Gower Handbook of Discrimination at Work
Edited by Tessa Wright and Hazel Conley
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Gower Handbook of Discrimination at Work
Edited by Tessa Wright and Hazel Conley
Gower Handbook of Discrimination at Work
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Gower Handbook of Discrimination at Work Edited by
Tessa Wright London Metropolitan University, UK
and Hazel Conley
Queen Mary University of London, UK
© Tessa Wright and Hazel Conley and the contributors 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Gower Publishing Limited Wey Court East Union Road Farnham Surrey GU9 7PT England Gower Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington VT 05401-4405 USA www.gowerpublishing.com Tessa Wright and Hazel Conley have asserted their moral rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Gower handbook of discrimination at work. 1. Discrimination in employment – Great Britain. 2. Diversity in the workplace – Great Britain. 3. Discrimination in employment – Law and legislation – Great Britain. I. Handbook of discrimination at work II. Wright, Tessa. III. Conley, Hazel. 658.3'008-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wright, Tessa. Gower handbook of discrimination at work / Tessa Wright and Hazel Conley. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-566-08898-8 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-1-4094-2629-5 (ebook) 1. Discrimination in employment – Law and legislation – Great Britain. I. Conley, Hazel. II. Title. III. Title: Handbook of discrimination at work. KD3102.W75 2011 344.4101'133 – dc22 2010046912 ISBN 9780566088988 (hbk) ISBN 9781409426295 (ebk)
II
Contents
List of Figures ix List of Tables xi About the Editors xiii Notes on Contributors xv Acknowledgementsxxi List of Abbreviations xxiii Introduction1 Hazel Conley and Tessa Wright
PART I
LEGal FraMEWOrK aND tHE LiMitS Of tHE LaW
Chapter 1
A Right Not to be Discriminated Against: The Origins and Evolution of Discrimination Law Sonia McKay
Chapter 2
The Road to Equality: Legislating for Change? Hazel Conley
Chapter 3
Dignity at Work: The Law’s Engagement with Bullying and Harassment in the Workplace Jackie Jones
Chapter 4
The Law Relating to Pregnancy and Maternity Leave Grace James
PART II DiSCriMiNatiON(S) iN tHE WOrKplaCE: GENDEr aND SEXUalitY Chapter 5
Chapter 6
9
11
23
33
47
57
Model Employment? The Challenges Ahead for Public Sector Employers and Unions in Tackling the Gender Pay Gap Carole Thornley and Dan Coffey
59
Pay Inequality in Manufacturing Industry: The Case of the Printing Industry Tricia Dawson
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Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Career Obstacles, Discrimination and Women’s Independent Networks: Evidence from the UK and Germany Nicole Avdelidou-Fischer
83
Creating Inclusive Organisations: What do Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Employees in the Private Sector Think Makes a Difference? Fiona Colgan and Aidan McKearney
97
Race, Migration and Religion
111
Chapter 9
The Racialised Organisation: The Experiences of Black Managers Tracie Jolliff
113
Chapter 10 The Role of Trade Unions in Fighting Racial Discrimination Wilf Sullivan
129
Chapter 11 Migration and Work: Discrimination Obligatory? Nick Clark
139
Chapter 12 Management Handling of Religion and Belief in the Workplace: Challenges and Solutions Martin Mitchell, Chris Creegan and Sarah Dickens
155
Disability
171
Chapter 13 Understanding Workplace Adjustments for Disabled Employees: The Law and Good Practice Deborah Foster
173
Chapter 14 Mental Health and Discrimination: A Short Guide to Being Unreasonable Alex Tambourides
185
201
Age
Chapter 15 Demographic Change and Implications for Workforce Ageing in Europe Andrea Winkelmann-Gleed
203
Chapter 16 Ageism, Solicitors and Female Mature Entrants: An Awkward Combination Alexandrine Guyard-Nedelec
219
Chapter 17 The ‘Duty to Consider’: How Employers are Managing Requests from Employees to Delay Retirement Matt Flynn
235
Contents
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PART III Equality – New Approaches
247
Chapter 18 Measures to Tackle Disadvantage and Discrimination in Access to Employment: The Role of Employers Anna Paraskevopoulou and Monika Beutel
249
Chapter 19 ‘Eyes and Ears’ in the Workplace: The Developing Role of Equality Representatives Sian Moore
265
Chapter 20 Strategies for Equality: The Norwegian Experience of the Use of Gender Quotas in the Private Sector Cathrine Seierstad
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Chapter 21 Tackling Gender Segregation in the UK Transport and Construction Sectors: Recent Initiatives and Procurement Strategies Tessa Wright
293
Index309
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List of Figures
Figure 11.1 Percentage of UK employees not born in UK Figure 18.1 A model of critical success factors: tackling disadvantage, disengagement and discrimination
141 260
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List of Tables
Table 1.1 Table 3.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 11.1 Table 16.1 Table 20.1 Table 20.2 Table 20.3
Outcome of tribunal claims, 2007–2008 Average employment tribunal costs to employers Gross pay per week for full time workers – percentages by sex The sexual division of labour by department The sexual division of labour within each department Percent of workforce in main industrial sectors by country of birth Age distribution of solicitors admitted to the Roll in 2006–2007 Affirmative action strategies in place in Norway Human development report, equality ranking The requirement for representation of both sexes on public limited companies boards of directors by the gender representation law in Norway Table 20.4 Women’s representation on boards Table 20.5 Share of women as chairs on boards
20 43 73 76 76 142 223 282 284
285 287 287
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About the Editors
Tessa Wright Tessa Wright has written and researched in the areas of discrimination and equality at work for many years. During her 12 years as an equality researcher and editor at the Labour Research Department, she wrote and researched widely on the discrimination faced by women, ethnic minorities, disabled workers and lesbians and gay men in the workplace, as well as trade union responses. Since moving to the Working Lives Research Institute at London Metropolitan University, Tessa has continued to develop her interest in effective measures to combat discrimination at work, working on a range of European and UK research projects. She is completing a PhD at the Centre for Research in Equality and Diversity, Queen Mary, University of London on the experiences of women working in non-traditionally female occupations, examining the intersections of gender, sexuality and class.
Hazel Conley Hazel Conley started her working life as a bank clerk, where she quickly noted gendered and racialised workplace segregation along with the subtle and not so subtle discrimination that followed. In 1989 Hazel decided to enter higher education. It was here that she began to understand the theories and concepts that sought to explain discrimination at work. She has researched and published extensively, particularly on the ways in which labour market segmentation, especially in relation to non-standard forms of work, can result in discrimination and disadvantage. Her recent work focuses on the discrimination and equality legislation, examining its strengths and limitations as a tool for fighting discrimination.
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Notes on Contributors
Nicole Avdelidou-Fischer Nicole Avdelidou-Fischer earned her PhD from the Centre for Research in Equality and Diversity at Queen Mary, University of London. Having worked for over a decade in German and British corporations, Nicole has witnessed and personally experienced patriarchal structures that create barriers for women to access powerful coalitions. Familiar with the topic of networking and inspired by gaps in the academic literature, Nicole embarked upon an investigation of independent networks for business and professional women at the crossroads of feminist and social movement theories.
Monika Beutel Monika Beutel is a freelance consultant and trainer for the public and third sectors. Her career has been mostly in universities, as a sociology lecturer and academic manager. She has a range of interests, including women’s entrepreneurship and adult education. She coordinated a London Learning Partnership as well as ‘Disadvantage, Disengagement and Discrimination in London’, a Working Lives Research Institute project which examined learning and skills development approaches for adults from diverse deprived communities.
Nick Clark Nick Clark is Senior Research Fellow at the Working Lives Research Institute (WLRI). He has worked at the Labour Research Department (1983–1987), print union Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT) (1987–1994), the Trade Union Congress (1994– 2005) – where he helped develop the TUC’s work on migrant workers – and in the General Secretary’s office at the Public & Commercial Services Union, joining WLRI in April 2009. He was a member of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority board from 2005 until January 2009.
Dan Coffey Dan Coffey is a Senior Lecturer at Leeds University Business School. His research interests include various aspects of the employment relation, in both the public and private sectors. He is co-author with Carole Thornley of Globalization and Varieties of Capitalism (2009) and coeditor with Carole Thornley of Industrial and Labour Market Policy and Performance: Issues and Perspectives (2003). He is widely published, and author and co-editor of several other books.
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Fiona Colgan Fiona Colgan is Director of the Comparative Organisation and Equality Research Centre and a Senior Research Fellow in the London Metropolitan Business School (LMBS) at London Metropolitan University. Her research interests include equality, organisation and employment relations focusing in particular on gender, sexual orientation and race/ ethnicity. Previous publications include two co-edited books, Women in Organisations: Challenging Gender Politics and Gender, Diversity and Trade Unions. She is currently publishing European Social Fund (ESF)- funded research on sexual orientation and equalities in the workplace.
Chris Creegan Chris Creegan is Director of Corporate Affairs at the National Centre for Social Research. He has researched and written widely on equality and diversity at work. He was previously a senior official for the public services trade union, UNISON.
Tricia Dawson Tricia Dawson has been a Senior Lecturer in HRM at Westminster Business School since 2008. She previously spent over 20 years working for the printing trade unions as a researcher and then as equality policy adviser with responsibility for developing and implementing equality policy across all equalities. She currently lectures in employee relations, human resource management and organisational behaviour.
Sarah Dickens Sarah Dickens was formerly a Research Director at the National Centre for Social Research, and is now a freelance social researcher. She has a strong interest in teasing out how social legislation is experienced in practice by the people it is targeting. In this context, Sarah recently worked with Martin Mitchell on a study of the impact of the Civil Partnership Act (2004), Adoption and Children Act (2002) and Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (2003) on the lives of same-sex couples. Sarah also has a strong research interest in the effects of social policies aimed at families and children and recipients of state welfare.
Matt Flynn Matt Flynn is a senior lecturer at Middlesex University Business School in the UK. His main area of expertise is age management. He has carried out research for the UK government, European Union, Economic and Social Research Council and British Council on age discrimination, age diversity and retirement. He has co-written the age
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management guide for the Trades Union Congress and Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD).
Deborah Foster Deborah Foster is Senior Lecturer in HRM at Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University. Deborah’s research interests include workplace equality and diversity, trade unionism in the UK and EU public service sector and women in Asia. Recent publications include articles in Work, Employment & Society (2007) and the British Journal of Industrial Relations (2010): findings from an ESRC-funded study that examined disabled employees’ experiences of negotiating workplace adjustments under the terms of the UK Disability Discrimination Act (DDA).
Alexandrine Guyard-Nedelec Alexandrine Guyard-Nedelec teaches English for social sciences at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France. She has recently completed a PhD on ‘Intersectional discrimination against women lawyers and judges in England and Wales’ at Université Paris Diderot and has worked under the supervision of Prof. Kate Malleson (Queen Mary, University of London). She is part of a team working on the translation into French of British legal texts for a series of books on the Fundamentals of Anglo-Saxon Feminism.
Grace James Grace James is a Reader in Law at the University of Reading. She teaches Employment Law, Discrimination Law and European Law and her research interests focus upon familyfriendly employment policies and discrimination law.
Tracie Jolliff Tracie Jolliff has a background in social work and has worked in British public services as a professional and manager. As an organisational development consultant and cofounder of JT&C The Knowledge Group, she continues to influence change on issues such as ethical leadership development, systems transformation and equality creation. She is an associate consultant with the Bristol Business School and has developed innovative leadership programmes engaging with themes mentioned in this chapter. She lectures, writes, speaks and is an active member on various boards.
Jackie Jones Jackie Jones is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Bristol Law School, University of the West of England. Her research interests include discrimination and equality laws, gender, EU
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constitutional law and human rights. She has written numerous articles and books on these topics. Her latest co-authored book is entitled Gender, Sexualities and Law (forthcoming).
Sonia McKay Sonia McKay is Professor of European Socio-Legal Studies at the Working Lives Research Institute, London Metropolitan University. She heads a number of research projects, mainly focusing on discrimination, migration and collective organisation. She holds a law degree from Queens University, Belfast and a PhD in employment law from Wolfson College, Cambridge. She previously worked for the Labour Research Department (LRD) where she held the post of employment law researcher from 1983 until 2004.
Aidan McKearney Aidan McKearney is a Senior lecturer on the MA Human Resource Management programmes at London Metropolitan Business School (LMBS), London Metropolitan University. He oversees and teaches on the MA HRS course at the Moscow International Higher Business School (MIRBIS) Institute. Aidan is a member of the Comparative Organisation and Equality Research Centre based in the LMBS. His research interests include diversity and equality with a specific focus on exploring issues surrounding organisation sexuality and sexual orientation in the contemporary workplace.
Martin Mitchell Martin Mitchell is a Senior Researcher in the Qualitative Research Unit at the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen). He has conducted a number of studies and reviews related to religion and belief, sexual orientation and equal opportunities. He also has a background in sociology and health services research.
Sian Moore Sian Moore is a Reader at the Working Lives Research Institute at London Metropolitan University. Her research focuses upon the relationship between class and gender and upon trade union activism, recognition and learning. She currently has a Leverhulme Fellowship to look at the outcome of the UK’s statutory recognition legislation; her book New Trade Union Activism: Class Consciousness or Social identity? looks at the fused identities of class, gender, sexuality, race and age in new trade union activism.
Anna Paraskevopoulou Anna Paraskevopoulou is a Research Fellow at the Working Lives Research Institute, London Metropolitan University. After completing her doctorate on ethnicity and ethnic
Notes on Contributors
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minorities at the London School of Economics, Anna has worked on a range of projects on disadvantage and discrimination in the labour market.
Cathrine Seierstad Cathrine Seierstad is a PhD student in the Centre for Research in Equality and Diversity in the School of Business and Management, Queen Mary, University of London. Her main research interests are women, leadership and the use of affirmative action strategies. In particular, her research has focused on the Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, in relation to the share of women and the use of affirmative action strategies in areas such as politics, academia and company boards of directors.
Wilf Sullivan Wilf Sullivan has worked for the TUC since December 2004 as TUC Race Equality Officer. Previously he worked in local government as a residential social worker. As a lay trade unionist, Wilf held a range of posts in National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) (now UNISON) and became a regional full-time officer in 1990 and UNISON’s National Black Members Officer in 2000. Wilf is a member of the Ethnic Minority Advisory Group that supports the Government’s Ethnic Minority Employment Taskforce. He represents the TUC at the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on migration issues, is Vice-Chair of the UK Race and Europe Network, and an adviser to the board of the European Network Against Racism.
Alex Tambourides Alex Tambourides is the Workplace Lead for Mind and is Deputy Chief Executive for Hammersmith and Fulham Mind. Alex has been working in the field of mental health for over five years, driven by a passion caused by his own experience of depression. Alex manages a number of projects at local and national level, including Mind Workplace, a consultancy and implementation service which allows employers to measure how mentally healthy their workplaces are and provides recommendations for improvement, and In Work Support which provides support to people in employment with mental health problems.
Carole Thornley Carole Thornley is a Professor in Keele Management School at the University of Keele. She researches equalities, employment, and public policy. She is an Associate Editor for Gender, Work and Organization, and with Dan Coffey is co-author of Globalization and Varieties of Capitalism (2009) and co-editor of Industrial and Labour Market Policy and Performance: Issues and Perspectives (2003). She is widely published and has given evidence to many official enquiries and reviews.
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Andrea Winkelmann-Gleed Andrea Winkelmann-Gleed is a Senior Research Fellow based at the Working Lives Research Institute, London Metropolitan University since 2004. She holds a PhD from the University of East Anglia (2005) and her expertise is in demographic change, health care and international migration related to the employment of marginalised workers, including refugees, migrants, ethnic minorities and older workers. She is currently conducting research into innovative approaches to the management of workforce ageing in the UK and Europe.
Acknowledgements
The editors would like to thank the contributors to this edited collection for their patience and readiness to update their chapters in what has been a turbulent time for the legislature, politics and economy of the UK. We would like to thank Jonathan Norman at Gower for commissioning the Handbook and the rest of the team at Gower for their expert and gentle guidance. Lastly we would like to thank Winnie and George for the distraction.
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List of Abbreviations
AA Acas ACE BAME BEO BME BPIF CBI CIPD CoJ CPE CSR DDA DED DES DLOs DLR DRC DWP EAT EE(A)R EEA EFA EHRC EO EOC EOR ER ESA ESF ESOL ESRC ETD GED GEM GLA GLC GOR GPMU
Affirmative Action Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service Age Concern England Black, Asian and minority ethnic Branch Equality Officer Black and minority ethnic British Printing Industries Federation Confederation of British Industry Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development Court of Justice Common Professional Examination Corporate Social Responsibility Disability Discrimination Act Disability Equality duty Disability Equality Scheme Direct Labour Organisations Discrimination Law Review Disability Rights Commission Department for Work and Pensions Employment Appeals Tribunal Employment Equality (Age) Regulations European Economic Area Employers’ Forum on Age Equality and Human Rights Commission Equal Opportunities Equal Opportunities Commission Equal Opportunities Review Equality Rep Employment and Support Allowance European Social Fund English for Speakers of Other Languages Economic and Social Research Council Equal Treatment Directive Gender Equality duty Gender empowerment measure Greater London Authority Greater London Council genuine occupational requirements Graphical, Paper and Media Union
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HCAs HRM IAPT IAS ILO ippr/IPPR IRLR LDA LFS LGB LGE LGPC LPC LSCs MRN NEET NERA NJC NVQ ODA OGC ONS PBS RDAs SAWS SDA SMEs SOGs SRA TAEN TfL TUC UCATT UKBA ULRs UMF WAMT WERS WINs WLRI WPCs WRS
Health Care Assistants Human Resource Management Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Immigration Advisory Service International Labour Organisation Institute for Public Policy Research Industrial Relations Law Reports London Development Agency Labour Force Survey Lesbian, Gay or Bisexual Local Government Employers Local Government Pay Commission Legal Practice Course Learning and Skills Councils Migrants Rights Network Not in Employment, Education or Training National Employment Rights Authority National Joint council National Vocational Qualification Olympic Delivery Authority Office of Government Commerce Office for National Statistics Points-Based System Regional Development Agencies Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme Sex Discrimination Act small and medium-sized employers Self-Organised Groups Statutory Retirement Age The Age and Employment Network Transport for London Trades Union Congress Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians UK Border Agency Union Learning Representatives Union Modernisation Fund Women and Manual Trades Workplace Employee Relations Survey Women’s Independent Networks Working Lives Research Institute Workplace Coordinators Workers Registration Scheme
Introduction HAZEL CONLEY AND TESSA WRIGht
These are exciting, if somewhat challenging, times to edit a book on discrimination at work in the UK. For almost the entire period that this book has been in production so too was the Equality Act 2010. The Equality Act was devised out of the general accord that the existing legislation was no longer fit for the purpose of combating the many forms of discrimination facing people in the UK. Despite this consensus the process of attempting to reform the legislative framework has been something of a roller-coaster with raised expectations that have sometimes failed to materialise in statute. Even now the Equality Act is in place, it is drafted in such a way that only a government with a strong commitment to equality and social justice need implement some of its more ambitious and innovative clauses. In addition to the uncertainty created by the most radical overhaul of the UK equality legislation since its inception, the Act received Royal Assent only weeks before a general election that changed the political context. The outcome of the election also brought relatively uncharted political territory with a coalition government. It is therefore in the midst of legislative and political uncertainty and change that this book was written and we would like to thank the contributors for their patience and understanding of the extended deadlines to accommodate the protracted reading of the Equality Bill followed by the result of the general election. We hope that in deciding to await these two outcomes this volume will be amongst the first to offer analysis of the new landscape of antidiscrimination policy and practice. In its broadest sense the word discrimination simply means to discern difference. However, for most of us, discrimination is a pejorative term because the action often involves attaching value judgements to differences between people that result in inequitable treatment. When this happens in the workplace the result is often heartache and hardship. Discrimination at work is therefore a social justice issue where one remedy is considered to be legal regulation. Whilst the main premise of this book is that the law, on its own, is not sufficient to combat discrimination at work, it is clear from its content that equality and the attempts to reduce discrimination at work are ‘juridified’ and take much of their lead from legal requirements. Having said that, a number of the chapters report on the limitations of the law, both in its conceptualisation and in its application. Other authors utilise ‘business case’ arguments in which the emphasis is on persuading employers that non-discrimination makes good business sense for a variety of reasons.1 The locus of business case arguments favours diversity rather than equality as a conceptual framework. As such, social justice and legal requirements not to discriminate are relegated to the cost–benefit equation implicit in a business case
1 For an excellent analysis and critique see M. Noon (2007) ‘The fatal flaws of diversity and the business case for ethnic minorities’, Work, Employment and Society, 21:4, 773–784.
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analysis (see Dawson, Chapter 6; Colgan and McKearney, Chapter 8; Jolliff, Chapter 9; Guyard-Nedelec, Chapter 16). In its entirety this book argues, from both social justice and business case perspectives, that discrimination at work is an experience that continues to blight the lives of thousands of workers each year despite four decades of equality legislation. However the message is not a negative one. Most of the chapters offer insights about existing positive international and domestic developments and make suggestions for the ways that positive change can be realised – using the law or not. Reflecting these aims, the book is structured in three parts; Part I provides the legal background including a critical analysis of the law as it, until recently, existed, as it currently stands and how it may be developed in the future; Part II provides analyses of discrimination in the workplace in relation to the main strands protected by the legislation; Part III, contains chapters that examine novel and innovative approaches to combating discrimination at work and looks forward to how these may be further developed to contend with inequality. In Chapter 1, Sonia McKay provides the historical background and antecedents of the legislative framework for equality in the UK. McKay examines key legal concepts such as less favourable treatment, direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation. Her analysis particularly highlights how the limits of Statute law result in complex and often contradictory case law, which in turn results in poor outcomes at employment tribunals for victims of discrimination. McKay also illustrates how cumbersome the anti-discrimination law was and how difficult it had become for employers to interpret and implement. Following on from McKay’s analysis, in Chapter 2, Hazel Conley examines the debates that preceded and accompanied the reform of the anti-discrimination legal framework that resulted firstly in the public sector equality duties, followed by the Equality Act 2010. She outlines some of the key features and innovations contained in the legislation and the arduous process by which they were negotiated. Conley argues that the potential for far-reaching positive change has been tempered by political concerns that legislative measures to curb discrimination have the capacity to be antithetical to business efficiency if not applied sparingly. In so doing she identifies a key contradiction in business case arguments. In Chapter 3, Jackie Jones broadens out the conceptualisation of the anti-discrimination legislation by examining the concept of dignity at work and the argument that the right not to be discriminated against is part of the human rights framework. The focus of this chapter is on workplace harassment as a form of discrimination. Although Jones provides an in-depth legal analysis of this complex variety of discrimination, she also illustrates the human cost of bullying and harassment at work and how this might be facilitated in organisational culture and management styles that demand competitive behaviour and long working hours. The final chapter in Part I, by Grace James, examines legislation that regulates a specific but endemic form of discrimination at work – that which is precipitated by the pregnancy of a worker. In a detailed historical analysis, James shows how protection for pregnant workers was surprisingly marginal to the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) until relatively recently and following intervention by the Court of Justice (CoJ – was ECJ). James illustrates that the legal requirement for a male comparator, while clearly absurd in the case of pregnancy discrimination, has for years thwarted the ability of pregnant workers to use the SDA as a remedy for discrimination in the workplace. As such, she argues that pregnancy discrimination does not fit easily into the equality model that shapes
Introduction
3
the anti-discrimination legislation. Her conclusion is that advances in reproductive technology mean that the limitations of the existing legislation are likely to become even more pronounced unless there is a re-conceptualisation of how far we, as a society, value parenthood. Building on the critical legal analysis in Part I, the chapters in Part II provide detailed empirical evidence of how discrimination is experienced on the separate grounds covered (and in the case of migrant workers not covered, see Clark, Chapter 11) by equality legislation. Some may see this as an ‘old-fashioned’ approach contrasting with the more recent emphasis on generic ‘equality’ or ‘diversity’, and which is reflected in the move to a merged equality commission and a single Equality Act (2010). However we believe that the arguments and evidence provided in this volume make a compelling case for retaining and targeting the specific forms of inequality or disadvantage faced by different groups, many of which persist despite years of anti-discrimination legislation. We have chosen to group the chapters in this Part to cover gender and sexuality; race, religion and migration; disability and finally age. This is not to say that we do not recognise the differences or overlaps between individual strands, or that understanding intersecting forms of discrimination between these strands is not important. Indeed several chapters address the ways in which multiple forms of discrimination occur, or take a more generic approach to equality (see for example Guyard-Nedelec, Chapter 16; Paraskevopoulou and Beutel, Chapter 18; Moore, Chapter 19) and point out that more subtle measures may be needed to ensure that the needs of these groups are not overlooked. Whilst the chapters in Part I examine the role of the State as legislator, Carole Thornley and Dan Coffey, in Chapter 5, consider the role of the State as employer. The theme of their chapter, equal pay in the public sector, is both topical and controversial. First, they problematise the concept of the State as a ‘model’ employer by drawing attention to the feminised and gender segregated nature of its workforce and the extensive gender pay gap that accompanies this key feature of public employment. Thornley and Coffey also report on recent tensions in local government in relation to equal pay, triggered by legislation, complex collective agreements and compounded by cuts in public spending. However rather than taking a wholly gloomy view of the prospects for equal pay, they argue there exists an ‘unusual potential convergence of interests between employers and unions which offers much to build upon if approached in a spirit of a problem to be resolved’. On this basis they offer an analysis of best practice on equal pay for the future. Analysis of the struggle for pay equality is continued by Patricia Dawson in Chapter 6, this time in the private sector setting of the print industry. Dawson’s case study highlights that although the economic relations in the print industry are clearly different from the public sector, the gendered social relations between female and male workers, their employers and trade unions are remarkably similar. Building on previous analyses of women workers in the print industry (Cockburn 19832) the emphasis is here on the gendered conceptualisations of skill and technology but with the material outcome of pay inequality as its focus. Dawson explains how the power to create and recreate gendered social relations and concepts of skill relies on and is diffused through particular forms of social networks. The power of social networks is a theme carried forward in Chapter 7 by Nicole Avdelidou-Fischer. However, here the argument is about the usefulness of social networks as support mechanisms for women workers. Avdelidou-Fischer studied four women’s 2
Cockburn, C. (1983), Brothers: Male Dominance and Technological Change, London: Pluto Press.
