , o f course, often find i t useful to spenk in the w a y that I b e l i e v e others w o u l d speak). My w o r d s are thus to be understood w i t h o u t any necessary reference to the l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y to w h i c h I belong. E x t e r n a l i s t s , i n contrast, take the v i e w that, t o q u o t e P u t n a m ' s n o w f a m o u s phrase, ' " m e a n i n g s ' j u s t a i n ' t i n the head." P u t n a m ' s p i o n e e r i n g 9
287
a r g u m e n t f o r this proceeds b y t r y i n g t o d e m o n s t r a t e , t h r o u g h a v a r i e t y o f h y p o t h e t i c a l examples, that t w o t r a d i t i o n a l internalist theses about m e a n i n g are i n c o m p a t i b l e . These theses are: 1. "Thai knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state:" and 2. "That the meaning of a term (in the sense of 'intension') determines its extension." " 1
F r o m these t w o theses, it w o u l d seem to f o l l o w that the p s y c h o l o g i c a l state associated w i t h k n o w i n g the m e a n i n g o f a t e r m determines the extension o f that t e r m . B u t , a c c o r d i n g to P u t n a m , there are cases in w h i c h , g i v e n d i f f e r i n g c o n d i t i o n s e x t e r n a l to the p s y c h o l o g i c a l state of the speaker, the same p s y c h o l o g i c a l state w i l l d e t e r m i n e d i f f e r e n t extensions. I f that is true, then there must be m o r e to k n o w i n g the m e a n i n g of a t e r m than b e i n g in a g i v e n p s y c h o l o g i c a l state. O n e set o f e x a m p l e s t o w h i c h P u t n a m alludes i n d e m o n s t r a t i n g that " i n n e r " p s y c h o l o g i c a l states are not s u f f i c i e n t to d e t e r m i n e e x t e n s i o n are cases a r i s i n g f r o m w h a t h e calls the " s o c i a l d i v i s i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c l a b o r . " T h e r e are m a n y instances in w h i c h it is useful f o r us to a c q u i r e a w o r d f o r s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t also a c q u i r i n g a n expertise i n r e c o g n i z i n g i f s o m e t h i n g g e n u i n e l y belongs to the e x t e n s i o n of "he w o r d . We leave this w o r k to o t h ers, thus d i v i d i n g the " l i n g u i s t i c l a b o r " : The features that are generally thought to be present in connection with a general name—necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the extension, ways of recognizing if something is in the extension ("cntena"). etc.—are all present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body; but that collective body divides the "labor" of knowing and employing diese various pans of the "meaning.'" 1
P u t n a m cites such e x a m p l e s as a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n f u s i o n o v e r the d i f ference between beeches and elms, or between a l u m i n u m and m o l y b d e n u m , o r a n i n a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e the exact e x t e n s i o n o f " g o l d . " P u t n a m c l a i m s that f o r any E n g l i s h speaker the e x t e n s i o n o f such t e r m s w i l l be the same, regardless o f h o w r i c h o r i m p o v e r i s h e d that speaker's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the extension o f the t e r m m i g h t be. O f course, the poorer m y concept o f a n e l m is. the m o r e l i k e l y I am to make m i s t a k e n c l a i m s and h o l d m i s t a k e n beliefs about the e l m . B u t because the extension of the t e r m is d e t e r m i n e d by other, m o r e c o m p e t e n t speakers o f E n g l i s h than I . i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r m e t o m a k e i l l u m i n a t i n g , useful, and even true claims about elms w i t h o u t k n o w i n g m u c h at all about t h e m . I n a series o f a r t i c l e s ,
, :
Bürge has a r g u e d a l o n g s i m i l a r lines m a t the
content of our i n t e n t i o n a l states is at least p a r t l y d e t e r m i n e d by the language and concepts o f the people w i t h w h o m w e i n t e r a c t — l a n g u a g e and concepts
288
of w h i c h we often have, at best, an i n c o m p l e t e understanding. Thus, accordi n g to Bürge, we can t h i n k things and say things w i t h o u t necessarily k n o w i n g w h a t w e t h i n k a n d mean. L i k e P u t n a m . Bürge begins w i t h the s u p p o s i t i o n that m e a n i n g determines extension. Consequently, i f t w o terms have different extensions, they m u s t also express d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s . T h e p r o b l e m is that, for a v a r i e t y of reasons, any g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l is often unable to rix the e x t e n s i o n of a t e r m . E v e n i f i n d i v i d u a l s are capable o f a r t i c u l a t i n g a t e r m ' s m e a n i n g , thereby e x p l i c a t i n g the basis o n w h i c h t h i n g s are i n c l u d e d i n o r e x c l u d e d f r o m its extension, they often lack the present a b i l i t y to do so. F o r instance, we often have a p r e c o g n i t i v e f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h e x a m p l e s o f a c e r t a i n k i n d o f t h i n g w i t h o u t h a y i n g conceptualized on w h a t basis the examples count as the k i n d o f t h i n g that w e take t h e m t o be. Perhaps, despite a l l o u r e x p e r i e n c e w i t h insects and arachnids, we have never r e a l l y t h o u g h t about w h a t makes us class ants w i t h bees but not w i t h spiders. Or it may be that we lack the sort o f direct experience w i t h the things i n q u e s t i o n that w o u l d a l l o w u s t o c l a r i f y o u r c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t it takes to c o u n t as such a t h i n g — p e r h a p s we t h i n k of m a m m a l s as furry, l a n d - d w e l l i n g creatures because we have never c o m e across w h a l e s . O r i t c o u l d b e that w e have d e v e l o p e d o n l y the d i s c r i m i n a t o r y capacities a n d a b i l i t i e s m a d e r e l e v a n t b y o u r c u r r e n t n o r m a l e n v i r o n m e n t , but l a c k the a b i l i t y t o d i s c r i m i n a t e b e t w e e n i h t n g s w h i c h b e l o n g a n d d o not b e l o n g i n the e x t e n s i o n i n n o n - n o r m a i e n v i r o n m e n t s . I m a g i n e the d i f f i c u l t y for someone raised in the U n i t e d States of c a t e g o r i z i n g a l l the creatures one encounters i n A u s t r a l i a . I n a l l such cases. Bürge argues, our a b i l i t y to d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n s i o n of o u r w o r d s and concepts is i n f e r i o r to that of the people we recognize as experts c o n c e r n i n g those c o n cepts. B u t this does not j u s t i f y us in the b e l i e f that we mean s o m e t h i n g d i f ferent by these w o r d s than the experts. To the contrary. Bürge contends, we h o l d ourselves responsible to the w o r d s and concepts as they are understood i n o u r c o m m u n i t y . W h e n w e lack the a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n s i o n o f c e r t a i n terms and concepts on o u r o w n . we defer to others w h o possess the a b i l i t y . T h e r e are thus m a n y instances i n w h i c h w e d e p e n d o n others t o d e t e r m i n e o u r content f o r us. O u r r e c o g n i t i o n o f this dependence. Bürge p o i n t s o u t . i s readily m a n i fest i n o u r w i l l i n g n e s s t o stand c o r r e c t e d b y others i n the m e a n i n g o f o u r w o r d s . Bürge w o u l d c l a i m that this i s not a matter o f h a v i n g others f o i s t t h e i r meanings on us. Rather, we are w i l l i n g to stand c o r r e c t e d because we r e c o g n i z e that we speak the same language as the experts do. a n d they understand p o r t i o n s o f o u r c o m m o n language better than w e do. O r w e reco g n i z e that, in m a n y instances, we r e l y on the experts f o r o u r access to the e x a m p l e s o n w h i c h o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o u r w o r d s a n d concepts i s based. T h e r e i s thus g o o d reason for a c c e p t i n g c o r r e c t i o n f r o m t h e m i n the e x p l i c a t i o n o f o u r concepts a n d w o r d s :
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Our explicational abilities, and indeed all our cognitive mastery, regarding the referents of such words and concepts do not necessarily fix the referents. Nor therefore . . . do they necessarily fix the translational meanings or concepts associated with the words. . . . Others are often in a better position to arrive at a correct articulation of our word or concept, because they are in a better position to determine relevant empirical features of the referents. . . . Since the referents play a necessary role in individuating the person's concept or translational meaning, individuation of an individual's concepts or translational meanings may depend on the activity of others on whom the individual is dependent for acquisition of and access to the referents. If the others by acting differently had put one in touch w i t h different referents, compatibly with one's minimum explicational abilities, one would have had different concepts or translational meanings. -' 1
I t f o l l o w s that w e s o m e t i m e s i n t e n d t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n a w a y that w e d o not ourselves understand. T h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of these social externalist arguments hinges e n t i r e l y on the extent to w h i c h the examples they use c o n v i n c e us that a p r o p e r unders t a n d i n g of the speaker's m e a n i n g requires a necessary reference to others i n her l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . T o better appraise the s o c i a l e x t e r n a l i s t a r g u ment, therefore, it is w o r t h w h i l e to e x a m i n e the examples m o r e closely. T h e e x a m p l e s as P u t n a m a n d Bürge t y p i c a l l y present t h e m fait to c a r e f u l l y dist i n g u i s h between those speakers w h o k n o w the subject matter w e l l , but w h o d o not f u l l y understand what others refer t o w i t h their terms, a n d those w h o k n o w neither. F o r instance, i n Bürge's e x a m p l e o f a m a n w i t h a r t h r i t i s , the m a n i n q u e s t i o n k n o w s the f o l l o w i n g k i n d s o f t h i n g s about his a r t h r i t i s : he thinks (correctly) that he has had arthritis for years, that his arthritis in his wrists and fingers is more painful than his arthritis in his ankles, that it is better to have anhritis than cancer of the liver, that stiffening joints is a symptom of anhritis. that certain sorts of aches are characteristic of anhritis. that there are various kinds of anhritis. and so f o r t h . 14
T h e m a n does not k n o w that " i n f o r m e d " m e m b e r s o f his speech c o m m u n i t y use the t e r m " a r t h r i t i s " to refer to an i n f l a m m a t i o n of a j o i n t . P r e s u m a b l y , the m a n also does n o t k n o w ( a l t h o u g h Bürge i s not e x p l i c i t o n this p o i n t ) that his p a i n i s c a u s e d b y a n i n f l a m m a t i o n o f the j o i n t s . B u t this d i s t i n c t i o n — b e t w e e n n o t k n o w i n g some fact a b o u t the o b j e c t i n q u e s t i o n a n d not k n o w i n g h o w others refer t o that f a c t — i s a c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n t o d r a w i f w e are c o r r e c t l y to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t the speaker means to say w h e n , to take B u r g e ' s h y p o t h e t i c a l e x a m p l e , h e says t h i n g s l i k e " I ' v e d e v e l o p e d a r t h r i t i s in my thigh." To help see the i m p o r t a n c e of d r a w i n g this d i s t i n c t i o n . I w a n t to set out a c o u p l e o f m y o w n e x a m p l e s — e x a m p l e s that I h a v e t a i l o r e d t o h i g h l i g h t the i m p o r t a n t features o f these k i n d s o f s i t u a t i o n s .
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First e x a m p l e . U n t i l I b u i l t my o w n house, I t h o u g h t that a gable was a k i n d of peaked r o o f , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y I b e l i e v e d that the phrase
"gable
r o o f was redundant. I t was o n l y w h i l e c o n s t r u c t i n g the gables o n m y house that I d i s c o v e r e d that a gable is not a c t u a l l y a roof, but rather the t r i a n g u l a r e x t e r i o r w a l l section b o u n d e d by the r o o f rafters. A gable r o o f is. in fact, a r o o f that ends in a g a b l e . Of course, this was a d i f f i c u l t m i s t a k e to c o r r e c t since w h a t I t h o u g h t was a gable was in almost a l l instances a d j o i n e d by a gable, m e a n i n g that my i m p r o p e r use was as d i f f i c u l t for others to detect as their proper use was f o r me. As a result, even t h o u g h I d i d not k n o w w h a t the t e r m " g a b l e " a c t u a l l y meant, m a n y ( i f not m o s t ) o f the utterances i n w h i c h I used the t e r m were understood by others in a w a y w h i c h was appropriate under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , if n o t a c t u a l l y true in a l i t e r a l sense. So. w h i l e I had no p a r t i c u l a r m i s c o n c e p t i o n s about the matters b e i n g t a l k e d a b o u t — I d i d n o t . f o r instance, ever t h i n k a w a l l was a r o o f — I d i d l a c k a proper understanding of the w a y the t e r m '"gable" is t y p i c a l l y used. Second e x a m p l e . W h e n o r d e r i n g a n e w c o m p u t e r last w e e k . I t o l d the c o m p u t e r p u r c h a s i n g agent at the u n i v e r s i t y that I w a n t e d an e x t r a 128 megabytes o f R A M f o r the c o m p u t e r . A l t h o u g h I k n o w that " " R A M " i s a n a c r o n y m f o r "random access m e m o r y . " and I have a c t u a l l y installed R A M in my laptop before. I do not r e a l l y understand w h a t it is or h o w it w o r k s . I d o , h o w e v e r , h a v e a v a g u e sense that, i n g e n e r a l , a c o m p u t e r w i t h m o r e R A M w o r k s better than a c o m p u t e r w i t h less R A M , a n d this was e n o u g h t o a l l o w me to say sensible t h i n g s to the c o m p u t e r p u r c h a s i n g agent about i t . Nevertheless, m y use o f the t e r m was l i m i t e d i n i m p o r t a n t w a y s . F o r instance. I w o u l d b e u n a b l e o n m y o w n t o d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n s i o n o f m y t e r m ' " R A M " w i t h any degree o f p r e c i s i o n . M o r e o v e r , there i s a c o m p a r a t i v e l y s m a l l set o f inferences I c o u l d d r a w f r o m any p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m about R A M — m u c h smaller, f o r instance, than a c o m p u t e r expert c o u l d draw. N o w . the issue is, w h a t do such e x a m p l e s teach us about s o c i a l c o n straints o n l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g ? L e t m e b r i e f l y r e v i e w . These t w o d i f f e r e n t e x a m p l e s are i n t e n d e d t o i l l u s t r a t e t w o d i f f e r e n t senses i n w h i c h i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to a speaker u n d e r d e t e r m i n e s the m e a n i n g of the speaker's utterance ( o r at least the m e a n i n g it has f o r an i n f o r m e d audience). In the first example, the speaker lacks i n f o r m a t i o n about h o w other speakers of the language d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n s i o n of a t e r m . We assume, h o w e v e r , that the speaker is c o m p e t e n t to d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n s i o n of the t e r m as he h i m s e l f uses i t . In the s e c o n d e x a m p l e , the speaker l a c k s e v e n this m u c h — h e is unable on his o w n to d e t e r m i n e the extension of the t e r m either as he uses it or as others use i t . In a d d i t i o n , or perhaps as a consequence, the speaker also is very constrained in his understanding of the i n f e r e n t i a l relations his utterance w o u l d bear to other possible utterances.
13
To the e x t e n t that P u t n a m a n d Bürge r e l y on cases l i k e my ""gable"' e x a m p l e , it is not clear that they are e n t i t l e d to d r a w any conclusions about
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s o c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s o n m e a n i n g . T h i s i s because, g i v e n m y i g n o r a n c e o f the w a y others use the t e r m '"gable," we c a n p l a u s i b l y take me to refer to a gable w h e n I say " g a b l e " o n l y i f w e a l r e a d y have some c o m p e l l i n g reason to h o l d me accountable to the w a y that others are u s i n g their w o r d s . B u r g e ' s p o i n t that I d e p e n d on others for my access to the referents of the t e r m does not h o l d i n this case. A n d , a s D a v i d s o n has p o i n t e d o u t . w i t h o u t a c o m p e l l i n g reason, i t w o u l d not b e g o o d p o l i c y t o h o l d m e t o a m e a n i n g o f w h i c h I am not a w a r e .
16
As a consequence, w h e r e Bürge takes my readiness
to alter my use of " g a b l e " to accord w i t h c o m m u n i t y n o r m s as evidence that we h o l d ourselves responsible to the p u b l i c language, D a v i d s o n sees me as e m p l o y i n g a p r a g m a t i c f l e x i b i l i t y i n a l t e r i n g m y m o d e o f speech t o a c c o m m o d a t e my listeners. T h a t i s . on D a v i d s o n ' s a c c o u n t . I s h o u l d be seen as s h i f t i n g m y usage s i m p l y t o a v o i d c o n f u s i o n o n the part o f m y hearers ( d e e m i n g i t easier t o d o s o than t o preface m y r e m a r k s a b o u t g a b l e r o o f s w i t h an e x p l a n a t i o n to the effect that I i d i o s y n c r a t i c a l l y refer to t h e m as " g a b l e s " ) . B u t this w i l l i n g n e s s t o shift one's use o f terms does not c h a n g e the fact that k n o w i n g h o w the speaker i n t e n d s f o r her w o r d s to be understood is the m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor in u n d e r s t a n d i n g a speaker. Of course, a speaker c a n n o t reasonably i n t e n d f o r her w o r d s to be u n d e r s t o o d in a w a y that she k n o w s the hearers c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d . A w i s e speaker w i l l o f t e n adopt, as a pragmatic strategy, the use of w o r d s that i h e believes is c o m m o n in the l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . B u t there is n o t h i n g i n t r i n s i c to successful l a n guage use that requires her t o d o so. A n d i t w o u l d have been m a n i f e s t l y w r o n g , before I got clear about h o w o t h e r speakers use the t e r m , to say of m e : " W r a t h a l l t h i n k s that gable there i s c o v e r e d w i t h asphalt s h i n g l e s , but anyone can see i t i s made o f b r i c k . " T h e r i g h t t h i n g t o say w o u l d be: " W r a t h a l l says the gable is c o v e r e d w i t h asphalt s h i n g l e s , but he t h i n k s a gable is a gable r o o f . " B u t what o f cases l i k e m y " R A M " e x a m p l e ? I n such cases. I speak w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f t a k i n g advantage o f the d i v i s i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c labor. A n d i f one w e r e to set o u t to r a d i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t the t h i n g s I say a b o u t R A M , it is not clear h o w m u c h c o n t e n t one c o u l d a t t r i b u t e t o m e g i v e n that I k n o w s o l i t t l e about the subject matter. In s u c h cases, w h a t is s a i d c a n o n l y have a determinate c o n t e n t b y a p p e a l i n g t o someone else's k n o w l e d g e o f the subj e c t matter. T h e right w a y to i n t e r p r e t m e — t h a t is. the w a y I w a n t to be i n t e r p r e t e d — i s t o see m e a s u s i n g " R A M " i n the w a y c o m p u t e r experts d o . I w o u l d i n fact b e m i s u n d e r s t o o d i f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e s t r i c t e d i t s e l f t o m y o w n pallid understanding of computers. It w o u l d be manifestly w r o n g , for instance, f o r the p u r c h a s i n g agent to c o n c l u d e : " W r a t h a l l says he w a n t s m o r e R A M . b u t h e ' l l settle f o r a n y t h i n g that i m p r o v e s the p e r f o r m a n c e o f the c o m p u t e r . " N o w the q u e s t i o n is, w i l l i t h e l p us to see H e i d e g g e r ' s " i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n " i n terms o f m y " R A M " e x a m p l e — t h a t i s . i n terms o f those instances
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w h e r e w e s u r r e n d e r t o others o u r a u t h o r i t y o v e r the m e a n i n g o f w h a t w e say? Before d i r e c t l y c o m p a r i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f i d l e conversation t o Putnam's account o f the sociaJ d i v i s i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c labor, o r Bürge's a r g u ment for o u r dependence o n others i n d e t e r m i n i n g the content o f o u r w o r d s , let me m a k e a c o u p l e of o b s e r v a t i o n s .
"
First, as P u t n a m notes, it is n o t a necessary feature of language that meaning be d e t e r m i n e d by experts: "some words do not e x h i b i t any d i v i s i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c l a b o r . " ' " P u t n a m ' s e x a m p l e i s " c h a i r " : m a n y others are easily i m a g i n a b l e . T h e p o i n t i s that f o r m a n y things i n o u r w o r l d , e v e r y o n e ( o r almost e v e r y o n e ) is c o m p e t e n t not j u s t in the use of the w o r d , but in r e c o g n i z i n g the t h i n g . T h e l i n g u i s t i c d i v i s i o n of labor is d r i v e n by the demands of efficiency, not by the v e r y structure of language itself. P u t n a m provides no reasons f o r t h i n k i n g that there c o u l d b e n o language i n w h i c h speakers spoke o n l y about those things of w h i c h they had a sufficient understanding. S i m i l a r l y , Bürge argues that the s o c i a l character of language is a p s y c h o l o g i c a l rather than conceptual necessity, w h i c h is to say that there is n o t h i n g in Burge's a c c o u n t that requires that m e a n i n g be s o c i a l l y d e t e r m i n e d . One w a y to see this is to note that the v e r y fact that some in a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y rely o n others t o f i x the e x t e n s i o n o f their terms shows that not e v e n one can f a i l to k n o w w h a t they are t a l k i n g about. There are necessarily some people in the c o m m u n i t y — t h e e x p e r t s — w h o do not rely on others to fix the extension.
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L a n g u a g e can f u n c t i o n , a n d often does f u n c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e ,
w i t h o u t any essential reference to the w a y in w h i c h the c o m m u n i t y at large understands a t e r m . T h u s , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f the sort that P u t n a m a n d Bürge advance w i l l not support the s t r o n g c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t the s t r u c t u r a l necessity of Gerede that people l i k e D r e y f u s and C a r m a n see i n Heidegger. A t best, they w o u l d support an e m p i r i c a l or p s y c h o l o g i c a l c l a i m to the effect that idle conversat i o n is in fact pervasive. Second, even i n examples l i k e the " R A i M " case, n o t h i n g about Putnam's o r B u r g e ' s a r g u m e n t s supports the d r i v e t o w a r d l e v e l i n g and b a n a l i z a t i o n that H e i d e g g e r finds in Gerede. As already noted, the idea that some people d o not f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e y ' r e t a l k i n g about o n l y makes sense, f o r b o t h P u t n a m and Bürge, o n the a s s u m p t i o n that others d o . I n other w o r d s , it m a y be true that, in some cases, m a n y or even m o s t of the speakers of a language d o not k n o w w h a t t h e y m e a n . B u t they can get a w a y w i t h i t prec i s e l y because s o m e (the e x p e r t s ) do k n o w . F o r b o t h P u t n a m and Bürge, then, p u b l i c language is not l e v e l e d d o w n to an average u n d e r s t a n d i n g — t o the c o n t r a r y , it preserves a g e n u i n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g because its c o n t e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y w h a t the e x p e r t s t h i n k , n o t b y w h a t the p u b l i c a t large c a n think. W i t h these notes i n the b a c k g r o u n d , w e can b e g i n t o see w h y the P u t n a m / B u r g e a c c o u n t o f the s o c i a l d i v i s i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c l a b o r i s not w h a t
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H e i d e g g e r has i n m i n d w i t h his n o t i o n o f idle c o n v e r s a t i o n . W h a t i s c r u c i a l to H e i d e g g e r ' s account is not the speaker's a b i l i t y or i n a b i l i t y to d e t e r m i n e the extension of her terms, or even to see w h a t is e n t a i l e d by her utterances. Rather, H e i d e g g e r sees b o t h these k i n d s of f a i l i n g s on the speaker's part as d e r i v e d f r o m her l a c k o f experience w i t h the objects, and the situations i n w h i c h the objects are t y p i c a l l y f o u n d . T h a t lack o f e x p e r i e n c e , and the corr e s p o n d i n g lack of sensibility that such experience fosters, is the real source of idle conversation. T o i l l u s t r a t e this p o i n t . I o f f e r a t h i r d e x a m p l e o f a k i n d o f d i s p a r i t y b e t w e e n w h a t a speaker can express and w h a t a speaker understands about the subject o f her e x p r e s s i o n . T h i s w i l l o r i e n t us to the w a y H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e r n differs f r o m the k i n d o f l i n g u i s t i c i n c o m p e t e n c e o n w h i c h P u t n a m and Bürge focus. T h e U . K . D e p a r t m e n t o f the E n v i r o n m e n t . Transport, and R e g i o n s issues the f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s on using a r o u n d a b o u t :
• • • • •
On approaching a roundabout take notice and act on all the information available to you. including traffic signs, traffic lights and lane markings which direct you into the correct lane. You should . . . decide as early as possible which exit you need to take give an appropriate signal. Time your signals so as not to confuse other road users get into the correct lane adjust your speed and position to fit in w i t h traffic conditions be aware of the speed and position of all the traffic around you.
When reaching the roundabout you should • give p r i o r i t y to traffic approaching from your right, unless directed otherwise by signs, road markings or traffic lights • check whether road markings allow you to enter the roundabout without g i v i n g way. If so. proceed, but still look to the right before j o i n i n g • watch out for vehicles already on the roundabout: be aware they may not be signalling correctly or at all • look forward before moving off to make sure traffic in front has moved o f f I consider m y s e l f a competent driver, and I am conversant b o t h in the use of a l l the terms e m p l o y e d i n these rules o f the h i g h w a y c o d e and i n the operat i o n o f a n a u t o m o b i l e . Nevertheless, m y b r i e f e x p e r i e n c e w i t h d r i v i n g i n B r i t a i n has c o n v i n c e d me that there is an i m p o r t a n t sense in w h i c h I do not r e a l l y understand w h a t I am b e i n g t o l d to do w h e n d i r e c t e d , f o r instance, to "adjust y o u r speed and p o s i t i o n t o f i t i n w i t h traffic c o n d i t i o n s . " o r t o "get i n t o the c o r r e c t l a n e . " or to "be aware of the speed a n d p o s i t i o n of the traffic a r o u n d y o u . " In s a y i n g that I do not r e a l l y understand these t h i n g s . I do not mean either that I w o u l d not use the terms in the same w a y that the h i g h w a y code does, or that I do not understand w h a t those d i r e c t i o n s are d i r e c t i n g m e t o d o . I n s t e a d . I m e a n that, i n v i r t u e o f m y l a c k o f e x p e r i e n c e i n
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n a v i g a t i n g r o u n d a b o u t s in B r i t a i n , those d i r e c t i o n s g i v e me. at best, an a p p r o x i m a t e a n d s u p e r f i c i a l sense f o r w h a t 1 w o u l d need to do if 1 f o u n d m y s e l f i n that s i t u a t i o n . I f I w e r e n o w , o n the basis o f h a v i n g read those guidelines, to instruct a colleague on d r i v i n g in preparation f o r her u p c o m i n g t r i p to L o n d o n . I w o u l d be e n g a g i n g in i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n because I w o u l d , i n a n i m p o r t a n t respect, l a c k u n d e r s t a n d i n g about that o f w h i c h I spoke. U n l i k e the p r e v i o u s e x a m p l e s , h o w e v e r . I am not i g n o r a n t of either h o w other speakers use their w o r d s , o r h o w t o g o about d e t e r m i n i n g the e x t e n s i o n o f m y o w n w o r d s . W h a t p r e c i s e l y i t i s that I l a c k needs f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n — a project to w h i c h I w i l l r e t u r n . B u t w h a t e v e r it is. I believe it is best u n d e r s t o o d on the basis of H e i d e g g e r ' s account of Gerede. B e f o r e expanding further on this example, therefore. I r u m to a more exegetical discussion o f H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n .
III.
LANGUAGE. IDLE
CONVERSATION.
AND
CONVERSATION
To understand H e i d e g g e r ' s account of i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n . Gerede, we need to start w i t h his account of c o n v e r s a t i o n , or Rede. L e t me b e g i n w i t h a review o f the role played b y c o n v e r s a t i o n i n H e i d e g g e r ' s o v e r a l l account o f being-in-the-world. Conversation is one of the c o n s t i t u t i v e moments of the disclosedness of the w o r l d . A w o r l d is disclosed w h e n we have a b a c k g r o u n d readiness to act i n w a y s w h i c h m a k e sense, i.e.. w h i c h g i v e u n i t y a n d coherence t o o u r activities in the w o r l d . In s a y i n g that d i s c l o s i n g is a background readiness. I ' m t r y i n g t o emphasize that i t i s not any particular active engagement w i t h the people and things around us. H e i d e g g e r calls the w a y in w h i c h p a r t i c u lar a c t i v i t i e s o p e n up a r e l a t i o n to t h i n g s in the w o r l d " d i s c o v e r i n g " to dist i n g u i s h it f r o m the b a c k g r o u n d readiness that is disclosure. W h e n I say that d i s c l o s i n g is a k i n d of b a c k g r o u n d readiness. I mean to d i s t i n g u i s h it f r o m a mere c a p a c i t y or a b i l i t y to do s o m e t h i n g . To i l l u s t r a t e this d i s t i n c t i o n , imagine someone fluent in b o t h G e r m a n and E n g l i s h , but w h o has never had any exposure to F i n n i s h . We m i g h t say of this person that she has a ( m e r e ) capacity to understand F i n n i s h , but is able—has an a b i l i t y — t o understand G e r m a n and E n g l i s h . I n a d d i t i o n , w h e n i n the U n i t e d States, she w i l l o r d i n a r i l y b e ready t o hear E n g l i s h , but n o t G e r m a n . Indeed, i f someone began speaking G e r m a n to her, it m i g h t a c t u a l l y take a m o m e n t before she understood w h a t was b e i n g said. M y c l a i m is, i n short, that H e i d e g g e r ' s concept of disclosure is meant to demonstrate h o w o u r active response to things and people in the w o r l d a r o u n d us is made possible by a readiness for the things that o r d i n a r i l y s h o w u p i n the w o r l d . H e i d e g g e r believes that i f w e w a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d the w a y h u m a n s are in a w o r l d , we first need to r e c o g n i z e the
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i m p o r t a n c e o f this k i n d o f readiness i n p r i m i n g u s for the p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i ties i n w h i c h one t y p i c a l l y engages i n that w o r l d . One o f the k e y features i n c o n s t i t u t i n g any p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f readiness for the w o r l d is m o o d , the ontic mode of disposedness. Disposedness makes us ready for things b y d e t e r m i n i n g i n advance h o w they w i l l matter to us: Being-in as such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-world can "matter" to it in this way. The fact that this son of thing can "matter'' to it is grounded in one's disposedness. . . . Existentially. disposedness implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. 10
F o r e x a m p l e , a s H e i d e g g e r notes, one consequence o f b e i n g i n a m o o d o f fear is that things in the w o r l d tend to matter to us insofar as they are threatening. A n o t h e r k e y feature i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f readiness i s o u r understandi n g — o u r k n o w i n g h o w t o d o t h i n g s , k n o w i n g w h a t i s a p p r o p r i a t e , necessary, w h a t makes sense, etc. A p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of readiness has the "shape" i t does i n v i r t u e o f the o n t i c a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n a n interpretation. As I understand it. in interpretation we appropriate an overall understanding of the w o r l d by d e c i d i n g w h i c h things are appropriate or necessary f o r us. m a k e sense f o r us. O n c e we reach s u c h a d e c i s i o n , we are ready to undertake p a r t i c u l a r actions in response to the s i t u a t i o n that c o n fronts us. F o r instance, I have a b a c k g r o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a v a r i e t y of pieces o f equipment and e q u i p m e n t a l c o n t e x t s — t h i n g s l i k e chalkboards and classrooms, airplanes and a i r p o r t s , j i g s a w s and w o o d shops. I also have a b a c k g r o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a v a r i e t y o f h u m a n activities and i d e n t i t i e s — w r i t i n g on a b o a r d and b e i n g a teacher, r e a d i n g w h a t is w r i t t e n on a b o a r d and b e i n g a student, e r a s i n g w h a t is on the b o a r d a n d b e i n g a j a n i t o r , etc. W h e n I act i n the w o r l d o n the basis o f m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f objects, a c t i v ities, contexts, and i d e n t i t i e s , m y a c t i o n b o t h decides for m e h o w a l l those w o r l d l y things w i l l line u p w i t h one another, and expresses an understandi n g o f those things a n d a c t i v i t i e s and contexts and identities b y a c t u a l i z i n g the w a y in w h i c h they stand in a t o t a l i t y of significance. T h u s , w h e n I d r a w a chart on a c h a l k b o a r d in a c l a s s r o o m , the a c t i o n is not j u s t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ; i t i s also a n a c t i o n i n w h i c h I i n t e r p r e t m y s e l f and the w o r l d around me in a teacherly way. In this way, the action looks b e y o n d the c o m municative intention toward a "future" realization of an identity through w h i c h I interpret the w o r l d a r o u n d m e . T h i s a c t i o n i s o p e n e d u p f o r m e , i n other w o r d s , b y a b a c k g r o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the k i n d o f t h i n g s teachers d o , together w i t h m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the w o r l d a r o u n d m e i n terms o f m y being a teacher. F i n a l l y , any p a r t i c u l a r readiness is c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i -
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ties i n w h i c h w e are absorbed, such a b s o r p t i o n b e i n g the ontic m o d e o f f a l l i n g . W h e n 1 am in the c l a s s r o o m t e a c h i n g a class, f o r instance. 1 am ready for classroom events. 1 w o u l d not be ready for, say, one of the people seated in the class to come spontaneously to the board w h i l e I ' m t a l k i n g and erase w h a t I have w r i t t e n . B u t the same act w o u l d n o t strike me as at a l l strange if I were absorbed in a d i f f e r e n t sort of a c t i v i t y , such as p r e p a r i n g the classroom for my next lecture. In disclosedness. then, a w o r l d is opened up for us in the sense 'hat we have a coherent w a y of b e i n g ready to respond to w h a t e v e r we encounter as w e g o about o u r business. T h e role o f c o n v e r s a t i o n . H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , i s the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f this readiness:
" T h e c o m p l e t e disclosedness o f the
there—a disclosedness w h i c h i s c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g , d i s posedness, and f a l l i n g — i s a r t i c u l a t e d t h r o u g h conversation."-A l t h o u g h one m i g h t hear a phrase l i k e " a r t i c u l a t e d t h r o u g h c o n v e r s a t i o n " a s d e n o t i n g a n e x p l i c i t , v e r b a l e x p l i c a t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g , this i s n o t p r i m a r i l y w h a t H e i d e g g e r has i n m i n d . Indeed, m y reason for p r e f e r r i n g " c o n v e r s a t i o n " to " d i s c o u r s e " as a t r a n s l a t i o n for Rede is that she E n g l i s h t e r m and its cognates still bear s o m e t h i n g o f the o r i g i n a l c o n n o t a t i o n o f l i v i n g w i t h , h a v i n g intercourse w i t h , o r b e i n g engaged w i t h a person o r t h i n g . T h e L a t i n root, versor. has the sense o f d w e l l i n g , l i v i n g , or r e m a i n i n g i n a place. I n the p a n i c i p i e . i t has the sense o f b u s y i n g o n e s e l f w i t h o r b e i n g engaged in s o m e t h i n g . T h e n o t i o n of a verbal c o n v e r s a t i o n is. ;n us o r i g i n a l E n g l i s h use. j u s t one species o f the broader sense o f l i v i n g w i t h or b e i n g i n v o l v e d together w i t h others i n some a c t i v i t y . T h a t " c o n v e r s a t i o n " has c o m e to be l i m i t e d to v e r b a l i n t e r a c t i o n is a natural e v o l u t i o n . I suppose, g i v e n that one o f the p r i m a r y f o r m s c f h u m a n i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h others i s that o f l i n g u i s t i c d i s c o u r s e . T h e earlier, broader sense is s t i i l present i n E n g l i s h terms l i k e " c o n v e r s a n c e " — b e i n g c o n v e r s a n t w i t h , i.e.. k n o w i n g h o w t o deal w i t h s o m e t h i n g o r s o m e o n e — b u t even a " c o n v e r s a t i o n " was once understood in n o n i i n g u i s t i c terms, as the K i n g James Translation of the B i b l e r e a d i l y attests. I cite a single e x a m p l e : St. Peter advised the C h r i s t i a n w i v e s of u n b e l i e v i n g husbands to set an e x a m p l e of f a i t h f o r their husbands w i t h o u t preaching to t h e m , so that their husbands " m a y w i t h o u t the w o r d be w o n b y the c o n v e r s a t i o n o f the w i v e s ; w h i l e they b e h o l d y o u r chaste c o n versation c o u p l e d w i t h f e a r . "
::
I t i s p r e c i s e l y the idea o f a n e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h i n g s and p e o p l e — a n engagement that c a n o c c u r " w i t h o u t the w o r d " — t h a t H e i d e g g e r means t o capture w i t h the n o t i o n o f Rede. E v e n w h e n c o n v e r s i n g o r c o n v e r s a t i o n i s l i n g u i s t i c i n f o r m , the e m p h a s i s s h o u l d not b e o n the c o n v e y a n c e o f t h o u g h t s or ideas f r o m i n s i d e one agent to another. Rather, the l i n g u i s t i c f o r m c o n v e r s a t i o n takes i s b u t one aspect o f a p r a c t i c a l engagement w i t h one another. O n c e again, I find this idea d e l i g h t f u l l y d e p i c t e d by an e a r l i e r E n g l i s h usage—this t i m e , in Jonathan S w i f t ' s Gulliver's Travels. G u l l i v e r .
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i n d e s c r i b i n g his stay w i t h the h o r s e - l i k e H o u y h n h n m s . recalls that: " B y c o n v e r s i n g w i t h the H o u y h n h n m s . a n d l o o k i n g u p o n t h e m w i t h D e l i g h t . 1 fell to i m i t a t e their G a i t and Gesture, w h i c h is n o w g r o w n i n t o a H a b i t ; and my friends often tell me in a b l u n t W a y . that / trot like a Horse: w h i c h , h o w 2
ever, I take f o r a great c o m p l i m e n t . " ' Such c o n v e r s i n g w i t h others, in w h i c h w e learn n o t m e r e l y l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s , b u t also a l l o u r f o r m s o f p r a c t i c a l c o m p o r t m e n t , is p r e c i s e l y w h a t 1 take H e i d e g g e r to mean in sayi n g that c o n v e r s a t i o n is the a r t i c u l a t i o n of disclosedness. W h e n H e i d e g g e r writes of a r t i c u l a t i o n in general, for instance, he notes that our componments. lived experiences taken in the broadest sense, are through and through expressed [ausgedrückte] experiences: even if they are not uttered in words, they are nonetheless expressed tn a definite articulation by an understanding that I have of them as t simply live in them without regarding them thematically. " ;
T h a t i s t o say. i n s i m p l y l i v i n g a n d d o i n g things i n accordance w i t h the structure of significance projected by a w o r l d , we articulate the w a y people and t h i n g s have been c o o r d i n a t e d i n t o m e a n i n g f u l forms o f i n t e r a c t i o n . F o r instance, i n " c o n v e r s i n g " w i t h a w o r k s h o p — i n b e i n g engaged w i t h the w o r k s h o p in such a w a y that one's v e r y mannerisms and habits are shaped b y the a c t i v i t i e s i n w h i c h one i s e n g a g e d — t w o t h i n g s h a p p e n . F i r s t , the objects i n the w o r k s h o p b e c o m e m a n i f e s t i n terms o f t h e i r use w i t h i n the workshop:
"conversation
is
conversation
about something,
such
that
the
about which becomes manifest in the conversation. T h i s b e c o m i n g manifest . . . f o r a l l that does n o t need to b e c o m e k n o w n e x p r e s s l y and t h e m a t i cally."
