Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics

Hegemony

and Socialist Strategy Towards

a

Radical Democratic Politics Second Edition

•

ERNESTO LACLAU an d

CHANTAL MOUFFE

VERSO London

•

New York

First published by Verso

1985

© Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe

1985

This second edition first published by Verso

© Emesro Laclau and Chantal Mouffe

2001

2001

All rights reserved The moral rights of the authors have been asserted

3 5

7

9 10 8 6

4

Verso

UK: 6 Meard Street, London W1F OEG US:

180 Varick Street,

New York, NY

10014-4606

Verso is the imprint of New Left Books www.versobooks.com ISBN ISBN

1-85984-621-1 1-85984-330-1

(pbk)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Printed and bound in Great Britain by BiddIes Ltd, King's Lynn, Norfolk

Contents

Preface to the Second Edition

VB

Introduction

1

1 Hegemony: the Genealogy of a Concept

7

2 Hegemony: the Difficult Emergence of a New

Political Logic

47

3 Be yo nd the Positivity of t he Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

93

4 Hegemony and Radical Democracy

149

Index

195

Preface to the Second Edition

Hegemon y an d Socialist Strategy was originally published in 1985, and since then it has been at the centre of many important theoretico­ political discussions, both in the Anglo-Saxon world and elsewhere. Many things have changed in the contemporary scene since that time. To refer just to the most important developments, it is enough to mention the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet system. To this we should add drastic transformations of the social structure, which are at the root of new paradigms in the con­ stitution of social and political identities. To perceive the epochal distance between the early 1980s, when this book was originally written, and the present, we have only to remember that, at that time, Eurocommunism was still seen as a viable political project, going beyond both Leninism and social democracy; and that, since then, the major debates which have absorbed the intellectual reflec­ tion of the Left have been those around the new social movements, multiculturalism, the globalization and deterritorialization of the economy and the ensemble of issues linked to the question of post­ modernity. We could say - paraphrasing Hobsbawm - that the 'short twentieth century' ended at some point in the early 1990s, and that today we have to face problems of a substantially new order. Given the magnitude of these epochal changes, we were surprised, in going through the pages of this not-so-recent book again, at how little we have to put into question the intellectual and political per­ spective developed therein. Most of what has happened since then has closely followed the pattern suggested in our book, and those issues which were central to our concerns at that moment have become ever more prominent in contemporary discussions. We could even say that we see the theoretical perspective developed then - rooted as it was in the Gramscian matrix and in the cen­ trality of the category of hegemony - as a far more adequate approach to contemporary issues than the intellectual apparatus

vm

which has often accompanied recent discussions on political subjec­ tivity, on democracy, and on the trends and political consequences of a globalized economy. This is why we want to recapitulate, as a way of introducing this second edition, some central points of our theo­ retic al intervention, and to counterpose some of its pol it ical conclusions to recent trends in the discussion about democracy. Let us start by s ayin g something about the intellectual project of Hegemony and the theoretical perspective from which it was written. In the mid-1970s, Marxist theorization had clearly reached an impasse. After an exceptionally rich and creative period in the 1960s, the limi ts of that expansion - which had its epicentre in Althusserianism, but also in a renewed interest in Gramsci and in the theoreticians of the Frankfurt School - were only too visible. There was an increasing gap between the realities of contemporary capital­ ism and what Marxism could legitimately subsume under its own categories. It is enough to remember the increasingly desperate con­ tortions which took place around notions such as 'determination in the last instance' and 'relative autonomy'. This situation, on the whole, provoked two ty pes of attitude: either to negate the changes, and to retreat unconvincingly to an orthodox bunker; or to add, in an ad hoc way, descriptive analyses of the new trends which were simply juxtaposed - without integration - to a theoretical body which remained largely unchanged. Our way of dealing with the Marxist tradition was entirely differ­ ent and could, perhaps, be expressed in terms of the Husserlian distinction between 'sedimentation' and 'reactivation'. Sedimented theoretical categories are those which conceal the acts of their orig­ inal institution, while the reactivating moment makes those acts visible again. For us - as opposed to Husserl - that reactivation had to show the original contingency of the synthesis that the Marxian categories attempted to establish. Instead of dealing with notions such as 'class', the triad of levels (the economic, the political and the ideological) or the contradiction between forces and rela­ tions of production as sedimented fetishes, we tried to revive the preconditions which make their discursive operation possible, and asked ourselves questions concerning their continuity or disconti­ nuity in contemporary capitalism. The result of this exercise was the realization that the field of Marxist theorization had been far more ambivalent and diversified than the monolithic transvestite that Marxism-Leninism presented as the history of Marxism. It has to be clearly stated: the lasting theoretical effect of Leninism has been an appalling impoverishment of the field of Marxian diversity. While, at

Preface

to the Second Edition

IX

the end of the period of the Second International, the fields in which Marxist discursivity was operating were becoming increasingly diver­ sified - ranging, especially in Austro-Marxism, from the problem of the intellectuals to the national question, and from the internal inconsistencies of the labour theory of value to the relationship between socialism and ethics - the division of the international workers' movement, and the reorganization of its revolutionary wing around the Soviet experience, led to a discontinuity of this creative process. T he pathetic case of a Lulcics, who contributed his undeni­ able intellectual skills to the consolidation of a theoretico-political horiwn which did not transcend the whole gamut of shibboleths of the Third International, is an extreme but far from isolated example. It is worth pointing out that many of the problems confronted by a socialist strategy in the conditions of late capitalism are already con­ tained in nuce in the theorization of Austro-Marxism, but had little continuity in the inter-war period. Only the isolated example of Gramsci, writing from the Mussolinian jails, can be quoted as a new departure producing a new arsenal of concepts - war of position, historical bloc, collective will, hegemony, intellectual and moral leadership - which are the starting point of our reflections in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Revisiting (reactivating) the Marxist categories in the light of these series of new problems and development had to lead, necessarily, to deconstructing the former - that is, to displacing some of their conditions of p ossibility and developing new possibilities which transcend anything which could be characterized as the application of a category. We know from Wittgenstein that there is no such thing as the 'application of a rule' - the instance of application becomes part of the rule itself. To reread Marxist theory in the light of contemporary problems necessarily involves deconstructing the central categories of that theory. This is what has been called our 'post-Marxism'. We did not invent this label - it only marginally appears (not as a label) in the Introduction to our book. But since it has become generalized in characterizing our work, we can say that we do not oppose it insofar as it is properly understood: as the process of reappropriation of an intellectual tradition, as well as the process of going beyond it. And in developing this task, it is impor­ tant to point out that it cannot be conceived just as an internal history of Marxism. Many social antagonisms, many issues which are crucial to the understanding of contemporary societies, belong to fields of discursivity which are external to Marxism, and cannot be reconceptualized in terms of Marxist categories - given, especially,

x

that their very presence is what puts Marxism as a closed theoretical system into question, and leads to the postulation of new starting points for social analysis. There is one aspect in particular that we want to underline at this point. Any substantial change in the ontic content of a field of research leads also to a new ontological paradigm. Althusser used to say that behind Plato's philosophy, there was Greek mathematics; behind seventeenth-century rationalism, Galilean physics; and behind Kant's philosophy, Newtonian theory. To put the argument in a transcendental fashion: the strictly ontological question asks how entities have to be, so that the objectivity of a particular field is possible. There is a process of mutual feedback between the incor­ poration of new fields of objects and the general ontological categories governing, at a certain time, what is thinkable within the general field of objectivity. The ontology implicit in Freudianism, for instance, is different and incompatible with a biologist paradigm. From this point of view, it is our conviction that in the transition from Marxism to post-Marxism, the change is not only ontic but also ontological. The problems of a globalized and information­ ruled society are unthinkable within the two ontological paradigms governing the field of Marxist discursivity: first the Hegelian, and later the naturalistic. Our approach is grounded in privileging the moment of political articulation, and the central category of political analysis is, in our view, hegemony. In that case, how - to repeat our transcendental question - does a relation between entities have to be, for a hege­ monic relation to become possible? Its very condition is that a particular social force assumes the representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it. Such a form of 'hegemonic uni­ versality' is the only one that a political community can reach. From this point of view, our analysis should be differentiated from analy­ ses in which universality finds in the social field a direct, non-hegemonically mediated expression, and those in which partic­ ularities are merely added up without any mediation between them being thinkable - as in some forms of post-modernism. But if a relation of hegemonic representation is to be possible, its ontologi­ cal status has to be defined. This is the point at which, for our analysis, a notion of the social conceived as a discursive space that is, making possible relations of representation strictly unthink­ able within a physicalist or naturalistic paradigm - becomes of paramount importance. In other works, we have shown that the category of 'discourse' has a pedigree in contemporary thought going

Preface to the Second Edition

Xl

back to the three main intellectual currents of the twentieth century: analytical philosophy, phenomenology, and structuralism. In these three the century started with an illusion of immediacy, of a non-dis­ cursively mediated access to the things themselves - the referent, the phenomenon and the sign, resp ectively. In all three, however, this illusion of immediacy dissolved at some point, and had to be replaced by one form or another of discursive mediation. This is what happened in analytical philosophy with the work of the later Wittgenstein, in phenomenology with the existential analytic of Heidegger, and in structuralism with the post-structuralist critique of the sign. It is also, in our view, what happened in epistemology with the transition verificationism - Popper - Kuhn - Feyerabend, and in Marxism with the work of Grarnsci, where the fullness of class identities of classical Marxism has to be replaced by hegemonic iden­ tities constituted through non-dialectical mediations. All these currents have fed our thought to some extent, but post­ structuralism is the terrain where we have found the main source of our theoretical reflection and, within the post-structuralist field, deconstruction and Lacanian theory have had a decisive importance in the formulation of our approach to hegemony. From deconstruc­ tion, the notion of undecidability has been crucial. If, as shown in the work of Derrida, undecidables permeate the field which had previously been seen as governed by structural determination, one can see hegemony as a theory of the decision taken in an undecidable terrain. Deeper levels of contingency require hegemonic - that is, contingent - articulations, which is another way of saying that the moment of reactivation means nothing other than retrieving an act of political institution that finds its source and motivation nowhere but in itsel£ For not unrelated reasons, Lacanian theory contributes decisive tools to the formulation of a theory of hegemony. Thus, the category of point de capiton (nodal point, in our terminology) or master-signifier involves the notion of a particular element assum­ ing a 'universal' structuring function within a certain discursive field - actually, whatever organization that field has is only the result of that function - without the particularity of the element per se predetermining such a function. In a similar way, the notion of the subject before subjectivation establishes the centrality of the cat­ egory of 'identification' and makes it possible, in that sense, to think of hegemonic transitions which are fully dependent on political articulations and not on entities constituted outside the political field - such as 'class interests'. Indeed, politico-hegemonic articu­ lations retroactively create the interests they claim to represent.

xu

'Hegemo ny' has very precise conditions of possibility, both from the point of view of what a relation requires to be conceived as hege­ monic, and from the perspective of the construction of a hegemonic subject. As for the first aspect, the already mentioned dimension of structural undecidability is the very condition of hegemony. If social objectivity, through its internal laws, determined whatever struc­ tural arrangement exists (as in a purely sociologistic conception of society), there would be no room for contingent hegemonic rearticu­ lations - nor, indeed, for politics as an autonomous activity. In order to have hegemony, the requirement is that elements whose own nature does not predetermine them to enter into one type of arrangement rather than another, nevertheless coalesce, as a result of an external or articulating practice. The visibility of the acts of orig­ inary institution - in their specific contingency - is, in this respect, the requirement of any hegemonic formation. But to sa y contingent articulation is to enounce a central dimension of 'politics . This privileging of the political moment in the structuration of soci­ ety is an essential aspect of our approach. Our book shows how, historically, the category of hegemony was originally elaborated in Russian social democracy as an attempt at addressing the autonomous political intervention which was made possible by the structural dislocation between actors and democratic tasks that resulted from the late development of capitalism in Russia; how, later, the notion of 'combined and uneven development' extended it to the general conditions of politics in the imperialist age; and how, with Gramsci, this hegemonic dimension was made constitutive of the subjectivity of historical actors (who thus cease to be merely class actors). We could add that this dimension of contingency, and the concomitant autonomization of the political, are even more vis­ ible in the contemporary world, in the conditions of advanced capitalism, where hegemonic rearticulations are far more generalized than they were in Gramsci's time. As for hegemonic subjectivity, our argument dovetails with the whole debate about the relation between universalism and particu­ larism which has become quite central in recent y ears. A hegemonic relation has, no doubt, a universalistic dimension, but it is a very particular type of universalism whose main features it is important to point out. It is not the result of a contractual decision, as in the case of Hobbes's Leviathan, for the hegemonic link transforms the iden­ tity of the hegemonic subjects. It is not necessarily linked to a public space, as with Hegel's notion of a 'universal class', for hegemonic rearticulations start at the level of civil society. It is not, finally, like

Prefoce to the Second Edition

xm

the Marxian notion of the proletariat as a universal class, for it does not result from an ultimate human reconciliation leading to the withering away of the State and the end of politics; the hegemonic link is, on the contrary, constitutively political. What, in that case, is the specific universality inherent in hege­ mony? It results, we argue in the text, from the specific dialectic between what we call 1,?gicsof difference and logics of equivalence. Social actors occupy differential positions within the discourses that constitute the social fabric. In that sense they are all, strictly speak­ ing, particularities. On the other hand, there are social antagonisms creating internal frontiers within society. Vis-a.-vis oppressive forces, for instance, a set of particularities establish relations of equivalence between themselves. It becomes necessary, however, to represent the totality of the chain, beyond the mere differential particularisms of the equivalential links. What are the means of representation? As we argue, only one particularity whose body is split, for without ceasing to be its own particularity, it transforms its body in the representa­ tion of a universality transcending it (that of the equivalential chain). This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the represen­ tation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is what we call a hegemonic relation. As a result, its universality is a contaminated universality: (1) it lives in this unresolvable tension between univer­ sality and particularity; (2) its function of hegemonic universality is not acquired for good but is, on the contrary, always reversible. Although we are no doubt radicalizing the Gramscian intuition in several respects, we think that something of the sort is implicit in Gramsci's distinction between corporative and hegemonic class. Our notion of a contaminated universality parts company with a con­ ception such as that of Habermas, for whom universality has a content of its own, independent of any hegemonic articulation. But it also avoids the other extreme - represented, perhaps, at its purest in the particularism of Lyotard, whose conception of society as con­ sisting in a plurality of incommensurable language games, whose interactions can be conceived only as tort, makes any political rearticulation impossible. As a result, our approach conceives of universality as a political universality and, in that sense, as depending on internal frontiers within society. This leads us to what is, perhaps, the most central argument of our book, which is linked to the notion of ant agon ism. We have explained why, in our view, neither real oppositions (Kant's &alrepugnanz) nor dialectical contradiction can account for the spe­ cific relation that we call 'social antagonism'. Our thesis is that

xiv antagonisms are not objective relations, but relations which reveal the limits of all objectivity. Society is constituted around these limits, and they are antagonistic limits. And the notion of antagonistic limit has to be conceived literally - that is to say, there is no 'cun­ ning of reason' which would realize itself through antagonistic relations. Nor is there any kind of supergame that would submit antagonisms to its system of rules. This is why we conceive of the political not as a superstructure but as having the status of an onto­

logy of the social.

From this argument it follows that, for us, social division is inher­ ent in the possibility of politics, and - as we argue in the last part of the book - in the very possibility of a democratic politics. We would like to emphasize this point. Antagonism is indeed at the centre of the current relevance of our approach, on both the the­ oretical and the political level. This might seem paradoxical, considering that one of the principal consequences of the profound transformations which have taken place in the fifteen y ears since the publication of this book has precisely been that the notion of antag­ onism has been erased from the political discourse of the Left. But unlike those who see that as progress, we believe this is where the main problem lies. Let us examine how and why it happened. One could have hoped that the collapse of the Soviet model would have given a renewed impetus to democratic socialist parties, finally freed of the negative image of the socialist proj ect that their old antagonist presented. However, with the failure of its communist variant, it is the very idea of socialism that became discredited. Far from being given new life, social democracy was thrown into disarray. Instead of a recasting of the socialist project, what we have witnessed in the last decade has been the triumph of neo-liberalism, whose hegemony has become so pervasive that it has had a profound effect on the very identity of the Left. It can even be argued that the left-wing project is in an even deeper crisis today than at the time in which we were writing, at the beginning of the 1980s. Under the pretence of'mod­ ernization', an increasing number of social-democratic parties have been discarding their left identity, redefining themselves euphemisti­ cally as 'centre-left'. They claim that the notions of Left and Right have become obsolete, and that what is needed is a politics of the 'radical Centre'. The basic tenet of what is presented as the 'third way' is that with the demise of communism and the socio-economic transformations linked to the advent of the information society and the process of globalization, antagonisms have disappeared. A poli­ tics without frontiers would now be possible - a 'win-win politics'

Preface to the Second Edition

xv

where solutions could be found that favoured everybody in society. This implies that politics is no longer structured around social divi­ sion, and that political problems have become merely technical. According to Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens - the theorists of this new politics - we are now living under conditions of 'reflexive modernization' where the adversarial model of politics, of us versus them, does not apply any more. They affirm that we have entered a new era in which politics needs to be envisaged in a completely dif­ ferent way. Radical politi cs should concern 'life' issues and be generative', allowing people and groups to make things happen ; and democracy should be envisaged inthe form of a dialogue', con­ troversial issues being resolved through listening to each other. There is much talk nowadays of a 'democratization of democracy' . There is nothing wrong, in principle, with such a perspective, and at first sight it seems to chime with our idea of a 'radical and plural democracy'. There is, however, a crucial difference because we never envisaged the process of a radicalization of democracy that we were advocating as taking place within a neutral terrain, whose topology would not be affected, but as a profound transformation of the exist­ ing relations of power. For us, the objective was the establishment of a new hegemony, which requires the creation of new political fron­ tiers, not their disappearance. No doubt it is a good thing that the Left has finally come to terms with the importance of pl uralism and of liberal-democratic institutions, but the problem is t hat this has been accompanied by the mistaken belief tliat it meant abandoni ng any attempt at transforming the present hegemonic order. Hence the sacralization of consensus, the blurring of the frontiers between Left and Right, and the move towards the Centre. But this is to draw the wrong conclusion from the fall of com­ munism. Certainly it is import ant to understand that liberal democracy is not the enemy to be destroyed in order to create, through revolution, a completely new society. This is indeed what we were already argu ing in this book when we insisted on the necessity of redefining the pro ject of the Left in terms of a radical ization' of democracy. In our view, the problem with 'actually existing' liberal democracies is not with their constitutive values crystallized in the principles of liberty and equality for all, but with the system of power which redefines and limits the operation of those values. This is why our project of 'radical and plural democracy' was conceived as a new stage in the deepening of the 'democratic revolution , as the extension of the democratic struggles for equality and liberty to a wider range of social relatio ns '

'

'

'

.

XVI

We never thought, though, that discarding the Jacobin friend!enemy model of politics as an adequate paradigm for demo­ cratic politics should lead to the adoption of the liberal one, which envisages democracy as simple com p etition among interests taking place in a neutral terrain - even if the accent is put on the 'dialogic' dimension. This, however, is precisely the way in which many left­ wing parties are now visualizing the democratic process. This is why they are unable to grasp the structure of power relations, and even begin to imagine the possibility of establishin g a new hegemony. As a consequence, the anti-capitalist element which had always been present in social democracy - in both its right-wing and its left­ win g variants - has now been eradicated from its supposedly modernized version. Hence the lack in their discourse of any refer­ ence to a possible alternative to the present economic order, which is taken as the only feasible one - as if acknowledging the illusory character of a total break with a market economy necessarily pre­ cluded the possibility of different modes of regulation of market forces, and meant that there was no alternative to a total acceptance of their logics. The usual justification for the 'no alternative dogma' is globaliza­ tion, and the argument generally rehearsed against redistributive social-democratic policies is that the tight fiscal constraints faced by governments are the only realistic p ossibility in a worl d where global markets would not permit any deviation from neo-liberal ortho­ doxy. This argument takes for granted the ideological terrain which has been created as a result of years of neo-liberal hegemony, and trans forms what is a conjunctural state of affairs into a historical necessity. Presented as driven exclusively by the information revolu­ tion, the forces of globalization are detached from their political dimensions and appear as a fate to which we all have to submit. So we are told that there are no more left-wing or right-wing economic policies, only good and bad ones! To think in terms of hegemonic relations is to break with such fal­ lacies. Indeed, scrutinizing the so-called 'globalized world' through the category of hegemony elaborated in this book can help us to understand that the present conjuncture, far from being the only natural or possible societal order, is the exp ression of a certain con­ figuration o f power relations. It is the result of hegemonic moves on the part of specific social forces which have been able to implement a profound transformation in the relations between capitalist corporations and the nation-states. This he gemony can be chal­ lenged. The Left should start elaborating a credible alternative to the

Prefoce to the Second Edition

XVlt

neo-liberal order, instead of simply trying to manage it in a more humane way. This, of course, requires drawing new political frontiers and acknowledging that there cannot be a radical politics without the definition of an adversary. That is to say, it requires the accept­ ance of the ineradicability of antagonism. There is another way in which the theoretical perspective devel­ oped in this book can contribute to restoring the centrality of the political - by bringing to the fore the shortcomings of what is cur­ rently presented as the most promising and sophisticated vision of a progressive politics: the model of 'deliberative democracy' which has been put forward by Habermas and his followers. It is useful to con­ trast our approach with theirs, because some similarities do actually exist between the conception of radical democracy we advocate and the one they defend. Like them, we criticize the aggregative model of democracy, which reduces the democratic process to the expression of those interests and preferences which are registered in a vote aiming at selecting leaders who will carry out the chosen policies. Like them, we object that this is an impoverished conception of democratic politics, which does not acknowledge the way in which political identities are not pre-given but constituted and reconsti­ tuted through debate in the public sphere. Politics, we argue, does not consist in simply registering already existing interests, but plays a crucial role in shaping political subjects. On these topics, we are at one with the Habermasians. Moreover, we agree with them on the need to take account of the many different voices that a democratic society encompasses and to widen the field of democratic struggles. There are, however, important points of divergence between our view and theirs which hinge on the theoretical framework that informs our respective conceptions. The central role that the notion of antagonism plays in our work forecloses any possibility of a final reconciliation, of any kind of rational consensus, of a fully inclusive 'we'. For us, a non-exclusive public sphere of rational argument is a conceptual impossibility.. Conflict and division, in our view, are nei­ ther disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated nor empirical impediments that render impossible the full realization of a harmony that we cannot attain because we will never be able to leave our particularities completely aside in order to act in accor­ dance with our rational self - a harmony which should nonetheless constitute the ideal towards which we strive. Indeed, we maintain that without conflict and division, a pluralist democratic politics would be impossible. To believe that a final resolution of conflicts is eventually possible - even if it is seen as an asymptotic approach to

xviii the regulative idea of a rational consensus -far from providing the necessary horizon for the democratic project, is to put it at risk. Conceived in such a way, pluralist democracy becomes a 'self-refut­ ing ideal', because the very moment of its realization would coincide with its disintegration. This is why we stress that it is vital for demo­ cratic politics to acknowledge that any form of consensus is the result of a hegemonic articulation, and that it always has an 'outside' that impedes its full realization. Unlike the Habermasians, we do not see this as something that undermines the democratic project, but as its very condition of possibility. A final word about the way we envisage the most urgent tasks for the Left. Several voices have been heard recently calling: 'Back to the class struggle'. They claim that the Left has become too closely iden­ tified with 'cultural' issues, and that it has abandoned the struggle against economic inequalities. It is time, they say, to leave aside the obsession with 'identity politics', and to listen again to the demands of the working class. What should we make of such critiques? Are we, today, in an opposite conjuncture to that which provided the background of our reflection, based as it was in criticizing the Left for not taking the struggles of the 'new movements' into considera­ tion? It is true that the evolution of the parties of the Left has been such that they have become concerned mainly with the middle classes, to the detriment of the workers. But this is due to their inca­ pacity to envisage an alternative to neo-liberalism and their uncritical acceptance of the imperatives of 'flexibility', not to a supposed infat­ uation with issues of 'identity'. The solution is not to abandon the 'cultural' struggle to go back to 'real' politics. One of the central tenets of Hegemon y an d Socialist Strategy is the need to create a chain of equivalence among the various democratic struggles against dif­ ferent forms of subordination. We argued that struggles against sexism, racism, sexual discrimination, and in the defence of the envi­ ronment needed to be articulated with those of the workers in a new left-wing hegemonic project. To put it in terminology which has recently become fashionable, we insisted that the Left needed to tackle issues of both 'redistribution' and 'recognition'. This is what we meant by 'radical and plural democracy'. Today, such a project remains as pertinent as ever - which is not to say that it has become easier to realize. Indeed, it appears some­ times as if, rather than thinking of 'radicalizing' democracy, the first priority is to defend it against the forces which insidiously threaten it from within. Instead of reinforcing its institutions, it seems that the triumph of democracy over its communist adversary has con-

Preface to the Second Edition

XIX

tributed to their weakening. Disaffection with the democratic process is reaching worrying proportions, and cynicism about the political class is so widespread that it is undermining citizens' basic trust in the parliamentary system. There is certainly no ground for rejoicing about the current state of politics in liberal-democratic societies. In some countries this situation is being cleverly exploited by right-wing populist demagogues, and the success of people like Haider and Berlusconi is there to testify- that such rhetorics can attract a very significant following. As long as the Left relinquishes the hegemonic struggle, and insists on occupying the centre ground, there is very little hope that such a situation could be reversed. To be sure, we have begun to see the emergence of a series of resistances to the transnational corporations' attempt to impose their power over the entire planet. But without a vision about what could be a differ­ ent way of organizing social relations, one which restores the centrality of politics over the tyranny of market forces, those move­ ments will remain of a defensive nature. If one is to build a chain of equivalences among democratic struggles, one needs to establish a frontier and define an adversary, but this is not enough. One also needs to know for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants to establish. This requires from the Left an adequate grasp of the nature of power relations, and the dynamics of politics. What is at stake is the building of a new hegemony. So our motto is: 'Back to the hegemonic struggle'.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffi November 2000

Introduction

Left-wing thought today s tands at a crossroads. The 'evident truths' of the past - the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left's struggles and objectives have been seriously challenged by an avalanche of historical mutations which have riven the ground on which those truths were constituted . Some of these mutations doubtless correspond to failures and disappointments: from Buda­ pest to Prague and the Polish coup d'etat, from Kabul to the sequels of Communist victory in Vietnam and Cambodia , a question-mark has fallen more and more heavily over a whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it. This has re­ charged c ritical thinking, at once corrosive and necessary, on the theoretical and political bases on which the intellectual horizon of the Left was traditionally c o nstituted But there is more to it than this . A whole series of positive new phenomena underlie t ho s e mutations which have made so urgent the task of theoretical reconsideration: the rise of the new feminism, the protest movements of ethnic, national and sexual minorities, the anti-institutional ecology struggles waged by marginalized layers of the population , the anti­ nuclear movement, the atypical forms of social struggle in countries on the capitalist periphery - all these imply an extension of social conflictuality to a wi d e range of areas , which creates the potential, but no more than the potential for an advance towards more free, democratic and egalitarian societies . This p roliferation of struggles presents itself, first of all , as a 'surplus' of the social vis-a-vis the rational and organized structures of society - that is , of the social 'order'. Numerous voices , deriving especially from the liberal-conservative camp. have insis tently argued that Western societies face a crisis of governability and a threat of dissolution at the hands of the egalitarian danger. How­ ever , the new forms of social conflict have also thrown into crisis -

.

,

­

2 theoretical and political frameworks closer to the ones that we shall seek to e ngage in dia l ogue in the major part of this book. These correspond to the classical discourses of the Left , and the charac­ teristic modes in which it has conceived the ag en ts of social change, the structuring of political spaces , and the p riv i le g e d points for the u n leash i ng of historical transformations . What is now in crisis is a whole conception of socialism which rests upon the ontological centrali ty of the w o rk i n g class , upon the role of Revolution , with a capital 'r', as the founding m o me nt in the transition from one type of society to anoth er , and upon the illusory prospect of a perfectly unitary and homogeneous collective will that will ren der pointless the moment of politics. The plural and multifarious character of contemporary social struggles has fmally disso l v ed the last founda­ tion for that po l i ti cal imaginary . Peop le d with 'universal' s ubjec ts and conceptually built around History in the sing ula r , it has postu­ lated 'society' as an intelligible structure that could be intellectually mastered on the basis of certain class positi ons and reconstituted, as a rational, transparent order, through a fo und i ng act of a political character. Toda y , the Left is witnessing the final act of the dis­ solution of that Jac o b i n imag i nary . Thus, the very wealth and plurality of co n te mporar y social strug­ gles has g ive n rise to a the ore tica l crisis . It is at the middle p oin t of this two-way movement between the theore ti ca l and the politi cal that our own discourse will be located. At every moment, we have tried to p revent an im p r essi oni st and s o ci ol og i s ti c descriptivism, which lives on ignorance of the conditions of its own di scurs i v it y , from fill ing the theoretical voids generated b y the crisis . Our aim has been the exact opposite: to focus on certain d is cu rsive categories which, at first sight , appeared to be privileged co n d ensa tion poin ts for many aspects of the crisis; and to unravel the possible meanin g of a history in the various facets of this multiple refraction. All discUr­ sive eclecticism or wavering was excluded from the very start. As is said in an inaugural 'manifesto' of the classical perio d , when one enters new territory, one must follow the exa mp le of 'travellers who, finding themselves lost in a forest, know that they ought not to wander first to one side and then to the other , nor, still less, to s to p in one place, but understand that th ey should continue to w a lk as s traight as they c an in one direction , not div ergin g for any slight reason , even though it was possibly chance alone that first deter­ mined them in their choice. By this means if they do not go exa ctly where they wish, they will at least arrive somewhere at the end, where probably they will be better off than in the middle of a forest 'I -

.

Introduction

3

The guiding thread of our analysis has been the transformations in concept of hegemony, considered as a discursive surface and fundamental nodal point of Marxist political theorization. Our prin­ cipal conclusion is that behind the concept of 'hegemony' lies hidden something more than a type of political relation complementary to the basic c a teg ories of Marxist theory . In fact , it introduces a logic oj the socia l which is incompa t ible with those categories . Faced with the rationalism of classical Marxism, which presented history and society as intelligible totalities constituted around conceptually ex­ plicable laws, t he l o gi c of h egemony presented itself from the outset as a complementary and contingent operation, required for conjunctural imbalances within an evolutionary paradigm whose essential or ' morp h ol og i cal ' v a lidity was not for a moment placed in question . (One of t he central tasks of this book will be to determine this specific logic of contingency .) As the areas of the co n cept 's applica­ tion grew broader, from Lenin to Gramsci, the field of contingent articulations also expanded, and the category of 'historical ne ces­ s ity ' - which had been the cornerstone of classical Marxism­ withdrew to the horizon of theory. As we shall argue in the last two ch apt e rs , the expansion and determination ofthe social logic implicit in t h e concept of 'hegemony' - in a direction that goes far beyond Gramsci - will p rovide us with an anchorage from which contem­ porary social struggles are thinkable in their specificity, as well as permitting us to outline a new politics for the Left based upon the project of a radical democracy. One question remains to be answered: why should we broach this task through a critique and a deconstruction of the v a rious discursive surfaces of class ica l Marxism? Let us first say that there is not on e discourse and one system of categories through which the 'real' might speak w i thout mediations . In operating deconstructively within M arxist categories , we do not claim to be writing 'universal h istor y ', to be inscribing our discourse as a moment of a single, linear process of knowledge. Just as the era of normative epistemo­ logies has come to an end, so too has the era of universal discourses . Political conclusions similar to those set forth in this book could have been approximated from very different discursive formations - for example, from certain forms of Christianity, or from lib erta rian discourses alien to the socialist tradition - none of which could as pire to be the truth of society (or 'the insurpassable p hilos oph y of our ti m e ', as Sartre put it). For this very reason, however, Marxism is one of the traditions through which it becomes poss i ble to formu­ late this new concepti on of politics. For us, the validity of this poin t th e

4

of departure is simply based on the fact that it constitutes our own past. I s it not the case that, in scaling down the pretensions and the area of validity of M arxist theory , we are breaking with something deeply inherent in that theory: namely, its monist aspiration to capture with its categories the essence or underlying meaning of History? The answer can only be in the affirmative. Only if we renounce any epistemological prerogative based upon the ontolo­ gically privileged position of a 'universal class' , will it be possible seriously to discuss the present degree of validity of the M arxist categories . At this point we should state quite plainly that we are now situated in a post-Marxist terrain . It is no longer possible to maintain the conception of subjectivity and classes elaborated by M arxism , nor its vision of the historical course of capitalist deve­ lopment, nor, of course, the conception of communism as a trans­ parent society from which antagonisms have disappeared. But if our intellectual project in this book is post-Marxist, it is evidently also post-Marxist. It has been through the development of certain intui­ tions and discursive forms constituted within Marxism , and the inhibition or elimination of certain others , that we have constructed a concept of hegemony which , in our view , may be a useful instru­ ment in the struggle for a radical , libertarian and plural democracy . Here the reference to Gramsci , though partially critical, is of capital importance. In the text we have tried to recover some of the variety and richness of Marxist discursivity in the era of the Second Inter­ national, which tended to be obliterated by that impoverished monolithic image of 'M arxism-Leninism' current in the Stalin and post-Stalin eras and now reproduced, almost intact though with opposite sign, by certain forms of contemporary 'anti-Marxism' . Neither the defenders o f a glorious, homogeneous and invulnerable ' historical materialism ' , nor the professionals of an anti-Marxism a la nouveaux philosophes , realize the extent to which their apologias or diatribes are equally rooted in an ingenuous and primitive concep­ tion o f a doctrine's role and degree of unity which, in all its essential determinations , is still tributary to the Stalinist imaginary. Our own approach to the M arxist texts has, on the contrary, sought to recover their plurality, to grasp the numerous discursive sequences - to a considerable extent heterogeneous and contradictory - which con­ s titute their inner structure and wealth, and guarantee their survival as a reference point for p olitical analysis . The surpassing of a great intellectual tradition never takes place in the sudden form of a collapse, but in the way that river waters , haying originated at a

Illtroduction

5

common source, spread in various directions and mingle with cur­ rents flowing down from other sources. This is how the discourses that constituted the field of classical Marxism may help to form the thinking of a new left: by bequeathing some of their concepts, transforming o r abandoning others, and diluting themselves in that infinite intertextuality of emancipatory discourses in which the plurality of the socialtakes shape. Note to Introduction I . Descartes , 'Discourse on Method', in Philosophical Works Vol. I , Cambridge 1 968 , p . 96.

1 Hegem ony: the Genealogy of a Concept

We will start by tracing the genealogy of the concept of 'hegemony' . I t should b e stressed that this will not b e the genealogy o f a concept endowed from the beginning with full positivity. In fact, using somewhat freely an expression of Foucault, we could say that our aim is to establish the 'archaeology of a silence' . The concept o f hegemony did n o t emerge t o defme a new type o f relation in its specific identity, but to fill a hiatus that had opened in the chain of historical necessity . 'Hegemony' will allude to an absent totality, and to the diverse attempts at recomposition and rearticulation which , in overcoming this original absence, made it possible for struggles to be given a meaning and for historical forces to be endowed with full positivity. The contexts in which the concept appear will be those of aJault (in the geological sense) . of a fissure that had to be filled up , of a contingency that had to be overcome. 'Hegemony' will be not the majestic unfolding of an identity but the response to a crisis . Even in its humble origins in Russian Social Democracy, where i t i s called upon t o cover a limited area of political effects , the concept of 'hegemony' already alludes to a kind of contingent intervention required by the crisis or collapse of what would have been a 'normal' historical development . Later, with Leninism , it is a keystone in the new form of political calculation required by the contingent 'con­ crete situations' in which the class struggle occurs in the age of imperialism . Finally , with Gramsci, the term acquires a new type of centrality that transcends its tactical or strategic uses: 'hegemony' becomes the key concept in understanding the very unity existing in a concrete social formation . Each of these extensions of the term , however, was accompanied by an expansion of what we could provisionally call a 'logic of the contingent' . In its turn, this expres­ sion stemmed from the fracture, and withdrawal to the explanatory horizon of the social, of the category of 'historical necessity' which

8 had been the cornerstone of Second International Marxism . The alternatives within this advancing crisis - and the different responses to i t , of which the theory of h egemo ny is but one form the object o f our study. -

The Dilemmas of Rosa Luxemburg Let us avoid any temptation to go back to the 'origitr ' . Let us simply pierce a moment in time and try to detect the presence of that void which the logic of hegemony will attempt to fill . This arbitrary beginning , proj ected in a variety of directio ns , will offer us , if not the sense of a trajectory, at least the dimensions of a crisis . It is in the m u l tiple, meandering reflections in the broken mirror of 'historical necessity' that a new logic of the social begins to insinuate itself, one that will only manage to think itself by questioning the very li t erality of the terms it articulates . In 1 906 R osa Luxemburg published The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions. A brief anal ys is of this text - which already presents all the ambiguities and crit i cal areas i m portant to our theme - will provide us with an initial point of reference . Rosa L uxemburg deals wi th a specific theme: the efficacy and significance of the mass strike as a political tool . But for her this implies con­ sideration of two vital problems for the socialist cause: the unity of the working class and the path to revolution in Europe. Mass strike, the dominant form of struggle in the first Russian revolution , is dealt with in its specific mechanisms as well as in its possible projections for the workers' struggle in German y . The theses of Rosa Luxem­ burg are well known : while debate concerning the efficacy of the mass s trike in Germany had centred almost exclusively on the poli­ tical strike, the Russian experience had demonstrated an interaction and a mutual and constant enrichment between the political and economic dimensions of the mass strike. In the repressive context of the Tsarist state , no movement for parti al demands could remain confined within itself: it was inevitably transformed into an example and symbol of resistance, thus fuelling and giving birth to other movements . These emerged at unpreconceived points and tended to expand and generalize in unforeseeable forms , so that they were beyond the capacity of regulation and organization of any politi cal or trade union leadership . This is the meaning of Luxe m burg s 'spon­ taneism ' . The u ni t y between the economic and the political struggle - that is to say , the very unity of the working class - is a '

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concept

9

consequence of this movement of feedback and i ntera ctio n . But this mo v emen t in tum is nothing other than the process of re vo lu tio n . I f we move from Russia to Ge rman y , R o s a L u x emb ur g argues, the situation becomes very different. Th e dominant trend is the frag m en ta t io n among diverse categories of workers , between the di fferent demands of various movements, between economic stru g gl e and p ol i ti cal struggle . 'Only in the sultry air of the period of revolution can any partial little conflict bet w een labour and capital grow into a g en er al e xp losio n . In G erm any the mos t violent, most brutal collisions between the workers and the employers take place every day without the struggle ov er-lea pin g the bo u n d of the in divi­ dual factories . . . None of these cases . . . changes suddenly into a common class action . And when they grow into isolated mass strikes which have without question a po l i ti cal colouring, they do not b rin g about a general storm . ' l This isol a t ion and frag mentatio n is not a contingent event: it is a structural effect of the capi tal i s t s ta te , whi c h is o n ly overcome in a rev ol u ti on ary a t mosphe re . 'As a matter of fa c t the separation of the p ol i tical and the economic struggle and the in d ep e n de n ce of each is nothin g but an artificial pro du ct of the parli amentarian p erio d , even if historically determined. On the one hand , in the pea ce fu l , "normal" course o f bo u rgeo i s society the eco no m i c s t ru ggl e is sp li t into a multitude o f i n di vi du al strugg l es in every un d e rtak in g and dissolved in every branch of pr odu c tion . On the other h an d , the politi cal struggle is not directed b y the masses themselves in a direct action, but in co rres pon dence with the fo rm of the bourgeois State, in a representative fas hi on , by the pr es e n ce o f le gisla ti v e repres e n ta tion . ' 2 In these co n di ti ons and g i ven that the rev o lution a ry outbreaks in R uss i a could be explained by factors such as the comparative back­ wardness of the co u n t r y , the absence of p oli ti cal liberties , or the poverty o f th e R ussi an p r ole t a ria t - were not t h e perspectives for revolution in the West postponed sine die? Here Rosa Lu x emb u r g ' s response becomes he s ita nt an d l es s conv in ci ng as it a s s u mes a charac­ teristic course: namely , an attempt to m ini miz e the differences between the Russian and the German proletariat, sh o wing the areas of po v er t y and the a bs en c e o f org a ni z a t io n in various sectors of the German workirig class, as well as the presence of inverse phenomena in the mos t advanced sectors of the Russian pro l e tar i a t . But what of those pockets of backwardness in Germ an y ? Were th e y not residual sectors which would be swept away by c api tali st expansion? And in that case, w h at g u a rante ed the emergence of a re v olu tion ary situa­ tion? The answer to our question - Ro s a Lux e mbu r g does no t at

10 any p o int formulate it in this text - comes to us abruptly and u neq u i vo c ab ly a few pages later: ' (The social democrats) must now and always h as ten the development of things and endeavour to

accelerate events . This they cannot do , however, by suddenly issuing the slo g a n for a mass strike at random at any moment, but first and foremost, by making clear to the widest layers of the proletariat the inevitable advent of this revolutionary period, the inner "

"

social factors making for it and the political consequences of it. '3 Thus,

the 'necessary laws o f capitalist development' establish themselves as

a gua ran tee for the future revolutionary situation in Germany.

Everything

is now clear: as there were no more bourgeois­ democratic changes to be achieved in Germany (sic) , the coming of a revolutionary s i tu a tion could only be resolved in a socialist direc­ tion; the Russian proletariat - struggling against absolutism, but in a histo rical context dominated by the maturity of world capitalism which prevented it from stabilizing its own struggles in a bourgeois stage - was the vanguard of the European proletariat and pointed out to the German working class its own future. The problem of the differences between East and West, so important in the strategic debates of European socialism from Bernstein to Gramsci, was here resolved by being discarded . 4 L e t us analyse the various moments of this remarkable sequence. Concerning the constitutive mechanism of class unity , Rosa Luxem­ burg 's position is clear: in capitalist society , the working class is necessarily fragm en ted and the recomposition of its unity only occurs th rou g h the very process of revolution. Yet the Jonn of this revolu tionary recomposition consists of a specific mechanism which has little to do with any mechanistic explanation . It is here that spontaneis m comes into play One could think that the 'spontaneist' theory simply a ffirms the impossibility ofJoreseeing the direction of a r ev o l u t i o nary process, given the complexity and variety of forms which it adopts . Nevertheless, this explanation is insufficient. For w h a t is at stake is not merely the complexity and diversity inherent in a dispersion of struggles - when these are seen from the point of view of an analyst or a p o l i t ic a l leader - but also the constitution of th e unity o f the revolutionary subject on the basis of this complexity and diversity . This alone shows us that in attempting to determine th e meaning of Luxemburgist 'spontaneism ' , we must concentrate not only on the plurality of forms of struggle but also on the relations which they establish among themselves and on the unifying effects which follow from them . And here, the mechanism of unification is clear: in a rev ol u tiona r y situation, it is impossible tofix the literal sense .

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concep t

11

of each isolated struggle, because each struggle overflows its own li tera l i ty and comes to represent, in the consciousness of the masses, a simple moment of a more global struggle aga in s t the system. And so it is that while in a period of stability the class consciousness of the worker - as a global c onscio usn ess constituted around his ' his­ torical interests' - is 'latent' and 'theoretical' , in a revolutionary situation it becomes 'active' and 'practical' . Thus, in a r e v o l u tionary situation the m eaning of every mobilization appears , so to speak, as split: aside from its specific literal demands, each mobilization repre­ sents the revolutionary p rocess as a whole; and these totalizing effects are visible in the overdetermination of some struggles by others . This is, however, nothing other than the defining cha ra c­ teristic o f th e symbol: the overflowing of the signifier by the sig­ nified . s The unity oj the class is therifo re a symbolic unity . Undoubtedly this is the h ig hes t point in Luxemburg's analysis , one which estab­ lishes the m axi mum distance from the orthodox theoreticians of the Second I n te rn a tion a l (for whom class unity is si mp l y laid down by the laws o f the economic base) . Although i n many other analyses of the period a role is given to the contingent - exceed in g the moment of 'structural' theorization - few texts advance as much as Rosa Luxemburg's in de te rmini ng the specific mechanisms of this contin­ gency and i n re co g ni z in g the e xtent o f its p ra c tical effects . 6 Now, o n the one hand, the analysis of Rosa Luxemburg has multiplied the p oin t s of antagonism and the forms of struggle which we will from now on call the subject p ositiofls - up to th e point o f e x p l odin g all capacity for control or planning of these struggles by a trade-union or poli ti cal leadership; on the other hand, it has proposed symbolic overdetermination as a concrete mecha n i s m for the unification of these struggles . Here, however, the p roble ms begin , since for Rosa Luxemburg this process of over­ determination constitutes a very precise unity: a class ufl ity . Yet there is nothing in the theory of sp o ntaneism which logically supports her conclusion . On the contrary, the very logic of sp o n t aneis m seems to imply that the resulting type of uni tary s u bje ct should remain largely in de ter min ate . In the case of the Tsarist state , if the condition of ove rdete r minati on o f the points of antagonism and the diverse struggle s is a repressive political context, wh y cannot the class limits be s u rpas sed and lead to the construction of, for example, partially unified subjects whose fundamental determination is po pu l a r or demo crat i c ? Even in Rosa Luxemburg's text - notwithstanding the dogmatic rigidity of the author, for whom every subject has to be a class subject - the surpassing of classist categ o r i es appears at a

12

number of points . 'Throughout the whole of the sp rin g of 1905 and into t he middle of summer there fe rm e n te d throughout the who le empire an uninterru p ted economic strike of almost the entire pro­ letariat ag ain st c ap ital - a struggle w hi ch on the one hand caught all th e petty-bourgeois and liberal p ro fe s s i ons and on the other hand penetrated to the domestic serv ants, the minor police officials and even to the stratum of the lu m pen p role taria t and simultaneously s ur ged from the towns to the country districts and even knocked at the iron gates of the m ilitary barracks . '7 Let us be cl e a r about the meanin g of our question : if the unity of the wo r kin g class were an infrastructural datum constituted outside the process of revolutionary overdetermination, the question con­ cerning the cl a s s character of the revolutionary s u bje c t would not arise. Indeed, b oth political and economic struggle w ould be sym­ m etrical expressions o f a clas s subject constituted prior to the s trugg le s themselves . But if the unity is this process of overdeter­ m in a t i o n , a n i n dependen t explanation has to be offered as to why there should be a necessary overlap between political subjectivity and class positions . Although Rosa Luxemburg does not offer such an explanation - in fact , she does not even perceive the problem the background of her th ou g ht makes clear what this would have been: namely, an affirma tion of the necessary character of the objec­ tive laws of c a p i t alis t d ev e lopm ent, which lead to an increasing p ro le t a ri ani z ation of the m i d d l e sectors a n d the peasantry and , thus, to a straightforward confrontation between bourgeoisie and prole­ tariat . C o n s e qu ently the innovatory effects of the log i c of spon­ taneism appear to be strictly limited from the beginning. 8 The effects are s o limited, n o doubt, because the area i n which they o perate is e x t re m el y circumscribed . But also because, in a second a n d more important sense, the logic of spontaneism and the lo gi c of n e c e s sit y do n ot converge as two distinct and positive principles to explain certain historical situations , but function instead as anti­ t he ti c al l o g i c s w hich only interact with each other thro u g h the re ci p r o c al limitation of their effects . Let us carefull y examine the point where they diverge. The logic of spontaneism is a log i c of the s y m bo l inasmuch as it operates precisely through the disruption of e v ery li t e r al me a ning The log ic of necessity is a logic of the literal: it o perates throu gh fixations which , precisely because they are neces­ s ary , e s t ablish a me anin g that eliminates any contingent variation. In t h i s case , however, the relation between the two l o g i cs is a relation of frontiers, which can expand in one or another direction but never overcome the irreducible dualism introduced into the analysis . ,

,

.

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concep t

13

In reality, we here witness the emergence of a double void . Seen from the category of necessity , the duality o f logics merges with the determinable/indeterminable opp os i ti on : that is to say, it only points to the operational limits o f that category . But the same thing o ccurs from the point of view o f s po ntan e i s m : the field of 'historical n eces s i t y ' presents itself as a limit to the working of the symbolic. The limits are, in actual fa ct , lim itations . If the s p eci fi ci ty of this li m it at ion o f e ffec t s i s no t i m m edi a tely evident, this is because it is tho u ght of as a con fluence of tw o p ositiv e and d iffere n t e xp l an a t ory principles , each valid in its own area, and not as what each of them is: the purely n ega tiv e reverse of the other. The double void c rea ted by du al i s m hereby becomes invisible . However, to make a void in vis ib l e is no t the same as to fill it up. Before we examine the changing fo rm s of thi s double void , we may for a moment place ourselves within it and practise the o n ly game i t allows us : that is , to move the fron tiers se par a ti ng the two opp o sed lo gi c s . If we broaden the area co r r es p onding to historical necessity, the res u lt is a w ell-k n o w n alternative: either capitalism leads th ro u gh its necessary laws to proletarianization and cri s is; or else these necessary laws do not function as expected, in which case, fo ll o wing the very logic of Luxemburgist discourse, the fragmen­ tation between d i ffe re nt subject positions ceases to be an ' a rti fi cial product' of the ca pi tali s t state and becomes a permanent re a lity . It is the zero-sum game in t r i ns i c to all eco no mis tic and reductionist co n cep t ion s . I f, on the contrary , we move the b o u n d a r y in the o p po site direction, to the po i nt where the class nature of political su bj e cts loses its necess ary character , the s pe c t a cle that appears before our eyes is not a t all i m agi na ry : it is the o rigin al forms o f overdetermination assumed by social s truggl es in the Third W orld , with the construction of political identities having li t tle to d o with strict class boundaries; it is the rise of fascism, which would b ru t a ll y dispel the illusion of the necessary character of certain class articula­ tions; it is the new forms of struggle in the advanced ca pi tal ist countries, where during the last few dec ade s we have witnessed the constant emergence of new forms of po l itica l subj e c ti v i t y cutting across the c a teg o ries of t he social and economic structure . The concept of ' h e g emon y ' will emerge pr ec i s el y in a conte x t dominated by the e x p eri e n ce of fra g m en t at i o n and b y the in d ete rm i n acy of the ar t i cul ati o ns between different st ru gg l e s and s u bje c t positions. It will offer a s o cia l i s t answer in a p o l i ti co-d i s cur s i v e universe that has witnessed a withdrawal of the category o f ' neces sit y ' to the horizon of the social. Faced with a t tempts to t ack le the crisis of a n e s sen t i a li st

14

monism through a proliferation o f dualisms - free-will/determi­ nism; science/ethics ; individual/collectivity; causality/teleology the t h e o ry of hegemony will g ro und its re s ponse on a displace­ ment of the terrain w h ic h m ade poss ibl e the monist/dualist alter­

-

native.

One final point before l e av i ng Rosa L uxem b ur g The l i m it at i on of effects which th e n e ce ssary laws ' produce in her discourse also functions in another i m por t ant direction: as a lim i t ation of the p ol i t ica l co n c l us i o ns capabl e of b ei ng derived from the 'observable te nd enci es in advanced capitalism . The role o f the or y is not to elaborate i nte l lectual l y the observable tendencies of fragmentation and di spe r s ion but to ensure that such tendencies have a transitory character. There is a split between theory and 'practice' which is a cle a r s ym p to m of a crisis . This crisis - to which the emergence of M arxist or t h odo x y' represents on l y one answer - is the starting­ p oin t of o u r analysis . Yet it requires that we pla ce ourselves at a point prior to this beginning, in order to i denti fy the paradigm that entered into crisis . For t h is we can refer to a document of exceptional clarity and systematicity: K auts k y s 1 892 co m me n tary to the Erfurt Pro­ gramme , the seminal manifesto of German Social D e mocracy 9 .

'

'

,

'

'

'

'

.

Crisis, Degree Zero The Class Struggle is a typical Kautskian text which puts fo rw ard an indissociable unit y o f the o ry history and strategy . 10 From our pre s ent d a y p ersp e ctiv e , of course, it appears extr em e ly naive an d s i mplis tic Yet we must inquire into t h e various dimensions of this s i mpl i cit y for they will permit us to understand both the structural characteristics of the paradigm and the reasons that led to its crisis at t h e turn o f the century . The p a rad igm i s s i mp le in a primary and literal sense that K au t s ky quite e xp li ci tly presents a th e o ry of the increasing simplification of the social structure and t he anta g onis ms within it. Capitalist society a d van c es t o w ard s an in cre asing concentration of property and ,

-

.

,

,

wealth in the hands of a few enterprises; and a rapid proletariani­ zation of the most diverse social strata and oc cupa tional categories is comb i n ed w.ith a g rowing impoverishment of the working class . This i mpoverishment , and the necessary laws of capitalist d evelop­ ment that are at its o rigin , hinder a real autonomization of spheres and functions w i t hin th e working class : the e conomic s trug g le can have only modest and precarious successes , and this leads to a deJacto s u bo rd i n at i on of trade-union to party o rgani zati o n , which alone can

Hegemony.'

the

Genealogy oj a

Concept

15

substantially modify t h e position o f th e proletariat through the conques t of po litic a l power. The structural moments or instances o f cap i ta l ist society also lack any form of relative autonom y . Th e state , for exam ple , is presen t ed in terms of the most crass instrumentalism . Thus , the s i m pl i ci t y of the Kautskia n paradigm consists , first of all , in a simplification of the system of s t r uctu ral differences con stitu ti ve of c a pi tal i s t s o c ie t y . Yet the K a ut sk i an pa ra di gm i s a l s o s i m p l e in a second and less freq u e n t l y mentioned sense , which is of c ru ci a l importance for our an a l ysis Here, th e po in t is not so much that t he pa radig m reduces the n u m be r of p e r t in e n t s tructural differences , but that it fixes them through the attribution to each of a single meaning, un de r s to od as a p r ecise location within a to t al i t y In the first sense , Kautsk y 's a na l ys i s w a s s im p l y economistic and reductionist; but if th i s were t he onl y p ro blem , the co rre c t i ve would merely have to introduce the 'relative autonomies ' of the p ol i ti cal and the i deolo g ica l , and render the analysis more co mpl ex th rou gh t he m ulti pli ca tio n of instances within a topography of t h e social . Yet each one oj these m u l tiplied instances or structural moments would have a n iden ti ty asJixed and singular as the instances oj the Kautskian p a radigm In order to illustrate this unicity oj m ean i ng , let us exam in e how Kautsky explains the relationship between economic and p ol i t ical struggle: ' Occasionally someone has att e m pt ed to op pos e the p o li ti c al s t rugg l e to the economic, and d e cl a re d that the pro le tar i a t should give its exclusive attention to one or the other . The fact is that the two cannot b e s ep a r a te d . The economic s truggle demands political r ig h t s and these will not fal l from heaven . To secure and ma i nt a in them the most vigorous political s t r u gg le is necessary . The political s tr uggl e is , in the last analysis , an economic str u gg l e 1 1 R os a Lu x e m b u rg also affirmed t h e unity o f the two ty p es of struggle , b u t she began from an initial diversity , and un i t y was a unification , t h e result of an overdetermination o f discrete elements withou t any forms of fixe d , a p r i or i articulation . For Kautsky , however, unity is the starting-point: th e working class struggles in the field of politics by v irt u e of an economic calculation. It is possible to pass fro m one struggle to th e o th e r t h ro u g h a pu r e l y logical transiti o n . In t he case of Rosa Luxemburg , each s tru gg le had mo re than one me an i n g - as we have seen , it was re d u p li ca t ed in a second sy m b o li c dimension . Nor was its meaning fixed: for it d e p en d e d upon variable articulations which, fro m her spontaneist p e rs p ec t ive repelled any a priori determination ( w i t h in the limits we have si g­ nailed) . Kautsky, on the other h and , s i m pl i fie d t he meaning of every .

.

.

' .

16 s ocial antagonism o r element b y r edu ci ng i t t o a spe c i fic structural lo ca ti o n a l ready fixed by the l ogic of the cap i tal i s t mode of p ro du c t i o n . The h i s t or y of cap i ta li s m set out in The Class Struggle co n s is ts of pure relations oj illteriority . We can pass fro m working class to ,

­

capitalists , from the economic sphere to the pol it i ca l sphe re , fro m manufacture t o monopoly capitalis m , without h a v ing to d e pa r t for one instant from the i n t e rn a l r a ti o na l i ty and inteIIigibility o f a closed pa r adigm Capi talism i s , no d o ubt presented to us as acting up o n an ex te rn a l s o ci a l r ea l i ty , yet the latter simply dissolves up o n ente ring i nto contact with the former. Capitalism changes , yet this change is n o th i ng more than the unfo ldi ng of its endogenous tendencies and contradictions . Here the lo gic of necessity is not limited by any t h i n g: this is what makes The Class Struggle a p re c ri s is t ext .

,

-

.

Finally , simplicity is present in a third dimension - that which refers to the role of theory itself. If this early Kautskian text is compared with others belonging to an earlier or later Marxist tradi­ tion, we find that it contains a rather surprising feature: it presents i t self not as an intervention to unravel the underlying sense of history , but as the systematization and generalization of a trans­ paren t experience which is there for all to see. As there is no social hieroglyph to decode, there is a perfect correspondence between theory and the practices of the workers movement . With regard to the constitution of class unity, Adam Przeworski has pointed out the peculiarity o f Kautsky's text: whereas Marx, from the time of the Poverty oj Philosophy, presented the unity of the economic insertion and political organization of the w o rking class as an unfinished p ro c es s - this was the hiatus which the distinction between 'class in itself and ' class for itself tried to fill - Kautsky argues as if the working class ha s already completed the formation of its unity . 'It seems that K au tsky believed that b y 1 890 the formation of the proletariat into a class was aJait accompli; it was already formed as a class and would remain so in the future . The organized proletariat had nothing l e ft to do but to pursue its historical mission , and the party could only participate in its realization. ' 1 2 Similarly, when Kautsky refers to growing proletarianization and impoverishment, to the inevitable crises of capitalism , or to the necessary advent of so cialism , he s ee ms to be speaking not o f potential tendencies revealed by analysis , but of empirically observable rea li ti es in the firs t t w o cases , and of a short-term transition in the third . Despite the fact that ne c e s si t y is t he dominant category in his discourse, its fun ction is not to guarantee a meaning beyond ex perien ce , but to systematize experience itself.

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concept

17

Now , although the combination o f e lements underl y ing t hi s optimism and simplici t y is presented as part of a universal process of class constitution , it merely represen t ed the crowni n g of the very specific hi stori cal formation of the German work ing class . Firstly , the po li tical autonomy of the German working class was the result of two failures: that of the German bourgeoisie , after 1 849 , to set itself up as the hegemonic force o f a liberal-democratic movement; and that of the Lassalleans' corporatist attempt to integrate t he workin g class into the Bi s marckian state Secondly , the great depression of 1873-96 , and the accompanying economic insecurity which affected all social strata, nurtured a general opti m ism about the imminent coll aps e of capitalism and the advent of proletarian revolution. Thirdly, the working class had a low degree of structural com­ plexity: the trade unions were inci pien t and subordinated to the party both politically and financially; and in the context of the twenty-year depres sion , the prospects for an impro v emen t in the workers ' condition through trade-union a c tivity seemed e x trem ely limited . Only with d i fficulty was the General Commission of the German trade unions , es tabli s hed in 1 890, able to impose its hegemony over the workers movement, amid the resistance of local trade union . powers and the overal l scepticism of S ocial D emo c r ac y . 1 3 Under these conditions, the unity and autonomy of the w ork ing class , and the collapse of the capitalist system , virtually appeared as facts of experience. These were the readi ng parameters which gave the Ka u tskian di scou rse its accepta b ili ty . Iii reality , howev er , the situation was strictly German - or, at' most, typical of certa in E u ro p ean c ount ries where the libe r al bourgeoisi e was weak and certainly did not cor respond to those processes of working cl as s formation in countries with a strong liberal (England) or democratic-Jacobin tradition (France) , or where ethnic and religious i den t i t ies pred o minated over those of class (the U ni ted S tates ) But s ince in the M arxist Vulgate, history advanced towards an ever greater sim p lification of s ocial antagonisms the extreme isolation and con fronta ti on course of the German workers movement would acquire the prestige of a paradig m towards which other national situations had to converge and in relation to which they were merely in ade qu ate a p proxi m ations . 1 4 The end of the depression b ro u g ht the be gi nning of the crisis o f this paradigm. The transition to o rg a ni zed capital ism , and the ensuing boom that lasted until 1 9 1 4, made uncertain the prospect of a 'general crisis of capi ta li sm Under the new condition s, a wave of .

-

-

.

,

,

'

' .