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independent networks (WINs) in Germany and the UK and argues that, for their members, WINs go some way to replacing the networks closed to them both in the workplace, family and wider society. The comparative nature of Avdelidou-Fischer’s research highlights that national culture, politics and welfare regimes also play a large part in shaping equality of opportunity and outcome for women workers, but not always in the direction that one might expect. Chapter 8, by Fiona Colgan and Aidan McKearney moves the discussion away from sex discrimination to discrimination based on sexual orientation. More precisely, their chapter examines examples of good practice in creating inclusivity for lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) employees in five private sector organisations, in contrast to most previous research in the area which has focused on the public sector, considered the ‘pioneer’ in sexual orientation equality. Colgan and McKearney identify that, even in ‘good practice’ organisations, LGB employees in the private sector feel that there is an implementation gap between policy and practice. However the focus of this chapter is again largely positive, providing an encouraging analysis of measures that lead to good practice in the experience of LGB employees and which move beyond legal compliance. Tracie Jolliff’s analysis of discrimination faced by black managers in Chapter 9 moves the debate on further. Jolliff includes both a strong theoretical and empirical basis for her arguments that the fabric of any organisation is racialised and claims to racial neutrality are therefore inevitably flawed. She deftly applies her theoretical position to workplace incidents to show how race gives rise to differential and negative treatment for black managers. In doing so, Jolliff produces a powerful critique of the organisational preference for diversity and business case arguments. Her conclusions are, however, positive providing thoughtful and useful pointers for acknowledging and acting upon racialisation in organisations. A collective approach to confronting racism at work is provided by Chapter 10, in which Wilf Sullivan, TUC Race Equalities Officer, introduces a reprinted3 section of a TUC/Working Lives Research Institute publication ‘Working Against Racism. The Role of Trade Unions in Britain’ by Mary Davis, Roger McKenzie and Wilf Sullivan. The section we have chosen to reproduce in this volume examines how trade union policies on racism can help to combat discrimination at work. Similar to Jolliff’s previous chapter, the pamphlet identifies overcoming denial of racism as the first hurdle to tackling it. Interestingly, the authors argue that when race discrimination is taken to an employment tribunal it represents a failure of trade unionism, particularly collective bargaining, to address racism in the workplace. They further argue that, to ensure collective bargaining plays its part, the representation of black workers at all levels should be increased in trade unions. Nick Clark, in Chapter 11, continues the discussion of race discrimination at work, but in the different legal context afforded to migrant workers. Clark provides an analysis of the often contradictory and fast-changing systems in place that face those seeking to come to the UK to work from within and outside the EU. In doing so he points out that the role of the majority of the law in relation to migrant workers is designed to reduce rights and protections rather than provide them. Following on from this Clark shows how a lack of rights inevitably results in discrimination and poorer terms and conditions of work for many migrant workers. He considers the difficulty of establishing rights for 3
Kindly reprinted by permission of the TUC and WLRI.
Introduction
5
migrants whose very existence as workers may be ‘tainted by illegality’. Despite these conceptual difficulties, Clark provides pointers for good practice, but ultimately argues that there needs to be a separation between immigration status and worker rights to prevent discrimination in the workplace. Such an approach also puts the emphasis on enforcing employment rights to the ultimate benefit of all workers, not only migrants. While discrimination based on race and on religion may sometimes overlap, separate legislation on religion and belief was introduced in 2003. In Chapter 12, Martin Mitchell, Chris Creegan and Sarah Dickens provide a detailed analysis of research covering the management of religion and belief in the workplace. Their analysis, which also examines a number of employment tribunal cases on religion and belief discrimination, reveals that the occurrence of discrimination at work on the basis of religion or belief is widespread, with the dominant form being the failure of employers to allow employees to participate in religious observances. Mitchell, Creegan and Dickens also show that poor management often results in employees resorting to the law. However, the way employment tribunals have interpreted the law has allowed employers to ‘objectively justify’ discrimination in relation to religion and belief on business grounds. Based on a ‘deliberative event’ methodology which brought together managers from small, medium and large organisations, the authors identify challenges that may prevent employers from successfully managing religion and belief in the workplace, including the competing and sometimes conflicting needs of different groups of workers. Building on their analysis, Mitchell et al. suggest a range of solutions to how the management of these issues could be improved. The following chapters in Part II focus on the workplace context of disability discrimination. Debbie Foster, in Chapter 13, examines the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 as amended and the Disability Equality Duty 2006, providing an analysis of how these two pieces of legislation are incorporated into the Equality Act 2010. Her focus is, however, on an aspect of the legislation that is distinctive and particularly pertinent to counteracting discrimination at work – the requirement for employers to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ that allow workers with disabilities to participate fully in organisational life. Foster argues that a failure by employers to understand their obligations under the legislation often results in a failure to make the reasonable adjustments that workers with disabilities are entitled to. Based on her research on the experiences of workers with impairments, Foster provides good practice guidelines for employers and trade unions. Complementing Foster’s chapter, Alex Tambourides extends the discussion to cover mental health – one of the most prevalent forms of disability amongst workers. In Chapter 14 Tambourides provides a unique account of his experience of addressing mental health issues in the workplace, based on his work in a voluntary sector organisation, the National Association for Mental Health (Mind), which supports those with mental illhealth. He argues that the DDA has been particularly poor at preventing discrimination against workers with mental health disabilities. His analysis of this failure is that the law, on its own, could never be sufficient to prevent the discrimination that is deeply rooted in historical, social and cultural attitudes that pervade mental health. Tambourides provides a tool to help managers open constructive discussions with workers with mental health conditions and pointers for the ways in which organisations can be proactive in planning for adjustments.
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The final three chapters in Part II examine the issue of age discrimination in the workplace, the most recent strand to be covered by legal protection since 2006. In Chapter 15 Andrea Winkelmann-Gleed provides an overview of workforce ageing in Europe and outlines some of the key policy debates it has prompted, notably in relation to the burden on healthcare services, immigration, pensions and retirement ages. Drawing on research in five European countries, Winkelmann-Gleed provides case study analysis of initiatives in different member states to retain older workers, but also to combine a balance between working life and transitions to retirement. In Chapter 16 Alexandrine Guyard-Nedelec provides a detailed analysis of how age discrimination intersects with gender to prevent mature women law students entering the legal profession, even when they achieve high academic performance. Guyard-Nedelec illuminates the ways in which institutional requirements to gain training contracts with employers prevent mature women law graduates from turning their qualifications into careers in the legal profession. She then examines the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 and, drawing on her own research, argues, in common with a number of other authors in the volume, that denial of age discrimination and ignorance of the Regulations is likely to limit the effectiveness of the legislation in the legal profession. The three chapters included here on age, although primarily focusing on older rather than younger age, reveal the variety of ways in which discrimination may be experienced, both in entry to work and, in Chapter 17, on when to leave it. Matthew Flynn examines a specific aspect of potential age discrimination concerning requests to delay retirement. He begins the chapter by positioning requests to delay retirement within the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 and the social policy debates that surrounded the introduction of the Regulations. His analysis focuses on the ‘duty to consider’ requests to delay retirement contained in the Regulations. Drawing on primary research data, Flynn examines how public and private sector managers have implemented the Regulations and ‘duty to consider’, reporting on innovative management practices that have allowed workers to delay retirement. His conclusions are mixed, finding that the Regulations have not resulted in the culture change in relation to older workers that the government had hoped for, but that innovative solutions have been adopted by a minority of employers where there is a business incentive to do so. As we noted earlier, this book has been written during times of great legal and political change and uncertainty, making it somewhat challenging to speculate on possible future developments in the field of equality. Yet Part III presents evidence from research that may indicate potential future directions for tackling inequality and disadvantage at work. Anna Paraskevopoulou and Monika Beutel, in Chapter 18, address the discrimination, disadvantage and disengagement (referred to in the chapter as the ‘3Ds’) faced by many groups seeking work. In contrast to the majority of chapters in this book, the focus is on those seeking to enter the labour market, rather than discrimination faced by those already in the workplace. The research described in the chapter analysed over 500 projects in London that aimed to increase the employability of disadvantaged social groups and sought out individuals experiencing multiple disadvantages and discrimination in accessing employment. In concentrating on projects that were supporting those facing multiple forms of disadvantage, this research is in tune with contemporary developments in thinking around inequality in two ways. First, they highlight that discrimination often takes multiple or intersecting forms, and shows that only by understanding these multiple disadvantages can effective measures to address them be deployed. Second, the chapter
Introduction
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takes a wide definition of disadvantage and covers issues such as ‘postcode discrimination’, low skills, lack of work experience, lack of social networks and participation in the informal economy, all of which are outside the protections offered by the six strands of anti-discrimination law, but which could have been encompassed under provisions in the Equality Act 2010 that required public bodies to address socio-economic disadvantage had the duty been taken up by the coalition government. Although the requirement would not have directly covered employment and offered nothing like the protection of the other strands, it indicated a shift in thinkingthat recognises that social class can be a significant root of disadvantage that needs legal remedies, alongside other forms of discrimination. Trade unions, however, were established to combat class-based inequality, and have at times been slow to see the relevance to their struggle of forms of inequality based on gender, race, disability and so on. However Sian Moore, in Chapter 19, shows us how a new form of union representative, the Equality Representative (ER), may be ideally placed to promote fairness by taking up the issues of discrimination so commonly experienced in the workplace. In this sense, ERs have an important role to play in ensuring that the gap between employer policy and practice – as identified by Colgan and McKearney in Chapter 8, – is minimised. In her evaluation of the Equality Rep project in public services union UNISON, Moore suggests that the ER role may be attracting new forms of activists to the union. However she warns of the risk that the ER role may reinforce trends towards the individual representation of workers at the expense of collective action, unless ERs are sufficiently involved in the union’s collective bargaining activities. Although the Equality Act did not concede statutory rights to time off for ERs, despite union lobbying, it is likely that the role of ERs will be a developing one in many trade unions. As it encompasses a broad definition of equality, ERs can take up many and multiple forms of discrimination. The private sector has, in the UK, been subject to less stringent demands from equality legislation than the public sector, as several chapters show (Conley, Chapter 2; Thornley and Coffey, Chapter 5; Wright, Chapter 21). But Catherine Seierstad, in Chapter 20, offers a glimpse of what can be done to tackle gender inequality in the private sector, by examining the use of gender quotas on company boards in Norway. Seierstad shows how Norway has traditionally been seen as one of the most equal countries in the world for men and women, but that women failed to achieve equality with men on private company boards, in common with many other countries. This led to the introduction of the law in 2004 that requires public limited companies to have 40 per cent of women on their board of directors. The law has resulted in a remarkable improvement in the gender composition of boards, although Seierstad’s analysis draws attention to the phenomenon of the ‘Golden Skirts’ – women on large numbers of different boards. Nonetheless, the chapter provides an innovative example of what can be achieved by effective legal intervention. In the final chapter, Tessa Wright takes as her starting point the persistent gender segregation in the UK workforce which is a major contributor to the gender pay gap. Wright argues, however, that recent government attention to the long-standing gender pay gap had resulted in some measures to attract women into traditionally male occupations, particularly in London. Drawing on research examining the intersections of gender, sexuality and class in the two UK sectors with the lowest proportion of women – transport and construction – the chapter examines some of these initiatives and explores in greater detail one particular strategy, that of linking equality with public procurement. She argues
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that public authorities are increasingly taking equality into account in the tendering process and in the contracts awarded to private contractors for public sector projects or services. Despite some initial legal uncertainty, using equality in procurement has been given momentum by the requirements of the public sector equality duties, and Wright considers whether this is taken further by the Equality Act 2010. Many provisions of the Equality Act 2010 will be implemented gradually (see Conley, Chapter 2) – and some may never be fully enacted, depending on government commitment – but in any case it will be some time before we can see the effects of this wide-ranging overhaul of anti-discrimination provisions on the everyday lives of working people. However, we hope that the contributions in this book provide a timely reminder of the extent and scale of discrimination still facing many workers, as well as some practical guidance and recommendations that can offer pointers to those seeking to challenge workplace discrimination. It is hoped that this Handbook of Discrimination at Work will be of use to a variety of readers. The chapters have been written by authors with a huge combined breadth and depth of experience in understanding workplace discrimination, as academics and researchers, as well as managers, consultants and trade union officials. Much of the research has contributed to policy formation, either through direct commissions or more diffuse means, and most of the authors are concerned to see their work have an impact on improving lives for people at work. We therefore hope that academics, researchers, policymakers, practitioners and students will all find something of value in this book.
Note As already pointed out, this handbook was prepared during a time of change and uncertainty surrounding the legal framework of UK discrimination law, culminating in the passing of the Equality Act 2010 in April 2010. While chapters have been updated to reflect any substantive changes to the legal position in the Equality Act, some chapters refer to the provisions under the previous anti-discrimination Acts, for example the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) or the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. The substance of the law described here has not changed, although these Acts have now been incorporated into the Equality Act 2010, as described in McKay, Chapter 1.
part
I
Legal Framework and the Limits of the Law
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chapter
1 A Right Not to be
Discriminated Against: The Origins and Evolution of Discrimination Law SONIA McKAY
Introduction This chapter begins by looking at the origins of UK discrimination laws, noting that earliest legislation, the Equal Pay Act 1970, represented the government’s response to industrial action taken by women workers who were being paid less than male colleagues doing similar work. The chapter then turns to consider how the law developed around concepts of non-discrimination, direct and indirect discrimination, together with the principle of no less favourable treatment. These concepts are explained and the key legal cases are reviewed. The chapter then discusses whether the law has been effective in countering discrimination and notes that the complexity of the law and the difficulties faced by applicants taking cases means that the likelihood of success is very low. The public sector duties not to discriminate, initially introduced into race discrimination legislation and gradually extended to other strands of discrimination, are not covered in this chapter, but are discussed in full elsewhere (see Conley, Chapter 2). Nearly 40 years ago the first piece of legislation aimed at tackling discrimination in employment – the Equal Pay Act 1970 – was introduced in the final days of the Labour government of 1964–1970, as the government’s response to a strike in 1968 of women workers at the Ford Motor Company. The women had demanded equal pay with men working on comparable, but different work, in other sections of the factory. Their strike had been partially successful and had highlighted that pay discrimination was systemic, with employers, and often unions, accepting that women could be paid less. Job segregation – the division of men and women into different types of work – assisted in this discriminatory process; since men and women often did not work alongside one another doing exactly the same jobs. The next two advances in discrimination law were the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976. The Acts were introduced at around the same time as European level legislation began to concern itself with issues
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of discrimination, with a directive, on equal pay in 1975 and another on equal treatment in 1976. However, while UK legislation also applied in relation to race discrimination, at European level the law dealt only with sex discrimination. It was not until 2000 that two new directives going beyond this were introduced: Directive 2000/43/EC, which implements the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial and ethnic origin; and Directive 2000/78/EC, which establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. From 1976 and for the next 20 years sex and race were the only areas covered by UK discrimination law. However, in the last 15 years, the range of issues covered by discrimination law has grown significantly. The Equality Act 2010 incorporates all of the following laws into one statute. The aim has been to standardise the legislation and to ensure that it reflects the decisions of the courts in a number of key legal rulings interpreting the legislation:
• Equal Pay Act 1970 (as amended): provided a right to equal pay with a comparable worker of the opposite sex;
• Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (as amended): prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender reassignment, marriage or civil partnership;
• Race Relations Act 1975 (as amended): prohibited discrimination on racial grounds – • • • • •
colour, race, nationality, ethnic or national origins; Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (as amended): prohibited discrimination against disabled persons; Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999: prohibited discrimination against transsexuals and those in the process of gender reassignment; Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003: prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation; Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003: prohibited discrimination on the grounds of an individual’s religion or belief; and Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006: prohibited discrimination on the grounds of age.
In addition, there are two other areas of law related to non-discrimination, on parttime workers and on fixed-term (temporary) employees. The relevant legislation is:
• Part-time workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 gave a right to no less favourable treatment to part-time workers; and • fixed-term employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002: gave a right to no less favourable treatment to temporary employees. There is therefore now a well-established body of law prohibiting discrimination at work and the range of issues covered is extensive. However, discrimination remains a constant feature of workplace experience in the UK (Hepple et al. 2000; Dickens 2007; Fredman and Spencer 2003; Wrench 2007). Women continue to earn around 20 per cent less than men (Ashe,2009); black and minority ethnic workers are more likely to be working in low-paying jobs and are also more likely to be unemployed than are white workers (ippr, 2010); lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered workers also experience discrimination and exclusion at work (Wright et al. 2006); disabled workers
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are disproportionately excluded from employment (Gore and Parckar 2010); part-time workers earn less per hour than full-time workers; and temporary workers are the most at risk when it comes to redundancies and cutbacks. The reasons for these continuing discriminatory outcomes are partly because the mere existence of a law cannot of itself guarantee equality, if the mechanisms in place to challenge discrimination are weak and where the structural basis of discrimination is strong. Persistent reported high levels of discriminatory treatment have also been consequent upon the nature of the laws themselves, which are unduly complex, procedurally difficult and have continuingly low success rates. Whilst the Equality Act 2010 may have some impact on this, the problem is more complex than one that can be rectified through consolidating the existing laws. It lies in the definitions of discriminatory treatment and in the inability of the legal and social mechanisms to commit to and to deliver equality. This chapter examines the key principles of the law, exploring the barriers that prevent it from being effective. It refers to a number of landmark court rulings that have shaped discrimination law and then reflects on the consequences of taking cases to tribunals for the individuals concerned, by looking at the data on outcomes and settlements.
The Concepts of Discrimination and Less Favourable Treatment Discrimination law is constructed around the following principles:
• • • •
The right not to be directly or indirectly discriminated against; the right to be treated no less favourably than comparable workers; the right not to be subjected to harassment on discriminatory grounds; the right not to be victimised for having brought a discrimination complaint; and, in the case of disabled workers • an obligation on the employer to consider suitable adjustments. These concepts appear in both the UK legislation and in the EU directives. On the face of it they appear to differentiate between two models – one of the prohibition of direct or indirect discrimination, harassment or victimisation and the other around the concept of ‘no less favourable treatment’. In practice the difference between these two models is not significant. In essence, whether the model is direct/indirect discrimination (sex, race, disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief, age) or less favourable treatment (part-time, fixed-term) the mechanism for taking a discrimination claim is similar. The individual must meet the requirements set out in the legislation and must generally show why the treatment complained of is as a consequence of unlawful discrimination, even if the precise tests, to show direct/indirect discrimination or less favourable treatment, may differ.
Direct Discrimination An employer directly discriminates against a person where that worker is treated less favourably than someone else (of the opposite sex, of a different racial group and so forth).1 An employer indirectly discriminates against a person where conditions are imposed which 1
Now, s.13 of the 2010 Act.
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apply to the workforce generally but which adversely affect one group and which the employer cannot objectively justify.2 Collins et al. (2005) make the point that the ‘dividing line between direct and indirect discrimination is not entirely clear’ but for lawyers the main distinction is that the legislation provides that direct discrimination cannot be justified (save in relation to disability and to age) whereas indirect discrimination can be, whether by reference to the business case, the impact non-discrimination would have on the workforce generally, or other reasons. Under the age discrimination regulations an employer may treat people differently on the grounds of age if it is ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ which could include business needs and efficiency; health, welfare and safety and for the particular training requirements of the job. In the age regulations there was also a default age of 65 after which an employer could dismiss an individual simply for age reasons although this provision is repealed with effect from October 2011. This had been viewed as a major deficiency in the law, but one that was upheld by the Court of Justice. Less favourable treatment, amounting to direct discrimination, can occur in a number of ways, including asking only women about their caring responsibilities; questioning only workers believed to be gay about their sexuality, failing to apply a procedure to a minority ethnic worker, when the procedure would have been applied to a worker of a different ethnicity. Cases of direct discrimination are less likely now to be taken to the tribunals than are cases of indirect discrimination. That is not to say that such cases never occur, but rather that employers are generally aware of the existence of discrimination laws and that they have a duty not to treat workers differently on account of their ethnicity, gender, sexuality, disability, age or religion. An example of a direct discrimination case that was argued in the courts is the landmark case of Shamoon v Chief Constable of the RUC [2003] IRLR 285. Ms Shamoon had some of her duties removed from her post specifically because she was a woman and the duties, which included being armed, were considered unsuited to her gender. Even though she had experienced no loss in pay or grading she took a sex discrimination claim against her employer. The House of Lords (hereinafter referred to as the Supreme Court, the UK’s highest appeal court) held that the employer’s actions, in removing the duties in question did amount to direct discrimination. Another example of direct discrimination is in the case of James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL), again a case that went to the Supreme Court. Mr James, who was over the age of 60 at the time but was not yet 65, had been charged to use his local swimming pool while his wife, who was the same age as him, was not. The existing rule was that free entry was only obtained after the person had passed state pension age, but since pension ages differ for men and women it meant that women were entitled to the benefit of free entry five years earlier than men. Mr James argued that the council had directly discriminated against him as a man and the Supreme Court agreed. James’ case led to service providers having to amend their rules where they offered age-related benefits. James took the case before the age discrimination laws came into force, and so had to argue the claim on the basis of sex discrimination law. A similar case today might also be argued using age discrimination law. Direct discrimination does not depend on the employer’s intention or motivation. The fact that, as a result of an employer’s actions, an individual is directly discriminated against, makes it irrelevant whether the employer intended the discrimination to occur or even discriminated for benevolent reasons (such as not giving a worker the chance to 2
Now, s.19 of the 2010 Act.
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carry out their full range of duties to keep them out of danger – the Shamoon case), if that action is applied in a discriminatory manner in areas protected by the law. For the case to be successful the worker has to show that a comparable worker (of the opposite sex/race and so on) would be or has been treated differently. The test is usually referred to as the ‘but for’ test, when the tribunal will ask the question whether, but for the fact that the individual was female/of a particular ethnicity and so on, the discrimination would have occurred. The law does not therefore attempt to enforce specific standards of behaviour on employers. There is no general obligation to act fairly or to treat all workers well. It is only in comparison with the treatment of other workers in the opposite category that a claim can be brought. If an employer decides to treat all workers badly, for example by stopping workers taking their holidays, a claim cannot be taken under discrimination law. Nor does the treatment have to be identical as long as it is comparable. For example, if there is an employer rule which imposes a dress code on only one sex, this would amount to sex discrimination. However, if dress codes were imposed on both sexes, even if the dress requirements differ (by sex/race and so on), these would not amount to discriminatory treatment (see: Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops [1978] ICR 85 (EAT)). Once the worker has shown that there has been discrimination, the burden of proving that this has not occurred shifts to the employer (see below: ‘Proving Discrimination’).
Indirect Discrimination Indirect discrimination is intended to tackle cases where employers have seemingly neutral rules, which apply generally but which in practice disadvantage groups of people defined by sex, race, religion, sexual orientation, disability3 or age. The law refers to the employer having a ‘provision, criteria or practice’ which is generally applied but which disadvantages a member or members of a protected group. Indirect discrimination involves the application of a criterion or practice that is shown to:
• Put members of the protected group at a particular disadvantage; • that is not justifiable; and • that is to their detriment. Thus the test is first to see whether a rule that the employer has applied is particularly disadvantageous to members of the protected group. Disadvantageous rules might include: requiring workers to do certain shifts which it is more difficult for those with caring responsibilities (predominantly women) to do; language tests which disadvantage ethnic minority workers; or requiring specific levels of agility, which disadvantage disabled workers. If such rules are applied the courts investigate whether the employer is able to justify the rule, even though it is discriminatory, for example, by showing a clear business need for the rule which could not be otherwise accommodated and which is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. In essence the court must try to weigh up the discrimination suffered by the employee against the employer’s reasonable needs. It is up to the employer to provide sufficient justification (see below: ‘Proving Discrimination’). 3
Disability is included within the area of indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.