2 5
Second, as we become conversant in the w o r k s h o p , thereby m o d i -
f y i n g i n concrete t e r m s o u r readiness f o r the w o r l d ( w h i c h i s d i s c l o s i v e c o m p o r t m e n t ) , that w o r l d becomes a v a i l a b l e for a n i n t e r p r e t i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n , a n d thereby for assertion: Conversation is exisientially equiprimotdial w i t h disposedness and understanding. The intelligibility of something has always been aniculated. even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Conversation is the .Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore ii undetlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordiaily in conversation, is what we have called "meaning." That which gets aniculated as such in conversing Articulation, we call the "totality-of-significations" [Bedeittunqsganze]. This can be dissolved or broken up into significations. Significations, as what has been Articulated from that which can be Articulated, always carry meaning [sind. . . sinnhaß]. . . The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world—an intelligibility which goes w i t h disposedness—expresses itself as conversation. The totality-of-significations of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y is put into words. To significations, words accrue.4
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It is here that we can see most c l e a r l y that the P u t n a m / B u r g e mode of a r g u i n g for the n e c e s s a r i l y s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f m e a n i n g i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o H e i d e g g e r — a t least as a c o n s t i t u t i v e s t r u c t u r e of b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . M e a n i n g is p r i o r to l a n g u a g e , f o r H e i d e g g e r , in the sense that w h a t others say about us, and i n d e e d w h a t we say about ourselves, depends on o u r p r i o r m e a n i n g f u l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the w o r l d . I t thus c a n n o t b e the case that the m e a n i n g s t h i n g s h o l d f o r us. i n c l u d i n g o u r e x p r e s s i o n s , are s t r u c t u r a l l y dependent on a p u b l i c language. B u t this i s not t o d e n y that s o c i a l features p l a y a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g the l a n d of m e a n i n g that is a v a i l a b l e to us. To see this, we t u r n at last to an analysis of Gerede—idle c o n v e r s a t i o n . Gerede in H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t is the e v e r y d a y m o d e of c o n v e r s a t i o n . T h e t u r n o f phrase "'idle t a l k " u s e d i n m o s t E n g l i s h translations o f H e i d e g g e r is a c t u a l l y q u i t e f o r t u i t o u s as a t r a n s l a t i o n , in that Gerede differs f r o m Rede precisely i n b e i n g a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f idleness, that is. i n h o l d i n g back f r o m a p r a c t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the t h i n g s b e i n g discussed. B u t as a r e m i n d e r that Gerede does not necessarily take the f o r m of talk or l i n g u i s t i c speech any m o r e than Rede does, and to keep in m i n d the structural i d e n t i t y b e t w e e n Rede a n d Gerede, I translate the latter as the s o m e w h a t n o n i d i o m a t i c " i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n " ( h o p i n g , o f course, that " c o n v e r s a t i o n " retains some echoes of its archaic E n g l i s h u s e i . C o n v e r s a t i o n , a n d a f o r t i o r i i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n , has f o u r c o n s t i t u t i v e parts. T w o are c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l the content o f the c o n versation: that w i t h w h i c h the c o n v e r s a t i o n is concerned [das Beredete}, and that w h i c h is u n d e r s t o o d in the c o n v e r s a t i o n [das Geredete}. T h e other t w o c o n s t i t u t i v e pans o f c o n v e r s a t i o n refer t o w h a t i s done i n c o n v e r s a t i o n : c o m m u n i c a t i o n [die Mitteilung], a n d m a k i n g manifest [die Bekundung]. Starting w i t h the latter t w o . it is i m p o r t a n t to note that H e i d e g g e r does not mean f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n to be u n d e r s t o o d in the first instance as l i n guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n : It is letting someone see w i t h us what we have pointed out by way of g i v i n g it a detinue character. Letting someone see with us shares with [teilt... mit] the Other that entity which has been pointed out in its definite character. That w h i c h is "shared" is our Being towards what has been pointed out—a Being in which we see it in c o m m o n . 2.
In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
H e i d e g g e r coins the phrase
" e x i s t e n t i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n " [e.xistenzielle Mitteilung], by w h i c h he means s h a r i n g a f o r m o f c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d things i n the w o r l d . H e thereby d i f ferentiates the c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n c o n v e r s a t i o n f r o m m e r e l y l i n guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
2 8
W h i l e I ' m not aware o f any other passages w h e r e
H e i d e g g e r uses this phrase, I w i l l a d o p t it here as a r e m i n d e r that c o m m u n i c a t i o n s h o u l d not be u n d e r s t o o d as p r i m a r i l y l i n g u i s t i c . In n o t i n g that this sort o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n i s a c o n s t i t u t i v e feature o f c o n v e r s a t i o n , H e i d e g g e r
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means to say that we are m a d e ready for an e n g a g e m e n t w i t h p e o p l e and t h i n g s i n o u r w o r l d b y s h a r i n g w i t h others a m o d e of" u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d the c o m m o n t h i n g s w e e n c o u n t e r i n the w o r l d . W h e r e e x i s t e n t i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n b r i n g s us i n t o a state of s h a r i n g a c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h o u r partners i n c o n v e r s a t i o n , " m a k i n g m a n i fest" [Bekundung] shares w i t h others o u r m o d e of disposedness, and hence expresses o u r sense for the w a y t h i n g s matter.-
9
T h e r e m a i n i n g t w o c o n s t i t u e n t s o f c o n v e r s a t i o n are that a b o u t w h i c h we converse [das Beredete], and the w a y in w h i c h we u n d e r s t a n d or relate to that t h i n g [das Geredete]. Das Geredete is manifest in the w a y in w h i c h "that w i t h w h i c h the c o n v e r s a t i o n is c o n c e r n e d [das Beredete] is a l w a y s , in 0
c o n v e r s a t i o n , ' t a l k e d t o ' i n a definite regard and w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s . " ' I n i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n , the m a n n e r in w h i c h we "address" ourselves to the t h i n g ( i n c l u d i n g w h a t we are disposed to do w i t h the t h i n g or say about the t h i n g ) is shared w i t h others, but there is no " p r i m o r d i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g " — n o backg r o u n d f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h that t h i n g — o f the sort g a i n e d b y f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h das Beredete itself. W h a t i n d i v i d u a l speakers l a c k a n d . c o n s e q u e n t l y , w h a t t h e i r c o m m u n i t y supplies for t h e m in idle c o n v e r s a t i o n is. then, d e c i d e d l y not an a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n a t e l y f i x the e x t e n s i o n o f o u r t e r m s . I n fact, i n l e a r n i n g das Geredete—what is u n d e r s t o o d a n d said about the subject of the c o n v e r s a t i o n — w e m a y learn p r e c i s e l y h o w t o d e f i n e i t . h o w t o a r t i c u l a t e its e x t e n s i o n , and w h a t other things are c o n v e n t i o n a l l y seen t o f o l l o w f r o m the k i n d o f c l a i m s c o n v e n t i o n a l l y m a d e about i t . B u t . a t the same t i m e , w e l a c k a sense f o r the w a y a conversance w i t h the object p r i m e s us to respond to the w o r l d by s h o w i n g us what is relevant in the current s i t u a t i o n , g i v e n o u r selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g and s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . W i t h o u t such a sense we w o u l d be p r a c t i c a l l y disoriented, z/nready to act. uncertain h o w to c o n t i n u e in our selfi n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A n d s o i n its place w e o r i e n t o u r s e l v e s t o the s i t u a t i o n b y a r r o g a t i n g the things " o n e " says and " o n e " does. In the process, we surrender, a t least for the m o m e n t , o u r o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n f a v o r o f a n a n o n y m o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f w h a t i s i m p o r t a n t and relevant here and n o w . W e can n o w see w h y neither the " R A M " n o r the " g a b l e " examples are w e l l - s u i t e d for c l a r i f y i n g w h a t i s o f interest t o H e i d e g g e r i n i d l e conversat i o n . In b o t h these examples, it is true, the speaker lacks a k i n d of expertise. B u t the " g a b l e " e x a m p l e does n o t d e m o n s t r a t e a l a c k o f conversance w i t h gables—just a t e r m i n o l o g i c a l c o n f u s i o n . T h e " R A M " e x a m p l e , o n the other h a n d , i s a rather e x t r e m e f o r m o f l a c k o f c o n v e r s a n c e w i t h a s u b j e c t — i n fact, too extreme to be a g o o d e x a m p l e . T h e speaker lacks not o n l y the k i n d o f conversance that articulates h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b u t actually k n o w s so l i t t l e about the s i t u a t i o n that he c o u l d get a l m o s t no pract i c a l g r i p o n i t a t a l l . Instead, the e x a m p l e o f m y l a c k o f conversance w i t h d r i v i n g i n B r i t a i n i s a m u c h better w a y o f h o m i n g i n o n the p h e n o m e n o n w i t h w h i c h Heidegger is concerned.
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T h e d r i v i n g e x a m p l e illustrates the difference between l i n g u i s t i c unders t a n d i n g a n d a p r a c t i c a l c o n v e r s a n c e w i t h a matter. It is possible to u n d e r stand e v e r y sentence i n the B r i t i s h H i g h w a y C o d e and s t i l l b e i l l - p r e p a r e d for d r i v i n g in B r i t a i n . To be at h o m e on B r i t i s h roads and in B r i t i s h cars, one needs an altered r e c e p t i v i t y to the w o r l d , a r e c e p t i v i t y that w i l l shift the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a l l k i n d s o f features one e n c o u n t e r s w h i l e d r i v i n g . T o b e g i n w i t h , B r i t i s h cars, b e i n g d e s i g n e d t o d r i v e o n the left-hand side o f the r o a d , have c o n t r o l s (such as t u r n signals and gear shifters) on the opposite side of the steering c o l u m n f r o m t h e i r l o c a t i o n i n a n A m e r i c a n car. r e q u i r i n g t h e m to be o p e r a t e d by the o p p o s i t e h a n d . O t h e r v e h i c l e s are in d i f f e r e n t places, a n d m o v i n g i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s , than one t y p i c a l l y finds t h e m i n the U n i t e d States: an A m e r i c a n d r i v e r w i l l thus f i n d herself i n t u i t i v e l y l o o k i n g i n j u s t the w r o n g places i n her a t t e m p t t o "be aware o f the speed a n d p o s i 1
t i o n o f a l l the traffic a r o u n d y o u . " ' F i n a l l y , m o s t A m e r i c a n s l a c k e x p o s u r e to roundabouts, and have little sense for g a u g i n g distances, or j u d g i n g w h e n to y i e l d , in such e n v i r o n m e n t s . I n s t r u c t i o n s such as those quoted above m a y help an A m e r i c a n d r i v e r think about w h a t she must do w h e n she approaches a r o u n d a b o u t , but t h e y w i l l not h e l p her to i n t u i t i v e l y k e y in on the relevant features of the r o u n d a b o u t . F o r that, n o t h i n g can help but extensive e x p e r i ence i n n a v i g a t i n g t h r o u g h t h e m . I t i s p r e c i s e l y this k i n d o f d i v e r g e n c e between l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g ana p r a c t i c a l c o n v e r s a n c e that H e i d e g g e r a i m s t o h i g h l i g h t w i t h the n o t i o n o f idle c o n v e r s a t i o n . W h a t w e cannot convey, i n i d l y discussing some t h i n g or state of affairs, is the w a y an actual f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h a situation affects o u r general readiness for the w o r l d . If I am correct in this interpretation, then we can see that H e i d e g g e r is in fact not c o m m i t t e d to the c i a i m that there is s o m e t h i n g essential a b o u t l i n g u i s t i c expression w h i c h alienates u s f r o m a n authentic u n d e r s t a n d i n g , or that it necessarily covers over the t r u t h . Rather, language i s g u i l t y a t m o s t o f a sin o f o m i s s i o n — o f f a i l i n g t o d o s o m e t h i n g for our readiness f o r the w o r l d . I n particular, i f w e converse i d l y , rather than b e c o m e c o n v e r s a n t w i t h a s i t u a t i o n , we settle for a p u b l i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of w h a t the s i t u a t i o n c a l l s for. I d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n thus "closes o f f * because i t gives us a sort of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t o n l y by a l l o w i n g us to evade the need t o learn t o r e s p o n d a u t h e n t i c a l l y , i n o u r o w n w a y . t o the specific s i t u a t i o n . T h i s e x p l a i n s w h y H e i d e g g e r sees o u r s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s a s t e n d i n g t o w a r d a k i n d o f fallenness. W e g a i n t h r o u g h s o c i a l and. i n p a r t i c u l a r , l i n guistic i n t e r a c t i o n a r i c h l y a r t i c u l a t e d a b i l i t y to isolate and d i s c r i m i n a t e features o f the w o r l d o f w h i c h w e have l i t t l e o r n o actual e x p e r i e n c e whatsoever. I d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n , by e x p l o i t i n g a ready-made sense f o r t h i n g s , offers us the c o n v e n i e n c e of g e t t i n g a c e r t a i n ( a l b e i t a n o n y m o u s ; grasp on the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n fact, i f one i s already f a i r l y s k i l l e d i n the area o f d i s cussion, w h a t is said is o f t e n e n o u g h to open up n e w possibilities f o r p r a c t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t i n the w o r l d . B u t w h a t i s said i s not, i n a n d o f i t s e l f , sufficient to c o n v e y w h a t is relevant, g i v e n the particularities of the s i t u a t i o n .
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a n d thus does not c o n v e y to the listener the readiness for a c t i o n that is necessary to g e n u i n e l y disclose a w o r l d . H e i d e g g e r uses the e x a m p l e o f a scientist h e a r i n g o f e x p e r i m e n t a l results to illustrate b o t h h o w idle conversation can be g e n u i n e l y i n f o r m a t i v e , and h o w it nevertheless is unable to c o n v e y a disclosive readiness. I d l e c o n versation, H e i d e g g e r emphasizes, can take the f o r m o f " p i c k i n g u p " w h a t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y said o f some m a t t e r t h r o u g h r e a d i n g . T h i s i d l y o b t a i n e d c o n v e r s a n c e w i t h a m a t t e r can e v e n t a k e place " i n such a w a y that the reader—there are p u r p o r t e d to be s u c h readers in the sciences as w e l l — acquires the p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e a l i n g w i t h the matters w i t h great s k i l l w i t h o u t ever h a v i n g seen t h e m . " A l t h o u g h they have a certain k i n d of expertise, they l a c k w h a t is c r u c i a l to an authentic disclosure: Accordingly, when men who have to deal w i t h a matter do so solely on the basis of idle conversation about it. they bring the various opinions, views, and perceptions together on an equal basis. In other words, they do so on the basis of what they have picked up from reading and hearing. They pass along what they have read and heard about the matter without any sensitivity for the distinction of whether or not lhat opinion or their own is actually relevant to the matter. Their care in discovering does not apply to the matter but to the conversation.^ Scientists tend to f a l l i n t o this k i n d of idle c o n v e r s a t i o n . H e i d e g g e r observes later in an o f f h a n d note, w h e n e v e r "there are no apparatuses and the l i k e . " " T h i s note makes perfect sense in l i g h t of the idea that idle c o n v e r s a t i o n is a k i n d o f f a i l u r e o f conversance w i t h w h a t i s b e i n g t a l k e d a b o u t , the p o i n t b e i n g that a s m u c h a s w e can learn f r o m r e a d i n g o r h e a r i n g a b o u t e x p e r i m e n t a l results, we are m i s s i n g s o m e t h i n g c r u c i a l as l o n g as we f a i l to c o n d u c t the e x p e r i m e n t ourselves. H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f l a n g u a g e i s c o m m i t t e d , then, t o n o m o r e than the u n s u r p r i s i n g v i e w that language cannot g i v e one a f u l l conversance w i t h its subject m a t t e r — t h e k i n d o f c o n v e r s a n c e necessary f o r a r t i c u l a t i n g a n authentic space o f disclosedness. T h i s entails n e i t h e r that (a) w h e n e v e r w e speak in a p u b l i c language, we f a i l to c o m m u n i c a t e a genuine disclosedness o f the w o r l d o r d i s c o v e r y o f that w i t h w h i c h w e cope, nor that (b) w h e n e v e r w e speak i n a w a y w h i c h i s amenable t o b e u n d e r s t o o d b y others, w h a t w e are saying is untrue. N o t (a), because one w h o does have a g e n u i n e c o n v e r sance w i t h t h i n g s can speak and c o n v e r s e w i t h another e x p e r t , w h o w i l l have in a d d i t i o n to an understanding of das Geredete, a f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h das Beredete. B y p o i n t i n g o u t l i n g u i s t i c a l l y the relevant feature o f the e n v i r o n m e n t — t h e one relevant for those w h o possess a certain k i n d o f e x p e r t i s e — the speaker c a n use language to t r i g g e r an a p p r o p r i a t e response in the hearer: "These boards are s p l i t t i n g , " one carpenter says to another, and she i n s t a n t l y begins h a m m e r i n g w i t h a s m a l l e r n a i l . N o t ( b ) , because (as D a v i d s o n ' s c r i t i c i s m o f social e x t e r n a l i s m makes clear) w h a t w e mean i s n o t
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altered b y b e i n g s p o k e n o u t l o u d . I f a n y t h i n g , rather than constraining w h a t its speaker can m e a n , i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n l i m i t s the a b i l i t y o f its hearer t o u n d e r s t a n d since i t a l l o w s her t o i m a g i n e that she understands e v e r y t h i n g that she needs to k n o w : " t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n w h i c h is c o m m u n i c a t e d can be u n d e r s t o o d to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent, e v e n if the hearer does not b r i n g h i m self i n t o such a k i n d of B e i n g t o w a r d s w h a t the discourse is about to have a p r i m o r d i a l understanding o f i t . " *
4
I d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n , i n s h o r t , i s a m o d e o f e n g a g e m e n t w i t h people a n d t h i n g s i n w h i c h a g e n u i n e readiness i s n o t c u l t i v a t e d . H e i d e g g e r calls the result a k i n d o f " f l o a t i n g " — a f a i l u r e t o b e g r a b b e d o r disposed i n any w a y by the things we encounter: when Dasein maintains itself in idle conversation, it is—as Betng-in-the-world—cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the w o r l d , towards Dasein-with. and towards its very Being-in. Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached [in einer Schwebe]; yet in so doing, it is always alongside the world, w i t h Others, and towards itself. "
IV. T H E N E C E S S I T Y O F B A N A L I Z A T I O N . L E V E L I N G . AND
UNTRUTH
I f m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n i s r i g h t , one consequence i s that D r e y f u s and C a r m a n are u n j u s t i f i e d in seeing the v e r y structure of language a s necessitating the b a n a l i z a t i o n and l e v e l i n g o f h u m a n existence. H o w d o they reach this u n j u s t i f i e d c o n c l u s i o n ? It is because, l i k e Putnam and Bürge, they see i n d i v i d u a l s as r e s p o n s i b l e to p u b l i c m o d e s of discourse, a respons i b i l i t y that consists i n s u b j e c t i n g the c o n t e n t o f one's o w n utterances t o the d o m i n a t i o n o f others. O r m o r e p r e c i s e l y , they see H e i d e g g e r a s a n a n t i Putnam—as h o l d i n g that the m e a n i n g o f w h a t w e say i s determined not b y the experts, but by the l o w e s t c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r of a linguistic c o m m u n i t y . It seems to me that this misses the real thrust of Heidegger's p o s i t i o n . B o t h C a r m a n a n d D r e y f u s m a k e the m i s t a k e o f t h i n k i n g that e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e , t o f u n c t i o n , m u s t b e a v a i l a b l e t o e v e r y b o d y . Dreyfus w r i t e s , t o r instance, that language is "necessarily p u b l i c a n d general, that is. meant to 1
be used by anyone, s k i l l e d or not. as a t o o l f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n . " ' ' Because language requires such g e n e r a l i t y and u n i v e r s a l i t y , they suppose that it cannot possibly capture a l l the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of a s i t u a t i o n . T h i s , in turn, a l l o w s t h e m t o c o n c l u d e that the m o m e n t w e e m p l o y a p u b l i c language, w e f a l l i n t o a banalized and l e v e l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w o r l d . B u t w h a t j u s t i f i e s the a s s u m p t i o n that w h a t is said in language must be a v a i l a b l e t o e v e r y o n e ? L i k e P u t n a m . D r e y f u s appeals t o a d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r — t h e m e a n i n g of o u r utterances is reduced to a "generality that tends
303
t o w a r d s b a n a l i t y " d i c t a t e d b y the need f o r " t h e d i v e r s i t y a n d s p e c i a l i z a t i o n characteristic of the e q u i p m e n t a l w h o l e . " " T h e idea seems to be that it is a useful t h i n g t o b e able : o t a l k a b o u t a l l k i n d s o f e q u i p m e n t — a l l the e q u i p m e n t that makes up o u r w o r l d — b u t it is net possible for e v e r y o n e to acquire a p r i m o r d i a l understanding of a l l that e q u i p m e n t . T h i s m u c h is quite right— i n d e e d , i t i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r that I a m advancing. B u t i t does not f o l l o w f r o m this that o u r w o r d s c a n o n l y m e a n w h a t anyone i n o u r l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y can u n d e r s t a n d t h e m t o mean. F r o m the fact that w e are not c o n v e r s a n t w i t h e v e r y t h i n g w e c a n t a l k about, i t does not f o l l o w that we can o n l y i n t e n d to say w h a t anyone a n d e v e r y o n e is capab l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A s P u t n a m a n d Bürge h a v e s h o w n , the p r e m i s e o f a social d i v i s i o n o f labor, i f a n y t h i n g , tends i n the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . W h a t w e s h o u l d say. then, is that speakers are often m i s u n d e r s t o o d by some members of the c o m m u n i t y , not that a speaker can o n l y m e a n w h a t anyone can understand her t o m e a n . A s a m a t t e r o f fact, l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t e s p e r f e c t l y w e l l in situations where what it c o m m u n i c a t e s is inaccessible to almost e v e r y o n e — a s most w o r k i n p h i l o s o p h y attests. A g o o d l a n g u a g e user aims her use to her actual listeners, not every c o n c e i v a b l e m e m b e r of the l i n g u i s tic c o m m u n i t y . O f course, s o m e t h i n g u n e r e d can a l w a y s b e misconstrued b y those incapable of understanding the assertion as it is i n t e n d e d , but this poss i b i l i t y does not change w h a t the speaker means b y h e r w o r d s . A n d so. w h i l e there v e r y w e l l m a y be, f r o m t i m e t o t i m e , g o o d reasons for m e a n i n g o n l y w h a t w e k n o w everyone i n the c u l t u r e can understand, there i s n o t h i n g inherent i n p u b l i c language w h i c h requires this. I r e t u r n at last to the q u e s t i o n w i t h w h i c h I started: W h a t role does o u r c o m m u n i t y p l a y i n d e t e r m i n i n g m e a n i n g ? H e i d e g g e r ' s a n s w e r has l i t t l e t o d o w i t h the r o l e o f a p u b l i c language i n d e t e r m i n i n g the m e a n i n g o f utterances made i n that language. Instead, o u r c o m m u n i t y affects m e a n i n g i n d i r e c t l y b y s t r u c t u n n g the k i n d s o f a c t i v i t i e s i n w h i c h w e c a n engage. W e f i n d ourselves already i n a w o r l d , H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s o u t . A l l o u r activities, i n t u r n , are i m p l i c a t e d i n a series o f interactions w i t h others i n the w o r l d . Because i t i s o u r f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h i n g s a s a r t i c u l a t e d i n o u r a c t i v i t i e s that determines o u r m e a n i n g , i t f o l l o w s that w h a t w e c a n m e a n i s a l w a y s shaped ( b u t n o t d e t e r m i n e d ) by the people and t h i n g s a r o u n d us.
NOTES This paper was first presented at the inaugural meeting of the International Society for Phenomenological Studies, held in Asilomar. California, July 19-23. 1999. I'm grateful to all the participants in that meeting for their constructive help. My thinking on these matters has been aided considerably by conversations with Bert Dreyfus. Taylor Carman. George Handley.
304
and James Siebach.
I ' d also l i k e 1 0 t h a n k C y n t h i a Münk for her c o n s i d e r a b l e assistance i n
preparing this manuscript tor p u b l i c a t i o n .
1. M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r . Being and Time,
trans. J o h n M a c q u a r r i e and E d w a r d R o b i n s o n I N e w
York: Harper & R o w . 1962). 211. 2.
Ibid.
3 . H e i d e g g e r . Sem und Zen ( T ü b i n g e n : c i t e d as
Sein
und Zeil a r e
Macquarrie and 4. I b i d . .
my
Robinson's
Max
N i e m e y e r Verlag.
translations.
1927).
Quotations cited
163. A l l q u o t a t i o n s
as
Being and
Time
are
translations.
169.
5. H u b e r t
L.
Dreyfus.
Being-in-ihe-World: A
Commentary on
Heidegger's
Being
and T i m e .
Division I ( C a m b r i d g e . M a s s . : M I T P r e s s . 1 9 9 1 i . 2 2 9 . 6. T a v l o r C a r m a n .
"Must
We
Be
Inauthentic?"
in
Heidegger.
Authenticity,
and Modernity.
e d . M a r k A . W r a t h a l l a n d J e f f M a l p a s ( C a m b r i d g e . M a s s . : M I T Press. : 0 0 O ) . 2 1 . 7 . M a r k W r a t h a l l . " T h e C o n d i t i o n s o f T r u t h i n H e i d e g g e r a n d D a v i d s o n . " Monist 8 2 ( 2 l ( A p r i l 1999): 3 0 4 - 2 3 . 8. ! w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r h e r e t h e o t h e r v e r s i o n o f e x t e r n a l i s m .
based o n the r o l e e x t e r n a l
o b j e c t s p l a y i n f i x i n g t h e c o n t e n t o f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n a l states. W h i l e t h i s e x t e r n a l i s m i s i n fact a m e n a b l e t o H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w o f t h i n g s , i t i s not r e l e v a n t t o the topic u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n h e r e — n a m e l y , w h e t h e r i t i s the s o c i a l character o f l a n g u a g e that leads t o i d l e c o n v e r s a t i o n and other inauthentic m o d e s o f i n h a b i t i n g the w o r l d . 9. H i l a r y
Putnam. "The
Meaning of
Meaning.
Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam s
" in
77ie
Turn
Earth
"Tlie Meaning of Meinung.
Chronicles:
Twenty
" ed. A n d r e w Pessin
a n d S a n f o r d G o l d b e r g l A r m o n k . N . Y . : Μ . E . S h a r p e . > 9 % i . 3 - 5 9 . q u o t a t i o n o n 13. 10. I b i d . . 6. 11. I b i d . . 1 2 . See
13. Tyler
Bürge.
"Wherein
is
Language
Social.'"
:n
Rejections
•·«
Chomsky
ed.
A . G e o r g e i N ' e w Y o r k : B l a c k w e l l . 19S9). 1 7 5 - 9 1 : " I n d i v i d u a l i s m and the M e n t a l . " i n
Midwest Studies
in
Philosophy,
vol.
4:
Studies
in
Metaphysics,
ed.
Peter
French.
T h e o d o r e U e h l i n g Jr.. H o w a r d W e t t s t e i n ( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a P r e s s . 1979).
73-121;
"Individualism
and
Psvchoiosv,"
Philosophical
Review
125
119861:
3-15. 13. B ü r g e . " W h e r e i n I s L a n g u a g e S o c i a l ? " U. 15.
186-S7.
Bürge. " I n d i v i d u a l i s m and the M e n t a l . " 77. O n e c o u l d i m a g i n e further e x a m p l e s that w o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the a b i l i t y t o determ i n e the e x t e n s i o n of a t e r m a n d the mastery
of the i n f e r e n t i a l relations that accrue to
s e n t e n c e s e m p l o y i n g t h a t t e r m . B u t t h e r e is a l i m i t t o h o w f a r t n e s e t w o f e a t u r e s o f l i n guistic mastery can be isolated: at some p o i n t , if a speaker lacks k n o w ledge of one type, w e are i n c l i n e d t o say that h e also l a c k s k n o w l e d g e o f :he o t h e r . '6.
M u c h o f t h e c o m m e n t s that f o l l o w are i n s p i r e d b y social
! 7 ! S.
externalism
in
"Knowing
American
Philosophical Association
Dialectica
45
(1991):
One's
(1987):
Own
441-58.
D a v i d s o n ' s discussion o f Bürge s
Mind." and
Proceedings and Addresses
"Epistemoiogy
of the
Externalized."
191-202.
P u t n a m . " M e a n i n g o f ' M e a n i n g . ' " 14. Davidson
makes this point
Michael Dummett,
ed.
Brian
in " T h e S o c i a l A s p e c t of L a n g u a g e . " in McGuinness and Gianluigi O l i v e n
The Philosophy o f
ι Dordrecht:
Kluwer
A c a d e m i c Publishers. 1994). 5. '•9. U . K . D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e E n v i r o n m e n t . T r a n s p o r t a n d t h e R e g i o n s . D r i v i n g S t a n d a r d s Agency.
The
Highway
Code: for pedestrians,
cyclists,
motorcyclists
e x p a n d e d e d . ( L o n d o n . 1999). G e n e r a l rules 160 & 1 6 1 . 2 0 . H e i d e g g e r . Being and Time.
176-77: translation modified.
2 1 . H e i d e g g e r , Sein und Zeit, 3 4 9 .
305
and
drivers.
New-
2 2 . 1 Peter 3 : 1 - 2 . K J V . 23. Jonathan S w i f t .
Gulliver's
Travels,
ed.
Paul Turner ( O x f o r d :
Oxford
University
Press.
1 9 7 1 ) . pt. [ V . c h a p . X . 2 8 6 . 24. M a r t i n
Heidegger.
History of the
Concept of Time:
Prolegomena,
trans.
Theodore
Kesiel
( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1 9 8 5 ) . 4 8 . h is i m p o r t a n t lo n o l e here that for H e i d e g g e r , ausdrücklichkeil i s n o t c x p l i c i t n e s s i n t h e s e n s e o f h a v i n g a t h e m a t i c o r c o n s c i o u s a w a r e n e s s o f a t h i n g . R a t h e r , s o m e t h i n g i s ausdrücklich i f i t i s e x p r e s s e d o r m a d e manifest b y o u r activities, and thus capable o f b e i n g made e x p l i c i t , even i f i l i s not presently explicit. 25. (bid., 262; translation modified. 2 6 . H e i d e g g e r , Being and Time. 27.
Ibid..
203—*: t r a n s l a t i o n m o d i f i e d , s o m e i t a l i c s o m i t t e d .
197.
28. Martin
Heidegger.
Basic
Problems
of
Phenomenology,
trans.
Albert
Hofstadter
( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1 9 8 2 ) . 2 9 7 .
2 9 . H e i d e g g e r . Being and Time. 2 0 5 . 3 0 . H e i d e g g e r . Sein und Zeit. 1 6 3 . 3 1 . James S i e b a c h tells m e that, i n m a n y c r o s s w a l k s i n L o n d o n , the w a r n i n g
' l o o k r i g h t " has
been p a i n t e d o n the c r o s s w a l k , a p p a r e n t l y i n response l o the t e n d e n c y o f v i s i t o r s t o step i n t o t h e p a t h o f t r a f f i c c o m i n g f r o m t h e r i g h l . h a v i n g f i r s t i n s t i n c t i v e l y l o o k e d l e f t (as o n e o u g h t w h e n cars d r i v e o n the r i g h t side o f the r o a d l . 3 2 . H e i d e g g e r . History o f the Concept o f Time.
2 6 9 - 7 0 : translation m o d i f i e d , italics added.
33. [ b i d . . 3 0 1 : translation modified. 3 4 . H e i d e g g e r . Being and Time. 2 1 2 : t r a n s l a t i o n m o d i f i e d . 35. I b i d . . 214: translation modified. 36. "Reply
lo Taylor Carman.'
in
Heidegger.
Authenticity.
Malpas, 307.
37. Dreyfus,
Being-in-the-Worid.
231.
306
Modernus:
ed.
Wrathall
and
Man and World 27: 49-70, 1994 © 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Primed in the Netherlands.
The concept of death in Being and Time
WILLIAM D. BLATTNER Department U.S.A.
of Philosophy,
Georgetown
University,
Washington,
DC 20057-1076,
That " . . . is to say that no one may experience death before actually d y i n g , w h i c h strikes me as crass m a t e r i a l i s m . " (Kierkegaard) 1
T h e c o n c e p t o f d e a t h i s one o f the least u n d e r s t o o d b u t m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t concepts
in
Being
and
Time.
2
H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t at the b e g i n n i n g
of
D i v i s i o n T w o f o r the need f o r a c o n t i n u e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the b e i n g o f D a s e i n rests o n the o b s e r v a t i o n that t h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c has t o that p o i n t t a k e n n o n o t i c e o f D a s e i n ' s f i n i t u d e , its h a v i n g a n e n d , n a m e l y d e a t h . I t i s t h r o u g h a n i n q u i r y i n t o the a p p r o p r i a t e response t o a n x i e t y i n the face o f d e a t h t h a t H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s a n d d e v e l o p s the n o t i o n s o f resoluteness a n d a u t h e n t i c i t y . A n d i t i s the results o f those i n q u i r i e s t h a t l e a d h i m t o reconceptualize the b e i n g of Dasein in terms of a r a d i c a l l y new c o n c e p t i o n o f t e m p o r a l i t y . Y e t H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f d e a t h has n o t r e c e i v e d t h e a t t e n t i o n i t m u s t , i f w e are t o take s e r i o u s l y H e i d e g g e r ' s p l a c e m e n t o f t h a t d i s c u s s i o n a t the b e g i n n i n g o f D i v i s i o n T w o , w h e r e h e sets o u t n o t j u s t t o e x p l o r e c l a s s i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h e m e s , such a s a n x i e t y , d e a t h , a n d g u i l t , b u t a l s o t o r e d e s c r i b e the b e i n g o f D a s e i n i n a n a l l e g e d l y m o r e r a d i c a l w a y . In o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the c o n c e p t of d e a t h in Being and Time, I w a n t to f o c u s o n a p u z z l i n g feature o f H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f i t : d e a t h i s a w a y to be Dasein. I shall begin by discussing an apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n in H e i d e g g e r ' s t r e a t m e n t o f d e a t h - that d e a t h i s a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n is u n a b l e to be, a n d that d e a t h is a w a y to be D a s e i n . I s h a l l s h o w that s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s t o r e s o l v e the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i l l n o t w o r k , a n d that w e m u s t t a k e s e r i o u s l y the c l a i m that death i s a w a y t o b e D a s e i n i n w h i c h Dasein is unable to be Dasein. A c c e p t i n g this c l a i m is tantamount to r e j e c t i n g the c o m m o n - s e n s i c a l i n t e r p r e t i v e n o t i o n t h a t d e a t h in Being and Time i s s o m e t h i n g l i k e the e n d i n g o f o n e ' s l i f e . T o r e s o l v e the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n , I s h a l l d i s t i n g u i s h t h i n a n d t h i c k senses o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g , a n d a r g u e that d e a t h i s a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n ' s b e i n g i s a t issue, but
307
50 in w h i c h Dasein is anxiously unable to understand itself by projecting itself i n t o s o m e p o s s i b l e w a y t o be. F i n a l l y , I s h a l l a r g u e that w e c a n u n d e r s t a n d the c o n d i t i o n a s w h a t o n e m i g h t c a l l " a l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n f o r D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y to-be."
The apparent contradiction Being and Time presents us w i t h an a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n in its c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f d e a t h (Tod). H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , D a s e i n ' s " d e a t h i s the possibility
of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there,"
(S&Z,
p. 250).
Throughout
B&Ts §50, t i t l e d , " A S k e t c h o f the E x i s t e n t i a l - O n t o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e o f Death,"
Heidegger
characterizes
Dasein's
death
as
a
possibility.
And
i n d e e d , i t w o u l d s e e m that since a h u m a n ' s d e m i s e i s a l w a y s p o s s i b l e , a n d is m o r e o v e r , we t h i n k , u n a v o i d a b l e at some p o i n t , the characterization seems f a i r . B u t Being and Time is a s y s t e m a t i c treatise, a n d the c o n c e p t of p o s s i b i l i t y is treated technically in it. H o w one should understand H e i d e g g e r ' s a p p a r e n t l y r e a s o n a b l e c l a i m that D a s e i n ' s d e a t h i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , t u r n s o f c o u r s e o n h o w one u n d e r s t a n d s the c o n c e p t o f p o s s i b i l i t y . A n d t h e r e i n l i e s a d i f f i c u l t y : " a p o s s i b i l i t y , " w h e n a p p l i e d t o D a s e i n , does not refer t o s o m e t h i n g t h a t c o u l d h a p p e n t o D a s e i n , b u t rather t o a p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s e i n . ( I s h a l l j u s t i f y t h i s c l a i m b e l o w . ) T h u s , i f H e i d e g g e r i s u s i n g his t e c h n i c a l l a n g u a g e s t r i c t l y , the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f d e a t h a b o v e t u r n s o u t t o generate a n apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n :
(a) (b) (c)
D e a t h is a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r D a s e i n . D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are p o s s i b l e w a y s t o b e D a s e i n . S o , d e a t h is a p o s s i b l e w a y to be D a s e i n !
T h e d i f f i c u l t y here i s not j u s t that i t s o u n d s o d d , o u t r a g e o u s , o r s c a n d a l o u s to say that d e a t h is a p o s s i b l e w a y to be D a s e i n . F o r H e i d e g g e r ' s s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the r e l e v a n t p o s s i b i l i t y i s that i t i s one a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h D a s e i n i s n o l o n g e r able t o be. T h u s f i n a l l y , (d)
D e a t h i s a p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s i n , one i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s not a b l e to be!
A n d t h i s appears c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
308
51 "Possibility" with
the
a
non-technical
apparent
in
contradiction
sense?
An
unsuccessful
strategy for
coping
H o w are w e t o c o p e w i t h t h i s a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n ? P r o b a b l y the m o s t n a t u r a l t a c k i s t o suggest that i n w r i t i n g that d e a t h i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f Dasein's
no
longer
being
able
to
be,
Heidegger
meant
the
word
" p o s s i b i l i t y " i n a m o r e o r d i n a r y w a y , i.e., a s s o m e t h i n g that c o u l d h a p p e n .
3
T h u s , i n the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f d e a t h , H e i d e g g e r i s n o t u s i n g " p o s s i b i l i t y " i n the w a y I f o r m u l a t e i n ( b ) a b o v e . T h i s m a k e s short w o r k o f the a p p a r e n t contradiction. B u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s s i m p l e s t r a t e g y i s not a v a i l a b l e t o us. H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " D e a t h is a w a y to be, w h i c h D a s e i n takes o v e r , as s o o n as it i s , " (S&Z,
p. 245).