'

18

successful trade union economic struggles enabled the wo rkers to consolidate their organizational power and influence within Social Democracy . But at this point, a steady tension began to assert i ts elf between the trade unions and the po li ti c al l ea de rs h i p within the party , so that the unity and socialist determination of the working class became increasingly problematic. In all areas of society , an autonomization oj spheres was taking place - which implied that any type of unity could only be attained through unstable and co m p lex forms of rearticulation . From this new perspective, a serious question-mark appeared over the seemingly l o g ic al and simple sequence of the various structural moments of the 1892 Kautski an paradigm. And as the relationship between theory and pro gra m me was one of total implication , the political crisis was reduplicated in a theoretical one. In 1 898 Thom a s M asaryk coined an expression that soon became popular: the ' crisis of M arxism ' . This crisis , which served as the background to all Marxist debates fro m the turn of the century until the war, seems to have been dominated by two basic moments : the new awareness of the opacity of the social , of the comp le xities and resistances of an increasingly organized capitalism; and the frag mentation o f the different posi­ tions of social agents which, according to the classical paradigm, should have been united. 1 5 In a famous passage of a letter to Lagardelle, Antonio Labriola stated at the beginning of the revi­ sionism debate: 'Truly, behind all this rumour of controversy, there is a s erious and essential problem: the a rden t , live l y and precocious hopes of some years ago - those expectations of over-precise details and contours - are now running up against the most complex resistance of economic relations and the most intricate meshing of the political world . ' 1 6 It w ou l d b e wrong t o see this a s a merely transitory crisis; o n the contrary , M arxism finally lost its innocence at that time. In so far as the paradigmatic sequence of its c a tego ries was subjected to the ' structural pressure' of i n cre as ingl y atypical s itu a tions , it became ever more difficult to reduce social relations to structural moments internal to those categories . A proliferation of caesurae and dis­ continuities start to break down the unity of a discourse that con­ sidered itsel f profoundly monist . From then on, the p rob lem of M arxism has been to th ink those discontinuities and , at the same time , to find forms reconstituting the unity of scattered and hete r og en eo us elements . The transitions between different structural moments have lost their o riginary logical transparency and reveal an opacity pertaining to contingent and laboriously constructed relations . The

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concep t

19

specificity of the different responses t o the crisis of this paradigm resides in the way of concei v ing this relational moment - whose importance increases to the extent that its nature becomes less evident. This is what we must now analyse . The First Response to the Crisis: the Formation of Marxist Orthodoxy

Marxist orthodoxy, as i t is constituted i n Kautsky and Plekhanov, is not a simple continuation of classical Marxism. It involves a very particular inflection , characterized by the new role assigned to theory . Instead of serving to systematize ob s er v ab l e historical ten­ dencies - as it did in Kautsky 's text o f 1 892 - theory sets itself up as a guarantee that these tendencies will eventually coincide with the type of social articulation proposed by the Marxist p aradigm . In other words , orthodoxy is constituted on the gro u n d of a growing disjuncture between Marxist theory and the political practice . of Social Democracy. It is the laws of motion of the infrastructure , guaranteed b y M arxist 'science' , which provide the terrain for the overcoming of this disjuncture and assure both the transitory character of the existing tendencies and the future revolutionary reconstitution of the working class . · Let us examine , in this regard, Kautsky's position on the relation­ ship between party and unions , as expressed in his polemic with the theoreticians of the trade union movement. 17 Kautsky is perfectly aware of the s trong tendencies toward fragmentation within the German working class : the rise of a labour aristocracy; the opposi­ tion between unionized and non-unioni z ed workers; the counter­ posed interests of different wage categories; the co ns ci ous policy of the bourgeoisie to di v i de the working class; the presence of masses of Cat holic workers subjected to a church populism which distances them fro m the Social Democrats , and so forth. He is equally con­ scious of the fact that the more immediate material interests predomi­ nate , the more tendencies toward fragmentation assert themselves; an d that hence pure t rade-unio n action c ann o t guarantee either the unity or the socialist determination of the working class . 1 8 These can be consolidated only if the immediate material interests of the work­ i n g class are subordinated to the Endziel, the final socialist objective, and this presupposes the subordination of economic struggle to political struggle, and thus of the trade unions to the party. 19 B u t the party can represent this totalizing instance only insofar as it is the

20 de p o s i t o ry o f science - that is , of M arxist th eory . The obvious fact t ha t the wo r k in g class was not fo l low in g a s o ci al i s t di re c t io n E n g lis h trade unionism was a resoun din g example of this , and by the t ur n of the century could n o lon ge r be ig nored - led Ka u ts k y to affirm a new privileged role for intellectuals which was to have such an i m po r t an t influence on Lenin's What is to be Done. Such intellec­ tual m ed ia ti o n is limited in its effects , for , according to the Spinozist formula , its s o le freedom consists in b ei n g the consciousness of n eces sit y . However , it does entail the emergence of an a rti cul a t in g nexus that c annot s i m p ly be referred to the chain of a monis ti ca lly con ceived necessity. The fissure that o p e n ed up in the i den t i ty o f the class , the growing d i ss o ci a ti on between the different s ubj ec t positions of t he w ork e rs , co u l d o nly be sur p a s s ed by a future m o vemen t of the economic base whose advent was g uarant eed by Marxist s ci en ce . C on s e qu en t ly , everything de pends on the p red i c ti v e capacity of this s cience and on t he necessary character of such pre d i ct ion s . It is no accident that the category o f ' n e cessi ty' has to be affirmed with e ver increas i n g virulence . It is well k no wn how ' n eces s i t y ' was un de rs t o od by the Second International: as a na tu ral necessity , foun de d on a combina­ tion of M ar x is m and Darwinism . The Darwinist influence has freq u e n t l y been p res en t ed as a vu lg ar Marxist substitute for Hegelian dialectics; but th e truth is that in the o r tho d ox co n cep ti o n , Hege­ l ian ism and Darwinism combined to form a hybrid cap ab l e of satis­ fying s trateg ic requirements . Darwinism alone does not offer ' g u ara nt ees for the future', sin ce natural selection does not operate in a di rection p redet er m ined fr o m the be ginnin g . 20 Only i f a Hegelian type of t ele o l o gy is added to Darwinism - which is totally incom­ p a ti b l e with it - can an evo l ut i o n a ry process be p resen t ed as a gua rantee of future t r an s i t i ons . This co n ce p ti o n of class unity as a future u ni t y assured by the action of i n eluc tab l e laws , had effects at a nu m be r of le ve l s : on the type of articulation attribu te d t o di ve rs e s ubj e c t positions; on the way of t r e a ti n g differences which could not be as sim ilated to th e pa ra d ig m ; and on the strategy for an al ys i s of historical events . Co n ce r n i n g the first p oi n t , it is e v i d ent that if the revolutionary subject es ta b li shes its class i de n ti ty at the level of the relations of p rod u c ti o n , 2 1 its presence at other levels can only be one of exteriority and i t m us t a do p t the form of 'representation oj interests ' . The terrain of politics can only be a superstructure , insofar as it is a terrain of s t r u gg le between agents whose identity , conceived under the form of 'interests ' , h a s set itself up at ano t h er level . This essential i d en ti ty

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concept

21

was thusjixed, once and for a ll , a s a n unalterable fact relating t o the various forms of political and ideological representation into which the working class entered . 22 S econ d l y , this reductionist problematic used two types of reason­ ing - which we ma y call th e argumentJrom appearance and th e argu­ ment Jrom co n ti ng en cy - to deal with differences that could not be assimilated to its own categories . The argument from appearance: everyth ing prese n ti n g i tself as different can be reduced to identity. This may take two forms: either appearance is a mere artifice of concealment, or it is a necessary form of the manifestation of essence . (An e x a m ple of the first form : ' n a ti o n a l is m is a screen w h i ch hides t h e interests of the bou r geoisie ' ; a n exa m p l e of the second: 'the Liberal S tate is a n ecess a ry political form of capitalis m ' . ) The argu­ ment from c o n ti ngenc y : a social category or sector may not be red ucibl e to the central identities o f a certain form of society , but in th at case i ts very marginality vis-a-vis the fundamental line of his­ torical d e ve l o p ment allows us to discard it as irrelevant . (For example : 'because ca pi tal i sm leads to the proletarianization of the middle classes and the peasantry, we can ignore these and co n cen­ trate our strategy on the co n fli ct between the bourgeoisie and the p r oleta ri a t ' . ) Thus , in the argument from contingency , identity is rediscovered in a diachronic totality: an inexorable succession of stages allows exis ting social reality to be divided into phenomena that are necessary or contingent, according to the stage of that s o ciety ' s approaching m a t u ri ty . History is therefore a continuous concretization of the ab s t rac t , an approximation to a paradigmatic purity whi ch appears a s both sense and direction of the process . Fin al ly the orthodox paradigm, qua analytic of the present, postu­ lates a strategy of recognition . In as much as Marxism claims to know the unavoidable course of history in its essential determinations, the understanding of an actual event can only m ean to identify it as a mom en t in a temporal succession tha t is fixed a priori . Hence dis­ cussions such as : is the rev o l u tio n of year x in co u nt ry y the bourgeois-democratic revolution ? Or, w ha t forms should the tran­ sition to socialism assume in t hi s or that country? The t h ree areas of effects an al y s e d above present a common characteristic: the concrete is reduced to the abstract. Diverse subject positions are reduced to m ani festati o n s of a single position; the plurality of differences is either reduced or rejected as contingent; the sense of th e p resent is revealed through its location in an a priori succession of s tages . It is precisely because the concrete is in this way reduced to the abstract , that h istory , society and social agents h av e ,

22 for orthodoxy ,

an essence which operates as their principle oj unification . And as this essence is not immediately visible, it is necessary to distinguish between a Sl4rJace or appearance of society and an under­ lying reality to which the ultimate sense of every concrete presence must necessarily be referred , whatever the level of complexity in the system of mediations . It is clear w hich strategic conception could be derived from this vision of the course of capitalism. The subject of this strategy was , of course, the workers' party . Kautsky vigorously rejected the revisionist notion of a 'popular party' because, in his view , it involved a transference of the interests of other classes to the interior of the party and, consequently , a loss of the revolutionary character of the movement. However, his supposedly radical position, based on the rejection of any compromise or alliance, was the centrepiece of a fundamentally conservative strategy . 23 Since his radicalism relied on a p rocess which did not require political initiatives , it could only lead to quietism and waiting. Propaganda and organization were the two basic - in fact the only - tasks of the party . Prop­ aganda was geared not to the creation of a broader 'popular will ' , through the winning of new sectors t o the socialist cause, but above all to the reinforcing of working-class identity . As to organization, its expansion did not involve greater political participation in a numbe r of fronts, but the construction of a ghetto where the work­ ing class led a self-focused and segregated existence . This progres­ sive institutionalization of the movement was well suited to a per­ spective in which the final crisis of the capitalist system would come from the bourgeoisie's own labours , while the working class merely prepared for its intervention at the appropriate moment. Since 1881 Kautsky had s tated: 'Our task is not to organize the revolution but to organize ourselves for the revolution; not to make the revolution but to take advantage of it. ' 24 Obviously, alliances did not represent for Kautsky a fundamental strategic principle. In concrete circumstances , a variety of alliances were possible at the level of empirical tactics; but in the long term, just as the revolution would have a purely proletarian character, so did the working class occupy an isolated position in the anti­ capitalist struggle . Kautsky's analysis of internal contradictions in other sectors precisely demonstrates the impossibility of establishing long-term democratic and antl-capitalist alliances with them. In the case of the peasantry , he attempts to prove that it is a disintegrating sector, so that working-class defence of its interests is a reactionary policy opposed to the general line of economic progress. Similarly ,

Hegemony: the G enealogy

oj a Concept

23

in the Kautskian a n al ys is of im pe ri a l i s m , the middle classes are increasingly united under the i d eo l o gi c a l domination of financ e capital and m ilitari s m . Ch ar ac teri s t i ca ll y , Ka u t s k y is never for one moment aware t h a t thi s p ol i tic a l and id eo lo g i ca l ho ld d a n gerous ly accentuates t h e workers' isolation , and t h a t , faced with the offensive of capital , the working class should res p o n d with a counter­ o ffe n si v e to win over these middle sectors to the an ti-capitalist c a u s e . This line o f t h o u g h t is closed because, in his a n aly s i s , the incr e a s ­ ing l y reactionary ch ara c te r of the m id d l e se c t ors cor respon d s to objective and unalterable pro ces ses . For the same reason, the is o l a­ tion of t h e workers is not a threat to socialism, because this is guaranteed by historically given laws which in the lo ng term will prove the p o w er less ne s s of a ll bo u r g eo i s m ac h i n ation s . A g o o d example of how Kautsky conceived the pro l e ta ri an s t rug g l e may b e found in his concept of 'war of a t t ri t i on' . This refers not to a special tactic but to the totality of p oli ti c al actions under­ t a k en by the w o r ki n g class since the 1 860s . Three a sp e c ts are in­ volved in war of a t tri ti on : ( 1 ) the p r e c on s ti tu t ed i den ti ty of the working class , which in crea sin g ly undermines the opponent's power but is n ot significantly m od i fi ed in the course of the struggle; (2) an e qu a ll y p re co n s t i tu te d i dent ity o f the b o u r g eo i sie , which increases or re d u c es its capa ci t y for domination but under n o cir­ cums ta nc e s alters its own nature; (3) a prefixed li n e of de v e l o p­ ment - o n ce ag a i n the 'inexorable laws' - which g i v es a d i rec­ tional tendency to the war of attri tion . This strategy has b een com­ pared to G r a msci ' s 'war of posi t i on ' /5 but in re al i ty the two are pro fo un dly different . W ar o f positIOn presupposes the concept of he gem o n y which, as we shall see , is incom pa ti b l e with the idea of a linear, p redetermined develop m en t and , above all , with the prc­ co n s t itu ted character of Kautskian subjec ts . The role as s i g n ed b y or thod o x M arxis m to theory confronts us with a p aradox . On the one hand , its role increases as the wid en in g gap bet w ee n 'present co ns c io u s n es s ' and 'historical mission' of the class can o n l y be e x t e rna ll y bridged thro ug h politic a l intervention . On the other hand , s ince the theory u n d e r pinn i n g p o li ti c al interven­ tion is pre s en t ed as consciousness of a necessary and mechanical determination , the ana ly s i s becomes ever more determinist and economist to the very extent that the composition oj h istorical Jorces depends more on theoretical mediation . This is e ven more evident in Pl e kh an o v than in Ka u tsk y . T h e in ci p i en t development of ca p i­ talism in Russia failed to c reate a bo u rgeo i s civilization, with the res u l t that the meaning of Russian re al i ty c o u ld o n l y be unravelled

24 t h rou gh a co m pari s on with Western ca p ital is t development. For Russian M arx i s ts , therefore , the social phenomena of their co un try w e r e sy m b o l s of a t e x t which t ran sce nd ed them and was available for a fu l l and explicit reading only in the capitalist West. This meant t hat t he o ry was in co m p ara b l y more important in Russia than in the W est: if the ' n e ces s ary laws of history' were not universally valid, the fleeting rea l i t y of a strike, of a demonstration, of a process of accumulation, threatened to melt away . A re fo rm ist like Guglielmo Ferrer0 26 could wax ironic about the orthodox claim that M arxism c o nstit ut e d a c o h e ren t and homogeneous theoretical field . In the end , if th e doctrine was eclectic and heteroclite, this scarcely affected the m a ter i a li ty of a social p ra c tic e sanctioned by the ensemble of p r ol et a ri a n institutions - a practice which, in the revisionism con­ t ro v e rs y , began to establish its own relations of exteriority with theory . This , however, could not be Plekhanov's position, for he confronted phenomena which did not spontaneously point in a precise direction , but whose meaning relied on their insertion within an inter p r etative system . The more the meaning of the social depended upon theoretical formulation, the more the defence of o r th od o x y turned i n to a political p roble m . W ith these points in mind, it is not surprising that the p rinc iple s of Marxist o r t h odox y were given a much more rigid for mul ation in Pl e k h a n o v than in Kautsky . I t is well known , for example, that he coine d the term ' dialectical materialism ' . But he was also responsible for the radical naturalism which led to such a strict separation between b as e and superstructure that the latter was considered to be no more than a combination of necessary expressions of the former. M oreo v e r , Plekhanov's concept of economic base allows for no intervention by social forces: the economic process is completely determined by th e productive forces , conceived as technology. 27 This rigid determination enables him to present society as a strict hier a rch y of i ns t ances , with decrea sin g degrees of efficacy: ' 1 ) the state oj the productive Jorces; 2) the economic relations these forces condition; 3) the s o cia-p o l iti ca l system that h a s de v e loped on the given economic " basis"; 4) the mentality of social man, which is deter­ mined in part by the economic conditions obtaining, and in part by the entire s o c ia- po l itical system that has arisen on that foundation; 5) the various ideologies that re fl e ct the properties of that mentality . ' 2 8 In Socialism and Political Struggle and Our Dilferences, Plekhanov formulated an equally rigid succession of stages th ro u gh which the Russian rev o l u tio n a ry p rocess had to pass , so that any ' uneven and combined development' w as eliminated from the fi el d of strategy .

Hegemony: the Genealog y oj a Concept

25

All the early analys is of R uss i an M arxism - from Peter Struve's 'legal M arxism', th rough Plekhanov as the ce nt ral moment, to Lenin's Development oj Capitalism in Russia - tended to obliterate the s t udy of specificities , repr es entin g these as n o t h i n g other than outwardly apparent or c ontingent forms of an essential reality : the abstract de ve l o pme n t of ca p i t al i sm through which every society must pass . Let us now make a final observation o n o r thod o xy . As we have seen , theory maintained that the growing d isj un ct u re between fin al objective and curren t po li t ical practices w o ul d be resolved at some future m o m en t , w hich o p e r a te d as a coincidentia oppositorum . As this practice of recomposition, however, could not be left entirely to the fu t u re a struggle had somehow to be waged in the present a gain s t the tend en c ies towards fragmentation . But since this s t ru gg le entailed forms of a rticul a tion which did no t at that time spontaneously result from the laws of capitalism, it was necessary to introduce a social logic different from mechanical de te r min is m - that is to s a y a space that would restore the autonomy ofpolitical initiative. Alt h ou gh minimal, this space is present in Kautsky: it comprises the relations of exteriority, between the work in g class and soci al i s m , which require the political mediation of intellectuals . There is a link here which cannot simply be ex plained by 'obj e c t i ve historical deter­ mination . This space was necessarily broader for those tendencies which, in order to overcome the split between day-to-day practi ces and final objective, strove hardest to break w i th q uieti s m and to achieve current political effects . 29 Rosa L u xe m b u rg s sp ontan e is m , and, more generally , the poli tical strategies of the Neue Linke con­ firm this . The most creative tendencies within orthodoxy attempted to li mi t the effects of the 'logic of necessity' , but th e ine v i t ab le ou t c o m e was th at the y p l aced their discourse in a perm a ne n t dualism between a 'logic of nece s si ty , produ cing ever fewer effects in term s of political practice, and a l o gi c of conting en c y which, by not determining its specificity , was in c a p a b le of theo ri zi ng itself. Let us give two examples of the dualism created by these partial a tte m p t s to 'open the ga me The first is the concept of morphological prediction in L a b ri o l a . He stated: 'Histo r ical fo r es i g h t . . . (in The Communist Manifesto) does n ot i mp l y, and this is s till the c a s e either a chronolo g ica l date or an a d van c e picture of a social configuration, as w a s and is typical of old a nd new apocal y ps es and pro p he cies . . . In the theory of c r i ti c a l communism, it is t h e whole of society which , a t a m o m ent in the process, discovers the reason fo r i ts i nev i t a b le course , and which , at a salient point in its curve, sheds li g ht on itself ,

,

'

'

'

'

'

' .

,

26 and reveals i ts laws of motion . The prediction to which the Manifesto a l lu d es for t he first time was not chronological , of an anticipatory or promise-like n a tu re ; it was morphological , a word which, in my o p i nio n , succinctly expresses ev ery thing. '30 Labriola was here waging a tw o fol d battle . The first was directed against tendencies critical of M arxism - Croce, Gentile3 1 - who, basing the unpre­

dictability of hi s to ry on the non-systematic character of events, found a u ni t a ry order only in the consciousness of the historian . For his p art , Labriola st ressed the objective character of historical l aws . However, these w e re morphological - that is , their area o f v alidi ty was re s t r i c t e d to certain fundamental tendencies . Labriola's second b att l e , then, w a s ag ai nst the forms of dogmatism which conve rted general tendencies into immediately legible facts on the surface of historical life . It is now clear that the way in which this twofold battle was waged could not but introduce a dualism which, in Labrio la , found e x p re ss ion in the counterposition of historical development as na rr a ti on and as morphology; and, more genera ll y , in the decreasing ca p a c it y of Engels 's d ial ec tical paradigm to explain h i s tor y . 32 More­ o ver , this d i c ho tomy presents the same double void that we found in Rosa Luxemburg . For, the 'narrative' elements are counterposed to the ' m o rp holog i cal ' ones not as something positive, with its own internal n eces sit y , but as the contingent reverse of morphological n e ces s ity . A c co rdi ng to Badaloni , the 'real unfolding of events can (fo r Labriola) g i ve rise to intricate and unforeseeable vicissitudes . Nonetheless , what counts is that the understanding of these vicis­ situdes should occur within the genetical h y po thesi s (class contradic­ tion and i t s progressive simplification) . Thus , the proletariat is located not in an indeterminate historical time, but in that pe cul iar

historical time which is dominated by the crisis of the bourgeois social formation . '33 In other words, 'morphological necessity' con­ stitutes a theoretico-discursive terrain which comprises not only its o w n d i sti n c t i ve te rritory but also what it excludes from itself ­ con tin gen cy . If an ensemble of 'events' are conceptualized as 'con­ tingent' , t h ey are not con ce p tu al i z ed at all, except in their lack of certain attributes existent in the morphological tendencies opposed to the m . However, since the life o f society is ever more complex than the mo rp hol ogi c al categories of Marxist discourse - and this c o m pl e x i t y was L ab rio l a's starting point - the only possible con­ s equ e n ce is that theory becomes an increasingly irrelevant tool for the u n d ers tan d ing of concrete social processes . Thus , to a v o id fa l li ng into complete agnosticism, it is necessary at s om e p o in t to introduce other explanatory catego r i es . Labriola does

Hegemony : the Genealogy oj a Concept

27

t hi s , fo r e xa m pl e , i n h i s co n cre te a n al y s e s , where diverse social c at eg ori e s are not s i m p l y con cep t ua l i zed in their 'contingency ' , but are each endowed with a certain necessity or lawfulness of their own. What is the r ela tion s h i p between these ' fa ct ual ' s tru c tur al com plexes and the s t ru c tures which are the o bj ec t of m orp h olog i c al p re di ctio n ? A first p o s si b l e solution would be ' di al e c t i c a l ' : to m a i n tain a monist perspective which conceives comp lexi ty as a system of mediations . 34 La b ri o l a c ould no t ado p t this solution , however, because i t would have fo rce d hi m to extend the effects o f necessi t y to the surface of historical life - the very area from which he wanted to d i s pl ace them . But if t he dialectical solution is rejected , it is not possible to pass logically from m o rpholo gi cal a n al ys i s to the distinctive lawful­ ness of pa rti a l totalities . The transition therefore assumes an extemal character - which is to say that the con ce p tual i z a ti o n of these legali­ ties is external to Marxist theory . Marxist th e o ry cannot, then , be the 'complete and h a rm oni o us wo rld-s y ste m ' presented b y Plekhanov and thinkable only w i t hin a closed model . The necessity/contin­ ge n cy dualism opens the way to a plu ral i s m of structural l eg ali ties whose internal l o g i cs and mutual relations have to be determined . This can be s een ev en m o re cle a rl y if we examine Austro­ Marxism , our s eco n d ex amp le of an 'open orthodoxy' . Here we fmd a more r a d ical and sys tematic e ffort than Labriola 's to d i ver si fy th e st a rt in g po i n ts , to m ul t i p l y the theoretical categories , and to auto­ nomize areas o f so c iety i n t hei r specific determinations . Otto Bauer , in his o b it u a ry on M ax Adler, referred to the b e g i n n i n g of the s chool in the followi n g terms: 'Whereas M arx and Engels beg a n from Hegel , and the later M ar x is ts from materialism, the more recent hAustro-M arxists " h ad at t hei r po in t of d epa r ture Kant a nd M ac h . '35 The Austro-Marxists were conscious of the obstacles to wo rk ing-c l a s s unity in the dual monarchy, and of the fact that such un i ty de pende d up on c ons ta nt poli ti ca l i niti a ti v e . The y therefore understood well what , from the different p e r specti v e of th e Leninist traditio n , w a s termed 'uneven and combined development' . 'In the Austro-Hungarian mona rch y there ar e e x a m ple s of all the economic forms t o be found in Europ e , including Turkey . . . The light of socialist propaganda s hines e v eryw he re in t he midst of these diver­ gent e co n o m i c and political conditions . This creates a picture of e x tre m e diversity . . . W hat exists in the International as a chrono­ lo gical development - the socialism of artisans , j ou rney m en , workers in manufacture, fac to r y wo rk e rs , an d a gri cultu ral wo rkers , wh ich u nd e rg o es alterations, with th e p o li tica l , the social, or the in tel le ctual asp ect of the m ovem ent p redo m ina ti n g at any given

28 moment - takes p lac es co n t e m p o rane o us l y in Austria . '36 In this mosaic of social and national s itu ati o n s , it was i mp o ssi b le to think o f n ation al identities as ' sup ers tru ct ural ' or of class unity as a n e cessar y consequence of the infrastructure . Indeed, such a unity de p ended on a c om p l ex p o li ti c a l construction . In the words of O tto Bauer: ' I t is an i ntell ec tu al force which maintains unity . . . "Austro-M arxism" today , as a p rodu ct of unity and a force for the maintenance of u n i ty , is nothing but the i d eolo g y of un i t y of the

workers movement. '37 The moment of class unity is , thus , a political m o men t . The constitutive c e n t re of what we m ig ht call a societ y 's relational con­ figuration or articulatory Jonn is displaced towards the fi eld of the superstructures , so t h a t the very distinction between economic base a n d s up e rs t ru ctur e be co me s bl urr e d a n d p ro b le m atic. Three main types of A us tro-M ar x is t theoretical intervention are closely linked to this n e w s t rat egi c pers pe ct i v e : the attempt to li mit the area of validity of ' historical nece ss it y ' ; the suggestion of new fronts of st r ugg l e based u p o n the com p lex ity of the social that was charac­ t e ristic o f m atu re c a p i tal is m ; and the e ffo r t to think in a no n reductive manner the s pe ci fi ci t y of s ubj e ct posi tions other than those of class . The first type of intervention is mainly connected with M ax Adle r ' s p h ilosop hi ca l reformul ati o n an d h is p e cul ia r form of neo­ Kantianism . The Kantian rethin ki n g of M arxism pro duced a number of liberating e ffects : it broadened the audience for so cial ism , insofar as the j us tness of its postulates could be posed in terms of a universality t ran s ce n d ing class b ounds ; it broke with the naturalist conception of social r ela tions and, by ela b o ra t i ng concepts such as the ' social a priori' , introduced a s trictly discursive element into the constitution o f s o cial objectivity; and finally , it allowed Marxists to co n cei v e the infrastructure as a terrain whose conformation depended upon forms of consciousness , and not upon the naturalis­ tic m ovement of the forces of production. The second type of intervention a lso place d the base/s u p erstructure distinction into qu est i o n . In the discussion regardi n g K autsky' s Road to Power, Bauer , for e x a m p l e ,38 tried to sho w how wrong it was to co nceive the economy as a homog eneous field dominated by an end ogeno us logic, given th at in the mo nopol y and imperial is t phase pol i tica l, technico-organizational and scientific transformations were inc re as­ ingl y part o f the industrial apparatus . In his view , if the laws of c o m pet i t i on prev i o usl y functioned as n a tu ral powers , the y now had to pass th rou gh the minds of m en and women . Hence the emphasis on the gro wi ng interlock between state and economy, which in the ­

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concept

29

1 920s led to the debate about 'organized capitalism' . Views also chan g e d about the p o i n ts of rupture and an tag on is m created by the n e w co nfigu r a tion of capi t a li s m : these were now located not solely in the r el ati o n s of production , but in a number of areas of the social and political s tru cture Hence too , th e new im p o r t an c e attributed to the v e r y d is p ers i on of the d a y t o d ay struggle (revo!utionare Kleinarbeit) , co ncei v ed in neither an e vo lu tio n a ry nor a re formist sense, 3 9 a nd the fresh s i g nifi c a n ce acquired by t he moment of poli­ tical a r t ic u latio n (This is reflected , among other things , in t he new way of p os i n g the relationship between party and intellectuals . 40) Finally , with regard to the new subject positions and the ensuing break w i th class reductionism, it is sufficient to mention Bauer's work o n the national q uesti on and Renner's on legal institutions. Th e g en e ral pattern of the theoretico-strategic intervention of Austro-M arxism s ho u l d now be clear: insofar as the p ractical e ffi cac y of autonomous p o li t i cal intervention is broadened, the dis­ course of ' historical necessity' loses its relevance and withdraws to the ho ri z o n of the social (in ex a c t ly the same way that , in deist dis co u rse the effects of God's presence in the wo rld a re d r a s tic ally red u ce d) This , in tu rn , requires a p roliferation of new discursive forms to occupy the terrain left vacant. The Austro-M arxists , how­ ever, failed to reach the point of breaki ng with dualism and el i m ina t in g the m o m e n t of mo rp h ol ogi ca l nec e ss ity . In the theoretico­ political u niv e r s e of jin-de-siecle M a rxi s m , this decisive step was taken only b y Sorel , th ro ug h his con tr a s t between 'melange' and 'bloc'. We shall return to this belo w . .

-

-

.

,

.

­

'

'

The Second Response to the Crisis: Revisionism The orthodox response to the ' crisis of M arxism' sought to over­ come the di sj u n ctu re between 'theory' and o b se rv a ble tendencies of ca p i ta lis m by intransigently affi rm in g the val id ity of the fo rme r and the a r t i ficial or t ran s i to ry character o f the latter. Thus it would seem very sim p le to con c l u de that the revisionist response was s y mme tri­ ca lly o p p os e d e spe ci all y since B e rns tein himself ins is ted on many occasions that he had no major disagreements wi th the p rogram m e and p r a c t i c e s of the S PD as the y had materialized since the Er fu rt Congress , and th a t the only purpose of his intervention was to rea l iz e an aggiornamento ada p tin g the t he or y to the concrete p ra cti ces of the movement. Nevertheless , such a conclu s io n would obscure i mpo rt an t dimensions of Bernstein 's intervention . In p a rti cular , it would lead us into the e rror o f id en ti fyin g riformism with revision'

'

,

30 ism . 4 1 The t r a de union leaders , who were the true spokesmen for a reformist policy within the SPD , expressed little interest in Berns t ei n ' s theoretical proposi tions an d rem a in e d s tri ct l y neutral in th e ensuing cont ro vers y - w h en they did not o p enl y support orthodoxy . 42 M oreover, in crucial political debates on the mass s trike43 and the attitude to war, Bernstein's po s itio n was not o nly different from but s t ri ctly oppo sed to that of the refo r m i s t leaders in the trade unions and the party . Thus , i n attempting to id entify the p recise d i fference between re for m i sm and revisionism , we must s t r es s that what is essential in a reformist practice is political quietism and the corp oratist confinement d the working class. The reformist leader a t tem p t s to defend the gains and immediate interests of the clas s , and he conse q uently tends to consider it as a segrega ted sector, endowed with a p e r fe c tly defined identity and limits . But a ' revisionist' theory is not necessary for this; indeed, a ' rev ol u tion ar y' th e o r y can - in many cases - better fulfil the same role b y i so l a tin g the working class and le a vin g to an indeterminate future any questioning of the e x istin g p ower structure . We have al r ea d y referred to the conserva­ tive cha r acter of Kautskian revolutionis m . Reformism does not identify with e i ther term of the revisionism/orthodoxy alternative but cuts a cross the two . The basic issue co nfro n t ing revisionist and o r tho d ox theoreticians was not , t herefore, the ques tion of reformism . Neither was it the p roblem of p e a ce fu l or violent transition from capitalism to s ocialis m - in relation to which the 'orthodox ' did not have a clear and unani m ous position. The main point oj divergence was that, whereas orthodoxy considered that theJragmentation and division characteristic oj the new stage d capitalism would be o v ercome through changes in the inJra­ structure, rev isionism held that this was to be achieved through autonomous political intervention. The a u t ono m y of the political from the economic base is the true novelty of Bernstein's argument. In fact, it has been pointed out44 that behind each of Bernstein's critiques of classi c al M arxist theory , there was an attempt to recover the political initiative in particular spheres . Revisionism, at its best moments , rep resented a real effort to break with the corporative isolation of the working class . It is, also true , however, that just as the political was emerging as an autonomous instance, it was used to validate a ' refo rmist' practice which was to a large extent i ts o p po s ite . This is the p a r a d ox that we must try to explain . I t refers us to certain limitations in Bernstein's rupture with economism which would only be rigorously overcome in Gramsci . Autonomy of the p o l i tical

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concept

31

and its limits: we must examine how these two moments a re s truc­ tured . It is important to recognize that Bernstein , more clearly than an y representative of orthodoxy, understood the changes affecting capitalism as it entered the monopoly era . His analyses were, in this sense, closer to the p roblematic of a Hilferding or a Lenin than to the orthodox theorizations of the time .45 Bernstein also grasped the political consequences of capitalist reorganization . The three main changes - a-symmetry between the concentration of enterprises and the concentration of patrimonies; the subsistence and g rowth of the middle s.trata; the role of economic planning in the prevention of crises - could only involve a total change in the assumptions upon which Social Democracy had hitherto been based . It was not the case that the evolution of the economy was proletarianizing the middle classes and the peasantry and heightening the polarization of society , nor tha t the transition to socialism could be expected to follow from a revolutionary outbreak consequent upon a serious economic crisis . Under such conditions, socialism had to change its terrain and strategy, and the key theoretical moment was the break with the rigid base/su perstructure distinction that had prevented any con­ ception of the autonomy of the political . It was this latter instance to which the moment of recomposition and overcoming of fragmenta­ tion was now transferred in the revisionist analysis . 'Sciences , arts , a whole series of social rela tions are today much less dependent on economics than formerl y , or, in order to give no room for mis­ conception , the point of economic development attained today leaves the ideological, and especially the ethical , factors greater space for independent ac ti v ity than was formerly the case . In consequence of this the interdependency of cause and effect between technical , economic evolution of other social tendencies is becoming always more indirect , and from that the necessities of the first are losing much of their power of dictating the form of the latter . '46 It is only this autonomization of the political , as opposed to the d ictates of th e economic base, that permits it to play this role of recomposition and reunification against infrastructural tendencies w hich if abandoned to themselves , can only lead to fragmentation . This can clearly be seen in Bernstein's conception of the dialectic of working-class unity and division . Economically, the working class always appears more and more divided . The modem proletariat is not that d ispossessed mass of which Marx and Engels w rote in the Manifesto: 'it is just in the most advanced of manufacturing industries ,

32 that a whole hierarchy of differentiated workmen are

to

be found,

between those groups only a moderate feeling of identity exists . '47

This diversification of interests - which was most apparent in the English case - was not simply the residue of a guildist past, as Cun o w had argued , but was the result of th e establishment of a democratic S tate . Although, under conditions of political re p res­ sion , unity in st ruggle p l ace d sectoral interests on a secondary level, these tended to blossom once again in a con t ex t of freedo m . N o w , i f t h e tendency towards division i s inscribed in the very structure of modern capita li sm , what is the source of the opposite moment, the tendency towards unification? A c co r d ing to Bernstein, it is the party . Thus , he speaks of the 'necessity of an organ of the cl a ss struggle which h ol ds the en tire class together in spite of its fragmentation through different employment, and that is t he Social Democracy as a politi cal party . In it, the special interest of the economic group is submerged in favour of the general interest of those who depend on income for their labour, of all the under­ p rivileged . '48 As we saw earlier , in Kautsky the party also repre­ sented the universal moment of the class; but while in his case p o liti c al unity was the s.cientific p refiguration of a real unity to be achieved by the movements of the infrastructure , in Bernstein the moment of political articulation could not be reduced to such move­ ments . The specificity of the political link escapes the chain of necessity; the irreducible space of the political , which in Kautsky was limited to the mediating role of the intelligentsia, appears here considerably enlarged . However, in Berns tein's analysis of political mediation as consti­ tutive of class unity, a barely perceptible ambiguity has slipped through to vitiate his entire theoretical construction . The ambiguity is this: if the working class appears increasingly divided in the economic sphere, and if its unity is autonomously constructed at the political level , in what sense is this political unity a class unity? The problem was not posed for orthodoxy , as the non-correspondence between economic and political identity was ultimately to be resolved by the evolution of the economy itself. In Bernstein's case, the lo gic al conclusion would seem to be that political unity can be constituted only through an overcoming of the class limitations of t he different fractions of workers , and that there should thus be a perma­ nent structural hiatus between economic and poli ti cal subjectivity . This is , however, a conclusion which Bernstein never reaches in his analysis. On the one hand , he insists that Social Democracy must be a party of all the oppressed and not only of the workers , but on the

Hegemony : the Genealogy cif a Concept

33

other he conceives this u ni t y as that of a n ensemble of sectors which 'accept the p oin t of view of the workers and recognize them as the le a d i n g class ' . As his bi o gra p h e r Peter Gay indicates ,49 Bernstein never went beyond this point . Conse q uently , a link is missing in his r ea soni n g . The class cha r a cter o f the unification between th e p ol i ti ca l and the e conomic is no t p rod uced in either of the two s phe r es , and the argument re m ai ns su s p en d e d in a void. This conclusion may p erha p s be ex ces siv e , because it assumes t h a t Berns te in ' s rea s oning moves on the same level as that of Kautsky or Rosa L u x em b ur g - that he is referring to necessary subjects of an ineluctable hi sto r i ca l proces s . The truth is , ho w e v e r , that by den y ­ ing that hi story is do m i n a ted by an abs t r a c t determinist logic, Bernstein pr ec is e l y shifted the debate from t h i s p l a n e. In his c o n c e p ­ tion , the cen t r a li t y of t he workers seems instead to r e fer to a his­ t or i c a l l y con t i n g en t line of arg u m e n t - for example , that th e work­ in g class is better p rep a red than other sectors to fulfil the le a d in g ro le , gi ven its degree of concentration and organization . Yet the problem re ma in s of why Bernstein p resente d these advantages - which were at m o st c o nju n c t ur a l - as irreversible achievements . The same ambiguity c an be fo und in Bernstein's dictum that ' the path is every­ thi ng and the goal is n ot hin g' . Traditionally , this has been consi­ d ered a ty p ic al ' g rad u a l is t ' sl o gan . 50 However , in s o m e of its mean­ i n gs , which p rodu ce both theoretical and political ejJects within the rev i ­ sionist discourse, g ra du a li sm is not logically en t ai l ed . The only neces­ sary im p li c at i o n of this statement is t h a t the wo r king class can o b t ain concrete gains within the c a p italis t system, and t h a t revolution cannot t h e r e fo re be co ns i de red as an absolute moment in the pa ss ag e from total d is p os s essio n to radical liberation. This does not neces­ sarily imply the g r adu a l is t co ncep tio n of slow , unilinear and irrever­ sible advances , a l thoug h it is true that Bernstein's line of argument concerning de mo c r atic advances links them to a grad uali s t perspec­ tive. Once a g a in , we must therefore po se t h e p rob l e m of the ter ra in w he re t h es e l o gicall y distinct s tructural moments unite . This b r i n g s our investi g ation t o the concrete forms of Bernstein's rup t u r e with orthodox determinism , and to the type of concepts he deploys in o rd e r to fill the space opened by its col l a p se. When Bernstein que sti on s whe t h er . a n y gen eral mechanism can val idl y explain the course of h is to r y , his a rgument assumes a characteristic form: he do e s not criticise the type of historical ca u sa l i t y p ropos ed by orthodoxy , but a t t em p ts to crea te a space where the free p l a y of s u bje c t i v i t y will be p os si ble in history . Accepting the orthodox identifica tion of obje cti v i t y a nd m e chan ica l ca us al it y , he me rely tries

34 to limit its e ffects . 5 1 He does not deny the scientific character of a p art of M a r x i s m , but he refuses to extend it t o t h e poi n t of c r e a tin g a closed system tha t will co v er the entire field of po li ti cal p re di ction The critique of the dogmat ic rationalism of o rthodoxy takes the form o f a Kantian d u al ism . For Berns tein , th e re were three p a rticul ar o bjecti o n s to the consideration of M ar x i s m as a closed s ci e n ti fic system . First, M arxism had fa i l e d to show th a t s o ci a li s m necess a r i ly followed fro m cap i t a li s m s c o l l ap s e S ec on dly , this could not be demonstrated becau s e histo r y was not a s imp l e o bj ec t i v e process: · w ill also p l ayed a rol e in it . Hence , history could only be e xpl ained as the r e s u l t of an interaction between obj e c t i v e and su bj e ct i v e factors. Thirdly , as soc i a l i s m was a party p rogramme and therefore founded . upon ethical decision, it could not be enti r el y s cientific - could not . b e b a s e d upon objective statements whose truth or falsehood had to be accepted by all . T h u s the autonomy of the ethical subject was the basis of Ber n ste i n s break with determinism . Now - and t h i s p o i nt is crucial - the i n t ro d u cti on of the et h i c a l subject cannot d i s pel th e a m b i gu i ti e s we fo und earlier in Bernstein's reasoning . The ethical subject's free d e ci si o n can at most create an · a rea of indeterminacy in h i s t o ry , but it cannot be t he fo und atio n fo r a g raduali s t the sis It is here th at a n ew postulate the p r og res s i v e a n d a scendi n g character of human history - intervenes to provide the terrain on which the pol i t i ca l and the economic combine , im­ p a rting a sense o f direction to every c o n cr et e achievement . The concept of e v ol ut i on, Entwicklung, 52 p l a ys a d e ci s i v e role in th e Bernsteinian discourse: in fa c t , his entire schema obtains its ; coherence from i t . The unification of the poli tical and econ om ic spheres takes place not on the basis of theoretically defined articu­ lations , but throu g h a tendential mo v e m e nt underlying them b oth and dictated by the laws of e v oluti on . For Bernstein, t h e s e laws are · not at all the same as in the orthodox system: t h e y include riot only antagonistic but also ha r m o ni o us processes . Yet in both cases they are conceived as totalizing contexts w hi ch fix a priori the m ean in g of every even t . Thus , although 'the facts' are freed from th e essentialist . connections which l i n ked t h em togethe r in the ort hod o x concep- . tion, they are later reunited in a gene r al theory of progress uncon­ nected to any d eter m i n ab l e mechanis m . The rupture with mechanist objectivism , which c o n si d er e d classes as transcendent s ubj ec ts is i achieved thro ugh the pos tulation of a new transcendent su bj ec t which imposes as cend a nc y in a h umanity the ethical subject increasingl y freed fro m economic necessity . 5 3 From here, it is ' impo s sibl e to move towards a theory of articulation and hegemony . : .

'

.

,

'

.

-

·

·

,

_

-

•

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a Concept

35

This cl a ri fi es why , in Bernstein , the autonomization of the poli­ tica l can be linked to acceptance of a reformist practice and a g ra d u al is t s trategy . For if every advance is irreversible - given the Entwicklung p o s t ul ate - its consolidation no longer depends upon an unstable articulation o f forces a n d ceases to be a political problem . If, on the other hand, the ensemble of democratic advances depended upon a contingent correlation of forces , then abstract consideration of the j u s tn es s of each demand would not be sufficient reason to assert its progressiveness . For example, a negative realignment of forces might be brought about by an ultra-left demand or its oppo­ site , an absence of radical political initia tives in a critical conjuncture . But if the ensemble of democratic advances depends solely upon a law of progres s , then the progressive character of any s truggle or conjunctural demand is defined independently o f its correlation with o the r forces operating at a given m o men t The fact that the demands of the workers movement are considered just and progressive , and ju d g ed separately fro m their correlation with other forces, erases the only basis for criticism of the corporative confinement of the work­ ing class . Here lie the p remises for a coincidence between theoretical revisionis m and pr act ical reformism: the broadening of political initiative to a number of democratic fronts never enters into contra­ diction with the quietism and corporatism of the working class . This can be clearly seen if we consider the revisionist theory of the State . For o r th od oxy , the problem was straigh tforward: the S tate was an instrument of class dominatio n , and S ocial Democracy could only participate in its i n stit u tio n s with the purpose of spreading its own ideology, and defending and o rganizing the working class . S u ch p a r t i ci p at i o n was therefore marked by exteriority . Bernstein sees this problem fro m the opposite perspective: the growing economic power of the working class, the advance in social legis la­ ti on , the hum a niz a tio n of capitalis m , all lead to the 'nationalization ' of the working class; the worker is not merely a proletarian , he has also beco me a citizen . Consequently, according to Bernstein , the functions o f s oc i a l o rg a ni z a t ion have a greater influence wi thi n the State than do those of class domination; its democratization trans­ forms it into a S tate 'of all the people' . Once agai n , Bernstein has understood better than orthodoxy the basic truth that the working class is already on the terrain of the State , and that it is s terile dog m at ism to seek to maintain with it pure relations of exteriority . In his discours e , however, this is immediately transfo rmed into a t o tal l y illegitimate prediction: na mely that the State will become increasingly democratic as a necessary consequence of 'historical .

'

'

,

36 vo l uti o n . H a v i ng reached this p o i n t we may now apply the tes t we used for R os a L u xe m b u r g : to follow the logical lin es of B e rn s tei n' s argu­

e

'

,

ment , w hi le e l i m i n a t i ng the essentialist p resu pp o siti o n s (in this case,

th e pos t u l at e of p r og r ess as a unifying tendency) which limit its

effects. Two conclusions immediately arise from this test. First, a d v an c e s within the State cease to be cumulative and b eg i n to d e pen d upon a r e lat i o n s h i p of forces that c an n o t be deter­ mined a prio ri The object of s trugg l e is not simply p u nc tu al ga ins b u t fo r m s of articulating fo r ces that will allow these gains to be consolidated . And these jonns are always reversible . In that fi g h t th e w o r kin g class must s t ru gg l e from where it really is: both within and outside the State . But and this is the second conclusion ­ Bernstein's v er y cl e arsig h te d n es s opens up a much more disqu i e t i n g possibility . If the worker is no longer just pr ole tarian but also c i t izen, consumer, and participant in a pl u rali t y of positions within the country 's cultural and ins titutional apparatus; if, moreover, this ensemble of positions is no longer united by any ' law of progress' (nor, of course, b y the 'necessary laws' of orthodoxy) , then the relations between them become an open articulation which offers no a priori guarantee that it will adopt a given form . There is also a possibility that contradictory an d mu t u al l y n eu t r al i z ing subject positions will arise. In that case, more than ever, democratic advance will necessitate a proliferation of political initiatives in different social areas - as required b y revisionism , but with the difference that the meaning of each initiative comes to depend upon its relation with the o thers . To think this dispersion of elements and po in ts of a nta gonis m and to conceive their articulation outside any a p rio ri schema of unification , is something that goes far beyond the field of revisionis m . Although it was the re visi oni sts who first posed the problem in its most general terms , the beginnings of an adequate response would only be found i n the Gramscian co n ce p tion of 'war of position ' .

democratic

.

,

,

-

,

The Third Response t o the Crisis: Revolutionary Syndicalism Our inquiry into revisionism h as b ro ugh t us to the point where Berns tein , paradoxically, faces the same dilemma as all o rtho d ox currents (including his ar ch-ene my R os a L u xe mbu rg) : the economic base is incapable of a ss u ring cl a s s u ni ty in the present; while p o l iti cs the sole terrain where that present u ni ty can be cons tructed , is unab le ,

Hegemony: the Genealogy

oj a Concept

37

con vi n c i n g ly t o guarantee the class ch a r acter of the uni ta ry subjects . This ant in o m y c a n b e p erce i v e d m o re cle a r l y in r e v o l u ti o na r y syn­ d ical i s m , which cons tituted a third type of r espon s e to th e 'crisis of Ma r xis m ' . In S o rel the an ti n o m y is drawn with particularly sharp lines , b e c aus e he was more conscious than B erns t ei n , or any orth o d o x theoretician , o f the true dimensions of the c ri s i s and of the pri ce theory had to pay in o r der to overcome it in a satisfactory mann e r . We find in S o r e l not only the p o stula t i on of an area of ' co n ti n gen cy ' and ' freedom ' , rep la ci ng the broken links in the chain of n eces s i t y , but a ls o an e ffor t to thi n k the s p eci ficit y of that ' log ic of con tin g e n cy' , of that new t e r ra i n on whi ch a field of to t a li z i ng effects is reconstituted . In thi s sens e , it is instructive to refer to t he key m o me n t s of his evolution. 54 Even in the relatively orthodox b egi n n i ngs of S o rel ' s M arxist career, both the sources of his political interest and t he theoretical a ssu m p ti o n s b e hi n d his ana ly s i s showed a ma r ke d o rig i n alit y and were c o ns i d era b ly m o re so phi s t ica ted than those of a Kau t s k y or a P lekh a n o v . He was far from keeping to the est a bl i s h ed idea of an unde rl y i n g historical mechanism that both unified a g i ven form of so c iet y an d g o verned the transitions between diverse forms . Indeed, Sorel's chief foc us of interest - and hence his frequen t reference to Vico - was the type of moral q u a l ities which allowed a society to r em ain united and in a process o f a s cens ion . H a v in g no guarantee of p o si t i vi t y , s oc i al tr ans fo r m at io n s w e re p e n etra te d by n ega t ivi ty as one of their p o s si bl e destinies . It w a s not simply the case that a given form o f s o c iet y w a s o p p osed by a different, p o s iti ve for m des tined to re pla c e it; it al s o faced the po s s i b i lit y of its own decay and disintegra­ tion, as was the case of the ancient world. W hat Sorel found attrac­ tive in M arxism was not in fact a th eo r y of the n ece ss ary laws of historical evolution , but rather the theory of the formation of a new agent - t h e p r ole t a r i a t - cap a ble of operating as an agglutinative fo r ce that w ou l d reconstitute around itself a hig he r fo rm o f ci viliza ti o n an d s uppla n t decl in i ng bo urgeo is soci ety . Thi s d i m en s io n o f S o rel ' s t ho ug h t is p res en t fro m t he begi nn in g . In his w rit in gs p rio r to the revisionism controversy, however , it is com b i n e d with an acceptance of the te n d en c i es of c a pita lis t deve­ l o pme n t p o stu l a t e d by o r th o d o xy . In these w ri tin gs , Sorel sees Marxis m as a 'new real m eta p h y s i c s ' . All real science , he argues , is constituted o n the basis of an ' e xp r es s i ve s u pport ' , whi ch in trodu ces an artificial element into a n a l y s i s . This can be the o rigi n of u t op ian or m y t hi c a l erro rs , but in the case of industrial society th e re is a grow­ in g un i fi c a t io n of the social te rr ai n a ro un d t h e i ma ge of the ­

38

mechanism . The expressive support of Marxism - the social character of labour and the category of 'commodity' , which increas­ ingly eliminates qualitative disctinctions - is not an arbitrary base, because it is the moulding and constitutive paradigm of social rela­ tions . Socialism , qua coll ec tiv e appropriation o f the means of pro­ duction, represents the necessary culmination of the growing socialization and ho m o gen i z a tion of labour. The increasing sway of this productivist paradigm relies on the laws of motion of capitalism, which are not ques tioned by Sorel at this point of his career . But even so, the agent conscious of its own interests - the one that will shift society to a higher form - is not constituted by a simple objective movemen t . Here another element of Sorel's analysis intervenes: M arxism is not for him merely a scientific analysis of society; it is also the ideology uniting the proletariat and giving a sense of direc­ tion to its struggles . The 'expressive supports' , therefore, operate as elements aggregating and condensing the historical forces that Sorel will c all blocs . It should be clear that, vis-a-vis orthodox M arxism, this analysis already shifts the terrain on a crucial point: the field of sQ-called ' objective laws' has lost its character as the rational sub­ stratum of the social , becoming instead the ensemble of fo rm s t hro u g h w hich a class constitutes itself as a dominant force and i m p o ses its will on the rest of society . However, as the validity of the se laws is not questioned, the distance from orthodoxy is ub­ m a t e ly not that considerable. The sep a rati o n begins when Sorel, starting from the revisionism debate, acce p ts en bloc Bernstein's and Croce's critiques of M arxism, b u t in o rder to extract very different conclusions . What is s t rik ing in S orel is the radicalism with which he accepts the consequences of the ' crisis o f M arxism' . Unlike Bernstein, he does not make the slightest attemp t to replace orthodoxy's historical rationalism with an alter­ native evolutionist view , and the possibility that a form of civili­ zation may disintegrate always remains open in his analysis . The totality as a founding rational substratum has been dissolved, and what now exists is melange. Under these circumstances , how can one think the p oss i b i l i t y of a process of recomposition? Sorel's answer c en tres on social classes, which no longer play the role of structural locations in an objective system , but are rather p o les of reaggre­ gation that he calls 'blocs'. The possibility of unity in society is thus referred to the will of certain groups to impose their conception of economic organization . Sorel's philosophy , in fact - influenced by N i e t z s ch e and in par ti cu l a r by Bergson - is one of action and will, in which the future is unforeseeable, and hinges on will. Further-

Hegemony: the Genealogy cif a Concept

39

more, t h e level at which the forces in struggle find their unity i s that of an ensemble o f i m a g e s or ' language fi gu r es fo re sha d ow in g the th e ory of m y t h . However, the consolidation of classes as his­ torical fo r c e s ce m ent ed by a ' p o li tica l idea' is reliant upon their '

-

confrontation with opp o s in g forces . Once its identity c eased to be based on a p rocess of infrastructural un i ty (at this level th e re is only melange) , the working class came to dep end upon a split fro m the capitalist class which c o ul d only be co m p lete d in struggle agains t it. For S o re l , ' war' thus becomes the c o n d i t i on for w orking cl ass iden­ ti ty , and the search for common ar e as w i t h t h e b our g eoisi e can only l ead to i t s o w n w eak ening . This consciousness of a split i s a juridical consciousness - Sorel sees th e construction of revolutionary sub­ jectivity as a process in which the proletariat b eco mes aware of a set of rights opp osi n g i t t o t he c la s s a d v ers a ry and est a bl i s h es a set of new ins t i tut i ons that will consolidate these ri g hts . 55 Sorel , however , an a r den t Dreyfusard , do es not see a nec essa ry contradiction between the p l u r al i t y o f wo rking cl ass po s i t i o n s within the po l i ti cal and economic system : he i s a p ar t i s a n of d em o c r a c y and of the po l i t ic a l struggle of the p r o le t a ri a t , and even co ns i d ers the po s si b il i ty that t h e w o r k in g class , while in no way economically link ed to the middle sectors , could become a pole for t h eir p o li ti c al r eg roup m en t We see a clear pattern in Sorel's evolution: like all the tenden ci es s trugg l i n g against the quietism of orthodoxy , he is co mpel l ed to d i s p l a ce the constitutive moment of c l a s s unity to the po li ti c al level; but as his b reak wi t h the category of hi s to ri cal necessity' is mo re radical than in o ther t en d en cie s , he als o feels o b l i g e d to s p ecify the fou n d ing bond of political u ni ty This can be seen e v e n m o re cl e a r l y when we move to the third stage of his th o u g h t which corresponds to the g reat d i s i l l usio n following the t r i u m p h of the D r e y fu s a rd coalition . M illerand's b rand of socialism is integrated in t o the s y s te m ; corrup ti on spreads; the re is a co nti nu o u s loss of prole t a ri an i d en ti t y; and energy saps away fro m the only class which, in Sorel's eyes , has t h e po s s i b i lity of a he r o ic future that will remodel d e cl inin g bo urg e o i s civilization . Sorel t h en becomes a d ec i d ed enemy of d em o c rac y , se ei n g it as the main c ul p ri t for that dis p ersi o n and fra gm en t a tio n of su bj e ct p o s i ti o n s with which M arxism had to g r a p ple at the tum o f the century . It was therefore necessary , at wha t e v e r cost, to restore the split and to r e c o ns ti t ut e the working cla s s as a unitary s u bj e c t As is w el l known , this led Sorel to reject political struggle and to affirm the syndicalist my th of the ge n e ra l strike . ' (We) kn o w that the general s trike is indeed what I have s aid: the myth in whi ch Socialism is wholly comp rised , i . e . a b o dy of -

-

.

'

.

,

.

40 i m ages capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspon d to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society . Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the nobles t , deepest and most moving sentiments that they possess; the general strike groups them all in a co-ordinated p icture , and, by bringing them together , gives to each one of them its maximum of in ten sity ; appealing to their p ainful memories of particul a r conflicts , it colours with an intense life all the details of the c o mposi tion presented to consciousness . We thus obtain that intui­ tion of So cialis m w hich language cannot give us with perfect clear­ ness and we obtain it as a whole, perceive it instantaneously . '56 The s y n dicalist 'general strike' , or the ' revolution' in M arx , is a myth in that it fun cti ons as an i deological point of condensation for p roletarian identity , constituted on the basis of the dispersion of s u bject positions . It is the one type of recomposing link that remains o nce politi cal s truggle has been discarded , and once it is thought that the economy of monopolies and imperialism - seen by Sorel as involving a process of refeudalization - is heightening the tend­ encies toward disintegration. M ore generally , one recognizes the old theme of anti-ph ysis in Sorel' s affirmation that societies have a n a t u ra l t endency to decay, and that the tendency to greatness is ' artificial ' . Thus, violence is the only force which can keep alive the an ta gonis m described by M arx . ' I f a capitalist class is energetic, it is co n stantl y affirmin g its determination to defend itself; its frank and co n sis t en tl y reactionary attitude contributes at least as greatly as p role t arian violence towards keep ing distinct that cleavage between classes which is the basis of all Socialism. '57 From this perspective, it matters little whether or not the general strike can be realized: its role is that of a reg u lati ng principle , which allows the proletariat to think the melange of social relations as organized around a clear line of demarcation ; the ca tegory of totality, eliminated as an objective d escrip tion of reality, is reintroduced as a mythical element esta­ blis h ing the u ni t y of the workers' consciousness . As de Paola has pointed out , 5 8 the notion of ' cognitive instrument' - or expressive s u p port - whose artificiality was recognized from the beginning, has been broa d en ed to include fictions . ' F o r Sorel , then , the possibili ty o f a dichotomous division of socie t y is gi ven not as a datum of the social structure , but as a c o nstruc tion at the level of the 'moral factors' governing group conflict . Here we come face to face with the problem that we have found w h e n e ver a M arxist tendency has attempted to break with economism and to establish class unity at some other level . Why -

'

'

Hegem o ny : the G en ea logy oj a Con cept

41

d o es t h is p o litic a l ly o r m y t h i c a lly r e c on st i t ut e d s u bj ec t have to be a class su bj ec t? But whereas the inadequacy of Rosa Lux e m b u rg' s or Labriola's rupture with eco n o m i s m created the conditions fo r th e i nv isi b ili t y of the double void that a pp e a re d in their discourses , in Sorel 's case the very r a dic al ity of his anti-economism made this void cl ea rly visible . So m u ch so that some of his followers , having abandoned h o p e of a revolutionary recovery of the w o rki n g class, gave themselves to a search for some other s u b s t i tu t e myt h capable of a ss u r i n g the struggle against bourgeois d e ca d en ce . It is known that they fo u n d i t in nationalism . This was t he a v e n u e th ro u g h which a part of Sorel 's intellectual l eg a cy contributed t o the rise of fascis m . Thus , in 1 9 1 2 h i s disciple Edouard Berth w a s a b l e to affirm :

' In fact , it is necessary that the tw o -s i d ed nationalist and sy n dicalis t m o ve m en t , b ot h p a r a ll el and synchronic, should lead to the com­ plete expulsion of the k in g do m o f g o l d a n d t o t h e tri u mp h of h e r o i c v alues o ve r th e i gn o b l e b ou r g e o is mat e r i a lis m in w hi ch p re sent-d a y E u ro p e is suffo c a ti ng . In o ther w or d s , i t i s n e c es sar y tha t t hi s awake n i ng of Force and Bloo d ag a in st Gold - whose first symptoms h a v e been revealed b y P a r e to a n d who s e si gn al has been given b y Sorel in his Riflexions sur la vio len ce and by M aurras in Si Ie coup dejorce est possible - should conclude with the absolute defeat of p l u toc ra cy . '59 Of course , this is me rel y one of the po s sibl e derivations fro m Sorel 's a na ly sis , and i t would be h i s to rica lly false and an a l y tically unfounded to c on clude that i t is a n e cess a ry outcome . 60 Historically fal se , because Sorel's influence made i tself fel t in a number of d irec­ tions - it w as , for ex a mpl e , crucial in the fo r mat ion of Gramsci's thought. A n a ly t ica ll y unfounded , because such a t e le o l o g i ca l in ter­ p retati o n assumes that the t r a n si tion fro m class to nation w a s neces­ sarily d e te rm i n e d by the v e ry structure of Sorel's t h o ug ht, whereas the latter's most specific and ori gin al m o me n t w a s p re cisel y the indeterminate , n on-a p ri o ri character of the my t h i c all y constituted s u bj ec t s . Furthermore , this indeterminacy i s not a w e ak n e ss of the theory , for it affirms th a t socia l rea l i t y itself is indeterminate (melange) an d that any unification turns on the re co m po s i n g p ractice s of a bloc. In this sense , there is no theoretical r e ason why the my t h i ca l reconstitution should not move in the direction of fa s ci sm , but equally n o n e to exclude its advance in another d i re ct ion - such as Bolshevis m , for ex a m p le , which Sorel e n t hu s i as t ica l ly welcomed . The decisive poi n t - and this is what mak es S o rel t h e most pro­ fo u nd and or ig i n a l thinker of the Second International - is th a t the very i d en t ity of soc i a l agents becomes indeterminate and that every

42 ' my thical' fixation of it d ep ends upon a struggle. The concept of h ege mony ' as it emerged in Russian Social Democracy - which, as we shall see, also s u pp o s ed a logic of contingency - was from this point of view much less radical . Neither Le n in nor Trotsky was capable of ques tioning the necessity fo r social agents to have a class ch ar a c te r Only with Gramsci did the two traditions converge in his concept of 'historical bloc' , where the co n c e p t of 'hegemony' d e ri v ed from Leninism meets in a new s y n th e s i s with the concept of b l o c derived from Sorel . '

.

'

'

Notes to Chapter One I . R . Luxemburg , The Mass Strike. the Political Party and the Trade Unions, London (n . d . ) , p . 48 . 2 . Ibid . , p p . 73-74. 3. Ibid . ,

pp.

64-65.

Emphasis in the original .

4. I t is i mportant to note that Bernstein's intervention in the German debate on the

mass strike (Der Politische Massenstreik und die Politische Lage der Sozialdemokratie in refers to tWo basic differences between East and West - the complexity and resistance of civil society in the West, and the weakness of the State in Russia which will later be central to Gramsci's argument. For an overview of the debate, see M . Salvadori, ' La socialdemocrazia tedesca e la rivoluzione russ a del 1 905 . II dibattito sullo sciopero di massa e sulle differenze fra Oriente c Occidente' . in E.]. Hobsbawm et aI . , eds . , Storia del marxismo, M ilan 1 979, vol . 2, pp. 547-594. 5. Cf. T . To d o rov , Theories du symbole, Paris 1 977, p. 29 1 . 'One could say that there is a condensation every time a single signifier leads us to comprehend more than one signified; or more plainly : every time that the signified is more abundant than the signifier. The great G e r m an mythologist Creuzer already defined the symbol in tha t way: by "the inadequacy of being and form, and by the overflowing of the content com pared to i ts expression " . ' 6 . A l t h ou g h Rosa Luxemburg's work i s the highest point i n the theoretical elabora­ tion of the mechanism of mass strike, the latter was posed as the fundamental form of struggle by the entire Neue Linke. See for example, A. Pannekoek , 'Marxist Theory and Revolutionar y Tactics ' , in A . Smart, ed . , Panllekoek and Gorter's Marxism , Lon d on 1 978, pp. 50-73. 7. R. Luxemburg , p. 30. 8. R ece n t l y , a number of studies have discussed the fa tal i s t or non-fatalist character of L uxembu r g i s t spontaneism . In our opinion, however, these have given excessive em phasis to a relatively secondary problem , such as the alternative between mechan­ ical co l l ap s e and conscious intervention of the class . The assertion that c ap i ta l i s m will mechanically collapse is so absurd that, as far as we kno w , nobody has upheld it. The decisive problem is, instead, that of knowing whether the subject of the anti-<:apitalist s t ru g gle does or does not constitute its entire identity within the capitalist relations of p roduction; a n d , in this respect, Rosa Luxemburg's position is unequivocably af­ firmative. For that reason, statements concerning the inevitability of socialism are not s impl y concessions to the rhetoric of th e time or the result of a psychological need, as Norman Geras maintains (C f N . Geras, The Legacy oj Rosa Luxemburg, London 1 976. p. 36) , but r a t h e r the nodal p o in t giving meaning to he r entire theoretical and strategic Deutschland)

-

.

Hegemony: the Genealogy oj a COIlcept

43

structure . A s , according to Rosa Luxemburg, the advent of socialism has to be en t i r e ly e x pl a i n ed o n the basis oj the logic oj capitalist developmen t , the revolutionary su bj ec t can only be the w or k ing class . (On Luxemburg's dog ma t i c adherence to M arx's theory of pauperization as the basis for the revolutionary determination of the working class, see G. Badia, ' L'analisi dello sviluppo capitalistico in Rosa Luxem­ burg ' , Feltrinelli Insti t u te , A nnali, M i l a n , p . 252.) 9 . K . Kautsky , The Class Struggle, N e w York 1 97 1 . 10. The o bj ect o f his ( Kau ts ky's ) entire struggle against revisionism was to b e that of preserving a n o t i o n of t h e programme not as a complex of determinate po l i t ica l demands - desti ned to establish the initiative of the party in specific phases of s tr ug gl e , and as such modifiable from time to time - but as an indissoluble bloc of theory and p o l i tics , within w hich the two terms lost their respective fields of autonomy and M arx.ism became the finalist ideology of the proletariat . ' (L. Paggi , ' Intellettual i , teoria e partito nel marxismo della Seconda Internazionale' . Introduc­ tion to M . Ad ler , Il socialismo e gli intellettua li, B a r i 1974.) 1 1 . K . K a u t s k y , pp. 1 85-6. 12. A. Przeworski, ' Proletariat into a Class . The Process of Class Formation from Karl K a u ts k y 's The Class Struggle to Recent Controversies' , Politics and Society, 7, 1 977.

1 893 Cologne Con g re s s of the SPD, Legien p r o tes ted s tatements by Vorwiirts according to w h ich ' t he s t ru g gl e for political power remains t he m o s t i m p o r ta nt a t every moment, while the economic struggle always finds the workers deeply divided , and the more h opel es s the situation is, the more acute and d a m agin g the division becomes . Sm;.lI-scale struggle w o u l d also certainly have i ts advan t a g es , but these would be of secondary importance for the fmal 13.