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Thus the difference between direct and indirect discrimination is that in the case of the latter the employer can defend the claim by citing reasons that justify the indirect discrimination, which the tribunals will take into account in deciding whether or not the discrimination claim is upheld. The courts will thus examine the rule and determine whether it is justified. The landmark case here is London Underground v Edwards (No. 2) [1997] IRLR 157 (EAT). In this case London Underground had imposed a requirement on its entire train staff that they had to work shifts. Ms Edwards was a single parent and was not able to work the new shift system due to her caring responsibilities. The EAT noted that the employer did have a rule obliging all workers to work shifts. It then noted that for women like Edwards, with caring responsibilities, shift working was much more problematic. It then went on to hold that the requirement for shift working did indirectly discriminate against Edwards and that the employer had not provided an acceptable justification, as other ways could have been found to cover the shifts. However, the fact that the courts are left to interpret whether employer rules or actions are justified or not means that there is both uncertainty in how the law is applied and also it results in discriminatory impacts being condoned. The key case is Hampson v Department of Education and Science [1989] ICR 179 (CA). Ms Hampson, a Hong Kong Chinese teacher who had qualified in Hong Kong applied for teacher recognition in the UK. She was told that her teaching qualification was not comparable to the UK qualification. Hampton claimed that the rules for qualification disadvantaged her on the grounds of her race. The Court of Appeal rejected her claim on the ground that the rule, although having a discriminatory impact, was justified by the objective of maintaining standards. Commenting on the impact of the Hampson and other rulings on justification, Connolly (2001) argues that the justification test ‘upsets the theory of indirect discrimination by sanctioning a certain amount of discrimination and blurring its causes. It also weakens the attack on business inefficiencies that benefits all’. Another failing of the law on indirect discrimination had been that, until the introduction of the Equality Act 2010, the concept did not apply in disability discrimination cases. Individuals who claimed that they had been discriminated against on the grounds of disability could only claim if they had been directly discriminated against (see below). The Equality Act 2010 includes the right to claim indirect discrimination in disability discrimination cases.
Less Favourable Treatment A central feature of discrimination law is the focus on a concept of ‘no less favourable treatment’. This means that the treatment complained of has to be compared to that experienced by members of the comparator group. In the case of women, it is male workers. In the case of disabled it is the non-disabled. In the case of homosexuals it is non-homosexuals, and so forth. The comparable worker can be actual or, where there is no actual comparable employee, it can be hypothetical, in other words it is possible to take a discrimination claim on the basis of how an employer would have treated someone of the comparator group. In equal pay claims, however, there is no provision for a hypothetical comparator. The comparable employee has to be someone of the opposite sex who is in employment and who is also paid more. It is, however, left to the individual making the claim to choose who the comparator should be. It does not matter whether, for example, there
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are also individuals of the opposite sex being paid the same as the individual making the claim, as long as she can show that there is one or more comparator who is paid more. The comparator must be employed in the same workplace or, if at a different workplace, under the same terms and conditions. The aim is to avoid individuals being able to compare their pay with that of workers with different employers, as the law does not have the aim of generally improving the rates of pay of the disadvantaged group. If an employer pays everyone a low rate of pay or, for example, only employs women and pays them a low rate of pay, they cannot point to another employer who is paying more to workers of the opposite sex doing similar work. In equal pay claims only there are also two types of comparison. The first is with individuals doing the same or similar work. The second is with individuals doing different work, but where its value is equal, with value usually being determined through some form of job evaluation exercise.
Unlawful Harassment It is unlawful to subject a worker to harassment on discriminatory grounds. In most harassment cases the worker will be complaining about a sustained record of harassment but the courts have also held that a single incident of harassment can amount to unlawful discrimination, depending on its seriousness and the impact it has had on the worker who was harassed. The key case is Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcelli [1986] ICR 564. Ms Porcelli had been subjected to sustained sexual harassment of a physical and verbal nature and claimed that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of her sex. The Court of Session held that the treatment she had received amounted to sex discrimination since a male employee would not have been subjected to the same form of sexual harassment. While the protection from harassment is an important right, the way that the courts have applied the law has meant that it is not in every case that the outcome is favourable to individuals, as in the Porcelli case, particularly where the courts decide that the harassment is not specific to gender (or on any other discrimination ground), but that it just denotes general harassment not protected by discrimination law. This point comes out clearly in the case of Pearce v The Governing Body of Mayfield Secondary School [2003] ICR 937. Ms Pearce was a teacher and was also out as a lesbian and as a consequence pupils at the school subjected her to verbal abuse. Pearce claimed that she had been subjected to harassment on the grounds of her sex4 but the court disagreed that the discrimination against her was sex-based, using the argument that a gay male teacher would have been subjected to the same abuse. The court’s position was that since male teachers would have been equally badly treated by the school’s pupils, there was no sex discrimination.
Unlawful Victimisation The law gives specific protection to individuals who take discrimination claims as it is recognised that if this were not the case, employers would be free to victimise workers 4 The case was taken prior to the regulations on sexual orientation coming into force meaning that Pearce could only take a claim using sex discrimination laws..
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because they had challenged discriminatory practices. A recent case on victimisation is the case of St Helens MBC v Derbyshire and others [2007] UKHL 16. This was an equal pay case in which the employer, in an attempt to get women to withdraw existing equal pay claims that had already been submitted to a tribunal, wrote to all council staff pointing out that a successful equal pay claim would jeopardise future pay improvements since the employer would not have the money to pay the women and to pay all workers a reasonable annual increase. The Court of Appeal held that the writing of the letter amounted to victimisation. Another key case is that of Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] AC 501. Mr Nagarajan had previously taken a claim of race discrimination. He subsequently applied for a promotion and was unsuccessful and claimed that he had been victimised because of his earlier claim. He succeeded, since the Supreme Court ruled that he was not required to show that the interview panel had consciously discriminated against him. It was enough that there had been unconscious discrimination, on the basis of their existing knowledge of his earlier claim. However, while the law is clear that victimisation is unlawful, again the interpretation that is applied by the courts means that it can also exclude individuals from its protection in some situations. In the key case of Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] ICR 1065 (HL), Mr Khan, a police officer, had asked for a reference, which was refused because at the time Khan was pursuing a race discrimination claim over nonpromotion. The Supreme Court ruled that the refusal did not amount to victimisation as it had occurred, not because Khan had taken a claim, but because that claim was still in progress. The mere fact that his case was still in progress was sufficient to deny him the right to protection from victimisation.
Disabled Workers The law on disability discrimination, while containing many of the same concepts as other discrimination laws, such as the issue of less favourable treatment and the provisions on victimisation and harassment, has differed in a number of respects from the treatment of other forms of discrimination. First, as already noted, prior to the Equality Act 2010 only direct discrimination was covered, and this had led to a ruling by the Supreme Court in 2008 (London Borough of Lewisham v Malcom [2008] HLUK 43) which had meant that disabled people had to compare their treatment with that of nondisabled people, without taking account of the disability itself. In the Malcom case this meant that a local authority was not discriminating when evicting a tenant who had sub-let his accommodation in breach of the tenancy agreement, given that the same rule would have been applied to a non-disabled person. The fact that it was the disability that had made him susceptible to distortions in thinking and had led him to sub-let, in breach of the tenancy agreement, was not relevant, according to the court. Furthermore an employer can directly discriminate against a disabled worker if the discrimination can be justified. This justification test was changed with the introduction of s.19 of the Equality Act 2010 (on indirect discrimination) and s.15 specifically on discrimination arising from disability. S.15 does not require a comparator. However, the test of objective justification does apply and there is additionally a defence of the employer not reasonably being expected to know that the employee had a disability. The way that the law operated, prior to the 2010 Act, meant that there were situations where disabled workers were treated less
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favourably without the right to protection under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (as amended) because the employer provided justification for the treatment. A disability can be physical and some forms of mental ill health are also covered but is defined in relation to the existence of medical evidence (for fuller discussion of mental health at work see Tambourides, Chapter 14). Addictive illnesses connected with alcohol and drug additions are not, however, covered. This leaves many workers with addictions that affect their ability to work outside the protection of the legislation. The less favourable treatment has to be in comparison to non-disabled workers. However, there is a concept of ‘associative discrimination’, where an individual may be held to have been discriminated against for reasons associated with disability, even though the individual her/himself is not disabled. This ruling is in the landmark case at the Court of Justice (Coleman v Attridge Law [2008] IRLR 722) when it was held that discrimination against a worker who required more flexible work arrangements, due to her caring obligations for a disabled child, and was refused them, had been subjected to discrimination on the grounds of disability. Section 13 of the Equality Act, which protects against direct discrimination, ‘because of’ a disability, intended to extend the protection from discrimination in line with the Coleman decision, which held that that parent of a disabled child could claim disability protection, when discriminated against for undertaking caring responsibilities to her child. A second important difference is that the law places a greater burden of proof on the worker to show that they are disabled. There are a number of tests that must be met. First, the disability must amount to an impairment, which is long-term and second, which inhibits the individual from carrying out normal day-to-day activities. The latter represents an unusual element in the construction of disability law since the normal day-to-day activities are generally activities exclusive of those connected solely with the individual’s employment. Thus, for example, if the job requires that the individual lift heavy weights, which their disability prevents them from doing, but these are beyond what an individual in normal day-to-day activities would lift, they cannot claim under disability discrimination law. Similarly if an individual’s disability restricts some other activity that is not defined as ‘normal’ and ‘day-to-day’ it does not come within the definition. The third important concept in disability law is the duty (on the employer) to make adjustments that might enable the disabled worker to continue in employment (see Foster, Chapter 13, for further discussion). The tribunals will look at whether the adjustment would actually remove the disadvantage faced by the employee and whether it is reasonable. This can be said to represent one of the major weaknesses in the legislation in that it puts the obligation on the employee (not on the employer) to identify the broad nature of the adjustment required and this is often difficult for employees since they are unlikely to have access to the kind of expert knowledge necessary to identify what kind of adjustments could be made. Furthermore, the fact that the requirement is constrained by the concept of what is reasonable means that employers can avoid the obligation to make adjustments where they can argue that the costs would be disproportionate or the adjustment would be unduly disruptive. The landmark case in relation to the duty to make adjustments is the Supreme Court decision in Archibald v Fife Council [2004] IRLR 651, which held that the employer should consider whether there are adjustments whose effect would be to no longer place the disabled person at a substantial disadvantage, while there is no requirement to treat a disabled person more favourably.
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Proving Discrimination In discrimination claims the rule is that the person making the claim has to establish that there has been less favourable treatment from which inferences can be drawn that the less favourable treatment is on the grounds protected by the Equality Act 2010. It is then that the burden of proof shifts to the employer, who must establish the reason for the treatment and this cannot be merely that there was no intention to discriminate, if the consequence is that discrimination has taken place. This provision for shifting the burden of proof onto the employer was an important advance in discrimination law, as it placed responsibility on the employer to prove that what had been done was not based on discriminatory treatment. Prior to the introduction of the Equality Act 2010 the provisions regarding the shift in the burden of proof did not apply in victimisation cases, which meant that there was a considerable weakness in the law. In cases of indirect discrimination where this is being justified by factors that include an economic argument, the employer must at least set out the basic economic analysis of the business and its needs and objectively justify the decision. Despite this positive aspect of the legislation, discrimination claims remain among the most difficult to win in the employment tribunals. The tribunals, while finding cases concerning redundancy or non-payment of wages relatively straightforward to deal with, seem to continue to struggle when dealing with concepts of discrimination. In part this reflects both their history and also their composition, since their membership remains overwhelmingly white and male. In the last year for which the statistics are available (2007–2008) just 489 sex discrimination cases were successful at tribunals, while 3,100 were settled through Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) conciliation procedures, out of 26,907 initially submitted. In race discrimination cases, out of 4,130 initial claims, just 121 succeeded at the tribunals and another 1,295 were Acas-conciliated settlements The low level of success following submission of a tribunal application is demonstrated by taking the successful and conciliated cases together in the two principal discrimination jurisdictions, where they amount to just 16 per cent of applicants. There are similarly low numbers for the other jurisdictions as the Table 1.1 shows.
Table 1.1
Outcome of tribunal claims, 2007–2008
Jurisdiction
No. applications
No. successful at tribunals
Sex Race Disability Religion/belief Sexual orientation Age Equal pay
26,907 4,130 5,833 709 582 2,949 62,706
489 121 178 14 29 56 678
% of all submitted claims successful at tribunal 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01
Median/Ave award £5,200/£11,263 £8,120/£14,566 £8,363/£19,523 N/A/£3,203 £2,103/£7,579 £1,526/£3,334 N/A
Source: Employment tribunal and EAT statistics 2007–2008.5 5 http://www.employmenttribunals.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/EmploymentTribunal_and_EAT_Statistics_v9.pdf
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Not only are the chances of winning a claim very slight, but the compensation which successful applicants receive is low, as the table shows. While a few high profile compensation claims hit the media headlines, the reality is that, even where an individual succeeds at a tribunal, the likelihood is that the amount awarded will be well under £20,000. These continuing low levels of compensation (despite the fact that the law states that there is no maximum amount that can be awarded) mean that employers who do discriminate are unlikely to face significant financial penalties.
Time Limits Most employment law rights are enforceable only within a specific time period from the treatment/event having occurred. This also applies in discrimination claims which, in general, must be submitted within three months of the discriminatory action having occurred, save in equal pay claims, where the time limit is six months. The fact that there is a time limit can be problematic for some claims, as the individual either needs to have submitted the tribunal claim within the three months or to have shown that the discrimination is ‘continuing’, in other words, while the discriminatory action occurred at a specific point in time, its detrimental consequences continue to be felt. This is often difficult to establish.
Procedures for Claiming Discrimination Discrimination claims are submitted to employment tribunals, generally consisting of two lay representatives and one legally qualified chair, who decide on the claim. The tribunals were originally intended as a relatively informal method of pursuing claims but over the years have become increasingly legalistic, with the parties now more likely to appoint lawyers to present their argument. As a result the legislation itself has become more complex, with legal precedents continuously emerging as the cases are taken through the higher courts. An unusual element in discrimination claims is the right of the individual who is considering taking a claim to require of the employer that he/she complete a questionnaire seeking information on the background to the potential claim. If the employer refuses to complete the questionnaire, the tribunal may draw inferences of discrimination. The questionnaire is a useful tool for employees who believe that they have been discriminated against but who lack the necessary evidence. They can use this process to put questions to the employer that will assist them in assessing whether or not they have a claim. Importantly, tribunals will take account not only of what the employer puts in the questionnaire, but can also draw inferences of discrimination if the employer refuses to give the answers requested.
Conclusion: Revising Discrimination Laws The failure of the law to tackle discrimination in the workplace and the continuing evidence of discriminatory treatment and outcomes have led to demands for changes to the law. The government’s response was to introduce the Equality Act 2010 to replace the existing discrimination laws. The arguments in favour are that this will simplify the law,
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as the tests will apply to all forms of discrimination. However, the principal reasons why discrimination cases remain so difficult to succeed in require more fundamental changes that the Equality Act does not address. The following chapter by Hazel Conley discusses recent developments in discrimination law, including the changes introduced by the Equality Act 2010.
References ASHE (2009) Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, Office for National Statistics (ONS), available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/product.asp?vlnk=13101 [accessed 28 January 2011]. Collins, H., Ewing, K. and McColgan, A. (2005) Labour Law Texts and Materials, 2nd ed. Oxford: Hart Publishing . Connolly, M. (2001) ‘Discrimination law: justification, alternative measures and defences based on sex’, Industrial Law Journal, vol. 30, 311–318. Dickens, L. (2007) ‘The road is long – thirty years of equality legislation in Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 45, no. 3, 463–494, September 2007. Fredman, S. and Spencer, S. (2003) Age as an Equality Issue – Legal and Policy Perspectives. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Hepple, R., Coussey, M. and Choudhury, T. (2000) Equality – A New Framework. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Ippr (2010) Recession Leaves Almost Half Young Black People Unemployed. London: Institute for Public Policy Research., Gore, E. and Parckar, G. (2010) Disability and the Downturn. London: Leonard Cheshire Disability. Wrench, J. (2007) Diversity Management and Discrimination – Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the EU. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Wright, T. ,Colgan, F., Creegan, C. and McKearney, A. (2006) ‘Lesbian, gay and bisexual workers: equality, diversity and inclusion in the workplace’, Equal Opportunities International, vol. 25, no. 6, 465–470.
chapter
2 The Road to Equality:
Legislating for Change?
HAZEL CONLEY
Introduction This chapter charts attempts to reform UK equality legislation since 1997. After a brief review of the academic and policy debates that called for change, the focus of the paper is on the public sector equality duties – recent legislation, beginning with the Race Equality Duty (RED) 2001, which began to broaden the conceptualisation of equality legislation in the UK. The chapter analyses the opportunities presented by new legislation and how far these opportunities have been pursued in subsequent legislation and in the single Equality Bill/Equality Act 2010. Unfortunately the conclusions are not altogether positive. They highlight that the conflicts of interest between achieving real equality of outcome and the burdens this is perceived to result in for employers that have led to historically compromised equality legislation continue to impede positive change. The anti-discrimination regulatory framework began to take shape in the UK in the early 1970s with the passing of the Equal Pay Act, the Sex Discrimination Act and the Race Relations Act. Comparable disability legislation did not follow until much later with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 with legislation on Sexual Orientation (2003), Religion (2003) and Age (2006) following the European Directives on Equal Treatment. Dickens (2007: 468) notes that, throughout its history, the development of equality legislation has been subject to a tug of war between fairness and efficiency, meaning that it has been introduced in very limited ways in the belief that restraint was required to cushion employers, as far as possible, from potential adverse business impacts of not discriminating. Apart from standing in contradiction to public policy that claimed a ‘business case’ for equality, the problem with this approach is that the legislation, as introduced, was in many cases not fit for purpose and, as well as having minimal impact on efficiency, did little to tackle the multiple problems of discrimination (see McKay, Chapter 1). The result is that most of the anti-discrimination legislation has at some stage required amendments, resulting in ‘116 different acts of Parliament, regulations, codes of practice and guidance’ (EHRC, Undated). Together this represents a body of law that Hepple et al. (2000: 5) argue is ‘widely criticised for being outdated, fragmented, inconsistent, inadequate, and at times incomprehensible’. Calls for a review of the anti-discrimination legislation began to gain momentum following the change of government in 1997. Academics, both from the Laws
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(Hepple et al. 2000) and Industrial Relations (Dickens 1997, 2007) disciplines have lobbied for radical change as have the leading equality bodies. In an insightful paper Dickens (1997: 285) argued: The current legislative approach in Britain centres on a predominantly private, individualised model of sex and race discriminations law concerned with formal equality (equality of treatment rather than outcomes). The main requirement is to desist from doing negative things, there is no legal requirement to do anything to promote equality….
The Hepple et al. (2000) report called for a review of all of the equality legislation and provides 53 detailed recommendations about how change could be achieved. The leading claim of Hepple et al. (2000: xiii) is that ‘the present framework places too much emphasis on state regulation and too little on the responsibility of organisations and individuals to generate change’. Their recommendations for change include the public sector taking a lead via the introduction of positive duties to promote equality and for a process of negotiated change within organisations ‘… to allow the employer time to absorb the costs of implementation…’ (ibid.: xv). Recommendation 24 calls for a single public sector equality duty to cover race, gender, disability, age, sexual orientation, religion and for persons with dependants.
Positive Duties – A New Direction Not all of the recommendations of Hepple et al. (ibid.) were introduced, but the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, which uncovered serious institutionalised race discrimination in the Metropolitan Police Force, added impetus for the recommendations concerning public sector equality duties to be adopted. Reflecting the seriousness of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, the first of these duties, the Race Equality Duty (RED), was introduced in 2001 under the Race Relations (amendment) Act 2000. The second duty to be introduced was the Disability Equality Duty (DED) in December 2006 as part of the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 and the final duty, the Gender Equality Duty (GED), came into force in April 2007 as part of the Equality Act 2006. The most important point to note about the public sector equality duties is that they are unlike any previous equality legislation in that they do not provide additional rights for individuals but rather place responsibilities on public authorities.1 In this respect they are considered to be a positive, proactive approach to equality which does not depend on discrimination having already taken place, thereby offering an additional and different approach to employment tribunals and their associated difficulties for claimants (see McKay, Chapter 1). A second important factor is that the duties require authorities to have ‘due regard’ in all of their public functions to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment and to promote equality of opportunity. In practice this approach is designed to ensure the mainstreaming of equality issues and to counter the past criticisms that equal opportunities were confined to specialist management functions and were not ‘owned’ by operational areas of public authorities (for example, Jewson and Mason 1986; Rees 2005). Another distinguishing 1 There is a complex schedule for each duty of which authorities the respective duties apply. The duties also cover voluntary or private sector organisations who undertake contracted out public functions.
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factor is that the duties cover public authorities both as employers and as service providers. All of the duties adopt a similar format with a set of substantive ‘general duties’ placed on public authorities to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment and to promote equality of opportunity. The RED also places a general duty on authorities to promote good relations between people of different racial groups. The general duties in relation to DED include a duty to promote positive attitudes towards people with disabilities, encourage participation in public life and to take into account reasonable adjustments even where this may mean treating people with disabilities more favourably. The general duties in the GED apply to women, men and transgendered people. Each equality duty also contains a set of more ‘specific duties’ which are procedural requirements in relation to the disadvantaged groups covered in each of the pieces of legislation. The specific duties for the GED include a responsibility to consider objectives to address the causes of the gender pay gap and to consult stakeholders, including trade unions, to determine gender equality objectives. As with any law, the equality duties are only useful if they are also enforceable. Given the conceptually different structure of the duties from previous antidiscrimination legislation, enforcement mechanisms have had to take a different format. The enforcement power for all of the equality duties now lies with the EHRC, created in 2007. If the EHRC deems that a public authority has failed to meet its responsibilities under any of the duties it can first issue a compliance notice, giving the authority 28 days to show how it has changed its practice to fall within the terms of the duties. A compliance notice applies to both general and specific duties. If the public authority does not act upon the compliance notice the EHRC can apply to the courts for a court order. If the public authority still does not meet its responsibilities the court may find it in contempt of court. A second method, involving an application to the High Court for judicial review, is also available to the EHRC and other interested parties to challenge the practice of an authority that is not considered to be meeting its responsibilities under the duties. These enforcement mechanisms have not yet been fully put to the test by the EHRC, which in itself offers some cause for concern. The equality duties offer an innovative approach to equality legislation but they have not been without problems. As Fredman (2001) notes, the success of the positive duties still hangs on convincing employers and managers of the importance and value of equality. Early assessment of the first positive equality duty on race found that engagement with the legislation was variable, particularly in relation to progress on employment-related issues (Equal Opportunities Review, 2002). The Audit Commission (2004) has similarly found an implementation gap between policy and outcomes. Current operational concerns focus on the need to streamline this legislation, and for further integration within the policy process. Some of the weaknesses of the RED have been addressed in the later duties, particularly in relation to a greater emphasis on participation of stakeholders and outcomes rather than achieving paperbased procedures.
The Equality Act 2010 – All Change? Despite their weaknesses, the public sector equality duties marked the first radical change to anti-discrimination legislation in over 40 years and Fredman (2001: 146) argues that they represent the ‘direction of the future.’ Most importantly, the duties have signalled that a different approach to tackling discrimination is not only necessary but possible.
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Perhaps the greatest hope for further and widespread legislative improvements for equality at work has been pinned on a single Equality Act (Dickens 2007). The 2005 Labour Party Manifesto, albeit on the last page, contained plans to formalise significant changes to the equality legislation. The pledge included the drafting of a single Equality Act to ‘simplify’ and ‘modernise’ 40 years of complex equality legislation, during the 2005–2010 Parliament. The Discrimination Law Review was established in 2005 to oversee the consultation process and the Equalities Review was commissioned by the government to provide an independent assessment. The Equalities Review (2007) recommended adoption of a single positive equalities duty, and more integrated implementation strategies across equalities areas. The Green Paper putting forward proposals for a single Equality Act was released for consultation in June 2007 (Discrimination Law Review, 2007). The consultation document is 187 pages in length. The longest section, Chapter 5, is dedicated to proposals to amend the public sector equality duties. Although a great deal of work and resources were allocated to the project, there were mixed feelings about its content. There are conceptual difficulties in moving from legal and institutional structures originally designed to address separate equality strands towards an approach that can challenge not only one dimensional disadvantage, but also be applied to multiple forms and intersections of discrimination. The method adopted has been largely one of integration (Durbin and Conley 2010). The first phase of integration included the merger of the three existing equality bodies2 in 2007 to create the Equalities and Human Rights Commission. The creation of the new equality body has been marred by the usual problems and power struggles associated with merger (Peacock 2009). Second, the main proposal in relation to the equality duties was to combine them into a single equality duty and to extend its coverage to other protected areas (age, sexual orientation, religion and belief, gender re-assignment, pregnancy and maternity). The move to simplify and extend equality legislation is widely supported by public service organisations that are required to implement piecemeal equality legislation through separate strategies. The Green Paper states that a significant number of public authorities have already introduced integrated equalities frameworks (p. 85 para. 5.22). However research has identified that integrated frameworks have been difficult to put into practice. Page and Conley (2009) found that, whilst the complexity of managing six rather than three separate equality strands within equality duty processes is the driver for local authorities to develop integrated frameworks, in practice some equality officers feared that, once integrated, the interests of some strands might dominate and others, particularly gender, would be subsumed. Another concern was that the Green Paper was silent in relation to some important principles established in the existing public sector equality duties, such as involvement of stakeholders, the requirement to set equality objectives; the requirement for impact assessments and the duty to consult with trade unions. The uncertainty in relation to the status of impact assessments was a particular concern. The separate equality duties require public authorities to conduct equality impact assessments (EIAs) on their policies and practices to cover all of the proposed and current activities of the authority to ensure that people from the protected strands are not disadvantaged. Where an authority identifies a potential impact, it should give due regard to modify the policy or practice (EOC 2006). Impact assessments are a tool that essentially requires authorities to mainstream equality into all decision-making processes. 2 Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and Disability Rights Commission (DRC).