And
for
good
measure,
the
first
sentence
o f the
very
p a r a g r a p h f r o m w h i c h the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f death a b o v e i s t a k e n , i s t h i s : " D e a t h is a possibility of being
[Seinsmöglichkeit], w h i c h D a s e i n i n e a c h
case i t s e l f has to t a k e o v e r , " (S&Z, p. 2 5 0 ) . So, H e i d e g g e r here d i r e c t l y endorses c l a i m ( c ) f r o m the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n a b o v e , a n d t h u s also p r o v i d e s i n d i r e c t c o n f i r m a t i o n that b o t h ( a ) a n d ( b ) are v i e w s o f his a s w e l l . T o u n d e r s c o r e the u n a v o i d a b i l i t y o f c o n f r o n t i n g ( c ) head o n , let u s b r i e f l y e x a m i n e H e i d e g g e r ' s use o f the t e r m " p o s s i b i l i t y . " I n a n i m p o r t a n t passage in D i v i s i o n O n e of Being and Time, he w r i t e s , P o s s i b i l i t y , w h i c h D a s e i n i n each case i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y , i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d j u s t a s m u c h f r o m e m p t y , l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y a s f r o m the c o n t i n g e n c y o f s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t , i n s o far a s w i t h the l a t t e r t h i s a n d t h a t c a n "happen" ["passieren"]. As a modal category of being-occurrent, p o s s i b i l i t y m e a n s the not yet a c t u a l a n d the not ever necessary. It c h a r a c t e r i z e s the merely [nur] p o s s i b l e . . . . P o s s i b i l i t y as an existentiale, o n the o t h e r h a n d , i s the m o s t o r i g i n a r y a n d last, p o s i t i v e , o n t o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f D a s e i n . . . . (S&Z, p p . 1 4 3 - 1 4 4 ) T h e s t r a t e g y u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a v o i d i n g the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n r e l i e s o n a sense o f " p o s s i b i l i t y " t h a t i s here d i r e c t l y e x c l u d e d f r o m a p p l i c a t i o n t o D a s e i n . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s s t r a t e g y , w h a t i s i t t o say o f death t h a t i t i s " p o s s i b l e " w i t h respect t o D a s e i n ? I t i s t o say that d e a t h i s s o m e t h i n g that c a n b e f a l l D a s e i n . T h i s sounds a l o t l i k e H e i d e g g e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h respect t o the o c c u r r e n t : " w i t h the l a t t e r this a n d that c a n ' h a p p e n ' . " T h e o c c u r r e n t (das Vorhandene) is a sort of e n t i t y u n l i k e D a s e i n . T h e t e r m has a b r o a d sense i n w h i c h i t refers t o a n y t h i n g u n l i k e D a s e i n , a n y t h i n g that does n o t have D a s e i n ' s d e f i n a t o r y features a s l a i d o u t i n 4
C h a p t e r s 1 a n d 2 o f D i v i s i o n O n e . ( H e i d e g g e r o f t e n flags t h i s b r o a d sense b y u s i n g the phrase " i n the b r o a d e s t sense," a s f o r e x a m p l e a t S&Z, p . 4 5 . ) T h e t e r m also has a n a r r o w sense, w h i c h i s b y far the m o s t f r e q u e n t i n Being
and
Time,
in
which
it
picks
out entities
309
unlike
Dasein
that
are
52 i n d e p e n d e n t o f D a s e i n . I n t h i s sense i t contrasts w i t h t h e t e r m " t h e a v a i l a b l e " (das Zuhandene), w h i c h refers to e n t i t i e s u n l i k e D a s e i n that are w h a t t h e y are i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n D a s e i n ' s p r o j e c t s a n d p r a c t i c e s , the p a r a p h e r n a l i a o f the h u m a n w o r l d . N o w , o n e m i g h t t r y t o a c c o m m o d a t e the c l a i m that d e a t h i s n o t a p o s s i b i l i t y i n the sense e x c l u d e d a t S&Z, p p . 1 4 3 - 1 4 4 b y p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t H e i d e g g e r l a b e l s t h e e x c l u d e d sense " t h e m e r e l y p o s s i b l e . " T h u s , p e r h a p s t h e p o i n t is t h i s . D e a t h is not merely p o s s i b l e , f o r after a l l , it is in s o m e sense
unavoidable.
In
fact,
in
§52,
Heidegger
indicates
that
death
is
" c e r t a i n , " not j u s t m e r e l y p o s s i b l e . B u t t h i s t a c t i c w i l l n o t w o r k e i t h e r . A l t h o u g h t h i s sense o f a " s t r o n g e r p o s s i b i l i t y " m i g h t ease the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n in H e i d e g g e r ' s characterization of death as a p o s s i b i l i t y , it w o u l d make nonsense o f m u c h o f w h a t Heidegger i s t r y i n g t o d o w i t h p o s s i b i l i t y i n § 3 1 , w h e r e the passage o c c u r s . D a s e i n ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are, a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , p o s s i b l e w a y s t o be: T h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t c a n b e e x h i b i t e d b y [ D a s e i n ] are t h u s n o t o c c u r r e n t " p r o p e r t i e s " o f a n o c c u r r e n t e n t i t y that " l o o k s " such a n d so, b u t r a t h e r p o s s i b l e w a y s f o r [ D a s e i n ] i n each case t o b e a n d o n l y that. (S&Z, p . 4 2 ) . H e i d e g g e r spells t h i s o u t one step f u r t h e r , w h e n h e w r i t e s o n the n e x t p a g e , " D a s e i n d e t e r m i n e s i t s e l f a s a n e n t i t y i n e a c h case i n t e r m s o f a p o s s i b i l i t y , w h i c h it is, i.e., at t h e same t i m e s o m e h o w u n d e r s t a n d s , " (S&Z, p. 4 3 ) . W h e n e v e r w e ask t h e q u e s t i o n , W h o i s t h i s Dasein'?, w e m u s t a n s w e r i n terms o f the possible w a y s t o b e Dasein i n terms o f w h i c h this D a s e i n understands itself. He writes, " E x i s t i n g b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d [i.e., Dasein) is d i s c l o s e d as s u c h in the f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h , a n d t h i s d i s c l o s e d n e s s is c a l l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " (S&Z, p . 1 4 3 ) . D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b l e w a y s t o b e are " f o r t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h i c h . " T o b e b r i e f w i t h a c o m p l e x issue, H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s that w h e n e v e r [ use s o m e b i t of p a r a p h e r n a l i a , say a c h a i r , I do so in o r d e r t o a c c o m p l i s h s o m e task, a n " i n - o r d e r - t o - w h i c h . " I sit i n the c h a i r i n o r d e r t o t y p e a t the c o m p u t e r , f o r e x a m p l e . A n d this i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h p a r a p h e r n a l i a ( t y p i n g a t t h e c o m p u t e r ) i s i n o r d e r t o a c c o m p l i s h y e t a n o t h e r task, n a m e l y w r i t i n g a b o o k . T h i s task a s w e l l ties i n t o f u r t h e r tasks. A t s o m e p o i n t , H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , t h i s c h a i n o f tasks c o m e s t o rest i n s o m e p o s s i b l e w a y to be Dasein. " T h e p r i m a r y ' i n - o r d e r - t o - w h i c h ' is a for-the-sake-ofwhich.
The
'for-the-sake-of,
however,
always
concerns
the
being
of
Dasein,..," (S&Z, p . 8 4 ) . I n t r a c i n g b a c k the t r a i l o f i n - o r d e r s - t o - w h i c h o n e e v e n t u a l l y a r r i v e s a t the p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s e i n f o r the sake o f w h i c h I sit i n the c h a i r a n d t y p e , say, b e i n g a n e d u c a t o r . F o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h i c h are p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f b e i n g f o r D a s e i n . " D a s e i n u n d e r s t a n d s i t s e l f a l w a y s already a n d a l w a y s s t i l l , a s l o n g a s i t is, i n t e r m s
310
53 o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " (S&Z, p . 1 4 5 ) . T h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f " p o s s i b i l i t y " i n §31 i s i n t e n d e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h the w a y i n w h i c h f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h i c h are p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h respect t o D a s e i n f r o m the w a y i n w h i c h t h e c o n t i n g e n c i e s o f t h e o c c u r r e n t are p o s s i b l e w i t h respect t o t h e m . A n d here t h e n i s t h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e m o s t recent a t t e m p t t o a v o i d the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n H e i d e g g e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f d e a t h : f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h i c h are n o t p o s s i b l e i n the s t r o n g e r sense that w e h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r i n g a s p o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o d e a t h . D e a t h m a y b e e i t h e r necessary o r c e r t a i n , b u t s u r e l y b e i n g a n e d u c a t o r i s n e i t h e r . Y e t the p r i m a r y bearers o f the t e r m " p o s s i b l e , " i n w h a t e v e r sense H e i d e g g e r i s a d v o c a t i n g its a p p l i c a t i o n t o D a s e i n , are Dasein's for-the-sakes-of-which. Death, if it is a p o s s i b i l i t y , is possible in t h e s a m e sense i n w h i c h b e i n g a n e d u c a t o r i s p o s s i b l e . A n d n o w w e h a v e a r r i v e d back at o u r apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Death
vs.
Demise:
Two
more
strategies for
avoiding
the
apparent
contradic-
tion W e h a v e seen that d e a t h i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense i s n o t s o m e e v e n t that m i g h t ( o r c e r t a i n l y o r n e c e s s a r i l y w i l l ) o c c u r a t the e n d o f D a s e i n ' s l i f e . H e c a l l s that e v e n t " d e m i s e " (Ableben). Perhaps i f w e e x a m i n e w h a t H e i d e g g e r has t o say a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n d e a t h a n d d e m i s e , w e c a n d i s c o v e r a w a y to a v o i d the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n . A f t e r presenting the concept of demise in Being and Time, I s h a l l c o n s i d e r t w o f u r t h e r strategies f o r a v o i d i n g t h e a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . T h e f i r s t s t r a t e g y suggests that death i s D a s e i n ' s p r o s p e c t i v e c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h d e m i s e . T h e s e c o n d s t r a t e g y d e v e l o p s the idea t h a t d e a t h i s a u t h e n t i c d e m i s e . N e i t h e r o f these strategies can s u c c e e d , I s h a l l argue, a n d s o w e shall s t i l l b e left w i t h the j o b o f s o r t i n g o u t the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Demise H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s the t e r m " d e m i s e " i n §49, t i t l e d " T h e d e m a r c a t i o n o f the E x i s t e n t i a l A n a l y s i s o f D e a t h i n C o n t r a s t w i t h O t h e r P o s s i b l e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the P h e n o m e n o n . " H e w o r k s his w a y t o " d e m i s e " b y w a y o f t h e t e r m " p e r i s h i n g " (Verenden). P e r i s h i n g i s the e n d i n g o f a l i f e : " W e c a l l the e n d i n g of w h a t l i v e s 'perishing,'" (S&Z, p. 2 4 7 ) . P e r i s h i n g is a b i o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f the e n d i n g o f the l i f e o f s o m e l i v i n g o r g a n i s m . H e i d e g g e r does n o t , a n d w e n e e d n o t here, d e v e l o p t h i s c o n c e p t i n a n y d e t a i l . S u f f i c e i t t o say that p e r i s h i n g i s s o m e t h i n g l i k e the c e s s a t i o n o f l i f e - m a i n t a i n i n g , o r g a n i c f u n c t i o n s . S u r e l y h u m a n s u n d e r g o such p e r i s h i n g . B u t h u m a n s are n o t m e r e l y l i v i n g , a n d w h e n a h u m a n l i f e e n d s , m u c h m o r e takes p l a c e t h a n s i m p l y a " c e s s a t i o n o f l i f e - m a i n t a i n i n g f u n c t i o n s . "
311
54
W h e n w e d e s c r i b e the l i f e o f s o m e D a s e i n , w e c a n d o s o a l w a y s i n t e r m s o f the d e v e l o p m e n t , goals.
Such
success,
failure,
descriptions
or unfinished
of human
lives
are
pursuit
possible
of projects in
virtue
and
of
the
d i s t i n c t i v e w a y o f b e i n g t h a t D a s e i n has, n a m e l y , t h a t i t d e t e r m i n e s a n d u n d e r s t a n d s i t s e l f b y t h r o w i n g i t s e l f i n t o f o r - t h e - s a k e s - o f - w h i c h . H e n c e , the e n d i n g of a h u m a n life is not mere perishing; it is w h a t Heidegger calls "demise:" E v e n i f D a s e i n ' s p h y s i o l o g i c a l death i s not o n t i c a l l y isolated, but rather c o - d e t e r m i n e d b y its o r i g i n a r y sort o f b e i n g , a n d e v e n i f D a s e i n c a n a l s o e n d w i t h o u t a u t h e n t i c a l l y d y i n g , a n d e v e n i f qua D a s e i n i t does n o t s i m p l y p e r i s h , n o n e t h e l e s s s i n c e D a s e i n " h a s " its p h y s i o l o g i c a l d e a t h , o f the sort h a d b y w h a t l i v e s , w e i n d i c a t e t h i s i n t e r m e d i a t e p h e n o m e n o n b y "demise." (S&Z, p. 2 4 7 ) The
point
o f the
passage
is
twofold:
(1)
to
grant
that
Dasein
has
a
p h y s i o l o g i c a l d e a t h , that i t i n s o m e sense perishes; a n d ( 2 ) t o i n d i c a t e that D a s e i n ' s p e r i s h i n g i s " c o - d e t e r m i n e d b y [ D a s e i n ' s ] o r i g i n a r y sort o f b e i n g , " i.e., that i t i s d i s t i n c t i v e i n v i r t u e o f the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s o f its w a y o f b e i n g . T h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p h e n o m e n o n - d e m i s e - is thus the p e r i s h i n g in so far as it i s m o d i f i e d b y D a s e i n ' s d i s t i n c t i v e w a y o f b e i n g . D a s e i n ' s d e m i s e i s the e n d o f its p u r s u i t o f tasks, goals, a n d p r o j e c t s , a n e n d i n g t h a t i s f o r c e d b y o r g a n i c p e r i s h i n g . D e m i s e i s thus the p o s s i b l e a n d c e r t a i n e v e n t t h a t b r i n g s Dasein's l i v i n g to a close. The
First
Strategy:
Death
is
Dasein's
understanding
of its
demise
S o m e have suggested that death is Dasein's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of or e n c o u n t e r w i t h d e m i s e . 5 T h i s s u g g e s t i o n f i t s w e l l w i t h the l i n e o f t h o u g h t t h a t f o r Heidegger what
is d i s t i n c t i v e l y Daseinish
about D a s e i n
i s n o t t h e facts
(Tatsachen) o f its b i o l o g y , b u t r a t h e r the F a c t s (Fakta) o f its
interpretation
t h e r e o f : b i o l o g i c a l sex d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o D a s e i n qua D a s e i n , b u t r a t h e r i n t e i p r e t i v e g e n d e r does. I t appears t o b e s u p p o r t e d a l s o b y H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m t h a t "Death, as the e n d of Dasein, is in t h i s e n t i t y ' s b e i n g t o w a r d s its e n d , " (S&Z, p. 2 5 9 ) . T h e t e r m " b e i n g - t o w a r d s " in Being and Time refers to a s o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y : D a s e i n i s t o w a r d s χ w h e n D a s e i n takes a c c o u n t o f Λ , u n d e r s t a n d s x, i n t e r p r e t s x, lets χ m a t t e r to i t , or e n c o u n t e r s x. So, D a s e i n has its d e a t h o n l y i n s o far a s i t i s " t o w a r d s , " o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i r e c t e d t o its end. This
strategy
is
also
unsuccessful.
Death
is
only
in
Dasein's
being
t o w a r d s its end, w h i c h is not d e m i s e , b u t r a t h e r death i t s e l f . 6 T h u s , d e a t h is o n l y i n D a s e i n ' s b e i n g t o w a r d s d e a t h . W h a t c o u l d that m e a n , h o w e v e r ? I t i s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f d e a t h a s a w a y t o b e D a s e i n . Pos s i b i l i t i e s are p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r D a s e i n o n l y i n s o far a s D a s e i n p r o j e c t s t h e m a s o p t i o n s f o r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g : " . . . p r o j e c t i o n . . . t h r o w s the p o s s i b i l i t y
312
55 ahead of i t s e l f as p o s s i b i l i t y a n d as s u c h lets it be," (S&Z, p. 1 4 5 ) . Heidegger introduces a technical t e r m to p i c k out this being towards death:
dying
(Sterben).
Dying, h o w e v e r , serves a s a t i t l e f o r the w a y o f b e i n g i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s towards its d e a t h . T h u s , w e m u s t say: D a s e i n n e v e r perishes. B u t D a s e i n c a n o n l y d e m i s e s o l o n g a s i t i s d y i n g . (S&Z, p . 2 4 7 ) T h e a r g u m e n t that f o l l o w s o n l y m a k e s sense i f w e h o l d fast t o a n o n t o l o g i cal d i s t i n c t i o n between death and demise. Heidegger continues, recall, " T h u s , w e m u s t say: D a s e i n n e v e r perishes. B u t D a s e i n c a n o n l y d e m i s e s o l o n g a s i t i s d y i n g , " (S&Z, p . 2 4 7 ) . D e a t h i s a d i s t i n c t i v e feature o f D a s e i n qua e n t i t y t h a t is e x i s t e n t in the t e c h n i c a l sense. F u r t h e r m o r e , d e a t h , as a p o s s i b l e w a y to be D a s e i n , is o n l y in so far as it is u n d e r s t o o d by D a s e i n . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of death is called " d y i n g . " D e m i s e , on the other hand, is the i n t e r m e d i a t e p h e n o m e n o n o f the d i s t i n c t i v e sort o f p e r i s h i n g that takes p l a c e w h e n D a s e i n ' s l i f e ceases. D e m i s e thus r e q u i r e s that the d e m i s i n g e n t i t y have D a s e i n ' s o r i g i n a r y sort o f b e i n g , i.e., that i t b e t o w a r d s its d e a t h , that it die. The
Second Strategy:
Dasein's
Death
is
the authentic,
demise
the
inauthentic
end
of
life
B u t there i s a n o t h e r w a y t o t r y t o e x p l o i t H e i d e g g e r ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the t e r m s " d e m i s e " a n d " d e a t h " i n o r d e r t o d o d g e the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . H e i d e g g e r associates " d e m i s e " a n d " d e a t h " w i t h i n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d a u t h e n t i c i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y . A n d s o here the idea e m e r g e s that p e r h a p s d e m i s e a n d d e a t h are b o t h w a y s o f h a v i n g o n e ' s l i f e c o m e t o a n e n d , o n e i n a u t h e n t i c , the o t h e r a u t h e n t i c . O n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , d e a t h w o u l d s t i l l b e the e n d i n g o f a h u m a n l i f e , but n o w c o n c e i v e d as understood or perhaps c o n f r o n t e d or undergone
by
authentic
Dasein;
demise w o u l d
be
such
an
ending
as
understood or confronted or undergone by inauthentic Dasein. B u t this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o v e r s i m p l i f i e s the t e x t . H e i d e g g e r i n fact seems t o say n o t that d e m i s e i s i n a u t h e n t i c d e a t h , b u t rather that w h e n D a s e i n i n a u t h e n t i c a l l y u n d e r s t a n d s ( i . e . , d i s o w n s ) its d e a t h , i t focuses o n d e m i s e i n s t e a d . I n a u t h e n t i c D a s e i n m i s u n d e r s t a n d s d e a t h a s b e i n g d e m i s e , h e n c e does not c o m e face t o face w i t h d e a t h , a n d t h e r e b y evades a n x i e t y a b o u t d e a t h . A l t h o u g h s a y i n g j u s t w h a t a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y are i s i n i t s e l f a s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r p r e t i v e e n t e r p r i s e , i t i s necessary t o say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e m here, s o that w e c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e s u g g e s t i o n that i s n o w u n d e r consideration. H e i d e g g e r offers a p r e l i m i n a r y characterization of authenticity
a n d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y in
§9 of Being and Time:
he c o n t r a s t s D a s e i n
" ' c h o o s i n g , ' w i n n i n g , i t s e l f w i t h i t " l o s i n g i t s e l f , o r better, n e v e r w i n n i n g i t s e l f b u t o n l y s e e m i n g t o , " (S&Z, p . 4 2 ) . I n §40, o n a n x i e t y , H e i d e g g e r
313
56 d e s c r i b e s D a s e i n ' s t e n d e n c y t o b u r y i t s e l f i n the p u b l i c , c o m m o n w a y s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h i n g s as " D a s e i n ' s f l i g h t from itself a n d (S&Z,
p. 184).
In
§§35-38
in
Chapter 5
of D i v i s i o n
its a u t h e n t i c i t y , " One,
Heidegger
i d e n t i f i e s the v a r i o u s m o d e s o f such f l i g h t : i d l e t a l k , perhaps t a l k f o r w h i c h one
takes
no
responsibility
(§35);
curiosity,
the
constant
search
after
s o m e t h i n g n e w , e.g., T a b l o i d j o u r n a l i s m ( § 3 6 ) ; a n d a m b i g u i t y ( § 3 7 ) . A l l o f these i n t u r n generate a k i n d o f t r a n q u i l i z a t i o n , a l i e n a t i o n , a n d t u r b u l e n c e ( § 3 8 ) . These m o d e s o f f l i g h t d i s t r a c t D a s e i n f r o m a n y g e n u i n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t sort o f e n t i t y i t is. O n l y t h r o u g h resoluteness - s i l e n t l y t h r o w i n g o n e s e l f i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e a t h , a n d b e i n g p r e p a r e d f o r the a t t e n d a n t a n x i e t y (S&Z, p p . 2 9 6 - 2 9 7 ) - does o n e c o m e face t o face w i t h w h a t sort o f e n t i t y one is, a n d h o l d o n t o t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n i n a u t h e n t i c i t y one d i s o w n s o n e ' s s o r t o f b e i n g ; i n a u t h e n t i c i t y one faces u p t o o n e ' s sort o f being and o w n s it. W i t h t h i s g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , let u s l o o k a l i t t l e m o r e c l o s e l y a t the d e t a i l s o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t r e a t m e n t o f d e a t h and demise
in
§ 5 2 of Being and Time,
so that we c a n
see w h e t h e r t h e
s u g g e s t i o n that d e a t h a n d d e m i s e are a u t h e n t i c a n d i n a u t h e n t i c v a r i e t i e s o f the same t h i n g i s w o r k a b l e . H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " T h e p u b l i c n e s s o f e v e r y d a y w i t h - o n e - a n o t h e r ' k n o w s ' d e a t h as a c o n s t a n t l y o c c u r r i n g e n c o u n t e r , as a 'case
of death'
[»Todesfall«].
(S&Z, p p . 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 ) .
7
This
or that
neighbor or
stranger
'dies,'"
The anonymous, public, inauthentic way of interpret-
i n g t h i n g s i n t e r p r e t s d e a t h a s a s o n o f e v e n t that i s c o n s t a n t l y o c c u r r i n g a r o u n d us. " . . . D a s e i n h i d e s t h i s fact [ o f its d e a t h ] f r o m i t s e l f b y t r a n s f o r m i n g d e a t h i n t o a n e v e r y d a y o c c u r r i n g case o f d e a t h a m o n g s t others, w h i c h c e r t a i n l y assures us e v e n m o r e c l e a r l y that
One oneself definitely still
' l i v e s , ' " (S&Z, p . 2 5 4 ) . S o , perhaps D a s e i n c o v e r s u p its o w n m o r t a l i t y b y f o c u s i n g o n the d e m i s e o f others a r o u n d i t . I t t h e n reassures i t s e l f b y n o t i n g t h a t o n l y o t h e r s h a v e d e m i s e d , not i t i t s e l f .
8
B u t I d o n o t t h i n k that this i s the r i g h t w a y t o read w h a t H e i d e g g e r i s u p to
i n the
p a r a g r a p h s . T h e p o i n t o f these passages
i s n o t that e v e r y d a y
D a s e i n h i d e s t h e fact that it w i l l d i e b y i n t e r p r e t i n g d e a t h as s o m e t h i n g that s t r i k e s others, b u t r a t h e r that by i n t e r p r e t i n g d e a t h as d e m i s e (the m u n d a n e e v e n t w i t h w h i c h w e are a l r e a d y f a m i l i a r ) , D a s e i n needs t o face u p o n l y t o its d e m i s e , n o t t o i t s d e a t h . The one does not let courage towards anxiety in the face of death emerge. T h e d o m i n a t i o n o f the p u b l i c interpretedness o f the o n e has a l w a y s a l r e a d y d e c i d e d a b o u t the a f f e c t i v i t y [Befindlichkeit] i n t e r m s o f w h i c h the a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s d e a t h s h o u l d b e d e t e r m i n e d . I n a n x i e t y i n the face o f d e a t h D a s e i n i s b r o u g h t b e f o r e i t s e l f a s d e l i v e r e d o v e r t o [ d e a t h ] . T h e o n e seeks t o t u r n t h i s a n x i e t y i n t o a fear i n t h e face o f a c o m i n g e v e n t [ v i z . , d e m i s e ] . (S&Z, p . 2 5 4 )
314
57 T o see the p o i n t I w a n t t o m a k e , one m u s t attend c a r e f u l l y t o H e i d e g g e r ' s s p e c i f i c l a n g u a g e here: the one does n o t t r y t o t r a n s f o r m a n x i e t y i n the face of my d e a t h i n t o a r e l i e f that it is n o t I w h o h a v e d i e d . R a t h e r , the o n e t r a n s f i g u r e s a n x i e t y i n the face o f d e a t h i n t o a fear i n the face o f d e m i s e , a coming e v e n t . I t is m y d e m i s e that is s t i l l a c o m i n g e v e n t , a n d i t is t o t h i s c o m i n g e v e n t that i n a u t h e n t i c i t y has m e a t t e n d . S o , the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n death a n d d e m i s e i s not that d e m i s e i s d e a t h m i s i n t e r p r e t e d a s s o m e t h i n g that does n o t s t r i k e m e , but o n l y o t h e r s . R a t h e r , d e a t h a n d d e m i s e j u s t are n o t the same t h i n g . T h e p u b l i c , i n a u t h e n t i c w a y o f i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i n g s , h o w e v e r , seizes o n d e m i s e a s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r d e a t h . I t seeks t o effect t h i s s u b s t i t u t i o n , because fear i n the face o f d e m i s e i s s o m e t h i n g that the p u b l i c c a n d e a l w i t h b y t r a n q u i l i z a t i o n , w h e r e a s a n x i e t y i n t h e face o f d e a t h i s n o t . T h e r e f o r e , the d e t a i l s o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r says b y w a y o f i n t r o d u c i n g , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g , and r e l a t i n g his t e r m s " d e a t h " a n d " d e m i s e " d o n o t a l l e v i a t e the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n f r o m w h i c h w e d e p a r t e d . I n s t e a d , t h e y r e i n f o r c e i t . D e a t h i s n o t the e n d i n g o f a h u m a n l i f e , w h e t h e r a u t h e n t i c a l l y c o n f r o n t e d or inauthentically, nor is it one's understanding of such an e n d i n g . D e a t h is s o m e t h i n g else. B u t w h a t ? W e l l , H e i d e g g e r has a l r e a d y said: a w a y t o b e D a s e i n . L e t u s n o w e x p l o r e w h a t h e c o u l d m e a n b y that.
D e a t h as a w a y to be D a s e i n L e t us t h e n accept that H e i d e g g e r means to c l a i m that d e a t h is a p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s e i n . I f h e means t h i s , i t n o w b e c o m e s clear, h e c a n n o t b e u s i n g " d e a t h " i n its o r d i n a r y s i g n i f i c a t i o n . D e a t h c a n n o t b e the state o f h a v i n g passed a w a y , f o r that state i s n o t a p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s e i n , b u t r a t h e r a w a y not to be at all. B u t n o w we have to c o n f r o n t the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . N e e d w e accept i t a s such? T h a t is, n e e d w e a c c e p t that H e i d e g g e r has t a l k e d h i m s e l f i n t o a c o r n e r ? R e c a l l the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n , as encapsulated in (d) f r o m above: (d)
Death is a possible w a y to be Dasein, one in w h i c h Dasein is not able to be!
E n d o r s i n g ( d ) w o u l d s e e m t o b e hopeless. M a r y i s a b l e t o r u n . N o w , c o n s i d e r the c o n d i t i o n o f n o t b e i n g a b l e t o r u n , i n t o w h i c h M a r y c a n f a l l , say t h r o u g h p a r a l y s i s . T h i s c o n d i t i o n - the i n a b i l i t y to r u n - is a p o s s i b l e w a y f o r M a r y t o be, t h o u g h c l e a r l y not a p o s s i b l e w a y f o r M a r y t o r u n . W h a t seems hopeless a b o u t ( d ) i s that i t appears t o d e m a n d a p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e , i n w h i c h M a r y i s n o t a b l e t o b e . A n d that i s i m p o s s i b l e !
315
58 T h i s i m p o s s i b i l i t y t h u s forces u s t o e x a m i n e the s u g g e s t i o n that p e r h a p s t h e r e i s a c o n d i t i o n o f b e i n g i n w h i c h D a s e i n is, i n o n e sense, b u t i s n o t a b l e t o be, i n a n o t h e r sense. T h a t is, w e can t r y t o d i s a m b i g u a t e t w o t h i n g s t h a t H e i d e g g e r m i g h t have i n m i n d b y Dasein's b e i n g , and thus a v o i d the c o n t r a d i c t i o n . W h a t w e need i s a t h i n a n d a t h i c k sense o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g , s o t h a t there c a n b e a c o n d i t i o n o f b e i n g i n the t h i n sense, i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s n o t a b l e t o b e i n the t h i c k sense. A n d w h a t m i g h t those t h i n a n d t h i c k senses b e ?
Existence
9
and
understanding
I n C h a p t e r 1 o f D i v i s i o n O n e o f Being and Time H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s the t e c h n i c a l c o n c e p t o f " e x i s t e n c e , " a s h e c a l l s i t . H e states that " t h e 'essence' o f [ D a s e i n ] lies i n i t s t o - b e , " (S&Z, p . 4 2 ) . T h e "essence" o f D a s e i n l i e s i n its b e - i n g , its g o i n g a b o u t the business o f b e i n g i n the w a y that i t d o e s . T h e t e r m "essence" a l w a y s o c c u r s i n scare-quotes, because D a s e i n a c t u a l l y has n o essence i n the n o r m a l sense. T h e essence o f a t h i n g i s w h a t a t h i n g m u s t be.
In
Dasein's
case,
Heidegger
argues,
who
1 0
Dasein
is
cannot
be
a n s w e r e d e x c e p t b y e x a m i n i n g h o w D a s e i n is, w h a t i t i s u p t o . T h e r e i s n o a n s w e r t o the q u e s t i o n , W h o i s D a s e i n ? , e x c e p t b y w a y o f e x a m i n i n g w h o D a s e i n , a s a m a t t e r o f fact, i s g o i n g a b o u t b e i n g . H e i d e g g e r p u t s the p o i n t i n o t h e r w o r d s b y w r i t i n g that D a s e i n ' s b e i n g i s "at i s s u e " i n its b e i n g . W h o D a s e i n is is n o t s e t t l e d by s o m e essence that defines i t , b u t r a t h e r is an issue D a s e i n m u s t c o n f r o n t a n d address i n e x i s t i n g . W e c a n say that w h o D a s e i n i s i s q u e s t i o n a b l e , i n t h e sense that i t i s a l w a y s i n q u e s t i o n . " Can
the
question
be
answered? T h i s query
is
ambiguous,
however,
b e t w e e n these t w o f u r t h e r q u e r i e s : (a) C a n the q u e s t i o n b e s e t t l e d b y a d e f i n i t i v e a n s w e r ? ; a n d ( b ) C a n one a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n , e v e n i f i n o n l y a p r o v i s i o n a l f a s h i o n ? T h e p r o p e r response t o the f i r s t q u e r y , ( a ) , i s t h a t n o , the q u e s t i o n c a n n o t b e d e f i n i t i v e l y settled, f o r t h e n D a s e i n ' s b e i n g w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e a t issue. B u t the p r o p e r response t o the s e c o n d q u e r y , ( b ) , i s t h a t yes, D a s e i n c a n p r o v i s i o n a l l y a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n . T h i s p r o v i s i o n a l a n s w e r i n g of the question Heidegger calls " u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " A n d so he w r i t e s , i n C h a p t e r 2 o f D i v i s i o n O n e , " D a s e i n i s the e n t i t y that i n its b e i n g c o m p o r t s [ r e l a t e s ] i t s e l f u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y t o this b e i n g , " (S&Z, p p . 5 2 - 5 3 ) . Let us explore understanding. The phenomenon
that H e i d e g g e r calls
"understanding" is
intimately
l i n k e d w i t h the c o n c e p t o f D a s e i n ' s " a b i l i t y - t o - b e . " T h e sort o f b e i n g o f D a s e i n a s a b i l i t y - t o - b e lies e x i s t e n t i a l l y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . D a s e i n is n o t s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t , w h i c h possesses as a s u p p l e m e n t , t h e a b i l i t y to do s o m e t h i n g [etwas zu können], b u t r a t h e r it is
316
59 p r i m a r i l y b e i n g - p o s s i b l e . D a s e i n i s i n each case w h a t i t c a n b e a n d h o w i t is its p o s s i b i l i t y . (SaZ, p. 143) T h e i d e a seems t o b e t h i s . W h a t i s i t f o r D a s e i n t o u n d e r s t a n d i t s e l f ? I t i s f o r i t t o " p r o j e c t i t s e l f u p o n its f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h , " that is, " D a s e i n u n d e r stands i t s e l f . . . i n t e r m s o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " (S&Z, p . 1 4 5 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , Dasein understands itself by t h r o w i n g itself into possible ways to be Dasein - b e i n g a teacher, b e i n g a student, b e i n g a m o t h e r or father, etc. - f o r the sake o f w h i c h i t u n d e r t a k e s the s u b s i d i a r y tasks i t does - w r i t i n g a l e c t u r e , g o i n g to a soccer g a m e , etc. - a n d w i e l d s the p a r a p h e r n a l i a it does - pens a n d paper, cars, soccer b a l l s , etc. To u n d e r s t a n d i t s e l f as b e i n g a t e a c h e r is p r e c i s e l y t o p u r s u e these tasks a n d w i e l d t h i s p a r a p h e r n a l i a f o r the sake o f b e i n g a teacher. I n H e i d e g g e r ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g there e m e r g e s t h e c r u c i a l c o n c e p t o f ability. A n d here w e b e g i n t o get a c l u e a b o u t d e a t h , f o r after a l l , in death Dasein Heidegger
is
writes,
"Understanding
is
n o t able t o be, in the
a
short
existential
(S&Z, p. 1 4 4 ) . To be a b l e - t o - b e
H e i d e g g e r has
and
largely
being something
of
obscurely
italicized
Dasein's
own
is to u n d e r s t a n d
declared. paragraph: ability-to-be," o n e s e l f as
s o m e t h i n g . T h e r e are t w o s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t s that e m e r g e i n t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y w a y o f the c o n c e p t o f a b i l i t y . F i r s t , D a s e i n ' s selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g ( a n d hence its f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h ) i s n o t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a s e l f - c o n c e p t in a n y n o r m a l sense, as a t h e o r y of o n e s e l f or a p l a n f o r one's
future.
"Projection
[i.e.,
understanding]
has n o t h i n g t o d o
with
c o m p o r t i n g oneself towards a thought out plan, in accordance w i t h w h i c h D a s e i n establishes its b e i n g , " (S&Z, p . 1 4 5 ) . M y b e i n g a teacher i s n o t s o m u c h s o m e t h i n g t h a t I p l a n , t h i n k t h r o u g h , a n d act o n , b u t r a t h e r m u c h more like my ability to drive, something developed through a combination of i m i t a t i o n , rote learning, supervision and censuring by others, and so on.
1 2
S e c o n d , a n d t h i s i s the p o i n t that i s r e a l l y r e l e v a n t here, D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y t o - b e a teacher is m a d e p o s s i b l e by an a f f e c t i v e d i s p o s i t i o n to be a teacher. T h e a b i l i t y is n o t s o m e p r o p e r t y that I possess, n o r is it s o m e abstract, purely intellectual or purely physical capacity of m i n e . Rather, ii is what H e i d e g g e r c a l l s a " t h r o w n p o s s i b i l i t y , " that is, a n e n g a g e d a b i l i t y t h a t r e q u i r e s a c e r t a i n a f f e c t i v e d i s c l o s u r e o f m y s e l f a n d the w o r l d t o m a k e sense f o r m e . I c o u l d n o t be a teacher, in the sense that I c o u l d n o t t h r o w m y s e l f i n t o t h e s u b s i d i a r y tasks a n d w i e l d the r e q u i s i t e p a r a p h e r n a l i a , i f I d i d n o t e n c o u n t e r the p o s s i b i l i t y ( h o w e v e r t a c i t l y ) a s n o b l e , o r d e s i r a b l e , o r w h a t e v e r . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g a teacher m u s t m a t t e r t o m e i n s o m e w a y , m u s t b e s i g n i f i c a n t i n s o m e w a y . T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the f o r - t h e - s a k e o f - w h i c h o f b e i n g a teacher i n t u r n l e n d s a d e r i v a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e t o the s u b s i d i a r y tasks a n d p a r a p h e r n a l i a . T h i s a f f e c t i v e d i s c l o s u r e , w h i c h H e i d e g -
317
60 ger c a l l s " a f f e c t i v i t y , " r e v e a l s t o m e the f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h a s b e a r i n g some " i m p o r t , " to b o r r o w a term f r o m Charles T a y l o r .
1 3
Heidegger:
P o s s i b i l i t y as an existentiale does n o t m e a n the f r e e - f l o a t i n g a b i l i t y - t o - b e i n the sense o f the " i n d i f f e r e n c e o f the w i l l " (libertas indifferentiae). D a s e i n , a s e s s e n t i a l l y a f f e c t i v e , i s i n each case a l r e a d y c a u g h t u p i n d e t e r m i n a t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . (S&Z, p. 1 4 4 ) Part o f w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n b e i n g able t o b e a teacher i s s o m e t h i n g a f f e c t i v e : Dasein
has the
motivational
or dispositional
ground for being
that.
A
c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h one does n o t care a b o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y i n q u e s t i o n c u t s the g r o u n d o u t f r o m u n d e r o n e ' s a b i l i t y - t o - b e i t .
Anxiety Now,
this
insight
suggests
a certain
unsettling
possibility
for
Dasein,
n a m e l y , that i t s h o u l d f i n d i t s e l f u n a b l e - t o - b e a n y t h i n g , because n o t h i n g matters to it in any w a y . T h i s c o n d i t i o n of n o t h i n g mattering to Dasein is w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls " a n x i e t y . " H i s p h e n o m e n o l o g y of anxiety in §40 is extremely complicated. Let
m e describe just enough o f w h a t Heidegger
m e a n s b y " a n x i e t y " that w e c a n see h o w i t relates t o d e a t h a n d helps u s d i s a m b i g u a t e the t h i n a n d t h i c k senses o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g . B y " a n x i e t y " H e i d e g g e r means t o p i c k o u t a g l o b a l d i s c o m f o r t w i t h the world.
The
sort
of attunement
(Stimmung),
or
way
of being
attuned
to
t h i n g s , that H e i d e g g e r has i n m i n d i s n o t a d i s c o m f o r t w i t h s o m e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t o r c o n t i n g e n c y . ( H e i d e g g e r c o n t r a s t s a n x i e t y w i t h fear, i n w h i c h o n e fears s o m e p a r t i c l a r f e a r s o m e t h i n g (S&Z, p . 186).) I t i s n o t the sort o f t h i n g o n e suffers b e f o r e a j o b i n t e r v i e w . R a t h e r , i t reveals the w h o l e ( h u m a n ) w o r l d in a definite way. ... lhe-in-the-face-of-which of anxiety is the world as such. T h e total i n s i g n i f i c a n c e w h i c h a n n o u n c e s i t s e l f i n [ a n x i e t y ] does not m e a n the absence o f the w o r l d , b u t rather means that i n t r a w o r l d l y [innerweltlich] e n t i t i e s are i n t h e m s e l v e s s o t o t a l l y u n i m p o r t a n t , that o n the basis o f t h i s insignificance o f the i n t r a w o r l d l y , the w o r l d i n its w o r l d h o o d i s s t i l l u n i q u e l y o b t r u s i v e . (S&Z, p. 187) A l t h o u g h d i r e c t e d t o n o t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s a n x i e t y i s s o real that o n e feels c r a m p e d , c o n f i n e d , s t i f l e d , a n d i f acute e n o u g h , o n e loses o n e ' s b r e a t h (S&Z, p.
186).
Anxiety
reveals
everything
within
the
world
(the
intraworldly)
as
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . W h a t does H e i d e g g e r h a v e i n m i n d here? T o a n s w e r t h i s , I m u s t v e r y b r i e f l y say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the w o r l d a n d a b o u t s i g n i f i c a n c e .