For example, at the

a g a i ns t

p a r t y . ' Le g ie n asked: 'Are these arguments from a party organ adequate to attract indifferen t workers to the movement ? I seriously doubt i t . ' Quoted fro m N. Benvenuti's an t h o lo g y of documents on the relationship b e tw een party and t r ade unions, Partito e Sindicati in Germania: /880-19 14), M ilan 1 98 1 , pp. 7�1 . 1 4 . This way of approaching the problem of class unity, according to w hich deviations from a p a rad i g m are conceptualized in terms of contingent 'obstacles ' and ' im p e di m e n t s ' to its full validity, continues to dominate certain historiographical traditions . M ike Davis, for example, in a stimula t i ng and hi gh ly interesting article ('Why the US W o r k i n g Class is Different ' , New Left Review 123, Sept . -Oct . 1980) , while s h ow in g t h e s pecifici t ies of the formation of the American w o rk ing class, co n cep t ualizes these as deviations from a n orma l pattern which, at some mo ment of history , will ev e ntua l ly impose i ts e lf. 1 5 . We must mak e clear that when we speak of ' fragmen t a ti on ' or 'dispersion' , it is always with reference to a discourse which postulates the unity of the dispersed and fra g m e nted elements . If these 'elements' are considered without reference to any discourse , t h e application to them of terms such as 'dispersion' or ' fr agment a tion ' lacks any m ea ning whatsoever. 1 6 . A . Labriola, Saggi sui materialismo storico, Rome 1 968 , p . 302 . 1 7 . K au ts k y ' s main writings on this matter are contained in the an tho lo g y by Ben ven u ti , Partito e Sindicati. 1 8 . 'The nature of th e trade unions is not therefore defined from the beginning. They may become an instrument of class struggle, but they may also become a fetter on it. ' K au t s k y in Benvenuti , p. 186. 19. Th e party seeks . . . to rea ch a final objective which once and for all does away with cap i t a li s t exploitatio n . W ith reg ard to this final objec t i ve , trade union activity, despite its importance and indispensability, can well be defined as a labour of Sisyph us , not in the sense of us el e ss work , but of work which is never concluded an d objective o f th e

44 has always to be be g un again. It follows from all this that where a strong s o cia l democratic party exists and has to be rec k o ned with, it h as a greater poss i b ility than the trade un ions to establish the necessary line for the class s t ruggle, and hence to indicate the direction which individual p roletari an o r g a niza t io ns not directly b el on g ing to th e p arty should tak e . In this way th e indispensable unity of the class struggle can be s a feg u a r ded . ' K a u tsky in Benvenuti , p. 1 95.

­

­

20 . C f. Lucio Colletti 's remarks i n 1'ralll onlo dell 'ideolagia , Rome 1 980, pp. 1 73-76.

J a cqu e s Monod a rgues in L e hasard el la neussite (Paris 1 970, pp. 46-7) : 'In t ry i n g to ba s e upon the laws of nature the e d ifice of th e i r social doctrines, Marx and Engels also had to make a mo re clear and deliberate use of the " an im ist proje c t i on " than Spencer had done . . . H e ge l ' s p o s tula te that the more genera l laws which govern the u n iv erse in i t s evolution are of a d i a l ect ic a l order, fmds i ts place w i thi n a system which d oes not recog n ize any permanent re ality other than m in d . . . But to preserve these s u bject i ve " l a ws " as s u ch, so as to make them rule a p u rely material universe, is to ca rry out the a n i m i s t p roje c tio n in all its clarity , with all its consequences, s t a r t i ng with the abandonment of the postulate of o bje cti v i ty . ' 2 1 . Thi s does not contradict our earlier assertion that for Kautsky immediate ma terial interests cannot constitute th e u n i t y a nd ident i t y of th e class . The po in t here is t h a t the 's c i e n t ifi c ' instance , as a separate moment, determines the t ot a l it y of i m pl i cations of the workers ' in s e r ti o n in to th e pro ductiv e process. Science, therefore, recognizes the i n t eres t s of which the different class fra g ment s , i n th eir p arti a l ity , do not have full consciousness. 22. This obviously simplified the p ro ble m of calculation , in a situation in which the clarity and transparency of interests reduced the problem of strategies to the ideal conditions of a 'rational choice ' . Michel de Certeau has recently stated: 'I call " st r a t eg y " the calculation of those relations of force that a re po ssi b le from the moment in w hich a subject of w ill (a prop rie to r , an en terp ri s e , a city , a s cien t ific insti tution) is isolated from an "environment" . . . Political, economic and scientific r ational it y is constructed upon this s t rateg i c model . Contrary to this, I call "tactics" , a c al c ula tio n that ca n n o t count upon som e thing of its own , n o r therefore u pon a fr o nti e r d ist i n g uishing the other as a visible totality. ' L 'invention du quotidien, Paris 1 980, vol . 1 , p p . 20-1 . In the light of this distinction , it is clear that, inasmuch as the 'interests' of the Kautskian s u bj ec ts are transparent , every c a lc u la t ion is of a strategic nature. 23 . Cf. E . M atthias , Kautsky e iI kautskismo, Rome 1 97 1 , passim. 24. S y m ma c h os ( K . Kautsky) , ' Verschworung oder Revolution?', Der Sozialde­ mokrat , 20/2/ 1 88 1 , quoted in H .J . Ste i n b e r g , 'II p artito e la formazione dell' ortodossia marxista ' , in E .] . Hobsbawm et aI . , vol. 2, p. 1 90 . 25 . See Perry Anderson , 'The Antin om ies o f Antonio Gramsci ' , New Left Review 100, Nov . 1976/Jan . 1 977. 26. Guglielmo Ferrero , L 'Europa giovane. Studi e viaggi nei paesi del Nord, M ilan 1 897 , p . 95. 27. C f. Andrew A rato, L'antinomia del marxismo c1assico: marxismo e filosofia', in E .J . Hobsbawm et aI . , vo l . 2, pp. 702-7. 28 . G. Plekhanov , Fundamental Problems oj Marxism, New York 1%9, p. 80. 29 . T h i s relation between the logic of necessity and quietism was clearly p e rceived by the critics of orthodoxy . Sorel affirmed: 'Re a di n g the works of the d emo c ratic soc i alist s , one is s u rprised by the ce rt ain t y with which th e y have th ei r future at their disposal; the y know t h e world is moving towards an inevitable revolution , of which t he y k no w th e g en e ral consequences . Some of them have such a faith i n their own theory that they end up in quietism . ' Geo rg es Sorel , Saggi di critiea del marxismo,

­

Hegemony : the Genealogy oj a Concept

45

Palermo 1 903 , p. 59. 30. A n tonio Labriol a , 'In m e m o r i a del M anifesto dei Comunisti', in SaJ:Ri de/

materialismo

storico,

p p . 34-5 .

3 1 . W ith regard to Labriola's intervention in the debate on the revision of Marxism, see Roberto R a c i n a ro , La (ris i del marxismo nella revisione de fine see% , Sari 1 978,

p ass im .

32. C f. N i c o l a B a dalo n i , II marxismo de Gramsci, Turin 1 975 , pp. 27-8 . 33 . I b i d . , p. 1 3 . 3 4 . According t o Badalon i , this is t h e so l u t io n which L a b r io l a should have followed: 'Perhaps the alternative proposed b y him was erroneous and t he true

alternative lay in a deepening and de v e lo p men t o f h is torical mo rp ho lo g y , which was excessively simplified in Engels's e x p osi t ion . ' B ada lon i , p. 27. W it h this, of course ,

the dualism would have been suppressed , but at the p r ice of e l iminat i n g the area o f morphological indeterminacy whose existence w a s essential for Labriola's theoretical project.

35 . Otto Bauer, 'Was ist Austro-M arxismus ' , Arbeiter-Zeitung, 3/ 1 1 / 1 927. Trans­ lated in the anthology of Austro-M arxist texts: Tom Bottomore a n d Patrick Goode , Austro-Marxism, Oxford 1 97 8 , p p . 45-8 . 36. E di t ori a l in the first number of Der Kampj, 1 907-8, reproduced in Bottomore and Goode, p p . 52-6 . 37 . Ibid . , p . 55 . 38 . On this discussion , and the general politico-intellectual trajectory of Austro­ M arxis m , see the excellent introduction by Giacomo Marramao to hi s antho l o g y of Austro-M arxist texts , Austro-marxismo e socialismo di sin istra jra /e due gu e"e, M ilan 1 977 . 39. 'To see the p rocess of transformation of c a p i talis t society into socialist society

no l on g er as fo l lo w i n g the tempo of a unified and homogeneous logico-historical

m ech a nism , but as the res u lt of a multiplication and proliferation of endogenous

factors o f mutation oi t h e relations of pro du ct i on and power - this implies , at the theoretical level , a m ajo r effort o f empirico-analytical d i sa gg re ga t ion of Marx's morphological p rediction, and, a t the political level , a supersession of the mystifying alternative between " reform" and " revolution " . However, it does not in any way involve an evolutionist type of option, as if socialism were realizable through homeo­ pathic doses . ' Giacomo M arramao, 'Tra bolscevismo e socialdemocrazia: Otto Bauer e l a cultura politi c a dell' austro-marxismo' , in E .] . Hobsbawm et aI . , vol. 3, p . 259. 40. See M a x Ad l e r , If socialismo e gli intellelluali. 4 I. 'The pecu lia ri ty o f r ev ision is m is misunderstood when i t is a-critically placed on the same plane as reformism or when it is si m ply viewed as the expressio n , si nce 1 890 , of t h e social-reformist practice of t h e party. The p r ob lem o f revisionism mus t , therefore, s u bs t a nt i all y limit i tself to the person of Bernstein a n d cannot be extended to either Vollmar or Hochberg . ' Hans-Josef S teinberg , II socialismo tedesco da Bebel a Kautsky, R o m e 1 979, p. 1 1 8 . 42. On t h e rela tionshi p between revisionism a n d trade unions, see Peter G a y , The Dilemma oj Democratic Socialism , London 1 962, p p . 1 37- 1 40 . 4 3 . Bernstein's defence o f the mass strike as a defensive w.e apon provoked the following com m entary b y the trade union leader Bomelburg: 'At one time , Eduard Bernstein does not know how far he ought to move to the right, another time he t a l k s about politi ca l mass strike. These lit/erati . . . are doing a disservice to the labour movemen t . ' Quoted in Peter Gay, p. 138. 44. Leonardo Paggi , p . 29 . 45. C f. Lucio Colletti , From Rousseau to Lenin , N L B , London 1 972, p. 62.

46 1 978, pp . 15--6 . Ibid . , p . 1 03. E . Bernstein, D ie heutige Soz ialdemokratie in Theorie un d Praxis , p . 1 33 . Quoted Gay , p. 207 . P . Gay, p. 1 20 . 5 0 . Earlier we distinguished between refonnism a n d revlSlonism . We must now establish a second distinction between rejonnism and gradualism . The basic point of d i fferentiation i s that reformism is a political and trade-union practice, whereas g radualism is a theory about the transition to socialis m . Revisionism is distinguished from both insofa r as it is a critique of classical M arxism based on the autonomization of the politica l . These distinctions are important if, as we argue in the text , each of these terms does not necessarily imply the others and has an area of theoretical and politica l effects which may lead it in very different directions. 5 1 . Hence his acceptance of a naive and techno logistic notion of the economy, which is in the last instance identical to that found in Plekhanov . Cf. Colletti, pp . 63ff. 52. On Bernstein's concept of Emwicklung see Vernon L. Lidtke, ' Le premesse teoriche del socialismo in Bernstein ' , Feltrinelli Institute, Annali, 1 5th year, 1 973 , pp. 46. E . Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism , New York

47 . 48 . by P. 49.

1 55 -8 . 53 . The sense of our critique should not be misunderstood . We do not question the

need for ethical judgements in the founding of a socialist politics - Kautsky's absurd denial of this , and his attempt to reduce the adherence to socialism to a mere awareness of its historical necessity, has been subjected to a devastating critique. Our argument is that from the presence of ethical judgements it does not follow that these should be attributed to a transcendental subject, constituted outside every discursive condition o f emergence. 54. Among modern works on Sorel, we found the following particularly useful: M i chele M aggi, La Jonnazione del l ' egemonia in Francia, Bari 1 977; M ichel Charzat, Georges Sorel et la re volution au XXe siecie, Paris 1 977;JacquesJulliard, Fernatld Pel/outier et les origines du syndicalisme d'action direcle, Paris 1 97 1 ; Gregorio de Paola, 'Georges Sorel, dalla metafisica al mito', in E .] . Hobsbawm et aI. , vol. 2, pp. 662--692; and with serious reservations , Zeev Sternhell, Ni droite n i gauch e. L 'ideologiejasciste etl Fran ce, Paris 1 983. 55 . See Shlomo Sand, ' Lutte de classes et conscience juridique dans 1a pensee de Sorel ' , Esprit 3 , M arch 1 983, pp. 20-35. 56 . G . Sorel, Reflections on Violence, New York 1 % 1 , p . 1 27 . 57. Ibid . , p . 1 82 . 58 . G . de Paola, p . 688. 59 . Quoted by Z. Sternhell, p. IDS. 60. This is what weakens SternheU's analysis (Ni droile n i gauche) , despite his richness of info rmation . The history p resented by him seems organized around an extremely simple teleology , according to which every rupture with a materialist or positivist v i e w can only be considered a forerunner of fascis m .

2 He g emony : The Difficult Em ergence of a New Political Logic It is necessary at this point to clarify the relationship between the do u ble v o id t h at e m erg ed in the essentialist discourse of the Second International , and the pe cu l ia r dislocation of stages to which th e prob l e m atic of hegemony will constitute a polit i cal response . Let us begin by specifying those characteristics of the double void wh i ch m a k e p o ss ib l e its comparison with the hegemonic su ture . I Fi r stl y , that void appears in the form of a dualism : its founding discou rse d o e s not seek to determine differential deg rees o f effi c a cit y within a topography of the social , but to set limits on the emb racing and d eter m in i ng capacity of every topographical s t r uct u r ati o n Hence such formulations as: 'the infrastructure does not det e rm i ne every­ thing , b e c a us e consciousness or will also intervenes in history'; or 'the gener al theo ry cannot account fo r concrete situations, because every prediction has a m o r pholog i c a l character' . This dualism is constructed through a hypostasis of the indeterminate qua ind e ter minate: entities which escape structural determination are under­ stood a s th e neg a tive reverse of the latter . This is what m akes dualism a relation of frontiers . If we observe closely , however, this response does not break at all with structural de terminis m : it merely comes down to a limitation of its effects . For ex a m p le it is perfectly p o ssi b le to argue both that there are vast areas of social life which escape economic determinism , and that, in the limited area in which i ts effe cts ar e operativ e , the action of the economy mus t be u nd er stood a c cord in g to a determinist para digm Nonetheless t here is an obvious p ro blem with this argument: in order to affirm that so m e th i ng is absolutely determined and to establish a clear line s e pa r ating it from the i nde ter m i n ate it is not sufficient to establish the specificity of the determination; its necessary cllaracter mu s t also be asserted. For this reason the supposed dualism is a s p u rio u s one: its two poles are not at the same level . The determinate, in e st abl i s hi n g i ts s pe ci fi city as necessary , sets t he limits of variation of the indeterminate. The .

­

,

­

.

­

,

47

48

indeterminate is thus reduced to a mere supplement2 of the deter­ m i n a te . Secondly , as w e have already seen , this apparent dualism responds to the fact t h a t structural determination does not provide the fou nd a­ tion for a pol i t i cal log i c in which a struggle can be waged here and now a g ai n s t t end en ci e s t ow a rd s fra g men t a t i on . It is i m med i a tely apparent, however, that the onl y ter rain per mi tti ng the specificity of s uch a l o g ic to be thought has been erased from the p i ct u re : as every th e o re t i ca l ly determinable specificity is r efe rred to the terrain of the infras tructure and the resulting class system, any other logic dis­ appears into the g e neral terrain o f contingent variation , or is referred to en tities e s c a p i n g all theoretical determination, such as will or e thical d eci s i o n . Th irdly , a n d finally , in the Second In t ern ati o nal's discourse, the class u nity o f social agents rested upon the ever weaker base of mirror p lay: eco n o mi c fragmentation w as unable to constitute class uni ty and referred us on to politica l re c o m po si tion ; yet poli t i cal reCOIIl­ p o s i ti o n was unable to found the necessary class character of s o cial ag e nts . Com bined Development and the Logic of the Contingent

Let us now compare this ensemble of fissures, present in the theo­ discourse of the Second International, wi th the disl oca tions

re t i c a l

that the concept of hegemony will attempt to suture. Perry Anderson) has studied the emergence of the concept of heg e mony in Russian Social D e mo cra cy - the theoreticians of the Comintern took it from there , and it reached G ram s ci t h ro ugh them - and the res u lt s of his inves tig a tion are cl ear : the concept of he g em on y fills a sp a c e left vacant by a c ri s is of what , according to Plekhanov's 'stagist' conception, should have been a norm al hi sto ri ca l d evelop­ men t . For that reas on, the h eg emon i zat i on of a task or an ensemble o f p oli ti cal forces belongs to the terrain of historic a l contin g ency . In Europe a n S ocial Democracy , the main problem had been th e dis­ p e r s i on of working-class pos i t i ons an d th e sh a t t ering of the unity post u late d among these by M arxis t theory . The very degree of maturity of bou rgeo is civilization reflected its structural o rde r within the worki n g class , s u bvert i ng the latter's unity . By contrast, in the t h eory o f h eg e mony as it was posed in the Rus si an context, the l i m it s of an ins u ffi ci en tly developed bourgeois civilization forced the wo r ki n g class to come out of itself and t o take on tasks that were not

HegemOlzy: the Difficult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

49

its o w n . The problem , then, was no longer to assure class unity , but to maximize the political efficacity of working-class struggle in a historical terrain where con t ing e nc y arose from the structural weak­ ness of the bourgeoisie to assume its own tasks . Let us examine how the s teps l ead i n g to the emergence of the concept of 'hegemony' were structured . In the writings of Plekhanov and A x el r o d , the term 'hegemony' was introduced to describe the process whereby the impotence of the Russian bour­ geo i s i e to carry through its 'normal' struggle for political liberty forced the working class to intervene decisively to achieve it. There was thus a split bet ween the class nature of the task and the historical agent carrying it out. This created a space of indeterminacy whose dimensions would vary co nsi dera bly - they were minimal in Plekhanov , and expanded to a maximum in Trotsky . But at any event , this space was to be the crucial point from which the various revol u ti on a ry orientations divided . The Russian revolution - the revolution 'against Capital', as Gramsci called it - had to justify its st ra te gy by broadening to the maximum the space of indeterminacy characteristic of the struggle for hegemony . Consequently , an op posi ti o n arose between a necessary interior (corresponding to the tasks o f the class in a 'normal' development) and a contingent exterior (the ensemble of tasks alien to the class nature of the social agents which they had to as s u m e at a g i ve n mo m e n t ) . There are significant differences between these historical disloca­ tions o f the o r th o d ox paradigm and those we found in the case of Western E uro pe . In both t h e d isl o c a tion p ro d uced a displacement; but whereas in Western Europe this involved a displacement of levels from the economic to the political within the same class , the dis­ pl a cem ent was much greater in Russia because it occurred between different classes . In Western Europe - with the exception of Austro-M arxism, where a m u l t i p l icity of national situations was p re s en t e d as a dislocation of stages we were confronted with a dissociation of the structural moments of a synchronic paradigm . Hence the thinking of the dissociation could not, as in Russian Social D e mo c ra c y, take the form of a narrative. Finally, whereas the dis­ loca tion and crisis of the paradigm was a negative phenomenon in the ot h e r cases, in Russia it became a positive phenomenon: the di s ha r m ony between bourgeois tas k s and the bourgeoisie's capacity to c ar ry them out was the stepping-stone for the seizure of political pow e r by the proletariat. For the same reason , the European forms of dislocation could be conceptualized purely through referel'1ce to negative cate go ri es - transience and contingency - which had to -

50

be o v e rco m e ; but in the Russian case, since the dislocations ex­ p res s e d them selves as positive conjunctures permitting the advance o f the w o rk i n g class - a c e r ta in way of infiltrating itself in to h i s to r y - it be c a m e necessary to characterize the new type of re l a t ion s h ip between the working class and the al i en tasks it had to

assume at a given moment. Tllis anomalous relation was called h e g em o n y . We must now examine the specificity of the hegemonic relation in the discourse of Russian Social Democracy . In fact , hege mon y he re des i g na tes , more t h a n a relation, a space dominated by the tension between two very different relations: a) that of the hegemonized task a n d its n a t u r a l ' class agent; and b) that of the hegemonized task and t h e class h e g em onizing it. If the coexistence of these two relations un d e r i m p re cis e conceptual forms is sufficient to give the term he ge m o n y a r efe re nt i al space, the precise determination of their l o gi c a l articulation is a sine qua non for the conversion of 'hegemony' into a theoretical category . In this case, however, one has only to examine the two relations with care, in order to observe that they are not l o g i c a ll y articulated at any point . First of all , in the struggle against absolutism , none of the Russian Social Democratic analyses suggests that bourgeois tasks ceas e t o b e bo u r ge o is w h e n they are assumed by th e proletariat. Class identity is constituted on the basis of the relations of production: for ortho­ d o x y , i t i s w i th in th a t p ri ma ry stru c t u re th a t th e anta goni s m b e t w e e n w o rk in g class and bo u rgeo i s i e arises . This prim a ry struc­ ture o r g a n iz e s i tself like a narrative - we may call i tJirst narrative given that its movement is contr a dic t o ry and tends to its self­ elimination . In the st ru cturi n g of this narrative, the l aws of cap i talist de velopm e n t are the plot, while the characters , with p e rfe ctl y a s s i g n e d roles , are the proletarian and capitalist classes . Now, the clarity of this h i s to ry is marred by the emergence of an ano ma ly : the bourgeois class cannot fulfil its role, and this has to b e taken over by t h e other character. We may call this role substitution the second narrative in Tr o ts k y s terms , the permanent revolution. What is th e s tructural re lat i o n between these two narratives? It is sufficient to read b riefly through the s t ra tegi c debate , to con v in ce ourselves that t h ei r articulation occurs in a th eore tic al terrain marked by the domi­ nance of the first. Three considerations are en o ugh to prove the p o i n t . ( 1 . ) The order of a p p ea r an ce of t h e characters is not altered by the second narrative: if the bou r geoi s ie is incapable of fulfil lin g 'its' tasks , these n e c es s a rily pass to the proletariat - yet the necessi ty of this transfer is only evident if one takes for g ra nted the to ta l it y of the '

'

'

'

'

'

'

-

-

'

Hegemony : the DiJlicult Emergence oj Ii New

Political Logic

51

evolutionary schema constituted a t the level o f the first narrative . (2 . ) The class nature of the tasks is not altered by the fact that they are ass u m ed by one class or the other - the democratic tasks remain b o ur g e o i s even when their historical agent is the working cl a ss . (3 . ) Th e very identity of t h e social agents i s determined b y their struc­ tural positions in the first narrative. Thus there is an une q ual relation between th e two narratives: hegemonic relations supplemen t class relations . Using a dis tinction of Sa us sure's, we could say that hege­ monic relations are always facts of parole, while class relations are facts of lang u e . The sense an d identity o f the hegemonic task and the agents which put it into effect are totally contained within relation (a) , as defined above . Hence the relation between the two components of relation (b) can only be one of exteriority . Now , a relation of exterio rity can be considered under two aspects : as a relation of exte rio ri ty and as a relation o f exteriority . The first aspect presents no difficulty: a rela­ tion is one of exteriority if the ide n tity of its components is entirely cons tituted o u ts id e the relation . As to the relational moment, in o rde r that the relation may be one of s trict exteriority , it is necessary that no conceptual specificity should be attributable to it . (Other­ w is e such specificity would become a structurally definable moment . And since this would require a special theory of its forms of articulation with other structural moments constituting the class as s u c h the identity of th e class would inevitably be m odified .) In other words , the relation of exteriority can only be thought of as pure contingency . This explains why the spurious dualism found in the discourse of the Second International is , for the same reasons , re­ p r o d u c e d in the theory of h egem o ny. Relation (a) and relation (b) cannot be conceptually articulated , simply because the latter has no positive conceptual specificity w ha t s oe v e r and is red u ced to a con­ tingently variant terrain of relations between agents co n s ti tu ted outside i tself. But, it could be argued , in Russian Social Democracy, from Plekhanov and Axelrod to Lenin and Trotsky , there was a positive a n d increasingly c o mp l e x t h eo ry o f h e gemo n y ! This is true , but it is not an objection to our argument. For such positivity and co mplexity refer to the typology oj situations ma k i n g possible he g e monic relations among classes , and to the v a riety oj relations a m o n g social g roups acting in a given conjuncture . Yet, the spec ifi c i ty oj the hegemonic li n k as such is never discussed or, rather, there is a subtle sl ei g h t-o f ha nd making it invisible . In order to see how this sleight-of-hand occurs , we should not focus on those approaches for which 'normal' forms of development ,

,

,

­

-

52

dominate t he cou rs e o f his tory and the he g em on ic moment occupies a clearly marginal p lace . (This is the case with Plekhanov , who saw intervention by the working class as a means of pressing the bour­ g eoisie to fulfIl i t s own tasks . ) M o re pertinent are those other approaches in which the heg e m oni c transference of tasks constitutes the very substance of revolution, so that it is comparatively more difficult for the specificity of the h ege m o nic link to be made in­ visible . In t h i s sense Trotsky's texts are of exemplary clarity , since they pl ace extreme emphasis o n the peculiarities of Russian develop­ m en t as o p pos ed to the course of Western European capitalism. As is well known , in a number of writings p u blis hed before and after the 1 905 Russian Revolution ,4 Tro ts ky raised the pos s i b ili ty of a w ork in g- c la s s government that would undertake a d irec t transition to socialism , as against the Menshevik perspective for a b o urgeo is­ democratic r e p ub l i c fo l lo w in g the co l l a p s e of Tsarism , and the B olshevik notion of a workers' and peasants' government that would re str ict its reforms to a bo ur geo is-demo c ra ti c mould . This possibility was inscribed in the very peculiarities of Russia's his­ torical development: weakness of the b ou r geo isie and urban civili­ zation; dis p ro p o rtio n ate growth of the State as a military-bureau­ cratic apparatus becoming autonomous from cl as s es ; insertion of advanced forms o f capitalism re sul ting from the 'privilege of back­ wa r dne s s ' ; freshness of the Russian proletariat , due to the absence of traditions ty i n g it to a complex civil s o cie t y ; and so on. As the bo u r ge o i s ie had arrived too late to assume the historical tasks of the s tr u g g l e a g ai ns t a bso l u ti sm , the pr ole t ar ia t became the key agen t for their realization. This dislocation in the stagist pa ra d i g m , and the s uper se s s i on of the resulting hegemonic transference, were the very axis of Trotsky's theory of the revo l u tio n . It would seem that no greater centrality could have been given to the hegemo n i c relation , as the very po ssibi lity of revolution revolved around i t . H owe v e r , we should look more closely at the forms which this cen t ral i ty assumes in Trotsky'S discourse . On two fundamental p oin ts hi s an aly si s is confronted with the sp eci fi ci ty of social relations that seem to resist strict class reductionism - that i s , the necessary character of r el a t i o n (a) - and o n both points he shrinks from a theoretical advance that would determine this speci­ fic i t y . The first po in t concerns the correlation between the structural we a k n ess of the bo u rg e oisie and the exceptional role played by the State in the historical formation of Russian society . Faced with the theoretical challenge po sed by the Bolshevik historian Pokrovsky who, from a crudely economist vie wp o in t , insists that to g ran t such

Hegemony : the Difficult Emergence oj a

New Pol itica l Logic

53

importance to the S tate would be to detach it from its class bases T ro t sky fails to reply with a theoretical analysis of relative State autonomy in d i fferent capitalist social formations , appealing instead to the greenness of life against the greyness of theory : 'Comrade Pokrovsky's tho u g h t is gripped in a vice of rigid social categories which he puts in p lace of living historical forces . W here there are no "special feat u r es , there is no history , but only a sort of pseudo­ materialist geometry . Instead of studying the living and cha n g i n g matter of economic development , it is enough to notice a few outward symptoms and adapt them to a few ready-made cliches . '5 W ith thi s , the 'special feature' constituted by the autonomization of the S tate from social cl ass es is hereby placed on a terrain which severely limits its effects from the beginning : we are now dealing with circumstances, which belong to an eminently factual o rder and are c ap able of b e in g incorporated into a story hence the predomi­ nantl y narrative tone of Trotsk y 's analysis but whi ch cannot be g ras p ed co nce p tu a l l y This would not necessarily be negative if all social determinations were s ubjec t ed to the same trea tmen t , because Trotsky would then have to narrate at the same level of Russia's specificities - the processes t h ro u g h w hich the economy manages to determine, in the last instance , all other social relations . This , however , does not happen; although there is a narration of the 'specificities' , the features considered common to every capitalist social formation are not subjected to a narrative treatment . That the economy determines in the last instance the processes o f history is something which, fo r Trotsky, is esta bl is h ed at a level as extra-historical as Pokrovsky's, and in as dogmatic a manner . An order of ' essences ' inescapably confronts an order of ' circumstances' , and both are reproduced within the same s o cial agents . What is liable in them to historical variation is reduced to that ensemble of characteristics which makes them deviate from a normal paradigm - the weakness of the bour­ geoisie i n Russia , the freshness of its proletariat, etc . These 'special fe a tu res' , however , do not in any way undermine the v alidity of the paradigm: this co n tinue s to pro duce its effects insofar as the social agents define their basic identity in relation to it, and insofar as the 'special features' p res ent themselves merely as em pirical ad vantag e s or d isadvan ta g e s for the attainment of class objectives pre­ established at the level of 'essences' . This i s clearly revealed in the second fundamental p oi n t where Trotsky's a n a lys i s touches the limits of the reductionist conception of classes: in the analysis of hegemony . As we saw earlier and this .

.

"

-

-

.

-

-

54

can also be applied to Tro tsky's a nalysis - there is a split between the 'natural ' class agent of a historical task and the concrete agent that puts it into effect. But we als o saw that, for the agent which under­ takes it, the class na tu r e of a task is not altered by this sp li t. The agent does n o t , t h e re fore , identify with the task undertaken; its relation w i th that task remains at the level of a circumstantial calculation even when this m ay i nv o l ve 'ci r c u mstances ' o f e p o c h al dimensions . The sp l itti ng of the task is an empirical phenomenon that does not affect its na t ure ; t he a g en t 's connection to the task is also e mpirica l , and a permanen t schism develops between an 'inside' and an 'out­ side' of the agent's identity . Never for a moment do we find in Trotsky the idea that the democratic and anti-absolutist identity of the masses constitutes a specific su bj ect pos ition which different classes can articulate and that, in do i n g so , they modify their own nature . The unfu l fi lle d democratic tasks are simply a stepp i ng -stone for the w o r k i n g class to advance t o wards its strictly class objectives . In t h is way , the co nditi o ns are crea ted no t o n ly for the s p e cifi ci ty of the he gem on i c link to be syste matically conj u red away ( giv e n that its factual or circumstantial character eschews any c on cep tual construc­ tion) , but also for its disappearance to be made invisible . Indeed , the ins e r tion o f the hegemonic re lati on into a narrative of adjus t ments a n d r e co m p o sitions , into a succession which cannot be su b s u med under t h e p r i n c i p l e of re p eti t i on , seems to g i v e a meaning to that conceptually evanescent p re sence . Thus , the histo ric o-nar rat ive form in which R ussi a n specificities are presented , plays an a m biguous r o l e : if, on the one hand, it limits them to the terrain of t h e circumstantial , on the other , the fact that they can be th o ugh t , even under the weak form of a na r ra tive, g ives them a princip l e of o r g an i z a tion , a certain discursive presence. Yet this is an e x t re m ely e p hemeral presence, since the saga of heg e mo n y concludes very quick l y: there is no speci fi city , either fo r T ro tsky or for Lenin, which can ass ure the survival of a Soviet S tate unless a socialist r e v o lu ti o n breaks out in E u ro p e , unless the victorious w o rking classes of the advanced indus trial co untries come to the assistance of the Russian revolu tionaries . Here the 'abn o rma l it y ' of the dis­ location of s t a ge s in R uss i a links up with the ' normal' dev el o pment of the W est; what we have called a 'second narrative' is reintegrated into the ' first na rrative' ; 'hegemony' r apidly finds its limits .

Hegem on y : the Diffi cult Emerg ence

oj a New Pol itical LO,{fic

55

'Class A l lia n ces' : Between Democracy and Authoritarianism

This conception o f t h e he g e mo nic link as external to the class iden­ t i t y of t he agents is not, of course , exclusive to Trotskyism but characterizes the whole L enin i s t tradition. For Leninis m , hegemony i n v ol v e s political leadership w ithin a class alliance . The political

character of the h ege m onic link is fundamental, i m p l y ing as it does t h at the terrain on which the l ink establishes i tself is different from that on w h ich the social agents are cons tituted . As th e field of the relations o f p rodu c t i o n is the s p e c i fic terrain of class constitution , the presence of classes in the p o l i tic a l field c an only be un d ers tood as a representation oj interests . Th ro u g h their representative parties t h e y unite under t h e l eaders hi p of one class , in an alliance against a comm o n e ne m y . This circums tantial unity d oes not , how ever, affect the identity of the cl as se s c o m pri s i ng the alliance , since their identity is co n s ti t uted around ' interes t s ' which are in the end strictly incompatible ( , strike toge t he r but m arch separately') . The i denti ty of the social ag en ts , rationalistically conceived under the form o f 'interes ts ' , and the tr a nsp are nc y of the m e a n s o f rep resen tation in re la t io n to what is re p re sen ted , are the two conditions which perm i t the exteriority of the h e ge mon ic link t o be established . T h i s ex­ teriority was at the root of those p a ra d o x ical si tuations in which the com munist militant ty p ical l y found himself. Often in the v a ng uard of a struggle for democratic l ib e r tie s , he n e ver t heles s could not identify with th e m since he would be the first to abolish them once the 'bourgeois-democratic' stage was co m p le ted . At this p o in t , it is im p o r ta n t to note the ambiguity and th e contradictory effects that stem from the cen tr ality of he g emony in Le nin i s t discourse . On t he one han d , the concept is undo u b ted ly associated with th e more authoritarian and nega t i v e tendencies of the Leninist t raditi o n , for it p o s tula t es a clear separation within the masses between the leading s e cto rs and those which are led . (This s ep a r a t ion is evidently absent in the rev o l u tio n a ry strategy of Kautskian orthodo xy , in which a co mp l e t e coincidence between political l e a de rs hi p and social base leaves no necessity fo r he gemo nic recompositions . ) But, on the other h an d , th e hege m o nic relation entails a co nce ption of politics which is p o ten tia ll y more democratic than a ny thing found within the tradition of t h e Second Inter­ national. Tasks and demands which, in cla s s i s t economis m, would have c o r res p onde d to different stages are no w seen to coexist in the same h istori ca l conj uncture . This results in the acceptance of current political v alidity for a plurality of anta goni sm s and p oi n ts of rupture,

56 so that revolutionary legitimacy is no longer exclusively concen­ trated in the wo rking class . A structural dislocatio n thus emerges between ' mass e s ' and 'classes ' , given that the line separating the former from the dominant sectors is not juxtaposed with class exploitation . Combined and uneven development becomes the terrain which for the firs t time allows M arxis m to render more complex its conception of the nature of social struggles . H o w , then , a re we to account for this paradox : that at the very moment when the democratic dimension of the mass struggle was being enlarged , an ever more vanguardist and anti-democratic con­ ception asserted itself in socialist political practice? Quite simply, by the fact that the o ntological privilege granted to the working class by M a rxism was transferred from the social base to the political leader­ ship of the mass movement . In the Leninist conception, the working class and i ts v anguard do not transform their class identity by fusing it with the m ultiple democratic demands that are politically recom­ posed by the hegemonic practices; instead , they regard these demands as stages, as necessary yet transitory steps in pursuit of their o w n class objectives ; Under such conditions , the relations between ' vanguard' and ' masses' cannot but have a predominantly external and manipulative character . Hence, to the extent that democratic demands bec o m e more diverse and the terrain of mass struggle more comple x , a vanguard that continues to identify with the 'objective interests of the working class' must increasingly broaden the hiatus between its o wn identity and that of the sectors it seeks to lead . The very expansion of the democratic potential of the mass movement gives ris e , in a strictly classist conception, to an increasingly authori­ tarian practice of politics . While democratization of the mass s truggle depends upon a proliferation of points of rupture which overflow class boundaries , political authoritarianism emerges at the moment when, in o rder to ground the necessity of class hegemony, a distinction is established between leaders and led within mass move­ ments . If this distinction were based upon a greater practical capacity for s elf-organization in the struggle for objectives shared by the entire movemen t , the consequences would not necessarily be authoritarian . But, as we have seen , it is actually posed in very different terms: one sector knows the underlying movement of history , and knows therefore the temporary character of the demands uniting the masses as a whole . The centrality attributed to the working class is not a p ractical but an ontological centrality , which i s , at the s ame time, the seat of an epistemological privilege: as the ' universal' class , the proletariat - or rather its party - is the

Hegemon y : the D!ffi cult Emerg ence oj a New Political Logic

57

depository o f science . At this point , the schism between class iden­ tity and the identity of the masses becomes permanent . The possi­ bility of this a uthoritarian turn was , in some way , present from the beginnings of M arxist orthodoxy; that is to say , from the moment in w hich a limited actor - the working class - was raised to the status of 'universal class ' . If none of the theoreticians of the Second International advanced in this authoritarian direction, this was because for them the political centrality of the working class had to coincide with the proletarianization of the other social strata , and there was thus no room for a schism between class and masses. All that was necessary for the authoritarian turn to become inevitable , how­ ever, was that the seizure of power should be conceived as an act of masses b roader than the working class , while the latter's political centrality was upheld as a principle in classical terms . Let us now bring together several links in our argument . It has become clearer why the tension between the two relations embraced by the concep t of hegemony - the relation between the hege­ monized task and the class hegemonizing it, and the relation between the hegemonized task and the class tha t is its 'natural' agent - could never be resolved in an effective conceptual articulation . The condi­ tion for the maintenance of working-class unity and identity on the terrain of economist stagism - the only terrain capable of constitut­ i ng it as a ' universal class' - was that the hegemonized tasks should not transform the identity of the hegemonic class, but enter into a merely external and factual relation with it. Moreover, the only way of affirming the external character of this relation was to tighten the bond between the hegemonized task and i ts ' natural' class agent. The terrain of hegemonic relations was , therefore, one of essentially pragmatic discourses . All the terminological innovations which Leninism and the Com intern introduce to Marxism belong to mili­ tary vocabulary (tactical alliance, strategic line, so many steps forward and so many back); none refers to the very structuring of the social relations , which Gramsci would later address with his con­ cepts of historical bloc, integral State, and so forth . Now, this tension between the two relations embraced by the concept of hegemony is not dis tinct from the ambiguity we have located between a democratic and an authoritarian practice of hege­ mony . The relation between a hegemonic class and a democratic task or demand assumes an external, manipulative character only insofar as this task is bonded to a different class , and to a necessary stage within the evolutionist paradigm . Conversely, the democratic potential can be developed only if this bond is broken, only if the

58

conditions disappe ar which permitted the emergence of a ri gi d separation between leaders and led within the masses . At this point, w e must p resent the c on d it i ons which would allow the original ambiguity to be overcome in either a democ r atic or an authoritarian practice of hegemony . Democratic p ractice . As we have indicated, the terrain of hegemonic recompos i t io n carries a potential for the democratic expansion and deepening of socialist political practice . Without hegemony, socialist practice can focus only on the demands and in terests of the working class . But insofar as the dislocation of stages compels the working class to act on a mass terrain it must abandon its class ghetto and trans form itself into the articulator of a mu l tipl i city of anta­ gonisms and demands stretching beyond itself. From everything we have said , it is evident that the d eepening of a mass democratic prac­ tice - which shuns vanguardist man i pulation and an external characterization of the relation between class hegemony and demo­ cratic tasks - can be achieved only ifit is recognized that these tasks do not have a necessary class character and if stagism is ren ounced in a thoro ughgoing manner . It is necessary to b re a k with the view that democratic tasks are bon ded to a bourgeois stage - only then will the obstacle preventing a permanent articulation between socialism and democracy be elim inated . Four fundamental consequences follow from this . First, the very identity of classes is transformed by the hegemonic tasks they take on themselves: the rigid line of demar­ cation between the internal and the external has fallen . Second , inasmuch as the democratic demands of the masses lose their neces­ sary class character, the field of hegemony ceases to involve a maxi­ mization of effects based on a zero-sum game among classes; the notion of ' class alliance' is also clearly insufficient, since hegemony supposes the cons truction of t he very identity of social agents , and not just a rational i st coincidence of 'interests' among preconstituted agen t s . Thirdly , the field of politics can no longer be considered a ' representation of interests' , given that the so-called 'representation' modifies the nature of what is represented . (In fact , the very notion of representation as transparency becomes untenable. What is actually called into question here, is the base/superstructure model itself. ) Finally , insofar as the identity of social agents ceases to be exclusively constituted th r ou gh their insertion in the relations of p roduction , and becomes a p recarious articulation among a number of subject positions , what is being i mplici t ly challeng ed is the identi­ fication between social agents and classes . A uthoritarian practi ce Here the conditions are the opposite . The ,

.

Hegemony: the D!fficult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

59

class nature of every demand or task has to be fixed a prio ri . There are bourgeois-democratic demands , petty-bourgeois demands , etc. , and their relative progressiveness is established through a political calculati on which a n a lys e s every conjuncture in terms of the tradi­ tional model of stages and the changes introduced by their uneven combination . There is , o b v i ou s ly a complete s e para ti on between the hegemonic tasks of the working class and its class identity. The military conception of pol i t ic s dominates the w hole range of strategic calculations . But since the real working class i s , of course, far fro m fully identifying with its ' historical interes ts' , the dissocia­ tion becomes p ermanent between the materiality of the class and the political instance representing its ' true identity ' . From Len in s What is to be Done to the B olshevization of the Communist parties under the Co mintem , this line of demarcation becomes incre a sin g ly rigid and is reflected in the growing authoritarian tum of Communist politics . It is important to clarify what makes this tum inevitable. We do not seek to deny the need for political mediation in the socialist determination of the working class; even less , to o ppose it with a workerism based upon the myth of a spontaneously sociali s t deter­ mination of the clas s . W hat is decisive, h ow ev e r , is how the n ature of this poli tical link is unders tood; and Leninism evidently makes no attempt to cons truct, through s truggle , a mass identity not prede t e r mined by any necessary law of history . On the contrary , it maintains that there is a ' for itself of the class accessible only to the enlightened vanguard - whose attitude towards the working class is therefore purely pedagogical . The roots of authoritarian politics lie in this interwea ving of science and politics . As a consequence, there is no longer any problem in considering the party as representative of the class - not of the class as flesh and blood , of course, but of that entelechy cons tituted by its 'historical interests ' . Whereas the demo­ cratic practice of hegemony increasingly calls into question the transparency of the p rocess of representation, the authoritarian p rac­ tice has laid the ground for the relation of representation to become the basic political mechani s m . Once every political relation is con­ ceived as a relation of representation, a progressive substi tutionism moves from class to party (representation of the objective interests of the proletariat) and from party to Soviet State (representation of the world interests of the Communist m ove m ent ) A martial concep­ tion of class s truggle thus concludes in an eschatological epic. A s w e have s een , the roots o f this transference of class uni ty to the political sphere go back to Second International orthodoxy . In Lenini s m as in Kautskyism, the constitutive character o f the political ,

'

­

.

60 moment does not entail that a m ajor role is attributed to super­ s tructures, because the p rivilege granted to the party is not ' topo­ graphical ' but 'epistemological': it is founded not on the efficacy of the poli t i cal level in cons tructing social relations , but on the scientific monopoly enj o ye d by a given class perspective. This monopoly guaranteed, at a theoretical level , the overcoming of the split between the vi si b l e tenden cie s o f c api talis m and its underlying evoluti on . The differen ce between Kautskyism and Leninism is that for the former the split is purely temporary and internal to the class , and the process of overcoming it inscribed in the endogenous ten­ den ci e s o f capitalist accumulation; w hile for Leninism , the split is the terrai n o f a structural dislocation between 'class' and 'masses' which permanently defines the conditions of political struggle in the i m perialis t era . This last point is decisive: hegemonic tasks become increasingly cen t ra l to communist s trategy , as they are bound up with the very conditions o f development of the world capitalist s ystem . For Lenin , the w o rld economy is not a mere economic fact, but a political realit y : it is an imperialist chain . The breaking points appear not at those links w hich are most advanced from the point of view o f the contradiction between forces and relations of production , but instead , a t those where the greatest number of contradictions have ac c umu la t ed , and where the greatest number of tendencies and antagonisms belonging , in the orthodox view , to diverse phases - merge into a ruptural unity . 6 This implies , however, that the revolutionary p rocess can be understood only as a political articulation of dissimilar elements: there is no revolution without a social co mplexity external to the simple antagonism among classes; in o ther w o rds , there is no revolution without hegemony . This m o ment o f political articulation becomes more and more funda­ mental when one encounters , in the stage of monopoly capitalism, a growing dissolution o f old solidarities and a general politicization of s o cial relations . Lenin clearly perceives the transition to a new bour­ geois mass politics - l abelled by him Lloyd Georgism7 - which is profoundly transforming the historical arena of class struggle. This possibility o f unsuspected articulations , altering the social and poli­ tical identities that are permissible and even thinkable , increasingly dissolves the o bviousness of the logical categories of classical stagism. Trotsky will draw the conclusion that combined and uneven development is the historical condition of our time. This can only mean an unceasing expansion of hegemonic tasks - as opposed t o purely class tasks , whose terrain shrinks like a wild ass's -

Hegemony : the Dilficult Emergence oj a New Political Log ic

61

skin . B u t i f there i s no historical process which does not involve a 'non-orthodox' combination of elements , what then is a normal de v e lopment ? C o mmunist discourse itself became increasingly dominated by t h e hegemonic character which every political init i a tive ac qu i red in the new historical terrain of the imperialist era . As a resul t , however, it te n ded to oscillate in a contr ad i ctory manner be tw e en what we have called a democratic and an authoritarian practice of hegemony. In the 1 920s economist stagism was everywhere in command, and as the prospect of rev olution receded the class lines grew still more rigi d . Since the European revolution was conceived purely in terms of working-class centrality , and since the Communist parties re­ pre se n ted the histo rical interests' of the working class , the sole function of these p arties was t6 maintain the revolutionary con­ sciousness of the p roletariat in opposition to the integrationist tendencies of social democracy . In periods of ' relative stabilization ' , therefore, i t was necessary t o strengthen the class barrier with even greater int r ansig e n ce . Hence, the slogan launched in 1 924 for the Bolshevization of the Communist parties . Zinoviev explained it as follo w s : 'Bolshevization means a firm will to struggle for the hege­ mony of the proletariat, it means a passionate hatred for the bou r­ geoisie, for the coun ter-revolu tionary leaders of social democracy , for centrism and the centrists, for the semi-centrists and the pacifists , for all the miscarriages of bourgeois ideology . . . Bolshevization is M arxis m in action; it is dedication to the idea of the dictatorship of the p r o l e tar iat, to the idea of Leninism . ' 8 As a renewal of the revolu­ tionary process w o ul d inevitably follow upon a worsening economic crisis, political periodization was a mere r e fl e ctio n o f economics : the only task left to the Communist parties in periods o f stabilization w a s t o accumulate forces around a wholly classist and 'rupturist' identity which , when the crisis arrived, would open the way to a new revolutionary initiative. (Characteris tically , the 'united front' policy was reinterpreted as a united front from below and as an opp o rtun i ty to expose the social democratic leaders . ) Under these conditions a manipulative approach t o other social and political forces could not fail to gain ascendancy . '

The break with this reductionist and manipulative conception or the beginnings of a break, as it has never been overcome in the communist tradition - was linked to the experience of fascism in Europe and the cy cl e of anti-colonial revolutions . In the fi rst case the crisis of the liberal-democratic S tate, and the emergence of radi cal­ popular i deolo gi e s of the Right, challenged the concep tion of dem o-

62 cratic rights and freedoms as 'bou rgeois' by nature; and , at the same ti me, the a n ti-fascist struggle created a popular and democratic mass s u bj ectivity which could potentially be fused with a soci alist i d en ti ty . I n the terms o f our earlier analysis , the link uniting the h egemonized task to its 'natural' class agent began to dissolve , and it became possible to fuse that task with the iden tity of the hegem o ni c class . In t h i s n e w perspective, hegemony w a s understood as the democractic reconstruction of the nation around a new cl ass core . This tendency would later be rei n forced by the varied experien ces of n a tional resi stance against the Nazi occupation . But the change i n c o m munist policy started with Dimitrov's report to the S eventh C ongress o f the Comin tern , where the Third P eriod line of ' class against class ' w as formally abandoned and the policy of the popul ar fronts first in troduced . 9 While i mplicitly retaining the notion of hegemony as a merely external alliance of classes , the new strategy conceived democracy as a common ground which w as not open to exclusive absorption by any one social sector . Under thes e condi­ tions , it became more and more difficult to maint ain a strict sep ar­ a tion between hegemonic tasks and class identity . A number of formulas ranging fro m Mao's 'new democracy' to Toglia t ti 's ' p rogressive democracy ' and 'national tasks of the working class' at tempted to locate themselves on a terrain that was difficult to define theoretically within Marxist parameters , since the ' popular' and the ' democratic' were tangible realities a t the level of the mass s t ru ggle b u t could not be ascribed to a s trict class belonging. Revolu­ ti ons in the peri pheral world which took place under a communist leadership present us w i th a similar phenomenon: from China to Vietnam o r Cuba, the popular mass identity was other and broader than class identi ty . The structural split between ' masses ' and ' cl ass ' , which we saw insinuating itself from the very be ginning of the Leninist tradition, here produced the totality of its effects . A t this poin t , communist discourse was confronted by a p a ir of c r uc ial problems . How should one characterize tha t plurality of an t agonisms emerging on a mass terrain different from that o f c l asses? A n d h o w could t h e hegemonic force retain a stri ctl y pro­ letarian character, once it had inco rporated the democratic demands of the m asses in its own identity? The main response to the first q u es tion was to implement a set of discursive strate gies whereby the rel a tionship established between classes went beyond their speci fi­ cally class character, while formally remaining on a class is t te rrain . Consider, for example , the use of enumeration in communis t dis­ courses . To enumerate is never an innocent operation; it involves -

Hegemony: the Dijficult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

63

m aj o r displacemen ts of mean i ng . Communist enumeration occurs within a dichoto mic space that es tablishes the anta g on is m between dominant and popular sectors; and the id e n ti t y of both is c on s t r u c t ed on the basis of en u mer a t in g their constitutive cl ass sectors . On the s id e o f the popular s e c t ors , for e x am p l e , woul d be included: the wo r k i n g class , the peas a n t ry , the petty bourgeo isie, progressive fractions of the national b o u r g eoisie , etc. This en u mer a tio n , how­ ev er , does not merely affirm the separate an d literal presence of c ert ain classes or class fractions a t t h e p op u la r p o l e; it also asserts their equivalence in the common co n fro nta ti o n with the dominan t p ol e . A re lati o n of equivalence is not a relation of i d en ti t y among objects . Equi valence i s never taut ol o g i ca l , as the su bs t itu t a bi li t y it es t a b l is h es among certain o bj e cts is only va l i d for d e t e rmi n a t e posi­ ti o ns w ithin a given s tructural contex t . In this sense, e quiv ale n ce d i spla ce s the i denti t y which makes it p ossi b le , from the obj ects themsel ves to the co n tex t s of their appearance or pres en c e . This , however, means that in t h e relation of e q u iv a l en ce t h e ide nti t y of t h e object is split: on th e one hand, it maintains its own ' li tera l' sense; o n the other, it s y m b ol i ze s the contextual position fo r which i t i s a substitutable element. This is ex actly what occurs in the commu nis t enumeration: fro m a st ri c tl y cl as s i s t p o i n t of view, there is no iden ti ty whatsoever among the sectors of the p o p ul a r p ol e , gi ven that each one has differentiated a nd even an tagoni s tic i n te r es t s ; yet , the rela tion of e q ui v a l e n ce established among them , in t he context o f thei r o p p o siti o n t o the dominant po l e , cons tructs a ' po pul a r " dis­ cursive position that is i rreducib l e to class p osi ti ons . In the M arxist dis course of the Second International , there were no equivalential e n u m e rat i o n s . For Kau t sk y , each class s ec to r oc c u pi ed a speci fi c differential p o s it i o n wi thin the l o g i c o f c ap i t a li s t developmen t ; one of t h e constitutive characteristics of Marxist d iscourse had been , precisely, the d iss o l uti o n of the 'people' as an a m or pho u s and i m p re cis e catego ry , and the r ed u c tion of every an tago nism to a cl ass confrontation w hich exhausted itself in its own li t e ral i t y , wi thout any equivalential dimension . As to the d i s co u rse of 'com bined and uneven developmen t ' , we have s e en that the dislocation of stages and t h e h e g e mo n ic r e com p o s i ti o ns were me rel y tho ug h t of as a m ore co mplex movement among classes , whose factual cha r a c te r made room for a n ar r a ti v e of exceptionalities but n o t for a c o n c ep t u al i ­ zati on o f s pecificities . In Rosa Luxemburg we come closer to a symbolic-equivalential split which subverts the literal sens e of each concrete s t rugg l e ; but as we saw, her at t r i b u t i o n of a ne ce s s a r y cl ass character to the re sul t i n g soci a l a g en t pl a ce s a ti gid limit on the

64

e x pa n s i v e logic of equivalences . Only in the enumerative practices of the popular fr o n ts p e riod does the 'people' - that agent cen tral to the political and social struggles of the nineteenth century - re­ emerge, timidly at first, in the field of Marxist d iscu rsivity . From what we have said, it is clear that the condition for the emergence of the 'people' as a political agent in communist disco urse has b e e n the relation of equivalence which splits the identity of classes and thereby constitutes a new type of polariza ti o n Now, this process takes place entirely within the field of the hegemoruc prac­ tices . Communist enumeration is not the confirma tion of a de facto si tuation , but has a performative character. The uruty of an ensemble of sectors is not a datum: it is a project to be built poli tically . The hegemonization of such an ensemble does not , therefore, involve a sim ple conj unctural or momentary agreement; it has to b uild a structurally new relation, different from class relations. This shows tha t the concept of ' class alliance' is as inadequa te to characterize a h e g e m o n i c relation as the mere listing of bricks would be to describe a b u i l d i n g . Nevertheless , gi ven its internal logic, the rela tion of equiva l ence cannot display its presence simpl y through the inci­ dental substitutability of its terms; it must gi ve rise to a general equivalent in which the relation as such crystallizes symbolically . It is at this point, in the political case we are examirung, that national­ p o pu l ar or popular-democratic symbols emerge to constitute s ubj e ct positions different from those of class; the hegemo nic relation t hen definitively loses its factual and episodic character, be c o m i n g instead a stable part of every p olitico-discursive formation . In this sense Mao's analyses of contradiction - despi te their near-to-zero philosophical value - do have the great merit of presenting the terrain of social struggles as a proliferation of contra­ dictions, not all of them referring back to the class prin ci ple . The other series of problems facing communist discourse con­ cerned the question of how to maintain the class iden tit y of the hegemonic secto r . Formulated i n its most general terms, the issue is the following: if in the new conception the hegemonic rela tion transforms the identity of the hegemonic sector, and if the condition o f social struggles in the imperialist era entails that these occur in an increasingly co mple x terrain dominated by recomposing practices , does it not follow that the class identity of the hegemoruc su bjects is pu t into question ? Up to what point can we continue to refer to a class core as the articulating p r in cip le of the various subject posi­ tions? Two answers - or rather, two ways of arriving at an answer - are possible here . And in the end they depend on the two .

Hegemony: the Difficult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

65

conceptions of hegemony - democratic and authoritarian - that we de s c r i bed earlier. For one of them , characterizing most of the communist tradition , the solution is fo u n d in an ad nauseam exten­ sion of the model of representation . Each instance is the represent­ ation o f another, until a final class core is reached which suppose dly gives meaning to the whole series . This response e v i d en tl y denies all o p a city and density to political relations , which are a bare stage on which characters constituted beyond them - the classes - wage their stru gg le . Furthermore, the class represented in this way cannot but be t h e class ' for itsel f , the finalist perspective incarnated in the ' s cienti fi c ' cosmovision of the party; that is , the ontologjcally pri­ vileg ed agent. In this way , all concrete problems concerning the practice of representation are simply eliminated . The other res ponse accepts the structural div e rsity of the relations in which social agents are i mmer s e d , and replaces the principle of representation with that of articulation. Unity between t h es e agents is then not the expression of a common underlying essence but the result of political construc­ tion and struggle. If the working class , as a hegemonic agent, manages to a rticulate around itself a number of democratic demands and struggles , t h is is due not to any a priori structural privile ge , but to a political initiative on the part of the class . Thus , the hegemonic s u bj ect is a class subject only in the sense that , on the basis of class positions , a certain hegemo nic formation is p ra ctica l ly articulated; but , in that case we are dealing with concrete workers and not with the entelechy consti tu t ed by their 'historical interests ' . In the world of the Third International, there was only one thinker in whom the notion of po l itics and hegemony as articulation found - with all its a m b igu i ti e s and limitations - a theoretically mature expression . We are, of course, referring to A n to n i o G ramsci .

The Gramscian Watershed The specificity of Gramscian though t is usually presented in two different and apparently contradictory ways. In one interpretation , Gramsci was an eminently I talian theoretician w ho se conce p t u a l innovations were related to the particular conditions o f I taly ' s b ack­ wardness: fai l u re of the Risorgimento project to construct a u ni fi e d national State ; strong regional split bet w � en indus tria l North and agrarian Mezzogiorno; lack of integration of the Catholic m ass es into the political life of the country , as a result of the Va ti can questi o n ; insufficien t and contradictory development of c apit a lis m ;

66 et c . In short, G ra msci was an o rigin a l theoreti ci an and a p o l i ti c al stra tegis t of ' uneven develop ment' , but his co ncep ts a re s c ar c el y rel evant to the conditions of advanced c a pi ta l i s m A s e con d , diver­ g en t reading presents him as a theo re ti ci a n of rev olu tion in the .

West, 1 0 whose strategic co nce p t i o n was based upon the complexity o f a dv a nce d industrial civilizations and the density of their soci al an d pol itical re lations . One of his in t e r p r eter s goes so far as to see him as the theoretician of the ca pi t a l is t r e s t r u cturi n g w hich followed the 1 929 w o rl d crisis , and o f the com p l ex i ty a cqui red b y ma s s s t r uggl e within the context of a growing in te r twin i n g o f po l i ti cs and e c o n o m ic s \I In fact, Gramsci's theoretical innovation is l o c a t ed at a m o re ge n era l leve l , so that both of these r ea d i n gs are p o ss i ble an d p a r ti al l y valid . M o re than any other theoretici an of his time, Gramsci broadened the terrain of po l i t i c al recomposition and hege­ mony , while o ffe rin g a theorization of the hegemonic l ink w hi ch cl e a rl y w e n t b e yo n d the Leninist category of 'cl ass alliance' . As, i n b o th the advanced industrial countries and the capitalist pe r iphe r y , the conditions o f political struggle moved furth er and further away from the ones i m a g i n ed b y orthodox s ta gism , the Gramscian cate­ gories applied equally to both cases . Their relevance sho uld th ere­ for e be situated at the level of the g ene r a l theory of Marxis m , and cannot b e re ferr ed to s p ecific geographical contexts . The s t a r ti n g point was, however , a strictly Leni n i s t a p p ro ac h I n Notes o n the Southern Question ( 1 926) , t he first Gramscian text in which the concept of h eg emo n y is used , he states: The pr ol e taria t can become the leading and the dominant class to the exten t that it su c c ee ds in creating a system of a l l i a n ce s which all ow s it to mobilize the m ajority o f the w o rking popu la ti o n a ga ins t c a pi t a lism and the b o u r g eoi s State. In I ta l y in the real class relations w hi c h exis t there, this means to the extent tha t it succeeds in g a inin g the consent of the broad peasant masses . ' 1 2 The precondition of this l eadi n g role is that the w orking class should not remain confined to t he narrow defence of i ts co rpor a ti v e interests , but should take u p those of other sectors . However, the logic is still only one of prec o ns titut e d sectoral i n te r es t s , which is perfectly c o mp a tib l e with the notion o f a cl ass alli a n c e . As in Lenin, leadership is merely poli ti c a l and not ' m oral .

-

.

'

,

and i ntellectual' It is in this m ovement, fro m the ' political ' to the i n te l l ect u a l and mora l ' p la n e , that the decisive transition takes place tow ard a c o n c e p t of he g e m on y b eyond cl ass alliances ' . For , w he re a s political leadership can be grounded upon a conjunct ural coin cidence of in te res ts in which the participating sectors retain their separate identity , moral and intellectual l e a de r ship r e q u ir es that an ensemble .

'

'

Hegemony: the Diffi cult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

67

of , i deas' and 'values' be shared by a number of sectors - or, to use our own terminology , that certain subject posi tions tra v e rs e a nu m ber of class sectors . Intellectual and moral leadership consti­ tu tes , according to Gram sci , a highe r synthesis , a 'collective wil l' , w hi ch , th ro ugh ide o lo g y , becomes the organi c ce m e n t uni fying a 'historical bloc' . A l l these are new concepts having an effect 0 f displacement with regard to the L e ninist pe rs p e c tive: the re lational specificity of the hegemonic l ink is no long er conce aled , bu t o n the contrary becomes entirely visible and theorized . The analysis con­ cep tually defines a new series of relations among gro u ps w hich baffles t h e i r structural location w i thin the revol uti o n a ry a nd rela­ tional s chema of economism . At the same time , i d e ol ogy is sign a lled as the precise terrain on which these relations are c ons ti tute d Thus , everything depends on ho w ideology is conceived . 13 H ere Gramsci brings about two new and fundamental displacements with regard to the classical problemati c . The first is his conce ption o f the materiality of ide olo gy Ide o l o gy is n o t identified wi t h a 'system of idea s ' or with the ' false consciousnes s ' of social agents; i t is i nste ad a n organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions a n d appara­ tuses , which welds together a histori cal bloc around a numb er o f basi c articulatory p r incip l e s T h is pre cl u de s the p o ss i b i l i t y of a 'superstru cturalist' reading of the ideological . In fact, through the concepts of historical bloc an d o f i d e o logy as organi c cemen t , a new totalizing category takes us beyond the old base/supers tructure dis­ tinction . This is not sufficient , however, because moral an d intel­ lectual leadership could s till be unders tood as the ideoiogi cal incul ca­ tion by a hegemonic class o f a whole range of subordin ate sect o rs . In that case , there would be no subject positions traversing cl ass es , for any that seemed to do so would in fact be a p p u r t en a n ce s of the dominant clas s , and th e i r p resence in o ther sectors could be under­ stood o nly as a p h en o me n o n of false conscio usness . It is at this crucial point that Gramsci in troduces his third and most important dis placement: the b reak with the reductionist problematic o f ideology . For Gramsci, political subjects are not - strictly s peak­ ing - classes , but c o m p le x ' collective wills'; si mil arl y , the ideo­ logical elements articulated by a hegemonic cl ass do not have a necessary class b e l o ng i ng Concerning the first p oin t, Grams ci ' s position is clear: the collective will is a result of the pol i ti c o ideological articul ation of dis p ers ed and frag mented h is t o ri c a l force s . ' From t h i s one c a n deduce the importance of th e " cul tural aspect " , even in practical (collective) a cti v i ty An histori cal act can only be performed by " collective man " , and this presupposes the attainment of a "cultural-social " uni ty through w hich a m ul tip licity .

.

.

.

­

.