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They have been particularly useful for equality officers in local government to encourage mainstreaming and to challenge poor practice or indifference (Page and Conley 2009). Although two years in the making, the Green Paper produced by the DLR was met by disappointment at its lack of ambition and vision for dealing with multiple forms of discrimination. The consultation process that accompanied the Green Paper revealed a great deal of disappointment with the proposals from key bodies concerned with equality. The following extracts have been taken from responses to the Green Paper:3 The Commission regrets ... that the proposed scope of a new Equality Act, as reflected in the Green Paper, falls far short of ministers’ stated ambitions when the DLR was established and the expectations they had created for new legislation which is coherent, simple and derived from fundamental principles. (Equality and Human Rights Commission undated) ... the Government’s commitment to review and simplify the law into a single Equality Act is extremely welcome. However, we are concerned that in some places the consultation’s proposals would weaken existing provisions, that in some parts of the document the intention is unclear, and that in some parts there is a clear case for going further than is proposed. (EDF undated) The Commission knows that if the current duties are replaced with a limited obligation to take action only towards certain equality priorities then a swath of important public services and law enforcement will proceed without any legal regard to race equality, or indeed when race intersects with gender or disability issues. This consequence is clearly regressive and is unacceptable. We don’t agree with the Government’s proposal to restrict the legal obligation to only a limited set of priority equality objectives. (Commission for Racial Equality 2007) The DLR seems to suggest that the current duties should be narrowed by requiring public bodies to identify priority objectives and take proportionate action towards them instead of the current requirement on public bodies to have ‘due regard’ to promote equality. We believe that it would be a backward step to narrow the requirements on public bodies. (Thompsons Solicitors 2007)
Criticism of the Green Paper obviously elicited some concern on behalf of the Government as the single Equality Act, due to be announced in the Queen’s Speech in November 2007, was withdrawn until 2008. In the meantime there was a change of government leadership and responsibility for the Equality Bill passed from Ruth Kelly to Harriet Harman. The White Paper eventually had its first reading on 24 April 2009 and the second on 11 May 2009. There were some improvements following the disappointment of the Green Paper and some further innovative, and controversial, inclusions. Perhaps the most controversial addition was the extension to permitted positive action in the recruitment and selection of employees. This clause: ... permits an employer to take a protected characteristic into consideration when deciding who to recruit or promote, where people having the protected characteristic are at a disadvantage or are under-represented. This can be done only where the candidates are equally qualified, and the clause does not allow employers to have a policy of automatically treating people who share a protected characteristic more favourably than those who do not.4 3 All responses to the Green paper consultation can be found at: http://www.equalities.gov.uk/equality_bill/consultation_ responses/organisations_which_responded.aspx?idx=301&idxltr=C&menupage=292 [accessed 25 January 2011] 4
Part 11, Chapter 2, Clause 153.
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This addition to the Bill was controversial because it moved away from the liberal, symmetrical or sameness approach to equality that has underpinned previous legislation. Equality legislation thus far had grasped tightly the principle that protected characteristics could not be considered either positively or negatively in selection decisions of employers. Only positive action to encourage under-represented groups to apply for posts was permissible. The extension of positive action to selection does allow employers under very limited circumstances and on a purely voluntary basis to move away from this principle. The Bill also included a dimension of equality that goes beyond the concept of protected characteristics by introducing a separate duty on public sector authorities, the so-called socio-economic duty, which requires public authorities: ... when making strategic decisions such as deciding priorities and setting objectives, to consider how their decisions might help to reduce the inequalities associated with socio-economic disadvantage. Such inequalities could include inequalities in education, health, housing, crime rates, or other matters associated with socio-economic disadvantage. It will be for public authorities subject to the duty to determine which socio-economic inequalities they are in a position to influence.5
It is important to note that the socio-economic duty does not introduce another protected characteristic. There is no intention that people can be protected against discrimination on the basis of their social class, but rather that socio-economic disadvantage is related to the six established strands of discrimination. Therefore, in considering socio-economic disadvantage when making decisions on policies or service provision, public authorities can reduce potential negative impacts. Despite these innovative inclusions, the details of the development of a single public sector equality duty were partial. The Bill included only the provisions for the general duties, and as such was rather vague on detail. The provision for specific duties was allowed for in secondary legislation, giving Ministers of the Crown powers to impose specific duties on public authorities. The government issued a consultation document regarding the specific duties for the single public sector equality duty (GEO 2009). It is clear from this document that the specific duties would in fact be far less specific than they are currently in the separate duties. For example, the consultation proposes that public authorities no longer be required to produce specific equality schemes. The justification for this is that ‘preparing and publishing equality schemes as discrete documents was burdensome and costly with little impact on outcomes’ (p. 20). The proposals are to allow authorities to identify their own objectives as part of the core business planning process. Given that the current long-term economic climate looks incredibly bleak for public authorities, this proposal is somewhat worrying. These proposals also have a knock-on effect for consultation of stakeholder groups. The DED and the GED currently require authorities to consult with stakeholder groups and, in the GED, trade unions. The consultation document plans for stakeholder participation were much weaker: The current disability and gender duties require public authorities to involve disabled people/ employees, service users and trades unions when drawing up their schemes. We propose to
5
Part 1, Clause 1.
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amend this, so that public authorities are required to consider how best to consult and involve people from the protected groups when setting equality objectives, and reviewing progress. (p. 82)
In their response to the consultation on the specific duties, the TUC (2009) highlighted the importance of retaining the specific reference to trade unions contained in the GED arguing: The reference to trade unions in the gender duty has been immensely helpful in getting public bodies to understand the important role trade unions can play in helping to engage the workforce and achieve the organisational and cultural change that was intended when the equality duties were introduced. (p. 12)
A similar fate has befallen the requirement for authorities to produce equality impact assessments. The consultation document again deferred to a more voluntarist approach to assessing impact by arguing that a specific duty to do so is ‘burdensome and bureaucratic’ (p. 22). The emphasis has moved away from public authorities being required to complete equality impact assessments on all of their policies and practices (EOC 2006: 37) to a position in the single public sector equality duty where there is no legislative requirement for public authorities to conduct impact assessments, but an expectation that impact assessments will be carried out on ‘key policies and service delivery initiatives’ (GEO 2010: 18). In effect this means that a valuable tool for mainstreaming equality has been severely weakened as not all policies and practices are subject to impact assessment. Similarly the potential for stakeholder involvement is reduced because they will no longer be able to insist on public authorities conducting equality impact assessments on anything not considered by the authority to be a key policy or service delivery initiative. Last, the consultation document proposed that the requirement to collect employment data should not be expanded to the new strands of age, sexuality and religion and only authorities with 150 or more employees be required to collect data on the established strands exempting, for example, the majority of schools. The results of the consultation published in a policy statement (GEO 2010) makes interesting reading. It highlights that there was considerable disagreement on the form the specific duties should follow, with employers’ bodies on the whole requiring less prescription, whilst stakeholder groups required greater or equivalent levels of prescription to that contained in the existing specific duties for race, gender and disability. Despite the mixed response to the consultation, the policy statement does not deviate to any great extent from the proposals in the consultation document, evident in the much repeated phrase ‘We remain of the view that ...’ (pp. 12, 18, 22, 23).
Conclusion: The End of the Road? Taken together, the proposals for the single Equality Act sent out a confusing message. In one respect there are innovative attempts to address some of the failings of the existing equality legislation and the intention of simplifying the existing web of legislation is broadly welcomed. However the proposals for the single public sector equality duty
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weaken one of the most innovative developments already made by invoking the familiar arguments that describe existing equality measures as ‘burdens’ and ‘costs’. It would appear that the new Act has not escaped the struggle between fairness and efficiency that Dickens (2007) argues has dogged all previous equality legislation. The wrangling over the content of the Equality Act 2010 was extensive. The slow progress of the Equality Bill through the Parliamentary system was caused by amendments from both ends of the political spectrum seeking either to strengthen weakened provisions or to limit or withdraw some of its more innovative aspects. In addition the Royal Assent, gained on 8 April 2010, which made the Bill law coincided with an announcement of a General Election where a change of political administration was expected and it was not clear whether the Bill would make it through the Parliamentary process before Parliament was dissolved. However much of the Act relies on secondary legislation to implement the most controversial measures, which may or may not be enacted in the future depending on the prevailing political ideology and strength of commitment to equality. Sadly it would appear that the historic face-off between efficiency and fairness has prevented the government from achieving the legislative innovation thought possible in 1997. One cannot escape the feeling that the tendency for compromise that has postponed equality for decades has won out again.
Addendum Since writing this chapter the coalition government has decided not to bring in to force the socio-economic duty, the provisions for gender pay gap reporting or the provisions for dual discrimination claims. Seven other provisions are still under consideration. The introduction of the specific duties in the Public Sector Equality Duty has been suspended pending further consideration by the government.
References Audit Commission (2004) The Journey to Race Equality, London: Audit Commission. Commission for Racial Equality (2007) Response to the Discrimination law Review, ‘A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Act for Great Britain’, London: CRE. Dickens, L. (1997) ‘Gender, Race and Employment Equality in Britain: Inadequate Strategies and the Role of Industrial Relations Actors’, Industrial Relations Journal, 28:4, 282–291. —— (2007) ‘The Road is Long – Thirty Years of Equality Legislation in Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 45:3, 463–494. Discrimination Law Review (2007) A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain, London: Women and Equality Unit. Durbin, S. and Conley, H. (2010) ‘Gender, Labour Process Theory and Intersectionality: Une Liason Dangereuse?’ in Thompson, P. and Smith, C. (eds) Working Life: Renewing Labour Process Analysis, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. EDF (undated) Discrimination Law Review: A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain, A response from the Equality and Diversity Forum (EDF), London: EDF, available on: http://www.edf.org.uk/blog/?p=194 [accessed 10 March 2010].
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EHRC (undated) http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/legislative-framework/equality-bill/summaryof-our-response/ [accessed 22 January 2011]. EHRC (undated) Response to the Discrimination Law Review ‘A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a New Equality Bill for Great Britain’, London: Equality and Human Rights Commission. EOC (2006) Gender Equality Duty Code of Practice England and Wales, Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission. Equal Opportunities Review (2002) ‘Race Equality Work Needs to Focus on Outcomes’, Equal Opportunities Review, Report 120. Fredman, S. (2001) ‘Equality: A New Generation?’, Industrial Law Journal, 30:2, 145–168. GEO (2009) Equality Bill: Making it Work. Policy Proposals for Specific Duties. A Consultation, London: Government Equalities Office. GEO (2010) Equality Bill: Making it Work. Policy Proposals for Specific Duties. Policy Statement, London: Government Equalities Office. Hepple, B., Coussey, M. and Choudhury, T (2000) Equality: A New Framework. Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation, Oxford: Hart Publishing. Jewson, N. and Mason, D. (1986) ‘Theory and Practice of Equal Opportunities Policies: Liberal and Radical approaches’, Sociological Review, 34:2, 307–334. Page, M. and Conley, H. (2009) Implementing the Gender Equality duty in Local Government: First Findings, paper presented at the Equal Opportunities International Conference, Istanbul, July 2009. Peacock, L. (2009) ‘EHRC Leadership Rocked by Three Resignations’, Personnel Today, 30 March. Rees, T. (2005) ‘Reflections on the Uneven Development of Gender Mainstreaming in Europe’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7:4, December, 555–574. Thompsons Solicitors (2007) ‘Response to the Consultation – Discrimination Law Review – A Framework for a Fairer Future: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain’, available at: http://www.thompsons.law.co.uk/ltext/discrimination-law-review.htm [accessed 10 March 2010]. TUC (2009) Equality Bill: Making it Work. TUC Consultation Response to GEO Proposals for Specific Duties, London: Trades Union Congress.
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3 Dignity at Work:
The Law’s Engagement with Bullying and Harassment in the Workplace
JACKIE JONES
Introduction A gay man employed at the Church in Wales wins £37,000 after being bullied out of his job in Coleg Trefeca in Brecon. His manager called him a ‘stupid poof’ and gave him pink fairy toilet paper as a present. Inmates at a Leeds prison received £120,000 from the Prison Service after suffering beatings and racial discrimination by prison officers. They had been racially harassed and victimised. Conwy Council in Wales was ordered to pay £10,000 to a family because it failed to deal with complaints against neighbours who were harassing them. The family had bricks thrown through the windows, were racially abused and their cars damaged. The family lived in housing association property and the husband was disabled. A gay airport guard received £62,500 compensation after he was called ‘batty boy’ and sexually harassed by a female colleague. Muslim City of London workers won a multi-million pound out-of-court settlement for being sexually harassed, racially and religiously discriminated against and being subjected to a sexual environment in which clients would be taken to lap-dancing clubs, Jewish clients taken off their books among other allegations. A culture of bullying and harassment in the kitchen of Harry’s Bar in Mayfair led a waitress to win her sexual harassment and unlawful dismissal claim worth £124,000. There were a series of incidences, including being pushed against a wall and kissed on the neck by the chef. There has been much outcry over a lesbian soldier being awarded £187,000 for sexual harassment by a male sergeant. There was a sustained campaign of victimisation after rejecting his advances. All of these snapshots took place within a six-month period in 2009. Bullying and harassment at work take many forms and make headlines every day. They are a major part of our working lives. Most people who suffer from this kind of treatment believe they must resign or put up with it. Most never complain and never use the law as a remedy. This chapter looks at how the law engages with workplace issues of bullying and
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harassment. It is a legal overview, offering some analysis of aspects of both issues and some thoughts on future directions. It cannot, within the space available, give a complete picture. The law in this area is constantly evolving and fitting itself around the new research that is being published in many countries around the world. That it is being, has been and continues to be, led by action on an EU-wide scale is testament to the fact that many countries have not developed domestic laws that are very sophisticated and that are able to address the globalised market, let alone the pervasive institutionalisation of the type of managerialism that is one of the main culprits of workplace or environmental bullying and harassment. This is particularly the case in times of recession in which women (more bullied and harassed than men) are often at the forefront of losing their already marginal space within an organization (TUC 2009).
Bullying and Harassment at Work Bullying is rife not just in UK workplaces, but in many countries around the world. The International Labour Office report on workplace violence found that bullying is one of the fastest growing forms of workplace violence (Chappell and Di Martino 2000). It has been argued that it is a form of evil and torture (see Vickers (2002) for a particularly vivid description of workplace bullying,). The definition of violence from the ‘Opinion on Violence at the Workplace,’ adopted on 29 November 2001 by the Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work of the European Commission states: Violence manifests itself in many ways, ranging from physical aggression to verbal insults, bullying, mobbing and sexual harassment, discrimination on grounds of religion, race, disability, sex or, in any event, difference and may be inflicted by persons both outside and inside the working environment.
Despite this global phenomenon, there are few countries which have, up to now, sought specifically to legislate to stop it. More often than not it is handled under harassment laws. This is equally the case in the UK although the Employment Rights Acts are often used as a legal vehicle. The UK has a major bullying problem. It is often featured on the news, seen on TV programmes and continually being ‘tackled’ in schools and the public sector. They are right to do so as one study of UK workplaces uncovered that 10.6 per cent of the employees had been bullied in the previous 6 months (Hoel and Cooper 2000). In another study, approximately 90 per cent of reported cases involved managers bullying subordinates. In addition, over 50 per cent of incidents of bullying were by females, leading one author analysing this trend to state that ‘occupational success caus[es] a metamorphosis into a bully’. (O’Donnell 1999). Bullying has been described as ‘a particularly insidious form of counterproductive workplace behaviour’ with one study in the UK finding that approximately one fourth of victims resigned voluntarily just to get away from the violence (Meglich-Sespico et al. 2007). Bullying is a specific form of harassment, usually developing gradually over time, with a cumulative effect that entraps the victim (Peyton 2003: 8). One definition of bullying developed by the former Manufacturing Science and Finance (MSF) union (now part of UNITE) is:
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Persistent, offensive, abusive, intimidating, malicious, or insulting behaviour, abuse of power or unfair penal sanctions, which makes the recipient feel upset, threatened, humiliated or vulnerable, which undermines their self-confidence and which may cause them to suffer stress. (Peyton 2003: 38)
Bullying takes many forms. Some of the most common include: name calling in public, using a scapegoat by blaming the party concerned, physical abuse, increases in work targets, moving the individual without support. In short, it aims to undermine your dignity as a human being (Bonafons et al. 2008, no page reference available). The effect on individuals who have been bullied or harassed can include an increase in stress, mental health issues, sickness absence, lack of progress in work targets, withdrawal from colleagues, even suicide (Harvey et al. 2009: 27; Vickers 2002). It is in this context that similarities between intimate partner violence and workplace bullying and harassment have been identified. For example, the power differential between employer (perpetrator) and employee (victim) plays a significant role, making it difficult for the employee to step out of the situation for fear of losing income, and so on, as well as the psychological and physical effect on the victim both at work (performance influencing) and at home (relationship influencing). This describes not only the primary form of bullying by (possibly) a colleague but also the secondary form of bullying through organisational policies and lack of clear legal remedies (Meglich-Sespico et al. 2007: 34). So when we spend a vast amount of time going to, being at, and leaving work, not to mention thinking about work when not physically at work, suffering violence mentally, physically and/or physiologically is bad for all in society (Mayhew et al. 2004). That is why it is important to take the situation out of the hands of those most affected and treat it as an organisational issue. Until relatively recently, harassment was seen as a private matter that just happened to take place at work. Sexual banter, racial jokes, comments about not being able to read, for example, were regarded as a normal part of everyday workplaces – quite acceptable or at least something one put up with. If someone took offence they must be sensitive and as the workplace is for all workers, the ‘sensitive ones’ just had to take it or leave. The legal concept of harassment (in particular sexual harassment) did not materialise in the UK until the US jurisprudence and legal theory was established in the 1970s (MacKinnon 1979, 1989; MacKinnon and Siegel 2004). So, for example, the struggle to have sexual harassment seen as sex discrimination was more successful in the USA than in many EU member states until this century. Indeed, most member states had no national laws recognising harassment until the EU enacted Directive 2002/73/EC of the EP and the Council amending the equal treatment Directive 76/207/EEC which required the recognition of harassment as a violation of personal dignity and thus violence. The EU took the lead in proposing harassment legislation as early as 1988 when the Commission funded a research report into the pervasiveness of sexual harassment of women in the workplace (Rubenstein, The Dignity of Women at Work, Commission of the European Communities, 1988; see generally Zippel 2006). It concluded, inter alia, that sexual harassment in the workplace was endemic and affected the dignity of all women at work. The main outcome of the report and current law is the emphasis in all forms of harassment law on the lack of respect for the dignity of a person as a woman, as a black person, as a transsexual, as a person with a disability, as a Jew, and so on (Monaghan 2007).
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Thus there has been a long struggle to make lawmakers accept the connection between being harassed (and bullied) at work and marginalisation within an organisation for belonging to a ‘minority’ or ‘protected’ group as well as the dynamics of workplace progression tactics.
The Law’s Response to Harassment at Work Originally only racial and sexual harassment were recognised by the law in UK workplaces. They were seen as forms of direct discrimination where the conduct amounted to less favourable treatment and there had been detriment (Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976). The main problem with proving any form of direct discrimination under the current law is the requirement for a comparator and proving that you have been treated less favourably because of (for example) your sex (Samuels 2004). That is to say, one has to compare oneself to another person similarly situated of (for example) the opposite sex; as a result of that treatment one suffered a detriment. Thus it was relatively easy to come up with defences to sexual and racial harassment claims. For example, putting semi-pornographic calendars up in the workplace might have offended as many men as women thus women were not treated less favourably than men (Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd [1996] ICR 535). Clearly this situation was unsatisfactory as there is a difference: the calendar may well offend men but it does not undermine their dignity as men (Monaghan 2007: 347). In ‘early’ cases this type of analysis, looking at the violation of a person’s dignity, was lacking. It was not until a freestanding anti-harassment law was enacted that this type of situation was rectified. It had become apparent that the use of direct discrimination with the requirement of a comparator and detrimental treatment was a blunt instrument, disabling more claims than it enabled, especially as the focus was clearly on what the perpetrator thought and the ‘sensitivity’ of the person targeted. Now there is a plethora of different statutes and regulations that can be used in order to obtain a remedy for bullying and harassment. In addition to provisions under the Equality Act 2010, these include:
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
Health and Safety Act 1974; Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978; Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; Employment Rights Act 1996; National Minimum Wage Act 1998; Working Time Regulations 1998; Data Protection Act 1998; Protection from Harassment Act 1997; Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998; Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Crime and Security Act 2001; and Employment Act 2002.
These cover both civil and criminal remedies and include compensation, injunctions, employment rights (dismissal) and discrimination. All the regulations regarding
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discrimination, actions under the common law of negligence and contract law as an implied term of the contract of employment of health and safety duty of the employer and trust and confidence are also available. Compensation is the most common form of remedy as it is awarded post facto once the harm has already been done. It is highly unusual for an ex-employee bullied or harassed out of the workplace to wish to return to that environment. There is no upper limit on the amount of compensation available for discrimination claims (see below). Two particular areas of law’s engagement with bullying and harassment will be dealt with in some detail here; the Protection from Harassment Act in which the law tries to deal with persistent forms of harassment by using both the criminal and civil law, and the free-standing harassment laws available for all strands of equality. The emphasis is on the workplace, although the law does not necessarily discriminate between places of work and elsewhere.
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 The Act covers all forms of harassment wherever it occurs and can also be used to cover workplace harassment and bullying despite initial uncertainty (see DPP v Moseley (1999) The Times 23 June; Majrowski v Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34). It does not define harassment with any precision (Conaghan 1999). Section (1) states that ‘a person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another, and which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other’. Section (1A) covers a situation where the harassment is of more than one person and where the harasser is trying to persuade another not to do something he legitimately is entitled to do or to do something that he is not under any obligation to pursue. Breach of either of these sections is a criminal offence punishable with up to six months imprisonment (s 2 of the Act) and could also constitute a tort for which damages can be awarded or an injunction put in place (ss 3 and 3A). A breach of an injunction under the Act is punishable with up to five years imprisonment thus making it a rather powerful weapon if used. The Act is a prime example of where the civil law and criminal law blur – but not in a good way (Conaghan 1999). From the point of view of the victim of harassment the option to ask for a criminal law remedy as opposed to a civil law remedy may be difficult. Research on domestic violence suggests that where the option for a civil law remedy is available, the woman will usually opt for it as she does not want to ‘criminalise’ her partner and probably the father of her children. Given this fact, it is difficult to envisage many workplace colleagues using such a draconian measure against a fellow employee. The Act specifies that there must a ‘course of conduct’. That requirement makes it more stringent than under discrimination law legislation which can be triggered with a single incident. Under the 1997 Act a course of conduct is defined in s 7(3) as involving ‘conduct on a least two occasions.’ However, where there has been a single event, the claimant can apply for injunctive relief (civil remedy, not criminal) where ‘an actual or apprehended breach of section 1 may be subject of a claim in civil proceedings’ (s 3(1)). Course of conduct means at least two incidents not too far apart in time unless there is clear evidence that they constitute a course of conduct (DPP v Lau [2000] The Times 29 March). This is a matter of evidence before the court/tribunal. The Act is ‘reserved’ for more serious forms of harassment and, because it is reactive law-making, offers less potential for claims of workplace harassment. Clearly the requirement of a course of
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conduct is a deterrent to most situations that start with what seems like ‘trivial’/small incidents that one may think are one’s imagination (arguably the bully’s best weapon). It is only really when they escalate that the law is engaged in a meaningful way.