318
61 " W h a t stifles [ u s ] i s n o t this o r that, but also n o t e v e r y t h i n g o c c u r r e n t t o g e t h e r as a s u m , b u t rather the possibility of the a v a i l a b l e in g e n e r a l , that is, the w o r l d i t s e l f , " (S&Z, p . 187). T h e w o r l d , f o r H e i d e g g e r , i s n o t a t h i n g , a " t h i s o r t h a t , " n o r i s i t the w h o l e p i l e o f t h i n g s that w e f i n d i n o u r e n v i r o n m e n t . I t is, r a t h e r , the e n t i r e s o c i a l m i l i e u that m a k e s t h i n g s p o s s i b l e b y c o m p r i s i n g the essential s t r u c t u r e s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e y m a k e sense. F o r the a v a i l a b l e ,
i.e., e q u i p m e n t o r p a r a p h e r n a l i a , the structures that m a k e
t h e m p o s s i b l e are the uses t h a t w e m a k e o f t h e m . B r i e f c a s e s are f o r c a r r y i n g papers a n d b o o k s a r o u n d , a n d t h i s use o f the briefcase i s w h a t m a k e s the b r i e f c a s e a b r i e f c a s e , r a t h e r t h a n a m e r e piece o f leather. T h e w o r l d i n v o l v e s the set o f s t r u c t u r e s that g i v e pieces o f e q u i p m e n t a n d p a r a p h e r n a l i a their roles. B u t the w o r l d has a n o t h e r d i m e n s i o n , i n d e e d a d i m e n s i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h i t c o u l d n e v e r g i v e pieces o f e q u i p m e n t t h e i r r o l e s : i t i s t h a t d o m a i n w h e r e i n D a s e i n d e t e r m i n e s i t s e l f . I t c o m p r i s e s also the set o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r h u m a n a c t i o n , a n d t h u s f o r h u m a n b e i n g s d e t e r m i n i n g w h o t h e y are. H e i d e g g e r says t h a t the t o t a l i t y o f a l l these structures i s significance. A n e n t i t y i n t u r n i s s i g n i f i c a n t i f i t i s c o n n e c t e d i n w i t h t h i s s t r u c t u r e ; t o b e a s s i g n e d b y the s t r u c t u r e to a r o l e or h u m a n p o s s i b i l i t y is to be s i g n i f i c a n t (S&Z, p. 8 7 ) . It is c r u c i a l that t h i s t e r m i s i n t r o d u c e d o n l y after H e i d e g g e r has a r g u e d t h a t the w o r l d is at once that " i n terms of w h i c h " Dasein encounters paraphernalia and that " w h e r e i n " D a s e i n u n d e r s t a n d s i t s e l f b y t h r o w i n g i t s e l f i n t o its o w n p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t takes b o t h l i n k s f o r there t o b e s i g n i f i c a n c e , a n d hence f o r i n t r a w o r l d l y things to be significant. S o , f o r e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n the w o r l d t o b e i n s i g n i f i c a n t , t h i s r e l a t i o n a l whole
must s o m e h o w
be
t o r n apart.
B u t h o w ? D o c h a i r s cease
being
a s s i g n e d t o t h e i r r o l e s ? H o w c o u l d t h e y b e c h a i r s o f t h e y w e r e severed f r o m t h e i r roles? T h e g r o u n d l e v e l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n pieces o f e q u i p m e n t a n d t h e i r r o l e s c a n n o t b e severed. Perhaps the r o l e s that pieces o f e q u i p m e n t p l a y are s e v e r e d f r o m h u m a n p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? I n t h i s case, a c h a i r w o u l d s t i l l b e used f o r s i t t i n g o n , b u t this w o u l d h a v e n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h e a t i n g d i n n e r ( o r a n y t h i n g else o f the s o r t ) . T h i s c o u l d n o t b e the a n s w e r e i t h e r . T h e o n l y l i n k left i n the c h a i n o f s i g n i f i c a n c e i s D a s e i n ' s ^ / / - a s s i g n m e n t t o poss i b i l i t i e s . T h i s l i n k m u s t b e b r o k e n . E v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n the w o r l d b e c o m e s i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n that i t n o l o n g e r h e l p s m e d e t e r m i n e m y s e l f . I t n o l o n g e r shows up for me as having anything to do w i t h me. S o , a n x i e t y reveals the w o r l d , the e n t i r e m a t r i x o f r e l a t i o n s that n o r m a l l y connects my self-understanding w i t h chairs and hammers and also h u m a n p o s s i b i l i t i e s , a s u n c o n n e c t e d t o m e , that is, a s i n s i g n i f i c a n t . T h e w o r l d i s s t i l l p a l p a b l y t h e r e , s o m u c h s o that i t r e m a i n s the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g a n d e v e r y o n e m a k e s sense. ( R e c a l l , H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " . . . the w o r l d i n its w o r l d h o o d i s s t i l l u n i q u e l y o b t r u s i v e . . . " , (S&Z, p . 1 8 7 ) . ) B u t i t does
319
62 n o t r e l a t e t o m e a n d m y s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . / cease t o m a k e sense, f o r I a m c u t o f f f r o m the c o n t e x t that lets t h i n g s m a k e sense. T h e b r i e f c a s e s t i l l m a k e s s o m e k i n d o f sense: i t i s w h a t o n e uses f o r c a r r y i n g papers a n d b o o k s a r o u n d . B u t I d o n ' t m a k e sense: I am n o t a s s i g n e d to a n y w a y to be a h u m a n b e i n g . T h u s , t h a t i n the face o f w h i c h I a m a n x i o u s i s g l o b a l , because i t i s the f r a m e w o r k o f a l l t h i n g s a n d h u m a n a c t i v i t y . I t is, i n s h o r t , b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . " I f a c c o r d i n g l y n o t h i n g , that i s the w o r l d a s s u c h , t u r n s o u t to be the i n - t h e - f a c e - o f - w h i c h of a n x i e t y , t h e n t h i s m e a n s : that in the face
of which
anxiety
is
anxious
is
being-in-the-world
itself,"
(S&Z,
p.
187).
E v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n the w o r l d b e c o m e s i n s i g n i f i c a n t , because n o t h i n g m a t t e r s t o D a s e i n . A n x i e t y i s the c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h n o t h i n g m a t t e r s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o b e a r i n m i n d , h o w e v e r , that a l t h o u g h n o t h i n g m a t t e r s t o m e , because I c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h o I a m , the issue o r q u e s t i o n , W h o a m I ? , r e m a i n s . T h e q u e s t i o n persists, b u t I a m i n d i f f e r e n t t o its a n s w e r s ; the answers
seem
irrelevant
to
me.
Indifference
characterizes
my
option
b e t w e e n t w o m o v i e s I c o u l d see t o n i g h t . I f the q u e s t i o n w e r e n o l o n g e r t h e r e , t h e n I w o u l d b e " n e i t h e r i n d i f f e r e n t n o r n o t i n d i f f e r e n t " (S&Z, p . 4 2 ) t o its a n s w e r s . W i t h respect t o t h e ( f o r m e n o n - ) o p t i o n b e t w e e n t w o w a y s to be an avant-garde Russian painter, I am neither indifferent nor not. B e i n g n e i t h e r i n d i f f e r e n t n o r n o t i s the l a n g u a g e that H e i d e g g e r uses t o d e s c r i b e the o c c u r r e n t . D a s e i n m u s t be, a t a m i n i m u m , i n d i f f e r e n t , because i t i s d e f i n e d b y e x i s t e n c e , its b e i n g b e i n g a t issue. I n d i f f e r e n c e i s a w a y t o b e d i s p o s e d w i t h respect t o a p o s s i b i l i t y o n e c o n f r o n t s . G l o b a l i n d i f f e r e n c e t o my possibilities is anxiety.
Thin
and
thick
senses
of Dasein's
being
" A n x i e t y , " t h e n , d e s c r i b e s the a f f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n o f D a s e i n w h e n n o t h i n g matters to it, w h e n e v e r y t h i n g is equally irrelevant. H o w should we describe D a s e i n ' s s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n such a c o n d i t i o n ? W e h a v e seen that t o b e able-to-be someone in particular involves being affectively disposed one w a y o r the o t h e r w i t h respect t o c e r t a i n p o s s i b l e w a y s t o b e D a s e i n . S o , i n such a c o n d i t i o n , D a s e i n w o u l d not be able to be anyone. It w o u l d be u n a b l e - t o - b e - D a s e i n . O r a t least one c o u l d p u t the p o i n t that w a y . I n s u c h a c o n d i t i o n , the t h i n c o n c e p t o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g - v i z . , its b e i n g b e i n g a t issue f o r i t , there b e i n g a q u e s t i o n , W h o a m I ? - s w i n g s free o f the t h i c k e r concept of Dasein's b e i n g - viz., being able-to-be someone by t h r o w i n g o n e s e l f i n t o s o m e d e f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t y . D a s e i n is, b u t i s u n a b l e - t o - b e . A n d t h i s m a t c h e s H e i d e g g e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f " d e a t h . " T h i s i s a sort o f e x i s t e n t i a l d e a t h , i f o n e m a y p u t the p o i n t this w a y . I t i s n o t the e n d i n g o f s o m e o c c u r r e n t p r o c e s s , n o r i s i t the d i s s o l u t i o n o f s o m e o r g a n i s m . R a t h e r ,
320
63 i t i s the i n a b i l i t y t o p r o j e c t o n e s e l f f o r t h i n t o s o m e w a y t o b e D a s e i n . T h i s thus r e s o l v e s the a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . W e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d that D a s e i n is in a t h i n sense - its b e i n g is at issue f o r it - a n d is p r i m a r i l y a n d u s u a l l y a l s o i n a t h i c k sense - i t u n d e r s t a n d s w h o i t i s b y t h r o w i n g i t s e l f i n t o p o s s i b l e w a y s t o be. B y d i s a m b i g u a t i n g these senses, and c a r e f u l l y r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f d e a t h (as the i n a b i l i t y - t o - b e - t h e r e ) i n t e r m s o f these t w o senses, w e c a n see that H e i d e g g e r does n o t c o n t r a d i c t h i m s e l f . W e c a n also u n d e r s t a n d w h y d e a t h a n d a n x i e t y are t i e d t o o n e another,
w h y o n e c o n f r o n t s death
in anxiety. F i n a l l y , this lends some
substance t o the i d e a that t h i s c o n d i t i o n o f a n x i o u s c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h d e a t h i s the sort o f t h i n g o n e m i g h t w a n t t o a v o i d , a n d t h u s that the p u b l i c , i n a u t h e n t i c w a y o f i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i n g s m i g h t seek t o e v a d e t h i s c o n d i t i o n b y d i s t r a c t i n g o n e w i t h a near r e l a t i v e , n a m e l y , d e m i s e . B u t are d e a t h a n d d e m i s e near r e l a t i v e s ? H e i d e g g e r says t h e y are, because b o t h c a n b e seen ( o n e r i g h t l y , the o t h e r w r o n g l y ) as the end of Dasein.
Ends a n d l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n s I n d e e d , one o f the m o s t p r e s s i n g o b j e c t i o n s t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I h a v e o f f e r e d i s that i n C h a p t e r 1 o f D i v i s i o n T w o H e i d e g g e r r e p e a t e d l y d e s c r i b e s d e a t h a s " t h e e n d o f D a s e i n . " W h a t c o u l d p o s s i b l y b e the e n d o f D a s e i n , i f n o t the e n d i n g o f D a s e i n ' s l i f e , w h i c h I have i n s i s t e d i s d e m i s e a n d n o t d e a t h ? A c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r a c t u a l l y says a b o u t ends a n d D a s e i n r e v e a l s , h o w e v e r , that the e n d i n g o f o n e ' s l i f e c a n n o t b e a c a n d i d a t e f o r the e n d o f D a s e i n . I w a n t t o suggest that w e m u s t , i n s t e a d , i n t e r p r e t the n o t i o n o f the e n d o f D a s e i n t h r o u g h the c o n c e p t o f a l i m i t s i t u a t i o n , a c o n c e p t that H e i d e g g e r learns f r o m Jaspers a n d t o w h i c h h e refers i n a c r u c i a l passage i n C h a p t e r 1 o f D i v i s i o n T w o .
The end of Dasein is not a stopping I s i s i m p o r t a n t t o b e a r i n m i n d the s t r u c t u r e o f C h a p t e r 1 o f D i v i s i o n T w o o f Being and Time, on d e a t h . A f t e r p u t t i n g to one side D a s e i n ' s e n c o u n t e r w i t h the p a s s i n g a w a y o f o t h e r s , H e i d e g g e r t u r n s t o the q u e s t i o n , W h a t i s the e n d o f D a s e i n i t s e l f ? §48, t i t l e d " W h a t i s s t i l l o u t s t a n d i n g , e n d , t o t a l i t y " ("Ausstand, Ende, Ganzheit"), t a c k l e s the c o n c e p t of the e n d of D a s e i n h e a d o n . T o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t H e i d e g g e r i s u p t o i n §48 a n d the s e c t i o n s that f o l l o w i t , it is c r u c i a l to see that §48 has a n e g a t i v e r e s u l t : it argues o n l y that c e r t a i n c o n c e p t i o n s o f the e n d o f D a s e i n are m i s g u i d e d , because t h e y are not o n t o l o g i c a l l y appropriate to D a s e i n .
1 4
321
A t the e n d o f §48 h e w r i t e s ,
64
Death as the end of Dasein cannot be appropriately characterized through any of these modes of ending. If death w e r e u n d e r s t o o d as b e i n g a t - i t s - e n d i n the sense o f a n e n d i n g o f the sort w e h a v e r e v i e w e d , t h e n Dasein w o u l d thereby be posited as something occurrent or available. (S&Z, p . 2 4 5 ) A n d t h e last p a r a g r a p h o f the s e c t i o n i s t h i s : T h e p o s i t i v e , e x i s t e n t i a l - a n a l y t i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f d e a t h a n d its c h a r a c -
ter of b e i n g the e n d [und seines Endcharakters] is to be c a r r i e d out in l i g h t o f the g u i d e , w h i c h w e w o n e a r l i e r , p r o v i d e d b y the f u n d a m e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n , the p h e n o m e n o n o f care. (S&Z, p . 2 4 6 ) S o , §48 d i s p e n s e s w i t h s e v e r a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f the e n d o f D a s e i n , those t h a t are based on a c o n c e p t i o n of d e a t h as " b e i n g - a t - i l s - e n d , " as a sort of e n d i n g . W h a t sense(s) o f e n d i n g i s i t that H e i d e g g e r rejects? A l l o f the senses h a v e i n c o m m o n that t h e y are m o d e s o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s " s t o p p i n g " (Aufhören). O n p p . 2 4 4 - 2 4 5 various modes of stopping, i n c l u d i n g these: (A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
H e i d e g g e r offers
a list o f
15
Disappearing: t h e r a i n stops; the b r e a d is g o n e . H e r e e i t h e r a process ceases, i.e., n o l o n g e r o c c u r s , o r s o m e t h i n g that w a s a v a i l a b l e i s g o n e , n o l o n g e r a v a i l a b l e because c o n s u m e d o r d e s t r o y e d . ( S p e l l e d o u t f u r t h e r i n t o S&Z, p . 2 4 5 . ) Breaking off: t h e r o a d stops, i n the w a y i n w h i c h the f o r m e r R i c h a r d M . N i x o n f r e e w a y i n s o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a f o r m a n y years after W a t e r g a t e , o f c o u r s e - h u n g i n m i d - a i r , i n c o m p l e t e , a s a r a m p t o n o w h e r e , because C a l i f o r n i a j u s t s t o p p e d b u i l d i n g i t . T h i s i s m o r e t h a n a m e r e d i s a p p e a r i n g , because the s t o p p i n g is premature. I n t h i s case, s o m e t h i n g stops before a n i n t e n d e d g o a l o r e n d - p o i n t i s r e a c h e d . ( B r e a k i n g o f f " d e t e r m i n e s a n incomplete o c c u r r e n t e n t i t y , " (S&Z, p. 2 4 5 ) . ) Completing: the r o a d stops, i n the w a y i n w h i c h I n t e r s t a t e 1 0 i s c o m p l e t e w i t h its e n d i n g b y the shores o f the P a c i f i c O c e a n i n Santa M o n i c a , t h e r e b y a c h i e v i n g its g o a l o f l i n k i n g the A t l a n t i c w i t h the P a c i f i c b y a s o u t h e r n r o u t e . H e r e s o m e t h i n g stops w i t h the reaching of an intended goal or endpoint. ( I n Heidegger's language, t h i s i s " p r e c i s e l y t o be, w i t h its e n d , f o r the f i r s t t i m e o c c u r r e n t , " a s w h a t i t is.) Fulfilling itself: t h e f r u i t f u l f i l l s i t s e l f w i t h its ripeness. T h i s is a " f o u n d e d m o d e o f ' c o m p l e t e n e s s ' " (S&Z, p . 2 4 5 ) , a s H e i d e g g e r says, f o r here the f r u i t i s c o m p l e t e a n d the i n t e n d e d g o a l i s i n t e r n a l t o the f r u i t a n d d e t e r m i n a t i v e o f w h a t t h a t f r u i t is. ( T h e p e r i s h i n g o f an unripe piece of fruit w o u l d then be a " f o u n d e d m o d e of b r e a k i n g off.")
H e i d e g g e r lets a l l these v a r i a n t s f a l l u n d e r the t e r m " b e i n g - a t - i t s - e n d . " W h a t i s t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t o f s t o p p i n g that u n d e r l i e s a l l these
322
more
65 s p e c i f i c c o n c e p t s ? I t i s the c o n c e p t o f the s t o p p i n g o f a p r o c e s s .
16
The
r a i n i n g is a process that begins at f o u r o ' c l o c k and ends at f i v e o ' c l o c k . B u i l d i n g the (subsequently i n c o m p l e t e ) freeway begins in 1970 and breaks off in
1 9 7 4 . T h e r i p e n i n g o f the f r u i t b e g i n s i n M a y a n d f u l f i l l s i t s e l f i n
S e p t e m b e r . W h e t h e r the s t o p p i n g i s a d i s a p p e a r i n g , l i k e the r a i n , o r a completion
like
the b u i l d i n g o f Interstate
10, o r a f u l f i l l m e n t ,
like
the
r i p e n i n g o f a f r u i t , t h e s t o p p i n g i n q u e s t i o n i s p a r a s i t i c u p o n the o n t o l o g y o f t h e o c c u r r e n t o r a v a i l a b l e . Processes ( a n d t h i n g s ) are o c c u r r e n t o r a v a i l a b l e ; t h e y c a n s t o p . D a s e i n , h o w e v e r , i s n e i t h e r process n o r t h i n g a n d c a n n o t s t o p , n o t because it goes on f o r e v e r , b u t r a t h e r because it is n o t a p r o c e s s to b e g i n w i t h . Dasein's b e i n g is characterized in terms of existence (its b e i n g b e i n g a t issue f o r i t ) a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( t h e a b i l i t y - t o - b e s o m e p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s e i n ) . H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s that these are n o t processes. This c l a i m is open to an immediate objection, however. "Surely Dasein i s a process o f l i v i n g , a n d s u r e l y t h i s process c o m e s t o a n e n d ! O f c o u r s e , the l i v i n g i s n o t m e r e l y b i o l o g i c a l , l i k e the l i v i n g o f a b i r d , b u t i s r a t h e r a l i v i n g of a h u m a n l i f e . Nonetheless, this l i v i n g must come to an end. Dasein m u s t a t s o m e p o i n t b e a t its e n d , o r else one i s a s s e r t i n g D a s e i n ' s i m m o r t a l i t y ! " H e i d e g g e r agrees w i t h the o b j e c t i o n , e x c e p t the f i r s t sentence. R e c a l l the i n t e r m e d i a t e p h e n o m e n o n o f d e m i s e : the e n d i n g o f a l i f e , w h e n t h a t l i f e has a d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g m o d i f i e d b y D a s e i n ' s originary way of being. That originary way of being, we now k n o w , is for D a s e i n ' s b e i n g t o b e i n q u e s t i o n f o r i t ( u n l i k e the b e i n g o f a cat, the g e n e r a l patterns o f l i f e o f w h i c h are " h a r d - w i r e d " i n t o its b i o l o g y ) a n d f o r i t t o m a k e a p r o v i s i o n a l a n s w e r t o that q u e s t i o n b y u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t s e l f i n t e r m s of some possible w a y to be itself. T h e
intermediate phenomenon of a
h u m a n life must c o m e to an end. Heidegger is not asserting i m m o r t a l i t y . H o w e v e r , w h a t h e i s p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n i s n o t the b e i n g - a t - i t s - e n d o f h u m a n l i f e , b u t a sense o f e n d that is t i e d e x c l u s i v e l y t o the c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k of Dasein's o r i g i n a r y w a y of being, to existence and understandi n g . H u m a n l i f e stops; n e i t h e r e x i s t e n c e n o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n b e s a i d t o s t o p as s u c h , h o w e v e r . B u t i s n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p r o c e s s , a process p r e c i s e l y o f ( p r o v i s i o n a l l y ) m a k i n g o n e s e l f w h o one i s b y t h r o w i n g o n e s e l f i n t o s o m e p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s e i n , say, b e i n g a f r i e n d ? M i g h t o n e n o t r e f e r t o t h i s process o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a sort of becoming! "Dasein
m u s t , as
H e i d e g g e r does
i t s e l f , become, that
is, be, w h a t
write
in
§48 that
it is n o t y e t , " (S&Z,
p . 2 4 3 ) . T h i s l i n e i s v i r t u a l l y a r e p r i e v e o f a passage f r o m §31 o n u n d e r standing: A n d o n l y because the b e i n g o f the there m a i n t a i n s its C o n s t i t u t i o n t h r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d its p r o j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r , because i t is, w h a t i t b e c o m e s , o r also does n o t b e c o m e , c a n i t i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g say t o i t s e l f :
323
66 " b e c o m e w h a t y o u a r e ! " (S&Z, p . 1 4 5 ) I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o see j u s t w h a t H e i d e g g e r i s a s s e r t i n g here. N o t e t h a t t h e r e p r i e v e l i n e s in §48 o c c u r c r u c i a l l y n o t in propria persona, b u t r a t h e r in the m i d s t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a t t e m p t , u l t i m a t e l y u n s u c c e s s f u l , t o c o n c e i v e d e a t h a s a sort o f s t o p p i n g , t o w o r k o u t a n a n a l o g y b e t w e e n D a s e i n a n d a p i e c e o f f r u i t , a s o r t o f l i f e . T h e a n a l o g y a n d its i m p l i c a t i o n s are r e j e c t e d b y the e n d o f § 4 8 , a s the d i s c u s s i o n a b o v e has s h o w n . D o e s that e n t a i l t h a t H e i d e g g e r does n o t m e a n w h a t h e says i n §31? N o . H e m e a n s exactly w h a t h e says: one c a n say t o o n e s e l f " b e c o m e w h a t y o u a r e ! " o n l y because o n e u n d e r s t a n d s o n e s e l f . O n the one h a n d , b e c o m i n g w h a t y o u are i s w h a t h e calls "an intermediate p h e n o m e n o n , " a p h e n o m e n o n of l i f e that is d i s t i n c t i v e l y m o d i f i e d b y D a s e i n ' s o r i g i n a r y w a y o f b e i n g . Its e n d i n g i s d e m i s e . O n the o t h e r h a n d , o r i g i n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g is, a s H e i d e g g e r has s a i d , a n a b i l i t y , n o t a p r o c e s s . I t does n o t s t o p a s s u c h . O n c e H e i d e g g e r has m a d e t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , b y t h e e n d o f §48, h e i s t h e n i n a p o s i t i o n t o i n t r o d u c e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n d e m i s e , w h i c h i s the s t o p p i n g o f D a s e i n ' s l i f e , a n d d e a t h , w h i c h i s t h e e n d o f D a s e i n i n s o m e o t h e r sense.
The
end
as
a
limit-situation
S o , i n w h a t sense does D a s e i n have a n e n d ? H e i d e g g e r does say t h a t d e a t h is the end of D a s e i n , and so we must c o m e to some understanding of h o w h e w a n t s t o use " e n d " i n t h i s c o n t e x t . U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s n o t a process; r a t h e r , i t i s a n ability. I n w h a t sense c o u l d a n a b i l i t y b e s a i d t o h a v e a n e n d ? A b i l i t i e s are n o t l i k e tasks o r p r o j e c t s , w h i c h d o b r e a k o f f o r c o m p l e t e themselves w i t h their e n d i n g .
1 7
I n the d i s c u s s i o n o f d e a t h H e i d e g g e r t i p s u s
o f f as to the d i r e c t i o n he is h e a d i n g by i n d i c a t i n g , in a f o o t n o t e , a d e b t to Jaspers's c o n c e p t o f a " l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n . " H e w r i t e s , F o r t h e f o l l o w i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n , one s h o u l d see especially: K . Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen *. ... Jaspers conceives death by m e a n s o f t h e c l u e o f the p h e n o m e n o n , set f o r t h b y h i m , o f ' l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n s , ' w h o s e f u n d a m e n t a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ranges b e y o n d a l l t y p o l o g i e s o f ' a t t i t u d e s ' a n d ' w o r l d - v i e w s ' . (S&Z, p. 2 4 9 n . ) 1
T h e r e are several p o i n t s o f c o n t a c t b e t w e e n H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f d e a t h in
Being
and
Time
and
Jaspers's
in
Psychologie
der
Weltanschauungen.
19
L e t m e s u m m a r i z e s o m e aspects o f that c o n n e c t i o n i n three theses. F i r s t , H e i d e g g e r takes o v e r f r o m Jaspers the i d e a that one c a n d e f i n e a n d d e l i m i t the c o n c e p t o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e b y d e s c r i b i n g its l i m i t s . S e c o n d , l i m i t s i t u a t i o n s are s i t u a t i o n s o r c o n d i t i o n s o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e i n w h i c h o n e c o n f r o n t s a l i m i t a t i o n o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . F i n a l l y , a l t h o u g h Jaspers a n d
324
67 Heidegger have very different w a y s of t h i n k i n g about this, each understands the r e l e v a n t e x i s t e n t i a l l i m i t s t o arise f r o m s t r u c t u r a l t e n s i o n s w i t h i n h u m a n existence. I f w e a l l o w H e i d e g g e r ' s reference t o l i m i t - s i u t a t i o n s t o g u i d e u s f r o m the c o n c e p t o f e n d i n g qua s t o p p i n g t o t h a t o f l i m i t a t i o n , w e c a n m a k e p r o g r e s s in c o m i n g to terms w i t h Heidegger's line of thought. Dasein is an ability-tobe, a n d i f w e e x a m i n e the w a y s i n w h i c h a n a b i l i t y c a n b e s a i d t o have l i m i t s , I t h i n k w e c a n see h o w H e i d e g g e r u n d e r s t a n d s e x i s t e n t i a l d e a t h t o b e a sort o f e n d . A b i l i t i e s c a n b e l i m i t e d i n (at least) t w o sorts o f w a y s . F i r s t , a b i l i t i e s h a v e l i m i t s o n w h a t t h e y c a n a c c o m p l i s h . M y a b i l i t y t o a m has its l i m i t a t 1 0 m p h , o r w h a t e v e r . M y a b i l i t y t o read m e e t s its m a t c h w i t h c o m p l e x , m o d e r n i s t p o e t r y , o r G o t h i c s c r i p t . S e c o n d , a b i l i t i e s ( o f t e n ) have s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h t h e y are s t i f l e d ,
2 0
prevented f r o m being exercised. My
a b i l i t y t o b r e a t h e i s s t i f l e d b y a l a c k o f o x y g e n , m y a b i l i t y t o see b y a n absence o f l i g h t . I t i s the s e c o n d o f these w a y s o f h a v i n g l i m i t s that interests m e here. I n the abscence o f l i g h t , the a b i l i t y t o see i s n o t n o n - e x i s t e n t ; i t i s s i m p l y stifled. Suppose we call situations in w h i c h an ability cannot be m a n i f e s t e d because s t i f l e d a " l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n " f o r that a b i l i t y , s o that u t t e r d a r k n e s s is a l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n f o r s i g h t . L i m i t - s i t u a t i o n s {Grenzsituationen) h e l p t o d e f i n e a n a b i l i t y , b y r e v e a l i n g its l i m i t s {Grenzen), l i m i t s w h i c h f u n c t i o n a s the b o u n d a r i e s o f the a b i l i t y , its ends, i n a r e c o g n i z a b l e sense o f that t e r m . T h e f i n i t u d e o f a n a b i l i t y ( i t s " e n d l i n e s s , " Endlichkeit) i s s p e l l e d out b y its l i m i t s . D e a t h i s t h e l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n that d e f i n e s the l i m i t s o f D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y - t o be. D a s e i n ' s b e i n g , i n the t h i c k sense, is an a b i l i t y - t o - b e . T h e e n d o r l i m i t o f t h i s a b i l i t y i s the i n a b i l i t y - t o - b e . T h e c o n d i t i o n H e i d e g g e r c a l l s " d e a t h " i s a l i m i t - s i t u a t i o n f o r t h a t a b i l i t y - t o - b e , one
in
w h i c h one confronts
this
l i m i t a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h i s l i m i t a t i o n arises o u t o f a t e n s i o n i n the v e r y s t r u c t u r e o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e : o n e ' s b e i n g i s a l w a y s a t issue f o r o n e , y e t t h e r e i s a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h o n e c a n n o t r e s p o n d t o that issue. D e a t h i s the c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s u n a b l e t o be-there, because i t i s u n a b l e t o e x e r c i s e its a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e w h o i t is. T h i s i s t o say that d e a t h i s a l i m i t s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h the a b i l i t y - t o - b e i s s t i f l e d , i n the w a y i n w h i c h the a b i l i t y t o see i s s t i f l e d b y the absence o f l i g h t . T h i s s i t u a t i o n o c c u r s w h e n D a s e i n i s beset b y a n x i e t y , i n w h i c h n o n e o f its p o s s i b i l i t i e s m a t t e r s t o i t d i f f e r e n t i a l l y , i n w h i c h a l l are e q u a l l y i r r e l e v a n t t o i t .
Conclusion T h e t e r m " d e a t h " in Being and Time does n o t refer to an e v e n t that takes p l a c e a t the e n d o f e v e r y h u m a n b e i n g ' s l i f e . R a t h e r , i t i s the n a m e f o r a
325
68 c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n c a n f i n d i t s e l f , v i z . , the c o n d i t i o n o f n o t b e i n g a b l e t o b e a n y o n e . T h i s c o n d i t i o n besets D a s e i n w h e n i t f i n d s i t s e l f s u f f e r i n g a n x i e t y , w h i c h i s a g l o b a l i n d i f f e r e n c e t o a l l the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that present
themselves
to
Dasein.
Since "death"
picks out this existential
c o n d i t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n the e n d i n g o f a h u m a n l i f e , H e i d e g g e r c a n refer t o d e a t h a s a p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e D a s e i n . H e c o u l d n o t d o t h i s i f " d e a t h " h a d its normal
meaning.
Furthermore,
we can
make
sense
of Heidegger's
ap-
p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f death - a s the p o s s i b l e w a y t o b e i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s not a b l e t o be-there - i f w e d i s t i n g u i s h w h a t I h a v e c a l l e d the " t h i n " a n d the " t h i c k " senses o f " b e i n g " f o r D a s e i n . W h i l e i n the c o n d i t i o n H e i d e g g e r c a l l s " d e a t h , " D a s e i n i s i n the t h i n sense, i n that its b e i n g is at issue f o r i t , y e t it is not a b l e to be in the t h i c k sense, in that it c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h o i t i s b y p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o s o m e d e f i n i t e w a y t o b e Dasein. I f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the c o n c e p t o f d e a t h i n Being and Time i s r i g h t , w e c a n g a i n s o m e i n s i g h t i n t o r e l a t e d issues h i n t e d a t here. F o r i n s t a n c e , i n d e v e l o p i n g t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f d e a t h , i t has been necessary t o d i s t i n g u i s h the s t r u c t u r e o f D a s e i n f r o m the s t r u c t u r e o f l i f e . I n t h i s w a y , w e h a v e a n e w a v e n u e o f access t o H e i d e g g e r ' s d e n i a l that h e i s r e a l l y e n g a g e d i n a f o r m o f l i f e - p h i l o s o p h y . W e d o n o t o n l y h a v e a v a i l a b l e these n e w o p p o r t u n i t i e s , b u t are also c o n f r o n t e d w i t h n e w i n t e r p r e t i v e tasks. I t w i l l be necessary to d e v e l o p n e w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f o t h e r r e l a t e d p h e n o m e n a . N o t o n l y those n o t i o n s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o that o f d e a t h , s u c h a s a n t i c i p a t i o n , a u t h e n t i c i t y , a n d resoluteness, b u t a l s o those c o n c e p t s b u i l t u p o n H e i d e g g e r ' s t r e a t m e n t o f d e a t h , such a s t e m p o r a l i t y .
2 1
Notes 1. S0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay ( N e w Y o r k : Penguin B o o k s , 1985), p. 75. 2. A l l references to Being and Time are to the 15th German edition: M a r t i n Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 15th ed. (Tübingen: M a x Niemeyer V e r l a g , 1979). A l l translations are my o w n , though of course I have relied heavily on Macquarrie and Robinson's English translation: Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and E d w a r d Robinson ( N e w Y o r k : Harper and R o w , 1962). I have tried to indicate most of my divergences from Macquarrie and Robinson's translations of technical terminology, usually by g i v i n g the German in parentheses. 3. Paul Edwards {Heidegger on Death: A critical Evaluation, M o n i s t M o n o g r a p h N o . 1 (LaSalle, I I I . : The Hegeler Institute, 1979)) e x p l i c i t l y considers the issue presented by Heidegger's c l a i m that death is a possible way to be, and rejects it as nonsense (p. 22). He later claims that Heidegger equivocates on " p o s s i b i l i t y . " M o s t l y Heidegger uses this term to refer to "alternatives ... w h i c h we k n o w ourselves to be capable of choosing," (p. 27). In the discussion
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69 of death, according to Edwards, Heidegger slides into using che term to refer to the total absence of experiences and behavior (p. 33). A n d though Edwards concludes that the term " p o s s i b i l i t y " is doing no w o r k in Heidegger's formulation - since what Heidegger is referring to is really the impossibility of experiences - we can see that Edwards has interpreted death as a possible event that can befall Dasein, and thus that he is pursuing the interpretive strategy 1 want to consider. Edwards's interpretation of Heidegger's concept of death as total annihilat i o n , the utter absence of experiences, is d i f f i c u l t to defend. Edwards can t h i n k of nothing else that Heidegger could consistently mean by "the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of any existence at a l l . " Yet Heidegger insists, and Edwards recognizes that he insists, that one not read "death" as referring to an event that takes place at the end of one's l i f e . Edwards forges ahead w i t h his interpretation, even though it makes nonsense out of many of Heidegger's claims, as Edwards shows acidly and at great length. T h i s comes out especially clearly in Edwards's Chapter 7, " D o u b l e - T a l k about S u r v i v a l After Death." Edwards points out that if one interprets death as utter n u l l i t y in the sense of unqualified non-existence, then it does not make any sense to c l a i m (as Heidegger does at S&Z, pp. 2 4 7 - 2 4 8 ) that one's v i e w is neutral w i t h respect to the notion of an after-life. I should have expected that this w o u l d lead Edwards to question his interpretation of Heidegger's concept of death. Unfortunately, it does not. 4. C h i e f among those features are these: ( i ) Dasein's being is at issue in everyt h i n g it does {S&Z, §9); ( i i ) Dasein's being is in each case mine (S&Z, §9); and ( i i i ) Dasein is always already familiar w i t h a w o r l d , a social m i l i e u thai is the horizon for the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of everything it does and everything it encounters w i t h i n the w o r l d (S&Z, §12). 5. Schräg seems to adopt this strategy. See C a l v i n O. Schräg, Existence and Freedom (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961), p. 113. G e l v e n develops a somewhat more c o m m o n approach, in w h i c h he claims that the issue that is important for existential treatments of deaths is "what impending death can mean to one in the fullness of one's life." See M i c h a e l G e l v e n , A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Revised E d i t i o n ( D e K a l b , 111.: Northern I l l i n o i s University Press, 1989), p. 143. This leaves open the question of what "death" refers to in Being and Time. 6. T h e p r e l i m i n a r y conception of death that Heidegger deploys throughout Chapter I of D i v i s i o n One is that death is the end of Dasein, as the passage above from S&Z, p. 259 indicates. 7. Note that in this passage the event that is being discussed is not death, but rather something else. This is indicated by Heidegger's liberal use of scarequotes. 8. T h o u g h his interpretation is more complex and sophisticated, Gelven adopts this basic line of approach. See Gelven, p. 150. 9. T h o u g h very different, this " t h i n and t h i c k " approach is inspired by Dreyfus and R u b i n ' s attempt to make sense of death in their interpretation of death as Dasein's i n a b i l i t y to define itself and give itself personal meaning. They are in effect distinguishing thin and thick sense of Dasein's being. See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane R u b i n , " Y o u Can't Get Something for N o t h i n g : Kierkegaard and Heidegger on H o w N o t to Overcome N i h i l i s m , " Inquiry 30 (1987). 3 3 - 7 5 . 10. Since Dasein is characterized by "mineness" (Jemeinigkeit), it must always be addressed w i t h a personal pronoun (S&Z, p. 42). Moreover, the question of
327
70 what Dasein is must become the question w h o Dasein is (S&Z, p. 45). 11. T h i s is of course a classic existentialist thesis: the self is that w h i c h relates i t s e l f to itself (Kierkegaard), or existence precedes essence (Sartre). 12. T h i s is a point developed at greath length in Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-theWorld (Cambridge: The M . I . T . Press, 1991) and John Haugeland, "Heidegger on B e i n g a Person," Nous 1 6 ( 1 9 8 2 ) : 15-26. 13. Charles Taylor, "Self-Interpreting A n i m a l s , " in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 48. 14. T h i s is a point recognized by many interpretations of D i v i s i o n T w o , Chapter 1, though it is not really mined for implications. For example, Schräg understands that §48 has a negative result, but he does not draw the conclusion that Dasein does not end ( i n the sense of stopping). Rather, he folds the issue into the c l a i m that Dasein's death, existentially understood, is being-towards-death. See Schräg, p. 112. 15. That it is these senses of stopping that Heidegger has in m i n d in the t w o passages quoted above is confirmed by the continuation of the first passage, the one from p. 245. 16. Each o f the modes o f stopping has a temporal and a spatial variety. I w i l l focus on the temporal varieties. 17. A n d thus it is important to distinguish the possibilities of Dasein, its possible ways of being, w h i c h are specific abilities, f r o m tasks or projects that are accomplished by Dasein. Dasein determines itself through its possibilities by means of understanding (Verstehen); it completes its tasks through circumspection (Umsicht). 18. K a r l Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 6th ed. (München: R. Piper, 1985). (Heidegger refers to the t h i r d edition, and to pages 2 5 9 - 2 7 0 , on death. The entire section on Grenzsituationen is found on pp. 2 2 9 - 2 8 0 . ) 19. I investigate the details of this Heidegger-Jaspers connection in my "Heidegger's Debt to Jaspers's Concept of the L i m i t - S i t u a t i o n , " in Heidegger and Jaspers, ed. A l a n M. Olson (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, in press). 20. I use this term intentionally to hook up w i t h Heidegger's description of anxiety. 2 1 . I want to thank Frank A m b r o s i o , Bert Dreyfus, Steve C r o w e l l , John Haugeland, M a r k Okrent, T o m Rockmore, and Ted Schatzki, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, as w e l l as the faculty and students of the Philosophy Department 3t Bates College, who heard an earlier version of this paper.