68 of dis persed wills with heterogenous aims, are wel ded together with a si n g le aim, on the basis o f an e q u a l and common conception of the

w o rl d . ' 1 4 Nothing more distant from this ' collective man' , 'wel ded to g e t h e r with a sin g l e a i m ' , than the Leninist notion of class al liance . W i th regard to the s e c on d p oi n t, it is equally evident that for G ramsci the organic ideology does not represent a purely cl a ss is t and closed view of the world; it is formed instead through the a rt ic u lation of elements which, considered in themselves, do not have any necessary class belongin g . Let us examine, in this connection , t he fo llow i n g critical passages: 'What matters is the cri ticism to which su ch an ideol o gical complex is subjected by the firs t represen tation of a new his to ri cal phase . This criticism makes p ossi b le a pro ce ss o f diffetentiation and change i n the re l a t iv e w eigh t that the elements of the old ideologies u s e d to possess . What was p revi o u sly secondary and subordinate, or even incidental , is n ow taken to be pri mary becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretic al complex . The old collective will dissolves into its co ntradictory elements since the subo rdinate ones de v el o p socially . ' ls 'How, on the other hand , should this theoretical consciousness , p ro p o s e d as au to no m o u s con­ sciousness , be formed? How should everyone choose an d combine the elements fo r the constitution of such an autonomous conscious­ ness? Will each element imposed have to be repu dia ted a prio r i ? It will have t o be r epudi ated inasmuch as it is imposed, but not in i t s el f; tha t is to say that it will be necessary to give a new form w hich is s p e ci fi c to the given g r o u p . ' 1 6 W e can thus see the central point which demarcates Grasmci from other anti -e co n om i s ti c positions formulated within the communist movement of t ha t period . Both Lukacs and Korsch, for instance , also reproportioned the terrain classically attributed to the super­ s tructures ; b u t they did this within the p a r ame te r s of a class­ reductionist perspective which identified the revolutionary subject w i th the working class, such that hegemony in the sense of arti­ cu la ti o n was s t ri c tly unthinkable . It was p recisely G rams ci' s intro­ duction of this l a t te r concept which radically s u b ve r ted the original conditions for the emergence o f Second International dualism , and its re p roduction on an extended scale in the discourse of the Third. On the one hand, the field of historical contingency has penetrated social relations more tho r o u g hl y than in any of the previous dis­ courses: the social segments have lost those essential connections which turned them into moments of the stagist paradigm; and their o w n meaning depended upon hegemonic articulations whose success was not guaranteed by any law of history . In terms of our earlier analysis , we m ig ht say that the diverse 'elements ' or 'tasks' no longer ­

-

Hegemon y : the Difficult Emergence oj a New Political Log ic

69

had any identity apart from their relation with the force hegemoniz­ ing them . On the other hand, these forms of precarious articulation began to receive names , to be theoretically thought, and were incor­ porated into the very identity of the social agents . This explains the importance attributed by Gramsci to the 'national-popular' and to the form ulation of a concept such as ' integral State ' , in which the dominant sector modifies its very nature and identity through the practice of hegemon y . For Gramsci a class does not take State power, it becomes S tate . A l l the conditions would seem t o b e present here for what we have called the democratic practice of hegemony . Nonetheles s , the entire construction rests upon an ultimately incoherent conception , which is unable fully to overcome the dualism of classical M arxism . For Gramsci, even though the diverse social elements have a merely relational identity - achieved through articulatory practices ­ there must always be a single unifying principle in every hegemonic formation , and this can only be a fundamental clas s . Thus two principles of the social order - the unicity of the unifying principle , and its necessary class character - are not the contingent resul t of hegemonic s truggle , but the necessary structural framework within which every s truggle occurs . Class hegemony is not a wholly prac­ tical res ult of struggle, but has an ultimate ontological foundatio n . The economic base m a y n o t assure the ultimate victory o f the working clas s , s ince this depends upon its capacity for hegemonic leadership . However, a failure in the hegemony of the working class can only be followed by a recons ti tution of bourgeo is hegemony , so that in the end , politi cal s truggle is still a zero-sum game among classes . This is the inner essentialist core which continues to be presen t in Gramsci' s thought, setting a limit to the decons tructive logic of hegemony . To assert, however , that hegemony must always correspond to a fundamental economic class is not merely to reaffirm determination in the last instance by the economy; it is also to predicate tha t , insofar as the economy constitutes an insurmount­ able limit to society's potential for hegemonic recomposition , the constitutive logic of the economic space is not itself hegemonic . Here the naturalist prejudice , which sees the economy as a homo­ geneous space unified by necessary laws , appears once again with all its force . This fundamental ambiguity can clearly be seen in the Grams cian concept o f ' war of position' . We have already noted the function of military metaphors in classical Marxist discourse , and it would be no exaggeration to say that, from Kautsky to Lenin, the M arxist con­ ception of politics res ted upon an imaginary owing a great deal to

70 Clausewitz . 1 7 The chief consequence was what might be called a segregation effect - for , if one understands relations with other social forces as military relations , then one will al wa y s keep one's own separate i d entity From Kautsky's 'war of attrition' to the e x t r e me militarism of the B ol she viz a ti o n drive and 'class ag ains t class ' , the establishment of a str i ct dividing li n e was co n s i d ered the po li ti cs ' b ein g conceived simply as one very co n d i t io n of p o li ti c s of the te r r a i n s of class stru g gle For Gramsci , by co ntra st, 'war of position' involves t h e p ro gre ssi v e · disaggregation of a c ivil i zation and the construction of a no th er around a new class core . Thus , the i d en t it y of the o ppo ne n ts , far fro m b e ing fixed from the beginning , constantly changes in the p r o ce s s It is clear that this has little to do w i t h 'war of position ' in the strict m i li ta ry sense, where enemy fo r ce s are not continually p a ss i ng to one's own side . I ndeed, the mi l it ar y m e ta p ho r is here me t a p hori ze d in the o pp os i te direction: if in Leninism there w a s a militarization of poli tics , in Gramsci there is a d e m i lita ri z a t ion of war. 1 8 N everth el ess , this transition to a non­ m il i t a r y conception o f p o l it ics reaches a limit p re c is e l y at the p o i n t where i t is argued that the class c o r e of the new hegemony - and , of .

-

'

.

.

c ou r s e , also o f the old - remains constant

t hrou ghou t the entire p rocess . In this sense , there is an element of continuity in th e confron­ tation, and the m e t a p ho r of the two armies in str u g g le can retain part of its pro d u c ti v i ty Thus , Gramsci's thought appears sus p ende d around a basic am­ biguity concerning the status of the work i n g class which fin a ll y leads it to a contradictory p osit ion On th e one hand, the political cen­ t r a lity o f the w o rk i n g class has a historical , contingent character: it req u ire s the class t o co me out o f itself, to transform its own identity by a r t i c ul a t i n g to it a p l ura li ty of s t rug g l es and d e m o cr atic demands . On th e other han d , it would seem that this a r t i c u l a to ry role is as s i g n e d to it by the economic base - hence , that the centrali ty ha s a n e ce ss a r y characte r . One cannot avoid the feeling that the transition fro m a morphological and essentialist co n cep t io n a la Labriola , to a radical h is tori c i st one, 19 has not been coherently acco m plis h ed At any event, if we compare Gramsci's thought with t he various c l as s i c a l tendencies of Second International M arxism, the radical nov el ty of his con c ep t o f h eg e m on y is qui t e eviden t . After the war, Kautsky20 for mu l at ed a democratic co n cep t i o n of the transition to s oc ial i s m which used the Bolshevik experience as a counter-model , r e s p ons i ble - in his view - for dictatorial practices that were in­ e v i t abl e i f an a t t em p t was made to bring about a transition to socialism in Russian-like co n dition s of b a ckward n ess However, the .

.

.

.

Hegemon y : the DiJ/icult Emerg ence oj a New Political Logic

71

alternative h e proposed was t o wait u ntil t he m y thi cal laws o f c ap i t a l ist d e v elop m e n t simpl i fi ed so ci al a n tagonism s : the co n dition s would t he n exis t fo r the dislocation between ' mas s es ' and ' cl a s ses ' to disappea r , and with it any possible s plit between leaders and led . The Gramscian theory of h eg emo n y , on the contrary , accepts social com p l e x i ty as the very co ndi tio n of pol it ica l s t ru g gl e and ­ t hro u g h i t s three fo l d d isplacemen t of the Le ni n is t theo ry of ' cl a s s alliances ' - sets the basis for a democr a ti c p racti ce of p ol i t ics , com­ patible with a p lu ral i t y of historical s u bj e cts. 2 1 As t o B ernstein, Gramsci shar es hi s affir m a t ion o f the p ri ma cy of p oli ti cs , and his acceptance of a p l ura l ity of s t ruggle s and demo­ cra t i c demands irreducible to class belonging . But unlike Bernstein , for whom th es e se p a r a t e strugg l e s and demands are united only at an ep oc hal le v el , th ro u g h the intervention of a g ene ral law of progres s, Gramsci h a s no room for a principle of Entwicklung . St r u g g le s derive their meaning from their heg emo n ic a rt icu l a t i o n , and their progres­ s i ve character - from a so ci alis t poin t of view - is not assured in a d v a nce . History , the refore , is reg ard ed not as an ascen d ant con­ tinuum o f democratic reforms , but as a discontinuous series of hege­ mo n i c formations or his,tori cal blocs . In the terms of a dis tinction we d re w earlier, Gramsci m i ght share with Bernstein his ' revisionism ' , but certainly no t hi s 'gradualism' . W i t h reg a r d t o S o r e l , the situation is m o r e complicated. Un­ d o ub te d ly , in his concepts of 'bloc' and 'myth', Sorel b reaks more radically than Gramsci w i th the e s se n t iali s t vision of an underlying morphology of hi s to ry . In this respect, and this alon e , Gramsci's concep t o f hi sto r ical bloc represents a step backwards . At the same time , however , Gramsci's p ers p ecti v e marks a clear advance on Sorel , for his theo ry of hegemon y as articulation entails the idea of democratic plurality, w h i le the Sorelian myth was simply destined to recreate the unity oj the class . S u cces siv e versions o f this m y th sought to s e cu r e a radical line of p ar tition within so ci et y , and n eve r to construct, t h rou g h a p ro c ess of heg e mo n i c re agg reg a tion , a new i n te g r a l State . The idea of a 'war of pos i tio n ' would have been r adi ca lly alien to S orel's perspective.

Social Democracy: From Stagnation to 'Planism ' The po litical and theoretical void which the turn to a hege m onic politics t ri e d to fill , can also be found in the pra c tice of the social­ democratic pa r t ie s after the First World War. In their case, the

72

d islocation between strictly class tasks and the new political tasks of the movement took a characteristic form: that of a contradiction between the limited list of demands and proposals coming forth from the la bour movement, and the diversity and complexity of the p olitical problems confronted by a social democracy thrown into power as a result of the post-war crisis . This new and peculiar form of uneven and combined' development could not but set up paralys­ ing political effects in social forces which had placed all their bets on the progressive development of the productive forces, with the proviso that this would lead to power only when the 'objective conditions' matured . The narrowly classist mentality of the social­ democratic parties would here produce all its negative consequences. This was evident in the limited capacity of the social-democratic parties to hegemonize the broad range of democratic demands and antagonisms resulting from the post-war crisis . ' From the tum of the century until the end of the Firs t World W ar, the European Socialist movement, under its cloak of a revolutionary party , was thus a mere parliamentary instrument of trade unionism . Its real activity was restricted to trade union problems , its constructive action to ques­ tions of wages and hours, social insurance, tariff problems and, at the most, suffrage reform . The struggle against militarism, and the p revention of the war, important as it was , was "incidental" to the main work of the party . '22 This mentality was to dominate social­ democratic activity as a whole between the end of the war and the Great Depression . In Germany, for example, from November 1918 onwards , most of the decrees passed by the Socialist Council of People' s Commissars referred almost exclusively to trade union demands and reforms in the suffrage system; no attempt whatsoever w as m ade to face up to key political and economic problems . This narrow classist mentality was also reflected in the total absence of a policy of radical democratization in those societies where the social democrats came to government . The classist mentality - reformist or revolutionary , it matters little - closed the road to the construc­ tion of a collective will articulating a variety of democratic demands and antagonisms within a new popular hegemonic bloc. Neither the Army nor the bureaucracy was subjected to any reform whatsoever. And as for foreign policy , the social-democratic governments and , above all , socialist ministers participating in cabinets dominated by o ther political forces - restricted themselves to following the d o m inant tendencies without formulating any political alternative. In the strictly economic field , the dominant policy of the post-war social democracies was one of nationalizations (called 'socializa'

Heg emony : the Difficu lt Emerg ence oj a New Politica l Logic

73

tions ') . In Der Weg zum Sozialismus , 2 3 Otto Bauer proposed a gra­ duated series of nationalizations together with democratic manage­ ment of the en te rp ris es Projects for nationalization appeared in a number of other countries , and in some of them like Germany, Britain and Sweden , c omm issio n s were s et up t o study socialization pl a ns Yet nothing came of this a c t ivi ty . ' Although social democrats formed or entered government in se v e ra l countries , the g l o b al result of the first a ttempts at socialization was nil: with the exception of the French ar m ame n t industry in 1 936 , n o t a single company was na tio n al i z ed in Western Europe by a social-democratic government during t h e entire inter-war period . ' 24 After the s ocialization fi as co , social democracy did not have the least alternative economic p roject until the Great Depression. There are various reasons for this failure, but they all come down to two m ain factors . First, there was a lack of a hegemonic project: h avi n g renounced any attempt to articula te a broad front of demo­ cratic s truggles , and aspiring instead merely to represent workers' interes ts, social democracy found i tself p o we rles s to alter the social and p o l iti cal l o g i c of the State ap p ar a t uses At th i s point, an option clearly emerged: either to participate in b ou r g eo i s cabinets in order to obtain the maximum number of social measures fa vou r abl e to working-class sectors; or else, to enter into opp os i ti on a nd t h ereby to double one's impotence . The pressure-group character of trade union interests , ty p i c al of social democracy , ne a rl y always imp o s ed the first alternative . There was , h o w e v er, a second reason for the paralysis of social democracy w i t h rega r d to any structural c h a n ge : and th i s was the persis tence of the Second I nte rn a tio n a l s economism , the view that the economy constituted a h o m o g e n eo us space dominated by neces­ sary laws , not susceptible to conscious r e gu l at i o n . A . Sturmthal perceptively comments: O d d l y enough, the Radical M arxist tradi­ tion, still a l ive in Herman M u l l e r and o t h e r right-wing leaders , increased their s t u b bo rn support of la issez-ja ire . The belief that ca pit a li s m cannot be reformed" was part of the M arxist credo, designed at the beginning of the Socialist party to separate it from all m i d dl e cla s s reform movements . Capitalis m was su p p o s e d to follo w its own laws; only a S o cialist revolution would permit banishment of the evil social consequences o f t h e old system. The obvious i m plication of this theory was the b el i e f in revolu tionary rather than democratic methods , but even when the s oci a l i st move­ ment acc ep te d democracy it did not completely a b a nd o n the ba sic ideo l ogy o f its o rig i n a l th eory . Cap�talist government had to be .

.

.

'

'

"

-

.

.

.

74

administered a cco r ding to this view, within the traditional frame­ work of c api t alis t economy . . . Thus Herman Muller had the sup­ port of the R adicals , who o the r wis e held him in deep mi strust . '25 I t w a s the Great Depressio n which forced a ch ange in this perspec­ tive and , at t he same time, gave a new basis for the redefinition of social-democratic po l i ti cs . The 'p l an is m ' of the 1930s was the first expression of the new type of a tti tude . While c rea ting a new welfare­ state economic a l t e r nati v e , the implementation of Keynesianism allowed a universalist status to be gra n t ed to the in tere s t s of the workers , inasmuch as a high-wages po l i cy became a stimulus for economic g ro w t h b y contributing to the expansion of a gg rega te demand . 26 Planis m at i ts he i gh t - as it was formulated in the works of its main exponent Henri De M an27 - was , however, more than a s i m p le economic proposal : it was an attempt to recast the objectives of the socialist m o v em ent in a ra di cally new, anti-economist ver­ sio n . All the elements we saw e m er ging in the crisis of the economist and redu c t i onist version of Marxism are present in De Man: t he c r i t i q ue of t he rationalist conception of su bj ec ti vi t y based on economic 'interests' - he was one of the first socialists seriously to study p sy c ho a n a l ys is; t h e cri t i q ue of class reductionism; the neces­ sity of a mass bloc broader than the working class; the need to put forward socialism as a national alte rn ati v e, as an organic reconstitu­ tion of the nation on a new basis; the req ui r ement of a myth - in the So relian sense - which would cement the diverse components of a col l e c t i ve socialist will . The ' Plan' was , t herefo re , not a si m pl e economistic i nst r u m ent ; it was the very axis for the reconstitution of a historical bloc which would m a ke i t p o ssib le to combat the decline o f b o u rge o i s society and to counter the advance of fascis m . (The pro-fascist po s i t i o n which De M an p e rs o na l l y adopted after 1 938 , a n d the similar evolution of Marcel Deat's socialists in France, should no t make us forge t the significance of plan is m as a real effort to re g a i n the political initiative for socialism in the transformed social c li m a te following the war and the Dep r essi on . Many of its themes became the co m m on patrimony of social de m ocra c y after 1 945 - particularly its economic-technocratic aspects ; while its more radi cal and reno v a t i n g political insights t e nd ed in the main to be cas t a s ide . ) In this respect, i t is instructive to recall a fr equen tly noted ambi­ guity28 w h i ch goes to the heart of the l im it ations of social­ democratic politics after W o rld War I I . The project of the left-wing supporters of p l an i s m was to establish a mixed eco no m y in which

Hegem ony: tlie DiJfjcult Emergence oj a

New Political

Logic

75

the ca p italist sector would g r adu a ll y disappear; thus , it was in effect a roa d of tr ansition to socialism . For a mo r e technocratic variant, however, the poi n t was merely to create an area of state intervention which would c o rrect particularly through the control of credit - the imbalances inherent in the course of ca p i tal is m . The terms of this alternative show very clearly that both the left and right alternativ es related to econom ic policy; while proj ec t s for ra dic a l democratization and the construction of a new collective will were either absent or occu p ied a marginal position Before 1 945 it was the inv e terate class ism of the social-democratic movements which barred any a t tem p t at h e g e m on i c articulation . A fter 1 945 with the creation of the Welfare State - this classism slackened con­ siderably , not of course in the direction of a deep e ning of the demo­ cratic process, but simply through the expansion of a Key nes i an S tate in which the interests of the different sect o r s were no lon ge r defined along clear-cut class lines In this sense, social democra cy becam e a po l iti co -economi c alternative within a given S ta te form, and not a radical alternative to that form. (Here we are evidently refe r ring not to a 'revolutionary ' alternative , involving the violent overthrow of the e xi st i ng State , but to a deepening and a r t i cu lation of a variety of antagonisms , within both the State and civil society , w hich allows a 'war of position ' against the dominant hegemonic for m s ) As a result of this absence of a he g emon i c al ternati ve, social de mo c rac y reduce d itself to a co m bi n ation of, on the one hand , p r iv i l eged p r ag m ati c relations with the trade un i ons and , on the other more or less le ft wing technocratic polici es , which in an y case made everything dependent u pon s o l u tions im p l e m ente d at a Sta t e level . This is th e root of the absurd notion according to which the degree of 'leftness ' o f a programme is gauged by the number of companies it proposes to nationalize . -

.

-

.

.

,

-

The Last Redoubt of Essentialism : the Economy Our e arl i e r analysis can be seen from two different pe rs pecti ves which are, strictly speaki n g , complementa r y From a first point of view , the pi c ture we h a ve presented is of a process of sp l i ts and fr a g m enta tio n s through which the disaggregation of the orthodox para d igm took place. But the space oc cupied by this p a r a digm does not remain empty: from a second point of view , the same p ro c ess can be seen as t h e emergence and expansion of the new articulatory an d recom p osing l og i c of h e gemony We saw , however, that this expan.

.

76

s ion met a limit. W hether the working class is considered as the political leader in a class alliance (Lenin) or as the articulatory core of a his torical bloc (Gramsci) , its fundament a l identity is const i tu ted in a t e r rai n different fro m that in which the hege m o n ic practices o perate . Thus , there is a threshold which n o n e of the strategic­ hegemonic con ce p tio n s manages to cross. If the validi ty of the e conomist p a rad i gm is maintained in a certain instance - last though de cisi v e , as it is the rational substratum of history - it is a cco rded a necessity such that hegemonic articulations can be con­ ceived on l y as mere conti n gen cy . This final rational stratum, w h ich gi ve s a ten den tial sense to all historical processes , has a specific locatio n in the top o graphy of the social: at the economic level . The e co n o m i c level , however , mus t s at i s fy three very p recise conditions in order to play this role of co n stitu tin g the subjects of hegemonic practices . Firstly, its laws of motion must be strictly endo genous and exclude all indetermin acy resulting from political or oth er external interventions - o therwis e , the constitutive func­ tion could not refer exclusively to the economy. Secondly, the unity an d ho m o geneity of social agents , constituted at the economic level, must result from the very laws of motion of this level (any frag­ mentation a nd dispersion of positions re q ui ri n g an ins tance of re­ co mposition external to the economy is excluded) . Thirdly, the position of these agents in the relations of production must endow the m with 'historical i nterests' , so th at the presence of such agents at ot h er social levels - through mechanisms of ' represen t a t ion ' or ' a rticulatio n ' - must ultimately be explained on the basis of economic interests . The latter are, therefore, not restricted to a determinate social sphere , but are the an chorage for a globalizing perspective on society . E ven those M arxist tenden c ies which s t r u g gled hardest to over­ come economism and reductionism mantained, in one way or an other , that essentialis t co n cep t ion of the s t ru ctu ri n g of economic space w hich we have just described. Thus , the debate between econ o mist and a n t i -ec o nomist tendencies within Marxism was n ecessarily reduced to t h e secondary problem of the weight that should be a tta ched to t he superstructures in the determination of historical p ro cesses . Yet the most ' s up ers t ru ct ural i st ' of co nce ptions retained a naturalist vision of the economy - even w hen it a ttempted to limit the area of its effects . In the remainder of this chapter we will probe this last redoubt of orthodox essentialism. Referring to certain contemporary debates , we will attempt to demonstrate that the space of the economy is itself structured as a

Hegemotl Y : the Dilficult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

77

p o liti ca l space , and that in it, as in a n y other 'level' o f society , those practices we characterized as hege m o n ic are fully o pe r a ti ve Before we embark on this t a s k , however, it is neces sary t o d i s ti ng ui s h two very different problems which have frequen tl y been co n fu s ed in the critique of economis m : the firs t refers to the nature and con s tituti o n of the e c o no mic space; the se co n d , which has no relation whatsoever with the jirst, c once rn s the rel at i ve weight of the e con o m i c s pace in .

the determination of social processes external to itself. The first is the de ci siv e p r o ble m and constitutes the ground for a rad i cal break with essentialist paradigms . The second, for reasons we will attempt to clarify in this book, canno t be determined at the level o f a g ene ral theorization of the social . (To as s e r t that what occurs at aI/ levels of so c i e t y in a given conjuncture is a b so l u tely determined by what h a ppe ns at the level o f th e economy, is not s t ri c t l y speaking l o g i c a ll y i nc o mp ati ble with an anti-economist response to our fi r st qu e sti o n ) Our three co n diti o n s fo r t h e ul ti m a te co ns titu t io n o f h egemon i c su bje c ts by the ec o n o m i c level correspond to three basic theses of classical Marxist theo ry : the condition re ga rd i n g the endog eno us character of the l aw s o f motion of t h e eco n o m y co rr es p o n ds to the thesis of the n eu t r a li t y of the p ro d u c ti ve forces; the condition of the uni ty of social agents at the economic level , to the th es is of the g ro w in g h o m o ge n i z at i on and im po ve ri s h m e n t of the working class; and the condition that the re l ati o n s o f p roducti o n should be the locus of hi s to ri ca l interests' transcending the economic sphere , to the thesis that the w o rk in g class has a fu n d a m en tal interest in so ci al is m We will now attempt to demonstrate that these three theses are false . For M a rxism, the devel o p m e n t of the p r o d u c t i v e forces plays the key role in the historical evolution towards socialism, given that ' the past d e v e l o pm en t of the pro d u c ti ve forces makes socialism possible, and their fu tu-re devel o p m en t mak es socia l ism necessary . '29 They a re at the root of th e formation of an ever more n u me rou s an d e xpl oit ed p ro let a ria t whose historical mission is to take possession of, and collectively mana g e , highly socialized and d eve l o p ed p ro d uc t i v e forces . At present, the capitalist relati ons o f p rod u c t i on constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the advance of these p ro du c tiv e forces. The contradiction betwe en b o urgeo is i e and p ro leta ri a t is , therefore , the social and political e x pre s s ion of a p r i m a l economic con tradic­ tion, one which combines a ge n e ra l law of dev e lo p m en t of the produ ct iv e forces with the laws of development s p e ci fi c to the c ap i t alist mode of p ro duction A cc o rdi n g to this view, if history has a sense and a rational substratum, it is due to the general law o f ,

-

-

.

'

.

,

.

78

development o f the productive forces . Hence, the economy may be understood as a mechanism of society acting upon objective pheno­ mena independently of human action. Now, in order that this general law of development of the produc­ tive forces may have full validity , it is necessary that all the elements intervening in the productive process be submitted to its determina­ tion s . To ensure this , Marxism had to resort to a fiction: it conceived of labour-power as a commodity . Sam Bowles and Herbert Gintis have shown how this fiction would make M arxism blind to a whole series of c haracteristics of labour-power as an element of the process of capitalist production . Labour-power differs from the other neces­ sary elements of production in that the capitalist must do more than simply purchase it; he must also make it produce labour. This essential aspect, however, escapes the conception oflabour-power as a commodity whose use-value is labour. For if it were merely a commodity like the o thers , its use-value could obviously be made automatically e ffective from the very moment of its purchase. 'The designation of labour as the use-value of labour-power to capital obscures the absolutely fundamental distinction between p roductive inputs embodied in people capable tlj social practices and all those remain­ i n g inputs for whom ownership by capital is sufficient to secure the " consu m ption" of their p roductive services. '30 A large part of the capitalist o rganization of /abour can be understood only as a result of the necessity to extract labour from the labour-power purchased by the cap ital i s t The evolution of the productive forces becomes un­ intelligible if this need of the capitalist to exercise his domination at the very heart o f the labour process is not understood . This , of course , calls into question the whole idea of the development o f the produ ctive forces as a natural , spontaneously progressive pheno­ menon . W e can therefo re see that both elements of the economist viewp oint - labour power as a commodity , and the development o f the productive forces as a neutral process - reinforce each other. Little wonder that the study of the labour process was for long depreciated within the Marxist tradition . It was the publication o f Braverman's Labour and Monopoly Cap itaP I which finally triggered o ff the debate . It defends the thesis that the guiding principle of technology under capitalism is the separation of conception and execution, producing ever more degraded and 'deskilled ' labour. Taylorism is the decisive moment in this struggle of the capitalists to dominate the workers and control the labour p roces s . B raverman postulates that it is the law of capital accumulation which lies behind the need of capital to wrest control .

Hegemony : the Diffi cult Emergence q a New Political Logic

79

of the labour process from the direct producer; he , ho w e ve r , fails to provide a real explanation why this is expressed t h ro u gh an unceas­ i n g effort to destroy the skills of the workers an d to reduce t h em to mere p er for mers . Above all , he presents this logic of domination as an o m n i po tent force - op e rat ing app a r e n tl y without trammels as if the eco nomic forces available to capital did not pe rmit the wo r ki n g class to resist and influence the course of development . H e re , the old no ti o n o f labour-power as c om mo di ty , en ti re ly sub­ ject to the lo g i c of capital , continues to p ro duce i t s e ffe cts . Co n t r a ry to Braverman 's argument, t h e c ritiqu e of the n o ti on of labour-power as a commo d ity whose use-value is labour allows us to understand capi t al ' s need to control the labour process . The fact is t h a t once labour-power is p urchased , the maximum p os si bl e labour has to be e x t ra c t e d fro m i t . H enc e the la b o u r process cannot exist without a series of relations of domination. Hence , too, well before t he advent o f m o nopol y capitalism, th e capitalist org a nization of labour had to be both a t echni q u e of p ro d u c t io n and a techni q ue of d o mi n a t io n . This a s p e c t has been stressed in a n u m ber of works , such as those by Stephen M argli n and Katherine Stone , 32 who argue that t he fragmentation and specialization of l a bo u r bear no relation whatsoever to a sup p osed need for efficiency , but are ins tead the effect of capital's need to exercise its d om inatio n over the labour pr o c e s s . Since the w orke r is c a p a b l e of social practices , he could resist the imp o s ed control mechanisms and force the capitalist to use different techniques . Thus , it is not a pure lo gi c of capital which determines the ev o lu t i o n of t h e labour process; the latter is not merely t he p l a ce where c a p ita l exerts i ts domination , but the ground of a struggle. A number of recent stud i es , undertaken in W e st e rn Europe and t he U nited S tates , have analysed the evolution of the labour process from t he po in t of view of the rel a t i on of forces between workers and ca p i ta l i s t s , and of the workers ' resistance . These reveal the pres ence of a ' p o l i ti c s of production ' , and cha l l en g e the idea that the d eve­ lopment of c a p i ta l i s m is the effe c t s o l e l y of the laws of c omp et i t i o n and the exigencies of accumulation . Richard Edwards , in Contested Terrairl , 3 3 distinguishes three m a i n forms of control: s i m p l e control b a se d on v ig il a n ce ; technical control , corresponding to the subordi­ n a t io n of the worker to the rhythm of th e machine as fou n d on t h e assembly l i n e ; and finally , bureaucratic control - man i festi n g itself t h r o u g h the institutionalization of hierarchical power - by which control depends no longer on the physical s tr u c t ur e of t h e labour proces s , as in the p r ev iou s case, but on its social structure. He

80 maintains that the workers ' resistance explains the need for capital to e x p e r i ment with new forms . Similarly , Jean-Paul Gaudemar isolates fou r cycles o f technological domination in the case of France: 'a "panoptic " cycle; a cycle oj extensive discip lining (in the factory and outside the factory) ; a cycle founded on a twofold process involving internalizatio n of d i s ciplin e wi thin a labour process remodelled on mechanizatio n , a cycle which I propose to call cycle oj mechanist discipline; finally , a cycle oj contractual discipline, in which the internali­ zation of discipline proceeds by formal and real modes of a p ar t ial d el e ga t i o n o f p ower. '34 For its part , the Italian operaista current of the sixties demonstrated how the development of capital , far from bl i n d ly i m po s ing its logic on the working class , is subordinated to the latter's s truggl e . Mario Tronti/5 for example , points out that wo rking-class struggles have forced capital to modify its internal co m p o s i t i o n and forms of domination - for , by imposing a limit on t h e working day , they have compelled capital to pass from absolute to relative surplus value . This leads Panzieri to uphold the thesis that production is a 'political mechanis m ' , and that it is neces­ sary to analyse ' technology and the organization of labour as estab­ lishing a relation of forces among classe s . '36 The idea common to these w o rks is that speci fic historical forms of capitalist control have to be studied as part of overall social rela tions , given that the chang­ i ng o rganizational forms of the labour process cannot be understood m e re l y in terms of t he difference between absolute and relative surplus value . M o reove r , a comparative historical analysis reveals i m p orta n t differences among the various countries . The strength of trade unions in Britain , fo r example, has made possible a greater resistance to change than elsewhere . W orker s ' s truggles, understood i n these terms , obviously cannot be e x plained by an endogenous logic of capitalism , since their v e ry dy n a m i s m cannot be subsumed under the 'commodity' form of l a b o ur p o w e r But if this split between a logic of capital and a logic of workers' resis tance influences the organization o f the capitalist l ab o ur proces s , it must also crucially affect the character and rhythm of expansion of the productive forces . Thus , the thesis that the p roductive forces are neutra l , and that their development can be conceived as natural and unilinear , is entirely unfounded . This also removes t h e only ground on which the economy could be under­ s tood as an autonomous and self-regulated universe . The fi rst con­ dition, therefore, of the exclusive privilege granted to the economic s p here i n the constitution of social agents , is not fulfilled . This conclusion should already make us suspect that the second -

.

Hegemon y : the

Difficult Emergence oj a New Pol itical Logic

81

condition is also not fulfilled , as the e conom y co u ld ha rdly constitute subjects unified by a sin g l e logic which it does not itself possess . Nevertheless , it is i mp o rt ant to explo re the v a ri eg a te d d ecen tr i ng of the diverse po s itio n s o i ' lhe 'working class ' subject . In the first p l a ce , the very concept of wor k in g class in Ma rx covers two di s tinct relations wit h their own laws of m o t io n : the wage relation esta­ blished th rou g h the sale of labour-power - which tu rns the worker into a p ro letari an ; and that r es ul ting from the worker's location in th e labour process - which makes him a manual w o rker. This dicho to my under p ins the pregnant distinction drawn by M ich ael B u r a w o y37 between relations oj p ro du cti o n and relations in pro d u c­ tion . If fo r M arx the distinction is not evident , it is not only because the two sets o f relations tended to coin c ide in his immediate his­ torical experience; b u t also because, s ee ing lab our-power as a simple co mmo d i t y , he tended to w ithd ra w all autonomy and relevance from the relations established in th e labour process . It d oes , how­ ever, remain clear that both relations have evolved in a different man n er , m a ki n g pro bl e m a tic the commo n ' w o r ki n g class' label which u ni ted the m : w hereas the wage form has become gen er ali zed in advanced ca pi t a l i s m , the class of in d us tri al workers has dec lin e d in numbers and i mpor tan ce . This dys ym metry is at the root of the a mbi g u ities which have dominated recent debate on the limits of the wor k in g class . Once the theor y o f i mp o veri shmen t p ro v e d untenable as a s pe c ific mechanism for the constitution of working-class un ity, two new atte m pts were m a d e to find an economic basis for such u n i ty : one centred on the p heno m enon of , de s kil l ing ' (Braverman) , while the o th e r sought to i d e n t i fy a m o re restricted core of workers who would con stitu t e the ' true' working class (Poulantzas) . Braverman, s tarti n g fro m h is an alys is of Ta y l o rism , argues that the de g r a dation of labour resulti n g from the s epa r a tio n between co ncep tion and ex ecu t ion bri n g s ever broader s trata of w o rk ers - be the y em­ pl o y e d b y the commodity-producing s e c tors or not - within the category of the p roletariani ze d working cl a s s , 38 A ccor d i n g to him , the polarization foreseen by M arx is therefore in the p ro ces s of fulfil m ent , and the on g o in g d e g r adati on of its labour co ndi t i ons will pus h the w o r k in g c l as s to organ i ze itself and str ug g le p ol itically aga ins t the syste m . However, few studies d eal i n g with the North American w o rk in g class share Braverman's homo g e niz a t io n thesis . On the contrary , the g e ne ral t e ndency is to in s i st on the division and fragmentation of the work in g class , The works of Edwards , Gordon and Reich39 demons trate, for ex a m ple, how the forms o f co ntrol in

82

the l abour p rocess , combined with racism and sexism, have created a segmentation of the labour market which has crystallized in the fractioning of the working class . 40 S i m ilar work in W estern Europe4 1 also vitiates the thesis of a progressive simplification of the social structure and confirms that the current general tendency is towards a polarization between two sectors of the economy: a well-paid and p rotected general sector, and a peripheral sector of unskilled or semi-skilled workers for whom no security exists . If we add a third secto r , that of the structurally unemployed whose number is con­ s tantly grow in g , it becomes apparent that the thesis ofhomogeniza­ tion truly cannot be sustained . Furthermore , deskilling does not display the general character attributed to it by Braverman: although it is increasing in some sectors , there is also a parallel process of the creation of new skills . Furthermore , the creation of a dual labour-power market must be related to the different capitalist strategies to combat shopfloor resistance and cannot be seen as a simple effect of capitalist deve­ lopment . Thus Andrew Friedman has shown how in the British cas e , capitalists employ various strategies according to the capacity of the different g roups of workers to resist their authority . 42 Within a given country and within the same company, a distinction may be d rawn between central and peripheral workers , belonging to dif­ ferent labour markets , whose wages and working conditions reflect their unequal capacity for resistance. W o men and immigrants are generally situated in the unprotected market. Friedman , how<;ver, sees this segmentation not as the result of a conspiracy to divide the working class , but as the consequence of relations of force in which the unions themselves play an important role . The divisions within the working class are therefore more deeply rooted than many wish to allow; and they are, to a certain extent, the result of the workers' o wn practices . They are political, and not merely economic divi­ . sIons . It is impossible to talk today about homogeneity of the working class, and a fortiori to trace it to a mechanism inscribed in the logic of capitalist accumulation . In order to maintain the idea of a workers' identity a round common interests , derived from a class insertion in the relations of p roduction , the second tendency we mentioned earlier has therefore attempted to locate the tnle working class by means of a m o re restricted definition . The reality of fragmentation is fully accepted , and the unitary identity is attributed to one of the fragments . In this respect, it is instructive to examine the debate which opposed Erik O lin Wright to Nicos Poulantzas . 43 According

Hegemony: the Difficult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

83

to Poulantzas , productive labour is the criterion for identifying the limits of the working clas s , 44 and unproductive waged workers constitute a 'new petty bourgeoisie' . The heterogeneity of the se ctors included in this category does not create a special problem for Poulantzas . Since, in his view , classes cannot be defined only at the economic level ; and s in ce the old and the new petty bourgeoisie occupy the same ideological position with regard to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, he feels quite justified in bracketing them in the same class category . This approach has been criticized by Eric Olin W right , who rejects not only Poulantzas's definition of p roductive labour, but also the very idea that such a criterion could serve to define the limits of the working class . His argument is that the distinction between p roductive and unproductive labour does not in any way imply that unproductive workers have diffe rent class interests and are not concerned with socialis m . He states : ' For two posi ti o n s within the social division of labour to be placed in different classes on the basis of economic criteria implies that they have fu n dament a lly different class interests at the economic level. '45 The solution he o ffers is to make a distinction between ' ambiguous' and 'non-ambiguous' class positions . The latter characterize the pro­ letariat , the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie .46 Together with these three n on-a m biguo u s positions , Wright distinguishes what he calls ' c ont rad i c t o r y class locations ' , half-way between the two n o n a m b i g uou s positions . Where the economic criteria are contradic­ to ry ideological and political struggle will play a determinant role in the definition of class interests . The reason for this Diogenes-like search for the 'true' working class is, of course, political: the object is to determine that category of workers whose economic interests link them directly to a socialist p e rspec ti v e and who are therefore destined to lead the anti-capitalist struggle. The p roble m , however, with these approaches which start from a restricted definition of the working class , is that they are still based on the concept of 'objective interest' - a concept which lacks any theoretical b a s i s whatsoever , and involves little more than an arbitrary attribution of interests , by the analyst, to a certain category of social agents . In the classical view , class unity was constructed aroun d interests , but it was not a datum of the social structure; it was a process of unification , resulting from the impoverishment and proletarianization which went hand in hand with the development of the productive forces . Braverman's homogenization through deskil­ ling belongs to the same explanatory level . The objective interests were historical interests , insofar as they depended upon a rational and ­

,

,

84 necessary movement of hi sto r y a cce ss i ble t o s ci ent ific kn ow le dge . W hat cann o t be done is to abandon the e sc h a to lo gic al con ce ption of h i s t o r y , and to reta in a notion of 'objective interest' which only has sense within the former . Both Poulantzas and W rig ht seem to assume t h a t t h e fra g men tat ion of the w ork i n g class is a fragmenta­ tion of positions among diverse s o ci al agents . Neither pays heed to a more s u b s t an t ial r e al it y of which classical Marxism was well aware: namely , that a fr a g m en ta t ion o f po s i ti o ns exists within the soc ial agents t he m se l v es , and that these t here fo re lack an ultimate rational identity . The tension between economic and p o liti ca l st ru g gl e and th eo re t i ca l analyses of w o rk in g-cl a s s 'embourgeoisement' or Bernstei n ' s assertion tha t thro u gh the progress of de moc rac y the worker ceases to be a prol e ta ri a n and becomes a citizen, e t c . i mplied that t he w o rki ng class was dominated by a pl ura li ty of w eakl y integrated and freq u en tly contr ad i c tory s u bject positions. Here, the alternative is clear: either one has a t h eo ry o f h is to ry according to w hi ch this con t rad i cto ry pl u r ali t y will be eliminated and an abs o l u t e l y united working class will become transparent to itself at the moment of proletarian chiliasm - in which case its 'objective interes ts ' can be determined from the very beginning; or else, one a bandons that theory and, with it, any basis for privileging certain subject positions over others in the d ete r m inat ion of t h e 'objective' interests o f the agent as a w ho l e - in which case this latter notion becomes mcaningless . In our view, in order to advance in the determination of social an t ag oni s m s it i s necessary to analyse the plu r ali t y of diverse and freq uen tly con trad i c t o ry positions , and to discard the idea of a perfectly unified and h omog en ou s agent, such as the 'working class ' of classical discourse . The search for the ' true' working clas s and its limits is a fal se p ro b l e m and as such lacks any theoretical o r p oliti c al relevance. E videntl y , this im pl ies not that wo rk in g class and socialism are incompatible , but the very different statement that fu nda men tal interests in socialism cannot be logically d e d u ce d from determinate positions in the economic process . The o p p o s i t e view - that s uch a link is p rovided by the wo rke rs ' i n te r est i n p re v e nt in g ca pi ta list absorption of the economic su r p lu s w o uld o n l y be valid if one further assumed (a) that the worker is a homo oeconomicus who tries to maxi mize the economic surplus just as much as the c a p i ta l i s t ; or b) that he is a sp o n t aneo u s ly coo p era ti v e b e i ng who aspires to the social d is tri b ut io n of his labour pr odu ct Even then, ho wev e r neither of these b arely p lausi b l e h y p o t hes es wo u ld s u pp ly the re q ui s i t e p r o o f, fo r there is no logical connection whatsoevcr ,

,

-

,

.

,

Hegemony: the D!fficult Emergence oj a New Political Logic

85

between positions in the relations of production and the mentality of the producers . The workers ' resistance to certain forms o f domina­ tion will depend upon the position they occupy within the ensemble of social relations, and not only in those of production . At this point, it is obvious that our last two conditions for the agents of hegemony to b e exclusively constituted by the economic sphere - that they should be fully constituted as subjects within that space , and that they should be endowed with 'historical interests' derived from their class positions - are not fulfilled either . Facing the Consequences

Let us draw the conclusions . It is not the case that the field of the economy is a self-regulated space subject to endogenous laws; nor does there exist a constitutive principle for social agents which can be fixed in an ultimate class core; nor are class positions the necessary location of historical interests . From this point, the implications quickly follow. Since Kautsky, Marxism knew that the socialist determination of the working class does not arise spontaneously but depends upon the political mediation of intellectuals . Such media­ tion , however, was not conceived as articulation that is to say, as a political construction from dissimilar elements. It had an epistemolo­ gical basis : socialist intellectuals read in the working class its objective destiny . In Gramsci politics is finally conceived as articulation , and through his concept of historical bloc a profound and radical com­ plexity is introduced into the theorization of the social . Yet even for Gramsci , the ultimate core of the hegemonic subject's identity is constituted at a point external to the space it articulates: the logic of hegemony does not unfold all of its deconstructive effects on the theoretical terrain of classical M arxism . We have witnessed, how­ ever, the fall of this last redoubt of class reductionism, insofar as the very unity and homogeneity of class subjects has split into a set of precariously integrated positions which, once the thesis of the neutral character of the productive forces is abandoned , cannot be referred to any necessary point of future unification . The logic of hegemony, as a logic of articulation and contingency , has come to determine the very identity of the hegemonic subjects. A number of consequences follow from this, representing as many starting points for our subsequent analysis . 1 . Unfixity has become the condi tion of every social identity . The fixity of every social element in the first theorizations of hegemony -

86

proceeded, as we saw , from the indissoluble link between the hege­ monized task and the class that was supposed to be its natural agent; w hil e the bond between the task and the class which hegemonized it w a s merely fa c tu al or co n tingen t . But, insofar as the task has ceased to h a v e any necessary link with a class , its identity is given to it solely by its articulation w it hi n a hegemonic formation . Its identity , then , has become purely rela tional . And as this system of relations has itself ceased to be fixed and stable - thereby making hegemonic practices possible - the sense of every social identity appears con­ s ta n tl y deferred . The moment of the 'final' suture never arrives . W ith this , however , no t o nl y does the very category of necessity fall , but it is no longer possible to account for the hegemonic relation in terms of pure co n ti n g ency , as the space which made intelligible the necessary/contingent opposition has dissolved . The idea that the hegemonic link could be grasped theoretically through a mere nar­ rative e xercise proves to have been a mirage. The link must instead be defined in terms of new theoretical categories whose status, insofar as they attempt to apprehend a type of relation that never manages to be identical to itself, constitutes a problem. 2 . Let us briefly refer to the dimensions in which this unfixity of the social produces i ts effects . The first belongs to the terrain of political s u bjecti v it y . We have seen that in Rosa Luxemburg , the symbolic di m e ns i o n linking th e different antagonisms and political points of rupture w a s the matrix of new social forces - the ones Gramsci was to call ' collective wills' . This logic of the symbolic constitution of the social encountered pre ci se limits in the persistence, at a morpho­ l o g ical lev e l of the economist conception of history . Once this has been dissolved , however, the overflowing of class bounds by the various forms of social protest can freely operate. (Freely, that is , of any a p ri o ri class character of struggles or demands - obviously not in the sense that every ar ticu l atio n is possible in a given conjuncture.) If this is the case, however, three important consequences can be derived fo r our analysis . The first refers to the link betw een socialis m and concrete soci al agents . We have demonstrated that t h e re is no log ica l and necessary relation between socialist objectives and the posi tions of social agents in the relations o f production; and that the articulation between them is external and does not proceed fro m any natural movement of each to unite with th e other. In other words , their articulation must be regarded as a hegemonic relation . It follows t h a t , from the socialist point of view, the direction of the workers ' s truggle is not uniformly progressive: i t depends , just as with any other social struggle, upon its forms of articulation within a ,

Hegemony : th e

Difficult Emerg ence of a New Political Logic

87

given hegemonic context. For the same rea so n , a v a ri e ty of other poin t s of rupture and d e mo cratic antagonisms can be articulated to a so ci a li s t 'collective will ' on an equal footing w ith workers' demands. The era of ' p ri vileged s ubj e c ts ' - in the on tol o gical , not practical sen s e - of the anti-cap i tal i s t struggle has been definitively super­ seded . The second conseq uence refers to the natu r e of the 'new social movements ' , which have been so much discussed du ri n g the last decade . Here, the two dominant tendencies of th o ught are incompatible with our theoretical p o siti o n . The first approaches th e nature and efficacy of these movements within a problematic of the p rivi l eged subject of socialist cha n ge : thus , they are co nsi d ere d either as marginal or pe ri pher al with regard to the working class (the fundamental subject in the o r thodox vi e w ) or as a re v ol utionary substitute for a working class which has been integrated into the system (M a r c u s e) . E v ery t hing we have said so fa r , however, indi­ cates that there are n o p riv ilege d p o in ts for t he unleashing of a s o ci a li s t political p ra cti ce ; this hinges upon a 'collective will' th at is laboriously co nstruct ed from a number of d iss i m il a r points . Nor can we agree , therefore , with th e other dominant tendenc y in th e dis­ cussion of new social movements , which consists in a p riori affir­ mation of their progressive nature . The po litica l m eani ng of a local community movement, of an eco l og i ca l struggle, of a sexual mi no ri t y m ovement, is not given from the beginnin g : it c rucia l l y depends upon i ts hegemonic articulation with other struggles and dem a n ds . The third consequence refers to the form of conceiving the rela tion among different subject p o s i tions , which our analysis has tended to de-totalize . However, w e r e the d ec e ntr i ng o pera t i on to be concluded at this point , we w o uld onl y have managed to a ffirm a new form of fixity: t h a t of the vario us d e centre d subj e ct p o s i ti ons . If t h ese themselves are n ot fixed, it is clear that a logic of de­ to t a l i z ation cannot s i m p l y affirm the separation of different struggles an d demands , and that the articulation cannot just be conceived as the l in k age of d issi mi lar and fully constituted e le ments . It is here that the r adi c a l i z a tio n of the concep t of 'overdetermination ' wi ll give us the key to the specific logic of social articulations . 3 . The logic of our analysis would seem, however, to imply that the very notion of ' heg e mony ' should be put into question. The discursive areas of the e me rgence and val id i ty of this ca t ego ry were origi nally limited to the theoretical terrain of a split. A class con­ stituted at the level of essences was c o nfr o n ted w ith historical con­ ti n g en ci es forcing it to take on tasks alien to its own nature . But we have seen , on the one hand , that th is s plit could not survive the

88 collapse of the distinction between these two planes; and, on the other , t ha t inso far as there was an advance in a democratic direction, the hegemonized task altered the identity of the hegemonic subject. Does this mean that 'hegemony' was merely a transitional concept, a moment in th e dissolution of the essentialist discourse, and unable to outlive it? In the next two chapters we will attempt to show that this is not an adequate answer, and that the tensions inherent in the

concept of he gemony are also inherent in every political practice and , strictly speaking, every social practice . Notes to Chapter Two

1 . The concept of 'suture ' , which we will be using frequently , is taken from psychoanalysis . Its explicit formulation is attributed to Jacques-Alain M iller (,Suture elements of the logic of the signifier' , Screen, W inter 1 977178, vol . 18, no. 4 , pp. 24-34) , although it implicity operates in the whole of Lacanian theory . It is used to designate the production of the subject on the basis of the chain of its discourse; that is , of the non-correspondence between the subject and the Other - the symbolic which preven ts the closure of the latter as a full p resence . (Hence, the constitution of t he unconscious as edge operating the junction/division between the subject and the Other . ) ' Suture names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see that it figures there as the element which is lackin g , in the form of a stand-in . For while there lackin g , it is not purely and simply absen t . Suture, b y extension - the general relation of lack to the structure of which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies the position of a taking-the-place of (Miller, pp. 25-6) . This moment of lack is, however, only one aspec t . In a second aspect, suture implies a fil\ing-in. As Stephen Heath points out, 'suture names not just a structure of lack but also an availability of the s u bj ect, a certain closure . . . It is not surprising . . . , therefore, that Lacan 's own u se o f the term "suture" . . . gives it sense of a "pseudo-identification" , defmes it as "function of the imaginary and the symbolic" . . . . The stake is clear: the "I" is a division but joins all the same, the stand-in is the lack in the structure, but nevertheless si multaneously , the possibility of a coherence, of the filling in' (S . Heath, ' No tes on Suture ' , Scree", pp . 55-6) . It is this double movement that we will attempt to stress in o ur extension of the concept of suture to the field of politics . Hegemonic practices are suturin g insofa r as their field of operation is determined by the openness of the social, by the ultimately unfixed character of every signifier. This original lack is precisely what the hegemonic practices try to fiU in. A totally sutured society would be one

where this filling-in would have reached its ultimate consequences and would have, therefore , managed to identify itself with the transparency of a closed symbolic order. Such a closure of the social is, as we will see, impossible .

2. In the sense in which Jacques Derrida has talked about a 'logic of the supplement' . The supplemen tary of the 'indeterminate' disappears , of course , if the link between the s peci ficity and the necessity ofthe 'determinate' is broken . We have seen that this is what happens with Sorel's myth. In that case, however, the only terrain that made possible the emergence of the dualism, also disappears . 3 . P . Anderso n , pp . 1 5 ff. 4. Concerning the initial formulation of Trotsky's thesis of permanent revolution,

Hegemon y : the Dijficuit Emergence oj a New Political Log ic

89

see A . B rossat, Aux origines de la revolution permanente: la penseI' politique du jeuMe

Trotsky, P a ris 1974; and M ichael L6wy , The Politics oj Combined a nd Unevetl Devtlop­ ment, London 1 98 1 , chapter 2. 5 . L . T rotsk y , 1905, London 1 97 1 , p p . 333 , 339.

6. There are n o miracles

in nature or h i s to r y, b u t ev er y abru p t tum in h istory, and

this a p p l ie s to every revolution , presents s u ch a weal th of c onten t , unfolds such unexpected and s p ec i fi c combinations of forms of struggle and a lign m ent o f forces of

the contestants, that to th e lay mind there is m u c h that must appear mi raculous . . . That t h e revolution succeeded so quick ly and - s eemi ng l y , at the first superficial

glance - so radi ca ll y , is only due to the fact that , as e xt r eme l y uniq ue historical s i tuat i o n , absolutely dissimilar curretlts, absolutely heterogeneous class interests , absolutely

contrary p o li tica l a n d so ci al striv in gs have merged and in a s tri kin g l y " harmonious" manner. ' Lenin, Lettersjrom Ajar, Firs t Letter. The First Stage of the Firs t Revolution ' , Collected Works, vol . 23 , p p . 297 , 302 . 7. 'The m echan ic s of pol it i ca l demo cracy works in the same dire ct io n . N o th ing in our times can be done without ele c tio ns ; nothing can be done w ithout the m a sse s . And in this era of printing and parliament a ris m it is impossible to g a in the following o f

the ma s ses withou t a wid el y ra m ified , s yste mat ica lly managed , we I l-equ i p ped system of fl att e r y , l ies, fra u d, j ugglin g with fashionable and popular catc h words , and p ro m isi n g all manner of reforms and bless in gs to th e w o rkers right and left - as long as they re no u nce the revolutionary s truggle for the overthrow of the b o urgeois i e . I would call this s ys te m Ll o y
8. Pyatyi vsemirnyi Kongress Komunisticheskogo Internatsionala . 1 7 iuni),a-8 iuliya 1924 g. Stenograjicheskiiotchet, Mos cow-Leningr ad 1 925, I, pp. 482-3. Quoted in M . Hajek, ' La bolscevizzazione dei p ar ti ti co munisti' , in E .J . Ho b s baw m et aI. , eds . , Storia, Turin 1 980, vol. 3, p. 468 . 9. C£. E. L ada u , Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London 1 977, p p . 1 38f£.

10. Cf. e s p e cia l ly Ch . Buci-Glucksmann , Gramsci and the State, London 1 980 . 1 1 . B . de G i ovan ni , ' Lenin a n d Gramsci: S tate, Politics a n d Party ' , i n Ch. Mouffe ,

ed . , Gramsci and Marxist Theory, London 1 979, pp. 259-288. Fo r a c ri t i qu e of de Giov anni 's conception , see C h . Mouffe' s intr oduction to that volume .

1 2 . A . Gramsci , ' Notes

on

the Southern Question ', in Selections Jrom Political

Writings 1 92 1-26, ed . a nd trans . Q. Hoare, London 1 978, p. 443 . . 1 3 . W i th re gard to the relationship between hegemon y , ideology and s tate in

Gramsci, see Ch . Mouffe, 'Hege m o n y an d I deol ogy in Gramsci ' , in Gramsci atld Marxist Theory, pp . 1 68-204; and C h . M o u ffe, 'Hegemony and the Integral St a te in Gra m sci : Towards a Ne w C o n c ep t of Politics ' , in G. B ridges and R. B runt , cds . , Silver Linings: Some StrategiesJor the Eighties, Lon don 1 98 1 . 1 4 . A. G r a msci , Quademi dal Carcere, ed. V. Gerratana, Turin 1975, vol . 2, p. 349 . 1 5 . Ib id . , p . 1 058 . 1 6 . I b id . , v o l . 3, p . 1 875 . 1 7 . S e e the essays contained in the vo l u m e Clausewitz en el pensamiellto marxista,

90 M exico 1 979, in particular the work by Clemente Ancona, 'La influencia de De la Guerra de Clausewitz en eI pen sam i en to marxista de M a r x a Lenin ' , p p . 7-38. These essays refer, however, more to the re l a t i o ns h i p between war and politics than to the political me t a p h o riz a t i on of m il it a ry notion s .

1 8 . I n a l i t er a l sense, which inclu d es armed confrontations themselves . From Mao o n w a rds, ' p eo p l e ' s war' is conceived as a p rocess of constitution of a mass 'collective will ' , w herein the military aspects are subo rd i n at e to the political o n es . 'War of

po s i t i o n ' , therefore, transcends the alternative armed struggle/peaceful struggle. 1 9 . A l thus s er has w ron g l y assimilated Gramscian 'absolute historicism ' to the o the r forms o f ' leftism' of the twenties, such as the works of Lukacs and K o rsch . Elsewhere, w e h a v e a rgu ed (see E. Laclau, 'To gli a tti and Politics ' , Politics and Power 2, London 1 980, pp. 25 1 -258) that this assimilation rests on a misunderstanding, in so fa r as what Gramsci calls 'absolute historicism ' is precisely the ra d ica l rejection of any e ssen tia l­ ism and of any a p riori te leo l og y , and it i s , therefore, in co m p at ib l e with the notion of ' false consciousness ' . On the specificity of Gr a m s ci 's intervention in this regard, see C . Buci-Glucksmann , o p . ci t . 20. An ad equate s t u d y of the positions a do p ted by Kautsky after the war, particu­ larly with regard to the October revolution , can be fo un d in A. Bergounioux and B. M anin, La social-democratie ou Ie compromis, Paris 1 979, pp. 73-104. 2 1 . This is w h y the critique undertaken by M. Salvadori (,Gramsci and the PCI: Two Conceptions of Hegemony ' , in Gramsci and Marxist Theory , pp. 237-258) to the theoreticians of the I talian Communist Party, is so unconvincin g . According to this critiq ue, Eurocommunism could not le g i ti mate ly cla i m the G ra m sc i an tradition as the source of its democratic strategy, for Gramsci 's tho ught continues to at trib u te an essential i m portance to the moment of rupture and seizure of power. Gramsci would, thus, constitute the h ighes t moment of a Leninism a d a pted to the conditions of W estern Europe . There is no doubt that for Gra msci 'war of position' is merely a prelude to 'war of mo ve m e n t ' ; yet, this d oes no t j us t i fy ta lking about a 'structural Leninism' in Gramsci . This would only be justified if the alternative reform/ revolu­ tio n , peaceful/violent road, was the on l y relevant distinction; but, as we have seen , the totali t y of Gramscian thought moves in the d i rec ti o n of withdrawing the im por t ance and eliminating the absolute character of this alternative. In more important aspects, neither the Gramscian concep t i on of po l i tica l s u bje c tiv it y, nor its form o f concep­ tualizing the hegemonic links , is co m p a t i b l e w ith the Leni n i s t t he ory of 'class alliance' . 22. A . S turmthal, The Tragedy oj European Labour, 1 9 1 8- 1939, London 1 944, p. 23 . T h i s early work is a h ig h ly pe ne tr a ti n g attempt t o establish a relation between the l i m i ts of Social Democratic p o litics and t h e co rpo ra t i ve men t alit y of the unions . 23. Vienna 1 9 1 9 . 24 . A . Przeworski , ' S ocial Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon' , New Left Review, n o . 1 22 , July-August 1980, p. 48 .

25 . A . Sturmtha l , p p . 39-40. 26 . A. Przeworski , ' Social Dem o c r a cy ' , p. 52. 27 . Cf. particularly Au-dela du marxistne ( 1 927) and L 'Idee socialiste ( 1 933) . 28 . See , for example, A . Bergounioux and B. Manin, p p . 1 18- 1 20.

29. G . A . Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory oj History, O xfo rd 1978, p . 206 .

30 . S. Bowles and H. Gintis , 'Structure and Practice in the Labour Theory of Value ' , Review oj Radical Political Economics, vol. 1 2 , no. 4, p. 8. This idea had already been criticized by Castoriadis in a 196 1 article, 'Le mouvement revolutionnaire so us Ie capitalisme moderne ' , Capitalisme modeme et revolution , Paris 1 979 , vo l . 1 . 3 1 . H . B . Braverm an, Labour and Monopoly Cap ital. The Degradation oj Work in the

Hegemony: the Dij/icult Emergence rj a

New Political Logic 9 1

Twentieth Century , N e w York 1 974.

32. S. M a rgl i n , ' W hat do Bosses Do?', Review oj Radical Po l itica l ECOllOmics, vol. 6, no . 2 , 1 974; K . S t o ne , 'The O r igin s of Job S t ruc tu re in t he S teel Indust ry ' , Rev iew, vol . 6, no . 2, 1 974 . 33. R. Edwards , Contested Terra ill: the Transformation oj the Workplace ill th e Twentieth Century, New York 1 979. 34 . Jean P. d e Gaude mar, L 'ordre et la p roduction . Naissance e t jonn es de la discipline d 'usin e , Paris 1 982, p. 24. 35 . M . T ron ti , Ouv riers et cap ita l, Pa ris 1977, p. 1 06 . 36 . Panzieri , quoted by B . C o ri a t , ' L 'operalsme italien ' , Dialectiques, n o . 3 0 , p . 96 . 37 . M . Burawoy, 'Terrains of Contest: F ac tor y and State under C a pitali s m and S oci a li s m ' , Socialist Review, no. 58 . 38. B ra verm a n , passim . 39. D . Go rd o n , R . Edwards and M . Reich, Segmented Work, Div ided Workers, Cambridge 1 982 . 40. They di s t i n g uis h the e x is t ence of th re e labour markets co r res p o n d ing to three different sections of the w o rk i n g class . The first includes most occupat io ns of a

p rofessional t y p e . It is the domain of t he middle sectors who enj oy s table employment wi t h possibilities of p ro m o ti on and o f rela t i vel y high salaries . These characteristics can also be found in the first subordinate market , with the difference th a t the wo rk e r s of this s ec t o r - the ' tr a d i tio n al ' w o rk in g class together w i t h the semi-skj]!ed wor kers of the t er ti a r y sector - o n ly p os s ess s pe c i fi c skills a cq ui red in the en te rp ris e , and th a t their work is re p eti ti ve and tied to th e rhy t hm of the machines . Third l y , we e nco unter the ' secondar y market' with its unskilled workers , having no p o ss i bi li ti e s o f promo­

tion, without e m plo y m e nt security and w i t h low wa g es . These workers are not u ni on iz ed , the turnover is quick and the proportion of b l a ck s and women is ve ry high. 4 1 . See, for example, M. Paci, Mercato del La vora e classi sociaIi in ItaUa : Ricerche sulla composiziane del p roletariata, B o l o g na 1 973 . For a" more gene ra l per s pe c t i v e on indus­ trial s o c i e t ies , see S. Berger and M . Piore , Du al ism and Discolltinuity in Indu s tria l Societies, C a m b ridge 1 980. 42 . A . L . F r i ed ma n , Indus t ry & Labour . Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Cap italism, London 1 977. 43 . N. P o u l a n t z as , Classes in Contemporary Cap italism, NLB, London 1 975; E . Olin W right, Class, Crisis and the State, London 1 978. 44 . The c on cep t of ' p r od u ct i v e labour' is m o re restricted in Poulantzas than in Marx, as he d efi n es it as 'labour that produces s u r p l us -v al u e while di rectly rep rodu c i ng the mat e ria l ele,nellts that serve as the substratum oj the relation oj explo itation : labour t hat is directly in volved in material p roduct i on by producing use-values that increase material wealth '

( p . 2 1 6) . 45 . W righ t , p . 48. 46. The criteria for belonging to the p ro l e ta r ia t a re : 1 ) absence o f con t rol o v e r t h e phy s i ca l means of p r o d u c t io n ; 2) absence o f control over investments and the process of accum u lation ; 3) absence of control o v er o t her p eo ple ' s labour-power. The bour­

geoisie is, on the contrary , defined by its exercise of co n trol over the three items,

while the petty bourgeoisie co n t ro ls investments , the process of accumulation and the ph ysical me a n s of prod uc t i o n - it does not exercise control o ver other people's labour-power.