Harassment, Discrimination Law and a Freestanding Claim The coverage of harassment law has been described as ‘perhaps one of the most successful elements in the move to codify all the major heads of discrimination’. (Smith and Thomas 2008: 274). With the enactment of the Race Directive (2000/43/EC), the Equal Treatment Directive (2002/78/EC) for sex discrimination and the Framework Employment Directive (2000/78/EC) for discrimination on other grounds (although slight differences exist in some respects) a freestanding offence of harassment was specifically created. The Equality Act now encapsulates the claim for age, disability, gender reassignment, race, religion and belief, sex and sexual orientation in sections 26 and 40. The sections do not cover maternity/pregnancy or marriage/civil partnership. Section 26 refers to the general situation of harassment, whereas section 40 covers harassment by an employer. Section 26 reads: 1. A person (A) harasses another (B) if – a) A engaged in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of – i) violating B’s dignity, or ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. 2. A also harasses B if – a) A engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, and b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b). 3. A also harasses B if – a) A or another person engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or that is related to gender reassignment or sex, b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), and c) because of B’s rejection of or submission to the conduct, A treats B less favourably than A would treat B if B had not rejected or submitted to the conduct.
The Act talks about unwanted conduct that is ‘related to’ a protected characteristic. This moves the emphasis away from the reason for the harassment. It also means that employees will be able to complain of behaviour that they find offensive even if it is not directed at them. In addition, the person affected need not possess the relevant characteristic themselves. The key to making out a claim is whether or not the unwanted conduct complained of has the effect of violating B’s dignity or creating an intimidating environment, and so on, as defined within the Act. Subsection (4) guides the court as to what to take into account when making a decision as to the effect on B of A’s conduct: the perception of B; the other circumstances of the case; and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. The judgment of whether or not conduct is unwanted
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and what effect it may have on B is a matter of fact not law and will be left to a tribunal/ jury to determine based on the facts presented at tribunal. This can be, and frequently is, a difficulty: what is unwanted to one may not be unwanted to another. It is therefore important for the individual to make clear that the conduct is unwanted by telling the person concerned or getting a representative to tell the person. Working life is rarely this straightforward however. Thus most employers have workplace policies that direct employees as to normally acceptable behaviour and unacceptable behaviour. Having bullying and harassment policies in place is an important aspect of employer responsibility. In fact, as of 1999 around 72 per cent of workplaces in the UK had a harassment policy (Zippel 2006: 110) and as of 2004 around 82 per cent had an anti-bullying policy (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD), Managing Conflict at Work, 2004), as well as a counselling service. Even where the conduct complained about is not explicitly mentioned in the workplace policy, there is an element of common sense that needs to be applied. So, for example, in Reed v Stedman [1999] Industrial Relations Law Reports (IRLR) 299, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that a sexually suggestive remark and attempt to look up the complainant’s skirt was sexual harassment. It is now clearly established that there need not be more than one incident that violates a person’s dignity for it to amount to unwanted conduct (Reed v Stedman [1999] IRLR 299). If there is more than one incidence then a tribunal will have to make a determination based on all the facts and not just look at each individual incident in isolation to decide if there is conduct which has the effect of creating an intimidating environment, and so on. In this way it can give effect to the realistic situation where ‘each successive episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the separate incidents may accumulate’ (Driskel v Peninsular Business Services Ltd (2000) IRLR 151). It is argued that this latter situation is one where positive duties (see Conley, Chapter 2) can play a leading role in prevention. There is no requirement for the harassment to be intentional, rather the conduct must have the purpose or effect of amounting to harassment as outlined above. If there is no manifested intention then the conduct is only seen as having the effect of harassing the claimant if, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the claimant’s perception of the conduct, it should reasonably be considered as having that effect. This is a reasonableness test (or reasonable consideration test) – subjective/ objective in terms of assessing if the conduct complained of would have the effect of creating an intimidating environment for a reasonable person (objective part of the test) but the particular perception of B will be taken into account (subjective part of the test) (see Driskel v Peninsula Business Services Ltd [2000] IRLR 151). It is for the court/tribunal to decide whether this test is made out. The burden of proof shifts (ss 136 and 137, Equality Act 2010) in the same way as for direct discrimination, meaning that if the complainant proves facts from which a court/tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the person complained of has harassed another, then the court/tribunal must uphold the complaint unless the person complained of can prove otherwise (see Monaghan 2007 Chapter 14). This shifting of the burden is significant because usually the person who has been harassed or bullied is no longer at the organisation and has no access to files, workmates, emails, and so on. Disproving discrimination is easier for the organisation than proving discrimination is for individuals, bearing in mind the disparity in power relations. The decision in Coleman (Case C303/06 S Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law; Waddington 2007) has been confirmed in that harassment by association is also covered
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in the case of all protected grounds (except maternity/pregnancy and marriage/civil partnership). Thus where there is conduct that amounts to harassment on the grounds that the person one is associated with is believed to be (for example) gay (C), then B can take a case of sexual orientation harassment by association. The crucial aspect of ‘on the grounds of’ in all harassment cases is the ability of B to prove that either it has the purpose or effect of violating someone’s dignity or the unwanted conduct was for the purpose of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person concerned. For example, this would include putting a calendar of naked men up on the wall of an open-plan workplace when just the week before it was discussed as being offensive. A ‘defence’ of ‘just a joke’ will in these circumstances not be acceptable. Section 40 Equality Act covers third party harassment – by an employer, whether B is employed by him/her or has applied for employment. A will be held liable for harassment where a third party harasses B in the course of her employment with A and A has failed to take such steps as would have been reasonably practicable to prevent the third party from doing so. The ‘three strikes rule’ known in sexual/sex harassment has been extended to cover all grounds (except, again, maternity/pregnancy and marriage/ civil partnership). This means that A must know that B has been harassed on at least two occasions by a third party during her employment with A. It is not material whether the third party is the same or a different person and need not be employed by A. Thus the provision covers employers, fellow employees and equally customers and extends from the workplace to, for example, after work social gatherings and training days. This latter form of harassment has been increasing in recent years and is a difficult area to police. However, once an employee makes the employer aware of harassing behaviour on the part of other employees or customers, the employer is fixed with knowledge which means the employer is under an obligation to take action as long as there has been a course of conduct. The action(s) to be taken should be laid down in the workplace harassment policy (EOC v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 483).
Outcomes: Awards of Compensation In Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1871, para. 65, the Court of Appeal laid down guidelines for tribunals in assessing the damages that should be awarded in cases of racial or sexual harassment. These same guidelines apply to other forms of workplace harassment. Aggravating features will significantly affect the level of damages awarded: The top band should normally be between £15,000 and £25,000. Sums in this range should be awarded in the most serious cases, such as where there has been a lengthy campaign of discriminatory harassment on the ground of sex or race … Only in the most exceptional case should an award of compensation for injury of feelings exceed £25,000. The middle band of between £5,000 and £15,000 should be used for serious cases, which do not merit an award in the highest band. Awards of between £500 and £5,000 are appropriate for less serious cases, such as where the act of discrimination is an isolated or one-off occurrence. In general, awards of less than £500 are to be avoided altogether, as they risk being regarded as so low as not to be a proper recognition of injury to feelings.
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It is common for employees to leave employment and claim constructive dismissal. The level of compensation awarded by courts or in out-of-court settlements have been relatively high, depending on the presence or absence of any aggravating features (for example, multiple discrimination or length of bullying): £28,000–£1 m and higher. This also includes suffering from stress, trauma, industrial and personal injury, whistle-blowing, negligence and injury to feelings as a result of being bullied at work.1 Stress-related claims have been on the increase year on year since the first case in 1995 (Walker v Northumberland CC; TUC 1998). This is a growing area were large pay-outs can be obtained if the liability of the employer for failing to take action over a protracted period of time can be proven. That is why the reaction to successful claims of bullying with large pay-outs has led many more employers to negotiate dignity at work policies with the unions. Having these policies in place is evidence that can be used by the employer in any tribunal/court to evidence that they will not tolerate bullying or harassment by employees – regardless of their position. Having a dignity at work policy which covers both harassment and bullying obviously does not exempt employers from liability but spreads the burden of ensuring a non-violent workplace amongst all employees, rather than making it purely a management issue. Unions can and do play a major role in ensuring the policy is enforced and training provided to all employees, including managers. Where a dignity at work policy has been negotiated it becomes harder to make a successful claim. In other words, arguably the burden of proof will be higher on the employee to prove bullying or harassment, despite the burden of proof shifting.
Current Trends It is clear that the law’s engagement with bullying and harassment has changed perspectives. It has been agued that harassment regulation can ‘be justified in accordance with the liberal harm principle by citing specific mental and psychological harms. These harms can be represented as individual because they are ways of interfering with the well being and autonomy of individuals.’ (Bamforth et al. 2008: 449). However, there has been a clear development in the philosophy underlying the legal provisions (both soft and hard law), reflecting the evolution from a pure liberty point of view (protection of dignity of the individual) to a gradual focus on equality (a right based on symmetrical comparison) (Baer 2004: 582), and I would argue an eventual amalgam of the two into positive duties that reflect the difficulties of rights enforcement both in law and in the workplace to shift the focus away from the individual employee to the working environment. Occupational stress has been recognised as one of the features of workplace organisations. The stress is exacerbated by the fact that in this country we have the individual litigation model. That is to say, normally, individual workers must take cases and no form of class action is possible. This is an unsatisfactory situation for several reasons. Framing the law on harassment and bullying in terms of dignity of the individual magnifies this stress because it relies on individual workers making the case that they have been bullied or harassed by a manager’s behaviour rather than focusing on (offensive) behaviour that is being accepted in the workplace. It has been pointed out 1
See www.bullyonline.org/action/caselaw.htm [accessed 25 January 2011.
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that stress felt by individuals who believe they have been bullied or are being harassed ‘pathologises’ the individual by blaming her for feeling a particular way. ‘There is something wrong with her/him if s/he feels harassed.’ ‘She is so sensitive.’ These attitudes do not serve to address the situation, having the effect of leading to more pressure and stress, thus dissuading individuals from taking action to alleviate the situation. This in turn permits the workplace to continue to be a hostile environment (Thompson 2003: 206; Vickers 2002). The same may be said of unregulated speech, drawings and writing in the workplace and may lead to the continuation of job segregation. That is because rampant harassment and bullying ‘create[s] a serious disincentive for women [transsexuals, disabled persons, and so on] to enter and remain in non-traditional jobs’ (Schultz 1990; Koppelman 1996). This is where the issue of human rights protections is most relevant. One person’s freedom of speech or action is another’s discriminatory practice. Thus society and business is in a situation where it has to make a choice as to which takes priority. It is in this decision that we can see the importance, or lack thereof, of equality and dignity. If we are to change the workplace these issues need to be addressed. The critical mass theory may lead to the de-sexualisation and so on of the workplace in which respect and dignity can be fostered and where bullying and harassment have no place. That would mean that the employers will have to accept the way women, transsexuals, gays, lesbians, disabled, black, and other people are, even if they are regarded as more sensitive, more emotional or not (Koppelman 1996: 254), or they have caring responsibilities which require the worker to physically take time away from the workplace, but not necessarily from work per se. We still have some way to go on this issue. If one accepts that the elimination of the causes of workplace violence, including bullying and harassment, are the responsibility of the employer then the type of management style prevalent in the UK needs to change. The impact of managerialism, long-hours culture, accountability, blame culture and a climate of redundancies all create an atmosphere in which bullying and harassment are able to flourish despite legal regulation. So, for example, the response from many managers to problems of production in the workplace is to bring in more managers to deal with the issue or to re-structure (similar to the frenzied law-making we have seen over the last 13 years from a Labour government) (Pockett 2008: 183). As with most issues, once the true cost of a problem becomes more apparent more action is forthcoming (Van der Vleuven 2007: 164–167). According to the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) there are direct and indirect costs: Conflict at work costs employers nearly 450 days of management time each year – equivalent to the time of two managers full time – and almost 4% of grievance and disciplinary cases are related to bullying or harassment incidents. (CIPD 2004, cited in Stephens and Hallas 2006: 19–20)
On average 12 days a year are spent on preparing for employment tribunal cases, not to mention the actual cost of defending a case before a tribunal. The CIPD report gives the costs to employers of tribunals as shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Average employment tribunal costs to employers Costs Settling out of court Paying compensation because of tribunal loss Legal advice Recruiting new staff
UK average (£) 2,063 650 3,021 1,750
Source: CIPD 2004.
By 2007 average annual costs associated with employment tribunals were almost £20,000 per organisation (CIPD 2007). Costs have continued to rise due to levels of awards as well as the fact that there is no upper limit on the amount of compensation available for a successful discrimination law case (see headlines above). These are direct costs. Indirect costs can be just as or even more expensive for an organisation. Costs include, sickness absence, work decrease, increased labour turnover, reduced customer satisfaction among others (Stephens and Hallas 2006: 20–22). Cost analysis also affects law-making. Thus as a result of ever increasing awards of compensation because of environmental bullying and harassment and the consequent occupational stress the law is starting to formulate its strategy around defining bullying and harassment as hate crime.
Criminalising Bullying and Harassment in the Workplace The development of legislation on hate crimes is significant as it recognises the aggravation of an offence by prejudice on grounds of race, sex, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity at the sentencing stage, increasing the length of sentence to reflect the severity of the prejudice manifested. The use of hate crime in the workplace and beyond as a deterrent criminal law measure can be used to force employers to fulfil their obligations to provide workers with a safe place to work. Indeed, the Crime and Security Act 2001 (amending the Crime and Disorder Act 1998) already created the offence of religiously aggravated harassment. So where there is hostility, violence and harassment based on a person’s religious affiliation this can be criminally punished as well as providing a remedy in unlawful harassment against the employer (see generally Macdonald 2004: 124 but note that some of the law has been updated). Arguably it was not until criminal law measures were enacted in relation to health and safety at work that employers really sat up and took notice. The current trend therefore is towards shifting responsibility for violence in the workplace away from the employee to the employer who is more able to both police and create a violence-free workplace. Related to this is the enactment in section 124 of the Equality Act 2010 which permits an employment tribunal to make recommendations to a change in the organisational behaviour from which a successful discrimination case has been made out. This would go some way in helping others affected by organisational practices which amount to bullying and harassment but will not help the individual who won the case.
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Conclusion: Shift to Organizational Responsibility The shift in focus in the law to organisational structures, policies and practices is an area in which positive duties can be useful. Here the idea of positive duties goes further than the existing public sector duties. As Fredman argues, the state has a duty to positively promote anti-discrimination, dignity and liberty wherever the individual citizen finds herself. That includes the workplace. Human rights law can be used as an instrument to proactively change the working environment by shifting the burden on the employer to have a zero-tolerance zone for bullying and harassment, backed up by penalties for breach. The shift requires all parties to work together collectively to genuinely achieve change (Fredman 2009). That may seem like an ideal to strive for, rather than a realistic goal. Nevertheless, it is advisable for all workplaces to have an up-to-date dignity at work policy for both bullying and harassment that includes procedures for investigating complaints, counselling services for victims, effective remedies for addressing complaints, disciplinary procedures against the perpetrator, and the availability of transferring to another part of an organisation as well as effective strategies for addressing any negative cultural behaviour. Thus the combination of positive actions on the part of all in the workplace, backed up by effective laws can make our extensive time at work a much more positive experience.
References Adams, A. and Crawford, N. (1992), Bullying at Work – How to Confront and Overcome It, London: Virago. Addison, A. (2007), Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law, Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish. Baer, S. (2004), ‘Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German and US Law’, in MacKinnon, C. and Siegal, R.B., Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, London: Yale University Press. Baker, C.N. (2008), The Women’s Movement against Sexual Harassment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bamforth, N., O’Cinneide, C. and Malik, M. (2008), Discrimination Law: Theory and Context, Text and Materials, London: Sweet and Maxwell. Becker, G.S. (1957), The Economics of Discrimination, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Blanck, P. and Schartz, H.P. (2003), ‘Studying the Emerging Workforce’, in Herr, S.S., Gostin, L.O. and Koh H.H., The Human Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Different but Equal, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chappell, D. and Di Martino, V. (2000), Violence at Work, 2nd ed. Geneva: International Labour Organisation (ILO). Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (2004), Managing Conflict at Work: A Survey of the UK and Ireland, London: CIPD. Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (2005), Bullying at Work: Beyond Policies to a Culture of Respect, London: CIPD. Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (2007), Managing Conflict at Work, London: CIPD. Chunn, D.E., Boyd, S.B. and Lessard, H. (eds) (2007), Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law, and Social Change, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
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Conaghan, J. (1999), ‘Enhancing Civil Remedies (Sexual) Harassment: s3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997’, Feminist Legal Studies, 7: 203–214. Discrimination Law Review: A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for Great Britain (2007), Department of Communities and Local Government, London: HMSO. Fredman, S. (2002), Discrimination Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (2009), Transforming Human Rights: Positive Duties Positive Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— and Spencer, S. (2003), Age as an Equality Issue: Legal and Policy Perspectives, Oxford: Hart Publishing. Fudge, J. and Owens, R. (eds) (2006), Precarious Work, Women, and the New Economy, Oxford: Hart Publishing. Hakim, C. (2004), Key Issues in Women’s Work (2nd ed.), London: Glasshouse Press. Harvey, M., Treadway, D., Thompson Heames, J. and Duke, A. (2009), ‘Bullying in the 21st Century Global Organization: An Ethical Perspective,’ Journal of Business Ethics, 85: 27–40. Hoel, H. and Cooper, C.L. (2000), Destructive Conflict and Bullying at Work, Manchester: University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology. Kennedy, H. (2004), Just Law: The Changing Face of Justice – And Why it Matters to us All, London: Chatto & Windus. Koppelman, A. (1996), Antidiscrimination Law & Social Equality, New Haven: Yale University Press. McColgan, A. (2005), Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd ed.), Oxford: Hart Publishing. Macdonald, L.A.C. (2004), Equality, Diversity and Discrimination, London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. MacKinnon, C.A. (1979), Sexual Harassment of Working Women, New Haven: Yale University Press. —— (1989), Towards a Feminist Theory of State, New Haven: Yale University Press. —— and Siegel, R.B. (2004), Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, New Haven: Yale University Press. Mayhew, C., McCarthy, P., Chapell, D., Quinlan, M., Barker, M. and Sheehan, M. (2004), ‘Measuring the Extent of Impact from Occupational Violence and Bulling on Traumatised Workers’, Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 16: 117–134. Meglich-Sespico, P., Farley, R.H. and Erdos Knapp, D. (2007), ‘Relief and Redress for Targets of Workplace Bullying’, Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 19: 31–43. Monaghan, K. (2007), Equality Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. O’Donnell, T. (1999), ‘The Sweat of the Brow or the Breaking of the Heart?’, in Morris, A. and O’Connell, T. (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Employment Law, London: Cavendish Publishing. Paoli, P. (2000), Violence at Work in the European Union Recent Finds, Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Peyton, P.R. (2003), Dignity at Work: Eliminate Bullying and Create a Positive Working Environment, Hove: Brunner-Routledge. Pitt, G. (2007), Employment Law (6th ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell. Pockett, P. (2008), ‘Human Service Professionals, Violence and the Workplace’, in Fawcett, B. and Waugh, F. (eds) Addressing Violence, Abuse and Oppression: Debates and Challenges, Milton Park: Routledge. Samuels, H. (2004), ‘A Defining Moment: Feminist Perspective on the Law of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace in the Light of the Equal Treatment Directive’, Feminist Legal Studies, 12: 181–211. Schultz, V. (1990), ‘Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Agreement’, 103 Harvard Law Review, 1749, at 1833. Smith, I. and Thomas, G. (2008), Employment Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Stephens, T. and Hallas, J. (2006), Bullying and Harassment: A Practical Handbook, Oxford: Chandos Publishing. Strebeigh, F. (2009), Equal: Women Reshape American Law, New York: WW Norton & Co. Thompson, N. (2003), Promoting Equality: Challenging Discrimination and Oppression (2nd ed.), Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. TUC (1998), Trade Union Trends: Focus on Union Legal Services, London: Trades Union Congress. TUC (2009), Women and Recession, London: Trades Union Congress. Van der Vleuven, A. (2007), The Price of Gender Equality, Aldershot: Ashgate. Vickers, L. (2002), Freedom of Speech and Employment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waddington, L. (2007), ‘Protection for Family and Friends: Addressing Discrimination by Association’, Anti-Discrimination Law Review, 5: 13–21. Zippel, K.S. (2006), The Politics of Sexual Harassment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
chapter
4 The Law Relating to Pregnancy and Maternity Leave
GRACE JAMES
Introduction Pregnancy-related discrimination has been described as ‘one of the most hidden and damaging forms of workplace injustice’ (EOC 2005), yet only relatively recently has it been specifically included in the text of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) at S3A and S6A. Prior to this, litigants could only draw on the plethora of case law that acknowledged less favourable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy, or a reason connected to pregnancy (such as being absent on maternity leave), as sex discrimination contrary to the Act. A brief outline of the scope and nature of this type of discrimination and a history of the development of the law are provided below (see below, ‘Pregnancy-Related Discrimination in the UK’, and ‘Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination’) At its core though, this chapter explores the potential and limitations of anti-discrimination law provisions to address this type of injustice. Then, ‘Key Issues’ will highlight the main boundaries of the legal protection available and, in doing so, reveals the limits of the equality model as a method of tackling this type of discrimination.
Pregnancy-Related Discrimination in the UK It is estimated that almost half of pregnant workers or those on maternity leave will experience some form of discrimination as a result of their pregnancies, and that every year some 30,000 women are dismissed, made redundant or leave as a result of some kind of detrimental treatment at work as a result of pregnancy or childbirth (EOC 2005; see also Dunstan 2001). Very few (1,000 per year) of those who actually experience discrimination of this nature actually litigate (James 2004, 2007 and 2009). Detrimental treatment might include being overlooked for training or promotion, demotion or refusal of time off for ante-natal appointments, being given the ‘cold shoulder’ or verbally abused (see further James 2007 and 2009; Adams et al. 2005; Dunstan 2001; O’Grady and Wakefield 1989). It can also include an unwanted reduction or increase in hours of work following the announcement of pregnancy or upon return from leave (James 2009: 28). In 2004 concern about the level and nature of pregnancy-related discrimination led the Equal
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Opportunities Commission (now part of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)) to conduct a formal investigation (see EOC 2005), but the problem is yet to be seriously tackled: recent evidence suggests that businesses are using the recent economic recession as a convenient excuse to break the law and make pregnant workers redundant (Woodroffe and Higham 2009). The levels of estimated incidence of pregnancy-related discrimination are surprising given that legislation provides a course of action in these situations and that employers can be required to pay considerable damages if found liable. It is also interesting that pregnancy-related discrimination in the UK is not geographically confined in any way and exists across all industries, where women are employed (James 2009: 29–30). However, research suggests that pregnancy-related dismissals are more likely to occur amongst those with limited service history at the time they announce their pregnancies (James 2009: 30) and this reflects research findings that some employers frown upon pregnancy within the first year of employment (Young and Morrell 2005). EOC research suggests that some cohorts of pregnant workers might be more vulnerable to discrimination of this nature than others – younger women, those with disabilities, lesbians, atypical workers (such as temporary or agency staff), those from ethnic minorities and those working for small businesses (EOC 2005; Leighton and Evans 2004). In addition, if poor attitudes exist towards pregnancy it seems likely to emerge prior to maternity leave: in a study of 1,368 pregnancy-related unfair dismissal cases, many women were dismissed within days of announcing their pregnancies to employers (James 2009: 30). The causes of pregnancy-related discrimination are difficult to pin down, although studies suggest that the likelihood of it occurring is influenced by: lack of dialogue and planning between workers and their employers (Young and Morrell 2005); limited understanding of legal obligations and the legal implications of detrimental treatment on the grounds of pregnancy and maternity leave amongst line-managers and small firms (Young and Morrell 2005; Leighton and Evans 2004); and negative stereotypical assumptions about pregnancy (Bistine, 1985; Collinson et al. 1990; EOC 2005; Halpert et al. 1993; Low Pay Unit 2002). Stereotypical attitudes include views that pregnant women are less committed to their jobs, are a financial burden on the business, are likely to be less focused and more irrational, and more likely to be absent because of illness and (in the future) childcare issues. Such negative views are often fuelled and privileged in high-profile sound-bites from the likes of Sir Alan Sugar, whose general unwillingness to employ women of childbearing age was discussed in a tabloid newspaper (Daily Mail, 9 February 2008; see also United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) MEP Godfrey Bloom, cited in The Daily Telegraph, 21 June 2004).
Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Pregnancy has, historically, proved particularly problematic in relation to the SDA, not least because of the need for a comparator in order to establish direct discrimination. When the SDA was drafted, pregnancy-related discrimination was not a part of its ambit (Honeyball 2000). Indeed maternity rights per se were seen as part of workers’ rights generally and provided for in the Employment Protection Act 1975, legislation that received Royal Assent on the same day as the SDA. The Employment Protection Act 1975 provided protection against dismissal on grounds of pregnancy or for a reason related to
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it (S60) and provisions for maternity leave and the right to return to work. The SDA on the other hand sought to tackle broader discrimination issues; ‘less favourable treatment’ on the grounds of sex, and used the symmetry model, based upon Aristotle’s notion that like ought to be treated alike and having at its core the need for a (in our case, male) comparator, to achieve its aim. For many years this need for a male comparator prevented the SDA from being fully utilised by working women as a means of challenging acts of pregnancy-related discrimination. Very early on the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT), in Reaney v Kanada Jean Productions Limited ([1978] IRLR 427), closed the door to potential claimants under the Act. The EAT held (at 428) that: It is impossible for a man to become pregnant (at all events in the specific state of scientific knowledge!). His situation therefore cannot be compared to that of a woman. The concept of discrimination involves by definition an act or treatment which in the case of a woman is less favourable than that which is or may be accorded to a man.