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•
I
I
•
DASEIN, EXISTENCE AND DEATH carol j . white
A few y e a r s ago P a u l E d w a r d s published two articles critiquing Heidegger's views on death. L a w r e n c e H i n m a n took i s s u e w i t h E d w a r d ' s r e a d ing o f H e i d e g g e r . * S u b s e q u e n t l y E d w a r d s e x p a n d e d his two studies a n d p u b l i s h e d t h e m a s the f i r s t v o l u m e i n the M o n i s t M o n o g r a p h S e r i e s . * * I w a n t to r e - o p e n t h e d e b a t e on»the s u b j e c t , not i n o r d e r t o c r i t i c i z e E d w a r d s i n the s a m e w a y H i n m a n d i d , but t o a r g u e a g a i n s t a b e l i e f t h a t t h e y both h o l d in common. E d w a r d s c l a i m s that Heidegg e r ' s p o s i t i o n c a n b e r e d u c e d t o the c l a i m t h a t (1) " u n l i k e p l a n t s a n d a n i m a l s , h u m a n beings know that they a r e
g o i n g t o d i e " a n d (2) "this k n o w l e d g e influences them in various w a y s . " E d w a r d s finds this a platitude whose triviality has been hidden behind Heidegger's obscure, ponderous jargon ( E d w a r d s 60). H i n m a n d o e s n ' t d i s a g r e e w i t h this a r t i c u l a t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h e s i s but rather tries to m a k e Heidegger's view m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g a n d i m p o r t a n t b y filling in the r e s t of his position. H i n m a n argues that Heidegger is trying to show u s h o w w e c a n " m a k e s e n s e out o f the possibility of one's own death." However, H i n m a n regretfully concludes
*
Lawrence M. Hinman, "Heidegger, Edwards, and Being-towardDeath," S o u t h e r n J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y , X V / (Fall, 1978), 193-212. Future page references to this article will be included in the text in parentheses and indicated by 'Hinman.' ** Paul Edwards, H e i d e g g e r a n d D e a t h : A C r i t i c a l E v a l u a t i o n (La Salle, Illinois: Hegeler, 1979), His two earlier articles on this subject are: "Heidegger on Death as Possibility," Mind LXXXIV (1975), 548-566; and "Heidegger and Death: A Deflationary Critique," The Monist, Vol. 59, no. 2 (April, 1976), 161-186. Future page references to the first work will be included in the text in parentheses and indicated by 'Edwards.' PHILOSOPHY TODAY
SPRli\C
52
330
1984
that he is "honestly not c e r t a i n w h e t h e r it is possible" to m a k e sense out of one's d e a t h , though H e i d e g g e r ' s efforts a r e a v a l i a n t attempt ( H i n m a n 211). I w a n t to a r g u e that the p r o b l e m which Heidegger is addressing has been f u n d a m e n t a l l y m i s c o n c e i v e d by both these a u t h o r s a s w e l l a s m a n y others, including James Demske, whose Being, Man and Death is a thorough investigation of H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s on d e a t h in w o r k s published d u r i n g h i s lifetime.* I think that to understand what Heidegger is saying we m u s t m a k e a r a d i c a l distinction bet w e e n the d e a t h of a person and the e x i s t e n t i a l d e a t h of D a s e i n . Heidegger isn't t r y i n g to m a k e "sense" out of one's p e r s o n a l d e a t h . In fact, it is not c l e a r that one's p e r s o n a l , p h y s i c a l d e a t h is the k i n d of thing that c a n h a v e "sense" <"Sinn") in his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of that notion. It is the sort of " n a t u r a l event" w h i c h he suggests is "against sense" ("widersinnig"! a n d "can b r e a k in upon us a n d destroy us."**
A s w e e x a m i n e H e i d e g g e r ' s conception of D a s e i n a n d its d e a t h , we should keep i n m i n d w h a t H e i d e g g e r a l w a y s insisted w a s the sole goal of Being and Time. He r e m i n d s us at the beginning of D i v i s i o n T w o before he s t a r t s h i s investigation of d e a t h : W h a t w e a r e seeking i s the a n s w e r to the question about the m e a n i n g of B e i n g . . . B u t to l a y b a r e the horizon w i t h i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g l i k e B e i n g i n g e n e r a l (überhaupt) b e c o m e s intelligible is t a n t a m o u n t to c l a r i f y i n g the possibility of h a v ing a n y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of B e i n g at a l l — an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h itself belongs to the constitution of the entity c a l l e d D a s e i n (231).
T h e c o m m o n opinion a m o n g H e i d e g g e r c o m m e n t a t o r s i s that H e i d e g g e r b r o k e off Being and Time after D i v i s i o n T w o b e c a u s e h i s conception of d e a t h , r e s o l uteness a n d t e m p o r a l i t y t r a p p e d h i m i n a s u b j e c t i v e v i e w of the B e i n g of D a s e i n f r o m w h i c h he could find no w a y to
*
J a m e s D e m s k e , B e i n g , M a n , a n d D e a t h (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970). Future page references to this book will be included in the text in parentheses and indicated by 'Demske. ' For two other short replies to Edwards in α vein similar to Hinman's, see Jamshid Mirfenderesky's "Concerning Paul Edward's 'Heidegger on Death': A Criticism" in the J o u r n a l of the B r i t i s h Society for P h e n o m e n o l o g y , Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 1982), 120-128, and Dan Magurshuk's "Heidegger and Edwards on Sein-zum-Tode," The Monist, Vol. 62, No. 1, (January, 1979), 107-118.
**
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, twelfth edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), p. 152. Future page references to this work will be included in the text and indicated by the page number in parentheses. This pagination is also given in the margins of the English edition: Being and Time, translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). My own translations frequently vary in both important and minor ways from this version. References to Heidegger's later marginal notes indicate the page number of the appendix of the Gesamtausgabe version of S e i n und Zeit published by Klostermann. These page numbers are indicated by a following asterisk. DASEIIS' A1\D
DEATH
·
·
· 53
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p r o c e e d w i t h his investigation of the m e a n i n g of Being.** My account of his a n a l y s i s of d e a t h w i l l show it to be in f a c t a s t e p a l o n g the p a t h o f h i s a n nounced quest. E x i s t e n c e and the Most Proper Being Since Heidegger describes death as "the p o s s i b i l i t y of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of e x i s t e n c e i n g e n e r a l ( ü b e r h a u p t ) " (262) a n d "the m o s t p r o p e r p o s s i b i l i t y " (250, 263), we need to c o n s i d e r the signific a n c e of two of Heidegger's t e c h n i c a l t e r m s : "existence" a n d "most proper" (etgensf). H i n m a n w a r n s us that " I f o n e i g n o r e s w h a t p r e c e d e s it, the c h a p ter on being-toward-death in BT is all b u t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , f o r H e i d e g g e r h a s developed a t e c h n i c a l v o c a b u l a r y in the preceding sections which is indispensab l e f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the c h a p t e r o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f d e a t h " ( H i n m a n 209f.). Unfortunately, H i n m a n ignores his own a d v i c e w h e n i t c o m e s t o t h e s e two c r u cial terms. I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d both t e r m s , w e n e e d t o get c l e a r f i r s t a b o u t the s o r t of entity that they a r e used to d e s c r i b e . I t i s D a s e i n , o f c o u r s e , but t h e n w h a t i s D a s e i n ? Heidegger s a y s a n u m b e r of t i m e s t h a t D a s e i n i s "the e n t i t y " t h a t "we o u r s e l v e s a l w a y s a r e . " M a c q u a r r i e a n d R o b i n s o n , a s w e l l a s the t r a n s lators of other w o r k s , persist in pluralizing Heidegger's singular term "das Seiende, i.e., " e n t i t y " or " w h a t i s . " T h u s , "das Seiende . . . sind wir je selbst" b e c o m e s "we a r e o u r s e l v e s t h e entities" (41), a n d "das Sein des Seien**
den" becomes "the Being of ent i t i e s " . (6) W h i l e I t h i n k t h a t the p l u r a l i z i n g of 'entity' h a s h a d p e r n i c i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l of H e i d e g ger's analysis in Being and Time in g e n e r a l , I w i l l o n l y d i s c u s s the i s s u e a s i t b e a r s o n the p r o b l e m o f d e a t h o f D a sein. Heidegger analyzes three types of "entity" in Being and Time: D a s e i n , entity ready-to-hand, and entity presentat-hand. ' D a s e i n ' i s not j u s t a n o t h e r w o r d for ' p e r s o n , ' a s the p l u r a l i z a t i o n o f 'ent i t y ' m i g h t s u g g e s t . W e c o u l d not s a y " W e o u r s e l v e s a r e the p e r s o n t o b e analyzed" unless we were speaking imp e r i a l l y , a n d H e i d e g g e r isn't. He isn't the entity under consideration. R a t h e r , w e a l l a r e . I f D a s e i n i s the entity that toe a r e , t h e n t h e d e a t h o f t h i s e n t i t y i s not the s a m e as the d e a t h of a p e r s o n . O f c o u r s e H e i d e g g e r does not d e n y t h a t e a c h person is Dasein. D a s e i n is "alw a y s m i n e " o r "je meinig." H o w e v e r , he is proposing a v e r y i m p o r t a n t , unu s u a l c o n c e p t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n bet w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l a n d the s p e c i e s in r e g a r d to w h a t we a r e , a n d this conception does h a v e important consequences for h i s n o t i o n of the d e a t h of b o t h i n d i v i d u a l people a n d D a s e i n as entity.' I n i n t r o d u c i n g h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f the entity that we a r e , Heidegger c l a i m s that Dasein is "distinctive" ("ausgezeichnet") w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h o t h e r types of entity in that D a s e i n m a k e s an issue of B e i n g , or alternatively put, of w h a t it is to be (11). In fact, he c l a i m s
Michael Zimmerman has provided the most recent attempt to show that Being and Time "foundered" because of a "subjective" and "voluntaristic" conception of human being. See his "The Foundering of B e i n g and T i m e , " Philosophy Today, XIX (Summer, 1975), 100-107. Zimmerman's recent book, T h e E c l i p s e of t h e S e l f : T h e D e v e l o p m e n t of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981) offers a more detailed investigation of both the continuity and difference in Heidegger's early and later thought.
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t h a t it is c o n s t i t u t i v e of w h a t it is to be D a s e i n t h a t this e n t i t y m a k e s a n i s s u e of B e i n g (12). T h e w o r d ' D a s e i n ' is supp o s e d to f u n c t i o n as a g r a p h i c a l l y ontological term: we a r e the entity t h r o u g h w h o m w h a t i t i s "to b e " ("Sein") i s r e v e a l e d , a n d t h u s w e a r e t h e " t h e r e " ("Da") w h e r e B e i n g i s d i s closed. W h e n B e i n g is discovered to be questionable, various answers c a n be g i v e n as to what it "is." A c c o r d i n g to H e i d e g g e r , the q u e s t i o n o f B e i n g w a s f i r s t r a i s e d b y the e a r l y G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s , a n d they proposed v a r i o u s ans w e r s . " T o b e " w a s t o b e chreon o r moira or logos. T h e q u e s t i o n i n g of B e i n g l a u n c h e s D a s e i n into a h i s t o r y d u r i n g the c o u r s e of w h i c h B e i n g h a s r e v e a l e d itself i n m a n y m o r e w a y s . I n " T h e O r i g i n o f the W o r k o f A r t , " Heidegger comments that Dasein's " f o u n d a t i o n " h a p p e n s " i n the W e s t f o r the first t i m e in G r e e c e . " He a d d s : W h a t w a s i n the f u t u r e t o b e c a l l e d B e i n g w a s set into w o r k , s e t t i n g the s t a n d a r d . T h e r e a l m o f e n t i t y thus opened up w a s then transf o r m e d into e n t i t y i n t h e s e n s e o f God's creation. T h i s happened in the Middle Ages. T h i s entity w a s a g a i n t r a n s f o r m e d at the beginn i n g a n d i n the c o u r s e o f t h e m o d e r n age. E n t i t y b e c a m e a n object that could be controlled a n d s e e n through by calculation. 2
I n this e s s a y Heidegger i s s p e c i f i c a l l y t a l k i n g a b o u t the w a y a w o r k o f a r t c a n manifest an understanding of B e i n g ; b u t t h i n k e r s , poets, s t a t e s m e n , a n d others, as w e l l as a r t i s t s , p r o v i d e the insight that changes our culture's und e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t it is to be " e n t i t y . " D a s e i n is distinctive in that it det e r m i n e s w h a t i t i s for e n t i t y i n g e n e r a l t o b e , a n d , a t the s a m e t i m e , s i n c e its understanding of B e i n g is constitutive o f D a s e i n itself, i t a l s o d e t e r m i n e s w h a t
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it is for us to be. In t h e a b o v e t h r e e m a j o r e p i s o d e s i n the h i s t o r y o f o u r changing understanding of Being, we h a v e taken o u r s e l v e s to be the a n i m a l that speaks (zoon logon echon), the i m a g e of G o d , a n d the c o n s c i o u s subject. Heidegger calls Dasein's w a y of Being as an understanding of Being "existence" (12). O n c e a g a i n he is playi n g o n the e t y m o l o g y o f t h e t e r m : h e supposes that it d e r i v e s f r o m the prefix 'ex-' i n d i c a t i n g 'out' o r ' t o w a r d ' a n d t h e L a t i n v e r b 'sistere' m e a n i n g 'to m a k e s t a n d . ' D a s e i n s t a n d s out f r o m a n y o t h e r e n t i t y in t h a t it t a k e s a s t a n d tow a r d B e i n g . O u r "existence" in this sense determines our essence or what we take o u r s e l v e s to be, e.g., s p e a k i n g animal or image of God or conscious s u b j e c t . H e i d e g g e r p u t s it: " T h e 'ess e n c e ' o f D a s e i n l i e s i n its e x i s t e n c e " (42). Before we c a n d i s c u s s the d e a t h of D a s e i n a s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of this s o r t of " e x i s t e n c e , " we need to e x a m i n e that other t e c h n i c a l t e r m , "most proper." As a product of its s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , D a s e i n ' s "essence" changes; w h a t we take ours e l v e s t o b e i s o n l y " a p o s s i b l e w a y for it to be" (42). So w h a t s h a l l we c a l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c that D a s e i n m u s t h a v e to be Dasein? L a c k i n g ready-made words, Heidegger invents one: D a s e i n ' s "most p r o p e r (eigenst) B e i n g " i s " s u c h t h a t i t has an understanding of B e i n g " (15). Its understanding of B e i n g , and consequently w h a t it takes itself to be, m a y v a r y ; but, a s D a s e i n , i t a l w a y s h a s o n e . T h e w o r d 'eigen' m e a n s ' p r o p e r , ' ' o w n , ' ' i n h e r e n t , ' ' p e c u l i a r , ' e t c . , a n d '-st' i s the suffix of the s u p e r l a t i v e d e g r e e . What is "most p r o p e r " to D a s e i n ' s B e i n g is that it h a s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of B e i n g . I n addition, the "most p r o p e r possibility" of this most p r o p e r B e i n g is for D a s e i n t o r e l a t e i t s e l f t o i t s o w n
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B e i n g , i.e. t o u n d e r s t a n d i t s e l f . H e i d e g g e r c o m m e n t s : " T h a t entity w h i c h in its B e i n g h a s this v e r y B e i n g a s a n i s s u e r e l a t e s i t s e l f t o its B e i n g a s its m o s t proper possibility" (42). D a s e i n is "eigentlich" or " p r o p e r l y " or " a u t h e n t i c a l l y " itself when it m a k e s an issue of B e i n g r a t h e r than t a k i n g the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B e i n g for g r a n t e d . T h e etymological connection between 'eigenst' and 'eigentlich' should not be f o r g o t t e n , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s lost i n t h e standard translation.
The Possibility of the Impossibility of E x i s t e n c e A t the b e g i n n i n g o f D i v i s i o n T w o o f Being and Time, as if to r e m i n d us of the technicality of the t e r m 'existence,' Heidegger r e m a r k s : T h e term 'existence' f o r m a l l y indicates that D a s e i n is as an understanding able-to-be (Seinkönnen) w h i c h i n its B e i n g m a k e s a n i s s u e of this B e i n g (231). T h e m e a n i n g of 'existence' h a s been ign o r e d i n d i s c u s s i o n s o f H e i d e g g e r ' s notion of death. Y e t if e x i s t e n c e is D a sein's B e i n g , then we should ponder w h a t i t m e a n s for D a s e i n not t o b e , i . e . , w h e n a n d h o w D a s e i n i s not " a s a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g able-to-be." D i s c u s s i o n s of H e i d e g g e r ' s notion o f d e a t h a s s u m e that D a s e i n dies w h e n it c e a s e s to be a c t u a l and that this h a p p e n s w h e n a person undergoes p h y s i c a l death. O r , if they recognize that H e i d e g g e r c a l l s d e a t h a " w a y t o b e " (245) a n d t h a t f o r h i m death is a matter of " B e i n g toward death" ("Sein zum Tode"), a t b e s t t h e y c o n s i d e r d e a t h to be a m a t t e r of h o w a p e r s o n c a r e s about his p h y s i c a l d e a t h . Both assumptions are mistaken. D a sein's "death," in H e i d e g g e r ' s t e c h n i c a l s e n s e o f this t e r m , i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m a person's "death" in the o r d i n a r y
s e n s e o f I h e w o r d . H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the l a t t e r "Ableben" or " d e m i s e " (247). Heidegger's later explanations of h i s u s e o f the t e r m ' e x i s t e n c e ' h e l p c l a r i f y w h a t i s a t i s s u e i n h i s notion o f d e a t h . I n the " L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m " h e explains: T h e s e n t e n c e " M a n e k - s i s t s " i s not an a n s w e r to the question of w h e t h e r m a n a c t u a l l y i s o r not; r a t h e r , it r e s p o n d s to the question concerning m a n ' s "essence."' H e i d e g g e r a l t e r s the s p e l l i n g o f ' e x i s t e n c e ' t o e m p h a s i z e its e t y m o l o g i c a l c o n n o t a t i o n s a n d its p e c u l i a r m e a n i n g in his philosophical v o c a b u l a r y . L a t e r i n the s a m e e s s a y H e i d e g g e r s a y s t h a t h i s notion of e x i s t e n c e i n Being and Time d i d not r e f e r to the a c t u a l i t y of the ego cogito but r a t h e r i n d i c a t e d D a s e i n ' s r e l a t i o n t o B e i n g ( L H 222/343). Consequently, we should see that in s p e a k i n g o f t h e " p o s s i b i l i t y o f the i m possibility of existence" Heidegger is not r a i s i n g a q u e s t i o n a b o u t t h e a c t u a l ity o f e i t h e r m a n i n g e n e r a l o r a n i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . H e i s not s u g g e s t ing that at s o m e t i m e in the future s u c h a c t u a l i t y m a y b e " i m p o s s i b l e " o r totally missing. As Heidegger indicates, h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f d e a t h i s not i n a n y w a y a d d r e s s i n g t h e i s s u e o f life a f t e r p h y s i c a l d e a t h ( 2 4 7 f . ) . H e i s not e v e n r a i s i n g a question about continued pers o n a l s u r v i v a l , let a l o n e a s s u m i n g a negative a n s w e r to s u c h a question as both E d w a r d s a n d H i n m a n s e e m t o think. T h e question Heidegger is raising c o n c e r n s the c h a r a c t e r of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g as existence. S u c h "standing out" t o w a r d B e i n g i n v o l v e s " i m p o s s i bility" e v e n for the a c t u a l l y l i v i n g D a sein or particular person. 5
I n the " W a y B a c k into t h e G r o u n d of Metaphysics" Heidegger further c h a r a c t e r i z e s w h a t h e m e a n s b y "existence." The " s t a n d i n g out" t o w a r d
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B e i n g i s not j u s t a m a t t e r o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s b e i n g a w a r e o f s o m e t h i n g "outs i d e " o f i t s e l f . W e a r e n ' t t a l k i n g about a h u m a n b e i n g ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s of, e.g., dogs, trees, r o c k s , etc. N o r a r e w e talki n g about s o m e t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e o r v o l u n t a r y , as if it w e r e up to e a c h peron to adopt a c e r t a i n attitude t o w a r d w h a t it i s t o be. R a t h e r , H e i d e g g e r s a y s , t h i s " s t a n d i n g out" is a " s t a n d i n g o p e n " for "the o p e n n e s s o f B e i n g . " T h e " s t a n d i n g out" d o e s n ' t s i g n i f y g e t t i n g out o f s o m e i m m a n e n c e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s but r a t h e r b e i n g "out" i n the o p e n n e s s o f B e i n g . T h i s " o p e n n e s s o f B e i n g " i s the d i s c l o sure of B e i n g w h i c h m a k e s possible our understanding of Being. We "stand out" t o w a r d B e i n g i n the s e n s e o f b e i n g o p e n for its r e v e l a t i o n . H e i d e g g e r a l s o c a l l s the d i s c l o s u r e o f B e i n g the " t r u t h o f B e i n g , " g i v i n g the w o r d ' t r u t h ' the m e a n i n g o f the G r e e k t e r m 'aletheia' o r 'unconcealedness.' T h u s existence also m e a n s , a s H e i d e g g e r p u t s i t i n the " L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m , " " s t a n d i n g out into the t r u t h o f B e i n g " ( L H 206/326).
D a s e i n into its s e l f a n d t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h it m a k e s D a s e i n a "whole." Heidegger c l a i m s that death "individuates" D a s e i n in some unique and important w a y , and we need to see w h a t s o r t of " i n d i v i d u a l " it t u r n s out to be. H e s a y s : D e a t h d o e s not j u s t " b e l o n g " i n a n u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d w a y t o the p r o p e r Dasein Idem eigenen Dasein); r a t h e r it l a y s c l a i m to it as individual. T h e non-relational c h a r a c ter ( U n b e z ü g l i c h k e i t ) of death as understood in anticipation indiv i d u a l i z e s D a s e i n into its s e l f (auf es selbst). T h i s i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g is a w a y in w h i c h the "there" is disc l o s e d for e x i s t e n c e (263).
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T h e openness of B e i n g grants D a s e i n its p o s s i b i l i t i e s a s " a n u n d e r s t a n d ing able-to-be." D a s e i n c a n be as existi n g b e c a u s e o f its o w n " s t a n d i n g out into" a r e v e l a t i o n o f B e i n g . F o r t h i s s o r t of " e x i s t e n c e " to be " i m p o s s i b l e " is for e x i s t e n c e to be c l o s e d off to possibilities instead of open to t h e m . H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f d e a t h , l i k e h i s notion o f e x i s t e n c e i n g e n e r a l , d o e s not d e a l w i t h a c t u a l i t y o r t h e l a c k o f i t but r a t h e r w i t h the c h a r a c t e r o f D a s e i n ' s Being. Dasein as Individual and Whole M o s t o f the p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d i n trying to understand what Heidegger is s a y i n g about d e a t h c o m e f r o m his own e x p o s i t i o n of t h i s n o t i o n in Being and Time. H i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t w o i s s u e s h a s p r o v e n t o b e e s p e c i a l l y m i s l e a d i n g : the sense in which death "individuates"
T h e non-relational c h a r a c t e r of death a n d the n a t u r e o f a n t i c i p a t i o n w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d b e l o w , b u t h e r e I w a n t to r a i s e a q u e s t i o n a b o u t the s o r t of "self" t h a t i s r e v e a l e d i n the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f the " t h e r e " ("Da") of D a s e i n . In a r e m a r k in a l a t e r section, Heidegger explains: " . . . when Dasein h a s b e e n i n d i v i d u a l i z e d into itself, i t i s f o r its s e l f s o m e t h i n g t h a t s i m p l y c a n not b e m i s t a k e n f o r a n y t h i n g e l s e (unverwechselbar)" ( 2 7 7 ) . This suggests that w h e n the entity D a s e i n is "indiv i d u a l i z e d " its B e i n g cannot be conf u s e d w i t h t h a t o f o t h e r e n t i t y , e.g., e n t i t y p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d . A m a r g i n a l note that H e i d e g g e r wrote in his own copy of Sein und Zeit a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f D a s e i n ' s "self" h a s nothi n g t o d o w i t h d i s t i n g u i s h i n g one p e r s o n from another. In a passage in Division One w h e r e he is discussing authenticity, he d e s c r i b e s D a s e i n as existing "as its self (als es selbst)" (146). In t h e l a t e r c o m m e n t h e a d d s : " H o w e v e r not qua subject and individual or qua pers o n " (443*). Heidegger's referenes to Dasein as a
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ing s o m e t h i n g like a personality or pers o n a l i n d i v i d u a l i t y . H e i d e g g e r m a y not h a v e been completely c l e a r in his own m i n d about what he w a s trying to s a y w h e n h e w r o t e t h i s e a r l y w o r k , but s u c h m a r g i n a l c o m m e n t s indicate that h e c a n i n r e t r o s p e c t s e e h i m s e l f a s o n the w a y t o w a r d a position w h i c h he m a k e s m o r e e x p l i c i t i n l a t e r w o r k s . I n h i s Introduction to Metaphysics he comments a b o u t t h i s notion of "self," s u b s t i t u t i n g ' m a n ' for ' D a s e i n ' : M a n ' s selfhood m e a n s this: he m u s t t r a n s f o r m the B e i n g t h a t d i s c l o s e s i t s e l f t o h i m into h i s t o r y a n d b r i n g h i m s e l f t o s t a n d i n it. S e l f h o o d d o e s not m e a n h e i s p r i m a r i l y a n " I " a n d a n indiv i d u a l . T h i s h e i s a s little a s h e i s a w e , a c o m m u n i t y ( I M 143f./110). D a s e i n , or " m a n " t a k e n in this sense, is not b e b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y nor with a collection of s u c h " I ' s . " I t i s the e n t i t y w h i c h w e a r e , the entity w h i c h understands B e i n g and lets a d i s c l o s u r e of B e i n g d e t e r m i n e w h a t i t i s . L a t e r , i n the " L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m , " Heidegger will comment t h a t it is a m i s t a k e to p o s e the q u e s t i o n of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g in s u c h a w a y that we e x p e c t to find as our a n s w e r "something like a person or object." He adds: . . . t h e p e r s o n a l , no l e s s t h a n t h e objective, misses and miscons t r u e s t h e w a y o f b e i n g ( d a s Wesende) of e k - s i s t e n c e as b e i n g - h i s torical fder seinsgeschichtlichen Ek-sistenz) (LH 207/327). D a s e i n ' s self is, so to s p e a k , the c o n d i t i o n f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g oneself a s a personal " I . " W e must h a v e an understanding of our mutual B e i n g in order to take ourselves to be p a r t i c u l a r persons differentiated f r o m one another. I n another e a r l y work, The Essence of Reasons, Heidegger claims:
Only because D a s e i n is determ i n e d b y selfhood c a n a n I - s e l f r e l a t e "itself" to a thou-self. Selfhood is the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f Deing a n " I " w h i c h i s r e v e a l e d o n l y i n the " t h o u . " Selfhood is n e v e r r e l a t e d to a t h o u ; it i s n e u t r a l t o w a r d I - b e i n g a n d thoub e i n g . . .' T h e s e l f u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n Being and Time is s u c h an e x i s t e n t i a l s e l f ; Dasein's selfhood is something we s h a r e i n c o m m o n , not w h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s one p e r s o n f r o m a n o t h e r . T h i s notion c a n n o t b e f u l l y e x p l i c a t e d h e r e , but we need to see that w h e n we "indiv i d u a t e " D a s e i n w e d o not a r r i v e a t something like a unique " I . " C o r r e l a tively, the d e a t h that individuates D a s e i n m o s t s h a r p l y i s not u n i q u e t o s u c h " I ' s " but r a t h e r is a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Dasein's Being. Contrary to what Hinm a n s a y s , H e i d e g g e r i s not a d d r e s s i n g h i m s e l f to the question of how e a c h person is related to his own death ( H i n m a n 197) n o r c l a i m i n g t h a t " i f m y o w n d e a t h is a p o s s i b i l i t y w h i c h r e l a t e s only to m e , then it is a possibility w h i c h individualizes me down to myself" (Hinm a n 205). I n f a c t , H i n m a n a n d H e i d e g g e r a r e s i m p l y not t a l k i n g a b o u t the s a m e sort of "death" since H i n m a n is t a l k i n g about a person r e l a t i n g to w h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s " d e m i s e , " i.e., the sort o f " d e a t h " t h a t D a s e i n c o n f r o n t s because it is embodied in living h u m a n b e i n g s w h o s e life w i l l c o m e t o a n e n d . T h e "end" which is an aspect of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g is quite different f r o m t h i s s o r t o f e n d o f life. I t i s a n e x i s t e n tial structure of Dasein's Being. H e i d e g g e r tells u s : " . . . the e x i s t e n t i a l meaning of Dasein's coming to an end m u s t b e t a k e n f r o m D a s e i n itself, a n d we m u s t show how such 'ending' c a n constitute Being-a-whole for the e n t i t y w h i c h 'exists'" (242). T h e p r o b l e m o f death is first brought up when Heideg-
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g e r r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r h i s analysis in Division One has captured the phenomenon of Dasein as a "whole." H i s p r e l i m i n a r y discussion of t h i s i s s u e i s b o u n d t o m i s l e a d , too, u n less w e heed his w a r n i n g signs. T h e init i a l l y p r o p o s e d a n s w e r i s t h a t the a n a l ysis hasn't captured D a s e i n as a whole b e c a u s e a s long a s D a s e i n exists s o m e thing remains "still outstanding." Heidegger says:
A n d i f e x i s t e n c e i s d e f i n i t i v e for D a s e i n ' s B e i n g a n d i f its e s s e n c e i s c o n s t i t u t e d i n p a r t b y able-to-be, then, as long as D a s e i n exists, it m u s t a l w a y s a s s u c h a n able-to-be not yet be (noch nicht sein) s o m e t h i n g (233). With Heidegger's initial encouragement, the r e a d e r supposes that this "not y e t " o r " s t i l l o u t s t a n d i n g " s o m e thing is s o m e event that hasn't happ e n e d y e t but s u r e l y w i l l . A n d , w h e n t h i s "not y e t " w h i c h w i l l m a k e D a s e i n a "whole" is labeled D a s e i n ' s "end" or "death," we quite n a t u r a l l y suppose he i s t a l k i n g a b o u t the p h y s i c a l d e a t h o f p a r t i c u l a r people w h i c h "completes" their lives. T h i s r e a d i n g i s not j u s t e n c o u r a g e d but a l m o s t forced upon the r e a d e r by the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n . T h e i n t e r j e c tion of p e r s o n a l i z i n g O n e ' s ' l e a d s us to think that we a r e t a l k i n g about the n a ture of p a r t i c u l a r people r a t h e r t h a n something we share in common. F o r example, Macquarrie and Robinson talk of "something still outstanding in one's potentiality-for-Being" where H e i d e g g e r s p e a k s o n l y of "einen Ausstand an Seinkönnen" ( 2 3 6 ) . T h e a d d e d 'one's' m a k e s i t a p p e a r t h a t s u c h a n "able-to-be" is u n i q u e or p a r t i c u l a r to a p e r s o n r a t h e r t h a n t o D a s e i n a s "the entity we ourselves a r e . " F o l l o w i n g this suggestion, D e m k s e , for e x a m p l e , c l a i m s that " m y B e i n g i s unique a n d
s p e c i f i c t o m e a l o n e " ( D e m s k e 19). I f w e e l i m i n a t e s u c h 'one's,' w h i c h a r e n ' t present in Heidegger's G e r m a n , we would more readily see that my B e i n g i s the s a m e t h i n g t h a t m a k e s u s a l l D a s e i n , not w h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s o n e p e r s o n f r o m a n o t h e r . W i t h the a d d i t i o n o f t h e 'one's' H e i d e g g e r a p p e a r s t o b e t a l k i n g about s o m e t h i n g p e c u l i a r l y p e r s o n a l , a n d w h a t could be m o r e p e r s o n a l in this view than a person's death? T h e "finitude o f e x i s t e n c e ( E n d l i c h k e i t der Existenz)" becomes the "finitude of one's e x i s t e n c e " (384).
S o the c o m m o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n goes. Heidegger helps it along with his introductory m u s i n g s in these sections. E v e n the r e a d e r t h o r o u g h l y f a m i l i a r w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s text, a s H i n m a n , for e x a m p l e , o b v i o u s l y i s , m a y not n o t i c e w h e n the i n i t i a l c o n c e p t i o n s u n d e r g o radical changes. I n arguing against E d wards, Hinman says: My own death is something still outstanding for me, something w h i c h h a s not y e t o c c u r r e d ; i n t h i s s e n s e it is a p o s s i b i l i t y . H e i d e g g e r c l e a r l y notes that this is the s e n s e in w h i c h he is a s s e r t i n g that my d e a t h i s for m e a p o s s i b i l i t y (196). In support of this H i n m a n r e f e r s to Heidegger's initial discussion on p p . 233-34 a n d i g n o r e s t h e f a c t t h a t i n following sections Heidegger will rep e a t e d l y d e n y t h a t t h i s s e n s e o f "not y e t " i s a p p r o p r i a t e for a n e n t i t y w i t h D a s e i n ' s sort of B e i n g , i.e., e x i s t e n c e (243, 244, 245, 246, 250, 259, 325, 3 2 7 ) . I n fact H e i d e g g e r w i l l s a y that the i n a u thentic understanding of death r e g a r d s it precisely as such an event which h a s n ' t h a p p e n e d y e t b u t w i l l i n the f u ture. He also repeatedly w a v e s a red flag to w a r n us that the i n i t i a l c o n c e p tion o f the p r o b l e m m a y b e e n t i r e l y i n adequate because it is regarding D a -
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s e i n a s e n t i t y p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d (236, 240, 241, 241f., 245, 248). H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n i n the o p e n i n g s e c t i o n s o f the c h a p t e r o n d e a t h g e t s d i v e r t e d into n o t i o n s o f " e n d i n g " w h i c h t u r n out t o b e a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y t o entity present-at-hand or entity readyto-hand. Heidegger eventually conc l u d e s that these other sorts of ending c a n n o t s u i t a b l y c h a r a c t e r i z e the d e a t h o f D a s e i n . I n the s o r t o f d e a t h a p p r o p r i a t e t o its B e i n g , D a s e i n d o e s not s i m p l y disappear or become finished. Dasein's sort of "end" is a w a y in w h i c h " D a s e i n gets a definite c h a r a c t e r ontologically" h e r e a n d n o w (241). T h e problem of getting D a s e i n as a " w h o l e " a n d the c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t i s "still outstanding" changes quite d r a m a t i c a l l y i n the c o u r s e o f H e i d e g ger's exposition. T h e p r o b l e m first app e a r e d to be that, s i n c e D a s e i n is "spread across" a time span, we cannot h a v e the w h o l e p h e n o m e n o n o f D a s e i n i n our g r a s p until w e e a c h h a v e a r r i v e d at our personal, p h y s i c a l death. H e r e Dasein's existence a p p e a r s to be f i n i t e o n l y i n the s e n s e t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l people w h o e m b o d y i t o c c u p y a finite s p a n o f t i m e . H o w e v e r , t h i s c o n ception treats D a s e i n as something present-at-hand, i.e., something which "comes along, has presence, and then d i s a p p e a r s " (389). H e i d e g g e r w i l l a r g u e l a t e r in Being and Time t h a t t h i s " s p a n ning" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c is a d e r i v a t i v e p h e n o m e n o n a r i s i n g out o f i n a u t h e n t i c D a s e i n . In fact D a s e i n itself isn't "lacking" anything because it is spread across a time span. What Dasein's authentic, primordial Being is "lacking" i s not s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a s n ' t h a p p e n e d y e t but r a t h e r a s e t t l e d , s e c u r e B e i n g . Dasein's Being always has something "outstanding" w h i c h is "unclosed" or "unsettled" (eine ständige unabgeschlossenheit) b e c a u s e its B e i n g i s a n i s s u e for it. H o w e v e r , t h i s "not y e t " a s -
p e c t of its B e i n g is not s o m e t h i n g y e t to c o m e in s o m e future that h a s n ' t happened yet. Since D a s e i n is as an unders t a n d i n g able-to-be, s i n c e i t e x i s t s a s a n openness to the r e v e l a t i o n of B e i n g , w h a t it can be is i n c l u d e d in w h a t it is now. B e i n g t o w a r d the end is "somet h i n g w h i c h , i n the d e p t h s o f i t s B e i n g , e v e r y D a s e i n i s " (317). O v e r the c o u r s e o f the d i s c u s s i o n , the m e t a p h o r h a s c h a n g e d f r o m one o f h o r i z o n t a l e x t e n s i o n to one of v e r t i c a l d e p t h . Death, Heidegger argues, is what puts an "end" to D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . T h e "impossibility" of e x i s t e n c e is not s o m e t h i n g y e t t o c o m e but r a t h e r i s w h a t d e t e r m i n e s e x i s t e n c e a s finite here and now. A s H e i d e g g e r s a y s , D a s e i n "does not h a v e a n e n d a t w h i c h i t j u s t s t o p s but exists finitely" ( 3 2 9 ) . T h i s i s not d e t e r m i n e d b y a n e v e n t i n the fut u r e ; it is a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of D a s e i n as an u n d e r s t a n d i n g able-to-be w h i c h is a l s o a not-able-to-be. E v e n t h o u g h o u r B e i n g i s a t i s s u e for u s , w e c a n n o t b e i n just any way. O u r possibilities a r e l i m ited by the fact that our able-to-be cont a i n s s u c h a n "end" w i t h i n itself. D e a t h "closes up" D a s e i n ' s B e i n g a s its "abschliessende" and determinate end(259). T h i s end, Heidegger adds, is not s o m e t h i n g t h a t D a s e i n o n l y c o m e s t o i n its d e m i s e . A s h e put h i s point e a r lier: T h e "end" of Being-in-the-world is death. T h i s end, w h i c h belongs to the able-to-be — t h a t is to s a y , to existence — limits and determines the a l w a y s p o s s i b l e w h o l e n e s s o f D a s e i n (234). Being toward Death After insisting that D a s e i n is alw a y s a l r e a d y its "not y e t " a n d its "end," Heidegger adds: T h e "ending" m e a n t b y d e a t h does not s i g n i f y Zu-ende-Sein of D a s e i n
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but r a t h e r a Sein zum Ende of this entity. D e a t h is a w a y to be w h i c h D a s e i n t a k e s o v e r a s soon a s i t i s (245). I l e a v e the t w o c r u c i a l p h r a s e s u n t r a n s l a t e d i n o r d e r t o e m p h a s i z e the d i f f e r ence. One important difference is o b s c u r e d b y the s t a n d a r d E n g l i s h translation: while 'Zu-Ende-sein' is a p h r a s e m a d e b y h y p h e n a t i n g its w o r d s , a s H e i d e g g e r does w i t h s o m a n y o f the p h r a s e s he uses to d e s c r i b e aspects of Dasein's Being (e.g., "In-sein," "Sichvorweg-sein,"
etc.)
'Sein
zum
Ende'
is
r e m a r k a b l e for its u n a d o r n e d r e f e r e n c e to
'Sein'.