3 Beyond the Positivity of the Social : Antagonism s and Hegemony

We now have to construct theoretically the concept of hegemony. Our analysis has so far provided us with something more and something less than a precise discursive location from which to embark . Something more, inasmuch as the space of hegemony is not merely that of a localized 'unthought' : it is rather a space in which bursts forth a whole conception of the social based upon an intelli­ gibility which reduces its distinct moments to the interiority of a closed paradigm. Something less, inasmuch as the diverse surfaces of emergence of the hegemonic relation do not harmoniously come together to form a theoretical void that a new concept is required to fill . On the contrary , some of them would seem to be surfaces of dissolution of the concept: for the relational character of every social identity implies a breaking-up of the differentiation of planes, of the unevenness between articulator and articulated, on which the hege­ monic link is fOllnded . To construct the concept of hegemony therefore involves not a simple speculative effort within a coherent context , but a more complex strategic movement requiring negotia­ tion among mutually contradictory discursive surfaces . From everything said so far, it follows that the concept of hege­ mony supposes a theoretical field dominated by the category of articulation; and hence that the articulated elements can be separately identified . (Later, we will examine how it is possible to specify 'elements ' independently of the articulated totalities . ) In any case, if articulation is a practice, and not the name of a given relational complex, it must imply some form of separate presence of the elements which that practice articulates or recomposes . In the type of theorization we wish to analyse, the elements on which articulatory practices operate were originally specified as fragments of a lost structural or organic totality. In the eighteenth century, the German Romantic generation took the experience of fragmentation and divi­ sion as the starting-point of its theoretical reflection . Since the seven93

94 teenth century the collapse of t he view of the cosmos as a m e anin g ful o rder wi t h i n which man occupied a precise and determined place and the repl a c e me n t of this view by a self-d efi n i ng conception of the s u bj e ct, as an entity m a i n ta ini n g relations of ex teri ori t y with the rest of t h e u n i v er s e (t h e W eberian disenchantment of the wo r ld ) - led the Romantic g en era ti o n of the Sturm und Drang to an eager search for that lost u ni ty , for a new synthesis that would p e r mi t the division to be overcome . The noti o n of man as the expression of an int e g ral t o ta lit y attempts to b reak with all dualisms - body/soul, reason/ fe el i n g , thought/senses - established by rationalism since the se v e nt ee n t h cen tury . I It is well known that the Romantics conceived this e x p e r i e n ce of di ss o c iat i o n as strictly linked to fu n c t i on al dif­ ferentiation and the division of society into classes , to th e grow i ng co m p le x i ty of a b u re au c r a ti c State es t ab lishin g relations of ex­ teriority with the other spheres of social life . Given that the el e me nts t o b e rearticulated were specified asjrag­ ments of a lost u n i t y , i t was clear that any recomposition would have an artificial ch a r ac te r , as opposed to the natura l organic un i t y p ecu lia r to G r ee k culture . H6lderlin stated : 'There are two ideals of our exis tence : one is the condition of the g rea t es t si mpl i ci t y , where our needs accord w i th each other, with our powers and with every thi n g we are related to , just through the l?rganization oj nature, w i tho u t any a c t io n on our part. The o ther is a condition o f the h i g h e s t cultivation, where this accord would come about b e t we e n in fi ni t el y diversified and s trengthened n ee ds and powers , through the o rg a n i z a ti o n which we are able to g i v e to ourselves . '2 Now, everything de pend s on how we c o n c eiv e this ' o r g an i zat i o n which we are able to give to our­ selves' and which gives the elements a new form of uni t y : either that o rganization i s con ti n g en t and , therefore, external to the fr ag men ts themselves; or else, both the fragments and the org anization are necessary moments of a to tali t y which transcends them . It is c lear that only t h e first t y p e of 'organization' can be co n cei v e d as an a rticulation; the second is , s t ric tl y speaking, a mediation . But it is also evident tha t , in p hilosophical discourses , the distances between the one and the o ther have been presen t e d more as a nebulous area of am biguities than as a clear watershed . From our present perspective, t h i s is the ambiguity which Hegel's t h o u g h t presents in its a pp r o a ch to the dialectic of unity and fra g­ m entation. His work is at once the highest moment of German Romanticism and the first modem - that is to say , post-Enlighten­ ment - reflection on society . It is not a c r i ti qu e of society from u to pia, nor a des c rip t i o n and theo riz a ti on o f the mechanisms which

Beyond the Positiv ity qf the Social: Antagonisms and HegemOtlY

95

m a k e p oss i b l e an order that is a cc ep ted as ce r ta in and gi v e n ; r a t her H e gel s reflection starts from the opaqueness of the social vis-a-vis el u s i v e forms of a r a ti onal i t y and i nte ll i gi b i l i ty detectable only by reference to a cu nning of reason which leads separation b ack to ,

'

unity . Hegel thus appears as located in a watershed b e twe e n two

epochs . In a first sense, he represents the h i gh es t point of rat i ona l ism:

the moment when it a ttempts to embrace within the field of reason, without dualisms, the tot a l i ty o f the universe of differences . History a nd society , therefore , h ave a r at io n al and i n t el li gi b l e s tructure . But, in a second sense, this sy n th esis contains all the seeds of i t s dissolu­ tion , as the r a t io n al i ty of h i sto r y can be a ffi r med only at t h e price of introducing con tr a di c tio n into the field o f reason. It would, there­ fore , be sufficient to show that this is a n impossible o p e ra ti o n reg uiring cons tant violation of the method that it itself postulates as was already demonstrated in t he nineteenth century by Tren­ delenburg3 - fo r the He g eli an d iscourse t o b eco m e so meth ing very different: a series of con ti ng ent and n ot l o gical transitions . It is precisely here that Hegel's mode rni ty lies : for him, ide nti ty is nev e r p o s i t i ve and closed in itself, but is cons ti t u ted as transition , relation, difference . If, ho wever , Hegel's lo g i c al rela tions b ecome cont in g en t t r an si t io n s , the connections between them c ann o t be fixed as moments of an un d er l yi n g or s utu r ed t o t a l it y This mea ns that they are articulations . In the M arx i s t tradi tion , this area of ambig ui t y is displayed in the con t ra dic to ry uses of the concept of 'dialectics ' . On t he one hand , this has been uncritically introduced whenever an attempt has been made to escape th e logi c of fixation - that is , to think articulation . (Consider, for e xa m ple, Mao Ts e t un g's pic­ turesque notion of dialectics : his v e r y incomprehension of t he logical ch a r a c te r of d i a l e c tic al transitions enables a logic of a rt i c ul a t ion to be introduced, in a d i alec tical d i s guise , at the politico-discursive level .) On the other hand, 'dialectics' exerts an effect of cl o s ure i n those cases where more wei ght is a t t ach ed to the necessary character of an a prio r i transition, than to the discontinuous moment o f an open articulation. We should not reproach M a r x is ts too much for these a m b i gu i t ie s an d i mpre cis ion s if, as Trendelenburg already point ed out, they were present . in H eg e l him s e l f Now, this area of am b ig uity constituted by th e discursive uses of di al e cti c s' is th e first that h as to be dissolved . I n order to p lace ourselves firmly withi n the field of a r ti cu lati o n we m u s t begin by r en o u n ci n g t h e conc e p t io n o f societ y as fou n d i ng totality of i ts partial processes . We must, the refo re , consider the open n ess of the social as the co ns ti t u tive ground or 'negative essence' of the e x is ting -

.

-

.

.

.

'

,

'

'

,

96

and the diverse 'social orders' as precarious and ultimately failed a tte mp t s to dom e s t ic ate the field of differences . A c cordi ng l y the multiformity of th e social cannot be a pp reh end e d th rough a system of m e d ia t i o n s nor the 'social order' understood as an underlying p r in c i p l e There is no s u tu re d space peculiar to s oci e ty , since the social itself has no essence . Three remarks are impor t an t here . Firs t, t h e t w o co nce p ti o n s imply di fferen t logics of the social: in the case of m ed i ati o n s ' , we are dealing with a system of lo gi cal transitions in w h ic h relations between o bje c ts are conceived as fo llo win g a re l ati on between concepts; in the second sense, we are deal in g with con­ ti ng e n t relations whose nature we have to d e t e r mi ne S eco nd ly in criticizing the conception o f so c iet y as an ensemble united by neces­ sary law s , we cannot simply bring out the non-necessary character of th e relations among elements , for we would then retain the neces­ s ary character of the identity of the elements th ems el v e s . A con ce p­ tion which de n i es any essentialist approach to social relations, must also s tate the precarious character of every identity and the impossi­ bility of fixing the s en s e of the 'elements' in any u l ti mate l iterali t y Thirdly , it is only in contrast to a discourse po s tul a tin g their uni ty ; that an ensemble of elements appears as fragmented or d is p ersed. Outside any discursive structure , it i s o b vio u sly n ot p oss ib le to s peak o f frag menta ti on nor even to specify elements. Yet, a discur­ sive structure is not a merely cog ni ti ve ' or con t e mpl a t ive entity; it is an articulatory practice which con s ti tut es and o rganizes social relations . We can thus talk of a growing com pl exi t y and frag menta­ tion o f advanced industrial societies - not in the sense that, sub specie aeternitatis, they are more complex than earlier societies; but in the sense that they are constituted around a fun da me n ta l asymmetry . This is the asymmetry existing between a growing p ro li fera ti on of differences - a surplus of meaning of 'the social' - and the diffi­ cu l t ies encountered by any d iscou rse attempting to fix those dif­ ,

,

.

'

'

'

.

,

.

,

'

'

'

ferences as moments of a stable articulatory structure. W e must, therefore, begin by analysing the categ ory of articula­ tion, which will give us our starting-point for the elaboration of the concept o f hegemony . The theoretical cons truction of this category requires us to take two steps: to establish the possi b i li ty of specifying the elements w h i ch enter into t h e a r t i c ul ato r y relation; and to deter­ mine the s pecificity of the relational moment co mpri sin g this arti­ culatio n . Although this task could be bro a c he d from a number of di fferen t points , we p refer to begin with a detour. We shall first analyse in detail those theoretical discourses in which some of the concepts we will elaborate are present , but in which their devel op-

Beyond the Positivity r:if the Social: Antagonisms and Hegem o n y

97

ment is still inhibited by the basic categories of an essentialist dis­ course . Let us, in this sense , consider the evolution of the Althus­ serian school : by radicalizing some of its themes in a way that will explode its basic concepts , we will attempt to constitute a ground that will allow us to construct an adeq u a te concept of 'articulation' .

Social Formation and Overdetermination Althusser began his theoretical trajectory by trying drastically to differentiate his conception of society as a 'complex structured whole' , from the Hegelian notion of totality. The Hegelian totality could be very complex, but its complexity was always that of a plurality of moments in a single process of self-unfolding . 'The Hegelian totality is the alienated development of the Idea; so, strictly speaking, it is the phenomenon , the self-manifestation of this simple principle which persists in all its manifestations , and therefore even in the alienation which prepares its restoration . '4 This conception, which reduces the real to the concept by identifying differences with necessary mediations in the self-unfolding of an essence, is of a very different order from the Althusserian complexity, which is the one inherent in a process of overdetennination . Given the indiscriminate and imprecise use subsequently made of this key Althusserian con­ cept, it is necessary to specify its original meaning and the theoretical effects it was called upon to produce in Marxist discou rse . The concept comes from psychoanalysis , and its extension had more than a superficially metaphoric character. In this regard , Althusser is very clear: 'I did not invent this concept. As I pointed out, it is horrowed from two existing disciplines: specifically, from lin­ ' guistics and psychoanalysis . In these disciplines it has an objective dialectical "connotation", and - particularly in psychoanalysis ­ one sufficiently related formally to the content it designates here for the loan not to be an arbitrary one. 'S For Freud, overdetermination is no ordinary process of ' fusion' or 'merger' - which would at most be a metaphor established by analogy with the physical world , compatible with any form of multi-causality; on the contrary, it is a very precise type of fusion entailing a symbolic dimension and a plurality of meanings . The concept of overdetermination is consti­ tuted in the field of the symbolic, and has no meaning whatsoever outside it. Consequently, the most profound potential meaning of Althusser's statement that everything existing in the social is over­ determined , is the assertion that the social constitutes itself as a

98

symb olic order . The s ym b o li c - i . e . , overdetermined character of social re l a ti ons th erefo re i mp lies that they la ck an ul timate l i t e r a lity which would reduce them to necess ary moments of an i m m a n e n t law . There are not two p l anes one of essences and th e other o f appearances , since there is no pos s i b i l it y of fixing an ultimate li teral sense for which th e symbolic would be a second and derived plane of s ign i fi c a t i o n Society and social agents lack any essence, and their r e gu l a r i ti es me re l y consist of th e relative and pre ca r i ous forms of fixation which a cc om pa n y the establishment of a certain order. This a n a l y s is seemed to open up t h e p ossi b i l it y of ela b o r ating a new concept of articulation, which would st a r t from the overdetermined c h ar a ct e r of social r ela tions But this did not occur. The concept of o v e r d e t erm in a t i on tended to disappear from Althusserian discourse, and a g row i ng closure led to the i ns ta ll a ti o n of a ne w variant of essentialism . This p rocess already started in ' On the M a terialist Dialectic ' , was to cul m ina t e in Reading Capital. I f the concept of o v er d et e rm ina t i o n was unable to p ro duce th e t o tal i t y of its decon s t ru c ti v e effects within M arxist discourse, this was because, from the very beg innin g an a tte mp t was made to render i t compati ble with another central moment in Althusserian discourse that i s , s tric tly s p eak ing , incompatible w i th the first: namel y , determination in the last instance by the economy . L et us consider the implications of this concept . If t hi s ultimate determina­ tion were a truth validJor every society, the relat i o n s hip between such determination and the conditions making it possible would not develop through a contingent historical articulation, but would constitute an a priori necessity . It is impo rtan t to note that the p roblem u n de r discussion is not that the economy should have its conditions of existence. This is a tauto logy , for if somethin g exists, it is because given conditions render its existence pos si b le . The problem is that if th e 'economy' is determinant in the last in stan ceJor eve ry type oj society, it must be defined in dependen t l y of any specific typ e of society; and the conditions of existence of the economy must a l s o be defined separately fro m any concrete social relation. In that case, however , the only reality of those conditions of existence would be that of assuring the exi sten ce and determining role of the economy - in other words , they wo u ld be an i n tern a l moment of the econom y as such; the difference would not be cons ti tut i ve 6 There is, however, something more. Al thusse r starts by affirming the need not to hypostatize the abstract, given t h a t there is no reality which is not o v erdeterm i ned . In this sense, he app rov i ngly quotes both M a o ' s analysis of contradiction and Marx's rej ection in the -

,

.

.

,

,

.

,

Beyond th e Positiv ity oj th e Social:

A ntagon isms and Hegemon y

99

1 857 Introduction , of abstractions like 'production', which only have meaning in terms of a concrete system of social relations. Yet, Althusser lapses into the very defect he criticizes: there is an abstract universal object, the ' econ o m y , which produces concrete effects (determination in th e last instance here and now) ; and the re is another equally abstract o bj e c t (conditions of exis tence) whose form s vary historically , but w hich are unified by the p re-established essential role of a ss uring the reproduction of the economy; finally , as the economy and its centrality are invariables of any p os s i b l e social a rra ngement , the possibility opens up of pr ov i d i ng a difi n i t i on of society . Here the anal y si s has tumed full c i r cl e If the economy is an object which can determine any type of society in the last instance, this means that, at least with reference to that i ns t an c e we a re faced with simple determination and not overdetermination . If society has a last instance which determines its laws of motion, t h en the relations between the overdetermined instances and the last instance must be conceived in terms oj simple, one-directional determination by the latter. We can deduce from this that the field of overdetermination is extremely limited: it is the field of contingent variation as o pp osed to essential determination. And, if s oc i ety does have a last and essential deter­ minatio n , the difference is not constitutive and the social is un i fied in the sutured space of a rationalist paradigm. Thus , we are confronted with exactly the same dualism that we found reproduced s ince the end of the nineteenth century in the field of M arxist discursiveness . This is the point where the disarticulation of Althusser's rationalism will begin It is important to note that the inconsistent dualism of the starting-point will be transmitted to t h o se very theoretical forms which will preside over the disaggregation of the original schema. In effect, two pos s ib i liti es arose: the first was to develop all the implications of the concept of overdetermination, showing the impossibility of a concept such as 'determination in the last i n sta n c e by the economy' and affirming the precarious and rel a t i on al character of every identity . The second possibility was to demonstrate th e logica l inconsistency o f the necessary links postu l ated among the elements of the social totality, and thus to show , by a di ffe rent path , the impossibility of the object 'society' as a r ati o n all y unified totality. The course actually followed was the latter. In consequence , the c ritiqu e of the initial rationalism took place in a terrain which accepted the analytical assumptions of rationalism , while denying the possibility of a rationalist co n ce p ti on of the social . The result of this deconstructive escalation was that the concept of articulation became strictly unthinkable. It is the critique of th i s line '

.

,

.

100

of thought which will provide us with a different basis for construct­ ing ou r concept of articulation . The attempt to break the logical connections among the different moments of the Althusserian rationalist p aradigm started with a self-criticis m by Bal i b a r, 7 and it was c a rri ed to its ultimate con­ sequences in certain currents of British M arxism . 8 The pattern of Balibar's self-criticism involved the introduction of hiatuses at various p oints in the argument of Reading Capital hia tuses in which the logical transitions were shown to have had a spurious character . He filled these, however , by diversifying the entities which were supposed to e ffec t the transition from abstract to con­ crete . Thus, the u n derstanding of the transition from one mode of p roduction to another necessitated an expansion of the terrain of class s truggle, whose unevenness pre v e nted its reduction to the simple log i c of a single mode of production . It was argued that reproduction required superstructural processes which could not be reduced to that logic; and that the unevenness of the diverse aspects of a co njuncture had to be understood in terms of a combination, in which the abstract unity of the participating elements dissol ved . It is clear, however, that these analyses on ly succeeded in reproducing on an enlarged scale the difficulties of the initial formulation. What actuall y are these classes whose struggles must account for the p rocesses of transition? If they are social agents constituted around interests determined by the relations of production, the rationality of their action and the forms of their p olitical calculation can be deter­ mined by the l og i c of the mode of production . I f, on the contrary, this does not exhaust the identity of classes, then where i s their identity constituted? Similarly , to know that the superstructures intervene in the process of reproducti on does not lead us very far if we also know from the start that they are superstructures, that they have a place assigned to them within the topography of the soci al A fu rther step along this deconstructive line can be found in the work of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, where the concepts o f 'deter­ mination in t h e last instance' and s t ru c tu ral causality' were subjected to a devastating critique. Having established the non-necessary character of the correspondence between productive forces and rela­ tions of p roduction, they concluded that the concept of mode of production had to be discarded as a legitimate object of Marxist discourse. Once any totalizing perspective was abandoned , the type of articulation e xistent in a concrete social formation was posed in the following terms : 'The social for m a ti on is not a totality governed by an organizing principle, determination in the last instance, struc-

,

.

'

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

10 1

tural causality , or whatever . It should be conceived as consisting of a definite set of relations of production together with economic, poli­ tical and cultural forms in whi ch their conditions of existence are secured. But there is no necessity for those conditions of existence to be secured and no ne ces sa ry s tructure of the s oci al formation in which those relations and forms must be co m b in ed As for classes . . . if they are conceived as economic cl as s es , as categories of eco nomi c agents occupying definite positions of possession of or separation from the means of production, then they cannot also be conceived as , or represented by, political forces and ideological forms . '9 We are here presented with a conception of social formation which specifies certain objects of classical Marxist discourse - relations of production, productive forces , etc . - and reconceptualizes the arti­ culation between those objec ts in terms of 'securing the conditions of existence ' . We will attempt to prove: a) that the criterion for speci­ fying objects is illegitimate; b) that the conceptualization of the relation among them in terms of mutually 'securing their conditions of existence ' , does not provide any concept of articulation. Regarding the first point, Cutler et al. start with the unobjec­ tionable statement that - unless we fall into a dogmatically rationalist attempt to determine at the conceptual level a general mechanism of reproduction of the social formation - it is impos­ sible to derive from the conditions of existence of a certain con­ ceptually specified relation , the necessity that those conditions be fulfilled or that specific forms be adopted by them . This is followed, however, by a n entirely illegitimate assertion: namely , that the relati o ns of production of a given social formation can be specified separately from the concrete forms securing their conditions of existence . Let us examine the problem with attention . The condi­ tions of existence of capitalist relations of production - for example, the legal conditions which secure private property - are logical conditions of existence, in so far as it would be contradictory to affirm the possibility of existence of those relations of production if such conditions were not fulfilled . It is also a logical conclusion that n ot h i ng in the concept of 'capitalist relations of production ' implies that they should secure their own conditions of existence. Indeed, at the level of the same discourse which constitutes the former as an object , it follows that the latter would be externally secured . But, precisely because of this , it is inappropriate to say that i t is not known how , in each case, these relations of production are to be secured, given that the distinction relations of production/conditions of exis.

102 tence is a lo g ica l distinction within a discourse about the abstract concept of relation of production, which does not diversify into a variety of concrete cases . Thus , if it is stated that in Britain the conditions o f existence of capitalist relations of p roduction are secured by these or those ins titu tions , a doubly illegitimate dis­ c ur s i v e transposi tion is brought in to play . On the one hand, it is asserted that certain concrete discourses and institutional practices secure the conditions of existence of an abstract entity - the c a pi t al i s t relations of production - belonging to another discursive o rd e r; on the other hand, if the abstract term 'capitalist relations of p roduction' is used to designate the relations of p ro duc ti o n in B rit ai n i t is evident that an o bj e c t specified in a certain discourse is being used as a name to point out, as referents , the objects constituted b y o ther discourses and practices - those comprising the ensemble of B r i tish p roductive relations . In this case, however, as these are not merely 'capitalist relations of production in general' but the locus of a multiplicity o f p ractices and discourses , there is no longer any terrain in which the ex t eri o ri t y of the relations of production to their conditions o f existence can be established a priori . Moreover, as the p ossibili t y o f specifying distinctions among objects was based on a logical criterio n , what is in question is the very pertinence of this criterion . I f, as Cutler et al . argue, a relation between concepts does not i mply a relation between the objects specified in those concepts, nor is it the case that a separation between objects can be derived from a separation between concepts . Cutler et al . maintain the specific i d en ti t y and separation of the objects , but only by specifying one of the o bjects in a certain discourse and the other in a d i fferen t dis­ ,

course . Let u s now move on to our second problem . Can the link called 'securing the conditions of existence ' be understood as an articu­

lation of elements? Whatever conception one might have of a relation of articulation, this must include a system o f differential positions; and , given that this system constitutes a configuration, the p roblem necessarily arises of the relational or non-relational character o f the identity of the elements involved . Is it possible to co nsi d e r that the s ecu rin g of the conditions of existence' constitutes an adequate analytical terrain for posing the problems raised by this relational m oment? E vidently not. To secure a condition of existence is t o fill a lo g i c a l requirement of an object's existence, but it does not constitute a relation cif existence between two objects . (For example, certain juridical forms can contribute the conditions of existence of '

Beyond the Positiv ity

oj the Social : A ntagonisms and Hegemony

1 03

certain relations of production, even if the latter do not actually exis t . ) I f, on the other hand, we consider the relations - and not simply the logical compatibility - existing between an object and the ins tance or instances that secure its conditions of exis tence, it is evident that those relations cannot be conceptualized on the basis that these instances secure the object's conditions of existence, simply because the securing does not constitute a relation . Con­ sequentl y , it is necessary to move to a different terrain, if one w ishes to think the specificity of the relation of articulatio n . Hirst a n d Wooley contend: 'He (Althusser) conceives social rela­ tions as totalities, as a whole governed by a single determinative principle . This whole must be consistent with itself and must subject all agents and relationships within its purview to its effects. We on the other hand consider social relations as aggregates of institutions, forms of organization, p ractices and agents which do not answer to any single causal principle or logic of constistency , which can and do differ in form and which are not essential to one another . ' to This paragraph reveals all the problems posed by a purely logicist decon­ struction . The notion of totality is here rejected by reference to the non-=essential character of the links uniting the elements of the pre­ sumed totality. In this , we have no disagreements . But, once elements such as 'institutions' , 'forms of organization' or 'agents' have been specified , a ques tion immediately arises . If these aggre­ gates - by contrast with the totality - are considered legitimate objects of social theo rization, must we conclude that the relations among the internal components of each of them are essential and necessary ? If the answer is yes , we have clearly moved from an essentialism of the totality to an essentialism of the elements; we have merely replaced Spinoza with Leibnitz , except that the role o f G o d is no longer t o establish harmony among the elements, but simply to secure their independence . If, on the contrary , the relations among those internal elements are neither essential nor necessary, then , besides having to specify the nature of relations charac terized in a purely negative m anner, we are compelled to explain why these non-necessary relations among internal components of the ' legiti­ mate' objects cannot exist among the legitimate objects themselves . Should this prove possible, a certain notion of totality could be reintroduced, with the difference that it would no longer involve an underlying principle that would unify 'society ' , but an ensemble of totalizing effects in an open relational complex . But if we move solely within the alternative 'essential relations or non-relational

104

identities' , all social analysis will involve a pursuit of the infinitely reced ing mirage of logical atoms irreducible to any subsequent division . The p roblem is that this enti re deb ate co ncern i ng the sep aration a mong elements and objects has evaded a prior and fundamental issue: that of the terrain where the separation occurs . In this way, a very cl ass i c al alternative has surreptitiously crept into the analysis : either the o bjects are separated as conceptu ally discrete elements in which case we are dealing w i th a logical separation; or else, they are separated as empiricall y given objects - in which case it is impossible to elude the category of 'experience' . T h us , by fa iling to specify the terrain in w hich the unity or separation among objects takes place, we once again fall back into the 'rationalism or empiri­ cism ' alternative which the Hindess and Hirst current tries by all poss i ble means to avoid. This unsatisfactory situation was , in fact, p redeter m i ned from the beginning : from the moment when the critique o f Althusser's rationalism adopted the form of a critique of the logical connections postulated among different elements of the ' to tality ' . For, a logical deconstruction can only be imp l emented if the disconnected 'elements' are conceptually specified and fixed; that is , if a full and unequivocal identity is attributed to them . The only path that is then left open is a logical pulverization of the social, coupled with a theoretically agnostic descriptivism of the 'concrete situations' . In the origin al Althusserian formulation, however, a very dif­ ferent theoretical undertaking was foresha do wed : that of a break with orthodox essenti alism no t through the logical disaggregation of its categories with a resultant fixing of the identity of the disaggregated elements - but through the critique of every type of fixity , through an affirmation of the in compl e te, open and politically n eg o tiable character of every identi ty . This was the l o gic of over­ determination . For it, the sense of every identity is overdetermined in asmuch as all literality appears as constitutively subverted and exceeded; far from there bein g an essentialist totalization, or a no less essentialist separation among objects, the presence of some objects in the others prevents any of their identities from being fixed. Objects appear a rticulated not like pieces in a clockwork mechanism, but because the p resence of some in the others hinders the suturing of the identity o f an y of them . Our examination of the history of Marxism has , in this sense , shown a very different spectacle from that depicted by the naive positivism of 'scientific' socialism: far from a rationalist game in which social agents , perfectly constituted around interests, -

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

105

wage a struggle defined by t ra n s p are nt parameters , we have seen the d i ffi c u l t i es of the working class in co n s titu tin g itself as a historical s u bj e ct , the d i s pe r s i on a n d fra g m ent a ti o n of its positionalities , the emergence of forms of s o ci al a nd pol i tica l re a g g re g a tio n - 'histori­ cal bloc' , 'collective will ' , 'masses ' , 'popular sectors' - which define new o bje c ts and new l ogics of their conformation . Thus, we are in the field of the overdetermination of s o m e entities by others , and the r e le g a t i o n of a n y form of p a ra dig m a ti c fix i ty to the ultimate horizon o f t h e ory . It is thi s sp e c i fic logic of articulation that w e m u s t now attempt to determine . Articulation and Discourse In the context of this d i s c u ss i o n , we wi ll call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their i den ti ty is mod i fi e d as a r e s u l t of the a r ti cul atory practice . The structured t o tali ty res ul ting from the articulatory p rac ti c e , we will call discourse. The differential p o s i ti o ns , insofar as they appear articulated within a d i sc o u rs e , we w il l call moments . By contrast, we w i l l call element any difference that is n o t discursively articulated. In o r de r to be co rrectl y understood, these distinctions require three m ain types o f specifica­ tion: with re g a rd to the c h a ra cte ri s tic coherence of the d is cur s ive formation; with regard to the dimensions and extensions of the d i s cu r s i v e; and with r ega rd to the openness or cl os u r e exhibited by the di s c u r s iv e fo r mati o n . 1 . A d isc urs i v e formation is not unified eith e r in the lo gica l coherence o f i t s elements, or in the a p ri ori of a transcendental s ubj e c t , or in a m e an i ng -giving s ubje c t a l a Husserl, or in the unity of an e x p e ri e n ce . The type of coherence we attribute to a discursive fo r ma ti o n is - with t h e differences we will indicate later - close to that which cha r acte riz es the concept of 'discursive formation' for­ m u lat e d by Foucault : r eg u l a r i t y in di s pers i o n . In the Archaeology oj Knowledge, Foucault reje c t s fo u r hy p o t h eses c o n c e r n i n g the unifying p rincip l e of a discursive formation - reference to the same obj e ct , a common s ty l e in the production of sta tem e n ts , constancy of the concepts , and reference to a .common theme . Instead, h e m akes di s p e r s ion itself the p rin ci p l e of unity, insofar as it is governed by rules o f fo rm ati o n , by the co m p lex conditions of existence of the d i s p e r s ed s ta tements . I I A re m a r k is necessary at this point . A dis­ pe rs i o n g o v e r n ed b y rules may be seen from two symmetrically opp o s e d perspectives . In the first place, as dispersion : th i s requires

1 06

determination of the point of reference with respect to which the elements can be thought of as dispersed . (In Foucault's case, one can evidently speak of dis persi on o n l y b y reference t o the type of absent unity constituted around the common o bje c t , the style , the concepts and the theme . ) But the discursive formation can also be seen from the perspective of the regularity in dispersion, and be t ho u g ht, in that sense , as an ensemble o f d i fferen ti al positions . This ensemble is not the expression of any und erlyin g principle external to itself - it cannot, for instance, be apprehended either by a hermeneutic read­ i ng or by a structuralist co mbinato ry - but it constitutes a con­ fig u r atio n , which in certain contexts of e x t e r i or i t y can be signified as a totality . Give n that our p r i n cip al concern is with articulatory practices , it is this second aspect which interests us in p a rticu l a r Now, in an articulated discursive totality , where every element occupies a differential position - in our terminology , where every element has been reduced to a moment o f that t o t a li t y - all i dentit y is relational and all relations have a necessary character. Benveniste, for example, states with reference to Saussure's principle of value: 'To say that the values are " relative" means that they are re l a t iv e to each other. Now , is that not precisely the proo f o f their necessity? Whoever says system says arrangement or con for m i t y of p arts in a structure w hich transcends and expl ains its elements . Ever yth i ng is so necessary in it that modifications of the whole and of the details reciprocally condition one another. The relativity of v alu es is the best proo f that they depend closely upon one an other in the synchrony o f a s y ste m which is always b ein g threatened, always being restored . The point is that all values are values of o pposi ti on and are defined only b y their difference . . . If language is some­ thing other than a fortuitous c onglo me ra ti on of e rra t ic notions and sounds uttered at random, it is because necessity is i n h erent in its structure as in all structure. " Z Necessity derives , the r efo re, n o t fro m a n u n derlyin g intelligible principle but from the regularity of a system of structural positions . In this sense, no relation can be contingent or external , since the identity of i t s elements would then be specified outside the relation itself. But this is no more than to affi rm that in a discursive-structural formation constituted in this way, the practice of articulation would be i mp o ss ib l e : the la t ter involves working on elements, while here we would be confronted only with m o men ts of a closed and fully constituted t ota l ity where every moment is subsumed from the be g inni ng under the principle of repetition . As we shall see, if contingency and articulation are possible, this is because no di s cu rs ive formation is a sutured totality .

.

.

.

Beyond

the Positivity oj t h e Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

1 07

and the transformation of the elements into moments is never co mpl e te .

2 . O ur a n aly s is reje cts the di s t in c t io n between discursive and non-discursive p r a c t i ces . It affi rm s : a) that e v er y o bj e c t is constituted a s a n o bj e ct of discourse, insofar as no object is gi ven outside every d i s cu r siv e condition of emergence; an d b) t h at any distin ction b e t wee n what are usually called the l i n g u i s ti c and behaviourial a s p ec t s of a s o cia l pr a c t i ce , is either an in c o r rec t distinction or ought to find its p l a ce as a differentiation wit h i n the social p roduction of me a n i n g , which is structured under the fo r m of dis cu rsi v e totalitites. Foucault , for e x a m p l e , who has maintained a d is t i n cti on - in o u r opinion inc o ns is t en t - between disc u rs i v e and non-cliscursive p r ac ti ces , 13 atte m p t s to determine t h e r el a t io n a l t o tali ty that founds the re g u l a r i t y of the d i s p er s i o ns of a d i s c ur s ive formatio n . But h e is only c a p ab le of doing this in terms of a discursive p ra c ti c e : ' (Clinical medicine must be re ga r ded ] as the establishment of a relation , in me d ic a l discourse, between a n u m b e r of distinct elemen ts, some of

which concerned the status o f doctors , o thers t h e institutional a nd t e ch ni cal s i te fr o m which they s p o ke , o thers their position as sub­ j e c ts p e r ce i v i ng , o b se r v i n g , describing, t ea c hi n g , etc. It can be said that this relation between d iffe r e n t elements (some of which are new , while o thers were a l re a d y in existence) is effected by c l i n i cal discourse: it is t h i s , as a p r ac t i ce , that establishes be t w ee n them all a s ys t e m of relations that is not "really" g iven o r co n s ti tu ted a priori; and if t h e r e is a un i ty , if the m o da li t i es of enunciation that it uses , or to w hi c h it g iv e s p l a c e, a re n o t s i m p l y j u xt a p o s e d by a s e ri e s of historical c ont i n g e nc ies , it is because it makes constant use of this gr o u p o f r e i at i o n s . ' J · Two p o i n ts have to be e m p h a s i ze d here . Fi rs tly , i f t h e so-called non-discursive co m p l e x es - ins titutions , tech n i q u e s , p r o d uc ti v e o r gani z ati o n , and so on - are a n a l y sed , we will only find m o re or less co m p lex forms of differential posi tions among o bjec t s , which d o not arise from a n e ce s s i ty external to the system s t ruc t u r i ng them and which can o nl y therefore be con cei ve d as discursive articulations. Secondly , the very l o gi c of Fou cau l t ' s a r g u m en t c on c e rn i n g the articulatory nature of clinical discourse implies that the id en ti t y of the articulated elements mus t be at least par t ia l l y modified by that articulation: that is , the c ateg o ry of dis­ pe rs io n only p artial ly pe rm its us to think the s p e cificity of the re g u l a r i t i e s . The s tat u s of the d is p er s ed entities is co n s t i t u t ed in s o m e intermediate region between the elements and the mo men t s . J5 W e c a n n o t enter here into all the complexities of a theor y of discourse as we un d e rs ta nd i t , bu t we should at least indicate the

108

following b asic points in order to obviate the more common mis­ understandings . (a) The fact that every object is constituted as an object of dis­ course has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought , o r with the realism/idealism opposition . An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists , in the sense that it occurs here and now , independently of my will . But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God ' , depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought , but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condi­ tion of emergence . (b) A t the root of the previous prejudice lies an assumption of the mental character of discourse. Against this , we will affirm the material character of every discursive structure. To argue the opposite is to accept the very classical dichotomy between an objective field con­ stituted outside of any discursive intervention, and a discourse con­ sisting of the pure expression of thought. This is , precisely , the dichotomy which several currents of contemporary thought have t ried to break . 16 The theory of speech acts has , for example, under­ lined their performative character. Language games , in Wittgen­ stein , include within an indissoluble totality both language and the actions interconnected with it: 'A is building with building-stones: there are blocks , pillars, slabs, and beams . B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block" , "pillar" , "slab", "beam " . A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such and such a call . ' 1 1 The conclusion is inevitable: 'I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven , the "language-game" . ' 1 8 It is evident that the very material properties of objects are part of what Wittgenstein calls language game, which is an example of what we have called dis­ course. W hat constitutes a differential position and therefore a relational identity with certain linguistic elements , is not the idea of building-stone or slab, but the building-stone or the slab as such. (The connection with the idea of 'building-stone' has not, as far as we know , been sufficient to construct any building. ) The linguistic and non-linguistic elements are not merely juxtaposed , but consti­ tute a differential and structured system of positions - that is, a discourse . The differential positions include, therefore, a dispersion of very diverse material elements . 19

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Afltagonisms and Hegemony

1 09

It might be argued that, in this case, the discursive unity is the teleological unity of a project; but this is not so. The objective world is structured in relational sequences which do not necessarily have a finalistic sense and which, in most cases , do not a c tually require any meaning at all: it is sufficient that certain regulari ties establish dif­ ferential positions for us to be able to speak of a di scursi v e formation . Two important conclusions follow from this . The first is that the material character of discourse cannot be unified in the ex p erience or consciousness of a founding subject; on the contrary , diverse subject positions appear dispersed within a discu r sive formation . The second consequence is that the practice of a r ticu l ati on , as fixation/disloca­ tion o f a system of differences, cannot consis t of p urely lin g u is ti c phenomena; but must instead pierce the entire m a terial d e n s i ty of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a dis­ cursive formation is structured. The reco gn i t ion of this co m p le x ity and of its discursive character , began to beat an obscure path in the terrain of M arxist theorization . Its characteristic form was the pro­ gressive affirmation, from Gramsci to Althusser, of the material character of ideologies, inasmuch as these are not simple sys tems of ideas but are embodied in institutions, rituals and so forth . W hat did , however, become an obstacle for the full theoretical un foldin g of this intuition was that, in all cases , it was re fe r re d to the field of ideologies; t ha t is, to formations whose identity was thought under the concept of 'superstructure ' . It was an a priori unity vis-a-vis the di s p e rs i on of its materiality, so that it required an appeal either to the unifying role of a class (Gramsci) , or to the functional requirements of the logic of reproduction (A l thuss e r) But once this essentialist assumption is abandoned, the category of articulation acquires a different theo­ retical status : a r ticul ati o n is now a discursive practice which does not have a plane of constitution prior to, or outside, the dispersion of the articulated elements . (c) Finally, we must consider the meaning and prod u ctiv i ty of the c en t rali t y we have assigned to the category of discour s e T h ro u g h this cen t r al i t y , we obtain a considerable enlargement of t h e field o f objectivity , and the conditions are created which perm it us to think nu me ro us relations placed before us by the ana l ys i s of the preceding chapters . Let us suppose that we attempted to analyse social re l a tion s on the basis of the type of objectivity constructed by the d i s course o f natural s ciences . This immediately sets s trict limits both on the objects that it is po s sible to construct within that discourse, and on the relations that can be established among them. Certain relations and certain objects are excluded in advance . Metaphor, for example, ,

.

.

1 10

is impossible as an o bj ecti v e relation between two entities . But this excludes the possibility of conceptually speci fyi n g a wide range of relations among objects in the social and political field . What we characterized as 'communist enumeration' , for example, is based on a relation o f equ ivalence among different class sectors within a social space divided into two antagonistic camps . But this equivalence supposes the operation of the principle of analogy among literally d i v e r s e contents and what is this but a metaphorical transposi­ tion ? I t is important to observe that the equivalence constituted through communist enumeration is not the discursive expression of a real movement constituted outside discourse; on the contrary, this enumerative discourse is a real force which contributes to the mould­ ing and constitution of social relations . Something similar occurs with a notion such as 'contradiction' - to which we will return below . If we consider social relations from the perspective of a naturalist paradigm, contradiction is excluded . But if we consider social relations as discursively constructed , contradiction becomes possible. For , whereas the classical notion of 'real object' excludes contradictio n , a relation of contradiction can exist between two objects of discourse. The main consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the thought/reality opposition, and hence a major enlargement of the field of those ca t e g ories which can account for social relations. S ynonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not forms of thought that add a second sense to a primary, constitutive literality of social relations; instead, they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is constituted. Rejection of the thought/reality dichotomy must go together with a rethinking and interpenetration of the categories which have until now been considered exclusive of one or the other. 3 . Now , the transition to the relational totality that we have called ' discourse ', would hardly be able to solve our initial problems if the relational and differential logic of the discursive totality prevailed without any limitation . In that case, we would be faced with pure relations of necessity , and , as we earlier pointed out, any articulation would be impossible given that every 'element' would ex dtjinitione be ' mo ment'. This conclusion can impose itself, however, only i f we allow that the relational logic of discourse be carried t h roug h to its ultimate consequences , without limitation by any exterior. 20 I f we accept , on the contrary , that a discursive totality never exists in the form of a simply given and delimited positivity , the relational logic will be incomplete and pierced by contingency . The transition from the 'elements' to the 'moments' is never e n ti r ely fulfilled . A no-

Beyand

the Pasitivity aj the Sacial: A ntagan isms and Hegemony

11 1

man' s-land thus emerges , making the articulatory practice possible . In this case, there is no social identity fully protected fro m a dis­ cursive exterior that deforms it and prevents i t becoming fully sutured . Bot h the identities and the relations lose their necessary charact er . As a systematic s tru c tu r a l ensemble, the relations a re unable to absorb the identities; but as the identities are purely rela­ tional , th i s is but another way of say in g that there is no identity which can be fully constituted . This being so, all discourse of fixation becomes metaphorical: l i te r ality is, in actual fact, the first of meta p h o rs Here we arrive at a de c i s i ve point in our a rgument . The incom­ plete character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as a te r rai n of analysis , the premise o f 'saciety ' as a s u tured and self­ defined t otal i t y . ' Society' is not a valid object of discourse . There is no single underl y i n g principle fixing - and hence constituting the whole field of differences . The irresoluble interiority/exteriority t ension is the condition of any social practice: necessi ty only exists as a partial limi tation of the field of contingency . It is in this terrain , where neither a total interiority nor a to t a l e x te r i o r i ty is p oss i b l e that the social is cons tituted . For the same reason that the soci al cannot be reduced to the interiority of a fixed system of differences , pure exteriority i s also impossible. I n order t o b e tatally ex te rn al to ea ch other, the entities would have to be totally internal with regard to themselves : that is, to have a fully constituted iden tity w h i ch is not subverted by any exterior. But this is precisely what we have just reje cted . Thisjield aj identities wh ich never manage ta bejullyJixed, is the .

-

,

Jield oj overdetermination .

Thus, neither absolute fixity nor absolute n o n fix i ty is possible . We will now consider these two s u c cess i v e moments , beginning with n on fixity. We have referred to 'discourse' as a system of differ.ential entities - that is , of moments. B u t we have just seen that such a s ystem only exists as a partial limitation of a 'sur p lus of meaning' w hich subverts it. Bein g inherent in every discursive situation, this 'surplus' is the necessary terrain for the constitution of every social practice. W e w ill call it th eJield aJ discursivity . This term ind i ca tes the form of its relation with every concrete d i s co u rse : it d eter m in es at the same time the necessarily discursive character of any object, and the i m p o s s i bi l i t y of any given discourse to i mple ment a final suture . On this point, our analysis meets up with a n u mbe r of contemporary currents of t h oug h t which - from Heidcgger to W ittgenstein have insisted on the impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings . Derrida, for example , starts from a radical -

-

­

-

1 12

break in the history of the concept of structure, occurring at the m o ment in which the centre - the transcendental sign ified in its multiple forms: eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia , aletheia, etc. is abandoned , and with it the possibility of fixing a meaning which underlies the flow of differences . At this point, Derrida generalizes the concept of discourse in a sense coincident w ith that of our text . ' I t became necessary to think both the law w h i ch somehow governed desire for a centre in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification wh i ch orders the di s place m en ts and s u bsti tu t ions for this law o f central presence - but as a central presence which has never been itself, has always already been exiled from itself into its own s ubstitute. The substitute does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it, henceforth, it was necessary to beg in thinking that there was no centre, that the centre could not be th o u g h t in the form of a present-being, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the m oment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when , in the absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse - provided we can agree on this word - that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified , is never absolutely present outside a system of differences . The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the p la y of signification infinitely . ' 2 1 Let us move o n t o o u r second dimension. The impossibility o f an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial fixations - otherwise, the very flow of differences would be im­ possible . E ven in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning . If the social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, the social only exists, however, as an effort to construct that impossible object . Any discourse is con­ s tituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity , to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre . We will call the pri vileged discursive points of this partial fixation , nodal POitltS . (Lacan has insisted on these partial fixations thro ug h his concept of points de capiton, that is , of privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain . This limitation of the productivity of the signifying chain establishes the positions that make predication pos s i bl e - a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of mean­ ing is the discourse of the psychotic. ) Saussure' s analysis o f language considered i t a s a system o f differ­ ences without positive terms; the central concept was that of value,

Bey o nd the Positivity oj the Social: Alttagonisms a n d Hegemony

1 13

a c co rdi n g to which the mean in g of a term was purely relati on al and determined o n l y b y i ts o p positi o n to all the others . But this shows us that we are p r esent e d with the co n d i t i o n s of possibility of a closed system: only within it is it p os s i bl e to fix in such a manner the meaning of every element. When the linguistic model was intro­ duced into the general field of h u man sciences , it w as t h is effect of s y s t e m at i ci t y that predom i n a ted, so that structuralisll1 became a new form of essentialism : a search for the u n d e r l y i ng structures consti­ tuting t h e inherent law of any p o s s i b l e variation . The critique o f structuralism i n v ol v ed a break with this view of a fully constituted structural space; but as it a ls o rejected any return to a conception of u n i t ies whose demarcation was g i ven , like a nomenclature, by its re fer en ce to an object, the resu l ti n g co n cept i on was of a relational s p a c e unable to constitute itself as such - of a field domin a ted by the desire for a structure that was alw ay s fin a l ly absent . The s ign is the n a m e of a s p l i t , of an impossible suture bet we en s i g ni fi ed and 22 s i g n i fie r . We no w have all the n e cessar y a na lytic al elements to specify the c o n ce p t of articulation . Since all i d en ti t y is rel a ti on al - even if the system of re la t io n s does no t reach the point of b e i n g fixed as a stable system of diffe ren c es - since, too , all d is co u rs e is s u b v e r ted by a field of discursivity wh ich overflows it, th e transition from 'elements ' to ' m o m ents ' can never be co m pl ete . The s t a tus of the 'elements ' is that of fl o a t i n g signifiers , i nca p a b le of bei ng wholly articulated to a discursive chain . And this fl o a t i ng characte r finally p en e t r a t es every discursive (i . e . s oci a l) id en tity . But if we a c cept the non-complete cha ra c t e r of all discursive fi xa t i on and, at the same time, affirm the relational character of e v ery iden ti t y , the ambiguous ch a r a c te r o f the s i g n ifi e r , its non-fixation to any s i g n i fi e d , can only exist insofar as there is a p roli fe ra ti o n of signifieds. It is not the p o v e rty of signifieds b u t, o n the contrary, p o ly se m y that disarticu­ lates a discursive structure. Tha t is what establishes the overdeter­ mi n e d , s ymbolic dimension of every social id e n t i t y . Society never manages to he i dent ical to itself, as every nodal po i n t is co ns ti tu ted within an intertextuality that overflows it. The p ractice oj a rticulation, thertjore, consists in the construction qf n o dal points which partially jix meaning; and the partial character oj thisjixa tio n proceedsjrom the openness oj the social, a result, in its turn, oj the constant ovetjlowing oj every discourse by the i1'ifi n itu de oj thejield oj discursi vity . Every social p ra c tice is t here fore - in one of its dimensions articulatory . As it is n o t the internal moment of a self-defined totality , it c a n n o t s im ply be the expression of s o me t h i n g already

1 14

acquired , it cannot be wholly subsumed u n de r the p rin ci p le of repeti ­ tion; rather, it always consists in the construction of new differences . The social is ar ti c u l at i on insofar as ' so cie t y ' is i m p ossi b le . Earlier we said that, for the social , ne c es s i ty o nly exists as a p a rti al effort to limit co n ti n gency . T h i s i mpl i e s that the relations between ' ne ce s s i t y ' and 'contingency ' ca n n o t be con cei v e d as relations between two areas that a re delimited and e x te rn al to e a c h other - as , for e x a m p l e , in Labriola's mor p hologi c al p redicti on - because the co ntingen t o nl y exists within the necessary. This presence of the contingent in the necessary is what we earlier called subversion, and it manifests itself as s y mbo l i z atio n , metaphorization, paradox, which deform and ques­ tio n the literal character of every n e ce ssit y . Necessity , therefore, exists not under the form of an underlying p rinc i p le , of a ground, but as an e ffort of literalization which fixes the differences of a relational system. The necessity of the social is the necessity proper to p u re l y relational i d en ti ties - as in the linguistic p ri n ci p le of value23 - not natural ' n ecess i ty ' or the necessity of an analytical judgement . ' Ne ces si ty ' , in this sense, is simp l y eq ui valent to a ' sy s tem of differen t ial positions in a sutured space' . This way of approaching the problem of articulation would seem to contain all the necessary elements to resolve the apparent anti­ n o mie s with which the logic of he ge mo n y confronted us: on the one hand, the open a n d i ncom p lete character of every social identity permits its articulation to different historico-discursive forma­ tions - that is, to 'blocs' in the sense of Sorel and Gramsci; on the other hand , the very identity o f the a rticu l a tory force is constituted in the gen eral field of d i scurs i vity - this eliminates any reference to a transcendental or originative subject. However, before formu­ lating our concept of hegemo n y , we need to tackle two further questions . The first concerns the precise status in our a n a lys i s of the category of 'subject'; the second concerns the concept of antagonism, whose i m p o r t a n ce stems from the fact that, in one of its key dimen­ sions, the s p e c ifi ci t y of a hegemonic a r ti c u l a tory practice is given by its c o nfr on t atio n with other a r t i cu l a t o r y pra c t ices of an a n ta gonisti c cha r a c te r . The Category of 'Subject'

Discussion of this category requires us to d ist in guis h two very different problems, which h a v e frequen t l y been confused in recent debates : the p roblem of the discursive or pre-discursive character of

Beyond the Positivity cif the Social: A ntagonisms and Hegemony

1 15

t he category of s ubj ec t ; and the problem of the r e l a ti o ns h ip among different subject positions . The first problem has re cei v ed more co ns i sten t attention , and has l e d to a g ro w i n g q u es t i onin g o f the ' constitutive' role that both rationalis m an d e mpi r ic is m attribute to 'h u m an individuals' . This critique has e s s en ti a ll y borne upon three co n cep t u a l targets : the view of the s u bj ec t as an agent both rational and tran s p a r en t to itself; t he supposed unity and homogeneity of the e n se m bl e of its po s i tio ns ; and the conception of the s u bjec t as ori gin and basis of social rela­ tions (the probl e m of constitutivity in the strict s en s e ) . We do not need to refer in detail to the main dimensions of this c ri t i q u e , as its classical m om e n ts - Nietzsche , Freud , Heidegger - are well enough known . M ore recen tly , Foucault has s h ow n how the ten­ sions of the 'analytic of finitude', characteristic of what he has called the ' A g e of M an' , are resolved in t o a set of o ppo s i t i o ns - the empirical/the transcendental , the C o g i to / t he u n th oug h t , with­ drawal/return of the or i g i n - which are insurmountable inso far as the category of 'Man' is m a i nta i n e d as a unified s ubject . 24 Other an aly s e s have pointed out the difficulties in b reaki n g with the cate­

g o ry of ' ori g inative s ubject ' , which continues to creep into the

very

c o nce p tio n s that seek to i m pl e me n t the rupture with it. 25 W ith regard to this alternative , and to its di verse constitutive elements, our position is c l ear . W henever we use the category o f 'subject' in this tex t, we will do so in the sense of ' su bj ec t p os i t i ons ' within a discursive st ruc t u re . S u bje c t s cannot, t h e re fo re , be t he origin of social relations - not even in the limited sense of b ei ng endowed with powers that render an experience possible - as all 'experience' depends on pre c i se d i s c urs i v e con di ti o ns o f p os s ib i­ lity .26 T h is , however , i s only an answer to o u r first problem , which in no way a n tici pa t es the solution that will be g i v e n to the second . From the discursive character of all su bj ec t p o s i t ions , n othin g follows co n cern i ng the type of rel a ti o n that could exist a m on g them . As every subject position is a dis cu rs i v e p o s i ti on , it partakes of th e open character of every discourse; consequently , the various positions cannot be totally fix ed in a clos ed system of d i ffe ren ces . We can see w hy these v ery different pro b l em s were co n fu s ed . Since the affirmation of the discursive character of every s u bj ec t po si t i o n was linked to the rejection of th e notion of s ubj e c t as an o ri gin a ti ve and founding to t a l i t y , th e an al y tic moment that had to p re v a il was that of d i s pe rs i on , detotalization or d ecen t ring of certain p os i tio n s with r e g ar d to others . Every moment of art ic ul a t i on or r e la ti on among

1 16

them broke the cognitive effects of the dispersion metaphor, and led

to the suspicion of a retotalization which would surreptitiously reintroduce the category of subject as a unified and unifying essence. From here, it was but one step to transform that dispersion of subject positions into an effective separation among them . However, the transformation of d is pe rsi o n into separation obviously creates all the analy tical problems we signalled earlier - especially those inherent in the re p l a c e ment of the essentialism of the totality with an essen­ tialism of the elements . If every subject position is a discursive p o s i ti on , the a n aly s is cannot dispense with the forms of overdeter­ mination of some positions by others - of the contingent character of all necessity which, as we have seen , is inherent in any discursive difference . Let u s consider two cases which have recently given rise t o impor­ ta n t discussions: that relating to the status of apparently ab s t r act categories (above all , ' M an'); and that relating to the 'subject' of feminis m . The first is at the centre of the entire recent debate on h u m an i s m . I f t he status o f ' M an'27 were that of an essence, its location with regard to o ther characteristics of 'human beings' would be i n sc r ibed on a logical scale proceeding from the abstract to the concrete . This would open the way for all the familiar tricks of an a n aly si s o f concrete situations in terms of 'alienation' and 'misrecog­ n i t io n ' But if, on the contrary , 'Man' is a discursively constructed su bj ec t p os i tion , its presumed abstract character in no way antici­ p a tes the form of its articulation with other subject positions . (The range is here i n fi ni t e , and it challenges the imagination of any ' humanist' . For example, it is known how , in the colonial countries , the equivalence between righ t s of Man' and 'European values' was a frequent and effective form of discursively constructing the accepta­ b i l i ty of i m pe rialis t domination . ) The confusion created by E . P . Thompson i n his attack o n Althusser28, rests precisely on this point. W hen referring to 'humanism ' , Thompson believes that if humanist values are denied the status of an essence, then they are deprived of all his t o r i cal validity . In r ea li ty , however, what is important is to try to show ho w 'Man' has been produced in modem times, how the ' h u m an subject that is , t he bearer of a human iden tity without distinctions - appears in certain religious discourses, is embodied in j ur id i c a l practices and is diversely constructed in other spheres . An understanding of this dispersion can help us to grasp the fragility of 'humanist ' values themselves , the possibility of their perversion through equivalential articulation with other values , and their re­ s tri c ti on to certain categories of the population - the property.

'

'

-

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony 1 1 7 owning class , for example, or the male pop u l ati on Far from con­ sidering that ' M an ' has the status of an essence - p res u mably a g ift from heaven - such an analysis can show us the his torical condi­ tions of its emergence and the reasons for its current vulnerability , thus enabling us to struggle m o re e ffi cientl y , and without illu s i o ns in defence of humanist values . But i t is equ a lly evident that the analysis cannot si m p ly remain at the momen t of dispersion, given that 'human identity' involves n o t merely an ensem b l e of dispersed positions but also the forms of overdetermination existing among them . 'M an ' is a fundamental nodal point from which it has been possible to proceed, since the ei g h t e enth century , to the 'humaniza­ tion' of a number of social practices . To insist on the dispersion of the posi tions from which 'Man' h as been p ro du ce d , consti tutes only a first momen t; in a second stage, it is necessary to show the relations of overdetermination and totalization that are established among these . The non-fixation or openness of the system of discursive differences is what makes possible these effects of analogy and interpenetra tion . Something similar may be said a bout the 'subj ect' of feminis m . The critique o f feminist essentialism has been carried o u t in parti­ cular by the English journal mlj: a number of important s tudies have rejected the notion of a preconstituted category 'women's oppres­ sion' - whether its cause is located in the family , the mode of production or elsewhere - and have attempted to study th e p ar t i­ cular historical moment, the institutions and practices through which the category of woman is produced' . 29 Once it is denied that there is a single mechanism of women 's oppression, an immense field of action opens up for feminist politics . One can then perceive the importance of punct u al stru ggl es against any oppressive form o f constructing sexual differences, b e i t at the level o f law , of the famil y , of social policy , or of the multiple cultural forms th ro ug h which the category of ' the feminine' is constantly produced . We are, therefore, in the field of a disp e r s i on of subject p os i t i ons . The difficulty with this approach, however, arises from the one-sided emphasis given to the moment o f dispersion - so one-sided that we are left with only a heterogeneous set o f sexual differences con­ structed through p ractices which have no relation to o ne another. Now, while it is absolutely correct to question the idea o f an orginal sexual division represented a p oste rio ri in social practices, it is also necessary to recognize that overdetermination among the diverse sexual differences p ro du ce s a systematic effect of sexual division . 30 Every construction of sexual differences , whatever their multiplicity .

,

'

1 18

and h ete rog e n e it y invariably const ructs the feminine as a pole sub­ or d i n a te d to t he masculine . It is for this reason that it is possible to s pe ak o f a sex/gender system . 3 1 The ensemble of social practices, of institutions and discourses which produce woman as a category , are not com pletely isolated but mutually reinforce and act upon one another . This does not mean that there is a single cause of feminine subordination . It is our view that once female sex has come to connote a feminine gender with specific characteristics , this i m a g ina r y signification' produces concrete effects in the diverse social p rac t i ce s Thus , there is a close correlation between 'subordi­ nation' , as a general category informing the ensemble of significa­ tions c o n s t i tu t in g fe mi nin i t y and the autonomy and uneven deve­ l o pmen t of the diverse practices which construct the concrete forms of s u bordi n a ti on . These latter are not the expression of an immutable fe mi n i ne essence; in their construction , however, the symbolism which is linked to the feminine condition in a given society , plays a p r i m o rdial role . The diverse forms of concrete subordination react, in turn , by c o n tri buting to th e maintenance and reproduction of this sy mbolism . 32 It is therefore possible to criticize the idea of an original an t a go n is m between men an d women, constitutive of the sexual division, without denying that in the various forms of construction of fe m i nin ity , there is a common element which has strong over­ determining effects in terms of the sexual division . Let us n o w move on t o consider the different forms which the determination of social and polit i cal subjects has adopted within the M arxis t t radition. The s t ar t i ng po in t and constant leitmotiv is clear: the subjects are social classes , whose unity is constituted around interests determined by their po s i t i o n in t h e relations of production. M o re i m p o r t a nt than insisting on this common theme , however, is to st u d y the precise ways in which M arxism has politically and t h eo retic a lly responded to the diversification and dispersion of subject positions with regard to the paradigmatic forms of their u n it y A fi rs t type of response - the most elementary - consists of an illegitimate passage t h rough the referent. It involves , for e x a m p l e the assertion that the workers' p·o litical struggle and economic struggle are unified by the concrete social agent - the working class - which conducts thecl both . This type of reason­ i n g - common not only in Marxism but also in the social sciences as a whole - is based on a fallacy: the expression 'working class' is u s e d in two different ways , to define a s p ecific subject position in the relations of p roduc ti o n and to name the agents who occupy that subject p o s i t i on The resu lti ng ambiguity allows the logically il le gi t ,

'

.

'

'

' ,

'

-

.

.

.

.