Similarly in Turley v Allders Department Stores [1980] ICR 66 EAT (at 67) the majority of the EAT argued that ‘a pregnant woman [is] not merely a woman but a woman with child with which there [is] no male equivalent’ and, hence, found that the case had ‘an insufficient infrastructure for argument of a submission under S.1(1)(b).’ In Hayes v Malleable Working Men’s Club & Institute [1985] IRLR 367 the EAT insisted that it was not the pregnancy itself but the effect it has upon performance at work of the need to be away from the workplace that presented the significant difficulty for employers (see also the dissenting opinion of Smith in Turley v Allders Department Stores [1980] ICR 66 EAT). It is, the tribunal suggested, ‘the consequence of the pregnancy, rather than the condition itself, which provides the grounds for dismissal’ (at 367) and, by implication, the treatment of a pregnant woman should, it held, be compared to that of an ill male who also needs time away from the workplace. Whilst a slight improvement on the previous approach, in that it ensured that some women could now put forward a realistic plea under the SDA, this approach was considered demeaning to women because it was thought to characterise pregnancy as an illness rather than a positive and normal condition worthy of legal protection in its own right (see Lacey 1992: 103). It was some 15 years later, in a preliminary reference brought by a Dutch court before the Court of Justice (CoJ – was ECJ), that the possibility of bringing an action under the SDA was deemed feasible. In Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen Plus (CaseC-177/88 [1990] ECR I-3941; [1991] IRLR 27 CoJ) the CoJ was asked whether the fact that a woman was refused employment on the grounds that because she was pregnant the employer’s insurance company would not reimburse maternity benefit, as they knew of the pending claim at the time of appointment, was contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive (ETD: 76/207/EEC as amended by 2002/73/EC). Despite being recommended as the best qualified applicant for the post, she was not employed by the respondent. In its ruling the CoJ demonstrated what Ellis referred to as ‘its fundamental grasp of what the law in this area is seeking to achieve’ (Ellis 1994: 567) when it ruled (at para. 12) that: As employment can only be refused because of pregnancy to [a] woman, such a refusal is direct discrimination on the grounds of sex. A refusal to employ because of the financial consequences of absence connected to pregnancy must be deemed to be principally on the fact of pregnancy.
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Accordingly, the functioning of the ETD is not, the CoJ decided, based upon the need for a comparison of any kind to be made. As McGarry comments, this landmark case ‘had significant consequences for the employers of Member States and for the Courts’ and ‘marked an important advance for those seeking to create a culture of protective rights for pregnant workers’ (McGarry 1995: 317). However, despite the fact that this ruling made it possible for sex discrimination legislation to be of practical use where women were dismissed because of pregnancy, it quickly became apparent that the protection it offers has limits. On the very day that the CoJ gave its ruling in Dekker, the same court delivered its ruling in Hertz, (Handels-og Kontorfunktionaernernes Forbund I Denmark (acting for Hertz) v Dansk Arbejdgiverforening (acting for Aldi Marked K/S) Case C-179/88 [1990] ECR I-3979; [1991] IRLR 31 CoJ), bestowing an immediate qualification on the potential scope of the legislation in relation to dismissals which are precipitated by pregnancy-related illness. This case concerned the dismissal of a woman who had taken a considerable amount of sick leave due to a complicated pregnancy and childbirth. She was dismissed because of repeated absences after resuming employment following maternity leave. The illness originated in the pregnancy and maternity leave period and the CoJ was asked whether such a dismissal was contrary to the ETD. The Court confirmed the basic tenet of the Dekker judgment and extended it to cover dismissal as well as non-recruitment. However, in relation to this particular case, it stated (at para. 13) that ‘during the maternity leave … a woman is protected from dismissal because of her absence’ but that, ‘after that period there is no reason to distinguish a pregnancy-related illness from any other illness’. Subsequent case law has further clarified the scope of the ‘protected period’ for the purposes of the SDA (see below) but, in brief, proving discrimination when illness arises after maternity leave, depends upon whether a male employee, absent due to (a non-pregnancy related) illness for the same period of time, would have been more favourably treated. A further restriction on the scope of the protection offered in Dekker emerged in cases regarding women employed on fixed-term contracts (see in particular, Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd Case C-32/93 [1994] ECR I-3567 and [1994] 4 All ER 115; HabermannBeltermann v Arbeiterwohlfahrt [1994] C-421/92 ECR I-1657 CoJ. See also, Caruana v Manchester Airport plc. [1996] IRLR 378 EAT and Mahlburg v Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Case C-207/98 [2000] IRLR 276 CoJ). These early cases suggested that the ETD did not apply in the case of fixed-term contracts – where, for example, a woman was not recruited or dismissed when pregnancy meant that she would not be available to work during a fixed-term contract. This distinction, especially given the line of reasoning adopted in Dekker and Hertz, has been described as ‘invidious’ (Fredman 1995: 222). However, more recent developments, not least the enactment of the Fixed-Term Work Directive (99/70/ EC), means that fixed-term workers are no longer treated differently to those on permanent contracts. In Tele Danmark A/S v Handels-og Kntorfunktionfrernes Forbund i Danmark (acting on behalf of Brandt-Nielsen) (Case C-109/00) [2001] IRLR 853), the CoJ ruled that the ETD and the Pregnant Workers Directive (PWD: 92/85/EEC) applied irrespective of whether the contract was for a fixed or indefinite period (see paras 33, 43 and 44. See also, Jimenez Melger v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios [2001] IRLR 848 CoJ, where a similar reasoning was applied in relation to non-renewal of a fixed-term contract).
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Since this important plethora of CoJ rulings (and others, discussed below) sex discrimination legislation in the UK has, since October 2005, explicitly included a section prohibiting less favourable treatment on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity leave under S3A (see also S6A which provides details of the scope of this protection). The inclusion of these sections has not been without drama as the original wording of S3A proved controversial and was successfully challenged in the High Court by the EOC (Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] IRLR 327). The EOC questioned the legality of the conceptual female comparator (one who was not pregnant and not on maternity leave) which had been introduced by the government in this section. This, the EOC argued successfully, constituted a regression and was contrary to the established case law, especially given that the CoJ had ruled in both Webb and Gillespie and Others v Northern Health and Social Services Board ([1996] IRLR 214) that such a comparative approach was unacceptable. The government has since indicated that it will amend the SDA in light of this ruling, and the recent Equality Act 2010, replicating this amended legislation, defines discrimination on the grounds of a woman’s pregnancy or pregnancy-related illness. Section 18(2) provides that ‘a person (A) discriminates against a woman if, in the protected period in relation to a pregnancy of hers, A treats her unfavourably – (a) because of the pregnancy, or (b) because of illness suffered by her as a result of it’. Section 18(3) and (4) prohibit discrimination because she takes or tries to take maternity leave. The protected period is defined as beginning when the pregnancy begins and ending at the end of her maternity leave entitlement or, if she has no such entitlement, at the end of two weeks beginning with the end of pregnancy (18(6)). In line with the CoJ rulings, the need for a comparator is explicitly excluded in relation to pregnancy and maternity discrimination at work. Interestingly, the Equality Bill originally defined discrimination as occurring if the pregnant woman or new mother was treated ‘less favourably’ and this was, in turn, defined as meaning the woman being treated ‘less favourably than is reasonable’. This definition might have enabled employers to defend claims by reference to, for example, costs and inconvenience. Following objections by the EHRC, and others, the terminology was amended and the final version is less likely to seriously undermine the effectiveness of the law in this area. The desire to legislate to protect pregnant women and new mothers from discrimination at work has always proved problematic and, as these difficulties in drafting show, it still sits uneasily within the ambit of anti-discrimination legislation as a whole. Indeed, the turbulent history discussed above also reflects an embedded awkward relationship between the ideals of anti-discrimination legislation and the realities of detrimental treatment against pregnant women and new mothers at work. Issues continue to test the boundaries of anti-discrimination law and reveal both its possibilities and limitations as a realistic cause of legal action, and in the next section some key areas of continuing friction for claimants and employers are outlined.
Key Issues The explicit statement of prohibition now included in the SDA and the Equality Act reflect the significance of judicial intervention in this area of anti-discrimination law. Women are able to claim direct discrimination if, for example, they are not considered
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for a post because of pregnancy, are dismissed because of pregnancy or selected for redundancy because they have taken maternity leave or given different work upon return to work because replacements are doing that job. The scope of legal protection for pregnant women and new mothers at work is not, however, without its limits. Indeed, although the SDA and Equality Act cover workers, as opposed to the narrower category of employees, it is important to note that statutory maternity leave is only available to ‘employees’ (as defined under S203 of the Employment Rights Act 1996). Hence, the protection afforded covers non-employees (such as agency workers) only when they are pregnant and for the two weeks (mandatory) leave immediately following childbirth. Given that all employees are now entitled to 12 months’ maternity leave in total, this significantly reduces the applicability of this protection to non-employees. Some further limitations of the legislation are discussed below. First, it is important to note that whilst a woman is generally protected from discrimination during maternity leave the rights to which she is entitled during this time are not absolute. For example, the CoJ, in Gillespie, ruled that a woman is not entitled to her normal salary during maternity leave. The government, in October 2005, inserted a new S6A into the SDA to clarify what terms and conditions a woman may be deprived of during this time, without contravening the protection afforded under S3A of the SDA. It highlighted a distinction that has historically been relevant in domestic law between ordinary maternity leave, when all benefits other than remuneration were preserved, and additional maternity leave, when they were not. The new S6A was successfully challenged by the EOC in its High Court action (see above), where it was argued that the restrictions placed on claims of discrimination in relation to the additional leave period offended the doctrine of regression and should be recast so as to comply with the CoJ rulings in Lewen v Denda ([2000] IRLR 67) and Land Brandenburg v Saas ([2005] IRLR 147). This change is reflected in the Equality Act (S18(4)) which prohibits unfavourable treatment ‘because she is exercising or seeking to exercise, or has exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave’, and is to be commended. Second, the case law relating to discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy-related illness provides specific protection only where the illness occurs during pregnancy or the maternity leave period. This, as stated above, was first established by the CoJ in Hertz, but it was clear that illness that occurs during and after pregnancy provides a dilemma: to impose timeframe boundaries or provide limitless protection against detrimental treatment, where the illness was pregnancy or childbirth related? The CoJ chose to interpret the ETD so that it protects a woman absent due to illness during her entire pregnancy and maternity leave, but not thereafter. Any ambiguity and confusion in relation to where the boundary had been drawn was finally laid to rest by the CoJ in Brown v Rentokil (C-394/96 IRLR [1998] 445 CoJ. See also the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in Stephenson v FA Wellworth & Co Ltd [1997] NI CA and Handels-Og kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark (acting for Larsson) v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening Case C-400/95 [1997] ECR I-2757). Brown v Rentokil concerned the termination of a contract of an employee who was absent from work for various pregnancy-related reasons, following a work rule that employees exceeding 26 weeks’ continuous sick leave be dismissed. The Scottish Court of Session (IRLR [1995] 211 CS) had held that ‘it was not relevant that the precise reason for the appellant’s illness was a condition, namely pregnancy, which was capable of affecting only women’. It based its decision on a narrow interpretation of the Hertz case, suggesting that a clear distinction
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had been made between pregnancy caused dismissal per se, and dismissal because of pregnancy-related illness. It held that in the latter situation there is no sex discrimination if the female employee is treated in the same way as a male employee absent due to illness. Counsel for the claimant insisted that this case could be distinguished from Hertz because the latter had been dealing with an illness that emerged some time after the pregnancy, whereas Ms Brown’s illness arose out of and during her pregnancy. The claimant appealed to the House of Lords and it made a preliminary reference to the CoJ for further guidance. The CoJ (at para. 22) declared that it was discriminatory, contrary to the ETD, to dismiss a woman on account of her incapacity to work because of a pregnancy-related illness, stating that: Pregnancy is a period during which disorders and complications may arise compelling women to undergo strict medical supervision and, in some cases, to rest absolutely for all or part of her pregnancy. Those disorders and complications, which may cause incapacity for work, form part of the risks inherent in the condition of pregnancy and are thus a specific feature of that condition.
It initially appeared as if the CoJ was declaring any pregnancy-related illness dismissal, whenever it appears, to be discriminatory. However, the CoJ clarified (at para. 26) that the scope of the protection was, as suggested in earlier judgments, confined to the pregnancy and maternity leave period. It ruled that: Where pathological conditions caused by pregnancy or childbirth arise after the end of maternity leave, they are covered by the general rules applicable in the event of illness. In such circumstances the sole question is whether a female worker’s absences … are treated in the same way as a male worker’s absences, for the same duration, caused by incapacity for work; if they are, there is no discrimination on grounds of sex.
Thus, whereas pregnancy-related dismissal is an issue capable of coming within the ambit of sex equality law, these cases demonstrate a simultaneous desire to limit the scope of that protection. The Equality Act reflects this approach and crystallises the notion of a ‘protected period’ during which poor treatment on the grounds of pregnancyrelated illnesses will constitute direct discrimination. It remains that if poor treatment occurs beyond the protected period a woman would need to be able to prove that the discrimination was because of her sex and be able to make the relevant comparison. As Wynn commented in relation to the Brown ruling, but it might be applied as a general description of the CoJ jurisprudence and ongoing domestic approach to this area of law, the ‘protected period’ constitutes ‘a pragmatic decision which recognises that, for cost reasons, domestic and work roles must conform to male work patterns outside a narrowly drawn maternity period’ (Wynn 1999: 435; see also Conaghan 1998; Ellis 1998). Third, the culpability of employers in relation to pregnancy-related discrimination is intrinsically linked to the requirement of knowledge, and this severely limits the scope of protection available. There is, quite simply, no discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy if the employer was not aware of the pregnancy at the time she or he decided to dismiss the employee. The main authority for this is a rather dated EAT decision relating to a claim for unfair dismissal, but it applies in relation to sex discrimination cases too: in Del Monte Foods v Mundon ([1980] IRLR 224 EAT) the claimant had been ill on numerous
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occasions when she was dismissed. Her employers claimed to have been unaware of the pregnancy at the time they decided to dismiss her, although they were aware by the time the actual dismissal took place. The EAT concluded that: If this section is to be relied upon, it seems to us essential that it be shown that the employers knew or believed that the woman was pregnant or that they were dismissing her for a reason connected with her pregnancy. If they do not know of the pregnancy, or do not believe that the pregnancy exists, it does not seem to us that it is possible for the employers to have as their reason for dismissal that the woman was pregnant. In a case where it is said that the reason for the dismissal is another reason connected with her pregnancy, not the pregnancy itself, it seems to us that the employers have to know the facts alleged by the employee as grounding the reason and also to know or believe that those facts relied upon are connected with the woman’s pregnancy. In summary it must be shown that the employers have either the knowledge of, or a belief in, the pregnancy, or knowledge of the facts, and their connection with the pregnancy, if there is some other reason than the pregnancy, which is the reason for the dismissal.
A similar conclusion was reached more recently in Ramdoolar v Bycity Ltd (EAT 30/07/04 case 0236/04) where the EAT actually felt that to question a woman about the existence of a pregnancy might itself be detrimental, contrary to the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 (SI No 3312) Regulation 19. In Ramdoolar, however, the EAT conceded that an employer who suspects pregnancy and, ‘fearing the consequences’, dismisses her would be acting unlawfully. Prior to Ramdoolar, doubt had been cast upon the reasoning behind the Del Monte decision: observations by Lindsey in Heinz Co Ltd v Kendrick (EAT 2001 IRLR 144), a disability discrimination case, suggested that awareness of the symptoms of pregnancy might be sufficient to establish a connection between pregnancy and dismissal whether or not pregnancy featured in the employer’s mind. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning was not followed in Ramdoolar and has since been overruled in relation to disability discrimination too in the controversial House of Lord’s decision in London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm ([2008] UKHL 43, HL, Baroness Hale dissenting. See Horton, 2008 for comment). Nothing in the Equality Act contravenes this approach and this silence embeds knowledge as a precondition of culpability. In summary, the current approach places the onus on pregnant employees to reveal their pregnancies, and to reveal them to the ‘right’ person (see Eildon Ltd v Sharkey ([2004] EAT case 0109/03), in order to gain legal protection. This presents a particularly difficult decision for women, the majority, who do not want to reveal their pregnancies for the first trimester, when risk of miscarriage and complications is at its highest (see further James 2009: 59–61). Overall, it is disappointing that women may be forced to prove that the employer did know of, or suspect the existence of, a pregnancy prior to the discriminatory act complained of. Anti-discrimination law alone cannot alter stereotypical attitudes or wholly prevent non-employment of women of childbearing age, or force individuals who have experienced wrongdoing to litigate and hence enforce the law where discrimination occurs (on this ‘litigation gap’ issue, see James 2009: 24–27). Legislation can however, if sympathetically drafted and applied, provide a course of action in many cases and hence a means of gaining compensation when wrongdoing occurs. In this regard, despite the limitations outlined here, it provides an important remedy for many individual women. The Equality Act promises to provide similar protection, and also to increase the powers of employment tribunals in discrimination cases to make recommendations in respect of
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all employees, not just the individual who has brought the claim, and probably left the place of work. This generic provision might help persuade employers to re-think broad policies, as opposed to simply reacting to individual claims and is, in the fight against this gendered, pervasive and damaging form of discrimination, to be commended.
Conclusion The discussion above demonstrates how the lives of pregnant workers and new mothers will forever be at odds with sex discrimination and equality laws. Pregnancy and parenting do not fit neatly into the equality model, based as it understandably is upon the need for comparators. This current law’s applicability to relevant situations will continue, at every junction, to be tested. For example, the issue of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment tested the scope of the law when, in Sabine Mayr v Backerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flockner OHG (2008 IRLR 387), the CoJ was asked whether the dismissal of a woman undergoing IVF treatment contravenes the Pregnant Workers Directive. The CoJ did not feel that the Pregnant Workers Directive was relevant to the case but insisted that, if the dismissal was linked to the treatment, she could rely upon the ETD. At the time of this dismissal the woman’s ova had been fertilised but, interestingly, had not yet been transferred to her uterus. Despite this, the CoJ felt that this was a procedure that ‘directly affects only women’ and that, because of this link to her sex, her dismissal as a result ‘constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of her sex’ (para. 30). This case demonstrates how a woman’s particular experience of pregnancy or here her attempts to become pregnant, continue to test the boundaries of the legislation. The CoJ decision is, from a pragmatic perspective, to be celebrated, but the reasoning behind the decision, which solidly grounds the protection available in terms of her gender, reveals the broadest limitation of this type of legislation: that it necessarily locates this type of discrimination as a gender issue. In doing so, it constructs all negative pregnancy and parenting–workplace relationships as ones that only impact upon (and, it implies, are caused by) women, perpetuating dominant ideologies of motherhood and fatherhood (see James 2009; see also McGlynn 2001). The scope of current sex discrimination legislation will continue to be challenged and reformed by litigation that pushes its scope so as to provide a cause of action for the thousands of women who experience discrimination of this type every year. However, progress by litigation, be it the SDA, Equality Act, ETD or any future equality legislation, is unlikely to achieve the fundamental goal of substantive, as opposed to formal, gender equality in the workplace because its framework was not designed with pregnancy, maternity or parenting (or indeed care-giving generally) in mind. It does not offer a suitable basis for consideration of the issues that impact upon the lives of working families today: we need to reconsider the difficulties and dilemmas imposed by pregnancy, parenting/ care-giving and workplace relationships for all parties, not just those women who are able and willing to bring claims under the anti-discrimination legislation. Only in the light of a more holistic reconsideration – which might include an assessment of the pregnancy and parenting–workplace relationships for mothers, fathers, carers, children, workers, employers and society as whole – can we purposefully (re)evaluate and (re)construct legal frameworks in a useful way.
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References Adams, L., McAndrew, F. and Winterbotham, M. (2005) Pregnancy Discrimination at Work: A Survey of Women, Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission. Bistine, S.M. (1985) ‘Making room for baby’. Association Management, 37: 96–98. Collinson, D., Knights, D. and Collinson, M. (1990) Managing to Discriminate, London: Routledge. Conaghan, J. (1998) ‘Pregnancy, equality and the European Court of Justice’, International Journal of Discrimination Law, 3: 115–133. Dunstan, R. (2001) Birth Rights: A CAB Evidence Report on Maternity and Paternity Rights at Work, London: National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux EOC (2005) Greater Expectations: Final Report of the EOC’s Investigation into Discrimination Against New and Expectant Mothers in the Workplace, Manchester: Equal OpportunitiesCommission. Ellis, E. (1994) ‘The definition of discrimination in European Community sex equality law’, European Law Review, 19: 563–580. —— (1998) ‘Recent developments in European Community sex equality law’, Common Market Law Review, 35: 379–408. Fredman, S. (1995) ‘Parenthood and the right to work’, Law Quarterly Review, 111: 220–223. Halpert, J., Wilson, M. and Hickman, J. (1993) ‘Pregnancy as a source of bias in performance appraisal’, Journal of Organizational Behaviour, 14: 649–663. Honeyball, S. (2000) ‘Pregnancy and sex discrimination’, Industrial Law Journal, 29(1): 43–52. Horton, R. (2008) ‘The end of disability-related discrimination in employment’, Industrial Law Journal, 37(4) (December): 376–384. James, G. (2004) Pregnancy Discrimination at Work: A Review, Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission. James, G. (2007) ‘Law’s response to pregnancy/workplace conflicts: a critique’, Feminist Legal Studies, 15: 167–188. —— (2009) The Legal Regulation of Pregnancy and Parenting in the Workplace, London: RoutledgeCavendish. Lacey, N. (1992) ‘From Individual to Group?’, in Hepple, B. and Szyszak, E. (eds), Discrimination: The Limits of Law, London: Mansell. Leighton, P. and Evans, R. (2004) Pregnant Women at Work: A Survey of Small Business Employers in Wales, Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission. Low Pay Unit (2002) A Difficult Delivery – Maternity Rights at Work, Manchester: Low Pay Unit. O’Grady, F. and Wakefield, H. (1989) Women Work and Maternity: The Inside Story, London: Maternity Alliance. McGarry, T. (1995) ‘Maternity rights in Northern Ireland and the struggle to achieve equality of opportunity’, Review of Employment Law Topics, 3(1): 309–334. McGlyn, C. (2001) ‘European Union family values: ideologies of “family” and “motherhood” in European Union law’, Social Politics, 8(3): 325–351. Woodroffe, J. and Higham, E. (2009) Alliance Against Pregnancy Discrimination in the Workplace Briefing. London: The Fawcett Society. Available from: http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/documents/ AllianceAgainstPregnancyDiscrimination.pdf. [accessed 25 January 2011]. Wynn, M. (1999) ‘Pregnancy discrimination: Equality, protection or reconciliation?’, Modern Law Review, 62(3): 435–447. Young, V. and Morrell, J. (2005) Pregnancy Discrimination at Work: A Survey of Employers (EOC Working Paper Series 20), Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission.
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II Discrimination(s) in the Workplace: Gender and Sexuality
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Model Employment? The Challenges Ahead for Public Sector Employers and Unions in Tackling the Gender Pay Gap CAROLE THORNLEY AND DAN COFFEY
Introduction The notion that the state sector is a ‘model’ or preferential employer is one which is deeply rooted in the public imagination and many academic accounts. This chapter, however, shows the extent to which reality lags behind the popular mythology, and therefore the extent of challenges remaining for public sector employers and unions. In particular, it makes the case for a clear re-evaluation of the significance of gender and gender-based disadvantage in this sector, thus offering a corrective to current trends to focus on ‘diversity’ and ‘intersectionality’ which run the risk of missing the bigger picture with respect to the main schisms in material rewards and key areas for reform. Recessionary conditions may also serve to obscure the need for change. The chapter therefore discusses the need both to understand and be committed to best practice and the challenges to public sector employers and unions in seeking to do this.
Model Employment? There have long been claims on the part of the UK state (and others internationally) to be – or to aspire to be – a ‘model employer’. Whilst the particular historical usage and meaning of this concept benefit from a much deeper analysis,1 it is the case that this is normally intended to convey the impression of generosity or fairness, with respect to internal arrangements as well as relative to the private sector. If anything, there has been 1
For a full and critical analysis see Coffey and Thornley (2009, especially pp. 81–109).