D a s e i n ' s d e a t h d o e s not j u s t s i g n i f y that D a s e i n is, as H e i d e g g e r later corr e c t s a n d m o d i f i e s the p h r a s e , ZumEnde-'sein,' or s i m p l y o v e r a n d d o n e w i t h , f i n i s h e d , a t a n e n d (234, 444*). I t c e r t a i n l y does not m e a n t h i s i n t h e sense that D a s e i n would c e a s e to be a c t u a l , a s for e x a m p l e m i g h t h a p p e n i f w e blow ourselves up in a n u c l e a r w a r . H o w e v e r , n e i t h e r c a n t h e n a t u r e o f its death be adequately determined s i m p l y by the notion of D a s e i n as Zum-Ende'sein' in the s e n s e t h a t i t s c u r r e n t , a c tual possibilities c o m e to an end, a n d t h i s point s u r e l y l i e s b e h i n d H e i d e g g e r ' s c o m m e n t s (cf. 246). W h a t w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n i s not j u s t that D a s e i n ' s possibilities c o m e to an e n d , i.e., that it c a n o n l y b e i n one w a y a n d not o t h e r s , e.g., i m a g e o f G o d o r c o n s c i o u s s u b j e c t . W e a r e interested i n w h y a n d how the possibilities a r e thus limited. T h i s is a matter of Dasein's v e r y w a y of B e i n g , a n d , s i n c e its B e i n g i s d e t e r m i n e d b y its r e l a t i o n s h i p t o B e i n g , u l t i m a t e l y t h i s i s a m a t t e r o f B e i n g überhaupt. T o u n derstand Dasein's Zum-Ende-'sein' we must c o n s i d e r Sein zum Ende. In r e g a r d to this distinction H e i d e g ger also remarks that "Zu-Ende-sein implies existentially: Sein zum Ende" (250). H o w D a s e i n c o m e s t o a n e n d
r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of its r e l a t i o n s h i p to B e i n g as existence. If a r e v e l a t i o n of B e i n g i s w h a t g i v e s D a s e i n its able-tobe as the e n t i t y w h i c h is its poss i b i l i t i e s , t h e n the "point," s o t o s p e a k , w h e r e D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s l e a v e off a n d its i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s b e g i n i s a l s o det e r m i n e d b y B e i n g überhaupt. H e i d e g ger is t r y i n g to c a p t u r e the idea that D a s e i n ' s d i s c l o s u r e of B e i n g is finite. There are some ways to be which Being h a s not yet r e v e a l e d , b u t s t i l l t h i s "something outstanding" is something that D a s e i n " c a n a n d w i l l be" (233). A m a r g i n a l note t h a t H e i d e g g e r l a t e r a d d s a t the p l a c e h e i n t r o d u c e s t h e notion o f " B e i n g t o w a r d d e a t h " (234) clarifies what he had in mind. He refers to this d e a t h as "Sein des Nichtseins" or " B e i n g o f n o t - B e i n g " ( 4 4 4 * ) . T h i s notB e i n g i s not a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g . R a t h e r , we might s a y , it h a s the c u r i o u s B e i n g of the n o t - y e t - B e i n g . Comments Heidegger makes in l a t e r w o r k s h e l p f u r t h e r c l a r i f y t h i s notion. O n e c o m m e n t c o n n e c t s d e a t h w i t h his famous m u s i n g s about "nothing." He says: D e a t h i s the s h r i n e o f n o t h i n g , t h a t is, of that w h i c h in e v e r y r e s p e c t is never something that m e r e l y is entity but w h i c h n e v e r t h e l e s s still presences as the mystery of B e i n g . As the s h r i n e of nothing, death h a r b o u r s w i t h i n itself the p r e s e n c i n g of B e i n g . As the s h r i n e of nothing, d e a t h is the s h e l t e r (Gebirg) of Being. We now c a l l mortals 'mortals not because t h e i r e a r t h l y life c o m e s t o a n e n d , but b e c a u s e t h e y a r e c a p a b l e o f death as death. 1
The odd use of the word 'Gebirg' (which ordinarily m e a n s 'mountain r a n g e ' ) is s u r e l y intended to c r e a t e a n e w m e a n i n g for t h e t e r m b y c a l l i n g upon a n a p p a r e n t e t y m o l o g i c a l connection with the verb 'bergen,' which
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m e a n s 'to c o n c e a l , ' 'to s a v e , ' or 'to s h e l t e r . ' T h e t e r m r e m i n d s the r e a d e r t h a t H e i d e g g e r s a y s t h a t B e i n g both r e v e a l s itself a n d c o n c e a l s itself; it is both "Unverborgenheit" and "Geborgenheit. In another later remark Heidegger explicitly s a y s that "in death the s u p r e m e concealedness of Being gathers." 9
In death Dasein c o n f r o n t s the l i m i t s of its d i s c l o s e d n e s s . In Being and Time H e i d e g g e r s a y s : " W i t h d e a t h D a s e i n s t a n d s b e f o r e i t s e l f in its most proper p o s s i b i l i t y . I n t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y the v e r y B e i n g of D a s e i n as Being-in-thew o r l d is at i s s u e " (250). D e a t h is D a sein's most proper possibility because in it D a s e i n ' s most proper B e i n g is at i s s u e . T o b e o r not t o b e i s i n d e e d the question. Heidegger adds: "Its death is the p o s s i b i l i t y of n o - m o r e - a b l e - t o - b e there (Nzc/rt-mehr-dasein-konnen)." In H e i d e g g e r ' s i n i t i a l d i s c u s s i o n , w i t h its c o n f u s i n g a d m i x t u r e of a p r e s e n t - a t h a n d c o n c e p t i o n o f D a s e i n , h e h a d spok e n o f " i V i c h i m e h r d a s e m " (237), but h e r e h e r e v i s e s the p h r a s e t o m a k e i t c l e a r that the conception of d e a t h that is a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e e n t i t y t h a t is its p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s one i n d i c a t i n g not its l a c k o f a c t u a l i t y but its l a c k o f poss i b i l i t i e s . I t i s not t h a t D a s e i n i s n o m o r e but t h a t i t i s not a b l e - t o - b e D a s e i n anymore. Heidegger's metaphoric description of Dasein as a "clearing" ("Lichtung") c a n i l l u s t r a t e t h i s notion g r a p h i c a l l y . T h e c l e a r i n g i s the r e a l m of possibilities that a r e r e v e a l e d to D a sein by B e i n g . B e y o n d it lie impossibilities in the r e a l m of B e i n g ' s conc e a l m e n t . I n a n e s s a y o n the p r e - S o c r a tic thinkers, Heidegger c o m m e n t s that t h e e s s e n c e of m o r t a l s — w h i c h is to be t h e " t h e r e " i n w h i c h B e i n g r e v e a l s its e l f — c a l l s u p o n m o r t a l s "to h e e d the call which beckons them towards death." He adds:
A s the o u t e r m o s t p o s s i b i l i t y o f m o r t a l D a s e i n , d e a t h i s not the e n d o f t h e p o s s i b l e but t h e h i g h e s t keeping (the gathering sheltering) of the m y s t e r y of c a l l i n g disclosure.' 0
D a s e i n ' s " o u t e r m o s t " ("äusserst") possibility, a p h r a s e which Heidegger also uses frequently in Being and Time, m a r k s the b o u n d a r y between the possible a n d the i m p o s s i b l e , a s far a s D a sein's B e i n g goes. W h a t lies "beyond" that possibility cannot be "fetched o v e r " b y D a s e i n into its c l e a r i n g , i.e., t h e p o s s i b i l i t y is "unüberholbar," a n d h e r e the "there" of B e i n g m u s t s i m p l y g i v e i t s e l f u p t o the d a r k n e s s b e y o n d (cf. 2 6 4 ) . I f , a s H e i d e g g e r s a i d i n the r e m a r k I q u o t e d e a r l i e r , D a s e i n ' s selfhood l i e s i n t r a n s f o r m i n g B e i n g into h i s t o r y a n d b r i n g i n g i t s e l f t o s t a n d i n it, t h e n D a s e i n g i v e s its s e l f u p w h e n B e i n g e l u d e s its d i s c l o s i n g l i g h t . , Heidegger also refers to death as Dasein's "non-relational" ("unbezügliche") p o s s i b i l i t y (250). E v e r y t h i n g to w h i c h D a s e i n r e l a t e s , a l l r e l a t i o n s bet w e e n p e o p l e a n d r e l a t i o n s t o t h e objects with which we concern ourselves, a r e r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n D a s e i n ' s "Bezug" o r the " n e t w o r k " o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s l a i d out b y its e x i s t e n c e . E x i s t e n c e i s o r i g i n a l l y defined as that B e i n g toward which Dasein c a n and somehow always does r e l a t e itself (12). B u t d e a t h is prec i s e l y "the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of e v e r y r e l a t i n g to . . ., of e v e r y e x i s t i n g " ( 2 6 2 ) . T h e n o n - r e l a t i o n a l possibility of death is really an impossibility w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e possibilities within Dasein's clearing: it is the l i m i t of D a s e i n ' s B e i n g . O u r relationships to o b j e c t s a n d to people will "fail" when Dasein's very Being is p l a c e d a t i s s u e (263). T h e y a r e d e t e r m i n e d b y t h i s B e i n g , not v i c e v e r s a . I n confronting death Dasein is thrown
• PHILOSOPHY TODAY · 62
340
b a c k u p o n i t s e l f t o d i s c l o s e its able-tobe. Inauthentic and Authentic B e i n g toward Death G i v e n this exposition of Heidegg e r ' s odd n o t i o n o f d e a t h , w e c a n s e e why he c l a i m s that "factically there a r e m a n y w h o don't k n o w a b o u t d e a t h " and that though " D a s e i n dies factically as long as it e x i s t s " m o s t of us h a v e an i n a u t h e n t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the n a t u r e o f o u r d e a t h (251f.). T h i s i n a u t h e n t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e a t h f l e e s the a n x i ety that c o m e s over D a s e i n when it reco g n i z e s t h e g r o u n d l e s s n e s s o f its B e i n g a s m e r e l y a p o s s i b l e w a y t o be. I n a u t h e n t i c B e i n g t o w a r d d e a t h flees a n x i ety in the f a c e of d e a t h by turning it into s i m p l e f e a r i n the f a c e o f s o m e oncoming event. Inauthenitc understandi n g o f d e a t h r e g a r d s i t p r e c i s e l y a s dem i s e , i.e., a s t h e p h y s i c a l d e a t h t h a t a w a i t s us as p a r t i c u l a r , living things (cf. 254 a n d 251). I n a u t h e n t i c u n d e r standing takes Dasein's Being to be p r e c a r i o u s only in that we e a c h face personal, p h y s i c a l extinction. T h u s D a sein avoids r e c o g n i z i n g the m o r e profound p r e c a r i o u s n e s s t h a t i n v a d e s its very Being here and now. T h i s threat a r i s e s out o f its c h a r a c t e r a s the " t h e r e " of B e i n g (265), not out of t h e biology o f t h e l i v i n g c r e a t u r e s e m b o d y ing D a s e i n . Heidegger's discussion of death p l a y s both e x p l i c i t l y a n d t a c i t l y o n the a n a l o g y b e t w e e n d e a t h r e g a r d e d a s the d e m i s e of a person and d e a t h r e g a r d e d as the e x i s t e n t i a l end of Dasein. E x p l i c i t l y he c l a i m s that a w a r e n e s s of d e m i s e or of "cases of death," as H e i d e g g e r also c a l l s the "ending" of p a r t i c u l a r people, m a y b e w h a t leads D a s e i n to p a y attention to death at a l l (257). H e i d e g g e r r e f e r s t h e r e a d e r t o Tolstoy's story, "The Death of Ivan Ilych," to i l l u s t r a t e the i n a u t h e n t i c u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e a t h a s the d e m i s e t h a t h a p p e n s to e v e r y o n e sooner or l a t e r (254). W e c a n note t h a t I v a n d o e s n ' t j u s t c o m e to realize that this "everyone" includes h i m s e l f ( w h i c h we might s a y is a m a t t e r of a c c e p t i n g one's dem i s e ) , but h e a l s o c o m e s t o q u e s t i o n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of B e i n g w h i c h he h a s t a k e n for g r a n t e d ( w h i c h w e m i g h t c a l l accepting Dasein's most proper B e i n g ) . " I would also s a y that throughout H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i n a u thentic and authentic views of death he tacitly relies on an analogy or proportion b e t w e e n m y d e m i s e a s a p e r s o n and my existential death as Dasein. I am to my death qua person as D a s e i n i s t o its d e a t h q u a D a s e i n . I n both r e spects I confront a "nothingness" i m penetrable to my understanding, and d e a t h c o n s t i t u t e s a s o r t of "other s i d e " to w h a t is.' 2
T h e continual interplay between t h e i n a u t h e n t i c a n d a u t h e n t i c notions o f death unfortunately only makes H e i d e g g e r ' s text m o r e o b s c u r e , a n d the i l l u m i n a t i o n that this analogy might c a s t , i f m a d e e x p l i c i t l y , i s lost. O n c e one r e a l i z e s h o w e x i s t e n t i a l d e a t h diff e r s f r o m p e r s o n a l d e m i s e , one n o t i c e s how frequently Heidegger puts w o r d s such as 'death' and 'dying' in s c a r e quotes w h e n he is either r e f e r r i n g to the c o m m o n conception of death or m a k i n g a r e m a r k that is intentionally ambiguous. T h e tacit analogy, which l e t s h i m s a y s i m i l a r t h i n g s a b o u t both conceptions, a c t u a l l y h i n d e r s the distinction from being as c l e a r as it should be. I n c o n t r a s t t o the i n a u t h e n t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f d e a t h , a u t h e n t i c B e i n g tow a r d death manifests what it is to be D a s e i n a s the entity through w h i c h B e i n g is r e v e a l e d . Most of our discussion h a s e m p h a s i z e d the m e a n i n g of the w o r d ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y ' i n the p h r a s e 'the possibility of the impossibility of exis-
DASEIN AND DEATH
·
·
·
63 341
t e n c e ' b y , e . g . , c o n t r a s t i n g i t w i t h nonactuality. B u t to understand fully H e i d e g g e r ' s notion o f a u t h e n t i c B e i n g t o w a r d d e a t h , w e n e e d t o b r i n g out the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the t e r m ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' . W h y doesn't Heidegger just speak of the "impossibility of existence"? Cont r a r y t o w h a t E d w a r d s t h i n k s , the t e r m ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' i s not " s u p e r f l u o u s " o r "fantastically misleading" ( E d w a r d s 33); nor does it s i m p l y m e a n , as H i n m a n s a y s in r e p l y , that death is something that hasn't happened yet. D a sein's sort of impossibility of existence is indeed a possibility; w h a t is impossible now is still in some sense possible. Dasein's understanding of Being can c h a n g e , a n d n e w w a y s o f B e i n g a r e not a l w a y s i m p o s s i b l e . W h a t does not h a v e B e i n g simpliciter s t i l l h a s the B e i n g o f n o t - B e i n g . B e i n g c a n r e v e a l the w a y o f B e i n g of entity that w a s f o r m e r l y conc e a l e d , a s h a p p e n e d i n the s h i f t s f r o m t h e G r e e k t o the m e d i e v a l a n d f r o m t h e m e d i e v a l t o the m o d e r n w o r l d s . C o n s i d e r i n g Heidegger's delight in p l a y i n g w i t h the e t y m o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n s of w o r d s , it is not too f a r - f e t c h e d to suggest that w h e n he describes death as the " m e a s u r e l e s s impossibility of e x i s t e n c e " (262) a n d w h e n h e i t a l i c i z e s t h e 'Un' of 'Unmöglichkeit' (306), he is p l a y i n g on the f a c t t h a t the 'Un-' p r e f i x can m e a n 'excessive amount' as well as 'not.' ( C o m p a r e the E n g l i s h p r e f i x ' i n - ' of 'indiscreet' and 'inflammable,' or c o n s i d e r the G e r m a n w o r d s 'Unmasse' a n d ' U n s u m m e , ' w h i c h both m e a n not ' n o t h i n g ' but e n o r m o u s n u m b e r o r v a s t q u a n t i t y . S i m i l a r l y , an "Untier" is not a n o n - a n i m a l but a " v e r y a n i m a l " a n i m a l , i.e., a brute, a m o n s t e r . ) Heidegger m a y be p l a y i n g on this double meaning, and capturing an important aspect o f D a s e i n ' s finite e x i s t e n c e , w h e n h e s a y s t h a t i n a u t h e n t i c B e i n g to-
ward death, possibility "becomes 'greater and g r e a t e r ; ' that is to s a y , the possibility r e v e a l s itself to be s u c h t h a t i t k n o w s n o m e a s u r e (mass) a t a l l , n o m o r e o r l e s s , but s i g n i f i e s t h e m e a sureless impossibility of existence" (262). O u r p a r t i c u l a r c u r r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B e i n g p r e c l u d e s s o m e possibilities of B e i n g as not-possibilities f o r u s , but y e t w e a r e o p e n t o n e w poss i b i l i t i e s o f B e i n g j u s t a s the G r e e k s a n d m e d i e v a l people w e r e . T h e possible w a y s B e i n g could r e v e a l itself a r e "measureless."' 3
Authentic Being toward death o p e n s D a s e i n u p for n e w p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Heidegger describes authentic B e i n g t o w a r d d e a t h as "Vorlaufen" of the possibility of death. The word literally m e a n s 'to r u n a h e a d ' o r 'to r u n i n f r o n t , ' a n d the d e r i v a t i v e w o r d 'Vorläufer' means 'forerunner' or 'harbinger.' Authentic D a s e i n is in fact a h a r b i n g e r of a n e w u n d e r s t a n d i n g of B e i n g . It " r u n s a h e a d " to the edge of its c u r r e n t c l e a r i n g i n o r d e r t o d i s c l o s e w h a t " c a n b e i n a t i m e " a s e n t i t y (338). Heidegger notes: "Being t o w a r d death a s r u n n i n g a h e a d o f p o s s i b i l i t y for the first time possibilizes this possibility a n d m a k e s i t free a s s u c h " (262). A u thentic B e i n g toward death thus m a k e s s o m e possibility possible. P r e s u m a b l y , i t w a s i n s o m e s e n s e not s o b e f o r e . W e c a n n o t fix t h e e x a c t t i m e w h e n s u c h a c h a n g e in the understanding of B e i n g h a p p e n s , but H e i d e g g e r c a n c o m f o r t a bly s a y that in s u c h a m o m e n t (the "Augenblick" or " m o m e n t of i n s i g h t " ) b o t h " p o s s i b i l i t y t u r n s into i m p o s s i b i l i t y " (308) a n d "the u t t e r i m p o s s i b i l i t y of e x i s t e n c e b e c o m e s possible" (265). A c h a n g e in the understanding of B e i n g l e a v e s old possibilities behind a n d lets n e w ones t a k e their place in the "there" of B e i n g .
• PHILOSOPHY TODAY ·
342
ENDNOTES 1.
Heidegger's
complicated
"Jemeinigkeit"
and obscure
notion of
7.
o r " a l w a y s - m i n e - n e s s " is i n t e n d e d
University Press,
G e r m a n original is on the
of
particular
people
and
that
individuals 8.
Heidegger,
stood
in
relation
to
Kierkegaard's
equally
xiety,
translated by
Reidar T h o m t e
P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, Heidegger,
1981),
" T h e Origin of the
Thought 76f.
See
See
p.
"Der
Ursprung
1977),
10.
by
Klos-
Introduction
R.
Manheim
to
11.
Haven:
this
work
will
be
included
in
second
page
number
(Tübingen:
indicates
the
page
in
1953).
See p.
4 7f.
F.
Capuzzi in
Basic Writings,
edited by D.
he
which
is
parallel
good
those
to
message
absent
in
12.
the
scarcely
immediately
against
most
noticeable
supressed,
and
indicated
by
remarks
that
Rilke
responsive c h o r d in
sisted
'LH.'
quoting
have
sorting out
the
but
body
I
of
Heidegger moon,
Klostermann,
1976).
F.W.
Humanismus," von Herrmann,
(Frankfurt
See p.
326f.
am
the
stantly
Main:
turned
quotes
so life has a
away
from
us,
the
as that
for this refer-
plenitude,
to the
t h e i s s u e o f life a f t e r d e a t h b e c a u s e h e a s s u m e s
luminated
by
us."
that
the
of
the
can
only
side of life realm
Heidegger dead
its o t h e r side.
sonal
network
(Bezug),'
at
physical
death.
(See
Ed-
60.) H i n m a n seems to think the "abso-
whole
That
i.e.,
n e t w o r k o f the
side
p.
302.
one
by
annihilation brought by physical death.
"What
man
p.
with
(See H i n -
"The
to Sartre,
Way
Back
into
Existentialism
the
from
G r o u n d of
Poets
For?"
of
the
Dich-
M y translation varies Albert in
Hofstadter
Poetry,
in
Language,
At least so it appears in the d i s c u s s i o n of D a -
Dostoevsky
sein's works
mann ( N e w York: N e w American Library, 271f.
13.
second edition, edited by Walter Kauf-
Metaphysics,"
Are
the
of
Thought, p . 1 2 4 .
200.)
Heidegger,
p.
the
and
'the other
"Wozu
from
equates
realm is
whole
See
Holzwege,
Heidegger
the
other
slightly
which
to
the
ter?" in
nullity"
to
unil-
"Death
Open."
"possibility of the impossibility of existence" is an
lute
adds:
belong
Being as
consciousness
not
"Death is
t h a t is t u r n e d a w a y f r o m u s ,
refer to the "totality of the destruction" of perwards p.
con-
is
t r u l y w h o l e a n d full s p h e r e a n d
the
existence"
saying:
life's opposite b u t its c o m p l e t i o n t o p e r f e c t i o n , globe of B e i n g . " Rilke also c o m m e n t s :
of
two
is
which
E d w a r d s accuses Heidegger of "double-talk" on "impossibility
the
side
ence.
the
re-
paper
In "Wozu
Rilke and
strike
have
the difference b e t w e e n
"Like
" B r i e f über
the
See also
makes obviously
in
Dichter?"
original:
been
152).
Heidegger,
them
the
German
was
qualified
impulses which
might
thinkers w o u l d require too m u c h space.
parentheses
For
what
highly
since
in
some of
points.
the
text
a
148.
Some a
Fu-
has
Heidegger's
Heidegger's
struggle
by
T h e second n u m b e r indicates the page n u m b e r in
Wegmarken, e d i t e d b y V o l . 9 o f Gesamtausgabe
6.
101. See " M o i r a " in
real t h i n g and all the rest false" (p.
Krell
207.
p.
t u r e r e f e r e n c e s to this w o r k w i l l be i n c l u d e d i n
in
5.
1977), p.
p.
Early Greek Thinking,
in
1975),
attempts
people,
for this
p.
( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r and R o w ,
1959),
it occurs to Ivan "that his scarcely per-
ceptible
the
"Letter on Humanism," translated by
Language, Unter-
Neske,
Although Tolstoy's
thoughts
considered
reference. Heidegger,
1960).
example,
the
Einführung in die Metaphysik
Niemeyer,
(Pfullingen:
"Moira"
dimension
Ivan's
text i n parentheses and indicated b y Ί Μ . ' T h e G e r m a n original:
Poetry,
in
See " D i e S p r a c h e " i n
notion of authenticity and inauthenticity,
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1959), p. 62, for a d e s c r i p t i o n to
(Pfullingen: Neske,
Vorträge und Aufsätze, p. 2 4 8 . S e e L e o T o l s t o y , The Death of Ivan Ilych and Other Stories ( N e w Y o r k : N e w A m e r i c a n L i moral
Yale
o f a u t h e n t i c h i s t o r y and " w o r l d - b u i l d i n g . " F u t u r e references
Heidegger,
brary,
Metaphysics,
(New
text of the
Poetry, Language, D i n g " i n Vorträge
in
"Language,"
H a r p e r and R o w ,
Kunstwerkes," Main:
The
translated by D. K r e l l and F. Capuzzi ( N e w York:
von Herrmann, Vol.
(Frankfurt am
Thing"
87.
facing page.
23.
of A r t , "
p. 64f.
Heidegger,
translated
des
F. W .
p.
translated
Northwestern
171.
Heidegger,
28f.
Work
"The
Thought, p . 2 0 0 . wegs zur Sprache
( N e w York: H a r p e r and R o w , 1971), p.
Holzwege, e d i t e d b y 5 o f Gesamtausgabe terman,
9.
(Princeton:
Poetry, Language,
translated by A . Hofstadter in
1978). p.
Concept of An
a n d the r a c e . " See K i e r k e g a a r d ' s
1969),
Thought, p . 1 7 8 . S e e " D a s und Aufsätze, f o u r t h e d i t i o n
obscure claim that the individual is " b o t h himself
4.
Illinois:
t o c a p t u r e t h i s idea that D a s e i n i s a l w a y s t h e D a
Heidegger's notion can only be adequately under
3.
Malick (Evanston.
sein
stand in a relationship of "care" to their Being.
2.
The Essence of Reasons,
Heidegger, by T.
See
M e t a p h y s i k ? ' " in
"Einleitung
Wegmarken,
zu:
such
Metaphysics
1975),
'Was
limitations as
a s w e l l as " T i m e a n d
seminar o n it,
1st
self is
p. 374.
Being and Time. L a t e r , i n Kant and the Problem of
in
finite,
B e i n g " and the
Heidegger will argue that B e i n g i t not just
Dasein's disclosure of it.
Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California 95053
DASEIN AND DEATH
·
·
·
65 343
Philosophy
and
Phenomenological
Research
Vol. L X , No. 2, March 2000
Metaphysics, Metontology, and the End of Being and Time STEVEN GALT CROWELL
Rice University
In
1928 H e i d e g g e r a r g u e d t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y he h a d p u r s u e d i n
and Time
needed
t o be
completed
by
what
he c a l l e d
"metontology."
Being
This
paper
analyzes w h a t this n o t i o n a m o u n t s t o . Far f r o m b e i n g m e r e l y a c u r i o s i t y of H e i d e g g e r s c h o l a r s h i p , the place o c c u p i e d b y " m e t o n t o l o g y " opens o n t o a g e n e r a l issue c o n c e r n i n g the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y and m e t a p h y s i c s , a n d also b e t w e e n b o t h o f these a n d n a t u r a l i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m . 1 p u r s u e these issues i n t e r m s o f a n a m b i g u i t y in the n o t i o n o f " g r o u n d i n g " i n
Being and Time
and i n the w o r k s o f w h a t I c a l l H e i d e g -
ger's "metaphysical decade" ( 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 3 7 ) , defending a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n ( g i v i n g p r i o r i t y t o the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ) against what proves t o b e the i l l u s o r y idea t h a i m e t a p h y s i c a l g r o u n d s are p r e s u p p o s e d i n s u c h t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y .
§1.
Introduction
The term "end" in my title should be understood in three senses: (1) Heidegger's unfinished book ends, concludes in §83, w i t h a series of questions that are to prepare the w a y for the sequel, an interpretation of the meaning o f being i n terms o f t i m e . T h i s preparation consists, strangely enough, in questioning the appropriateness of the method used in the p r e v i ous four hundred or so pages. T h e analysis of Dasein's o n t o l o g i c a l structure is, Heidegger now reminds us, " o n l y one way w h i c h we may take."' Indeed, "whether this is the only way or even the right one at all can be decided o n l y after one has gone along it.'' At the end of Being and Time, then, can we say
T h e G e r m a n reads:
D i e H e r a u s s t e l l u n g d e r S e i n s v e r f a s s u n g des D a s e i n s b l e i b ! a b e r
ein Weg. Sein und Zeil
Ziel
g l e i c h w o h l nur
Das
Heidegger.
(Tübingen: M a x Niemeyer. !976>. ρ
i s t d i e A u s a r b e i t u n g des S e i n s f r a g e überhaupt." M a r t i n 436;
Being and Time.
tr.
John Macquarrie and E d w a r d R o b i n s o n ( N e w Y o r k : Harper & R o w . 1962). p. 487. The apposition
of emphasized
terms—ein
Weg a n d Ziel—suggests
lhal
H e i d e g g e r is e m p h a
s i z i n g n o l . a s t h e M a c q u a r r i e a n d R o b i n s o n t r a n s l a t i o n has i t . l h a l t h i s i s o n e w a y a m o n g o t h e r s , b u t t h a i i t i s i n g e n e r a l o n l y o n t h e w a y . n o t vet a t the g o a l
Some justification for
the t r a n s l a t i o n i s f o u n d , h o w e v e r , i n t h e s e n t e n c e I c i t e n e x t i n the t e x t , w h i c h i s separ a i e d f r o m i h i s o n e b y a p a r a g r a p h . A s s h a l l b e seen i n w h a t f o l l o w s , H e i d e g g e r s t a n d s h e r e at a m o m e n t o f m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c r i s i s . F u t u r e r e f e r e n c e s t o
Being and Time
w i l l be
g i v e n i n t h e t e x t , c i t i n g f i r s t (he E n g l i s h a n d t h e n the G e r m a n p a g i n a t i o n . I h a v e m o d i f i e d t h e t r a n s l a t i o n s w h e r e I saw f i t , w i t h o u t f u r t h e r c o m m e n t .
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y . A N D T H E E N D O F BEING ASD TIME
345
307
whether the path has been the right one? O n l y if we k n o w what was to be accomplished by its means—hence, a second sense of "end": (2) The end, or a i m , of Being and Time is perhaps best understood through a c o m p a r i s o n that H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f increasingly e m p l o y e d in the later 1920s, v i z . , w i t h K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason, w h i c h Kant described as "a 2
treatise on the m e t h o d , not a system of the science itself." " M e t h o d " in this transcendental sense means demonstrating the conditions of p o s s i b i l i t y for synthetic a p r i o r i k n o w l e d g e , p r e l i m i n a r y to w o r k i n g out a system of such k n o w l e d g e . C o n s t r u i n g K a n t ' s synthetic apriori k n o w l e d g e as " o n t o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e . " Heidegger views transcendental critique as a reflection on the " o n t o l o g i c a l g r o u n d " of o n t o l o g y . S i m i l a r l y , the aim of Being and Time is to lay the g r o u n d w o r k for o n t o l o g i c a l knowledge ( o f the "meaning of b e i n g " ) , but in place of K a n t ' s focus upon the cognitive c o m p o r t m e n t of judging, Heidegger turns first to the interrogative comportment of raising the question of being. Where K a n t locates the ground of ontological knowledge in " a p r i o r i synthesis,"
Heidegger
locales
it
in
the
"understanding
of being"
(Seinsverständnis) presupposed in all questioning. For this reason the focus of reflection falls on " D a s e i n , " a terminus lechnicus i n d i c a t i n g that being w h o , in a p r e - p h i l o s o p h i c a l w a y , necessarily raises questions about its o w n being and thereby provides the inescapable starting p o i n t for p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y , "the point where it arises and to w h i c h it returns" ( B T 487, 62; SZ 436, 38). But if, g i v e n the a i m of s h o w i n g how ontological knowledge is possible, Dasein has a peculiar c l a i m on our attention, by the end of Being and Time Heidegger detects a "fundamental problem that s t i l l remains ' v e i l e d ' " ( B T 4 8 7 ; S Z 4 3 6 ) . F o r i f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f o n t o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e lies i n Dasein's pre-philosophical understanding of being, must not any such k n o w l edge be l i m i t e d to the particular, finite perspective occupied by the questioner? Heidegger has all a l o n g acknowledged—indeed emphasized—that p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y is n o t h i n g but a " r a d i c a l i z a t i o n " of that everyday yet "essential" tendency that Dasein has to question the meaning of its being, and that thus his o w n i n q u i r y is u l t i m a t e l y " o m i c a l l y rooted [verwurzelt]" ( B T 35, 34; SZ 15, 13). B u t when Heidegger asks whether " o n t o l o g y a l l o w s of being ontologically grounded [begründen], or rather requires in addition an ontic g r o u n d [Fundamentes]," he cannot be r e f e r r i n g to the p r e v i o u s l y described p r i o r i t y of Dasein, for he immediately appends the further question, "and which entity m u s t take on this function of g r o u n d i n g ? " T h i s question w o u l d make no sense if "ontic ground" merely referred to Dasein, the inquirer, as the inescapable starting point for philosophy ( B T 4 8 7 ; SZ 436). It appears rather that when Heidegger asks for an " e n t i t y " in w h i c h to ground o n t o l o g -
:
K a n t , Critique o f Pure Reason, t r . N o r m a n K e m p S m i t h ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n . 1 9 6 8 ) , p . 2 5 (Bxxii).
308
STEVEN G A L T C R O W E L L
346
ical knowledge he siands poised to make a move lhat has since become f a m i l iar in philosophy, namely, lo relaiivize such knowledge to some aspect of the context in w-hich it arises. To ascribe a g r o u n d i n g function to the e n t i t y , "nature.'' for example, might y i e l d something like that " n a t u r a l i s m " w h i c h seeks to explain ontological knowledge in terms of causal relations between environment and brain states. S i m i l a r l y , to embrace the entity, " h i s t o r y , " as such a ground might yield a k i n d of " h i s t o r i c i s m " in w h i c h the content of one's thought, one's ontological k n o w l e d g e , is explained w i t h reference to the conceptual resources of one's historical m i l i e u . ' Other candidates for the grounding entity could be proposed—society, language, even G o d — b u l the fact that in entertaining the p o s s i b i l i t y of an ontic g r o u n d of o n t o l o g y Heidegger must ask " w h i c h " entity or context is to serve this function signals a methodological crisis that threatens the a i m of Being and Time, v i z . , to make the transition from Dasein's understanding of being to the meaning of being. Hence, a final sense of "end": (3) The end of Being and Time also means the collapse of its project, the demise of fundamental ontology. What happened? W h y was the announced sequel to Being and Time never published? T h i s question, deeply e n t w i n e d w i t h the problem of the so-called " t u r n " (Kehre) in Heidegger's t h i n k i n g , has occasioned much commentary. O u r angle on it shall be established by the observation that at first the idea of a turn was immanent to the project of Being and Time itself: only later did it take on, in Heidegger's self-interpretat i o n , the status of a turn away from that project, a rejection of its grasp on the p r o b l e m . T h o u g h e x a m i n i n g the i m m a n e n i turn suggests an interpretation of the turn in the broader sense, that is not my m a i n quarry. Instead. 1 shall show how the immanent turn at the end of Being and Time gets entan-
T h e execution and o f course.
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f these d i s l i n c l e x p l a n a t o r y p r o p o s a l s d i f f e r m a r k e d l y ,
Heidegger's ontological knowledge
is knowledge of meaning.
c a u s a l I h e o r y . the n a t u r a l i s i m i g h t o f f e r a n a c c o u n t o f s u c h
A p p e a l i n g to a
O n t o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e ' ' that
e l i m i n a t e s i l a l l o g e l h e r . See. f o r e x a m p l e . J o h n M c D o w e l l ' s a c c o u n t o f Q u i n e ' s n o t i o n o f 'empirical significance" in The
Mind and World
(Cambridge: Harvard.
historic ist. on the other h a n d , t y p i c a l l y argues that the
19941. pp.
intentional
131-33.
"content" of a
c l a i m to o n t o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e depends u p o n l i n g u i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n i n g at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e : a n d f u r t h e r ( i f she i s a p r a g m a t i s t ) t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s are t h e m s e l v e s a f u n c t i o n o f h i s t o n c a l K c o n t i n g e n t s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , a n d s o o n . H e r e m e a n i n g i s not e l i m i n a t e d , but justification is tied to what ihe norms inhereni allow
in current c o n d i t i o n s and practices
H e i d e g g e r is oflen taken to espouse s o m e t h i n g l i k e ihe h i s t o r i c a l
view, hut if he
does e s p o u s e i t i t i s o n t h e basis o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a i i o n s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n n a t u r a l i s m a n d h i s t o r i c i s m as unite e x p l a n a t o r y p r o p o s a l s a r e n o ! d e c i s i v e i n c o n t e x t o f the p r e s e n t essay the situatedness o f o n t o l o g i c a l
F o r t h e p e r t i n e n t q u e s l i o n a f l e r 1927 i s w h e t h e r
knowledge, ahead}
attested
p h c n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y . can
b e c o m e t h e t h e m e o f an o n t i c inquiry. E m p i r i c a l i n q u i r i e s m l o n a t u r a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s are o f c o u r s e p o s s i b l e , b u t I h e y c a n n o t i o n for o n t o l o g i c a l search
for
knowledge
another
son
since
they
of i n q u i r y
presuppose
into
this
such
Heidegger's view > yield grounds knowledge
situatedness;—designated
Heidegger s
failed
"metaphysical"
or
" m e t o n t o l o g i c a l " — i s t h e t o p i c o f the p r e s e n t p a p e r .
M E T A P H Y S I C S . M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D T H E E N D O F BEIXG A.VD TIME
347
309
gled w i t h the very different issue of an "ontic g r o u n d " of o n t o l o g y . To ask why Heidegger imagines that there should be an ontic ground of ontology is to expose a latent inconsistency in his magnum opus. T h o u g h I analyze this inconsistency in terms of an o p p o s i t i o n between phenomenology and metaphysics (the terms in w h i c h Heidegger formulates the turn), the p r o b l e m can be seen to have far w i d e r provenance. For "phenomenology" here represents that aspect of Heidegger's project that adheres to the critical-transcendental formulation of philosophical questions, whereas "metaphysics"—the heading under w h i c h an ontic g r o u n d is sought—turns out to be a v i r t u a l cipher for any appeal to " c o n t e x t u a l i z i n g " discourses w i t h pretensions to p r o v i d e independent grounds for the transcendental problematic. T h o u g h Heidegger d i d not i m m e d i a t e l y grasp the p r o b l e m — i n d e e d , he places great w e i g h t on his c o n v i c t i o n that "ontology can only be founded 4
o n t i c a l l y , " a fact that "no one before me has e x p l i c i t l y seen or stated" —the collapse of his project results f r o m the inconsistent belief that a turn is to be made from phenomenology to metaphysics. Kept at bay in Being and Time ( 1 9 2 7 ) , this i n c o n s i s t e n c y comes g l a r i n g l y to l i g h t in an A p p e n d i x to Heidegger's last M a r b u r g lecture course, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928). In order to complete his project, Heidegger here demands something called " m e t o n t o l o g y , " a " t u r n i n g around [Kehre], where ontology i t s e l f expressly runs back i n t o the metaphysical ontic in w h i c h it i m p l i c i t l y always 3
remains." To ask what m e t o n t o l o g y c o u l d be is to uncover the precise p o i n t where phenomenological j n d metaphysical (pre-transcendental) motifs confront one another. T h i s confrontation occupies Heidegger for a decade u n t i l , conceding in effect that appeal to an ontic ground involves what K a n t calls "transcendental i l l u s i o n , " he
f o r m u l a t e s his idea for " o v e r c o m i n g "
(Überwindung; Verwendung) metaphysics. Since Heidegger often seems to suggest that o v e r c o m i n g metaphysics leaves important aspects of the phenomenological project in place, it m i g h t be said that Being and Time d i d not altogether collapse and that Heidegger continued in the spirit of the c l a i m that " o n l y as phenomenology is o n t o l o g y possible" ( B T 60; SZ 35). §2.
The
Language
of Metaphysics
Perhaps the best w a y of i n t r o d u c i n g the argument is to consider some famous passages in w h i c h Heidegger explains w h y Being and Time was never c o m pleted. In his 1947 "Letter on H u m a n i s m " he writes that the crucial section 4
Letter to K a r l L ö w i t h ( 2 0 A u g u s t 1927), i n Z u r vol.
II,
ed.
Dietrich
Pappenfuss
and
Otto
philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers.
Pöggeler (Frankfurt:
Vittono
Klostermann,
1990), p. 36. 3
Martin Heidegger,
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz.
Gesamtausgabe B d . 2 6 , e d
Klaus H e l d (Frankfurt:
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, v e r s i t y Press,
1984). p.
158
1978). p. 2 0 1 ;
F u t u r e references g i v e n , i n the t e x t , w i t h G e r m a n ( G A 2 6 )
followed by English ( M F L ) paginalion.