-

Beyond the Positivity oj the Socia l : A. ntagonisms and Hegemony

1 19

imate conclusion to slip t hro u gh that the other positions occupied by these agents are also ' w o rki ng-cla s s posi tio n s ' . (They a re obviously ' w o r ki n g - cla s s ' in the s eco nd sense , but not necessarily in the first . ) T he implicit a s s u m p tio n o f the uni t y and transparency of t h e con­ s c io u s n es s of every social agent s erve s to consolidate the am biguity

- and hence the confusion . Th i s s u bte r fu g e , however , can o n l y operate when one t ries to affirm the u n i t y among empirically givEn po s i t i o n s ; not when one tries to ex p l a in - as has been mos t fr e q uen t l y the case in t he M arxist traditi o n - the essential heterogeneity of s o me posi tions with re g ard to t he others (that is , t h e characteristic splits o f 'false con­ s c io u sn e ss ' ) . In this case, as w e h a v e see n , t h e u n i t y of th e class is conceived as a fu t u r e unity; the way in which t h a t unity mani fests itself is through the category of repres e n ta ti on , the sp l i t between real workers and their objective interests re qu i r i n g that the l a tte r be re p res e n ted by the va ng u a rd party . Now, every rel a tion of repre­ sentation is founded on a fic t io n : that of the p res en ce at a cert a i n level of so m e t hing which, stri ctl y s pe a ki ng , is absent from it. But because it is at the same time a fiction and a principle or g anizing a c tu a l social relations , re p res en tati o n is the terrain of a game whose result is not predetermined from the b egin n i ng . At one end of the spectru m of pos si b ilit ies we would have a dissolution of the fictitious character of representation , s o that the m e ans and the field of re pres e n ta ti o n would be t o t al l y transparent vis-a-vis what is re p res en ted ; at th e other end, we would have total opaqueness b etw een rep r es en ta t iv e and re p r e s e n te d : the fiction would b e co m e a fiction in a strictly l iteral sense . It is imp o rtant to note that neither of th e s e extremes const i tutes an i m p o s si b l e situation , as bo t h have well-defined conditions of p o ss ib ility : a re p re s en ta t i v e can be s u bj e c t ed to s uc h conditions o f co n tr ol that what be co mes a fiction is th e very fi ct i tio u s n ess of the repre s entation; and , on the contrary, a total absence of control can make the rep res entatio n literal l y fictitious . The Marxist con cep tion ­

of the v ang u ard party shows this peculiarity : th at the party repre­ sents not a c o n cret e agent but its historical interests , and that there is n o fiction since re p re sen tative a n d rep resented are constituted by the same d isco u rse and on the s a m e p lan e . This ta u to lo g ic a l relation , however, exists in its extreme form only in tiny sects which proclaim them s el ves to be the va ngu a r d of the proletariat, without the pro l et a ri a t ever rea li zing , of cours e , that it has a vanguard . In every politi ca l stru ggl e of a cert a in sig ni ficance , there is on the contrary a very cl ea r effort to win the allegiance of concrete social agents to their supposed 'historical in te r ests ' . If the t a u t o l o gy of a

120

s ingle discourse constituting both represented and representative is a b a ndo ned it is necessary to conclude that represented and repre­ senta tive are constituted at different levels . A first temptation would then be to make total that separation of planes , and to derive the i m possibility of the relation of representation from its fictitious character. Thus, it has been stated: 'To deny economism is to reject the classical conception of the economic-political-ideological unity of classes . I t is to maintain that political and ideological struggles cannot be conceived as the struggles of economic classes . There is no middle way . . . Class "interests" are not given to politics and ideology by the economy . They arise within the political practice, and t hey are determined as an effect of definite modes of political practice . Political practice does not recognize class interests and then represeht them : it constitutes the interests which it represents . '33 This assertion could, however , only be upheld if political practice was a perfectly delimited field , whose frontiers with the economy could be drawn more geometrico - that is , if we excluded as a matter of p rinciple any overdetermination of the political by the economic or vice vers a . But we know that this separation can only be esta­ blished a priori in an essentialist conception , which derives a real separation among elements fro m a conceptual separation, trans­ forming the conceptual specification of an identity into a fully and a bs ol u tely differentiated discursive position . Yet, if we accept the overdetermined character of every identity , the situation changes . There is a different way which - although we do not know whether it is middle - is in any case a third way . The 'winning over of agents to their historical interests ' is , q uite simply , an articulatory practice which constructs a discourse wherein the concrete demands of a group - the industrial workers - are conceived as steps towards a total liberation involving the overcoming of capitalism . Undoub­ tedl y , there is no essential necessity for these demands to be articu­ la te d in this way . But nor is there an essential necessity for them to be articulated in any other way, given that, as we have seen, the relation of articulation i s not a relation of necessity . What the discourse of 'historical interests' does is to hegemonize certain demands . On this p o in t , Cu tler et al . are absolutely right: political practice constructs the interes ts it represents. But if we observe closely , we will note that, far from being consolidated , the separation between the economic and the political is hereby eliminated. For, a reading in s ocialist terms of immediate economic s truggles discursively articu­ lates t he political and the economic, and thus does away with the exteriority existing between the two . The alternative is clear: either ,

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: A ntagonisms and Hegemony

12 1

t h e s e p a ration between the p oli tical and the economic t akes p l ace on an extra-discursive p l a ne which secures it a p rio ri ; or else th a t separ­ a tion is the re s u l t of di s c u rsi v e practices , and it is not possible to immunize it a priori fro m every discourse constructing their unity . I f the dispersion o f posi tions i s a condition o f any articulatory p r ac tice , there is no reason wh y that dispersion should necessa rily take the fo r m o f a s e p a r a tion between the politic al and t h e economic identity of social agents . Were economic iden t i t y and political identity to be sutu r ed , the conditions of a n y relation of r e p r ese n t a ti o n would evidently disappear: we would have returned to the tautological situation i n which re p re s entat i v e and represented are moments of a single relational i den ti ty . Let us a c cep t instead that neither the poli­ t i ca l identity nor the e cono m i c i den ti ty of the agents c ry sta ll iz es as diffe r ent i al moment of a unified discourse , and that the rel atio n between them is the p recariou s unity of a t en s i on . W e already know what this means: the subversion of each of the terms by a polysemy w hich prevents their s table articulation . In this case, the e con o m ic is a nd is not present in the p o l iti c a l and vice versa; the relation is not one of l ite r a l differentiations but of unstable a n al o gi e s between the two te r m s . Now, this form of presence through metaphorical trans­ p osit i on is t he one that the jictio iuris of rep resent a t i on attempts to think . R e pre sen t a t i on is therefore constituted not as a de fin i te type of re l a tio n ; but as the field of an unstable oscillation whose vanishing p oint is, as we saw, either the literalization of the fi ctio n through the breaking of every link between representative and represented, o r the disappearance of the sep a ra te identity of both th ro ug h th ei r a b so r p tion as moments of a si n gle i dent i t y . All this shows us that the speci ficity of the c a t e gory of subject cannot be established either throug h the absolutization of a dis­ p e rs i o n of 'subject posi tions ' , or th roug h the equally abso l u tis t unification of thes e around a ' transcendental subject' . The c a te g ory of subject is penetrated by the same ambiguous , in c o mp le te and polysemical ch a r a cte r which overdetermination ass i g ns to every discursive i den t i t y . For this reason, the moment of closure of a d i s cursive totality , which is n ot given a t the ' o bj e c ti ve ' level o f that tot ali t y , cannot be e sta b l ished at the level of a 'meaning-giving s u bj e c t ' , since the s u bj e ctivity of t he agent is p enet ra t ed by the same pre ca ri o us n ess and absence of suture a pp a rent at any other point of the discursive to tal i ty of which it is part. 'Objectivism' and 'sub­ je c tiv i s m ' ; 'holism' and 'individualism' are s y m me tri c a l expressions of the desire for a fullness that is permanently deferred . Owing to this very absence of a final suture, the dispersion of subject positions

122

cannot constitute a solution: given that none of them manages ultimately to consolidate itself as a separate position , there is a game of overdetermination among them that reintroduces the horizon of an i m p oss i b l e totality. It is this game which makes hegemonic articu­ lation possible. Antagonism and Objectivity

The impossibility of closure (i . e . , the impossibility of 'society ') has up to this point been presented as the precariousness of every i de n ti ty , which manifests itself as a continuous movement of differ­ ences . We must now, however, ask ourselves : are there not some ' ex p e riences , some discursive forms, in which what is manifested is no l onger the continuous deferment of the ' transcendental signified', but t h e v e r y vanity of this deferring , the final impossibility of any stable difference and, thus , of any 'objectivity'? The answer is yes . This ' experience' of the limit of all objectivity does have a form of precise discursive presence , and this is antagonism . Anta g onisms have been widely studied in historical and socio­ logi c a l literature. From M arxism to the various forms of 'conflict t heo r y ' , a w h o l e range of ex plan a ti o ns have been given as to how and why a n t a g o nis m s emerge in society . This theoretical diversity does , however, display a common feature: the discussion has centred almost exclusively on the description of antagonisms and their original causes . Only rarely has an attempt been made to address the core of our proble m : what is an antagonistic relation? what type of relation among objects does it suppose? Let us begin with one of the few discussions which have broached this question: namely , that initiated by Lucio Colletti's analysis of the specificity of social anta­ g o nis m s , and o f the claims which the categories 'real opposition' and 'contradiction' can make to account for that specificity . 34 Colletti starts from the Kantian distinction between real oppo­ sition (Realrepugnanz) and logical contradiction . The first coincides with the principle of contrariety and responds to the formula 'A B ' : each of its terms has its own posi ti v ity , independent of its relation with the other . The second is the category of contradiction and re s po n d s to th e for m u l a ' A not A ' : the relation of each term with the other exhausts the reality of both . Contradiction occurs in the ter r a in of the proposition; it is only possible to enter into con­ tr adi ct i ons at a logico-<:onceptual level . The first type of opposition occurs , on the contrary, in the terrain of real objects , for no real '

-

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

123

obj e c t e x h a u s ts its iden tity by its opp os i ti on to another object; i t has a reality of i ts o wn , i n de p e nd en t o f t h a t o pp o s i ti o n . 3s Colletti th e n concludes that wh e re as H e gel , as an idealist philosopher who reduced rea l i t y to the concept, could introduce co n t r a di c ti on into the rea l , t h is is i nc o m p a tib le wi t h a materialis t p hilosophy like M arxism which starts from the extra-mental character of th e real . A c co r d i n g to this vie w , M arxists fell into a l amentable con fusion by consider­

i n g a n tago ni s ms as contradi ctions . Colletti' s progr a m m e is to re­ in t er p r e t the former i n terms of real opp o s i t i o ns . Let us note t h a t Colletti s tarts from an exclusive alternative: either s o m e t hi n g is a real opposition, or i t is a con tradiction . This derives fro m the fact that h i s universe ha s room for only two types of entities , re al o bje cts and concepts; and that the starting-point and pe r m a n en t as s u m p ti o n of all h i s analysis is the s epa rati on b e tw een t ho u g h t a n d rea lity . There fo llow a number of consequences which , a s we shall t r y to show , d e s tr o y the c r ed e n ti al s of both ' real opposi­ t i o n ' and ' co n t rad i c ti o n ' as ca tego ri e s c ap a b l e of a c c o u n ting for a n t a g o n i sms . First of a ll , it is clear that an an ta go n i s m cannot be a real o p p o s i ti o n . There is n o thin g antagonis tic in a crash between two vehicles: it is a material fa c t o b e y in g p o s i t i ve p h y sic a l laws . To apply the same p rinciple to the s o ci al terrain would be tantamount to s ay i n g that what is a n t a g o n i s t i c in class s t r u g gl e is the ph y s i c al act by which a policeman hits a w o rk e r militan t , or the shouts of a gro u p in P a rl i ame nt which prevent a me m b e r of an op p o si n g sector from speaking . ' O p p o siti o n ' is here a con cep t of the physical world w h i ch has been metaphorically e x t en ded to the social world, or vice versa; but there is e v i de n t l y li tt l e p o i n t in p ret en d i n g that there is a c om m o n core of m eani ng which i s s uffi cien t to e xp la in the t yp e of relation im p l icit i n both cases . This is even clearer if, in order to refer to the s o cial , we re p la ce ' o ppo se d forces ' with 'enemy fo rce s ' - for in this case , the m e t ap h o r i c al transposition t o the physical w o r l d , at least in a post-Homeric universe, has not taken p lace. It may be o bje c t e d that it is not the physical cha racter of the op p os i t i on that counts but o n l y its extra-logical cha r a c t e r . But it is even less clear how a th e or y of the sp e ci fi ci t y of social a n t ago n is m s can be g r o un ded u p o n th e m e re o p p o s i t ion to l og i cal contradiction that is shared by a clash b e tween two social force s and a c o l l i s i on between two s tones . 36 Furthermore, as Roy Edgley37 and Jon Els t e r38 have pointed out, t w o different assertions are m ixed together in t hi s p roblem: (a) th a t the real is co n t r a dicto ry , and (b) that con tra d i cti o n s e x is t i n real ity . Regardi ng the firs t , there can be no doubt that the statement is self-defeating. Po p p e r' s fa mous cri tique of the dialectic39 is , from

124

this point of view, unobjectionable . The second assertion , however, is undeniable: it is a fact that in reality there are situations which can only be described in terms of logical contradiction . Propositions are also a part of the real and , insofar as contradictory propositions exist empirically , it is evident that contradictions exist in the real . People argue and , inasmuch as a set of social practices - codes , beliefs , e t c . - can adopt a propositional structure , there i s n o reason why they should not give rise to contradictory propositions . (At this point, however, Edgley falls into the obvious fallacy of believing that the possible real existence of contradictory propositions proves the co rrectness of the dialectic. The dialectic is a doctrine about the essentially contradictory nature of the real, not about the empirical e xistence of contradictions in reality. ) It would thus seem that the category of contradiction has an assured place within the real , and that it provides the basis from which to account for social antagonisms . But a moment's reflection is sufficient to convince us that this is not so . We all participate in a number of mutually contradictory belief systems , and yet no antag­ onism emerges from these contradictions . Contradiction does not, therefore, necessarily imply an antagonistic relation . 40 But if we have excluded both 'real opposition' and 'contradiction' as cate­ gories accounting for antagonism , it would seem that the latter's specificity cannot be apprehended . The usual descriptions of antago­ nisms in the sociological or historical literature confirm this impres­ sion: they explain the conditions which made antagonisms possible, but not the antagonisms as such . (The description proceeds through expressions such as 'this p rovoked a reaction' or 'in that situation X or Zjound itself forced to react' . In other words , there is a sudden jump fro m explanation to an appeal for our common sense or experience to complete the meaning of the text: that is to say , the explanation is interrupted . ) Let u s attempt t o unravel the meaning of this interruption . First, we must ask ourselves whether the impossibility of assimilating antagonism to real opposition or to contradiction, is not the impos­ sibility of assimilating it to something shared by these types of relation . They do, in fact, share something, and that is the fact of being objective relations - between conceptual objects in the second case, and between real objects in the first. But in both cases , it is something that the objects already are which makes the relation intelligible. That is , in both cases we are concerned with full identi­ ties . In the case of contradiction, it is because A is fully A that being-not-A is a contradiction - and therefore an impossibility. In

Beyond tile

Positivity oj tile Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

125

the case of real opposition , it is because A is also fully A that its relation with B produces an objectively determinable effect. But in the case of antagonism, we are confronted with a different situation: the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities , but from the impossibility of their constitution . The presence of the Other is not a logical impossibility: it exists; so it is not a contradiction . But neither is it subsumable as a positive differential moment in a causal chain , for in that case the relation would be given by what each force is and there would be no negation of this bein g . (It is because a physical force is a physical force that another identical and countervailing force leads to rest; in con trast, it is because a peasant cannot be a peasant that an antagonism exists with the landowner expelling him from his land .) Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for m yself. But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective being is a s ymbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which prevent its being fixed as full positivity. Real opposition is an o bject ive relation - that is, deter­ minable, definable - among things; contradiction is an equally definable relation among concepts; antagonism constitutes the limits of every objectivity , which is revealed as partial and precarious objectification . I f language is a system of differences , antagonism is the failure of difference: in that sense, it situates itself within the limits of language and can only exist as the disruption of it - that is , as m e t apho r . We can thus understand w h y sociological and historical narratives must interrupt themselves and call upon an 'experience' , transcending their categories , t o fill their hiatuses : for every language and every society are constituted as a repression of the consciousness of the impossibility that penetrates them . Antago­ nism escapes the possibility of being apprehended through language, since language only exists as an attempt to fix that which antagonism subverts . Antagonis m , far from being an objective relation, is a relation wherein the limits of every objectivity are shown in the sense in which Wittgenstein used to say that what cannot be said can be shown . But if, as we have demonstrated , the social only exists as a partial effort for constructing society - that is , an objective and closed system of differences - antagonism, as a witness of the impossibility of a final suture, is the 'experience' of the limit of the social. Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal but external to s o c ie t y; or rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latter's impossibility of fu l ly constituting itself. This statement may seem -

126

pa r a do x ical , but only if we s u r repti tiousl y introduce certain assump­ tions which must be carefully excluded from our theoretical per­ s pe c ti v e . In particular, two such assumptions would make absurd our thesis concerning the theoretical location of antagonism. The first is the iden tifica tion o f 'soci e ty with an ensemble of physically e xi s t i n g agents who live within a given territory . If this criterion is accepted , it is obvious that a n ta gon i sms occur among th os e agents and a re not external to them . But it does not necessarily follow , from the 'empirical' coexistence of the agents, that the relations among them s hould be shaped according to an objective and intelligible pattern . (The price of identifying 'society' with the referent would be to empty it o f any rationally specifiable content . ) However, a cce p t ing that 'society ' is an intelligible and objective ensemble , we would i n t r o d uce another assumption in co mp atible with our analysis if we attributed to that rational totality the character of an un de rl yi n g p r i n ci pl e of the social conceived as an empirical totality . For there would t h en no longer be a n y aspect of the second which could not be reabsorbed as a moment of the fi rs t . In that case antagonisms , like everything else, would have to be positive internal moments of s o ci et y , and we would have returned to the Hegelian cunning of re as o n . But if we maintain our conception of the social as a non­ s u t u red space, as a field in which all positivity is metaphorical and subvertible , then there is no way of r e fe rr i ng the negation of an o bje c t i v e position to an underlying positivity be it causal or of an y other type - which would account for it. Antagonism as the n e ga t i o n of a gi v en order is , quite simply , the limit of that order, a n d not the moment of a broader totality in relation to which the two po l es of the antagonism would constitute differential - i . e . objec­ tive - partial i n s t a n ces (Let us be understood: the conditions which made the antagonism possible may be described as positivi­ ties , but the antagonism as such is not reducible to them . ) W e must consider this 'experience' o f the limit o f the social from two different points of view . On the one hand , as an experience of fa il ure. If the subject is constructed through language, as a pa r tial a nd m e t a p horical in corpo ra tion into a symbolic order , any p utting into qu es tio n of that order must necessarily co n s titu te an i de n tity crisis. But, on the o ther han d , this experience of failure is not an access to a diverse o n to l og i c a l order, to a something beyond differences , s i mp l y because . . . there is no beyond. The limit of the social cannot be traced as a frontier separating two territories - for the p e rcepti o n of a frontier supposes the perception of something b e y o n d it that would have to be objective and positive - that is , a '

-

.

Beyond the Positivity ,?! the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

127

new di fference . The limit of the social must be given within t he social itself as some t hing s u b v er t ing it, d es tro y ing its a m bi tio n to co n s titute a ful l presence . Society never man a g e s fu l l y to be society , b eca u se everything in it is pen etr ated by its l i m i ts , which prevent it fr o m constituting itself as an o bj e c t i v e reality . We must now consider the way in w h i ch this subversion is d is c urs ively con­ structed . As w e have s een , this will require us to determine the forms ass u me d by t h e p resence of the an ta gonist i c a s s u ch .

Equivalence and Difference How does this s u bversion occur? As we have seen, the condi tion for

a full presence is the existence of a c lo se d space where e a ch differ­ ential position is fixed as a specific and i rr epl a cea b l e momen t . So , the first condition for the subversion of that space , for the p revention of closure, is that the speci fici ty of each p o si ti on should be d i s sol v ed I t i s at this point that o u r earlier re m a r k s about the rela tion of equi­ valence acq u i r e all their relevance . Let us give an e xa mp l e In a co l o nized country , the p resence of the dominant power is every d ay made evident through a variety of conten ts: differences of d ress , o f language, of skin colour, of customs . S ince each of these co n ten t s is eq u i val en t to the o th e rs in terms of their common differentiation from the colonized people, it loses its con d i t ion of d i fferen ti a l moment, and acquires the floating ch a ra ct er of an elem ent . T h u s equivalence creates a second meaning w hich , though parasitic on the firs t , subverts it: th e differences cancel one other out insofar as they are used to express s o mething i den tical u nderl yin g them all . The p ro b l e m is to determine the co n te nt of that 'identical something' present in the various terms of the equivalence . I f, t hro u g h the ch ain of equivalence, all t h e differential objective determinations o f its terms have been lost, then i d en ti t y can only b e gi v e n either by a positive de term i nation u n derl y i n g them all , or by th eir common reference to something external. The first of these possibilities is excluded: a common pos i ti v e determination is ex p ressed in a d i re ct way , without requiring a relation o f eq ui v al en ce But the common ex te rn a l reference cannot be to s o m e thin g p o s i t i ve for in th a t case the relation between the two po l es could also be cons tructed in a direct and positive way , an d this would make i mpossible the complete cancellation of differences i m p lied by a rel ati o n of total equivalence . This is the case, for example, in Marx's an al ys is of the relation of equivalence. The non-materiality o f labour as substance o f .

.

,

.

,

128

value is expressed through the equivalence among materially diverse commodities . However, the materiality of commodities and the non-materiality of value are not equivalent to each other . It is because o f this that the use-value/exchange-value distinction can be conceived in terms of d i ffe renti a l and , hence , positive pos i t i ons . But if all the differential features o f an object have become equivalent, it is impossible to express anything positive con ce rn ing that object; this can only imply that through the equivalence something is expressed which the object is not. Thus , a relation of equivalence a bso r bing all 'the positive determinations of the colonizer in opposition to the colonized , does not create a system of positive differential po s i tions between the two , simply because it dissolves all positivity : the colonizer is discursively constructed as the a nti co l on iz ed In o th er words , the identity has come to be purely negative. It is because a negative identity cannot be represented in a direct manner - i . e . , positively that i t can only b e represented indirectly, through an equivalence between its differential moments. Hence the ambiguity penetrating every relation of equivalence: two terms, to be equiva­ lent , must be different - otherwise, there would be a simple identity . On the other hand, the equivalence exists only through the act of subverting the differential character of those terms . This is exactly the point where, as we said earlier, the contingent subverts the necessary by preventing it from fully constituting itself. This non-constitutivity - or contingency - of the system of differ­ en c es is rev ea led in the unfixity which equivalences introduce . The ultimate character of this unfixity, the ultimate precariousness of all difference, will thus show itself in a relation of total equivalence, where the differential positivity of all its terms is dissolved . This is precisely the formula of antagonism , which thus e sta bl i s h es itself as the limit o f the social . We should note that in this formula it is not the case that a pole defined as positivity confronts a negative pole: as all the diffe rential determinations of a pole have dissolved through their negative-equivalential reference to the other pole , each one of them shows exclusively what it is not . Let us insist once again: to be something is always not to be so mething else (to be A implies not to be B) . This banality is not what we are asserting , as it is situated in a logical terrain en ti rely dominated by the principle of contradiction: not being something is simply the logical consequence of being something different; the positivity of being dominates the totality of the discourse. What we affirm is something different: that certain discursive Jorms, through equivalence, annul all positivity oj the object and give a real existence to -

-

.

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

1 29

negativity as such . This impossibility of the real - ne g ati v i t y - has att ained a form of presence . As the social is penet r ated by ne g ati

­

vity - that is, by a nta gonism - it do es not attain the status of transparency , o f fu l l presence, and the o bj ecti vi ty of its identities i s perma n ent l y subverted . From he r e onward, the impossible relation between objectivity and n eg a tivi ty has become constitutive of the social . Ye t the impossibility of the relati o n remains : it is for this rea s o n that the coexistence of its te r ms must be conceived not as an objective rel a t i on of frontiers , but as reciprocal subversion of th ei r co n t e n ts This last point is important: if negati vi ty and o bje c ti v i ty exist only through their reciprocal subversion, this means that neither the conditions of total equivalence nor those of total differential objec­ tivity are ever fully achieved . The condition of total equivalence is that the discursive space s hou ld strictl y divide into two camps . A n t a g onism does no t admit tertium quid. And it is easy to see w h y For if we co ul d differentiate the chain of equivalences with regard to something other than that which it opposes , its terms could not be exclusively defined in a negative manner We wo ul d have adjudi­ cated to it a specific position in a system of relations : that is , we would h a v e endowed it with a new obj ec ti vity The logic of the su b v ersio n of differences would here have found a l i m it But, just as the logic of difference never manages to con s titu t e a fully sutured space, neither does the logic of e q uivalence ever achieve this . The dissolution of the differential character of the social agent's positions through the equivalential condensation, is never complete . If society is not totally possible, neither is it totally i mpos s ib le This allows us to formulate the following conclusion: if society is never transparent to itself b e c ause it is unable to constitute itself as an objective field , neither is antagonism entirely transparen t , as it does not manage totally to dissolve the o bj ec tiv i t y of the social . At this p o in t we must move on to co n sider the s tructuring of political spaces , from the points o f view of the opposed l o gi c s of e quiv a lence and difference . Let us take certain polar examples of situations in which one or the other p r edo minate s An extr eme example of the logic of e q uivalence can be found in m i l lenn a rian movements . Here the world d i vid es , through a system of parata c tical eq u i va l enc es into two camps: pe a s a nt culture representing the iden t i t y of the movement, and urban culture incarnating evil. The second is the negative rev er se of the first . A maximum separation has been reached : no ele ment in the sys tem of equivalences enters into relations other than th ose of opposition to the elements of th e other .

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

­

,

130

sys t e m . There are not one but two societies . And when the millen­ narian rebellion takes place , the assault on the city is fierce , total and indiscriminate: there exis t no discourses capable of establishing differences within an equivalential chain in which each and every one of i ts elements symbolizes evil . (The only alternative is massive emigration towards another region in order to set up the C ity of God, totally isolated from the corruption of the world . ) N o w let u s consider an opposite example: the politics ofDisraeli in the nineteenth cen tury . Disraeli as a novelist had started from his concep tion of the two nations , that is, of a clear-cllt division of society into the two extremes of poverty and wealth . To this we must add the equally clear-cut division of European political space between the 'anciens regimes ' and the ' people ' . (The first half of the nineteenth century, under the combined effects of the industrial revolu tion and the democratic revolution , was the era of the frontal chains of equivalence . ) This was the situation Disraeli wanted to change , and his first objective was to overcome the paratactical division of social space - that i s , the impossibility of constituting soci e ty . His formula was clear: 'one nation ' . For this it was necessary to break the system of equivalences which made up the popular revolutionary subjectivity , stretching from republicanism to a varied ensemble of social and poli tical demands . The method of this rupture: the differential absorption of demands , which segregated them fro m their chains of equivalence in the popular chain and transformed them into objective differences w i thin the system that is , t rans fo rmed them into 'positivities ' and thus displaced the frontier o f antagonism to the periphery of the social . This consti­ tution of a pure s pace of differences would b e a tendential line , which w as later expanded and affirmed with the development of the W elfare S tate . This is the moment of the positivist illusion that the ensemble of the social can be absorbed in the intelligible and ordered fra m ework of a society . W e , thus , see that the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simpli­ fication o f political space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expans i on and increasing complexity. Taking a comparative ex a m ple from linguistics , we could s a y tha t the logic of difference tends to expand the syntagmatic pole of language , the number of posi tions that can enter in to a relation o f combination and hence of continuity with one ano ther; w hile the logic of equivalence expands the paradigmatic pole - that is , the elements that can be substituted for one another - thereby reducing the number of p o s i t i on s which can possibly be combined .

B ey o n d the Positivity oj the

Socia l : A n tagonisms and Hegemony

13 1

U n til now , when we h a ve s poken of a nt a gon i s m , we have ke p t it in the s ingular in o r der to s i m p l i fy our a r g umen t . B u t it is clear that ant a g o n i s m does not necessarily eme r ge at a s i ngle point: any position in a system of differences , insofar as it is negated , ca n become the locus of an a n t a g o nism . Hence, the re are a va ri e t y of possible antagonisms in t h e social , m a ny of them in opposition to each other. The i mp or tan t p ro b l em is that the chains of equivalence will v ary radically ac c o rd in g to which an t a g o ni sm is involved; and that th e y may a ffect and penetrate , in a contradictory way, th e identity of the subject itself. This gives rise to the following con­ clusion: the more unstable the social relations , the less su cce s s ful will be a n y definite system of differences a n d the more the points of a nt a g o n is m w ill p ro l ife r a te . This p roliferation will make m o re difficult the cons t ruction of any cen tr a l i ty and , co n s eq uent l y , the es t a b li s h m e n t of u n i fi ed chains of equi valence. (Thi s is , approxi­ mately , the situation described by G r a m s c i under the term 'organic

crisis ' . ) It would thus seem that o u r p ro b l em may be reduced , in the analysis of the p o liti c al spaces which are the fou n d a tion of an tago ­ nisms , t o one of determining the points of ru p tu re and their possible m o d e s of arti c u l a ti on . But h e re we enter a d an g er o u s terrain in

which s li g ht displacements in our reasoning can lead to radically mis ta ke n conclusions . We shall therefore s t a r t fro m an i mp res­ sionistic description and then a t temp t to determine the co nd i t ions of val i d i t y of that d escript iv e picture . It would appear th at an important di ffer en t ia l characteristic may be established between a d van ce d indu s t rial s o c i e ti es a nd t h e p erip h e r y of the c ap it alis t world: in the fo r me r , th e pro l i ferati o n of points of ant a g o ni s m permits the multi­ p li c at i o n of democratic stru gg l es , but t h es e struggles , giv en their diversity , do not tend to c o n s t i t ut e a ' p eo p l e ' , that is , to enter into equivalence with o n e another and to divide the p ol i tical space into t w o a n t a g on i s t ic fields . On the contrary , in the countries of the Third World, imperialist expl oi t a tio n and the p redominance o f brutal and c e n traliz ed forms of domination tend from the beginning to endow th e p o p ular s tr u g g l e with a centre, with a sing l e an d c l e ar l y defined ene m y . Here the division of the p oli tical space into two fields is present fr o m the outset , but the diversity of democratic s t rug gles is more redu ced . We shall use the term popular subject position to refer to th e p o si ti o n that is c o nstitu te d on the basis of dividing the poli tical space into two antagonistic camps; and democratic subject position t o

refer to th e locus of a clear l y di v i de s oc i ety in that way .

d el i m i ted a n t ag o nis m which

does not

1 32

Now, this descriptive distinction confronts us with a serious difficulty . For if a democratic struggle does not divide the political space into two camps, into two paratactical series of equivalences , it follows that the democratic antagonism occupies a precise location in a s ystem of relations with other elements; that a system of positive relations is established among them; and that there is a lessening of the charge of negativity attaching to the antagonism . From here it is but one s tep to affirm that democratic struggles - feminism, anti­ racism, the gay movement , etc . - are secondary struggles and that the struggle for the 'seizure of power' in the classical sense is the only truly radical one, as it supposes just such a division of the political space into two camps . The difficulty arises , however, from the fact that the no tion of 'political space' has not been given a precise definition in our analysis , so that it has surreptitiously been made to coincide with the empirically given social formation. This is , of course, an illegitimate identification . Any democratic struggle emerges within an ensemble of positions , within a relatively sutured political space formed by a multiplicity of practices that do not exhaust the referential and empirical reality of the agents forming part of them . The relative closure of that space is necessary for the discursive construction of the antagonism , given that the delimita­ tion of a certain interiority is required to construct a totality per­ mitting the division of this space into two camps . In this sense, the autonomy of social movements is something more than a require­ ment for certain struggles to develop without interference: it is a requirement for the antagonism as such to emerge . The political space of the feminist struggle is constituted within the ensemble of p ractices and discourses w hich create the different forms of the subordination of women; the space of the anti-racist struggle, within the overdetermined ensemble of practices constituting racial dis- . crimination . But the antagonisms within each of these relatively autonomized spaces divide them into two camps . This explains the fact that, when social struggles are directed no t against objects constitu ted within their own space but against simple empirical refe rents - for example, men or white people as biological referents - they find themselves in difficulties . For, such struggles ignore the specificity of the political spaces in which the other democratic antagonisms emerge. Take, for example, a discourse which p resents men , qua biological reality, as the enemy . What will h appen to a discourse of this kind when it is necessary to develop antagonisms like the struggle for the freedom of expression or the struggle against the monopolization of economic power, both of

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms atld Hegemony

133

which affect men and women? As to the terrain w h ere those spaces become au ton o m ous from o ne ano th er, in p a rt it is constituted by th e discursive formations w hi c h have ins ti tutional ize d the various forms of subordination, and in part it is the result of the struggl es themselves . Once we have constructed th e theoretical terrain which per m its the radical a n tagonis ti c character of democratic strugg le s to be ex­ pl a i ned, what remains of the specificity of the 'popular' camp? Does n ot the n on-cor r es p on dence b etween ' politi ca l space' and ' so c ie ty ' as an e mp i r i c a l referent annul the sole differenti al criter ion b etw e en ' the p o pu l a r ' and ' t h e democratic' ? The answer is that t he po l i t ic a l space of the p o p ula r emerges in those situations where, th rou g h a ch ai n of democratic equivalences , a political lo gi c tends to bri d ge the gap between politi c al space and society as an e m p i ri c al referent . Con­ ceived in this manner , popular struggles only oc c ur in the case of relations of extreme e x teri or it y between the domi n an t groups and the r est of the co m muni t y . In the case of m illenarianis m , to w hi ch we previously referred , th e poi nt is ev ident : be tw een the peasa n t comm unity and the dominant urban community the r e are pra cti cally no elements in common; and, in this sense, all the features o f urb a n culture can be s y m b ol s of the anti-community . If we tu m to the c ycle of e xp a nsion and constitution of popular spaces in Western E u ro p e , we notice that all such cases h ave coin cided w i th th e p h e nomenon of extern a l i t y or externalization of power . The begin­ n in g s of p op u l ist pa trio tis m in France appeared during the Hund red Years War, th a t is, in the m i d s t of a division of the po l iti cal space r e s u l ti ng from something so extern al as the presence of a foreign power . The symbolic construction of a national s pace through the a c t i on of a ple beian figu re l i ke Joan of Arc is, in Western Europe, one of the first moments of emergence of the ' peop le ' as a historical agent. In the case of t h e ancien regime and the French Revolution, the frontier of the popular has become an internal frontier, and its condition is the sepa ra tion an d p arasi tism of the nob i l i ty and the monarchy vis-a-vis the rest of the nation . But, through the pro ce s s we have poin ted out, in the countries of advanced capi t a li s m since the middle of the nineteenth century , the multi p l ication and ' u n even development' of democratic positions h ave i n cre asing ly diluted their simple and a u t o m at ic unit y around a p o pular pole. Partly because of their very success , dem o crati c s t ruggles tend less and less to be unified as 'popular struggles' . The conditions of po litical strug gle in mature ca p i ta li sm are in creasingly distant from the nineteenth­ century model of a clear-cut ' po li ti cs of frontiers ' and t end to ad op t a ­

134

new pattern which we will attempt to analyse in the next chapter. The p roduc tion of ' frontier effects' - which are the condition of ex p ansi on o f the negativity pertaining to a n tagon i sm s - ceases thus to be g r o u nded upon an evident and given separation , in a referential framework acq ui red once and for all . The production of this frame­ w o r k the constitution of the very identities which will have to confront one another antagonistically , becomes now the first oj political problems. This widens im mensely the field of articulatory p r a c ti ces , and transforms any frontier in to something essentially a m big u ous and unstable, subject to constant displacements . Having reached this poin t , we have all th e necessary theoretical elements to determine the specificity of the concept of hegemony. ,

Hegemony

W e must now see how our different theoretical categories link up to

produce the concept o f ' hegemony ' . The general field of the

e mergence of hegemony is that of articulatory practices , that is, a fi el d where the ' elements' have not crystallized into 'moments ' . In a closed s y s tem of relational identities , in which the meaning of each moment is absolutely fixed , there is no place whatsoever for a heg e m o ni c practice . A fully successful system of differences , which excluded any floating signifier, would not make possible any articu­ lation; the p rinciple of repetition would dominate every practice within this system and there would be nothing to hegemonize. It is because hegemony supposes the incomplete and open character of the social , that it can take place only in a field dominated by arti­ c ul a t o r y practices . This , however , immediately poses the problem: who is the articu­ lating subject? We have already seen the answer that the M arxism of the Third International gave to this question : fro m Lenin to Gramsci it maintained with all the nuances and differences we analysed earlier - that the ultimate core of a hegemonic force consists of a fundamental class . T he difference between hegemonic and hege­ monized forces is posed as an ontological difference between the plan e s of constitution of each of them . Hegemonic relations are sy n tactic relations founded upon morp hological categories which precede them . But it is clear tha t this cannot be our answer, for it is pr e c i s ely that differentiation of planes which all our previous analysis has attempted to dissolve . In point o f fact, we are once again confronted with the interiority/exteriority alternative, and with the two equally ess en ti ali st solutions which we would face if we -

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

135

ac ce pt ed it as e x c lus i v e . The hegem o n i c subject , as the subject of any a rticulatory p ractice , must be partiallly exterior to w h at it arti­ c u la tes - o therwise, there would not be any a r ti cu l a ti on at all. On the other hand, however, such ex te ri o rit y cannot be c o n c e i ve d as that e xi s t i n g between two d i ffe re n t ontological levels . Conse­ q u en t ly it would seem that the solution is to reintroduce our dis­ tinction between discourse and g en e r a l field o f discursivity : in that case , both th e h e g e mo ni c force and the ensemble of hegemonized elements would constitute themselves on the same p l a n e t he g en er a l field of discursivity - w h ile t he ex te ri o ri ty would be that c o r respon d in g to different discursive formations . No doubt this is so , but it must be further specified that thi s ex teri o rity cannot co r re s po nd to two fully constitu ted discursive formations . For, what characterizes a discursive formation is the regularity in dis­ p er sio n , and if that e x ter io ri ty were a r eg ula r feature in the re l a t i on between the two formations, it would become a n ew difference and the two formations would not, s t ri c tl y speaking , be external to e a ch other. (And with this , once again , the possibility of an y articulation would disappea r . ) Hence , if the ext e rio ri t y s u p p o s e d by the ar ticu l a to r y p rac t ice is lo ca ted in the general field o f discursivity, it cannot be tha t co rresponding to t w o systems of fully cons tituted d i ffe r ence s It must therefore be the exteriority e x i s ting between subj ect positions located within ce rtai n discursive fo r ma t io n s and 'elements' w hich have no precise discursive articulation . It is this am b i g ui t y which makes possible articulation as a practice instituting nodal p o i n t s w h i ch pa rti a lly fix the m e an i n g of the s o ci al in an organized s y st em of differences . We m u s t now consider t h e s pe c ifi ci t y of the hegemonic p r a c ti ce within the general field of a rt i cu l a t ory practices . Let us s t a r t from two si t u at i o n s which we wo u l d not characterize as h e ge m o nic arti­ cu l ation s . At one extreme we could refer, as an example , to a r eo r g an i z atio n of an e n s e mb le of b ureaucratic administrative fu nc­ t ion s a cc o rdi n g to criteria of effi ciency or rationality. Here are present central elements of any articulatory practice: c on s t i tu t ion of an organized system of differences - of moments , therefore ­ s ta r t i n g fr o m d i sa ggr ega ted and d is p e r se d elements . And here , howeve r , w e would n o t speak of hegemony . The reason i s t h a t in order to s p ea k of hegemon y , the a r t i cu l a tory moment is not suf­ ficien t . I t is also n e cess ar y th a t th e ar t i c ula t io n s hou l d t a ke p l a ce through a co n fro n tati on with a n t a gon i s ti c a rti cula t o ry pr acti c es in other w ord s that hegemony should emerge in a field c ri s s -c ro s se d by a n ta g o n is ms and therefore suppose phenomena of equivalence ,

-

.

,

136

and frontier effects . But, conversely , not every antagonism supposes he ge m o nic pr ac t i c es In the case of millennarianism, for example, we have an a ntag oni sm in its most pure form, and yet there is no he g e mo n y because there is no articulation of floating elements:- the distance between t he two communities is something immediately given and acquired from the beginning , and it does not suppose any articu l at o ry construction. The chains of equivalence do not con­ struct the communitarian space; rather, they operate on pre-existing communitarian spaces . Thus , the two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the p resence of antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them . Only the presence of a vast area of fl o ati n g elements and the poss i b il it y of their articulation to opposite camps - which implies a constant redefinition of the latter - is what constitutes the terrain permitting us to define a practice as hegemonic. Without equivalence and without frontiers, it i s impossible to speak strictly of hegemony . A t this point i t i s clear how w e may recover the basic concepts of Gramscian analysis , although it will be necessary to radicalize them in a direction tha t leads us beyond Gramsci . A co njunc ture where .

there is a g en er a lize d weakening of the relational system defining the i de nt i t i e s of a g i v e n so ci a l o r po l i ti ca l space , and where , as a result there is a proliferation of flo a ti n g elements , is what we will call following Gramsci , a conjuncture of organic crisis . It doe s not emerge fr o m a s i n g le poi nt , but it is the result of an ov e rde te r m inati on of circumstances ; and it reveals itself not only in a proliferation of a n t a g o n i s m s but a l s o in a g en e ra l i zed crisis of social identites . A social a nd po l i tica l s p ace relatively unified through the instituting of nodal p o i n t s and the cons titution o f tendentially re l a t ion al identities , is what Gramsci called a h istorical bloc. The type of link joining the different elements of the historical bloc - not unity in any form of hi s to r ical a p rior i but regu l a rit y in dispersion - coincides with our concept of discursive formation . Insofar as we consider the historical bloc fro m the point of view of the a nt a g onist i c terrain in which it is ,

cons tituted , we w il l call it hegemonicformation .

Finally , inasmuch as the heg e moni c formation implies a pheno­

menon of frontiers , the concept of war oj position r eve al s its full sig n i fican ce Through this concept Gramsci brings about two im­ .

portant theoretical effects . The first is to confirm the impossibility of a n y closure of the social: since the frontier is internal to the social, it is i m possib l e to subsume the social formation as an e mpi ri cal re ferent under the i nt el li gi b l e forms of a society. Every 'society' constitutes its own fo r m s of rationality and intelligibility by dividing itself; that

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and He�emony

137

is , by expelling outside itself any su rpltls o f me a n i ng s u b v ertin g i t . But, on the other hand, i nso fa r as that frontier varies w i t h the fluctuatio n s in the 'war of position ' , the id en ti t y of the actors in confrontation al so c h ange s and i t is therefore impossible to fmd in t he m that final anchorage not offered to us b y an y sutured totality . E a r l i e r we said that the concept of war of position led to a demilitari­ z a t i o n of war; it a c tu ally d o es s o me t hin g more: it introduces a radical a m bigui t y into the social which prevents i t fr o m b e i ng fixed in any tran s cenden tal signified . This is, h o w e v e r , the p o i nt at w h i c h the concept of war of position d is p la y s its limits . War ot po s i t ion supposes the d i v i s i on of the social space into two ca m p s and p res ent s the hegemonic articulation as a lo g i c of m o b i lit y of the fro n t i er s e p a r a tin g the m . H o w e v e r , it is evident that this assumption is illegitimate: the existence of two cam p s may in some c as es be an eJfect of the h e g emo n ic articulation but not its a p riori condition - for, if it were , the te rr a i n in which the hegemo n i c articula tion ope ra ted would no t itself be th e p ro d u c t of that ar t ic u la t io n The Gra m s cian war of p osition supposes the type of d i v i si o n of the p o liti ca l space w h ich earlier we characterized as sp e c i fi c to popular identities . I ts advance over the nineteenth-century conception of the ' people' co n si s t s in the fact that for Gramsci such a p o p u l a r identity is no longer something simply given, but has to be constructed - hence the articulatory logic of hegemony; there still r e m a ins however, from the old conception, the idea th a t such a cons truction always operates on the basis of exp andin g the frontier within a dichotomi­ cally divided political s pa ce This is the p oin t where the Gramscian view becomes unacceptable . As we p oin t e d out earlier, the p ro l i feration of these political spaces , a nd th e co m pl exi t y and difficulty of their ar ticulation , are a central characteristic of the a dv an ced capitalist social form a tion s We will thus retain from the Gramscian view the logic of a r ti cul a ti on and the political cen t r al i ty of the fr o n t ie r effects , but we will el i min a t e the assumption of a single political space as the necessary fra m e wor k for those ph eno m en a to arise . We will therefore speak of democratic s t r uggle s where these imply a p l u r al i t y of p o li ti cal spaces , and of popular s t r u ggles where certain discourses tendentially c o n s t r uc t the division of a s i n gl e p oli ti c al space in two opposed fields . But it is clear that the funda­ mental concept is that of 'democratic struggle' , and that popular s t r u g g le s are m e r e l y specific co nj un c t u r e s r e s u l t i n g from the multi­ p l i cat i o n of e q u i val en c e effects among the d e m o c r a t i c stru ggles . I t is clear fr o m the a bo ve that we have mo ved away from two key aspects of Gramsci's tho u g h t : (a) his insistence that hegemonic ,

.

,

.

­

.

138 subj ects are necessarily constituted on the plane of the fundamental classes ; and (b) his postulate tha t , with the exce p tion of interregna co ns t i tu t e d by o r g an ic crises , every social formation s tructures itself around a single h e ge m o n ic centre . As we pointed out earlier, th e s e are the two l as t elements of esse n ti al i s m remaining in Gramscian thought . B u t , as a r es u lt o f a b a n d on ing the m , we must now confront two successive series of p ro b lem s that did not arise for Gramsci . The first problem concerns the sepa r ati o n of p lan es , the external m om e n t which hegemony , like any articulatory relation, supposes. As we have seen , this does not present any p r o b lems for Gramsci , as the fi na l class core of a ' collective will' is not, i n his analysis , the res ult of hegemonic a r ti cu l a tions But how do things s tand once the ontological privilege of this final core has been dissolved? If, in the case of a successful hegemony, the articulatory practices have m a n a ge d t o construct a s truc t u r al system of di ffe r e nce s , of rela t io n al identi ties, does n o t the external character of the hegemonic force also d i s a p p e a r ? Does it not beco me a new difference within the historical b l o c ? The answer must un d oubted l y be affirmativ e . A s i t ua ti on in which a s yst e m of differences had been so welded to ge t he r would imply the end of the h ege m o n i c form of po li ti cs . In that case there would be relations of subordination or power, but not, strictly s pe a k i ng h e ge m on i c relations . For, with the d i sappea r a n ce of the s e p a ra ti o n of p l a n es , of t he momen t of exterio rity , the field of articulatory practices would also have disappeared. The h egemonic dimension o f politics o n l y e x p and s as the open, non-sutured character of th e social increases . In a medieval peasant community the area o p e n to d i fferential articulations is minimal and , thus , there are no h e g e m o ni c forms of articulation: there is an a b ru p t t ran s i tion fr o m repeti t i v e p ractices within a closed system of differences to fr o nt a l and absolute e q uiv al en ces when the community finds itself threa tened . This is why the hegemonic form of pol i t ics only beco mes dominant a t the beginning o f modern times , when the reproduction of the different social areas t akes p l a c e in permanently changing co ndi t i o n s which c o n s t antly r e q u ire the construction of n e w systems of d i fferences . Hence the area of articulatory practices is i mmensely b r o ad e n e d Thus the conditions and the p o ss i b i l ity of a pure fixing o f differences recede; every social identity becomes the m e e t i n g p o i n t for a multiplicity of articulatory p ractices , many of them an t a go nis tic In these circumstances , it is not p o ss ib le to arrive at a c o m p l et e in t eri ori z a ti o n t h a t t o t al l y bridges the gap between articulated a n d articulator. B u t , it is important to emphasize, neither -

.

,

.

.

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

139

is it possible for the identity of the articulating force to remain separate and unchanged . Both are subjected to a constant process of subversion and redefini tion . This is so much the case that not even a system o f equivalences is immune to the danger of bein g trans­ formed into a new differen ce: it is known how the frontal opposition of many grou p s to a sys tem can cease to be exterior to it and be c o m e simpl y a con tradictory but internal location within that system that is , another difference . A hegemonic formation also embr.aces what op poses i t , insofa r as the opposing force accepts the system of basic articulations o f that formation as something it negates , bu t the place c1 the negation is defined by the internal parameters of the formation itself. S o , the theoretical determination of the conditions of extinction o f the hegemonic form of politics , also explains the reasons for the constant expansion of this form in modern times . The second problem refers to the singleness of the hegemonic cen tre . Once we reject the ontological plane, which wo uld inscribe hegemony as centre of the social and hence as its essence, it is evidently not possible to maintain the idea of the singleness of the nodal hegemonic poin t . Hegemony is, quite simply , a political type oj relation , ajorm, if one so wishes , of politics; but not a determinable location within a topography o f the social . In a given social forma­ tio n , there can be a variety of hegemonic nodal points . Eviden tly some of them may be highly overdetermined : they may constitute points o f condensation of a number of social relations and , thus , becom e the focal poi nt o f a m ultiplicity of totalizing effects . But inso far as the social is an infinitude not reducible to any underlyin g unitary p rinciple, the mere idea of a centre of the s o cial h a s no meaning at all . Once the s tatus of the concept of hegemony and the characteristic plurality o f the social has been redefined in t hese terms, we must ask ourselves about t h e fo rms of relation existing between the m . This i rreducible plurality of the social has frequently been conceived as an autonomization of spheres and forms o f struggle. This requires that we b riefly analyse some of the problems related to the concept of 'autono m y ' . In recent years there has been consider­ able debate concerning , for example , the concept o f ' relati ve autonomy of the S tate' , 4 1 but it has mostly been posed in terms that have led it into a dead end . In general , such attempts to explain the ' relative autonom y of the State' were made in a framework that accepted the assumption of a sutu red society for exam p le , through determination in the last instance by the econom y - and so the p ro b lem of relative a u tono m y , be it of the S tate or of any other entity , became insoluble . For , either the structural framework con-

-

140

stituted by the basic determinations of society explains not only the limits of autonomy but also the nature of the autonomous entity in w hich case that entity is another structural determination of the sys tem and the concept of 'autonomy' is redundant; or else the autonomous entity is not determined by the system , in which case it is necessary to explain where it is constituted, and the premise of a sutured society would also have to be discarded . It is precisely the wish to combine this premise with a concept of autonomy incon­ sistent with it, that has marred most contemporary Marxist debate on the State - the work of Poulantzas in particular. If, however, we reno unce the hypothesis of a final closure of the social, it is necessary to s tart fro m a plurality of political and social spaces which do not refer to any ultimate unitarian basis . Plurality is not the phenomenon to be explained, but the starting point of the analysis . But if, as we have seen, the identity of each of these spaces is always precarious , it is no t possible simply to affirm the equation between autonomy and dispersion . Neither total autonomy nor total subordination is, consequentl y , a plausible solution. This clearly indicates that the pro blem cannot be resolved in the terrain of a stable system of differences; that both autonomy and subordination - and their different degrees of relativity - are concepts which only acquire their meaning in the field of articulatory practices and , insofar as these operate in political fields crisscrossed by antagonisms , of hegemonic practices . Articulatory practices take place not only with in given social and political spaces , but between them . The autonomy of the State as a whole - assuming for a moment that we can speak of it as a unity - depends on the construction of a political space which can only be the result of hegemonic articulations . And something similar can be said for the degree of unity and autonomy existing among the different branches and apparatuses of the State. That is, the autonomization of certain spheres is not the necessary s tructural effect of anything , but rather the result of p recise articu­ latory practices constructing that autonomy . Autonomy, Jar Jrom being incompatible with hegemony, is aJonn oj hegemonic construction. Something similar can be said for the other important use made of the concept of autonomy in recent years: autonomy linked to the pluralism required by the expansion of the new social movements . Here we are in the same situation . If the identity of the subjects o r social forces that become autonomous was constituted once and for all, the problem would be posed only in terms of autonomy . But if these identities depend on certain precise social and political condi­ tions of existence, autonomy itself can only be defended and

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony 14 1 expanded in terms of a wider hegemonic struggle. The fem i n is t or ecological political subjects, for example, are u p to a certain point, like any other social identity, floa t in g si g nifiers and i t is a d ange rous illusion to think that they are assured once a n d for a l l , that the terrain which hils c on s t it u t e d their discursive conditions of em e r gence cannot be s u b v e rted . The question of a hegemony which would come to threaten the autonomy of certain movements is , therefore, a ba d l y posed pro b le m . S t rict l y speaking , this incompatibility would only exist if the social movements were monads , disconnected one from another; but if the identity of each m o v e m en t can never b e acquired once and for all , then it cannot be indifferent to what takes place outside i t . That, in certain circumstances, the class political subjectivity of white workers in Britain is overdetermined by racist or anti-racist attitudes , is evidently i m po rta n t for the struggle of the immigrant workers . This will bear u p on certain practices of the trade union movement, which will in turn have consequences in a number o f aspects of State policy and ultimately rebound upon the political identity of the immigrant workers themselves . Here there dearly is a hegemonic struggle, i ns ofa r as the articulation between the trade union militancy of white workers an d racism or an ti r a ci s m is not defined from the beginning; but the forms of this s truggle undertaken by anti-racist movements will in part pass thro ug h the autonomization of certain activities and o rg ani za tiona l forms , partly th ro u g h systems of alliances with other forces , and p a r tl y th rou gh the construction of systems of eq uiv al e nce among contents of the different movements . For, nothing can consolidate anti-racist strug­ gles m o re than the construction of stable forms of overdetermina­ tion among such contents as anti-racism , anti-sexism and ant i cap i ta lis m which , left to themselves , do not necessarily tend to converge . Once a g ai n , autonomy is not opposed to hegemony , but is a n internal moment of a wider hegemonic operation . (Evi d en t ly this ope ra t io n does not nece s s a r ily pass through the ' party ' form , nor th ro u g h a s in gle institutional form, nor through any other type of a priori a rra ng e m en t . ) I f hegemony i s a type oj political relation and not a to p ogr ap hi ca l concept , i t is dear that it cannot either be conceived as an irradiation of effects from a privileged point . In this sense, we could say that h e gemo n y i s b a s i ca l ly m eto ny mic al : its e ffects always emerge fro m a surplus of m e aning which results from an operation of di sp l a c e m ent (For example, a trade union or a religious o rga n i z ati on ma y take on o r g a n i z a tion al functions in a community, which go b e yo n d the traditional p ractices ascribed to them , and which are combated and ,

-

­

,

.

1 42

resisted by op p o s in g fo rces ) This moment of dislocation is essenti al to any h e ge moni c p r a ctice : we h a ve w i tnessed it from the very e mergence of the concept in Russian S o cial D e m o c ra cy , under the form of the e x t eri o rity of cl a s s identity to t h e h e g e m oni c tasks; an d our conclusion is that no social identity is ever tot al ly acquired - a fact which gives the articulatory-hegemonic moment the full me a s u r e of its cent r a li ty . The condition of this centrality is , there­ fore, the collapse of a clear demarcation line b e t w een the internal and the external, b etw ee n t h e co n ti ng en t and the necessary . But this leads to an i n es ca p a b l e conclusion: no he g e mo ni c l o g i c can account for t he t o t a l i t y of the social and constitute its centre , for in that case a new suture would have been p ro d u c e d and the very concep t o f h ege m o n y would have elim inated itself. The openness of the social i s , thus , the p r e co n d i ti o n of e v e ry h eg e mo n i c practice . Now , this necess a ri l y leads to a second co n c l u s i o n : t h e h e g e m oni c formation, as we have conceived it, cannot be refe rred to the s pe ci fi c l og i c of a s in gl e social force . Every his t o ri ca l bloc - or hegemonic forma­ tion - is constructed th rou g h regul a ri t y in di s p ers i o n , and this dis p e rs io n includes a p ro li fe r a ti on of very diverse elements : systems of differences wh ich partially de fin e relational identities ; chains of equivalences which s u b v e r t the latter but which can be trans­ fo rm ist ica ll y recovered insofar as th e place of o pp o si tion itself becom es regular and , in that way, co n s t i tu t es a new difference; fo rm s of overdetermination which concentrate either power, or the different forms of resistance to it; and s o fo r th Th e i m port an t point is that every form of power is constructed in a p ra g m a t i c way and internally to the social , through the o pp os ed logics of equivalence and difference; power is never foundational. The p ro b le m of power canno t , t h e r e for e , be posed in t er m s of the search for the class or the d o minan t sector which con s t i tu te s the centre of a h ege m o n i c forma­ tion , given that, by de fini tio n , such a centre will a l w a y s elude us . But it is e q u a lly wrong to propose as an alternative, e i th e r plur al ism or the to t a l diffusion of power w i thi n the social , as this would blind the a na l y s i s to the p r es en ce of nodal poin ts a n d to the pa r tia l con­ cen t r a tion s of p o w e r e x i stin g in every concrete social formation . This is the point at whi c h many of t h e concepts of classical a n a lys i s - 'centre ' , p owe r au ton o m y , etc . - can be rein tro­ duced , i f their s tatu s is red e fi ned : all of t h e m are contingent social logics w h i c h as such, acquire their m e a nin g in precise con­ junct u ral and relational contexts , where t he y will al ways be limited by other - fr e q u en t ly co n t ra d i cto ry - l ogi cs ; but none of them has a b s o l u t e va lid i t y , in the sense of d e fi n i ng a s pace or structural .

.

'

,

' ,

'

'

Beyond the Positivity oj the

Social:

Antagonisms and Hegemony 143

moment which could n o t in its tum be subverted . It is , therefore, i m p ossi b l e to arrive at a theor y of the social on the basis of a bso l u t izi n g any of those con cepts . If soci e ty is not s utured by any single unitary a n d positive logic, our understanding o f i t cannot p ro v i d e that l o g i c . A 's cie n t i fi c ' approach attempting to deter m ine the 'essence' o f the social w o u ld , in actual fa c t , be the h e i g ht of u to p i a ni s m . O n e i m p o r ta n t po i n t before we c on c lud e . In the fo r eg o i ng arg u m ent we spoke of ' s o ci a l formation' as an e m p i r i cal referent, and o f 'h e g em oni c formation' as a n a rt i cu l at ed to tal i t y of dif­ fe re n c e s . The s a m e term - ' formation' - is use d , the refore , in two to t a l l y different senses , and we must attempt to e l i m i n at e the res ulting ambigu i ty . The problem in i ts more gen eral fo rm may be formulated as follows: i f an ensemble of e mpir i ca l ly given agents (in the case of a social for ma t i o n ) or an ensemble of d i s c u rs i ve moments (in the case of a hegemonic fo r m at i o n ) are included i n the totality i m p lie d by the no tion o f formation , it is because th ro u gh th at to tali ty it is p ossibl e to di s t i n g u is h th e m w i th r e g a r d to som e th i n g external to the latter. Thus , i t is on t h e basis of its own limits tha t a formati o n is s h a p ed as a tot a li ty . If we po s e t h e pro bl e m of the c o ns tru c tion of th e se lim i ts in the case o f a h ege m o n i c formation , we will have to d istin gui sh two levels: that r el at e d to the a b st ra c t conditions of possibility of every ' fo r m a ti o n' , and that related to the specific difference w h ic h the l ogic of h ege mo n y introduces into i t . Let us be g i n from the i n te r n a l space of a fo r m a ti on as a r el a tiv e l y stable system of differences . It is c l e a r that the lo gi c o f difference is n o t sufficient to construct limits , for if it were exclusively do mi n an t , what lay be y o nd it could o nl y be other differences , a n d th e reg u lar i t y of th e se would transform them into a part of t he formation itself. If w e remain in the fi e l d of differences , we remain in the field of an infini t u d e which makes i t i m po s s i b l e to think any fron t ier and which , c on se qu en tl y , dissolves the concept of ' for ma t io n' . That i s , limits o n l y ex is t insofar as a s y s t em a ti c ensemble o f differen ces can be cut out as totality with r eg a r d to s o m e th i n g be y ond the m , and it is only t h rou g h t h i s c u tti n g o u t that the t o ta l ity cons titutes itself as formation . If, from what has been said , it is clear that th a t b ey on d c a n no t c on s i s t i n so m e thi n g p o si ti ve - in a new d i ffer e n ce - then the only possibility i s that it will c o ns i s t in s om et h ing ne gat i ve . But we alr e ad y k no w th a t th e lo g i c of equivalence is the one that intro­ d uc e s neg a tiv it y into the field of the social . T h i s i mp l i es that a fo rma t i o n manages to signify itself ( t ha t i s , to cons titu te itself as such) o nl y by t ran sfo r m in g the limits into frontiers , by c o ns t i tu ti n g a

144

chain of equivalences which constructs what is beyond the limits as that which it ;s not. It is only through negativity , division and antagonism that a formation can constitute itself as a totalizing horizon. The logic of equivalence, however, is merely the most abstract and general condition of exis tence of every formation. In order to be able to speak of hegemonic formation, we have to introduce another condition provided by our previous analysis: namely, that con­ tinuous redefinition of the social and political spaces and those constant processes o f displacement of the limits constructing social division , which are proper to contemporary societies . It is only under these conditions that the totalities shaped through the logic of equivalence acquire a hegemonic character. But this would seem to imply that , insofar as this precariousness tends to make unstable the internal frontiers of the social , the category of formation itself is threatened . And this is exactly what occurs: if every frontier disappears , this does not simply mean that the formation is more difficult to recognize. As the totality is not a datum but a con­ struction , when there is a breaking of its constitutive chains of equivalence , the totality does something more than conceal itself: it dissolves . It follows from this that the term 'social formation' , when used to designate a referent, is meaningless . Social agents do not, as referents , constitute any formation . If the term 'social formation' attempts , for example , in an apparently neutral way , to designate the social agents living in a given territory , the problem is immediately posed of the limits of that territory. And here it is necessary to defme political boundaries - that is, configurations constituted at a level different from that of the simple referential entity of the agents . Here there are two options: either the political limits are considered as a simple external datum in which case terms such as 'French social formation ' or 'English social formation' designate hardly more than 'France' or 'England' , and the term 'formation' is clearly excessive; or else the agents are reintegrated into the various formations consti­ tuting them and in that case there is no reason w hy these should coincide with national frontiers . Certain articulatory practices will make them coincide with the limits of the formation as such . But in either case this is an open process which will depend on the multiple hegemonic articulations shaping a given space, and operating within it at the same time. Through this chapter we have attempted to show, at several points in our argument, the openness and indeterminacy of the -

-

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony

1 45

social, which gives a primary and founding character to n e gativity and antagonism , and assures the e x ist ence of articulatory and hegemonic practices . We m us t now once again take up the line of our poli t i c al argument of the first two ch apters and show how the indeterminacy of the social and the articulatory logic which follows from it, allows t h e question of t he relation between hegemony and democracy to be posed in new terms . ,

Notes to Chapter 3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

C. Taylor, Hegel , Ca mb r idge 1 975 , p. 23 and, in gen e ral , chapter I . Holderiin , Hyperion Fragment, quoted in C . Taylor, p . 35. A . Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, Hildesheim 1 964 (first edition L . Althusser , For Marx, London 1 %9, p. 203 .

1 840) .

Ibid . , p. 206 (footnote) . 6. As can be observed, our critique coincides on some po i n ts with that of the Hindess and Hirst school in England . We do , however, have some fundamental disagreements with their approach, to which we will refer later in the text. 7 . E . Balibar, 'Sur la dialectique historique. (Q uelques remarques critiques a propos d e Ure Ie Cap ita f) ' , in Cinq etudes du mattrialisme historique, Paris 1 984 . 8. B . H i ndes s and P . Hirst, Pre-cap italist Modes oj Production , London 1 975; B .

Hindess and P . Hirst, Mode oj Production and Social Fonnation , London 1 977 ; A . Cutler , B . Hindess, P. Hirst and A. Hus se i n , Marx's Cap i ta l and Capitalism Today, London 1 977, 2 vols. 9. C u tler et aI . , vol . I , p . 222. 1 0 . P. Hirst and P. W o ole y , Social Relations and Human Attributes, London 1982, p .

134. 1 1 . M. Foucault, Archaeology oj Knowledge, London 1 972, pp . 3 1 -39. 12. E . B enven is t e Problems in General Lingu istics M iami 197 1 , pp. 47-8. 1 3 . In an insightful study on the limits of Foucault's archaeological met hod B . Brown and M . Cousins (,The linguistic fault: the case o f Foucault's archaeology ' , Economy and Society , August 1980, vol. 9, n o . 3 ) state: '(Foucault) makes n o distri­ ,

,

,

bution of phenomena into two classes of being, Discourse and the Non-Discu rsive. For him the q u est io n is always the identity of part i cular discursive formations . What falls outs i de a part i cular discursive formation merely falls outside it. It does not thereby join the ranks of a general form of bein g , the N on-Discursive . ' This is undoubtedly true regarding a possible ' distribution of phenomena into two classes of bei n g ' , that is, with reg ard to a discourse tha t would establish regional divisions w it h in a totality . B u t this does not eliminate the problem concerning the fo nn of conceiving the discursive. The acceptance of no n-d i scursi v e entities does not merely have a topographical relevance; it also modifies the concep t of discourse . 14. M . Foucault, p p . 53-4. H . L . D re y fus and P. Rabinow , in their book on Foucault (Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Henn etleutics, Chicago 1 982, pp. 65-6) , realize the potential i m p o r ta n ce of this passage, but reject it rather hastily in favour of a conception of institutions as 'non-discursive ' . 1 5 . What is strictly implied here, is t h e very concept of ' formation ' . The p roblem can be formulated , in i t s most general form, as follows: if what characterizes a fo rma ti o n is regularity in dispers i on , how then is it possible to determine the limits of

1 46 that formation ? Let us s u ppose that there is a discursive en tit y or difference which is

exterior to the formation , but which is absolutely re g ul a r in this exteriority . If the sole

cri terion a t stake is dis p ersi on , how is it p o ss ible to establish the 'exteriority' of that d i fference' The first q u e s t i o n to be decided m u s t , in that case , be whether or not the

det er m i nat i on of the l imits depend s upon a concept o f ' formation' wh i ch super­

i m p oses itsel f on the a r chaeolog ic a l fact . If we accept the first possibility , we a re si m p l y in t roduc in g an en tity of the same type as those which had been methodo­

logically excluded at the b eg in n in g - 'oeuvre' , ' t radit i o n ' , et cetera. If we accept the second possibility , it is clear t h a t within the a rchaeological material itself, there m u s t exist certain l o g i cs which produce effects of totality capable of const ructing the l i m its , a n d thus of con s t i tu t i ng the form atio n . As we will argue further on in the text , this is t h e role fulfilled by the logics of equi valence. 1 6 . S tarting from phenomenolog y , Merleau-Ponty conceived the project of an existential phenomenology as the attempt to overcome the dualism between ' i n-i ts e l f and ' for-itsel f , and to set up a terrain w hich would allow the overcoming of oppo­ si tions considered insurmountable by a philosophy such as that of Sartre. The phmo­ menon is th u s conceived as the po i n t where the link is establis hed between ' th e thing'

and 'the mind ' , a n d perception as a m o re p ri m a ry founding level than the Cogito . The

limits of the co n cept i o n o f meaning inherent in every phenomenology , insofar as it is b a sed on t h e irreducibility of ' the lived ' , must not make us forget that in some of its

for m u l a t i on s - and part i cu l a r ly in the work of Merleau-Ponty - we find some of the most radical attempts to break with the essentialism inherent in e v e r y form of d u alis m .

1 7 . L . W itt g enst e i n , Philosophical Itl vestigations, Oxford 1 983, p. 3 . 1 8 . Ibid . , p . S . 1 9 . T o the obje ct i on o f a certain type of M arxis m , which argues that su ch a v i ew of the pri m a c y of the discursive would ca ll ' materialism' into question , w e would simply

suggest a g l i m pse through the texts o f M ar x . An d in particular Cap ital: not only the fa mous passage about the bee and the architect a t the beginning of the chapter on the

labour proces s , but also the whole analysis of the value fo rm, where the very logic of

the process of co m m od i t y p roduction - the foundation of capi t a l is t accumu­ lation - is presented as a strictly s o cial logi c which only imposes i t sel f through establishing a relation of eq u ival en ce a mong materially distinct objects . From the first page it is stated - as a comment on the assertion of Barbon: ' "Things have an intrinsik vertue" (t h is is Barbon's special term fo r u se- value) "which in all

places have the same vertue; as the loads to ne to attract iron" (op . cit . p . 6) . The magnet's property of attracting iron only became useful once it had led to the dis c o ver y of magnetic polari t y . '

20. W ith this 'exterior' we are not reintroducing the category of the extra­ discursive . The exterior is cons tituted by other discourses . It is the discursive nature of this exterior w hich creates the conditions of vulnerability of every discourse, as nothin g finally p ro tec ts it against the deformation and destabilization of its system of di ffe ren ce s b y other discursive articulations which act from outside i t . 2 1 . J . Derrida, Writing a n d Dijferetlce, London 1 978, p . 280. 22 . A n u m be r of recent works have extended this conception concern ing the i m p o s s ibil i ty of s ut u r a tio n and, therefore, of the ultimate internal in te l l ig i bi lity of every rel ational system, to the very system traditionally presented as a model of a pure structural l og i c : that is , lan gu age . F . Gadet and M. Pecheux , for example, have p oi n t e d out concerning Saussure: ' Regarding the theories which isolate the poetic as a location of s p e ci a l effects, from language as a w hole , the work of Sa us s ure . . makes the poetic a s l i p pi n g inherent to every language: what Saussure has es tabl i s h ed is not a

Beyond the Positivity oj the Social: Antagonisms and Hegemony 1 4 7 property o f Satumian ve rse , nor even o f poetry , but a property o f l an g u a g e itself' (La langue introu vable, Paris 1 98 1 , p. 57) . C f. F . G ade t , ' La double faille ' , Acres du Colloque de Sociololinguistique de Ro u en , 1 978; e. N o rm and, ' L'arbitraire du signe co mme phcnomene de deplacemen t ' , Diaiectiques, 1 972, no. 1 -2; J . e . M i l n e r , L 'amcur de ia langue, Paris 1 978.