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a recent renaissance of the use of model employer terminology. For example, the UK Department of Health’s policy guidance currently makes ‘the case for becoming a model employer’ as follows: There is a wealth of research evidence which demonstrates clear links between good employment practices and business outcomes. Creating an environment where staff are valued, rewarded, appropriately trained and developed, regularly appraised and properly managed has a positive impact on people who use services and their carers. Model employers are also more likely to attract and retain high-quality staff and are also more likely to have high-performing and motivated staff who are more flexible and take less time off work. For social care, People need People – the report on the outcomes of the joint Social Services Inspectorate and Audit Commission inspections (2000), found that: ‘Those councils that are performing best in service delivery and the management of performance and resources are also those who score highly on their management of workers’.2
This guidance argues that ‘being a model employer means developing and implementing the right people management practices for your workforce’, with such practices covering a wide range of issues including ‘good benefits including reward structures’ (ibid.). The model employer concept was previously included in the National Health Service (NHS) Plan in July 2000, and subsequently in new payment systems in the NHS in the 2000s. Self descriptions as ‘model employers’ can now be found widely on websites and in internal documentation for both health service Trusts and local authorities in the UK, and are frequently employed as claims to be a model employer alongside further aspirational ideals. If the concept is important in the sense of practitioner usage, it is also prevalent in modern academic accounts of public sector employment and employment relations. The majority have been relatively uncritical of the broad account of ‘model employment’, even where they see exceptions and (in particular) note that some political administrations make a marked departure from the ‘ideal’ in particular epochs (see for example, Fredman and Morris (1989a, 1989b); Farnham and Pimlott (1995); Carter and Fairbrother (1999); Bach and Winchester (2003)).3 A recent view taken on the relative position of public sector workers vis-à-vis their private sector counterparts in an influential commentary, for example, is very positive: ‘many public sector workers enjoy relatively high job security, shorter working hours … while low pay is also relatively rare’ (Bach and Winchester 2003: 286). Gender disadvantage is acknowledged, but again the prognosis is optimistic: ‘in most parts of the public services … the gender pay gap and other expressions of women’s disadvantaged position vis-à-vis men have declined over the last 20 years’ (ibid.: 294–295). The problem with such idealised accounts, however, is that they sit rather awkwardly with the key features of public sector employment – that is to say, with the basic facts – both historically and currently. While we explore historical features in some detail elsewhere (see Coffey and Thornley 2009: 82–101), we here focus on the material, and structural, realities of modern public sector employment. 2 See http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/Browsable/ DH 5675761 [accessed 8 January 2008]. 3
For a full review of this literature, see Coffey and Thornley (2009).
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The first thing that would strike any objective ‘newcomer’ to the state sector is that it is a major area of employment for women. While class and race also provide important schisms within, and sources of disadvantage for, public sector employment and pay,4 it is the feminised nature of public services which is striking, and which has been much neglected in most accounts. More than five and a half million workers are directly employed in the UK state sector (Labour Market Trends 2006: 1), the majority of whom are women; in fact, around a third of all women who are employed in the economy work in the public sector. There has been increasing ‘feminisation’ of the public sector in the UK over time – from a position of just under half the workforce in 1971 (Beaumont 1992: 34–35), women now account for up to four fifths of total public sector employment.5 This compares with an employment rate for women of under half in the economy as a whole. The treatment of women in the state sector is therefore a major ‘test’ for our understanding of ‘model employer’ status. The facts suggest the need for a clear re-evaluation. First, the public sector is itself an example of gender segregation in terms of its feminisation as a whole vis-à-vis the private sector. Even so, the patterns of horizontal and vertical segregation within individual service sectors, and even within discrete ‘occupations’, are striking and embedded. The two largest sectors are health and local government, jointly accounting for some 78 per cent of all public sector employment, with 1.4 and 2.8 million workers respectively (Labour Market Trends 2004: 273) and both are highly feminised: women account for four fifths of workers in health and almost three quarters in local government (figures for England and Wales, Local Government Pay Commission (LPGC) 2003: 10–16). Within health, women are proportionately under-represented – relative to the number of women employed overall – at the top of the hierarchy and over-represented in the lower echelons. And, horizontal segregation is also apparent, with women, for example, far more likely to be employed as nurses than as ambulance workers. If we consider occupations, in nursing there is again evidence of vertical and horizontal segregation (Thornley, 2001: 97). Similarly, local government as a whole – encompassing occupations like teaching, social work, and administrative staff – exhibits vertical and horizontal segregation, especially in the largest bargaining group, Local Government National Joint Council (NJC) services, where 1.6 million workers are employed and which includes staff such as home carers, social workers and non-teaching staff in schools. Here, horizontal segregation can be extreme with overwhelmingly ‘male’ occupations such as refuse collectors and overwhelmingly ‘female’ occupations such as school cooks, for example. Both health and local government are also characterised by disproportionately high numbers of part-time workers (and temporary workers6), the great majority of whom are women. While part-time work only accounts for around a quarter of overall UK employment, it accounts for two fifths of employment in health, and almost half in local government, rising to 55 per cent for the 1.6 million workers in NJC services. Such part-time work is also concentrated in the female-dominated occupations, and relatively rare in the maledominated occupations. 4 This is in no way to diminish the importance of exploring each of these features, and in tandem – see, for example, Thornley (1996, 2001) for the health services in the UK, and Thornley (2004, 2007) for local government. However, this chapter stands as a ‘corrective’ to approaches which can tend to diminish or neglect the importance of gender per se. 5 Estimates do vary and lower bound estimates start at around two thirds of total employment, depending on source. 6
For a good discussion of gendered temporary work in the public services, see Conley (2003).
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The segregation and high levels of part-time work evidenced above reflect in unequal and low pay in the public sector. So far as full-time workers are concerned there is still a sizeable gender pay gap in the public sector, and this has been relatively sticky in recent years. Currently, the ‘internal’ gender pay gap between women and men full-time workers within the public sector stands at about 18 per cent, while the ‘external’ full-time gender pay gap between women in the public sector and men in the private sector stands at around 19 per cent, and there has been only a marginal shift in these figures over the period of New Labour.7 While this gap appears superficially better than the private sector gender pay gap, the public sector employs a relatively high proportion of women in ‘professional’ and ‘non-manual’ occupations and has a generally higher qualification level than for the whole economy. It is also the case that women in the public services have a typically mature age profile, and an above economy average length of service (see Thornley 2006: 349) – so like is not being compared with like. Moreover, the real extent of the gender pay gap in the public sector is poorly captured by considering comparisons based only on full-time workers because of the disproportionately higher numbers of part-time women workers employed. Part-time women workers typically have a much larger pro rata pay gap with male full-time workers – in the public sector as in the private sector. It is thus important to look at more disaggregated levels to see the real extent of gendered pay outcomes in different parts of the public sector and for different occupations. For example, a disaggregated independent study of local government workers (see Thornley 2003) found pay deteriorations in the 1990s and early 2000s reflecting disadvantages of class and gender – NJC workers, manual workers and women workers all fared particularly badly.8 In the health services too, more than half of all nurses, an overwhelmingly female occupation and the single largest occupation in health, have basic salary levels well below the economy-wide median, with most clustered at the lower end of the pay grades.9 Female registered nurses working full-time still earn less than the national average and considerably less than the national average for male workers; while nursing auxiliaries (NAs) and health care assistants (HCAs) have fared particularly badly (Thornley 1998, 2005). The impact of part-time work can also be extreme in particular areas: for example, the majority of part-time women in NJC local government services earned less than £11,000 basic earnings pro rata equivalent in 2002, and an estimate of the ‘real’ gender pay gap for women in NJC services, which takes proper pro rata account of the composition of the workforce, is 35 per cent, roughly twice the aggregate ‘internal’ gender pay gap for the public sector reported above (Thornley 2003a). In health too, where part-time work is most prevalent in the lower echelons, some of the lowest-paid workers (for example, HCAs) have seen relative pay deteriorate not only against male, but also against female comparators, with a sharp polarisation in pay levels and a widening of the gender pay gap (see Thornley 1998, 2005, 2008). In line with the above features, there is endemic low pay in the public sector and this is deeply interlinked with gender. More than one quarter of full-time women and up to three quarters of full-time manual women in the public sector are low paid when 7 For source and a fuller discussion of these measures see Thornley (2006). While the current figure for the internal public sector gap for 2007 stands at 21 per cent, this is calculated from a discontinuous series as the New Earnings Survey (NES) was replaced in 2004 by Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). 8 The ‘internal’ gender pay gap within local government is wider than the public sector aggregate gap, and the gap between NJC female workers measured against all-economy men is higher than the economy-wide gender pay gap. 9
See Thornley (1998).
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measured against the Council of Europe decency threshold using gross pay (Thornley 2006: 350). In health, around a third of nurses overall are low-paid, and almost all HCAs and NAs (Thornley 1998, 2005, 2008), while in local government, the average earnings of full-time female manual workers fall below this threshold: indeed, in NJC services the majority of staff, over 80 per cent of women and 90 per cent of part-time women, are low paid on this measure (using basic pay) (Thornley 2003a). Low pay is also prevalent in administrative and clerical and ancillary work in both health and local government. Lowpaid workers across these sectors form large pockets just above the level of the National Minimum Wage (a much lower measure than the Council of Europe measure). The facts of segregation, unequal and low pay in a highly feminised public sector suggest the need for a much more circumspect view of claims on the part of the state, or constituent parts of it, to be – or to aspire to be – a ‘model employer’; and these facts also show the importance of considering gender in its own right. They also flag up the extent of the challenges ahead, if women employed in the public sector are to receive a ‘fairer’ share of the rewards of work.
The Need for Best Practice The features above undoubtedly reflect a variety of complex causal mechanisms.10 However, the problem viewed from the perspective of employers or unions is more accessible if approached from the position that something needs to be done about the gender pay gap. We therefore first discuss why there is a pressing need to adopt best practice, and then conclude with the challenges to progress. While it is certainly possible to argue for a ‘moral’ or ‘business case’ for addressing gender inequality in the public services, it is the case that pragmatic considerations associated with sea changes in the collective bargaining and legislative/litigious context are now paramount. The formation of UNISON in 1993 through the merger of the unions National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), National and Local Government Officers’ Association (NALGO) and Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE)11 effected significant changes in the balance of power in significant parts of the public sector; this undoubtedly lent stimulus to its own objective appraisal of overall membership and potential for membership growth. In this respect, the union was able to take stock of a situation in which public sector employment had been feminising in previous decades and where the majority of public sector employees were now female, and where part-time work was particularly prevalent. Currently, almost three quarters of its membership are women, over one third of whom work part-time. In line with this, low and unequal pay were viewed as core issues for the new union (see Thornley 2000), along with changes in its internal democratic forms vis-à-vis women (see McBride 2001). UNISON has subsequently tended to combine a highly strategic twin-track approach to campaigns based on ‘low pay’ collective bargaining initiatives alongside ‘equal pay’ (and litigation-based) initiatives (for full detail, see Thornley 2006). 10 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve into a number of relevant theoretical issues, but for an early exploration of these (and for the case of nurses) see Thornley (1996). 11
For full detail on this merger and the early years of the new union, see Terry (2000).
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UNISON has had a strong impact upon new payment systems, using early campaigning for a National Minimum Wage to pursue a ‘dual strategy’ of legislation through the Labour Party and TUC while also developing a bargaining agenda to present to employers ‘to secure guaranteed minimum pay levels in the collective agreements negotiated by the union’ (Morris 2000: 158). The National Minimum Wage was viewed clearly as also providing the ‘opportunity to renegotiate structures to ensure equal pay for women members’ (ibid.: 163), and was then reflected in the single status agreements in local government in 1997 and subsequent new pay determination systems in health. Whilst the final form of these agreements undoubtedly reflected tensions between union and employer objectives, equalities influences are evident and reflect some commonality of interest between unions seeking changes and employers seeking to avoid falling foul of the law. In practice, the complexity and expense of addressing gender inequalities have made for slow progress and led to industrial relations problems – another pragmatic pressure for change. In local government, an initial failure to progress led to the rejection of two pay offers, costly industrial action, Acas-intervention and a temporary settlement through the establishment of the Local Government Pay Commission (LGPC) and a longer-term pay deal. In health, equalities and job evaluation were also major features of Agenda for Change but progress has again been slow and contentious. In both cases the funding required to address unequal and low pay remains a major issue: as UNISON have put it ‘Agenda for Change in the NHS and Single Status in local government and education have established the principle of equal pay, but there is still a long way to go before the principle is fully implemented as a reality’, (UNISON 2007). However, the litigious background of UNISON’s (and other public sectors unions’) campaigns has provided an important underpinning pressure for movement (see Thornley 2006) and recent tribunal rulings have also added impetus, whilst also proving a doubleedged sword. A major shock to the system here has been the proliferation of legal cases ‘actively’ encouraged by ‘no-win, no-fee’ lawyers, both against employers and against unions (UNISON 2007). The case Allen & others v GMB in 2006 has reverberated around the pay determination terrain. Here, the tribunal held that the General, Municipal, Boilermakers (GMB) union indirectly discriminated against female members on the grounds of their sex by recommending an ‘ill-considered’ back pay deal rather than equal pay litigation which would have been in their better interests, and also victimised those members who brought equal pay proceedings (Practical Law Company (PLC) 2006). The subsequent appeal by the GMB was overturned in July 2008.12 The impact of such cases and rulings has been significant. If both opportunities and challenges are apparent here for unions, then the recent cases have also had profound impacts upon employers. According to a piece on People Management Online: Local authorities had a 31 March deadline to reach single status pay agreements to ensure equality between the sexes, but many – particularly the larger employers – missed the deadline and could be open to legal claims. Councils are having to give up to six years’ back pay to eligible female workers as a result of agreements … Some may be holding back because of concerns that their deals with unions are not legally watertight, said LGE spokesman Richard Stokoe … (2007). 12 For a note on the subsequent appeals processes see http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/reports/ article4648852.ece [accessed 3 May 2009].
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A rather more nuanced account is provided by the Local Government Employers (LGE) themselves (2006). The report first acknowledges that some ten years after the signing of the original agreements, and after the findings of the Local Government Pay Commission ‘which argued that local government had an equal pay, rather than low pay, problem … so far, only 33 per cent of authorities have implemented new pay structures … this represents 25 per cent of the local government workforce’ (2006: 2). It is argued that ‘problems have arisen with financing this agreement due to back pay and pay protection issues, and the need for employers and trade unions to defend themselves against legal challenge’ (ibid.). The LGE is thus arguing, on the basis of recent cases, that cost is now no longer the sole issue: ‘legal developments have produced a situation where money alone will not solve the problem … unions and employers need to be confident that the money is being distributed in a way that is not open to challenge’. It is further noted that legal action from no-win no-fee solicitors has ‘paralysed’ the unions and that the collective bargaining process is being: further undermined by recent employment tribunal decisions … legal action has been taken against authorities, individual councillors and trade unions and is undermining the ability of local employers to negotiate … furthermore, even where negotiations are continuing, the approach has to some extent been forced on unions and is making deals less and less affordable. (Ibid.: 3)
Despite the clear challenges for unions and employers here, and employers’ arguments around a potential stasis, opportunities also present themselves for an equality agenda; on the LGE’s own account of the Allan v GMB case, the tribunal found that: The GMB rushed headlong into accepting an ill-considered back pay deal [for women], accepting the authority’s plea of poverty, there was a striking contrast between the union’s approach to pay protection [for men] compared to the assessment of the back pay offer, it should have established equal value in the pay system and then sorted out back pay. Instead the union agreed that the authority could keep back pay settlements low and then move to establishing an equal pay system. GMB (along with the authority and Acas) manipulated unsophisticated union members with alarmist information which suggested that a refusal to accept the offer would involve job losses and make them traitors to their colleagues. (Ibid.: 12)
If at one level this clearly militates against ‘sore thumbing’ and ‘fudge’ in future deals, at another it equally opens up the opportunities to focus on equal pay issues and casts a spotlight upon the real resources needed to fund equalities. There is little doubt that recent legislation – in particular, the Equality Act 2006 – and the Equality Act 2010 each reflect problems being experienced in the public sector in particular, and frustration in some parts of government,13 at the failure to address the gender pay gap.14 Such legislation adds further weight to the case for change, and to the case to be made by those with responsibility for equalities in organisations which might otherwise be recalcitrant. The price of inaction is now high and widely acknowledged 13
Though by no means all parts of government.
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As well as EU Directives.
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amongst senior practitioners and policy makers. There is also an unusual potential convergence of interests between employers and unions which offers much to build upon if approached in a spirit of a problem to be resolved.
Conclusion: Best Practice and the Challenges Ahead Tackling the gender pay gap in the public sector undoubtedly requires a much broader perspective than those typically employed, and requires movement away from ‘risk avoidance’ strategies15 to a more positive and proactive agenda. Indeed, the Gender Equality Duty (GED) contains specific duties on consulting with trade unions and addressing the gender pay gap.16 A starting point for some is the process of pay audits and review to show the extent of the problem to be addressed – across grades and not just within grades, and with due regard to the stone floor as well as the glass ceiling – and then the use of outcome based measures to evaluate new policies and procedures. There is evidence, in small pockets, of some employers working alongside unions to build much more imaginative equalities agendas covering a gamut of best practices which address all aspects of discriminatory employment practices: from recruitment and selection, through training, work/life flexibilities, and promotion. Some of the best of these go beyond narrowly construed and legalistic approaches to ‘equal value’ to look at undervaluation, truncated career paths and the possibility for creation of ‘new’ jobs which carry a more rounded views of ‘skills’ and involve ‘links and ladders’ in their construction. However, such approaches have been all too rare and frequently also deeply dependent at local levels upon a very senior ‘sponsor’ within the organisation. Far more frequently those who start out with imaginative and enlightened approaches are stymied by lack of support at different organisational levels, a position which is then entrenched by the straitjacket of financial constraints. The history of public services is littered with projects which end up delinking training and pay, and which are focused on the glass ceiling because the stone floor (where so many women are located) is so much more expensive and complex to tackle. In practice, ‘low road’ and labour substitution and even privatisation approaches have tended to predominate and have actually exacerbated the gender pay gap where they do (see, in particular, Thornley 2003b, 2006, 2008). It perhaps goes without saying that the terrain is likely to get even more challenging. Even prior to the current recession, there were global trends to liberalisation and privatisation,17 and funding constraints were already making the task of addressing 15 A temptation for employers in the past has been to make a risk analysis against the potential for litigation – these have routinely miscalculated the potential for very large and costly cases, as well as doing little to address causation underlying the gender pay gap. The public sector was (and is) highly susceptible to litigation (see, in particular, Kingsmill 2001: 7, and Local Government Pay Commission 2003: 93–94). Several ground-breaking cases were brought by UNISON from its formation involving millions of pounds of back pay (Thornley 2006: 353–354); since then a number of ‘no-win, no-fees’ lawyers have increased the number of cases sharply, with significant implications. At the time of writing (April 2010), a new tribunal ruling in local government in Birmingham has once again demonstrated the potential for costly outcomes from the viewpoint of employers and for very high pay outs to staff: see http://web.orange.co.uk/article/news/ women_win_multi_million_council_equality_case_1 16 A position which is likely to be reinforced by the new Equality Act – albeit if by integrating multiple equality strands in an echo of the academic ‘intersectionality’ approaches it also runs the risk of confusing the issue. 17 A very comprehensive review of key global trends in liberalisation, and of corporate interests (particularly USbased) in sponsoring it, is given in International Labour Organisation, (ILO) (2005/2006).
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equalities difficult. The recession, and level of public indebtedness, are both likely to intensify these pressures, and most are predicting absolute cuts in public services and/or pay and/or employment in future years. There has also been a trend in the mass media to sustain public perceptions that public servants are doing relatively well at a point when private sector workers are suffering. And electoral uncertainties at the time of writing add to this picture. This terrain is likely to prove difficult for those working for greater equalities from both the employer and union sides. But at the same time, and setting to one side the moral case that women should not suffer disproportionately from recession, the pragmatic case for best practice and ‘new model’ employment discussed in this chapter is likely to remain a reality, and is likely to do so for as long as women working in the public sector fail to get a fair deal at work. It is thus important that employers and unions keep their ‘eye on the ball’. And there is here also a role to be played by academics – the temptations inherent in ‘diversity’ and ‘intersectionality’ approaches are that the focus shifts to individuals and individual agency at the expense of collective experience and agency. While such approaches in some respects would appear to accord with the recent drift of legislation and a desire to accord equal weight to all forms of discrimination and to ‘human rights’, it is far from clear that these provide an adequate basis for understanding and change previously better met by specialist approaches. Whether this gap can be successfully breached remains a major challenge for writers in this area.
References Bach, S. and Winchester. D. (2003) ‘Industrial Relations in the Public Sector’, in P. Edwards (ed.), Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice (2nd ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 285–312. Beaumont, P.B. (1992) Public Sector Industrial Relations, London and New York: Routledge. Carter, B. and Fairbrother, P. (1999) ‘The Transformation of British Public Sector Industrial Relations from “Model employer” to Marketised Relations’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 7 (Spring), 119–146. Coffey D. and Thornley, C. (2009) Globalization and Varieties of Capitalism: New Labour, Economic Policy and the Abject State, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Conley, H. (2003) ‘Temporary Work in the Public Services: Implications for Equal Opportunities’, Gender, Work and Organisation, 10:4, 455–477. Farnham, D. and Pimlott, J. (1995) Understanding Industrial Relations, London: Cassell. Fredman, S. and Morris, G. (1989a) The State as Employer: Labour Law in the Public Services, London: Mansell. Fredman. S. and Morris, G. (1989b) ‘The State as Employer: Setting a New Example’, Personnel Management, August. ILO (International Labour Organization) (2005/2006) Winners or Losers? Liberalizing Public Services, E. Rosskam, (ed.), Geneva: International Labour Office. Kingsmill, D. (2001) The Kingsmill Review, http://www.kingsmillreview.gov.uk [accessed 9 November 2005]. Labour Market Trends (2004) Labour Market Trends, July, http://www.statistics.gov.uk [accessed 12 March 2006].
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—— (2006) Public Sector Employment 2006: Seasonally Adjusted Series and Recent Trends, 114:12, 419– 438. Local Government Employers (LGE) (2006) Unblocking the Route to Equal Pay in Local Government, November. Local Government Pay Commission (LGPC) (2003) Report of the Local Government Pay Commission (kindly provided by UNISON). McBride, A. (2001) Gender Democracy in Trade Unions, Aldershot: Gower. Morris, P. (2000) ‘UNISON and Low Pay Policy’ in M. Terry (ed.), Redefining Public Service Unionism, London: Routledge, pp. 155–166. People Management Online (2007) ‘Councils’ deal fear’, http://www.peoplemanagement.com [accessed 25 June 2007]. PLC (2006) Union’s Failure to Pursue Equal Pay Litigation was Sex Discrimination, http://www. practicallaw.com [accessed 25 June 2007]. Terry, M. (ed.) (2000) Redefining Public Service Unionism, London and New York: Routledge. Thornley, C. (1996) ‘Segmentation and Inequality in the Nursing Workforce: Re-evaluating the Evaluation of Skills’, in R. Crompton, D. Gallie and K. Purcell (eds), Changing Forms of Employment: Organisations, Skills and Gender, London: Routledge, 160–181. —— (1998) A Question of Fairness: Nurses’ Pay Trends 1979–98, London: UNISON (Evidence to the Review Body for Nurses). —— (2000) ‘UNISON and Low Pay Policy’, in M. Terry (ed.), Redefining Public Service Unionism, London: Routledge, 167–174. —— (2001) ‘Divisions in Health-Care Labour’, in C. Komaromy (ed.) Dilemmas in UK Health Care, Buckingham: Open University Press, 85–107. —— (2003a) Cold Comfort: The State of Local Government Pay and ‘More Cold Comfort’, A UNISON briefing for the NJC Local Government Pay Commission, April, London: UNISON. —— (2003b) ‘What Future for Health Care Assistants: High Road or Low Road?’ in C. Davies (ed.), The Future Health Workforce, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. —— (2004) Perceptions at Work: Women and Men in Local Government, London: UNISON. —— (2005) Still Waiting? Non-registered Nurses in the NHS, an Update, London: UNISON (Evidence to the Review Body for Nurses). —— (2006) ‘Unequal and Low Pay in the Public Sector’, Industrial Relations Journal, 37:4 (July), 344–358. —— (2007) ‘Working Part-Time For The State: Gender, Class And The Public Sector Pay Gap’, Gender, Work and Organization, 14:5 (September), 458–479. —— (2008) ‘Efficiency and Equity Considerations in the Employment of Health Care Assistants and Support Workers’, Social Policy and Society, 7:2, 135 –146. UNISON (2007) ‘Equal Pay: Winning for all’, http://www.unison.org.uk [accessed 26 June 2007].
chapter
6 Pay Inequality in
Manufacturing Industry: The Case of the Printing Industry
TRICIA DAWSON
Introduction Pay inequality is a key source of legislative vulnerability for UK employers. It is clear from recent research that the gender pay gap is persistent and operates ‘across equalities areas’ (Longhi and Platt 2008); that means, despite other characteristics, gender remains a central indicator of unequal pay. The latest official statistics indicate that on average there is a 15.5 per cent gap between men’s and women’s hourly earnings and a 15 per cent gap between their weekly earnings (ONS 2010). At the same time women are becoming more aware of their rights and trade unions are increasingly supporting large scale equal pay claims to employment tribunals (The Guardian 7 April 2009; The Times 28 July 2008). The cost of ignoring pay inequality may be reaching the point where it is too high to take risks. At the same time social justice arguments for greater equality are becoming more insistent (Noon 2007; Bellamy and Rake 2005). Evidence suggests that the pay gap in the private sector is higher than that in the public sector (Kingsmill 2001). It is also claimed that at the current rate of progress it will be 2065 before women achieve pay equality (Bellamy and Rake 2005: 30). Organisations clearly need to consider how they might avoid legal penalties while delivering greater pay equality for women in manufacturing industry. The Equality Act 2010 aims to tackle some of the issues raised by this printing industry case study but, as will become clear, it may not be sufficient to result in a significant improvement in the pay gap. The case study presented here builds on research conducted in many different sectors (for example, Cockburn 1983; Burchell et al. 1994; Colling and Dickens 1989; Bradley 1999) and reveals parallels with the problems experienced by women across industry in accessing well-paid jobs and getting paid according to their skills. Using data from research conducted in the British printing industry,1 it is possible to begin to determine 1 The data was collected in 2002 and consisted of interviews with employers and trade union officials, as well as a national survey of men and women union members working in the industry from which a sample of 30 interviewees was identified.