310
Vitiorio Klostermann.
lr. Michael H e i m ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana U n i -
STEVEN G A L T CROWELL
348
on " T i m e and B e i n g , " in w h i c h the immanent turn was to be made, was "held back because t h i n k i n g failed in the adequate saying of this turning and d i d not 6
succeed w i t h the help of the language of metaphysics." C r u c i a l l y , the " a n d " here indicates that the thinking that failed d i d not already employ the language of metaphysics; rather, at a certain moment it turned to the language of metaphysics for help. The "and" thus distinguishes t w o distinct phases of Heidegger's thought: on the one hand, the t h i n k i n g that failed e m p l o y e d the vocabulary of hermeneutic phenomenology, as in the published p o r t i o n of Being and Time; on the other hand, the unhelpful language of metaphysics was the t r a d i t i o n a l K a n l i a n - L e i b n i z i a n - A r i s t o t e l i a n language (specifically excluded f r o m Being and Time in favor of its notorious neologisms) w h i c h Heidegger began to speak around 1928 and w h i c h he once more abandoned in the m i d 19305, w h e n he c a l l e d for o v e r c o m i n g metaphysics. T h e o d o r e K i s i e l has labeled the years between 1916 and 1927 Heidegger's " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l decade"; I suggest that the years between 1927 and 1937 are Heidegger's "metaphysical decade."
7
T h o u g h crucial to my argument, this reading of the conjunction as indicati n g t w o d i s t i n c t phases of Heidegger's thought is not u n i v e r s a l l y shared. T y p i c a l l y the reference to metaphysics is understood to include the whole transcendental project of Being and Time. So Jean G r o n d i n writes that "what the 'Letter on H u m a n i s m ' teaches or confirms is that Being and Time fails to say this Kehre, remaining in a certain respect prisoner of the horizon of the 8
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of m e t a p h y s i c s " — a n interpretation suggested by the later Heidegger's tendency to see the entire tradition, i n c l u d i n g his earlier thought, as part of the " h i s t o r y of metaphysics" that needs to be overcome. Yet precisely in our passage Heidegger seems interested in preserving a nuance of difference. M o r e revealing is D a v i d K r e l l ' s remark that immediately f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of Being and Time Heidegger " s t i l l hopes to r e j o i n " the
T h e G e r m a n reads:
" D e r f r a g l i c h e A b s c h n i t t w u r d e z u r ü c k g e h a l t e n , w e i l das D e n k e n i m
zureichenden
dieser
Sagen
Kehre
versagte
und
mit
n i c h t d u r c h k a m . " M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r . " B r i e f über d e n
Hilfe
der
Sprache
der
(Frankfurt: V i t t o r i o K l o s l e r m a n n . 1978). ρ 3 2 5 : "Letter o n H u m a n i s m , " i n
ings,
ed
Metaphysik
H u m a n i s m u s ' . " i n Wegmarkeη
Basic Writ
D a v i d Farrell Krell ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r C o l l i n s . 1993), p. 2 3 1 .
Theodore Kisiel.
The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time
( L o s Angeles: University
Being and Time a n d (he P r o b l e m o f M e t a p h y s i c s . " Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters Kyushu Univer sity, f o r t h c o m i n g ( p p . 2 0 - 2 Π . has seen t h i s q u i t e c l e a r l y : D u r i n g t h e late 1 9 2 0 s "the c o n c e p t i o n o f f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y i n Being and Tune is t r a n s f o r m e d i n i o l h a t o f m e l a o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 59
Ryioichi Hosokawa. " T h e Conception of
p h y s i c s . " a n d t h i s " p e r i o d o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n m e t a p h y s i c s c a n b e f o l l o w e d u p t o ihe first a n d s e c o n d l e c t u r e s o n N i e t z s c h e ( W S 1 9 3 6 / 3 7 . S S 1 9 3 7 1 " . h e n c e " i t i s a grea( m i s ( a k e i f o n e m a i n t a i n s l h a l H e i d e g g e r I n e s t o o v e r c o m e m e i a p h y s i c s b e g i n n i n g i n 1 9 3 0 " See a l s o his extremely valuable "Heidegger und die E t h i k . "
Phänomenologie der Praxis
ι19891. p .
256 Jean G r o n d i n .
Hermeneutics
"Prolegomena l o an U n d e r s t a n d i n g o f H e i d e g g e r ' s T u r n . " in
Sources of
( A l b a n y : Stale U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k Press. 1995). p . 64.
M E T A P H Y S I C S . M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D T H E E N D OF BEING AND TIME
349
3 I I
9
"tradition of metaphysics" in a "positive and fruitful w a y " — i m p l y i n g a certain distance between Being and Time and that tradition. H a v i n g noted that in Being and Time the term "metaphysics" almost always occurs in scare-quotes, Joanna Hodge captures the decisive point: after Being and Time Heidegger is " t r y i n g to retrieve a disqitotational use of the term ' m e t a p h y s i c s ' . " ' " To support my reading of the conjunction, then, a brief look at the " q u o t a t i o n a l " use in Being and Time is necessary. The tension between metaphysics and p h e n o m e n o l o g y in H e i d e g g e r ' s thought goes back to his student years, when metaphysics was associated above a l l w i t h neo-Scholasticism and its defense of A r i s t o t e l i a n r e a l i s m against n e o - K a n t i a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l idealism. In the debate over whether logic and theory of k n o w l e d g e presupposed a metaphysics of the object, a theory o f " o n t o l o g i c a l t r u t h , " Heidegger took the " c r i t i c a l " s i d e . " T h o u g h Heidegger d i d not t h i n k that c r i t i c a l philosophy presupposed a metaphysics, he d i d believe that it led to one: transcendental theory of k n o w l e d g e is to be completed by "an u l t i m a t e metaphysical-teleological interpretation of c o n sciousness."
12
Rather than d e v e l o p i n g such a metaphysics, however, between
1917 and 1927 Heidegger w o r k e d at the transformation of p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n t o a "hermeneutics of f a c t i c i t y , " an o n t o l o g y intended as an i m m a n e n t development of the critical-transcendental impulse. Even Heidegger's renewed interest in A r i s t o t l e d u r i n g this p e r i o d should not be seen as an attempt to revive metaphysics but to recover a more phenomenological k i n d of questioning concealed by the Scholastic t r a d i t i o n . Thus, w h i l e the project of Being and Time may be interpreted as a " r e p e t i t i o n " or retrieval of A r i s t o t l e ' s "first 3
p h i l o s o p h y , " ' that retrieval casts itself as a transcendental i n q u i r y opposed to then-current conceptions of metaphysics. F o l l o w i n g Husserl, Heidegger saw p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d as a l i b e r a t i o n f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c a l p s e u d o - p r o b l e m s : m i n d - b o d y d u a l i s m , doubts about the external w o r l d , realism/idealism debates, and so o n . In Being and Time the term " o n t o l o g y " 9
David Farrell Krell,
Intimations of Mortality
( U n i v e r s i t y Park: T h e P e n n s y l v a n i a State
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 8 6 ) , p . 3 9 . 1 ( 1
"
Joanna H o d g e , I n his 1914
Heidegger and Ethics
review
( L o n d o n : Routledge. 1 9 9 5 ) . p. 177.
o f Charles Sentroul's
Kant und Aristoteles,
for example. Heidegger
rejects the t h e o r y o f " o n t o l o g i c a l t r u t h , " c o n c l u d i n g that " e v e n t o d a y the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the t h e o r y o f science i s l a c k i n g i n a r i s t o t e l i a n scholastic p h i l o s o p h y " I n contrast t o the K a n t i a n t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e , A r i s t o t l e ' s i s " f r o m the b e g i n n i n g h e a v i l y b u r d e n e d w i t h
Frühe Schriften ( F r a n k f u n : V i n o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1 9 7 8 ) , p p . 5 2 . 5 0 . Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, i n Frühe Schriften,
metaphysics " 1 2
Heidegger,
ρ
3 4 8 . A n i n c o n s i s t e n c y s i m i l a r t o I h e o n e t h a t leads m e t o n t o l o g y t o a d e a d e n d a l r e a d y infects Heidegger's earlier concept of metaphysics, however. A partial account can be found i n m y " M a k i n g L o g i c Philosophical Again (1912-1916),"
the Start,
Y o r k Press, 1 9 9 4 ) , p p 1 3
A s has
55-72.
"Sein und Zeil als Philosophisches Jahrbuch v o l 9 4 , n o . 2
been s h o w n i n c o n v i n c i n g detail by R y i o i c h i H o s o k a w a .
W i e d e r h o l u n g ' der A r i s t o t e l i s c h e n Seinsfrage," (1987).
312
Reading Heidegger from
ed. T h e o d o r e K i s i e l and John V a n B u r e n ( A l b a n y : State U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w
STEVEN G A L T CROWELL
350
does n o l "indicate some definite philosophical discipline standing in intercon n e c t i o n w i t h others;" nor does it "have to measure up to the tasks of some d i s c i p l i n e that has been presented beforehand" ( B T 49; SZ 27). Further, m e t h o d demands that o n t o l o g i c a l language be scrutinized for metaphysical prejudices t h r o u g h a deconstruction (Destruktion) of the history of o n t o l o g y . As in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, such traditional preconcep tions are to be put out of play. There are t w o main reasons, then, why Being and Time surrounds the term " m e t a p h y s i c s " w i t h scare-quotes. First, it serves notice that H e i d e g g e r ' s project is not to be confused w i t h the popular postwar (urn from c r i t i c a l neoKantianism
t o w a r d n e o - H e g e l i a n i s m . Lebensphilosophie, and the l i k e ; and
second, it points t o w a r d a new sort of inquiry whose nature can be established o n l y on the ground of Heidegger's transcendental-phenomenological project. An example of the first is f o u n d in the c l a i m that the question of being has been forgotten "even t h o u g h in our time we deem it progressive to give our approval to 'metaphysics' a g a i n " ( B T 2 1 ; SZ 2), and the second in the c l a i m that " w h a t m i g h t be discussed under the topic of a 'metaphysic of death' lies outside the d o m a i n of an existential analytic of death" and presupposes " a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . o f the o n t o l o g y of the aggregate of entities as a w h o l e " ( B T 292; SZ 248). We shall see that the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of m e t o n t o l o g y hinges on whether the
"language of metaphysics" can help articulate what an i n q u i r y
i n t o this "aggregate of entities as a w h o l e " might be. If it is therefore plausible to suggest that the " a n d " in Heidegger's 1947 r e c o l l e c t i o n indicates a d i s t i n c t i o n , i m p o r t a n t to his t h o u g h t in
1927,
between p h e n o m e n o l o g y and metaphysics, it becomes possible to argue that the collapse o f Being and Time has less to do w i t h phenomenology than w i t h what proved to be a transitory positive evaluation of metaphysics.
Yet the
same recollection also seems to preclude the c l a i m that Heidegger resolved the inconsistency in Being and Time by o v e r c o m i n g metaphysics in favor of p h e n o m e n o l o g y , for it suggests that the hermeneutic p h e n o m e n o l o g y of Being and Time failed. But w hat about it failed? Is there evidence for h o w we should understand the failure, especially given Heidegger's statement that "the t h i n k i n g that hazards a few
steps in Being and Time has even today not
advanced beyond that p u b l i c a t i o n . " or that "the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one"? 1 4 A clue is found in Heidegger's explanation that " i n the poverty of its first b r e a k t h r o u g h " the sort of t h i n k i n g at w o r k in Being and Time failed because it d i d not yet
"succeed in retaining the essential help
of phenomenological seeing w h i l e dispensing w i t h the inappropriate concern
The
first
remark
is
s e c o n d is f r o m i h e
found
in
" L e i t e r o n H u m a n i s m . " p.
246 ι
Weltmarken, p . 3 3 9 ) . t h e Sein und Zen. i n
1 9 5 3 " A u t h o r ' s P r e f a c e l o the S e \ e n ( h E d i t i o n " o f
w h i c h H e i d e g g e r announces t h a i the p r o m i s e d second h a l f o f the (ext " c o u l d be
no longer
added."
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y . A N D T H E E N D O F BEING AND TIME
351
3 I 3
15
w i t h 'science' and 'research'." The "concern w i t h 'science' and 'research'," it seems, and not "phenomenological seeing," spoils the project of Being and Time. It w o u l d be a lengthy task to unpack this statement f u l l y , b u l for the contrast between phenomenology and metaphysics it is not necessary to do so. Decisive is the connection between phenomenological "seeing" and the idea of grounding philosophical practice and discourse in the matter (die Sache) that calls for and authorizes t h i n k i n g . Heidegger's appeal to phenomenological seeing recalls Husserl's " p r i n c i p l e o f a l l p r i n c i p l e s " u n d e r l y i n g the phenomenological theory of evidence (Evidenz): "every originary presentative i n t u i t i o n is a l e g i t i m i z i n g source of c o g n i t i o n " such that " e v e r y t h i n g o r i g i n a r i l y . . . o f f e r e d to us in ' i n t u i t i o n ' is to be accepted s i m p l y as what it is presented as being, but also only w i t h i n the l i m i t s in w h i c h it is presented t h e r e . " " The force of this principle for Husserl is to insist that g r o u n d i n g or j u s t i f i c a t i o n in p h i l o s o p h y u l t i m a t e l y lies in direct c o n f r o n t a t i o n , h o w e v e r achieved, w i t h the matters in question and not in dialectical or logical theoryconstruction concerning these matters, however useful or even indispensable these may at times be. T h o u g h Heidegger c r i t i c i z e s H u s s e r l ' s v i e w of evidence in various w a y s — c h a l l e n g i n g the reliance on visual metaphors, b r i n g i n g out its interpretive structure—it remains a significant element of his t h i n k i n g to the end of his l i f e .
11
In contrast, as I shall n o w argue, Heidegger's
transitory positive evaluation of metaphysics after Being and Time results from an "inappropriate concern w i t h 'science' and 'research'," an esprit de Systeme that originates in his renewed enthusiasm for Kant and brings to the surface a latent inconsistency in Being and Time between p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l and metaphysical senses of "ground." What leads Heidegger's project astray is its flirtation w i t h a "disquotational" sense of metaphysics largely m o t i v a t e d by his desire to find a successor d i s c i p l i n e — a " m e t a p h y s i c a l o n t i c " or " m e t o n t o l o g y " — t o the dogmatic metaphysics ruled out by K a n t ' s Transcendental Dialectic.
(Wegmarken, p . 3 5 3 ) . Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and lo a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book, tr. F. K e r s t e n ( T h e H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 4 4 . H e i d e g g e r , " L e t t e r on H u m a n i s m , " pp. 2 5 8 - 5 9
E d m u n d Husserl,
T o a r g u e the
p o i n t f u l l y w o u l d require a separate essay, b u t the basic
sketched by F r i e d r i c h - W i l h e l m von Herrmann,
Heidegger und Husserl
i d e a has b e e n
Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei
(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
1988), p. 5 1 , w h o argues that
the l a t e r H e i d e g g e r n o l o n g e r reflects o n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l
m e t h o d or describes his
t h i n k i n g i n those t e r m s , not "because h e a b a n d o n e d p h e n o m e n o l o g y b u t because h e c o n t i n u e d t o p r a c t i c e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l seeing and d e m o n s t r a t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y . " H e i d e g g e r s t i l l d e f e n d s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l seeing i n his last S e m i n a r i n Z ä h r i n g e n ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,
Seminare
314
( F r a n k f u r t : K l o s t e r m a n n . 1977), pp
I lOff.
STEVEN G A L T CROWELL
352
Vier
§
3. Ontology and Metontology
It was noted above that between 1926 and 1929 Heidegger came increasingly to view his project in Kantian terms. In particular, in his Kant and the Prob lem of Metaphysics (1929. based on a lecture course f r o m WS 1927/28). Heidegger tied K a n t ' s transcendental project (and so also his o w n ) to the d i s t i n c t i o n between metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis. The former indicates transcendental inquiry into the grounds of o n t o l o g i c a l k n o w l edge, w h i l e the latter is the system of such knowledge, viz.. rational psy chology, c o s m o l o g y , and theology
In contrast to the previously cited state
ment f r o m Being and Time, according to w h i c h phenomenological o n t o l o g y does not need to "measure up to the tasks of some d i s c i p l i n e that has been presented b e f o r e h a n d , " Heidegger's eagerness to see his p r o j e c t as a " r e t r i e v a l " 1 " of K a n t ' s now exerts a pressure toward " s y s t e m " on that very project. F o r instance, according to K a n t ' s Transcendental D i a l e c t i c , meta physica specialis proves to rest on a "transcendental i l l u s i o n " {Schein) and cannot y i e l d any genuine theoretical knowledge. 1 9 Because Heidegger views Being and Time as carrying out Kant's Copernican t u m at the deeper level of "Dasein's
finitude" 2 0
and thus as roughly congruent w i t h the task of meta
physica generalis, he must take a stand on the Dialectic's negative j u d g m e n t on the possibility of metaphysica specialis. The conclusion of the Kant-book hints at such a stand. H a v i n g identified Being and Time w i t h a retrieval of the problematic of the Transcendental A n a l y t i c , Heidegger asks whether, "by extension," he should not also be able to retrieve "a p o s i t i v e p r o b l e m a t i c " in the apparently p u r e l y negative "characteristic of the Transcendental D i a l e c t i c . " In a series of e l l i p t i c a l remarks he suggests that what Kant identified as "transcendental appearance [Schein]" or i l l u s i o n needs to be rethought in l i g h t of Being and Time's theory of t r u t h , such that the " i n f i n i t u d e " presupposed in raising the question of Dasein's finitude can itself be brought into focus. 2 ' T h u s , w h i l e sharing K a n t ' s strictures against dogmatic metaphysics (he does not deny that tran scendental appearance is an illusion, for example, calling it "transcendental u n t r u t h " ) , Heidegger nevertheless demands a reassessment of the D i a l e c t i c . '*
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik ( F r a n k f u r t : K l o s i e r m a n n . Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, t r . R i c h a r d T a f t ( B l o o m i n g t o n :
See M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r . 1951). p . 199:
I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1 9 9 7 ) . ρ Kant,
Crmuue of Pure Reason,
154 pp
2 9 7 - 3 0 0 [ A 2 9 3 / B 3 4 9 - A 2 9 8 / B 3 5 5 ) . 1 leave out o f
account here K a n t ' s arguments tor a k i n d o f
metaphysica specialis
based o n practical
r e a s o n , t h o u g h i l i s p e r h a p s n o t w i t h o u t r e l e v a n c e f o r the p r o b l e m a t h a n d . F o r v a l u a b l e s u g g e s l i o n s ( t h o u g h w i t h l i t t l e a n a l y s i s o f m e l o n l o l o g y ) . see F r a n k S c h a l o w .
if the K.mlHeidegger Dialogue
The Retrieval
( A l b a n y : Stale U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k Press.
1992).
M ö s l r e c e n t l y i h e r e i s S a r a h L i l l s H e i d i . F r o m Transcendence lo lhe Open: Freedom und
Finitude in the Thought of Marlin Heidegger ( P h . D . diss.. Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y . 1 9 9 7 ) . :
"
2
1
H e i d e g g e r . Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p p . 2 0 8 f f : E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n , p p . 162ff. Heidegger.
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, ρ
METAPHYS
2 2 1 . E n g l i s h translation, ρ 172.
. M E T O N T O L O G Y . A N D T H E E N D O F BEING AND TIME
353
315
one that entertains the possibility o f some sort o f metaphysica specialis, some l e g i t i m a t e f o r m o f metaphysical i n q u i r y . H e i d e g g e r ' s turn t o the language of metaphysics for help in c o m p l e t i n g the project of Being and Time seems intended to occupy the terrain opened up by his reassessment of the Transcendental Dialectic. For having liberated this metaphysical problem atic f r o m "that architectonic into w h i c h Kant forced i t , " it becomes possible for H e i d e g g e r to i m a g i n e that reflection on " i n f i n i t u d e " m i g h t stand in a hermeneutical relationship to the analysis of Dasein's finitude f r o m w h i c h it sprang, thus p r o v i d i n g a ''metaphysical" ground for o n t o l o g y . A n d just here we encounter the puzzling idea of metontology. W h e n Heidegger introduces metontology a further connection w i t h K a n t ' s Transcendental Dialectic becomes e x p l i c i t . He distinguishes broadly between Being and Time's ontological inquiry (metaphysica generalis) and another sort of i n q u i r y , a " n e w investigation" that "resides in the essence of ontology it self and is the result of its overturning [Umschlag], its μ ε τ α β ο λ ή " namely, " m e t o n t o l o g y , " a "special problematic w h i c h has for its proper theme beings as a w h o l e [das Seiende im Ganzen]" ( G A 2 6 : I 9 9 ; M F L 157). K a n t ' s T r a n scendental D i a l e c t i c is concerned precisely w i t h i n q u i r y i n t o beings as a w h o l e — t h a t is, w i t h reason's c l a i m to be able to grasp the " t o t a l i t y " of a series of c o n d i t i o n s for every c o n d i t i o n e d . " B u t where K a n t judges meta p h y s i c s c o g n i t i v e l y w a n t i n g in this pretense,
Heidegger,
thanks to his
reassessment of the Dialectic, seems to believe that an i n q u i r y w h i c h "makes beings thematic i n their t o t a l i t y i n l i g h t o f o n t o l o g y " ( G A 2 6 : 2 0 0 ; M F L 157)—hence an inquiry w i t h the scope of metaphysica specialis—is possible after a l l . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , m e t o n t o l o g y cannot s i m p l y be equated w i t h the i m m a n e n t turn called for in Being and Time, since that turn was intended not as an o v e r t u r n i n g (Umschlag) of o n t o l o g y but as a m o v e , within o n t o l o g y , f r o m Dasein's understanding of being to the m e a n i n g of being itself. E v e n t h o u g h it is to be developed " i n l i g h t of o n t o l o g y " (i.e., p h e n o m e n o l o g y ) , m e t o n t o l o g y must be a new kind of i n q u i r y . As D a v i d W o o d has argued, the idea of an i n q u i r y i n t o beings as a w h o l e can arise o n l y because "Heidegger t h i n k s t h r o u g h again the idea of fundamental ontology." 2 - 1 Because this r e t h i n k i n g e x p l o i t s an inconsistency in Being and Time, however, Heideg ger's attempt to rescue metaphysics f r o m K a n t ' s Transcendental D i a l e c t i c f a i l s — o r so I shall argue. One clue to h o w metontology is supposed to relate to o n t o l o g y is found in H e i d e g g e r ' s
1928 characterization of the project of Being and Time:
Because it aimed solely at elucidating Dasein's "understanding of being," the "analysis of the existence of D a s e i n " was neither an " a n t h r o p o l o g y nor an 2 2
25
Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason,
p. 3 I 8 ( A 3 2 6 / B 3 8 3 ) .
D a v i d W o o d . " R e i t e r a t i n g the T e m p o r a l : T o w a r d a R e t h i n k i n g o f H e i d e g g e r o n T i m e , " in
Rereading Heidegger,
ed
J o h n S a l l i s ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press, I 9 9 3 ) . ρ
139.
3 16
STEVEN G A L T CROWELL
354
ethics." It focused instead upon Dasein " p r i o r to every factual c o n c r e t i o n , " thus w i t h a " p e c u l i a r n e u t r a l i t y " regarding a w h o l e host of questions that, Heidegger n o w suggests, w o u l d fall w i t h i n the scope o f a " m e t a p h y s i c s o f Dasein"—questions, for example, o f s e x and gender, e m b o d i m e n t , h i s t o r i c a l particularization, socio-culrural dispersal, and entanglement i n " w h a t w e c a l l 'nature' i n the broadest
Sinse"
( G A 2 6 : 1 7 1 - 7 4 ; Μ F L 1 3 6 - 3 8 ) . T h i s suggests
that the "metaphysics of D a s e i n " w o u l d be a chapter w i t h i n m e t o n t o l o g y as an i n q u i r y i n t o beings as a w h o l e — a r e t u r n to homo humanus that appears very much
l i k e the philosophical
anthropology
w i t h w h i c h Being and Time
is s t i l l too often confused. : J H o w e v e r , this return is c o m p l i c a t e d by the fact that Heidegger, t u r n i n g t o the "language o f m e t a p h y s i c s " for h e l p , h a s significantly transformed t h e question he is asking. D u r i n g his A r i s t o t e l i i n - H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l decade, H e i d e g g e r held the basic question of philosophy to be o n t o l o g i c a l : W h a t is the meaning of being? A g a i n s t this, M a x Scheler objected that p h i l o s o p h y begins w i t h the "absolute w o n d e r " that "mere is a n y t h i n g at a l l and not n o t h i n g , " and this L e i b n i z i a n q u e s t i o n — W h y is there s o m e t h i n g rather than n o t h i n g ? — c o m e s to d o m i n a t e H e i d e g g e r ' s m e t a p h y s i c a l decade. 2 5 Yet it stands in a certain tension
with
the central argument of Being and Time.71 F o r instance,
if the
question asks after a reason or ground " f o r " beings as a w h o l e , i n Being and Time this ground can o n l y be understood transcendentally: being, " t h a t w h i c h determines entities as endues," is that " o n the basis of w h i c h entities are already understood"; further, this " b e i n g of entities is not i t s e l f an e n t i t y , " i.e., not a g r o u n d i n the orilic sense, an ens realissimum or t o t a l i t y o f entities of any
kind
( S Z 6;
BT 25-26). The
c o m p l e t i o n of Being
and Time
was to
i n v o l v e a t u r n f r o m Dasein's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g t o the m e a n i n g o f b e i n g — a n d so was to remain w i t h i n the scope of a g r o u n d of m e a n i n g . B u t Heidegger's new questicn appears suspiciously l i k e the search for an o n l i c " e x p l a n a t i o n " for beings as a w h o l e , one w h i c h threatens to a n n u l his genuine insight i n t o the difference between being ( m e a n i n g ) and beings. The question of w h y there is something rather than n o t h i n g thus forces a c o n frontation between a transcendental ( o n t o l o g i c a l or p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l ) and a
Krell. Intimations of Mortality, p. 28. Cf. Otto Pöggeler. "Ausgleich und andere Anfang: Schcler und Heidegger." Studien -ur Philosophie von Max Scheler. ed. Ernst Wolfgang Orth und Gerhard Pfafferott (München: Karl Alber. 1 9 9 3 ) , p. 178. John Salus, Echoes. After Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). p. 154. for example, notes that the 1935 lecture, which became Einführung in die Metaphysik and which starts from this Leibnizian question, tries to "retrace the way from (he question of metontology back to the question of fundamental ontology." The tension between the two questions is also explored in William McNeill's essay, "Metaphysics, Fundamental Ontology. Metontology 1925-1935." Heidegger Studies. Vol. 8 (1992). pp. 63-80. In what follow: I s h o w that this tension results f r o m an equivocation on the meaning of "ground."
M E T A P H Y 5 : C S . M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D T H E E N D OF BEING AND TIME
355
3) 7
metaphysical concept of grounding, and " m e t o n t o l o g y " names the confusion o f the t w o . T h e w h o l e problem is that it is not at all clear what status an inquiry i n t o beings as a w h o l e could have w i t h i n the framework of Being and Time. The care w i t h w h i c h that text handles the question of b r i n g i n g Dasein i n t o v i e w "as a w h o l e "
2 7
m i g h t lead us to expect an equally g i n g e r l y approach to ques-
tions of metaphysical totalities. A f t e r a l l , Kant d i d not deny that we someh o w think of ourselves as belonging w i t h i n what is as a w h o l e ; indeed, he analyzed various experiences (e.g., the s u b l i m e ) in w h i c h that sense overcomes us. He denied only that we c o u l d rationally inquire i n t o the " w h o l e of w h a t i s . " So if Heidegger is to give a positive sense to the idea of metaphysical i n q u i r y he owes an account, consistent w i t h Being and Time, of h o w 2
metaphysical totalities can be comprehended sufficiently to be inquired i n t o . ' Some natural candidates for such an account present themselves; none, h o w ever, can stand up to scrutiny. First, the idea of an inquiry into das Seiende im Ganzen as the ontic context for a metaphysics of Dasein clearly tracks Heidegger's current interest in s o m e t h i n g like philosophical cosmology, stimulated by M a x Scheler's w o r k . As Pöggeler argues, " i t was through impulses f r o m Scheler's question conc e r n i n g man's place in the cosmos that Heidegger was led to recontextualize his fundamental ontology in a m e t o n t o l o g y or metaphysical o n t i c . "
29
B u t if
Heidegger shared w i t h Scheler the desire to " r i s k again the step into authentic metaphysics," he j u d g e d the latter's o w n attempt a f a i l u r e — n o t "authentic" metaphysical i n q u i r y but mere Weltanschauung—precisely because it d i d not address the "central question o f general o n t o l o g y " ( G A 2 6 : 1 6 5 ; M F L 132). H a v i n g confronted that question head-on in Being and Time, does Heidegger's m e t o n t o l o g y a v o i d Scheler's fate? Does he describe a plausible n o t i o n of cosmological inquiry?
2 7
See S Z 2 3 3 ; B T 2 7 6 , b u l Ihe f i r s t t h r e e c h a p t e r s o f D i v i s i o n I I are d e v o t e d t o t h i s q u e s t i o n .
2
I n the 1929 essay " W a s ist M e t a p h y s i k ? "
"
Basic
Writings,
p.
99)
Heidegger
{Wegmarken,
insists
" c o m p r e h e n d i n g t h e w h o l e o f b e i n g s as s u c h finding o n e s e l f i n t h e m i d s t o f b e i n g s as a w h o l e he continues, "is impossible i n p r i n c i p l e . " T h i s
on
"an
p . 1 0 9 ; " W h a t is M e t a p h y s i c s ? " essential
distinction"
between
[des Ganzen des Seienden an sich] a n d [des Seienden im Ganzen] T h e f o r m e r , " l e a v e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t inquiry i n t o the
latter m i g h t be. W h a t H e i d e g g e r i n this essay calls " m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y " is r e a l l y s t i l l o n l y o n t o l o g i c a l i n t h e sense o f
Being and Time
and provides
no e v i d e n c e for w h a t
m e t o n t o l o g y m i g h t be. 2
9
O t t o Pöggeler, "Heideggers logische Untersuchungen,"
Außenansichten.
Martin Heidegger: Innen- und
e d . S i e g f r i e d B l a s c h e , et a l . ( F r a n k f u r t : S u h r k a m p , 1 9 8 9 ) , p p . 9 2 - 9 3 .
P ö g g e l e r f u r t h e r takes the t e r m " m e t o n t o l o g y " to e c h o S c h e l e r ' s p r o p o s a l f o r a " m e t anthropology"—an
inquiry
"concerned
with
metaphysical
sciences." Otto Pöggeler. "Heidegger on A r t , "
Technology, 1994), p.
ed.
116
Karsten
Harries and C h r i s t o p h J a m m e ( N e w Y o r k :
Others, h o w e v e r — e . g . Krell,
"Heidegger und die Ethik," ρ (μεταβολή.
318
perspectives
in
the
various
Martin Heidegger: Politics. Art, and
Intimations,
Holmes &
Meier.
pp. 3 8 - 3 9 , and H o s o k a w a ,
2 5 1 — l i n k the l e r m w i t h the idea of a "sudden t r a n s i t i o n "
Umschlag) of o n t o l o g y
STEVEN G A L T CROWELL
356
A second candidate is suggested when one notes that the very language Heidegger uses to describe m e t o n t o l o g y — t h a t it cultivates a "metaphysical o n t i c " b y w a y o f " e x i s t e n t i e l l q u e s t i o n i n g " ( G A 2 6 : 2 0 0 , 199; M F L 158, 157)—poses a puzzle f r o m the perspective of Being and Time, since there these terms ( " o n t i c , " "existentiell") refer to a pre-transcendental concern w i t h entities f r o m e m p i r i c a l l y particular points of v i e w .
50
M i g h t it be, then, that
Heidegger's c o s m o l o g y is prepared to make the naturalizing m o v e that has become f a m i l i a r in late twentieth-century philosophy? His remoteness f r o m all that becomes obvious, however, when he contrasts his proposal w i t h the then-popular " i n d u c t i v e metaphysics" of Oswald Kiilpe, a position Heidegger had criticized already in 1912. K i i l p e held that the goal of p h i l o s o p h y , metaphysics, could be achieved by projecting the findings of the sciences of nature (physics and p s y c h o l o g y ) to the p o i n t where they intersected and f o r m e d a u n i f i e d p i c t u r e o f the w o r l d .
In
1912 H e i d e g g e r o b j e c t e d that the
"hypothetical" basis of such naturalism contradicted the very idea of p h i l o s o 3
p h y . ' In 1928 he reiterates that even though metontology is l i k e e m p i r i c a l science in h a v i n g "beings for its subject matter," it "is not a s u m m a r y ontic in the sense of a general science that e m p i r i c a l l y assembles the results of the i n d i v i d u a l sciences into a so-called ' w o r l d - p i c t u r e , ' so as to deduce f r o m it a w o r l d - v i e w and guide for l i f e " ( G A 2 6 : 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 ; M F L 157). Heidegger thus implies that m e t o n t o l o g y does not a i m to naturalize what Being and Time calls Veritas transcendentalis, transcendental truth. Indeed, m e t o n t o l o g y is to "make beings thematic in their t o t a l i t y in l i g h t o f o n t o l o g y " ( G A 2 6 : 2 0 0 ; M F L 157)—i.e.. i n light o f the transcendentally disclosed meaning of being. Should we see it then as supplying the c o m p l e t e "system of categories" hinted at in Being and Time, the regional " o n t o l o g i e s themselves w h i c h are p r i o r to the ontica! sciences and w h i c h p r o v i d e their foundations" ( S Z 1 1 ; BT 31)? T h i s t h i r d candidate w o u l d be consistent w i t h the transcendental standpoint of Being and Time and c o u l d , w i t h o u t m u c h semantic strain, be labeled a "metaphysical ontic," since it w o u l d concern the a p r i o r i c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the o b j e c t - d o m a i n s o r ontic regions c u l t i v a t e d i n anthropology, p s y c h o l o g y , b i o l o g y , history, and the l i k e . T w o considerations—one structural and one substantive—tell against i d e n t i f y i n g m e t o n t o l ogy w i t h regional-ontological i n q u i r y , however. First, considered structurally Heidegger's conception of fundamental ontology already contains a place for regional ontologies, and that is not the place of metontology. F u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y consists of three phases ( G A 2 6 : 1 9 6 ; M F L 154). T h e first is a
Compare
K r e l l . Iniimatwns of Mortality, p . 4 1 .
M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r . " D a s R e a l i t ä t s p r o b l e m i n der m o d e r n e n P h i l o s o p h i e . " Frühe Schriften. ρ
15
T h i s c r i t i c i s m s h o u l d n o t b l i n d o n e t o t h e fact t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n p o s i t i o n i n 1 9 1 2
i s v e r y m u c h l i k e t h a t o f K ü l p e ' s s o - c a l l e d " c r i t i c a l r e a l i s m . " w i t h all its a t t e n d a n t a m b i g u i t i e s , a n d t h a t i t i s n o t u n t i l h i s m e t a p h y s i c a l d e c a d e that H e i d e g g e r c o m e s t o t e r m s w i t h t h i s aspect o f h i s t h i n k i n g
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y . A N D T H E E N D O F BEISC AND TIME
357
3 19
" g r o u n d i n g that establishes the intrinsic p o s s i b i l i t y of the being question as the basic problem of metaphysics—the interpretation of Dasein as t e m p o r a l i t y " carried out in Being and Time. Second, there is "an e x p l i c a t i o n of the basic problems contained in the question of being—the temporal e x p o s i t i o n of the problem of being." a task sketched in what Heidegger called a " n e w i:
elaboration of d i v i s i o n 3 of part 1 of Being and Time." Here, in a d d i t i o n to the
move
from
Dasein's temporality
(Zeitlichkeit) to the
temporality
(Temporalität) of being, we find the elaboration of four "basic p r o b l e m s contained in the question of b e i n g . "
33
One of these problems is " c l a r i f i c a t i o n
of the existence mode of things and their regional c o n s t i t u t i o n . " Here is the place for regional ontologies of "history and a r t w o r k s , " of "nature" and its "diverse modes: space, number, l i f e , h u m a n existence itself," and so on ( G A 2 6 : l 9 l f ; M F L 151). but it is not m e t o n t o l o g y , i.e., not what H e i d e g g e r means by a metaphysical i n q u i r y . The latter is reached o n l y w i t h the t h i r d phase of fundamental o n t o l o g y — " t h e development of the self-understanding of the
p r o b l e m a t i c , its
task and
l i m i t s — t h e o v e r t u r n i n g [Umschlag]"
( G A 2 6 : 1 9 6 ; M F L 154). T h e second, substantive, reason w h y m e t o n t o l o g y cannot be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h regional-ontological (categorial) i n q u i r y w i t h i n the framework of Being and Time f o l l o w s from the last remark. For categorial inquiry i n t o the " u n i t y of the idea of being and its regional variants" ( G A 2 6 : 1 9 1 ; M F L 151) s t i l l operates w i t h the phenomenological concept of grounds of meaning. M e t o n t o l o g y , on the other hand, is not to be grounded in Dasein's understanding (or the "idea" of being) but is to provide grounds for Dasein. The "language of metaphysics" thus invokes a second, as yet unclarified. sense of " g r o u n d " whereby the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of Being and Time is itself to be g r o u n d e d in that "metaphysical ontic i n w h i c h i t i m p l i c i t l y always remains" ( G A 2 6 : 2 0 1 ; M F L 158). The inconsistency in Being and Time emerges w i t h this idea of a double grounding. §4. T h e P r o b l e m o f D o u b l e G r o u n d i n g W h a t exactly is meant by "double g r o u n d i n g , " and w h y is it a p r o b l e m ? These questions are best answered by considering a passage where Heidegger explains w h y there is supposed to be an " i n t r i n s i c necessity" that o n t o l o g y " t u r n back" to its ontic point of o r i g i n . Heidegger writes: The being
man'
understands b e i n g : understanding of b e i n g effects a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n b e i n g
and beings: being is there o n l y w h e n Dasein understands being.
3
·
T h a t is, i n I h e l e c t u r e course o f SS Gesamtausgabe
Bd.
Kloslermann.
1975),
24,
ed.
ρ
1;
1 9 2 7 , Die
Friedrich-Wilhelm Basic
Problems
of
( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1 9 8 2 ) , ρ 33
Grundprobleme
von
Herrmann
Phenomenology,
der
Phänomenologie.
(Frankfurt: tr
Albert
Vittorio Hofstadter
1.
T h e s e f o u r p r o b l e m s are d i s c u s s e d a g a i n , i n s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t t e r m s , a t G A 2 6 : 1 9 1 - 9 5 ; M F L 151-53.
320
I n other w o r d s , the p o s s i b i l i t y
STEVEN G A L T C R O W E L L
358
t h a t b e i n g i s t h e r e i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g p r e s u p p o s e s the f a c t i c a l e x i s t e n c e o f D a s e i n , a n d t h i s i n t u r n presupposes the f a c t i c a l extantness o f nature ( G A 2 6 : 1 9 9 : M F L 156).
The first sentence in this passage merely restates the thesis of Being and Time that the transcendental ground of ontological knowledge lies in Dasein's understanding of being. Problems begin in the next sentence: h o w are we to read the first occurrence of "presupposes"? If it means no more than thai there is no t h i n k i n g without a thinker, it is t r i v i a l . By introducing it w i t h " i n other words," however, Heidegger signals that it too must be read in light of Being and Time, where the term "factical existence" does not refer to the "fact" of whether a being of such-and-such constitution is currently found among the furniture of the universe, but to the constitution of that b e i n g i t s e l f .