23 . C f. what we said before reg ard in g B en v eni s t e' s c ri t ique of S a us sure. 24. Cf. M . Foucault, The Order oj Things, L o n d o n 1 970. 25 . Cf. with re gard to this B. B rewster, ' Fet is h i s m in Capital and Reading Capital', Economy alld Society , 1 976, vol . 5 , n o . 3 ; and P . Hirst , ' A lthusser a n d the Theor y of Ideology', Economy and Society , 1 976 , vol . 5 , no. 4. 26 . Cf. ibid . 27 . The ambiguity a rising fro m the use o f ' M an ' to refer at th e same time to ' human being' and 'male member of the s pec i es ' is symptomatic of the discursive a m bigui ties which we are atte m p t i n g to s h ow . 2 8 . E . P . T ho m ps o n , The Poverty oj Theory, London 1 978. We should not , however, jump to the co n c l usion t h a t T ho m p s o n h as si m pl y misread A l t h u s s er . The p rob l e m is considerably more complex, for if Tho m ps o n p r o po s ed a false alterna tive by op p o s i n g a 'humanism' based on the postulate of a human essence and an anti­ h u m ani s m founded on the negation of the l at t e r , i t is equally true that Althusser's ap p ro a ch to humanism l ea v es little room for a n y t hi n g other than its re le g a t i o n to the field of ideology . For, ifhistory has an inte l l i gib l e structure given by the succession of modes of production , and if it is this structure which is accessible to a 'scientific' p ra ct i ce , this can o n l y be a cco m pa n ied by a notion of 'humanism ' as so me t h in g constituted on the p l a n e of ideo lo g y - a plane which , th ou g h not concei ved as false consciousness , i s on to l ogi c all y different and subordinate to a me cha n is m of s o c ia l reproduction established by the logic of the mode of production . The way o u t of the blind a l l ey to which these two essentialisms - constituted a ro un d ' M an ' and ' mode of p ro du ct i o n ' - lead , is the d isso lu t ion of the differen tiation of p l a n e s wherein the appearance/reality distinction is founded . In that case , humanist discourses have a status which is neither pri v i l eg ed a priori nor subordinated to other discourses . 29. mit, 1 978 , n o . 1 , editorial note. 30 . Cf. e. M o u ffe , 'The Sex/Gender S y s te m and th e Discursive Construction of Women's S u b o r di n a tio n ' , in S. Haninen and L. Paldan , eds . , Reth inking Ideology: A Marxist Debate, B e r l i n 1 983. A h i stori ca l introduction to fe m in is t politics from this v i ew p o i n t can be fo un d in Sally Alexander, 'Women, Class a n d Sexual Difference' , History Workshop 1 7 , Spring 1 984. O n the more general q ue s t i on o f sexual politics , see Jeffrey Weeks, Sex , Politics and Society , London 1 98 1 . 3 1 . This c on cept has been de v e lo ped by G a y le Rubin, ' The T raffic in Women : Notes on the " Political Economy" of Sex ' , in R . R . Reiter , ed . , Toward an Atllhro­ pology oj Women , New York/London 1 975 , pp . 1 57-2 10. 32 . T h is aspect is not totally ig no re d by the e d itor s of mlj. Thu s , P . Adams and J . M inson state: 'there are certain forms o f " al l - p ur po s e" responsability which cover a multitude of so ci a l relations - that pe r s o n s are held "responsible" in general, in a multiplicity of evaluations (being held "irresponsible" in the negative pole) . But however diffuse t h i s a l l-purp ose responsability a p p e ars to be i t is nonetheless s till subject t o the satisfaction of d e fini t e social conditions and "all-purpose" responsibility must be con s t rued as a heterogeneous bu n d l e of s t a t u s es ' . 'The "Subject" of Fe m in i s m ' , m /j, 1 9 78 , no. 2 , p . 53 . 33. A Cutler et aI . , vol . 1 . p . 236-237 . 34. L. C ol l e tt i , 'M arxism and t h e Dialectic' , New Left Review, September/October 1 975 , n o . 93, pp. 3-29; a n d Tramo/llo dell 'ideologia, pp . 87-1 6 1 .

148 35. Ka n t summarizes in the following four principles the characteristics of real o ppos i tion in its difference with contrad ic tion . 'In the first place, the determinations which oppo s e each other m us t be found in the sam e subject: if we, in effect, pose that a determination is in one thing, and another determination, whatever it may be, is in another th ing , a real opposition does no t follo w . Second l y : in a real opposition one of

the opposed determinations cannot ever be the contradictory contrary of the other, as in that case the contrast would be of a logical nature , and as we saw earlier, impossible. Thirdly : a d etermination cannot ever negate anything different from that which is posed by the ot h e r , as in the latter there would not be any opposition w hatsoev er. Fourthly : if they are in contrast neither of them can be negative, as in the latter case neither of them would pose something th at was annulled by the other. It is because of t h is that in every real opposition both predicates must be positive , but in such a manner that in their union within the same su bject the consequences recip rocally annul each other. Thus, in the case of those things which are considered each the ne g ative of the other, w hen they combine in the same subject, the result is zero . ' (I . Kant, ' I I concett o delle quantita nega t ive ' , in Scritli precritici, Bari 1 953, pp. 268-9) . The posit iv it y of its two terms is thus the defming characteristic of real opposition . 36 . It is interesting to point out that Hans Kelsen , in his polemic with Max Adler, clearly perceived the need to move outside the exclusive altemative real opposition/ contradiction in characterizing an tagonis ms bel on g in g to the social world . Cf. with regard to thi s the sum m ar y of K else n ' s position in R . Racinaro, 'Hans Kelsen e i l dibattito su democrazia e pa rla mentaris m o negli ann i Venti-Trenta ' , Introduction to H . Kelsen , Socialismo e Stato. Una ricerca sulla teoria politica del marxismo, Bari 1 978 , pp . cxxii-cxxv . 37. R. Edg ley , ' D ialectic: the Contradictions of C o lletti ', Critique, 1 977, no. 7. 38. J . Elster, Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds, Chichester 1978 . 39 . ' W hat is Dialectic? ' , in Conjectures and Refutations, London, 1 969, p. 312-335. 40. On this point, our opinion differs with that expressed by o ne of the authors of this book in an earlier work , in which the concept of antagonis m is assimilated to that of co n tradiction (E. Ladau, ' Populist Rupture and Discourse' , Screen Education, Spring 1980) . In rethinking our earlier position , the critical commentaries made by Emilio De Ipola in a nu mbe r of conversations, have proved most usefu l . 41. C on cern ing t h e various ways o f approaching the p roble m of relative au tono my of the State in different contemporary Marxist theorizations, see B. Jessop, The Cap italist State, N e w York and London 1 982.

4 He g em ony and Radical Democracy In N o v em b er 1 937, i n exile in New Yo r k Arthur Rosenberg was con cl uding his reflections upon co ntem po rary European hi s tory since the French R evo l ution I These reflections , w hi ch brought to a close his life as a militant intellectual, were cen tred upon a funda­ mental theme: the relationship be tw een socialism and democracy , or, better, t he fai lu re o f a tt e m p ts to con s tit u te or g anic forms of unity between the two . This double failure - of d e m o cra cy and of ,

.

socialism a ppe are d to him as a process of progressive estrange­ m en t , dominated by a radical break . In i t i all y 'democracy' , con­ ceived as a field o f pop u la r action , is the g rea t protagonist in the historic confrontations w h ich dominate the life of Europe between 1 789 and 1 848 . It is the 'people' (in the sense of plebs rather than populus) , the b a rel y o rgan ize d and differentiated ma s s es who domi­ na te the barricades of 1 789 and 1 848 , the Chartist agitation in En gla n d and the Mazzinian an d Garibaldian mobilizations in Italy. L a t er comes the maj or break constituted by th e long reaction of the 1 850s; and when this comes to an end and popular protest is renewed , the protagonists have changed . It w i l l be the unions or nas c en t social-democratic parties , first in Germany and England and then in the rest of Europe, which establish themselves w i th increas­ i ng so l i di ty in the las t third of the century . This break has frequently been interpreted as the t rans i t io n to a moment of higher political ra ti on a l i t y on the part of the dominated sectors: in the fi rst half of the century the amorphous cha rac te r of 'democracy' , its lack of r oo ts in the economic bases of society, made it e s s en t i ally vulnerable and unstable, and prev en te d it from con­ stitutin g itself into a steadfast and permanent trench in the struggle a g ains t the established order. Only w i th the disintegration of this amorphous ' people' , a nd its replacement w i th the solid social base of the working class , would popular movements achieve the m aturi t y that allowed them to u nd er tak e a l o ng-term s t rug g l e against the -

,

150

dominant classes . Nevertheless, this mythical transition to a higher sta g e of social maturity resulting fro m industrialization , and to a hi g h e r level of political efficacy in which the anarchic outbursts of

the ' people' would be replaced by the rationality and solidity of class

po l i ti cs , could only ap p ear as a b ad joke to Rosen b e rg , who wrote his book while Spain burned , Hitler was p re p a ri n g for the Atlschluss, and M ussolini was invading Ethiopia . For Rosenberg , this clos i n g up a l o ng class lines cons tituted on the contrary the great historical sin of t h e Eu ropean labour movemen t . The workers ' i n a b i l i ty to con­

stitu te the 'people ' as an histo rical agent was for him the essential fault o f social dem o c r a c y and the A riadne ' s thread which allowed him to unravel th e whole of the tortuous political process which b eg a n in 1 860 . The cons titution of a unified popular pole, far from b ec o m in g more simple, grew increasingly difficult as the growing com plexi t y and institutionaliza tion o f capitalist society - the ' trenches a n d forti fica tions of civil society' of which Gramsci s p o k e - led to the c o rp o r a ti z a t ion and separation of those sectors which should ideally have been united 'among the people' . This process of g rowing social complexi ty was already in evidence between 1 789 and 1 848: ,

The task of democracy in 1 789 consisted of leading in a unitary

manner the struggle of the dependent peasantry ag a in s t the land­ o w n i n g no b i li ty and the struggle of the poor citizens against capital. At this time this was much easier than it would be in 1 848. [n e ffe ct between the two peri od s the industrial proletariat, for all that the greater part of it was still working in small-scale industry, had g r own so much in importance that it made every political problem culminate in the confrontation between proletarian and capitalist . . . This required on the part of the democratic party an exceptional tactical sk i ll in or d er to achieve convergence between the workers ' movement and that of the peasants . If it wished to pass o ver the heads of the peasant owners to reach the mass of small tenants and labourers , it req u i r ed tactics which were abso­ l u tely realistic and complex into the bargain . Thus the task of social d e mocracy fi fty years after Robespierre had become in­ creasin g l y difficult , while at the same time the democrats were less in te l l e c t ua ll y capable o f resolving the problem s . 2 ,

And of course, the growing difficulty o f constituting a popular

a nt i s y s t em po le had only increased after 1 848 . In reality , Rosenberg -

was seeking to orient himself upon a new terrain , dominated by a

Hegemony and

Radical Democracy

15 1

radical mutation o f w hich he was only half conscious: the decline of a for m o f politics for which the division of the social into two antago­ nistic camps is an original and immutable datum, p rior to all hegemonic construction, 3 and t h e transition towards a new situation , cha rac­ t er i ze d by the essential instability of p oliti c a l spaces , in which the very identity of the forces in struggle is submitted to c o n s t a nt shifts, an d calls fo r an incessant process of redefinition . I n o t her words, in a manner at once far-sighted and hesitant, Rosenberg is describing to us t h e p rocess of generalization of the hegemonic fo r m of p o l i t i cs which imposes itself as a co n d i t io n for the emergence of every collective id en ti t y once a rticulatory p ractices have succeeded in de­ termining the very principle of social division and showing u s at the same time the vanity of the aspiration that the ' class struggle' s h oul d constitute i tself, in an automatic and a p riori manner, in the foundation of this p ri n ciple In all rigour, the opposition people/ancien regime was the last moment i n which the an t a goni s t i c limits between two forms of societ y presented themselves - with the qu a lifi c a t i on no ted - in t he form o f clear and emp i ri ca lly given lines of demarcation . From then on the demarcating line between the internal and the external , the d i viding line fro m which the antagonism was constituted in the form o f two opposing sys tems of equivalences , b ecame i n cre asing l y fragile a nd a m b ig u ous and i ts construction came to be the c rucial problem o f p olit i cs That is to say , from then on there was no politic s without heg e mo n y This permits us to unde rs tan d the spe cifi ci t y of M ar x ' s intervention: his reflection took place in a m o m e n t at which the d i v ision o f the p o li t i c al space in terms of the d i c h o tomy people/ ancien regime seemed to have exhaus ted its productivity , and was in any case incapable of c on s t r u c ting a vis i on of the political which w o u l d recapture the complexity and the plurality peculiar to the social in industrial societies . M arx seeks , then , to think the p rimary fact o f social d i vis i o n on the basis of a new principle: the confronta­ tion between classes . The n e w p rinciple, however, is undermined from the start by a radical insufficiency, a ris i n g from the fact t h a t class opposition i s i n c ap a ble of dividing the t o t a l i t y of th e social body into t w o antagonistic camps , of reproducing itself automatically as a line of demarcation in the po l i ti c al s phere. It is for this reason that the affi rmation o f the cl a s s s t ru g gle as the fundamental p r in ci pl e of political division a l w a ys had to be accompanied b y supplementary hypo theses which relegate d its full a ppl i cab i l i t y to the future: historical-sociological h y p o theses - the simplifcation of the social structure , w h i c h would lead to the coincidence of real political -

.

,

.

.

1 52

struggles and st ruggles between the classes as agents constituted at the level of relations of produ c ti on ; h y potheses reg a rdi ng the con­ sciousness of the a gen ts - the transition from the class in itself to the class for itself. What is imp o rtant , in any case, is that this change in troduced by M arxi sm into the political principle of social division maintains un al te red an essential component of the Jacobin i ma gi n a r y : the post u l a tion of one founda tio nal moment of rupture, and of a unique s pace in which the politi cal is co nstituted. Only the temporal dimension has ch anged , as this division , at once social and political , into two camps is r el e gated to the fu ture, at the same time that we are p rovided with a set of sociological h y pothe ses re g ardin g the process which would lead to it. In this chapter we sh a ll defend the thesis that it· is this moment of co ntinuity between the J acobin and th e M arxi s t poli tical imaginary which has to be put in question by the proj e c t for a radical demo­ cracy . The rej e c t ion of privileged poin ts of rupture and the con­ fluence of stru g g les into a unified po liti cal space, and the acceptance, on the contrary , of the plura lity and indetermin acy of the social, seem to u s the two fundamental bases from which a new political imaginary can be constructed, radically libertarian and infmitely mo re ambitious in its o bj e c tives than that of the classic left . This deman d s , in the first place, a description of the historical terrain in whi c h it emerg ed , which is the field of what we s hal l call the ' de m o c rati c re v ol u ti o n ' . ­

The Dem ocratic Revolution

The theoretical p rob lem a ti c which we have pres en ted excludes not only the concentration of social conflict on a p rio ri privileged agents, but also reference to any general prin c ip l e or substratum of an anthro­ pological nature which , at the same time that it unified th e different s u bj ect p o sitions , would a ssign a character of inevi t abi li ty to re­ sistance against the diverse forms of subordination . There is there­ fore nothing inevitable or natural in the different struggles against p ower, and it is necessary to explain in each case the reasons for their emergence and the different modulations they ma y a do p t . The struggle against subordination can no t be the result of the situation of subo rdination itself. Although we can affirm, with Foucault, that wherever there is power there is resistance, it must also be recog­ n ized that the forms of resistance m ay be extre mely varied . Only in certa in cases do these forms of resistance take on a p ol itical cha r acter

Hegemony and Radical Democracy 153 and become struggles directed towards putting an end to relations of subordination as such . If th ro u gho u t the centuries there have been multiple forms of resistance by women against male domination , it is only under certain conditions and specific forms that a feminist movement which demands equality (eq u ality before the law in the first place, and subs equ e ntly in other areas) has been able to emerge. Clearly , when we speak here of the 'political' character of th ese struggles, we do not do so in the restricted sense of demands which are situated at the level of parties and of th e State. W hat we are referring to is a type of action whose objective is the transformation of a social relation which constructs a subject in a relat i onsh i p of subordination . Certain contemporary feminist pr a c t ices for example, tend to transform the relationship between masculinity and fe m i n i n ity without passing in any way through parties or the State . Of c ou rse , we are not seeking to deny that certain practices require the in te rv e n ti on of th e political in its restricted sense. W hat we wish to p oi n t out is that politics as a pr acti ce of creation, repro­ duction and transformation of s oci al relations cannot be located at a determinate level of the social , as the problem of the political is the problem of the institution of the social, that is, of the definition and articulation of social relations in a field criss-crossed with antago­ ,

nIsms . Our centr a l problem

is to id enti fy the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective action, directed towards struggling against i nequaliti e s and challenging relations of subordination . We m i g ht also say that our task is to identify the conditions in which a relation of subordination becomes a relation of oppression, and thereby constitutes itself into the site of an antagonism . We enter here onto a terrain constituted by n u mero us terminological shifts w h ic h have end e d by e s tabl i s hin g a s yn on ymi ty between 'subordination', 'op­ p re s sion' , and ' domination' . The base which makes this synonymity p os s i b l e is, as is evident, the anthropological assumption of a 'human nature' and of a unified subject: if we can d e te r m ine a priori the essence of a su bjec t every relation of subordination which denies it automatically becomes a relatio n o f oppression . But if we reject this essentialist perspective , we need to differentiate 'subordination' fr om o p p ress ion and explain the precise conditions in which s ubor­ din ati on becomes o pp r essi ve We shall understand by a relation oj subordination th a t in which an a g en t is subjected to the decisions of a n o th e r - an employee with respect to an employer, for example, or i n certain forms of family organization the woman with respect to th e m a n , and so on . W e shall call relations � oppression, in contrast , ,

'

'

.

1 54 those relations of subordination which have transformed themselves into sites of a nta g o ni s ms . Finall y , we shall call relations oj domination the set of those relations of subordination which are considered as i llegit ima te from the perspective, o r in the judgement , of a social agent external to them , and which , as a consequence , may or may not coincide w i th the relations of oppres s i o n a ct ua l l y e xis ting in a de t e rm i n a te social formation . The problem i s , therefore , to explain how relations of oppression are constituted out of relations of subordination . It is clear why relations of subordination , considered in the msel v es cannot be antagonistic relation s : a relation of subordina tion establishe s , simpl y , a set of differential positions between social agents , and we al re ady know that a system of differences which constructs each social identity as p ositivity not only ca n n o t be a n ta go n i stic, but would bring about the ideal conditions for the eli mination of all a n tagon is ms - we would be faced with a su tured social space, from which every equivalence would be excluded . It is only to the extent that the positive differential character of the subordinated subject position is subverted that the a n t a g on is m can emerge . 'Serf , 'slave ' , and so on, do not designate in themselves antagonistic p o sit io n s ; it is only in the terms of a different discu rsive formation , such as ' the rights inherent to every human being ' , that the d i ffere nt ia l positivity of these categories can be subverted and the subordination constructed as o p pression . This means t ha t there is no relation of oppression without the presence of a discursive 'exterior' from which the discourse of s ubordination can be interrupted . 4 The lo g ic o f eq uiva l en ce in this sense displaces the effects o f some discourses towards others . I f, as was the case with w omen until th e seventeenth century , the ensemble of discourses which constructed them as subjects fixed them purely and simply in a subordinated po s i tio n , feminism as a movement of struggle ag a inst wo m en ' s subordination could not emerge . Our thesis is that it is o nl y from the moment when the democratic discourse becomes a vailable to articulate the different forms of resistance to subordina­ tion that the conditions will e x ist to make possible the struggle a ga ins t different types of inequality. In the case of women we may cite as an example the role played in England by M ary Wollstone­ craft , whose book Vindication oj the Rights oj Women, published in 1 792, determined the b ir th of feminism thro u gh the use made in it of the d e m o cr a t i c discourse, which was thus displaced from the field of p o l it i cal eq ua lity between citizens to the field of equality between the sexes . But in o rd er to be m ob i l ized in this way , the democratic principle ,

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

1 55

of l i b e r ty a n d e q u al i ty first had to impose itself as the new m a trix of the social imaginary ; or, in our terminology , to constitute a funda­ mental nodal point in the construction of the political . This decisive m utat i o n in the p o li ti cal imaginary of W este rn societies took place two h u n d red years ago and can be defined in these term s : the logic of e q uivalence w as t ra nsfo rmed into the fu nda men t al instrument of production o f the social . It is to designate this mutation that, t a king an ex p res sion from de Toc q ueville, w e shall speak of 'democratic re v o l u t io n W ith this we shall designate the end of a society o f a h i e ra r ch ic and inegalitarian type, ruled by a theological-political l og i c in which the social order had its foundation in divine will . The social body was conceived of as a whole in which individuals appeared fixed in differen tial positions . For as long as such a holistic mode of i nst it ut io n of the social predominated , politics could not be more than the repetition of hierarchical relations which re produ ced the same type of s u bord i nated subjec t . The key moment in the b e g i n n i ng s of t h e democratic revolution can be found in the French Revolution since , as Fran�ois Furet has indicated , its affirmation of the absolute power of its people in troduced something truly new at t he level of the social imaginary . I t is there, according to Fure t , that the true discontinuity is located: in the establishment of a new l egi t im a c y , in the invention of democratic culture: · The Frendl Re vo l u t io n is not a transition , it is an origin , and t he phantom of an o rig i n What is u n i q ue about it is what constitutes its historical intere st , and , what is more, it is this "unique" element that has become universal: the first experience o f democrac y . '5 If, as Hannah A rendt has s ai d , 'it was the French and not the American Revolution that set t h e world on fire ' , 6 it is because it was the firs t to found itsel f on no other legitimacy than the pe op l e It thus initiated what Claude Lefort h a s shown to be a new mode o f institution of the socia l . This bre ak with the ancien regime, symbolized by the Declaration of the Rights of Man , would provide the discursive conditions which made it possible to p ro pose the different forms of inequ a l it y as illegitimate and anti-natural, and thus make them e qu i v ale n t as forms of oppres­ s io n Here lay the p ro fo un d subversive power of the democratic discourse, which would allow the spread of eq ua l ity a nd lib e rty in to increasingly wider domains and therefo re act as a fermenting agent upon th e different forms of s trugg le against subordination . M any workers ' struggles in t he nineteenth century constructed their de m a n d s discursively on the basis of st rugg l es for political l i b e r ty . In the case o f English C h a rtis m for instance , the s tudies of Gareth St e d m a n Jones7 have revealed the fundamental role of the ideas of ' .

.

.

.

,

1 56 English radicalism , profoundly i nfluenced by the French Revolu­ tion, in the cons titution of the movement and the determining of i ts o bj ectives . 7 ( H enc e the central role of the demand fo r universal suffrag e , of w h i ch little account is taken by interpretations of Ch a r t i s m as a p hen om en o n of a fu n d am e n tall y social character, an ex p ression of t h e class consciousness of the new indus trial p roletariat . ) Fro m the critique of political inequality there is effected , through the different socialist discourses , a displacement towards the critique o f econom ic inequality, which leads to the p utting in question of o ther forms of s ubordination and the demanding of new rights . The s o ci a l is t demands s h o uld therefore be seen as a moment internal to the democratic revolution, an d o n ly intelligible on the basis of the e q uiv al e n t i a l logic which the latter establishes . And the irradiation e ffects m u lt i ply in a gro w i ng variety of d i r e c ti ons . In the case of fem i n i s m , it was a question of g aining access for women first to p o l i tical rights; later to economic equality; and , with contemporary fe m i ni s m , to equality in the domain of sexuality . As de Tocqueville p oi n ted o u t : ' I t is impossible to believe that equality will no t finally penetrate as much into the political world as into o ther domains . It is n o t possible to co ncei v e of men as eternally unequal among them­ selves on one p o i n t , and equal on o thers; at a certain momen t, they will come to be equal on all points . '8 In e very case it is the impossibility of constituting relations of subordination as a closed system of differences - an impossibility im plying the externality of the subordinator and subordinated identi­ ties to each o ther , rather than their absorption into the system through their positions - which lies at the base of the relation of o ppre s s i o n . It is instructive, in this respect , to consider the trans­ fo r m at io n s experienced by the antagonis tic potential of workers' s t r u g gles . There were without a doubt radically anti-capitalist s t ru g g l e s in the n i n e tee nt h century, but they were not struggles of the p ro l e tar i at - if by ' p roletariat ' we understand the type of worker produced by the development of capitalism , rather than the artisans whose qual i ficat io ns and modes of life were threatened by the establishment o f the capitalist system of production . The st r o n gl y antagonistic character of t h e struggles of these ' reactionary radicals ' - in C raig Calhoun 's p hrase - their calling into question of the whole of the capitalist syste m , are explained by the fact that t h es e struggles expressed resistance to the des t ruction of artisanal iden tities and the w h ol e set of s o cial , cultural and political forms which went with them . From that stemmed the total rejection of the

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

1 57

n ew relations o f production which capitalism was in the process o f i mplan t i ng ; the complete externality existing between two systems

of social organization generated the division of social space into two camps , which , as we k n ow , is the condition for every antagonism . C al ho un , in his critique of E . P . Thompson's The Making oj the English Working Class, has s how n convincingly that a heterogeneous set o f s o cial groups are there grouped under the label ' working clas s ' , withou t sufficient reco g nition of the profound difference between 'old' and 'new ' workers in their objectives and their forms of mob ili­ zation . According to Calhou n , ' the former fought on t h e basis o f strong community foundations b u t agains t t h e preponderant forces of economi c change The latter fought on a weaker social basis but within the emergen t industrial ord er. This distinction militates strongly against a notion o f the con tinuous development and increasing radicalization o f the working c lass '9 It i s towards the middle o f the nineteenth century in B ritain, and towards the end of the century in the rest of E urope that there emerges a labour movement which can be strictly consid e red a product of cap i talis m ; but this labour movemen t tends to call less a n d less into q uestion capitalist relations of production a s such these having by then solidly implanted - and concen trates on the struggle for the transformation of relations in production . Those struggles which the M arxist t ra d ition would term ' refo rmist' , and co n sid er as a ba ckward step with respect to previous social s t ruggles , correspond more in real i ty to the mode adopted by the mobilizations o f the industrial p roletariat than do the more radical earlier s truggles . The relations o f subordination between workers and capitalists are thus to a c ert a in extent absor b ed as legitimate differe ntial p o s i tio n s in a unified discursive space . I f we turn o u r a tten tion t o another period of radical mobilizations by workers - that of the workers' coun c il movements in Italy and Germany at the end of the First World War we see that they too have at their base an overdetermined set of circumstances: the collapse of the social o rder following the war, the militariz ation o f the factories , the beginnings o f Taylorization , the transformation o f the role o f skilled w orkers in p roduction . All o f these conditions were linked either to an organic crisis which reduced the hegemonic capaci ty of the logics of difference , or to trans forma tions which called into ques tion t raditional forms of worker identity We shoul d not fo rget , for example, t h e central role played i n these struggles b y skilled workers , a rol e which i s generally recognized b u t ex p lained in d i ffe r ent ways . I O For some it is a q uestion of the defence of skills .

.

,

-

.

158 a g ains t the already p resent danger of Taylorization . For ot he rs it is the experience that these wo rkers had acquire d during the war which m ade them think of the possibili ties of self-m g anization of the p ro c ess of production and pressed them to a confron tation with their e m ploy ees . In either case, however, it is the defence of a certain identity which t h e workers had acquired ( t h eir skills or their or g ani­ za tional functions in production) w hich leads them to r e b e l . We can therefore establish a parallel with the ' radical reactionaries' we m en tioned above, as they too w ere d e fe nd i n g a type of id e ntity

u n der threa t .

I t w o u ld be w ron g , however, t o understand this e x te rn a li ty of p o w er in a purely ' stagist' sense, as if the fact of belongi n g to a phase in the p r o cess of being tr ansce n d ed were the nec e ss a r y condition for r a di c a lism in a s t r u ggle ; if this were th e case , s uch radicalism would be characteris tic only of defensive struggles . I f the ' a n a c hr o nisti c ' s t r u ggles which we mentioned above illustrate well t he externality o f po w e r w h ich is a condition o f every antagonis m , certain social t ransfo r mations can , in contras t , constitute new forms of r a dical s u bjectivity on the basis of di s cur siv ely constructing a s an e x te rn al im pos i tion - and therefore as forms of oppression - relations of subordination w hich until that moment had not been questioned . This is the point at which the equivalential di s p l ace m en t peculiar to th e de m ocratic imaginary comes into play . The i m age of radical s truggles as things from the past is perfectly unrealistic . It derives in g oo d p a r t fro m the neo-capitalist euphoria of the two decades after the Second W o rld W a r , which appeared to offer an unlimited c a pac i t y fo r transformist absorption on the part of the s y s tem , and showed a linear tendency towards a homogeneous society in which e v ery a ntagonistic po tential would be dissolved , and each collective ide n t i t y fixed i n a syste m o f d i ffe re nc es . We shall try, on the co n t r a ry , to show that the complexity and the frequently cont r adic­ tory aspects of this p rocess of expansion , as the very act of satisfying a wide range of social d e man d s during the apogee of the Welfare State, far from assuring the indefinite in te gr a tion of the do m inant h egemonic formations, frequently laid bare the arbitrary chara c te r o f a w h o l e set of relations of subordination . Thus the terrain has been c re at e d which makes possi b l e a new extension of egalitarian equiva­ len ces , and thereb y the expansion of the democratic revolu tion in new direct i o ns . It is in this terrain that there have arisen those new fo rms of political identity which , in recent debates , have frequently been g rouped under the name of ' n e w social movements' . We should therefo re st u d y the democratic potential and the amb i gui t i es

Hegemony and Radical o f these movements , as well as th e ha ve em e rge d .

Democratic Revolution and

Democracy

1 59

historical context in which they

New

Antagonisms

The e q u iv alen t ial disp l ace m e n t between distinct s u bj e c t posi tions which is a con d i ti on for the emergence of an an ta g o n is m - may thus present itself in two fundamental v aria n t s . F i rs t l y , it m ay be a q u e s ti o n of re l a tions of subordination already in exis tence which , thanks to a d isp l a ce m ent of the democratic im aginary , are re­ a r t i cu la ted as relations of oppression . To take the case of fe m in i s m once a g a i n , it is because women as women are d e ni e d a rig h t which t h e democratic id eo l o gy r e c ognize s in principle for all c i t i z en s that there appears a fissure in the c o ns tru ctio n of the subordinated feminine s u bj e ct from which an a n ta g on ism may arise. I t is also the c a s e with the ethnic minorities who demand their civil rights . B u t t h e a n t a go n i s m can also arise i n other circumstances - fo r e x a m p l e , w h e n a cq u i re d r i gh t s are being called into q u es ti o n , or when social relations which had not been constructed under the form of s u b o rd i ­ nation be g in to be so under the i mp a ct of ce r tai n social trans forma­ tions . In t h i s case it is because it is n eg a t e d by prac t ice s and discourses bearing new forms of i ne q u a li t y that a subject p o si t i o n can become the site of an a n t a gonis m . But in ev e r y case what allows the forms of resistance to assume the ch a r a c te r of collective stru gg le s is the e x i s ten ce of an external dis co u rse w h i ch i mp e d e s the stabilization o f subord in at io n as difference . The u n s atisfa c t o r y term 'new social movements ' groups t o geth e r a s eri es of highly d i v e rs e struggles : urban , e c o l o gi c a l , anti-authori­ tari an , anti-institutional , fem ini s t , anti-racist, ethnic , regional or that of sexual minorities. The co m m o n denominator of all of th e m would be their differentiation from wo rk ers ' struggles, con­ sidered as 'class' st ru g g le s . It is po int l ess to insis t u pon the proble­ ma t i c nature of this l a tte r n otion : i t amal g a ma tes a serie s of very different struggles at the level o f the rel a t io n s of production, which are set apart from the 'new antagonisms' for reasons that display a l l too dearly the p e rsi s t en c e of a d i sco urse founded upon the pri vileg e d status of 'classes ' . What interests us about these new social move­ ments , then, i s not the idea of a rb i t ra ril y gro up i ng them into a category opposed to that of dass, but the novel role t h ey play in articulating th a t rapid di ffu s ion of social conflictuality to mo re and more n u m ero u s relations which is characteristic t o day of advanced

160 industrial s o cieties . This is what we shall seek to a nalyse th r o ugh the theoretical p roblematic pr e s e n te d above, w hich leads us to conceive these m o vements as an extension of the d emoc ra t ic revolu tion to a whole new s e r i e s of social re lat ion s As for their novelt y , t ha t is conferred upon them by th e fact that th e y call into qu es ti on new forms of subordina tion . We s ho u l d di s tin g uish two aspects of this relation of con tinuity/discon tin u ity . The as pect of co nt i n ui t y basi­ cally invol ves the fa c t that the conversion of liberal-democratic ideo l o g y in t o the ' common sense' o f Western societies laid the fo u n da t i o n fo r that p r og re s si v e challenge to th e h i erarchica l p r i n ci p l e w hich Tocqueville called the 'equalization o f conditions ' . It is t h e permanence of this ega l i ta ri a n i ma gi n a r y which permits us to establish a c o n t i nui ty between the s truggles of t h e nineteenth century a g a i n s t the inequ;> l i ties be q ue a th e d by the ancien regime and t h e social movements of the p rese n t . But from a second po in t of view we can speak of d i s co nt i n u ity as a g ood p ropor t i o n o f the new p oli ti c a l s u bj e c ts have been constituted t hr ou g h t heir anta go nis t i c r el a t i o ns hip t o r ec e nt fo rms o f sub or d in at i o n , derive d from th e i m p la n ti n g a n d e x p an si on of capi t ali s t rclations of production and the gr o wi n g intervention of th e state . It is to these new relations of s u b o r d in a tion and to the an tago n ism s constituted within them that w e sha l l n o w address o u rs el v es . I t was i n the context o f the r eorgan iza t io n which took place after the Second World War that a series of changes occurred at t h e level of social relations and a n ew h egemo nic formation was consolidated . The latter a rticulated modifications at the level of t h e labour process , the for m of s tate and the dominant modes of cultural diffusion which were to b ring about a pro fo un d transformation in the e xisting forms of s o ci al intercourse . If we e x am in e the prob le m from an economic point of view , the de cisi v e c h an ge is what M ichel Aglietta has termed the transition from an extensive to an intensive regime of accumulation . The latter is characterized b y t h e sprea d of capitalist re l a t i on s of p r o d u ctio n to the w hole set of social relations , and the subordination of t h e l a t t e r to the lo g i c of p roduc t io n for profit. A c c o r d i ng to A gl i e tt a the fundamental moment o f t h i s transition is th e introduction of Fordis m , which he describes as ' the p rinciple of an a rti c u l a t ion between process of production and mode of con­ II s u m p t i on . M ore s pecifi c ally, it is the articulation between a l a bo ur p r o c e s s o rg a nized around the semi-automatic pro d uction line, and a m od e of co n s um pt io n characterized by the i n divi d ual a cq uisit ion of co m mo d i tie s p roduced on a large scale for pri v ate consumption . This pe n et r a t io n of ca p i t al is t rel a tio ns o f p ro duc tion in itia te d at t he .

,

'

,

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

161

beginning o f the century a nd st e pp e d u p from the 1 940s o n , was to transfor m society into a vast ma r k et i n whi ch new n e eds w e re ceaseles s l y created , and in w hich m o re and more of the products of hu m an labour were tu rne d into commodities . This ' commodifica­ tio n ' o f social life destroyed prev i ou s social relation s , replacing them with commodity rela tions through which the logic of capitalist accum ulation p e netrated into increasingly numerous s p he re s Today it is not only as a seller of la b o u r power that the indiv i dual is subo r d in a ted to c a pital , but also throu g h his or her incorporation into a mul ti tude of other social relations : culture , free time, illnes s , edu c ation sex and even death . Th e re is pr a ctically no domain of individual or collective life w hich e scapes c apitalist re l ati o ns B u t this ' consumer society' has not l e d to the end of ideology , as Daniel Bell announced , nor to the creation of a one-dimensional man , as M a rcuse feared . On the contrary , numerous new st ruggles have ex p ressed resist a nce a ga i nst the new forms of subordinatio n , and t h i s fro m within t h e v e r y heart of the new society . Thus i t i s that the w a s te o f n a tural resources , the pollution and destruction of the environment, the consequences of productivism have given birth to the ec o l ogy movemen t . O ther struggles , which M an uel Castells terms 'urban ' , 12 ex p ress diverse forms of resistance to the capi tal i st occupat i on of so ci al space . The gener a l urbanization which h a s accom p anied economic growth , the trans fer of the popula r classes to the urban periphery o r their relegation to the decayin g inner cities, and the general lack of collective goods and servic e s have caused a series o f n e w problems w hich affect the org a ni z ation of the whole of so ci a l life outside work . Hence the mult i plicity o f social re l at i ons fro m which an t agonisms 'and struggles may originate: habit a t con s u m p tion, various services ca n all constitute terrains for the struggle against inequalities and the cl a iming of new rights These new demands must also be set within the context o f the K e yn e si a n Welfare State, the cons titution of which has been another fundamental fact of the post-war period It is without doubt an ambiguous and complex phenom enon , for if on the one hand this new type of state was necessary in orde r to p erfo rm a series o f functions re q uired by t h e n e w capitalist regime of accu mulation , it is also the result of what Bowles and Gintis have c alled ' the post W o rld W a r accord between c a pita l an d la bour', 13 and the result , therefo re, of struggles again s t changes in the social relations generated by capitalism I t is , for ex a m ple the destruction o f the networks of traditional solidarity of a community or fa mily type (based , let us not forget , on the subord ination of women ) which has forced the '

'

.

-

,

.

,

.

.

-

.

,

162 state to intervene in diverse ' social services' for the sick , the un­ , the old, and so on . Elsewhere , under p ressure from workers ' s trugg les , the s tate has intervened to a ssu r e a new labour policy ( m i n i m u m wage , length o f the working day , accident and unem p l o y men t insurance , and the social wage) . If we can accept with Benj a m in Coriat 14 that this state-plan in te r ven e s in the repro­ n u ction of the labour fo rce in order to subordinate it to the needs of G l p i t al , thanks to the p ractice o f th e collective contract and the negotia ted agreements which link rises in wages to those in pr o du c­ tivi t y , i t is no less the case that these are gains which have brought real and i m portant benefits to the workers . B u t this i n t e rv ent ion by the state at ever broader levels of social reproduction has been a c co m p an ied by a gro w i n g bureaucratization o f its practices which has come to constitute, along with commodifi­ cation , one of the fundamental sources of inequalities and conflicts . In all the do m a in s in which the s tate has intervened , a politicization of social rela tions is at the base of numerous new an t a gon i s m s . This double transformation of social relations , resulting from the expansion of ca p italis t relations of production and of the new bureaucratic-state fo r m s , is found in different combinations in all the advanced industrial countries . Their effects are gen e r all y mutually reinforcing , although this is not always so. Claus O ffe has indicated , for example, how the provision by the state of services linked to the social w age can have effects which go in the direction of 'decom­ modification ' . 15 This latter p h e no m e no n may adversely affect the i nte res t s of ca p i t ali s t accumulation, to t he extent that a range of activities w hich could be sources of p rofi t beg i n to be p r o vide d by the public secto r . For O ffe this phenomenon , linked to that of the ' de p roletarianization ' arising out of the various payments which allow wo rkers to survive without being obliged to sell their labour­ power at a n y price , is an i mportant factor in the present crisis in the capitalist economies . But what crucially concerns us here is to trace the consequences of this bureaucratization un derlyi n g new antago­ n i s ms . The important fact is the imp osit i on of multiple forms of vi g ila n ce and regulation in social relations which had previously been conceived as forming part of the private domain . This shifting of the line of demarcation between the 'public' and the ' private' has a m b i g uous e ffects . On the one hand, it serves to reveal the political character (in the broad sense) of social relations , and the fact that these are always th e result of modes of institution that give them their form and meaning; on the o ther , given the bureaucratic character o f s tate interven tion , this creation of 'public spaces' is e m pl oyed

Hegemony

and Radical Democracy 1 63

carried out not in the form of a true d emoc ra t izat i o n , but thro u g h the imposition of new forms of subordination . I t is here that we h a ve to look for the terra in on which numerous s t ru gg l es emerge against b u r eaucratic forms o f s tate power . This should not blind us, h o w e v e r , to n u m erous other aspects which poin t i n the oppo s ite direction, an d which give the W elfare S tate its characteristic ambiguity: the emergence o f a n ew type of r i g h t designated as 'positive lib e r t i es ' has also pr ofoundl y tran s formed the d o m in an t co m mo n sense, lending le g i ti m ac y to a whole series of dem an d s for e conom i c equality and insis tence upon new social rights . M ove­ ments s u ch as the ' W el fare Rights M ovement' in the United States , studied by Piven and Clow a r d , 16 are an example of th is extension of the de m a nd s directed a t t h e state, once its responsibility for the welfare of citizens is a cce p ted . I t is the notion of ci ti zen sh i p itself w h i ch has been transformed with the social s tate, as ' social rights' are n o w attributed to the citizen . As a c o n s eq u en c e , the c a t e g o rie s of 'justice ' , ' libert y ' , 'e q uit y ' , a n d 'e q ual i t y ' h a v e been redefined and liberal-democratic d is co u rse h a s bee n p ro fo u ndl y modified by this b roadening of the s ph e re of rights . One cannot understand the p resent exp a nsi o n of the field of so c i a l conflictuality and t h e consequent emergence of new political subjects without situating both in the con tex t o f the commodi fi­ cation and bureaucratization of so ci al relations on the one h an d , and the reformulation of the liberal-democratic ide o l o gy - re s ul t ing fro m the e xpans i o n of st rugg l es for eq ual it y - on the othe r . For this reason we have proposed that this pro l i ferat i on of a n ta g o n i s m s and calli n g into question of relations of subordination should be con­ sidered as a moment of deepening of the de m o c ra tic revolution . This has also been s ti m u la ted b y the th i r d i m p ort a n t aspect in the mutation of social re l atio n s which has characterized the hegemonic for mation of t h e post-war period: name l y , the new cultural forms l inked to the e xpansion of the means of mass comm un ic a tion . These were to make possible a new mass culture wh ic h would profoundly sha k e traditional identities . Once again , the effects here are amb ig uo u s, as a l o n g with the un de nia b l e effects of m a s s ifi c a ti o n and unifo rm izati o n , this media-based culture also contains powerful elements for the subversion o f in e q ua l it i es: the do m in ant discourses in consumer s ociety p resent it as social progress and the advance of democracy , to the ex ten t that it a ll o ws the vast majority of the pop ulation access to an ever-increasing range of goods . Now , while Baudrillard is right to say that we are 'ever further away fro m an equality vis-a-vis the object' , 17 the reigning appearance of equality

1 64 and the cultural democratization which is the inevitable consequence of the action of the media permit the q u est i on i n g of p ri vil e ge s based upon older forms of status . I n t e r pe ll a t ed as e q uals in their ca p a cit y as consumers , ever m or e nu m e ro u s grou p s a re i m pe lled to reject the real i n e q u a lit i e s which continue to exist . This ' democratic consumer c u l t u r e' has und o ub ted l y stimulated the emergence of new struggles w h i ch have pl a ye d an impo rt ant part in the rejection of old forms of su b o r d i n a t i o n , as w as the case in the United S tates w i th th e s t r u g g le of the black mo v e men t for civil rights . The p he n om e n o n of the y o u n g is p a rticular l y interesting, and it is no cause for wo n de r t h a t t h e y should constitute a new axis for the emergence of an t ag on i s m s . In order to create new necessities , th e y are increasingly constructed as a s p e c i fi c category o f consumer, which stimulates them to see k a fi n a n ci a l a u tono m y t h a t so cie t y is in no co n d i t i on t o g i v e them . On the contrary, the e co n o m i c crisis and unemployment m ak e their si tuation difficult indeed . If we add to this the dis inte gr a tion of the family cell and its growing redu ction to pure functions of consump­ tio n , along with the absence o f social forms of in te gr a ti o n of these ' n e w subjects ' who have received the impact of the general q ues ti on­ ing of e x is t i n g hierarchies , we easily understand the different forms which the reJ:>ellion of the young has ad o p t e d in industrial so ci eti es . The fact that these 'new antagonisms' are the e x p res s ion of forms of resistance to th e commodification, bureaucratization and inc rea s­ i n g homogenization of social life i t sel f ex p lai ns why the y should frequently ma n ife s t themselves through a proliferation of parti­ c u la ri s m s , and c rys t a ll ize into a demand for autonomy itself. It is also for this reason that th e re is an identifiable t enden c y towards the valorization of ' differences ' and the creation of n e w i d en ti t ies w hi ch t en d t o p r i v i l e ge ' cultural' criteria (clothes , music, l ang ua ge , regional t ra d i ti o ns , and so on) . Insofar as of the two great themes of the democratic imaginary - e qu a lity and liberty - it was that of equa l i t y w hich was traditionally predominant, the demands for autonom y bestow an i n c re as i n g l y central role upon l ib e rt y . For this reason many of th es e forms of resis tance are made manifest not in th e form of collective s truggles , but through a n i ncre asin g l y affirmed individualism . (The Left, of course, is ill p re p a red to take into a cc ou n t these s truggles , which even today it tends to dismiss as 'liberal ' . H en ce the danger that they may be articulated by a dis­ course of the Rig h t , of the defence of p ri vileges . ) But in an y case , and whate ver the politi cal o ri en t a t i o n through w hich the antagonism c ry s ta l l i ze s (this will de p e n d upon the ch a in s of e q u i v a l e n ce which co n s t r uc t it) , theJorm I!! the antagonism as such i s identical in all ca ses .

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

1 65

That is to say , it always consists in the construction of a so c i al iden tity - of an overdetermined subject position - on the b asis of the equivalence between a set of elements or values w hich exp e l or externalize those others to which they are opposed . Once again , we find o urselves co n fr o nting the division of social space . The last in time of these ' new social movements ' , and without doubt one of the most active at the present moment , is the peace movemen t . It appears to us that it falls perfectly into the theoretical fram e w ork which we h a v e put forw ard . W ith the expansion of what E . P. Tho mpson has called the 'logic of exterminis m ' , a growing nu m b er of people feel that the most basic of all rights , that o f life , has been called into question . In addition , the deployment in numerous co untries o f foreign nuclear weapons whose use is not under national contro l , generates new demands rooted in the extension to the field of natio n al defence of the principles of dem oc r a t i c control which citizens have the right to exercise in the political fiel d . Discourse con c e rni n g defence policy traditionally the enclosed preserve of restricted military and political elites - is thus subverted as the d e m ocrat i c p rinciple of control lodges i tsel f at its heart . The central idea which we have defended thus far is that the new struggles - and the radicalization of older struggles such as those of women o r ethnic minorities - should be understood from the double pe r sp ec ti v e of the transformation of social relations charac­ teristic o f the new hegemonic formation of the post-w ar period , and of the effects of the displacement into new areas of social life of the egalitarian i m a gina ry constituted around the liberal-democratic dis­ co u rs e It is this which has provided the framework necessary for the questioning of the different relations of subordination and the d e m a n ding of new rights . That the democratic imaginary has p lay e d a fundamental role in the eruption of new demands since the 1960s, is perfe c tl y well understood by the Ame ri can neo-conservatives , who denounce the 'excess of democracy' and the wave of 'egalitarianism' which in their view caused an overload in the political systems of the Wes t . S amuel Huntington , in his report to the Trilateral Commis­ sion in 1 975, a r g ued that the s truggles in the United S tates in the 1 960s for g r e a te r equality and p a rt i cipation had provoked a 'demo­ cratic surge' which had made society 'ungovernable' . He concluded that ' the strength of the democratic ideal poses a problem for the governability of democracy . ' 18 The increasingl y numerous demands for real equality have led societ y , a c cording to the neo conser vatives , to the edge of the 'egalitarian precipice' . This is where they see the o rigins of t h e double transformation which in their -

.

-

,

­

166 o p i n i on , the idea of equality ha s unde rgon e : it has passed from equality o f o pp o r tu ni t y t o equality of results , and from equality between individuals to equality betw een groups . D an iel Bell considers that this 'new egali t a r ianism ' p u ts in jeopardy the true ideal of eq u alit y , wh ose objec tive cannot be e q ua l i t y of res u l t s , but a 'just m e rit o c r acy ' . 19 The present cri si s is , then, seen as the result of a ' cr is i s of v a lu e s ' , the consequence o f the development of an ' adversary cul t ur e ' and of the 'cultural contradictions of cap it a lis m ' . Thus far w e have p r e s ented the em er g e nce o f new antagonisms a nd p o l i t i c a l s ubjects as linked to th e expansion and g en e rali z ation of the democratic revolution . In r e a l it y , i t can also be seen as a pro­ l o n gat i o n of various other areas of p o li tica l effects which we have come across freq u en t ly th r ou g h o u t our analysis . In particular, the p r o li fe r ati o n of these anta g o nis m s makes us see in a new li gh t the problem of the fr a g m en t a ti on of the ' un i t a r y ' s ubjec ts o f the social s t r u g gl es with whi ch M arxism found itself confronted in the wake of its first crisis , a t the end o f the l as t century . All the dis c uss ion on s t r a t e g ie s for recom po s i t i on of wor k in g -c lass uni ty , seen in pe r s pective, is nothin g o ther than the first act of a re co g niti o n ­ reluctant, it is t ru e - of the plu r ality of the socia l , and the u ns utu red character of all p o li ti cal i de n tit y . If we r ea d so us rature the texts of Rosa Luxe mb urg , Labriola, and of Kautsky himself, we shall see t ha t this u n a ssim i la ble m oment of plurality is in one way or another present in their d i s c o u r s e , u nd er mi ning the coherence of their cate­ gories . It is clear that this m u l t i for m i t y was not necessarily a neg at ive moment of frag ment a ti o n or the reflection of an artificial d ivisio n re s u l ti ng from the logic of capitali s m , as the th e o ri s ts of the Second International thought, but the v er y terrain which made possible a d eepe ning o f the democratic revolution . As we shall s ee , t his d ee p e ning is revealed even in the a m bigui t ie s and difficulties which every pr a c tice of articulation and re co mp osition has to face. Renun­ ciation of the c a t e gory of subject as a u n i tary , transparent and sutured e n t i ty opens the way to the re co g nition of the s p e ci ficit y of the antagonisms constituted on the b asis of different s u bjec t p os i­ tions , and , hen ce , the po ss i b i li t y of the deepeni ng of a p l u r alist and democratic conception . The cri ti qu e of the category of unified subject, and the recognition of the di s c u r s i v e dispersion within which every s u bje ct p osi ti on i s c onst i tuted , t h er efo re i n v ol v e s o m e t hi n g more than the enunciation of a gen e r al th eo retical position : t h ey are the sine qua non fo r t h i nk i n g the multiplicity o u t of which a n ta g o n isms emerge in s o ci etie s in which the democratic revolution has crossed a certain threshold . This gives us a the o re tical t erra in on ­

­

Heg emony and Radica l Democracy

1 67

the b a sis of which the notion of radical and plural democracy - which will be central to our argument fr o m t his poin t on - finds the first cond i t i ons under which i t can be appre hended . O nl y if it is a ccep t ed that the s ubject p o s itions cannot be led back to a positive and un i ta r y fo u n din g p r i nci p le - only then can pl ur ali s m be considered rar'l ical . Pluralism is radical onl y t o the extent that each term of thj < piwraiity o f iden t i t ies finds w ithin i tself the p r i n cipl e of its own validity , without this ha v i ng to be s o u g ht in a tran s cenden t or underl yi n g positive g round for the hier a rch y o f m ea ning of them all and the s o ur c e and guarantee of their legi ti m a cy . And this radical p l u r al i sm is democratic to the extent that the autoconstitutivity of each one of its terms is the result of displ a ce m ents of the egali t a ri a n i m a gin a ry . Hence , the p r oject for a radical and plural democracy , in a primary sense, is nothin g oth er than the struggle for a maximum a u to ­ nomization of sp heres on the ba s i s of the generalization of the equivalential-egalitarian logic. This a p proach permits us to redi mension and do jus tice to workers ' s t r u g gles themselves , whose character is dis to r te d when they are co n t r a s t ed en bloc to the struggles of the ' n e w p o li ti c al subjects ' . Once the concep tion of the working class as a 'universal class' is r eject e d , it becomes possible to recognize the p l u ral i t y of the antagonisms which take place in the field of what is arbitrarily grouped under the label of 'workers ' str u ggles ' , and the inestimable importance of the great m ajo ri t y of them for the deepening o f th e democra tic process . W ork ers ' str u ggl e s have been numerous , and h a ve assumed an e x traordinary v ar i ety o f fo r m s as a fun c ti o n of transformations in the role of the state , the t rade- un i on prac ti c es of different categories of w o rk er s , the an t a gonis m s within and outside the factories , and the ex isting hegemonic equilibri a . An excellent exa m pl e is afforded us by the so-called 'new workers' struggles ' , which took place in France and in Italy at the end of the 1 960s . They show well how the forms of s tru ggles within the factory depend u po n a d iscurs i v e context m u ch vaster than that o f s im p le relations of production . The evident influence of the stru ggles and slog ans of the student movement; the central role p l a y ed by young wo rkers , whose culture was radically different fro m that of their older col­ leag u es ; the i m p or t an ce o f immigran ts in France and southerners in It a l y - all this re v e al s to us th a t the other social relations in which workers are enrolled will determine the manner in which they react inside the factor y , and that a s a res u l t the plura l ity of these relations cannot be m a gic a l l y erased to constitute a single wor k ing class . Nor, then , can workers' demands be reduced to a uniq u e antagonism

1 68 whose n a t ur e is ont o logically different from that of other social a n d p ol i t i ca l su bje cts . Thus far we have s poken of a m ultiplicity of anta g onisms whose e ffects , c on verging and o v e rd e termined , are regi stered within the fra mework of what we have called the ' democratic revolution ' . At this point i t is necessar y , nevertheless, to make i t c lea r that the democratic revolu tion is s i mply the terrain upon which there operates a l og i c of displacement supported by an e g alitarian ima g i­ nary , b ut that it does not predeter m ine the direction in which t h is im agi n a r y will operate . I f this direction were p redetermi n ed we should s i mply have constructed a new teleolo g y we w o uld be on a terrain similar to that o f Bernstein's Entwicklung . B u t in that case t her e w ould be no room at all for a hegemonic p racti c e The reason -

.

why it i s n o t thus , and why no teleolo g y can account for social a rt ic ulations is that the di s cu rs i v e com pass of the democratic revolu tion opens the way for politic a l lo g i cs as di verse as ri g ht wing pop ul i s m and totalitarianism on the one hand , and a radical demo­ crac y on the other . Therefore, if we wish to cons truct the hegemonic a rti culations which allow us to set o ursel v es in the direction of the latter, we must understand in all their radical he t erogeneity the range o f p o ss i b i lit i es which are opened in the terrain of democracy itself. I t ca n not be doub ted tha t the prolifera t ion of new antagonisms and o f new r i g hts is lead i ng to a crisis o f the hegem o nic formation o f the post-war period . B u t the form i n which this crisis will be overcome is far fr o m be i n g predetermined, as the manner in which r i g h ts will be defined and the forms which strug gle agains t subordi­ nation will adopt are not unequ ivocally established . We are faced here with a true p ol y sem i a . Feminism or ecolog y , for exa m ple, exist in multiple forms , which depend upon the manner in whi ch the a n tagon i s m is discursively constitute d Thus we have a radical femin i s m which attacks men as such; a feminism of difference which s eeks to revalo rize fem in i nity ; and a M arxist fe m inism for which the fundamental enemy is capital i s m considered as li n ked indis­ s olubly to patriarchy . There are therefore a plurality of discursive fo r ms o f co n s truct i ng an antagonism on the b asis of the different m odes of women's subordina tion . Ecolo g y , in the same way , may be a nt i ca pi t al i st , anti-industrialist , a uthori t arian , libertarian , socia­ l is t , rea c ti ona ry , and so on . The fo rms of articulation of an an­ tagon is m therefore, far fro m being predetermined, are the result of a hegemo nic s t ruggle This a ffirmation has important conse q uences a s it i m p lie s that these new s truggles do not ne ce ssa r i l y have a p r ogre ssi ve character, and that it is th e re fore an error to think, as ,

-

'

'

.

'

'

,

-

,

.

,

Hegemony and Radica l Democra cy

1 69

many do , that t h ey s pon taneousl y ta k e their p la ce in th e context o f left-wing p o l i tics . M any have d e vo te d themselves s ince the 1 960s to the search for a new priv i leg ed revolutionary s u bject which might c o m e to replace t h e working cl a s s , with the latter seen as having failed in its historical mission of ema n cipa t ion . The ecological move­ m en t s , the s t u d e nt movements , feminism and the m a rgin a l m asses have bee n the most popular candidates for the carrying out of th is new role . But it is clear that such an a p proa ch does not es cape the trad i tional p r o bl e ma ti c , b u t s imp l y d i sp l a c es i t . The re is no unique p ri v i leged p osi t ion fro m which a uniform contin u it y of e ffe c t s will fo ll o w , c o n c l u d i ng with the t ransformation of society as a whole . All struggles , whether those o f w o r ker s or ot h er p olit i c al subjects, left to themsleves , have a partial character, and can be a r t i cu l a t e d to very d i ffe re nt discourses . It is this articulation which gives t h em their character, not the p l a ce from which they come . There is there­ fo r e no s u bj ect - nor , further, any ' n e ce ss it y' - which is abso­ l u t el y radical and i r re cu p era b l e by t he dominant order, and w hic h constitutes an absolutely gua rantee d point of d ep arture for a total transformation . (Equally, th ere is n o t hi n g which permanently a s s u res the stability o f an e s tablishe d o r d er . ) I t is in relation to this poi n t that we consider that cer tai n highly interes ting an a l y s es such as t h o s e of Alain To ur ai n e and Andre Gorz, do not go far eno ug h in th e ir break w i th the traditional problematic. 20 Gorz, fo r ex amp l e , giv e n that he a tt ri b u tes to the ' non-class o f non-w o rker s ' the p ri v ileg e which h e denies to the p roletariat, really does no m o re than invert the Marxist po si ti on . It is still the location at the level of relations of pro d u cti o n which is deter m inin g , even w hen , as in Gorz ' s case, the revolutionary subject is defined by th e absence of that insertio n . As for Touraine, his search for the social movement which can p la y in the ' p r ogram m ed so ci e ty ' the role w hich was play ed by t h e worki n g class in in d u s tr i a l society indicates clearly that he too d o es not q u est io n the idea of the u n i q u eness of the s ocia l force which can brin g about a radical change in a d eter m inate s o ciety . That the forms of r e s i s t ance to new forms of subordination are p ol y se m i c and can per fe ct ly well be articulated into an anti-demo­ c rat i c discourse , is c l ear l y demonstrated by t h e advances of the 'new right ' in recent years . Its no ve lty lies in its successful articulation to neo-liberal d i s co u r s e of a series of democratic resis tances to the transformation of s o c ial rel a ti o n s . Pop u lar support for the Reagan and Thatcher p roj ect s of d i s m ant l in g the W el fa re S tate is expla ined by t h e fact that t h e y have succeeded in mobilizing ag ains t the latter a whole series of resis tances to th e bureaucra tic character of the new

1 70 forms of state organizatio n . Th at the chains of equivalence wh i ch each hegemonic a rti c ulati o n constitutes can be of grea tl y d i ffering

natures is pa tently demonstrated by th is neo-conservative di sco urse: the a nt a g onisms constituted around bureaucratization are articulated in the defence o f the t r a d i ti o n al inequalities of sex and race . The defence o f ac qu i re d rig hts fo u n d ed on whi t e , male supremacy which feeds the conservative reaction t h e reb y broadens t he area of its h e gem o n i c effects . An a nt ago nism is thus co n s tru ct e d between two poles: the ' people ' , which includes all those who defend the tradi­ tional values and freedom of enterprise; and their adversaries: the s tate and all the subversives ( femini s ts , blacks , young people and permi s si ve s of every type) . An attempt is thus m ad e to construct a new historic bloc in which a pl u r a li ty of economic, social and cultural aspects are articulated. Stuart Hall has p oi nte d out, for example, how Thatcherite p op ul i s m ' combines the resonant themes of o rganic To ryi s m - nation , fa m il y , d ut y , a u t hor ity standards , traditionalism - with the aggressive themes of a revived neo­ li be r a l i s m - self-interest, c omp eti t i v e individualism, anti­ s tatis m . ' 2 1 In the case of the United States , Allen Hunter shows that the attack of the New Right on the W elfare State is the point at w hich the cultural and eco n omi c critiques come to g e t h e r Both affirm that '

'

,

.

the s tate interferes 'with the economic and ethical features of the m a rke t in t h e name o f a s p e c io us egalitarianis m . They also attack welfare liberalism for creating state intervention in the priva te lives of the p e o p le and the moral structure of s o ciet y in such areas as th e s ocialization of c hil d re n and the relation between the s exe s . ' 2 2 It is p recisely this polysemic character of every antagonism which makes its me a n i ng de p en d e n t upon a h e g e m onic articulation to t he extent that, as we have seen, the terrain of hegemonic practices is c o n s t i t u t e d out of the fundamental a m b iguit y of the social, . the impos s i b i lit y of establishing in a definitive manner the meaning of a n y s t r u g g l e , whether considered in isolation or throug h its fixing in a r e lati o n a l system . A s we have said, the re are h e g em on ic practices because this radical un fixity m ak e s it i m pos s i b le to consider the p o lit i ca l strug g le as a game in which the iden tity of t h e opposing forces is constituted from the s tart . This means that any p olit ics w ith h egem o n i c as p i r a ti ons can never consider itself as repetition, as taking p l a ce in a s pace del i m i t i ng a pure i nte rn a l it y but must always mo b i liz e i t s e l f on a plur a l i t y of pl a ne s If the m ean in g of each s t r u g g l e is not given fro m the start, th i s means that it is fixed p a r t i al l y - only to th e extent that the struggle moves outside itself a n d , t hr o ugh chains of equivalence, links its e l f structurally to other ,

.

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

171

struggles . Every a n tagon is m , left free to itself, i s a flo a tin g signi fier, a ' wild' an t ago n i s m which does not p rede te r m i n e the form in which it can be articulated to other elements in a social formation . This permits us to es ta bl i s h the radical difference between the cu rrent social s trug gles and t h o s e which t o o k pl a c e before the democratic revolution . The l a t t e r always took pl a ce in the context of the denial ofg iven and relatively stable i den ti ti es ; as a result , the fro n t ie r s of the a n tago nis m were p lainly v isible and did not r eq ui re to be con­ structed - the hegemonic dimension of p o liti c s was co n seq u ently absent. But in the p resent industrial societies , the very p r o li fer ation of w i d ely d i ffer ing points of rupture, the p re cariou s character of all social i d e n tit y , lead also to a b l urri n g o f th e frontiers . In co n ­ sequence, the constructed ch arac t e r of the demarcating lines is made more evident by the greater i nstabil i ty of the latter, and the dis­ p l a c eme nt of t h e frontiers and internal divisions of the s o ci a l become more radical . It is in this field and from this p er spe cti v e that the neo-conservative project acquires all its hegemonic dimensions .

The Anti-Democratic Offensive What the neo-conservative or n eo l i b e ral 'new right' calls into question is the type of articulation which has led democratic l i be ra l i s m t o j u s ti fy the in te rven tio n of t h e state in th e s truggle against ine q u al i ti es and th e installation of the Welfare State. The c ri t i q ue of this transformation is not a recen t de v el op men t . As lo n g ago as 1 944, in The Road to Serfdom, Hayek launched a vi o l en t attack on the interventionist state and the various forms of economic pla n ning that were b e in g implemented a t the time. He announced that the Western s o c i e ti es were in the p roce ss o f be co mi n g collec­ tivist , and thus taking off in the d i r e c t ion of totalitarianism . Accord­ i ng to him , the threshold of collectivism is passed at the moment in w hi ch the law, instead of being a means of con tro l l in g the admini­ stration , is ut i lized by i t in order to attribute new powers to it s el f and to fa c i l i t a t e the e x pansi o n of the bureaucracy . From this p o i n t on it is in e v i ta ble that the power of the law will de cl i n e , while that of the bur e a u cra cy increase s . In real ity , what is at i ss u e t h rou gh this neo­ liberal critique is the very articulation be t w een liberalism and dem o cracy which was p e r fo rm e d du rin g the course of the nineteenth centur y . 23 T hi s 'democratization ' of li b e rali s m which was the res u lt of m u l t i p l e s tru g g les , would eventually have a pro fo und impact u po n the fo r m in w hich the very idea ofliberty was conceived . From -

,

,

­

,

1 72

the traditional liberal definition o f Locke - 'liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others' - we had passed with John Stuart M ill to the acceptance of 'political' li b ert y and democratic pa rti ci p a t i on as an important component of liberty. More recently , in social-democratic discourse, liberty has c o m e to mean the c a pa c i t y ' to m a k e certain choices and to k e e p open a s e r i e s of real alternatives . I t is thus that poverty , lack of education, and great disparities in the conditions of life are today considered offences a ga ins t lib e r t y It is this transformation which n eo l ib eralism wishes to question . Hayek is , without doubt, the one who has devoted himself most s tren u o u sl y to reformulating the p rin c ipl es of liberalism i n order to combat t h o s e shifts of meaning which have permitted the broad­ e n in g and deepening of liberties . He proposes to reaffirm the 'true' nature of li b e r al is m as the doctrine which seeks to reduce to the minimum the powers of the state, in order to maximize the central p oli t ic al objective: individual liberty . This comes once again to be defined n eg a ti v el y as 'that condition of men in which coercion of some by o thers is reduced as much as possible in society' . 24 Political l i b e rty i s o stensib l y excluded from this definition . According to Hay ek , 'democracy (is) essentially a means , a utilitarian device for sa fe g u ard i ng internal peace and individual freedom . '25 This attempt to return to the traditional conception of libe r ty , which characterizes it as non-interference with the right o f unlimited appropriation and with the mechanisms of the capitalist market economy, exerts itself to discredit every ' p os i t i ve conc eption ofliberty as being potentially totalitarian. It affirms that a liberal political order can only exist in the framework of a capitalist free market e cono m y In Capitalism and Freedom M ilton Friedman declares that this is the only type of social organization which respects the p rinciple of individual liberty, as it cons titutes the only economic system capable of coordinating the activities of a great n u mb er of people without recourse to coercion . All state intervention, except in connection with matters that cannot be regulated t h ro u gh the market, is cons i d ere d as an attack on individual lib erty The notion o f social or redistributive justice, in s o far as it is invoked to j u sti fy intervention by the state, is one of the favourite targets of the neo-liberals. According to Hayek, it is a notion which is completely unin tel li gi ble in a liberal society, as 'in such a system in which each is allowed to use his knowledge for his own purposes the concept of " social justice" is necessarily empty and meaningless , b ec a use in it nobody's will can determine the rel a tiv e incomes of the different people, or prevent that they be '

.