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strategies that may help to remove the barriers that currently embed women’s low pay. First, the underlying contributing factors will be outlined before moving on to examine the links between pay determination and the valuation of women’s skills, as well as the effects of occupational segregation in limiting women’s employment choices.
Barriers to Achieving Equal Pay Because the valuation of work has been largely explained by traditional demand and supply theories, women’s low pay has tended to be justified as being a simple reflection of their lower worth. This ignores evidence that in reality pay systems are not necessarily rational (Phelps Brown 1977; Brown and Nolan 1988) and tend to incorporate many social factors that undermine supply and demand, for example, existing wage structures, work organisation and related practices, the nature of technology and the responses of existing workers to these developments (Craig et al. 1984). Powerful groups of workers, usually men, have benefited often at the expense of women workers and such processes have been embedded through occupational segregation. Occupational segregation occurs in two forms: horizontal segregation leads to the sextyping of jobs, that is, the identification of particular jobs with one sex or the other, and vertical segregation leads to men dominating the top positions in the hierarchy (Beechey 1986). It is through the implementation of employment policies that the gendered division of labour has been institutionalised. Horizontal segregation is fuelled by recruitment and promotion practices that remain based on traditional gender stereotypes in manufacturing industries. So, even where women have gained similar levels of qualifications or experience to men, occupational segregation may not decrease (McEwen Scott 1994) because employers are unwilling to recruit women to non-traditional jobs. In addition, the cheapness and perceived reliability of informal recruitment methods, such as word-of-mouth recommendation, is often preferred, thereby replicating existing gender divisions in the workforce. Vertical segregation arises when ideas about suitability and acceptability impact on both recruitment and promotion so that, even in areas where women are the majority workers, it tends to be men that get promoted to supervisory roles (Craig et al. 1984: 77). Even the increase in women managers is unlikely to challenge these trends because they are forced to replicate the practices that fit a male managerial model (Connell 1983). Skill is a gendered concept that has often been used to define the jobs that women do as automatically unskilled (Phillips and Taylor 1980). This also has the effect of generating an attitude that women are largely irrelevant when work organisation is considered because they do not possess valuable skills. Thus, women become invisible and tend to be ignored, particularly when restructuring occurs, unless the restructuring requires that their jobs or pay are sacrificed. It is often assumed that women are non-technical (Cockburn 1994) and so when new technology arrives, it may either reduce the scope for women’s involvement in the new processes or actually lead to their removal in favour of the assumed technical superiority of men. Even where women remain, it has been observed that re-segregation occurs in the new processes, tending to leave them in the lowest-paid jobs. The usual means of redress is to call for more training for women but this tends to fail largely because men’s sense of ‘owning the organisation’ (Cockburn 1991) tends to
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lead them to expect preferential access to any training provided and because jobs subject to skills’ shortages tend to be male-dominated and the easiest solution is to fill them with ‘suitable male candidates’ (Women and Work Commission 2006; Dickens 2005). Furthermore, there is still a strong residual belief that it is not worth training women who may take time out for childbearing and care and certainly flexible working tends to be rare where craftwork dominates (Dex and Smith 2002). The resulting lack of qualifications supports the notion that women are simply paid what they are worth (Mincer and Polachek 1974) rather than stemming from underlying discrimination. Women do not have access to power resources in the same way that men and employers do (Bradley 1999). As a result women have been pushed into the background, rendered largely invisible through both overt and covert forms of power that tend to create a view that the status quo is natural (Lukes 2005) and cannot be successfully challenged. Frequently, women have been perceived as irrelevant to decisions on work organisation and pay determination, even when their work is central to the survival of the organisation, and this has served to embed their low pay. The system of power resources utilised here was developed from Bradley’s original schema (1999) and includes, but is not restricted to, technical power (knowledge of work processes), positional power (hierarchical position), collective power (formation of groups with common interests), legal power (utilising the law to challenge the status quo), physical power (ability to undertake heavy work), sexual power (linked to sexual harassment), symbolic power (ability to interpret aspects of work organisation and pay systems), and economic power (access to a variety of rewards). In order to tackle women’s low pay it will, therefore, be necessary to identify ways to empower women and render them visible when decisions on work organisation and pay determination are being considered.
The British Printing Industry This study focused on general and commercial printing, which covered magazines, packaging, advertising materials, security printing, business forms, books, stationery and catalogues (Gennard and Bain 1995). The industry is characterised by a large number of small and medium-sized companies with a few large multinationals dominating the sector. Each of these forms is represented in the research. Jobs in the sector were broken into three main categories: pre-press (all the work necessary to prepare material for printing); printing (setting up printing machines and printing the work); and finishing/ bindery (all the operations necessary to turn the printed product into a finished article ready for despatch). Pre-press was male-dominated despite some encroachment from women during periods of computerisation but retained its skilled categorisation; printing has always been regarded as skilled and almost totally dominated by men; and finishing was dominated by women, although the jobs denoted as skilled within this section were dominated by men. There has traditionally been little part-time working in the industry and this was also borne out by the research. Traditionally, this was a highly unionised sector, which relied heavily upon the closed shop.2 Estimates at the time of conducting the research suggested that union density was 2 The closed shop was an attempt to secure 100 per cent membership in each establishment that was union organised and was a specific objective in the union’s rule book throughout its existence and in the rule books of its constituent unions.
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still in excess of 60 per cent in this sector. The Graphical, Paper and Media Union (GPMU), the main union at the time of the research,3 was the result of merger between the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT) and the National Graphical Association (NGA). These two unions broadly represented the split between non-skilled and skilled workers, respectively. They were also the result of many previous mergers (see Gennard 1990; and Gennard and Bain 1995). Consequently, the NGA had few women members but retained the dominant positions in the GPMU and therefore the major impact on policy direction. Women were 17 per cent of GPMU membership. Employment in the industry was traditionally male-dominated, women constituting around a third of the industry since the 1970s but was higher, at around 38 per cent, before the Second World War. Since the 1980s there have been fluctuations around a generally declining trend for both women and men, so that by 2002 there were 193,900 men and 101,600 women employed full-time in the industry (ONS 2003). GPMU members were interviewed and surveyed for this research and the employers interviewed were members of the British Printing Industries Federation (BPIF). Those members interviewed for the research were chosen to represent a variety of characteristics, including occupation, region, company size, age, sex and pay grade. One manager out of the five interviewed was female and worked for a multinational and four of the union officials out of the fourteen interviewed were women (one of whom was retired). The results of this research reveal interesting lessons that can be learned about discrimination in the private sector, especially in view of the statement made by the Conservative Party spokesman in the final debate on the Equality Bill as it passed into law as the Equality Act 2010. Mark Harper, MP said that they did not agree with three aspects of the Bill and that if they formed the next government they would not, ‘bring those three requirements – socio-economic duty, the mistaken way in which the Government are tackling equal pay, and positive action … – into force’ (quoted in the monthly employment law newsletter, emplaw.co.uk4). Now the Conservatives are the biggest partner in the coalition government this does not bode well for improved legislation on equal pay, making this research even more relevant to the implementation of the Equality Act 2010. ‘Pay Determination and the Valuing of Women’s Jobs’, and ‘Access to Higher-Grade Jobs’, look at the effects of pay and work organisation processes on women’s pay.
Pay Determination and the Valuing of Women’s Jobs The gender pay gap in the printing industry is wider than that in Britain as a whole, women earning just 64.4 percent of male median weekly earnings (50.2 percent of median hourly earnings) (ONS 2002) when this research was conducted. Table 6.1 reveals the unequal dispersion of pay between the sexes in the industry. Over £350 per week gross pay women’s representation tailed off as men’s increased.
3 The GPMU has since become part of UNITE, following a merger of Amicus (which GPMU joined in 2004) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in 2007. 4
At http://www.emplaw.co.uk.
Pay Inequality in Manufacturing Industry
Table 6.1
Gross pay per week for full time workers – percentages by sex
No <£50 reply Men %
73
£51– £101– £151– £201– £251– £301– £351– £401– £451– >£500 Total 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
8.4
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.3
5.8
8.1
13.8
13.5
18.5
2.9
28.2
100
Women 16.3 %
0.2
2.0
6.1
7.4
21.3
16.1
13.3
8.6
4.7
0.5
3.5
100
0.1
1.0
3.1
3.8
13.2
12.0
13.6
10.9
12.1
1.8
16.1
100
Total
12.3
Source: Survey of GPMU members 2002 (N=1216).
The printing industry pay structure was a simple one, reflecting the basic demarcation of jobs and covered by a national agreement between the BPIF and GPMU. Class 1 denoted skilled work, that is, all the jobs in pre-press, most of the jobs in printing and some in finishing; Class 2 denoted semi-skilled work in printing, primarily machine assistants; and Class 3 denoted unskilled work and related to finishing/bindery jobs. The latter was where most of the women were employed. Basic pay relativities, based on the Class 1 rate, appeared small. In fact, a number of additional payments that accrued largely to Class 1 occupations significantly widened the gap between these grades. These payments were not based on productivity but on types of machines operated and working patterns, that is, shift and overtime premiums. This pay structure continues to the present day. Women in the printing industry have fought a long battle to be considered as skilled workers. As one woman said: I have with me a list of women’s work graded class 3, the lowest. There are forty-nine different operations, and women in the course of a week’s work could be called on to do every one of them … A great many of our firms employ only two or three women, therefore, interchangeability is a must. So it is not unusual to find yourself doing a dozen or more different job operations in the course of a day’s work. (SOGAT BDC, 1976: 398)
While work organisation has changed somewhat over the years, more recent interview evidence revealed that the general tenor of this comment still holds true. However, the ability to utilise generalised assumptions about ‘women’s work’ could provide a means to justify lower pay. For instance, it has often been assumed that women do not do heavy lifting (Walby,1990) but evidence from interviewees in the printing industry suggested otherwise. A woman union official observed that ‘women were always pack horses; men have machinery for moving reels’. The experience of a woman worker confirmed this. She explained that, while men were supposed to help with heavy lifting: There can be 10 items [for feeding into machines], so the stock gets piled up far away from the machine, so you have to pick up the boxes and they can weigh up to 15–20 kilos. We should have someone to lift but with 10 or 12 machines running it’s not possible, so you do your own or get shouted at for downtime.
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As this is not an official part of their job it is easy to overlook when grading jobs. It has been observed that men may seek to justify higher pay through claims to greater skill when, in fact, strength is the issue (Cockburn 1983:174–175, 203–204). Similarly, the informal nature of women setting machines is also ignored, as earlier research also noted (Craig et al. 1984: 37; Beechey and Perkins 1987), whereas men receive a premium for this work. In both cases informality leads to invisibility. Here, managers’ positional power gives them the (symbolic) power of interpretation, allowing them to define what will count towards pay determination. Male union members may see no need to challenge this as it has preserved their own economic power in the pay hierarchy, so their collective and technical power embeds this interpretation. Furthermore, the case study revealed that men, who either have a craft apprenticeship background (whether union or management representatives) or have held positional power for many years alongside such men, dominate pay determination. This has resulted in embedded assumptions about women’s lesser worth as workers, justifying their invisibility in pay determination processes. As one manager said, ‘finishing, in your mind, is of lesser value, so you don’t pay as much’. In the private sector management often sets pay unilaterally and so equality issues may be less likely to be considered. But even where there is collective bargaining there may have been limited progress in pursuing equal pay. Under pressure from the GPMU’s Women’s Committee, the bargaining agenda regularly included items that explicitly addressed equality issues but negotiating processes ensured these seldom resulted in concrete improvements for women on the shop floor. For instance, in printing, negotiating always focused on the pay rise for Class 1 with little thought given to the consequences for those lower down the grading structure. The prioritising of bargaining agenda items tended to mean that equality issues were raised early in proceedings; met with resistance from the employers; and fell off the agenda. In any case, while many equality issues were raised over the years these never included discussions around women’s pay but tended to focus on general equal opportunities clauses, harassment and maternity rights. This reflected a union strategy of focusing on occupational segregation as the main issue rather than the undervaluation of ‘women’s work’, an approach the employers supported (see Achieving a Balance, BPIF 1988). Similarly, the employers’ focus on the ‘bottom line’ became apparent when the BPIF representative explained, ‘the business case is not sufficient in itself because of other [production] pressures’. He also characterised the union as pursuing a business case approach to equality: Most employers are well aware that the union needs to grow its membership base ... [and] are not surprised that most minority groups are on the list. The union is a business that needs to grow.
The inference was that this approach lacked the legitimacy of the traditional bargaining agenda. The power of interpretation linked with employers’ and male union members’ collective power, therefore, served to restrict the bargaining agenda, rendering issues of importance to women invisible and irrelevant, overwhelming women’s collective power to challenge these processes. Employers also reinforced gender pay inequality through three other mechanisms. On the one hand, the federation representative explained how they took advantage of union weakness to widen differentials between the predominantly men’s grades and
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the predominantly women’s grade; ‘we hoped that over time ... [differentials] would widen out’ (BPIF representative). The justification for this approach was based on false comparisons between women in printing and other industries and assumptions about ‘women’s work’. As one national official said: I think they’re [the employers] just comparing other industries where there’s unskilled workers on low pay. I don’t think it’s a … measured comparison or even one that they try to justify on the basis of similar or same work being undertaken. It’s just vis-à-vis skilled and unskilled.
On the other hand, employers also pushed for full cost recovery, which meant that all national pay deals would be self-financing. This encouraged the extension of flexibility and reduction in headcount but, as discussed in the next section, women bore the brunt of this strategy. Last, employers used the power of interpretation to identify equality issues as ‘social issues’, which tended to de-legitimise their importance in bargaining. At local level, the union failed to police the implementation of the national agreement and were rarely proactive in pursuing equality for women workers. Both employers and union officials tended to wait for women to raise issues with them that might have legal consequences. As none of the employers interviewed had faced litigation there was no pressure to address gender inequality. The woman HR director of the multinational felt that the link between pay progression and job progression would be sufficient to ensure there were no equal pay issues, thus ignoring the gendered nature of job grading and ensuring that pay inequality was embedded. This was further reinforced at local level because bargaining was usually conducted on a departmental basis and departments often aligned with the gender split in occupations (see below). Women’s legal power has been insufficient to successfully challenge the power of inaction (Lukes 2005: 68) that supports the status quo. Successful challenges have been rare given the focus on occupational segregation rather than equal pay but have arisen from three sources. In one case a woman official had challenged the operation of the national agreement on the basis that women tended to do many Class 3 occupations, which cumulatively, would equate with a higher grade in equal value terms. Occasional legal challenges on the same grounds were also successful but ad hoc rather than strategic;5 instead the aim was to settle equal pay claims through negotiation. This contrasts with the approach of UNISON in the public sector, where a combination of collective bargaining and litigation, alongside education and political campaigning has resulted in improvements for women (Thornley 2006). The other route to success has been when a respected male union official with a traditional approach to bargaining has championed specific equal pay cases. When men originating from the shop floor were seen to take these issues seriously other male workers appeared more likely to support change. This broke with men’s collective power to retain the status quo but tended to occur in circumstances where women were threatening to use their legal power. It is therefore important that interview evidence revealed women’s awareness of equal pay legislation and a willingness to use it where practicable.
5 A case involving a company in the North West and the GPMU went to tribunal but was settled by agreement to conduct a job evaluation within the company that resulted in Class 3 table hands (women) being found equal to Class 1 guillotine operators (men). However, this case was never used to challenge the BPIF agreement more widely.
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Access to Higher-Grade Jobs If getting a fair valuation for the work done is hard, getting access to higher-paid jobs is just as difficult. The case study revealed a continuation of the historical gendering of jobs.
Table 6.2 The sexual division of labour by department Pre-press Printing Finishing/bindery Other Non-response Total
Women 6.1% 4.0% 52.8% 34.2% 3.0% 100%
Men 15.3% 38.5% 23.5% 20.6% 2.1% 100%
Source: Survey of GPMU members 2002 (N=1216).
Table 6.3 The sexual division of labour within each department Women Men Non-response Total
Pre-press 26.3% 69.3% 4.4% 100%
Printing 8.9% 88.2% 3.0% 100%
Finishing/bindery 66.5% 30.9% 2.5% 100%
Source: Survey of GPMU members 2002 (N=1216).
Whether the industry is viewed by the gender splits in departments or the departmental split by gender, Tables 6.2 and 6.3 suggest that women have been effectively denied access to jobs regarded, and paid, as skilled. This has been sustained through the increased use of functional flexibility, utilising increased mechanisation of printing machines to telescope some traditional women’s work into printers’ jobs. Women’s employment has consequently reduced. The criteria for employment in skilled jobs appeared to be subject to line managers’ perceptions of suitability and acceptability. Given that line managers tended to have a craft background and that other research has identified managers’ poor record of assessing jobs dissimilar to their own (Burchell et al. 1994: 177, 180), it becomes easier to understand the continuation of women’s segregation into lower-paid jobs. As one union official made clear, ‘it was not on anyone’s [employers] radar screen’ that women would get skilled jobs, or that they might be seen as a solution to the longstanding problem of skills shortages. Recruitment was also subject to a ‘family effect’. Informal methods of recruitment including family/personal recommendations and the local union as a source of job information reinforced segregation. For instance, a woman union official explained how it was common for male craft workers to obtain jobs for their wives or partners in the bindery. Given that over 50 per cent of all survey respondents, regardless of sex, obtained
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their jobs through word of mouth recruitment, the importance of social networks in job search and in designating the ‘social composition of the workforce’ (Grieco and Whipp 1986) becomes apparent. It was also clear that these factors affected promotion as, not only did women not get access to skilled jobs, ‘but they can’t even become the supervisor of the Class 3 jobs’ (male union official). Unmonitored, decentralisation of human resource management to line managers has also been implicated in preventing increased diversity (Dickens 1997; Kirton and Greene 2005) and one HR director revealed this was a feature in the multinational she represented. She also denied that the union had a role in delivering equality, in particular, the elimination of sexual harassment, despite admitting that four such incidents had occurred in ten months. Harassment (a form of sexual power) can embed segregation because women perceive the costs of entering male dominated occupations as too risky (Cockburn 1988). Another key factor appeared to be the industry’s poor record on family-friendly employment. Interview and survey evidence indicated that women tended to leave service when they had children, take on less well paid work, and then return to the industry later in life. Full-time employment was generally required and there were few opportunities to work part-time. Additionally, the survey revealed evidence of a ‘long hours’ culture’, where only 19 per cent of women and 11 per cent of men never worked overtime. Around a quarter of both sexes worked, on average, six to nine hours extra per week. Similarly, shift working was common, with 73 per cent of men and 42 per cent of women working shifts. The evidence suggested a less than enlightened attitude to childcare among employers, with one woman declaring her company had ‘never ever worked round people with kiddies. You either accept it, or you don’t’. In another instance, a woman took maternity leave of 15 weeks and on return was placed on a lower graded machine. Additionally, some 98 per cent of respondents could not identify any help with childcare available in their companies. The case study also supported earlier evidence (Craig et al. 1984: 83) of a reluctance to train women who may take time out for childcare. This evidence reveals that employment policies are working to reinforce the status quo. Recruitment, promotion and training policies are implemented to ensure that women cannot encroach on ‘men’s work’. In part, this recognises male workers collective power, reinforcing men’s sense of owning the job (Cockburn 1991: 46). But employers are also utilising their economic, positional and collective power resources to gain the benefit of women’s cheap labour. Their ability to define the industry as mainly suitable for fulltime workers removes the need to accommodate childcare and allows for re-employing these skilled women at a later date when childcare is no longer an issue.
Conclusion: Achieving Equal Pay in Manufacturing Industry The above discussion reveals an imbalance in access to different power resources that makes it difficult for women to successfully challenge their position in the pay hierarchy. Both men and managers have been able to treat women’s contribution to production as irrelevant and thereby justify their low pay, reinforcing their apparent irrelevance by embedding occupational segregation in technological change. They have also been able
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to control the operation of pay processes, restricting negotiation to issues of occupational segregation, not undervaluation. The usual arguments for delivering equality are to stress the importance of diversity and the business case benefits (Kingsmill,2001; Women and Work Commission 2006). However, the limitations of the business case, identified elsewhere (Dickens 1997; Noon 2007), are also evident in this study; production pressures and a lack of litigation removed any compulsion to act. A systematic analysis of the barriers to equal pay evident in this case study can begin to point to measures that may provide some leverage in narrowing the pay gap more generally. Employers gained women’s cheap labour by ignoring the actual content of women’s jobs. They also utilised inaccurate comparisons with women workers in other industries, which devalued women’s work; and delegitimised equality issues through designating them ‘social’. The employer’s belief that the union was only pursuing equality at all because of its need to survive reinforced the lack of legitimacy. Meanwhile, the union’s strategic focus on occupational segregation reduced the importance of equal pay bargaining and sustained the focus on the highest paid men. As a result there was seldom a proactive approach to equality at the workplace. The lack of litigation also removed pressure from employers to act on inequality. Consequently, pay processes embedded unequal pay outcomes, especially in relation to the extra payments that constituted a major element of the pay gap. Work organisation processes further restricted the scope for women to earn higher pay. Recruitment and promotion processes that relied on craft-trained line managers for their implementation were unlikely to challenge the traditional criteria for acceptability and suitability that normally characterised selection. Furthermore, Grieco and Whipp’s observation (1986: 120) that family and social networks embed segregation was confirmed here. Segregation was compounded by the reorganisation of work, which also removed women’s jobs. Finally, the lack of family-friendly employment led women to self-select on the basis of whether they could successfully manage the double burden of work and domestic responsibilities. The argument that invisibility was crucial to continuing pay inequality might be expected to fall, given the passage of the Equality Act 2010. Women’s collective power has produced a successful campaign to bring much of the equality legislation together. However, the much-heralded requirement to publish pay gap data is qualified by its application to companies with over 250 employees (UNISON and Fawcett Society 2009). Many of the women in this case study will not benefit from this important change because their companies are too small to be captured by its provisions. This will be true for some 59 per cent of private sector workers (ibid.: para. 3.3). The data publication provision is also subject to regulation, rather than primary legislation. This is easier to avoid or remove than primary legislation and is therefore considerably more vulnerable to the motivation of the party in government. In any case, the above discussion makes it clear that there are already legal grounds on which to make an assault on the pay gap. The landmark case (see footnote 4) that identified equal value between a Class1 occupation and a Class 3 occupation clearly calls into question, not the national agreement itself but its interpretation. At present, the agreement will classify a job as graded Class 3 no matter how many tasks are undertaken. This ignores the cumulative effect of undertaking numerous Class 3 tasks. It is within the power of the negotiating parties to change this interpretation to take account of equal
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value as the woman official did in her successful equal pay negotiation. Furthermore, the effect of extra payments links both work organisation and pay processes and unless the provisions of the law can expose both the pay gap would remain in printing. While these are not bonuses as such, similar considerations would apply to bonus payments. It is the criteria for grading jobs as eligible for such payments that requires exposure. In this regard, forming alliances with supportive men (Colgan and Ledwith 1996) is also a necessary step. As noted in this case study, the importance of male workers identification with male union officials in gaining their consent to negotiating equal pay cannot be underestimated. Another crucial issue is the provision of family-friendly employment in the manufacturing industry. Dex and Smith (2002: 25) confirmed that where craft-working, and therefore largely male employment, predominates flexibility is rare. If this case study is replicated in other sectors, then women in manufacturing employment will require much stronger legal rights to flexible working and access to childcare that can cater for a world based on 24/7 working patterns. On this evidence, it is clear that the gender pay gap could be reduced. Practitioners could take action now in the interpretation of agreements, work and pay practices, forging alliances between women and supportive men to challenge the status quo. However, it would also require robust legal provisions to overcome invisibility – publishing pay data, would be a start but alone will not achieve a closure of the pay gap as it is the underlying pay and work organisation processes that must be exposed. Strengthening rights to flexible working and better access to affordable childcare also remain a priority. The range of power resources that men and managers have access to can only be counteracted by providing women with sources of power that allow them to challenge the status quo. This requires comprehensive and effective legal and policy developments that will only come from women’s continued campaigning.
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