34
"Factical existence" is shorthand for the full ontological character of Dasein, the " f a c t i c i t y " and " e x i s t e n t i a l i t y " that together account p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y for Dasein's understanding of being ( S Z 191; BT 235). Read this w a y , the first occurrence of "presupposes" is non-trivial because it adumbrates the transcendental g r o u n d . It is the second occurrence of "presupposes" in this sentence, h o w e v e r , that signifies the supposed necessity of a passage f r o m ontology to m e t o n t o l o g y , and here Heidegger seems to rely on the trivial sense w h e n he claims that "the factical existence of D a s e i n . . . i n t u r n presupposes the factical extantness [faktische Vorhandensein] o f nature." O n t o l ogy thus finds a second ground in the "factical extantness of n a t u r e " — i t is possible " o n l y if a possible totality of beings is already there" ( G A 2 6 : 1 9 9 ; M F L 157). M e t o n t o l o g y is to inquire into this sort o f dependency. There is, then, an equivocation on the notion of "presupposition" in this passage. T h e c l a i m that "the possibility that being is there in the understandi n g " presupposes "the factical existence of Dasein" refers to a transcendentalphenomenological sense o f ground concerned w i t h conditions o f i n t e l l i g i b i l ity, w h i l e the c l a i m that "the factical existence of Dasein" presupposes "the factical extantness of nature" refers to an entirely different sense of g r o u n d — an ontic sense—whose relation to the first is by no means clear. By itself, the existence of this e q u i v o c a t i o n is not a problem; it becomes one o n l y if ihe relations between the t w o senses of " g r o u n d " are not i d e n t i f i e d and respected. In Being and Time the equivocation is present but is contained by Heidegger's Husserlian procedure of bracketing all question of ontic grounds, and overt inconsistency is avoided. It breaks out only when Heidegger tries to remove the brackets w i t h help from the language of metaphysics. That the p r o b l e m of double grounding lurks in Being and Time is not hard lo show. W h e n Heidegger claims lhat "readiness-to-hand is the w a y in w h i c h
H e i d e g g e r m a k e s a s i m i l a r p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l point later i n the t e x t : " I f I say o f D a s e i n that i t s b a s i c c o n s t i t u t i o n i s b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , I a m t h e n f i r s t o f a l l a s s e r t i n g s o m e t h i n g that b e l o n g s t o its essence, a n d t t h e r e b y d i s r e g a r d w h e t h e r the b e i n g o f s u c h a n a t u r e f a c t u a l l y exists o r n o t " ( G A 2 6 . 2 1 7 . M F L 169).
M E T A P H Y S I C S . M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D T H E E N D O F BEING AND TIME
359
321
entities as they are ' i n themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially" (i.e.. p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y ) , for e x a m p l e , he i m m e d i a t e l y notes that " o n l y by reason of something extant [auf dem Grunde von Vorhandenem] 'is there' a n y t h i n g ready to h a n d . " Hence the extant is presupposed. Nevertheless, it does not f o l l o w that "readiness-to-hand is o n t o l o g i c a l l y founded on extantness" ( S Z 7 1 ; BT 101), and an o n t o l o g i c a l ground must therefore be other than whatever sort of ground belongs to the presupposition of the extant. Such examples c o u l d be m u l t i p l i e d , but they all y i e l d the same d i s t i n c t i o n : o n t o l o g i c a l g r o u n d i n g concerns the priority of meaning, that w h i c h enables u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and in that sense we are able to grasp the extant o n l y " t h r o u g h " the ready to hand, or better, t h r o u g h the " w o r l d " as the meaningh o r i z o n of entities w i t h i n the w o r l d . " O n l y on the basis of the phenomenon of the w o r l d can the being-in-itself of entities w i l h i n - t h e - w o r l d be grasped o n t o l o g i c a l l y " ( S Z 76; B T 1 0 6 ) . " T o c l a i m that " o n l y b y reason o f some t h i n g extant 'is there' anything ready to hand," however, is to invoke another s o n of p r i o r i t y , one that does not concern relations of meaning but relations between those e n t i t i e s — o f w h i c h " m a n " is o n e — t h a t show up in the w o r l d via Dasein's u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " Hence the question raised at the end of Being and Time: Can ontology be o n t o l o g i c a l l y grounded, or does it also require an ontic ground? What Heidegger says of Kant expresses the paradox of his o w n p o s i t i o n : " O n t o l o g y is grounded in the ontic, and yet the transcendental p r o b l e m is developed out of what is thus g r o u n d e d , and the transcendental also first clarifies the function of the o n t i c " ( G A 2 6 : 2 1 0 ; M F L 164). Has Being and Time c l a r i f i e d the f u n c t i o n of the o n t i c such that it becomes possible to i n q u i r e i n t o an ontic ground of o n t o l o g y ? Heidegger has a l l along insisted, against subjective or e m p i r i c a l i d e a l i s m , that entities are not reducible to Dasein's understanding of being; they have a certain "independence."' 7 In ask i n g after an ontic ground of o n t o l o g y he seems to want to make this indepen dence t h e m a t i c in such a w a y that the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l project can be clarified, grounded, in terms of i t . B u t can o n t o l o g y really be said to presup pose nature i n any non-trivial sense? Heidegger certainly cannot intend to
35
Similar
remarks
are
frequent
G A 2 6 1 9 4 - 5 ; M F L 153; 3ή
Compare G A 2 6 M 8 6 ; M F L a
primordial
sense that
in
Heidegger's
texts
of
the
Basic Problems of Phenomenology,
period;
compare,
e.g.,
p. 297 ( G A 2 4 : 4 2 1 - 2 2 ) .
147: " B e i n g i s p r i o r n e i t h e r o n t i c a l l y n o r l o g i c a l l y , b u t p r i o r i n
precedes
both.
It
is
p r i o r to each
in
a different
way.
neither
o n t i c a l l y n o r l o g i c a l l y p r i o r but o n t o l o g i c a l l y . " I i n t e r p r e t this t o refer t o the t r a n s c e n d e n lal-phenomenological priority o f m e a n i n g (the topic o f ical,
formal, and
metaphysical
Being and Time)
over all empir
modes o f k n o w l e d g e or "encounter" o f beings
H e i d e g g e r elsewhere suggests, this o n t o l o g i c a l g r o u n d " i m p l i e s n o t h i n g about, cal relations between beings, between nature and D a s e i n . . . "
nomenology, 3 1
See,
(Basic Problems of Phe
p. 295; G A 2 4 : 4 I 9 ) .
for example.
BT
255,
272;
SZ
212,
.330; Basic
GA26:194;MFL251.
322
A n d , as the o n t i -
STEVEN G A L T CROWELL
360
Problems,
pp
169.
175,
219;
offer empirical-causal explanations for whal was presented in the transcendental account, a story about how the natural entity, man, e v o l v e d and h o w its understanding of being can be explained in terms of natural laws—perhaps as an adaptation of neurological, psychological, or socio-cultural factors. Such inquiries can be carried out, bul to see them as grounds of ontological k n o w l edge relativizes the latter in a way that Heidegger shows no interest in d o i n g : "being cannot be explained through entities" ( B T 2 5 1 ; SZ 207). Yet a metaphysical appeal to entities, such as metontology is said to be, is no less objectionable. To see w h y , it w i l l be useful to glance briefly at h o w Husserl negotiated the same impasse Heidegger reaches at the end of Being and Time, avoiding the inconsistency that undermines Heidegger's t h i n k i n g . As is w e l l k n o w n , Husserl's breakthrough to p h e n o m e n o l o g y in the Logical Investigations came w i t h the idea thai no non-circular explanation of k n o w l e d g e as a factual occurrence is possible, hence that p h i l o s o p h i c a l grounding of k n o w l e d g e can only strive to clarify the meaning of c o g n i t i o n by reflection on cognitive intentional experiences (Erlebnisse). H o w e v e r , the Logical Investigations was s t i l l caught in a double-bind: on the one hand, w h i l e the structure of the Erlebnisse could be adequately grasped in direct reflection, that appeared merely to be psychological i m m a n e n c e , shut o f f f r o m the physical w o r l d . Phenomenology thus seemed to y i e l d a k i n d of skepticism. On the other hand, to speak of the " p s y c h o l o g i c a l " presupposes reference to the supposedly unavailable real world after a l l , thus rendering the }
phenomenological delimitation of its sphere of evidence dogmatic. " Husserl's escape f r o m this naturalistic double-bind came through his theory of the phenomenological reduction. T h e reduction interests us here solely in relation to the idea of phenomenological g r o u n d i n g , and the main point to note is that t h r o u g h it the field of phenomenological evidence explored in ihe Logical Investigations is freed of those presuppositions that identify it. prior to p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i cism, w i t h a particular region of being, a particular slice of the w o r l d . This it does first by " b r a c k e t i n g " all scientific theories ( i n c l u d i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l theories) that seek to explain what is given to reflection, and together w i t h these, a l l interpretations of the given w h i c h depend on what Husserl calls "transcendent" assumptions—for instance, the assumption of an o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the mental and the p h y s i c a l . T h i s m o v e y i e l d s a specifically transcendental idealism, distinguished f r o m e m p i r i c a l or psychological idealism in that the latter, but noi ihe former, makes first-order claims about the nature of objects (e.g.. that they are really " m e n t a l " constructs). W h a t Henry A l l i s o n says of Kant's position holds equally of Husserl's, v i z . . that "transcendental idealism must be characterized p r i m a r i l y as a metaphilo-
Cf. Theodore DeBoer. Nijhoff.
The Development of Husserl's Thought
(The Hague:
Maninus
1978).
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y . A N D T H E E N D O F BEING AND TIME
361
323
s o p h i c a l or m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 'standpoint.' rather than as a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y metaphysical doctrine about the nature or o n t o l o g i c a l status of the objects of human cognition."
59
What distinguishes K a n t ' s f r o m Husserl's transcendental
i d e a l i s m is that the former considers objects in l i g h t of w h a t A l l i s o n calls "epistemic conditions.'" i.e., conditions "necessary for the representation of an object or an objective state of a f f a i r s . "
40
w h i l e the latter casts a w i d e r net,
reflecting upon grounds of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y or m e a n i n g per se—thus upon the entire sphere of " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " or conscious life in its m e a n i n g f u l connections. Because these grounds concern c o n d i t i o n s that make entities i n t e l l i g i ble, there is no sense in w h i c h they c o u l d in turn be r e l a t i v i z e d (reduced) to one or another region of entities. Put otherwise, the r e l a t i v i t y of m e a n i n g to transcendental subjectivity is not a case of causal dependence, an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l species-relativism, or a metaphysical c l a i m about a peculiar "absolute" e n t i t y . These are versions of subjectivism w h i c h transcendental i d e a l i s m , as a m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l standp o i n t achieved through the reduction, leaves behind. Whether one denies the predicate " b e i n g " to this transcendental subject, as Husserl does, or exploits this standpoint as a way of raising the w h o l e question of the meaning of b e i n g in a new way, as does Heidegger, the real danger lies in misconstruing these transcendental relations as ontic ones, thereby s u c c u m b i n g to w h a t Husserl calls "transcendental realism." Transcendental realism is the "absurd p o s i t i o n " into w h i c h one falls i f one mistakes the sphere o f transcendental s u b j e c t i v i t y for a "tag end of the w o r l d , " i.e., an entity i t s e l f defined by the w o r l d l y nexus w h i c h i s its p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y disclosed c o r r e l a t e .
41
By
bracketing the v a l i d i t y claims of w o r l d l y being, the r e d u c t i o n yields a k i n d of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l evidence whose significance is p r i o r to the mesh of the w o r l d . There is no sense, then, in w h i c h such evidence presupposes the factical extantness of nature. N o w Husserl, no less than Heidegger, saw that the transcendental ground is reached by reflecting upon the "natural a t t i t u d e " — o n w h a t Husserl calls p s y c h o l o g i c a l s u b j e c t i v i t y or what H e i d e g g e r calls average everydayness. T h u s both recognized that their starting p o i n t was entangled in the w o r l d , yet both sought a distinct perspective on that entanglement (a phenomenological g r o u n d ) f r o m w h i c h the meaning of that entanglement c o u l d be clarified. It is true that Husserl appears more r a t i o n a l i s t i c in his b e l i e f that the natural attitude can be thoroughly clarified, w h i l e Heidegger doubts that the c o n d i -
Henry
Allison,
Kant's
Transcendental
Idealism
(New
Haven.
Yale
University
Press,
1983). p. 25. I b i d . , p.
10.
H u s s e r l , Cartesian Meditations, tr. D o r i o n C a i m s ( T h e H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 24.
324
STEVEN G A L T CROWELL
362
1969), p.
2
tions of meaning can be made f u l l y t r a n s p a r e n t / H o w e v e r , these are i n l e r phenomenological disputes about the reach of phenomenological evidence (or g r o u n d i n g ) itself, whereas the real danger—one that neither Husserl nor Heidegger can altogether resist—lies in the p u l l of t r a d i t i o n a l , non-phe5
n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s / U l t i m a t e l y , it is something like the phenomenol o g i c a l reduction from entities to meaning that enables Heidegger to thematize the ontological difference between being and beings, w h i l e the impasse he reaches at the end of Being and Time arises f r o m a confusion about its i m p l i c a t i o n s for Existenz, Dasein's mode of being. For example, " w o r l d " in Being and Time is a structural feature of Dasein's being, i.e., a transcendental c o n d i t i o n of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and thus the m e a n i n g - g r o u n d of what shows up w i t h i n the w o r l d . "Nature," in contrast, is "an entity w i t h i n the w o r l d " ( B T 254; SZ 211) and thus "can never make worldhood i n t e l l i g i b l e " ( S Z 65; BT 9 4 ) . To suggest that Dasein's understanding of being presupposes the factical extantness of nature thus implies a shift toward a transcendental realistic perspective w h i c h is not just supplemental to, but inconsistent w i t h , the phen o m e n o l o g i c a l project. E m p i r i c a l i n q u i r i e s i n t o " m a n ' s " entanglement i n nature are certainly possible, but only on the g r o u n d of Dasein's understanding of being. Even the mere possibility of a metaphysical reading of this entanglement that could avoid the objection of transcendental realism, h o w ever, has yet to be s h o w n . "
§5. T h e E n d o f B e i n g a n d T i m e a n d t h e O v e r c o m i n g of Metaphysics If transcendental realism is the error of treating b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d as j u s t another w o r l d l y entity, we have already encountered Heidegger's closest brush 4 2
This difference is
nicely elaborated
by
Huben
Dreyfus.
Being-in-the-World ( C a m b r i d g e :
M I T Press. 1 9 9 1 ) . 4
3
I n H u s s e r l ' s case t h i s is e s p e c i a l l y a p p a r e n t i n h i s c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h E u g e n F i n k o n t h e so-called
" S i x t h C a r t e s i a n M e d i t a t i o n , " i n w h i c h t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c a l issues c o m e l o
the fore, l a r g e l y . I b e l i e v e , thanks l o F i n k ' s H e g e l i a n w a y o f f o r m u l a t i n g p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s . See E u g e n F i n k . Sixth
Cartesian Meditation, t r . w i t h an i n t r o d u c t i o n b y
R o n a l d B r u z i n a ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1 9 9 5 ) . 4
4
O n e w i l l o b j e c t l h a t t h i s r e a d i n g c a n n o t be
right
s i n c e it i m p u t e s t o H e i d e g g e r a n a c c e p -
t a n c e o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n ( i n a t least s o m e o f its a s p e c t s ) , w h e n h e m u s t surely reject i t . W h a t is H e i d e g g e r ' s h e r m e n e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y , after a l l . if not a r e j e c t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s r e d u c t i o n o f the w o r l d t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i v i t y ? A n d d o e s n ' t h e s p e c i f i c a l l y r e p u d i a t e the r e d u c t i o n i n t h e l e c t u r e c o u r s e f r o m W S Concept Press,
of Time: 1985). p.
Prolegomena,
tr.
Theodore
Kisiel
(Bloomington:
1 9 2 5 . History o f the Indiana
University
109? As I h a v e a r g u e d e l s e w h e r e , the p r o b l e m is a g o o d deal m o r e
c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n a n y s i m p l e a c c e p t a n c e o r r e j e c t i o n : Being and Time is f i n a l l y i n c o n s i s tent on ihe issue. Since there is no r o o m to repeal the a r g u m e n t s here. 1 r e f e r to my "Ontology
and
Transcendental
Phenomenology
Husserl in Contemporary Context, e d 36. and
Husserl.
Encyclopaedia
Between
Husserl
Burt Hopkins (Dordrecht" Kluwer.
Heidegger, and Transcendental
Philosophy:
and
Heidegger."
1997). pp.
Another Look
13-
at the
Britannica A r t i c l e . " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research v o l . L,
no. 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . pp. 5 0 1 - 1 8 .
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D T H E E N D O F BEING AND TIME
363
325
w i t h i t , v i z . . in his suggestion that the transcendental " n e u t r a l i t y " of the analysis of Dasein be supplemented by a "metaphysics of D a s e i n . " There, the categorial features of Dasein that in Being and Time were defined exclusively w i t h reference to the transcendental project of g r o u n d i n g o n t o l o g i c a l k n o w l edge are to be reinterpreted in terms of the "factical extantness of n a t u r e . "
1
Heidegger certainly felt that this m e t o n t o l o g y w o u l d p r o v i d e a distinctivelyp h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d , for it was to be neither an e m p i r i c a l i n q u i r y nor a d e v e l o p m e n t o f transcendental p h i l o s o p h y ' s i m p l i c i t r e g i o n a l ontologies. Recalling our earlier discussion of K a n t ' s Transcendental D i a l e c t i c , Heidegger seems lo have hoped thai m e t o n t o l o g y w o u l d restore p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o s m o l ogy and p r o v i d e a metaphysical g r o u n d for the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l project of Being and Time. Y e t it is hard to a v o i d the suspicion that c o s m o l o g y of this sort is rather less i n q u i r y than c o n s t r u c t i o n of w h a t H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f describes as w o r l d v i e w — a n " a l l - i n c l u s i v e reflection on the w o r l d and the h u m a n Dasein," one that is " e x i s t e n t i e l l , " i.e., "determined by e n v i r o n m e n t — people, race, class, developmental stage of c u l t u r e " ; not so m u c h "a matter of theoretical k n o w l e d g e " as "a coherent c o n v i c t i o n w h i c h determines the current affairs of l i f e more or less expressly and d i r e c t l y , " an o u t l o o k that "always 4
arises out o f the particular factical existence o f the h u m a n b e i n g . " ' ' N o w H e i d e g g e r ' s relation to the w o r l d v i e w q u e s t i o n is c o m p l e x ,
4 7
but given his
c r i t i q u e of Scheler we k n o w that he e n v i s i o n e d s o m e t h i n g more for metont o l o g y ; indeed, it must be s o m e t h i n g m o r e since " p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f never gives a w o r l d - v i e w , nor does it have the task of p r o v i d i n g o n e " ( G A 2 6 : 2 3 0 ; M F L 179). If we ask what the relevant d i s t i n c t i o n between p h i l o s o p h y and w o r l d v i e w is, the preceding d i s c u s s i o n suggests that where p h i l o s o p h y inquires i n t o grounds or reasons, w o r l d v i e w s presuppose such grounds and b u i l d u p o n them. C o s m o l o g y , then, seems to get us no further than w o r l d v i e w ; but perhaps the genuine m e t a p h y s i c a l g r o u n d is to be found o n l y by m o v i n g t h r o u g h c o s m o l o g y to retrieve r a t i o n a l theology f r o m K a n t ' s Dialectic. T h i s w o u l d certainly provide an answer to Heidegger's question, at the end of Being and Time, c o n c e r n i n g what e n t i t y was to f u n c t i o n as the ontic g r o u n d of o n t o l o g y . If the factical existence of Dasein presupposes the factical extantness of nature (beings as a w h o l e ) , m e t o n t o l o g y m i g h t be seen as p r o v i d i n g the m e t a p h y s i c a l - o n t i c g r o u n d for o n t o l o g y b y r e f e r r i n g this
D a v i d W o o d , " R e i t e r a t i n g the T e m p o r a l , " p .
1 4 1 , c o r r e c t l y notes that w h a t Heidegger
p r o p o s e s h e r e i s s o m e t h i n g l i k e " t h e u n i t y o f a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d set t h a t h e has a l r e a d y a n a l y z e d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y , " a take o n D a s e i n t h a t " c a n n o t , h o w e v e r , b e o n t i c [sc. e m p i r i c a l ] , n o r can it be transcendental " He then expresses w e l l - f o u n d e d w o r r i e s that in so d o i n g H e i d e g g e r threatens t o "dispense w i t h c e r t a i n c o n s t i t u t i v e rules o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y "
H e i d e g g e r . Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p p . 5 - 6 ( G A 2 4 : 7 - 8 ) . A sensitive treatment is found in R o b e n Bernasconi, ' " T h e D o u b l e Concept of Philoso-
p h y ' a n d t h e P l a c e of E t h i c s in Being and Time," in Heidegger in H i g h l a n d s : H u m a n i t i e s Press, 1 9 9 3 ) .
326
STEVEN GALT CROWELL
364
Question ( A t l a n t i c
c o s m o l o g i c a l w h o l e t o its g r o u n d i n G o d . M a n y things speak i n favor o f such a suggestion. F o r instance, Heidegger l i n k s m e t o n t o l o g y w i t h meta physica specialis, i.e., w i t h "metaphysics as final purpose," and this, in t u r n , i s identified w i t h that part o f π ρ ώ τ η φιλοσοφία A r i s t o t l e c a l l e d Θ ε ο λ ο γ ί α ( G A 2 6 : 2 2 9 ; M F L 178). F r o m this angle, Heidegger's metaphysics is essen t i a l l y a retrieval of A r i s t o t l e ' s : Being and Time focuses u p o n o n t o l o g y , an i n q u i r y i n t o being qua being ( τ ό όν ή ö v ) , w h i l e m e t o n t o l o g y takes up theology or the " p r o b l e m of transcendence," an inquiry into "the highest k i n d o f being" ( τ ό τ ι μ ι ώ τ α τ ο ν γένο%
Είναι),
τ ό Θείον. 4 8 A " m e t a p h y s i c a l " g r o u n d
w o u l d thus be a t h e o l o g i c a l one, and the relation between p h e n o m e n o l o g y and metaphysics w o u l d be the relation between transcendental p h i l o s o p h y and theology. E v e n if this suggestion is right, however, it is hard to see h o w it avoids the charge of transcendental realism: A p p e a l to G o d c o u l d no m o r e consis tently serve as an account of Dasein's understanding of b e i n g ( o n t o l o g y ) , independent of thai very understanding, than could c o s m o l o g i c a l appeal to the contexts o f nature o r history. H e i d e g g e r ' s earlier p o i n t s t i l l h o l d s : " b e i n g cannot be explained t h r o u g h e n t i t i e s . " 4 9 B u t in fact the suggestion does not really get us beyond c o s m o l o g y at a l l . since Heidegger's r e a d i n g of t h e o l o g y i s essentially c o s m o l o g i c a l :
τό
Θείου
signifies
"simply
beings—the
heavens: the encompassing and o v e r p o w e r i n g , that under and u p o n w h i c h we are t h r o w n , that w h i c h dazzles us and takes us by s u r p r i s e , the over w h e l m i n g " ( G A 2 6 : 1 3 ; M F L 11). ? " Heidegger does l i n k this " u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f being qua superior power [Übermächtig]" w i t h "holiness" ( G A 2 6 : 2 1 1 ; M F L 165), and Pöggeler is surely r i g h t to say that Scheler's w a y of a s k i n g the why-question has "stimulated Heidegger to reopen the question of the d i v i n e [Göttlichen] in terms of w h i c h human beings have understood themselves," thus taking up again the thread of his theological b e g i n n i n g s . " Nevertheless, Heidegger is not i d e n t i f y i n g the ontic ground of ontology w i t h G o d . A l m o s t as if he had the o b j e c t i o n of transcendental realism in m i n d , he e x p l i c i t l y states that in discussing being as the o v e r p o w e r i n g the " d i a l e c t i c a l i l l u s i o n is especially great" and that it is therefore "preferable to put up w i t h the cheap accusation of atheism w h i c h , if it is intended ontically, is in fact c o m p l e t e l y correct" ( G A 2 6 : 2 1 1 ; M F L 165, m y emphasis). The " b e i n g that must take over the function of p r o v i d i n g " an ontic ground, i n v o k e d at the end of Being and Time, cannot be G o d . F o r f u l l e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h i s s u g g e s t i o n see H o s o k a w a . and the
-The C o n c e p t i o n o f Being and Time
P r o b l e m o f M e t a p h y s i c s . " a n d " H e i d e g g e r u n d d i e E t h i k , " passim.
T h i s does not, o f course, r u l e out a n o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o l o g y : i t o n l y rules o u t t a k i n g such t h e o l o g y as g r o u n d of o n t o l o g y . This
view
of Aristotle's
"theology"
predates
present as e a r l y as the lecture course of WS
Heidegger's
metaphysical
decade.
It
is
1 9 2 4 / 2 5 . Plawn: Sophistes. G e s a m t a u s g a b e
B d . 19. e d . I n g e b o r d Schüßler ( F r a n k f u r t : V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n . 1 9 9 2 ) . p . 2 2 2 . Pöggeler.
Heideggers logische
Untersuchungen." p. 93.
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D T H E E N D O F BEING AND TIME
365
327
There is, then, apparently n o t h i n g left but to see the ontic ground as Dasein itself—not insofar as it understands being, but insofar as it finds itself already in the midst of a t o t a l i t y of beings "under and upon w h i c h we are 2
thrown"* Heidegger claims lhat the t w o sides of A r i s t o t l e ' s first philosop h y — " k n o w l e d g e of beings and k n o w l e d g e of the o v e r w h e l m i n g " — c o r r e spond "to the t w o f o l d in Being and Time of existence and thrownness" (GA26:13;
MFL
11).
H a v i n g concentrated
on
a
phenomenological 5
1
clarification of Dasein's understanding of being—so the argument goes - — Being and Time concludes by a c k n o w l e d g i n g that the "projection" or interpretation of existence upon w h i c h such phenomenology draws is itself compromised by ontic presuppositions due to the inquirer's "thrownness" or factici t y , i.e., her being always already particularly situated in the midst of beings as a w h o l e . Since, as H e i d e g g e r r e m i n d s us, Being and Time e m p l o y s a "factical ideal of Dasein," an " o n t i c a l way of taking existence w h i c h . . . n e e d not be binding for everyone," the " o n t o l o g i c a l ' t r u t h ' of the existential analy4
sis is developed on the g r o u n d of the p r i m o r d i a l existentiell t r u t h . " ' It is plausible, then, to t h i n k that m e t o n t o l o g y turns back to investigate this p r i m o r d i a l existentiell truth in some w a y , as the ontic " g r o u n d " of the ontological project. T h e value of this suggestion does not lie in any precise insight it gives i n t o what metontological or metaphysical i n q u i r y c o u l d be; it adds—and can add—nothing to what we have already considered. Indeed, though this appears to be the interpretation of these matters favored by most commentators, 1 m e n t i o n it only at this late stage because anyone adopting it must already have conceded that there can be no purely metaphysical grounds distinct from phenomenological
ones,
hence
that
there
can
be
no
metaphysical
(metontological) i n q u i r y i n t o them. It is impossible that metontology c o u l d investigate thrownness—in the sense of demonstrating the natural, social, or historical limits of Dasein's understanding of being—since such investigation w o u l d already be grounded in that very understanding. Further, Being and Time has already analyzed the finitude of Dasein's understanding, and our access
to
it,
(Befindlichkeit)
by and
appeal mood
to
the e x i s t e n t i a l
(Stimmung).
If the
categories "primary
of d i s p o s i t i o n
discovery
of the
w o r l d " is by way of "bare m o o d , " we do not have the basis for an i n q u i r y , but precisely the reverse: "the ' w h e n c e ' and the ' w h i t h e r ' " of our being in the midst of what is "remain in darkness" ( B T 177, 173; SZ 138, 134). W h a t more can metontology hope to do but reaffirm this? A n d when Heidegger
I t i s t e m p t i n g t o l i n k t h i s s u g g e s t i o n w i t h a r e t r i e v a l o f r a t i o n a l psychology f r o m K a n t ' s Dialectic. 5
3
V e r s i o n s o f t h i s v i e w c a n b e f o u n d i n H o s o k a w a , " H e i d e g g e r u n d d i e E t h i k " : K r e l l , Intimations, S a l l i s . Echoes;
McNeill,
"Metaphysics,
"Prolegomena"; among others 5
4
328
B T 358, 360, 364; S Z 3 1 0 . 312. 3 1 6 .
STEVEN GALT CROWELL
366
Fundamental
Ontology":
and
Grondin,
revisits these issues at the start of his m e t a p h y s i c a l d e c a d e — i n the
1929
" W h a t i s M e t a p h y s i c s ? " — n o t h i n g has changed: the d i s t i n c t i v e m o o d o f Angst is said to reveal the n o t h i n g (das Nichts), that is, to b r i n g us before the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l fact that reasons—ontic answers to the question of w h y there is something rather than n o t h i n g — g i v e out." Yet the fact that meta physics or m e t o n t o l o g y represents, on this reading, less an i n q u i r y than the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of one is, for those w h o adopt i t . j u s t the p o i n t : the o n t i c g r o u n d of ontology is understood precisely as something the r e c o g n i t i o n of w h i c h undermines the project of o n t o l o g y , signaling the end. the collapse, of Being
and
Time.
T h u s Jean G r o n d i n t h i n k s that " D a s e i n proves to be too finite and too h i s t o r i c a l l y situated to enable it to d e r i v e . . . t r a n s c e n d e n t a l structures of its most f u n d a m e n t a l
being,"
w h i l e John
Sallis
holds that appeal
to the
" o v e r w h e l m i n g " i n the m i d s t o f w h i c h w e find ourselves leads t o " t h e sacrifice of the understanding." 5 S M o r e modestly, Robert Bemasconi concludes not that Dasein's finitude, its ontic situatedness, precludes it f r o m grasping transcendental ( o n t o l o g i c a l ) structures, but that " H e i d e g g e r is not readily able to sustain the purity of the d i s t i n c t i o n between the ontic and the o n t o l o g i c a l . " 5 7 This, however, does noi i m p l y lhat no such d i s i i n c t i o n is to be made, or that such " i m p u r i t y " requires "sacrifice of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " S i m i l a r l y , D a v i d W o o d recognizes that " i t may be v i t a l to shift f r o m ontic discourse, discourse about beings and their r e l a t i o n to each other, to discourse about being," but we nevertheless cannot ignore "back-door entanglements between the ontic and the o n t o l o g i c a l " ; indeed, "the transcendental...is nowhere else but in the e m p i r i c a l . " 5 " B u t if that is what the collapse of Being and Time amounts to, I w o u l d take it as g o o d evidence for my earlier c l a i m that what " f a i l e d " was not p h e n o m e n o l o g y ( " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l seeing"), but Ihe "inappropriate concern w i t h 'science' and 'research'." For what must be aban doned in the face of o n t i c - o n l o l o g i c a l entanglement is the esprit de Systeme— far more evident in Heidegger's a p p r o p r i a t i o n of phenomenology than it is in Husserl's o r i g i n a l 1 ' — l h a t demands a successor-discipline to traditional meta physics.
The
hermeneutic
"5
this
reason,
For
as
we
phenomenology
saw
above.
of Being and Time is already
Heidegger
distinguishes
here
between
' c o m p r e h e n d i n g the w h o l e o f b e i n g s " — w h i c h he sees as i m p o s s i b l e f o r a f i n i t e b e i n g — and
"finding oneself in ihe m i d s i of beings as a w h o l e " — w h i c h is a c c o m p l i s h e d all the
time through mood
T h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f m o o d c a n serve a s t h e
b a s i s f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l inquiry is e x p l o r e d i n t h e l e c t u r e c o u r s e Grundbegriffe
der
Metaphysik:
from WS
Gesamtausgabe
Wetl-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit.
ed. F r i e d n c h - W i l h e l m von H e r r m a n n ( F r a n k f u r t : V u i o n o K l o s t e r m a n n .
1 9 2 9 / 3 0 . Die Bd.
29/30.
1983). I n m y
v i e w η does n o i gel b e y o n d the impasse of 1 9 2 8 . b u l the issue is t o o c o m p l e x to treat here. 5 f
Grondin.
" P r o l e g o m e n a . " p . 6 9 : S a l l i s . Echoes, p p .
Bemasconi.
1-45.
US.
" T h e Double Concept of Philosophy'." p. 33
5S
W o o d . "Reiterating the T e m p o r a l . " p p
5y
I mean b y this perhaps c o n t e n t i o u s - s o u n d i n g statement o n l y lhat the " a r c h i t e c t o n i c " d r i v e is m o r e c l e a r K
156-57.
p r e s e n t i n Being and Time t h a n i n a n y t h i n g H u s s e r l e v e r p u b l i s h e d .
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D 1ΉΕ E N D O F BEING AND TIME
367
329
n o t h i n g but the continual attempt to negotiate this i m p u r i t y , seeking the transcendental in the e m p i r i c a l . If p h i l o s o p h y can never constitute itself as absolute, infallible, secured, unrevisable—a fixed system of permanent possessions—the search for something like transcendental conditions of meaning is nevertheless inseparable from the project of p h i l o s o p h i z i n g , a necessary " i l l u s i o n " ( G A 2 6 : 2 0 1 ; M F L 158), as Heidegger comes to call it. W h y "illusion"? Perhaps because although we acknowledge our finitude (the f a l l i b l e , impure character of o n t o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y ) , after we arrive phenomenologically
at
what
we
understand
to
be
necessary,
apriori
(transcendental) truths, the c l a i m that our insight has arisen f r o m our l i m i t e d abilities as thinkers "is no more e x c i t i n g " — a s J. L. A u s t i n once put i t * " — "than adding ' D . V . ' " At a deeper l e v e l , t h o u g h , reference to a necessary i l l u s i o n points to the confluence of ethical and epistemological motives in the n o t i o n of philosophical g r o u n d i n g . T h e phenomenological project, as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l practice, proves to be an "art of e x i s t i n g " ( G A 2 6 : 2 I 0 ; M F L 158), and it is no accident that this art—the ontic ideal i n f o r m i n g the analysis of existence in Being and Time—exhibits what Bernasconi calls "an unstated bias toward w h a t . . . m i g h t be called the 'virtues of the p h i l o s o p h e r ' . "
61
For
that ontic ideal reflects an ethics of p h i l o s o p h y , those motives, collected by Husserl under the heading of the philosopher's "ultimate self-responsibility," that lead to the insistence on "phenomenological seeing" itself. Thus even if phenomenology cannot provide a systematic foundational science, the phen o m e n o l o g i c a l concept of ground has a d i s t i n c t — t h o u g h
ethical—priority
over the "adventure" of metaphysical cosmology, theology, and psychology. It should be emphasized that Heidegger d i d not consistently understand m e t o n t o l o g y this way; at least d u r i n g his metaphysical decade he remained seduced by a k i n d of dialectical i l l u s i o n . Faced w i t h the phenomenological encounter w i t h the n o t h i n g — w i t h the fact that ontic grounds for the w h o l e g i v e out—he d i d not stay w i t h i n the ethical space of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reasoning but believed instead that the finitude of t h i n k i n g demanded anchor in ontic political and historical affairs, "decision" about the "meaning" of das Seiende im Ganzen. To this extent, Habermas is right that Heidegger transf o r m e d the transcendental p h i l o s o p h y of Being and Time into an inflated h i s t o r i c i s m and decisionism, s o m e t h i n g l i k e a w o r l d v i e w .
6 2
The notorious
" p o l i t i c a l engagement" w o u l d thus be a consequence not of the phenomenology of Being and Time, but of Heidegger's conflation of the ethical ground of t h i n k i n g w i t h the ontic involvements of the thinker.
J. L . A u s t i n , " O t h e r M i n d s . "
Philosophical Papers
(Oxford: Oxford
University
Press.
1961), p. 66 Bernasconi. ' " T h e D o u b l e Concept o f P h i l o s o p h y ' , " p . 37. Jürgen H a b e r m a s , " M a r t i n
texte
330
Heidegger—Werk
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), p. 58.
STEVEN GALT CROWELL,
368
und Weltanschauung,"
Texte und Kon-
B u t one ought not to agree entirely w i t h Habermas's further c l a i m that, after his metaphysical decade, Heidegger retreated ever more into a m y t h i c a l self-indemnification. It took Heidegger • decade to realize that there could be no Umschlag from ontology to metontology, that phenomenological grounds needed no supplement from metaphysics, or politics either. T h o u g h Heidegger never got so far as to see that the ontic ground of ontology is exclusively 3
ethical.'' his later w o r k no longer makes any appeal to m e t o n t o l o g y , or to a metaphysical ground. Rather, in the midst of many different motives (some of them perhaps suspect), one finds Heidegger engaged in a phenomenological project of getting back to the ground of metaphysics i t s e l f in order to confront the metaphysical way of t h i n k i n g w h i c h "represents" beings as a w h o l e . " Rather than f o l l o w the fruitless path toward w o r l d v i e w formation—a path that confuses being (meaning) w i t h beings, p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l w i t h ontic grounds—Heidegger tries to t h i n k the "truth of being," to "experience" (i.e., bring to phenomenological evidence) that w h i c h , in a l l o w i n g access to beings, conceals itself. To overcome metaphysics in this w a y is not to reject philosophical reflection on nature but merely to deny that phenomenology (or Denken) can be contextually grounded as a being among beings.
65
If preserv-
i n g the radical impulse of phenomenology thus requires rejecting the claims of metaphysics, the demise of Being and Time, its end, was o n l y the end of the inconsistency s t i l l infecting its concept of p h i l o s o p h i c a l reason-giving. Paraphrasing Jacobi, then, Heidegger m i g h t w e l l say that "I need the assumpt i o n of phenomenology to get i n t o metaphysics, but w i t h this assumption it is not possible for me to remain in i t . "
6 6
I t s h o u l d b e o b v i o u s t h a i ( h i s p a p e r has n o t t r i e d t o p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n i a r g u m e m f o r t h i s c l a i m about an eihica) ground. See. f o r e x a m p l e , t h e
1949
G r u n d der .Metaphysik."
Einleitung Zu:
Wegmarken,
W a s ist M e t a p h y s i k ? '
D e r Rückgang i n d e n
pp. 361-377.
T h u s I agree w i t h M c N e i l l , " M e t a p h y s i c s , F u n d a m e n t a l O n t o l o g y . " ρ H e i d e g g e r has " n o n e e d " o f m e t o n t o l o g y a n d d o e s n o t t h c m a t i z e
78, that i h e later
" b e i n g s ' as such, but.
f o r e x a m p l e , p e o p l e , t h i n g s , a n d n a t u r e " — b u t 1 w o u l d say t h a t t h i s s o n o f i n q u i r y
("thoroughly
e x i s t e n t i e l l " b u t n o t a n " o b j e c t i f i c a i i o n " ) is n o t h i n g b u ( ( h e p r a c t i c e o f p h e
nomenological
seeing
freed
from
an
"inappropriate
concern
with
science'
and
'research'." 1 w o u l d like to thank Charles G u i g n o n for helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. 1 w o u l d also l i k e lo t h a n k
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research's
anony
m o u s referee f o r f o r c i n g m e t o c l a r i f y m y a r g u m e n t a t c r u c i a l p o i n t s
M E T A P H Y S I C S , M E T O N T O L O G Y , A N D T H E E N D O F BEING AND TIME
369
331
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(1997):
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Being
who
Thematizes,"
Epoche
5
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Eduardo
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Nancy
with
the
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of
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and
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