-

'

.

.

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

1 73

p a r t ly de p en de n t on acciden t . ' 26 From a 'libertarian ' p ers p ective Robert Nozick has equa lly ques­ t i oned the idea that there can exist such a thin g as a distributive justice whic h the s t ate sh o u ld pro vide . 27 In his view , the sole function o f the st ate co m p a tib l e with liberty is that of proteding what l e g it im ate l y belongs to us , while it does not have the .i.ght to establ i sh taxes which go beyond what is re q u i r ed for the develop­ ment o f p o l ici ng activities . In cont ras t to the American ultrali­ bertarian s , who reject all st a te in ter v en ti o n , 28 N oz ick ju s tifies the existence of the minimal state - that is to say , law and order. But a st at e which went bey o n d that would be unjustifiable, as in that case it wou l d violate the rights of individuals . In any c a se , Nozick clai m s , there wo u ld not be anything available which could be legally dis­ tributed by the state , as eve rythin g that e xisted would be p o ss es sed by i n div i d u a ls or be u n d e r thei r l e giti m a te control. Another way of a t tack ing the subversive effects of the articulation be twee n liberalism and de m o c racy is , in the manner of t he neocon­ servatives , to redefme the n o ti o n of demo cra cy itself in s u ch a way as to restrict its fi eld of ap p lica tion and limit p olitical p arti cip a t ion to an ever narrower a rea . Thus B rzez in s k i proposes to 'increasingly separate t he poli t i cal system from society and to begin to conceive the two as sep ara te enti t ies . '29 The o bj ecti v e is to remove public decisions more and mo re fro m po li ti cal control, and to make them the exclusive responsibility of experts . In such a case the effect would be a depoliticization of fu nd amental decisions, at the eco n om i c level as wel l as at social and politi cal levels. Such a s o cie t y , in his view, would be democratic 'in a libertarian sense; de m oc rat ic not in terms of exercising fundamental choices concerning policy-making but in the se n se of maintaining certain area s of au tonom y for individual self-expression' . 30 A ltho u g h the demo cra ti c ideal is not openly atta ck e d , an at tem p t is m ade to empty it of all substance and to propose a n ew definition o f democracy which in fact would serve to legitimize a reg ime in which p olitical pa rtici p a tio n might be v i rt ua l l y non-existent. In France , among the theoreticians of the new right, there has been a far more a u d aci o us and frontal critique of democracy . Thus its principal s p okesman , Alain de Benoist, d e cla res o penl y that the French Revolution marked one of the fun dam en tal stages of d egen­ eration of Western civilization - a degeneration which began with C h r isti a ni ty , the ' B olshe v is m of Antiquity' . He further argues that it is the s pi ri t itself of the 1 789 Declaration of the Rights of Man which h a s to be reje cted . S kilfu lly re ca p t uring a series of libertarian themes

1 74 from the movement of 1968 , Alain de Benoist considers that in attributing a fundamental role to universal suffrage , democracy places all individuals on the same level and fails to recognize the i mportant differences among them . Thence derives a uniformization and massification of the citizenry , upon whom is imposed a single norm which shows the necessarily totalitarian character of democracy . In the face of the chain of equivalences equality = identit y = totalitarianism , the new right proclaims the 'right to dif­ ference ' , and affirms the sequence difference= inequality = liberty . De Benoist writes : 'I call " right-wing" the attitude which considers the diversity of the world , and hence inequalities , as a good, and the progressive homogenization of the world, favoured and brought about by the bimillennarian discourse of the totalitarian ideology , as an evil. '3 1 It would be an error to underestimate the importance of these attemp ts to redefine notions such as 'liberty ' , 'equality ', 'justice' and 'democracy ' . The traditional dogmatism of the Left, which attri­ buted secondary importance to problems at the centre of political philosophy , based itself upon the 'superstructural' character of such p roblems. In the end , the Left interested itself only in a limited range of issues linked to the infrastructure and the subjects constituted within it, while the whole of the vast field of culture and the defmi­ tion of reality built upon the basis of it, the whole effort of hege­ monic rearticulation of the diverse discursive formations, was left free for the initiative of the right . And, in effect , if the whole of the liberal-democratic conception of the state , as associated with the Right, was simply seen as the superstructural form of bourgeois domination , it was difficult - without falling into crass oppor­ tunism - to consider a different attitude possible . However, once we have abandoned the base/superstructure distinction, and rejected the view that there are privileged points from which an emanci­ patory political practice can be launched , it is clear that the consti­ tution of a hegemonic left alternative can only come from a complex process of convergence and political construction , to which none of the hegemonic articuliltions constructed in any area of social reality can be of indifference . The form in which liberty , equality, democracy and justice are defined at the level of political philosophy may have important consequences at a variety of other levels of d is course, and contribute decisi vely to shaping the common sense of the m asses. Naturally , these irradiation effects cannot be considered as the simple adoption of a philosophical point of view at the level of 'ideas ' , but should rather be seen as a more com plex set of discursive-

Hegemony and Radical

Democracy

1 75

hegemonic operations embracing a variety of aspects , both institu­ tional and ideological , t h r oug h which certain 'themes ' are trans­ formed into nodal points of a discursive formation (i . e . of a h i s toric bloc) . If neo-liberal ideas have acquired an unquestionable poli t i c al resonance, it is because they have permitted the articulation of resistances to the g rowing bureaucratization of social relations to which we referred earlie r . Thus the new conservatism has succeeded in presenting its programme of dismantling the Welfare State as a defence of individual liberty against the oppressor state. But in order for a philosophy to become 'organic ideology ' , certain ana log i es must exis t between the type of s u bjec t which it c o ns t r u c ts and the s u bj ec t positions which are constituted at the level of other social relations . If the theme of individual liberty can be mobilized so effectively , it is also because, despite its articulation with the democratic imaginary , liberalism has con tin ued to retain as a m a trix of production of the individual what M acpherson called ' possessive individualism ' . This latter constructs the rights of individuals as exis ting before society , and often in opposition to it. To the extent that m o re and more numerous subjects demanded these rights in the framework of the democratic revolution, it was inevitable that the matrix of possessive individualism would be broken , as the rights of some came into collision with the rights of others . It is in this context of crisis of democratic liberalism that it is necessary to locate the offensive which seeks to dissolve the subversive poten tial of t he articulations between liberalism and democracy , reaffirming the centrality of liberalism as the defence of individual liberty against all interference from the state and in opposition to the democratic component, which is founded upon equal rights and popular sovere­ ign t y . But this e ffort to restrict the terrain of democratic struggle, and to preserve the inequalities existing in a number of social relation s , demands the defence of a hierarchical and anti-egalitarian principle which had been endangered by liberalism itself. This is why the liberals increasingly resort to a set of themes from con­ s e rv a t ive philosophy , in which they find the necessary ingredients to justify inequality . We are thus witnessing the emergence of a new hegemonic project, that of liberal-
1 76 Radical Democracy: Alternative for a New Left The conservative reaction thus has a clearly hegemonic character . It s eeks a p rofound transformation of the terms of political discourse and the crea tion of a new 'defmition of reality' , which under the cover of the defence of 'individual liberty' would legitimize in­ equalities and restore the hierarchical relations which the struggles of previous decades had destroyed . What is at stake here is in fact the c re a tio n of a new historic bloc.; Converted into organic ideology, liberal-conservatism would construct a new hegemonic articulation through a s y s tem of equivalences which would unify multiple subject p osit ions around an individualist definition of rights and a negative conception of liberty . We are once again faced, then , with the displacement of the frontier of the social . A series of subject p ositions w hich were accepted as legitimate differences in the hegemonic formation corresponding to the Welfare State are expelled fro m the field of social positivity and construed as negativity - the parasites on social security (M rs Thatcher's 'scroungers') , the inefficiency associated with union privileges, and state subsidies , and so on . lt is clear, therefore, that a left alternative can only consist of the construction of a different system of equivalents , which establishes social divisio n on a new basis . In the face of the project for the reconstruction of a hierarchic society , the alternative of the Left should consist of locating itself fully in the field of the democratic revolution and expand ing the chains of equivalents between the different struggles against oppression . The task oj the Lift therifore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and exp and it in the dire ct io n oj a radical and plural dem o cra cy We shall ex p lain the dimensions of this task in the following pages , but the very fact that it is possible arises out of the fact that the meaning of liberal dis cours e on individual rights is not definitively fixed; and j ust as this unfixity permits their articulation with elements of conservative discourse, it also p er mi t s different forms of articulation and redefiniti o n which accentuate the democratic moment. That is to say, as with any other social element , the elements making up the liberal discourse never appear as crystallized, and may be the field of hegemonic struggle. It is not in the abandonment of the democratic terrain but, on the contrary , in the extension of the field of demo­ cr a tic struggles to the whole of civil society and the state, that the pos s ibility resides for a hegemonic strategy of the Left . It is never­ theless important to understand the radical extent of the changes .

Hegemony

and Radical

Democracy

1 77

which a re necessary in the p oli ti ca l im ag ina ry of the Left, if it wishes to succeed in fou n ding a p oli tical practice fully located in the fi eld of the democratic revolution and conscious of the depth and v a ri e ty of the hegemonic a r ticu l a ti o ns which the present conjuncture requi res . The fundamental obstacle in th is task is the one to which we have b een d raw ing attention from the begin nin g of this book: essentialist a p r i o ris m , the conviction that the social is sutured at some point, fro m which it is p ossibl e to fix the m eanin g of any event inde­ pendently of any arti cul a to ry pr actic e . This has led to a fai lure to understand the constant d isplacem en t of the nodal points structuring a social formation, and to an o rg an iz a ti on of discourse in te rm s of a logic of 'a prio ri p ri vi leged points ' w hich seri ousl y limits the Left's ca p a ci t y fo r ac tion and p oli tical analysis . This logic of privileged p o ints h a s op er a ted in a variety of directions . From the p o i n t of view of the determining of the fu nd amental an ta g onis ms , the basi c obs tacle, as we have seen , has been classism: that is to say , the idea that the work ing class represents the p rivileged agent in which the funda­ mental i m pulse of soci al change resides - without perceiving that the very orientation of the working class depends upon a po li ti cal balance of fo r c es and the radicalization of a plu rality of democratic struggles which are decided in go o d part outside the class itself. From t he point of view of the social levels at which the p ossibili ty o f implem enting ch an ges is co ncentrated , the fundamental obstacles have b een statism - the idea that the expansion of the role of the sta te is the panacea for all p ro blems; and economism (particularly in its techno cratic v ersi on ) - the idea that fro m a successful econo mic stra teg y there n ecessarily follows a con tin u i ty of political e ffec ts which can be clearly specified . But if we look for the ultimate core of this essentialist fixity , we sh a ll find it in the fundamental nodal point which has galvanized the political i magination of the Left : the classic concept of 'revolution' , cast i n the Jacobin mould . Of cou rse , there would be no thing in the concept of 'revolution' to which obje c tio n could be made if we understood by it the overdetermination of a set of st ru ggles in a point of political rupture, fro m which there foJ Iow a variety of effects spread across the whole of the fabric of society . If this were all that was involved, there is n o doubt that in many cases the violent overthrow of a r ep r essiv e regi m e is the con di ti on of every demo­ cratic advance . But the classic concept of revolu tion i m p lied much more than this : it imp lie d the foundational character of the rev olu­ tio na ry act, the institution of a po in t of concentration of power from which society could be ' ra tionally ' reorganized . This is the perspec-

1 78 tive which is incompatible with the plurality and the opening which a radical demo cracy requires . Once again radicalizing certain of Gramsci 's concepts , we find the theoretical instruments which allow us to re dimens i on the revolutionary act itself. The concept of a 'war of position' implies p recisely the process character of every radical transformation the revolutio n a ry act is, simply , an internal moment of this process . The multiplication of political spaces and the p re v en ting of the concentration of power in one point are, then, preconditions of every truly democratic transformation of society . The classic con ception of socialism supposed that the disappearance of private ownership of the means of production would set up a chain of effects which , over a whole his to ri ca l epoch , would lead to the extinction of all forms of subordination . Today we know that this is not so. There are not, for example, necessary links between anti-sexism and anti-cap i talism, and a unity between the two can o n ly be the result of a hege mo ni c articulation . It follows that it is only possible to construct this articulation on the basis of separate s t rug gles which only exercise their e q ui v alent i al and overdeter­ mini ng effects in certain spheres of the social . . This requires the autonomization of the spheres of struggle and the multiplication of p o l itica l spaces , which is incompatible with the concentration of po wer and knowledge that classic Jacobinism and its different socialist v ar iants im ply . Of course, every project for radical demo­ c ra cy implies a socialist dimension, as it is necessary to put an end to capita l is t relations of production, which are at the root of numerous rela tio ns of subordination; but so cialism is one of the com ponents of a project for radical democracy , not vice versa. For this very re as o n , when one speaks of the socialization of the means of produ ction as one element in the strategy for a radical and plural d emo cra cy , one mu st insist that this cannot mean only workers' self-management , as what is at stake is true participation by all s u bj e c t s in d ec i s i ons about what is to be produced , how it is to be produced , and the forms in which the product is to be distributed . Only in s u ch conditions can there be social appropriation of produc­ tion . To reduce the issue to a problem of workers ' self-management is to ign o re the fact that the workers ' 'interests' can be constructed in such a w a y that they do not take account of ecological demands or d e man d s of other groups whi ch , without being producers, are affected by decisions taken in the field of production . 32 From the p oint of view of a hegemonic politics , then , the crucial limi tation of the traditional left perspective is that it attempts to de term ine a priori agents of change, levels of effectiveness in the field -

,

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

1 79

of the social, and privileged points and moments of rupture. All these obstacles come together into a common core, which is the refusal to abandon the assumption of a sutured society . Once this is discarded , however, there arises a whole set of new problems which we should now tackle. These may be summarized in three questions which we shall address in turn: 1) How do we determine the surfaces oj emergence and th e jorms oj articulation of the antagonisms which a project for radical democracy should embrace? 2) To w h a t extent is the pluralism proper to a radical democracy compatible with the effects of equivalence which, as we have seen, are characteristic of every hegemonic articulation? 3) To what extent is the logic implicit in the displacements of the democratic imaginary suffici en t to define an h egemonic p roject? On the first point it is evident that , just as the apriorism implicit in a topography of the social has proved untenable, so it i s impossible to define a p riori the surfaces on which antagonisms will be constituted " Thus , although several left politics may be conceived and specified in certain contexts , there is not one politics of the Left whose contents can be determined in isolation from all contextual reference. It is for this reason that all attempts to proceed to such determination a priori have n ecessari l y been unilateral and arbitrary , with no validity in a great number of circumstances . The exploding of the uniqueness of mean­ ing of the political - which is link ed to the phenomena of combined and uneven development - dissolves every possibility of fixing the signified in terms of a division between left and right. Say we try to define an ultimate content of the left which underlies all the contexts in w hich the word has been used: we shall never find one which does not present exceptions . We are exactly in the field of W ittgenstein's language games: the closest we can get is to find 'family resem­ blances ' . Let us examine a few examples . In recent years much has been talked about the need to deepen the line of separation between state and civil society . It is not difficult to realize, however, that this proposal does not furnish the Left with any theory of the surface of emergence of antagonisms w hi ch can be generalized beyond a limited number of situations . It would appear to imply that every form of domination is incarnated in the state. But it is clear that civil society is also the seat of numerous relations of oppression , and, in consequence, of antagonisms and democratic struggles . With a greater o r lesser clarity in their results, theories s uch as Althusser's analysis of 'ideological state apparatuses' sought to create a con­ ceptual framework with which to think these phenomena of dis­ placement in the field of domination. In the case of th e feminist

180 s t r u gg le , the s tate is an i m p or tant means for effecting an advance , fr eq uently against civil s o ci ety, in le gislati on which combats sexism . In numerous u n de rd e v e lo p ed countries the ex p a nsion o f the functions of the cen tral state is a means of establishing a frontier in the struggle against extreme fo rms of exploitation by lan dow n ing oligarchies . Furthermore, the state is not a h o mog eneou s medium, separated fro m civil society by a ditch, but an uneven set of branches and functions , onl y relatively integrated b y the hege m onic practices which take place within it. Above all , it should not be forgotten that t he state can be the seat of numerous democratic antagonisms , to the extent that a s e t of functions w ithin i t p ro fessi o n al or technical, for ex a m p le - can enter into relations of antagonism with centres of power, within the state itself, which seek to restrict and deform th e m None of this means to say , of course , that in c er tain cases the division between state and civil socie ty cannot constitute the funda­ mental p oli ti cal line of demarcation : this is what happens when the s tate has been transformed into a bureaucratic excrescence imposed by fo r ce upon the rest of so ciety , as in Eastern Europe, or in the Ni cara g u a of the Somozas , which was a di c ta to rs hi p sustained by a m i l i t a ry apparatus . At any event, it is clearly im p os s i b le to identify either the state or civil society a priori as the su r face of emergence of democratic antagonism s . The same can be said when it is a question of det er m i n i n g th e p o sitive o r negati ve character, from the p o int of view of the pol iti cs of the L eft , o f certa in o rg aniz ational forms . Let us consider, for example, the party form. The party as a poli tical institution can, in certain circumstances , be an instance of bureau­ cratic crystallization which acts as a brake upon mass movem ents; but in others it can be t he o rg ani zer of dis p ers ed and p oli tica lly v irgin masses , and can thus serve as an instrument for the expansion and d eep enin g of democratic s truggles The im por t an t po i nt is that inasmuch as the field of s oci ety in general has disappeared a s a v alid framework of p o li ti cal an al y s i s , there has also d is a p pe a red the p os s i­ b i li ty of es t a b lis hin g a general theory of po l i tics on the basis of topographic categories that is to say , of ca teg o r ies which fix in a permanent mann er th e me anin g of certain contents as di ffere nces which can be located within a relational com p l ex The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that it is im­ p o s s ibl e to s p e cify a priori surfaces of emergence of a nt ago ni sms as the re is no surface which is not constantly s u b ve r ted by the over­ d ete r min i n g effects o f others , and because there is , in consequence, a co n s t an t d i s p lacemen t of the so cia l lo g ics characteristic of cer t ain spheres towards other spheres . This is , among other things , the -

.

'

'

.

'

'

-

.

,

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

181

'demonstration effect' that we have seen i n o p e ra tio n in th e case o f the d e mocr a ti c revolution . A democratic st r ugg l e can autonomiz e a ce r t a i n space within which i t d ev elo ps , and produce effects of equi­ val e nce w ith other struggles in a different p ol itic a l space. It is to this p l u r a l i ty of the social that the project for a radical dem o c racy is linked , and t he p ossibility of it em a n ates dir ectl y from the decentred character of the social agents , from the discursive plu ra li ty which constitutes them as subjects , and from the displacements w hich take p lac e wi t hi n that p lu rality Th e o riginal forms of democratic t h ough t were linked to a positive and unified co ncept i o n of human nature, and, to that extent, they t en ded to co nstitute a sin gle space within which that nature would ha ve to manifest the effects of its radical liberty and e q u ality : it was thus that there was constituted a public s pace linked to t he idea of citizenship The p ublic/private d i s t inc ti o n constituted the separation between a space in which differences were erased th rough the uni vers al eq uiv alence of citizens, and a p lura lity of private spa ces in which the ful l force of those differences was maintained . It is at this point that the over­ determ in a tion of effects linked t o the democratic revolution begins to dis p l a ce the line of demarcation between the public a n d the private and to politicize soci al relations; that is , to mu l ti pl y the s p a ces in which the new logics of equivalence dissolve t he di ffe ren tial p os i ti v i t y of the s o ci a l : this is the lo n g process which stretches from the workers ' struggles of the nin eteenth century to the struggle of women , diverse racial and sexual minorities, and diverse marginal groups, and the new an ti institu tion a l s truggl es in th e present cent ur y Th us w ha t ha s b e en ex p lo ded is the idea and the reali ty itself of a unique space of constitution of t he p oli tic al . What we are witnessing is a politicization far more radical than any we have known in the past , because it tends to dissolve the distinction between the public a nd the private, not in terms of the encroachment on the priv a te by a u n ified p u b li c space, but in terms o f a p ro li­ feration of ra dic ally new and different political spaces . We are con­ fronted with the emergence of a plurality oj subjects, whos e forms of constitution and div e rs ity it is on ly p ossible to think if we re l inqu ish the category of 'subject' as a u ni fied a nd uni fying es sen ce Is this plurality of the p o liti c al not in cont ra dicti o n, h ow e v er with the unification res ul tin g from the eq ui val ent ial effects w hi ch as we know , are the condition of antagonisms? Or, in o th er words, is there not an i n comp a ti b ili ty b e tw ee n t h e proliferati o n of p o l iti ca l spaces p ro per to a ra dic a l demo cr acy and the constructio n of collective i d ent it ies on the basis of th e l og ic of e q uival ence ? Once again , we are .

.

­

-

.

.

,

,

182

faced here with the apparent dichotomy autonomy/hegemony , to which we have already referred in the previous chapter, and whose political implications and effects we should now consider . Let us co n s i d e r the que s ti on from two perspectives : a) from the point of view of the terrain on which the di ch oto m y can p resent i ts el f as exclusive; and b) fro m the p oin t of view of the possibility and the historical conditions of the emergence of that terrain of exclusion. Let us b eg i n , then, by cons i de r ing the terrain of the incompati­ b ility between equivalential effects and autonomy . First, the logic of equivalence. We have already indicated that, inasmuch as antago­ nism arises not only in the dichotomized space w hi c h constitutes it but also in the field of a pl u ral ity of the social which alwa y s over­ flows that space, it is only by coming out of itself and hegemonizing external elements that the identity of the two poles of the anatago­ nis m is consolidated. The strengthening of specific democratic s t ruggle s requires , therefore, the expansion of chains of equivalence which extend to other struggles . The equivalential articulation be­ tween anti-racism, anti-sexism and anti-capitalism, for example, requires a hege m o ni c construction which, in certain circumstances, may be the condition for the consolidation of each one of these struggles . The l ogic of equivalence, then , taken to its ultimate con­ sequences , would i mply the dissolution of the au t onomy of the spaces in which e a c h one of these struggles is constituted; not neces­ sarily because any of them become subordinated to others, but because they have all become, strictly s peaking, equivalent symbols of a un i qu e and in di vis i b le struggle. The antagonism would thus ha ve achieved the conditions of total transparency , to the extent that all u n ev ennes s had b een eliminated, and the differential specificity of the sp aces in which each of the democratic struggl e s was constituted had been dissolved . Second , the logic of autonomy . Each of these struggles retains its differential specificity with respect to the others . The p o litica l spaces in which each of them is constituted are different and unable to communicate with each other. But it is easily seen tha t this apparently libertarian logic is only sustained on the basis of a new clo s ure . For if each struggle transforms the moment of its sp ecificity into an absolute pri n cip l e of i den t ity, the set of these s trugg l es can o nly be conceived of as an absolute system oj diJIerences, and this system can only b e tho ugh t as a closed totality . That is to say, the trans­ parency of the social has simply been transferred from the unique­ ness and intelligibility of a system of equivalences to the uniqueness and i n t el ligibi li t y of a system of differences. But in both cases we are dealing with discourses which seek , through their categories, to

Hegemony and Radical Democracy 1 83 dominate the social as a to tality . In bo th cases , therefore, the mo m en t of totality cea s es t o b e a horizon and becomes ajou n da tio n . It is only in this rational and h omog en e o us s pa ce t h a t t h e l o g i c of equivalence and the l o g ic of autonomy are contradictory , b e ca u s e it is only there that social identities are p re se n ted as already acquired and fixed, and it

is only there , therefore , th at two ultimately co n tr ad i cto ry social logics find a t e rr ai n in which th e s e ultimate e ffe c ts can develop fully. But a s , by definition, this u l ti mat e moment never arrives, the in­ c o m p atib il it y b etwe en equ iv alen ce an d au ton o m y dis a p pea rs . The status of each ch a n g es : it is no l on g e r a ca s e ofjoundations of th e social order, but of social logics, which intervene to di ffe re nt degrees in the constitution of every social ident it y , and which partially limit their m u tua l effects. From this we can deduce a basic p reco ndition for a radically libertarian c on cepti on o f po l i ti c s : the refusal to dominate - in tellectu all y or po l iti c a ll y - every presumed ' u ltima t e founda­ tion' of the s o ci al . Every conception whi ch seeks to base i t s el f on a knowledge of this foundation finds itself fa ce d , sooner or l a te r , with the Rousseauian paradox according to which m en should be obliged to be free . This ch a n ge in th e status of certain co n cep ts , whi ch tr ans fo rms int o so ci al l o gi cs what were pre v iou sly foundations , allows us to understand the varie t y of dimensions on w h i ch a d e m o c ra ti c p ol iti cs is based . It all o w s us , first of all , to id en t i fy with pre ci sio n the m eaning and the limits of what we may call the ' p rin c i p le of demo­ cratic eq u iv ale nce ' . We are able to specify the m ean ing because it b e co me s clear that th e mere di s pla ce m e nt of the e galitari an imaginary is not sufficient to p ro du ce a tr ans fo rm a t i o n in the identity of the groups upon which thi s d i sp la ce m e nt operates . On the basis of th e principle of e qua l ity , a corporatively constituted g rou p can demand its rights to equali t y with other groups , but to the extent th at the de m a n ds of va ri o u s groups are di ffe ren t and in many cases i n c o mp atibl e among themselves, this does not lead to any real equivalence be tw e e n the various democratic demands . In all those cases in w hic h th e proble mati c of possessive individualism is main­ tained as the matrix of p ro duc t i o n of the id en tit y of the different groups , this result is inevitable. Fo r there to be a 'democratic equi­ v a l e nce ' something else is necessary : the co n s tru c tio n of a n e w 'co m mon sense' which c h anges the iden t i t y of th e different gr o u p s , in such a way t ha t the de m a n d s of e ach group are articulated eq u i v a­ l en t i ally with those of th e others - in M arx's words , 'that the free dev elopm e nt of each sh o uld be the condition fo r t h e fre e dev elop ment of all' . That is , equiv alen ce is al w a y s h ege m o ni c insofar as it ­

1 84 does not si m p ly establish an 'alliance' between g i ven interests , but m o di fie s the very i d entit y of the forces en gag i n g in that alliance. For the defence of th e interests of the wo rk ers not to be made at the expense of the rights o f wom en , immig rants or consumers , it is necessary to establish an equivalence between these different struggles . It is only on this condition that struggl es a gainst power become t r u ly de mo cra tic, and that the demanding of ri g hts is not carried out on the b as is of an individualistic problematic, but in the context of respect for the rights to equality of other s ubord ina ted groups . But if this is the m ea n i ng of the p ri nci p le of democratic e q u i v alen ce , its limits are also cle a r . This total eq ui v a len ce never exists; every equi va l e nce is penetrated by a constitutive preca rious­ ness, derived from the unevenness of the so cia l . To this extent, the p r ec ario usn es s of every equi v alenc e demands that i t be c o m ple­ mented/limited by the logic of autonomy . It is for this reason that the demand for eq uality is not sufficient , but needs to be balanced by the demand for liberty, w hich leads us to sp e ak of a radical and plural democracy . A ra dical and non-p lural de m oc racy would be one which co nst it u t ed one single sp a ce of equality on the basis of the u n l imit ed operation of the lo gic of equivalence, and did no t recog­ nize the irreducible moment of the plurality of spaces . This principle of the se p a ra tion of spaces is the basis of the demand for libert y . It is within it that the pri nci p le of pluralism resides and that the project for a plural democracy can link up with the l ogic of liberalism. It is not liberalism as such which should be called into question , for as an ethical principle which defends t he libe r ty of the individual to fulfil his or her human cap acities , it is more valid toda y than ever. But i f this dimension of li ber ty is cons titu tive of every democratic and emancipatory p roj e ct , it should not lead us , in reaction to certain ' ho l is t i c' excesses, to return p ure l y and simply to the de fen ce of ' bour g eois ' individualism . W hat is involved is the product ion of another i n di v id ual , an individual who is no lon ger constructed out of the matrix of po s s ess ive individualism . Th e idea of 'n a tu ral ' rights prior to socie ty - and , indeed, the whole of the false dichotomy individual/society - should be aband oned , and replaced by another manner of posing the problem of ri ghts. It i s neve r possible for individual rights to be d e fined in iso l a tion , but only in the con te x t of social relations which define determinate s ubj ec t pos it ions . As a co n sequ ence , it will al w ays be a question of rights which involve o ther s u bj e c ts who p ar ticipate in the same social relation. It is in this sense that the no ti on of 'democratic rights' mus t be understood, as these are rig h t s which can only be exercised collectively, and which

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

185

suppose t he existence of equ al ri ghts for others . The spaces consti­ tutive of t h e different social r el a ti o ns m a y v a ry en o rm o usly accord­ i n g to w h e t he r the r el a ti ons involved are those of produGtion, of c i t i z e n s h i p , of n eig hbou r hoo d of couples , and so on. The forms o f d e m o c r ac y should th e re fo re also be pl u r a l inasmuch as they have to be a d a pted to the social s p a ces in question direct de m o cr a cy cannot be the on l y o rg a ni za tio n al form , as it is only a ppl i ca b le to r e d u c ed social spaces . ,

,

,

-

It is ne ce s s a ry , therefore, t o broaden the domain of the exercise of democratic ri gh ts bey on d the limited traditional field of ci t iz en­ shi p ' . As r e g a rd s the ex t en si on of d e m oc r a ti c rig h t s from the classic '

' political' domain to that of the economy, this is the terrain of the s p ec ifi ca ll y ant i c apit ali s t s t ru g g le A g ain s t t h os e c h a m p i on s of economic liberalism wh o affirm that the economy is the do m a in of the p ri v a t e , the seat of natural ri g hts and that the criteria of de mo c r ac y have no re as o n to be ap p l i ed within it, socialist theory defends the right of the social agent to e qu al i ty and to p a r ti cip a ti on as a p ro du cer and no t o nl y as a citizen . Some advances ha v e been made in this di rect i o n by theorists of the pluralist scho o l such as Dahl and Lindblom,33 who today recognize that to speak of the econom y as the d o m ai n of the private in the era of multinational co r pora tio ns is senseless , and that it is the refore necessary to a cc ep t certain form s of w o rker participation in t he running of e n ter p r ise s . Our pers p e ct i ve is c e rtain l y very different, as it is the very idea that there can be a n at ura l domain of the p riv a te ' which we wish to question . The dis t inc tions public/private, civil s o ciet y Ipolitical society are only the result of a certain type of hegemonic articulation, and their limits vary in accordance with the existing rel a t io ns of forces at a given m o m e n t For ex a mp le it is clear that neo-conservative discourse t o d ay is e xer t i n g itself to restrict the domain of the p ol i tica l and to r ea ffirm the field o f the private in the face of the reduction to which this has been submitted in recent decades under the i m pac t of th e different democratic st ru g g l e s Let us take up again at this po int o u r ar g u m en t re g ard in g the mutual and n e c es s ar y limitations between equivalence and a u t o n o m y Th e con c ep t io n of a plurality of p ol it i cal spaces is in­ c om p a tible with the lo gi c of eq ui v alen ce onl y on the assumption of a cl o sed system. But once th i s ass um p ti o n is a b andoned it is not possible to derive from the p r olifera ti o n of spaces and the ultimate i nd e t er m i na cy of the social the i m poss i b il i t y of a society signi fying i tsel f - and thus t hi nk i n g itself as a totality, or the incompati­ bili t y of this totalizing moment with the pr oj e c t for a radical demo-

'

.

'

,

'

.

,

.

.

,

-

1 86

cracy . The construction of a political space with equivalential effects is not only not incompatible with democratic struggle, but is in many cases a requirement for it. The construction of a chain of democratic equivalences in the face of the neo-conservative offen­ sive , for example , is one of the conditions of the struggle of the Left for hegemony in the present circumstances . The incompatibility therefore does not lie in equivalence as a social logic. It arises only from the moment at which this space of equivalences ceases to be c on si d e red as one political space among others and comes to be seen as the centre , w hich subordinates and organizes all other spaces . It arises , that is, in the case where there takes place not only the construction of equivalents at a certain level of the social, but also the transformation of this level into a unifying principle, which reduces the o thers to differential moments internal to itself. We see then, p aradoxically, that it is the very logic of openness and of the demo­ cratic subversion of differences which creates, in the societies of today , the possibility of a closure far more radical than in the past: to the extent that the resistance of traditional systems of differences is broken , and indeterminacy and ambiguity turn more elements of society into 'floating signifiers', the possibility arises of attempting to institute a centre which radically eliminates the logic of autonomy and reconstitutes around itself the totality of the social body . If in the nineteenth century the limits of every attempt at radical democracy were found in th e survival of old forms of subordination across broad areas of social relations, at the present those limits are given by a new possibility w hi c h arises in the very terrain of democracy: the logic of totalitarianism . Claude Lefort has shown how the 'democratic revolution' , a s a new terrain which supposes a profound mutation at the symbolic level , implies a new form of institution of the social. In earlier societies , organized in accordance with a theological-political logic, power was incorporated in the person of the prince, who was the representative of God - that is to say, of sovereign justice and s o ve reig n reason. Society was thought as a body , the hierarchy of w hose members rested upon the principle of unconditional order . According to Lefort, the radical difference which democratic society introduces is that the site of power becomes an empty space; the reference to a transcendent guarantor disappears , and with it the representation of the substantial unity of society. As a consequence a split occurs between the instances of power, knowledge, and the law , and their foundations are no longer assured. The possibility is thus o pen e d up of an unending process of questioning: 'no law

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

187

which can be fixed , whose dictates are not subject to contest, or whose foundations cannot be called into question; in sum , no repre­ sentation of a centre of society : unity is no longer able to erase social division . Democracy inaugurates the experience of a society which cannot be apprehended or controlled, in which the people will be proclaimed sovereign , bu t in which its identity will never be de fin i­ tively given, but w ill remain latent . '34 It i s in this context, acco rd in g to Lefort, that the p ossibility must be understood of the emergence of totalitarianism , which consists of an attempt to re-establish the unit y which democracy has shattered between the loci of power , law and knowledge. Once all references to extra-social powers have been abolished through the democratic revolution , a purely social power can emerge, presen ting itself as total and extracting from itself alone the principle o f law and the principle of knowledge . W ith totalit­ arianism , rather than designating a vacant site, power seeks to make itself material in an organ which assumes itself to be the representa­ tive of a unitary people. Under the pretext of achieving the unity of the people the social division made visible by the logic of democracy is thereupon denied . This denial constitutes the centre of the logic of totalitarianism, and it is effected in a double movement: ' the annulment of the signs of the division of the state and society , and of those o f th e internal division of society . These imply the annulment of the differentiation of instances which govern the constitution of political society . There are no longer ultimate criteria o f the law , nor ultimate criteria o f knowledge, which are separate from power. '35 If we examine them in the light of our problematic, it is possible to link these analyses to what we have characterized as the field of hegemonic practices . It is because there are no more assured founda­ tions arising out of a transcendent order, because there is no longer a centre which binds together power, law and knowledge, that it becomes possible and necessary to unify certain political spaces through hegemonic articulations . But these articulations will always be p artial and subject to being contested , as there is no longer a sup reme guarantor. Every attempt to establish a definitive suture and to deny the radically open character of the social which the logic of d emocrac y institutes , leads to what Lefort designates as 'totali­ tarian is m ' ; that is to sa y , to a logic of construction of the political which consists of establishing a point of departure from which society can be perfe ctly mastered and known . That this is a political logic and not a type of social organization is proved by the fact that it cannot be ascribed to a particular political orientation: it may be the result of a politics of the 'left', according to which every antagonism ,

188 may be eliminated and society rendered completely transparent, or the result of an authoritarian fixing of the social order in hierarchies established by the s tate, as in the case of fascis m . But in both cases the state raises itself to the status of the sole possessor of the truth of the social order, w hethe r in the name of the proletariat or of the nation, and seeks to control all the networks of sociability . In the face of the radical in dete rminacy which democracy opens up, this involves an a t te m p t to reimpose an absolute centre, and to re-establish the closure which will thus restore unity . But if th er e is no doubt that one of the dangers which threatens democracy is the totalitarian attempt to pass beyond the constitutive cha racte r of antagonism and deny plurality in order to restore unity , there i s also a sym me t ri cally opposite danger of a lack of all reference to this unit y . For, even though impossible , this remains a horizon whi ch , given the absence of articulation between social relations , is necessary in order to prevent an implosion of the social and an a b se nce of any common point of reference. This unravelling of the social fabric caused by the destruction of the symbolic framework is another form of the disappearance of the political. In contrast to the d a n g e r of totalitarianism, which imposes immutable articulations in an a ut ho ri ta ri an manner, the problem here is the absence of those articulations which allow the establishment of meanings common to the different social subjects . Between the logic of complete identity and that of pure difference, the experience of democracy should consist of the recognition of the multiplicity of social logics along with the n ece ssi ty of their articulation . But this articulation should be co nst an t l y re-created and renegotiated , and there is no fmal point at which a b alance will be definitively achieved . This leads us to our third question, that of the rel a tions hip between democratic logic and hegemonic project. It is evident from everything we have said so far that the logic of democracy cannot be sufficient for the formulation of any hegemonic project. This is because the logic of democracy is simply the equivalential displace­ ment of the egalitarian imaginary to ever more extensive social relations , and, as such, it is only a logic of the elimination of relations of subordination and of inequalities. The logic of democracy is not a l og ic of the positi v i t y of the social, and it is therefore incapable of founding a nodal point of any kind around which the social fabric can be reconstituted . But if the subversive moment of the logic of dem o c racy and the positive moment of the institution of the social are no longer unified by any anthropological foundation which tra n s fo rms them into the fronts and reverse s i des of a single process,

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

189

it follows clearly that every possible form of unity between the tw o is co nti ng ent , and is therefore itself the result of a pro ces s of articu­ la ti o n . This being the c a se , no hegemonic project can be based exclusively on a democratic l og ic , but must also consist of a set of proposals for the positive o rga ni za tio n of the social . If the demands of a subordinated g ro u p are presented purely as nega t i ve demands subversive of a certain order , without b e i ng linked to any viable project for the reconstruction of specific areas of society , their capacity to act hegemonically will be ex c l ude d from the o ut s e t . This is the difference between what might be called a 's t r a teg y of oppo­ s i t i on ' and a 'strategy of construction of a new o r d er ' . In the case of th e first, the element of n e ga tio n of a certain social or political order p redo mina tes , but this element of negativity is not a cc o m pan ied by any real attempt to establish different nodal points from which a process of different and p o s i tive reconstruction of the s o ci al fabric could be instituted - and as a result the strategy is condemned to marginality. This is the case with the different versions of 'enclave politics ' , whether i deolo g ical or corpora ti v e . In the case of the s trategy of construction of a new order, in contrast, the element of social p o s itivity p re d o m inates , but this very fact creates an unstable balance and a con s t an t tension with the subversive lo g ic of d emo­ cracy . A situation of hegemony would be one in which the manage­ ment of the posi tivi ty of the social and th e articulation of the diverse democratic demands had achieved a maximum of i n te gra ti o n - the opposite situation , in which social negativity b ri ngs about the dis­ i n teg r ation of every s table system of di fferen ce s , would co r resp ond to an organic crisis . This allows us to see the sense in which we can s p e ak of the project for a radical democracy as an al tern a ti ve for the Left . This cannot consist of the affirmation , from positions of marginality, of a set of anti-system demands; on t he contrary , it must base itself upon the search for a point of equilibrium be tween a maximum advance for the d emo cra tic revolution in a broad range of spheres , and the ca p aci t y for the hege mo ni c direction and positive reconstruction of these s p here s onthe part of subordinated groups . Every hegemonic p os i tion is based, therefore, on an unstable equilibrium: construction starts from negativity , but is only con­ solidated to the extent that it s ucceeds in co n s ti t u ti n g the po s iti v i ty of the social. These two moments are not theo reti cally articulated: they outline the space of a contradictory tension which constitutes the specifi ci ty of the different political conjunctures. (As we h a ve seen , the contra d icto ry character of these two moments does not imply a contradiction in our argument, as , from a logical point of

190 view , the coexistence of two different and contradictory social logics, ex i s tin g in the form o f a mutual limitation of their effects , is perfectly possible) . But if this plurality of social logics is charac­ teristic of a tension , it also requires a plurality of spaces in which they are to be constituted . In the case of the s trategy of construction of a n e w order, the c han g es which it is possible to introduce in social p o s i tivit y will depend not only on the more or less democratic character of the forces which pursue that strategy , but also upon a set o f structural limits established by other logics - at the level of state apparatuses , the economy , and so on . Here it is important not to fall into the different forms of utopianism which seek to ignore the variety of spaces which cons titute those structural limits, or of apolitici s m , which reject the traditional field of the political in v iew of the limited character of the changes which it is possible to im­ ple ment from within it. But it is also of the greatest importance not to seek to limit the field of the political to the management of social p o s it ivity , and to accept only those changes which it is possible to i m ple m ent at presen t , rejecting every c ha rge of negativity which goes beyond them . In recen t years there has been much talk, for example, of the need for a 'laicization of politics ' . If by this one understands a critique of the essentialism of the traditional Left, which p roceeded with absolute ca tegori es of the type 'the Party ' , 'the Clas s ' , or 'the Revolution' , one would not dissent . But fre quently such ' laicization ' has meant something very different: the total e x pu l s i o n of utopia from the field of the political . Now, without

'utopia ' , without the possibility of negating an o rde r beyond the point that we are able to threaten it, there is no possibility at all of the constitution of a radical imaginary whether democratic or of any other type . The presence of this imaginary as a set of symbolic m e a n ings which totalize as negativity a certain social order is abso­ lutely essential fo r the constitution of all left-wing thought. We have a lread y indicated that the hegemonic forms of poli ti cs always suppose an unstable equilibrium between this imaginary and the -

management of social positivity ; but this tens ion , which is one of the fo r m s in which the i m po ssibili t y of a transparent society is mani­ fested, should be affirmed and defended . Every radical democratic politics should avoid the two extremes represented by the totali­ tarian myth of the Ideal City , and the positivist pra gma tis m of reformists without a project . This moment of tension , of opennes s , which gives the social its ess en t i al ly i nco m pl e te and precarious cha racter, is what every pro­ j ec t for radical democracy should set out to institutionalize . The

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

19 1

i n stit u ti o n a l d i v ers i t y a nd co mpl e x it y which characterizes a demo­ cr a tic so ci ety should be conceiv ed of in a very different manner from the diversification of fun c t i on s proper to a complex b u re au cratic system . In the latter it is always exclusiv el y a question of the management of the social as p os i ti v it y , and every diversification takes place , in co ns equen ce , within a rat i o n ality which dominates t he w hole set of s p he r es and functions . The Hegelian co n c e p t ion of the b u re a uc r ac y as a universal class is the pe rfe c t theoretical crystal­ lization of this perspective . It has been t ra n s fe r red to the sociological plane in so far as the diversification of levels wi th in the s o ci a l following a functionalist, structuralist or any other similar perspec­ tive - is linked to a conception of each of th es e levels as const i tuti ng m oments o f an in t e ll i g ib l e t ot a l i t y which dominates them and g i ve s them their meaning . But in t he case of the pl u ral i s m proper to a ra dic a l democracy , diversification has been transformed into a diversity, as each of these diverse elements and levels is no l o n ge r the expression of a total i t y which transcends it. The multi p l i c a t i on of spaces and the institutional diversification which a cco m pa n i es it no longer con s is t of a rational u n fo l din g of fun c t i ons , nor do they ob ey a subterranean log i c which con st i tu tes the ra ti o n al p rin ci ple of all chan ge , but they express exactly the o pp o si te : through th e irre­ ducible character of this d iversi t y an d p lu ral i ty , so ci ety constructs the i m a ge and the man agemen t of i ts own impossibility . The com­ promise , the p reca ri o us character of every arrangement, the antago­ nism, are the p r i mary facts , and i t is only within this i ns t ab i li ty that the moment of pos i tivi ty and its man age m en t take place . The ad va n cin g of a p roj e c t for radical d emo cra cy means , therefore, forcing the myth of a rat i o na l and t r an sp a ren t s o cie t y t o rece de prog r ess iv e ly to the horizon of the social . This b ecomes a 'l1on­ p l a ce ' , t he s y mb o l of its own i mpo ss i b ility . But, for this very reas o n , the pos s i bi lit y of a unified discourse of the Left is also erased. If th e various subject p o s i tions and the diverse a n t ag o n ism s a n d poin ts of rupture constitute a diversity a n d not a diversification, it is clear that they cannot be led back to a p oi n t from which they could all be embraced and explained by a s i ng l e dis­ course. D is cu rsi v e discontinuity becomes p ri m a r y and constitutive . The discourse of radical d emoc racy is no lo ng er the discourse of the universal; the epistemological niche from wh i ch 'universal' classes and s u bj ec ts spoke has been eradi ca t ed, and it has been rep laced by a polyphony of v o ices , each of which constructs its own irreducible discursive ide n ti t y . This p o in t is decisive: t he re is no radical and pl u r a l d e mo c rac y without renouncing t he discourse of the un i versa l

1 92 and its implicit assumption of a privileged point of access to 'the truth ' , which can be reached only by a limited number of subjects . In political terms this means that just as there are no surfaces which are p ri v i l e ged a priori for the emergence of antagonisms , nor are there d iscursive regions which the programme of a radical democracy should e xclu d e a priori as pos s i ble spheres of struggle . Juridical institutions , the educational system , labour relations , the discourses of the resistance of marginal populations construct ori gi n a l and irreducible forms of social protest, and thereby contribute all the d iscursive complexity and richness on which the programme of a radical democracy should be founded . The classic discourse of socialism was of a very different type: it was a discourse of the universal , which transformed certain social categories into deposi­ tories of political and epistemological privileges; it was an a priori discourse concerning differential levels of effectiveness within the social - and as such it reduced the field of the discursive surfaces on which it considered that it was possible and legitimate to operate; it was , finall y , a discourse concerning the privileged points from which historical changes were set in motion - the Revolution, the General Strike, or 'evolution' as a unifying category of the cumu­ lative and irreversible character of partial advances . Every project for radical de mo c racy necessarily includes , as we have said , the socialist dimension - that is to say , the abolition of capitalist relations of p rodu c tion ; but it rejects the idea that from this abolition there necessarily follows the elimination of the other inequalities . In con­ sequence , t h e de-centring and autonomy of the different discourses and struggles, the multiplication of antagonisms and the cons­ truction of a plurality of spaces within which they can affirm themselves and develop, are the conditions sine qua non of the possibility that the different components of the classic ideal of socialism - which should, no doubt, be extended and reformu­ lated can be achieved . And as we have argued abundantly in these p ages , this plurality of spaces does not deny , but rather requires , the overdetermination of its effects at certain levels and the consequent hegemonic articulation between them . Let us come to a conclusion . This book has been constructed around the vicissitudes of the concept of hegemony , of the new logic of the social implicit within it, and of the 'epistemological obstacles ' which, fro m Lenin to Gramsci , prevented a comprehension of its radical political and theoretical potential . It is only when the open, unsutured character of the social is fully accepted , when the essen­ tialism of the totality and of the elements is rejected, that this -

Hegemony and Radical Democracy

193

po t e n tia l becomes clearly visible and 'hegemony' can come to constitute a fundamental tool for political analysis on the left. These conditions arise originally in the field of what we have termed the 'democratic revolution' , but they are only maximized in all their decon s tructive effects in the project for a radical democracy, or, in other words, in a form of politics which is founded not up o n dogmatic postulation of any 'essence of the social ' , but, on the con t r a ry, on affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of every 'essence' , and on the constitutive character of social division and antagonis m . Affirmation of a 'ground' which lives only by negating its fundamental c hara c te r ; of an 'order' which exists o nl y as a partial limiting of disorder; of a 'meaning' which is constructed only as excess and paradox in the face of meaninglessness - in other words, the field of the political as the space for a game which is never 'zero-sum ' , because the rules and the players are never fully explicit. This game , which eludes the concept, does at least have a name:

hegemony .

Notes to Chapter 4 1 . A . R osen be rg , Democrazia e socialismo. Storia polit ica degli ultimi centodnquanti anni

( 1 789- 1937) , Bari 197 1 .

2. Ibid . , p. 1 19 . 3 . Strictly co n s i de red , this affirmation i s of course exaggerated . The realignment of forces during the F re nc h Revolution also requi red hege mon i c opera tions , and implied certain cha n ge s of alliances: think of episo des such as the Vendee. It is only from a

historical perspective, and in co m pa rison with the com p lexi ty of the hegemonic a r ti c u lation s which ch a ra cte r ize subsequent phases of European history, that one can argue fo r the rela t ive s tab ili t y of the fra mew or k of basic divisions and oppositions in the course of the Fre nch Re volu t ion . 4. On the concept of ' i n te rrupt ion ' see D. S i v erm an and B. Torode, The Material Word, L on do n 1980, chap te r one. 5 . F. Furet, Pense, la Revolution F,anraise. Paris 1 978, p. 1 09 . 6. H. Arendt, O n Revolution, London 1973, p. 55. 7 . G. S ted ma n Jones, ' Rethinking Chartis m ' , in idem, Languages oj Class, C a m b r idg e , England, 1 983 . 8. A. de Tocqueville, De la D€mocratie en Amerique, Paris 1 98 1 , vol. 1 , p. 1 1 5 . 9 . C . Calhoun, The Question oj Class Struggle, C h ica go 1 982, p. 140. For a related arg ument see L. Pa ra m io , 'Por una inte rp retac i on revisionista de la historia del m o vi m i en t o obrero europeo , ' En Teoria 8/9, Madrid , 1 982. to. On this theme see C . S i r ian i , 'Workers Control in the Era of World War 1 ' , Theory and Society, 9: 1 ( 1 980) , and C . S a bel , Work and Politics, Cambridge, Eng land, 1 982, C h ap te r 4. 1 1 . M. Aglietta , A Theory oj Cap italist Regulation, London 1979, p . l Ii 1 2 . C f. M . C a ste lls, La question urbaine, Paris 1 972 .

194 1 3 . S. Bowles and H.

G intis , 'The crisis

of Liberal Democratic Capitalis m ' ,

and Society, vol . 2, no . 1 ( 1 982) . 1 4 . B . Coriat, L 'alelier el le chronomelre, Paris 1 979 , p. 1 5 5 . 1 5 . C . O ffe, Contradictions oj the Welfare State, edited b y J . Ke a n e ,

Politics

London 1984, p.

263. 1 6 . Cf. F. Piven and R. Clow ard , Poor People's Mo vements, New York 1 979. 1 7. J. Ba ud ri l la r d , Le systeme des objets, Paris 1 %8 , p. 1 8 3 .

1 8 . S . Hun tington , 'The Democratic Distemper' , in N . Glazer and I . K ristol(eds . ) , New Y o r k 1 976, p . 37.

The American Commonwealth,

1 9 . D. Bell, 'On M er i toc ra cy and Equality ' , The Public [IIIerest, Fall 1 972. 20. C f. A . Touraine, L 'apres-socialisme, Pa ri s 1 980; A. Gor z , Adieux au protetariat, Paris 1 980. For an i n te rest i n g discussion of Touraine see J . L. Cohen , Class and Civil Society: The Limits oj Marxian Critical Theory, A mhers t 1 982. 2 1 . S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds . ) , The Politics ojThatcherism, London 1 983 , p. 29.

The way in w h i c h sexism has been mobilized to c reate a popular base for Thatcherism is ind ica te d in B. C am pbell , Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics in the '80s, London 1 984.

22. A. H un te r , 'The I deo l og y of the New R igh t ' in Crisis in the Public Sector. A R eader, New York 1 98 1 , p. 324. For a thoughtful analysis o f the present politi cal conj uncture in American politics see D. Plotke 'The U ni t ed States in Transition: Towards a New O rd e r ' , Socialist Review, N o 54, 1 980 and 'The Politics o f T ran siti on : The United S t a t es in Transition ' Socialist Review, no . 55, 198 1 . 23 . This articulation has been analysed by C . B . M acpherson in The Life and Times oj Liberal Democracy, Oxford 1 977. 24 . F. Ha y ek, The Constitut ion oj Liberty, C hicag o 1 960, p . 1 1 . 25. F . H ay ek , The Road to Serjdom, Lo n do n 1944 , p . 52. 26. F . Hayek, Law, Leg islation alld Liberty, vol . 2, C h ica go 1 976, p. 69. 27. Cf. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, N ew York 1974 . 28 . For a p resen t ati o n o f thei r p ositi on consult M . N . Rothbard, For a New Liberty. The L ib erta ria n Manifesto, New York 1 973 . 29 . Z. Brzezinski, cited by P. Steinfelds, The NeD-Conservatives, New York 1 979, p.

269.

30. Ibid . , p . 270 . 3 1 . A . de Benoist, Les idees ii l 'er/droit, Paris 1 979, p. 8 1 . 32 . A pa rt from the fact that our reflexion is located in a very different theoretical p rob le ma ti c , ou r e m p h asis on the need to articulate a plurality of fo rm s of democracy correspondin g to a m u lti p li cit y of subj ect po sitions distin g u i s hes ou r approach from t h at of the theorists of 'participatory democracy' w i th whom we nevertheless share many important concerns . On ' pa r ticipato ry democracy' , see C . B . M acp herson , op. cit . chapter 5 and C . Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge, England, 1 970. 33 . Cf. R. Dahl , Dilemmas oj Pluralist Democracy, N e w Haven and C. Lindblo m , Politics and Markets, New York 1 977 . 34. C. Lefort, L 'invention dtmocratique, Paris 198 1 , p. 173. 35 . Ibid . , p . 1 00.

Lo ndon 1 982, and

Index

Adams, P. 1 47 Adler, M. 27, 28, 43, 45, 1 48 Aglietta, M. 1 60, 1 93 Alexander, s. 1 47 Athusser, L. x, 90, 97-99, 1 03,

1 04, 1 09, 1 1 6, 1 45, 1 47, 1 79 Ancona, C. 90 Anderson, P. 44, 48, 88 Arato, A. 44 Arendt, H. 1 5 5, 1 93 Axelrod, L. 49, 51 Badaloni, N. 26, 45 Badia, G. 43 Balibar E. 1 00, 1 4 5 Barbon, N. 1 46 Baudrillard, J. 1 63, 1 94

Bauer, O. 27, 28, 29, 45, 73 Beck, U. xv Bell, D. 1 6 1 , 1 66, 1 94 Benoist, A. de 1 73-4, 1 94 Benveniste, E. 1 06, 1 45, 1 47 Benvenuti, N. 43, 44 Berger, S. 9 1 Bergounioux, A. 9 0 Bergson, H . 38 Bernstein, E. 1 0, 29-36, 37, 38,

42, 45, 46, 7 1 , 84, 1 68 Bomelburg, Th. 4 5 Bottomore, T. 45 Bowles, S. 78, 90, 1 6 1 , 194

Braverman, H.B. 78, 8 1 , 82, 83,

90, 9 1 Brewster, B . 1 47 Bridges, G. 89 Brossat, A. 89 Brown, B . 1 45 Brunt, R. 89 Brzezinski, Z. 1 73, 1 94 Buci-Glucksmann, Ch. 89, 90 Burawoy, M. 8 1 , 91

Calhoun, C . 1 56, 1 57, 1 93 Campbell, B. 1 94 Castells, M. 1 6 1 , 1 93 Castoriadis, C. 90 Certeau, M. de 44 Charzat, M. 46 Clausewitz, C. von 70, 89, 90 Cloward, R. 1 63, 1 94 Cohen, G .A. 90 Cohen, J.L. 1 94 Colletti, L. 44, 45, 46, 1 22-3, 1 47 Coriat, B. 9 1 , 1 62, 1 94 Cousins, M. 1 45 Creuzer, F. 42 Croce, B. 26, 38 Cunow, H. 32 Cutler, A. 1 0 1 -2, 1 20-1 , 145, 1 47 Dahl, R 1 85 , 1 94 Davis, M. 43

195

196

Index

Deat, M. 74 Derrida, J . xi, 88, 1 1 1-2, 1 46 Descartes, R. 5 Dimitrov, G. 62 Disraeli, B. 130 Dreyfuss, H .L. 145 Edwards, R . 79, 8 1 , 9 1 Edgley, R. 1 23, 1 24, 1 48 Elster, J. 1 23, 1 48 Engels, F. 26, 27, 3 1 , 44, 45 Ferrero, G. 24, 44 Feyerabend, P. xi Foucault, M. 7, 1 05-6, 1 07, 1 1 5, 1 45 , 1 47, 1 52 Freud, S. 97, 1 1 5 Friedman, A. 82, 9 1 Friedman, M . 1 72 Furet, F. 1 55, 1 93

Haninen, S. 1 47 Hayek, F. 1 7 1-2 Heath, S. 88 Hegel, G.WF. xiii, 27, 44, 94-5 , 1 23, 1 4 5 Heidegger, M. xi, I l l , 1 1 5 Hilferding, R. 3 1 Hindess, B . 1 00, 1 04, 1 45 Hirst, P. 1 00, 1 03, 1 04, 1 45, 1 47 Hitler, A. 1 50 Hoare, Q. 89 Hobbes, T. xii Hobsbawm, E.J. 42, 44, 45, 46, 89 Hochberg, K. 45 Holder!in, F. 94, 1 45 Hunter, A. 1 70, 1 94 Huntington, S. 1 65 , 1 94 Hussein, A. 145 Husser!, E.G.A. viii Ipola, E. de 148

Gadet, F. 1 46, 1 47 Gaudemar, J . P. 80, 9 1 Gay, P. 33, 45, 46 Gentile, G . 26 Geras, N. 42 Gerratana, V 89 Giddens, A. xv Gintis, H. 78, 90, 1 6 1 , 1 94 Giovanni, B. de 8 9 Glazer, N. 1 94 Goode, P. 45 Gordon, D. 8 1 , 9 1 Gorz, A. 1 69, 1 94 Gramsci, A. ix, xii, 3, 4, 7, 1 0, 23, 30, 4 1 , 42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 57, 65-7 1 , 76, 8 5 , 86, 89, 90, 1 09, 1 1 4, 1 34, 1 36-8, 1 50, 1 78, 1 92 Habermas, J. xiii, xvii-xviii Hajek, M. 89 Hall, S. 1 70, 1 9 4 .

Jacques, M. 1 94 Jessop, B. 1 48 Joan of Arc 1 33 Juillard, J. 46 Kant, 1 . x, xiii-xiv, 27, 1 48 Kautsky, K. 1 4--2 5, 28, 32, 44, 46, 63, 69, 70, 85, 90, 1 66 Kelsen, H. 148 Korsch, K. 68, 90 Kristol, 1. 1 94

A. 1 8, 25-7, 4 1 , 43, 45, 70, 1 1 4, 1 66 Lacan, J. xi, 88, 1 1 2 Laclau, E. 8 9, 90, 1 48 Lagardelle, H. 1 8 Lefort, C. 1 55, 1 86-7, 1 94 Legien, K. 43 Leibnitz, G .W 1 03

Labriola,

Index Lenin, VJ. 3 , 25, 3 1 , 32, 45, 5 1 ,

54, 59, 60, 66, 69, 76, 89, 90, 1 34, 1 92 Lid tke, v.1. 46 Lindblom. e . 1 85, 1 94 Lloyd-George, D. 89 Locke, ) . 1 7 2 wwy, M. 89 Lulcics, G . ix, 68, 90 Luxemburg, R . 8-1 4, 1 5, 25, 3 1 , 32, 45, 5 1 , 54, 59, 60, 66, 69, 76, 89, 90, 1 34, 1 92 Lyotard, ) F. xiii .

-

Mache, E. 27 Macpherson, C.B. 175, 1 94 Maggi, M. 46 Man, H . de 74

Manin, B. 9 0

Mao Tse-tung 62, 64, 90, 95, 9 8 Marcuse, H . 87, 1 6 1 M argli n, S . 79, 9 1 Marramao, G . 45 Marx, K. 1 6, 27, 3 1 , 40, 43, 44,

8 1 , 90, 9 1 , 98, 1 27, 1 45, 1 46, 1 5 1 , 1 83 Masaryk, Th. 1 8 Matthias, E. 44 Maurras, Ch. 4 1 Merleau-Ponty, M . 1 46 Mill, ) .S. 1 72 Miller, ).A. 88 Millerand, A. 39 Milner, ) e 147 Minson, ) . 1 47 Monod, ). 44 Mouffe, Ch. 89, 1 47 Mill ler, H. 73, 74 Mussolini, B. 1 50 .

.

Nietzsche, F. 38, 1 1 5 Normand, C. 1 47

197

Nozick, R. 1 73, 1 94

Offe, e. 1 62, 1 94

Paci,

M.

91

Paggi, 1 . 43, 45 Paldan, 1. 1 47

Panzieri. R. 80, 9 1

Pannekoek, A . 42 Paola, G. de 40, 46

Paramio, 1. 1 93 Pareto, V. 4 1 Pate m an , C . 1 94 Pecheux, M. 1 46 Pelloutier, F. 46 Pi ore, M. 9 1 Piven, F. 1 63, 1 94 Plekhanov, G. 1 9, 23-5, 27 , 37, 44, 46, 48, 49, 5 1 , 52 Plotke, D. 1 94 Pokrovsky, M.N. 52 , 53 Popper, K. xi, 1 23 Po u lantzas , N. 8 1 , 82-3, 84, 9 1 , 1 40 Przeworski, A. 1 6, 43, 90 Rabinow, P. 1 45 Racinaro, R. 45, 1 48

Reagan, R. 1 69 Reich , M. 8 1 , 9 1 Reiter, R. 1 47 Renner, K. 29 Robespierre, M. 1 50 Rose nb erg, A. 1 49-5 1 , 193 Rousseau, ) .). 45 Rothbard, M.N. 1 94 Rubin, G. 1 47 Sabel, e. 1 93 Salvadori, M. 42, 90 Sand, S . 46 Same, J.P. 3, 146

198

Index

Saussure, F. de 5 1 , 1 06, 1 1 2, 1 46, 1 47 Siriani, C. 1 93 Silverman, D . 1 93 Smart, A. 42 Sorel, G. 29, 36-42, 44, 46, 7 1 , B8, 1 14 Spencer, H. 44 Spinoza, B. 1 03 Stalin, J. 4 Stedman Jones, G. 1 55, 1 93 Steinberg, H.J. 44, 45 Steinfelds, P. 1 94 Sternhell, Z. 46 Stone, K. 79, 9 1 Struve, P. 25 Sturmthal, A. 73, 90 Taylor, Ch. 1 45 Thatcher, M. 1 69, 1 76 Thompson, E.P. 1 1 6, 147, 1 57, 1 65

Tocqueville, A. de 1 55 , 1 56, 1 60, 1 93 Todorov, T. 42 Togliatti, P. 62 Torode, B. 1 93 Touraine, A. 1 69, 1 94 Trendelenburg, A. 95, 145 Tronti, M. 80, 9 1 Trotsky, L. 42, 49, 50, 5 1 , 52-4, 60, 88, 89 Vieo, G . 37 Vollmar, G . von 45 Wittgenstein, L. ix, xi, l OB, I l l, 1 25, 1 46, 1 79 Wollstonecraft, M. 1 54 Wooley, P. 1 03 Wright, E.O. 82, 83, 84, 9 1 Zinoviev, C. 6 1